Lexicon of the Phaedrus

Words, arguments and images in Plato's dialogue

Diotimos Editions

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About this lexicon

This lexicon accompanies the supplied Diotimos Editions Greek and English Phaedrus, from 227a to 279c. It explains the words by which the dialogue moves from love to the soul, and from the soul to speaking, teaching and writing. The articles are organized by subject and alphabetically within each subject. They can be read continuously, but the alphabetical directory, Greek and English lookup routes, and passage index also let a reader begin from an unfamiliar word or a particular page.

The model is the supplied Charmides lexicon. Each substantial article begins with a lexical display and a short overview, then explains the relevant meanings, develops their use in the dialogue, offers annotated places to read, and comments on the wording of this edition. The shorter vocabulary register gives local explanations of additional words, phrases, people and images. A shorter record is not a lesser assertion: its sense still depends on who speaks, in what situation, and with what purpose.

The central difficulty is that the same word can change its force as the conversation proceeds. Love is first condemned and then defended; ordinary temperance is both praised and surpassed by divine madness; speech can mislead or teach; writing can remind without itself answering a question. The entries therefore follow changes and qualifications rather than assigning a single doctrine to every occurrence. A claim in Lysias' speech, a claim of the concealed lover in Socrates' first speech, and a claim in the palinode are identified as such.

The coverage is extensive but selective. The entire supplied dialogue has been read for this companion, and the entries gather significant senses and selected attestations. This is not a complete lemma concordance or a claim that every inflected occurrence has been counted. Main articles, shorter records, displayed forms and cited passages are different things; the lookup routes connect them without treating them as interchangeable.

The argument map that follows offers routes through the dialogue and through the lexicon. The soul's chariot, the return of the wings, the living body of a speech and the garden of discourse should be read with their local wording. Their connections invite interpretation; the lexicon distinguishes such connections from definitions explicitly given by a speaker.

The governing source is the supplied Phaedrus Edition, translated by Diotimos Editions in 2026. It presents the Greek text of John Burnet's Oxford edition in a later impression, reproducing seventy-three Greek pages with a corresponding English translation, apparatus and notes. Its own

editorial note distinguishes the 1901 edition, the 1910 second edition and the later impression. Those bibliographical descriptions are reported from the supplied edition; this lexicon has not independently collated its transcription against manuscript witnesses or the photographed impression.

References such as 249b–c are Stephanus references. Burnet page numbers refer to the numbered Greek-page units used by the supplied edition, not to the page numbers of this lexicon or to a universal pagination of Plato. Where a passage crosses one of those units, more than one page is cited. The corresponding English appears under the same unit in the supplied reading text. The indexes also give this lexicon's own page locations for practical lookup.

Greek headwords may be dictionary forms or explicitly identified phrases and word families. Attestations retain the forms printed in the continuous Greek text; the original line-break hyphenation is joined for lookup. Accent and inflection in an attestation are not silently replaced by the headword. Deleted words, editorial supplements, apparent printing errors and apparatus variants are distinguished when they affect an explanation. A reading quoted only in the apparatus is not treated as an unqualified occurrence in Plato's continuous text.

English quotations and rendering discussions refer to the supplied translation. They are evidence about this edition's choices, not claims that one English word exhausts a Greek word's meaning. Modern introductions, the glossary, the essay on later readings and the edition's review history have been kept separate from the dialogue itself. The interpretive authority for an entry remains the cited passage and its continuation.

This is an AI-assisted reference companion, independently checked within that workflow for source meaning, coverage and format. It is not a new critical edition and does not claim review by a human classical philologist. It preserves the supplied edition as a separate work. Claims about broader traditions or later reception are included only where their source basis is stated; resemblance alone does not establish influence.

References such as 227a–228e identify Stephanus pages and sections. Burnet page numbers identify the numbered Greek source units in the supplied edition. Page numbers in the directories refer to this lexicon's PDF and Word pagination; the EPUB and Markdown links lead to the same entries.

The lexicon contains 61 main articles and 302 separately explained vocabulary records. Attestations are selected and annotated; this is not a complete occurrence concordance.

Argument map

The walk and the concealed book

227a–230e · Burnet pp. 1–6

A book draws Socrates out of the city. The landscape, the familiar myth of Boreas and Oreithyia, and the question of knowing oneself establish different ways of attending to a story. Reading here is also a social encounter: Phaedrus wants an audience, while Socrates makes the desire to hear visible.

Read with: Drug, remedy and enchantment (p. 119); Leisure and walking (p. 139); Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Phaedrus (p. 148); Self-knowledge (p. 150); Socrates (p. 152)

The case for one who is not in love

230e–234c · Burnet pp. 6–10

The speech Phaedrus reads measures love by regret, gratitude, jealousy, advantage and the stability of affection. These are the claims of the speech's interested speaker, not settled conclusions of the dialogue. Follow the repeated contrast between the person in love and the person who says he is not.

Read with: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Friendship (p. 18); Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Jealousy and possession (p. 23); Love and the lover (p. 28); Lysias (p. 142)

The challenge to Socrates

234c–237b · Burnet pp. 10–15

Praise, criticism, borrowed inspiration and friendly pressure turn the listener into another speaker. Socrates covers his head. His new speech introduces a lover who conceals his love, so that its apparent defence of self-control is itself a persuasive performance.

Read with: Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30); Phaedrus (p. 148); Shame and shamelessness (p. 37); Socrates (p. 152)

Defining love and describing its harms

237b–241d · Burnet pp. 14–20

The first speech begins by asking what the deliberation is about. It distinguishes desire from acquired opinion that aims at the best, then describes a kind of desire whose mastery is irrational. The later palinode revises its judgement of love, while the later methodological discussion finds something useful in its attempt to define and divide.

Read with: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Definition and agreement (p. 90); Desire (p. 16); Pleasure and pain (p. 33); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

The sign and the recantation

241d–244b · Burnet pp. 21–24

A customary divine sign prevents Socrates from leaving. He recognizes an offence against Love and invokes the precedent of Stesichorus. The new speech does not merely supply the missing praise of the non-lover; it contests the assumption that madness must be worse than ordinary soundness of mind.

Read with: Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Shame and shamelessness (p. 37); The daimonic sign (p. 155)

Divine madness and the self-moving soul

244a–246a · Burnet pp. 24–27

Prophetic, purificatory and poetic madness prepare the defence of love's madness. The argument for immortality then turns on self-motion and the status of a beginning. Keep the demonstrative argument distinct from the likeness of a charioteer and horses that follows it.

Read with: Initiation and mysteries (p. 57); Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Self-motion and immortality (p. 79); Soul (p. 82)

The procession and what truly is

246a–248c · Burnet pp. 27–30

The soul's likeness is developed through flight, divine procession, nourishment and vision. What truly is is without colour, shape, or tangibility, although the account gives its approach a richly spatial setting. The non-divine souls' limited vision and damaged wings explain the transition toward embodied lives.

Read with: Being and reality (p. 45); Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55); Intellect and seeing (p. 60); Nourishment (p. 69); Wing and flight (p. 85)

The lives and the work of recollection

248c–250e · Burnet pp. 30–33

The ordinance concerning lives is followed by an account of gathering many perceptions into one. Recollection connects human understanding with what the soul once saw. Beauty's exceptional visibility gives the argument a new point of departure within embodied experience.

Read with: Beauty (p. 42); Fate and choice of life (p. 52); Justice and virtue (p. 63); Philosophy (p. 71); Recollection (p. 76)

Longing and the growth of the wings

250e–253c · Burnet pp. 33–36

The lover's response is described through shuddering, reverence, heat, water, itching, longing and relief. Lovers seek a beloved in the likeness of the god they followed; the passage includes the violent danger associated with Ares's followers as well as the improving care described for others. These images belong to the mythic explanation of love, but their moral force depends on the difference between possessive jealousy and a desire to make another person better.

Read with: Beauty (p. 42); Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Jealousy and possession (p. 23); Longing and yearning (p. 25); Reverence (p. 35); Wing and flight (p. 85)

The struggle and the answering love

253c–257b · Burnet pp. 36–41

The horses and charioteer make conflict within desire visible. Memory of beauty with temperance interrupts the rush toward gratification; the beloved later experiences a returning stream of love without yet understanding what it is. The outcomes distinguish the philosophical pair from an honour-loving pair whose conduct is less controlled.

Read with: Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Friendship (p. 18); Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Philosophy (p. 71); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

From speeches on love to speaking well

257b–260d · Burnet pp. 41–46

The charge of being a speech-writer shifts attention from the content of the speeches to the worth of writing them. The cicadas interrupt any easy separation between setting and inquiry. The question is not simply whether to speak or write, but how to do either well.

Read with: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135); Opinion and seeming (p. 105); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Truth (p. 116); Writing and letters (p. 132)

Truth similarity and deception

260d–263c · Burnet pp. 46–50

The inquiry tests whether the ability to persuade can count as a craft without knowledge of truth. Small similarities make a transition from one judgement to another hard to notice. The speaker needs discrimination precisely where an audience may be led astray.

Read with: Definition and agreement (p. 90); Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Similarity and deception (p. 114); Truth (p. 116)

The living structure of a speech

263c–266c · Burnet pp. 51–55

Lysias' speech is tested for a beginning, an ordered body and a definition. Socrates' own speeches supply examples of collection and division. The appeal to natural joints requires discrimination; it is not permission to cut a topic into any convenient pieces.

Read with: Definition and agreement (p. 90); Dialectic and conversation (p. 92); Form, collection and division (p. 94); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

From the handbook to an art of souls

266c–272b · Burnet pp. 55–63

The catalogue of rhetorical devices is followed by analogies with medicine, tragedy and music. Preliminary studies are necessary without being sufficient. The positive demand joins knowledge of kinds of soul and speech to the recognition of actual people and appropriate moments.

Read with: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Nature, whole and part (p. 103); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108); Practice and training (p. 110); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Soul (p. 82)

The likely and the long road

272b–274b · Burnet pp. 63–66

Socrates gives the defence of probability its own hearing before answering it. The weak man and the strong man show how a plausible account can detach itself from what happened. The proposed answer subordinates likelihood to the knowledge that can recognize its resemblance to truth.

Read with: Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Likelihood and the plausible (p. 99); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30); Similarity and deception (p. 114); Truth (p. 116)

Letters their limits and their uses

274b–277a · Burnet pp. 66–70

Theuth offers an invention; Thamus judges its effects. Their difference turns on memory, reminding and the appearance of wisdom. The contrast between an unanswering written discourse and living discourse in a learner's soul leads to the images of legitimate offspring, cultivation and fertile seeds.

Read with: Drug, remedy and enchantment (p. 119); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Memory and reminding (p. 123); Play and earnestness (p. 125); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127); Writing and letters (p. 132)

The name of the philosopher and the final prayer

277a–279c · Burnet pp. 70–73

The closing summary joins truth, division and adaptation to souls. A writer able to defend and surpass his writing receives a name drawn from his greater activity, not merely from his book. Socrates' words about Isocrates remain a prediction; the prayer then turns from beautiful speech toward inward beauty and harmony.

Read with: Friendship (p. 18); Isocrates (p. 137); Philosophy (p. 71); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74); Wisdom and the names of a writer (p. 130)

Main articles

Love and human relations

Benefit and harm

ὠφελία, ōphelia, "benefit"; βλάβη, blabē, "harm; damage"; ὠφελέω, ōpheleō, "benefit; be useful to"

At a Glance

Benefit and harm supply a common test throughout the dialogue. What changes is the account of the person's good—from prudent advantage to education of the soul, divine love and responsible speech.

Meaning

Ōphelia is the help or advantage something gives, and blabē the injury or damage it causes. A benefit can concern possessions, the body, character or the soul. The question therefore needs its recipient and time-scale: a thing pleasant now to the lover may harm the beloved, while a difficult discipline may prove a lasting good.

The opening speech often approaches this test through what "is to our advantage", sympherein. Socrates' first speech makes benefit or harm the express question of the inquiry; his second retains the question while challenging the first answer.

Use in the Phaedrus

Lysias' speaker promises mutual advantage and concludes that no harm should follow but benefit to both (230e, 234c). His detailed comparisons nevertheless include discretion, security against abandonment and capacity to repay. He also claims that companions who improve the boy are a benefit rather than a threat (232c–d), a point that becomes central to both Socratic speeches.

After defining the love under investigation, Socrates considers its effects in an ordered series: mind and education, bodily condition, property and family independence, everyday company, and the future after love ends (238e–241c). The gravest harm is deprivation of divine philosophy, by which the beloved could become most intelligent. The hierarchy culminates in the education of the soul, called more precious than anything else for gods and human beings. Even this hostile speech therefore sets a standard that a better love could satisfy.

The palinode accepts the burden of demonstrating that divine erotic madness benefits both parties (245b–c). Its lovers improve themselves in order to honour the beloved and imitate their god; the boy receives education and returns love. The best outcome joins disciplined living and philosophy, while a lesser outcome remains better than the non-lover's merely mortal thrift (256a–257a). Benefit here cannot be calculated by wealth retained or disturbance avoided alone.

The later discussion transfers the test to speech and writing. A rhetorician ignorant of good and evil may persuade a similarly ignorant city to do evil while calling it good (260b–d). Thamus asks what benefit each invention brings, and distinguishes inventing from judging the harm and benefit of its use (274d–275a). Good intentions do not settle the latter question: Theuth's affection for letters makes him misjudge their power. The dialogue's ethical test survives these changes of subject because the relevant question remains what an attachment, practice or tool actually does to its recipient.

Places to Read

230e–234c · Burnet pp. 6–10 Mutual advantage and Lysias' promised benefits.

237c–241c · Burnet pp. 15–20 The inquiry's test and a hierarchy of injuries.

245b–c; 253a–c; 256a–257a · Burnet pp. 26, 36, 40–41 The palinode's undertaking and its outcomes.

260b–d · Burnet p. 46 Harmful persuasion in the city.

274d–275a · Burnet pp. 66–67 Thamus distinguishes invention from judging benefit.

In this edition

"Benefit" and "harm" make the repeated pair easy to follow, but the opening sympherein is rendered "be to our advantage". At 239b the superlative harm has a definite object: being shut out from philosophy and the intelligence it can cultivate. It is not merely a generalized complaint that all relationships distract from study.

Attested forms

ὠφελίαν (234c · Burnet p. 10) — "benefit". Lysias' conclusion requires benefit to both.

ὠφελίᾳ (245b · Burnet p. 26) — "benefit". The palinode undertakes to defend the divine benefit to lover and beloved.

βλάβην (237d · Burnet p. 15) — “harm”. The proposed investigation asks what love provides.

βλάβης (239b · Burnet p. 17) — “harm”. Exclusion from philosophy produces the greatest harm in the first speech.

ὠφελεῖσθαι (232d · Burnet p. 8) — “benefited”. Lysias says non-lovers welcome beneficial associates.

See also

Drug, remedy and enchantment (p. 119); Friendship (p. 18); Jealousy and possession (p. 23); Philosophy (p. 71); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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Counter-love and mirror

ἀντέρως, anterōs, “Counter-love”; κάτοπτρον, katoptron, “Mirror”; ῥεῦμα, rheuma, “Stream”; ἠχώ, ēchō, “Echo”; ὀφθαλμία, ophthalmia, “Eye-disease”

At a Glance

The beloved’s answer to love begins before he understands or names it correctly. A returning stream, an echo, an eye-disease and a mirror explain this unrecognized reciprocity (255b–e).

Meaning

Anterōs is love answering love, rendered “counter-love”. The prefix marks response or return here, not enmity. Socrates calls it an eidōlon, an image of love. Katoptron is a mirror; rheuma, a stream; ēchō, an echo. Each image explains a different feature of what is happening to the beloved.

The beloved calls the condition philia, friendship, and thinks it is not erōs. Socrates’ narrative makes that naming an incomplete self-understanding. This does not make friendship itself false or worthless: the passage also celebrates the lover’s extraordinary goodwill and the couple’s subsequent friendship.

Use in the Phaedrus

The response begins through association. The beloved is served as a peer of the gods by someone genuinely affected, and is naturally friendly toward the person serving him. Even if companions had told him that intimacy with a lover was shameful, time, age and what must be bring him to admit the lover into company (255a). The narrative then says that the lover’s goodwill,

experienced at close range, strikes the beloved with its exceptional force (255b).

Continued contact allows the stream of beauty to flow abundantly toward the lover. Some sinks into him; as he fills, some flows out again. Like a breath or an echo rebounding from a smooth solid surface, it returns to where it began (255c). The analogy specifies the direction of return. The beloved is not described as receiving an unrelated beauty from a third source.

The returning current enters the beautiful one through the eyes, reaches his soul, raises its wings and waters their passages. It fills his soul with love, but he cannot say what he loves or explain what he has undergone. He is compared to someone who caught an eye-disease from another without knowing its cause; then to someone seeing himself in the lover as in a mirror without recognizing that this is what he sees (255c–d). The comparisons jointly mark transmission, reflection and ignorance.

When the lover is present his anguish ceases; when absent he yearns and is yearned for. He has counter-love, an image of love, but names it friendship. He wants to see, touch, kiss and lie beside the other, in a way resembling the lover's but weaker (255d–e). Similarity of direction is explicitly distinguished from equality of intensity.

The response does not settle the ethical outcome. The subsequent scene gives both souls their own good and unruly powers. Their common life may be directed by the better parts of mind toward philosophy, or toward the less ordered honour-loving outcome (255e–256d). Reciprocity makes a shared education possible, but still requires decisions about what the pair will do with their attraction.

Places to Read

254e–255b · Burnet pp. 38–39 The beloved's admission of the lover and recognition of his goodwill.

255c–e · Burnet p. 39 The returning stream, echo, eye-disease, mirror and naming of counter-love.

255e–256d · Burnet pp. 39–40 The two souls' internal conflict and the shared alternatives.

In this edition

The edition renders philein "kiss" in the sequence of embodied desires at 255e, while elsewhere it can mean "love". That local English choice should not be transferred automatically to every occurrence of the verb.

"Similarly … but more weakly" preserves paraplēsiōs men, asthenesterōs de. "Mirror" is an explicit simile, not a statement that the beloved has

consciously formulated a philosophy of self-love. The stream's causal narrative belongs to the palinode's poetic physiology, which Socrates later calls a possibly truth-touching likeness (265b–c).

Attested forms

ἀντέρωτα (255e · Burnet p. 39) — "counter-love".

κατόπτρῳ (255d · Burnet p. 39) — "mirror".

ῥεύματος (255c · Burnet p. 39) — "stream".

ῥεῦμα (255c · Burnet p. 39) — "stream".

ἠχὼ (255c · Burnet p. 39) — "echo".

ὀφθαλμίας (255d · Burnet p. 39) — "eye-disease".

See also

Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Friendship (p. 18); Longing and yearning (p. 25); Love and the lover (p. 28); Wing and flight (p. 85)

Contents · Alphabetical index

Desire

ἐπιθυμία, epithymia, "desire"; ἐπιθυμέω, epithymeō, "desire; long to do"

At a Glance

Desire is wider than erotic love. What matters is its object, its strength, the company it keeps and whether it rules or participates in a better-directed life.

Meaning

Epithymia names wanting or appetite, and epithymein the corresponding activity. An object may be a body, a pleasure, a speech or an action. The family does not itself pronounce the desire good or bad. Socrates' eagerness to hear and Phaedrus' eagerness to perform prepare the dialogue's erotic vocabulary before either man gives an account of eros.

The first speech distinguishes the inborn desire for pleasures from acquired opinion aiming at what is best (237d–e). These can agree or fall into conflict. Their distinction is therefore not the assertion that every act of wanting opposes reason: conflict, victory and rule are further conditions that explain the names temperance and insolence.

Use in the Phaedrus

In Lysias' speech desire measures the anticipated life of a bargain. Lovers regret their kindness after it ceases; many desired the body before knowing

the boy's character; praise and judgement are distorted while the desire lasts (231a, 232e–233b). The non-lover nevertheless wants something from the same boy. At 237d Socrates makes the implication explicit: those not in love also desire beautiful things, so the mere presence of desire cannot distinguish the two parties.

The resulting definition tracks a particular struggle. Desire for bodily beauty, reinforced by kindred desires, defeats opinion striving towards what is right and gains the strength from which the speech derives the name love (238b–c). Appetites for food and drink have already supplied parallel cases. Their point is not that food, drink and beauty are interchangeable objects, but that the ruling appetite gives its characteristic direction and name to the person's condition.

The palinode redescribes erotic disturbance through longing, wing-growth and memory, without making bodily desire disappear. The beloved himself comes to desire seeing, touching, kissing and lying beside the lover, though more weakly (255e). At 256a his readiness to grant a requested favour is checked by the better horse and charioteer. The pair's achievement is not the simple absence of wanting, but an ordered life in which the better elements prevail. Socrates' own desire at 243d is to wash away the earlier offence with a better speech: wanting can drive correction as well as acquisition.

Places to Read

227d–228c · Burnet p. 2 Desire to hear, inspect and tell speeches.

231a–233c · Burnet pp. 6–9 Desire as the unstable basis of the bargain.

237d–238c · Burnet pp. 15–16 Its distinction from opinion, its kinds and its rule.

243d · Burnet pp. 23–24 Socrates desires the corrective speech.

255e–256c · Burnet pp. 39–40 The beloved's desire and the possible outcomes of conflict.

In this edition

"Desire" keeps the epithymia family distinct from the palinode's "longing" and "yearning". At 238b–c "pleasure of beauty" belongs to the whole phrase; beauty is the object toward which this desire is led, not an additional meaning inherent in epithymia. The perfect epitethymēka, printed as ἐπιτεθύμηκα at 227d, marks Socrates' already developed eagerness to hear.

Attested forms

ἐπιθυμία (237d · Burnet p. 15) — “desire”. Both lover and non-lover can desire beautiful things.

ἐπιθυμίας (238e · Burnet p. 17) — “desire”. The harmful lover is ruled by desire.

ἐπιτεθύμηκα (227d · Burnet p. 2) — “have come to desire”. Socrates desires to hear the speech.

ἐπιθυμεῖ (255e · Burnet p. 39) — “He desires”. The beloved desires contact, like the lover but more weakly.

See also

Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Longing and yearning (p. 25); Love and the lover (p. 28); Pleasure and pain (p. 33); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

Contents · Alphabetical index

Friendship

φιλία, philia, “friendship”; φίλος, philos, “friend; friendly; dear”; φιλέω, phileō, “love; kiss”; εὔνοια, eunoia, “goodwill”

At a Glance

The rival speeches compete to say which companionship deserves the name friendship. The decisive contrast is between using another for present satisfaction and willing and cultivating his good.

Meaning

Philia names friendship or attachment; philos can identify a friend, express friendliness or provide an affectionate address. Philein often means loving, but at 255e–256a it means kissing. Eunoia makes an important element explicit: goodwill, the favourable disposition of one person towards another.

Erotic and friendly relations are neither identical nor mutually exclusive. Lysias’ speaker distinguishes family and loyal friends from sexual desire; the palinode makes a lover’s friendship a divine gift; the beloved calls his own counter-love friendship before he understands what has happened to him.

Use in the Phaedrus

Friendship frames the dialogue in ordinary speech. Socrates greets “my friend Phaedrus”; affectionate forms continue through persuasion, teasing

and correction. At 228e he can say he loves Phaedrus while refusing the proposed rehearsal. The dramatic friendship allows a refusal that a flattering admirer might fear to make.

Lysias recommends a relationship founded before erotic gratification and therefore likely to survive it. Fathers, mothers, sons and faithful friends show that strong friendship need not arise from this kind of desire (233c–d). His imagined non-lover will forgive involuntary wrongs and oppose voluntary ones, while lovers flatter against the beloved's best interest. The speech's claim is that durable friendship and prudent reciprocity can replace passion, not that company or affection should cease.

The first Socratic speech attacks the lover's very title to friendship. A man who keeps the boy ignorant and isolated may be a guardian or partner in name, but is useful to neither the boy's mind nor his future. At 241c the lack of goodwill explains the image of wolves cherishing lambs: the word of affection remains, while the intention is consumption.

The palinode answers precisely this deprivation. A true lover honours the beloved, educates himself because of him and seeks to lead him towards the divine pattern rather than jealously keep him weak (252d–253c). Once admitted into company, his goodwill strikes the boy as exceeding that of all his other companions combined (255b). The returning stream of beauty makes the boy love in turn, though he calls the experience philia (255e). The name is insufficient for the mechanism, not evidence that friendship is worthless.

Both the philosophic and the less disciplined honour-loving pairs remain friends; the second pair are expressly less so than the first, but their mutual pledges keep them from enmity even when passion has passed (256c–e). The closing proverb, "the things of friends are common", brings the relation back from myth to Socrates and Phaedrus. They depart sharing a prayer for inward beauty and an ordered relation between inward and outward possessions (279b–c).

Places to Read

227a; 228d–e · Burnet pp. 1, 3 Affection in the exchange between the speakers.

232b–234c · Burnet pp. 8–10 Lysias on durable friendship, family and repayment.

239a–241d · Burnet pp. 17–20 The harmful lover and the absence of goodwill.

252d–253c; 255a–257a · Burnet pp. 35–36, 38–41 Educative love, recognized goodwill, reciprocal attachment and lasting bonds.

279b–c · Burnet p. 73 The friends share the final prayer.

In this edition

The edition translates the philia family visibly as “friendship”, “friend” and “love”, but “kiss” at 255e–256a is the local action meant by philein. At 264a its “dear head” is a stock affectionate phrase. At 255b the extraordinary comparison with other friends belongs to what the beloved perceives when the god-filled lover’s goodwill becomes apparent.

Attested forms

φιλίας (233c · Burnet p. 9) — “friendship”. The non-lover offers signs of a long-lasting attachment.

φιλίαν (255e · Burnet p. 39) — “friendship”. The beloved calls his reciprocal love friendship.

φίλε (227a · Burnet p. 1) — “My friend”. Socrates’ opening address.

φίλων (279c · Burnet p. 73) — “friends”. Phaedrus asks to share the prayer.

φιλῶ (228e · Burnet p. 3) — “I love”. Socrates loves Phaedrus but declines to be a practice audience when the book is present.

φιλεῖν (255e · Burnet p. 39) — “kiss”. A particular desired bodily action.

εὐνοίας (241c · Burnet p. 20) — “goodwill”. Denied of the possessive lover’s friendship.

εὔνοια (255b · Burnet p. 39) — “goodwill”. The beloved recognizes the true lover’s concern.

See also

Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Jealousy and possession (p. 23); Love and the lover (p. 28); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74)

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Gratifying and gratitude

χαρίζομαι, charizomai, "gratify; grant a favour"; χάρις, charis, "favour; gratitude; grace"

At a Glance

The question "whom should one gratify?" begins as an erotic bargain and ends as a question about the gods whom a speaker should aim to please.

Meaning

Charizesthai means to do what pleases someone, to oblige him or grant him a favour. In the erotic speeches the boy's gratifying an admirer means granting the favour for which that admirer is asking. Charis can name the favour itself, the gratitude felt for it or the favourable reception one seeks. Context and grammatical direction decide who gives, who receives and who owes.

This vocabulary lets the dialogue test generosity against exchange. A favour can be freely offered, calculated as a debt, demanded as repayment, or directed towards a good beyond the approval of the immediate audience. The same family also appears in gracious conversational concessions.

Use in the Phaedrus

Phaedrus states the whole question with charisteon, "one should gratify", at 227c. Lysias' speaker then calculates obligations. The lover adds up expenditure, neglected affairs and toil and concludes that he has already repaid the beloved; the non-lover claims to give willingly and within his means (231a–b). Later the speaker rejects need as the governing criterion: the boy should prefer those most able to return the favour, not simply those most desperate for it (233d–234a). His apparent generosity is tied to the expectation of reciprocity.

This accounting becomes the crisis in the first Socratic speech. The boy demands the favour due under old promises, while the lover who has regained sense refuses to honour what his former state promised (241a–b). "Becoming another" breaks the imagined continuity of the debtor. The language therefore exposes a weakness in making a changing appetite the guarantor of a lasting exchange.

The palinode does not erase the erotic sense. The bad horse forces an approach to mention the favour of Aphrodite's pleasures (254a), and the beloved would not refuse to gratify the lover if asked, until the better elements oppose that course (256a). But at the close Socrates addresses Love as a recipient of the palinode, asking pardon for the first speech and favour

for the second (257a). The speech itself is now a gift and a discharged obligation.

The conversational uses connect these scenes. Socrates will not concede that Lysias exhausted the subject simply to gratify Phaedrus, since earlier wise speakers would refute him (235b). Agreement offered as a personal favour cannot replace a warranted judgement. At 273e–274a the long labour of the true speaker is directed primarily toward gratifying good divine masters, not human fellow slaves. Pleasing people is allowed as a secondary task, not made the ruling end. The next question, how to gratify a god about speeches, opens the discussion of writing (274b).

Places to Read

227c; 231a–b · Burnet pp. 2, 6 The erotic request and the lover's reckoning.

233d–234c · Burnet pp. 9–10 Need, worthiness, repayment and mutual benefit.

235b · Burnet p. 12 Socrates refuses a merely gratifying concession.

241a–b · Burnet p. 20 The beloved demands the debt.

254a; 256a; 257a · Burnet pp. 37, 40–41 Sexual favour and the palinode offered to Love.

273e–274b · Burnet pp. 65–66 The speaker's work should gratify the gods.

In this edition

The edition's "gratify" preserves the connection between erotic favours and the later service to gods. "Favour" and "grateful" express different constructions of charis: at 233d those relieved of great evils will know gratitude, whereas at 231b lovers think they have returned the favour due. These constructions should not be collapsed into a single financial sense of debt, although the speeches deliberately use the language of repayment.

Attested forms

χαριστέον (227c · Burnet p. 2) — "one should gratify". The question posed by Lysias' speech.

χαρίζεσθαι (273e–274a · Burnet p. 65) — "gratifying". The proper principal recipients become the gods.

χάριν (231b · Burnet p. 6) — "favour". What lovers count as already repaid.

χάριν (257a · Burnet p. 41) — "favour". Socrates asks Love to receive the palinode favourably.

See also

Benefit and harm (p. 12); Friendship (p. 18); Love and the lover (p. 28); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74)

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Jealousy and possession

φθόνος, phthonos, "jealousy; begrudging another's good"; φθονέω, phthoneō, "be jealous; begrudge"; φθονερός, phthoneros, "jealous"

At a Glance

The harmful lover begrudges whatever could make the beloved independent. The divine model reverses this: good is shared, and the lover tries to increase rather than diminish the beloved's capacities.

Meaning

Phthonos is jealousy or begrudging, especially resentment at another's advantage. In these speeches it includes fear of rivals, but reaches beyond sexual exclusiveness. Money, intelligence, family and philosophy can all be resented because they loosen the lover's hold.

The source distinguishes phthonos from being envied or admired, zēlousthai, in the lover's boast at 232a. Both involve another person's valuation, but the crucial moral question of phthonos is whether one withholds or opposes a good another could have.

Use in the Phaedrus

Lysias presents jealous lovers as interpreting everything as a possible injury to themselves. They fear the rich person's money and the educated person's understanding, persuade the boy to alienate such people and leave him in a solitude without friends (232c–d). The non-lover claims the opposite disposition: he welcomes those whose company benefits the boy. It is a promise within his own solicitation, but it identifies a substantive criterion by which the later speeches can judge love.

The first Socratic speech makes that jealousy follow from domination by pleasure. The lover cannot welcome an equal or superior and therefore delights in or manufactures weaknesses. Most damagingly, he shuts the beloved away from philosophy lest he be despised (239a–b). Family and property become further obstacles: the lover wishes the boy deprived of protecting relatives, resents his wealth, rejoices at its loss and wants him

unmarried, childless and homeless for as long as possible (239e–240a). Possession of the person is secured by stripping him of possessions and relationships.

At 247a, in the palinode's heavenly procession, jealousy stands outside the divine chorus. Those willing and able may follow; divine life does not protect its excellence by preventing others from approaching it. The educative lover later imitates this openness. He persuades and forms the boy towards the god's way of life, explicitly without jealousy or servile ill will (253b–c). The desired likeness is an increase in excellence, not an engineered inferiority.

The palinode still depicts the followers of Ares who, feeling wronged in love, are ready to kill themselves and their darlings (252c). The narrative's divine framework does not make every lover safe or every imitation successful. The beautiful outcome at 253c is conditional on the lovers achieving their undertaking as described. Read against these qualifications, freedom from jealousy is a demanding standard for a true lover, not an automatic property of attachment.

Places to Read

232c–e · Burnet p. 8 Rivals, money, education and isolation from friends.

239a–240a · Burnet pp. 17–18 The beloved's weakness, exclusion from philosophy and loss of independence.

243c–d · Burnet p. 23 The imagined noble lover rejects the blanket accusation.

247a · Burnet p. 28 Jealousy outside the divine chorus.

252c–253c · Burnet pp. 35–36 Dangerous possessiveness and its educative opposite.

In this edition

"Jealousy" should be read broadly enough to include begrudging the boy wealth or education. The speech at 240a says the lover rejoices when the property is lost; it does not say here that he himself destroys it. At 253b the negative is explicit: the lovers being described do not use jealousy or servile ill will towards the darling.

Attested forms

φθόνος (247a · Burnet p. 28) — "jealousy". Excluded from the divine chorus.

φθόνῳ (253b · Burnet p. 36) — "jealousy". Denied of the true lover's treatment of his darling.

φθονοῖεν (232d · Burnet p. 8) — "be jealous". Lysias claims non-lovers will not begrudge the boy's other associates.

φθονεῖν (240a · Burnet p. 18) — "be jealous". The possessive lover resents his darling's property.

φθονερὸν (239a–b · Burnet p. 17) — "jealous". A consequence of the first speech's definition of love.

See also

Benefit and harm (p. 12); Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Friendship (p. 18); Love and the lover (p. 28); Philosophy (p. 71)

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Longing and yearning

πόθος, pothos, "Yearning"; ἵμερος, himeros, "Longing"; ἀπορροή, aporrhoē, "Outflow"; κέντρον, kentron, "Goad"

At a Glance

Yearning reaches toward a remembered or absent beauty; longing becomes an incoming current that warms the soul's wings. The palinode explains the mixture of pain, joy and urgency rather than reducing love to either pleasure or lack.

Meaning

Pothos is yearning, often directed toward what is absent, and pothein is the related verb. Himeros is longing, here given a playful derivation from particles coming and flowing. The speech does not install an exhaustive technical taxonomy of desires, but it uses the two families to make different aspects of the experience vivid.

At 250c the yearning is for the former vision; at 252a the soul wants to sleep near its "yearning", where the object of longing is conveyed through the name of the passion. Such shifts belong to ordinary poetic and affective language, not to a second invisible person introduced into the story.

The related verb also appears in Lysias' closing invitation: if the hearer still yearns for an omitted point, he should ask (234c). That ordinary conversational use shows why the family cannot be restricted to erotic or transcendent absence.

Use in the Phaedrus

The recollection of the former blessed vision has made Socrates' account longer than planned. He offers that expansion as a favour to memory, prompted by yearning for the things of then (250c). Longing therefore begins in the narration itself, not only in the subsequent account of the lover's body.

When the freshly perfected lover sees a beautiful face, he receives an outflow of beauty through his eyes. Warmth softens the obstruction around the wings and nourishment makes their shafts swell (251a–b). Socrates then describes particles coming and flowing from the boy and plays upon their movement as the name himeros, longing (251c). The etymological play is part of the speech's imaginative explanation; it is not a demonstrated physical composition of desire.

Presence brings watering, warmth, relief and gladness. Absence dries the outlets and shuts in the shoots together with longing; their throbbing movement pricks the soul. At the same time memory of the beautiful one makes it glad. The combined pain and pleasure leave it puzzled and frantic, unable to sleep at night or settle by day. It runs wherever it thinks the beloved may be found (251c–e). Neither the pain nor the joy alone explains its movement.

The encounter releases the blockage and gives breathing-space, which the soul experiences as the sweetest present pleasure. It then values the beloved above family, friends, possessions and former social decorum, ready for servitude in order to remain near him, because he seems the only doctor of its greatest sufferings (252a–b). This is an account of an absorbed soul's valuations. The following section still has to explain which form of love can educate and govern that absorption well.

In the chariot scene yearning supplies goads to the driver himself, while the remembered nature of beauty checks the team's rush (253e–254b). Later the beloved too yearns and is yearned for, but feels desires similar to the lover's at a lesser intensity (255d–e). The narrative moves from apparently solitary distress toward reciprocal affection without declaring their two experiences identical.

Places to Read

234b–c · Burnet p. 10 The non-erotic wish for something omitted from an account.

250c–251b · Burnet p. 33 Yearning for the earlier vision and beauty's incoming outflow.

251c–252c · Burnet pp. 34–35 The name-play on longing, blocked growth, pain and joy, urgency and the naming of love.

253e–254b · Burnet p. 37 Yearning's goads within the soul's team.

255c–e · Burnet p. 39 Returned longing and the beloved's weaker reciprocal desire.

In this edition

"Longing" renders himeros; "yearning" is used for pothos and its verbal family in these passages. At 251c Burnet brackets the manuscripts' repeated ton himeron, "the longing", after "receives". The English follows the surrounding construction rather than counting that bracketed repetition as another independent statement.

The edition preserves the wing's plant-language and "birth-pangs" at 251e. These specific images are more informative than translating every painful term simply as "suffering". The description remains within Socrates' avowed likeness and later-qualified mythic hymn.

Attested forms

ποθεῖς (234c · Burnet p. 10) — "yearn for". An ordinary wish for an omitted point to be supplied, not specifically erotic yearning.

πόθῳ (250c · Burnet p. 33) — "in yearning".

πόθου (252a · Burnet p. 34) — "yearning".

ποθεῖ (255d · Burnet p. 39) — "yearns". A form of ποθέω, the related verb.

ἵμερος (251c · Burnet p. 34) — "longing".

ἵμερον (255c · Burnet p. 39) — "longing".

ἀπορροὴν (251b · Burnet p. 33) — "outflow".

κέντρων (251e · Burnet p. 34) — "goads".

κέντρων (253e · Burnet p. 37) — "goads".

κέντρων (254a · Burnet p. 37) — "goads".

See also

Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Desire (p. 16); Love and the lover (p. 28); Pleasure and pain (p. 33); Reverence (p. 35); Wing and flight (p. 85)

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Love and the lover

ἔρως, erōs, "love; Love"; ἐραστής, erastēs, "lover"; ἐρώμενος, erōmenos, "beloved; the one loved"; τὰ παιδικά, ta paidika, "darling; beloved boy"

At a Glance

Love moves from a condition to be avoided to a divine possibility that must be discriminated from possessive appetite. The same name does not guarantee the same kind of relationship.

Meaning

Erōs is the desire and attachment that makes someone a lover; erastēs names the one in love, while erōmenos names the person loved. Ta paidika, grammatically neuter plural, can likewise name a darling rather than a collection of children. The dialogue's erotic speeches address a beautiful boy or youth and examine relations between him and an older admirer. Their claims about love are made within this particular dramatic and social setting.

The important contrast is not simply love against friendship. A lover can claim friendship, and a friendship can be generated by love. Nor does "not in love" mean "without desire": the non-lover is soliciting the boy's favour. This distinction, explicit at 237d, makes the rival speeches a dispute about how desire governs a person and what sort of good his company can bring.

Use in the Phaedrus

Phaedrus introduces Lysias' paradox: the beautiful boy should gratify the non-lover rather than the lover (227c). The imagined non-lover presents himself as prudent, discreet and steady. His rival is sick, changeable and jealous; when desire ends, promised generosity ends with it. The speech is advocacy by an interested party. Its estimates of advantage, public exposure and repayment make the boy's choice look like a calculation of future security.

Socrates' first speech sharpens this case while exposing a problem in its performance. Its speaker is himself a wily lover who has persuaded the boy that he is not in love (237b). He first defines the passion as desire that defeats the opinion aiming at what is right, then derives the lover's harmful conduct from that rule. A man enslaved to present pleasure wants the beloved weaker, dependent and available; the concluding wolves and lambs make his apparent friendship a form of feeding (241c–d). The definition organizes the argument, but its force does not establish that it covers every love.

The reversal begins before the palinode: if Love is a god or something divine, the speakers have done wrong to make him simply bad (242d–e).

Socrates imagines a generous, gentle lover who would recognize neither himself nor a free person's love in their denunciation. The palinode then explains how love can recall a soul to beauty, encourage the lover's own education and make him cultivate the beloved's likeness to the god they follow. Its outcome depends on their conduct: the philosophic pair master themselves, while the honour-loving pair attain a lesser but still real friendship (256a–e).

At 265e–266b the two speeches are reread as divisions of a shared field. One finds a left-hand love and rightly censures it; the other finds a divine love of the same name. The later account thus preserves the first speech's diagnosis within a restricted kind instead of merely replacing blame with unconditional praise. Socrates immediately calls himself a lover of collection and division: the relation between erotic attachment and intellectual pursuit is enacted in the vocabulary of the method itself.

Places to Read

227c–228c · Burnet p. 2 The paradoxical non-lover and Socrates as a lover of speeches.

230e–234c · Burnet pp. 6–10 Lysias' interested comparison of lovers and non-lovers.

237b–238c · Burnet pp. 15–16 A concealed lover gives the first definition.

238e–241d · Burnet pp. 17–20 The possessive lover's consequences and the wolves image.

242d–244a · Burnet pp. 22–24 Love's divinity requires the reversal.

249d–257b · Burnet pp. 32–41 Divine love, education, reciprocal attachment and two outcomes.

265a–266b · Burnet pp. 53–54 The two kinds share a name; Socrates loves the method that distinguishes them.

In this edition

The edition renders erōs as "love", capitalizing it where the god is meant; the distinction is interpretive context, not a separate Greek noun. "Darling" normally preserves the affectionate force of paidika without reproducing its plural grammar. At 238b–c the repeated language of strength supplies the first speech's playful derivation of erōs from rhōmē; this is the speaker's wordplay, not an etymology established by the lexicon.

Attested forms

ἔρως (237d · Burnet p. 15) — “love”. The first speech calls love a kind of desire.

Ἔρως (242e · Burnet p. 22) — “Love”. Socrates recognizes Love as a god or something divine.

ἔρωτα (266a–b · Burnet p. 54) — “love”. Two loves share a name but belong to opposite divisions.

ἐραστὴς (231a · Burnet p. 6) — “lover”. The speaker of Lysias’ speech denies being the addressee’s lover.

ἐραστής (266b · Burnet p. 54) — “lover”. Socrates calls himself a lover of collections and divisions.

ἐρωμένοις (231b · Burnet p. 6) — “beloveds”. Dative plural: recipients of the favour lovers count themselves as having repaid.

παιδικὰ (239a · Burnet p. 17) — “darling”. Neuter plural used for the person courted.

See also

Beauty (p. 42); Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Desire (p. 16); Form, collection and division (p. 94); Friendship (p. 18); Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

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Persuasion and compulsion

πείθω; πείθομαι, peithō; peithomai, “persuade; be persuaded or obey”; βία, bia, “force”; ἀνάγκη, anankē, “necessity; constraint”; ἑκών; ἄκων, hekōn; akōn, “willing; unwilling”

At a Glance

Persuasion can be counsel accepted, a deception believed or a truthful guidance fitted to a soul. Compulsion ranges from playful pressure to appetite’s domination and the discipline that resists it.

Meaning

Peithein is to persuade; its middle and passive forms can mean being persuaded, trusting or obeying. A listener’s obedience is often the practical result of his accepting what another says. Bia marks force, while anankē can be constraint, compulsion or necessity in an argument. Hekōn and akōn mark the person’s willingness or unwillingness.

The dialogue does not simply oppose free rational persuasion to irrational force in every occurrence. People willingly believe falsehoods; shame can force the good horse to hold back; a reasoned conclusion can be necessary. The local agent, recipient and object show what sort of force or assent is in question.

