

PLATO

ALCIBIADES I

ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ

The Greek text of John Burnet
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with a new English translation and notes

THE COMPLETE DIALOGUE

103a–135e

Translation by Diotimos Editions

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INTRODUCTION

THE DIALOGUE

The *Alcibiades*, called the *First* or the *Greater* to tell it from a shorter dialogue of the same name, is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, at the moment when the young man is about to come before the Athenian Assembly for the first time. Socrates has loved him for years without speaking to him, held back, he says, by “a certain divine opposition”; now that the other lovers have given up, and the sign no longer opposes him, he speaks (103a–b). Alcibiades is “not yet quite twenty” (123d); Pericles, his guardian, is alive and still keeping company with Damon (118c); and Alcibiades expects to come forward before the Athenians “in a very few days” (105a–b). No one else speaks, and there is no narrator and no setting beyond the two of them: “there are just the two of us”, Socrates says (118b). Socrates speaks as a lover (*erastēs*) in the Athenian sense, an older man courting a beautiful youth; such courtship ended as the youth became a man, and this is why, with Alcibiades nearly twenty, the others have given up and his body’s bloom is said to be fading (131c–d). The dialogue runs from page 103 to page 135 in the pages of Stephanus’ edition, by which Plato is still cited, and fills fifty-eight pages of Burnet’s Oxford text.

The ancient arrangement of Plato’s works by Thrasyllus, which Diogenes Laertius preserves (3.59), places the dialogue first in the fourth tetralogy, with the *Second Alcibiades*, the *Hipparchus* and the *Lovers*, and Burnet’s second volume prints the four in that order. Thrasyllus gives it the subtitle “On the nature of man” and classes it as “maieutic”, a dialogue that brings a thought to birth. In late antiquity it was where the study of Plato began, because it turns the reader to knowing himself, the beginning of philosophy: the Neoplatonist Iamblichus put it first among the dialogues of his course, and Proclus and Olympiodorus, whose commentaries Burnet cites in his apparatus, both expounded it. Since the early nineteenth century its authenticity has been doubted, and it is still disputed (see “What is most exposed”, below). When it was written is not known.

THE QUESTION AND THE ANSWERS

Socrates begins by telling Alcibiades what he thinks of himself. He thinks he needs no one, trusting in his beauty and stature, his family and friends, his guardian Pericles and his wealth (104a–c); and his hopes are larger still: to show the Athenians that he is worthy of being honored as no one ever was, to have the greatest power in the city, then among the Greeks and the barbarians, until he fills “all mankind, so to speak, with your name and your power” (105a–c). None of this, Socrates says, can come about without him (105d–e). He offers no long speech to prove it, only questions, and asks for answers (106b).

What will Alcibiades advise the Athenians about? Not letters, the lyre or wrestling, the only things he has learned (106e–107a), nor building, divination or health, which belong to the experts (107a–c), but war and peace and “the city’s affairs” (107d). Socrates asks him to name the better in war and peace as the better in wrestling is called “gymnastic” and in singing to the lyre “musical” (108a–e). Alcibiades cannot; shamed into trying, he says that wars are made over wrongs suffered “justly or unjustly” (109b), and agrees that the better is the more just (109c). Then where did he learn what is just? He has always thought he knew it, even as a boy at knucklebones (110b), so he never sought it, and did not discover it (110c–d). If he learned it from the many, they are good teachers of Greek, about which they agree, but not of justice, about which they disagree so violently that they fight and kill one another, as in Homer, at Tanagra and at Coronea (111a–112d). Then comes the turn that gives the dialogue’s method its character: since Alcibiades has been answering, it is not Socrates who says that Alcibiades knows nothing about justice; Alcibiades has said it himself (112e–113c).

Alcibiades retreats to new ground: the Athenians seldom deliberate about what is just, but about what will be to their advantage, and the two are not the same (113d). Socrates makes him answer again. Just things are fine, fine things good, good things advantageous, and so just things are advantageous; and again it is Alcibiades who has said so (115a–116d). He confesses that he is “simply like a man in a strange state”, saying one thing and then another (116e). Socrates names the condition. A man wanders about what he does not know but thinks he knows, and this ignorance, “the disgraceful stupidity”, is the cause of mistakes; Alcibiades has it about the greatest things, and so do most of those who manage the city’s affairs, except a few, and perhaps Pericles (116e–118c).

But Pericles has made no one wise, not even his sons (118c–119a).

Alcibiades concedes, and draws the wrong conclusion: if the politicians are uneducated, why should he train? He will be “far, far above these men by nature, at least” (119b–c). Socrates’ answer fills the next five pages (119c–124b), most of it a single long speech (121a–124b). His real rivals are not the politicians at home but the kings of Sparta and Persia, whose birth, upbringing, education and wealth leave him nowhere: the Persian queen has whole regions for her girdle and her veil, while his own land at Erchia “is not even three hundred plethra” (123b–c), and the queen mother Amestris would wonder what on earth he trusts in, and the Spartan Lampido that he means to contend with her son when he has been so badly reared (123c–124a). Nothing will let him surpass them but care and craft; so he must listen to Socrates and to the inscription at Delphi, “know thyself” (124a–b).

THE ARGUMENT’S MAIN STRETCH

Here the dialogue turns from what Alcibiades lacks to what caring for himself would be. Asked in what they want to become good, he says: good at managing affairs, at ruling men in the city who have dealings with one another; the knowledge of it is good counsel, and what it produces is friendship among the citizens, which he takes to be concord (124e–126c). But husbands and wives are in concord about nothing that only one of them knows, and if each does his or her own business, as Alcibiades thinks a well-ordered city requires, there will be no concord and no friendship (126e–127c). Alcibiades admits that he does not even know what he is saying, and that he may long have been “in the most shameful state” without noticing it; Socrates tells him to take heart, since at his age there is time (127d–e).

The rest of the dialogue asks what caring for oneself is (127e–135e). Caring for what is one’s own is not caring for oneself: shoe-making cares for shoes and gymnastics for the feet (128a–d). To know the craft that makes oneself better one must know what one is (128e–129a), and so Socrates asks how “the self itself” might be discovered (129b). Whoever uses a thing is other than what he uses; a man uses his whole body; what uses and rules the body is the soul; so a man is his soul, or nothing (129b–130c). Socrates grants that this has been shown “adequately” rather than “precisely”, and that where they should first have looked into “the self itself”, they have looked instead into “what each thing itself is”; perhaps that will suffice (130c–d). It follows that in their conver-

sation soul has been speaking to soul (130d–e); that the doctor, the trainer and the craftsman know their bodies or what belongs to them, but not themselves (131a–c); and that the lover of Alcibiades' body goes away when its bloom fades, while Socrates, the lover of his soul, stays (131c–132a). His fear is that Alcibiades will become "a lover of the people" and be corrupted (132a).

How, then, can the soul know itself? By the example of sight. An eye sees itself when it looks into another eye, into the pupil, the region in which the eye's virtue comes to be; so a soul must look into a soul, into the region in which wisdom comes to be, and nothing in the soul is more divine than that (132c–133c). In Burnet's text, from Eusebius, the image goes on: the god is purer and brighter than the best in our soul, and by looking into him, as the finest mirror, we would best know ourselves (133c8–17). Knowing oneself was agreed to be temperance (131b, 133c). Without it a man cannot know what is his own, or what belongs to others or to cities, and so cannot be a statesman or a household manager; he will make mistakes and do badly, in private and in public (133c–134a). Cities need virtue, not walls and triremes; Alcibiades must acquire it first, and must procure for himself and the city not license or rule to do whatever he wishes but justice and temperance (134b–e), not tyranny but virtue; until a man has virtue it is better for him to be ruled, and vice befits a slave, virtue a free man (135a–c).

THE ENDING

Asked whether the condition he is in befits a free man, Alcibiades says he perceives it "very keenly indeed", and that he will escape it "if you wish it, Socrates". Socrates corrects him: "If god wills" (135c–d). Alcibiades then says that they are likely to change parts: from this day he will attend Socrates as a tutor attends a boy (135d). Socrates' love, Socrates replies, will be like the stork, tended in turn by the winged love it has hatched; Alcibiades says he will begin at once to care for justice; and Socrates, who would wish him to carry it through, ends with a fear: "seeing the strength of the city", he dreads that it may get the better of them both (135e).

WHAT IS MOST EXPOSED

Four things in this dialogue are likely to trouble a first-time reader, and they are best stated plainly.

First, it may not be Plato's. No ancient doubt of it is recorded,

and it was placed at the head of the Neoplatonist curriculum. In 1809 Schleiermacher, introducing his German translation, judged it unworthy of Plato, and since then scholars have been divided: some defend it, as Nicholas Denyer does in his commentary (2001), dating it to Plato's last years; others think it the work of a follower writing later in the fourth century. The case against it rests less on its language than on its manner and doctrine: it reads as an introduction, argues openly to convert the young man instead of leaving him at a loss, and teaches about the soul and self-knowledge in ways some find unlike the dialogues no one doubts. The case for it rests on its art, on studies of its style and on the ancient tradition. This edition takes no side, and speaks of the dialogue's author only where it must.

Second, the claim at the center of the dialogue is provisional by its own account. That a man is his soul is reached quickly, by elimination: not the body, which is ruled, nor the two together, since the body has no share in the ruling, so the soul (130a–c). Socrates says himself that it has been shown adequately, not precisely, and that the argument has looked into "what each thing itself is", not into "the self itself" which it set out to discover (130c–d). What "the self itself" names is not said, and readers have disagreed: the form of the self, a reason common to all men, the god, or simply Alcibiades' own self (see the note at 129b).

Third, the passage in which the god becomes the finest mirror of the soul (133c8–17) is not in the medieval manuscripts B and T. Burnet prints it in angle brackets from Eusebius, a Christian bishop of the early fourth century AD, who quotes it, and notes that Julian and Stobaeus read something like it. Its authenticity is disputed; Denyer, who defends the dialogue, takes these lines for a later addition. Without them the conclusion is still drawn: the part of the soul where wisdom comes to be resembles the god, and whoever looks into it knows himself best (133c1–6).

Fourth, the dialogue was written for readers who knew how the story ended. Alcibiades became the most brilliant and the most destructive Athenian of his generation; he urged Athens into the Sicilian expedition and was one of its generals, went over to Sparta, returned, and died in exile; and Socrates' association with him was remembered against Socrates. Other followers of Socrates, Aeschines of Sphettus and Antisthenes, also wrote dialogues called *Alcibiades*, and Xenophon answers the charge at length (*Memorabilia* 1.2.12–47). Socrates' fear that Alcibiades will become "a lover of the people" (132a), and his last words, that

"the strength of the city" may get the better of them both (135e), are dramatic irony of the plainest kind. The note at the close says more.

THE MANNER

The dialogue is a lover's approach, and much of its comedy is erotic and social. Socrates' opening is a lover's speech that turns into a catalogue of the beloved's vanities (103a–105e). Alcibiades, who has been meaning to ask what Socrates wants, finds that he has been beaten "to it by a whisker" (104c–d), and Socrates warns him that having had such trouble starting, he may have as much trouble stopping (104e). Alcibiades' pride is the target throughout, and he gives as good as he gets: "You're teasing, Socrates" (109d); "You're insolent, Socrates" (114d); and when Alcibiades says he will come to no harm by answering, Socrates replies, "Why, you're a prophet" (115a). Socrates mocks his taste for new arguments as a taste for clean clothes (113e–114a), and asks whether he would give one answer and then another about whether he has two eyes or three (116e); "By now I'm afraid for myself", says Alcibiades (117a).

The comedy of Socrates' answer is the comedy of scale. The Athenian politicians have "the slave's hair, as the women would say, still on their souls" (120b), and one of them, Meidias, is a "quail-tapper" (120a). Alcibiades traces his family back to Zeus; so, says Socrates, does his own, through Daedalus, the legendary craftsman (121a). The Persian heir's birthday is kept by all Asia, while "when we are born, as the comic poet says, not even the neighbours much notice it" (121c–d); the Persian prince has four royal tutors, the wisest, the most just, the most temperate and the most courageous, and Alcibiades had Zopyrus, "the household slave most useless from old age" (122b). The money that goes into Sparta leaves tracks like the animals in Aesop's lion's cave, none of them coming out (123a). The last page turns the joke on Socrates himself: his love, cared for by the love it has hatched, will be no different from a stork (135e). The translation tries to keep all of this and to add nothing. Where the English cannot carry a joke, a note says what it was.

ON READING THIS EDITION

Each left-hand page is a page of Burnet's Oxford text, line for line, with his apparatus at the foot; each right-hand page translates it, with the Stephanus section letters in the margin so that any pas-

sage can be found on both sides. Words in angle brackets < > in the Greek are not in the principal manuscripts and have been supplied, by a scholar or from another witness; they are translated. Words in square brackets [] are ones Burnet thought spurious; they are not translated. The Key Words of the Dialogue, which follow, explain the words on which the argument turns and how they are rendered. At the back, the Outline gives the argument's joints by Stephanus page, the Editorial Note sets out the conventions of both pages and explains the abbreviations of the apparatus, the Glossary lists the renderings for reference, and the Note on this Edition says how the volume was made and where a reader should be careful.

A NOTE ON THE PERSONS

The dialogue itself establishes a good deal about Alcibiades. He is the son of Cleinias (103a) and Deinomache (105d, 123c); his father died at Coronea (112c); Pericles, son of Xanthippus, is guardian to him and his brother Cleinias (104b, 118e), whom Alcibiades calls "a madman" (118e). His family traces itself to Eurysaces and so to Zeus (121a); his land at Erchia is "not even three hundred plethra" (123c). As a boy he learned letters, the lyre and wrestling, and would not learn the pipes (106e); his tutor was the old Thracian slave Zopyrus (122b). He is "not yet quite twenty" (123d), beautiful and tall (104a), with many lovers, all of whom have given up (103a–104c). Of Socrates the dialogue says that he was the first of those lovers (103a); that he is the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete (131e); that he claims descent from Daedalus (121a); and that a divine sign, which he calls "the god", kept him from speaking until now (103a, 105d–e, 124c).

The rest comes from other sources, and on some points they disagree. Alcibiades (about 451–404 BC) was a kinsman of Pericles through his mother, an Alcmaeonid; Plutarch, whose *Life of Alcibiades* is the fullest ancient account, names Pericles and his brother Aripheon as his guardians and traces the family through his father to Eurysaces (1); Cleinias was the younger brother (*Protagoras* 320a). He served at Potidaea with Socrates, who saved his life there, and at Delium, where he protected Socrates in the retreat (Plato, *Symposium* 220d–221c; Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 7). In the *Symposium* (212c–222b) Plato has him tell, drunk, how he once tried and failed to seduce Socrates. His public career began about 420; he was one of the generals of the expedition against Syracuse in 415, was recalled to stand trial for profaning the Mysteries, escaped to

Sparta, later returned to Athens, and was killed in exile about 404. Socrates (469–399 BC) was tried and executed in 399. The dramatic date of the dialogue is not given; if Alcibiades is not yet twenty and Pericles is alive, it falls about 433–432, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War and before the Potidaea campaign in which Alcibiades served beside Socrates, though the details do not all agree (the note at 124a observes that Lampido's son became king only in 427/6).

KEY WORDS OF THE DIALOGUE

These notes are for orientation, not reference: each explains a word the argument leans on, what it meant in Plato's Athens, and what the dialogue does with it. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they matter.

CARE FOR ONESELF (EPIMELEISTHAI HEAUTOU)

The verb means to take pains over a thing, to look after it, to make it one's concern: a guardian cares for a ward, a magistrate for his charge. It is the dialogue's demand. Socrates tells Alcibiades that he must "learn, and care for himself" before contending with the king (123d), and that nothing will let him surpass his rivals but care and craft (124b); from 127e the question is what caring for oneself is. The argument separates caring for a thing from caring for what belongs to it: shoemaking cares for shoes, gymnastics for the feet (128a–d), so whoever cares for what is his own is not yet caring for himself, and whoever tends his money tends what is further off still (131b–c). The answer, that caring for oneself is caring for the soul (132c), carries the rest of the dialogue to its close, where Alcibiades says he will "care for justice" (135e). The verb is rendered "care for" throughout, and the noun *epimeleia* "care"; its opposite, *amelein*, is "take no care" (113c, 120b), and *melei* is "care about" (122b), so that the family of words stays visible. At 120c–d, where the phrase first appears with "yourself", an earlier state of this edition had "take more care of yourself" and "taking care of yourself"; both are now "care for".

KNOW THYSELF (GNŌTHI SAUTON), AND TEMPERANCE (SŌPHROSYNĒ)

"Know thyself" was carved at Apollo's temple at Delphi. The dialogue first invokes it at 124a–b, where it is Socrates' own command as well as the god's, for Burnet prints the words without quotation marks: Alcibiades is to listen to Socrates and the inscription and "know thyself: these are our rivals"; an earlier state of this edition quoted the inscription and added a second "know". It comes back three times. At 129a Socrates asks whether it is easy; at 130e the one who enjoins it bids us know the soul; at 132c–d its meaning

is shown by the eye that sees itself in another eye. *Sōphrosynē*, rendered “temperance” throughout, one word for one word, as in the *Charmides* of this series, is the virtue the Persian prince’s “most temperate” tutor teaches, not to be ruled by his pleasures (121e–122a), and one of the Spartan virtues (122c). From 131b it is identified with knowing oneself, the definition Critias tries in the *Charmides*, and the argument makes it the condition of knowing what is one’s own, of ruling a city, and of being happy (133c–134d). The narrow modern sense, abstinence from drink, should be set aside.

JUST AND ADVANTAGEOUS (DIKAIOS, TA SYMPHERONTA)

Dikaïos covers what is just and fair between men, and what is lawful; *ta sympheronta* are the things that are advantageous, that pay. The first argument makes “the more just” the better in war and peace (109c), and asks where Alcibiades learned it; the second answers his retreat to the advantageous, which he says is different (113d), by showing, from his own answers, that just things are advantageous (116d). The Greek words are rendered “just” and “advantageous” throughout, and *ta dikaia* “what is just”, or “just things” in the argument of 114e–116d; *adikein*, to do injustice, is “do wrong” (109b, 110b–c, 113d). Justice (*dikaïosynē*) returns at the end, joined with temperance as what Alcibiades must procure for himself and the city (134c), and as what he says he will begin to care for (135e).

FINE, BEAUTIFUL, SHAMEFUL (KALOS, AISCHROS)

Kalos is beautiful, of a person or a thing, and fine or noble, of an act; *aischros* is ugly and shameful. The dialogue uses both senses, and the English divides them: of persons “beautiful” and “ugly” (104a, 107b, 113b, 131d, 135c), of conduct “fine” and “shameful” (109c, 115a–116c). The division is sometimes a loss, because Plato means the reader to hear one word: Alcibiades is “the beautiful” (113b), Socrates urges him to be “as beautiful as you can” (131d), and the last page speaks of a condition one should not name “where a beautiful man is concerned” (135c), while the argument at 115a–116c makes the fine the good. *Kaloi kagathoi*, “the fine and good”, the usual phrase for gentlemen, keeps “fine” (124e); the note there explains the phrase. *Kalōs* is rendered as the idiom requires in “well said” (108c, 109e, 126a), “not well said” (135d) and “you have not spoken well” (112e).

GOOD AND BAD, DOING WELL, HAPPY (AGATHOS, KAKOS, EU PRATTEIN,
EUDAIMŌN)

Agathos and *kakos* are “good” and “bad” throughout, never “evil”. “Good” is first good at something (125a–b: the shoemaker is good at shoes and bad at cloaks); Alcibiades wants to be “good at managing affairs” (124e). *Eu prattein* means both to act well and to fare well, and the argument at 116b trades on both senses (“Whoever does finely, does he not also do well?”); the English “do well” keeps both, and *kakōs prattein* is “do badly” (134a, 135b). At 134a–e the same verb runs through acting and faring, and “act” and “do” render it. *Eudaimōn* is “happy”, the prosperous and blessed condition of a life, not a mood; *athlios* is “wretched” (134a–b).

KNOWING, AND THINKING ONE KNOWS (EIDENAI, EPISTASTHAI, OIESTHAI
EIDENAI, AMATHIA)

The dialogue’s diagnosis is that Alcibiades does not know what he thinks he knows. *Eidenai* and *epistasthai* are both “know”; *gignōskein*, which carries “Know thyself”, is also “know”, and *gnōrizein* “come to know” (130e). The condition of not knowing but thinking one knows is the cause of mistakes (117d–118a); Socrates calls it “the disgraceful stupidity” (*amathia*, literally “not having learned”, 118a–b), and contrasts it with the harmless ignorance of one who knows he does not know, and leaves the tiller to the pilot (117c–e). Its symptom is that a man “wanders” (*planasthai*), giving one answer and then another (112d, 116e–118a). *Agnoein*, “be ignorant”, is kept apart from “not know”. *Hamartanein* is “make mistakes” (117d–e, 134a).

LEARNING, DISCOVERING, SEEKING (MANTHANEIN, HEURISKEIN, ZĒTEIN)

The argument of 106d–114a rests on a dilemma: whatever a man knows he has either learned from someone or discovered himself, and he will not seek what he thinks he already knows. Alcibiades has thought he knew what is just since he was a boy, so he never sought it and did not discover it; and the many, from whom he says he learned it, do not know it themselves (109d–112d). The three verbs are “learn”, “discover” and “seek” throughout, so that the dilemma, when it returns at 113e–114a and again with “the self itself” (129b), is recognisable; only where *manthanein* means “I understand” (111c, 128a–b) is it rendered so. Other verbs of finding out are kept off “learn”: *pyntanesthai* is “find out” (103a, 104d,

123d, 131e), and at 105a *gnōsēi* is “you will come to know”; at 103a, 105a and 123d an earlier state of this edition had “learn”. At 116c “find” renders *heuriskein* where it means finding that something is so.

CRAFT, AND THE BETTER (TECHNĒ, TO BELTION)

Technē is a craft or art, a skill with rules that can be taught: shoemaking, piloting, medicine, music. Socrates’ method is to ask what craft governs a thing and what it calls the better: the better in wrestling is “gymnastic”, in singing to the lyre “musical” (108a–e), and so the better in war and peace must have a name too, which turns out to be “the more just” (109c). Later the question is which craft makes us better, as shoemaking makes shoes better (128b–e), and it turns out to be for one craft to discern oneself, what is one’s own and what belongs to it (133d–e). *Beltion* and *ameinon* are both “better”, since the argument at 108b turns on the word. Ruling a city is likened to the crafts of piloting and chorus-training (125c–e); their knowledge is “good counsel”.

GOOD COUNSEL, CONCORD, FRIENDSHIP (EUBOULIA, HOMONOIA, PHILIA)

Asked what knowledge rules the city, Alcibiades says “good counsel” (125e), and that what it produces is friendship among the citizens, which he takes to be *homonoia*, literally “like-mindedness”, rendered “concord” (126c). *Homonoia* was a political watchword, the opposite of faction (*stasis*), and the dialogue tests it on the household: husbands and wives cannot be in concord about wool-working or hoplite fighting, which only one of them knows (126e–127a). “Agree” is kept for *homologeîn*, the partners’ assent in the argument, and “disagree” for *diapheresthai*, the disagreement of the many about justice (111b–112d), so that the three ideas stay apart. *Philia* is “friendship” and *philein* “love”, as of a father for his son (126e).

ONE’S OWN, AND DOING ONE’S OWN BUSINESS (TA HAUTOU, TA HAUTOU PRATTEIN)

The dialogue distinguishes three things: oneself; what is one’s own (*ta hautou*), such as the body or the hands; and what belongs to what is one’s own (*ta tōn hautou*), such as shoes, rings, cloaks and money. It draws the distinction at 128a–d (“what belongs to the foot”) and 131a–c (“things still further off than what is his

own”), and names it at 133d–e. Caring for the second is not caring for the first, and knowing the first is the condition of knowing the others. The English is “what is one’s own” throughout, and at 133d–e “what belongs to what is one’s own”; in an earlier state of this edition 128d, 131a–c and 133d had “what is yours”, “what is his” and “what is theirs”, which hid that 133d recalls 131a. The phrase *ta hautou prattein*, “to do one’s own business”, is the formula the *Charmides* tests as a definition of temperance and the *Republic* makes the definition of justice; here Alcibiades offers it as the cause of friendship in cities (127b–c), and Socrates later makes a joke of it: the money-maker is no longer doing his own business (131c).

THE SELF ITSELF, SOUL AND BODY, THE USER (AUTO TAUTO, PSYCHĒ, SŌMA, CHRĒSTHAI)

At 129b Socrates asks how “the self itself” (*auto tauto*; at 130d *auto to auto*) might be discovered, and at 130d admits that the argument has looked instead into “what each thing itself is”. The phrase is difficult; the note at 129b sets out the readings. The argument between rests on using: the user and what he uses are different (129c–e); a man uses his body; what uses and rules it is the soul (*psychē*); so a man is his soul (130a–c). *Chrēsthai* is “use” and *ho chrōmenos* “the user” throughout; at 125c–d, of men who “make use of one another” in a city, the same verb is “make use of”. *Anthrōpos*, the human being as such, is “man”, as in “Then what on earth is man?” (129e). *Psychē* is “soul” and *sōma* “body” everywhere.

LOVER AND LOVE (ERASTĒS, ERŌS)

The relation the dialogue assumes is the Athenian one between an older lover (*erastēs*) and a beautiful youth. Socrates is the first of Alcibiades’ lovers and the only one to stay (103a), and he defines himself as the lover of the soul, who does not go away when the body’s bloom fades (131c–132a). The vocabulary extends to politics: Socrates fears that Alcibiades will become a *dēmerastēs*, “a lover of the people” (132a), and calls the Athenian people a handsome face that should be seen stripped. At the end the parts are reversed, and Socrates’ love will be tended by the love it has hatched, like the stork (135d–e). *Erastēs* is “lover” and *erōs* “love” throughout.

VIRTUE, LICENSE, RULE, TYRANNY (ARETĒ, EXOUSIA, ARCHĒ, TYRANNIS)

Aretē is excellence of any kind: of a land (122d, where it is “excellence”), of a craft, of a man. It is “virtue” of persons and of crafts throughout, so that “the virtue of piloting” (125c) and “the eye’s virtue” (133b) stand beside the soul’s virtue, wisdom. In the last pages the argument sets virtue against power. *Exousia*, the freedom or authority to do as one likes, is “license”; *archē* is “rule”; *tyrannis* is “tyranny”, and *tyrannein*, to be a tyrant, is rendered literally even of the sick man who will take no rebuke (135a), so that it leads to the conclusion that follows: it is not tyranny one must procure, but virtue (135b). Until a man has virtue it is better for him to be ruled than to rule (135b).

LOOK INTO (SKOPEIN, BLEPEIN EIS)

Skopein and *skepsis*, Socrates’ verb for examining a question, are “look into” and “looking into” throughout, so that the repetition shows (“Look into it this way”, 116b). In the passage on the eye and the soul (132d–133c) the same English also renders *blepein eis*, to look into an eye, a mirror or the god, because there the looking is the argument: the eye sees itself by looking into another eye, the soul by looking into a soul and into the god. Where both verbs meet, at 132d5, Socrates’ *Skopei* is rendered “Consider”. At 132c, where the soul is to be kept in view, and at 134d–e, where one acts with one’s eyes on the divine or the godless, the English is “look to” and “looking toward”. An earlier state of this edition had “look at” in parts of 133a–c.

ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ

St. II
p. 103

ΣΩ. ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου, οἶμαί σε θαυμάζειν ὅτι πρῶτος a
 ἐραστής σου γενόμενος τῶν ἄλλων πεπαυμένων μόνος οὐκ
 ἀπαλλάττομαι, καὶ ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι δι' ὄχλου ἐγένοντό σοι
 διαλεγόμενοι, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσούτων ἐτῶν οὐδὲ προσείπον. τούτου
 δὲ τὸ αἴτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ τι δαιμόνιον 5
 ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πεύσῃ. νῦν δὲ
 ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐναντιοῦται, οὕτω προσελήλυθα εὖελπιδ' b
 εἰμὶ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ ἐναντιώσεσθαι αὐτό. σχεδὸν οὖν
 κατανεόκηκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ σκοπούμενος ὥς πρὸς τοὺς
 ἐραστὰς ἔσχες πολλῶν γὰρ γενομένων καὶ μεγαλοφρόνων
 οὐδεὶς ὃς οὐχ ὑπερβληθεὶς τῷ φρονήματι ὑπὸ σοῦ πέφευγεν. 5
 τὸν δὲ λόγον, ᾧ ὑπερπεφρόνηκας, ἐθέλω διελθεῖν. οὐδενὸς 104
 φῆς ἀνθρώπων ἐνδεὴς εἶναι εἰς οὐδέν· τὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχοντά
 σοι μεγάλα εἶναι, ὥστε μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος
 ἀρξάμενα τελευτῶντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν. οἷοι γὰρ δὴ εἶναι
 πρῶτον μὲν κάλλιστός τε καὶ μέγιστος—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ 5
 παντὶ δῆλον ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐ ψεύδῃ—ἔπειτα νεανικωτάτου γένους
 ἐν τῇ σεαυτοῦ πόλει, οὔση μεγίστη τῶν Ἑλληνίδων, καὶ
 ἐνταῦθα πρὸς πατρός τέ σοι φίλους καὶ συγγενεὶς πλείστους b

a5 ἀνθρώπειον B Olympiodorus: ἀνθρώπων TW b1 οὐκέτι BT: οὐκ Proclus
 a3 ὥστε . . . δεῖσθαι secl. Cobet

soc. Son of Cleinias,¹ I imagine you wonder that I, who was the
 first to become your lover, am the only one who does not give up 103
 now that the others have stopped, and that while the others made
 nuisances of themselves to you by talking with you, in all these
 years I have not even spoken to you. The cause of this has been
 nothing human, but a certain divine opposition, whose power you
 will find out later on as well.² But now, since it no longer opposes
 me, so I have come to you; and I have good hopes that it will not op- b
 pose me in future either. So in this time, looking into it, I have more
 or less come to understand how you have behaved toward your
 lovers: many as they have been, and high-minded too, there is not
 one who was not outdone by you in pride and fled. The argument
 by which you have looked down on them I want to go through. You 104
 say you need no human being for anything at all: what you have is
 so great, beginning with the body and ending with the soul, that
 you need nothing. You think, first, that you are the most beautiful
 and the tallest—and this, at any rate, anyone can see is no lie—and
 next, that you are of the most vigorous family in your own city,
 which is the greatest of the Greek cities, and that there, on your
 father's side, you have friends and kinsmen most numerous b

1. Alcibiades' father Cleinias fell fighting the Boeotians at Coronea (Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 1), a battle dated 447 or 446 BC, when his son was a small child.

2. The "divine opposition" (*daimonion enantiōma*) is Socrates' famous sign. In the *Apology* (31c–d) he describes it as a voice that has come to him since childhood and always turns him back from something he is about to do, and never urges him on; there too he says that it "opposes" him (31d, 40a–c).

εἶναι καὶ ἀρίστους, οἳ εἴ τι δέοι ὑπηρετοῖεν ἄν σοι, τούτων
 δὲ τοὺς πρὸς μητρὸς οὐδὲν χείρους οὐδ' ἐλάττους. συμπάντων
 δὲ ὧν εἶπον μεῖζω οἷε σοι δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν Περικλέα τὸν
 Ξανθίππου, ὃν ὁ πατὴρ ἐπίτροπον κατέλιπε σοί τε καὶ τῷ 5
 ἀδελφῷ ὅς οὐ μόνον ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει δύναται πράττειν ὅτι
 ἂν βούληται, ἀλλ' ἐν πάσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων
 ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ μεγάλοις γένεσιν. προσθήσω δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν
 πλουσίων δοκεῖς δέ μοι ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἥκιστα μέγα φρονεῖν. c
 κατὰ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα σύ τε μεγαλαυχούμενος κεκράτηκας τῶν
 ἐραστῶν ἐκεῖνοί τε ὑποδεέστεροι ὄντες ἐκρατήθησαν, καί σε
 ταῦτ' οὐ λέληθεν ὅθεν δὴ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι θαυμάζεις τί διανοοῦ-
 μένός ποτε οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι τοῦ ἔρωτος, καὶ ἦντιν' ἔχων 5
 ἐλπίδα ὑπομένω τῶν ἄλλων πεφευγόντων.

ΑΛ. Καὶ ἴσως γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι σμικρὸν
 με ἔφθης. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι ἐν νῷ εἶχον πρότερός σοι προσελθὼν d
 αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἐρέσθαι, τί ποτε βούλει καὶ εἰς τίνα ἐλπίδα βλέπων
 ἐνοχλεῖς με, αἰεὶ ὅπου ἂν ὦ ἐπιμελέστατα παρών τῷ ὄντι
 γὰρ θαυμάζω ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἥδιστ' ἂν 5
 πυθοίμην.

ΣΩ. Ἀκούσῃ μὲν ἄρα μου, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, προθύμως, εἴπερ,
 ὡς φῆς, ἐπιθυμεῖς εἰδέναι τί διανοοῦμαι, καὶ ὡς ἀκουσομένην
 καὶ περιμενοῦντι λέγω.

ΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀλλὰ λέγε.

ΣΩ. "Ορα δὴ οὐ γάρ τοι εἴη ἂν θαυμαστὸν εἰ, ὥσπερ e
 μόγῃς ἠρξάμην, οὕτω μόγῃς καὶ πανσαίμην.

ΑΛ. Ὡγαθὲ λέγε ἀκούσομαι γάρ.

ΣΩ. Λεκτέον ἂν εἴη. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἄνδρα οὐχ
 ἥττονα ἐραστῶν προσφέρεισθαι ἐραστῇ, ὅμως δὲ τολμητέον 5
 φράσαι τὴν ἐμὴν διάνοιαν. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰ μὲν

b 3 οὐδὲν BW Proclus: οὐδὲ T b 4 ὑπάρχειν] ἐπαρκεῖν Ast: fort. παρέχειν Stall-
 baum c 1 μέγα φρόνειν B Olympiodorus: μεγαλοφρονεῖν T Proclus d 2 αὐτὰ
 ταῦτ' B: ταῦτὰ ταῦτ' T: ταῦτα Proclus d 3 ὅπου BT: ὅπουπερ Proclus d 7 φῆς
 T Proclus: ἔφης B εἰδέναι Proclus: εἰδέναι καὶ ἀκούσαι B: εἰδέναι ἀκούσαι T e 2
 μόγῃς καὶ TW: καὶ μόγῃς B Priscianus πανσοίμην Cobet

and best, who would serve you if there were any need, and on your mother's side ones no worse and no fewer than these. And greater than all those I have named you think is the power you have in Pericles son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian to you and your brother:¹ a man who can do whatever he wants not only in this city but in all Greece, and among many great nations of barbarians. I will add too that you are one of the rich; though that, I think, is what you pride yourself on least. So, vaunting yourself on all these grounds, you have got the better of your lovers, and they, being your inferiors, have been beaten; and this has not escaped you. That is why I know very well that you wonder what I can have in mind that I do not give up my love, and what hope I have in staying on when the others have fled. c

ALC. And perhaps you don't know, Socrates, that you beat me to it by a whisker. I meant to come to you first and ask you this very thing: what on earth you want, and what hope you have in view, that you make a nuisance of yourself to me, always there, wherever I am, with the greatest care. I really do wonder what on earth your business is, and I'd be very glad to find out. d

SOC. Then you will listen to me eagerly, as is likely, if, as you say, you desire to know what I have in mind; and I speak to you as to one who will listen and stay to hear me out.

ALC. Certainly; go on.

SOC. Be warned, then: it would be no wonder if, having had such trouble starting, I had just as much trouble stopping.² e

ALC. My good friend, speak. I'll listen.

SOC. Speak I must. It is hard, to be sure, for a lover to approach a man who is not bested by lovers; all the same, I must venture to tell you what I have in mind. For, Alcibiades, if

1. Plutarch (*Alcibiades* 1) names Pericles and his brother Aripbron, kinsmen of the boy, as Alcibiades' guardians; The dialogue makes Pericles guardian of the younger brother too. This is the younger Cleinias, whom Pericles, in the *Protagoras* (320a–b), took away from Alcibiades for fear he would be corrupted, and handed back within six months because nothing could be done with him.

2. The joke turns on *mogis*, "with difficulty", said twice: the lover who could hardly bring himself to begin may hardly be able to stop.

