The Lovers Lexicon

A Philological and Philosophical Reading Companion

October 2026

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Introduction and argument map

The Lovers asks a disarmingly simple question: what is philosophizing? Its answers unfold in a school, before an audience of attractive young men, as two rivals try to distinguish themselves. One trusts bodily training, the other his education. Socrates tests their claims through ordinary activities: eating, exercising, planting, building, treating illness, steering a ship, disciplining animals, judging disputes and ordering a household. These activities supply the dialogue's philosophical vocabulary. They are not decorations around an otherwise abstract argument.

This lexicon accompanies the second edition of Diotimos Editions' Greek and English Lovers. Its main articles explain words and related concepts in their dramatic and argumentative setting. The shorter register gives independently defined vocabulary with exact attestations. Phrase glosses trace constructions whose force is easily lost in translation. Three indexes allow entry by English or Greek wording, Stephanus passage, or theme. The governing distinction throughout is between what a word can mean, what a speaker does with it here, and what the argument actually establishes.

The dialogue and its title

The supplied Greek is headed ΕΡΑΣΤΑΙ, Erastai, "Lovers". The alternative Ἀντερασταί, Anterastai, "Rival Lovers", is recorded in the supplied apparatus as a later marginal title and in the ancient catalogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius (3.59). Both suit the scene. The main title identifies the lovers as a group; the alternative foregrounds their

competition. “On Philosophy” is an ancient subtitle, not a line spoken in the conversation.

The work belongs to the transmitted Platonic corpus, but its authorship is disputed. The supplied Introduction notes both its placement in Thrasyllus’ fourth tetralogy, after Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II and Hipparchus, and the conditional wording reported at Diogenes Laertius 9.37, “if the Rival Lovers is Plato’s”. This companion does not turn corpus membership into proof of authorship, identify the educated lover with Democritus as an established dramatic fact, or assign a secure date. References to Socrates describe the narrator and speaker in this text. Comparisons with other dialogues illuminate the questions without silently supplying answers that this one leaves unstated.

How to use an article

The English headword supplies a practical point of entry. The italic Greek line gives dictionary forms or expressly identified expressions, followed by transliterations. A lemma need not occur in precisely that inflection: the separate attestations show the form actually printed. The word explains meanings and distinctions; In The Lovers follows the word through the conversation; The places supplies exact Greek and explains why each passage matters; In this edition records the supplied translation and relevant textual decisions. See also links connect the discussion to related entries.

Stephanus references, such as 135c or 137e–138a, identify the ancient text independently of this book’s page numbers. A range may cover the completion of a sentence across section boundaries. Quotations retain the supplied edition’s Greek, including editorial brackets where

relevant. Accents, breathings and long-vowel marks in transliteration matter for recognition. Transliteration is a reading aid, not a claim about a single historical pronunciation: ē represents eta, ō omega, y upsilon, ph phi, th theta, ch chi, and rough breathing h. Ordinary English spellings are retained for familiar names.

The printed page locators refer to this lexicon's matching PDF. In an EPUB, text size and screen dimensions change pagination; the linked headings remain the reliable route. Notes belong to this companion and are distinct from the edition's thirty explanatory notes. A reference to "the edition's note" means the supplied Diotimos text, not a new examination of manuscripts.

Argument map

The school and the value of philosophy 132a–133b

Socrates enters Dionysius' school. Two young men draw circles and imitate inclinations with their hands; he cannot distinctly hear their dispute and cautiously associates it with Anaxagoras or Oenopides. The athlete calls their activity heavenly prattle and philosophizing. His cultivated rival denounces this judgement. Once the young men become listeners, the rival raises his voice for his beloved. The question whether philosophy is fine is therefore already entangled with reputation, beauty and competition.

The first methodological turn is at 133b: can someone know whether a thing is fine or shameful without knowing what it is? The educated lover accepts this demand. An avowal of philosophy's value must now become an account of its character.

Much learning tested by bodily training 133c–134c

The educated lover invokes Solon's lifelong learning and turns it into a quantitative programme: learn as much as possible. Socrates calls this much learning. He then asks whether the analogous love of exercise is much labor. The athlete, restored to the discussion for his experience, says moderate labors produce bodily good condition. A comic insult and the youths' laughter accompany the concession, but ridicule is not itself the argument. The substantive distinction is between quantity and what is fitting.

Measure for the soul and a shared difficulty 134c–135a

Food and other bodily inputs are beneficial in moderation. The same is granted of what is offered to the soul, including subjects of learning. A doctor or trainer can judge bodily measure; a farmer can judge seed. Who judges the amount and kind of learning appropriate to the soul? All three speakers are perplexed. The inquiry has not proved that learning is bad or specified a fixed curriculum. It has exposed the need for a competent standard. The Homeric bow joke tests whether the rivals will let someone else attempt what they cannot.

A cultivated generalist and the pentathlete 135a–136b

The educated lover now identifies suitable learning by the reputation it brings. He wants knowledge of many crafts, especially prestigious ones, in the manner appropriate to a free, educated man: understanding without manual specialization. The carpenter and master builder example tests how demanding that expertise is. The lover retreats

from complete precision to the ability to follow experts and contribute a judgement better than other bystanders.

Socrates supplies the pentathlete image. Such a person is below the specialist in each event but above the other competitors. The image expresses comparative standing; it does not establish that this philosopher is first overall. The lover accepts it as a picture of freedom from enslavement to one occupation. The earlier word “moderate” reappears, now describing a limited hold on many crafts rather than an established measure of what benefits the soul.

From priority to alleged uselessness 136b–137b

The good are said to be useful, and philosophers especially useful. Yet illness calls for a doctor, and a storm calls for a pilot. The lover’s initial “Both” is narrowed to whom he would prefer first. Socrates generalizes: whenever a craftsman is available, the philosopher is not useful; craftsmen are always available; so the generalist philosopher is useless and base.

The conclusion depends on more than the examples independently show. Being less useful than a specialist in a specific emergency does not by itself entail having no use. The recapitulation also includes “we ourselves are philosophers”, not previously agreed in those words. The reader should distinguish the accepted argumentative sequence from an unqualified proof. Socrates immediately resists its depreciatory outcome and proposes that philosophizing must be something else.

Improvement punishment and self knowledge 137b–138b

The craft that improves horses or dogs also punishes them rightly and distinguishes good from bad specimens. This

complex is transferred to human beings. The knowledge that punishes civic disorder is called judicial knowledge and justice. Knowing one and knowing many are then linked. The argument shifts from an expert's knowledge of animals to an animal's supposed knowledge of its own kind and itself, then to a person's self-knowledge.

Not knowing oneself is identified with not being temperate; knowing oneself is then identified with being temperate. The Delphic inscription is interpreted as an exhortation to temperance and justice. Because the same knowledge is said to punish rightly and discriminate oneself and others, justice and temperance are declared the same. These transitions are compressed. The shared vocabulary makes the route intelligible without removing questions about the changes of subject or the strength of the asserted identities.

One craft of rule and a demand to lead 138b–139a

Cities are well ordered when wrongdoers pay the penalty. Political, kingly, tyrannical, household-managing and masterly arts are identified with the same craft, justice and temperance. "Rightly" and "well" govern this sequence: it does not establish that every actual king, tyrant or household head is just. Nor should the inclusion of the tyrant be erased by importing a distinction from another dialogue.

Socrates returns to following expert speech and contributing judgement. The philosopher cannot accept second place where his own household, his friends' arbitration or his city's judgement is concerned. He must lead. The ending rejects philosophy as much learning or busying oneself with crafts. It indicates a positive direction toward self-knowledge and responsible judgement, but

does not expressly define philosophy as one named science. The educated lover is silent with shame, the unlearned lover agrees, and the others praise the result. Applause closes the scene; it does not settle every philosophical difficulty for the reader.

Five distinctions to keep in view

- Fine is not simply good. The speakers move from admiration and shame to benefit and use, and the move requires assent.
- Moderate is not simply few. Neither maximum nor minimum determines the fitting amount, and the soul’s judge remains a question.
- Understanding is not identical with practical craftsmanship. The generalist’s ability to follow and contribute must still face the test of what it achieves.
- Less useful is not automatically useless. The priority demanded by an emergency and the total value of a person are different claims.
- A common craft is not merely a common title. The final identifications concern supposedly right exercise of knowledge; their demanding conditions must travel with them.

This volume contains 82 full articles, 326 separately defined register records and 35 contextual phrase glosses. The three indexes and repeated cross-references provide routes into this material; they are not counted as additional definitions.

Lexicon

Agreement, recap, and refutation

ὁμολογεῖν (homologein); συγχωρεῖν (synchōrein); ἀνομολογεῖσθαι (anomologeisthai)

The word. Homologein is to agree or acknowledge; synchōrein is to concede or grant. Anomologeisthai at 136e means to go over or acknowledge again what has been said. The edition translates that act as “agree over again.” It is a review of commitments in the conversation, not a technical doctrine of recollection. The verbs register different turns of assent, but they do not guarantee that each accepted proposition has been demonstrated.

The comparative agroikoteron at 136e asks whether pressing the next question would be “rather boorish,” with the underlying association of rusticity. This is a question about conversational tact, not an assessment of actual farmers. The running narrative distinguishes freely volunteering a claim, conceding under questioning and being compelled to agree. Those differences matter because the dialogue is at once a test of propositions and a public encounter between proud rivals.

In The Lovers. The cultivated lover repeatedly agrees with Socrates while reserving a very different attitude toward his rival. At 134c he says he need not strive for victory against his own opinion when speaking to Socrates. His willingness to concede is therefore not simply indifference to winning; it is part of how he presents his own intellectual character before the audience.

At 136e he is “compelled to agree” that the proposed philosopher is useless. Socrates then asks whether another question would be “rather boorish” and says he only wants

to review the commitments. The recap includes philosophy's being fine, the philosophers' goodness, good people's usefulness, base people's uselessness and the generalist's redundancy while craftsmen exist. Putting these side by side exposes the conflict within the lover's account.

One element deserves special notice: "we ourselves are philosophers" is included in the recap, although it was not explicitly agreed earlier. Edition note 22 marks the discrepancy and reports a scholarly deletion proposal. The printed dialogue retains it. The addition makes the refutation personal, drawing the speakers themselves into the threatened classification as base and useless. A reader should neither silently delete it nor invent an earlier explicit agreement to justify it.

The second half proceeds through another rapid sequence of assents. The same craft improves, punishes and discriminates; knowledge of one extends to many; self-knowledge becomes temperance; justice and temperance become one. These are propositions accepted within the dialogue. Their compressed presentation leaves room to question the transitions, especially where the subject of knowledge changes from animal expert to animal itself.

Agreement is thus indispensable evidence for reconstructing the argument, but not a substitute for analyzing its steps. The ending's silence and the audience's praise similarly show how the discussion lands dramatically. They do not provide independent proof of every proposition that preceded them.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **136e.** Ἠναγκάζετο ὁμολογεῖν — The narrator reports an assent as compelled.

- **136e.** ἀνομολογήσασθαι — The proposed next step is a review of what has been said.
- **137a.** καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι — The recap includes a self-identification not explicitly agreed before.

In this edition. Edition note 22 says Schanz, following Forster, deleted the clause about the speakers themselves being philosophers. Burnet's printed text as reproduced here retains it, and so does the translation. The apparatus is evidence for the editorial disagreement, not permission to treat the retained phrase as absent.[1]

See also. Both, rather, and first: the missing inference (p. 21) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · One, many, and the claim to one craft (p. 110) · Knowing oneself and one's quality (p. 83) · The wise man's silence and the others' praise (p. 167)

Ambition, anxiety, and display

φιλοτίμως (philotimōs); ἀγωνιᾶν (agōnian); ἐνδεικνύναι (endeiknynai)

The word. Philotimōs means ambitiously or with love of honor. It is an adverb describing the manner of the lover's answer, not a formal accusation that ambition is always vicious. Agōnian means to be anxious or "on edge"; the edition connects it with the anxiety of a competitor before a contest. Endeiknynai means to show or indicate; the opening uses its participle endeiknymenos for the speaker's gesture toward his rival. The verb can describe

[1] The discrepancy concerns an explicit prior agreement. The scene may suggest that the speakers identify with philosophy, but such an inference is different from their having jointly stated the proposition the recap attributes to them.

indication without necessarily meaning boastful display, although the context here is conspicuously performative.

These terms mark different components of a single response: desire for distinction, apprehension under observation, and a gesture that makes the target unmistakable. The loud voice and stated wish that his beloved hear complete the staging.

In The Lovers. The youths' move from disputants to listeners changes the conditions under which the adults speak. Socrates says he is dazzled and judges that the cultured lover is no less on edge. The latter nevertheless responds very ambitiously, declaring that he would not count himself, or anyone else with the contrary view, as a man if he thought philosophy shameful. His gesture makes "anyone else" point at the athlete. A general claim about a pursuit becomes a public challenge to one person.

This motive remains relevant when the definition changes. The cultured lover later selects subjects likely to confer the greatest reputation for philosophy and imagines outshining whoever happens to be present. The early theatrical details thus anticipate a substantive weakness: an educational program chosen to secure a reputation may not supply the competence needed when a real task arises.

Yet the characterization is not a complete psychological diagnosis. Socrates reports appearances and leaves some reactions unknown. The man also agrees against his immediate advantage and participates in a sustained inquiry. Ambition makes those concessions harder and dramatically more consequential; it does not prove that he never cares about truth.

At the end, shame and silence answer the loud beginning. The audience's approval cannot by itself demonstrate the

final reasoning, but it shows that the lover's chosen arena has judged him on terms he did not control.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **133a.** οὐχ ἧττον ἐμοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν — Socrates judges the lover to be no less on edge than himself.
- **133a.** καὶ μάλα φιλοτίμως — The answer is delivered very ambitiously.
- **133b.** καὶ λέγων μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ — The volume of the speech makes the social audience explicit.

In this edition. The note at 133a translates agōnian as the anxiety of a competitor and compares Charmides 162c. The note on philosophizing includes philotimōs among the dialogue's love-compounds, alongside love of exercise and love of winning. Those lexical connections are a useful guide, while "display" in this article remains a description of the combined dramatic action rather than the translation of every occurrence of endeiknynai.

See also. Youths, lads, and the beloved (p. 186) · Wisdom and the claim to be wiser (p. 182) · Quarreling, contention, and love of victory (p. 129) · Laughter, blushing, and shame (p. 88) · Fine, beautiful, and shameful (p. 50)

Anaxagoras

Ἀναξαγόρας (Anaxagoras)

The word. Anaxagoras is a personal name, not a general term for a kind of philosopher. The opening prints the genitive Anaxagorou after "about": Socrates thinks that the boys' quarrel concerns Anaxagoras or Oenopides. A reader must preserve both the case distinction and the uncertainty. The narrator has not heard clearly enough to

report their thesis or even to decide which named thinker they mean.

In The Lovers. Anaxagoras enters at the border between what Socrates hears and what he sees. The circles and tilted hands suggest a learned discussion; the nearby lover dismisses that activity as talk about things in the sky. The name therefore establishes a recognizable intellectual setting without supplying an astronomical argument that the rest of the dialogue tests. Nothing said later refutes an Anaxagorean cosmology. The target becomes the lover's definition of philosophy as accumulation of learning.

This restraint has interpretive consequences. One can see a contrast between cosmic topics at the entrance and self-knowledge and civic judgment near the close. But "Socrates rejects Anaxagoras" would turn a dramatic transition into a doctrinal verdict absent from the text. The boys' earnestness remains potentially admirable: it is the athlete who first labels it nonsense, while Socrates asks whether their subject is great and fine.

Nor does the pairing authorize an identification of either lover with Anaxagoras. Both names belong to the subject apparently discussed by the lads; the lovers are described through music and gymnastics and are otherwise unnamed.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132a.** ἢ περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου — The first of two possible subjects of the lads' quarrel.

In this edition. The edition's note identifies Anaxagoras as the thinker from Clazomenae, gives approximate dates of 500–428 BC, and says he taught at Athens and held the sun to be a fiery stone, citing Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.7.7. Those details are contextual information from the note,

not statements in The Lovers, and no independent historical verification is claimed here. The supplied Greek assigns the name to 132a; Oenopides begins 132b. The cross-section placement is worth observing when quoting the opening alternatives.

See also. Oenopides (p. 109) · Circles, drawing, and inclinations (p. 27) · Things up in the sky (p. 171) · Prattling and talking nonsense (p. 122)

Benefit and beneficial learning

ὠφελεῖν (ōphelein); ὠφέλιμος (ōphelimos)

The word. Ōphelein means to benefit, help, or do good to someone; ōphelimos means beneficial or helpful. The opening passive form ōphelētheiēn means “I might be benefited,” while ōphelimōtata at 134d is the neuter plural superlative, “most beneficial.” Benefit describes an effect on a recipient. It is therefore more specific than the bare social approval conveyed by calling something fine.

The dialogue later uses chrēsimos, useful, in its test of the philosopher against specialists. The ideas are related but the words are distinct. The present family asks what improves or helps body and soul; the later utility test asks where a particular kind of person has a useful role.

In The Lovers. Socrates initially says he will question the man who claims to be wiser so that he too might benefit from him. This makes questioning potentially educative rather than solely adversarial. It may have an ironic edge in light of the result, but the narrative does not require us to assume that the wish to learn is insincere. The speaker’s claim should be tested by whether it offers something of value.

At 133d the addition “good as well” to “fine” opens the route toward consequences. The body becomes well through appropriately measured exercise, and food and other bodily inputs are judged by benefit. When the same question is asked about the soul, learning is no longer an unqualified accumulation of honors. It is something that can be apportioned well or badly for the person receiving it.

The passage is stronger as an inquiry into criteria than as a completed educational theory. It secures agreement that measured inputs benefit, then asks who can recognize the measure. Neither the cultured lover’s prestige nor the athlete’s physical expertise supplies that answer. The initial promise of being benefited by a wiser man therefore becomes the very issue under examination: what would establish that someone can actually help another person learn well?

A useful distinction follows. An activity may look fine before spectators, feel competitive, and still fail the test of benefit. Conversely, a correction from an unfashionable or verbally unassuming source may be beneficial. The athlete’s contribution dramatizes that possibility.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132d.** ἵνα καὶ εἴ τι δυναίμην παρ’ αὐτοῦ ὠφεληθείην — Socrates presents benefit as a reason to question the professedly wiser man.
- **134d.** ὠφελιμώτατα εἶναι τὰ μέτρια — The bodily argument names moderate amounts as most beneficial.
- **134d.** Καὶ τούτων ἄρα τὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰ πολλά; — Benefit becomes the criterion for learning-subjects as well.

In this edition. The edition preserves “benefited” at 132d and “benefit” or “beneficial” in the body-soul argument, rather than using “useful” indiscriminately. At 134d the supplied apparatus attributes the printed finite ōphelei to Stephanus against an infinitive in B and T, and records Schanz’s adjustment in the preceding statement about what is most beneficial. These notes concern the edited wording; they do not by themselves invalidate the conceptual distinction between benefit and quantity.

See also. Fine, beautiful, and shameful (p. 50) · Moderation and measure (p. 104) · The body and good condition (p. 160) · The soul as the recipient of learning (p. 163) · Doctor and trainer as judges of measure (p. 44)

Both, rather, and first: the missing inference

ἀμφότεροι (amphoteroi); μᾶλλον (mallon); πρότερον (proteron)

The word. Amphoteroi means both members of a pair; the accusative amphoterous answers whom the lover would bring in. Mallon means more or rather, expressing comparative preference. Proteron means earlier or first relative to the other choice. At 136d Socrates combines preference and priority: which person rather and first? None of these words means “the other is completely useless.”

In The Lovers. The small exchange is the logical hinge of the practical objection. Socrates asks whether, in seeking health, the lover would summon the runner-up or the doctor. “Both” is the initial answer. It resists the exclusive choice built into the question and leaves room for two different contributions. Socrates rules out that response as

an answer to his next question and demands priority. The lover accepts the doctor “both rather and first.”

This supplies a clear ranking without settling the whole distribution of usefulness. One can prefer and consult a doctor first while retaining some possible use for another knowledgeable person. The text neither explains what that secondary use would be nor disproves it. The storm example repeats the preference structure: one would rather trust the pilot than the philosopher.

Socrates then proposes that in everything else too, whenever a craftsman exists, the philosopher is not useful. The interlocutor answers that it appears so. That assent is part of the dialogue’s evidence, but it should not be mistaken for an independently demonstrated entailment. The passage moves from lower priority to no use. A reader can identify the gap without replacing the actual accepted conclusion with the stronger defense the lover might have made.

There is a related shift in quantification. The examples concern a competent person available for a particular practical choice. The claim that there are always craftsmen generalizes this into permanent redundancy for the philosopher. To make the deduction strict, one would need additional assumptions about access, exclusivity of useful roles and the range of tasks. Those assumptions are not separately argued.

The refutation still has force against the lover’s grand claim that philosophers are “most useful.” He owes an account of a task in which breadth provides a distinctive benefit. His answer “Both” gestures toward a possible account but stops short of giving it. The closing argument changes the proposed philosophical responsibility rather than completing a theory of generalist assistance.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **136d.** Ἀμφοτέρους ἔγωγ’ ἄν — The first reply is “Both.”
- **136d.** ἀλλ’ ὁπότερον μᾶλλόν τε καὶ πρότερον — Socrates replaces joint assistance with comparative priority.
- **136d.** τὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον — The conceded priority belongs to the doctor.

In this edition. The edition keeps the emphatic repetition “both rather and first,” despite its slightly unusual English. That precision is philosophically useful: smoothing the answer into “only the doctor” would erase the inference problem by changing what the interlocutor actually conceded.

See also. Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Sickness, health, and the practical choice (p. 145) · Pilot and entrusting responsibility (p. 120) · Craftsman and specialist (p. 34) · Agreement, recap, and refutation (p. 13)

Busybody and stooping over things

πολυπραγμονεῖν (polypragmonein); κυπτάζειν (kyptazein); πραγματεία (pragmateia)

The word. Polypragmonein is to meddle or be a busybody, occupying oneself with many affairs. Kyptazein means to stoop or bend over things; in the phrase at 137b it gives this life a bodily posture. Pragmateia is occupation, business or sustained involvement; at 139a the edition renders the phrase about crafts as “busying oneself with the crafts.” These related-looking terms should not all be flattened into a single technical concept of scholarship.

The participles polypragmonounta and kyptazonta at 137b describe how one lives. They are evaluative and picturesque, not a neutral catalogue of a philosopher's research methods.

In The Lovers. After deriving the unacceptable result that philosophers would be base and useless, Socrates proposes that philosophy is something else. The rejected description includes earnest occupation with crafts, living as a busybody stooped over things and learning much. The language compresses the lover's various attempts into a recognizable way of life, scattered among many pursuits yet capable of consuming a person's attention.

This criticism does not straightforwardly amount to "curiosity is bad." The dialogue itself begins with an inquiry into what philosophy is, and Socrates continues asking questions after two proposals fail. The target is the identification of philosophy with an accumulation of technical occupations, not the mere act of investigating an unfamiliar subject. Nor is all practical engagement rejected: the ending insists on responsible participation in one's household and city.

The posture also complicates the lover's initial distinction between intellectual understanding and manual work. He had imagined broad education as liberating him from servile absorption. Socrates redescribes the result as a stooping, busy life associated with the very crafts from which the lover wished to maintain distance. This is rhetorically pointed, and its force draws partly on social contempt for technical labor. It should not be presented as a demonstration independent of those values.

The conclusion at 139a repeats the rejection in less pictorial form: philosophy is far from much learning and occupation with the crafts. That explicit negative result is

firmer textual ground than any proposed positive definition inferred from the intervening ethical argument.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **137b.** οὐδὲ πολυπραγμονοῦντα κυπτάζοντα ζῆν — A rejected way of life is busy and physically stooped over its concerns.
- **139a.** ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία — The final sentence rejects occupation with crafts as the account of philosophy.

In this edition. Edition note 23 connects polypragmonein with the same verb in Charmides 161d. The apparatus at 137b reports B's kyptazonta and T's ktypazonta, as well as a proposed deletion in the surrounding phrase. The article follows the edition's chosen "stooping over things"; it does not claim to settle the textual issue independently.

See also. Menial and the contempt for crafts (p. 100) · Freedom, education, and being a slave to one pursuit (p. 57) · Craft and the limits of expertise (p. 31) · Philosophy and philosophizing (p. 117) · Learning and much learning (p. 92)

Carpenter and carpentry

τέκτων (tektōn); τεκτονική (tektonikē)

The word. Tektōn is a carpenter or builder; tektonikē is the corresponding craft, carpentry. The edition chooses "carpenter" and "carpentry" for the ordinary practitioner and craft at 135b–c. The word does not itself imply that the person lacks all understanding. Socrates distinguishes this worker from a top master builder within the same broad field, rather than contrasting a mindless hand with an entirely unrelated intellectual profession.

In The Lovers. The example tests the lover's proposal to learn what belongs to understanding rather than handiwork. Socrates asks whether he means something like the difference between the available carpenter and the exceptionally rare master builder. The lover agrees. The money comparison then makes the gap vivid: the ordinary carpenter can be bought for five or six minae, whereas even ten thousand drachmas would not buy the top master builder.

The verb "buy" makes the human transaction part of the illustration. It should not be silently converted into an annual wage or a consultancy fee. The example belongs to a society in which a skilled person could be owned and purchased. At the same time, the dialogue supplies no biography, actual sale or independently documented market quotation; these are illustrative figures within Socrates' question.

Socrates next asks whether one person could learn even two crafts in the proposed way. That question depends on taking the understanding of a master builder seriously. If the lover's generalist must possess this kind of command in each domain, breadth becomes implausible. The lover accordingly clarifies that he has meant a lower degree of knowledge. The carpenter is thus not a disposable picturesque detail: the comparison forces the move from commanding intelligence within a craft to cultivated participation around it.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135b.** ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τεκτονικῇ — Carpentry is Socrates' concrete test of the proposed distinction.

- **135c.** τέκτονα μὲν ἂν πρίαιο πέντε ἢ ἓξ μνῶν — The hypothetical purchase names a range of five or six minae.

In this edition. Edition note 16 gives the conversion of one mina to one hundred drachmas. It treats the master builder as worth more than sixteen carpenters at the higher ordinary price. That is a comparison of the stated lower bound with six minae, not an exact valuation of the master builder.

See also. The top master builder (p. 165) · Minae, drachmas, and the price comparison (p. 102) · Understanding and handiwork (p. 175) · Freedom, education, and being a slave to one pursuit (p. 57)

Circles, drawing, and inclinations

κύκλος (kyklos); γράφειν (graphein); ἔγκλισις (enklisis)

The word. Kyklos means a circle; the opening has the plural accusative kyklous, the objects being drawn. Graphein can mean to write or draw, and the drawn circles make “drawing” appropriate here. Enklisis means an inclination or tilt; the plural enkliseis names what the lads imitate by inclining their hands. None of these nouns by itself specifies the celestial equator, zodiac, or an exact angular measurement.

The choice between “write” and “draw” is a small reminder that the writing-master’s setting does not restrict the activity to letters. The same general graphic action can represent geometry. Likewise the hands do not merely accompany speech decoratively: Socrates treats their position as evidence about the subject being considered.

In The Lovers. Because Socrates cannot quite hear, the opening establishes knowledge through limited

observation. He reports what the two seemed to be drawing and what their gestures resembled, then asks the lover beside him. That lover's answer offers an evaluation, "prattling" and "talking nonsense," rather than an explanation of the diagram. The gap between seeing a practice, labeling it, and understanding it prepares the later demand to know what philosophy is before judging its worth.

The lads' earnestness accompanies the images. A circle may look simple while the question it expresses is difficult; conversely, earnest gestures do not guarantee an important result. The narrative leaves both possibilities available. Socrates' initial "great and fine" is a question, not a certification of the astronomy.

Drawing and manual imitation also warn against mapping the two adult rivals too neatly onto mind and body. The supposed intellectual pursuit is embodied, and the athlete later supplies a sound judgment about measure. The conceptual contrast is between relevant understanding and empty claims, not between hands as such and thinking as such.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132b.** κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν ἐφαινέσθην — Socrates reports apparent circle-drawing, rather than an overheard proposition.
- **132b.** ἐγκλίσεις τινὰς ἐμιμοῦντο — The inclinations are presented indefinitely as things imitated.

In this edition. The edition suggests that the inclinations could depict one circle tilted against another and associates that possibility with its note on Oenopides. The inference is explicitly tentative. At 132b1 the apparatus reports graphein in B beside graphontes in T and W; the

continuous text follows Burnet's infinitive reading. This article quotes the supplied edited text, not a new collation of those manuscripts. "Inclinations" preserves the geometrical suggestion without inserting an unnamed celestial mechanism.

See also. Oenopides (p. 109) · Anaxagoras (p. 17) · Things up in the sky (p. 171) · Words and deeds (p. 184) · Questions, answers, and what a thing is (p. 131)

City, good order, and paying the penalty

πόλις (polis); διοικεῖν (dioikein); οἰκεῖσθαι (oikeisthai); δίκην διδόναι (dikēn didonai)

The word. Polis is a city or civic community. Dioikein is to order, administer or manage; oikeisthai in this context is to be ordered or governed. Dikēn didonai is the idiom "to pay the penalty": dikē here supplies the penalty or satisfaction, and didonai is literally to give. The idiom should not be translated word for word as "give justice," nor assumed to specify a monetary fine.

The edition's "order" and "be ordered" keep the civic and household applications connected. Good order is always qualified by well or rightly in the crucial questions. The mere existence of an administration is not the achievement being praised.

In The Lovers. The city first enters the constructive sequence through the people who are unruly and break its laws. Knowledge that punishes them rightly is called the judge's and identified with justice. After justice and temperance are made one, Socrates says cities are well ordered when wrongdoers pay the penalty. This makes corrective justice a condition of the order under discussion.

The claim does not furnish a complete account of everything a city needs. The text does not discuss defense, resources, legislation or the selection of officials. It isolates a mode of good ordering which can be treated as knowledgeable judgment about human conduct. The statesman's art is then identified with that same competence.

The move to a single man ordering the city brings king and tyrant into the list. The parallel question about one man ordering a household allows the argument to pass between political and domestic scales. The earlier one/many agreement has prepared this extension: the relevant knowledge is taken to apply to a single subject or many subjects. Whether changes of scale also change the required knowledge is not independently examined.

At 138e the city becomes the source of a concrete assignment. It may direct the philosopher to decide or judge something. This role differs from the philosopher necessarily being a king or sole ruler. The final responsibility can arise through a limited public commission as well as within private household life. In that assigned matter, appearing second or third is called shameful.

Thus the city is both the setting for the definition of justice and one of the communities in which philosophical competence is tested. The dialogue's negative conclusion about crafts does not remove philosophy from practical civic affairs; it relocates the demand for authoritative judgment within them.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **138b.** αἱ πόλεις εὖ οἰκοῦνται — The relevant political result is a city's being well ordered.

- **138b.** ὅταν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δίκην διδῶσιν — Wrongdoers' paying the penalty gives the corrective criterion.
- **138e.** ἡ πόλις τι προστάττῃ διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν — The city can entrust a definite decision or judgment to the philosopher.

In this edition. The edition's Key Words explicitly gloss dikēn didonai as "pay the penalty." Its singular noun inside the idiom does not mean that all punishments are one kind, and no amount or procedure is stated. The rhetorical concentration on penalty should not be inflated into a detailed penal constitution.

See also. Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Punishing rightly and correcting (p. 126) · Statesman and the political craft (p. 153) · King and the kingly craft (p. 79) · Tyrant and the surprising identity with the king (p. 173) · Household and responsibility at home (p. 70) · Friends and entrusted arbitrations (p. 59)

Craft and the limits of expertise

τέχνη (technē)

The word. A technē is a craft or art: an organized competence through which someone knows how to do something. Its range here includes carpentry, medicine and steering a ship, but also judging and governing. The English "craft" should therefore not be restricted to manual manufacture. The plural technai, "crafts," often marks the differentiated fields in which different practitioners possess authority. At 135b the genitive plural technōn occurs; the dictionary form technē is not the form of that phrase.

The term does not by itself mean either a narrow mechanical habit or a comprehensive philosophical science. Which capacities count as one craft, and which person possesses them, are questions the argument must establish. Especially in the closing pages, calling several activities one craft is an argumentative identification, not a dictionary definition.

In The Lovers. After the failure of much learning, the cultivated lover proposes familiarity with all crafts, or as many as possible, particularly those “worth mentioning” (135b). Socrates initially construes this as command of the understanding possessed by an outstanding master builder. The lover retreats from that demanding interpretation. His philosopher need only follow specialists and contribute intelligent judgments in their presence. The passage thus separates knowledge across fields from the full competence internal to each field.

The usefulness test then makes the plurality of crafts a difficulty for the proposed philosopher. For sickness there is medicine; for a storm there is piloting. As long as the appropriate practitioner exists, Socrates asks, what use is someone less expert? The conclusion that the generalist has no use is stronger than the examples alone establish, but the lover accepts it. At 137a Socrates expressly limits the damaging result to expertise “in the way you mean.” It is this account of philosophy that is under pressure.

The next movement does not abolish craft as an explanatory model. On the contrary, the “same craft” both makes animals best and punishes them rightly (137c). The argument extends that unity to human beings, then identifies judicial knowledge, justice, temperance and the governing arts. At 138c it reaches “one craft.” The contrast is consequently between being second in a collection of

others' crafts and possessing the relevant knowledge for judging and ordering human affairs. Even this leaves open exactly how philosophy relates to the one craft. The concluding rejection of "busying oneself with the crafts" is not an explicit definition of philosophy as a new profession.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135b.** τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος εἶναι πασῶν — The lover initially values a reputation for experience of all crafts.
- **137c.** Ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη — The same-craft claim begins the constructive sequence.
- **138c.** καὶ μία τέχνη ἐστὶν — Several governing and ethical capacities are declared one craft.

In this edition. The edition consistently uses "craft," including in contexts where "art" or "expertise" might sound more natural in present-day English. That consistency exposes the deliberate return to the craft model after the rejection of polymathy. Its Key Words describe the late argument as finding a craft for the philosopher; this is a helpful interpretive summary, provided it is not mistaken for the dialogue's having supplied a formal definition.

See also. Craftsman and specialist (p. 34) · Understanding and handiwork (p. 175) · Precision and the cost of mastery (p. 124) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · One, many, and the claim to one craft (p. 110) · Philosophy and philosophizing (p. 117)

Craftsman and specialist

δημιουργός (dēmiourgos)

The word. Dēmiourgos means a craftsman or practitioner of a craft. “Specialist” usefully describes the person’s argumentative role here, but it is not the edition’s regular translation. The craftsman is someone with a determinate field of competence, not necessarily a manual laborer: the doctor and pilot supply the practical examples in the surrounding discussion. The text also uses the descriptive phrase “the one who has the craft” rather than treating a professional title alone as proof of knowledge.

In The Lovers. The craftsman first provides the standard against which the educated generalist measures himself. At 135d the philosopher should follow what the craftsman says more effectively than other listeners and offer his own judgment. His success is comparative within the audience; he is not expected to outperform the practitioner. This is why the pentathlete analogy can initially appear complimentary.

The lover’s defense at 136a–b reverses the comparison. Devotion to one field supposedly leaves craftsmen behind in all the others. From his point of view, specialization has an opportunity cost: expertise narrows the rest of a life. Socrates does not directly disprove that cost. He changes the question from the breadth of a person’s attainments to the usefulness of the person when a definite task has to be done.

The assumption that craftsmen are always available makes the later objection unusually strong. The generalist cannot reserve a role as a substitute when no specialist can be found. Yet the examples establish a preference for the specialist, not a demonstration that a second person could

provide no assistance. The article on usefulness therefore matters as much as the one on expertise: who knows most and who can help are not automatically identical questions.

Nor does the ending recommend dismissing craftsmen altogether. The philosopher's inability to follow a physician is still presented as shameful at 138d. What changes is that equally secondary competence will not satisfy the responsibilities of one's own household or an entrusted judgment. The craft practitioner remains the successful model of responsible knowledge even while the cultivated lover looks down on the practitioner's restricted life.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135d.** ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ — The craftsman is the speaker the educated man must follow.
- **136e.** εἰσὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀεί που δημιουργοί — The claim of continual availability closes off substitution as an obvious use.

In this edition. At 136e the edition's "always" follows Hermann's aei; the apparatus reports dē, "of course," in B and T. The recap at 137a also speaks of craftsmen always existing. The distinction matters because the universal availability premise does argumentative work; the reader should not mistake the chosen wording at 136e for an uncontested manuscript reading.[2]

See also. Craft and the limits of expertise (p. 31) · Precision and the cost of mastery (p. 124) · Freedom, education, and

[2] Edition note 21 identifies Hermann's correction. The source's apparatus, rather than a fresh inspection of the manuscripts, is the evidence for the reported alternatives.

being a slave to one pursuit (p. 57) · Both, rather, and first: the missing inference (p. 21) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179)

Decent and worthless: judging quality

χρηστός (chrēstos); μοχθηρός (mochthēros)

The word. Chrēstos means good in quality, serviceable or decent; the edition uses “decent.” Mochthēros means bad, poor in quality or worthless, and is translated “worthless.” These words are applied to animals as well as people. Calling a horse “decent” in this translation therefore identifies sound or good quality, not human moral etiquette; conversely, “worthless” does not name a fixed legal or social class of humans.

The word family of chrēstos overlaps with chrēsimos, useful, and its negation achrēstos, useless. The late shift from usefulness to the discrimination of character and quality consequently has a verbal connection. A shared root does not settle whether the kinds of evaluation are conceptually identical.

In The Lovers. At 137c Socrates asks whether the craft that makes animals best and punishes them rightly is also the one that recognizes the decent and worthless among them. The identification is plausible if a trainer must assess the condition and defects that training is meant to improve. It gives corrective activity a diagnostic foundation.

The same claim is then extended to human beings. The knowledge that improves and punishes people must distinguish the decent from the worthless. When this knowledge is called the judge’s and identified with justice, evaluation of people becomes part of an account of civic

authority. The argument treats right punishment as informed rather than arbitrary, while leaving the substantive criteria of good human quality unspecified.

At 137e–138a the distinction is transferred to the evaluated being's own understanding. A horse that cannot discriminate good and bad horses will not know what sort of horse it is, and the human analogue follows. This is a significant change of subject: a trainer who knows horses is not the same knower as a horse knowing itself. The recurrence of the same quality words makes the transition easy to follow verbally, but does not prove it.

The human conclusion asks whether one oneself is decent or base. "Self-knowledge" is accordingly tied to an ability to place oneself within evaluative distinctions that also apply to others. The dialogue does not offer a separate account of introspection or private psychological access. Its ambition is to unite knowledge of self and others with the ability to correct and judge them, an ambition supported by a short chain of assents rather than a detailed theory.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **137c.** γιγνώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς μοχθηρούς — The trainer's craft is said to recognize good and bad quality.
- **137d.** διαγιγνώσκουσαν τοὺς χρηστούς τε καὶ μοχθηρούς — The discrimination is extended to human beings.
- **138a.** τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηροὺς ἀνθρώπους — Ignorance of others' quality becomes the premise for ignorance of oneself.

In this edition. Edition note 24 separately identifies chrēstos, ponēros and mochthēros and explains its three English renderings. The apparatus records variation between the two bad-quality words in some passages. Claims here concern the chosen running text and its translation, not an assertion that every manuscript consistently preserves that lexical differentiation.

See also. Good and base in the argument about value (p. 61) · Discriminating persons and deciding cases (p. 42) · Making best and the end of a craft (p. 97) · Horses, dogs, oxen, and the change of knower (p. 68) · Knowing oneself and one’s quality (p. 83) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179)

Delphi, the inscription, and practice

Δελφοί (Delphoi); γράμμα (gramma); ἀσκεῖν (askein); παρακελεύεσθαι (parakeleuesthai)

The word. Delphoi is Delphi, the sanctuary named here in the dative Delphois. Gramma is something written, a letter or inscription; in context it is “the inscription at Delphi.” Askein means to practice or cultivate. Parakeleuesthai means to urge or exhort; the finite parakeleuetai attributes an exhortation to the inscription. Together these words make the written maxim an instruction for a way of life rather than a piece of information merely to memorize.

In The Lovers. The inscription is invoked at 138a after knowing oneself has been identified with being temperate. Socrates says this, it seems, is what the writing at Delphi urges: to practice temperance and justice. The familiar background is “Know thyself,” explained in edition note 27. The dialogue does not itself reproduce that imperative

in Greek, so it must not be printed as though it were an exact quotation from this section.

The mention of justice is important. Temperance has just been linked directly with self-knowledge, while justice entered as the knowledge of right punishment. The inscription is now interpreted as urging both, and the following exchange brings the two capacities under the same knowledge. Delphi supplies an authoritative ethical resonance, but the reasoning remains in the argument's identifications; the inscription alone does not prove them.

Practice also matters. The text does not treat self-knowledge merely as an interesting proposition about the self. The instruction concerns cultivation of virtues which will soon be applied to household and city. The movement toward practical responsibility is thus already present before the philosopher is told to judge and lead.

The episode contrasts with the lover's earlier quotation of Solon. Both speakers draw on culturally authoritative words, but Socrates does not use Delphi to prescribe an accumulation of learning. He interprets a familiar saying as requiring a kind of knowledge and conduct that resists the runner-up model. This comparison is an interpretive observation about the dialogue's structure, not an explicit contrast voiced by either speaker.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **138a.** τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα παρακελεύεται — The text refers to and interprets an inscription rather than quoting its wording.
- **138a.** σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην — Its exhortation is stated as practicing two virtues.

In this edition. Note 27 identifies the inscription at Apollo's temple and compares Critias' reading in Charmides 164d–165a, where "Know thyself" is understood as the god's greeting and as "Be temperate." The Lovers adds justice to its interpretation. These details are reported from the supplied edition; the dialogue names neither Critias nor the Charmides.

See also. Knowing oneself and one's quality (p. 83) · Temperance as self-knowledge (p. 157) · Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Solon and learning as one grows old (p. 151) · Learning and much learning (p. 92)

Dionysius and the writing-master's school

Διονύσιος (Dionysios); γραμματιστής (grammatistēs)

The word. Dionysios is the personal name Dionysius, the owner or master of the establishment into which Socrates enters. Grammatistēs is a teacher of letters, rendered "writing-master" in this edition. It should not be mistaken for a modern specialist in linguistic grammar. The opening Greek has the genitives Dionysiou tou grammatistou, literally indicating "Dionysius the writing-master's"; "the school" makes explicit in English the place understood from that construction. No independent word meaning a school building is printed there.

Teaching letters places the scene within elementary literary formation, but the label does not determine every visitor's age or every activity conducted in the room. The lads can be discussing geometric or astronomical matters while Socrates happens to be in a writing-master's premises. The text does not say Dionysius assigned their dispute or even that he is present during it.

In The Lovers. The setting brings education and its social audience together before anyone asks for a definition of philosophy. Socrates notices handsome youths of esteemed fathers and their lovers, then two disputing lads. A question about education is therefore asked in a place already identified with a recognized kind of instruction. Later, the doctor, trainer, and farmer can be named as competent judges in their respective fields, but the question who can judge learning for the soul remains unanswered. The named teacher at the entrance makes that later absence especially suggestive, though the dialogue does not explicitly oppose Dionysius to an ideal philosophical educator.

The school is also a place where people watch one another. The lads become listeners; a lover raises his voice so his beloved can hear; ridicule is rewarded with laughter. Instruction here is not isolated from prestige, imitation, and embarrassment. Yet it would overstate the evidence to describe the whole event as a formal lesson under Socrates or to treat the writing-master as responsible for the lovers' claims.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132a.** Εἰς Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ εἰσῆλθον — The opening locates the narrative at Dionysius the writing-master's establishment.

In this edition. The note at 132a explains that a grammatistēs taught boys their letters and cites Diogenes Laertius 3.4, who says that Plato learned letters from a Dionysius named in the Rival Lovers. That biographical connection is supplied by the later source as reported in the edition; the dialogue itself says neither that Plato is present nor that Socrates has entered Plato's old school.

The edition's final review records "writing-master" as a deliberate rendering consistent with its Charmides and Alcibiades I.

See also. Socrates (p. 148) · Youths, lads, and the beloved (p. 186) · Music and literary culture (p. 107) · Subjects of learning (p. 155) · Doctor and trainer as judges of measure (p. 44)

Discriminating persons and deciding cases

διαγιγνώσκειν (diagignōskein); διακρίνειν (diakrinein)

The word. Diagignōskein is to distinguish or discriminate, here recognizing the decent and worthless or distinguishing oneself and others. Diakrinein means to separate, distinguish or decide; at 138e it describes a matter the city assigns one to decide. The shared English family of "distinguishing" and "deciding" can show the connection, but the two verbs should not be treated as identical forms of one word.

"Discrimination" in this article means discerning differences by judgment. It is not a claim about modern categories of unlawful discrimination or an invitation to rank human worth by a social label.

In The Lovers. The power to discriminate appears as the cognitive partner of making best and punishing rightly. Someone who cannot recognize good and bad quality would lack the basis for successful correction. At 137d this competence is extended to humans alongside improvement and punishment. The argument gives judgment a standard, even though it does not explain that standard's substantive content.

At 138b the object expands to “both oneself and others.” What had been expert evaluation of subjects now includes the evaluator. Socrates identifies the capacity with temperance, just as right punishment is identified with justice. The subsequent identity claim depends on both belonging to the same knowledge. The important transition is not merely from one English synonym to another, but from outward assessment to a knowledge in which the self is also an object.

The final civic commission makes discrimination practical. The city may direct the philosopher to decide or judge something. This is no longer a display of informed opinion in the presence of a craftsman. The person must render a decision and is expected to lead. Discernment has become the basis of an entrusted action.

A possible reading is that the whole closing sequence demands reflective, well-grounded practical judgment. That captures its direction, but the passage never offers a separate definition of philosophical judgment or a procedure for deciding difficult cases. It asserts a unity between corrective, evaluative and governing knowledge and then challenges the proposed philosopher to meet its standard.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **137d.** διαγιγνώσκουσαν τοὺς χρηστούς τε καὶ μοχθηρούς — The same craft is said to distinguish good and bad human quality.
- **138b.** διαγιγνώσκειν καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους — Self and others are brought under one discerning capacity.

- **138e.** προστάττῃ διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν — Civic discernment issues in an assigned decision or judgment.

In this edition. “Distinguish” and “decide” in the translation preserve different contexts without requiring a strict philosophical opposition between the Greek verbs. The wording “oneself and others” is essential: an abridgment to introspective self-awareness would lose the interpersonal reach on which the identity with justice relies.

See also. Knowing and being ignorant (p. 80) · Decent and worthless: judging quality (p. 36) · Justice, the judge’s knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Knowing oneself and one’s quality (p. 83) · Friends and entrusted arbitrations (p. 59)

Doctor and trainer as judges of measure

ἰατρός (iatros); παιδοτρίβης (paidotribēs)

The word. Iatros means doctor, a practitioner concerned with bodily illness and health. Paidotribēs means a trainer, especially a teacher of bodily exercise. The compound’s association with training boys helps explain the traditional role, but the passage uses the trainer as an authority on bodily exertion and food without specifying the age of every client. The English “trainer” should not be reduced to a casual companion who enjoys exercise.

The athlete’s experience in gymnastics and the paidotribēs named as an adviser are related but not expressly identified. The dialogue does not say the unnamed lover is himself a professional trainer or doctor. Knowing one relevant fact differs from possessing the full expertise needed to prescribe measure.

In The Lovers. At 134e Socrates asks whom they would properly consult to determine suitable labors and food for the body. All three agree on doctor or trainer. The agreement demonstrates that they can recognize the outline of relevant expertise in a familiar domain. It does not claim the two professions are identical in every respect. The question is deliberately framed broadly enough that either may be an appropriate answer.

The farmer provides a second domain, making the ensuing failure about the soul more conspicuous. They do not lack names for experts in general; they lack an agreed answer about educational measure. The analogy points toward the need for an informed judge, while leaving who that judge is unresolved.

The doctor's later return at 136c–d changes the test. Now an illness makes a choice urgent: would one bring in the generalist philosopher or the doctor to acquire health? The cultured lover initially wants both, but grants priority to the doctor. The figure who first helped establish that there is expertise in measuring bodily inputs now exposes the limits of non-specialist usefulness. The two examples are related but do distinct argumentative jobs.