Use in the Phaedrus

The walk begins with medical advice obeyed, and the exchange about the hidden book becomes a game of reciprocal pressure. Socrates predicts that Phaedrus would speak by force to an unwilling audience (228c). When challenged to outperform Lysias, Socrates hears his own words turned against him: they are alone, Phaedrus is younger and stronger, and he must choose willing speech over force (236c–d). The decisive threat is not bodily violence but deprivation of future speeches. Phaedrus has found the necessity appropriate to a speech-lover (236e). The joke identifies the desire through which one person can move another.

Lysias exploits the contrast in earnest, claiming that non-lovers do good willingly rather than under necessity (231a). Socrates' first speaker meanwhile obtains his hearing by a prior act of deception: although himself in love, he has persuaded the boy he is not (237b). Persuasion alone therefore cannot certify either the truth of the account or the disinterest of the persuader.

The palinode moves constraint into the soul. The good horse obeys command and speech without a blow; the bad horse requires whip and goads and in turn forces charioteer and yokemate towards the beloved (253d–254b). Remembered beauty provokes the violent pull that checks the team. The contrast is between forms of internal rule and responsiveness, not a literal recommendation for treating other people as horses. In the educative relation itself, lovers are described as persuading and bringing their darlings into rhythm, without jealousy (253b).

Later rhetoric is examined precisely as a power of leading souls. Knowing what persuades a given soul must be joined to knowledge of truth and to perception of the actual person and occasion (261a, 271b–272b). The apparently casual pressures of the opening thus provide cases for the later inquiry: whose desire is being used, what is being induced, and whether the listener is made better by it. At 277c the final requirements apply both to teaching and to persuading; influence has not been dismissed, but made answerable to knowledge.

Places to Read

227a; 228a–c · Burnet pp. 1–3 Advice, obedience and the imagined unwilling audience.

231a; 237b · Burnet pp. 6, 15 Willing generosity claimed and persuasion by a concealed lover.

236b–237a · Burnet pp. 13–14 Reciprocal threats and the oath about future speeches.

253b–254e · Burnet pp. 36–38 Education by persuasion and conflict within the team.

261a–b; 271b–272b; 277b–c · Burnet pp. 47, 61–63, 70 Influence as an exacting craft of addressing souls.

In this edition

"Obeying" at 227a and "persuading" at 253b belong to the same Greek family. "Necessity" preserves anankē across dramatic constraint and argumentative consequence; the context supplies the difference. Phaedrus' concession at 236b grants Socrates permission to assume the lover is sicker: it is a stipulated premise for the contest, not evidence independently establishing that general claim.

Attested forms

πειθόμενος (227a · Burnet p. 1) — "obeying". Phaedrus follows Acumenus' advice.

πείθοντες (253b · Burnet p. 36) — "persuading". True lovers guide the darling towards their god's way of life.

βίᾳ (228c · Burnet p. 3) — "by force". Socrates imagines Phaedrus speaking even without a willing listener.

βίαν (236d · Burnet p. 13) — "force". Phaedrus jokingly threatens to compel Socrates.

ἀνάγκην (236e · Burnet p. 14) — "necessity". The threat to withhold future speeches proves irresistible to Socrates.

ἑκόντες (231a · Burnet p. 6) — "willingly". The non-lovers' claimed way of doing good.

ἄκοντα (254c · Burnet p. 37) — "against his will". The bad horse is pulled back unwillingly.

See also

Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Craft and expertise (p. 87); Desire (p. 16); Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

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Pleasure and pain

ἡδονή, hēdonē, "pleasure"; ἡδύς, hēdys, "pleasant; sweet"; λύπη, lypē, "pain; distress"

At a Glance

Pleasure can be the delight of learning, the enjoyment of another's presence, or the appetite that reduces another person to a means. Its value is tested through what produces it and whom it benefits.

Meaning

Hēdonē is pleasure, while hēdys means pleasant and, in suitable contexts, sweet. Lypē is pain or distress; the dialogue also uses sharper language for bodily and erotic anguish. These words apply both to sensation and to companionship or speech. Their presence does not by itself establish a single theory of all pleasures.

Pleasantness is often relational: pleasant to whom, now or later, in what activity? The first speech's lover wants the boy pleasant to himself. The non-lover promises future benefit instead of only present gratification. The palinode gives pain and pleasure a shared role in the soul's regrowth.

Use in the Phaedrus

The dramatic setting is richly pleasant before pleasure becomes an accusation. Walking barefoot in the stream is not unpleasant; the breeze, shade and grass make an excellent resting place (229a–230c). Phaedrus' delight in Lysias' speech is visible to Socrates (234d). These pleasures keep the men together and make further inquiry possible, though admiration can also precede judgement.

Lysias argues that passion makes its subjects exaggerate both hurt and delight, praise badly and mistreat the beloved (233a–c). The first Socratic speech then derives harm from the priority of the lover's pleasure. He prefers the beloved dependent, discourages strengthening friendships and philosophy, and is himself unpleasant company. The older admirer's continual sensory enjoyment imposes continual attendance on the younger

man without a corresponding delight (240b–e). The wolves image finally gives the pleasant its most predatory form: the other is food for surfeit.

The palinode does not remove disturbance from love. At 251c–252b absence dries the channels through which the wings grow; their trapped growth pricks the soul, while memory brings joy. Seeing the beloved again relieves the obstruction and yields the sweetest pleasure for the present. The same alternation will reach the beloved through reciprocal love (255d). The delight now belongs to a larger account of recollection and growth, although bodily appetite still needs discipline.

After the speech Phaedrus says the pleasure of examining speeches makes life worth living, contrasting it with bodily pleasures that nearly always require prior pain (258e). That is Phaedrus' evaluation, with its own qualification "nearly all". Socrates answers with the cicadas: delight in song once made their human predecessors forget food and drink, and their present song may lull hearers into mental idleness. A pleasurable conversation must remain awake. The end of the dialogue accordingly envisages delight in cultivated written reminders while reserving greater seriousness for teaching that grows in another soul (276d–277a).

Places to Read

229a–230c · Burnet pp. 3–5 The pleasant setting.

233a–c · Burnet p. 9 Lysias' accusation and promise.

238e–241d · Burnet pp. 17–20 Pleasure bought at the beloved's expense.

251c–252b; 255d–e · Burnet pp. 34, 39 Pain, memory and relief in reciprocal love.

258e–259c · Burnet p. 44 Conversational pleasure and the cicadas' warning.

276d–277a · Burnet pp. 69–70 The pleasures of writing and the more serious cultivation of souls.

In this edition

"Pleasant", "pleasure" and "sweetest" preserve the related adjective and noun without forcing every use into sensual gratification. At 233b the grammatical subject of the alleged distortion is love; at 258e the speaker making the comparison with bodily pleasure is Phaedrus. Those attributions matter because the dialogue subsequently tests rather than simply repeats both assessments.

Attested forms

ἡδονὴν (233b · Burnet p. 9) — “pleasure”. The non-lover says he will not attend only to present pleasure.

ἡδονὴν (251e–252a · Burnet p. 34) — “pleasure”. Renewed sight of the beloved relieves anguish.

ἡδύ (230c · Burnet p. 5) — “pleasant”. The breeze makes the place pleasant.

ἥδιστον (238e · Burnet p. 17) — “as pleasant as possible”. What the possessive lover wants to make the beloved for himself.

λύπην (233b · Burnet p. 9) — “pain”. Lysias says love distorts judgements of distress and pleasure.

προλυπηθῆναι (258e · Burnet p. 44) — “first be pained”. Phaedrus contrasts conversation with pleasures preceded by bodily pain.

See also

Benefit and harm (p. 12); Cicadas and Muses (p. 135); Desire (p. 16); Leisure and walking (p. 139); Longing and yearning (p. 25); Play and earnestness (p. 125)

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Reverence

σέβομαι, sebomai, “Revere”; ἄγαλμα, agalma, “Statue and sacred image”

At a Glance

Reverence is the lover’s recognition that beauty asks for more than possession. In the palinode it begins as awe before a godlike appearance and becomes a restraint exercised through recollection (251a; 254b–e).

Meaning

Sebesthai is to revere, honour with awe or feel religious respect. Its force differs from a merely social fear of embarrassment, although the passage places reverence beside shuddering, shame and fear. Agalma is a statue or sacred image, something fashioned and honoured in relation to a god.

The wording “as a god” and “as to a statue and a god” matters. Socrates describes how the lover responds to a godlike image of beauty; he does not simply identify every attractive human being with an immortal deity.

Use in the Phaedrus

The contrast first appears at 250e. The spectator who is not newly perfected or has been corrupted is not quickly carried from the present namesake to beauty itself. He therefore does not revere it, but turns toward gratification. The freshly perfected spectator, by contrast, shudders at a face or bodily figure that imitates beauty well; terrors from the former vision return, and he reveres what he sees as a god (251a). Reverence belongs to a remembered relation between likeness and object.

Socrates says that, were this lover not afraid of the reputation of utter madness, he would sacrifice to his darling as to a statue and a god (251a). This is a counterfactual conditioned by fear of reputation, not an assertion that he actually performs the sacrifice. The hyperbole makes the religious intensity of the experience vivid.

The later account of divine imitation gives the statue-image a formative turn. Each lover selects a beloved in accordance with his own manner and fashions and adorns him like an image of his god, intending to honour and celebrate him (252d). In the successful development, that adoration requires the lover to learn divine habits himself and cultivate them in the beloved, rather than merely decorate a passive object.

At 254b the charioteer's memory recalls beauty's nature standing with temperance on a holy pedestal. Memory itself is said to see, fear, revere and fall back, and the reins are pulled sharply backward. Reverence therefore checks an approach already driven toward sexual solicitation. Repetition finally brings the bad horse under the charioteer's forethought, and the lover's whole soul follows the beloved in modesty and fear (254e). The beloved remains the object of that following, not the one who takes over the driver's cognitive work.

The first speech had made the lover jealous of any superiority in his beloved. Reverence opens another possibility: attention to an excellence that the lover wants both to honour and to emulate. The speech still distinguishes successful philosophical formation from more limited outcomes, so the presence of awe alone is not treated as a completed virtue.

Places to Read

250e–251a · Burnet p. 33 The contrast between non-reverent gratification and the newly initiated lover's awe.

252d–253c · Burnet pp. 35–36 The beloved as a sacred image and the activity of divine imitation.

254b–255a · Burnet pp. 37–38 Memory's reverent recoil and the soul's respectful following.

In this edition

The edition preserves the conditional sacrifice at 251a: "if he did not fear … he would sacrifice". A summary that changes this into a habitual sacrifice removes an important limitation.

At 254b the feminine participle sephtheisa agrees with mnēmē, memory. The striking personification should remain visible. "Modesty", "shame", "fear" and "reverence" render distinct words and should not all be flattened into a single emotion.

Attested forms

σέβεται (251a · Burnet p. 33) — "reveres".

σεφθεῖσα (254b · Burnet p. 37) — "in reverence".

ἀγάλματι (251a · Burnet p. 33) — "statue".

ἄγαλμα (252d · Burnet p. 35) — "statue".

See also

Beauty (p. 42); Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Recollection (p. 76); Shame and shamelessness (p. 37)

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Shame and shamelessness

αἰσχύνη, aischynē, "shame"; αἰδώς, aidōs, "modesty; restraining shame"; ἀναίδεια, anaideia, "shamelessness"; αἰσχρός, aischros, "shameful; ugly"

At a Glance

Shame can check appetite, register an offence, or merely reflect mistaken public opinion. The dialogue asks what one is ashamed of and before whom.

Meaning

Aischynē is the feeling of shame; aischros marks what is shameful, disgraceful or ugly. Aidōs is a regard for what should restrain one, rendered here as modesty; anaideia is its shameless absence. The families overlap in practice but are not interchangeable in every sentence.

The presence of shame does not guarantee right judgement. One can be ashamed to admit a change, ashamed before an unworthy audience, or

wrongly taught to regard good love as disgraceful. Equally, a fear of deserved shame can help a soul resist a lower impulse.

Use in the Phaedrus

Lysias first treats shame socially. The boy fears the established norm and the reproach of people who discover the relationship; the non-lover offers discretion, promising silence where an excited lover might boast (231e–232b, 234a). Later, when the former lover owes what he promised, shame stops him admitting that he has become another person (241a). It is an obstacle to candour in a relationship whose terms have failed.

Socrates' head-covering dramatizes a different uncertainty. He says he will rush through the first speech without looking at Phaedrus and being immobilized by shame (237a). After the divine sign he identifies what was wrong with it: the speeches slandered Love. Now he will speak bare-headed (243b). He calls the speeches shameless and imagines an audience capable of exposing their unfairness, a gentle and noble lover who knows a free person's love. Shame before this possible listener helps motivate the recantation (243c–d).

Within the palinode, the good horse combines temperance, modesty and responsiveness to speech. Modesty restrains it from leaping on the beloved, and shame and amazement drench the soul after the charioteer's vision (253d–254c). The bad horse instead pulls with shamelessness and must be subdued. At 256a modesty and reason again resist the lower demand. These are internal powers of restraint within a soul already moved by divine love.

But the beloved's schoolfellows may have told him that approaching a lover is shameful (255a). Goodwill and experience correct that blanket judgement. The discussion of writing makes the same distinction explicit: powerful men may profess shame at being called speech-writers, yet desire the permanence of their own decrees. Writing itself is not shameful; writing or speaking badly is (257c–258d). At 277d–e public praise cannot remove the real reproach of ignorance about good and bad. The proper standard of shame is therefore not simply whatever the surrounding audience applauds.

Places to Read

231e–232b; 234a · Burnet pp. 7, 10 Public reproach and promised discretion.

237a; 241a–b · Burnet pp. 14, 20 Head-covering and shame that conceals a broken commitment.

243a–d · Burnet p. 23 Shameless speeches, a noble imagined listener and recantation.

253d–256a · Burnet pp. 37–40 Modesty, shameless appetite and the beloved's social inhibition.

257c–258d; 277d–e · Burnet pp. 42–43, 71 The difference between public embarrassment and genuine fault in writing.

In this edition

"Modesty" renders aidōs, while "shame" renders aischynē in the head-covering scenes. The English "shamelessly" at 243c is the adverb anaidōs, not the noun anaideia displayed from 254d. At 240e "disgraceful" follows Heindorf's conjectured epaischeis; the edition notes that B and T instead give a phrase meaning "to his shame".

Attested forms

αἰσχύνης (237a · Burnet p. 14) — "shame". Socrates covers his head before the first speech.

αἰσχύνης (243b · Burnet p. 23) — "shame". He contrasts the head-covering with the bare-headed palinode.

αἰδοῦς (253d · Burnet p. 37) — "modesty". A quality of the good horse.

αἰδοῦς (256a · Burnet p. 40) — "modesty". Together with reason it resists gratification.

ἀναιδείας (254d · Burnet p. 38) — "shamelessness". The bad horse pulls towards the beloved without restraint.

αἰσχρὸν (255a · Burnet p. 38) — "shameful". Companions may have taught the boy to reject a lover.

αἰσχρὸν (258d · Burnet p. 43) — "shameful". Writing is not itself shameful; writing badly is.

See also

Love and the lover (p. 28); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Reverence (p. 35); Temperance and self-control (p. 40); Truth (p. 116); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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σωφροσύνη, sōphrosynē, "temperance"; σωφρονέω, sōphroneō, "be temperate; be of sound mind"; ἐγκρατής, enkratēs, "master of oneself"; ὕβρις, hybris, "insolence; outrageous excess"

At a Glance

The palinode rejects the assumption that all sanity is better than all madness, not the value of self-mastery. Its best lovers are both divinely moved and temperate.

Meaning

The sōphrōn family joins sound-mindedness to measured, self-controlled conduct. In Lysias' contrast it supplies the apparently safe alternative to erotic sickness; in the first Socratic definition it names a specific ruling relation within the person. Enkratēs describes having mastery, here explicitly mastery of oneself. Hybris names the contrary rule when desire drags a person toward pleasures without reason.

These are not fixed labels for two unchanging classes of people. A lover can regain temperance, divine madness can exceed ordinary sanity, and a pair of inspired lovers can become masters of themselves. The dialogue continually asks what governs the person and toward what end.

Use in the Phaedrus

Lysias claims the non-lover is stronger than himself, while the lover knows he is thinking badly but cannot master himself (231d–232a). Socrates' first speech gives this opposition a structure: acquired opinion can guide by reason towards the best, while appetite can drag without reason toward pleasure (237d–238a). In the story's final reversal, the former lover acquires sense and temperance and abandons his promises (241a–b). The return of self-command does not repair the relationship built by its opposite; the boy discovers that the man he trusted has, in the speech's language, become another.

At 244a–245b the palinode contests the crucial generalization. Prophetic and poetic achievements show that a divine departure from ordinary sanity can be better than merely human temperance. The restriction matters: madness from a god is compared with temperance from human beings at 244d. The speech is not recommending every derangement or making the worse horse virtuous.

Temperance remains among the things truly seen beyond heaven (247d); earthly likenesses of it are dim (250b); the good horse loves honour with

temperance and modesty (253d); and remembered beauty stands with temperance on a holy pedestal (254b). At 256a–b the lovers' victory consists in order, concord and mastery, enslaving the source of vice and freeing the source of virtue. No human temperance or divine madness can procure a greater good than this victory. Its two ingredients are not competitors at that point.

The "mortal temperance" of the non-lover at 256e is narrower: a thrifty management of mortal interests that engenders a servility admired by the multitude. Later the temperate speaker must undertake the long labour needed primarily to gratify gods, with gratifying fellow slaves only a secondary task (273e–274a). The closing prayer again makes the temperate man a measure of possession (279c). What is rejected is prudence limited to gain, not disciplined inquiry or proportion in life.

Places to Read

231d–232a · Burnet p. 7 Lysias' sickness/self-mastery contrast.

237d–238b · Burnet pp. 15–16 Temperance and insolence as rival rules.

241a–b · Burnet p. 20 The recovered lover refuses his former commitments.

244a–245b · Burnet pp. 24–26 Divine madness compared with ordinary sanity.

247d; 250b; 253d–254b · Burnet pp. 29, 32, 37 Temperance as reality, likeness and companion of beauty.

256a–257a · Burnet pp. 40–41 Self-mastery in the lovers and mortal temperance in the non-lover.

273e–274a; 279b–c · Burnet pp. 65, 73 Temperate labour and the final prayer.

In this edition

"Temperate" retains one English family across markedly different contexts; "of sound mind" renders neighbouring phronein expressions. The edition's "insolence" should be heard as excessive domination rather than merely rude manners. At 256a "reason" follows the corrected singular logou, where B and T have the plural "words"; the apparatus makes the basis of the English explicit.

Attested forms

σωφροσύνη (237e · Burnet p. 15) — "temperance". The name of opinion's mastery when it leads by reason toward the best.

σωφροσύνην (247d · Burnet p. 29) — “temperance”. One of the realities the soul beholds.

σωφροσύνῃ (256e · Burnet p. 41) — “temperance”. The non-lover’s affinity is mixed with mortal temperance.

σωφρονεῖν (231d · Burnet p. 7) — “temperate”. Lysias’ lover admits sickness rather than temperance.

ἐγκρατεῖς (256b · Burnet p. 40) — “masters of themselves”. The philosophic lovers order their life.

ὕβρις (238a · Burnet p. 15) — “insolence”. The rule of desire dragging without reason towards pleasures.

See also

Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Desire (p. 16); Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74); Reverence (p. 35)

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Soul and divine life

Beauty

κάλλος, kallos, “Beauty”; καλός, kalos, “Beautiful and fine”; φιλόκαλος, philokalos, “Lover of the beautiful”

At a Glance

Beauty joins the dialogue’s attractive surroundings, its judgment of speeches and its account of love. In the palinode it is uniquely clear and lovable to bodily sight, awakening recollection of beauty itself (250b–251a).

Meaning

The adjective kalos means beautiful, fine or admirable; the noun kallos names beauty. A beautiful person, beautiful speech and beautiful action need not be beautiful in exactly the same way. The lexicon keeps the wide adjective alongside the concentrated account of beauty that governs the palinode.

Philokalos, “lover of the beautiful”, appears in the first rank of embodied lives beside a lover of wisdom and someone musical and erotic (248d). The neighbouring terms connect cultivated love, beauty and philosophy without constituting a separate proof that all three descriptions are equivalent.

Use in the Phaedrus

The setting first offers beauty as something encountered: the broad plane tree, the shaded chaste-tree, its fragrance, the spring and the comfortable grass (230b–c). Phaedrus has already introduced Lysias' speech as the solicitation of one of the beautiful. The dialogue thus begins among attractive bodies, places and words before asking how any of these should be judged.

The palinode identifies the divine as beautiful, wise and good, qualities that nourish the wing (246e). In the vision beyond heaven, however, beauty has a special later role. Justice and temperance lack brightness in their earthly likenesses and are recognized with difficulty through dim instruments, by few. Beauty shone in the former spectacle and now glitters through sight, the keenest bodily perception (250b–d). It alone receives the particular portion of being most manifest and most lovable. The contrast concerns clarity and the force of attraction, not a claim that justice has no earthly likeness whatever.

This exceptional visibility does not make beauty self-interpreting. The corrupted or insufficiently initiated spectator fails to pass swiftly from the present namesake to beauty itself and gives himself over to gratification. The freshly perfected spectator, who had seen much before, recognizes a godlike face or bodily figure as a good imitation and responds with shuddering and reverence (250e–251a). The beautiful body is therefore the occasion of different possible responses, distinguished by memory, education and conduct.

The account of regrowth makes this occasion sustaining. Beauty's outflow enters through the eyes, warms and waters the soul and allows the wing's shaft to swell from its root (251b). In the chariot scene the sight of the beloved carries memory to the nature of beauty standing together with temperance; that remembered union checks the demand for sexual possession (254b). Beauty nourishes attraction and, when recollected rightly, also helps discipline it.

The later examination of speeches takes up what it is to speak and write beautifully rather than shamefully (258d, 277d). The question no longer asks only which performance pleased Phaedrus more; it asks about knowledge, method and the formation of a hearer. The final prayer brings the vocabulary within the speaker himself: Socrates asks to become beautiful within and to have his outward possessions friendly to that inward condition (279b–c). That request gathers rather than abolishes the dialogue's outward attractions.

Places to Read

230b–c · Burnet p. 5 The beautiful setting and its sensory details.

246d–e, 248c–d · Burnet pp. 28, 30 The beautiful as nourishment and the lover of beauty in the first embodied rank.

250b–251b · Burnet pp. 32–33 Beauty's exceptional visibility, different responses and the beginning of regrowth.

254b–c · Burnet p. 37 Remembered beauty together with temperance restrains the team.

258d, 277d–278a · Burnet pp. 43, 71 Beautiful speaking and writing assessed through the quality of knowledge and teaching.

279b–c · Burnet p. 73 The prayer for beauty within.

In this edition

The edition often retains "beautiful" where idiomatic English might prefer "fine" or "noble"; its consistency helps disclose connections among places, people, works and conduct. It does not follow that every use refers directly to the noun's transcendent object.

At 250d the conditional about intelligence says it would produce formidable loves if it supplied a comparably clear visible image. The premise is counterfactual in the passage: intelligence is not seen through bodily sight. Beauty's distinct portion should therefore not be paraphrased as the only good thing that exists, or the only thing that can be understood.

Attested forms

κάλλος (249d · Burnet p. 32) — "beauty".

κάλλους (254b · Burnet p. 37) — "of beauty".

καλή (230b · Burnet p. 5) — "beautiful".

καλός (246b · Burnet p. 27) — "beautiful".

καλὸν (277d · Burnet p. 71) — "beautiful".

καλῷ (279b · Burnet p. 73) — "beautiful".

φιλοκάλου (248d · Burnet p. 30) — "lover of the beautiful".

See also

Intellect and seeing (p. 60); Philosophy (p. 71); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74); Recollection (p. 76); Reverence (p. 35); Truth (p. 116); Wing and flight (p. 85)

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οὐσία, ousia, "Being, substance and property"; τὸ ὂν ὄντως, to on ontōs, "What really is"; ἀχρώματος, achrōmatos, "Colourless"; ἀσχημάτιστος, aschēmatistos, "Shapeless"; ἀναφής, anaphēs, "Intangible"

At a Glance

The heavenly vision distinguishes what really is from changing things ordinarily called beings. Its object is colourless, shapeless and intangible, yet is approached through images of sight, place and nourishment (247c–e).

Meaning

Ousia can name being or substance, what a thing is, and can also mean one's material substance or property. The dialogue uses both: soul has a substance and account at 245e; the reality beyond heaven is ousia at 247c; the lover neglects his ousia, his possessions, at 252a. A repeated English rendering does not erase the distinction.

To on is "what is" or "being"; adding ontōs, "really" or "genuinely", yields "what really is". At 247c the related phrase ousia ontōs ousa is the substance that really is. The formulations emphasize the dependable object of true knowledge rather than merely the fact that some attractive image appears before the eyes.

Use in the Phaedrus

The palinode's place beyond heaven is said to exceed any adequate poetic hymn. Socrates nevertheless dares to describe it because he is speaking about truth: colourless, shapeless, intangible substance occupies that place and is beheld only by intellect, the soul's pilot (247c). The scenic claim and the denial of sensory properties stand together. The myth supplies a way of picturing access to what the picture itself says is not an ordinary visible body.

The divine mind, and any soul's mind concerned to receive what is appropriate, is nourished by seeing being and contemplating true things. Its circuit includes justice itself, temperance and knowledge. This knowledge is distinguished from knowledge accompanied by becoming, or different in different things we now call beings; it is knowledge in what really is what it is (247d–e). The contrast concerns the stability and object of knowing, not simply a ranking of human professions.

Other souls see unevenly. Some glimpse one thing but miss another; those who fail to complete the spectacle turn instead to nourishment of opinion (248a–b). The difference between full seeing and opinion is consequently dramatized as a difference in what can sustain and lift the soul. The

expression “plain of truth” makes this same relation visible through landscape.

Human understanding later recollects what the soul once saw while looking beyond what “we now say are” toward what really is (249b–c). Earthly likenesses are not therefore dismissed as useless: beauty’s likeness is the effective occasion of renewed recollection, while likenesses of justice and temperance are harder to discern (250a–d). The narrative needs both the difference between likeness and object and the possible movement from one toward the other.

The later inquiry requires a speaker to know what is truly just, good and beautiful, not simply what will seem so to a crowd (259e–260a and following). That requirement continues the concern for reality while proceeding by a different route, through examples and the conditions of craft. The retrospective description of the palinode as a possibly truth-touching mythic likeness (265b–c) is important: the dialogue itself does not demand that its heavenly topography be read as an unqualified literal map.

Places to Read

245e–246a · Burnet p. 27 Soul’s substance and account in the motion-proof.

247c–248b · Burnet pp. 29–30 Reality beyond heaven, objects of vision and nourishment of opinion.

249b–250d · Burnet pp. 31–33 Recollection and the relation between earthly likenesses and their objects.

252a · Burnet p. 34 Ousia in the distinct sense of property.

259e–260a · Burnet p. 45 The issue of what is truly just, good and beautiful.

265b–c · Burnet pp. 53–54 The later qualification of the mythic likeness.

In this edition

The edition retains “substance” for ousia in several settings, including property at 252a. Its note at 247e identifies “what it is” as language used for a Form; the present article explains the printed expression without importing an additional hierarchy not stated by this passage.

At 247c the translation follows the printed reading “beheld only by intellect”. The apparatus records a construction in which the substance uses intellect as its only beholder. Both locate the privileged apprehension in intellect, but they distribute grammatical agency differently; the lexicon follows the edition’s continuous text.

Attested forms

οὐσίαν (245e · Burnet p. 27) — “substance”.

οὐσία (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “substance”.

οὐσίας (252a · Burnet p. 34) — “substance”.

τὸ ὂν ὄντως (249c · Burnet p. 31) — “what really is”.

τὰ ὄντα ὄντως (247e · Burnet p. 29) — “the other things that really are”. The English “other” comes from τἆλλα immediately before.

ἀχρώματός (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “colourless”.

ἀσχημάτιστος (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “shapeless”.

ἀναφὴς (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “intangible”.

See also

Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55); Intellect and seeing (p. 60); Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Opinion and seeming (p. 105); Recollection (p. 76); Truth (p. 116)

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Charioteer and horses

ἡνίοχος, hēniochos, “Charioteer”; ζεῦγος, zeugos, “Team”; ἵππος, hippos, “Horse”; ἡνία, hēnia, “Reins”; χαλινός, chalinos, “Bit”; μάστιξ, mastix, “Whip”

At a Glance

The soul’s team makes internal conflict visible. The good horse can be governed by speech; the bad horse initially overpowers both its partner and driver. Recollection of beauty supplies the decisive interruption (253c–254e).

Meaning

The hēniochos is a charioteer, a holder of reins; zeugos is the yoked team, and hippos the horse. At 246a the likeness is not merely “a chariot” but a grown-together power of a winged team and driver. The unity of the power is stated before the contrast among its members.

Within divine teams the horses and drivers are all good and of good stock. For other souls the composition is mixed: the human driver has one beautiful and good horse and another of opposite stock and character. Difficult guidance follows from that mixture, not from a general assertion that every horse or bodily appetite is evil.

Use in the Phaedrus

In the first heavenly ascent the teams' condition explains their different journeys. The gods' vehicles are evenly balanced and easy to rein. The horse sharing in badness weighs down the driver who has not reared it well (247b). During the struggle outside the heavenly circle, the driver's vice as well as the horses' force can prevent vision and damage the wings (248a–b). Leadership has responsibilities and can fail; the image does not make every driver automatically wise.

At 253c Socrates resumes the threefold division to explain the approach to a beloved. The good horse is upright and well jointed, white and black-eyed, a lover of honour with temperance and modesty and a companion of true opinion. It requires no blow: command and speech alone govern it. The bad horse's distorted bulk, shaggy ears and deafness answer its companionship with insolence and boastfulness. It barely yields to whip and goads (253d–e). The physical descriptions dramatize responsiveness and resistance.

All three members feel the force of the beloved's beauty. The charioteer is warmed and filled with yearning; the good horse restrains itself through modesty. The bad one insists on an approach to solicit sexual gratification and finally drags the unwilling pair along (254a–b). The good horse's resistance is therefore not the absence of feeling, and the driver's authority is not initially complete.

When the beloved flashes before them, the charioteer's memory is carried to beauty itself, standing with temperance on a holy pedestal. The grammatical image becomes striking: memory sees, fears, reveres and falls backward, compelling the pull on the reins. Both horses are checked, the good one willingly and the insolent one unwillingly. The bad horse's repeated return produces repeated and painful restraint, until it follows the driver's forethought in fear (254b–e). This is the story's interior discipline, not a prescription for treating another human being as a beaten animal.

The beloved has a corresponding team. When they lie together, his unruly horse is eager to gratify the lover, while its yoke-fellow and driver resist through modesty and reason (255e–256a). The possible victory of the better powers leads to an ordered philosophical life; the lesser outcome arises when both ungoverned horses catch their souls unguarded. The image thus makes mutual love a continuing matter of governance rather than a conflict resolved once for all by the first beautiful sight.

Places to Read

246a–b · Burnet p. 27 The soul-likeness and the difference between divine and mixed teams.

247b–248b · Burnet pp. 28–30 Rearing, driving, uneven vision and damage in the ascent.

253c–254e · Burnet pp. 36–38 The extended description and struggle of the two horses and driver.

255e–256c · Burnet pp. 39–40 The beloved's team and the two pairs' different choices.

In this edition

"By command and speech alone" at 253d renders keleusmati monon kai logōi: "alone" covers the two coordinated means, not speech as a contrast excluding command. The later "with modesty and reason" follows the singular logou printed from a correction; B and T have plural "words".

The edition retains memory as grammatical agent in the recoil at 254b. A summary may relate this to the driver's response, but should not silently eliminate the personified memory that sees and falls back. The tale's three forms should likewise not be renamed as a fully imported technical scheme that the Phaedrus does not state here.

Attested forms

ἡνιόχου (246a · Burnet p. 27) — "charioteer".

ἡνίοχος (253e · Burnet p. 37) — "charioteer".

ζεύγους (246a · Burnet p. 27) — "team".

ἵπποι (246a · Burnet p. 27) — "horses".

ἵππος (247b · Burnet p. 28) — "horse".

ἵππων (253d · Burnet p. 36) — "horses".

ἡνίας (254c · Burnet p. 37) — "reins".

χαλινοῦ (254c · Burnet p. 38) — "bit".

χαλινόν (254d · Burnet p. 38) — "bit".

μάστιγι (253e · Burnet p. 37) — "whip".

μάστιγος (254a · Burnet p. 37) — "whip".

See also

Justice and virtue (p. 63); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30); Recollection (p. 76); Reverence (p. 35); Shame and shamelessness (p. 37); Soul (p. 82); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

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Divine following and imitation

ἕπομαι, hepomai, "Follow"; μιμέομαι, mimeomai, "Imitate"; ῥυθμίζω, rhythmizō, "Bring into rhythm"; Ζεύς, Zeus, "Zeus"; Ἄρης, Arēs, "Ares"; Ἥρα, Hēra, "Hera"

At a Glance

Human lovers reproduce patterns from the gods they formerly followed. The best development is active learning and shared formation, repeatedly limited by what is possible for human beings (252c–253c).

Meaning

Following is expressed through hepesthai and related words for an attendant or companion. Mimeisthai means to imitate or make oneself like a model. Rhythmizein means to shape or bring into rhythm. Together these words move from going behind a god to cultivating a manner of life.

The language of resemblance is often qualified: the best soul has been likened to its god; a lover imitates as far as possible; a human being shares in a god to the extent possible. These phrases describe an orientation and a task, not a declaration that a human lover becomes simply identical with his deity.

Use in the Phaedrus

Zeus leads the divine procession, arranging and caring for all, and eleven divisions of gods and daimons follow. Within heaven each god does what belongs to him; anyone willing and able may follow, for jealousy stands outside the divine chorus (246e–247a). The invitation has both willing and ability as conditions. Later souls differ according to how well they follow and how much their horses allow them to see.

The terrestrial lover retains the character of his former leader. Those of Zeus can bear love's burden more steadily; those of Ares, when caught by Love and believing themselves wronged, become murderous and ready to sacrifice themselves and their beloveds (252c). The violent example prevents the whole section from being paraphrased as "every imitation of a god is

gentle". The injury is what these lovers think has happened, not an independently established fact about the beloved.

Each lover chooses a beautiful person according to his own way and fashions and adorns him as if he were a statue of his god (252d). Zeus' followers seek a philosophical and leading nature. If they have not yet undertaken the relevant way of life, their love makes them begin: they learn wherever possible and search for the god's nature themselves. Memory brings them into contact with the god, from whom they take habits and practices (252e–253a). Their own formation precedes and accompanies their influence on the beloved.

The image of drawing from Zeus like bacchants and pouring upon the beloved's soul depicts that transmission. Hera's followers seek a kingly nature; followers of Apollo and the other gods likewise pursue the character of their own leader. They imitate, persuade and bring the beloved into rhythm, trying as far as their power reaches to create a complete resemblance (253a–c). Unlike the possessive lover of the first speech, they do not use jealousy or servile ill will to keep the beloved inferior.

This positive account remains conditional. The true lovers' eagerness and rite benefit the beloved if they achieve what they seek in the manner described, and if he is won over (253c). The ensuing chariot scene shows why success is difficult. Following itself remains a morally open verb: the bad horse eventually follows the driver's forethought, and the whole lover's soul follows the beloved in modesty and fear (254e). What leads, who follows and how they do so must be stated.

Places to Read

246e–248a · Burnet pp. 28–29 The divine procession, willing and able followers, and the best human soul's likeness.

252c–253c · Burnet pp. 35–36 The differentiated gods, imitation, learning, habits and formation of the beloved.

254e–255a · Burnet p. 38 Following within the team and the lover's respectful attendance on the beloved.

257b · Burnet p. 41 The closing prayer that Lysias and Phaedrus turn toward philosophical love.

In this edition

The translation's repeated "as far as" and "as possible" preserve explicit limits in the Greek. It calls the transformative activity "bringing the darling into rhythm", retaining the shaping sense of rhythmizein rather than reducing it to abstract agreement.

Burnet prints the corrected name Hera at 253b against the transmitted "day", and "for these" at 253a against "him", so that the beloved is credited with the acquired divine habits. These are editorial readings recorded by the supplied edition, not independent collation performed for this lexicon.

Attested forms

εἱπόμην (234d · Burnet p. 11) — "I followed you". Socrates says he followed Phaedrus' enthusiastic response to the speech.

ἕπεται (247a · Burnet p. 28) — "follows".

ἕπεται (254e · Burnet p. 38) — "follows".

μεμιμημένον (251a · Burnet p. 33) — "imitates".

μιμούμενος (252d · Burnet p. 35) — "imitating".

μιμούμενοι (253b · Burnet p. 36) — "imitating".

ῥυθμίζοντες (253b · Burnet p. 36) — "bringing the darling into rhythm". Phrase-level: the object "the darling" is supplied by adjacent τὰ παιδικά, not contained in the verb itself.

Ζεύς (246e · Burnet p. 28) — "Zeus".

Διὸς (252c · Burnet p. 35) — "Zeus".

Διὸς (253a · Burnet p. 36) — "Zeus".

Ἄρεώς (252c · Burnet p. 35) — "Ares".

Ἥρας (253b · Burnet p. 36) — "Hera".

See also

Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Fate and choice of life (p. 52); Jealousy and possession (p. 23); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30); Philosophy (p. 71); Reverence (p. 35)

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Fate and choice of life

θεσμός, thesmos, "Ordinance"; μοῖρα, moira, "Portion"; κλήρωσις, klērōsis, "Allotment"; αἵρεσις, hairesis, "Choice"; Ἀδράστεια, Adrasteia, "Adrasteia"

At a Glance

The myth combines an ordinance governing fall and return with judgment, allotment and choosing a life. Better or worse conduct matters within every first-life rank; the ranking is not a substitute for ethical responsibility.

Meaning

Thesmos is an ordinance; nomos, used in the same sequence, is a law. Moira is a share or portion, not always an irresistible fate. Klērōsis is allotment by lot, while hairesis is choice. Their coordination at 249b lets the narrative state both an allotted arrangement and an act of selection without explaining every mechanism between them.

Adrasteia gives the ordinance its divine name. The edition explains it as "the Inescapable", a name of Nemesis. In the passage the name introduces consequences of vision, failure and conduct rather than a separate speaking character who settles each decision aloud.

Use in the Phaedrus

A soul following a god and seeing something true is protected until the next circuit. If it can continue to do this always, it remains always unharmed. If it fails to follow and see, meets mischance, fills with forgetfulness and vice and grows heavy, it sheds wings and falls (248c–d). The repeated conditions make an important distinction between the promise of continuing protection and the actual course of any particular soul.

The first birth is not into a beast's nature but into a human one. The soul that saw most enters the life of a lover of wisdom or beauty, or someone musical and erotic; the list then runs through royal, civic, practical, prophetic, poetic, productive and sophistic lives to the tyrant (248d–e). The text explicitly names degree of vision for the first rank; the edition treats its extension to the whole ordering as an inference. Within all these lives, whoever lives justly receives a better portion and whoever unjustly a worse (248e).

The usual return requires ten thousand years before wing-growth restores the place from which the soul came. The exception concerns the one who has philosophized without guile or loved boys with philosophy: after choosing that life three times consecutively, such souls depart winged in the three-thousandth year (248e–249a). Three successive choices are the stated condition, not three years or one moment of philosophical enthusiasm.

Other souls face judgment after their first life, undergoing penalties beneath the earth or dwelling in heaven according to their previous conduct. In the thousandth year both groups come to allotment and choose the next life each wants. A human soul can then enter an animal life, and a soul that was formerly human can return from an animal to human form (249a–b). The restriction on first birth and the later possibility of animal embodiment must not be conflated.

The erotic outcomes at the speech's end apply this structure to the pair. Philosophical lovers win one of three truly Olympian bouts; the honour-loving pair still carry off a substantial prize, beginning wing-growth and avoiding the underground journey (256b–e). The damaging nine-thousand-year wandering at 257a belongs to the soul befriended by the non-lover: his affinity plants servility in that soul. It is not a sentence explicitly placed on the non-lover's own soul.

Places to Read

248b–249d · Burnet pp. 30–31 Adrasteia's ordinance, first lives, just conduct, return, judgment, allotment and choice.

250d · Burnet p. 33 Beauty's distinct portion, a non-eschatological use of moira.

256a–257a · Burnet pp. 40–41 The two lovers' rewards and the non-lover's harmful effect on the friend's soul.

In this edition

The list at 248d follows the edition's printed supplements and corrections, including "or" separating the toil-loving and athletic possibilities. It does not support turning every listed occupation into a rigid moral verdict on every practitioner.

The edition marks the identification of the three wrestling bouts with the three philosophical lives as an interpretation, and likewise the explanation of nine thousand as the remainder of the usual ten thousand. The lexicon keeps these as possible connections, while treating the stated numbers and conditions as the narrative's explicit claims.

Attested forms

θεσμός (248c · Burnet p. 30) — "ordinance".

μοίρᾳ (244c · Burnet p. 25) — "portion".

μοίρας (248e · Burnet p. 31) — "portion".

μοῖραν (250d · Burnet p. 33) — "portion".

κλήρωσίν (249b · Burnet p. 31) — "allotment".

αἵρεσιν (249b · Burnet p. 31) — "choice".

αἵρεσιν (256c · Burnet p. 40) — "choice".

Ἀδραστείας (248c · Burnet p. 30) — "Adrasteia".

See also

Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Friendship (p. 18); Justice and virtue (p. 63); Philosophy (p. 71); Wing and flight (p. 85)

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Heaven and beyond heaven

οὐρανός, ouranos, "Heaven"; ὑπερουράνιος, hyperouranios, "Beyond heaven"; ὑπουράνιος, hypouranios, "Beneath heaven"; περιφορά, periphora, "Revolution"; Ἑστία, Hestia, "Hestia"

At a Glance

Heaven is the circuit traversed by the gods and souls; beyond it lies the non-sensible object of intellectual vision. The inside, vault, back and beyond give the myth a navigable shape while its own language warns against treating the object as a body.

Meaning

Ouranos means heaven or sky. Hyperouranios is above or beyond heaven; hypouranios is beneath it. The distinction matters because the procession moves through a sequence of locations, and the later fate of the lovers is not described with the same preposition as the highest vision.

Periphora is revolution or a carrying round; periodos is a circuit or cycle. The myth uses these for the motion carrying the spectators and for the recurrent occasions of seeing and returning. Its durations and repetitions belong to the narrative's ordered framework.

Use in the Phaedrus

All soul traverses heaven in various forms, and the perfect winged soul governs the cosmos from above (246b–c). The divine procession has Zeus as its caring and ordering leader. Of the twelve ruling gods, Hestia alone remains at home; the others lead eleven divisions (246e–247a). The explicit exception should not disappear into a picture of all twelve travelling alike.

Within heaven there are many blessed spectacles and paths. Each god does his own work, and whoever is willing and able may follow, since jealousy has no place in the divine chorus (247a). The journey then climbs to the topmost vault beneath heaven. The gods' balanced and obedient teams travel easily; others struggle under a horse pulling toward earth (247b). Geography expresses differences of psychic order.

The souls called immortal emerge and stand upon heaven's back. Its revolution carries them while they contemplate what is outside. The place beyond heaven is said never to have been adequately hymned; Socrates describes its reality as colourless, shapeless and intangible, visible only to intellect (247c). These denials are integral to the description. "Beyond" supplies the story's direction of ascent, not an ordinary astronomer's measurement of an extra celestial body.

The divine mind's circuit through justice, temperance, knowledge and other realities ends when it returns inside heaven and comes home. The other souls rise only to varying degrees, and many remain submerged, competing and damaging one another (247d–248b). The plain and meadow of truth explain the need for ascent through the fitting nourishment found there.

The later life-cycle places judgments below the earth and rewards in some place of heaven (249a). At the close, the honour-loving pair are spared the underground journey because they have already begun the journey beneath heaven, and they are promised a bright life together (256d–e). The supplied text does not call this immediately the perfected vision beyond heaven. These distinctions allow both the reward and its incompleteness to remain visible.