σε έώρων ἃ νυνδὴ διήλθον ἀγαπῶντα καὶ οἰόμενον δεῖν ἐν
τούτοις καταβιώναι, πάλαι ἂν ἀπηλλάγμην τοῦ ἔρωτος, ὥς
γε δὴ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω νῦν δ' ἕτερόν σε κατηγορήσω διανοή- 105
ματα σὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν σέ, ᾧ καὶ γνώσῃ ὅτι προσέχων γέ σοι
τὸν νοῦν διατετέλεκα. δοκεῖς γάρ μοι, εἴ τίς σοι εἴποι θεῶν
“ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, πότερον βούλει ζῆν ἔχων ἃ νῦν ἔχεις, ἢ
αὐτίκα τεθνάναι εἰ μὴ σοι ἐξέσται μείζω κτήσασθαι;” 5
δοκεῖς ἂν μοι ἐλέσθαι τεθνάναι ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐπὶ τίνι δὴ ποτε
ἐλπίδι ζῆς, ἐγὼ φράσω. ἡγῇ, ἐὰν θᾶπτον εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίων
δῆμον παρέλθῃς—τοῦτο δ' ἔσεσθαι μάλα ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν— b
παρελθὼν οὖν ἐνδείξεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ἄξιός ἐστι τιμᾶσθαι
ὥς οὔτε Περικλῆς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων,
καὶ τοῦτ' ἐνδείξάμενος μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐὰν 5
δ' ἐνθάδε μέγιστος ᾖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσι, καὶ οὐ
μόνον ἐν Ἑλλήσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ὅσοι ἐν τῇ
αὐτῇ ἡμῖν οἰκοῦσιν ἡπειρώ. καὶ εἰ αὖ σοι εἴποι ὁ αὐτὸς
οὗτος θεὸς ὅτι αὐτοῦ σε δεῖ δυναστεύειν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ,
διαβῆναι δὲ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν οὐκ ἐξέσται σοι οὐδὲ ἐπιθέσθαι c
τοῖς ἐκεῖ πράγμασιν, οὐκ ἂν αὖ μοι δοκεῖς ἐθέλειν οὐδ' ἐπὶ
τούτοις μόνοις ζῆν, εἰ μὴ ἐμπλήσεις τοῦ σοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ
τῆς σῆς δυνάμεως πάντας ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ
οἰμαί σε πλὴν Κύρου καὶ Ξέρξου ἡγεῖσθαι οὐδένα ἄξιον 5
λόγου γεγονέναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχεις ταύτην τὴν ἐλπίδα, εὖ
οἶδα καὶ οὐκ εἰκάζω. ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποις, ἄτε εἰδὼς ὅτι
ἀληθῆ λέγω, “Τί δὴ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ σοι πρὸς
λόγον; [ὄν ἐφησθα ἐρεῖν, διὸ ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἀπαλλάττῃ;]” ἐγὼ δὲ d
σοί γε ἐρῶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ Κλεινίου καὶ Δεινομάχης. τούτων
γάρ σοι ἀπάντων τῶν διανοημάτων τέλος ἐπιτεθῆναι ἄνευ

e7 διήλθον B Proclus: διήλθομεν T καὶ T Proclus: τε καὶ B Olympiodorus b 1
ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν B Proclus: ἡμερῶν ὀλίγων T b 2 οὖν B: δὲ T Proclus ἐνδείξεσθαι
B: ἐνδείξασθαι T Proclus b 4 μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι BT: μέγιστος γενήσῃ Proclus
c 1 ἀσίαν T: ἀσίην B c 7 ὅτι BT: ὡς Proclus d 1 ὄν . . . ἀπαλλάττῃ seclusi ὄν]
ὁς Cobet διὸ BT Proclus Olympiodorus: δι' ὄν recc. δὲ B: δὴ T Proclus d 2
δεινομάχης TW Olympiodorus: δεινομένης Bt et εν supra μάχ W Proclus

I saw you content with the things I went through just now, and thinking you ought to live out your life among them, I would long ago have given up my love, as I persuade myself at least. But now I shall in turn denounce other designs of yours, to your own face, and from this you will come to know that I have kept my mind on you all along. I think that if one of the gods were to say to you, “Alcibiades, would you rather live with what you have now, or die at once if you are not to be allowed to acquire anything greater?” you would choose, I think, to die. But as it is, I will tell you on what hope you live. You think that as soon as you come before the Athenian people—and that, you suppose, will be in a very few days—you will come forward and show the Athenians that you are worthy of being honored as neither Pericles nor anyone else who ever lived; and having shown it, you will have the greatest power in the city; and if you are greatest here, among the other Greeks as well, and not only among the Greeks but among the barbarians who live on the same continent as we do. And if this same god in turn were to say to you that you must hold power here in Europe, but will not be allowed to cross into Asia or take a hand in affairs there, I think you would not be willing to live on these terms alone either, unless you are going to fill all mankind, so to speak, with your name and your power. I think that apart from Cyrus and Xerxes you think no one who ever lived worth mentioning.¹ That you have this hope I know well, and do not guess. Perhaps, then, since you know that what I say is true, you would say, “What then, Socrates, has this to do with your point?”² I will tell you, my dear son of Cleinias and Deinomache.³ For it is impossible for all these designs of yours to be brought to fulfillment without

1. Cyrus the Great founded the Persian empire in the sixth century; Xerxes ruled it from 486 to 465 BC and invaded Greece in 480. Socrates credits the young Athenian with the ambitions of a Great King.

2. Burnet brackets as an interpolation the words that follow in the manuscripts, “the thing you said you would tell, why you do not leave me alone” (apparatus, d1), and they are not translated.

3. Deinomache, Alcibiades’ mother, was an Alcmaeonid, daughter of Megacles (Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 1). Greeks seldom named a respectable man’s mother; Plutarch remarks that the mothers of Alcibiades’ famous contemporaries are not even known. Naming her may recall the maternal kin listed at 104b, or carry a tender or teasing note; both are interpretations.

ἐμοῦ ἀδύνατον τοσαύτην ἐγὼ δύναμιν οἶμαι ἔχειν εἰς τὰ σὰ
 πράγματα καὶ εἰς σέ, διὸ δὴ καὶ πάλαι οἴομαί με τὸν θεὸν 5
 οὐκ εἶναι διαλέγεσθαί σοι, ὃν ἐγὼ περιέμενον ὀπηνίκα ἐάσει.
 ὥσπερ γὰρ σὺ ἐλπίδας ἔχεις ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι
 αὐτῇ παντὸς ἄξιός εἰ, ἐνδειξάμενος δὲ [ὅτι] οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ e
 παραντίκα δυνήσεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ γὰρ παρὰ σοὶ ἐλπίζω μέγιστον
 δυνήσεσθαι ἐνδειξάμενος ὅτι παντὸς ἄξιός εἰμί σοι καὶ οὔτε
 ἐπίτροπος οὔτε συγγενὴς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἱκανὸς παραδοῦναι
 τὴν δύναμιν ἧς ἐπιθυμεῖς πλὴν ἐμοῦ, μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέντοι. 5
 νεωτέρῳ μὲν οὖν ὄντι σοι καὶ πρὶν τοσαύτης ἐλπίδος γέμειν,
 ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ εἶα ὁ θεὸς διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ μάτην
 διαλεγοίμην. νῦν δ' ἐφήκεν νῦν γὰρ ἂν μου ἀκούσαιοις. 106

ΑΛ. Πολύ γέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν ἀτοπώτερος αὐ φαίνη,
 ἐπειδὴ ἤρξω λέγειν, ἢ ὅτε σιγῶν εἶπου καίτοι σφόδρα γε
 ἦσθ' ἰδεῖν καὶ τότε τοιοῦτος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ταῦτα δια-
 νοῦμαι ἢ μὴ, ὥς ἔοικε, διέγνωκας, καὶ εἰ μὴ φῶ, οὐδέν 5
 μοι ἔσται πλέον πρὸς τὸ πείθειν σε. εἶεν εἰ δὲ δὴ ὅτι
 μάλιστα ταῦτα διανενόημαι, πῶς διὰ σοῦ μοι ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ
 σοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο; ἔχεις λέγειν;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ἐρωτᾷς εἴ τι ν' ἔχω εἰπεῖν λόγον μακρόν, οἷους b
 δὴ ἀκούειν εἴθισαι; οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐμόν ἀλλ'
 ἐνδείξασθαι μὲν σοι, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, οἷός τ' ἂν εἶην ὅτι ταῦτα
 οὕτως ἔχει, εἰ μὴ ἐν μόνον μοι ἐθελήσης βραχὺ ὑπηρετῆσαι.

ΑΛ. Ἄλλ' εἴ γε δὴ μὴ χαλεπὸν τι λέγεις τὸ ὑπηρετήμα, 5
 ἐθέλω.

ΣΩ. Ἡ χαλεπὸν δοκεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα;

ΑΛ. Οὐ χαλεπόν.

d 4 δύναμιν οἶμαι B: οἶμαι δύναμιν T Proclus d 7 ἐνδείξασθαι . . . e 2 δυνήσεσθαι
 TW Proclus: om. B e 1 ὅτι om. Proclus e 3 παντὸς B Olympiodorus: παντὸς
 μᾶλλον TW: καὶ αὐτὸς μᾶλλον Proclus σοι B: om. T Proclus e 4 ἱκανὸς B
 Proclus: ἱκανὸς T e 5 τοῦ BW Proclus Olympiodorus: om. T a 1 ἐφήκεν BT:
 ἀφήκε Proclus a 2 αὐ BW Olympiodorus: om. T Proclus b 4 ἐθελήσης T Pro-
 clus: ἐθέλης B Olympiodorus b 7 ἢ Buttman: εἰ BT ἀποκρίνασθαι T Proclus
 Olympiodorus: ἀποκρίνεσθαι B

me: such is the power I believe I have over your affairs and over you. That is why, I think, the god has long not allowed me to talk with you, and I have been waiting for the time when he would allow it. For just as you hope to show, in the city, that you are worth everything to it, and, once you have shown it, to be able at once to do anything at all, so I too hope to have the greatest power with you, once I have shown that I am worth everything to you, and that neither guardian nor kinsman nor anyone else is good enough to hand over to you the power you desire, except me—with the god's help, to be sure. While you were younger, and before you were full of so great a hope, the god did not allow me, it seems to me, to talk with you, so that I should not talk in vain. But now he has let me; 106 for now you would listen to me.

ALC. You seem to me much stranger still, Socrates, now that you have begun to speak, than when you followed me about in silence; and yet you were very strange to look at even then. Whether or not I have these things in mind, you have apparently decided, and if I deny it, it will do me no good in persuading you. Very well: but even if I do have them in mind, in the fullest sense, how will they come about for me through you, and not without you? Can you say?

soc. Are you asking whether I can make you a long speech, of the kind you are used to hearing? That is not my way. But I could show you, I think, that these things are so, if you will be willing to do me just one short service.

ALC. Well, if the service you mean is nothing difficult, I'm willing.

soc. Do you think it difficult to answer what you are asked?

ALC. Not difficult.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνου δή.

ΑΛ. Ἐρώτα.

10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὥς διανοοῦμένου σου ταῦτα ἐρωτῶ, ἃ φημί σε
διανοεῖσθαι;

c

ΑΛ. Ἐστω, εἰ βούλει, οὕτως, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι καὶ
ἐρεῖς.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή διανοῇ γάρ, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι, παρίεναι συμβου-
λεύσων Ἀθηναίοις ἐντὸς οὐ πολλοῦ χρόνου εἰ οὖν μέλλοντός
σου ἵεναι ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα λαβόμενος ἐροίμην “ᾧ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ,
ἐπειδὴ περὶ τίνος Ἀθηναῖοι διανοοῦνται βουλευέσθαι, ἀνί-
στασαι συμβουλεύσων; ἄρ’ ἐπειδὴ περὶ ὧν σὺ ἐπίστασαι
βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι;” τί ἂν ἀποκρίναιο;

5

ΑΛ. Εἴποίμ’ ἂν δήπου, περὶ ὧν οἶδα βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι.

d

ΣΩ. Περὶ ὧν ἄρ’ εἰδὼς τυγχάνεις, ἀγαθὸς σύμβουλος εἶ.

ΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μόνον οἶσθα, ἃ παρ’ ἄλλων ἔμαθες ἢ
αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρες;

5

ΑΛ. Ποῖα γὰρ ἄλλα;

ΣΩ. Ἐστὶν οὖν ὅπως ἂν ποτε ἔμαθές τι ἢ ἐξηῦρες μήτε
μανθάνειν ἐθέλων μήτ’ αὐτὸς ζητεῖν;

ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡθέλησας ἂν ζητῆσαι ἢ μαθεῖν ἃ ἐπίστασθαι
ᾧ;

10

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄ ἄρα νῦν τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, ἦν χρόνος ὅτε οὐχ
ἡγοῦ εἰδέναι;

e

ΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἃ γε μεμάθηκας σχεδόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα
εἰ δέ τι ἐμὲ λέληθεν, εἰπέ. ἔμαθες γὰρ δὴ σύ γε κατὰ
μνήμην τὴν ἐμὴν γράμματα καὶ καθαρίζεις καὶ παλαίεις οὐ
γὰρ δὴ αὐλεῖν γε ἡθέλες μαθεῖν. ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐπίστασαι,

5

c 2 ὅτι καὶ T: ὅτι B Proclus e 1 ἃ ἄρα B: ἄρ’ ἃ T Proclus e 4 ἐγὼ BT: αὐτὸς
Proclus e 6 τὴν B: om. T: τὴν ἐμὴν om. Proclus

soc. Answer, then.

alc. Ask.

soc. Then may I ask you on the understanding that you have in mind what I say you have in mind? c

alc. Let it be so, if you like, so that I may know what you are actually going to say.

soc. Come, then. You have it in mind, as I say, to come forward and advise the Athenians before long. Suppose that as you were about to go up to the platform I took hold of you and asked, “Alcibiades, what is it the Athenians have in mind to deliberate about, that you are getting up to advise them? Is it about things you know better than they do?” What would you answer?

alc. I would say, surely, that it is about things I know better than they do. d

soc. So you are a good adviser about the things you in fact know.

alc. Of course.

soc. Now, do you know only the things you learned from others or discovered for yourself?

alc. What else could I know?

soc. And is there any way you could ever have learned or discovered anything if you were willing neither to learn it nor to seek it for yourself?

alc. There isn’t.

soc. Well then: would you have been willing to seek or learn what you thought you knew?

alc. Certainly not.

soc. So there was a time when you did not think you knew the things you now in fact know? e

alc. Necessarily.

soc. But what you have learned I too pretty much know; if anything has escaped me, tell me. You learned, as far as I remember, your letters, the lyre and wrestling; the pipes, of course, you would not learn.¹ These are the things you know,

1. The three were the ordinary schooling of a well-born Athenian boy. Plutarch (*Alcibiades* 2) tells how the young Alcibiades refused to learn the pipes, which distort the player’s face, and set a fashion in Athens for despising them.

εἰ μή πού τι μανθάνων ἐμὲ λέληθας οἶμαι δέ γε, οὔτε
νύκτωρ οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐξιὼν ἔνδοθεν.

ΑΛ. Ἄλλ' οὐ πεφοίτηκα εἰς ἄλλων ἢ τούτων.

10

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν, ὅταν περὶ γραμμάτων Ἀθηναῖοι βου- 107
λεύονται, πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς γράφοιεν, τότε ἀναστήσει αὐτοῖς
συμβουλευσάν;

ΑΛ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὅταν περὶ κρουμάτων ἐν λύρα;

5

ΑΛ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ περὶ παλαισμάτων γε εἰώθασι
βουλεύεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ.

ΑΛ. Οὐ μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος βουλεύονται; οὐ γάρ που ὅταν 10
γε περὶ οἰκοδομίας.

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οἰκοδόμος γὰρ ταυτά γε σοῦ βέλτιον συμβουλεύσει.

ΑΛ. Ναί.

b

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ὅταν περὶ μαντικῆς βουλεύονται;

ΑΛ. Οὔ.

ΣΩ. Μάντις γὰρ αὖ ταυτά ἄμεινον ἢ σύ.

ΑΛ. Ναί.

5

ΣΩ. Ἐάν τέ γε μικρὸς ἢ μέγας ᾗ, ἐάν τε καλὸς ἢ
αἰσχρὸς, ἔτι τε γενναῖος ἢ ἀγεννής.

ΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Εἰδότες γὰρ οἶμαι περὶ ἐκάστου ἢ συμβουλή, καὶ οὐ
πλουτοῦντος.

10

ΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐάντε πένης ἐάντε πλούσιος ᾗ ὁ παραινῶν,
οὐδὲν διοίσει Ἀθηναίους ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βου-

e 8 γε οὔτε B: οὔτε γε T Proclus: οὔτε Olympiodorus a 10 βουλεύονται T Proclus
Olympiodorus: βούλονται B b 4 αἰ T: ἂν B: om. Proclus b 6 ἢ μέγας T Proclus:
καὶ μέγας B b 8 πῶς ... b 10 πλουτοῦντος post c 2 σύμβουλον transp. Apelt b 9
καὶ οὐ πλουτοῦντος secl. Schanz b 13 βουλεύονται T Proclus: βούλονται B

unless you have been learning something without my noticing; and I think you haven't, whenever you go out of the house, by night or by day.¹

ALC. No: I haven't been to any lessons but those.

soc. Then is it when the Athenians are deliberating about letters, 107
how to write correctly, that you will stand up to advise them?

ALC. By Zeus, not I.

soc. Then when it is about notes on the lyre?

ALC. Not at all.

soc. Nor, surely, are they in the habit of deliberating about
wrestling holds in the Assembly.

ALC. No indeed.

soc. Then when they are deliberating about what? Not, I suppose, when it is about building.

ALC. Certainly not.

soc. For a builder will advise them on that better than you.

ALC. Yes.

soc. Nor when they deliberate about divination?

ALC. No.

soc. For a prophet, again, will do so better than you.

ALC. Yes.

soc. Whether he is short or tall, beautiful or ugly, and again well-born or lowborn.

ALC. Of course.

soc. For advice on each thing belongs, I imagine, to the one who knows, and not to the one who is rich.

ALC. Of course.

soc. But whether the man giving the recommendation is poor or rich will make no difference to the Athenians when they deliberate about the people in the city,

1. Socrates follows him everywhere, as Alcibiades complained at 104d; his claim to know all the young man's lessons rests on having watched him constantly.

λεύονται, πῶς ἂν ὑγιαίνοιεν, ἀλλὰ ζητήσουσιν ἰατρὸν εἶναι c
τὸν σύμβουλον.

ΑΛ. Εἰκότως γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος σκοπῶνται, τότε σὺ ἀνιστάμενος
ὡς συμβουλευέσων ὀρθῶς ἀναστήσῃ; 5

ΑΛ. Ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τῶν περὶ ναυπηγίας λέγεις, ὁποίας τινὰς χρὴ αὐτοὺς
τὰς ναῦς ναυπηγεῖσθαι;

ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ναυπηγεῖν γὰρ οἶμαι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. τοῦτ' αἴτιον 10
ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΑΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ περὶ ποίων τῶν ἑαυτῶν λέγεις πραγμάτων d
ὅταν βουλευῶνται;

ΑΛ. Ὅταν περὶ πολέμου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ περὶ εἰρήνης ἢ
ἄλλου του τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα λέγεις ὅταν βουλευῶνται πρὸς τίνας χρὴ εἰρήνην 5
ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τίσιν πολεμεῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Χρὴ δ' οὐχ οἷς βέλτιον;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τόθ' ὁπότε βέλτιον; e

ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἄμεινον;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν βουλευοῖντο Ἀθηναῖοι τίσιν χρὴ προσπα- 5
λαίειν καὶ τίσιν ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον, σὺ ἄμεινον
ἂν συμβουλευοῖς ἢ ὁ παιδοτρίβης;

ΑΛ. Ὁ παιδοτρίβης δῆπου.

ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν πρὸς τί ἂν βλέπων ὁ παιδοτρίβης

c1 ζητήσουσιν TW: ζητοῦσιν B Proclus c7 τῶν B Olympiodorus: τὸν T: μῶν
Apelt d4 ἄλλου B Olympiodorus: περὶ ἄλλου TW d8 οὐχ BW: om. T e9 ἂν
addidi: post συμβουλευέσειεν Ast

how they may be healthy, but will seek to have a doctor as their adviser. c

ALC. Naturally.

soc. Then when they are looking into what, will you be right to stand up and advise them?

ALC. When it is about their own affairs, Socrates.

soc. About shipbuilding, do you mean, what sort of ships they ought to have built?

ALC. Not I, Socrates.

soc. Because you don't know how to build ships, I suppose. Is that the reason, or something else?

ALC. No, that's it.

soc. Then which of their own affairs do you mean, when they deliberate? d

ALC. When it's about war, Socrates, or peace, or any other of the city's affairs.

soc. Do you mean when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom to make war, and in what way?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And ought it not to be with those it is better to?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And at the time when it is better? e

ALC. Certainly.

soc. And for as long as it is better?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Now if the Athenians were deliberating with whom they ought to wrestle and with whom to spar, and in what way, would you advise them better, or the trainer?¹

ALC. The trainer, surely.

soc. Then can you say what the trainer would have in view

1. The *paidotribēs*, the "boy-rubber", was the trainer at the wrestling-school, who taught wrestling and bodily training. The same figure stands for expert knowledge in the *Gorgias* (452b) and the *Laches* (184e).

συμβουλευέσειεν οἷς δεῖ προσπαλαίειν καὶ οἷς μή, καὶ ὁπότε 10
καὶ ὄντινα τρόπον; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἄρα τούτοις δεῖ
προσπαλαίειν οἷς βέλτιον, ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα καὶ τοσαῦτα ὅσα ἄμεινον;

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ΑΛ. Τοσαῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τότε ὅτε ἄμεινον;

ΑΛ. Πάννυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἄδοντα δεῖ καθαρίζειν ποτὲ πρὸς τὴν 5
ὥδην καὶ βαίνειν;

ΑΛ. Δεῖ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τότε ὁπότε βέλτιον;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοσαῦθ' ὅσα βέλτιον;

10

ΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ βέλτιον μὲν ὠνόμαζες ἐπ' ἀμφο-
τέροις, τῷ τε καθαρίζειν πρὸς τὴν ὥδην καὶ τῷ προσπαλαίειν, b
τί καλεῖς τὸ ἐν τῷ καθαρίζειν βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τὸ ἐν τῷ
παλαίειν καλῶ γυμναστικόν· σὺ δ' ἐκείνο τί καλεῖς;

ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ἐμὲ μμεῖσθαι. ἐγὼ γάρ που ἀπε- 5
κρινάμην τὸ διὰ παντὸς ὀρθῶς ἔχον, ὀρθῶς δὲ δήπου ἔχει τὸ
κατὰ τὴν τέχνην γιγνόμενον ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ τέχνη οὐ γυμναστικὴ ἦν;

ΑΛ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

10

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δ' εἶπον τὸ ἐν τῷ παλαίειν βέλτιον γυμνα- c
στικόν.

ΑΛ. Εἶπες γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς;

ΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

5

a 5 ἄδοντα T: τὸ ἄδοντα B: τὸν ἄδοντα Ast b 2 καθαρίζειν B: ὀρθῶς καθαρίζειν T

when he advised with whom one ought to wrestle and with whom not, and when, and in what way? What I mean is this: ought one to wrestle with those it is better to, or not?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And as much as is better?

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ALC. As much.

soc. And at the time when it is better?

ALC. Certainly.

soc. Again, one who is singing must sometimes play the lyre to accompany the song, and keep step?

ALC. He must.

soc. At the time when it is better?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And as much as is better?

ALC. I say so.

soc. Well then: since you used the word “better” of both, of playing the lyre to accompany the song and of wrestling, what do you call the better in lyre-playing, as I call the better in wrestling “gymnastic”? What do you call that?

ALC. I can’t think.

soc. Then try to imitate me. My answer, I take it, named what is right in every case; and what is done according to the craft is surely right, isn’t it?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And wasn’t the craft gymnastics?

ALC. Of course.

soc. And I said that the better in wrestling was gymnastic.¹

c

ALC. You did.

soc. Well said, wasn’t it?

ALC. I think so.

1. *Gymnastikon*, “gymnastic”, is the neuter of the adjective *gymnastikos*; its feminine, *gymnastikē* (with “craft” understood), names the trainer’s craft. Socrates wants the “better” in each activity named after the craft that governs it, and is leading Alcibiades to find the corresponding word for the lyre.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ—πρέποι γὰρ ἄν που καὶ σοὶ τὸ καλῶς διαλέγεσθαι—εἰπὲ πρῶτον τίς ἡ τέχνη ἥς τὸ καθαρίζειν καὶ τὸ ἄδειν καὶ τὸ ἐμβαίνειν ὀρθῶς; συνάπασα τίς καλεῖται; οὐπω δύνασαι εἰπεῖν;

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

10

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὧδε πειρῶ τίνες αἱ θεαὶ ὧν ἡ τέχνη;

ΑΛ. Τὰς Μούσας, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ γε. ὅρα δὴ τίνα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐπωνυμίαν ἡ d
τέχνη ἔχει;

ΑΛ. Μουσικὴν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Λέγω γάρ. τί οὖν τὸ κατὰ ταύτην ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐγώ σοι τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, 5
τὴν γυμναστικὴν, καὶ σὺ δὴ οὖν οὕτως ἐνταῦθα τί φῆς; πῶς γίγνεσθαι;

ΑΛ. Μουσικῶς μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις. Ἴθι δὴ, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν βέλ-
τιον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνῃ ἄγειν, τοῦτο τὸ βέλτιον τί 10
ὀνομάζεις; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ ἔλεγες τὸ ἄμεινον, ὅτι e
μουσικώτερον καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐτέρῳ, ὅτι γυμναστικώτερον
πειρῶ δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λέγειν τὸ βέλτιον.

ΑΛ. Ἄλλ' οὐ πάνυ τι ἔχω.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρόν γε εἰ μὲν τίς σε λέγοντα 5
καὶ συμβουλευόντα περὶ σιτιῶν ὅτι βέλτιον τόδε τοῦδε καὶ
νῦν καὶ τοσοῦτον, ἔπειτα ἐρωτήσκειν “Τί τὸ ἄμεινον λέγεις,
ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη;” περὶ μὲν τούτων ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ ὑγιει-
νότερον, καίτοι οὐ προσποιῇ γε ἰατρὸς εἶναι περὶ δὲ οὐ
προσποιῇ ἐπιστήμων εἶναι καὶ συμβουλεύσεις ἀνιστάμενος 109

c6 ἴθι BTW Olympiodorus: ἴσθι Proclus c9 οὐπω... d2 ἔχει secl. Hermann d4
κατὰ ταύτην T: κατ' αὐτήν B d6 δὴ οὖν T: δ' οὖν B e1 ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ secl. Schanz
τὸ ἄμεινον Proclus: τῷ ἀμείνονι BT e4 οὐ πάνυ τι T Proclus: οὐ πάνυ B e9
καίτοι οὐ T Proclus: καὶ τοιοῦτον B γε Proclus: om. BT: τε al. a1 συμβουλεύσεις
BTW (sed σ puncto notatum in T): συμβουλεύεις Proclus vulg.

soc. Come now, you too—for it would suit you as well, I suppose, to talk well¹—say first what the craft is to which playing the lyre, and singing, and keeping step rightly belong. What is it called as a whole? Can't you say yet?

alc. No, I can't.

soc. Well, try it this way: who are the goddesses the craft belongs to?

alc. Do you mean the Muses, Socrates?

soc. I do. Now see: what name does the craft take from them? d

alc. You mean music, I think.²

soc. I do. Then what is it that is done rightly according to it? Just as there I told you that what accorded with the craft, gymnastics, was done rightly, so you too, then, in the same way: what do you say here? How do you say it is done?

alc. Musically, I think.

soc. Well said. Come now: the better in making war, and in keeping peace—this better, what do you call it? Just as there you said, in each case, what the better was: in the one, that it was more musical, and in the other, that it was more gymnastic. Try now to say what the better is here as well. e

alc. I can't, not really.

soc. And yet it is shameful, surely—if, when you were speaking and advising about food, that this is better than that, and now, and this much, someone were then to ask, “What do you mean by better, Alcibiades?”, about these things you could say that it is the healthier, though you don't claim to be a doctor; but about the thing you claim to have knowledge of, and will stand up to advise on 109

1. Socrates has just asked whether his own answer was “well” said (*kalōs*, 108c), and Alcibiades has agreed. Talking well, he now says, would suit Alcibiades too: probably a play on *kalos*, “beautiful”, the word for the young man himself (compare 104a). This is an interpretation.

2. *Mousikē*, “the Muses’ craft”, took in poetry and dance as well as music, so the lyre, the song and the step all fall under it.

ὥς εἰδώς, τούτου δ', ὥς ἔοικας, πέρι ἐρωτηθεὶς ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ; ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανείται;

ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν πρὸς τί τείνει τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην τε ἄγειν ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν οἷς δεῖ;

ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶν οὐ δύναμαι ἐννοῆσαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' οἶσθα, ἐπειδὴν πόλεμον ποιούμεθα, ὅτι ἐγκαλουῦντες ἀλλήλοις πάθημα ἐρχόμεθα εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸ ὀνομάζοντες ἐρχόμεθα;

ΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε, ὅτι γε ἐξαπατῶμενοί τι ἢ βιαζόμενοι ἢ ἀποστερούμενοι.

ΣΩ. Ἐχέ πῶς ἕκαστα τούτων πάσχοντες; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν τί διαφέρει τὸ ὦδε ἢ ὠδε.

ΑΛ. Ἡ τὸ ὠδε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δικαίως ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως;

ΣΩ. Αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε διαφέρει ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; Ἀθηναίοις σὺ πρὸς ποτέρους συμβουλεύσεις πολεμεῖν, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἢ τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας;

ΑΛ. Δεινὸν τοῦτό γε ἐρωτᾷς εἰ γὰρ καὶ διανοεῖται τις ὥς δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας πολεμεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ νόμιμον τοῦθ', ὥς ἔοικεν.

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα οὐδέ γε καλὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ σὺ [τὸ δίκαιον] τοὺς λόγους ποιήσῃ;

ΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

a 3 φανείται T Proclus: φαίνεται B a 6 τὸ BT: om. Proclus a 8 ἐννοῆσαι T Proclus: νοῆσαι B a 9 ὅτι T Proclus: τί B Olympiodorus b 1 γε TW: om. B b 5 ἢ corr. Coisl.: εἰ BT: εἰ δὲ Proclus c 6 ταῦτ' BT Proclus: τοῦτ' ci. Stephanus τὸ δίκαιον secl. Nürnberger

as one who knows, if, when you are asked about it, you can't say, as it seems you can't—are you not ashamed? Or will it not look shameful?

ALC. Very much so.

soc. Then look into it, and do your best to say: what does the better in keeping peace, and in making war on those we should, tend toward?

ALC. I'm looking into it, but I can't think.

soc. Don't you know this either: when we make war, what suffering we accuse one another of as we go to war, and what name we give it as we go?

ALC. I do: that we are being deceived in something, or forced, or robbed. b

soc. Hold on: suffering each of these in what way? Try to say what difference there is between this way and that.

ALC. By “this way”, Socrates, do you mean justly or unjustly?

soc. That very thing.

ALC. Well, this at least makes a difference, whole and entire.

soc. What then? Which will you advise the Athenians to make war on, those who are doing wrong, or those who are doing what is just?

ALC. That's a dreadful question you ask. Even if someone does c
have it in mind that one ought to make war on those who are doing what is just, he would not admit it, at least.

soc. No, for that is not lawful, it seems.

ALC. No indeed; nor does it seem fine either.

soc. Then you too will make your speeches with these things in view?¹

ALC. Necessarily.

1. Burnet brackets *to dikaion*, “the just”, after “you too”, as an addition to the text, and it is not translated. Without it, “these things” points back to what has just been said, that such a war is neither lawful nor fine; whoever added the bracketed words took it to mean justice.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἡρώτων βέλτιον πρὸς
τὸ πολεμεῖν καὶ μή, καὶ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς μή, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ 10
μή, τὸ δικαιότερον τυγχάνει ὄν; ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. Φαίνεται γέ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη; πότερον σαυτὸν d
λέληθας ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο, ἢ ἐμέ ἔλαθες μανθάνων
καὶ φοιτῶν εἰς διδασκάλου ὅς σε ἐδίδασκε διαγιγνώσκειν
τὸ δικαιότερόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτερον; καὶ τίς ἐστὶν οὗτος;
φράσον καὶ ἐμοί, ἵνα αὐτῷ φοιτητὴν προξενήσης καὶ ἐμέ. 5

ΑΛ. Σκώπτεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Φίλιον τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σόν, ὃν ἐγὼ
ἤκιστ' ἂν ἐπιорκήσαιμι ἀλλ' εἵπερ ἔχεις, εἰπέ τίς ἐστιν.

ΑΛ. Τί δ' εἰ μή ἔχω; οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με ἄλλως εἰδέναι e
περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων;

ΣΩ. Ναί, εἴ γε εὖροις.

ΑΛ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν εὔρεῖν με ἡγή;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα γέ, εἰ ζητήσῃς. 5

ΑΛ. Εἴτα ζητῆσαι οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με;

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ γε, εἰ οἴηθείς γε μή εἰδέναι.

ΑΛ. Εἴτα οὐκ ἦν ὅτ' εἶχον οὕτω;

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον
ὅτε οὐκ ᾧου εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδικα; φέρε, πέρυσιν 110
ἐζήτης τε καὶ οὐκ ᾧου εἰδέναι; ἢ ᾧου; καὶ τάληθῃ
ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα μὴ μάτην οἱ διάλογοι γίνωνται.

ΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ᾧμην εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Τρίτον δ' ἔτος καὶ τέταρτον καὶ πέμπτον οὐχ 5
οὕτως;

ΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρὸ τοῦ παῖς ἦσθα. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

d 3 διδασκάλου B Proclus Olympiodorus: διδασκάλους T d 5 καὶ ἐμέ B: ἐμέ T
Proclus Olympiodorus d 7 οὐ μὰ Proclus: μὰ BT e 5 γε om. Stobaeus a 2
τε B Proclus: om. T a 3 διάλογοι] λόγοι Cobet a 8 τοῦ T Proclus: τούτου B
Olympiodorus

soc. Then is it not the case that this better I was asking about just now—in making war or not, and on whom one should and on whom not, and when and when not—is in fact the more just? Or not?

alc. So it appears.

soc. How is this, then, my dear Alcibiades? Has it escaped your own notice that you do not know this, or did it escape mine that you were learning, and going to a teacher who taught you to tell the more just from the more unjust? And who is he? Tell me too, so that you may introduce me to him as a pupil as well.

alc. You're teasing, Socrates.

soc. No, by the god of Friendship, mine and yours, by whom I would least of all swear falsely.¹ But if you really can, tell me who he is.

alc. And what if I can't? Don't you think I could know about what is just and unjust in some other way?

soc. Yes, if you discovered it.

alc. Well, don't you think I could discover it?

soc. Very much so, if you sought it.

alc. Then don't you think I would seek it?

soc. I do, if you thought you did not know.

alc. Well, wasn't there a time when I was in that state?

soc. Well said. Can you tell me, then, the time when you did not think you knew what is just and unjust? Come: last year, were you seeking it, and not thinking you knew? Or did you think you knew? And answer truly, so that our conversations may not be held in vain.

alc. Well, I thought I knew.

soc. And two years ago, and three, and four, wasn't it the same?²

alc. It was.

soc. But before that, at any rate, you were a child, weren't you?

alc. Yes.

1. *Philios*, Zeus as guardian of friendship. Socrates calls on him in the *Euthyphro* (6b) and the *Gorgias* (500b, 519e) as well, but only here does he swear by him.

2. The Greek counts inclusively: "the third year" is two years ago, and so on.

ΣΩ. Τότε μὲν τοῖνυν εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ᾧου εἰδέναι.

10

ΑΛ. Πῶς εὖ οἶσθα;

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις σοῦ ἐν διδασκάλων ἤκουον παιδὸς ὄντος b
καὶ ἄλλοθι, καὶ ὁπότε ἀστραγαλίζοις ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ παιδιὰν
παῖζοις, οὐχ ὥς ἀποροῦντος περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων,
ἀλλὰ μάλα μέγα καὶ θαρραλέως λέγοντος περὶ ὅτου τύχοις
τῶν παίδων ὥς πονηρός τε καὶ ἀδικος εἶη καὶ ὥς ἀδικοῖ 5
ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω;

ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἔμελλον ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁπότε τίς
με ἀδικοῖ;

ΣΩ. Σὺ δ' εἰ τύχοις ἀγνοῶν εἶτ' ἀδικοῖο εἶτε μὴ τότε,
λέγεις, τί σε χρή ποιεῖν; 10

ΑΛ. Μὰ Δί' ἀλλ' οὐκ ἠγνόουν ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς c
ἐγίνωσκον ὅτι ἡδικοῦμην.

ΣΩ. Ὡς οὖν ἄρα ἐπίστασθαι καὶ παῖς ὢν, ὥς ἔοικε, τὰ
δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδίκαια.

ΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε καὶ ἠπιστάμην γε.

5

ΣΩ. Ἐν ποίῳ χρόνῳ ἐξευρών; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐν ᾧ γε
ᾧου εἰδέναι.

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ἠγοῦ; σκόπει οὐ γὰρ εὐρήσεις
τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον. 10

ΑΛ. Μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶσθα αὐτά.

ΣΩ. Εὐρὼν μὲν ἄρ' οὐκ οἶσθα αὐτά.

d

ΑΛ. Οὐ πάνυ φαίνομαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄρτι γε οὐδὲ μαθὼν ἔφησθα εἰδέναι
εἰ δὲ μὴθ' ἠῦρες μὴτ' ἔμαθες, πῶς οἶσθα καὶ πόθεν;

ΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως τοῦτό σοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρινάμην, τὸ 5
φάναι εἰδέναι αὐτὸς ἐξευρών.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ πῶς εἶχεν;

ΑΛ. Ἐμαθον οἶμαι καὶ ἐγὼ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

a 10 μὲν τοῖνυν BT: μέντοι Proclus b 1 σοῦ om. Proclus c 6 ποίῳ Dobree: ὁποίῳ
BT d 5 ἀπεκρινάμην BT: ἀπεκρίθην Stobaeus d 7 τὸ δὲ BT: τὸ δὲ ὧδε Coisl.: τὸ
δὲ οὕτω Proclus

soc. Then at that time, I know for certain, you thought you knew.

alc. How do you know it for certain?

soc. I often heard you, when you were a child, at your teachers' b
and elsewhere, and whenever you were playing knucklebones or
some other game,¹ not at a loss about what was just and unjust, but
saying very loudly and boldly of whichever of the boys it might be
that he was wicked and unjust, and that he was doing wrong. Or
am I not telling the truth?

alc. Well, what was I to do, Socrates, when someone wronged
me?

soc. And if you were in fact ignorant at the time whether you
were being wronged or not, you ask what you ought to do?

alc. No, by Zeus, I was not ignorant: I recognized clearly that I c
was being wronged.

soc. So even as a child, it seems, you thought you knew what
was just and unjust.

alc. I did; and I did know.

soc. Having discovered it at what time? Not, surely, at a time
when you thought you knew.

alc. Certainly not.

soc. Then when did you think you were ignorant? Look into it:
you won't discover that time.

alc. By Zeus, Socrates, I can't say, no.

soc. So it is not by discovering them that you know them. d

alc. I don't appear to, not at all.

soc. And yet just now you said you did not know them by learn-
ing either. But if you neither discovered them nor learned them,
how do you know them, and where from?

alc. Well, perhaps I did not answer you rightly in this, in saying
I knew them by discovering them myself.

soc. Then how was it?

alc. I learned, I suppose, just as the others did.

