Epinomis

There remains still, for a reputation for wisdom, a strange power, which the many would name nature rather than wisdom: at those times when one notices someone learning easily whatever he learns, 976c and remembering very many things, and securely; and when someone keeps in mind what suits each case, what would be fitting if it were done, and does it quickly. For all these things some will set down as nature, others as wisdom, others as quick-wittedness of nature; but none of the intelligent will ever be willing to call anyone really wise for any of these.

And yet some knowledge, at least, must appear, having which the one who is really wise, and not only reputed so, would become wise. Let us see, then. For 976d we are attempting an argument that is altogether hard: to find another knowledge, apart from those we have spoken of, which would really and reasonably be called wisdom, while the one who takes it up will be neither menial nor an idiot, but through it will be a wise and good citizen and ruler and ruled of a city, justly, and in tune as well. Let us observe this first: which one knowledge, of those now present, if it departed from human nature or had not come to it, would render the human living being the most senseless and most unintelligent. 976e This, at least, is not very hard to observe. For, one set against one, so to speak, the one that has given number to the whole mortal race would do this. And I think that a god, rather than some fortune, having given it to us, preserves us. Which god I think it to be, I must declare, though he is strange, and again in a way not strange. For how 977a should we not think that what is the cause of all good things for us has been the cause also of by far the greatest of them, intelligence? And which god is it, then, that I speak of so solemnly, Megillus and Clinias? Heaven, very nearly:¹ whom it is also most just — as do all the other