Places to Read

246b–247b · Burnet pp. 27–28 Soul's cosmic care, divine procession, Hestia's exception and the ascending vault.

247b–248c · Burnet pp. 29–30 Heaven's back, intellectual reality beyond it, the circuit, struggle and meadow.

249a–b · Burnet p. 31 Heavenly and underground places of judgment and return.

256d–e · Burnet pp. 40–41 The lesser pair's journey beneath heaven and eventual shared wings.

In this edition

At 247b the edition follows the readings giving movement "to" the topmost vault "beneath heaven" and "where" the teams ascend. Its apparatus records alternatives for each expression. At 256d Burnet prints hypouraniou, "beneath heaven", rather than the suggested hyperouraniou, "beyond heaven".

The myth is introduced as an account of what soul resembles and later described as a mythic hymn that may have touched truth or been carried elsewhere (246a; 265b–c). Keeping that frame does not erase its distinctions; it specifies the form in which they are being offered.

Attested forms

οὐρανὸν (246b · Burnet p. 27) — “heaven”.

οὐρανοῦ (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “heaven”.

ὑπερουράνιον (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “beyond heaven”.

ὑπουράνιον (247b · Burnet p. 28) — “beneath heaven”.

ὑπουρανίου (256d · Burnet pp. 40–41) — “beneath heaven”. The printed word crosses the P40/P41 page boundary: ὑπου- / ρανίου.

περιφορά (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “revolution”.

περιφορὰ (247d · Burnet p. 29) — “revolution”.

Ἑστία (247a · Burnet p. 28) — “Hestia”.

See also

Being and reality (p. 45); Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Fate and choice of life (p. 52); Intellect and seeing (p. 60); Nourishment (p. 69); Wing and flight (p. 85)

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Initiation and mysteries

τελετή, teletē, “Rite and initiation”; τέλεος, teleos, “Perfect and complete”; ἀτελής, atelēs, “Imperfect”; μυέω, myeō, “Initiate”; ἐποπτεύω, epopteuō, “Behold as an initiate”; νεοτελής, neotelēs, “Newly perfected”; ἀρτιτελής, artitelēs, “Freshly perfected”

At a Glance

The palinode speaks of philosophical recollection through the vocabulary of rites and perfected vision. It moves from purifying madness to the soul’s former initiation and then to the lover’s formative work (244e; 249c–251a; 253c).

Meaning

Teletē is a rite, especially one that brings its participant toward fulfilment. Teleos means complete or perfect; the verbal family can mean completing, perfecting or initiating. Atelēs is its contrary, incomplete and, in a ritual setting, uninitiated. The passage deliberately activates these related senses rather than using a single technical word in isolation.

Myein is to initiate, and epopteuein is to behold as an initiate. The adjectives neotelēs and artitelēs mean newly and freshly perfected or initiated.

Their temporal force matters: the difference between a fresh vision and diminished access helps explain different responses to beauty.

Use in the Phaedrus

The defence of divine madness first speaks of relief from ancient afflictions through prayer and service to the gods. Madness obtains purifications and rites and finds release for the person rightly mad and possessed (244d–e). This is one beneficial form in the survey; its ritual character is made explicit before the philosophical use of the vocabulary.

The inspired poet's merely technical rival is called imperfect, and souls returning without the full spectacle of being are also imperfect in their vision (245a, 248b). These occurrences prepare the close verbal pattern at 249c: a man rightly using recollective reminders, being always perfected in perfect rites, alone becomes really perfect. Completion is here joined to keeping near the divine objects through memory. The repeated words make the conceptual and ritual senses mutually audible.

The former procession is narrated as a blessed ceremony. The souls saw with their gods and were initiated into whole, simple, unmoving and happy apparitions, themselves whole, untouched by later evils and in pure light (250b–c). The next sentence contrasts this with being bound in the body like an oyster. The language supplies a picture of unhindered beholding; the dialogue has not shifted into an instruction manual for an earthly initiation ceremony.

The freshness of that initiation becomes an explanatory condition in the encounter with a beloved. Someone not newly perfected, or corrupted, fails to rise quickly from the present namesake to beauty itself. The freshly perfected one, who formerly saw much, shudders and reveres the godlike appearance (250e–251a). Both the degree of prior seeing and the present condition of the person matter; fresh initiation is not a guarantee that no further discipline will be needed.

The lover's own educational effort is then called a rite. By learning and imitating his god, persuading the beloved and bringing him into rhythm, he tries to make both lives godlike. Socrates says the eagerness and rite of true lovers become beautiful and happiness-making if they accomplish their purpose in the way described (253a–c). The conditional clause belongs to the praise. Later uses of "perfect" in craft and teaching retain the ordinary sense of completion without requiring a renewed claim about mystery ritual (269d, 278a).

Places to Read

244d–245a · Burnet pp. 25–26 Purification and rites, then the imperfect poet without the Muses.

248b–250c · Burnet pp. 30–33 Incomplete vision, perfection through reminders and the former mystery-like spectacle.

250e–251a · Burnet p. 33 The contrast of not-newly and freshly perfected spectators.

253a–c · Burnet p. 36 The lover's formative work as a conditional, happiness-making rite.

269d, 278a · Burnet pp. 59, 71 Completion in rhetorical competence and living teaching.

In this edition

The English deliberately repeats "perfected", "perfect rites" and "perfect" at 249c rather than smoothing away the common Greek family. The note explains the language of the mysteries; the article retains that lexical evidence without claiming access to otherwise undisclosed ritual practices.

At 253c "rite" translates teletē, a correction printed by Burnet; B and T have teleutē, "end". At 250c the printed "unmarked" is asēmantoi, not the conjectured apēmantoi, "free of woe". The edition notes a possible wordplay with body and tomb, but does not settle it as an explicit definition.

Attested forms

τελετῶν (244e · Burnet p. 25) — "rites".

τελετὰς (249c · Burnet p. 31) — "rites".

τελετή (253c · Burnet p. 36) — "rite".

τελέους (249c · Burnet p. 31) — "perfect".

τέλεος (249c · Burnet p. 31) — "perfect".

τέλεον (278a · Burnet p. 71) — "perfect".

ἀτελὴς (245a · Burnet p. 26) — "imperfect".

ἀτελεῖς (248b · Burnet p. 30) — "imperfect".

ἀτελὴς (269d · Burnet p. 59) — "imperfect".

μυούμενοί (250c · Burnet p. 32) — "being initiated into".

ἐποπτεύοντες (250c · Burnet p. 32) — "admitted to the beholding of".

νεοτελὴς (250e · Burnet p. 33) — "newly perfected". Qualified by μὴ, "not".

ἀρτιτελής (251a · Burnet p. 33) — "freshly perfected".

See also

Beauty (p. 42); Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Recollection (p. 76); Reverence (p. 35)

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Intellect and seeing

νοῦς, nous, "Sense and intellect"; διάνοια, dianoia, "Mind and thinking"; φρόνησις, phronēsis, "Intelligence"; ὄψις, opsis, "Sight and visible appearance"; αἴσθησις, aisthēsis, "Perception"

At a Glance

The dialogue uses several words for sense, thought and sight. Bodily sight makes beauty vivid; intellect alone beholds the reality beyond heaven. Reasoning and perceptive judgment connect these domains without making them identical.

Meaning

Nous ranges from practical sense to intellect: the recovered lover in the first speech regains "sense", while the soul's pilot in the palinode is "intellect". Dianoia names thought or mind; phronēsis is intelligence or understanding. These overlapping words should be interpreted in their immediate constructions rather than assigned an unchanging rank in a system imported from elsewhere.

Opsis can mean sight, the act or faculty of seeing, or a visible appearance. Aisthēsis is perception, and its plural can name the particular perceptions gathered in understanding. The dialogue's frequent verbs of seeing can describe bodily encounters, intellectual recognition or the myth's presentation of knowledge as a spectacle.

Earlier, Phaedrus offers to report the thought of Lysias' speech rather than the exact expressions (228d), and Lysias uses the same noun for the disposition a boy might have toward suitors (234b–c). "Mind" and "thought-content" are connected senses, not competing translations of one invariant technical noun.

Use in the Phaedrus

The first speech contrasts the former lover's sense and temperance with his past senseless rule by love and madness (241a–c). The palinode does not simply discard intelligence in favour of feeling. It begins by requiring apprehension of the truth about soul, then makes intellect the only beholder

of the colourless and intangible reality beyond heaven (245c, 247c). Its alternative to merely sober calculation is a divinely animated cognitive life, not the abandonment of understanding.

The heavenly driver's head rises beyond the circuit and catches sight of beings, but unevenly because the horses disturb it (248a). The image explains how cognitive access may depend on the ordering of the whole soul. At 249b–c human understanding gathers many perceptions into one by reasoning; this is identified with recollection. Reasoning therefore works upon the sensory multiplicity instead of merely shutting it out.

The passage on beauty carefully separates intellect's object from bodily sight. Sight is the keenest bodily perception, yet intelligence is not seen by it. If intelligence supplied as clear a visible image of itself, it would inspire formidable loves; as matters stand, beauty has the distinctive portion of being most manifest and lovable (250d). The hypothesis explains a difference in visibility, not a lack of worth in intelligence.

Dianoia also admits conflict. The better parts of the lovers' mind can lead toward philosophy, while the lesser pair's gratification occurs without the whole mind's approval (256a–c). Later Socrates asks that the speaker's mind know the truth about the subject (259e). The mental vocabulary links erotic self-government with the epistemic demands of good speech.

The account of rhetoric then insists on perception in practice. A prospective rhetorician must understand kinds of soul and speech, but must also recognize their actual occurrence in actions and identify the particular person before him (271d–272a). A scheme remembered from a teacher is not enough. The sensible farmer at 276b similarly knows how to fit seed, ground, time and purpose. The everyday use of nous remains beside its exalted role as the pilot of soul.

Places to Read

228d, 234b–c · Burnet pp. 3, 10 Dianoia as thought-content and disposition before the palinode.

235a · Burnet p. 11 Applying the mind in attention.

241a–c · Burnet p. 20 Nous as recovered sense in the first speech.

244c · Burnet p. 25 Nous as sense in the prophetic name-play.

245c, 247c–248a · Burnet pp. 26, 29 Apprehension of soul and intellect as the sole beholder of the reality beyond heaven.

249b–250d · Burnet pp. 31–33 Perceptions gathered by reasoning and the distinction between sight and intelligence.

256a–c, 259e · Burnet pp. 40, 45 Mind's internal ordering and truth in a speaker's mind.

270a, 271d–272a · Burnet pp. 60, 62 Intellect and mind in the account of Anaxagoras; perception in rhetorical practice.

276b–c · Burnet p. 69 The farmer's practical sense and its comparison with the knowledgeable speaker.

In this edition

The English varies nous according to context: "sense" at 241a and "intellect" at 247c are not different Greek nouns. Dianoia can name content as well as the thinking faculty; the earlier remarks about a speech's "thought" should not be forced into the palinode's personification of mind.

At 270a Burnet prints dianoias, "mind", from V and Aristides rather than anoias, "lack of intellect", in B and T. At 247c the edition's "only" qualifies intellect as the beholder, not the number of realities available to it.

Attested forms

νοῦν (235a · Burnet p. 11) — "paying attention". Phrase-level: *τὸν νοῦν προσείχον*, applying the mind; "attention" is not the noun's sole lexical sense.

νοῦν (241a · Burnet p. 20) — "sense".

νοῦν (244c · Burnet p. 25) — "sense". Within the playful derivation of oionoïstikē.

νῷ (247c · Burnet p. 29) — "intellect".

νοῦν (276b · Burnet p. 69) — "sense".

διάνοιαν (228d · Burnet p. 3) — "thought".

διάνοιαν (234b–c · Burnet p. 10) — "thought".

διάνοια (247d · Burnet p. 29) — "mind".

διάνοια (249c · Burnet p. 31) — "mind".

διανοίας (256a · Burnet p. 40) — "of the mind".

διάνοιαν (259e · Burnet p. 45) — "mind".

φρόνησις (250d · Burnet p. 33) — "intelligence".

ὄψιν (250b · Burnet p. 32) — "sight".

ὄψις (250d · Burnet p. 33) — "sight".

ὄψιν (254b · Burnet p. 37) — "appearance".

αἰσθήσεων (249b · Burnet p. 31) — "perceptions".

αἰσθήσεως (250d · Burnet p. 33) — “through the clearest of our perceptions”. Phrase-level rendering: αἰσθήσεως is singular in the superlative phrase, while τῶν ἡμετέρων supplies the comparison with our perceptions.

αἰσθήσει (271d · Burnet p. 62) — “perception”.

See also

Beauty (p. 42); Being and reality (p. 45); Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Nature, whole and part (p. 103); Recollection (p. 76); Soul (p. 82)

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Justice and virtue

δικαιοσύνη, dikaiosynē, “Justice”; ἀρετή, aretē, “Virtue and excellence”; κακία, kakia, “Vice and badness”

At a Glance

Justice is both an object of the soul’s former vision and a standard for the lives it chooses. Virtue names excellence in a power or person, and requires more than praise from the crowd.

Meaning

Dikaiosynē is justice; dikaios and dikaiōs name what is just and acting justly. Aretē is excellence or virtue, while kakia is badness or vice. A horse can have an aretē within the soul-likeness; a human soul can acquire virtue; a false social judgment can also call servility virtue.

The words therefore do not all refer to one fixed object on every occasion. Seeing justice itself, living justly and asking what makes a good horse good are related but different uses that the surrounding construction must identify.

Use in the Phaedrus

Lysias’ speaker had already claimed virtue for the non-lover: such men obtain what they need through virtue and will display their virtue when the boy’s youth has ended (232d,234a–b). These are claims within his solicitation, not a verdict delivered by the dialogue. The later contrast between real virtue and publicly praised servility makes the earlier self-description worth testing.

In the divine circuit the mind sees justice itself, temperance and knowledge among the things that really are (247d). After embodiment, however, justice and temperance lack the conspicuous brightness beauty has in present likenesses; a few discern their kind with difficulty through dim

instruments (250b). The contrast makes moral discernment difficult, not unnecessary.

The ordinance gives that discernment practical weight. Across all the ranked first lives, just living gives a better share and unjust living a worse one (248e). Subsequent judgment sends some souls below to discharge a penalty and lifts others through Justice to a fitting place of heaven (249a). The catalogue of occupations is not sufficient on its own to determine the worth of how a particular life is lived.

The chariot scene asks what the excellence of the good horse is and what the vice of the bad one is (253d). The answer is behavioural as well as visual: the good one loves honour with temperance and modesty, accompanies true opinion and heeds command and speech without blows. The bad one accompanies insolence and boastfulness and resists correction. Excellence is disclosed through the form of responsiveness that allows a composite soul to be guided.

When the better powers bring the lovers into ordered living and philosophy, they enslave what generated vice and free what generated virtue (256a–b). The reversal of slavery and freedom is internal: becoming masters of themselves is the means of living together in concord. By contrast, the non-lover's thrifty affinity can plant servility in his friend's soul, even though the multitude praises that servility as virtue (256e–257a). Social approval is thus explicitly separable from the thing approved.

The second half of the dialogue brings justice into the standard for speech. Phaedrus reports the view that an orator need learn only what seems just to the judging crowd, not what really is just (259e–260a). Socrates' ensuing inquiry contests that separation. Medicine's analogy requires rhetorical knowledge of soul if discourse and lawful practices are to convey virtue (270b). At the end, just, beautiful and good things are the matters about which serious, responsive teaching must be written in soul (276c–278a).

Places to Read

232d, 234a–b · Burnet pp. 8, 10 Virtue claimed for non-lovers in Lysias' speech.

247d–249b · Burnet pp. 29–31 Justice itself, just conduct, judgment and the better or worse portion.

250b · Burnet p. 32 Justice's dim earthly likenesses.

253d–254a · Burnet pp. 36–37 The excellence and vice of the horses.

256a–257a · Burnet pp. 40–41 Virtue-producing self-government and falsely praised servility.

259e–260a, 270b · Burnet pp. 45, 60 Reality rather than mere seeming, and virtue as a purpose of speech.

276c–278a · Burnet pp. 69–71 Just, beautiful and good things as the subject of serious teaching.

In this edition

The edition's "virtue" for aretē retains the same English noun in the good horse's excellence and in moral formation. The shift in subject must remain visible: "the virtue of the good one" at 253d is first a question about the horse within the likeness.

Justice is personified as Dike in the judgment scene, where she lightens certain souls into heaven. The ordinary noun dikaiosynē names the quality seen at 247d. Their relation is evident within the moral narrative, but they are not the same printed form or grammatical subject.

Attested forms

δικαιοσύνην (247d · Burnet p. 29) — "justice".

δικαιοσύνης (250b · Burnet p. 32) — "justice".

δικαιοσύνης (276e · Burnet p. 70) — "justice".

ἀρετὴν (232d · Burnet p. 8) — "virtue". Lysias' speaker claims virtue as the non-lovers' means of obtaining what they need.

ἀρετὴν (234a–b · Burnet p. 10) — "virtue". The speaker promises a display of virtue after the boy's youth has ended.

ἀρετὴ (253d · Burnet p. 36) — "virtue".

ἀρετή (256b · Burnet p. 40) — "virtue".

ἀρετὴν (256e · Burnet p. 41) — "virtue".

ἀρετὴν (270b · Burnet p. 60) — "virtue".

κακίᾳ (248b · Burnet p. 30) — "vice".

κακίας (248c · Burnet p. 30) — "vice".

κακία (253d · Burnet p. 36) — "vice".

See also

Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Fate and choice of life (p. 52); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Opinion and seeming (p. 105); Philosophy (p. 71); Temperance and self-control (p. 40); Truth (p. 116)

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Madness and divine possession

μανία, mania, "Madness"; κατοκωχή, katokōchē, "Seizure"; ἐνθουσιάζω, enthousiazō, "Be filled with a god"; ἐνθουσίασις, enthousiasis, "Divine possession"; μαντική, mantikē, "Divination"; οἰωνιστική, oiōnistikē, "Reading bird-signs"

At a Glance

The palinode distinguishes harmful disorder from god-given madness and argues that erotic madness can bring the greatest benefit. The later review both classifies the kinds and calls the account a playful mythic hymn (265a–c).

Meaning

Mania is madness, the condition associated with mainesthai, "to be mad". The language of divine states also includes katokōchē, "seizure", and enthousiazein, "to be filled with the god". These expressions stress an agency greater than ordinary deliberate competence; they do not remove the need to distinguish beneficial from damaging outcomes.

Sōphrosynē can oppose madness as soundness or self-possession, but the polemical comparison is qualified. At 244d Socrates sets madness from a god above temperance from human beings. At 256b neither human temperance nor divine madness could give a greater good than the philosophical lovers' victory. The dialogue's local contrasts do not require temperance to be universally rejected.

Use in the Phaedrus

Inspired language precedes the defence of divine madness. Socrates says after his first speech that continued praise would fill him with the god through the Nymphs (241e), and later recalls that inspiration when asking Phaedrus whether he had defined love (263d). Since the first speech still needs correction, possession-language itself is not a substitute for examining what a speech says.

The earlier speech assumed that the mad lover should be displaced by the temperate non-lover. The palinode challenges the assumption: if madness were simply evil, that preference would be well stated; but the greatest goods come through madness, provided it is a divine gift (244a). The qualification "provided" is central. It turns the question toward kinds, causes and fruits of the disturbance rather than toward the word's bad reputation.

Three examples prepare the fourth. Prophetic madness has benefited Greece through the Delphic prophetess, Dodona's priestesses and other seers. Socrates playfully reads the old names of divination as testimony to its honour. A second madness finds relief from inherited afflictions through prayer, service, purification and rites. A third, from the Muses, seizes a tender soul and educates posterity through the poetic adornment of ancient deeds; craft alone cannot match it (244a–245a).

Love's claim remains to be demonstrated after these examples. Socrates says an opponent must show that love is not sent for the benefit of both persons, while his own task is to show the greatest good fortune from it (245b–c). The ensuing account of soul, vision and regrowth supplies that defence. In erotic madness the person seeing beauty recollects the true, grows wings and strains upward; observers blame what they see as derangement while missing the god-filled character of the experience (249c–e).

The possession does not eliminate ethical differences. Forgetfulness and corrupt company impede recollection; some lovers respond to beauty through mere gratification; followers of Ares may become murderous when they think themselves wronged. The successful lover instead cultivates a resemblance to his god and helps his beloved toward it, while the pair's best outcome requires the better powers of mind to win (250a–251a, 252c–253c, 256a–b).

In the retrospective discussion Socrates distinguishes madness caused by human diseases from a divine departure from customary ways, then divides the divine kind into prophetic, ritual, poetic and erotic inspirations. He names their gods explicitly there. Yet he also says that their likeness of erotic experience may have touched something true or been carried elsewhere: it was a not wholly unpersuasive mythic hymn, played in honour of Love (265a–c). The useful division survives this self-qualification, but the picturesque narrative is not presented as a mechanically verified anatomy.

Places to Read

241a–c · Burnet p. 20 The first speech's opposition of madness to regained sense.

241e · Burnet p. 21 Socrates' inspiration-language after the first speech.

244a–245c · Burnet pp. 24–26 The conditional defence, three preparatory examples and task of proving love's benefit.

249c–250a · Burnet pp. 31–32 The fourth madness and the crowd's misrecognition.

252c–256b · Burnet pp. 35–40 Differentiated divine models and the work needed for a good outcome.

263d · Burnet p. 51 The first speech's definition reconsidered through the language of inspiration.

265a–266b · Burnet pp. 53–54 The two kinds, the four divine divisions and the retrospective qualification.

In this edition

The edition's "filled with the god" keeps the theological force of enthousiasmos-related language audible. "Madness" should not be converted into a modern clinical diagnosis: the later distinction itself separately names human diseases.

At 249d the relative clause beginning "which" is left grammatically incomplete in Burnet's text. The edition retains that interruption rather than inventing a finite verb. At 265b the named assignment of Apollo, Dionysus, Muses, Aphrodite and Love is a later recapitulation: the original survey had not expressly named every corresponding god.

Attested forms

μανίαν (244b · Burnet p. 25) — "madness".

μανίας (249d · Burnet p. 32) — "madness".

Μανίας (265a · Burnet p. 53) — "madness".

κατοκωχή (245a · Burnet p. 25) — "seizure".

ἐνθουσιάσω (241e · Burnet p. 21) — "I shall plainly be filled with the god". The English "plainly" comes from σαφῶς; the verb itself means future divine inspiration.

ἐνθουσιάζων (249d · Burnet p. 31) — "filled with the god".

ἐνθουσιῶντες (253a · Burnet p. 36) — "filled with the god".

ἐνθουσιάσεων (249e · Burnet p. 32) — "ways of being filled with the god".

μαντικὴν (244c · Burnet p. 25) — "mantikē".

μαντικὴ (244d · Burnet p. 25) — "mantikē".

οἰωνιστικὴν (244d · Burnet p. 25) — "oiōnistikē".

οἰονοϊστικὴν (244c · Burnet p. 25) — "oionoïstikē".

See also

Cicadas and Muses (p. 135); Form, collection and division (p. 94); Initiation and mysteries (p. 57); Love and the lover (p. 28); Philosophy (p. 71); Play and earnestness (p. 125); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

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Nourishment

τροφή, trophē, "Nourishment"; τρέφω, trephō, "Nourish and rear"; νομή, nomē, "Pasture"; λειμών, leimōn, "Meadow"; ἀμβροσία, ambrosia, "Ambrosia"; νέκταρ, nektar, "Nectar"; ἄρδω, ardō, "Water"

At a Glance

The palinode makes what a soul sees into what sustains it. Truth provides pasture; opinion supplies a lesser nourishment; visible beauty waters regrowth. Different diners and foods remain distinct within the imagery.

Meaning

Trophē is nourishment or food, trephein is to nourish or rear, and nomē is pasture. Ardein means to water or irrigate. The account combines animal feeding, cultivation and cognitive activity to show that a soul's powers grow or decline through what they receive.

The imagery also distinguishes parts and recipients. Mind contemplates and is nourished by true things; the soul's best part has its fitting pasture; the wing's nature is fed by the same meadow; and the divine horses receive ambrosia and nectar after the homecoming. These are coordinated images, not one sentence with one undifferentiated eater.

Use in the Phaedrus

The first speech had pictured the possessive lover's friendship as an appetite for food: wolves cherish lambs as lovers love a boy (241c–d). The palinode develops a different economy of nourishment. The divine—beautiful, wise, good—feeds the soul's plumage; the ugly and bad waste it away (246d–e). What sustains ascent is no longer another person's consumption but an orientation toward qualities worthy of both souls.

At 247d the mind of a god is fed on intellect and untainted knowledge, and so is the mind of any soul that cares to receive what is fitting. Seeing being after an interval, it cherishes it and is nourished in contemplating true things. The cycle ends with the driver feeding the horses at their manger

(247e). The narrative marks the mind's intellectual feast before the horses' mythic meal.

The unsuccessful souls depart incomplete in their vision and resort to nourishment of opinion. Socrates then explains why seeing the plain of truth matters so urgently: the proper pasture for the soul's best part comes from its meadow, and this also nourishes the wing by which soul is lifted (248b–c). Opinion's food can sustain a diminished life, but the passage distinguishes it from the nourishment enabling ascent.

In embodied love the same relation becomes an inflow through the eyes. Beauty's outflow warms the soul; nourishment arrives, and the wing's shaft swells and grows (251b). Presence waters and relieves; separation dries and blocks; the returning current eventually waters the beloved's wing-passages too (251c–252b, 255c–d). The beloved's beauty is the occasion of shared growth rather than merely a prey possessed by the first lover.

The cicadas' myth and the medical analogy give contrasting later uses. The original human singers forgot literal food and drink, and their descendants received freedom from needing nourishment (259b–c). In medicine bodily drugs and nourishment produce health; by analogy, rhetoric gives soul speeches and lawful practices with a view to persuasion and virtue (270b). The analogy preserves the difference between what is applied to body and what is offered to soul.

Places to Read

241c–d · Burnet p. 20 The predatory food-image at the first speech's ending.

246d–248c · Burnet pp. 28–30 Wing-food, the mind's feast, divine horse-feeding and nourishment of opinion.

251b–252b, 255c–d · Burnet pp. 33–34, 39 Beauty's inflow, irrigation, blockage and reciprocal nourishment.

259b–c · Burnet p. 44 Cicadas and exemption from bodily nourishment.

270b, 276d · Burnet pp. 60, 69 Medical nourishment and the later playful use of "watering" at drinking parties.

In this edition

"Nourishment of opinion" renders trophēi doxastēi at 248b. The adjective describes the nourishment as belonging to opinion; the passage does not enumerate a literal diet. At 247d "nourished on … untainted knowledge" follows the reading printed by Burnet rather than the variant involving "turning about".

The English "watered" and "watering" retains ardein in both the wing-growth and the drinking-party comparison (276d). Repeated vocabulary makes a contrast available, but does not make those different practices equivalent sources of philosophical growth.

Attested forms

τροφῇ (248b · Burnet p. 30) — "nourishment".

τροφῆς (251b · Burnet p. 33) — "nourishment".

τροφὴν (270b · Burnet p. 60) — "nourishment".

τρέφεταί (246e · Burnet p. 28) — "is nourished".

τεθραμμένος (247b · Burnet p. 28) — "reared".

τρεφομένη (247d · Burnet p. 29) — "is nourished".

νομὴ (248b · Burnet p. 30) — "pasture".

λειμῶνος (248b · Burnet p. 30) — "meadow".

ἀμβροσίαν (247e · Burnet p. 29) — "ambrosia".

νέκταρ (247e · Burnet p. 29) — "nectar".

ἄρδεται (251b · Burnet p. 33) — "is watered".

ἄρδει (255d · Burnet p. 39) — "waters".

ἄρδοντες (276d · Burnet p. 69) — "watering".

See also

Being and reality (p. 45); Cicadas and Muses (p. 135); Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Nature, whole and part (p. 103); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127); Wing and flight (p. 85)

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Philosophy

φιλοσοφία, philosophia, "Philosophy"; φιλόσοφος, philosophos, "Lover of wisdom"

At a Glance

Philosophy is a love and practice of wisdom that changes how people love, speak and live. The palinode's winged mind and the closing title "lover of wisdom" belong to the same continuing task, not to a claim of already possessing divine wisdom.

Meaning

Philosophia is love or pursuit of wisdom; philosophos names the lover of wisdom. The compound keeps desire within the name of the activity. The dialogue uses it of a way of life, a person's natural capacity, speeches shaped by that pursuit and an appropriate title for an author able to answer for his work.

The final contrast with sophos, "wise", does not deny the value of learning. Socrates says that calling someone wise seems great and fitting to a god alone, whereas lover of wisdom or something similar is more suitable for the human being described (278d).

Use in the Phaedrus

Philosophy first appears within the speech against the lover. The possessive lover must block his beloved from the association that could make him most intelligent, "divine philosophy", because he fears being despised (239b). That speech has misconceived love as a whole, but the educational good it identifies is not consequently discarded. The palinode's task is to show a love that helps rather than prevents the pursuit.

The first rank of embodied life belongs to the soul that saw most and will become a lover of wisdom or beauty, or someone musical and erotic (248d). A soul that philosophizes without guile, or loves boys with philosophy, receives the exceptional possibility of regaining wings after three successive choices of that life (249a). The union with love is explicit; the conditions of sincerity, repeated choice and time prevent the reward from becoming a mere label.

The philosopher's mind alone grows wings because it stays by memory, as far as possible, near the things by proximity to which a god is divine (249c). To ordinary observers the person who stands apart from their serious pursuits seems deranged. The palinode interprets the same behaviour as a divine possession grounded in recollection. Its phrase "as far as possible" keeps human practice distinct from the divine state that supplies its model.

Zeus' followers seek a beloved who is philosophical and fit to lead. Their love leads them to learn and search even if they had not previously begun that pursuit; they then share the acquired habits with the beloved (252e–253a). At the decisive practical juncture the better parts of mind can lead both lovers into an ordered philosophical life, freeing what produces virtue and subduing what produces vice (256a–b). Philosophy is thus verified in the ordering of conduct as well as in the direction of attention.

At the start of the rhetorical inquiry Socrates calls approaching arguments noble creatures and asks them to persuade Phaedrus that unless he loves

wisdom sufficiently he will not be capable of speaking about anything (261a). The ensuing account of rhetoric as leading souls makes philosophy a condition of adequate speech, not simply an optional rival occupation.

Socrates ends the palinode by asking Love to turn Lysias toward philosophy, so that Phaedrus may live simply for Love with wisdom-loving speeches (257b). The cicadas will later report philosophical activity to Calliope and Urania (259d). The ending gives the aspiration a critical test: the lover of wisdom knows truth, can defend his writing in examination and has something more precious than the written product (278c–e). Even the prediction about Isocrates is phrased as a potential divine impulse toward greater things, grounded in a certain philosophy in his mind, not as an established achievement (279a–b).

Places to Read

239a–c · Burnet p. 17 The possessive lover excludes the beloved from divine philosophy.

248d–249d · Burnet pp. 30–31 The first embodied rank, exceptional return and philosopher's winged mind.

252e–253a, 256a–b · Burnet pp. 35–36, 40 Philosophical nature, reciprocal learning and an ordered life.

257b, 259d · Burnet pp. 41, 45 The prayer for Lysias and Phaedrus and philosophy's place among the Muses.

261a · Burnet p. 47 Philosophizing as the required preparation for adequate speaking.

278c–279b · Burnet pp. 72–73 The human title and the qualified promise concerning Isocrates.

In this edition

The edition usually translates the person-name as "lover of wisdom", while retaining "philosophy" for the activity. At 249a it translates the second qualification explicitly as having been "a pederast together with philosophy"; the historical erotic setting should not be concealed behind a modernized euphemism.

At 278d Socrates proposes "lover of wisdom or some such thing", a deliberately modest formulation. The interpretation of the later praise of Isocrates is disputed in the supplied note; this article does not settle its sincerity or irony from the word philosophia alone.

Attested forms

φιλοσοφία (239b · Burnet p. 17) — “philosophy”.

φιλοσοφίας (249a · Burnet p. 31) — “philosophy”.

φιλοσοφίαν (256a · Burnet p. 40) — “philosophy”.

φιλοσοφίαν (257b · Burnet p. 41) — “philosophy”.

φιλοσόφου (248d · Burnet p. 30) — “lover of wisdom”.

φιλοσόφου (249c · Burnet p. 31) — “lover of wisdom”.

φιλόσοφον (278d · Burnet p. 72) — “lover of wisdom”.

See also

Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Isocrates (p. 137); Justice and virtue (p. 63); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Recollection (p. 76); Wisdom and the names of a writer (p. 130)

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Prayer and inner beauty

εὔχομαι, euchomai, “pray; wish”; τἄνδοθεν, tandothen, “the things within; inwardly (crasis)”; πλούσιος, plousios, “rich”

At a Glance

The last prayer asks for inner beauty, friendship between outer possessions and what is within, and a measure of wealth governed by wisdom and temperance. Phaedrus asks to share it.

Meaning

Εὔχεσθαι is to pray or express a wish; the compound συνεύχεσθαι is to pray together or join another in prayer. In the final address the optative verbs express requests, not claims that Socrates already possesses what he asks for. Τἄνδοθεν is the contracted expression for what is within; the prayer contrasts it with what he has outside. Its grammar does not identify every outer possession as an evil. The request is that they be friends to what is inside.

Use in the Phaedrus

Prayer has not been confined to the closing lines. The first speech gives the jealous lover troubling wishes: he would pray to deprive the beloved of competing attachments and preserve his own access (239e–240a). The palinode ends with Socrates asking Love to forgive the first speech, preserve

his erotic craft and turn Lysias towards philosophy (257a–b). Phaedrus joins that prayer with the condition that the requested outcome be better for them (257b–c). Wishes can therefore reveal the quality of a person's orientation, and their desirability can require qualification.

At 278b Phaedrus both wants and prays that he and Socrates become the kind of men whose serious accounts are written in soul. The final prayer follows the message to Isocrates and the easing of the heat. It is addressed to Pan and all the other gods of the place (279b). The local setting that prompted the speeches becomes a setting from which the men take leave reverently.

Socrates first asks to become beautiful within. The dialogue has moved from the attractive boy and the beautiful landscape to the beauty of speeches, methods and forms of life. The prayer gives inward character priority without repudiating visible beauty, which the palinode has treated as an aid to recollection. It then asks that whatever he has outside be friendly to the inward things. The relation is concord, not compulsory stripping away of possessions.

Next he asks to count the wise person rich, redirecting wealth from a simple quantity of gold to a judgement about value. The subsequent wish concerning gold remains deliberately striking: may his quantity be such as none but the temperate person could carry or lead off. The passage does not state a numerical allowance, and the lexicon should not supply one or smooth the formulation into a detailed economic doctrine. Its limit is ethical, through temperance.

Socrates says he has prayed moderately. Phaedrus requests the same for himself because friends' things are common (279c). The reply transforms a personal aspiration into shared goods without erasing either man's work of becoming. The dialogue ends with movement—"Let us go"—after the examination has changed what they are willing to ask for.

Places to Read

239e–240a · Burnet p. 18 The possessive lover's wishes in the first speech.

257a–c · Burnet p. 41 Prayer to Love and Phaedrus' qualified agreement.

278a–b · Burnet pp. 71–72 The shared wish to become the person described by the inquiry.

279b–c · Burnet p. 73 Prayer to the local gods, inward beauty, wealth and common goods.

In this edition

"Become beautiful within" preserves the request to become, rather than announcing an accomplished condition. At 279c the edition translates φέρειν and ἄγειν as "carry" and "lead off", retaining the unusual pair instead of silently converting the gold wish into a maxim about poverty. The note reports the pair's broader usage, but no external doctrine is imported into the prayer.

Attested forms

εὐξαμένῳ (279b · Burnet p. 73) — "after praying". Socrates proposes prayer before leaving the place.

συνεύχου (279c · Burnet p. 73) — "Pray ... together". Related compound συνεύχομαι: Phaedrus asks to share the prayer.

τἄνδοθεν (279b · Burnet p. 73) — "within". Socrates asks to become beautiful within.

πλούσιον (279c · Burnet p. 73) — "rich". Socrates prays that he may hold the wise person rich.

See also

Beauty (p. 42); Friendship (p. 18); Philosophy (p. 71); Temperance and self-control (p. 40); Wisdom and the names of a writer (p. 130)

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Recollection

ἀνάμνησις, anamnēsis, "Recollection"; ἀναμιμνήσκω, anamimnēskō, "Recollect or remind"

At a Glance

Recollection connects many present perceptions with the soul's former vision, and lets visible beauty recall what it resembles. Its vocabulary also names ordinary, even troublesome reminding; context makes the difference.

Meaning

Anamnēsis is recollection, a bringing back into awareness. The verb anamimnēskein can make someone remember, while its middle forms describe recollecting. Mnēmē, memory, is the capacity or retained awareness at work. The palinode gives this ordinary family a particular explanatory use without exhausting all its uses in the dialogue.

The key sentence calls human understanding according to a form, going from many perceptions into one gathered by reasoning, "recollection" of what the soul once saw in a god's company (249b–c). Perception, reasoning, unity and prior vision all belong to the account: none can be removed while leaving this local definition intact.

Use in the Phaedrus

The mythology of human birth establishes the premise. A soul that has never seen truth cannot enter the human shape; every human soul has therefore beheld beings, though its present recollection may be difficult (249b, 249e–250a). Some saw only briefly; others have been turned toward injustice by bad company after their fall and forgotten what they once saw. The universal past vision is thus joined to sharply unequal present access.

The philosopher's mind keeps near the divine objects by memory as far as it can, and the person using such reminders rightly becomes truly perfected (249c). "Rightly" gives the reminder a disciplined use. The passage does not make every spontaneous association sufficient for knowledge; it identifies a practice of sustained attention that ordinary people can misread as derangement.

Beauty's distinctive visibility gives this practice its erotic occasion. Seeing beauty here and recollecting the true raises wings and draws the lover's gaze upward. A likeness may strike a person who still does not understand what has happened to him (249d–250b). Recognition develops through affect and puzzlement before it becomes an account. The long description of the former vision is itself offered as a favour to memory, prompted by yearning for what was then (250c).

The chariot scene dramatizes recollection as an interruption of conduct. At the beloved's flashing appearance, the driver's memory is carried to beauty's nature, sees it with temperance, fears and recoils, pulling the reins back (254b–c). Yet the bad horse later makes the pair recollect their promise to return for the same solicitation (254d). The same verbal family can recall an obligation that needs resisting; remembering is not automatically wisdom.

Thamus' criticism of writing brings the distinction into a new setting. People trusting external marks will recollect from outside rather than from within themselves; Theuth has discovered a drug of reminding, not of memory (275a). The contrast is not a ban on all reminders: written notes can serve those who already know, and the author can store them for forgetful old age (275d, 276d). Read beside 249c, the issue is the knowledge and activity of the person using the aid, not simply whether an object happens to

prompt recall. Socrates' invitation to Phaedrus to recollect useful teaching about rhetoric at 272c is another ordinary use of the same verb.

Places to Read

249b–250b · Burnet pp. 31–32 The account of recollection and the difference between prior vision and present accessibility.

250c–251a · Burnet p. 33 Memory, yearning and the newly perfected lover's recognition.

254b–d · Burnet pp. 37–38 Memory's reverent recoil and the bad horse's ordinary reminder.

272c · Burnet p. 63 Recollecting instruction heard from Lysias or another teacher.

275a–d, 276d · Burnet pp. 67–69 External marks, the memory/reminding distinction and legitimate written reminders.

In this edition

The edition keeps "what is said … going … gathered" at 249b–c as three neuter participles without a supplied Greek noun; Burnet does not print the proposed article that would regularize the construction. The lexical explanation follows the connection made by "this is recollection", without pretending the syntax is simpler than the printed text.

At 254b "the memory" remains the subject of seeing and reverent falling back. At 275a "recollect" renders the palinode's verb again. The later criticism should not be turned into a rigid technical rule that every occurrence of a reminding-word is external or bad; the earlier right use of reminders is expressly positive.

Attested forms

ἀνάμνησις (249c · Burnet p. 31) — "recollection".

ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος (249d · Burnet p. 32) — "recollecting".

ἀναμιμνήσκων (254d · Burnet p. 38) — "making them recollect".

ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος (272c · Burnet p. 63) — "recollecting". Phaedrus is invited to recall any help heard from Lysias or another teacher.

ἀναμιμνῃσκομένους (275a · Burnet p. 67) — "recollect".

See also

Beauty (p. 42); Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Form, collection and division (p. 94); Intellect and seeing (p. 60); Memory and reminding (p. 123); Philosophy (p. 71)

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Self-motion and immortality

τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν, to hauto kinoun, "What moves itself"; ἀθάνατος, athanatos, "Immortal"; ἀεικίνητος, aeikinētos, "Ever-moving"; ἀρχή, archē, "Beginning and source"; ἀγένητος, agenētos, "Ungenerated"; ἀδιάφθορος, adiaphthoros, "Indestructible and uncorrupted"

At a Glance

The proof argues from self-originating, unceasing motion to the immortality of soul; it should be read before, and distinguished from, the chariot myth (245c–246a).

Meaning

The central Greek expression is a substantive phrase, "what moves itself", not an abstract noun for a detached faculty called self-motion. The reflexive forms make the same thing both origin and recipient of the motion. Aeikinēton means "ever-moving"; athanatos, "immortal"; agenēton, "ungenerated"; and adiaphthoron, "indestructible". These words name different steps of the argument rather than four freely interchangeable descriptions.

Archē is a beginning, here also an originating source. Calling the self-moving a "spring and beginning of motion" combines the image of a fountain with the logical requirement that what originates motion cannot itself depend on a prior origin in the same way.

Use in the Phaedrus

Socrates begins with "All soul is immortal", then argues that what is ever-moving is immortal. Something that moves another but is itself moved by another can cease moving and thereby cease living. By contrast, only what moves itself never abandons itself and therefore never leaves off moving. The "only" identifies the condition of uninterrupted motion; it does not say that only souls ever move anything (245c).

He next treats this self-moving as a source for other motions. A beginning must be ungenerated: if it derived from something, it would no longer be a

beginning. Since it cannot come to be, it cannot be destroyed either, for the destruction of the beginning would leave neither it nor what depends on it able to arise anew. The counterfactual picture of heaven and earth collapsing into immobility illustrates the consequence of losing the source of motion (245d–e).

The argument still has to join the source to soul. Socrates does this through the contrast between externally moved, soulless bodies and bodies whose motion comes from within, from themselves. This is declared the nature of soul. If the self-moving is nothing other than soul, the conclusion follows that soul is necessarily ungenerated and immortal (245e–246a). The identification is thus an explicit premise in the reasoning, not an inference supplied later by the chariot picture.

The next paragraph sets a limit to what has been established. Immortality has been treated sufficiently; the figure of soul will now be narrated by likeness. Similarly, the description of a god as an immortal animal composed of soul and body is said to be something we fashion without adequate seeing or understanding (246c–d). That qualification concerns the imagined divine animal and does not simply retract the immediately preceding motion-proof.

The adjective "immortal" later acquires different applications. A lawgiver may be an immortal speech-writer in his city, in the sense of enduring authority or fame (258c). The seeds of knowledgeable discourse can keep their propagation immortal through new growth in other characters (277a). These contexts extend the word's reach without repeating the argument that identifies soul with an underived moving source.

Places to Read

245c–246a · Burnet pp. 26–27 The complete demonstration, from ever-moving life through the beginning of motion to soul.

246a–d · Burnet pp. 27–28 The boundary between the demonstration, the likeness and the fashioned image of an immortal animal.

258b–c · Burnet p. 43 The transferred immortality of a lawgiver's written work.

276e–277a · Burnet p. 70 Immortal continuation through the seeds of living discourse.

In this edition

At 245d the translation follows Buttmann's reading printed by Burnet: a derived beginning would "no longer be a beginning". The apparatus gives a different transmitted construction, "would not come to be from a beginning". At 245e the printed text follows the reading giving "all the

earth" and "into one", rather than "all coming to be". These are material textual choices within the proof, not merely changes of punctuation.