1. Plutarch (*Alcibiades* 2.2–3) tells how the boy Alcibiades, playing knucklebones in a narrow street, threw himself face down in front of a loaded wagon rather than let it cross his throw.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἤκομεν λόγον. παρὰ τοῦ;
φράζε καί μοι.

10

ΑΛ. Παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν.

e

ΣΩ. Οὐκ εἰς σπουδαίους γε διδασκάλους καταφεύγεις
εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναφέρων.

ΑΛ. Τί δέ; οὐχ ἱκανοὶ διδάξαι οὗτοι;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οὖν τὰ πεττευτικά γε καὶ τὰ μὴ καίτοι 5
φαιλότερα αὐτὰ οἶμαι τῶν δικαίων εἶναι. τί δέ; σὺ οὐχ
οὕτως οἶει;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἴτα τὰ μὲν φαιλότερα οὐχ οἰοί τε διδάσκειν, τὰ
δὲ σπουδαιότερα;

10

ΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε ἄλλα γοῦν πολλὰ οἰοί τ' εἶσιν δι-
δάσκειν σπουδαιότερα τοῦ πεττεύειν.

ΣΩ. Ποῖα ταῦτα;

ΑΛ. Οἶον καὶ τὸ ἐλληνίζειν παρὰ τούτων ἔγωγ' ἔμαθον, 111
καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν ἑμαυτοῦ διδάσκαλον, ἀλλ' εἰς
τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀναφέρω οὓς σὺ φῆς οὐ σπουδαίους εἶναι
διδασκάλους.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦ γενναῖε, τούτου μὲν ἀγαθοὶ διδάσκαλοι οἱ 5
πολλοί, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινοῦντ' ἂν αὐτῶν εἰς διδασκαλίαν.

ΑΛ. Τί δῆ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἔχουσι περὶ αὐτὰ ἃ χρή τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς δι-
δασκάλους ἔχειν.

ΑΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

10

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι χρή τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν ὅτιοῦν
αὐτοὺς πρῶτον εἰδέναι; ἢ οὐ;

b

ΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοὺς εἰδότας ὁμολογεῖν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ
μὴ διαφέρεισθαι;

e 2 καταφεύγεις T: καταφεύγει B e 9 οἰοί τε Proclus: οἰοί B: οἰοί T a 2 ἂν
T Proclus: om. B εἰπεῖν ἑμαυτοῦ B: ἑμαυτοῦ εἰπεῖν T Proclus a 3 αὐτοὺς
T: ἑμαυτοὺς B a 6 ἐπαινοῦντ' ἂν . . . εἰς διδασκαλίαν BT: ἐπαινοῖτ' ἂν . . . ἢ
διδασκαλία Proclus αὐτῶν secl. ci. Stallbaum

soc. We have come back to the same argument. From whom? Tell me too.

alc. From the many. e

soc. It is no serious teachers you take refuge in, when you refer it to the many.

alc. Why? Aren't they good enough to teach?

soc. Not, at any rate, what is good play at draughts and what is not;¹ and yet these things, I think, are more trivial than what is just. What? Don't you think so?

alc. Yes.

soc. Then they cannot teach the more trivial things, but can teach the more serious?

alc. I think so. At any rate there are many other things, more serious than playing draughts, that they can teach.

soc. What sort of things?

alc. For instance, I learned to speak Greek from them; and I 111
could not name my own teacher, but I refer it to the same people you say are not serious teachers.

soc. But of that, my noble friend, the many are good teachers, and they might justly be praised for their teaching of it.

alc. Why so?

soc. Because in that matter they have what good teachers ought to have.

alc. What do you mean by that?

soc. Don't you know that those who are to teach anything must first know it themselves? Or not? b

alc. Of course.

soc. And that those who know agree with one another and do not disagree?

1. *Petteia*, a board game played with pebbles, is a stock example in Plato of an expert's craft: compare *Republic* 333b, where the draughts-player, not the just man, is the useful partner in placing the pieces.

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐν οἷς δ' ἂν διαφέρωνται, ταῦτα φήσεις εἰδέναι αὐτούς;

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν διδάσκαλοι πῶς ἂν εἶεν;

ΑΛ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοι διαφέρεσθαι οἱ πολλοὶ ποιῶν ἐστι λίθος ἢ ξύλον; καὶ ἐάν τινα ἐρωτᾷς, ἄρ' οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὁρμῶσιν ὅταν βούλωνται λαβεῖν λίθον ἢ ξύλον; ὡσαύτως καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα τοιαῦτα σχεδὸν γάρ τι μανθάνω τὸ ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι ὅτι τοῦτο λέγεις ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς μὲν ταῦθ', ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἀλλήλοις τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἰδίᾳ, καὶ δημοσίᾳ αἱ πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν αἱ μὲν ταῦθ' αἱ δ' ἄλλα φάσκουσαι;

ΑΛ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Εἰκότως ἂν ἄρα τούτων γε καὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶεν ἀγαθοί.

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν βουλοίμεθα ποιῆσαί τινα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰδέναι, ὁρθῶς ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν εἰς διδασκαλίαν τούτων τῶν πολλῶν;

ΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ βουλευθεῖμεν εἰδέναι, μὴ μόνον ποῖοι ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν ἢ ποῖοι ἵπποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τίνες αὐτῶν δρομικοί τε καὶ μή, ἄρ' ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦτο ἱκανοὶ διδάξαι;

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἰκανὸν δέ σοι τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστανται οὐδὲ

b 12 οὐ T: οὖν B c 8 ἄλλα φάσκουσαι T Proclus: ἄλλαι φάσκουσιν B c 11 γε B: om. T Proclus d 2 βουλοίμεθα B Proclus: βουλοίμεθ' ἂν T

ALC. Yes.

soc. And the things they disagree about, will you say they know those?

ALC. Certainly not.

soc. Then how could they be teachers of them?

ALC. In no way.

soc. Well then: do the many seem to you to disagree about what sort of thing a stone or a piece of wood is? And if you ask any of them, do they not agree on the same things, and reach for the same things whenever they want to take up a stone or a piece of wood? And so too with everything of that kind; for I more or less understand that this is what you mean by knowing how to speak Greek. Or not? c

ALC. Yes.

soc. So on these matters, as we said, they agree both with one another and with themselves in private, and in public the cities do not dispute with one another, some saying one thing and some another?

ALC. No, they don't.

soc. Then it is reasonable that of these things, at any rate, they should also be good teachers.

ALC. Yes. d

soc. So if we wanted to make someone know about them, we would rightly send him to be taught by these, the many?

ALC. Certainly.

soc. And what if we wanted to know not only what sort of things men are, or what sort horses are, but also which of them are good runners and which are not? Are the many still good enough to teach this?

ALC. Certainly not.

soc. And is it evidence enough for you that they do not know, nor

κρήγνοι διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν e
ἐαυτοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν;

ΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ βουλευθεῖμεν εἰδέναι, μὴ μόνον ποῖοι
ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ὅποιοι ὑγιεῖνοι ἢ νοσώδεις, ἄρ' ἱκανοὶ 5
ἂν ἡμῖν ἦσαν διδάσκαλοι οἱ πολλοί;

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἦν δ' ἄν σοι τεκμήριον ὅτι μοχθηροὶ εἰσι τούτων
διδάσκαλοι, εἰ ἑώρας αὐτοὺς διαφερομένους;

ΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε.

10

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; νῦν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἀνθρώ-
πων καὶ πραγμάτων οἱ πολλοὶ δοκοῦσί σοι ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὶ 112
ἐαυτοῖς ἢ ἀλλήλοις;

ΑΛ. Ἦκιστα νῆ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῶν διαφέρεισθαι;

ΑΛ. Πολύ γε.

5

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶμαι γε πάποτε σε ἰδεῖν οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι
σφόδρα οὕτω διαφερομένους ἀνθρώπους περὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ
μή, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα μάχεσθαι τε καὶ ἀποκτείνεσθαι ἀλλήλους.

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἔγωγ' οἶδ' ὅτι, 10
καὶ εἰ μὴ ἑώρακας, ἀκήκοας γοῦν ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ b
Ὅμηρον καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας γὰρ καὶ Ἰλιάδος ἀκήκοας.

ΑΛ. Πάντως δῆπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα ποιήματά ἐστι περὶ διαφορᾶς δικαίων
τε καὶ ἀδίκων;

5

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αἱ μάχαι γε καὶ οἱ θάνατοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν
διαφορὰν τοῖς τε Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Τρωσὶν ἐγένοντο,
καὶ τοῖς μνηστήρσι τοῖς τῆς Πηνελόπης καὶ τῷ Ὀδυσσεΐ.

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

c

e 11 καὶ ἀδίκων B: om. TW Proclus a 2 ἀλλήλοις Proclus: ἄλλοις BT

are they useful teachers of these things,¹ since they agree among themselves about them not at all? e

ALC. For me, yes.

soc. And what if we wanted to know not only what sort of things men are, but what sort are healthy or sickly: would the many be good enough teachers for us?

ALC. Certainly not.

soc. And would it be evidence to you that they are poor teachers of this, if you saw them disagreeing?

ALC. For me, yes.

soc. Well, then: now, about just and unjust men and actions, do the many seem to you to agree with themselves, or with one another? 112

ALC. Least of all, by Zeus, Socrates.

soc. What? To disagree about them most of all?

ALC. By far.

soc. I don't suppose you have ever seen or heard of people disagreeing so violently about what is healthy and what is not that they fight and kill one another over it.

ALC. Certainly not.

soc. But about what is just and unjust I know that, even if you have not seen it, you have heard of it at least, from many others and from Homer; for you have heard the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*. b

ALC. Of course I have, Socrates.

soc. Then aren't these poems about a disagreement over what is just and unjust?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And it was over this disagreement that the battles and the deaths came about, for the Achaeans and the Trojans besides, and for Penelope's suitors and Odysseus.

ALC. What you say is true. c

1. The word is *krēgyos*, "good" or "useful", a rare old word: Homer has it once, when Agamemnon tells the prophet Calchas he has never yet said anything good to him (*Iliad* 1.106).

ΣΩ. Οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Τανάγρα Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ
 Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἀποθανούσι, καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον
 ἐν Κορωνείᾳ, ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ [Κλεινίας] ἐτελεύτησεν,
 οὐδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς ἄλλου ἢ διαφορὰ ἢ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ 5
 ἀδίκου τοὺς θανάτους καὶ τὰς μάχας πεποίηκεν ἢ γάρ;

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τούτους οὖν φῶμεν ἐπίστασθαι περὶ ὧν οὕτως
 σφόδρα διαφέρονται, ὥστε ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἀλλήλοις τὰ d
 ἔσχατα σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐργάζονται;

ΑΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς τοιούτους διδασκάλους ἀναφέρεις
 οὓς ὁμολογεῖς αὐτὸς μὴ εἰδέναι; 5

ΑΛ. Ἔοικα.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν εἰκός σε εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα,
 περὶ ὧν οὕτω πλανᾷ καὶ οὔτε μαθὼν φαίνῃ παρ' οὐδενὸς
 οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐξευρών;

ΑΛ. Ἐκ μὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις οὐκ εἰκός. 10

ΣΩ. Ὅρᾳς αὖ τοῦθ' ὥς οὐ καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ; e

ΑΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἐμὲ φῆς ταῦτα λέγειν.

ΑΛ. Τί δέ; οὐ σὺ λέγεις ὥς ἐγὼ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι περὶ
 τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων; 5

ΣΩ. Οὐ μέντοι.

ΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐγώ;

ΣΩ. Ναί.

ΑΛ. Πῶς δῆ;

ΣΩ. Ὡςδε εἶσθι. ἐάν σε ἔρωμαι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ δύο πότερα 10
 πλείω ἐστί, φήσεις ὅτι τὰ δύο;

ΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Πόσω;

c 4 post Κορωνεία add. συμβᾶσιν Proclus ἐν οἷς BT: ὅτε Proclus κλεινίας
 BT: om. Proclus c 5, 6 ἢ διαφορὰ . . . πεποίηκεν B: τὴν διαφορὰν . . .
 πεποικηκέναι T Proclus d 5 αὐτὸς] αὐτοὺς Hirschig e 4 οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι Ven.
 184: συνεπίσταμαι BTW: οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι Proclus

soc. And for the Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians who died at Tanagra too, I think, and for those who died later at Coronea, among whom your father also met his end,¹ it was a disagreement about nothing else than the just and the unjust that caused the deaths and the battles. Isn't that so?

ALC. What you say is true.

soc. Then are we to say that these people know about the things over which they disagree so violently that, disputing with one another, they do the worst to one another?

ALC. It doesn't appear so, no.

soc. So it is to teachers like these that you refer it, whom you yourself agree do not know?

ALC. So it seems.

soc. How, then, is it likely that you know what is just and unjust, on which you wander so, and appear neither to have learned them from anyone nor to have discovered them yourself?

ALC. From what you say, at least, it is not likely.

soc. Do you see, Alcibiades, that here again you have not spoken well?

ALC. In what?

soc. In saying that it is I who am saying these things.

ALC. What? Aren't you saying that I know nothing about what is just and unjust?

soc. No, indeed.

ALC. I am, then?

soc. Yes.

ALC. How so?

soc. You will know it this way. If I ask you which is more, one or two, will you say two?

ALC. I will.

soc. By how much?

1. At Tanagra (457 BC) the Spartans and their allies defeated the Athenians (Thucydides 1.107–108); on Coronea see the note at 103a. After "your father" Burnett brackets the name "Cleinias" as an addition, and it is not translated.

- ΑΛ. Ἐνί.
 ΣΩ. Πότερος οὖν ἡμῶν ὁ λέγων ὅτι τὰ δύο τοῦ ἐνὸς 15
 ἐνὶ πλείω;
 ΑΛ. Ἐγώ.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἡρώτων, σὺ δ' ἀπεκρίνου;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ τούτων μὴν ἐγὼ φαίνομαι λέγων ὁ ἐρωτῶν, 113
 ἢ σὺ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;
 ΑΛ. Ἐγώ.
 ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔρωμαι ποῖα γράμματα Σωκράτους,
 σὺ δ' εἴπῃς, πότερος ὁ λέγων; 5
 ΑΛ. Ἐγώ.
 ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, ἐνὶ λόγῳ εἰπέ ὅταν ἐρώτησίς τε καὶ
 ἀπόκρισις γίγνηται, πότερος ὁ λέγων, ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἢ ὁ ἀπο-
 κρινόμενος;
 ΑΛ. Ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. 10
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄρτι διὰ παντὸς ἐγὼ μὲν ἢ ὁ ἐρωτῶν;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Σὺ δ' ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;
 ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.
 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τὰ λεχθέντα πότερος ἡμῶν εἴρηκεν; 5
 ΑΛ. Φαίνομαι μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων
 ἐγώ.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέχθη περὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ὅτι Ἀλκι-
 βιάδης ὁ καλὸς ὁ Κλεινίου οὐκ ἐπίσταιτο, οἶοιτο δέ, καὶ
 μέλλοι εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἐλθὼν συμβουλευσεῖν Ἀθηναίους περὶ 10
 ὧν οὐδὲν οἶδεν; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν;
 ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.
 ΣΩ. Τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἄρα συμβαίνει, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη
 σοῦ τάδε κινδυνεύεις, οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι, οὐδ' ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ

a 4 ἔρωμαι ποῖα Olympiodorus: ἐρῶ καὶ ποῖα BT: ἐρωτῶ καὶ ποῖα Proclus b 1
 παντὸς TW Proclus: παντὸς τοῦ λόγου B b 8 ὅτι post ἀδίκων B: ante περὶ T c 3
 οὐκ Proclus (cf. Eur. Hipp. 352): ἀλλ' οὐκ BT

ALC. By one.

SOC. Then which of us is the one saying that two is more than one by one?

ALC. I am.

SOC. And wasn't I asking, and you answering?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then about these things, surely it isn't I, the one asking, 113
who appear to be saying them? Or is it you, the one answering?

ALC. I am.

SOC. And what if I ask what letters make "Socrates", and you tell me: which of us is the one saying it?

ALC. I am.

SOC. Come, then, tell me in a word: when there is question and answer, which is the one saying, the one asking or the one answering?

ALC. The one answering, I think, Socrates.

SOC. And just now, all the way through, wasn't I the one asking? b

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And you the one answering?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. Well then: which of us has said what was said?

ALC. I do appear to be the one, Socrates, from what has been agreed.

SOC. And wasn't it said, about what is just and unjust, that Alcibiades the beautiful, son of Cleinias, did not know, but thought he did, and was about to go into the Assembly and advise the Athenians on things he knows nothing about? Wasn't that it?

ALC. So it appears. c

SOC. Then it is as in Euripides, Alcibiades: you have heard this, it seems, from yourself, not from me,¹ and it is not I who am

1. Euripides, *Hippolytus* 352. Phaedra, who loves her stepson Hippolytus, makes her nurse say his name, and answers, "You hear this from yourself, not from me." The manuscripts have "but not from me"; Burnet prints Proclus' "not from me", which matches the line.

ταῦτα λέγων, ἀλλὰ σύ, ἐμὲ δὲ αἰτιᾶ μάτην. καὶ μέντοι
καὶ εὖ λέγεις. μανικὸν γὰρ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιχείρημα ἐπι- 5
χειρεῖν, ὧ βέλτιστε, διδάσκειν ἂ οὐκ οἶσθα, ἀμελήσας
μανθάνειν.

ΑΛ. Οἶμαι μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀλιγάκις Ἀθηναίους βου- d
λεύεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας πότερα δικαιότερα
ἢ ἀδικότερα τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἡγοῦνται δηλα εἶναι,
ἐάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὁπότερα συνοίσει
πράξασιν. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα οἶμαι ἐστὶν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ 5
συμφέροντα, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐλυσιτέλησεν ἀδικήσασι με-
γάλα ἀδικήματα, καὶ ἑτέροις γε οἶμαι δίκαια ἐργασαμένοις
οὐ συνήνεγκεν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἕτερα μὲν τὰ δίκαια
τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα, οὗ τί πού αὖ σὺ e
οἶε ταῦτ' εἰδέναι ἂ συμφέροι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δι' ὅτι;

ΑΛ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰ μὴ με αὖ ἐρήση
παρ' ὅτου ἔμαθον ἢ ὅπως αὐτὸς ἡῦρον.

ΣΩ. Οἶον τοῦτο ποιεῖς. εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις, τυγχάνει 5
δὲ δυνατὸν ὃν ἀποδείξαι δι' οὐπὲρ καὶ τὸ πρότερον λόγου,
οἶε δὴ καινὰ ἄττα δεῖν ἀκούειν ἀποδείξεις τε ἑτέρας, ὡς
τῶν προτέρων οἶον σκευαρίων κατατετριμμένων, καὶ οὐκέτ'
ἂν σὺ αὐτὰ ἀμπίσχοιο, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι τεκμήριον καθαρὸν
καὶ ἄχραντον οἴσει. ἐγὼ δὲ χαίρειν ἐάσας τὰς σὰς προ- 114
δρομὰς τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡττον ἐρήσομαι πόθεν μαθὼν αὖ τὰ
συμφέροντ' ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὅστις ἐστὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, καὶ
πάντ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερον ἐρωτῶ μὴ ἐρωτήσῃ; ἀλλὰ γὰρ
δηλὸν ὡς εἰς ταὐτὸν ἤξεις καὶ οὐχ ἕξεις ἀποδείξαι οὔθ' ὡς 5
ἐξευρῶν οἶσθα τὰ συμφέροντα οὔθ' ὡς μαθῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ
τρυφᾷς καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν ἡδέως τοῦ αὐτοῦ γεύσαιο λόγου, τοῦ-
τον μὲν ἐὼ χαίρειν, εἴτ' οἶσθα εἴτε μὴ τὰ Ἀθηναίους συμ-

c 4 ἐμὲ δὲ αἰτιᾶ T: με διαιτιᾶ B: ἐμὲ δὲ διαιτιᾶ W e 6 ὃν B: om. T Proclus e 7 δὴ
B: δεῖ T ἀποδείξεις τε ἑτέρας secl. Cobet e 9 τεκμήριον om. Ficinus, secl. Ast
a 2 πόθεν B Proclus: ὁπόθεν T Olympiodorus a 3 ὁ B Proclus: om. T

saying these things, but you, and you blame me without cause. And indeed what you say is right too: for it is a mad undertaking you mean to undertake, my excellent friend, to teach what you do not know, having taken no care to learn it.

ALC. I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the other Greeks seldom deliberate about which is more just or more unjust; for they think such things are obvious. So they let them be, and look into which course will be to their advantage if they take it. For what is just and what is advantageous are not the same, I think: many indeed have profited by doing great wrongs, and others, I think, have done what is just, and it was not to their advantage. d

soc. What then? Even if, in the fullest sense, what is just is in fact one thing and what is advantageous another, you surely don't think, again, that you know what is advantageous to men, and why? e

ALC. What's to prevent it, Socrates? Unless you're going to ask me again whom I learned it from, or how I discovered it myself.

soc. What a way to behave! If you say something not rightly, and it is in fact possible to prove it by the very argument we used before, you think, if you please, that you must hear some new things and different proofs, as though the earlier ones were, so to speak, little garments worn threadbare and you would no longer put them on, unless someone brings you evidence clean and unsoiled.¹ But I shall let your running ahead of the argument go, and ask none the less, this time about what is advantageous, where you learned it so as to know it, and who the teacher is; and am I to ask all those earlier questions in a single question? But no: it is plain you will come to the same place, and will not be able to prove either that you know what is advantageous by discovering it or by learning it. But since you are fastidious, and would no longer enjoy a taste of the same argument, I let that go, whether or not you know what is advantageous to the Athenians. 114

1. Socrates teases the young man's taste for novelty: an argument once used is a garment he will no longer put on, and a moment later a dish he is too fastidious to taste twice.

φέροντα πότερον δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντ' ἢ ἕτερα, τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας; εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σέ, εἰ δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διέξελλθε.

ΑΛ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴην, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ διελθεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦγαθέ, ἐμὲ ἐκκλησίαν νόμισον καὶ δῆμον καὶ ἐκεῖ τοί σε δεήσει ἓνα ἕκαστον πείθειν. ἦ γάρ;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἓνα τε οἷόν τε εἶναι κατὰ μόνας πείθειν καὶ συμπόλλους περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῇ, ὥσπερ ὁ γραμματιστὴς ἓνα τέ που πείθει περὶ γραμμάτων καὶ πολλούς;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς ἓνα τε καὶ πολλούς πείσει;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος δ' ἔσται ὁ εἰδώς, ὁ ἀριθμητικός;

ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ἄπερ καὶ πολλούς οἷός τε πείθειν εἶ, ταῦτα καὶ ἓνα;

ΑΛ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα δῆλον ὅτι ἂ οἴσθα.

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν τοσοῦτον μόνον διαφέρει τοῦ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ῥήτορος ὁ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ συνουσίᾳ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἀθρόους πείθει τὰ αὐτά, ὁ δὲ καθ' ἓνα;

ΑΛ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι νῦν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται πολλούς τε καὶ ἓνα πείθειν, ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐμμελέτησον καὶ ἐπιχείρησον ἐπιδιδῆσαι ὥς τὸ δίκαιον ἐνίοτε οὐ συμφέρει.

ΑΛ. Ὑβριστὴς εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

c2 τέ που πείθει B Proclus: τε ἔπειθέν που T: τε πείθει που W c4 οὐ B: om. T Proclus c9 καὶ σὺ T Proclus: σὺ B c14 διαφέρει T Proclus: διαφέρειν B d4 νῦν BT: τοῖνυν Proclus: δὴ νῦν vulg. d5 ἐμμελέτησον T Proclus: ἐν μελέτησον B

But whether what is just and what is advantageous are the same or different, why not prove it? If you like, by questioning me as I questioned you; or else go through it yourself, in a speech of your own. b

ALC. But I don't know whether I would be able, Socrates, to go through it before you.

soc. But, my good friend, think of me as the Assembly and the people. There too, you know, you will have to persuade each one of them. Isn't that so?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And doesn't it belong to the same man to be able to persuade one on his own and many together about the things he knows, just as the writing-master, I suppose, persuades one about letters, and many too? c

ALC. Yes.

soc. And about number too, won't the same man persuade one and many?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And this will be the one who knows, the arithmetician?

ALC. Certainly.

soc. And you too: the things you can persuade many of, you can persuade one of as well?

ALC. Likely, at any rate.

soc. And these are plainly the things you know.

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then isn't this the only difference between the speaker before the people and the speaker in a gathering like this: that the one persuades them of the same things all together, and the other one by one? d

ALC. It looks like it.

soc. Come now: since it appears to belong to the same man to persuade many and one, practise on me, and try to demonstrate that what is just is sometimes not advantageous.

ALC. You're insolent, Socrates.¹

1. *Hybristēs*, "insolent", "outrageous": in the *Symposium* Agathon (175e) and Alcibiades (215b) throw the same word at Socrates.

ΣΩ. Νῦν γοῦν ὑφ' ὕβρεως μέλλω σε πείθειν τάναντία οἷς σὺ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις.

ΑΛ. Λέγε δῆ.

10

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνου μόνον τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.

ΑΛ. Μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς λέγε.

e

ΣΩ. Τί δ'; οὐχ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλει πεισθῆναι;

ΑΛ. Πάντως δῆπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ λέγεις ὅτι ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, μάλιστ' ἂν εἷης πεπεισμένος;

5

ΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνου δῆ καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς σὺ σαυτοῦ ἀκούσης ὅτι τὰ δίκαια καὶ συμφέροντά ἐστιν, ἄλλω γε λέγοντι μὴ πιστεύσης.

ΑΛ. Οὔτοι, ἀλλ' ἀποκριτέον καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶομαι βλαβήσεσθαι.

10

ΣΩ. Μαντικὸς γὰρ εἶ. καί μοι λέγε τῶν δικαίων φῆς ἔνια μὲν συμφέρειν, ἔνια δ' οὐ;

115

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τὰ μὲν καλὰ αὐτῶν εἶναι, τὰ δ' οὐ;

ΑΛ. Πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;

5

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ἤδη σοι ἔδοξεν αἰσχροῖα μὲν, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν;

ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλά;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

10

ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ τὰ καλά; πότερον πάντα ἀγαθὰ, ἢ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δ' οὐ;

ΑΛ. Οἶομαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνια τῶν καλῶν κακὰ εἶναι.

e7 σαυτοῦ TW Proclus Olympiodorus: om. B ἀκούσης B Olympiodorus Stobaeus: ἀκούης T Proclus e8 καὶ add. Stobaeus: om. BT γε add. BW Proclus Stobaeus: om. T Olympiodorus a4 τί δέ T (τί δαί) Proclus: om. B αὐτῶν εἶναι B: εἶναι αὐτῶν T Proclus a6 ἥδη T Proclus Olympiodorus: δῆ B a9 καὶ T Proclus: om. B a11 ἢ T Proclus: om. B

soc. This time, at any rate, it is out of insolence that I am going to persuade you of the opposite of what you are unwilling to persuade me of.

alc. Speak, then.

soc. Just answer what you are asked.

alc. No, you speak yourself.

soc. What? Don't you want to be persuaded as fully as possible?

alc. Of course I do.

soc. Then if you say that this is so, you would be most fully persuaded?

alc. I think so.

soc. Answer, then; and if you yourself do not hear it from yourself that just things are also advantageous, don't believe anyone else who says it, at least.

alc. I won't. I must answer, then; and besides, I don't think I'll come to any harm.

soc. Why, you're a prophet.¹ Now tell me: of just things, do you say some are advantageous and some not? 115

alc. Yes.

soc. And again: that some of them are fine, and some not?

alc. How do you mean that question?

soc. Has anyone ever seemed to you to do things that were shameful but just?

alc. Not to me.

soc. Then all just things are fine as well?

alc. Yes.

soc. And again, fine things: are they all good, or some and not others?

alc. I think, Socrates, that some fine things are bad.

1. Perhaps truer than he knows: the refutation will cost him his opinion, but for Socrates being refuted does a man no harm; it cures him (compare *Gorgias* 475d).

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ αἰσχροὶ ἀγαθά;

15

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα λέγεις τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πολλοὶ ἐν πολέμῳ
βοηθήσαντες ἐταίρῳ ἢ οἰκείῳ τραύματα ἔλαβον καὶ ἀπέθανον,
οἱ δ' οὐ βοηθήσαντες, δέον, ὑγιεῖς ἀπῆλθον;

b

ΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν τοιαύτην βοήθειαν καλὴν μὲν λέγεις
κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τοῦ σῶσαι οὓς ἔδει, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν
ἀνδρεία ἢ οὐ;

5

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὴν δέ γε κατὰ τοὺς θανάτους τε καὶ ἔλκη ἢ γάρ;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

10

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἢ ἀνδρεία, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ θάνατος;

c

ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτόν γ' ἐστι καλὸν καὶ κακὸν τὸ
τοῖς φίλοις βοηθεῖν;

ΑΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

5

ΣΩ. Ὅρα τοίνυν εἰ, ἥ γε καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ
ἐνταῦθα. κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν γὰρ ὁμολόγεις καλὸν εἶναι τὴν
βοήθειαν τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ σκόπει, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ἀγαθὸν ἢ
κακόν; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει σὺ πότερ' ἂν δέξαιό σοι εἶναι,
ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά;

10

ΑΛ. Ἀγαθά.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μέγιστα μάλιστα.

d

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἥκιστα τῶν τοιούτων δέξαιο ἂν στέρεσθαι;

ΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν λέγεις περὶ ἀνδρείας; ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν αὐτοῦ
δέξαιο στέρεσθαι;

5

b 2 ἐταίρῳ T Proclus: ἐτέρῳ B b 3 οἱ T: οὐ B b 9 ἔλκη TW Proclus: τὰ ἔλκη
B c 1 οὖν οὐκ T Proclus: οὐκ B c 3 κατὰ ταῦτόν T: κατ' αὐτόν B Stobaeus c 6
ὥσπερ καὶ B Stobaeus: ὥσπερ T Proclus c 9 σὺ πότερα ἂν T: πότερα ἂν Proclus:
πότερον ἂν Olympiodorus: πότερ' ἂν Stobaeus: ποτέραν B d 2 ναί add. Dobree

soc. And some shameful things good?

alc. Yes.

soc. Do you mean things like this: many in war have gone to the help of a comrade or a kinsman and been wounded and died, while others did not go to help when they should have, and came away unharmed? b

alc. Certainly.

soc. Now such help you call fine in respect of the attempt to save those they ought to save, and that is courage, isn't it?

alc. Yes.

soc. But bad in respect of the deaths and wounds, isn't it?

alc. Yes.

soc. Now isn't courage one thing and death another? c

alc. Certainly.

soc. Then helping one's friends is not fine and bad in the same respect?

alc. It appears not.

soc. See, then, whether insofar as it is fine it is also good, as here too. For you agreed that the help was fine in respect of courage. Now look into this very thing, courage: is it good or bad? Look into it this way: which would you be willing to have, good things or bad?

alc. Good things.

soc. And the greatest most of all. d

alc. Yes.¹

soc. And these are the things you would least be willing to be deprived of?

alc. Of course.

soc. Then what do you say about courage? At what price would you be willing to be deprived of it?

1. No witness gives Alcibiades an answer here, Stobaeus included; Dobree supplied "Yes", and Burnet prints it in angle brackets.

- ΑΛ. Οὐδὲ ζῆν ἂν ἐγὼ δεξαίμην δειλὸς ὢν.
 ΣΩ. Ἐσχατον ἄρα κακῶν εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ ἢ δειλία.
 ΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε.
 ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἴσου τῷ τεθνάναι, ὡς ἔοικε. 10
 ΑΛ. Φημί.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν θανάτῳ τε καὶ δειλίᾳ ἐναντιώτατον ζωῇ καὶ ἀνδρεία;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Καὶ τὰ μὲν μάλιστ' ἂν εἶναι βούλοιό σοι, τὰ δὲ e
 ἥκιστα;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄριστα ἡγῇ, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα;
 ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. 5
 ΣΩ. Ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἄρα σὺ ἡγῇ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι κὰν τοῖς κακίοις θάνατον.
 ΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.
 ΣΩ. Τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις, ἥ μὲν καλόν, κατ' ἀγαθοῦ πράξιν τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας, καλὸν αὐτὸ 10
 προσείπας;
 ΑΛ. Φαίνομαί γε.
 ΣΩ. Κατὰ δέ γε κακοῦ πράξιν τὴν τοῦ θανάτου κακόν;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὧδε δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἐκάστην τῶν 15
 πράξεων εἴπερ ἡ κακὸν ἀπεργάζεται κακὴν καλεῖς, καὶ ἡ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὴν κλητέον. 116
 ΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.
 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οἶν καὶ ἡ ἀγαθόν, καλόν ἡ δὲ κακόν, αἰσχυρόν;

d7 ἐγὼν BT: ἔγωγε Stobaeus d8 κακῶν εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ B: σοι κακὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ T Proclus: σοι δοκεῖ κακὸν εἶναι Stobaeus e1 μάλιστ' ἂν B: μάλιστα T Proclus Stobaeus e4 ὅτι BT: οἶν Stobaeus e5 πάνυ γε . . . e7 θάνατον Stobaeus: om. BT Proclus e8 ἔγωγε B: πάνυ γε TW Proclus e13 δέ γε T Proclus: δὲ B Stobaeus e15 ὧδε δίκαιον BT: δίκαιον ὧδε Stobaeus e16 ἀπεργάζεται B Stobaeus: ἐργάζεται T Proclus

ALC. I wouldn't even be willing to live, if I were a coward.

SOC. Then cowardice seems to you the very worst of bad things.

ALC. To me, yes.

SOC. On a par with being dead, it seems.

ALC. I say so.

SOC. And are not life and courage the most opposite to death and cowardice?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And the one pair you would most want to be yours, and the other least?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Is that because you think the one pair best and the other worst?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. So you think courage is among the best things, and death among the worst.¹

ALC. I do.

SOC. Then helping one's friends in war, insofar as it is fine, in respect of the doing of something good, the doing of courage, you called fine?

ALC. I appear to have, yes.

SOC. But in respect of the doing of something bad, the doing of death, bad?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then it is just to name each of our doings in this way: if you call it bad insofar as it produces something bad, then insofar as it produces something good it must be called good.

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ALC. I think so.

SOC. Then is it also fine insofar as it is good, and shameful insofar as it is bad?

1. Alcibiades' "Certainly" and this sentence of Socrates' are missing from B, T and Proclus; Burnet prints them in angle brackets from Stobaeus, who quotes 114e–116d (*Anthology* 3.1.193).

ΑΛ. Ναί.

5

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἄρ' ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις βοήθειαν λέγων καλὴν μὲν εἶναι, κακὴν δέ, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως λέγεις ἢ εἰ προσεῖπες αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν μὲν, κακὴν δέ.

ΑΛ. Ἀληθὴ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν καλῶν, καθ' ὅσον καλόν, κακόν, 10 οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσchrῶν, καθ' ὅσον αἰσchrόν, ἀγαθόν.

ΑΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

b

ΣΩ. Ἐτι τοίνυν καὶ ὧδε σκέψαι. ὅστις καλῶς πράττει, οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δ' εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαίμονες;

5

ΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εὐδαίμονες δι' ἀγαθῶν κτῆσιν;

ΑΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Κτῶνται δὲ ταῦτα τῷ εὖ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

10

ΣΩ. Τὸ εὖ ἄρα πράττειν ἀγαθόν;

ΑΛ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καλὸν ἢ εὐπραγία;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτόν ἄρα ἐφάνη ἡμῖν πάλιν αὖ καλόν τε καὶ 15 ἀγαθόν.

ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἂν ἄρα εὖρωμεν καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν εὐρήσομεν 5 ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τὰ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρει ἢ οὐ;

ΑΛ. Συμφέρει.

a 8 προσεῖπες B Stobaeus: προεῖπες T Proclus post κακὴν δέ add. οὐδαμῶς Stobaeus b 3 οὐχὶ καὶ BT: οὐκ Olympiodorus b 11 τὸ γοῦν καλῶς πράττειν Stobaeus c 4 καὶ B Olympiodorus Stobaeus: τε καὶ T c 5 λόγου BT: παραδείγματος Stobaeus

ALC. Yes.

soc. So when you say that the help given to friends in war is fine, but bad, you are saying nothing different than if you had called it good, but bad.

ALC. I think what you say is true, Socrates.

soc. So nothing fine, insofar as it is fine, is bad, and nothing shameful, insofar as it is shameful, is good.

ALC. It appears not.

soc. Then look into it this way as well. Whoever does finely, does he not also do well?¹

ALC. Yes.

soc. And those who do well, are they not happy?

ALC. Of course.

soc. And they are happy through the acquisition of good things?

ALC. Most certainly.

soc. And they acquire these by doing well and finely?

ALC. Yes.

soc. So doing well is good?

ALC. How could it not be?

soc. And is not doing well fine?

ALC. Yes.

soc. So once again the same thing has appeared to us both fine and good.

ALC. So it appears.

soc. Whatever we find to be fine, then, we shall also find to be good, from this argument at least.

ALC. Necessarily.

soc. What about this: are good things advantageous or not?

ALC. Advantageous.

1. *Eu prattein*, “to do well”, means both to act well and to fare well, to prosper. The argument trades on both senses, and the English “do well” keeps both.

