Stobaeus Lexicon

A Reader's Companion
to Volume One

610 entries with Greek and English
Passage references and explanatory notes

Diotimos Editions

Complete expanded edition · October 2026

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Introduction

A companion for reading

This expanded Stobaeus Lexicon offers 610 entries for readers of the Greek-English edition of Volume One. It follows the vocabulary across philosophy, theology, arithmetic, astronomy, weather, living bodies, the senses, and the soul. Each entry joins a Greek headword to English renderings, an explanation of its use, and passages where that use can be examined.

This edition adds 450 main articles to the earlier 160-entry companion and incorporates 85 subsidiary treatments within related articles. Its 1,132 annotated references lead to 605 distinct passage locations. The selection follows a vocabulary audit of the edited Greek corpus; terms are admitted for their attested use and interpretive value, rather than to meet a numerical quota. The aim is a more substantial companion to the whole volume, while retaining selective reading lists rather than claiming an exhaustive concordance.

Stobaeus preserves many voices. A poet's image, a school definition, a dialogue's provisional argument, and a Hermetic address can use the same word differently. The entries therefore preserve attributions, qualifications, and disagreements. "In Stobaeus" means in the texts collected by him; it does not make every statement his own doctrine.

The supplied Platonic Lexicon provides the model for the entry structure and restrained book design. This companion's explanations are newly written for the Stobaeus edition. Its focus is the wording and arguments preserved in this first volume, rather than a general history of each term across all ancient literature.

How to read an entry

The word introduces the meanings needed for the cited passages. In Stobaeus explains how the term works in particular accounts. The places supplies an annotated reading list. Additional sections develop contrasts, images, or important groups of sources when the entry needs them. In this edition explains choices in the English translation. See also connects related entries.

Greek and transliteration appear beneath each English headword. Greek accents are retained; ē and ō indicate the long vowels eta and omega. The transliteration is a reading aid, not a reconstruction of pronunciation. Headwords use dictionary forms; cited passages may contain an inflected form or a related verb or adjective. Related words may share an entry when that makes their relation clearer.

The Greek index provides a route from the printed Greek term to the article, including terms treated within a broader entry. Subsidiary treatments are not counted as additional main articles. The English–Greek index pairs main English headwords with Greek and transliteration and adds lookup references for the 85 subsidiary treatments. The thematic index groups all 610 main entries into nine areas of study; an entry's placement is a navigational choice, not an assertion that it belongs to only one subject.

The footnote attached to each entry gives the original printed pages for its selected passages and any additional editorial qualification. In the PDF and Word editions these are footnotes; Markdown uses linked note definitions, and EPUB provides linked notes following each entry. Cross-references are linked in the digital editions.

References and translation

The base text is Curt Wachsmuth, Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo priores, volumen I (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884), in the supplied scan. The running Greek occupies printed pages 15–502; preliminary testimony and ancient contents occupy pages 3–10. Source footnotes refer to this printed pagination, not the scan's page count.

An identifier such as I.49.1a.3 means Book I, chapter 49, excerpt 1a, modern comparison subdivision 3. Arith.9 identifies the ninth arithmetic excerpt. These identifiers match the accompanying bilingual edition. The subdivisions help compare the languages and are not additional ancient chapters.

"Edition p." refers throughout to the English page in the clean 1,755-page PDF Stobaeus Volume One. Its Greek counterpart is the immediately preceding page. The passage identifier remains the primary locator in reflowable formats or if pagination changes. Numbers in this Lexicon's contents and indexes refer instead to its own PDF pages; Word and EPUB cross-references navigate directly to the articles.

The Lexicon follows the project's independent English translation and the reviewed Greek text. This expansion was checked against that edited corpus; it is not a new diplomatic transcription or a fresh complete collation of the nineteenth-century scan. English equivalents vary with context; conversely, one English word can render more than one Greek term. Entries explain important distinctions, such as breath and spirit, form and shape, or knowledge and belief, where a fixed one-word substitution would obscure the argument.

Supplied attributions, conjectural readings, rejected additions, and gaps retain their qualifications. A restored heading with missing running text provides evidence for the chapter's question, not a surviving answer. Ancient wordplay is identified as such. Reports about bodily processes and weather are described in their historical terms rather than rewritten as present-day scientific accounts.

Accident

συμβεβηκός, sumbebēkos, accident; incidental attribute; incidentally[1]

The word. Symbebēkos describes what belongs incidentally. The expression kata symbebēkos indicates that a predicate applies through an association rather than in the thing's own right.

In Stobaeus. The report about Aristotle calls soul unmoved but allows it to participate in motion incidentally. Shapes and boundaries supply the analogy: they move when the bodies whose shapes or boundaries they are move. This distinction concerns the way motion is attributed, not an unpredictable mishap.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.7b Soul participates in motion incidentally, like shapes and boundaries belonging to bodies. *(Edition p. 1001.)*

In this edition. Render the phrase "incidentally" where it modifies a predicate. The English noun "accident" can otherwise suggest chance or misfortune.

See also. Chance and fortune; Form; Immovable; Motion; Underlying subject.

Action

πρᾶξις; πράττειν, praxis; prattein, action; conduct; doing[2]

The word. Praxis is action or doing; related verbs describe performing an act. The noun should not be confined to a later technical distinction without contextual support.

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[1] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 325. The report's statement that soul "precedes" motion need not assert an earlier temporal event.

[2] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 390. The selected witness is the verb prattein. The noun and verb are grouped as a lexical family rather than presented as the same grammatical form.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic creator warns souls against doing something new contrary to his plans. Action is evaluated through its relation to appointed order and threatened consequences. The passage's verb therefore concerns accountable conduct, not an abstract definition of action as such.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.20 Departure from the creator's plans is treated as punishable conduct. *(Edition p. 1257.)*

In this edition. "Act" or "do" suits the verb; "action" names the corresponding activity.

See also. Choice; Deed and work; Order; Punishment; Will and wish.

Active or productive

ποιητικός, poiētikos, productive; active; capable of making[3]

The word. Poiētikos concerns producing or bringing something about. In causal explanations it marks the agent's role rather than merely the possession of an activity.

In Stobaeus. The report under Pythagoras's name couples the productive cause with the formal cause and identifies this side with intellect or god. The receptive and material side is distinguished from it. The contrast explains complementary causal roles; it does not require every instance of making to be divine creation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.10 Productive and formal causation are aligned with intellect. *(Edition p. 303.)*

I.10.12.5 The silversmith illustrates the acting cause required alongside material. *(Edition p. 301.)*

[3] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 123–125. The silver-cup example is the reporter's criticism of a purely material explanation, not a quotation from Anaximenes.

In this edition. "Productive" suits causal contrasts; "active" may suit a direct opposition to passive. "Poetic" would mislead in these passages.

See also. Art and craft; Cause; Creator and poet; Demiurge and craftsman; Passive and capable of affection.

Activity

ἐνέργεια, energeia, activity; actuality[4]

The word. Energeia concerns being at work or in operation. Its relation to capacity varies with the account being reported: an activity may be the exercise of a power, while "actuality" emphasizes what is realized.

In Stobaeus. In the report on form, activity is one of Aristotle's several names for form. In the definition of motion, the same Greek noun concerns what is potentially movable precisely insofar as it is movable. These uses connect the term with a capacity without making every activity a change of place.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.1b.1 Activity is listed among the expressions used of form. *(Edition p. 335.)*

I.19.1.5 Motion is the actuality of what is potentially movable. *(Edition p. 433.)*

I.49.21.1 The soul's affections are described as activities, unlike the heating and cooling of bodies. *(Edition p. 1081.)*

The Platonists. The passage from Porphyry at I.49.21.1 distinguishes incorporeal activity from alteration in the body. Calling the soul's affections activities belongs to this argument; it is not a definition imposed on every use of pathos.

[4] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 134–135, 162–163, 344.

In this edition. "Activity" is the usual rendering, but the Aristotelian definition of motion uses "actuality." The related energēma in I.50.1 names the experienced activity of perception.

See also. Actuality; Affection; Motion; Perception; Power and capacity.

Actuality

ἐντελέχεια, entelecheia, actuality[5]

The word. The term names a thing's realized or completed condition. The contrast with what exists potentially is central to the examples collected here; "actuality" does not merely mean that something is real rather than imaginary.

In Stobaeus. The report of Aristotle explains the word through both continuity and completeness. Bronze can become a statue; once it has received the appropriate form, the statue exists in actuality. In the account of soul, Aristotle's definition calls soul the first actuality of an organic natural body possessing life potentially.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.1b.2 Bronze becomes an actual statue when it receives its form and attains its end. *(Edition p. 335.)*

I.14.1b Division without limit is allowed potentially, but not as an accomplished actuality. *(Edition p. 355.)*

I.49.1a.3 Soul is defined as the first actuality of a body capable of life. *(Edition p. 979.)*

Images and comparisons. The bronze statue gives the reader a concrete contrast between a material's capacity and the completed thing. This is the report's explanatory example, not an allegory supplied by the lexicon.

[5] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 135, 141, 319. I.49.1a.3 first prints ἐνδελέχειαν, with delta, then ἐντελέχειαν, with tau. The translation follows the definition while retaining the spelling difference in the Greek.

In this edition. Entelecheia is "actuality"; its adverbial use can be "actually." Energeia can also require "actuality," so the English equivalent does not by itself identify which Greek word stands behind it.

See also. Activity; Division; End; Form; Life; Power and capacity; Soul.

Addition

πρόσθεσις, prosthesis, addition; adding on[6]

The word. Prosthesis is addition or the addition of something to a subject. In the account of motion, it concerns quantitative increase rather than a change of quality.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian report associates growth and diminution with addition and subtraction, contrasting them with alteration from hot to cold or sweet to bitter. It then distinguishes locomotion. The classification makes clear why adding an amount is not the same kind of change as changing a thing's quality or position.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.1.5 Addition helps characterize quantitative motion in a threefold classification. *(Edition p. 433.)*

In this edition. "Addition" is direct; specify what is added when the context provides it rather than treating every increase as numerical calculation.

See also. Change and alteration; Growth; Locomotion; Quantity; Subtraction and removal.

[6] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 162–163. The definition of motion in this report is broader than movement from place to place.

Advantage

ὠφέλεια, ōpheleia, benefit; advantage[7]

The word. Ōpheleia is benefit or advantage, the good an action or condition brings to someone.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedrus argument asks whether divinely sent love benefits lover and beloved and promises to defend the positive case. Benefit is therefore the disputed point, not an assumption that every kind of madness helps. The following distinctions among sources of madness are necessary to the argument.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.8 The benefit of divinely sent love is set as the claim to be demonstrated. *(Edition p. 275.)*

In this edition. "Benefit" makes the recipient's good clear; "advantage" is a broader equivalent.

See also. Demonstration; Divine inspiration; Good; Love; Madness.

Aether

αἰθήρ, aithēr, aether; upper air[8]

The word. Aithēr names a heavenly or upper region and, in some physical accounts, a special celestial substance. The context determines whether a location or a constituent of the heavens is in view.

In Stobaeus. The treatise transmitted as Aristotle's letter to Alexander distinguishes aether from the four elements. It links the word with the heavens' perpetual circular running, rejecting a derivation from burning. Elsewhere the word occurs in the description of the eagle's proper upper region.

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[7] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 113. The passage distinguishes its particular divine madness from departures from ordinary behavior caused by illness.

[8] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 256, 460. The alternatives αἴθεσθαι, "to burn," and ἀεὶ θεῖν, "always to run," are ancient explanatory wordplay. They are not presented here as established historical etymologies.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.5 Aether is the uncorrupted celestial element, distinct from the four. *(Edition p. 765.)*

I.49.68.10 The eagle returns to the upper air, the region suited to it. *(Edition p. 1535.)*

Images and comparisons. In the Isis-Horus dialogue, birds returning to their own heights illustrate the assignment of souls to appropriate regions. The eagle's upper air participates in that comparison; the passage is not introducing a new fifth-element theory.

In this edition. "Aether" is retained for the celestial substance; "upper air" expresses the regional sense in the Hermetic comparison. The two renderings make the function of the word visible.

See also. Air; Circular motion; Element; Heaven; Nature; World.

Affection

πάθος, pathos, affection; experience; what is undergone[9]

The word. Pathos names something undergone or a condition produced in a subject. It can concern feeling and suffering, but it need not be an emotion: physical and perceptual changes also fall within its range.

In Stobaeus. The Philebus extract describes soul and body sharing a single affection and movement, named perception. Porphyry subsequently distinguishes what bodies undergo from what is said of incorporeal things. The apparent sameness of vocabulary therefore conceals a question about whether the two subjects are affected in the same way.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.50.2b A shared affection and movement of soul and body is called perception. *(Edition p. 1583.)*

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[9] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 307, 344, 472. In I.50.2b the Greek construction is compressed. The translation preserves both the common affection and the common movement without equating pathos exclusively with pain.

I.49.21.1 Bodily alteration is distinguished from the soul's activities. *(Edition p. 1081.)*

I.47.12.1 The Timaeus extract introduces pleasant, painful, perceived, and unperceived affections. *(Edition p. 933.)*

In this edition. "Affection" preserves the breadth of the noun. Where the syntax is verbal, "being affected" makes the relation clearer. Apathēs is "unaffected," not automatically "unfeeling."

See also. Activity; Body; Change and alteration; Pain; Perception; Pleasure; Soul.

Age and maturity

ἡλικία, hēlikia, age; stage of life; maturity[10]

The word. Hēlikia is age or a stage of life. It can concern development rather than a numerical count of years.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account distinguishes activities present from human generation from purer activities cooperating with the rational soul as age changes. Psychic functions are therefore described as becoming operative at different stages. The text does not give a fixed age at which every person reaches rational maturity.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.6.6 Different activities accompany different stages of development. *(Edition p. 855.)*

In this edition. "Age" is direct; "maturity" fits only where the developmental direction is explicit.

See also. Activity; Aging; Child and childhood; Rational and irrational; Soul.

[10] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 285–286. A main verb is understood in the clause about purer activities. The English supplies the parallel sense without adding a timetable.

Aggregation

σύγκρισις, sunkrisis, combination; aggregation[11]

The word. Synkrisis is a bringing together or combination. In physical accounts it can explain apparent generation through persistent constituents.

In Stobaeus. The survey groups several philosophers as explaining worlds through combinations and separations rather than generation and destruction strictly understood. The contrast concerns quantitative gathering versus qualitative alteration. It does not imply that Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Epicurus all posit the same kinds of constituents.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.20.1d.1 Aggregation explains apparent generation without qualitative alteration of constituents. *(Edition p. 459.)*

In this edition. "Combination" is broad; "aggregation" emphasizes the gathering of parts.

See also. Atom; Change and alteration; Coming into being and passing away; Compound aggregate; Discrimination and separation.

Aging

γηράσκειν, gēraskein, growing old; aging[12]

The word. Gēraskein is to grow old. The process can be contrasted with renewed youth in accounts of exceptional creatures.

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[11] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 170. The source says finely divided bodies; it does not call every listed thinker an atomist.

[12] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 398–399. The catalogue contains idealized claims about exemplary animals, including sleepless lions and harmless serpents; these remain features of its narrative.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic animal catalogue describes a serpent becoming young again even after growing old, comparing its renewal with divine nature. Aging supplies the condition from which renewal occurs. The excerpt leaves the mechanism unspecified, so the explanation should not add an unmentioned process such as shedding skin.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.49 A serpent's renewed youth is contrasted with its prior aging. *(Edition p. 1287.)*

In this edition. "Growing old" preserves the verbal process; "old age" names the resulting condition.

See also. Age and maturity; Immortality; Life; Living creature; Rebirth.

Air

ἀήρ, aēr, air[13]

The word. Aēr names air as a constituent of the physical world. Its relation to breath is a question within the text: some reports identify the two, while other contexts distinguish a surrounding medium from a moving current.

In Stobaeus. The account of Anaximenes makes air the principle from which things arise and into which they dissolve. It compares the soul's holding a person together with air and breath encompassing the world. Archelaus' account instead stresses density and rarefaction in explaining the production of fire and water. Air therefore has both a material and an explanatory role.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.5 Anaximenes' air and breath encompass and hold together. *(Edition p. 301.)*

I.10.12.7 Archelaus connects air with density and rarefaction. *(Edition p. 303.)*

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[13] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 123–124. The criticism of Anaximenes and the silversmith comparison belong to the reporter, not to the quoted analogy itself.

In this edition. "Air" renders aēr. The report's explicit equivalence with pneuma in the first passage does not make the two words interchangeable throughout the volume.

See also. Aether; Breath; Density and rarefaction; Element.

Allotment

μοῖρα; διακλήρωσις, moira; diaklērōsis, allotment; portion; fate[14]

The word. Moira is a portion or allotted share and can designate one's fate. The movement between portion and destiny is explicit in some ancient explanations of divine names.

In Stobaeus. Homer's warrior speech declares that neither coward nor brave can escape his moira once born. The cosmological discussion attributed in its heading to Aristotle explains the name through apportionment, alongside other names interpreted through linkage, limitation, distribution, and inescapability. The first is a statement about a mortal's assigned end; the second makes the word part of a coordinated interpretation of divine governance.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.5.1 The allotted fate cannot be escaped after birth. *(Edition p. 167.)*

I.5.22a Moira is explained through things having been apportioned. *(Edition p. 189.)*

I.49.39.3 Different soul descents follow different prior allocations. *(Edition p. 1207.)*

Differentiated allocations. Diaklērōsis is an allocation or distribution by allotment. I.49.39.3 connects different descents of souls to different prior assignments. The term explains an ordered relation among souls, their recipients, and their descents. It does not in itself establish that the distribution is random merely because the language is related to lots.

[14] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 74, 82–83, 377.

In this edition. "Fate" conveys the personal destiny in the verse. "Allotment" keeps the underlying image visible; the ancient wordplay is not presented as a modern proof of etymology.

See also. Descent; Fate; Law; Limit; Necessity; Part and whole; Soul.

Altar

βωμός, bōmos, altar[15]

The word. Bōmos is an altar, a raised place of sacred offering. It can become a cosmological designation through analogy.

In Stobaeus. The report about Philolaus calls the central fire nature's altar, alongside hearth, house of Zeus, bond, and measure. These names express religious and structural roles for the cosmic center. The central fire remains distinct from the enclosing fire and from the sun moving in the system.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.22.1d.1 Altar is one of the names assigned to the central fire. *(Edition p. 537.)*

In this edition. "Altar" preserves the sacred image; it does not imply a human-built structure at the center of the world.

See also. Fire; God; Measure; Sacred; World.

Always moving

ἀεικίνητος, aeikinētos, ever-moving; always moving[16]

The word. Aeikinētos describes continuous or abiding motion. It must be distinguished from autokinētos, self-moving, which concerns the source of motion.

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[15] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 196. The passage explicitly distinguishes the central and enclosing fires; conflating them would erase its arrangement.

[16] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 281–282. The unusual list of denied conditions belongs to the source's distinction between soul and bodily motion.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account calls soul ever-moving in essence and self-moving in thought. It then denies that this motion depends on the ordinary conditions of bodily movement: motion in a place, toward something, or for the sake of body. The term consequently cannot be reduced here to endless travel through space.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.4.1 Ever-motion and self-motion are distinguished within a description of incorporeal soul. *(Edition p. 843.)*

In this edition. "Ever-moving" preserves the compact predicate; explain the kind of motion before imagining a physical trajectory.

See also. Immovable; Incorporeal; Motion; Self motion; Soul.

Amber

ἤλεκτρον, ēlektron, amber[17]

The word. Ēlektron denotes amber here, although the word can have other material senses in other contexts.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus groups amber's apparent attraction with that of lodestones and denies that these effects involve a pulling force. The following explanation invokes displacement and movements of bodies in a world without void. Amber is an example requiring explanation, not evidence that the speaker accepts attraction as a basic force.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.60.1.14 Amber's apparent attraction is named and then given a non-pulling explanation. *(Edition p. 1709.)*

In this edition. "Amber" is required by the context of attraction; do not substitute a metal alloy.

See also. Body; Friendship and cosmic attraction; Motion; Stone; Void.

[17] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 501. The Heraclean stones named beside amber are lodestones. The passage distinguishes the observed effect from the mechanism it rejects.

Analysis and resolution

ἀνάλυσις, analusis, resolution; dissolution; analysis[18]

The word. Analysis is a loosening or resolving into constituents. The English "analysis" can name an intellectual procedure, but the selected passage is concerned with physical resolution.

In Stobaeus. The commentator reads Homer's wish that warriors become water and earth as a statement about dissolution into the universe's generative elements. The interpretation turns a poetic rebuke into physical doctrine. The entry must distinguish what the verse says from the cosmological significance assigned by its reader.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.6 A Homeric verse is interpreted as resolution into generative elements. *(Edition p. 291.)*

In this edition. "Dissolution" or "resolution" conveys the local physical meaning better than an unexplained modern "analysis."

See also. Dissolution; Earth; Element; Synthesis; Water.

Angel and messenger

ἄγγελος, angelos, messenger; angel[19]

The word. Angelos is a messenger and can name an angelic being in a philosophical hierarchy. Context determines whether the term is functional or classificatory.

In Stobaeus. The survey lists angels separately from gods, daimons, and heroes among higher kinds. It then describes a Platonic position that does not classify descents by those divisions. The hierarchy is cited as a possible framework, not endorsed by the alternative account under discussion.

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[18] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 120. The commentary is transmitted under Plutarch's name; its attribution is not secure. The quoted verse is Iliad 7.99.

[19] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 378. Ptolemy is explicitly called the Platonist here; the passage does not justify identifying him with another historical Ptolemy.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.39.4 Angels appear as one kind within a listed hierarchy of higher beings. *(Edition p. 1209.)*

In this edition. "Angels" fits the named class, without importing an entire later religious angelology.

See also. Descent; Divine spirit; God; Hero; Higher beings.

Anger

ὀργή, orgē, anger[20]

The word. Orgē is anger, an emotional response that may be addressed or restrained. It is related in subject matter to thymos but should not be automatically identified with the whole spirited power.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo describes soul as admonishing desires, anger, and fears, as one thing speaking to another. This ruling activity challenges the proposal that soul is merely the harmony of bodily constituents. Anger is one of the responses governed in the argument.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.13.14 Soul's ability to address anger illustrates its ruling activity. *(Edition p. 1055.)*

In this edition. "Anger" is direct; distinguish it from the broader spirited disposition when the text does.

See also. Anger and spirit; Desire; Fear; Self-control and temperance; Soul.

[20] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 337–338. The examples include both gentle persuasion and painful discipline, including physical training and medicine.

Anger and spirit

θυμός; θυμοειδές, thumos; thumoeides, spirit; anger; life[21]

The word. Thymos can name spirited anger, a power of soul, or, in poetry, the life that departs from a body. Its English rendering must follow the local use.

In Stobaeus. The Republic excerpt first asks whether the power by which we become angry is a third element or belongs to appetite. A subsequent passage describes the spirited element as a natural ally of reason unless a bad upbringing corrupts it. Homer uses thymos differently when life leaves the bones and soul flies away like a dream. This poetic occurrence must not be converted into the later three-part psychology.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.30.5 Anger raises the question of a third psychic element. *(Edition p. 1141.)*

I.49.31.1 Spirit is described as reason's natural ally. *(Edition p. 1143.)*

I.49.50.10 The word describes life leaving the bones. *(Edition p. 1367.)*

I.47.10 Spiritedness connects individual and civic character. *(Edition p. 931.)*

The spirited element. Thumoeides is the spirited element or quality. I.47.10 traces civic traits to the individuals composing a city, using spiritedness as one example; I.49.31.1 discusses its distinction from appetite and alliance with reason. Spiritedness includes assertive and passionate energy, and cannot be reduced to a passing episode of anger. The regional generalizations in the civic example remain the ancient speaker's claims.

In this edition. "Spirit" here must also be distinguished from the rendering of pneuma in some Hermetic passages. The same English word can represent different Greek terms.

See also. Breath; City; Desire; Life; Rational and irrational; Soul.

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[21] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 306, 361–362, 420.

Angle

γωνία, gōnia, angle; right angle[22]

The word. Gōnia is an angle. The example of a right angle joins practical measurement to a philosophical comparison of cognitive standards.

In Stobaeus. The work transmitted under Archytas's name lists rule, plumb line, and right angle as measures of uprightness and straightness. It then compares such standards with perception and intellect as measures of their objects. Geometry supplies an analogy for discrimination, not a claim that thinking literally uses a carpenter's tool.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.6.1 The right angle participates in an analogy between measuring instruments and cognition. *(Edition p. 965.)*

In this edition. "Right angle" should preserve orthos as well as the headword; "angle" alone would weaken the measuring example.

See also. Intellect; Measure; Perception; Standard of judgment; Straight.

Appearance in reflection

ἔμφασις, emphasis, appearance; reflected image[23]

The word. Emphasis is an appearance produced or presented in another medium. In the optical passage it concerns a visible image, not rhetorical stress on a word.

In Stobaeus. The cloud is treated as a mirror-like surface in the explanations of rainbow, luminous rod, and halo. Their appearances differ in form and in position relative to the luminous body. The term helps describe what is seen without identifying the appearance as a separate celestial body.

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[22] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 315. The treatise belongs to the writings transmitted under Archytas's name; its attribution should not be treated as independently secure.

[23] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 266. The account is the ancient source's optical explanation; the word does not by itself validate every part of that mechanism.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.45 Rainbow, rod, and halo are distinguished as luminous appearances. *(Edition p. 795.)*

In this edition. "Appearance" is natural; "reflected image" can clarify the mechanism the source proposes. The modern English "emphasis" is unsuitable.

See also. Light; Mirror; Rainbow and halo; Reflection; Streaks and rods.

Appellation

προσηγορία, prosēgoria, appellation; designation; name[24]

The word. Prosēgoria is a designation or appellation. It directs attention to the expression applied to something.

In Stobaeus. The brief definition calls chance the designation of disorderly activity. Its grammatical form explains how a term is used; it does not by itself establish chance as an additional agent causing the activity. The reader should distinguish the named occurrence from assumptions about what kind of cause its name represents.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.7.9b Chance is defined as the designation of disorderly activity. *(Edition p. 219.)*

In this edition. "Name" reads naturally; "designation" makes the definition's linguistic emphasis explicit.

See also. Cause; Chance and fortune; Deed and work; Disorder; Name.

[24] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 92. The saying is anonymous in the adopted text. A proposed attribution to Democritus is not retained as certain.

Apprehension

κατάληψις, katalēpsis, apprehension; cognitive grasp[25]

The word. Katalēpsis is a grasp or apprehension. In the passages selected here it concerns cognition; the English "apprehension" should be read as grasping or understanding, rather than anxiety.

In Stobaeus. A brief Stoic report predicates both assent and apprehension of every perception. A Hermetic passage describes the soul's apprehension of what is truly good and true. The shared noun does not establish that the latter passage adopts the full Stoic account.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.50.14 Every perception is called both assent and apprehension in a Stoic report. *(Edition p. 1591.)*

I.41.1.3 Apprehension of the good and true directs the embodied soul away from evil. *(Edition p. 817.)*

I.48.5.5 Intellect's apprehension is explained through its turning toward itself. *(Edition p. 961.)*

In this edition. "Apprehension" keeps the term distinct from assent, perception, and knowledge. The accompanying definition or argument supplies the kind of grasp intended.

See also. Assent; Intellect; Knowledge; Perception.

Archetype

ἀρχέτυπος, archetupos, archetype; original pattern[26]

The word. Archetypos characterizes an original pattern in relation to what resembles it. In the selected passage the adjective is used substantivally in the plural.

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[25] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 273, 313–314, 474. The statement at I.50.14 is preserved as a compressed report of a school position. It is not expanded into a complete account of Stoic epistemology.

[26] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 136. The final identification as the world's pattern is supplied by Wachsmuth from the parallel passage in Eusebius.

In Stobaeus. The report assigned to Arius Didymus describes the particular forms as archetypes with priority over sensible bodies. It then moves to a most perfect substance containing the forms together, presented as the comprehensive model of the cosmos. Priority here is explanatory; the wording alone does not require an earlier moment in time.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.2a.2 Particular forms are archetypes, and their comprehensive unity models the world. *(Edition p. 339.)*

In this edition. "Archetype" is retained where the relation to copies is explicit. It should not suggest an inherited psychological image.

See also. Idea; Intelligible; Pattern and model; World.

Arrangement

διάταξις, diataxis, arrangement; ordering; disposition[27]

The word. Diataxis names an ordering of things or an arranged exposition. Its force depends on whether the subject is a reality, a sequence, or a text.

In Stobaeus. The discussion of soul's first procession appeals to the arrangement of the Timaeus as evidence for differentiated allotments. Here the word refers to how the dialogue presents its account, although that presentation concerns cosmic order. Textual arrangement and the arrangement described by a text should not be collapsed.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.39.3 The Timaeus's arrangement is invoked to support distinct allocations and descents of souls. *(Edition p. 1207.)*

In this edition. "Arrangement" keeps the textual reference clear; "ordering" can suit the disposition of realities elsewhere.

See also. Allotment; Cosmic ordering; Order; Pattern and model; Procession.

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[27] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 377. The passage's list of souls and recipients is abbreviated in Greek; the English makes the pairings explicit.

Art and craft

τέχνη, technē, art; craft; organized skill[28]

The word. Technē is an organized art or skill directed toward an activity or product. Its scope includes medicine, music, and other disciplines beyond what modern usage calls the fine arts.

In Stobaeus. The Symposium excerpt presents divination as an art governing communication between gods and humans, including sacrifice. Elsewhere painting, music, and writing illustrate how art combines contrasting elements in imitation of nature. The shared idea is skilled ordering, although the objects and aims differ.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.16.2 Divination is described as an art concerned with divine-human relations. *(Edition p. 283.)*

I.40.1.58 Painting, music, and writing illustrate art's combination of contrasting elements. *(Edition p. 805.)*

In this edition. Choose "art" or "craft" according to the activity; neither necessarily implies manual work alone.

See also. Craftsman as skilled practitioner; Divination; Instrument; Music; Nature.

Artery

ἀρτηρία, artēria, artery[29]

The word. Artēria is an artery or bodily conduit, whose exact ancient anatomical sense depends on the source.

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[28] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 117, 270. The divinatory account belongs to a particular speech about love and should not be treated as the anthology's general definition of every art.

[29] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 123–124. The terminology and inference are those of the ancient report about Anaxagoras, not a direct quotation of his surviving words.

In Stobaeus. The report about Anaxagoras lists artery alongside vein, flesh, sinew, and bone as parts nourished from apparently uniform food. Their growth supports an inference that corresponding constituents already exist in the food, though discernible by reason rather than separately visible. The artery is one example within that argument.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.6 The nourishment of arteries supports the report's inference to like-parted constituents. *(Edition p. 301.)*

In this edition. "Artery" preserves the list's distinction from vein without importing a modern account of circulation.

See also. Bone; Flesh; Homogeneous parts; Nutrition; Vein.

Ascent

ἄνοδος, anodos, ascent; going up[30]

The word. Anodos is ascent. Philosophically it may describe a soul's return toward its cause or a more comprehensive reality.

In Stobaeus. The account of purification lists ascent to the generating cause among its benefits, together with restoration of proper essence and reception of power, life, and activity. Ascent is therefore part of a reciprocal relation: return toward the source accompanies gifts received from the whole.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.65.10 Purification brings ascent to the originating cause and renewed participation in life. *(Edition p. 1513.)*

In this edition. "Ascent" preserves the image without requiring a literal upward journey through measured space.

See also. Cause; Life; Purification; Return and turning back; Self-sufficiency.

[30] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 455–456. The list includes conjunction of parts with wholes, so ascent should not be reduced to isolated escape from every relation.

Assent

συγκατάθεσις, *synkatathesis*, assent[31]

The word. Assent is acceptance of what is presented. It is consequently distinguishable from the presentation itself, even when a particular account joins the two closely in explaining perception.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic report at I.50.14 calls every perception both assent and apprehension. Porphyry's discussion of Numenius compares the power of assent with the imaginative power and then turns to the Stoics. This is an account of competing relations among powers, not a single undifferentiated psychology.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.50.14 Perception, assent, and apprehension are brought together. *(Edition p. 1591.)*

I.49.25.1 Numenius distinguishes an accompaniment of assent from its work or product; the Stoic account follows. *(Edition p. 1097.)*

In this edition. Synkatathesis is "assent." Keeping this rendering visible allows the reader to distinguish acceptance from phantasia, the presentation, and from hormē, impulse.

See also. Apprehension; Impulse; Perception; Power and capacity; Presentation and imagination; What depends on us.

Assigned portion

λῆξις, *lēxis*, allotment; assigned portion[32]

The word. Lēxis is an allotment or the portion assigned. It is distinct from lexis, wording or expression, despite their similar transliterations.

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[31] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 349, 474. I.49.25.1 ends with compressed nominatives. The edition gives "a sensory presentation, an assent," preserving the printed construction rather than silently rewriting it as "assent to a presentation."

[32] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 83, 377. The temporal assignment of the three Fates differs from that in the preceding Platonic excerpt; the schemes are not silently harmonized.

In Stobaeus. The interpretation of the Fates says that a natural allotment awaits all things and associates it with the future. In the soul survey, particular allotments establish the recipients from which different descents proceed. Allocation thus organizes both temporal expectation and cosmic placement.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.5.22b Natural allotment is linked to Lachesis and the future. *(Edition p. 191.)*

I.49.39.3 Allotments organize the recipients and descents of souls. *(Edition p. 1207.)*

In this edition. "Allotment" is general; "assigned portion" emphasizes what is received.

See also. Allotment; Descent; Fate; Lot; Wording and expression.

Association and intercourse

συνουσία, sunousia, association; companionship; intercourse[33]

The word. Synousia is being together, association, or intercourse. A sexual sense is possible in other contexts but is not required here.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo describes the soul's constant association with the body as making bodily character ingrained in it. Repeated companionship and practice explain the acquired disposition. The passage concerns habitual intimacy between soul and body, rather than an act of sexual intercourse.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.57.5 Continual bodily association makes a bodily disposition grow into the soul. *(Edition p. 1415.)*

In this edition. "Association" is clearest; if "intercourse" is retained, explain its broader sense of sustained contact.

See also. Body; Embodiment; Habit and disposition; Practice and exercise; Soul.

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[33] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 432. The language of growing together describes an acquired condition in the argument, preparing the account of the soul's weight and visibility.

Astringent

στρυφνός; στυφνός, struphnos; stuphnos, astringent; contracting; puckering[34]

The word. Struphnos and stuphnos belong to the vocabulary of astringency, a constricting or drying sensation. The local contrast matters more than a single fixed English equivalent.

In Stobaeus. An explanation of color compares compression and dispersal across different senses, invoking tastes that contract or irritate the tongue. The taste account itself distinguishes a stronger roughening, called astringent, from a milder austere effect. These comparisons use familiar bodily experiences to explain differences in sensation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.2.3 Astringency enters an analogy between effects in sight, touch, and taste. *(Edition p. 385.)*

I.55.2.2 Astringent and austere tastes are distinguished by degree of roughening. *(Edition p. 1673.)*

In this edition. "Astringent" makes the contracting sensation explicit; "harsh" alone obscures the local distinction.

See also. Austere taste; Color; Compaction; Taste; Tongue.

Atom

ἄτομος, atomos, atom; indivisible[35]

The word. The adjective means uncut or indivisible; its neuter plural can designate atoms. The philosophical use identifies bodies treated as indivisible, without implying the structure or properties of the atom in modern science.

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[34] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 150, 494. The two Greek forms are related in use but should not be collapsed into a claim that every occurrence has exactly the same physiological explanation.

[35] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 146, 155–156. At I.15.6a.2 Wachsmuth exchanges the transmitted objects of the reports under Anaxagoras and Leucippus. The facing edition follows that printed correction and explains it in its note.

In Stobaeus. In the reports on shape, the followers of Leucippus assign many shapes to atoms. In the discussion of void, Democritus and other atomists are credited with infinitely many atoms and a void infinite in extent. These are different claims about number and magnitude.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.15.6a.2 Atoms of many shapes are assigned to the followers of Leucippus. *(Edition p. 373.)*

I.18.1a.3 The multitude of atoms is infinite; the extent of void is infinite. *(Edition p. 405.)*

In this edition. "Atoms" is used where the noun is intended. Their indivisibility is part of the ancient theory reported, not a claim about the particles described by present-day physics.

See also. Body; Indivisible; Number; Shape; Unlimited; Void.

Attachment

προσπάθεια, prospatheia, attachment; passionate inclination[36]

The word. Prospatheia is attachment or an affective inclination toward something. It emphasizes a relation sustained by concern or desire.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry explains the image accompanying a departed soul through its attachment to the former body. An imaginative imprint is left in the pneuma gathered from the spheres, which travels with the soul. The attachment links past bodily life with a continuing image without making soul, pneuma, and solid body identical.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.55.2 Bodily attachment explains the image impressed on accompanying breath. *(Edition p. 1403.)*

[36] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 429. The particular logos describing bodily relation is provisionally rendered formative principle; the compressed construction remains interpretively difficult.

In this edition. "Attachment" is clear and should retain its directed object, the body.

See also. Breath; Image; Impression and stamp; Return and turning back; Vehicle of the soul.

Austere taste

αὐστηρός, austēros, austere; dry and rough in taste[37]

The word. Austēros can describe an austere, dry, or rough taste. Its intensity must be understood relative to the terms contrasted with it.

In Stobaeus. In the taste account, particles roughen the tongue with different strengths. The weaker effect is called austere, while the stronger is astringent. Consequently the ordinary English force of "harsh" can mislead if it suggests that this is the stronger member of the pair.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.55.2.2 Austere taste is the milder roughening in a contrast with astringency. *(Edition p. 1673.)*

In this edition. "Austere" preserves the technical contrast; "mildly rough" explains the relative effect intended here.

See also. Astringent; Perception; Quality; Taste; Tongue.

Awareness and apprehension

ἀντίληψις, antilēpsis, apprehension; awareness; grasp[38]

The word. Antilēpsis is apprehension or taking cognizance of something. The related adjective can describe a power that apprehends without deciding how it operates.

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[37] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 494. The passage's scale is local to its explanation. It should not be converted into a universal modern classification of flavors.

[38] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 348. A printed lacuna follows the description of shape and configuration; the missing comparison is not reconstructed.

In Stobaeus. The examination of Ariston's classification asks how perception and intellect differ if both belong to an apprehensive genus. The suggested distinction is between apprehending shape and apprehending essence. Recognizing a human or horse is assigned to another power than the perception of configuration, although a gap interrupts the explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.24.3 Apprehensive powers are differentiated by organs and by their objects. *(Edition p. 1093.)*

In this edition. "Apprehension" works across the comparison; distinguish this Greek family from katalēpsis in passages where school terminology matters.

See also. Apprehension; Being and substance; Intellect; Perception; Shape.

Axis

ἄξων, axōn, axis; axle[39]

The word. Axōn is an axle or axis. The mechanical image makes the relation between a fixed alignment and a revolving body intelligible.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic description compares the Bear's action to an axle, linking it to the daily revolution. A separate celestial account explicitly imagines the axis as the straight line through the poles. The first is an operational comparison involving a constellation; the second is a geometrical construction.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.21.9.11 The Bear's role in celestial revolution is compared with an axle. *(Edition p. 525.)*

I.40.1.3 An imagined pole-to-pole line defines the axis. *(Edition p. 765.)*

[39] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 192–193, 256. The Bear's position "at the middle of the zodiac" is difficult in the Hermetic passage and has not been silently relocated.

In this edition. Use "axle" when the mechanical comparison is foregrounded and "axis" for the geometrical line.

See also. Circular motion; Diameter; Heaven; Pole; Straight.

Beam in the sky

δοκίς, dokis, beam-like light; beam in the sky[40]

The word. Dokis is a beam, here a name for an elongated luminous appearance. The comparison concerns shape, not a wooden object in the heavens.

In Stobaeus. The cosmological description groups beams with pits and comets among lights appearing and disappearing in the fiery, changeable region. The term records an ancient appearance-based category. A precise modern identification requires more information than the name alone supplies.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.9 Beams are named among transient lights in the fiery region. *(Edition p. 769.)*

In this edition. "Beam" retains the shape analogy; "beam-like light" prevents an overly literal reading.

See also. Comet; Flame; Pits in the sky; Shape; Shooting star.

Beauty

καλόν; κάλλος, kalon; kallos, beauty; the beautiful; the fine[41]

The word. Kalon means beautiful, fine, or noble according to context; kallos is beauty. Physical attractiveness and excellence of order can be connected without being identical.

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[40] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 257. The account places these phenomena below the aether in a changing region; it does not use modern astronomical categories.

[41] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 114, 117–118, 181–182.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedrus excerpt makes visible beauty awaken a recollection of true beauty and describes the lover's upward impulse through growing wings. In the Timaeus, the best maker must produce what is most beautiful; beauty belongs to the explanation of cosmic ordering. The Symposium passage argues that Love desires good and beautiful things because he lacks them, making beauty an object of desire rather than a possession already secured.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.10 Visible beauty points beyond itself through recollection. *(Edition p. 277.)*

I.21.1.2 Beauty expresses the fitting work of the best maker. *(Edition p. 493.)*

I.9.17.1 Love's relation to beauty is one of desire and lack. *(Edition p. 285.)*

In this edition. "Beautiful" follows the prominent senses here; "fine" or "noble" may be preferable where the force is evaluative without a visual emphasis.

See also. Good; Love; Order; Recollection; World.

Being and substance

οὐσία, ousia, being; substance; essence; nature[42]

The word. Ousia may concern what something is, its being, or its substance. A single English word cannot preserve its function equally well in every definition, physical account, and contrast with coming-to-be.

In Stobaeus. The opening heading asks what God's essence is. The physical account of aether calls it the substance of heaven and the stars. In the discussion of souls after punishment, the Platonists are said to release souls from coming-to-be into being. These are distinct uses within the anthology.

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[42] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 23, 256, 456. The translation of ousia is contextual. The glossary records these choices without treating the differences between the quoted authors as inconsistencies to be removed.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.heading The divine essence is among the chapter's questions. *(Edition p. 33.)*

I.40.1.5 Aether is the substance of the heavens. *(Edition p. 765.)*

I.49.65.16 Being is contrasted with coming-to-be in an account assigned to the Platonists. *(Edition p. 1517.)*

In this edition. The rendering follows the relation expressed: "essence" in a question about what a thing is, "substance" in many physical accounts, and "being" in opposition to genesis. The Greek remains available for comparison.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Form; God; Matter; Nature.

Belief and opinion

δόξα; δοξαστικόν, doxa; doxastikon, belief; opinion[43]

The word. Doxa names a belief or opinion, and it can also identify a view under discussion. The word alone does not decide whether the belief is true, false, secure, or inadequately grounded.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo extract describes a proposed sequence from perception through memory and belief to knowledge. In the inquiry into souls' entry into bodies, one opinion is divided into three forms. Here doxa designates a reported explanation rather than a separate faculty.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.51.6 Memory and belief are associated with the emergence of stable knowledge. *(Edition p. 1625.)*

I.49.41.3 One opinion about the soul's entry into a body has three alternatives. *(Edition p. 1221.)*

I.49.34.3 Opinion appears among an enumeration of the soul's powers. *(Edition p. 1171.)*

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[43] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 348–349, 369, 381, 482. The Phaedo passage is part of Socrates' account of an earlier inquiry. It should not be cited without qualification as Plato's final theory of knowledge.

I.49.24.4 The power of opinion is differentiated by its relation to imagination and perception. *(Edition p. 1093.)*

The power of opinion. Doxastikon is the capacity for forming opinion. I.49.24.4 distinguishes a course of thought accompanied by imagination or perception from one proceeding without them; another account instead gives a single rational substance different activities. The faculty name therefore belongs to a reported classification, not to an uncontested map of the soul.

In this edition. "Belief" often suits an epistemological sequence; "opinion" suits a reported position or list of powers. Neither English word is a standing verdict on the truth of the passage.

See also. Knowledge; Perception; Power and capacity; Presentation and imagination; Soul; Thought.

Benefaction

εὐεργεσία, euergesia, benefaction; good deed; benefit[44]

The word. Euergesia is a benefaction or good deed, and can also denote the benefit conferred. Agent and recipient determine the emphasis.

In Stobaeus. The Republic narrative says that those who performed benefactions and lived justly and reverently receive corresponding recompense. The word identifies conduct assessed favorably in judgment. Elsewhere a blinded soul can mistake punishment for benefaction, showing that an apparent benefit may be misjudged.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.64.10 Good deeds receive their due in the afterlife account. *(Edition p. 1499.)*

I.49.44.46 Distorted judgment mistakes punishment for benefit. *(Edition p. 1283.)*

[44] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 398, 452. The Republic narrator declines to recount the treatment of very short lives. The omitted explanation is not reconstructed here.

In this edition. "Good deeds" fits the plural acts; "benefit" fits what a recipient experiences.

See also. Advantage; Judgment; Justice; Recompense; Worth and desert.

Bile

χολή, cholē, bile[45]

The word. Cholē is bile. In physiological arguments it can be assigned effects on bodily heat and mental functioning.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry's interpretation of Homer invokes the claim that blood overheated by fever and bile produces derangement. The example supports his reading of the underworld's need for blood as connected with understanding. The physiological explanation is part of the interpreter's argument, not an explicit Homeric medical doctrine.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.53.10 Bile is invoked in an account of overheated blood and impaired understanding. *(Edition p. 1383.)*

In this edition. "Bile" is direct; distinguish the bodily substance from metaphorical anger where the context changes.

See also. Blood; Disease; Heat; Intellect; Understanding and practical wisdom.

Bitter

πικρός, pikros, bitter[46]

The word. Pikros is bitter. In the selected theory, the taste is linked to an excessively cleansing or scouring action.

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[45] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 424. The passage distinguishes Tiresias's retained reasoning about human matters from his ability to prophesy for the living.

[46] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 494. Natron is an alkaline cleansing material in this context; the name does not establish one pure modern chemical compound.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus says that substances washing the tongue beyond measure and attacking its own tissue are called bitter, giving natron as an example. The account differentiates the intensity and effect of the action, rather than merely listing foods recognizable as bitter.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.55.2.3 Bitterness is explained through excessive cleansing of the tongue. *(Edition p. 1673.)*

In this edition. "Bitter" preserves the taste. The described mechanism belongs to the ancient physiological account.

See also. Affection; Measure; Sweet; Taste; Tongue.

Black

μέλας, melas, black; dark[47]

The word. Melas denotes black or darkness, depending on what is being described.

In Stobaeus. The report about the Pythagoreans places black among the main kinds of color. Plato's quoted mixture account gives it several roles, including the combination with white that yields gray and the darkening of other mixtures. Black therefore functions as a differentiated color term within the explanation, not simply as the absence of every visible property.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.1.2 Black is listed among the kinds of color. *(Edition p. 379.)*

I.16.2.7 Black enters mixtures producing gray and darker hues. *(Edition p. 389.)*

In this edition. "Black" suits the classifications; use "dark" only when the broader context calls for it.

See also. Color; Dark blue; Darkness; Mixture and blending; White.

[47] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 148, 151. The passages preserve different reports and should not be merged into a single school's theory of color.

Bladder

κύστις, kustis, bladder[48]

The word. Kustis is a bladder or sac. Here it is the organ that receives drink in the account of bodily passages.

In Stobaeus. The physiological report locates the bladder beyond the path associated with the lung and kidneys. It also relates bodily outlets, compressed breath, and the generation of seed to the arrangement of marrow. The entry's meaning comes from this particular anatomical construction, rather than from the generic idea of a hollow container.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.1.3 The bladder is situated within the routes of drink and bodily discharge. *(Edition p. 907.)*

In this edition. "Bladder" is appropriate; "sac" would lose the anatomical specificity of the passage.

See also. Breath; Kidney; Lung; Marrow; Seed.

Blessed

μακάριος, makarios, blessed; supremely fortunate[49]

The word. Makarios describes a blessed or exceptionally fortunate condition. Its religious force depends on the surrounding account.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic soul laments separation from a blessed shared life with the gods and confinement in lowly bodily dwellings. Blessedness characterizes the former mode of existence through proximity, splendor, and divine companionship. The adjective does not by itself identify a separately defined rank of being.

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[48] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 298–299. The adjacent account links several processes that modern physiology distinguishes differently. Their association is evidence for the ancient explanation preserved here.

[49] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 395–396. The soul speaks within a lament. The imagery of confinement belongs to that narrative perspective.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.38 The lost heavenly life with the gods is called blessed. *(Edition p. 1275.)*

In this edition. "Blessed" preserves the religious setting; "happy" alone may understate its contrast with embodiment.

See also. Embodiment; God; Happiness and flourishing; Heaven; Soul.

Blessed experience

εὐπάθεια, eupatheia, good experience; blessed experience[50]

The word. Eupatheia is a good or happy experience. It can have a specialized philosophical sense elsewhere, but that sense is not automatic.

In Stobaeus. In the Republic narrative, souls returning from heaven recount happy experiences and beautiful sights, contrasted with the sufferings recalled by those from below. The word concerns what they underwent on their journeys. It is not used here to introduce the Stoic classification of good emotions.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.64.7 Blessed experiences contrast with the painful memories of the other travelers. *(Edition p. 1497.)*

In this edition. "Blessed experiences" suits the heavenly setting; "good experiences" makes the general sense explicit.

See also. Beauty; Blessed; Destiny after death; Memory; Pleasure.

[50] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 452. The account contrasts both experiences and sights. The stated thousand years belongs to the journey described.

Blood

αἷμα, haima, blood[51]

The word. Haima names blood. In the anthology it can be a bearer of nourishment, an instrument of thought, or a bodily substance distinguished from soul.

In Stobaeus. The Empedoclean verses identify blood around the heart with thought, introduced by the reporter as an account of blood as an instrument of understanding. The Hermetic passage rejects the inference that soul is blood, explaining coagulation through the prior withdrawal of spirit. The Timaeus extract describes blood as the nourishment of flesh and the whole body.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.53.11 Heart-blood is connected with thought. *(Edition p. 1383.)*

I.47.9.2 Blood is distinguished from soul in an account of death. *(Edition p. 929.)*

I.60.1.18 Blood nourishes and replenishes the body. *(Edition p. 1713.)*

In this edition. The English keeps "blood" constant while preserving the different relations asserted: identity in a verse, instrument in its introduction, and bodily nourishment elsewhere.

See also. Breath; Death; Heart; Nutrition; Soul; Thought.

Body

σῶμα; ὄνυξ, sōma; onux, body[52]

The word. Sōma denotes a body, including physical bodies more generally than a human organism. Its opposition to the incorporeal becomes an explicit philosophical issue in the anthology.

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[51] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 305–306, 424, 502.

[52] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 61–62, 319, 344, 474. At I.50.10 the genitive *σωμάτων* is taken as identifying the objects of perception. The note in the bilingual edition distinguishes that grammatical claim from a claim about the constitution of perceptions.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic notice that perceptions are of bodies identifies their objects. It does not itself say that perceptions are bodies. Aristotle's definition of soul describes a natural body equipped with organs and capable of life, while Porphyry distinguishes bodily alteration from incorporeal activity.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.50.10 Bodies are the objects of perception in a Stoic report. *(Edition p. 1589.)*

I.49.1a.3 Soul is defined with reference to a natural organic body. *(Edition p. 979.)*

I.49.21.1 What bodies undergo is compared with what is said of incorporeal things. *(Edition p. 1081.)*

I.3.50 Nails and eyes illustrate a contrast in the value of bodily and moral goods. *(Edition p. 131.)*

Nails in an ethical comparison. Onux is a nail or claw. In I.3.50, sound nails are contrasted with lost eyes to illustrate how superficial advantages can coexist with a much greater loss. The bodily comparison supports an argument that moral degradation is worse than loss of wealth or strength. It does not offer a detailed anatomical classification.

In this edition. Sōma is normally "body"; asōmaton is "incorporeal." The English preserves this vocabulary even when authors disagree about what qualifies as bodily.

See also. Affection; Blood; Eye; Incorporeal; Living creature; Matter; Perception; Soul; Virtue and excellence; Void.

Boldness and daring

τόλμα; τολμᾶν, tolma; tolman, daring; boldness; venturing[53]

The word. Tolma is daring or boldness; the related verb means to dare or venture. Its value depends on what a person ventures to do.

[53] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 67, 399–400. The ordeal's efficacy is a claim within the reported account, not an independently verified test.

In Stobaeus. In the reported ordeal, fear of exposure means that no one dares deny wrongdoing. The verb therefore describes readiness to attempt an action under risk, without praising that action as courageous. Elsewhere bold human inquiry can likewise be criticized rather than celebrated.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.56b Fear of exposure prevents daring to deny an offense. *(Edition p. 147.)*

I.49.44.52 Boldness characterizes the human intrusion into nature's mysteries. *(Edition p. 1289.)*

In this edition. "Dare" suits the verb; do not automatically translate boldness as the virtue courage.

See also. Courage; Error and wrongdoing; Fear; Human being; Knowledge.

Bond

δεσμός, desmos, bond; restraint; connection[54]

The word. Desmos is a bond or tie. Its force can range from constructive connection to restrictive confinement.

In Stobaeus. The wordplay on body describes it as the soul's bond and frame while soul is held in it, and as sign and trace after soul departs. The bond image therefore explains a changing relation between soul and the same bodily thing. It does not by itself establish that every bodily relation is wrongful.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.10.2 The body is called a bond while it holds the soul. *(Edition p. 881.)*

In this edition. "Bond" preserves both connection and restraint; the local argument determines their balance.

See also. Body; Corpse; Prison; Release; Soul.

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[54] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 293. The passage links desmos with demas and sōma with sēma through wordplay; this is interpretation rather than proof of historical etymology.

Bone

ὀστοῦν, ostoun, bone[55]

The word. Ostoun is bone; variant inflected forms occur in different dialectal and stylistic settings.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account of sleep assigns incoming earth to bones and marrow while other elements nourish other structures. Bone exemplifies a differentiated bodily part within the proposed distribution. Its association with earth belongs to that physiology and is not a claim that bones are simply pieces of ordinary soil.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.8.5 Bones and marrow receive the earthy component during sleep. *(Edition p. 877.)*

In this edition. "Bone" is direct; maintain the distinction between bone and the marrow associated with it.

See also. Body; Earth; Marrow; Nutrition; Sleep.

Brain

ἐγκέφαλος, enkephalos, brain[56]

The word. Enkephalos names the brain. The excerpts associate it with sensory functions or locate the ruling faculty there, but these are distinct explanatory claims.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo excerpt recalls an inquiry in which the brain supplies hearing, sight, and smell, from which memory, belief, and eventually knowledge arise. Its place in Socrates' account of earlier investigation matters. The report about Alcmaeon puts the ruling faculty in the brain and explains smell through the drawing in of odors during inhalation.

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[55] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 291–292. The element-to-organ assignments are specific to this excerpt's explanatory scheme.

[56] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 482, 492.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.51.6 Brain, sense perception, memory, and knowledge form an explanatory sequence. *(Edition p. 1625.)*

I.54.1 Alcmaeon locates the ruling faculty in the brain. *(Edition p. 1663.)*

In this edition. The first passage is not presented as Plato's unqualified final account of cognition. "Brain" names the proposed bodily organ, not a synonym for intellect.

See also. Hearing; Knowledge; Memory; Ruling part; Sight; Smell.

Breadth

πλάτος, platos, breadth; width[57]

The word. Platos is breadth or width. It can describe a dimension ranked relative to others or an extent assigned a particular direction.

In Stobaeus. The dimensional accounts distinguish breadth from the objects possessing it. One Stoic definition identifies it as the second extent, another as the extent to right and left. The meaning remains relational: breadth is recognized within an ordered set of dimensions rather than by one absolute direction throughout the cosmos.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1c.1 Breadth is one of the magnitudes possessed by continuous things. *(Edition p. 355.)*

I.14.1l.1 Breadth is defined through rank and through right-left direction. *(Edition p. 365.)*

In this edition. "Breadth" preserves the traditional dimensional vocabulary; "width" is an accessible equivalent in ordinary descriptions.

See also. Depth; Dimension and distance; Length; Magnitude.

[57] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 141, 143–144. The supplied men in I.14.1l.1 marks one side of the alternative definition rather than adding another dimension.

Breath

πνεῦμα, pneuma, breath; spirit; wind; current of air[58]

The word. Pneuma concerns breath or moving air. In physical and psychological accounts its role can be more extensive than an ordinary inhalation, but the word should not automatically be understood as an immaterial spirit.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic definition calls soul intelligent, warm breath. In the explanation of hearing attributed to Empedocles, a current of air strikes a structure within the ear. The anthology thus uses breath-language in accounts of both life and particular bodily processes.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.1b.1 The Stoics define soul as intelligent, warm breath. *(Edition p. 979.)*

I.53.1 A current of air striking the ear is compared with the action of a bell. *(Edition p. 1657.)*

I.41.7.5 In a Hermetic account, the soul enters breath and sets it in living motion. *(Edition p. 871.)*

I.47.9.1 Spirit sustains the body within a hierarchy of life. *(Edition p. 929.)*

I.47.9.2 Its withdrawal is distinguished from the behavior of blood. *(Edition p. 929.)*

Images and comparisons. The ear's cartilage is pictured as something that swings and is struck like a bell. The comparison explains the reported mechanism of hearing; it does not give pneuma a symbolic meaning independent of that mechanism.

Breath and spirit. In the Hermetic hierarchy of human life, pneuma carries soul's activity through veins, arteries, and blood and is rendered "spirit." Its withdrawal into soul precedes the body's death. This use differs from both an ordinary current of air and the Stoic definition of soul as warm breath. The English "spirit" here does not identify pneuma with thymos, the spirited element, or with daimōn, a divine spirit.

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[58] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 290, 305–306, 319, 491.

In this edition. "Breath" serves the life-bearing and physical sense; "current of air" makes the auditory explanation intelligible. "Soul" is reserved for psychē in these comparisons. "Spirit" is used for pneuma in I.47.9.1–2; the local hierarchy keeps it distinct from soul.

See also. Air; Anger and spirit; Blood; Body; Breathing; Divine spirit; Element; Hearing; Perception; Soul.

Breathing

ἀναπνοή; ἐκπνοή, anapnoē; ekpnoē, breathing; inhalation and exhalation[59]

The word. Anapnoē denotes breathing. Context determines whether attention falls on the complete alternating process or on a particular movement of air.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus account begins from the absence of void: outgoing breath displaces neighboring air, and a continuous circuit fills the spaces it leaves. Heat changes the direction of this movement through the two outlets of mouth and nostrils and the bodily surface. The same oscillation later carries the fire that divides and distributes nourishment. Breathing is thus embedded in a general explanation of material movement.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.60.1.1 The account starts from displacement in a world without void. *(Edition p. 1701.)*

I.60.1.8 Alternating heat and movement produce the breathing cycle. *(Edition p. 1705.)*

I.60.1.16 The cycle contributes to the distribution of food. *(Edition p. 1711.)*

I.25.1c The sun's fire is described as breathing through an opening. *(Edition p. 583.)*

[59] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 208, 499–502.

Breathing out beyond physiology. Ekpnoē is an outward breath or exhalation. In the Anaximandrean solar report at I.25.1c, fire breathes through the opening of a great wheel, and closing the opening produces an eclipse. The vocabulary extends a familiar action to a cosmological model. It does not establish that the sun is an animal with lungs.

In this edition. "Breathing" names the process; "breath" or "spirit" renders pneuma where appropriate. Difficult directional language remains explained in the edition's notes.

See also. Air; Blood; Breath; Eclipse; Exhalation; Heat; Nutrition; Sun; Void.

Brightness

λαμπρός, lampros, bright; shining; brightness[60]

The word. Lampros describes brightness or brilliance. Its substantival use can mean what is bright, rather than a separately existing substance called brightness.

In Stobaeus. The interpretation of Homer explains the sun's red appearance at rising through moisture and exhalation, which redden bright things mingling with them. Brightness and redness therefore perform different roles: something luminous acquires a particular appearance under specified conditions.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.25.7.2 Moisture and exhalation explain the reddening of what is bright. *(Edition p. 603.)*

In this edition. "Bright" preserves the adjective; "brightness" is suitable when English requires the quality as a noun.

See also. Exhalation; Light; Radiance; Red; Rising.

[60] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 214. The explanation is the commentator's inference, not a physical doctrine explicitly stated in Homer's simile.

Burning

καῦσις, kausis, burning[61]

The word. Kausis is burning, the process by which fire or heat consumes or alters something.

In Stobaeus. The account of lightning distinguishes materials that resist passage and burn from porous materials through which the moving wind passes before burning occurs. A shield's bronze may melt while its wood remains unharmed. The contrast is explained through resistance and ease of passage within the source's meteorology.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.29.1.19 Resistance and porosity are invoked to explain unequal effects of lightning. *(Edition p. 677.)*

In this edition. "Burning" should remain distinct from the separately mentioned melting of bronze.

See also. Fire; Heat; Lightning and thunderbolt; Pore and passage; Resistance.

Cartilage

χόνδρος, chondros, cartilage; gristle[62]

The word. Chondros names cartilage or gristle. In the hearing report it denotes a responsive structure within the ear.

In Stobaeus. The account attributed to Empedocles explains hearing when air strikes a cartilage suspended inside the ear like a bell. The comparison emphasizes the structure's response to impact. Air and vibration belong to this explanation without requiring that the transmitted anatomical description be equated precisely with a modern structure.

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[61] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 235. The examples also occur in Aristotle's Meteorology. They report the ancient explanation rather than a modern account of electrical conductivity.

[62] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 491. The bell is an explanatory comparison. Pneuma in this context is the air involved in hearing, not necessarily a distinct psychic or divine substance.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.53.1 A bell-like cartilage responds to air entering the ear. *(Edition p. 1657.)*

In this edition. "Cartilage" preserves the reported material identification; "eardrum" would substitute a more specific identification not securely given by the word.

See also. Air; Ear; Hearing; Impact; Voice.

Cause

αἴτιον; αἰτία; αἴτιος, aition; aitia; aitios, cause; explanation[63]

The word. Both words belong to the language of causation and explanation. Some reports distinguish the cause itself from the account that explains it, so their relation must be established passage by passage.

In Stobaeus. Chrysippus is reported as distinguishing a bodily cause from what it causes, which is neither a body nor an existent in the same statement. The account of that cause is called aitia. The difficult formulation is valuable precisely because it does not collapse causing and explaining into a single thing.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.13.1c.3 Aition names the cause, while aitia names the explanatory account. *(Edition p. 347.)*

I.7.9a Chance is described as a variable cause or a cause obscure to human calculation. *(Edition p. 219.)*

I.6.17a.3 Intellect, nature, necessity, and chance are listed as causes in a report concerning Aristotle. *(Edition p. 205.)*

I.49.36.5 A ship's motion distinguishes principal causes from indispensable conditions. *(Edition p. 1179.)*

I.6.17c Choice appears among different kinds of cause. *(Edition p. 209.)*

I.1.26 Zeus is described as the cause of all in an etymological argument. *(Edition p. 55.)*

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[63] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 31, 87–89, 92, 138–139, 371. A clause in I.13.1c.3 is supplied by Wachsmuth from the following report of Posidonius. The English retains the marked supplement and the compressed contrast between "because" and "because of something."

Principal causes and conditions. The analogy of a moving ship distinguishes conditions without which motion cannot occur from the helmsman and wind as principal causes. It is then applied to soul's use of body. The causal classification reported under Theophrastus also makes room for choice alongside nature, chance, and necessity. These examples show why an indispensable condition and a source of directed action should not be collapsed into the same explanatory role.

Being responsible as cause. Aitios can mean responsible for something or causative. At I.1.26, Zeus is aitios of everything, in wordplay relating Dia to dia, "through." The term is causal here and does not imply blame. Moral responsibility is a possible contextual development of the adjective, not an unavoidable meaning in every divine or physical explanation.

In this edition. "Cause" is the broad rendering. Where the text explicitly distinguishes aitia from aition, "explanation" preserves the distinction.

See also. Chance and fortune; Choice; Demiurge and craftsman; God; Necessity; Principle; Reason and account; Relation; Sign; Vehicle of the soul.

Cave

σπήλαιον, spēlaion, cave[64]

The word. Spēlaion is a cave or cavern. Its significance comes from the particular account, not from an automatic association with a philosophical allegory.

In Stobaeus. The reported Indian cave contains a statue combining male and female sides and becomes the setting for a test of conduct. The cave is described as naturally occurring. Nothing in this passage identifies it with Plato's cave or licenses replacing the unnamed statue with a confidently named deity.

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[64] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 67–68. The narrative reaches Stobaeus through Porphyry's quotation of Bardisanes, which preserves a further layer of reported speech.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.56c A natural cave houses the unusual statue in reported testimony. *(Edition p. 147.)*

In this edition. "Cave" is clear; keep its natural origin distinct from the crafted statue inside it.

See also. Female; Male; Mountain; Statue; Test and refutation.

Center

κέντρον, kentron, center[65]

The word. Kentron is a center, especially a geometrical or cosmic center. It should be distinguished from merely being somewhere in the middle of a collection.

In Stobaeus. Zeno's account makes the motion of parts toward the center an explanation of cohesion and cosmic stability. The earth is established in equilibrium about the world's center, while the world remains at rest in surrounding infinite void. The argument extends from the organization of individual wholes to the organization of the cosmos.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.4.1 Central tendency explains the rest of the world and the earth's equilibrium. *(Edition p. 443.)*

In this edition. "Center" preserves the spatial and explanatory focus; do not substitute a modern gravitational mechanism.

See also. Circumference; Middle; Void; Weight; World.

[65] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 166. The report concerns the Stoic Zeno; "in equilibrium" renders the expression for equal strength or power.

Chance and fortune

τύχη, tychē, chance; fortune[66]

The word. Tychē can name what befalls someone, the changing course of fortune, personified Fortune, or chance considered as a cause. These uses are related but are not interchangeable in every context.

In Stobaeus. The title of chapter 6 places fortune beside what happens of itself. The reports in chapter 7 ask how chance relates to variability and the limits of human calculation. The poems and technical notices therefore approach the same word through different kinds of question.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.6.heading Fortune is placed beside spontaneous occurrence. *(Edition p. 193.)*

I.7.9a Epicurus, Anaxagoras, and the Stoics appear in contrasting reports about chance. *(Edition p. 219.)*

I.5.13 A tragic line denies that fortune can force its way ahead of fate. *(Edition p. 173.)*

In this edition. "Fortune" usually suits a person's lot or a poetic power; "chance" suits the causal discussions. Capitalization can mark personification, but it does not settle a philosophical theory.

See also. Cause; Fate; Necessity; Spontaneous occurrence.

Change and alteration

μεταβολή; ἀλλοίωσις, metabolē; alloiōsis, change; alteration[67]

The word. Metabolē is change; alloiōsis is alteration. Their local distinction often concerns a change in quality, but the volume's vocabulary is not uniformly restricted to one technical system.

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[66] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 77, 83, 92. The distinctions in I.7.9a are retained as the compiler transmits them. They should not be assumed to have identical meanings for all the thinkers named there.

[67] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 162–163, 178, 344.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian classification describes change from hot to cold or sweet to bitter as qualitative, alongside quantitative increase and local motion. Porphyry treats bodily being-affected as alteration but calls psychic affections activities, denying that they resemble heating or cooling. Posidonius' account of growth adds a further distinction between changing material and persisting individual quality.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.1.5 Qualitative alteration is distinguished from other forms of motion. *(Edition p. 433.)*

I.49.21.1 Bodily alteration is distinguished from incorporeal activity. *(Edition p. 1081.)*

I.20.7.3 The individually qualified being persists through material change. *(Edition p. 481.)*

In this edition. "Motion" remains broad enough to include more than locomotion. "Alteration" does not imply destruction of the changing subject.

See also. Affection; Coming into being and passing away; Growth; Motion; Quality; Sameness and difference.

Character

ἦθος, ēthos, character; habitual disposition[68]

The word. Ēthos is character or an established way of behaving. Its plural can refer to traits or dispositions subject to training.

In Stobaeus. The account of descent distinguishes souls assisting the world, souls training and correcting their own character, and souls undergoing punishment. Character belongs to the second purpose, where embodiment serves an educative function. This prevents all descents from being reduced to the same punitive explanation.

[68] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 380. The author expressly presents this differentiation as his own judgment within the survey of accounts.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.40.4 Correction of character defines one purpose of descent. *(Edition p. 1217.)*

In this edition. "Character" is clear; "habits" may fit a narrower practical context.

See also. Correction and restoration; Descent; Education; Habit and disposition; Virtue and excellence.

Chasm

χάσμα, chasma, chasm; fissure; opening[69]

The word. Chasma is a gap or opening. The object in which it occurs determines whether it is a terrestrial fissure or another kind of apparent opening.

In Stobaeus. The earthquake account says that enclosed air can force the ground apart and escape through fissures. The opening is consequently part of the proposed mechanism ending the disturbance. Examples from named places give the explanation a historical setting without supplying a modern verification of its cause.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.36.2.9 Fissures release the air said to cause an earthquake. *(Edition p. 743.)*

In this edition. "Fissure" suits split ground; "chasm" emphasizes a larger opening.

See also. Air; Earth; Earthquake; Separation; Windstorm.

[69] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 251. The island called Sacred is Hiera in the fuller parallel account; the adjective functions as a name in this example.

Chest

στῆθος, stēthos, chest; breast[70]

The word. Stēthos is the chest or breast. It can be the physical site addressed or struck when emotion is represented bodily.

In Stobaeus. The Homeric quotation portrays Odysseus striking his breast and rebuking his heart. In the Phaedo discussion, the act of self-address serves as evidence for a soul capable of governing and resisting affections. The chest is the bodily location in the example, while the argument concerns psychic agency.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.13.15 Striking the breast accompanies an address commanding the heart to endure. *(Edition p. 1055.)*

In this edition. "Breast" suits the verse; "chest" is clear in anatomical prose.

See also. Affection; Body; Heart; Self-control and temperance; Soul.

Chest and mind

φρένες; φρήν, phrenes; phrēn, diaphragm; breast; mind[71]

The word. Phrēn and its plural phrenes can name a bodily region or the mind and its resolve. Context is indispensable.

In Stobaeus. The Ajax verses speak of stubborn phrenes overcome by time, where minds or resolves is appropriate. The Timaeus locates a psychic kind between phrenes and navel, where the diaphragm is meant. Neither passage licenses one unvarying anatomical or mental translation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.23 Stubborn minds are said to yield to time. *(Edition p. 231.)*

I.42.1.3 The diaphragm marks a bodily boundary. *(Edition p. 885.)*

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[70] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 338. The quoted lines are used by Socrates within an argument; the use should be distinguished from the original Homeric narrative setting.

[71] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 97, 101, 294. The plural form does not necessarily require a plural English organ; its lexical range differs from a modern anatomy label.

I.8.39.1 Phrēn names the source of a preference among seasons. *(Edition p. 241.)*

Phrēn as mind or heart. Phrēn belongs to a word family linking the bodily region of the midriff with thought and feeling. In I.8.39.1, the question "what your heart chooses" uses phrēn for the inward source of preference. "Diaphragm" would be too anatomical in this dialogue, although anatomical senses of the family help explain its wider history.

In this edition. Use "mind" for thought or resolve and "diaphragm" for the anatomical location specified here.

See also. Body; Chest; Choice; Navel; Thought; Time.

Child and childhood

παῖς; παιδίον, pais; paidion, child; young child[72]

The word. Pais can mean child and, in other settings, a dependent or servant; paidion is a form used for a young child. Context is decisive.

In Stobaeus. The Republic comparison observes spirit in children before developed reasoning and also in animals. Children provide an example for distinguishing psychic powers by their different development. The speaker's sweeping remark about some never reasoning is part of the argument's rhetoric, not a diagnostic classification.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.31.2 Children exemplify spirit operating before developed reasoning. *(Edition p. 1143.)*

In this edition. "Children" fits the developmental comparison; no servile meaning is intended.

See also. Age and maturity; Anger and spirit; Education; Living creature; Reasoning and calculation.

[72] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 362. A rejected negative interrupts the printed sentence if retained as running text; the edition marks it rather than treating it as part of the argument.

Choice

προαίρεσις, proairesis, choice; deliberate choice[73]

The word. Proairesis denotes choice, often deliberate choice. In the causal notices it identifies a way in which action can come about.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian report distinguishes chance within the sphere of action and choice from the wider range of spontaneous occurrence. Theophrastus is reported to distinguish choice as a cause alongside nature, chance, and necessity. A compressed Epicurean notice likewise lists necessity, choice, and chance. These classifications show the term's explanatory role without supplying a single shared theory of freedom.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.6.17a.1 Choice helps distinguish chance from spontaneous occurrence. *(Edition p. 203.)*

I.6.17c Choice appears in two reported classifications of causes. *(Edition p. 209.)*

I.7.9a Choice is distinguished from other ways in which events occur. *(Edition p. 219.)*

In this edition. "Deliberate choice" makes the action-related sense clear where needed. The word alone does not establish freedom from every causal condition.

See also. Cause; Chance and fortune; Necessity; Spontaneous occurrence; What depends on us.