At 138d the doctor is again a point of comparison for what the philosopher should be able to follow and contribute. These returns give the early example continuity without making bodily medicine the final object of philosophy. The concluding demand centers on judgment in one's own household and community.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **134e.** ὅτι ἰατρὸν ἢ παιδοτρίβην — All three identify doctor or trainer as an appropriate bodily adviser.

- **136d.** τὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον — In the later illness case the doctor is preferred and chosen first.

In this edition. The supplied translation keeps “doctor” and “trainer” as plain role names and reports the early answer in Socrates’ first-person plural: “We agreed, the three of us.” That detail prevents the exchange from appearing to be merely another reluctant concession by the cultured lover. The edition’s introduction also identifies doctor and pilot as recurring examples of specialist preference across Socratic dialogues; this is contextual framing, not a claim that this passage names another work.

See also. Moderation and measure (p. 104) · The body and good condition (p. 160) · Farmer, seeds, planting, and sowing (p. 48) · Perplexity and looking another way (p. 115) · Benefit and beneficial learning (p. 19)

Even a pig would know

ὗς (hys); κἂν ὗν (kan hyn)

The word. Hys means a pig; hyn is the accusative singular used here as the understood subject of “know” in indirect construction. Kan combines kai and an in the expression kan hyn, “even a pig.” The particle combination helps make the extravagant hypothetical point: the relevant fact is so obvious that even an animal proverbially invoked for lack of discernment would recognize it. The article’s Greek phrase is the edited reading, not a separate ordinary noun phrase meaning a special kind of pig.

The target of the joke is human pretension. It does not offer an observation about porcine cognition or attribute a theory of bodily training to animals.

In The Lovers. Socrates asks the athlete whether many or moderate labors put bodies in good condition. The answer combines a sound distinction with humiliating rhetoric: even a pig would know that moderate labors do so, so how could an allegedly cultivated man fail to know it? The athlete then makes his rival a sleepless, unfed, untrained figure thin with worries. The lads laugh and the target blushes.

The proverb lets the athlete reverse the insult that prompted the debate. Earlier he was dismissed as a creature of neck-twisting, eating, and sleeping; now he implies that the learned man lacks knowledge beneath the threshold of ordinary humanity. His rival's previous declaration that he would not consider an enemy of philosophy a man gives this downward comparison additional bite.

The intellectual contribution nevertheless needs to be distinguished from the laughter it earns. The principle is moderate exertion, not "what amuses an audience must be true." Socrates restates the point as a proposition about neither many nor few labors and asks for agreement, rather than treating ridicule as sufficient refutation.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **134a.** κἂν ὖν γνῶναι — Hermann's conjecture, printed by Burnet, supplies the proverbial pig.
- **134a.** οἱ μέτριοι πόνοι εὖ ποιοῦσιν ἔχειν — The substantive claim concerns the benefit of moderate exertion.

In this edition. This is a textually exposed joke. The edition's note says Burnet adopts Hermann's correction κἂν ὖν, "even a pig," for the manuscripts' καὶ νῦν, "and now." The apparatus names B and T for the latter. The pig

therefore belongs to the edited text followed by the translation, but must not be described as an uncontested transmitted reading. The edition compares a play on the proverb in Laches 196d. Reporting that parallel is not an independent proof of Hermann's conjecture; it explains why the restored joke is recognizable and plausible.

See also. Gymnastics and the lover of exercise (p. 63) · Moderation and measure (p. 104) · Laughter, blushing, and shame (p. 88) · Sleep, hunger, thinness, and worries (p. 146)

Farmer, seeds, planting, and sowing

γεωργός (geōrgos); σπέρμα (sperma); σπορά (spora); φύτευσις (phyteusis)

The word. Geōrgos means farmer or cultivator of land. Sperma means seed, with the plural spermatōn referring to seeds in the question about sowing. Spora is sowing, the distribution of seed; phyteusis is planting. The final pair extends the agricultural image to subjects of learning placed in the soul. Both nouns name acts of cultivation, not an established technical classification of two kinds of teaching.

The literal and figurative levels must remain distinct. A farmer judges the amount of seed for a field. Learning-subjects are then described as planted and sown in a soul. The metaphor makes selection, preparation, proportion, and growth thinkable together, but it does not state that a soul is literally a field or that every agricultural operation has an educational counterpart.

In The Lovers. The agricultural example follows the doctor and trainer. Socrates asks whom they would consult about the sowing of seeds and how much is moderate; all agree on the farmer. A second practical domain supports

the idea that a beneficial amount is not self-evident to just anyone. It depends on the kind of activity and on someone able to judge it.

The next question fuses agriculture with the earlier body-soul analogy: whom should they ask about planting and sowing subjects of learning in a soul, both how many and what kind are moderate? The addition of “what kind” is decisive. The issue is not solved by reducing the number of lessons. A smaller selection can still be inappropriate if chosen for reputation rather than benefit.

This is where all become perplexed. The metaphor has not supplied the educator it makes imaginable. The absence can be productive: the dialogue has converted a confident slogan about much learning into a question about the knowledge required to guide learning well. Socrates then tries another way by asking which subjects a philosopher should learn.

The opening’s school setting makes the image particularly pointed, but no one identifies Dionysius as the required cultivator. The text likewise does not state that Socrates alone has the missing expertise. A reader may see his questioning as a form of cultivation; that is an interpretation of what he does, not an answer explicitly offered in this exchange.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **134e.** περὶ σπερμάτων σπορᾶς ὁπόσον μέτριον — The literal case asks about the measured amount of seed to sow.
- **134e.** τὸν γεωργὸν ὡμολογοῦμεν — The interlocutors agree on the farmer.

- **134e.** φυτεύσεώς τε καὶ σπορᾶς — Planting and sowing become a joint metaphor for education.

In this edition. The edition translates both planting and sowing and preserves the double question “how many and what kind.” Its apparatus reports B’s plural spermatōn beside T’s singular spermatos, while the edited text has the plural. The difference should not be made to carry an invented distinction between species of seed. More important for the argument is the passage from a readily named farmer to an unnamed judge of learning.

See also. The soul as the recipient of learning (p. 163) · Subjects of learning (p. 155) · Moderation and measure (p. 104) · Doctor and trainer as judges of measure (p. 44) · Perplexity and looking another way (p. 115)

Fine, beautiful, and shameful

καλός (kalos); αἰσχρός (aischros)

The word. Kalos means beautiful or fine: attractive in appearance, admirable in an action, or creditable as a pursuit. Aischros is its contrary, ugly or shameful. These are not always interchangeable with good and bad. The interlocutors separately ask whether philosophy is fine and whether it is good as well, so translating kalos simply as “good” would erase an argumentative step.

The inflected forms often conceal the continuity. Kalōn at 133a describes beautiful young people; kalon in the questions about philosophy is “fine”; kallion at 132d is the comparative in “answer more finely.” Aischron describes the supposedly shameful activity or failure. The related language of feeling ashamed describes a response to such an evaluation, not automatically proof that the response is warranted.

In The Lovers. The dialogue moves between attractive persons and admirable practices from its first page. Socrates asks whether the boys' earnestness concerns something great and fine. The athlete's sneer prompts a question about shame. The cultured rival defends philosophy so emphatically that he makes disdain for it incompatible with considering oneself a man. Meanwhile, the appearance of the listening youths affects both Socrates and his respondent. The same evaluative vocabulary inhabits an erotic scene and a philosophical inquiry.

Socrates then imposes an order on evaluation: can someone know whether a thing is fine or shameful without knowing what it is? The cultured lover agrees that he cannot. The initial question is not abandoned; it becomes dependent on an account of philosophy. His successive definitions must explain a practice worthy of the praise he confidently gave.

At 133d "good as well" supplies a further requirement, enabling an inquiry into benefits rather than admiration alone. Toward the close, shame returns as a test of responsibility: it would be shameful for the philosopher to lack a contribution to great matters of judgment, or to be second or third when friends or city call on him. The standard is no longer merely how cultivated one looks before a beloved.

The argument does not provide a general theory identifying all beauty, goodness, and usefulness. Nor does the social reality of embarrassment guarantee truth. The philosopher's supposed shame in being outranked must still be read with the reasons about judgment and knowledge, rather than treated as an independent proof.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132d.** εἰ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καλὸν εἶναι ἢ οὔ — The explicit question asks whether philosophizing is fine.
- **133a.** ὑπὸ τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν — The same adjective describes beautiful youths.
- **133b.** εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρόν — Evaluation is made dependent on knowing what the thing is.
- **133d.** καλὸν εἶναι μόνον τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἢ καὶ ἀγαθόν — Being fine and being good are expressly distinguished.

In this edition. The edition's Key Words keeps "beautiful" for the young and "fine" for pursuits, while retaining a single Greek heading. It also preserves "shameful" at the final questions. The note on the edition records a consequential correction at 138d: the second half of Socrates' question proposes "not shameful," which the reply rejects. Reading it instead as an English question that presses toward "is it not shameful?" would blur the contrast Socrates is testing.

See also. Questions, answers, and what a thing is (p. 131) · Ambition, anxiety, and display (p. 15) · Youths, lads, and the beloved (p. 186) · Benefit and beneficial learning (p. 19) · Laughter, blushing, and shame (p. 88)

Following an expert and contributing a judgment

ἐπακολουθεῖν (epakolouthein); ἕπεσθαι (hepesthai); συμβάλλεσθαι (symballesthai); γνώμη (gnōmē)

The word. Epakolouthein means to follow along, here intellectually following what a craftsman says. Hepesthai is also to follow and performs the corresponding role in the final discussion. Symballesthai means to contribute or bring something to a shared undertaking; with gnōmē, a judgment or considered opinion, it means contributing one's own judgment. At 135d the text prints the infinitive xymballesthai with the alternative spelling ξυμ-; at 138d it has συμ-. These are not two contrasting activities.

The pair defines active, informed participation. Following is more than hearing words, while contributing a judgment is more than displaying facts. Neither activity by itself entails possessing the craft or directing its performance.

In The Lovers. The cultivated lover introduces these capacities at 135d after refusing exact specialist knowledge as an educational requirement. His free and educated man should follow better than the other people present and add his own judgment. A genuine intellectual ability is being proposed, but its measure is social and comparative: the effect is to seem the most accomplished and wisest member of the audience.

The practical tests at 136c–d do not directly examine this conversational competence. They ask whom one would summon for illness or trust in a storm. The preferred person is the one who can perform the decisive task. This is why an interpreter might defend the cultivated participant by distinguishing assistance with discussion

from responsibility for treatment or navigation. The dialogue does not develop that defense; its interlocutor accepts the shift in criterion.

At 138d the original vocabulary returns almost as an audit of the proposal. If inability to follow or contribute when a doctor speaks is shameful, can inability to do so when a judge or king speaks be unshameful? The lover rejects the proposed exemption: having nothing to contribute about such great matters would indeed be shameful. The negative in the question is therefore not Socrates' final verdict.

The next question raises the standard further. In one's own household, and when friends or the city entrust decisions, the philosopher cannot remain an informed runner-up. He must judge rightly and lead. The progression is important: the dialogue does not discard receptive understanding or conversation as worthless. It treats them as insufficient when a person bears the responsibility to act. The final challenge redirects the lover's own educational ideal toward matters where his status cannot excuse a lack of authoritative judgment.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135d.** ἐπακολουθῆσαί τε τοῖς λεγομένοις — The first proposed capacity is following the specialist's words.
- **135d.** καὶ αὐτὸν ξυμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην — The participant contributes a judgment of his own.
- **138d.** οὐκ αἰσχρὸν περὶ τούτων μήτε ἔπεσθαι — The question proposes an exemption from shame which the answer rejects.

In this edition. “Follow” and “contribute” recur in the English so that the later challenge visibly reuses the earlier standard. The source’s apparatus reports variation in the longer wording about what is said or done at 138d, but the central pair of capacities remains clear in the printed text. The article quotes the edition’s chosen wording, not an independent reconstruction.

See also. Understanding and handiwork (p. 175) · Reputation, seeming, and the cultivated audience (p. 138) · Precision and the cost of mastery (p. 124) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90) · Justice, the judge’s knowledge, and judging (p. 76)

Food and the amount that benefits

σιτίον (sition); σιτία (sitia)

The word. Sition denotes food or a portion of food; sitia is the plural form used in the dialogue, rendered collectively as “food.” The singular is a lexical headword, not a claim that the scene discusses one particular ration. The questions concern how much and what sort is appropriate for the body, without naming ingredients, meals, or a prescribed diet.

Food is distinct from the rival’s earlier “stuffing himself.” The latter is an insulting description of behavior, whereas sitia names a bodily input about which all three can seek competent advice. Keeping that distinction prevents a caricature of appetite from becoming the premise of the argument.

In The Lovers. Once the cultured lover admits that moderate exercise produces good condition, Socrates asks simply, “And what about food: moderate or much?” The speaker agrees about food too. Its familiarity makes the

next generalization seem natural: in all bodily matters, moderate amounts are most beneficial. Food bridges training and the wider class of things supplied to a person.

That bridge is necessary for the subsequent question about the soul. Learning-subjects can now be viewed as inputs whose benefit depends on appropriate selection and measure. The analogy is intelligible without asserting that knowledge behaves exactly like food. An alert reader should notice how quickly the interlocutor permits the generalization and consider what would justify it.

When Socrates asks whom they should consult about bodily labors and food, they agree on doctor or trainer. Thus “moderate” does not mean whatever amount an uninformed person happens to call moderate. The example directs attention toward an informed judgment suited to a recipient and an end. The difficulty of naming an equivalent adviser for the soul then becomes sharper.

The dialogue offers no medical regimen. Its use of food is conceptual and dramatic: an ordinary material necessity makes it harder to defend the indiscriminate maximization of learning merely because learning is praised.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **134c.** Τί δὲ τὰ σιτία; τὰ μέτρια ἢ τὰ πολλά; — Food extends the test from exertion to another bodily input.
- **134e.** ὁποῖοι μέτριοι πόνοι καὶ σιτία πρὸς τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν; — The subsequent question asks who can judge suitable labor and food.

In this edition. The English “food” is deliberately ordinary. It avoids inserting either austerity or indulgence

into sitia itself, even though the competing portraits of the lovers mention overeating and going unfed. At 134e the text joins food and labors in a single question about suitable bodily measure. The edition's outline correctly preserves the distinction between this agreed example and the still unanswered educational analogue.

See also. The body and good condition (p. 160) · Moderation and measure (p. 104) · Doctor and trainer as judges of measure (p. 44) · Sleep, hunger, thinness, and worries (p. 146) · The soul as the recipient of learning (p. 163)

Freedom, education, and being a slave to one pursuit

ἐλεύθερος (eleutheros); δουλεύειν (douleuein)

The word. Eleutheros means free, in contrast to enslaved, and here also carries expectations about the education and standing of a free man. The plural eleutherois at 135b names those for whom particular learning is fitting; at 135d the singular adjective accompanies "educated." Douleuein means to be a slave or to serve as one. At 136a "not to be a slave to any one thing" applies the vocabulary of dependence to absorption in a single pursuit.

The metaphor should neither be reduced to a harmless modern phrase nor made to say more than it does. The dialogue's social world includes people who can be bought, while the cultivated lover treats technical absorption as servile. Yet the sentence about devotion to a pursuit does not assert that every craftsman is legally enslaved.

In The Lovers. The lover's second proposal is an account of education suited to social identity. What is fitting to learn depends on being free: understanding is selected,

handiwork excluded. At 135d the free and educated man can follow specialists and offer a judgment without knowing the craft as precisely as its possessor. The formulation appeals to a recognizable ideal of cultivated independence, but the conversation has not established that this ideal is philosophy.

His enthusiastic acceptance of the pentathlete makes the value explicit. Concentration on one thing would cost a person familiarity with all the others. To have touched them all “in moderation” seems to preserve intellectual freedom. This repurposes the earlier discovery that moderate quantities benefit body and soul. The earlier argument asked who could judge the proper measure; the lover now treats limited investment in every craft as if it already answered that question.

The examples of illness and danger expose a tension in this conception of independence. The person who avoids dependence on one pursuit must rely on someone who has devoted himself to precisely that pursuit. Freedom from specialized labor does not make him capable of healing or steering. Socrates uses the dependence to challenge his usefulness, though reliance on an expert does not by itself eliminate every possible contribution from others.

Finally, the philosopher must not entrust his own household to another. This is not a general prohibition on seeking advice, because the doctor and pilot examples remain intact. Rather, the ending presses a responsibility that cannot be discharged by staying a cultured spectator. Freedom in the lover’s initial sense, the avoidance of binding commitments to any one expertise, is placed under pressure by the demand to judge and lead.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135b.** ἃ προσήκει τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μαθεῖν — Fitting learning is explicitly framed by the learner's free status.
- **135d.** ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερόν τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον — Free and educated describes the proposed audience participant.
- **136a.** μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι — The lover praises freedom from enslavement to one pursuit.

In this edition. The edition renders douleuein directly as "be a slave," maintaining the force of the social metaphor. "Liberal education" is a useful modern heading for the issue but is not a named curriculum in the Greek. No list of subjects or institutional program follows from the phrase alone.

See also. Understanding and handiwork (p. 175) · Craftsman and specialist (p. 34) · Minae, drachmas, and the price comparison (p. 102) · Household and responsibility at home (p. 70) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90) · Moderation and measure (p. 104)

Friends and entrusted arbitrations

φίλος (philos); δίαιτα (diaita)

The word. Philos means a friend, or friendly/dear when adjectival. Diaita has a range of senses involving way of life or settlement; the plural diaitas at 138e means arbitrations or disputes entrusted for settlement. The legal context is provided by friends entrusting them to someone and by the parallel civic assignment to decide or judge. It does not mean dietary regimens in this sentence.

In The Lovers. Friends appear in two practical settings. At 136c Socrates asks what the lover would do if a friend he cared greatly about fell sick. Concern for another person sharpens the demand for competent help: the doctor's expertise matters because someone dear needs health. At 138e friends entrust arbitrations to the philosopher. He is now the person whose competence must justify their trust.

The parallel is significant. In the first case the cultivated man must recognize another's superior knowledge; in the second he must possess adequate judgment himself. Philosophy cannot be defined solely by being an impressive participant in discussions if people have reason to rely on its practitioner for decisions affecting them.

The text pairs the friends' private entrustment with the city's command to decide or judge something. It thereby covers more than formal political office. The philosopher need not be a king to encounter a responsibility in which second or third place would be shameful. Ordinary relations of trust can require authoritative practical judgment.

No actual lawsuit, named friend or disputed matter is given. The passage is hypothetical and does not prescribe a detailed arbitration procedure. It also does not establish that being someone's friend alone supplies the knowledge to judge well. Friendship provides the occasion of trust; the entire preceding argument concerns the competence necessary to deserve it.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **136c.** τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σῶν περὶ ὧν σὺ σπουδὴν μεγάλην ἔχεις — A cared-for friend makes the medical test personally serious.

- **138e.** ἐάντε οἱ φίλοι αὐτῷ διαίτας ἐπιτρέπωσιν — Friends may entrust arbitrations to the philosopher.
- **138e.** ἐάντε ἡ πόλις τι προστάττῃ — Private trust is paired with a public assignment.

In this edition. The edition's "arbitrations" is a contextual rendering of diaitai, not a reason to give every occurrence of the Greek noun that meaning. Keeping the friends and city as two possible sources of an assignment prevents the final demand from being narrowed to royal government alone.

See also. Pilot and entrusting responsibility (p. 120) · Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Discriminating persons and deciding cases (p. 42) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90) · Sickness, health, and the practical choice (p. 145) · City, good order, and paying the penalty (p. 29)

Good and base in the argument about value

ἀγαθός (agathos); πονηρός (ponēros)

The word. Agathos means good. Ponēros means bad or base; this edition generally chooses "base" in the crucial argument. Both adjectives can characterize people and their quality without functioning as rigid philosophical technical terms. The plural substantivized forms mean "the good" and "the base," that is, good and base people. Later ponēros is also applied to horses and to the question what sort of person one oneself is.

"Base" should not make every occurrence exclusively a judgment of wicked intent. The animal examples use the vocabulary of good and bad quality across species. Yet the

human setting and the identification with justice eventually make moral evaluation unavoidable. The argument exploits this continuity rather than pausing to distinguish all its senses.

In The Lovers. At 133d Socrates asks whether philosophy is merely fine or also good. The lover emphatically adds good. The distinction is important: social admiration and genuine benefit need not be assumed identical. In the exercise analogy, good condition of the body gives the claim a practical direction; at 136b the good are explicitly linked to usefulness.

The damaging conclusion comes from joining that moral classification to the supposed uselessness of the runner-up philosopher. By the lover's account, philosophers would be base and useless while crafts exist. Socrates marks the conclusion as conditional on the account under examination and promptly doubts it. The dialogue is therefore not announcing that philosophers as a class are base. It uses the unacceptable result to reopen what philosophizing is.

A careful reader should also distinguish the premises actually accepted from a fully established equivalence. The interlocutor grants that the good are useful and the base useless. The later movement from uselessness to baseness treats these classes as if they exhaust the relevant possibilities, but no independent discussion establishes that exhaustive division. This is part of the compressed argumentative form.

In the final sequence the good/base distinction becomes a problem of discrimination and self-knowledge. A horse ignorant of good and base horses would not know what sort of horse it is; the human analogue follows. At 138a the question about oneself is explicitly whether one is decent

or base. Self-knowledge is thus evaluative, not merely recognition of one's name or biography. The late argument attempts to find a knowledgeable basis for the evaluations that the early dispute had delivered confidently.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **133d.** καλὸν εἶναι μόνον τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἢ καὶ ἀγαθόν — Fine and good are initially distinguished in a question.
- **136b.** οἱ ἀγαθοὶ χρήσιμοι, οἱ πονηροὶ ἄχρηστοι — The useful/useless contrast is aligned with good/base.
- **138a.** πότερον χρηστός ἐστιν ἢ πονηρός — The distinction becomes the content of evaluative self-knowledge.

In this edition. The translation keeps ponēros as "base" and mochthēros as "worthless" rather than flattening both into "bad." Edition note 24 explicitly warns that the same bad-quality terms occur of horses and humans. Their differentiation in English aids tracking even where the Greek argument treats them as functionally comparable.

See also. Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Decent and worthless: judging quality (p. 36) · Knowing oneself and one's quality (p. 83) · Knowing and being ignorant (p. 80) · Fine, beautiful, and shameful (p. 50)

Gymnastics and the lover of exercise

γυμναστική (gymnastikē); φιλογυμναστία (philogymnastia); φιλογυμναστής (philogymnastēs)

The word. Gymnastikē is the practice or art of bodily training, "gymnastics" in the edition. Philogymnastia is the

love of exercise, a disposition toward that practice; philogymnastēs is someone who loves exercise. The distinction matters: a pursuit, love of that pursuit, and the person pursuing it are related without being interchangeable. Calling the unnamed lover “the athlete” is useful shorthand for his commitment and experience, not a claim that the text gives him a competition record.

The compound “love of exercise” parallels “philosophy,” understood as love of wisdom. That resemblance supplies the cultured lover with an analogy: much labor is to exercise what much learning is to philosophy. The athlete’s response will show that the likeness of words does not guarantee the correctness of the proposed equations.

In The Lovers. The first account of gymnastics comes through a hostile rival, who reduces it to a twisted neck, stuffing oneself, and sleep. Socrates’ narration is more discriminating: the athlete claims experience in deeds rather than words. When the argument asks what makes bodies well, that experience becomes relevant evidence. Socrates “nudges” him back into the discussion, recalling the physical nudge with which he began it.

His contribution defeats the false alternative between much and little exertion. Moderate labors produce good condition. He makes the point with abuse of his own, painting the cultured rival as sleepless, unfed, untrained, and thin with worry. The audience laughs, but the comic victory and the substantive correction should be separated: the principle can be accepted without treating every insult as true.

The lovers’ apparent hierarchy is thereby reversed locally. The man who did not claim mastery of words knows something the defender of culture needs to learn. This does not make gymnastics the final definition of

philosophy. Rather, it shows why the quantity of an activity is not a sufficient measure of its benefit and creates the question who possesses comparable judgment about the soul. The later pentathlete image reuses athletic comparison for a different purpose; it should not be confused with the unnamed athlete's earlier argument.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132d.** περὶ γυμναστικήν — The second lover's sphere is bodily training.
- **133d.** φιλογυμναστίαν — Socrates asks whether love of exercise is fine and good.
- **134a.** διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς γυμναστικῆς — The athlete is recalled for relevant experience.

In this edition. The edition consistently renders philogymnastia as "the love of exercise" and reserves "much labor" for polyponia. Its note on philosophy expressly includes the love of exercise among the dialogue's recurring love-compounds. The narrative's "nudged" at 134a is also deliberate: the final review says it preserves the link with Socrates' earlier elbow nudge. No modern training advice is intended by these formulations; they are premises within an ancient argument about measure.

See also. Labor and much labor (p. 86) · Moderation and measure (p. 104) · The body and good condition (p. 160) · The wrestler's neck (p. 170) · Music and literary culture (p. 107)

Homer, the suitors, and the bow

Ὅμηρος (Homēros); μνηστήρ (mnēstēr); τόξον (toxon); ἐντείνειν (enteinein)

The word. Homēros is the name Homer. Mnēstēr means a suitor, someone seeking marriage; the plural mnēstēras here denotes the suitors in the Homeric story. Toxon means a bow. Enteinein means to stretch or string, and the future entenei in the sentence means "will string." These are the elements of a compressed literary comparison, not participants or objects physically present in the school.

A suitor and an erastēs, the dialogue's lover, are not identical social roles. Their relevance lies in a shared competitive situation: one person's unexpected competence threatens the standing of established claimants. The comparison does not require every narrative detail to match.

In The Lovers. After all three adults fail to name the right adviser for education, Socrates teasingly suggests asking the lads. He then asks whether they are ashamed, like Homer's suitors, who did not think it fitting that anyone else should string the bow. The argument has become a test of who is willing to let another person succeed where he has failed.

The image gives the boys an unrealized possibility of authority. They began as earnest disputants and became an audience for adult rivalry; now Socrates imagines them as potential contributors to a question their elders cannot answer. He never actually gives them the bow-equivalent by eliciting a response. The force is diagnostic: would the adults refuse the attempt because of status rather than because they have tested the boys' competence?

It is tempting to equate Socrates with the disguised hero, but the local proposal points to the lads as the people who might be asked. Socrates also includes himself in “we” who are perplexed and possibly ashamed. The comparison is more flexible than a cast list assigning every figure a Homeric counterpart.

The passage joins the earlier Solon citation as a use of poetry within philosophical inquiry. Solon provides a plausible first account that requires testing; Homer supplies an image of resistance to unexpected competence. Neither literary reference simply settles the substantive question of what philosophy is or who can judge its appropriate learning.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135a.** ὥσπερ ἔφη τοὺς μνηστῆρας Ὅμηρος — Socrates invokes Homer’s suitors as a comparison for threatened prestige.
- **135a.** ὅστις ἐντενεῖ τὸ τόξον — Stringing the bow represents a competence the established competitors might deny another person the chance to display.

In this edition. The note identifies Odyssey 21.285–329: after the suitors fail to string Odysseus’ bow, the disguised Odysseus asks to try and they protest, ashamed at the prospect that a beggar could succeed. Those details explain the allusion; they are not all stated in The Lovers. Burnet prints axiountōn in the comparison, with alternative forms reported in the apparatus. The edition translates the sense as a relative description of the suitors and marks Socrates’ manner as teasing. An article should therefore preserve the scene’s exploratory joke rather than present the Homeric episode as a formal proof.

See also. Perplexity and looking another way (p. 115) · Youths, lads, and the beloved (p. 186) · Lovers, rival lovers, and the title (p. 95) · Quarreling, contention, and love of victory (p. 129) · Solon and learning as one grows old (p. 151)

Horses, dogs, oxen, and the change of knower

ἵππος (hippos); κύων (kyōn); βοῦς (bous)

The word. Hippos means horse; kyōn means dog; bous means ox or bovine animal, rendered “ox” here. The ordinary inflections include hippous and kynas, horses and dogs as objects of the trainer’s knowledge, followed by hippos, bous and kyōn as the beings imagined to know or fail to know themselves. The grammatical change reflects an argumentative change, not mere variation in illustration.

In The Lovers. Horses and dogs enter at 137b–c as subjects to be improved and punished rightly. The knowers are the people capable of doing that work. The point is that one craft both makes its subjects best and recognizes which are decent or worthless. The first analogy therefore concerns expert knowledge about an animal kind.

At 137e Socrates instead asks about someone “being a horse.” If this horse did not know decent and base horses, would it also fail to know itself and what sort it is? The same question follows for an ox and then a dog. Oxen occur only at this self-knowledge stage; the text did not previously establish an ox-training craft in the way it introduced horses and dogs.

This switch is the passage’s critical hinge. Knowledge possessed by an expert about horses is not automatically

knowledge possessed by a horse about itself. The argument can be read as proposing that any member of a kind needs evaluative knowledge of the kind to understand its own quality. But that proposition requires argument of its own, and the dialogue supplies rapid assents rather than an explanation of animal self-understanding. Edition note 26 explicitly marks the move from knowing horses to being one.

The human case at 138a makes the intended result clear. Someone ignorant of decent and worthless people is said to be ignorant of himself, since he too is human. The animals help detach the abstract relation of one to many from the interlocutor's pride before it returns to human self-knowledge. They are not evidence for a developed theory of animal consciousness.

The animals' evaluative vocabulary is also worth preserving. "Decent," "base" and "worthless" occur across species. This makes human quality seem continuous with standards an expert applies to a kind, but it leaves open whether moral excellence can be treated just like excellence in a trained animal.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **137c.** κύνας οὐχ οἳ βελτίστους ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν — At first the knowers are the people who make dogs best.
- **137e.** Εἰ ἄρα ἵππος ὢν ἀγνοοῖ — The imagined ignorant subject is now a horse itself.
- **137e.** Καὶ εἰ βοῦς ὢν — The ox appears in the later self-knowledge series.
- **137e.** Οὕτω δὴ καὶ εἰ κύων — The dog repeats the changed structure.

In this edition. The second occurrence of “oxen” is supplied in the Greek as ⟨βοῦς⟩, a conjectural addition credited to Bekker in the apparatus. The translation includes the supplied word, according to the edition’s convention. The supplementation clarifies the animal objects; it does not remove the larger shift in who is supposed to know.[3]

See also. Knowing and being ignorant (p. 80) · One, many, and the claim to one craft (p. 110) · Knowing oneself and one’s quality (p. 83) · Decent and worthless: judging quality (p. 36) · Making best and the end of a craft (p. 97)

Household and responsibility at home

οἰκία (oikia)

The word. Oikia means house or household. At 136c it is the house into which someone might bring a doctor or the runner-up; at 138c–e it is the household to be ordered rightly. The same word can emphasize a place or the people and affairs organized there. The later argument requires the broader social sense, not merely maintenance of a building.

In The Lovers. The first appearance in the usefulness test makes the house a place where expert help is sought. If one or a cared-for friend is ill, the doctor is the preferred arrival. Bringing a specialist into the house is a rational response to a need the householder cannot meet through general learning alone.

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[3] Angle brackets mark a scholarly supplement, unlike square brackets, which mark text Burnet regarded as spurious. The article follows the provided edition’s apparatus rather than claiming direct manuscript evidence.

Later the household becomes a model of governance. One person who orders it rightly is called manager and master, and the ordering is done by justice. This joins the domestic sphere to the city through the claim of one governing knowledge. The analogy takes unity of right judgment to survive a change of scale without elaborating the differences between family, property, dependents and civic institutions.

The philosopher's own household then becomes the first concrete test of the alternative to second-place expertise. He must not merely hand it to another while accepting second prizes; he must himself judge rightly if it is to be well ordered. The demand is personal before it becomes public. It is followed by friends' arbitrations and a civic commission, widening the sphere of trust.

The household passage should not be converted into a claim that the philosopher needs no doctor or should personally perform every craft. The earlier medical choice has not been revoked. The issue is competent responsibility for ordering human affairs, not self-sufficiency in all services. Nor does the dialogue specify modern family arrangements or a universal domestic hierarchy for readers to adopt. It uses the household of its dramatic world as the nearest arena of accountable judgment.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **136c.** εἰσάγοις ἂν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν — The house first receives a potential helper in illness.
- **138c.** οἰκίαν διοικῇ ὀρθῶς — The household later becomes an object of right ordering.

- **138e.** εἰ μέλλει εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ἡ οἰκία — Good order is the stated end of the philosopher's personal judgment.

In this edition. The English alternates "house" and "household" according to the work being done by the word. This is not a contradiction or a claim that two unrelated Greek terms are present. The shift in emphasis mirrors the progression from receiving an expert to exercising responsible rule.

See also. Household manager and the household art (p. 72) · Master and the master's craft (p. 99) · Pilot and entrusting responsibility (p. 120) · Sickness, health, and the practical choice (p. 145) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90) · City, good order, and paying the penalty (p. 29)

Household manager and the household art

οἰκονόμος (oikonomos); οἰκονομική (oikonomikē)

The word. Oikonomos is a household manager; oikonomikē is the household manager's art, with craft understood. Although the English word "economics" ultimately belongs to this Greek family, modern macroeconomics or a technical theory of markets is not the subject here. The household is a sphere of people, property and practical authority, not simply a monthly budget.

In The Lovers. At 138c Socrates parallels the earlier civic question. What is one man called when he orders a household rightly? The answer is household manager and master. Asked whether he orders it well by justice or some other craft, the interlocutor chooses justice. The domestic capacity is thus brought into the same knowledge already

associated with punishment, self-discrimination and temperance.

The move does not discuss a manager hired for wages, a legal appointment or the detailed division of household duties. Its force comes from the structural analogy: one agent correctly orders a community, whether civic or domestic. The role's normative competence rather than its institutional arrangements supplies the point of comparison.

The final application makes household management personally unavoidable for the proposed philosopher. His own house must not be entrusted to another in a way that leaves him merely holding second prizes. He must himself judge rightly if it is to be well ordered. This demand exposes a limit of the cultivated audience ideal. Merely being able to discuss management impressively is insufficient where one is responsible for its outcome.

It would nevertheless overread the passage to turn it into a general prohibition on assistance or specialized services within a household. The earlier physician is brought into a house precisely because medical expertise is needed. The closing requirement concerns ownership of the judgment and ordering attributed to philosophy, not performing every task personally.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **138c.** οὐκ οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης — Manager and master are paired as names for the right orderer.
- **138c.** Δικαιοσύνῃ — Justice is the accepted means of ordering the household well.

- **138c.** οἰκονομική, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη — The household art appears in the one-craft list with the virtues.

In this edition. “Household manager” keeps the agent’s practical function visible without the misleading modern associations of “economist.” The edition’s parallel with the Statesman helps locate the identity claim, but no detailed household manual is included in this dialogue.

See also. Household and responsibility at home (p. 70) · Master and the master’s craft (p. 99) · City, good order, and paying the penalty (p. 29) · Justice, the judge’s knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90) · Pilot and entrusting responsibility (p. 120)

Irony and the two answers

εἰρωνικῶς (eirōnikōs); εἰρωνεία (eirōneia)

The word. Eirōnikōs means ironically, in a manner that says less than or something other than what is meant. Eirōneia is the corresponding noun, irony or dissembling. The noun explains the word-family but is not the form printed in this passage. The narrator expressly applies the adverb to the cultured lover, so “Socratic irony” cannot be substituted automatically for every use of the term in a Socratic dialogue.

This local irony is unusually explicit: the speaker gives two answers to one question, each assigned to a different listener. The discrepancy is announced rather than concealed from the audience. That makes it both an act of mockery and a declaration of how personal rivalry interferes with a common argument.

In The Lovers. Socrates asks whether love of exercise, like philosophy, is fine and good. The cultured lover says that

to his rival his answer is “neither,” but to Socrates he agrees it is both fine and good, adding that he thinks rightly. He refuses the athlete credit in the same breath with which he supplies the concession Socrates needs. His ironic manner protects the appearance of antagonism while allowing the argument to proceed.

The scene could be read as playful rather than deeply dishonest: everyone hears both answers, so no one is necessarily deceived about his belief. Yet the joke still reveals that an answer may be shaped by whom one wants to defeat rather than what one judges true. The later promise not to contend against his own opinion with Socrates repeats the distinction.

Socrates does not stop to define or condemn irony. He takes the concession addressed to him and tests the analogy between much labor and much learning. Thus the relevant achievement is a proposition that the respondent will acknowledge, despite the social performance around it. The dramatic coloring remains essential because it shows how difficult such acknowledgment may be when a rival and beloved are watching.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **133d.** Ὁ δὲ καὶ μάλα εἰρωνικῶς εἶπε δύο — The narrator explicitly characterizes the cultured lover’s double response as ironic.
- **133d.** Πρὸς μὲν τόνδε μοι εἰρήσθω ὅτι οὐδέτερα — His answer to the rival denies both fineness and goodness.

In this edition. The edition renders the phrase “very ironically” and explains the underlying noun in its note. It compares Thrasymachus’ charge against Socrates in Republic 337a. That parallel supplies a range of usage; it

does not identify the present speaker with Socrates or make the present remark an instance of exactly the same strategy. The Greek eipe dyo, “said two,” is translated as “gave two answers,” making an implied object explicit without inventing a third position.

See also. Quarreling, contention, and love of victory (p. 129) · Gymnastics and the lover of exercise (p. 63) · Words and deeds (p. 184) · Ambition, anxiety, and display (p. 15)

Justice, the judge’s knowledge, and judging

δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosynē); δίκαιος (dikaios); δικαστική (dikastikē); δικαστής (dikastēs); δικάζειν (dikazein)

The word. Dikaiosynē is justice; dikaios is just, or substantivally a just person. Dikastikē is the feminine adjective “judicial” or “the judge’s,” here with knowledge understood from the question. Dikastēs is a judge, and dikazein is to judge a case. These are related expressions, but justice as a virtue, a judge as a person and judging as an activity are not interchangeable definitions before the argument connects them.

The edition’s “the judge’s” at 137d keeps the ellipsis visible: Socrates asks what knowledge rightly punishes the unruly and lawbreaking, and proposes the judge’s knowledge. The passage concerns correct judicial competence, not the assertion that everyone holding judicial office must possess it.

In The Lovers. Justice enters through a chain beginning with animal improvement. The same craft that makes horses and dogs best also punishes rightly and recognizes good and bad quality. The interlocutor grants the same

structure for humans. Socrates then names the civic knowledge that punishes lawbreakers rightly and asks whether any other knowledge is called justice. The answer is no, this one.

This gives justice an epistemic role: it is something by which one knows how to act correctly and distinguish persons. It also assigns justice a corrective function, since the chain has linked punishment with making best. The dialogue does not independently demonstrate that every just act is punitive or that justice is exhausted by courtroom procedure. Its chosen route concentrates on the judicial case and expands from there.

The identity with temperance depends on the discriminating capacity. The knowledge by which people punish rightly also knows decent and worthless subjects. The self is included among the human subjects, and self-knowledge is identified with temperance. At 138b Socrates concludes that justice and temperance are the same. This is stronger than mutual support between virtues; it makes their apparently different activities functions of one knowledge. The disputed or compressed steps, especially the move from expert knowledge to knowledge of oneself, remain part of that conclusion’s support.

Justice then becomes the means by which a city and household are well ordered. The statesman’s, king’s, tyrant’s, manager’s and master’s arts are identified with it. Here the argument extends one normative competence across scales of rule, rather than merely saying that rulers should obey existing judges.

The closing demand places the philosopher under this standard. He must be able to follow and contribute when a judge speaks, but also must himself punish while judging rightly in his household. If friends entrust arbitrations or

the city assigns a decision, he cannot be content to appear second or third. The text thereby gives philosophy an unmistakable orientation toward just judgment while stopping short of a sentence defining philosophy as justice or as judicial knowledge.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **137d.** οὐχ ἡ δικαστική — The proposed answer is the judge's knowledge.
- **137d.** καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην — That knowledge is explicitly named justice.
- **138b.** Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη — Justice and temperance are asserted to be one.
- **138e.** δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς — The final requirement concerns judging rightly.

In this edition. The edition translates the word family consistently enough to trace its stages while leaving "the judge's" less abstract than a modern "judicial science." Its Key Words identify dikēn didonai separately as paying the penalty. That distinction matters: punishing, judging and the wrongdoer's undergoing a penalty occupy different places in the same civic relation.

See also. Punishing rightly and correcting (p. 126) · Unruliness and breaking the law (p. 177) · Knowing oneself and one's quality (p. 83) · Temperance as self-knowledge (p. 157) · Discriminating persons and deciding cases (p. 42) · City, good order, and paying the penalty (p. 29) · Statesman and the political craft (p. 153)

King and the kingly craft

βασιλεύς (basileus); βασιλική (basilikē)

The word. Basileus is a king; basilikē is the feminine adjective "kingly," used with craft expressed or understood. The person's title and the competence by which he rules are distinguished in the questions. At 138b Socrates asks what to call a single man who orders a city rightly, then asks by what craft he does so. The qualification rightly is prior to the title in the argument.

In The Lovers. The interlocutor accepts "tyrant and king" as names of the sole right orderer and agrees that his kingly and tyrannical crafts are the same as the capacities already identified. The discussion then passes to household manager and master before listing all the roles with temperate and just people. The unity asserted is a unity of knowledge for right ordering across different descriptions.

The passage should not be read as verifying the virtue of every historical king. A royal title is not independently investigated, and the stipulated correct governance does much of the work. Nor does it establish that a king and household manager hold the same institutional office. Their functions are treated as applications of one art.

At 138d the king appears alongside the judge as a person whose speech the philosopher ought to be able to follow and contribute to. The interlocutor rejects any exemption from shame for ignorance about matters so great. The final demand is still more exacting when the philosopher himself has responsibility: he must not merely be an informed audience member.

Kingship consequently supplies a model of authoritative judgment in the late argument, but the conclusion does not require that every philosopher become a monarch. It

explicitly includes one's household, friends' arbitrations and decisions commissioned by the city. Those settings keep the practical challenge broader than possession of a royal office.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **138b.** ὄνομά γε τούτῳ οὐ τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς — The right sole ruler receives the paired titles.
- **138b.** βασιλικῇ τε καὶ τυραννικῇ τέχνῃ — The next question moves from titles to crafts.
- **138d.** δικαστὴς ἢ βασιλεὺς — King and judge exemplify discourse about weighty practical matters.

In this edition. Edition note 29 compares the Statesman's identification of governing knowledges, while noting that its treatment of the tyrant differs. This parallel helps explain the king's place in the list without importing a complete Platonic political theory into the short dialogue.

See also. Tyrant and the surprising identity with the king (p. 173) · Statesman and the political craft (p. 153) · One, many, and the claim to one craft (p. 110) · City, good order, and paying the penalty (p. 29) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90)

Knowing and being ignorant

ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai); γιγνώσκειν (gignōskein); ἀγνοεῖν (agnoein); εἰδέναι (eidenai); ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

The word. Epistasthai is to know or know how, often used here of competence in a craft. Gignōskein is to know or recognize; agnoein is to be ignorant of, fail to know or fail to recognize. Eidenai also means to know and occurs in the

dialogue's questions about what philosophy is and in Socrates' wish to understand the lover clearly. Epistēmē is knowledge; the judge's knowledge is explicitly named at 137d. These overlapping Greek expressions should not be forced into a fixed hierarchy of kinds of cognition that the dialogue does not announce.

Context supplies the crucial distinctions. Knowing how to punish is practical competence; recognizing decent and worthless subjects is discrimination; knowing oneself is an evaluative relation to one's own character. The argument's ambition is to connect them.

In The Lovers. At 135c–d the lover distinguishes knowing each craft precisely from knowing enough to follow its possessor. He therefore already allows degrees and forms of competence. The later attack on usefulness operates within that proposed hierarchy, not between total knowledge and total ignorance.

The restart at 137b–d asks who knows how to punish animals rightly and whether the same craft knows their quality. The shift from knowing how to acting correctly, and from acting to recognizing subjects, is presented as a unity of competence. When the case becomes human, the civic knowledge that punishes rightly is identified as judicial knowledge and justice.

The argument then states that whoever knows one will know many, and that whoever is ignorant of many is ignorant of one. Its plausibility depends on "knowing" meaning possession of general criteria of quality rather than merely being acquainted with an individual. The text does not explicitly spell out that restriction. Without it, knowing one person plainly need not imply knowing many people; even with it, the transition to self-knowledge requires further work.

A horse or human who cannot discriminate quality in others is said not to know himself. This is not ignorance of every fact about oneself. The text specifies ignorance of "what sort" one is and, for the human case, whether one is decent or base. The conclusion is consequently evaluative and limited in content, even though it leads to the large identification of self-knowledge with temperance.

Socrates' own language provides a counterpoint to the lover's confidence. He says he is keen to know clearly what is meant, repeatedly asks questions and restarts after perplexity. The dialogue dramatizes inquiry as a way of testing claims to knowledge, while leaving some of its own late identifications compressed and contestable.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135c.** ἑκάστην τῶν τεχνῶν τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα ἐπίστασθαι — The proposed degree of knowing each craft requires clarification.
- **137d.** Τίς οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη — Judicial knowledge is sought as a determinate competence.
- **137e.** Ὅστις δὲ ἕνα γιγνώσκει, καὶ πολλοὺς γνώσεται — Knowledge of one is extended to many.
- **138a.** αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖ πότερον χρηστός ἐστιν ἢ πονηρός — The relevant self-ignorance is ignorance of evaluative quality.

In this edition. The edition uses ordinary "know," "knowledge" and "ignorant" rather than assigning a separate English technical vocabulary to each Greek verb. That keeps the dialogue readable but makes it especially important to inspect objects and complements. The article's differentiation is contextual, not a claim that these

verbs always carry sharply separated philosophical meanings.

See also. Precision and the cost of mastery (p. 124) · Discriminating persons and deciding cases (p. 42) · One, many, and the claim to one craft (p. 110) · Knowing oneself and one's quality (p. 83) · Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Perplexity and looking another way (p. 115)

Knowing oneself and one's quality

ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκειν (heauton gignōskein); αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖν (hauton agnoein)

The word. Heauton gignōskein means to know oneself: heauton is the reflexive object "oneself," and gignōskein is to know or recognize. Hauton agnoein means to be ignorant of oneself, with the contracted reflexive hauton and the verb agnoein, to be ignorant. The differing reflexive spellings in the running text do not establish different selves or kinds of selfhood.

The relevant knowledge is specified by the preceding question: whether one is decent or base. It is not merely awareness that one exists, recognition of one's face, knowledge of personal biography or a comprehensive modern account of introspection.

In The Lovers. Socrates reaches the self through knowledge of others. The same craft that improves and punishes rightly also discriminates decent and worthless subjects. Knowledge of one and many is then treated as interchangeable within that competence. A member of the kind who lacks the relevant evaluative knowledge cannot know what sort of member he himself is. The human case

concludes that someone ignorant of decent and worthless people is ignorant of himself, since he too is human.

The animal sequence makes a difficulty visible. The argument first concerns the trainer who knows horses; then it supposes a horse who knows or fails to know horses and itself. Passing from expert knowledge about a class to self-knowledge by a member is a change in the knower. The text gives no separate defense of the move. Edition note 26 explicitly calls attention to it, so a lexicon should not absorb it into a seamless paraphrase.

At 138a self-ignorance is said not to be temperance. Socrates immediately asks whether self-knowledge is therefore being temperate, and the interlocutor assents. As a strict inference, denial of the negative case does not alone establish a complete equivalence without further assumptions. The dialogue presents the equivalence as accepted rather than elaborately proved. It then invokes the Delphic inscription as urging the practice of temperance and justice.

The knowledge remains interpersonal. At 138b temperance is the capacity by which one distinguishes “both oneself and others.” The inward turn does not withdraw the person from social judgment; it includes the self under the same standards applied outwardly. Because the same knowledge has also been linked to right punishment, justice and temperance are declared identical.

The ending puts pressure on the lover’s earlier confidence. He had known that philosophy was fine before giving an adequate account of it and had aimed at seeming accomplished before the audience. The late demand for self-knowledge can be read as an alternative to such

untested self-ranking. That is an interpretation of the dramatic pattern, not a separately announced lesson.