ΣΩ. Μνημονεύεις οὖν περὶ τῶν δικαίων πῶς ὡμολογή-
σαμεν;

10

ΑΛ. Οἶμαί γε τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας ἀναγκαῖον
εἶναι καλὰ πράττειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς τὰ καλὰ ἀγαθά;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρειν;

d

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δίκαια ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, συμφέροντά ἐστιν.

ΑΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ταῦτα οὐ σὺ ὁ λέγων, ἐγὼ δὲ ὁ ἐρωτῶν;

5

ΑΛ. Φαίνομαι, ὡς ἔοικα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τις ἀνίσταται συμβουλεύσων εἴτε Ἀθηναίους
εἴτε Πεπαρηθίους, οἰόμενος γιγνώσκειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ
ἄδικα, φήσει δ' εἶναι τὰ δίκαια κακὰ ἐνίοτε, ἄλλο τι ἢ
καταγελῶς ἂν αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδὴ περ τυγχάνεις καὶ σὺ λέγων
ὅτι ταῦτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντα;

10

e

ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ' ἔγωγε
οὐδ' ὅτι λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικα ἀτόπως ἔχοντι τοτὲ
μὲν γάρ μοι ἕτερα δοκεῖ σοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, τοτὲ δ' ἄλλα.

ΣΩ. Εἰτα τοῦτο, ὦ φίλε, ἀγνοεῖς τὸ πάθημα τί ἐστιν;

5

ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οἶε ἂν οὖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῶν σε δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς ἢ
τρεῖς ἔχεις, καὶ δύο χεῖρας ἢ τέτταρας, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν
τοιούτων, τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλα, ἢ
αἰετὰ αὐτά;

10

ΑΛ. Δέδοικα μὲν ἔγωγε ἤδη περὶ ἐμαντοῦ, οἶμαι μέντοι
τὰ αὐτά.

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ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτι οἶσθα; τοῦτ' αἴτιον;

c9 ὡμολογήσας Stobaeus c11 οἶμαί γε om. Stobaeus τὰ δίκαια B Stobaeus:
δίκαια T c13 καὶ B: om. T οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς τὰ καίρια λέγοντας Stobaeus (om.
mox duobus versibus) d5 λέγων B Olympiodorus: λέγων εἰ T d9 φήσει] φησὶ
ci. Stallbaum εἶναι B: εἰδέναι T a3 οἶσθα bt: οἶσθας BT

soc. Do you remember, then, what we agreed about just things?

alc. I think, at least, that those who do just things must do fine things.

soc. And that those who do fine things do good things?

alc. Yes.

soc. And that good things are advantageous?

d

alc. Yes.

soc. So just things, Alcibiades, are advantageous.

alc. It seems so.

soc. Well then: aren't you the one saying these things, and I the one asking?

alc. I appear to be, it seems.

soc. Then if someone stands up to advise the Athenians or the Peparethians,¹ thinking he knows what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes bad, would you do anything but laugh at him, since you yourself are in fact saying that what is just and what is advantageous are the same?

e

alc. But by the gods, Socrates, I don't even know what I'm saying; I am simply like a man in a strange state: at one time one thing seems so to me as you question me, and at another time another.

soc. And you are ignorant, my friend, of what this condition is?

alc. Certainly.

soc. Do you think, then, that if someone asked you whether you have two eyes or three, and two hands or four, or anything else of that kind, you would answer at one time one thing and at another time another, or always the same?

alc. By now I'm afraid for myself; but still, I think the same.

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soc. Isn't that because you know? Is that the reason?

1. Peparethos, a small island off Thessaly (modern Skopelos): a great city or a small one.

ΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Περὶ ὧν ἄρα ἄκων τάναντία ἀποκρίνη, δῆλον ὅτι 5
περὶ τούτων οὐκ οἶσθα.

ΑΛ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ καλῶν
καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ
μὴ ἀποκρινόμενος φῆς πλανᾶσθαι; εἶτα οὐ δῆλον ὅτι διὰ 10
τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτα πλανᾷ;

ΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει ἐπειδάν τις τι μὴ εἰδῇ,
ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τούτου πλανᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν; b

ΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἶσθα ὄντινα τρόπον ἀναβήσῃ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν; 5

ΑΛ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ πλανᾶταί σου ἡ δόξα περὶ ταῦτα;

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' αἴτιον οἶσθα ἢ ἐγὼ φράσω;

ΑΛ. Φράσον.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ φίλε, οὐκ οἶε αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὐκ ἐπι- 10
στάμενος.

ΑΛ. Πῶς αὖ τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅρα καὶ σὺ κοινῇ. ἂ μὴ ἐπίστασαι, γινώσκεις δὲ
ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι, πλανᾷ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; ὥσπερ περὶ
οἷφου σκευασίας οἶσθα δήπου ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα; c

ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αὐτὸς περὶ ταῦτα δοξάζεις ὅπως χρὴ
σκευάζειν καὶ πλανᾷ, ἢ τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ ἐπιτρέπεις; 5

ΑΛ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ ἐν νηϊ πλείοις, ἄρα δοξάζοις ἂν πότερον
χρὴ τὸν οἶακα εἰσω ἄγειν ἢ ἔξω, καὶ ἅτε οὐκ εἰδὼς πλανῶ d
ἂν, ἢ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἂν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοις;

b 2 καὶ (ἀεὶ) ἔχει Schleiermacher b 3 τούτου] τοῦτο Ast b 9 ἐγὼ T: om. B c 2
δὲ ὅτι T: διότι B

ALC. I think so.

soc. So about the things on which you give contrary answers against your will, it is plain that you do not know them.

ALC. Likely, at any rate.

soc. And about what is just and unjust, fine and shameful, bad and good, advantageous and not, you say too that you wander in answering? Then is it not plain that it is because you do not know about them that you wander?

ALC. To me, yes.

soc. Is it so, then: whenever someone does not know a thing, his soul must wander about it?

ALC. Of course.

soc. Well then: do you know in what way you will go up to heaven?

ALC. By Zeus, I don't.

soc. And does your opinion wander about that too?

ALC. Certainly not.

soc. Do you know the reason, or shall I tell you?

ALC. Tell me.

soc. Because, my friend, not knowing it, you do not think you know it.

ALC. How do you mean that, again?

soc. You too, see it along with me. The things you do not know, but know that you do not know: do you wander about things like that? As about the preparing of a dish: you know, surely, that you don't know?

ALC. Certainly.

soc. Then do you form opinions yourself about how it should be prepared, and wander, or do you leave it to the one who knows?

ALC. The latter.

soc. And if you were sailing in a ship, would you form opinions on whether one ought to push the tiller in or out, and wander for not knowing, or would you leave it to the pilot and keep quiet?

ΑΛ. Τῷ κυβερνήτῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ αὐτῆς μὴ οἶσθα πλανᾷ, ἄνπερ εἰδῆς ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα;

5

ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔοικα.

ΣΩ. Ἐννοεῖς οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα ἐν τῇ πράξει διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιάν ἐστι, τὴν τοῦ μὴ εἰδότα οἶσθαι εἰδέναι;

ΑΛ. Πῶς αὖ λέγεις τοῦτο;

10

ΣΩ. Τότε που ἐπιχειροῦμεν πράττειν, ὅταν οἰώμεθα εἰδέναι ὅτι πράττομεν;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ γέ πού τινες μὴ οἶωνται εἰδέναι, ἄλλοις παραδιδόασιν;

ΑΛ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν μὴ εἰδόντων ἀναμάρτητοι ζῶσι διὰ τὸ ἄλλοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιτρέπειν;

5

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίνες οὖν οἱ ἀμαρτάνοντες; οὐ γάρ που οἱ γε εἰδότες.

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐθ' οἱ εἰδότες οὐθ' οἱ τῶν μὴ εἰδόντων εἰδότες ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν, ἢ ἄλλοι λείπονται ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες, οἰόμενοι δ' εἰδέναι;

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ΑΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὐτοί.

ΣΩ. Αὕτη ἄρα ἡ ἄγνοια τῶν κακῶν αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία;

5

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν ἡ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα, τότε κακουργοτάτη καὶ αἰσχίστη;

ΑΛ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἔχεις μείζω εἰπεῖν δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων;

10

ε 1 δέ γε T: λέγε B a 4, 5 καὶ . . . ἀμαθία secl. Hermann a 4 καὶ secl. Schleiermacher ἡ secl. Buttman

ALC. Leave it to the pilot.

soc. So you do not wander about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know?

ALC. I seem not to.

soc. Do you take in, then, that mistakes in doing, too, are due to this ignorance, the ignorance of thinking one knows when one does not?

ALC. How do you mean that, again?

soc. We set about doing something, I suppose, when we think we know what we are doing?

ALC. Yes.

soc. But when some people, I suppose, do not think they know, e they hand it over to others?

ALC. Of course.

soc. So such people, among those who do not know, live without making mistakes, because they leave these things to others?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then who are the ones who make mistakes? Not, surely, those who know.

ALC. Certainly not.

soc. And since it is neither those who know, nor those who, not knowing, know that they do not know, does anyone else remain 118 except those who do not know but think they know?

ALC. No, only these.

soc. So this ignorance is the cause of bad things, and is the disgraceful stupidity?¹

ALC. Yes.

soc. And when it concerns the greatest things, then it does the most harm and is most shameful?

ALC. By far.

soc. Well then: can you name anything greater than what is just, fine, good and advantageous?

1. *Amathia*, "stupidity", is literally the state of one who has not learned. "The disgraceful *amathia*" is Socrates' name for the ignorance that thinks it knows, as in the *Apology* (29b); he returns to it at 118b.

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ταῦτα σὺ φῆς πλανᾶσθαι;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ πλανᾷ, ἄρ' οὐ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὅτι 15
οὐ μόνον ἀγνοεῖς τὰ μέγιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐκ εἰδὼς οἶει αὐτὰ b
εἰδέναι;

ΑΛ. Κινδυνεύω.

ΣΩ. Βαβαῖ ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, οἷον πάθος πέπονθας 5
ὃ ἐγὼ ὀνομάζω μὲν ὀκνῶ, ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμέν, ὅ
ρήτεον. ἀμαθία γὰρ συνοικεῖς, ὦ βέλτιστε, τῇ ἐσχάτῃ, ὡς
ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ καὶ σὺ σαυτοῦ διὸ καὶ ἄττεις ἄρα
πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πρὶν παιδευθῆναι. πέπονθας δὲ τοῦτο
οὐ σὺ μόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πραττόντων τὰ τῆσδε
τῆς πόλεως, πλὴν ὀλίγων γε καὶ ἴσως τοῦ σοῦ ἐπιτρόπου c
Περικλέους.

ΑΛ. Λέγεται γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου
σοφὸς γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς καὶ σοφοῖς συγγεγονέναι,
καὶ Πυθοκλείδῃ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τηλικούτος 5
ὢν Δάμωνι σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἤδη τιν' εἶδες σοφὸν ὅτιοῦν ἀδυνατοῦντα
ποιῆσαι ἄλλον σοφὸν ἅπερ αὐτός; ὥσπερ ὅς σε ἐδίδαξεν
γράμματα, αὐτός τ' ἦν σοφὸς καὶ σὲ ἐποίησε τῶν τε ἄλλων
ὄντιν' ἐβούλετο ἦ γάρ; 10

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ὁ παρ' ἐκείνου μαθὼν ἄλλον οἷός d
τε ἔσῃ;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ καθαριστὴς δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδοτρίβης ὡσαύτως;

b1 οἶει TW: om. B αὐτὰ B: ταῦτα T b4 οἷον T Olympiodorus: ποῖον B b5
μόνῳ] αὐτοῖ Cobet b6 ἐσχάτῃ B Olympiodorus: αἰσχίστῃ T b7 κατηγορεῖ BT:
καταμαρτυρεῖ Olympiodorus b8 πρὸς BT: ἐπὶ Olympiodorus c1 γε B Olym-
piodorus: τε T c3 τοι B Olympiodorus: om. T c6 αὐτοῦ τούτου T: αὐτουτου B
c7 ἤδη T: δὴ B c8 ὥσπερ B: ὅσπερ T c10 ὄντιν' B: ὄντα T c11 ναί Bt: om. T

ALC. Certainly not.

soc. And it is about these that you say you wander?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And if you wander, is it not plain from what went before that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but also, not knowing them, think you know them? b

ALC. It seems I am.

soc. Oh dear, Alcibiades, what a condition you are in! I shrink from naming it, but all the same, since there are just the two of us, it must be said. For you are living with stupidity, my excellent friend, of the most extreme kind, as the argument accuses you and you accuse yourself; and that, it seems, is why you are darting into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this condition: so are most of those who manage the affairs of this city, except for a few, and perhaps your guardian Pericles. c

ALC. Well, Socrates, he at least is said not to have become wise of himself, but to have kept company with many wise men, Pythocleides and Anaxagoras; and even now, at his age, he keeps company with Damon for this very purpose.¹

soc. Well then: have you ever yet seen anyone wise in anything at all who was unable to make another wise in what he was wise in himself? Just as the man who taught you your letters was wise himself and made you so, and anyone else he wished. Isn't that so?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And you too, having learned from him, will be able to make another so? d

ALC. Yes.

soc. And the lyre-master and the trainer likewise?

1. Pythocleides, a teacher of music, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, the natural philosopher, and Damon, the theorist of music, are all named by Plutarch (*Pericles* 4–6) among Pericles' teachers.

ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

5

ΣΩ. Καλὸν γὰρ δήπου τεκμήριον τοῦτο τῶν ἐπισταμένων ὅτιοι οὐκ ἐπίστανται, ἐπειδὴν καὶ ἄλλον οἶοί τ' ὦσιν ἀποδείξαι ἐπιστάμενον.

ΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν Περικλῆς τίνα ἐποίησεν σοφόν, ἀπὸ τῶν ὑέων ἀρξάμενος;

10

ΑΛ. Τί δ' εἰ τῷ Περικλέους ὑεὶ ἡλιθίῳ ἐγενέσθην, ὦ Σώκρατες;

e

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ Κλεινίαν τὸν σὸν ἀδελφόν.

ΑΛ. Τί δ' ἂν αὐτὸν Κλεινίαν λέγοις, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον;

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν Κλεινίας μὲν μαίνεται, τὸ δὲ Περικλέους ὑεὶ ἡλιθίῳ ἐγενέσθην, σοὶ τίνα αἰτίαν ἀναθῶμεν, δι' ὅτι σε οὕτως ἔχοντα περιορᾷ;

5

ΑΛ. Ἐγὼ οἶμαι αἴτιος οὐ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων δοῦλον ἢ ἐλευθέρου εἰπέ ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγονέναι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔχω σοὶ εἰπεῖν διὰ τὴν Ζήνωνος Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάρχου, ὧν ἕκαστος Ζήνωνι ἑκατὸν μνᾶς τελέσας σοφός τε καὶ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν.

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5

ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δὲ οὐκ ἔχω.

ΣΩ. Εἴεν τί οὖν διανοῇ περὶ σαυτοῦ; πότερον ἔαν ὥς νῦν ἔχεις, ἢ ἐπιμέλειάν τινα ποιείσθαι;

ΑΛ. Κοινὴ βουλή, ὦ Σώκρατες. καίτοι ἐννοῶ σου εἰπόντος καὶ συγχωρῶ δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντες ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων ἀπαιδεύονται εἶναι.

b

ΣΩ. Εἴτα τί δὴ τοῦτο;

ΑΛ. Εἰ μὲν που ἦσαν πεπαιδευμένοι, ἔδει ἂν τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα αὐτοῖς ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι μαθόντα καὶ ἀσκήσαντα

5

d6 τεκμήριον τοῦτο B: τοῦτο τεκμήριον T Olympiodorus e4 ἂν secl. Schleiermacher et mox λέγεις e6 ἡλιθίῳ BT: λίθοι Olympiodorus a8 ἔαν B: ἐὰν Olympiodorus: ἂν T b1 κοινὴ βουλή Stephanus: κοινῇ βουλῇ BT b5 ἂν τὸν T: αὐτὸν τὸν B

ALC. Certainly.

soc. For this, surely, is fine evidence that those who know anything do know it: when they are able to turn out another who knows it as well.

ALC. I think so.

soc. Well then: can you say whom Pericles made wise, beginning with his sons?

ALC. What if Pericles' two sons turned out simpletons, Socrates?¹ e

soc. Then Cleinias, your brother.

ALC. And why would you name Cleinias in turn, a madman?

soc. Well, since Cleinias is mad, and Pericles' two sons turned out simpletons, what cause are we to assign in your case, why he lets you be as you are?

ALC. I am the cause, I think, by not paying attention.

soc. But tell me, of the other Athenians or of the foreigners, slave 119
or free, who is credited with having become wiser through his company with Pericles, as I can name for you, through Zeno's company, Pythodorus son of Isolochus and Callias son of Calliades: each of them paid Zeno a hundred minae and has become wise and distinguished.²

ALC. No, by Zeus, I can't.

soc. Very well: what do you have in mind about yourself, then? To leave yourself as you are now, or to take some care?

ALC. Let us deliberate on it together, Socrates. And yet I take in b
what you have said, and I concede it: those who manage the city's affairs seem to me, except for a few, to be uneducated.

soc. And so what of that?

ALC. If, I suppose, they were educated, anyone setting about contending against them would have to learn and train

1. Xanthippus and Paralus. In the *Meno* (94b) Socrates says that Pericles had them taught riding and music and all that art can teach, but could not make them good; in the *Protagoras* (319e–320a) they wander about on their own, in case they light on virtue by themselves.

2. Zeno of Elea, Parmenides' pupil. Zeno and Parmenides lodge with Pythodorus in the *Parmenides* (127b–c); Callias is usually identified with the general killed at Potidaea in 432 (Thucydides 1.61–63). A hundred minae was a very large fee: in the *Apology* (20b) Evenus teaches for five.

ιέναι ὡς ἐπ’ ἀθλητάς νῦν δ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ οὗτοι ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντες ἐλγλύθασιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, τί δεῖ ἀσκεῖν καὶ μανθάνοντα πράγματα ἔχειν; ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰ οἶδ’ ὅτι τούτων τῇ γε φύσει πάνυ πολὺν περιέσομαι.

ΣΩ. Βαβαῖ, οἶον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοῦτ’ εἴρηκας ὡς ἀνάξιον τῆς ιδέας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν σοι ὑπαρχόντων.

ΑΛ. Τί μάλιστα καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἀγανακτῶ ὑπὲρ τε σοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑμαυτοῦ ἔρωτος.

ΑΛ. Τί δῆ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἡξιώσας τὸν ἀγῶνά σοι εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπους.

ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τίνας μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἄξιον τοῦτό γε καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἄνδρα οἰόμενον μεγαλόφρονα εἶναι.

ΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; οὐ πρὸς τούτους μοι ὁ ἀγών;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ τριήρη διενσοῦ κυβερνᾶν μέλλουσιν ναυμαχεῖν, ἥρκει ἂν σοι τῶν συνναυτῶν βελτίστῳ εἶναι τὰ κυβερνητικά, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν ὧν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ἀπέβλεπες δ’ ἂν εἰς τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνταγωνιστάς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς νῦν εἰς τοὺς συναγωνιστάς; ὧν δήπου περιγενέσθαι σε δεῖ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καταφρονηθέντας συναγωνίζεσθαι σοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι γε καλόν τι ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι διανοῇ καὶ ἄξιον σαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς πόλεως.

ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διανοοῦμαι γε.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ σοι ἄρα ἄξιον ἀγαπᾶν εἰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν βελτίων εἶ, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἡγεμόνας ἀποβλέπειν εἴ ποτε ἐκείνων βελτίων γέγονας, σκοποῦντα καὶ ἀσκοῦντα πρὸς ἐκείνους.

c 5 τε BT: om. Olympiodorus σοῦ Olympiodorus: τοῦ σοῦ BT ἑμαυτοῦ B
Olympiodorus: ἐμοῦ T d 4 ἀλλὰ T: ἄρα B d 7 δ’ ἂν B: δὲ T e 1 ἀξιοῦν
ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι B: συνανταγωνίζεσθαι T: συναγωνίζεσθαι W (αντ s.v. w) e 5 σοι
ἄρα B: ἄρα σοι T Olympiodorus e 7 εἴ ποτε scripsi: ὁπότε BT: ὅπη τε Heindorf
(qua ratione Ficinus): τί ποτε Ast γέγονας BT: γένιοιο Heindorf Stallbaum cum
Ven. 184

and go against them as against athletes; but as it is, since these men too have come to the city's affairs as amateurs, why should one train, and take the trouble of learning? For I know very well that I shall be far, far above these men by nature, at least. c

soc. Oh dear, best of men, what a thing you have said! How unworthy of your looks and of the other advantages that are yours!

ALC. Why ever do you say that, Socrates, and with what in view?

soc. I am indignant on your behalf, and on behalf of my love.

ALC. Why?

soc. That you should have thought fit to have your contest with the men here.

ALC. Well, with whom, then?

soc. That is a question worth asking indeed, for a man who thinks himself high-minded. d

ALC. What do you mean? Isn't my contest with these men?

soc. Well, if you had it in mind to pilot a trireme that was about to fight at sea, would it be enough for you to be the best of your shipmates at piloting? Or would you think that these things must be yours already, and look to your real opponents, and not, as now, to those contending on your side? These, surely, you must surpass so far that they do not think fit to contend against you, but, despised, contend on your side against the enemy, if you really have it in mind to display some fine deed worthy of yourself and of the city. e

ALC. Well, I do have it in mind.

soc. So it is quite worthy of you, then, to be content if you are better than the soldiers, and not to look to the rivals' leaders, whether you have ever become better than they,¹ looking into them and training against them.

1. Burnet's own correction (*scripsi*): "whether ever", where the manuscripts have "when".

ΑΛ. Λέγεις δὲ τίνας τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθα ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις τε καὶ τῷ μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ πολεμοῦσαν ἐκάστοτε;

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἡγεμῶν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς 5 πόλεως, πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέας καὶ τοὺς Περσῶν τὸν ἀγῶνα ἡγούμενός σοι εἶναι ὀρθῶς ἂν ἡγοίς;

ΑΛ. Κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ὦγαθέ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς Μειδίαν σε δεῖ τὸν ὀρτυγο- 6 κόπον ἀποβλέπειν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους—οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πρᾶττειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἔτι τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη, φαῖεν ἂν αἱ γυναικες, τρίχα ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπ' ἀμουσίας καὶ οὐπω ἀποβεβληκότες, ἔτι δὲ βαρβαρίζοντες ἐληλύθασι 5 κολακεύοντες τὴν πόλιν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρξοντες—πρὸς τούτους σε δεῖ, οὐσπερ λέγω, βλέποντα σαντοῦ δὴ ἀμελεῖν, καὶ μήτε μανθάνειν ὅσα μαθήσεως ἔχεται, μέλλοντα τοσοῦτον ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι, μήτε ἀσκεῖν ὅσα δεῖται ἀσκήσεως, καὶ πᾶσαν παρασκευὴν παρεσκευασμένον οὕτως ἰέναι ἐπὶ 6 τὰ τῆς πόλεως.

ΑΛ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς μὲν μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν, οἶμαι μέντοι τοὺς τε Λακεδαιμονίων στρατηγούς καὶ τὸν 5 Περσῶν βασιλέα οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦ ἄριστε, τὴν οὔησιν ταύτην σκόπει οἷαν ἔχεις.

ΑΛ. Τοῦ πέρι;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν ποτέρως ἂν οἶε σαντοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπι- 6 μεληθῆναι, φοβούμενός τε καὶ οἰόμενος δεινούς αὐτοὺς εἶναι, ἢ μή;

a 6 πόλεως B: πόλεως ὡς T καὶ τοὺς] καὶ τὸν Cobet a 9 ὀρτυγοκόπον Olympiodorus Athenaeus scholiastes: ὀρτυγοτρόφον BT b 2 ἔτι T Olympiodorus: ἐπὶ B b 3 ἐν B Olympiodorus: ἐπὶ T b 5 κολακεύοντες T: κολακεύοντες B b 6 δὴ Madvig: δὲ BT: om. al. c 1 παρεσκευασμένον B: παρασκευασάμενον T Olympiodorus: παρασκευασμένον W c 4 τὸν T: τῶν B c 9 ποτέρως B Olympiodorus: πότερος T

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ALC. And who do you mean by these, Socrates?

soc. Don't you know that our city is at war with the Spartans and the Great King time after time?

ALC. What you say is true.

soc. Then if you mean to be a leader of this city, you would be right to think that your contest is with the kings of the Spartans and of the Persians?

ALC. You may well be right.

soc. No, my good friend: it is to Meidias the quail-tapper that you must look, and others like him, who set about managing the city's affairs with the slave's hair, as the women would say, still on their souls from their lack of culture, and have not yet cast it off, and who, still talking like barbarians, have come to flatter the city, not to rule it. To these, the very ones I mean, you must look, and take no care of yourself, of course, and neither learn what calls for learning, when you are going to contend in so great a contest, nor train in what calls for training, and, thus prepared in every way, go into the city's affairs.¹

ALC. Well, Socrates, you seem to me to be right; and yet I think the generals of the Spartans and the king of the Persians are no different from anyone else.

soc. But, best of men, look into this notion of yours, what sort of notion it is.

ALC. In what respect?

soc. First: in which case do you think you would care for yourself more, if you feared them and thought them formidable, or not?

1. Meidias was a politician mocked in comedy: Aristophanes says he was called Quail, looking like a quail struck on the head by a quail-tapper (*Birds* 1297–99). In one ancient account of the game (Pollux 9.107–9) a quail was flicked on the head to see if it would hold its ground. The manuscripts have “quail-breeder”; Burnet prints “quail-tapper” from Olympiodorus, Athenaeus and a scholiast. What custom lies behind “the slave’s hair” is uncertain.

ΑΛ. Δηλὸν ὅτι εἰ δεινὸς οἰοίμην.

ΣΩ. Μὴ οὖν οἶε τι βλαβήσεσθαι ἐπιμεληθεὶς σαυτοῦ;

ΑΛ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὀνήσεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῦτο τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔχει ἢ οἷσιν αὕτη.

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δεύτερον τοῖνυν, ὅτι καὶ ψευδὴς ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων σκέψαι.

ΑΛ. Πῶς δῆ;

ΣΩ. Πότερον εἰκὸς ἀμείνους γίγνεσθαι φύσεις ἐν γενναίοις γένεσιν ἢ μή;

ΑΛ. Δηλὸν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς γενναίοις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοὺς εὖ φύντας, ἐὰν καὶ εὖ τραφῶσιν, οὕτω τελέους γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετήν;

ΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκεψώμεθα δῆ, τοῖς ἐκείνων τὰ ἡμέτερα ἀντιτιθέντες, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι φανλοτέρων γενῶν εἶναι οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Περσῶν βασιλῆς. ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὥς οἱ μὲν Ἡρακλέους, οἱ δὲ Ἀχαιμένους ἔκγονοι, τὸ δ' Ἡρακλέους τε γένος καὶ τὸ Ἀχαιμένους εἰς Περσέα τὸν Διὸς ἀναφέρεται;

ΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς Εὐρυσάκη, τὸ δ' Εὐρυσάκους εἰς Δία.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ γενναῖε Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰς Δαίδαλον, ὁ δὲ Δαίδαλος εἰς Ἥφαιστον τὸν Διός. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τούτων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀρξάμενα βασιλῆς εἰσιν ἐκ βασιλέων μέχρι Διός, οἱ μὲν Ἄργους τε καὶ Λακεδαίμονος, οἱ δὲ τῆς Περσίδος τὸ αἶε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοὶ τε ἰδιῶται καὶ οἱ πατέρες. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς προγόνους σε δέοι καὶ τὴν πατρίδα Εὐρυσάκους ἐπιδείξαι Σαλαμῖνα ἢ τὴν Αἰακοῦ τοῦ ἔτι προτέρου

d₃ εἰ B: καὶ εἰ T d₁₂ γίγνεσθαι BT: γενέσθαι Olympiodorus e₃ τραφῶσιν T: γράφωσιν B e₄ ἀρετὴν (ἀνάγκη) Cobet e₉ οἱ δὲ . . . e₁₀ γένος καὶ Tb (in marg.): om. pr. B b₁ σε T: om. B

ALC. If I thought them formidable, plainly.

soc. And surely you don't think you would come to any harm by caring for yourself?

ALC. Not at all; I would even gain a great deal.

soc. So this is one bad thing, and a great one, that this notion of yours has.

ALC. What you say is true.

soc. Then look into the second, from what is likely: that it is also false.

ALC. How so?

soc. Is it likely that better natures arise in wellborn families, or not? e

ALC. In wellborn ones, plainly.

soc. And that those who are well endowed by nature, if they are also well brought up, become in this way complete in virtue?

ALC. Necessarily.

soc. Then let us look into it, setting what we have against what they have: first, whether the kings of the Spartans and of the Persians seem to be of humbler families. Or don't we know that the one line descends from Heracles and the other from Achaemenes, and that the family of Heracles and that of Achaemenes go back to Perseus son of Zeus?¹

ALC. Why, ours too, Socrates, goes back to Eurysaces, and that of Eurysaces to Zeus.² 121

soc. Why, ours too, my wellborn Alcibiades, goes back to Daedalus, and Daedalus to Hephaestus son of Zeus.³ But their lines, beginning from themselves, are kings sprung from kings all the way to Zeus, the one kings of Argos and Lacedaemon, the other of Persia always, and often of Asia too, as now; while we are private persons ourselves, and so were our fathers. And if you had to show your ancestors, and Eurysaces' homeland Salamis, or the homeland of Aeacus, who came still earlier, b

1. Heracles was Perseus' great-grandson, and Herodotus traces the Spartan kings back to Perseus (6.53); the Persians took their name from Perses, Perseus' son (7.61, 7.150).

2. Alcibiades' father's family traced its line to Eurysaces, son of Ajax (Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 1); Ajax was the grandson of Aeacus, a son of Zeus.

3. The joke is the grandeur of a stonemason's family tree. Socrates' father was a stonemason (Diogenes Laertius 2.18), and in the *Euthyphro* (11b–c) he calls Daedalus, the legendary craftsman, his ancestor; Daedalus' line went back through the early kings of Athens to Hephaestus (Apollodorus 3.14.6, 3.15.8).

Αἴγυναν Ἀρτοξέρξη τῷ Ξέρξου, πόσον ἂν οἶε γέλωτα
 ὀφλεῖν; ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ τοῦ τε γένους ὄγκῳ ἐλαττώμεθα τῶν
 ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ τροφῇ. ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι τοῖς τε Λακε- 5
 δαιμονίων βασιλεῦσιν ὡς μεγάλα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ὧν αἱ
 γυναῖκες δημοσίᾳ φυλάττονται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων, ὅπως εἰς
 δύναμιν μὴ λάθῃ ἐξ ἄλλου γενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἢ ἐξ
 Ἑρακλειδῶν; ὁ δὲ Περσῶν τοσοῦτον ὑπερβάλλει, ὥστ' c
 οὐδεὶς ὑποψίαν ἔχει ὡς ἐξ ἄλλου ἂν βασιλεὺς γένοιτο ἢ ἐξ
 αὐτοῦ διὸ οὐ φρουρεῖται ἢ βασιλέως γυνὴ ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπὸ
 φόβου. ἐπειδὴν δὲ γένηται ὁ παῖς ὁ πρεσβύτατος, οὐπερ
 ἢ ἀρχή, πρῶτον μὲν ἐορτάζουσι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ βασιλείῳ, 5
 ὧν ἂν ἄρχῃ, εἶτα εἰς τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ
 βασιλέως γενέθλια πᾶσα θύει καὶ ἐορτάζει ἡ Ἀσία ἡμῶν
 δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τοῦ κωμωδοποιοῦ, οὐδ' οἱ γείτονες σφόδρα d
 τι αἰσθάνονται, ὧ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ. μετὰ τοῦτο τρέφεται ὁ
 παῖς, οὐχ ὑπὸ γυναικὸς τροφῶν ὀλίγου ἀξίας, ἀλλ' ὑπ'
 εὐνούχων οἱ ἂν δοκῶσιν τῶν περὶ βασιλέα ἄριστοι εἶναι
 οἷς τά τε ἄλλα προστέτακται ἐπιμέλεισθαι τοῦ γενομένου, 5
 καὶ ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστος ἔσται μηχανᾶσθαι, ἀναπλάττοντας
 τὰ μέλη τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ κατορθοῦντας καὶ ταῦτα δρῶντες
 ἐν μεγάλῃ τιμῇ εἰσιν. ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐπτέτεις γένωνται οἱ e
 παῖδες, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους
 φοιτῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θήρας ἄρχονται ἰέναι. δις ἐπτά δὲ
 γενόμενον ἑτῶν τὸν παῖδα παραλαμβάνουσιν οὓς ἐκεῖνοι
 βασιλείους παιδαγωγοὺς ὀνομάζουσιν εἰσὶ δὲ ἐξαιρεγμένοι 5
 Περσῶν οἱ ἄριστοι δόξαντες ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τέτταρες, ὃ τε σο-
 φώτατος καὶ ὁ δικαιοτάτος καὶ ὁ σωφρονέστατος καὶ ὁ
 ἀνδρειώτατος. ὧν ὁ μὲν μαγείαν τε διδάσκει τὴν Ζωρο- 122

b 3 ἀρτοξέρξη re vera BT ἂν BT: δὴ Stobaeus b 4 τοῦ BT: τῷ τοῦ Stobaeus c 2
 ἂν βασιλεὺς B Stobaeus: βασιλεὺς ἂν T c 3 ἀλλ' ἢ] ἀλλῇ B: ἢ T (suprascr. ἀλλ')
 c 7 γενέθλια T Olympiodorus: γενέσια B πᾶσα T: ἅπασα B καὶ ἐορτάζει secl.
 Cobet d 2 τι T: om. B d 5 τά τε ἄλλα T: ταλλα B d 6 ὅτι T: om. B e 1
 ἐπτετεῖς (sic) B: ἐπέτεῖς (sic) T e 4 γενόμενον Buttmann: γενομένων BT

Aegina, to Artaxerxes son of Xerxes,¹ how much ridicule do you think you would incur? But see whether we do not fall short of these men in the weight of family and in the rest of their upbringing. Or haven't you perceived how great the advantages of the Spartan kings are? Their wives are guarded publicly by the ephors, so that, as far as possible, a king born of anyone but the Heraclids may not go unnoticed. And the Persian king so far surpasses them c that no one has any suspicion that a king could be born from anyone but himself; that is why the king's wife is guarded by nothing but fear. When the eldest son is born, to whom the rule belongs, first all those in the king's domain, as many as he rules, hold festival, and then for all time after, on this day, all Asia sacrifices and holds festival for the king's birthday. But when we are born, as the comic poet says, not even the neighbours much notice it, Alcibiades.² After this the child is brought up, not by a woman nurse of d little worth, but by the eunuchs who are thought the best of those about the king; they are charged with caring for the newborn in every other way, and with contriving that he shall be as beautiful as possible, moulding the child's limbs and setting them straight; and for doing this they are held in great honour. When the boys are e seven years old, they go to the horses and to their riding-masters, and begin to go hunting. When the boy is twice seven years old, he is taken over by those they call the royal tutors. These are four Persians in the prime of life, chosen as the ones judged best: the wisest, the most just, the most temperate and the most courageous. Of these, one teaches the Magian lore of Zoroaster 122

1. Artaxerxes I, king of Persia from 465 to 424 BC. Burnet notes that B and T really do have the form Artoxerxes.

2. The poet is not named; some editors have assigned the line to the comic poet Plato.

άστρου τοῦ Ὀρομάζου—ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θεῶν θεραπεία—
 διδάσκει δὲ καὶ τὰ βασιλικά, ὁ δὲ δικαιοτάτος ἀληθεύειν
 διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ὁ δὲ σωφρονέστατος μὴδ' ὑπὸ μιᾶς
 ἄρχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἵνα ἐλεύθερος εἶναι ἐθίζεται καὶ 5
 ὄντως βασιλεύς, ἄρχων πρῶτον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ μὴ
 δουλεύων, ὁ δὲ ἀνδρειότατος ἄφοβον καὶ ἀδεᾶ παρασκευά-
 ζων, ὡς ὅταν δείσῃ δοῦλον ὄντα σοὶ δ', ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη,
 Περικλῆς ἐπέστησε παιδαγωγὸν τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸν ἀχρειό- b
 τατον ὑπὸ γήρως, Ζώπυρον τὸν Θρᾶκα. διήλθον δὲ καὶ
 τὴν ἄλλην ἂν σοι τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν τροφήν τε καὶ παι-
 δείαν, εἰ μὴ πολὺ ἔργον ἦν καὶ ἅμα ταῦθ' ἱκανὰ δηλώσαι
 καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα τῆς δὲ σῆς γενέσεως, 5
 ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας, ἣ ἄλλον ὁτουοῦν
 Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδενὶ μέλει, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις
 ἐραστὴς σου τυγχάνει ὦν. εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθέλεις εἰς πλούτους
 ἀποβλέψαι καὶ τρυφὰς καὶ ἐσθῆτας ἱματίων θ' ἔλξεις καὶ c
 μύρων ἀλοιφὰς καὶ θεραπόντων πλήθους ἀκολουθίας τὴν
 τε ἄλλην ἀβρότητα τὴν Περσῶν, αἰσχυνθείης ἂν ἐπὶ σεαυτῷ,
 αἰσθόμενος ὅσον αὐτῶν ἐλλείπεις. εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθέλῃσεις εἰς
 σωφροσύνην τε καὶ κοσμιότητα ἀποβλέψαι καὶ εὐχέρειαν 5
 καὶ εὐκολίαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην καὶ εὐταξίαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν
 καὶ καρτερίαν καὶ φιλοπονίαν καὶ φιλονικίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίας
 τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων, παῖδ' ἂν ἡγήσαιο σαυτὸν πᾶσι τοῖς
 τοιούτοις. εἰ δ' αὖ τι καὶ πλούτῳ προσέχεις καὶ κατὰ d
 τοῦτο οἶει τι εἶναι, μὴδὲ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ἄρρητον ἔστω, εἴαν πως
 αἰσθῇ οὐ εἶ. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλεις εἰς τοὺς Λακε-
 δαιμονίων πλούτους ἰδεῖν, γνώσῃ ὅτι πολὺ τὰνθάδε τῶν
 ἐκεῖ ἐλλείπει γῆν μὲν γὰρ ὅσῃν ἔχουσιν τῆς θ' ἐαυτῶν 5
 καὶ Μεσσήνης, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἀμφισβητήσῃ τῶν τῇδε πλήθει

a7 παρασκευάζων] παρασκευάζει Schleiermacher b7 μέλει B: μέλλει T b8
 ἐθέλεις T Olympiodorus: ἐθέλοισ B c4 αἰσθόμενος TW: αἰσθανόμενος B
 ἐθελήσεις BT: ἐθελήσειας Olympiodorus: ἐθέλεις Heindorf d3 εἰς add. Schneider
 d5 γῆν T Olympiodorus: τῇν B: γῆς ci. Stallbaum

son of Horomazes (and this is the service of the gods),¹ and he teaches the kingly arts as well; the most just teaches him to tell the truth all his life long; the most temperate, not to be ruled by even a single one of his pleasures, so that he may grow used to being free and a real king, ruling first the things within himself and not being their slave; and the most courageous makes him fearless and unafraid, on the ground that when he is afraid he is a slave. But over you, Alcibiades, Pericles set as tutor the household slave most useless from old age, Zopyrus the Thracian.² I would go through b
for you the rest of your opponents' upbringing and education too, if it were not a long task, and if, besides, these things were not enough to show all the rest that goes with them. But no one, one may say, cares about your birth, Alcibiades, or your upbringing and education, or those of any other Athenian, unless someone is in fact your lover. And again, if you choose to look at the wealth, the luxuries, the robes and trailing cloaks, the anointings with per- c
fume, the crowds of attendants following, and all the rest of the Persians' refinement, you would be ashamed of yourself, perceiving how far you fall short of them. And again, if you choose to look at the temperance and orderliness of the Spartans, their readiness and easy temper, their high-mindedness and good discipline, their courage and endurance, their love of toil, of victory and of honour, you would think yourself a child in all such things. And if, again, d
you also pay any attention to wealth, and think yourself something on that score, let us not leave this unsaid either, in the hope that you may somehow perceive where you stand. For on this score, if you choose to look at the wealth of the Spartans, you will find that what we have here falls far short of what they have there. For as to land, the land they hold in their own country and in Messene, not one of our people here could dispute with them in extent

1. Horomazes is Ahura Mazda, the supreme god of the Persian religion; to call Zoroaster his son is a Greek way of putting it. This is one of the earliest surviving mentions of Zoroaster in Greek. The Magi, a Median tribe in Herodotus (1.101), were the Persians' priests: no sacrifice could be made without one (1.132). *Mageia* here is the lore of the Magi, which Socrates at once defines as the service of the gods; it is not "magic" in the bad sense the word could already carry (Gorgias, *Helen* 10).

