Greek reading vocabulary — The Lovers

Use in the book

These glosses follow the text in order. They explain the construction and local force of selected phrases; a gloss is not a new critical reading of the source.

Places to read

1. 132dTo revile or verbally abuse someone. The imperfect identifies what the educated lover was doing to the athletic rival in his caricature. This narrator's description marks the speech as antagonistic. It discourages taking the caricature as an impartial account of the athlete's life and keeps the competition for the boys' admiration visible beneath the apparent defense of philosophy.

Abuse

λοιδορέω (loidoreō)

To revile or verbally abuse someone. The imperfect identifies what the educated lover was doing to the athletic rival in his caricature. This narrator's description marks the speech as antagonistic. It discourages taking the caricature as an impartial account of the athlete's life and keeps the competition for the boys' admiration visible beneath the apparent defense of philosophy.

Attestation. 132d: ὃν ἐλοιδόρει.

Accomplished

χαρίεις (charieis)

Graceful, cultivated or accomplished. The superlative describes how the generalist should appear among those present. Its social praise is paired with seeming wisest, revealing the prestige sought by the lover's educational ideal. The word does not establish exact mastery of each craft or moral excellence on its own; cultivated participation and practical authority are deliberately separated in the next stage.

Attestation. 135d: χαριέστατον εἶναι.

Acquire

κτάομαι (ktaomai)

To acquire, obtain or secure something for oneself. The aorist middle infinitive here has health as its object. Its role is to name the outcome for which help is sought, not the possession of money or technical knowledge. The choice between philosopher and doctor is therefore framed by effective attainment of the desired good rather than admiration for either person's reputation.

Attestation. 136c: κτήσασθαι.

Agree

ὁμολογέω (homologeō)

To agree, acknowledge or make a common admission. Here the lover gives Socrates the answer he withholds from his rival. Agreements later supply the material for the refutation, but their repetition does not prove they were all independently established. The recap at 137a adds a claim about the speakers being philosophers that was not expressly agreed earlier.

Attestation. 133e: ὁμολογῶ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθόν.

Agree again

ἀνομολογέομαι (anomologeomai)

To agree over again or review the admissions together. The infinitive states Socrates' purpose in recapitulating the discussion. It is more than repeating sounds: the assembled claims are about to reveal an inconsistency with the lover's estimate of philosophy. The edition notes that one item in the ensuing recap, that the speakers themselves are philosophers, was not expressly agreed earlier.

Attestation. 136e: ἀνομολογήσασθαι.

All

πᾶς (pas)

All, every or the whole, with scope determined by the noun it qualifies. Here the ambitious ideal is familiarity with all crafts, immediately relaxed to as many as possible. The distinction between all subjects, many subjects and appropriate subjects is central to the educational argument. A universal expression should not be silently weakened to 'several' when tracing a proposed definition.

Attestation. 135b: τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος εἶναι πασῶν.

Always

ἀεί (aei)

Always or continually. In the recap, the alleged continual availability of craftsmen sustains the conclusion that the generalist is useless. The edition notes Hermann's ἀεί at the earlier 136e occurrence against the manuscripts' δή. The temporal scope matters: occasional availability of a better expert would not by itself establish permanent uselessness, and the argument depends on the stronger claim.

Attestation. 137a: δημιουργοὺς δὲ ἀεὶ εἶναι.

Ambitiously

φιλοτίμως (philotimōs)

With ambition or eagerness for honour. The adverb characterises the educated lover's manner of answering once the boys attend. Its love-of-honour formation belongs to the dialogue's network of competing loves, but its local point is public display. The emphatic defense of philosophy that follows establishes his aspiration to esteem before establishing any knowledge of philosophy's nature.

Attestation. 133a: καὶ μάλα φιλοτίμως.

Anaxagoras

Ἀναξαγόρας (anaxagoras)

The thinker named as one possible subject of the boys' dispute. The surrounding appearance-verb and alternative 'or Oenopides' keep the attribution uncertain. The edition supplies historical background about Anaxagoras in its note; the dialogue itself neither states his doctrines nor identifies the particular question at issue. His name helps mark the apparently scientific character of the scene.

Attestation. 132a: περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου.

Answer

ἀπόκρισις (apokrisis)

An answer or reply to a question. Socrates first wonders at the athlete's answer, later interprets and tests the educated lover's successive answers. The noun names a contribution within an exchange, not necessarily a successful definition. Keeping that distinction helps track why an emphatic or impressive reply can still require clarification, agreement and examination of its consequences.

Attestation. 132c: τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.

Anything else than

ἄλλος (allos)

Other or another. In this question the genitive phrase with ἤ asks whether exercise-lovers desire anything other than bodily good condition. The construction invites denial of an alternative and thereby secures an agreed goal. It should not be read as introducing a second unnamed object of desire; the point is to isolate the end against which training is evaluated.

Attestation. 133e: ἄλλου του ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ τούτου.

Appear

φαίνομαι (phainomai)

To appear or seem, often with an infinitive or participle specifying what appears to be the case. The dual imperfect here introduces Socrates' tentative impression of the boys' subject. Later short answers such as φαίνεται can signal assent with a qualified tone. Appearance should therefore be read contextually rather than automatically treated as either deception or established truth.

Attestation. 132a: ἐφαινέσθην.

Arbitration

δίαιτα (diaita)

An arbitration or decision entrusted to an arbiter. The plural refers to disputes that friends may ask the philosopher to settle. Although the noun can have other senses elsewhere, 'diet' or 'way of life' would be wrong here. The combination with entrusting makes responsibility explicit: his broad cultivation must now support a judgment on which other people rely.

Attestation. 138e: διαίτας ἐπιτρέπωσιν.

As it seems

ὡς ἔοικε (hōs eoike)

As it seems or apparently. The perfect-form verb ἔοικε has a present force of seeming or likelihood. Socrates uses the parenthetical phrase while drawing the account's troubling consequence. It gives the inference a conversationally qualified tone, but does not supply a separate argument for it. Readers should inspect the stated premises instead of treating either confidence or hesitation as proof.

Attestation. 137a: ὡς ἔοικε.

As long as

ἕως ἄν (heōs an)

For as long as or whenever the stated condition lasts, with ἄν and the subjunctive. The philosopher is called not useful while a craft-holder is present. The condition restricts the claim, though the subsequent assertion that experts always exist makes it extensive. This construction must remain attached when assessing the transition from a particular emergency to general uselessness.

Attestation. 136d: ἕως ἄν τις δημιουργὸς ᾖ.

As many as possible

ὡς πλεῖστος (hōs pleistos)

A construction with ὡς and the superlative, meaning as many or as much as possible. Here it states the aim of lifelong learning in the lover's account. The maximising force is stronger than simply continuing to learn. It is precisely what makes the next question about πολυμαθία apt and allows the contrast between maximum quantity and beneficial measure.

Attestation. 133c: ὡς πλεῖστα ἐν τῷ βίῳ μάθῃ.

Ask

ἐρωτάω (erōtaō)

To ask or question someone. Socrates explicitly transfers his question to the educated lover, keeping its content the same. Forms from ἐρωτάω and the related asking stem ἐρ- occur throughout the conversation. A reader should track both the respondent and the question asked, because the inquiry moves from philosophy's value to its nature, quantity of learning and distinctive responsibility.

Attestation. 132d: σὲ ἐρωτῶ.

Assign

προστάσσω (prostassō)

To order, assign or charge someone with a task. The city may assign the philosopher a matter to decide or judge. The verb marks an institutional demand, contrasted with friends' private entrusting of arbitrations. The hypothetical does not appoint him to a named office; it establishes that civic responsibilities can require active competence rather than admired second-hand familiarity.

Attestation. 138e: ἡ πόλις τι προστάττῃ.

At all; to begin with

τὴν ἀρχήν (tēn archēn)

An adverbial accusative meaning 'at all' or 'to begin with' in this negative context. It qualifies not knowing what the thing is; it does not introduce a theory of first principles or a chronological origin of philosophy. The question concerns the minimum understanding required before a judgment of fine or shameful can count as knowledge.

Attestation. 133b: τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅτι ἔστιν.

At any rate

γοῦν (goun)

At any rate or at least, often giving a concrete fact supporting a preceding impression. Socrates is unsure of the boys' precise topic, but they at least appear to be drawing circles. The particle does not convert the guess into certainty. It narrows the evidence to what the narrator can report while leaving the larger interpretation open.

Attestation. 132b: κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν.

At least; precisely

γε (ge)

A focusing particle whose effect depends on the expression it attaches to: at least, indeed, precisely or emphatic limitation. In Πάνυ γε it strengthens assent. Elsewhere it can restrict a claim to a particular person or point. It is not safe to add 'certainly' everywhere; local emphasis may narrow a proposition just where an English reader is tempted to universalise it.

Attestation. 133c: Πάνυ γε.

Athlete

ἀθλητής (athlētēs)

A competitor in athletic contests. The 'other athletes' form the group whom the pentathletes surpass after conceding first place to specialists. Keeping that group distinct is essential: the text does not call the pentathlete first among all competitors without qualification. The analogy later transfers this structured ranking to craft knowledge, with experts above and ordinary company below.

Attestation. 135e: τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν.

Base

πονηρός (ponēros)

Bad, inferior or base. Here it is opposed to good in the proposed relation between character and usefulness. Later the term also applies to horses and oxen, where badness concerns their kind rather than the full moral sense of human vice. The edition keeps it distinct from μοχθηρός, worthless; readers should track the local standard instead of flattening both into one technical category.

Attestation. 136b: οἱ πονηροὶ ἄχρηστοι.

Be a busybody

πολυπραγμονέω (polypragmoneō)

To busy oneself with many matters, meddle or be a busybody. Socrates rejects this as an adequate account of philosophizing alongside absorption in crafts and much learning. The participle describes a way of living rather than a single helpful inquiry. Its negative force should not be indiscriminately extended to every broad interest or to responsible involvement in civic affairs.

Attestation. 137b: πολυπραγμονοῦντα κυπτάζοντα ζῆν.

Be a slave

δουλεύω (douleuō)

To serve as a slave or be enslaved; figuratively here, to be bound to no single occupation. The lover praises the generalist's freedom from specialist absorption. The language carries social valuation and echoes the earlier free-man ideal. Its rhetorical attraction must be distinguished from the question whether refusing intensive attention leaves the philosopher useful when expert action is needed.

Attestation. 136a: μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι.

Be affected

πάσχω (paschō)

To undergo, experience or be affected by something. Socrates says he does not know what effect the boys' attention had on the lovers, before describing his own response. The ordinary verb marks a limit on narrated psychological knowledge. His subsequent impression of the rival's anxiety remains an appearance, not a claim to have direct access to another person's feelings.

Attestation. 133a: ὅτι μὲν οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἔπαθον.

Be ashamed

αἰσχύνομαι (aischynomai)

To feel shame or be embarrassed. Socrates asks whether the adults hesitate to seek help from the boys out of shame, likening them to the suitors. The same family marks the educated lover's final silence. In both places sensitivity to public standing shapes participation in inquiry; shame is not by itself proof that the ashamed person has acquired the missing knowledge.

Attestation. 135a: ἴσως αἰσχυνόμεθα.

Be compelled

ἀναγκάζω (anankazō)

To force or compel; in the passive here, to be constrained to agree. The educated lover confronts a conclusion about philosophical uselessness that follows from admissions Socrates has assembled. The expression describes argumentative pressure, not a physical threat. It also does not guarantee the inference is beyond criticism: the reader can still examine the move from specialist preference to the generalist's alleged uselessness.

Attestation. 136e: Ἠναγκάζετο ὁμολογεῖν.

Be dazzled

ἐκπλήσσω (ekplēssō)

To strike with astonishment; in the passive here, to be dazzled or overwhelmed. Socrates openly reports being affected by the young and beautiful when they listen. The aorist gives this event, and the following present generalises his susceptibility. The confession complicates any image of the narrator as emotionally untouched by the competitive setting he is about to examine.

Attestation. 133a: αὐτὸς δ’ οὖν ἐξεπλάγην.

Be disposed

διάκειμαι (diakeimai)

To be in a condition or disposed in a certain way. The participle extends the educated lover's contempt to anyone holding the attitude he has described toward philosophy. His gesture identifies the rival as the intended target. The phrase refers to an evaluative disposition rather than physical posture, despite the important bodily positioning of the characters elsewhere in the scene.

Attestation. 133b: τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον.

Be doubtful

ἀμφιγνοέω (amphignoeō)

To be uncertain or in doubt about something. Socrates says he still did not clearly grasp what the lover meant by his account, prompting the athletic analogy. The imperfect describes an unresolved interpretive state. It need not imply that the account is already disproved: before testing its consequences, Socrates first tries to produce a formulation the respondent explicitly recognises.

Attestation. 135d: ἠμφεγνόουν τὸν λόγον.

Be eager

προθυμέομαι (prothymeomai)

To be eager or ready to do something. Socrates describes himself as keen to know clearly what the lover means before asking about usefulness. The participle frames the new test as clarification of the accepted account. It need not be read as a private disclosure of all his intentions; its explicit purpose is to make the proposed philosopher's standing more definite.

Attestation. 136b: προθυμούμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι.

Be fitting

προσήκω (prosēkō)

To belong to, be appropriate or be fitting for someone. Here it governs what free men should learn of the crafts. The dative identifies the people to whom the learning is appropriate. The lover distinguishes intellectual understanding from manual work by social suitability; the phrase does not by itself prove that this distinction identifies the best learning for every person.

Attestation. 135b: ἃ προσήκει τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μαθεῖν.

Be fitting; ought

χρή (chrē)

An impersonal verb expressing what is needed, fitting or ought to be done. Socrates thinks he ought to release the first lover from questioning and examine the wiser claimant. The infinitive χρῆναι depends on his judgment. The word should not be mistaken for an external command; it describes a reasoned conversational choice within the narrator's account of the encounter.

Attestation. 132d: χρῆναι τὸν μὲν ἕτερον ἀφιέναι.

Be ignorant

ἀγνοέω (agnoeō)

To be ignorant of or fail to recognise someone or something. Socrates moves from ignorance of many members of a kind to ignorance of one, then of oneself. The verb's object matters throughout: not knowing an individual's quality, not understanding a kind and not knowing oneself are connected by the argument but should not be treated as interchangeable without examination.

Attestation. 137e: πολλοὺς ἀγνοεῖ.

Be ill

ἀσθενέω (astheneō)

To be weak or ill. Socrates imagines the respondent or a cared-for friend falling sick, creating an immediate need for competent assistance. The participle works with τύχοις in a hypothetical case. Illness turns the discussion from social display toward effective help: the relevant question becomes whom one would bring in to recover health, not who speaks most impressively.

Attestation. 136c: εἰ τύχοις ἢ αὐτὸς ἀσθενήσας.

Be in earnest

σπουδάζω (spoudazō)

To take something seriously or be earnestly engaged in it. The printed dual perfect participle describes the boys' settled, concentrated attitude. Their seriousness initially invites Socrates' assumption that the object is great and fine, but the athlete mocks it. Later the same family describes absorption in crafts, showing that earnest effort needs evaluation rather than guaranteeing wisdom by itself.

Attestation. 132b: μάλ’ ἐσπουδακότε.

Be in good condition

εὖ ἔχω (eu echō)

To be well or in good condition. The phrase here concerns the body and gives physical training its agreed goal. The accusative τὸ σῶμα specifies the bodily respect in which the people are to fare well. The later noun εὐεξία names this condition compactly; neither expression by itself identifies the amount of exercise that will produce it.

Attestation. 133e: εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα.

Be left behind

ἀπολείπομαι (apoleipomai)

To be left behind or fall behind. The perfect infinitive describes the lasting disadvantage in other pursuits allegedly caused by intense care for one craft. The lover uses it to defend general cultivation. The claim belongs to his model, not a demonstrated universal law that expertise in any domain makes all other interests impossible or every specialist socially deficient.

Attestation. 136b: ἀπολελεῖφθαι.

Be necessary

δεῖ (dei)

An impersonal expression of necessity: it is necessary, one must or one ought. Here it asks which subjects the philosophizing person must learn. The infinitive specifies the required action and the accusative its subject. Necessity is tied to a proposed role or goal, not invariably physical compulsion. At 139a the idiom πολλοῦ δεῖ instead means being far from something.

Attestation. 135a: ἃ δεῖ τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα μανθάνειν.

Be on edge

ἀγωνιάω (agōniaō)

To be anxious or on edge, especially in the expectation of a contest. The edition notes its connection with competitive anxiety. Socrates thinks the educated lover is no less affected than himself when the lads listen. The verb makes his ambitious answer dramatically motivated: he is defending an admired pursuit while facing a rival and an audience he wants to impress.

Attestation. 133a: οὐχ ἧττον ἐμοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν.

Be storm-tossed

χειμάζομαι (cheimazomai)

To be exposed to winter weather or driven by a storm. Here the participle qualifies the ship in Socrates' hypothetical choice between pilot and philosopher. The dangerous condition makes practical reliance urgent. The word does not describe a metaphorical storm of argument at this point; it supplies a literal case whose stakes make the preference for relevant expertise especially plain.

Attestation. 136d: ἐν νηὶ χειμαζομένῃ.

Be taught

διδάσκω (didaskō)

To teach; the middle-passive participle here means being taught or learning. Solon's line pictures its speaker continually receiving instruction while growing old. The dialogue then uses μανθάνω for the lover's account of learning. The vocabulary shift does not introduce two opposed educational methods; it moves from a quoted verse to the respondent's own elaboration of it.

Attestation. 133c: πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

Be temperate

σωφρονέω (sōphroneō)

To be temperate, sound-minded or self-controlled. The dialogue identifies it with knowing oneself after rejecting ignorance of oneself as temperance. The term is not limited here to moderation in food, drink or exertion. Nor does the earlier argument about μέτριος by itself supply this identity: the new claim connects ethical soundness with discriminating knowledge of one's own quality.

Attestation. 138a: Τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἄρα γιγνώσκειν ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν.

Be unruly

ἀκολασταίνω (akolastainō)

To behave without restraint or be unruly. The participle identifies some of those rightly corrected by judicial knowledge. The edition explains its relation to the family of κολάζω, punish: the unchastened require appropriate correction. That verbal relationship supports the sequence, but it does not determine which conduct is blameworthy or establish that any imposed restraint automatically counts as rightful correction.

Attestation. 137d: ἀκολασταίνοντας.

Be well ordered

οἰκέω (oikeō)

To inhabit or manage; the middle-passive construction here means that cities are well ordered. The adverb εὖ supplies the positive standard. Socrates links this outcome with wrongdoers paying penalties, then with political expertise. The verb describes the achieved condition of the community, not merely someone's possession of a title, and the later household example uses the same practical standard.

Attestation. 138b: αἱ πόλεις εὖ οἰκοῦνται.

Be willing

ἐθέλω (ethelō)

To be willing or consent to do something. The future question asks whether the lover will accept the same account for human beings that he has accepted for animals. The form introduces a further commitment rather than recording one already secured. This matters at a major transition: a willingness to extend the analogy is sought where differences between the cases could otherwise require examination.

Attestation. 137c: Ἐθελήσεις οὖν.

Beloved

παιδικά (paidika)

The beloved youth, expressed by a neuter plural substantive that can denote a single person. Here he is the intended hearer of the lover's loud speech. The grammatical plural must not be turned into several beloveds in this scene. The term clarifies that the rivalry involves one shared object of affection, even though two lads are present as listeners.

Attestation. 133b: τὰ παιδικά.