The dialogue points philosophy toward this knowledge and the responsibilities connected with it, but never simply completes the definition “philosophy is self-knowledge.” Its final explicit sentence remains a rejection of much learning and occupation with crafts.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **138a.** πότερον χρηστός ἐστιν ἢ πονηρός — Self-knowledge concerns what sort of person one is.
- **138a.** Τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἄρα γιγνώσκειν ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν — Knowing oneself is identified with being temperate.
- **138b.** καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους — The self is joined with others as an object of discrimination.

In this edition. Edition note 27 explains the Delphic background and compares the reading of “Know thyself” in Charmides 164d–165a. The famous imperative is not quoted verbatim in the Lovers’ Greek. The present text refers to “the inscription at Delphi” and interprets its exhortation; that difference should be preserved in quotations and references.

See also. Knowing and being ignorant (p. 80) · Horses, dogs, oxen, and the change of knower (p. 68) · One, many, and the claim to one craft (p. 110) · Temperance as self-knowledge (p. 157) · Delphi, the inscription, and practice (p. 38) · Justice, the judge’s knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Philosophy and philosophizing (p. 117)

Labor and much labor

πόνος (ponos); πολυπονία (polyponia); γυμνάσιον (gymnasion)

The word. Ponos means labor, toil, or exertion; its plural ponoi here refers to the labors of bodily training. Polyponia means much labor. Gymnasion can name a place of exercise, but in the plural forms used in this argument the edition renders it “exercises.” Context therefore matters: the question is about what exertions produce, not about how many gymnasium buildings someone visits.

The passage draws a precise parallel between polyponia and polymathia. Both words make quantity prominent; both are proposed as characterizations of a valued pursuit. But a large amount of exertion and a love of exercise are not equivalent merely because the first can accompany the second.

In The Lovers. Socrates asks whether the lover of exercise desires anything beyond what will make his body well. The cultured lover accepts the end and then treats many labors as its means. When challenged, he asks how anyone could become well from few. This answer reveals an unexamined opposition: if little is insufficient, much must be best.

The athlete supplies a third possibility, measured exertion. Socrates then explicitly asks for agreement that neither many nor few labors, but moderate ones, put bodies in good condition. The conclusion is not that “less exercise is better,” and it would be misleading to summarize the scene as a victory for laziness over work. The required measure depends on the end and, as the next question establishes, on relevant expertise.

The cultured lover's concession matters because he has accepted the analogy and expressly repeated its equation. He cannot easily preserve the claim that sheer quantity constitutes philosophy while admitting that quantity does not constitute the corresponding good pursuit in bodily training. The analogy remains contestable: bodily dosage and intellectual learning need not operate identically. The dialogue records the agreement that they do for purposes of this test; the reader can examine the transfer rather than assume it is self-proving.

Later, the lover praises the generalist for not laboring at one thing to the point of precision. That reprise changes the educational issue from total quantity to distribution of effort. The first lesson about measure has been adopted, but its appropriate use has not yet been settled.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **133e.** τὴν πολυπονίαν φιλογυμναστίαν ἡγῇ εἶναι; — Socrates asks whether much labor is identical with love of exercise.
- **134b.** μήτε πολλοὺς μήτε ὀλίγους πόνους — Both many and few labors are excluded as sufficient descriptions of what benefits.
- **134c.** τὰ μέτρια γυμνάσια — The concession concerns moderate exercises.

In this edition. The Key Words pairs "much labor" with "much learning" and preserves "labors" for ponoi. The English thus keeps the formal resemblance that makes Socrates' analogy visible. It translates gymnasia as "exercises" at 134c and "in exercises" at 133e, avoiding an unnecessary shift from activity to architecture. These are argumentative examples, not prescriptions for a modern exercise program.

See also. Gymnastics and the lover of exercise (p. 63) · Learning and much learning (p. 92) · Moderation and measure (p. 104) · Doctor and trainer as judges of measure (p. 44) · The body and good condition (p. 160)

Laughter, blushing, and shame

ἐπιγελᾶν (epigelan); ἐρυθριᾶν (erythrian); αἰσχύνεσθαι (aischynesthai)

The word. Epigelan means to laugh at or over something; erythrian means to blush or grow red. Aischynesthai means to feel ashamed or be ashamed before a prospect or fact. The text uses past-tense forms for the lads' laughter and the lover's blush at 134b, a present plural for the adults' possible shame at 135a, and a participle for the cultured lover's closing shame at 139a. A blush is a visible reaction; shame is an interpreted or expressly named relation to something judged discreditable.

Neither laughter nor blushing is a logical premise. These words describe how an exchange affects people who are exposed to one another's judgment.

In The Lovers. At 134b the lads are delighted by the athlete's retort and laugh at it, while the other lover blushes. The man who had spoken loudly to gain his beloved's admiration receives precisely the opposite attention. Because the retort includes both the moderation principle and a bodily caricature, the laughter cannot safely be assigned to approval of the philosophical proposition alone. Socrates still needs to obtain explicit agreement to that proposition.

At 135a shame becomes an obstacle to further inquiry. Socrates proposes asking the boys and compares the adults with Homer's suitors, who would not welcome another

person's success with the bow. The possibility is that admitting dependence on someone lower in the apparent hierarchy feels worse than remaining ignorant. The text presents this as teasing and does not record the boys being tested.

Finally, the cultured lover falls silent, ashamed of what had been said before. This reprises both the earlier blush and the high-stakes question of what is shameful. The ending may represent recognition, defeat, or a mixture. Silence alone does not specify how his beliefs have changed; the explicit assent belongs to the unlearned lover, while the others praise the discussion. A reader should preserve that difference rather than make all the participants speak an identical conclusion.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **134b.** ἥσθη τὰ μειράκια καὶ ἐπεγέλασεν — The lads are pleased and laugh at the retort.
- **134b.** ὁ δ' ἕτερος ἠρυθρίασε — The cultured lover's embarrassment is visible.
- **135a.** ἢ ἴσως αἰσχυνόμεθα — Socrates asks whether shame prevents turning to the boys.
- **139a.** αἰσχυνθεὶς τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐσίγησεν — The cultured man's final shame is joined to silence.

In this edition. The edition's final review restores "laughed at it," avoiding a vague report that the boys simply laughed, and renders the closing phrase "ashamed of what had been said before." The latter wording matters because the final praise likewise concerns "what had been said." The note on the edition thus draws attention to a verbal framing effect without asserting that audience approval proves the argument sound.

See also. Ambition, anxiety, and display (p. 15) · Quarreling, contention, and love of victory (p. 129) · Homer, the suitors, and the bow (p. 66) · Fine, beautiful, and shameful (p. 50) · Youths, lads, and the beloved (p. 186)

Leading rather than remaining second

ἡγεῖσθαι (hēgeisthai); προστάττειν (prostattein)

The word. Hēgeisthai can mean to lead or guide, and in other constructions to think or consider. At 139a the edition renders it “lead,” in contrast with appearing second or third. Earlier forms of the same verb often mean thinking or holding a view. Context, not a rigid English equivalent, distinguishes the senses. Prostattein is to assign, direct or command; at 138e the city may assign the philosopher a matter to decide or judge.

In The Lovers. The final demand for leadership grows out of three settings: one’s own household, an arbitration entrusted by friends and a decision assigned by the city. In each, the philosopher is responsible for practical judgment. The requirement is not a free-floating ambition to outrank everyone or acquire an office. It concerns doing an entrusted task with the competence that its importance requires.

This changes the meaning of the competitive imagery. The earlier pentathlete could be satisfied with second place to specialists because he surpassed everybody else. Now that attractive compromise is insufficient. If the philosopher must himself judge rightly, his inferiority cannot be excused by pointing to his breadth in unrelated crafts. Leadership is the capacity to take the responsible first role in these affairs.

The question at 138d prepares the transition carefully. Socrates asks whether inability to follow and contribute could be unshameful when the speaker is a judge or king, even though it is shameful with other craftsmen. The answer rejects that exemption. Socrates then goes beyond merely following and contributing: in the matters that are one's responsibility, the standard is to lead. The passage should not be summarized as approving ignorance of judges or as demanding only better conversation about government.

There remains a tension with the practical argument against the generalist. That argument treated second place as useless whenever a specialist exists; the ending now claims the philosopher must have first-place competence in the chosen sphere. The dialogue does not explain in a separate educational program how that competence is acquired. It identifies the failure of the lover's definition and sketches the ethical knowledge that a more adequate account would need to accommodate.

The final sentence accordingly says philosophy is far from much learning and occupation with crafts. The positive demand for leadership is clear, but it is not followed by an explicit comprehensive definition of philosophy. A responsible reading can emphasize the normative orientation without filling in that missing formulation.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **138d.** Πῶς δ' οὐκ αἰσχρόν — The interlocutor rejects the suggestion that ignorance here is unshameful.
- **138e.** ἡ πόλις τι προστάττῃ διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν — The public role can be a specified commission.

- **139a.** δεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον καὶ μὴ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι — The final contrast is between trailing and leading in the entrusted matter.

In this edition. The edition's "lead" draws out the active sense of hēgeisthai here, while "think" suits its earlier uses. Its introduction explicitly cautions that the dialogue reaches its alternative by identifications rather than a final definition. That caution guards against turning the closing demand into an unqualified manifesto of philosopher-rule.

See also. Second prizes and refusing second place (p. 143) · Following an expert and contributing a judgment (p. 53) · Household and responsibility at home (p. 70) · Friends and entrusted arbitrations (p. 59) · Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Philosophy and philosophizing (p. 117)

Learning and much learning

μανθάνειν (manthanein); πολυμαθία (polymathia); πολυμαθεῖν (polymathein); ἀμαθής (amathēs)

The word. Manthanein means to learn. Polymathia is much learning, the accumulation or possession of learning in many matters; polymathein means to learn much. Amathēs means unlearned or lacking learning. The shared learning-root makes the closing contrast pointed: the man called unlearned assents after the defender of much learning falls silent. These words should not be flattened into "intelligent" and "unintelligent," which would make different claims.

Polymathia contains an explicit quantity element, poly-, "much" or "many." That gives it the shape of polyponia, "much labor," with which Socrates compares it. The resemblance helps stage the question whether increasing

the amount of an activity guarantees the end for which it is valued. The text does not stipulate that all breadth of learning is intrinsically bad.

In The Lovers. The first proposed account of philosophy begins with lifelong learning and becomes learning as much as possible. Socrates names the result polymathia; the cultured lover accepts the name and later repeats the equation. It is therefore a jointly fixed thesis, not an accusation the respondent rejects. The ensuing physical analogy asks whether much labor likewise constitutes the love of exercise.

The athlete supplies the missing alternative: moderate exertion rather than either much or little produces good condition. Once this is accepted for food and other bodily inputs, Socrates asks about things supplied to the soul, including subjects of learning. The interlocutor again agrees that moderation benefits. On his own premises, mere quantity can no longer identify the beneficial pursuit he praised.

The strongest reading of the refutation is accordingly limited and precise. It undercuts “the more the better” as a sufficient criterion. It does not determine the right number of subjects, prove that extensive learning always harms, or vindicate ignorance as an ideal. Indeed, the next question asks what subjects a philosopher should learn. Learning remains necessary enough to be discussed after much learning has failed as a definition.

Near the end Socrates again excludes learning much from the account under challenge and closes by saying philosophy is far from polymathia and busyness about crafts. Calling the athlete amathēs then makes the narrative’s irony audible: formal cultural advantage has not secured the better account. But the athlete’s agreement

does not alone supply a positive definition, and the dialogue never gives him an alternative comprehensive curriculum.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **133c.** εἰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολυμαθίαν ἡγοῖτο — Socrates proposes the quantitative restatement of the lover's answer.
- **133e.** τὴν πολυμαθίαν φιλοσοφίαν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι — The lover expressly owns the identification.
- **139a.** ὁ δὲ ἀμαθὴς ἔφη ἐκείνως εἶναι — The unlearned man assents to the closing result.

In this edition. The edition keeps the plain rendering "much learning," avoiding a more flattering "encyclopedic education" or a more condemnatory "pedantry." Its note invokes Heraclitus' reported rebuke, "Much learning does not teach one to have sense," citing DK 22 B 40 through Diogenes Laertius 9.1. That is an editorial parallel, not an explicit citation by Socrates. The edition also distinguishes the didaskomenos of Solon's verse from the manthanein of the lover's explanation and the mathēmata, subjects of learning, in the subsequent argument. At 139a4 Burnet prints polymathia, "much learning," with B, while the apparatus reports T's philomathia, "love of learning." The translation follows the quantitative term Burnet prints; the variant must not be silently substituted to make the conclusion reject love of learning itself.

See also. Solon and learning as one grows old (p. 151) · Subjects of learning (p. 155) · Labor and much labor (p. 86) · Moderation and measure (p. 104) · Wisdom and the claim to be wiser (p. 182)

Lovers, rival lovers, and the title

ἐραστής (erastēs); ἀντεραστής (anterastēs)

The word. Erastēs is a lover, here an older lover of a youth; anterastēs is a rival lover, one courting the same beloved as another. The second word adds an adversarial relation rather than simply naming an additional lover. Erastai and anterastai are the corresponding plurals, “lovers” and “rival lovers,” and supply the two titles under which the work has circulated. Neither term by itself means “philosopher,” although the dialogue invites comparison between different objects and styles of love.

At 132c anterastēs is predicative: the other man is sitting nearby, “being his rival in love.” At 133b the accusative anterastēn names the man toward whom the cultured speaker gestures. These local relations establish the dramatic rivalry; the title is not needed to infer it.

In The Lovers. The lovers’ rivalry supplies more than an entertaining frame. Their verdicts on philosophy are entangled with their claims to deserve admiration. The athlete dismisses the lads’ sky-talk; the cultured rival attacks his bodily habits and presents himself as philosophy’s defender. The audience matters enough that he speaks loudly for his beloved. His later willingness to defend even a poorer thesis against the athlete shows how victory over a person can detach argument from one’s own belief.

Socrates repeatedly changes the direction of this competition. He turns disparagement into a request for an account, asks the athlete to contribute relevant experience, and gets all three adults to agree about expertise and measure. When they cannot name the appropriate educator of the soul, his comparison with Homer’s suitors

raises a pointed possibility: lovers may resist another person's success precisely because it threatens their standing.

The dialogue does not simply replace erotic rivalry with a disembodied inquiry. Socrates confesses that beauty affects him too, and the closing shame and approval remain social responses. What changes is the standard under discussion: from the impressive quantity of one's learning toward the ability to judge and act rightly. Whether every participant has learned that lesson is left less certain than the failure of the cultured lover's definitions.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132a.** καὶ τούτων ἐραστάς — Lovers are among the people Socrates sees.
- **132c.** ἀντεραστὴς ὤν — The second interlocutor is identified as a rival in love.
- **133b.** ἐνδεικνύμενος εἰς τὸν ἀντεραστήν — An explicit gesture makes the philosophical declaration a personal challenge.

In this edition. Burnet's heading is Erastai. The supplied apparatus reports that B and T support it and that a later hand in B's margin gives Anterastai. The introduction says the latter is the title used in the Thrasyllan arrangement preserved by Diogenes Laertius 3.59, with the subtitle "or On Philosophy" and the classification "ethical." These are facts reported by the edition about transmission and cataloguing, not subtitles spoken within the dialogue. The same introduction separates traditional inclusion among Plato's works from disputed authorship; choosing either English title cannot settle that dispute.

See also. Youths, lads, and the beloved (p. 186) · Quarreling, contention, and love of victory (p. 129) · Ambition, anxiety, and display (p. 15) · Homer, the suitors, and the bow (p. 66) · Irony and the two answers (p. 74)

Making best and the end of a craft

βέλτιστος (beltistos); ποιεῖν (poiein)

The word. Beltistos means best, a superlative of good; poiein is to make or do. In the recurring expression beltistous poiein, the accusative plural describes making the subjects best. At 137c the subjects are horses or dogs; at 137d human beings are named. The phrase is stronger than the bare claim that the agent produces some change or makes things slightly better.

In The Lovers. The new inquiry starts by assigning right correction to the people capable of making animals best. This gives the craft an end against which correction can be assessed. If an intervention is to improve a horse or dog rather than damage it, its agent must know what good quality in that kind of animal involves. The next question adds that the same craft recognizes the decent and worthless.

The extension to people is philosophically ambitious. A competence that makes human beings best must discriminate human quality and punish rightly. Socrates calls the civic version judicial knowledge and justice. What counts as best for a human being, however, is not specified through an independent account of human flourishing. The animal model supplies the form of the argument, while the interlocutor’s assents carry it into ethics.

The final identification with temperance and governing knowledge depends on this initial concentration of

capacities. If making best, correcting and discriminating belonged to separable kinds of knowledge, the later unification would require further argument. The dialogue instead presents their common ownership as something sufficiently plausible to accept quickly.

The phrase also answers the earlier problem of usefulness by changing the relevant goal. The cultivated generalist sought reputation and breadth; the final sequence introduces improving and ordering human affairs. That contrast supports an interpretation of the ending's direction, but the text does not explicitly state that "making people best" is the complete definition of philosophy.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **137c.** Οἵπερ βελτίστους — The competent correctors are the very people who make the animals best.
- **137d.** ἥπερ βελτίστους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ — The improvement claim is explicitly extended to human beings.

In this edition. The apparatus records alternatives involving the comparative beltious, "better," at several points, while the running text and translation choose the superlative "best." A lexicon should explain that chosen reading rather than silently weaken it to "improve." "Improvement" is a convenient description of the argument's role, not an exact replacement for every occurrence.

See also. Punishing rightly and correcting (p. 126) · Decent and worthless: judging quality (p. 36) · Discriminating persons and deciding cases (p. 42) · Craft and the limits of expertise (p. 31) · Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76)

Master and the master’s craft

δεσπότης (despotēs); δεσποτική (despotikē)

The word. Despotēs is a master, a person with authority over a household and, in the relevant social setting, over slaves. Despotikē is the master’s craft or competence. The English descendant “despot” can imply arbitrary political tyranny, but the edition’s “master” keeps this household role distinct from the separately named tyrant.

In The Lovers. The master first appears paired with the household manager at 138c. Socrates asks how one man who orders a household rightly is named; the two titles are accepted, and justice is identified as the knowledge by which he orders it well. The master is then placed in both the person list and the craft list joining domestic authority, political authority and the virtues.

The passage therefore subjects mastery to the same correctness condition as kingship or judicial action. It does not begin from bare power to command and conclude that whatever the master does is just. The person under examination orders rightly, and the question concerns the knowledge that makes this possible. At the same time, the dialogue does not examine or reject the social institution of slavery. Its normative inquiry operates within that assumed household world.

There is a revealing contrast with the earlier lover’s praise of not being a slave to any one pursuit. The cultivated man values his freedom from technical absorption, but the final discussion asks whether he possesses the knowledge appropriate to responsible authority. That is a change from describing one’s own independence to answering for one’s treatment and judgment of others.

The final demand that the philosopher punish while judging rightly belongs to this domestic setting. No particular subordinate, offense or form of punishment is specified. A lexicon can explain the authority relation without inventing a concrete household scene or turning the passage into advice about imposing discipline.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **138c.** οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης — The master is introduced within household rule.
- **138c.** πολιτική, δεσποτική, οἰκονομική — The master's art is distinguished by name but identified in knowledge with other arts.

In this edition. The supplied edition's comparison with Statesman 258e–259c names the master of slaves in the parallel argument. That context clarifies the social reach of "master"; it does not warrant silently replacing the Lovers' shorter title with a complete institutional account.

See also. Household manager and the household art (p. 72) · Household and responsibility at home (p. 70) · Freedom, education, and being a slave to one pursuit (p. 57) · Punishing rightly and correcting (p. 126) · Tyrant and the surprising identity with the king (p. 173)

Menial and the contempt for crafts

βάνανσος (banausos); ὄνειδος (oneidos)

The word. Banausos is an adjective of contempt associated with manual or mechanical trades; the edition renders its plural banausous as "menial." Oneidos means reproach or disgrace. At 137b Socrates says that earnest involvement in the crafts is a disgrace and that those so involved are called menial. The wording invokes an existing social

description rather than giving an occupationally neutral definition.

In The Lovers. This is a revealing point in the refutation. The craftsmen have just defeated the generalist in the usefulness test: when help is needed, the doctor and pilot are preferred. Nevertheless, Socrates now appeals to the stigma attached to people who devote themselves to crafts. Useful expertise and high social standing are not automatically aligned in the world of the conversation.

The remark also turns the cultivated lover's own standard back upon him. He proposed learning appropriate to free men and avoiding the slavery of absorption in one pursuit. If philosophy is simply earnest involvement in crafts, even on his selectively intellectual terms, its social description begins to look embarrassingly close to what he disdains. The argument's practical objection and its status objection are therefore related but not identical.

Readers should resist two simplifications. The passage does not prove that manual workers are morally bad; the preceding conclusion concerns the proposed philosopher under the lover's account. Nor does it simply abandon the concept of craft as unworthy, since the next questions speak of the same craft that improves and punishes, and the conclusion identifies a single governing craft with justice and temperance. The hierarchy among kinds of work is part of the problem, not an unexamined modern principle the reader must adopt.

The sting of "menial" is social and dramatic. It contributes to a discussion in which each lover wants admiration and one looks down on the other's bodily pursuits. The move toward self-knowledge may be read as challenging that premature confidence about what makes a person worthy,

though the dialogue does not explicitly criticize the prejudice itself.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **137b.** καὶ ὄνειδος εἶναι τοῦτο — The occupation is described as a disgrace.
- **137b.** βαναύσους καλεῖσθαι — The contemptuous label is reported as what such people are called.

In this edition. Edition note 23 cites Xenophon's Oeconomicus 4.2 for the view that menial crafts are despised because they damage workers' bodies. This supplies historical context as reported by the edition; the Lovers itself gives no physiological explanation here. The label should be attributed to the dialogue's speech, not endorsed as a description of present-day workers.

See also. Busybody and stooping over things (p. 23) · Freedom, education, and being a slave to one pursuit (p. 57) · Craftsman and specialist (p. 34) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Reputation, seeming, and the cultivated audience (p. 138)

Minae, drachmas, and the price comparison

μνᾶ (mna); δραχμή (drachmē); πρίασθαι (priasthai)

The word. Mna is a mina, a unit in the monetary comparison; drachmē is a drachma. The source uses their genitive plurals, mnōn and drachmōn, for the amounts of the purchase. Priasthai is the infinitive "to buy"; the attested priaio is a second-person optative within a hypothetical statement, "you could buy." The figures concern the purchase of a skilled person, not the purchase price of a completed building.

In The Lovers. Socrates offers five or six minae for a carpenter and says a top master builder could not be bought even for ten thousand drachmas. With the edition's conversion of a mina to one hundred drachmas, the carpenter's range is 500–600 drachmas. Ten thousand is one hundred minae. It is already more than sixteen times the higher carpenter price, and the master builder remains beyond that offered sum.

The asymmetry matters. The carpenter has a stated range, while the master builder has a rejected amount, a lower bound on what would suffice rather than an exact price. A table that assigned "master builder: 10,000 drachmas" would therefore erase the force of "not even." Nor can this small example support a general reconstruction of wages, purchasing power or ordinary prices across ancient Greece.

Its philosophical work is comparative. The lover has separated understanding from handiwork. Socrates places exceptional understanding at such a height of rarity and value that acquiring it across several crafts looks impossible. Monetary magnitude makes the difference in competence legible, but the issue is how demanding the proposed education would be. The lover responds by reducing the required precision, not by contesting the figures.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135c.** πέντε ἢ ἓξ μνῶν — The ordinary carpenter's hypothetical price is a range.
- **135c.** οὐδ' ἂν μυρίων δραχμῶν — The negative denies that ten thousand drachmas would suffice.

In this edition. The conversion and the comparison with sixteen carpenters come from edition note 16. No modern

currency equivalent is offered: the supplied text does not provide the economic evidence needed for a responsible conversion. Its own monetary units are sufficient to explain the scale of the rhetorical contrast.

See also. Carpenter and carpentry (p. 25) · The top master builder (p. 165) · Freedom, education, and being a slave to one pursuit (p. 57) · Precision and the cost of mastery (p. 124)

Moderation and measure

μέτριος (metrios); ἄμετρος (ametros); μετρίως (metriōs); μέτρον (metron)

The word. Metrios means measured, appropriate in measure, or moderate; ametros means unmeasured or immoderate. Metriōs is the adverb, “in moderation.” Metron means a measure and supplies the family’s underlying notion, although that noun is not the form used in the key argument. The recurring adjective is often neuter plural, ta metria, “what is moderate,” allowing exercises, food, and subjects of learning to share a description without becoming the same kind of thing.

“Moderate” does not necessarily mean the mathematical midpoint between two fixed amounts. It names what keeps to the appropriate measure. Nor is it automatically interchangeable with the later ethical term sōphrosynē, temperance. The argument about metria concerns suitable quantity and kind; the later identification of temperance with self-knowledge requires its own steps.

In The Lovers. The athlete introduces moderation as an alternative to the cultured lover’s inference from insufficiently few exercises to beneficially many. Socrates makes the correction explicit: neither many nor few

labors, but moderate ones, produce bodily good condition. The speaker then concedes the same about food, other bodily matters, and what is supplied to the soul. Moderation is doing argumentative work because it distinguishes a pursuit's amount from its success.

The questions at 134e show why this is not a self-applying slogan. A doctor or trainer can tell what bodily exertions and food are suitable; a farmer can judge the sowing of seeds. Who can tell how many and what kind of learning-subjects should be planted in a soul? The agreement on moderation yields a problem about authority and expertise rather than an easy answer to philosophy's identity. Saying "do a moderate amount" is inadequate unless one can recognize the relevant measure.

The cultured lover later retrieves the adverb for his generalist ideal: the philosopher has laid hold of all crafts "in moderation." That use sounds as though the earlier lesson has been learned. But it may shift the issue from a beneficially judged curriculum to deliberately incomplete familiarity with many pursuits. Socrates asks what this person is actually useful for when a specialist is available. The recurrence of the same word thus does not guarantee the same substantive standard.

A careful reading neither turns the passage into an attack on learning nor imports an independently established doctrine of a golden mean. What is secured within the conversation is that indiscriminate quantity does not explain a pursuit's goodness. What remains contested is the competence needed to determine and act by the right measure.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **134a.** ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων; — The athlete is invited to contrast many labors with moderate ones.
- **134d.** τὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ ἢ τὰ ἄμετρα — Moderation and immoderation are contrasted for what reaches the soul.
- **134e.** ὁπόσα καὶ ὁποῖα μέτρια — The right measure includes quantity and kind.
- **136b.** ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι — The cultured lover later reuses moderation for broad, non-specialist familiarity.

In this edition. The edition's Key Words explicitly derives metrios from metron and keeps "moderate" across the early argument. It renders metriōs at 136b "in moderation," noting that another volume in the series uses "adequately" in a different context. That choice keeps the echo audible. The apparatus also records editorial interventions at 134d where the beneficial effect of moderate amounts is stated; the article follows the supplied Burnet text without claiming manuscript unanimity.

See also. Labor and much labor (p. 86) · Learning and much learning (p. 92) · Doctor and trainer as judges of measure (p. 44) · Farmer, seeds, planting, and sowing (p. 48) · The soul as the recipient of learning (p. 163) · Subjects of learning (p. 155)

Music and literary culture

μουσική (mousikē)

The word. Mousikē is the art or cultivation associated with the Muses. In the educational setting of the dialogue it embraces poetry, song, and letters, not only what modern English ordinarily calls music. The edition keeps “music” in the narrative and explains the wider range in a note. Calling the interlocutor “the musician” is therefore a convenient designation, not evidence that he plays a named instrument or works as a professional performer.

The Greek says that he has spent his time concerning mousikē. This contrasts with the other lover’s gymnastics. Neither statement amounts to a full educational biography, and neither names the man. The relative description “wiser” belongs to his claim and later narrative designation, not to the lexical meaning of mousikē.

In The Lovers. The cultured lover makes philosophy a mark of personal standing. He rebukes Socrates for even asking an athlete’s opinion and declares, loudly before his beloved, that he would not consider himself a man if he thought philosophizing shameful. When asked what philosophy is, he answers with a verse of Solon. The answer shows literary resources at work, but possession of a quotation does not settle what follows from it. Socrates restates the claim as “much learning” and tests it by comparison with bodily training.

His culture is not depicted as wholly empty. He can follow questions, offer distinctions, and concede a point against his public interest. Yet it repeatedly serves comparison with others: he wants reputation, the appearance of accomplishment, and victory over his rival. The criticism

falls on turning cultivation into a sufficient account of philosophy.

The article's label must not settle disputed identity. The edition reports a later conditional suggestion that the unnamed speaker concerned with the pentathlete image could be Democritus. That external suggestion does not override the dialogue's decision to leave its cultured interlocutor unnamed.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132d.** περὶ μουσικὴν διατετριφώς — The narrator identifies the man's sphere of cultivation.
- **133c.** Τί δ' ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ τὸ Σόλωνος; — His definition is introduced through the authority of a poet.

In this edition. The note at 132d is brief but decisive: mousikē meant "poetry, song and letters, not music alone." The introduction accordingly calls the man a lover of music and letters and sometimes "the musician." Its interpretation should be kept distinct from details not supplied: no curriculum, teacher, instrument, or profession is given. The opening apparatus also records sophōteron, "wiser," in T against sophōtaton, "wisest," in B; Burnet's edited text follows the comparative, strengthening the need to distinguish a claim to superiority from established wisdom.

See also. Wisdom and the claim to be wiser (p. 182) · Solon and learning as one grows old (p. 151) · Learning and much learning (p. 92) · Ambition, anxiety, and display (p. 15) · Gymnastics and the lover of exercise (p. 63)

Oenopides

Οἰνοπίδης (Oinopidēs)

The word. Oinopidēs is the Greek personal name conventionally written Oenopides in English. The opening has Oinopidou, its genitive, governed by “about.” It completes the uncertain alternative “either about Anaxagoras or about Oenopides.” Naming him does not identify the exact claim being disputed, since Socrates explicitly could not hear the conversation well.

In The Lovers. The immediate visual evidence is unusually concrete: drawn circles and hands imitating inclinations. That combination allows the name to suggest a mathematical or astronomical subject without turning the opening into a technical lesson. The bodily gestures are themselves a form of explanation, so the scene already complicates the later opposition between being experienced in words and being experienced in deeds. Intellectual activity here involves drawing and miming as well as speaking.

Oenopides has no further role as an authority. Neither rival quotes him, and Socrates never asks whether one of his propositions is correct. The transition instead asks whether an activity contemptuously called philosophizing is fine, and then what that activity is. An entry about Oenopides consequently illuminates the starting scene; it cannot recover an otherwise lost debate between the boys.

The attraction of linking the inclinations to a specific astronomical discovery is understandable, but a plausible background remains different from a textual assertion. The indefinite “some inclinations” and the narrator’s repeated “appeared” keep the subject partially open.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132b.** ἢ περὶ Οἰνοπίδου ἐρίζειν — The second possible subject of the boys' discussion.

In this edition. The note at 132a–b identifies Oenopides of Chios as a fifth-century mathematician and astronomer and reports that he first found the slant of the zodiac, on Eudemus' authority as preserved in Theon of Smyrna, page 198 Hiller. The edition then says the inclinations "can be read" as one circle's tilt relative to another. That wording marks an interpretation. It should not be strengthened into a claim that the text names the zodiac, specifies an angle, or attributes the boys' particular diagram to Oenopides. The English spelling and Greek transliteration are two renderings of the same name.

See also. Anaxagoras (p. 17) · Circles, drawing, and inclinations (p. 27) · Things up in the sky (p. 171)

One, many, and the claim to one craft

εἷς (heis); πολλοί (polloi); αὐτός (autos); ταὐτόν (tauton)

The word. Heis is one; the feminine mia and neuter hen belong to the same numeral. Polloi is many, with number and case changing according to its noun. Autos has several uses, including "himself" and "the same"; the construction with the article gives "the same craft." Tauton is a contraction of to auto, "the same thing." These small words perform much of the late argument's work, but sameness of a capacity is different from sameness of every person who exercises it.

In The Lovers. At 137d the interlocutor agrees that the craft which improves, punishes and distinguishes one human being does so for many, and conversely. Socrates

extends the pattern to horses and all the other cases. At 137e the formulation becomes knowledge of one and many: whoever knows one will know many; whoever is ignorant of many is ignorant of one. The intended force appears to be that a craft's standards apply across its domain, not that acquaintance with one individual magically supplies acquaintance with everyone.

That charitable reading is still an interpretation of a compressed claim. The text gives no detailed argument about general concepts, expertise or exceptions. The further step to self-knowledge treats the self as one member of the many whose quality the knowledge discriminates. Yet, in the animal illustrations, the knower has changed from trainer to animal. The unity of subject matter does not by itself establish the unity of the knowing subject.

"Same" then coordinates two virtues. The knowledge by which one punishes rightly is justice; the knowledge by which one distinguishes self and others is temperance. Because both were assigned to one capacity, Socrates calls justice and temperance the same. The claim is stronger than saying they usually cooperate or are both desirable.

The governing list makes the same move across roles. Statesman, king, tyrant, household manager and master are associated with one craft of right ordering. At 138c the formulation first aligns the persons and then the arts and virtues. It should not be paraphrased as every actual king, tyrant and householder being equally just or being numerically the same individual. The preceding questions stipulate someone who orders rightly. The argument identifies knowledge under different role descriptions.

This article's theme therefore differs from the earlier objection to much learning. The goal is not merely to

replace many subjects with a single subject. It is to establish a unity among capacities that the lover's education had treated as occasions for second-hand participation.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **137d.** καὶ ἥτις ἕνα, καὶ πολλούς — The craft's reach is extended from one to many.
- **138b.** Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη — The two virtues are asserted to be the same thing.
- **138c.** καὶ μία τέχνη ἐστὶν — The list of governing roles culminates in one craft.

In this edition. The edition's introduction marks the one/many transition and the later identifications as unusually short. Its caution is valuable: a lexicon can reconstruct the likely general-competence principle without presenting that reconstruction as an explicit proof supplied by the dialogue.

See also. Craft and the limits of expertise (p. 31) · Knowing and being ignorant (p. 80) · Horses, dogs, oxen, and the change of knower (p. 68) · Knowing oneself and one's quality (p. 83) · Temperance as self-knowledge (p. 157) · Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Statesman and the political craft (p. 153)

Pentathlete and the generalist ideal

πένταθλος (pentathlos)

The word. Pentathlos means a pentathlete, a competitor in the five-event contest. Edition note 17 lists running, long jump, discus, javelin and wrestling. The plural pentathloi

at 135e introduces the athletic comparison; the singular pentathlō at 136a is the person to whom the philosopher has been likened. The dialogue itself names running and wrestling as the examples relevant to its comparison, without listing the other events.

In The Lovers. Socrates offers the image while still professing uncertainty about the lover's account. The pentathlete falls short of a specialist racer at racing and of a specialist wrestler at wrestling, but surpasses the other athletes. Applied to education, this means second rank in the understanding of each craft and superiority to other nonspecialists. It does not mean winning every event, being the best athlete overall by a calculated aggregate, or merely knowing a few disconnected facts.

The cultivated lover welcomes the analogy. It allows him to describe breadth as an achievement: he is independent of any one pursuit and has laid hold of all in moderation. There is also dramatic irony in the use of an athletic image to flatter the man who had disparaged his athletic rival. Socrates explains the intellectual's identity through the very world the intellectual has treated with contempt.

Once the analogy has been accepted, Socrates asks what these runners-up are useful for. In the immediate crises of illness and storm, the specialists who beat them in the relevant event are precisely the people one wants. The favorable ranking against everybody else no longer settles the issue. The argument has moved from comparative accomplishment to a practical demand.

At 138e Socrates explicitly brings the pentathlete back. Should the philosopher be second here too, in the judging and ordering just identified with justice and temperance? The accepted answer is no. One's household and entrusted decisions require responsible leadership. The analogy is

therefore first accepted as a model of cultivated breadth, then rejected as a sufficient model for philosophy. Its explanatory usefulness does not make it the dialogue's final ideal.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135e.** οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς — The comparison is with event specialists.
- **136a.** ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλῳ — The lover warmly accepts Socrates' likeness.
- **138e.** πένταθλον αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὕπακρον — The ending reopens and rejects the second-place ideal in its crucial field.

In this edition. According to edition note 17, Diogenes Laertius reports that Thrasyllus conditionally identified the speaker behind this ideal with Democritus, "if" the dialogue is Plato's. This is an ancient interpretation reported by the edition, not a personal name supplied by the dialogue. The anonymous lover should not simply be relabeled Democritus.[4]

See also. Racers, wrestlers, and event-specific excellence (p. 133) · Runner-up: just under the top (p. 140) · Second prizes and refusing second place (p. 143) · Freedom, education, and being a slave to one pursuit (p. 57) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90)

[4] The edition locates the report at Diogenes Laertius 9.37. Its conditional wording bears on the ancient reception and attribution of the dialogue as well as on the identity conjecture.

Perplexity and looking another way

ἀπορία (aporia); ἀθυμεῖν (athymein); σκοπεῖν (skopein)

The word. Aporia means perplexity, being at a loss or without a clear way forward. Athymein means to lose heart or become dispirited. Skopein means to look into or examine. The three words distinguish an intellectual impasse, an emotional response to it, and an activity that may continue despite it. Aporia is not synonymous with despair, and losing one proposed route is not proof that no route exists.

The first occurrence is “full of perplexity,” the second “in perplexity.” Both are plural first-person expressions in Socrates’ narration or speech. Their scope matters: the difficulty is not assigned exclusively to the interlocutor whose definition has failed.

In The Lovers. The group reaches perplexity when asked who can judge how many and what sort of learning-subjects should be planted in a soul. Earlier examples have established that one should consult doctor, trainer, or farmer in the appropriate domain. The failure is thus specific: they cannot identify the corresponding educational authority. It is not simply that they have forgotten the topic or run out of quotations.

Socrates includes himself among those at a loss and teasingly proposes asking the lads. The joke tests whether a concern for status might prevent them from seeking help. The Homeric analogy to suitors and bow makes that possibility vivid, but no actual answer from the boys follows. Perplexity opens a question about how to continue, not merely about what proposition to believe.

Seeing the lovers lose heart over the argument, Socrates tries to examine the issue another way. He asks which

subjects the philosopher must learn. The revised inquiry retains the problem of education while shifting from maximal amount to selection. The cultured lover then proposes reputation as a criterion, giving the conversation a fresh thesis to test.

This is not a dialogue that simply ends in aporia. It moves on to a lengthy critique of the generalist and then to self-knowledge and judgment. Conversely, its later movement does not erase the honesty of the earlier impasse or supply a detailed retrospective answer about curricula. The shared uncertainty remains an important check on interpreting Socrates' dramatic authority as omniscience.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135a.** ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες — The entire group, including the narrator, is full of perplexity.
- **135a.** ἐπειδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐσμέν — Socrates names their shared condition before proposing help.
- **135a.** ἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν — He responds by trying to examine the problem another way.

In this edition. The edition uses "perplexity" twice at 135a and keeps skopein as "look into," its regular method verb. The introduction highlights "we were all of us" in its account of the first argument. At 135a7 the apparatus and Editorial Note also draw attention to the reconstructed wording of the new curricular question. That textual detail should not distract from the clear narrative transition: recognized difficulty is followed by another attempt at inquiry.

See also. Questions, answers, and what a thing is (p. 131) · Farmer, seeds, planting, and sowing (p. 48) · Subjects of

learning (p. 155) · Homer, the suitors, and the bow (p. 66) · Socrates (p. 148)

Philosophy and philosophizing

φιλοσοφία (philosophia), φιλοσοφέω (philosopheō), φιλόσοφος (philosophos)

The word. Philosophia is philosophy: the pursuit associated with loving wisdom. Philosopheō is the corresponding verb, to philosophize; philosophos names a philosopher or qualifies a person as philosophical. The dialogue repeatedly uses the infinitive philosophein, “to philosophize”, often with the article, so that an activity becomes the subject of inquiry. These related forms do not supply a definition simply by being recognized. Nor does their connection with wisdom decide whether philosophizing consists in collecting information, understanding crafts, knowing oneself, or exercising judgement.

The term is socially contested from its first appearance. One person can use it contemptuously of what another regards as indispensable to a worthy life. Its English equivalents are familiar enough to conceal that contest. Reading every occurrence as a settled university discipline would import an institutional definition that the conversation is trying to find.

In The Lovers. At 132b the athlete attaches philosophizing to prattle about the heavens. His rival answers that he would hardly count himself, or anyone else with that opinion, a human being if he regarded philosophizing as shameful. These opposed evaluations precede an account of the activity. Socrates reverses the order at 133b–c: first ask what it is, then what makes it fine or shameful. The

dialogue thus tests not only a definition but the authority of people who confidently praise or blame philosophy.

The educated lover first offers lifelong learning on Solon's model, which Socrates condenses as much learning. The bodily training analogy dislodges quantity as a sufficient criterion: moderate inputs benefit, and someone must judge their kind and amount. At 135a–d the lover replaces quantity with cultivated breadth across crafts. His philosopher need not be a precise specialist but must follow a specialist's speech and contribute a judgement better than the surrounding non-specialists. The pentathlete image gives this position a flattering social shape.

The test of use turns the compliment into a difficulty. A doctor is preferred in illness and a pilot in a storm. Under the lover's account, Socrates says, the philosopher becomes useless wherever experts exist. The qualification "under your account" is crucial: this is a challenge to the accepted model, not the narrator's final verdict that philosophers have no value. At 137b Socrates expressly suspects that philosophers are not as the argument has made them appear and says that philosophizing must be something else.

The final movement connects improvement, right punishment, discrimination of character, self-knowledge, temperance, justice and rule. It concludes that the philosopher cannot remain second in ordering his own household or responding to friends and city. This gives a positive direction to the inquiry, but the last sentence about philosophizing is negative: it is far from much learning and occupation with crafts. The text does not explicitly decide whether philosophy is the common governing craft, knowledge of that craft, or the pursuit of

it. A reading that sees responsible self-knowledge as the intended answer has substantial support; it remains an interpretation of the movement rather than a quotation of a completed definition.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132b.** φλυαροῦσι φιλοσοφοῦντες — The athlete joins philosophizing to talking nonsense, making the word part of the dramatic dispute.
- **133c.** ὅτι ἔστιν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν — The inquiry now asks what philosophizing is before accepting its value.
- **135e.** οἷον λέγεις τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα — The focus becomes what sort of person the proposed education produces.
- **137a.** κατά γε τὸν σὸν λόγον — The adverse conclusion is expressly tied to the interlocutor's account.
- **137b.** μηδ' ᾗ τοῦτο φιλοσοφεῖν — Socrates reopens the account instead of accepting philosophy's alleged uselessness.
- **139a.** τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμαθία τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία — Within the governing "far from", the closing words reject the two accounts rather than state an explicit positive definition.

In this edition. The edition keeps "philosophy", "philosophize" and "philosopher" as stable equivalents. At 136a the perfect participle πεφιλοσοφηκότα becomes "the man who has philosophized", preserving the activity that has produced the supposed generalist. The translation does not routinely replace the family with "love of wisdom", so the lexical relationship has to be heard

through the other loves of the dialogue: honour, exercise and victory.

The ending is rendered “far from being either much learning or busying oneself with the crafts”. This wording prevents an English “not both” reading that would leave one rejected account intact. At 137b the plural “they are not so” concerns the philosophers just called base and useless. Both details matter to the transition from refutation toward the final demand.

See also. Learning and much learning (p. 92) · Wisdom and the claim to be wiser (p. 182) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Knowing oneself and one’s quality (p. 83) · Temperance as self-knowledge (p. 157) · Justice, the judge’s knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Pentathlete and the generalist ideal (p. 112)

Pilot and entrusting responsibility

κυβερνήτης (kybernētēs); ἐπιτρέπειν (epitrepein)

The word. Kybernētēs is a pilot or helmsman, the person who directs the ship. Epitrepein is to entrust, allow or commit something to someone; its precise object determines the sense. In the storm one entrusts oneself and one’s belongings to the pilot. At the end the same verb family concerns entrusting a household or an arbitration. Its recurrence connects competent action with the acceptance or delegation of responsibility.

In The Lovers. The pilot is selected without hesitation at 136d. This is not a claim that navigation encompasses all knowledge, but that the relevant craft governs the relevant danger. The lover’s philosophical generalist remains less competent in that domain. The choice gives concrete meaning to the abstract question of usefulness.

A striking reversal follows at 138e. The philosopher is told not to entrust his own household to another. The earlier example approved entrustment to an expert; the later question insists on a task he must himself perform. The natural reading is not a ban on all delegation or specialist assistance. The difference is the sphere of responsibility being claimed for philosophy: rightful judgment and ordering must be something the philosopher can actually exercise.

Friends may then entrust arbitrations to him. Here he is the recipient of trust rather than its giver. The sequence runs from choosing a reliable pilot, to refusing to evade one's household responsibility, to proving reliable for others. It turns the educated spectator into a potential decision-maker whose competence matters to people depending on him.

This connection is argumentative rather than lexical magic. The same verb can describe different lawful or customary arrangements, and the text does not derive a universal political theory from it. What it does is expose a common practical demand: a person trusted with important matters must know enough to do the work rightly, not merely appear cultivated in conversation.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **136d.** τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ — The storm makes the choice of the appropriate practitioner explicit.
- **138e.** τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἐπιτρεπτέον — Responsibility for one's own household is not to be passed off.

- **138e.** οἱ φίλοι αὐτῷ διαίτας ἐπιτρέπωσιν — The philosopher may himself receive friends' trust in arbitration.

In this edition. "Pilot" is the edition's rendering throughout this example. The repeated English "entrust" makes a connection that would be obscured by translating the later occurrences only as "give" or "allow." The passage does not specify the legal form of either nautical or arbitral responsibility.

See also. The ship in a storm (p. 162) · Household and responsibility at home (p. 70) · Friends and entrusted arbitrations (p. 59) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179)

Prattling and talking nonsense

ἀδολεσχεῖν (adoleschein); φλυαρεῖν (phlyarein)

The word. Adoleschein means to prattle, to engage in talk dismissed as idle or excessively minute. Phlyarein means to talk nonsense or chatter foolishly. These infinitives are dictionary forms; the opening prints the finite plurals adoleschousi and phlyarousi, "they prattle" and "they talk nonsense." The verbs evaluate the quality or worth of speech, rather than merely recording that people converse.

The two verbs need not name two separate activities. The athlete piles them onto one scene, while "philosophizing" tells how he classifies what the boys are doing. His contempt is stronger than an admission that he cannot follow their discussion. It announces that the pursuit is beneath respect.

In The Lovers. The first philosophical issue grows out of this careless-looking dismissal. Socrates asks whether

philosophizing is shameful and why the lover speaks so harshly. His rival then tries to discredit the athlete through a story about eating, sleeping, and wrestling. At that stage neither opponent has explained philosophy: one condemns a caricature and the other defends a badge of culture. Socrates' later definitional question exposes the lack on both sides.

Prattle is also an important counterpoint to "words and deeds." The athlete disclaims verbal expertise, but he is capable of a verbally effective and substantively relevant retort about moderate exercise. The cultured lover is fluent, yet his fluent defense of much learning fails. The distinction the scene encourages is therefore not speech against silence, but speech that can answer for itself against speech whose main work is display or abuse.

The ending does not vindicate the initial insult without qualification. Socrates explicitly resists the claim that philosophers are base and useless. What is refuted is a particular account of philosophical accomplishment. Treating "prattle" as the author's final verdict would miss that rescue and the later positive requirements of judgment.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132b.** ἀδολεσχοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὗτοί γε — The athlete characterizes the lads' earnest conversation as prattle.
- **132b.** καὶ φλυαροῦσι φιλοσοφοῦντες — Nonsense-talk and philosophizing are contemptuously joined in his description.

In this edition. The edition's note links adoleschein and talk of the heavens with the vocabulary of comedy, citing Clouds 1480 and 1485 and the Phaedo's denial that even a

comic poet could accuse Socrates of prattling at 70b–c. These parallels explain a recognizable tone, not a proof of direct borrowing. “Talking nonsense” retains phlyarein as a second dismissive verb; reducing the whole sentence to “they are philosophizing” would lose the provocation that starts the argument.