2. At Athens the *paidagōgos*, "tutor", was the slave who took a boy to school and watched over him; he did not teach him. Plutarch (*Alcibiades* 1) takes Zopyrus' name from this passage.

οὐδ' ἀρετῇ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀνδραπόδων κτήσει τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ
 τῶν εἰλωτικῶν, οὐδὲ μὴν ἵππων γε, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα βοσκή- e
 ματα κατὰ Μεσσήνην νέμεται. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἐὼ
 χαίρειν, χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσιν Ἑλ-
 λησιν ὅσον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἰδίᾳ πολλὰς γὰρ ἤδη γενεὰς
 εἰσέρχεται μὲν αὐτόσε ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολ-
 λάκις δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἐξέρχεται δὲ οὐδαμόσε, 5
 ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸν Αἰσώπου μῦθον ὃν ἡ ἀλώπηξ πρὸς 123
 τὸν λέοντα εἶπεν, καὶ τοῦ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα νομίσματος εἰσ-
 ιόντος μὲν τὰ ἴχνη τὰ ἐκείσε τετραμμένα δῆλα, ἐξιόντος
 δὲ οὐδαμῇ ἂν τις ἴδοι. ὥστε εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι ὅτι καὶ χρυσῶ
 καὶ ἀργύρῳ οἱ ἐκεῖ πλουσιώτατοί εἰσιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ 5
 αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὁ βασιλεὺς ἕκ τε γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων μέγισται
 λήψεις καὶ πλείσταί εἰσι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ
 βασιλικὸς φόρος οὐκ ὀλίγος γίγνεται, ὃν τελοῦσιν οἱ Λακε-
 δαιμόνιοι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ὥς b
 πρὸς Ἑλληνικοὺς μὲν πλούτους μεγάλα, ὥς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς
 Περσικοὺς καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνων βασιλέως οὐδέν. ἐπεὶ ποτ'
 ἐγὼ ἤκουσα ἀνδρὸς ἀξιοπίστου τῶν ἀναβεβηκότων παρὰ
 βασιλέα, ὃς ἔφη παρελθεῖν χώραν πάνυ πολλὴν καὶ ἀγαθὴν, 5
 ἐγγὺς ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, ἣν καλεῖν τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ζώνην
 τῆς βασιλέως γυναικός εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἣν αὖ καλεῖσθαι
 καλύπτραν, καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς τόπους καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς c
 εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἐξηρημένους τὸν τῆς γυναικός, καὶ ὀνόματα
 ἔχειν ἐκάστους τῶν τόπων ἀπὸ ἐκάστου τῶν κόσμων. ὥστ'
 οἶμαι ἐγώ, εἴ τις εἴποι τῇ βασιλέως μητρί, Ξέρξου δὲ
 γυναικί, Ἀμήστριδι, ὅτι ἐν νῶ ἔχει σου τῷ υἱὲ ἀντιτάτ- 5
 τεσθαι ὁ Δεινομάχης υἱός, ἣ ἔστι κόσμος ἕως ἄξιος μνῶν
 πεντήκοντα εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, τῷ δ' υἱὲ αὐτῆς γῆς πλέθρα

e3 πολλὰς . . . γενεαῖς T: πολλαῖς . . . γενεαῖς B e4 αὐτόσε B: αὐτὸς T: αὐτοῖς
 Olympiodorus a1 ὃν . . . a2 εἶπεν secl. Schanz a3 τὰ ἐκείσε τετραμμένα secl.
 Hirschig τετραμμένα T: γεγραμμένα B a6 αὐτῶν] αὐ Schanz τε γὰρ τῶν T:
 τε γὰρ ὧν pr. B: τεττάρων D c5 ἔχει σου T: ἔχεις οὐ B

or in excellence; nor again in the slaves they own, the helots and the rest, nor indeed in horses, nor in all the other flocks and herds that graze in Messene.¹ But I let all that go. Gold and silver, though: there is not as much in all Greece as there is in Lacedaemon in private hands.² For many generations now it has been going in there from all the Greeks, and often from the barbarians too, and going out nowhere; but, just as in Aesop's fable that the fox told the lion,³ so too with the money that goes into Lacedaemon: the tracks turned that way are plain to see, but nowhere would anyone see tracks of it coming out. So you may be sure that in gold and silver the people there are the richest of the Greeks, and of them the king is richest; for the largest and most frequent receipts of this kind go to the kings, and besides, the royal tribute that the Spartans pay to their kings is no small one. And the Spartans' wealth is great compared with Greek wealth, but compared with that of the Persians and their king it is nothing. For I once heard a trustworthy man, one of those who had gone up to the king's court, say that he had passed through a very large and good stretch of country, close to a day's journey, which the people of the place called the Girdle of the King's Wife; and there was another, called in its turn her Veil, and many other fine and good places set apart for the wife's adornment, each of the places named after one of the adornments.⁴ So I think that if someone were to say to the king's mother, Amestris, Xerxes' wife, "The son of Deinomache means to array himself against your son" (Deinomache, whose adornment is worth perhaps fifty minae at the very most, and whose son's land

1. Messene, that is Messenia, the rich country west of Mount Taygetus, was conquered by Sparta and worked by the helots, serfs who belonged to the Spartan state.

2. A surprising picture, since Spartan law was said to forbid citizens to keep gold and silver (Xenophon, *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* 7.5–6; Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 9).

3. The old lion lay in his cave pretending to be sick, and ate the animals that came to visit him. The fox stayed outside: he could see the tracks of many going in, and none coming out (Aesop, fable 142 Perry; Horace, *Epistles* 1.1.73–75).

4. Such grants were real. Xenophon's army camped in villages that had been given to Parysatis, mother of the king, "for her girdle" (*Anabasis* 1.4.9), and Herodotus says that the Egyptian city of Anthylla was given to the wife of whoever ruled Egypt, to keep her in shoes, a custom dating from the Persian conquest (2.98).

Ἐρχίασιν οὐδὲ τριακόσια, θαυμάσαι ἂν ὅτῳ ποτὲ πιστεύων
 ἐν νῶ ἔχει οὗτος ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τῷ Ἀρτοξέρξῃ διαγωνί- d
 ζεσθαι, καὶ οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ
 πιστεύων οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἐπιχειρεῖ πλὴν ἐπιμελεία τε καὶ
 σοφία ταῦτα γὰρ μόνα ἄξια λόγου ἐν Ἑλλήσιν. ἐπεὶ εἴ
 γε πύθοιτο ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης οὗτος νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ πρῶτον 5
 μὲν ἔτη οὐδέπω γεγονῶς σφόδρα εἴκοσιν, ἔπειτα παντά-
 πασιν ἀπαίδευτος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, τοῦ ἔραστοῦ αὐτῷ
 λέγοντος ὅτι χρή πρῶτον μαθόντα καὶ ἐπιμεληθέντα αὐτοῦ
 καὶ ἀσκήσαντα οὕτως ἵνα διαγωνιούμενον βασιλεῖ, οὐκ e
 ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ φησιν ἐξαρκεῖν καὶ ὥς ἔχει, οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν
 θαυμάσαι τε καὶ ἐρέσθαι “Τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστιν ὅτῳ πιστεύει
 τὸ μειράκιον;” εἰ οὖν λέγοιμεν ὅτι κάλλει τε καὶ μεγέθει 5
 καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡγήσασθαι ἂν
 ἡμᾶς, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, μαίνεσθαι πρὸς τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀπο-
 βλέψασα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λαμπιδῶ, τὴν
 Λεωτυχίδου μὲν θυγατέρα, Ἀρχιδάμου δὲ γυναῖκα, Ἄγιδος 124
 δὲ μητέρα, οἱ πάντες βασιλῆς γεγόνασιν, θαυμάσαι ἂν καὶ
 ταύτην εἰς τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ὑπάρχοντα ἀποβλέψασαν, εἰ σὺ
 ἐν νῶ ἔχῃς τῷ ὑεῖ αὐτῆς διαγωνίζεσθαι οὕτω κακῶς ἡγμένος.
 καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ αἱ τῶν πολεμίων γυναῖκες 5
 βέλτιον περὶ ἡμῶν διανοοῦνται, οἷους χρή ὄντας σφίσιν
 ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ἡμεῖς περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε,
 πειθόμενος ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματι, γνώθι
 σαυτόν, ὅτι οὗτοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν ἀντίπαλοι, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗς σὺ b
 οἶε ὦν ἄλλῳ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ περιγενοίμεθα, εἰ μὴ περ
 ἐπιμελεία γε ἂν καὶ τέχνη. ὦν σὺ εἰ ἀπολειφθήσῃ,
 καὶ τοῦ ὀνομαστὸς γενέσθαι ἀπολειφθήσῃ ἐν Ἑλλάσιν

δ1 οὗτος B: οὕτως T δ3 * ἀνὴρ B: ὁ ἀνὴρ T δ5 ἀλκιβιάδης T: ὁ ἀλκιβιάδης B e2 αὐτὴν B: om. T e3 πιστεύει recc.: πιστεύοι BT a1 Λεωτυχίδου T: δ' εὐτυχίδου pr. B: λευτυχίδου b a5 εἶναι εἰ αἱ T Olympiodorus: εἶναι B a6 περὶ ἡμῶν διανοοῦνται B: διανοοῦνται περὶ ἡμῶν T b1 ἡμῖν T Olympiodorus: om. B b2 εἰ δ' ἐμὴ περ B: εἰ μὴ T b3 γε ἂν scripsi: τε ἂν BT: τε Schanz b4 ὀνομαστὸς T Olympiodorus: ὀνόματος B

at Erchia is not even three hundred plethra),¹ she would wonder what on earth this Alcibiades trusts in, that he means to contend with Artaxerxes; and I think she would say that there is nothing else this man is trusting in for his attempt except care and wisdom; for these are the only things worth mentioning among the Greeks. For if she found out that this Alcibiades is now making the attempt, first when he is not yet quite twenty years old, and then entirely uneducated, and besides, when his lover tells him that he must first learn, and care for himself, and train, and only then go to contend with the king, he will not, but says that even as he is he is equal to it: I think she would wonder and ask, “What on earth is it, then, that the lad trusts in?” If, then, we were to say that it is beauty and stature and family and wealth and the nature of his soul, she would look at all such things among her own people and think us mad, Alcibiades. And I think that Lampido too, daughter of Leotychides, wife of Archidamus, mother of Agis, all of whom have been kings,² would wonder in her turn, looking at what her people have, that you mean to contend with her son when you have been so badly reared. And yet does it not seem shameful if our enemies’ wives have a better idea than we ourselves of what sort of men we must be to take them on? Come, my dear fellow, listen to me and to the inscription at Delphi, and know thyself:³ these are our rivals, not the ones you think. And there is nothing else by which we could surpass them, unless by care, at least, and by craft.⁴ If you fall short of these, you will fall short too of becoming famous among Greeks

1. Amestris was the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes I; Herodotus names her (7.61) and tells stories of her cruelty (7.114, 9.112). Deinomache, an Alcmaeonid, was Alcibiades’ mother. Erchia was an Attic deme east of Athens. A mina was a hundred drachmas; a plethron was a square a hundred feet on each side, so that three hundred plethra come to some sixty-five acres.

2. Lampido, as Herodotus calls her (6.71), was the daughter of King Leotychides and married King Archidamus II; their son was Agis II (Plutarch, *Agesilaus* 1, where she is Lampido). Agis became king only in 427/6, after the dialogue’s dramatic date.

3. “Know thyself” was carved at the temple of Apollo at Delphi. In the *Charmides* (164d–165a) Critias reads it as the god’s greeting to those who enter, and in the *Protagoras* (343a–b) it is one of the sayings the Seven Sages dedicated there.

4. Burnet’s own correction (*scripsi*): “by care, at least”; the manuscripts have “both by care and by craft”.

τε καὶ βαρβάροις, οὐ μοι δοκεῖς ἐρᾶν ὥς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος 5
ἄλλον.

ΑΛ. Τίνα οὖν χρὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ποι-
εῖσθαι; ἔχεις ἐξηγήσασθαι; παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικας
ἀληθῆ εἰρηκότι.

ΣΩ. Ναί ἀλλὰ γὰρ κοινὴ βουλή ᾧτινι τρόπῳ ἂν ὅτι 10
βέλτιστοι γενοίμεθα. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι οὐ περὶ μὲν σοῦ λέγω ὥς c
χρὴ παιδευθῆναι, περὶ ἐμοῦ δὲ οὐ οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ σου
διαφέρω πλὴν γ' ἐνί.

ΑΛ. Τίνι;

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἐπίτροπος ὁ ἐμὸς βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ σοφώτερος 5
ἢ Περικλῆς ὁ σός.

ΑΛ. Τίς οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Θεός, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ὅσπερ σοί με οὐκ εἶα πρὸ
τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας διαλεχθῆναι ᾧ καὶ πιστεύων λέγω ὅτι ἡ
ἐπιφάνεια δι' οὐδενὸς ἄλλον σοι ἔσται ἢ δι' ἐμοῦ. 10

ΑΛ. Παίξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. d

ΣΩ. Ἴσως λέγω μέντοι ἀληθῆ, ὅτι ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα,
μᾶλλον μὲν πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀτὰρ νῶ γε καὶ μάλα σφόδρα.

ΑΛ. Ὅτι μὲν ἐγώ, οὐ ψεύδῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ὅτι γε ἐγώ. 5

ΑΛ. Τί οὖν ἂν ποιοῖμεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀπορρητέον οὐδὲ μαλθακιστέον, ὦ ἑταῖρε.

ΑΛ. Οὗτοι δὲ πρέπει γ', ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, ἀλλὰ σκεπτέον κοινῇ. καί μοι λέγε
φαμέν γὰρ δὴ ὥς ἄριστοι βούλεσθαι γενέσθαι. ἦ γάρ; e

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίνα ἀρετήν;

ΑΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι ἦνπερ οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοί.

b 10 κοινὴ βουλή Stephanus: κοινῇ βουλή BT c 6 ὁ σός BT: ὁ σὸς θεῖος Pro-
clus d 5 ἐγώ B: ἐγὼ δέομαι T (sed deομαι extra verum) d 6 ἂν ποιοῖμεν BT:
ποιῶμεν Cobet: δὴ ποιῶμεν Schanz d 7 ἀπορρητέον corr. Ven. 184: ἀπορητέον
TW Olympiodorus: ἀποκητέον B et in marg. W μαλθακιστέον T Olympiodorus:
μαλακιστέον B e 1 δὴ B Olympiodorus: om. T ὥς T Olympiodorus: ὦ B

and barbarians, the thing you seem to me to love as no one has ever loved anything.

ALC. Then what care ought one to take, Socrates? Can you explain? For you certainly seem to have spoken the truth.

soc. Yes; but let us deliberate together on how we might become as good as we can. For I am not, you know, saying that you need to be educated and I do not: there is nothing in which I differ from you, except in one thing.

ALC. What is that?

soc. My guardian is better and wiser than your Pericles.

ALC. Who is he, Socrates?

soc. The god, Alcibiades, who did not let me talk with you before this day;¹ and trusting in him I say that your distinction will come to you through no one else but me.

ALC. You're joking, Socrates.

soc. Perhaps; but I am telling the truth when I say that we need care: all men need it a good deal, but the two of us very much indeed.

ALC. That I do is no lie.

soc. Nor that I do, either.

ALC. Then what are we to do?

soc. We must not give up or go soft, my friend.

ALC. No, it certainly is not befitting, Socrates.

soc. No; but we must look into it together. Now tell me: we say, surely, that we want to become as good as possible. Isn't that so?

ALC. Yes.

soc. In what virtue?

ALC. Plainly the virtue of good men.

1. The "divine opposition" of 103a, which Socrates called the god at 105d–e; it has now let him speak.

- ΣΩ. Οἱ τί ἀγαθοί; 5
 ΑΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι οἱ πράττειν τὰ πράγματα.
 ΣΩ. Ποῖα; ἄρα τὰ ἵππικά;
 ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.
 ΣΩ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἵππικους γὰρ ἂν ἤμην;
 ΑΛ. Ναί. 10
 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὰ ναυτικά λέγεις;
 ΑΛ. Οὔ.
 ΣΩ. Παρὰ τοὺς ναυτικούς γὰρ ἂν ἤμην;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ποῖα; ἂ τίνας πράττουσιν; 15
 ΑΛ. Ἐπερ Ἀθηναίων οἱ καλοὶ κάγαθοί.
 ΣΩ. Καλοὺς δὲ κάγαθους λέγεις τοὺς φρονίμους ἢ τοὺς 125
 ἄφρονας;
 ΑΛ. Τοὺς φρονίμους.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἕκαστος φρόνιμος, τοῦτ' ἀγαθός;
 ΑΛ. Ναί. 5
 ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ἄφρων, πονηρός;
 ΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ σκυτοτόμος φρόνιμος εἰς ὑποδημάτων
 ἐργασίαν;
 ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. 10
 ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸς ἄρ' εἰς αὐτά;
 ΑΛ. Ἀγαθός.
 ΣΩ. Τί δ'; εἰς ἱματίων ἐργασίαν οὐκ ἄφρων ὁ σκυ-
 τοτόμος;
 ΑΛ. Ναί. 15
 ΣΩ. Κακὸς ἄρα εἰς τοῦτο;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ κακός τε καὶ
 ἀγαθός.
 ΑΛ. Φαίνεται. 5

e 6 οἱ T Olympiodorus: οἰοι B a 11 αὐτά B: ταῦτα T

SOC. Good at what?

ALC. Plainly, good at managing affairs.

SOC. What sort of affairs? Horsemanship?

ALC. Certainly not.

SOC. Because for that we would go to the horsemen?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Seafaring, then, do you mean?

ALC. No.

SOC. Because for that we would go to the seamen?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then what sort? Those managed by whom?

ALC. Those that the fine and good among the Athenians manage.¹

SOC. By the fine and good do you mean the intelligent or the unintelligent? 125

ALC. The intelligent.

SOC. And is not each man good at what he is intelligent in?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And worthless at what he is unintelligent in?

ALC. Of course.

SOC. Well, is the shoemaker intelligent in the making of shoes?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. Then he is good at it?

ALC. Good.

SOC. What about the making of cloaks: isn't the shoemaker unintelligent there?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then he is bad at that? b

ALC. Yes.

SOC. So by this argument, at any rate, the same man is both bad and good.

ALC. It appears so.

1. *Kaloi kagathoi*, "the fine and good", was the usual Greek phrase for gentlemen, men of standing and good breeding (the *Charmides*, 154e, plays on its "beautiful"). Socrates at once asks what it means, and reduces "good" to "good at something".

- ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν λέγεις τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εἶναι καὶ κακοὺς;
 ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.
 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τίνας ποτὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς λέγεις;
 ΑΛ. Τοὺς δυναμένους ἔγωγε ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει.
 ΣΩ. Οὐ δήπου ἵππων γε; 10
 ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.
 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀνθρώπων;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Ἄρα καμνόντων;
 ΑΛ. Οὔ. 15
 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ πλεόντων;
 ΑΛ. Οὔ φημι.
 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ θεριζόντων;
 ΑΛ. Οὔ.
 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ποιούντων ἢ τι ποιούντων; c
 ΑΛ. Ποιούντων λέγω.
 ΣΩ. Τί; πειρῶ καὶ ἐμοὶ δηλώσαι.
 ΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν τῶν καὶ συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χρω-
 μένων ἀλλήλοις, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. 5
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν ἀνθρώποις χρω-
 μένων;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Ἄρα κελευστῶν χρωμένων ἐρέταις;
 ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα. 10
 ΣΩ. Κυβερνητικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε ἀρετή;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν ἀνλητῶν, ἀνθρώποις
 ἡγουμένων ὥδῃς καὶ χρωμένων χορευταῖς; d
 ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.
 ΣΩ. Χοροδιδασκαλικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γ' αὖ;
 ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

b 6 ἢ BT: τῶ Olympiodorus λέγεις BT: καλοῖς Olympiodorus c 4 τῶν καὶ BT:
 καὶ τῶν Olympiodorus c 11 κυβερνητικὴ B: κυβερνητικῆς T

soc. Do you say, then, that good men are bad as well?

alc. Certainly not.

soc. Then whom on earth do you mean by the good?

alc. Those who are able to rule in the city, I mean.

soc. Not over horses, surely?

alc. Certainly not.

soc. Over men, then?

alc. Yes.

soc. Over sick men?

alc. No.

soc. Over men at sea?

alc. I say no.

soc. Over men harvesting?

alc. No.

soc. Over men doing nothing, or men doing something? c

alc. Doing something, I mean.

soc. Doing what? Try to make it clear to me too.

alc. Well, men who have dealings with one another and make use of one another, as we live in our cities.

soc. So you mean ruling men who make use of men?

alc. Yes.

soc. Boatswains who make use of rowers?¹

alc. Certainly not.

soc. Because that, at least, is the virtue of piloting?

alc. Yes.

soc. Then do you mean ruling men who are pipers, who lead men in song and make use of dancers? d

alc. Certainly not.

soc. Because that, in turn, is the virtue of chorus-training?

alc. Certainly.

1. The *keleustēs*, “boatswain”, gave the time to the rowers of a trireme.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ποτε λέγεις χρωμένων ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώ- 5
ποις οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἄρχειν;

ΑΛ. Κοινωνούντων ἔγωγε λέγω πολιτείας καὶ συμ-
βαλλόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τούτων ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν τῇ
πόλει.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν αὕτη ἡ τέχνη; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ σε ἐροίμην 10
πάλιν τὰ νυνδῇ, κοινωνούντων ναυτιλίας ἐπίστασθαι ἄρχειν
τίς ποιεῖ τέχνη;

ΑΛ. Κυβερνητική.

ΣΩ. Κοινωνούντων δ' ὠδῆς, ὡς νυνδῇ ἐλέγετο, τις ἐπι- e
στήμη ποιεῖ ἄρχειν;

ΑΛ. Ἦνπερ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἡ χοροδιδασκαλία.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πολιτείας κοινωνούντων τίνα καλεῖς ἐπι- 5
στήμην;

ΑΛ. Εὐβουλίαν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μὴν ἀβουλία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τῶν κυβερνητῶν;

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εὐβουλία;

ΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, εἷς γε τὸ σῶζεσθαι πλέοντας. 126

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. τί δέ; ἦν σὺ λέγεις εὐβουλίαν,
εἰς τί ἐστιν;

ΑΛ. Εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον τὴν πόλιν διοικεῖν καὶ σῶζεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἄμεινον δὲ διοικεῖται καὶ σῶζεται τίνος παρα- 5
γιγνομένου ἢ ἀπογιγνομένου; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σύ με ἔροιο
“Ἄμεινον διοικεῖται σῶμα καὶ σῶζεται τίνος παραγιγνομένου
ἢ ἀπογιγνομένου;” εἵποim' ἂν ὅτι ὑγείας μὲν παραγιγνο-
μένης, νόσου δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης. οὐ καὶ σὺ οἶε οὕτως;

ΑΛ. Ναί. b

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἴ μ' αὖ ἔροιο “Τίνος δὲ παραγιγνομένου
ἄμεινον ὅμματα;” ὡσαύτως εἵποim' ἂν ὅτι ὄψεως μὲν παρα-
γιγνομένης, τυφλότητος δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης. καὶ ὦτα δὲ

e2 ποιεῖ B: ποιεῖν T a7 διοικεῖται . . . σῶζεται B: διοικεῖσθαι . . . σῶζεσθαι T
σώματα T: σῶμα B b2 παραγιγνομένου B: om. TW

soc. Then what on earth do you mean by being able to rule men who make use of men?

alc. Those who share in the life of the city and have dealings with one another: ruling these, the people in the city, I mean.

soc. Then what craft is this? As if I were to ask you again what I asked just now: what craft makes one know how to rule those who share in a voyage?

alc. Piloting.

soc. And what knowledge, as was said just now, makes one rule those who share in song?¹

alc. The one you spoke of just now: chorus-training.

soc. Well then: those who share in the life of the city, what do you call the knowledge of ruling them?

alc. Good counsel, I would say, Socrates.

soc. Well then: surely the pilots' knowledge doesn't seem to you to be want of counsel?

alc. Certainly not.

soc. Good counsel, then?

alc. So it seems to me, for being kept safe at sea, at any rate. 126

soc. Well said. And the good counsel you speak of, what is it for?

alc. For ordering the city better and keeping it safe.

soc. And what is it whose presence or absence makes the city better ordered and kept safe? Just as if you were to ask me, "What is it whose presence or absence makes a body better ordered and kept safe?", I would say: the presence of health and the absence of disease. Don't you think so too?

alc. Yes. b

soc. And if you were to ask me again, "And what is it whose presence makes eyes better?", I would say likewise: the presence of sight and the absence of blindness. And ears,

1. Burnet's page prints *tis* without an accent, which would make it the indefinite "some knowledge"; the translation takes it as the question *tis*, "what knowledge", which is how Alcibiades answers it.

κωφότητος μὲν ἀπογιγνομένης, ἀκοῆς δὲ ἐγγιγνομένης 5
βελτίω τε γίγνεται καὶ ἄμεινον θεραπεύεται.

ΑΛ. Ὅρθως.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ; πόλις τίνος παραγιγνομένου καὶ ἀπο-
γιγνομένου βελτίων τε γίγνεται καὶ ἄμεινον θεραπεύεται 10
καὶ διοικεῖται;

ΑΛ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν φιλία μὲν c
αὐτοῖς γίγνηται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τὸ μυσὲν δὲ καὶ στασιάζειν
ἀπογίγνηται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν φιλίαν λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν ἢ διχόνοιαν;

ΑΛ. Ὅμόνοιαν. 5

ΣΩ. Διὰ τίν' οὖν τέχνην ὁμονοοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις περὶ
ἀριθμούς;

ΑΛ. Διὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ οἱ ἰδιῶται; οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτήν;

ΑΛ. Ναί. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἕκαστος;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Διὰ τίνα δὲ τέχνην ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁμονοεῖ
περὶ σπιθαμῆς καὶ πήχεος ὁπότερον μείζον; οὐ διὰ τὴν d
μετρητικὴν;

ΑΛ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀλλήλοις καὶ αἱ πόλεις;

ΑΛ. Ναί. 5

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; περὶ σταθμοῦ οὐχ ὡσαύτως;

ΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ σὺ λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν, τίς ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ
τοῦ, καὶ τίς αὐτὴν τέχνη παρασκευάζει; καὶ ἄρα ἥπερ πόλει,
αὕτη καὶ ἰδιώτῃ, αὐτῷ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον; 10

c2 τὸ μυσὲν δὲ B: τὸ δὲ μυσὲν τε T c13 ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ B: αὐτὸς αὐτῷ
ἕκαστος T: αὐτὸς αὐτῷ Olympiodorus d6 σταθμοῦ T: σταθμοὺς B d9 αὐτὴν
T Olympiodorus: αὐτὴν B τέχνη Olympiodorus al.: τέχνην BT ἥπερ (vel ἥπερ)
πόλει T Olympiodorus: εἰ περιπολεῖ B: εἵπερ πόλει W d10 αὕτη ci. Bekker: αὕτη
B: αὐτῇ T Olympiodorus: αὕτη vulg.

when deafness is absent and hearing comes to be in them, become better and are better tended.

ALC. Rightly said.

soc. Well then: a city, what is it whose presence and absence make it become better and be better tended and ordered?

ALC. It seems to me, Socrates, that it is when friendship comes to be among them toward one another, and hatred and faction are absent. c

soc. By friendship, then, do you mean concord or discord?

ALC. Concord.

soc. And through what craft are cities in concord about numbers?

ALC. Through arithmetic.

soc. And private persons? Isn't it through the same?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And each man with himself, too?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And through what craft is each man in concord with himself about a span and a cubit, which is the bigger? Isn't it through measurement? d

ALC. Of course.

soc. And private persons with one another, and cities too?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Well then: about weight, isn't it likewise?

ALC. I say so.

soc. And the concord you speak of, what is it, and about what, and what craft produces it? And is the one that belongs to a city the same for a private person too, for himself with himself and with another?¹

1. "The same" is Bekker's conjecture, which Burnet prints. B has the same letters with a different breathing ("itself"), T and Olympiodorus the dative ("for it"), and the older printed texts "this" (apparatus, d10).

ΑΛ. Εἰκός γέ τοι.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἔστι; μὴ κάμῃς ἀποκρινόμενος, ἀλλὰ
προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν.

e

ΑΛ. Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι φιλίαν τε λέγειν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν,
ἣνπερ πατὴρ τε υἱὸν φιλῶν ὁμονοεῖ καὶ μήτηρ, καὶ ἀδελφὸς
ἀδελφῷ καὶ γυνὴ ἀνδρί.

ΣΩ. Οἶε ἂν οὖν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, ἄνδρα γυναικὶ περὶ 5
ταλασιουργίας δύνασθαι ὁμονοεῖν, τὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενον τῇ
ἐπισταμένῃ;

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε δεῖ οὐδέν γυναικεῖον γὰρ τοῦτό γε μάθημα.

ΑΛ. Ναί.

10

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; γυνὴ ἀνδρὶ περὶ ὀπλιτικῆς δύναται ἂν 127
ὁμονοεῖν μὴ μαθοῦσα;

ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀνδρεῖον γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἴσως αὐ φαίης ἂν εἶναι.

ΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

5

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ μὲν γυναικεῖα, τὰ δὲ ἀνδρεῖα μαθή-
ματα κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

ΑΛ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἓν γε τούτοις ἐστὶν ὁμόνοια γυναιξὶ πρὸς
ἄνδρας.

10

ΑΛ. Οὔ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα φιλία, εἴπερ ἡ φιλία ὁμόνοια ἦν.

ΑΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἦι ἄρα αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ αὐτῶν πράττουσιν, οὐ
φιλοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

15

ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

b

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα οἱ ἄνδρες ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἢ τὰ
αὐτῶν.

ΑΛ. Οὔ.

e 2 τε] σε ci. Stallbaum: τε (ἔχων) Schanz: fort. γε e 9 γε B Olympiodorus: om. T

ALC. Likely, at any rate.

soc. Then what is it? Don't grow weary of answering, but be eager to say. e

ALC. For my part, I think I mean friendship and concord: the concord that a father who loves his son has with him, and a mother too, and brother with brother, and wife with husband.

soc. Do you think, then, Alcibiades, that a husband could be in concord with his wife about wool-working, when he does not know it and she does?

ALC. Certainly not.

soc. Nor need he at all: for that, at least, is a woman's subject.

ALC. Yes.

soc. Well then: could a wife be in concord with her husband about hoplite fighting, if she has not learned it? 127

ALC. Certainly not.

soc. For that, at least, you would perhaps say in turn, is a man's.

ALC. I would.

soc. Then by your argument some subjects are women's and some men's.

ALC. Of course.

soc. Then in these, at least, there is no concord between wives and husbands.

ALC. No.

soc. Nor friendship either, if friendship was concord.

ALC. It appears not.

soc. Then insofar as wives do their own business, they are not loved by their husbands.¹

ALC. It seems not. b

soc. Nor, then, husbands by their wives, insofar as they do their own.

ALC. No.

1. *Ta hautōn prattein*, "doing their own business", is the formula the *Charmides* tests as a definition of temperance (161b–163c), and the *Republic* makes the definition of justice (433a–b). Socrates brings it in here against friendship; at 127b Alcibiades claims it as the very cause of friendship in cities, and by 127d friendship seems both present and absent in the same people.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' εὖ ἄρα ταύτῃ οἰκοῦνται αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν τὰ 5
αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν;

ΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, φιλίας μὴ παρούσης, ἣς ἔφαμεν ἐγ-
γιγνομένης εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι τὰς πόλεις, ἄλλως δ' οὔ;

ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ' αὐτοῖς φιλία 10
ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτεροι πράττουσιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρτι γε νῦν δὲ πῶς αὖ λέγεις; ὁμονοίας μὴ c
ἐγγιγνομένης φιλία ἐγγίγνεται; ἢ οἷόν θ' ὁμόνοιαν ἐγγί-
γνεσθαι [περὶ τούτων] ὧν οἱ μὲν ἴσασι περὶ τούτων, οἱ δ' οὔ;

ΑΛ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Δίκαια δὲ πράττουσιν ἢ ἄδικα, ὅταν τὰ αὐτῶν 5
ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν;

ΑΛ. Δίκαια πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δίκαια οὖν πραττόντων ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν πολιτῶν
φιλία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται πρὸς ἀλλήλους;

ΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη αὖ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες. 10

ΣΩ. Τίνα οὖν ποτε λέγεις τὴν φιλίαν ἢ ὁμόνοιαν περὶ d
ἣς δεῖ ἡμᾶς σοφούς τε εἶναι καὶ εὐβούλους, ἵνα ἀγαθοὶ
ἄνδρες ὦμεν; οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι μαθεῖν οὔθ' ἥτις οὔτ' ἐν
οἰστίσιν τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς φαίνεται ἐνοῦσα, τοτὲ
δ' οὔ, ὥς ἐκ τοῦ σου λόγου. 5

ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἶδ'
ὅτι λέγω, κινδυνεύω δὲ καὶ πάλαι λεληθέναι ἑμαυτὸν
αἰσχιστα ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ θαρρεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἦσθου πεπονθὼς
πεντηκονταετῆς, χαλεπὸν ἂν ἦν σοι ἐπιμεληθῆναι σαν- e
τοῦ νῦν δ' ἦν ἔχεις ἡλικίαν, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἐν ἣ δεῖ αὐτὸ
αἰσθέσθαι.

b 5 εὖ Olympiodorus: αὖ BT b 8 ἔφαμεν T: φαμὲν B: ἐλέγομεν Olympiodorus
ἐγγιγνομένης TW Olympiodorus: γιγνομένης B b 10 τοῦτο BT: τὰ αὐτὰ Olym-
piodorus b 11 πράττουσιν B: πράττωσιν T c 1 μὴ B Stobaeus: om. T c 2
ἐγγίγνεσθαι TW: γίγνεσθαι B c 3 περὶ τούτων ὧν οἱ μὲν ἴσασι περὶ τούτων B:
περὶ τούτων ὧν οἱ μὲν ἴσασι T

soc. Nor, then, are cities well ordered in this respect, when each does its own business?

alc. I think they are, Socrates.

soc. How do you mean, when friendship is not present? We said that cities are well ordered when friendship comes to be in them, and not otherwise.

alc. But it seems to me that friendship comes to be among them on this very account, because each of the two does its own business.

soc. It did not a moment ago, at any rate. But now, again, how do you mean it? Does friendship come to be when concord does not? Or is it possible for concord to come to be among people of whom some know about these things and others do not?¹

alc. Impossible.

soc. And do they do just things or unjust, when each does its own business?

alc. Just things; how could they not?

soc. Then when the citizens in the city do what is just, does friendship not come to be among them toward one another?

alc. Again it seems to me that it must, Socrates.

soc. Then what on earth do you mean by the friendship or concord about which we must be wise and of good counsel, if we are to be good men? For I cannot learn either what it is or in whom it is: at one time it appears to be present in the same people, at another not, by your argument.

alc. No, by the gods, Socrates, I don't even know myself what I am saying; and it may be that I have long been in the most shameful state without noticing it myself.

soc. But you must take heart. For if you had perceived this condition in yourself at fifty, it would be hard for you to care for yourself; but the age you are now is the very age at which you ought to perceive it.

