Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 44 of 174
Book I · Chapter 6 · §§ 13–15
Latin
p. 90Quemadmodum si visio neque esset in visu aliquo neque luminis alieni visio esset, sed in se ipsa maneret suique ipsius visio foret. Ubicunque enim intellectus quasi intelligendi potentia ponitur, etiam si intelligat semetipsum, tamen qua ratione intelligibilis est prior quodammodo se ipso dicitur qua ratione intellectualis consideratur. Intelligibile enim tamquam prius atque praestantius intellectualem virtutem quasi posteriorem inferioremque movet et format et perficit. Idcirco quidam Deum potius sive intelligibilis sive intellectionis quam intellectus nomine nuncupant, quamquam haec etiam nomina Deo haud propria omnino ratione conveniunt. Sed de his alias.
Accedit ad haec quod animae opus est vitalem motum praebere, siquidem ipsa vita quaedam est; mentis autem opus, ordinare per formas. Ipsa enim species quaedam est et secundum species operatur, quod in nostra mente conspicimus. Vitalis ille motus per omnia viventia funditur. Rebus carentibus vita non competit. Ordinatio vero per formas convenit rebus etiam non viventibus. Haec siquidem ordine specieque non carent. Tanto intervallo mens animam superat, quanto latius funditur formarum ordo quam vita. Quoniam vero ultra formarum ordinem est prima illa informis rerum materia, in qua latent quaedam, ut ita loquar, formarum pullulantium semina, mentis munus, quod terminatur formis, haec informia non complectitur. Ipsa tamen materia bona est quodammodo, quia boni, id est formae, appetens, quia ad bonum suscipiendum exposita, quia bono necessaria mundo. Semina quoque sunt bona, quia sunt formarum bonarum incohationes. Tanto saltem intervallo bonitas mentem superat, quanto longius boni quam speciei tendit largitio.
Quo enim res quaeque potentior est, eo longius operatur.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book I
p. 91It is as though sight existed in no organ of sight and were not the sight of another's light, but remained in itself and were the sight of itself. Wherever intellect is posited as a potency for understanding, even if it understands itself, then insofar as it is intelligible it is said in a certain way to be prior to itself insofar as it is considered intellectual. For the intelligible, as prior and more excellent, moves, forms, and perfects intellectual power as something posterior and inferior. Some therefore call God by the name of the intelligible or of intellection rather than of intellect, although these names too do not apply to God in an altogether proper sense. But of these matters elsewhere.
To these considerations must be added that the work of soul is to impart vital motion, since soul is itself a kind of life, while the work of mind is to order by means of forms. Mind itself is a kind of form and works according to forms, as we see in our own mind. Vital motion extends through all living things; it does not belong to things devoid of life. Order through forms, however, belongs even to things that do not live, for these do not lack order and form. Mind surpasses soul by as great an interval as the order of forms extends more widely than life. Yet beyond the order of forms lies that prime, formless matter in which there lie hidden, so to speak, certain seeds of forms about to germinate. The office of mind, being bounded by forms, does not embrace these formless things. Matter itself is nevertheless good in a certain measure, because it desires the good—that is, form—because it lies open to receiving the good, and because it is necessary to a good world. The seeds too are good, because they are the beginnings of good forms. Goodness therefore surpasses mind by at least as great an interval as the bounty of the good extends farther than form.
For the more powerful a thing is, the farther its action extends.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book I · I.6.13–I.6.15
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.