See also. Things up in the sky (p. 171) · Words and deeds (p. 184) · Questions, answers, and what a thing is (p. 131) · Gymnastics and the lover of exercise (p. 63) · Music and literary culture (p. 107)

Precision and the cost of mastery

ἀκριβῶς (akribōs); ἀκρίβεια (akribeia)

The word. Akribōs means precisely or with exact knowledge; akribeia is precision or exactness. At 135d the adverb characterizes knowing a craft as its actual possessor knows it. At 136a the noun names the level to which the lover’s philosopher deliberately avoids laboring at a subject. Neither expression denotes mere verbal fastidiousness: both concern depth of competence.

In The Lovers. Precision enters when the building example threatens to make the lover’s program impossible. If the understanding to be acquired is that of the top master builder, even two crafts may exceed one learner’s capacity. The lover corrects Socrates: the philosopher need not know each craft precisely, but should know it in the way appropriate to a free and educated person. Precision thus marks the line between the practitioner and the informed participant.

The distinction has an intelligible motivation. The lover thinks exact labor in one pursuit leaves all other pursuits behind. The philosopher should avoid that imbalance and

touch everything moderately. His ideal is not ignorance; it combines a considerable degree of understanding with refusal of exhaustive specialization. The pentathlete represents this as a rank just below the specialists and above everyone else.

Socrates then changes the evaluative test. On the lover's account, precision appears costly because it narrows a life. In the cases of sickness and storm, its absence is costly because somebody's health or safety depends on correct action. The same division of labor that limits an expert's range now makes that expert the preferred person to trust. The dialogue does not measure how much learning a generalist actually needs, or establish that intellectual breadth has no value; it asks whether this breadth can constitute philosophy and its alleged usefulness.

The closing responsibilities imply that there is at least one sphere where a philosopher cannot settle for second place. Yet the text never simply says "philosophy is precision." It changes the field and standard of obligation: one must judge rightly in one's household and in matters entrusted by friends or the city. The earlier educational problem, how to determine the proper measure of learning for the soul, is approached through responsible knowledge rather than a new quantitative rule.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135d.** ἀκριβῶς ὥσπερ αὐτὸν τὸν τὴν τέχνην ἔχοντα — The specialist's exact knowledge is explicitly excluded from the proposal.
- **136a.** μηδ' εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι — Labor to the point of precision is treated as a threat to breadth.

In this edition. The English “precisely” and “precision” preserve the word-family connection. The edition also uses “have labored at” for diapeponēkenai, which recalls the earlier argument about much and moderate labor. That connection is suggestive, but the later claim that technical depth crowds out other pursuits is the lover’s own defense, not the athlete’s earlier training advice.

See also. Understanding and handiwork (p. 175) · The top master builder (p. 165) · Freedom, education, and being a slave to one pursuit (p. 57) · Runner-up: just under the top (p. 140) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90) · Moderation and measure (p. 104)

Punishing rightly and correcting

κολάζειν (kolazein); ὀρθῶς (orthōs)

The word. Kolazein is to check, correct, chastise or punish. The edition consistently chooses “punish,” for animals as well as humans. Orthōs means rightly or correctly. The adverb is indispensable: the argument concerns competent and justified correction, not simply the capacity to inflict a penalty. The later adjective and verb family for unruliness recalls the condition of being unchastened.

The possible corrective sense should not be used to make every occurrence gentle, while the translation “punish” should not be used to add unspecified harshness. No particular technique or penalty is described. What is examined is the knowledge required to act rightly.

In The Lovers. Socrates restarts from horses and dogs. Who knows how to punish them rightly? The very people who make them best. The interlocutor accepts that one craft performs both tasks. Socrates then adds discrimination: the craft must also recognize decent and

worthless animals. Corrective activity is thereby connected both to an end, improvement, and to a judgment about the subject's condition.

The claim is extended to human beings at 137c–d. A craft that makes people best also punishes rightly and discriminates good from bad quality. Judicial knowledge is then identified as the knowledge that rightly punishes the unruly and lawbreaking in cities, and this is called justice. The sequence assumes a close link between human improvement and just punishment rather than arguing separately for every case in which a penalty might be due.

When self-knowledge has been identified with temperance, Socrates returns to the shared knowledge of punishment. What enables right punishment is justice; what distinguishes oneself and others is temperance. Since the same knowledge does both, justice and temperance are declared identical. Punishment is thus not an incidental legal example: it is the bridge connecting practical authority with knowledge of human quality.

At 138e the philosopher must himself punish while judging rightly if his household is to be well ordered. The demand contrasts responsible action with the lover's earlier role as an educated listener. Yet the claim remains conditioned by right judgment and good order. It does not authorize arbitrary power, establish that every household problem requires punishment or state that force alone constitutes philosophy.

A critical reading can ask whether improvement, discrimination and judicial authority truly belong to one competence, and whether expertise about others automatically gives self-knowledge. Those are the substantive links the dialogue compresses. Keeping

“rightly” visible prevents the discussion from being reduced to a celebration of domination.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **137c.** Ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς — Improvement and correct punishment are assigned to the same craft.
- **137d.** ἀκολασταίνοντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας ὀρθῶς κολάζει — The civic application specifies unruliness and lawbreaking.
- **138e.** αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς — The household demand combines personal action with right judging.

In this edition. The Key Words and note 25 explain the family connection between punishment and unruliness. The repeated “punish” in English makes the continuity from animal training to civic and household justice stark. It is legitimate to examine that continuity rather than smoothing the animals into “training” and humans into “sentencing,” as if the passage itself made two different claims.

See also. Making best and the end of a craft (p. 97) · Unruliness and breaking the law (p. 177) · Justice, the judge’s knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Discriminating persons and deciding cases (p. 42) · Knowing oneself and one’s quality (p. 83) · Household and responsibility at home (p. 70)

Quarreling, contention, and love of victory

ἔρις (eris); ἐρίζειν (erizein); φιλονικεῖν (philonikein); ὑπόθεσις (hypothesis)

The word. Eris means strife or quarrel, and erizein is to quarrel or dispute. Philonikein means to strive for victory, literally to love winning. Hypothesis here is a position laid down for argument, not necessarily a modern scientific hypothesis to be experimentally tested. These terms distinguish an encounter's contentious manner, its competitive aim, and the proposition being defended.

A disagreement can be earnest without being dishonest. The two lads begin by erizein, but Socrates has not heard enough to assess their reasons. Philonikein becomes especially problematic when the cultured lover links it with arguing contrary to his own opinion.

In The Lovers. The beginning places the boys in dispute and the adults in erotic rivalry. As the adults become the main speakers, the boys stop their quarrel and listen. Competition has not disappeared; it changes form. The cultured man claims he would gladly contest matters with his rival and could defend the position he laid down even if it were poorer. The remark makes skill at winning independent of the thesis's quality.

Toward Socrates, however, he says he has no need to strive for victory against his own opinion. He then concedes that moderate, not many, exercises produce good condition. The two audiences elicit two declared standards. His statement may show a real willingness to submit to Socratic correction, an effort to save face by presenting a forced concession as voluntary, or both. The text does not decide the psychology for us.

Socrates also uses contest language. After the athlete's intervention he asks whether the cultured rival is fighting out the argument against the two of them. That numerical alliance can add social pressure, but its force should not replace the evidence from training. For the inquiry to test a sincerely held position, agreement must answer to what the speakers actually judge.

The closing requirement that a philosopher lead in matters of judgment should not be equated without qualification with the earlier love of winning. Leadership there is tied to responsible competence. The opening rivalry seeks superiority before a beloved; the later question concerns duties to one's household, friends, and city. The text's reuse of rank and precedence invites comparison while keeping the purposes distinguishable.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132a.** δύο τῶν μειρακίων ἐρίζοντε — The opening dispute belongs first to the lads.
- **134c.** βοηθῆσαι τῇ ὑποθέσει ἣν ὑπεθέμην — The cultured lover boasts of defending the position he has laid down.
- **134c.** παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν — He disclaims striving for victory against his own opinion when speaking with Socrates.

In this edition. The note at 132b makes philonikein part of the recurring family of love-compounds. The English keeps "strive for victory" at 134c, while translating hypothesis as "the position I laid down." Its final review restores the paired phrasing "with this fellow … with you, however," mirroring the earlier double answer about exercise. That repetition helps show that the competitive distortion is a

pattern within the scene rather than a single accidental outburst.

See also. Lovers, rival lovers, and the title (p. 95) · Irony and the two answers (p. 74) · Ambition, anxiety, and display (p. 15) · Words and deeds (p. 184) · Questions, answers, and what a thing is (p. 131)

Questions, answers, and what a thing is

ἐρωτᾶν (erōtan); ἀποκρίνεσθαι (apokrinesthai); τί ἐστιν (ti estin)

The word. Erōtan means to ask or question; apokrinesthai means to answer. Ti estin means “what is it?” or, with an expressed subject, “what is [the thing]?” Here ti asks “what,” and estin is “is.” The expression is a question, not a technical noun for a definition. “Definition” names the explanatory demand the question makes in this context.

The dialogue repeatedly separates answering from merely replying. The athlete has given an answer at 132b, but its harshness leads to another question. The cultured rival claims he could answer more finely, but that claim makes him responsible for stating what the praised activity actually is. A confident response is not yet an adequate account.

In The Lovers. At 133b Socrates asks whether one can know that anything is fine or shameful while not knowing at all what it is. His interlocutor denies that possibility and then says he knows what philosophizing is. “What is it, then?” follows. The movement places a burden on evaluative confidence: praise and blame must answer to some understanding of their object. It does not establish, independently and for every possible case, a general epistemological theorem that no partial recognition is

possible without a complete definition. The premise is secured by agreement in this conversation.

The first answer quotes Solon and expands his lifelong learning into learning as much as possible. Socrates does not immediately discard it. He says it initially seemed to have substance, thinks it over, and asks whether it amounts to much learning. This restatement gives the interlocutor an opportunity to own the proposition being tested. It also reveals a shift from an admirable life-practice to a quantitative criterion.

As the discussion proceeds, questions ask what produces benefit, whom one should consult, and what sort of subjects should be learned. The inquiry is therefore not confined to dictionary substitution. It probes the conditions under which a proposed account would count as good and useful. When one approach ends in perplexity, Socrates tries another rather than declaring all inquiry impossible.

The closing negative result matters for the opening question. Philosophy is said to be far from much learning and preoccupation with crafts, but no fresh ti estin answer is formally announced. A reader may infer a positive orientation toward self-knowledge and judgment; the textual distinction between an implication and an explicit definition should remain visible.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **133b.** ὃ μὴ εἰδείη τις τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅτι ἔστιν — Knowing what the thing is becomes a condition of the proposed evaluation.
- **133c.** Τί οὖν ἔστιν; — The compressed question initiates the attempt to define philosophizing.

- **135a.** ἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν — Socrates tries to examine the problem another way after perplexity.

In this edition. At 132d the edition translates Schleiermacher's erōtōmenon as "the one I had questioned," supported in Burnet's apparatus by Ficino's Latin. The reported manuscript alternatives would refer to "the beloved" or "the one who asked." This affects who is being released from questioning. At 133c the printed question is direct and short; retaining that simplicity avoids making Socrates ask for a modern academic theory more elaborate than the text requires.

See also. Learning and much learning (p. 92) · Fine, beautiful, and shameful (p. 50) · Perplexity and looking another way (p. 115) · Words and deeds (p. 184) · Socrates (p. 148)

Racers, wrestlers, and event-specific excellence

δρομεύς (dromeus); παλαιστής (palaistēs); ἆθλον (athlon)

The word. Dromeus is a runner or racer; palaistēs is a wrestler. Athlon can denote a prize or contest, and the edition translates the plural athla at 135e as "events." In this context the reference is to the racers' and wrestlers' own competitive disciplines, not to an inventory of trophies. The plural accusatives dromeas and palaistas name the specialist competitors against whom pentathletes are compared.

In The Lovers. Running and wrestling make the intellectual hierarchy concrete. The same person can outperform most people and still lose to the appropriately trained specialist. The pentathlete is second in these men's own events, and first among the remaining athletes. The

qualification “in these men’s own events” prevents a global inference that every specialist is better in every respect than every generalist.

This local ranking matters when Socrates moves to the doctor and pilot. The practical question selects a single field in the way that an event selects a single skill. Illness calls for medical competence, a storm for navigation. The analogy works to that extent, but competitive defeat and practical uselessness are not equivalent: losing to a specialist does not demonstrate that one could give no help. The later inference therefore requires more than the image itself supplies.

Wrestling also reconnects the argument to the dramatic rivalry. The athlete had been insulted for having his neck twisted, and he had replied by mocking the intellectual’s unrubbed neck. When Socrates now reaches for a wrestler as an example of genuine expertise, the supposedly inferior rival’s world becomes an explanatory resource. The text need not declare the athlete philosophically superior for that reversal to be visible.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135e.** τοὺς δρομέας ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς — Racers and wrestlers supply the named specialists.
- **135e.** κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἆθλα — Their superiority is tied to their own events.

In this edition. The edition’s “racers” keeps the competitive setting conspicuous. Its “events” for athla should not be mechanically replaced by “prizes,” although prize language becomes explicit in the following description of second rank. The transition from an event to its ranking is part of the analogy’s construction.

See also. Pentathlete and the generalist ideal (p. 112) · Runner-up: just under the top (p. 140) · Second prizes and refusing second place (p. 143) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Gymnastics and the lover of exercise (p. 63)

Reading the text and apparatus

ἐρωτώμενον (erōtōmenon), κἂν ὗν (kan hyn), ἀεί (aei), ⟨βοῦς⟩ (bous)

The word. These four printed expressions illustrate different ways an editorial decision can affect a reading. Erōtōmenon is the accusative participle meaning “the one being questioned”, here the man Socrates had questioned; kan hyn contracts kai an with the noun for pig, yielding “even a pig” in the potential construction; aei means “always”; bous is an ox, here supplied in angle brackets to complete the comparison. They are not labels for abstract philosophical doctrines. Their importance is that the transmitted alternatives can change who is addressed, whether a joke exists, how strong a premise is, or how explicitly an analogy is stated.

An apparatus is the editor’s compact record of readings and proposals beneath the text. It is not a second continuous version of the dialogue. A lemma identifies the wording under discussion, and sigla identify the witnesses reported. A conjecture is a proposed correction or supplement, not an independently surviving manuscript reading. The supplied edition reproduces Burnet’s apparatus and explains its conventions; this lexicon cites those reports rather than claiming a fresh collation.

In The Lovers. At 132d Schleiermacher’s reading makes Socrates leave aside the man he had questioned, the

athlete. The reported manuscript alternatives concern a beloved or a questioner. The adopted reading supports the scene's movement from the dismissive lover toward his supposedly wiser rival. At 134a Hermann's correction yields the proverbial pig, allowing the athlete to ridicule the rival's bodily ignorance before the youths. A reader who treats every memorable detail as secure in all witnesses misses the dependence of this joke on an editorial choice.

At 136e the printed "always" is especially consequential: the inference to the generalist's uselessness uses the asserted continuous availability of craftsmen. The apparatus reports Hermann's aei against the manuscripts' dē, "of course". The strength of the premise should therefore be distinguished both from the logical adequacy of the inference and from what all witnesses independently attest. At 137a the recapitulation's claim that "we ourselves are philosophers" stands in Burnet's text despite a reported deletion proposal. A report that someone deleted words does not mean the edition silently omits them.

Two visible bracket conventions require special care. At 136c Burnet places "the philosopher" in square brackets after "that runner-up", adopting Cobet's rejection of the explanatory phrase; the English does not translate it. At 137e he supplies "oxen" in angle brackets, adopting Bekker's addition; the English translates the supplied noun. The added noun makes explicit the animals already understood in the comparison. It does not repair the larger inferential transition from expert knowledge of animals to an animal's supposed self-knowledge.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132d.** τὸν ἐρωτώμενον — The adopted participle identifies the previously questioned athlete; the edition's note records the alternative readings.
- **134a.** κἂν ὖν γνῶναι — Hermann's adopted correction supplies "even a pig would know".
- **136c.** τὸν ὕπακρον ἐκεῖνον [τὸν φιλόσοφον] — The square brackets mark words Burnet regards as spurious and the translation omits.
- **136e.** εἰσὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀεί που δημιουργοί — The printed "always" strengthens the availability premise and is reported as Hermann's reading.
- **137e.** τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ χρηστοὺς ⟨βοῦς⟩ — The angle-bracketed noun is an adopted supplement, not unmarked manuscript text.

In this edition. The edition identifies B as the Bodleian Clarke 39, T as the Marcianus and W as the Vindobonensis, and distinguishes later hands from their first hands. Absence of a witness from an entry is not evidence of its agreement. The Editorial Note also identifies three places where Burnet's printed wording is not given in exactly that form by a listed witness: 135a7, 137e2 and 137e11. Consequently, selecting the first item of every apparatus entry does not reliably reconstruct the printed text.

The source records two apparatus readings that may be printing faults, at 133e1 and 138a2, and a damaged letter in the reproduced copy at 138c1. These remain reports about that copy; they are not grounds for inventing corrected manuscript evidence. Exact Greek citations in this lexicon follow the supplied text. Comparison with the official Perseus Greek transcription confirms the lexical

sequence across the dialogue when capitalization and punctuation conventions are set aside.[5]

See also. Dionysius and the writing-master's school (p. 40) · Even a pig would know (p. 46) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Agreement, recap, and refutation (p. 13) · Horses, dogs, oxen, and the change of knower (p. 68) · Philosophy and philosophizing (p. 117)

Reputation, seeming, and the cultivated audience

δόξα (doxa); δοκεῖν (dokein); χαρίεις (charieis)

The word. Doxa can mean opinion or reputation. At 135b it is reputation for philosophy, a standing acquired in the eyes of others. Dokein means to seem or to think; its force depends on construction and speaker. The lover wants to seem experienced and later to seem the most accomplished and wisest of those present. Charieis means graceful, cultivated or accomplished; the superlative chariestaton at 135d is rendered "most accomplished." The dictionary form is not the word printed there.

These expressions do not all mean deception. Seeming competent can reflect real competence, and Socrates' own narrative frequently uses "it seemed to me" without alleging fraud. What is striking at 135b–d is the explicit choice of reputation as a criterion for selecting studies.

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[5] The comparison source is the Perseus Digital Library's Greek TEI, urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg016.perseus-grc2, edited by John Burnet, Platonis Opera II (Oxford, 1910), distributed in the PerseusDL canonical-greekLit repository. The comparison checks the sequence of Greek words section by section, normalizing case, punctuation and elision marks; it does not verify Burnet's apparatus, a manuscript reading, or a printed letterform. The supplied edition retains its own capitalization, line division and editorial brackets.

In The Lovers. Asked which subjects the philosopher should learn after unrestricted much learning has been rejected, the lover answers with those that produce the greatest reputation. The question was educational; his criterion is social. He proposes experience in all crafts, if possible, and especially the ones worth mentioning. The audience and the prestige of the subject help determine the desired achievement before its use has been considered.

The dramatic scene makes this significant. Earlier the lover speaks loudly so that his beloved will hear him, and his confidence must survive an audience that has laughed at the athlete's counterattack. At 135d the aim is again to rank above the people present. Socrates' pentathlete translates this social distinction into a technical hierarchy: below specialists but above everybody else. The lover welcomes the translation because second place among experts can still mean first place in an ordinary gathering.

The usefulness test changes the relevant audience. A sick friend or a person on a storm-tossed ship needs an outcome, not a display of cultivated superiority. Reputation alone cannot establish the necessary competence. Still, the argument should not be summarized as exposing a mere impostor: the lover's proposal includes genuine understanding and the ability to contribute a judgment. Its problem is the adequacy and purpose of that understanding.

Appearance also survives in the ending. It is shameful to "appear second or third" in judging for friends or the city. Socrates does not simply replace all concern for how one appears with an invisible inner virtue. Public performance remains a test, now attached to a task for which one must

take responsibility. The shift concerns what deserves recognition and what sort of knowledge can justify it.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135b.** πλείστην δόξαν ἔχοι τις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν — Reputation for philosophy is the lover's stated selection criterion.
- **135d.** ὥστε δοκεῖν χαριέστατον εἶναι καὶ σοφώτατον — Cultivated superiority is measured against those present.
- **139a.** δεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον — The closing demand still concerns one's manifest standing in a task.

In this edition. The edition distinguishes "reputation" here from "opinion" in the lover's earlier refusal to compete against his own belief (134c). That distinction prevents a single mechanical translation of doxa from obscuring two different pressures: fidelity to what one thinks and pursuit of what others think of one.

See also. Following an expert and contributing a judgment (p. 53) · Runner-up: just under the top (p. 140) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90) · Lovers, rival lovers, and the title (p. 95) · Quarreling, contention, and love of victory (p. 129)

Runner-up: just under the top

ὕπακρος (hypakros)

The word. Hypakros means just under the top. The edition uses "runner-up" for this rare word and connects it with akros, "top," in the earlier top master builder. The singular hypakron at 136a describes the sort of man produced by

the proposed philosophizing. “Runner-up” here is a metaphor of rank, not a claim that the person literally runs races.

The position has two sides: below the specialist in the specialist’s field, above the other participants. Omitting either side distorts the ideal. “Second-rate” can suggest simple incompetence, while “all-round champion” makes the claim too strong. The lover thinks this intermediate standing admirable.

In The Lovers. Socrates develops the label from the pentathlete analogy. The person who has philosophized falls short of the first in understanding the crafts, holds the second prizes and surpasses everyone else. This is a revised account of philosophy after the maximal learning proposed earlier has met the problem of measure and the difficulty of exact mastery.

The lover’s approving answer gives the rank a rationale. Specialists are left behind in other fields because of attention to one thing. The runner-up sacrifices the last increment of precision in exchange for breadth. The dialogue thus gives the ideal a real attraction before testing it; the figure should not be caricatured as a fool who knows nothing properly.

Socrates’ next question asks where such people are useful. In sickness the lover initially says he would summon both doctor and runner-up. When pressed about priority, he prefers the doctor; in a storm he prefers the pilot. The concession establishes the superior person to trust for the relevant task. The further conclusion that the runner-up has no usefulness is accepted, but it does not follow from comparative rank alone. A secondary role might still be valuable. That unresolved possibility is a limitation of the argument, not a reason to ignore its actual course.

At 138e the label is reapplied to the field of just judgment and good order. Should the philosopher be a runner-up here as well? The demand that he take responsibility for his household and lead in entrusted decisions rejects that alternative. The last movement therefore does not make him first in every technical field. It singles out the responsibilities explored in the final argument and denies that second place is enough there.

The phrase “in everything” at 136a belongs to the lover’s rejected model. Reading the ending as a promise of universal intellectual supremacy would reproduce the breadth problem rather than solve it. The dialogue does not provide a complete positive definition that specifies how philosophy secures the required governing knowledge.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **136a.** περὶ πάντα ὕπακρόν τινα ἄνδρα — The proposed philosopher is a kind of runner-up in everything.
- **136c.** ποῦ καὶ χρήσιμοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ ὕπακροι οὗτοι — Socrates turns the flattering label into a question of use.
- **138e.** πένταθλον αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὕπακρον — Second rank is explicitly reconsidered for judging and ordering.

In this edition. At 136c Burnet brackets the explanatory words “the philosopher” following “that runner-up”; the edition leaves those bracketed words untranslated. This does not make the identity of the runner-up uncertain: the preceding discussion supplies it. Note 18 explains the lexical link with akros and the rank above all other nonspecialists.

See also. The top master builder (p. 165) · Pentathlete and the generalist ideal (p. 112) · Second prizes and refusing second place (p. 143) · Both, rather, and first: the missing inference (p. 21) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90)

Second prizes and refusing second place

τὰ δευτερεῖα (ta deutereia); δεύτερος (deuteros); πρῶτος (prōtos)

The word. Ta deutereia is the neuter plural expression for the second prizes or second honors. Deuteros means second; prōtos means first. The article ta belongs to the prize phrase, not to a separate technical term. The passage moves freely between the image of honors and the ranking those honors express: the pentathlete is second to specialists but first among the other athletes.

In The Lovers. At 136a “holding the second prizes” makes qualified excellence attractive. The generalist is not merely failing to attain the summit; he possesses an acknowledged distinction. The cultivated lover can accept second place relative to experts because it still guarantees superiority in the ordinary audience. Socrates’ image translates social accomplishment into an intelligible hierarchy.

The final question repeats the prize expression twice (138e). Is the philosopher to hold the second prizes in the newly identified governing craft, or must he refuse second rank in ordering his household? The repetition makes the change of standard unmistakable. What counted as an attractive compromise among technical subjects becomes inadequate when the person himself bears the responsibility to judge rightly.

The following phrase “second or third” widens the reproach from one precise runner-up position to failure to lead in an entrusted task. It is not a theory of athletic scoring or an assertion that the philosopher must win every intellectual competition. Its scope is the household, arbitrations entrusted by friends and decisions assigned by the city. The vocabulary of rank remains, but it is redirected toward responsible performance rather than the pursuit of a reputation for breadth.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **136a.** τὰ δευτερεῖα δ’ ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων περιεῖναι — Second honors coexist with superiority to the remaining people.
- **138e.** οὐδὲ τὰ δευτερεῖα ἐν τούτῳ ἑκτέον — The philosopher must not accept second prizes in his own household responsibility.
- **139a.** δεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον — The final shame concerns failing to lead in entrusted judgment.

In this edition. “Second prizes” preserves the concrete competitive idiom. It should not be read as evidence for the exact awards or scoring procedure of the ancient pentathlon; the text uses the sporting image to arrange relative competence. The argumentative point survives without reconstructing those historical details.

See also. Runner-up: just under the top (p. 140) · Pentathlete and the generalist ideal (p. 112) · Reputation, seeming, and the cultivated audience (p. 138) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90) · Household and responsibility at home (p. 70)

Sickness, health, and the practical choice

ἀσθενεῖν (asthenein); ὑγεία (hygeia); κάμνειν (kamnein)

The word. Asthenein is to be weak or sick; at 136c the participle asthenēsas describes having fallen ill. Hygeia is health, the result the person wants to acquire or regain. Kamnein is to suffer or be ill in the medical context; at 138d the plural participle kamnontōn means the sick. The dictionary infinitives supplied here distinguish the verb families from the inflected forms printed in the dialogue.

In The Lovers. Illness makes the usefulness question personal. Socrates does not ask which person gives the most impressive account of medicine before an indifferent audience. He asks what the lover would do if he himself, or a friend about whom he cares greatly, fell sick. The purpose is health. The choice is between bringing in the runner-up and obtaining the doctor.

The lover first answers that he would bring both. This preserves a possibility of consultation or complementary assistance. Socrates presses him to identify whom he prefers and summons first, and the doctor wins. The case supports medical priority, but alone it does not show that the other person would contribute nothing. The distinction matters because the subsequent conclusion is absolute uselessness whenever an expert exists.

Medicine has already provided a standard for judging the proper measure of exercise and food at 134e. Its return shows that expert knowledge is useful because it is directed toward an appropriate result and can judge what serves that result. By contrast, the lover’s initial selection of studies by reputation supplies no comparable outcome.

At 138d the doctor’s speech about the sick reappears. The point is now that the philosopher should be able to follow

and contribute to technical discussion, and should be no less capable when justice and rule are at issue. The dialogue neither turns the philosopher into the treating physician nor retracts the need for the medical specialist.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **136c.** ὑγείαν βουλόμενος κτήσασθαι — The desired result makes the competence relevant.
- **136c.** ἢ αὐτὸς ἀσθενήσας ἢ τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σῶν — The stakes include oneself or a cared-for friend.
- **138d.** ἰατρὸς περὶ τῶν καμνόντων τι λέγῃ — The late argument returns to understanding medical speech.

In this edition. The translation's "health" is deliberately concrete. This is an analogy for the authority and use of knowledge, not medical advice or a diagnosis. Burnet's bracketed "the philosopher" after "that runner-up" at 136c is omitted in the English, as edition note 20 explains.

See also. Both, rather, and first: the missing inference (p. 21) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Following an expert and contributing a judgment (p. 53) · Doctor and trainer as judges of measure (p. 44) · The body and good condition (p. 160) · Friends and entrusted arbitrations (p. 59)

Sleep, hunger, thinness, and worries

καθεύδειν (katheudein); ἄγρυπνος (agrypnos); ἄσιτος (asitos); λεπτός (leptos); μέριμνα (merimna)

The word. Katheudein means to sleep; agrypnos means sleepless or wakeful; asitos means unfed or without food. Leptos means thin or slender, here of the man's body.

Merimna is a worry or care; the plural merimnōn supplies the supposed cause of thinness. These are the terms of a polemical portrait, not diagnoses made by the narrator. The dictionary infinitive katheudein appears in the text as the participle katheudōn, “sleeping.”

An unfed person and a person who eats moderately are not identical. Likewise, sleep and sleeplessness are not themselves markers of vice and wisdom. The speakers turn visible bodily habits into social labels; the argument that follows requires a different, measured standard.

In The Lovers. The cultured lover says the athlete spends life wrestling, filling himself, and sleeping. That first caricature implies a life devoid of intellectual wakefulness. The athlete’s return caricature makes the supposed thinker sleepless and unfed, his neck untrained, his body thin with worries. Excessive bodily comfort and excessive intellectual strain become competing badges of ridicule.

The context gives the retort a clear target: the man who claims wisdom has failed to recognize a principle that even a pig would know. His outward signs of study are thus represented as useless expenditure. The lads reward the joke with laughter, making the embarrassment immediate. Yet the text does not say that the cultured man really never sleeps or eats. Both descriptions use a hostile voice and comic exaggeration.

The better criterion emerges alongside the abuse: appropriate exertion and food produce bodily benefit. That principle resists both caricatures. It also prepares the claim that educational inputs should be beneficially measured. Reading the scene as a simple recommendation for hunger and sleepless study, or as a dismissal of all intensive thought, would mistake the rivals’ insults for Socrates’ conclusion.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132c.** καὶ καθεύδων πάντα τὸν βίον διατετέλεκεν — Sleeping is part of the cultured man's caricature of his rival.
- **134b.** ἄγρυπνόν τε καὶ ἄσιτον — The athlete returns a portrait of sleeplessness and hunger.
- **134b.** καὶ λεπτὸν ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν — Thinness from worries completes the comic image.

In this edition. The note at 134b identifies the portrait with comedy's picture of the philosopher. It cites the pale pupils in Aristophanes' Clouds 103 and the passage at 412–421 in which a would-be pupil is promised happiness if he can endure cold, hunger, and abstention from exercise and boasts of sleepless worry and a frugal belly. The edition's revision record carefully distinguishes the promise to the pupil from a question. These are contextual comparisons supplied by the editor, not evidence that the unnamed lover is literally an Aristophanic character.

See also. The wrestler's neck (p. 170) · Even a pig would know (p. 46) · Food and the amount that benefits (p. 55) · The body and good condition (p. 160) · Laughter, blushing, and shame (p. 88)

Socrates

Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs)

The word. Sōkratēs is the personal name Socrates. The dialogue normally presents him through first-person narration, rather than by repeated naming: he says that he entered, saw, asked, and thought. The name itself is heard in the vocative Sōkrates, "Socrates," when the cultured lover addresses him at 132c. A vocative identifies the

person spoken to; it is not a different name or the name of another speaker.

Socrates is both participant and narrator. Consequently, statements that someone appeared anxious, seemed to have lost heart, or claimed superior wisdom are already mediated by his account. The report distinguishes what he knows from what he infers. At 133a he expressly says that he does not know how the lovers were affected, while admitting that he himself was dazzled.

In The Lovers. His opening action is bodily and unceremonious: he nudges a lover with his elbow and asks what deserves the lads' earnestness. That man's contempt turns an overheard discussion about astronomy into a discussion about philosophy. Socrates first lets the athlete go because the latter claims experience in deeds rather than words, then recalls him as an ally once physical training supplies a relevant counterexample. This is a redistribution of authority within the scene: verbal confidence does not make one the best witness on every subject.

Socrates never places himself wholly outside the competitive and erotic setting. He is vulnerable to beautiful youths, makes the rivals answer before their audience, and teases them with the prospect that the lads might solve what their lovers cannot. His narrative "we" includes himself among those at a loss at 135a. Readers need not choose between a sincere inquiry and dramatic management: the written scene supplies evidence of both, without giving access to a hidden intention.

The final argument is likewise conducted through questions and agreements rather than an uninterrupted lecture. Socrates rejects the conclusion that philosophers are base and useless at 137b, then brings philosophy into

proximity with self-knowledge and right judgment. He does not finish with a new formal definition. His last explicit result is that philosophy is far from much learning and preoccupation with the crafts. The authority of the protagonist should not erase the compressed steps by which that result is reached.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132c.** ὦ Σώκρατες — The cultured lover addresses the first-person narrator by name.
- **133a.** καὶ ὅτι μὲν οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἔπαθον οὐκ οἶδα — Socrates marks a limit to his knowledge of the lovers' response.
- **135a.** ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες — His narration includes everyone in the perplexity.

In this edition. The edition's introduction stresses that Socrates narrates to no named listener. Burnet supplies neither a cast list nor speaker labels, so an English quotation mark or paragraph break is a reading aid, not an ancient stage direction. The note at 133a compares Socrates' susceptibility to beauty with the "white line" image in the Charmides, a builder's marking line invisible on white stone that suggests an inability to discriminate among beautiful youths; this is an editorial parallel, not a reference made by the speaker here. The edition also treats the dialogue's attribution to Plato as disputed. Its Socrates should therefore be read first as this work's represented speaker, without assuming that every statement establishes either the historical Socrates' doctrine or Plato's settled position.

See also. Lovers, rival lovers, and the title (p. 95) · Youths, lads, and the beloved (p. 186) · Questions, answers, and

what a thing is (p. 131) · Perplexity and looking another way (p. 115) · Fine, beautiful, and shameful (p. 50)

Solon and learning as one grows old

Σόλων (Solōn); γηράσκειν (gēraskein); διδάσκεσθαι (didaskesthai)

The word. Solōn is the personal name Solon. Gēraskein means to grow old; the quoted first-person gēraskō means "I grow old." Didaskesthai is the middle/passive form of the verb for teaching, here having the sense of being taught or learning. The verse has the participle didaskomenos, "learning," agreeing with the speaker. Translating it as "learning" is natural, but its Greek form differs from manthanein, the ordinary verb of learning used in the lover's explanation.

The verse connects aging with continued receptivity: growing old and learning many things proceed together. It does not in itself specify a curriculum, identify an expert adviser, or say that quantity alone makes learning beneficial. Those further claims must come from its use in the conversation.

In The Lovers. Asked what philosophizing is, the cultured lover appeals to Solon and quotes "I grow old always learning many things." He then prescribes that the prospective philosopher always learn at least one thing, when younger and when older, so as to learn as much as possible during life. Socrates initially finds something in the answer before asking whether it identifies philosophy with much learning. The speaker accepts that restatement.

It is important to distinguish the verse from the interpretation built upon it. Lifelong learning is not refuted merely because maximal accumulation proves an

inadequate definition of philosophy. The cultured lover has drawn a program from Solon and treated its quantity as sufficient; Socrates tests that inference through the contrast between much exertion and properly measured exertion. The line can continue to express an admirable openness without settling what, how much, or from whom to learn.

Solon also performs a social function in the scene. A lover identified with music and letters answers a definitional question by deploying poetry. That resource can start reflection, but authority does not exempt the proposed account from examination. The dialogue's later Homeric comparison likewise uses poetry to illuminate a difficulty rather than to terminate inquiry by citation.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **133c.** γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος — The line of Solon is quoted as the first answer to what philosophizing is.
- **133c.** καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ πρεσβύτερον — The lover applies continued learning to both younger and older life.

In this edition. The note identifies Solon as the Athenian lawgiver and poet of the early sixth century BC and assigns the verse to fragment 18 West. It notes allusions, rather than direct quotations, in Laches 188b and 189a and Republic 536d. The apparatus records Burnet's δ' αἰεὶ with the siglum Solo, the form supplied by Solon's own verse, beside differing forms in B and T. The edition sets the verse separately and translates didaskomenos as "learning"; its glossary explicitly flags that Greek distinction. This article reports the edition's source

identification, not an independent reconstruction of Solon's text.

See also. Learning and much learning (p. 92) · Music and literary culture (p. 107) · Subjects of learning (p. 155) · Questions, answers, and what a thing is (p. 131) · Homer, the suitors, and the bow (p. 66)

Statesman and the political craft

πολιτικός (politikos); πολιτική (politikē)

The word. Politikos can mean political or skilled in civic affairs; used of a person it is the statesman. Politikē is the corresponding feminine adjective, the statesman's art with craft understood. The edition translates the person as "statesman" and the competence as "the statesman's," avoiding the assumption that the word refers merely to anyone active in party politics in the modern sense.

In The Lovers. The political art enters immediately after the assertion that cities are well ordered when wrongdoers pay the penalty. "Then the statesman's art too is the same" links governing knowledge to the justice just identified with temperance. The order matters: the dialogue does not first define politics as power and then ask whether it should become ethical. It derives the political craft from rightful order achieved through knowledgeable judgment.

The next questions bring sole rule under the same heading and then extend the pattern to the household. At 138c the person list and the craft list make the unity explicit. The statesman shares the relevant knowledge with king, tyrant, household manager and master, and with the temperate and just person. The claim is not merely that all these people sometimes need advice from one another.

This identification depends on the earlier argument that one craft can deal with one and many. The civic community does not receive a separate science in virtue of its scale or institutional complexity. That economy is the passage's strength and a potential weakness: it points to a common standard of right judgment, while leaving unexplained any knowledge specific to managing a city rather than a household.

The philosopher's late obligation is aligned with this political knowledge but not fully defined by it. If the city entrusts him with deciding or judging something, he must lead rather than accept second place. The dialogue thereby makes civic competence central to its critique of cultivated generalism. It does not explicitly equate philosophy, in a final definitional answer, with the statesman's craft.

Readers may compare other dialogues that connect political and household knowledge, but the short chain here must still be evaluated on its own wording. The point is the competence to order rightly, not the claim that every person called a statesman in ordinary life is already just and temperate.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **138b.** Καὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρα αὐτή ἐστιν — Political art is identified with the knowledge just described.
- **138c.** πολιτικός, οἰκονόμος, δεσπότης — The person list carries the identity across civic and household roles.
- **138c.** τυραννική, πολιτική, δεσποτική — The craft list repeats the unification.

In this edition. Edition note 29 compares Statesman 258e–259c, which argues that the knowledge of statesman, king,

master of slaves and household manager is one. The supplied introduction also mentions Alcibiades I 133d–e as a related passage. Such parallels illuminate the conceptual neighborhood; they are not explicit citations in the Lovers or proof of its authorship.

See also. City, good order, and paying the penalty (p. 29) · King and the kingly craft (p. 79) · Tyrant and the surprising identity with the king (p. 173) · Household manager and the household art (p. 72) · Master and the master's craft (p. 99) · One, many, and the claim to one craft (p. 110) · Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90)

Subjects of learning

μάθημα (mathēma); μαθήματα (mathēmata)

The word. Mathēma is something learned, a subject or item of learning; mathēmata is its plural. The edition consistently uses "subjects of learning." That wording leaves open whether a given instance is a skill, a discipline, or another learnable matter. The Greek word is not restricted here to modern mathematics, despite the familiar descendant of the same root and the circles seen at the opening.

An activity of learning and its objects need separate names. Manthanein denotes the process; polymathia describes much learning; mathēmata are what one learns. The shift to this noun allows Socrates to ask not only about enthusiasm or quantity but about the appropriate contents of education.

In The Lovers. At 134d subjects of learning are counted among what is supplied to the soul. The premise makes the body-soul analogy possible: just as food and exertion must

suit the body, educational inputs should benefit the soul. The analogy does not claim that knowledge literally enters the mind as edible matter. It provides a way to ask about quantity, quality, and skilled selection.

The agricultural formulation immediately sharpens those questions. Who can say “how many and what kind” are moderate when subjects are planted and sown in a soul? The difficulty is not simply that there are too many options. No agreed competent adviser has been named. A curriculum needs a standard and someone able to judge by it.

After the resulting perplexity, Socrates asks what sort of subjects the philosopher must learn, since they are not all or many. This does not follow as a newly established numerical limit for every learner; it resumes the constraints conceded against indiscriminate accumulation. The cultured lover’s answer chooses subjects likely to yield the greatest reputation and familiarity with crafts. The unresolved question of genuine benefit consequently reappears in another form.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **134d.** Οὐκοῦν ἓν τῶν προσφερομένων ψυχῇ ἐστι καὶ τὰ μαθήματα; — Learning-subjects are among the things supplied to the soul.
- **134e.** ὁπόσα καὶ ὁποῖα μέτρια — The inquiry asks both how many and what kind are measured appropriately.
- **135a.** τῶν μαθημάτων ἃ δεῖ τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα μανθάνειν — The next approach retains learning while reconsidering its contents.

In this edition. The final review of the edition records the decision to render mathēmata uniformly as “subjects of learning.” That consistency lets readers hear the same object moving through nourishment, sowing, and curricular selection. At 135a7 the Editorial Note points out that Burnet’s printed wording combines an order and a word drawn from different reported witnesses. The uncertainty concerns the formulation “what sort … at our best guess,” not a warrant to replace mathēmata with a narrower modern discipline.

See also. Learning and much learning (p. 92) · The soul as the recipient of learning (p. 163) · Farmer, seeds, planting, and sowing (p. 48) · Moderation and measure (p. 104) · Perplexity and looking another way (p. 115)

Temperance as self-knowledge

σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē); σωφρονεῖν (sōphronein); σώφρων (sōphrōn)

The word. Sōphrosynē is temperance, sound-minded self-control or discretion; sōphronein is to be temperate or exercise such soundness; sōphrōn is temperate or a temperate person. The edition’s Key Words explain the word’s connection with soundness and mind. The familiar English “temperance” should not narrow the subject to moderation in drinking. Here its decisive content is knowing oneself.

The word is also distinct from metrios, moderate, in the earlier discussion of exercise, food and learning. Both have associations with measure and limits, but the dialogue does not derive temperance simply by repeating the quantitative conclusion that neither too much nor too little is beneficial.

In The Lovers. At 138a Socrates asks whether being ignorant of oneself is being temperate or not. The interlocutor chooses not being temperate. Socrates then identifies knowing oneself with being temperate, receives assent and interprets the Delphic inscription as urging temperance and justice. The transition rests on the preceding argument that evaluative knowledge of humans includes oneself as a human.

The positive identity is stronger than the initial exclusion. From the claim that self-ignorance is not temperance, one might infer that temperance requires self-knowledge; saying self-knowledge is temperance also makes it sufficient. The text does not pause to defend that strengthening. Its brisk question-and-answer structure invites a reader to test the relation rather than supplying a formal analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Temperance is then described as that by which one discriminates oneself and others. This is wider than private inward inspection and more cognitive than a simple ability to restrain appetite. Since the same competence has been assigned the function of right punishment, justice and temperance are declared one. The two virtues are not merely praised together; they are identified through their common knowledge.

The final list places the temperate person alongside king, tyrant, statesman, household manager, master and just person. The corresponding list of capacities culminates in justice and temperance as one craft. This does not establish that every actual officeholder is temperate. The route into the list has stipulated right ordering and knowledgeable judgment, and the identity concerns those roles insofar as they possess the requisite competence.

The philosopher's responsibility to lead then becomes a demand to possess and exercise this ethical knowledge rather than remain a second-ranked spectator. It would be too strong, however, to present the text as having formally defined philosophy as temperance. The dialogue offers a direction and a cluster of identifications, while its final stated conclusion is negative.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **138a.** Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖν σωφρονεῖν ἐστιν ἢ μὴ σωφρονεῖν — Self-ignorance is tested against the virtue.
- **138a.** σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην — The Delphic exhortation is interpreted as a call to practice both virtues.
- **138c.** δεσπότης, σώφρων, δίκαιος — The list joins governing roles with temperate and just persons.

In this edition. The edition maintains "temperance" across the noun, verb and adjective, rather than changing to "wisdom" when knowledge becomes prominent. That consistency lets the reader see the intellectual reinterpretation of a familiar ethical term. The comparison with the Charmides is supplied by note 27 and should be identified as a parallel, not a dialogue explicitly cited by Socrates here.

See also. Knowing oneself and one's quality (p. 83) · Delphi, the inscription, and practice (p. 38) · Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · One, many, and the claim to one craft (p. 110) · Moderation and measure (p. 104)

The body and good condition

σῶμα (sōma); εὖ ἔχειν (eu echein); εὐεξία (euexia)

The word. Sōma means the body. Eu echein means to be well or in good condition: eu is “well,” and echein, literally “to have” or “hold,” forms an idiom of being in a condition. Euexia is the corresponding noun, good condition. The argument passes from having the body well to the good condition produced in people by exercise. The change of grammatical form does not introduce a new goal.

Good condition is not simply a large body, a thin body, or visible attractiveness. The rivals’ insults invoke those appearances, but Socrates’ inquiry asks what produces the appropriate bodily outcome. Nor does this occurrence establish every aspect of human flourishing under the label euexia; its immediate setting is training.

In The Lovers. The body provides the first relatively agreed domain in which an activity can be judged by its result. The love of exercise is conceded to be fine and good, and its practitioners are said to desire what makes their bodies well. Socrates can therefore ask whether a greater quantity of exertion reliably produces that result. The athlete’s answer gives measure priority over quantity.

Food then broadens the test beyond exertion. After agreement that moderate food is beneficial, Socrates presses the claim across all bodily matters. This expansion supports the subsequent move to the soul. The argument’s strength lies in moving from familiar practices toward a harder educational question; its vulnerable point is the breadth of the generalization. The interlocutor’s concession should not be mistaken for a detailed demonstration covering every possible bodily input.

The initial opposition of a bodily athlete and a cultured lover is unsettled along the way. The bodily expert supplies a sound principle, while the cultured man's caricature of excessive eating and sleep returns against him as a caricature of sleeplessness and hunger. Neither bodily neglect nor bodily absorption is itself the recommended philosophical life. The dialogue's positive question is how a pursuit benefits the person it shapes.

At 134e doctors and trainers can be named as appropriate advisers for bodily measure. Naming them makes the later inability to name an equivalent adviser for the soul a specific deficit in judgment, rather than a general inability to recognize expertise anywhere.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **133e.** εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα — The end attributed to those who love exercise.
- **134c.** τὴν εὐεξίαν ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις — The noun good condition restates the effect of moderate exercises.
- **134d.** τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα — Socrates generalizes from exercise and food to bodily matters.

In this edition. The edition preserves the idiom "have their bodies in good condition" and the noun "good condition," making the repeated goal audible. This differs from the "health" sought in the later illness example, where the Greek uses another term. The body-soul pairing here should also be kept local: no argument for the soul's immortality or separation from the body appears in this passage.

See also. Labor and much labor (p. 86) · Food and the amount that benefits (p. 55) · The soul as the recipient of

learning (p. 163) · Moderation and measure (p. 104) · Doctor and trainer as judges of measure (p. 44)

The ship in a storm

ναῦς (naus); χειμάζεσθαι (cheimazesthai)

The word. Naus means ship; the text has its dative nēi, “in a ship.” Cheimazesthai means to be storm-tossed or exposed to stormy weather. The participle cheimazomenēi agrees with the ship at 136d. The situation is already an emergency, not a calm comparison of general educational accomplishments.

In The Lovers. After the doctor receives priority in illness, Socrates asks whom the lover would trust on a storm-tossed ship: the pilot or philosopher. The answer is the pilot. The example strengthens the felt urgency of appropriate expertise. One’s own person and belongings are at stake, and a theoretical claim to breadth offers little reassurance if navigation is the immediate need.

The ship is often readily allegorized, but this passage does not explicitly call the city a ship or a ruler its pilot. Its immediate role is a practical test of the runner-up’s alleged usefulness. The political argument comes later through punishment, justice and the ordering of a city. Reading a latent governing analogy is possible, but it should remain an interpretation rather than part of the sentence’s literal content.

