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Ancient Greek Page · Branch 23 of 32
Epinomis · 988c–989b
Ancient Greek
p. 40σῶμα εἴληχεν φέρειν αὐτό τε ἑαυτὸ θερμότητι καὶ ψύξεσιν καὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἀλλ’ οὐ ψυχὴ σῶμά τε καὶ ἑαυτήν· 988d νῦν δ’ ὅτε λέγομεν ψυχὴν μέν, ἄνπερ ἐν σώματι γένηται, θαῦμα οὐδὲν κινεῖν τε καὶ περιφέρειν τοῦτο καὶ ἑαυτήν, οὐδ’ ἡμῖν ἀπιστεῖ ψυχὴ κατὰ λόγον οὐδένα ὡς βάρος οὐδὲν περιφέρειν δυναμένη. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀξιούντων, ψυχῆς οὔσης αἰτίας τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ πάντων μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὄντων τοιούτων, τῶν δὲ αὖ φλαύρων τοιούτων ἄλλων, τῆς μὲν φορᾶς πάσης 988e καὶ κινήσεως ψυχὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι θαῦμα οὐδέν, τὴν δ’ ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν φορὰν καὶ κίνησιν τῆς ἀρίστης ψυχῆς εἶναι, τὴν δ’ ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἐναντίαν, νενικηκέναι δεῖ καὶ νικᾶν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα.
Ταῦτα ἡμῖν εἴρηται πάντα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνοσίων τιμωρὸν [δὲ] δίκην· περὶ δὲ δὴ τὸ δοκιμαζόμενον οὐχ οἷόν τε ἡμῖν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐ δεῖ τόν γε ἀγαθὸν σοφὸν ἡμᾶς ἡγεῖσθαι, 989a τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ταύτην, ἣν ζητοῦμεν πάλαι, ἴδωμεν ἄν ποτ’ ἄρα ἐπινοήσωμεν ἢ κατὰ παιδείαν ἢ κατὰ τέχνην, ἥντινα τοῦ γιγνώσκειν ἐνδεεῖς ὄντες τῶν δικαίων, ἀγνώμονες ἂν εἶμεν ὄντες τοιοῦτοι. δοκοῦμεν δή μοι, καὶ λεκτέον· ἄνω γὰρ καὶ κάτω ζητῶν ᾗ μοι καταφανὴς γέγονεν, πειράσομαι δήλην ὑμῖν αὐτὴν ἀποτελεῖν. τὸ δὴ μέγιστον ἀρετῆς οὐ καλῶς πραττόμενον ἡμῖν γέγονεν αἴτιον, ὡς ἄρτι σημαίνειν ἐκ τῶν 989b εἰρημένων μοι σφόδρα δοκεῖ. μεῖζον μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτε πείσῃ τῆς εὐσεβείας εἶναι τῷ θνητῷ γένει· τοῦτο δ’ ὅτι δι’ ἀμαθίαν τὴν μεγίστην ἐν ταῖς ἀρίσταις φύσεσιν οὐ γέγονεν, λεκτέον. ἄρισται δ’ εἰσὶν αἱ χαλεπώτατα μὲν ἂν γενόμεναι, μέγιστον δὲ ὄφελος, ἂν γίγνωνται· τά τε γὰρ τῆς βραδείας τε καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας φύσεως μετρίως ἀποδεχομένη ψυχὴ καὶ πρᾴως, εὔκολος ἂν εἴη, τήν τε ἀνδρείαν ἀγαμένη, καὶ πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν εὐπειθής, καὶ τό γε μέγιστον, ἐν
Epinomis
p. 41body has obtained, to carry its own self by heat and coldness and all such things, and not the one by which soul carries body and itself. 988d But now, when we say that it is no wonder that soul, if it comes to be in a body, moves and carries round both this and itself, soul does not, by any account, disbelieve us, as though it were unable to carry round any weight. And so now too, since we claim — soul being the cause of the whole, and all good things being of this sort, and the poor ones, again, of another such sort — 988e that it is no wonder that soul is the cause of all motion and movement, and that the motion and movement toward the good belongs to the best soul, and the contrary to the contrary, the good things must have conquered, and must conquer, the things that are not such.
All these things have been said by us in accordance with the justice that avenges the unholy; but as to the matter under scrutiny, then, it is not possible for us to disbelieve that we must think the good man, at least, wise; 989a but this wisdom, which we have long been seeking, let us see whether we might ever, then, come to think of it, either by education or by craft: one, lacking the knowing of which, we would be without judgment of what is just, being such. And to me we do seem to be such; and it must be said; for, seeking up and down, in the way it has become plain to me, I shall try to make it clear to you. The greatest thing of virtue, then, not being finely practiced, has become the cause for us, as, 989b it very strongly seems to me, what has been said just now indicates. For let no one ever persuade us that anything of virtue is greater, for the mortal race, than piety; and it must be said that it is through the greatest stupidity that this has not come about in the best natures.1 The best are those that would come into being with the greatest difficulty, but are of the greatest benefit, if they come into being; for a soul that accepts the things of the slow nature and of the contrary one moderately and gently would be good-natured, admiring courage, and ready to be persuaded toward being temperate; and, what is greatest, in
Socrates
Reading Epinomis · Epinomis · 988c–989b
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
The complete Epinomis, 973a–992e: the Athenian stranger, Clinias, and Megillus examine wisdom, number, the soul, and the ordered heavens. Burnet’s Greek faces a new Diotimos Editions English translation, with an introduction, key words, outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and linked translator notes. Transmitted under Plato’s name, the dialogue’s authorship is disputed; the supplied Introduction presents the question without deciding it.
Historical Text and Translation
Greek: Epinomis, transmitted under Plato’s name, with disputed authorship, in John Burnet, Platonis Opera, volume V, part II (Oxford, 1907; a later impression printed by John Johnson, issued 1936–1945). The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against the printed pages by the supplied edition; Burnet’s lineation and critical apparatus are retained. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, under CC BY-SA 4.0. English translation and editorial matter: Diotimos Editions, 2026.
About Diotimos Editions
This historical edition credits Diotimos Editions as its English translator.
Rights
The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The new English translation and editorial matter are credited to Diotimos Editions, 2026; no open license is stated in the supplied edition.
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