Circle

κύκλος, kuklos, circle[74]

The word. Kyklos is a circle and can also name a circular course or arrangement. The geometrical form is distinct from an individual circular object.

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[73] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 87, 89, 92.

[74] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 316–317. The Greek's unusual grammatical agreement before "circle" is preserved in the bilingual text rather than silently corrected.

In Stobaeus. The account of cognition lists circle itself among intelligibles, alongside triangle and sphere. It distinguishes such forms from particular instances and from the necessary properties studied in geometry. Recognizing these levels avoids treating a drawn circle, a theorem about circles, and circle itself as the same object of knowledge.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.6.7 Circle itself is an intelligible form in a classification of cognitive objects. *(Edition p. 971.)*

In this edition. Use "circle" for the figure and "circuit" when the context instead specifies a circular course of movement.

See also. Circular motion; Circumference; Intelligible; Sphere; Triangle.

Circular motion

περιφορά, periphora, circular motion; revolution; circuit[75]

The word. Periphora denotes a circular course or revolution and can name the circuit itself. A fixed center need not imply an absence of movement.

In Stobaeus. One notice calls heaven the outermost circuit around earth. The Aristotelian report describes aether as unchanging in substance while moving in a circle around the center. Hermes' dialogue uses the Bears to show movement that turns about the same point and is bounded by stillness. These passages distinguish the route of motion from the change of what moves.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.23.1.1 Heaven is described as the outermost circuit. *(Edition p. 553.)*

I.23.2.2 Unchanging aether is compatible with circular movement. *(Edition p. 555.)*

I.19.2.3 Revolution combines a moving course with a stable reference. *(Edition p. 437.)*

[75] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 164, 200–201.

In this edition. "Circuit" may describe a course or boundary rather than assert an additional rotation. The first notice does not say that earth itself revolves.

See also. Aether; Heaven; Motion; Rest; Star.

Circumference

περιφέρεια, periphereia, circumference; periphery[76]

The word. Periphereia is the circular outer extent or periphery. In cosmology it is defined in relation to the center of the whole.

In Stobaeus. Zeno's account describes air and fire as forming their mass toward the world's circumference while also tending in some way toward its center. The apparently opposed tendencies are both retained. The periphery is a location within the explanation of elemental arrangement, not an independent substance outside the cosmos.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.4.2 Air and fire accumulate toward the circumference despite a qualified central tendency. *(Edition p. 443.)*

In this edition. "Circumference" suits the spherical geometry; "periphery" can clarify the outer region where accumulation occurs.

See also. Air; Center; Fire; Lightness; Sphere.

City

πόλις, polis, city; civic community[77]

The word. Polis is a city understood as a civic community, not only its buildings or geographical site.

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[76] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 166. The qualification "in some way" belongs to the tendency toward the center; the passage does not explain its mechanism.

[77] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 24. The final word mortal is supplied from a parallel quotation; the city is present in the transmitted line.

In Stobaeus. Simonides pairs city and mortal in asserting that excellence comes through the gods. The parallel treats a community as capable of excellence just as an individual is. A narrow rendering as fortification or townscape would miss the collective ethical subject.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.10 City and individual are paired as recipients of divinely aided excellence. *(Edition p. 37.)*

In this edition. "City" is familiar, with its communal sense made clear.

See also. Civic constitution; God; Human being; Law; Virtue and excellence.

Civic constitution

πολιτεία, politeia, constitution; civic order; way of life[78]

The word. Politeia can mean a civic constitution or a shared manner of life. Its political origin does not require the same institutional sense everywhere.

In Stobaeus. The Laws describes war overturning constitutions and changing laws. The Hermetic lament instead calls the souls' blessed existence with gods a politeia. The first concerns civic arrangements; the second a common life. Preserving that range avoids making the heavenly scene into an unmentioned earthly constitution.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.6.17b.1 War can overthrow civic constitutions. *(Edition p. 207.)*

I.49.44.38 The shared life of souls with gods is described with the same noun. *(Edition p. 1275.)*

In this edition. "Constitution" suits political arrangements; "way of life" suits the broader communal use.

See also. Blessed; City; Law; Regimen; War.

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[78] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 88, 395–396. The Laws passage initially stresses circumstances but subsequently allows a role for skilled human action.

Clay and mud

πηλός, pēlos, clay; mud[79]

The word. Pēlos is clay or mud, a mixture associated with earth and moisture. Its role can be descriptive or figurative.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo description contrasts the worn lower region with a finer upper earth, using the seabed's clay and mud as an analogy for relative imperfection. Pēlos is one material in the comparison, not an independent metaphysical principle of evil.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.58.18 Clay contributes to the comparison between lower and higher regions. *(Edition p. 1437.)*

In this edition. "Clay" preserves the adopted distinction from the neighboring word for mud.

See also. Beauty; Earth; Matter; Place and space; Water.

Cloud

νέφος; ἀνέφελος, nephos; anephelos, cloud[80]

The word. Nephos names a cloud. The related nephelē also appears in the volume. A cloud can be a stage in a process of condensation or the proposed material of a luminous heavenly appearance.

In Stobaeus. Anaximenes' weather account makes clouds through the thickening of air and showers through further compression. Xenophanes' stars are clouds set on fire, extinguished by day and rekindled at night. The two uses show why cloud-language cannot be confined to the chapter on precipitation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.31.1 Cloud and shower belong to successive stages of thickening. *(Edition p. 709.)*

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[79] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 437–438. A substantial supplement restores the two-stage comparison. The disparaging description of the sea belongs to the illustrative narrative.

[80] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 198, 204, 242–243.

I.24.1n.1 Ignited clouds explain the stars' appearance. *(Edition p. 569.)*

I.22.2.4 Cloudless brightness characterizes the Homeric divine dwelling. *(Edition p. 545.)*

Cloudlessness. Anephelos means cloudless. The Homeric description of Olympus quoted at I.22.2.4 excludes wind, rain, and snow and presents a cloudless clarity filled with radiance. Cloudlessness contributes to an image of the gods' secure dwelling. It is a poetic description used in an argument, not a general observation about the weather at a terrestrial mountain summit.

In this edition. The English generally uses "cloud" for both related nouns. The physical role follows the attributed theory: water-bearing material in one setting, fuel of a light in another.

See also. Air; Exhalation; Fire; Heaven; Light; Rain and precipitation; Star.

Cold

ψυχρόν, psychron, cold; the cold[81]

The word. Psychron denotes cold or what is cold. It must be distinguished from psychē, soul: the similarity of their English transliterations is not a license to join the concepts.

In Stobaeus. Cold is paired with hot in the account of Strato's elements. In the Aristotelian list it belongs to the powers associated with generated things. The contrast helps explain why an opposition such as hot and cold can organize a physical account without asserting that two independent substances are present.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.9 Cold is one of Strato's reported elements. *(Edition p. 303.)*

I.10.16a.3 Cold belongs to the four elemental powers. *(Edition p. 311.)*

[81] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 124, 128.

In this edition. The rendering follows the grammar: "cold" for the quality, "the cold" where the adjective functions as a named principle. The surrounding report determines its explanatory status.

See also. Dryness; Element; Heat; Moisture.

Collision

σύγκρουσις, sunkrousis, collision; striking together[82]

The word. Synkrousis is collision or striking together. It describes an encounter between bodies rather than their mere combination.

In Stobaeus. The report about Democritus calls lightning a collision of clouds and connects it with friction gathering fire-producing constituents through porous structures. Collision initiates an account involving arrangement and passage. It is not identical with the compound aggregate invoked in the preceding explanation of thunder.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.29.1.9 Colliding clouds explain lightning through material interactions. *(Edition p. 669.)*

In this edition. "Collision" preserves the encounter; distinguish synkrousis from synkrisis, aggregation.

See also. Aggregation; Cloud; Friction; Lightning and thunderbolt; Pore and passage.

Color

χρῶμα, chrōma, color; hue[83]

The word. Chrōma names color; the related chroa is rendered "hue." The word raises questions about bodies, their constituents, the medium of vision, and the conditions under which a quality is perceived.

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[82] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 232–233. The similar-looking Greek nouns for collision and aggregation have different roles in this report and should not be conflated.

[83] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 149–150.

In Stobaeus. Empedocles' report defines color through its fit with the passages of sight. Democritus' report denies color to the primary constituents and explains the colors of compounds through arrangement, shape, and position. The Aristotelian notice makes a further distinction between potential and actual hue. These are different explanatory strategies, not successive parts of a single theory.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.1.3 Color fits the passages of sight in the Empedoclean account. *(Edition p. 379.)*

I.16.1.7 Colors of compounds arise from uncolored constituents. *(Edition p. 381.)*

I.16.1.9 Color and visibility are distinguished through potentiality and actuality. *(Edition p. 383.)*

In this edition. "Color" does not imply that a quality belongs intrinsically to every constituent of the colored body. The explanation must be read with the attribution.

See also. Darkness; Light; Presentation and imagination; Quality; Sight.

Comet

κομήτης, komētēs, comet[84]

The word. Komētēs names the comet in a group of accounts concerned with unusual luminous appearances. Whether it is a returning star, an optical appearance, or burning material is itself disputed.

In Stobaeus. Some Pythagoreans call it a periodically appearing star; unnamed others explain it through reflected sight, comparing mirrors. Epigenes describes ignited wind mixed with earth, Boethus ignited air, and Diogenes a star. The shared headword is therefore the subject of classification, not a guarantee of an agreed physical kind.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.28.1a.1 Periodic return and reflected sight are alternative explanations. *(Edition p. 649.)*

[84] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 227–228.

I.28.1a.7 Wind, air, and stellar classification give further alternatives. *(Edition p. 653.)*

In this edition. "Comet" is the convenient equivalent. It does not import a modern account of the body's orbit or composition into the ancient report.

See also. Air; Fire; Reflection; Star; Wind.

Coming into being and passing away

γένεσις; φθορά, genesis; phthora, coming into being; passing away; generation; destruction[85]

The word. The paired terms concern the formation and dissolution of things. Their range includes living birth and death, but also physical processes and the changing condition of embodied existence.

In Stobaeus. Parmenides and Melissus are reported as denying both because they hold the whole to be unmoving. The account of matter defines it as what underlies these processes. In the discussion of souls, coming-to-be is opposed to being in a report about release after punishment.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.20.1a Parmenides and Melissus deny coming into being and passing away. *(Edition p. 457.)*

I.11.1 Matter underlies both processes and other changes. *(Edition p. 321.)*

I.49.65.16 Souls are released from coming-to-be into being in the reported Platonic view. *(Edition p. 1517.)*

In this edition. "Generation" and "destruction" sometimes serve the same Greek pair. "Coming-to-be" keeps the process visible where it contrasts with being; it need not mean a single biological birth.

See also. Being and substance; Matter; Motion; Soul.

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[85] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 130, 170, 456. The denial in I.20.1a is a report about named philosophers. It is not presented as the anthology's own conclusion about all change.

Common

κοινός, koinos, common; shared; general[86]

The word. Koinos describes what belongs to more than one thing or has a scope extending across a class. Commonality need not mean numerical identity.

In Stobaeus. The definition attributed to Pythagoras is called common to every kind of motion. The claim concerns the definition's reach: difference or otherness in matter is proposed as covering the kinds under discussion. The word does not say that every movement has the same direction, speed, or physical mechanism.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.1.1 One proposed definition is said to cover all motion. *(Edition p. 429.)*

In this edition. "Common" suits shared possession; "general" may clarify the scope of a definition. Preserve the class over which the statement ranges.

See also. Community and communion; Difference; Limit and definition; Motion; Universal.

Community and communion

κοινωνία, koinōnia, community; sharing; communion[87]

The word. Koinōnia is a relationship of sharing or participation. It can describe a community of functions within one being as well as association among separate beings.

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[86] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 162. The definition is transmitted under Pythagoras's name; the attribution does not establish that its wording is his own.

[87] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 356. The argument concerns internal psychic powers; its comparison should not be detached into a direct prescription for a human political constitution.

In Stobaeus. The account of the soul's parts argues that their community must be fitted together through appropriate shares of power and standing. Equal allocations to unlike functions would fail, but unequal allocations would also fail if inferior powers governed superior ones. The decisive issue is ordered cooperation, not equality alone.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.27.5 The soul's parts require an allocation suited to their different functions. *(Edition p. 1119.)*

In this edition. "Community" makes the political analogy audible; "sharing" or "communion" suits the relationship emphasized in other contexts.

See also. Common; Concord and agreement; Harmony; Order; Three-part soul.

Compaction

πίλησις, pilēsis, compaction; compression[88]

The word. Pilēsis is compression or packing together. It names a process rather than merely a dense resulting state.

In Stobaeus. The cosmological report explains air as a separation from earth vaporized through earth's more violent compression. Compression and separation therefore belong to the same proposed process: material pressed together yields something that passes out. The account should not be simplified into the claim that compression always produces only denser matter.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.22.1a.3 Compression of earth is invoked to explain the separation of air. *(Edition p. 535.)*

[88] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 195. The passage distinguishes aether from the fiery heaven below it, unlike other cosmic arrangements in the anthology.

In this edition. "Compression" is natural; "compaction" emphasizes the pressing together of material.

See also. Air; Density and rarefaction; Earth; Evaporation and vapor; Separation.

Composite

σύνθετος; ἀσύνθετος, sunthetos; asunthetos, composite; compounded[89]

The word. Synthetos describes something put together from constituents. The constituents may be principles, powers, or bodies; the adjective does not specify one kind of composition.

In Stobaeus. The report under Pythagoras's name distinguishes numbers and their proportions as principles from compounds formed from them as elements. The distinction prevents "element" from automatically meaning an absolutely simple beginning. In discussions of soul, the denial of composition serves a different argument about the relation between soul and its powers.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.10 Elements are described as compounds of numerical principles and proportions. *(Edition p. 303.)*

I.49.33.1 Soul's powers are not treated as components added to a composite soul. *(Edition p. 1163.)*

Arith.5a Uncompounded being is named within a fragmentary arithmetic account. *(Edition p. 19.)*

The uncompounded. Asunthetos means uncompounded. Arith.5a places it among predicates of an ungenerated and eternal principle, but a gap after the statement that number consists of monads leaves the grammatical antecedent uncertain. The term securely opposes composition; the fragment does not permit an unqualified claim that the immediately preceding "number" receives every subsequent predicate.

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[89] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 18–19, 124–125, 367. The Pythagorean account is a transmitted philosophical report, not an independently preserved exposition by Pythagoras.

In this edition. "Composite" emphasizes the resulting whole; "compounded" can emphasize its formation. Identify the constituents from the text.

See also. Element; Monad; Number; One; Principle; Simple; Synthesis.

Compound aggregate

σύγκριμα, sunkrima, compound; aggregate; composition[90]

The word. Synkrima is what has been combined, a compound or aggregate. It is the result rather than the act of synkrisis.

In Stobaeus. The lunar report uses the word for the moon's composition, described as not pure because of admixture. Its different school attributions propose different reasons for the impurity. The noun identifies a constituted whole without deciding by itself whether its constituents interpenetrate or lie beside one another.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.26.4.5 The moon's composition is treated as impure in distinct reported accounts. *(Edition p. 629.)*

In this edition. "Composition" suits the lunar description; "aggregate" emphasizes constituent plurality.

See also. Aggregation; Mixture and blending; Moon; Part and whole; Pure and unmixed.

Compulsion and force

βία, bia, force; compulsion[91]

The word. Bia is force or compulsion. It may name the means of overcoming resistance without necessarily denoting a moral wrong.

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[90] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 222. The Aristotelian clause contains the difficult aerōmata, provisionally formations of air; no conjectural replacement is treated as certain.

[91] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 358, 379. The phrase "into the same" is retained without resolving it exclusively as sameness or as a unified whole.

In Stobaeus. In the Timaeus mixture of cosmic soul, the maker forcibly fits the hard-to-mix nature of the different together with the same. Force expresses the resistance involved in unification. It belongs to a constructive cosmological act here, unlike passages where coercion drives a soul toward a worse condition.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.28.3 Force overcomes the resistance of difference in the soul's mixture. *(Edition p. 1127.)*

I.49.39.8 Compulsion distinguishes involuntary descent. *(Edition p. 1213.)*

In this edition. "Force" suits the mixing; "compulsion" suits an agent constrained against its inclination.

See also. Demiurge and craftsman; Difference; Mixture and blending; Sameness and difference; Voluntary.

Concept

ἐννόημα, ennoēma, concept; conception[92]

The word. Ennoēma is a concept or conception. Its status can be distinguished from the things represented by it.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic report calls concepts images in soul that are only as it were somethings and qualified things. This qualification separates representative content from the status of ordinary objects. It also explains the reporter's treatment of ideas of humans, horses, and other kinds without turning them into independently subsisting Forms.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.3.1 Concepts are qualified as quasi-things represented in soul. *(Edition p. 341.)*

[92] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 136–137. The technical expressions something and qualified thing are deliberately retained; simplifying them can erase the account's ontological distinction.

In this edition. "Concept" is clear, provided the repeated "as it were" remains central to the explanation.

See also. Idea; Image in imagination; Subsistence; Thought; Universal.

Conception

ἐπίνοια, epinoia, conception; conceptual consideration[93]

The word. Epinoia concerns conceiving or considering something in thought. A distinction in conception need not be a separation into two independently existing things.

In Stobaeus. Posidonius's account says that substance and matter differ in conception alone while being the same in underlying reality. Matter is considered without a determinate quality of its own, though it always occurs with some shape and quality. The conceptual distinction is therefore not a claim that wholly unqualified matter appears separately in experience.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.11.5c Substance and matter differ conceptually while sharing underlying reality. *(Edition p. 331.)*

In this edition. "In conception" preserves the contrast with hypostasis. "Imaginary" would wrongly suggest that the distinction is simply false.

See also. Concept; Matter; Quality; Subsistence; Thought.

Concord

συμφωνία, sumphōnia, concord; agreement; consonance[94]

The word. Symphōnia is a sounding together, hence concord or agreement. A musical image can express coordination without deciding whether the coordinated things form one substance.

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[93] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 133. "The same" is supplied in the base edition; the surrounding contrast explicitly opposes conception to underlying reality.

[94] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 351–352. The passage explores alternatives. Its interrogative and conditional structure matters for the status of the choral model.

In Stobaeus. The inquiry into soul considers whether multiple souls might agree like a chorus, alongside alternatives involving parts or powers of one soul. Concord appears as a possible relation between several things. The analogy must not be turned into the author's settled assertion that every person contains several independent souls.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.25a.6 Choral concord illustrates one possibility in an inquiry into psychic unity. *(Edition p. 1105.)*

In this edition. "Concord" preserves the musical analogy; "agreement" fits a nonmusical application.

See also. Harmony; Music; Part and whole; Power and capacity; Soul.

Concord and agreement

ὁμόνοια, homonoia, concord; agreement in mind[95]

The word. Homonoia is concord or agreement, especially a shared orientation among persons or parts. It differs in vocabulary from musical symphōnia.

In Stobaeus. Aesara's account requires each psychic part to receive its fitting proportion for concord, friendship, and justice to exist. Simply giving the superior more and the inferior less is insufficient. Agreement depends on a distribution fitted to the function of each part.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.27.6 Concord within soul requires proportionate arrangement. *(Edition p. 1119.)*

In this edition. "Concord" conveys the ordered agreement; specify the psychic context rather than assuming a political assembly.

See also. Friendship and cosmic attraction; Justice; Part and whole; Ratio and proportion; Soul.

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[95] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 356–357. The dialectal form for justice is not a comparative or superlative; it names the resulting just condition.

Conjunction

σύνοδος, sunodos, conjunction; coming together[96]

The word. Synodos is a coming together. Astronomically it denotes an apparent meeting of heavenly bodies, here the moon with the sun.

In Stobaeus. The lunar month is measured to conjunction in the report of planetary periods. Another report locates solar eclipses at conjunctions and lunar eclipses at full moons. This specifies a necessary phase for each kind of eclipse without asserting that an eclipse occurs every time that phase returns.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.42c.1 Conjunction marks a boundary in the stated lunar month. *(Edition p. 255.)*

I.25.5.2 Solar eclipses are associated with conjunctions. *(Edition p. 599.)*

In this edition. "Conjunction" is the established astronomical rendering; it does not imply a physical collision.

See also. Eclipse; Month; Moon; Phase and appearance; Sun.

Constitution

σύστασις, sustasis, constitution; composition; formation[97]

The word. Systasis concerns how constituents stand together as an organized thing. It can name both their combination and the resulting constitution.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic description of an animal's balanced constitution associates proportionate elements with warmth for action, lightness for motion, tempering to touch, and firmness. Proportion is qualitative and functional as well as numerical. The passage does not say that equal quantities of every element are required.

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[96] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 107, 213. The apparent meeting concerns their observed positions. The source separately allows eclipses of differing extent.

[97] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 469. Symmetros means proportionate here, while pēxis refers to firmness or consolidation rather than a different apparatus reading.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.69.34 A proportionate elemental constitution supports several bodily capacities. *(Edition p. 1569.)*

In this edition. "Constitution" emphasizes the resulting organization; "composition" emphasizes the constituents. Avoid treating it as a modern chemical formula.

See also. Body; Element; Mixture and blending; Ratio and proportion; System and organized whole.

Constitution as fitness

κατασκευή, kataskeuē, constitution; equipment; fitness for a function[98]

The word. Kataskeuē is the arrangement or equipment by which something is fitted for an activity. In this analysis it names a constitution enabling a natural function.

In Stobaeus. The discussion distinguishes a part's subject, form, activity, constitution, and power. Constitution is its fitness for the relevant natural work; power is a condition of that constitution through which the activity can occur. These distinctions prevent a bodily part from being defined solely by its visible material.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.25a.7 Constitution and power are distinguished in the analysis of a functional part. *(Edition p. 1105.)*

In this edition. "Constitution" needs its functional sense here. "Construction" alone may suggest only the process of making the part.

See also. Activity; Constitution; Instrument; Part and whole; Power and capacity.

[98] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 352. The text allows some constitutions and powers to coincide in the relevant respect. Its distinctions are analytical, not a claim that each term always names a separate object.

Contemplation

θεωρία, theōria, contemplation; cognitive consideration[99]

The word. Theōria is contemplation or attentive consideration. In a philosophical argument it may describe an act of knowing rather than passive looking.

In Stobaeus. The account of intellect begins from the claim that thinking belongs to its being: deprived of thinking, intellect would cease to be what it is. It then examines cognition to determine how intellect contemplates its objects. The activity differs from ordinary sensory observation even though the language retains an image of viewing.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.5.2 Inquiry into contemplation proceeds from thinking's constitutive role in intellect. *(Edition p. 957.)*

In this edition. "Contemplation" is appropriate when its cognitive meaning is clear; it does not necessarily imply withdrawal from all activity.

See also. Awareness and apprehension; Intellect; Intellection; Knowledge; Perception.

Continuance

διαμονή, diamonē, continuance; continued existence[100]

The word. Diamonē is continuance or enduring persistence. By itself it need not mean complete immunity from change.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry calls the soul's continuance and eternity a celebrated Pythagorean teaching and illustrates it with a reported dream anecdote. The account asserts endurance, while another passage allows an enduring soul to undergo change and affection. Persistence and changelessness therefore require separate treatment.

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[99] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 313. The statement expresses the account being defended in this excerpt, not a premise shared by all the anthology's sources.

[100] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 445. The dream exchange is introduced by they say; it is evidence for a transmitted tradition, not independent confirmation of a dream's object.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.59.1 The soul's continued existence is attributed to Pythagorean teaching. *(Edition p. 1467.)*

I.49.60.2 Endurance is distinguished from absence of change. *(Edition p. 1469.)*

In this edition. "Continued existence" clarifies what persists; "continuance" is a compact heading.

See also. Change and alteration; Dream; Eternity and lifetime; Immortality; Soul.

Continuity

συνεχές, syneches, continuity; the continuous[101]

The word. Syneches describes what is continuous. In the relevant reports, continuous magnitude is connected with divisibility rather than a heap of indivisible pieces.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian survey calls magnitudes and things possessing magnitude continuous and divisible without limit; its list includes motion and time as well as spatial things. The account of time explains continuity through earlier and later portions and makes the now their boundary. A common boundary connects the sequence without turning the now into an extended piece of time.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1c.1 Continuity is applied to magnitudes and several kinds of bearer. *(Edition p. 355.)*

I.8.40c The now bounds earlier and later portions of time. *(Edition p. 245.)*

In this edition. "Continuous" does not mean merely persistent or long-lasting. The local argument concerns how a magnitude or ordered sequence admits division.

See also. Division; Limit; Motion; Quantity; Time.

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[101] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 103, 141.

Contrary

ἐναντίον, enantion, contrary; opposite[102]

The word. Enantion is what stands opposite. The relevant opposition may be ethical, physical, or logical, and must be supplied by the argument.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account of the soul's love of the good says that a soul raised to apprehend the good and true cannot slip toward the contrary. Its context identifies that contrary through evil and departure from the good. The term here expresses a moral direction, not a complete technical account of contradictory propositions.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.1.3 Apprehension of the good prevents the soul's movement toward its opposite. *(Edition p. 817.)*

In this edition. "Opposite" fits ordinary and directional contrasts; "contrary" is useful when the opposition itself becomes a technical topic.

See also. Difference; Evil; Good; Love; Truth.

Corpse

νεκρός, nekros, corpse; dead body[103]

The word. Nekros means dead and, substantivally, a dead person or corpse. Here the visible bodily remains are the focus.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo observes that a corpse does not immediately dissolve, and that embalming or resistant parts can prolong its persistence. This prepares a comparison with soul. The qualified description of bones and sinews as immortal emphasizes relative durability, not literal exemption from every possible destruction.

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[102] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 273. The assurance about not falling away belongs to the teacher's description of the transformed soul.

[103] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 331. "So to speak" explicitly qualifies immortality in the bodily example and should not be omitted from its interpretation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.9.10 The corpse's persistence becomes a step in an argument about soul. *(Edition p. 1027.)*

In this edition. "Corpse" fits the material body left after death; retain qualifications on its durability.

See also. Body; Bone; Death; Dissolution; Soul.

Correction and chastisement

κόλασις, kolasis, punishment; chastisement; correction[104]

The word. Kolasis is punishment or chastisement. A corrective purpose may be present, but it should not be assumed in every occurrence.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry describes the unburied soul's memory, longing, and grief as a terrible punishment. Elsewhere the Hermetic account explicitly calls embodiment punishment. These uses emphasize the condition endured; neither word alone guarantees that the process ends in moral rehabilitation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.53.21 The unburied soul's attachment and grief constitute punishment. *(Edition p. 1393.)*

I.49.68.15 Embodiment is explicitly called punishment. *(Edition p. 1537.)*

In this edition. "Punishment" is safest where no corrective outcome is stated; "chastisement" can retain the traditional tone.

See also. Embodiment; Memory; Punishment; Release; Retribution.

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[104] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 426, 461. The quotation about Elpenor follows the printed "sleep," despite the familiar Homeric reading "wine."

Correction and restoration

ἐπανόρθωσις, epanorthōsis, correction; restoration; setting right[105]

The word. Epanorthōsis is correction or setting right. It can repair an existing order rather than replace it entirely.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus says that the gods continually correct fate, lessening, relieving, or removing evils. Such correction preserves destiny while keeping it from disorder. In the account of descent, correction can instead concern a soul's own character, giving the term both cosmic and educative applications.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.35 Divine correction preserves fate through ordering. *(Edition p. 83.)*

I.49.40.4 Correction of character is one purpose of descent. *(Edition p. 1217.)*

In this edition. "Correction" preserves the active setting right; "restoration" suits a return to a proper condition.

See also. Character; Education; Fate; Order; Providence.

Cosmic administration

διοίκησις, dioikēsis, administration; governance; ordering[106]

The word. Dioikēsis is administration or governance. Applied to the whole, it concerns the organization and direction of the universe.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic passage says that universal governance depends on the One and extends through one intellect, which unites humans and gods. Souls are blessed or deprived according to their participation in this intellect. Governance thus connects cosmic order with the soul's condition.

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[105] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 43, 380. The difficult clause about fate's manifestation is left qualified; the text's explicit claim of preservation is the basis of this explanation.

[106] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 304. Intellect is explicitly called the good daimon here. That local identification should not replace every other use of daimōn in the anthology.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.8.3 Universal governance proceeds through intellect and unites divine and human. *(Edition p. 923.)*

In this edition. "Governance" is accessible; "administration" preserves the organized direction implied by the term.

See also. Intellect; One; Order; Providence; World.

Cosmic conflagration

ἐκπύρωσις, ekpyrōsis, conflagration; burning up[107]

The word. Ekpyrōsis denotes burning up. In cosmological accounts it can name the world's resolution into fire, but not every occurrence has that universal scope.

In Stobaeus. The report about Heraclitus and Hippasus makes fire both the principle and the agent of the world's dissolution. The Stoic report allows surrounding void for this expansion; Posidonius limits its extent to what the dissolution requires. In the climatic account of an inclined world, however, the same noun means scorching heat that renders regions uninhabitable. The scale and subject determine the sense.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.14.1 The world and bodies resolve into fire. *(Edition p. 307.)*

I.18.4b.2 The extent outside the world is discussed in relation to its dissolution. *(Edition p. 423.)*

I.15.6c The word instead denotes a climatic extreme. *(Edition p. 373.)*

In this edition. "Conflagration" marks the cosmic process; "scorching heat" preserves the local climatic use without importing a world-ending event.

See also. Dissolution; Fire; Heat; Void; World.

[107] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 126, 147, 160.

Cosmic ordering

διακόσμησις, diakosmēsis, ordering of the world; cosmic arrangement[108]

The word. Diakosmēsis concerns the ordering or ordered formation of the cosmos. It can name the process and the resulting disposition.

In Stobaeus. The report on Chrysippus distinguishes the cosmic system from the divine principle according to which its ordering arises and reaches completion. Thus "world" can name either the organized whole or, in another sense, the ordering god. The noun helps keep the activity of ordering distinct from the already organized totality.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.21.5.1 God is called world as the principle through which cosmic ordering is completed. *(Edition p. 501.)*

I.17.3.3 Continuing cosmic cycles and ordering accompany enduring tension. *(Edition p. 397.)*

In this edition. "Cosmic ordering" makes the reference explicit; "arrangement of the world" suits emphasis on the resulting structure.

See also. Arrangement; God; Order; Tension; World.

Courage

ἀνδρεία, andreia, courage[109]

The word. Andreia is courage. Its formation may involve the right organization of spirit rather than the absence of every strong feeling.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account says that thymos becomes courage when it enters a settled relation to the soul's thought and is no longer led astray by cowardice. Courage is therefore an ordered disposition of an impulse. It is not simply equivalent to aggression or physical strength.

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[108] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 153, 184. The report about Chrysippus is assigned by Wachsmuth to Arius Didymus; the several senses of world are stated within that report.

[109] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 321–322. Thymos here is assertive or angry spirit, distinct from pneuma, the breath or spirit of other physiological accounts.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.4.1 Spirit ordered in relation to thought becomes courage. *(Edition p. 989.)*

In this edition. "Courage" is direct and avoids making the virtue exclusively male despite the word's formation.

See also. Anger and spirit; Cowardice; Habit and disposition; Thought; Virtue and excellence.

Court of judgment

δικαστήριον, dikastērion, court; tribunal[110]

The word. Dikastērion is a court or place of judgment. It concerns an institution or setting, distinct from the judging person and the act of judgment.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic cultural narrative credits its teachers with establishing courts and spreading good order and justice. The courts appear alongside trust, pledges, and the personified Oath. Judicial institutions are thereby placed within a sacred account of orderly human relations.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.77 Courts are introduced with trust and oath as supports of justice. *(Edition p. 1313.)*

In this edition. "Court of judgment" makes the institutional sense clear.

See also. Judge; Judgment; Justice; Oath; Well-ordered law.

[110] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 406. The following care for the dead is part of the same cultural account but does not specify a complete embalming procedure.

Cowardice

δειλία, deilia, cowardice[111]

The word. Deilia is cowardice, a failure of courage. It is distinct from fear considered simply as an emotion.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account presents cowardice as something that can lead spirit astray. A stable relation to the soul's thought instead makes spirit courageous. The contrast concerns how an impulse is governed; the passage does not offer a separate definition of every form of fear.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.4.1 Cowardice is opposed to spirit's stable ordering as courage. *(Edition p. 989.)*

In this edition. "Cowardice" preserves the ethical contrast; "fear" would be too broad.

See also. Anger and spirit; Courage; Fear; Habit and disposition; Vice and wickedness.

Craftsman as skilled practitioner

τεχνίτης, technitēs, craftsman; skilled practitioner; maker[112]

The word. Technitēs is someone who possesses or exercises a technē. Applied to a cosmic maker, the word retains the analogy of intelligent, skilled production.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic passage calls the creator the craftsman of all things. His willing to become known initiates the seeker's movement toward discovery: divine yearning and illumination assist the search. The craftsman image therefore accompanies an account of revelation as well as production.

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[111] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 321–322. The passage explains virtue through settled relations among psychic powers, rather than treating courage as mere intensity of impulse.

[112] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 386. The English supplies a connective expression to complete the difficult conditional wording; that addition is not an independent Greek assertion.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.4 The cosmic craftsman wills to be known and assists the seeker. *(Edition p. 1241.)*

In this edition. "Craftsman" preserves the connection with technē. Do not assume that every occurrence is interchangeable with the distinct noun dēmiourgos.

See also. Art and craft; Demiurge and craftsman; God; Ignorance; Mental recognition.

Creator and poet

ποιητής, poiētēs, maker; creator; poet[113]

The word. Poiētēs is a maker and, in a familiar specialized use, a poet. Its relation to poiein, to make, explains the range without making every poet a cosmic creator.

In Stobaeus. The philosophical report names the source of divine offspring father and maker. The civic-cosmic analogy uses the same noun for the poet Homer when quoting descriptions of trees. The immediate object and context decide between creator and poet.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.29b.6 God is described as father and maker. *(Edition p. 71.)*

I.1.36c The poet introduces Homeric quotations. *(Edition p. 87.)*

In this edition. "Maker" suits production; "poet" is required when the quoted literary author is meant.

See also. Deed and work; Demiurge and craftsman; Father; God; Making and poetry.

[113] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 37, 44. The report about Plato interprets his theology; it is not a direct dialogue quotation of every designation it lists.

Cube

κύβος, kubos, cube[114]

The word. Kybos is the cube, a solid figure with equal square faces. In the elemental classification, it names the geometrical figure associated with earth.

In Stobaeus. The report says that earth comes from the cube and assigns other regular solids to the other elements. The statement concerns a proposed geometrical constitution, not an observation that every lump of earth visibly has a cubic outline. Its role should be read with the rest of the scheme.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.21.6c.2 Earth is associated with the cube among the five solids. *(Edition p. 507.)*

In this edition. "Cube" is direct; avoid replacing the figure with the broader word "solid," which would erase the classification.

See also. Earth; Element; Pyramid; Solid; Square and quadrilateral.

Cycle and period

περίοδος, periodos, circuit; cycle; period[115]

The word. Periodos is a going around or complete circuit and, by extension, the time needed to complete it.

In Stobaeus. The astronomical report describes a year of Saturn as a circuit of thirty ordinary years and gives different periods for other bodies. The same word thus joins spatial return with elapsed time. The reference body matters: a planetary year is not automatically a terrestrial calendar year.

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[114] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 186. The report is transmitted under Pythagoras's name; this attribution is preserved rather than silently replaced with Plato.

[115] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 107. The ancient numerical values are reported as such, without replacing them with modern orbital measurements.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.42c.1 The planets' circuits are expressed as differing periods. *(Edition p. 255.)*

In this edition. "Circuit" foregrounds the motion; "period" foregrounds its duration.

See also. Circle; Month; Motion; Planet; Year.

Cylinder

κύλινδρος, kulindros, cylinder[116]

The word. Kylindros is a cylinder. In an astronomical description, it can define the surface around which a spiral course is conceived.

In Stobaeus. The account contrasts a solar spiral in a sphere with a spiral around a cylinder. In the latter description, straight advance and circular winding are combined. The figure explains the path's organization and need not be treated as a visible cylindrical body enclosing the sun.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.25.3i.2 A cylindrical spiral is contrasted with a spherical account of the sun's course. *(Edition p. 593.)*

In this edition. "Cylinder" preserves the proposed geometry; the spiral's straight advance does not make its motion purely rectilinear.

See also. Axis; Circular motion; Sphere; Straight; Sun.

Dark blue

κυανοῦς, kuanous, dark blue[117]

The word. Kyanous denotes a dark blue color in these passages. Its contrast with a lighter result is central to the explanation.

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[116] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 211. The unnamed holders of the cylindrical account are not securely identified by this excerpt.

[117] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 151. The neighboring glaukon can include gray or greenish associations in other contexts; its rendering here follows the stated mixture.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus quotation derives dark blue from white and brightness entering intense black, then obtains glaukon by adding white to the blue. The local sequence supports a contrast between darker and paler blue, although glaukon has a wider range elsewhere.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.2.7 Dark blue is distinguished from the lighter color produced by adding white. *(Edition p. 389.)*

In this edition. "Dark blue" preserves this contrast without claiming a precise modern color value.

See also. Black; Brightness; Color; Green; White.

Darkness

σκότος, *skotos*, darkness[118]

The word. Skotos is darkness, a condition in which sight or the manifestation of color becomes problematic. Its presence need not carry a moral or symbolic meaning.

In Stobaeus. Epicurus and Aristarchus are reported to deny hue to bodies in darkness. The neighboring Aristotelian report instead distinguishes potential possession from actual manifestation and separates having no hue from not being seen. The disagreement is preserved in the anthology; it should not be resolved by reading the later qualification into the earlier statement.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.1.8 Bodies in darkness are said to have no hue. *(Edition p. 383.)*

I.16.1.9 Potential color is distinguished from color in actuality. *(Edition p. 383.)*

In this edition. "Darkness" retains the physical condition. The difference between "not present" and "not visible" belongs to the argument, not merely to an English choice of synonym.

See also. Actuality; Color; Light; Power and capacity; Sight.

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[118] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 149–150.

Day

ἡμέρα, hēmera, day[119]

The word. Hēmera can mean daylight or a day as a unit of time. Its rhetorical force may depend on brevity rather than astronomical measurement.

In Stobaeus. Sophocles contrasts the long testing needed to reveal a just person with the single day sufficient to recognize a bad one. The day functions as an emphatically short interval. The saying concerns the difficulty of knowing character and does not prescribe an exact timetable for judging particular people.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.21 A single day contrasts with the longer disclosure of justice over time. *(Edition p. 231.)*

In this edition. "Day" is sufficient; here the expression does not require a distinction between daylight and twenty-four hours.

See also. Character; Justice; Night; Test and refutation; Time.

Death

θάνατος; ταφή; θάπτειν, thanatos; taphē; thaptein, death[120]

The word. Thanatos names death. In arguments about soul, it can mark the separation or dissolution associated with bodily death without already deciding what happens to soul.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account denies that soul simply is blood: spirit withdraws into soul, blood coagulates, and the body dies. The Phaedo excerpt asks whether what refuses death must also be indestructible. Porphyry's notice calls death a kind of life for a substance whose being is living. These accounts make different claims about the subject that dies and the subject that persists.

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[119] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 97. The verses are quoted from Oedipus; the contrast is a dramatic maxim rather than an empirical rule.

[120] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 305–306, 342, 345, 422–423.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.9.2 Bodily death follows the withdrawal of spirit. *(Edition p. 929.)*

I.49.16.4 Refusing death and being indestructible are distinguished. *(Edition p. 1071.)*

I.49.22 Death is reconsidered in relation to living substance. *(Edition p. 1083.)*

I.49.53.4 Burial and deserved punishment jointly affect passage within Hades. *(Edition p. 1377.)*

Burial and passage below. Taphē means burial; the cited account also uses forms of thaptein, to bury. I.49.53.4 distinguishes the souls of the buried from those of the unburied at Acheron. Burial permits passage, but deserved punishment may still prevent it. This qualification matters: the report does not make funeral rites an unconditional guarantee of the same destination for every soul.

In this edition. The English preserves the distinction between death, destruction, and dissolution; one term cannot establish all three conclusions.

See also. Destiny after death; Dissolution; Immortality; Life; Punishment; Separation.

Decad

δεκάς, dekas, decad; ten[121]

The word. Dekas is ten, understood in the arithmetic excerpts as a complete numerical order. The word can carry evaluative and cosmological significance beyond counting ten objects.

In Stobaeus. The fragment under Philolaus's name describes the decad's power as guiding divine, heavenly, and human life, and connects its absence with indefiniteness and obscurity. The doxographical report also observes that counting returns to the unit after ten. These are claims about numerical organization and explanatory power.

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[121] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 16–17, 125. Arith.3a contains a lacuna around the claim about participation and guidance; the entry does not supply the missing syntax.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.3a The decad's power is praised as a principle of ordered intelligibility. *(Edition p. 15.)*

I.10.12.11 Counting and the first-four-number sum explain the decad's completeness. *(Edition p. 305.)*

In this edition. "Decad" is retained as a technical headword; "ten" explains the numerical reference.

See also. Measure; Number; Tetractys; Tetrad; Unlimited.

Deed and work

ἔργον, ergon, deed; work; product[122]

The word. Ergon can mean a deed, work, or the result of an activity. Its ethical value must be supplied by qualification or context.

In Stobaeus. The tragic maxim says that an unjust deed does not escape the gods. Ergon identifies the action evaluated, while unjust states its character. The word itself is not restricted to labor, artistic production, or morally good achievement.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.11 An unjust deed is placed under divine observation. *(Edition p. 111.)*

I.49.44.10 Ordering the world is described as the creator's work. *(Edition p. 1247.)*

In this edition. "Deed" suits an ethically judged action; "work" suits an undertaking or product.

See also. Action; Art and craft; Creator and poet; God; Justice.

[122] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 54, 388. The tragic maxim's author is unidentified in the adopted edition.

Demiurge and craftsman

δημιουργός; δημιουργία; δημιουργικός; καταβολή; κοσμοποιός, dēmiourgos; dēmiourgia; dēmiourgikos; katabolē; kosmopoios, craftsman, maker, creator; craftsmanship or creation; creative[123]

The word. Dēmiourgos is a maker or skilled craftsman. When it names a divine maker, the English transliteration 'demiurge' retains the Greek term, while 'craftsman' brings its image of skilled production into view. Dēmiourgia names the work or activity of making; dēmiourgikos means creative or belonging to such making. These related forms belong together in one article. The word itself does not decide whether its referent is a supreme god, a subordinate maker, or a productive power: that must be learned from the passage.

In Stobaeus. Stobaeus preserves several accounts of divine making, rather than a single doctrine of the demiurge. In the Timaeus quotation at I.13.1a.2, the craftsman looks to a model and fashions his work accordingly. An unchanging model grounds the beauty of what is made; a generated model does not. The distinction is between the maker, the model, and the product. It is not a statement that the maker and the model are identical.

An unidentified Platonist at I.1.28a–c applies the name 'god' to both maker and cosmos while distinguishing them. The passage interprets Plato's Zeus as the maker and explains the cosmos as the god that comes to be. That identification belongs to the excerpt's interpreter; it should not be presented as an unqualified definition supplied by Stobaeus.

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[123] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 32, 34–35, 137–138, 181, 290–291, 311–312, 377, 406–407, 410, 457–458. For the general lexical range, see Liddell–Scott–Jones, s.v. δημιουργός and δημιουργία, through the University of Chicago's Logeion. The meanings discussed in this article are established from the cited Volume I passages, rather than inferred from the word's etymology alone. https://logeion.uchicago.edu/δημιουργός ; https://logeion.uchicago.edu/δημιουργία

Other texts widen the range. The report about Heraclitus at I.1.29b.3 calls reason productive of existing things through the movement of opposites. Here the creative function is expressed within an account of fire, fate, and reason. In the Hermetic passage I.48.3.4, intellect is the craftsman of all things and uses fire as its instrument; human intellect's making is restricted to earthly things. Neither use should automatically be folded into the Timaeus's particular narrative.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.28a The unidentified Platonist distinguishes maker and cosmos while calling both divine. *(Edition p. 57.)*

I.1.29b.3 The report about Heraclitus describes reason as productive of existing things; the term is not confined to the Platonic craftsman. *(Edition p. 67.)*

I.13.1a.2 The Timaeus quotation distinguishes the craftsman from the unchanging or generated pattern used in making. *(Edition p. 343.)*

I.20.10.1 The maker addresses the generated gods as their maker and father. Their continuance depends on his will, although a composite is capable of dissolution. *(Edition p. 491.)*

I.41.8.1 Hermes describes the maker of everlasting bodies, whose work is completed once and entrusted to its own ordered movement. *(Edition p. 873.)*

I.41.8.2 The same excerpt distinguishes an embodied maker of mortal bodies from that maker's own maker. The embodied maker is not named here. *(Edition p. 873.)*

I.48.3.4 Cosmic intellect uses fire as an instrument of craftsmanship; human intellect has a more limited field of production. *(Edition p. 953.)*

I.49.39.3 The creative sowing of souls is differentiated into allotments and recipients. The related noun and adjective help explain the maker's activity. *(Edition p. 1207.)*

I.49.44.79 The Hermetic narrative attributes the correspondence of things below with things above to the creator's ordinance. *(Edition p. 1315.)*

I.49.45.11 The creator gives souls form; the passage says that souls in themselves are neither male nor female, distinguishing their nature from bodily conditions. *(Edition p. 1327.)*

I.49.67.6 Ascent returns souls within the bounds of their prior creative placement. *(Edition p. 1523.)*

I.1.29b.1 World-making distinguishes two reported accounts of divine mind. *(Edition p. 63.)*

More than one maker. I.41.8.1–2 explicitly distinguishes levels of making. Everlasting bodies and mortal bodies have different makers and different conditions of persistence. The lower maker is embodied, but the excerpt does not name him. Identifying him with a particular deity would go beyond this passage. Elsewhere, the 'maker of the whole' rules the heavenly gods together with everything else (I.49.45.2). These are claims made in particular excerpts, not a single hierarchy that every source in the anthology shares.

Making and goodness. In I.20.10.1, the maker's willingness to preserve what has been well fitted together distinguishes continued existence from intrinsic indissolubility. A reader should therefore keep 'generated,' 'dissoluble,' and 'destined to perish' apart. The term demiurge does not, by itself, mean an evil creator. Nor does translating it 'creator' establish creation from nothing: the cited arguments instead discuss models, causes, substance, instruments, and the maker's will.

Souls and creative ordering. The discussion at I.49.39.2–3 links the demiurge's sowing to the differentiated first establishment of souls. Its vocabulary joins creation with allocation, procession, and descent. In the Hermetic narrative at I.49.44.64, rebellious souls insist that they share the gods' craftsman. Their claim has a dramatic role in the narrative and should not be detached from that setting as a universal thesis about all the anthology's sources.

Attribution and text. Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 32–33. The author of I.1.28 is unidentified: proposals of Porphyry or Iamblichus are not secure attributions. The supplied clause from Phaedrus 246e remains marked in the bilingual edition. I.13.1a.2 cites Timaeus 28a–b (printed pp. 137–138). Printed pp. 290–291 and 407. The double source heading 'To Ammon, to Tat' is preserved in I.41.8.1. I.41.8.2 follows the unusual printed wording translated 'the embodiment that gave birth'; the distinction between the makers should not be used to silently rewrite that phrase. Printed pp. 377 and 402–403. In I.49.39.3, the Greek's abbreviated list of souls and recipients is made explicit in the translation. In I.49.44.64, the shared craftsman is invoked by the rebellious souls themselves.

Creative establishment. Katabolē can mean a laying down, foundation, or initial establishment. At I.49.67.6, each soul's ascent is bounded by its previous creative establishment: the place where the creator originally sowed it. "Establishment" identifies this initial placement without assuming an act of creation from nothing or a wholly unrestricted return beyond every assigned order.

The maker of the world. Kosmopoios means world-making or maker of the cosmos. I.1.29b.1 contrasts Archelaus's mind, explicitly not called world-making, with the world-making mind attributed to Anaxagoras. The contrast makes the productive role precise. It is a report of two positions and should not be flattened into a claim that every ancient identification of God with mind includes the same cosmology.

The activity of craftsmanship. Dēmiourgia is making, craftsmanship, or creative work. At I.48.3.4, intellect uses fire as its instrument of craftsmanship. The passage distinguishes the universal intellect's scope from that of human intellect in its earthly dwelling. The noun names activity rather than an additional craftsman standing apart from the intellect already described.

The creative adjective. Dēmiourgikos means creative or belonging to the craftsman's work. In I.49.39.3 it qualifies the sowing of souls; in the same discussion plural dēmiourgiai names divine acts of creation. The adjective preserves a relation to ordered production, while the differences among recipients explain why creative action is not described as identical in every case.

In this edition. 'Craftsman' suits passages that emphasize model, form, tool, and productive skill. 'Maker' is often the clearest English when the creative agent is the focus. 'Creator' can suit the elevated register of a Hermetic address, while 'demiurge' makes a technical discussion recognizable. The Greek index gathers these renderings under dēmiourgos. Related poiētēs ('maker,' also 'poet') and technitēs ('skilled practitioner') have separate entries; they are not interchangeable in every sentence.

See also. Allotment; Art and craft; Ascent; Cause; Craftsman as skilled practitioner; Creator and poet; Fire; Form; Generated; God; Idea; Instrument; Intellect; Matter; Pattern and model; Procession; Reason and account; Seed; Soul; World.

Demonstration

ἀπόδειξις, apodeixis, demonstration; proof; showing[124]

The word. Apodeixis is a showing or demonstration offered to establish a claim. The form and standards of proof must be learned from the passage.

In Stobaeus. In the Phaedrus excerpt, Socrates undertakes to show that divine madness benefits lover and beloved. He contrasts the proof's reception by the clever and by the wise. This rhetorical setting should not be reduced to a formal syllogistic definition: what is to be shown and who can recognize it are both part of the argument.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.8 The promised demonstration defends the benefit of divinely given love. *(Edition p. 275.)*

[124] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 113. The passage defends a particular divine madness; the next excerpt distinguishes it from illness-related disturbance.

In this edition. "Proof" is natural in the dialogue; "demonstration" makes the technical noun recognizable without specifying an absent logical form.

See also. Divine inspiration; Knowledge; Madness; Reason and account; Truth.

Density and rarefaction

πυκνόν; ἀραιόν; πύκνωσις; μάνωσις, puknon; araion; puknōsis; manōsis, dense; rare; density; rarefaction[125]

The word. The language of the dense and the rare describes differences in compactness. An account may explain transformations by changing the condition of a material rather than by introducing a wholly unrelated constituent.

In Stobaeus. Archelaus' report joins unlimited air to density and rarefaction, then names fire and water as the resulting alternatives. Its compressed "one ... the other" does not explicitly match each condition with its product. The stars attributed to Parmenides and Heraclitus are described as condensations of fire and as nourished by exhalation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.7 Air's density and rarefaction explain opposed products. *(Edition p. 303.)*

I.24.1i The stars are condensations of fire nourished from below. *(Edition p. 563.)*

I.27.4 The dense and rarefied combine to produce a milk-like color. *(Edition p. 645.)*

I.8.42b Condensation enters an explanation of winter. *(Edition p. 255.)*

Condensation. Puknōsis is a becoming dense or a state of increased density. In I.8.42b, the report attributed jointly to Empedocles and the Stoics links winter with air forced upward through condensation. "Condensation" here belongs to an ancient elemental explanation; it need not mean specifically the modern change from a gas to a liquid.

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[125] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 107, 124, 203, 226. The lemma gives the descriptive pair; the reports also use nouns and verbs for becoming compact or rare.

Rarefaction as thinning. Manōsis is rarefaction or thinning. The report about Archelaus at I.10.12.7 places it beside density in an account of unlimited air. The ensuing compressed statement names fire and water without explicitly matching each product to a condition. The familiar direction of such theories should not be used to rewrite what this particular report actually states.

In this edition. The edition preserves the report's degree of explicitness. "Condensation" is related physical vocabulary, but it should not erase the distinct wording of each passage.

See also. Air; Exhalation; Fire; Season; Star; Unlimited.

Depth

βάθος, bathos, depth[126]

The word. Bathos is depth. It can mean inward extent, a front-to-back dimension, or extension downward under a particular directional convention.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic dimensional account gives alternative senses rather than one universal definition. The discussion of the world's center then denies height and depth to the cosmos in the particular sense of fixed upward and downward extents. This denial does not remove the world's spatial magnitude.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1l.1 Depth is described as inward or front-to-back extent. *(Edition p. 365.)*

I.15.6e.2 Depth defined from above downward does not apply unqualifiedly to the cosmos. *(Edition p. 377.)*

In this edition. Use "depth," retaining the source's explanation of direction. "Thickness" can obscure the explicit contrast with height.

See also. Breadth; Center; Extended; Height; Length.

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[126] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 143–144, 147–148. The difficult printed "inward extent" is retained; "smallest extent" is an apparatus alternative.

Descent

κάθοδος, kathodos, descent; coming down[127]

The word. Kathodos is descent. In accounts of soul it concerns movement toward a lower domain or bodily association, not necessarily spatial travel in an ordinary physical sense.

In Stobaeus. The survey connects different descents with prior creative allotments and the recipients assigned to souls. Other passages distinguish voluntary administration, obedience, training, and punishment. Descent must therefore be explained through its source, destination, and purpose rather than treated as one uniform fall.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.39.3 Descents follow different creative allotments. *(Edition p. 1207.)*

I.49.39.8 Voluntary and compelled descents are distinguished. *(Edition p. 1213.)*

I.49.40.4 The purposes of descent differ. *(Edition p. 1217.)*

In this edition. "Descent" preserves the directional image while allowing the account to specify its meaning.

See also. Allotment; Ascent; Demiurge and craftsman; Embodiment; Procession.

Desiderative impulse

ὄρεξις, orexis, desire; appetitive striving[128]

The word. Orexis is a reaching toward or desire for something. The familiar technical range of the term must be checked against each source.

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[127] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 377, 379–380. The appeal to the Timaeus is the later author's interpretation of its arrangement, not a direct quotation of every claim made here.

[128] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 77–78. The order changes between the poem's lists. Each named correspondence must be followed rather than inferred from its numerical position.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic poem pairs orexis with Cytherea, or Aphrodite, among seven divine-human correspondences. In that poetic setting desire is one allotted experience alongside tears, laughter, speech, and sleep. The list does not divide desire into a complete philosophical taxonomy.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.5.14b Desire corresponds to Cytherea among the seven powers. *(Edition p. 175.)*

In this edition. "Desire" is clearest here; "desiderative impulse" helps distinguish the Greek family in an index.

See also. Allotment; Desire; Impulse; Love; Planet.

Desire

ἐπιθυμία; ἐπιθυμητικόν, epithumia; epithumētikon, desire; appetite[129]

The word. Epithymia denotes desire or appetite. It may describe a particular inclination or the appetitive power distinguished from reasoning and spirit.

In Stobaeus. The Republic excerpt groups loving, hunger, thirst, and other desires under the appetitive element, associated with satisfactions and pleasures. The Hermetic account places desire beside spirit and makes their balanced adherence to reasoning the condition of justice. In the Timaeus physiology, desire for outflow and generation arises through the ensouled marrow. These psychological and bodily explanations should remain distinct.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.30.4 Appetite is distinguished from the reasoning element. *(Edition p. 1139.)*

I.49.4.2 Desire and spirit are balanced under reasoning. *(Edition p. 989.)*

I.47.1.3 A vital desire is linked with generation. *(Edition p. 907.)*

I.49.31.1 Appetite is distinguished from reasoning and spirit. *(Edition p. 1143.)*

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[129] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 298–299, 322, 361–362.

I.47.1.4 The adjective characterizes desire for childbearing in an ancient bodily account. *(Edition p. 907.)*

The appetitive element. Epithumētikon names what is capable of desire, including the appetitive element of soul. I.49.31.1 contrasts it with the reasoning element and spirit. I.47.1.4 uses the adjective in the image of a creature desirous of childbearing. That ancient physiological description illustrates the range of the adjective; it should not be substituted for the Republic's psychological classification.

In this edition. "Appetite" is useful for the defined psychic power; "desire" preserves the broader range of particular inclinations.

See also. Anger and spirit; Choice; Justice; Love; Pleasure; Rational and irrational; Reason and account.

Destiny after death

Ἅιδης, Haidēs, Hades; the realm of the dead[130]

The word. Haidēs names Hades, either the god or the realm of the dead according to context. The heading gathers the philosophical explanations of that realm preserved here.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo argument moves from the relation of living and dead to the continued existence of souls in Hades. A later excerpt associates the unseen soul with an unseen destination and uses wordplay between "unseen" and Hades. Porphyry instead explains presence in Hades through an image over which soul presides. These are arguments and interpretations within cited sources, not one geography affirmed by the anthology.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.8.6 The reciprocal generation of living and dead supports a conclusion about souls. *(Edition p. 1011.)*

I.49.9.11 The soul's unseen nature is connected with its destination. *(Edition p. 1027.)*

I.49.55.1 An image explains how soul can be associated with a place. *(Edition p. 1403.)*

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[130] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 328, 331–332, 429.

In this edition. "Hades" is retained instead of a term importing another religious tradition's account. The ancient wordplay is identified as wordplay.

See also. Death; Image; Immortality; Punishment; Rebirth; Separation.

Determination and delimitation

διορισμός, diorismos, determination; delimitation; distinctness[131]

The word. Diorismos is determination or marking off. In philosophical prose it may concern the maintained distinction of things rather than their physical boundaries.

In Stobaeus. The soul discussion says that distinctness need not be controlled by the cosmos or confined by nature. The claim preserves differentiation while denying a particular dependence on cosmic conditions. It should not be reduced either to total fusion or to spatial isolation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.67.9 Distinctness is retained without the cosmic confinement rejected by the author. *(Edition p. 1525.)*

In this edition. "Distinctness" suits the relation described; "delimitation" emphasizes the act or condition of marking off.

See also. Difference; Division; Limit and definition; Soul; World.

Dew

δρόσος, drosos, dew[132]

The word. Drosos is dew. Accounts of its formation connect it with cooled vapor remaining close to the ground.

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[131] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 458. The printed reference to inseparable essences is difficult and is not replaced with a conjectural term meaning separate or incorporeal.

[132] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 246–247. The Greek names miltos, phoinias, and erysibē do not securely identify a single set of modern substances in this passage.

In Stobaeus. Arrian describes fine vapor cooling and descending as dew, then explains certain red and black appearances as changes produced by the sun. The first claim identifies the formation of dew; the subsequent color account adds a separate ancient explanation of phenomena named by terms for reddish material and blight.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.31.8.7 Cooled vapor becomes dew, followed by an account of its supposed color changes. *(Edition p. 729.)*

In this edition. "Dew" is clear. The unusual names for altered forms need explanation rather than confident modern identifications.

See also. Cold; Evaporation and vapor; Frost; Heat; Moisture.

Diameter

διάμετρος, diametros, diameter[133]

The word. Diametros is a line across a circular or spherical figure through its center. Its endpoints and central relation matter in the celestial example.

In Stobaeus. The line imagined between the poles is called the axis and described as a diameter of the cosmos. Earth occupies its middle. The terms express related but different features: diameter concerns the line's geometry, while axis concerns the rotation organized about it.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.3 The pole-to-pole axis is also a diameter through the earth's central position. *(Edition p. 765.)*

I.25.4.4 Diametrical alignment locates the moon between the sun's rays and the earth. *(Edition p. 597.)*

[133] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 213, 256. The diameter belongs to the spherical, geocentric description presented in the source.

Diametrical alignment. Kata diametron can describe alignment across a diameter. In the solar-eclipse account at I.25.4.4 it places the moon directly beneath the sun so as to intercept its rays. Calling this simply "opposition" could mislead readers into thinking of the modern sun–moon configuration at full moon, which is not the solar-eclipse arrangement described.

In this edition. "Diameter" is exact here. Do not translate axis and diameter as though they were interchangeable in every geometrical context.

See also. Axis; Center; Eclipse; Line; Moon; Pole; Sphere; Sun.

Difference

διαφορά, diaphora, difference; distinguishing feature[134]

The word. Diaphora marks a difference between things or the respect in which they differ. It can organize an argument without functioning as a formal logical differentia.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic comparison of immortal and mortal bodies locates their difference in constitution and activity: the immortal body is composed from a single matter and acts, whereas the mortal body is acted upon. The political analogy of ruler and slave elaborates this contrast; it is not itself the literal definition of the bodies.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.6.8 Constitution and active or passive status distinguish two sorts of body. *(Edition p. 857.)*

In this edition. Use "difference" unless a specifically classificatory argument calls for "differentia." State the respect of difference whenever it is supplied.

See also. Active or productive; Body; Genus and kind; Sameness and difference.

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[134] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 286. The passage does not identify the immortal body's single matter with a named heavenly element.

Dimension and distance

διάστασις, diastasis, extension; dimension; distance[135]

The word. Diastasis concerns extension or separation over an extent. It differs from the figure that bounds or determines that extension.

In Stobaeus. The survey of mathematical definitions of soul distinguishes figure as the limit of extension from extension itself. Severus and Speusippus are then located in this mathematical class, before a more unified causal account is considered. The vocabulary belongs to an argument about the status of soul, not simply a measurement of a visible object.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.32.5 Figure, extension, their form, and their unifying cause are distinguished. *(Edition p. 1151.)*

In this edition. "Extension" best fits the passage's contrast with figure; "distance" is appropriate only where separated positions are intended.

See also. Extended; Limit; Magnitude; Shape; Soul.

Diminution

μείωσις, meiōsis, diminution; decrease[136]

The word. Meiōsis is decrease in amount, size, or extent. It is distinguished from destruction even when an argument connects the two in a sequence.

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[135] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 363–364. The printed reading attributes extension to the relevant form; the alternative "unextended" recorded in the apparatus is not adopted.

[136] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 162–163, 320–321. In I.49.3.1, the body is the subject of the concluding claim about receiving life through soul.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account links generation to growth, growth to diminution, and diminution to destruction, contrasting bodily dependence with incorporeal soul. The Aristotelian classification places diminution under quantity. The process can therefore be identified independently of the further claim that it culminates in a thing's destruction.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.3.1 Bodily diminution belongs to a sequence leading toward destruction. *(Edition p. 985.)*

I.19.1.5 Diminution is distinguished as quantitative change. *(Edition p. 433.)*

In this edition. "Diminution" preserves the technical noun; "decrease" is often clearer in explanatory prose.

See also. Body; Dissolution; Growth; Quantity; Subtraction and removal.

Discrimination and separation

διάκρισις, diakrisis, separation; distinction; discrimination[137]

The word. Diakrisis is separation or distinction. Its objects determine whether it is a physical process or an intellectual differentiation.

In Stobaeus. The damaged report about Plotinus's followers ends with a twofold distinction of opinion, while the physical survey pairs diakrisis with aggregation. The first divides accounts; the second separates constituents. Neither use by itself supplies the meaning of the other.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.43.6 A twofold distinction of opinion emerges from a preceding position. *(Edition p. 1235.)*

I.20.1d.1 Separation is paired with physical aggregation. *(Edition p. 459.)*

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[137] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 170, 384. The opening of I.49.43.6 lacks its governing construction and explicit antecedent; the missing wording is not invented.

In this edition. "Distinction" suits opinions; "separation" suits constituent bodies.

See also. Aggregation; Belief and opinion; Division; Separation; Thought.

Disease

νόσος, nosos, disease; illness[138]

The word. Nosos is disease or illness; related verbs describe being diseased. The term should remain distinct from affection in its wider philosophical sense.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic maxims say that not every body is diseased but every diseased body is dissoluble. The statement links susceptibility to bodily breakdown with disease without claiming that every affection is illness. The regimen discussion separately describes illness following a disruptive change in habit.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.1.10 Disease implies dissolubility in a sequence of bodily maxims. *(Edition p. 823.)*

I.47.7.2 Illness follows a disturbance of accustomed regimen. *(Edition p. 919.)*

In this edition. "Disease" or "illness" suits nosos; translating every instance of paschein as illness would erase a distinction.

See also. Affection; Body; Dissolution; Habit and disposition; Health.

Dishonor

ἀτιμία, atimia, dishonor; loss of honor[139]

The word. Atimia is dishonor or deprivation of esteem. The judgment that something is dishonorable can itself be mistaken.

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[138] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 275, 302–303. The maxims also distinguish pain from being affected. Their neighboring terms should not be collapsed into one medical sense.

[139] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 398. A gap affects the preceding relation between release and former happiness, but the subsequent reversal of values is explicit.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic warning predicts a reversal of understanding in which souls take punishment as benefit and improvement as dishonor and outrage. The term marks their distorted evaluation, not the narrator's endorsement of that evaluation. The ethical point depends on recognizing the inversion.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.46 A blinded judgment mistakes improvement for dishonor. *(Edition p. 1283.)*

In this edition. "Dishonor" preserves the social and evaluative force; identify whose judgment applies the term.

See also. Benefaction; Embodiment; Falsehood; Honor; Judgment.

Disorder

ἀταξία; ἄτακτος, *ataxia; ataktos*, disorder; disordered[140]

The word. Ataxia is disorder; ataktos is disordered or unarranged. The absence of order can be evaluated differently in different explanatory settings.

In Stobaeus. Eurysus opposes a disordered, irrational nature to an ordered and rational one, assigning chance events to the former's intrusion. This makes disorder part of a dual opposition within that account. Other sources' use of chance should not automatically inherit the same explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.6.19.2 Disorder characterizes one of two opposed natures. *(Edition p. 213.)*

In this edition. "Disorder" is clear; retain the contrast with taxis and related terms for arrangement.

See also. Chance and fortune; Evil; Inexpressible; Order; Rational and irrational.

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[140] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 90. The political comparison of kingship and tyranny reinforces the evaluative character of this particular opposition.

Dissolution

διάλυσις, dialysis, dissolution; resolution into constituents[141]

The word. Dialysis is dissolution or a taking apart. It can describe the undoing of a compound without implying that its underlying material ceases to exist.

In Stobaeus. Chrysippus' account distinguishes the four elements as constituents from fire as the preeminent element into which all finally resolves. Ocellus locates the cause of mortal dissolution in the changeable matter of which mortal things are composed and says their passing-away preserves the matter that produces them. The cosmic conflagration report asks how much surrounding space the world's dissolution requires. These discussions concern different scales of disintegration.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.16c.1 Constituents and final resolution into fire are distinguished. *(Edition p. 315.)*

I.13.2.2 Mortal dissolution preserves the underlying matter. *(Edition p. 351.)*

I.18.4b.2 The world's dissolution raises a question about surrounding extent. *(Edition p. 423.)*

In this edition. "Dissolution" is not automatically annihilation. What persists, and what loses its organization, must be determined from the source's account.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Cosmic conflagration; Death; Element; Matter; Mixture and blending.

[141] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 129, 139–140, 160.

Divination

μαντική, mantikē, divination; divinatory art[142]

The word. Mantikē is the art or practice of divination. Its function may include interpreting and ordering relations with the divine rather than predicting future events alone.

In Stobaeus. Eryximachus describes divination as protecting and healing love in the communion between gods and humans. It creates friendship through knowledge of the relevant relations. The medical vocabulary gives this account its distinctive model of religious expertise.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.16.2 Divination is assigned a healing role in divine-human relationships. *(Edition p. 283.)*

In this edition. "Divination" is broad enough for the passage; "prediction" would be too narrow.

See also. Art and craft; Impiety; Love; Prophet and seer; Sacrifice.

Divine inspiration

ἐνθουσιασμός, enthousiasmos, divine inspiration[143]

The word. Enthousiasmos is divine inspiration, a state understood as involving the divine. Its ancient religious sense is stronger than modern enthusiasm.

In Stobaeus. The soul treatise places movements of divine inspiration beside immaterial intellections among activities proper to soul itself, released from the composite animal. Such movements are said to join us to gods. The claim belongs to the author's account of distinct levels of psychic activity.

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[142] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 117. The closing reference to reverence follows the printed Stobaean wording, which differs from a reading in the separate Platonic tradition.

[143] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 371. The connection with gods is an assertion of the excerpt, not a psychological diagnosis supplied by the editor.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.36.6 Divine inspiration exemplifies an activity proper to soul itself. *(Edition p. 1181.)*

In this edition. "Divine inspiration" conveys the intended religious force more clearly than "enthusiasm."

See also. God; Immaterial; Intellection; Madness; Soul.

Divine spirit

δαίμων, daimōn, divine spirit; divine power; daimon[144]

The word. Daimōn can designate a divine power or spirit. The word does not by itself imply an evil being, and its function changes between poetry, theological classification, and accounts of the soul.

In Stobaeus. Menander's couplet pictures a spirit standing beside each person from birth as a guide through life. Onatas distinguishes God and the divine, then a divine spirit and what belongs to it, applying the noun to soul. These passages should be read in their own settings.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.5.4 A divine spirit accompanies each human being as a guide through life. *(Edition p. 169.)*

I.1.39e Onatas distinguishes nouns for divine beings from their corresponding adjectives. *(Edition p. 101.)*

Images and comparisons. Menander calls the spirit a mystagōgos, a guide into mysteries. The image gives life the character of an initiation; the two lines do not supply a complete doctrine of guardian spirits.

In this edition. "Divine spirit" or "divine power" usually keeps the sense open; "daimon" is retained where the technical term is useful. The adjective may be "daimonic" without implying malignity.

See also. Fate; God; Soul.

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[144] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 50, 75. Onatas' classification contrasts theos/theion and daimōn/daimonion. Its phrasing is discussed in the facing edition rather than flattened into the single English adjective "divine."

Divinely inspired breath

ἐπίπνοια, epipnoia, inspiration; inspired breath[145]

The word. Epipnoia is a breathing upon or inspiration. The breath image supplies a religious metaphor without necessarily identifying a bodily fluid.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedrus classification assigns prophetic inspiration to Apollo, initiatory inspiration to Dionysus, poetic inspiration to the Muses, and love to Aphrodite and Eros. The fourfold arrangement differentiates kinds of divine departure from customary behavior rather than treating them as one indistinguishable state.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.9 Prophetic inspiration takes its place within the fourfold divine classification. *(Edition p. 275.)*

In this edition. "Inspiration" is fluent; "inspired breath" explains the Greek image.

See also. Divination; Divine inspiration; Initiation; Love; Madness.

Divisible

μεριστός, meristos, divisible; divided among bodies[146]

The word. Meristos describes what is divided or admits division. In the selected account it distinguishes bodies from intellect and helps situate soul between them.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry calls intellect indivisible and bodies divisible, placing soul between indivisible substance and the substance divided among bodies. Qualities and forms in matter concern divisible bodies. The distinction is therefore more than a measurement of size: it helps explain how soul relates to both intelligible unity and bodily distribution.

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[145] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 113–114. The four divine sources include groups or paired figures; the wording should not force the list into exactly four individual persons.

[146] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 343. The supplied article in the final clause attaches "divisible" to bodies in the printed construction.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.17 Soul is placed between indivisible intellect and divisible bodily reality. *(Edition p. 1077.)*

In this edition. "Divisible" expresses capacity for division; "divided among bodies" preserves the distribution emphasized in the longer phrase.

See also. Division; Indivisible; Intellect; Partless; Soul.

Division

διαίρεσις, diairesis, division; divisibility[147]

The word. Diairesis is division; related forms express whether something can be divided. The possibility of further division differs from an already completed infinite partition.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian notice allows bodies to be divided without limit potentially but not actually. Chrysippus' report extends unlimited divisibility to body and to surface, line, place, void, and time, while denying that a body is therefore composed of infinitely many bodies. Democritus supplies a contrasting endpoint in things without parts. The chapter's disagreement concerns both limits and the relation between division and composition.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1b Potential and actual infinite division are distinguished. *(Edition p. 355.)*

I.14.1c.1 Dividing magnitudes is associated with continuity. *(Edition p. 355.)*

I.14.1e Unlimited divisibility does not imply an infinite collection of constituents. *(Edition p. 357.)*

I.14.1g Partless things terminate division in the rival account. *(Edition p. 361.)*

[147] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 141–143.

In this edition. The English preserves "divisible" as a modal claim. It does not imply that every possible division has already occurred.

See also. Actuality; Atom; Continuity; Indivisible; Part and whole; Unlimited.

Doctrine and conviction

δόγμα, dogma, conviction; settled opinion; doctrine[148]

The word. Dogma is a settled view, conviction, or doctrine. It need not mean an unquestionable religious dogma in the modern sense.

In Stobaeus. The anonymous saying distinguishes necessity and conviction from love as motives toward goodness, praising love for bringing virtue to completion. Dogma concerns a belief capable of directing conduct. The passage does not identify a particular school's formal creed.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.7 Conviction is one motive toward goodness, alongside necessity and love. *(Edition p. 273.)*

In this edition. "Conviction" conveys the practical role; "doctrine" suits an articulated teaching.

See also. Action; Belief and opinion; Love; Necessity; Virtue and excellence.

Double

διπλάσιος, diplasios, double; twofold; twice as great[149]

The word. Diplasios expresses doubling or a twofold relation. Its exact force depends on whether amounts, distances, or coordinated activities are compared.

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[148] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 113. The edition prints anonymous prose and rejects an earlier attempt to arrange the sentence as tragic verse.

