The Anatomy of Melancholy

The places. David knows the vileness of his deed. (p. 30; DJR-026-49.) A foul deed can bring public disgrace. (p. 99 [supplied]; DJR-040-30.) A shameful act does not justify cruel reproach. (p. 151; DJR-051-49.) Fact names a deed discussed by religious authorities. (p. 216–217; DJR-066-08.)

In this edition. “filthiness of his fact” → “vileness of his deed” (DJR-026-49); “some foul fact” → “some foul deed” (DJR-040-30); “committed a foule fact” → “committed a shameful act” (DJR-051-49); “the same fact” → “the same deed” (DJR-066-08). Deed and act preserve the reference to something done. The adjectives, speakers and reported judgments retain their separate roles.

See also. Action; Censure; Tax; Bewray; Absolve.

Faculty

Source forms: faculty; Æstimative; Cogitative

The word. A faculty is a power or capacity of the soul or mind. Estimative and cogitative name powers of estimation or thought which Burton groups here under imagination. Faculty does not refer to a university teaching body in these passages.

In Burton. Imagination receives and examines forms communicated by common sense, recalls them, and makes others of its own. The religious discussion later describes an impaired imagination alongside otherwise coherent thought. In both places imagination is a particular capacity within historical psychology, broader than the modern association with creativity.

The places. Imagination is described as an internal faculty. (p. 23; DJR-025-18.) An impaired imagination is distinguished from other coherent thought. (p. 677; DJR-160-27.)

In this edition. “Æstimative, or Cogitative” → “the estimative or cogitative faculty” (DJR-025-18); “this faculty is free” → “this faculty is free” (DJR-025-18); “læsam habent imaginationem” → “their imagination is impaired” (DJR-160-27). Faculty is retained as a useful technical term and supplied in the first phrase to identify what the adjectives name. The later rendering preserves the claim of a particular impairment.

See also. Animal faculties; Common sense; Intellect; Memory and recollection; Will and nill; Reason.

Faith and assurance

Source forms: faith; security

The word. Faith occurs both among kinds of understanding and in the religious discussion of belief and salvation. Assurance is confidence in one’s spiritual state; security has that sense in the sufferer’s question about distinguishing it from presumption.

In Burton. The philosophical list places faith among lasting intellectual dispositions. The later dialogue asks how a person can trust while feeling no signs of grace. Burton answers feared rejection with patience and hope, while the sufferer objects that weak faith may conceal unfounded confidence. The voices must remain distinct for the argument to be intelligible.

The places. Faith appears among kinds of understanding. (p. 28; DJR-026-30.) Burton counsels patience despite a lack of felt signs. (p. 709; DJR-167-05.) The sufferer questions the difference between assurance and presumption. (p. 714; DJR-167-54.)

In this edition. “Faith” → “faith” (DJR-026-30); “despair not, or think thou art a Reprobate” → “Do not despair or think yourself rejected by God” (DJR-167-05); “discern my security from carnall presumption” → “distinguish my assurance from fleshly presumption” (DJR-167-54). Faith remains in both contexts. Assurance gives security its local favourable sense; the objection and the pastoral reply keep their separate speakers.

See also. Despair; Carnal presumption; Secure; Election and reprobation; Hope; Conscience.

Familiar

Source forms: familiars

The word. Familiars here are close friends or associates. The noun identifies people on intimate or habitual terms with someone, rather than spirits or merely things that are well known.