Beneficial

ὠφέλιμος (ōphelimos)

Helpful or beneficial; the superlative here means most beneficial. Moderate bodily provisions receive that evaluation in contrast with excessive or insufficient quantities. The adjective shares its family with ὠφελέω, to benefit, keeping the test focused on effects. Calling something moderate is therefore not enough unless the measure can be related to what actually benefits the body or soul.

Attestation. 134d: ὠφελιμώτατα.

Benefit

ὠφελέω (ōpheleō)

To help or benefit; the passive optative here means 'might be benefited'. Socrates frames his questioning as an opportunity to gain something from the wiser claimant. Later the active verb tests which provisions benefit body and soul. The common family keeps practical improvement in view: admiration for a pursuit is tested against what good it actually does.

Attestation. 132d: ὠφεληθείην.

Blush

ἐρυθριάω (erythriaō)

To blush or redden. The other lover's visible response follows the boys' delight and laughter at his expense. The narrator can report this bodily sign without claiming exact knowledge of every feeling behind it. It anticipates his final shame and silence, making the argument's progress also a story about exposure before the audience he sought to impress.

Attestation. 134b: ὁ δ’ ἕτερος ἠρυθρίασε.

Body

σῶμα (sōma)

The body, first the object whose good condition the lovers of exercise seek. It becomes the familiar case from which the dialogue moves to provisions for the soul. The contrast is functional in the argument: bodily benefit is assigned recognised experts, while the corresponding authority for learning remains unsettled. It does not itself establish a comprehensive metaphysical theory of body and soul.

Attestation. 133e: τὸ σῶμα.

Boorish

ἄγροικος (agroikos)

Rustic, uncultivated or boorish. Socrates uses the comparative to ask whether proceeding would be rather rude after the respondent has been forced to agree. The word belongs to the dialogue's concerns with cultivated appearance, but here it marks conversational delicacy. The lover permits him to ask, and the apparently modest recap then exposes the account's most damaging consequence.

Attestation. 136e: ἀγροικότερόν ἐστιν ἐρέσθαι.

Both

ἀμφότερος (amphoteros)

Both of two, here the philosopher and the doctor. The respondent initially refuses Socrates' exclusive choice by saying he would bring both. Socrates then asks which he would prefer and consult first. The brief answer matters philosophically: it leaves room for complementary use before the questioner changes the test to priority, from which uselessness is subsequently inferred.

Attestation. 136d: Ἀμφοτέρους ἔγωγ’ ἄν.

Bow

τόξον (toxon)

A bow, the object that an unexpected challenger might string in the Homeric allusion. The edition supplies the Odyssey context. In the dialogue it represents a test that exposes the established contestants' limitations. The object should remain tied to that dramatic comparison rather than treated as an example of another craft the would-be philosopher is now required to learn.

Attestation. 135a: τὸ τόξον.

Break the law

παρανομέω (paranomeō)

To act contrary to law or transgress it. The participle is paired with being unruly in the description of people subject to judicial punishment. The lawbreaking is part of the hypothetical criterion for the relevant knowledge. The passage does not identify a statute, decide a real case or prove that every existing law supplies a flawless measure of human goodness.

Attestation. 137d: καὶ παρανομοῦντας.

Busying oneself with crafts

πραγματεία (pragmateia)

Occupation, active engagement or busying oneself in a field. The prepositional phrase specifies the crafts, one of the rejected accounts of philosophizing in the final sentence. The noun differs from πολυπραγμονέω, the earlier disparaging busybody verb, though the themes overlap. The conclusion denies that craft preoccupation defines philosophy; it does not spell out a complete alternative definition.

Attestation. 139a: ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία.

Buy

πρίαμαι (priamai)

To buy, here in a potential second-person optative: one could buy a carpenter for five or six minae. The genitive gives the price. The example quantifies the contrast with a master builder, but remains a hypothetical argumentative comparison. It supplies no present market offer and should not be rewritten as wages, a commission or a fee for one completed project.

Attestation. 135c: ἂν πρίαιο πέντε ἢ ἓξ μνῶν.

Care

ἐπιμέλεια (epimeleia)

Attention, care or sustained cultivation. The lover worries that attention to one activity will leave a person behind in all the rest. The noun identifies the investment through which expertise develops, not merely affection or a passing concern. The later demand that the philosopher manage his own household puts pressure on an ideal that avoids concentrated responsibility altogether.

Attestation. 136a: τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου ἐπιμέλειαν.

Carpenter

τέκτων (tektōn)

A carpenter or builder. Socrates gives the hypothetical price at which one could buy such a worker and contrasts it with the price of a top master builder. The language belongs to a social world where persons can be bought; it is not a modern salary quotation. The comparison is used to emphasise the much greater valuation of rare expertise.

Attestation. 135c: τέκτονα μὲν ἂν πρίαιο.

Carpentry

τεκτονική (tektonikē)

The craft of building or carpentry. Socrates uses it to test whether the lover's intellectual-manual distinction means the difference between an ordinary carpenter and an outstanding master builder. The ensuing price comparison makes high expertise rare and costly. The example presses the scale of what learning many crafts might require before the respondent retreats from exact mastery.

Attestation. 135b: ἐν τῇ τεκτονικῇ.

Certainly

πάνυ (pany)

Entirely or very much; in short answers, certainly or emphatically yes. The expanded formula here strongly affirms that philosophizing is fine. Its force is conversational commitment, not additional evidence. The educated lover repeatedly answers with confidence, and the subsequent questions test whether that confidence is supported by a coherent account of the thing he praises.

Attestation. 133b: Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Circle

κύκλος (kyklos)

A circle, here something the boys appear to draw. The plural objects belong with γράφειν and support Socrates' guess about their scientific discussion. The passage does not specify the surface, instruments or completed diagram. Read the noun together with the hand gestures and inclinations: these visible activities suggest geometrical or astronomical inquiry without disclosing its exact argument.

Attestation. 132b: κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν.

City

πόλις (polis)

A city or civic community, not merely a collection of buildings. The plural identifies the setting of unruly and lawbreaking people who fall under judicial correction. Later good civic ordering and assignments from the city extend the philosopher's responsibilities. The word carries an institutional community whose governance is at issue, while the dialogue supplies no particular city's constitutional arrangements here.

Attestation. 137d: τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

Claim

προσποιέομαι (prospoieomai)

To claim, profess or lay claim to being something. The contrast is between one man who does not claim verbal experience and another who claims to be wiser. The participle leaves distance between the narrator and the profession. Later labels such as 'the wiser one' inherit this dramatic context and should not automatically be read as Socrates' unqualified certification.

Attestation. 132d: τὸν δὲ σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον.

Clearly

σαφῶς (saphōs)

Clearly or distinctly. Socrates wants clear knowledge of what the lover is saying and turns from the flattering analogy to the question of usefulness. Later σαφέστερον promises a clearer test through the punishment examples. The comparative movement matters: clarity is something inquiry seeks through specified cases, not something guaranteed by emphatic speech, familiar imagery or an admired label.

Attestation. 136b: σαφῶς εἰδέναι.

Come, then

φέρε δή (phere dē)

A conversational summons to undertake the next step: come, then, let us find out. The imperative φέρε is idiomatic and does not ask anyone literally to carry an object. Joined with the hortatory γνῶμεν, it begins the concrete usefulness tests. The phrase marks a shift from agreeing to a description toward examining whether its consequences satisfy an admitted standard.

Attestation. 136c: Φέρε δὴ γνῶμεν.

Comely

ἐπιεικής (epieikēs)

Here attractive or comely, qualified explicitly by τὴν ἰδέαν, 'in looks'. The superlative describes those thought the most comely, and δοκοῦντας retains the element of reputation or appearance. Although the adjective can carry ethical senses elsewhere, this occurrence does not declare the boys morally best. Their appearance and esteemed parentage jointly establish their social attractiveness.

Attestation. 132a: τοὺς ἐπιεικεστάτους.

Companion

ἑταῖρος (hetairos)

A companion or associate, here a conversational address to the educated lover. It need not imply a formally established friendship or membership in a political association. The address softens the manner while Socrates presses a demanding conclusion about appearing second or third. The personal tone and the severity of the argumentative demand coexist rather than cancelling each other.

Attestation. 139a: ὦ ἑταῖρε.

Compel

προσαναγκάζω (prosanankazō)

To compel further or press someone into an additional admission. Socrates reports continuing to secure agreement that moderation benefits all other bodily matters too. The imperfect suggests the continuing pressure of the exchange. It describes argumentative constraint, not physical force; the reader should examine the sequence of admissions instead of assuming that pressure itself supplies a proof.

Attestation. 134d: προσηνάγκαζον αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν.

Concede

συγχωρέω (synchōreō)

To give way, allow or concede a proposition. Socrates asks the educated lover to concede that moderate rather than many or few exertions are beneficial. The verb can mark reluctant acceptance after pressure, not enthusiastic endorsement. Subsequent concessions keep the discussion moving, but readers should still inspect what has been accepted and whether the next inference preserves its scope.

Attestation. 134b: σὺ ἤδη συγχωρεῖς.

Concur

σύμφημι (symphēmi)

To say yes along with someone or concur. The reported imperfect records the lover's agreement that moderate rather than numerous subjects of learning benefit. Like other short assent verbs, it moves the discussion forward without adding a new reason. Its force should not be inflated into an independent demonstration that all possible forms of extensive learning have now been refuted.

Attestation. 134d: Συνέφη.

Consider

νομίζω (nomizō)

To regard, consider or hold something to be the case. The potential optative here forms the lover's declaration that he would not consider himself a man if he despised philosophy. It reports his evaluative standard, not an objective fact established by the discussion. Socrates next asks whether such evaluation can precede knowing what the evaluated activity is.

Attestation. 133b: νομίσαιμι ἐμαυτὸν εἶναι.

Contend

διαγωνίζομαι (diagōnizomai)

To compete or contend vigorously. The educated lover says he would gladly contest matters with his rival and could defend even a worse position against him. The potential optative advertises confidence in competitive performance. His contrast with honest agreement before Socrates reveals the danger of treating discussion as victory over a person rather than assessment of what one actually believes.

Attestation. 134c: διαγωνισαίμην.

Contest

ἀγωνία (agōnia)

Competition or the circumstances of a contest. The athletic setting supplies the comparison for a philosopher's relative performance among experts and ordinary participants. It echoes the earlier anxiety expressed by ἀγωνιᾶν, though the noun here locates an actual comparison of competitors. The likeness concerns ranked competence across events, not a proof that philosophical discussion should itself aim only at winning.

Attestation. 135e: ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ.

Contribute

συμβάλλομαι (symballomai)

To contribute something to a joint activity or discussion. The negative construction asks about being unable to add anything concerning what is said or done. This is the later spelling of the family printed ξυμβάλλεσθαι at 135d. The repeated requirement helps expose a mismatch if cultured competence is prized in ordinary crafts but not demanded in judging and governing.

Attestation. 138d: μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι μηδὲν.

Contribute a judgment

ξυμβάλλομαι (xymballomai)

To contribute or bring something to a common discussion; the object γνώμην specifies a judgment or considered view. Burnet prints ξυμβάλλεσθαι here, while the later reprise uses συμβάλλεσθαι. The difference in spelling does not create two separate capacities. The philosopher is expected to add an intelligent contribution, although the argument still must determine whether that amounts to useful expertise.

Attestation. 135d: ξυμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην.

Craft

τέχνη (technē)

A craft, art or organised competence in a particular activity. The lover's new account asks for familiarity with many crafts, especially their intellectual side. The dialogue then tests the distinction between a generalist and the person who actually possesses a craft. Later judgment and governance are also called crafts, so the word is broader than manual fabrication alone.

Attestation. 135b: τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος.

Craftsman

δημιουργός (dēmiourgos)

A practitioner of a craft or specialist worker. The lover wants the philosopher to follow the practitioner's explanations better than other listeners and contribute intelligently. In the usefulness argument the actual craft-holder becomes the preferred source of help. The word need not mean only a manual labourer: the examples include medical and navigational competence as well as productive crafts.

Attestation. 135d: ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ.

Decent

χρηστός (chrēstos)

Good, sound, serviceable or decent, depending on the kind being judged. The adjective applies first to animals and then to human beings. The edition retains 'decent' and notes its relation to χρήσιμος, useful. That kinship helps the argument's vocabulary cohere but does not erase the difference between being useful for a task and having the human ethical quality at issue.

Attestation. 137c: τοὺς χρηστοὺς.

Decide

διακρίνω (diakrinō)

To separate, settle or decide, here a matter assigned by the city. Paired with δικάζειν, it concerns adjudicative action. It must be distinguished from διαγιγνώσκω, recognising or distinguishing the quality of people. The argument connects discernment and decision through a common expertise, but the verbs still name different aspects: judging what someone is and settling what should be done.

Attestation. 138e: διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν.

Deed

ἔργον (ergon)

A deed, work or action, contrasted here with words. Socrates credits the athlete with claiming experience in actions rather than verbal discussion. The contrast describes the man's self-presentation and chosen pursuit; it is not yet a verdict that bodily doing lacks knowledge. Indeed his practical experience soon supplies a correction that the verbally confident lover must accept.

Attestation. 132d: ἀλλὰ περὶ ἔργων.

Delphi

Δελφοί (delphoi)

Delphi, the place of the inscription invoked in the self-knowledge discussion. The dative plural follows ἐν. The edition's note identifies the inscription as 'Know thyself' at Apollo's temple, but those imperative Greek words are not quoted in the dialogue's running text. The allusion supports Socrates' interpretation; it does not make the full justice-temperance identification the inscription's explicit wording.

Attestation. 138a: τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα.

Desire

ἐπιθυμέω (epithymeō)

To desire or aim at obtaining something. Socrates asks whether lovers of exercise desire anything beyond the good condition of their bodies. The admitted end then supplies the standard for assessing exertion. The verb is not automatically a term for irrational appetite here: it names an intelligible practical aim whose means may be appropriate or excessive.

Attestation. 133e: ἄλλου του ἐπιθυμεῖν.

Dionysius

Διονύσιος (dionysios)

The writing-master whose premises provide the setting. His name is in the genitive after εἰς: Socrates goes into Dionysius' place, with the word for school left understood. He never speaks in the dialogue. The edition's note connects him with Diogenes Laertius' report about Plato's teacher; that identification comes from the note's external source, not from the narrated scene itself.

Attestation. 132a: Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ.

Discern in

ἐνοράω (enoraō)

To see or discern something in something else. Socrates asks whether the respondent sees the quality under discussion as peculiar to philosophy. The verb retains a figurative perceptual force within an intellectual question. It asks what the lover recognises in the pursuit, but the subsequent analogy tests that recognition rather than treating his confident 'seeing' as independent evidence.

Attestation. 133d: ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τι τοῦτο ἴδιον ἐνορᾷς.

Disgrace

ὄνειδος (oneidos)

A reproach or disgrace, something treated as grounds for blame. Socrates says he thought earnest absorption in crafts carried such a reproach and led people to be called menial. The social judgment belongs to his transition away from the generalist model. Its presence should be acknowledged without converting the surrounding cultural prejudice into a neutral definition of skilled work.

Attestation. 137b: καὶ ὄνειδος εἶναι τοῦτο.

Dispute

ἔρις (eris)

A quarrel or dispute. The genitive follows the participle meaning to stop: the lads cease their argument and listen to the adults. It names their earlier scientific disagreement, whose content remains unrecovered. The noun helps distinguish the transfer of attention from the completion of a successful demonstration; their dispute stops because another conversation becomes more compelling, not because it has been resolved.

Attestation. 133a: παυσαμένω τῆς ἔριδος.

Dispute a claim

ἀμφισβητέω (amphisbēteō)

To dispute, challenge or contest a claim. The respondent says nobody would contest preferring the doctor both rather and first. The potential construction expresses confident consensus about that choice. It does not independently settle the stronger proposition that the philosopher can contribute nothing: the uncontroversial preference becomes a premise in a more contestable generalisation about usefulness.

Attestation. 136d: Οὐδεὶς ἄν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἀμφισβητήσειεν.

Distinguish

διαγιγνώσκω (diagignōskō)

To distinguish, discriminate or recognise the difference between kinds or conditions. The improving craft is said also to distinguish decent from worthless people. Later this capacity is directed toward oneself and others in the account of temperance. Distinguishing quality is a cognitive task; the claim that it belongs to the same knowledge as rightful punishment is an argumentative identification, not the verb's definition.

Attestation. 137d: διαγιγνώσκουσαν τοὺς χρηστούς τε καὶ μοχθηρούς.

Do wrong

ἀδικέω (adikeō)

To act unjustly or do wrong. The article and participle form the class 'wrongdoers', whose payment of penalties is connected with civic order. The word shares the justice family without determining every case of wrongdoing in advance. The claim concerns rightly administered correction within the argument; it should not be read as approval of every actual punishment imposed by a city.

Attestation. 138b: οἱ ἀδικοῦντες.

Doctor

ἰατρός (iatros)

A physician or doctor. Along with the trainer, the doctor is recognised as competent to judge appropriate bodily exertion and food. At 136c illness makes the comparison concrete: the doctor is preferred to the philosophical generalist. The example establishes a recognised expert for a particular need, not the claim that physicians are automatically authorities over the entire good life.

Attestation. 134e: ἰατρὸν ἢ παιδοτρίβην.

Dog

κύων (kyōn)

A dog; κύνας is the accusative plural. Dogs provide a second animal case for the proposed unity of improving and punishing correctly. At 137e a dog is imagined as a member of its kind who might fail to know itself. The changing role is important: an expert handler's knowledge of dogs and a dog's self-knowledge are not simply the same subject.

Attestation. 137c: κύνας οὐχ οἳ βελτίστους.

Drachma

δραχμή (drachmē)

A monetary unit. Socrates says a top master builder could not be bought even for ten thousand drachmas, contrasted with five or six minae for a carpenter. The edition explains the relation of the units. The large difference dramatises rare expertise; it should not be silently turned into an exact modern monetary value or a claim about contemporary architectural fees.

Attestation. 135c: μυρίων δραχμῶν.

Draw

γράφω (graphō)

To mark, draw or write; here 'draw', because its object is circles. The infinitive depends on the appearance-verb: they appeared to be drawing. The same family later supplies γράμμα, the inscription at Delphi, but the local object controls the sense. There is no basis for translating this occurrence as writing an account or copying a philosophical text.

Attestation. 132b: κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν.

Earnestness

σπουδή (spoudē)

Serious attention, zeal or earnestness directed toward something. Socrates asks what great and fine object has attracted so much of it. Later earnest care concerns a sick friend, while earnestness about crafts comes under criticism. The noun therefore names intensity of concern, not automatic approval of its object; whether that object deserves the attention is precisely what inquiry must determine.

Attestation. 132b: τοσαύτην σπουδὴν.

Educated

παιδεύω (paideuō)

To educate or train; the perfect passive participle means a person who has been educated. Joined with 'free', it describes the lover's ideal of cultured competence without specialist precision. The completed formation implied by the perfect is a social and educational claim, not proof that its possessor can answer every question. The dialogue tests what this cultivated person is actually able to contribute.

Attestation. 135d: πεπαιδευμένον.

Elbow

ἀγκών (ankōn)

An elbow. The dative specifies the instrument of Socrates' nudge, not the part of the lover's body he touches. This small detail presents the inquiry as arising from a casual encounter among seated companions. It also prepares the later description of the athlete as needing to be nudged back into a discussion that Socrates had initially directed elsewhere.

Attestation. 132b: τῷ ἀγκῶνι.

Enter

εἰσέρχομαι (eiserchomai)

To go or come into a place. Here the first-person aorist opens Socrates' retrospective narrative: he entered Dionysius' establishment and saw the company there. The movement establishes an encounter rather than an arranged lesson. The form is built on the aorist stem ἐλθ-, so it should be looked up under εἰσέρχομαι rather than treated as an independent verb.