[149] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 223, 350–351. The eighteenth-fold statement following the damaged distance comparison has no explicit independent subject; neither ratio is reconstructed here.

In Stobaeus. The account of interwoven souls describes their movements as twofold because each shares the other's affections. An astronomical report also speaks of a doubled distance, but its syntax is too damaged to secure which distances stand in the ratio. The clear numerical word cannot repair an uncertain comparison by itself.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.25a.3 Two intertwined souls have twofold movements and share affections. *(Edition p. 1101.)*

I.26.5.1 A doubled astronomical distance occurs in a damaged comparison. *(Edition p. 633.)*

In this edition. Use "twofold" for the psychic movements and "twice as great" for an established quantitative ratio.

See also. Dimension and distance; Dyad; Motion; Ratio and proportion; Soul.

Dream

ὄνειρος, oneiros, dream[150]

The word. Oneiros names a dream and can furnish an image for something fleeting, insubstantial, or removed from ordinary waking perception.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus account links the relative absence of dreams with quiet internal movements after the eyelids close. Homer's account of the dead uses a different force of the word: once life leaves the bones and fire consumes the body, the soul flies away like a dream. The comparison describes the soul's elusive condition; it does not identify the soul with a sleeper's mental image.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.52.19.5 The quiet of sleep is associated with few dreams. *(Edition p. 1643.)*

I.49.50.10 The departing soul is compared to a dream. *(Edition p. 1367.)*

[150] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 420, 487.

In this edition. "Dream" retains both the physiological context and the poetic comparison. Their shared word does not make them a single theory of dreaming.

See also. Death; Destiny after death; Image; Sleep; Soul.

Drug and remedy

φάρμακον, pharmakon, drug; remedy; preparation[151]

The word. Pharmakon is a drug or preparation and can signify a remedy or harmful substance according to context. The word alone does not settle its effect.

In Stobaeus. The Alcestis fragment says that neither learning nor poetic ascent discovers a remedy stronger than Necessity. In the Hermetic narrative, sacred books are anointed with a preparation of incorruptibility. The first use denies an escape; the second presents a preserving substance within a sacred story.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.4.3 No remedy is found against Necessity. *(Edition p. 157.)*

I.49.44.8 A preparation of incorruptibility preserves sacred books. *(Edition p. 1245.)*

In this edition. "Remedy" suits the tragic fragment; "drug" or "preparation" retains the material image in the Hermetic account.

See also. Imperishable; Knowledge; Medicine; Necessity; Preservation and salvation.

[151] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 71, 387–388. The tragic excerpt ends before the original song's further specification of remedies. The Hermetic passage supplies no recipe.

Dryness

ξηρόν, xēron, dry; the dry; dryness[152]

The word. Xēron names what is dry or the quality of dryness. In these physical explanations it is a relative and causally important condition, not simply an everyday description of an object's surface.

In Stobaeus. The report on Thales argues from plants drying when deprived of moisture to the importance of a watery origin. The Aristotelian notice places the dry among four elemental powers. One passage uses a familiar change in living things as evidence; the other supplies a classification of the powers of bodies.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.1 The drying of plants supports the report's argument from moisture. *(Edition p. 297.)*

I.10.16a.3 The dry is counted among elemental powers. *(Edition p. 311.)*

In this edition. "Dryness" makes the quality explicit; "the dry" preserves its role in a philosophical enumeration. Neither wording should be substituted automatically for the element earth.

See also. Earth; Moisture; Plant; Power and capacity.

Dyad

δυάς, dyas, dyad; twofold principle[153]

The word. Dyas means dyad or two. A technical account can use it for a principle of duality rather than merely the second item in a count.

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[152] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 122, 128.

[153] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 21–22, 124–125.

In Stobaeus. Moderatus' report distinguishes later thinkers who introduced monad and dyad as principles from the Pythagorean account through successive even and odd terms. The report under Pythagoras' name, by contrast, places the monad and indefinite dyad among principles and aligns them with productive form-giving and receptive material roles. A numerical naming scheme calls the dyad Artemis. These reports preserve different classifications and symbolic associations.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.9 Monad and dyad are set within a historical distinction. *(Edition p. 27.)*

I.10.12.10 The indefinite dyad has a receptive and material role. *(Edition p. 303.)*

Arith.10a The dyad receives a divine name in a numerical scheme. *(Edition p. 29.)*

In this edition. "Dyad" preserves the technical term; "indefinite" is retained where specified. The divergent reports are not harmonized into one account of Pythagoras.

See also. Matter; Monad; Number; Odd and even; Unlimited.

Ear

οὖς, ous, ear[154]

The word. Ous is the ear. Its inflected forms, including ōta, should be recognized when locating discussions of hearing.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic report distinguishes streams of pneuma directed toward ears, eyes, and other sense organs from different qualities present in one underlying subject. Ears illustrate bodily distribution, whereas presentation and assent illustrate qualitative differentiation within the ruling center. The distinction prevents every psychic difference from becoming a separate organ.

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[154] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 368. The apple's sweetness and fragrance illustrate qualities in one bearer; that comparison belongs to the second kind of distinction.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.33.5 The ears exemplify distinct bodily destinations of sensory pneuma. *(Edition p. 1167.)*

In this edition. "Ear" is direct; preserve the difference between the organ and hearing as an activity.

See also. Breath; Eye; Hearing; Instrument; Ruling part.

Earth

γῆ; χθών, gē; chthōn, earth[155]

The word. Gē can mean the earth as a region or the earthy constituent of bodies. The reader must distinguish questions about the earth's position and shape from claims that things are constituted from earth.

In Stobaeus. The verse assigned to Xenophanes makes earth both the origin and the end of everything. Aristotle's reported classification places earth at the heavy extreme of the elements. The lost chapters on the earth preserve their headings, but those headings supply questions rather than surviving answers.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.4 Xenophanes' verse makes earth the origin and end. *(Edition p. 299.)*

I.14.1a.3 Earth occupies the heaviest position. *(Edition p. 353.)*

I.33.heading The surviving heading asks about earth's size, finitude, and position. *(Edition p. 735.)*

I.1.12b Earth is one of the regions governed by the divine order. *(Edition p. 41.)*

Chthōn: earth and ground. Chthōn means earth, land, or ground, especially in poetic language. In the hymn at I.1.12b, deeds on earth are contrasted with events in heaven and the sea. The word does not itself mean exclusively the underground region. An underworld sense requires the surrounding language, rather than being built into every occurrence.

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[155] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 25–26, 123, 141, 248.

In this edition. The ordinary English "earth" preserves both uses. A reference to a lost chapter must not be treated as evidence for a doctrine absent from the surviving text.

See also. Element; Heaven; Place and space; Sea and tides; Water; Weight.

Earthquake

σεισμός, seismos, earthquake[156]

The word. Seismos denotes an earthquake or shaking. The chapter's physical explanation places it among disturbances arising from the movement of material beneath the ground.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian account makes dry exhalation enter porous underground spaces and shake them when confined. Compactness, cooling, and dryness can hold the force inside. The apparent calm above ground is then explained by the wind's force turning inward. These linked claims distinguish the evidence offered by the report from the mechanism it proposes.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.36.2.1 Confined dry exhalation shakes the ground. *(Edition p. 739.)*

I.36.2.2 Surface conditions retain the force and explain calm above. *(Edition p. 739.)*

In this edition. "Earthquake" preserves the phenomenon under discussion. The entry records the ancient explanation without replacing it with a modern geological account.

See also. Air; Earth; Exhalation; Wind.

[156] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 249.

Eastern winds

εὖρος; ἀπηλιώτης, euros; apēliōtēs, east winds; Eurus[157]

The word. Euros can name a particular easterly wind, while its plural can group winds of the eastern quarter.

In Stobaeus. The catalogue relates eastern winds to the changing points of sunrise. Its restored sequence places Eurus at winter sunrise and Apeliotes at equinoctial sunrise. A neighboring passage locates Euronotus between Eurus and Notus. A single English "east" would conceal these subdivisions.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.36 Eastern winds are organized by seasonal sunrise positions. *(Edition p. 789.)*

I.40.1.37 Eurus helps locate the intermediate Euronotus. *(Edition p. 789.)*

I.21.9.16 The wind-name identifies the eastern quarter of an appearance. *(Edition p. 529.)*

Apēliōtēs and the east. Apēliōtēs names the east wind and can indicate its quarter of the sky. At I.21.9.16 it specifies where certain portentous stars appear; other quarters are likewise named by winds. The passage concerns directions of appearance, not necessarily a wind blowing those stars to their positions.

In this edition. "Eastern winds" suits the group; retain "Eurus" for the named member.

See also. Divination; Rising; Season; South wind; Star; West wind; Wind.

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[157] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 193–194, 264. The catalogue has an inconsistent use of Aparctias in its opening eastern position; the edition preserves the transmitted problem.

Eclipse

ἔκλειψις, ekleipsis, eclipse; obscuration[158]

The word. Ekleipsis concerns an eclipse or disappearance of a heavenly light. The visible result does not determine the mechanism proposed for it.

In Stobaeus. Anaximander's solar report describes closure of a fiery outlet, while the lunar report speaks of the wheel's turnings. The Pythagorean solar explanation assigns obscuration to the moon's passage in front. Xenophanes instead gives extinction and renewed formation. Each mechanism must be read independently; even the Anaximander notices are not silently made uniform.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.25.1c Closure of the solar outlet causes eclipse. *(Edition p. 583.)*

I.26.1a.1 Turnings of the lunar wheel cause eclipse. *(Edition p. 613.)*

I.25.1i The moon passes in front of the sun. *(Edition p. 585.)*

In this edition. "Eclipse" identifies the phenomenon being explained. It does not certify that a report describes the physical mechanism now associated with the word.

See also. Light; Moon; Sun.

Education

παιδεία, paideia, education; cultivation; training[159]

The word. Paideia is education understood as the cultivation of a person, not simply the possession of information.

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[158] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 208–209, 217–218.

[159] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 434. The consequences after death are introduced as something reported or said; the narrative qualification should remain visible.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo narrative says that the soul takes only its education and nurture into Hades. These can help or harm it at the beginning of its journey. The association with nurture gives education a lasting formative role: what matters after death is the condition acquired by the soul, rather than possessions left behind.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.58.3 Education and nurture accompany the soul on its journey after death. *(Edition p. 1423.)*

In this edition. "Education" should retain this broader sense of formation. Distinguish paideia from the accompanying term for nurture or upbringing.

See also. Character; Destiny after death; Learning; Philosophy; Soul.

Effluence

ἀπόῤῥοια, aporroia, effluence; outflow; emanation[160]

The word. Aporrhoia is a flowing away or outflow. In theological prose it can describe something proceeding from a divine source, while retaining the image of flowing.

In Stobaeus. In the Hermetic narrative the creator promises an outflow of his own nature that will watch deeds and judge without being deceived. This outflow is presented as a personal agent with a punitive role below. The term therefore does more than name a physical emission, but the passage does not explicitly name the agent.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.72 An outflow of the creator's nature becomes an observer and judge. *(Edition p. 1309.)*

I.49.44.3 Hidden outflows belong to the narrative's account of cosmic powers. *(Edition p. 1241.)*

[160] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 386, 405. The feminine noun aporrhoia is followed by masculine reference to the agent. This personification does not license supplying a divine proper name absent from the text.

In this edition. "Outflow" keeps the image visible. "Emanation" is useful only if it does not import a complete later system of successive divine levels.

See also. Creator and poet; God; Judgment; Providence; Punishment.

Element

στοιχεῖον, stoicheion, element[161]

The word. An element is a constituent from which something is composed. The chapter heading joins elements to principles, but that pairing leaves open whether a thinker treats them as the same or different kinds of explanation.

In Stobaeus. The anthology places doctrines of principles and elements together before discussing matter. Reports on blending treat elements as constituents of compounds. The account of aether distinguishes a fifth celestial element from earth, water, air, and fire.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.heading Principles and elements are the chapter's paired subjects. *(Edition p. 289.)*

I.17.1.1 Blends are described as mixtures of elements through alteration. *(Edition p. 391.)*

I.40.1.5 Aether is distinguished from the four elements. *(Edition p. 765.)*

In this edition. "Element" retains the ancient compositional vocabulary. Its constituents should be understood from the report itself, rather than identified with the elements of the modern periodic table.

See also. Aether; Matter; Mixture and blending; Principle; World.

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[161] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 118, 152, 256. The four-element and fifth-element schemes belong to particular accounts in the collection. The heading does not establish one scheme as Stobaeus's own doctrine.

Embodiment

ἐνσωμάτωσις; οἴκησις; σωμάτωσις; σωματοποίησις, ensōmatōsis; oikēsis; sōmatōsis; sōmatopoiēsis, embodiment; incorporation into a body[162]

The word. Ensōmatōsis is embodiment, the soul's coming to be in or association with a body. Its value varies among the anthology's accounts.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic passage explicitly calls embodiment punishment and compares it with immersion in flesh and blood. A separate survey distinguishes corrective, beneficial, and punitive descents. The lexical meaning does not make the punitive interpretation universal across all sources.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.68.15 Embodiment is named as punishment. *(Edition p. 1537.)*

I.49.40.4 Different purposes of bodily descent qualify any single account. *(Edition p. 1217.)*

I.47.1.8 Aquatic dwellings belong to a moral account of transformed lives. *(Edition p. 911.)*

I.41.6.5 Everlasting bodily production is distinguished from the dissolution of particular bodies. *(Edition p. 853.)*

Dwellings and embodiment. Oikēsis is a dwelling or residence. At I.47.1.8, aquatic creatures receive the lowest dwellings as a consequence of extreme ignorance within the Timaean narrative. The dwelling image connects kinds of life with the condition of their souls. It reports that narrative's moral geography of embodiment, not a modern biological ranking of aquatic species.

Embodiment and body formation. Sōmatōsis is embodiment; sōmatopoiēsis is the making of bodies. I.41.6.5 calls bodily formation an everlasting activity because activities require bodies as places and instruments. The argument concerns continuing bodily production. It does not infer that each particular earthly body is indissoluble merely because the activity of forming bodies continues.

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[162] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 285, 300, 380, 461. The Hermetic release clause contains a gap, but the parenthetical identification of embodiment as punishment is explicit.

In this edition. "Embodiment" avoids deciding in advance whether the event is a fall, task, or training.

See also. Activity; Body; Descent; Dissolution; Freedom; Ignorance; Rebirth; Soul.

Embryo

ἔμβρυον, embryon, embryo; developing offspring[163]

The word. Embryon names the offspring developing in the womb. The surrounding notices ask about development, nourishment, and the conditions of birth.

In Stobaeus. The surviving report associated with Aristotle and Hippocrates contrasts seven-month and nine-month births and connects incomplete nourishment with a weakened umbilical connection. Its compressed explanation is preserved as an ancient report. A separate heading asks whether the embryo is a living creature, but the accompanying text is missing: the question survives without the answer that once followed it.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.42.13.1 Development is related to nourishment and the duration of gestation. *(Edition p. 895.)*

I.42.11.heading The question of animal life survives in a restored heading. *(Edition p. 893.)*

In this edition. "Embryo" follows the printed noun. The missing chapter cannot be used to assign Stobaeus or his sources a conclusion about its status.

See also. Growth; Life; Living creature; Nutrition; Seed.

[163] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 296.

Emptying and depletion

κένωσις, kenōsis, emptying; depletion[164]

The word. Kenōsis is emptying or depletion. Its object determines whether the loss is material or, as here, a diminution of power.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry describes soul's inclination toward matter as emptying its own power, while ascent to intellect restores fullness. The paired images of poverty and fullness explain different orientations of soul. The passage does not describe a measurable volume being drained from a physical container.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.23.7 Inclination toward matter depletes the soul's power. *(Edition p. 1089.)*

In this edition. "Depletion" clarifies the loss of power; "emptying" preserves the image.

See also. Ascent; Intellect; Matter; Poverty; Repletion.

End

τέλος, telos, end; goal; completion[165]

The word. Telos can be an end reached, a goal sought, or the completion of a process. The English "end" may therefore concern fulfillment or purpose rather than mere cessation.

In Stobaeus. The bronze statue attains its end when it has received the appropriate form. In the Hermetic address, the goal of piety directs a way of living and dying. Both uses concern attainment, but one explains a completed object and the other a life's orientation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.1b.2 The completed statue has attained its end. *(Edition p. 335.)*

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[164] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 347. The earlier thinkers alluded to at the close are unnamed in the excerpt; an apparatus association does not make the passage a direct named quotation.

[165] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 135, 273–274.

I.41.1.4 The goal of piety is presented through a road to truth and the soul's upward flight. *(Edition p. 819.)*

Images and comparisons. The Hermetic speaker combines a road and an upward flight. These are images used by the source to orient the embodied soul toward truth, not a diagram of physical movement.

In this edition. "End" suits the language of completion; "goal" often clarifies a directed undertaking. The local argument determines whether a terminal boundary, purpose, or fulfilled condition is intended.

See also. Actuality; Form; Nature; Soul.

Ensouled

ἔμψυχος, empsuchos, ensouled; animate[166]

The word. Empsychos means having soul or animated by soul. It need not mean conscious in the modern sense of reflective awareness.

In Stobaeus. The survey of soul-body relations imagines an ensouled tiller to illustrate an art internal to its instrument. This differs from a separable helmsman directing a ship. The adjective therefore marks what the hypothetical instrument would possess if its governing skill were intrinsic.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.41.6 An ensouled tiller illustrates art implanted in an instrument. *(Edition p. 1225.)*

In this edition. "Ensouled" makes the relation to psychē explicit; "animate" is smoother where no technical contrast is lost.

See also. Art and craft; Instrument; Soul; Soulless; Use.

[166] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 382. The tiller is an analogy within a survey of competing accounts, not a claim that ordinary ship equipment is alive.

Envy

φθόνος, phthonos, envy; begrudging[167]

The word. Phthonos is envy or begrudging. Its use in an abstract account may carry moral evaluation into a discussion of principles.

In Stobaeus. The arithmetical passage assigns falsehood and envy to the unlimited, unintelligent, and irrational, contrasting them with truth's affinity to number. Envy therefore participates in a strongly evaluative opposition between kinds of order. Its unexpected presence should not be silently converted into a more familiar mathematical term.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.3c Envy appears with falsehood in the contrast between number and the unlimited. *(Edition p. 17.)*

In this edition. "Envy" follows the printed noun even where its philosophical application is unusual.

See also. Falsehood; Number; Rational and irrational; Truth; Unlimited.

Equality

ἰσότης; ἄνισος, isotēs; anisos, equality; equal allocation[168]

The word. Isotēs expresses equality, whether of amounts, shares, or relations. It should not be substituted for proportionateness when the text distinguishes them.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic explanation of sleep says that the maker assigned equal time to movement and rest, then immediately corrects this to more time for rest. Equality is the initial formulation, not the final exact claim. The correction supports the argument that the body requires generous restoration.

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[167] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 17–18. Wachsmuth retains phthonos while recording proposed alternatives; the adopted reading remains the basis of this entry.

[168] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 20, 291, 356. A nearby description of sleep's benefit is corrupt in I.41.8.4; the clause about equality and its correction remains intelligible.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.8.4 Equal shares of movement and rest are qualified in favor of rest. *(Edition p. 875.)*

I.49.27.5 Equal shares of psychic power are rejected where functions are unlike. *(Edition p. 1119.)*

Arith.6 Unequal portions characterize the whole-number division of odd number. *(Edition p. 23.)*

Unequal division. Anisos means unequal. In Arith.6, odd numbers divide into unequal whole-number portions and retain a middle, in contrast with even numbers. The point concerns the treatment of units in the account's arithmetic. It does not deny that an odd numerical magnitude can be halved if fractional quantities are admitted.

In this edition. "Equality" and "equal" should preserve the comparison's terms. Do not smooth away the source's explicit self-correction.

See also. Community and communion; Division; Measure; Odd and even; Ratio and proportion; Rest; Sleep.

Equinox

ἰσημερία; ἰσημερινός, isēmeria; isēmerinos, equinox; equinoctial[169]

The word. Isēmeria is an equinox, defined through equality of day and night. The related adjective isēmerinos can identify the equinoctial circle, or equator.

In Stobaeus. The seasonal definitions place one equinox in spring and one in autumn. The account of five celestial circles uses the adjective for the equator between the tropics. An event in the annual cycle and a circle of the sky are related but distinct referents.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.42.5 Equinoxes are defined as occasions when night and day are equal. *(Edition p. 255.)*

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[169] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 106–107, 201. The arctic and antarctic circles in the same list concern visibility for an observer; they are not simply modern geographical polar circles.

I.23.3.1 The equinoctial circle appears in a list of celestial circles. *(Edition p. 555.)*

In this edition. Translate the noun "equinox" and the relevant adjectival circle "equator."

See also. Circle; Day; Night; Solstice and turning; Zodiac.

Error and wrongdoing

ἁμαρτία; ἁμάρτημα, hamartia; hamartēma, error; wrongdoing; offense[170]

The word. Hamartia and hamartēma concern error or wrongdoing, with the latter often naming a particular offense. Context determines the ethical weight.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry's reported ordeal distinguishes an innocent accused person from one who has done wrong. The Brahmans return the latter alive for punishment without a death sentence. The term therefore names the offense under accusation, not an inherited condition attached to every person.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.56b Wrongdoing is what the reported water ordeal claims to expose. *(Edition p. 147.)*

I.49.58.46 Serious offenses are distinguished according to their possibility of remedy. *(Edition p. 1461.)*

In this edition. "Wrongdoing" or "offense" fits these ethical contexts; "error" suits a less specifically culpable mistake.

See also. Correction and chastisement; Injustice; Judgment; Test and refutation; Voluntary.

[170] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 67, 443–444. The water's changing depth is part of reported testimony, not a phenomenon independently established by this lexicon.

Eternity and lifetime

αἰών, aiōn, eternity; age; lifetime[171]

The word. Aiōn can name an age or span of life, as well as eternity. Its force depends on what endures and on the contrast drawn with time.

In Stobaeus. Moschion uses the word for an earlier age of human life. The Timaeus excerpt gives it a more exact philosophical role: eternity remains in unity, whereas its image, time, proceeds according to number. An indefinitely long historical period and this unchanging model of time therefore require different explanations.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.38.1 An earlier age of human life is contrasted with civilization. *(Edition p. 237.)*

I.8.45.2 Time is fashioned as the moving, numbered image of abiding eternity. *(Edition p. 261.)*

I.8.45.3 Past and future belong to temporal becoming rather than unchanging being. *(Edition p. 263.)*

In this edition. Use "age" in the historical poem and "eternity" in the argument about time's model. A uniform rendering would erase the contrast.

See also. Everlasting; Pattern and model; Time; World.

Etesian winds

ἐτησίαι, etēsiai, Etesian winds; annually recurring winds[172]

The word. Etēsiai names winds characterized by yearly recurrence. The adjective connects their identity with the annual cycle.

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[171] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 100, 109–110. The Timaeus passage supplies the main philosophical comparison; the word does not designate timelessness in every occurrence.

[172] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 264–265. The same passage places the bird-associated Ornithian winds in spring, preserving a separate seasonal class.

In Stobaeus. The account distinguishes winds by course and season, placing the Etesians among those prevailing in summer and describing them as a combination of northern and western winds. Their periodicity is therefore separate from the geometrical course of any individual gust.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.38 The summer Etesians combine northern and western components. *(Edition p. 791.)*

In this edition. "Etesian winds" preserves the conventional name; "annually recurring" explains its force.

See also. North wind; Season; West wind; Wind; Year.

Evaporation and vapor

ἀτμός; ἀτμίς, atmos; atmis, vapor; evaporation[173]

The word. Atmos and atmis name vapor. Related verbal forms describe its rising or formation, while the nouns primarily identify what is raised.

In Stobaeus. The meteorological account likens heat lifting vapor to a bearer carrying a burden. Vapor from low, moist places is said to remain near earth when the heat cannot raise it farther. The analogy explains limits of ascent within this ancient physical account.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.31.6.6 Vapor is the burden carried upward by heat. *(Edition p. 717.)*

In this edition. "Vapor" is appropriate for the noun; "evaporation" names the process only when the construction supports it.

See also. Cloud; Exhalation; Heat; Moisture; Rain and precipitation.

[173] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 244–245. The abridgment extends its claim more broadly than Aristotle's immediate discussion of frost; the transmitted scope is retained.

Everlasting

ἀΐδιος, aidios, everlasting; eternal[174]

The word. Aidios describes what always exists or endures. It often accompanies "immortal," but the two adjectives answer different questions: duration and liability to death.

In Stobaeus. The collected sayings call God immortal and everlasting, and identify the divine maker as everlasting intellect. Other passages apply the adjective to heavenly bodies. The predicate alone does not settle how their continuance relates to a maker: the Hermetic account can call bodies everlasting while also describing their production.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.29a Sayings attributed to Socrates and Hermes describe everlasting divinity. *(Edition p. 63.)*

I.41.8.1 The maker produces bodies whose enduring constitution needs no external replenishment. *(Edition p. 873.)*

In this edition. "Everlasting" emphasizes continuance; "eternal" may be appropriate in theological descriptions. Preserve the passage's separate claims about origin.

See also. Demiurge and craftsman; Eternity and lifetime; Immortality; Ungenerated.

Evidence

τεκμήριον, tekmērion, evidence; proof; convincing sign[175]

The word. Tekmērion is evidence offered to establish a claim. The term often points from an observed fact to what that fact is taken to show.

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[174] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 34, 290–291. The sayings in I.1.29a are transmitted attributions, not verified records of historical conversations.

[175] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 111. The attribution to Euripides is supplied from a parallel quotation; the excerpt does not securely identify a play.

In Stobaeus. The poetic praise of Aphrodite promises evidence through her works rather than words alone: the union of earth and rain sustains mortal life. The observation is framed by a personified account of nature. Calling it evidence identifies its argumentative function without committing every reader to the speaker's theological explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.1 The fertility of earth and sky is offered as evidence of Aphrodite's power. *(Edition p. 269.)*

In this edition. "Evidence" preserves the inferential role; "proof" suits a speaker presenting the case as decisive.

See also. Deed and work; Demonstration; Love; Nature; Sign.

Evil

κακόν, kakon, evil; badness; bad things[176]

The word. Kakon can name an evil, a bad condition, or something harmful. Kakos can characterize a person or an action; its force must be determined locally.

In Stobaeus. Cleanthes speaks of what bad people do through folly while also praising the common reason that fits good and bad into one order. The hymn preserves both claims. Iamblichus describes divine correction as lessening, relieving, or removing evils without abolishing fate. The Hermetic account of the soul's love of the good gives evil another role, as what the newly oriented soul forgets and leaves behind.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.12b Human folly is set alongside the universal ordering reason. *(Edition p. 41.)*

I.1.35 Divine correction changes the presence or force of evils. *(Edition p. 83.)*

I.41.1.3 The soul's orientation toward the good displaces evil. *(Edition p. 817.)*

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[176] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 25–26, 43, 273.

In this edition. "Evil" is not imposed where "bad," "harmful," or a context-specific contrast is more exact. The edition does not supply a reconciliation missing from the quoted argument.

See also. Fate; Good; Justice; Matter; Punishment.

Excess and greed

πλεονεξία, pleonexia, excess; greed; seeking more[177]

The word. Pleonexia is the tendency to have or seek more than one's share. Its ethical vocabulary can be extended metaphorically to natural processes.

In Stobaeus. Eryximachus attributes damaging seasonal conditions to greed and disorder among hot, cold, dry, and moist forces. Balanced love yields a fruitful year; excess disrupts the mixture. The personified language interprets physical imbalance through a pattern familiar from human relationships.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.16.1 Excess among natural forces is contrasted with a temperate seasonal mixture. *(Edition p. 283.)*

In this edition. "Excess" clarifies the physical application; "greed" preserves the ethical metaphor.

See also. Disorder; Love; Measure; Mixture and blending; Season.

Exhalation

ἀναθυμίασις, anathymiasis, exhalation; rising vapor[178]

The word. Anathymiasis names material rising from below, especially from earth or water. Accounts may distinguish dry and moist kinds and make them causes of different phenomena.

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[177] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 116–117. The passage belongs to Eryximachus's speech in the Symposium, whose medical framework shapes the comparison.

[178] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 243–244, 248–249.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian weather report derives rain and other precipitation from moist exhalation. The wind account begins from dry exhalation, though it allows mixing with the moist. In the earthquake account the same kind of material shakes the ground when confined beneath it. Exhalation connects processes above and below ground without making their conditions identical.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.31.6.1 Moist exhalation produces several kinds of precipitation. *(Edition p. 715.)*

I.32.1 Dry exhalation is connected with wind. *(Edition p. 733.)*

I.36.2.1 Confined exhalation explains earthquakes. *(Edition p. 739.)*

In this edition. "Exhalation" retains the physical substance or process intended. It does not necessarily mean an organism's breath or a modern chemical gas.

See also. Air; Breath; Cloud; Earthquake; Rain and precipitation; Wind.

Extended

διαστατός, diastatos, extended; dimensioned[179]

The word. Diastatos describes extension or dimensionality. In the definition of body, it is qualified as threefold and specified through breadth, depth, and length.

In Stobaeus. The report presents three-dimensional extension as one definition of body and resistant bulk as another. Their juxtaposition matters: dimensionality and resistance are distinct explanatory features. The definition does not make every mathematical description of extension an independently existing physical body.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1a.1 Body is defined first through three dimensions and then through resistant bulk. *(Edition p. 353.)*

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[179] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 140. The qualification "so far as depends on itself" belongs to the definition through resistance, not to the preceding list of dimensions.

In this edition. "Having three dimensions" reads naturally where the Greek says "extended in three ways." Keep the listed dimensions visible.

See also. Body; Breadth; Depth; Dimension and distance; Length; Resistance.

Extinction

σβέσις, sbesis, extinction; extinguishing[180]

The word. Sbesis is extinction, the putting out or dying out of fire or light.

In Stobaeus. Arrian argues that the phenomena under discussion do not perish immediately: formation in cold air would, he says, lead to rapid extinction. Their eventual destruction nevertheless shows that they are temporary. The distinction separates duration for a time from permanence.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.28.2.2 Delayed extinction and eventual destruction support different parts of the argument. *(Edition p. 657.)*

In this edition. "Extinction" or "being extinguished" conveys the disappearance of the fiery phenomenon.

See also. Cold; Comet; Coming into being and passing away; Fire; Kindling.

Eye

ὀφθαλμός; ὄμμα, ophthalmos; omma, eye[181]

The word. Ophthalmos and omma both designate the eye. Their occurrence does not by itself imply different organs or theories of sight.

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[180] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 229. A gap precedes the word evidence, so the precise claim supported by the first surviving sentence is missing.

[181] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 410. The text's "tunics" are coverings. The printed correction establishing dim vision is important to the contrast.

In Stobaeus. Isis explains differences in understanding through an analogy with the eye's coverings: thick, dense coverings permit dim sight, while thin, open-textured ones permit sharper vision. The account then applies the contrast to coverings of the soul. The eye serves as an explanatory model for cognition.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.45.14 The condition of the eye's coverings prepares an analogy for the soul. *(Edition p. 1329.)*

In this edition. "Eye" is clear for both nouns; preserve any distinction between the organ and its power of seeing.

See also. Pupil of the eye; Sight; Soul; Thick; Thin and subtle.

Falsehood

ψεῦδος, *pseudos*, falsehood; the false[182]

The word. Pseudos denotes falsehood; pseudēs means false. The term's application to an appearance, belief, or statement is part of the philosophical disagreement.

In Stobaeus. The Epicurean notice denies falsity to perception and impression while allowing it to some beliefs. The Sophist passage explicitly includes thought, belief, and appearance among things in soul that can be false or true. The difference requires attention to what each account means by appearance and how it relates to belief. A single English word does not establish a shared classification.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.50.21.1 False belief is distinguished from true perception and impression. *(Edition p. 1595.)*

I.59.1.1 Falsity is admitted in three forms of psychic activity. *(Edition p. 1691.)*

[182] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 475, 498.

In this edition. "False" is not automatically "deceptive": the latter can imply an intention absent from the passage. The technical differences are preserved in the accompanying definitions.

See also. Belief and opinion; Perception; Presentation and imagination; Thought; Truth.

Fate

εἱμαρμένη, heimarmenē, fate[183]

The word. Heimarmenē is the chief word rendered "fate" in this volume. Poetic expressions for an allotted portion or lot, such as moira and aisa, may occur nearby without carrying precisely the same implications.

In Stobaeus. Chapter 5 explicitly joins fate to the orderly arrangement of events. Other excerpts distinguish it from necessity, choice, chance, and spontaneous occurrence. The anthology preserves both poetic images of destiny and philosophical attempts to explain an order of causes.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.5.heading Fate is paired with the orderly arrangement of what comes to pass. *(Edition p. 167.)*

I.7.9a Fate stands among several reported explanations of events. *(Edition p. 219.)*

I.5.22a A series of divine and fatal names is explained through verbal associations. *(Edition p. 189.)*

I.1.35 Correction and the preservation of fate are joined. *(Edition p. 83.)*

I.3.52 Fate and Justice govern different aspects of human condition. *(Edition p. 133.)*

[183] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 43, 62–63, 74, 82–83, 92. The associations in I.5.22a explain names within the ancient argument. They are not treated as secure historical derivations, nor as definitions accepted by every author quoted in the chapter.

Correction and responsibility. Iamblichus argues that divine correction preserves fate by preventing disorder; the argument does not simply abolish fate whenever an evil is relieved. The Hermetic notice distinguishes subjection to fate through coming-to-be from subjection to Justice through wrongdoing. The distinction gives different explanations for embodied condition and moral recompense. Choice and what depends on us require their own passages rather than being inferred from the English associations of "fate."

In this edition. "Fate" usually renders heimarmenē. The names Moira, Aisa, Nemesis, and Adrasteia are kept distinguishable where their particular wording matters.

See also. Allotment; Cause; Chance and fortune; Choice; Justice; Necessity; Providence; What depends on us.

Father

πατήρ, patēr, father[184]

The word. Patēr is father, used both for human parenthood and for a divine source or ruler.

In Stobaeus. The Homeric verses call Zeus father of humans and gods while describing human understanding as shaped by the day he brings. In the philosophical report, God as mind is father and maker of divine offspring. The paternal vocabulary marks dependence and origin, but each passage supplies a different explanatory setting.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.15 Zeus's paternal title accompanies his influence on human circumstances. *(Edition p. 47.)*

I.1.29b.6 Father and maker describe the source of divine offspring. *(Edition p. 71.)*

[184] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 28, 37. The Homeric day includes the circumstances it brings; the verse is not limited to a change in daylight.

In this edition. "Father" preserves the relational image; do not assume literal bodily generation in every use.

See also. Cause; Coming into being and passing away; Creator and poet; God; Mother.

Fear

φόβος, phobos, fear; the fearful[185]

The word. Phobos denotes fear; related adjectives describe what is frightening or fearful. The experience may arise before the event that occasions it.

In Stobaeus. The Philebus excerpt distinguishes painful bodily affections from the soul's anticipation of them. What is expected before pain is fearful and distressing, just as the anticipation of pleasure can be encouraging. Fear therefore belongs here to the account of expectation, not only to the immediate response of a body. This distinction helps explain how a present psychic affection can concern an experience still to come.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.13.4 Anticipated pain produces fear and distress in soul. *(Edition p. 941.)*

In this edition. "Fearful" preserves the anticipatory character of the Greek adjective. The passage supports a local explanation of fear; it does not offer an exhaustive classification of emotions.

See also. Affection; Memory; Pain; Pleasure; Soul.

[185] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 309.

Female

θῆλυς, thēlus, female[186]

The word. Thēlys means female. Figurative applications can connect it with fertility and nourishment in a particular author's explanation.

In Stobaeus. The commentator explains fruitful things as female and barren streams as male, reasoning that the female both receives generation and nurtures. The phrase female dew is accordingly read as fertile, nourishing dew. This is an interpretation of poetic imagery, not a neutral biological classification of waters.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.50.6 Female dew is interpreted through fertility and nourishment. *(Edition p. 1365.)*

In this edition. "Female" preserves the argument's literal vocabulary; "fertile" can explain the figurative sense.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Dew; Interpretation; Male; Nutrition.

Fiery whirlwind

πρηστήρ, prēstēr, fiery whirlwind[187]

The word. Prēstēr names a violent fiery whirlwind in the selected meteorological contrast. The term should retain the heat distinguishing it from typhōn.

In Stobaeus. Strato's reported account links fiery whirlwinds and whirlwinds to an excess of material drawn along by each. The former draws hotter material, while the latter draws faster material in the printed reading. The contrast gives prēstēr a specific place among several related violent atmospheric phenomena.

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[186] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 419. The commentary's male-female contrast belongs to its explanation of the quoted images and should remain attributed to it.

[187] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 233. The parallel reading "thicker" is not adopted for the other phenomenon; the text here prints "faster."

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.29.1.14 The fiery whirlwind is distinguished by the hotter material it draws along. *(Edition p. 673.)*

In this edition. "Fiery whirlwind" preserves the distinction better than the unqualified "whirlwind."

See also. Fire; Heat; Whirlwind and hurricane; Wind; Windstorm.

Fire

πῦρ, pyr, fire[188]

The word. Pyr names fire as a visible process, an elemental constituent, or a governing principle in a particular account. Its presence in an explanation does not by itself tell us whether an author means ordinary flame or a more comprehensive cosmic power.

In Stobaeus. Heraclitus and Hippasus are reported to make fire the principle of everything and the agent of a world-consuming conflagration. The Aristotelian notice distinguishes the powers hot, cold, moist, and dry from the elemental bodies possessing them. In the account of weight, fire is the lightest element. These claims concern origin, quality, and direction respectively.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.14.1 Fire grounds a cycle of formation and dissolution. *(Edition p. 307.)*

I.10.16a.3 Elemental bodies are distinguished from their powers. *(Edition p. 311.)*

I.14.1a.3 Fire is called the lightest element. *(Edition p. 353.)*

In this edition. "Fire" and "heat" are kept separate. Likewise, a fiery star is not automatically a star constituted solely from fire.

See also. Cosmic conflagration; Element; Heat; Star; Weight.

[188] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 126, 128, 141.

Fixed stars

ἀπλανής, aplanēs, fixed; non-wandering; fixed stars[189]

The word. Aplanēs means non-wandering and describes the fixed stars or their sphere in contrast with the planets.

In Stobaeus. Asclepius asks how the sphere of fixed stars can move the wandering spheres if motion requires something stationary. The question depends on the fixed-star sphere itself having motion. "Fixed" concerns the stars' mutual arrangement and their contrast with planetary wandering; it does not make their sphere motionless.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.2.1 The fixed-star sphere raises a difficulty for the dialogue's account of motion. *(Edition p. 435.)*

In this edition. "Fixed stars" is conventional, with the relational sense of fixed made explicit.

See also. Heaven; Motion; Planet; Rest; Sphere.

Flame

φλόξ, phlox, flame[190]

The word. Phlox is flame. In accounts of color and vision, it can designate a luminous process issuing from bodies.

In Stobaeus. The report about Plato defines color as flame from bodies whose particles are commensurate with sight. The relation to the visual faculty is essential: it is not an assertion that all colored objects visibly burn. The fuller quotation differentiates particles by their sizes relative to the visual stream.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.1.4 Color is explained as flame with particles proportioned to sight. *(Edition p. 381.)*

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[189] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 163. The speaker labels are supplied in the edition from the separate Hermetic tradition.

[190] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 149. Commensurate here means suitably related in size, not that every particle has exactly the same size.

In this edition. "Flame" retains the physical language of the theory; explain its special role rather than replacing it with modern light terminology.

See also. Color; Fire; Ratio and proportion; Sight; Visual stream.

Flesh

σάρξ, sarx, flesh[191]

The word. Sarx is flesh, the bodily material that grows and changes with nourishment and regimen.

In Stobaeus. The discussion of habituation describes bodies initially disturbed by foods, drinks, and exertions, then developing flesh adapted to them. A later change can disturb the acquired familiarity again. Flesh is thus involved in a temporal account of bodily accommodation, rather than treated as an inert covering.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.7.2 Flesh develops in relation to a familiar regimen. *(Edition p. 919.)*

In this edition. "Flesh" preserves the material sense; "body" would erase the distinction between whole and constituent.

See also. Body; Change and alteration; Habit and disposition; Health; Nutrition.

Fluidity and melting

χύσις, chusis, diffusion; liquefaction; melting[192]

The word. Chysis concerns flowing, pouring, or diffusion. In an elemental sequence it describes loosening and transition from a more consolidated state.

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[191] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 302–303. Regimen includes exertion as well as food and drink; it should not be narrowed to diet alone.

[192] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 129. The witness cited here occurs in the retained running text. The preceding bracketed explanation is rejected by Wachsmuth as an addition.

In Stobaeus. The report about Chrysippus reverses condensation from fire to earth: earth diffuses into water, water into air, and air into fire. Because the process continues beyond liquids, "melting" alone is too narrow for the whole sequence. The term belongs to a cycle of elemental transformation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.16c.2 Diffusion carries the sequence from earth back toward fire. *(Edition p. 315.)*

In this edition. "Diffusion" covers the repeated transitions; "liquefaction" fits only the stage into water.

See also. Change and alteration; Density and rarefaction; Element; Fire.

Foot

πούς, pous, foot[193]

The word. Pous is a foot. Compounds describe creatures with four feet, many feet, or none.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus narrative explains changing numbers of feet through a creature's earthward inclination and its previous neglect of reason. Feet serve as supports connecting bodily form with a psychic history. The passage presents an explanatory myth rather than an observed evolutionary sequence.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.1.7 The multiplication and loss of feet express increasing attachment to earth. *(Edition p. 911.)*

In this edition. "Foot" preserves the concrete bodily support; compounds should retain their numerical contrast.

See also. Earth; Kinship and affinity; Limb; Living creature; Soul.

[193] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 300. The Greek shifts from a singular divine maker to an unnamed plural subject, which the translation renders as the gods.

Forgetfulness

λήθη, lēthē, forgetfulness; forgetting[194]

The word. Lēthē is forgetting or loss from memory. Something never perceived and never remembered cannot be forgotten in precisely that sense.

In Stobaeus. The Philebus discussion distinguishes a bodily affection that escapes awareness from the disappearance of a memory. The distinction prevents an unnoticed event from being described as forgetting. It also clarifies why perception and memory must be considered together when determining what a soul has lost.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.14.3 Unnoticed bodily affection is distinguished from the loss of memory. *(Edition p. 945.)*

In this edition. "Forgetfulness" fits an enduring condition; "forgetting" fits the process. Neither should replace the absence of awareness in this argument.

See also. Affection; Awareness and apprehension; Memory; Perception; Recollection.

Form

εἶδος, eidos, form[195]

The word. Eidos concerns form, but the word does not automatically assert the independent existence of a Platonic Form. Its philosophical force emerges through its relations to matter, shape, definition, or the thing formed.

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[194] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 309–310. The passage exploits the relation between escaping notice and forgetting while insisting that the two cases differ.

[195] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 132, 134–136, 319. The attributions to Arius Didymus and Aëtius in these groups are editorial identifications supplied by Wachsmuth and marked in the bilingual edition.

In Stobaeus. The report concerning Aristotle first places form beside matter, then gathers several descriptions of form and distinguishes it from surface shape. In the account of soul, form is used to explain actuality. A separate Pythagorean report pairs forms with ideas in numbers and harmonies.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.1b.1 Form is paired with matter and distinguished from surface shape. *(Edition p. 335.)*

I.49.1a.3 Form and activity explain the actuality named in the definition of soul. *(Edition p. 979.)*

I.12.1a.2 Forms and ideas are paired in a report under Pythagoras's name. *(Edition p. 333.)*

I.11.4.2 Form and matter are considered separately in defining body. *(Edition p. 327.)*

I.12.2b Forms as patterns explain participation through likeness in a proposal. *(Edition p. 339.)*

Images and comparisons. The account of Aristotle contrasts whiteness on a painted surface with the whiteness belonging to milk's substance. The comparison concerns the depth of a determination, not only an external outline.

Definition, pattern, and likeness. Form considered apart from matter is called incorporeal in the Aristotelian report. The Parmenides excerpt proposes a different explanatory relation: forms are patterns, and other things participate by being made like them. The proposal belongs to an argument in which it is subsequently tested. Its use of patterns should not be transferred without qualification to every occurrence of form in accounts of body, soul, or physical shape.

In this edition. "Form" normally renders eidos. The paired eidos and idea may become "form" and "idea" to preserve a local distinction, although idea is itself "form" in other contexts.

See also. Actuality; Being and substance; Demiurge and craftsman; Idea; Incorporeal; Matter; Participation; Resemblance and imitation; Shape.

Formless

ἄμορφος, amorphos, formless; without shape[196]

The word. Amorphos denies determinate form or configuration. It can characterize matter considered in its own nature rather than the visible appearance of a finished object.

In Stobaeus. The distinction between principles and elements treats earth and water as having something prior to them: matter without shape or form. Formlessness here explains why the recipient is not identical with a particular formed element. It should not be visualized simply as a shapeless lump, which would already possess some physical configuration.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.16b.1 Matter is prior to generated elements and lacks their determinate forms. *(Edition p. 313.)*

I.11.3.2 Matter's own nature is distinguished from the forms it receives. *(Edition p. 323.)*

In this edition. "Without shape or form" makes the paired negatives clear. Do not turn a denial of determination into a denial of all existence.

See also. Form; Impression-receiving medium; Matter; Privation; Shape.

Fracture

θραῦσις, thrausis, breaking; fracture; breaking up[197]

The word. Thrausis is breaking or fracture. It can describe disruption in a compressed physical explanation without identifying a solid object split into visible pieces.

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[196] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 128, 131. Part of the argument distinguishing principles from elements is supplied in angle brackets in the base edition.

[197] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 232. The pronoun most naturally returns to light, but the intervening mention of resisting air leaves the construction compressed and uncertain.

In Stobaeus. The report about Empedocles links the quenching and breaking of incoming light with a crash, while its shining produces lightning. The relative pronoun is difficult because air intervenes in the sentence. The entry can explain breaking without pretending the precise physical subject is beyond dispute.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.29.1.6 Breaking and quenching are invoked to explain the crash associated with lightning. *(Edition p. 667.)*

In this edition. "Breaking up" is suitably broad for the compressed account.

See also. Extinction; Impact; Light; Lightning and thunderbolt; Thunder.

Freedom

ἐλευθερία, eleutheria, freedom; liberty[198]

The word. Eleutheria is freedom. What one is free from must be supplied by the context, rather than assumed to be political rule or causal necessity.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic discussion contrasts immersion in flesh and blood with the soul's own freedom after punishment. Freedom concerns release from embodiment in this account, while sacred order continues to govern the souls. It does not mean absence of every arrangement or obligation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.68.15 The soul's own freedom is contrasted with bodily immersion and punishment. *(Edition p. 1537.)*

In this edition. "Freedom" is direct; specify the bodily condition from which release is envisaged.

See also. Embodiment; Order; Release; Self-determination; Soul.

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[198] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 461. A gap interrupts the clause where a verb or participle of release is expected. The missing wording is not reconstructed as certain.

Freezing and solidification

πῆξις, pēxis, congealing; freezing; solidification[199]

The word. Pēxis is a setting or solidifying. Its physical sense does not require that every occurrence describe ordinary water turning to ice.

In Stobaeus. The Philebus explains cold-induced pain through the unnatural congealing of a creature's moisture. Restoration of its constituents toward their natural condition is then associated with pleasure. Solidification matters because it disturbs the organized living state, not because every increase in firmness is necessarily painful.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.13.3 Unnatural congealing illustrates the bodily disturbance associated with pain. *(Edition p. 941.)*

In this edition. "Congealing" suits bodily moisture; "freezing" should be used only where that more specific process is intended.

See also. Cold; Moisture; Nature; Pain; Pleasure.

Friction

παράτριψις, paratripsis, friction; rubbing[200]

The word. Paratripsis is friction or rubbing. It describes contact in movement, which may help explain the production of fire.

In Stobaeus. Democritus's reported lightning account uses friction to gather fire-producing constituents during cloud collision. Elsewhere a shooting flare is said to arise from friction while its speed explains its elongated appearance. The term names the proposed generating action, separate from the light's subsequent path.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.29.1.9 Friction gathers constituents involved in lightning. *(Edition p. 669.)*

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[199] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 308–309. The speakers accept the account as an outline. Its broader argument invokes the principles of limit and the unlimited.

[200] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 232–233, 266. The two accounts belong to different reports; their shared term does not imply identical theories of the constituents involved.

I.40.1.46 Friction generates a moving luminous flare. *(Edition p. 795.)*

In this edition. "Friction" is clear without requiring a modern quantitative theory of heating.

See also. Collision; Fire; Kindling; Motion; Shooting star.

Friendship and cosmic attraction

φιλία; φιλότης; φίλος, philia; philotēs; philos, friendship; Love; concord[201]

The word. Philia is friendship or attachment; philotēs is a related term for love or union. In the Empedoclean material, the binding power is commonly rendered "Love."

In Stobaeus. The quoted verses describe things coming together into one through Love and being borne apart through Strife. Their commentator connects this with friendship and quarrels among the parts of the universe, using Homer's divine reconciliation as an image. Another report explains the world's generation and destruction by the alternating ascendancy of the two powers. The same vocabulary can thus describe social concord and a cosmic process.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.11b.2 Empedoclean union is connected with Homeric reconciliation. *(Edition p. 297.)*

I.20.1f.3 Love and Strife alternately dominate cosmic change. *(Edition p. 463.)*

Arith.2a Friendship is interpreted as harmony. *(Edition p. 13.)*

I.1.12b Friendly and hostile relations are brought into the hymn's divine order. *(Edition p. 41.)*

Friendly and dear. Philos can mean friendly, dear, or a friend according to its construction. In I.1.12b, what is not friendly is friendly to Zeus within the hymn's account of cosmic order. This is distinct from treating "Friendship" as a separately named physical power in Empedocles, even though both uses help describe reconciliation and union.

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[201] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 16, 25–26, 122, 171.

In this edition. "Love" names the cosmic power where the context requires it; it should not be confused with every occurrence of erōs.

See also. Concord and agreement; Harmony; Love; Mixture and blending; One; Strife; World.

Frost

πάχνη, pachnē, frost[202]

The word. Pachnē is frost. Its relation to dew provides a comparison for other forms of atmospheric water.

In Stobaeus. Arrian says that freezing produces frost and compares frost's relation to dew with snow's relation to rain. The analogy distinguishes freezing from the gathering of moisture without freezing. Plato's quoted classification similarly connects frost with dew congealing on earth, while arranging the other products by location and degree.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.31.8.8 Frost and dew form one pair in an analogy of frozen and unfrozen water. *(Edition p. 729.)*

I.31.9.2 Frost is classified as congealed dew at ground level. *(Edition p. 731.)*

In this edition. "Frost" should remain distinct from ice, hail, and snow in each classification.

See also. Cold; Dew; Freezing and solidification; Ice; Snow.

[202] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 247. The excerpts preserve different explanatory schemes; their similar vocabulary does not make their accounts identical.

Garment of soul and intellect

χιτών, chitōn, tunic; garment; covering[203]

The word. Chitōn is a tunic or garment. Philosophical imagery uses clothing to explain how soul or intellect is associated with other levels of existence.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic passage assigns intellect its own fiery tunic after release from the earthen body. This differs from the soul and pneuma that clothe it during embodiment. The wearer matters: the selected passage specifically concerns intellect, so all its garments should not be indiscriminately called the soul's body.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.3.2 Soul covers intellect during embodiment, with pneuma serving soul. *(Edition p. 951.)*

I.48.3.3 Intellect puts on its own fiery tunic after bodily release. *(Edition p. 953.)*

I.49.45.14 The eye's coverings also use the image of tunics. *(Edition p. 1329.)*

In this edition. "Tunic" keeps the concrete image; "covering" is clearer in the anatomical analogy.

See also. Body; Fire; Intellect; Release; Vehicle of the soul.

Generated

γενητός, genētos, generated; having come to be[204]

The word. Genētos describes what has an origin through coming to be. The word concerns a mode of existence, not by itself a judgment of worthlessness.

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[203] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 311, 410. The earthly and fiery clothing are distinguished within this Hermetic account; no universal theory of subtle bodies is inferred from the noun alone.

[204] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 137–138, 278. The Hermetic passage presents a reason for restricting disclosure, not a general equation of generation with unreality or evil.

In Stobaeus. A Hermetic teacher warns that an unprepared hearer may despise the cosmos after learning that it is generated and may excuse misconduct by blaming fate. The warning exposes a misuse of the doctrine. In the Timaeus material, generated things can be beautiful when fashioned after an unchanging pattern.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.1.23 The teacher fears an ethically damaging interpretation of cosmic generation. *(Edition p. 835.)*

I.13.1a.2 A generated product is evaluated by the model used in making. *(Edition p. 343.)*

In this edition. "Generated" is useful in technical contrasts; "has come into being" often reads more naturally in continuous prose.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Fate; Pattern and model; Ungenerated.

Genus and kind

γένος, genos, kind; genus; race[205]

The word. Genos groups things by a shared kind, descent, or character. A formal classificatory genus is one possible use, not the meaning of every occurrence.

In Stobaeus. A poetic description of Aphrodite's power speaks of the mortal race sustained by earth and rain. The definitions of soul employ kinds in a more philosophical classification of bodily and incorporeal realities. The reader must distinguish a group of living beings from an articulated division of being.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.1 The mortal race flourishes through the union of earth and rain. *(Edition p. 269.)*

I.49.32.13 Definitions place soul between or in relation to kinds of reality. *(Edition p. 1157.)*

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[205] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 111, 365–366. The occurrence in I.10.5 stands in a corrupt line. Clearer passages are used here to establish the entry's meanings.

In this edition. "Race" suits the poetic collective; "kind" or "genus" suits classificatory arguments. Avoid a modern racial interpretation of the human collective.

See also. Difference; Division; Higher beings; Human being.

Geographical inclination

κλίμα, klima, region; inclination; geographical zone[206]

The word. Klima can denote an inclination or a region associated with geographical orientation. It is not simply the modern aggregate of weather patterns called climate.

In Stobaeus. The account of poles places the visible pole toward the northern klima. Here region is sufficient: the phrase locates the observer's northern sky. The passage does not provide a numerical latitude or a system of climatic zones.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.4 The northern region locates the visible celestial pole. *(Edition p. 765.)*

In this edition. "Region" is clearest locally; "geographical inclination" explains the headword's wider technical range.

See also. Heaven; Inhabited earth; North wind; Place and space; Pole.

Geometrical point

στιγμή, stigmē, point; geometrical point[207]

The word. Stigmē names a point. In the mathematical analogy here, the point has no parts and serves as a model of indivisibility.

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[206] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 256. The southern-pole clause is restored from the parallel text, while the northern occurrence of klima belongs to the retained wording.

[207] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 316. The Greek has a Doric form of the headword. A proposed additional comparison of perception to a dyad and line is not printed by Wachsmuth.

In Stobaeus. The comparison places intellect beside a unit and a point, while perception is described as divided and divisible. The analogy concerns the structure of cognition and its object. It does not say that intellect is a tiny physical speck or that it occupies a minimal portion of space.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.6.6 The point and unit illustrate intellect's partlessness and indivisibility. *(Edition p. 969.)*

In this edition. "Point" is sufficient once the geometrical context is clear. Distinguish it from a short but extended perceptual interval.

See also. Indivisible; Intellect; Monad; Partless; Smallest.

Gnomon

γνώμων, gnōmōn, gnomon; added border; figure-preserving addition[208]

The word. Gnōmōn has several uses. In this arithmetic setting it is an added arrangement that enlarges a figure while preserving the relevant kind of shape.

In Stobaeus. Successive odd numbers can be arranged as borders around a square: adding three to one gives four, and adding five gives nine. The account compares this with an even-number construction of oblong figures. Gnomon here belongs to a visual presentation of number, not to the measurement of a shadow.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.10c Gnomons explain the relation of successive odd numbers to squares. *(Edition p. 31.)*

In this edition. "Gnomon" retains the traditional term; "added border" explains its local function.

See also. Number; Oblong; Odd and even; Shape; Square and quadrilateral.

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[208] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 22. A gnomon can elsewhere be a pointer or sundial component. That sense should not displace the arithmetic construction described here.

God

θεός; θεῖος, theos; theios, god; God[209]

The word. Theos names a god or, in a singular theological argument, God. English capitalization is an editorial aid; the Greek word alone does not establish one theology shared by all the excerpts.

In Stobaeus. The first chapter asks about God as maker and governor of the whole. Its poetry also speaks of Zeus and the gods. Onatas distinguishes the divine source from the divine cosmos and then from the soul as a divine spirit. These voices stand together in the collection without being made identical.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.heading God is described as maker and governor through providential reason. *(Edition p. 33.)*

I.1.4 Homer's Zeus increases or diminishes human prowess. *(Edition p. 35.)*

I.1.39e Onatas distinguishes God, the divine, a divine spirit, and what belongs to that spirit. *(Edition p. 101.)*

I.21.1.2 The maker's goodness explains the move out of disorder. *(Edition p. 493.)*

I.1.35 Divine correction is said to preserve fate and psychic self-determination. *(Edition p. 83.)*

Arith.3a Divine life is distinguished within an account of number's scope. *(Edition p. 15.)*

Craftsmanship and correction. In the Timaeus excerpt, the maker's goodness explains bringing the visible out of disorder and producing what is most beautiful. Iamblichus describes the gods as correcting fate through their goodness, preserving its order and the soul's self-determination together. The plurality of gods in the second passage and the maker in the first remain features of their respective sources. Neither is silently recast as the language of a single theological system.

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[209] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 16–17, 23, 43, 50, 181–182. The opening word dēmiourgos, "maker" or "craftsman," does not by itself specify creation from nothing. The collection's theological claims require their local wording and attribution.

The divine adjective. Theios means divine or pertaining to a god. Arith.3a speaks of divine, heavenly, and human life in an account of the decad's power. The adjective's scope depends on what it qualifies. It should not automatically turn every divine property or activity into a separate god or erase distinctions among the kinds of life named.

In this edition. "God," "god," and "gods" follow the argument and number of the Greek. A chapter heading does not turn every subsequent dramatic or poetic voice into a statement by Stobaeus.

See also. Beauty; Decad; Demiurge and craftsman; Divine spirit; Good; Law; Life; Order; Piety; Principle; Providence; World.

Good

ἀγαθόν, agathon, good; the good; good things[210]

The word. Agathon can mean something good or, with the article, the good. The plural commonly names good things rather than a single abstract principle.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus account makes divine craftsmanship aim at everything being good so far as possible. The Hermetic address to Tat describes a soul's enduring orientation toward the good after it apprehends what is truly good and true. Iamblichus explains divine correction of fate through the gods' goodness and the preservation of the good character of providence. These are different relations to goodness: a maker's purpose, a soul's orientation, and the character of divine governance.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.21.1.2 The maker's purpose is expressed through goodness and beauty. *(Edition p. 493.)*

I.41.1.3 Knowledge reorients the soul toward the good. *(Edition p. 817.)*

I.1.35 Divine goodness corrects and preserves fate. *(Edition p. 83.)*

[210] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 43, 181–182, 273.

In this edition. The translation distinguishes "the good" from "good things" according to the Greek construction, without assuming every occurrence names a separate metaphysical entity.

See also. Beauty; Evil; God; Piety; Providence.

Grace and favor

χάρις, charis, grace; favor; charm[211]

The word. Charis can mean favor, gratitude, or grace and charm. The local image determines which aspect is prominent.

In Stobaeus. The lyric hymn depicts grace shining around Fortune's golden wing while praising her gifts of honor, relief, and light. Grace is part of Fortune's attractive and beneficent appearance. The passage does not introduce a technical doctrine of grace in a later theological sense.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.6.13 Grace shines around Fortune within a favorable hymn. *(Edition p. 199.)*

In this edition. "Grace" preserves the radiant image; "favor" suits a more explicit act of benefaction.

See also. Beauty; Benefaction; Blessed; Chance and fortune; Honor.

Green

πράσινος; πράσιος, prasinos; prasios, green; leek green[212]

The word. Prasinos names a green associated with the leek. The related form prasion occurs in the parallel color passage.

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[211] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 86. The poet is unidentified. Its favorable account of Fortune stands alongside contrasting views elsewhere in the anthology.

[212] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 151, 490. The account describes itself as likely. Ancient color categories need not coincide exactly with modern pigment names.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus account says that flame red mixed with black produces this green. The result belongs to the dialogue's proposed physical explanation of color. Translating the term does not require accepting the combination as a modern paint-mixing instruction.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.52.20.9 Leek green concludes the list of proposed mixtures. *(Edition p. 1651.)*

I.16.2.7 The parallel passage uses the related form prasion. *(Edition p. 389.)*

In this edition. "Leek green" keeps the concrete color association; "green" is convenient when no finer contrast is needed.

See also. Black; Color; Dark blue; Mixture and blending; Red.

Growth

αὔξησις, auxēsis, growth; increase[213]

The word. Auxēsis means growth or increase. In a living thing, increase of material raises a further question: what makes the growing thing the same individual?

In Stobaeus. Posidonius' account distinguishes the persistence of the individually qualified being from gains and losses of its material. Dion or Theon remains individually qualified from generation to destruction. A Hermetic passage instead considers growth before animal life: movement in the womb is fitted by harmony to receive the life of thought. The first concerns continued identity; the second the ordering of development.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.20.7.3 The individual persists through growth and diminution. *(Edition p. 481.)*

I.41.7.4 Growth in the womb is prepared for further living activity. *(Edition p. 871.)*

I.1.34b Lunar waxing and waning are linked to changes on earth. *(Edition p. 81.)*

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[213] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 42, 178, 290.

The moon's waxing. Auxēsis is increase or growth, and in lunar contexts waxing. I.1.34b pairs the moon's waxing with its diminution as part of a claim that earthly conditions respond to celestial changes. The translation "waxing" marks the context without implying that the moon's entire material body grows larger during each phase.

In this edition. "Growth" is used for the living process; "increase" can express the more general quantitative contrast. The two passages should not be treated as one theory.

See also. Embryo; Life; Moon; Nutrition; Quality; Sameness and difference; Sympathy.

Gulf and hollow basin

κόλπος, kolpos, gulf; bay; hollow recess[214]

The word. Kolpos can describe a hollow or enfolding recess. In geographical prose it commonly denotes a gulf or bay.

In Stobaeus. The inner sea enters through a narrow western opening, broadens, and forms interconnected gulfs. Kolpoi are therefore subdivisions within the larger body of water, not separate oceans. The wording emphasizes the sea's widening shape and continuity.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.17 Great connected gulfs form within the inner sea. *(Edition p. 775.)*

In this edition. "Gulf" suits this geographical scale; other bodily or figurative senses require their own context.

See also. Hollow; Isthmus; Ocean; Place and space; Sea and tides.

[214] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 259. The encompassing Ocean is the larger frame of the account, while the inner sea corresponds to the Mediterranean.

Habit and disposition

ἕξις; συνήθεια; διάθεσις; ἔθος, hexis; sunētheia; diathesis; ethos, disposition; condition; habituation[215]

The word. Hexis is a disposition or settled condition. Related discussion of habituation uses the language of becoming accustomed, which describes the formation of a condition rather than simply naming it.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account makes justice arise when desire and spirit establish an equal disposition and follow the soul's reasoning. The Laws excerpt considers how bodies become accustomed to food, drink, and exertion over time; changing an established regimen disturbs them. The first passage concerns the arrangement of psychic powers, the second a process of bodily adaptation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.4.2 An equal disposition of desire and spirit produces justice. *(Edition p. 989.)*

I.47.7.2 Repeated bodily experience creates familiarity with a regimen. *(Edition p. 919.)*

I.5.16 Diathesis names the arrangement of the stars. *(Edition p. 181.)*

I.49.44.1 Receiving ambrosia is described as the souls' accustomed practice. *(Edition p. 1239.)*

Disposition as arrangement. Diathesis can mean an arrangement as well as a personal disposition. The Hermetic account at I.5.16 makes fate responsible for the arrangement of the stars. This use is spatial and cosmic rather than a character trait. A single English equivalent must therefore be sensitive to what is being disposed or arranged.

Custom and being accustomed. Ethos, with epsilon, means custom or habitual practice; it should be distinguished from ēthos, with eta, often rendered character. In I.49.44.1, souls are accustomed to receive ambrosia from gods. The expression reports a recurring practice within the Hermetic narrative, without necessarily naming a settled moral virtue or vice.

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[215] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 79–80, 302–303, 322, 385.

In this edition. "Disposition" renders hexis where the arrangement itself is meant. "Habit" or "habituation" must not suggest that every settled condition arises through the same mechanism.

See also. Body; Character; Desire; Fate; Growth; Justice; Soul; Star; Virtue and excellence.

Hail

χάλαζα, chalaza, hail[216]

The word. Chalaza is hail. It can illustrate a substantial meteorological formation as well as receive a particular account of freezing.

In Stobaeus. The report distinguishing actual formations from appearances uses rain and hail on the first side, the rainbow on the second. Hail is treated as a body with its own subsistence; the rainbow is treated as an appearance dependent on conditions. This distinction concerns the status of the phenomena, not whether both can be seen.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.30.1.1 Hail exemplifies a substantial formation rather than an optical appearance. *(Edition p. 691.)*

I.31.9.2 Hail is classified as thoroughly frozen water above earth. *(Edition p. 731.)*

In this edition. "Hail" is direct, while the surrounding account should distinguish formation from appearance.

See also. Appearance in reflection; Ice; Rain and precipitation; Snow; Subsistence.

[216] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 238–239, 247. The claim that an appearance lacks its own subsistence does not mean that no appearance occurs or that observers merely invent it.

Hair

θρίξ, thrix, hair[217]

The word. Thrix is a hair; its plural commonly denotes hair collectively.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus describes birds as growing feathers in place of hair when certain human lives are refashioned. The contrast supplies a visible bodily sign of transformation. Hair's role is therefore comparative: it marks the earlier human covering against the new avian one.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.1.6 Feathers replace hair in the narrative of birds' origin. *(Edition p. 909.)*

In this edition. "Hair" translates the plural naturally in English; individual strands need not be emphasized.

See also. Body; Change and alteration; Living creature.

Hand

χείρ, cheir, hand[218]

The word. Cheir is the hand, a bodily member whose distinct action can illustrate a logical point.

In Stobaeus. In the Republic argument, an archer pushes with one hand and pulls with the other. The example shows why apparently contrary actions do not belong to the same acting part in the same respect. It supports the subsequent distinction between thirst and the power resisting thirst within the soul.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.30.2 The archer's two hands illustrate the need to distinguish acting parts. *(Edition p. 1137.)*

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[217] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 299–300. The narrative relates bodily change to the former character and cognitive habits of the transformed persons.

[218] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 360. The principle includes the same part, object, and time. Omitting these qualifications would make the example appear contradictory.

In this edition. "Hand" is direct; keep "one" and "the other" explicit because the argument depends on them.

See also. Action; Contrary; Part and whole; Soul; Thirst.

Happiness and flourishing

εὐδαιμονία; κακοδαίμων, eudaimonia; kakodaimōn, happiness; flourishing; well-being[219]

The word. Eudaimonia is happiness or flourishing, a favorable condition of life rather than merely a passing pleasant feeling.

In Stobaeus. Eryximachus credits love fulfilled in good things, with restraint and justice, with producing happiness and friendship among humans and with gods. The term gathers the benefits of rightly ordered relations. It is linked to pleasure only indirectly through this broader account of living well.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.16.3 Orderly love provides happiness and friendship. *(Edition p. 285.)*

I.3.50 A term for wretchedness forms part of a philosophical rebuke. *(Edition p. 131.)*

The unhappy person. Kakodaimōn means unhappy, unfortunate, or wretched. In I.3.50 it appears in direct address to someone objecting to dependence on others for nourishment. "Poor fellow" conveys the rhetorical rebuke. The word's daimon element should not be made into a literal claim that a particular hostile spirit possesses the addressee.

In this edition. "Happiness" is natural when its durable scope is clear; "flourishing" can prevent confusion with momentary enjoyment.

See also. Divine spirit; Friendship and cosmic attraction; Good; Justice; Love; Nutrition; Self-control and temperance.

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[219] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 61–62, 117. This account is the conclusion of a particular speech about love, not a definition agreed upon by every source in the anthology.

Hard

σκληρός, sklēros, hard[220]

The word. Sklēros is hard or resistant. In a contrast with soft, it can mark a qualitative condition that changes while place remains constant.

In Stobaeus. The Theaetetus discussion distinguishes movement through place from becoming old, changing color, or becoming hard from soft. Hardness illustrates alteration: a thing changes what it is like without necessarily changing where it is. The example is classificatory rather than an explanation of how hardening occurs.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.8 Becoming hard from soft exemplifies qualitative alteration. *(Edition p. 449.)*

In this edition. "Hard" is direct; a metaphorical meaning such as harshness is not intended here.

See also. Change and alteration; Motion; Quality; Rest; Soft.

Harmony

ἁρμονία, harmonia, harmony; fitting together; concord[221]

The word. Harmonia denotes a fitting together or harmony. It can describe numerical relations, bodily constitution, cooperation, or a proposed account of soul.

In Stobaeus. The arithmetic excerpt relates friendship and enmity to harmony and its absence, deriving harmony from numerical ratios. The report under Pythagoras' name makes numbers and their proportions principles. The Philebus excerpt describes pain through the dissolution of bodily harmony and pleasure through its restoration. In the Phaedo, however, the claim that soul itself is a harmony is challenged as incompatible with recollection and prior existence.

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[220] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 167–168. The printed closing term is revolution, although the opening examples include broader movement from place to place.

[221] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 16, 124–125, 308, 335.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.2a Social concord is interpreted through numerical harmony. *(Edition p. 13.)*

I.10.12.10 Harmonies belong to the account of principles. *(Edition p. 303.)*

I.47.13.1 Bodily harmony explains pleasure and pain. *(Edition p. 937.)*

I.49.13.5 The harmony theory of soul is rejected within the argument. *(Edition p. 1041.)*

In this edition. The common translation does not make these accounts identical. In particular, a harmonious body does not establish that soul is a harmony.

See also. Friendship and cosmic attraction; Number; Pleasure; Ratio and proportion; Recollection; Soul.

Hatred

μῖσος, *misos*, hatred[222]

The word. Misos is hatred. It can be distinguished from hostility or enmity even where the two appear together.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry interprets Homeric divine beings as sharing desire, anger, hatred, and enmity and consequently being capable of wrongdoing and punishment. Hatred belongs to the attributed susceptibility to passions that supports the inference. The passage does not assert that every divine being in every philosophical account is hateful.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.53.14 Hatred is one of the passions attributed to Homeric divine beings. *(Edition p. 1387.)*

In this edition. "Hatred" preserves the distinction from the separately named enmity.

See also. Affection; Anger; Desire; God; Punishment.

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[222] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 425. The inference is Porphyry's reading of the poetic gods, who are also described here as subject to fate.

Head

κεφαλή, kephalē, head[223]

The word. Kephalē is the head, which can have both anatomical and explanatory roles in accounts of cognition.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus narrative contrasts rational revolutions in the head with psychic rulers around the breast. Failure to use the former contributes to its explanation of animal transformation. Elsewhere the division of psychic activities among head, chest, and liver is distinguished from division of soul itself.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.1.6 Revolutions in the head are associated with rational activity. *(Edition p. 909.)*

I.49.25a.9 The head is a bodily site of activity rather than a part possessed by incorporeal soul. *(Edition p. 1109.)*

In this edition. "Head" is direct; identify which theory assigns it a particular psychic role.

See also. Body; Intellect; Liver; Living creature; Soul.

Health

ὑγίεια; ὑγεία; ὑγιεινός, hugieia; hugeia; hugieinos, health; healthfulness[224]

The word. Hygieia is health; related adjectives mean healthy or healthful. The spelling hygeia also occurs in the corpus.

In Stobaeus. In the Hermetic complaint, Air describes itself as diseased and no longer healthful because of exhalation from dead bodies. The personification links Air's condition with its effects on living creatures. Elsewhere health is associated with bodily accommodation to a familiar regimen.

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[223] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 299–300, 353. The transformations in I.47.1.6 belong to the Timaeus narrative and connect bodily form with a previous use or neglect of reason.

[224] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 302–303, 404. Air's speech belongs to a divine assembly narrative; its personification should remain visible in the explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.68 Personified Air loses its healthful condition through pollution. *(Edition p. 1305.)*

I.47.7.2 Health accompanies an adapted bodily regimen. *(Edition p. 919.)*

In this edition. "Health" names the condition; "healthful" suits an environment that supports health.

See also. Air; Body; Disease; Exhalation; Medicine.

Hearing

ἀκοή, akoē, hearing[225]

The word. Akoē denotes hearing, either as a faculty or as the occurrence of auditory perception. Its proposed physical conditions include moving air and transmission within the body.

