Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Name: Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Author: Marsilio Ficino

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 15 · §§ 18–20

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English Page · Branch 61 of 191

Book V · Chapter 15 · §§ 18–20

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Latin

p. 116

Denique quodcumque membrum divisionis acceperis, una haec summopere ratio persuadet animum in complexione corporis tamquam origine non iacere, quia non tam avide, tam facile, tam assidue, dum philosophamur, mutabili posthabito corpore, immutabilibus rationibus sese misceret, neque melius esset cum est in illis quam cum est in corpore. Est autem in illis tanto melius quam in corpore quanto praestantius vivit in illis quam in ipso. Tanto autem vivit praestantius quanto perfectius operatur. Operatur vero in illis perfectius quia intelligit verius, desiderat pacatius, fruitur dulcius, plenius atque securius. Et cum saepe consonante secum corpore animus ipse dissonet secum tum speculatione tum moribus, atque contra consonet dissonante, qui non viderit animum non consistere in corporis consonantia, is dissonat veritati.

Sed ut revertamur ad Aurelium: hic forte oboritur nonnulla quaestio. Utrum, sicut non interit animus, ita nec in deteriorem commutetur essentiam. Videri enim cuipiam potest, neque iniuria, id effectum esse ratione hac ut animus ad nihilum pervenire non possit.

Converti autem in corpus forsitan possit. Si enim quod erat ante animus corpus fuerit effectum, non utique omnino non erit. Sed hoc fieri non potest nisi aut ipse id velit aut ab alio cogatur. Neque continuo tamen animus, sive ipse id appetierit sive coactus fuerit, poterit corpus esse. Illud enim sequitur ut, si sit, necessario velit aut cogatur. At illud non sequitur ut, si velit aut cogatur, sit. Numquam autem volet. Nam omnis eius appetitus ad corpus aut ut id possideat est, aut ut vivificet, aut ut quodammodo fabricet, aut quolibet pacto ei consulat. Nihil autem horum fieri potest si non sit corpore ipse melior. At si erit corpus, melior corpore profecto non erit.

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 117

Finally, whichever member of the division you accept, this one consideration above all persuades us that the mind does not lie in the body’s composition as in its source. Otherwise, when we philosophize and leave the mutable body behind, the mind would not mingle so eagerly, readily, and continually with immutable principles, nor would it be better when present in them than when present in the body. It is better in those principles than in the body to the extent that it lives in them more excellently; it lives more excellently to the extent that it operates more perfectly; and it operates more perfectly there because it understands more truly, desires more peacefully, and enjoys more sweetly, fully, and securely. Moreover, the body is often in harmony with itself while the mind is at variance with itself in both contemplation and conduct; and conversely, the mind may be in harmony while the body is discordant. Anyone who fails to see from this that the mind does not consist in bodily harmony is himself out of harmony with truth.

But let us return to Aurelius. A question may arise here: just as the mind does not perish, is it also incapable of being changed into an inferior essence? Someone might reasonably think that the present argument has established that the mind cannot come to nothing.

Perhaps, however, it might be converted into a body. If what was formerly mind became body, it would not altogether cease to be. Yet this could occur only if the mind either willed it itself or were compelled by another. Even then it does not immediately follow that, merely because it desired or was forced to become body, it could do so. If it did become body, it would necessarily have willed or been forced; but the converse does not follow—that if it willed or were forced, it would become body. In fact, it will never will this. Every desire it has concerning body is directed toward possessing a body, giving it life, shaping it in some manner, or caring for it in some other way. None of these acts is possible unless the mind is superior to body. But if it became body, it certainly would not be superior to body.

About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.