Like the medical example, the storm establishes whom to prefer, not independently that all nonpilots aboard are useless. The dialogue immediately generalizes from the chosen expert to the claim that the philosopher is not useful whenever a craftsman is present. Keeping the ship’s precise function visible allows the reader to appreciate the

force of the emergency without treating it as a complete proof of that stronger claim.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **136d.** ἐν νηὶ χειμαζομένῃ — The emergency is a ship being storm-tossed.
- **136d.** σαυτόν τε καὶ τὰ σεαυτοῦ — Both person and possessions are entrusted.

In this edition. The edition renders the compact Greek situation as “in a storm” within the ship question. It supplies no account of vessel type, crew organization or a particular voyage. Those details are unnecessary for the comparison and should not be invented to make the scene more picturesque.

See also. Pilot and entrusting responsibility (p. 120) · Both, rather, and first: the missing inference (p. 21) · Useful and useless: the decisive test (p. 179) · Craft and the limits of expertise (p. 31)

The soul as the recipient of learning

ψυχή (psychē)

The word. Psychē means soul. Here it names the aspect of the person to which subjects of learning are supplied and in which they can be planted or sown. The passage does not pause to define the soul’s substance or parts. Rendering psychē simply as a modern “mind” might make the educational context familiar, but would narrow the Greek and obscure its place in the wider ethical vocabulary of the dialogue.

The inflected psychēn follows “concerning” at 134d, psychēi marks the recipient of what is supplied, and eis

psychēn at 134e describes planting into a soul. The grammatical changes keep the same recipient in view through several images.

In The Lovers. The soul appears after the interlocutors agree that moderation benefits the body. Socrates asks whether moderate or immoderate amounts of what is supplied benefit the soul. Once moderation is conceded, subjects of learning are counted among those supplies. An educational account based solely on accumulating as much as possible is thereby brought under the same test as diet and exercise.

The subsequent planting and sowing metaphor introduces cultivation rather than passive storage. Learning has to be selected and apportioned so that it develops well in its recipient. The question asks both how many subjects and what kind are appropriate, and who is competent to judge. It is therefore more than a recommendation that everyone learn a middling amount. A measure has to answer to the nature and good of what is cultivated.

All three adults fail to identify the required adviser. The difficulty can be read as the central educational problem the opening has uncovered: they can name authorities for familiar bodily and agricultural practices, but cannot yet identify the knowledge by which education becomes beneficial. The remainder of the dialogue moves through general learning and crafts toward self-knowledge and right judgment. That development suggests a possible answer, but the speaker never explicitly returns to name a “farmer of souls” or to give a complete curriculum.

Nothing in this passage establishes that body and soul are enemies or that bodily pursuits are intrinsically inferior. The athlete’s bodily experience has made the educational

problem visible. The analogy depends on both as possible recipients of beneficial and inappropriate treatment.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **134d.** τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν — The argument moves from bodily matters to the soul.
- **134d.** τῶν προσφερομένων ψυχῇ — Learning is considered among what is supplied to the soul.
- **134e.** περὶ μαθημάτων εἰς ψυχὴν φυτεύσεώς τε καὶ σπορᾶς — The educational question becomes one of planting and sowing in a soul.

In this edition. The translation keeps “soul” through the supply and planting images and consistently calls mathēmata “subjects of learning.” The edition’s introduction links the eventual positive direction to knowledge of oneself and ordering of household and city, while emphasizing that the dialogue reaches identifications rather than an explicit final definition of philosophy. That caution applies especially here: the soul’s good motivates the inquiry without receiving a separate systematic account.

See also. The body and good condition (p. 160) · Subjects of learning (p. 155) · Farmer, seeds, planting, and sowing (p. 48) · Moderation and measure (p. 104) · Perplexity and looking another way (p. 115)

The top master builder

ἀρχιτέκτων (architektōn); ἄκρος (akros)

The word. Architektōn is a master builder, the leading practitioner responsible for building work. “Architect” is a related modern word but could suggest a modern division

of design and construction not supplied by this passage. Akros means top, highest or at the summit; it marks outstanding command, not merely possession of the occupational title. The accusative phrase at 135c is akron architektona, “a top master builder.”

In The Lovers. The master builder is Socrates’ first candidate for what the lover means by understanding without handiwork. His enormous value and rarity suggest a kind of intelligence that does much more than attend conversations about construction. There might be only a few such people even in all Greece. The example therefore takes the proposed intellectual distinction in a demanding direction before the lover scales it back.

The price statement is negative: not even ten thousand drachmas would buy this person. It is not a claim that every master builder costs precisely that amount, nor an exact salary attached to an occupation. Socrates uses the distance from a carpenter’s five or six minae to bring scarcity and depth into view. An education that promised the corresponding mastery of many great crafts would face a serious burden.

Akros also prepares the later word hypakros, the runner-up “just under the top.” The dialogue moves from a person at the summit of a field to a person just below each summit. That verbal connection gives the pentathlete proposal more precision than “a little of everything.” The revised philosopher is still meant to be impressive; he simply no longer possesses the full command represented by the top builder. The later objection is not that such a person knows nothing, but that a better-qualified practitioner will be preferred when the craft is needed.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135c.** ἄκρον ἀρχιτέκτονα δὲ οὐδ’ ἂν μυρίων δραχμῶν — Not even ten thousand drachmas would purchase the top master builder.
- **135c.** ὀλίγοι γε μὴν κἂν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι γίγνοιντο — Rarity extends across Greece in Socrates’ hypothetical comparison.

In this edition. The edition’s notes 16 and 18 connect “top” with “runner-up.” That is a lexical explanation of the Greek, whereas treating the builder as an image of philosophical mastery would be an interpretation. The text never explicitly names the master builder a philosopher.

See also. Carpenter and carpentry (p. 25) · Minae, drachmas, and the price comparison (p. 102) · Runner-up: just under the top (p. 140) · Precision and the cost of mastery (p. 124) · Understanding and handiwork (p. 175)

The wise man’s silence and the others’ praise

σιγᾶν (sigan); ἀμαθής (amathēs); ἐπαινεῖν (epainein); αἰσχύνεσθαι (aischynesthai)

The word. Sigan means to be silent; the aorist esigēsen reports that the cultivated lover fell silent. Amathēs means unlearned, lacking learning; it labels the athletic lover in the final sentence. Epainein means to praise or approve, with epēinesan reporting the others’ response. Aischynesthai is to feel shame or be ashamed; the participle aischyntheis gives the wise one’s reaction to what was said before.

The terms describe the outcome of the encounter, not four new propositions about the nature of philosophy.

“Unlearned” also echoes the root of polymathia, the “much learning” initially proposed as philosophy.

In The Lovers. Socrates’ last statement rejects much learning and occupation with crafts. The narrator then calls one rival “the wise one” and the other “the unlearned one.” The labels are dramatically loaded. The man who claimed superior learning is now silent and ashamed, while the one whose learning was disparaged affirms what has been said. Edition note 30 highlights the lexical return to the root of much learning.

This reversal does not establish that ignorance is philosophy or that the athlete has become an expert in the one governing craft. His final agreement is reported without a new argument from him. The scene instead exposes the inadequacy of the cultivated lover’s confident account and rearranges the status competition that had animated the discussion.

Silence also has different roles across the dialogue. The lads’ earlier silence made them listeners; the athlete’s temporary silence allowed Socrates to call on his practical expertise. The final silence belongs to someone whose account has failed in public. It can signal shame and lack of a reply without proving that he has accepted a fully articulated positive teaching. The narrator explicitly supplies shame as its circumstance, so purely serene contemplation would be an unsupported redescription.

The others’ praise closes the narrated scene with approval. The text does not specify every member of that group or give their reasons. Their reaction therefore belongs to dramatic evidence about persuasion and reception, not an independent logical warrant for all the preceding transitions.

The ending remains open in a specific sense. Two proposed definitions have been rejected and a demanding ethical-political orientation has been introduced, yet no final definition states exactly whether philosophy is the unified craft, knowledge of it or love of it. The audience can applaud and the proud speaker can be refuted while that conceptual question remains uncompleted.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **139a.** ὁ μὲν σοφὸς αἰσχυνθεὶς τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐσίγησεν — The wise one's silence is explicitly associated with shame.
- **139a.** ὁ δὲ ἀμαθὴς ἔφη ἐκείνως εἶναι — The unlearned rival agrees with the final statement.
- **139a.** καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπῄνεσαν τὰ εἰρημένα — The other listeners praise what has been said.

In this edition. Note 30 connects amathēs with polymathia. The apparatus also reports B's polymathia and T's philomathia in the concluding rejection at 139a; the running text chooses "much learning," matching the earlier thesis and the translation. The lexical closing effect belongs to that printed reading.

See also. Agreement, recap, and refutation (p. 13) · Reputation, seeming, and the cultivated audience (p. 138) · Leading rather than remaining second (p. 90) · Learning and much learning (p. 92) · Wisdom and the claim to be wiser (p. 182) · Fine, beautiful, and shameful (p. 50)

The wrestler’s neck

τράχηλος (trachēlos); τραχηλίζεσθαι (trachēlizesthai); ἀτριβής (atribēs)

The word. Trachēlos means neck. Trachēlizesthai means to have the neck seized and bent in wrestling; the opening participle trachēlizomenos describes undergoing that treatment. Atribēs means unrubbed or unworn and, by extension in relevant contexts, unpractised. Here the adjective describes the rival’s neck: a neck bearing no sign of the athlete’s familiar friction or handling. The local translation “unrubbed” preserves the physical echo.

The bodily image needs care in English. “Having his neck wrung” can suggest killing, whereas the passage’s point is a recurring wrestling experience. The insult reduces a whole life of training to the treatment of one body part; it is not a report of mortal violence.

In The Lovers. The cultured lover’s first attack says the athlete has spent his whole life having his neck twisted, stuffing himself, and sleeping. A practice that might have its own discipline is recast as passive, bodily repetition. The athlete later answers with an “unrubbed neck” among his portrait of the philosopher as hungry, sleepless, and thin with worries. Each rival uses the other’s absence from his own practice as evidence of inferiority.

The verbal echo is exact enough to matter dramatically. The athlete has heard and retained the insult, then reverses its evaluative direction: the untrained neck is now the defect. The two physical caricatures explain why this debate cannot be read as a frictionless exchange of propositions. Each concession takes place under a personal threat to reputation.

Still, the athlete's expertise is more than a neck. Socrates recalls him because of experience in gymnastics, and his substantive contribution identifies appropriate measure. The scene thereby lets a crude bodily joke coexist with a real correction to the cultured speaker's reasoning. Neither the insult nor its answer should be substituted for a complete account of either man.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132c.** τραχηλιζόμενος καὶ ἐμπιμπλάμενος καὶ καθεύδων — The cultured lover caricatures the athlete's bodily life.
- **134b.** ἀτριβῆ τὸν τράχηλον ἔχοντα — The athlete's retort reverses the neck image.

In this edition. The note at 132c explicitly derives the wrestling verb from trachēlos and connects it with the later "unrubbed neck." The edition's revision record explains why "wrung" became "twisted": the earlier English risked suggesting killing. That small translation correction changes the imagined scene substantially. No technical reconstruction of an exact wrestling hold is required beyond what the edition's note supplies.

See also. Gymnastics and the lover of exercise (p. 63) · Sleep, hunger, thinness, and worries (p. 146) · Quarreling, contention, and love of victory (p. 129) · Words and deeds (p. 184)

Things up in the sky

μετέωρος (meteōros); τὰ μετέωρα (ta meteōra)

The word. Meteōros means raised or up aloft. Its neuter plural with the article, ta meteōra, means the things above or in the sky. In the athlete's speech the genitive tōn

meteōrōn follows “about.” The edition’s “the things up in the sky” preserves an ordinary descriptive phrase rather than substituting the modern technical discipline “meteorology.” The latter would also mislead by narrowing the phrase toward weather, whereas the opening names thinkers and shows circles and inclinations.

In The Lovers. The expression belongs to a hostile speech. The athlete says the boys prattle about the things in the sky and talk nonsense while philosophizing. A cosmological subject is thus bundled with a contemptuous judgment about the activity. Socrates does not endorse that bundle: he is surprised by the answer and asks why philosophizing should be shameful.

The phrase helps define the distance traversed by the dialogue. Its initial instance of philosophy concerns distant things apparently represented in diagrams. Its final sequence concerns oneself, other people, the household, and the city. One can reasonably read the movement as a reorientation of philosophical importance, but not as a demonstrated ban on investigating the heavens. The text never evaluates the boys’ actual astronomical conclusions.

It is equally important not to turn the athlete’s sneer into a secure historical definition of philosophy. The dialogue makes such a label the occasion for inquiry. What people call philosophizing is precisely what the interlocutors have not yet adequately explained.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132b.** περὶ τῶν μετεώρων — The skyward subject is named by the disparaging lover.

In this edition. The note at 132b connects the expression with comic portrayals of philosophers. It cites

Aristophanes' Clouds 225–228, where Socrates investigates things above from a basket, and passages calling his school prattle. The supplied edition, rather than a fresh survey of comedy, is the source for that contextual connection. The note's comparison illuminates the tone of the athlete's remark; it does not establish a quotation from a particular comic line in The Lovers.

See also. Prattling and talking nonsense (p. 122) · Circles, drawing, and inclinations (p. 27) · Anaxagoras (p. 17) · Oenopides (p. 109)

Tyrant and the surprising identity with the king

τύραννος (tyrannos); τυραννική (tyrannikē)

The word. Tyrannos is a tyrant or sole ruler; tyrannikē is the adjective "tyrannical," here qualifying a craft. Edition note 28 explains the historical title as a sole ruler whose power lacks a lawful or traditional title and notes that it was not always a word of blame. That background should not be confused with the modern tendency to make "tyrant" itself mean a cruel and unjust ruler.

In The Lovers. At 138b Socrates asks the name of one man who orders a city rightly. The accepted answer pairs tyrant and king, and the corresponding crafts are treated as identical with the previously established knowledge. Tyrant then appears again in the comprehensive list at 138c. Its inclusion is one of the most exposed features of the passage.

The qualification "rightly" explains part of the move: the argument begins from competent good order and then attaches names to its agent. Yet the names are not politically innocent. The dialogue offers no sustained

examination of how rule was acquired, whether subjects consent or how a tyrant differs from a king. It acts as though those title distinctions do not affect the knowledge now under consideration.

A charitable interpretation is that the same knowledge would be required to order rightly, whatever the officeholder is called. A more critical reading sees the conflation as too quick, especially if illegitimacy or coercive rule affects the nature of the political task. The text does not adjudicate between these readings; it records assent and continues toward household rule.

The term is therefore not a license to claim that the dialogue endorses cruelty, nor should it be quietly omitted to make the final unity less troubling. The supplied edition itself singles out the issue by contrasting the Statesman, which separates tyrant and king at the relevant point. The lexicon preserves the surprise rather than smoothing it away.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **138b.** τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς — The two titles are paired in the answer about right sole rule.
- **138c.** βασιλική, τυραννική, πολιτική — The tyrannical craft remains in the final unity list.

In this edition. Notes 28–29 supply the historical nuance and the comparison with Statesman 276e; the longer unification of governing knowledge is located at Statesman 258e–259c. These are the edition's references, not works named within the Lovers. The difference between the dialogues should remain a difference rather than be resolved by importing the other dialogue's distinction here.

See also. King and the kingly craft (p. 79) · Statesman and the political craft (p. 153) · City, good order, and paying the penalty (p. 29) · One, many, and the claim to one craft (p. 110) · Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76)

Understanding and handiwork

σύνεσις (synesis); χειρουργία (cheirourgia)

The word. Synesis is understanding: the capacity to grasp what is involved in a subject or activity. Cheirourgia is handiwork, work performed with the hands. At 135b the text has their genitives, syneseōs and cheirourgias, after a phrase meaning "belongs to" or "has to do with." The lover selects what belongs to understanding and excludes what belongs to handiwork. This is his proposed educational boundary, not a neutral statement that every craft consists of two fully separable departments.

Neither word should be silently translated into a later division between pure theory and applied science. Understanding here is displayed in following practitioners' explanations and contributing a judgment about what they say and do. It is therefore intellectually active and connected to practice, even though the learner avoids acquiring a craft through manual performance.

In The Lovers. The distinction is introduced to reconcile breadth with the standing of a free man. The cultivated lover wants wide familiarity, but not the sort of involvement that might identify him with a working craftsman. Socrates' building example tests the demand at its strongest: perhaps he means the rare understanding of a top master builder as opposed to that of an ordinary carpenter. When Socrates asks whether even two crafts can be mastered on that scale, the lover clarifies that he

does not require precision comparable to the practitioner's.

The clarification exposes an ambiguity in "understanding." It might initially suggest the directing intelligence that makes a master builder exceptionally valuable. It comes instead to mean a listener's informed participation, superior to that of other nonspecialists but inferior to expert command. The pentathlete image resolves that ambiguity into a ranking. The philosopher is below the first in "understanding of the crafts" (136a), while above the rest.

This leaves a serious question for the usefulness test. Socrates treats inferior understanding as grounds for preferring a specialist in illness or a storm. The earlier distinction could have supported a complementary role for someone who interprets, compares or evaluates expert advice, but the lover does not develop such a defense. Calling this a possible reply identifies an opening in the argument; it does not attribute an unstated theory of interdisciplinary knowledge to the dialogue.

At the end, following and contributing return in the sphere of judging and ruling. The intellectual capacities originally offered as sufficient become a minimum: the philosopher must also undertake responsibility and judge rightly. The movement is from cultivated comprehension towards accountable action, without a claim that all manual proficiency is itself philosophical.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **135b.** ὅσα συνέσεως ἔχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας — The proposed distinction specifies what free men should learn.

- **136a.** πρώτων εἰς σύνεσιν περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐλλείπεσθαι — Even in understanding, the proposed philosopher falls short of the first.

In this edition. “Understanding” and “handiwork” preserve the immediate opposition without importing “theory” and “practice.” The edition’s building note helps mark the substantial difference between conceptual command and merely respectable conversation. The passage should nevertheless be read as a sequence of proposed interpretations and corrections, not as one settled account of technical intelligence.

See also. Freedom, education, and being a slave to one pursuit (p. 57) · The top master builder (p. 165) · Precision and the cost of mastery (p. 124) · Following an expert and contributing a judgment (p. 53) · Craft and the limits of expertise (p. 31)

Unruliness and breaking the law

ἀκολασταίνειν (akolastainein); παρανομεῖν (paranomein)

The word. Akolastainein is to be unruly or undisciplined. Paranomein is to act contrary to law or break the law. At 137d the present participles akolastainontas and paranomountas describe the people whom the relevant civic knowledge punishes rightly. The pair joins disorderly conduct with violation of law without explicitly making them synonyms.

Akolastainein belongs to the family of akolastos, literally unchastened, and is connected with kolazein, to punish or correct. Edition note 25 draws attention to that connection. Paranomein introduces law into the discussion, but the passage supplies neither a particular statute nor a systematic account of what makes a law just.

In The Lovers. The words occur when the animal-training analogy becomes a civic argument. Socrates has secured agreement that the craft improving human beings also punishes rightly and distinguishes decent from worthless. He now asks for the knowledge that does this in cities, specifying people who are unruly and break the law. “The judge’s” is the answer, and the knowledge is identified with justice.

The specification prevents the argument from being read as punishment of people simply because a ruler dislikes them. There is conduct to be corrected, and punishment must be right. Yet the text does not spell out the relation between legal violation, moral badness and the need for improvement. The short question draws those considerations into one practical picture.

The resulting theory is therefore not a complete philosophy of law. It does not discuss unjust legislation, conflict between law and virtue or criteria for proportionate penalty. Those would be genuine further questions, not answers silently contained in the vocabulary. The dialogue uses the familiar judicial function to move toward a unity of corrective and discriminating knowledge.

The contrast with temperance is also suggestive. The unchastened person is the object of right correction, while the temperate person possesses self-knowledge. But the argument does not explicitly define temperance as having been punished. It identifies temperance with knowing oneself, then unites that knowledge with the knowledge of right punishment.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **137d.** τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀκολασταίνοντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας — The civic subjects are specified by unruliness and lawbreaking.
- **137d.** ὀρθῶς κολάζει — Correctness remains a condition on the punishment.

In this edition. The edition's "unruly and break the law" keeps two descriptions where a loose paraphrase might say only "criminals." That broader modern noun could obscure the corrective word-family and imply a more precise legal category than the text provides.

See also. Punishing rightly and correcting (p. 126) · Justice, the judge's knowledge, and judging (p. 76) · City, good order, and paying the penalty (p. 29) · Temperance as self-knowledge (p. 157)

Useful and useless: the decisive test

χρήσιμος (chrēsimos); ἄχρηστος (achrēstos); ἀχρεῖος (achreios)

The word. Chrēsimos means useful, capable of serving a purpose. Achrēstos means useless; achreios, used at 138e, likewise means of no use. The edition keeps "useful" and "useless" for the principal opposition, then uses "of no use" in the final application. Usefulness here is relational: useful to someone, in some situation, for a desired result. The question "where are they actually useful to us?" asks for an identifiable application rather than a purely honorific assessment.

Chrēsimos is related to chrēstos, "decent" in the later discussion; achrēstos literally negates the same verbal family. That lexical connection makes the movement

between functional value and the quality of a person easy to hear. It does not itself prove that usefulness and goodness are identical.

In The Lovers. The lover accepts that good people are useful and base people useless, then goes beyond Socrates' question to call philosophers "most useful" (136b–c). Socrates now has a claim stronger than cultural distinction to test. A person who is second to each specialist must explain where this alleged supreme usefulness appears.

Illness supplies the first trial. The interlocutor's initial answer, "Both," allows doctor and runner-up to help together. Socrates excludes that response and asks whom he would summon rather and first. The doctor has priority. In the storm example the pilot is the person to whom one entrusts oneself and one's belongings. The argument then generalizes: as long as a craftsman is present, the philosopher is not useful. Because craftsmen are said always to exist, this becomes an unrestricted practical indictment of the proposed philosopher.

The key inference is stronger than the examples. "A is preferred to B" does not by itself entail "B has no use," and the initial answer "Both" points directly toward a possible complementary role. Nor does an expert's existence somewhere automatically establish availability to every person at every moment. The lover nevertheless accepts the generalization, and the dialogue proceeds with the accepted account. A reading that silently supplies these missing premises makes the argument smoother than the text.

The conclusion that philosophers would be base is also governed by the accepted moral division between good/useful and base/useless. The text does not separately examine whether a person might be neither, or useful in

one respect and harmful in another. The refutation is strongest as a challenge to the lover's combined commitments: philosophy is fine and good, yet philosophy as he defines it appears to offer no distinctive needed competence.

Socrates immediately resists treating the damaging conclusion as the truth about philosophers. At 137b he suspects "they are not so" and proposes that philosophizing is something else. The closing sequence looks for a sphere in which a philosopher must exercise authoritative judgment rather than offer optional secondary help. It rejects a particular account of usefulness without spelling out a complete positive theory of philosophy.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **136b.** τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πότερον χρησίμους ἢ ἀχρήστους — The practical test begins with the value of good people.
- **136c.** χρησιμωτάτους εἶναι ἡγεῖσθαι — The lover intensifies the claim to "most useful."
- **136d.** ἕως ἄν τις δημιουργὸς ᾖ, οὐ χρήσιμός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος — The decisive generalization moves from preference to nonusefulness.
- **138e.** καὶ ἀχρεῖον εἶναι — The final question recalls the verdict of no use.

In this edition. Edition note 24 explains the lexical relationship between usefulness and decent or bad quality. Note 21 identifies "always" at 136e as Hermann's correction. Both points aid reading, but neither removes the logical gap between priority and uselessness. The edition's introduction itself distinguishes the rejected

runner-up account from the unnamed alternative sought at the close.

See also. Both, rather, and first: the missing inference (p. 21) · Runner-up: just under the top (p. 140) · Good and base in the argument about value (p. 61) · Decent and worthless: judging quality (p. 36) · Craftsman and specialist (p. 34) · Pilot and entrusting responsibility (p. 120) · Sickness, health, and the practical choice (p. 145) · Philosophy and philosophizing (p. 117)

Wisdom and the claim to be wiser

σοφός (sophos); σοφώτερος (sophōteros); σοφώτατος (sophōtatos); προσποιεῖσθαι (prospoieisthai)

The word. Sophos means wise or skilled; sophōteros is its comparative, “wiser,” and sophōtatos its superlative, “wisest.” Prospoieisthai means here to lay claim to something, to represent oneself as possessing an attribute. It need not by itself mean fraudulent pretence. The opening combination is crucial: Socrates questions “the one who laid claim to being wiser,” not a man whose superior wisdom has already been established.

The degrees of the adjective distinguish different comparisons. A claim to be wiser than a nearby rival is modest compared with appearing the wisest among all those present; neither is the same as knowing what wisdom itself is. The narrative can call the man “the wiser one” or “the wise one” after introducing him through his claim, without silently validating everything he says.

In The Lovers. The claim determines Socrates’ initial choice of respondent. He hopes, or says that he hopes, to benefit from the man who professes greater wisdom. This makes the ensuing examination a test appropriate to the

speaker's own standing. The simple question whether philosophizing is fine quickly turns into what philosophizing is, and the speaker answers with certainty. His knowledge of a verse and his readiness to make broad claims create the appearance of ample resources.

What fails is his account of the relevant excellence. First he equates philosophy with accumulating learning. Next, when quantity is challenged, he chooses subjects that bring reputation and imagines a person able to seem most accomplished and wisest before any gathering. Wisdom becomes increasingly entangled with a comparison among spectators. Socrates redirects the question toward actual benefit and the work that must be done.

The final label "the wise one" accompanies his shame and silence, while "the unlearned one" agrees. That ending invites irony, but it does not establish a simple reversal whereby the athlete has become the wise man and the cultured lover knows nothing. He has recognized objections and granted premises. The point is that his claim cannot substitute for a defensible account, and his self-image has been brought under pressure.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132d.** τὸν δὲ σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον εἶναι — The claim to be wiser motivates Socrates' closer questioning.
- **135d.** ὥστε δοκεῖν χαριέστατον εἶναι καὶ σοφώτατον — The revised ideal aims at appearing most accomplished and wisest.
- **139a.** ὁ μὲν σοφὸς αἰσχυνθεὶς — The closing designation "wise" survives into the scene of shame.

In this edition. Burnet prints sophōteron at 132d, with T; the apparatus reports B's sophōtaton, "wisest." The edition translates the printed comparative and then preserves "the wiser one" at 135b and "the wise one" at 139a. Its note on the ending explains the shared learning-root of "unlearned" and "much learning." The glossary's listing of all three degrees is therefore philosophically useful: comparative superiority, superlative display, and the unqualified label occupy distinct dramatic moments.

See also. Music and literary culture (p. 107) · Ambition, anxiety, and display (p. 15) · Learning and much learning (p. 92) · Laughter, blushing, and shame (p. 88) · Benefit and beneficial learning (p. 19)

Words and deeds

λόγος (logos); ἔργον (ergon)

The word. Logos can denote speech, words, an account, or an argument. Ergon is a deed or work, something done rather than merely said. At 132d the plural logōn and ergōn oppose the two spheres in which the athlete does and does not claim experience: words and deeds. The same Greek noun logos later names the argument under dispute. Its changing English rendering follows context, not a change to an unrelated Greek word.

"Deeds" should not be understood as moral achievements by definition. Here the immediate reference is the athlete's practical sphere. Nor does logos automatically mean reason as a metaphysical faculty. The relevant questions are who can answer, what an answer means, and whether the position can survive examination.

In The Lovers. Socrates initially chooses the man who claims superior wisdom as the proper person to question

closely. This is responsive to the men's own representations: the athlete does not claim verbal expertise. When the practical effects of exertion become relevant, Socrates turns back to him. The narrative thus refuses a permanent division in which speakers alone know and practical people merely perform. Relevant experience can correct a fluent account.

The cultured lover reveals another tension at 134c. He says he could defend his position against the athlete even if it were poorer, yet he does not wish to strive against Socrates contrary to his own opinion. Here an argument can mean either an account one believes or a competitive object to be defended for victory. Socrates needs agreement in the first sense if his questions are to examine a claim rather than merely stage a contest.

The later discussion of crafts continues to ask what the philosopher can follow or contribute when things are said and done. The opening contrast therefore cannot support the conclusion that philosophical ability is wholly verbal. By the ending, having something to contribute to judgment and the ordering of one's household matters more than displaying an impressive command of talk. Nevertheless, the entire claim is itself worked out in a narrated conversation; the text does not dismiss argument as an instrument of inquiry.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132d.** περὶ λόγων ἔμπειρος εἶναι ἀλλὰ περὶ ἔργων — The athlete claims practical rather than verbal experience.
- **134b.** περὶ τοῦ λόγου — Logos is now the argument over which they contend.

- **135d.** ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις τε καὶ πραττομένοις — Later philosophical participation concerns things both said and done.

In this edition. The edition preserves “words” and “deeds” at 132d, “argument” in the ensuing contest, and “what is said and done” in the crafts passage. Its glossary treats the speaker’s legein in clarification questions as “mean,” which helps distinguish verbal formulation from intended account. The note on the opening correction erōtōmenon explains which person Socrates lets go; it should not be confused with a philosophical distinction between a lover and a doer.

See also. Gymnastics and the lover of exercise (p. 63) · Questions, answers, and what a thing is (p. 131) · Quarreling, contention, and love of victory (p. 129) · Prattling and talking nonsense (p. 122)

Youths, lads, and the beloved

νέος (neos); μειράκιον (meirakion); παιδικά (paidika); ἐπιεικής (epieikēs); ἰδέα (idea); εὐδόκιμος (eudokimos)

The word. Neos means “young”; used substantivally, it identifies a young person or, in the plural, the young. Meirakion is a youth or lad, the edition’s term for the two who are quarreling. These words mark youth without giving a numerical age. Paidika, though neuter plural in grammatical form, can designate a single beloved youth. Thus “his beloved” at 133b is not evidence that the cultured lover is addressing several beloveds.

The opening description also uses epieikēs, here comely or pleasing, in its superlative epieikestatous. The qualification tēn idean, “in looks,” makes this an assessment of appearance, not a blanket attribution of moral equity. Idea

here means look or appearance, not a technical Platonic Form. Eudokimos means esteemed or of good reputation and describes the fathers. These are judgments of social appearance and standing, not guarantees of their children's wisdom.

The opening's distinction between the young in the room and two particular lads matters. Socrates sees a broader gathering, singles out two disputants, and sits beside the lover of one of them. The second man is that lover's rival. The dialogue supports the conclusion that the lovers compete for the same youth; it does not identify either lad by name or assign each a separate lover in a neat four-person pairing.

In The Lovers. The lads first possess the initiative. Their diagrams and hand movements command such attention that Socrates asks what they are so earnest about. When the adults turn to the value of philosophy, the lads stop and become listeners. This shift makes the lovers' argument a performance before those they wish to impress. The cultured lover's loud claim that disdaining philosophy would make him unworthy even of being considered a man is explicitly intended to reach his beloved's ears.

Their laughter at the athlete's retort changes the emotional balance. The man who appeared verbally superior now blushes before his desired audience. At 135a Socrates proposes that the baffled adults ask the lads for help. He does not actually elicit an answer from them. The proposed reversal exposes the possibility that pride prevents learning from an unexpected person; it does not establish that these youths know the right answer.

The opening description links appearance and family reputation: these are youths thought especially comely and

born of esteemed fathers. Those are represented social assessments, not proof that beauty or distinguished parentage brings wisdom. In fact, the narrative repeatedly asks what the appearances surrounding education are worth.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **132a.** δύο τῶν μειρακίων ἐρίζοντε — Two of the lads begin as the disputants.
- **133a.** ἡμῶν ἀκροαταὶ ἐγενέσθην — The two become listeners to the adults.
- **133b.** ἵν' αὐτοῦ κατακούοι τὰ παιδικά — The lover speaks so that his beloved can hear.

In this edition. The edition translates paidika consistently as "beloved" and explains the older-lover/younger-beloved terminology in its Key Words. Its account of the persons deliberately leaves the unnamed youths unidentified. The use of "lads" should not be converted into a modern exact age category. Likewise, the report of Socrates' response at 133a belongs to the dramatic depiction of attraction; no further relationship or action is narrated.

See also. Lovers, rival lovers, and the title (p. 95) · Ambition, anxiety, and display (p. 15) · Laughter, blushing, and shame (p. 88) · Homer, the suitors, and the bow (p. 66)

Defined vocabulary register

These shorter records define words and constructions in their local setting. Lemmas and transliterations identify the lexical family; the separately labelled attestation gives the exact printed form. The register is selective about elementary inflection, but includes ordinary vocabulary wherever it helps follow the dialogue.

Abuse

λοιδορέω (loidoreō)

To revile or verbally abuse someone. The imperfect identifies what the educated lover was doing to the athletic rival in his caricature. This narrator's description marks the speech as antagonistic. It discourages taking the caricature as an impartial account of the athlete's life and keeps the competition for the boys' admiration visible beneath the apparent defense of philosophy.

Attestation. 132d: ὃν ἐλοιδόρει.

Accomplished

χαρίεις (charieis)

Graceful, cultivated or accomplished. The superlative describes how the generalist should appear among those present. Its social praise is paired with seeming wisest, revealing the prestige sought by the lover's educational ideal. The word does not establish exact mastery of each craft or moral excellence on its own; cultivated participation and practical authority are deliberately separated in the next stage.

Attestation. 135d: χαριέστατον εἶναι.

Acquire

κτάομαι (ktaomai)

To acquire, obtain or secure something for oneself. The aorist middle infinitive here has health as its object. Its role is to name the outcome for which help is sought, not the possession of money or technical knowledge. The choice between philosopher and doctor is therefore framed by effective attainment of the desired good rather than admiration for either person's reputation.

Attestation. 136c: κτήσασθαι.

Agree

ὁμολογέω (homologeō)

To agree, acknowledge or make a common admission. Here the lover gives Socrates the answer he withholds from his rival. Agreements later supply the material for the refutation, but their repetition does not prove they were all independently established. The recap at 137a adds a claim about the speakers being philosophers that was not expressly agreed earlier.

Attestation. 133e: ὁμολογῶ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθόν.

Agree again

ἀνομολογέομαι (anomologeomai)

To agree over again or review the admissions together. The infinitive states Socrates' purpose in recapitulating the discussion. It is more than repeating sounds: the assembled claims are about to reveal an inconsistency with the lover's estimate of philosophy. The edition notes that one item in the ensuing recap, that the speakers themselves are philosophers, was not expressly agreed earlier.

Attestation. 136e: ἀνομολογήσασθαι.

All

πᾶς (pas)

All, every or the whole, with scope determined by the noun it qualifies. Here the ambitious ideal is familiarity with all crafts, immediately relaxed to as many as possible. The distinction between all subjects, many subjects and appropriate subjects is central to the educational argument. A universal expression should not be silently weakened to ‘several’ when tracing a proposed definition.

Attestation. 135b: τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος εἶναι πασῶν.

Always

ἀεί (aei)

Always or continually. In the recap, the alleged continual availability of craftsmen sustains the conclusion that the generalist is useless. The edition notes Hermann’s ἀεί at the earlier 136e occurrence against the manuscripts’ δή. The temporal scope matters: occasional availability of a better expert would not by itself establish permanent uselessness, and the argument depends on the stronger claim.

Attestation. 137a: δημιουργοὺς δὲ ἀεὶ εἶναι.

Ambitiously

φιλοτίμως (philotimōs)

With ambition or eagerness for honour. The adverb characterises the educated lover’s manner of answering once the boys attend. Its love-of-honour formation belongs to the dialogue’s network of competing loves, but its local point is public display. The emphatic defense of

philosophy that follows establishes his aspiration to esteem before establishing any knowledge of philosophy's nature.

Attestation. 133a: καὶ μάλα φιλοτίμως.

Anaxagoras

Ἀναξαγόρας (anaxagoras)

The thinker named as one possible subject of the boys' dispute. The surrounding appearance-verb and alternative 'or Oenopides' keep the attribution uncertain. The edition supplies historical background about Anaxagoras in its note; the dialogue itself neither states his doctrines nor identifies the particular question at issue. His name helps mark the apparently scientific character of the scene.

Attestation. 132a: περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου.

Answer

ἀπόκρισις (apokrisis)

An answer or reply to a question. Socrates first wonders at the athlete's answer, later interprets and tests the educated lover's successive answers. The noun names a contribution within an exchange, not necessarily a successful definition. Keeping that distinction helps track why an emphatic or impressive reply can still require clarification, agreement and examination of its consequences.

Attestation. 132c: τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.

Anything else than

ἄλλος (allos)

Other or another. In this question the genitive phrase with ἤ asks whether exercise-lovers desire anything other than

bodily good condition. The construction invites denial of an alternative and thereby secures an agreed goal. It should not be read as introducing a second unnamed object of desire; the point is to isolate the end against which training is evaluated.

Attestation. 133e: ἄλλου του ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ τούτου.

Appear

φαίνομαι (phainomai)

To appear or seem, often with an infinitive or participle specifying what appears to be the case. The dual imperfect here introduces Socrates' tentative impression of the boys' subject. Later short answers such as φαίνεται can signal assent with a qualified tone. Appearance should therefore be read contextually rather than automatically treated as either deception or established truth.

Attestation. 132a: ἐφαινέσθην.

Arbitration

δίαιτα (diaita)

An arbitration or decision entrusted to an arbiter. The plural refers to disputes that friends may ask the philosopher to settle. Although the noun can have other senses elsewhere, 'diet' or 'way of life' would be wrong here. The combination with entrusting makes responsibility explicit: his broad cultivation must now support a judgment on which other people rely.

Attestation. 138e: διαίτας ἐπιτρέπωσιν.

As it seems

ὡς ἔοικε (hōs eoike)

As it seems or apparently. The perfect-form verb ἔοικε has a present force of seeming or likelihood. Socrates uses the parenthetical phrase while drawing the account's troubling consequence. It gives the inference a conversationally qualified tone, but does not supply a separate argument for it. Readers should inspect the stated premises instead of treating either confidence or hesitation as proof.

Attestation. 137a: ὡς ἔοικε.

As long as

ἕως ἄν (heōs an)

For as long as or whenever the stated condition lasts, with ἄν and the subjunctive. The philosopher is called not useful while a craft-holder is present. The condition restricts the claim, though the subsequent assertion that experts always exist makes it extensive. This construction must remain attached when assessing the transition from a particular emergency to general uselessness.

Attestation. 136d: ἕως ἄν τις δημιουργὸς ᾖ.

As many as possible

ὡς πλεῖστος (hōs pleistos)

A construction with ὡς and the superlative, meaning as many or as much as possible. Here it states the aim of lifelong learning in the lover's account. The maximising force is stronger than simply continuing to learn. It is precisely what makes the next question about πολυμαθία apt and allows the contrast between maximum quantity and beneficial measure.

Attestation. 133c: ὡς πλεῖστα ἐν τῷ βίῳ μάθῃ.

Ask

ἐρωτάω (erōtaō)

To ask or question someone. Socrates explicitly transfers his question to the educated lover, keeping its content the same. Forms from ἐρωτάω and the related asking stem ἐρ- occur throughout the conversation. A reader should track both the respondent and the question asked, because the inquiry moves from philosophy's value to its nature, quantity of learning and distinctive responsibility.

Attestation. 132d: σὲ ἐρωτῶ.

Assign

προστάσσω (prostassō)

To order, assign or charge someone with a task. The city may assign the philosopher a matter to decide or judge. The verb marks an institutional demand, contrasted with friends' private entrusting of arbitrations. The hypothetical does not appoint him to a named office; it establishes that civic responsibilities can require active competence rather than admired second-hand familiarity.

Attestation. 138e: ἡ πόλις τι προστάττῃ.

At all; to begin with

τὴν ἀρχήν (tēn archēn)

An adverbial accusative meaning 'at all' or 'to begin with' in this negative context. It qualifies not knowing what the thing is; it does not introduce a theory of first principles or a chronological origin of philosophy. The question concerns the minimum understanding required before a judgment of fine or shameful can count as knowledge.

Attestation. 133b: τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅτι ἔστιν.

At any rate

γοῦν (goun)

At any rate or at least, often giving a concrete fact supporting a preceding impression. Socrates is unsure of the boys' precise topic, but they at least appear to be drawing circles. The particle does not convert the guess into certainty. It narrows the evidence to what the narrator can report while leaving the larger interpretation open.

Attestation. 132b: κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν.

At least; precisely

γε (ge)

A focusing particle whose effect depends on the expression it attaches to: at least, indeed, precisely or emphatic limitation. In Πάνυ γε it strengthens assent. Elsewhere it can restrict a claim to a particular person or point. It is not safe to add 'certainly' everywhere; local emphasis may narrow a proposition just where an English reader is tempted to universalise it.

Attestation. 133c: Πάνυ γε.

Athlete

ἀθλητής (athlētēs)

A competitor in athletic contests. The 'other athletes' form the group whom the pentathletes surpass after conceding first place to specialists. Keeping that group distinct is essential: the text does not call the pentathlete first among all competitors without qualification. The analogy later

transfers this structured ranking to craft knowledge, with experts above and ordinary company below.

Attestation. 135e: τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν.

Base

πονηρός (ponēros)

Bad, inferior or base. Here it is opposed to good in the proposed relation between character and usefulness. Later the term also applies to horses and oxen, where badness concerns their kind rather than the full moral sense of human vice. The edition keeps it distinct from μοχθηρός, worthless; readers should track the local standard instead of flattening both into one technical category.

Attestation. 136b: οἱ πονηροὶ ἄχρηστοι.

Be a busybody

πολυπραγμονέω (polypragmoneō)

To busy oneself with many matters, meddle or be a busybody. Socrates rejects this as an adequate account of philosophizing alongside absorption in crafts and much learning. The participle describes a way of living rather than a single helpful inquiry. Its negative force should not be indiscriminately extended to every broad interest or to responsible involvement in civic affairs.

Attestation. 137b: πολυπραγμονοῦντα κυπτάζοντα ζῆν.

Be a slave

δουλεύω (douleuō)

To serve as a slave or be enslaved; figuratively here, to be bound to no single occupation. The lover praises the generalist’s freedom from specialist absorption. The

language carries social valuation and echoes the earlier free-man ideal. Its rhetorical attraction must be distinguished from the question whether refusing intensive attention leaves the philosopher useful when expert action is needed.

Attestation. 136a: μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι.

Be affected

πάσχω (paschō)

To undergo, experience or be affected by something. Socrates says he does not know what effect the boys' attention had on the lovers, before describing his own response. The ordinary verb marks a limit on narrated psychological knowledge. His subsequent impression of the rival's anxiety remains an appearance, not a claim to have direct access to another person's feelings.

Attestation. 133a: ὅτι μὲν οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἔπαθον.

Be ashamed

αἰσχύνομαι (aischynomai)

To feel shame or be embarrassed. Socrates asks whether the adults hesitate to seek help from the boys out of shame, likening them to the suitors. The same family marks the educated lover's final silence. In both places sensitivity to public standing shapes participation in inquiry; shame is not by itself proof that the ashamed person has acquired the missing knowledge.

Attestation. 135a: ἴσως αἰσχυνόμεθα.

Be compelled

ἀναγκάζω (anankazō)

To force or compel; in the passive here, to be constrained to agree. The educated lover confronts a conclusion about philosophical uselessness that follows from admissions Socrates has assembled. The expression describes argumentative pressure, not a physical threat. It also does not guarantee the inference is beyond criticism: the reader can still examine the move from specialist preference to the generalist's alleged uselessness.

Attestation. 136e: Ἠναγκάζετο ὁμολογεῖν.

Be dazzled

ἐκπλήσσω (ekplēssō)

To strike with astonishment; in the passive here, to be dazzled or overwhelmed. Socrates openly reports being affected by the young and beautiful when they listen. The aorist gives this event, and the following present generalises his susceptibility. The confession complicates any image of the narrator as emotionally untouched by the competitive setting he is about to examine.

Attestation. 133a: αὐτὸς δ' οὖν ἐξεπλάγην.

Be disposed

διάκειμαι (diakeimai)

To be in a condition or disposed in a certain way. The participle extends the educated lover's contempt to anyone holding the attitude he has described toward philosophy. His gesture identifies the rival as the intended target. The phrase refers to an evaluative disposition rather than physical posture, despite the important bodily positioning of the characters elsewhere in the scene.

Attestation. 133b: τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον.

Be doubtful

ἀμφιγνοέω (amphignoeō)

To be uncertain or in doubt about something. Socrates says he still did not clearly grasp what the lover meant by his account, prompting the athletic analogy. The imperfect describes an unresolved interpretive state. It need not imply that the account is already disproved: before testing its consequences, Socrates first tries to produce a formulation the respondent explicitly recognises.

Attestation. 135d: ἠμφεγνόουν τὸν λόγον.

Be eager

προθυμέομαι (prothymeomai)

To be eager or ready to do something. Socrates describes himself as keen to know clearly what the lover means before asking about usefulness. The participle frames the new test as clarification of the accepted account. It need not be read as a private disclosure of all his intentions; its explicit purpose is to make the proposed philosopher's standing more definite.

Attestation. 136b: προθυμούμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι.

Be fitting

προσήκω (prosēkō)

To belong to, be appropriate or be fitting for someone. Here it governs what free men should learn of the crafts. The dative identifies the people to whom the learning is appropriate. The lover distinguishes intellectual understanding from manual work by social suitability; the

phrase does not by itself prove that this distinction identifies the best learning for every person.

Attestation. 135b: ἃ προσήκει τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μαθεῖν.

Be fitting; ought

χρή (chrē)

An impersonal verb expressing what is needed, fitting or ought to be done. Socrates thinks he ought to release the first lover from questioning and examine the wiser claimant. The infinitive χρῆναι depends on his judgment. The word should not be mistaken for an external command; it describes a reasoned conversational choice within the narrator’s account of the encounter.

Attestation. 132d: χρῆναι τὸν μὲν ἕτερον ἀφιέναι.

Be ignorant

ἀγνοέω (agnoeō)

To be ignorant of or fail to recognise someone or something. Socrates moves from ignorance of many members of a kind to ignorance of one, then of oneself. The verb’s object matters throughout: not knowing an individual’s quality, not understanding a kind and not knowing oneself are connected by the argument but should not be treated as interchangeable without examination.

Attestation. 137e: πολλοὺς ἀγνοεῖ.

Be ill

ἀσθενέω (astheneō)

To be weak or ill. Socrates imagines the respondent or a cared-for friend falling sick, creating an immediate need

for competent assistance. The participle works with τύχοις in a hypothetical case. Illness turns the discussion from social display toward effective help: the relevant question becomes whom one would bring in to recover health, not who speaks most impressively.

Attestation. 136c: εἰ τύχοις ἢ αὐτὸς ἀσθενήσας.

Be in earnest

σπουδάζω (spoudazō)

To take something seriously or be earnestly engaged in it. The printed dual perfect participle describes the boys' settled, concentrated attitude. Their seriousness initially invites Socrates' assumption that the object is great and fine, but the athlete mocks it. Later the same family describes absorption in crafts, showing that earnest effort needs evaluation rather than guaranteeing wisdom by itself.

Attestation. 132b: μάλ' ἐσπουδακότε.

Be in good condition

εὖ ἔχω (eu echō)

To be well or in good condition. The phrase here concerns the body and gives physical training its agreed goal. The accusative τὸ σῶμα specifies the bodily respect in which the people are to fare well. The later noun εὐεξία names this condition compactly; neither expression by itself identifies the amount of exercise that will produce it.

Attestation. 133e: εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα.

Be left behind

ἀπολείπομαι (apoleipomai)

To be left behind or fall behind. The perfect infinitive describes the lasting disadvantage in other pursuits allegedly caused by intense care for one craft. The lover uses it to defend general cultivation. The claim belongs to his model, not a demonstrated universal law that expertise in any domain makes all other interests impossible or every specialist socially deficient.

Attestation. 136b: ἀπολελεῖφθαι.

Be necessary

δεῖ (dei)

An impersonal expression of necessity: it is necessary, one must or one ought. Here it asks which subjects the philosophizing person must learn. The infinitive specifies the required action and the accusative its subject. Necessity is tied to a proposed role or goal, not invariably physical compulsion. At 139a the idiom πολλοῦ δεῖ instead means being far from something.