Attestation. 132a: εἰσῆλθον.

Entrust

ἐπιτρέπω (epitrepō)

To entrust, commit or place under another's charge. On the storm-tossed ship, one commits oneself and one's possessions to the pilot rather than the philosopher. The family returns for household management and friends' arbitrations at 138e. Those repetitions change the issue from choosing the best helper to accepting responsibilities in which the philosopher must himself exercise sound judgment.

Attestation. 136d: ἐπιτρέποις σαυτόν τε καὶ τὰ σεαυτοῦ.

Esteemed

εὐδόκιμος (eudokimos)

Well regarded or of good reputation. Here it characterises the youths' fathers, making family esteem part of the opening social scene. The word belongs to the broad field of public judgment that later becomes explicit in δόξα, reputation for philosophy. It does not prove that inherited prestige gives either the boys or their admirers the knowledge being sought.

Attestation. 132a: πατέρων εὐδοκίμων.

Event

ἆθλον (athlon)

A contest, event or prize, according to context; here the specialists' own competitive events. The pentathletes fall short relative to these particular activities, not in every imaginable respect. The phrase limits the comparison that generates the runner-up model. Translating it solely as a prize would obscure the relevant performances against which the competitors are being ranked.

Attestation. 135e: κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἆθλα.

Exercise

γυμνάσιον (gymnasion)

An exercise or training activity here, with the plural used in the discussion of exertion and fitness. Although the noun can elsewhere denote a training place, this argument concerns exercises and their amount. At 134c moderate γυμνάσια produce good condition. Reading it only as a building would obscure the analogy between quantities of exertion and quantities of learning.

Attestation. 133e: ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις.

Experience

ἐμπειρία (empeiria)

Experience or practical familiarity in a domain, here physical training. Socrates appeals to it when the educated lover assumes many exertions must be beneficial. The genitive specifies what the experience concerns. The episode credits situated competence without making its possessor an expert in every subject, precisely the distinction that will later pressure the generalist account of philosophy.

Attestation. 134a: τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς γυμναστικῆς.

Experienced

ἔμπειρος (empeiros)

Experienced or familiar with something, commonly specified by περί. Socrates distinguishes experience in words from experience in deeds; the later definition asks the philosopher to appear experienced in all crafts. Experience is consequently a claim needing a domain and a standard. Mere familiarity, the ability to follow speech and exact possession of a craft are not treated as identical.

Attestation. 132d: περὶ λόγων ἔμπειρος εἶναι.

Fall short

λείπομαι (leipomai)

To be left behind, fall short or be inferior to someone. The pentathletes fall short of specialists in their respective events. The comparative relation needs both the people and the domain supplied by the context. It is not an assertion of complete worthlessness: the generalists still outperform other athletes, which is why the lover initially accepts the image as complimentary.

Attestation. 135e: τούτων μὲν λείπονται.

Fall silent

σιγάω (sigaō)

To be silent or stop speaking. The dual aorist marks the boys' cessation of their dispute as they become listeners. The same verb describes the educated lover's final silence at 139a. The repeated action reverses the scene's roles: the boys initially yield the floor, whereas the confident adult eventually has no further reply after his account is examined.

Attestation. 133a: ἐσιγησάτην.

Far from

πολλοῦ δεῖ (pollou dei)

An idiom meaning to be far from something, with πολλοῦ expressing the extent of the shortfall. Socrates concludes that philosophizing is far from being either much learning or preoccupation with crafts. The negative force rejects the proposed definitions. It should not be weakened to 'not both', nor expanded into an explicit positive definition that the concluding sentence does not actually give.

Attestation. 139a: Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ.

Farmer

γεωργός (geōrgos)

A cultivator or farmer, identified as the appropriate judge of moderate sowing. The familiar craft provides an analogy for a yet-unidentified educational competence. The speakers' agreement is easy in the literal agricultural case, which sharpens their shared perplexity about the soul. The noun names a domain-specific practitioner; it does not supply the missing educational expert by itself.

Attestation. 134e: τὸν γεωργὸν.

Father

πατήρ (patēr)

A father or male parent; the genitive plural here describes the youths as coming from esteemed fathers. The social qualification accompanies their good looks rather than supplying a claim about their own learning. The passage offers no names or biographies of these fathers. Its concern is the standing of the young people before whom the rivals subsequently perform.

Attestation. 132a: πατέρων εὐδοκίμων.

Few; little

ὀλίγος (oligos)

Few in number or little in amount. The educated lover objects that few exertions could not yield bodily fitness. The athlete's correction introduces moderate exertion, and Socrates later excludes both many and few as automatic guarantees of benefit. Thus the alternative to indiscriminate abundance is not simply minimal effort; it is the amount appropriate to the intended good.

Attestation. 134a: ἀπό γε ὀλίγων πόνων.

Fight it out

διαμάχομαι (diamachomai)

To contest or fight a matter through. Socrates asks whether the rival will keep fighting against the two of them over the argument. The present form puts continuing resistance in view. This verbal struggle parallels the athletic setting but concerns a proposition about training, so conceding a sound point need not mean conceding general personal inferiority to the athlete.

Attestation. 134b: ἢ διαμάχῃ.

Fine

καλός (kalos)

Beautiful, fine or admirable, according to the object praised. The opening applies it to an apparently worthwhile pursuit, while the young and beautiful later exemplify its visual sense. Philosophy's fineness is affirmed before its nature is established. Socrates subsequently distinguishes being fine from being good, so the word should not erase that argumentative distinction by always becoming 'beneficial'.

Attestation. 132b: μέγα τι καὶ καλόν.

First; initially

πρῶτος (prōtos)

First in order or rank; the neuter accusative phrase here means 'at first'. Socrates distinguishes his initial favourable impression from his later reconsideration. Elsewhere first place is competitive rank, and the final household obligation is introduced first in a sequence. The local construction decides the sense; a chronological 'first' need not assert superiority or greatest importance.

Attestation. 133c: τὸ μὲν πρῶτον.

Follow

ἐπακολουθέω (epakoloutheō)

To follow after or keep up with, here to follow what a craftsman says. The dative identifies the statements followed. The educated lover takes superior conversational comprehension as evidence of philosophical cultivation. At 138d the closely related ἕπεσθαι returns in the same test for medicine and governance, where merely following may no longer satisfy the responsibilities under discussion.

Attestation. 135d: ἐπακολουθῆσαί τε τοῖς λεγομένοις.

Follow a discussion

ἕπομαι (hepomai)

To follow or go along with, here to understand and keep up with what is being said. The middle infinitive returns to the capacity earlier expressed by ἐπακολουθῆσαι. This is a receptive competence, paired with contributing. The question does not yet say that following alone makes one an expert; its force is to prevent exempting ethical and political matters from even that minimum.

Attestation. 138d: μήθ’ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις.

Food

σιτίον (sition)

Food or provisions, commonly in the plural. Socrates extends the agreed need for moderate exertion to eating, and the lover agrees. The example is deliberately ordinary and bodily before the move to the soul. Its function is not to supply a dietary quantity but to reinforce the distinction between beneficial measure and simple abundance in things given to a recipient.

Attestation. 134c: τὰ σιτία.

For

γάρ (gar)

An explanatory particle, usually 'for' or 'because'. Here it opens the aside explaining how Socrates could nudge the lover: he was seated beside him. The particle often looks backward to justify or clarify what precedes. It should not automatically be treated as introducing a formal proof; in this narrative its explanation can be spatial, motivational or argumentative.

Attestation. 132b: καθήμην γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἐραστὴν.

Free

ἐλεύθερος (eleutheros)

Free, especially free rather than enslaved. The substantive plural sets the social standard for which parts of crafts the philosopher should learn. At 135d the ideal person is free and educated. This is a status-laden distinction within the lover's proposal, not a modern assertion of intellectual freedom for everyone; the rejection of manual labour must be read in that setting.

Attestation. 135b: τοῖς ἐλευθέροις.

Friend

φίλος (philos)

A friend or person dear to someone. The example adds a cared-for friend's illness to one's own, preventing the choice of expert from seeming merely self-interested. Later friends entrust arbitrations to the philosopher. The noun thus links personal concern with responsibility, but the dialogue gives no named friends or detailed relationships beyond the hypothetical cases used in argument.

Attestation. 136c: τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σῶν.

Full

μεστός (mestos)

Full of something, with a genitive specifying the contents. The speakers are figuratively full of perplexity, an expressive reversal after their confident agreements about moderation. The adjective emphasises that the difficulty is shared rather than confined to the embarrassed lover. It gives no positive definition of philosophy, but marks the point where the existing route ceases to provide an answer.

Attestation. 135a: ἀπορίας μεστοὶ.

Go through

διέρχομαι (dierchomai)

To go through, traverse or review. The perfect here refers to the roles just discussed, such as judge and ruler. It marks the present question as a return to the preceding list rather than the introduction of an unrelated subject. Recognising the backward reference helps track how the ending applies the newly unified governing competence to the proposed philosopher.

Attestation. 138d: ὧν νυνδὴ διεληλύθαμεν.

Good

ἀγαθός (agathos)

Good, beneficial or excellent, with scope set by the object under discussion. Socrates asks whether philosophy is good as well as fine, opening the test of its benefit. Later good people are said to be useful. The passage moves between evaluation of a pursuit and of its practitioners, so those shifts should be tracked rather than silently treated as identical propositions.

Attestation. 133d: ἢ καὶ ἀγαθόν.

Good condition

εὐεξία (euexia)

Good bodily condition or fitness. The noun states the beneficial result that moderate exercises produce and condenses the earlier phrase εὖ ἔχειν. It is an outcome to be secured, not a synonym for the exertions used to secure it. That separation of end and means makes possible the criticism of excessive training and, by analogy, indiscriminate learning.

Attestation. 134c: τὴν εὐεξίαν.

Great

μέγας (megas)

Great, large or important. Paired with καλόν here, it evaluates the imagined object of the boys' concentration rather than its physical size. The athlete repeats the pair incredulously before dismissing their discussion. The final concern with 'matters so great' at 138d likewise concerns importance; greatness in this dialogue calls for judgment about an activity's worth.

Attestation. 132b: μέγα τι καὶ καλόν.

Greek

Ἕλλην (hellēn)

A Greek person; the substantive plural gives the population among whom exceptionally skilled master builders would be few. The phrase broadens the scarcity claim beyond the immediate company or one city. It does not name a single political state equivalent to modern Greece. Its argumentative point is the rarity of top expertise even across a wide cultural community.

Attestation. 135c: ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι.

Grow old

γηράσκω (gēraskō)

To grow old or age. In Solon's quoted first-person line, aging proceeds alongside continual learning. The educated lover uses the line to support learning in youth and old age alike. Its temporal breadth should be separated from the stronger quantitative claim he develops: that the aspiring philosopher should accumulate as many subjects as possible over a lifetime.

Attestation. 133c: γηράσκω δ’ αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

Guess

τοπάζω (topazō)

To conjecture or make a guess. Socrates asks for their best estimate of the kinds of subjects the philosopher should learn after rejecting all or many indiscriminately. The verb keeps the new proposal provisional. The edition notes a mixed printed reading in the surrounding phrase's manuscript evidence; that editorial detail concerns the printed arrangement of the question, not the provisional force of the verb.

Attestation. 135a: μάλιστα ἄττα τοπάζομεν.

Gymnastics

γυμναστική (gymnastikē)

The practice or expertise of physical training. It distinguishes the athletic lover's established pursuit from his rival's music and letters. Initially dismissed as merely bodily, its experiential knowledge becomes decisive when appropriate exertion is considered. The dialogue does not reject gymnastics; it uses the athlete's competence to test whether quantity alone can make an activity beneficial.

Attestation. 132d: περὶ γυμναστικήν.

Hand

χείρ (cheir)

A hand; the dual dative means 'with the two hands'. The form marks the means by which the boys mime inclinations, alongside the dual participle for tilting. Bodily demonstration belongs to the opening scientific scene itself. It therefore complicates any simple division in which intellectual activity consists only of speech and all physical movement belongs to the athletic lover.

Attestation. 132b: τοῖν χεροῖν.

Handiwork

χειρουργία (cheirourgia)

Manual work or work done with the hands. The genitive depends on the understood relation expressed by ἔχεται in the preceding clause: the lover excludes what belongs to manual execution. The contrast carries social assumptions about free men's education. It is his selection principle, not an established finding that bodily performance never involves understanding or contributes to knowledge.

Attestation. 135b: μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας.

Happen to

τυγχάνω (tynchanō)

With a supplementary participle, to happen to be doing something or in fact be doing it. The dual imperfect ἐτυγχανέτην accompanies ἐρίζοντε: two lads were engaged in a dispute when Socrates arrived. The idiom need not imply chance in a strong philosophical sense. It supplies circumstantial narrative information before Socrates begins questioning either admirer.

Attestation. 132a: ἐτυγχανέτην οὖν δύο τῶν μειρακίων ἐρίζοντε.

Harshly

χαλεπῶς (chalepōs)

Harshly, severely or unfriendly in manner. Socrates asks why the athlete speaks so harshly about philosophizing. The adverb evaluates the way the criticism is expressed while the preceding question probes its content. Keeping those questions separate preserves Socrates' opening move: he neither simply condemns the speaker's manners nor already proves that philosophy must be admirable.

Attestation. 132c: οὕτως χαλεπῶς λέγεις.

Have one's neck twisted

τραχηλίζομαι (trachēlizomai)

To have one's neck gripped or bent in wrestling. The middle-passive participle belongs to the educated lover's caricature of the athlete's whole life. The edition cautions against an English rendering suggesting a fatal broken neck. The athletic sense also prepares the retort about the rival's 'unrubbed neck' at 134b: the insults mirror each other's bodily stereotypes.

Attestation. 132c: τραχηλιζόμενος.

Health

ὑγεία (hygeia)

Health, the desired outcome in the illness example. The infinitive of acquiring it makes the practical aim explicit. Judging the competing helpers against that end brings the doctor ahead of the generalist. The example does not supply medical advice; it uses a familiar domain where expertise and a recognisable benefit can be connected more readily than philosophy's distinctive task.

Attestation. 136c: ὑγείαν βουλόμενος κτήσασθαι.

Hear

ἀκούω (akouō)

To hear or listen to. Here the rival hears Socrates questioning and the athlete answering; the genitive participles specify the activity heard. His intervention grows out of this overheard exchange, not a direct invitation. The verb's ordinary perceptual sense matters because the dialogue repeatedly changes when people hear: the lads cease their own dispute, and the lover deliberately projects his voice.

Attestation. 132c: ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ τε ἐρομένου.

Hear clearly

κατακούω (katakouō)

To hear distinctly or catch what is being said. Socrates' negative qualification means he could not quite make out the boys' topic; it limits the certainty of his subsequent guess. At 133b the same verb describes the beloved hearing a deliberately loud answer. The contrast is between imperfect access to another discussion and speech designed to reach an audience.

Attestation. 132a: οὐ σφόδρα κατήκουον.

Help

βοηθέω (boētheō)

To come to someone's aid or support. Socrates asks for the athlete's help because of his experience in gymnastics. At 134c the rival claims he could defend a poor position against the athlete. The same helping verb can therefore serve truth-directed correction or competitive defense; the object helped and the speaker's aim determine the character of the assistance.

Attestation. 134a: ἵνα μοι βοηθήσῃ.

Homer

Ὅμηρος (homēros)

The poet invoked for the story of the suitors and the bow. Socrates uses the literary reference to expose embarrassment at being outdone by an unexpected competitor. The exact episode and its wider circumstances are supplied in the edition's note. Within the dialogue the allusion functions as teasing comparison, not as an authority defining the right subjects of philosophical education.

Attestation. 135a: ὥσπερ ἔφη τοὺς μνηστῆρας Ὅμηρος.

Horse

ἵππος (hippos)

A horse. Horses begin the new sequence about the competence that improves, punishes and recognises good or bad members of a kind. Later the argument imagines being a horse oneself, a significant shift from being its knowledgeable handler. Keeping those roles distinct prevents the move toward self-knowledge from seeming automatically established by the initial animal-training example.

Attestation. 137b: τίνες ἵππους ἐπίστανται.

House; household

οἰκία (oikia)

A house or household. Here it is the place into which one might bring a helper during illness; later it is the organised household the philosopher must govern responsibly. The sense expands with the action: entering a building and ordering a domestic community are not identical activities. The repeated noun joins practical dependence on expertise to obligations one cannot simply delegate away.

Attestation. 136c: εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν.

Household manager

οἰκονόμος (oikonomos)

A person who manages a household. Socrates assigns this name to the single man who orders a household rightly and then asks whether he does so by justice. The role concerns an organised domestic community, not just financial bookkeeping. It supplies the immediate responsibility through which the ending challenges the philosopher's willingness to remain a runner-up in every field.

Attestation. 138c: οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης.

Household-management craft

οἰκονομική (oikonomikē)

The craft of household management, one of the capacities gathered into the proposed single knowledge. It is broader than modern economics and is not simply household budgeting. The earlier doctor enters a house as an outside specialist; the ending insists that the philosopher cannot permanently outsource this governing responsibility when it concerns his own household's good order.

Attestation. 138c: δεσποτική, οἰκονομική, δικαιοσύνη.

However; though

μέντοι (mentoi)

A particle marking qualification, contrast or renewed insistence, often 'though' or 'however'. Socrates could not hear clearly, yet the boys appeared to be discussing the named thinkers. The contrast preserves his limited evidence. Later the lover uses it when distinguishing what he will say to his rival from what he will concede to Socrates, making the change of addressee explicit.

Attestation. 132a: ἐφαινέσθην μέντοι.

Imitate

μιμέομαι (mimeomai)

To imitate, represent or mime. The boys are representing inclinations through movements of their hands. The imperfect describes their continuing activity as Socrates observes them. This is practical demonstration rather than an assertion about an artistic theory of imitation; their gesture supplies evidence for the narrator's impression of the discussion's subject without giving him its spoken content.

Attestation. 132b: ἐμιμοῦντο.

Immoderate

ἄμετρος (ametros)

Unmeasured or immoderate, opposed to μέτριος. Socrates contrasts moderate and immoderate provisions for the soul after discussing many and few bodily provisions. The shift matters: a question about the proper measure replaces a merely numerical opposition. The adjective does not by itself specify whether a provision is excessive, insufficient or otherwise inappropriate; that requires a competent standard.

Attestation. 134d: τὰ ἄμετρα τῶν προσφερομένων.

Impossible

ἀδύνατος (adynatos)

Impossible or beyond someone's ability. Socrates asks whether learning even two crafts to the proposed high standard would be impossible for one person, let alone many. The statement belongs to a question reported in indirect form. It pressures the interpretation of the lover's claim rather than offering a quantified study of every person's learning capacity or every possible pair of crafts.

Attestation. 135c: εἰ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἴη.

In common

εἰς κοινόν (eis koinon)

To the company or into common discussion. Socrates presents his question as open to the assembled group, even though he physically nudged one lover. The phrase makes the rival's intervention legitimate without granting his claim to superior wisdom. It marks a question's shared setting, not a doctrine of common property or an assertion that every person has already answered.

Attestation. 132d: Εἰς κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐρώτημα ἠρόμην.

In moderation

μετρίως (metriōs)

Moderately or with measure. The adverb deliberately recalls the moderate exertions, food and learning of the earlier argument. Here the lover applies it to broad acquaintance with all crafts. The recurrence does not prove that this new programme supplies the earlier missing educational measure: neither the right subjects nor an expert judge of their benefit has thereby been established.

Attestation. 136b: πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι.

