Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I

25Otherwise God would have made—and would now make—all things at once; he would also make evil things. Moreover, just as the future events of things are inscribed in God's foreknowledge, so too are their causes and their modes of acting. As our works are known to God, so is our will, which is the cause of our works and their free mode of action. Just as God foresees that you will do a certain thing, he foresees how you will do it—that is, voluntarily and freely. Therefore, if divine foresight makes our works necessary once some condition has been posited, it likewise makes necessary—that is, confirms—the mode in which they are done: the freedom of our judgment.

26For God, who tempers every nature, preserves in each thing the nature he has given it; he does not take that nature away. Thus, while governing all things, he governs each according to its own nature. He conducts rising elements upward and descending elements downward. If he governs an animal's motion, he assists it in walking, because by its own nature that motion is progressive. If he guides the heavens, he contributes to their circuit, because their roundness makes them naturally revolving. If he impels souls, since they can turn freely upward or downward, he impels them freely: he attracts but does not drag; he does not compel, but persuades.

27Zoroaster bears witness to this in these words: ‘The Father does not strike fear into them, but pours persuasion upon them.’

28Yet because the first mover must prevail and rule, he does, as Plato teaches, in a certain sense compel souls toward the good, so that they cannot fail to will the good itself.