Attestation. 135a: ἃ δεῖ τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα μανθάνειν.

Be on edge

ἀγωνιάω (agōniaō)

To be anxious or on edge, especially in the expectation of a contest. The edition notes its connection with competitive anxiety. Socrates thinks the educated lover is no less affected than himself when the lads listen. The verb makes his ambitious answer dramatically motivated: he is defending an admired pursuit while facing a rival and an audience he wants to impress.

Attestation. 133a: οὐχ ἧττον ἐμοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν.

Be storm-tossed

χειμάζομαι (cheimazomai)

To be exposed to winter weather or driven by a storm. Here the participle qualifies the ship in Socrates' hypothetical choice between pilot and philosopher. The dangerous condition makes practical reliance urgent. The word does not describe a metaphorical storm of argument at this point; it supplies a literal case whose stakes make the preference for relevant expertise especially plain.

Attestation. 136d: ἐν νηὶ χειμαζομένῃ.

Be taught

διδάσκω (didaskō)

To teach; the middle-passive participle here means being taught or learning. Solon's line pictures its speaker continually receiving instruction while growing old. The dialogue then uses μανθάνω for the lover's account of learning. The vocabulary shift does not introduce two opposed educational methods; it moves from a quoted verse to the respondent's own elaboration of it.

Attestation. 133c: πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

Be temperate

σωφρονέω (sōphroneō)

To be temperate, sound-minded or self-controlled. The dialogue identifies it with knowing oneself after rejecting ignorance of oneself as temperance. The term is not limited here to moderation in food, drink or exertion. Nor does the earlier argument about μέτριος by itself supply

this identity: the new claim connects ethical soundness with discriminating knowledge of one's own quality.

Attestation. 138a: Τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἄρα γιγνώσκειν ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν.

Be unruly

ἀκολασταίνω (akolastainō)

To behave without restraint or be unruly. The participle identifies some of those rightly corrected by judicial knowledge. The edition explains its relation to the family of κολάζω, punish: the unchastened require appropriate correction. That verbal relationship supports the sequence, but it does not determine which conduct is blameworthy or establish that any imposed restraint automatically counts as rightful correction.

Attestation. 137d: ἀκολασταίνοντας.

Be well ordered

οἰκέω (oikeō)

To inhabit or manage; the middle-passive construction here means that cities are well ordered. The adverb εὖ supplies the positive standard. Socrates links this outcome with wrongdoers paying penalties, then with political expertise. The verb describes the achieved condition of the community, not merely someone's possession of a title, and the later household example uses the same practical standard.

Attestation. 138b: αἱ πόλεις εὖ οἰκοῦνται.

Be willing

ἐθέλω (ethelō)

To be willing or consent to do something. The future question asks whether the lover will accept the same account for human beings that he has accepted for animals. The form introduces a further commitment rather than recording one already secured. This matters at a major transition: a willingness to extend the analogy is sought where differences between the cases could otherwise require examination.

Attestation. 137c: Ἐθελήσεις οὖν.

Beloved

παιδικά (paidika)

The beloved youth, expressed by a neuter plural substantive that can denote a single person. Here he is the intended hearer of the lover's loud speech. The grammatical plural must not be turned into several beloveds in this scene. The term clarifies that the rivalry involves one shared object of affection, even though two lads are present as listeners.

Attestation. 133b: τὰ παιδικά.

Beneficial

ὠφέλιμος (ōphelimos)

Helpful or beneficial; the superlative here means most beneficial. Moderate bodily provisions receive that evaluation in contrast with excessive or insufficient quantities. The adjective shares its family with ὠφελέω, to benefit, keeping the test focused on effects. Calling something moderate is therefore not enough unless the

measure can be related to what actually benefits the body or soul.

Attestation. 134d: ὠφελιμώτατα.

Benefit

ὠφελέω (ōpheleō)

To help or benefit; the passive optative here means ‘might be benefited’. Socrates frames his questioning as an opportunity to gain something from the wiser claimant. Later the active verb tests which provisions benefit body and soul. The common family keeps practical improvement in view: admiration for a pursuit is tested against what good it actually does.

Attestation. 132d: ὠφεληθείην.

Blush

ἐρυθριάω (erythriaō)

To blush or redden. The other lover’s visible response follows the boys’ delight and laughter at his expense. The narrator can report this bodily sign without claiming exact knowledge of every feeling behind it. It anticipates his final shame and silence, making the argument’s progress also a story about exposure before the audience he sought to impress.

Attestation. 134b: ὁ δ’ ἕτερος ἠρυθρίασε.

Body

σῶμα (sōma)

The body, first the object whose good condition the lovers of exercise seek. It becomes the familiar case from which the dialogue moves to provisions for the soul. The contrast

is functional in the argument: bodily benefit is assigned recognised experts, while the corresponding authority for learning remains unsettled. It does not itself establish a comprehensive metaphysical theory of body and soul.

Attestation. 133e: τὸ σῶμα.

Boorish

ἄγροικος (agroikos)

Rustic, uncultivated or boorish. Socrates uses the comparative to ask whether proceeding would be rather rude after the respondent has been forced to agree. The word belongs to the dialogue's concerns with cultivated appearance, but here it marks conversational delicacy. The lover permits him to ask, and the apparently modest recap then exposes the account's most damaging consequence.

Attestation. 136e: ἀγροικότερόν ἐστιν ἐρέσθαι.

Both

ἀμφότερος (amphoteros)

Both of two, here the philosopher and the doctor. The respondent initially refuses Socrates' exclusive choice by saying he would bring both. Socrates then asks which he would prefer and consult first. The brief answer matters philosophically: it leaves room for complementary use before the questioner changes the test to priority, from which uselessness is subsequently inferred.

Attestation. 136d: Ἀμφοτέρους ἔγωγ' ἄν.

Bow

τόξον (toxon)

A bow, the object that an unexpected challenger might string in the Homeric allusion. The edition supplies the Odyssey context. In the dialogue it represents a test that exposes the established contestants' limitations. The object should remain tied to that dramatic comparison rather than treated as an example of another craft the would-be philosopher is now required to learn.

Attestation. 135a: τὸ τόξον.

Break the law

παρανομέω (paranomeō)

To act contrary to law or transgress it. The participle is paired with being unruly in the description of people subject to judicial punishment. The lawbreaking is part of the hypothetical criterion for the relevant knowledge. The passage does not identify a statute, decide a real case or prove that every existing law supplies a flawless measure of human goodness.

Attestation. 137d: καὶ παρανομοῦντας.

Busying oneself with crafts

πραγματεία (pragmateia)

Occupation, active engagement or busying oneself in a field. The prepositional phrase specifies the crafts, one of the rejected accounts of philosophizing in the final sentence. The noun differs from πολυπραγμονέω, the earlier disparaging busybody verb, though the themes overlap. The conclusion denies that craft preoccupation defines philosophy; it does not spell out a complete alternative definition.

Attestation. 139a: ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία.

Buy

πρίαμαι (priamai)

To buy, here in a potential second-person optative: one could buy a carpenter for five or six minae. The genitive gives the price. The example quantifies the contrast with a master builder, but remains a hypothetical argumentative comparison. It supplies no present market offer and should not be rewritten as wages, a commission or a fee for one completed project.

Attestation. 135c: ἂν πρίαιο πέντε ἢ ἓξ μνῶν.

Care

ἐπιμέλεια (epimeleia)

Attention, care or sustained cultivation. The lover worries that attention to one activity will leave a person behind in all the rest. The noun identifies the investment through which expertise develops, not merely affection or a passing concern. The later demand that the philosopher manage his own household puts pressure on an ideal that avoids concentrated responsibility altogether.

Attestation. 136a: τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου ἐπιμέλειαν.

Carpenter

τέκτων (tektōn)

A carpenter or builder. Socrates gives the hypothetical price at which one could buy such a worker and contrasts it with the price of a top master builder. The language belongs to a social world where persons can be bought; it is not a modern salary quotation. The comparison is used to emphasise the much greater valuation of rare expertise.

Attestation. 135c: τέκτονα μὲν ἄν πρίαιο.

Carpentry

τεκτονική (tektonikē)

The craft of building or carpentry. Socrates uses it to test whether the lover's intellectual-manual distinction means the difference between an ordinary carpenter and an outstanding master builder. The ensuing price comparison makes high expertise rare and costly. The example presses the scale of what learning many crafts might require before the respondent retreats from exact mastery.

Attestation. 135b: ἐν τῇ τεκτονικῇ.

Certainly

πάνυ (pany)

Entirely or very much; in short answers, certainly or emphatically yes. The expanded formula here strongly affirms that philosophizing is fine. Its force is conversational commitment, not additional evidence. The educated lover repeatedly answers with confidence, and the subsequent questions test whether that confidence is supported by a coherent account of the thing he praises.

Attestation. 133b: Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Circle

κύκλος (kyklos)

A circle, here something the boys appear to draw. The plural objects belong with γράφειν and support Socrates' guess about their scientific discussion. The passage does not specify the surface, instruments or completed diagram. Read the noun together with the hand gestures and inclinations: these visible activities suggest geometrical or

astronomical inquiry without disclosing its exact argument.

Attestation. 132b: κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν.

City

πόλις (polis)

A city or civic community, not merely a collection of buildings. The plural identifies the setting of unruly and lawbreaking people who fall under judicial correction. Later good civic ordering and assignments from the city extend the philosopher's responsibilities. The word carries an institutional community whose governance is at issue, while the dialogue supplies no particular city's constitutional arrangements here.

Attestation. 137d: τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

Claim

προσποιέομαι (prospoieomai)

To claim, profess or lay claim to being something. The contrast is between one man who does not claim verbal experience and another who claims to be wiser. The participle leaves distance between the narrator and the profession. Later labels such as 'the wiser one' inherit this dramatic context and should not automatically be read as Socrates' unqualified certification.

Attestation. 132d: τὸν δὲ σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον.

Clearly

σαφῶς (saphōs)

Clearly or distinctly. Socrates wants clear knowledge of what the lover is saying and turns from the flattering

analogy to the question of usefulness. Later σαφέστερον promises a clearer test through the punishment examples. The comparative movement matters: clarity is something inquiry seeks through specified cases, not something guaranteed by emphatic speech, familiar imagery or an admired label.

Attestation. 136b: σαφῶς εἰδέναι.

Come, then

φέρε δή (phere dē)

A conversational summons to undertake the next step: come, then, let us find out. The imperative φέρε is idiomatic and does not ask anyone literally to carry an object. Joined with the hortatory γνῶμεν, it begins the concrete usefulness tests. The phrase marks a shift from agreeing to a description toward examining whether its consequences satisfy an admitted standard.

Attestation. 136c: Φέρε δὴ γνῶμεν.

Comely

ἐπιεικής (epieikēs)

Here attractive or comely, qualified explicitly by τὴν ἰδέαν, ‘in looks’. The superlative describes those thought the most comely, and δοκοῦντας retains the element of reputation or appearance. Although the adjective can carry ethical senses elsewhere, this occurrence does not declare the boys morally best. Their appearance and esteemed parentage jointly establish their social attractiveness.

Attestation. 132a: τοὺς ἐπιεικεστάτους.

Companion

ἑταῖρος (hetairos)

A companion or associate, here a conversational address to the educated lover. It need not imply a formally established friendship or membership in a political association. The address softens the manner while Socrates presses a demanding conclusion about appearing second or third. The personal tone and the severity of the argumentative demand coexist rather than cancelling each other.

Attestation. 139a: ὦ ἑταῖρε.

Compel

προσαναγκάζω (prosanankazō)

To compel further or press someone into an additional admission. Socrates reports continuing to secure agreement that moderation benefits all other bodily matters too. The imperfect suggests the continuing pressure of the exchange. It describes argumentative constraint, not physical force; the reader should examine the sequence of admissions instead of assuming that pressure itself supplies a proof.

Attestation. 134d: προσηνάγκαζον αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν.

Concede

συγχωρέω (synchōreō)

To give way, allow or concede a proposition. Socrates asks the educated lover to concede that moderate rather than many or few exertions are beneficial. The verb can mark reluctant acceptance after pressure, not enthusiastic endorsement. Subsequent concessions keep the discussion moving, but readers should still inspect what has been

accepted and whether the next inference preserves its scope.

Attestation. 134b: σὺ ἤδη συγχωρεῖς.

Concur

σύμφημι (symphēmi)

To say yes along with someone or concur. The reported imperfect records the lover's agreement that moderate rather than numerous subjects of learning benefit. Like other short assent verbs, it moves the discussion forward without adding a new reason. Its force should not be inflated into an independent demonstration that all possible forms of extensive learning have now been refuted.

Attestation. 134d: Συνέφη.

Consider

νομίζω (nomizō)

To regard, consider or hold something to be the case. The potential optative here forms the lover's declaration that he would not consider himself a man if he despised philosophy. It reports his evaluative standard, not an objective fact established by the discussion. Socrates next asks whether such evaluation can precede knowing what the evaluated activity is.

Attestation. 133b: νομίσαιμι ἐμαυτὸν εἶναι.

Contend

διαγωνίζομαι (diagōnizomai)

To compete or contend vigorously. The educated lover says he would gladly contest matters with his rival and could

defend even a worse position against him. The potential optative advertises confidence in competitive performance. His contrast with honest agreement before Socrates reveals the danger of treating discussion as victory over a person rather than assessment of what one actually believes.

Attestation. 134c: διαγωνισαίμην.

Contest

ἀγωνία (agōnia)

Competition or the circumstances of a contest. The athletic setting supplies the comparison for a philosopher's relative performance among experts and ordinary participants. It echoes the earlier anxiety expressed by ἀγωνιᾶν, though the noun here locates an actual comparison of competitors. The likeness concerns ranked competence across events, not a proof that philosophical discussion should itself aim only at winning.

Attestation. 135e: ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ.

Contribute

συμβάλλομαι (symballomai)

To contribute something to a joint activity or discussion. The negative construction asks about being unable to add anything concerning what is said or done. This is the later spelling of the family printed ξυμβάλλεσθαι at 135d. The repeated requirement helps expose a mismatch if cultured competence is prized in ordinary crafts but not demanded in judging and governing.

Attestation. 138d: μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι μηδὲν.

Contribute a judgment

ξυμβάλλομαι (xymballomai)

To contribute or bring something to a common discussion; the object γνώμην specifies a judgment or considered view. Burnet prints ξυμβάλλεσθαι here, while the later reprise uses συμβάλλεσθαι. The difference in spelling does not create two separate capacities. The philosopher is expected to add an intelligent contribution, although the argument still must determine whether that amounts to useful expertise.

Attestation. 135d: ξυμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην.

Craft

τέχνη (technē)

A craft, art or organised competence in a particular activity. The lover's new account asks for familiarity with many crafts, especially their intellectual side. The dialogue then tests the distinction between a generalist and the person who actually possesses a craft. Later judgment and governance are also called crafts, so the word is broader than manual fabrication alone.

Attestation. 135b: τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος.

Craftsman

δημιουργός (dēmiourgos)

A practitioner of a craft or specialist worker. The lover wants the philosopher to follow the practitioner's explanations better than other listeners and contribute intelligently. In the usefulness argument the actual craft-holder becomes the preferred source of help. The word need not mean only a manual labourer: the examples

include medical and navigational competence as well as productive crafts.

Attestation. 135d: ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ.

Decent

χρηστός (chrēstos)

Good, sound, serviceable or decent, depending on the kind being judged. The adjective applies first to animals and then to human beings. The edition retains ‘decent’ and notes its relation to χρήσιμος, useful. That kinship helps the argument’s vocabulary cohere but does not erase the difference between being useful for a task and having the human ethical quality at issue.

Attestation. 137c: τοὺς χρηστούς.

Decide

διακρίνω (diakrinō)

To separate, settle or decide, here a matter assigned by the city. Paired with δικάζειν, it concerns adjudicative action. It must be distinguished from διαγιγνώσκω, recognising or distinguishing the quality of people. The argument connects discernment and decision through a common expertise, but the verbs still name different aspects: judging what someone is and settling what should be done.

Attestation. 138e: διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν.

Deed

ἔργον (ergon)

A deed, work or action, contrasted here with words. Socrates credits the athlete with claiming experience in actions rather than verbal discussion. The contrast

describes the man's self-presentation and chosen pursuit; it is not yet a verdict that bodily doing lacks knowledge. Indeed his practical experience soon supplies a correction that the verbally confident lover must accept.

Attestation. 132d: ἀλλὰ περὶ ἔργων.

Delphi

Δελφοί (delphoi)

Delphi, the place of the inscription invoked in the self-knowledge discussion. The dative plural follows ἐν. The edition's note identifies the inscription as 'Know thyself' at Apollo's temple, but those imperative Greek words are not quoted in the dialogue's running text. The allusion supports Socrates' interpretation; it does not make the full justice-temperance identification the inscription's explicit wording.

Attestation. 138a: τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα.

Desire

ἐπιθυμέω (epithymeō)

To desire or aim at obtaining something. Socrates asks whether lovers of exercise desire anything beyond the good condition of their bodies. The admitted end then supplies the standard for assessing exertion. The verb is not automatically a term for irrational appetite here: it names an intelligible practical aim whose means may be appropriate or excessive.

Attestation. 133e: ἄλλου του ἐπιθυμεῖν.

Dionysius

Διονύσιος (dionysios)

The writing-master whose premises provide the setting. His name is in the genitive after εἰς: Socrates goes into Dionysius' place, with the word for school left understood. He never speaks in the dialogue. The edition's note connects him with Diogenes Laertius' report about Plato's teacher; that identification comes from the note's external source, not from the narrated scene itself.

Attestation. 132a: Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ.

Discern in

ἐνοράω (enoraō)

To see or discern something in something else. Socrates asks whether the respondent sees the quality under discussion as peculiar to philosophy. The verb retains a figurative perceptual force within an intellectual question. It asks what the lover recognises in the pursuit, but the subsequent analogy tests that recognition rather than treating his confident 'seeing' as independent evidence.

Attestation. 133d: ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τι τοῦτο ἴδιον ἐνορᾷς.

Disgrace

ὄνειδος (oneidos)

A reproach or disgrace, something treated as grounds for blame. Socrates says he thought earnest absorption in crafts carried such a reproach and led people to be called menial. The social judgment belongs to his transition away from the generalist model. Its presence should be acknowledged without converting the surrounding cultural prejudice into a neutral definition of skilled work.

Attestation. 137b: καὶ ὄνειδος εἶναι τοῦτο.

Dispute

ἔρις (eris)

A quarrel or dispute. The genitive follows the participle meaning to stop: the lads cease their argument and listen to the adults. It names their earlier scientific disagreement, whose content remains unrecovered. The noun helps distinguish the transfer of attention from the completion of a successful demonstration; their dispute stops because another conversation becomes more compelling, not because it has been resolved.

Attestation. 133a: παυσαμένω τῆς ἔριδος.

Dispute a claim

ἀμφισβητέω (amphisbēteō)

To dispute, challenge or contest a claim. The respondent says nobody would contest preferring the doctor both rather and first. The potential construction expresses confident consensus about that choice. It does not independently settle the stronger proposition that the philosopher can contribute nothing: the uncontroversial preference becomes a premise in a more contestable generalisation about usefulness.

Attestation. 136d: Οὐδεὶς ἄν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἀμφισβητήσειεν.

Distinguish

διαγιγνώσκω (diagignōskō)

To distinguish, discriminate or recognise the difference between kinds or conditions. The improving craft is said also to distinguish decent from worthless people. Later this

capacity is directed toward oneself and others in the account of temperance. Distinguishing quality is a cognitive task; the claim that it belongs to the same knowledge as rightful punishment is an argumentative identification, not the verb's definition.

Attestation. 137d: διαγιγνώσκουσαν τοὺς χρηστούς τε καὶ μοχθηρούς.

Do wrong

ἀδικέω (adikeō)

To act unjustly or do wrong. The article and participle form the class 'wrongdoers', whose payment of penalties is connected with civic order. The word shares the justice family without determining every case of wrongdoing in advance. The claim concerns rightly administered correction within the argument; it should not be read as approval of every actual punishment imposed by a city.

Attestation. 138b: οἱ ἀδικοῦντες.

Doctor

ἰατρός (iatros)

A physician or doctor. Along with the trainer, the doctor is recognised as competent to judge appropriate bodily exertion and food. At 136c illness makes the comparison concrete: the doctor is preferred to the philosophical generalist. The example establishes a recognised expert for a particular need, not the claim that physicians are automatically authorities over the entire good life.

Attestation. 134e: ἰατρὸν ἢ παιδοτρίβην.

Dog

κύων (kyōn)

A dog; κύνας is the accusative plural. Dogs provide a second animal case for the proposed unity of improving and punishing correctly. At 137e a dog is imagined as a member of its kind who might fail to know itself. The changing role is important: an expert handler's knowledge of dogs and a dog's self-knowledge are not simply the same subject.

Attestation. 137c: κύνας οὐχ οἵ βελτίστους.

Drachma

δραχμή (drachmē)

A monetary unit. Socrates says a top master builder could not be bought even for ten thousand drachmas, contrasted with five or six minae for a carpenter. The edition explains the relation of the units. The large difference dramatises rare expertise; it should not be silently turned into an exact modern monetary value or a claim about contemporary architectural fees.

Attestation. 135c: μυρίων δραχμῶν.

Draw

γράφω (graphō)

To mark, draw or write; here 'draw', because its object is circles. The infinitive depends on the appearance-verb: they appeared to be drawing. The same family later supplies γράμμα, the inscription at Delphi, but the local object controls the sense. There is no basis for translating this occurrence as writing an account or copying a philosophical text.

Attestation. 132b: κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν.

Earnestness

σπουδή (spoudē)

Serious attention, zeal or earnestness directed toward something. Socrates asks what great and fine object has attracted so much of it. Later earnest care concerns a sick friend, while earnestness about crafts comes under criticism. The noun therefore names intensity of concern, not automatic approval of its object; whether that object deserves the attention is precisely what inquiry must determine.

Attestation. 132b: τοσαύτην σπουδὴν.

Educated

παιδεύω (paideuō)

To educate or train; the perfect passive participle means a person who has been educated. Joined with ‘free’, it describes the lover’s ideal of cultured competence without specialist precision. The completed formation implied by the perfect is a social and educational claim, not proof that its possessor can answer every question. The dialogue tests what this cultivated person is actually able to contribute.

Attestation. 135d: πεπαιδευμένον.

Elbow

ἀγκών (ankōn)

An elbow. The dative specifies the instrument of Socrates’ nudge, not the part of the lover’s body he touches. This small detail presents the inquiry as arising from a casual encounter among seated companions. It also prepares the later description of the athlete as needing to be nudged

back into a discussion that Socrates had initially directed elsewhere.

Attestation. 132b: τῷ ἀγκῶνι.

Enter

εἰσέρχομαι (eiserchomai)

To go or come into a place. Here the first-person aorist opens Socrates' retrospective narrative: he entered Dionysius' establishment and saw the company there. The movement establishes an encounter rather than an arranged lesson. The form is built on the aorist stem ἐλθ-, so it should be looked up under εἰσέρχομαι rather than treated as an independent verb.

Attestation. 132a: εἰσῆλθον.

Entrust

ἐπιτρέπω (epitrepō)

To entrust, commit or place under another's charge. On the storm-tossed ship, one commits oneself and one's possessions to the pilot rather than the philosopher. The family returns for household management and friends' arbitrations at 138e. Those repetitions change the issue from choosing the best helper to accepting responsibilities in which the philosopher must himself exercise sound judgment.

Attestation. 136d: ἐπιτρέποις σαυτόν τε καὶ τὰ σεαυτοῦ.

Esteemed

εὐδόκιμος (eudokimos)

Well regarded or of good reputation. Here it characterises the youths' fathers, making family esteem part of the

opening social scene. The word belongs to the broad field of public judgment that later becomes explicit in δόξα, reputation for philosophy. It does not prove that inherited prestige gives either the boys or their admirers the knowledge being sought.

Attestation. 132a: πατέρων εὐδοκίμων.

Event

ἆθλον (athlon)

A contest, event or prize, according to context; here the specialists' own competitive events. The pentathletes fall short relative to these particular activities, not in every imaginable respect. The phrase limits the comparison that generates the runner-up model. Translating it solely as a prize would obscure the relevant performances against which the competitors are being ranked.

Attestation. 135e: κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἆθλα.

Exercise

γυμνάσιον (gymnasion)

An exercise or training activity here, with the plural used in the discussion of exertion and fitness. Although the noun can elsewhere denote a training place, this argument concerns exercises and their amount. At 134c moderate γυμνάσια produce good condition. Reading it only as a building would obscure the analogy between quantities of exertion and quantities of learning.

Attestation. 133e: ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις.

Experience

ἐμπειρία (empeiria)

Experience or practical familiarity in a domain, here physical training. Socrates appeals to it when the educated lover assumes many exertions must be beneficial. The genitive specifies what the experience concerns. The episode credits situated competence without making its possessor an expert in every subject, precisely the distinction that will later pressure the generalist account of philosophy.

Attestation. 134a: τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς γυμναστικῆς.

Experienced

ἔμπειρος (empeiros)

Experienced or familiar with something, commonly specified by περί. Socrates distinguishes experience in words from experience in deeds; the later definition asks the philosopher to appear experienced in all crafts. Experience is consequently a claim needing a domain and a standard. Mere familiarity, the ability to follow speech and exact possession of a craft are not treated as identical.

Attestation. 132d: περὶ λόγων ἔμπειρος εἶναι.

Fall short

λείπομαι (leipomai)

To be left behind, fall short or be inferior to someone. The pentathletes fall short of specialists in their respective events. The comparative relation needs both the people and the domain supplied by the context. It is not an assertion of complete worthlessness: the generalists still outperform other athletes, which is why the lover initially accepts the image as complimentary.

Attestation. 135e: τούτων μὲν λείπονται.

Fall silent

σιγάω (sigaō)

To be silent or stop speaking. The dual aorist marks the boys' cessation of their dispute as they become listeners. The same verb describes the educated lover's final silence at 139a. The repeated action reverses the scene's roles: the boys initially yield the floor, whereas the confident adult eventually has no further reply after his account is examined.

Attestation. 133a: ἐσιγησάτην.

Far from

πολλοῦ δεῖ (pollou dei)

An idiom meaning to be far from something, with πολλοῦ expressing the extent of the shortfall. Socrates concludes that philosophizing is far from being either much learning or preoccupation with crafts. The negative force rejects the proposed definitions. It should not be weakened to 'not both', nor expanded into an explicit positive definition that the concluding sentence does not actually give.

Attestation. 139a: Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ.

Farmer

γεωργός (geōrgos)

A cultivator or farmer, identified as the appropriate judge of moderate sowing. The familiar craft provides an analogy for a yet-unidentified educational competence. The speakers' agreement is easy in the literal agricultural case, which sharpens their shared perplexity about the

soul. The noun names a domain-specific practitioner; it does not supply the missing educational expert by itself.

Attestation. 134e: τὸν γεωργὸν.

Father

πατήρ (patēr)

A father or male parent; the genitive plural here describes the youths as coming from esteemed fathers. The social qualification accompanies their good looks rather than supplying a claim about their own learning. The passage offers no names or biographies of these fathers. Its concern is the standing of the young people before whom the rivals subsequently perform.

Attestation. 132a: πατέρων εὐδοκίμων.

Few; little

ὀλίγος (oligos)

Few in number or little in amount. The educated lover objects that few exertions could not yield bodily fitness. The athlete's correction introduces moderate exertion, and Socrates later excludes both many and few as automatic guarantees of benefit. Thus the alternative to indiscriminate abundance is not simply minimal effort; it is the amount appropriate to the intended good.

Attestation. 134a: ἀπό γε ὀλίγων πόνων.

Fight it out

διαμάχομαι (diamachomai)

To contest or fight a matter through. Socrates asks whether the rival will keep fighting against the two of them over the argument. The present form puts continuing resistance

in view. This verbal struggle parallels the athletic setting but concerns a proposition about training, so conceding a sound point need not mean conceding general personal inferiority to the athlete.

Attestation. 134b: ἢ διαμάχῃ.

Fine

καλός (kalos)

Beautiful, fine or admirable, according to the object praised. The opening applies it to an apparently worthwhile pursuit, while the young and beautiful later exemplify its visual sense. Philosophy's fineness is affirmed before its nature is established. Socrates subsequently distinguishes being fine from being good, so the word should not erase that argumentative distinction by always becoming 'beneficial'.

Attestation. 132b: μέγα τι καὶ καλόν.

First; initially

πρῶτος (prōtos)

First in order or rank; the neuter accusative phrase here means 'at first'. Socrates distinguishes his initial favourable impression from his later reconsideration. Elsewhere first place is competitive rank, and the final household obligation is introduced first in a sequence. The local construction decides the sense; a chronological 'first' need not assert superiority or greatest importance.

Attestation. 133c: τὸ μὲν πρῶτον.

Follow

ἐπακολουθέω (epakoloutheō)

To follow after or keep up with, here to follow what a craftsman says. The dative identifies the statements followed. The educated lover takes superior conversational comprehension as evidence of philosophical cultivation. At 138d the closely related ἔπεσθαι returns in the same test for medicine and governance, where merely following may no longer satisfy the responsibilities under discussion.

Attestation. 135d: ἐπακολουθῆσαί τε τοῖς λεγομένοις.

Follow a discussion

ἕπομαι (hepomai)

To follow or go along with, here to understand and keep up with what is being said. The middle infinitive returns to the capacity earlier expressed by ἐπακολουθῆσαι. This is a receptive competence, paired with contributing. The question does not yet say that following alone makes one an expert; its force is to prevent exempting ethical and political matters from even that minimum.

Attestation. 138d: μήθ’ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις.

Food

σιτίον (sition)

Food or provisions, commonly in the plural. Socrates extends the agreed need for moderate exertion to eating, and the lover agrees. The example is deliberately ordinary and bodily before the move to the soul. Its function is not to supply a dietary quantity but to reinforce the distinction between beneficial measure and simple abundance in things given to a recipient.

Attestation. 134c: τὰ σιτία.

For

γάρ (gar)

An explanatory particle, usually ‘for’ or ‘because’. Here it opens the aside explaining how Socrates could nudge the lover: he was seated beside him. The particle often looks backward to justify or clarify what precedes. It should not automatically be treated as introducing a formal proof; in this narrative its explanation can be spatial, motivational or argumentative.

Attestation. 132b: καθήμην γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἐραστὴν.

Free

ἐλεύθερος (eleutheros)

Free, especially free rather than enslaved. The substantive plural sets the social standard for which parts of crafts the philosopher should learn. At 135d the ideal person is free and educated. This is a status-laden distinction within the lover’s proposal, not a modern assertion of intellectual freedom for everyone; the rejection of manual labour must be read in that setting.

Attestation. 135b: τοῖς ἐλευθέροις.

Friend

φίλος (philos)

A friend or person dear to someone. The example adds a cared-for friend’s illness to one’s own, preventing the choice of expert from seeming merely self-interested. Later friends entrust arbitrations to the philosopher. The noun thus links personal concern with responsibility, but the

dialogue gives no named friends or detailed relationships beyond the hypothetical cases used in argument.

Attestation. 136c: τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σῶν.

Full

μεστός (mestos)

Full of something, with a genitive specifying the contents. The speakers are figuratively full of perplexity, an expressive reversal after their confident agreements about moderation. The adjective emphasises that the difficulty is shared rather than confined to the embarrassed lover. It gives no positive definition of philosophy, but marks the point where the existing route ceases to provide an answer.

Attestation. 135a: ἀπορίας μεστοὶ.

Go through

διέρχομαι (dierchomai)

To go through, traverse or review. The perfect here refers to the roles just discussed, such as judge and ruler. It marks the present question as a return to the preceding list rather than the introduction of an unrelated subject. Recognising the backward reference helps track how the ending applies the newly unified governing competence to the proposed philosopher.

Attestation. 138d: ὧν νυνδὴ διεληλύθαμεν.

Good

ἀγαθός (agathos)

Good, beneficial or excellent, with scope set by the object under discussion. Socrates asks whether philosophy is

good as well as fine, opening the test of its benefit. Later good people are said to be useful. The passage moves between evaluation of a pursuit and of its practitioners, so those shifts should be tracked rather than silently treated as identical propositions.

Attestation. 133d: ἢ καὶ ἀγαθόν.

Good condition

εὐεξία (euexia)

Good bodily condition or fitness. The noun states the beneficial result that moderate exercises produce and condenses the earlier phrase εὖ ἔχειν. It is an outcome to be secured, not a synonym for the exertions used to secure it. That separation of end and means makes possible the criticism of excessive training and, by analogy, indiscriminate learning.

Attestation. 134c: τὴν εὐεξίαν.

Great

μέγας (megas)

Great, large or important. Paired with καλόν here, it evaluates the imagined object of the boys' concentration rather than its physical size. The athlete repeats the pair incredulously before dismissing their discussion. The final concern with 'matters so great' at 138d likewise concerns importance; greatness in this dialogue calls for judgment about an activity's worth.

Attestation. 132b: μέγα τι καὶ καλόν.

Greek

Ἕλλην (hellēn)

A Greek person; the substantive plural gives the population among whom exceptionally skilled master builders would be few. The phrase broadens the scarcity claim beyond the immediate company or one city. It does not name a single political state equivalent to modern Greece. Its argumentative point is the rarity of top expertise even across a wide cultural community.

Attestation. 135c: ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι.

Grow old

γηράσκω (gēraskō)

To grow old or age. In Solon's quoted first-person line, aging proceeds alongside continual learning. The educated lover uses the line to support learning in youth and old age alike. Its temporal breadth should be separated from the stronger quantitative claim he develops: that the aspiring philosopher should accumulate as many subjects as possible over a lifetime.

Attestation. 133c: γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

Guess

τοπάζω (topazō)

To conjecture or make a guess. Socrates asks for their best estimate of the kinds of subjects the philosopher should learn after rejecting all or many indiscriminately. The verb keeps the new proposal provisional. The edition notes a mixed printed reading in the surrounding phrase's manuscript evidence; that editorial detail concerns the printed arrangement of the question, not the provisional force of the verb.

Attestation. 135a: μάλιστα ἅττα τοπάζομεν.

Gymnastics

γυμναστική (gymnastikē)

The practice or expertise of physical training. It distinguishes the athletic lover's established pursuit from his rival's music and letters. Initially dismissed as merely bodily, its experiential knowledge becomes decisive when appropriate exertion is considered. The dialogue does not reject gymnastics; it uses the athlete's competence to test whether quantity alone can make an activity beneficial.

Attestation. 132d: περὶ γυμναστικήν.

Hand

χείρ (cheir)

A hand; the dual dative means 'with the two hands'. The form marks the means by which the boys mime inclinations, alongside the dual participle for tilting. Bodily demonstration belongs to the opening scientific scene itself. It therefore complicates any simple division in which intellectual activity consists only of speech and all physical movement belongs to the athletic lover.

Attestation. 132b: τοῖν χεροῖν.

Handiwork

χειρουργία (cheirourgia)

Manual work or work done with the hands. The genitive depends on the understood relation expressed by ἔχεται in the preceding clause: the lover excludes what belongs to manual execution. The contrast carries social assumptions about free men's education. It is his selection principle, not

an established finding that bodily performance never involves understanding or contributes to knowledge.

Attestation. 135b: μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας.

Happen to

τυγχάνω (tynchanō)

With a supplementary participle, to happen to be doing something or in fact be doing it. The dual imperfect ἐτυγχανέτην accompanies ἐρίζοντε: two lads were engaged in a dispute when Socrates arrived. The idiom need not imply chance in a strong philosophical sense. It supplies circumstantial narrative information before Socrates begins questioning either admirer.

Attestation. 132a: ἐτυγχανέτην οὖν δύο τῶν μειρακίων ἐρίζοντε.

Harshly

χαλεπῶς (chalepōs)

Harshly, severely or unfriendly in manner. Socrates asks why the athlete speaks so harshly about philosophizing. The adverb evaluates the way the criticism is expressed while the preceding question probes its content. Keeping those questions separate preserves Socrates' opening move: he neither simply condemns the speaker's manners nor already proves that philosophy must be admirable.

Attestation. 132c: οὕτως χαλεπῶς λέγεις.

Have one's neck twisted

τραχηλίζομαι (trachēlizomai)

To have one's neck gripped or bent in wrestling. The middle-passive participle belongs to the educated lover's

caricature of the athlete's whole life. The edition cautions against an English rendering suggesting a fatal broken neck. The athletic sense also prepares the retort about the rival's 'unrubbed neck' at 134b: the insults mirror each other's bodily stereotypes.

Attestation. 132c: τραχηλιζόμενος.

Health

ὑγεία (hygeia)

Health, the desired outcome in the illness example. The infinitive of acquiring it makes the practical aim explicit. Judging the competing helpers against that end brings the doctor ahead of the generalist. The example does not supply medical advice; it uses a familiar domain where expertise and a recognisable benefit can be connected more readily than philosophy's distinctive task.

Attestation. 136c: ὑγείαν βουλόμενος κτήσασθαι.

Hear

ἀκούω (akouō)

To hear or listen to. Here the rival hears Socrates questioning and the athlete answering; the genitive participles specify the activity heard. His intervention grows out of this overheard exchange, not a direct invitation. The verb's ordinary perceptual sense matters because the dialogue repeatedly changes when people hear: the lads cease their own dispute, and the lover deliberately projects his voice.

Attestation. 132c: ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ τε ἐρομένου.

Hear clearly

κατακούω (katakouō)

To hear distinctly or catch what is being said. Socrates' negative qualification means he could not quite make out the boys' topic; it limits the certainty of his subsequent guess. At 133b the same verb describes the beloved hearing a deliberately loud answer. The contrast is between imperfect access to another discussion and speech designed to reach an audience.

Attestation. 132a: οὐ σφόδρα κατήκουον.

Help

βοηθέω (boētheō)

To come to someone's aid or support. Socrates asks for the athlete's help because of his experience in gymnastics. At 134c the rival claims he could defend a poor position against the athlete. The same helping verb can therefore serve truth-directed correction or competitive defense; the object helped and the speaker's aim determine the character of the assistance.

Attestation. 134a: ἵνα μοι βοηθήσῃ.

Homer

Ὅμηρος (homēros)

The poet invoked for the story of the suitors and the bow. Socrates uses the literary reference to expose embarrassment at being outdone by an unexpected competitor. The exact episode and its wider circumstances are supplied in the edition's note. Within the dialogue the allusion functions as teasing comparison, not as an authority defining the right subjects of philosophical education.

Attestation. 135a: ὥσπερ ἔφη τοὺς μνηστῆρας Ὅμηρος.

Horse

ἵππος (hippos)

A horse. Horses begin the new sequence about the competence that improves, punishes and recognises good or bad members of a kind. Later the argument imagines being a horse oneself, a significant shift from being its knowledgeable handler. Keeping those roles distinct prevents the move toward self-knowledge from seeming automatically established by the initial animal-training example.

Attestation. 137b: τίνες ἵππους ἐπίστανται.

House; household

οἰκία (oikia)

A house or household. Here it is the place into which one might bring a helper during illness; later it is the organised household the philosopher must govern responsibly. The sense expands with the action: entering a building and ordering a domestic community are not identical activities. The repeated noun joins practical dependence on expertise to obligations one cannot simply delegate away.

Attestation. 136c: εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν.

Household manager

οἰκονόμος (oikonomos)

A person who manages a household. Socrates assigns this name to the single man who orders a household rightly and then asks whether he does so by justice. The role concerns an organised domestic community, not just financial bookkeeping. It supplies the immediate

responsibility through which the ending challenges the philosopher's willingness to remain a runner-up in every field.

Attestation. 138c: οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης.

Household-management craft

οἰκονομική (oikonomikē)

The craft of household management, one of the capacities gathered into the proposed single knowledge. It is broader than modern economics and is not simply household budgeting. The earlier doctor enters a house as an outside specialist; the ending insists that the philosopher cannot permanently outsource this governing responsibility when it concerns his own household's good order.

Attestation. 138c: δεσποτική, οἰκονομική, δικαιοσύνη.

However; though

μέντοι (mentoi)

A particle marking qualification, contrast or renewed insistence, often 'though' or 'however'. Socrates could not hear clearly, yet the boys appeared to be discussing the named thinkers. The contrast preserves his limited evidence. Later the lover uses it when distinguishing what he will say to his rival from what he will concede to Socrates, making the change of addressee explicit.

Attestation. 132a: ἐφαινέσθην μέντοι.

Imitate

μιμέομαι (mimeomai)

To imitate, represent or mime. The boys are representing inclinations through movements of their hands. The

imperfect describes their continuing activity as Socrates observes them. This is practical demonstration rather than an assertion about an artistic theory of imitation; their gesture supplies evidence for the narrator's impression of the discussion's subject without giving him its spoken content.

Attestation. 132b: ἐμιμοῦντο.

Immoderate

ἄμετρος (ametros)

Unmeasured or immoderate, opposed to μέτριος. Socrates contrasts moderate and immoderate provisions for the soul after discussing many and few bodily provisions. The shift matters: a question about the proper measure replaces a merely numerical opposition. The adjective does not by itself specify whether a provision is excessive, insufficient or otherwise inappropriate; that requires a competent standard.

Attestation. 134d: τὰ ἄμετρα τῶν προσφερομένων.

Impossible

ἀδύνατος (adynatos)

Impossible or beyond someone's ability. Socrates asks whether learning even two crafts to the proposed high standard would be impossible for one person, let alone many. The statement belongs to a question reported in indirect form. It pressures the interpretation of the lover's claim rather than offering a quantified study of every person's learning capacity or every possible pair of crafts.

Attestation. 135c: εἰ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἴη.

In common

εἰς κοινόν (eis koinon)

To the company or into common discussion. Socrates presents his question as open to the assembled group, even though he physically nudged one lover. The phrase makes the rival's intervention legitimate without granting his claim to superior wisdom. It marks a question's shared setting, not a doctrine of common property or an assertion that every person has already answered.

Attestation. 132d: Εἰς κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐρώτημα ἠρόμην.

In moderation

μετρίως (metriōs)

Moderately or with measure. The adverb deliberately recalls the moderate exertions, food and learning of the earlier argument. Here the lover applies it to broad acquaintance with all crafts. The recurrence does not prove that this new programme supplies the earlier missing educational measure: neither the right subjects nor an expert judge of their benefit has thereby been established.

Attestation. 136b: πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι.

Inclination

ἔγκλισις (enklisis)

A tilting or inclination, here represented with the boys' hands. The indefinite τινάς leaves the exact inclinations unspecified. The edition suggests a circle tilted against another as a plausible astronomical interpretation, not an explicitly named doctrine. Preserving this uncertainty lets the reader see how little Socrates initially knows about the conversation he is about to replace.

Attestation. 132b: ἐγκλίσεις τινὰς.

Indicate

ἐνδείκνυμι (endeiknymi)

To indicate, point out or display. Here the lover points toward his rival while declaring his disdain for anyone who thinks philosophy shameful. At 136a Socrates uses the same family for the kind of philosopher the proposed account indicates. Context separates a visible gesture directed at a person from an account's indication of a type of person.

Attestation. 133b: ἐνδεικνύμενος εἰς τὸν ἀντεραστήν.

Inscription

γράμμα (gramma)

A written mark, text or inscription; here the famous writing at Delphi. Socrates explains what it urges rather than quoting its actual wording. The edition supplies that identification in a note. Distinguishing allusion from direct quotation prevents a reader from attributing the dialogue's expanded command to practise both virtues to the inscribed words themselves without qualification.

Attestation. 138a: τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα.

Ironically

εἰρωνικῶς (eirōnikōs)

Ironically or dissemblingly in speech. The narrator applies it to the educated lover's two different answers: neither fine nor good when addressing his rival, both when addressing Socrates. This is not a blanket label for Socrates' method. The local example shows social hostility

producing a knowingly divided response even when the question's substantive content remains the same.

Attestation. 133d: καὶ μάλα εἰρωνικῶς.

Judge

δικαστής (dikastēs)

A judge, here an example of someone discussing matters of civic or ethical significance. The noun names a person, unlike δικαστική, the judicial competence earlier equated with justice. Socrates asks whether inability to follow or contribute in such a discussion could be acceptable. The word alone does not certify that every actual judge possesses the correct knowledge the argument requires.

Attestation. 138d: ὅταν δὲ δικαστὴς ᾖ βασιλεύς.

Judge rightly

δικάζω (dikazō)

To judge, decide a case or exercise judicial judgment. The participle here specifies how the philosopher himself must punish: by judging rightly. The activity is not reducible to issuing any decision, nor does the necessity of acting guarantee competence. It connects the earlier judicial knowledge with a concrete obligation to order one's own household well.

Attestation. 138e: αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς.

Judgment

γνώμη (gnōmē)

A judgment, considered view or opinion offered in discussion. The educated person should contribute one of his own when crafts are discussed. This differs from δόξα

as public reputation and from institutional judging later expressed by δικάζειν. A contribution can be perceptive without settling the technical decision; its practical authority remains the point tested by the ensuing examples.

Attestation. 135d: ξυμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην.

Judicial craft

δικαστική (dikastikē)

The judicial art or knowledge, with the feminine adjective taking its substantive force from the surrounding discussion of ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη. Socrates names it as the competence that punishes wrongdoers rightly. He then identifies it with justice. The adjective denotes the proposed expertise, not simply the existence of courts or a guarantee that every person called a judge possesses it.

Attestation. 137d: οὐχ ἡ δικαστική.

Just person

δίκαιος (dikaios)

Just or possessing justice. The adjective here is substantival in a list of persons whose correct activities are assigned to one knowledge. It should be distinguished from δικαίως, ‘justly’, used earlier of consulting an appropriate expert. The dialogue’s equivalence of the just person with other competent rulers is a philosophical claim, not a licence to call every actual ruler just.

Attestation. 138c: σώφρων, δίκαιος.

Justice

δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosynē)

Justice, identified here with the knowledge that punishes rightly and distinguishes human quality. The later argument makes it identical with temperance and governing crafts. Those are substantial claims within the dialogue, not meanings automatically built into the noun. A reading should keep the proposed unity in view while recognising that alternative dimensions of justice are not separately examined in this short exchange.

Attestation. 137d: καὶ δικαιοσύνην.

Justly; properly

δικαίως (dikaiōs)

Justly, rightly or with proper warrant. Here it qualifies asking the appropriate expert about moderate bodily provisions or learning. The question is whom it is reasonable to consult, not yet the institutional administration of justice. The later δικαιοσύνη argument makes the word-family important, but the ordinary use at this stage should not be retroactively converted into a complete theory of justice.

Attestation. 134e: δικαίως ἐροίμεθα.

King

βασιλεύς (basileus)

A king or royal ruler. Socrates places the king beside the tyrant when naming a single person who correctly orders a city. The subsequent argument identifies the relevant ruling craft with justice and other capacities. The title itself does not certify competence, and the edition points out

that a comparison with the Statesman reveals distinctions the present dialogue does not make.

Attestation. 138b: τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς.

Kingly craft

βασιλική (basilikē)

The royal or kingly craft, here in the dative as the means by which the ruler governs. The feminine adjective agrees with τέχνῃ. It is incorporated into the argument's single governing knowledge, rather than defined through hereditary succession or court institutions. The important condition is correct ordering, which must not be lost when translating the name of the role.

Attestation. 138b: βασιλικῇ τε καὶ τυραννικῇ τέχνῃ.

Know

οἶδα (oida)

To know, with εἰδέναι as its infinitive and forms such as οἶσθα in questions. Socrates asks whether one can know a thing's value without knowing what it is. Although historically perfect in form, the verb commonly has present meaning. Here knowledge is distinguished from confident praise, making the demand for an account prior to the dispute about quantity of learning.

Attestation. 133b: εἰδέναι πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν.

Know how

ἐπίσταμαι (epistamai)

To know or know how, often with an infinitive specifying the competent action. Here the infinitive 'punish rightly' follows into 137c, making practical expertise explicit.

Earlier the philosopher's exact knowledge of crafts was questioned. The verb can connect understanding with successful performance, but the kind and standard of knowledge still depend on its complement and the argument's accepted assumptions.

Attestation. 137b: τίνες ἵππους ἐπίστανται.