The edition's "what itself moves itself" preserves both the emphatic and the reflexive force of the Greek at 245d. Its "ever-moving" at 245c should not be weakened into merely "moved": the continuity of motion is necessary to the argument.

Attested forms

τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν (245c · Burnet p. 26) — "what moves itself".

τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν (245e · Burnet p. 27) — "what itself moves itself". Phrase continues across the printed line break; the reflexive is preserved.

ἀθάνατος (245c · Burnet p. 26) — "immortal".

ἀθανάτόν (246d · Burnet p. 28) — "immortal".

ἀθάνατος (258c · Burnet p. 43) — "immortal".

ἀθάνατον (277a · Burnet p. 70) — "immortal".

ἀεικίνητον (245c · Burnet p. 26) — "ever-moving".

ἀρχῆς (241a · Burnet p. 20) — "rule". The former lover's senseless rule, not the origin of cosmic movement.

ἀρχὴ (245c · Burnet p. 26) — "beginning".

ἀρχῇ (253c · Burnet p. 36) — "at the beginning". Here the beginning of the tale, not the metaphysical source.

ἀγένητον (245d · Burnet p. 26) — "ungenerated".

ἀγένητόν (246a · Burnet p. 27) — "ungenerated".

ἀδιάφθορον (245d · Burnet p. 26) — "indestructible".

ἀδιάφθορος (252d · Burnet p. 35) — "uncorrupted".

See also

Being and reality (p. 45); Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55); Soul (p. 82); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127)

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Soul

ψυχή, psychē, "Soul"; ἔμψυχος, empsychos, "Ensouled"; ἄψυχος, apsychos, "Soulless"

At a Glance

Soul is first the life-source that moves itself, then the subject of a chariot-likeness, and finally the nature that any serious craft of speech must understand. Read 245c–246c with 270b–271d.

Meaning

Psychē names soul: what lives, experiences, thinks, desires, learns and directs an embodied life. The Phaedrus does not introduce it as an isolated technical word. The first speech already judges the lover most harmful to the beloved's education of soul (241c), and Socrates calls soul "something prophetic" when he recognizes his offence against Love (242c). These uses place its formation and discernment at stake before the argument for immortality begins.

The contrast of empsychos, "ensouled", and apsychos, "soulless", makes the life-bearing sense explicit. A body moved from within, from itself, is ensouled; a body moved from outside is soulless (245e). The mortal animal is subsequently named as the whole formed when soul and earthy body are fixed together (246c). Soul and the embodied animal are therefore not interchangeable subjects of the claims made about death.

Use in the Phaedrus

The palinode must establish that love sent by the gods benefits both lover and beloved. To do so Socrates proposes an account of the nature of soul, divine and human, through its experiences and works (245b–c). He begins with the proposition "All soul is immortal". The proof associates uninterrupted life with motion originating in oneself and argues that such an origin is neither generated nor destructible. Its final identification of the self-moving with soul is expressed through the nature of ensouled bodies (245e–246a).

After the proof Socrates carefully changes the kind of explanation. To state what soul is would require an altogether divine and long account; to say what it resembles requires a human and shorter one. He therefore asks that it resemble the grown-together power of a winged team and charioteer (246a). The whole composite power is the likeness of soul. The charioteer is not the whole soul with two wholly alien forces attached: the later erotic struggle

divides each soul into two horse-shaped forms and a third charioteer-shaped form (253c).

The story gives soul a wider care than its particular body. All soul takes care of all that is soulless and traverses heaven in different forms (246b). Perfect and winged, it travels above and governs the cosmos; wingless, it settles in an earthy body. The procession, fall, vision and regrowth make the soul's condition depend on what it can follow and see, what nourishes it and how its powers are governed. The effort to recall beauty is consequently also an effort to reorder an entire life.

The dialogue later returns from this grand likeness to the requirements of rhetorical explanation. Medicine needs knowledge of bodily nature; rhetoric needs knowledge of soul if speeches and lawful practices are to produce persuasion and virtue by craft rather than routine (270b). Socrates asks whether soul is simple or many-formed, what it naturally acts on and undergoes, and which kinds of speeches persuade which kinds of soul for which causes (270d–271d). This is a programme of inquiry, not a completed table of psychological types supplied by the earlier threefold image.

The final account locates serious teaching in soul itself. The discourse written with knowledge in a learner's soul can defend itself and recognize when to speak or remain silent; Phaedrus calls it living and ensouled (276a). Dialectic plants such discourse in a fitting soul and allows it to grow in other characters (276e–277a). The repeated noun ties together the dialogue's questions: what can live, what can be formed well, and what must be understood before one claims to guide another.

Places to Read

241a–c · Burnet p. 20 The first speech contrasts recovered sense with madness and values the education of soul above other goods.

242b–d · Burnet p. 22 Socrates calls soul prophetic as he recognizes his impious speech.

245b–246d · Burnet pp. 26–28 Proof of immortality, explicit transition from nature to likeness, and soul's relation to an embodied animal.

249b–250a · Burnet pp. 31–32 Human understanding and differing capacities for recollection.

253c–256b · Burnet pp. 36–40 The soul's internal differences and their possible ordering in love.

270b–272a · Burnet pp. 60–62 The methodological demand to know soul's nature and its response to speeches.

276a–278a · Burnet pp. 68–71 Living discourse, fitting souls and teaching written within soul.

In this edition

"All soul" renders psychē pasa at 245c and 246b. The edition notes that the Greek can be taken collectively or distributively, as "all soul" or "every soul"; the lexicon does not resolve that ambiguity by silently replacing it with "the world-soul" or only "each individual soul".

At 246a Burnet prints the imperative "let it resemble", supported by the reported variant tradition; the main manuscript readings instead state a resemblance. The edition's wording makes the announced likeness especially explicit. At 276a "ensouled" preserves the same adjective used of the internally moved body in the proof, while its subject is now knowledgeable discourse.

Attested forms

Ψυχὴ πᾶσα (245c · Burnet p. 26) — "All soul". Phrase-level rendering; πᾶσα permits "all soul" or "every soul", while the headword ψυχή means soul.

ψυχὴ (245e–246a · Burnet p. 27) — "soul".

ψυχῆς (270b · Burnet p. 60) — "of the soul".

ἔμψυχον (245e · Burnet p. 27) — "ensouled".

ἔμψυχον (276a · Burnet p. 68) — "ensouled".

ἄψυχον (245e · Burnet p. 27) — "soulless".

ἀψύχου (246b · Burnet p. 27) — "that is soulless".

See also

Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Nature, whole and part (p. 103); Recollection (p. 76); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Self-motion and immortality (p. 79)

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πτερόν, pteron, "Wing"; πτέρωμα, pterōma, "Plumage"; πτεροῤῥυέω, pterorrhyeō, "Shed wings"; πτεροφυέω, pterophyeō, "Put forth wings"; πτερόω, pteroō, "Grow wings"; ὁμόπτερος, homopteros, "Alike-winged"

At a Glance

The wing is the soul's lifting power, nourished by the divine and regrown through the encounter with beauty. Its loss, painful growth and eventual recovery carry the palinode's movement from fall to renewed flight.

Meaning

Pteron can mean wing or feather; pterōma is plumage or the winged equipment as a whole. The verbal family distinguishes becoming winged, putting forth wings and shedding them. Pterophyein, "to grow wings", makes growth part of the name, while the description develops it through roots, shafts, shoots, watering and blocked outlets.

The wing belongs to the explicitly proposed likeness of soul (246a). Its function is intelligible from its physical power: it raises what is heavy upward to the dwelling of the gods. The moral and cognitive conditions of ascent are then narrated through the wing's nourishment and condition.

Use in the Phaedrus

The divine is beautiful, wise, good and everything of that sort; these things feed and enlarge the soul's plumage. The ugly, bad and contrary things waste and destroy it (246d–e). A soul still fully winged travels aloft; when it sheds its wings it comes down and settles into an earthy body (246b–c). Wing-loss is thus the image's transition from cosmic travel to mortal embodiment.

The celestial struggle gives the damage a history. Poorly reared horses drag downward; rival souls trample one another, and through the vice of drivers many are lamed and many lose feathers. A soul unable to follow and see becomes filled with forgetfulness and vice, grows heavy, loses wings and falls (247b–248d). The narrative does not say that one unsuccessful glimpse automatically condemns every soul alike: it describes graded vision and conditional protection.

Recollection makes renewed flight possible. Only the philosopher's mind, says the palinode, grows wings, because it remains by memory, as far as possible, near the things by which a god is divine (249c). Seeing beauty here and remembering the true makes the lover look upward like a bird, eager but

still unable to fly (249d). The visible awkwardness belongs to an unfinished recovery, which ordinary observers misread as mere madness.

The detailed growth at 251b–252b turns that recovery into an experience. Beauty flows through the eyes, warms the soul and melts the hardened obstruction around the wing's emergence. A shaft swells from its root throughout the soul. Teething explains why new growth itches and hurts. Presence supplies flow and relief; absence dries the outlets and imprisons the growing shoots, combining pain with the joy of remembered beauty. This sequence explains the lover's urgency without making every action produced by it good.

The comic divine name Pterōs gives the wing-growth a final verbal emblem (252b–c). Socrates quotes verses in which mortals call the god Erōs, but immortals Pterōs through wing-growing necessity. He warns that the verse is insolent and metrically rough, and leaves its acceptance optional; what he continues to maintain is the cause and experience the narrative has described.

The beloved eventually grows wings too when beauty's stream returns to him (255c–d). Their subsequent conduct determines the outcome. The philosophical pair leave winged and light; the honour-loving pair leave wingless but already beginning to grow wings and are promised a shared bright journey, with wings alike when they attain them (256b–e). Regrowth therefore has stages and differing results, not one immediate reward granted to everyone who feels attraction.

Places to Read

246a–247b · Burnet pp. 27–28 Winged likeness, the wing's lifting power and its nourishment.

248a–249c · Burnet pp. 30–31 Damage, fall and the times and conditions of recovery.

249d–252c · Burnet pp. 32–35 Birdlike longing, the visible beloved and the physiology of wing-growth.

255c–256e · Burnet pp. 39–41 The beloved's regrowth and the two couples' differing outcomes.

In this edition

At 246d Burnet brackets psychē, "soul", found in B and T. In the printed text it is the wing's power, among things concerned with the body, that especially shares in the divine; inserting the bracketed noun would change the subject. The lexicon follows the edition's unbracketed continuous sense.

The edition renders kaulos “shaft”, while its note observes that the Greek serves both a plant’s stem and a feather’s quill. It prints “journey beneath heaven” at 256d, not the conjecture “beyond heaven”. The two outcomes should retain the exact difference between already winged and still wingless but beginning to grow.

Attested forms

πτεροῦ (246d · Burnet p. 28) — “of the wing”.

πτερὰ (248b · Burnet p. 30) — “wings”.

πτερά (251c · Burnet p. 34) — “wings”.

πτέρωμα (246e · Burnet p. 28) — “plumage”.

πτεροῤῥυήσασα (246c · Burnet p. 27) — “that has lost its wings”.

πτεροῤῥυήσῃ (248c · Burnet p. 30) — “loses its wings”.

πτεροφυεῖν (251c · Burnet p. 34) — “to put forth wings”.

πτεροφυεῖν (255d · Burnet p. 39) — “putting forth wings”.

πτεροῦται (249c · Burnet p. 31) — “grows wings”.

πτεροῦσθαι (256d · Burnet p. 40) — “to grow wings”.

ὁμοπτέρους (256e · Burnet p. 41) — “have them alike”. The English supplies “wings” from the adjective’s context.

See also

Beauty (p. 42); Fate and choice of life (p. 52); Longing and yearning (p. 25); Nourishment (p. 69); Philosophy (p. 71); Recollection (p. 76)

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Speech, knowledge and method

Craft and expertise

τέχνη, technē, “craft; systematic expertise”; τριβή, tribē, “practised knack”; ἐμπειρία, empeiria, “experience; routine”

At a Glance

A craft is not merely a repertory of effects. It knows its subject, the nature on which it acts, the reasons for its operations and the circumstances in which each is appropriate.

Meaning

Τέχνη names an organized capacity to make or do something with understanding. The dialogue also calls rhetorical handbooks τέχναι, "crafts": a book presenting the art takes the art's name. That usage creates a danger the closing argument exposes. Possessing a book about a craft is not equivalent to possessing the craft. The adjective τεχνικός may mark a genuine expert or occur in an ironic description of someone who only claims expertise.

Τριβή, literally associated with repeated wearing or rubbing, names a knack acquired through practice; ἐμπειρία names experienced familiarity. The distinction here is not that experience is worthless. At 270b Socrates says "not by knack only and routine but by craft", and at 271d–e he requires perception of actual cases in addition to an account.

Use in the Phaedrus

The palinode first puts a limit on craft's sufficiency: the poet who approaches the doors without the Muses' madness, convinced that craft alone will make him capable, is imperfect (245a). Later Socrates asks for a craft of speaking that does not detach itself from truth (260e). These claims concern different insufficiencies. Neither mechanical technique without inspiration nor persuasion detached from knowledge is enough in its respective setting.

At 260d Socrates lets rhetoric defend itself. It does not compel ignorant pupils to learn speaking, it says; they should first acquire truth, but knowing truth will not by itself give them craftful persuasion. Socrates accepts the fairness of this claim only if the challenging arguments can establish that rhetoric really is a craft. The personification should not be read as an already ratified doctrine of the teachers.

The catalogue of preambles, narrations, proofs and emotional appeals is followed by three analogies (268a–269c). A person may know how to heat or cool bodies, cause vomiting or evacuation, yet not know whom to treat, when, or how much. One may produce long, short, frightening or pitiable speeches without knowing how to make a tragedy whose parts fit each other and the whole. One may adjust a string to extreme pitches without knowing harmony. These accomplishments are necessary preliminary lessons; their deficiency is not that they achieve no effects, but that they lack the ordering knowledge of the art.

Socrates imagines competent artists correcting these pretenders gently. The error is understandable: unable to converse and define rhetoric, they took its prerequisites for its entirety and left persuasive combination to the pupils. The subsequent medical comparison supplies a more positive

method: determine whether the object is simple or many-formed, enumerate its forms if necessary, and study what each can do and undergo in relation to others (270c–271b).

The writing myth adds a further distinction. Theuth can invent an art, but Thamus says invention and judgement of its benefit are different abilities (274e). The inventor's goodwill towards his offspring may misjudge its effects. Thus neither successful production, pedagogical transmission, nor the authority of an inventor exempts a craft from examination.

Places to Read

244e–245a · Burnet pp. 25–26 Craft alone does not perfect the poet.

260c–261a · Burnet pp. 46–47 Rhetoric's defence and the challenge to its standing.

266d–269c · Burnet pp. 55–59 Handbook techniques and the medical, tragic and musical analogies.

270b–272b · Burnet pp. 60–63 A craft's study of nature and application.

274e–275a · Burnet p. 67 Invention distinguished from evaluation of benefit.

In this edition

The edition uses "craft" for τέχνη and often "masterly" or "master of the craft" for its adjective. "Crafts of speeches" at 271c means handbooks, as the note explains. Its English "knack" at 260e and 270b renders τριβή; "routine" at 270b renders ἐμπειρία. At 260e3 the note flags a grammatical difference between Burnet's printed dative τέχνῃ and the nominative sense translated in "that it is a craft"; this is not silently harmonized here.

Attested forms

τέχνη (260e · Burnet p. 47) — "craft". The status of rhetoric as a craft is contested.

τέχνῃ (270b · Burnet p. 60) — "by craft". Contrasted with knack and routine in medicine and rhetoric.

τριβή (260e · Burnet p. 47) — "knack". The approaching arguments accuse rhetoric of being a craftless knack.

ἐμπειρίᾳ (270b · Burnet p. 60) — "routine". The contrast is "not by knack only and routine but by craft".

See also

Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Nature, whole and part (p. 103); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108); Practice and training (p. 110); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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Definition and agreement

ὅρος, horos, "boundary; definition"; ὁρίζομαι, horizomai, "define; mark off"; ὁμολογία, homologia, "agreement"

At a Glance

A definition marks off the subject so inquiry can proceed in agreement. It can make a speech clear and consistent without proving that its account is true.

Meaning

Ὅρος is a boundary or limit and, in an account, a definition. Ὁρίζεσθαι is to mark off what something is. The ὁμολογ- family concerns saying the same thing together: agreement between interlocutors or consistency within an account. The dialogue distinguishes these achievements from knowledge of truth even while making them conditions for a well-directed inquiry.

Use in the Phaedrus

Socrates' first speech begins with an apparently exemplary procedure (237b–d). Its speaker says that the many do not know what they are deliberating about, but fail to notice the ignorance. They omit agreement at the outset and later disagree with themselves and others. He and the boy should instead lay down an agreed definition of love, its character and power, and use that standard to ask whether it harms or benefits. The speaker is a concealed lover advocating the non-lover's case. His procedural good sense must not erase that dramatic setting or turn his eventual definition into Socrates' final view.

The later examination distinguishes relatively uncontested words such as iron and silver from just and good, over which people dispute both with others and within themselves (263a). The intended rhetorician must distinguish these domains methodically and recognize to which the particular subject belongs. Love is disputable: Phaedrus has just heard it described both as harmful and as the greatest good (263c).

Lysias' beginning is reread to test whether it first made Love some definite one among the things that are and organized the remainder accordingly (263d–264a). Phaedrus admits that the sought definition is absent. Socrates' own first speech, by contrast, did define love. That does not remove the need for the palinode. In the methodological retrospective, Socrates expressly says that whether love was defined well or badly, the definition enabled clarity and consistency (265d). This distinction is central: intelligibility is a genuine virtue that a mistaken speech can possess.

Collection and division then supply definition with a method: bring scattered cases into one figure, and cut according to forms at natural joints. The final summary requires a speaker to know the truth of the things discussed, define each by itself, and divide down to what cannot further be divided in the analysis (277b). Agreement alone is no substitute for these demands. At the same time, the repeated requests for Phaedrus' assent keep the examination an exchange rather than a set of definitions imposed without testing.

Places to Read

237b–238c · Burnet pp. 15–16 The first speech's agreed definition and its outcome.

263a–264a · Burnet pp. 50–51 Uncontested names, disputed values and Lysias' missing starting-point.

265d–266b · Burnet p. 54 Clarity and consistency distinguished from a correct definition.

269b; 277b–c · Burnet pp. 59, 70 Failure to define rhetoric; definition in the final method.

In this edition

The edition preserves "definition" for ὅρος at 237d and "defined" for forms of ὁρίζεσθαι. At 265d the wording "whether well or badly" is not a minor hedge: it prevents the method's clarity from being mistaken for proof of its content. At 263a "in concord" follows T and Galen's ὁμονοητικῶς; the apparatus reports a different reading in B, not an additional claim by Socrates.

Attested forms

ὅρον (237d · Burnet p. 15) — "a definition". To be laid down by agreement before testing benefit and harm.

ὁριζόμενος (265d · Burnet p. 54) — "by defining". Collection makes the subject clear for teaching.

ὁμολογίᾳ (237d · Burnet p. 15) — "by agreement". The proposed definition is agreed between speaker and boy.

See also

Dialectic and conversation (p. 92); Form, collection and division (p. 94); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Love and the lover (p. 28); Truth (p. 116)

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Dialectic and conversation

διαλεκτικός, dialektikos, "dialectical; skilled in collection and division"; διαλέγομαι, dialegomai, "converse; discuss"

At a Glance

Dialectic is the name Socrates gives to the capacity for collection and division. Its serious work is not a finished text alone but knowledgeable conversation that grows an answerable account in a soul.

Meaning

Διαλέγεσθαι means to converse or discuss. The adjective διαλεκτικός and its substantive plural διαλεκτικοί are related to this activity, but the local explanation is specific: Socrates calls the people able to see together and divide by kinds "dialecticians" (266b–c). He marks the naming as his practice "up to now", with a modest reservation about whether the address is right. Phaedrus accepts it.

Ordinary conversation elsewhere in the dialogue does not on that account become a full technical exercise in dialectic. The context must show whether the speakers are exchanging talk, testing an account, or employing the described craft.

Use in the Phaedrus

Socrates says he loves collections and divisions so as to be able to speak and to be intelligent (266b). When he recognizes someone capable of seeing one and many, he follows the person's track as though it were a god's. This movement reverses the opening scene in which the speech-lover follows Phaedrus because of a book. The later pursuit is directed to a capacity of understanding rather than to possession of an attractive composition.

Phaedrus distinguishes this dialectical form from the rhetorical part he thinks is still missing (266c). The handbook catalogue follows, but its techniques turn out to be preliminary studies rather than the completed art.

In the imagined speech of experienced artists, the teachers' inability to converse explains their inability to define rhetoric (269b). They mistook the necessary preparations for the thing prepared for. Conversation here concerns the capacity to distinguish and give an account, not simply sociability or fluency.

Dialectic returns by name at the culmination of the writing discussion (276e). The practitioner chooses a fitting soul and plants and sows speeches with knowledge. Those speeches can defend themselves and their planter, carry seed into other characters, and make their possessor as happy as a human can be. The passage connects method with teaching, responsiveness and continuity. The soul receiving the account is not an interchangeable container: its suitability matters.

The account does not make speaking aloud automatically dialectical. At 277e–278a recited speeches without questioning and teaching are placed alongside written compositions as insufficient for great earnestness. The serious alternative consists in what is taught and spoken for learning and truly written in soul. An author who can enter refutation about the written work and support it by a richer living account exemplifies this priority (278c). Thus the dialogue's contrast is more exacting than a simple opposition between oral and written culture: the criterion is an account capable of being understood, examined and defended.

Places to Read

266b–d · Burnet pp. 54–55 The name dialectician and Phaedrus' question about rhetoric.

269b–c · Burnet p. 59 Conversation and definition in the critique of handbook teaching.

276e–277c · Burnet p. 70 The dialectical craft plants living speeches; the method is recapitulated.

277e–278d · Burnet pp. 71–72 Questioning, teaching and a writer's capacity for defence.

In this edition

The edition uses "converse" for διαλέγεσθαι and "dialectical" for the adjective. The explanatory note's comparisons to other Platonic dialogues are not evidence independently consulted for this article. Here the local definition is collection and division, and the later local application is the knowledgeable planting of speeches in soul.

Attested forms

διαλεκτικούς (266c · Burnet p. 55) — “dialecticians”. Socrates’ current name for those able to collect and divide.

διαλεκτικῇ (276e · Burnet p. 70) — “dialectical”. The craft used to plant knowledgeable speeches in a fitting soul.

διαλέγεσθαι (269b · Burnet p. 59) — “converse”. The imagined experts explain handbook writers’ failure to define rhetoric.

See also

Form, collection and division (p. 94); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Philosophy (p. 71); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127)

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Form, collection and division

εἶδος, eidos, “form; kind”; ἰδέα, idea, “figure; unified aspect”; συναγωγή, synagōgē, “collection; bringing together”; διαίρεσις, diairesis, “division”

At a Glance

Collection brings dispersed cases into one view; division follows their natural articulations. Together they let an account say what it is about without confusing kinds that share a name.

Meaning

Εἶδος and ἰδέα can describe a form, shape or kind. The edition distinguishes them by “form” and “figure”. Their occurrence is not by itself a declaration that every kind under discussion is a separately existing reality. At 237d the two ruling tendencies within us are figures; at 263b the classes of agreed and disputed subjects are forms. At 265d–e the words articulate a method.

Συναγωγή brings together; διαίρεσις separates. The names at 266b follow concrete descriptions: see scattered things together and lead them into one figure, then cut again by forms at the joints as they are naturally constituted. Collection and division are coordinated operations, not permission first to lump everything arbitrarily and then to subdivide at will.

Use in the Phaedrus

The palinode describes human understanding as going from many perceptions into one, gathered by reasoning, and calls this recollection

(249b–c). The later description of collection resembles that movement, but its immediate question is how the speeches on love became clear and could move from censure to praise. At 265c Socrates calls much of their content play and isolates two forms of procedure whose power would be valuable to grasp by craft.

The first procedure defines the subject by taking a single view of scattered material. Socrates credits his initial definition of love with making its speech clear and in agreement with itself, whether the definition was well or badly made. The second procedure is discriminating rather than destructive. A bad butcher breaks a part instead of cutting at its joints (265e). The image presents kinds as having articulations that the inquiry must respect, not as passive material for the speaker's convenience.

Socrates retrospectively describes the two speeches as taking an irrational or aberrant condition in common and then cutting towards left and right. The first pursued a left-handed love and censured it; the other found divine love on the right and praised it as the cause of great goods (266a–b). The bodily analogy explains how things can be paired and share a name while differing in character. The palinode's divine love is not made identical in value with the condemned love merely because both are called love.

This retrospective description is an account of the speeches' methodological pattern. It is not necessary to make every stage of the earlier speeches conform to a fully displayed classification tree: Socrates himself is extracting what can be learned from them. In the examination of rhetoric, the same method applies to souls and speeches. Determine whether the nature is simple or multiform, count its forms if there are several, and explain each one's powers and relations (270d–271b).

The final demand is to define the subject and cut by forms "down to the uncuttable" (277b). This gives the analysis an appropriate stopping-point; it does not supply an exhaustive catalogue of the indivisible kinds or their number. A competent speech then fits the relevant form of account to the nature of its hearer.

Places to Read

237d; 249b–c · Burnet pp. 15, 31 Figures within us; many perceptions gathered into one.

263a–c; 265c–266c · Burnet pp. 50, 53–55 Classes of subjects, collection, natural division and dialecticians.

270d–271b; 273d–e · Burnet pp. 61–62, 65 Application to natures, souls and speeches.

277b–c · Burnet p. 70 Definition and division to the uncuttable in the final summary.

In this edition

"Figure" renders ἰδέα and "form" εἶδος in the cited passages. At 266a2 the printed "one" is Heindorf's addition; the apparatus does not show an unqualified unanimous text. At 266b7 Burnet's printed participle underlies "by his nature" of the capable person; the alternative reading reported in the note makes the one and many what is naturally so. The method's general requirement should not be made to depend on suppressing that difference.

Attested forms

εἴδη (265e · Burnet p. 54) — "forms". Division is to follow forms and natural joints.

ἰδέαν (265d · Burnet p. 54) — "figure". Scattered things are led into one figure.

συναγωγῶν (266b · Burnet p. 54) — "collections". Socrates calls himself a lover of collections and divisions.

διαιρέσεων (266b · Burnet p. 54) — "divisions". Paired with collections as what enables speaking and intelligence.

See also

Definition and agreement (p. 90); Dialectic and conversation (p. 92); Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Nature, whole and part (p. 103); Recollection (p. 76)

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Knowledge and ignorance

ἐπιστήμη, epistēmē, "knowledge"; ἀγνοέω, agnoeō, "be ignorant; fail to recognize"; οἶδα, oida, "know"

At a Glance

Knowing includes familiarity, practical ability and understanding of what a thing is. The dialogue repeatedly tests the distance between knowing some operations, seeming to know and possessing the knowledge a craft requires.

Meaning

The vocabulary is wider than the noun ἐπιστήμη. Οἶδα and ἐπίσταμαι can both mean "know"; their complements determine whether a person knows a

fact, knows what something is, or knows how to perform an operation. Ἀγνοεῖν is to be ignorant of something or fail to recognize it. It need not name a total absence of intelligence. A person may know one thing well and be ignorant of the matter on which that knowledge is being used.

The distinction is dramatized in the horse example: Socrates imagines knowing Phaedrus' opinion accurately while both are ignorant of horses (260b). Knowledge of the audience's belief therefore does not amount to knowledge of the subject or of its good use.

Use in the Phaedrus

At the beginning Socrates jokes that ignorance of Phaedrus would entail forgetting himself (228a); Phaedrus later turns the words against him (236c). Their mutual familiarity can predict how the other will behave. This is a local, interpersonal sense of knowing, not already the systematic knowledge of soul required of rhetoric. Socrates' admission that he has not yet fulfilled "know yourself" gives ignorance a more demanding ethical force (229e–230a).

The concealed lover in Socrates' first speech announces that good deliberation must begin by knowing the thing deliberated about (237b–c). People who do not recognize their ignorance skip agreement at the start and later fail to agree even with themselves. Yet this promising method does not certify his eventual account of love. At 265d Socrates can value the definition's clarity and consistency "whether well or badly" love was defined. A claim to knowledge and a clear definition must still be tested for truth.

The palinode distinguishes the true knowledge whose object is what really is from forms of knowledge associated with becoming or varying objects (247c–e). In the practical discussion, knowledge becomes a requirement for rhetoric: the knower must distinguish similarities, understand the nature acted on, and explain persuasion's causes. The same word does not make every successful medical operation or remembered maxim equivalent to that understanding.

The pretended doctor knows how to produce heat, cold, vomiting and evacuation, but does not know whom to treat, when, or to what degree (268a–c). The correction does not deny his first knowledge; it denies that it is sufficient to make him a doctor. Similarly, natural rhetorical ability requires knowledge and practice, and classroom knowledge must be recognized in actual cases (269d; 271d–272a).

Thamus' criticism of writing concentrates on a deceptive relation between knowledge and reputation. Pupils who have heard much without teaching will seem to have much judgement while mostly lacking it

(275a–b). Socrates subsequently permits writing to remind the person who already knows. The superior account is produced with knowledge in the learner's soul and can answer for itself. This is why an author's ability to defend and surpass the written product matters more than how impressively the product is assembled.

Places to Read

228a; 229e–230a; 236c · Burnet pp. 2, 5, 13 Familiarity with a friend and the unresolved task of self-knowledge.

237b–d; 265d · Burnet pp. 15, 54 Knowing the subject and the limits of a clear definition.

247c–e · Burnet p. 29 True knowledge in the palinode.

260b; 268a–269d · Burnet pp. 46, 57–59 Knowing an audience's opinion; prerequisite skills versus the art.

271d–272a; 275a–276a; 278c · Burnet pp. 62–63, 67–68, 72 Application, apparent learning and a knowledgeable defence.

In this edition

"Know" translates several Greek forms; this entry makes no one-word rule for the English. At 277b5 the edition prints εἰδῇ, "knows", a correction in D where B and T have forms understood as "sees". At 271c the assertion that handbook writers know soul perfectly but conceal it is part of Socrates' pointed challenge; it should not be converted into a factual certification of their expertise.

Attested forms

ἐπιστήμην (269d · Burnet p. 59) — "knowledge". To be added with practice to natural rhetorical aptitude.

ἐπιστήμης (276a · Burnet p. 68) — "knowledge". Living speech is written with knowledge in the learner's soul.

ἀγνοοῖμεν (260b · Burnet p. 46) — "were ignorant". Both speaker and hearer in the horse example are supposed ignorant of horses.

εἰδέναι (237c · Burnet p. 15) — "know". Knowing the subject is proposed as the beginning of good deliberation.

See also

Craft and expertise (p. 87); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Memory and reminding (p. 123); Self-knowledge (p. 150); Truth (p. 116)

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Likelihood and the plausible

εἰκός, eikos, "likely; plausible; what is to be expected"; πιθανός, pithanos, "persuasive; credible"

At a Glance

The likely ranges from an ordinary expectation to a courtroom substitute for what happened. Socrates challenges the latter doctrine by arguing that plausible resemblance depends on truth.

Meaning

Εἰκός is a participial form used as an adjective or substantively: what is likely, plausible or fitting to expect. It need not signify a calculated probability. The dialogue uses it in conversational judgements, in speeches predicting conduct, and in the rhetorical technique that prefers likely appearances to an unlikely actual event. Πιθανός is persuasive or credible; the rhetoric teachers' reported account equates what persuades the court with the likely. That equation is one position under examination, not the definition of every possible persuasion.

Use in the Phaedrus

The opening discussion of rationalized mythology imagines bringing strange stories into line with what is likely (229e). Socrates does not take up that endless labour: he still lacks knowledge of himself. Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech repeatedly reason from what people are likely to do. Their predictions concern lovers, non-lovers, social suspicion and advantage. Because those speeches are later challenged, such likelihoods must be read as the speakers' argumentative resources, not established psychological laws.

In the technical catalogue Tisias and Gorgias are said to honour likelihoods more than truths and to make small things appear large and large things small by the strength of speech (267a). At 272c–d Socrates deliberately gives the opposing side a hearing, calling this "the wolf's part". Its advocates say the rhetorician need not know truth about just or good things or the relevant people. Even events that really occurred should sometimes be replaced by likelihoods when the events are implausible.

The example attributed to Tisias is carefully specified (273b–c). A weak but manly person beats a physically mighty but cowardly person and takes his cloak or something else. Neither party is to tell the whole truth. The victim denies being assaulted by the man alone; the attacker disproves that claim but asks how someone of his physique could have attempted such a victim. The victim's unwillingness to admit cowardice may lead him into

further lies and expose him to refutation. The argument exploits a public expectation about physical strength while concealing the qualities that made the event possible.

Socrates replies that likelihood arises for the many through similarity to truth, and that the person who knows truth best discovers similarities (273d). Consequently this alternative does not exempt the speaker from knowledge, collection and division, or the study of hearers' natures. The labour is long, but shortcutting it does not supply a genuine craft.

Ordinary εἰκός continues to be usable after this criticism. Phaedrus says that it is not likely that the knowledgeable person will seriously entrust his seeds to ink (276c). The target is therefore not all reasonable expectation but a doctrine that declares truth dispensable while claiming complete expertise.

Places to Read

229e; 231c–233a; 238e · Burnet pp. 4, 7–8, 17 Likelihood in myth-rationalization and predictions about lovers.

266e–267b · Burnet pp. 55–56 Likelihood as a handbook technique and a preferred standard.

272c–273c · Burnet pp. 63–64 The opposing doctrine and the weak man's courtroom argument.

273d–274a; 276c · Burnet pp. 65, 69 Dependence on truth; an ordinary later use of the likely.

In this edition

The edition renders the substantivized form as "the likely" and the plural as "likelihoods"; this preserves the shift from a predicate to something pursued as a rhetorical standard. At 273b the identification with "what the multitude thinks" is made in Socrates' interrogation of Tisias' position. It must not be projected onto every εἰκός elsewhere.

Attested forms

εἰκότα (266e · Burnet p. 55) — "likelihoods". An item in the handbook catalogue.

τὸ εἰκὸς (273b · Burnet p. 64) — "the likely". Tisias' likely is identified with what the multitude thinks.

τοῦ πιθανοῦ (272d · Burnet p. 64) — "what is persuasive". Object of attention in the reported courtroom doctrine.

See also

Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Opinion and seeming (p. 105); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Similarity and deception (p. 114); Truth (p. 116)

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Logos: speech, account and reason

λόγος, logos, "speech; account; reason"

At a Glance

The same Greek word joins the compositions Phaedrus loves, the accounts by which they are tested, and the reason that directs a life. Its value depends on what a speech knows and what it can do with a hearer.

Meaning

Λόγος can be an utterance or a connected speech, an explanatory account or an argument, and in some settings reason. These are related senses, not interchangeable English labels. A λόγος may be written or spoken, long or brief, true or misleading. Its name alone confers neither truth nor rationality. In this dialogue the plural often names the speeches that the friends eagerly collect and hear; elsewhere it names the considerations by which a proposed art is examined.

The verb λέγειν means to say or speak. A phrase such as "by speech" need not mean "by rational demonstration": the hearer, occasion and surrounding contrast decide. Conversely, when λόγος is rendered "reason", the dialogue has not introduced an entirely different Greek object from the speeches that stand before the two men.

Use in the Phaedrus

Phaedrus first brings a λόγος as something already composed by Lysias (227c–228b). At 228d Socrates guesses that he has "the speech itself" beneath his cloak. The written object can make the absent Lysias present for purposes of reading, but the closing discussion will ask how much presence a book really supplies. Phaedrus' distinction between remembering the expressions and recounting their thought already separates a speech's wording from what it is about.

In Socrates' first speech opinion leads "by reason" towards the best, while desire drags "without reason" towards pleasure (237e–238c). This description belongs to a speech later repudiated for treating love simply as

bad; it nevertheless gives a usable contrast between direction by an account and uncontrolled impulse. The palinode does not discard speech: its obedient horse is guided by command and λόγος alone (253d–e), and the better pair resist with modesty and reason (256a).

The account of soul expressly distinguishes saying what soul is from saying what it resembles (245e–246a). A λόγος may therefore state a definition or offer an acknowledged likeness. At 247c Socrates insists on truth when speaking about truth; later he describes his hymn more cautiously as perhaps touching truth and perhaps wandering elsewhere (265b). The reader must retain both assertions rather than treating the word λόγος as a certificate for the myth.

In the rhetoric inquiry arguments themselves approach, testify, protest and require Phaedrus to answer (260e–261a). Here the translation's "arguments" makes the local sense clear, while the Greek sustains the drama of speeches that behave like living agents. Rhetoric is then defined as soul-leading through λόγοι. An excellent speech has its own body and connected parts (264c), but even a beautifully ordered written speech cannot answer a new question unaided (275d–e).

The better λόγος is written with knowledge in the learner's soul (276a). It can defend itself, speak to the right people, and remain silent when that is fitting. This is not an automatic privilege of sound over marks: recited speeches delivered without questioning and teaching are also denied great seriousness (277e–278a). The decisive contrast is between an account possessed and tested by a knower and an utterance that merely circulates.

Places to Read

227c–228e · Burnet pp. 2–3 The composition, its wording, and "the speech itself" in the book.

237e–238c · Burnet pp. 15–16 Reason directing opinion, and desire acting without it.

245e–247c · Burnet pp. 27–29 Account, likeness and the demand to speak truth.

253d–e; 256a · Burnet pp. 37, 40 Speech guides the good horse; reason resists the inferior impulse.

260e–261a; 264c · Burnet pp. 47, 52 Arguments speak; a speech is compared to an animal.

275d–276a; 277e–278a · Burnet pp. 68, 71 Written and living accounts; recitation without examination.

In this edition

The edition renders λόγος by local sense: “speech” at 227c, “reason” at 237e, and “arguments” at 260e. At 256a it prints λόγου, a correction in Coisl. 155, and translates “reason”; B and T have the plural λόγων, reported as “words” in the note. The article follows the printed text without treating that correction as unanimous manuscript evidence.

Attested forms

λόγος (227c · Burnet p. 2) — “speech”. Lysias’ written composition on love.

λόγῳ (237e · Burnet p. 15) — “by reason”. Instrumental dative: acquired opinion leads towards the best by reason.

λόγοι (260e · Burnet p. 47) — “arguments”. Arguments are personified as approaching to challenge rhetoric.

See also

Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Opinion and seeming (p. 105); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Truth (p. 116); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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Nature, whole and part

φύσις, physis, “nature; native constitution”; ὅλος, holos, “whole”; μέρος, meros, “part”

At a Glance

A speech requires an articulated whole, and a craft must know the nature it acts on. The method asks whether that nature is simple or many-formed; it does not settle the answer merely by asking.

Meaning

Φύσις can name how something grows or is constituted, its characteristic capacities, or a person’s native aptitude. Forms of φύεσθαι and πέφυκεν retain this sense of what a thing naturally is or does. Ὅλον is a whole; μέρος a part. Their relation is not only numerical. A speech or tragedy must have parts fitting one another and its overall organization, and division must respect rather than damage the articulated subject.

Use in the Phaedrus

The opening self-examination already asks whether Socrates is a complicated monster or a simpler creature sharing a divine portion by nature (230a). The palinode describes soul's nature through self-motion and then offers a likeness of its structure (245e–246a). It also says that soul and body fixed together form the animal called mortal (246c). These contexts should remain distinct from the later methodological question about the nature of "the whole".

At 264b–c Socrates asks why each part of Lysias' speech occupies its place. The standard is an animal with its own body, neither headless nor footless, with middle and extremities fitting one another and the whole. An unordered set of individually polished pieces cannot meet this requirement. The same vocabulary returns in the analogy of tragedy: its art consists in an appropriate putting-together, not just the production of impressive speeches of different emotional kinds (268d).

The butcher image adds a standard for analysis (265e). One should divide by forms at the joints where they naturally lie, rather than break a part. The images of organic arrangement and natural division are complementary: good composition connects what belongs together, and good inquiry distinguishes what should not be confused.

At 270b Socrates joins medicine and rhetoric because each must divide a nature, body in the one case and soul in the other. He asks whether soul can be understood adequately without the nature of the whole. Phaedrus invokes Hippocrates for a similar requirement even in medicine; Socrates agrees to examine not just the authority but whether the account itself is in consonance. The reference of "the whole" is not defined here beyond dispute. The edition notes the alternatives of universe and whole body-and-soul, and this lexicon leaves that uncertainty visible.

The procedure that follows is explicit (270d–271b): ask whether the object is simple or multiform; if simple, examine its powers of acting and undergoing in relation to others; if multiform, enumerate and do the same for each form. Applied to soul, this is a demand on any serious teacher of rhetoric. It is not a newly proved assertion that souls have a specified number of parts, nor a ready-made psychological classification. The eventual speaker has to recognize the relevant nature in the person actually before him.

Places to Read

230a; 245e–246c · Burnet pp. 5, 27 Self-examination, soul's nature and the composite animal.

264b–e; 265e–266a; 268d · Burnet pp. 52, 54, 58 Organic composition, natural joints and tragedy.

269d–270c · Burnet pp. 59–60 Native aptitude and the disputed nature of the whole.

270d–272a; 277b–c · Burnet pp. 61–63, 70 Simple or multiform nature and actual application.

In this edition

At 270c the printed ὅλου, "whole", follows T and W; B has λόγου, "account". At 264c the edition prints σῶμά τι, "a body", from a later hand; B and T have σώματι, "with a body". Neither difference licenses ignoring the surrounding explicit demand that the parts fit one another and the whole.

Attested forms

φύσιν (270b · Burnet p. 60) — "a nature". The doctor and rhetorician must analyse their respective objects: bodily nature and soul's nature.

φύσεως (270c · Burnet p. 60) — "nature". The question concerns soul's nature and that of the whole.

τῷ ὅλῳ (264c · Burnet p. 52) — "to the whole". A speech's parts must be becoming to each other and to the whole.

μέρος (265e · Burnet p. 54) — "part". Division must not break a part in the manner of a bad butcher.

See also

Craft and expertise (p. 87); Form, collection and division (p. 94); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108); Soul (p. 82)

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Opinion and seeming

δόξα, doxa, "opinion; seeming; reputation"; δοκέω, dokeō, "seem; think; resolve"

At a Glance

Doxa may be a judgement that guides, a public reputation that attracts or frightens, or the appearance of wisdom without its possession. The dialogue does not equate every opinion with error.

Meaning

Δόξα and δοκεῖν belong to the vocabulary of what one thinks or what seems so. The noun can name a person's judgement, what people think of somebody, or a seeming as distinguished from the truth. The verb likewise ranges from "I think" and "it seems" to the decision formula "it was resolved". To decide whether a use is unreliable, tentative, true or merely conventional, one must read its object and argumentative setting.

Φαίνεσθαι, "appear", often works beside δοκεῖν. Neither verb automatically means "appear falsely". Phaedrus' frequent agreements that something seems so may mark an accepted result without claiming that it has been established beyond every possibility of revision.

Use in the Phaedrus

In the first speech the acquired opinion aiming at the best is contrasted with inborn desire for pleasure (237d–e). When opinion leads by reason and has mastery, the condition is called temperance. In the palinode, souls that fail to see reality sufficiently take nourishment of opinion (248b). These are not simply identical assessments of the same situation: one contrasts judgement with appetite in a human life; the other contrasts a lesser nourishment with direct contemplation. The good horse remains a companion of true opinion (253d). Opinion can therefore have truth and a helpful role without becoming the fullest knowledge.

Reputation drives much of the dramatic concern. The non-lover claims that lovers seek honour by displaying their conquests, while non-lovers choose the best rather than public repute (231e–232a). This is the interested speaker's claim about the parties, not a neutral social law. Later Phaedrus supposes that dignified politicians avoid writing because they fear being called sophists by posterity (257d). Socrates answers that the proudest politicians eagerly record their own speeches and the public approval they receive. The decree's "Resolved" supplies a public form of seeming or deciding, not evidence that its author understands justice.