1. Burnet brackets the first of two “about these things” (*peri toutōn*) as spurious, and it is not translated. With it, as in T, the question is whether there can be concord “about things” that some know and others do not.

- ΑΛ. Τί οὖν τὸν αἰσθανόμενον χρὴ ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες;
 ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη καὶ 5
 εἴαν τοῦτο ποιῆς, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, εἴ τι δεῖ καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ μαντεία
 πιστεύειν, σύ τε ἀγὼ βέλτιον σχήσομεν.
 ΑΛ. Ἔσται ταῦτα ἔνεκά γε τοῦ ἐμὲ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
 ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τί ἐστὶν τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι—μὴ πολ-
 λάκεις λάθωμεν οὐχ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι, οἴομενοι δέ 128
 —καὶ πότ' ἄρα αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπος; ἄρ' ὅταν τῶν αὐτοῦ
 ἐπιμελῇται, τότε καὶ αὐτοῦ;
 ΑΛ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.
 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ποδῶν ἄνθρωπος ποτε ἐπιμελεῖται; ἄρ' 5
 ὅταν ἐκεῖνων ἐπιμελῇται ἅ ἐστι τῶν ποδῶν;
 ΑΛ. Οὐ μανθάνω.
 ΣΩ. Καλεῖς δέ τι χειρός; οἷον δακτύλιον ἔστιν ὅτου ἂν
 ἄλλου τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φαίης ἢ δακτύλου;
 ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα. 10
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποδὸς ὑπόδημα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος
 ὁμοίως;
 ΑΛ. Ναί. b
 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὅταν ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελώμεθα, τότε ποδῶν
 ἐπιμελούμεθα;
 ΑΛ. Οὐ πάννυ μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες.
 ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη; ὁρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καλεῖς τι 5
 ὁπουοῦν πράγματος;
 ΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.
 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὅταν τίς τι βέλτιον ποιῇ, τότε ὁρθὴν
 λέγεις ἐπιμελείαν;

e 4 αἰσθανόμενον T Olympiodorus: αἰσθόμενον B e 5 ἀποκρίνασθαι Olympi-
 odoros e 6 θέλῃ Olympiodorus: ἐθέλῃ BT e 7 βέλτιον BT: βελτιόνως Coisl.
 a 2 αὐτὸ ποιεῖ B Stobaeus: ποιεῖ αὐτὸ T ἄνθρωπος Schanz (et mox): ἄνθρωπος
 BT a 13 καὶ ἱματία . . . b 1 ναί Stobaeus: om. BT b 8 τι T: om. B Olympiodorus

ALC. Then what must the one who perceives it do, Socrates?

SOC. Answer what you are asked, Alcibiades. And if you do that, if god wills—if my divination too is to be trusted at all—you and I will both be in a better state.

ALC. So it shall be, as far as my answering goes.

SOC. Come, then: what is caring for oneself (we may perhaps fail to notice that we are not caring for ourselves, though we think we are), and when does a man do it? Is it when he cares for what is his own that he cares for himself as well? 128

ALC. So it seems to me, at least.

SOC. Well then: when does a man care for his feet?¹ Is it when he cares for the things that belong to his feet?

ALC. I don't understand.

SOC. Is there anything you call a hand's? A ring, for instance: would you say it belongs to any other part of a man than the finger?

ALC. Certainly not.

SOC. And the shoe belongs to the foot in the same way?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And cloaks and bedclothes, likewise, to the rest of the body?

ALC. Yes.²

b

SOC. So when we care for our shoes, are we then caring for our feet?

ALC. I don't quite understand, Socrates.

SOC. Well, Alcibiades: is there something you call caring rightly for a thing, any thing at all?

ALC. There is.

SOC. Then when someone makes a thing better, do you call that right care?

1. Burnet's page prints *pote* without an accent, which would make it "ever"; the translation takes it as the question *pôte*, "when", as at 128a2, which the next question presupposes.

2. Socrates' question about cloaks and bedclothes and Alcibiades' "Yes" are missing from B and T; Burnet prints them in angle brackets from Stobaeus (apparatus, a13–b1).

- ΑΛ. Ναί. 10
 ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τέχνη ὑποδήματα βελτίω ποιεῖ;
 ΑΛ. Σκυτική.
 ΣΩ. Σκυτικῇ ἄρα ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελούμεθα;
 ΑΛ. Ναί. c
 ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ποδὸς σκυτικῇ; ἢ ἐκείνη ἣ πόδας βελτίους
 ποιούμεν;
 ΑΛ. Ἐκείνη.
 ΣΩ. Βελτίους δὲ πόδας οὐχ ἥπερ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σώμα; 5
 ΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.
 ΣΩ. Αὕτη δ' οὐ γυμναστική;
 ΑΛ. Μάλιστα.
 ΣΩ. Γυμναστικῇ μὲν ἄρα ποδὸς ἐπιμελούμεθα, σκυτικῇ
 δὲ τῶν τοῦ ποδός; 10
 ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.
 ΣΩ. Καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν χειρῶν, δακτυλιογλυφία δὲ τῶν
 τῆς χειρός;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν σώματος, ὑφαντικῇ δὲ καὶ ταῖς 15
 ἄλλαις τῶν τοῦ σώματος; d
 ΑΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
 ΣΩ. Ἄλλη μὲν ἄρα τέχνη αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου ἐπιμελούμεθα,
 ἄλλη δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ.
 ΑΛ. Φαίνεται. 5
 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὅταν τῶν σαντοῦ ἐπιμελῇ, σαντοῦ ἐπιμελῇ.
 ΑΛ. Οὐδαμῶς.
 ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὕτη τέχνη, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἢ τις ἂν αὐτοῦ τε
 ἐπιμελοῖτο καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ.
 ΑΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται. 10
 ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ποία ποτ' ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμεληθείημεν;
 ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

c 12 δακτυλιογλυφία T: δακτυλογλυφία B d 2 μὲν οὖν B: om. TW d 6 σαντοῦ
 corr. Coisl.: ἐαντοῦ B: αὐτοῦ T d 8 ἢ τις Stobaeus: ἥτις BT d 11 ποία T: om. B

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then what craft makes shoes better?

ALC. Shoemaking.

soc. So it is by shoemaking that we care for our shoes?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And for our feet too, by shoemaking? Or by that craft by which we make our feet better?

ALC. By that.

soc. And don't we make our feet better by the same craft as the rest of the body?

ALC. I think so.

soc. And isn't that gymnastics?

ALC. Most certainly.

soc. So by gymnastics we care for the foot, and by shoemaking for what belongs to the foot?

ALC. Certainly.

soc. And by gymnastics for the hands, and by ring-engraving for what belongs to the hand?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And by gymnastics for the body, and by weaving and the other crafts for what belongs to the body?

ALC. Absolutely.

soc. So it is by one craft that we care for each thing itself, and by another that we care for what belongs to it.

ALC. It appears so.

soc. Then when you care for what is your own, you are not caring for yourself.

ALC. Not at all.

soc. For it is not the same craft, it seems, by which one would care for oneself and for what is one's own.

ALC. It appears not.

soc. Come, then: by what craft on earth could we care for ourselves?

ALC. I can't say.

c

d

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε ὁμολόγηται, ὅτι οὐχ ἢ ἂν τῶν e
ἡμετέρων καὶ ὅτιοῦν βέλτιον ποιοῖμεν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἔγνωμεν ἂν ποτε τίς τέχνη ὑπόδημα βέλτιον
ποιεῖ, μὴ εἰδότες ὑπόδημα; 5

ΑΛ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε τίς τέχνη δακτυλίου βελτίους ποιεῖ,
ἀγνοοῦντες δακτύλιον.

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τίς τέχνη βελτίω ποιεῖ αὐτόν, ἄρ' ἂν ποτε 10
γνοῖμεν ἀγνοοῦντες τί ποτ' ἐσμὲν αὐτοί;

ΑΛ. Ἀδύνατον. 129

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν δὴ ράδιον τυγχάνει τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτόν,
καὶ τις ἦν φαῦλος ὁ τοῦτο ἀναθείς εἰς τὸν ἐν Πυθοῖ νεών, ἢ
χαλεπόν τι καὶ οὐχὶ παντός;

ΑΛ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις μὲν ἔδοξε παντὸς 5
εἶναι, πολλάκις δὲ παγχάλεπον.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἴτε ράδιον εἴτε μὴ ἐστίν, ὅμως
γε ἡμῖν ὧδ' ἔχει γνόντες μὲν αὐτὸ τάχ' ἂν γνοῖμεν τὴν
ἐπιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες δὲ οὐκ ἂν ποτε.

ΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. 10

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τί' ἂν τρόπον εὐρεθείη αὐτὸ ταυτό; οὕτω b
μὲν γὰρ ἂν τάχ' εὔρομεν τί ποτ' ἐσμὲν αὐτοί, τούτου δ' ἔτι
ὄντες ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἀδύνατοί που.

ΑΛ. Ὅρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἔχε οὖν πρὸς Διός. τῷ διαλέγῃ σὺ νῦν; ἄλλο τι 5
ἢ ἐμοί;

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐγὼ σοί;

e1 τοσόνδε γε B Stobaeus: τοσοῦτον δέ γε T e2 ποιοῖμεν Struve: ποιῶμεν BT
e4 ἢ οὖν Olympiodorus: εἰ οὖν BT a2 δὴ B: ἂν T a3 ἐν secl. Cobet b2 ἂν
τάχ' BT: τάχ' ἂν Olympiodorus b3 ὄντες B: ὄντος T b4 ὀρθῶς λέγεις T: om.
B b5 ἄλλο τι BT: ἄλλω τῷ Stobaeus

soc. But this much, at least, has been agreed: that it is not the craft by which we would make anything at all of what is ours better, but the one by which we would make ourselves better? ^e

ALC. What you say is true.

soc. Well, could we ever have known what craft makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe?

ALC. Impossible.

soc. Nor what craft makes rings better, being ignorant of a ring.

ALC. True.

soc. Well then: what craft makes oneself better, could we ever know that, while we are ignorant of what on earth we ourselves are?

ALC. Impossible. 129

soc. Now, is it in fact an easy thing to know oneself, and was the one who dedicated this in the temple at Pytho a nobody? Or is it something hard, and not for everyone?¹

ALC. To me, Socrates, it has often seemed to be for everyone, and often very hard.

soc. Well, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, this is still how it stands with us: if we know it, we might perhaps know the care of ourselves, but if we are ignorant of it, never.

ALC. That is so.

soc. Come, then: in what way could the self itself be discovered? ^b For in that way we might perhaps discover what on earth we ourselves are; but while we are still in ignorance of it, we are surely unable to.²

ALC. What you say is right.

soc. Hold on, then, for Zeus' sake. Whom are you talking with now? With me, isn't it?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And I with you?

1. Pytho is the old name of Delphi, and the dedication is the inscription "Know thyself" (124a–b).

2. "The self itself" renders *auto tauto*, which returns written out at 130d as *auto to auto*. *Tauto* is *to auto*, which can mean either "the same" or "the 'itself'", so the phrase can be read "the same itself" or "the itself itself": the self as such, rather than this or that self. What it names is disputed by interpreters: the form of the self, a reason common to all men, the god, or simply Alcibiades' own self. At 130d Socrates admits that the argument has looked instead at each thing itself.

- ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Σωκράτης ἄρ' ἐστὶν ὁ διαλεγόμενος; 10
 ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.
 ΣΩ. Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' ὁ ἀκούων;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λόγῳ διαλέγεται ὁ Σωκράτης;
 ΑΛ. Τί μῆν; c
 ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ταυτόν που καλεῖς.
 ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.
 ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ χρώμενος καὶ ᾧ χρῆται οὐκ ἄλλο; 5
 ΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;
 ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ σκυτοτόμος τέμνει που τομῇ καὶ σμύλῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις.
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄλλο μὲν ὁ τέμνων καὶ χρώμενος, ἄλλο δὲ 10 οἷς τέμνων χρῆται;
 ΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως καὶ οἷς ὁ κιθαριστὴς κιθαρίζει καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κιθαριστὴς ἄλλο ἢν εἶη;
 ΑΛ. Ναί. 15
 ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἀρτίως ἡρώτων, εἰ ὁ χρώμενος καὶ ᾧ d χρῆται αἰεὶ δοκεῖ ἕτερον εἶναι.
 ΑΛ. Δοκεῖ.
 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν φῶμεν τὸν σκυτοτόμον; τέμνειν ὀργάνοις μόνον ἢ καὶ χερσίν; 5
 ΑΛ. Καὶ χερσίν.
 ΣΩ. Χρῆται ἄρα καὶ ταύταις;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς χρώμενος σκυτοτομεῖ;
 ΑΛ. Ναί. 10

c7 τομῇ B² TW Olympiodorus: τομῇ pr. B (ut videtur) Stobaeus c10 χρώμενος Stobaeus: ὁ χρώμενος BT c11 οἷς ὁ W: οἷς BT d1 καὶ B: τε καὶ T

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then Socrates is the one talking?

ALC. Certainly.

soc. And Alcibiades the one listening?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And Socrates talks by means of speech?

ALC. Of course.

soc. And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose.

ALC. Certainly.

soc. And the user and what he uses: are they not different?

ALC. How do you mean?

soc. As a shoemaker, I suppose, cuts with a cutter and a knife and other tools.

ALC. Yes.

soc. Then the one who cuts and uses is one thing, and what he uses in cutting is another?

ALC. Of course.

soc. Then in the same way what the lyre-player plays with and the lyre-player himself would be different?

ALC. Yes.

soc. Well, this is what I was asking just now: whether the user and what he uses always seem to be different.

ALC. They do.

soc. Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with tools only, or with his hands too?

ALC. With his hands too.

soc. Then he uses these as well?

ALC. Yes.

soc. And does he use his eyes too in making shoes?

ALC. Yes.

- ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ χρώμενον καὶ οἷς χρήται ἕτερα ὁμολογοῦμεν;
 ΑΛ. Ναί.
- ΣΩ. Ἐτερον ἄρα σκυτοτόμος καὶ κιθαριστὴς χειρῶν καὶ
 ὀφθαλμῶν οἷς ἐργάζονται; e
- ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.
- ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ παντὶ τῷ σώματι χρήται ἄνθρωπος;
- ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.
- ΣΩ. Ἐτερον δ' ἦν τό τε χρώμενον καὶ ᾧ χρήται; 5
- ΑΛ. Ναί.
- ΣΩ. Ἐτερον ἄρα ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ;
- ΑΛ. Ἔοικεν.
- ΣΩ. Τί ποτ' οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος;
- ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. 10
- ΣΩ. Ἐχεις μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τὸ τῷ σώματι χρώμενον.
- ΑΛ. Ναί.
- ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλο τι χρήται αὐτῷ ἢ ψυχῇ; 130
- ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλο.
- ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄρχουσα;
- ΑΛ. Ναί.
- ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τόδε γ' οἶμαι οὐδένα ἂν ἄλλως οἰηθῆναι. 5
- ΑΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;
- ΣΩ. Μὴ οὐ τριῶν ἐν γέ τι εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
- ΑΛ. Τίνων;
- ΣΩ. Ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα ἢ συναμφότερον, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο.
- ΑΛ. Τί μὴν; 10
- ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχον ὁμο-
 λογήσαμεν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι;
- ΑΛ. Ὁμολογήσαμεν.
- ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν σῶμα αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄρχει; b

e 3 ἄνθρωπος Schanz: ἄνθρωπος BT e 5 δ' ἦν B: δὴ T e 7 ἄνθρωπος Bekker:
 ἄνθρωπος BT τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ B: τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ σώματος T e 9 ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος BT: ἄνθρωπος Bekker a 1 ἦ] T: εἰ B ἢ BT: ἦ ἢ W b 1 ὁμολογήσαμεν
 B: ὁμολογήσαμεν τίς οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος TW b 2 ἄρχει BT: ἄρξει Olympiodorus

soc. And we agree that the user and the things he uses are different?

alc. Yes.

soc. Then the shoemaker and the lyre-player are different from the hands and eyes they work with? e

alc. It appears so.

soc. And a man uses his whole body too?

alc. Certainly.

soc. And what uses and what it uses were different?

alc. Yes.

soc. Then a man is different from his own body?

alc. It seems so.

soc. Then what on earth is man?

alc. I can't say.

soc. Indeed you can: that he is what uses the body.

alc. Yes.

soc. Then does anything else use it but soul? 130

alc. Nothing else.

soc. And by ruling it?

alc. Yes.

soc. And here is something, I think, about which no one would think otherwise.

alc. What is that?

soc. That man is at least one of three things.

alc. Which?

soc. Soul, or body, or the two together, this whole.

alc. Of course.

soc. But we agreed that the very thing that rules the body is man?

alc. We agreed. b

soc. Well, does the body rule itself?

- ΑΛ. Οὐδαμῶς.
 ΣΩ. Ἄρχεσθαι γὰρ αὐτὸ εἵπομεν.
 ΑΛ. Ναί. 5
 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν δὴ τοῦτό γε εἴη ὃ ζητοῦμεν.
 ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.
 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα τὸ συναμφότερον τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει, καὶ
 ἔστι δὴ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος;
 ΑΛ. Ἴσως δῆτα. 10
 ΣΩ. Πάντων γε ἥκιστα μὴ γὰρ συνάρχοντος τοῦ ἑτέρου
 οὐδεμία που μηχανὴ τὸ συναμφότερον ἄρχειν.
 ΑΛ. Ὅρθῶς.
 ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε τὸ συναμφότερόν ἐστιν c
 ἄνθρωπος, λείπεται οἶμαι ἢ μηδὲν αὐτ' εἶναι, ἢ εἴπερ τί ἐστι,
 μηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἄνθρωπον συμβαίνειν ἢ ψυχὴν.
 ΑΛ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
 ΣΩ. Ἔτι οὖν τι σαφέστερον δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναί σοι ὅτι ἡ 5
 ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος;
 ΑΛ. Μὰ Δία, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν.
 ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ μετρίως, ἐξαρκεῖ
 ἡμῖν ἀκριβῶς μὲν γὰρ τότε εἰσόμεθα, ὅταν εὗρωμεν ὃ νυνδὴ
 παρήλθομεν διὰ τὸ πολλῆς εἶναι σκέψεως. d
 ΑΛ. Τί τοῦτο;
 ΣΩ. Ὅ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἐρρήθη, ὅτι πρῶτον σκεπτέον εἴη
 αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἐσκέμμεθα
 ὅτι ἐστί. καὶ ἴσως ἐξαρκέσει οὐ γάρ που κυριώτερόν γε 5
 οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν φήσαιμεν ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν.
 ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς ἔχει οὕτω νομίζειν, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ προσ-

b9 ἔστι δὴ τοῦτο B Stobaeus: ἔστιν τοῦτό γε T b11 συνάρχοντος B: οὖν
 ἄρχοντος TW (συν s.v. W) c1 σῶμα B: τὸ σῶμα T c2 prius ἢ T: om. B
 c5 τι BT: om. Olympiodorus c8 ἀλλὰ καὶ μετρίως TW: om. B d4 δὲ B: δὴ
 T ἀντὶ Tb: αὐτὶ pr. B αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ Schleiermacher: αὐτοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ
 Stallbaum αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ Stephanus: αὐτοῦ αὐτὸν BT d5 ὅτι B Stobaeus: τί T

ALC. Not at all.

SOC. For we said that it is ruled.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then this would not be what we are seeking.

ALC. It seems not.

SOC. Well, then, is it the two together that rule the body, and is this man?

ALC. Perhaps it is.

SOC. Least of all: for if one of the two does not share in the ruling, there is surely no way for the two together to rule.

ALC. Rightly said.

SOC. But since neither body nor the two together is man, what remains, I think, is either that man is nothing, or, if he is anything, that man turns out to be nothing other than soul. c

ALC. Exactly so.

SOC. Must it be proved to you still more clearly, then, that the soul is man?

ALC. No, by Zeus: I think it is good enough as it stands.

SOC. Well, if not precisely, then adequately at least, that suffices for us. For we shall know it precisely once we have discovered what we passed over just now, because it needed much looking into. d

ALC. What is that?

SOC. What was said just now, more or less: that we must first look into the self itself. But as it is, instead of the self, we have looked into what each thing itself is. And perhaps that will suffice; for surely we would not say that anything of ourselves has more authority than the soul.¹

ALC. Certainly not.

SOC. Then is it well to hold it so: that you and I

1. The Greek is compressed: "instead of the itself, each itself". *Auto* is Stephanus' correction of the manuscripts' *auton*, "each man himself"; Schleiermacher's "instead of the itself itself" and Stallbaum's "the itself by itself" stand only in Burnet's apparatus (d4) and are not followed. Socrates leaves the larger question open.

ομιλεῖν ἀλλήλοις τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν
ψυχὴν; 10

ΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' ἄρα ἦν ὃ καὶ ὀλίγω ἔμπροσθεν εἵπομεν,
ὅτι Σωκράτης Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαλέγεται λόγῳ χρώμενος, οὐ
πρὸς τὸ σὸν πρόσωπον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν
Ἀλκιβιάδην ποιούμενος τοὺς λόγους τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἡ 5
ψυχή.

ΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ψυχὴν ἄρα ἡμᾶς κελεύει γνωρίσαι ὃ ἐπιτάττων
γνώναι ἐαυτόν.

ΑΛ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ὅστις ἄρα τῶν τοῦ σώματός τι γινώσκει, τὰ αὐτοῦ
ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτὸν ἔγνωκεν. 131

ΑΛ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδεὶς ἄρα τῶν ἰατρῶν ἐαυτὸν γινώσκει, καθ'
ὅσον ἰατρός, οὐδὲ τῶν παιδοτριβῶν, καθ' ὅσον παιδο- 5
τρίβης.

ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Πολλοὺ ἄρα δέουσιν οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δη-
μιουργοὶ γινώσκειν ἐαυτούς. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ἐαυτῶν οὐτοί γε, 10
ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἐαυτῶν κατὰ γε τὰς
τέχνας ἄς ἔχουσιν τὰ γὰρ τοῦ σώματος γινώσκουσιν, οἷς b
τοῦτο θεραπεύεται.

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ τὸ ἐαυτὸν γινώσκειν,
οὐδεὶς τούτων σώφρων κατὰ τὴν τέχνην. 5

ΑΛ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ βάνανσοι αὐται αἱ τέχναι δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ μαθήματα.

ΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

d 9 τῇ ψυχῇ] τὴν ψυχὴν Dobree e 3 λόγῳ TW: om. B a 2 τι Stobaeus: om. BT
a 5 γινώσκει T: γινώσκειν B b 1 ἄς T: om. B b 7 ταῦτα Tb: ταν pr. B

converse with each other, using words, soul to soul?

ALC. Certainly.

soc. Then this was what we said a little earlier too: that Socrates, using speech, talks with Alcibiades, addressing his words not to your face, it seems, but to Alcibiades; and that is the soul.

ALC. I think so.

soc. Then it is the soul that we are bidden to come to know by the one who enjoins us to know ourselves.

ALC. It seems so.

soc. Then whoever knows something about the body knows what is his own, but not himself.

ALC. Just so.

soc. Then no doctor knows himself, insofar as he is a doctor, nor any trainer, insofar as he is a trainer.

ALC. It seems not.

soc. Then the farmers and the other craftsmen are far from knowing themselves. For they do not even know what is their own, it seems, but things still further off than what is their own, at least so far as the crafts they practise go: for they know what belongs to the body, the things by which it is tended.

ALC. What you say is true.

soc. Then if temperance is knowing oneself, none of these is temperate so far as his craft goes.

ALC. I don't think so.

soc. That, indeed, is why these crafts are thought to be menial, and not a good man's subjects.¹

ALC. Certainly.

1. The word is *banausos*, used of craftsmen who work with their hands. Greek gentlemen held such work to spoil body and mind and to unfit a man for the life of a citizen (Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 4.2–3; Aristotle, *Politics* 1337b8–15). Socrates gives the old prejudice a new ground: these crafts know at most the body and what belongs to it, never the self, and so make no one temperate.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πάλιν ὅστις αὖ σώμα θεραπεύει, τὰ ἐαυτοῦ 10
ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτὸν θεραπεύει;

ΑΛ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ὅστις δέ γε τὰ χρήματα, οὐθ' ἐαυτὸν οὔτε τὰ 1
ἐαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἐαυτοῦ; c

ΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἄρα ἔτι πράττει ὁ χρηματιστής.

ΑΛ. Ὅρθως.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τις γέγονεν ἐραστής τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου 5
σώματος, οὐκ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἄρα ἠράσθη ἀλλὰ τινος τῶν
Ἀλκιβιάδου.

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὅστις δέ σου τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρά;

ΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη φαίνεται ἐκ τοῦ λόγου. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν τοῦ σώματός σου ἐρών, ἐπειδὴ λήγει
ἀνθοῦν, ἀπιὼν οἴχεται;

ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρών οὐκ ἄπεισιν, ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ d
βέλτιον ἦ;

ΑΛ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ οὐκ ἀπιὼν ἀλλὰ παραμένων 5
λήγοντος τοῦ σώματος, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεληλυθότων. 5

ΑΛ. Εὖ γε ποιῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες καὶ μηδὲ ἀπέλθοις.

ΣΩ. Προθυμοῦ τοίνυν ὅτι κάλλιστος εἶναι.

ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ προθυμήσομαι.

ΣΩ. Ὡς οὕτω γέ σοι ἔχει οὐτ' ἐγένεθ', ὥς ἔοικεν, e
Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ Κλεινίου ἐραστής οὐτ' ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ εἷς
μόνος, καὶ οὗτος ἀγαπητός, Σωκράτης ὁ Σωφρονίσκου καὶ
Φαιναρέτης.

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῇ. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφησθα συμκρὸν φθῆναί με προσελθόντα σοι,

b 10 τὰ B: τὸ T b 11 οὐχ ἐαυτὸν T Stobaeus: οὐκ αὐτὸν B c 6 ἄρα T: om. B d 6
μηδὲ T: μὴ B e 2 ἀλλ' ἢ T: ἀλλ' B

soc. Then again, whoever tends a body tends what is his own, and not himself?

alc. It looks like it.

soc. And whoever tends his money tends neither himself nor what is his own, but things still further off than what is his own? c

alc. I think so.

soc. Then the money-maker is no longer doing his own business.

alc. Rightly said.

soc. Then if anyone has become a lover of Alcibiades' body, it was not Alcibiades he loved, but something of Alcibiades'.

alc. What you say is true.

soc. But whoever loves your soul?

alc. Necessarily, it appears, from the argument.

soc. Then the lover of your body, when it stops blooming, takes himself off and is gone?

alc. It appears so.

soc. But the lover of your soul does not go away, so long as it goes toward what is better? d

alc. Likely, at any rate.

soc. Then I am the one who does not go away but stays, now that your body is fading and the others have gone.

alc. And good of you, Socrates; may you never go away.

soc. Then be eager to be as beautiful as you can.

alc. Well, I will be eager.

soc. For this is how it stands with you: Alcibiades son of Cleinias, it seems, neither had nor has any lover but one alone, and he one to be cherished, Socrates the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.¹ e

alc. True.

soc. Then you said that I had beaten you to it by a whisker in coming to you,

1. Socrates' father Sophroniscus is named in the *Laches* (180d); his mother Phaenarete, a midwife, in the *Theaetetus* (149a). Socrates names his own parents as he named Alcibiades' at 105d, "son of Cleinias and Deinomache".

ἐπεὶ πρότερος ἄν μοι προσελθεῖν, βουλόμενος πυθέσθαι δι'
ὅτι μόνος οὐκ ἀπέρχομαι;

ΑΛ. Ἦν γὰρ οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον, ὅτι μόνος ἐραστής ἦν σός, οἱ 10
δ' ἄλλοι τῶν σῶν τὰ δὲ σὰ λήγει ὥρας, σὺ δ' ἄρχῃ ἀνθεῖν.
καὶ νῦν γε ἂν μὴ διαφθαρήs ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ 132
αἰσχίων γένῃ, οὐ μὴ σε ἀπολίπω. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ μάλιστα
ἐγὼ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ δημεραστήs ἡμῖν γενόμενος διαφθαρήs
πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ ἀγαθοὶ αὐτὸ πεπόνθασιν Ἀθηναίων.
εὐπρόσωπος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ μεγαλήτορος δῆμος Ἐρεχθέως 5
ἀλλ' ἀποδύντα χρή αὐτὸν θεάσασθαι. εὐλαβοῦ οὖν τὴν
εὐλάβειαν ἣν ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΑΛ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Γύμνασαι πρῶτον, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ μάθε ἃ δεῖ μαθόντα b
ιέναι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆs πόλεως, πρότερον δὲ μὴ, ἵν' ἀλεξιφάρμακα
ἔχων ἵης καὶ μηδὲν πάθῃs δεινόν.

ΑΛ. Εὖ μοι δοκεῖs λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες ἀλλὰ πειρῶ
ἐξηγεῖσθαι ὄντιν' ἂν τρόπον ἐπιμεληθεῖμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν πεπέρανται
—ὁ γὰρ ἐσμέν, ἐπικικῶs ὠμολόγηται—ἐφοβούμεθα δὲ μὴ
τούτου σφαλέντες λάθωμεν ἑτέρου τινὸs ἐπιμελόμενοι ἀλλ'
οὐχ ἡμῶν.

ΑΛ. Ἦστι ταῦτα. 10

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ ὅτι ψυχῆs ἐπιμελητέον καὶ εἰς c
τοῦτο βλέπτεον.

ΑΛ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Σωμάτων δὲ καὶ χρημάτων τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἑτέροis
παραδοτέον. 5

ΑΛ. Τί μήν;

e 10 σός] σοῦ Stallbaum a 2 ἀπολίπω BT: ἀπολείπω Olympiodorus a 3 ἡμῖν
γενόμενος B: γενόμενος ἡμῖν T b 5 ὄντιν' ἂν Bekker: ὄντινα BT b 7 ἐφοβούμεθα
T: φοβούμεθα B c 1 δὴ ὅτι Stobaeus: δὲ ὅτι T: ἤδη B ψυχῆs T Olympiodorus
Stobaeus: τῆs ψυχῆs B

since you would have come to me first, wanting to find out why I alone do not go away?¹

ALC. Yes, it was so.

soc. Well, the cause of it was this: that I alone was your lover, and the others lovers of what is yours. What is yours is leaving its prime, but you are beginning to bloom. And now, unless you are corrupted by the Athenian people and grow uglier, I will never leave you. For this is what I fear most, that you may become a lover of the people and be corrupted, to our cost;² for many good men among the Athenians have suffered it already. For “the people of great-hearted Erechtheus” has a handsome face; but one should look at it stripped.³ So take the precaution I speak of. 132

ALC. What precaution?

soc. Exercise first, my dear fellow, and learn what one must learn before going into the city’s affairs, and not before, so that you may go with antidotes and come to no harm. b

ALC. I think you speak well, Socrates; but try to explain in what way we might care for ourselves.

soc. Well, so much has been accomplished for us so far (for what we are has been fairly well agreed); and we were afraid that, missing this, we might fail to notice that we were caring for something else and not for ourselves.

ALC. That is so.

soc. And after this, that we must care for the soul, and look to this. c

ALC. Clearly.

soc. And hand over the care of bodies and money to others.

ALC. Of course.

1. At 104c–d.

2. *Dēmerastēs*, “lover of the people”, puts politics in the language of love. In the *Gorgias* (481d) Socrates says that he loves two things, Alcibiades and philosophy, and Callicles two, the Athenian *dēmos* and Demos son of Pyrilampes; Pericles in Thucydides urges the Athenians to become “lovers” of their city (2.43.1).

3. Homer, *Iliad* 2.547, from the Catalogue of Ships, where the Athenians are those who held “the *dēmos* of great-hearted Erechtheus”, their legendary king. In Homer *dēmos* there means the land; Socrates takes it in its Athenian sense, “the people”. Burnet spaces the words to mark the quotation. “Handsome face” (*euprosōpos*) and “stripped” make the people a beautiful boy whose looks the lover must judge. In the *Charmides* (154d–e) Chaerephon calls Charmides “handsome of face” and says that if he stripped he would seem to have no face, so fine is his body; Socrates proposes to strip his soul first.

ΣΩ. Τίν' οὖν ἂν τρόπον γινώμεν αὐτὸ ἐναργέστατα; ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γνόντες, ὥς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς γνωσόμεθα. ἄρα πρὸς θεῶν εἰς λέγοντος οὐ νυνδὴ ἐμνήσθημεν τοῦ Δελφικοῦ γράμματος οὐκ συνίμεν; 10

ΑΛ. Τὸ ποῖόν τι διανοούμενος λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι φράσω, ὃ γε ὑποπτεύω λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἡμῖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα. κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐδὲ πολλαχοῦ εἶναι παράδειγμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον. d

ΑΛ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Σκόπει καὶ σύ. εἰ ἡμῶν τῷ ὄμματι ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπων συμβουλευόν εἶπεν “ἰδὲ σαντόν,” πῶς ἂν ὑπελάβομεν τί παραινεῖν; ἄρα οὐχὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλέπειν, εἰς ὃ βλέπων ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἔμελλεν αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν; 5

ΑΛ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Ἐννοῶμεν δὴ εἰς τί βλέποντες τῶν ὄντων ἐκεῖνό τε ὁρῶμεν ἅμα ἂν καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς; 10 e

ΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι εἰς κάτοπτρά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ᾧ ὁρῶμεν ἔνεστί τι τῶν τοιούτων; 5

ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐννενόηκας οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τὸ πρόσωπον ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ὀψει ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ὃ δὴ καὶ κόρην καλοῦμεν, εἰδωλον ὃν τι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος; 133

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὁφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὀφθαλμὸν θεώμενος, καὶ ἐμβλέπων εἰς τοῦτο ὅπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ καὶ ᾧ ὁρᾷ, οὕτως ἂν αὐτὸν ἴδοι. 5

c7 αὐτὸ Schleiermacher: αὐτὰ BT c8 καὶ T: om. B c10 ξυνίμεν B Stobaeus: ξύνισμεν T d6 συμβουλευόν Apelt: συμβουλεύων B: ξυμβουλευόν T εἶπεν T: εἶπεν B σαντόν BT: εἰσάντον Stobaeus d7 βλέπειν B: βλέπει T ó B: om. T e5 τι add. F. A. Wolf a2 ὁ . . . καλοῦμεν secl. Schleiermacher κόρην B Stobaeus: κορυφήν T a3 ὃν τι B: ὃν T

soc. Then in what way could we know it most clearly?¹ Since if we know this, it seems, we shall know ourselves too. In the gods' name, can it be that we do not understand the Delphic inscription we mentioned just now, though it speaks well?

ALC. What do you have in mind in saying that, Socrates?

soc. I will tell you what I, at least, suspect this inscription is saying and advising us. For it may be that there is no example of it to be found in many places, but only in the case of sight.

ALC. What do you mean by that?

soc. Consider it with me. If it had advised our eye as though it were a man, and said "See thyself", how would we have taken what it was recommending? Would it not be to look into that thing, looking into which the eye would see itself?

ALC. Clearly.

soc. Let us think, then: looking into what, among the things that are, would we see both it and ourselves at the same time?

ALC. Clearly, Socrates, into mirrors and things of that kind.

soc. Rightly said. Then is there also something of that kind in the eye with which we see?

ALC. Certainly.

soc. Have you noticed, then, that the face of one who looks into an eye shows in the eye of the one opposite, as in a mirror, the thing we also call the pupil, since it is a kind of image of the one looking in?²

ALC. What you say is true.

soc. Then an eye, observing an eye and looking into that which is best in it, the very thing with which it sees, would in this way see itself.

1. "It" is Schleiermacher's correction (*auto*); B and T have "them" (*auta*). The neuter takes up "this" in Socrates' last speech but one, where the soul is meant.

2. *Korē* means "girl" or "doll", and also the pupil of the eye, from the tiny figure of the onlooker seen in it; the Latin *pupilla*, "little girl", the source of the English "pupil", likewise means both. Schleiermacher rejected the words "the thing we also call the pupil" as an addition (*apparatus*, a2).

ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γ' εἰς ἄλλο τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βλέπει ἢ τι τῶν ὄντων, πλὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον, οὐκ ὄψεται ἑαυτόν. 10

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὁφθαλμὸς ἄρ' εἰ μέλλει ἰδεῖν αὐτόν, εἰς ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτῷ βλέπτον, καὶ τοῦ ὀμματος εἰς ἐκείνον τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει ἢ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ ἐγγιγνομένη ἔστι δὲ τοῦτό που ὄψις; 5

ΑΛ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ᾧ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ψυχὴ εἰ μέλλει γνῶσθαι αὐτήν, εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλέπτον, καὶ μάλιστ' εἰς τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται ἢ ψυχῆς ἀρετή, σοφία, καὶ εἰς ἄλλο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον ὄν; 10

ΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστίν; c

ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

ΣΩ. Τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καί τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίῃ μάλιστα. 5

ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὅθ' ὥσπερ κάτοπτρά ἐστι σαφέστερα τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἐνόπτρου καὶ καθαρώτερα καὶ λαμπρότερα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θεὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ βελτίστου καθαρώτερόν τε καὶ λαμπρότερον τυγχάνει ὄν; 10

ΑΛ. Ἔοικέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἄρα βλέποντες ἐκείνῳ καλλίστῳ ἐνόπτρῳ χρώμεθ' ἂν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων εἰς τὴν ψυχῆς

a 10 τοῦτο] αὐτὸ Madvig b 4 ἢ B: om. T: ἢ τοῦ Stobaeus b 5 ὄψις T: ἢ ὄψις B b 10 σοφία secl. Heusde c 1 θειότερον TW: νοερώτερον B: κυριώτερον Cobet c 2 τε] γε B: το T ἐστίν B Stobaeus: om. T c 4 θεῷ B: θείῳ T c 5 θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν om. Olympiodorus c 8-17 Ἄρ' οὖν . . . Naί Eusebius: om. BT (sed talia fere legerunt Iulianus Stobaeus)

ALC. It appears so.

soc. But if it should look into anything else that belongs to a man, or into any of the things that are, except that which this in fact resembles, it will not see itself.