Inclination

ἔγκλισις (enklisis)

A tilting or inclination, here represented with the boys' hands. The indefinite τινάς leaves the exact inclinations unspecified. The edition suggests a circle tilted against another as a plausible astronomical interpretation, not an explicitly named doctrine. Preserving this uncertainty lets the reader see how little Socrates initially knows about the conversation he is about to replace.

Attestation. 132b: ἐγκλίσεις τινὰς.

Indicate

ἐνδείκνυμι (endeiknymi)

To indicate, point out or display. Here the lover points toward his rival while declaring his disdain for anyone who thinks philosophy shameful. At 136a Socrates uses the same family for the kind of philosopher the proposed account indicates. Context separates a visible gesture directed at a person from an account's indication of a type of person.

Attestation. 133b: ἐνδεικνύμενος εἰς τὸν ἀντεραστήν.

Inscription

γράμμα (gramma)

A written mark, text or inscription; here the famous writing at Delphi. Socrates explains what it urges rather than quoting its actual wording. The edition supplies that identification in a note. Distinguishing allusion from direct quotation prevents a reader from attributing the dialogue's expanded command to practise both virtues to the inscribed words themselves without qualification.

Attestation. 138a: τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα.

Ironically

εἰρωνικῶς (eirōnikōs)

Ironically or dissemblingly in speech. The narrator applies it to the educated lover's two different answers: neither fine nor good when addressing his rival, both when addressing Socrates. This is not a blanket label for Socrates' method. The local example shows social hostility producing a knowingly divided response even when the question's substantive content remains the same.

Attestation. 133d: καὶ μάλα εἰρωνικῶς.

Judge

δικαστής (dikastēs)

A judge, here an example of someone discussing matters of civic or ethical significance. The noun names a person, unlike δικαστική, the judicial competence earlier equated with justice. Socrates asks whether inability to follow or contribute in such a discussion could be acceptable. The word alone does not certify that every actual judge possesses the correct knowledge the argument requires.

Attestation. 138d: ὅταν δὲ δικαστὴς ἢ βασιλεὺς.

Judge rightly

δικάζω (dikazō)

To judge, decide a case or exercise judicial judgment. The participle here specifies how the philosopher himself must punish: by judging rightly. The activity is not reducible to issuing any decision, nor does the necessity of acting guarantee competence. It connects the earlier judicial knowledge with a concrete obligation to order one's own household well.

Attestation. 138e: αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς.

Judgment

γνώμη (gnōmē)

A judgment, considered view or opinion offered in discussion. The educated person should contribute one of his own when crafts are discussed. This differs from δόξα as public reputation and from institutional judging later expressed by δικάζειν. A contribution can be perceptive without settling the technical decision; its practical authority remains the point tested by the ensuing examples.

Attestation. 135d: ξυμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην.

Judicial craft

δικαστική (dikastikē)

The judicial art or knowledge, with the feminine adjective taking its substantive force from the surrounding discussion of ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη. Socrates names it as the competence that punishes wrongdoers rightly. He then identifies it with justice. The adjective denotes the proposed expertise, not simply the existence of courts or a guarantee that every person called a judge possesses it.

Attestation. 137d: οὐχ ἡ δικαστική.

Just person

δίκαιος (dikaios)

Just or possessing justice. The adjective here is substantival in a list of persons whose correct activities are assigned to one knowledge. It should be distinguished from δικαίως, 'justly', used earlier of consulting an appropriate expert. The dialogue's equivalence of the just person with other competent rulers is a philosophical claim, not a licence to call every actual ruler just.

Attestation. 138c: σώφρων, δίκαιος.

Justice

δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosynē)

Justice, identified here with the knowledge that punishes rightly and distinguishes human quality. The later argument makes it identical with temperance and governing crafts. Those are substantial claims within the dialogue, not meanings automatically built into the noun. A reading should keep the proposed unity in view while recognising that alternative dimensions of justice are not separately examined in this short exchange.

Attestation. 137d: καὶ δικαιοσύνην.

Justly; properly

δικαίως (dikaiōs)

Justly, rightly or with proper warrant. Here it qualifies asking the appropriate expert about moderate bodily provisions or learning. The question is whom it is reasonable to consult, not yet the institutional administration of justice. The later δικαιοσύνη argument makes the word-family important, but the ordinary use at this stage should not be retroactively converted into a complete theory of justice.

Attestation. 134e: δικαίως ἐροίμεθα.

King

βασιλεύς (basileus)

A king or royal ruler. Socrates places the king beside the tyrant when naming a single person who correctly orders a city. The subsequent argument identifies the relevant ruling craft with justice and other capacities. The title itself does not certify competence, and the edition points out that a comparison with the Statesman reveals distinctions the present dialogue does not make.

Attestation. 138b: τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς.

Kingly craft

βασιλική (basilikē)

The royal or kingly craft, here in the dative as the means by which the ruler governs. The feminine adjective agrees with τέχνῃ. It is incorporated into the argument's single governing knowledge, rather than defined through hereditary succession or court institutions. The important condition is correct ordering, which must not be lost when translating the name of the role.

Attestation. 138b: βασιλικῇ τε καὶ τυραννικῇ τέχνῃ.

Know

οἶδα (oida)

To know, with εἰδέναι as its infinitive and forms such as οἶσθα in questions. Socrates asks whether one can know a thing's value without knowing what it is. Although historically perfect in form, the verb commonly has present meaning. Here knowledge is distinguished from confident praise, making the demand for an account prior to the dispute about quantity of learning.

Attestation. 133b: εἰδέναι πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν.

Know how

ἐπίσταμαι (epistamai)

To know or know how, often with an infinitive specifying the competent action. Here the infinitive 'punish rightly' follows into 137c, making practical expertise explicit. Earlier the philosopher's exact knowledge of crafts was questioned. The verb can connect understanding with successful performance, but the kind and standard of knowledge still depend on its complement and the argument's accepted assumptions.

Attestation. 137b: τίνες ἵππους ἐπίστανται.

Knowledge

ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

Knowledge or an organised competence. Socrates asks which knowledge rightly punishes lawbreakers in cities and identifies it with the judicial craft. The noun is close in local function to τέχνη, yet the passage does not explicitly develop a general distinction between theoretical science and practical skill. Its important claim is that right judgment depends on a knowable competence rather than mere office-holding.

Attestation. 137d: Τίς οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη.

Knowledgeable

ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

Knowledgeable or possessed of knowledge. Socrates uses the plural in recapitulating the lover's account of philosophy as knowledge about crafts in a specified manner. The qualification 'in the way you mean' is essential: the condemned account is the accepted generalist model, not every possible possession of craft knowledge. The adjective alone does not imply specialist precision or practical authority.

Attestation. 137a: περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι.

Labour

πόνος (ponos)

Labour, effort or exertion, here especially the labours of training. The plural allows comparison of many, few and moderate amounts. The athlete's intervention rejects simple maximisation in favour of what produces fitness. The word can carry hardship, but this passage assesses exertion by its beneficial measure rather than condemning labour merely because it is difficult or uncomfortable.

Attestation. 133e: οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι.

Labour thoroughly

διαπονέω (diaponeō)

To labour at thoroughly or work something out with effort. The perfect infinitive describes intensive work the proposed philosopher has not devoted to any single field. The lover presents this restraint as protection against neglecting other pursuits. The verb connects depth of training with a cost in breadth, but the argument still must determine whether that trade-off produces a useful kind of competence.

Attestation. 136a: μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι.

Lad

μειράκιον (meirakion)

A lad or adolescent youth. The opening selects two from the young company, and the Greek repeatedly uses dual forms for their actions. They begin as disputants and become listeners when the adults take up philosophy. Their laughter later exposes the stakes of the lovers' rivalry; they are not merely background decoration or identified pupils of either man.

Attestation. 132a: δύο τῶν μειρακίων.

Laugh at

ἐπιγελάω (epigelaō)

To laugh at or in response to something. The boys' laughter follows their delight at the athlete's insult. The singular verb goes with the neuter plural subject understood from the preceding clause. It records a public reaction to wit, not a formal assent to every premise; that distinction matters when the educated lover then tries to preserve his standing while conceding.

Attestation. 134b: καὶ ἐπεγέλασεν.

Lay hold of

ἐφάπτομαι (ephaptomai)

To touch, engage with or lay hold of something, taking the genitive. The perfect infinitive describes having engaged with all pursuits moderately. The image stresses range without exhaustive mastery. Its breadth can sound attractive, but the usefulness test asks whether such acquaintance provides a needed capacity when someone who possesses the relevant craft is available to act.

Attestation. 136b: πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι.

Lead

ἡγέομαι (hēgeomai)

To lead or take the leading position. The ending contrasts it with appearing second or third in entrusted matters. Earlier the same verb commonly means think or regard, so the local construction and competitive contrast determine the change in sense. The demand is for responsible primacy in judgment, not merely a strong private opinion about what philosophy should be.

Attestation. 139a: καὶ μὴ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι.

Learn

μανθάνω (manthanō)

To learn or come to know through learning. The educated lover says the would-be philosopher should always be learning at least one thing, so as to learn as much as possible. Socrates tests the quantity and kind of learning required. The verb names acquisition, not by itself the achieved mastery, judgment or proper use of everything acquired.

Attestation. 133c: ἕν γέ τι μανθάνειν.

Learn much

πολυμαθέω (polymatheō)

To learn many things or engage in extensive learning. The participle returns verbally to πολυμαθία, the first proposed definition of philosophy. Socrates denies that this alone identifies philosophizing and points instead toward something else. The negative is directed at a proposed account of the activity; the passage does not provide a numerical limit beyond which every kind of learning becomes harmful.

Attestation. 137b: οὐδὲ πολυμαθοῦντα.

Let alone

μὴ ὅτι (mē hoti)

An idiom meaning let alone or not to mention. Socrates asks whether one man could master even two crafts in the demanding sense proposed, let alone many important ones. The expression orders claims by difficulty rather than adding an independent negation of the following words. It intensifies the challenge that prompts the lover to deny requiring specialist precision.

Attestation. 135c: μὴ ὅτι πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας.

Let go

ἀφίημι (aphiēmi)

To release, let go or leave someone aside. Socrates decides to stop questioning the first lover because he does not claim experience in words. This is a conversational release, not departure from the school: the athlete remains nearby and is recalled at 134a. The choice makes the man claiming greater wisdom responsible for defending philosophy's value.

Attestation. 132d: τὸν μὲν ἕτερον ἀφιέναι.

Life

βίος (bios)

A life or the course of one's life. The accusative with πάντα gives the duration supposedly spent wrestling, eating and sleeping. The rival's sweeping claim is part of an insult, not verified biography. At 133c the same noun measures lifelong learning, so the dialogue contrasts ways of filling a life before asking what makes a pursuit good.

Attestation. 132c: πάντα τὸν βίον.

Liken

ἀπεικάζω (apeikazō)

To compare, represent by a likeness or liken one thing to another. The educated lover approves Socrates' comparison of the philosopher to a pentathlete. The aorist participle identifies how Socrates has understood him. Agreement on an apt image is not yet proof of the definition: the dialogue subsequently examines whether the accepted likeness has consequences the lover can tolerate.

Attestation. 136a: ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλῳ.

Listener

ἀκροατής (akroatēs)

A listener or member of an audience. The boys become listeners 'of us', with the genitive indicating whose speech they hear. Their new role intensifies the lovers' ambition and the narrator's emotional response. The word does not imply passive indifference: the boys later laugh at a successful insult and the surrounding company eventually praises what has been said.

Attestation. 133a: ἡμῶν ἀκροαταὶ.

Look into

σκοπέω (skopeō)

To inspect, consider or examine. Socrates' method verb introduces the new question about which subjects the philosopher should learn. Its object is an unresolved matter requiring investigation, not a conclusion already secured. The ordinary sense of looking closely suits the dialogue's recurrent shifts from impressive appearances and confident formulas to the consequences of what the speakers actually accept.

Attestation. 135a: ἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν.

Looks

ἰδέα (idea)

Appearance, outward form or looks. The accusative specifies the respect in which the young people are judged especially comely. Nothing here requires the technical philosophical sense 'Form' or a separate intelligible entity. Reading the local construction is crucial: this is an appraisal of visible attractiveness, which helps explain the lovers' rivalry and Socrates' later admission of being dazzled.

Attestation. 132a: τὴν ἰδέαν.

Lose heart

ἀθυμέω (athymeō)

To be discouraged or lose heart. Socrates reports that the lovers seemed dispirited about the argument after the question of educational measure left them perplexed. The appearance-verb qualifies his psychological judgment. He therefore tries another approach, showing an adjustment to the respondents' condition rather than simple insistence on repeating a question they have already failed to answer.

Attestation. 135a: ἐδόκουν ἀθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον.

Love of exercise

φιλογυμναστία (philogymnastia)

Fondness for or devotion to physical exercise. Socrates chooses it as a parallel to philosophy, giving the athletic rival's pursuit a place in the argument. The compound names a love or orientation, not automatically the amount of exertion performed. Identifying it with much labour is the educated lover's next commitment, whose weakness the athlete is well placed to expose.

Attestation. 133d: φιλογυμναστίαν.

Lover

ἐραστής (erastēs)

An admirer or lover, here an older male courting a youth within the social setting presented by the dialogue. The plural initially names the youths' admirers in the company; the narrative then concentrates on two rivals for one boy. Their desire to impress an audience shapes their answers, so the word identifies both a social role and a source of argumentative pressure.

Attestation. 132a: καὶ τούτων ἐραστάς.

Lover of exercise

φιλογυμναστής (philogymnastēs)

Someone devoted to physical exercise, here the athletic lover whom Socrates brings back into the exchange. The noun parallels the earlier abstract φιλογυμναστία. His practical experience now qualifies him to correct the rival's account of beneficial exertion. This change of role is important: lack of professed verbal skill does not mean lack of useful knowledge about his own pursuit.

Attestation. 134a: ὁ φιλογυμναστής.

Make best

βελτίστους ποιέω (beltistous poieō)

To make the recipients best or improve them to the highest relevant condition. The superlative βελτίστους is predicative to the understood animals. Socrates links this capacity with punishing rightly and recognising quality. What counts as best depends on the kind considered; moving from horses and dogs to human beings requires more than merely retaining the same grammatical construction.

Attestation. 137c: οἵπερ βελτίστους ποιοῦσιν.

Man

ἀνήρ (anēr)

A man, especially an adult male, rather than the broader ἄνθρωπος, human being. Here the accusative names the free and educated man whose appropriate competence the lover is describing. The social ideal is specific to the speaker's picture of cultivation. It should not be confused with the earlier boast involving ἄνθρωπος, nor silently universalised into an explicit curriculum for every person.

Attestation. 135d: ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερόν τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον.

Man; human being

ἄνθρωπος (anthrōpos)

A human being or person, rendered 'man' in this emphatic self-assessment. The lover says he would not even count himself human if he judged philosophy shameful. The boast should not be narrowed to a technical claim about masculinity or citizenship. Later the same noun grounds self-knowledge in one's membership of the human kind, a quite different argumentative use.

Attestation. 133b: οὐδ’ ἂν ἄνθρωπον νομίσαιμι ἐμαυτὸν εἶναι.

Many; much

πολύς (polys)

Many in number or much in amount. Solon's line presents learning many things, which the lover expands into learning as much as possible. Socrates tests whether quantity identifies philosophy and parallels it with many exertions. The term alone says neither that its objects are good nor that the amount is excessive; that judgment requires the later comparison with an appropriate measure.

Attestation. 133c: πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

Master

δεσπότης (despotēs)

A master or household lord, including authority over slaves in the social setting of the term. Socrates pairs the role with household manager under the condition of correct ordering. The word is therefore institutionally stronger than a casual expert or teacher. Its inclusion in the unified craft exposes the dialogue's assumptions about authority rather than eliminating them through a benign modern paraphrase.

Attestation. 138c: οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης.

Master builder

ἀρχιτέκτων (architektōn)

A master builder or supervising expert in construction. Socrates contrasts a top practitioner with the ordinary carpenter to probe what expertise in a craft entails. The modern word 'architect' can obscure the practical craft setting. The example makes exceptional competence both scarce and highly valued, preparing the objection that one person cannot master many crafts at that level.

Attestation. 135c: ἄκρον ἀρχιτέκτονα.

Master's craft

δεσποτική (despotikē)

The master's art or competence of household authority. The feminine substantive belongs to the list declared one craft with justice and temperance. It names a form of governing expertise within the dialogue's social order, not mastery of any subject whatever. The claim of sameness depends on ordering rightly, and should not be detached from that normative condition.

Attestation. 138c: πολιτική, δεσποτική, οἰκονομική.

Menial

βάναυσος (banausos)

Menial or associated contemptuously with manual trades. Socrates reports that those absorbed in crafts are called this. The edition explains the social disparagement and supplies an external parallel. The word's evaluative force matters: it helps distance philosophy from craft absorption, yet it should not be presented as an objective fact that all practitioners lack intelligence, character or useful knowledge.

Attestation. 137b: βαναύσους καλεῖσθαι.

Mina

μνᾶ (mna)

A monetary unit; the edition's note states that one mina equals one hundred drachmas. Five or six minae are the hypothetical price of a carpenter. Keeping the unit distinct from the following drachmas makes the disparity intelligible. The figures illustrate the value placed on expert mastery, not a currency conversion into modern purchasing power or an independently established historical price series.

Attestation. 135c: πέντε ἢ ἓξ μνῶν.

Moderate

μέτριος (metrios)

Measured, appropriate or moderate in amount. The athlete contrasts moderate exertions with many, and Socrates subsequently also excludes too few. Its force is not automatically an arithmetic midpoint: what counts as appropriate depends on the activity and its benefit. The later question asks who can determine the measure for the soul, revealing that agreement on moderation has not solved the educational problem.

Attestation. 134a: ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων.

Much labour

πολυπονία (polyponia)

A great quantity of labour or exertion. The compound parallels πολυμαθία, much learning, in the proposal that a devoted pursuit consists in doing a great deal of its characteristic activity. Physical training makes that quantitative account testable. The later preference for moderate exertion challenges the identification, while leaving open how the appropriate amount is to be judged.

Attestation. 133e: τὴν πολυπονίαν.

Much learning

πολυμαθία (polymathia)

Extensive learning or learning many things. Socrates uses the noun to condense the lover's appeal to Solon, and the lover accepts the identification with philosophy. The compound's quantitative element is crucial to the analogy with much labour. The final rejection concerns this proposed account, not a demonstrated claim that learning many things can never have any value.

Attestation. 133c: τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολυμαθίαν.

Music and letters

μουσική (mousikē)

The cultural education associated with the Muses, including poetry, song and letters rather than instrumental music alone. It is the educated lover's pursuit and explains his claim to superiority in speech. The word should not be reduced to a modern school subject. His later appeal to Solon displays that cultural formation, but does not by itself establish a definition.

Attestation. 132d: περὶ μουσικὴν.

Name

ὄνομα (onoma)

A name or designation. Socrates asks what title belongs to a single person ordering a city rightly, then to one managing a household. The movement from names to a common craft is fast and significant. Sharing an effective function can support a comparison, but the mere availability of different names does not prove that all holders of those titles are equally knowledgeable.

Attestation. 138b: ὄνομά γε τούτῳ.

Neck

τράχηλος (trachēlos)

The neck. Its literal bodily sense underlies both the present 'unrubbed neck' and the earlier wrestling verb τραχηλίζομαι. The athlete mocks the rival's lack of physical training using the same body part previously made a sign of his own supposed stupidity. The reciprocal detail ties the two attacks together without establishing which kind of life is better overall.

Attestation. 134b: τὸν τράχηλον.

Nevertheless

οὐ μὴν ἀλλά (ou mēn alla)

A corrective or concessive expression meaning nevertheless or all the same. Although the educated lover seems anxious before the boys, he does answer Socrates, ambitiously. The idiom should be read as a unit rather than translated word for word into contradictory negatives. It links the emotional hesitation with the decisive public response that the narrator immediately describes.

