Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I

5Since the angel is not altogether simple but possesses number, while above number there must be unity—because unity is the origin of all number and has no need of union, whereas multiplicity by its nature needs union—it is necessary that above the angel there be something else, not merely immobile but wholly one and simple. That indeed is God, the most powerful of all things in the same measure that he is the simplest of all. For union consists in simplicity, and power in unity.

6Let no one dare to say that God is composed of many things. For if he were composite in any proper sense, he would consist of one thing that served as subject and another that served as form. God would therefore not be perfect in every respect, since one part within him would be more imperfect than another, and every part would be more imperfect than the whole itself. He would not be the supreme agent, because he would not act with his whole self in whatever he did, but through one part, namely form. He would not be supremely blessed, because he would not enjoy himself everywhere; for he would not contain his whole self in every member. He would see within himself something other than God, since part and whole are not the same. He would surely be more blessed if whatever he saw within himself were himself, if he were nowhere absent from himself, but encountered his whole self everywhere. Finally, the part posited in God as a subject could not form itself, because considered in itself it is formless. The other part, which played the role of form, could much less exist from itself, because it does not subsist in itself. This composite God would therefore be formed by some higher form; and that higher form would have a better claim to be God. This is the first line of reasoning by which we prove that God is above the angel.