Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 88 of 174
Book II · Chapter 10 · §§ 6–9
Latin
p. 178Esse in Deo atque intelligere idem est omnino. Ideoque sicut esse eius infinitum est, ita intelligere infinitum.
Cum intellectus humanus vim habeat ad ea cognoscenda quae sunt potentia infinita, potest in infinitum species numerorum multiplicare et in aliis multis absque fine pro arbitrio progredi. Quod si intellectus divinus res actu infinitas non intelligit, sed certum dumtaxat numerum intuetur, quaero numquid ulterius intelligere queat, an nequeat. Si potest, Deus non intelligit illa actu omnia ad quae intelligenda vim possidet. Si non potest, intellectus humanus plura cognoscere valet quam divinus. Utrumque absurdum est. Res igitur actu infinitas intelligit. Quapropter divina mens, cum sit infinita, merito nominatur ab Orphicis ἄπειρον ὄμμα, id est, oculus infinitus.
Ex iis eorum philosophorum impius error arguitur, qui finita dumtaxat videre Deum existimarunt, quia quaecumque videntur ab eo comprehendantur, et quae comprehenduntur necessario finiantur. His in praesentia respondemus: idem esse Deum et quae in ipso Deo videntur ab ipso. Quisquis ergo dicit haec a Deo comprehendi nihil dicit aliud quam haec comprehendi a semet ipsis.
Absurdum quidem esset rem infinitam ab alio comprehendi. Comprehendi autem a se ipsa non est absurdum.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 179Being and understanding are wholly the same in God. Therefore, just as his being is infinite, so is his understanding.
Since the human intellect has the power to know things potentially infinite, it can multiply forms of numbers to infinity and proceed at will without end in many other matters. But if the divine intellect does not understand things actually infinite, and beholds only a fixed number, I ask: can it understand still more, or not? If it can, God does not actually understand all the things he has the power to understand. If it cannot, the human intellect can know more than the divine. Both alternatives are absurd. It therefore understands things actually infinite. Hence the divine mind, since it is infinite, is rightly named by the Orphics ἄπειρον ὄμμα, that is, “the infinite eye.”
From this the impious error of those philosophers is exposed who thought that God sees only finite things, because whatever was seen by him would be comprehended, and whatever was comprehended would necessarily be bounded. For the present we reply that God is the same as the things seen by him in God himself. Thus whoever says that these things are comprehended by God says nothing other than that they are comprehended by themselves.
It would indeed be absurd for an infinite thing to be comprehended by another; but for it to be comprehended by itself is not absurd.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.10.6–II.10.9
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.