Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 58 of 174
Book II · Chapter 3 · §§ 4–8
Latin
p. 118Cur iudicamus animam corpore meliorem, nisi quia sit summae bonitati propinquior? Si nusquam esset bonitas summa, sed in infinitum de bono ascenderetur in bonum, per infinitum intervallum omnino distaret a summa bonitate corpus.
Per infinitum similiter anima. Infinitum alterum non est aut amplius aut angustius altero infinito. Neque erit usquam ratio mensuraque idealis per quam alia aliis praeferantur. Quare nihilo vel propinquior vel convenientior esset anima ipsi bonitati quam corpus.
Igitur neque melior. Neque angelus melior anima.
Proinde quicquid fluit ab alio natura sua fluitat, quoniam et secundum se nihil est et per fluxum quendam prodit in esse. Si non sit in rebus primum aliquid, res quaelibet emanabit ab alia. Omnes igitur fluitabunt.
Quapropter nusquam erit unitas, aequalitas, similitudo, status, ordo et restitutio. Nunc vero, quia haec rebus insunt, oportet rerum ab alio manantium fluxum duci et cohiberi statu cardinis alicuius ab alio non manantis, perinde ut interminatum fluxum corporum liquidorum terminari necesse est non alio corpore liquido similiter diffluente, sed corpore solido.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 119Why do we judge the soul better than the body, unless because it is nearer to supreme goodness? If supreme goodness existed nowhere, but the ascent were from good to good without end, the body would be separated from supreme goodness by an infinite interval.
The soul would likewise be separated by an infinite interval. One infinite is neither broader nor narrower than another infinite. Nor would there be anywhere an ideal standard and measure by which some things are preferred to others. The soul would therefore be no nearer or more akin to goodness itself than the body.
Therefore the soul would not be better than the body; nor would the angel be better than the soul.
Accordingly, whatever flows from another is by its own nature in flux, since in itself it is nothing and comes forth into being through a certain flowing. If there is no first thing among things, each thing will emanate from another. All things, therefore, will be in flux.
Consequently, nowhere will there be unity, equality, likeness, stability, order, or restoration. But since these are in fact present in things, the flux of things emanating from another must be guided and restrained by the stability of some pivot which does not emanate from another, just as the endless flow of liquid bodies must be bounded, not by another liquid body similarly flowing away, but by a solid body.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.3.4–II.3.8
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.