In the rhetoric inquiry Socrates rejects the attempt to hunt audience opinions while ignoring truth (262c). Opinion is manipulable partly because people disagree about good and just things and even dispute with themselves (263a). Yet knowledge of an audience's views remains necessary as part of knowledgeable soul-leading; the criticism is of using those views as the sufficient standard.

Thamus' "seeming, not truth" of wisdom culminates in δοξόσοφοι, those wise in seeming (275a–b). The pupils' own appearance and reputation can outstrip their judgement because extensive hearing has not been

accompanied by teaching. The final requirement that an author withstand examination supplies a practical test against this discrepancy.

Places to Read

231e–232a; 237d–e · Burnet pp. 7, 15 Repute in the non-lover's argument; reason-directed opinion.

248b; 253d · Burnet pp. 30, 37 Nourishment of opinion and the good horse's true opinion.

257d–258c · Burnet pp. 42–43 Future reputation and public "Resolved" formulae.

260a–263b · Burnet pp. 45–50 Audience belief and disputed subjects.

275a–b; 278c–e · Burnet pp. 67, 72 Seeming wisdom and the test of a writer's resources.

In this edition

The edition's three renderings of δόξα displayed above are deliberately kept distinct. It also renders personal δοκεῖ μοι as "I think" in many exchanges; no universal "seeming equals falsehood" rule is warranted. The human soul's better horse has ἀληθινῆς δόξης, "true opinion" (253d), a decisive local counterexample to such a rule.

Attested forms

δόξα (237d · Burnet p. 15) — "opinion". Acquired opinion aims at the best.

δόξαν (257d · Burnet p. 42) — "repute". Politicians are said to fear the repute of later time.

δόξαν (275a · Burnet p. 67) — "the seeming". Thamus contrasts the seeming of wisdom with its truth.

Ἔδοξέ (258a · Burnet p. 42) — "Resolved". Formula of a public decree, not an assertion of truth.

See also

Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Likelihood and the plausible (p. 99); Temperance and self-control (p. 40); Truth (p. 116); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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Opportunity and fitting speech

καιρός, kairos, "right occasion; opportune moment"; εὐκαιρία, eukairia, "timeliness"; ἀκαιρία, akairia, "untimeliness"

At a Glance

The right speech is not simply a good text: it is a speech fitting this soul, this purpose and this occasion. Knowing when not to speak belongs to the same expertise.

Meaning

Καιρός names a fitting or decisive occasion, not merely elapsed time. Its family includes εὐκαιρία, timeliness, and ἀκαιρία, untimeliness. The language of fitting is broader: προσήκειν concerns what belongs or is appropriate, πρέπον what becomes its setting, and προσαρμόττειν the adjustment of one thing to another. In the rhetoric discussion these words connect the structure of a speech with the condition of its hearer.

Use in the Phaedrus

The opening provides an ordinary, concrete use. Phaedrus happens to be barefoot "opportunely", since the friends propose to walk along the Ilissus (229a). The appropriateness belongs to a situation, not to bare feet considered in isolation. Later the first speech describes the beloved's misery at hearing praises that are untimely and excessive (240e). Praise is not made beneficial merely by being praise. Both scenes anticipate, without constituting a technical theory, the later demand for discriminating application.

The pretend doctor's missing knowledge is precisely whom to treat, when, and to what extent (268b). The defect is not a lack of powerful interventions; it is their separation from a patient and a measure. Likewise a speech's parts must fit one another and its whole, and the rhetorical practitioner must fit a kind of speech to a kind of soul (264c; 271b).

At 271d–272b the learner must move beyond abstract types. He needs to identify the person before him as the nature discussed in instruction, know which speeches to apply and for what persuasion, and add recognition of the right moments for speaking and holding back. Brief speech, appeals to pity and exaggeration are not approved everywhere or rejected everywhere. Each has timely and untimely employment. Socrates says the craft is complete only when these requirements are present.

The criticism of writing later turns on the loss of this responsive discrimination. Once written, a speech circulates alike among those who

understand and those for whom it is unsuitable; it does not know to whom it ought to speak (275e). The living account, by contrast, knows how to speak and remain silent before the appropriate people (276a). Silence is consequently not an accidental absence of rhetoric. It can express the same knowledge that makes effective speech possible.

The final summary gives a subtle, many-harmonied speech to a subtle soul and a simple speech to a simple soul (277c). This is not licence to tell each hearer whatever pleases him. The summary has already made truth, definition and division prerequisites. Adaptation concerns the mode of teaching or persuasion within those requirements.

Places to Read

229a; 240e · Burnet pp. 3, 19 Ordinary opportunity and the burden of untimely praise.

264c; 268a–b · Burnet pp. 52, 57 Fitting parts and the doctor's questions of patient, time and measure.

271b–272b · Burnet pp. 61–63 Causal matching, perception of the actual person and timely speech.

275e–276a; 277b–c · Burnet pp. 68, 70 Writing's indiscriminate circulation and the living account's discretion.

In this edition

At 272a the edition includes "and untimeliness" on the basis of T, W and Galen; B lacks the phrase. The pair is retained in the printed Greek and English. "The right moments" renders καιρούς together with the following specification of when speech and restraint are called for; it is not a free-standing theory of opportunism.

Attested forms

καιρόν (229a · Burnet p. 3) — "Opportunely". Phaedrus' bare feet suit the proposed walk in the stream.

καιροὺς (272a · Burnet p. 63) — "the right moments". When to speak and when to hold back.

εὐκαιρίαν (272a · Burnet p. 63) — "timeliness". Judgement of each form of speech's appropriate occasion.

ἀκαιρίαν (272a · Burnet p. 63) — "untimeliness". The opposite is part of the same expertise.

See also

Craft and expertise (p. 87); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Nature, whole and part (p. 103); Practice and training (p. 110); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

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Practice and training

μελέτη, meletē, "practice; disciplined attention"; μελετάω, meletaō, "practise; study"; ἀμελετησία, ameletēsia, "want of practice"

At a Glance

Practice can strengthen memory and ability, but it can also perfect the handling of mistaken opinions. It becomes part of a craft when joined to knowledge, aptitude and discrimination of actual cases.

Meaning

Μελέτη and μελετᾶν concern practice, rehearsal or sustained attention. Their object matters: a speech, public opinions and gratifying divine masters are different things on which one may practise. The negative noun ἀμελετησία names a lack of such exercise. Training is not restricted to memorizing words, and familiarity through repetition is not itself the completed art.

Use in the Phaedrus

Phaedrus' opening ambition is to perform a speech from memory. Socrates imagines his repeated listening, rereading favourite parts and going outside to practise (228a–b). Once the book is discovered beneath the cloak, Socrates refuses to be a practice audience when Lysias himself is supposedly present in the written speech (228d–e). The exchange makes rehearsal a bodily and social activity: a walker needs a hearer, and the hearer may resist being used.

The rhetoric argument separates exercise from its standard. A speaker can have practised the multitude's opinions and nevertheless persuade a similarly ignorant city to exchange good actions for bad (260c). Repetition and audience familiarity do not correct ignorance of good and bad. The craftless knack challenged at 260e is not defeated by denying that it sometimes works; it is defeated as a claim to explanatory and responsible expertise.

At 269d Socrates proposes the familiar combination of nature, knowledge and practice. If the native capacity is present, adding knowledge and practice

can make an orator of note; lacking any ingredient leaves a corresponding deficiency. The statement is offered as likely, perhaps necessary, rather than as a demonstrated law about every person. It also rejects two reductions: natural talent is not sufficient, and written instruction alone does not manufacture the whole practitioner.

The later requirement of perceptive recognition supplies the practical dimension in detail (271d–272a). After learning kinds of souls and speeches, one must observe them in actual actions and keep pace with their manifestations. A pupil who cannot recognize the nature before him still has only the accounts once heard in lessons. Judgement of timeliness completes the transition from preparation to use.

Thamus' warning about unexercised memory (275a) therefore belongs to a larger pattern. An external aid can weaken an ability if reliance on it replaces its exercise. Yet the knowledgeable writer can store reminders for an old age of forgetfulness (276d). The criticism is of substituting possession of aids for cultivation of the capacity, not of every aid or every act of writing.

Places to Read

228a–e · Burnet pp. 2–3 Repeated listening, rehearsal and the refused practice audience.

260c–e · Burnet pp. 46–47 Practising public opinions without truth.

269d; 271d–272b · Burnet pp. 59, 62–63 Nature, knowledge and practice; learning to recognize actual cases.

273e–274a; 275a; 276d · Burnet pp. 65, 67, 69 The aim of practice, neglected memory and legitimate reminders.

In this edition

The edition's "having practised the opinions" at 260c keeps the direct object of μελετᾶν visible: the speaker has not thereby acquired knowledge of good and bad. "Want of practice of memory" at 275a translates ἀμελετησίᾳ with its genitive μνήμης. The causal claim is Thamus' within Socrates' narrated exchange.

Attested forms

μελέτην (269d · Burnet p. 59) — "practice". One ingredient alongside knowledge and natural rhetorical aptitude.

μελετῴη (228b · Burnet p. 2) — "practise". Socrates imagines why Phaedrus went outside the wall.

μεμελετηκὼς (260c · Burnet p. 46) — "having practised". The ignorant rhetorician has worked on the multitude's opinions.

ἀμελετησίᾳ (275a · Burnet p. 67) — "through want of practice". Thamus' explanation of the forgetfulness fostered by reliance on writing.

See also

Craft and expertise (p. 87); Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Memory and reminding (p. 123); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

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Rhetoric and soul-leading

ῥητορική, rhētorikē, "rhetoric; the craft of speaking"; ψυχαγωγία, psychagōgia, "leading of souls"

At a Glance

Rhetoric is enlarged from courtroom technique to the guidance of souls through speech. To make that guidance a craft requires truth, division of kinds, knowledge of the hearer and judgement of the occasion.

Meaning

Ῥητορική names the art or practice associated with the public speaker, the ῥήτωρ. Socrates asks whether, "taken as a whole", it is a craft and a certain ψυχαγωγία through speeches (261a). The compound joins soul and leading. Its local explanation is supplied by the inquiry itself: speeches act on souls and bring about persuasion. The definition does not say that every successful influence is good, or that every persuasion deserves the name of craft.

Use in the Phaedrus

Before this definition, rhetoric already belongs to Phaedrus' admiration for polished speech. Socrates says that he attended to Lysias' "rhetorical side", not thereby granting that the speaker had said what the subject required (234e–235a). In the first speech a rhetorician is the stronger counterpart of a person unable to speak (239a). Both uses treat rhetorical ability as a recognizable power without settling its worth.

Phaedrus initially knows rhetoric chiefly in lawsuits and public addresses (261b). Socrates extends the same inquiry to private meetings, small matters and great. Correct procedure is not less correct because its subject is humble. The dialogue's private exchange about love is therefore not outside rhetoric:

it is a case in which guidance, flattery, resistance and reconsideration can be watched directly.

The extension includes contradiction. A skilled speaker can make the same thing appear just and unjust to the same people, or good and bad to a city; the "Eleatic Palamedes" similarly makes things appear one and many, moving and at rest (261c–e). Socrates speaks conditionally of one craft "if indeed it exists". The next argument does not vindicate indiscriminate manipulation. It establishes that controlled passage through similarities, including exposure of another person's deception, needs knowledge of what things are.

The second positive account concerns the receiving soul (270b–272b). As medicine studies bodies before applying drugs or food, rhetoric must study the nature and powers of soul before applying speeches and lawful ways of life. Its teacher must distinguish kinds of souls and speeches and explain why a given sort is persuaded by a given sort. The repeated "so many", "such-and-such" is a programme for the knowledge required, not a completed classification delivered in the dialogue.

Theory must meet the individual standing before the speaker. The learner has to recognize in actual conduct the nature discussed in the lessons, choose the appropriate speech, and know when to speak or hold back. Only then is the craft complete. The final summary places teaching and persuasion under these same conditions (277b–c). Rhetoric, so reconstituted, is neither a packet of stylistic tricks nor mere sincerity: truth about the subject and knowledgeable adaptation to the hearer belong together.

Places to Read

234e–235a; 239a · Burnet pp. 11, 17 Rhetorical polish and rhetorical power before their examination.

259e–262c · Burnet pp. 45–49 Truth, soul-leading and the scope of contradiction.

270b–272b · Burnet pp. 60–63 Soul types, causal explanation and actual recognition.

273d–274a; 277b–c · Burnet pp. 65, 70 The long route and the final conditions of teaching and persuasion.

In this edition

"Leading of souls" preserves the compound ψυχαγωγία rather than replacing it with a modern psychological label. At 261a the Greek has τις, "a kind of"; at 271c Socrates recalls the power of speech as ψυχαγωγία. The note mentions another ancient use of the noun, calling up the dead, but the

present article rests on the dialogue's own account of speakers and hearers, not on that external comparison.

Attested forms

ῥητορικὴ (261a · Burnet p. 47) — "rhetoric". Socrates asks what rhetoric taken as a whole would be.

ψυχαγωγία (261a · Burnet p. 47) — "a kind of leading of souls". Qualified definition: ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων.

ψυχαγωγία (271c · Burnet p. 62) — "a leading of souls". The power of speech is recalled as soul-leading.

See also

Craft and expertise (p. 87); Dialectic and conversation (p. 92); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Nature, whole and part (p. 103); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30); Similarity and deception (p. 114)

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Similarity and deception

ὁμοιότης, homoiotēs, "similarity"; ἀπάτη, apatē, "deception"

At a Glance

Small resemblances can carry a hearer unnoticed towards an opposite. The same capacity to discriminate resemblance is needed to expose deception and to explain why an account seems likely.

Meaning

Ὁμοιότης is likeness or similarity; ἀνομοιότης is dissimilarity. The associated verb ὁμοιοῦν means to make or show things alike, depending on context. Ἀπάτη names deception, while ἀπατᾶν is to deceive. The rhetoric argument concerns discernible relations between things, not a claim that everything is really the same as everything else. Its scope is expressly limited to things capable of being likened and to the things to which they can be likened (261e).

Use in the Phaedrus

The dialogue has already made likeness important before turning it into a rhetorical problem. Socrates' first speech says friendship follows similarity in age and pleasures (240c). The palinode gives a likeness rather than a complete divine account of soul (246a), and describes embodied beauty and other

earthly appearances as images or similitudes of what was seen before embodiment (250a–d). Lovers also attempt to make the beloved resemble themselves and the god they honour (253a–c). These uses need not deceive: a likeness can disclose a relation while remaining less than its original.

At 261c–e Socrates considers speakers who make the same subject appear under opposed descriptions. The "Eleatic Palamedes" extends the example beyond politics to like and unlike, one and many, staying and moving. The proposed general craft is conditional. Its double capacity would include both making allowable likenesses and bringing another person's concealed manipulation to light.

The crucial contrast is between a large jump and a series of small transitions. Phaedrus agrees that deception is easier among things differing little. One who wishes to lead another astray without being misled himself must therefore know similarities and dissimilarities precisely (261e–262a). Socrates then argues that one cannot recognize a thing's similarities while ignorant of its truth. The conclusion is that an opinion-hunter's alleged craft is laughable and craftless (262c). The argument establishes a dependence on knowledge; it does not instruct the reader to make deception the goal of philosophical rhetoric.

The earlier speeches provide concrete examples of how someone who knows the truth might playfully lead hearers astray (262d). Socrates attributes their useful features to the local gods and cicadas and disclaims a share in speaking-craft. That self-presentation belongs to the drama and does not settle which details of either speech are true. The subsequent analysis isolates collection and division rather than canonizing the entire performance.

Tisias' alternative route through likelihood returns to the same relation (273d). What appears likely to the many owes its persuasive appearance to resemblance to truth, and the person who knows truth best discovers the resemblances. Finally, writing's likeness to painting shows an apparent life without the corresponding power to answer (275d). Similarity can reveal a limitation as well as obscure one.

Places to Read

240c; 246a; 250a–d; 253a–c · Burnet pp. 19, 27, 32–33, 36
Friendship, soul's likeness, earthly images and divine imitation.

261c–262d · Burnet pp. 48–49 Opposites, gradual transitions and knowledge of likeness.

265b–266b · Burnet pp. 53–54 The speeches' provisional truth and analysis by division.

273d; 275d–276a · Burnet pp. 65, 68 Likelihood and truth; written speech as an image.

In this edition

At 262b the English "this experience has flowed in through certain similarities" follows the passive situation of those deceived; the victims are not thereby described as expert manipulators. At 262d the note reports uncertainty about which "two speeches" the dual denotes. The article does not make a disputed identification carry the argument.

Attested forms

ὁμοιότητα (262a · Burnet p. 48) — "similarity". Knowledge of similarity and dissimilarity is required of the controlled deceiver.

ὁμοιότητα (273d · Burnet p. 65) — "similarity". Likelihood arises in the many through similarity to truth.

ἀπάτη (261e · Burnet p. 48) — "deception". Asked whether deception occurs more with small or great differences.

See also

Beauty (p. 42); Form, collection and division (p. 94); Likelihood and the plausible (p. 99); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Truth (p. 116)

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Truth

ἀλήθεια, alētheia, "truth"; ἀληθής, alēthēs, "true"

At a Glance

Truth is not introduced only as rhetoric's opponent. It is the measure by which speeches, likenesses, apparent knowledge and the claimed independence of likelihood are judged.

Meaning

Ἀλήθεια names truth; the adjective ἀληθής, "true", often appears substantivally as τὸ ἀληθές, "the truth" or "what is true". The dialogue asks both whether a statement is true and whether a speaker knows how the thing spoken of actually stands. Expressions such as "in truth" or "truly" can also intensify an ordinary assertion. Their presence does not by itself refer to the heavenly reality of the palinode.

Use in the Phaedrus

The first speeches become unacceptable not just because they are unkind, but because they say nothing healthy or true while seeking esteem through deception (243a). Socrates begins his corrective speech with Stesichorus' formula "Not true is this account" (244a). He then asks to apprehend the truth about the nature of soul before demonstrating the benefit of divine love (245c). At the summit of the myth he says one must dare to speak truth especially when speaking about truth (247c). The "plain of truth" supplies nourishment for the soul's best part (248b–c). These uses connect truthful discourse with what the soul seeks to know and become.

The rhetoric discussion begins with a direct challenge. Socrates asks whether the speaker must know the truth; Phaedrus reports that an orator need learn only what will seem just, good or beautiful to the judging multitude (259e–260a). This is reported teaching, not Phaedrus' final conclusion. The imagined praise of an ass as a horse shows the practical danger of shared ignorance, and the city persuaded to do bad instead of good gives the comic example its serious application (260b–d).

Truth also enters the mechanics of deception. To move another unnoticed from something to its opposite by small similarities, and not be deceived oneself, one must distinguish what each thing is (261e–262c). Socrates therefore argues against the alleged art on its own ground: even controlled misleading cannot be competently detached from knowledge. This does not make deceit the final aim of the art. The later account requires knowledge of souls and ultimately directs effort towards what pleases good divine masters (273e–274a).

Likelihood is not simply thrown away. Socrates' answer to Tisias is that what appears likely to the many arises through resemblance to truth, and that the knower of truth best finds such resemblances (273d). Nor is the narrative origin of a claim a substitute for truth. When Phaedrus remarks on Socrates' ability to invent Egyptian stories, Socrates asks whether the important question is who speaks and where he comes from, or whether what is said is so (275b–c).

The closing test of an author is accordingly conditional: if he wrote knowing the truth, can defend his account and can show his written product to be of lesser worth than what he can say, his proper title comes from that serious pursuit (278c–d). Truth is inseparable here from accountability, not merely from confident assertion.

Places to Read

243a–245c · Burnet pp. 23–26 The false account is corrected; truth about soul is required.

247c–249b · Burnet pp. 29–31 True being, nourishment and the plain of truth.

259e–262c · Burnet pp. 45–49 Truth against opinion-only rhetoric and as a condition of recognizing likeness.

273d; 275b–c · Burnet pp. 65, 67 Likelihood's dependence; truth rather than a tale's provenance.

277b–c; 278c–d · Burnet pp. 70, 72 Knowledge of truth in the final account of speech and authorship.

In this edition

The translation alternates "truth", "the truth", "true" and "truly" according to construction. At 275a Thamus contrasts the seeming of wisdom with its truth; the sentence does not say that written marks can never contain a true assertion. Socrates' own description of the palinode at 265b allows both contact with something true and departure elsewhere, an important qualification on treating every detail of the myth as a literal account.

Attested forms

ἀληθείας (260e · Burnet p. 47) — "truth". A genuine craft of speaking requires laying hold of truth.

ἀλήθειαν (262c · Burnet p. 49) — "truth". Contrasted with hunting opinions.

τὸ ἀληθὲς (259e · Burnet p. 45) — "the truth". The speaker's mind must know the truth about its subject.

ἀληθῆ (275b · Burnet p. 67) — "true". The ancient hearers would accept oak or rock if it spoke true.

See also

Being and reality (p. 45); Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Likelihood and the plausible (p. 99); Opinion and seeming (p. 105); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Similarity and deception (p. 114)

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Writing, teaching and memory

Drug, remedy and enchantment

φάρμακον, pharmakon, "drug; remedy; charm"; καταφαρμακεύω, katapharmakeuō, "drug; treat by a drug or charm"

At a Glance

The book is first a drug that draws Socrates outside; writing is later offered as a drug of wisdom and memory. What a drug actually does must be judged, not inferred from its inventor's praise.

Meaning

Φάρμακον can name a drug, remedy or charm, and its effects can be beneficial or harmful according to the substance and its use. In the Phaedrus the word passes between comic attraction, literal medical treatment and the contested benefit of writing. It should not be flattened into "poison" at every occurrence or assumed to mean a guaranteed cure. The neighbouring proper name Pharmaceia belongs to the earlier myth of Oreithyia; its lexical resonance is not a claim that that myth explains the later writing argument.

Use in the Phaedrus

Socrates says that Phaedrus has discovered the drug for his departure from the city (230d). Holding out written speeches resembles leading hungry animals with a branch or fruit. The immediate effect is attractive and directive: the book draws the lover of learning to the countryside. Socrates' following is enthusiastic, but the image shows that the hearer's appetite can be guided by another person.

After the first speech, Socrates says the offending account came through his mouth "drugged" by Phaedrus (242e). This accompanies his attribution of the earlier speech to Phaedrus and his demand for purification. The dramatic blame is not an account of literal poisoning. It marks the power of the shared speech-making situation and leaves Socrates undertaking the correction rather than merely excusing himself.

The medical comparison gives the term a concrete disciplinary setting. Someone who has encountered little drugs or read about bodily effects can imagine himself a doctor while ignorant of the craft (268c). Genuine medicine must study bodily nature before applying drugs and food to produce health and strength; rhetoric has an analogous obligation towards the soul (270b). Possessing an active agent is distinct from knowing how and to whom it should be applied.

Theuth then announces letters as a drug of memory and wisdom (274e). Thamus, the evaluator rather than the inventor, separates that intended benefit from the effect he predicts. The art will produce forgetfulness through lack of practice and supply the appearance rather than truth of wisdom. Yet his correction still calls writing a drug: one of reminding, not memory (275a). The word survives because the question is what use and effect it has, not whether it belongs in a simple good-or-bad class.

Socrates' later permission to store written reminders makes this narrower benefit intelligible. A knowledgeable user can take pleasure in the written garden without entrusting serious cultivation to it alone. The repeated drug vocabulary thus invites scrutiny of agency, recipient, use and outcome across the dialogue; it does not itself establish a universal theory of language as poison or cure.

Places to Read

229c; 230d · Burnet pp. 4, 6 Pharmaceia in the myth; written speech as Socrates' attractive drug.

242e–243a · Burnet pp. 22–23 The drugged mouth and the correction of an unhealthy account.

268c; 270b · Burnet pp. 58, 60 Little drugs without medicine; nature-guided treatment.

274e–276d · Burnet pp. 67–69 Theuth's claim, Thamus' correction and the use of reminders.

In this edition

The edition deliberately uses "drug" at 230d and 274e–275a, and "drugged" at 242e. "Remedy" and "poison" explain the word's possible range, not two separately asserted effects in every local passage. At 270b drugs and food are applied to the body, while speeches and lawful ways of life are applied to the soul; the analogy must not exchange their grammatical recipients.

Attested forms

φάρμακον (230d · Burnet p. 6) — "drug". The written speeches attract Socrates out of town.

φάρμακα (270b · Burnet p. 60) — "drugs". Medicine applies drugs and nourishment to body.

φάρμακον (274e · Burnet p. 67) — "drug". Theuth's description of letters, subsequently revised by Thamus.

καταφαρμακευθέντος (242e · Burnet p. 22) — "drugged". Socrates describes his mouth as drugged by Phaedrus.

See also

Craft and expertise (p. 87); Memory and reminding (p. 123); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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Living speech and defence

ζῶν καὶ ἔμψυχος λόγος, zōn kai empsychos logos, "living and ensouled speech (phrase)"; βοηθέω, boētheō, "help; come to a defence"; ἀνάκρισις, anakrisis, "questioning; examination"

At a Glance

The living account is one possessed with knowledge and able to answer for itself. Its contrast with writing also excludes unexamined oral recitation: mere sound is not life.

Meaning

The phrase "living and ensouled" identifies a λόγος whose knowledge-bearing activity belongs to a soul, not a claim that ink marks literally become an animal. Βοηθεῖν is to help or come to someone's aid; in these passages it includes defending an account when it is challenged. Ἀμύνειν likewise names defence. Ἀνάκρισις is questioning or examination, the activity missing from a performance that seeks persuasion without teaching.

Use in the Phaedrus

Socrates has already compared a well-composed speech to an animal with an organized body (264c). That image concerns the fit of a speech's parts. The later comparison with painting asks a different question: can the apparent life respond? Painted creatures stand as if alive yet remain solemnly silent when questioned. Written accounts appear intelligent but signify the same thing each time a learner asks what they mean (275d).

The written speech then leaves its author's control. It moves among appropriate and inappropriate readers without knowing the difference and cannot defend itself from unjust ill-treatment (275e). Its need for a father is part of the dialogue's recurrent image of speeches as offspring; earlier Lysias was called the father of the offending speech (257b). The account's

vulnerability is not proof that all criticism of writing is justified: Socrates expressly imagines an unjust attack.

The legitimate brother of written speech is the account written with knowledge in a learner's soul (276a). It can defend itself and knows to whom it should speak and before whom it should remain silent. Phaedrus calls this the knower's living and ensouled speech and the written one its image. The superiority thus combines understanding, answerability and judgement of recipients. It is not merely spontaneity or a speaker's physical presence.

In the planting image, knowledgeable speeches can help both themselves and the one who planted them (276e–277a). Their seed grows in other characters. The teacher does not preserve a single inflexible wording so much as produce understanding capable of further speech and defence. The image of continuing seed concerns transmissible life of accounts; it is not a new version of the proof that soul is immortal by self-motion.

At 277e–278a the distinction explicitly reaches oral performances. Speeches recited as rhapsodes recite, without questioning and teaching, are not made worthy of great earnestness simply by being spoken. The serious account is taught and spoken for learning, truly written in soul, and concerns just, beautiful and good things.

The final authorial test is conditional and practical (278c). If someone wrote knowing the truth and can support the writing in refutation, while showing through his own speech that the written things are paltry in comparison, he deserves a title based on that deeper pursuit. "Paltry" here need not mean false or useless: it marks the written product's lesser worth beside the resources the author can bring to its defence.

Places to Read

257b; 264c · Burnet pp. 41, 52 Speech's father and its organized body.

275d–276a · Burnet p. 68 Painting, indiscriminate circulation and the living brother.

276e–277a · Burnet p. 70 Accounts help themselves and their planter and carry seed onward.

277e–278d · Burnet pp. 71–72 Questioning and teaching; the author's resources under refutation.

In this edition

The phrase "living and ensouled" is Phaedrus' formulation at 276a, accepted by Socrates. The edition renders βοηθεῖν as "help", but the surrounding refutation at 278c makes its defensive role explicit. The written

work's "paltriness" is comparative in the final test; no claim that true writing is worthless is added.

Attested forms

ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον (276a · Burnet p. 68) — "living and ensouled". Phaedrus identifies the knowledgeable account in the learner's soul.

βοηθῆσαι (275e · Burnet p. 68) — "help". Written speech cannot help itself.

βοηθεῖν (278c · Burnet p. 72) — "help". The knowledgeable author can defend what he wrote under refutation.

ἀνακρίσεως (277e · Burnet p. 71) — "questioning". Recitation without questioning and teaching lacks the serious condition.

See also

Dialectic and conversation (p. 92); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127); Wisdom and the names of a writer (p. 130); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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Memory and reminding

μνήμη, mnēmē, "memory"; ὑπόμνησις, hypomnēsis, "reminding"; ὑπόμνημα, hypomnēma, "reminder; thing that prompts memory"

At a Glance

Writing can prompt someone who knows, but prompting is not the same as teaching knowledge. The distinction is about the use and possessor of the reminder, not an absolute rule that external reminders are bad.

Meaning

Μνήμη is memory, while ὑπόμνησις is reminding and ὑπόμνημα a reminder. The related verbs describe remembering, recalling something to oneself or bringing it to someone's attention. The dialogue does not enforce a single rigid taxonomy across every occurrence. In particular, ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι, the verb associated with recollection in the palinode, also describes the externally prompted recollecting criticized by Thamus (275a).

The central local distinction is therefore functional: retaining and exercising knowledge within oneself differs from relying on marks to prompt an appearance of knowledge that one has not learned.

Use in the Phaedrus

The opening scene is a comedy of memory. Phaedrus wants to reproduce Lysias' composition worthily, and Socrates imagines repeated hearing and reading until he knows it by heart (228a–b). Phaedrus then says he did not learn the precise expressions but can summarize the thought (228d). The book interrupts the proposed memory performance. Socrates himself later claims to have forgotten the sources from which he was filled, though he feels able to make a rival speech (235c–d). These local claims concern remembered words, ideas and sources, not necessarily the recollection of pre-embodied reality.

The palinode gives memory a deeper setting: the philosophical soul remains near the realities it once saw, as far as it can, by memory and right use of reminders (249c). The charioteer's memory carries him back to beauty with temperance when he sees the beloved (254b). That important account is treated under Recollection; its positive reminders prevent the later criticism of writing from making every ὑπόμνημα intrinsically inferior or corrupting.

Reminding is also an ordinary pedagogical service. The handbook recapitulation reminds listeners in summary of what has been said (267d). Phaedrus asks Socrates to remind him of the requirements for craft after the seed analogy (277b). These requests are part of an inquiry, not proof that inquiry has failed.

Theuth calls letters a drug of memory and wisdom; Thamus replies that they are a drug of reminding, not memory (274e–275a). His reason is that trust in outside marks belonging to others will leave memory unpractised. He contrasts recollecting from outside with doing so from within, oneself by oneself. The same recollecting verb occurs on both sides of the contrast.

Socrates' qualified permission for writing gives the distinction its practical shape. Written accounts can remind the person who knows of their subject (275c–d). The writer may store reminders against the possibility of an old age of forgetfulness and for anyone following the same path (276d). This leaves writing a real benefit while denying that possession of a reminder supplies the learning and defensible understanding it presupposes.

Places to Read

228a–d; 235c–d · Burnet pp. 2–3, 12 Memorized wording, summarized thought and forgotten sources.

249c; 254b · Burnet pp. 31, 37 Philosophical memory and the charioteer's recovery of beauty.

267d; 274e–275d · Burnet pp. 57, 67–68 Recapitulation and the distinction made by Thamus.

276d; 277b–278a · Burnet pp. 69–71 Reminders for old age and fellow seekers; reminders for those who know.

In this edition

The edition's "recollect" at 275a preserves the same verbal family as the palinode's recollection. Its note explicitly points to that relation. "Reminding" at 275a belongs to Thamus' corrective phrase, while "reminders" at 249c and 276d have positive uses. No exclusive rule equating reminding with external falsehood is supported by these passages.

Attested forms

μνήμης (275a · Burnet p. 67) — "of memory". Memory is weakened through lack of its exercise in Thamus' account.

ὑπομνήσεως (275a · Burnet p. 67) — "of reminding". Thamus revises Theuth's claim for the drug.

ὑπομνήματα (276d · Burnet p. 69) — "reminders". A knowledgeable writer stores them for himself and fellow seekers.

See also

Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Practice and training (p. 110); Recollection (p. 76); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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Play and earnestness

παιδιά, paidia, "play"; παίζω, paizō, "play"; σπουδή, spoudē, "earnestness; seriousness"

At a Glance

Play can be beautiful and instructive; earnestness can be misplaced. The dialogue's final priority is serious cultivation of understanding, not the abolition of pleasurable speech-making.

Meaning

Παιδιά is play, and παίζειν to play or sport. Σπουδή is earnest application or seriousness, with σπουδάζειν its verb. The opposition is not identical to true versus false or valuable versus worthless. A playful speech may disclose a

useful procedure, while someone can be earnestly mistaken about the object of his labour. The context determines the quality and degree of the play or seriousness.

Use in the Phaedrus

Phaedrus first presses the distinction after Socrates' extravagant response to Lysias (234d–e). When he asks whether this is how Socrates intends to play, Socrates counters by asking whether he seems to be playing rather than in earnest. Phaedrus then demands a truthful comparison. The exchange dramatizes how tone can leave a listener uncertain about the speaker's commitment. At 236b Socrates says Phaedrus is taking seriously his teasing of Lysias, Phaedrus' darling.

The ass-and-horse example shows that earnest persuasion does not secure truth (260b–c). A speaker can seriously commend the wrong creature to a friend. The humour prepares the more harmful case of a city persuaded to act badly. The question is what the earnest speaker knows and produces, not merely how sincere he is.

In the methodological retrospective Socrates calls the palinode a mythic hymn played moderately to Love, perhaps touching something true and perhaps straying elsewhere (265b–c). Much of the earlier performance has been play, but collection and division can be extracted from it as procedures worth grasping by craft. Play can therefore be a medium of inquiry, provided its claims and examples are examined rather than immunized from criticism by their charm.

The farming comparison sets different times and purposes beside each other (276b). A sensible farmer may grow quickly flourishing gardens of Adonis for play and festival, but does not treat that as the serious cultivation of seeds he wants to bear fruit. The knowledgeable person similarly writes gardens in letters for play and reminders. Phaedrus calls this beautiful play compared with ordinary diversions; Socrates agrees but calls dialectical planting in a fitting soul a still more beautiful earnestness (276d–e). The comparison ranks goods rather than reducing the lower member to nothing.

The final account reserves great seriousness for learning and defensible knowledge of just, beautiful and good things (277e–278a). Even oral performances without questioning and teaching fall short. Socrates nevertheless closes by saying that the matter of speeches has been played moderately by the two of them (278b). This self-description keeps the conversation's aspiration and its limits together: it has articulated a serious standard while remaining a particular performance that readers and hearers must continue to test.

Places to Read

234d–e; 236b · Burnet pp. 11, 13 Playful praise, teasing and Phaedrus' insistence on seriousness.

260b–c; 265b–d · Burnet pp. 46, 53–54 Earnest error and instructive play.

276b–277a · Burnet pp. 69–70 Festival gardens, literary play and serious dialectical planting.

277e–278b · Burnet pp. 71–72 The standard of great earnestness and the dialogue's moderate play.

In this edition

The edition retains the verbal repetition in "played in play" at 265c. At 276d it translates the pleasures of writing positively, including the writer's delight in the tender growth of his gardens. "Earnestness" is thus not a warrant for removing the passage's acknowledged beauty and pleasure.

Attested forms

παιδιᾷ (265c · Burnet p. 54) — "in play". Socrates characterizes much of the preceding performance.

παίζειν (234d · Burnet p. 11) — "play". Phaedrus questions whether Socrates' praise is playful.

σπουδὴ (276e · Burnet p. 70) — "earnestness". Dialectical planting is a more beautiful seriousness than literary play.

See also

Dialectic and conversation (p. 92); Leisure and walking (p. 139); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127); Truth (p. 116); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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Sowing, gardens and seeds

σπέρμα, sperma, "seed"; σπείρω, speirō, "sow"; κῆπος, kēpos, "garden"

At a Glance

The final agricultural image distinguishes quick beautiful display from patient, fruitful teaching. Written gardens can preserve reminders; serious sowing grows answerable accounts in other souls.

Meaning

Σπέρμα is seed; σπείρειν to sow; φυτεύειν to plant; κῆπος a garden. Fruit, growth, ripeness and fitting ground give the metaphor its structure. It is not enough for a seed to spring up quickly or look beautiful: the purpose for which it was planted and its capacity to bear further seed matter. The dialogue applies these concrete differences to writing and teaching.

Use in the Phaedrus

Agricultural and nourishing images have already crossed the speeches. The book leads Socrates like fruit held before a hungry animal (230d). The first speech's possessive lover wants the beloved to remain without family or household so that he can reap his own sweetness for as long as possible (240a). In the palinode wings grow through nourishment, and the uninitiated lover attempts to "sow children" in the pursuit of bodily pleasure (250e). Those uses retain their own ethical and narrative settings; not every growth image names philosophical instruction.

At 260c–d rhetoric that has persuaded an ignorant city to do bad rather than good is asked what fruit it will reap from what it sowed. The crop is the consequence of a persuasive practice, not a neutral ornament. This prepares the later demand that the teacher know what sort of nature receives his speech.

The full comparison begins with a sensible farmer (276b–c). Would he seriously sow cherished seeds in gardens of Adonis in summer and rejoice in eight-day beauty, or reserve that activity for play and festival while using the farming craft for the crop that matures in the eighth month? The hypothetical contrasts uses, not a universal ban on festival planting. The same farmer can engage in both with different purposes.

A knower of just, beautiful and good things should not be less sensible about his seeds. He will not entrust them in earnest to black water, sowing through a reed pen with speeches unable to defend themselves or teach truth sufficiently (276c). He may write gardens in letters as play, treasuring reminders for his own possible forgetfulness and for fellow seekers (276d). The garden is not said to lack all benefit; it lacks the self-sufficient fruitfulness required of serious teaching.

The better sowing is dialectical (276e–277a). A fitting soul is selected; speeches are planted with knowledge; they can aid themselves and the planter; and they have seed from which other accounts grow in other characters. Their capacity to render this immortal describes the continuing propagation of understanding. It should not be substituted for the distinct proof of soul's immortality at 245c–e. The final human outcome is

happiness to the highest extent possible for a human being, retaining the explicit limit.

The metaphor thus joins three requirements: knowledgeable cultivation, appropriate ground and generative result. A teacher cannot infer successful cultivation simply from a polished text, a delighted audience or immediate verbal reproduction.

Places to Read

230d; 240a; 250e–251b · Burnet pp. 6, 18, 33 Fruit as attraction, the lover's harvest and bodily or wing growth.

260c–d · Burnet p. 46 Bad rhetoric's harvest from its sowing.

276b–e · Burnet p. 69 Adonis gardens, serious farming and reminders in ink.

276e–277a · Burnet p. 70 Dialectical planting and further seed in other characters.

In this edition

The English retains "black water" and "reed pen" at 276c. Its note identifies the water as ink; the image is not a claim that the writer literally plants seeds in an ordinary stream. At 277a the plural accounts growing in other characters are the continuation of the knowledgeable planting, not a promise that every reader of a text will automatically be transformed.

Attested forms

σπερμάτων (276b · Burnet p. 69) — "seeds". The sensible farmer wants the seeds he cares for to bear fruit.

σπέρμα (277a · Burnet p. 70) — "seed". Knowledgeable speeches carry seed for further growth in others.

σπείρῃ (276e · Burnet p. 70) — "sows". The dialectician plants accounts with knowledge in a fitting soul.

κήπους (276b · Burnet p. 69) — "gardens". The gardens of Adonis are contrasted with serious cultivation.

See also

Dialectic and conversation (p. 92); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Nourishment (p. 69); Play and earnestness (p. 125); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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σοφός, sophos, "wise; skilled"; δοξόσοφος, doxosophos, "wise in seeming"; ἐπωνυμία, epōnymia, "title; appellation"

At a Glance

The final name depends on the author's serious resources, not simply the object he produces. "Wise" is reserved there for a god; a human who can defend and surpass his writing receives a more fitting, aspirational name.

Meaning

Σοφός can mean wise or skilled, and *σοφία* wisdom or expertise. The dialogue uses these words admiringly, playfully and sometimes with a challenge to the claimed standing. The ending does not retroactively turn every earlier occurrence into a literal declaration of divine wisdom. Ἐπωνυμία is a title or appellation: the name by which an activity or person is designated in view of a characteristic.

Δοξόσοφος combines seeming or opinion with wisdom. At 275b it names a discrepancy between appearing to know and possessing judgement. The term is stronger than the ordinary admission that a person holds an opinion.

Use in the Phaedrus

Socrates initially refers to the "wise" who rationalize myths, yet describes the required enterprise as laborious and not especially fortunate (229c–e). He can invoke Sappho, Anacreon and other wise predecessors when challenging Lysias' monopoly on fine speeches (235b–c), then disclaim having conceived the material himself. In the handbook catalogue the honorific becomes conspicuous: Evenus is wise, Prodicus most wise, and the teachers receive gifts like kings (266c–267b). The subsequent analogies reveal that such status need not establish mastery of the complete craft.

Thamus uses wisdom as the decisive test of writing's promise (274e–275b). Theuth says letters will make Egyptians wiser; the king says pupils will receive wisdom's seeming, not truth, and will become difficult companions because hearing much has not supplied teaching. The failure affects both self-assessment and relations with others.

At the end Socrates addresses three representative producers: Lysias and speech-composers, Homer and poets, Solon and law-writers (278b–c). The rule is not a factual verdict that all three have passed the test. If an author composed with knowledge of truth, can help the writing under refutation and can show by his own speech how much less the written product is worth, he should receive a name from what he seriously pursues.

Phaedrus asks for the name. Socrates finds "wise" too great for a human and becoming to a god alone; "lover of wisdom", or something of that sort, is more harmonious and more in tune (278d). The fuller account of philosophy belongs under Philosophy. Here the lexical point is the adjustment between a name and a person's actual, finite resources.

Conversely, someone with nothing more precious than what he has composed, repeatedly gluing and removing pieces, can rightly be called poet, speech-writer or law-writer (278d–e). The names are not universally dishonourable occupations. They name the limits of this person's serious possession. The judgement depends on the comparison between the product and the author's understanding, not on genre alone.

Places to Read

229c–e; 235b–c · Burnet pp. 4, 12 Wise rationalizers and remembered predecessors.

266c–267c · Burnet pp. 55–56 The honorifics of the technical catalogue.

274e–275b · Burnet p. 67 Wisdom promised, seeming wisdom produced.

278b–e · Burnet p. 72 Conditional message to authors and the fitting human title.

279c · Burnet p. 73 The prayer to regard the wise person as rich.

In this edition

The edition's "more in harmony" and "more in tune" at 278d retain the musical language of fitting a name. Its rendering "lover of wisdom" makes the human aspiration audible rather than treating "philosopher" as a professional credential. The reservation concerning "wise" is Socrates' closing judgement about naming here, not a rule the narrator applies mechanically to every earlier compliment.

Attested forms

σοφόν (278d · Burnet p. 72) — "wise". Socrates regards this name as great and becoming to a god alone.

σοφὸς (267a · Burnet p. 56) — "wise". Socrates calls Evenus wise in the playful catalogue of techniques.

δοξόσοφοι (275b · Burnet p. 67) — "wise in seeming". Thamus' description of pupils who have hearing without teaching.

ἐπωνυμίας (278d · Burnet p. 72) — "titles". Phaedrus asks what titles the defended writer should receive.

See also

Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Philosophy (p. 71); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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Writing and letters

γραφή, graphē, "writing"; γράμματα, grammata, "letters; written characters"; σύγγραμμα, syngramma, "written composition"

At a Glance

Writing is not shameful in itself. The danger is to mistake an unresponsive written composition for a clear, secure and self-sufficient possession of knowledge.