In Stobaeus. Empedocles' report compares the cartilage inside the ear to a suspended bell struck by a current of air. The notice assigned to Plato's followers instead describes air in the head being struck and reflected toward the governing parts. Both use a blow and transmission, but they identify different structures and explanatory stages. The Timaeus excerpt explicitly asks for the causes of the affections involved in hearing.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.53.1 Cartilage is compared to a swinging bell. *(Edition p. 1657.)*

I.53.4 Struck air transmits the effect to governing parts. *(Edition p. 1659.)*

I.53.5.1 Auditory experience is treated as an affection requiring causes. *(Edition p. 1659.)*

In this edition. "Hearing" names the faculty or experience; "sound" and "voice" name what is heard in their respective contexts.

See also. Air; Brain; Perception; Ruling part; Voice.

[225] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 491–492.

Heart

καρδία, kardia, heart[226]

The word. Kardia is the heart. Its physical position and relation to blood support several different explanatory and symbolic uses.

In Stobaeus. The Empedoclean fragment places thought in the blood around the heart. In a Hermetic geographical analogy, the heart stands at the body's middle and is described as the starting place of soul; Egypt is then compared to this central bodily region. The analogy supplies the source's explanation of a claimed national character. It is not the same argument as the physiological fragment about blood.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.53.11 Blood around the heart is called thought. *(Edition p. 1383.)*

I.49.45.20 The heart supports an analogy between body and country. *(Edition p. 1335.)*

In this edition. "Heart" is retained in both contexts. Claims built upon geographical centrality remain claims of the quoted speaker, not judgments endorsed by the edition.

See also. Blood; Body; Brain; Soul; Thought.

Heat

θερμόν, thermon, hot; heat[227]

The word. Thermon, used substantivally, is "the hot." It can identify a quality, a causal power, or something proposed as an elemental constituent. It need not name a separately bounded body.

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[226] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 412, 424.

[227] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 124, 128. "The hot" is supplied by Wachsmuth in the short Strato notice.

In Stobaeus. The brief notice on Strato assigns elemental status to hot and cold. The Aristotelian account makes a more explicit distinction: hot, cold, moist, and dry are elemental powers, while the familiar elements are the substances in which those powers occur. Keeping the distinction visible prevents a list of qualities from becoming an additional list of bodies.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.9 Strato's opposed elemental principles are hot and cold. *(Edition p. 303.)*

I.10.16a.3 The hot is a power of elemental bodies. *(Edition p. 311.)*

In this edition. "The hot" retains the substantivized adjective when the classification matters; "heat" is appropriate when the discussion concerns the quality or its action.

See also. Cold; Element; Fire; Power and capacity.

Heaven

οὐρανός, ouranos, heaven; the heavens[228]

The word. Ouranos names heaven, the surrounding celestial region or structure. A description of its position is different from a claim about the substance composing it.

In Stobaeus. Anaximenes and Parmenides are reported to identify heaven with the outermost circuit around earth. Empedocles' heaven is air solidified by fire like ice. The Aristotelian account makes heaven and the stars aetherial, enduring, and circularly moving. Their common subject does not make their proposed materials equivalent.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.23.1.1 Heaven is the outermost circuit. *(Edition p. 553.)*

I.23.1.2 Empedocles explains its solidity through an ice comparison. *(Edition p. 553.)*

I.23.2.2 The aetherial heaven remains unaltered while moving in a circle. *(Edition p. 555.)*

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[228] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 200–201.

In this edition. "Heaven" preserves the ancient cosmological subject. The descriptions are not silently converted into modern atmospheric or astronomical terminology.

See also. Aether; Circular motion; Earth; Star; World.

Height

ὕψος, hupsos, height; upward extent[229]

The word. Hypsos is height. In the selected discussion it is explicitly defined as extension from below upward.

In Stobaeus. The report denies that the world has height or depth in this directional sense, because it is constituted about its own center equally in every direction. The qualification is essential. A denial of a fixed cosmic top is not a denial that the world has dimensions or that local observers distinguish above and below.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.15.6e.2 The center-based constitution of the cosmos qualifies the applicability of height. *(Edition p. 377.)*

In this edition. "Height" should be accompanied by its stated directional definition when the argument depends on it.

See also. Center; Depth; Dimension and distance; Middle; World.

Hemisphere

ἡμισφαίριον, hēmisphairion, hemisphere; half-sphere[230]

The word. Hēmisphairion is half of a sphere. Its cosmological use divides the world into regions whose opposed contents or functions matter to an explanation.

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[229] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 147–148. The final relation to the center is compressed in Greek; the English preserves its symmetrical sense without adding a measured radius.

[230] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 210. The reflecting arrangement is compressed and difficult; "crystal-like sun" follows the printed wording rather than an unprinted correction to heaven.

In Stobaeus. The report about Empedocles locates original solar fire in one hemisphere and its visible reflection in the other, associated with heated air. The distinction organizes an account of the sun's appearance and movement. It does not refer simply to the modern division of earth into northern and southern halves.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.25.3e.1 Opposed hemispheres contain the original fire and the visible solar reflection. *(Edition p. 589.)*

In this edition. "Hemisphere" is exact, provided the sphere being divided is identified as the world.

See also. Air; Fire; Reflection; Sphere; Sun.

Hero

ἥρως, hērōs, hero[231]

The word. Hērōs is a hero, including a recipient of religious observance distinct from ordinary living humans.

In Stobaeus. The civic analogy names rites for heroes between sacrifices to gods and libations for the dead. A later classification lists heroes among higher kinds alongside gods, angels, and daimons. The two uses show cultic and classificatory roles, which should not be treated as an identical comprehensive taxonomy.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.36b Heroes receive rites within the city's religious order. *(Edition p. 85.)*

I.49.39.4 Heroes appear in a hierarchy of higher beings. *(Edition p. 1209.)*

In this edition. "Hero" needs its ancient religious scope here, rather than merely an admirable protagonist.

See also. Divine spirit; God; Higher beings; Sacred rite; Sacrifice.

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[231] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 43–44, 378. The passages preserve different explanatory settings: civic observance and a survey of philosophical accounts of descent.

Hidden

κρυπτός, kruptos, hidden; concealed[232]

The word. Kryptos is hidden or concealed. It concerns lack of access or disclosure without necessarily meaning that something is inherently unknowable.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic narrative describes hidden outflows from heavenly mysteries as helping order and increase things below. The effects are narrated while the outflows themselves remain concealed. Hiddenness therefore marks their mode of operation within the account, not their absence or inactivity.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.3 Hidden outflows connect heavenly order with the lower realm. *(Edition p. 1241.)*

In this edition. "Hidden" is clear; avoid adding secret ritual content beyond what the passage says.

See also. Cosmic administration; Effluence; Invisible; Mysteries; Unmanifest.

High and sharp

ὀξύς, oxus, sharp; high in pitch[233]

The word. Oxys describes sharpness and, in musical contexts, a high pitch. The sensory field governs the meaning.

In Stobaeus. The comparison between art and nature contrasts high with low notes and long with short ones. Music combines these differences into harmony. Oxys concerns pitch in this example, whereas length concerns duration; it says nothing by itself about a note's loudness or emotional intensity.

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[232] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 386. The sentence's treatment of night's light is textually difficult; the final claim about hidden outflows is retained without identifying visible objects for them.

[233] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 55, 270, 495. The contrast with barys, low or deep, establishes the musical sense in this passage.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.58 High and low pitches are combined with contrasting durations. *(Edition p. 805.)*

I.3.16 Oxus expresses visual keenness in a statement about divine sight. *(Edition p. 115.)*

I.55.2.8 Oxu names the sour cause of the described effects on the tongue. *(Edition p. 1677.)*

Sharpness and sourness. Oxus means sharp or keen and can extend across senses to an acid or sour taste. At I.3.16, it describes the gods' keen eye, not a flavor. In sensory contexts the shared vocabulary must be translated according to the organ and effect being described; the same Greek adjective need not receive the same English word in sight, sound, and taste. I.55.2.8 explicitly calls the cause of the tongue's seething and fermentation oxu, "sour," supplying the taste use beside visual keenness.

In this edition. "High" is clearer than "sharp" here, since modern musical sharpness can suggest a particular alteration of a note.

See also. Contrary; God; Harmony; Music; Sight; Sound; Taste.

Higher beings

κρείττονα γένη, kreittona genē, higher kinds; superior beings[234]

The word. Kreittona genē means higher or superior kinds. It is a relational designation whose members depend on the particular hierarchy.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus reports views equating soul's substance with intellect, gods, and higher kinds, while carefully differentiating the positions of Numenius, Plotinus, Amelius, and Porphyry. Another passage names gods, angels, daimons, and heroes as examples. The phrase should not be treated as one fixed rank with invariant membership.

[234] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 365, 378. The assessments of the named philosophers belong to the reporter, and the asserted equality is expressly restricted to substance.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.32.11 Higher kinds enter a disputed account of soul's substance. *(Edition p. 1155.)*

I.49.39.4 A list supplies examples of higher kinds. *(Edition p. 1209.)*

In this edition. "Higher beings" is accessible; "higher kinds" preserves the classificatory noun.

See also. Angel and messenger; Divine spirit; God; Hero; Soul.

Hollow

κοῖλος, koilos, hollow; concave[235]

The word. Koilos is hollow or concave. A description of apparent shape need not assert the object's actual internal structure.

In Stobaeus. Aratus treats a hollow-looking solar disk as an unfavorable weather sign. The phrase concerns how the sun appears under atmospheric conditions, in contrast with a clear and unmarked disk. It should not be converted into a claim that the sun is physically an empty shell.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.25.9.1 A hollow-seeming disk is interpreted as a sign of rain or wind. *(Edition p. 603.)*

In this edition. "Hollow-seeming" keeps the passage's explicit distinction between appearance and composition.

See also. Rain and precipitation; Shape; Sign; Sun; Wind.

[235] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 214–215. The excerpt belongs to a sequence of weather indications; its observational setting governs the sense of the adjective.

Homogeneous parts

ὁμοιομερής; ὁμοιομέρεια, homoiomerēs; homoiomereia, like-parted; homogeneous; like-parted constituents[236]

The word. Homoiomerēs means having parts like the whole or like one another in the relevant respect. Homoiomereia names the condition or a constituent described in those terms.

In Stobaeus. The report about Anaxagoras argues from nourishment: bread and water sustain flesh, bones, sinews, and other bodily structures, so the appropriate constituents must already be present in food. Reason discerns what sight cannot pick out. Intellect is then distinguished as an arranging cause from these material constituents.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.6 The composition of food explains the growth of different tissues. *(Edition p. 301.)*

In this edition. "Like-parted constituents" is more informative here than the bare transliteration "homoeomeries."

See also. Element; Intellect; Mixture and blending; Nutrition; Part and whole.

Honor

τιμή, timē, honor; esteem; due recognition[237]

The word. Timē is honor or esteem, including the recognition paid to a god. It need not denote monetary value.

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[236] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 123–124. This is the terminology of the transmitted report. Its vocabulary should not automatically be attributed to Anaxagoras as his own surviving wording.

[237] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 26–27. The earlier description of misguided pursuits is damaged, but the closing prayer's reciprocal language of honor is clear.

In Stobaeus. Cleanthes prays that humans receive judgment from Zeus and, honored by him, repay him with honor by continually praising his works and the common law. Honor is reciprocal within the hymn's relation between divine benefaction and human acknowledgment.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.12c Divine honor is answered by human praise of Zeus and common law. *(Edition p. 43.)*

In this edition. "Honor" preserves the reciprocity and should remain distinct from reputation earlier in the poem.

See also. God; Hymn; Justice; Law; Recompense.

Hope

ἐλπίς, *elpis*, hope; expectation[238]

The word. Elpis is hope or expectation. It does not guarantee that the expected object is good or that the expectation will be fulfilled.

In Stobaeus. The lamenting souls anticipate wrongful actions driven by bad hopes while obtaining necessities for mortal bodies. Later Fire asks the creator to fill life with good hopes. The explicit qualifiers matter: the same capacity for expectation can accompany disorder or a better ordered life.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.39 Bad hopes accompany the anticipated difficulties of embodiment. *(Edition p. 1277.)*

I.49.44.66 Good hopes are requested as part of divine ordering. *(Edition p. 1303.)*

In this edition. "Hope" is natural, provided its moral quality is not assumed in advance.

See also. Desire; Embodiment; Evil; Good; Peace.

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[238] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 396, 403. The soul's lament includes a rejected poetic quotation, which is not used as independent evidence for this entry.

Human being

ἄνθρωπος, anthrōpos, human being; human[239]

The word. Anthrōpos names the human being. It can introduce a class of embodied creatures or support an account of the distinctive reach of human thought.

In Stobaeus. The Cratylus excerpt links anthrōpos with examining what one has seen. This is the dialogue's interpretive wordplay, not an established historical derivation. The Hermetic account places the human after the cosmos and first among mortals, then describes the hierarchy of intellect, reason, soul, spirit, and body. Another Hermetic formulation compares earthly humans with heavenly gods.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.3 The name is explained through reflective seeing. *(Edition p. 913.)*

I.47.9.1 The human is situated within a hierarchy of living beings. *(Edition p. 929.)*

I.47.8.7 Human and divine life are joined in a reciprocal comparison. *(Edition p. 927.)*

In this edition. "Human being" preserves the general reference where the Greek is not specifying a male. Ancient explanations of the word remain attributed to their source.

See also. Body; God; Intellect; Living creature; Soul.

Hunger

λιμός, limos, hunger; scarcity of food[240]

The word. Limos is hunger and can extend to famine or scarcity. The scale of the deprivation depends on the context.

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[239] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 301, 305.

[240] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 101. The poem offers a distinct attraction for each season, including winter's leisure, before asking for a preference.

In Stobaeus. The bucolic dialogue presents autumn as pleasant because hunger then weighs lightly on people. Agricultural abundance makes the season attractive within a comparison of all four seasons. The phrase describes relief from hunger, without requiring a specific historical famine behind the poem.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.39.1 Autumn's abundance is praised through the lightening of hunger. *(Edition p. 241.)*

In this edition. "Hunger" is appropriate here; "famine" would give the line an unsupported scale.

See also. Nutrition; Pleasure; Repletion; Season; Thirst.

Hymn

ὕμνος; ὑμνεῖν, humnos; humnein, hymn; song of praise[241]

The word. Hymnos is a hymn or song of praise; hymnein is to sing or celebrate in this manner.

In Stobaeus. Cleanthes closes his prayer by asking that humans repay divine honor through continuing praise of Zeus's works and the common law. Hymning is an act of acknowledgment informed by better judgment. The poem itself enacts the response it requests.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.12c Hymning divine works and common law repays the honor received from Zeus. *(Edition p. 43.)*

In this edition. "Hymn" preserves the religious and poetic act; "praise" explains the related verb.

See also. God; Honor; Law; Music; Sacred.

[241] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 26–27. The surviving closing prayer is clearer than the damaged preceding description of conflicting human pursuits.

Hypothesis

ὑπόθεσις, hupothesis, hypothesis; premise; proposed basis[242]

The word. Hypothesis is what an argument lays down or takes as its basis. It may be tested through consequences rather than presented as an established truth.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo tests the proposal that soul is harmony by deriving an unacceptable consequence: all souls would be equally good. The speakers reject that outcome and question the premise. The passage is evidence for a method of examination, not a claim that the proposed equality of souls is true.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.13.11 An unacceptable consequence is used to challenge the harmony hypothesis. *(Edition p. 1053.)*

In this edition. "Premise" fits the argument's immediate structure; "hypothesis" retains the broader idea of a proposed starting point.

See also. Demonstration; Good; Harmony; Soul; Test and refutation.

Ice

κρύσταλλος, krustallos, ice; crystal[243]

The word. Krystallos denotes ice in the selected classification. In other settings the term and its derivatives can evoke crystal-like clarity or solidity.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus arranges frozen water by both location and degree of freezing: fully frozen water on earth is ice, while its counterpart above earth is hail. Snow and frost occupy the less fully frozen branch of the account. The structure of the classification governs the meaning here.

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[242] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 337. The conclusion ranges over souls of all living creatures. Its broad scope is part of the objection.

[243] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 247. The explanation invokes the departure of fire and air from water; it is an ancient physical account rather than a modern phase diagram.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.31.9.2 Ice is distinguished from hail by location in the proposed scheme. *(Edition p. 731.)*

In this edition. "Ice" is required in this account of water; "crystal" would suggest a different material.

See also. Freezing and solidification; Frost; Hail; Snow; Water.

Icosahedron

εἰκοσάεδρον, eikosaedron, icosahedron; twenty-faced solid[244]

The word. Eikosaedron is a solid with twenty faces. The regular form has twenty triangular faces.

In Stobaeus. In the five-solid scheme, the icosahedron is assigned to water. This places it within a comparison of geometry, elements, and the cosmos. The water assignment is intelligible in the restored text, but the state of the wording matters when it is used as evidence for the precise form of the transmitted scheme.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.21.6c.2 The icosahedron appears in the restored assignment of solids to elements. *(Edition p. 507.)*

In this edition. "Icosahedron" preserves the exact shape; "twenty-faced solid" supplies an explanatory gloss.

See also. Octahedron; Shape; Solid; Water.

[244] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 186. The name of the solid is preserved, while wording identifying water in this portion of the sentence is supplied editorially. The distinction should remain visible in accounts of the evidence.

Idea

ἰδέα, idea, idea; form[245]

The word. Idea can refer to form or character. The modern sense of a private thought or a plan is not a sufficient guide to its use, and the word does not always name a separate intelligible entity.

In Stobaeus. One report under Pythagoras's name pairs ideas with forms, placing them in numbers, harmonies, and geometrical things. In the Phaedrus excerpt, the discussion turns to the soul's form and immediately distinguishes stating what soul is from saying what it resembles.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.1a.2 The words for forms and ideas occur together in a Pythagorean report. *(Edition p. 333.)*

I.49.11.5 The soul's form introduces the comparison with a winged team and charioteer. *(Edition p. 1033.)*

Images and comparisons. The winged team is offered as a likeness. The text expressly acknowledges the difference between an image and an adequate account of what the soul is.

In this edition. "Ideas" keeps the paired Greek nouns distinct in I.12.1a.2. "Form" suits the question about soul in I.49.11.5, without deciding that the passage asserts a separate Form of soul.

See also. Form; Intellect; Soul.

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[245] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 134, 333. I.12.1a.2 also says "inseparable from bodies." The lexicon preserves this reported qualification rather than replacing it with a more familiar account of Platonic Forms.

Ignorance

ἀγνωσία; ἄγνοια, agnōsia; agnoia, ignorance; lack of understanding[246]

The word. Agnoia and agnōsia name ignorance or the absence of knowledge. Their objects and effects vary with the account in which they occur.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic creator's illumination opposes ignorance and assists recognition of the divine. Another Hermetic passage proposes keeping certain hearers unaware of doctrines so that fear restrains wrongdoing. The juxtaposition reveals different uses of ignorance within teaching: a condition to overcome and a condition deliberately maintained for particular hearers.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.4 Divine illumination assists the seeker against ignorance. *(Edition p. 1241.)*

I.41.1.23 Restricted disclosure is defended through the supposed effects of ignorance. *(Edition p. 835.)*

In this edition. "Ignorance" should identify what is unknown without automatically implying culpable stupidity.

See also. Education; Fear; Knowledge; Mental recognition; Unmanifest.

Image

εἴδωλον, eidōlon, image[247]

The word. Eidōlon is an image. The word can name something entering perception, a likeness without solid substance, or a vehicle through which soul is associated with a place.

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[246] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 278, 386. These are arguments made by speakers within the excerpts, not a single consistent educational policy stated by Stobaeus.

[247] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 420, 429, 483.

In Stobaeus. The atomist report explains sight through incoming images. The interpretation of Homer compares the dead with reflections in mirrors or water: likeness and movement remain, while graspable solidity is absent. Porphyry explains soul's presence in Hades through its presiding over a dark image capable of being in a place. These accounts assign the image different material and explanatory statuses.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.52.1 Incoming images explain visual experience. *(Edition p. 1627.)*

I.49.50.11 Reflections illustrate likeness without graspable solidity. *(Edition p. 1369.)*

I.49.55.1 An image mediates the soul's relation to Hades. *(Edition p. 1403.)*

In this edition. "Image" is not automatically "illusion" or "mental picture." The entry keeps eidōlon distinct from the faculty of imagination.

See also. Body; Destiny after death; Presentation and imagination; Reflection; Resemblance and imitation; Sight.

Image and likeness

εἰκών, eikōn, image; likeness[248]

The word. Eikōn is an image or likeness understood in relation to an original. It can be an ordered expression of that original, not merely a deceptive appearance.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus account calls time a moving image of eternity. The image differs from its model precisely through numbered succession, while the model remains in unity. The relation is therefore one of resemblance with a specified difference, and does not simply equate temporal existence with unreality.

[248] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 109. The opening report's "generated in conception" is the reporter's interpretation; the direct Timaeus quotation begins in the following unit.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.45.1 The introductory report calls time a moving image of eternity. *(Edition p. 259.)*

I.8.45.2 The direct quotation explains the relation between temporal image and eternal model. *(Edition p. 261.)*

In this edition. "Image" preserves the model-product relation. Keep eikōn distinguishable from eidōlon and phantasma when their local uses differ.

See also. Eternity and lifetime; Image; Image in imagination; Pattern and model; Time.

Image in imagination

φάντασμα, phantasma, image; image in imagination[249]

The word. Phantasma is an image associated with imagination, distinguished from phantasia as the image-presenting activity. An image need not, merely by being an image, be false.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry compares the accompaniment of perception by bodily affection with the accompaniment of intellection by imagination. The phantasma is placed on the latter side of the analogy. The wording is difficult, but it clearly differentiates an image from the activity or power through which images occur.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.19.2 Image and impression are compared as accompaniments of different cognitive activities. *(Edition p. 1079.)*

In this edition. "Image" is sufficient when its relation to imagination is stated. "Fantasy" would add an implication of invention or unreality.

See also. Image; Impression and stamp; Intellection; Perception; Presentation and imagination.

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[249] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 344. The final analogy is textually uncertain; the printed reference to intellection is retained rather than replaced by a proposed correction.

Immaterial

ἄυλος, aulos, immaterial; without matter[250]

The word. Aylos means immaterial or without matter. It is distinct from a denial of existence.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry describes soul as a substance without magnitude, immaterial and indestructible, possessing its being in life. The related predicates explain why immateriality does not mean an empty abstraction: the account attributes a positive mode of living being to soul.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.20 Soul's immateriality accompanies a positive account of its being in life. *(Edition p. 1081.)*

In this edition. "Immaterial" preserves the denial of matter; do not substitute unreal or merely imaginary.

See also. Being and substance; Incorporeal; Life; Material and in matter; Soul.

Immortality

ἀθανασία, athanasia, immortality; deathlessness[251]

The word. Athanasia is immortality; athanatos means immortal or deathless. The claim that something does not admit death can require a further argument that it cannot be destroyed.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo explicitly introduces that further condition: if the immortal is also indestructible, soul cannot perish when death approaches. Its comparisons with odd number and fire clarify the refusal of a contrary, but the passage does not silently identify this refusal with indestructibility. A Hermetic formula calls the heavenly god an immortal human being, placing mortality and immortality within a comparison between human and cosmic life.

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[250] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 344. The participle describing possession of living agrees with life, while the participle describing possession of being agrees with soul.

[251] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 305, 342.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.16.4 The argument adds indestructibility to deathlessness. *(Edition p. 1071.)*

I.47.8.7 The earthly human and heavenly god exchange descriptive terms. *(Edition p. 927.)*

In this edition. "Immortal" is distinguished from "indestructible." The Hermetic formula is presented as a daring comparison in its source, not a biological definition.

See also. Death; God; Human being; Life; Soul.

Immovable

ἀκίνητος, akinētos, unmoved; motionless; immovable[252]

The word. Akinētos denies motion or being moved. An unmoved cause need not therefore be inactive or unable to produce movement in another thing.

In Stobaeus. The discussion of soul's activities considers an unmoved actuality that contains activity as the abiding cause of motions. Its argument explicitly allows living functions to proceed from such a source. The report on Aristotle likewise distinguishes soul's lack of motion in its own right from incidental movement with a body.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.36.2 Unmoved actuality can contain activity as a cause of motions. *(Edition p. 1177.)*

I.49.7b Soul is unmoved but participates in bodily motion incidentally. *(Edition p. 1001.)*

In this edition. "Unmoved" best preserves the causal contrast. "Immovable" can misleadingly suggest mere physical rigidity unless the context is supplied.

See also. Accident; Activity; Actuality; Rest; Self motion.

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[252] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 325, 370. I.49.36.2 is conditional and reports what some maintain; the rejected gloss "from soul" remains marked in the edition.

Impact

πρόσπτωσις; ἔνστασις; πληγή, prosptōsis; enstasis; plēgē, impact; striking against[253]

The word. Prosptōsis is a falling or striking against something, hence impact. It identifies an encounter producing an effect.

In Stobaeus. The earthquake explanation attributes violent shaking to the impact of exhalation increased and compressed within the earth. The pressure builds because moisture and cold obstruct escape. Impact is the resulting action on the surrounding ground, distinct from the earlier accumulation of material.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.36.2.5 Confined exhalation moves the earth through impact. *(Edition p. 741.)*

I.52.10 Meeting the object is a stage in a reported account of sight. *(Edition p. 1633.)*

I.1.12a The thunderbolt's stroke expresses the power directing nature. *(Edition p. 39.)*

Encounter with an object. Enstasis can name a standing against or encounter; elsewhere it may have a logical sense of objection. I.52.10 uses it in an account of visual rays meeting an object and returning to the eye. "Encounter" or "meeting" suits this optical context. The account is attributed to some Academics, and the noun "rays" is supplied in the text.

Blow and stroke. Plēgē is a blow, stroke, or impact. In Cleanthes's hymn at I.1.12a, all nature trembles beneath the thunderbolt's stroke. The bodily language of striking serves a theological image of divine power and government. It should be distinguished from the more narrowly mechanical collisions described in atomist accounts.

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[253] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 25, 250, 484. The printed sequence is disrupted and a rearrangement is discussed in the apparatus; this entry follows the retained wording.

In this edition. "Impact" keeps the causal action distinct from compression and from the shaking it produces.

See also. Compaction; Earthquake; Exhalation; God; Lightning and thunderbolt; Motion; Ray; Resistance; Sight.

Impassible

ἀπαθής, apathēs, unaffected; impassible[254]

The word. Apathēs denies undergoing an affection or alteration in the relevant respect. It can describe physical invariability rather than emotional detachment.

In Stobaeus. The account of Epicurus explains an atom's indivisibility through its being unaffected and containing no internal void. The context specifies inability to be fractured or altered. Calling the atom impassible here does not mean that it cannot change position, nor that it possesses an ethical state of calm.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.14.3 An atom is unaffected in the explanation of why it cannot be cut. *(Edition p. 309.)*

In this edition. "Unaffected" is accessible in the physical account; "impassible" is useful when contrasted systematically with what undergoes affection.

See also. Affection; Atom; Indivisible; Motion; Passive and capable of affection.

[254] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 126–127. The same passage explicitly says that an atom is not named merely because it is the smallest magnitude.

Imperishable

ἄφθαρτος, aphthartos, imperishable; incorruptible; indestructible[255]

The word. Aphthartos describes what does not undergo destruction or corruption. It is used of enduring realities without itself specifying the reason for their endurance.

In Stobaeus. A definition of soul joins the adjective to absence of magnitude, immateriality, and a life that has its living from itself. In Ocellus's cosmology, the same adjective characterizes the whole world. These applications share a denial of destruction but belong to different accounts of what exists and how it persists.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.20 Soul's imperishability accompanies immateriality and self-derived life. *(Edition p. 1081.)*

I.20.3.1 The cosmos is declared ungenerated and imperishable. *(Edition p. 469.)*

In this edition. "Imperishable" and "indestructible" can both fit. Preserve the Greek distinction from athanatos where an argument also discusses immortality.

See also. Immaterial; Immortality; Indestructible; Soul; World.

Impiety

ἀσέβεια, asebeia, impiety; irreverence[256]

The word. Asebeia is impiety or failure of due reverence, especially in relations with gods and other objects of sacred obligation.

In Stobaeus. Eryximachus explains impiety through favoring disorderly love over orderly love in dealings with gods and with parents, living or dead. Divination is then assigned a healing role. Impiety is thus incorporated into his medical analogy for the ordering of relationships.

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[255] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 173–174, 344. At I.49.20, "having its living from itself" grammatically qualifies life, while "possessing its being" qualifies soul.

[256] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 117. The final wording follows Stobaeus's printed text, which differs from a reading in the separate Platonic tradition.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.16.2 Disordered love explains failures of reverence toward gods and parents. *(Edition p. 283.)*

In this edition. "Impiety" is appropriate; "irreverence" may clarify the relational failure without narrowing it to disbelief.

See also. Divination; Father; Love; Order; Piety.

Impression and stamp

τύπος; τύπωσις, tupos; tupōsis, imprint; impression; impressing[257]

The word. Typos can name a mark, stamp, or pattern; typōsis emphasizes an impress or formation. The language can extend beyond literal marking of a surface.

In Stobaeus. The account of intellect describes form as an impress of being while explicitly denying that it is a body's boundary. Porphyry's afterlife account instead describes imagination leaving an imprint in the accompanying pneuma. The common image does not require one physical mechanism across the passages.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.6.6 An impress of being is distinguished from a bodily outline. *(Edition p. 969.)*

I.49.55.2 An imaginative imprint is described in the soul's accompanying breath. *(Edition p. 1403.)*

In this edition. "Impress" or "imprint" preserves the image, with its local object and medium explained.

See also. Attachment; Breath; Form; Image in imagination; Intellect.

[257] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 316, 429. The description of form in I.48.6.6 is difficult but explicitly resists interpretation as a mere bodily boundary.

Impression-receiving medium

ἐκμαγεῖον, ekmageion, impression-receiving medium; matrix[258]

The word. Ekmageion names a medium in which an impression is received. Here receptivity, rather than a fixed shape imposed by the medium, is the decisive feature.

In Stobaeus. The report on Plato places it among descriptions of matter that include nurse and mother. Matter receives forms while lacking determinate shape in its own nature. The image helps explain how a succession of configurations can appear in a recipient without making that recipient one of the configurations.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.11.3.2 The medium receives forms alongside the metaphors of nursing and motherhood. *(Edition p. 323.)*

In this edition. "Impression-receiving medium" is more precise here than "mold," which can suggest that the recipient supplies the shape itself.

See also. Form; Impression and stamp; Matter; Nurse of becoming; Receptacle.

Impulse

ὁρμή, hormē, impulse; impulsive capacity[259]

The word. Hormē denotes an impulse or directed movement toward action. The corresponding adjective can designate the capacity by which a living creature moves.

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[258] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 131. The medium receives an impression; it is not an independent agent stamping forms upon other things.

[259] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 298, 349, 496.

In Stobaeus. The report about Aristotle uses impulse together with perception to distinguish animals from plants. The notice on locomotion calls its moving capacity impulsive and states that its first mover is unmoved. In the discussion of Numenius and the Stoics, impulse enters a different explanatory sequence: perception, presentation, and assent are related, with assent said to occur according to impulse.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.45.2 Impulse belongs to the definition of animal life. *(Edition p. 901.)*

I.56.1.3 The impulsive capacity concerns movement from place to place. *(Edition p. 1683.)*

I.49.25.1 Impulse enters the reported connection between perception and assent. *(Edition p. 1097.)*

In this edition. "Impulse" does not necessarily suggest rashness or a momentary whim. It can name a general power of directed activity.

See also. Assent; Desire; Living creature; Motion; Perception.

Incantation

ἐπῳδή, epōdē, incantation; sung charm; spell[260]

The word. Epōidē is a sung or spoken charm, an incantation. The word can name the verbal component of ritual without supplying any particular formula.

In Stobaeus. In Diotima's account, the intermediary role of daimons encompasses practices including sacrifices, initiations, prophecy, and incantations. Incantation is one member of a varied list illustrating communication between human and divine realms. The passage does not identify every listed practice as the same art.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.17.2 Incantations belong to the ritual practices associated with daimonic mediation. *(Edition p. 287.)*

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[260] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 118. The excerpt preserves a discourse within Plato's Symposium. Its classification should not be treated as Stobaeus's own first-person account of ritual practice.

In this edition. "Incantation" conveys the ritual use; "song" alone would be too general.

See also. Divination; Divine spirit; Initiation; Magic; Sacrifice.

Inclination and tendency

ῥοπή; νεῦσις; σύννευσις, rhopē; neusis; sunneusis, inclination; tendency; leaning toward[261]

The word. Rhopē is a tipping, inclination, or tendency. Neusis and its compound sunneusis name a leaning or turning toward something.

In Stobaeus. Among rival explanations of the soul's presence in a body, one describes an inclination and tendency toward the body while the soul exercises mastery over it. This is one proposed relation alongside cooperation, participation in a whole, and the presence of an art in its instrument. The directional image does not by itself imply that the body overpowers the soul. The report about Plato at I.14.1a.2 uses neusis and rhopē of a body in a foreign place; there the direction concerns heaviness and lightness.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.41.6 Inclination toward the body is one account of the soul's relation to it. *(Edition p. 1225.)*

I.14.1a.2 Neusis and rhopē describe a body's inclination outside its proper place. *(Edition p. 353.)*

In this edition. "Inclination" preserves the directional image. "Fall" would introduce a stronger narrative than this wording requires.

See also. Body; Instrument; Participation; Power and capacity; Soul.

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[261] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 140, 382. The cited expression uses sunneusis, the compound of neusis. The reading governing the soul's mastery is editorially corrected in the source.

Inclination and tilt

ἔγκλισις, enklisis, inclination; oblique motion; tilt[262]

The word. Enklisis is inclination or slanting. In the selected classification it names a mixed, oblique course.

In Stobaeus. The account distinguishes straight and circular locomotion as simple paths and the inclined path as mixed. It then classifies elemental movement relative to the center. Enklisis belongs to this geometrical arrangement and is not the Epicurean atomic swerve called parenklisis.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.1.6 Oblique motion is classified as a mixed path. *(Edition p. 433.)*

In this edition. "Oblique motion" is clearest here; "inclination" preserves the noun more generally.

See also. Circular motion; Element; Locomotion; Motion; Swerve.

Incorporeal

ἀσώματον; ἀσώματος, asōmaton; asōmatos, incorporeal; bodiless[263]

The word. Asōmaton means what is not a body. The term does not by itself mean inactive, unreal, or absent from bodily life.

In Stobaeus. The report about Aristotle makes bodies act and undergo effects through incorporeal powers. Porphyry distinguishes the soul's activities from bodily alteration: heating and cooling are not models for every affection attributed to soul. The Hermetic account says that incorporeal activities operate in and through bodies. These are different explanations of how something nonbodily can be connected with bodily effects.

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[262] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 163. The term follows the printed correction. The fifth elemental body moves around the center in the subsequent classification.

[263] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 21, 141, 285, 344.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1c.3 Incorporeal powers explain the action and passivity of bodies. *(Edition p. 357.)*

I.49.21.1 Psychic activity is distinguished from bodily alteration. *(Edition p. 1081.)*

I.41.6.4 Incorporeal activities act through bodies. *(Edition p. 853.)*

Arith.9 Numbers and numbered things illustrate the contrast of incorporeal and bodily. *(Edition p. 27.)*

The adjective asōmatos. The adjective asōmatos means incorporeal or bodiless. Arith.9 contrasts numbers with numbered things as incorporeal things with bodies. Its "One," however, is a bodily unit divisible without limit. The passage therefore provides a particularly clear warning that incorporeality cannot be assigned to every occurrence of the One merely because other passages treat unity as an intelligible principle.

In this edition. "Incorporeal" is kept distinct from "immaterial" unless matter itself is the subject of the contrast. Neither word alone establishes separability.

See also. Activity; Affection; Body; Matter; Number; One; Power and capacity; Separation.

Indestructible

ἀνώλεθρος, anōlethros, indestructible; not liable to destruction[264]

The word. Anōlethros denies destruction. In arguments about soul, it can express a stronger conclusion than the initial assertion that soul does not admit death.

[264] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 342. The argument is conditional before the interlocutor's assent; that qualification belongs to its philosophical structure.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo excerpt makes the extra step explicit: if what is immortal is also indestructible, soul possesses both properties; otherwise another argument is needed. The interlocutor accepts the additional premise by appealing to the everlasting character of the immortal. The sequence matters because the conclusion is not obtained merely by exchanging synonymous English words.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.16.6 The dialogue distinguishes immortality from the further premise of indestructibility. *(Edition p. 1073.)*

In this edition. Keep "indestructible" distinct from "immortal" when both occur. Their relationship is precisely what the speakers are discussing.

See also. Death; Immortality; Imperishable; Soul.

Indivisible

ἀδιαίρετον; ἀμέριστος, adiaireton; ameristos, indivisible[265]

The word. Adiaireton means not divisible. The reason for denying division matters: a smallest body, an incorporeal principle, and something merely treated as a unit need not be indivisible in the same way.

In Stobaeus. The report on Ecphantus makes indivisible bodies and void principles of everything and treats Pythagorean units as corporeal. The Democritean notice says division stops at things without parts. By contrast, the Aristotelian report permits bodily division without limit potentially. These statements place the stopping point of division at issue rather than merely disagreeing about the sizes of visible pieces.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.16a.1 Indivisible bodies and void serve as principles. *(Edition p. 309.)*

I.14.1g Division terminates at things without parts. *(Edition p. 361.)*

I.14.1b A competing account allows unlimited potential division. *(Edition p. 355.)*

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[265] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 16, 127, 141, 143.

Arith.2b The One is described as an undivided primary form. *(Edition p. 15.)*

Without division. Ameristos means undivided or indivisible. In Arith.2b the reported Aristotelian description makes the One the primary undivided form of the odd and indivisible principle. The distinction between an undivided principle and divisible numbered things helps explain why "indivisible" is not restricted to the physical atoms of atomism.

In this edition. "Indivisible" is not substituted for "without parts" where the source uses the latter expression. The formulations are related but not verbally identical.

See also. Atom; Body; Division; Monad; One; Void.

Inexpressible

ἄρρητος, *arrētos*, inexpressible; not expressible[266]

The word. Arrhētos means inexpressible or not spoken. Its value is not automatically exalted or mystical.

In Stobaeus. The Eurysus excerpt contrasts an expressible, ordered, rationally related nature with an inexpressible, disordered, irrational one. Here inexpressibility belongs to the inferior side of the contrast. It must not be interpreted as a direct reference to a supreme divine reality beyond language.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.6.19.2 Inexpressibility accompanies disorder and irrationality. *(Edition p. 213.)*

In this edition. "Inexpressible" preserves the opposition to expressible; explain its negative role in this passage.

See also. Disorder; Hidden; Rational and irrational; Reason and account; Unlimited.

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[266] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 90. The same argument compares beneficent kingship with destructive tyranny; its moral evaluation shapes the whole opposition.

Inference and syllogism

συλλογισμός, sullogismos, inference; syllogism[267]

The word. Syllogismos is an inference in which statements support a conclusion. The word alone does not identify a particular textbook arrangement of premises.

In Stobaeus. The discussion of mechanics distinguishes knowing what a thing is, knowing why, and knowing that it exists or is so. Reason establishes a fact through inference, while perception can confirm an account. In this setting, inferential and perceptual support have different functions within explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.5.4 Inference and perceptual confirmation are distinguished as ways of establishing a fact. *(Edition p. 849.)*

In this edition. "Inference" avoids imposing an unstated formal pattern; "syllogism" is appropriate when such a pattern is actually relevant.

See also. Cause; Demonstration; Intellect; Perception; Reasoning and calculation.

Inhabited earth

οἰκουμένη, oikoumenē, inhabited world; inhabited earth[268]

The word. Oikoumenē is the inhabited world, often the world known to the speaker and audience rather than the entire planet considered physically.

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[267] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 283–284. The difficult final construction is retained in the edition rather than replaced by an apparatus suggestion.

[268] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 258. The final sentence at I.40.1.13 is textually difficult. Its general picture of land amid water is clearer than every syntactic detail.

In Stobaeus. The geographical account compares the known inhabited region and other great land masses to islands within an encompassing sea. The plural extends the model to further inhabited worlds or regions beyond direct view. It does not describe separate astronomical planets in this context.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.13 Inhabited land masses are compared to islands within the whole sea. *(Edition p. 771.)*

I.40.1.12 The known inhabited world is distinguished from unseen others. *(Edition p. 771.)*

In this edition. "Inhabited world" preserves the human geographical standpoint; "earth" alone may make the scope too broad.

See also. Earth; Invisible; Island; Ocean; Part and whole.

Initiation

τελετή; μύστης, teletē; mustēs, initiation; initiatory rite[269]

The word. Teletē is an initiation or sacred rite. Its associations with preparation and purification can support a comparison beyond a literal ceremony.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry says that one should approach death as in an initiation, purifying soul and setting aside harmful desires, envy, hostility, and anger. The comparison emphasizes the condition in which departure occurs. It does not supply instructions for reconstructing a particular historical initiation ritual.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.60.12 Initiation models purification at the approach of death. *(Edition p. 1477.)*

I.49.68.1 Horus asks to be initiated into knowledge of the souls' destination. *(Edition p. 1529.)*

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[269] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 447, 458–459. The printed teletē is retained rather than a variant meaning death. The final construction concerning understanding remains difficult.

The initiate. Mustēs is an initiate, one admitted to a mystery or sacred instruction. At I.49.68.1, Horus wishes to become an initiate into contemplation of the souls' destination after bodily release. The language makes instruction itself an initiation. The excerpt does not supply a complete external ritual to accompany that request.

In this edition. "Initiation" preserves the explicit comparison; "rite" is a broader alternative.

See also. Contemplation; Death; Destiny after death; Mysteries; Purification; Sacred rite; Soul.

Injustice

ἀδικία, adikia, injustice[270]

The word. Adikia is injustice or wrongdoing in relation to justice. It can describe both a disposition and its harmful expression.

In Stobaeus. The Laws excerpt joins injustice with insolence and folly as destructive of human beings, opposed to justice, restraint, and understanding. The surrounding struggle has divine allies and requires vigilance. Injustice therefore belongs to an ethical and theological account, not merely to a narrow category of legal offenses.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.55b.3 Injustice and folly oppose the virtues that preserve human beings. *(Edition p. 143.)*

In this edition. "Injustice" keeps the direct relation to justice; "wrongdoing" can fit an action-centered construction.

See also. Insolence and outrage; Justice; Preservation and salvation; Understanding and practical wisdom; Vice and wickedness.

[270] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 65–66. The saving virtues are said to dwell in ensouled divine powers, which gives the contrast its particular theological setting.

Innate and connatural

σύμφυτος, sumphutos, innate; connatural; native to[271]

The word. Symphytos describes what belongs naturally together or is native to a being. In the discussion of powers, it denies their being merely external additions.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus's report presents Plato's powers of soul as innate and subsisting together under one form because soul is uncompounded. The powers are distinguishable in explanation without becoming separate ingredients out of which soul is assembled. The related account of Aristotle also resists treating powers as additions to a composite subject.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.33.1 Soul's powers are treated as native to its simple substance.
(Edition p. 1163.)

In this edition. "Innate" is concise, but "native to its nature" avoids suggesting a modern theory about acquired versus inherited psychology.

See also. Composite; Power and capacity; Property and peculiarity; Simple; Soul.

Inquiry

ζήτησις, zētēsis, inquiry; investigation[272]

The word. Zētēsis is an inquiry or pursuit of understanding. It can name the question being examined as well as the activity of examining it.

In Stobaeus. Isis calls the inquiry into souls' places necessary, then begins from the proposition that what has established existence and does not vanish has a place. The term marks a deliberate explanatory investigation. The first proposition is the basis offered by the speaker, not a result already established by the word "inquiry."

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[271] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 367. "Uncompounded" follows the printed editorial correction; the passage is Iamblichus's account of Plato and Aristotle.

[272] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 459. The edition follows Wachsmuth's transposition of the clause introducing Isis's account.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.68.2 The investigation begins from a claim about subsistence and place. *(Edition p. 1529.)*

In this edition. "Inquiry" is preferable to "search" where an argument rather than a physical hunt is intended.

See also. Hypothesis; Knowledge; Place and space; Reason and account; Soul.

Insolence and outrage

ὕβρις, hubris, insolence; outrage; violent overstepping[273]

The word. Hybris is insolent or outrageous overstepping, often expressed in harmful conduct. It is broader than an inward feeling of pride.

In Stobaeus. Archilochus invokes Zeus as observing lawless human deeds and caring for outrage and justice even among beasts. The pairing emphasizes misconduct subject to divine concern. The term should not be weakened into mere confidence or ordinary ambition.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.34 Outrage is paired with justice under Zeus's care. *(Edition p. 123.)*

I.3.55b.3 Insolence joins injustice and folly as destructive. *(Edition p. 143.)*

In this edition. "Outrage" suits wrongful conduct; "insolence" emphasizes the overbearing disposition.

See also. Error and wrongdoing; Excess and greed; God; Injustice; Justice.

[273] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 58, 65–66. The poem's extension of divine concern to beasts differs from other excerpts' contrasts between animal and human justice.

Instrument

ὄργανον; ὀργανικός, organon; organikos, instrument; organ; tool[274]

The word. Organon is a means through which an operation is performed. It can be bodily, material, or part of a philosophical account of mediation.

In Stobaeus. The report on Hippasus describes number as a discriminating instrument of the god who fashions the cosmos. A Hermetic passage calls fire the instrument used by cosmic intellect in making. The instrument must be distinguished from the maker using it, even where its operation is indispensable to production.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.32.6 Number is described as the cosmic maker's discriminating instrument. *(Edition p. 1151.)*

I.48.3.4 Cosmic intellect uses fire instrumentally in craftsmanship. *(Edition p. 953.)*

I.49.1a.3 The body in the definition of soul is equipped with organs. *(Edition p. 979.)*

Organic and instrumental. Organikos relates a thing to organs or instruments. In the Aristotelian definition of soul at I.49.1a.3, it qualifies the natural body that has life potentially: a body equipped for the functions of life. "Organic" here should not be read in the modern chemical or agricultural sense. The adjective connects bodily organization with the capacities actualized in living.

In this edition. "Instrument" suits mediation in an activity; "organ" suits a bodily part where its function is at issue.

See also. Actuality; Body; Demiurge and craftsman; Fire; Intellect; Number; Soul.

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[274] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 311–312, 319, 364. In I.49.32.6, number remains the understood subject across the abbreviated accounts of different thinkers.

Intellect

νοῦς, nous, intellect; mind[275]

The word. Nous concerns understanding or intellect. The collection distinguishes it in various contexts from soul, perception, reasoning, and a particular act of thought; those contrasts matter more than a fixed modern division between mind and matter.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic sayings distinguish intellect in God, reasoning in human beings, and reason in intellect. Another report makes intellect and perception criteria for different objects: the intelligible and the perceptible. In a further Hermetic passage the pious soul becomes wholly mind.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.1.11 Nous, logismos, and logos are distinguished. *(Edition p. 825.)*

I.58.1.3 Intellect judges intelligible things, while perception concerns perceptible things. *(Edition p. 1689.)*

I.49.49.1 The pious soul is said to become wholly mind. *(Edition p. 1357.)*

I.49.24.5 Intellect and discursive thought differ in their manner of activity. *(Edition p. 1095.)*

I.48.5.7 The apprehension of intelligibles is related to self-contemplation. *(Edition p. 963.)*

I.48.5.8 The many intelligibles bear on the priority of the One. *(Edition p. 963.)*

Images and comparisons. At I.48.6.6 intellect is compared with a unit and a point because it is without parts. The analogy concerns indivisibility, not physical minuteness.

Intellect and successive thought. The survey of powers contrasts the all-at-once activity of intellect with discursive thought proceeding step by step. It also reports competing classifications, including the view that one rational substance has different activities. The argument about intelligibles locates their apprehension in intellect's relation to itself, then uses their plurality to place the One before intellect. Neither discussion makes intellect simply the physical organ of perception.

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[275] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 275, 314, 349, 417–418, 497. In I.49.49.1 a supplied negation limits the claim to the pious soul. The lexicon does not generalize it to every soul.

In this edition. "Intellect" often marks the philosophical distinction; "mind" remains appropriate in some passages. Neither rendering should erase the difference between nous and psychē, soul.

See also. Brain; Demiurge and craftsman; Intelligible; Knowledge; Multiplicity; Perception; Reason and account; Soul; Thought.

Intellection

νόησις, noēsis, intellection; thinking[276]

The word. Noēsis is the act of thinking or apprehending intellectually. Its scope varies with theories of the relation between intellect, imagination, and matter.

In Stobaeus. The discussion contrasts outward-directed perception with intellect's gathering into itself, then considers thinkers who identify imagination in a rational creature with thinking. The latter position is explained as consistent with dependence on matter. The excerpt's contrast should be retained instead of giving noēsis one unvarying psychological mechanism.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.5.6 Intellectual thinking is compared with perception and materialist accounts of imagination. *(Edition p. 961.)*

In this edition. "Thinking" is natural in prose; "intellection" helps distinguish the act associated with nous from other cognitive operations.

See also. Contemplation; Intellect; Object of thought; Perception; Presentation and imagination.

[276] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 314. The transition connecting the competing accounts is textually strained; the clearer statement about rational imagination does not remove that difficulty.

Intellective

νοερός, noeros, intellectual; intellective[277]

The word. Noeros describes what belongs to intellect or operates intellectually. It is related to noētos, intelligible, but the two adjectives should not automatically be treated as identical.

In Stobaeus. The argument about incorporeal objects says that intellectual things are gathered through thinking rather than found at an external material location. Intellect contemplates itself in apprehending them. The word participates in an account of their relation to intellect; it does not locate them in a physical chamber inside the thinker.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.5.7 Intellectual realities are gathered by thought without an external material place. *(Edition p. 963.)*

I.1.29b.2 Noeros qualifies the fiery divine breath. *(Edition p. 65.)*

Noeros: intelligent and intellective. Noeros describes something endowed with intellect or operating intellectually. The report about Posidonius at I.1.29b.2 calls the divine breath intelligent and fiery. "Intelligent" suits this description of an active power. It does not make the breath expressly incorporeal, nor require every intellective adjective to denote an independent level in a metaphysical hierarchy.

In this edition. "Intellectual" fits the objects described here; "intellective" can foreground an active capacity in other constructions.

See also. Breath; God; Incorporeal; Intellect; Intellection; Intelligible; Place and space.

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[277] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 34–35, 314. The source's "nowhere" denies material location, not existence. Several supplements and rejected words remain marked in the bilingual text.

Intelligible

νοητόν, noēton, intelligible; object of intellect[278]

The word. Noēton means what is apprehended by intellect. It describes the object of thinking in a philosophical contrast, rather than merely something that happens to be understandable.

In Stobaeus. The discussion of intellectual contemplation asks where incorporeal objects could be situated if they lie outside matter. Its answer connects their apprehension with intellect's turning toward itself. The following argument takes the plurality of intelligibles to imply a plurality within intellect, then places the One before that multiplicity. Spatial location and conceptual priority therefore require different kinds of explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.5.7 Intelligibles have no external material location. *(Edition p. 963.)*

I.48.5.8 Their multiplicity bears on the relation between intellect and the One. *(Edition p. 963.)*

In this edition. "Intelligible" names an object of intellect; "intellectual" usually characterizes the relevant power or activity. The distinction is kept where the Greek permits it.

See also. Incorporeal; Intellect; Multiplicity; One; Thought.

Intent and purpose

πρόθεσις, prothesis, intention; purpose; proposed end[279]

The word. Prothesis is an intention or purpose, something set before an agent. The relation to an end can be explicit.

In Stobaeus. The brief report about Plato places intention directed toward an end within a difficult definition of chance and its relation to choice. The sentence is too compressed to establish a complete theory of intention, but its purposive orientation is clear.

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[278] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 314.

[279] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 87. The report is textually uncertain and is not a verbatim quotation from an identified Platonic passage.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.6.17a.2 Intention toward an end enters the reported account of chance and choice. *(Edition p. 203.)*

In this edition. "Intention" is preferable to "proposition" in this construction.

See also. Action; Chance and fortune; Choice; End; Will and wish.

Interpretation

ἑρμηνεία, hermēneia, expression; interpretation; verbal formulation[280]

The word. Hermēneia can concern expression as well as interpretation. Its English equivalent depends on whether a passage discusses making something understood or construing what has been said.

In Stobaeus. The causal classification reports different forms of expression: that from which, by which, according to which, and for the sake of which. These formulations distinguish matter, agent, form, and end. Here hermēneia concerns the language expressing explanatory relations, rather than a commentary interpreting an obscure text.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.13.1b.2 Different verbal formulations distinguish kinds of cause. *(Edition p. 345.)*

In this edition. "Expression" or "formulation" suits this passage better than an automatic "interpretation."

See also. Cause; End; Form; Matter; Speech and utterance.

[280] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 138. The account is a report of Aristotle's causal distinctions; the opening reference to matter is supplied in the printed text.

Interval

διάστημα, diastēma, interval; extent; span[281]

The word. Diastēma is an extent or interval. It may be spatial or temporal and does not necessarily signify an empty gap.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic dimensional account uses the word of bodily extents measured by relative size or by direction. In accounts of time, it describes an interval of motion. The common feature is an extended span, while the object and mode of comparison determine its precise meaning.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1l.1 Length, breadth, and depth receive alternative definitions through extents. *(Edition p. 365.)*

I.8.42.2 Time is defined through the interval of motion. *(Edition p. 251.)*

In this edition. "Extent" suits dimensions of a body; "interval" suits temporal or separated limits. Avoid introducing emptiness where none is asserted.

See also. Breadth; Depth; Dimension and distance; Length; Time.

Invisible

ἀόρατος; ἀειδής, aoratos; aeidēs, invisible; unseen; without visible form[282]

The word. Aoratos denies visibility. The related-looking aeidēs can require "unseen" or "formless" according to context, so its meaning should not be fixed by resemblance alone.

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[281] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 105–106, 143–144. The printed phrase "inward extent" in I.14.1l.1 is difficult; an apparatus alternative is not silently adopted.

[282] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 286, 358. In I.49.28.4, the best maker belongs to the intelligible order, while soul is the best among generated things; the two descriptions should not be interchanged.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus excerpt contrasts the visible body of heaven with its invisible soul, which participates in reasoning and harmony. In the Hermetic discussion of a corpse's dissolution, aeides instead describes the body becoming formless. Invisibility and loss of configuration are distinct claims.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.28.4 Invisible cosmic soul is contrasted with the visible heavenly body. *(Edition p. 1127.)*

I.41.6.8 Dissolution makes the abandoned body formless. *(Edition p. 857.)*

In this edition. Use "invisible" for denial of sight and "formless" where configuration is lost. The context governs the choice.

See also. Body; Formless; Incorporeal; Soul; Visible.

Island

νῆσος, nēsos, island[283]

The word. Nēsos is an island, land surrounded by water. The term can be extended from familiar local islands to a much larger geographical model.

In Stobaeus. The account challenges the conventional division between islands and continents by treating the whole known inhabited world as one island encircled by Ocean. Other great islands are inferred across the water. Their existence is presented as likely, not as the result of voyages described in the excerpt.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.12 The inhabited world is itself classified as an island. *(Edition p. 771.)*

[283] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 258. The word supplying likelihood is restored from the parallel On the Cosmos; the unknown lands remain explicitly unseen by the author's community.

In this edition. "Island" preserves the comparison across scales; it does not mean that all the lands described were individually surveyed.

See also. Earth; Inhabited earth; Ocean; Part and whole; Sea and tides.

Isthmus

ἰσθμός, isthmos, isthmus[284]

The word. Isthmos is a narrow tract of land between bodies of water. It can serve as a boundary in a geographical convention.

In Stobaeus. The account records competing divisions between continents, sometimes using isthmuses and sometimes rivers. The narrow land between the Arabian Gulf and the inner sea is one such boundary. The term therefore identifies a physical feature whose classificatory role depends on the convention adopted.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.24 Isthmuses and rivers provide alternative continental boundaries. *(Edition p. 779.)*

In this edition. "Isthmus" is precise; a short explanation helps readers unfamiliar with the geographical term.

See also. Earth; Gulf and hollow basin; Limit and definition; River; Sea and tides.

Judge

δικαστής, dikastēs, judge[285]

The word. Dikastēs is a judge, someone who examines and decides a case.

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[284] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 261. The passage explicitly reports disagreement over boundaries, so no one scheme should be presented as the unanimous ancient division.

[285] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 415. The named judges in the preceding unit are Minos and Rhadamanthys; the account's assurance against lying belongs to its narrative conditions.

In Stobaeus. The afterlife narrative presents judges questioning each arrival about the life lived and the practices followed while embodied. The impossibility of lying makes the Plain of Truth effective as a judicial setting. The term names the agents of examination, not the judgment or punishment itself.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.47.4 Judges examine the whole life and particular pursuits of arriving souls. *(Edition p. 1349.)*

In this edition. "Judge" is direct; preserve the distinction between inquiry and the eventual verdict.

See also. Court of judgment; Destiny after death; Judgment; Pursuit and practice; Truth.

Judgment

κρίσις, krisis, judgment; discrimination; decision[286]

The word. Krisis is a judgment or act of deciding between claims or cases. A judicial use belongs to the wider vocabulary of discrimination but has a particular narrative setting.

In Stobaeus. In the Gorgias account, Zeus explains that judgments have gone wrong because souls are judged clothed in bodily beauty, ancestry, and wealth. These appearances attract favorable witnesses and conceal character. The argument concerns the conditions for judging justly, not simply a judgment's formal announcement.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.63.5 Misleading outward advantages corrupt the judgment of souls. *(Edition p. 1487.)*

In this edition. "Judgment" suits the judicial scene; "discrimination" may suit a cognitive comparison without a court.

See also. Character; Court of judgment; Judge; Justice; Wealth.

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[286] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 449–450. Zeus speaks within Socrates's narrative, and "clothing" extends beyond literal garments to body, lineage, and riches.

Justice

δίκη; δικαιοσύνη, dikē; dikaiosunē, justice; Justice[287]

The word. Dikē can name justice or its personified divine power; dikaiosynē names justice as a condition or virtue. The two terms overlap but do not always perform the same work.

In Stobaeus. Hesiod contrasts human justice with animals devouring one another. The Hermetic passage presents Justice as a power overseeing earthly wrongs, parallel to the ordering functions of providence and necessity. Another Hermetic account locates justice within soul: desire and spirit acquire an equal disposition under reasoning. Social order, divine oversight, and psychic balance are related themes, not interchangeable definitions.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.1 Justice distinguishes human life in Hesiod's contrast. *(Edition p. 107.)*

I.3.52 Justice governs the consequences of earthly wrongdoing. *(Edition p. 133.)*

I.49.4.2 Justice arises from a balanced disposition of psychic powers. *(Edition p. 989.)*

I.3.55b.3 Justice is a preserving virtue in company with self-restraint and understanding. *(Edition p. 143.)*

Justice as virtue. Dikaiosunē names justice as a quality or virtue. In I.3.55b.3 it joins self-restraint and understanding among the powers that preserve human beings, contrasted with injustice, insolence, and folly. This use complements dikē as justice, judgment, or personified Justice without making the two nouns interchangeable in every construction.

In this edition. Capitalization marks personification where appropriate. "Justice" also renders the unpersonified condition of soul.

See also. Anger and spirit; Desire; Law; Preservation and salvation; Providence; Punishment; Virtue and excellence.

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[287] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 52, 62–63, 65–66, 322.

Kidney

νεφρός, nephros, kidney[288]

The word. Nephros is a kidney. Its explanatory role in the cited physiological account concerns the route of drink through the body.

In Stobaeus. The account associated with Timaeus describes drink passing through the lung, beneath the kidneys, and toward the bladder. It combines this route with a discussion of marrow and generation. The kidneys function here as anatomical landmarks within an ancient explanation; the passage does not explicitly set out a modern account of renal filtration.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.1.3 The kidneys help locate the reported path of drink toward the bladder. *(Edition p. 907.)*

In this edition. "Kidney" is straightforward, but the surrounding physiology should be translated as stated rather than silently corrected.

See also. Bladder; Lung; Marrow; Nutrition; Seed.

Kindling

ἔξαψις, exapsis, kindling; ignition[289]

The word. Exapsis is a kindling or ignition, the beginning of a fire or blaze.

In Stobaeus. The account defines a luminous flare as the kindling of a mass of fire in the air, then distinguishes moving from stationary flares. Speed explains a moving light's apparent length, whereas a stationary extension is described differently. Kindling names their fiery origin within the classification, not their subsequent motion.

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[288] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 298–299. The historical identification of a named organ does not make every process attributed to the surrounding organs anatomically accurate.

[289] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 266. The source places comets among stationary extensions of aerial fire; these categories should not be equated uncritically with modern astronomical classes.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.46 Kindling introduces the distinction between moving and stationary luminous flares. *(Edition p. 795.)*

In this edition. "Kindling" preserves the onset of fire; "burning" alone would lose that temporal distinction.

See also. Burning; Comet; Extinction; Flame; Shooting star.

King

βασιλεύς, basileus, king[290]

The word. Basileus is a king. Its application can be human or divine, with the hierarchy supplied by the passage.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic arrangement assigns earth's humans and other animals to the king in power at the relevant time, while the moon, sun, and maker govern other levels. The human king is therefore one ruler within a larger ordered scheme. He is not identified with the creator of the whole.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.45.2 The earthly king occupies one level of a four-region hierarchy. *(Edition p. 1319.)*

In this edition. "King" is direct; preserve the distinction between regional and universal governance.

See also. Demiurge and craftsman; Law; Order; Rule and kingship; Ruler.

[290] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 407. The temporal expression can mean at the particular time; it does not necessarily assert a fixed cycle of royal succession.

Kinship and affinity

συγγένεια; συγγενής, sungeneia; sungenēs, kinship; affinity; being akin[291]

The word. Syngeneia and syngenēs express a relationship of kind or nature, often using the language of kinship. Shared ancestry is not always literal biological descent.

In Stobaeus. In the Phaedo, the soul's affinity with what is pure, everlasting, and unchanging helps explain the steadiness of its thought when it examines things by itself. Affinity supports a relation between knower and known; it is not merely an observation that their outward appearances are alike.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.9.6 Soul's contact with stable objects is explained through its affinity with them. *(Edition p. 1021.)*

In this edition. "Akin" suits the relational predicate; "affinity" often avoids an unintended claim of biological parentage.

See also. Intelligible; Proper and one's own; Pure and unmixed; Resemblance and imitation; Soul.

Knowable

ἐπιστητός, epistētos, knowable; object of knowledge[292]

The word. Epistētos describes what is an object of knowledge. The selected Doric passage uses epistatos, whose forms must be distinguished from superficially similar words about supervision.

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[291] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 330. The passage retains the qualifications "whenever" soul is by itself and "is able"; affinity is not presented as a constant achieved state of every embodied soul.

[292] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 316–317. The Doric form is preserved in the source; the headword is given in a conventional dictionary form for lookup.

In Stobaeus. The classification locates necessary properties of forms under knowledge, giving geometry as its example. It then assigns the forms themselves and the principles of those properties to intellect. "Knowable" here therefore has a defined place in a fourfold scheme rather than meaning anything whatsoever that a person might learn.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.6.7 Necessary geometrical properties are distinguished from instances and forms themselves. *(Edition p. 971.)*

In this edition. "Object of knowledge" makes the classification explicit; "knowable" supplies a compact adjectival equivalent.

See also. Intelligible; Knowledge; Object of opinion; Perceptible; Triangle.

Knowledge

ἐπιστήμη; γνῶσις, epistēmē; gnōsis, knowledge[293]

The word. Epistēmē names knowledge. The passages here place it in relations with perception, memory, belief, intellect, and stability, allowing the reader to follow how a proposed cognitive order is constructed.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo passage recounts a sequence in which perception yields memory and belief, and stabilized memory and belief are associated with knowledge. In the Timaeus extract, intellect and knowledge result when the soul's appropriate circle addresses what is accessible to reasoning.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.51.6 A proposed development from perception through memory and belief leads to knowledge. *(Edition p. 1625.)*

I.50.41.2 Intellect and knowledge arise in the account of the circle of Sameness. *(Edition p. 1617.)*

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[293] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 188–189, 480, 482. These extracts have different dramatic and theoretical settings. The Phaedo report of an earlier inquiry and the Timaeus' cosmic account should not be merged into one unqualified statement of doctrine.

I.21.7d.1 A restriction on human knowledge still allows an inference about cosmic constituents. *(Edition p. 513.)*

Gnōsis: knowledge and cognition. Gnōsis names knowledge or cognition. In I.21.7d.1, the divine being or nature of things is said not to admit human knowledge, except for an inference concerning the prior existence of the world's constituents. The restriction and its exception belong together. "Knowledge is impossible" would overstate a passage that still allows a particular kind of understanding.

In this edition. "Knowledge" renders epistēmē in these places. Other Greek words also concern knowing, so an English occurrence of "knowledge" is not by itself a complete lexical identification.

See also. Apprehension; Being and substance; Belief and opinion; Intellect; Memory; Nature; Perception; Recollection; Thought; Truth.

Lake

λίμνη, limnē, lake[294]

The word. Limnē is a lake or standing body of water. In underworld accounts it can be associated with a river of the same name.

In Stobaeus. The interpretation of Sophocles identifies Acheron with the Acherusian lake, then quotes Achilles' soul describing its dark shores and lamenting streams. The relationship of lake and river belongs to the source's reading of poetic geography. It does not require that the two common nouns mean the same thing in every setting.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.50.5 The Acherusian lake and Acheron are identified in an interpretation of tragic verse. *(Edition p. 1363.)*

In this edition. "Lake" keeps the distinction from river while preserving the stated identification.

See also. Destiny after death; Myth; River; Soul; Stream and current.

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[294] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 419. The quoted verses contain editorial corrections and a transposition; their unusual descriptors are further interpreted in the surrounding prose.

Law

νόμος, nomos, law[295]

The word. Nomos is law. Its referent may be an established human institution, a rule given to humans, or the common divine order.

In Stobaeus. Hesiod calls the human possession of justice a law laid down by Zeus. Cleanthes describes a common law of God that people fail to see or hear despite wanting good things. The Laws excerpt explains a different aspect: long familiarity with unchanged laws creates reverence and fear of disturbing them. Divine authority and the psychological force of inherited institutions therefore require separate attention.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.1 Law assigns justice to human beings. *(Edition p. 107.)*

I.1.12b The hymn invokes God's common law. *(Edition p. 41.)*

I.47.7.3 Long habituation reinforces reverence for established laws. *(Edition p. 921.)*

In this edition. "Law" is retained without automatically turning cosmic order into legislation or every civil law into a direct divine command.

See also. Habit and disposition; Justice; Order; Reason and account.

Lawgiver

νομοθέτης, nomothetēs, lawgiver; legislator[296]

The word. Nomothetēs is one who establishes laws or rules. Its application can include the ordering of arts and practices as well as civic statutes.

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[295] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 25–26, 52, 303.

[296] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 406–407. The passage links earthly rites to heavenly mysteries through correspondence without detailing every rule or ceremony.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic narrative says that recipients of Hermes's instruction became introducers and lawgivers of human arts, sciences, and pursuits. Their authority arises from learning hidden divine ordinances. Lawgiving participates in a sacred account of cultural origins rather than an ordinary record of one city's legislation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.79 The teachers of human practices also act as their lawgivers. *(Edition p. 1315.)*

In this edition. "Lawgiver" preserves the active establishment of order; "legislator" may sound narrower than this cultural role.

See also. Art and craft; Knowledge; Law; Pursuit and practice; Sacred rite.

Learning

μάθησις, *mathēsis*, learning; acquisition of knowledge[297]

The word. Mathēsis is learning. The philosophical question concerns what occurs when a learner comes to know, not merely the organization of instruction.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo recalls the argument that learning is recollection and uses it to support the soul's existence before embodiment. Cebes and Simmias reaffirm their acceptance. The excerpt reports their commitment to an earlier argument; it does not reproduce all the steps needed to establish the recollection doctrine.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.13.1 Learning as recollection is invoked in support of the soul's prior existence. *(Edition p. 1037.)*

In this edition. "Learning" preserves the activity and remains distinct from memory, since their relation is what the argument examines.

See also. Embodiment; Knowledge; Memory; Recollection; Soul.

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[297] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 333–334. The printed verb means being placed in the body; the alternative wording about being bound is not silently substituted.

Length

μῆκος, mēkos, length[298]

The word. Mēkos is length, one of the dimensions used to characterize magnitude. Its definition can depend on relative size or on an assigned direction.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian report distinguishes length as a magnitude from things that possess it. The Stoic account adds two usages: the greatest extent of a body, or its extent from below upward. A reader must identify which convention governs a description before converting its dimensions into a familiar modern orientation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1c.1 Length is distinguished from the things possessing magnitude. *(Edition p. 355.)*

I.14.1l.1 Length can be the greatest extent or the upward extent. *(Edition p. 365.)*

In this edition. "Length" is stable, but its directional meaning should follow the passage rather than a drawing imposed on it.

See also. Breadth; Depth; Extended; Height; Magnitude.

Letter and written character

γράμμα, gramma, letter; written character[299]

The word. Gramma is a written character or letter and, in broader uses, something written. The smallest written unit can become important in arguments about names.

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[298] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 141, 143–144. The alternative dimensional definitions are explicitly acknowledged by the source.

[299] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 292. The Orphic explanation is reported within the dialogue's discussion of names and should retain that attribution and setting.

In Stobaeus. The Cratylus excerpt connects the name of the body with its keeping or preserving the soul, and stresses that the explanation requires no change of a letter. The claim concerns the closeness of the proposed verbal connection. It is part of an ancient etymological interpretation, not proof of the historical origin of the word.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.9.2 An explanation of sōma emphasizes that no letter need be altered. *(Edition p. 879.)*

In this edition. "Letter" is appropriate for the individual character; "writing" would lose the point of the wordplay.

See also. Body; Interpretation; Name; Preservation and salvation; Soul.

Life

ζωή, zōē, life; living activity[300]

The word. Zōē denotes life. Its scope depends on what is said to live: the activity of an embodied creature, intellectual life, and the life attributed to an incorporeal substance need not have the same conditions.

In Stobaeus. A Hermetic account distinguishes growth in the womb from animal movement and the life of thought; soul subsequently sets breath in living motion. Porphyry makes a more radical distinction: for a substance whose very being is life, death must itself be a kind of life rather than the complete removal of life. The latter claim concerns the substance under discussion, not the continuing bodily functions of a dead animal.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.7.4 Growth is prepared as a receptacle for the life of thought. *(Edition p. 871.)*

I.41.7.5 Soul sets breath into living movement. *(Edition p. 871.)*

I.49.22 Porphyry distinguishes death from the complete absence of life. *(Edition p. 1083.)*

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[300] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 290, 345.

In this edition. "Life" is retained across these contexts, but the accompanying account determines its meaning. "Living" does not automatically mean bodily animation.

See also. Death; Immortality; Living creature; Soul.

Light

φῶς, phōs, light; illumination[301]

The word. Phōs is luminous light. It differs from the adjective meaning light in weight, even though English uses the same spelling for both.

In Stobaeus. Aristarchus' reported definition makes color light falling upon objects. The Stoic notice on weight uses "light" first for bodies tending away from the center and then, with a different Greek word, for luminous light moving in straight or circular courses. The change of vocabulary matters: the final claim does not simply restate the classification of light elements.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.1.5 Aristarchus connects color with incident light. *(Edition p. 381.)*

I.14.1f.1 Luminous light is distinguished from lightness in weight. *(Edition p. 359.)*

In this edition. The English uses "light" naturally but the notes identify the change between phōs and kouphon. Readers comparing explanations of vision should keep illumination distinct from the perceived color.

See also. Color; Darkness; Sight; Weight.

[301] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 142, 149.

Lightness

κουφότης; κοῦφος, kouphotēs; kouphos, lightness; light; buoyant[302]

The word. Kouphotēs is lightness and kouphos means light, opposed to heavy. Figurative use can concern temperament as well as physical weight.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account links a predominance of warmth with a light, ardent person, and cold with heaviness and sluggishness. The contrast concerns temperament in relation to bodily mixture. In the locomotion classification, lightness instead helps explain upward movement of bodies.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.3.3 Lightness characterizes the warm temperament. *(Edition p. 987.)*

I.19.1.6 Lightness and weight distinguish directions of straight motion. *(Edition p. 433.)*

In this edition. "Light" must be read as a quality of weight or temperament, not illumination.

See also. Cold; Harmony; Heat; Locomotion; Weight.

Lightning and thunderbolt

ἀστραπή; κεραυνός; σκηπτός, astrapē; keraunos; skēptos, lightning; thunderbolt[303]

The word. Astrapē is lightning; keraunos is a thunderbolt. The distinction matters in classifications that assign different material conditions or degrees of force to related phenomena.

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[302] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 163, 321. The text says intelligence does not reach everyone, not that it reaches no one; its differentiated constitutions explain the qualification.

[303] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 232–233, 235.