ALC. What you say is true. b

soc. Then if an eye is to see itself, it must look into an eye, and into that region of the eye in which the eye's virtue in fact comes to be; and this, I suppose, is sight?

ALC. Just so.

soc. Then, my dear Alcibiades, if a soul too is to know itself, must it look into a soul, and above all into that region of it in which the soul's virtue, wisdom, comes to be, and into anything else which this in fact resembles?

ALC. I think so, Socrates.

soc. Can we say, then, what part of the soul is more divine c than this, the part with which knowledge and intelligence are concerned?¹

ALC. We cannot.

soc. Then this part of it resembles the god, and whoever looks into this and comes to know all that is divine, god and intelligence, would in this way know himself too, most of all.

ALC. It appears so.

soc. Is it so, then, that just as mirrors are clearer than the mirror in the eye, and purer and brighter, so too the god is in fact purer and brighter than the best in our soul?²

ALC. It seems so, Socrates.

soc. Then by looking into the god we would be using him as the finest mirror, and, among human things, by looking into the soul's

1. "More divine" is the reading of T and W, which Burnet prints. B has "more intellectual" (*noerōteron*), and Cobet proposed "having more authority" (*kuriōteron*), the word used of the soul at 130d.

2. This question, Alcibiades' answer, and the speech and answer that follow (133c8–17) are not in B or T. Burnet prints them in angle brackets from Eusebius, who quotes the passage in his *Preparation for the Gospel* (11.27.5), and notes that Julian and Stobaeus read something like them. Their authenticity is disputed.

ἀρετήν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα ὀρώμεν καὶ γιγνώσκοιμεν 15
 ἡμᾶς αὐτούς.

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ὠμολογοῦμεν σωφροσύνην
 εἶναι;

ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

20

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μὴ γιγνώσκοντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς μηδὲ σώ-
 φρονες ὄντες δυναίμεθ' ἂν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακά
 τε καὶ ἀγαθά;

ΑΛ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἴσως σοι φαίνεται μὴ γιγνώσκοντα d
 Ἀλκιβιάδην τὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου γιγνώσκειν ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδου
 ἐστίν.

ΑΛ. Ἀδύνατον μέντοι νῆ Δία.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα τὰ ἡμέτερα ὅτι ἡμέτερα, εἰ μηδ' ἡμᾶς 5
 αὐτούς;

ΑΛ. Πῶς γάρ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δ' ἄρα μηδὲ τὰ ἡμέτερα, οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων;

ΑΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα πάνυ τι ὀρθῶς ὠμολογοῦμεν ὁμολογοῦντες 10
 ἄρτι εἶναί τινες οἱ ἑαυτοὺς μὲν οὐ γιγνώσκουσιν, τὰ δ' αὐτῶν,
 ἄλλους δὲ τὰ τῶν ἑαυτῶν. ἔοικε γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι
 κατιδεῖν ενός τε καὶ μιᾶς τέχνης, αὐτόν, τὰ αὐτοῦ, τὰ τῶν e
 ἑαυτοῦ.

ΑΛ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ὅστις δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων που
 ἂν ἀγνοοῖ κατὰ ταῦτά. 5

ΑΛ. Τί μήν;

c18 ὠμολογοῦμεν T: ὁμολογοῦμεν B Stobaeus c22 δυναίμεθ' ἂν B: δυναίμεθα T:
 δυνάμεθα Stobaeus d1 γάρ TW: om. B Olympiodorus σοι B Olympiodorus: om.
 TW d5 ὅτι ἡμέτερα TW: om. B d8 μηδὲ Stobaeus: om. BT d10 ὠμολογοῦμεν
 T: ὁμολογοῦμεν B Olympiodorus d12 ἄλλους δὲ Stobaeus: ἀλλ' οὐ BT e5 ἂν
 ἀγνοοῖ T: ἀγνοοῖ B: ἀγνοεῖ Stobaeus

virtue; and in this way we would most of all see and know ourselves.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And knowing oneself, we agreed, is temperance?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. Then could we, not knowing ourselves and not being temperate, know what is our own, the bad and the good?

ALC. And how could that happen, Socrates?

SOC. For perhaps it seems impossible to you that someone who does not know Alcibiades should know that what is Alcibiades' is Alcibiades'.^d

ALC. Impossible indeed, by Zeus.

SOC. Nor, then, could we know that what is ours is ours, if we do not know ourselves either?

ALC. How could we?

SOC. And if not what is ours, then not what belongs to what is ours either?

ALC. It appears not.

SOC. Then we were not quite right when we agreed a moment ago that there are some who do not know themselves but know what is their own, and others who know what belongs to what is their own.¹ For it seems that it is for one man and one craft to discern all these: oneself, what is one's own, and what belongs to what is one's own.^e

ALC. It looks like it.

SOC. And whoever is ignorant of what is his own would, I suppose, be ignorant of what belongs to others too, in the same way.

ALC. Of course.

1. "And others ..." is Stobaeus' reading, which Burnet prints; B and T have "but not what belongs to what is their own". The reference is to 131a-c: the doctor and the trainer know what is their own, the body; the farmers and the other craftsmen only what belongs to it; and the money-maker, likewise, tends things "still further off than what is his own".

- ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἀγνοήσῃ.
 ΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν γένοιτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ πολιτικός.
 ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα. 10
 ΣΩ. Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' οἰκονομικός γε.
 ΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα. 134
 ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε εἴσεται ὅτι πράττει.
 ΑΛ. Οὐ γὰρ οὔν.
 ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται;
 ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. 5
 ΣΩ. Ἐξαμαρτάνων δὲ οὐ κακῶς πράξει ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ;
 ΑΛ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;
 ΣΩ. Κακῶς δὲ πράττων οὐκ ἄθλιος;
 ΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. 10
 ΣΩ. Τί δ' οἷς οὔτος πράττει;
 ΑΛ. Καὶ οὔτοι.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε, ἐὰν μὴ τις σώφρων καὶ ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.
 ΑΛ. Οὐχ οἷόν τε. b
 ΣΩ. Οἱ ἄρα κακοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄθλιοι.
 ΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ὁ πλουτήσας ἀθλιότητος ἀπαλλάττεται, ἀλλ' ὁ σωφρονήσας. 5
 ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τειχῶν οὐδὲ τριήρων οὐδὲ νεωρίων δέονται αἱ πόλεις, ὧ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, εἰ μέλλουσιν εὐδαιμονήσῃν, οὐδὲ πλήθους οὐδὲ μεγέθους ἄνευ ἀρετῆς.
 ΑΛ. Οὐ μέντοι. 10
 ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ μέλλεις τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράξῃν ὀρθῶς καὶ καλῶς, ἀρετῆς σοι μεταδοτέον τοῖς πολίταις. c

a 2 γε T: om. B a 13 οὐκ ἄρα . . . b 3 σφόδρα γε Tb: om. B b 4 ἀθλιότητος TW
 Olympiodorus: ματαιότητος B

soc. Then if of what belongs to others, he will be ignorant of what belongs to cities too.

alc. Necessarily.

soc. Then such a man could not become a statesman.

alc. Certainly not.

soc. Nor a household manager either.

alc. Certainly not.

134

soc. Nor will he even know what he is doing.

alc. No indeed.

soc. And will the one who does not know not make mistakes?

alc. Certainly.

soc. And making mistakes, will he not do badly, in private and in public?

alc. How could he not?

soc. And doing badly, is he not wretched?

alc. Very much so.

soc. And what of those for whom he is acting?

alc. They too.

soc. Then it is not possible, unless someone is temperate and good, to be happy.

alc. It is not possible.

b

soc. Then the bad among men are wretched.

alc. Very much so.

soc. Then it is not even the one who has grown rich who is rid of wretchedness, but the one who has grown temperate.

alc. It appears so.

soc. Then it is not walls or triremes or dockyards that cities need, Alcibiades, if they are to be happy, nor numbers nor size, without virtue.

alc. Certainly not.

soc. If, then, you are going to manage the city's affairs rightly and finely, you must give the citizens a share of virtue.

c

ΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Δύναιτο δ' ἂν τις μεταδιδόναι ὃ μὴ ἔχοι;

ΑΛ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Αὐτῷ ἄρα σοὶ πρῶτον κτητέον ἀρετήν, καὶ ἄλλω ὃς 5
μέλλει μὴ ἰδίᾳ μόνον αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἄρξαι καὶ
ἐπιμελήσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πόλεως καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως.

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐξουσίαν σοι οὐδ' ἀρχὴν παρασκευαστέον
σαυτῷ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ, οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην 10
καὶ σωφροσύνην.

ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Δικαίως μὲν γὰρ πράττοντες καὶ σωφρόνως σύ τε d
καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε.

ΑΛ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, εἰς τὸ 5
θεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ὁρῶντες πράξετε.

ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐνταῦθά γε βλέποντες ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς
καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα ἀγαθὰ κατόψεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε.

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ πράξετε; 10

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε πράττοντας ὑμᾶς ἐθέλω ἐγ- e
γυῆσασθαι ἢ μὴν εὐδαιμονήσειν.

ΑΛ. Ἀσφαλῆς γὰρ εἰ ἐγγυητής.

ΣΩ. Ἀδίκως δέ γε πράττοντες, εἰς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινὸν
βλέποντες, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα, ὅμοια τούτοις πράξετε ἀγνοοῦντες 5
ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.

ΑΛ. Ὅμοιον.

ΣΩ. ὦ γὰρ ἂν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἐξουσία μὲν ἢ
ποιεῖν ὃ βούλεται, νοῦν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ, τί τὸ εἰκὸς συμβαίνειν,

c3 ἔχοι T Olympiodorus: ἔχει B Stobaeus c5 κτητέον T: κλητέον B d8 καὶ B:
τε καὶ T e4 γε T: om. B Stobaeus καὶ T: καὶ τὸ B Stobaeus e8 ἂν Laur. lxxxv.
9: om. BT

ALC. Of course.

SOC. And could anyone give a share of what he did not have?

ALC. How could he?

SOC. Then you yourself must first acquire virtue, and so must anyone else who is going to rule and care for not only himself and what is his own, in private, but the city and the city's affairs.

ALC. What you say is true.

SOC. Then it is not license, nor rule, to do whatever you wish that you must procure for yourself, nor for the city, but justice and temperance.

ALC. It appears so.

SOC. For if you and the city act justly and temperately, you will act in a way dear to the gods.

ALC. Likely, at any rate.

SOC. And, as we were saying earlier, you will act looking toward what is divine and bright.

ALC. It appears so.

SOC. And indeed, looking there, you will see and know yourselves and your own goods.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then you will act rightly and do well?¹

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And indeed, if you act in this way, I am willing to stand guarantor that you will truly be happy.

ALC. Yes, for you are a safe guarantor.²

SOC. But if you act unjustly, looking toward what is godless and dark, then, as is likely, you will act in keeping with these, being ignorant of yourselves.

ALC. It seems so.

SOC. For whoever, my dear Alcibiades, has license to do what he wishes but has no sense, what is likely to befall him,

1. "Act" and "do" render one Greek verb, *prattein*, which runs through 134a–e; with "well" it means both acting well and faring well (116b).

2. Standing guarantor was proverbially risky: "Pledge, and ruin is near" was among the sayings dedicated at Delphi after "Know thyself" (*Charmides* 165a).

ιδιώτῃ ἢ καὶ πόλει; οἷον νοσοῦντι ἐξουσίας οὔσης δρᾶν ὁ 10
 βούλεται, νοῦν ἱατρικὸν μὴ ἔχοντι, τυραννοῦντι δὲ ὡς μηδὲν 135
 ἐπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ, τί τὸ συμβησόμενον; ἄρ' οὐχ, ὡς τὸ
 εἶκός, διαφθαρῆναι τὸ σῶμα;

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν νηί, εἴ τω ἐξουσία εἴη ποιεῖν ὁ δοκεῖ, νοῦ 5
 τε καὶ ἀρετῆς κυβερνητικῆς ἐστερημένῳ, καθορᾶς ἂ ἂν
 συμβαίῃ αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς συνναύταις;

ΑΛ. Ἐγωγε, ὅτι γε ἀπόλουντο πάντες ἄν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως ἐν πόλει τε καὶ πάσαις ἀρχαῖς καὶ
 ἐξουσίαις ἀπολειπομέναις ἀρετῆς ἔπεται τὸ κακῶς πράττειν; b

ΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τυραννίδα χρή, ὦ ἄριστε Ἀλκιβιάδη, παρα-
 σκευάζεσθαι οὐθ' αὐτῷ οὔτε τῇ πόλει, εἰ μέλλετε εὐδαιμονεῖν,
 ἀλλ' ἀρετήν. 5

ΑΛ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πρὶν δέ γε ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ἄρχεσθαι ἄμεινον ὑπὸ
 τοῦ βελτίονος ἢ τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνδρί, οὐ μόνον παιδί.

ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τό γ' ἄμεινον καὶ κάλλιον; 10

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ κάλλιον πρεπωδέστερον;

ΑΛ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Πρέπει ἄρα τῷ κακῷ δουλεύειν ἄμεινον γάρ. c

ΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δουλοπρεπὲς ἄρ' ἢ κακία.

ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἐλευθεροπρεπὲς δὲ ἢ ἀρετή. 5

ΑΛ. Ναί.

a 1 ὥς] ὥστε Schanz (et mox ἐπιπλήττειν cum Buttmann) μηδὲ ἐπιπλήττοι τις
 αὐτῷ T: μηδὲν ἐπιπλήττει τις αὐτῷ Olympiodorus: μηδ' ἐπιπλήττοντι ἑαυτῷ B
 a 5 δοκεῖ T: δοκεῖν B a 7 ζυμβαίῃ W Stobaeus: ζυμβαίνῃ BT: ζυμβαῖνοι Coisl. a 8
 ἂν T: om. B a 9 πάσαις B Stobaeus: ἀπάσαις T

a private person or a city too? For example, if a sick man has license to do what he wishes, and has no medical sense, but is a tyrant, so that no one may rebuke him at all, what will be the result? Will his body not, in all likelihood, be ruined? 135

ALC. What you say is true.

SOC. And what of a ship? If someone had license to do what seemed good to him, but lacked sense and virtue in piloting, do you see what would happen to him and his shipmates?

ALC. I do: they would all perish.

SOC. Then in the same way, in a city, and in all kinds of rule and license that lack virtue, doing badly follows? b

ALC. Necessarily.

SOC. Then it is not tyranny, Alcibiades, best of men, that one must procure, either for oneself or for the city, if you are to be happy, but virtue.

ALC. What you say is true.

SOC. And before one has virtue, it is better to be ruled by one's better than to rule, for a man, not only for a child.

ALC. It appears so.

SOC. And what is better is also finer?

ALC. Yes.

SOC. And what is finer is more befitting?

ALC. How could it not be? c

SOC. Then it befits the bad man to be a slave; for it is better.

ALC. Yes.

SOC. Then vice befits a slave.

ALC. It appears so.

SOC. And virtue befits a free man.

ALC. Yes.

- ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φεύγειν χρή, ὦ ἐταῖρε, τὴν δουλοπρέπειαν;
 ΑΛ. Μάλιστα γέ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
 ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνη δὲ νῦν πῶς ἔχεις; ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς ἢ οὔ; 10
 ΑΛ. Δοκῶ μοι καὶ μάλα σφόδρα αἰσθάνεσθαι.
 ΣΩ. Οἷσθ' οὖν πῶς ἀποφεύξῃ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ σέ νῦν;
 ἵνα μὴ ὀνομάζωμεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ καλῷ ἀνδρί.
 ΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. d
 ΣΩ. Πῶς;
 ΑΛ. Ἐὰν βούλῃ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
 ΣΩ. Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη.
 ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς χρή λέγειν; 5
 ΣΩ. Ὅτι ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.
 ΑΛ. Λέγω δὴ. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις μέντοι τόδε λέγω, ὅτι
 κινδυνεύσομεν μεταβαλεῖν τὸ σχῆμα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὲν
 σὸν ἐγώ, σὺ δὲ τοῦμόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐ παιδαγωγήσω
 σε ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, σὺ δ' ὑπ' ἐμοῦ παιδαγωγήσῃ. 10
 ΣΩ. ὦ γενναῖε, πελαργοῦ ἄρα ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως οὐδὲν e
 διοίσει, εἰ παρὰ σοὶ ἐννεοττεύσας ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον ὑπὸ
 τούτου πάλιν θεραπεύσεται.
 ΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄρξομαί γε ἐντεῦθεν τῆς
 δικαιοσύνης ἐπιμέλεσθαι. 5
 ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην ἄν σε καὶ διατελέσαι ὀρρωδῶ δέ, οὔ τι
 τῇ σῇ φύσει ἀπιστῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ὀρῶν ῥώμην,
 μὴ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ κρατήσῃ.

d7 μέντοι τόδε BT: μὲν ὧδε Olympiodorus d8 μεταβαλεῖν] μεταλαβεῖν Cobet
 e2 ἐννεοττεύσας B: ἐννεοττεύσασι T

soc. Then one must flee, my friend, what befits a slave?

alc. Most of all, Socrates.

soc. And do you perceive how it is with you now? As befits a free man, or not?

alc. I think I perceive it very keenly indeed.

soc. Then do you know how you will escape this thing that is about you now? So as not to call it by its name, where a beautiful man is concerned.

alc. I do.

soc. How?

alc. If you wish it, Socrates.

soc. That is not well said, Alcibiades.

alc. Well, how should I put it?

soc. "If god wills."¹

alc. Then I say it. And besides this I say this as well: that we are likely to change parts, Socrates, I taking yours and you mine. For from this day on there is no way that I shall not attend you as a tutor attends a boy, and you will be attended by me.²

soc. My noble friend, then my love will be no different from a stork, if, having hatched a winged love in you, it is to be tended by it in return.³

alc. Well, so it is; and I shall begin from this very moment to care for justice.

soc. I would wish you to carry it through as well. But I dread, not that I distrust your nature at all, but seeing the strength of the city, that it may get the better of both me and you.⁴

1. Socrates had put his own claim the same way at the start, "except me—with the god's help, to be sure" (105e), and again at 127e, "if god wills".

2. The *paidagōgos* was the slave who escorted a boy and watched over him (122b). The parts are reversed: the young man will now follow the older one about, as Socrates followed him (104d, 106a).

3. Greeks believed that young storks fed their parents in old age (Aristotle, *History of Animals* 615b23–24; in Aristophanes' *Birds* 1353–57 the "law of the storks" requires it). Eros was pictured with wings: the love Socrates' love hatches in Alcibiades will look after it in turn.

4. The last words look ahead to what the dialogue's readers knew. Alcibiades was one of the generals of the Athenian expedition against Syracuse in 415, was recalled to stand trial for profaning the Mysteries, escaped, and went over to Sparta; he returned to Athens in 407, lost his command after the defeat at Notium the next year and withdrew to his forts in the Chersonese, and was killed in exile about 404. In 399 the city tried Socrates and put him to death. Xenophon reports "the accuser" as charging that Critias and Alcibiades, Socrates' associates, did the city the greatest harm (*Memorabilia* 1.2.12).

OUTLINE

The divisions follow the argument, not the blocks in which the edition was made. References are to Stephanus pages and sections, which stand in the margins of both pages of the text.

I. THE LOVER'S APPROACH (103A–106C)

- 103a–b** Socrates, the first of Alcibiades' lovers and the only one who has not given up, explains his years of silence: "a certain divine opposition", which no longer opposes him.
- 103b–104c** Alcibiades' pride: he thinks he needs no one, trusting in his beauty and stature, his family and friends, Pericles' power and his wealth; and so he has got the better of all his lovers.
- 104c–e** Alcibiades: "you beat me to it by a whisker". He meant to ask Socrates what he wants, "always there, wherever I am".
- 105a–e** Socrates tells him on what hope he lives: to show the Athenians "that you are worthy of being honored as neither Pericles nor anyone else who ever lived", and then to fill "all mankind, so to speak, with your name and your power". None of it can come about without Socrates, "with the god's help, to be sure".
- 106a–c** No long speech, but "one short service": to answer what he is asked.

II. WHAT WILL ALCIBIADES ADVISE ON? (106C–109C)

- 106c–e** He will advise on what he knows better than the Athenians. What one knows one has learned from others or discovered, and no one seeks or learns what he thinks he knows; so there was a time when he did not think he knew it.
- 106e–107a** He has learned letters, the lyre and wrestling, and nothing else; the Athenians do not deliberate about these.
- 107a–d** Nor about building, divination or health, where they go to the experts, but about war and peace, "or any other of the city's affairs".
- 107d–108e** One must wrestle and make war with whom it is better, when, and as much as is better. The better in wrestling is "gymnastic", in music "musical"; what is the better in war and peace?

108e–109c Alcibiades cannot say, and is shamed. We accuse one another of being deceived, forced or robbed, “justly or unjustly”; the better in war is “the more just”.

III. WHERE DID HE LEARN WHAT IS JUST? (109C–113C)

109d–110d He neither learned it from a teacher nor discovered it: he has thought he knew what is just ever since he was a child at knucklebones, and one seeks only what one thinks one does not know.

110d–111d “From the many.” They are good teachers of Greek, about which they agree, but not of draughts, still less of what is just.

111d–112d The many disagree about what is just so violently that they fight and kill one another: the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, Tanagra, Coronea, “among whom your father also met his end”.

112d–113c “In saying that it is I who am saying these things”: since Alcibiades has been answering, he has said himself that he does not know what is just. “You have heard this, it seems, from yourself, not from me.”

IV. THE JUST AND THE ADVANTAGEOUS (113D–116E)

113d–114b Alcibiades: the Athenians deliberate about what is advantageous, which is different from what is just. Socrates will not repeat the old proof for one so “fastidious”, but asks him to prove it.

114b–115a “Think of me as the Assembly and the people.” Alcibiades will not make a speech; Socrates will persuade him “out of insolence”, if Alcibiades answers.

115a–116a All just things are fine; but some fine things, Alcibiades says, are bad. Helping a friend in war is fine as courage and bad as death; but insofar as it is fine it is good.

116a–d Whoever does finely does well, and those who do well are happy; so fine things are good, good things advantageous, and just things advantageous. “Aren’t you the one saying these things, and I the one asking?”

V. IGNORANCE THAT THINKS IT KNOWS (116E–119A)

116e–117b “I am simply like a man in a strange state.” A man does not give contrary answers about whether he has two eyes or three; he wanders about what he does not know.

- 117b–118a** No one wanders about what he knows he does not know, how to prepare a dish or steer a ship; mistakes come from thinking one knows when one does not. “So this ignorance is the cause of bad things, and is the disgraceful stupidity?”
- 118a–c** Alcibiades is “living with stupidity”, and so are most of those who manage the city’s affairs, “except for a few, and perhaps your guardian Pericles”.
- 118c–119a** Pericles kept company with Pythocleides, Anaxagoras and Damon, but has made no one wise: not his sons, not Cleinias, not Alcibiades, not anyone else, as Zeno made Pythodorus and Callias.

VI. THE REAL RIVALS (119A–124B)

- 119a–c** “Let us deliberate on it together.” The politicians are uneducated, so Alcibiades need not train: he will be “far, far above these men by nature, at least”.
- 119c–120c** His contest is not with the men at home, Meidias and his like, but with the kings of Sparta and Persia.
- 120c–121a** His notion that the kings are no different from anyone else does harm, for he would care for himself more if he feared them; and it is false. The kings are of better family: from Heracles and from Achaemenes, and so from Perseus and Zeus. “Why, ours too, my wellborn Alcibiades, goes back to Daedalus.”
- 121a–122b** The kings’ wives guarded, the Persian heir’s birthday kept by all Asia; his upbringing by eunuchs, his riding and hunting, and the four royal tutors. “But over you, Alcibiades, Pericles set as tutor the household slave most useless from old age, Zopyrus the Thracian.”
- 122b–123b** The Persians’ luxury, the Spartans’ virtues, and the Spartans’ wealth, which goes in like the animals in Aesop’s lion’s cave and never comes out.
- 123b–124b** The Persian king’s wealth, the queen’s girdle and veil. Amestris would wonder what Alcibiades trusts in, and Lampido that he means to contend with her son. “Know thyself: these are our rivals”; “there is nothing else by which we could surpass them, unless by care, at least, and by craft”.

VII. GOOD AT WHAT? (124B–127E)

- 124b–d** “Let us deliberate together on how we might become as good as we can.” Socrates’ guardian is better than Pericles: “The god, Alcibiades.”
- 124d–125d** Good at managing affairs: the affairs of “the fine and good”, the intelligent; the shoemaker is good and bad at once. To rule men in the city who make use of one another: not ruling boatswains who make use of rowers (that is the virtue of piloting), nor pipers who make use of dancers (chorus-training).
- 125d–126c** The knowledge of ruling those who share in the city is “good counsel”; it makes the city better ordered and kept safe, as health makes a body, when “friendship comes to be among them toward one another”.
- 126c–127d** Friendship is concord; but concord comes from the crafts, arithmetic and measurement, and husbands and wives are not in concord about wool-working and hoplite fighting. If each does his own business, there is no friendship. “No, by the gods, Socrates, I don’t even know myself what I am saying.”
- 127d–e** “But you must take heart”: at fifty it would be hard, but this is the age at which to perceive it.

VIII. CARING FOR ONESELF AND FOR WHAT IS ONE’S OWN (127E–129B)

- 127e–128d** “Come, then: what is caring for oneself?” Caring for what is one’s own is not caring for oneself: shoemaking for shoes, gymnastics for the feet; weaving and the other crafts for what belongs to the body.
- 128e–129b** We could not know what craft makes oneself better without knowing what we ourselves are. Is it easy to know oneself, and was the one who dedicated the inscription at Pytho a nobody? “In what way could the self itself be discovered?”

IX. MAN IS SOUL (129B–130E)

- 129b–130a** Socrates talks with Alcibiades by means of speech; the user and what he uses are different, as the shoemaker and his tools, his hands and his eyes; a man uses his whole body. “Then what on earth is man?” What uses the body: the soul.
- 130a–c** Man is soul, or body, or the two together; the body is ruled, and the two together cannot rule; “that man turns out to be nothing other than soul”.
- 130c–e** “If not precisely, then adequately at least”: they have looked

into “what each thing itself is” instead of the self. So Socrates and Alcibiades converse “soul to soul”, and the one who enjoins us to know ourselves bids us know the soul.

X. KNOWING ONESELF; THE LOVER OF THE SOUL (131A–132C)

- 131a–c** The doctor and the trainer know what is their own, not themselves; the craftsmen know what belongs to the body. If temperance is knowing oneself, none of them is temperate by his craft, and so the crafts are “menial”. Whoever tends his money tends what is further off still: “the money-maker is no longer doing his own business”.
- 131c–132a** The lover of Alcibiades’ body goes away when it stops blooming; the lover of his soul stays. “Then be eager to be as beautiful as you can.”
- 132a–c** Socrates’ fear: “that you may become a lover of the people and be corrupted”. “The people of great-hearted Erechtheus” has a handsome face, “but one should look at it stripped”. Alcibiades is to exercise first, and they are to care for the soul.

XI. THE EYE AND THE SOUL (132C–133C)

- 132c–133b** “See thyself”: an eye sees itself by looking into an eye, into the pupil, “since it is a kind of image of the one looking in”, the region in which the eye’s virtue comes to be.
- 133b–c** So a soul must look into a soul, into the region where wisdom comes to be, the most divine part of it; whoever looks into this knows himself.
- 133c** The god as the finest mirror (in angle brackets, from Eusebius).

XII. TEMPERANCE, THE CITY AND VIRTUE (133C–135C)

- 133c–134a** Knowing oneself is temperance; without it we cannot know what is our own, or what belongs to it, or what belongs to others or to cities. Such a man will be no statesman, will make mistakes, do badly and be wretched.
- 134a–c** “Then it is not walls or triremes or dockyards that cities need, Alcibiades, if they are to be happy.” Alcibiades must give the citizens a share of virtue, and first acquire it.
- 134c–135a** Not license or rule to do whatever one wishes, but justice and temperance; looking toward what is divine and bright, Alcibiades and the city will do well. The sick man who is a

tyrant, the ship without a pilot's sense.

- 135a-c** "Then it is not tyranny, Alcibiades, best of men, that one must procure." Before one has virtue, it is better to be ruled; vice befits a slave, virtue a free man.

XIII. THE CHANGE OF PARTS (135C-E)

- 135c-d** Alcibiades perceives his condition, and will escape it "If you wish it, Socrates." "That is not well said": "If god wills."
135d-e "We are likely to change parts, Socrates, I taking yours and you mine." Socrates' love will be no different from a stork. Alcibiades will begin "from this very moment to care for justice"; Socrates dreads "the strength of the city".

EDITORIAL NOTE

The Greek text. The Greek is John Burnet's, from the second volume of his Oxford Classical Text of Plato (1901), still the most widely cited text of the *Alcibiades*; Antonio Carlini published a separate critical edition in 1964. The copy reproduced is a later impression, undated, printed at Oxford by John Johnson as Printer to the University and published by Humphrey Milford, and so made between 1925 and 1945. It carries Burnet's preface of March 1901 and a short addendum dated at St Andrews in April 1910, in which he records that he had added the readings of the Oxyrhynchus papyri in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* and used Hermann Schoene's collation of W in the *Symposium*. The text is reproduced page for page and line for line: each left-hand page of this edition is one page of Burnet, with his line-ends, his marginal section letters and line numbers, and his apparatus criticus at the foot. The line numbers were counted afresh and agree with his, except at 135b, where his "10" stands one line early; this edition sets it on the tenth line. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet, and every line was then checked against the photographs of this copy; where the two differ, this edition prints what Burnet printed. Burnet's paragraphing (a new, indented paragraph at each change of speaker), his abbreviations of the speakers' names (ΣΩ. for Socrates, ΑΛ. for Alcibiades), his capitals at the openings of speeches and of quoted speech, his quotation marks and his letterspacing of the line of Homer at 132a are kept. Angle brackets < > enclose words that are not in the principal manuscripts and have been supplied, by conjecture (Burnet's own at 107e9, Dobree's at 115d2, Schneider's at 122d3, F. A. Wolf's at 132e5) or from another witness (Stobaeus at 115e and 128a13-b1, Eusebius at 133c8-17, a later manuscript at 134e8); inside an apparatus entry they mark words a scholar would add (117b2, 120e4, 126e2). Square brackets [] enclose words Burnet believed spurious: his own deletion at 105d1 (*seclusi*), a scholar's that he accepts at 109c6, words that Proclus leaves out at 105e1 and 112c4, and the first of two "περὶ τούτων" at 127c3.

Reading the apparatus. The notes at the foot of each Greek

page are Burnet's, unaltered, including his occasional misprints (*φρόνευ* for *φρονεῖν* at 104c1, *ἱματία* for *ἱμάτια* at 128a13). Entries are keyed by section letter and line as numbered in the margin, so that "a 4" is the fourth line of section a. The section letters begin again with each Stephanus page, so that on a page running from 103a to 104b, "a 3" after "b 1" belongs to 104a. A further entry on the same line follows after a wider space without repeating the key. Usually the reading printed in the text comes first, followed by the witnesses that have it; a colon separates it from the alternatives, each followed by its witnesses. Where the text's reading is followed by a square bracket, the witnesses for the text are not listed and only the alternatives are given. An entry with no colon reports a single proposal or witness without listing the witnesses for the text: an alternative ("*πανσοίμην* Cobet", 104e2), a deletion, omission or addition (109c6, 105e1, 115d2), or, with *re vera*, a confirmation of the text's own reading (121b3). Three spaced points between two words cover the whole passage from the first to the last. The apparatus reports each witness's own spelling, which may differ from the text's without being a different reading: *ἐαυτόν* at 131b11 against the text's *αὐτόν*, *ξυνιέμεν* at 132c10 against *συνιέμεν*, *ξυμβαίη* at 135a7 against *συμβαίη*.

The witnesses. The three principal manuscripts are B, the Bodleian Plato (MS. E. D. Clarke 39, written in 895); T, the Venice manuscript (Marcianus, Append. Class. 4, cod. 1); and W, the Vienna manuscript (Vindobonensis 54, suppl. phil. Gr. 7). B² is an early corrector of B; later hands in B, T and W are marked b, t and w; *pr.* is a manuscript's first hand, before correction. Letters written together share a reading, so that "BT" is B and T, and "Bt" B together with a later hand in T. Burnet also cites D (Venetus 185) at 123a6, and three later manuscripts by name: the Coislinianus 155 in Paris (Coisl.), whose corrected readings his preface regards as conjectures rather than tradition; Venetus 184 (Ven. 184); and a manuscript in the Laurentian Library at Florence (Laur. lxxxv. 9), at 134e8. *recc.* are later manuscripts in general, and *vulg.* the reading of the older printed editions. Of the ancient authors who quote the dialogue, he cites the Neoplatonist commentators Proclus (fifth century AD), whose commentary survives only as far as 116b (Burnet cites him once later, at 124c6), and Olympiodorus (sixth century), whose commentary covers the whole dialogue; he warns that their manuscripts have themselves been corrected from copies of Plato. He cites the anthologist Stobaeus (fifth century), whose *Anthology* quotes long stretches of the dialogue, among

them 109e and 110d–e (3.1.191–192), 114e–116d (3.1.193), and a passage beginning at 127e (3.21.23) that includes 128a13–b1 and the mirror at 133c; the Latin grammarian Priscian (about AD 500), at 104e2; Athenaeus, author of the *Learned Banqueters* (about AD 200), and the ancient scholia, the anonymous notes in the margins of the manuscripts, at 120a9; Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea (early fourth century), whose *Preparation for the Gospel* (11.27.5) quotes 133c1–17; and the emperor Julian (reigned 361–363), at 133c. Iulianus, Priscianus and Ficinus are the Latin forms of the names. Ficinus is Marsilio Ficino, whose Latin translation of Plato (Florence, 1484) is cited where it implies a reading (113e9, 119e7).

Abbreviations. *add.*, added: of a witness, words it has in addition (114e8), of a scholar, words he supplied (115d2, 122d3, 132e5); with *post*, the word after which they stand (112c4). *addidi*, I have added (107e9). *al.*, other manuscripts (108e9, 120b6). *ante*, before (113b8). *cf.*, compare: Euripides' *Hippolytus* (*Eur. Hipp.*) at 113c3. *ci.*, conjectured (109c6). *corr.*, corrected; "corr. Coisl." is the corrected text of the Coislinianus, and so "corr. Ven. 184" (124d7). *cum*, with: a scholar following a manuscript (119e7) or another scholar (135a1). *et*, and. *et mox*, and shortly after: a further reading by the same witness or scholar a little further on, of the same word (128a2) or another (118e4, 135a1). *extra versum*, outside the line (124d5). *fort.*, perhaps: a tentative proposal, Burnet's own where no name is given (126e2). *in marg.*, in the margin (120e9, 124d7). *om.*, leaves out. *om. mox duobus versibus*, leaves out two lines just after (116c13, of Stobaeus). *post*, after: with *transp.*, a proposed change of order (107b8); with *add.* or a scholar's name, where a word is to be inserted (107e9). *pr.*, first hand (120e9, 123a6). *prius*, the first of two identical words in a line (130c2). *puncto notatum*, marked with a dot, the scribes' sign for deletion (109a1). *re vera*, really, and *sic*, so: the manuscript has the odd form reported (121b3, 121e1). *s.v.* (*supra versum*), above the line (119e1, 130b11); *supra*, above (105d2, where W has *εν* above *μάχ*, turning *Δεινομάχης* into *Δεινομένης*); *suprascr.*, written above (121c3). *scripsi*, I have written: Burnet's own correction, printed in the text (119e7, 124b3). *secl.*, rejected as spurious (109c6); *seclusi*, I have bracketed (105d1). *sed*, but (109a1, 124d5). *sed talia fere legerunt*, but ... read something of the kind (133c8–17, of Julian and Stobaeus). *transp.*, transposed (107b8). *ut videtur*, as it seems (129c7). *vel*, or (126d9). An asterisk stands for a letter erased in a manuscript, one asterisk to each letter (123d3). Letters printed small above a word are written above it in the witness (124b2,

125b6). Words in italic Latin inside an entry, as *qua ratione* at 119e7, are quoted from Ficino's translation.

Names. Stephanus is Henri Estienne, whose edition of 1578 supplies the page numbers by which Plato is cited. The other names are of modern scholars, cited for the reading of their editions or for a conjecture: among the editors of Plato, Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, K. F. Hermann and Schanz; Nürnberger, who edited the two *Alcibiades* (1796); Friedrich Schleiermacher, Plato's German translator; and, among the critics, Heindorf, Buttmann, F. A. Wolf, Dobree, Heusde, Hirschig, Schneider, Struve, Cobet, Madvig and Apelt.

The English. The translation is new. It aims to be exact, with every clause answering to a clause of the Greek, and to keep Socrates' humor: his deadpan, his mock-solemnity, his teasing of a proud young man, and the quick timing of the short exchanges; and it lets Alcibiades be proud, quick and impatient. Nothing is added to make it funnier; where a joke depends on the Greek, a note explains it. Each speech opens with the speaker's name in small capitals. Burnet's text is translated as printed, including his conjectures and the words he prints in angle brackets; words he brackets as spurious are not translated. At two places Burnet's page prints a word without the accent the sense requires (*τις* at 125e1, *ποτε* at 128a5); the Greek keeps the print, the English takes the words as questions, and a note says so.