Attestation. 133a: οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἀπεκρίνατό γέ μοι.

No less

οὐχ ἧττον (ouch hētton)

No less, with the genitive supplying the person compared. Socrates thinks the other man is no less anxious than himself when the lads attend. The phrase reports comparable intensity rather than proving identical feelings or motives. The narrator's surrounding 'it seemed to me' remains in force, so the psychological comparison should retain its explicitly observational qualification.

Attestation. 133a: οὐχ ἧττον ἐμοῦ.

Nudge

κινέω (kineō)

To move or set in motion; with a person and the elbow here, to nudge. The concrete touch brings the athlete into the conversation. At 134a κινητέος, a verbal adjective of necessity, returns to the same action when Socrates needs his expertise. The repetition links bodily prompting to the argument's change of speaker and temporary change of authority.

Attestation. 132b: κινήσας οὖν αὐτὸν τῷ ἀγκῶνι.

Oenopides

Οἰνοπίδης (oinopidēs)

The alternative named subject of the boys' apparent dispute, paired with Anaxagoras. The gestures and circles prompt the narrator's inference, but no doctrine is quoted. The edition's note identifies a mathematician and astronomer and relates him to the zodiac's inclination. Those historical details explain a possible allusion; they should not become a certainty about what the boys are discussing.

Attestation. 132b: ἢ περὶ Οἰνοπίδου.

Of no use

ἀχρεῖος (achreios)

Of no use or unserviceable. The adjective renews the earlier charge of ἄχρηστος when Socrates asks whether the philosopher can remain a runner-up in the governing arts. The edition distinguishes the English renderings while preserving their close function. The question is now sharpened by personal responsibility: someone may have to exercise judgment rather than wait for a superior substitute.

Attestation. 138e: καὶ ἀχρεῖον εἶναι.

Older

πρέσβυς (presbys)

Old or elder; the comparative form here means older. Paired with νεώτερον, younger, it extends the proposed duty of learning across stages of life. No exact age boundary is supplied. The pair elaborates Solon's growing-old verse, but the accompanying aim of learning as much as possible adds a quantitative demand that is not established merely by continuing education into old age.

Attestation. 133c: καὶ πρεσβύτερον.

One

εἷς (heis)

One, a single member or person. Socrates claims the craft effective for one is also effective for many, and conversely. The compressed wording leaves the relevant activities understood from the previous sentence. The transition is consequential: knowing or improving one case is being linked to competence over a class. The numeral itself supplies no proof that such generalisation always follows.

Attestation. 137d: ἥτις ἕνα, καὶ πολλούς.

Oneself

ἑαυτοῦ (heautou)

The reflexive pronoun, referring an action or judgment back to its subject. The accusative ἑαυτόν here makes the imagined horse itself the object of its ignorance. Contracted αὑτόν also occurs in the text. This grammatical self-reference is the hinge toward human self-knowledge, but the pronoun alone does not specify whether the self is body, soul, character or another object of inquiry.

Attestation. 137e: κἂν ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοοῖ.

Opinion

δόξα (doxa)

A belief, judgment or opinion; here the speaker's own view, against which he says he need not compete before Socrates. At 135b the same noun means reputation in other people's eyes. The two uses must remain distinct: personal sincerity in argument is one issue, obtaining a public reputation for philosophy another. Their proximity exposes the lover's mixed motives.

Attestation. 134c: παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν.

Order; manage

διοικέω (dioikeō)

To administer, manage or order a whole. Here one person orders a city correctly, and the next section applies the verb to a household. The adverb 'rightly' is essential: the inquiry concerns competent rule, not mere control. The parallel use supports the proposed unity of governing knowledge while leaving differences in scale and institutions largely unexamined.

Attestation. 138b: ὀρθῶς πόλιν διοικῇ.

Overhear

ἐπακούω (epakouō)

To hear what is being said, here to overhear a conversation already in progress. The dual participle identifies the two lads whose own discussion is interrupted. They then become the adults' audience. The change is consequential: the lovers' answers now have an immediate spectator whose approval matters, and Socrates too admits the effect of the beautiful young listeners.

Attestation. 133a: ἐπακούσαντε τὼ μειρακίω.

Ox

βοῦς (bous)

An ox or bovine animal. The example repeats the horse's supposed ignorance of its own quality as a member of a kind. In this quoted occurrence the angle brackets are essential: the edition reports that Burnet prints Bekker's supplied βοῦς, absent from the manuscripts at that point. The opening βοῦς of the same sentence is independently present without supplementation.

Attestation. 137e: τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ χρηστοὺς ⟨βοῦς⟩.

Pay the penalty

δίκην δίδωμι (dikēn didōmi)

To pay a penalty or give satisfaction; an idiom built from δίκη and δίδωμι, to give. The subjunctive follows ὅταν in a general circumstance: cities are well ordered when wrongdoers pay. The expression should not be narrowed to paying a monetary fine. The dialogue's surrounding insistence on correct judgment supplies the standard that makes the penalty part of good order.

Attestation. 138b: δίκην διδῶσιν.

Peculiar

ἴδιος (idios)

One's own, particular or peculiar to something. Socrates asks whether the combination of fineness and goodness is special to philosophy or applies to other pursuits as well. The adjective tests the scope of the lover's valuation. It does not yet mean a private possession or a subjectivity that would exempt the claim from comparison with physical training.

Attestation. 133d: τι τοῦτο ἴδιον.

Pentathlete

πένταθλος (pentathlos)

A competitor in the pentathlon. The edition lists its five events, but the dialogue's argument stresses comparative placement: below specialists in their own events and above other athletes. The model is not simply 'best overall'. It gives the educated lover a flattering picture of broad competence that Socrates then tests by asking when a runner-up supplies indispensable help.

Attestation. 135e: οἱ πένταθλοι.

Perplexity

ἀπορία (aporia)

A difficulty, lack of a way forward or perplexity. Here all three adults are full of it when asked who can judge the proper learning for the soul. The state follows an acknowledged gap in their account, not a claim that no knowledge is possible. Socrates responds by changing the approach, while teasing their reluctance to ask the boys.

Attestation. 135a: ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες.

Philosopher

φιλόσοφος (philosophos)

A person who philosophizes, whose defining activity is the dialogue's subject. Here Socrates asks what kind of man the lover means and proposes the pentathlete comparison. The noun must not silently import a settled modern profession or a fully formed Platonic ideal. The text tests competing descriptions and concludes against two accounts without expressly supplying a complete positive definition.

Attestation. 135e: τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα.

Philosophize

φιλοσοφέω (philosopheō)

To pursue philosophy or engage in the activity called philosophizing. Here the participle appears inside the athlete's insult; its value and content remain disputed. The dialogue tests much learning and general familiarity with crafts as proposed accounts. Its final negative conclusion does not supply an equally explicit positive definition, so the verb should retain the question of what activity it names.

Attestation. 132b: φιλοσοφοῦντες.

Philosophy

φιλοσοφία (philosophia)

The pursuit called philosophy, whose value and nature the dialogue investigates. The name combines love and wisdom, but that etymology does not answer what activities constitute it. The athlete disparages it, his rival praises it, and Socrates asks for an account before accepting the evaluation. Much learning and broad craft familiarity are tested rather than adopted as the noun's settled meaning.

Attestation. 132c: αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖται φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι.

Pig

ὗς (hys)

A pig, invoked in the claim that even such an animal would know moderate exertion benefits the body. The force is proverbial and insulting toward the rival who missed the obvious point. The edition identifies κἂν ὗν as Hermann's correction of the manuscripts' καὶ νῦν; the animal belongs to the printed text, with that editorial status explicitly acknowledged.

Attestation. 134a: κἂν ὗν γνῶναι.

Pilot

κυβερνήτης (kybernētēs)

The skilled pilot or helmsman directing a ship. The respondent chooses him over the philosopher when lives and possessions are threatened by a storm. The example relies on a recognisable craft with practical responsibility. The noun need not be converted into a general metaphor for political rule here, though the later discussion will seek an analogous competence in governing people.

Attestation. 136d: τῷ κυβερνήτῃ.

Planting

φύτευσις (phyteusis)

Planting, paired with sowing when subjects of learning are imagined entering the soul. Its genitive belongs to the topic about which someone competent should be questioned. The image emphasises provision with a view to development. It does not tell us which curriculum is best; the speakers become perplexed precisely because the agricultural analogy leaves its educational authority unnamed.

Attestation. 134e: φυτεύσεώς τε καὶ σπορᾶς.

Political craft

πολιτική (politikē)

The statesman's art or political competence. The feminine substantive is added to the knowledge already identified as justice and temperance because it orders cities well. It denotes a claimed expertise, not politics in every modern sense or a party affiliation. The identification is one step in the dialogue's unification of governing capacities and should be assessed as such.

Attestation. 138b: Καὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρα αὑτή ἐστιν.

Poorer; inferior

φαῦλος (phaulos)

Inferior, poor or of lower quality, with a comparative here. The philosopher is poorer than each craft-holder within the relevant craft. Earlier the lover imagined defending an even poorer hypothesis. In neither place does the adjective necessarily mean morally depraved: it measures weakness against a contextual standard, which Socrates later connects to usefulness through additional admitted premises.

Attestation. 136c: φαυλότερός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος.

Position; hypothesis

ὑπόθεσις (hypothesis)

A position laid down for discussion. The accompanying verb ὑπεθέμην makes the laying-down explicit. Here the position is the rival's earlier claim about the benefit of many exertions, which he boasts he could defend even if it were worse. The term need not denote a modern scientific hypothesis or a fully specified deductive method; its local force is argumentative commitment.

Attestation. 134c: τῇ ὑποθέσει ἣν ὑπεθέμην.

Practise

ἀσκέω (askeō)

To exercise, cultivate or practise something. Here its objects are temperance and justice, making ethical knowledge something to be enacted or cultivated. The activity recalls the earlier language of training without simply equating the virtues with athletic exertion. The passage gives no detailed regimen; its immediate point is what the interpreted inscription urges its reader to pursue.

Attestation. 138a: σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην.

Praise

ἐπαινέω (epaineō)

To praise or approve. The others praise what has been said after the educated lover falls silent and the athlete agrees. The aorist closes the narrative with an audience response. It records social approval rather than an additional demonstration of the argument: readers still must assess the condensed steps that identified self-knowledge, justice and the various governing crafts.

Attestation. 139a: ἐπῄνεσαν τὰ εἰρημένα.

Prattle

ἀδολεσχέω (adolescheō)

To talk idly, chatter or prattle. The athlete uses the verb to discredit the boys' discussion of heavenly matters before explaining or evaluating any of its content. The edition associates this language with comic depictions of philosophers. Its role is openly polemical: it reports a character's contempt, not the narrator's settled definition of philosophy or astronomy.

Attestation. 132b: ἀδολεσχοῦσι.

Precisely

ἀκριβῶς (akribōs)

Exactly, accurately or with thorough mastery. The lover denies that a philosopher must know each craft as precisely as its actual practitioner. The adverb specifies a level of competence, not simply correctness in one isolated statement. Removing this demand allows the generalist ideal to emerge, but also creates the gap on which the subsequent challenge about practical usefulness depends.

Attestation. 135d: ἀκριβῶς ὥσπερ αὐτὸν τὸν τὴν τέχνην ἔχοντα.

Precision

ἀκρίβεια (akribeia)

Exactness, precision or thorough mastery. The lover denies that the generalist has laboured at one thing to this extent, because such absorption would leave other pursuits behind. The noun repeats the standard earlier rejected by ἀκριβῶς. It names the depth of specialist competence whose absence is first praised as freedom and then exposed as a limitation in practical use.

Attestation. 136a: εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν.

Produce in

ἐμποιέω (empoieō)

To produce, implant or bring about in someone. The moderate exercises are said to produce good condition in people. The verb makes a causal claim about the result of appropriate activity, not a mere association between athletic identity and fitness. When the argument extends to learning, the relevant question similarly becomes what a provision does for its recipient.

Attestation. 134c: ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Provide

προσφέρω (prospherō)

To bring, offer or supply something to someone. The middle-passive participle here means the things supplied to the soul. Subjects of learning are then included among them. The provision metaphor treats education as something whose effects and quantity can be assessed, but it does not establish that every lesson works exactly like food or exercise for a body.

Attestation. 134d: τῶν προσφερομένων.

Punish

κολάζω (kolazō)

To punish, correct or discipline. The dialogue consistently adds 'rightly' when connecting punishment with a craft that improves its recipients. The action is therefore not validated merely by inflicting a penalty. The animal examples lead to judicial knowledge and household responsibility, but they do not by themselves prove that every actual punishment benefits or that every punisher possesses the relevant expertise.

Attestation. 137c: κολάζειν ὀρθῶς.

Pursue an activity

ἐπιτηδεύω (epitēdeuō)

To practise, engage in or pursue an activity. The participle with the article names those who pursue philosophizing as the activity under discussion. The cognate object ἐπιτήδευμα emphasises habitual practice and its effect on the practitioner. Socrates asks whether this pursuit produces the pentathlete-like person described; the verb itself does not guarantee either cultivated appearance or practical usefulness.

Attestation. 135e: τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα.

Pursuit

ἐπιτήδευμα (epitēdeuma)

A pursuit, practice or habitual occupation. Philosophizing is provisionally treated as an activity that shapes those who engage in it, as training shapes competitors. The noun is accompanied by the related participle ἐπιτηδεύοντας, pursuing. It does not presuppose a modern institutional discipline; the discussion is still asking what this way of spending effort actually produces in a person.

Attestation. 135e: τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα.

Quarrel

ἐρίζω (erizō)

To quarrel, dispute or contend verbally. The participle is dual, agreeing with the two lads. Their disagreement concerns, apparently, scientific thinkers or problems, but its exact subject is not heard. The activity becomes ἔρις when they stop at 133a. Distinguish this initial dispute from the lovers' later competitive posturing, though the scene deliberately places both kinds together.

Attestation. 132a: ἐρίζοντε.

Question

ἐρώτημα (erōtēma)

A question put for an answer. Socrates says his original question was addressed to the company, allowing the educated rival to take it up. The noun points back to whether philosophizing is fine, before the inquiry becomes what philosophizing is. Its public destination matters: the shift of respondent is presented as available to anyone able to answer better.

Attestation. 132d: τὸ ἐρώτημα.

Question closely

διερωτάω (dierōtaō)

To question thoroughly or closely. Socrates chooses the man claiming greater wisdom for further examination, hoping he might benefit from him. The prefix gives the asking a more searching force than a single casual question. The verb announces the sustained testing that follows, though Socrates presents it as potentially instructive for himself rather than solely as an attack.

Attestation. 132d: διερωτῆσαι.

Racer

δρομεύς (dromeus)

A competitor in running, here treated as the specialist against whom the pentathlete ranks second in that event. The edition uses 'racer' to avoid creating an English pun with 'runner-up' that the Greek does not make. The word's role is comparative: a specialist's superiority in one activity supplies the model for a craft-holder's superiority over the philosophical generalist.

Attestation. 135e: πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας.

Rather; more

μᾶλλον (mallon)

More or rather, expressing comparison or preference. Socrates asks which helper would be chosen rather and first after the answer 'both'. The shift yields the doctor's priority without itself excluding every contribution from the philosopher. Keeping the comparative sense visible is essential when the discussion proceeds to the stronger conclusion that the less preferred person is of no use.

Attestation. 136d: ὁπότερον μᾶλλόν τε καὶ πρότερον.

Reasonable

εἰκός (eikos)

Fitting, likely or reasonable; here what is reasonable for a free and educated man. The impersonal expression introduces the appropriate level of craft knowledge rather than a probabilistic estimate. It relies on an accepted social ideal that the lover expects Socrates to understand. The discussion then asks whether that socially plausible standard supplies an independently useful philosophical competence.

Attestation. 135d: ὡς εἰκὸς ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερόν τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον.

Recognise; know

γιγνώσκω (gignōskō)

To know, recognise or judge what someone or something is. Here it is the craft's ability to recognise good and bad members of a kind. It differs locally from the infinitive εἰδέναι used in the earlier demand to know what philosophy is. The later reflexive construction turns this discriminatory knowledge toward oneself, where its relation to temperance is asserted.

Attestation. 137c: γιγνώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς.

Reply

ἀποκρίνομαι (apokrinomai)

To answer or reply. Socrates invites the rival to answer more finely than the first lover. The middle form is normal for the verb and need not imply answering oneself. Throughout the dialogue, answering may mean stating a position, accepting a paraphrase or conceding a consequence; successful responsiveness is not identical to giving an impressive speech for the assembled audience.

Attestation. 132d: ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι.

Reputation

δόξα (doxa)

Public estimation or reputation. The proposed subjects are selected for producing the greatest reputation for philosophy, especially through appearing experienced in many crafts. This differs from the speaker's own opinion at 134c, though the Greek noun is the same. The external audience is now part of the definition's criterion, making seeming learned potentially more important than possessing expert knowledge.

Attestation. 135b: πλείστην δόξαν ἔχοι τις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν.

Rightly

ὀρθῶς (orthōs)

Rightly or correctly, describing the manner in which something is thought or done. The lover initially asserts that his judgment is right. Later correct punishment and governance require expertise. The adverb therefore marks a standard to be met, not a guarantee that the accompanying action is correct merely because a speaker says so or possesses an official title.

Attestation. 133e: ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ ὀρθῶς.

Rival lover

ἀντεραστής (anterastēs)

A rival in love, one courting the same beloved as another admirer. The participial phrase explains why the nearby man intervenes so readily against the athlete. The term later appears when he gestures toward his opponent while speaking loudly for the boy's benefit. It makes the argument a contest for esteem as well as an inquiry about philosophy.

Attestation. 132c: ἀντεραστὴς ὤν.

Runner-up

ὕπακρος (hypakros)

Just below the top, rendered runner-up. The rare adjective relates to ἄκρος, used of the top master builder. It describes someone second to each specialist yet superior to non-specialists, not automatically the best overall or someone incompetent. Socrates tests the usefulness of this intermediate position, and the final argument denies that it suffices in responsibilities one must discharge oneself.

Attestation. 136a: ὕπακρόν τινα ἄνδρα.

Same

αὐτός (autos)

The same, when placed with the article in this construction. Socrates asks whether the same craft improves and correctly punishes, then extends its competence to recognising good and bad. Identity is stronger than resemblance or cooperation between skills. The many ensuing claims of sameness therefore require attention: grammatical repetition does not establish that every named role has identical functions or institutions.

Attestation. 137c: Ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη.

Say; mean

λέγω (legō)

To say, speak or mean, depending on construction. Here Socrates refers to the manner of craft knowledge the lover means by philosophizing. The difference matters: not every occurrence reports a fresh utterance; some ask for the intended content of an account. Tracking intended meaning before testing consequences is a recurrent method of the conversation, even when its summaries require scrutiny.

Attestation. 137a: ὃν σὺ λέγεις τὸν τρόπον.

Second

δεύτερος (deuteros)

Second in order or rank. Here the pentathletes stand second to the specialists in their own events, while first among the others. The word is therefore relational, not a claim of mediocrity in every respect. At the ending being second or third in one's own responsibilities becomes shameful, making the permissibility of second place depend on the task at issue.

Attestation. 135e: δεύτεροί εἰσι.

Second prizes

δευτερεῖα (deutereia)

The rewards or honours of second place. The substantivised plural presents the generalist as holding second prizes in understanding the crafts while surpassing ordinary people. The competitive metaphor preserves both achievement and subordination. At 138e it returns when Socrates denies that the philosopher can accept the same rank in governing his own household and carrying out entrusted judgments.