In Stobaeus. Anaxagoras' report explains lightning by brilliance against a dark cloud and the bolt by the quantity and magnitude of light. Democritus describes the bolt through purer, finer, closely fitted fire-producing constituents forcing their way through. The vocabulary also appears in poetry, but the physical explanations here make precise local distinctions.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.29.1.4 Lightning and the bolt are distinguished within one sequence. *(Edition p. 667.)*

I.29.1.9 Friction and passage through rarefied spaces explain lightning. *(Edition p. 669.)*

I.29.1.10 A more uniform moving structure explains the bolt. *(Edition p. 669.)*

I.29.2.1 Striking the earth gives several phenomena the collective name skēptoi. *(Edition p. 679.)*

A collective name for striking phenomena. Skēptos names something striking or swooping down. At I.29.2.1 it covers several aerial phenomena when they strike the ground, including ones distinguished by their degree of fire. "Thunderstrike" would be too narrow if it implied that every member of this group was explicitly a fiery thunderbolt.

In this edition. The two nouns remain distinguishable. The terminology of fiery whirlwinds likewise follows each report instead of imposing a single classification on the chapter.

See also. Cloud; Darkness; Fiery whirlwind; Fire; Light; Thunder; Whirlwind and hurricane.

Limb

κῶλον, kōlon, limb; bodily member[304]

The word. Kōlon is a limb or bodily member. It overlaps with melos without requiring the two nouns to designate identical anatomical subdivisions everywhere.

In Stobaeus. In the Timaeus account, creatures plant their forelimbs and heads on earth as their bodily forms reflect an earthward inclination. Kōla here are supporting limbs, distinct from the feet subsequently counted and from the heads accompanying them.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.1.7 Forelimbs are placed on earth in the account of bodily transformation. *(Edition p. 911.)*

In this edition. "Limb" is natural; "forelimb" translates the additional qualifier, not the noun by itself.

See also. Body; Foot; Head; Limb and bodily member; Living creature.

Limb and bodily member

μέλος, melos, limb; bodily member[305]

The word. Melos can mean a bodily member as well as a musical phrase or song. The surrounding account determines which sense is active.

In Stobaeus. The description of sleep speaks of the relaxation of connected limbs while incoming matter is distributed into bodily structures. Bones, marrow, blood, sinews, veins, and eyes receive different elemental contributions in this ancient account. Sleep is therefore presented as involving internal bodily processes alongside outward relaxation.

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[304] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 300. The account associates bodily configuration with habitual psychic activity. Its causal framework remains the narrative's own.

[305] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 291–292. The elemental assignments belong to the source's physiology and are not descriptions of modern anatomy or metabolism.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.8.5 Relaxed limbs accompany the distribution of material through the sleeping body. *(Edition p. 877.)*

In this edition. "Limb" is natural for the bodily context; avoid the unrelated musical rendering.

See also. Blood; Body; Bone; Element; Sleep.

Limit

πέρας, peras, limit; boundary[306]

The word. Peras denotes limit or boundary. It can serve as a principle of determination or as the boundary of a numerical process.

In Stobaeus. The brief notice on Philolaus names limit and the unlimited as principles without preserving a further exposition. Moderatus describes the monad as the point at which subtraction of whole units must stop. The arithmetic contrast between odd and even associates being bounded with a geometrical construction, but its wording is uncertain. These examples connect determination with number in different ways.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.8 Limit is paired with the unlimited. *(Edition p. 303.)*

Arith.8 The monad bounds the backward progression of quantity. *(Edition p. 27.)*

Arith.5b Being bounded enters an obscure geometrical comparison. *(Edition p. 21.)*

In this edition. "Limit" names the principle where appropriate; "boundary" can clarify a terminal condition. A brief heading or notice is not expanded into a lost proof.

See also. Dyad; Monad; Number; Quantity; Unlimited.

[306] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 19, 21, 124.

Limit and definition

ὅρος, horos, boundary; limit; definition[307]

The word. Horos can mark a boundary or delimit what something is in a definition. It must be distinguished from oros, mountain, which differs in accent and breathing.

In Stobaeus. The definition of motion attributed to Pythagoras is called a common horos of every motion. Here delimitation is conceptual: the formula states what counts as motion under the account. In geometrical discussions, related language can instead concern a figure's boundary or limit.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.1.1 A formula is presented as the common definition of motion. *(Edition p. 429.)*

I.48.6.6 Form is contrasted with the boundary of a body. *(Edition p. 969.)*

In this edition. "Definition" suits an explanatory formula; "boundary" suits spatial delimitation. Do not use one rendering indiscriminately.

See also. Common; Determination and delimitation; Limit; Mountain; Shape.

Line

γραμμή, grammē, line[308]

The word. Grammē is a line, treated in geometrical discussions as distinct from a surface and a solid body. Its divisibility is a philosophical question as well as a mathematical one.

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[307] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 162, 316. Accent-insensitive searches confuse ὅρος and ὄρος; the distinction is retained in the Greek index.

[308] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 142. The compressed final clause leaves the corresponding constituents of lines and surfaces implicit.

In Stobaeus. The report on Chrysippus says that lines, like bodies and other continua, are divisible without limit. It also denies that endless divisibility requires an already completed collection of infinitely many constituents. The line is a useful example because the argument can address division without relying on the physical thickness of a drawn mark.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1e Unlimited divisibility is distinguished from composition out of an actual infinite collection. *(Edition p. 357.)*

In this edition. Retain "line" in the geometrical list; a drawn stroke is not the definition being asserted.

See also. Continuity; Division; Solid; Surface; Unlimited.

Liver

ἧπαρ, hēpar, liver[309]

The word. Hēpar is the liver, a bodily organ that can also serve as a location for psychic activities in philosophical physiology.

In Stobaeus. The inquiry into soul's unity lists head, chest, and liver as bodily sites through which different activities occur. It insists that soul itself does not possess these organs. Bodily distribution explains why division is attributed to soul without requiring soul in itself to have quantitative parts.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.25a.9 The liver helps illustrate the bodily distribution of psychic activities. *(Edition p. 1109.)*

In this edition. "Liver" is precise; keep an activity occurring through an organ distinct from soul being that organ.

See also. Activity; Body; Head; Part and whole; Soul.

[309] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 353. The words immediately before liver are corrupt, but the anatomical item and the general contrast remain recoverable.

Living creature

ζῷον, zōion, living creature; animal[310]

The word. Zōion can denote a living creature broadly or an animal more narrowly. English must preserve the class intended by the particular report.

In Stobaeus. One notice divides living creatures into terrestrial, aquatic, winged, and heavenly kinds, including the stars. Another assigns Plato and Thales the view that plants are ensouled living creatures. The following notice gives Aristotle a narrower classification: plants have soul but are not animals, since animals have impulse and perception. These are differences of classification, not a contradiction to be removed by translating every occurrence identically.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.43.1 Heavenly creatures are included in a fourfold classification. *(Edition p. 897.)*

I.45.1 Plants count as ensouled living creatures. *(Edition p. 901.)*

I.45.2 Animals are distinguished by impulse and perception. *(Edition p. 901.)*

In this edition. "Living creature" keeps the broader range visible; "animal" is used where the passage expressly contrasts animals with plants.

See also. Human being; Impulse; Life; Perception; Plant; Star.

[310] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 297–298. The closing clause about the cosmos in I.43.1 is textually damaged; it should not carry an unqualified doctrinal conclusion.

Locomotion

φορά, phora, locomotion; movement from place to place[311]

The word. Phora is movement in respect of place. In a classification of changes, it has a narrower scope than kinēsis, which can include changes of quality and quantity.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian report distinguishes increase and decrease in quantity, alteration in quality, and locomotion in place. Its account of motion as the actuality of what is potentially movable belongs to the same discussion. Translating all these terms simply as "movement" would conceal the distinctions that organize the report.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.1.5 Locomotion is distinguished from quantitative and qualitative change. *(Edition p. 433.)*

I.19.1.6 Circular and straight movements further divide locomotion. *(Edition p. 433.)*

In this edition. "Locomotion" identifies the technical category; "movement" remains appropriate where no contrast among categories is at issue.

See also. Change and alteration; Circular motion; Growth; Motion; Place and space.

Lot

κλῆρος, klēros, lot; allotted share[312]

The word. Klēros is a lot or allotted share. Depending on context it can name an instrument of allocation or the portion received.

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[311] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 162–163. The report summarizes Aristotelian classifications; its formulation should not be treated as a continuous verbatim quotation from a single passage of Aristotle.

[312] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 79. The name-based explanation is part of the ancient argument; the name itself does not independently prove the doctrine of fate.

In Stobaeus. The interpretation of the Fates connects Lachesis with the lot assigned to each according to justice. The emphasis is on the distributed share and its ordering, not necessarily a random draw. The etymological explanation gives the divine name a doctrinal role.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.5.15d The lot received by each explains the name Lachesis. *(Edition p. 179.)*

In this edition. "Lot" preserves the traditional expression; "allotted share" prevents an automatic inference of randomness.

See also. Allotment; Assigned portion; Fate; Justice; Number.

Love

ἔρως, erōs, love; Love[313]

The word. Erōs denotes love or desire and also the personified Love. The anthology preserves arguments about his status as well as descriptions of the lover's experience.

In Stobaeus. In the Phaedrus excerpt, love is associated with the divine inspiration awakened by beauty, pictured as the growth of wings. In the Symposium dialogue, Diotima reasons that Love's lack of good and beautiful things prevents his being a god; he is a great daimōn between mortal and immortal. The explanation of desire and the classification of the intermediary belong to that particular argument.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.10 The lover's inspiration is explained through beauty and recollection. *(Edition p. 277.)*

I.9.17.1 Love's intermediate status follows from desire and lack. *(Edition p. 285.)*

[313] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 114, 117–118.

In this edition. Capital "Love" marks the personified subject. The Empedoclean power also rendered "Love" uses related but different Greek vocabulary, treated under Friendship and cosmic attraction.

See also. Beauty; Desire; Divine spirit; Friendship and cosmic attraction; Good; Recollection.

Luminous flare

σέλας, selas, luminous flare; blaze; gleam[314]

The word. Selas is a blaze or luminous appearance. In an account of phenomena aloft, it names an appearance of light rather than a metaphysical process of emanation.

In Stobaeus. The account of fiery appearances in the air distinguishes movement and extension: a rapidly moving ignition makes a streak, whereas a more stationary extended appearance can take a comet-like form. The visible configuration and duration help distinguish these phenomena.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.46 Ignition, motion, and extension explain different luminous appearances. *(Edition p. 795.)*

In this edition. "Luminous flare" or "blaze" is preferable here to "emanating light," which would suggest a different philosophical question.

See also. Comet; Exhalation; Fire; Light; Shooting star.

[314] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 266. These ancient appearance-based classes do not map automatically onto present-day astronomical categories. The report's explanation is presented in its own physical terms.

Lung

πνεύμων, pneumōn, lung[315]

The word. Pneumōn is the lung. Its assigned functions in ancient physiology need not coincide with those in modern anatomy.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus excerpt describes drink as passing through the lung toward the kidneys and bladder within its account of the reproductive outlet. The claim is part of the dialogue's physiological narrative. A faithful translation preserves this unusual route rather than silently replacing it with the digestive tract.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.1.3 The lung appears in the described course of drink through the body. *(Edition p. 907.)*

In this edition. "Lung" is the lexical meaning even where the assigned function is unfamiliar.

See also. Bladder; Body; Breathing; Kidney; Seed.

Lyre

λύρα, lura, lyre[316]

The word. Lyra is the lyre, a stringed musical instrument. Philosophical comparisons can use its material construction and tuning to examine relations between soul and body.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo argument observes that the lyre and its strings exist before their harmony, whereas harmony depends on their being appropriately arranged. This becomes an objection to identifying soul with harmony while also accepting that soul existed before the body. The example tests the consistency of two commitments.

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[315] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 298–299. The surrounding syntax linking marrow, breath, and desire is difficult; the anatomical route itself remains explicit in the printed text.

[316] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 334. The argument is directed against the soul-as-harmony proposal; it does not reject every analogy between psychic order and music.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.13.3 The instrument's priority to its harmony challenges a proposed account of soul. *(Edition p. 1039.)*

In this edition. "Lyre" names the instrument precisely; a generic "music" would remove the material example.

See also. Body; Harmony; Hypothesis; Soul; String.

Madness

μανία, mania, madness; inspired departure from ordinary reason[317]

The word. Mania is madness, with its source and value requiring contextual distinction. It is not a single modern diagnostic category.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedrus passage defends a particular madness sent by gods through love, arguing that it benefits lover and beloved. The next distinction separates divine inspiration from states associated with illness. The positive claim therefore does not praise every disordered condition indiscriminately.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.8 Divinely sent loving madness is defended as beneficial. *(Edition p. 275.)*

In this edition. "Madness" preserves the startling ancient contrast, with its divine qualification made explicit.

See also. Advantage; Disease; Divine inspiration; Love; Rational and irrational.

[317] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 113. The speaker promises an argument for the benefit; the opening assertion alone is not the whole demonstration.

Magic

μαγεία, mageia, magic; magical art[318]

The word. Mageia names magic or magical practice. The term's relation to knowledge and ritual depends on the account in which it appears.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic narrative groups magic with philosophy in nourishing the soul, while medicine attends to the body. It also connects the training of prophets with a broader preparation for their work. The passage gives magic an educational or therapeutic place without specifying a complete inventory of its practices.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.80 Magic and philosophy are associated with the soul's nourishment. *(Edition p. 1315.)*

In this edition. "Magic" retains the transmitted category; replacing it with "science" or "superstition" would impose an external evaluation.

See also. Divination; Incantation; Medicine; Philosophy; Soul.

Magnitude

μέγεθος, megethos, magnitude; size[319]

The word. Megethos is magnitude or size, distinguished from the number of things and from a thing's possession of magnitude.

In Stobaeus. Diodorus's smallest bodies are said to be infinite in number but bounded in magnitude. The qualifications prevent two different senses of infinity from being confused. The Aristotelian report separately lists length, breadth, and depth as magnitudes, then names the things that possess them.

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[318] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 407. The wording about comprehensive training is disturbed. The secure association of the named pursuits should be distinguished from uncertain details of that sentence.

[319] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 128, 141. Diodorus's bodies are also called partless; bounded magnitude does not by itself state their divisibility.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.16a.4 An infinite number of bodies can each have bounded size. *(Edition p. 311.)*

I.14.1c.1 Magnitudes are distinguished from the continua possessing magnitude. *(Edition p. 355.)*

In this edition. "Magnitude" suits the mathematical distinction; "size" often makes a statement about individual bodies clearer.

See also. Extended; Length; Quantity; Smallest; Unlimited.

Mainland

ἤπειρος, ēpeiros, mainland; continent[320]

The word. Ēpeiros is mainland or continental land, contrasted with sea or islands.

In Stobaeus. The optical example says that the mainland appears to move when observers sail. Its actual bodily presence is not denied; the motion is the appearance requiring explanation. The example prepares a distinction between substantial formations and appearances such as the rainbow.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.30.1.1 The apparently moving mainland illustrates dependence on the observer's situation. *(Edition p. 691.)*

I.40.1.12 Mainlands and islands are contrasted before the larger island model is proposed. *(Edition p. 771.)*

In this edition. "Mainland" suits the sailing example; "continent" suits the broader geographical division.

See also. Appearance in reflection; Island; Motion; Perception; Sea and tides.

[320] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 238–239, 258. The example does not say that the mainland itself lacks substance; it is the apparent motion that illustrates the distinction.

Making and poetry

ποίησις, poiēsis, making; poetic composition; poetry[321]

The word. Poiēsis is making or production and can specifically mean poetic composition. The narrower meaning is decisive in the selected passage.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry interprets the crossroads of Hades through the soul's threefold structure and declares the result to be truth and a natural account rather than myth or poetry. Here poetry names the kind of imaginative narrative from which the interpretation claims to move. The claim is Porphyry's own assessment of the explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.60.9 A psychological reading of the underworld is contrasted with myth and poetry. *(Edition p. 1475.)*

In this edition. "Poetry" fits this contrast. "Making" belongs to contexts in which production rather than poetic discourse is intended.

See also. Interpretation; Myth; Nature; Soul; Truth.

Male

ἄρρην; ἄρσην, arrēn; arsēn, male[322]

The word. Arrēn and arsēn are variant forms meaning male. Their application may be bodily, divine, or figurative.

In Stobaeus. The Orphic poem presents Zeus both as male and as an immortal bride within a single cosmic body. The pairing expresses comprehensiveness and generative powers in the poem's theology. It should not be reduced to an ordinary description of one human body or treated as a universal rule of Greek divine language.

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[321] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 447. The passage's claim to disclose a natural account should not be mistaken for independent verification of its allegorical interpretation.

[322] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 29–30, 419. The attribution identifies an Orphic poem; it does not establish a historical author named Orpheus.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.23a Male and bridal descriptions are combined in the cosmic Zeus. *(Edition p. 51.)*

I.49.50.6 Male imagery receives a particular interpretation in the underworld commentary. *(Edition p. 1365.)*

In this edition. "Male" preserves the adjective without substituting man or husband.

See also. Body; Coming into being and passing away; Female; God; World.

Marrow

μυελός, myelos, marrow[323]

The word. Myelos names marrow. Its ancient explanatory range in these passages connects bodily formation, reproduction, and the distribution of nourishment.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus excerpt describes a continuous formation from the head down the neck and spine and recalls its earlier designation as seed. In a Hermetic explanation of sleep, incoming matter is distributed into bodily constituents: the earthy portion becomes bones and marrow. One account concerns a reproductive pathway; the other describes the restorative work of sleep.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.1.3 Marrow, seed, and generation are connected. *(Edition p. 907.)*

I.41.8.5 Earthy matter becomes bones and marrow during sleep's activity. *(Edition p. 877.)*

In this edition. "Marrow" preserves the source's category. The description should be read with the passage's own anatomy and elemental scheme.

See also. Body; Earth; Nutrition; Seed; Sleep.

[323] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 291–292, 298–299.

Master

δεσπότης, despotēs, master; lord[324]

The word. Despotēs is a master or lord, naming authority over dependents or a domain. Its force need not be identical with the modern political term despot.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic narrative calls the god master of the cosmos when he commands the human race to come into being. Hermes then seeks direction about the material to use. Mastery distinguishes the commanding source from the subordinate work described in the creation narrative.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.33 The cosmic master commands the making of human beings. *(Edition p. 1271.)*

In this edition. "Master" retains authority without automatically implying abusive rule.

See also. Creator and poet; Demiurge and craftsman; God; Ruler; World.

Material and in matter

ἔνυλος, enulos, material; in matter[325]

The word. Enylos means in matter or material. It characterizes a thing's relation to matter, not simply its importance or practical relevance.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry lists the sensible and material as dispersed, changeable, composite, located, and extended. These predicates contrast with an intelligible mode of being considered in the continuation. The adjective belongs to a structured distinction between kinds of reality rather than a casual synonym for visible.

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[324] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 394. The deliberate excess of water in the subsequent bodily mixture explains weakness within the narrative's own physiology.

[325] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 281. The supplied negative in the claim about not existing independently is essential to the contrast.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.3.1 The material is characterized by composition, change, place, and extension. *(Edition p. 841.)*

In this edition. "Material" is natural; "in matter" can clarify the literal relation when contrasting forms.

See also. Body; Immaterial; Intelligible; Matter; Perceptible.

Matter

ὕλη; χρυσός; ἄργυρος; ἀργύρεος; χαλκός; χάλκεος; σίδηρος, hulē; chrusos; arguros; argureos; chalkos; chalkeos; sidēros, matter; material; fuel[326]

The word. Hylē concerns material, and in philosophical definitions what underlies change. The ordinary material sense remains audible even where the word has a technical role.

In Stobaeus. The opening definition in chapter 11 calls matter the underlying subject of generation, destruction, and other changes. A report of Aristotle pairs matter with form. The argument that stars are not fire uses the same noun concretely: fire cannot persist apart from its fuel.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.11.1 Matter is defined by its underlying role in change. *(Edition p. 321.)*

I.12.1b.1 Matter and form are presented as principles. *(Edition p. 335.)*

I.25.4.2 Fire cannot be separated from its fuel. *(Edition p. 595.)*

I.11.4.2 Body requires the conjunction of matter and form. *(Edition p. 327.)*

I.11.5a.2 Primary matter persists while its parts divide and blend. *(Edition p. 329.)*

I.1.39d Gold and lead illustrate the contrast between purity and admixture. *(Edition p. 101.)*

I.3.56e Silver is among the materials denied of a remarkable statue. *(Edition p. 149.)*

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[326] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 49–50, 68–69, 100, 130, 132–135, 212.

I.8.38.1 Iron evokes an agricultural implement in a poem about civilization. *(Edition p. 237.)*

Images and comparisons. The bronze of the statue at I.12.1b.2 supplies a familiar material that can receive a form. The example illustrates a relation, rather than proving that every account of matter must mean a finished physical substance.

Constitution and persistence. The Aristotelian report says matter considered without form is not itself a constituted body, although it is corporeal as the subject of bodily qualities. The conjunction of matter and form is required for body. The Chrysippean account instead emphasizes primary matter's persistence without increase or decrease while its parts divide and blend. These statements answer different questions about the underlying subject and the transformations of compounds.

Gold in a comparison of purity. Chrusos is gold. I.1.39d compares the staining of soul through bodily mixture with lead staining gold. The metals make a hierarchy of purity vivid within this author's argument. Their role as examples should not be confused with a claim that the soul is literally metallic or that all theories of embodiment regard it as pollution.

Silver as a material. Arguros is silver; the related adjective argureos means made of silver. I.3.56e uses the adjective while denying that an extraordinary statue is made of any familiar listed material. The passage supplies a material vocabulary, but deliberately withholds an identification of the statue's substance. Its marvelous claims remain those of the embedded report.

Bronze and copper. Chalkos can denote copper or bronze according to context; chalkeos describes something made of it. The statue report at I.3.56e uses the adjective among rejected material identifications. "Bronze" suits the artifact setting, but the bare word family does not by itself specify the proportions of an alloy.

Iron and its implements. Sidēros is iron and can also evoke an iron implement. In I.8.38.1, "laboring iron" stands for the tool tending a vineyard, within a poem about the emergence of civilized life. The material thus names an instrument through what it is made of; this is not an abstract assertion about matter's spontaneous activity.

In this edition. "Matter" suits the technical subject; "material" or "fuel" can preserve a concrete use. The initial definition does not settle all later questions about whether matter is itself a body.

See also. Art and craft; Body; Coming into being and passing away; Deed and work; Demiurge and craftsman; Dissolution; Form; Incorporeal; Instrument; Mixture and blending; Principle; Pure and unmixed; Quality; Quantity; Statue; Wording and expression.

Mean and mediation

μεσότης, mesotēs, mean; mediation; intermediate relation[327]

The word. Mesotēs is a mean or intermediate relation. In a mathematical account it can provide a bond between things that differ.

In Stobaeus. The survey of soul as harmony distinguishes bodily harmony from mathematical harmony. Moderatus emphasizes making differences commensurate, while the account attributed to Timaeus treats harmony as a mean and bond in substances, lives, and generation. The term here is relational and mathematical, not automatically the ethical doctrine of a mean between vices.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.32.8 Mathematical harmony mediates and binds different realities. *(Edition p. 1153.)*

In this edition. "Mean" preserves the mathematical vocabulary; "mediation" explains its connective function.

See also. Bond; Harmony; Middle; Ratio and proportion; Soul.

[327] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 364. The source's reference identifies Timaeus of Locri; it should not be treated without qualification as a direct reference to Plato's dialogue.

Measure

μέτρον, metron, measure; standard of measurement[328]

The word. Metron is a measure by which an amount or relation is determined. In philosophical contexts, a measure may be a principle of intelligibility as well as a physical unit.

In Stobaeus. The arithmetic fragment connects measure with first principles, though its opening gap leaves the precise subject uncertain. Posidonius's account calls time a measure of speed and slowness. The two settings show why identifying what is measured is essential: numerical intelligibility and temporal comparison are related uses, not identical claims.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.5a Measure appears among predicates in a fragmentary account of numerical principles. *(Edition p. 19.)*

I.8.42.2 Time is defined as a measure of speed and slowness. *(Edition p. 251.)*

In this edition. Use "measure" rather than "measurement" when the word names the standard or means of measuring.

See also. Limit; Number; Quantity; Ratio and proportion; Time.

Medicine

ἰατρική; ἰατρός, iatrikē; iatros, medicine; medical art[329]

The word. Iatrikē is the medical art, with technē often understood. It names an organized practice concerned with bodily care.

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[328] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 18–19, 105–106. In Arith.5a, the gap after "monads" obscures the following antecedent, and "intelligible things" is supplied by the editor.

[329] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 65, 407. The clause describing the prophets' complete formation is disturbed; the distinct naming of the three disciplines is nevertheless clear.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account places medicine beside philosophy and magic in the comprehensive training of prophets. Philosophy and magic nourish the soul, while medicine preserves the suffering body. Their coordinated place in the curriculum does not make the three disciplines interchangeable.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.80 Medicine preserves the body within a broader account of sacred training. *(Edition p. 1315.)*

I.3.55b.2 The physician's care illustrates protective government. *(Edition p. 141.)*

The physician as guardian. Iatros is a physician. In I.3.55b.2, physicians protecting bodies from diseases furnish one comparison for divine rulers, beside pilots, commanders, farmers, and herdsmen. The analogy highlights watchfulness and skilled care. It does not imply that the divine agents literally practice the same treatments as human doctors.

In this edition. "Medicine" is clear; "medical art" makes the relation to skilled practice explicit.

See also. Art and craft; Body; Disease; God; Health; Philosophy; Providence.

Memory

μνήμη, mnēmē, memory[330]

The word. Mnēmē is memory: the retention that makes a past experience available. The excerpts distinguish it from both the original sensation and the later act of recollection.

[330] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 309–310, 482.

In Stobaeus. The Philebus extract derives a kind of pleasure belonging to soul from memory, then turns back to sensation to explain how memory becomes possible. It carefully denies that an unnoticed bodily disturbance has been forgotten: forgetting presupposes a memory that once existed. The Phaedo's account of an earlier physical inquiry places memory between sensory experience and more settled belief or knowledge.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.14.1 Memory is needed to explain a pleasure of soul. *(Edition p. 943.)*

I.47.14.3 Absence of sensation is distinguished from forgetting. *(Edition p. 945.)*

I.51.6 Memory belongs to a proposed sequence leading toward knowledge. *(Edition p. 1625.)*

In this edition. "Memory" is kept distinct from "recollection." Failure to notice is not translated as the loss of something remembered.

See also. Belief and opinion; Knowledge; Perception; Pleasure; Recollection.

Mental recognition

ἐπίγνωσις, epignōsis, recognition; knowledge; coming to know[331]

The word. Epignōsis is recognition or knowledge of something. It need not designate a separately defined faculty in every occurrence.

In Stobaeus. Horus asks Isis for knowledge of a hymn so that he will not remain ignorant. The word here concerns learning the requested sacred content. Stobaeus's excerpt ends after Isis tells him to attend, leaving the hymn itself unquoted.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.82 Horus requests knowledge of a hymn that the surviving excerpt does not provide. *(Edition p. 1317.)*

[331] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 407. The absence of the hymn is a boundary of the excerpt, not evidence that an English translation of it was omitted from the volume.

In this edition. "Knowledge" is most natural here; "recognition" suits contexts of identifying something already encountered.

See also. Education; Hymn; Ignorance; Knowledge; Learning.

Middle

μέσον, meson, middle; mean; central member[332]

The word. Meson is what lies between extremes or occupies the middle. Arithmetic and spatial uses need to be distinguished.

In Stobaeus. The arithmetic comparison favors odd number because it has beginning, end, and a middle, whereas even number lacks a central member in that arrangement. This is not the claim that even quantities cannot have a midpoint. The argument relies on the organization of units, then moves into a more obscure geometrical comparison.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.5b A central unit distinguishes odd from even number in an argument about completeness. *(Edition p. 21.)*

In this edition. "Middle" is safest here; "mean" would suggest a specific proportional relation not established by this clause.

See also. Center; Odd and even; Perfection and completeness; Ratio and proportion.

Milk

γάλα, gala, milk[333]

The word. Gala is milk. In philosophical examples its visible properties can illustrate a relation between substance and quality.

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[332] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 19. The geometrical continuation is difficult and does not supply a fully recoverable diagram.

[333] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 134–135. The contrast is supplied by the ancient reporter and follows an editorially repaired sentence; it is not an identified direct quotation from Aristotle.

In Stobaeus. The report of Aristotle's terminology contrasts whiteness on a painted surface with whiteness belonging throughout milk. Milk thus illustrates a determination extending through the thing, as opposed to a superficial appearance. The example helps explain the report's distinction between form and shape.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.1b.1 Milk's whiteness illustrates a determination extending through a substance. *(Edition p. 335.)*

In this edition. "Milk" is direct; the example's point is the extent of the quality, not milk's nutritive function.

See also. Being and substance; Form; Quality; Shape; White.

Milky Way

γαλαξίας, galaxias, Milky Way; milky circle[334]

The word. Galaxias is the milky band or circle, named in the opening description through its white appearance. The chapter preserves alternatives concerning what produces that appearance.

In Stobaeus. One account makes it a fiery track; another explains it through reflection. The notice with the supplied name Democritus attributes it to the combined radiance of closely gathered stars, whereas Aristotle's report makes it an ignition of continuous dry exhalation. These accounts place the visible band within very different physical explanations.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.27.1 The opening description explains the milky name. *(Edition p. 643.)*

I.27.6 The band is the combined radiance of stars. *(Edition p. 645.)*

I.27.7.1 Dry exhalation supplies an alternative account. *(Edition p. 647.)*

[334] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 225–226.

In this edition. "Milky Way" names the observed band without endorsing every ancient theory offered for it. The supplemented attribution to Democritus remains qualified.

See also. Color; Exhalation; Heaven; Reflection; Star.

Mine and mineral working

μέταλλον, metallon, mine; mineral working[335]

The word. Metallon means a mine or mineral working in the selected passage. Its resemblance to the modern word metal must not determine the translation.

In Stobaeus. The account describes cold water at depth, including water in mines, because it is removed from the sun. It immediately adds an exception for places heated from within the earth. The mine supplies an example of depth, not a universal guarantee of coldness.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.39.1.4 Water in mines illustrates the effect of depth, qualified by underground heat. *(Edition p. 759.)*

In this edition. "Mine" preserves the setting; translating the plural as metals would change the argument.

See also. Cold; Earth; Heat; Stone; Water.

Mirror

κάτοπτρον, katoptron, mirror; reflection in a mirror[336]

The word. Katoptron is a mirror; related forms describe seeing by reflection. The distinction between an object and its reflected appearance matters in the optical explanations.

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[335] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 254. The parenthesis requires removal from both aerial and terrestrial heat, making the qualification integral to the explanation.

[336] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 209–210, 241–242. The eclipse passage contains the adverb katoptrikōs rather than an explicit noun naming a mirror. Its final construction is uncertain.

In Stobaeus. The account attributed to Thales describes an eclipse observed by means of a mirror. Another passage compares a cloud producing a mock sun to a smooth bronze mirror. Reflection is a means of observation in the first case and part of the proposed explanation of an appearance in the second.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.25.3b The compressed account is interpreted as observing an eclipse by reflection. *(Edition p. 587.)*

I.30.2.8 A smooth bronze mirror illustrates the reflecting cloud. *(Edition p. 705.)*

In this edition. "Mirror" is direct for the noun; "by reflection" may suit the corresponding adverb.

See also. Appearance in reflection; Eclipse; Mock sun; Reflection; Smooth.

Mist

ὁμίχλη, homichlē, mist[337]

The word. Homichlē is mist. The source defines it by comparison with air and cloud rather than by a modern measurement of droplets.

In Stobaeus. Mist is described as vaporous exhalation thicker than air but thinner than cloud, arising at a cloud's formation or from its remnant. Its failure to produce water means that it does not yield falling rain. Clear weather is then defined through the absence of cloud and mist.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.28 Mist occupies an intermediate state between air and cloud. *(Edition p. 783.)*

[337] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 262. The comparison concerns degrees of thickening in the ancient account, not a denial that mist contains moisture.

In this edition. "Mist" is direct; explain that "produces no water" concerns rain in this definition.

See also. Air; Cloud; Exhalation; Rain and precipitation; Thin and subtle.

Mixture and blending

μίξις; κρᾶσις, mixis; krasis, mixture; blending[338]

The word. The two nouns concern combination, but some accounts distinguish their processes or results more narrowly than ordinary English does. Their relation should be read from the definition being reported.

In Stobaeus. At the start of chapter 17, Thales and his followers are credited with defining blends as mixtures of elements through alteration. In the account of pleasure and pain attributed to Empedocles, differences in composition and elemental blending help explain why things are alien to one another.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.17.1.1 Blends are mixtures through alteration in the report assigned to Thales and his followers. *(Edition p. 391.)*

I.50.31 Differences in elemental blending enter the explanation of pain and opposition. *(Edition p. 1603.)*

In this edition. "Mixture" normally renders mixis and "blending" krasis. This distinction keeps both words visible while leaving each ancient account to define how closely they coincide.

See also. Affection; Body; Element; Matter.

[338] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 152, 477. The note at I.17.1.1 directs readers onward to the narrower distinctions in excerpt 4. The opening report alone should not be treated as a definition binding on the whole chapter.

Mock sun

παρήλιος, parēlios, mock sun; parhelion[339]

The word. Parēlios is a mock sun, a luminous appearance resembling the sun beside it.

In Stobaeus. The report attributed to Aristotle groups mock suns with halos, rainbows, and rods as appearances produced through reflection under differing conditions. The more detailed explanation compares the cloud to a smooth mirror and stresses resemblance in color and shape. The appearance is distinguished from another independently existing sun.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.30.2.1 Mock suns belong to a class of phenomena explained through reflection. *(Edition p. 699.)*

I.30.2.8 A reflecting cloud produces an appearance like the sun. *(Edition p. 705.)*

In this edition. "Mock sun" is accessible; "parhelion" is the technical equivalent, without endorsing the ancient mechanism.

See also. Appearance in reflection; Mirror; Rainbow and halo; Reflection; Sun.

Moisture

ὑγρόν, hygron, moist; the moist; moisture[340]

The word. Hygron identifies the moist, fluid, or wet character of things. It can describe a quality shared by different substances, so its scope is wider than the noun "water."

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[339] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 240–242. The report describes reflection of sight. It should not be silently rewritten as a modern optical explanation using ice crystals.

[340] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 122, 128.

In Stobaeus. The Thales notice joins moist generative fluid, plant nourishment, and exhalations in an argument for water as the principle. The account of Aristotle distinguishes the moist as a power from the bodies possessing that power. Moisture can thus supply evidence for a theory or a term within a classification.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.1 Moisture connects generation, nourishment, and heavenly fire. *(Edition p. 297.)*

I.10.16a.3 The moist is a power rather than an additional elemental body. *(Edition p. 311.)*

In this edition. "Moisture" and "the moist" preserve the shared quality. "Water" is used when the Greek itself names hydōr.

See also. Dryness; Nutrition; Seed; Water.

Monad

μονάς, monas, monad; unit[341]

The word. Monas is a unit and, in numerical theory, a principle of number. "Monad" preserves the technical noun where the argument distinguishes it from the One or from the multitude made from units.

In Stobaeus. The arithmetic extracts call the monad the beginning of number. Another report expressly distinguishes the monad, as beginning of numbers, from the One, as beginning of numbered things. In a comparison about intellect, the same noun functions as a unit without parts.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.2b The monad is a generative principle and beginning of numbers. *(Edition p. 15.)*

Arith.9 Monad and One are distinguished in a particular numerical report. *(Edition p. 27.)*

I.48.6.6 Intellect is compared with a unit and a point. *(Edition p. 969.)*

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[341] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 16, 18–19, 21, 316. Arith.9 calls the One in that report bodily and divisible without limit. The lexicon keeps this local doctrine distinct from other accounts of unity.

Arith.5a Monads compose number in the fragmentary account. *(Edition p. 19.)*

The monad as unit. "Unit" often makes the counting function of monas clearer than leaving "monad" unexplained. Arith.5a says that number is composed of monads, then moves into a fragmentary account of a principle. "Units" suits the first statement, but does not resolve the gap or establish that every predicate later in the fragment applies directly to ordinary counted units.

In this edition. "Monad" is used when the numerical principle is prominent; "unit" can serve a direct comparison. Neither is automatically synonymous with every occurrence of "the One."

See also. Intellect; Number; One; Principle.

Month

μήν, mēn, month[342]

The word. Mēn is a month. In astronomical contexts its definition depends on the lunar appearances or positions chosen as boundaries.

In Stobaeus. The report on celestial periods gives the moon thirty days and calls the complete month the interval from appearance to conjunction. This is the account's stated reckoning. It should remain distinct from the longer circuits assigned to the other heavenly bodies and from modern precise measurements.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.42c.1 The lunar period is stated as thirty days from appearance to conjunction. *(Edition p. 255.)*

In this edition. "Month" preserves the familiar unit, while a note should retain the report's particular boundary terms.

See also. Conjunction; Cycle and period; Moon; Phase and appearance; Year.

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[342] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 107. The wording "from appearance to conjunction" is retained as transmitted rather than silently converted into another definition of a lunar month.

Moon

σελήνη, selēnē, moon[343]

The word. Selēnē is the moon. Descriptions of its material body, visible illuminated portion, and changing phase are related but do not answer the same question.

In Stobaeus. The report on Anaxagoras and Democritus gives the moon a solid surface with plains, mountains, and ravines while also calling it incandescent. Posidonius and most Stoics are assigned a spherical mixture of fire and air that presents changing phases. Chrysippus' account explicitly distinguishes the visible portion from the moon considered as a whole.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.26.1e.1 The moon is described as a solid body with varied terrain.
(Edition p. 615.)

I.26.1k Spherical shape is distinguished from changing appearance.
(Edition p. 619.)

I.26.1l.2 The visible moon is defined through the portion appearing to us.
(Edition p. 619.)

In this edition. "Moon" translates selēnē; the related vocabulary of month and visible moon is explained where the source itself distinguishes it.

See also. Eclipse; Light; Sea and tides; Shape; Sun.

Mortal

θνητός, thnētos, mortal; subject to death[344]

The word. Thnētos marks liability to death and can also designate a mortal being. It does not simply mean bodily, since several excerpts recognize immortal bodies.

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[343] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 218–220.

[344] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 117–118, 291. The Symposium excerpt reports Diotima's teaching within Socrates's narration; it differs from other speeches about Love in the anthology.

In Stobaeus. In Diotima's discussion of Love, rejecting his divinity does not make him an ordinary mortal. He belongs between mortal and immortal as a great daimōn. The distinction establishes an intermediate order and prevents the contrast from becoming an exhaustive division into only two classes.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.17.1 Love occupies an intermediate position between gods and mortals. *(Edition p. 285.)*

I.41.8.2 Mortal bodies are made under conditions different from those of everlasting bodies. *(Edition p. 873.)*

In this edition. Use "mortal" for the adjective and, where grammar requires, "a mortal" for the being described. Do not substitute "human" automatically.

See also. Body; Death; Divine spirit; Immortality; Love.

Mother

μήτηρ, mētēr, mother[345]

The word. Mētēr is mother. Its metaphorical application can designate a sustaining or generative source.

In Stobaeus. The cosmological description calls life-bearing earth the mistress and mother of animals. Motherhood emphasizes earth's relation to living things within a model that places it motionless at the center. The image does not by itself make earth identical with every named mother goddess.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.2 Earth is called mother of the animals it bears. *(Edition p. 763.)*

In this edition. "Mother" retains the personifying image instead of flattening it into material alone.

See also. Earth; Father; Living creature; Nature; Nutrition.

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[345] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 255–256. The stationary central earth is part of this account's cosmology, which differs from other models preserved in the volume.

Motion

κίνησις, kinēsis, motion; movement[346]

The word. Kinēsis is broader than movement from one place to another. The collection includes changes of quantity and quality as well as locomotion, and discusses motion both bodily and psychically.

In Stobaeus. The account of Aristotle distinguishes increase and decrease, qualitative alteration, and change of place. It defines motion through the actuality of what is potentially movable. In a report on soul, continual motion and self-motion are presented as distinguishable descriptions.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.1.5 The kinds of motion include quantity, quality, and place. *(Edition p. 433.)*

I.49.1a.1 The soul is described as always moving or moving itself. *(Edition p. 977.)*

I.8.40e Zeno's account relates time to an interval of motion. *(Edition p. 247.)*

In this edition. "Motion" is used for the philosophical category; "movement" often suits a particular occurrence. "Locomotion" marks change of place where the Greek argument distinguishes it.

See also. Activity; Actuality; Place and space; Soul; Time.

Mountain

ὄρος, oros, mountain[347]

The word. Oros, mountain, must be distinguished from horos, boundary or definition, by its breathing and context.

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[346] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 104, 162–163, 318–319. The condition "insofar as it is movable" belongs to the definition at I.19.1.5. Omitting it would change the relation between the capacity and its exercise.

[347] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 67–68. The first-person introduction belongs to Porphyry, who introduces Bardisanes's words; it is not Stobaeus claiming personal observation.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry quotes Bardisanes's report of a natural cave in a very high mountain near the earth's center. The mountain locates a remarkable statue and a ritual test within the reported landscape. Its height and central position belong to that testimony rather than to a geographical measurement supplied by the compiler.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.56c A high mountain provides the setting for the cave and statue. *(Edition p. 147.)*

In this edition. "Mountain" is direct; transliteration should preserve the difference between oros and horos.

See also. Cave; Earth; Limit and definition; Place and space; Statue.

Mouth

στόμα, stoma, mouth; opening[348]

The word. Stoma is the mouth and can more broadly mean an opening. Anatomical and geographical uses share that image without becoming identical.

In Stobaeus. The breathing account joins mouth and nostrils as one route, contrasting it with passage through the body's surface. Heated and cooled air move through the alternating circuit. Here stoma is the bodily mouth, not a separately named respiratory organ or a metaphor for speech.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.60.1.7 Mouth and nostrils form one of two routes in the breathing account. *(Edition p. 1705.)*

In this edition. "Mouth" preserves the anatomical sense; "opening" suits non-anatomical extensions.

See also. Air; Body; Breathing; Heat; Nose and nostril.

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[348] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 500. The Greek dual organizes two routes, not merely two individual holes. The translation makes understood subjects explicit.

Multiplicity

πλῆθος, plēthos, multitude; multiplicity; the many[349]

The word. Plēthos denotes a multitude or plurality. In mathematical and metaphysical discussion, the relation of the many to a unit or the One matters more than mere largeness.

In Stobaeus. Aristoxenus defines number as a multitude composed of monads. Moderatus describes its progression from a monad and its return toward one through subtraction. The argument about intelligibles connects their plurality with plurality in intellect and therefore places the One before intellect. A numbered collection and a plurality within intellectual reality are different applications of the relation between one and many.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.6 A multitude of monads constitutes number. *(Edition p. 23.)*

Arith.8 Plurality increases from and returns toward the monad. *(Edition p. 27.)*

I.48.5.8 The many intelligibles bear on the priority of the One. *(Edition p. 963.)*

In this edition. "Multitude" follows the counting context; "multiplicity" or "the many" clarifies the philosophical contrast. Priority is not automatically a temporal sequence.

See also. Intellect; Intelligible; Monad; Number; One.

Music

μουσική, mousikē, music; musical art[350]

The word. Mousikē is the musical art and can have a broader cultural range where the context permits. The selected example concerns the ordering of sounds.

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[349] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 20–21, 314.

[350] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 270. High and low concern pitch, whereas long and short concern duration; treating all four as degrees of loudness would change the argument.

In Stobaeus. The account of nature's combination of opposites compares painting, music, and writing. Music joins high and low pitches and long and short durations into one harmony. The example presents contrast as a condition of ordered unity, with pitch and duration contributing different kinds of difference.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.58 Music combines contrasting pitches and durations into harmony. *(Edition p. 805.)*

In this edition. "Music" is sufficient here, provided pitch and duration remain distinct in the explanation.

See also. Art and craft; Concord; Contrary; Harmony; Musical fourth.

Musical fourth

συλλαβή, sullabē, fourth; musical fourth[351]

The word. Syllabē can mean a joining or gathering, and in musical usage names the interval of the fourth. Its ordinary grammatical meaning "syllable" does not fit the selected passage.

In Stobaeus. The numerical account assigns the fourth the ratio four to three, the fifth three to two, and the octave two to one. The fourth and fifth together make the octave by compounding their ratios. The terminology connects audible intervals with numerical relations.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.21.7d.3 The fourth is distinguished from the fifth and octave by its ratio. *(Edition p. 515.)*

In this edition. "Fourth" should replace a mechanically literal "syllable" in this musical account.

See also. Concord; Harmony; Music; Number; Ratio and proportion.

[351] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 189. Combining the intervals multiplies their ratios; it does not add four-thirds and three-halves as ordinary fractions.

Musical note

φθόγγος, phthongos, note; musical sound[352]

The word. Phthongos is a sound, particularly a musical note in this context. It denotes a sounding event rather than a written note symbol.

In Stobaeus. The art-and-nature comparison says that music combines high and low, long and short notes into harmony. Their differences concern both pitch and duration. A note's contribution is understood through its relation to other sounds in an ordered whole.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.58 Contrasting notes combine to make one harmony. *(Edition p. 805.)*

In this edition. "Note" suits music; "sound" is broader where no musical arrangement is intended.

See also. Concord; Harmony; High and sharp; Music; Sound.

Mysteries

μυστήρια, mustēria, mysteries; sacred secrets[353]

The word. Mystēria can designate mystery rites or sacred secrets. Figurative use may apply the language of restricted disclosure to nature.

In Stobaeus. Momus fears that the human creature will boldly inspect nature's beautiful mysteries through its inquisitive senses. Elsewhere heavenly mysteries provide the counterparts of earthly sacred rites. The first stresses concealed objects of inquiry; the second explicitly relates heavenly and earthly sacred order.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.52 Nature's mysteries are objects of potentially intrusive human inquiry. *(Edition p. 1289.)*

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[352] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 270. The passage distinguishes pitch from duration; the adjectives should not all be rendered as degrees of loudness.

[353] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 399–400, 406–407. The passages do not identify a particular mystery cult or provide enough detail to reconstruct its ceremonies.

I.49.44.79 Heavenly mysteries correspond to earthly rites. *(Edition p. 1315.)*

In this edition. "Mysteries" preserves both uses, with the immediate sense explained.

See also. Hidden; Initiation; Knowledge; Nature; Sacred rite.

Myth

μῦθος, muthos, myth; traditional story[354]

The word. Mythos is a narrative or story, whose explanatory standing depends on the speaker. It can convey an account indirectly through divine figures.

In Stobaeus. The account traditionally transmitted under Aristotle's name interprets the Fates through past, future, and present, treating myth as an indication of divine order. This interpretation gives the story philosophical work to do. It does not establish that every ancient account assigns the same temporal role to each Fate.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.5.22b The Fates are interpreted as expressing the ordering of time. *(Edition p. 191.)*

In this edition. "Myth" is appropriate without implying either straightforward history or mere nonsense.

See also. Fate; Interpretation; Making and poetry; Necessity; Time.

[354] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 83. This material belongs to the work conventionally known as On the Cosmos, transmitted under Aristotle's name; the attribution requires that qualification.

Name

ὄνομα, onoma, name[355]

The word. Onoma is a name by which a person or thing is designated. A shared name does not necessarily establish identity between its bearers.

In Stobaeus. The Platonist account applies divine names to the maker and discusses the cosmos as divine. Its use of naming must be read alongside its distinctions between the maker, the model, and the ordered product. The vocabulary can relate levels of reality without collapsing them into one object.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.28a Names of the maker occur within an account distinguishing maker and cosmos. *(Edition p. 57.)*

In this edition. "Name" is direct. Where a name is applied or transferred, make the act of designation clear.

See also. Appellation; Demiurge and craftsman; God; Interpretation; World.

Nature

φύσις, physis, nature[356]

The word. Physis can concern a thing's constitution or characteristic way of being and acting. It may also name a principle or power involved in natural life, rather than the totality of the outdoor world.

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[355] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 32. The excerpt's author is uncertain; associations with Porphyry or Iamblichus should not become an unqualified attribution.

[356] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 132, 271, 298, 308, 369. In I.49.34.3 the word is retained in both lists of powers. Its local reference to natural life-functions is explained without replacing the printed term with an unexpressed technical label.

In Stobaeus. The chapter on human nature gives the word a broad anthropological setting. In the discussion of the soul's powers, nature appears as a power among perception, desire, movement, and thought. The same English noun therefore requires different scales of attention.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.heading Human nature is the chapter's subject. *(Edition p. 905.)*

I.49.34.3 Nature appears among enumerated powers of the soul. *(Edition p. 1171.)*

I.40.1.63 The nature of the whole is praised through order and beauty. *(Edition p. 809.)*

I.11.4.1 Nature is considered as a principle of motion and rest. *(Edition p. 327.)*

I.47.13.1 The natural constitution is disrupted and restored. *(Edition p. 937.)*

Principle and natural condition. The report about Aristotle calls nature a principle of motion and rest and uses that definition when distinguishing matter from form. The Philebus excerpt speaks of the living creature's natural constitution being disrupted and restored, relating those changes to pain and pleasure. The first use identifies a principle of explanation; the second describes the condition to which a creature returns. Neither is merely a name for the outdoor environment.

In this edition. "Nature" remains the chief rendering. Notes clarify whether it denotes a constitution, a life-function, or the ordered whole; no single modern contrast between nature and culture governs all occurrences.

See also. Body; Life; Motion; Pain; Pleasure; Power and capacity; Principle; Rest; Soul; World.

Navel

ὀμφαλός, omphalos, navel; umbilical connection[357]

The word. Omphalos is the navel and can refer to the umbilical connection in embryological contexts.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus locates a third kind of soul between diaphragm and navel and attributes that kind to plants. The gestational report uses the word for the connection nourishing the embryo. The first provides a bodily boundary; the second describes a nutritive connection.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.42.1.3 The navel marks the lower boundary of a psychic region. *(Edition p. 885.)*

I.42.13.1 The umbilical connection supplies embryonic nourishment. *(Edition p. 895.)*

In this edition. "Navel" suits the boundary; "umbilical cord" clarifies the nourishing connection where context requires it.

See also. Chest and mind; Embryo; Nutrition; Plant; Womb.

Necessity

ἀνάγκη, anankē, necessity; constraint[358]

The word. Anankē ranges from constraint and unavoidable circumstance to the personified power Necessity. A claim that something happens necessarily must therefore be understood within its speaker's account of what constrains it.

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[357] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 294, 296. The plant passage grants perception and desire while denying opinion, reasoning, and intellect; it should not be replaced by a different later plant psychology.

[358] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 70, 82–83, 92. The adjective "divine" in I.4.heading is a supplement supplied by Wachsmuth from the parallel evidence. It is marked as supplied in the facing edition.

In Stobaeus. Chapter 4 links divine necessity with the accomplishment of God's will. Elsewhere necessity appears in a list alongside fate, choice, chance, and spontaneous occurrence. The collection can preserve such distinctions even when a different extract draws the divine names together.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.4.heading Divine necessity makes what accords with God's will inexorable. *(Edition p. 155.)*

I.7.9a Necessity is one of several reported explanations of events. *(Edition p. 219.)*

I.5.22a Necessity and other names are explained through their verbal associations. *(Edition p. 189.)*

In this edition. "Necessity" is usual in the technical or personified sense; "constraint" can express a local condition. The term is not silently replaced by "fate."

See also. Cause; Chance and fortune; Fate; Providence.

Neck

αὐχήν, auchēn, neck[359]

The word. Auchēn is the neck. In anatomical descriptions it can mark the route connecting head and trunk.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus account describes marrow extending from the head down the neck and through the spine, then connects it with the reproductive outlet. The neck locates one segment of that continuity. Its role is spatial within a theory identifying reproductive seed with marrow.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.1.3 The neck forms part of the described course of marrow. *(Edition p. 907.)*

[359] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 298–299. The identification of seed with marrow belongs to the dialogue's ancient account, not to modern reproductive anatomy.

In this edition. "Neck" is direct and should not be replaced with a more specific structure absent from the Greek.

See also. Body; Head; Marrow; Seed; Spine.

Need and utility

χρεία, chreia, need; requirement; utility[360]

The word. Chreia can mean need or use. A construction about having need of something emphasizes requirement rather than usefulness alone.

In Stobaeus. The gods ask the creator to consider what already exists and what future things will need. Need belongs to prospective ordering of the world: what is to come requires provision. The passage does not reduce every need to a felt desire of an individual.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.10 Future requirements are included in the request for cosmic ordering. *(Edition p. 1247.)*

In this edition. "Need" is clearest here; "utility" suits contexts about the use served by something.

See also. Cosmic administration; End; Providence; Useful; World.

Night

νύξ, nux, night[361]

The word. Nyx is night, opposed to day in the recurring order of the heavens.

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[360] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 388. A supplied article turns the expression later into later things in the adopted Greek.

[361] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 109–110. The argument concerns temporal predicates and generated divisions of time; it does not make night an independently existing substance.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus passage places nights with days, months, and years among the parts of time generated with heaven. Their temporal succession is then contrasted with everlasting being, to which the account assigns only "is." Night therefore participates in a larger distinction between measured becoming and unchanging reality.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.45.3 Nights and other temporal divisions arise together with the ordered heaven. *(Edition p. 263.)*

In this edition. "Night" is direct. Avoid treating its role here as simply a symbol of ignorance or evil.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Day; Eternity and lifetime; Heaven; Time.

Nobility of birth

εὐγένεια, eugeneia, noble birth; nobility of origin[362]

The word. Eugeneia is noble birth or excellence of origin. Its application can extend from human ancestry to a claim about the source of souls.

In Stobaeus. The newly embodied souls assert their noble origin and common craftsman while rebelling against the heavenly gods. Their claim explains their resentment of confinement and their instigation of human conflict. The narrative does not simply praise their appeal to origin as justified conduct.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.64 Souls invoke their common creator and noble origin in rebellion. *(Edition p. 1301.)*

In this edition. "Noble origin" suits the cosmic setting better than a narrowly hereditary social title.

See also. Demiurge and craftsman; Dishonor; Honor; Soul; War.

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[362] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 402–403. The relation between souls as instigators and humans as instruments is left as the narrative states it, despite its compression.

Nonbeing

τὸ μὴ ὄν, to mē on, nonbeing; what is not[363]

The word. To mē on is "what is not." Its philosophical significance depends on what kind of being is denied and on the contrast in which it appears.

In Stobaeus. A Hermetic summary says that everything existing moves and only what does not exist is motionless. Here nonbeing supplies the limiting contrast for a universal statement about motion. The aphorism should not be combined uncritically with other excerpts that affirm an unmoved intellect or an unmoved actuality of soul.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.1.7 Nonbeing contrasts with the assertion that all existing things move. *(Edition p. 821.)*

In this edition. "What does not exist" clarifies the immediate statement. "Nonbeing" is useful as a headword linking different discussions of negation and existence.

See also. Being and substance; Contrary; Immovable; Motion; Privation.

North wind

βορέας, boreas, north wind; Boreas[364]

The word. Boreas names a northern wind and can also serve as a personified name in poetry. Wind catalogues may distinguish it from other northerly winds.

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[363] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 274. The selected unit is a sequence of summary sayings; it does not offer a separate, fully developed theory of nonbeing.

[364] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 264. The catalogue contains inconsistent alternative names. They are preserved rather than silently redistributed into a corrected compass diagram.

In Stobaeus. The catalogue places Boreas beside Caecias and separately assigns Aparctias to the polar meridian. Thus "north wind" is a useful general rendering but does not reproduce every subdivision in this particular wind scheme. The distinction is necessary when following the list's spatial relations.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.37 Boreas is distinguished from the wind along the polar meridian. *(Edition p. 789.)*

In this edition. Retain "Boreas" in a detailed catalogue and explain its northern direction.

See also. Eastern winds; Pole; South wind; West wind; Wind.

Nose and nostril

ῥίς, rhis, nose; nostril[365]

The word. Rhis names the nose or, in the plural, the nostrils as bodily openings. The grammatical number and activity help determine the rendering.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus breathing account groups the nostrils with the mouth as one route in an alternating movement of air. The other route is through the bodily surface. The description concerns breathing and heat exchange, not primarily the nose's role in smell.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.60.1.7 The nostrils and mouth share one of the account's two routes. *(Edition p. 1705.)*

In this edition. "Nostrils" fits the plural openings; "nose" suits the organ more generally.

See also. Air; Breathing; Heat; Mouth; Smell.

[365] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 500. The text's shifting subjects are made explicit in English as heat and air, based on the preceding explanation.

Number

ἀριθμός, arithmos, number[366]

The word. Arithmos is number. The introductory extracts distinguish numbers from the things numbered and investigate the role of number in knowledge, proportion, and order.

In Stobaeus. The arithmetic material calls number a multitude composed of monads. Philolaus' fragment says that all known things have number, since nothing can be conceived or known without it. That wording is more specific than the different claim that all things simply are numbers.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.6 Number is a multitude of monads and numbers stand in ratios. *(Edition p. 23.)*

Arith.9 Numbers are distinguished from numbered things. *(Edition p. 27.)*

I.21.7b Philolaus connects having number with being knowable. *(Edition p. 511.)*

Arith.8 Numerical progression and subtraction terminate in a monad. *(Edition p. 27.)*

I.49.32.6 Different numerical descriptions of soul are distinguished. *(Edition p. 1151.)*

Images and comparisons. The dramatic account in Arith.1a makes number a discovery that orders a previously confused human life. Its civilizing role is expressed through the contrast between human order and a life likened to that of beasts.

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[366] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 20–21, 188, 364. I.21.7b is identified in the edition as Philolaus fragment 4. The lexicon follows the excerpt's wording "have number."

Units, principles, and explanation. Moderatus describes number through progression from a monad and diminution back toward one. The separate reports on monad and dyad distinguish their use as numerical principles from the bodily things that are numbered. Number also enters accounts of soul, but the survey lists several different meanings: simply number, self-moving number, and number related to encompassing rational principles. Calling something numerical therefore begins an interpretive question rather than resolving it.

In this edition. "Number" renders arithmos; "things that are numbered" renders arithmēta. Keeping the distinction visible avoids turning a claim about intelligibility or counting into an identity of things and numbers.

See also. Dyad; Harmony; Monad; Multiplicity; Odd and even; One; Principle; Ratio and proportion; Reason and account; Self motion.

Nurse of becoming

τιθήνη, *tithēnē*, nurse; nurturer[367]

The word. Tithēnē is a nurse. In cosmological description, the bodily image expresses a sustaining relationship to things that come to be.

In Stobaeus. The report on Plato groups the nurse with the mother and the impression-receiving medium as images of matter. Matter is described as lacking shape and quality in its own nature while receiving forms. The nurse image therefore concerns its role in generated things; it should not be treated as a literal person or as the model that determines their character.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.11.3.2 Matter is compared to a nurse, mother, and recipient of impressions. *(Edition p. 323.)*

[367] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 131. The passage is a report about Plato preceding a direct Timaeus quotation; its descriptive language should retain that source distinction.

In this edition. "Nurse" preserves the family of maternal images. "Nurse of becoming" identifies the article's topic without adding those words to every occurrence.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Impression-receiving medium; Matter; Mother; Receptacle.

Nutrition

τροφή, trophē, nourishment; nutrition; food[368]

The word. Trophē denotes nourishment or the food that nourishes. The same word can emphasize the material received or the process by which a body is maintained.

In Stobaeus. The concluding Timaeus extract explains the division of food by fire accompanying the oscillation of breath. Particles pass from the belly into the vessels, and blood provides nourishment to the flesh and the whole body. Each part receives what replaces its losses. The embryological report likewise makes nourishment central to development, though its local mechanism and condition of the offspring are different.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.60.1.16 Food is divided and distributed in association with breathing. *(Edition p. 1711.)*

I.60.1.18 Blood replenishes the body's losses. *(Edition p. 1713.)*

I.42.13.1 Nourishment is a condition of development in the womb. *(Edition p. 895.)*

In this edition. "Food" and "nourishment" follow the immediate emphasis. The account is not recast as a description of modern blood circulation.

See also. Blood; Breathing; Embryo; Growth; Life.

[368] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 296, 502.

Oath

ὅρκος, horkos, oath[369]

The word. Horkos is an oath, a solemn pledge. It can also be personified as a divine guarantor of trust.

In Stobaeus. The Ajax verses say that even a formidable oath and a stubborn mind can be overcome by time. The Hermetic account instead introduces Oath as a god alongside pledges and trust. These distinct contexts examine the oath's vulnerability and its normative authority without resolving them into one doctrine.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.23 Time's power is said to extend even to an oath. *(Edition p. 231.)*

I.49.44.77 Oath is personified among the foundations of orderly life. *(Edition p. 1313.)*

In this edition. "Oath" is direct; capitalization marks explicit personification where present.

See also. Assent; Court of judgment; Law; Time; Truth.

Object of opinion

δοξαστόν, doxaston, object of opinion; opinable[370]

The word. Doxaston names what belongs to opinion as its object. It need not mean a false statement or an illusion.

In Stobaeus. The fourfold classification assigns participating instances and images to opinion, as a particular human participates in human being and a particular triangle in triangle. Necessary properties and forms themselves occupy other levels of cognition. The term differentiates the kind of object, rather than announcing that every opinion about it must be wrong.

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[369] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 97, 406. The tragic statement is a character's reflection on change. It should not become the anthology's general rejection of oath-keeping.

[370] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 316–317. The classification is specific to this excerpt; other sources in the anthology need not divide cognitive objects in the same way.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.6.7 Instances participating in forms are classified as objects of opinion. *(Edition p. 971.)*

In this edition. "Object of opinion" is clearer than "opinable" in ordinary prose and preserves the contrast with objects of knowledge.

See also. Belief and opinion; Image and likeness; Knowable; Participation; Particular.

Object of thought

νόημα, noēma, thought; object of thought[371]

The word. Noēma can name a thought or what is thought. Its relation to the act of thinking must be established from the sentence rather than assumed from an English equivalent.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic definition describes soul as an everlasting thinking substance with its own reason as noēma. The clause presents a reflexive relation between soul's thought and its logos. Its compression also permits emphasis on reason as constituting the thought, so the English should not force an elaborate theory of mental objects on this line alone.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.1c Soul's own reason is described as its object of thought. *(Edition p. 983.)*

In this edition. "Object of thought" clarifies the construction; "thought" retains the broader range where object and content are less sharply distinguished.

See also. Concept; Intellection; Reason and account; Soul; Thought.

[371] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 320. The definition recurs in the anthology with a different word order; the edition retains both occurrences.

Oblique

λοξός, loxos, oblique; slanting[372]

The word. Loxos describes an oblique relation to another direction or circle. Inclination is meaningful only in relation to the relevant reference.

In Stobaeus. The zodiacal circle is oblique to the equator and tropics, whereas the meridian crosses the parallel circles at right angles. The contrast differentiates kinds of celestial circle. It does not make the zodiac another member of the set of mutually parallel circles.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.23.3.2 The zodiac's obliquity is distinguished from the meridian's perpendicular crossings. *(Edition p. 557.)*

In this edition. "Oblique" suits the geometrical relation; "slanting" is a less technical alternative when the reference remains clear.

See also. Angle; Circle; Inclination and tilt; Pole; Zodiac.

Oblong

ἑτερομήκης, heteromēkēs, oblong; having unequal sides[373]

The word. Heteromēkēs means having unequal lengths. In this arithmetic discussion it concerns oblong arrangements contrasted with squares.

In Stobaeus. The even-number construction yields oblong figures, while the corresponding odd-number construction yields squares. The relevant oblongs can be represented by consecutive side lengths, n and n + 1. The account also brings odd and even into a larger contrast of center, limit, and balance; those evaluative associations belong to its interpretation of number.

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[372] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 201. The Greek's "touching" includes meeting the equator and the two tropics in different ways. The rejected preposition is not used to reconstruct a new geometry.

[373] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 22. Heteromēkēs is broader as an ordinary adjective than the particular consecutive-sided figures used in this construction. The account's value judgments are not modern mathematical properties.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.10c Oblong figures are contrasted with the square arrangement of odd-number gnomons. *(Edition p. 31.)*

In this edition. "Oblong" is the traditional rendering here. "Rectangle" alone would not convey the contrast with equal sides.

See also. Gnomon; Limit; Number; Odd and even; Square and quadrilateral.

Ocean

ὠκεανός, ōkeanos, Ocean; encompassing ocean[374]

The word. Ōkeanos can name Ocean as a divine figure or the great encompassing body of water. The selected geographical account uses the latter sense.

In Stobaeus. The sea beyond the inhabited world is called both Atlantic and Ocean, flowing around the inhabited region. Through the Pillars of Heracles it enters the inner sea, described as an inlet expanding into connected gulfs. Ocean provides the larger geographical frame within which the Mediterranean is situated.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.17 The inner sea is described as an inlet of the encompassing Ocean. *(Edition p. 775.)*

In this edition. "Ocean" preserves the named encompassing sea; distinguish this use from explicit poetic personification.

See also. Earth; River; Sea and tides; Water; West wind.

[374] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 259. The Pillars of Heracles designate the western entrance to the Mediterranean at the Strait of Gibraltar.

Octahedron

ὀκτάεδρον, oktaedron, octahedron; eight-faced solid[375]

The word. Oktāedron names a solid with eight faces. In the scheme of regular solids, these are triangular faces.

In Stobaeus. The report attributed to Pythagoras associates the octahedron with air, alongside other assignments linking the regular solids to elements and the whole cosmos. The shape belongs to an explanatory correspondence between geometry and physical bodies, not a report that ordinary visible air consists of readily observable polyhedra.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.21.6c.2 The octahedron is assigned to air among five geometrical figures. *(Edition p. 507.)*

In this edition. "Octahedron" is the precise geometrical term; "eight-faced solid" explains the name.

See also. Air; Icosahedron; Shape; Solid.

Odd and even

περιττός; ἄρτιος, perittos; artios, odd; even[376]

The word. Perittos and artios designate odd and even number. Their ordinary senses can also suggest unevenness and regularity, which allows numerical language to enter broader comparisons.

In Stobaeus. The arithmetic account distinguishes even numbers divided into equal parts from odd numbers divided into unequal parts with a middle. Another passage judges the odd more complete because it has beginning, end, and middle, though its ensuing geometrical explanation is obscure. Cleanthes' hymn uses the paired terms in praise of the god who makes what is uneven even and brings order to disorder.

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[375] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 186. The scheme resembles the elemental geometry familiar from Plato's Timaeus, but the attribution of this report must still be given as it stands. Some neighboring assignments contain editorially supplied wording.

[376] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 19–20, 25–26.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.6 Odd and even are defined through division and a middle. *(Edition p. 23.)*

Arith.5b Numerical completeness is connected with boundary and ratio. *(Edition p. 21.)*

I.1.12b The vocabulary supports a poetic account of divine ordering. *(Edition p. 41.)*

In this edition. "Odd/even" serves arithmetic; "uneven/even" preserves the hymn's wider force. The difficult geometry is not reconstructed without evidence.

See also. Division; Limit; Monad; Number; Order.

One

ἕν; τὸ ἕν; ἑνότης, hen; to hen; henotēs, one; the One[377]

The word. The neuter of "one" can be made into a substantive, "the One." The resulting expression may serve different numerical or philosophical functions; capitalization in English is not a guarantee of one doctrine.

In Stobaeus. The arithmetic extracts place the One near the monad but also report an explicit distinction between them. In Arith.9 the One is the beginning of numbered things and is described as a body divisible without limit. Its sense must be read from that particular report.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.2b The One and monad are closely related in a compressed account attributed to Aristotle. *(Edition p. 15.)*

Arith.9 The One of numbered things is distinguished from the monad of numbers. *(Edition p. 27.)*

I.8.41.2 Unity helps explain time's continuity across distinct phases. *(Edition p. 249.)*

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[377] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 16, 21, 104–105. The definition in Arith.9 is deliberately not imported into other excerpts. Different claims about unity remain distinguishable across the collection.

Unity across succession. Henotēs is unity or oneness. I.8.41.2 joins unity with identity and continuity to explain how past, present, and future form one time despite their distinction. Here oneness concerns the connection of temporal phases. It does not name an independent first principle merely because other passages use "the One" in that way.

In this edition. "The One" renders the substantival expression where useful. The definite article in Greek and the local contrast are more informative than English capitalization alone.

See also. Continuity; Monad; Number; Principle; Time; Unlimited.

Opportune time

καιρός, kairos, opportunity; opportune moment; critical time[378]

The word. Kairos is the fitting or decisive moment, distinguished from time merely passing. Its significance depends on recognizing and using the occasion.

In Stobaeus. The lyric fragment wishes that opportunity were as evident as it is hidden, and connects its growth with watchful care. Opportunity is therefore something attention can help disclose or make fruitful. The saying does not present every passing moment as equally suited to action.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.16 The hidden opportunity becomes fruitful through attentiveness. *(Edition p. 229.)*

In this edition. "Opportunity" expresses the practical force; "opportune moment" makes its temporal aspect explicit.

See also. Action; Awareness and apprehension; Season; Time.

[378] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 96. The poet is unidentified in the adopted edition; an earlier attribution to Agathon is rejected.

Oracle

χρησμός, chrēsmos, oracle; oracular utterance[379]

The word. Chrēsmos is an oracle or divinely authorized utterance. It names the pronouncement rather than necessarily the place or institution producing it.

In Stobaeus. Fire asks the creator to grant laws to life and oracles to night, as part of a petition for divine presence and peace. The unusual reference to night is retained but not elaborated into a particular ritual. Oracles belong to the requested guidance of mortal existence.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.66 Oracles accompany laws and good hopes in Fire's petition. *(Edition p. 1303.)*

In this edition. "Oracles" preserves the plural utterances; avoid turning the word into an unnamed sanctuary.

See also. Divination; Hope; Law; Night; Prophet and seer.

Order

τάξις, taxis, order; arrangement[380]

The word. Taxis denotes order or arrangement. Depending on context, it can explain a physical appearance, an organized whole, or a normative structure.

In Stobaeus. The Democritean color report glosses arrangement as order and makes it one of the conditions producing appearances in compounds. The Timaeus excerpt describes divine craftsmanship bringing the visible out of disorder toward what is better and more beautiful. The Hermetic account of Justice connects divine order with providence and necessity. Material arrangement and purposive governance thus share vocabulary without having the same explanatory commitments.

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[379] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 403. The apparatus questions the reading night, but the adopted text retains it and does not specify a nocturnal technique.

[380] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 62–63, 149, 181–182.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.1.7 Order of constituents contributes to perceived color. *(Edition p. 381.)*

I.21.1.2 Divine craftsmanship brings the visible out of disorder. *(Edition p. 493.)*

I.3.52 Justice is compared with powers maintaining divine order. *(Edition p. 133.)*

In this edition. "Arrangement" often makes the material sense clear; "order" preserves the wider structural or evaluative force.

See also. Beauty; God; Harmony; Justice; Providence; Shape.

Pain

λύπη; ἀλγηδών; πόνος, lypē; algēdōn; ponos, pain; distress; suffering; exertion[381]

The word. Lypē commonly names pain or distress; algēdōn emphasizes pain or a pang; ponos can mean toil or exertion as well as suffering. Their ranges overlap without being identical.

In Stobaeus. The Philebus account links bodily pains with the dissolution of natural harmony and distinguishes the distress produced by anticipating them. The Hermetic account says that pain supplies sharper pangs and sufferings. In the description of bodily habituation, ponoi are exertions to which a body becomes accustomed, rather than necessarily injuries or emotional grief.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.13.1 Disruption of the natural constitution produces pains. *(Edition p. 937.)*

I.47.13.4 Anticipation produces distress in soul. *(Edition p. 941.)*

I.41.6.17 Pain is related to sharper pangs and sufferings. *(Edition p. 865.)*

I.47.7.2 Bodies become accustomed to exertion. *(Edition p. 919.)*

[381] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 289, 302–303, 308–309.

In this edition. The English follows the kind of experience meant. "Exertion" avoids giving every occurrence of ponos the same meaning as lypē.

See also. Affection; Fear; Habit and disposition; Pleasure.

Pale yellow

ὠχρός, ōchros, pale yellow; pallid[382]

The word. Ōchros denotes a pale or yellowish color. In this edition its color-classification use is rendered pale yellow.

In Stobaeus. The Pythagorean report lists it beside white, black, and red. The Timaeus quotation distinguishes it from xanthos, golden yellow, and describes it as a mixture of white with that color. Consistency preserves the difference between the two terms even where the textual tradition is uncertain.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.1.2 Pale yellow completes the reported list of color kinds. *(Edition p. 379.)*

I.16.2.7 Pale yellow is distinguished from golden yellow in the mixture sequence. *(Edition p. 389.)*

In this edition. "Pale yellow" is maintained for the printed term rather than silently substituting green.

See also. Color; Green; Mixture and blending; Red; White.

Part and whole

μέρος; ὅλον, meros; holon, part; whole[383]

The word. Meros is a part; holon is a whole. The relation can concern material constituents, a complete living being, or the differentiated powers that cooperate within it.

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[382] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 148, 151. Wachsmuth retains ōchron in the early reports while discussing a proposed correction to chlōron; the correction is not adopted here.

