Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 49 of 174
Book II · Chapter 1 · §§ 3–5
Latin
p. 100Quandoquidem unio perfectione cunctis praestat atque potentia. Verum super eam si vis ut sit aliquid, duo statim sequuntur absurda. Si enim unitas sub aliquo est superiore principio, certe superioris illius fit particeps. Inferiora enim a superioribus causis semper aliquid capiunt. Sic non erit haec unitas ipsa, sed aliquid ex unitate quadam et vi superne accepta compositum; eritque multitudo quaedam, non unitas. Ac etiam quod unitati praeponitur nullius erit particeps unitatis. Nam superius principium ab inferiori quoad naturam suam suscipit nihil. Igitur erit aut nihil, aut multitudo omnium penitus unione privata, cuius nulla pars unum aliquid erit. Neque tota multitudo erit una, neque ulla inerit communio partibus vel ad se invicem vel ad totum. Rursus super veritatem est nihil. Nam simili ratione haec non esset veritas ipsa, sed verum aliquid ex veritate quadam et superioris illius portione compositum. Et illud quod super eam locatur, cum neque sit veritas nec particeps veritatis, falsum est penitus atque nihil. Neque esse potest veritate praestantius, nisi per veritatis vim verum procul dubio sit illud esse praestantius.
Similiter super bonitatem non est aliquid. Nam et haec non pura esset bonitas, sed bonum aliquid ac bonitas quadam commixtione alterius inquinata. Et illud quod bonitati praeponitur penitus erit malum. Non enim bonum erit, cum sit ultra terminos bonitatis; neque melius bonitate, cum nihil nisi per maiorem bonitatis portionem sit melius.
Quomodo autem malum excedat bonitatem non video, cum excessus atque imperium ad bonitatem pertineant; sunt enim appetibilia tamquam bona. Ergo malum per naturam bonitatis superabit bonitatem, et bonitas malo vim praestabit imperii. Praeterea, si est aliud rerum principium super ipsam bonitatem, ipsum certe aliquod ex se munus rebus impertiet, sicut omnis causa superior solet. Porro bonitas ipsa munus suum impertit omnibus, id est unicuique aliquam bonitatem.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 101For union surpasses all things in perfection and in power. Yet if you insist that something stands above it, two absurdities follow at once. If unity lies beneath some higher principle, it must surely participate in that higher thing, since lower things always receive something from higher causes. It will therefore not be unity itself, but something compounded from a certain unity and a power received from above; it will be a multiplicity, not unity. Moreover, whatever is placed before unity will participate in no unity at all, for a higher principle receives nothing from an inferior so far as its own nature is concerned. It will therefore be either nothing, or a multiplicity wholly deprived of all union, no part of which will be some one thing. Neither will the whole multiplicity be one, nor will its parts possess any communion either with one another or with the whole. Again, nothing stands above truth. By the same reasoning, such a thing would not be truth itself, but something true compounded from a certain truth and a share of that higher thing. Yet what is placed above truth, since it is neither truth nor a participant in truth, is altogether false and nothing. Nor can anything be more excellent than truth unless, through the power of truth, that supposedly more excellent thing is itself undoubtedly true.
Likewise, nothing stands above goodness. For such a thing would not be pure goodness, but some good thing, a goodness polluted by admixture with something else. And whatever is placed before goodness will be wholly evil: it will not be good, since it lies beyond the bounds of goodness, nor better than goodness, since nothing is better except through possessing a greater share of goodness.
But I do not see how evil could surpass goodness, since superiority and dominion belong to goodness: they are desirable as goods. Evil, then, would surpass goodness through the very nature of goodness, and goodness would furnish evil with its power of rule. Moreover, if there is some other principle of things above goodness itself, it will surely impart some gift of its own to things, as every higher cause is wont to do. Goodness itself imparts its gift to all things—that is, some goodness to each.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.1.3–II.1.5
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.