Attestation. 136a: τὰ δευτερεῖα.

See

ὁράω (horaō)

To see, here expressed by the aorist εἶδον, 'I saw'. Socrates begins from observation of people and gestures, then distinguishes what he could hear from what merely appeared to be happening. That contrast matters: the boys' scientific topic remains an inference from their drawing and movements, not a conversation whose precise intellectual content the narrator reports.

Attestation. 132a: εἶδον αὐτόθι.

Seed

σπέρμα (sperma)

A seed. The genitive plural identifies what is sown in the agricultural example, whose appropriate amount is judged by the farmer. Socrates then transfers planting and sowing to subjects of learning in the soul. The literal seed should be distinguished from the metaphorical educational material; the analogy raises the need for judgment without establishing identical mechanisms of growth.

Attestation. 134e: περὶ σπερμάτων σπορᾶς.

Seek

ζητέω (zēteō)

To seek, look for or request. Socrates says he seeks nothing other than renewed agreement about what has been said. The declaration narrows the announced activity to a recap rather than a fresh thesis. Because recapitulation can alter emphasis or add a premise, the reader should still compare the reported agreements with the earlier exchange rather than assume verbal continuity ensures accuracy.

Attestation. 136e: ζητῶ ἄλλο ἢ ἀνομολογήσασθαι.

Seem; think

δοκέω (dokeō)

To seem, appear or be thought; with a personal dative here, 'does it seem to you', naturally 'do you think'. The word locates an evaluation in a speaker's judgment rather than asserting it directly. Throughout the dialogue it also marks social appearance and tentative assent. Context decides whether the emphasis falls on opinion, seeming competence or an accepted conclusion.

Attestation. 132c: δοκεῖ σοι.

Shameful

αἰσχρός (aischros)

Shameful, disgraceful or ugly, opposed here to philosophy's being fine. Socrates asks whether the athlete really gives philosophizing that negative evaluation. The educated rival later stakes his human standing on rejecting it, and shame becomes personal when he blushes and finally falls silent. The adjective therefore links evaluative argument with the pressure of being judged before an audience.

Attestation. 132c: αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι.

Ship

ναῦς (naus)

A ship. The dative singular νηί follows ἐν and is qualified by a participle describing storm conditions. The emergency provides the second practical test of specialist competence after illness. The reader should recognise the inflected form under ναῦς rather than seek a separate headword; the vessel itself matters as the setting where entrusted lives and possessions need skilled direction.

Attestation. 136d: ἐν νηὶ χειμαζομένῃ.

Sit

κάθημαι (kathēmai)

To be seated or sit. Socrates explains in a narrative aside that he was sitting beside one boy's lover, which makes the elbow nudge natural. The rival is seated nearby at 132c and can overhear. The spatial arrangement matters dramatically: no formal summons is needed for a private-seeming question to become a competitive exchange before the boys.

Attestation. 132b: καθήμην γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἐραστὴν.

Sleep

καθεύδω (katheudō)

To sleep. The participle completes the hostile list of wrestling, filling oneself and sleeping by which the educated lover dismisses his rival. Its ordinary sense is important to the later exchange: the athlete answers with a picture of an intellectual who is sleepless, unfed and thin. Neither caricature should be mistaken for a neutral definition of the relevant pursuit.

Attestation. 132c: καθεύδων.

Sleepless

ἄγρυπνος (agrypnos)

Sleepless or wakeful. The athlete uses it in a mocking portrait of his intellectual rival, together with being unfed, physically untrained and thin from worries. It answers the earlier picture of the athlete as constantly sleeping. The adjective supplies a comic stereotype within the rivalry; the dialogue does not certify a medical symptom or recommend sleeplessness as philosophical discipline.

Attestation. 134b: ἄνδρα γε ἄγρυπνόν.

So; accordingly

οὖν (oun)

A connective often meaning 'so', 'then' or 'accordingly'. It can move the narrative forward or mark the next argumentative step. Here Socrates proceeds to address the educated lover after explaining why he chose him. Its force is often lighter than a strict deductive 'therefore'; the reader should ask whether it links events, resumes an exchange or presents an inference.

Attestation. 132d: εἶπον οὖν.

Socrates

Σωκράτης (sōkratēs)

The named narrator and principal questioner. He tells the encounter in the first person to no identified listener, while the other speakers address him by name. His observations, tentative impressions and reported reactions should be distinguished from what each lover says. The dialogue's transmission among Plato's works does not make every claim spoken by this character an unqualified authorial doctrine.

Attestation. 132c: ὦ Σώκρατες.

Solon

Σόλων (solōn)

The poet and lawgiver invoked by the educated lover as authority for lifelong learning. The dialogue quotes one line and then the lover develops it into his proposed account of philosophy. The edition identifies it as fragment 18 West. Solon's name authenticates the cultural appeal within the conversation; it does not make every inference drawn from the line Solon's own doctrine.

Attestation. 133c: Σόλων γάρ που εἶπε.

Soul

ψυχή (psychē)

The soul, the recipient of learning in the comparison with bodily nourishment and training. Socrates asks whether its provisions likewise benefit through moderation. The passage treats it as capable of improvement and education without explaining its metaphysical constitution. The crucial difficulty is practical and epistemic: who can judge which subjects, and how many, constitute the appropriate nourishment for it?

Attestation. 134d: τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν.

Sowing

σπορά (spora)

Sowing, the act of scattering or planting seed. First used literally in the farmer example, it is immediately repeated metaphorically for introducing subjects of learning into the soul. The repeated noun makes the transition vivid. The outstanding question concerns who knows the proper amount and kind, rather than whether every available seed or lesson should be put in.

Attestation. 134e: σπερμάτων σπορᾶς.

Spend one's time

διατρίβω (diatribō)

To spend time, occupy oneself or pursue an activity. The perfect participle describes the educated lover as having devoted time to music and letters; the corresponding statement places his rival in gymnastics. Socrates supplies this background after the insult. The verb identifies established pursuits without itself confirming either lover's expertise, superiority or capacity to give an account of philosophy.

Attestation. 132d: περὶ μουσικὴν διατετριφώς.

Statesman

πολιτικός (politikos)

A person concerned with governing a city, here the statesman included among the supposedly identical possessors of one expertise. The masculine substantive names a practitioner, while πολιτική names the craft. The list's claim is about knowledge required for correct rule, not literal identity of every office or person. Keeping practitioner and competence distinct helps parse the compressed conclusion.

Attestation. 138c: βασιλεύς, τύραννος, πολιτικός.

Stoop over things

κυπτάζω (kyptazō)

To bend or stoop over, suggesting close, absorbed attention to one's work. In this passage the participle joins busybody activity in an unflattering description of a life devoted to crafts. The bodily image contributes to a status-laden critique. It should not be expanded into a claim that close observation or all manual work is intrinsically irrational or morally corrupt.

Attestation. 137b: κυπτάζοντα ζῆν.

Stop

παύω (pauō)

To stop or cause to cease; in the middle construction here, to stop one's own activity. The dual participle has the genitive τῆς ἔριδος, the dispute from which the two lads desist. They stop because they become listeners to the adults. The verb marks interruption of their scientific conversation, not an implied resolution of the question they had been arguing about.

Attestation. 133a: παυσαμένω τῆς ἔριδος.

String the bow

ἐντείνω (enteinō)

To stretch or draw tight; here to string the bow. The future form occurs in the Homeric allusion to someone else accomplishing what the suitors cannot. The physical task serves as a comparison for answering the unresolved question. It is the possibility of being outdone that matters, not a claim that successful philosophical inquiry requires literal archery or force.

Attestation. 135a: ἐντενεῖ τὸ τόξον.

Strive for victory

φιλονικέω (philonikeō)

To seek victory or dispute for the sake of winning. The educated lover says he has no need to do this against his own judgment when speaking with Socrates. The compound belongs to the dialogue's network of loves and rivalries. His disclaimer still leaves his admitted willingness to defend inferior positions against the athlete, distinguishing personal deference from a general commitment to inquiry.

Attestation. 134c: παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν.

Stuff oneself

ἐμπίμπλημι (empimplēmi)

To fill; in this middle-passive form, to fill oneself or eat one's fill. The educated lover groups it with wrestling and sleeping to caricature his rival as absorbed in bodily habits. It is the speaker's hostile portrait, not a measured account of athletic training. Food later becomes a serious example where appropriate quantity, rather than abundance, is beneficial.

Attestation. 132c: ἐμπιμπλάμενος.

Subject of learning

μάθημα (mathēma)

Something learned, a lesson or a subject of learning. The plural here is included among the things provided to the soul. It need not mean mathematics specifically. The argument first asks how much learning benefits, then what kinds the philosopher should learn, so the noun accommodates both quantity of acquired material and choice among subjects without settling their proper ordering.

Attestation. 134d: τὰ μαθήματα.

Sufficient; capable

ἱκανός (hikanos)

Sufficient, adequate or capable. Here the lover claims he would prove capable of defending his hypothesis against the athlete. The infinitive specifies the alleged capacity. The word concerns ability in a particular contest, not the truth of the position defended; he explicitly says the position could be worse and he would still expect to succeed against this opponent.

Attestation. 134c: ἱκανὸς ἂν γενοίμην βοηθῆσαι.

Suitor

μνηστήρ (mnēstēr)

A suitor, here the men in Homer's story who resist another person's attempt to string the bow. Socrates uses them to tease the adults' possible reluctance to consult the lads. The edition identifies the Odyssey episode in its note. The allusion concerns wounded prestige and exclusion of a challenger, not a literal identification of the schoolroom lovers with every feature of Homer's characters.

Attestation. 135a: τοὺς μνηστῆρας.

Surpass

περίειμι (perieimi)

To be superior to or surpass, with the genitive identifying those surpassed. The generalist is said to surpass the others while falling short of the first in craft understanding. This asymmetry is what makes the account attractive. It does not establish superiority to the specialists themselves, nor show where the lower-ranking yet impressive participant offers necessary practical help.

Attestation. 136a: τῶν ἄλλων περιεῖναι.

Surpassingly

διαφερόντως (diapherontōs)

In a superior or outstanding way, here better than those present. The comparison assesses the generalist's ability to follow a craftsman's statements relative to the surrounding audience. It does not say he follows better than the expert himself. That restricted comparison is central to the runner-up model: distinction among non-specialists can coexist with inferiority to the craft-holder.

Attestation. 135d: διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων.

Take pleasure

ἥδομαι (hēdomai)

To enjoy something or be pleased. The aorist describes the lads' delight at the athlete's retort; the neuter plural subject takes a singular verb. Their reaction changes the social balance without deciding the argument by itself. The narrative records pleasure followed by laughter, making visible the audience whose approval the educated lover had earlier tried to secure.

Attestation. 134b: ἥσθη τὰ μειράκια.

Take up; understand

ὑπολαμβάνω (hypolambanō)

To take up, respond, suppose or understand, depending on construction. Here the educated lover takes up the new question; at 135c he asks Socrates not to understand him in a mistaken way. The range reflects conversational participation as well as interpretation. It must not be translated mechanically as an unchanging mental operation when the dialogue is also marking a turn of speaker.

Attestation. 135b: Ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ σοφώτερος.

Talk nonsense

φλυαρέω (phlyareō)

To babble or talk nonsense. Together with 'prattle', it forms the athlete's dismissive characterization of philosophizing. The participle φιλοσοφοῦντες names the activity while this verb judges it contemptuously. The dispute starts because Socrates challenges that judgment; treating the insult as an objective translation of philosophy would settle in advance the very question the dialogue opens.

Attestation. 132b: φλυαροῦσι φιλοσοφοῦντες.

Tease

προσπαίζω (prospaizō)

To joke with, playfully address or tease someone. Socrates proposes consulting the lads when the adults cannot identify the needed expert. The participle identifies the manner of his proposal and prepares the allusion to Homer's suitors. The jest exposes concern for status without showing that the boys actually know the answer or that Socrates seriously expects them to supply it.

Attestation. 135a: προσπαίζων αὐτοὺς.

Temperance

σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē)

Temperance or sound-minded self-command. Socrates reads the Delphic inscription as urging this together with justice, because self-knowledge and correct punishment have been assigned to the same competence. The noun is broader than the earlier quantitative moderation of training and learning. The proposed identity with justice must be read as an argued conclusion of this dialogue, not a universally fixed dictionary equivalence.

Attestation. 138a: σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην.

Temperate person

σώφρων (sōphrōn)

A temperate, sound-minded or self-controlled person. In the list it names the bearer of σωφροσύνη alongside political and domestic rulers. The local argument has construed this virtue through knowledge of oneself and others. It does not follow merely from holding office or possessing social standing; the list asserts a unity of capacities whose demanding conditions are the issue.

Attestation. 138c: δεσπότης, σώφρων, δίκαιος.

The sick

κάμνω (kamnō)

To be weary, suffer or be ill; the article with the participle here means sick people. The doctor speaking about them recalls the earlier illness test of expertise. The present question asks whether a philosopher should be able to follow and contribute to such discussion. It prepares a comparison with judges and rulers, whose matters carry responsibilities the philosopher cannot evade.

Attestation. 138d: περὶ τῶν καμνόντων.

Then; therefore

ἄρα (ara)

An inferential particle, often 'then', 'so' or 'therefore'. Socrates uses it to draw out what follows from an answer, here that the lover regards philosophizing as fine. It signals a claimed connection rather than certifying its validity. Tracking each occurrence helps distinguish a fresh assertion from a consequence the questioner presents as licensed by the preceding agreement.

Attestation. 133b: Καλὸν ἄρα δοκεῖ σοι.

There

αὐτόθι (autothi)

At that very place, here at Dionysius' school. The adverb anchors what Socrates saw to the location he has just entered. It is a small narrative word, but keeps the encounter concrete: these youths and their admirers form a present company, not a general description of Athenian education or an imagined class of philosophers.

Attestation. 132a: αὐτόθι.

Thin

λεπτός (leptos)

Thin, slight or delicate; here bodily thinness attributed to worries. The athlete presents the educated lover through a comic intellectual stereotype. The causal phrase ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν gives his mock explanation. This occurrence should not be intellectualised into subtle reasoning or fine distinctions: the joke concerns a body whose appearance is held up to ridicule before the lads.

Attestation. 134b: καὶ λεπτὸν ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν.

Thing; matter

πρᾶγμα (pragma)

A thing, matter or affair. Modified by ὁτιοῦν, it means anything whatever whose fineness or shamefulness someone might judge. Socrates' question therefore generalises beyond philosophy before applying the principle to it. Later the word concerns fields of occupation and important public matters; it does not always name a physical object or an identical philosophical category.

Attestation. 133b: πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν.

Things in the sky

μετέωρος (meteōros)

Raised up or aloft; the substantivised neuter plural here means the things up in the sky. The athlete uses it for the boys' apparent subject. In the edition's note the expression carries comic associations with speculative inquiry. It is broader than the modern discipline of meteorology and does not identify a specific heavenly body or physical theory.

Attestation. 132b: περὶ τῶν μετεώρων.

Think fit

ἀξιόω (axioō)

To deem worthy, appropriate or fit. In the allusion the suitors do not think it fitting that someone else should string the bow. The participle portrays exclusion motivated by their own failure. This ordinary evaluative verb should not be confused with an objective demonstration of worth: Socrates' comparison makes their judgment about another person's opportunity itself open to criticism.

Attestation. 135a: μὴ ἀξιούντων εἶναί τινα ἄλλον.

Think over

ἐννοέω (ennoeō)

To notice, consider or take something into thought. Socrates first finds the answer impressive, then thinks it over and asks whether it means much learning. At 135e the same verb introduces his attempt to take in the proposed philosopher's character. Its force is active consideration or comprehension in context, not a technical faculty explicitly opposed to perception.

Attestation. 133c: ἔπειτά πως ἐννοήσας.

Think; regard

ἡγέομαι (hēgeomai)

To think, regard or judge something to be a certain way. The infinitive construction here concerns judging philosophy shameful. The dialogue repeatedly asks what speakers regard as fine, good or useful. The final ἡγεῖσθαι instead means lead, determined by its opposition to second or third place; retaining that shift prevents an ordinary polysemous verb from being flattened into one English sense.

Attestation. 132c: εἰ αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖται φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι.

Think; suppose

οἴομαι (oiomai)

To think, suppose or hold a belief. Socrates asks whether the rival thinks he could answer better than the athlete. Its frequent contracted forms include οἴει and the past ᾤμην. The verb reports a subject's belief rather than asserting its correctness; Socrates often uses such beliefs as starting points for questions whose consequences have still to be examined.

Attestation. 132d: εἰ δὲ σὺ οἴει.

Third

τρίτος (tritos)

Third in order or rank. Paired with second at the ending, it contrasts subordinate standing with taking the lead in matters entrusted by friends or the city. The numeral extends the competitive language of the pentathlete image. The issue is now not the attractiveness of broad cultivation but whether someone responsible for a judgment can accept merely appearing below another's competence.

Attestation. 139a: δεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον.

Those present

πάρειμι (pareimi)

To be present; the participle with the article means the people present. They supply the comparison group for the educated lover's proposed philosopher. The ambition is to seem most accomplished and wisest in each company, while remaining below the relevant expert. The expression brings the original audience-conscious rivalry into the definition rather than leaving reputation as an abstract concern.

Attestation. 135d: τῶν παρόντων.

Tilt

ἐπικλίνω (epiklinō)

To incline or tilt. The dual participle describes the two lads tilting their hands while representing inclinations. Its action corresponds to the noun ἐγκλίσεις without specifying which geometrical planes or astronomical circles are intended. The detail makes the boys' concentration visible and offers Socrates grounds for a tentative inference, not direct knowledge of the theory they are debating.

Attestation. 132b: ἐπικλίνοντε.

Top

ἄκρος (akros)

At the highest point, topmost or outstanding. Here it qualifies the master builder, whose expertise commands a far greater hypothetical price. The word later underlies ὕπακρος, just below the top or runner-up. This lexical relation helps the reader track the shift from exact mastery to the educated lover's less demanding ideal of ranking beneath specialists but above everyone else.

Attestation. 135c: ἄκρον ἀρχιτέκτονα.

Trainer

παιδοτρίβης (paidotribēs)

A trainer in bodily exercise, especially of the young. The speakers name this practitioner alongside the doctor as a proper source of judgment about bodily exertion and food. The term is distinct from the mere lover of exercise: devotion to an activity and professional capacity to supervise it are related but not automatically identical. Both offer a contrast with uncertainty about educating the soul.

Attestation. 134e: ἰατρὸν ἢ παιδοτρίβην.

True

ἀληθής (alēthēs)

True or truthful; the neuter plural with λέγεις means saying things that are true. Socrates proposes finding out whether the lover's claim of philosophical usefulness is true by testing concrete needs. The word makes the claim answerable to examination. It does not mean that the respondent is intentionally lying if his confident generalisation proves unsupported or inconsistent.

Attestation. 136c: εἰ σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Try

πειράομαι (peiraomai)

To try or attempt, with an infinitive stating the attempted action. Socrates tries to look into the issue another way after the group reaches perplexity. The imperfect presents a renewed investigative effort, not a guaranteed successful method. It is important that the change of route concerns how to examine philosophy, rather than an abandonment of the question as unanswerable.

Attestation. 135a: ἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν.

Tyrannical craft

τυραννική (tyrannikē)

The tyrant's craft or capacity, paired with the kingly craft in the argument about correct sole rule. The adjective labels the ruler's expertise as it is being stipulated here. Modern English can make 'tyrannical' automatically mean cruel, but that would conflict with the local condition of ruling rightly. The troubling identification should remain visible rather than be silently morally harmonised.