[383] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 133–134, 197, 355–356.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus excerpt explains the world's completeness by the use of all four constituents, leaving no part or power outside. Aesara's account of soul treats a community as requiring members with different functions, comparing psychic portions with different sense organs. The Parmenides excerpt considers unlimited parts of being within a dialectical argument. Its placement under Matter does not turn that argument into a physical inventory.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.22.1f.2 Complete parts constitute a single complete world. *(Edition p. 541.)*

I.49.27.3 Different psychic portions make cooperation possible. *(Edition p. 1117.)*

I.11.6 The dialectical argument distributes being among its many parts. *(Edition p. 331.)*

In this edition. "Part" does not always mean a detachable piece of matter. Its relation to function or to an argument about being must remain visible.

See also. Body; Division; Living creature; Multiplicity; Soul; World.

Participation

μέθεξις, methexis, participation; sharing in[384]

The word. Methexis means participation; metechein means to share in or partake of something. The words do not by themselves specify a single mechanism of connection.

In Stobaeus. The Parmenides excerpt proposes that forms are patterns and participation is the other things' being made like them. In the full argumentative setting, the proposal faces objections, so the extract should not be treated as a final definition accepted without qualification. The Stoic notice speaks of participating in concepts, but its contrast with obtaining "cases" or "appellations" is textually uncertain. Ethical discussion also asks whether perception can share in virtue.

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[384] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 136–137, 350.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.2b Participation is proposed as likeness to a pattern. *(Edition p. 339.)*

I.12.3.2 Participation in concepts occurs in an uncertain transmitted contrast. *(Edition p. 341.)*

I.49.25.3 Sharing in virtue depends on the status of assent. *(Edition p. 1099.)*

In this edition. "Sharing in" is useful outside the technical discussion of forms. The edition does not make the damaged Stoic sentence more definite than its text allows.

See also. Assent; Form; Idea; Resemblance and imitation; Virtue and excellence.

Particular

καθ' ἕκαστον, kath' hekaston, particular; individual case[385]

The word. Kath' hekaston means with respect to each item or, substantivally, the particular. It points to the individual case as opposed to what is taken universally.

In Stobaeus. The passage on criteria assigns perceptible particulars to perception and intelligible universals to intellect. This division concerns the respective objects and judgments of the two faculties. Its compressed concluding sentence does not explain every possible cooperation between them, so the opposition should not be expanded into a complete psychology on this evidence alone.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.58.1.3 Perception judges the particular, while intellect judges the universal. *(Edition p. 1689.)*

In this edition. "The particular" is appropriate in the paired technical contrast. Elsewhere the phrase may simply mean "in each case."

See also. Intellect; Perception; Standard of judgment; Universal.

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[385] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 497. The final "everything" in the cited unit has an unspecified scope; the entry does not supply a further theory to fill that compression.

Partless

ἀμερής, amerēs, without parts; partless[386]

The word. Amerēs denies the possession of parts. It is related to, but should not be silently equated with, every claim that a thing cannot be divided.

In Stobaeus. In the account of developing life, partlessness accompanies unchangeability after the life of thought and harmony have been introduced. The antecedent of the pronoun remains uncertain. The predicate can be explained securely even though the passage does not securely identify which of those subjects it qualifies.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.7.4 Partlessness is paired with unchangeability in an account of growth and thought. *(Edition p. 871.)*

In this edition. "Without parts" is the clearest rendering. Retain the distinction from "indivisible" when the Greek uses different terms.

See also. Divisible; Harmony; Indivisible; Simple; Thought.

Passive and capable of affection

παθητός; παθητικός, pathētos; pathētikos, capable of affection; receptive; passive[387]

The word. Pathētos and pathētikos concern undergoing an effect rather than producing it. Receptivity is relational: it is receptivity to some action, condition, or determination.

In Stobaeus. The account under Pythagoras's name aligns one principle with productive and formal causation, the other with the receptive and material side represented by the visible world. "Passive" therefore does not mean nonexistent or causally irrelevant. It identifies the role of what receives an operation in this particular explanation.

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[386] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 290. The uncertain pronoun may refer to thinking life or to harmony; the entry does not resolve that textual difficulty by assumption.

[387] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 124–125, 286. The first selected passage uses the related adjective pathētikos; related forms are treated together in this article.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.10 The receptive and material principle is contrasted with productive intellect. *(Edition p. 303.)*

I.41.6.8 The contrast between acting and being acted upon distinguishes bodies. *(Edition p. 857.)*

In this edition. "Receptive" is often clearer than "passive" for matter's role. "Capable of affection" makes the relation to pathos explicit.

See also. Active or productive; Affection; Dyad; Impassible; Matter.

Pattern and model

παράδειγμα, paradeigma, pattern; model; exemplar[388]

The word. Paradeigma is that with reference to which something is formed, recognized, or compared. A model's role differs from the material out of which a product is made.

In Stobaeus. The report on forms calls the incorporeal form a pattern for sensible things and a cause of their ordering. In the Timaeus quotation, the craftsman's model determines the quality of the result: an unchanging model grounds beauty. Pattern, productive agent, and recipient can thus be distinguished within a single explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.1a.1 Form is a pattern for sensible subsistence and ordering. *(Edition p. 333.)*

I.13.1a.2 The craftsman's work depends on whether the model is unchanging or generated. *(Edition p. 343.)*

In this edition. "Pattern" and "model" retain the relation of exemplar to product. "Example" can be too weak when causal dependence is at issue.

See also. Archetype; Demiurge and craftsman; Idea; Matter; Resemblance and imitation.

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[388] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 134, 137–138. The opening causal clause of I.12.1a.1 is grammatically defective; the general pattern relation is also supported by the parallel accounts.

Peace

εἰρήνη, eirēnē, peace[389]

The word. Eirēnē is peace, opposed here to a savage way of life marked by violence.

In Stobaeus. Fire petitions the creator to initiate mortal life into peace and to grant laws and good hopes. The vocabulary of initiation makes peaceful life something into which humanity must be led. Peace belongs with divine disclosure and ordered conduct, not merely a pause between battles.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.66 Peace is requested together with laws and good hopes. *(Edition p. 1303.)*

In this edition. "Peace" preserves the contrast; keep the verb's initiatory image where possible.

See also. Hope; Initiation; Law; Order; War.

Perceptible

αἰσθητός, aisthētos, perceptible; sensible[390]

The word. Aisthētos describes an object accessible to sense-perception. "Sensible" has this technical meaning here, rather than reasonable or prudent.

In Stobaeus. The report about Plato contrasts intelligible patterns with the perceptible sun, moon, stars, earth, and containing cosmos. A separate classification identifies resistant bodies as perceptible objects. These uses concern how things are apprehended and their position in an account of reality, not merely whether someone is currently attending to them.

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[389] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 403. The request for oracles to night is textually questioned but retained; no particular nocturnal ritual is supplied.

[390] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 37, 316–317. The account at I.1.29b.6 is an ancient report about Plato with textual qualifications, not a direct dialogue quotation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.29b.6 Visible cosmic bodies are distinguished from intelligible patterns. *(Edition p. 71.)*

I.48.6.7 Resistant bodies are assigned to perception in a cognitive classification. *(Edition p. 971.)*

In this edition. "Perceptible" is often clearer than "sensible" for modern readers. Preserve its wider range than visible.

See also. Body; Intelligible; Knowable; Perception; Visible.

Perception

αἴσθησις; αἰσθητικόν; αἰσθητικῶς, aisthēsis; aisthētikon; aisthētikōs, perception; sense[391]

The word. Aisthēsis can concern sensing, a perceptual capacity, or an actual perception. Whether a passage treats these together or separates them is part of its explanation.

In Stobaeus. The report under Epicurus's name uses the word for both capacity and experienced activity. The Philebus excerpt describes a shared movement of soul and body. Other notices distinguish perceptions from impressions or join perception to assent and apprehension.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.50.1 Perception names both capacity and activity in the Epicurean report. *(Edition p. 1581.)*

I.50.2b A shared bodily and psychic movement is called perception. *(Edition p. 1583.)*

I.50.20 A Stoic report distinguishes perceptions from impressions. *(Edition p. 1593.)*

I.50.21.1 The truth of perception is distinguished from the truth of belief. *(Edition p. 1595.)*

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[391] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 42, 349–350, 472, 475. I.50.1 calls the capacity a "part" in its compressed wording. The edition retains that term rather than silently substituting "organ."

I.49.25.3 A claim about virtue requires assent to be in our control. *(Edition p. 1099.)*

I.49.24.6 The perceptive capacity is distinguished through its use of organs. *(Edition p. 1095.)*

I.1.34b Perceptual activity is coordinated with thought and assent. *(Edition p. 81.)*

Truth and the several senses. The Epicurean report assigns truth to every perception and impression while allowing beliefs to be false. The discussion of assent asks a different question: can perception share in virtue unless assent belongs among things in our control? The chapters on individual senses then examine material conditions such as incoming images, striking air, inhaled odors, and intervening liquids. A general definition of perception does not settle these separate questions about truth, responsibility, and physical mechanism.

The perceptive capacity. Aisthētikon names the perceptive capacity, while related forms describe perceiving or being affected perceptually. I.49.24.6 explicitly contrasts the faculty's use of organs with imagination without them. In I.1.34b the adverb aisthētikōs describes being moved in perception, alongside thought and assent. These grammatical forms describe related activities without requiring identical classifications.

In this edition. "Perception" is the usual singular rendering; "senses" suits the enumeration of faculties. "Sensation" should not be assumed to exhaust the word's cognitive range.

See also. Apprehension; Assent; Belief and opinion; Hearing; Instrument; Knowledge; Memory; Presentation and imagination; Sight; Smell; Taste; Touch; Truth; What depends on us.

Perfection and completeness

τέλειος; ἀτελής; τελείωσις, teleios; atelēs; teleiōsis, complete; perfect; fulfilled[392]

The word. Teleios describes attainment of an end or completeness of constitution. "Perfect" may express this completion without introducing moral faultlessness.

In Stobaeus. The explanation of actuality uses bronze and a statue: bronze is potentially a statue, whereas shaped bronze has attained the appropriate form and end. Completeness thus concerns realization of a specified kind. A thing may be complete as the thing it is without possessing every possible excellence.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.1b.2 A statue is complete when the bronze receives its appropriate form. *(Edition p. 335.)*

Arith.10b Even number is described as incomplete in a numerical interpretation. *(Edition p. 29.)*

I.49.65.2 Some thinkers deny intellect's need for further perfecting. *(Edition p. 1507.)*

Incompleteness in arithmetic. Atelēs means incomplete or lacking completion. Arith.10b calls even number incomplete and odd number full and complete, drawing on addition and division to support that contrast. The arithmetic relations are distinct from the evaluative conclusion: evenness is not thereby a mathematical defect in the modern sense.

Perfecting and fulfillment. Teleiōsis means completion or perfecting, the process rather than only the completed condition. I.49.65.2 reports thinkers who deny that essential reason and intellect need such perfecting, reserving purification for lower activities. The noun's occurrence thus expresses a debated requirement, not agreement that every level of soul remains equally incomplete.

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[392] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 22, 135, 454. The report's associations between entelecheia, continuity, and completeness are ancient explanatory wordplay, not a modern derivation silently substituted for the text.

In this edition. "Complete" is often the most precise rendering in accounts of actuality; "perfect" suits contexts stressing excellence as well as fulfillment.

See also. Actuality; End; Form; Intellect; Number; Odd and even; Purification; Self-complete; Virtue and excellence.

Perishable

φθαρτός, phthartos, perishable; liable to destruction[393]

The word. Phthartos names what can pass away or be destroyed. It need not imply that the material or underlying reality is annihilated along with a particular formation.

In Stobaeus. The cosmological poem attributed to Linus distinguishes the death of perishable things from what persists while changing its appearances and shapes. Its paradox of "immortal death" gives recurring dissolution a lasting place within the whole. The contrast is between changing manifestations and enduring existence, although several surrounding verses are damaged.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.5 Perishable formations die while underlying existence changes its appearance. *(Edition p. 291.)*

In this edition. "Perishable" preserves the contrast with aphthartos and related negatives. Avoid translating the word as "unreal."

See also. Change and alteration; Dissolution; Imperishable; Part and whole.

[393] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 119–120. The Linus excerpt contains corrupt verses and editorial repairs; it does not support a fully reconstructed cosmological system in every detail.

Perplexity and lack of resources

ἀπορία, aporia, perplexity; difficulty; lack of resources[394]

The word. Aporia can be an inability to find a way forward, whether intellectual or practical. Its familiar philosophical sense of perplexity must not obscure other kinds of lack.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry describes soul's inclination toward matter as a lack of all things and an emptying of its own power. Its ascent to intellect is contrasted as fullness. The immediate sense is privation of resources or fulfillment, not merely being puzzled by a difficult question.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.23.7 The soul's material inclination is characterized by lack and depletion. *(Edition p. 1089.)*

In this edition. "Lack" conveys this use; "perplexity" suits a specifically intellectual impasse when the context supplies one.

See also. Ascent; Emptying and depletion; Intellect; Poverty; Privation.

Persuasion

πειθώ, peithō, persuasion; persuasive power[395]

The word. Peithō is persuasion, either the act of convincing or the power that makes speech effective. It may also be personified.

In Stobaeus. In the Hermetic divine assembly, Hermes offers persuasion together with wisdom, self-control, truth, and discovery. Persuasion is thus one of several capacities contributing to the human world. Its proximity to truth is significant, but the list does not define all successful persuasion as truthful.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.32 Hermes promises persuasion among his gifts. *(Edition p. 1269.)*

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[394] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 347. The earlier thinkers alluded to at the close remain unnamed in the excerpt; an apparatus association is not promoted to a direct attribution.

[395] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 393–394. The accompanying astrological signs are not identified securely enough in this excerpt to name them as particular zodiacal signs.

In this edition. "Persuasion" preserves both the activity and the capacity; a personal divine figure should be inferred only when the context requires one.

See also. Mental recognition; Self-control and temperance; Speech and utterance; Truth; Wisdom.

Phase and appearance

φάσις, phasis, appearance; phase[396]

The word. Phasis is an appearance or becoming visible. Its astronomical meaning must be distinguished from other Greek words with the same spelling.

In Stobaeus. The report of the moon's period describes a month from appearance to conjunction. Phasis marks the visible appearance used as one boundary. The modern word "phase" is related in sense, but its broader application to every stage of the lunar cycle should not replace the particular event named in this sentence.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.42c.1 Appearance is contrasted with conjunction in the stated lunar period. *(Edition p. 255.)*

In this edition. "Appearance" stays closest to this wording; explain any use of "phase" rather than assuming an exact modern definition.

See also. Conjunction; Month; Moon; Rising of a star; Visible.

[396] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 107. The thirty-day value and the boundary formula are retained as the ancient report gives them.

Philosophy

φιλοσοφία, philosophia, philosophy; philosophical pursuit[397]

The word. Philosophia names the pursuit of wisdom and the disciplined activity associated with it. The anthology preserves differing descriptions of what that pursuit requires.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic narrative places philosophy alongside magic as nourishment for the soul, while medicine heals the body. The Phaedo instead emphasizes philosophy's preparation for separation and purification. These passages locate philosophy within distinct accounts of human improvement and should retain their respective settings.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.80 Philosophy and magic are associated with the soul's nurture. *(Edition p. 1315.)*

I.49.57.2 Philosophy is interpreted as practice for separation from the body. *(Edition p. 1411.)*

In this edition. "Philosophy" is appropriate, with explanation of its local practical and religious dimensions.

See also. Art and craft; Education; Practice and exercise; Purification; Wisdom.

Piety

εὐσέβεια; ὁσιότης; ὅσιος; ὁσία, eusebeia; hosiotēs; hosios; hosia, piety; reverence[398]

The word. Eusebeia denotes piety or reverence. The Hermetic excerpts give it an intellectual as well as a devotional expression.

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[397] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 407, 431. The wording about the completion of prophetic training at I.49.44.80 is disturbed; the clearer distinction between psychic and bodily care does not resolve every detail.

[398] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 71, 273–274.

In Stobaeus. The work addressed to Tat calls understanding the things that exist and giving thanks to their maker the most fitting piety. Its account of the goal of piety joins living well, dying blessed, and knowing the soul's upward destination. The road to truth is thus described as a way of life, difficult for an embodied soul even though venerable and smooth in itself.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.1.1 Understanding and gratitude express piety. *(Edition p. 815.)*

I.41.1.4 Piety's goal is linked with truth and the soul's destination. *(Edition p. 819.)*

I.4.2d Piety is set against Necessity in an edited tragic verse. *(Edition p. 157.)*

Reverent holiness. Hosios means holy, reverent, or religiously right; hosiotēs names holiness. The verse at I.4.2d uses hosia as the noun rendered piety and opposes it to Necessity. That reading is editorially adopted over a manuscript adjective. The moral and religious sense is clear in the printed verse, while its textual qualification should remain visible.

In this edition. "Reverence" conveys the attitude toward God; "piety" preserves the term when its nature or goal is explicitly discussed.

See also. Destiny after death; God; Good; Knowledge; Necessity; Sacred; Truth.

Pits in the sky

βόθυνος, bothunos, pit; hollow; pit-like appearance in the sky[399]

The word. Bothunos is a pit or hollow. Applied to the sky, it names an appearance resembling such a hollow.

[399] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 257, 266–267. The older broad sense of "meteorological" concerns phenomena aloft. It should not lead readers to interpret these pits as meteorite impact craters.

In Stobaeus. The account groups pits with torches, beams, and beards among transient appearances aloft. It explicitly explains the names by resemblance. These are things seen in the sky, distinguished from the permanently fixed celestial bodies; the word does not describe a crater made by an object striking the ground.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.9 Pit-like appearances belong to the phenomena of the region beneath the fixed heavens. *(Edition p. 769.)*

I.40.1.47 Pits, beams, torches, and beards receive their names from their shapes. *(Edition p. 797.)*

In this edition. "Pits in the sky" preserves the ancient visual comparison while identifying its setting.

See also. Beam in the sky; Comet; Exhalation; Heaven; Luminous flare.

Place and space

τόπος; χώρα, topos; chōra, place; space[400]

The word. These spatial terms acquire different definitions in different reports. Topos may also be a topic of discussion; chōra can designate a region or an occupied area as well as space in a technical distinction.

In Stobaeus. Strato defines place through the interval between container and contained. Zeno and his followers distinguish void, place, and space by bodily occupation. In the inquiry into souls' entry, topos introduces the topic being examined rather than a physical location.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.18.1b Place is an interval in the report of Strato. *(Edition p. 407.)*

I.18.1d Void, place, and space are distinguished by whether body occupies them. *(Edition p. 409.)*

I.49.41.3 Topos is the topic under which the manner of the soul's entry is investigated. *(Edition p. 1221.)*

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[400] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 156–157, 381. At I.49.41.3 the printed topos is retained and interpreted as "topic"; it is not replaced by the conjectured tropos, "manner."

In this edition. "Place" and "space" preserve the paired terminology where it is explicit. A local non-spatial use of topos can be "topic." The lexicon does not impose one definition on all the reports.

See also. Body; Motion; Void; World.

Plane

ἐπίπεδον, epipedon, plane; planar figure[401]

The word. Epipedon designates a plane or something planar. In a numerical and geometrical classification, it stands between line-like extension and solid magnitude.

In Stobaeus. The reported account of Plato associates the number of the plane with opinion and that of the solid with perception. This belongs to a sequence linking numerical or dimensional structures with cognitive powers. It should not be paraphrased as a literal claim that opinions are flat pieces of matter.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.32.7 Plane and solid numbers are related to opinion and perception in a reported classification. *(Edition p. 1153.)*

In this edition. "Plane" preserves the geometrical level; explain the relation to number rather than replacing the phrase with an unsupported numeral.

See also. Belief and opinion; Number; Perception; Solid; Surface.

Planet

πλανήτης, planētēs, wandering star; planet[402]

The word. Planētēs belongs to the language of wandering. The contrast is with stars whose mutual arrangement remains fixed, not with all bodies capable of motion.

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[401] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 364. The account is mediated through Aristotle's On the Soul, not quoted directly from a Platonic dialogue; "and breadth" is supplied.

[402] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 202–204.

In Stobaeus. The Empedoclean report contrasts fixed stars fastened to the vault with planets that are unattached. The planetary sequence attributed to Plato lists five named wandering bodies and then the sun and moon. The Aristotelian account places planetary motion beneath the oblique zodiacal circle while affirming that all heavenly bodies move.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.24.1b Fixed attachment is contrasted with unattached planets. *(Edition p. 559.)*

I.24.1l.2 The sun and moon complete a sequence of seven wandering bodies. *(Edition p. 567.)*

I.24.1m.2 Planetary motion is distinguished within a moving heaven. *(Edition p. 567.)*

In this edition. The ancient category is broader than the modern list of planets. The term is explained through the classification used by the particular report.

See also. Circular motion; Heaven; Moon; Star; Sun.

Plant

φυτόν, phyton, plant[403]

The word. Phyton names a plant or growing thing. The question whether plants possess soul is distinct from the question whether they belong to the same class as animals.

In Stobaeus. The first notice in the plant chapter assigns Plato and Thales the view that plants are ensouled living creatures. The evidence offered is their movement under tension and their response to applied loads. The next notice assigns Aristotle soul in plants but withholds animal status, grounding the distinction in impulse and perception. The chapter therefore concerns both observed movements and the criteria of classification.

[403] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 297–298.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.45.1 Movement and elastic recovery support the description of plants as ensouled. *(Edition p. 901.)*

I.45.2 Soul is admitted while animal status is denied. *(Edition p. 901.)*

In this edition. The translation distinguishes "ensouled" from "animal." Plant life cannot be excluded merely by choosing the narrower English meaning of zōion.

See also. Growth; Impulse; Life; Living creature; Soul.

Pleasure

ἡδονή, hēdonē, pleasure[404]

The word. Hēdonē names pleasure. Its causes, bodily conditions, and value depend on the account in which the word occurs.

In Stobaeus. The Philebus excerpt associates pleasure with the restoration of a living creature's disrupted harmony. It then distinguishes pleasure arising in soul through anticipation from the bodily affection expected. A Hermetic discussion, by contrast, calls pleasure-bearing rejoicing harmful because of the evils it produces. The Timaeus passage on musical concord distinguishes pleasure from the gladness of those who understand the harmony.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.13.1 Restoration of natural harmony gives rise to pleasure. *(Edition p. 937.)*

I.47.13.4 Expectation produces a pleasure belonging to soul. *(Edition p. 941.)*

I.41.6.17 Pleasurable rejoicing is judged harmful. *(Edition p. 865.)*

I.60.1.13 Pleasure is distinguished from understanding gladness. *(Edition p. 1709.)*

[404] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 289, 308–309, 501.

In this edition. "Pleasure," "joy," and "gladness" preserve differences among the Greek terms instead of imposing one evaluation on every pleasant experience.

See also. Affection; Desire; Harmony; Memory; Pain.

Pole

πόλος, polos, pole; revolving heavens[405]

The word. Polos can name a celestial pole, but also the revolving sky. The immediate construction decides whether a fixed point or the heavens' movement is intended.

In Stobaeus. The spherical description calls the two fixed opposite points poles. Porphyry's account of the sun instead uses the word for the revolving heavens whose course the sun opposes. Translating both occurrences as a stationary point would make the second comparison unintelligible.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.3 Two fixed opposite points define the poles of celestial rotation. *(Edition p. 765.)*

I.25.2 The sun's course is opposed to the revolving heavens. *(Edition p. 585.)*

In this edition. "Pole" suits the fixed points; "revolving heavens" conveys the broader sense in Porphyry.

See also. Axis; Circular motion; Heaven; Sphere; Sun.

[405] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 209, 256. The interpolated clause bracketed in I.25.2 is not used as independent evidence for the headword's meaning.

Pore and passage

πόρος, poros, pore; passage; channel[406]

The word. Poros is a way through something: a passage, channel, or pore. Its scale and physical character must be inferred from the particular account.

In Stobaeus. The report concerning Empedocles explains color through the fitting of what is seen to the pores of sight. It also connects a fourfold classification of colors with the four elements. The explanatory role of the pores is selective admission or fitting, not merely the presence of empty holes.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.1.3 Color is related to the pores of sight in the Empedoclean account. *(Edition p. 379.)*

In this edition. "Pores" retains the established vocabulary of this theory; "passages" makes the underlying image clearer.

See also. Color; Effluence; Element; Perception; Sight.

Possibility

δυνατός; ἀδύνατος, dunatos; adunatos, possible; capable; able[407]

The word. Dynatos can describe what is possible or someone capable of acting. Its relation to dynamis is visible, but a statement of ability is not automatically a definition of logical possibility.

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[406] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 149. The report does not supply a secure one-to-one assignment of each named color to an element. Its visual pores should not be identified without qualification with structures in modern anatomy.

[407] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 62–63, 393. The sovereign is the understood subject of the concluding "is able" in the cited sentence.

In Stobaeus. In the Hermetic creation narrative, the sovereign can provide future human beings with something from each god. The adjective concerns the agent's ability to distribute contributions. The following speeches differentiate those contributions; they do not say that every participating god independently produces the whole human being.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.29 The divine sovereign is able to provide the contributions to human life. *(Edition p. 1267.)*

I.3.52 Divine inability to err contrasts with human wrongdoing. *(Edition p. 133.)*

What is impossible. Adunatos means unable or impossible according to the construction. At I.3.52 it is impossible for the divine to go astray, whereas human beings remain liable to error. The impossibility belongs to this account of divine order. It should not be expanded into an unrestricted theory of logical possibility without further argument.

In this edition. "Can" or "is able" suits this personal construction; "possible" suits an impersonal claim about what can occur.

See also. Active or productive; Demiurge and craftsman; Error and wrongdoing; God; Necessity; Power and capacity.

Poverty

πενία, penia, poverty; lack[408]

The word. Penia is poverty or lack. A philosophical extension may concern a soul's powers rather than material possessions.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry uses poverty for the soul's depleted state when inclined toward matter, contrasting it with fullness in relation to intellect. The economic image explains dependence and loss of proper power. It should not be read as an assertion that financially poor people necessarily lack intellectual life.

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[408] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 347. The closing allusion leaves its earlier thinkers unnamed, even though the apparatus suggests an association.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.23.7 Poverty names the soul's depletion in its material inclination. *(Edition p. 1089.)*

In this edition. "Poverty" preserves the image; "lack" can clarify its non-economic object.

See also. Emptying and depletion; Intellect; Matter; Perplexity and lack of resources; Wealth.

Power and capacity

δύναμις, dynamis, power; capacity; potentiality[409]

The word. Dynamis names a power or capacity. In constructions contrasting potential with actual, the related adverbial use is "potentially." The word can concern what a thing can do or become.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry's survey announces an inquiry into the powers of the soul, including the relation between powers and parts. The report on perception distinguishes capacity from activity. Aristotle's statue example makes the potential use concrete: bronze can be a statue before it is one in actuality.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.24.1 The powers of the soul are the announced subject of a historical survey. *(Edition p. 1091.)*

I.50.1 Perceptual capacity is distinguished from perceptual activity. *(Edition p. 1581.)*

I.12.1b.2 Bronze is potentially a statue before receiving its form. *(Edition p. 335.)*

In this edition. "Power" suits an active faculty or explanatory force; "capacity" often makes a contrast with activity clearer. "Potentially" translates the adverbial dative where the argument requires it.

See also. Activity; Actuality; Perception; Soul.

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[409] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 135, 347, 472. The opening of Porphyry's survey distinguishes earlier accounts from their later assessment. Positions mentioned in the survey should not all be assigned to Porphyry himself.

Power to act

ἐξουσία, exousia, authority; permission; power to act[410]

The word. Exousia is authority or the permitted scope to act. It can mean leave to perform a particular action rather than an intrinsic physical capacity.

In Stobaeus. In the Hermetic divine assembly, Fire is first given leave to speak after the elements approach their maker to complain of human violence. Exousia concerns the right or opportunity to address the assembly. Translating it simply as strength would confuse permission with force.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.65 Fire has the first permission to speak before the creator.
(Edition p. 1301.)

In this edition. "Leave" or "permission" fits this construction; "authority" suits broader granted competence.

See also. Element; God; Power and capacity; Self-determination; Speech and utterance.

Practice and exercise

μελέτη, meletē, practice; exercise; preparation[411]

The word. Meletē is practice or sustained preparation. Its object determines whether the activity is bodily, intellectual, or ethical.

In Stobaeus. In the Phaedo excerpt, philosophy is described as practicing death: the soul gathers into itself and seeks separation from bodily distractions. The phrase concerns a cultivated condition of soul and readiness for separation. It does not describe an exercise in causing physical death.

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[410] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 403. The elements are personified petitioners. Their orderly sequence of speeches supplies the immediate institutional image.

[411] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 431. The Greek also speaks of being dead, emphasizing the state of separation for which the philosopher prepares.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.57.2 Philosophical purification is interpreted as preparation for the soul's separation. *(Edition p. 1411.)*

In this edition. "Practice" conveys repeated cultivation; "preparation" helps explain the otherwise startling expression about death.

See also. Body; Education; Philosophy; Purification; Soul.

Presence

παρουσία; ἀπουσία, parousia; apousia, presence; being present[412]

The word. Parousia is the presence of something or its being there with another. The word does not by itself settle whether that presence is spatial, causal, or constitutive.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic description says that desire and spirit arrive when the divine part enters a mortal body, and through their presence a human soul results. Their presence therefore helps characterize human psychic constitution. It should not be replaced by a claim that the divine part changes into those other powers.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.5.4 The presence of desire and spirit accompanies the formation of human soul. *(Edition p. 995.)*

I.36.2.13 The absence of warm exhalation is invoked to explain cold. *(Edition p. 747.)*

Absence as explanation. Apousia is absence. In I.36.2.13 the absence of warm exhalation explains the cold said to precede early-morning earthquakes. The word marks the lack of a particular physical factor; it does not name an independently active substance. Reading presence and absence together clarifies the report's causal contrast.

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[412] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 251, 323. The source distinguishes the activities' immortality from the mortality of the bodies in which they operate.

In this edition. "Presence" preserves the relation without specifying a mechanism that the passage does not supply.

See also. Anger and spirit; Constitution; Desire; Earthquake; Embodiment; Exhalation; Participation.

Presentation and imagination

φαντασία; φανταστικόν, phantasia; phantastikon, presentation; impression; imagination[413]

The word. Phantasia concerns what appears or is presented to a subject, and in some passages the activity of presenting images. The English "imagination" must not imply that every phantasia is invented or false.

In Stobaeus. A Stoic report allows impressions to be true or false while treating perceptions differently. Porphyry discusses the relation of presentation to assent; another passage links imagination to acts of intellection and distinguishes it from the resulting image, phantasma.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.50.20 Impressions are distinguished from perceptions and can be true or false. *(Edition p. 1593.)*

I.49.25.1 Presentation is considered in relation to assent. *(Edition p. 1097.)*

I.49.19.2 Imagination accompanies intellection, while phantasma names an image. *(Edition p. 1079.)*

I.49.24.6 The imaginative capacity is contrasted with perception using organs. *(Edition p. 1095.)*

The imaginative capacity. Phantastikon names the imaginative capacity. I.49.24.6 distinguishes perception using organs from imagination operating without their immediate use. The surrounding classification also asks how opinion relates to discursive thought. Its concluding alternatives are difficult, so the adjective's clear reference should not conceal the uncertainty of the whole scheme.

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[413] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 344, 349, 475. The concluding analogy at I.49.19.2 is textually difficult. The edition follows the printed references to soul and intellection and explains the uncertainty in its footnote.

In this edition. "Presentation" or "impression" often suits a cognitive occurrence; "imagination" suits the image-presenting activity. Phantasma is "image," preserving the distinction between activity and what accompanies it.

See also. Assent; Belief and opinion; Instrument; Intellect; Perception.

Preservation and salvation

σωτηρία, sōtēria, preservation; safety; salvation[414]

The word. Sōtēria is preservation or salvation, with the object and danger determining its force.

In Stobaeus. The account of descent distinguishes a soul coming for the preservation, purification, and perfection of things here from one correcting its own character or undergoing punishment. Preservation in the first case benefits the lower realm. It is not simply the descending soul's escape from that realm.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.40.4 One kind of descent serves the preservation of things here. *(Edition p. 1217.)*

In this edition. "Preservation" keeps the wider beneficial sense; "salvation" suits a context explicitly emphasizing rescue.

See also. Benefaction; Descent; Perfection and completeness; Purification; Soul.

Pretext and occasion

πρόφασις, prophasis, reason; occasion; pretext[415]

The word. Prophasis can be an alleged reason, occasion, or pretext. It need not always imply a deceptive excuse.

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[414] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 380. The three purposes are expressly differentiated by the author and should remain separate in interpretation.

[415] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 56. The explanation belongs to the quoted argument. A textually questioned word near its end does not alter the central distinction between fear and disposition.

In Stobaeus. Theodectes asks the critic of delayed divine punishment to hear the reason: delay reveals character beyond behavior compelled by immediate fear. Prophasis introduces the defense offered by the speaker. Translating it as pretext would prejudge that defense as insincere.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.22 A reason is offered for the delay of punishment. *(Edition p. 117.)*

In this edition. "Reason" is appropriate here; "pretext" belongs where an ostensible or deceptive justification is indicated.

See also. Cause; Character; Fear; Punishment; Time.

Principle

ἀρχή, archē, principle; beginning; origin[416]

The word. Archē can be a beginning or an explanatory principle. The relation between priority in an explanation and priority in time is not decided by the English word "first."

In Stobaeus. Chapter 10 pairs principles with elements of the universe. The report on Anaximander makes the unlimited the principle of existing things. In the arithmetic passages, the monad is the beginning of number. Each use asks the reader to identify what depends upon the proposed origin.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.heading Principles and elements are placed together for comparison. *(Edition p. 289.)*

I.10.12.2 The unlimited is reported as Anaximander's principle. *(Edition p. 299.)*

Arith.6 The monad is called the beginning of number. *(Edition p. 23.)*

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[416] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 20, 118, 122–123. The criticism following the account of Anaximander in I.10.12.2 is the reporter's judgment. It is not Anaximander's own description of a defect in his theory.

In this edition. "Principle" serves explanatory contexts; "beginning" preserves a less technical or explicitly generative relation. The chosen English word should not remove a connection the Greek leaves open.

See also. Cause; Element; Monad; One; Unlimited.

Prison

δεσμωτήριον, desmōtērion, prison; place of confinement[417]

The word. Desmōtērion is a prison, a place where someone is held in bonds.

In Stobaeus. The Gorgias narrative calls Tartarus the prison of requital and punishment for those who lived unjustly and impiously. It contrasts this destination with the Isles of the Blessed. The prison belongs to the narrative's moral geography and should be distinguished from metaphors naming the living body a confinement.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.63.3 Tartarus is designated the prison assigned to unjust lives.
(Edition p. 1485.)

In this edition. "Prison" is direct and preserves the institutional image.

See also. Bond; Destiny after death; Justice; Punishment; Retribution.

Privation

στέρησις, sterēsis, privation; absence of form[418]

The word. Sterēsis is privation or lack. In the list of Aristotelian principles it is distinguished from both the form and the matter that receives form.

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[417] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 449. The law governing destinations remains constant in the narrative, while the procedure for judging souls is subsequently corrected.

[418] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 128. The entry explains the compressed report; it does not replace its distinction between principles and elements with a single list.

In Stobaeus. The report names form, matter, and privation together, then separately discusses elements and their qualities. Privation is therefore not another material body or a fifth elemental quality. It expresses the absence involved in an account of coming to be, whereas matter names the underlying recipient and form the determination acquired.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.16a.3 Privation appears among principles, before a separate account of elements and qualities. *(Edition p. 311.)*

In this edition. "Privation" preserves the technical distinction. An explanatory "absence of form" is useful where the term would otherwise be opaque.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Form; Matter; Nonbeing; Principle.

Procession

πρόοδος, proodos, procession; going forth[419]

The word. Proodos is a going forward or coming forth. In later philosophical accounts it can name the emergence of realities from their causes.

In Stobaeus. The survey describes souls' first procession as arising with creative sowing and accompanied by their recipients: world, heavenly spheres, and elements. Procession is distinguished from the later descents associated with particular allotments. The sequence gives it a structural role within creation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.39.3 First procession accompanies creative sowing and the constitution of recipients. *(Edition p. 1207.)*

[419] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 377. The compressed list shifts grammatical number. The translation supplies the understood souls and recipients without identifying souls with the elements themselves.

In this edition. "Procession" is the conventional technical rendering; "coming forth" explains it without assuming material outflow.

See also. Allotment; Cause; Demiurge and craftsman; Descent; Soul.

Progression

προποδισμός; ἀναποδισμός, *propodismos; anapodismos*, forward progression; advance[420]

The word. Propodismos is forward progression. In Moderatus's definition it names the advance of numerical multitude from the unit.

In Stobaeus. Number is described both as a system of monads and as an advance from a monad paired with a retreat back to it. Subtraction of whole units terminates at the monad in this account. The language of travel organizes a numerical relation, not a literal journey of objects through space.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.8 Numerical progression and return are bounded by the monad. *(Edition p. 27.)*

Backward progression. Anapodismos is a backward progression, paired in Arith.8 with forward progression from the monad. Subtraction brings the multitude back toward the unit, where this account makes it stop. "Regression" describes an arithmetic direction here and need not imply moral deterioration or the reversal of a historical development.

In this edition. "Forward progression" keeps the contrast with backward progression explicit. Avoid substituting modern negative numbers into the stated boundary.

See also. Addition; Limit; Monad; Number; Subtraction and removal.

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[420] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 21. The explanation of monas through remaining and being alone is the source's wordplay; the printed plural construction concerns monads limiting quantity.

Proper and one's own

οἰκεῖος; ἀλλότριος, oikeios; allotrios, one's own; proper; fitting; congenial[421]

The word. Oikeios expresses belonging, affinity, or suitability. The relationship may concern a possessor, a nature, or the place appropriate to a being.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry's interpretation of Homer calls the region around the moon the fitting place for reverent souls after death. The adjective links a destination to the condition of the souls assigned there. It does not, by itself, establish ownership of a physical locality or name a separate faculty of soul.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.61.1 The lunar region is interpreted as the appropriate home of reverent souls. *(Edition p. 1479.)*

I.14.1a.2 A foreign place is contrasted with a body's proper place. *(Edition p. 353.)*

What belongs elsewhere. Allotrios means belonging to another or foreign to the thing concerned. In I.14.1a.2, the report about Plato contrasts a body's own place with a place foreign to it: in the latter it acquires an inclination and a tendency toward heaviness or lightness. The opposition is relational, not a moral judgment that foreign things are bad.

In this edition. "Fitting" or "proper" suits the relation between nature and destination; "one's own" suits possession or belonging.

See also. Destiny after death; Inclination and tendency; Kinship and affinity; Moon; Place and space; Property and peculiarity.

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[421] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 140, 448. The lunar destination belongs to Porphyry's interpretation of the Homeric verses, not to an explicit statement in the verses themselves.

Property and peculiarity

ἰδιότης, idiotēs, distinctive property; peculiarity[422]

The word. Idiotēs is the feature proper to a thing and characteristic of it. It need not mean an accidental or merely unusual trait.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic list assigns enclosure to place, interval and number to time, motion to nature, friendship to harmony, and change to body. Thinking according to essence distinguishes soul. The repeated formula organizes the account by characteristic functions and conditions rather than by a single definition imposed on all subjects.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.4.4 A series of distinctive properties differentiates place, time, nature, harmony, body, and soul. *(Edition p. 845.)*

In this edition. "Distinctive property" makes the explanatory role clearer than "peculiarity," which can sound like an exception or oddity.

See also. Nature; Place and space; Proper and one's own; Soul; Time.

Prophet and seer

μάντις, mantis, seer; diviner; prophet[423]

The word. Mantis is a seer or diviner, a person who discloses or interprets divine indications. It need not imply the office denoted by prophētēs in another source.

In Stobaeus. The Ajax excerpt reports a seer's warning that those who think beyond human measure fall under grave divine misfortune. The seer communicates an interpretation of conduct and its consequences. The word identifies the speaker's religious role rather than validating the warning by itself.

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[422] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 282. "Enclosure" follows the reading adopted by Wachsmuth; the rendering of harmony's property as friendship preserves the text's analogy.

[423] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 55–56. The warning is reported within a tragic speech and retains that dramatic setting.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.20 A seer warns against thinking beyond human measure. *(Edition p. 117.)*

In this edition. "Seer" is precise and avoids merging distinct Greek titles under prophet.

See also. Divination; Human being; Insolence and outrage; Measure; Oracle.

Providence

πρόνοια, pronoia, providence; foresight[424]

The word. Pronoia can be foresight or providential care. In a theological argument it may name the ordering governance of the whole; in a practical saying it can simply concern thinking ahead.

In Stobaeus. The opening heading describes God as governing through the rational order of providence. The chapter on the world asks whether the world is governed providentially. A tragic maxim says that foresight destroys thoughtlessness, giving the same noun an ordinary practical force.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.heading Providence belongs to the account of divine governance. *(Edition p. 33.)*

I.21.heading Providential governance is one question about the world. *(Edition p. 493.)*

I.3.4 Foresight is opposed to thoughtlessness in a tragic maxim. *(Edition p. 109.)*

I.3.52 Providence and necessity are compared with the work of Justice. *(Edition p. 133.)*

I.1.35 Divine goodness corrects evils while preserving order. *(Edition p. 83.)*

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[424] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 23, 43, 53, 62–63, 147, 181. The body of chapter 2 is lost. Its restored heading and the explicitly proposed reconstruction in the bilingual edition must not be treated as a complete surviving ancient argument against providence.

I.15.6c A climatic explanation invokes providence only tentatively.
(Edition p. 373.)

Divine ordering in practice. The Hermetic comparison places providence and necessity over divine order and Justice over earthly wrongdoing. Iamblichus gives providential goodness a corrective role that lessens or removes evils while maintaining fate. These passages develop the questions posed by the chapter headings. The climatic report's "perhaps through providence" is deliberately qualified: a conjectural cause in a report must not become a universal explanation asserted by Stobaeus.

In this edition. "Providence" suits the cosmic or divine argument; "foresight" suits the practical maxim. The latter should not be made theological solely because it uses the same noun.

See also. Evil; Fate; God; Good; Justice; Necessity; Order; Reason and account; World.

Pulse

σφυγμός, sphugmos, pulse; throbbing[425]

The word. Sphygmos is a pulse or throbbing movement. Its bodily associations can be extended to explain motion in earth.

In Stobaeus. The earthquake account describes imprisoned vapor producing throbbing and trembling in the ground. Heavy rain seals the earth and compresses the exhalation within it, increasing the force of impact. Pulse here is an image or description of repeated motion, not the observation of an anatomical artery.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.36.2.5 Throbbing characterizes earth disturbed by enclosed vapor.
(Edition p. 741.)

[425] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 250. The sequence is textually disrupted. The edition preserves the printed order while noting a proposed rearrangement.

In this edition. "Throbbing" is clearest in the terrestrial context; "pulse" retains the bodily analogy.

See also. Compaction; Earth; Earthquake; Evaporation and vapor; Motion.

Pungent

δριμύς, drimus, pungent; sharp in taste[426]

The word. Drimys describes pungency or a sharp sensory effect. Here it belongs to the vocabulary of heating tastes.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus compares actions across different senses: effects on the visual stream are related to hot and cold effects on flesh and to astringent and pungent effects on the tongue. Pungency is a member of this comparison, not another name for a visible color.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.2.3 Heating tastes provide an analogy for the physical actions involved in color perception. *(Edition p. 385.)*

In this edition. "Pungent" marks the taste context while "sharp" may need explanation.

See also. Color; Heat; Perception; Taste; Tongue.

Punishment

τιμωρία, timōria, punishment; retribution[427]

The word. Timōria names punishment or retribution; timōros describes an avenging or punishing agent. The passages connect the action with justice and the violation of an order.

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[426] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 150. The passage proposes similar physical actions across different domains of sensation; it does not claim that the sensations are experienced identically.

[427] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 62–65.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic notice appoints Justice to punish those who do wrong on earth, distinguishing subjection to fate through generation from subjection to Justice through wrongdoing. Plato's Laws describes Justice following God and punishing departure from divine law. The proud person's apparent success ends in the ruin of self, household, and city. Punishment thus answers conduct in these passages, not merely the fact of being mortal.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.52 Punishment answers wrongdoing within an ordered universe. *(Edition p. 133.)*

I.3.55a Departure from divine law brings consequences beyond the individual. *(Edition p. 139.)*

In this edition. "Punishment" is kept distinct from pain as an experience. The excerpts do not make every instance of suffering evidence of a particular offense.

See also. Destiny after death; Fate; Justice; Law; Pain.

Pupil of the eye

κόρη, korē, pupil of the eye[428]

The word. Korē can mean a maiden or the pupil of the eye. The anatomical context determines the latter sense here.

In Stobaeus. In the account of Chrysippus, visual pneuma extends from the ruling part as far as the pupil before acting on the surrounding air. The pupil marks a boundary in the description of the visual process. It is not identical with the whole eye or with the ruling psychic power from which the pneuma proceeds.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.52.18 The pupil is the endpoint of the internal course of visual pneuma. *(Edition p. 1639.)*

[428] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 486. The visual cone is conditioned by the intervening air's uniform nature in the reported account.

In this edition. "Pupil" is precise in this context; retain the distinction from the eye as a whole.

See also. Air; Eye; Ruling part; Sight; Visual stream.

Pure and unmixed

εἰλικρινής, eilikrinēs, pure; unmixed; unalloyed[429]

The word. Eilikrinēs describes purity or freedom from admixture. It can apply to physical composition as well as clarity or other qualities.

In Stobaeus. The report about Chrysippus calls the sun pure fire, contrasting it with the moon's two-element composition and earthly compounds involving four elements. Purity here means that only one elemental constituent is assigned, not moral innocence or freedom from embodiment.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.16c.3 The sun's pure fire contrasts with multi-element compounds. *(Edition p. 317.)*

In this edition. "Pure" is direct; "unmixed" makes the compositional claim explicit.

See also. Compound aggregate; Element; Fire; Mixture and blending; Sun.

Purification

κάθαρσις; καθαρός, katharsis; katharos, purification[430]

The word. Katharsis names purification. In the discussion of souls its meaning emerges through distinctions among judgment, punishment, and purification, rather than through a single general metaphor of washing.

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[429] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 129–130. The report is explaining different senses of element. Its astronomical compositions belong to that ancient physical scheme.

[430] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 35–36, 454. The introductory words "each of these things" look back into a larger discussion. The note in the bilingual edition cautions against restricting their reference to the immediately preceding excerpt.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus asks who carries out the three processes and reports that most Pythagoreans and Platonists assign them to individual souls. The discussion presents and compares positions; it does not establish that every author quoted by Stobaeus accepts the same process after death.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.65.3 Judgment, punishment, and purification are distinguished and their agents questioned. *(Edition p. 1509.)*

I.1.29b.4 Purity qualifies both participants and participation in a divine account. *(Edition p. 67.)*

The Platonists. The reported agreement of "most" Pythagoreans and Platonists is qualified wording. The lexicon retains that qualification instead of converting it into a unanimous school doctrine.

Pure and purely. Katharos means pure or clean; katharōs means purely. The report at I.1.29b.4 describes pure participants sharing purely in divine souls. This repeated vocabulary concerns the participants' condition as well as their manner of participation. The surrounding account is textually damaged, so its local language of purity should not be made to support an elaborately reconstructed ritual system.

In this edition. "Purification" preserves the term's place in the argument. It is kept distinct from the punishment or requital named by dikē in the same sentence.

See also. Affection; Being and substance; Destiny after death; Participation; Punishment; Rebirth; Soul; Virtue and excellence.

Purple of sea dye

ἁλουργής; ἁλουργός, halourgēs; halourgos, sea-purple; purple[431]

The word. Halourgēs and related halourgos describe a purple associated with sea dye. The color use does not require a discussion of dye manufacture in every passage.

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[431] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 151, 239. The attested forms belong to related adjectives. The mixture account is an ancient physical explanation, not a tested pigment recipe.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus mixture account produces purple from red, black, and white. The rainbow report uses sea-purple alongside another purple term and distinguishes both from scarlet. The lexicon preserves these lexical contrasts without assigning exact modern color values.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.2.7 Purple is one result in the proposed color mixtures. *(Edition p. 389.)*

I.30.1.6 Sea-purple appears beside a distinct purple word in the rainbow sequence. *(Edition p. 695.)*

In this edition. "Purple" is fluent; "sea-purple" helps distinguish the Greek term when several purple names occur together.

See also. Color; Mixture and blending; Rainbow and halo; Red; Scarlet and crimson.

Pursuit and practice

ἐπιτήδευμα, epitēdeuma, pursuit; practice; occupation[432]

The word. Epitēdeuma is a pursuit, occupation, or practiced way of acting. It can encompass activities not reducible to a formal science.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic narrative credits the recipients of Hermes's teaching with introducing arts, sciences, and pursuits among humans. The threefold list gives pursuits a broad practical range. Their introduction is linked with lawgiving and the establishment of corresponding earthly rites.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.79 Pursuits accompany arts and sciences in the account of human instruction. *(Edition p. 1315.)*

In this edition. "Pursuits" preserves the breadth; "practices" emphasizes habitual activity.

See also. Art and craft; Education; Knowledge; Lawgiver; Sacred rite.

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[432] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 406–407. The account of earthly and heavenly correspondence does not specify a complete ritual system beyond the acts it names.

Pyramid

πυραμίς, puramis, pyramid; tetrahedron in the elemental scheme[433]

The word. Pyramis names a pyramid. In the list of five regular solids, it refers specifically to the tetrahedron.

In Stobaeus. The report associates the pyramid with fire, while assigning cube to earth, octahedron to air, and the remaining figures to water and the whole. The figure is part of a geometrical explanation of elemental constitution. Its sense is not the unrestricted class of pyramids with any polygonal base.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.21.6c.2 The pyramid is the solid associated with fire. *(Edition p. 507.)*

In this edition. Retain "pyramid" in the translation and explain its tetrahedral sense in this scheme.

See also. Cube; Fire; Icosahedron; Octahedron; Solid.

Quality

ποιότης, poiotēs, quality; qualification[434]

The word. Poiotēs names quality. It can describe a bodily determination or the character through which an individual remains the particular being it is.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian account considers matter apart from form and denies it determinate qualities such as color or heaviness in its own definition. The Democritean report denies color to the elements but explains the colors of compounds through arrangement, shape, and position. Posidonius instead discusses the individual quality of Dion or Theon that persists through growth and diminution. These claims operate at different explanatory levels.

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[433] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 186. The scheme resembles the Timaeus but is transmitted here under Pythagoras's name. Part of the list is editorially restored.

[434] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 132, 149, 178.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.11.4.1 Matter considered in itself lacks determinate qualities. *(Edition p. 327.)*

I.16.1.7 Compound appearances are explained through arrangements of unqualified elements. *(Edition p. 381.)*

I.20.7.3 Individual quality persists despite material change. *(Edition p. 481.)*

In this edition. "Quality" does not always mean a readily perceived property. In the last passage it contributes to an account of individual identity.

See also. Color; Growth; Matter; Quantity; Sameness and difference; Shape.

Quantity

ποσόν, poson, quantity; how much[435]

The word. Poson designates quantity or how much something is. Its contrast with quality distinguishes changes of amount from changes of character.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian account of motion groups increase and decrease under quantity, alteration under quality, and locomotion under place. Moderatus describes the monad as the limit reached when subtraction diminishes a numerical multitude. Strato's definition of time as the quantity in motion and rest uses quantity in yet another setting: what is measured need not be a collection of bodily pieces.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.1.5 Quantitative change is distinguished from qualitative and local change. *(Edition p. 433.)*

Arith.8 Subtraction reaches the monad as a boundary of quantity. *(Edition p. 27.)*

I.8.40b.2 Strato's definition connects time with quantity in motion and rest. *(Edition p. 245.)*

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[435] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 21, 103, 162–163.

In this edition. "Quantity" preserves the general category; "amount" can clarify a particular application. The entry does not assume that every quantity is discrete number.

See also. Continuity; Growth; Monad; Number; Quality; Time.

Radiance

αὐγή, augē, radiance; gleam[436]

The word. Augē is radiance or a gleam, the brightness by which something shines or appears illuminated.

In Stobaeus. The quotation from Homer compares shining bronze to the radiance of fire or the rising sun. Its ancient interpreter uses the alternatives to argue that Homer distinguished the sun from fire. The poetic comparison itself and the physical doctrine inferred from it should be kept separate.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.25.7.1 The radiance of fire and sun supplies a Homeric comparison used in a later argument. *(Edition p. 601.)*

In this edition. "Radiance" conveys luminous appearance; it does not identify a particular physical substance.

See also. Fire; Interpretation; Light; Ray; Sun.

Rain and precipitation

ὑετός; ὄμβρος, huetos; ombros, rain; rainfall[437]

The word. Hyetos denotes rain or rainfall. The entry groups it with the neighboring vocabulary of drizzle, dew, frost, snow, and hail because the volume explains their different formation conditions together.

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[436] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 214. The prose interpretation is from the work on Homer transmitted under Plutarch's name and conventionally attributed to Pseudo-Plutarch.

[437] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 111, 242–244.

In Stobaeus. Anaximenes links showers with closely compressed air and cloud. The Aristotelian account derives several forms of precipitation from moist exhalation, then describes rain as condensed vapor returning as water when the raising heat leaves it. Drizzle is distinguished by the small portions into which the falling water is divided.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.31.1 Showers arise through further compression. *(Edition p. 709.)*

I.31.6.1 The moist exhalation underlies the group of phenomena. *(Edition p. 715.)*

I.31.6.2 Rain and drizzle are distinguished by formation and portion size. *(Edition p. 715.)*

I.9.1 Rain joins earth and sky in a poetic image of fertility. *(Edition p. 269.)*

Rain as ombros. Ombros means rain or a shower. In the poem at I.9.1, earth longs for rain and sky longs to pour it down; their union under Aphrodite produces nourishment. The word is embedded in a personification of cosmic fertility. Its physical reference remains rain, while the lovers' language explains the poem's account of productive union.

In this edition. Specific names are preserved where the source distinguishes them. The unusual assignment of snow and hail in the Anaximenes report follows the printed text and is discussed in the bilingual note.

See also. Cloud; Cold; Exhalation; Heat; Love; Nutrition; Water.

Rainbow and halo

Ἶρις; ἅλως, iris; halōs, rainbow; halo[438]

The word. Iris names the rainbow and can also name its divine personification. Halōs names a halo. Their grouping reflects optical explanations that treat them as related appearances.

[438] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 238–240.

In Stobaeus. The opening account distinguishes substantial formations such as rain from appearances such as the rainbow. It then explains reflected sight at droplets and offers sprayed water as a practical comparison. The Aristotelian report gives halos and rainbows a common cause while distinguishing the surfaces and conditions of reflection. The poetic story of Iris belongs to a different mode of explanation within the same chapter.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.30.1.1 The rainbow is classified as an appearance. *(Edition p. 691.)*

I.30.1.8 Sprayed water supplies an observable comparison. *(Edition p. 697.)*

I.30.2.1 Different reflective conditions distinguish related phenomena. *(Edition p. 699.)*

In this edition. The English keeps an optical appearance distinct from a separately existing body. Personification is retained where the source invokes Iris as a figure.

See also. Color; Image; Light; Reflection; Sight.

Ratio and proportion

λόγος; ἀναλογία; συμμετρία; σύμμετρος, logos; analogia; summetria; summetros, ratio; proportion[439]

The word. Logos can mean ratio in a numerical setting; analogia denotes proportion or correspondence of ratios. The Pythagorean report uses symmetria for the proportions it calls harmonies. This mathematical use must be distinguished from speech, argument, or reason.

[439] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 16, 20, 124–125, 180.

In Stobaeus. The arithmetic passage connects harmony with numerical ratios. Aristoxenus' excerpt says that numbers stand in a ratio to one another and presents number as extending beyond commercial calculation. The report under Pythagoras' name identifies the proportions among numbers as harmonies and assigns them a role among principles. In the Timaeus quotation, proportion brings the world's constituents into agreement and friendship.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.2a Numerical ratios ground the interpretation of harmony. *(Edition p. 13.)*

Arith.6 Numbers stand in relations to one another. *(Edition p. 23.)*

I.10.12.10 Proportions are called harmonies and treated as principles. *(Edition p. 303.)*

I.20.9a Proportion brings the world's constituents into agreement. *(Edition p. 489.)*

Proportion and commensurability. Summetros means proportionate or commensurate; summetria names the corresponding relation. The Pythagorean report at I.10.12.10 makes numbers and their proportions, called harmonies, principles. "Proportions" fits this occurrence. A stricter geometrical claim about a common measure should be made only where the context establishes that technical sense.

In this edition. "Ratio" is used when a numerical relation is meant. It should not be replaced by the usual philosophical rendering "reason" solely because the Greek word is logos.

See also. Harmony; Number; Order; Reason and account; Relation.

Rational and irrational

λογικός; ἄλογος; λογιστικόν; λογιστική, logikos; alogos; logistikon; logistikē, rational; nonrational; irrational[440]

The word. Logikos characterizes what possesses or belongs to reason; alogos marks its absence. "Irrational" in this setting need not mean foolish or behaving contrary to one's own judgment.

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[440] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 18, 298, 323, 361–362.

In Stobaeus. The plant notice distinguishes animals with impulse and perception from the subset that also has reason. The Hermetic account attaches desire and spirit to human soul while describing the soul of nonrational creatures through those two powers. Plato's Republic excerpt distinguishes the calculating or rational element from appetite. Classification of creatures and analysis of one soul thus use related language at different levels.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.45.2 Reason belongs to some animals in the reported classification. *(Edition p. 901.)*

I.49.5.4 Human and nonrational souls are distinguished. *(Edition p. 995.)*

I.49.30.4 Reason and appetite are separated within soul. *(Edition p. 1139.)*

I.49.31.1 The reasoning element is distinguished from appetite and spirit. *(Edition p. 1143.)*

Arith.4 The related term logistikē names calculation. *(Edition p. 19.)*

The reasoning element. Logistikon names the reasoning element of the soul. In I.49.31.1, the Republic distinguishes it from appetite and asks whether spirit forms a third element naturally allied with reason. The nearby civic comparison clarifies functions without equating every person with only one part. The related feminine logistikē elsewhere means the art of calculation, a distinct contextual use.

In this edition. "Nonrational" often clarifies a classificatory absence of reason; "irrational" follows established phrasing where a psychic part is under discussion.

See also. Anger and spirit; Desire; Impulse; Reason and account; Reasoning and calculation; Soul.

Ray

ἀκτίς, aktis, ray; beam[441]

The word. Aktis is a ray or beam of light. Different ancient theories explain its origin and physical role differently.

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[441] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 210. The following claim of extinction by cold is printed under the same attribution without a separate heading specifying an eclipse or solstice.

In Stobaeus. The report about Diogenes likens the sun to pumice and describes rays from the aether lodging in it. Rays therefore arrive at the sun within this account, rather than simply issuing from it. The direction of their movement is essential to understanding the unusual explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.25.3c Rays from the aether are received by a porous, pumice-like sun. *(Edition p. 587.)*

In this edition. "Ray" preserves the luminous phenomenon without substituting a modern account of radiation.

See also. Aether; Cold; Heat; Light; Sun.

Rearrangement into other bodies

μετακόσμησις, metakosmēsis, rearrangement; passage into another bodily form[442]

The word. Metakosmēsis is rearrangement or reordering. In the selected account it concerns the soul's relation to successive bodily forms.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry interprets myth as expressing a soul that persists but changes, moving into bodies suited to its pleasures and accustomed life. Rearrangement is therefore compatible with continued existence. The term does not establish that soul becomes a wholly new substance whenever its embodiment changes.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.60.2 An enduring soul undergoes rearrangement into other forms of body. *(Edition p. 1469.)*

In this edition. "Rearrangement into other bodies" makes the local application explicit.

See also. Continuance; Embodiment; Habit and disposition; Pleasure; Rebirth.

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[442] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 445. The author presents an interpretation of teachings associated with Pythagoras and Plato; it is not a direct quotation from either.

Reason and account

λόγος, *logos*, reason; account; ratio; principle; rational order[443]

The word. Logos has a wide range: an account or explanation, reason, a ratio, or a principle expressed in an ordered relation. The argument determines which English word communicates the particular use.

In Stobaeus. The opening heading associates logos with providential governance. The account of Chrysippus calls an explanation a logos of a cause. In the arithmetic material, numbers stand in a logos to one another. These uses share a vocabulary without necessarily sharing a complete theory.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.heading Logos is the rational order of providence. *(Edition p. 33.)*

I.13.1c.3 An explanation is an account of a cause. *(Edition p. 347.)*

Arith.6 Numbers stand in ratios to one another. *(Edition p. 23.)*

I.41.1.11 Reason is distinguished from intellect and from reasoning. *(Edition p. 825.)*

I.1.12b Common reason unifies the world in Cleanthes' hymn. *(Edition p. 41.)*

I.47.9.1 Reason occupies a place in a hierarchy of human life. *(Edition p. 929.)*

The Hermetic writings. At I.41.1.11 logos is in nous, while logismos belongs to human beings. The edition gives "reason," "intellect," and "reasoning," allowing the three Greek expressions to remain distinct.

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[443] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 20, 23, 25–26, 138–139, 275, 305. This is a selected guide to philosophical uses, not a list of every ordinary occurrence of logos or every English expression into which it enters.

Cosmic and embodied uses. Cleanthes' hymn calls the reason running through everything common and connects it with the ordering of good and bad. The Hermetic account instead places reason within a hierarchy of intellect, soul, spirit, and body. These are particular relations expressed by logos, not interchangeable definitions. The reader should distinguish the explanatory account offered by a speaker from a rational principle that the account says operates in the world.

In this edition. Contextual renderings include "reason," "account," "ratio," and "principle." "Rational order" expresses the opening heading. A single English replacement would conceal important differences.

See also. Cause; Intellect; Law; Number; Principle; Providence; Ratio and proportion; Rational and irrational; Thought; Voice.

Reasoning and calculation

λογισμός, logismos, reasoning; calculation; deliberative thought[444]

The word. Logismos is the activity of reasoning or calculating. It is related to logos but often emphasizes a process or exercise rather than an account or principle.

In Stobaeus. In the Hermetic account, reasoning supplies what desire lacks and brings it into a settled relation with soul, producing self-control. A separate account associates reasoning with memory gathered through images into universal judgments. These uses explain why calculation is not limited to arithmetic.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.4.1 Reasoning orders desire and supplies its deficiency. *(Edition p. 989.)*

I.49.54.6 Reasoning gathers memory through images into universal judgments. *(Edition p. 1399.)*

[444] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 321–322, 428. The two selected accounts have distinct settings and should not be combined into one unqualified faculty theory.

In this edition. "Reasoning" suits the psychic operation; "calculation" belongs where reckoning is foregrounded.

See also. Memory; Reason and account; Self-control and temperance; Thought; Universal.

Rebirth

παλιγγενεσία; ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, palingenesia; anabiōskesthai, rebirth; renewed coming-to-be[445]

The word. Palingenesia denotes renewed birth or coming-to-be. Its sense depends on whether the account is narrating embodiment or interpreting a cycle through myth.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic narrative presents bodily embodiment as a consequence of earlier deeds and distinguishes rebirths through the bodies assigned. The passage about release is damaged and cannot establish every detail of the promised restoration. Porphyry interprets Circe as the circular course of rebirth, joining destruction to birth and birth to destruction. This is the commentator's allegory, not a separate literal assertion by Homer.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.46 Different rebirths involve different bodies within a narrative of recompense. *(Edition p. 1283.)*

I.49.60.5 Circe is interpreted as the circuit linking birth and destruction. *(Edition p. 1473.)*

I.49.8.7 Coming back to life is proposed as the process balancing dying. *(Edition p. 1013.)*

Coming back to life. Anabiōskesthai means to come back to life. In I.49.8.7, the Phaedo's argument requires a process opposite to dying so that nature is not "lame" in one direction. The verb states the return whose necessity is being argued. It does not yet give a detailed account of its mechanism or the particular body in which a soul returns.

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[445] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 328, 398, 446.

In this edition. "Rebirth" preserves renewed embodiment where that is the context. The entry distinguishes a mythical speech from an allegorical interpretation of poetry.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Contrary; Death; Destiny after death; Justice; Punishment; Soul.

Rebound and vibration

ἀποπαλμός; παλμός, apopalmos; palmos, rebound; vibration; pulsation[446]

The word. Apopalmos is a rebound or springing back; palmos is a shaking or vibration. The compound is especially useful where motion follows a blow.

In Stobaeus. The account of Epicurus distinguishes the atoms' downward movement, their swerve, and upward motion resulting from impact and rebound. Rebound belongs to the mechanics of collision. It must not be confused with the unforced deviation introduced under the separate heading of the swerve.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1f.2 Impact and rebound explain an upward motion of atoms. *(Edition p. 359.)*

In this edition. "Rebound" suits apopalmos in this passage. "Vibration" is a broader rendering of the word family, not a claim that this sentence describes periodic oscillation.

See also. Atom; Impact; Motion; Swerve; Weight.

[446] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 142. The preceding clause about weight is disturbed. The contrast between the swerve and motion caused by a blow remains important despite that uncertainty.

Receptacle

ὑποδοχή, hupodochē, receptacle; receiving condition[447]

The word. Hypodochē names reception or what receives. Its local object must be identified before importing a familiar cosmological interpretation.

In Stobaeus. In the Hermetic account of development in the womb, harmony fits the movement of growth to receive the life of thought. The receptacle here belongs to the transition from growing life to a life capable of thinking. The surrounding pronouns are uncertain, so the passage should not be made into a more exact physiology than its wording permits.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.7.4 The movement of growth is fitted as a receptacle for thinking life. *(Edition p. 871.)*

In this edition. "Receptacle" expresses receptivity without deciding that the thing described is a container with fixed spatial boundaries.

See also. Embryo; Harmony; Matter; Nurse of becoming; Thought.

Recollection

ἀνάμνησις, anamnēsis, recollection[448]

The word. Anamnēsis denotes recollection. In the Phaedo passages it names the proposed recovery involved in learning and therefore supports an argument about soul before embodiment.

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[447] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 290. The referent of "this" and the following grammatical subject remain uncertain. This occurrence is not the Timaeus's cosmological receptacle.

[448] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 333–335.

In Stobaeus. Socrates asks whether the interlocutors still accept that learning is recollection and that soul consequently existed before being placed in a body. Simmias accepts this while reconsidering the competing account of soul as harmony. He then rejects the harmony claim because the two explanations do not fit together. Recollection here is an argumentative commitment with consequences, not simply another word for everyday remembering.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.13.1 Learning as recollection implies prior existence of soul. *(Edition p. 1037.)*

I.49.13.5 Acceptance of recollection excludes the competing harmony account. *(Edition p. 1041.)*

In this edition. "Recollection" preserves the connection between learning and prior possession. The entry does not add an account of innate knowledge beyond the argument quoted.

See also. Harmony; Knowledge; Memory; Rebirth; Soul.

Recompense

ἀμοιβή, amoibē, return; recompense; exchange[449]

The word. Amoibē is a return, exchange, or recompense. Its moral character depends on what is given and what comes back.

In Stobaeus. The tragic couplet says that evil designs yield evil returns to mortals under fate. The verb of reaping adds an agricultural image to the exchange: the consequence corresponds to the intention sown. The saying does not specify a legal procedure or a named agent administering the return.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.8 Evil designs are said to produce evil recompense. *(Edition p. 109.)*

[449] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 53. The poet is unidentified in the adopted heading; the two verses should not receive a conjectural author as though certain.

In this edition. "Returns" preserves the broad relation; "recompense" makes the consequence of conduct explicit.

See also. Deed and work; Evil; Fate; Intent and purpose; Retribution.

Red

ἐρυθρός, eruthros, red[450]

The word. Erythros is red. Nearby terms can identify fiery, golden, or scarlet shades without sharing exactly the same range.

In Stobaeus. The Pythagorean report includes red among the principal colors. In the Timaeus quotation, red mixed with black and white produces purple, while a distinct term, pyrrhos, names a fiery red in another mixture. Maintaining the lexical distinctions allows readers to follow the source's sequence.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.1.2 Red belongs to the reported fourfold color classification. *(Edition p. 379.)*

I.16.2.7 Red and flame red have different places in the mixture account. *(Edition p. 389.)*

In this edition. "Red" should remain distinct from "flame red" where the Greek changes its term.

See also. Black; Color; Mixture and blending; Scarlet and crimson; White.

Reflected light

ἀνταύγεια, antaugeia, reflected light; reflection[451]

The word. Antaugeia is an answering or reflected brightness. It can name the luminous appearance rather than the reflecting surface.

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[450] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 148, 151. Modern shade boundaries are not assumed; the renderings primarily preserve contrasts made within the ancient account.

[451] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 210. The printed "crystal-like sun" is retained. Replacing it with heaven would silently resolve a textual and interpretive difficulty.

In Stobaeus. The report about Empedocles distinguishes an original fiery sun from the visible sun as its reflection. The account connects earth, a crystal-like sun, and a moving fiery hemisphere in a compressed explanation. The distinction between original light and visible reflection is clearer than the exact arrangement of all the reflecting surfaces.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.25.3e.1 The visible sun is explained as a reflection of an original fire. *(Edition p. 589.)*

In this edition. "Reflection" or "reflected light" suits the context; preserve the distinction from the original source.

See also. Appearance in reflection; Fire; Radiance; Reflection; Sun.

Reflection

ἀνάκλασις, anaklasis, reflection[452]

The word. Anaklasis names a turning or bending back. In optical discussions the thing reflected may be sight itself; that language is part of the explanation.

In Stobaeus. The account of the rainbow describes sight striking droplets and being reflected. The Aristotelian report groups rainbows, halos, mock suns, and related appearances by their shared cause, while distinguishing reflecting surfaces and conditions. A comet theory likewise compares the appearance with mirrors. The connection is explanatory, not evidence that all these phenomena are one kind of object.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.30.1.5 Reflected sight at droplets explains the rainbow. *(Edition p. 693.)*

I.30.2.1 Several appearances share a cause but differ in conditions. *(Edition p. 699.)*

I.28.1a.1 Mirror-like reflection appears as a comet theory. *(Edition p. 649.)*

[452] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 227, 239–240.

In this edition. The translation preserves "sight" where the source says sight. It does not automatically replace the ancient formulation with incoming light rays.

See also. Image; Light; Rainbow and halo; Sight.

Regimen

δίαιτα, diaita, way of life; regimen[453]

The word. Diaita is a manner of living or regimen, including activities and habits as well as food and drink.

In Stobaeus. The blessed region is characterized by a pleasant way of life with cultivated company, feasts, music, and freedom from pain. In the bodily discussion, changing a regimen can disturb an acquired adaptation. The broader meaning connects the passages without reducing either to a list of foods.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.47.5 A pleasant way of life completes the description of the pious region. *(Edition p. 1351.)*

I.47.7.2 Regimen includes food, drink, and exertion in bodily habituation. *(Edition p. 919.)*

In this edition. "Way of life" suits the afterlife description; "regimen" suits the account of bodily habits.

See also. Habit and disposition; Health; Life; Nutrition; Pleasure.

Relation

πρός τι; σχέσις, pros ti; schesis, relation; in relation to something[454]

The word. Pros ti literally means in relation to something. Its occurrence must be read in its sentence: it need not always introduce a formal category of relatives.

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[453] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 302–303, 415–416. The pairing of poets' gatherings and philosophers' theaters follows this edition's wording, despite a different pairing in the parallel text.

[454] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 72–73, 281–282, 285.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account of soul distinguishes moving in something, in relation to something, and for the sake of something. It denies these conditions to the soul's own movement and then associates them with place, time, nature, harmony, form, shape, and body. Another Hermetic passage describes activities constituted in relation to something or for a purpose as unable to remain idle in their proper activity.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.4.1 Relations conditioning bodily motion are distinguished from the soul's own movement. *(Edition p. 843.)*

I.41.6.4 Relative and purposive constitution entails continued activity. *(Edition p. 853.)*

I.4.7c.2 The maker's relation to matter enters a report about necessity. *(Edition p. 161.)*

The relation of maker to matter. Schesis can describe how one thing stands toward another. In I.4.7c.2, the report about Plato identifies necessity at one point with the maker's relation to matter. That interpretation is distinct from the ensuing quotation from the Timaeus. "Relation" preserves the connection between the two terms without turning it into a separately existing substance.

In this edition. The English retains the prepositional distinctions, including their unusual application. It does not silently replace them with a textbook list of categories.

See also. Activity; Demiurge and craftsman; End; Form; Matter; Motion; Necessity; Self motion.

Release

ἀπαλλαγή; ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι; ἀπόλυσις, apallagē; apallassesthai; apolusis, release; separation; departure[455]

The word. Apallagē is release or departure; the related verb describes becoming free of or separating from something.

