Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II
Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 60 of 191
Book V · Chapter 15 · §§ 15–17
Latin
p. 114In quibus ars consistit ratiocinandi, quae ab animo rationali minime separatur. Nam si ab eo ratio illa artificiosa vel ars rationalis, quae rationum coetus est, separabitur, aut nusquam erit, aut in re aliqua non vivente, aut in re vivente. Nusquam esse non est dicendum perpetuas et immutabiles rationes. Esse quoque in re non vivente rationes veras impossibile est, siquidem vita rationis est fundamentum. Si autem artificiosa ratio de vita transit in vitam, numquam id facit commodius quam cum docet quis alios. Cum vero id non contingat—nemo enim docendo alios obliviscitur—non fit transitus.
Ars igitur inseparabiliter inest animo. Inesset quoque corpori, si animus esset corporis harmonia. Quapropter mutabilis esset sicut corpus tam ratio ipsa quam animus. Cum vero ratio talis sit immutabilis, ideoque et animi essentia immutabilis, cui illa tamquam subiecto inest, non est animus corporis temperatio.
Atque ita disputasse sufficiat ex primo illo divisionis superioris membro, quo concessum sit animo rationes inesse. Praeterea, si quis secundum illud membrum admiserit, scilicet illis inesse animum, sequitur idem. Quo enim pacto animus est corporis temperatio, si in ratione rerum a corpore separata est tamquam subiecto, cum non possit esse alibi quam in corpore corporis temperatio? Si tertium divisionis illius membrum concesseris, scilicet utrumque substantiam per se subsistentem esse, tam animum quam ipsam rationem rerum, per se subsistet animus, neque temperationi corporis astringetur.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V
p. 115In these principles consists the art of reasoning, which is in no way separable from the rational mind. If this structured reason, or rational art—the ordered gathering of intelligible principles—were separated from the mind, it would have to exist nowhere, in something not alive, or in something alive. We cannot say that perpetual and immutable principles exist nowhere. Nor can true principles exist in a lifeless thing, since life is the foundation of reason. If structured reason passes from one living thing into another, it can do so in no more fitting way than when someone teaches others. Yet no such transfer takes place, for no one forgets a truth by teaching it to others. Therefore reason does not pass from one life into another.
The art of reasoning is therefore inseparably present in the mind. It would also be present in the body if the mind were a harmony of the body. In that case both reason and mind would be mutable like the body. But since reason of this kind is immutable, the essence of the mind in which it inheres as in a subject is likewise immutable. The mind is therefore not a temperament of the body.
Let this suffice as an argument from the first member of the foregoing division, which grants that intelligible principles are present in the mind. The same conclusion follows if someone accepts the second member, namely, that the mind is present in those principles. How could the mind be a bodily temperament if it exists as in a subject within a principle of things that is separate from body, when a bodily temperament can exist nowhere but in a body? If you grant the third member of the division—that both the mind and the intelligible principle of things are substances subsisting in their own right—then the mind will subsist in its own right and will not be bound to a bodily temperament.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II · Book V · V.15.15–V.15.17
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.
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- public-domain-base-witnessFlorence 1482 editio princeps — Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
- collating-witness-cc-by-4.0Paris 1559 printing — Universidad Complutense de Madrid
- late-control-and-ocr-aidParis 1641 Opera printing — Internet Archive