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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook VI · Chapter 11 · § 1

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English Page · Branch 102 of 191

Book VI · Chapter 11 · § 1

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Latin

p. 198

Octava ratio: anima est vita aut fons vitae.

Animam esse putamus naturam quandam quae aut vita quaedam sit, aut vitam ceu comitem habeat et pedisequam, postquam corpora vitam per animam sortiuntur. Corpus necessario in plures partes dividitur. Nam corpus aliud est ex pluribus elementis compositum. Aliud elementum, ex elementis aliis minime congregatum, sed ex forma et materia constitutum. Si animam dixeris esse corpus constructum ex pluribus elementis, sciscitabimur numquid illa elementa quaelibet per se seorsum ab aliis vitam habeant, aut nulla sed congregata simul vitam pariant, aut unum quiddam illorum possideat vitam. Si quodlibet illorum per se habet vitam, tot ibi sunt animae quot elementa. Neque ibi est anima una ex multis conflata partibus, sed animae multae sedem eandem colentes. Si nullum illorum habet vitam, numquam concursu mutuo vitam creabunt. Ac si in eorum concursu vita nascatur, non quidem ipsorum vi, cum ipsa vita careant, sed vi potius alicuius concursum illum ordinantis vita illa nascetur. Praesertim cum sit fatendum, etiam si concursione multorum vita constetur, non tamen quomodocumque concurrant, verum si certa ratione viaque concurrant, vitam in illis gigni. Ita illius certe concursionis intimus ordinator anima ipsa erit, vitam suo modo confluentibus exhibens. Sin dixeris aliquid e multis elementis habere vitam, illud solummodo anima ipsa erit; neque opus erit praeter istud aliis elementis ut anima generetur. Quamobrem anima nullo modo putanda est esse corpus ex elementis pluribus constitutum. Sed neque elementum unum. Quia elementum quodlibet ex materia et forma componitur. Si istud viveret, non per materiam viveret, cum informis materia nequeat vitam aut alicui aut sibi ipsi praebere. Igitur tale viveret per formam. Forma igitur esset anima.

198

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VI

p. 199

Eighth argument: the soul is life or the source of life.

We take the soul to be a certain nature which either is a kind of life or has life as its companion and attendant, since bodies receive life through the soul. A body is necessarily divided into several parts. One kind of body is composed of several elements; another is an element, not gathered from other elements but constituted of form and matter. If you say that the soul is a body constructed from several elements, we shall ask whether each of those elements has life by itself, apart from the others; whether none has life but together they produce it; or whether some one of them possesses life. If each has life of itself, there are as many souls present as there are elements. There is then not one soul compounded of many parts, but many souls inhabiting the same seat. If none of them has life, they will never create life by coming together. And if life does arise in their conjunction, it will arise not by their own power, since they themselves lack life, but rather by the power of something that orders their conjunction. This is especially so because we must admit that, even if life is constituted by the conjunction of many things, it is not generated in them however they happen to meet, but only when they meet according to a definite order and way. The soul itself will therefore certainly be the inward orderer of that conjunction, giving life in its own manner to the things that flow together. If you say that something among the many elements has life, that thing alone will itself be the soul; no other elements beyond it will be needed to generate the soul. The soul, therefore, must in no way be thought a body constituted from several elements. Nor is it a single element. For every element is composed of matter and form. If such an element lived, it would live not through matter—since formless matter can give life neither to anything else nor to itself—but through form. The form, then, would be the soul.

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.