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English Page · Branch 21 of 65
Alcibiades I · 113c–114a
Ancient Greek
p. 36ταῦτα λέγων, ἀλλὰ σύ, ἐμὲ δὲ αἰτιᾷ μάτην. καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὖ λέγεις. μανικὸν γὰρ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιχείρημα ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, διδάσκειν ἃ οὐκ οἶσθα, ἀμελήσας μανθάνειν.
113dΑΛ. Οἶμαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀλιγάκις Ἀθηναίους βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας πότερα δικαιότερα ἢ ἀδικώτερα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἡγοῦνται δῆλα εἶναι, ἐάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὁπότερα συνοίσει πράξασιν. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ οἶμαι ἐστὶν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐλυσιτέλησεν ἀδικήσασι μεγάλα ἀδικήματα, καὶ ἑτέροις γε οἶμαι δίκαια ἐργασαμένοις οὐ συνήνεγκεν.
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἕτερα μὲν τὰ δίκαια 113e τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα, οὔ τί που αὖ σὺ οἴει ταῦτ’ εἰδέναι ἃ συμφέρει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δι’ ὅτι;
ΑΛ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰ μή με αὖ ἐρήσῃ παρ’ ὅτου ἔμαθον ἢ ὅπως αὐτὸς ηὗρον.
ΣΩ. Οἷον τοῦτο ποιεῖς. εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις, τυγχάνει δὲ δυνατὸν ὂν ἀποδεῖξαι δι’ οὗπερ καὶ τὸ πρότερον λόγου, οἴει δὴ καινὰ ἄττα δεῖν ἀκούειν ἀποδείξεις τε ἑτέρας, ὡς τῶν προτέρων οἷον σκευαρίων κατατετριμμένων, καὶ οὐκέτ’ ἂν σὺ αὐτὰ ἀμπίσχοιο, εἰ μή τίς σοι τεκμήριον καθαρὸν 114a καὶ ἄχραντον οἴσει. ἐγὼ δὲ χαίρειν ἐάσας τὰς σὰς προδρομὰς τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐρήσομαι πόθεν μαθὼν αὖ τὰ συμφέροντ’ ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὅστις ἐστὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, καὶ πάντ’ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερον ἐρωτῶ μιᾷ ἐρωτήσει; ἀλλὰ γὰρ δῆλον ὡς εἰς ταὐτὸν ἥξεις καὶ οὐχ ἕξεις ἀποδεῖξαι οὔθ’ ὡς ἐξευρὼν οἶσθα τὰ συμφέροντα οὔθ’ ὡς μαθών. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τρυφᾷς καὶ οὐκέτ’ ἂν ἡδέως τοῦ αὐτοῦ γεύσαιο λόγου, τοῦτον μὲν ἐῶ χαίρειν, εἴτ’ οἶσθα εἴτε μὴ τὰ Ἀθηναίοις συμ-
Alcibiades I
p. 37saying these things, but you, and you blame me without cause. And indeed what you say is right too: for it is a mad undertaking you mean to undertake, my excellent friend, to teach what you do not know, having taken no care to learn it.
Alc. 113d I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the other Greeks seldom deliberate about which is more just or more unjust; for they think such things are obvious. So they let them be, and look into which course will be to their advantage if they take it. For what is just and what is advantageous are not the same, I think: many indeed have profited by doing great wrongs, and others, I think, have done what is just, and it was not to their advantage.
Soc. What then? Even if, in the fullest sense, what is just 113e is in fact one thing and what is advantageous another, you surely don’t think, again, that you know what is advantageous to men, and why?
Alc. What’s to prevent it, Socrates? Unless you’re going to ask me again whom I learned it from, or how I discovered it myself.
Soc. What a way to behave! If you say something not rightly, and it is in fact possible to prove it by the very argument we used before, you think, if you please, that you must hear some new things and different proofs, as though the earlier ones were, so to speak, little garments worn threadbare and you would no longer put them on, unless someone brings you evidence clean 114a and unsoiled.1 But I shall let your running ahead of the argument go, and ask none the less, this time about what is advantageous, where you learned it so as to know it, and who the teacher is; and am I to ask all those earlier questions in a single question? But no: it is plain you will come to the same place, and will not be able to prove either that you know what is advantageous by discovering it or by learning it. But since you are fastidious, and would no longer enjoy a taste of the same argument, I let that go, whether or not you know what is advantageous to the Athenians.
Socrates
Reading Alcibiades I · Alcibiades I · 113c–114a
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates and Alcibiades examine political ambition, education, justice, and the care of the soul. Their inquiry turns on what it means to know oneself. This complete revised edition presents the dialogue, 103a–135e, across fifty-eight Greek–English page pairs, with an introduction, Key Words of the Dialogue, an outline, glossary, critical apparatus, and translator’s notes. The dialogue is transmitted among Plato’s works; its authorship remains disputed.
Historical Text and Translation
The Greek follows John Burnet’s Platonis Opera, volume II (Oxford, 1901), in a later Oxford impression printed by John Johnson and published by Humphrey Milford. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library transcription and checked against the supplied printed pages. Burnet’s lineation and critical apparatus are retained, including the extended mirror passage at 133c. The supplied PDF preserves the complete printed layout.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared and revised this independent English translation directly from the Greek, preserving the argument’s distinctions, consistent key terms, Socrates’ humor, and the quick exchanges with Alcibiades. Each English dialogue page translates the Greek page opposite it. Translator’s notes accompany their passages. The introduction and Key Words of the Dialogue precede the text; the Outline, Editorial Note, Glossary of Key Terms, and Note on this Edition follow it. Introductory and concluding matter reflows for the screen.
Rights
The ancient Greek work and Burnet’s printed edition are in the public domain. The Perseus digital Greek transcription and its modifications are attributed to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, and reused under CC BY-SA 4.0. The independent English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are © 2026 Diotimos Editions.