Knowledge

ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

Knowledge or an organised competence. Socrates asks which knowledge rightly punishes lawbreakers in cities and identifies it with the judicial craft. The noun is close in local function to τέχνη, yet the passage does not explicitly develop a general distinction between theoretical science and practical skill. Its important claim is that right judgment depends on a knowable competence rather than mere office-holding.

Attestation. 137d: Τίς οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη.

Knowledgeable

ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

Knowledgeable or possessed of knowledge. Socrates uses the plural in recapitulating the lover's account of philosophy as knowledge about crafts in a specified manner. The qualification 'in the way you mean' is essential: the condemned account is the accepted generalist model, not every possible possession of craft knowledge. The adjective alone does not imply specialist precision or practical authority.

Attestation. 137a: περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι.

Labour

πόνος (ponos)

Labour, effort or exertion, here especially the labours of training. The plural allows comparison of many, few and moderate amounts. The athlete's intervention rejects simple maximisation in favour of what produces fitness. The word can carry hardship, but this passage assesses exertion by its beneficial measure rather than condemning labour merely because it is difficult or uncomfortable.

Attestation. 133e: οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι.

Labour thoroughly

διαπονέω (diaponeō)

To labour at thoroughly or work something out with effort. The perfect infinitive describes intensive work the proposed philosopher has not devoted to any single field. The lover presents this restraint as protection against neglecting other pursuits. The verb connects depth of training with a cost in breadth, but the argument still must determine whether that trade-off produces a useful kind of competence.

Attestation. 136a: μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι.

Lad

μειράκιον (meirakion)

A lad or adolescent youth. The opening selects two from the young company, and the Greek repeatedly uses dual forms for their actions. They begin as disputants and become listeners when the adults take up philosophy. Their laughter later exposes the stakes of the lovers' rivalry; they are not merely background decoration or identified pupils of either man.

Attestation. 132a: δύο τῶν μειρακίων.

Laugh at

ἐπιγελάω (epigelaō)

To laugh at or in response to something. The boys' laughter follows their delight at the athlete's insult. The singular verb goes with the neuter plural subject understood from the preceding clause. It records a public reaction to wit, not a formal assent to every premise; that distinction matters when the educated lover then tries to preserve his standing while conceding.

Attestation. 134b: καὶ ἐπεγέλασεν.

Lay hold of

ἐφάπτομαι (ephaptomai)

To touch, engage with or lay hold of something, taking the genitive. The perfect infinitive describes having engaged with all pursuits moderately. The image stresses range without exhaustive mastery. Its breadth can sound attractive, but the usefulness test asks whether such acquaintance provides a needed capacity when someone who possesses the relevant craft is available to act.

Attestation. 136b: πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι.

Lead

ἡγέομαι (hēgeomai)

To lead or take the leading position. The ending contrasts it with appearing second or third in entrusted matters. Earlier the same verb commonly means think or regard, so the local construction and competitive contrast determine the change in sense. The demand is for responsible

primacy in judgment, not merely a strong private opinion about what philosophy should be.

Attestation. 139a: καὶ μὴ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι.

Learn

μανθάνω (manthanō)

To learn or come to know through learning. The educated lover says the would-be philosopher should always be learning at least one thing, so as to learn as much as possible. Socrates tests the quantity and kind of learning required. The verb names acquisition, not by itself the achieved mastery, judgment or proper use of everything acquired.

Attestation. 133c: ἔν γέ τι μανθάνειν.

Learn much

πολυμαθέω (polymatheō)

To learn many things or engage in extensive learning. The participle returns verbally to πολυμαθία, the first proposed definition of philosophy. Socrates denies that this alone identifies philosophizing and points instead toward something else. The negative is directed at a proposed account of the activity; the passage does not provide a numerical limit beyond which every kind of learning becomes harmful.

Attestation. 137b: οὐδὲ πολυμαθοῦντα.

Let alone

μὴ ὅτι (mē hoti)

An idiom meaning let alone or not to mention. Socrates asks whether one man could master even two crafts in the

demanding sense proposed, let alone many important ones. The expression orders claims by difficulty rather than adding an independent negation of the following words. It intensifies the challenge that prompts the lover to deny requiring specialist precision.

Attestation. 135c: μὴ ὅτι πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας.

Let go

ἀφίημι (aphiēmi)

To release, let go or leave someone aside. Socrates decides to stop questioning the first lover because he does not claim experience in words. This is a conversational release, not departure from the school: the athlete remains nearby and is recalled at 134a. The choice makes the man claiming greater wisdom responsible for defending philosophy's value.

Attestation. 132d: τὸν μὲν ἕτερον ἀφιέναι.

Life

βίος (bios)

A life or the course of one's life. The accusative with πάντα gives the duration supposedly spent wrestling, eating and sleeping. The rival's sweeping claim is part of an insult, not verified biography. At 133c the same noun measures lifelong learning, so the dialogue contrasts ways of filling a life before asking what makes a pursuit good.

Attestation. 132c: πάντα τὸν βίον.

Liken

ἀπεικάζω (apeikazō)

To compare, represent by a likeness or liken one thing to another. The educated lover approves Socrates' comparison of the philosopher to a pentathlete. The aorist participle identifies how Socrates has understood him. Agreement on an apt image is not yet proof of the definition: the dialogue subsequently examines whether the accepted likeness has consequences the lover can tolerate.

Attestation. 136a: ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλῳ.

Listener

ἀκροατής (akroatēs)

A listener or member of an audience. The boys become listeners 'of us', with the genitive indicating whose speech they hear. Their new role intensifies the lovers' ambition and the narrator's emotional response. The word does not imply passive indifference: the boys later laugh at a successful insult and the surrounding company eventually praises what has been said.

Attestation. 133a: ἡμῶν ἀκροαταὶ.

Look into

σκοπέω (skopeō)

To inspect, consider or examine. Socrates' method verb introduces the new question about which subjects the philosopher should learn. Its object is an unresolved matter requiring investigation, not a conclusion already secured. The ordinary sense of looking closely suits the dialogue's recurrent shifts from impressive appearances

and confident formulas to the consequences of what the speakers actually accept.

Attestation. 135a: ἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν.

Looks

ἰδέα (idea)

Appearance, outward form or looks. The accusative specifies the respect in which the young people are judged especially comely. Nothing here requires the technical philosophical sense ‘Form’ or a separate intelligible entity. Reading the local construction is crucial: this is an appraisal of visible attractiveness, which helps explain the lovers’ rivalry and Socrates’ later admission of being dazzled.

Attestation. 132a: τὴν ἰδέαν.

Lose heart

ἀθυμέω (athymeō)

To be discouraged or lose heart. Socrates reports that the lovers seemed dispirited about the argument after the question of educational measure left them perplexed. The appearance-verb qualifies his psychological judgment. He therefore tries another approach, showing an adjustment to the respondents’ condition rather than simple insistence on repeating a question they have already failed to answer.

Attestation. 135a: ἐδόκουν ἀθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον.

Love of exercise

φιλογυμναστία (philogymnastia)

Fondness for or devotion to physical exercise. Socrates chooses it as a parallel to philosophy, giving the athletic rival's pursuit a place in the argument. The compound names a love or orientation, not automatically the amount of exertion performed. Identifying it with much labour is the educated lover's next commitment, whose weakness the athlete is well placed to expose.

Attestation. 133d: φιλογυμναστίαν.

Lover

ἐραστής (erastēs)

An admirer or lover, here an older male courting a youth within the social setting presented by the dialogue. The plural initially names the youths' admirers in the company; the narrative then concentrates on two rivals for one boy. Their desire to impress an audience shapes their answers, so the word identifies both a social role and a source of argumentative pressure.

Attestation. 132a: καὶ τούτων ἐραστάς.

Lover of exercise

φιλογυμναστής (philogymnastēs)

Someone devoted to physical exercise, here the athletic lover whom Socrates brings back into the exchange. The noun parallels the earlier abstract φιλογυμναστία. His practical experience now qualifies him to correct the rival's account of beneficial exertion. This change of role is important: lack of professed verbal skill does not mean lack of useful knowledge about his own pursuit.

Attestation. 134a: ὁ φιλογυμναστής.

Make best

βελτίστους ποιέω (beltistous poieō)

To make the recipients best or improve them to the highest relevant condition. The superlative βελτίστους is predicative to the understood animals. Socrates links this capacity with punishing rightly and recognising quality. What counts as best depends on the kind considered; moving from horses and dogs to human beings requires more than merely retaining the same grammatical construction.

Attestation. 137c: οἵπερ βελτίστους ποιοῦσιν.

Man

ἀνήρ (anēr)

A man, especially an adult male, rather than the broader ἄνθρωπος, human being. Here the accusative names the free and educated man whose appropriate competence the lover is describing. The social ideal is specific to the speaker's picture of cultivation. It should not be confused with the earlier boast involving ἄνθρωπος, nor silently universalised into an explicit curriculum for every person.

Attestation. 135d: ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερόν τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον.

Man; human being

ἄνθρωπος (anthrōpos)

A human being or person, rendered 'man' in this emphatic self-assessment. The lover says he would not even count himself human if he judged philosophy shameful. The boast should not be narrowed to a technical claim about masculinity or citizenship. Later the same noun grounds

self-knowledge in one's membership of the human kind, a quite different argumentative use.

Attestation. 133b: οὐδ' ἂν ἄνθρωπον νομίσαιμι ἐμαυτὸν εἶναι.

Many; much

πολύς (polys)

Many in number or much in amount. Solon's line presents learning many things, which the lover expands into learning as much as possible. Socrates tests whether quantity identifies philosophy and parallels it with many exertions. The term alone says neither that its objects are good nor that the amount is excessive; that judgment requires the later comparison with an appropriate measure.

Attestation. 133c: πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

Master

δεσπότης (despotēs)

A master or household lord, including authority over slaves in the social setting of the term. Socrates pairs the role with household manager under the condition of correct ordering. The word is therefore institutionally stronger than a casual expert or teacher. Its inclusion in the unified craft exposes the dialogue's assumptions about authority rather than eliminating them through a benign modern paraphrase.

Attestation. 138c: οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης.

Master builder

ἀρχιτέκτων (architektōn)

A master builder or supervising expert in construction. Socrates contrasts a top practitioner with the ordinary carpenter to probe what expertise in a craft entails. The modern word ‘architect’ can obscure the practical craft setting. The example makes exceptional competence both scarce and highly valued, preparing the objection that one person cannot master many crafts at that level.

Attestation. 135c: ἄκρον ἀρχιτέκτονα.

Master’s craft

δεσποτική (despotikē)

The master’s art or competence of household authority. The feminine substantive belongs to the list declared one craft with justice and temperance. It names a form of governing expertise within the dialogue’s social order, not mastery of any subject whatever. The claim of sameness depends on ordering rightly, and should not be detached from that normative condition.

Attestation. 138c: πολιτική, δεσποτική, οἰκονομική.

Menial

βάνανσος (banausos)

Menial or associated contemptuously with manual trades. Socrates reports that those absorbed in crafts are called this. The edition explains the social disparagement and supplies an external parallel. The word’s evaluative force matters: it helps distance philosophy from craft absorption, yet it should not be presented as an objective fact that all practitioners lack intelligence, character or useful knowledge.

Attestation. 137b: βαναύσους καλεῖσθαι.

Mina

μνᾶ (mna)

A monetary unit; the edition's note states that one mina equals one hundred drachmas. Five or six minae are the hypothetical price of a carpenter. Keeping the unit distinct from the following drachmas makes the disparity intelligible. The figures illustrate the value placed on expert mastery, not a currency conversion into modern purchasing power or an independently established historical price series.

Attestation. 135c: πέντε ἢ ἓξ μνῶν.

Moderate

μέτριος (metrios)

Measured, appropriate or moderate in amount. The athlete contrasts moderate exertions with many, and Socrates subsequently also excludes too few. Its force is not automatically an arithmetic midpoint: what counts as appropriate depends on the activity and its benefit. The later question asks who can determine the measure for the soul, revealing that agreement on moderation has not solved the educational problem.

Attestation. 134a: ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων.

Much labour

πολυπονία (polyponia)

A great quantity of labour or exertion. The compound parallels πολυμαθία, much learning, in the proposal that a devoted pursuit consists in doing a great deal of its characteristic activity. Physical training makes that

quantitative account testable. The later preference for moderate exertion challenges the identification, while leaving open how the appropriate amount is to be judged.

Attestation. 133e: τὴν πολυπονίαν.

Much learning

πολυμαθία (polymathia)

Extensive learning or learning many things. Socrates uses the noun to condense the lover's appeal to Solon, and the lover accepts the identification with philosophy. The compound's quantitative element is crucial to the analogy with much labour. The final rejection concerns this proposed account, not a demonstrated claim that learning many things can never have any value.

Attestation. 133c: τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολυμαθίαν.

Music and letters

μουσική (mousikē)

The cultural education associated with the Muses, including poetry, song and letters rather than instrumental music alone. It is the educated lover's pursuit and explains his claim to superiority in speech. The word should not be reduced to a modern school subject. His later appeal to Solon displays that cultural formation, but does not by itself establish a definition.

Attestation. 132d: περὶ μουσικὴν.

Name

ὄνομα (onoma)

A name or designation. Socrates asks what title belongs to a single person ordering a city rightly, then to one

managing a household. The movement from names to a common craft is fast and significant. Sharing an effective function can support a comparison, but the mere availability of different names does not prove that all holders of those titles are equally knowledgeable.

Attestation. 138b: ὄνομά γε τούτῳ.

Neck

τράχηλος (trachēlos)

The neck. Its literal bodily sense underlies both the present ‘unrubbed neck’ and the earlier wrestling verb τραχηλίζομαι. The athlete mocks the rival’s lack of physical training using the same body part previously made a sign of his own supposed stupidity. The reciprocal detail ties the two attacks together without establishing which kind of life is better overall.

Attestation. 134b: τὸν τράχηλον.

Nevertheless

οὐ μὴν ἀλλά (ou mēn alla)

A corrective or concessive expression meaning nevertheless or all the same. Although the educated lover seems anxious before the boys, he does answer Socrates, ambitiously. The idiom should be read as a unit rather than translated word for word into contradictory negatives. It links the emotional hesitation with the decisive public response that the narrator immediately describes.

Attestation. 133a: οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἀπεκρίνατό γέ μοι.

No less

οὐχ ἧττον (ouch hētton)

No less, with the genitive supplying the person compared. Socrates thinks the other man is no less anxious than himself when the lads attend. The phrase reports comparable intensity rather than proving identical feelings or motives. The narrator's surrounding 'it seemed to me' remains in force, so the psychological comparison should retain its explicitly observational qualification.

Attestation. 133a: οὐχ ἧττον ἐμοῦ.

Nudge

κινέω (kineō)

To move or set in motion; with a person and the elbow here, to nudge. The concrete touch brings the athlete into the conversation. At 134a κινητέος, a verbal adjective of necessity, returns to the same action when Socrates needs his expertise. The repetition links bodily prompting to the argument's change of speaker and temporary change of authority.

Attestation. 132b: κινήσας οὖν αὐτὸν τῷ ἀγκῶνι.

Oenopides

Οἰνοπίδης (oinopidēs)

The alternative named subject of the boys' apparent dispute, paired with Anaxagoras. The gestures and circles prompt the narrator's inference, but no doctrine is quoted. The edition's note identifies a mathematician and astronomer and relates him to the zodiac's inclination. Those historical details explain a possible allusion; they should not become a certainty about what the boys are discussing.

Attestation. 132b: ἢ περὶ Οἰνοπίδου.

Of no use

ἀχρεῖος (achreios)

Of no use or unserviceable. The adjective renews the earlier charge of ἄχρηστος when Socrates asks whether the philosopher can remain a runner-up in the governing arts. The edition distinguishes the English renderings while preserving their close function. The question is now sharpened by personal responsibility: someone may have to exercise judgment rather than wait for a superior substitute.

Attestation. 138e: καὶ ἀχρεῖον εἶναι.

Older

πρέσβυς (presbys)

Old or elder; the comparative form here means older. Paired with νεώτερον, younger, it extends the proposed duty of learning across stages of life. No exact age boundary is supplied. The pair elaborates Solon's growing-old verse, but the accompanying aim of learning as much as possible adds a quantitative demand that is not established merely by continuing education into old age.

Attestation. 133c: καὶ πρεσβύτερον.

One

εἷς (heis)

One, a single member or person. Socrates claims the craft effective for one is also effective for many, and conversely. The compressed wording leaves the relevant activities understood from the previous sentence. The transition is consequential: knowing or improving one case is being

linked to competence over a class. The numeral itself supplies no proof that such generalisation always follows.

Attestation. 137d: ἥτις ἕνα, καὶ πολλούς.

Oneself

ἑαυτοῦ (heautou)

The reflexive pronoun, referring an action or judgment back to its subject. The accusative ἑαυτόν here makes the imagined horse itself the object of its ignorance. Contracted αὐτόν also occurs in the text. This grammatical self-reference is the hinge toward human self-knowledge, but the pronoun alone does not specify whether the self is body, soul, character or another object of inquiry.

Attestation. 137e: κἂν ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοοῖ.

Opinion

δόξα (doxa)

A belief, judgment or opinion; here the speaker's own view, against which he says he need not compete before Socrates. At 135b the same noun means reputation in other people's eyes. The two uses must remain distinct: personal sincerity in argument is one issue, obtaining a public reputation for philosophy another. Their proximity exposes the lover's mixed motives.

Attestation. 134c: παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν.

Order; manage

διοικέω (dioikeō)

To administer, manage or order a whole. Here one person orders a city correctly, and the next section applies the verb to a household. The adverb 'rightly' is essential: the

inquiry concerns competent rule, not mere control. The parallel use supports the proposed unity of governing knowledge while leaving differences in scale and institutions largely unexamined.

Attestation. 138b: ὀρθῶς πόλιν διοικῇ.

Overhear

ἐπακούω (epakouō)

To hear what is being said, here to overhear a conversation already in progress. The dual participle identifies the two lads whose own discussion is interrupted. They then become the adults' audience. The change is consequential: the lovers' answers now have an immediate spectator whose approval matters, and Socrates too admits the effect of the beautiful young listeners.

Attestation. 133a: ἐπακούσαντε τὼ μειρακίω.

Ox

βοῦς (bous)

An ox or bovine animal. The example repeats the horse's supposed ignorance of its own quality as a member of a kind. In this quoted occurrence the angle brackets are essential: the edition reports that Burnet prints Bekker's supplied βοῦς, absent from the manuscripts at that point. The opening βοῦς of the same sentence is independently present without supplementation.

Attestation. 137e: τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ χρηστοὺς ⟨βοῦς⟩.

Pay the penalty

δίκην δίδωμι (dikēn didōmi)

To pay a penalty or give satisfaction; an idiom built from δίκη and δίδωμι, to give. The subjunctive follows ὅταν in a general circumstance: cities are well ordered when wrongdoers pay. The expression should not be narrowed to paying a monetary fine. The dialogue's surrounding insistence on correct judgment supplies the standard that makes the penalty part of good order.

Attestation. 138b: δίκην διδῶσιν.

Peculiar

ἴδιος (idios)

One's own, particular or peculiar to something. Socrates asks whether the combination of fineness and goodness is special to philosophy or applies to other pursuits as well. The adjective tests the scope of the lover's valuation. It does not yet mean a private possession or a subjectivity that would exempt the claim from comparison with physical training.

Attestation. 133d: τι τοῦτο ἴδιον.

Pentathlete

πένταθλος (pentathlos)

A competitor in the pentathlon. The edition lists its five events, but the dialogue's argument stresses comparative placement: below specialists in their own events and above other athletes. The model is not simply 'best overall'. It gives the educated lover a flattering picture of broad competence that Socrates then tests by asking when a runner-up supplies indispensable help.

Attestation. 135e: οἱ πένταθλοι.

Perplexity

ἀπορία (aporia)

A difficulty, lack of a way forward or perplexity. Here all three adults are full of it when asked who can judge the proper learning for the soul. The state follows an acknowledged gap in their account, not a claim that no knowledge is possible. Socrates responds by changing the approach, while teasing their reluctance to ask the boys.

Attestation. 135a: ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες.

Philosopher

φιλόσοφος (philosophos)

A person who philosophizes, whose defining activity is the dialogue's subject. Here Socrates asks what kind of man the lover means and proposes the pentathlete comparison. The noun must not silently import a settled modern profession or a fully formed Platonic ideal. The text tests competing descriptions and concludes against two accounts without expressly supplying a complete positive definition.

Attestation. 135e: τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα.

Philosophize

φιλοσοφέω (philosopheō)

To pursue philosophy or engage in the activity called philosophizing. Here the participle appears inside the athlete's insult; its value and content remain disputed. The dialogue tests much learning and general familiarity with crafts as proposed accounts. Its final negative conclusion does not supply an equally explicit positive definition, so

the verb should retain the question of what activity it names.

Attestation. 132b: φιλοσοφοῦντες.

Philosophy

φιλοσοφία (philosophia)

The pursuit called philosophy, whose value and nature the dialogue investigates. The name combines love and wisdom, but that etymology does not answer what activities constitute it. The athlete disparages it, his rival praises it, and Socrates asks for an account before accepting the evaluation. Much learning and broad craft familiarity are tested rather than adopted as the noun's settled meaning.

Attestation. 132c: αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖται φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι.

Pig

ὗς (hys)

A pig, invoked in the claim that even such an animal would know moderate exertion benefits the body. The force is proverbial and insulting toward the rival who missed the obvious point. The edition identifies κἂν ὗν as Hermann's correction of the manuscripts' καὶ νῦν; the animal belongs to the printed text, with that editorial status explicitly acknowledged.

Attestation. 134a: κἂν ὗν γνῶναι.

Pilot

κυβερνήτης (kybernētēs)

The skilled pilot or helmsman directing a ship. The respondent chooses him over the philosopher when lives

and possessions are threatened by a storm. The example relies on a recognisable craft with practical responsibility. The noun need not be converted into a general metaphor for political rule here, though the later discussion will seek an analogous competence in governing people.

Attestation. 136d: τῷ κυβερνήτῃ.

Planting

φύτευσις (phyteusis)

Planting, paired with sowing when subjects of learning are imagined entering the soul. Its genitive belongs to the topic about which someone competent should be questioned. The image emphasises provision with a view to development. It does not tell us which curriculum is best; the speakers become perplexed precisely because the agricultural analogy leaves its educational authority unnamed.

Attestation. 134e: φυτεύσεώς τε καὶ σπορᾶς.

Political craft

πολιτική (politikē)

The statesman’s art or political competence. The feminine substantive is added to the knowledge already identified as justice and temperance because it orders cities well. It denotes a claimed expertise, not politics in every modern sense or a party affiliation. The identification is one step in the dialogue’s unification of governing capacities and should be assessed as such.

Attestation. 138b: Καὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρα αὐτή ἐστιν.

Poorer; inferior

φαῦλος (phaulos)

Inferior, poor or of lower quality, with a comparative here. The philosopher is poorer than each craft-holder within the relevant craft. Earlier the lover imagined defending an even poorer hypothesis. In neither place does the adjective necessarily mean morally depraved: it measures weakness against a contextual standard, which Socrates later connects to usefulness through additional admitted premises.

Attestation. 136c: φαυλότερός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος.

Position; hypothesis

ὑπόθεσις (hypothesis)

A position laid down for discussion. The accompanying verb ὑπεθέμην makes the laying-down explicit. Here the position is the rival's earlier claim about the benefit of many exertions, which he boasts he could defend even if it were worse. The term need not denote a modern scientific hypothesis or a fully specified deductive method; its local force is argumentative commitment.

Attestation. 134c: τῇ ὑποθέσει ἣν ὑπεθέμην.

Practise

ἀσκέω (askeō)

To exercise, cultivate or practise something. Here its objects are temperance and justice, making ethical knowledge something to be enacted or cultivated. The activity recalls the earlier language of training without simply equating the virtues with athletic exertion. The passage gives no detailed regimen; its immediate point is what the interpreted inscription urges its reader to pursue.

Attestation. 138a: σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην.

Praise

ἐπαινέω (epaineō)

To praise or approve. The others praise what has been said after the educated lover falls silent and the athlete agrees. The aorist closes the narrative with an audience response. It records social approval rather than an additional demonstration of the argument: readers still must assess the condensed steps that identified self-knowledge, justice and the various governing crafts.

Attestation. 139a: ἐπῄνεσαν τὰ εἰρημένα.

Prattle

ἀδολεσχέω (adolescheō)

To talk idly, chatter or prattle. The athlete uses the verb to discredit the boys' discussion of heavenly matters before explaining or evaluating any of its content. The edition associates this language with comic depictions of philosophers. Its role is openly polemical: it reports a character's contempt, not the narrator's settled definition of philosophy or astronomy.

Attestation. 132b: ἀδολεσχοῦσι.

Precisely

ἀκριβῶς (akribōs)

Exactly, accurately or with thorough mastery. The lover denies that a philosopher must know each craft as precisely as its actual practitioner. The adverb specifies a level of competence, not simply correctness in one isolated statement. Removing this demand allows the generalist

ideal to emerge, but also creates the gap on which the subsequent challenge about practical usefulness depends.

Attestation. 135d: ἀκριβῶς ὥσπερ αὐτὸν τὸν τὴν τέχνην ἔχοντα.

Precision

ἀκρίβεια (akribeia)

Exactness, precision or thorough mastery. The lover denies that the generalist has laboured at one thing to this extent, because such absorption would leave other pursuits behind. The noun repeats the standard earlier rejected by ἀκριβῶς. It names the depth of specialist competence whose absence is first praised as freedom and then exposed as a limitation in practical use.

Attestation. 136a: εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν.

Produce in

ἐμποιέω (empoieō)

To produce, implant or bring about in someone. The moderate exercises are said to produce good condition in people. The verb makes a causal claim about the result of appropriate activity, not a mere association between athletic identity and fitness. When the argument extends to learning, the relevant question similarly becomes what a provision does for its recipient.

Attestation. 134c: ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Provide

προσφέρω (prospherō)

To bring, offer or supply something to someone. The middle-passive participle here means the things supplied

to the soul. Subjects of learning are then included among them. The provision metaphor treats education as something whose effects and quantity can be assessed, but it does not establish that every lesson works exactly like food or exercise for a body.

Attestation. 134d: τῶν προσφερομένων.

Punish

κολάζω (kolazō)

To punish, correct or discipline. The dialogue consistently adds ‘rightly’ when connecting punishment with a craft that improves its recipients. The action is therefore not validated merely by inflicting a penalty. The animal examples lead to judicial knowledge and household responsibility, but they do not by themselves prove that every actual punishment benefits or that every punisher possesses the relevant expertise.

Attestation. 137c: κολάζειν ὀρθῶς.

Pursue an activity

ἐπιτηδεύω (epitēdeuō)

To practise, engage in or pursue an activity. The participle with the article names those who pursue philosophizing as the activity under discussion. The cognate object ἐπιτήδευμα emphasises habitual practice and its effect on the practitioner. Socrates asks whether this pursuit produces the pentathlete-like person described; the verb itself does not guarantee either cultivated appearance or practical usefulness.

Attestation. 135e: τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα.

Pursuit

ἐπιτήδευμα (epitēdeuma)

A pursuit, practice or habitual occupation. Philosophizing is provisionally treated as an activity that shapes those who engage in it, as training shapes competitors. The noun is accompanied by the related participle ἐπιτηδεύοντας, pursuing. It does not presuppose a modern institutional discipline; the discussion is still asking what this way of spending effort actually produces in a person.

Attestation. 135e: τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα.

Quarrel

ἐρίζω (erizō)

To quarrel, dispute or contend verbally. The participle is dual, agreeing with the two lads. Their disagreement concerns, apparently, scientific thinkers or problems, but its exact subject is not heard. The activity becomes ἔρις when they stop at 133a. Distinguish this initial dispute from the lovers' later competitive posturing, though the scene deliberately places both kinds together.

Attestation. 132a: ἐρίζοντε.

Question

ἐρώτημα (erōtēma)

A question put for an answer. Socrates says his original question was addressed to the company, allowing the educated rival to take it up. The noun points back to whether philosophizing is fine, before the inquiry becomes what philosophizing is. Its public destination matters: the shift of respondent is presented as available to anyone able to answer better.

Attestation. 132d: τὸ ἐρώτημα.

Question closely

διερωτάω (dierōtaō)

To question thoroughly or closely. Socrates chooses the man claiming greater wisdom for further examination, hoping he might benefit from him. The prefix gives the asking a more searching force than a single casual question. The verb announces the sustained testing that follows, though Socrates presents it as potentially instructive for himself rather than solely as an attack.

Attestation. 132d: διερωτῆσαι.

Racer

δρομεύς (dromeus)

A competitor in running, here treated as the specialist against whom the pentathlete ranks second in that event. The edition uses ‘racer’ to avoid creating an English pun with ‘runner-up’ that the Greek does not make. The word’s role is comparative: a specialist’s superiority in one activity supplies the model for a craft-holder’s superiority over the philosophical generalist.

Attestation. 135e: πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας.

Rather; more

μᾶλλον (mallon)

More or rather, expressing comparison or preference. Socrates asks which helper would be chosen rather and first after the answer ‘both’. The shift yields the doctor’s priority without itself excluding every contribution from the philosopher. Keeping the comparative sense visible is

essential when the discussion proceeds to the stronger conclusion that the less preferred person is of no use.

Attestation. 136d: ὁπότερον μᾶλλόν τε καὶ πρότερον.

Reasonable

εἰκός (eikos)

Fitting, likely or reasonable; here what is reasonable for a free and educated man. The impersonal expression introduces the appropriate level of craft knowledge rather than a probabilistic estimate. It relies on an accepted social ideal that the lover expects Socrates to understand. The discussion then asks whether that socially plausible standard supplies an independently useful philosophical competence.

Attestation. 135d: ὡς εἰκὸς ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερόν τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον.

Recognise; know

γιγνώσκω (gignōskō)

To know, recognise or judge what someone or something is. Here it is the craft's ability to recognise good and bad members of a kind. It differs locally from the infinitive εἰδέναι used in the earlier demand to know what philosophy is. The later reflexive construction turns this discriminatory knowledge toward oneself, where its relation to temperance is asserted.

Attestation. 137c: γιγνώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς.

Reply

ἀποκρίνομαι (apokrinomai)

To answer or reply. Socrates invites the rival to answer more finely than the first lover. The middle form is normal for the verb and need not imply answering oneself. Throughout the dialogue, answering may mean stating a position, accepting a paraphrase or conceding a consequence; successful responsiveness is not identical to giving an impressive speech for the assembled audience.

Attestation. 132d: ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι.

Reputation

δόξα (doxa)

Public estimation or reputation. The proposed subjects are selected for producing the greatest reputation for philosophy, especially through appearing experienced in many crafts. This differs from the speaker's own opinion at 134c, though the Greek noun is the same. The external audience is now part of the definition's criterion, making seeming learned potentially more important than possessing expert knowledge.

Attestation. 135b: πλείστην δόξαν ἔχοι τις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν.

Rightly

ὀρθῶς (orthōs)

Rightly or correctly, describing the manner in which something is thought or done. The lover initially asserts that his judgment is right. Later correct punishment and governance require expertise. The adverb therefore marks a standard to be met, not a guarantee that the accompanying action is correct merely because a speaker says so or possesses an official title.

Attestation. 133e: ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ ὀρθῶς.

Rival lover

ἀντεραστής (anterastēs)

A rival in love, one courting the same beloved as another admirer. The participial phrase explains why the nearby man intervenes so readily against the athlete. The term later appears when he gestures toward his opponent while speaking loudly for the boy’s benefit. It makes the argument a contest for esteem as well as an inquiry about philosophy.

Attestation. 132c: ἀντεραστὴς ὤν.

Runner-up

ὕπακρος (hypakros)

Just below the top, rendered runner-up. The rare adjective relates to ἄκρος, used of the top master builder. It describes someone second to each specialist yet superior to non-specialists, not automatically the best overall or someone incompetent. Socrates tests the usefulness of this intermediate position, and the final argument denies that it suffices in responsibilities one must discharge oneself.

Attestation. 136a: ὕπακρόν τινα ἄνδρα.

Same

αὐτός (autos)

The same, when placed with the article in this construction. Socrates asks whether the same craft improves and correctly punishes, then extends its competence to recognising good and bad. Identity is stronger than resemblance or cooperation between skills. The many ensuing claims of sameness therefore require

attention: grammatical repetition does not establish that every named role has identical functions or institutions.

Attestation. 137c: Ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη.

Say; mean

λέγω (legō)

To say, speak or mean, depending on construction. Here Socrates refers to the manner of craft knowledge the lover means by philosophizing. The difference matters: not every occurrence reports a fresh utterance; some ask for the intended content of an account. Tracking intended meaning before testing consequences is a recurrent method of the conversation, even when its summaries require scrutiny.

Attestation. 137a: ὃν σὺ λέγεις τὸν τρόπον.

Second

δεύτερος (deuteros)

Second in order or rank. Here the pentathletes stand second to the specialists in their own events, while first among the others. The word is therefore relational, not a claim of mediocrity in every respect. At the ending being second or third in one's own responsibilities becomes shameful, making the permissibility of second place depend on the task at issue.

Attestation. 135e: δεύτεροί εἰσι.

Second prizes

δευτερεῖα (deutereia)

The rewards or honours of second place. The substantivised plural presents the generalist as holding

second prizes in understanding the crafts while surpassing ordinary people. The competitive metaphor preserves both achievement and subordination. At 138e it returns when Socrates denies that the philosopher can accept the same rank in governing his own household and carrying out entrusted judgments.

Attestation. 136a: τὰ δευτερεῖα.

See

ὁράω (horaō)

To see, here expressed by the aorist εἶδον, ‘I saw’. Socrates begins from observation of people and gestures, then distinguishes what he could hear from what merely appeared to be happening. That contrast matters: the boys’ scientific topic remains an inference from their drawing and movements, not a conversation whose precise intellectual content the narrator reports.

Attestation. 132a: εἶδον αὐτόθι.

Seed

σπέρμα (sperma)

A seed. The genitive plural identifies what is sown in the agricultural example, whose appropriate amount is judged by the farmer. Socrates then transfers planting and sowing to subjects of learning in the soul. The literal seed should be distinguished from the metaphorical educational material; the analogy raises the need for judgment without establishing identical mechanisms of growth.

Attestation. 134e: περὶ σπερμάτων σπορᾶς.

Seek

ζητέω (zēteō)

To seek, look for or request. Socrates says he seeks nothing other than renewed agreement about what has been said. The declaration narrows the announced activity to a recap rather than a fresh thesis. Because recapitulation can alter emphasis or add a premise, the reader should still compare the reported agreements with the earlier exchange rather than assume verbal continuity ensures accuracy.

Attestation. 136e: ζητῶ ἄλλο ἢ ἀνομολογήσασθαι.

Seem; think

δοκέω (dokeō)

To seem, appear or be thought; with a personal dative here, ‘does it seem to you’, naturally ‘do you think’. The word locates an evaluation in a speaker’s judgment rather than asserting it directly. Throughout the dialogue it also marks social appearance and tentative assent. Context decides whether the emphasis falls on opinion, seeming competence or an accepted conclusion.

Attestation. 132c: δοκεῖ σοι.

Shameful

αἰσχρός (aischros)

Shameful, disgraceful or ugly, opposed here to philosophy’s being fine. Socrates asks whether the athlete really gives philosophizing that negative evaluation. The educated rival later stakes his human standing on rejecting it, and shame becomes personal when he blushes and finally falls silent. The adjective therefore links

evaluative argument with the pressure of being judged before an audience.

Attestation. 132c: αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι.

Ship

ναῦς (naus)

A ship. The dative singular νηί follows ἐν and is qualified by a participle describing storm conditions. The emergency provides the second practical test of specialist competence after illness. The reader should recognise the inflected form under ναῦς rather than seek a separate headword; the vessel itself matters as the setting where entrusted lives and possessions need skilled direction.

Attestation. 136d: ἐν νηὶ χειμαζομένῃ.

Sit

κάθημαι (kathēmai)

To be seated or sit. Socrates explains in a narrative aside that he was sitting beside one boy's lover, which makes the elbow nudge natural. The rival is seated nearby at 132c and can overhear. The spatial arrangement matters dramatically: no formal summons is needed for a private-seeming question to become a competitive exchange before the boys.

Attestation. 132b: καθήμην γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἐραστὴν.

Sleep

καθεύδω (katheudō)

To sleep. The participle completes the hostile list of wrestling, filling oneself and sleeping by which the educated lover dismisses his rival. Its ordinary sense is

important to the later exchange: the athlete answers with a picture of an intellectual who is sleepless, unfed and thin. Neither caricature should be mistaken for a neutral definition of the relevant pursuit.

Attestation. 132c: καθεύδων.

Sleepless

ἄγρυπνος (agrypnos)

Sleepless or wakeful. The athlete uses it in a mocking portrait of his intellectual rival, together with being unfed, physically untrained and thin from worries. It answers the earlier picture of the athlete as constantly sleeping. The adjective supplies a comic stereotype within the rivalry; the dialogue does not certify a medical symptom or recommend sleeplessness as philosophical discipline.

Attestation. 134b: ἄνδρα γε ἄγρυπνόν.

So; accordingly

οὖν (oun)

A connective often meaning ‘so’, ‘then’ or ‘accordingly’. It can move the narrative forward or mark the next argumentative step. Here Socrates proceeds to address the educated lover after explaining why he chose him. Its force is often lighter than a strict deductive ‘therefore’; the reader should ask whether it links events, resumes an exchange or presents an inference.

Attestation. 132d: εἶπον οὖν.

Socrates

Σωκράτης (sōkratēs)

The named narrator and principal questioner. He tells the encounter in the first person to no identified listener, while the other speakers address him by name. His observations, tentative impressions and reported reactions should be distinguished from what each lover says. The dialogue's transmission among Plato's works does not make every claim spoken by this character an unqualified authorial doctrine.

Attestation. 132c: ὦ Σώκρατες.

Solon

Σόλων (solōn)

The poet and lawgiver invoked by the educated lover as authority for lifelong learning. The dialogue quotes one line and then the lover develops it into his proposed account of philosophy. The edition identifies it as fragment 18 West. Solon's name authenticates the cultural appeal within the conversation; it does not make every inference drawn from the line Solon's own doctrine.

Attestation. 133c: Σόλων γάρ που εἶπε.

Soul

ψυχή (psychē)

The soul, the recipient of learning in the comparison with bodily nourishment and training. Socrates asks whether its provisions likewise benefit through moderation. The passage treats it as capable of improvement and education without explaining its metaphysical constitution. The crucial difficulty is practical and epistemic: who can judge

which subjects, and how many, constitute the appropriate nourishment for it?

Attestation. 134d: τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν.

Sowing

σπορά (spora)

Sowing, the act of scattering or planting seed. First used literally in the farmer example, it is immediately repeated metaphorically for introducing subjects of learning into the soul. The repeated noun makes the transition vivid. The outstanding question concerns who knows the proper amount and kind, rather than whether every available seed or lesson should be put in.

Attestation. 134e: σπερμάτων σπορᾶς.

Spend one's time

διατρίβω (diatribō)

To spend time, occupy oneself or pursue an activity. The perfect participle describes the educated lover as having devoted time to music and letters; the corresponding statement places his rival in gymnastics. Socrates supplies this background after the insult. The verb identifies established pursuits without itself confirming either lover's expertise, superiority or capacity to give an account of philosophy.

Attestation. 132d: περὶ μουσικὴν διατετριφώς.

Statesman

πολιτικός (politikos)

A person concerned with governing a city, here the statesman included among the supposedly identical

possessors of one expertise. The masculine substantive names a practitioner, while πολιτική names the craft. The list's claim is about knowledge required for correct rule, not literal identity of every office or person. Keeping practitioner and competence distinct helps parse the compressed conclusion.

Attestation. 138c: βασιλεύς, τύραννος, πολιτικός.

Stoop over things

κυπτάζω (kyptazō)

To bend or stoop over, suggesting close, absorbed attention to one's work. In this passage the participle joins busybody activity in an unflattering description of a life devoted to crafts. The bodily image contributes to a status-laden critique. It should not be expanded into a claim that close observation or all manual work is intrinsically irrational or morally corrupt.

Attestation. 137b: κυπτάζοντα ζῆν.

Stop

παύω (pauō)

To stop or cause to cease; in the middle construction here, to stop one's own activity. The dual participle has the genitive τῆς ἔριδος, the dispute from which the two lads desist. They stop because they become listeners to the adults. The verb marks interruption of their scientific conversation, not an implied resolution of the question they had been arguing about.

Attestation. 133a: παυσαμένω τῆς ἔριδος.

String the bow

ἐντείνω (enteinō)

To stretch or draw tight; here to string the bow. The future form occurs in the Homeric allusion to someone else accomplishing what the suitors cannot. The physical task serves as a comparison for answering the unresolved question. It is the possibility of being outdone that matters, not a claim that successful philosophical inquiry requires literal archery or force.

Attestation. 135a: ἐντενεῖ τὸ τόξον.

Strive for victory

φιλονικέω (philonikeō)

To seek victory or dispute for the sake of winning. The educated lover says he has no need to do this against his own judgment when speaking with Socrates. The compound belongs to the dialogue's network of loves and rivalries. His disclaimer still leaves his admitted willingness to defend inferior positions against the athlete, distinguishing personal deference from a general commitment to inquiry.

Attestation. 134c: παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν.

Stuff oneself

ἐμπίμπλημι (empimplēmi)

To fill; in this middle-passive form, to fill oneself or eat one's fill. The educated lover groups it with wrestling and sleeping to caricature his rival as absorbed in bodily habits. It is the speaker's hostile portrait, not a measured account of athletic training. Food later becomes a serious example where appropriate quantity, rather than abundance, is beneficial.

Attestation. 132c: ἐμπιμπλάμενος.

Subject of learning

μάθημα (mathēma)

Something learned, a lesson or a subject of learning. The plural here is included among the things provided to the soul. It need not mean mathematics specifically. The argument first asks how much learning benefits, then what kinds the philosopher should learn, so the noun accommodates both quantity of acquired material and choice among subjects without settling their proper ordering.

Attestation. 134d: τὰ μαθήματα.

Sufficient; capable

ἱκανός (hikanos)

Sufficient, adequate or capable. Here the lover claims he would prove capable of defending his hypothesis against the athlete. The infinitive specifies the alleged capacity. The word concerns ability in a particular contest, not the truth of the position defended; he explicitly says the position could be worse and he would still expect to succeed against this opponent.

Attestation. 134c: ἱκανὸς ἂν γενοίμην βοηθῆσαι.

Suitor

μνηστήρ (mnēstēr)

A suitor, here the men in Homer’s story who resist another person’s attempt to string the bow. Socrates uses them to tease the adults’ possible reluctance to consult the lads. The edition identifies the Odyssey episode in its note. The allusion concerns wounded prestige and exclusion of a

challenger, not a literal identification of the schoolroom lovers with every feature of Homer's characters.

Attestation. 135a: τοὺς μνηστῆρας.

Surpass

περίειμι (perieimi)

To be superior to or surpass, with the genitive identifying those surpassed. The generalist is said to surpass the others while falling short of the first in craft understanding. This asymmetry is what makes the account attractive. It does not establish superiority to the specialists themselves, nor show where the lower-ranking yet impressive participant offers necessary practical help.

Attestation. 136a: τῶν ἄλλων περιεῖναι.

Surpassingly

διαφερόντως (diapherontōs)

In a superior or outstanding way, here better than those present. The comparison assesses the generalist's ability to follow a craftsman's statements relative to the surrounding audience. It does not say he follows better than the expert himself. That restricted comparison is central to the runner-up model: distinction among non-specialists can coexist with inferiority to the craft-holder.

Attestation. 135d: διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων.

Take pleasure

ἥδομαι (hēdomai)

To enjoy something or be pleased. The aorist describes the lads' delight at the athlete's retort; the neuter plural subject takes a singular verb. Their reaction changes the

social balance without deciding the argument by itself. The narrative records pleasure followed by laughter, making visible the audience whose approval the educated lover had earlier tried to secure.

Attestation. 134b: ἥσθη τὰ μειράκια.

Take up; understand

ὑπολαμβάνω (hypolambanō)

To take up, respond, suppose or understand, depending on construction. Here the educated lover takes up the new question; at 135c he asks Socrates not to understand him in a mistaken way. The range reflects conversational participation as well as interpretation. It must not be translated mechanically as an unchanging mental operation when the dialogue is also marking a turn of speaker.

Attestation. 135b: Ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ σοφώτερος.

Talk nonsense

φλυαρέω (phlyareō)

To babble or talk nonsense. Together with ‘prattle’, it forms the athlete’s dismissive characterization of philosophizing. The participle φιλοσοφοῦντες names the activity while this verb judges it contemptuously. The dispute starts because Socrates challenges that judgment; treating the insult as an objective translation of philosophy would settle in advance the very question the dialogue opens.

Attestation. 132b: φλυαροῦσι φιλοσοφοῦντες.

Tease

προσπαίζω (prospaizō)

To joke with, playfully address or tease someone. Socrates proposes consulting the lads when the adults cannot identify the needed expert. The participle identifies the manner of his proposal and prepares the allusion to Homer's suitors. The jest exposes concern for status without showing that the boys actually know the answer or that Socrates seriously expects them to supply it.

Attestation. 135a: προσπαίζων αὐτοὺς.

Temperance

σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē)

Temperance or sound-minded self-command. Socrates reads the Delphic inscription as urging this together with justice, because self-knowledge and correct punishment have been assigned to the same competence. The noun is broader than the earlier quantitative moderation of training and learning. The proposed identity with justice must be read as an argued conclusion of this dialogue, not a universally fixed dictionary equivalence.

Attestation. 138a: σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην.

Temperate person

σώφρων (sōphrōn)

A temperate, sound-minded or self-controlled person. In the list it names the bearer of σωφροσύνη alongside political and domestic rulers. The local argument has construed this virtue through knowledge of oneself and others. It does not follow merely from holding office or possessing social standing; the list asserts a unity of capacities whose demanding conditions are the issue.

Attestation. 138c: δεσπότης, σώφρων, δίκαιος.

The sick

κάμνω (kamnō)

To be weary, suffer or be ill; the article with the participle here means sick people. The doctor speaking about them recalls the earlier illness test of expertise. The present question asks whether a philosopher should be able to follow and contribute to such discussion. It prepares a comparison with judges and rulers, whose matters carry responsibilities the philosopher cannot evade.

Attestation. 138d: περὶ τῶν καμνόντων.

Then; therefore

ἄρα (ara)

An inferential particle, often ‘then’, ‘so’ or ‘therefore’. Socrates uses it to draw out what follows from an answer, here that the lover regards philosophizing as fine. It signals a claimed connection rather than certifying its validity. Tracking each occurrence helps distinguish a fresh assertion from a consequence the questioner presents as licensed by the preceding agreement.

Attestation. 133b: Καλὸν ἄρα δοκεῖ σοι.

There

αὐτόθι (autothi)

At that very place, here at Dionysius’ school. The adverb anchors what Socrates saw to the location he has just entered. It is a small narrative word, but keeps the encounter concrete: these youths and their admirers form a present company, not a general description of Athenian education or an imagined class of philosophers.

Attestation. 132a: αὐτόθι.

Thin

λεπτός (leptos)

Thin, slight or delicate; here bodily thinness attributed to worries. The athlete presents the educated lover through a comic intellectual stereotype. The causal phrase ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν gives his mock explanation. This occurrence should not be intellectualised into subtle reasoning or fine distinctions: the joke concerns a body whose appearance is held up to ridicule before the lads.

Attestation. 134b: καὶ λεπτὸν ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν.

Thing; matter

πρᾶγμα (pragma)

A thing, matter or affair. Modified by ὁτιοῦν, it means anything whatever whose fineness or shamefulness someone might judge. Socrates' question therefore generalises beyond philosophy before applying the principle to it. Later the word concerns fields of occupation and important public matters; it does not always name a physical object or an identical philosophical category.

Attestation. 133b: πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν.

Things in the sky

μετέωρος (meteōros)

Raised up or aloft; the substantivised neuter plural here means the things up in the sky. The athlete uses it for the boys' apparent subject. In the edition's note the expression carries comic associations with speculative inquiry. It is broader than the modern discipline of meteorology and

does not identify a specific heavenly body or physical theory.