Meaning

Γράφειν is to write or inscribe; γραφή the writing or written representation; γράμματα the characters or letters and, by extension, written learning. Σύγγραμμα is a composed written work. The word-family can extend to painting, ζωγραφία, and Socrates uses that kinship in an analogy: visible marks can stand as if alive without answering the questions put to them.

The dialogue also speaks of writing with knowledge in a learner's soul. That metaphor shows that the contrast is not exhausted by the physical presence or absence of letters. What matters is whether the account can be understood, questioned, appropriately used and defended.

Use in the Phaedrus

Writing is present before it becomes the subject of discussion. Lysias' speech lies under Phaedrus' cloak, and Socrates says that with the book present Lysias is present too (228d–e). The text is read, admired, challenged, reread at its beginning and compared with other speeches. Its stable wording makes examination possible, even though the author is absent.

Phaedrus later reports that a politician reproached Lysias as a speech-writer (257c). Socrates answers that politicians themselves love writing and record their public approval. A ruler or speaker capable of becoming an immortal speech-writer could take himself to be godlike; the claim is framed as a possibility, not a report that every lawgiver has achieved it (258b–c). The explicit conclusion is that writing speeches is not itself shameful. Speaking

and writing badly are shameful; the inquiry must ask what makes them well done (258d).

The Egyptian story examines writing's promised benefit (274c–275b). Theuth presents it as a discovery that will make Egyptians wiser and better at remembering. Thamus replies that inventing an art and judging its effects are different abilities. Trust in external marks will encourage neglect of memory, and extensive hearing without teaching will create the seeming of wisdom. These are distinct voices in Socrates' story: the inventor's claim must not be quoted as the dialogue's unchallenged conclusion.

Socrates develops the limitation through painting (275d–e). A written speech appears to answer intelligently, but when questioned about its meaning it signifies the same thing again. Once released it rolls everywhere, unable to discriminate between apt and unsuitable readers. If attacked unjustly, it needs its father's help. The problem is responsiveness and agency; the passage does not say that every sentence in a book is false or unreadable.

Writing nevertheless retains an honourable, limited use. The knowledgeable person may plant gardens in letters as play, storing reminders for himself and for those following the same track (276d). The more serious planting occurs through dialectical instruction in a fitting soul. The final judgement extends to public laws and private compositions alike: blame falls on the author who credits his written product with great firmness and clarity while lacking knowledge of just and good things. An author able to defend what he wrote and show the written product's lesser worth is to receive a title from his deeper pursuit, not merely from writing (277d–278e).

The dialogue's own written existence sharpens these distinctions but does not require a prohibition on reading it. Its enacted rereading, questioning and self-correction give a reader examples of how a text can become material for examination rather than a substitute for it.

Places to Read

228a–230e · Burnet pp. 2–6 The book, the absent author and the attraction of written speeches.

257c–259e · Burnet pp. 42–45 Speech-writing, laws and the question of writing well.

274b–275c · Burnet pp. 66–67 Theuth's invention and Thamus' judgement.

275c–276e · Burnet pp. 68–69 Painting, helpless circulation and reminders in letters.

277d–278e · Burnet pp. 71–72 False security in written works and the author's living resources.

In this edition

The English distinguishes "writing", "letters" and "written work" in the displayed uses. At 276c the two occurrences of *ἀδυνάτων* refer to the speeches as unable to help themselves and teach truth sufficiently; the note records a reading that makes the writer unable, but that is not the continuous text translated here. At 274d the exact relation between Thamus and Ammon is uncertain in the note; this entry calls Thamus the judging king without silently settling that identification.

Attested forms

γραφῆς (274b · Burnet p. 66) — "writing". The question turns to the becomingness and unbecomingness of writing.

γραφή (275d · Burnet p. 68) — "writing". Writing is compared to painting.

γράμματα (274d · Burnet p. 66) — "letters". One of Theuth's inventions.

γράμμασι (275c · Burnet p. 68) — "letters". Mistaken belief that a craft can be left behind in letters.

σύγγραμμα (258a · Burnet p. 43) — "written work". A politician's decree is treated as a written speech.

See also

Drug, remedy and enchantment (p. 119); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Memory and reminding (p. 123); Play and earnestness (p. 125); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127); Wisdom and the names of a writer (p. 130)

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Drama, landscape and people

Cicadas and Muses

τέττιξ, tettix, "Cicada"; Μοῦσα, Mousa, "Muse"; Καλλιόπη, Kalliopē, "Calliope"; Οὐρανία, Ourania, "Urania"; Τερψιχόρα, Terpsichora, "Terpsichore"; Ἐρατώ, Eratō, "Erato"; Σειρήν, Seirēn, "Siren"; γέρας, geras, "Privilege"

At a Glance

The cicadas turn the pleasant riverside sound into a test of attention. Their story asks whether Socrates and Phaedrus will surrender to sleepy pleasure or honour the Muses by continuing their inquiry (258e–259d).

Meaning

Tettix is a cicada, the clear-sounding summer insect first heard in the setting's chorus. Mousa is a Muse, a divine source or patron of song and cultivated activity. The dialogue does not restrict mousikē, the Muses' activity, to music in the narrow modern sense: philosophy and divine and human speeches also fall within its scope.

Geras is an honour or privilege. The cicadas' privilege includes singing without nourishment and reporting human honours to the appropriate Muse. Their apparently decorative presence can therefore become an intermediary relation between mortal conversation and divine recognition.

Use in the Phaedrus

Socrates first praises the riverside's breeziness, which echoes the summery clear chorus of cicadas (230c). The sound belongs to the same attractive environment as shade, water and soft grass. After the speeches on love, when the companions turn toward the question of good speaking and writing, the midday singers return with a new function (258e).

The Muses are also invoked before the first speech: Socrates asks them to take hold of his tale with him, playing on their clear-voiced epithet and the name of the Ligurians (237a–b). That earlier invocation, uttered before a speech he later retracts, shows that invoking poetic help does not itself settle whether a speech speaks truly.

Phaedrus has just praised intellectual pleasures over bodily pleasures that require antecedent pain. Socrates imagines the cicadas watching the pair. If they see them nodding in idleness of mind, they may laugh at them as slaves or little sheep sleeping beside the spring. If instead they see them conversing and sailing past like men passing Sirens, unenchanted, they may bestow their

divine privilege (259a–b). The alternatives concern what the listeners do with pleasure, not whether the setting ceases to be pleasant.

The explanatory tale is introduced as something said. Before the Muses came to be, the cicadas were human beings. When song appeared, some were so overcome with pleasure that they neglected food and drink and died without noticing. Their descendants received the ability to sing from birth without needing nourishment until death, then go to the Muses and report who honours whom (259b–c). The transformation makes their earlier fatal absorption into their distinctive service.

The reports distinguish forms of activity. Dancers are reported to Terpsichore, lovers to Erato; the other Muses receive corresponding honours. Calliope, the eldest, and Urania after her hear of those living in philosophy and honouring their music. These two are especially concerned with heaven and with divine and human speeches and send forth the most beautiful voice (259c–d). The narrative places philosophical conversation within, rather than outside, the Muses' world.

This recalls the earlier account of poetic possession. The Muses seize a tender and untrodden soul, awaken it into song and educate later people through ancient deeds (245a). Yet the cicada scene asks for wakeful inquiry rather than passive absorption alone. Socrates' conclusion is practical and immediate: for many reasons they must speak, not sleep at midday. Their ensuing investigation of truth and rhetorical craft is itself the chosen way of honouring the scene's divine audience.

Places to Read

230b–c · Burnet p. 5 The cicada chorus within the attractive riverside setting.

237a–b · Burnet p. 14 The Muses invoked before the first speech, whose account of love is later corrected.

244e–245b · Burnet pp. 25–26 The Muses' possession and the inspired poet.

258e–259d · Burnet pp. 44–45 The complete cicada tale, its test of attention and allocation of honours.

278b–c · Burnet p. 72 The final description of the place as a stream and Muse-shrine of the Nymphs.

In this edition

The edition retains "music" for mousikē at 259d but states that its subject here is philosophical activity. At 259d "send forth" follows the corrected

reading printed in the Greek, while the apparatus records a reading meaning "go".

The tale begins "It is said", not "I saw". Its Siren comparison is explicit; it invites a way of listening and conversing rather than requiring the reader to identify cicadas literally with the mythical singers. The article confines itself to the supplied narrative rather than reconstructing an independent cult or natural history.

Attested forms

τεττίγων (230c · Burnet p. 5) — "cicadas".

τέττιγες (258e · Burnet p. 44) — "cicadas".

Μουσῶν (245a · Burnet p. 25) — "Muses".

Μούσας (259b · Burnet p. 44) — "Muses".

Καλλιόπῃ (259d · Burnet p. 45) — "Calliope".

Οὐρανίᾳ (259d · Burnet p. 45) — "Urania".

Τερψιχόρᾳ (259c · Burnet p. 45) — "Terpsichore".

Ἐρατοῖ (259d · Burnet p. 45) — "Erato".

Σειρῆνας (259a · Burnet p. 44) — "Sirens".

γέρας (259b · Burnet p. 44) — "privilege".

γέρας (259c · Burnet p. 44) — "privilege".

See also

Leisure and walking (p. 139); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Nourishment (p. 69); Philosophy (p. 71); Pleasure and pain (p. 33)

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Isocrates

Ἰσοκράτης, Isokratēs, "Isocrates"

At a Glance

Socrates' final message treats the young Isocrates as a promise, not an already completed philosopher. His hoped-for advance depends on what his nature and a more divine impulse may bring.

Meaning

Ἰσοκράτης is the personal name of the young man introduced only at the dialogue's close. The passage itself presents him as "still young", beautiful in Phaedrus' address, gifted in nature and nobler in character in Socrates' judgement. The edition's historical note identifies the later teacher of rhetoric and notes that the tone of the praise is disputed. This entry distinguishes that editorial context from what the dramatic speakers actually say.

Use in the Phaedrus

After Socrates charges Phaedrus to carry the message about writing and wisdom to Lysias, Phaedrus insists that Socrates' own companion must not be passed over (278e). He names "Isocrates the beautiful". The exchange mirrors the earlier attachment between Phaedrus and Lysias and places Socrates' judgement under the same conversational pressure: what should be said to the man close to him?

Socrates responds not with a report of achievements but with something he divines about a young man (278e–279a). He thinks Isocrates' natural gifts exceed the measure of Lysias' circle and that his character is blended more nobly. He then offers possibilities: it would not be surprising if, as he grows older, Isocrates should surpass previous practitioners in the speeches he now attempts; nor if those activities should cease to satisfy him and a more divine impulse lead him towards greater things. The conditional sequence matters. It is not a certificate that either development has already occurred.

The reason given is that some philosophy is present by nature in his mind (279a). This is a limited formulation, "a certain philosophy", tied to potential and direction. The ending has just required truth, defence and resources beyond written products for the fitting human name; the Isocrates passage does not explicitly report that the young man has passed those tests. It makes his possible growth a hopeful counterpart to the request that Lysias turn towards philosophy.

Socrates calls the message a report from the gods of the place and addresses Isocrates as his darling, as Phaedrus will address Lysias (279b). That symmetry keeps eros, speech and education connected in the final exchange. Whether the praise also carries irony cannot be decided merely by the words "beautiful" or "divine". The text supports attention to its playful frame and explicit qualifications; claims about Plato's eventual rivalry with a school require evidence beyond this dialogue.

The arrival of Isocrates does not begin a new treatise or give a retrospective biography. It tests how the standards just articulated might be

directed towards particular living persons, and leaves their future response open before the friends pray and depart.

Places to Read

257a–c · Burnet p. 41 Lysias is asked to turn towards philosophy: contextual contrast.

278b–e · Burnet p. 72 The criteria for naming an author and the message to Lysias.

278e–279b · Burnet p. 73 Isocrates named, his potential forecast and his possible larger pursuit.

In this edition

The translation retains "I think", "if" and "a certain philosophy", preserving the forecast's scope. "What I divine" renders the prophetic self-description of the judgement; it does not turn the subsequent possibilities into events already accomplished. The edition labels the dispute over sincere or ironic praise as interpretation, and this article leaves it so.

Attested forms

Ἰσοκράτη (278e · Burnet p. 73) — "Isocrates". Phaedrus asks what message Socrates will give him.

Ἰσοκράτει (279b · Burnet p. 73) — "to Isocrates". Socrates reports his judgement to Isocrates as to his darling.

See also

Lysias (p. 142); Philosophy (p. 71); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Wisdom and the names of a writer (p. 130)

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Leisure and walking

σχολή, scholē, "leisure; time available"; περίπατος, peripatos, "walk"; διατριβή, diatribē, "pastime; time spent in an occupation"

At a Glance

The walk supplies a place and time outside ordinary business, but leisure still has to be used well. The dialogue distinguishes freedom for inquiry from mere idleness.

Meaning

Scholē is available time, leisure, or the unhurried circumstances in which something can be done. A peripatos is a walk, and diatribē the spending of time in some occupation. The opening does not contrast serious thought with all recreation: the walk itself becomes the occasion of the inquiry.

The repeated motion words make the dialogue a physical itinerary as well as an argumentative one. Leading on, turning aside, crossing the stream, sitting, lying down, staying and finally departing mark decisions about when and where to speak.

Use in the Phaedrus

Phaedrus has been sitting with Lysias since early morning and, following Acumenus' advice, takes the roads rather than the running-tracks for a less tiring walk (227a). Socrates values hearing what occupied them above ordinary business. His extravagant willingness to follow as far as Megara makes the distance a measure of appetite for speeches, not a travel plan. Phaedrus in turn claims that Lysias composed at leisure over a long period, explaining why an amateur could not readily match him from memory (228a).

They turn down beside the Ilissus and choose a shaded place under a plane tree. Bare feet touch cold water; a chaste-tree supplies fragrance, the breeze and cicadas sound, and the grass slopes conveniently beneath a reclining head (229a–230c). Phaedrus acts as guide, while Socrates seems a stranger outside the town. Speeches in books are the lure that brought him out, as food draws hungry animals. The setting therefore joins bodily ease to intellectual desire without making either sufficient for good judgement.

The refusal of myth-rationalizing at 229e gives leisure a sharper meaning. Socrates has time for this long conversation but no time for an endless task that leaves knowing himself unattended. Availability is governed by a ranking of purposes. Later, when he tries to leave after the first speech, the midday heat and Phaedrus' proposal to discuss what was said hold him there; the divine sign then supplies a different and decisive reason not to cross the river (242a–c).

At 258e Socrates says they have leisure to examine speeches. The cicadas' story immediately tests what they will do with it. Sleeping through the heat would be mental idleness and a kind of servitude; awake conversation can honour the Muses. When the heat finally gentles at 279b, Phaedrus proposes departure. They pray and go together. The dialogue has filled the interval not merely with more speeches but with an examination of the desires, truth and teaching that make hearing speeches worthwhile.

Places to Read

227a–228b · Burnet pp. 1–2 Medical walking, leisure to listen and time to compose.

229a–230e · Burnet pp. 3–6 The riverside stopping-place and its attractions.

229e–230a · Burnet pp. 4–5 No leisure for an inquiry of lower priority.

241e–242c · Burnet pp. 21–22 Midday, the attempted crossing and the check.

258e–259d · Burnet pp. 44–45 Wakeful conversation against idleness.

279b–c · Burnet p. 73 The heat abates and the friends leave after prayer.

In this edition

"Pastime" at 227b is an occupation of time, not necessarily something trivial. The opening "above even business" is a poetic quotation in which ascholia is literally lack of leisure, as the edition explains. The closing verb for being on one's way repeats the ordinary motion family of Phaedrus' first answer, binding the walk's beginning and end.

Attested forms

σχολὴ (227b · Burnet p. 1) — "leisure". Phaedrus asks whether Socrates has time to listen.

σχολή (229e · Burnet p. 4) — "leisure". Socrates says he has none for rationalizing legends.

Σχολὴ (258e · Burnet p. 44) — "leisure". They have time to examine speaking and writing.

περίπατον (227a · Burnet p. 1) — "walk". Phaedrus is going outside the wall.

διατριβή (227b · Burnet p. 1) — "pastime". Socrates asks how Phaedrus spent the morning.

See also

Cicadas and Muses (p. 135); Phaedrus (p. 148); Pleasure and pain (p. 33); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74); Self-knowledge (p. 150); Socrates (p. 152)

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Lysias

Λυσίας, Lysias, "Lysias"

At a Glance

Lysias is physically absent but repeatedly made present by the book, Phaedrus' admiration and the scrutiny of his speech. His work becomes a test case, not merely a defeated rival.

Meaning

Lysias is introduced as son of Cephalus, staying with Epicrates near the Olympieion (227a–b). Within the dialogue he is a formidable composer admired by Phaedrus and an author of a speech urging a beautiful youth to prefer a non-lover. The supplied edition identifies him as a professional speech-writer; the action here concerns the particular work Phaedrus carries.

No direct conversation with Lysias occurs. We hear Phaedrus' estimates of him, Socrates' comments and the speech read aloud as his. The distinction between the historical person, his represented literary work and its imagined soliciting speaker remains useful throughout.

Use in the Phaedrus

His presence first enters through hearing and writing. Phaedrus has repeatedly listened to him, taken the book and studied desired passages (228a –b). When Socrates finds the book under the cloak, he says that Lysias himself is present and declines to let Phaedrus practise on him instead (228d –e). The person's availability through a written speech is thus staged long before writing's limitations are formally examined.

Phaedrus believes the speech has exhausted what can be said well on the topic; Socrates distinguishes rounded, carefully finished expressions from saying what the subject needs (234c–235b). He neither claims that every element is wrong nor promises an argument with no common material. A case for the non-lover necessarily praises sound judgement and censures folly. What can differ is both arrangement and the discovery of further material (235e–236a).

After the palinode Socrates prays that Love turn Lysias from this kind of speech toward philosophy, as his brother Polemarchus has turned, and thereby steady Phaedrus' own allegiance (257b). The prayer preserves a possibility of improvement. When Phaedrus fears Lysias may stop writing because a politician called him a speech-writer, Socrates exposes the politicians' own desire to leave writings and insists that writing is not itself shameful (257c–258d).

The actual criticism becomes more exact on rereading. Lysias begins from the petitioner's known circumstances and desired result without defining the disputed love; his sequence lacks a demonstrated necessity connecting its parts (262e–264e). These are examples from which an inquirer can profit without imitating them. At the end Lysias is one addressee of a general message to speech-writers, poets and lawgivers: an author who knows the truth and can defend and surpass his writings deserves a title drawn from that more serious occupation (278b–e). The dialogue ends with the message assigned, not with evidence that Lysias has accepted it.

Places to Read

227a–228e · Burnet pp. 1–3 Phaedrus' morning, the book and the author made present.

230e–234c · Burnet pp. 6–10 The represented speech.

234d–236a · Burnet pp. 11–13 Style, adequacy and a fair comparison.

257b–258d · Burnet pp. 41–43 The prayer for his conversion and defence of writing as such.

262e–265a · Burnet pp. 50–53 The criticism of beginning, definition and arrangement.

278b–279b · Burnet pp. 72–73 The final message and comparison with Isocrates.

In this edition

The edition notes that whether Plato reproduces an actual Lysian speech or composes one in his manner is disputed; the article does not resolve that question from the text alone. "Father of the speech" at 257b is Socrates' wording, and "darling" at 236b and 279b characterizes Phaedrus' attachment within their playful exchange.

Attested forms

Λυσίου (227a · Burnet p. 1) — "Lysias". Phaedrus has just left him.

Λυσίαν (257b · Burnet p. 41) — "Lysias". Socrates calls him the father of the speech and prays for his turn to philosophy.

See also

Definition and agreement (p. 90); Isocrates (p. 137); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Love and the lover (p. 28); Phaedrus (p. 148); Writing and letters (p. 132)

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μυθολόγημα, mythologēma, "legend; a story told"; μῦθος, mythos, "tale"; μυθικός, mythikos, "mythic"

At a Glance

Socrates declines an endless project of making legends plausible, yet repeatedly tells and examines tales. Their value is tested by what they disclose and how responsibly their claims are made.

Meaning

Mythologēma is a legend or narrated story; mythos here is a tale, including a deliberately constructed one; mythikos describes the palinode as mythic. These words do not create a simple opposition between story and reason. The first erotic speech is introduced as a tale, the second combines argument with likeness, and the later scrutiny can assess both.

At 229c–e the activity often called rationalization is described concretely: one substitutes a wind for the divine abductor and then brings each further marvel into line with the likely. Socrates' objection concerns the inexhaustible labour and the neglect of an inquiry he considers more urgent.

Use in the Phaedrus

The riverside invites local storytelling. Phaedrus asks whether this is the place where Boreas carried off Oreithyia and whether Socrates believes the legend. Socrates can supply an explanation in which a gust pushes the girl from rocks while she plays with Pharmaceia. But one correction would lead on to Centaurs, Chimaera, Gorgons, Pegasuses and an overwhelming crowd of strange natures (229b–e). To normalize each would require much leisure and a laborious wisdom he calls boorish. He lets the received account stand while turning to himself.

The sequel shows what this refusal does and does not mean. Socrates invokes the Muses to tell of a hidden lover (237a–b); he tells Stesichorus' recovery of sight to model his own recantation (243a–b); and after an argument for immortality he distinguishes a full divine narration of what soul is from the shorter human account of what it resembles (246a). The winged team is offered under that second, explicitly analogical undertaking. A tale can organize perception and inquiry without claiming to be an exhaustive description of its subject.

The cicadas' story redirects the men's leisure toward wakeful conversation (259a–d). The Egyptian story introduces a test of writing's powers (274c–275b). When Phaedrus jokes that Socrates can make stories from any

country, Socrates asks whether the decisive issue is who speaks and from where, or whether what is said is true (275b–c). This changes the listener's responsibility: neither a prestigious origin nor a suspicion about provenance replaces examination of the account.

Socrates' later description of his palinode is correspondingly measured. In making a likeness of erotic experience they may have touched something true and may also have been carried elsewhere; they mixed a not altogether unpersuasive speech and played a mythic hymn (265b–c). He then extracts the methodological powers of collection and division. The story is neither discarded as false nor allowed to excuse every claim from scrutiny; its fruitful articulation can be retained while its reach is acknowledged.

Places to Read

229b–230a · Burnet pp. 4–5 Boreas, naturalistic explanation, monstrous proliferation and self-inquiry.

237a–b; 243a–b · Burnet pp. 14–15, 23 Invented erotic tale and Stesichorus' corrective song.

246a–b · Burnet p. 27 What soul is contrasted with what it resembles.

258e–259d · Burnet pp. 44–45 The cicadas' story directs the conversation.

265b–266b · Burnet pp. 53–54 Mythic play and the method extracted from it.

274c–275c · Burnet pp. 66–67 The Egyptian story and truth rather than provenance.

In this edition

The edition uses "legend" for mythologēma, "tale" for mythos, and "mythic hymn" for mythikon hymnon. Its note calls the treatment of rationalizers mocking and labels that an interpretation. Here the sustained contrast is secured by Socrates' actual description of a proliferating task requiring much leisure and employing boorish wisdom, and by his stated priority of self-knowledge. The external stories named in the edition's notes have not been independently used as proof of their historical transmission.

Attested forms

μυθολόγημα (229c · Burnet p. 4) — "legend". Phaedrus asks whether the Boreas story is true.

μύθου (237a · Burnet p. 14) — "tale". Socrates invokes the Muses before his invented lover's speech.

μύθου (253c · Burnet p. 36) — “tale”. The palinode recalls its three-part likeness of soul.

μυθικόν (265b–c · Burnet p. 53) — “mythic”. Socrates describes the palinode as a mythic hymn.

See also

Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Cicadas and Muses (p. 135); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Play and earnestness (p. 125); Self-knowledge (p. 150); Truth (p. 116)

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Palinode and purification

παλινῳδία, palinōidia, “palinode; recanting song”; καθαρμός, katharmos, “purification”; ἀφοσιόομαι, aphosioomai, “make expiation; clear a religious obligation”

At a Glance

The second speech is not simply another attempt to win the contest. It is a corrective offering that acknowledges an offence, changes the account of Love and seeks restored favour.

Meaning

A palinode is a song sung back, hence a recantation. Socrates takes its name from the story he tells of Stesichorus’ correction of his account of Helen. Katharmos is a purification, and aphosiousthai the making of expiation required before Socrates can depart. The words give correction a religious as well as an argumentative setting.

The palinode does not assert that whatever was said first must be false in every application. The later division preserves the denunciation of a left-hand love while distinguishing divine love. What requires correction is the sweeping treatment of Love as bad, together with the speakers’ complacent display of wisdom.

Use in the Phaedrus

The usual sign stops Socrates as he is about to cross the river. He interprets his earlier unease as recognition that the speeches offended the divine: Love is Aphrodite’s son and a god or something divine, and so cannot simply be an evil (242b–e). At 243a he says he must purify himself and tells the old remedy for those who go wrong in legend-telling.

Stesichorus, in Socrates' account, lost his sight for speaking badly of Helen, recognized the cause and composed the poem denying that she sailed to Troy. After the full Palinode he recovered sight immediately. Socrates proposes to be wiser in one precise respect: he will give Love his corrective song before suffering a penalty. The three quoted lines are a model of retracting a false account, not a demonstration of every detail of the surrounding legend.

The change is embodied. He will uncover the head that was covered during the first speech. He imagines a noble, gentle lover whose experience would expose the speeches' shameless generalizations and proposes to rinse the salty hearing with drinkable speech (243b–d). Phaedrus is asked to provide the boy again so that the earlier advice will not be acted on unheard by its correction. A recantation therefore has a recipient and practical urgency: one must reach the person misled.

The speech opens by echoing Stesichorus' "Not true is the account". Its argumentative turn is exact: if madness were simply bad, the preference for the sane non-lover would follow; divine gifts show that premise is insufficient (244a). After the account of soul, beauty, remembrance and the lovers' lives, Socrates names the offering completed and discharged to Love (257a). He asks pardon, preservation of his erotic craft and a turn to philosophy for Lysias and Phaedrus. Correction aims beyond erasing guilt towards a changed practice of speaking and loving.

When the pair later analyze the speeches, the palinode becomes both a mythic hymn and an example of finding a distinct kind by division (265b–266b). Its religious purpose and methodological use are complementary: acknowledging a bad account produces the occasion to ask how its subject should have been divided and understood.

Places to Read

242b–243a · Burnet pp. 22–23 The sign, offence and necessity of purification.

243a–d · Burnet pp. 23–24 Stesichorus, uncovered speech and the rinsing image.

243e–245c · Burnet pp. 24–26 The boy must hear the correction; its initial argument.

257a–b · Burnet p. 41 The palinode discharged and Love petitioned.

265b–266b · Burnet pp. 53–54 Hymnic play and the distinction of two loves.

In this edition

The supplied edition identifies the Stesichorus quotation and explains "palinode" as a song sung back; this article uses the story as Socrates tells it here, not as an independently established historical report. At 257a the edition's "given" follows T against B's alternative, as its apparatus notes. The language of giving and discharging makes the offering an obligation fulfilled.

Attested forms

παλινῳδίαν (243b · Burnet p. 23) — "palinode". Socrates promises a corrective speech to Love.

παλινῳδία (257a · Burnet p. 41) — "palinode". The completed speech is given and discharged to the god.

καθαρμὸς (243a · Burnet p. 23) — "purification". The ancient remedy for offending in legend-telling.

ἀφοσιώσωμαι (242c · Burnet p. 22) — "I have made expiation". The voice will not permit departure before this.

See also

Form, collection and division (p. 94); Love and the lover (p. 28); Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Shame and shamelessness (p. 37); The daimonic sign (p. 155)

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Phaedrus

Φαῖδρος, Phaidros, "Phaedrus"

At a Glance

Phaedrus brings the book, chooses the place, elicits the speeches and gradually becomes a partner in judging them. His love of speech is the conversation's engine and one of its objects of education.

Meaning

Phaedrus is the named companion addressed in the dialogue's first words. At 244a Socrates supplies his father's name, Pythocles, and his deme, Myrrhinus, while attributing the first speech to him. These are the dialogue's own identifications. His role here is best followed through his decisions as listener, reader and questioner rather than through a reconstructed biography.

Use in the Phaedrus

He has spent the morning with Lysias and carries the speech concealed under his cloak. He would like to practise recounting it, but Socrates detects the book (228b–e). His interest is active: he asks for repetitions, studies the desired passages and seeks an audience. Socrates jokingly pairs his own sickness for hearing with Phaedrus' readiness for a shared Corybantic frenzy. The exaggeration makes the pleasure of circulation between speaker and listener visible before the erotic arguments begin.

Phaedrus guides Socrates to the riverside and draws out his response to the legend of Boreas. He then reads Lysias with evident delight and takes the speech to have omitted nothing worth saying. Socrates' criticism prompts him to demand a competing performance (234c–236e). He turns Socrates' own phrases back on him and finally swears not to provide more speeches if Socrates refuses. His expertise at eliciting speech is therefore based on close knowledge of his companion's desire, though not yet on the technical account of souls later proposed.

After the first speech he wants the symmetrical praise of the non-lover that Socrates has withheld. After the palinode he praises the greater beauty of what he heard and joins the prayer that Lysias be turned toward philosophy (257b–c). His fear that writing may be disreputable opens the next inquiry. He provides the book for renewed analysis, acknowledges its missing definition and its disorder, and distinguishes the handbook material he has heard from the fuller craft Socrates demands.

Phaedrus is not merely a passive assent-giver. He supplies the decisive criteria in the medical analogy—knowing to whom, when and how far to apply a treatment (268a–b)—and points to the corresponding composition of tragedy. He can also recognize a correction: after questioning the Egyptian provenance of the writing tale, he accepts that whether the account is true matters more than where it claims to come from (275b–c).

His final role is prospective. He is to report the dialogue's standard to Lysias, while Socrates will address Isocrates (278b–279b). The narrative does not show either report being delivered. What it does show is Phaedrus asking that Socrates' prayer be made for him too, on the ground that friends' things are common. His attachment to excellent speaking has been turned toward a shared wish for a better inward condition.

Places to Read

227a–230e · Burnet pp. 1–6 Reader, rehearsing amateur, guide and provider of the book.

234c–237a · Burnet pp. 10–14 Admiration, challenge, repeated words and oath.

241d–244a · Burnet pp. 21–24 He keeps Socrates there and receives the correction.

257b–258d · Burnet pp. 41–43 The prayer for Lysias and the question about writing.

268a–269d; 275b–c · Burnet pp. 57–59, 67 Contributions to the craft analogies and correction of a listener's criterion.

278b–279c · Burnet pp. 72–73 His commission and the shared final prayer.

In this edition

The edition's notes identify other appearances of Phaedrus, but this article uses only his conduct and identifications in the supplied dialogue. Socrates' calling Lysias his "darling" and Phaedrus Lysias' "lover" belongs to the dialogue's playful treatment of intellectual allegiances; it does not by itself establish an external biographical relationship.

Attested forms

Φαῖδρε (227a · Burnet p. 1) — "Phaedrus". Socrates addresses his companion.

Φαίδρου (244a · Burnet p. 24) — "Phaedrus". The first speech is playfully assigned to Phaedrus, son of Pythocles, of Myrrhinus.

See also

Desire (p. 16); Friendship (p. 18); Leisure and walking (p. 139); Lysias (p. 142); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30); Socrates (p. 152)

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Self-knowledge

γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν, gnōnai emauton, "to know myself"; σκοπέω, skopeō, "look into; examine"

At a Glance

Socrates gives knowing himself priority over explaining away monsters. The monster he still has to examine may be within.

Meaning

The phrase gnōnai emauton is an infinitive with its reflexive object: "to know myself". Socrates introduces it through the Delphic inscription rather

than as a discovery of his own. Skopein names the looking and examining by which he pursues it. The same ordinary verb can mean looking for a place to sit, investigating a question or inspecting one's own interest.

The contrast at 229e–230a is between one's own unresolved condition and "what is other people's". This is a priority in inquiry, not a claim that nothing outside the self can matter. The dialogue will spend much of its length investigating the soul and the speeches through which people influence one another.

Use in the Phaedrus

Before the Delphic passage, the two friends jokingly use self-knowledge to establish mutual familiarity. If Socrates does not know Phaedrus, he says, he has forgotten himself too (228a). Phaedrus later returns the sentence word for word, substituting the names, to expose Socrates' feigned reluctance to speak (236c). Such confidence about a companion's habits contrasts with the deeper uncertainty Socrates professes about himself.

Asked whether he believes Boreas carried off Oreithyia, Socrates describes the endless work of making every mythological creature plausible. He has no leisure for that because he still cannot know himself according to the Delphic inscription. What he examines is whether he is a beast more intricate and fuming than Typhon or a gentler, simpler animal sharing a divine and unfuming portion (229e–230a). Myth has not been banished: Typhon becomes a comparison through which the question of the self can be sharply posed.

The palinode gives this question a larger field. The human soul's mixture makes its own direction difficult; appetite, shame, memory and reason can pull differently. Later the lover recognizes a divine pattern in the beloved and learns what he needs himself to become (252d–253a). The beloved sees himself in the lover as in a mirror without recognizing that this is what he is doing (255d). The distinction between experiencing oneself and understanding the experience remains open inside the erotic relation.

The final prayer does not announce that the Delphic task has been completed. Socrates asks to become beautiful within and to have external possessions friendly to what is inside (279b–c). Read beside the opening, it gives self-examination an ethical direction: the inward condition, not the performance of cleverness before an audience, should order the life. Phaedrus asks to share the prayer, and their departure is an agreed beginning rather than a certificate of achieved self-knowledge.

Places to Read

228a; 236c · Burnet pp. 2, 13 The mirrored joke about knowing one's friend and oneself.

229c–230a · Burnet pp. 4–5 The Delphic task and the comparison with Typhon.

252d–253a · Burnet pp. 35–36 The lover's education through his god and beloved.

255d · Burnet p. 39 Unrecognized self-seeing in the mirror of the lover.

279b–c · Burnet p. 73 The prayer for inward beauty and friendship between inner and outer.

In this edition

The English "not yet able" corresponds to the unfinished condition Socrates asserts; "unfuming" renders atyphos and preserves its play against Typhon and "fuming". The edition's note also points out the sense "free of vanity". That association enriches the question, but the lexicon does not turn Socrates' two alternatives into a proved classification of his character.

Attested forms

γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν (229e · Burnet p. 5) — "to know myself". Socrates names the still unfinished Delphic task.

σκοπῶ (230a · Burnet p. 5) — "I look into". Socrates turns his scrutiny towards himself rather than foreign marvels.

See also

Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74); Socrates (p. 152); Soul (p. 82)

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Socrates

Σωκράτης, Sōkratēs, "Socrates"; φιλομαθής, philomathēs, "lover of learning"; φιλόλογος, philologos, "speech-loving"

At a Glance

Socrates is at once an eager listener, an improvised speaker, a repentant offender and the examiner of the speeches he has helped produce. His authority here includes the willingness to correct himself.

Meaning

The dialogue presents Socrates through conversation, without an external narrator describing him. His self-descriptions are therefore part of his activity with Phaedrus: lover of learning, lover of speeches, limited seer, lover of collection and division. Their immediate purposes matter as much as the titles themselves.

Philomathēs names the desire to learn, philologos the attraction to speeches or discourse. The first explains his preference for the city's people over country places and trees; the second makes him susceptible to Phaedrus' threat to withhold future speeches.

Use in the Phaedrus

At first Socrates seems to know Phaedrus' habits better than Phaedrus can conceal them. He reconstructs the morning's repeated hearing, study and rehearsal and exposes the hidden book (228a–e). Outside the walls, however, he is the one who needs guiding, delighting in the stopping-place like a stranger (230b–d). The contrast makes familiarity and ignorance local, not total traits. He also confesses that knowing himself remains an unfinished task (229e–230a).

His response to Lysias combines apparent admiration with a demand to separate polished wording from adequate thought. When pressed to compete, he claims to be filled like a jar from other people's streams, though he cannot recall the source; he calls himself an amateur improvising beside a good maker (235c–d, 236d). These professions occur in an exchange of teasing and competitive pressure. The reader can observe what he actually does: he gives the argument a definition and derives a structured accusation from it.

The divine check changes his task. He recognizes an offence against Love and supplies a palinode rather than merely a more elaborate rival performance (242b–243d). His correction includes an imagined good lover who could expose the first speeches' unfairness. At the close he asks Love not to remove the erotic craft given him and asks that Lysias and Phaedrus be directed toward philosophy (257a–b). His account of education is thus accompanied by a prayer for his own continuing capacity.

In the later conversation Socrates submits his own speeches as well as Lysias' to analysis. He calls the palinode a mythic hymn that may have reached something true and may have wandered elsewhere; he extracts collection and division as powers to be pursued by craft (265b–266b). He also corrects the pair's manner of criticism: genuine experts would treat pretenders more gently than he and Phaedrus have done (268d–269c). The

examination concerns how to speak well both in content and towards persons.

The final naming of a philosopher reserves full wisdom to a god (278d), and the prayer asks for inward beauty rather than announcing its possession. This ending suits the dialogue's Socrates: a seeker whose appetites for speech and company are made answerable to learning, correction and the good of the soul.

Places to Read

228a–230e · Burnet pp. 2–6 Knowledge of Phaedrus, self-inquiry and love of learning.

234d–237a · Burnet pp. 11–14 Judgement, professed borrowing and reluctant performance.

242b–243d; 257a–b · Burnet pp. 22–24, 41 Recognition, recantation and prayer.

265b–266c; 268d–269c · Burnet pp. 53–55, 58–59 Examination of his speeches and correction of his critical manner.

278d–279c · Burnet pp. 72–73 Human philosophy and the prayer for inward beauty.

In this edition

The edition often preserves the extravagant affectionate addresses and claims of ignorance rather than flattening them into explanatory paraphrase. Their tone can be playful, but the entry does not use "irony" to cancel every literal statement of limitation. At 242c the restricted description of his divination—sufficient for himself alone—is explicit.

Attested forms

Σώκρατες (227a · Burnet p. 1) — "Socrates". Phaedrus addresses him in the opening answer.

φιλομαθὴς (230d · Burnet p. 5) — "a lover of learning". Socrates explains why he usually stays among people in town.

φιλολόγῳ (236e · Burnet p. 14) — "speech-loving". The disposition Phaedrus exploits to obtain a speech.

See also

Dialectic and conversation (p. 92); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Phaedrus (p. 148); Self-knowledge (p. 150); The daimonic sign (p. 155); Wisdom and the names of a writer (p. 130)

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The daimonic sign

τὸ δαιμόνιον, to daimonion, "the daimonic"; σημεῖον, sēmeion, "sign"; ἐπέχω, epechō, "hold back; check"

At a Glance

The sign stops an action; Socrates then identifies the offence and supplies the corrective account. Warning, interpretation and argument are distinct moments in the scene.

Meaning

Daimonion here is a substantivized adjective, "the daimonic", coupled in the printed text with the customary sign. Sēmeion is an indication or sign. Epechein describes its checking or holding-back effect. The passage should not be reduced either to an independent dramatic character or to a complete verbal theory delivered by the sign.

Other daimonic vocabulary in the dialogue has other local functions: Socrates' extravagant response to Lysias is "daimonically" spoken at 234d, while gods and daimons process through heaven at 246e. These do not make every such occurrence another episode of the personal warning.

Use in the Phaedrus

Socrates has finished the first speech and means to cross the river before Phaedrus can force him into something larger. Phaedrus urges him to stay because it is midday and hot; then Socrates says a further speech has become necessary (241e–242b). The physical threshold, already present as a proposed departure, is the place where the warning comes.

He reports that the daimonic and customary sign occurred and adds that it always checks what he is about to do. He also thought he heard a voice from that spot, not allowing him to leave before expiation for an offence against the divine (242b–c). The scene supplies no transcript of a developed argument from the voice. Socrates describes himself instead as a seer only adequate for himself, and interprets the disturbance that had already troubled him during the speech.

His recognition becomes explicit in discussion with Phaedrus. If Love is a god or divine, he cannot be bad; yet the two speeches treated him that way. Their fault combines impiety and intellectual pretension, saying nothing healthy or true while hoping to impress small human audiences (242d–243a). The sign has interrupted a wrongful course, but Socrates must still state why it was wrong and produce a better speech.

The episode consequently joins religious responsiveness to the willingness to revise. He does not use the warning merely to silence Phaedrus or avoid further examination. It commits him to a palinode, and that palinode will itself later be analyzed for its method and limits. The personal sign functions here as an occasion for renewed responsibility in speech.

Places to Read

241e–242b · Burnet p. 21 Attempted departure and promise of another speech.

242b–e · Burnet p. 22 The sign, the heard voice, limited divination and recognition of the offence.

243a–d · Burnet pp. 23–24 Purification and the promised corrective speech.

265b–266b · Burnet pp. 53–54 The resulting speech remains open to examination.

In this edition

The edition prints “the daimonic and the sign”, reflecting the wording preserved in its Greek text; the apparatus records proposed alterations, but the continuous text is the basis here. Its note refers to other Platonic accounts of the sign. Those works have not been independently consulted for this entry, so the habitual checking function is stated only as Socrates states it in this passage.

Attested forms

τὸ δαιμόνιόν (242b–c · Burnet p. 22) — “the daimonic”. Socrates’ customary warning occurs at the attempted crossing.

σημεῖόν (242b–c · Burnet p. 22) — “sign”. The customary sign checks the action about to be done.

ἐπίσχει (242c · Burnet p. 22) — “checks”. Socrates describes the sign’s habitual inhibiting effect.

See also

Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Shame and shamelessness (p. 37); Socrates (p. 152)

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Explained vocabulary register

This register gives compact lexical explanations alongside the sustained main articles. Exact printed forms are distinguished from headwords, phrase records and word families. Each record identifies a local sense, an attestation and a route into the larger discussion.

ἄγαλμα

agalma · Statue and sacred image · lemma

A statue or image honouring a deity.

The lover would sacrifice to his beloved as to a statue and god if he did not fear seeming wholly mad. Later he fashions and adorns the beloved like a statue after his own god. Both constructions explicitly mark the comparison.

Attested: ἀγάλματι (251a · Burnet p. 33) — "statue".

Attested: ἄγαλμα (252d · Burnet p. 35) — "statue".

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Reverence (p. 35)

ἀγγεῖον

angeion · Jar or vessel · lemma

A container into which something is poured.

Socrates claims his breast is full of material heard from others, as if he were a jar filled from their streams. He is conscious of his own lack of learning and cannot name the remembered source. The image marks dependence on hearing; it is not proof that the proposed speech is an independent discovery.

Attested: ἀγγείου (235d · Burnet p. 12) — "jar". Genitive in the comparison "like a jar".

See: Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Memory and reminding (p. 123); Socrates (p. 152)

ἀγένητος

agenētos · Ungenerated · lemma

Not having come into being.

Socrates argues that a beginning would cease to count as a beginning if it were derived from something. Ungenerated is therefore not a synonym for long-lived: it denies an originating event for the source under discussion.

Attested: ἀγένητον (245d · Burnet p. 26) — “ungenerated”.

Attested: ἀγένητόν (246a · Burnet p. 27) — “ungenerated”.

See: Self-motion and immortality (p. 79)

ἄγνος

agnos · Chaste-tree · lemma

The flowering fragrant tree or shrub at the resting-place.

Socrates praises its height, deep shade and flowering prime. The edition identifies the plant as the chaste-tree and notes that its name sounds like the word for pure. That note is a lexical association; the immediate text describes fragrance and shelter, not a botanical argument about chastity.

Attested: ἄγνου (230b · Burnet p. 5) — “chaste-tree”. Genitive: its height and shadiness.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139)

Ἄγρα

Agra · Agrae · lemma

The shrine-area used to locate the Boreas story downstream.

Socrates places the abduction two or three stades lower down, near a crossing towards the shrine in Agrae. The supplied edition explains that the shrine noun is understood and that this wording follows Burnet’s correction. It is useful as a locator, but the present lexicon has not independently reconstructed the ancient route.

