From the book
Stobaeus, Volume II
John Stobaeus · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordThe preliminary end names the first congenial attachment of a creature not yet rational; it describes a starting condition rather than a smaller mature ethical achievement.
- In StobaeusNutritive and perceptive beginnings explain how attachment can precede rational development, while three rival candidates leave the content of that first attachment unsettled.
- In this editionRetain the unusual preliminary end and explain its local definition; replacing it with ordinary purpose would obscure the account’s developmental comparison of roots and plant.
- A place to readChapter 7 · Excerpt 3c · Passage 2 Read the creature’s awareness of its own constitution alongside the root image and the three proposed objects; the list does not decide among them.
- English renderings
- preliminary end; initial congenial affection
Meaning
Hypotelis names the creature’s first congenial affection or attachment before rational development. It is not simply a smaller version of the mature ethical end.
Use in the book
The account places this starting point where a living creature first becomes aware of its constitution while still nonrational. Its natural beginnings are compared with roots rather than a developed plant. Three possible candidates are given: pleasure, freedom from disturbance, or the primary things according to nature. Naming these candidates does not decide the dispute among accounts of the first attachment. The lexicon therefore keeps the preliminary end distinct from the rationally articulated final aim and from the target of an action.
The root comparison links the definition to capacities already operating in the new creature. Nutrition and perception have beginnings that are effective before rational maturity, so an initial attachment need not already contain a reasoned account of the good life. The passage also says attachment occurs immediately upon coming into being; it is not presented as a later intellectual decision. Yet it offers pleasure, freedom from disturbance and primary natural things as alternatives. Its developmental claim is therefore more determinate than its answer about the object to which the creature first attaches.
“Each of these occupies the place of a root, not yet of a plant.” (Chapter 7 · Excerpt 3c · Passage 2).
Places to read
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 3c · Passage 22The first congenial affection is defined and three candidates listed.
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 3c · Passage 32The account develops the relation between the initial attachment and later life.
Translation in this edition
The unusual noun is rendered “preliminary end,” with its definition supplied by the passage.
Ὑποτελὶς
Attested. Chapter 7 · Excerpt 3c · Passage 2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 47.
Ὑποτελὶς δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον τοῦ ζῴου πάθος, ἀφ’ οὗ κατήρξατο συναισθάνεσθαι
Source note
Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 47–48. The root/plant comparison marks development; it does not identify the creature with a literal plant.