Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Name: Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Author: Marsilio Ficino

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VI · Chapter 12 · §§ 9–10

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Facing Pages · Branch 108 of 191

Book VI · Chapter 12 · §§ 9–10

Book Mode

Latin

p. 210

Ubi cavillatio illa excluditur, qua nonnulli contendunt ostendere corpus aliquod per se moveri, dicentes ipsum ex materia et forma vel ex quattuor elementis ita componi, ut alia quaedam natura praeter materiam et formam et quattuor elementa proveniat, quae sit totius integritas, quae se ipsam moveat, quia per formam habet hoc ut moveat, per materiam ut moveatur. Talis obiectio adversus Platonicos nihil valet: tum quia in alia essentia erit radix per quam movere, in alia per quam moveri videbitur. Oportet tamen ad aliquam essentiam pervenire quae sit et fons et receptaculum motionis et vitae, quemadmodum ad aliquam pervenitur quae lucis, et ad aliquam quae caloris radix est simul et fundamentum. Tum quia natura illa quae est totius integritas, si quantitate protenditur, non magis poterit ex se ipsa moveri quam moles ipsa corporea, ut supra monstravimus. Sin autem indivisibilis est, iam, ut cupiebamus, ad naturam pervenimus incorpoream, in qua sit sui ipsius agitandi potestas.

Non quod in se ipsam agat et patiatur. Motio enim in ea non transitum significat ab agente in patiens, sed naturalem essentiae illius vicissitudinem, qua suarum affectionum variat vices, atque ita per se discurrit, non agitante alio; ut per se calet ignis, neque alio calefaciente, neque parte sui alia in aliam fundente calorem. Motus igitur animalis cum non sit a corpore, quod est sua natura pigrum, neque sit a solo composito, in quo non erit vis ulla movendi, si ex partibus talibus sit conflatum in quibus nulla vis sit ad motum, necessario est ab anima; quae si vim migrandi ex otio in actum tribuit animali, multo magis priusque tribuit ipsa sibi. Quicquid enim boni actusque vitalis a causa traducitur in effectum, prius explicatur in causa. Sic enim calor calet fervetque secum ipse prius quam materiam aliam calefaciat. Et animata corpora turgent seminibus fetusque concipiunt in se ipsis prius quam partus edant. Dum igitur anima vitalem a potentia in actum progressionem explicat in se ipsa, dicitur a se ipsa moveri.

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VI

p. 211

This excludes the quibble by which some try to show that a body can move itself. They say that it is composed of matter and form, or of the four elements, in such a way that some further nature arises beyond matter and form or the four elements. This nature, they claim, is the integrity of the whole and moves itself, because through form it has the power to move and through matter the capacity to be moved. Such an objection has no force against the Platonists. First, the root through which the thing moves will lie in one essence, and the root through which it appears to be moved in another. Yet we must arrive at some essence that is both the source and the receptacle of motion and life, just as we arrive at one essence that is the root of light and another that is at once the root and foundation of heat. Second, if the nature that is the integrity of the whole is extended in quantity, it will no more be able to move from itself than the corporeal mass itself, as we showed above. But if it is indivisible, we have now reached, as we wished, an incorporeal nature possessing the power to move itself.

This does not mean that the soul acts upon itself and is acted upon. For motion in it does not signify a passage from agent to patient, but the natural alternation of that essence, by which it varies the successive states of its own affections. Thus it ranges through them of itself, with nothing else acting upon it—just as fire is hot of itself, without something else heating it or one part of the fire pouring heat into another. Since the motion of an animal does not come from body, which is inert by its nature, nor from the composite alone—which will have no power to move if it is compounded of parts in which there is no such power—it must necessarily come from soul. And if the soul gives the animal the power to pass from rest into act, it gives that power first and still more fully to itself. For whatever good and vital act is carried from a cause into its effect is first unfolded in the cause. Heat is itself hot and seethes within itself before it heats other matter; animate bodies swell with seed and conceive offspring within themselves before they bring forth their young. Thus, when the soul unfolds within itself life's advance from potency into act, it is said to move itself.

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.