Attested: Ἄγρας (229c · Burnet p. 4) — “Agrae”. The place-name in Burnet’s printed correction.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Myth and rationalization (p. 144)

ἀδιάφθορος

adiaphthoros · Indestructible and uncorrupted · lemma

Not destroyed; in an ethical condition, not corrupted.

The source of motion is said necessarily to be indestructible. A lover’s imitation of his god at 252d continues while he is uncorrupted: there the adjective describes a condition of conduct, not a demonstration that an individual cannot perish.

Attested: ἀδιάφθορον (245d · Burnet p. 26) — “indestructible”.

Attested: ἀδιάφθορος (252d · Burnet p. 35) — “uncorrupted”.

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Self-motion and immortality (p. 79)

ἀδολεσχία · μετεωρολογία

adoleschia · meteōrologia · Idle talk and lofty talk · paired nouns

Extended talk and talk about things aloft, here inquiry about nature expressed in apparently belittling terms.

Socrates says great crafts need this sort of inquiry and associates Pericles’ rhetorical completeness with what he learned through Anaxagoras. The terms’ disparaging flavour is redeployed rather than made a straightforward dismissal. “Lofty talk” is not restricted here to the modern science of weather.

Attested: ἀδολεσχίας (270a · Burnet p. 60) — “idle talk”.

Attested: μετεωρολογίας (270a · Burnet p. 60) — “lofty talk”. Inquiry about nature from which Pericles draws what is useful to rhetoric.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

Ἀδράστεια

Adrasteia · Adrasteia · proper name

The divine name attached to the ordinance governing the soul’s vision and fall.

The edition glosses the name as “the Inescapable” and identifies it with Nemesis. In the speech her ordinance supplies the structured consequences of seeing or failing to see, not a speaking dramatic character.

Attested: Ἀδραστείας (248c · Burnet p. 30) — “Adrasteia”.

See: Fate and choice of life (p. 52)

Ἄδραστος

Adrastos · Adrastus · proper name

The honey-voiced figure invoked beside Pericles as a judge of rhetorical techniques.

The name occurs in Socrates’ hypothetical comparison: what would such accomplished speakers say of the handbooks? The edition notes that readers have proposed a contemporary orator behind the legendary designation, but

the dialogue gives no explicit identification. Its local function is the imagined expert's corrective voice.
Attested: Ἄδραστον (269a · Burnet p. 58) — "Adrastus".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

Ἄδωνις

Adōnis · Adonis · proper name

The figure after whom the quickly growing festival gardens are named.

The text contrasts their eight-day beauty with the farmer's eight-month crop. The knowledgeable farmer can grow the former for play and festival while caring for serious seeds differently. The analogy ranks uses rather than prohibiting festival pleasure.
Attested: Ἀδώνιδος (276b · Burnet p. 69) — "Adonis".

See: Play and earnestness (p. 125); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127)

ἀεικίνητος

aeikinētos · Ever-moving · lemma

Always in motion.

The opening premise makes the ever-moving immortal. The next sentence asks what can sustain motion without depending on a mover that can cease; it is not a claim that every observed moving body is immortal.
Attested: ἀεικίνητον (245c · Burnet p. 26) — "ever-moving".

See: Self-motion and immortality (p. 79)

ἀθάνατος

athanatos · Immortal · lemma

Not subject to death; also, in a transferred use, enduring in fame or transmission.

The argument predicates immortality of soul. The myth separately acknowledges that calling a god an immortal animal rests on a fashioned account. An "immortal speech-writer" at 258c and immortal propagation of discourse at 277a use the adjective beyond the proof's immediate subject.
Attested: ἀθάνατος (245c · Burnet p. 26) — "immortal".

Attested: ἀθάνατόν (246d · Burnet p. 28) — "immortal".

Attested: ἀθάνατος (258c · Burnet p. 43) — "immortal".

Attested: ἀθάνατον (277a · Burnet p. 70) — “immortal”.

See: Self-motion and immortality (p. 79); Soul (p. 82)

αἱμύλος

haimylos · Wily · lemma

Cunningly winning in manner or speech.

The boy’s apparently non-loving adviser in Socrates’ first tale is identified from the outset as wily and in love no less than the rest. The audience therefore knows something the boy has been persuaded not to believe. The characterization separates the argument’s organized form from the speaker’s actual motive.

Attested: αἱμύλος (237b · Burnet p. 15) — “wily”. Predicate of the concealed lover.

See: Definition and agreement (p. 90); Love and the lover (p. 28); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30)

αἵρεσις

hairesis · Choice · lemma

A choosing or the option chosen.

Souls choose subsequent lives. The same noun at 256c names the sexual choice the many count blessed, made when the lesser pair’s souls are unguarded. That decision is not approved by the whole mind, which explains its rare repetition.

Attested: αἵρεσιν (249b · Burnet p. 31) — “choice”.

Attested: αἵρεσιν (256c · Burnet p. 40) — “choice”.

See: Fate and choice of life (p. 52)

αἴσθησις

aisthēsis · Perception · lemma

Sensory apprehension or a particular perception.

Human understanding gathers many perceptions into one by reasoning. Sight gives beauty its exceptional clarity. Later the rhetorician needs sharp perception of actual people and actions, not only a remembered classification of souls.

Attested: αἰσθήσεων (249b · Burnet p. 31) — “perceptions”.

Attested: αἰσθήσεως (250d · Burnet p. 33) — "through the clearest of our perceptions". Phrase-level rendering: αἰσθήσεως is singular in the superlative phrase, while τῶν ἡμετέρων supplies the comparison with our perceptions.

Attested: αἰσθήσει (271d · Burnet p. 62) — "perception".

See: Intellect and seeing (p. 60); Recollection (p. 76)

Ἀκουμενός

Akoumenos · Acumenus · lemma

The adviser whose walking recommendation Phaedrus follows.

Phaedrus calls Acumenus a companion of both men and follows his recommendation of road walks. Later Socrates names him with his son Eryximachus as the doctors who would distinguish isolated treatments from knowledge of when and to whom to apply them. The edition identifies him as a physician.

Attested: Ἀκουμενῷ (227a · Burnet p. 1) — "Acumenus". Dative: the person whose advice is obeyed.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Leisure and walking (p. 139)

ἀκούω

akouō · Hear and listen · lemma

To receive speech through hearing, whether attentively or merely as a recipient.

Socrates eagerly desires to hear Lysias, and Phaedrus has heard the same speech repeatedly. The palinode must be heard by the boy before he acts on the earlier advice. The final writing discussion distinguishes hearing much from learning with instruction: repeated exposure is not yet knowledge.

Attested: ἀκοῦσαι (227d · Burnet p. 2) — "to hear". Socrates' expressed desire.

Attested: ἤκουσεν (228a · Burnet p. 2) — "he heard". Phaedrus did not hear Lysias only once.

Attested: ἀκούσῃ (243e · Burnet p. 24) — "he may hear". The boy must also receive the correction.

See: Desire (p. 16); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Phaedrus (p. 148)

ἁμαρτάνω; ἁμάρτημα

hamartanō; hamartēma · Miss the mark and offence · word family

To go wrong; an error or offence produced by going wrong.

Socrates denies claiming that Lysias missed the mark altogether. His first speech says one must know the subject or miss the mark in deliberation. At the divine check the corresponding noun names an offence against the divine. The family spans inadequate argument and culpable speech without making every mistake a religious offence.

Attested: *ἡμάρτηκεν* (235e · Burnet p. 12) — "has altogether missed the mark". Socrates rejects an exaggerated account of his criticism.

Attested: *ἁμαρτάνειν* (237c · Burnet p. 15) — "misses the mark". Consequence of not knowing the subject.

Attested: *ἁμάρτημα* (242c–d · Burnet p. 22) — "offence". What Socrates now identifies in the speeches.

See: Definition and agreement (p. 90); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Socrates (p. 152)

ἀμβροσία

ambrosia · Ambrosia · lemma

The divine horses' food in the narrated homecoming.

After the mind has feasted on what really is, the charioteer puts ambrosia before the horses and gives them nectar. The two meals have related narrative positions but different grammatical diners and objects.

Attested: *ἀμβροσίαν* (247e · Burnet p. 29) — "ambrosia".

See: Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55); Nourishment (p. 69)

ἀμέλεια; ἀμελέω

ameleia; ameleō · Neglect and heedlessness · word family

Failure to attend to something, which may be ordinary need or an important good.

Lysias says non-lovers cannot charge the beloved for neglecting their own affairs. The palinode's newly stirred lover disregards dwindling property; the cicadas' predecessors forget food and drink through delight in singing. The shared family does not make all such neglect equally admirable: its object and consequences must be read.

Attested: ἀμέλειαν (231b · Burnet p. 6) — “heedlessness”. Neglect of one’s own affairs.

Attested: ἀμέλειαν (252a · Burnet p. 34) — “heedlessness”. Loss of property while absorbed in the beloved.

Attested: ἠμέλησαν (259c · Burnet p. 44) — “were heedless”. The singers fail to attend to food and drink.

See: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135); Desire (p. 16); Pleasure and pain (p. 33)

ἀμύνω

amynō · Defend or ward off · dictionary headword

Repel an attack or defend something against it.

Written speech cannot defend itself, while the knowledgeable account in soul can. The earlier horse example uses the same verb for warding off enemies (260b), giving the later argumentative defence a concrete verbal counterpart without making the objects identical.

Attested: ἀμύνασθαι (275e · Burnet p. 68) — “defend itself”.

Attested: ἀμῦναι (276a · Burnet p. 68) — “defend itself”. The living account’s capacity.

See: Living speech and defence (p. 121); Writing and letters (p. 132)

ἀμφισβητήσιμος

amphisbētēsimos · Disputable · dictionary headword

Open to dispute or contest.

Love is assigned to this class because the two Socratic speeches have described it under strongly opposed evaluations. The fact of dispute creates a need for definition and discrimination; it does not show that no true account is possible.

Attested: ἀμφισβητησίμων (263c · Burnet p. 51) — “disputable”.

See: Definition and agreement (p. 90); Love and the lover (p. 28)

Ἀνακρέων

Anakreōn · Anacreon · lemma

The poet named beside Sappho in Socrates’ uncertain account of his sources.

Socrates calls Anacreon wise while suggesting where the contents of his full breast may have originated. Phaedrus is more interested in hearing the

new speech than in establishing its source. The edition identifies Anacreon as a lyric poet of love; no poem has been independently consulted for this record.

Attested: Ἀνακρέοντος (235c · Burnet p. 12) — “Anacreon”. Genitive with the epithet wise.

See: Love and the lover (p. 28); Memory and reminding (p. 123); Socrates (p. 152)

ἀναμιμνήσκω

anamimnēskō · Recollect or remind · lemma

To remind; in middle use, to recollect.

The lover recollects the true on seeing beauty. The bad horse also makes its partners recollect their promised return, an ordinary and unedifying remembering. Thamus later contrasts recollecting from external marks with doing so from within oneself. At 272c Socrates asks Phaedrus to recollect anything useful he has heard about rhetoric, another ordinary retrieval of past instruction.

Attested: ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος (249d · Burnet p. 32) — “recollecting”.

Attested: ἀναμιμνήσκων (254d · Burnet p. 38) — “making them recollect”.

Attested: ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος (272c · Burnet p. 63) — “recollecting”. Phaedrus is invited to recall any help heard from Lysias or another teacher.

Attested: ἀναμιμνῃσκομένους (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “recollect”.

See: Recollection (p. 76)

ἀνάμνησις

anamnēsis · Recollection · lemma

A bringing back into awareness of what was formerly seen or known.

At 249b–c Socrates identifies understanding through a form, gathering many perceptions into one by reasoning, as recollection of the soul’s earlier vision. The noun’s local argument includes the pre-bodily journey; it is not merely the ability to repeat a speech.

Attested: ἀνάμνησις (249c · Burnet p. 31) — “recollection”.

See: Recollection (p. 76)

Ἀναξαγόρας

Anaxagoras · Anaxagoras · proper name

The inquirer into nature whose association is said to have benefited Pericles.

Socrates connects him here with extended discussion of intellect and mind. The source is used to explain a possible contribution to rhetorical preparation, not to present or endorse Anaxagoras' entire cosmology. The edition's choice of "mind" is textually qualified.

Attested: Ἀναξαγόρας (270a · Burnet p. 60) — "Anaxagoras". Printed "mind" follows V and Aristides; B and T have "lack of intellect".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

ἀναφής

anaphēs · Intangible · lemma

Not accessible to touch.

The adjective completes the sensory exclusions surrounding the reality beyond heaven. Its beholder is intellect, not a bodily organ extended into a distant region.

Attested: ἀναφὴς (247c · Burnet p. 29) — "intangible".

See: Being and reality (p. 45); Intellect and seeing (p. 60)

ἀνελευθερία

aneleutheria · Servility · lemma

An unfree or narrow condition of soul praised by the multitude as virtue.

The palinode says the non-lover's thrifty management of mortal interests engenders this condition in the friend's soul. The indictment targets a constricted orientation, contrasted with love's power to initiate ascent. It is not a statement that every prudent act or every non-erotic friendship produces literal enslavement.

Attested: ἀνελευθερίαν (256e–257a · Burnet p. 41) — "servility". The condition generated by the non-lover's merely mortal affinity.

See: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Love and the lover (p. 28); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

ἀντέρως

anterōs · Counter-love · lemma

Love answering another's love, here an image of love in the beloved.

The beloved feels a reciprocal passion without understanding its source and calls it friendship. Socrates says his desires resemble the lover's but are weaker; counter-love therefore does not mean hostility or exact equality of experience.

Attested: ἀντέρωτα (255e · Burnet p. 39) — "counter-love".

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14)

ἀντιλέγω

antilegō · Contradict · dictionary headword

Speak against another party's assertion.

Opposing litigants provide the initial example. The issue is not simply that they exchange words but that they contest the just and unjust. Socrates uses this familiar activity to ask what knowledge a controlled alteration of appearances would require.

Attested: ἀντιλέγουσιν (261c · Burnet p. 48) — "contradict".

See: Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Similarity and deception (p. 114)

ἀντιλογική

antilogikē · Contradiction · dictionary headword

The proposed craft of opposing accounts or arguments.

Socrates extends its possible range beyond lawsuits and public assemblies to everything said, but calls it one craft only conditionally, "if indeed it exists". Its supposed capacities include exposing another's concealed likeness-making as well as making likenesses oneself.

Attested: ἀντιλογικὴ (261d–e · Burnet p. 48) — "craft of contradiction".

See: Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Similarity and deception (p. 114)

ἀνυπόδητος

anypodētos · Barefoot · lemma

Without shoes.

Phaedrus happens to be barefoot and remarks that Socrates always is. This makes walking in the stream convenient. The remark belongs to the

immediate bodily arrangement of the walk; the edition supplies parallels for Socrates' habit, but this record rests on Phaedrus' statement here.

Attested: ἀνυπόδητος (229a · Burnet p. 3) — "barefoot". Phaedrus describes himself; the following clause contrasts Socrates' habitual state.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Socrates (p. 152)

ἄπληκτος

aplēktos · Needing no blow · lemma

Not struck; here requiring no blows in guidance.

The good horse is driven by command and speech alone. The negative adjective belongs to a positive account of teachable responsiveness, contrasted with its partner's near-deafness to correction.

Attested: ἄπληκτος (253d · Burnet p. 37) — "needing no blow".

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47)

ἁπλοῦς · πολυειδής

haplous · polyeidēs · Simple and many-formed · paired adjectives

Single in the relevant constitution, or displaying several forms.

The method first asks which description fits its object. If simple, it investigates that object's powers; if multiform, it counts the forms and examines each. Applied to soul, this remains a question that a genuine teacher must answer, not a completed enumeration in the passage.

Attested: ἁπλοῦν (270d · Burnet p. 61) — "simple".

Attested: πολυειδές (270d · Burnet p. 61) — "of many forms". Alternative to simple in the methodological question.

See: Form, collection and division (p. 94); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

ἀπορέω

aporeō · Be at a loss · word family

To lack a way forward or an explanation; to be puzzled.

The wing-growing soul is at a loss before its mixed pain and pleasure; the beloved is at a loss about what he loves. The related compound diaporeomai describes Socrates fearing that shame will stop his performance. These are particular perplexities, not automatically a formal stage of dialectical refutation.

Attested: ἀποροῦσα (251d · Burnet p. 34) — "at a loss".

Attested: ἀπορεῖ (255d · Burnet p. 39) — "is at a loss".

Attested: διαπορῶμαι (237a · Burnet p. 14) — "be at a loss". A form of the compound διαπορέω, not the simple verb.

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Longing and yearning (p. 25)

ἀπορροή

aporrhoē · Outflow · lemma

An effluence or flowing out.

The lover receives beauty's outflow through the eyes. The warmth melts the hardened parts around the wing's emergence and allows nourishment in. The word belongs to the physiological imagery of the speech.

Attested: ἀπορροὴν (251b · Burnet p. 33) — "outflow".

See: Longing and yearning (p. 25); Wing and flight (p. 85)

ἀποτορνεύω

apotorneuō · Turn on a lathe · dictionary headword

Finish by turning on a lathe; figuratively, fashion verbal expression precisely.

The perfect passive describes the exact shaping of Lysias' words. The workshop metaphor makes stylistic polish visible but leaves open the larger question of what the speech says. It is an image of workmanship, not evidence that physical written letters were literally lathed.

Attested: ἀποτετόρνευται (234e · Burnet p. 11) — "turned on the lathe".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

ἀποτρέπω

apotrepō · Turn away or prevent · lemma

To divert someone or avert something.

Lysias' lovers turn away the beloveds' other associations, while his non-lover promises to turn away voluntary faults. Socrates hopes the further divine seizure might be turned aside as his first speech gathers momentum. The verb's moral force depends on what is averted, rather than on prevention as such.

Attested: ἀποτρέπουσιν (232c · Burnet p. 8) — "turn away". Other beneficial associations are obstructed.

Attested: ἀποτρέπειν (233c · Burnet p. 9) — "turn away". The non-lover promises to prevent voluntary wrongdoing.

Attested: ἀποτράποιτο (238d · Burnet p. 17) — "might even be turned away". Socrates hopes to avert what is coming over him.

See: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Jealousy and possession (p. 23); Socrates (p. 152)

ἄργυρος

argyros · Silver · dictionary headword

Silver, paired with iron as a name the interlocutors treat as agreed.

The contrast concerns shared conception, not the value of silver as money. Agreement about a familiar material illustrates why rhetoric has greater room to mislead where meanings and evaluations are unsettled.

Attested: ἀργύρου (263a · Burnet p. 50) — "silver".

See: Definition and agreement (p. 90); Similarity and deception (p. 114)

ἄρδω

ardō · Water · lemma

To water or irrigate.

Beauty waters the growing wing; returning beauty waters the beloved's wing-passages. Later people "water" themselves at drinking parties. The repeated agricultural verb supports the imagery without making the drinking-party pleasure equivalent to philosophical nourishment.

Attested: ἄρδεται (251b · Burnet p. 33) — "is watered".

Attested: ἄρδει (255d · Burnet p. 39) — "waters".

Attested: ἄρδοντες (276d · Burnet p. 69) — "watering".

See: Nourishment (p. 69); Wing and flight (p. 85)

ἀρετή

aretē · Virtue and excellence · lemma

The excellence of a being or power; morally, virtue.

Lysias' speaker claims virtue for non-lovers and promises its enduring display (232d,234a–b). Socrates later asks what makes the good horse good; the philosophical lovers free the source of virtue, and rhetoric's analogy with medicine includes conveying virtue. At 256e servility can instead be praised

as virtue by the multitude: neither a speaker's claim nor public praise settles the distinction.

Attested: ἀρετὴν (232d · Burnet p. 8) — "virtue". Lysias' speaker claims virtue as the non-lovers' means of obtaining what they need.

Attested: ἀρετὴν (234a–b · Burnet p. 10) — "virtue". The speaker promises a display of virtue after the boy's youth has ended.

Attested: ἀρετὴ (253d · Burnet p. 36) — "virtue".

Attested: ἀρετή (256b · Burnet p. 40) — "virtue".

Attested: ἀρετὴν (256e · Burnet p. 41) — "virtue".

Attested: ἀρετὴν (270b · Burnet p. 60) — "virtue".

See: Justice and virtue (p. 63)

ἀρήν

arēn · Lambs · lemma

The young prey whose being cherished is not for their own good.

The accusative plural arnas is the object of the wolves' affection in the near-hexameter ending Socrates' first speech. The grammar matters: it is the wolves who cherish the lambs. The comparison illustrates affection without goodwill, not reciprocal friendship between the two animals.

Attested: ἄρνας (241d · Burnet p. 20) — "lambs". Accusative plural in the wolves comparison.

See: Friendship (p. 18); Love and the lover (p. 28)

Ἄρης

Arēs · Ares · proper name

The god whose former followers display a more violent erotic response.

If these lovers think the beloved has wronged them, they become murderous and ready to sacrifice themselves and him. The thought of injury is attributed to them; the narrative does not certify the beloved's guilt.

Attested: Ἄρεώς (252c · Burnet p. 35) — "Ares".

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50)

ἄρθρον

arthron · Joint · dictionary headword

An articulation at which an appropriately conducted division cuts.

The plural occurs in the instruction to divide by forms "at the joints" as they naturally lie. It gives a bodily image to discriminating analysis and contrasts with the fracture of a part by bad workmanship.
Attested: ἄρθρα (265e · Burnet p. 54) — "joints".

See: Form, collection and division (p. 94); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

ἁρμονία

harmonia · Harmony · dictionary headword

The ordered relation of musical notes, not mere ability to raise or lower a string.

The gentle musician tells the pretender that he possesses necessary studies before harmony but not harmony's art. The analogy grants the preliminary ability while denying its sufficiency; it does not mock music or dismiss practical exercise.
Attested: ἁρμονίας (268e · Burnet p. 58) — "harmony".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Practice and training (p. 110)

ἀρτιτελής

artitelēs · Freshly perfected · lemma

Just initiated or perfected.

This person has beheld much before and shudders on seeing a godlike face that imitates beauty well. The adjective combines temporal freshness with the initiation vocabulary already used of the prior vision.
Attested: ἀρτιτελής (251a · Burnet p. 33) — "freshly perfected".

See: Beauty (p. 42); Initiation and mysteries (p. 57)

ἀρύτω

arytō · Draw liquid · lemma

To draw or dip up liquid.

The lovers draw from Zeus as bacchants do, then pour upon the beloved's soul. The drawn content has just been identified as divine habits and ways of life; the comparison gives that acquisition a flowing form.
Attested: ἀρύτωσιν (253a · Burnet p. 36) — "draw".

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Nourishment (p. 69)

ἀρχή

archē · Beginning and source · lemma

A beginning or originating source; also rule or governing authority.

The premise that whatever comes to be comes from a beginning is joined to the claim that the beginning itself cannot derive from another. Elsewhere the same ordinary word can mark the beginning of the myth, not an eternal principle. The first speech's "former senseless rule" at 241a uses the same noun for the authority that love and madness had exercised within the lover.

Attested: ἀρχῆς (241a · Burnet p. 20) — "rule". The former lover's senseless rule, not the origin of cosmic movement.

Attested: ἀρχὴ (245c · Burnet p. 26) — "beginning".

Attested: ἀρχῇ (253c · Burnet p. 36) — "at the beginning". Here the beginning of the tale, not the metaphysical source.

See: Self-motion and immortality (p. 79)

ἀσήμαντος

asēmantos · Unmarked · lemma

Without a mark; here not yet marked by the body now carried about.

The former participants were pure and unmarked by what they now call body. The edition notes a possible play on sēma, tomb, beside sōma, body; that remains a possible association, while Burnet's printed adjective must be distinguished from the conjecture apēmantoi, free of woe.

Attested: ἀσήμαντοι (250c · Burnet p. 33) — "unmarked".

See: Initiation and mysteries (p. 57); Soul (p. 82)

ἄστυ

asty · Town · lemma

The built town and the people who live there.

Socrates first asks whether Lysias was in town. Later he says that country places and trees do not teach him, but people in town do. This explains his ordinary preference while the dialogue itself shows how a setting outside town can become fruitful when a speaking companion is there.

Attested: ἄστει (227b · Burnet p. 1) — "town". Lysias' location.

Attested: ἄστεος (230c–d · Burnet p. 5) — "town". The place Socrates rarely leaves.

Attested: ἄστει (230d · Burnet p. 6) — “town”. Its people are the source of learning.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Socrates (p. 152)

ἀσχημάτιστος

aschēmatistos · Shapeless · lemma

Without a spatial figure or shape.

Joined to colourless and intangible, it describes the substance that really is. “Shapeless” does not mean intellectually indeterminate: this same object is accessible to intellect and true knowledge.

Attested: ἀσχημάτιστος (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “shapeless”.

See: Being and reality (p. 45)

ἅτε

hate · As being; since · causal particle

A connective giving the circumstances as the speaker’s explanation or cause.

Thamus says forgetfulness will result from unpractised memory, since trust in writing leads learners to recollect through alien marks from outside. The causal force belongs to his diagnosis within the story. At 275b Socrates uses the same word in a teasing description of the supposedly unwise ancients: its occurrence does not remove the need to distinguish speaker and tone.

Attested: ἅτε (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “since”.

See: Memory and reminding (p. 123); Writing and letters (p. 132)

ἀτελής

atelēs · Imperfect · lemma

Incomplete; in a ritual setting, uninitiated.

The merely technical poet is imperfect beside the inspired poet, and unsuccessful souls depart incomplete in their vision. Later a rhetorician deficient in nature, knowledge or practice is imperfect in that respect. Context gives the ritual force its particular strength.

Attested: ἀτελὴς (245a · Burnet p. 26) — “imperfect”.

Attested: ἀτελεῖς (248b · Burnet p. 30) — “imperfect”.

Attested: ἀτελὴς (269d · Burnet p. 59) — “imperfect”.

See: Initiation and mysteries (p. 57)

ἄτμητος

atmētos · Uncuttable · dictionary headword

Not further divisible at the endpoint required by the method.

The final summary asks the speaker to define and divide by forms down to this point. It does not enumerate the terminal forms or state that every possible division has already been carried out in the conversation.

Attested: ἀτμήτου (277b · Burnet p. 70) — “uncuttable”.

See: Dialectic and conversation (p. 92); Form, collection and division (p. 94)

ἄτοπος

atopos · Outlandish · word family

Strange, out of the expected place or pattern.

Socrates says disbelief in the legend would not make him outlandish like someone outside the fashionable wise. Phaedrus then calls Socrates most outlandish because he behaves like a visitor in his own countryside. The palinode’s anguished lover experiences a related strangeness in himself. The word registers dislocation, not one fixed psychological diagnosis.

Attested: ἄτοπος (229c · Burnet p. 4) — “outlandish”. What Socrates would not be by joining the rationalizers.

Attested: ἀτοπώτατός (230c · Burnet p. 5) — “most outlandish”. Phaedrus on Socrates as a stranger-like guidee.

Attested: ἀτοπίᾳ (251d · Burnet p. 34) — “outlandishness”. The lover’s bewildering mixed experience.

See: Longing and yearning (p. 25); Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Socrates (p. 152)

Ἀχελῷος

Achelōios · Achelous · lemma

The river-god worshipped with the Nymphs at the site.

The visible offerings make Socrates think the place sacred to Achelous and some Nymphs. The edition identifies him as the great river of north-western Greece. His presence here is cultic, not a claim that the Ilissus is geographically the same river.

Attested: Ἀχελῴου (230b · Burnet p. 5) — “Achelous”. Genitive coupled with the Nymphs.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Socrates (p. 152)

ἀχρώματος

achrōmatos · Colourless · lemma

Without colour.

The reality beyond heaven is colourless, shapeless and intangible, although narrated through a vision. The adjective prevents the myth’s scenic surface from being confused with ordinary coloured objects.

Attested: ἀχρώματός (247c · Burnet p. 29) — “colourless”.

See: Being and reality (p. 45); Intellect and seeing (p. 60)

ἄψυχος

apsychos · Soulless · lemma

Without soul or animation of its own.

A body whose movement comes only from outside is called soulless. The next stage says that all soul takes care of what is soulless: the adjective marks what requires animation and governance, not a moral condemnation of an insensitive person.

Attested: ἄψυχον (245e · Burnet p. 27) — “soulless”.

Attested: ἀψύχου (246b · Burnet p. 27) — “that is soulless”.

See: Soul (p. 82)

βλάστη

blastē · Shoot · lemma

A sprout or new growth.

When separation dries and closes the outlets, the shoot of the wing is shut in; it presses against its own passage and causes pain. The image gives longing an alternation of inflow, blockage and release.

Attested: βλάστην (251d · Burnet p. 34) — “shoot”.

See: Longing and yearning (p. 25); Wing and flight (p. 85)

Βορέας

Boreas · Boreas · lemma

The North Wind, named as Oreithyia's abductor.

The story gives the landscape a remembered divine action; the proposed rationalization uses the same name for a gust of wind that could push the girl to her death. Phaedrus asks both where it happened and whether Socrates is persuaded of its truth, joining topographical and interpretive questions.

Attested: Βορέας (229b · Burnet p. 4) — "Boreas". Subject of the reported abduction.

Attested: Βορέου (229c · Burnet p. 4) — "Boreas". The gust in the proposed alternative account.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Myth and rationalization (p. 144)

βραχυλογία

brachylogia · Brief-speech · dictionary headword

Concise speech or a compressed manner of expression.

It is among the techniques recalled at 269a and among the forms whose timeliness or untimeliness must be recognized at 272a. Brevity is therefore not made a universal virtue: its fitness depends on the hearer, purpose and occasion.

Attested: βραχυλογίας (272a · Burnet p. 63) — "brief-speech".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108)

γελοῖος

geloios · Laughable · lemma

Apt to provoke laughter through incongruity or mistaken priorities.

Socrates finds explaining alien marvels laughable while still ignorant of himself. Later the ignorant horse-buyer provides a comic model for dangerous political persuasion. Laughter can expose an error without itself deciding the truth; Socrates also asks whether a laughable friend is preferable to a formidable enemy.

Attested: γελοῖον (229e · Burnet p. 5) — "laughable". The mistaken priority in inquiry.

Attested: γελοῖος (236d · Burnet p. 14) — "laughable". Socrates' anticipated amateur performance.

Attested: γελοῖον (260b · Burnet p. 46) — “laughable”. Phaedrus judges the mistaken horse-purchase.

See: Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Self-knowledge (p. 150); Socrates (p. 152)

γέρας

geras · Privilege · lemma

An honour, prerogative or special gift.

The cicadas possess a privilege from the gods to give humans; the tale explains their privilege from the Muses as singing without nourishment and later reporting human honours. The promised benefit is placed within that intermediary service.

Attested: γέρας (259b · Burnet p. 44) — “privilege”.

Attested: γέρας (259c · Burnet p. 44) — “privilege”.

See: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135)

γνήσιος

gnēsios · Legitimate · dictionary headword

Genuine or legitimately born, here of a speech imagined as a brother or son.

Socrates calls the living account the legitimate brother of the written one, then describes serious accounts as legitimate sons, first in oneself and then growing in other souls. The kinship metaphor distinguishes understanding genuinely one’s own from mere possession of verbal products.

Attested: γνήσιον (276a · Burnet p. 68) — “legitimate”.

See: Living speech and defence (p. 121); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127)

γνωμολογία

gnōmologia · Maxim-speech · dictionary headword

Speech employing maxims or general sayings.

One of the verbal accomplishments attributed to Polus. Its place in the catalogue shows how a recognizable kind of expression can become a teachable device. The later argument asks what turns the device into an appropriate part of a persuasive whole.

Attested: γνωμολογίαν (267c · Burnet p. 56) — “maxim-speech”.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

Γοργίας

Gorgias · Gorgias · proper name

The teacher named in connection with powerful manipulation of speech and likelihood.

Phaedrus suggests that Socrates' Nestor may mean Gorgias (261c). The catalogue later credits Gorgias and Tisias with magnifying small things, diminishing great ones, and commanding both compressed and extended speech. The attributions identify capacities; the later argument questions whether such capacities constitute the complete art.

Attested: Γοργίαν (267a · Burnet p. 56) — "Gorgias".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Likelihood and the plausible (p. 99)

δείνωσις

deinōsis · Exaggeration or intensification · dictionary headword

Making a matter formidable or striking in speech; here the edition's "exaggeration".

It is listed with brief-speech and pity-speech as something whose opportune and inopportune employment the practitioner must discern. The entry follows that local technical sense rather than assigning every use of the adjective "formidable" to this device.

Attested: δεινώσεως (272a · Burnet p. 63) — "exaggeration".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108)

Δελφικός

Delphikos · Delphic inscription · lemma

The inscription at Delphi that sets the task of knowing oneself.

Socrates invokes the Delphic writing as an obligation he has not yet fulfilled. This is one early appearance of a written saying that can orient inquiry; its authority does not remove the work of understanding oneself. Later Delphi appears as a site of prophetic divine madness.

Attested: Δελφικὸν (229e · Burnet p. 5) — "Delphic". Adjective modifying inscription.

See: Self-knowledge (p. 150); Writing and letters (p. 132)

διαγιγνώσκω

diagignōskō · Discern · dictionary headword

Distinguish or recognize something by discriminating its character.

Socrates asks whether someone ignorant of a thing's truth can discern its lesser or greater similarities in other things. Phaedrus answers that he cannot. At 272a the same family of discernment concerns timely and untimely use of speech, joining recognition of relations to practical judgement.

Attested: διαγιγνώσκειν (262a · Burnet p. 49) — "discern".

See: Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Similarity and deception (p. 114)

διάθεσις

diathesis · Arrangement · dictionary headword

Disposition or ordering of a speech's material.

Socrates distinguishes finding things to say from arranging them. Even shared or necessary material may be arranged well. The later requirement that a speech's parts fit each other and its whole makes arrangement more than decorative variation: placement needs an intelligible reason.

Attested: διάθεσιν (236a · Burnet p. 13) — "the arrangement".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

διάνοια

dianoia · Mind and thinking · lemma

Thought or its content; also the mind as a thinking power.

Phaedrus offers the thought of Lysias' speech rather than its exact expressions at 228d; in the speech the word also means the thought or disposition one is asked to have toward suitors (234b–c). The palinode then speaks of a god's mind being nourished and the philosopher's mind growing wings; at 256c the lesser pair act without the whole mind's decision. These contexts distinguish content, disposition and faculty.

Attested: διάνοιαν (228d · Burnet p. 3) — "thought".

Attested: διάνοιαν (234b–c · Burnet p. 10) — "thought".

Attested: διάνοια (247d · Burnet p. 29) — "mind".

Attested: διάνοια (249c · Burnet p. 31) — "mind".

Attested: διανοίας (256a · Burnet p. 40) — "of the mind".

Attested: διάνοιαν (259e · Burnet p. 45) — “mind”.

See: Intellect and seeing (p. 60); Philosophy (p. 71)

διδαχή

didachē · Teaching · dictionary headword

Instruction that makes extensive hearing into informed understanding.

Thamus says the new pupils will become hearers of much “without teaching”, which explains why their apparent judgement exceeds their actual judgement. The omission concerns formation of knowledge, not merely lack of exposure to words. At 277e teaching is paired with questioning in the criticism of unexamined recitation.

Attested: διδαχῆς (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “teaching”.

Attested: διδαχῆς (277e · Burnet p. 71) — “teaching”. Questioning and teaching are absent from the recitation under criticism.

See: Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Memory and reminding (p. 123)

διήγησις

diēgēsis · Narration · dictionary headword

A connected telling of the matter or events, listed as a speech’s second component.

Testimonies follow upon this narration in the handbook sequence. The earlier contrast at 246a between a divine, long narration of soul’s true nature and a shorter human likeness shows that narrating need not always mean forensic storytelling.

Attested: διήγησίν (266e · Burnet p. 55) — “narration”.

Attested: διηγήσεως (246a · Burnet p. 27) — “narration”. What soul is calls for a divine and long narration; the human account gives a likeness.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

δικαιοσύνη

dikaiosynē · Justice · lemma

Justice, seen itself in the divine circuit and approached through imperfect earthly likenesses.

At 250b justice's likenesses lack beauty's visible brightness. At 276e it becomes a subject of speech and serious dialectical planting. Its lack of sensory brilliance does not remove it from human ethical concern.

Attested: δικαιοσύνην (247d · Burnet p. 29) — "justice".

Attested: δικαιοσύνης (250b · Burnet p. 32) — "justice".

Attested: δικαιοσύνης (276e · Burnet p. 70) — "justice".

See: Justice and virtue (p. 63)

διπλασιολογία

diplasiologia · Doubling of speech · dictionary headword

A rhetorical device named as doubling speech.

It appears among Polus' prized verbal resources alongside maxim-speech and image-speech. The dialogue gives the technical name rather than an example or comprehensive definition. Its retention records the teachers' terminology without inventing a detailed modern figure in its place.

Attested: διπλασιολογίαν (267c · Burnet p. 56) — "doubling of speech".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

δρᾶν · παθεῖν

dran · pathein · Acting and undergoing · paired infinitives: δράω and πάσχω

Exercising a power upon something, and being affected by something.

The inquiry asks not just whether a nature acts or is acted on, but what it does, in relation to what, and what it undergoes from what. The relational complements must be retained: an undifferentiated claim of "power" would omit the causal understanding required by the method.

Attested: δρᾶν (270d · Burnet p. 61) — "acting".

Attested: παθεῖν (270d · Burnet p. 61) — "undergoing". Passive side of the same relational investigation.

See: Nature, whole and part (p. 103); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

δρόμος

dromos · Running-tracks · lemma

Tracks contrasted with roads for walking.

Phaedrus reports the doctor's view that road walks are less tiring than those in the running-tracks. The edition explains the reference as the

gymnasia's tracks, also used for walking. The comparative concerns fatigue, not a rejection of all exercise or athletic training.

Attested: δρόμοις (227a–b · Burnet p. 1) — "running-tracks". Locative plural in the comparison of walks.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139)

ἔθος

ethos · Habit · lemma

An accustomed habit or manner of acting.

The lovers reach their god by memory and take from him habits and ways of life, within the stated limit of how far a human can share in a god. This is the short-e noun ἔθος, not a licence to treat every similarly spelled form of ἦθος, character, as the same lemma.

Attested: ἔθη (253a · Burnet p. 36) — "habits".

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50)

εἰκονολογία

eikonologia · Image-speech · dictionary headword

Speech employing images or comparisons.

Named among Polus' accomplishments and recalled among the devices that the imagined great orators would judge as preliminary. The presence of an image does not make it a truthful likeness: the larger dialogue requires knowledge to discriminate its relations and effects.

Attested: εἰκονολογίαν (267c · Burnet p. 56) — "image-speech".

Attested: εἰκονολογιῶν (269a · Burnet p. 58) — "image-speeches". Included among the techniques to be examined in the light.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Similarity and deception (p. 114)

ἐκπλήττω

ekplēttō · Strike with amazement · lemma

To strike someone out of an ordinary state through astonishment or powerful emotion.

Socrates says he was struck while watching Phaedrus enjoy Lysias' speech; souls are struck by likenesses of what they formerly saw; the beloved is struck by the lover's close goodwill. The object or cause differs, so the verb alone does not certify divine recollection. In the cicada tale the original singers are

struck by the pleasure of song, to the point of neglecting food and drink (259b).

Attested: ἐκπλαγῆναι (234d · Burnet p. 11) — “was struck”.

Attested: ἐκπλήττονται (250a · Burnet p. 32) — “are struck”.

Attested: ἐκπλήττει (255b · Burnet p. 39) — “strikes”.

Attested: ἐξεπλάγησαν (259b · Burnet p. 44) — “were so struck”. The former human singers are struck by pleasure.

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Madness and divine possession (p. 66)

ἔλεγχος · ἐπεξέλεγχος

elenchos · epexelenchos · Refutation and further refutation · paired technical nouns

Testing or refuting an assertion; in the catalogue, refutation and an additional refutatory stage.

Theodorus’ procedures are to be used both in accusation and defence. The unprefixed noun later has a broader critical role: a writer must enter refutation about what he wrote and possess the means to defend it. These uses do not make every forensic tactic equivalent to the final examination of knowledge.

Attested: ἔλεγχόν (267a · Burnet p. 55) — “refutation”.

Attested: ἐπεξέλεγχον (267a · Burnet p. 55) — “further refutation”. An additional named stage in the handbook list.

Attested: ἔλεγχον (278c · Burnet p. 72) — “refutation”. The author submits what he wrote to testing and can help it.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Living speech and defence (p. 121)

ἐλεινολογία

eleinologia · Pity-speech · dictionary headword

Speech designed to awaken pity.

Socrates requires knowledge of when this form is timely or untimely. The earlier catalogue associates piteous appeals over age and poverty with Thrasymachus’ power, but effectiveness with a crowd does not by itself establish the complete craft.

Attested: ἐλεινολογίας (272a · Burnet p. 63) — “pity-speech”.

See: Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

Ἑλένη

Helenē · Helen · lemma

The subject of the slander and retraction in Socrates' Stesichorus story.

Socrates says Stesichorus was deprived of sight through his evil-speaking of Helen. The quoted recantation denies that she sailed in the ships or came to Troy. Her role here is to establish an analogy for retracting evil-speaking of Love, not to make the dialogue itself narrate a full alternative Trojan history.

Attested: Ἑλένης (243a · Burnet p. 23) — "Helen". Genitive naming the person slandered; Stesichorus loses sight for speaking badly of her.

See: Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Palinode and purification (p. 146)

ἐλεύθερος

eleutheros · Free or free-person's · word family

Not servile; in the corrective passage, qualifying a kind of love.

The imagined noble listener would conclude that the speakers had never seen a free person's love. The social language contrasts generous character with jealous use of another. Later the philosophic pair free the source of virtue within themselves. The latter is an internal liberation, not a change in civic legal status.

Attested: ἐλεύθερον (243c · Burnet p. 23) — "a free man's". Qualifies love in the noble listener's imagined judgement.

Attested: ἐλευθερώσαντες (256b · Burnet p. 40) — "freed". The lovers free the source of virtue in the soul.

See: Jealousy and possession (p. 23); Love and the lover (p. 28); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

ἔμψυχος

empsychos · Ensouled · lemma

Having soul; animated.

In the proof a body moved from within is ensouled. At the end Phaedrus calls the knowledgeable person's responsive speech living and ensouled. The latter use characterizes a discourse able to answer, defend itself and address the appropriate hearer.

Attested: ἔμψυχον (245e · Burnet p. 27) — "ensouled".

Attested: ἔμψυχον (276a · Burnet p. 68) — "ensouled".

See: Soul (p. 82)

ἐνθουσιάζω

enthousiazō · Be filled with a god · lemma

To be divinely inspired or possessed.

The many notice the philosopher's departure from ordinary business but miss that he is god-filled. Lovers later reach their god by memory and take habits from him while inspired. The edition's rendering preserves the divine element of the verb. Before the palinode Socrates had already forecast being inspired by the Nymphs if he continued his first speech (241e); the word's presence does not by itself certify a speech as correct.

Attested: ἐνθουσιάσω (241e · Burnet p. 21) — "I shall plainly be filled with the god". The English "plainly" comes from σαφῶς; the verb itself means future divine inspiration.

Attested: ἐνθουσιάζων (249d · Burnet p. 31) — "filled with the god".

Attested: ἐνθουσιῶντες (253a · Burnet p. 36) — "filled with the god".

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Madness and divine possession (p. 66)

ἐνθουσίασις

enthousiasis · Divine possession · lemma

A state or manner of being filled with a god.

Erotic madness is called best among these states for both its possessor and its partner. The superlative belongs to Socrates' encomium of this fourth madness, not a statement about every unregulated attachment.

Attested: ἐνθουσιάσεων (249e · Burnet p. 32) — "ways of being filled with the god".

See: Madness and divine possession (p. 66)

ἔξωθεν · ἔνδοθεν

exōthen · endothen · From outside and from within · paired adverbs

Contrasting sources from which recollecting is prompted.

In Thamus' claim, reliance on alien written marks produces outwardly prompted recollection instead of inward exercise. The same spatial contrast also has different roles elsewhere: self-motion's source at 245e and the final prayer's inner and outer goods at 279b. Those are contextual connections, not identical lexical arguments.

