Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 73 of 174
Book II · Chapter 7 · §§ 10–14
Latin
p. 148Immo aeque dissolutioni partium subiecta foret ac fuit subiecta connexioni. Ideoque non esset ex necessitate, cum per dissolutionem posset etiam quandoque non esse. Talis est utique Deus, substantia simplex necessario per se subsistens.
Quam ob causam Orpheus Deum appellavit necessitatem: δεινὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη πάντα κρατεῖ, id est, fortis necessitas omnibus dominatur. Si summa essendi necessitas Deus est, et quod summum est in quolibet genere unum est dumtaxat, nulla res praeter Deum erit talis essendi necessitas.
Nempe si talem quoque esse vis angelum, ita ut duae sint summae necessitates, Deus et angelus, declarare cogeris qua in re angelus differt a Deo. Non enim in ipsa essendi necessitate.
Nam in hac unum abs te ponuntur esse. Igitur erit aliquid aliud praeter ipsam necessitatem in angelo, per quod a Deo differre queat. Quapropter non erit angelus summa necessitas, quando est non necessitas pura et sola, sed mixta. Quicquid autem est in aliquo genere summum, puram debet habere generis illius naturam, rebus aliis non immixtam, ne minuatur per mixtionem.
Cogeris etiam respondere unde habeat angelus illam necessitati additam proprietatem, utrum a sui ipsius necessitate an aliunde. Si primum detur, eandem proprietatem habebit Deus a simili sui ipsius necessitate provenientem. Ergo per illam a Deo angelus non distinguitur. Si concedatur alterum, sequitur ut aliunde propria angeli ipsius natura nascatur quam ab angelo, quia proprietatem per quam distinguitur extrinsecus adipiscitur.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 149Indeed, it would be as subject to the dissolution of its parts as it had been to their union. Thus it would not exist by necessity, since through dissolution it could at some time cease to be. Such, however, is God: a simple substance subsisting necessarily through itself.
For this reason Orpheus called God necessity: δεινὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη πάντα κρατεῖ, that is, ‘mighty necessity rules over all things.’ If God is the supreme necessity of being, and what is supreme in any genus is one alone, then no thing besides God will be such a necessity of being.
To be sure, if you wish an angel also to be such that there are two supreme necessities, God and an angel, you will be compelled to explain in what respect the angel differs from God. Not, certainly, in the very necessity of being.
For in this respect you posit them as one. There will therefore be something else in the angel besides necessity itself, by which it can differ from God. The angel will thus not be supreme necessity, since it is not pure and sole necessity, but mixed. Whatever is supreme in any genus must possess the nature of that genus pure and unmixed with other things, lest it be diminished by admixture.
You will also be forced to answer whence the angel has that property added to necessity: from its own necessity, or from elsewhere? If the first is granted, God will possess that same property arising from a like necessity of his own. The angel is therefore not distinguished from God by that property. If the second is granted, it follows that the angel’s own proper nature arises from elsewhere than from the angel, since it acquires from without the property by which it is distinguished.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.7.10–II.7.14
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.