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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II

Books V–VIII · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IIBook V · Chapter 8 · § 3

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English Page · Branch 24 of 191

Book V · Chapter 8 · § 3

Latin

p. 42

Anima vero propter tertiae illius essentiae proprietatem mera quaedam forma est, non composita ex materia et forma neque recubans in materia. Ideo in se ipsa permanens, quicquid in se est nihil est aliud praeter formam. Ipsa igitur sua essentia non formatur per aliud quicquam, sed sui ipsius est forma; id est, ipsamet forma est. Nihil est autem quod per se a sua essentia separetur, quia nihil a se ipso discedit. Omnia siquidem naturali instinctu nixuque perpetuo se ipsa servant pro viribus sibique inhaerent. Igitur anima, si numquam a se disiungitur et ipsa sui forma est, numquam a sua forma disiungitur. Itaque numquam desinit esse, cum esse a forma semper hauriatur. Sua quidem sponte a se non separatur, ut diximus. Sed neque etiam ab extrinseca violentia cogitur ut a se ipsa secedat, quoniam quicquid extrinsecus accipit suo quodam accipit modo. Ipsa plane spiritalis est atque a loco et tempore absoluta. Ergo spiritali modo et absolute accipit omnia. Spiritalia vero et absoluta quando ab aliquo capiuntur nequaquam interimunt. Spiritalis namque susceptio cum fit in corporibus, corpora ipsa, licet sibi dissimilia, non corrumpit, ut simulacrorum susceptio in aqua et speculo. Multo minus corrumpet rem spiritalem sibi persimilem. Praeterea cum absolutum illud quod ab animae essentia suscipi fingebatur aeternum sit, cur susceptaculum suum interimat? An ut ex illius materia se ipsum alat? Non, cum alimento non egeat illud quod est aeternum. An ut se ipsum propaget generetque ex illius materia sibi simile aliquid? Nequaquam. Non enim eget propagatione quod semper idem manet, neque etiam potest ex re corruptibili perpetuam generare. Non ergo corrumpit quicquam ut perpetuum aliquid sibi simile generet. Nullo itaque modo potest quicquam animae essentia capere a quo perdatur. Merito non potest capere omnino noxium quicquam, cum materia careat, quae primum et proprium passionum talium dicitur receptaculum.

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume II: Book V

p. 43

The soul, however, by the property of the third essence is a pure form: it is neither composed of matter and form nor lodged in matter. Therefore, remaining in itself, the soul has within it nothing other than form. Its own essence is therefore not formed by anything else; it is the form of itself—that is, it is form itself. Nothing, however, separates itself from its own essence, because nothing departs from itself. By natural instinct and perpetual striving, all things preserve themselves as far as they can and cling to themselves. Therefore, if the soul is never separated from itself and is itself its own form, it is never separated from its form. It never ceases to be, since being is always drawn from form. As we have said, it does not separate itself from itself of its own accord. Nor is it compelled by outward violence to withdraw from itself, for whatever it receives from without, it receives in its own manner. The soul is wholly spiritual and free from place and time; it therefore receives everything spiritually and without limitation. Spiritual and absolute things do not destroy that by which they are received. Indeed, when spiritual reception occurs in bodies, it does not corrupt the bodies themselves even though what they receive is unlike them, as we see in the reception of images by water and a mirror. Much less will it corrupt a spiritual thing closely akin to itself. Moreover, since the absolute thing supposed to be received by the soul's essence is eternal, why should it destroy its own receptacle? Is it to nourish itself from the receptacle's matter? No, for what is eternal has no need of nourishment. Is it to propagate itself and generate from that matter something like itself? By no means. What always remains the same has no need of propagation, nor can it generate something perpetual from a corruptible thing. It therefore corrupts nothing in order to generate something perpetual like itself. In no way, then, can the soul's essence receive anything by which it might be destroyed. With good reason, then, it can receive nothing harmful at all, since it lacks matter, which is called the first and proper receptacle of passions of this kind.

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About This Reading Edition

Volume II continues Ficino’s inquiry into the immortality of the soul through Books V–VIII. Its arguments consider the rational soul’s self-motion, its relation to the body, sensation, and the powers of the mind. The Latin and independent English translation follow the supplied edition’s facing pages and matching comparison units.

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is independently established from the Florence 1482 editio princeps (M1482), collated against the Paris 1559 printing (G1559), with the Paris 1641 Opera used only as a late control. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and consequential readings are recorded in the apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independent English translation in the voice established in Volume I, preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purposes, and qualifications. Editorial notes and witness variants accompany their passages as numbered notes. The edition and source statement, contents, and reading guidance are also retained. The source locator register remains available in the downloadable edition.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.