Attestation. 138b: βασιλικῇ τε καὶ τυραννικῇ τέχνῃ.

Tyrant

τύραννος (tyrannos)

A sole ruler designated tyrant, paired here with king in the case of one man who orders a city rightly. The edition notes that the word was not invariably blameful and explains its relation to nontraditional or unlawful title. The dialogue's local stipulation of correct governance must remain explicit; it is not a finding that every historical tyrant governs well.

Attestation. 138b: τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς.

Understanding

σύνεσις (synesis)

Understanding or intelligent comprehension. The lover selects what belongs to understanding while excluding handiwork. At 136a it becomes the dimension in which the generalist falls short of specialists. The noun therefore does not guarantee complete expertise: one may understand enough to follow and comment without matching the craft-holder's precision. Its adequacy is exactly what the usefulness argument tests.

Attestation. 135b: ὅσα συνέσεως ἔχεται.

Unfed

ἄσιτος (asitos)

Without food, fasting or unfed. Paired with sleeplessness in the athlete's insult, it reverses the rival's earlier description of him as stuffing himself. The local use is caricature rather than a nutritional prescription. Food soon receives a sober argumentative role when both speakers agree that an appropriate quantity, rather than an unlimited one, supports bodily well-being.

Attestation. 134b: καὶ ἄσιτον.

Unlearned

ἀμαθής (amathēs)

Unlearned or lacking learning. The article makes it the narrative designation of the athletic lover, contrasted with 'the wise one'. The edition notes its root connection with πολυμαθία, much learning. The apparently unlearned speaker now agrees while the learned claimant falls silent, creating an ironic reversal without proving that ignorance as such is the best route to philosophy.

Attestation. 139a: ὁ δὲ ἀμαθὴς.

Unrubbed

ἀτριβής (atribēs)

Not rubbed or worn through practice; here an unrubbed neck, signalling lack of wrestling experience. The accusative specifies the respect in which the man is ἀτριβής. The expression answers the earlier insult about having one's neck twisted. The edition treats this bodily description as part of the comic portrait of an intellectual, not as a technical diagnosis.

Attestation. 134b: ἀτριβῆ τὸν τράχηλον.

Urge

παρακελεύομαι (parakeleuomai)

To exhort, encourage or urge someone to act. Socrates attributes this function to the Delphic inscription, interpreting it as a call to practise temperance and justice. The verb presents a practical demand rather than merely a factual statement. The interpretation depends on the preceding identifications, so the inscription's authority does not independently establish each premise used to explain it.

Attestation. 138a: παρακελεύεται.

Useful

χρήσιμος (chrēsimos)

Useful, serviceable or capable of being put to beneficial use. The good are agreed to be useful, and philosophers exceptionally so. Socrates then asks where the runner-up model provides that use when a specialist is available. The reasoning moves from comparative inferiority to alleged uselessness; the adjective itself does not warrant that inference without examining what assistance could still be offered.

Attestation. 136b: τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πότερον χρησίμους.

Useless

ἄχρηστος (achrēstos)

Useless or not serviceable. The dialogue contrasts it with useful and connects it to badness through the lovers' agreements. The ensuing examples make the generalist less preferable than a doctor or pilot, then call him useless while experts are present. The strength of that conclusion should be examined: being second choice and having no use are not definitions of the same condition.

Attestation. 136b: ἢ ἀχρήστους.

Voice

φωνή (phōnē)

Voice or sound of speech. The dative phrase means that the lover speaks in a loud voice so his beloved will hear. The detail exposes the double destination of his answer: Socrates asks the question, but the boy's approval is also sought. The force of the answer therefore cannot be assessed solely by its confident volume.

Attestation. 133b: μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ.

Way

τρόπος (tropos)

A way, manner or mode. The accusative phrase limits the claim about knowledge of crafts to the way the respondent means it. It protects the argument from becoming an unrestricted rejection of all technical knowledge. When following the conclusion that philosophers are useless, keep this qualification attached: Socrates is drawing consequences from the particular account that has just been agreed.

Attestation. 137a: ὃν σὺ λέγεις τὸν τρόπον.

Well

εὖ (eu)

Well, successfully or in a good manner. Here it qualifies household administration, which Socrates links with justice. The adverb is an indispensable normative restriction: the dialogue is not claiming that any exercise of control already possesses the unified governing craft. Its earlier bodily uses likewise concern achieving good condition, not simply doing a great quantity of the relevant activity.

Attestation. 138c: δικαιοσύνῃ εὖ ἂν τὴν οἰκίαν διοικοῖ.

Whether; which of two

πότερον (poteron)

An interrogative introducing alternatives, often followed by ἤ, 'or'. Here Socrates asks whether the quality is peculiar to philosophy or applies elsewhere. The form directs the respondent to a choice rather than an unrestricted definition. Some later alternatives are rhetorically loaded, so it remains important to identify both branches and see which one the answer actually accepts or rejects.

Attestation. 133d: Πότερον οὖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ.

Win

νικάω (nikaō)

To win or defeat someone. The pentathletes beat the other athletes, while losing to specialists in those specialists' events. This local object fixes the scope of the claim. The verb echoes the rivalry and desire for victory elsewhere, but here describes the accepted comparison; whether comparative success makes the philosopher useful is the separate question Socrates raises next.

Attestation. 135e: καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτούς.

Wise

σοφός (sophos)

Wise, skilled or knowledgeable; the comparative here is embedded in a claim to be wiser. The educated lover's title remains dramatically qualified by that claim. His ambition is later to seem wisest among those present, while the ending calls him 'the wise one' as he falls silent. The adjective's irony depends on this narrative sequence rather than on a fixed insult.

Attestation. 132d: σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον.

Wish

βούλομαι (boulomai)

To wish or be willing. The plural question asks whether the group wants to consult the lads. Elsewhere the verb expresses wanting health or intending a meaning. Its sense must follow the complement: willing to try a conversational move, desiring an outcome and meaning something by an expression are related uses, not a single technical theory of will.

Attestation. 135a: Βούλεσθε.

With respect to

κατά (kata)

A preposition with several senses; with the accusative here, in respect of or measured against the specialists' own events. It limits where the pentathletes fall short. This restriction keeps relative inferiority from becoming inferiority without qualification. Other occurrences mean according to an account or in the case of people, so the complement and argument determine the appropriate English wording.

Attestation. 135e: κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἆθλα.

Wonder

θαυμάζω (thaumazō)

To wonder at or be surprised by something. Socrates reacts to the athlete's answer, especially its disparagement of philosophy. The participle reports his response before he asks whether philosophizing is shameful. Although wonder can have broader philosophical associations, this occurrence has a precise conversational object: an unexpectedly hostile judgment that calls for explanation rather than immediate acceptance.

Attestation. 132c: θαυμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.

Words; argument

λόγος (logos)

Speech, words, an account or an argument, as the construction requires. Here plural λόγων contrasts verbal experience with deeds. Later singular λόγος names the unfolding argument or the educated lover's position. The same English rendering cannot cover every occurrence without loss: the dialogue moves from skill in speaking toward whether the account spoken is coherent and useful.

Attestation. 132d: περὶ λόγων ἔμπειρος.

Worry

μέριμνα (merimna)

Care, concern or worry. The plural is the alleged cause of the rival's thinness in the athlete's taunt. The edition connects the portrait with comic representations of philosophical students. The word here does not establish that serious thought must be anxious, or that intellectual care lacks value; it is evidence of how one lover attacks the other's public image.

Attestation. 134b: ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν.

Worth mentioning

ἀξιόλογος (axiologos)

Worth speaking of, noteworthy or important. The educated lover especially recommends familiarity with crafts carrying this distinction. The adjective helps specify a socially selective curriculum rather than all possible activities indiscriminately. Its local criterion remains entangled with reputation: what makes a craft noteworthy is not yet independently explained in terms of the soul's benefit or the philosopher's distinctive expertise.

Attestation. 135b: μάλιστα τῶν ἀξιολόγων.

Worthless

μοχθηρός (mochthēros)

Bad or worthless, kept distinct by the edition from πονηρός, base. Socrates recalls the relation between bad people and uselessness with this adjective, and later uses it of animals and people judged by an improving craft. The English can sound absolute, but the relevant standard remains contextual: competence, condition and ethical quality need to be distinguished rather than assumed identical.

Attestation. 136e: τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς ἀχρήστους.

Wrestler

παλαιστής (palaistēs)

A wrestler, the second explicit specialist in the pentathlete comparison. Alongside the racer, he illustrates the generalist's inferiority in a specialist's own event. The example also returns to the athletic world mocked at the opening. Its role is not to make the athletic lover the winner of every argument, but to clarify a structure of relative expertise he would recognise.

Attestation. 135e: ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς.

Writing-master

γραμματιστής (grammatistēs)

A teacher of letters and elementary literacy, identifying Dionysius' occupation. The genitive belongs with his name, not with the youths' fathers. The school setting places the discussion among education, youthful display and older admirers before philosophy has been defined. It does not establish that Dionysius himself teaches astronomy, conducts this debate or endorses either lover's account of learning.

Attestation. 132a: τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ.

Young

νέος (neos)

Young in age; with the article and genitive plural here, 'of the young people'. Later the young and beautiful distract Socrates when they turn into an audience. The term should be distinguished from μειράκιον, the more specific designation of the two lads, and from Socrates' address ὦ νεανία, 'young man', to the athlete at 132c.

Attestation. 132a: τῶν τε νέων.

Young man

νεανίας (neanias)

A young man; the vocative addresses the athletic lover. It should not be confused with the two lads whom Socrates has been observing. The address introduces a question about the harsh dismissal of philosophy. It identifies the person Socrates challenges without supplying an exact age, and its conversational tone need not be expanded into either elaborate politeness or an insult.

Attestation. 132c: Ὦ νεανία.

A school entered, a topic only inferred

132a. Εἰς Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ εἰσῆλθον (eis dionysiou tou grammatistou eisēlthon)

The opening means that Socrates went into Dionysius the writing-master's place. Εἰς normally takes an accusative of destination, but the personal genitive here leaves the destination understood: the school or establishment belonging to Dionysius. The narrative therefore begins with an ordinary local encounter. The following τὴν ἰδέαν is an accusative of respect: the youths are considered especially comely in looks, not pronounced possessors of a metaphysical Form.

Socrates carefully separates what he saw from what he understood. He could not quite hear the boys' dispute, and their connection with Anaxagoras or Oenopides is introduced through appearing. These qualifications should survive any summary. The dialogue establishes a scientific-looking activity in a socially charged setting; it does not give the boys' theory, identify a winning argument or show that Socrates has already judged their learning.

Two lads, two hands, and an interrupted sentence

132b. ἐγκλίσεις τινὰς ἐμιμοῦντο τοῖν χεροῖν ἐπικλίνοντε καὶ μάλ’ ἐσπουδακότε (enkliseis tinas emimounto toin cheroin epiklinonte kai mal’ espoudakote)

The dual forms keep the pair of lads conspicuous: ἐπικλίνοντε describes the two tilting, and ἐσπουδακότε the two being intensely engaged. Τοῖν χεροῖν is a dual dative of means, with their hands. The boys are miming some inclinations; τινάς leaves their precise nature open. The edition's astronomical interpretation is plausible explanatory context, not an additional proposition uttered in the dialogue.

Socrates' next sentence starts κἀγώ, breaks off into an explanation of where he was seated, and resumes with the nudge and question. The pause makes the inquiry feel improvised within the room. His expectation of something great and fine is then echoed derisively by the athlete. The exchange is already about how concentrated activity is evaluated, before anyone supplies a definition of philosophizing.

A rebuke that answers for someone else

132c. Οὐ πρὸς σοῦ γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ποιεῖς τὸ καὶ ἀνερέσθαι τοῦτον (ou pros sou ge, ephē, ō sōkrates, poieis to kai aneresthai touton)

Οὐ πρὸς σοῦ gives the sense 'it is not like you' or 'not characteristic of you'. The articulated infinitive τὸ καὶ ἀνερέσθαι identifies the criticised action: even asking this man the question. The rival does not initially answer whether philosophy is fine. He challenges Socrates' decision to ask someone whose entire life he then caricatures through wrestling, eating and sleeping.

The hearing construction just before this names both participants through genitive participles: he hears Socrates asking and the other answering. He is therefore an overhearer who takes the floor, and his status as rival lover explains the personal aggression. Reading his speech as a neutral cultural distinction would lose the drama. Socrates has asked for a judgment about an activity; the intervention instead discredits a person as unworthy to judge it.

Choosing the respondent who claims more

132d. τὸν δὲ σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον εἶναι διερωτῆσαι (ton de sophōteron prospoioumenon einai dierōtēsai)

The accusative phrase identifies the man Socrates chooses to question closely: the one claiming to be wiser. Προσποιούμενον keeps the claim distinct from the narrator's endorsement. The contrast is with the athlete, who does not profess experience in words but in deeds. It is therefore the additional profession, not a demonstrated superiority, that makes the educated lover responsible for the ensuing account.

The edition notes that τὸν ἐρωτώμενον, the man who had been questioned, is Schleiermacher's correction supported by Ficino, against readings referring to a beloved or the questioner. Burnet's adopted wording keeps the released respondent the athlete. Socrates then says the original question was offered to the company, so the change of speaker is legitimate; he asks the same evaluative question before turning toward definition.

When the disputants become an audience

133a. ἐπακούσαντε τὼ μειρακίω ἐσιγησάτην, καὶ αὐτὼ παυσαμένω τῆς ἔριδος ἡμῶν ἀκροαταὶ ἐγενέσθην (epakousante tō meirakiō esigēsatēn, kai autō pausamenō tēs eridos hēmōn akroatai egenesthēn)

The sequence of dual forms makes the two lads act as a pair: they overhear, fall silent, stop their dispute and become listeners. Παυσαμένω takes the genitive τῆς ἔριδος, stopping from their quarrel, while ἡμῶν identifies whose listeners they become. Their earlier inquiry is not resolved; its attention is displaced by the adults' exchange.

Socrates distinguishes his own reported feeling from his impression of the lovers. He does not know what they experienced, but says he himself was dazzled, then judges that the other man seemed no less anxious. The concessive οὐ μὴν ἀλλά carries him from that anxiety to the ambitious answer. The public audience is now explicit, and the educated lover's certainty will be displayed under pressure to impress.

Can value be known before the thing is known?

133b. εἰδέναι πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ εἰδείη τις τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅτι ἔστιν (eidenai pragma hotioun eite kalon eite aischron estin, ho mē eideiē tis tēn archēn hoti estin)

The infinitive εἰδέναι supplies what is said to be possible: knowing of any thing whatever whether it is fine or shameful. The relative clause restricts the case to something whose nature one does not know at all. Τὴν ἀρχήν is adverbial here, not a reference to philosophy's historical beginning. The question distinguishes knowing a value from merely asserting it with conviction.

The lover's preceding declaration has made the value claim personal: he would not consider himself human if he despised philosophy, and he ensures that his beloved hears. Socrates does not rebut that declaration with an insult. He extracts the positive evaluation and asks what knowledge could warrant it. The accepted negative answer opens the demand for an account of philosophizing in the next section.

From lifelong learning to a maximum quantity

133c. ἵν’ ὡς πλεῖστα ἐν τῷ βίῳ μάθῃ (hin’ hōs pleista en tōi biōi mathēi)

The purpose clause means 'so that he may learn as much as possible in his life'. Ὡς with the superlative πλεῖστα expresses maximisation, and μάθῃ is the aorist subjunctive after ἵνα. The formulation is the lover's elaboration of Solon's line. It should not be silently attributed to the quoted poet as though the whole paragraph were a quotation.

The preceding claim that one must always learn at least one thing could describe continued learning without specifying its ultimate quantity. The purpose clause gives the stronger accumulation ideal that prompts Socrates' summary as πολυμαθία. Socrates initially thinks the answer says something, then reconsiders it. That narrative hesitation makes his interpretation a step to secure from the respondent, rather than a definition the reader should automatically accept.

One question, two deliberately different answers

133d. Πρὸς μὲν τόνδε μοι εἰρήσθω ὅτι οὐδέτερα (pros men tonde moi eirēsthō hoti oudetera)

The perfect passive imperative εἰρήσθω gives 'let it stand said' or 'let my answer be'. Πρὸς μὲν τόνδε directs the answer toward 'this fellow', the rival; the following πρὸς μέντοι σέ directs a different answer to Socrates. Οὐδέτερα means neither of the two predicates under discussion, fine and good. The lover is not announcing uncertainty about which one applies.

The narrator expressly calls the delivery ironic. The same pursuit is disdained before the rival and acknowledged before Socrates, making addressee and social competition alter the spoken answer. The question itself has broadened: philosophy was called fine, and is now called good too; exercise is proposed as a comparison. The reader should retain both distinctions, between the predicates and between the audiences.

A matched pair of quantity compounds

133e. ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν τὴν πολυμαθίαν φιλοσοφίαν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι (hōsper ge kai en tōi philosophein tēn polymathian philosophian hēgoumai einai)

The lover accepts much labour as love of exercise 'just as' he takes much learning to be philosophy. The infinitive construction contains two accusatives: what is being regarded and what it is regarded as. The parallel compounds πολυπονία and πολυμαθία foreground quantity, but their matching shape is not evidence that the underlying activities share every relevant feature.

Socrates next asks what exercise-lovers desire. The answer supplies a practical end, bodily good condition, against which amounts of exertion can be tested. This step prevents the discussion from remaining a contest over impressive names. The subsequent correction will show that neither the lover's devotion nor the sheer volume of activity automatically secures the good he agrees the pursuit is meant to produce.

A familiar expert returns through a joke

134a. κἂν ὗν γνῶναι (kan hyn gnōnai)

The phrase means 'even a pig would know'. Κἄν combines καί and ἄν, while ὗν is the accusative subject of the infinitive γνῶναι in the athlete's report of what he thought. The edition identifies the wording as Hermann's correction of the manuscripts' καὶ νῦν. The proverb-like insult therefore belongs to the printed text, but its conjectural status should remain visible.

Before the joke, Socrates decides that the lover of exercise is κινητέος, someone who must be nudged or set in motion. The verbal adjective recalls the literal elbow nudge at the opening. His practical experience is now required to correct the intellectual's assumption. The joke wins audience approval, but the substantive contribution is the distinction between many exertions and the appropriate ones that produce bodily fitness.

Neuter plural boys, singular reactions

134b. ἥσθη τὰ μειράκια καὶ ἐπεγέλασεν, ὁ δ’ ἕτερος ἠρυθρίασε (hēsthē ta meirakia kai epegelasen, ho d’ heteros ērythriase)

The boys were delighted and laughed, while the other man blushed. The singular verbs ἥσθη and ἐπεγέλασεν are compatible with the neuter plural subject τὰ μειράκια; they do not introduce an otherwise unidentified single spectator. The shift to ὁ δ’ ἕτερος then clearly identifies the embarrassed educated lover.

His rival's bodily caricature answers the opening insult point for point: sleeplessness answers sleeping, being unfed answers stuffing oneself, and the unrubbed neck answers wrestling. Socrates turns the scene's success into a question about concession: will the educated lover accept moderate exertion, or continue fighting against two opponents? Laughter is not treated as proof by itself; an explicit admission is still sought, though public embarrassment intensifies its pressure.

A defensible position need not be a believed one

134c. οὐδὲν δέομαι παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν (ouden deomai para doxan philonikein)

The sense is 'I have no need to strive for victory against my own opinion'. Παρά with the accusative expresses going against the belief, and φιλονικεῖν names competition for victory. The speaker distinguishes the position he could defend from what he actually thinks. His earlier ὑπόθεσις is simply the position laid down in the argument, not automatically a scientific theory.