Attestation. 132b: περὶ τῶν μετεώρων.

Think fit

ἀξιόω (axioō)

To deem worthy, appropriate or fit. In the allusion the suitors do not think it fitting that someone else should string the bow. The participle portrays exclusion motivated by their own failure. This ordinary evaluative verb should not be confused with an objective demonstration of worth: Socrates' comparison makes their judgment about another person's opportunity itself open to criticism.

Attestation. 135a: μὴ ἀξιούντων εἶναί τινα ἄλλον.

Think over

ἐννοέω (ennoeō)

To notice, consider or take something into thought. Socrates first finds the answer impressive, then thinks it over and asks whether it means much learning. At 135e the same verb introduces his attempt to take in the proposed philosopher's character. Its force is active consideration or comprehension in context, not a technical faculty explicitly opposed to perception.

Attestation. 133c: ἔπειτά πως ἐννοήσας.

Think; regard

ἡγέομαι (hēgeomai)

To think, regard or judge something to be a certain way. The infinitive construction here concerns judging

philosophy shameful. The dialogue repeatedly asks what speakers regard as fine, good or useful. The final ἡγεῖσθαι instead means lead, determined by its opposition to second or third place; retaining that shift prevents an ordinary polysemous verb from being flattened into one English sense.

Attestation. 132c: εἰ αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖται φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι.

Think; suppose

οἴομαι (oiomai)

To think, suppose or hold a belief. Socrates asks whether the rival thinks he could answer better than the athlete. Its frequent contracted forms include οἴει and the past ᾠμην. The verb reports a subject's belief rather than asserting its correctness; Socrates often uses such beliefs as starting points for questions whose consequences have still to be examined.

Attestation. 132d: εἰ δὲ σὺ οἴει.

Third

τρίτος (tritos)

Third in order or rank. Paired with second at the ending, it contrasts subordinate standing with taking the lead in matters entrusted by friends or the city. The numeral extends the competitive language of the pentathlete image. The issue is now not the attractiveness of broad cultivation but whether someone responsible for a judgment can accept merely appearing below another's competence.

Attestation. 139a: δεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον.

Those present

πάρειμι (pareimi)

To be present; the participle with the article means the people present. They supply the comparison group for the educated lover's proposed philosopher. The ambition is to seem most accomplished and wisest in each company, while remaining below the relevant expert. The expression brings the original audience-conscious rivalry into the definition rather than leaving reputation as an abstract concern.

Attestation. 135d: τῶν παρόντων.

Tilt

ἐπικλίνω (epiklinō)

To incline or tilt. The dual participle describes the two lads tilting their hands while representing inclinations. Its action corresponds to the noun ἐγκλίσεις without specifying which geometrical planes or astronomical circles are intended. The detail makes the boys' concentration visible and offers Socrates grounds for a tentative inference, not direct knowledge of the theory they are debating.

Attestation. 132b: ἐπικλίνοντε.

Top

ἄκρος (akros)

At the highest point, topmost or outstanding. Here it qualifies the master builder, whose expertise commands a far greater hypothetical price. The word later underlies ὕπακρος, just below the top or runner-up. This lexical relation helps the reader track the shift from exact

mastery to the educated lover's less demanding ideal of ranking beneath specialists but above everyone else.

Attestation. 135c: ἄκρον ἀρχιτέκτονα.

Trainer

παιδοτρίβης (paidotribēs)

A trainer in bodily exercise, especially of the young. The speakers name this practitioner alongside the doctor as a proper source of judgment about bodily exertion and food. The term is distinct from the mere lover of exercise: devotion to an activity and professional capacity to supervise it are related but not automatically identical. Both offer a contrast with uncertainty about educating the soul.

Attestation. 134e: ἰατρὸν ἢ παιδοτρίβην.

True

ἀληθής (alēthēs)

True or truthful; the neuter plural with λέγεις means saying things that are true. Socrates proposes finding out whether the lover's claim of philosophical usefulness is true by testing concrete needs. The word makes the claim answerable to examination. It does not mean that the respondent is intentionally lying if his confident generalisation proves unsupported or inconsistent.

Attestation. 136c: εἰ σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Try

πειράομαι (peiraomai)

To try or attempt, with an infinitive stating the attempted action. Socrates tries to look into the issue another way

after the group reaches perplexity. The imperfect presents a renewed investigative effort, not a guaranteed successful method. It is important that the change of route concerns how to examine philosophy, rather than an abandonment of the question as unanswerable.

Attestation. 135a: ἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν.

Tyrannical craft

τυραννική (tyrannikē)

The tyrant's craft or capacity, paired with the kingly craft in the argument about correct sole rule. The adjective labels the ruler's expertise as it is being stipulated here. Modern English can make 'tyrannical' automatically mean cruel, but that would conflict with the local condition of ruling rightly. The troubling identification should remain visible rather than be silently morally harmonised.

Attestation. 138b: βασιλικῇ τε καὶ τυραννικῇ τέχνῃ.

Tyrant

τύραννος (tyrannos)

A sole ruler designated tyrant, paired here with king in the case of one man who orders a city rightly. The edition notes that the word was not invariably blameful and explains its relation to nontraditional or unlawful title. The dialogue's local stipulation of correct governance must remain explicit; it is not a finding that every historical tyrant governs well.

Attestation. 138b: τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς.

Understanding

σύνεσις (synesis)

Understanding or intelligent comprehension. The lover selects what belongs to understanding while excluding handiwork. At 136a it becomes the dimension in which the generalist falls short of specialists. The noun therefore does not guarantee complete expertise: one may understand enough to follow and comment without matching the craft-holder's precision. Its adequacy is exactly what the usefulness argument tests.

Attestation. 135b: ὅσα συνέσεως ἔχεται.

Unfed

ἄσιτος (asitos)

Without food, fasting or unfed. Paired with sleeplessness in the athlete's insult, it reverses the rival's earlier description of him as stuffing himself. The local use is caricature rather than a nutritional prescription. Food soon receives a sober argumentative role when both speakers agree that an appropriate quantity, rather than an unlimited one, supports bodily well-being.

Attestation. 134b: καὶ ἄσιτον.

Unlearned

ἀμαθής (amathēs)

Unlearned or lacking learning. The article makes it the narrative designation of the athletic lover, contrasted with 'the wise one'. The edition notes its root connection with πολυμαθία, much learning. The apparently unlearned speaker now agrees while the learned claimant falls silent, creating an ironic reversal without proving that ignorance as such is the best route to philosophy.

Attestation. 139a: ὁ δὲ ἀμαθὴς.

Unrubbed

ἀτριβής (atribēs)

Not rubbed or worn through practice; here an unrubbed neck, signalling lack of wrestling experience. The accusative specifies the respect in which the man is ἀτριβής. The expression answers the earlier insult about having one's neck twisted. The edition treats this bodily description as part of the comic portrait of an intellectual, not as a technical diagnosis.

Attestation. 134b: ἀτριβῆ τὸν τράχηλον.

Urge

παρακελεύομαι (parakeleuomai)

To exhort, encourage or urge someone to act. Socrates attributes this function to the Delphic inscription, interpreting it as a call to practise temperance and justice. The verb presents a practical demand rather than merely a factual statement. The interpretation depends on the preceding identifications, so the inscription's authority does not independently establish each premise used to explain it.

Attestation. 138a: παρακελεύεται.

Useful

χρήσιμος (chrēsimos)

Useful, serviceable or capable of being put to beneficial use. The good are agreed to be useful, and philosophers exceptionally so. Socrates then asks where the runner-up model provides that use when a specialist is available. The reasoning moves from comparative inferiority to alleged

uselessness; the adjective itself does not warrant that inference without examining what assistance could still be offered.

Attestation. 136b: τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πότερον χρησίμους.

Useless

ἄχρηστος (achrēstos)

Useless or not serviceable. The dialogue contrasts it with useful and connects it to badness through the lovers' agreements. The ensuing examples make the generalist less preferable than a doctor or pilot, then call him useless while experts are present. The strength of that conclusion should be examined: being second choice and having no use are not definitions of the same condition.

Attestation. 136b: ἢ ἀχρήστους.

Voice

φωνή (phōnē)

Voice or sound of speech. The dative phrase means that the lover speaks in a loud voice so his beloved will hear. The detail exposes the double destination of his answer: Socrates asks the question, but the boy's approval is also sought. The force of the answer therefore cannot be assessed solely by its confident volume.

Attestation. 133b: μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ.

Way

τρόπος (tropos)

A way, manner or mode. The accusative phrase limits the claim about knowledge of crafts to the way the respondent means it. It protects the argument from becoming an

unrestricted rejection of all technical knowledge. When following the conclusion that philosophers are useless, keep this qualification attached: Socrates is drawing consequences from the particular account that has just been agreed.

Attestation. 137a: ὃν σὺ λέγεις τὸν τρόπον.

Well

εὖ (eu)

Well, successfully or in a good manner. Here it qualifies household administration, which Socrates links with justice. The adverb is an indispensable normative restriction: the dialogue is not claiming that any exercise of control already possesses the unified governing craft. Its earlier bodily uses likewise concern achieving good condition, not simply doing a great quantity of the relevant activity.

Attestation. 138c: δικαιοσύνῃ εὖ ἂν τὴν οἰκίαν διοικοῖ.

Whether; which of two

πότερον (poteron)

An interrogative introducing alternatives, often followed by ἤ, ‘or’. Here Socrates asks whether the quality is peculiar to philosophy or applies elsewhere. The form directs the respondent to a choice rather than an unrestricted definition. Some later alternatives are rhetorically loaded, so it remains important to identify both branches and see which one the answer actually accepts or rejects.

Attestation. 133d: Πότερον οὖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ.

Win

νικάω (nikaō)

To win or defeat someone. The pentathletes beat the other athletes, while losing to specialists in those specialists' events. This local object fixes the scope of the claim. The verb echoes the rivalry and desire for victory elsewhere, but here describes the accepted comparison; whether comparative success makes the philosopher useful is the separate question Socrates raises next.

Attestation. 135e: καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτούς.

Wise

σοφός (sophos)

Wise, skilled or knowledgeable; the comparative here is embedded in a claim to be wiser. The educated lover's title remains dramatically qualified by that claim. His ambition is later to seem wisest among those present, while the ending calls him 'the wise one' as he falls silent. The adjective's irony depends on this narrative sequence rather than on a fixed insult.

Attestation. 132d: σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον.

Wish

βούλομαι (boulomai)

To wish or be willing. The plural question asks whether the group wants to consult the lads. Elsewhere the verb expresses wanting health or intending a meaning. Its sense must follow the complement: willing to try a conversational move, desiring an outcome and meaning something by an expression are related uses, not a single technical theory of will.

Attestation. 135a: Βούλεσθε.

With respect to

κατά (kata)

A preposition with several senses; with the accusative here, in respect of or measured against the specialists' own events. It limits where the pentathletes fall short. This restriction keeps relative inferiority from becoming inferiority without qualification. Other occurrences mean according to an account or in the case of people, so the complement and argument determine the appropriate English wording.

Attestation. 135e: κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἅθλα.

Wonder

θαυμάζω (thaumazō)

To wonder at or be surprised by something. Socrates reacts to the athlete's answer, especially its disparagement of philosophy. The participle reports his response before he asks whether philosophizing is shameful. Although wonder can have broader philosophical associations, this occurrence has a precise conversational object: an unexpectedly hostile judgment that calls for explanation rather than immediate acceptance.

Attestation. 132c: θαυμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.

Words; argument

λόγος (logos)

Speech, words, an account or an argument, as the construction requires. Here plural λόγων contrasts verbal experience with deeds. Later singular λόγος names the unfolding argument or the educated lover's position. The

same English rendering cannot cover every occurrence without loss: the dialogue moves from skill in speaking toward whether the account spoken is coherent and useful.

Attestation. 132d: περὶ λόγων ἔμπειρος.

Worry

μέριμνα (merimna)

Care, concern or worry. The plural is the alleged cause of the rival's thinness in the athlete's taunt. The edition connects the portrait with comic representations of philosophical students. The word here does not establish that serious thought must be anxious, or that intellectual care lacks value; it is evidence of how one lover attacks the other's public image.

Attestation. 134b: ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν.

Worth mentioning

ἀξιόλογος (axiologos)

Worth speaking of, noteworthy or important. The educated lover especially recommends familiarity with crafts carrying this distinction. The adjective helps specify a socially selective curriculum rather than all possible activities indiscriminately. Its local criterion remains entangled with reputation: what makes a craft noteworthy is not yet independently explained in terms of the soul's benefit or the philosopher's distinctive expertise.

Attestation. 135b: μάλιστα τῶν ἀξιολόγων.

Worthless

μοχθηρός (mochthēros)

Bad or worthless, kept distinct by the edition from πονηρός, base. Socrates recalls the relation between bad people and uselessness with this adjective, and later uses it of animals and people judged by an improving craft. The English can sound absolute, but the relevant standard remains contextual: competence, condition and ethical quality need to be distinguished rather than assumed identical.

Attestation. 136e: τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς ἀχρήστους.

Wrestler

παλαιστής (palaistēs)

A wrestler, the second explicit specialist in the pentathlete comparison. Alongside the racer, he illustrates the generalist's inferiority in a specialist's own event. The example also returns to the athletic world mocked at the opening. Its role is not to make the athletic lover the winner of every argument, but to clarify a structure of relative expertise he would recognise.

Attestation. 135e: ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς.

Writing-master

γραμματιστής (grammatistēs)

A teacher of letters and elementary literacy, identifying Dionysius' occupation. The genitive belongs with his name, not with the youths' fathers. The school setting places the discussion among education, youthful display and older admirers before philosophy has been defined. It does not establish that Dionysius himself teaches astronomy,

conducts this debate or endorses either lover's account of learning.

Attestation. 132a: τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ.

Young

νέος (neos)

Young in age; with the article and genitive plural here, 'of the young people'. Later the young and beautiful distract Socrates when they turn into an audience. The term should be distinguished from μειράκιον, the more specific designation of the two lads, and from Socrates' address ὦ νεανία, 'young man', to the athlete at 132c.

Attestation. 132a: τῶν τε νέων.

Young man

νεανίας (neanias)

A young man; the vocative addresses the athletic lover. It should not be confused with the two lads whom Socrates has been observing. The address introduces a question about the harsh dismissal of philosophy. It identifies the person Socrates challenges without supplying an exact age, and its conversational tone need not be expanded into either elaborate politeness or an insult.

Attestation. 132c: Ὦ νεανία.

Contextual phrase glosses

These glosses follow the text in order. They explain the construction and local force of selected phrases; a gloss is not a new critical reading of the source.

A school entered, a topic only inferred

132a. *Εἰς Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ εἰσῆλθον* (eis dionysiou tou grammatistou eisēlthon)

The opening means that Socrates went into Dionysius the writing-master's place. Εἰς normally takes an accusative of destination, but the personal genitive here leaves the destination understood: the school or establishment belonging to Dionysius. The narrative therefore begins with an ordinary local encounter. The following τὴν ἰδέαν is an accusative of respect: the youths are considered especially comely in looks, not pronounced possessors of a metaphysical Form.

Socrates carefully separates what he saw from what he understood. He could not quite hear the boys' dispute, and their connection with Anaxagoras or Oenopides is introduced through appearing. These qualifications should survive any summary. The dialogue establishes a scientific-looking activity in a socially charged setting; it does not give the boys' theory, identify a winning argument or show that Socrates has already judged their learning.

Two lads, two hands, and an interrupted sentence

132b. *ἐγκλίσεις τινὰς ἐμιμοῦντο τοῖν χεροῖν ἐπικλίνοντε καὶ μάλ’ ἐσπουδακότε* (enkliseis tinas emimounto toin cheroin epiklinonte kai mal’ espoudakote)

The dual forms keep the pair of lads conspicuous: ἐπικλίνοντε describes the two tilting, and ἐσπουδακότε the two being intensely engaged. Τοῖν χεροῖν is a dual dative of means, with their hands. The boys are miming some inclinations; τινάς leaves their precise nature open. The edition’s astronomical interpretation is plausible explanatory context, not an additional proposition uttered in the dialogue.

Socrates’ next sentence starts κἀγώ, breaks off into an explanation of where he was seated, and resumes with the nudge and question. The pause makes the inquiry feel improvised within the room. His expectation of something great and fine is then echoed derisively by the athlete. The exchange is already about how concentrated activity is evaluated, before anyone supplies a definition of philosophizing.

A rebuke that answers for someone else

132c. *Οὐ πρὸς σοῦ γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ποιεῖς τὸ καὶ ἀνερέσθαι τοῦτον* (ou pros sou ge, ephē, ō sōkrates, poieis to kai aneresthai touton)

Οὐ πρὸς σοῦ gives the sense ‘it is not like you’ or ‘not characteristic of you’. The articulated infinitive τὸ καὶ ἀνερέσθαι identifies the criticised action: even asking this man the question. The rival does not initially answer whether philosophy is fine. He challenges Socrates’ decision to ask someone whose entire life he then caricatures through wrestling, eating and sleeping.

The hearing construction just before this names both participants through genitive participles: he hears Socrates asking and the other answering. He is therefore an overhearer who takes the floor, and his status as rival lover explains the personal aggression. Reading his speech as a neutral cultural distinction would lose the drama. Socrates has asked for a judgment about an activity; the intervention instead discredits a person as unworthy to judge it.

Choosing the respondent who claims more

132d. *τὸν δὲ σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον εἶναι διερωτῆσαι* (ton de sophōteron prospoioumenon einai dierōtēsai)

The accusative phrase identifies the man Socrates chooses to question closely: the one claiming to be wiser. Προσποιούμενον keeps the claim distinct from the narrator's endorsement. The contrast is with the athlete, who does not profess experience in words but in deeds. It is therefore the additional profession, not a demonstrated superiority, that makes the educated lover responsible for the ensuing account.

The edition notes that τὸν ἐρωτώμενον, the man who had been questioned, is Schleiermacher's correction supported by Ficino, against readings referring to a beloved or the questioner. Burnet's adopted wording keeps the released respondent the athlete. Socrates then says the original question was offered to the company, so the change of speaker is legitimate; he asks the same evaluative question before turning toward definition.

When the disputants become an audience

133a. *ἐπακούσαντε τὼ μειρακίω ἐσιγησάτην, καὶ αὐτὼ παυσαμένω τῆς ἔριδος ἡμῶν ἀκροαταὶ ἐγενέσθην* (epakousante tō meirakiō esigēsatēn, kai autō pausamenō tēs eridos hēmōn akroatai egenesthēn)

The sequence of dual forms makes the two lads act as a pair: they overhear, fall silent, stop their dispute and become listeners. Παυσαμένω takes the genitive τῆς ἔριδος, stopping from their quarrel, while ἡμῶν identifies whose listeners they become. Their earlier inquiry is not resolved; its attention is displaced by the adults' exchange.

Socrates distinguishes his own reported feeling from his impression of the lovers. He does not know what they experienced, but says he himself was dazzled, then judges that the other man seemed no less anxious. The concessive οὐ μὴν ἀλλά carries him from that anxiety to the ambitious answer. The public audience is now explicit, and the educated lover's certainty will be displayed under pressure to impress.

Can value be known before the thing is known?

133b. *εἰδέναι πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ εἰδείη τις τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅτι ἔστιν* (eidenai pragma hotioun eite kalon eite aischron estin, ho mē eideiē tis tēn archēn hoti estin)

The infinitive εἰδέναι supplies what is said to be possible: knowing of any thing whatever whether it is fine or shameful. The relative clause restricts the case to something whose nature one does not know at all. Τὴν ἀρχήν is adverbial here, not a reference to philosophy's historical beginning. The question distinguishes knowing a value from merely asserting it with conviction.

The lover's preceding declaration has made the value claim personal: he would not consider himself human if he despised philosophy, and he ensures that his beloved hears. Socrates does not rebut that declaration with an insult. He extracts the positive evaluation and asks what knowledge could warrant it. The accepted negative answer opens the demand for an account of philosophizing in the next section.

From lifelong learning to a maximum quantity

133c. *ἵν' ὡς πλεῖστα ἐν τῷ βίῳ μάθῃ* (hin' hōs pleista en tōi biōi mathēi)

The purpose clause means 'so that he may learn as much as possible in his life'. Ὡς with the superlative πλεῖστα expresses maximisation, and μάθῃ is the aorist subjunctive after ἵνα. The formulation is the lover's elaboration of Solon's line. It should not be silently attributed to the quoted poet as though the whole paragraph were a quotation.

The preceding claim that one must always learn at least one thing could describe continued learning without specifying its ultimate quantity. The purpose clause gives the stronger accumulation ideal that prompts Socrates' summary as πολυμαθία. Socrates initially thinks the answer says something, then reconsiders it. That narrative hesitation makes his interpretation a step to secure from the respondent, rather than a definition the reader should automatically accept.

One question, two deliberately different answers

133d. *Πρὸς μὲν τόνδε μοι εἰρήσθω ὅτι οὐδέτερα* (pros men tonde moi eirēsthō hoti oudetera)

The perfect passive imperative εἰρήσθω gives ‘let it stand said’ or ‘let my answer be’. Πρὸς μὲν τόνδε directs the answer toward ‘this fellow’, the rival; the following πρὸς μέντοι σέ directs a different answer to Socrates. Οὐδέτερα means neither of the two predicates under discussion, fine and good. The lover is not announcing uncertainty about which one applies.

The narrator expressly calls the delivery ironic. The same pursuit is disdained before the rival and acknowledged before Socrates, making addressee and social competition alter the spoken answer. The question itself has broadened: philosophy was called fine, and is now called good too; exercise is proposed as a comparison. The reader should retain both distinctions, between the predicates and between the audiences.

A matched pair of quantity compounds

133e. *ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν τὴν πολυμαθίαν φιλοσοφίαν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι* (hōsper ge kai en tōi philosophein tēn polymathian philosophian hēgoumai einai)

The lover accepts much labour as love of exercise ‘just as’ he takes much learning to be philosophy. The infinitive construction contains two accusatives: what is being regarded and what it is regarded as. The parallel compounds πολυπονία and πολυμαθία foreground quantity, but their matching shape is not evidence that the underlying activities share every relevant feature.

Socrates next asks what exercise-lovers desire. The answer supplies a practical end, bodily good condition, against which amounts of exertion can be tested. This step prevents the discussion from remaining a contest over impressive names. The subsequent correction will show that neither the lover's devotion nor the sheer volume of activity automatically secures the good he agrees the pursuit is meant to produce.

A familiar expert returns through a joke

134a. *κἂν ὖν γνῶναι* (kan hyn gnōnai)

The phrase means 'even a pig would know'. Κἄν combines καί and ἄν, while ὖν is the accusative subject of the infinitive γνῶναι in the athlete's report of what he thought. The edition identifies the wording as Hermann's correction of the manuscripts' καὶ νῦν. The proverb-like insult therefore belongs to the printed text, but its conjectural status should remain visible.

Before the joke, Socrates decides that the lover of exercise is κινητέος, someone who must be nudged or set in motion. The verbal adjective recalls the literal elbow nudge at the opening. His practical experience is now required to correct the intellectual's assumption. The joke wins audience approval, but the substantive contribution is the distinction between many exertions and the appropriate ones that produce bodily fitness.

Neuter plural boys, singular reactions

134b. *ἥσθη τὰ μειράκια καὶ ἐπεγέλασεν, ὁ δ' ἕτερος ἠρυθρίασε* (hēsthē ta meirakia kai epegelasen, ho d' heteros ērythriase)

The boys were delighted and laughed, while the other man blushed. The singular verbs ἥσθη and ἐπεγέλασεν are

compatible with the neuter plural subject τὰ μειράκια; they do not introduce an otherwise unidentified single spectator. The shift to ὁ δ’ ἕτερος then clearly identifies the embarrassed educated lover.

His rival’s bodily caricature answers the opening insult point for point: sleeplessness answers sleeping, being unfed answers stuffing oneself, and the unrubbed neck answers wrestling. Socrates turns the scene’s success into a question about concession: will the educated lover accept moderate exertion, or continue fighting against two opponents? Laughter is not treated as proof by itself; an explicit admission is still sought, though public embarrassment intensifies its pressure.

A defensible position need not be a believed one

134c. *οὐδὲν δέομαι παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν* (ouden deomai para doxan philonikein)

The sense is ‘I have no need to strive for victory against my own opinion’. Παρά with the accusative expresses going against the belief, and φιλονικεῖν names competition for victory. The speaker distinguishes the position he could defend from what he actually thinks. His earlier ὑπόθεσις is simply the position laid down in the argument, not automatically a scientific theory.

The concession is selective. Against the athlete he claims he could support an even poorer position; toward Socrates he presents himself as candid. That distinction leaves his competitive motives intact even while the proposition is corrected. The final admission credits moderate exercises with producing fitness. Food then extends the test beyond one athletic example, preparing the move from bodily provisions to learning as something given to the soul.

What is supplied to the soul

134d. *Οὐκοῦν ἓν τῶν προσφερομένων ψυχῇ ἐστι καὶ τὰ μαθήματα* (oukoun hen tōn prospheromenōn psychēi esti kai ta mathēmata)

The question includes subjects of learning among the things supplied to the soul. Προσφερομένων is a substantivised passive participle in the genitive, dependent on ἕν: one of the supplied things or kinds of provision. The plural τὰ μαθήματα names the educational material considered collectively. Ψυχῇ is the recipient, while the following question asks which amount of these provisions benefits it.

The movement relies on analogy. Moderate exertions and food help the body; the lover now agrees that moderate provisions help the soul too. Yet no curriculum or educational measure has been identified. The repeated short assents can make the result sound settled, but the next question exposes the missing competence: someone must judge not just that moderation is good, but how many and what kinds of lessons are appropriate.

A measure needs both quantity and kind

134e. *ὁπόσα καὶ ὁποῖα μέτρια* (hoposa kai hopoia metria)

The paired interrogatives ask how many and what kind are moderate. They prevent the educational question from being merely numerical. A suitable provision depends on selecting the right sort as well as the amount. The preceding doctors, trainers and farmers supply familiar examples where the speakers can name someone authorised by competence to judge a practical measure.

Planting and sowing subjects of learning in the soul repeats the agricultural vocabulary of seeds. The image

clarifies the need for cultivated judgment without naming its possessor. Δικαίως, used of asking, means with proper warrant or appropriately here; the question is whom it makes sense to consult. The adults' coming perplexity marks a genuine gap between praising moderation and knowing how to determine it in education.

Shared perplexity and a literary challenge

135a. *Τοὐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες* (tounteuthen ēdē aporias mestoi ēmen hapantes)

The opening says that from that point all of them were full of perplexity. Ἀπορίας is the genitive of what fills them, and ἅπαντες includes Socrates as well as the two lovers. The narration does not isolate the educated lover as the sole person unable to identify the relevant expertise. This shared impasse supplies the reason to try a different approach.

Socrates' offer to consult the lads is explicitly teasing, and the suitors' refusal to let another string the bow exposes the risk of protecting status rather than seeking an answer. When the lovers seem discouraged, he shifts from who judges the educational measure to which subjects they would conjecture are fitting. Τοπάζομεν keeps this new proposal provisional; the printed phrase around it has the textual history described in the edition.

The criterion becomes appearing knowledgeable

135b. *πλείστην δ' ἂν ἔχοι δόξαν, εἰ δοκοίη τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος εἶναι πασῶν* (pleistēn d' an echoi doxan, ei dokoiē tōn technōn empeiros einai pasōn)

The lover would have the greatest reputation if he appeared experienced in all crafts. The potential optative ἂν ἔχοι and conditional δοκοίη formulate the envisaged

route to esteem. The earlier reported εἴη belongs to indirect speech after ‘said’; it should not be treated as a separate expression of uncertainty merely because it is optative.

Δόξα now means reputation, whereas at 134c it meant the speaker’s own opinion. The change makes the audience part of the educational criterion. The lover immediately relaxes all crafts to as many as possible, especially noteworthy ones, and selects what suits free men: understanding rather than manual performance. That social selection principle is a new proposal; it has not answered the preceding question about who knows the soul’s proper measure.

An expensive expert and an impossible curriculum

135c. *δύο μόνας τέχνας οὕτω μαθεῖν τὸν αὐτόν, μὴ ὅτι πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας* (dyo monas technas houtō mathein ton auton, mē hoti pollas kai megalas)

Socrates asks about one and the same person learning only two crafts in this way, let alone many and important ones. Τὸν αὐτόν is the accusative subject of μαθεῖν. Μὴ ὅτι is the idiom ‘let alone’, escalating the difficulty; it does not add an independent negative assertion about the later words. The phrase ‘in this way’ retains the demanding standard supplied by the master-builder comparison.

The preceding figures contrast five or six minae with not even ten thousand drachmas. The edition explains their ratio; the important argumentative point is the great value and scarcity of top mastery, not a modern wage comparison. The lover then corrects Socrates’ interpretation: he does not require the philosopher to know each craft exactly as its practitioner does. That retreat creates room for the runner-up model.

Following, contributing, and seeming best in the room

135d. *ἐπακολουθῆσαί τε τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οἷόν τ’ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων, καὶ αὐτὸν ξυμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην* (epakolouthēsai te tois legomenois hypo tou dēmiourgou hoion t’ einai diapherontōs tōn parontōn, kai auton xymballesthai gnōmēn)

The proposed free and educated person can follow what the craftsman says better than those present and contribute a judgment of his own. Τοῖς λεγομένοις is the dative object of following, while ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ identifies the speaker. The comparison group is the surrounding company, not the specialist himself. The two abilities are receptive comprehension and an active contribution.

The stated result is to seem most accomplished and wisest among whoever is present. This reprises the original social scene, where the lover speaks to impress his beloved. Burnet’s ξυμβάλλεσθαι here and συμβάλλεσθαι at 138d belong to the same contributing verb-family. The later reprise will ask why this minimum competence should matter for ordinary crafts but somehow cease to matter when judges and rulers discuss more consequential affairs.

The pentathlete is first only within a restricted comparison

135e. *τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἆθλα καὶ δεύτεροί εἰσι πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι* (toutōn men leipontai kata ta toutōn athla kai deuteroi eisi pros toutous, tōn d' allōn athlētōn prōtoi)

The μέν … δέ structure separates two comparisons. Pentathletes fall short of racers and wrestlers in those specialists' own events and rank second to them; against the other athletes they rank first. Κατά restricts the respect in which they are inferior, and the repeated demonstratives keep the specialists in view. The text does not call them first overall without qualification.

This structured analogy offers the lover a flattering intermediate position: broad enough to outperform ordinary company, but not committed to specialist perfection. Socrates asks whether philosophizing produces a person of that kind. The analogy is still an attempt to understand the account, which the lover will endorse. Its adequacy as a definition depends on the later question whether such relative rank yields the exceptional usefulness claimed at 136b–c.

Freedom from specialism, at the price of depth

136a. *μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι, μηδ' εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι* (mē douleuein mēdeni pragmati, mēd' eis tēn akribeian mēden diapeponēkenai)

The philosopher is praised as not being enslaved to any one occupation and not having laboured over anything to the point of precision. The negative expressions accumulate around infinitives describing his character. The perfect διαπεπονηκέναι emphasises the intensive work

that would have been invested. This is a defense of freedom from absorption, not a claim that the ideal person has done no work at all.

The following explanation says care for one thing could leave him behind in everything else. The lover accepts ὕπακρος, just below the top, as a compliment and links breadth with the social ideal of a free person. Yet the accepted absence of precise expertise will become the weakness Socrates tests. A limitation that sounds liberating in a portrait can become costly when someone needs successful action.

Moderation returns without its judge

136b. *ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι* (alla pantōn metriōs ephēphthai)

The contrast is that the cultivated person has laid hold of everything moderately. Ἐφῆφθαι is the perfect infinitive of a verb taking the genitive, so πάντων supplies the activities touched or engaged with. The adverb μετρίως recalls the measure praised in exertion, food and learning. It gives the new generalist ideal the verbal appearance of satisfying the earlier correction.

But the unresolved question at 134e concerned who could judge the proper quantity and kind for the soul. Saying ‘everything moderately’ does not itself answer it. Socrates now tests the account through another admission: good people are useful, bad people useless, and philosophers useful. This changes the pressure from the curriculum’s social elegance to what the resulting person can actually do for someone who needs help.

Testing usefulness while preserving the printed brackets

136c. *τὸν ὕπακρον ἐκεῖνον [τὸν φιλόσοφον]* (ton hypakron ekeinon [ton philosophon])

The phrase identifies ‘that runner-up’, followed in Burnet’s text by the bracketed explanatory words ‘the philosopher’. The edition reports that Burnet, following Cobet, regarded those words as an addition and does not translate them. The square brackets therefore express an editorial judgment of suspected interpolation; they do not denote words Socrates spoke in an aside or an uncertainty about the person’s identity.

The practical case asks which helper one would bring home if oneself or a valued friend became ill and wanted health. The change from cultivated conversation to dependence under need is deliberate. The question assumes the philosopher is poorer than each specialist in the respective craft. That establishes comparative limitation, while the stronger conclusion of uselessness still requires scrutiny, especially after the respondent initially chooses both helpers.

A change from usefulness to priority

136d. *Μή μοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀμφοτέρους λέγε, ἀλλ’ ὁπότερον μᾶλλόν τε καὶ πρότερον* (mē moi, eipon egō, amphoterous lege, all’ hopoteron mallon te kai proteron)

Socrates rejects ‘both’ as an answer and asks which of the two the respondent would choose rather and first. The paired comparatives concern preference and priority. The reply selects the doctor, as the ship example then selects the pilot. These choices make the expert’s superiority

compelling in the specified emergencies, but do not simply restate the earlier answer in a different form.

The subsequent question says that, as long as any craftsman is present, the philosopher is not useful. That moves beyond comparative preference: a second helper might conceivably contribute while not being first choice. The text records assent to the stronger proposition. A careful reading should mark the transition rather than either dismissing the practical examples or allowing the change in criterion to pass unnoticed.

The word that makes a conditional charge general

136e. *εἰσὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀεί που δημιουργοί* (eisi gar hēmin aei pou dēmiourgoi)

The sentence says that there are always craftsmen for us, with που giving a light qualifying or conversational tone. Its ἀεί supplies the temporal generalisation needed to extend the previous ‘as long as a craftsman is present’ claim. The edition identifies ‘always’ as Hermann’s reading, against δή in the named manuscripts. The printed word is therefore both textually and argumentatively consequential.

Socrates next asks whether continuing would be rather boorish, and receives permission to ask whatever he likes. His declared aim is only to agree again on what has been said. The polite pause does not remove the coming pressure: gathering the admissions together exposes their clash with the lover’s high estimate of philosophy. The recap also needs checking against the earlier conversation, rather than automatic acceptance as a perfect record.

A recap that adds the speakers to the claim

137a. *ὡμολογήσαμεν καλὸν εἶναι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι* (hōmologēsamen kalon einai tēn philosophian kai autoi philosophoi einai)

Socrates recalls agreement that philosophy is fine and that the speakers themselves are philosophers. The first-person plural ὡμολογήσαμεν makes the recap shared, while αὐτοί brings the speakers personally into its content. The edition notes that this second claim was not expressly agreed in those words; it also reports Schanz's deletion proposal following Forster. Burnet nevertheless prints the clause without brackets.

The culminating consequence is limited by κατά γε τὸν σὸν λόγον, according to your account at least, and by the specified way of having craft knowledge. The target is the respondent's accepted model. These qualifications matter when philosophers are called base and useless: Socrates is exposing what follows from this description, before immediately resisting that description as an adequate account of philosophizing.

Rescuing the people by rejecting the account

137b. *ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ φίλε, ἔχωσι* (alla mē ouch houtōs, ō phile, echōsi)

The edition renders the cautious expression as Socrates' suspicion that they are not so. The plural ἔχωσι refers back to the philosophers just described as base and useless, rather than an impersonal singular 'that is not how things are'. The wording therefore resists the derogatory result while opening the possibility that the proposed account of philosophizing is mistaken.

The following negatives reject earnest absorption in crafts, busybody stooping over things and much learning as sufficient identifications; ‘something else’ is left to be sought. The social contempt of ὄνειδος and βάναυσος remains part of this transition and should not be washed out. Socrates then proposes a clearer test through horses: which people know how to punish rightly? The argument starts afresh from practical expertise, now directed toward improvement and discrimination.

Improving, punishing, and recognising quality

137c. *Ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς* (hē autē ara technē beltistous te poiei kai kolazei orthōs)

The question assigns two activities to the same craft: making the animals best and punishing them rightly. The coordinated τε … καί pairs the activities, while βελτίστους is a predicative complement of the animals being improved. Ὀρθῶς is indispensable. The claimed connection is between competent improvement and correct discipline, not between benefit and any act someone happens to call punishment.

The next question adds recognising the decent and worthless members of the kind. Thus the proposed craft combines an improving action, a corrective action and a discriminatory judgment. The dialogue then asks to transfer the pattern to people. The repeated ‘same’ signals identity of expertise, a stronger claim than saying the functions are related; the short assents should not conceal how much is being gathered into that single competence.

One and many in a compressed question

137d. *Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἥτις ἕνα, καὶ πολλούς, καὶ ἥτις πολλούς, καὶ ἕνα* (oukoun kai hētis hena, kai pollous, kai hētis pollous, kai hena)

The feminine relative ἥτις refers back to the craft, with its relevant verbs understood: the craft that does this for one also does it for many, and conversely. The repeated accusatives ἕνα and πολλούς are the people affected or known. The ellipsis makes the agreement rapid, but the missing verbs must be supplied from the preceding account of improving, punishing and distinguishing.

This passage generalises the competence across number without separately demonstrating why individual and collective cases require no further knowledge. Socrates then names judicial expertise as the knowledge that rightly punishes people behaving lawlessly in cities, and identifies it with justice. The wording does not assert that all such people are citizens. The movement from human quality to civic adjudication is a further step, not merely a translation of the numeral contrast.

From knowing animals to being one

137e. *Καὶ εἰ βοῦς ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ χρηστοὺς ⟨βοῦς⟩, κἂν αὐτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τίς ἐστιν* (kai ei bous ōn agnooi tous ponērous kai chrēstous ⟨bous⟩, kan hauton agnooi poios tis estin)

The hypothetical asks whether someone who is an ox and does not know good and bad oxen would also fail to know what sort he himself is. Βοῦς ὤν makes the knower a member of the animal kind, a change from the earlier human practitioner who knows how to improve it. The

edition flags this shift in its note; retaining the subject prevents the argument from seeming a simple repetition.

The second βοῦς is printed in angle brackets, marking Bekker's supplied word as adopted by Burnet. The first occurrence is unbracketed. The conjecture makes the object of knowing explicit, but the logical issue is separate: ignorance of the class is being connected with ignorance of oneself as a member. The horse, ox and dog cases prepare the transfer to human self-assessment rather than independently proving its full scope.

From not knowing oneself to a positive identity

138a. *Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖν σωφρονεῖν ἐστιν ἢ μὴ σωφρονεῖν* (to de hauton agnoein sōphronein estin ē mē sōphronein)

The article makes the infinitive phrase 'being ignorant of oneself' the subject of a question: is it being temperate, or not being temperate? The respondent chooses the negative. Socrates then asks for the positive identification of knowing oneself with being temperate. That reversal deserves attention; rejection of one identification is being made to support a stronger equivalence, without a separate examination of intermediate possibilities.

The ensuing Delphic reference interprets an inscription rather than quoting it. The edition identifies 'Know thyself' in its note, while the running Greek says the inscription urges practising temperance and justice. The added justice depends on the preceding chain that joined recognising quality to correct punishment. The authority of the inscription and Socrates' expanded interpretation should therefore remain distinguishable in the reader's account.

Two functions assigned to one underlying capacity

138b. *ᾗ μὲν κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα, δικαιοσύνη αὕτη ἐστίν, ᾗ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους, σωφροσύνη* (hēi men kolazein orthōs epistametha, dikaiosynē hautē estin, hēi de diagignōskein kai heauton kai allous, sōphrosynē)

The paired datives ᾗ μὲν … ᾗ δέ mean that by which we know how to perform the respective activities. One aspect is punishing correctly, called justice; the other is distinguishing oneself and others, called temperance. The second clause leaves words understood from the first. This syntactic parallel supports the presentation of two named functions of the same previously admitted competence.

The next question concludes that justice and temperance are the same. That conclusion depends on the earlier identity claims, not just on the parallel form of the clauses. The discussion then adds civic order through wrongdoers paying penalties, and political expertise follows. Each step enlarges the scope of the proposed knowledge, so the accelerating short responses should be read as substantive commitments rather than harmless changes of terminology.

Many titles under the condition of ruling rightly

138c. *καὶ μία τέχνη ἐστὶν βασιλική, τυραννική, πολιτική, δεσποτική, οἰκονομική, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη* (kai mia technē estin basilikē, tyrannikē, politikē, despotikē, oikonomikē, dikaiosynē, sōphrosynē)

The sentence declares one craft across the royal, tyrannical, political, master’s and household-manager’s capacities, justice and temperance. The first adjectives are feminine because they name kinds of τέχνη; the final

abstract nouns join the same list. Just before this, masculine titles list their possessors. The change from people to capacities should not be lost by treating the whole passage as a string of interchangeable labels.

The preceding questions repeatedly stipulate ordering the city or household rightly. That condition is essential: the list is not a finding that every actual king, master or tyrant is just. The edition notes a parallel with the Statesman's unification of several governing knowledges and a difference over the tyrant. Here the compression leaves differences of institution and scale largely unexplored while asserting a common competent activity.

The second half proposes "not shameful"

138d. *οὐκ αἰσχρὸν περὶ τούτων μήτε ἔπεσθαι δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν* (ouk aischron peri toutōn mēte hepesthai dynasthai mēte symballesthai peri autōn)

This is the second branch of Socrates' extended comparison: could inability to follow or contribute be shameful when doctors or craftsmen speak, but not shameful when judges, kings and the recently listed rulers do? The words οὐκ αἰσχρόν must remain the proposed 'not shameful', rather than being rewritten as a simple positive question, 'is it not shameful?' The answer rejects that exemption.

The negative pair μήτε … μήτε coordinates inability to follow and to contribute, returning to the educated lover's earlier standard for cultured conversation. He now insists that having nothing to contribute about such important matters would indeed be shameful. The response makes political and ethical competence unavoidable on his own evaluative terms; it has not yet established that second-

place conversational competence is sufficient for the responsibilities that follow.

A household one must not simply hand over

138e. *οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἐπιτρεπτέον οὐδὲ τὰ δευτερεῖα ἐν τούτῳ ἑκτέον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς* (ouk allōi epitrepteon oude ta deutereia en toutōi hekteon, all' auton kolasteon dikazonta orthōs)

The verbal adjectives in -τέον express necessity: the household must not be entrusted to another, second prizes must not be held in this matter, and the philosopher must himself correct, judging rightly. Their impersonal shape allows the person responsible to be specified through the surrounding construction. Δικάζοντα explains the required manner of correction; the obligation does not authorise arbitrary punishment.

The condition is that his household be well ordered. Socrates then extends the responsibility to arbitrations entrusted by friends and decisions assigned by the city. Διαίτας here means arbitrations, not diet or a way of life; διακρίνειν concerns deciding a matter, distinct from the earlier διαγιγνώσκειν of recognising people's quality. These particular obligations sharpen why general admiration and permanent second place will no longer suffice.

A negative conclusion, followed by silence

139a. *Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμαθία τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία* (pollou ara dei hēmin, ō beltiste, to philosophein polymathia te einai kai hē peri tas technas pragmateia)

Πολλοῦ δεῖ is the idiom 'it is far from', not a recommendation that a great quantity is needed. The conclusion rejects philosophizing as either much learning

or preoccupation with crafts; it should not be weakened to the claim that it is not both together. Just before it, ἡγεῖσθαι means lead, in contrast with second or third place, rather than the earlier common sense of think.

The ending does not state a complete positive definition matching the rejected ones. Instead the wise claimant is ashamed of what was said before and falls silent, the unlearned lover agrees, and the company praises the words. Those reactions complete the dramatic reversal of the opening. They register acceptance and embarrassment, while leaving the reader to examine the rapid identities through which governing responsibility has been made central to philosophy.

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- οὐ μὴν ἀλλά (ou mēn alla) — Nevertheless (p. 262)
- οὖν (oun) — So; accordingly (p. 284)
- οὐχ ἧττον (ouch hētton) — No less (p. 263)
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- τυραννική (tyrannikē) — Tyrannical craft (p. 299)
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Source guide

The reading edition

Diotimos Editions, The Lovers, second edition, 2026, Greek and English with notes. The four supplied files contain the edition used throughout this companion. Its Introduction, Key Words, thirty explanatory notes, Outline, Editorial Note, Glossary and Note on this Edition provide the immediate framework for translation choices and reported textual decisions. Those components are distinguished from the dialogue's own statements.

The supplied edition identifies the Greek as John Burnet's Platonis Opera, volume II, first issued in 1901 and in a second edition in 1910, reproduced from a later Oxford impression printed by John Johnson and published by Humphrey Milford. Its Editorial Note dates that copy no earlier than January 1935 from the bound publisher's list. "Burnet page 1" through "Burnet page 13" in the reading edition are local page labels for this dialogue; 132a–139a are the Stephanus references used for citation. The latter should not be confused with either the lexicon's page numbers or the scan's leaf numbers.

Greek comparison source

Perseus Digital Library, Lovers, Greek text edited by John Burnet supplies the digital comparison text, identified as Platonis Opera II, Oxford, 1910. The official PerseusDL TEI file was compared with the supplied Greek across all thirty-five Stephanus sections. The lexical sequence agrees after normalizing capitalization, punctuation and elision-mark conventions. Exact quotations in the lexicon retain the supplied edition's displayed forms.

This comparison is independent of the supplied file as a transfer and transcription check, but the texts share Burnet as their editorial source. It does not constitute a new manuscript collation or an independent verification of every apparatus entry. The printed volume identified by Perseus remains a useful route for readers wishing to consult the historical edition. Reports about its impression and individual type damage here are attributed to the supplied edition.

Ancient sources used by the edition

The following references locate the main comparisons that inform the articles. When an article follows the supplied edition's historical or textual note, it says so. A comparison is not evidence that the dialogue explicitly mentions that other work.

- Diogenes Laertius 3.4, 3.57–59 and 9.37: Dionysius as Plato's writing teacher; the tetralogical catalogue, alternative title and subtitle; the conditional attribution and reported Democritus identification
- Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.7.7: Anaxagoras and the sun; Theon of Smyrna, p. 198 Hiller, reporting Eudemus: Oenopides and the inclination of the zodiac
- Solon, fragment 18 West, quoted at Lovers 133c: growing old while always learning many things; Laches 188b–189a and Republic 536d offer comparisons for its use elsewhere
- Heraclitus, DK 22 B 40, preserved at Diogenes Laertius 9.1: the criticism of much learning cited by the edition

- Aristophanes, Clouds 103, 225–228, 412–421, 1480 and 1485: the comic background of celestial inquiry, prattle, pallor, hunger and sleeplessness; Phaedo 70b–c provides the edition's comparison for the accusation of prattling
- Homer, Odyssey 21.285–329: the suitors' opposition to the disguised Odysseus attempting the bow
- Charmides 154b, 161d and 164d–165a: Socrates and beauty, busying oneself with many things, and the Delphic saying interpreted through temperance
- Republic 337a and Laches 196d: comparisons for irony and the pig proverb
- Xenophon, Oeconomicus 4.2: the socially derogatory judgement of manual crafts cited by the edition
- Statesman 258e–259c and 276e: the common knowledge of several governing roles and the contrasting treatment of the tyrant
- Stobaeus, Anthology 3.21, in the Wachsmuth–Hense arrangement: the chapter on self-knowledge cited by the edition for its quotation of Lovers 138a–b

What the companion establishes

The articles explain attested words, the supplied translation and the argumentative work those words perform. The shorter register and phrase glosses each supply their own meanings and attestations; indexes and repeated links are navigation, not additional definitions. Interpretive alternatives are made explicit where the dialogue's compressed reasoning leaves room for them.

The companion's editorial choices do not settle authorship, date or the historical identity of unnamed speakers. They

also do not turn a report of a conjecture into manuscript evidence. Textual agreement across the reading formats and working electronic links establish consistency and usability; an EPUB’s exact appearance remains dependent on its reading application.