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[455] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 311, 454. The witness contains a verbal form of release. Its elemental explanation should not be mistaken for a modern account of the body's composition.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic passage says that intellect, released from its earthen body, puts on its own fiery tunic. Release is followed by another mode of clothing, so it is not presented as the disappearance of every vehicle or garment. The distinction matters within this particular account of embodiment.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.3.3 Release from the earthen body is followed by the fiery tunic. *(Edition p. 953.)*

I.49.65.2 Intellect is said not to need release from superfluous accretions. *(Edition p. 1507.)*

Release from what is superfluous. Apolusis means release or loosening. I.49.65.2 reports a view that essential reason and intellect never need perfection or release from what is superfluous, while purification concerns lower psychic activities. The denial is crucial: the passage names a release that this account says intellect does not require.

In this edition. "Release" fits the separation; specify what is left behind and what remains.

See also. Embodiment; Fire; Freedom; Garment of soul and intellect; Intellect; Purification.

Repletion

πλήρωσις, plērōsis, filling; replenishment; repletion[456]

The word. Plērōsis is filling or replenishment. It emphasizes restoration where a deficiency has arisen.

In Stobaeus. The Philebus contrasts hunger with eating that replenishes, and thirst with moisture refilling what has dried out. Pleasure is explained through a return toward the natural condition after depletion. Repletion therefore belongs to a relational account of loss and restoration rather than simply meaning excessive fullness.

[456] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 308. The account gives a proposed general explanation through familiar examples; it does not identify every pleasure with a single bodily process.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.13.2 Eating and drinking restore losses and illustrate pleasure. *(Edition p. 939.)*

In this edition. "Replenishment" is usually clearer than "repletion," which can suggest overfilling in modern English.

See also. Emptying and depletion; Hunger; Nature; Pleasure; Thirst.

Resemblance and imitation

ὁμοίωμα; μιμεῖσθαι; ὁμοίωσις; ὁμοιότης; ἀνόμοιος; ἀνομοιότης, homoiōma; mimeisthai; homoiōsis; homoiotēs; anomoios; anomoiotēs, likeness; resemblance; imitation[457]

The word. Homoiōma is a likeness; mimeisthai means to imitate. Their related vocabulary describes a connection whose strength varies with the objects compared.

In Stobaeus. The Parmenides proposal treats forms as patterns and the things resembling them as likenesses, explaining participation through being made like. The interpretation of Homer compares souls with reflections that resemble people and imitate their movements while lacking solid substance. A later account says that divine bodies imitate intellect. None of these relations requires the likeness to have every property of its original.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.2b Resemblance is proposed as an explanation of participation. *(Edition p. 339.)*

I.49.50.11 Reflections imitate movements without possessing solidity. *(Edition p. 1369.)*

I.49.40.2 Divine bodies are described as imitating intellect. *(Edition p. 1215.)*

I.20.6.2 Natural and artificial things provide likenesses of a principle. *(Edition p. 475.)*

I.1.29b.8 An unusual list places likenesses among imperishable kinds. *(Edition p. 73.)*

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[457] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 38, 67–68, 136, 176–177, 379, 420.

I.3.56c Dissimilarity of two sides is visible within one undivided body. *(Edition p. 147.)*

Likeness as representation. Homoiōsis can name a likeness as well as a process of becoming like. In I.20.6.2, images and likenesses of the first principle occur among natural products and artifacts. Here the plural points to representations or analogues, not necessarily to a moral exercise of assimilation to God.

The noun homoiotēs. Homoiotēs is likeness or similarity. The unusual Epicurean report at I.1.29b.8 lists likenesses among imperishable kinds and then associates them with like-parted constituents. The wording must be acknowledged as transmitted rather than silently repaired into a familiar account of Epicurean images or Anaxagorean matter.

Dissimilarity within a whole. Anomoios means unlike; the related noun anomoiotēs names dissimilarity. The latter describes the visibly different male and female sides of a single statue in the account quoted by Porphyry from Bardisanes. Difference here coexists with bodily unity. The description does not itself identify the statue's deity, and its final explanatory wording is textually questioned.

In this edition. "Likeness" and "imitation" preserve the asserted relation without making it identity. The Parmenides passage remains a proposal within a debate.

See also. Body; Form; Homogeneous parts; Idea; Image; Participation; Principle; Sameness and difference.

Resistance

ἀντέρεισις, antereisis, resistance; counterpressure[458]

The word. Antereisis is resistance or pressure offered against something. It helps distinguish physical body from geometrical extension in the selected definition.

[458] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 141. This definition is the reported account in the excerpt; other theories of mixture in the volume permit different relations between bodies.

In Stobaeus. The account observes that three dimensions belong to place as well as body. Body therefore also needs resistance and exclusion of another body from the same place. Resistance supplies a physical criterion beyond length, breadth, and depth.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1c.2 Resistance distinguishes body from place despite their shared dimensionality. *(Edition p. 355.)*

In this edition. "Resistance" is clear; it should not be confused with psychological opposition in this physical definition.

See also. Body; Dimension and distance; Impact; Place and space; Quantity.

Rest

στάσις; ἀνάπαυλα, stasis; anapaula, rest; stillness[459]

The word. Stasis expresses rest or stillness; anapaula denotes repose or a respite from activity. The opposite of movement may be a stable state, a fixed point, or repose relative to particular bodily operations.

In Stobaeus. The report about Aristotle defines nature through motion and rest. The Hermetic discussion of the Bears describes circular movement held within bounds by stillness, so a stable reference and a moving circuit coexist. The Hermetic passage on sleep calls for bodily rest, while the next explains sleep's activity. The relevant contrast must therefore be identified before rest is equated with complete inactivity.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.11.4.1 Rest enters the conceptual definition of nature. *(Edition p. 327.)*

I.19.2.3 Circular motion is held in place by stillness. *(Edition p. 437.)*

I.41.8.4 Bodies require periods of repose. *(Edition p. 875.)*

[459] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 132, 164, 291.

In this edition. "Rest" and "stillness" preserve different emphases. Neither necessarily means that every power of the resting being has ceased to operate.

See also. Activity; Circular motion; Motion; Nature; Sleep.

Retribution

τίσις, tisis, retribution; requital[460]

The word. Tisis is requital or retribution, often the payment exacted for wrongdoing.

In Stobaeus. The dream-message to Hipparchus declares that no wrongdoer will escape paying retribution. Repeated language of endurance frames the warning as something to be suffered. Its force arises within a historian's account of an ominous dream, not a philosophical demonstration supplied in the excerpt.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.51 A dream-message links wrongdoing with unavoidable requital. *(Edition p. 133.)*

In this edition. "Retribution" captures the punitive return; "payment" preserves the associated verbal image.

See also. Correction and chastisement; Dream; Injustice; Necessity; Recompense.

Return and turning back

ἐπιστροφή, epistrophē, turning toward; return; reorientation[461]

The word. Epistrophē is a turning or orientation toward something. Its direction is not inherently upward or liberating.

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[460] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 62. The excerpt is from Herodotus's narrative of Hipparchus's dream before the Panathenaea.

[461] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 343. Apatheia in the second clause means freedom from these affections, not ordinary modern apathy or lack of care.

In Stobaeus. The maxim says that soul is bound to body by turning toward bodily affections and released through freedom from them. Here the turn creates attachment rather than ascent. The object of the preposition is therefore essential: a general doctrine of return to the divine cannot replace this local sense.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.18 Turning toward bodily affections binds soul to body. *(Edition p. 1077.)*

In this edition. "Turning toward" is more accurate here than an unexplained "return."

See also. Affection; Ascent; Attachment; Bond; Release.

Riddle and allusion

αἴνιγμα, ainigma, riddle; enigmatic expression; allusion[462]

The word. Ainigma is an enigmatic saying or representation whose meaning requires interpretation. The cognate verb can mean to hint at something through such a representation.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry reads a myth as an enigmatic statement about the soul, connecting Pythagorean and Platonic teaching with its imperishability and its susceptibility to change. Pleasure and habit help explain altered embodiment. The interpretive claim belongs to Porphyry's reading; it is not direct proof that every detail of the myth originally carried that philosophical intention.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.60.2 A myth is interpreted as an allusion to the soul's changing condition. *(Edition p. 1469.)*

In this edition. "Riddle" emphasizes concealed expression; "allusion" suits the act of intimating a doctrine through narrative.

See also. Habit and disposition; Interpretation; Myth; Rebirth; Soul.

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[462] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 445. An allegorical interpretation must be distinguished from a literal retelling and from an independently established account of an earlier poet's intention.

Rising

ἀνατολή, anatolē, rising; sunrise; east[463]

The word. Anatolē is rising, especially that of a heavenly body, and can also designate the eastern direction associated with sunrise.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic geographical account connects repeated sunrise with heating and disturbance in the east. It then attributes corresponding effects to people born there. The term identifies the physical phenomenon invoked by the argument; it does not establish the validity of the account's claims about regional human character.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.45.22 Sunrise supplies the account's explanation of eastern heat. *(Edition p. 1337.)*

I.25.5.2 Rising marks the endpoints of a complete daily circuit. *(Edition p. 599.)*

In this edition. Use "rising" for the event and "east" where a direction is intended.

See also. Geographical inclination; Heat; Rising of a star; Setting; Sun.

Rising of a star

ἐπιτολή, epitolē, rising of a star[464]

The word. Epitolē is a rising or appearance above the horizon, used here of stars. A more specific astronomical sense needs further contextual evidence.

In Stobaeus. The report links weather signs in winter and summer with stellar risings and settings. These appearances provide a framework for recognizing seasonal conditions. The brief statement does not specify a detailed observational definition for every rising, so "heliacal rising" would be more precise than the surviving wording warrants.

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[463] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 213, 412–413. The passage's expression for mental attention is difficult, and its southwest is retained even though treated as opposite sunrise.

[464] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 203–204. The preceding list gives an ordering of heavenly bodies ascribed to Plato in this report; it differs from the ordering in the Timaeus.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.24.11.2 Stellar risings and settings are associated with seasonal weather signs. *(Edition p. 567.)*

In this edition. "Rising" preserves the report's level of specificity.

See also. Fixed stars; Rising; Season; Setting; Sign.

River

ποταμός, potamos, river[465]

The word. Potamos is a river, whether in descriptions of the inhabited world or in narratives of the underworld.

In Stobaeus. The afterlife account names Acheron and Cocytus as rivers to be crossed before judgment. They structure a journey through successive boundaries and lead to the Plain of Truth. Their narrative role should not be confused with an assertion that they have been located within ordinary surveyed geography.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.47.3 Underworld rivers mark stages before the soul's judgment. *(Edition p. 1349.)*

I.40.1.11 Rivers belong to the varied living landscape of earth. *(Edition p. 771.)*

In this edition. "River" is direct; preserve names where the route depends on a particular river.

See also. Destiny after death; Judge; Lake; Stream and current; Water.

[465] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 258, 415. The Greek shifts from singular to plural travelers; the English uses a generalized individual to carry the sequence.

Root

ῥίζα; ῥίζωμα, rhiza; rhizōma, root; foundation; source[466]

The word. Rhiza is a root, with rhizōma a related formation. The image can name a generative foundation in arithmetic or cosmology as well as the root of a plant.

In Stobaeus. The Pythagorean oath calls the tetractys the source and root of ever-flowing nature. In its arithmetic setting, the first four numbers yield ten through their sum. "Root" thus expresses foundational and productive importance; it is not the modern mathematical operation of extracting a square root.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.11 The tetractys is praised as nature's source and root. *(Edition p. 305.)*

In this edition. "Root" preserves the image without replacing it with the more abstract "principle."

See also. Nature; Number; Principle; Tetractys.

Rough

τραχύς, trachus, rough[467]

The word. Trachys is rough; its comparative and related verbs describe greater roughness or an action that roughens.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus account explains astringent and austere tastes through earthy particles contracting and drying the tongue's small vessels. Greater roughness produces the stronger astringent effect, while less roughening produces the weaker taste. A tactile vocabulary thus contributes to the ancient explanation of taste.

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[466] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 125. The sum is 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10. The passage should not be explained as though the tetractys meant the square of four.

[467] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 494. "Austere" here describes a taste, not moral severity. The physiological mechanism belongs to the ancient account.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.55.2.2 Different degrees of roughening distinguish two contracting tastes. *(Edition p. 1673.)*

In this edition. "Rough" preserves the proposed physical action; the taste terms need their own explanation.

See also. Dryness; Earth; Smooth; Taste; Tongue.

Rule and kingship

βασιλεία, basileia, kingship; royal rule[468]

The word. Basileia is kingship or royal rule. It can extend to supremacy within a field as well as political sovereignty.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account distinguishes rule over souls, bodies, art, knowledge, and other things, relating earthly condition to the zone from which a soul descends. Kingship therefore has a deliberately varied range. Not every instance in the list describes a territorial monarchy.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.69.18 Several forms of kingship correspond to differing domains. *(Edition p. 1559.)*

In this edition. "Kingship" preserves the royal image; "rule" is useful when explaining its extension.

See also. Art and craft; Descent; King; Knowledge; Ruler.

Ruler

ἄρχων, archōn, ruler; governing agent[469]

The word. Archōn is one who rules. The term can designate a political officeholder or a governing power in another domain.

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[468] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 466. The construction linking a royal zone with a corresponding condition is difficult; the English gives a provisional sense without altering the Greek.

[469] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 274. The phrase about the defeated parts being bereft of themselves and their ruler is difficult and remains unrepaired in the adopted text.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic struggle between one and two parts refers to their ruler within an account of inward victory and ascent. The vocabulary of rule describes psychic organization. Its difficult wording should not be used to invent a named class of cosmic archons absent from the passage.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.1.6 A ruler appears within the account of psychic contest and ascent. *(Edition p. 821.)*

In this edition. "Ruler" keeps the functional meaning without adding an office or hierarchy not specified.

See also. Ascent; Rule and kingship; Ruling part; Self-control and temperance; Soul.

Ruling part

ἡγεμονικόν, hēgemonikon, ruling part; ruling faculty[470]

The word. The neuter substantive names what directs or rules. It can identify a controlling part or faculty, but neither its location nor its relation to other powers is settled by the word alone.

In Stobaeus. The chapter on the world asks where its ruling part is, alongside questions about soul, nourishment, and providence. The report of Alcmaeon places the ruling faculty in the brain and uses it to explain smell through inhalation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.21.heading The location of the world's ruling part is posed as a question. *(Edition p. 493.)*

I.54.1 The ruling faculty is placed in the brain in Alcmaeon's account of smell. *(Edition p. 1663.)*

[470] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 181, 492. The English at I.54.1 takes "by this" as referring to the ruling faculty located in the brain. The source's concise wording remains open to inspection on the facing page.

In this edition. "Ruling part" retains the structural question; "ruling faculty" can better express a cognitive function. The singular Greek in I.54.1 is retained.

See also. Brain; Heart; Intellect; Perception; Power and capacity; Smell; Soul; World.

Sacred

ἱερός, hieros, sacred; holy; sacred matters[471]

The word. Hieros describes what is sacred or belongs to religious observance. The substantival plural can mean sacred matters or rites.

In Stobaeus. Diotima's account places the art of sacred matters within the mediation connecting gods and humans. Sacrifices, initiations, and incantations are among its activities. The adjective therefore identifies a field of practice rather than declaring that every practitioner has an identical moral or metaphysical status.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.17.2 Sacred practices operate through the mediating daimonic realm. *(Edition p. 287.)*

In this edition. "Sacred" is broadly suitable; "holy" may carry associations unnecessary to the passage.

See also. Divine spirit; Incantation; Initiation; Sacred rite; Sacrifice.

Sacred image

ἄγαλμα, agalma, sacred image; divine image[472]

The word. Agalma can denote an image, especially one associated with a god. The context supplies its sacred role.

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[471] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 118. The speaker's contrast with the mere artisan expresses a hierarchy of expertise within the speech, not a neutral description of all crafts.

[472] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 68–69. The account is mediated through Bardisanes and Porphyry; the report's extraordinary material claims are preserved as testimony.

In Stobaeus. Bardisanes's reported inquiry describes a seated divine image on the head of the larger statue. The two objects should remain distinct: the larger statue's material and mixed bodily features are discussed separately from the image above it. The deity represented is not named in the excerpt.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.56e A seated image of a god rests on the larger statue. *(Edition p. 149.)*

In this edition. "Image of a god" is explicit and avoids an unsupported identification.

See also. God; Image and likeness; Sacred; Shape; Statue.

Sacred rite

ἱεροποιία, hieropoiia, sacred rite; ritual performance[473]

The word. Hieropoiia is the performance or establishment of sacred acts. The compound emphasizes making or doing what is sacred.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic teachers establish rites on earth corresponding to heavenly mysteries, after learning the creator's ordinance that lower things share in the affections of higher ones. Ritual action is thus grounded in a proposed cosmic correspondence. The text does not give a complete manual of its performance.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.79 Earthly sacred rites are aligned with heavenly mysteries. *(Edition p. 1315.)*

In this edition. "Sacred rites" is clear; "ritual performance" emphasizes the activity rather than its institution.

See also. Demiurge and craftsman; Initiation; Mysteries; Sacred; Sympathy.

[473] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 406–407. The adjective describing the relation suggests alignment or perpendicular correspondence; the translation does not supply an additional ritual system.

Sacrifice

θυσία, thusia, sacrifice; sacrificial offering[474]

The word. Thysia is sacrifice or a sacrificial observance. The word by itself does not specify every material or action involved.

In Stobaeus. The civic analogy lists sacrifices to gods beside rites for heroes and libations for the dead. These different activities coexist under one lawful authority, illustrating how a community's diverse actions can form an order. Sacrifice is one distinct item in that coordinated religious life.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.36b Sacrifices participate in the city's varied but ordered activities. *(Edition p. 85.)*

I.9.17.2 Sacrifices are conveyed through divine-human mediation. *(Edition p. 287.)*

In this edition. "Sacrifice" is appropriate without supplying an unmentioned victim or procedure.

See also. City; Divine spirit; Hero; Law; Sacred rite.

Saline taste

ἁλυκός, halukos, salty; saline[475]

The word. Halukos means salty or saline. It names a taste or a quality of substances encountered by the tongue.

In Stobaeus. The Timaean account distinguishes a moderate cleansing action producing saltiness from a more forceful action associated with bitterness. Saltiness is described as less harsh and more agreeable in this comparison. The explanation classifies effects on the tongue, not simply a list of chemical substances.

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[474] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 43–44, 118. The civic comparison comes from On the Cosmos, transmitted under Aristotle's name, and includes a quotation from Sophocles.

[475] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 494. The comparison with natron belongs to the ancient explanation of cleansing action. It does not establish an identity between every salty substance and natron.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.55.2.4 Moderate cleansing is associated with a salty taste. *(Edition p. 1673.)*

In this edition. "Salty" is direct; "saline" is useful when the adjective qualifies a substance or quality rather than the immediate sensation.

See also. Bitter; Purification; Sweet; Taste; Tongue.

Salt

ἅλς, hals, salt; salts[476]

The word. Hals can denote salt; its forms must be read in context because related inflections also occur in the vocabulary of the sea.

In Stobaeus. The account of water's properties attributes the solidification of salts and alkalis to admixture with hot, smoky exhalation. Salt is one material product among several whose qualities the theory seeks to explain. The plural need not designate a modern chemical classification of salts.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.39.1.2 Salts and alkalis illustrate solidification through an admixture. *(Edition p. 757.)*

In this edition. "Salts" follows the plural without identifying exact compounds unsupported by the passage.

See also. Exhalation; Freezing and solidification; Mixture and blending; Taste; Water.

[476] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 254. The report is an epitome with its own wording, not a verbatim quotation of the parallel discussion in Aristotle.

Sameness and difference

ταὐτόν; ἕτερον, tauton; heteron, the same; the different; other[477]

The word. Tauton means the same; heteron means different or other. Arguments using them often specify the respect in which something is the same or differs.

In Stobaeus. The Republic excerpt insists that contrary actions cannot belong to the same thing at the same time, through the same part, and toward the same object. The archer's two hands explain why apparently opposed movements need not violate this rule. Posidonius considers another problem: an individually qualified being remains itself while its material increases or decreases. Identity across change is not identical with absence of every difference.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.30.2 The qualifications of sameness distinguish contrary psychic impulses. *(Edition p. 1137.)*

I.20.7.3 Individual quality persists through material growth and loss. *(Edition p. 481.)*

In this edition. The qualifications attached to "same" are retained. "Other" and "different" follow whether the passage distinguishes another item or a contrasting character.

See also. Change and alteration; Desire; Growth; Part and whole; Quality.

Scarlet and crimson

φοινικοῦς, phoinikous, scarlet; crimson[478]

The word. Phoinikous designates a strong red shade, rendered scarlet in the rainbow account. It should be distinguished from the separate purple terms beside it.

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[477] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 178, 360.

[478] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 239. The sequence differs from the Aristotelian account quoted nearby. The two sequences should remain separate.

In Stobaeus. The report divides the rainbow into differently colored regions, assigning phoinikoun to the first and sea-purple and purple to the second. Treating all these words as "purple" would erase the report's own distinctions. The vocabulary describes color appearances reflected in droplets.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.30.1.6 Scarlet is distinguished from the two purple expressions and from blue and green. *(Edition p. 695.)*

In this edition. "Scarlet" preserves the adopted translation; "crimson" indicates the broader red range without prescribing a modern shade.

See also. Color; Dark blue; Green; Rainbow and halo; Red.

School and choosing

αἵρεσις, hairesis, position; school; choosing[479]

The word. Hairesis is choosing or a chosen position and can name a school or philosophical approach. It does not invariably mean a historically organized sect.

In Stobaeus. The soul survey distinguishes reported Aristotelian explanations from a position that could plausibly be proposed but has not been handed down. Calling that alternative a hairesis does not make it an attested school. Its hypothetical status is expressly stated.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.32.4 A possible but untransmitted position is distinguished from reported doctrines. *(Edition p. 1149.)*

In this edition. "Position" is accurate here; "school" would overstate its historical attestation.

See also. Choice; Doctrine and conviction; Hypothesis; Quality; Soul.

[479] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 363. The final account of qualities and their totality is textually compressed; its status as a possible proposal is nevertheless explicit.

Sea and tides

θάλασσα; ἄμπωτις; πλήμμυρα, thalassa; ampōtis; plēmmyra, sea; ebb; flood; tides[480]

The word. Thalassa is the sea. Ampōtis names the withdrawing ebb, and plēmmyra the advancing flood. The terms distinguish opposite movements within the tidal cycle.

In Stobaeus. The chapter on the sea itself has lost its running text. The surviving tidal notices offer different causes: Aristotle and Heraclides are assigned an account in which sun-driven winds move the Atlantic sea, whereas Pytheas relates the two tidal effects to the moon's filling and waning. The brief lunar report supplies no detailed timetable or mechanism.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.37.heading The sea chapter survives as a heading with missing text. *(Edition p. 749.)*

I.38.1 Sun-driven winds explain advancing and retreating water. *(Edition p. 751.)*

I.38.3 Pytheas relates the effects to the moon. *(Edition p. 753.)*

In this edition. "Flood" and "ebb" describe opposite movements. The lost sea chapter cannot supply an explanation of salinity beyond the question preserved in its restored heading.

See also. Moon; Sun; Water; Wind.

Season

ὥρα; ἔαρ; θέρος; φθινόπωρον, hōra; ear; theros; phthinopōron, season; appropriate time[481]

The word. Hōra is a season or a time appropriate to an activity. Context determines whether it refers to part of a year, a stage of life, or another fitting interval.

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[480] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 252.

[481] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 15, 69–70, 101, 106–107. The account is mediated through reported testimony; its descriptions should retain that narrative distance.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry's report of the Brahmans describes gatherings during summer and around autumn, when fruit is abundant. Hōra here locates activity within the year and its natural conditions. An appointed day is also mentioned, but the excerpt does not provide enough information to reconstruct a detailed festival calendar.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.56g Seasonal abundance accompanies journeys to a communal gathering. *(Edition p. 151.)*

I.8.42.5 The seasons are defined through heat, cold, and their mixtures. *(Edition p. 255.)*

I.8.39.1 Spring is one of four seasons offered for comparison. *(Edition p. 241.)*

Arith.1 Summer is recognized through the heavenly signs taught by Prometheus. *(Edition p. 11.)*

Spring. Ear is spring; poetic and dialectal forms include ēar and eiar. In I.8.39.1, lovely spring appears in a comparison of the attractions of all four seasons. The setting is a rustic dialogue about preference, so the name should not be forced into an astronomical definition or a fixed modern calendar interval.

Summer. Theros is summer. In Arith.1, Prometheus lists fruit-bearing summer among the seasons whose signs human beings learned to recognize through the stars. The seasonal word connects practical human activity with celestial observation. The excerpt's particular wording must be followed even where it differs from the play's more familiar transmitted text.

Autumn. Phthinopōron is autumn, associated here with plentiful fruit. I.3.56g reports visitors gathering in summer and around autumn at the site of a statue and ritual test. The seasonal indications locate the reported practice without supplying enough information to reconstruct an exact festival calendar.

In this edition. "Season" fits the annual setting; do not impose the modern clock-hour meaning.

See also. Choice; Equinox; Number; Nutrition; Opportune time; Pleasure; Sacred rite; Solstice and turning; Star; Winter and storm; Year.

Seed

σπέρμα; σπορά, sperma; spora, seed; generative seed[482]

The word. Sperma is seed, including the generative material of animals. Its explanatory role can connect reproduction with the composition and activity of the body.

In Stobaeus. In the Timaeus excerpt, marrow extending from the head through the neck and spine is identified with what the earlier account called seed. A passage is opened between it and the bodily outlet; the ensouled marrow's breathing then produces a desire for outflow and generation. The passage combines anatomical description, vital movement, and desire within one ancient account.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.1.3 Marrow is connected with seed and the desire to procreate.
(Edition p. 907.)

I.49.39.3 Creative sowing links souls with their appointed recipients.
(Edition p. 1207.)

The sowing of souls. Spora is sowing or seed sown. In I.49.39.3 the creative sowing of souls is differentiated according to divine acts of making and the recipients allotted to the souls. The agricultural image explains ordered placement and generation. It should not turn souls into literal botanical seeds or imply creation from nothing.

In this edition. "Seed" retains the source's material vocabulary. It should not be silently replaced with a modern anatomical identification that the excerpt does not supply.

See also. Allotment; Breathing; Demiurge and craftsman; Desire; Embryo; Marrow.

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[482] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 298–299, 377. The syntax and physiological connections in this passage are compressed; the bilingual edition notes the principal interpretive difficulty.

Self motion

αὐτοκίνητον, autokinēton, self-movement; self-moving[483]

The word. Autokinēton means self-moving. Motion originating in the moving subject is conceptually different from merely being in motion at all times.

In Stobaeus. The early doxographical notices attach continual or self-originating motion to soul; Alcmaeon's account connects eternal self-movement with immortality. The later survey distinguishes Xenocrates' self-moving number from other numerical accounts of soul. The Hermetic account denies to soul the external conditions governing bodily movement and calls it self-moving in thought. These reports use self-motion within different explanations of psychic life.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.1a.1 Self-motion and everlasting motion enter accounts of soul. *(Edition p. 977.)*

I.49.32.6 Self-moving number is one among several numerical interpretations. *(Edition p. 1151.)*

I.41.4.1 Soul moves in thought without the conditions of bodily motion. *(Edition p. 843.)*

In this edition. "Self-moving" preserves the proposed source of movement. It is not automatically a claim about conscious choice or moral independence.

See also. Immortality; Life; Motion; Number; Soul; What depends on us.

[483] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 281–282, 318–319, 364.

Self-complete

αὐτοτελής, autotelēs, complete in itself; self-complete[484]

The word. Autotelēs describes something whose completeness belongs to itself. It is stronger than saying that an external operation has happened to finish.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account calls soul a self-complete substance before describing its chosen life and the attachment of spirit and desire. Those additions need not be treated as ingredients required to make soul exist in the first place. The later ethical ordering of impulses concerns its embodied life, a distinct issue from its initial characterization.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.4.1 Soul's self-completeness precedes the account of its relation to lower impulses. *(Edition p. 989.)*

In this edition. "Complete in itself" makes the compound intelligible without implying that soul has no relations or activities directed beyond itself.

See also. Choice; Desire; Perfection and completeness; Self-sufficiency; Soul.

Self-control and temperance

σωφροσύνη, sōphrosunē, self-restraint; temperance; self-control[485]

The word. Sōphrosynē names sound self-command or temperance. Its precise structure depends on the account of the soul in which it appears.

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[484] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 321–322. The same sentence joins choice with fate without explaining their reconciliation; self-completeness should not be used to resolve that tension by assumption.

[485] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 65–66, 321–322. The Laws passage places the virtues within ensouled divine powers; this language should not be reduced to impersonal moral rules.

In Stobaeus. The Laws excerpt joins self-restraint with justice and understanding as powers preserving human beings. The Hermetic account explains it more specifically through desire acquiring a settled relation to reasoning. The shared ethical value does not erase the difference between a theological appeal and a psychological explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.55b.3 Self-restraint joins justice and understanding among the saving virtues. *(Edition p. 143.)*

I.49.4.1 Ordered desire becomes self-control through its relation to reasoning. *(Edition p. 989.)*

In this edition. "Self-restraint" or "self-control" is accessible; "temperance" retains the traditional virtue term.

See also. Desire; Justice; Reasoning and calculation; Understanding and practical wisdom; Virtue and excellence.

Self-determination

αὐτεξούσιον, autexousion, self-determination; acting on one's own authority[486]

The word. Autexousion names a power of acting on one's own authority. It addresses agency without automatically supplying every feature of a modern theory of free will.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus argues that divine correction preserves fate, providential goodness, and the soul's self-determination together. Correction restrains disorder instead of abolishing destiny. The soul's agency is asserted within that theological order, not defined through independence from every divine influence.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.35 Self-determination is preserved alongside fate and divine will. *(Edition p. 83.)*

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[486] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 43. The compressed clause about fate's manifestation remains difficult; it should not be rewritten as a different claim about fate's operation.

In this edition. "Self-determination" is useful when its local relation to providence is explained.

See also. Choice; Fate; Freedom; Providence; Will and wish.

Self-sufficiency

αὐτάρκεια, autarkeia, self-sufficiency; sufficiency in oneself[487]

The word. Autarkeia is sufficiency without the relevant deficiency or external supplement. The respect of sufficiency must be identified from the context.

In Stobaeus. In the account of purification, self-sufficiency appears among restoration of proper essence, perfection, ascent, and conjunction with wholes. It therefore does not mean isolation from all higher causes. The purified soul's sufficiency is presented alongside the reception of power, life, and activity from more comprehensive realities.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.65.10 Self-sufficiency belongs to a sequence of benefits of purification and return. *(Edition p. 1513.)*

In this edition. Retain "self-sufficiency," but explain its relation to fulfillment and participation. "Independence" can suggest too absolute a separation.

See also. Ascent; Part and whole; Participation; Purification; Self-complete.

[487] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 455–456. The list includes both return to a generating cause and gifts received from wholes; both directions belong to its account.

Semen and generation

γονή, gonē, generation; seed; generative source[488]

The word. Gonē can denote generation, offspring, or generative seed according to context. A mathematical application requires a figurative rendering.

In Stobaeus. The arithmetical excerpt reports that Timaeus of Locri calls the monad gonē because it governs the generation of numbers. The word imports an image of reproduction into an account of numerical origin. "Semen" would be too bodily as the unqualified English rendering of this sentence.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.2b The monad is called a generative principle of numbers. *(Edition p. 15.)*

In this edition. "Generative principle" explains this use; "seed" preserves the image more compactly.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Monad; Number; Principle; Seed.

Sense and judgment

γνώμη, gnōmē, judgment; considered view; good sense[489]

The word. Gnōmē can denote judgment, an opinion, or a considered intention. The selected passage uses the Doric form gnōma for a cognitive function.

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[488] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 16. The neighboring discussion distinguishes the One and the monad in a compressed reported doctrine; the two expressions are not automatically interchangeable.

[489] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 355. Some words specifying the psychic functions are restored in the printed text. The Doric spelling does not indicate a separate philosophical term.

In Stobaeus. Aesara's account makes human nature a standard for law and justice in household and city. Within its threefold soul, intellect produces judgment and prudence, the spirited part strength and impulse, and desire love and goodwill. Judgment belongs to an ordered account of the powers that support communal life.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.27.1 Judgment and prudence are functions of intellect within the threefold soul. *(Edition p. 1115.)*

In this edition. "Judgment" is clearer here than the very broad "opinion," which could obscure the contrast between psychic functions.

See also. Anger and spirit; Desire; Intellect; Justice; Understanding and practical wisdom.

Separation

χωρισμός, chōrismos, separation; being apart[490]

The word. Chōrismos and related verbal forms describe separation. A distinction in thought, an independence of activity, and departure from a body are different possible senses.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian report considers form abstracted from matter and matter considered without form; this is a conceptual account of what constitutes body. Porphyry distinguishes incorporeal activities separated from matter from those approaching bodies. The discussion of soul's use of body compares it with a helmsman able to stand apart from his ship, then contrasts a rider's shared journey. These passages ask different questions about independence.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.11.4.2 Matter and form are considered separately in their definitions. *(Edition p. 327.)*

I.49.21.1 Separation from matter qualifies incorporeal activity. *(Edition p. 1081.)*

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[490] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 132, 344, 382.

I.49.41.5 Analogies distinguish degrees of soul's association with body. *(Edition p. 1223.)*

In this edition. "Separate" does not always mean spatially distant. The kind of separation must be recovered from the argument rather than supplied by the English word alone.

See also. Body; Death; Form; Incorporeal; Matter; Vehicle of the soul.

Servitude

δουλεία; δοῦλος, douleia; doulos, slavery; servitude[491]

The word. Douleia is slavery or servitude. Applied to psychic conflict, it names domination rather than a literal civic status.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account sets one aspiring part against two that pull it downward. The former longs for freedom, while the others cherish slavery. The image emphasizes opposed orientations within the soul and gives release an ethical direction toward the good.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.1.5 The soul's inward struggle is expressed through freedom and slavery. *(Edition p. 819.)*

I.41.1.14 Enslavement and freedom distinguish earthly and heavenly conditions. *(Edition p. 827.)*

Enslaved and free. Doulos means slave or enslaved according to its construction. I.41.1.14 states that nothing in heaven is enslaved and nothing on earth is free. These sweeping antitheses characterize heavenly and earthly orders in the Hermetic excerpt. Their use of servitude is cosmological, and does not by itself describe a particular institution of human slavery.

In this edition. "Slavery" preserves the severity of the image; "servitude" is a less concrete equivalent.

See also. Freedom; Good; Heaven; Master; Soul; Three-part soul.

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[491] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 274, 276. The three parts are not named in this passage. Familiar labels should not be inserted as if the text supplied them.

Setting

δύσις, dusis, setting; sunset; west[492]

The word. Dysis is setting, particularly the disappearance of a heavenly body below the horizon. It can also indicate the western direction.

In Stobaeus. The Orphic cosmic anatomy portrays sunrise and sunset as the two golden horns of Zeus, while sun and moon are his eyes. Setting here is incorporated into an image of the divine body encompassing the cosmos. The concrete bodily imagery is part of the poem's construction, not a technical anatomical claim.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.23b Sunrise and sunset form the horns in a poetic cosmic body. *(Edition p. 51.)*

In this edition. "Sunset" is appropriate beside sunrise; "setting" works for other stars and planets.

See also. Body; God; Rising; Sun; World.

Shadow

σκιά, skia, shadow[493]

The word. Skia is a shadow, a region deprived of direct light by an intervening body.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry interprets the poetic limits of the earth through the extent of its shadow, invoking mathematical astronomers who associate night with the earth's shadow reaching the moon. The physical image supports his reading of a poetic destination. Its interpretive role should remain distinct from a measured account of the shadow's dimensions.

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[492] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 30. The poem's several correspondences should be kept distinct: horns, eyes, hair, and ear represent different cosmic features.

[493] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 448. The account reports Porphyry's interpretation of poetic geography and does not supply a modern astronomical measurement.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.61.3 The earth's shadow explains the poetic expression for the earth's limits. *(Edition p. 1479.)*

In this edition. "Shadow" is direct; "shade" might obscure the cosmological extent intended.

See also. Earth; Light; Limit and definition; Moon; Night.

Shape

σχῆμα; μορφή, schēma; morphē, shape; configuration[494]

The word. Schēma names shape or configuration. Morphē can also be translated "shape," particularly where a report contrasts a surface determination with form extending through a thing.

In Stobaeus. The report on Aristotle distinguishes form from surface shape through the comparison between whiteness in milk and whiteness in painting. The notice on Anaxagoras and the followers of Leucippus assigns many shapes respectively to like-parted constituents and atoms. Democritus' color theory makes shape one condition of perceived appearance. Shape can therefore explain both constitution and perceptual difference.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.12.1b.1 Morphē is contrasted with form extending through depth. *(Edition p. 335.)*

I.15.6a.2 The primary constituents are assigned many shapes. *(Edition p. 373.)*

I.16.1.7 Schēma helps explain color appearance. *(Edition p. 381.)*

In this edition. The translation distinguishes "shape" from "form" when the source makes the contrast. A shared English rendering does not establish identity between morphē and schēma.

See also. Atom; Color; Form; Image.

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[494] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 134–135, 146, 149.

Shooting star

διάττων, diattōn, shooting star; darting light[495]

The word. Diattōn is a participle meaning darting or shooting across. Used substantivally of a celestial light, it gives the familiar designation shooting star.

In Stobaeus. Anaxagoras's reported explanation makes shooting stars sparks falling from the aether and therefore rapidly extinguished. Related verbal forms also describe the darting of thunderbolts. The motion word does not by itself identify all its referents as the same physical phenomenon.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.28.1a.8 Shooting stars are explained as falling sparks. *(Edition p. 653.)*

I.40.1.43 Darting also characterizes one class of thunderbolts. *(Edition p. 793.)*

In this edition. "Shooting star" suits the named luminous phenomenon; "darting" suits the general participle or verb.

See also. Aether; Comet; Extinction; Kindling; Lightning and thunderbolt.

Sight

ὄψις, opsis, sight; vision; eye[496]

The word. Opsis can name seeing, the visual faculty, or the eye considered as its organ. The surrounding explanation determines which English expression is appropriate.

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[495] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 228, 266. The Greek designation describes appearance and motion. It does not assert that an ordinary fixed star has fallen from its position.

[496] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 483, 486–487.

In Stobaeus. The report on Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus makes visual experience depend on incoming images. The Timaeus excerpt instead describes a gentle, nonburning fire flowing outward through the eyes. These opposed directions of explanation must remain visible. They also help explain why the optical chapters can speak of sight itself being reflected from a cloud or a surface.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.52.1 Visual experience is explained by the entry of images. *(Edition p. 1627.)*

I.52.19.1 The eyes are formed as bearers of gentle light. *(Edition p. 1639.)*

I.52.19.2 The eyes filter an outward stream of inner fire. *(Edition p. 1641.)*

In this edition. "Sight" is not automatically replaced by "light." The bracketed addition about returning rays in I.52.1 is editorially rejected text and cannot be merged into the preceding atomist report.

See also. Color; Image; Light; Perception; Reflection.

Sign

σημεῖον; σῆμα, sēmeion; sēma, sign; indication[497]

The word. Sēmeion is a sign or indication. In the meteorological passages, an observed appearance supports an inference about the state of the air or the weather to come.

In Stobaeus. A mock sun is called a sign of rain because the cloud reflecting it is near the condition of becoming water; the southern occurrence is assigned greater force within that explanation. Mist, by contrast, is described as a thin, non-rain-bearing formation whose earlier dispersal serves as a sign of fair weather. Each sign is tied to a proposed physical account.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.30.2.10 A mock sun indicates rain through the state of the reflecting cloud. *(Edition p. 705.)*

I.31.6.5 Dispersing mist indicates fair weather. *(Edition p. 717.)*

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[497] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 242, 244, 292.

I.41.9.1 The body is interpreted through the double sense tomb and sign. *(Edition p. 877.)*

Tomb and sign. Sēma can mean both a tomb and a sign. I.41.9.1 exploits the resemblance of sōma, body, to sēma: the soul is imagined as buried in its body, yet also as signifying through it. These are proposed verbal explanations within the Cratylus excerpt. They illuminate the argument without establishing the historical derivation of the word for body.

In this edition. "Sign" here need not mean a supernatural omen. The interpretation follows the causal connection claimed by the ancient report, not a modern forecasting rule.

See also. Body; Cause; Cloud; Prison; Rain and precipitation; Rainbow and halo; Reflection; Speech and utterance.

Simple

ἁπλοῦς, haplous, simple; uncompounded; uniform[498]

The word. Haplous describes what is simple rather than composite. The respect of simplicity varies: a material can be uniform, while a soul can be described as lacking constituent parts.

In Stobaeus. The report on Anaximenes criticizes the explanation of living creatures from simple, uniform air alone, insisting that an acting cause is also needed. The discussion of soul's powers instead connects simplicity with powers that belong intrinsically to soul rather than being added components. These arguments ask different questions about composition.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.5 Uniform material alone is criticized as an insufficient account of production. *(Edition p. 301.)*

I.49.33.1 Soul's powers are discussed without treating soul as a composite. *(Edition p. 1163.)*

[498] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 123, 367. The criticism of Anaximenes is the reporter's, not part of the quoted analogy between soul and cosmic air.

In this edition. "Simple" retains the common contrast; "uniform" or "uncompounded" can explain the particular sense. It does not mean intellectually unsophisticated.

See also. Air; Cause; Composite; Innate and connatural; Soul.

Sinew

νεῦρον, neuron, sinew; tendon-like tissue[499]

The word. Neuron can refer to sinew or related cord-like bodily tissue. Its resemblance to the modern word neuron should not impose a modern anatomical meaning.

In Stobaeus. The sleep account assigns air to neura and veins, alongside other allocations to blood, bones, and sight. The text does not supply enough anatomical detail to identify all the neura with modern nerves. "Sinews" preserves the broader ancient category.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.8.5 Sinews occur with veins in the elemental distribution of bodily material. *(Edition p. 877.)*

In this edition. "Sinew" avoids unwarranted precision; use "nerve" only when a particular context supports it.

See also. Air; Body; Bone; Limb and bodily member; Vein.

Sleep

ὕπνος, hypnos, sleep[500]

The word. Hypnos denotes sleep. It may be described as rest relative to waking bodily movements while still being an activity of soul.

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[499] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 291–292. The term's bodily range must be determined locally rather than inferred from a modern scientific derivative.

[500] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 291–292, 487.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account presents sleep as a gift preserving bodies through rest. It then insists on sleep's powerful activity: the joined limbs relax and incoming material is apportioned into bodily constituents. The Timaeus passage gives another mechanism, in which the closing eyelids confine the power of fire and quiet internal movements. Great quiet produces sleep with few dreams.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.8.4 Rest preserves bodies. *(Edition p. 875.)*

I.41.8.5 Sleep actively distributes material within the body. *(Edition p. 877.)*

I.52.19.5 Quiet internal movements produce sleep with few dreams. *(Edition p. 1643.)*

In this edition. The English distinguishes "few dreams" from short sleep. Rest and activity can coexist because the descriptions concern different operations.

See also. Activity; Body; Dream; Rest; Sight.

Smallest

ἐλάχιστον, elachiston, smallest; minimum[501]

The word. Elachiston means smallest in the relevant comparison. A perceptual minimum need not be a mathematically indivisible point or an atomic body.

In Stobaeus. Posidonius distinguishes the point-like boundary between past and future from the smallest stretch of time perceived as now. Diodorus's account instead calls partless bodies smallest. The accounts concern different domains and different grounds of minimality; the adjective alone does not identify one common doctrine of indivisibles.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.42.2 The smallest perceptible present has duration, unlike a point-like boundary. *(Edition p. 251.)*

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[501] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 105–106, 128. The Epicurean report at I.10.14.3 explicitly distinguishes being an atom from simply being the smallest.

I.10.16a.4 Partless bodies are also called smallest bodies. *(Edition p. 311.)*

In this edition. Translate the qualifying phrase with the superlative: "smallest perceptible" is more exact than an unqualified "instant."

See also. Atom; Geometrical point; Magnitude; Partless; Time.

Smell

ὀσμή, osmē, smell; odor[502]

The word. Osmē means an odor or smell; the verb osphrainesthai means to smell. The object drawn in and the faculty that perceives it should be distinguished.

In Stobaeus. Alcmaeon locates the ruling faculty in the brain and explains smelling by its drawing in odors through inhalation. Empedocles' report also makes odor enter with inhaled air, then uses difficulty in breathing to explain why odor may fail to be perceived. The second notice thus adduces an impaired condition to support a proposed mechanism of ordinary perception.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.54.1 The ruling faculty draws in odors through inhalation. *(Edition p. 1663.)*

I.54.2 Obstructed breathing prevents the associated perception. *(Edition p. 1663.)*

In this edition. "Odor" usually names what enters; "smell" can name the resulting experience. Neither report supplies a modern account of sensory receptors.

See also. Air; Brain; Breathing; Perception; Ruling part.

[502] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 492.

Smoke

καπνός, kapnos, smoke[503]

The word. Kapnos is smoke. Figuratively it can characterize something as insubstantial or ineffectual.

In Stobaeus. Menander's comic speaker dismisses mortal foresight as smoke and nonsense, assigning real control to Fortune. The image gives rhetorical force to the claim that human names are merely attached to deeds Fortune performs. It expresses a speaker's extreme assessment of agency, not necessarily the dramatist's settled doctrine.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.6.1a Smoke figures the supposed emptiness of human foresight. *(Edition p. 193.)*

In this edition. "Smoke" preserves the concrete image; paraphrasing it simply as error would lose the rhetoric.

See also. Chance and fortune; Deed and work; Human being; Intellect; Providence.

Smooth

λεῖος, leios, smooth[504]

The word. Leios describes a smooth surface. In optical analogies, smoothness helps specify the kind of reflecting surface envisaged.

In Stobaeus. The account of a mock sun compares the cloud to a smooth bronze mirror. Its uniform, watery, dense condition is said to produce a white appearance resembling the sun in shape and color. Smoothness belongs to the comparison explaining the reflection, rather than to a claim that clouds are metal.

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[503] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 83–84. Pronoia here means mortal foresight, contrasted with Fortune's governing power, rather than divine providence.

[504] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 241–242. Wachsmuth retains the noun mirror, recognizing the passage as a paraphrase rather than an exact quotation of Aristotle.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.30.2.8 The smooth bronze mirror models the reflecting cloud. *(Edition p. 705.)*

In this edition. "Smooth" is direct and should remain distinct from the cloud's separately stated uniformity and density.

See also. Cloud; Mirror; Mock sun; Reflection; Rough.

Snow

χιών, chiōn, snow[505]

The word. Chiōn is snow. Its explanation varies among the meteorological reports.

In Stobaeus. The account attributed to Anaximenes assigns snow to falling water that freezes and hail to moisture enclosing airy material. Wachsmuth suspects that the names have changed places in transmission, but retains their printed order. The lexicon therefore records both the word's meaning and the uncertainty affecting this particular explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.31.1 Snow is explained through freezing in a text with a suspected interchange. *(Edition p. 709.)*

I.31.9.2 Plato's classification describes snow as less fully frozen water above earth. *(Edition p. 731.)*

In this edition. "Snow" translates the printed noun; do not silently exchange it with hail.

See also. Cloud; Frost; Hail; Ice; Rain and precipitation.

[505] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 242–243, 247. The possible interchange is a textual problem, not a reason to rewrite the adopted Greek without notice.

Soft

μαλακός, malakos, soft[506]

The word. Malakos describes softness, opposed here to hardness. It can name a bodily quality without implying weakness of character.

In Stobaeus. The Theaetetus uses the transition from soft to hard to demonstrate a change occurring in something that stays in the same place. Softness is the starting quality in the example; its loss is still motion in the broader classification under examination.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.8 Softness can be lost through alteration without locomotion. *(Edition p. 449.)*

In this edition. "Soft" keeps the physical sense. Ethical meanings should not be imported into this example.

See also. Body; Change and alteration; Hard; Motion; Quality.

Solid

στερεόν, stereon, solid; solid body[507]

The word. Stereon can name a solid geometrical or bodily magnitude. Solidity in this sense concerns dimensional structure, not necessarily hardness to the touch.

In Stobaeus. The report grouping followers of Thales and Pythagoras lists solid body among continuous things divisible without limit. A separate numerical account relates the solid to perception. These applications must be distinguished from uses concerned with material firmness, where hardness or consolidation is the relevant contrast.

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[506] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 167–168. The dialogue distinguishes kinds of motion rather than presenting a theory that all soft substances harden in the same way.

[507] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 143, 364. The grouping of followers is the ancient reporter's classification, not a direct quotation from either Thales or Pythagoras.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1i Solid body appears beside line and surface among continuous things. *(Edition p. 361.)*

I.49.32.7 The solid's number is associated with perception in a mathematical classification. *(Edition p. 1153.)*

In this edition. Use "solid body" when the noun sōma is present. Do not infer resistance to deformation from geometrical solidity alone.

See also. Body; Depth; Hard; Plane; Surface.

Solstice and turning

τροπή, tropē, turning; solstice[508]

The word. Tropē is a turning. In a seasonal astronomical setting, the plural tropai denotes the sun's solstitial turnings.

In Stobaeus. The seasonal account distinguishes two equinoxes from two solstices each year, assigning the latter to summer and winter. The term reflects the turning of the sun's seasonal course at its extremes. It should not be confused with the daily rising and setting of the sun.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.42.5 Two annual solstices are distinguished from two equinoxes. *(Edition p. 255.)*

In this edition. "Solstice" is the clearest technical rendering; "turning" explains the Greek image.

See also. Equinox; Season; Sun; Year; Zodiac.

[508] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 106–107. The definitions follow a gap in the transmitted excerpt; their immediate wording remains intelligible without reconstructing the missing material.

Soul

ψυχή; ὅλη ψυχή, psuchē; holē psuchē, soul[509]

The word. Psychē is the central term of the volume's long discussion of soul. The excerpts ask what it is, how it acts, how it relates to body, and what becomes of it. The noun itself does not settle any of those questions.

In Stobaeus. The opening reports juxtapose continual or self-originating motion, number, harmony, actuality, breath, and other descriptions. Aristotle's first actuality and the Stoic warm breath belong to different accounts. Reading the collection requires following the attribution as carefully as the recurring term.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.1a.1 Several reports connect soul with continual motion or self-motion. *(Edition p. 977.)*

I.49.1a.3 Aristotle's definition describes first actuality. *(Edition p. 979.)*

I.49.1b.1 The Stoics define soul as intelligent, warm breath. *(Edition p. 979.)*

I.49.11.5 Plato's Phaedrus offers a likeness of soul, the winged team and charioteer. *(Edition p. 1033.)*

I.49.30.4 Reason and appetite are distinguished through their activities. *(Edition p. 1139.)*

I.49.31.1 Spirit is considered as a third element and an ally of reason. *(Edition p. 1143.)*

I.49.41.5 Helmsman and rider illustrate different relations to body. *(Edition p. 1223.)*

I.49.16.4 Indestructibility is an additional condition in the argument. *(Edition p. 1071.)*

I.49.60.5 Porphyry interprets Circe as the circuit of rebirth. *(Edition p. 1473.)*

I.49.39.3 The universal soul is paired with the whole cosmos. *(Edition p. 1207.)*

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[509] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 318–319, 333, 342, 361–362, 377, 382, 446. The comparison identifiers subdivide long excerpts for facing-page use. They should not be mistaken for a new ancient chapter system.

Images and comparisons. The Phaedrus extract explicitly distinguishes what soul is from what it resembles. Its winged team and charioteer are a likeness offered in place of a longer divine account.

The Platonists. The discussion at I.49.65.3 separately asks about judgment, punishment, and purification. These are attributed positions in the anthology, not an undifferentiated doctrine of the soul's fate.

Powers and embodiment. The Republic excerpts distinguish reason, appetite, and spirit by their activities and conflicts. That division concerns powers within soul; it is different from the question whether plants count as ensouled animals or whether soul itself is a bodily substance. The anthology also preserves arguments about soul's relation to an instrument or vehicle. The helmsman can be considered apart from a ship, while a rider's journey emphasizes shared movement. Each comparison selects a relation rather than defining everything that soul is.

Death and continued existence. The Phaedo's argument explicitly distinguishes refusing death from being indestructible. Its conclusion depends on the additional condition that the immortal cannot be destroyed. The accounts of rebirth and Hades use further arguments, mythical speeches, and interpretations of poetry. A definition of soul as a principle of life cannot on its own establish every later claim about survival, judgment, or renewed embodiment.

The universal soul. The phrase holē psuchē means the whole or universal soul. I.49.39.3 uses an abbreviated construction, "the whole," with soul understood, and pairs it with the whole cosmos as its recipient. The passage distinguishes this relation from those of other souls to heavenly spheres and elements. The elliptical grammar should not obscure those different assignments.

In this edition. "Soul" preserves psychē in these comparisons. "Intellect" or "mind" usually renders nous, and "breath" pneuma; keeping the terms distinct lets the ancient identifications remain visible.

See also. Actuality; Allotment; Anger and spirit; Body; Breath; Demiurge and craftsman; Desire; Destiny after death; Immortality; Intellect; Life; Power and capacity; Purification; Rebirth; Self motion; Separation; Vehicle of the soul; World.

Soulless

ἄψυχος, apsuchos, soulless; without soul; inanimate[510]

The word. Apsychos means without soul. A body moved from outside can be called soulless without denying that a soul acts upon it.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic classification adds a kind associated with things without soul and explains its activity as external to their bodies. The apparent contradiction is reduced by distinguishing what moves from what is moved. The formulation remains tentative in the Greek.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.5.5 External psychic activity is distinguished from the soulless bodies it moves. *(Edition p. 995.)*

In this edition. "Things without soul" is clearest where the argument contrasts mover and recipient.

See also. Body; Cause; Ensouled; Motion; Soul.

Sound

ψόφος, psophos, sound; noise[511]

The word. Psophos is sound or noise, particularly as an effect of impact, rupture, or movement. It need not be articulate speech or an animal voice.

In Stobaeus. Anaximander's reported explanation makes thunder the noise of wind escaping from a dense cloud. The rupture also accounts for the accompanying flash in the ancient account. Sound here belongs to a physical explanation of weather and should be distinguished from the communication conveyed by a voice.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.29.1.1 Thunder is explained as the noise of escaping wind. *(Edition p. 665.)*

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[510] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 323–324. This fourth kind follows an initial threefold list. Its addition and the qualified "would be" should both remain visible.

[511] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 231. Pneuma in this explanation is moving air or wind; importing a specialized psychic meaning would obscure the meteorology.

In this edition. "Noise" emphasizes the rupture; "sound" is the more general equivalent.

See also. Cloud; Motion; Thunder; Voice; Wind.

South wind

νότος, notos, south wind; Notus[512]

The word. Notos names a south wind. The plural can designate a southern class of winds.

In Stobaeus. The catalogue places Notus opposite Aparctias, coming from the unseen southern pole. Neighboring winds occupy the intervals toward Eurus and Lips. The organization depends on an observer for whom the southern pole is not visible, making the geographical standpoint part of the description.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.37 Notus occupies the southern position opposite the polar north wind. *(Edition p. 789.)*

In this edition. "South wind" is clear in prose; keep "Notus" when comparing named positions.

See also. Eastern winds; North wind; Pole; West wind; Wind.

Southwest wind

λίψ, lips, southwest wind; Lips[513]

The word. Lips is the name of a southwestern wind. The ancient catalogue locates directions through neighboring winds and seasonal solar positions.

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[512] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 264. "Unseen pole" describes the observer's celestial view, not a claim that the pole is intrinsically invisible from every place.

[513] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 264. The catalogue contains inconsistent alternative names elsewhere; they are not silently reassigned to make a perfect wind rose.

In Stobaeus. The list places Libonotus or Libophoenix between Lips and Notus. Elsewhere Lips is assigned to winter sunset in a restored clause. The positional relations clarify the wind's western-southern direction without imposing an evenly divided modern compass on the entire catalogue.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.37 Lips defines one boundary of an intermediate southern wind. *(Edition p. 789.)*

I.40.1.36 Winter sunset locates Lips in the restored catalogue. *(Edition p. 789.)*

In this edition. "Southwest wind" is useful in prose; "Lips" preserves the named position.

See also. Season; Setting; South wind; West wind; Wind.

Speech and utterance

ῥῆμα, rhēma, word; utterance; expression[514]

The word. Rhēma can mean a word or something said. It does not always carry the narrower grammatical meaning "verb."

In Stobaeus. The report about Pythagoras says that he first called philosophy by this word. Rhēma therefore refers to a designation and its alleged introduction. The passage preserves a tradition about the naming of philosophy rather than supplying direct evidence from Pythagoras's own writings.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.10 The name philosophy is attributed to Pythagoras as an introduced expression. *(Edition p. 303.)*

In this edition. "Word" conveys the immediate sense; "utterance" is useful where a complete saying is meant.

See also. Appellation; Interpretation; Name; Persuasion; Philosophy.

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[514] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 124–125. Claims that a thinker first coined a term belong to the transmitted biographical tradition and should be attributed accordingly.

Sphere

σφαῖρα, sphaira, sphere; spherical body[515]

The word. Sphaira is a sphere, occurring in geometry and in accounts of the heavens. Geometrical sphere and cosmic sphere must be distinguished by context.

In Stobaeus. The arithmetic excerpt places bodies within a sphere and names a difficult fifth "vessel" of the sphere. A clearer epistemological passage treats sphere itself as an intelligible form alongside circle and triangle. One use organizes the cosmos spatially; the other concerns the kind of object known.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.3d A cosmic sphere contains the named elemental bodies. *(Edition p. 19.)*

I.48.6.7 Sphere itself is classified with intelligible geometrical forms. *(Edition p. 971.)*

In this edition. "Sphere" is appropriate in both settings, with the surrounding explanation determining whether a body, region, or form is intended.

See also. Circle; Heaven; Intelligible; Solid; World.

Spindle

ἄτρακτος, atraktos, spindle[516]

The word. Atraktos is a spindle, the tool whose turning produces thread. In the afterlife narrative, spinning makes a chosen life binding.

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[515] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 18, 316–317. The "vessel of the sphere" in Arith.3d is textually difficult and does not securely identify the fifth body.

[516] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 82. The subsequent journey to Forgetfulness belongs to the souls; the Greek's changing grammatical references require care in following the agents.

In Stobaeus. The Republic describes souls approaching the Fates after choosing lives. Clotho's turning spindle confirms the chosen lot, while Atropos makes the spun result irreversible. The order matters: choice precedes confirmation. The image does not make the souls' choices irrelevant from the beginning.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.5.21 The spindle participates in confirming and fixing chosen lives. *(Edition p. 187.)*

In this edition. "Spindle" preserves the concrete instrument and the relation between turning and thread.

See also. Choice; Circular motion; Fate; Lot; Necessity.

Spine

ῥάχις, *rhachis*, spine; backbone[517]

The word. Rhachis is the spine or backbone. The form used here locates an internal course through the body.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus describes marrow as continuous from the head through the neck and spine. A connection with the reproductive outlet then explains generative desire in the narrative. The spine is the bodily route containing this marrow, not another word for the marrow itself.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.1.3 Marrow extends through the spine toward the reproductive connection. *(Edition p. 907.)*

In this edition. "Spine" preserves the anatomical distinction between supporting structure and its contents.

See also. Bone; Head; Marrow; Neck; Seed.

[517] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 298–299. The sentence's explanation of breath and desire is compressed and uncertain; the stated course through the spine is clear.

Spontaneous occurrence

αὐτόματον, automaton, spontaneous occurrence; what happens of itself[518]

The word. The substantivized expression concerns what happens of itself. In the technical contexts selected here, an outcome need not be the result intended by an agent acting toward it.

In Stobaeus. Chapter 6 places spontaneous occurrence beside fortune. The report in chapter 7 lists it separately from necessity, fate, choice, and chance. The separation is worth preserving even when ordinary English might call all unexpected events "chance."

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.6.heading Fortune and spontaneous occurrence are paired in the heading. *(Edition p. 193.)*

I.7.9a Spontaneous occurrence is listed alongside, but separately from, chance. *(Edition p. 219.)*

In this edition. "Spontaneous occurrence" marks the technical expression. "What happens of itself" or "of its own accord" can make a less formal use more natural without introducing conscious choice.

See also. Cause; Chance and fortune; Choice; Fate; Necessity.

Spring and source

πηγή, pēgē, spring; source[519]

The word. Pēgē is a spring or source. It can describe an actual water source or extend metaphorically to the origin of another process.

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[518] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 83, 92. The compressed chapter heading prints a contracted form, ταὐτομάτου. The lexicon gives the uncontracted headword for ease of lookup.

[519] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 258, 500. The bodily passage explicitly introduces a comparison, "as though." That qualification prevents the image from becoming a literal anatomical claim.

In Stobaeus. The geographical description includes springs among earth's waters. The Timaeus physiology compares internal bodily heat to a spring of fire, using the familiar image of an issuing source to explain the origin of movement. The comparison does not identify a discrete anatomical organ called a spring.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.11 Springs appear alongside rivers in the description of earth. *(Edition p. 771.)*

I.60.1.5 A spring of fire figures the internal source of bodily heat. *(Edition p. 1703.)*

In this edition. "Spring" preserves the image; "source" makes the extended sense explicit.

See also. Fire; Heat; Principle; River; Water.

Square and quadrilateral

τετράγωνον, tetragōnon, square; quadrilateral; square number[520]

The word. Tetragōnon denotes a four-angled figure and, where equal-sided numerical construction is intended, a square. The arithmetic context determines the more specific sense.

In Stobaeus. Successive odd gnomons placed around a unit generate square numbers: one, four, nine, and so on. The contrasting even construction gives unequal-sided oblongs. The passage connects numerical increase with figured arrangements, making equality of sides central rather than merely counting four angles.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

Arith.10c Odd gnomons generate squares, contrasted with even constructions producing oblongs. *(Edition p. 31.)*

In this edition. Use "square" in this figured-number argument. "Quadrilateral" would lose the equality on which the contrast depends.

See also. Equality; Gnomon; Number; Oblong; Odd and even.

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[520] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 22. The starting figure for the even construction is left implicit; the entry explains the standard pattern without inserting words into the source.

Standard of judgment

κριτήριον, kritērion, criterion; standard of judgment[521]

The word. A kritērion is what enables discrimination or judgment. The term can concern a cognitive faculty or a measure used to assess a difference; it need not be a proposition or rule.

In Stobaeus. The chapter on imagination and the criterion names intellect and perception as criteria for intelligible and perceptible things respectively. Zeno's report on time calls time both a measure and a criterion of speed and slowness.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.58.1.3 Intellect and perception are criteria for different kinds of object. *(Edition p. 1689.)*

I.8.40e Time measures and supplies a criterion for speed and slowness. *(Edition p. 247.)*

In this edition. "Criterion," with plural "criteria," preserves the technical term. This headword supplies the plainer gloss "standard of judgment" to make the entry easier to find.

See also. Intellect; Knowledge; Perception; Time.

Star

ἀστήρ, astēr, star; heavenly body[522]

The word. Astēr names a star or heavenly body. The term's scope in ancient classifications should be read with the distinction between fixed and wandering stars.

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[521] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 104, 497. I.58.1.3 makes a compressed final claim about everything being constituted from and through these. The lexicon does not expand its unspecified scope into a further theory.

[522] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 201, 204.

In Stobaeus. Thales is assigned earthy stars that are on fire; this separates their material from their condition. Aristotle's reported stars are constituted from the fifth body and need no nourishment. The account under Heraclides and the Pythagoreans makes each star a world containing earth and air. These differences concern what sort of thing a star is, not simply different words for the same material.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.24.1a Earthy constitution is distinguished from being on fire. *(Edition p. 559.)*

I.24.1m.1 Aetherial stars are said to need no nourishment. *(Edition p. 567.)*

I.24.1o.1 Each star is described as a world. *(Edition p. 569.)*

In this edition. "Fixed" refers to stellar arrangement and need not deny the common rotation of the heavens. "World" in a stellar account is retained without identifying it with a modern solar system.

See also. Aether; Heaven; Nutrition; Planet; World.

State and settlement

κατάστασις, katastasis, state; disposition; established condition[523]

The word. Katastasis is a state, arrangement, or settled condition. Its meaning depends on what is constituted or placed in that condition.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account attributes differences among kings' characters to the disposition of the angels and daimons escorting their souls, rather than to differences in the divine character of the souls themselves. Katastasis names the escorts' condition within this explanation, not the act of founding a settlement.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.45.6 The disposition of a royal soul's escort explains differences in character. *(Edition p. 1323.)*

[523] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 408–409. The claim that all the royal souls are divine belongs to this narrative's explanation and is not a general historical assessment of rulers.

In this edition. "Disposition" fits this use; "state" is broader and should not imply a political state automatically.

See also. Angel and messenger; Character; Divine spirit; Habit and disposition; King.

Statue

ἀνδριάς; ἱδρώς, andrias; hidrōs, statue; human-shaped figure[524]

The word. Andrias is a statue, commonly a figure in human form. Its grammatical formation does not require every represented figure to be simply male.

In Stobaeus. The cave narrative describes a statue with male features on its right side and female features on its left, its arms extended crosswise. The word names the crafted figure whose extraordinary form prompts wonder. It does not name the deity or identify the statue's cultural setting more precisely than the report does.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.56c The statue combines male and female sides in one body. *(Edition p. 147.)*

I.3.56f Sweating and fanning belong to the reported behavior of the statue. *(Edition p. 151.)*

Sweat in a reported marvel. Hidrōs is sweat. At I.3.56f, the statue is said to sweat in heat and to stop when fanned by the Brahmans. The words identify the moisture through a bodily analogy within a marvelous report. They should not turn the reported behavior into an independently verified observation.

In this edition. "Statue" is clearer than a narrowly male image in this context.

See also. Art and craft; Body; Cave; Female; Heat; Male; Sacred image.

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[524] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 67–69. The estimate of ten or twelve cubits is retained without an exact modern conversion or a conjectural divine name.

Steersman

κυβερνήτης, kubernētēs, steersman; helmsman[525]

The word. Kybernētēs is a helmsman or steersman, a skilled director of a vessel's movement.

In Stobaeus. The soul treatise pairs helmsman and wind as principal causes of a ship's motion, distinguishing them from other indispensable conditions. The analogy presents soul as using body as instrument or vehicle. Its causal point differs from the related analogy stressing a helmsman's ability to leave the ship.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.36.5 The helmsman illustrates a principal cause rather than a merely necessary condition. *(Edition p. 1179.)*

I.49.41.5 A separable helmsman illustrates one account of bodily use. *(Edition p. 1223.)*

In this edition. "Helmsman" is conventional; "steersman" keeps the governing activity explicit.

See also. Cause; Instrument; Soul; Use; Vehicle of the soul.

Stone

λίθος, lithos, stone; rock[526]

The word. Lithos is stone, a rock, or a particular piece of stony material. Context determines whether a mineral identification is warranted.

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[525] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 371, 382. The verb translated encompassing follows the printed reading despite proposed alternatives in the apparatus.

[526] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 254–255. The preceding phrase is grammatically uneven. The clear reference to lithos supports interpreting pagos there as rock rather than frost.

In Stobaeus. The account of cold waters associates their condition with passage through moist rock, explaining that stone and especially such stone is cold. The word identifies the surrounding material in a causal explanation of water's qualities. It does not name a precise rock species.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.39.1.7 Moist rock is invoked to explain cold water. *(Edition p. 761.)*

In this edition. "Stone" suits the material; "rock" is natural for the mass through which water flows.

See also. Cold; Earth; Mine and mineral working; Quality; Water.

Straight

εὐθύς, *euthus*, straight; a straight line[527]

The word. Euthys means straight; its feminine form can stand for an understood straight line. The geometrical sense differs from the adverbial "immediately."

In Stobaeus. The celestial description asks the reader to imagine a straight line joining the two fixed poles. This line is the axis and a diameter of the spherical cosmos, with earth at its center. Straightness specifies the imagined connection, whereas circular motion belongs to the revolving whole.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.3 A straight line through the poles defines the celestial axis. *(Edition p. 765.)*

In this edition. Supply "line" when the substantival adjective requires it in English. Do not make the imagined line a material rod.

See also. Axis; Circular motion; Diameter; Line; Pole.

[527] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 256. The passage explains a geocentric celestial model by comparison with a sphere revolving on a lathe.

Streaks and rods

ῥάβδος, rhabdos, rod; streak; straight luminous band[528]

The word. Rhabdos is a rod or staff; by resemblance, it can name an elongated appearance of light.

In Stobaeus. The discussion of rainbow-like appearances distinguishes a straight rod from a curved rainbow. Their relation is explained through the configuration of the reflecting cloud and the observer's position. A halo is distinguished by encircling a luminous body, whereas the rainbow appears opposite the sun or moon.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.45 The rod is the straight member of a group of related luminous appearances. *(Edition p. 795.)*

In this edition. "Rod" retains the image; "streak" gives a more immediately visual English equivalent.

See also. Cloud; Light; Rainbow and halo; Reflection; Sight.

Stream and current

ῥεῦμα, rheuma, stream; current; flow[529]

The word. Rheuma is a flow or current, emphasizing the movement of water rather than simply the channel containing it.

In Stobaeus. In the Phaedo afterlife account, the current ejects certain souls from Tartarus after a year and carries them along different rivers according to their offenses. The moving water thus organizes the next stage of punishment. Expulsion does not itself amount to final release.

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[528] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 266. The passage presents an ancient account through reflection. Its taxonomy should not be silently replaced by modern optical classifications.

[529] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 443–444. The offenses described include regret after parental violence. Those who strike parents are not automatically being called their parents' killers.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.58.46 The current carries souls from Tartarus toward further conditions of release. *(Edition p. 1461.)*

In this edition. "Current" suits the force carrying the souls; "stream" suits a flowing body more generally.

See also. Motion; Prison; Punishment; River; Water.

Strength

ἰσχύς, ischus, strength; forcefulness[530]

The word. Ischys is strength, the ability to exert force or withstand opposition. Its possession does not by itself constitute virtue.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic narrative describes the strong using their superiority to burn and kill the powerless. Strength is therefore morally distinguished from its exercise: the violence provokes the elements' appeal for divine ordering. The abstract contrast with weakness explains a social imbalance in the story.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.65 Strength used against weakness produces destructive domination. *(Edition p. 1301.)*

In this edition. "Strength" preserves the capacity; distinguish it from the permission named exousia later in the same unit.

See also. Compulsion and force; Injustice; Peace; Power and capacity; Weakness.

Strife

νεῖκος, neikos, Strife; strife; conflict[531]

The word. Neikos denotes strife or conflict. In the Empedoclean reports it functions as the name of the power associated with separation.

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[530] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 403. The elements become speaking petitioners after witnessing this violence, establishing the transition to their requests for law.

[531] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 121–122, 171.

In Stobaeus. One collected fragment places Strife at the outermost edge as the roots come together. Another contrasts the union of all through Love with their dispersal through Strife. The doxographical notice explains cosmic coming-to-be and destruction by the alternating dominance of the two powers. The explanatory role of Strife therefore depends on its relation to the enduring constituents and the opposing power of union.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.11a Strife stands apart as the roots come together. *(Edition p. 295.)*

I.10.11b.2 Strife is contrasted with Love's unifying action. *(Edition p. 297.)*

I.20.1f.3 Alternating dominance explains cosmic change. *(Edition p. 463.)*

In this edition. Capital "Strife" indicates the named cosmic power. These physical contexts do not reduce it to moral wickedness or ordinary human disagreement.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Element; Friendship and cosmic attraction; Mixture and blending; Separation.

String

χορδή, chordē, string; musical string[532]

The word. Chordē is a string, including the sounding string of an instrument. In the selected analogy it is the bodily material acted on by the musician.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry describes a musician moving a string according to a harmony that does not itself undergo the string's affection. The distinction helps explain how an ordering principle can govern an affected body without sharing the same alteration. Mere willing is not enough: the action is specified by musical order.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.21.3 The affected string is distinguished from the harmony governing its movement. *(Edition p. 1083.)*

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[532] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 345. The personification of harmony as speaking or prescribing should not be silently replaced by a different Greek reading.

In this edition. "String" is direct; the language of harmony prescribing an action remains figurative.

See also. Affection; Harmony; Instrument; Lyre; Motion.

Subsistence

ὑπόστασις, hupostasis, subsistence; stable existence; persistence[533]

The word. Hypostasis can describe the establishment or continuing reality of something. "Subsistence" is useful only if the particular claim about existence remains clear.

In Stobaeus. Ocellus contrasts the change of a subject in generation with the subject's identity and persistence on the causal side. In the account of forms, sensible things have a subsistence patterned by an incorporeal exemplar. These uses concern how things stand or exist; they do not automatically name a fixed hierarchy of metaphysical persons.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.20.3.3 Stable subsistence characterizes the cause in contrast with what changes. *(Edition p. 471.)*

I.12.1a.1 The form patterns the subsistence of sensible things. *(Edition p. 333.)*

In this edition. "Persistence" is especially clear in Ocellus's contrast. Retain "subsistence" where the mode of existence is the central issue.

See also. Being and substance; Continuance; Pattern and model; Underlying subject.

[533] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 134, 174. The same Greek noun need not carry the specialized sense found in later doctrinal classifications.

Subtraction and removal

ἀφαίρεσις, aphairesis, subtraction; removal; taking away[534]

The word. Aphairesis is taking away. Its object can be a quantity or a condition judged foreign to a being; a technical theory of intellectual abstraction should not be assumed in every occurrence.