The concession is selective. Against the athlete he claims he could support an even poorer position; toward Socrates he presents himself as candid. That distinction leaves his competitive motives intact even while the proposition is corrected. The final admission credits moderate exercises with producing fitness. Food then extends the test beyond one athletic example, preparing the move from bodily provisions to learning as something given to the soul.

What is supplied to the soul

134d. Οὐκοῦν ἓν τῶν προσφερομένων ψυχῇ ἐστι καὶ τὰ μαθήματα (oukoun hen tōn prospheromenōn psychēi esti kai ta mathēmata)

The question includes subjects of learning among the things supplied to the soul. Προσφερομένων is a substantivised passive participle in the genitive, dependent on ἕν: one of the supplied things or kinds of provision. The plural τὰ μαθήματα names the educational material considered collectively. Ψυχῇ is the recipient, while the following question asks which amount of these provisions benefits it.

The movement relies on analogy. Moderate exertions and food help the body; the lover now agrees that moderate provisions help the soul too. Yet no curriculum or educational measure has been identified. The repeated short assents can make the result sound settled, but the next question exposes the missing competence: someone must judge not just that moderation is good, but how many and what kinds of lessons are appropriate.

A measure needs both quantity and kind

134e. ὁπόσα καὶ ὁποῖα μέτρια (hoposa kai hopoia metria)

The paired interrogatives ask how many and what kind are moderate. They prevent the educational question from being merely numerical. A suitable provision depends on selecting the right sort as well as the amount. The preceding doctors, trainers and farmers supply familiar examples where the speakers can name someone authorised by competence to judge a practical measure.

Planting and sowing subjects of learning in the soul repeats the agricultural vocabulary of seeds. The image clarifies the need for cultivated judgment without naming its possessor. Δικαίως, used of asking, means with proper warrant or appropriately here; the question is whom it makes sense to consult. The adults' coming perplexity marks a genuine gap between praising moderation and knowing how to determine it in education.

Shared perplexity and a literary challenge

135a. Τοὐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες (tounteuthen ēdē aporias mestoi ēmen hapantes)

The opening says that from that point all of them were full of perplexity. Ἀπορίας is the genitive of what fills them, and ἅπαντες includes Socrates as well as the two lovers. The narration does not isolate the educated lover as the sole person unable to identify the relevant expertise. This shared impasse supplies the reason to try a different approach.

Socrates' offer to consult the lads is explicitly teasing, and the suitors' refusal to let another string the bow exposes the risk of protecting status rather than seeking an answer. When the lovers seem discouraged, he shifts from who judges the educational measure to which subjects they would conjecture are fitting. Τοπάζομεν keeps this new proposal provisional; the printed phrase around it has the textual history described in the edition.

The criterion becomes appearing knowledgeable

135b. πλείστην δ’ ἂν ἔχοι δόξαν, εἰ δοκοίη τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος εἶναι πασῶν (pleistēn d’ an echoi doxan, ei dokoiē tōn technōn empeiros einai pasōn)

The lover would have the greatest reputation if he appeared experienced in all crafts. The potential optative ἂν ἔχοι and conditional δοκοίη formulate the envisaged route to esteem. The earlier reported εἴη belongs to indirect speech after 'said'; it should not be treated as a separate expression of uncertainty merely because it is optative.

Δόξα now means reputation, whereas at 134c it meant the speaker's own opinion. The change makes the audience part of the educational criterion. The lover immediately relaxes all crafts to as many as possible, especially noteworthy ones, and selects what suits free men: understanding rather than manual performance. That social selection principle is a new proposal; it has not answered the preceding question about who knows the soul's proper measure.

An expensive expert and an impossible curriculum

135c. δύο μόνας τέχνας οὕτω μαθεῖν τὸν αὐτόν, μὴ ὅτι πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας (dyo monas technas houtō mathein ton auton, mē hoti pollas kai megalas)

Socrates asks about one and the same person learning only two crafts in this way, let alone many and important ones. Τὸν αὐτόν is the accusative subject of μαθεῖν. Μὴ ὅτι is the idiom 'let alone', escalating the difficulty; it does not add an independent negative assertion about the later words. The phrase 'in this way' retains the demanding standard supplied by the master-builder comparison.

The preceding figures contrast five or six minae with not even ten thousand drachmas. The edition explains their ratio; the important argumentative point is the great value and scarcity of top mastery, not a modern wage comparison. The lover then corrects Socrates' interpretation: he does not require the philosopher to know each craft exactly as its practitioner does. That retreat creates room for the runner-up model.

Following, contributing, and seeming best in the room

135d. ἐπακολουθῆσαί τε τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οἷόν τ’ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων, καὶ αὐτὸν ξυμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην (epakolouthēsai te tois legomenois hypo tou dēmiourgou hoion t’ einai diapherontōs tōn parontōn, kai auton xymballesthai gnōmēn)

The proposed free and educated person can follow what the craftsman says better than those present and contribute a judgment of his own. Τοῖς λεγομένοις is the dative object of following, while ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ identifies the speaker. The comparison group is the surrounding company, not the specialist himself. The two abilities are receptive comprehension and an active contribution.

The stated result is to seem most accomplished and wisest among whoever is present. This reprises the original social scene, where the lover speaks to impress his beloved. Burnet's ξυμβάλλεσθαι here and συμβάλλεσθαι at 138d belong to the same contributing verb-family. The later reprise will ask why this minimum competence should matter for ordinary crafts but somehow cease to matter when judges and rulers discuss more consequential affairs.

The pentathlete is first only within a restricted comparison

135e. τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἆθλα καὶ δεύτεροί εἰσι πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι (toutōn men leipontai kata ta toutōn athla kai deuteroi eisi pros toutous, tōn d’ allōn athlētōn prōtoi)

The μέν ... δέ structure separates two comparisons. Pentathletes fall short of racers and wrestlers in those specialists' own events and rank second to them; against the other athletes they rank first. Κατά restricts the respect in which they are inferior, and the repeated demonstratives keep the specialists in view. The text does not call them first overall without qualification.

This structured analogy offers the lover a flattering intermediate position: broad enough to outperform ordinary company, but not committed to specialist perfection. Socrates asks whether philosophizing produces a person of that kind. The analogy is still an attempt to understand the account, which the lover will endorse. Its adequacy as a definition depends on the later question whether such relative rank yields the exceptional usefulness claimed at 136b–c.

Freedom from specialism, at the price of depth

136a. μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι, μηδ’ εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι (mē douleuein mēdeni pragmati, mēd’ eis tēn akribeian mēden diapeponēkenai)

The philosopher is praised as not being enslaved to any one occupation and not having laboured over anything to the point of precision. The negative expressions accumulate around infinitives describing his character. The perfect διαπεπονηκέναι emphasises the intensive work that would have been invested. This is a defense of freedom from absorption, not a claim that the ideal person has done no work at all.

The following explanation says care for one thing could leave him behind in everything else. The lover accepts ὕπακρος, just below the top, as a compliment and links breadth with the social ideal of a free person. Yet the accepted absence of precise expertise will become the weakness Socrates tests. A limitation that sounds liberating in a portrait can become costly when someone needs successful action.

Moderation returns without its judge

136b. ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι (alla pantōn metriōs ephēphthai)

The contrast is that the cultivated person has laid hold of everything moderately. Ἐφῆφθαι is the perfect infinitive of a verb taking the genitive, so πάντων supplies the activities touched or engaged with. The adverb μετρίως recalls the measure praised in exertion, food and learning. It gives the new generalist ideal the verbal appearance of satisfying the earlier correction.

But the unresolved question at 134e concerned who could judge the proper quantity and kind for the soul. Saying 'everything moderately' does not itself answer it. Socrates now tests the account through another admission: good people are useful, bad people useless, and philosophers useful. This changes the pressure from the curriculum's social elegance to what the resulting person can actually do for someone who needs help.

Testing usefulness while preserving the printed brackets

136c. τὸν ὕπακρον ἐκεῖνον [τὸν φιλόσοφον] (ton hypakron ekeinon [ton philosophon])

The phrase identifies 'that runner-up', followed in Burnet's text by the bracketed explanatory words 'the philosopher'. The edition reports that Burnet, following Cobet, regarded those words as an addition and does not translate them. The square brackets therefore express an editorial judgment of suspected interpolation; they do not denote words Socrates spoke in an aside or an uncertainty about the person's identity.

The practical case asks which helper one would bring home if oneself or a valued friend became ill and wanted health. The change from cultivated conversation to dependence under need is deliberate. The question assumes the philosopher is poorer than each specialist in the respective craft. That establishes comparative limitation, while the stronger conclusion of uselessness still requires scrutiny, especially after the respondent initially chooses both helpers.

A change from usefulness to priority

136d. Μή μοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀμφοτέρους λέγε, ἀλλ’ ὁπότερον μᾶλλόν τε καὶ πρότερον (mē moi, eipon egō, amphoterous lege, all’ hopoteron mallon te kai proteron)

Socrates rejects 'both' as an answer and asks which of the two the respondent would choose rather and first. The paired comparatives concern preference and priority. The reply selects the doctor, as the ship example then selects the pilot. These choices make the expert's superiority compelling in the specified emergencies, but do not simply restate the earlier answer in a different form.

The subsequent question says that, as long as any craftsman is present, the philosopher is not useful. That moves beyond comparative preference: a second helper might conceivably contribute while not being first choice. The text records assent to the stronger proposition. A careful reading should mark the transition rather than either dismissing the practical examples or allowing the change in criterion to pass unnoticed.

The word that makes a conditional charge general

136e. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀεί που δημιουργοί (eisi gar hēmin aei pou dēmiourgoi)

The sentence says that there are always craftsmen for us, with που giving a light qualifying or conversational tone. Its ἀεί supplies the temporal generalisation needed to extend the previous 'as long as a craftsman is present' claim. The edition identifies 'always' as Hermann's reading, against δή in the named manuscripts. The printed word is therefore both textually and argumentatively consequential.

Socrates next asks whether continuing would be rather boorish, and receives permission to ask whatever he likes. His declared aim is only to agree again on what has been said. The polite pause does not remove the coming pressure: gathering the admissions together exposes their clash with the lover's high estimate of philosophy. The recap also needs checking against the earlier conversation, rather than automatic acceptance as a perfect record.

A recap that adds the speakers to the claim

137a. ὡμολογήσαμεν καλὸν εἶναι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι (hōmologēsamen kalon einai tēn philosophian kai autoi philosophoi einai)

Socrates recalls agreement that philosophy is fine and that the speakers themselves are philosophers. The first-person plural ὡμολογήσαμεν makes the recap shared, while αὐτοί brings the speakers personally into its content. The edition notes that this second claim was not expressly agreed in those words; it also reports Schanz's deletion proposal following Forster. Burnet nevertheless prints the clause without brackets.

The culminating consequence is limited by κατά γε τὸν σὸν λόγον, according to your account at least, and by the specified way of having craft knowledge. The target is the respondent's accepted model. These qualifications matter when philosophers are called base and useless: Socrates is exposing what follows from this description, before immediately resisting that description as an adequate account of philosophizing.

Rescuing the people by rejecting the account

137b. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ φίλε, ἔχωσι (alla mē ouch houtōs, ō phile, echōsi)

The edition renders the cautious expression as Socrates' suspicion that they are not so. The plural ἔχωσι refers back to the philosophers just described as base and useless, rather than an impersonal singular 'that is not how things are'. The wording therefore resists the derogatory result while opening the possibility that the proposed account of philosophizing is mistaken.

The following negatives reject earnest absorption in crafts, busybody stooping over things and much learning as sufficient identifications; 'something else' is left to be sought. The social contempt of ὄνειδος and βάναυσος remains part of this transition and should not be washed out. Socrates then proposes a clearer test through horses: which people know how to punish rightly? The argument starts afresh from practical expertise, now directed toward improvement and discrimination.

Improving, punishing, and recognising quality

137c. Ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς (hē autē ara technē beltistous te poiei kai kolazei orthōs)

The question assigns two activities to the same craft: making the animals best and punishing them rightly. The coordinated τε ... καί pairs the activities, while βελτίστους is a predicative complement of the animals being improved. Ὀρθῶς is indispensable. The claimed connection is between competent improvement and correct discipline, not between benefit and any act someone happens to call punishment.

The next question adds recognising the decent and worthless members of the kind. Thus the proposed craft combines an improving action, a corrective action and a discriminatory judgment. The dialogue then asks to transfer the pattern to people. The repeated 'same' signals identity of expertise, a stronger claim than saying the functions are related; the short assents should not conceal how much is being gathered into that single competence.

One and many in a compressed question

137d. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἥτις ἕνα, καὶ πολλούς, καὶ ἥτις πολλούς, καὶ ἕνα (oukoun kai hētis hena, kai pollous, kai hētis pollous, kai hena)

The feminine relative ἥτις refers back to the craft, with its relevant verbs understood: the craft that does this for one also does it for many, and conversely. The repeated accusatives ἕνα and πολλούς are the people affected or known. The ellipsis makes the agreement rapid, but the missing verbs must be supplied from the preceding account of improving, punishing and distinguishing.

This passage generalises the competence across number without separately demonstrating why individual and collective cases require no further knowledge. Socrates then names judicial expertise as the knowledge that rightly punishes people behaving lawlessly in cities, and identifies it with justice. The wording does not assert that all such people are citizens. The movement from human quality to civic adjudication is a further step, not merely a translation of the numeral contrast.

From knowing animals to being one

137e. Καὶ εἰ βοῦς ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ χρηστοὺς ⟨βοῦς⟩, κἂν αὑτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τίς ἐστιν (kai ei bous ōn agnooi tous ponērous kai chrēstous ⟨bous⟩, kan hauton agnooi poios tis estin)

The hypothetical asks whether someone who is an ox and does not know good and bad oxen would also fail to know what sort he himself is. Βοῦς ὤν makes the knower a member of the animal kind, a change from the earlier human practitioner who knows how to improve it. The edition flags this shift in its note; retaining the subject prevents the argument from seeming a simple repetition.

The second βοῦς is printed in angle brackets, marking Bekker's supplied word as adopted by Burnet. The first occurrence is unbracketed. The conjecture makes the object of knowing explicit, but the logical issue is separate: ignorance of the class is being connected with ignorance of oneself as a member. The horse, ox and dog cases prepare the transfer to human self-assessment rather than independently proving its full scope.

From not knowing oneself to a positive identity

138a. Τὸ δὲ αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖν σωφρονεῖν ἐστιν ἢ μὴ σωφρονεῖν (to de hauton agnoein sōphronein estin ē mē sōphronein)

The article makes the infinitive phrase 'being ignorant of oneself' the subject of a question: is it being temperate, or not being temperate? The respondent chooses the negative. Socrates then asks for the positive identification of knowing oneself with being temperate. That reversal deserves attention; rejection of one identification is being made to support a stronger equivalence, without a separate examination of intermediate possibilities.

The ensuing Delphic reference interprets an inscription rather than quoting it. The edition identifies 'Know thyself' in its note, while the running Greek says the inscription urges practising temperance and justice. The added justice depends on the preceding chain that joined recognising quality to correct punishment. The authority of the inscription and Socrates' expanded interpretation should therefore remain distinguishable in the reader's account.

Two functions assigned to one underlying capacity

138b. ᾗ μὲν κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα, δικαιοσύνη αὕτη ἐστίν, ᾗ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους, σωφροσύνη (hēi men kolazein orthōs epistametha, dikaiosynē hautē estin, hēi de diagignōskein kai heauton kai allous, sōphrosynē)

The paired datives ᾗ μὲν ... ᾗ δέ mean that by which we know how to perform the respective activities. One aspect is punishing correctly, called justice; the other is distinguishing oneself and others, called temperance. The second clause leaves words understood from the first. This syntactic parallel supports the presentation of two named functions of the same previously admitted competence.

The next question concludes that justice and temperance are the same. That conclusion depends on the earlier identity claims, not just on the parallel form of the clauses. The discussion then adds civic order through wrongdoers paying penalties, and political expertise follows. Each step enlarges the scope of the proposed knowledge, so the accelerating short responses should be read as substantive commitments rather than harmless changes of terminology.

Many titles under the condition of ruling rightly

138c. καὶ μία τέχνη ἐστὶν βασιλική, τυραννική, πολιτική, δεσποτική, οἰκονομική, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη (kai mia technē estin basilikē, tyrannikē, politikē, despotikē, oikonomikē, dikaiosynē, sōphrosynē)

The sentence declares one craft across the royal, tyrannical, political, master's and household-manager's capacities, justice and temperance. The first adjectives are feminine because they name kinds of τέχνη; the final abstract nouns join the same list. Just before this, masculine titles list their possessors. The change from people to capacities should not be lost by treating the whole passage as a string of interchangeable labels.

The preceding questions repeatedly stipulate ordering the city or household rightly. That condition is essential: the list is not a finding that every actual king, master or tyrant is just. The edition notes a parallel with the Statesman's unification of several governing knowledges and a difference over the tyrant. Here the compression leaves differences of institution and scale largely unexplored while asserting a common competent activity.

The second half proposes “not shameful”

138d. οὐκ αἰσχρὸν περὶ τούτων μήτε ἕπεσθαι δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν (ouk aischron peri toutōn mēte hepesthai dynasthai mēte symballesthai peri autōn)

This is the second branch of Socrates' extended comparison: could inability to follow or contribute be shameful when doctors or craftsmen speak, but not shameful when judges, kings and the recently listed rulers do? The words οὐκ αἰσχρόν must remain the proposed 'not shameful', rather than being rewritten as a simple positive question, 'is it not shameful?' The answer rejects that exemption.

The negative pair μήτε ... μήτε coordinates inability to follow and to contribute, returning to the educated lover's earlier standard for cultured conversation. He now insists that having nothing to contribute about such important matters would indeed be shameful. The response makes political and ethical competence unavoidable on his own evaluative terms; it has not yet established that second-place conversational competence is sufficient for the responsibilities that follow.

A household one must not simply hand over

138e. οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἐπιτρεπτέον οὐδὲ τὰ δευτερεῖα ἐν τούτῳ ἑκτέον, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς (ouk allōi epitrepteon oude ta deutereia en toutōi hekteon, all’ auton kolasteon dikazonta orthōs)

The verbal adjectives in -τέον express necessity: the household must not be entrusted to another, second prizes must not be held in this matter, and the philosopher must himself correct, judging rightly. Their impersonal shape allows the person responsible to be specified through the surrounding construction. Δικάζοντα explains the required manner of correction; the obligation does not authorise arbitrary punishment.

The condition is that his household be well ordered. Socrates then extends the responsibility to arbitrations entrusted by friends and decisions assigned by the city. Διαίτας here means arbitrations, not diet or a way of life; διακρίνειν concerns deciding a matter, distinct from the earlier διαγιγνώσκειν of recognising people's quality. These particular obligations sharpen why general admiration and permanent second place will no longer suffice.

A negative conclusion, followed by silence

139a. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμαθία τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία (pollou ara dei hēmin, ō beltiste, to philosophein polymathia te einai kai hē peri tas technas pragmateia)

Πολλοῦ δεῖ is the idiom 'it is far from', not a recommendation that a great quantity is needed. The conclusion rejects philosophizing as either much learning or preoccupation with crafts; it should not be weakened to the claim that it is not both together. Just before it, ἡγεῖσθαι means lead, in contrast with second or third place, rather than the earlier common sense of think.

The ending does not state a complete positive definition matching the rejected ones. Instead the wise claimant is ashamed of what was said before and falls silent, the unlearned lover agrees, and the company praises the words. Those reactions complete the dramatic reversal of the opening. They register acceptance and embarrassment, while leaving the reader to examine the rapid identities through which governing responsibility has been made central to philosophy.