Each right-hand page translates the Greek page opposite. When a sentence runs over the turn of Burnet's page, the English breaks at the nearest point English word order allows. The Stephanus section letters in the margin of the English mark where each section begins.

Key terms. The words the argument leans on are each rendered one way throughout. Two were settled at the start: *epimeleisthai heautou*, the dialogue's central demand, is "to care for oneself", and *sōphrosynē* is "temperance", as in the *Charmides* of this series. The Key Words of the Dialogue explain these and the others, and the Glossary lists them.

The notes. The translator's notes at the foot of the English page identify people, places and quotations; explain the jokes the English cannot carry; flag the places where Burnet's choice of reading changes the sense; and mark the dramatic irony that every ancient reader would have felt, since Alcibiades' later career was known to them. Where a note offers a doubtful interpretation, it says so. The notes are numbered afresh on each page.

This edition. The volume contains the whole dialogue, 103a–

135e, in Burnet's fifty-eight pages. It was made in seven blocks, each checked before the next was begun, and then read through and checked again as a whole; the Introduction, the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Outline and the Glossary were written last, from the finished text. The Note on this Edition, at the end, says how the volume was made, what the checks found, and what remains undone.

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

The English words on which the argument depends, in alphabetical order, with the Greek they render and the places where they matter, by Stephanus page. Where a word has a longer entry in the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Glossary says so.

advantageous, συμφέρειν, τὰ συμφέροντα (*symppherein, ta symphereonta*); **be to one's advantage**, συνενεγκεῖν. Alcibiades' distinction of the advantageous from the just, and its refutation: 113d–117a, 118a. See Key Words, *Just and advantageous*.

advise, adviser, advice, συμβουλεύειν, σύμβουλος (*sympouleuein, symboulos*). What Alcibiades means to do in the Assembly: 106c–107e, 109a–b, 113b. **Recommend** is παραινεῖν (107b, 132d).

agree, ὁμολογεῖν (*homologeîn*). The partners' assent in the argument, and the many's agreement about Greek: 111b–112a, 113b, 116c, 128e, 130a–b, 133c–d. At 109c it is “admit”. Kept apart from **concord** and **disagree**. See Key Words, *Good counsel, concord, friendship*.

be ignorant, ignorance, ἀγνοεῖν, ἄγνοια (*agnoein, agnoia*). 110b–c, 116e, 117d–118b, 128e–129b, 133e, 134e. Kept apart from “not know”. See **stupidity** and Key Words, *Knowing, and thinking one knows*.

beautiful, ugly, καλός, αἰσχρός (*kalos, aischros*), of persons: 104a, 107b, 113b, 131d, 135c. See **fine** and Key Words, *Fine, beautiful, shameful*.

befit, πρέπει (*prepei*), and the chain **more befitting, befits a slave, befits a free man, what befits a slave, as befits a free man** (πρεπωδέστερον, δουλοπρεπήs, ἐλευθεροπρεπήs, δουλοπρέπεια, ἐλευθεροπρεπῶs): 124d, 135b–c.

better, βέλτιον, ἄμεινον (*beltion, ameinon*). Both “better”, because the argument turns on the word: 107d–109c; 135b. See Key Words, *Craft, and the better*.

care for, ἐπιμελείσθαι (*epimeleisthai*); **care**, ἐπιμέλεια; **take no care**, ἀμελεῖν; **care about**, μέλει. The dialogue's demand, one rendering throughout: 104d, 113c, 119a, 120b–d, 123d, 124b–d, 127e–129a, 132b–c, 134c, 135e. See Key Words, *Care for oneself*.

concord, discord, be in concord, ὁμόνοια, διχόνοια, ὁμονοεῖν

- (*homonoia*). What Alcibiades takes friendship to be: 126c–127d. See Key Words, *Good counsel, concord, friendship*.
- condition**, πάθημα, πάθος (*pathēma, pathos*). Alcibiades' state of mind: 116e, 118b, 127d. At 109a, where it is a grievance, πάθημα is "suffering".
- contest, contend, contend against, opponent**, ἀγών, ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι, ἀνταγωνιστής (*agōn*). 119b–120b, 123d–124a.
- courage, cowardice**, ἀνδρεία, δειλία (*andreia, deilia*). 115b–e; the Persian prince's "most courageous" tutor, 121e–122a; the Spartans' courage, 122c.
- craft**, τέχνη (*technē*). 108b–d, 124b, 125d–126d, 128b–e, 131b, 133e. See Key Words.
- deliberate**, βουλευέσθαι (*bouleuesthai*). What the Athenians do in the Assembly: 106c–107e, 113d. **Let us deliberate on it together** (119b) and **let us deliberate together** (124b) render κοινὴ βουλή, Stephanus' reading, printed at both places: Socrates hands Alcibiades' words back to him.
- disagree, disagreement**, διαφέρεσθαι, διαφορά (*diapheresthai*). The many about what is just: 111b–112d. **Dispute** is ἀμφισβητεῖν (111c, 112d).
- discover**, εὐρίσκειν (*heuriskein*); **seek**, ζητεῖν (*zētein*); **learn**, μανθάνειν (*manthanein*). The dilemma of 106d–114a, and again at 129b–130c. **Find out** is πυνθάνεσθαι (103a, 104d, 131e). See Key Words, *Learning, discovering, seeking*.
- divination**, μαντική, μαντεία (*mantikē, manteia*); **prophet**, μάντις, μαντικός. 107b, 115a, 127e.
- do one's own business**, τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν (*ta hautou prattein*). 127a–c, 131c. See Key Words, *One's own*.
- do well, do badly**, εὖ πράττειν, κακῶς πράττειν (*eu prattein, kakōs prattein*); **do finely**, καλῶς πράττειν. Both acting and faring: 116b, 134a–e, 135b. See Key Words, *Good and bad*.
- do wrong, be wronged**, ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖσθαι (*adikein*). 109b, 110b–c, 113d.
- educated, uneducated, education**, παιδεύειν, ἀπαιδευτος, παιδεία (*paideuein*). 118b, 119b, 122b, 123d, 124c.
- exercise**, γυμνάζεσθαι (*gymnazesthai*). 132b, after "stripped". **Train, training** is ἀσκεῖν, ἄσκησις (119b–120b, 123e).
- family**, γένος (*genos*); **nature**, φύσις (*physis*); **upbringing, bring up**, τροφή, τρέφειν (*trophē*). 119c, 120d–122b.
- fine, shameful**, καλόν, αἰσχρόν (*kalon, aischron*), of conduct: 108e–109c, 115a–116c, 118a, 124a, 127d. **The fine and good**, καλοὶ κάγαθοί, gentlemen: 124e. See **beautiful**.

friendship, *φιλία* (*philia*); **love** (of a father for his son), *φιλεῖν* (*philein*). 126c–127d. See **lover** and Key Words, *Good counsel, concord, friendship*.

god, the god, *θεός, ὁ θεός* (*theos*). Socrates' name for his divine sign (105d–e, 124c), and the god in whom the soul sees itself (133c); **if god wills**, *ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ* (127e), *ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ* (135d); **divine**, *θεῖος* (133c, 134d); **divine opposition**, *δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα* (103a).

good, bad, *ἀγαθός, κακός* (*agathos, kakos*). Never “evil”: 115a–116d, 124e–125b, 133c, 134b. **Worthless** is *πονηρός* (125a). See Key Words, *Good and bad*.

good counsel, want of counsel, *εὐβουλία, ἀβουλία* (*euboulia*). The knowledge of ruling the city: 125e–126a, 127d. See Key Words, *Good counsel, concord, friendship*.

good enough, *ἱκανός* (*hikanos*). 105e, 110e–111e. **Evidence enough**, *ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον* (111d).

gymnastics, gymnastic, *γυμναστική, γυμναστικόν* (*gymnastikē*). 108b–e, 128c.

happy, *εὐδαίμων, εὐδαιμονεῖν* (*eudaimōn*). 116b, 134a–135b. **Wretched, wretchedness**, *ἄθλιος, ἀθλιότης* (134a–b). See Key Words, *Good and bad*.

have in mind, *διανοεῖσθαι* (*dianoeisthai*). 104c–e, 106b–c, 119a, 119d–e. **Mean to** is *ἐν νῷ ἔχειν* (104d, 113c, 120a, 123c–124a); **have a better idea**, *διανοεῖσθαι* at 124a.

insolent, insolence, *ὑβριστής, ὕβρις* (*hybristēs*). 114d.

intelligent, unintelligent, intelligence, *φρόνιμος, ἀφρων, φρονεῖν, φρόνησις* (*phronimos, phronēsis*). 125a, 133c. **Wise, wisdom** are *σοφός, σοφία* (118c–119a, 123d, 124c, 133b).

just, unjust, justice, *δίκαιος, ἄδικος, δικαιοσύνη* (*dikaios, dikaiosynē*); **what is just**, *τὰ δίκαια*, and **just things** in the argument of 114e–116d. 109b–118a, 127c, 134c, 135e. See Key Words.

know, *εἰδέναι, ἐπίστασθαι, γινώσκειν* (*eidenai, epistasthai, gignōskein*); **come to know**, *γνωρίζειν* (130e); **think one knows**, *οἶεσθαι εἰδέναι* (110c, 117b–118b). **Know thyself**, *γνώθι σαυτόν*: 124a–b, 129a, 130e, 132c–d. See Key Words, *Know thyself and Knowing, and thinking one knows*.

license, *ἐξουσία* (*exousia*). 134c–135b. **Rule**, *ἀρχή, ἄρχειν*: 125b–e, 130a–b, 134c, 135a–b. See Key Words, *Virtue, license, rule, tyranny*.

look into, *σκοπεῖν, σκοπεῖσθαι, σκέψις* (*skopein, skepsis*): Socrates' verb for examining, 103b, 107c, 109a, 110c, 113d, 115c, 116b, 120c–

- e, 124d, 130c–d. Also βλέπειν εἰς (*blepein eis*) in the passage on the eye and the soul, 132d–134e; there **Consider** renders Σκόπει (132d). See Key Words, *Look into*.
- love**: see **friendship** and **lover**.
- lover**, ἐραστής (*erastēs*); **love**, ἔρως, ἐρᾶν (*erōs, eran*). 103a–104e, 122b, 123d, 131c–132a, 135e. **Lover of the people**, δημοραστής (132a). See Key Words.
- make mistakes**, ἁμαρτάνειν (*hamartanein*); **mistakes**, ἁμαρτήματα; **without making mistakes**, ἀναμάρτητος. 117d–e, 134a. See Key Words, *Knowing*, and *thinking one knows*.
- man**, ἄνθρωπος (*anthrōpos*). The human being as such: 128a, 129e–130c (“Then what on earth is man?”). See Key Words, *The self itself*.
- manage**, πράττειν τὰ πράγματα, τὰ τῆς πόλεως (*prattein*). The city’s affairs: 118b, 119b, 120b, 124e, 134b. **Order** is διοικεῖν (126a–b), **be well ordered** εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι (127b).
- many, the**, οἱ πολλοί (*hoi polloi*). Alcibiades’ teachers of justice: 110e–112d.
- menial**, βάνανσος (*banausos*). 131b; noted.
- mirror**, κάτοπτρον, ἔνοπτρον (*katoptron, enoptron*). 132e–133c.
- one’s own, what is one’s own**, τὰ αὐτοῦ (*ta hautou*); **what belongs to what is one’s own**, τὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ. 128a–e, 131a–c, 133d–e, 134c. See Key Words.
- perceive**, αἰσθάνεσθαι (*aisthanesthai*). 121b, 122c–d, 127d–e, 135c. At 121d, in the comic poet’s line, it is “notice”.
- persuade**, πείθειν (*peithein*). 114b–e; **listen to**, πείθεσθαι (124a).
- pilot, piloting**, κυβερνήτης, κυβερνητική (*kybernētēs*). 117d, 119d, 125c–e, 135a.
- power**, δύναμις (*dynamis*). 103a, 104b, 105c–e.
- precisely, adequately**, ἀκριβῶς, μετρίως (*akribōs, metriōs*). How far it has been shown that man is soul: 130c.
- pride, high-minded, look down on, pride oneself**, φρόνημα, μεγαλόφρων, ὑπερφρονεῖν, μέγα φρονεῖν (*phronēma, megalophrōn*). Alcibiades’ character: 103b–104c, 119d; the Spartans’ high-mindedness, 122c.
- private person**, ἰδιώτης (*idiōtēs*). 121a, 126c–d, 134e. **As amateurs**, ἰδιωτικῶς (119b).
- pupil**, κόρη (*korē*). 133a; noted.
- rivals**, ἀντίπαλοι (*antipaloi*). 119e, 124b. **Surpass**, περιγίγνεσθαι (119d, 124b).
- self itself, the**, αὐτὸ ταυτό, αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό (*auto tauto*). 129b, 130d; noted. See Key Words.

sight, ὄψις (*opsis*). 126b, 132d, 133b; at 133a, where it is the eye that reflects, “eye”.

soul, ψυχὴ (*psychē*); **body**, σῶμα (*sōma*). 129e–131d, 132c, 133b–c. See Key Words, *The self itself*.

stupidity, ἀμαθία (*amathia*). “The disgraceful stupidity”, 118a–b; noted. See Key Words, *Knowing, and thinking one knows*.

talk (with), διαλέγεσθαι (*dialegesthai*). 103a, 105d–106a, 108c, 124c, 129b–c, 130e. **Converse** is προσομιλεῖν (130d).

teach, teacher, διδάσκειν, διδάσκαλος (*didaskain*). 109d–114a, 118c–119a.

temperance, temperate, σωφροσύνη, σώφρων (*sōphrosynē, sōphrōn*). One rendering throughout: 121e–122c, 131b, 133c–134d. See Key Words.

tend, θεραπεύειν (*therapeuein*). 126b, 131b, 135e. **The service of the gods**, θεῶν θεραπεία (122a).

think, ἡγεῖσθαι, οἶεσθαι (*hēgeisthai, oiesthai*). Throughout. See **know**.

trainer, παιδοτρίβης (*paidotribēs*). 107e, 118d, 131a.

tyranny, be a tyrant, τυραννίς, τυραννεῖν (*tyrannis*). 135a–b. See Key Words, *Virtue, license, rule, tyranny*.

use, user, χρήσθαι, ὁ χρώμενος (*chrēsthai*). 129c–130a, 133c; **make use of**, 125c–d. See Key Words, *The self itself*.

virtue, ἀρετή (*aretē*). Of persons and crafts: 120e, 124e–125d, 133b–c, 134b–135c. Of land, “excellence” (122d). See Key Words.

wander, πλανᾶσθαι (*planasthai*). 112d, 117a–118a. See Key Words, *Knowing, and thinking one knows*.

worthy, worth, unworthy, think fit, ἄξιος, ἀνάξιος, ἀξιοῦν (*axios*). One chain: 105b–e, 119c–e. **Worth mentioning**, ἄξια λόγου (105c, 123d).

NOTE ON THIS EDITION

HOW THE VOLUME WAS MADE

The Greek was taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet and cut into Burnet's lines by reading every line-end from the photographs of his page, in the impression described in the Editorial Note. Accents, breathings and iota subscripts were read on the sharpest image of each page that the scan provides, and a doubtful mark was settled by setting it beside sure examples of each form on the same page. The section letters and line numbers in the margin were computed from the Stephanus divisions rather than copied, and were then compared with Burnet's: across the 1,698 lines of the dialogue they fall where he prints them, except for one line number at 135b that he misplaces. Burnet's apparatus was transcribed from the same images. Where the digital text differs from Burnet's page (six words missing at 104a7, a section division missing at 128b, three breathings and an accent, Burnet's capitals, a stray character, a repeated speaker's label, a comma for a full stop, speeches run together or bracketed separately), this edition follows Burnet; the record of the blocks lists each case.

The work was done in seven blocks of eight to ten pages, each finished and checked before the next was begun. Each block was checked by four independent reviewers: two compared the Greek and the apparatus with the page images letter by letter, one compared the English with the Greek clause by clause, and one checked every fact and reference in the notes. Each finding was examined again against the evidence before it was adopted, and not all were adopted. What each block's check caught is recorded at the end of this Note.

When the last block was done the volume was read through as one text, since a check made page by page cannot see some kinds of error: a word rendered one way in one block and another way in the next, a sentence broken badly at a page turn, a recapitulation that states a step in other words than the step itself. The translator read the whole volume, and four further reviewers read it independently: one for the consistency of terms across the whole book, two for sense, omissions and continuity in its two halves, and one for

the Editorial Note against the scan of Burnet's volume. The Introduction, the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Outline and the Glossary were then written from the finished text, and their claims and references were checked against it by three more reviewers.

WHAT THE FINAL READING CAUGHT

It found some forty faults that the seven block checks had passed, most of them small and several substantive. They fall into a few classes, and the classes are worth a reader's knowing, because they are the kinds of error an edition checked page by page is likely to contain.

The most serious was words that Burnet deletes surviving in the English. At 127c3 Burnet brackets the first of two "*περὶ τούτων*", "about these things", which the manuscript T has and B repeats; the English had followed T's text ("concord ... about things that some know about"), translating the bracketed words. It now follows Burnet: concord "among people of whom some know about these things and others do not".

The largest class was terms rendered two ways, the change usually falling between blocks. The dialogue's central phrase, "care for oneself", where it first occurs with "yourself" (120c-d), was "take more care of yourself" and "taking care of yourself"; it is now "care for" there too. "What is one's own" had become "what is yours", "what is his" or "what is theirs" (128d, 131a-c, 133d), so that when Socrates at 133d recalls what "we agreed a moment ago", the English recalled it in other words. In the passage on the eye and the soul, "look into" had become "look at" (133a-c), so that the soul did not look into a soul as the eye looks into an eye. "If god wills" (135d), which Socrates repeats from his own words at 127e, had been "god willing" at 127e; Alcibiades' "I don't even know what I'm saying" (116e) had become "what I mean" when he repeats it at 127d; "perceive" had become "notice" at 121b, the word the English keeps for escaping notice; "rivals" (124b) had been "the other side" at 119e, and "surpass" (119d) "get the better of" at 124b. Smaller departures from the edition's own rulings were corrected at 103a ("talking with you"), 103a, 105a and 123d (three verbs that are not "learn"), 104e ("My good friend"), 105a and 105c ("think"), 105b ("worthy"), 105e and 111e ("good enough", "useful"), 107c ("seek"), 108a ("I say so"), 110d and 112d ("appear"), 115e ("doings"), 124d ("befitting"), 130c ("suffices"), 131d ("I will be eager"), 134e ("being ignorant"), 135a ("shipmates", "seemed good to him") and 135d ("not well said").

Next came sense errors in hard constructions, sentences that read plausibly on their own. At 124a–b Burnet prints “know thyself” without quotation marks, so that it is Socrates’ own command as well as the god’s (“know thyself: these are our rivals”); the English had quoted the inscription and added a second “know”. At 121e the four royal tutors had been “chosen from those judged the best”, inventing a larger group; the Greek says that the four are the ones judged best. At 131a “what belongs to the body” made the doctor know the same things as the craftsmen two lines later, against the distinction the argument draws; it is now “something about the body”. At 127e Socrates’ fear that “we may perhaps fail to notice” had been turned into a statement, and its recall at 132b (“we were afraid”) is now in the same words. At 105d–e the parallel of “in the city” and “with you” is restored. Small additions (“never” at 104e, “even” at 131c) were removed, and small omissions (“for” at 127d, “indeed” at 131b) restored; at 105b “the same god” is now “this same god”. At 127c a note now records Burnet’s deletion.

In the notes, the note at 133d now gives the money-maker’s “still further off than what is his own” (131c) in the text’s words, and the note at 135d cites the places where Socrates followed Alcibiades about (104d, 106a). Two notes that spoke of “Plato” as the author (104b, 121d) now speak of the dialogue, since the Introduction leaves the question open.

The Editorial Note had given the printing as between 1925 and 1946; the publisher’s imprint, Humphrey Milford’s, narrows it to between 1925 and 1945, and the title page, which had spoken of a revision in 1910, now describes the impression in the same terms. It said that Burnet keeps in his text words that others reject unless he deletes them himself, which is not so: he brackets one scholar’s deletion (109c6), words that Proclus omits (105e1, 112c4), and once (127c3) words for which he reports no deletion. Its explanations of *et mox*, *cum*, *add.* and *om.* *mox duobus versibus* were too narrow or wrong; it did not say that a *fort.* without a name is Burnet’s own; it described the scholiast as one author; and it did not identify the scholars named in the apparatus. All are now corrected, the chief passages of Stobaeus’ *Anthology* that Burnet relies on are identified, and Eusebius’ quotation of 133c is located (*Preparation for the Gospel* 11.27.5).

Three of Burnet's ancient witnesses are not fully located. Julian, whom Burnet cites at 133c as reading something like the bracketed lines, has not been found quoting them in his surviving works; the place in Priscian cited at 104e2 has not been verified; and the passages of Stobaeus behind Burnet's citations at 121b–c, 127c and 134c–135a have not been identified; those for 109e–110e are identified from Hense's edition but have not been checked against it.

At 125e1 and 128a5 Burnet's page prints *τις* and *ποτε* without accents where the sense requires the interrogatives *τίς* and *πότε*. The Greek keeps the print and the English takes the questions, with a note. Stobaeus' text of 128a appears to print *πότε*; other editions of the dialogue have not been consulted.

A few marks in Burnet's small apparatus type lie at the limit of what the scan can show, and are printed as read: T's form *οῖοι* at 110e9 and the *ὦν* of B's first hand at 123a6, with a circumflex and no breathing; B's *οὐ* at 115b3; and Olympiodorus' *τι* with a small *ó* above it at 125b6, whose meaning is not settled. They should be checked against another copy of the volume.

The apparatus is Burnet's alone. It has not been collated against the manuscripts, and readings proposed since 1901, including those of Carlini's edition (1964), are not reported. The translation follows Burnet's text even where later scholars would print something else.

The notes are a reader's aid, not a commentary. They were chosen to explain what the English cannot carry and to mark the dramatic irony, and they label the more doubtful interpretations as such. The question whether Plato wrote the dialogue is set out in the Introduction but not argued; a reader who wants the scholarly debate on it, or on "the self itself", will need a commentary.

The checks described above were made by independent reviewers working from the same page images. The volume has not been read by a specialist outside the project, and a reader who finds an error is asked to report it.

THE RECORD OF THE BLOCKS

The notes that follow were written as each block was finished, and are kept as a record of what each check found. Where the final reading changed something they report, the text above says so.

BLOCK I (103A–108C)

How it was made. The first eight pages of Burnet's text (scan pp. 311–318). The line-ends were read from enlarged images of the scan, and the margin numbers computed from the Stephanus divisions and compared with Burnet's: all 224 lines agree. The digital text omits six words at 104a7 ("πόλει, οὔση μέγιστη τῶν Ἑλληνίδων, καί"), which Burnet prints and this edition supplies; it carries a stray character at 105d1, removed; it repeats Socrates' speaker label at 104a, where his speech runs on and Burnet prints none; and it lower-cases the openings of speeches and of quoted speech, where Burnet's capitals are restored.

What verification caught. Four independent reviewers checked the block: two compared the Greek and the apparatus with the page images letter by letter, one compared the English with the Greek clause by clause, and one checked every fact and reference in the notes and in the Editorial Note. In the Greek, the digital text's ἄδοντα at 108a5 is Burnet's ᾗδοντα, and is corrected. In the apparatus, Burnet prints "φρόνειν" at 104c1, a misprint of his own, and it is kept as printed. Every speech was confirmed as given to the right speaker.

In the English, two sentences had a construction wrong. At 107a10 Socrates asks what the Athenians are deliberating about, not when; and at 105e Alcibiades hopes, once he has shown his worth, to be able to do anything at all, a clause the draft had turned into a second thing he would show. Socrates' hope at 105e is now for the greatest power "with you", answering Alcibiades' power "in the city". Smaller corrections of mood, particle and reference were made at 103b, 104c, 104d, 104e, 105a, 105c, 106a, 106c and 107b; small omissions were restored at 103a, 104b, 105a, 106a and 106e; and "of men" was removed at 104a. Several echoes are now audible: the "nuisance" Socrates says the other lovers made of themselves (103a) is the word Alcibiades throws back at him (104d), the young man "outdone" his proud lovers "in pride" (103b), and "wonder" runs through Socrates' opening and Alcibiades' reply. The renderings "have in mind", "look into" and "adviser" are now kept wherever their Greek recurs.

In the notes, the dates and sources for Cleinias' death, the guardianship of Pericles and Ariphton, and the naming of Deino-mache were made exact; the account of Socrates' sign now cites the *Apology's* own word for its "opposing"; and two interpretations are labelled as such. The Editorial Note now describes this copy exactly (an undated impression printed between 1925 and 1946,

whose 1910 addendum concerns other dialogues), explains every abbreviation the block uses, and records the limits of Proclus' commentary.

BLOCK II (108C–112E)

How it was made. Burnet pages 9–16 (scan pp. 319–326), made as Block I: the line-ends read from enlarged images of the scan, and the margin numbers computed and compared with Burnet's, all of which agree. The digital text again has a rough breathing for Burnet's smooth one in ᾗδew (108c8), as at 108a5; it prints in lower case the Muses (108c12) and the opening of the question quoted at 108e7, where Burnet has capitals; and it has τις at 108e5, where Burnet prints τῖς. All are corrected to Burnet.

What verification caught. Four reviewers checked the block as before. The Greek was confirmed letter by letter against the images, with two marks settled there: a small mark touching the last letter of Ἑμοιγε at 111e3, first taken for an accent, is a blemish of the type and is not reproduced; and in the apparatus at 110e9 the form reported for T is printed with a circumflex and no breathing, οῖοι, and is kept as printed.

In the English, one word at the turn from page 14 to page 15 belonged to the next page and has been moved, and ἐπειδή there is now "since". At 109d Socrates' matched pair is restored: either the thing escaped Alcibiades' own notice, or his lessons escaped Socrates'. The two questions at 109a are now parallel ("what suffering ... and what name"), the inference in Socrates' οὐκοῦν (112d), the grudging "at least" of Alcibiades' reply (112d) and Socrates' "you will know" (εἴσῃ, 112e) are kept, and small omissions and additions were mended at 108d, 108e, 109b, 109d, 110c, 111a and 111b. "These things" at 109c6 is now plural, as the Greek is.

In the notes, the note on 109c no longer gives Alcibiades a word that was Socrates' ("lawful"), and its reading of the passage is offered as one of two; the note on Zeus Philios now says that Socrates elsewhere calls on him but swears by him only here; Plutarch's story of the boy and the wagon is told as Plutarch tells it; draughts is described as Plato's stock example of an expert's craft; and the note on Coronea refers to the note at 103a instead of repeating it.

BLOCK III (112E–117A)

How it was made. Burnet pages 17–24 (scan pp. 327–334), made as before; the margin numbers computed from the Stephanus divi-

sions agree with Burnet's throughout. Two passages needed new handling. At 115d2 Burnet prints an answer of Alcibiades', "Yes", supplied by Dobree, with the angle brackets round the speaker's name as well; and at 115e5–7 he prints an answer and a sentence of Socrates' that are missing from the manuscripts and supplied from Stobaeus' quotation of the passage, with one opening bracket before the first speaker's name and one closing bracket after the second speech. The digital text runs these supplied speeches on inside the speech before them; this edition sets each as its own paragraph, as Burnet does.

What verification caught. Four reviewers checked the block as before. The Greek was confirmed letter by letter; in the apparatus at 114d5 the form reported for B is printed with a rough breathing and a grave, ἐν μελέτῃσιν, and is now so transcribed.

In the English, a question at 114c that expects the answer yes ("isn't this the only difference ...?") had been turned the other way, so that Alcibiades' assent agreed to the opposite; it is corrected, with its two speakers in the Greek order. The challenge Socrates sets at 114b and the conclusion he draws at 116e now use the same words ("what is just and what is advantageous"), as the Greek does, and the recapitulation at 116d says "these things", recalling 113a–c. Alcibiades' grudging admissions that he himself is the one saying it ("I do appear to be the one", 113b; "I appear to be, it seems", 116d) keep their personal form. Smaller corrections: "going to" for μέλλω at 114d, kept apart from "mean to"; "running ahead of the argument" at 114a; "this time" for αὖ at 114a; "without cause" for μάτην at 113c; "as fully as possible" at 114e; "look into" and "see" for the Socratic verbs at 115c and 116b; one rendering, "doing", for πράξις at 115e; and two Stephanus letters moved to the word where the section begins (113e, 114a).

In the notes, the remark on "Why, you're a prophet" now gives the Socratic sense of the irony (refutation cures rather than harms, *Gorgias* 475d); the notes on the supplied speeches say exactly what is missing, from which witnesses, and where Stobaeus quotes the passage; and the note on *eu prattein* says that the argument trades on both senses rather than passing from one to the other.

BLOCK IV (117A–122A)

How it was made. Burnet pages 25–32 (scan pp. 335–342), made as before; the margin numbers agree with Burnet's throughout. The digital text has, for the third time, a rough breathing on a form of ᾄσσω or ᾄδω, here ᾄττεις at 118b7, which Burnet prints with a

smooth breathing; it is corrected.

What verification caught. Four reviewers checked the block as before. The Greek and the apparatus were confirmed letter by letter, including the doubtful marks: the breathings of ὄντω' (rough) and ὄντα (smooth) in the apparatus at 118c10, a blemish on the first letter of συνουσίαν at 119a3, and the unaccented forms Burnet reports for B at 118c6 and 121d5.

In the English, the most serious correction is at 118a4. The draft had turned "this ignorance is the cause of bad things, and is the disgraceful stupidity" into a single phrase in apposition, which silently adopted a deletion that Burnet records but does not make; the καί is now translated. At 120b6 "the very ones I mean" replaces a misreading of a relative clause; at 117e1 two small words (πού, τινες) and the pairing "think they know / do not think they know" are restored; and at 119c-e the chain of words built on ἄξιος ("unworthy", "thought fit", "worth asking", "worthy of yourself", "worthy of you") is now kept, so that the irony of the last one shows. Alcibiades' reply at 118c is now a rally rather than a concession, and Socrates' "Why, ours too" at 121a repeats Alcibiades' words exactly, as the Greek does. Smaller corrections: three Stephanus letters moved (119c, 120d, and 121c); μόνω, a dual, is "just the two of us"; "cast off" for ἀποβεβληκότες; "the weight of family" for γένους ὄγκω; and terms aligned with the register.

In the notes, Damon, Anaxagoras and Pythocleides are all cited from Plutarch's *Pericles*; the note on Callias says that his identification with the general killed at Potidaea is the usual one, and compares Zeno's fee with Evenus' five minae in the *Apology*; the note on Meidias quotes Aristophanes exactly and gives the source for the game; the note on the royal genealogies adds Herodotus' tracing of the Spartan kings to Perseus; the note on Socrates' Daedalus no longer presents the step to Hephaestus as his invention; and the note on the comic poet no longer claims more than is known.

BLOCK V (122A–126D)

How it was made. Burnet pages 33–40 (scan pp. 343–350), made as before; the margin numbers agree with Burnet's throughout. The digital text needed no correction in this block.

What verification caught. Four reviewers checked the block as before. The Greek text was confirmed letter by letter, including the breathings of αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ and αὐτοῦ at 122a6, 123d7–8 and 126c–d. In the apparatus two forms are now transcribed exactly

as printed: at 123a6 the reading of B's first hand has a circumflex and no breathing ($\omega\nu$), and at 124b2 B's $\delta\epsilon$ has no accent, with $\mu\eta$ set small above it. Also confirmed as printed: the asterisk at 123d3, the small $\acute{o}$ over $\tau\iota$ at 125b6, the unaccented forms reported for B at 124e6 and 126d9, and the pair $\eta\pi\epsilon\rho$ (vel $\eta\pi\epsilon\rho$) at 126d9. At 125e1 Burnet's page prints $\tau\iota\varsigma$ without an accent; the Greek keeps it, and the English takes it as the question "what knowledge", which Alcibiades answers, with a note.

In the English, two errors are corrected. At 123c5 the message to Amestris keeps the second person of the Greek ("against your son"); the draft's "her son" had also blurred whose land lay at Erchia. At 124a Lampido would wonder that Alcibiades means to contend with her son, not whether he does. $\epsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omega$ is no longer "if you care to", which put the dialogue's key word on a verb of wishing a page before care becomes the argument, and $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota$ at 122b is now "no one cares about", keeping that family of words together. Socrates' question at 125e ($\mu\omega\nu$) now expects the answer no; the second of the paired questions at 125c–d is "the virtue of chorus-training", as the first is "the virtue of piloting"; the inscription is "Know thyself", as in the *Charmides*; and Socrates' "let us deliberate together" at 124b now hands back Alcibiades' own words at 119b. Smaller corrections: set phrases as in the *Charmides* ("is in fact", "certainly"); two Stephanus letters moved (122d, 126d); small words restored ($\alpha\lambda\lambda\omega$ at 124b, $\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon$ at 123e, $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$ at 124d, $\gamma\epsilon$ at 125c and 126a); and new terms recorded, among them "concord" for $\acute{o}\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$, "tend" for $\theta\epsilon\rho\alpha\pi\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ and "order" for $\delta\iota\omicron\iota\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$.

In the notes, the Magi are a Median tribe in Herodotus, and *mageia* could already mean magic in the bad sense (Gorgias, *Helen* 10); Herodotus' Anthylla went to the wife of whoever ruled Egypt, not to the Persian queen; Agis became king only after the dialogue's dramatic date; Socrates first calls his sign "the god" at 105d; and the note on Bekker's conjecture at 126d10 now says how each witness differs from it.

BLOCK VI (126D–130D)

How it was made. Burnet pages 41–48 (scan pp. 351–358), made as before; the margin numbers agree with Burnet's throughout. The digital text lacks the division at 128b, which was supplied, and brackets the two supplied speeches at 128a13–b1 separately, where Burnet prints one pair of brackets round both; the Greek follows Burnet.

What verification caught. Four reviewers checked the block as before. The most serious correction is in the Greek. At 128a2 and a5 and at 129e3 and e7 the draft had changed the digital text's *ἄνθρωπος*, "the man", to *ἄνθρωπος*, misreading both the page and the apparatus; set beside sure examples of each breathing, the page shows the rough breathing of Schanz's and Bekker's crasis, with the manuscripts' *ἄνθρωπος* in the apparatus. The text and the apparatus entries are now as printed. Also as printed: the misprint *ἱματία* in the apparatus at 128a13, B's *αὐ* *τι* at 130d4, and Stallbaum's *καθ'* *αὐτό*. Damaged letters (127c4, 129b9, 129d11, 130a7, and three in the apparatus) are given in their intended forms.

In the English, two errors are corrected. At 127e Socrates' parenthesis means "perhaps we fail to notice", not "we may often fail": *πολλάκις* after *μή* is "perhaps". At 130d the draft's "instead of the self itself" had silently adopted a conjecture that Burnet records but does not print; the English now follows his text, "instead of the self, ... what each thing itself is", and the note says what the apparatus offers. At 128a5 Burnet's page prints *ποτε* without an accent; the English takes it as the question "when", and a note says so, as at 125e1. Smaller corrections: four Stephanus letters moved (126e, 127e, 128d, 130d); "well ordered" for *εἰ* *οἰκεῖσθαι*, answering "ordering" at 126a; "what is just" for *τὰ δίκαια*; "Answer what you are asked", as at 106b; "discover" for *εὕρισκειν* and "seek" for *ζητεῖν*; "for Zeus' sake", an appeal rather than an oath; and several small words restored.

In the notes, the note on "the self itself" now says that *tauto* and *to auto* are the same words, and names the main readings of the phrase without choosing among them; the note on "doing one's own business" says who uses the formula when; and the note at 130d says exactly what Burnet prints.

BLOCK VII (130D–135E)

How it was made. Burnet pages 49–58 (scan pp. 359–368), the end of the dialogue, made as before. The margin numbers agree with Burnet's except at 135b, where his "10" is misplaced and the count is kept. The digital text brackets the four supplied speeches at 133c8–17 separately, where Burnet prints one pair of brackets round all of them, and has a comma after *ἀνδρί* at 135c13 where Burnet has a full stop; the Greek follows Burnet.

What verification caught. Four reviewers checked the block as before. The Greek text was confirmed letter by letter, every breathing of the *αὐτ*- and *αὐτ*- forms set beside sure examples; in the ap-

paratus the draft had ἄν for Burnet's ἄν at 134e8 and 135a8. Kept as printed: the apparatus spellings that differ from the text (ἐαυτὸν at 131b11, ξυνίεμεν at 132c10, ξυμβαίη at 135a7), the unaccented το at 133c2, and ὅθ' at 133c8. Damaged letters (132c1, 134e4, 135c12) are given in their intended forms.

In the English, one error of sense is corrected: at 131c10 Alcibiades' answer had become "He must love you", which in his mouth points at Socrates; the Greek says only that it follows from the argument. At 133c13 the god is the finest mirror that we would use ("using him as the finest mirror"), not "that finest mirror". The phrase τυγχάνει ... ὃν is now "is in fact" (133a-c), so that the god is not purer "by chance"; the sentence about the pupil at 133a is one question again; the plural "you" of 134d is set up where it begins, and at 135b the impersonal "one must ... for oneself" is kept; 133e5 is a potential "would"; and an added clause at 135c13 is gone. Smaller corrections bring the block into line with the earlier ones ("make mistakes", "recommend", "a private person", "manage the city's affairs", "best of men", "tended", "intelligence" for φρόνησις), keep the repeated words of the Greek ("look into", "guarantor"), and make the last warning "I dread". One Stephanus letter was moved (133e).

In the notes, the line of Homer quoted at 132a calls Athens, not the Athenians, "the *dēmos* of Erechtheus", where *dēmos* means the land; Schleiermacher's deletion at 133a2 is only "the thing we also call the pupil"; the money-maker at 131c tends what lies further off, rather than knowing it; and the last note no longer says that Alcibiades was exiled a second time in 406, when he lost his command and withdrew to the Chersonese, or that the charge about him was made at Socrates' trial: Xenophon gives it as "the accuser's".