In Stobaeus. The classification of motion pairs subtraction with addition in quantitative change. The account of purification instead names removal of what is foreign as a benefit, alongside restoration of proper essence. Both involve taking away, but one concerns amount and the other the soul's condition.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.19.1.5 Subtraction is associated with diminution in quantity. *(Edition p. 433.)*

I.49.65.10 Purification removes what is foreign and restores proper essence. *(Edition p. 1513.)*

In this edition. "Subtraction" suits quantities and "removal" suits purification. "Abstraction" requires a context that specifically supports that intellectual operation.

See also. Addition; Diminution; Proper and one's own; Purification; Quantity.

Suitable receptivity

ἐπιτηδειότης, epitēdeiotēs, fitness; aptitude; suitable receptivity[535]

The word. Epitēdeiotēs is fitness or aptitude for something. In some contexts it concerns receptivity, but it need not be purely passive.

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[534] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 162–163, 455–456. The shared idea is taking away. Neither cited passage establishes a separate theory of intellectual abstraction.

[535] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 352. The passage also records that some thinkers identify constitution and power, preserving disagreement about the distinction.

In Stobaeus. The definition of psychic constitution calls it the fitness proper to parts for their natural function. Power is then a state enabling activity in accordance with that constitution. Fitness identifies suitability for a role, while the surrounding account distinguishes it from both the part and its exercised activity.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.25a.7 Fitness explains constitution in relation to the natural function of parts. *(Edition p. 1105.)*

In this edition. "Fitness" is clearest here; "receptivity" requires a context about receiving something.

See also. Activity; Constitution as fitness; Nature; Part and whole; Power and capacity.

Sun

ἥλιος, hēlios, sun[536]

The word. Hēlios names the sun, but agreement on that visible object leaves its substance, shape, size, and motion open to competing explanations.

In Stobaeus. Anaximander's report distinguishes the visible sun from a much larger wheel whose fire appears through an outlet. Xenophanes explains the sun by clouds set ablaze and its eclipse by extinction. The Pythagorean account instead gives a spherical sun and an eclipse caused by the moon's passage in front. The lexicon keeps these mechanisms attached to their reported proponents.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.25.1a The sun is explained as ignited clouds. *(Edition p. 581.)*

I.25.1c A fiery wheel and its outlet are distinguished. *(Edition p. 583.)*

I.25.1i The moon's passage obscures the spherical sun. *(Edition p. 585.)*

[536] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 207–209.

In this edition. Ancient comparisons and ratios remain in their own terms. "Sun" must not blur the distinction between a luminous appearance and a supporting structure in the wheel account.

See also. Eclipse; Fire; Moon; Star.

Supplication

δέησις, deēsis, supplication; prayer; request[537]

The word. Deēsis is a request or supplication, especially a prayer addressed to a higher power in the selected passage.

In Stobaeus. Diotima describes prayers and sacrifices passing from humans toward gods through the daimonic intermediary, with commands and recompense moving in return. Supplication is one side of a structured exchange. The passage explains mediation rather than promising that every request receives its desired answer.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.9.17.2 Human prayers are carried through the intermediary between gods and humans. *(Edition p. 287.)*

In this edition. "Prayers" is natural in the religious setting; "requests" suits a less sacred context.

See also. Divine spirit; God; Recompense; Sacred; Sacrifice.

Surface

ἐπιφάνεια, epiphaneia, surface[538]

The word. Epiphaneia is a surface, considered separately from the solid body it bounds or from a line. A surface need not be a plane surface in every use.

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[537] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 118. The account distinguishes what humans send from what gods return, making direction essential to the mediating role.

[538] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 141–142. The passage's inclusion of place, void, and time shows that the list is broader than visible surfaces alone.

In Stobaeus. In Chrysippus's reported account, the surface belongs among things resembling bodies that admit division without limit. The account distinguishes such divisibility from an infinite completed composition. Its place in the list helps prevent treating every continuous magnitude as a body with three dimensions.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1e The surface is one of the continua divisible without limit. *(Edition p. 357.)*

I.14.1c.1 Surface is listed among things possessing magnitude. *(Edition p. 355.)*

In this edition. "Surface" preserves the category; do not automatically replace it with "plane," which adds a geometrical specification.

See also. Body; Continuity; Line; Plane; Solid.

Sweet

γλυκύς, glukus, sweet[539]

The word. Glykys is sweet. The taste term can be explained through a physical or evaluative account without losing its sensory reference.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus describes sweetness as the pleasant effect of material suited to the tongue restoring its natural condition. It smooths what has been roughened and corrects excessive contraction or dispersal. Sweetness is therefore presented as restorative in this theory, rather than simply identified by a modern chemical constituent.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.55.2.9 Sweet taste is explained as restoration of the tongue's natural state. *(Edition p. 1677.)*

[539] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 495. The exact distribution of the passage's demonstratives is difficult, but the general contrast between disturbance and restoration is explicit.

In this edition. "Sweet" is direct; retain the distinction between the taste and the pleasure it produces.

See also. Nature; Pleasure; Rough; Taste; Tongue.

Swerve

παρέγκλισις, *parenklisis*, swerve; deviation[540]

The word. Parenklisis is a swerve away from a course. In the Epicurean report it is specifically distinguished from straight downward motion and motion through impact.

In Stobaeus. Atoms are said to move sometimes along a plumb line and sometimes by a swerve, while upward movement is assigned to impact and rebound. The report identifies these modes but does not here explain the swerve's connection with voluntary action or supply its precise scale.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1f.2 Atomic swerving is distinguished from downward motion and rebound. *(Edition p. 359.)*

In this edition. "Swerve" is the established equivalent; keep it distinct from enklisis, oblique motion.

See also. Atom; Impact; Inclination and tilt; Motion; Rebound and vibration.

[540] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 142. The preceding statement about weight is textually troubled; the distinction among motions is clearer than that syntax.

Sympathy

συμπάθεια; συμπαθής; συμπαθεῖν, sumpatheia; sumpathēs; sumpathein, sympathy; sharing affections; correspondence[541]

The word. Sympatheia and related forms concern being affected together or responding in correspondence. The sense is wider than fellow-feeling or compassion.

In Stobaeus. A report about Plato denies that divine intellect shares the affections of mutable nature. Conversely, the Hermetic narrative says that the maker ordained things below to share in the affections of those above, grounding corresponding sacred rites. The relation can therefore be asserted at one level and denied at another.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.29b.6 Separated intellect is described as not sharing mutable nature's affections. *(Edition p. 71.)*

I.49.44.79 Correspondence between upper and lower things grounds earthly rites. *(Edition p. 1315.)*

In this edition. "Sharing affections" clarifies the physical or cosmic relation. Retain "sympathy" when its technical meaning has been explained.

See also. Affection; Impassible; Relation; Sacred rite; World.

Synthesis

σύνθεσις, sunthesis, combination; composition; synthesis[542]

The word. Synthesis is putting together. It describes combination without by itself identifying the constituents' independence or the kind of unity produced.

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[541] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 37, 406–407. The selected passages attest related adjective and verb forms. Their claims belong respectively to a report about Plato and a Hermetic narrative.

[542] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 311. The passage's "excellence" belongs to intellect and is not restricted to moral virtue.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account describes the combination of intellect's coverings in an earthen body. Soul mediates for intellect and uses spirit as a servant governing the creature. The coverings have distinct functions; synthesis does not make soul, spirit, and body interchangeable names for one undifferentiated material.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.3.2 The combination of coverings mediates between intellect and earthly body. *(Edition p. 951.)*

In this edition. "Combination" reads naturally in the garment image; "synthesis" is useful when contrasted with resolution.

See also. Analysis and resolution; Breath; Composite; Garment of soul and intellect; Intellect.

System and organized whole

σύστημα, sustēma, organized whole; composite; system[543]

The word. Systēma is a whole whose constituents are brought together. The English "system" is useful when the relation of parts is explicit, but can sound overly abstract in an account of embodied life.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic narrative calls the human constitution a device for binding souls. Chrysippus's reported definitions use the noun of the cosmos as a whole of heaven and earth, or gods and humans with their surroundings. The scale changes; the idea of constituents belonging together remains.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.28 Human constitution serves as the soul's binding composite in a narrative. *(Edition p. 1265.)*

I.21.5.1 The world is defined as an organized whole of its constituents. *(Edition p. 501.)*

[543] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 184, 392–393. The Hermetic narrative's "continually" should not erase its later possibility of release for individual souls.

In this edition. "Constitution" suits the human composite; "system" or "organized whole" suits the cosmic definitions.

See also. Bond; Constitution; Embodiment; Part and whole; World.

Taste

γεῦσις, geusis, taste[544]

The word. Geusis denotes tasting. The short notice devoted to it focuses on the medium through which the experience occurs.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian report transmitted under Didymus states that tasting takes place through an intervening medium of tastable liquids. The following discussion pairs taste with touch: in both, the medium goes unnoticed because the distance involved is short, unlike the distances of sight, hearing, and smell. The two notices together make the apparently immediate character of tasting compatible with mediation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.55.1 Liquids provide the intervening medium. *(Edition p. 1671.)*

I.56.1.2 A short distance makes mediation in taste and touch unnoticed. *(Edition p. 1681.)*

In this edition. "Taste" names the act or faculty, while "tastable" marks its object. The terse first notice is not expanded into a taxonomy of flavors absent from the preserved text.

See also. Moisture; Perception; Touch; Water.

[544] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 494, 496.

Tension

τόνος, tonos, tension; tautness[545]

The word. Tonos is tension or tautness. In cosmology it can name a continuing condition of the world's substance rather than a temporary strain between separate bodies.

In Stobaeus. The account associated with Cleanthes says that tension does not cease while cosmic cycles and ordering continue. Growth from seeds provides the analogy: parts of the whole appear at their appropriate times, as parts of an individual do. The word thus links sustained cohesion with an ordered unfolding of living things.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.17.3.3 Unceasing tension accompanies the development of cosmic parts at their proper times. *(Edition p. 397.)*

In this edition. "Tension" preserves the physical image. It should not be translated as emotional stress in this account.

See also. Continuity; Cosmic ordering; Fire; Growth; Seed.

Test and refutation

ἔλεγχος, elenchos, test; examination; refutation[546]

The word. Elenchos is a test or exposure of a claim, and can become a refutation when the claim fails. Not every occurrence describes a formal disputation.

In Stobaeus. A saying attributed to Thales calls time the clearest test of all things because it reveals truth. Here testing occurs through experience and disclosure over time. The surrounding anecdotes similarly treat time as discoverer and teacher, broadening the term beyond an exchange of questions and answers.

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[545] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 153. The opening construction is difficult. The translation takes fire as the implicit agent of the cycle without inserting it into the printed Greek.

[546] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 102. The unit collects transmitted sayings; their attributions do not establish historical conversations.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.40a Time is the test that makes truth manifest. *(Edition p. 243.)*

In this edition. "Test" is the right emphasis in the saying; "refutation" would incorrectly decide in advance that every tested claim is false.

See also. Evidence; Hypothesis; Learning; Time; Truth.

Tetractys

τετρακτύς, tetraktus, tetractys; fourfold numerical arrangement[547]

The word. Tetraktys names the arrangement of the first four numbers whose sum is ten. Its significance depends on both the sequence and the completed total.

In Stobaeus. The report quotes an oath invoking the person who handed down the tetractys, called a source and root of ever-flowing nature. The numerical explanation precedes the religious formula. Reading them together shows how arithmetic order becomes an object of reverence without reducing the oath to an ordinary calculation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.11 The sum of the first four numbers grounds the tetractys and its oath. *(Edition p. 305.)*

In this edition. Retain "tetractys," with the numerical explanation. Translating it simply "four" would erase the arrangement.

See also. Decad; Number; Oath; Root; Tetrad.

[547] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 125. The printed oath says "our head," rendered "our mind"; the parallel wording "soul" is recorded in the apparatus but not substituted.

Tetrad

τετράς, tetras, tetrad; four[548]

The word. Tetras is four taken as a numerical group or principle. It is distinct from the tetractys, the arrangement of the first four numbers.

In Stobaeus. The Pythagorean report locates the power of ten in four because one, two, three, and four complete ten when summed. Four marks the last member needed for that completion. The argument does not obtain ten by multiplying four by itself, nor simply identify four and ten as the same number.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.11 The tetrad completes the sum of the first four numbers to ten. *(Edition p. 305.)*

In this edition. "Tetrad" preserves its role in numerical doctrine; an accompanying "four" prevents needless obscurity.

See also. Decad; Number; Perfection and completeness; Tetractys.

Thick

παχύς, pachus, thick; dense[549]

The word. Pachys describes thickness or a relatively dense constitution. Its sense depends on the object being compared.

In Stobaeus. Arrian's damaged account describes northern air as thicker, although the connection to the surrounding argument cannot be recovered securely. The Hermetic comparison of eye coverings provides a clearer contrast: thick coverings are associated with dim vision. The second passage illustrates the word without repairing the first.

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[548] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 125. The source's phrase about four and its parts is explained through the sum 1 + 2 + 3 + 4.

[549] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 229, 410. The incomplete ending at I.28.2.3 remains unresolved. A conjectural reference to earth is not supplied as if transmitted.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.28.2.3 Northern air is described as thicker in a corrupt argument. *(Edition p. 657.)*

I.49.45.14 Thick coverings are contrasted with thin ones in an analogy of sight. *(Edition p. 1329.)*

In this edition. "Thick" preserves the texture or thickness described; do not assume a measured modern density.

See also. Air; Density and rarefaction; Eye; Sight; Thin and subtle.

Thin and subtle

λεπτός; λεπτύνειν, leptos; leptunein, thin; fine; subtle[550]

The word. Leptos describes thinness or fineness. Related verbs can express the process of becoming finer or more attenuated.

In Stobaeus. Zeno's reported elemental cycle makes fire arise as air becomes finer. The Hermetic eye analogy instead contrasts thin coverings with thick ones. Neither passage uses "subtle" merely to mean intellectually clever: the immediate concern is the constitution or texture of bodies.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.17.3.1 Air becoming finer leads to the kindling of fire. *(Edition p. 395.)*

I.49.45.14 Thin coverings are associated with sharper vision. *(Edition p. 1329.)*

In this edition. "Finer" suits elemental attenuation; "thin" suits the coverings. Avoid an unexplained metaphorical "subtle."

See also. Air; Density and rarefaction; Eye; Fire; Thick.

[550] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 152–153, 410. The clause about air becoming finer follows Wachsmuth's emendation of a damaged reading.

Thirst

δίψα; δίψος, dipsa; dipsos, thirst[551]

The word. Dipsa and dipsos denote thirst. The bodily desire can serve both psychological analysis and images of punishment.

In Stobaeus. The Republic isolates thirst as an impulse to drink, then distinguishes a resisting power in the soul. The underworld catalogue gives Tantalus's unending thirst as a punishment. One passage analyzes the structure of desire; the other makes frustrated desire part of an afterlife narrative.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.30.2 Thirst supplies the example of an impulse resisted by another psychic power. *(Edition p. 1137.)*

I.49.47.8 Tantalus's thirst appears among perpetual punishments. *(Edition p. 1353.)*

In this edition. "Thirst" is direct; preserve whether the focus is desire, deprivation, or its frustration.

See also. Desire; Hunger; Punishment; Repletion; Soul.

Thought

διάνοια, dianoia, thought; discursive thought[552]

The word. Dianoia denotes thought and, in a technical contrast, thought that proceeds through successive steps. Its distinction from nous depends on the source's classification.

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[551] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 360, 416. The qualification "in so far as it is thirsty" is essential to the Republic's isolation of the impulse.

[552] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 348–349.

In Stobaeus. The survey of psychic powers reports a division between thought proceeding without imagination or perception and the opinion-forming activity that accompanies them. Some authorities instead posit one rational substance with different activities. The ensuing criticism distinguishes intellect's all-at-once activity from discursive thought's successive procedure. The report therefore presents both contested terminology and an evaluative distinction.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.24.4 Different classifications separate thought from opinion or distinguish activities. *(Edition p. 1093.)*

I.49.24.5 Intellect's simultaneous activity is contrasted with thought proceeding step by step. *(Edition p. 1095.)*

In this edition. "Discursive thought" is used where succession is explicit; ordinary "thought" remains appropriate elsewhere. Dianoia and nous are not forced into an invariant opposition.

See also. Apprehension; Belief and opinion; Intellect; Presentation and imagination; Reason and account.

Three-part soul

τριμερής, trimerēs, threefold; having three parts[553]

The word. Trimerēs means three-part or threefold. Applied to soul, it need not be a claim that every possible psychic function falls into exactly three categories.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry explains the familiar threefold division through its ethical purpose of establishing virtues. He notes that imaginative, perceptive, intellective, and nutritive powers are not comprehensively captured by it. Elsewhere he distinguishes division of bodily activity from quantitative division of soul itself.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.25a.2 The threefold division is explained as serving an ethical purpose. *(Edition p. 1101.)*

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[553] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 350, 353. This is Porphyry's report about Plato and Aristotle; it is not a claim that all their psychological accounts use one identical division.

I.49.25a.9 Bodily distribution is distinguished from soul's own unity. *(Edition p. 1109.)*

In this edition. "Threefold soul" is convenient, provided the kind and purpose of the division are stated.

See also. Division; Part and whole; Power and capacity; Soul; Virtue and excellence.

Thrust

πρόωσις, proōsis, forward thrust; pushing onward[554]

The word. Proōsis is a forward push or thrust. Direction is part of the term's force.

In Stobaeus. The account of marine disturbances contrasts waves that recoil with waves having only a forward thrust. The distinction concerns how the advancing water behaves after or during its incursion. It is not a general definition of every wave as a single one-way movement.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.54 Forward thrust is contrasted with returning recoil in advancing waves. *(Edition p. 801.)*

In this edition. "Forward thrust" makes the directional contrast explicit.

See also. Impact; Motion; Rebound and vibration; Sea and tides; Wave.

Thunder

βροντή, brontē, thunder[555]

The word. Brontē is thunder, the audible phenomenon explained alongside lightning and the thunderbolt. Accounts distinguish sound from visible brilliance even when they assign both to a common process.

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[554] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 268–269. The examples of Helice and Bura illustrate destructive incursions within the ancient account; no precise modern wave classification is supplied.

[555] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 232–233.

In Stobaeus. Anaxagoras' report makes thunder the noise produced when a hot portion of aether enters cold air. Democritus' account explains it through an irregular aggregate forcing its enclosing cloud downward. The accompanying lightning theory uses collisions and friction. These mechanisms should be compared as alternatives, not assembled into a single narrative.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.29.1.4 Hot entering cold produces noise and brilliance. *(Edition p. 667.)*

I.29.1.9 A moving aggregate and its cloud explain thunder. *(Edition p. 669.)*

In this edition. "Thunder" names the sound. "Thunderbolt" renders a different Greek noun and must not be substituted simply because English connects the two words.

See also. Cloud; Hearing; Lightning and thunderbolt; Voice.

Time

χρόνος; ἐνεστώς; παρεληλυθώς; μέλλον; νῦν; πρότερον; ὕστερον; ὁδούς, chronos; enestōs; parelēluthōs; mellon; nun; proteron; husteron; odous, time[556]

The word. Chronos names time. The collection asks about its nature and divisions as well as its causal and measuring roles; definitions of time should be distinguished from poetic statements about what time brings.

In Stobaeus. The report of Zeno calls time an interval of motion and a measure and criterion of speed and slowness. It then relates time to what comes to be, reaches completion, and exists. The note in the edition distinguishes this definition from the preceding Aristotelian account through number.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.heading The chapter asks about time's nature, parts, and effects. *(Edition p. 223.)*

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[556] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 17, 32–33, 36–37, 83, 93, 97, 103–104. The name Zeno follows the attribution in the excerpt. The term diastēma, "interval," should not be silently replaced by Aristotle's different definition through number.

I.8.40e Time is an interval of motion and a criterion of speed and slowness. *(Edition p. 247.)*

I.8.40c Before, after, and the now explain continuity and division. *(Edition p. 245.)*

I.8.40b.2 Several reported definitions distinguish measure, quantity, and accompaniment. *(Edition p. 245.)*

I.5.22b Clotho's spinning represents the present. *(Edition p. 191.)*

I.8.41.1 Past, present, and future are considered as both distinct and interconnected. *(Edition p. 249.)*

I.1.28c Future existence is interpreted through generation and embodiment. *(Edition p. 59.)*

Arith.3b Nun introduces the actual explanatory role assigned to number. *(Edition p. 17.)*

I.1.29b.5 Earlier doctrines are distinguished in a judgment about philosophical transmission. *(Edition p. 69.)*

I.8.22 Time's sharp teeth express its power to wear things away. *(Edition p. 231.)*

Before, after, and the now. The Aristotelian account calls time the number of motion with respect to before and after. Its now is a shared boundary: the end of what precedes and the beginning of what follows. The collection also records Strato's quantity in motion and rest and Epicurus' accompaniment of motions. These compressed definitions classify time differently; the edition retains each report's key noun instead of replacing them all with a neutral word such as "duration."

The present. Enestōs, literally standing or being present, names the present time. I.5.22b assigns it to Clotho's ongoing spinning, distinguished from the completed past and the future allotment. The image makes present activity intelligible through a thread in the process of being worked. This allocation belongs to the passage's interpretation of the Fates.

The past. Parelēluthōs means having passed and, substantivally, the past. I.8.41.1 examines the relation of past, present, and future through a deliberately paradoxical account of their separation and union. The opening gap and disputed relation to the surviving heading limit attribution, but the interdependence of the temporal terms is clear.

What is to come. Mellon names what is to come or what is impending. In I.1.28c, gods "to come" are interpreted as those subject to generation and bodily association. This is the commentator's reading of quoted Platonic language, not simply the grammatical meaning of every occurrence of the future participle.

Now and as things stand. Nun commonly means now, but it can also introduce the actual state of affairs after a hypothetical contrast. In Arith.3b, "as it is" better expresses nun de after the claim that without number things would not be intelligible. Not every occurrence of the word develops a philosophical theory of the temporal instant.

Before and after. Proteron and husteron express before and after, or earlier and later. Their relation may be temporal, logical, or explanatory. The form ta protera at I.1.29b.5 concerns earlier doctrines associated with Plato. It is a historical or doctrinal comparison, illustrating why priority should not always be read as a technical claim about the structure of time.

The teeth of time. Odous is a tooth. I.8.22 gives Time sharp teeth with which to wear away even the mightiest things. This personification makes gradual destruction vivid. "Teeth" belongs to the poetic image and should not be rationalized into a literal physical mechanism attributed to an independently bodily Time.

Before and after in the definition. The explicitly temporal pairing occurs in I.8.40c: time is the number of motion in respect of to proteron and to husteron, with the now forming their shared boundary. This technical use should be distinguished from ordinary references to earlier doctrines.

In this edition. "Time" renders chronos. The accompanying terms "interval," "measure," and "criterion" are retained because they carry the particular account's explanatory work.

See also. Allotment; Change and alteration; Coming into being and passing away; Continuity; Demiurge and craftsman; Fate; Knowledge; Limit; Motion; Myth; Number; Order; Quantity; Rest; Standard of judgment.

Tongue

γλῶσσα; γλῶττα, glōssa; glōtta, tongue; language[557]

The word. Glōssa and glōtta are forms of the same word for tongue, also capable of denoting language. The bodily context is primary here.

In Stobaeus. Momus describes the prospective human being as talkative with the tongue while listing other intrusive uses of the senses. The tongue therefore stands for articulate speech within a criticism of unchecked curiosity. In the taste passages it has a different, directly sensory role.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.52 Talkativeness accompanies other forms of intrusive human inquiry. *(Edition p. 1289.)*

I.55.2.9 The tongue's condition is central to the account of sweetness. *(Edition p. 1677.)*

In this edition. "Tongue" retains the organ; "language" would be inappropriate in these anatomical constructions.

See also. Human being; Knowledge; Mouth; Speech and utterance; Taste.

Touch

ἁφή, haphē, touch[558]

The word. Haphē denotes touch. The excerpt investigates how something between the perceived object and the flesh can participate in what seems an immediate encounter.

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[557] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 399–400, 495. The spelling variation does not establish two distinct organs or faculties.

[558] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 496.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian notice makes touching occur through an intervening body, identified as air, water, or something common to the two. It then explains why this medium usually escapes notice: the distance is short, as in taste. The claim belongs to the transmitted formulation, including its editorially supplied words, and should not be silently rewritten to match a fuller account from elsewhere.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.56.1.1 Touch is explained through a body between flesh and object. *(Edition p. 1681.)*

I.56.1.2 Short distance conceals the intervening medium. *(Edition p. 1681.)*

In this edition. "Touch" names the perception, and "what is touched" its object. The language of mediation is retained even where ordinary English suggests direct contact.

See also. Air; Body; Perception; Taste; Water.

Transgression and discord

πλημμέλεια, plēmmeleia, discord; disharmony; transgression[559]

The word. Plēmmeleia evokes going wrong or being out of tune and can mean fault or transgression. Its musical force may remain active in an abstract argument.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus says that divine goodness prevents fate from slipping into disorderly disharmony. The term characterizes a deviation from proper order, while correction preserves the order's integrity. It is not necessarily a particular criminal offense in this cosmological setting.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.35 Divine correction restrains disorderly disharmony. *(Edition p. 83.)*

[559] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 43. The argument makes correction compatible with the preservation of fate, rather than abolishing fate as inherently discordant.

In this edition. "Disharmony" preserves the image here; "transgression" suits specifically wrongful conduct.

See also. Correction and restoration; Disorder; Error and wrongdoing; Fate; Harmony.

Transparency

διαφανής, diaphanēs, transparent; the transparent[560]

The word. Diaphanēs describes what is transparent or allows visibility through it. Used substantivally, it names "the transparent."

In Stobaeus. The brief report on Alcmaeon explains sight through apprehension of the transparent. It does not identify the transparent's precise location or explain the mechanism in detail. The compressed wording supports a lexical identification but leaves considerable uncertainty about the full theory of vision intended.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.52.8 Sight is associated with apprehension of the transparent. *(Edition p. 1631.)*

In this edition. "The transparent" preserves the substantive adjective without supplying an unattested organ or medium.

See also. Awareness and apprehension; Light; Perception; Pore and passage; Sight.

Triangle

τρίγωνον, trigōnon, triangle[561]

The word. Trigōnon is a triangle. The philosophical example distinguishes a particular triangle from triangle itself and from properties necessarily belonging to the figure.

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[560] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 484. The adopted word is antilēpsis, apprehension. A proposed reading meaning an answering flash or reflection is recorded but not adopted.

[561] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 316–317. The word specifying a particular triangle is supplied in the printed Greek and marked in the bilingual edition.

In Stobaeus. The classification of cognition assigns images or participating instances to opinion, necessary geometrical properties to knowledge, and forms themselves to intellect. Triangle illustrates the sequence. The point is not merely that the same drawing can be looked at in several ways, but that different kinds of object are being distinguished.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.48.6.7 Particular triangle, necessary properties, and triangle itself illustrate kinds of cognition. *(Edition p. 971.)*

In this edition. "Triangle itself" preserves the explicit contrast with an instance. Do not omit the qualification as redundant.

See also. Circle; Intelligible; Knowledge; Participation; Plane.

Truth

ἀλήθεια, alētheia, truth; the true[562]

The word. Alētheia is truth; alēthēs means true. What can be true, and how truth is recognized, depends on the account of cognition or reality in question.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic maxims contrast bodily things with an incorporeal domain free from falsehood. The Epicurean report instead distinguishes universally true perceptions and impressions from beliefs, some true and some false. The Sophist excerpt allows both truth and falsity in thought, belief, and appearance. These propositions classify different subjects and should not be combined into an unqualified statement about what all ancient philosophers call true.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.1.11 Truth is contrasted across bodily and incorporeal domains. *(Edition p. 825.)*

I.50.21.1 Perceptions and beliefs receive different classifications. *(Edition p. 1595.)*

I.59.1.1 Thought, belief, and appearance admit truth and falsity. *(Edition p. 1691.)*

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[562] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 275, 475, 498.

In this edition. "True" remains stable while the entry identifies what bears truth in each source. "Reality" is not substituted merely to remove a difficult claim.

See also. Belief and opinion; Falsehood; Knowledge; Perception; Standard of judgment.

Tyrant

τύραννος, turannos, tyrant; absolute ruler[563]

The word. Tyrannos is a tyrant or sole ruler. In poetry it can express supremacy without reproducing a full constitutional definition.

In Stobaeus. The tragic fragment calls Fortune tyrant over all the gods and dismisses other divine names as vain additions. The extreme image gives Fortune sole governance. It is the fragment's claim, not an editorial resolution of the anthology's differing accounts of providence and chance.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.6.16 Fortune is portrayed as supreme ruler over the gods. *(Edition p. 201.)*

In this edition. "Tyrant" preserves the force of domination; "ruler" alone may soften the statement.

See also. Chance and fortune; God; Providence; Rule and kingship; Ruler.

[563] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 87. The edition retains an Aeschylean heading while also recording the fragment among anonymous tragic material; the attribution is not wholly secure.

Unchanging

ἀμετάβλητος; ἄτρεπτος, ametablētos; atreptos, unchanging; unchangeable[564]

The word. Ametablētos denies change. Its scope depends on the kind of change excluded and the nature of the subject described.

In Stobaeus. The report on Aristotle calls the aetherial fifth body unchanging, distinguishing it from the elemental qualities of generated things. A Hermetic account also joins unchangeability to partlessness in its discussion of life and harmony. These uses should not be treated as the claim that all subjects described as unchanging have the same constitution.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.16a.3 The fifth, aetherial body is set apart as unchanging. *(Edition p. 311.)*

I.41.7.4 Unchangeability accompanies partlessness in a difficult account of development. *(Edition p. 871.)*

Arith.8 The monad remains unchanged at the lower limit of subtraction. *(Edition p. 27.)*

Unalterable at the limit. Atreptos means unalterable or unchanged. In Arith.8 the monad remains unchanged at the limit of subtraction, since whole units cannot be subtracted beyond it within the account's conception of number. The term belongs to an argument about arithmetic rest and the name monas, not to a general denial that every physical unit can undergo change.

In this edition. Use "unchanging" for the condition asserted and "unchangeable" when incapacity for change is emphasized.

See also. Aether; Change and alteration; Everlasting; Immovable; Monad; Partless; Subtraction and removal.

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[564] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 21, 128, 290. The subject of the adjective in I.41.7.4 is grammatically uncertain; that limitation does not affect its clear attribution to the aetherial body in I.10.16a.3.

Underlying subject

ὑποκείμενον, hupokeimenon, underlying subject; substrate[565]

The word. Hypokeimenon is what lies beneath or serves as a subject. In accounts of change, it is the bearer that undergoes different conditions.

In Stobaeus. The report on Plato identifies matter as what underlies coming to be and passing away, distinguishing it from divine mind and the pattern. Ocellus uses the same vocabulary to contrast a changing subject with an abiding causal subject. The term therefore requires a relational question: underlying what change, predicate, or activity?

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.16a.2 Matter is distinguished from maker and model as the underlying recipient. *(Edition p. 311.)*

I.20.3.3 Persistence and change are contrasted with reference to their subjects. *(Edition p. 471.)*

In this edition. Use "underlying subject" in the argument; "substrate" is a compact technical alternative when its role has been explained.

See also. Accident; Change and alteration; Matter; Subsistence.

Understanding

σύνεσις, sunesis, understanding; comprehension[566]

The word. Synesis is understanding or comprehension. The word describes cognitive grasp without itself determining whether its explanation is bodily or incorporeal.

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[565] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 127–128, 174. The location of form in divine thought in I.10.16a.2 belongs to the reporter's interpretation of Plato, not a quoted Platonic sentence.

[566] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 424. The first quoted verse has an unexpressed feminine subject; the edition preserves the fragmentary opening.

In Stobaeus. The account introducing Empedocles's verses treats blood as an instrument of understanding. The quoted lines then identify thought with blood around the heart. The reader should distinguish the commentator's instrumental formulation from the more compressed poetic statement it introduces, rather than flatten both into a single proposition.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.53.11 Blood and heart are discussed in relation to the instrument and occurrence of understanding. *(Edition p. 1383.)*

In this edition. "Understanding" is clear here. It need not carry the specialized sense assigned to a different Greek cognitive term elsewhere.

See also. Blood; Heart; Instrument; Intellect; Thought.

Understanding and practical wisdom

φρόνησις, phronēsis, understanding; prudence; practical wisdom[567]

The word. Phronēsis concerns intelligent understanding or judgment. The familiar ethical rendering "practical wisdom" is not appropriate in every philosophical passage.

In Stobaeus. In the Phaedo, the soul's stable contemplation of what is pure and unchanging is called phronēsis. In the account attributed to Aesara, the corresponding Doric form accompanies judgment among the intellect's functions. These contexts require attention to cognition before importing a particular ethical classification.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.9.6 The soul's stable relation to intelligible reality is called understanding. *(Edition p. 1021.)*

I.49.27.1 Judgment and prudence are assigned to intellect in a tripartite soul. *(Edition p. 1115.)*

[567] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 330, 355. The term's occurrence does not by itself establish the narrower definition of practical wisdom associated with Aristotle's ethical works.

In this edition. "Understanding" suits the Phaedo passage; "prudence" can express intelligent practical judgment where the context supports it.

See also. Contemplation; Intellect; Sense and judgment; Soul; Wisdom.

Ungenerated

ἀγένητος, agenētos, ungenerated; without coming to be[568]

The word. Agenētos denies an origin through generation. It should be distinguished from a claim that something will never cease to exist.

In Stobaeus. The treatise attributed to Ocellus argues that the cosmos is ungenerated and imperishable. Circular shape and movement, together with time and substance, are taken to exhibit neither beginning nor end. Here the two predicates form a connected argument, although one concerns origin and the other destruction.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.20.3.1 Ocellus connects the cosmos's lack of beginning and end with circularity. *(Edition p. 469.)*

I.20.3.3 Generation within the universe is distinguished from its abiding cause. *(Edition p. 471.)*

In this edition. "Ungenerated" preserves the philosophical contrast with coming to be. "Unborn" would suggest biological birth too narrowly.

See also. Circular motion; Generated; Imperishable; World.

[568] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 173–174. The work circulated under Ocellus's name; its traditional attribution is retained. The phrase "absence of a beginning" is editorially supplied in I.20.3.1.

Union

ἕνωσις, henōsis, union; unification[569]

The word. Henōsis expresses making or being one. The nature of the unity depends on the argument; it need not mean material fusion or the disappearance of every distinction.

In Stobaeus. In the analysis of soul's activity, unification stands with end, cohesion, and abiding causation as a proposed characterization of activity in relation to motions. The motions can remain differentiated while depending on a unifying source. This local use should be understood before attaching a general mystical sense to the word.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.36.2 Activity is considered as the unification and abiding cause of motions. *(Edition p. 1177.)*

In this edition. "Unification" brings out the explanatory work performed; "union" suits emphasis on the resulting relation.

See also. Activity; Community and communion; Mixture and blending; One; Part and whole.

Universal

καθόλου, katholou, universal; in general; generally[570]

The word. Katholou can be adverbial, meaning generally, or substantival, naming the universal. These uses should be distinguished before constructing an account of universal objects.

In Stobaeus. The epistemological passage contrasts the universal judged by intellect with the particular judged by perception. A difficult Hermetic fragment instead speaks of essential being described in general as common to existing things. The shared expression does not make these two discussions a single theory of universals.

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[569] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 370. The account begins conditionally, "if, as some say"; it is one position under examination.

[570] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 293, 497. The distinctions in I.41.11.1 are textually difficult; they are retained without resolving them into an unstated metaphysical system.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.58.1.3 Intellect and perception are assigned universal and particular objects. *(Edition p. 1689.)*

I.41.11.1 Essential being is discussed generally in a damaged Hermetic passage. *(Edition p. 881.)*

In this edition. Use "the universal" where the article makes the expression a substantive; "in general" or "generally" preserves the adverbial use.

See also. Common; Genus and kind; Intellect; Knowledge; Particular.

Unlimited

ἄπειρον, apeiron, unlimited; boundless; infinite[571]

The word. Apeiron concerns the absence of a limit. What lacks a limit may be a magnitude, a multitude, a process of division, or a proposed principle; these should not all be treated as the same kind of infinity.

In Stobaeus. Anaximander's principle is reported as the unlimited. The atomist report distinguishes infinitely many atoms from a void infinite in extent. Aristotle's report on division allows division without limit potentially, while denying its accomplishment actually.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.2 The unlimited is the principle attributed to Anaximander. *(Edition p. 299.)*

I.18.1a.3 Infinity of number is distinguished from infinity of extent. *(Edition p. 405.)*

I.14.1b Potentially unlimited division is distinguished from actual division. *(Edition p. 355.)*

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[571] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 122–123, 141, 155–156. The equation of the unlimited with matter in I.10.12.2 occurs in the reporter's criticism. It should not be transferred without attribution to Anaximander himself.

In this edition. "Unlimited" suits the substantive principle; "infinite" often suits number or extent; "without limit" can preserve the force of a process. The object of the qualification remains essential.

See also. Actuality; Atom; Continuity; Division; Limit; Number; Principle; Void.

Unmanifest

ἄδηλος; φανερός, adēlos; phaneros, unmanifest; unclear; unknown[572]

The word. Adēlos describes what is not manifest or clear. It can concern uncertainty in knowledge rather than an object's intrinsic invisibility.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic teacher proposes withholding certain doctrines so that fear of what is unknown will restrain wrongdoing. The unknown is therefore defined by the hearers' limited understanding. Its ethical effect belongs to the teacher's argument and does not imply that every hidden matter is fearful by nature.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.1.23 Fear of the unknown is invoked as a reason for restricted disclosure. *(Edition p. 835.)*

I.1.37a The moon makes temporal divisions clear to human observers. *(Edition p. 91.)*

What is manifest. Phaneros means manifest, apparent, or clear. In the conversation with Euthydemus at I.1.37a, the moon makes the divisions of the month clear. Manifestness is something available to observation or understanding in that argument. It does not necessarily mean a special revelation of an otherwise inaccessible reality.

In this edition. "Unknown" or "hidden" reads naturally here; "unmanifest" is useful when contrasted directly with what is evident.

See also. Fate; Fear; Hidden; Invisible; Knowledge; Moon; Time.

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[572] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 46, 278. The passage preserves the teacher's stated rationale without presenting it as a universal principle of education.

Use

χρῆσις, chrēsis, use; employment[573]

The word. Chrēsis is use or employment of something. In accounts of soul and body it raises the relation between user and instrument.

In Stobaeus. The survey compares soul's use of body to a helmsman steering a ship or a rider guiding a vehicle. The first analogy emphasizes separability, while the second emphasizes a shared journey. The passage asks for distinctions rather than endorsing one simple model for every kind of embodiment.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.41.5 Ship and vehicle analogies distinguish modes of bodily use. *(Edition p. 1223.)*

In this edition. "Use" is direct, with the different kinds of association explained.

See also. Body; Instrument; Soul; Steersman; Vehicle of the soul.

Useful

χρήσιμος, chrēsimos, useful; serviceable[574]

The word. Chrēsimos describes something useful for an end or purpose. Its usefulness is relational, not an independent guarantee of truth.

In Stobaeus. Socrates offers Cebes an account of his intellectual experiences, inviting him to use whatever proves helpful in reaching conviction about the matter under discussion. Usefulness concerns the contribution to inquiry. The invitation does not make every recollected opinion automatically correct.

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[573] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 382. The compressed grammar of the vehicle analogy is unfolded in English without eliminating its emphasis on shared travel.

[574] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 338–339. This is Plato's presentation of Socrates's intellectual history within the Phaedo, not an independent autobiographical document.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.14.1 Socrates offers material useful for inquiry into causes and the soul. *(Edition p. 1059.)*

In this edition. "Useful" is direct; make the purpose explicit when the sentence supplies one.

See also. Cause; Inquiry; Need and utility; Persuasion; Use.

Vehicle of the soul

ὄχημα, ochēma, vehicle; bodily vehicle[575]

The word. Ochēma is a vehicle or conveyance. In accounts of soul it can describe the body as an instrument, a divine body, or an intermediate covering.

In Stobaeus. The ship analogy distinguishes principal moving causes from necessary conditions and describes soul using the whole body as instrument or vehicle. Another survey assigns vehicles to divine kinds according to their rank. The passage on coverings describes ethereal, heavenly, and pneumatic intermediaries that protect intellectual life and connect it with solid body. The language should therefore not be restricted to one uniform "subtle body" doctrine.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.36.5 The body serves soul as instrument or vehicle. *(Edition p. 1179.)*

I.49.40.2 Divine kinds direct vehicles appropriate to their rank. *(Edition p. 1215.)*

I.49.43.9 Intermediate coverings mediate association with solid body. *(Edition p. 1237.)*

In this edition. "Vehicle" retains the image of conveyance. The difficult wording about the coverings' position between souls is preserved and explained in the edition's note.

See also. Body; Breath; Image; Incorporeal; Separation; Soul.

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[575] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 371, 379, 385.

Vein

φλέψ, phleps, vein; blood vessel[576]

The word. Phleps denotes a vein or vessel. Ancient accounts may use the term more broadly than a modern arterial-venous distinction.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account describes pneuma passing through veins, arteries, and blood to move and sustain the living creature. The vessels belong to the bodily medium carrying psychic activity. Since arteries are separately named here, the distinction should remain visible even though the physiology is not modern circulation theory.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.47.9.1 Veins help carry the pneuma that moves and sustains the animal. *(Edition p. 929.)*

In this edition. "Vein" suits the explicit contrast; "vessel" may be clearer where no such contrast occurs.

See also. Artery; Blood; Body; Breath; Vehicle of the soul.

Vice and wickedness

κακία, kakia, vice; wickedness; badness[577]

The word. Kakia is badness or vice, with the ethical sense prominent when opposed to virtue.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo tests the claim that soul is harmony. If vice is discord and soul wholly harmony, the hypothesis seems to exclude vice from every soul. This implausible consequence is used against the hypothesis. It must not be reported as Socrates's positive teaching that no soul can be vicious.

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[576] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 305. A supplied clause completes the sequence from soul to pneuma to body; the English retains its marked status in the bilingual edition.

[577] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 336–337. The conditional structure governs the conclusion. The restored verb participate is supplied from Plato in the adopted text.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.13.10 The possibility of vice challenges the soul-as-harmony hypothesis. *(Edition p. 1051.)*

In this edition. "Vice" preserves the ethical opposition to virtue; "badness" suits broader contexts.

See also. Evil; Harmony; Hypothesis; Soul; Virtue and excellence.

Virtue and excellence

ἀρετή, aretē, virtue; excellence; prowess[578]

The word. Aretē concerns excellence. What counts as excellence depends on the subject and setting: prowess in a heroic poem, the distinction of a city, or the moral condition of a soul are not identical applications.

In Stobaeus. Homer's Zeus increases or diminishes human prowess. Simonides joins city and individual in the need for divine help in attaining excellence. In Plato's discussion of the soul, excellence stands beside goodness and against wickedness; the Phaedo's afterlife passage urges virtue and understanding.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.4 Aretē is prowess in Homer's martial setting. *(Edition p. 35.)*

I.1.10 Simonides speaks of excellence for both a city and a mortal. *(Edition p. 37.)*

I.48.2 A good soul's intellect and excellence contrast with folly and wickedness. *(Edition p. 949.)*

I.49.58.51 Virtue and understanding are connected with the noble prize and great hope. *(Edition p. 1463.)*

Images and comparisons. The Phaedo passage calls the reward a prize. Its contest-language gives ethical effort an image of attainment, while the following qualification in the dialogue limits certainty about the narrative of the afterlife.

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[578] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 23–24, 310, 444.

In this edition. "Prowess," "excellence," and "virtue" express the local application. Their variety is deliberate; imposing "virtue" everywhere would make some poetic passages narrower than the Greek.

See also. God; Intellect; Knowledge; Purification; Soul.

Visible

ὁρατός, horatos, visible; able to be seen[579]

The word. Horatos describes what can be seen. It is narrower than perceptible, since perception also includes senses other than sight.

In Stobaeus. The clearer conclusion of the Onatas excerpt distinguishes an invisible divine ruler from visible or perceptible works and actions. Access to effects does not amount to direct sight of their cause. The distinction supports reasoning from the manifest world while reserving contemplation of God to reason and mind.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.1.39a God's perceptible works are distinguished from God as an object of rational contemplation. *(Edition p. 97.)*

In this edition. "Visible" should not replace every occurrence of "perceptible." Preserve the text's distinction between sight and sensory access generally.

See also. Evidence; God; Invisible; Perceptible; Sight.

Visual stream

ὀπτικὸν πνεῦμα, optikon pneuma, visual breath; visual pneuma[580]

The word. Optikon pneuma is the breath or pneuma assigned a role in sight. "Visual stream" is a convenient heading, but the Greek phrase specifies pneuma.

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[579] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 48. The opening of the excerpt is badly damaged; this explanation rests on its clearer concluding contrast.

[580] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 486. The passage does not specify an anatomical seat for the ruling part. Such a location should not be added to this excerpt.

In Stobaeus. Chrysippus's reported account extends this pneuma from the ruling part to the pupil. It strikes the intervening air and establishes a shared tension shaped as a cone, provided the air is uniform. Vision thus involves an organized relation between the perceiver and the surrounding medium.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.52.18 Visual pneuma tensions the intervening air in a cone. *(Edition p. 1639.)*

In this edition. "Visual breath" preserves the terminology; explain that this is a theoretical account of vision, not simply exhaled air.

See also. Breath; Pupil of the eye; Ruling part; Sight; Tension.

Voice

φωνή, phōnē, voice; articulate sound[581]

The word. Phōnē can mean voice or sound. One preserved account explicitly distinguishes its strict articulate sense from an extended use for animal cries and inanimate noises.

In Stobaeus. The Platonic report defines voice both as breath passing through the mouth from thought and as a blow transmitted by air through bodily structures to soul. Its next clause reserves voice in the strict sense for articulation that makes thought clear, while allowing an extended use for neighing and noises. Production, transmission, and meaning therefore occupy different parts of the account.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.57.1.1 Thought, outgoing breath, and transmitted impact are connected. *(Edition p. 1685.)*

I.57.1.2 Strict and extended uses of the word are distinguished. *(Edition p. 1685.)*

[581] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 497.

In this edition. "Voice" is retained where the source discusses the term itself. Its local restriction to articulate expression is attributed to this report, not imposed on every use in the volume.

See also. Air; Breath; Hearing; Reason and account; Thought.

Void

κενόν, kenon, void; empty[582]

The word. The substantivized adjective names the void; the adjective itself can mean empty. Philosophical reports ask whether such absence of body exists, and where, rather than merely naming an apparently vacant container.

In Stobaeus. Strato is reported as denying void outside the world while allowing it to arise inside. Zeno and his followers place an infinite void outside the world but none within it. The atomist report distinguishes the void's unlimited extent from the infinite number of atoms.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.18.1b Strato allows void within the world but denies it outside. *(Edition p. 407.)*

I.18.1d Zeno's followers distinguish void from occupied place and partly occupied space. *(Edition p. 409.)*

I.18.1a.3 Void is infinite in extent in the atomist report. *(Edition p. 405.)*

In this edition. "Void" identifies the philosophical object of discussion; "empty" remains appropriate where the word functions adjectivally. An everyday empty vessel and a space wholly without body are not assumed identical.

See also. Atom; Body; Breathing; Cosmic conflagration; Place and space; Unlimited; World.

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[582] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 155–157. The differing inside/outside claims are the positions of the named thinkers. The lexicon preserves their opposition instead of reconciling them into a single cosmic map.

Voluntary

ἑκούσιος; ἀκούσιος, hekousios; akousios, voluntary; willing[583]

The word. Hekousios describes what is voluntary. The criteria for voluntariness can include acting in willing obedience, not only initiating an action independently.

In Stobaeus. The classification of descents calls both a soul's chosen administration of earthly affairs and its obedience to higher beings voluntary. Compelled movement toward a worse condition forms the contrasting category. Descent is therefore not uniformly presented as an involuntary punishment.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.39.8 Chosen administration and obedience both count as voluntary descent. *(Edition p. 1213.)*

I.3.56c A reported test concerns both voluntary and involuntary wrongdoings. *(Edition p. 147.)*

The involuntary. Akousios means involuntary or unwilling. I.3.56c contrasts involuntary with voluntary wrongdoings when distinguishing two reported ordeals. The contrast marks a difference relevant to judging conduct, but this narrative does not itself provide a complete philosophical analysis of ignorance, compulsion, and responsibility.

In this edition. "Voluntary" preserves the classification; explain its inclusion of obedience where needed.

See also. Choice; Compulsion and force; Descent; Error and wrongdoing; Soul; Will and wish.

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[583] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 67–68, 379. The passage introduces another division among several reported classifications, rather than replacing all preceding accounts with one.

Vortex

δίνη; δίνησις, dinē; dinēsis, vortex; whirl; whirling motion[584]

The word. Dinē is a whirl or vortex; dinēsis emphasizes the activity of whirling. The vocabulary describes circular movement in a medium.

In Stobaeus. Arrian explains a whirlwind through a current blocked from straight escape, turning back and coiling upon itself. Cloud thickness, cold, or an opposing current can provide the obstruction. The vortex is thus an organized pattern arising from constrained movement in this explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.29.2.6 A blocked current coils into a whirl before issuing from the cloud. *(Edition p. 681.)*

In this edition. "Whirl" suits the immediate description; "vortex" is a concise technical equivalent.

See also. Circular motion; Cloud; Resistance; Whirlwind and hurricane; Windstorm.

Waking

ἐγρηγορέναι, egrēgorenai, being awake; waking[585]

The word. Egrēgorenai means to be awake, a state distinguished from the transition of waking up.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedo uses waking and sleeping as a familiar pair of opposites in examining living and being dead. The two states and the processes connecting them must remain distinct. The analogy supplies a model for reciprocal transitions; it is not itself a complete proof about the soul's survival.

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[584] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 236. The listed obstacles are alternatives in the account, not cumulative conditions all required in every instance.

[585] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 327. The next stages of the argument depend on distinguishing being dead from dying and coming back to life.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.8.4 Being awake and sleeping provide the comparison for living and being dead. *(Edition p. 1009.)*

In this edition. "Being awake" is precise for the infinitive; "waking" may ambiguously name either state or transition.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Contrary; Death; Life; Sleep.

War

πόλεμος, *polemos*, war[586]

The word. Polemos is war or armed conflict and can also enter broader images of opposition.

In Stobaeus. The Laws discussion gives war as one circumstance that overturns constitutions and changes laws, alongside poverty and disease. This initially emphasizes the limits of deliberate planning. The dialogue then qualifies the claim by allowing a role for skilled action, so war is not proof that legislation is always futile.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.6.17b.1 War illustrates circumstances forcing constitutional and legal change. *(Edition p. 207.)*

In this edition. "War" is direct; retain the difference between the circumstance and the legislative response.

See also. Art and craft; Chance and fortune; Civic constitution; Law; Peace.

[586] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 88. The initial claim that chance legislates everything is a stage in the argument, not its final unqualified conclusion.

Wasting and consumption

φθίσις, phthisis, wasting; consumption; decline[587]

The word. Phthisis is wasting or diminution, the loss that something undergoes as its material is used up or passes away.

In Stobaeus. The Timaeus describes the cosmos as receiving nourishment from its own wasting. Because no material remains outside it, its losses must be reused within the whole. The phrase concerns circulation and self-sufficiency in the living cosmos, not a disease attributed to the universe.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.21.2 The cosmos supplies its own nourishment from its internal losses. *(Edition p. 495.)*

In this edition. "Wasting" preserves the loss; the surrounding explanation should make its reuse clear.

See also. Body; Nutrition; Part and whole; Self-sufficiency; World.

Water

ὕδωρ, hydōr, water[588]

The word. Hydōr is water, both an ordinary substance and a proposed constituent or principle. Its familiar properties support arguments about nourishment, generation, and transformations among the elements.

In Stobaeus. Thales' reported reasons for making water the principle appeal to moist generative fluid, the nourishment of plants, and exhalations sustaining the heavenly fires. The report about Heraclitus and Hippasus places water within a succession: earth melts, water forms, and vapor becomes air. These passages assign water different positions in an explanation of the whole.

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[587] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 182. The compressed statement that nothing existed is interpreted locally as nothing outside the cosmos, not the nonexistence of the cosmos itself.

[588] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 122, 126.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.10.12.1 Water is the principle in the report about Thales. *(Edition p. 297.)*

I.10.14.1 Water is an intermediate stage in elemental transformation. *(Edition p. 307.)*

In this edition. "Water" remains distinct from "moisture": hygron describes a quality or a class of moist things, whereas hydōr names the substance.

See also. Air; Earth; Fire; Moisture; Nutrition.

Wave

κῦμα, kuma, wave[589]

The word. Kyma is a wave or surge. In descriptions of disaster it can emphasize a mass of advancing water.

In Stobaeus. The account of maritime disturbances distinguishes waves with a returning recoil from those making only a forward thrust. The examples of Helice and Bura illustrate overwhelming incursions. Waves belong to a broader comparison between disturbances on land, at sea, and in the air.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.54 Advancing waves are differentiated by recoil and forward movement. *(Edition p. 801.)*

In this edition. "Wave" is general; "surge" can convey the force of an incursion where appropriate.

See also. Earthquake; Motion; Sea and tides; Stream and current; Water.

[589] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 268–269. The passage also names unusual marine appearances whose precise identification remains uncertain; they should not be used to impose a single modern disaster model.

Weakness

ἀσθένεια, astheneia, weakness; lack of strength[590]

The word. Astheneia is weakness or lack of strength. It can denote bodily infirmity or vulnerability without implying moral inferiority.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account sets weakness opposite the strength of aggressors. The powerless suffer violence, prompting the elements to petition their maker. Weakness names their inability to resist in this situation; it does not identify them as the wrongdoers or explain their character.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.65 Weakness exposes the powerless to violent domination. *(Edition p. 1301.)*

In this edition. "Weakness" is direct; "illness" would be too narrow in this social contrast.

See also. Body; Injustice; Power and capacity; Preservation and salvation; Strength.

Wealth

πλοῦτος, ploutos, wealth; riches[591]

The word. Ploutos is wealth or riches. It can function as a social advantage without indicating the character of its possessor.

In Stobaeus. In the Gorgias judgment narrative, wealth is one of the coverings that conceal a wicked soul, along with bodily beauty and noble ancestry. Supportive witnesses reinforce the disguise. The criticism concerns misleading evidence of worth, not the claim that every wealthy person necessarily has a bad soul.

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[590] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 403. The narrative separately uses words for the strong and the powerless, reinforcing the relation between force and vulnerability.

[591] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 449–450. The clothing metaphor extends to social advantages as well as literal bodily appearance.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.63.5 Riches can conceal character during a flawed judgment. *(Edition p. 1487.)*

In this edition. "Wealth" suits the general condition; "riches" preserves the concrete plural.

See also. Character; Judgment; Nobility of birth; Poverty; Worth and desert.

Weather indication

ἐπισημασία, episēmasia, weather sign; weather indication[592]

The word. Episēmasia is an indication or sign, here connected with weather. It concerns a phenomenon taken as significant for atmospheric conditions.

In Stobaeus. One report attributes weather indications to the sun alone; another associates seasonal signs with stellar risings and settings. The term identifies the class of indications, while the accounts differ over their explanation and associations. Their common vocabulary should not conceal that difference.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.24.1k.2 Weather signs are attributed to the sun. *(Edition p. 565.)*

I.24.1l.2 Seasonal signs are linked to stellar appearances. *(Edition p. 567.)*

In this edition. "Weather indication" or "weather sign" is clearer than an unexplained omen.

See also. Rising of a star; Season; Sign; Sun; Wind.

[592] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 203–204. The surrounding report that stars turn around rather than beneath earth belongs to its particular cosmological model.

Weight

βάρος; βαρύς; βαρυηχής, baros; barus; baruēchēs, weight; heaviness[593]

The word. Baros is weight or heaviness. The reports ask whether it belongs to bodies by nature, arises in relation to place, or explains their motion. These questions need to remain distinct.

In Stobaeus. The Platonic notice makes heaviness and lightness dependent upon displacement from a proper place. The Aristotelian notice ranks earth and fire at opposite extremes. Democritus is reported to deny weight to the primary solid bodies and to explain their motion through collisions. The lexicon records this last claim as transmitted rather than reconciling it with other ancient testimonies.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.14.1a.2 Weight depends on a body's relation to its proper place. *(Edition p. 353.)*

I.14.1a.3 Earth and fire occupy opposite extremes. *(Edition p. 353.)*

I.14.1f.3 The primary solid bodies are said to lack weight. *(Edition p. 359.)*

I.1.23c The compound baruēchēs characterizes the sea's deep roar. *(Edition p. 53.)*

Weight in the language of sound. Barus can characterize sound as low, deep, or heavy, as well as physical weight. The compound baruēchēs describes the deep-roaring sea in the cosmic hymn at I.1.23c. This is a poetic characterization of its sound, not a measurement of the sea's mass. The word family illustrates how physical qualities furnish auditory descriptions.

In this edition. "Heavy" and "light" are relational in some passages and natural classifications in others. The English does not settle that difference in advance.

See also. Atom; Body; Earth; Hearing; Light; Motion; Place and space; Sea and tides; Voice.

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[593] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 30–31, 140–143.

Well-ordered law

εὐνομία, eunomia, good order; lawful order[594]

The word. Eunomia is good order, especially order associated with law. It can have civic or religious application.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic maxims identify good order with concord with God and then with law. The following contrasts of divine time and human law are difficult, but the repeated term links arrangement and concord. Another passage connects courts with the spread of eunomia.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.41.1.13 Good order is linked with divine concord and law. *(Edition p. 825.)*

I.49.44.77 Courts are associated with good order and justice. *(Edition p. 1313.)*

In this edition. "Good order" is broad enough for these uses; "well-ordered law" explains its legal association.

See also. Concord and agreement; Court of judgment; Justice; Law; Order.

West wind

ζέφυρος, zephuros, west wind; Zephyrus[595]

The word. Zephyros names the west wind; a plural can encompass winds from the western quarter.

In Stobaeus. The catalogue distinguishes western winds by summer, equinoctial, and winter sunset positions, assigning Zephyrus specifically to equinoctial sunset. In the Homeric Elysium passage, its refreshing breezes help characterize a blessed climate. The technical and poetic uses share a direction but perform different explanatory work.

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[594] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 275–276, 406. The apparatus proposes lawlessness for one occurrence, but the printed repetition of good order is retained.

[595] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 264, 422. Some directional clauses in the catalogue are restored from the parallel text of On the Cosmos.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.40.1.36 Zephyrus is associated with the equinoctial sunset. *(Edition p. 789.)*

I.49.53.3 The West Wind refreshes the inhabitants of Elysium. *(Edition p. 1377.)*

In this edition. "West Wind" suits the poem; "Zephyrus" helps preserve distinctions in the catalogue.

See also. Eastern winds; Equinox; Ocean; Setting; Wind.

What depends on us

τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, to eph' hēmin, what is in our control; what depends on us[596]

The word. To eph' hēmin is the expression for what depends on us or lies within our control. It identifies a condition of responsibility in the argument, rather than naming a separate faculty.

In Stobaeus. The discussion of perception and assent asks whether perception can share in virtue. Even if perception is a presentation through a sense organ combined with assent, that conclusion does not follow unless assent belongs among the things in our control. The sentence is conditional: it identifies what the ethical conclusion would require instead of proving that every instance of assent meets the condition.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.25.3 The participation of perception in virtue depends on the status of assent. *(Edition p. 1099.)*

In this edition. "In our control" expresses the local requirement. The entry does not turn this short condition into a complete doctrine of free will.

See also. Assent; Choice; Fate; Perception; Virtue and excellence.

[596] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 350.

Whirlwind and hurricane

τυφών, tuphōn, whirlwind; violent rotating storm[597]

The word. Typhōn denotes a violent whirlwind in these physical accounts. "Hurricane" can suggest a modern meteorological category more specific than the Greek warrants.

In Stobaeus. Strato contrasts it with the fiery prēstēr through the material it draws along. The Aristotelian report explains it as a descending squall forced to turn within a cloud, carrying the cloud downward and violently lifting objects. Rotation and force characterize the explanation.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.29.1.14 The whirlwind is paired with, but distinguished from, the fiery whirlwind. *(Edition p. 673.)*

I.29.1.16 A rotating descending squall explains the whirlwind's destructive action. *(Edition p. 675.)*

In this edition. "Whirlwind" is generally preferable here to a precise modern storm classification.

See also. Cloud; Fiery whirlwind; Motion; Vortex; Windstorm.

White

λευκός, leukos, white[598]

The word. Leukos is white or bright, with the precise emphasis determined by its contrast and setting.

In Stobaeus. The Pythagorean color report lists white with black, red, and pale yellow, explaining differences through elemental mixtures. The Timaeus mixture account also combines white and black to produce gray. These classifications treat white as a component in an explanation of color, rather than merely a symbol of purity.

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[597] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 233–234. The noun in these passages names a weather phenomenon; a mythological identification with Typhon should not be added automatically.

[598] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 148, 151. The ancient mixture accounts should not be treated as verified recipes for combining modern pigments.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.16.1.2 White appears among four kinds of color. *(Edition p. 379.)*

I.16.2.7 White participates in several stated color mixtures. *(Edition p. 389.)*

In this edition. "White" is appropriate in these lists; "bright" would obscure their distinctions between brightness and hue.

See also. Black; Brightness; Color; Mixture and blending; Red.

Will and wish

βούλησις, boulēsis, will; wish; willing[599]

The word. Boulēsis is willing or wish. Its object and agent determine whether the emphasis is purpose, intention, or desire.

In Stobaeus. The report of Platonists around Taurus presents divine willing as the purpose that gods become manifest through the pure lives of souls. This is one explanation of descent, distinguished from another concerning completion of the cosmos. Will here is directed toward a specified manifestation, not an unspecified power to choose anything.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.39.7 The gods' will is expressed through the manifestation of divine life. *(Edition p. 1211.)*

I.1.35 Divine will coexists with the soul's self-determination in Iamblichus's account. *(Edition p. 83.)*

In this edition. "Will" suits the purposive divine use; "wish" may suit other contexts without the same emphasis.

See also. Descent; God; Intent and purpose; Self-determination; Voluntary.

[599] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 43, 378–379. The report distinguishes two purposes of descent; neither should be silently substituted for the other.

Wind

ἄνεμος, anemos, wind[600]

The word. Anemos is wind. Related passages use pneuma for a moving current, but that wider word also serves explanations of breathing, life, and soul.

In Stobaeus. The Aristotelian report explains wind through dry exhalation gathering and moving around the earth. Squalls involve a dense mass whose rapid discharge produces force. In the earthquake explanation, a similar moving material is confined underground. The shared material connects the accounts; the direction and confinement distinguish their effects.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.32.1 Many exhalations gather into a current of wind. *(Edition p. 733.)*

I.32.2 Density and speed distinguish a violent squall. *(Edition p. 733.)*

I.36.2.1 Wind-like movement produces a different effect when confined underground. *(Edition p. 739.)*

In this edition. "Wind" suits atmospheric movement; "current" and "breath" suit other uses of pneuma. These choices retain a physical connection without collapsing the settings.

See also. Air; Breath; Earthquake; Exhalation; Sea and tides.

Windstorm

ἐκνεφίας, eknephias, squall; windstorm from a cloud[601]

The word. Eknephias is a squall issuing from a cloud. Its origin in the cloud is part of the term's force in the reported explanation.

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[600] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 248–249.

[601] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 234. The report is associated with Arius Didymus's epitome and parallels Aristotle's Meteorology; it is not presented as a verbatim quotation throughout.

In Stobaeus. The account attributed to Aristotle describes a whirlwind as a squall descending in rotation. Obstruction prevents straight movement, while pressure from behind turns the wind back upon itself. Calling the result an undigested squall suggests a process that has failed to develop or discharge normally.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.29.1.16 A cloud squall forced into rotation becomes the model for a whirlwind. *(Edition p. 675.)*

In this edition. "Squall" is concise; "windstorm from a cloud" explains the fuller sense.

See also. Cloud; Fiery whirlwind; Resistance; Whirlwind and hurricane; Wind.

Winter and storm

χειμών, cheimōn, winter; wintry storm[602]

The word. Cheimōn can mean winter or stormy weather. These senses overlap where winter is characterized by cold and storms.

In Stobaeus. The Homeric description of Elysium promises a mild life without snow, heavy winter storm, or rain. In that poetic list, the word emphasizes adverse weather from which the destination is exempt. The separate seasonal definitions use the same noun for the coldest part of the year.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.53.3 Elysium is described as free from harsh wintry weather. *(Edition p. 1377.)*

I.8.42.5 Winter is defined through extreme cold. *(Edition p. 255.)*

In this edition. "Winter storm" suits the Homeric setting; "winter" suits the seasonal classification.

See also. Cold; Rain and precipitation; Season; Snow; Wind.

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[602] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 106–107, 422. Porphyry's surrounding discussion emphasizes that Menelaus is promised this destination while alive.

Wisdom

σοφία, sophia, wisdom[603]

The word. Sophia is wisdom, often carrying praise for an authoritative or accomplished understanding. What counts as wisdom depends on the speaker and context.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus invokes the celebrated wisdom of Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, and other ancient thinkers in support of the account of soul he prefers. The appeal establishes a claimed tradition of agreement. It is evidence for Iamblichus's interpretation of those predecessors, not independent proof that their doctrines were identical.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.32.14 The wisdom of earlier philosophers is invoked in a harmonizing account of soul. *(Edition p. 1159.)*

I.49.44.32 Wisdom appears among the gifts promised by Hermes. *(Edition p. 1269.)*

In this edition. "Wisdom" preserves the evaluative force; it should not be reduced to technical information.

See also. Education; Knowledge; Philosophy; Truth; Understanding and practical wisdom.

Womb

μήτρα, mētra, womb; uterus[604]

The word. Mētra is the womb, the place of gestation in the selected physiological report.

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[603] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 366, 393–394. The claim of agreement among earlier philosophers belongs to the source's argument and requires that attribution.

[604] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 296. "Womb" is the adopted correction from the parallel tradition. The report names those associated with Aristotle and Hippocrates rather than quoting an identified work by either.

In Stobaeus. The account associated with Aristotle and Hippocrates discusses offspring emerging after seven or nine months, linking viability with fullness and nourishment. The womb provides the setting, while the umbilical connection supplies nourishment. The report's claims about timing are part of ancient physiology and should retain their historical attribution.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.42.13.1 The womb and umbilical nourishment organize the account of gestational development. *(Edition p. 895.)*

In this edition. "Womb" is clear; "uterus" is a more anatomical equivalent without changing the ancient theory.

See also. Coming into being and passing away; Embryo; Female; Month; Nutrition.

Wording and expression

λέξις, lexis, wording; expression; verbatim formulation[605]

The word. Lexis can mean wording or verbal expression. In the phrase kata lexin it concerns the words in which something is reported.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry announces that he will set down Bardisanes' account in its wording. This marks a claim about the fidelity of the embedded quotation. Stobaeus preserves Porphyry's statement within an excerpt; the first-person promise is not a declaration that Stobaeus himself interviewed Bardisanes.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.3.56c Porphyry introduces the wording of Bardisanes' account. *(Edition p. 147.)*

In this edition. "Verbatim" conveys the force of kata lexin, while remaining a claim made within the transmitted source.

See also. Evidence; Letter and written character; Reason and account; Speech and utterance.

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[605] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 67–68. Lexis, with epsilon, must be distinguished from lēxis, with eta, which belongs to the vocabulary of allotment or assigned portion.

World

κόσμος, *kosmos*, world; cosmos; order[606]

The word. Kosmos connects the world with order and adornment. Some passages rely on that connection directly; in others it is simply the name for the ordered whole under discussion.

In Stobaeus. Chapter 21 asks whether the world has a soul, is governed by providence, possesses a ruling part, and receives nourishment. The treatise transmitted under Aristotle's name praises its beauty and order through the relation between kosmos and being ordered or adorned.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.21.heading The world is examined as a possibly living and governed whole. *(Edition p. 493.)*

I.40.1.63 The language of cosmic beauty turns on the shared vocabulary of order. *(Edition p. 809.)*

I.1.39e Onatas distinguishes God from the divine cosmos. *(Edition p. 101.)*

I.22.1f.2 Using all the constituents explains the world's completeness and uniqueness. *(Edition p. 541.)*

I.20.1f.3 Different schools give different accounts of cosmic destruction. *(Edition p. 463.)*

Images and comparisons. The account treats beauty and order as belonging to the world's name. The lexicon explains that linguistic connection without making every description of the world into an allegory.

Completeness and dissolution. The Timaeus excerpt explains the world's uniqueness through the maker's use of every part of the four constituents: nothing remains from which a second such world could arise. The doxographical survey instead records positions on cosmic destruction, including Stoic conflagration and Empedoclean alternation of Love and Strife. The argument for completeness in one source and the account of dissolution in another must be followed under their own attributions.

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[606] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 50, 171, 181, 197, 271.

In this edition. "World" is usual, while "cosmos" can retain an audible wordplay or a particular philosophical register. To pan, "the all" or "the universe," remains distinguishable where the source contrasts the expressions.

See also. Cosmic conflagration; Demiurge and craftsman; Dissolution; Friendship and cosmic attraction; God; Heaven; Nature; Part and whole; Providence; Ruling part; Soul; Strife.

Worth and desert

ἀξία; ἄξιος, axia; axios, worth; worthiness; desert[607]

The word. Axia is worth or desert; the adjective axios describes something worthy, fitting, or commensurate with an object or consequence.

In Stobaeus. Hermes addresses sacred books that must remain hidden until heaven produces souls worthy of them. Worthiness concerns fitness to receive sacred knowledge. The passage does not identify it with wealth, social rank, or a numerical measure of achievement.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.49.44.8 Souls must be worthy of the preserved sacred books. *(Edition p. 1245.)*

In this edition. "Worthy" fits the attested adjective; "desert" suits contexts explicitly linking conduct and recompense.

See also. Education; Good; Judgment; Knowledge; Sacred.

[607] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 387–388. The selected witness contains axia as an inflected adjective, not the abstract noun axia; the lexical family is grouped for lookup.

Year

ἐνιαυτός, eniautos, year[608]

The word. Eniautos is a year, understood as a returning cycle as well as a measure of duration.

In Stobaeus. Hermippus personifies the year as a round figure containing everything within itself and generating the speakers as it circles the earth. Its lack of beginning or end belongs to the circular image. This is poetic representation, not a technical claim that every measured year has no boundaries.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.8.36 The year is imagined as a circular, generative living figure. *(Edition p. 235.)*

I.8.42c.1 Different celestial periods are called years. *(Edition p. 255.)*

In this edition. "Year" is direct; specify which celestial cycle is meant in astronomical reports.

See also. Circle; Cycle and period; Month; Season; Time.

Zodiac

ζῳδιακός, zōdiakos, zodiac; zodiacal circle[609]

The word. Zōidiakos is the adjective "zodiacal," used with an understood circle to name the oblique circle associated with the zodiac.

In Stobaeus. The account distinguishes this oblique circle from the three middle parallel circles: the two tropics and the equator. It meets the equator and reaches the tropics at its extremes. The accompanying meridian is another circle with a different orientation and must not be confused with the zodiac.

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[608] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 99, 107. The isolated poem does not identify the speakers who say that the year brings "us" into being.

[609] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 201. The source's "touching" has a broad sense of meeting: it does not make every intersection a geometrical tangency.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.23.3.2 The zodiacal circle is located relative to the tropics, equator, and meridian. *(Edition p. 557.)*

In this edition. "Zodiacal circle" keeps the geometrical object explicit.

See also. Circle; Equinox; Heaven; Solstice and turning; Zodiacal figure.

Zodiacal figure

ζῴδιον; ἀστερισμός, zōdion; asterismos, zodiacal sign; zodiacal figure[610]

The word. Zōidion can denote a small figure and, astronomically, a figure or sign of the zodiac. The selected use is celestial.

In Stobaeus. The report attributed to Zeno gives the sun and moon a daily motion with the cosmos and a separate progress from one zodiacal sign to another. The signs mark stages of that second movement. They do not themselves constitute the whole daily revolution described in the preceding clause.

The places. Selected passages in Volume One.

I.25.5.2 The sun and moon advance from sign to sign while sharing the cosmos's daily movement. *(Edition p. 599.)*

I.49.44.20 A constellation is part of the souls' appointed heavenly station. *(Edition p. 1257.)*

Constellation. Asterismos names a constellation or stellar arrangement. In I.49.44.20, souls that remain steadfast are promised their appointed constellation and heavenly thrones. The word locates an assigned celestial station within the narrative. It should not automatically be restricted to the twelve zodiacal signs or assigned a modern constellation name.

[610] Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 213, 390. The two motions are distinguished in the report. "From rising to rising" denotes a complete daily circuit.

In this edition. "Zodiacal sign" fits the astronomical sequence; "figure" retains the pictorial origin of the term.

See also. Cycle and period; Moon; Motion; Soul; Star; Sun; Zodiac.

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