Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 130 of 174
Book III · Chapter 2 · §§ 1–4
Latin
p. 262Anima est medius rerum gradus, atque omnes gradus tam superiores quam inferiores connectit in unum, dum ipsa et ad superos ascendit et descendit ad inferos.
Ceterum, ut ad id quandoque veniamus quod cupimus, in quinque gradus iterum omnia colligamus: Deum et angelum in arce naturae ponentes; corpus et qualitatem in infimo; animam vero inter illa summa et haec infima mediam, quam merito essentiam tertiam ac mediam more Platonico nominamus, quoniam et ad omnia media est et undique tertia. Si a Deo descenderis, tertio descensus gradu hanc reperis; tertio quoque ascensus gradu, si supra corpus ascenderis. Huiusmodi essentiam in natura summopere necessariam arbitramur.
Quoniam angelus quidem, ut Platonici dicunt, vere est, id est stat semper; qualitas fit, id est movetur aliquando; ideo qualitas omnino differt ab angelo, tum quia haec movetur, ille manet, tum quia haec fit aliquando, ille est semper. Ergo opus est medio quod partim cum angelo, partim cum qualitate conveniat. Quid illud? Numquid quod est, id est intrinsecus manet, aliquando? Non. Tale enim aliquid non reperitur. Nam quod per tempus aliquod intrinsecus, id est vel ex se vel ex statu proxime, manet, manet et semper. Itaque medium erit illud quod semper fit, id est movetur. Quod quia semper est, cum angelo congruit; quia movetur, cum qualitate. Unde sequitur esse oportere essentiam tertiam horum mediam, quae semper moveatur et vivat, suoque motu vitam diffundat in corpora.
Recte dicitur a Platonicis super id quod est in parte temporis esse quod est per omne tempus; super illud rursus esse quod est per aevum; denique super illud aevum existere. Sed inter illa quae sunt aeterna solum atque illa quae solum sunt temporalia esse animam quasi quoddam vinculum utrorumque. Cui quidem hac in re similes quodammodo sunt partes corporis mundani praecipuae.
Sunt et qui caelum empyreum tamquam prorsus immobile in aeternitate ponant.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book III
p. 263The soul is the middle grade of things and binds all the grades, higher and lower, into one, since it both ascends to those above and descends to those below.
But at last, so that we may come to what we desire, let us gather all things once more into five levels: placing God and angel at nature’s summit, body and quality at its lowest point, and soul midway between those higher things and these lower ones. Following Platonic custom, we rightly call soul the third and middle essence, since it stands midway in relation to all things and is third whichever way we count. If you descend from God, you find it at the third degree of descent; likewise, if you ascend above body, at the third degree of ascent. We judge an essence of this kind to be supremely necessary in nature.
For angel, as the Platonists say, truly is—that is, it always stands—whereas quality becomes, that is, it is moved at one time or another. Quality therefore differs altogether from angel: the one is moved while the other abides; the one comes to be at some time while the other always is. We consequently need a middle that agrees partly with angel and partly with quality. What can it be? Something that is—that is, that inwardly abides—only at times? No; nothing of that kind is found. For whatever abides inwardly through some span of time, whether from itself or from the stability nearest to it, abides always as well. The middle, then, will be that which always becomes, that is, is always moved. Because it always is, it agrees with angel; because it is moved, with quality. It follows that there must be a third essence between them, one that is always moved and alive and by its own motion diffuses life into bodies.
The Platonists rightly say that above what exists during only part of time stands what exists throughout all time; above that again, what exists through the eternal age; and finally, above that, the eternal age itself. Yet between things that are only eternal and things that are only temporal stands soul, like a bond joining the two. In this respect the principal parts of the world’s body are in some measure like it.
There are also those who place the empyrean heaven in eternity as something wholly motionless.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book III · III.2.1–III.2.4
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.