Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 82 of 191
Book VI · Chapter 2 · §§ 19–20
Latin
p. 158Corpus siquidem longum est, latum atque profundum. Quoniam vero nullum corpus est infinitum, ideoque finem habet profunditatis, finitur in superficiem non profundam. Habetis iam superficiem longam quidem et latam sicut corpus, sed profunditate carentem, atque ex una hac parte surgentem ad incorporea. Superficiei quoque latitudo finita ad longam lineam terminatur, neque profundam neque latam. Habetis lineam duabus partibus ad spiritum accedentem. Sed haec ipsa lineae longitudo, quia finita est, ad punctum ducitur, non profunditate solum et latitudine privatum, sed etiam longitudine. Habetis punctum tribus partibus ad naturam vergens incorporealem. Sed hoc, quoniam lineae terminus est, ideo certum habet situm in corpore, neque implet totum neque vivificat. Separate, si placet, ipsum a linea. Potest autem cogitatione saltem a linea separari, quod est lineae terminus et prius in se ipso est quodammodo quam terminet lineam. Quod autem prius est, licet ab eo quod est posterius separare. Habetis punctum quodammodo, id est cogitatione, solutum a linea, quarto iam gradu discedens a corpore. In hac ipsa solutione assequitur ut omnes partes corporis aeque respiciat. Fundatur per omnes et moveat: hic irrationalis anima sedem habet.
Et quoniam rationalis cogitatio non fallitur ascendendo, ideo sicut invenit punctum a corpore cogitatione liberum, sic re vera inveniet punctum, id est individuum aliquid re ipsa solutum a corpore, quod non modo impleat corpus et moveat, sed ipsum libere moveatur et tollatur ad supera, quod iam unitatis nomine appellatur. Hic anima viget rationalis, quinto gradu a mole corporis aliena. Si tanto quid impurius est quanto eget patiturque magis, corpus impurius est quam superficies. Pluribus enim ad hoc ut sit dimensionibus eget atque ex partibus dividitur pluribus. Superficies simili ratione cedit lineae, linea puncto, punctum denique unitati, quae neque dimensionibus indiget neque situ. Si horum perfectissima substantialis unitas est, et quia perfectissima, ideo potentissima et verissima, atque haec sunt aliquid existuntque, quis negaverit vere existere unitatem? Ergo quid prohibet animam esse aliquid, et id quidem virtute magnum, licet non sit magnum aliquid quantitate?
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book VI
p. 159Body is long, broad, and deep. Yet because no body is infinite and it therefore has a limit to its depth, it is bounded by a surface without depth. You now have a surface, long and broad like a body, but lacking depth and in this one respect rising toward incorporeal things. The breadth of the surface, being finite, likewise ends at a long line which is neither deep nor broad. You have a line approaching spirit in two respects. Yet because the length of the line is itself finite, it is brought to a point deprived not only of depth and breadth, but also of length. You have a point inclining in three respects toward incorporeal nature. But because it is the limit of a line, it has a determinate position in the body and neither fills the whole nor gives it life. Separate it, if you please, from the line. It can at least in thought be separated from the line, because it is the line's limit and in a certain way exists in itself before it bounds the line. What is prior may be separated from what is posterior. You now have a point in some manner—that is, in thought—released from the line and withdrawing from body by a fourth degree. In this very release, let it attain the power to regard all parts of the body equally. Let it be diffused throughout them all and move them. Here the irrational soul has its seat.
And because rational thought is not deceived in its ascent, just as it discovered a point freed from body in thought, so in reality it will discover a point—that is, an indivisible something actually released from body. This not only fills and moves the body, but is itself freely moved and raised to things above; and it is now called by the name of unity. Here the rational soul thrives, removed from the bulk of body by a fifth degree. If a thing is more impure the more it needs and undergoes, body is more impure than surface. In order to exist, it needs more dimensions and is divided into more parts. For the same reason surface yields to line, line to point, and point at last to unity, which needs neither dimensions nor position. If substantial unity is the most perfect of these, and because it is most perfect is therefore the most powerful and the most true, and if these other things are something and do exist, who will deny that unity truly exists? What, then, prevents the soul from being something, and indeed something great in power, although it is not something great in quantity?
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book VI · VI.2.19–VI.2.20
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
- collating-witness-cc-by-4.0Paris 1559 printing — Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive