Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 107 of 174
Book II · Chapter 13 · §§ 1–3
Latin
p. 216Deus amat et providet.
Si Deus sibi ipse placet, si amat se ipsum, profecto imagines suas et sua diligit opera.
Diligit faber opera sua, quae ex materia fecit externa. Amat multo magis filium genitor, quem ex materia intrinseca generavit, quamvis eam prius acceperit, dum comederet, aliunde. Amat Deus ardentius sua quaelibet opera, cum non acceperit aliunde materiam, sed ipse idem materiam creaverit qui et formavit, quo fit ut et solus et totius operis causa fuerit. Si Deus usque adeo amat opera sua, bona illis vult; quod vero vult, consequitur. Igitur bene illa disponit, et summa sua bonitate disponit quam optime. Sicut enim fecunditas proclivitasque ad agendum agentibus omnibus ab agentis primi fecunditate ingenita est, sic diligentia in custodiendis operibus inserta est singulis a diligentia prima agentis primi, omnium tamquam filiorum procuratoris. In quo quanto maior fecunditas est quam in ceteris, tanto et diligentior providentia.
Rursus Deus sui gratia facit cuncta, quia si ad alium finem praeter se ipsum ageret, ab illo fine penderet actio Dei, ergo et ab eodem agendi voluntas, ab eodem quoque Deus, cum idem sit Deus Deique voluntas. Si ad Dei finem facit omnia atque summum est bonum, ad bonum, ut Plato vult in Timaeo, cuncta disponit, ita ut singula pro natura sua divinam capiant bonitatem. Praeterea, cum omnia bonum appetant bonique appetitio bona sit et ideo ab ipso fit primo bono, unde sunt bona omnia, sequitur ut a divina bonitate illecta divinam appetant bonitatem. Quis igitur negaverit Deum res gubernare, cum ad bonum dirigat finem?
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 217God loves and exercises providence.
If God takes pleasure in himself, if he loves himself, then surely he loves his own images and his own works.
A craftsman loves the works he has fashioned from material outside himself. A father loves far more the son whom he has begotten from material within himself, although he first received that material from elsewhere when he ate. God loves each of his works more ardently still, for he received their matter from no other source: the same God who gave it form also created its matter. He alone is therefore the cause of the whole work. Since God loves his works so deeply, he wills their good; and whatever he wills, he attains. He orders them well, then, and in his supreme goodness orders them in the best possible way. Just as every agent's fruitfulness and inclination to act are implanted by the fruitfulness of the first agent, so every creature's care in preserving its works is implanted by the primal care of the first agent, who watches over them all as his children. As his fruitfulness surpasses that of all others, so too does the diligence of his providence.
Again, God makes all things for his own sake. If he acted for some end other than himself, God's action would depend upon that end; his will to act would therefore depend upon it as well, and so would God himself, since God and his will are one. If he makes everything for God's own end, and God is the highest good, then, as Plato teaches in the Timaeus, he orders all things toward the good, so that each may receive divine goodness according to its nature. Moreover, all things desire the good; the desire for good is itself good, and therefore comes from the first Good, from which every good proceeds. It follows that all things, drawn by divine goodness, desire divine goodness. Who, then, could deny that God governs things, when he directs them toward the good as their end?
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.13.1–II.13.3
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.