Attested: ἔξωθεν (275a · Burnet p. 67) — "from outside".

Attested: ἔνδοθεν (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “from within”. Contrasted with prompting from alien written marks.

See: Memory and reminding (p. 123); Writing and letters (p. 132)

ἐπάνοδος

epanodos · Recapitulation · dictionary headword

A return over what has been said at the speech’s end.

Phaedrus explains it as reminding the listeners in summary of each point. Different teachers give the ending different names, but Socrates treats the function as shared. The example supplies an ordinary and legitimate use of reminding before the writing myth’s more demanding distinction.
Attested: ἐπάνοδον (267d · Burnet p. 57) — “recapitulation”.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Memory and reminding (p. 123)

ἐπαντλέω

epantleō · Pour over · lemma

To pour liquid upon something.

The lovers pour what they draw from Zeus upon the beloved’s soul, making him as like their god as possible. The beloved’s soul is the recipient; the human lovers, not the god directly, perform the narrated pouring.
Attested: ἐπαντλοῦντες (253a · Burnet p. 36) — “pour it over”.

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Nourishment (p. 69)

ἐπέχω

epechō · Hold back · dictionary headword; verbal adjective attested

Refrain or check action; here, withhold speech at an unsuitable moment.

The verbal adjective at 272a belongs to the knowledge of when one should speak and when hold back. It makes restraint a positive part of complete rhetorical judgement. The entry does not claim that silence is always appropriate or that speaking is intrinsically suspect.
Attested: ἐπισχετέον (272a · Burnet p. 63) — “to hold back”.

See: Living speech and defence (p. 121); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108)

ἐπίγραμμα

epigramma · Inscription or epigram · dictionary headword

A short inscribed composition, here the verses attributed to Midas' tomb.

Socrates claims the lines can be rearranged without difference and uses them as a comparison for Lysias' sequence. The poem's bronze maiden promises continued announcement, but its role here is primarily compositional: a succession of lines is not yet a necessary order.

Attested: ἐπιγράμματος (264c · Burnet p. 52) — "epigram".

See: Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Writing and letters (p. 132)

Ἐπικράτης

Epikratēs · Epicrates · lemma

The host with whom Lysias is staying when Phaedrus visits.

Phaedrus locates Lysias with Epicrates at the nearby house of Morychus. Epicrates does not speak and has no further role in the conversation. The edition calls him an Athenian politician; that contextual note does not establish his opinions about the erotic speech.

Attested: Ἐπικράτει (227b · Burnet p. 1) — "Epicrates". Dative after "with".

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Lysias (p. 142)

ἐπιτήδευμα

epitēdeuma · Practice and way of life · lemma

A pursued practice, occupation or settled manner of living.

Zeus-like lovers may begin a pursuit they had not previously entered; they acquire their god's habits and practices and lead the beloved toward his way of life. Later political writers also prize their own pursuit. The noun is not inherently philosophical or virtuous.

Attested: ἐπιτηδεύματι (252e · Burnet p. 35) — "way of life".

Attested: ἐπιτηδεύματα (253a · Burnet p. 36) — "ways of life".

Attested: ἐπιτήδευμα (253b · Burnet p. 36) — "way of life".

Attested: ἐπιτηδεύματος (258b · Burnet p. 43) — "way of life".

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Philosophy (p. 71)

ἕπομαι

hepomai · Follow · lemma

To go after, accompany or be guided by another.

At 234d Socrates says he followed Phaedrus' visible enthusiasm for Lysias and joined his Bacchic revel. At 247a whoever is willing and able follows the divine procession. At 254e the repeatedly checked bad horse now follows the charioteer's forethought; the lover's soul then follows the darling in modesty and fear (254e–255a). The darling is the object of that final following, while modesty and fear describe its manner. Guide, object, conditions and manner determine the value of following; the verb alone does not certify a good allegiance.

Attested: εἱπόμην (234d · Burnet p. 11) — "I followed". Socrates says he followed Phaedrus' response.

Attested: ἕπεται (247a · Burnet p. 28) — "follows". Whoever is willing and able follows in the divine courses.

Attested: ἕπεται (254e · Burnet p. 38) — "follows". The humbled bad horse follows the charioteer's forethought.

Attested: ἕπεσθαι (254e–255a · Burnet p. 38) — "follows". The lover's soul follows the darling; modesty and fear describe its manner.

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Phaedrus (p. 148); Socrates (p. 152)

ἐποπτεύω

epopteuō · Behold as an initiate · lemma

To be admitted to or exercise the beholding of the mysteries.

Joined to "being initiated", the verb gives the former vision a ritual character. The edition explains the term through the title epoptai, the beholders; the lexicon's claim concerns that explicit language, not a reconstructed secret ritual.

Attested: ἐποπτεύοντες (250c · Burnet p. 32) — "admitted to the beholding of".

See: Initiation and mysteries (p. 57)

Ἐρατώ

Eratō · Erato · proper name

The Muse honoured in matters of love.

Named between the Muse of dances and the pair who receive philosophical activity, Erato gives matters of love a place within the differentiated service of the Muses.
Attested: Ἐρατοῖ (259d · Burnet p. 45) — "Erato".

See: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135)

ἐρημία

erēmia · Solitude · lemma

An absence of company or support.

Jealous lovers leave the boy in a solitude of friends, meaning deprived of friends. Later Phaedrus stresses that he and Socrates are alone in solitude while threatening to compel a speech. One use describes damaging social isolation, the other their secluded setting and its playful imbalance of power.
Attested: ἐρημίαν (232d · Burnet p. 8) — "a solitude". Qualified by the genitive "of friends".

Attested: ἐρημίᾳ (236c · Burnet p. 13) — "solitude". The two friends' secluded location.

See: Jealousy and possession (p. 23); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30)

Ἑστία

Hestia · Hestia · proper name

The goddess who remains in the gods' house.

Hestia alone stays while eleven divine divisions proceed. This exception is explicitly stated and prevents the general procession from being misreported as including every god without exception.
Attested: Ἑστία (247a · Burnet p. 28) — "Hestia".

See: Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55)

ἑταίρα

hetaira · Courtesan · lemma

A female companion invoked as another example of possible harm with pleasant company.

The first speech says one might censure a courtesan as harmful, then groups such examples by their capacity to be pleasant day to day. The modal wording is part of a comparison, not a developed argument about all

courtesans. Its purpose is the claimed absence of compensating pleasure in the older lover's company.

Attested: ἑταίραν (240b · Burnet p. 19) — "a courtesan". Object of the hypothetical act of censure.

See: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Pleasure and pain (p. 33)

εὐέπεια

euepeia · Fine diction · dictionary headword

The quality of speaking well or elegantly at the level of expression.

Licymnius' words are described as given to Polus for making fine diction. The possession of striking vocabulary belongs to the preliminary equipment of speech and remains distinct from the true account of its subject and the fitting of a whole.

Attested: εὐεπείας (267c · Burnet p. 56) — "fine diction".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

εὐήθεια

euētheia · Simple-mindedness · lemma

Uncritical simplicity or complacent naïveté, with different local values.

The early speeches dignify themselves despite saying nothing healthy or true; Socrates calls their simplicity urbane. Later he evokes the simplicity of people content to hear an oak or rock if it spoke truly. The second use does not simply repeat the insult: it can expose a sophisticated listener's misplaced concern with provenance.

Attested: εὐήθεια (242e · Burnet p. 22) — "simple-mindedness". The complacency of the two speeches.

Attested: εὐηθείας (275b · Burnet p. 67) — "simple-mindedness". The earlier hearers' simple concern for truth.

See: Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Truth (p. 116)

Εὐηνός

Euēnos · Evenus · proper name

The Parian credited with insinuation and incidental praises.

Socrates adds that some say he composed incidental censures in metre to help memory, and calls him wise. The shift from direct attribution to "some

say" is part of the source's evidential wording. The list is a dramatic survey of named techniques, not independent historical verification of inventions.
Attested: Εὐηνὸν (267a · Burnet p. 56) — "Evenus".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Memory and reminding (p. 123)

εὐπειθής

eupeithēs · Readily persuaded · lemma

Obedient or easily persuaded.

The good horse's obedience is directed to its charioteer. Later the adjective describes hearers susceptible to particular kinds of speeches for specified causes; neither use establishes that readiness to obey is always good irrespective of its object.
Attested: εὐπειθὴς (254a · Burnet p. 37) — "obedient".

Attested: εὐπειθεῖς (271d · Burnet p. 62) — "easily persuaded".

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47)

εὕρεσις

heuresis · Finding or invention · dictionary headword

The finding of material to say, distinguished from its arrangement.

At 236a Socrates allows that some argumentative material is unavoidable: when using that material, the speaker deserves praise for arrangement rather than discovery. Where material is not necessary and is hard to find, discovery too may deserve praise. The division of credits does not prove the anti-love premise on which the proposed speech proceeds.
Attested: εὕρεσιν (236a · Burnet p. 13) — "the finding".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

ζεῦγος

zeugos · Team · lemma

A yoked pair or team.

The soul is likened to the grown-together power of a winged team and driver. The pair's unequal composition, unlike the gods' teams, explains the difficulty of human guidance.
Attested: ζεύγους (246a · Burnet p. 27) — "team".

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47)

Ζεύς

Zeus · Zeus · proper name

The god leading and ordering the heavenly procession.

Zeus goes first, ordering and caring for all. Human followers of Zeus later seek philosophical and leading natures in their beloveds and draw divine habits into a shared life. The narrative makes the god a model for this group, not the sole model for all souls.

Attested: Ζεύς (246e · Burnet p. 28) — "Zeus".

Attested: Διὸς (252c · Burnet p. 35) — "Zeus".

Attested: Διὸς (253a · Burnet p. 36) — "Zeus".

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55)

ζωγραφία

zōgraphia · Painting · dictionary headword

The making of pictured living things, used as an analogy for writing.

Its offspring stand as if alive but remain silent when questioned. The comparison does not deny the pictures can resemble life; it distinguishes that resemblance from the power to answer. Written speeches likewise appear intelligent while repeating the same thing.

Attested: ζωγραφίᾳ (275d · Burnet p. 68) — "painting".

See: Living speech and defence (p. 121); Writing and letters (p. 132)

ζῷον

zōion · Animal or living creature · dictionary headword

A living creature used as the model for a speech's integrated body.

Every speech should have its own body, neither headless nor footless, with middle and extremities fitting each other and the whole. This concerns organized composition. The later "living and ensouled" account adds the distinct capacity to answer and defend itself.

Attested: ζῷον (264c · Burnet p. 52) — "animal".

See: Living speech and defence (p. 121); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

ἡγέομαι

hēgeomai · Believe and lead · lemma

To take something to be the case; elsewhere, to lead.

In Lysias' speech lovers believe they have already repaid the favour. In the heavenly procession the ruling gods act as leaders. These are distinct established constructions of the verb; the occurrence expressing belief should not automatically be glossed as governance of the soul.

Attested: ἡγοῦνται (231b · Burnet p. 6) — "they believe". Takes an infinitive concerning the favour repaid.

Attested: ἡγοῦνται (247a · Burnet p. 28) — "act as leaders". The ruling gods lead in their assigned ranks.

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Opinion and seeming (p. 105)

ἦθος

ēthos · Character · dictionary headword

The character or disposition in which further knowledgeable accounts grow.

At 277a the plural marks the different human settings for the seed's continuation. It must not be confused with ἔθος, habit, solely because the transliterations resemble one another. Here the image is growth of accounts in other characters through teaching.

Attested: ἤθεσι (277a · Burnet p. 70) — "characters".

See: Living speech and defence (p. 121); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127)

ἡνία

hēnia · Reins · lemma

Reins used to direct and restrain a team.

When memory sees beauty with temperance, the recoil pulls back the reins so violently that both horses sit on their haunches. The good horse submits willingly; the insolent one does not.

Attested: ἡνίας (254c · Burnet p. 37) — "reins".

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Reverence (p. 35)

ἡνίοχος

hēniochos · Charioteer · lemma

The driver who holds the reins.

The image assigns leadership and recollective vision to the driver, but the driver can fail: bad charioteering causes damage in the heavenly scramble. At 254b his memory of beauty checks the rush toward sexual gratification.

Attested: ἡνιόχου (246a · Burnet p. 27) — "charioteer".

Attested: ἡνίοχος (253e · Burnet p. 37) — "charioteer".

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47)

Ἥρα

Hēra · Hera · proper name

The goddess whose followers seek a kingly beloved.

The palinode gives Hera's followers a corresponding royal ideal. Burnet prints the corrected divine name rather than the corrupt "day" in B and T.

Attested: Ἥρας (253b · Burnet p. 36) — "Hera".

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50)

Ἡρόδικος

Hērodikos · Herodicus · lemma

The authority invoked for an extravagantly long walk.

Socrates would follow Phaedrus to Megara and back, as Herodicus would have it, if that won him the hearing of the speech. The edition identifies Herodicus as a trainer and doctor. The immediate point is Socrates' appetite for hearing rather than a prescription the conversation puts into practice.

Attested: Ἡρόδικον (227d · Burnet p. 2) — "Herodicus". Accusative in the phrase attributing the proposed regimen.

See: Desire (p. 16); Leisure and walking (p. 139)

ἦτριον

ētrion · Warp · dictionary headword

The warp or web of a fabric, imagined as showing gaps when held to the light.

After Phaedrus acknowledges the handbooks' considerable force among crowds, Socrates asks whether their warp seems to stand apart. The medical,

tragic and musical comparisons expose the missing connections. The image criticizes an incomplete organization rather than denying every thread has a use.

Attested: ἧτριον (268a · Burnet p. 57) — "warp".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

ἠχώ

ēchō · Echo · lemma

A reflected sound.

A breath or echo rebounding from smooth solid things illustrates beauty's return current. This is an explicit comparison: the soul's stream is not said literally to be sound.

Attested: ἠχὼ (255c · Burnet p. 39) — "echo".

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14)

θαλλός

thallos · Green branch · lemma

Fresh plant-growth used to lure a hungry animal.

Speeches in books are to Socrates what a green branch or fruit is to livestock. Phaedrus can lead the eager listener anywhere by holding them out. The comparison shows the direction of influence before the speeches analyze the person ruled by appetite.

Attested: θαλλὸν (230d · Burnet p. 6) — "a green branch". One of the objects shaken before hungry livestock.

See: Desire (p. 16); Leisure and walking (p. 139); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30)

Θαμοῦς

Thamous · Thamus · proper name

The judging king in the Egyptian story.

He asks each invention's benefit and evaluates Theuth's claims. His corrective judgement gives letters a role in reminding while disputing their promised production of memory and wisdom. The nearby reference to Ammon is textually and interpretively difficult; the king's spoken role is clear without forcing that identification.

Attested: Θαμοῦ (274d · Burnet p. 66) — “Thamus”.

See: Drug, remedy and enchantment (p. 119); Memory and reminding (p. 123); Writing and letters (p. 132)

Θεόδωρος

Theodōros · Theodorus · proper name

The Byzantine teacher associated with a multiplication of speech-parts.

Phaedrus identifies the speech-Daedalus as Theodorus. Confirmation and further confirmation, refutation and further refutation exemplify his refined nomenclature. He is also mentioned in the playful earlier comparison of modern teachers with Homeric speakers; the dialogue does not reconstruct his complete handbook.

Attested: Θεόδωρον (266e · Burnet p. 55) — “Theodorus”.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

θεραπεύω

therapeuō · Tend or attend · lemma

To devote care or service to someone or something.

The non-lover promises not to tend present pleasure alone, but future benefit. The first Socratic speech asks how an admirer will tend the beloved’s body; the palinode presents a boy genuinely tended as a peer of the gods. The object decides whether the care serves appetite, health or the beloved’s good.

Attested: θεραπεύων (233b · Burnet p. 9) — “tending”. Present pleasure is the object.

Attested: θεραπεύσει (239c · Burnet p. 17) — “will tend”. The lover’s tending of the beloved’s body.

Attested: θεραπευόμενος (255a · Burnet p. 38) — “is tended”. Passive: the beloved receives genuine care.

See: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Friendship (p. 18); Love and the lover (p. 28)

θερίζω

therizō · Reap · dictionary headword

Harvest what has been sown; figuratively, receive the results of persuasion.

Socrates asks what fruit rhetoric would reap after persuading a city to act badly while calling bad good. The question is conditional on this practice

and its ignorance, not a declaration that every exercise of rhetoric must bear a bad crop.
Attested: θερίζειν (260d · Burnet p. 46) — “reap”.

See: Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127)

θεσμός

thesmos · Ordinance · lemma

An authoritative enactment or ordinance.

The ordinance of Adrasteia assigns protection to a soul that follows a god and sees something true; its continuing protection is conditional on continuing ability to do so. The next conditions describe failure, descent and first embodiment.
Attested: θεσμός (248c · Burnet p. 30) — “ordinance”.

See: Fate and choice of life (p. 52)

Θεύθ

Theuth · Theuth · proper name

The inventor in Socrates’ Egyptian story, father of letters.

He presents number, calculation, geometry, astronomy, draughts, dice and letters to the king. His claim that letters confer memory and wisdom is challenged by Thamus. The dialogue distinguishes the power to invent from the ability to judge effects on future users, rather than treating paternal goodwill as reliable evaluation.
Attested: Θεύθ (274c · Burnet p. 66) — “Theuth”.

See: Drug, remedy and enchantment (p. 119); Memory and reminding (p. 123); Writing and letters (p. 132)

θοίνη

thoinē · Banquet · lemma

A feast, literal in an image and applied to the enjoyment of speeches.

Socrates cannot bear to lose the banquet of speeches threatened by Phaedrus’ oath. The palinode later sends gods and souls towards their repast and banquet before the vision beyond heaven. The shared vocabulary lets nourishment describe both immediate listening and a more demanding satisfaction of the soul.

Attested: θοίνης (236e · Burnet p. 14) — “banquet”. Socrates’ reason for yielding.

Attested: θοίνην (247a–b · Burnet p. 28) — “banquet”. The heavenly procession’s destination.

See: Desire (p. 16); Nourishment (p. 69); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30)

Θρασύμαχος

Thrasymachos · Thrasymachus · proper name

A named teacher used to test what teaching rhetoric would truly require.

He is associated with the power of piteous appeals, angering crowds, calming them and handling slander, under the title “the might of the Chalcedonian” (267c–d). Later Socrates says that Thrasymachus or anyone teaching seriously must set out soul’s nature and causal responsiveness. This is a requirement, not a report that his handbook has already done so.

Attested: Θρασύμαχός (271a · Burnet p. 61) — “Thrasymachus”.

See: Nature, whole and part (p. 103); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

θρέμμα

thremma · Livestock and creatures reared · lemma

A creature maintained or reared, here an animal attracted by food.

The hungry livestock comparison makes Socrates the follower whose desire supplies a lead. In the first speech the word returns for creatures or persons of a sort who can be harmful yet pleasant company. The noun is broader than cattle and does not specify one animal species.

Attested: θρέμματα (230d · Burnet p. 6) — “livestock”. The hungry animals in the lure image.

Attested: θρεμμάτων (240b · Burnet p. 19) — “creatures”. Kinds compared with the harmful lover.

See: Desire (p. 16); Pleasure and pain (p. 33)

Ἴβυκος

Ibykos · Ibycus · lemma

The poet whose words help Socrates describe his unease about offending the gods.

Socrates says he was abashed in Ibycus’ terms, fearing that by error before the gods he might gain human honour in exchange. The citation marks the

competing audiences of the speech: approval from people may accompany an offence against a higher standard. The edition identifies the lyric poet and fragment.

Attested: Ἴβυκον (242c · Burnet p. 22) — "Ibycus". Accusative in the phrase introducing the quoted words.

See: Palinode and purification (p. 146); Shame and shamelessness (p. 37); The daimonic sign (p. 155)

ἰδιώτης

idiōtēs · Private person or amateur · lemma

Someone speaking outside the corresponding professional or poetic expertise.

Phaedrus calls himself an amateur beside Lysias, and Socrates repeats the contrast before improvising. Later the word identifies the writer without metre in contrast with the poet. The local oppositions differ; the English "private person" should not be mistaken for a fixed claim that these speakers possess no abilities or public connections.

Attested: ἰδιώτην (228a · Burnet p. 2) — "a private person". Phaedrus contrasts himself with Lysias.

Attested: ἰδιώτης (236d · Burnet p. 14) — "a private person". Socrates describes his own improvisation.

Attested: ἰδιώτης (258d · Burnet p. 44) — "a private person". Contrasted with writing in metre as a poet.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Phaedrus (p. 148); Socrates (p. 152); Writing and letters (p. 132)

ἱερόν

hieron · Sanctuary · lemma

A place sacred to a god or gods.

Socrates infers from the figures that the site is sacred to Nymphs and Achelous. His wording presents an inference from visible evidence. The conversation later credits the local gods with its speeches and ends by praying to the gods of the place.

Attested: ἱερὸν (230b · Burnet p. 5) — "sanctuary". Substantivized neuter adjective; the inferred sacred site.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74)

Ἰλισός

Ilisos · Ilissus · lemma

The river beside which the conversation takes place.

Socrates proposes turning aside along the Ilissus before the men choose a resting-place. The river gives Phaedrus a setting for the Boreas question and later becomes the threshold Socrates is about to cross when the sign checks him. The edition locates it outside the south-eastern walls.

Attested: Ἴλισὸν (229a · Burnet p. 3) — "Ilissus". Accusative after the phrase "along".

Attested: Ἰλισοῦ (229b · Burnet p. 4) — "Ilissus". Genitive in the question about Oreithyia's abduction.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Myth and rationalization (p. 144); The daimonic sign (p. 155)

ἱμάτιον

himation · Cloak · lemma

The garment concealing Phaedrus' copy of Lysias.

Socrates asks what Phaedrus holds under his cloak with his left hand, exposing the book and frustrating the planned rehearsal. In Tisias' later example a cloak is what the attacker takes from his victim. An ordinary object serves first the play of concealment and later a forensic hypothetical.

Attested: ἱματίῳ (228d · Burnet p. 3) — "cloak". Dative after "under".

Attested: ἱμάτιον (273b · Burnet p. 64) — "cloak". The object stolen in the imagined court case.

See: Likelihood and the plausible (p. 99); Lysias (p. 142); Phaedrus (p. 148)

ἵμερος

himeros · Longing · lemma

Longing imagined as the incoming flow of beauty.

Socrates links the name in wordplay with particles coming and flowing from the boy. The myth's fluid physiology makes longing a force that warms and waters the wing-growth; it is also what returns toward the beloved at 255c.

Attested: ἵμερος (251c · Burnet p. 34) — "longing".

Attested: ἵμερον (255c · Burnet p. 39) — "longing".

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Longing and yearning (p. 25)

Ἱππίας

Hippias · Hippias · proper name

The stranger from Elis whom Socrates thinks would agree with Prodicus.

His role in this passage is brief and modal: Socrates thinks he would cast the same vote. The text does not quote a speech by him or enumerate his arts. The point is support for a fitting measure rather than mere longness or shortness.

Attested: Ἱππίαν (267b · Burnet p. 56) — “Hippias”.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108)

Ἱπποκράτης

Hippokratēs · Hippocrates · proper name

The Asclepiad invoked for a medical method attentive to the whole.

Phaedrus introduces the appeal to him; Socrates says the account too must be examined for agreement. Thus a recognized name is not a substitute for testing the method. The passage does not name a particular Hippocratic treatise, and the edition notes uncertainty about any specific writing intended.

Attested: Ἱπποκράτει (270c · Burnet p. 60) — “Hippocrates”.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

ἵππος

hippos · Horse · lemma

A horse; in the soul-likeness, one of the two powers driven together.

The good horse loves honour with temperance and modesty and heeds words; the bad horse resists reins and presses the others toward gratification. Both belong within the likeness of one soul, rather than being two external companions.

Attested: ἵπποι (246a · Burnet p. 27) — “horses”.

Attested: ἵππος (247b · Burnet p. 28) — “horse”.

Attested: ἵππων (253d · Burnet p. 36) — “horses”.

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47)

κακία

kakia · Vice and badness · lemma

Badness or defect, including moral vice and failed guidance.

Vice of charioteers damages souls in the heavenly struggle. Forgetfulness and vice weigh a soul down. The good and bad horses are defined through their excellence and vice, and the philosophical pair subdue the source of vice within themselves.

Attested: κακίᾳ (248b · Burnet p. 30) — "vice".

Attested: κακίας (248c · Burnet p. 30) — "vice".

Attested: κακία (253d · Burnet p. 36) — "vice".

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Justice and virtue (p. 63)

κάλαμος

kalamos · Reed pen · dictionary headword

A reed used as the instrument of writing.

The writer is imagined sowing through a reed into black water. The instrument belongs to the written garden's material production; it does not by itself give the account a power to defend itself or teach adequately.

Attested: καλάμου (276c · Burnet p. 69) — "reed pen".

See: Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127); Writing and letters (p. 132)

Καλλιόπη

Kalliopē · Calliope · proper name

The eldest Muse in the cicada tale.

Together with Urania, she hears reports of people who live in philosophy and honour their music. Their special concern includes heaven and speeches divine and human.

Attested: Καλλιόπη (259d · Burnet p. 45) — "Calliope".

See: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135)

κάλλος

kallos · Beauty · lemma

Beauty, the quality seen in the beloved and recalled as itself.

Beauty has the distinctive share of being manifest to bodily sight while its prior reality is recalled. It should be distinguished from the adjective kalos, which also judges actions, speeches and lives as fine or beautiful.
Attested: κάλλος (249d · Burnet p. 32) — “beauty”.

Attested: κάλλους (254b · Burnet p. 37) — “of beauty”.

See: Beauty (p. 42)

καλός

kalos · Beautiful and fine · lemma

Beautiful, fine or admirable, of appearances, deeds, people and speech.

The riverside is beautiful, the good horse beautiful and good, and good speaking and writing beautiful rather than shameful. The closing prayer asks for beauty within: the adjective’s reach is wider than the visual attraction explained under kallos.
Attested: καλή (230b · Burnet p. 5) — “beautiful”.

Attested: καλός (246b · Burnet p. 27) — “beautiful”.

Attested: καλὸν (277d · Burnet p. 71) — “beautiful”.

Attested: καλῷ (279b · Burnet p. 73) — “beautiful”.

See: Beauty (p. 42)

καρπός

karpos · Fruit · lemma

Produce used as food, and the result one metaphorically reaps.

Fruit helps lure the animal in the opening image. The later question about the fruit rhetoric will reap from persuading an ignorant city to evil transfers the image from appetite to consequences. The object obtained depends on what has been cultivated, not merely on the effectiveness of persuasion.
Attested: καρπὸν (230d · Burnet p. 6) — “fruit”. A lure for hungry livestock.

See: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Desire (p. 16); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127)

κατοκωχή

katokōchē · Seizure · lemma

A taking hold or possession.

The Muses seize a tender and untrodden soul, rouse it into song and use poetry's adornment of past deeds to educate later people. The word identifies the poet's source of animation rather than the metrical competence of the finished poem.
Attested: κατοκωχή (245a · Burnet p. 25) — "seizure".

See: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135); Madness and divine possession (p. 66)

κάτοπτρον

katoptron · Mirror · lemma

A mirror.

The beloved sees himself in the lover as in a mirror, without realizing that he does so. This comparison follows the return of the stream of beauty: the image locates reciprocity in an unrecognized reflection, not in an explicit theory developed by the boy.
Attested: κατόπτρῳ (255d · Burnet p. 39) — "mirror".

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14)

καυλός

kaulos · Shaft and stem · lemma

A stem or stalk; also the shaft of a feather.

The shaft of the wing swells and grows from a root beneath the soul's whole form. The double vocabulary of plant growth and feather growth supplies a concrete picture of regeneration.
Attested: καυλὸς (251b · Burnet p. 33) — "shaft".

See: Wing and flight (p. 85)

κέντρον

kentron · Goad · lemma

A sharp driving point or sting; figuratively an urgent prick of desire or pain.

Goads belong to the harness scene, but the growing wing also goads the soul from within and yearning fills the charioteer with goads. The word lets mechanical restraint and involuntary erotic pressure confront each other.
Attested: κέντρων (251e · Burnet p. 34) — "goads".

Attested: κέντρων (253e · Burnet p. 37) — "goads".

Attested: κέντρων (254a · Burnet p. 37) — “goads”.

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Longing and yearning (p. 25)

κλήρωσις

klērōsis · Allotment · lemma

An allocation by lot.

At the thousandth year souls come to the allotment and choice of a second life. The paired nouns preserve both an allotted framework and each soul’s choosing; the passage does not explain every detail of their relation.

Attested: κλήρωσίν (249b · Burnet p. 31) — “allotment”.

See: Fate and choice of life (p. 52)

κνῆσις

knēsis · Itching · lemma

An itching irritation.

Socrates names itching and vexation about the gums of those cutting teeth before applying the comparison to the wing-growing soul. Burnet prints the form supported by T, while B and W have kinēsis, “movement”, in the apparatus.

Attested: κνῆσίς (251c · Burnet p. 34) — “itching”.

See: Wing and flight (p. 85)

κόλαξ

kolax · Flatterer · lemma

A harmful companion whose company can nevertheless be immediately pleasant.

The first speech calls the flatterer a dreadful beast and great harm, while conceding an admixture of pleasure. The comparison strengthens its attack on the possessive lover: he is alleged to provide neither long-term good nor even the everyday pleasure that some bad companions supply.

Attested: κόλακι (240b · Burnet p. 18) — “a flatterer”. Dative in the example of harm mixed with pleasure.

See: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Pleasure and pain (p. 33)

κολλάω · ἀφαιρέω

kollaō · aphaireō · Gluing and taking away · paired verbs

Joining pieces together and removing them in the revision of a composition.

Socrates describes a writer who turns his material over for a long time, gluing and subtracting, yet has nothing more precious than the resulting text. Revision itself is not forbidden. The criticism concerns what the writer lacks beyond the worked product.

Attested: κολλῶν (278e · Burnet p. 72) — "gluing".

Attested: ἀφαιρῶν (278e · Burnet p. 72) — "taking away". Second operation in the description of textual revision.

See: Wisdom and the names of a writer (p. 130); Writing and letters (p. 132)

κομψός

kompsos · Refined or ingenious · word family

Cleverly accomplished, elegant or pleasingly arranged.

Phaedrus credits Lysias with refinement for reversing the expected choice of lover. Socrates later calls the grass's convenient slope the most refined feature of the setting. Moving the word from professional ingenuity to bodily comfort gently shifts the scale on which the reader hears the original praise.

Attested: κεκόμψευται (227c · Burnet p. 2) — "has been refined". Verb describing Lysias' clever reversal.

Attested: κομψότατον (230c · Burnet p. 5) — "most refined". Superlative applied to the grass's arrangement.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Lysias (p. 142)

κόρη

korē · Girls and votive figures · lemma

A girl, or a figure representing a girl.

Phaedrus describes waters fit for girls to play beside; Socrates then infers a sanctuary from the girls and statues at their stopping-place. The edition explains the latter girls as votive figures. The change from living children to representations is a local change of referent, not a new philosophical meaning of the noun.

Attested: κόραις (229b · Burnet p. 4) — "girls". Those imagined playing by the stream.

Attested: κορῶν (230b · Burnet p. 5) — "girls". The figures from which Socrates infers a sanctuary.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Myth and rationalization (p. 144)

κρίνω

krinō · Judge or discriminate · dictionary headword

Determine or evaluate the effect and worth of something.

Thamus distinguishes the ability to give birth to a craft's products from the ability to judge their harm and benefit for users. The future users, not only the inventor, are the recipients whose outcome must be assessed. This applies the dialogue's recurring demand for discrimination to innovation itself.

Attested: κρῖναι (274e · Burnet p. 67) — "judge".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Writing and letters (p. 132)

κυλινδέομαι

kylindeomai · Roll about · dictionary headword

Move about without discriminating one destination from another.

Once written, a speech rolls everywhere among expert and unsuitable recipients alike. The metaphor names indiscriminate circulation, not a literal physical action required of every book. Its limitation is the absence of the judgement of audience demanded by the rhetorical craft.

Attested: κυλινδεῖται (275e · Burnet p. 68) — "rolls about".

See: Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108); Writing and letters (p. 132)

λανθάνω

lanthanō · Escape notice · lemma

To be unobserved or fail to be recognized, sometimes by oneself.

Those beginning inquiry can fail to notice their own ignorance. The boy fails to notice that the recovered lover has changed; the beloved later fails to recognize himself in the lover's mirror. With a supplementary participle the Greek often says that someone does something without noticing it, not that the action is unreal.

Attested: λέληθεν (237c · Burnet p. 15) — “it escapes the notice”. The many do not recognize their ignorance.

Attested: λέληθεν (241a · Burnet p. 20) — “has escaped his darling’s notice”. The lover’s change remains unrecognized.

Attested: λέληθεν (255d · Burnet p. 39) — “it escapes his notice”. The beloved sees himself without recognizing it.

Attested: ἔλαθον (259c · Burnet p. 44) — “escaped their own notice”. The singers died without noticing.

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Self-knowledge (p. 150)

λειμών

leimōn · Meadow · lemma

A meadow providing pasture.

The meadow “there” supplies fitting nourishment for the soul’s best part and the wing. Its scenic concreteness belongs to the myth, alongside the explicit claim that the reality seen is colourless and intangible.

Attested: λειμῶνος (248b · Burnet p. 30) — “meadow”.

See: Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55); Nourishment (p. 69)

Λικύμνιος

Likymnios · Licymnius · proper name represented by related adjective

The name behind words said to have been supplied for Polus’ fine diction.

The continuous text uses an adjective formed from the name, not the personal-name lemma displayed here. Its function is to identify a source of vocabulary within the technical catalogue. No general theory of Licymnius is supplied by the dialogue.

Attested: Λικυμνίων (267c · Burnet p. 56) — “of Licymnius”. Adjectival attribution of words to Licymnius.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

λογισμός

logismos · Reasoning · lemma

Reasoning or calculation.

At 249b–c many perceptions are gathered into one by reasoning; Socrates immediately identifies this understanding as recollection. The instrumental dative makes reasoning the means of gathering, not a separate visible object.
Attested: λογισμῷ (249b–c · Burnet p. 31) — "by reasoning".

See: Intellect and seeing (p. 60); Recollection (p. 76)

λύκος

lykos · Wolf · lemma

The predatory animal in the first speech's final comparison.

Lovers' apparent affection is compared with wolves' fondness for lambs: the intended good is food for the lover, not the beloved's flourishing. Later Socrates asks to hear the wolf's side too before examining a shortcut to rhetoric. That proverb grants an opposing case a hearing rather than erasing the earlier image's accusation.
Attested: λύκοι (241d · Burnet p. 20) — "wolves". Subject of the comparison with lovers.

Attested: λύκου (272c · Burnet p. 63) — "wolf". The proverbial opposing side that should be heard.

See: Friendship (p. 18); Likelihood and the plausible (p. 99); Love and the lover (p. 28)

μάγειρος

mageiros · Butcher · dictionary headword

A cook or butcher, here someone whose bad cutting damages an articulated body.

The bad butcher breaks parts instead of cutting at the joints. The analogy instructs the inquirer to respect the natural articulations of the subject. It does not say that division should be violent or that classifications are arbitrary cuts.
Attested: μαγείρου (265e · Burnet p. 54) — "butcher".

See: Form, collection and division (p. 94); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

μάθημα

mathēma · Study or lesson · dictionary headword

Something learned; here a necessary preliminary study.

Socrates separates the lessons before harmony, tragedy, medicine or rhetoric from the complete art. In the writing myth Theuth also calls letters a study. Learning a component can be real without constituting mastery of the organized whole.

Attested: μαθήματα (268e · Burnet p. 58) — "studies".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96)

μανία

mania · Madness · lemma

A condition of being beside one's ordinary state; in the dialogue divided into diseased and divine kinds.

The palinode does not merely reverse "madness bad" into "madness good". It proposes that the greatest goods come through madness when given by a god; the later review formally distinguishes human disease from divine departure from accustomed ways.

Attested: μανίαν (244b · Burnet p. 25) — "madness".

Attested: μανίας (249d · Burnet p. 32) — "madness".

Attested: Μανίας (265a · Burnet p. 53) — "madness".

See: Madness and divine possession (p. 66)

μαντική

mantikē · Divination · lemma

Prophetic discernment, named as a craft.

Socrates' wordplay makes mantikē the altered name of manikē, the craft of madness. The comparison elevates inspired prophecy over the sober inference he associates with bird-signs; it is offered as ancient testimony, in a playful etymological argument.

Attested: μαντικὴν (244c · Burnet p. 25) — "mantikē".

Attested: μαντικὴ (244d · Burnet p. 25) — "mantikē".

See: Madness and divine possession (p. 66)

μαρτυρία

martyria · Testimony · dictionary headword

Witness testimony supplied with the narration.

The plural names a recognized forensic resource in the technical catalogue. The entry records its local role without treating the whole

handbook list as a complete or endorsed theory of proof. At 260e, by contrast, arguments themselves are personified as witnesses.
Attested: μαρτυρίας (266e · Burnet p. 55) — “testimonies”.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

μάστιξ

mastix · Whip · lemma

A whip for driving or correction.

The bad horse barely yields even to whip and goads. At the sight of the beloved it ceases to heed them altogether, showing that possession of disciplinary instruments is not yet effective self-command.
Attested: μάστιγι (253e · Burnet p. 37) — “whip”.

Attested: μάστιγος (254a · Burnet p. 37) — “whip”.

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47)

Μέγαρα

Megara · Megara · lemma

The distant endpoint in Socrates’ extravagant promise to follow Phaedrus.

Socrates says he will not be left behind even if Phaedrus walks to Megara, reaches its wall and returns as Herodicus recommends. The point is the intensity of his wish to hear, not a proposal to take that journey. The edition gives the approximate distance as forty kilometres.
Attested: Μέγαράδε (227d · Burnet p. 2) — “to Megara”. Directional form, not the citation-form place-name.

See: Desire (p. 16); Leisure and walking (p. 139)

μέθοδος

methodos · Method or route of inquiry · dictionary headword

A directed way of pursuing understanding or an art.

Socrates contrasts the route of Lysias and Thrasymachus with the inquiry into nature. A method that omits the relevant powers of acting and undergoing resembles a blind person’s journey. The repeated roads and circuits connect intellectual procedure with the dialogue’s walking setting.
Attested: μέθοδος (270d · Burnet p. 61) — “method”.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

μέλας

melas · Black; black water · dictionary headword

Black, qualifying the water in which the writer metaphorically sows.

The adjective makes the water ink: a person writes through a reed pen. Socrates says the knower does not entrust serious cultivation to these self-defenceless speeches alone, while allowing gardens in letters for play and reminders. The noun "ink" is explanatory, not a separate displayed Greek noun here.

Attested: μέλανι (276c · Burnet p. 69) — "black".

See: Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127); Writing and letters (p. 132)

μεσημβρία

mesēmbria · Midday · lemma

The time when heat discourages departure and tests wakefulness.

Phaedrus asks Socrates to remain through the standing midday heat. Later the cicadas might laugh if the friends sleep like sheep rather than converse. The final lessening of heat permits their departure. Time and bodily circumstance help structure the argument's opportunities.

Attested: μεσημβρία (242a · Burnet p. 21) — "midday". Phaedrus' reason to wait.

Attested: μεσημβρίᾳ (259a · Burnet p. 44) — "midday". The condition in the cicadas' imagined observation.

See: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135); Leisure and walking (p. 139)

μεταβιβάζω

metabibazō · Lead across by stages · dictionary headword

Move someone from one position to another.

The relevant motion is argumentative: the operator leads a hearer little by little through similarities from what is to its opposite. The infinitive's complement gives the deception its direction; "deceive" is not the unrestricted dictionary meaning of the verb.

Attested: μεταβιβάζειν (262b · Burnet p. 49) — "leading over".

See: Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Similarity and deception (p. 114)

μεταγιγνώσκω

metagignōskō · Change one's mind · lemma

To revise an earlier judgement or decision.

Lysias contrasts lovers' regret with the non-lovers, for whom he says there is no fitting occasion to change their minds. The claim supports his promise of stability because their benefactions were deliberate. It does not establish that revising a judgement is always a vice: Socrates' later recantation makes correction necessary.

Attested: μεταγνῶναι (231a · Burnet p. 6) — "change their minds". Aorist infinitive in the denial about non-lovers.

See: Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Palinode and purification (p. 146)

μεταμέλει

metamelei · Regret · impersonal citation form

An impersonal construction for regretting an earlier act.

The opening charge against lovers says that they regret the good they have done once desire ceases. The construction puts the regret in relation to its experiencers and the past benefactions. The assertion belongs to Lysias' interested comparison and is later answered by the possibility of love that produces enduring friendship.

Attested: μεταμέλει (231a · Burnet p. 6) — "regret". Impersonal verb with the lovers as experiencers.

See: Friendship (p. 18); Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Love and the lover (p. 28)

μέτριος

metrios · Measured or moderate · dictionary headword

Having an appropriate measure rather than an extreme of length.

Prodicus claims that the needed speeches are moderate, not long or short. Phaedrus answers with conspicuous praise. The anecdote gives a corrective to verbal extremes but does not itself supply the account of souls and occasions required later.

Attested: μετρίων (267b · Burnet p. 56) — "moderate".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108)

Μίδας

Midas · Midas · proper name

The Phrygian named as the recipient of a tomb inscription.

Socrates reports that some say the quoted epigram was inscribed for Midas. The attribution is reported, not independently certified. No gold-touch story enters this passage; the relevant image is the bronze maiden and the interchangeability of the poem's lines.

Attested: Μίδᾳ (264c · Burnet p. 52) — "Midas".

See: Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Writing and letters (p. 132)

μιμέομαι

mimeomai · Imitate · lemma

To make oneself or something like a model.

The lover honours and imitates the god he formerly followed. He then tries, through persuasion and training, to bring his beloved toward that likeness. At 251a the godlike face has already imitated beauty well, giving the present encounter its recollective force.

Attested: μεμιμημένον (251a · Burnet p. 33) — "imitates".

Attested: μιμούμενος (252d · Burnet p. 35) — "imitating".

Attested: μιμούμενοι (253b · Burnet p. 36) — "imitating".

See: Beauty (p. 42); Divine following and imitation (p. 50)

μοῖρα

moira · Portion · lemma

An allotted share or portion.

Madness may come by divine portion; just or unjust life changes a soul's share for better or worse; beauty receives the special share of being conspicuous and lovable. The noun does not always name an inexorable destiny independent of conduct.

Attested: μοίρᾳ (244c · Burnet p. 25) — "portion".

Attested: μοίρας (248e · Burnet p. 31) — "portion".

Attested: μοῖραν (250d · Burnet p. 33) — "portion".

See: Beauty (p. 42); Fate and choice of life (p. 52)

Μόρυχος

Morychos · Morychus · name represented by adjectival form

The name attached to the house where the morning's gathering took place.

The Greek uses an adjectival description of the house, rendered "the house of Morychus". The edition identifies Morychus as a gourmand mocked by comic poets. In the dialogue the practical function is simply to locate Lysias' gathering near the Olympieion.

Attested: Μορυχίᾳ (227b · Burnet p. 1) — "the house of Morychus".

Adjectival dative agreeing with house, not the personal name in citation form.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Lysias (p. 142)

Μοῦσα

Mousa · Muse · proper name

A divine source or patron of song and cultivated activity.

The Muses' possession creates inspired poetry; in the cicada story different Muses receive reports of their particular honours. Calliope and Urania are linked with philosophy and discourse about heaven, gods and people.

Attested: Μουσῶν (245a · Burnet p. 25) — "Muses".

Attested: Μούσας (259b · Burnet p. 44) — "Muses".

See: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135); Madness and divine possession (p. 66)

μυέω

myeō · Initiate · lemma

To initiate into rites; here used of the souls admitted to their former vision.

The souls are initiated into whole, simple, unmoving and happy apparitions in clean light. The present participle within a recollected past scene describes their participation in the mystery-like beholding.

Attested: μυούμενοί (250c · Burnet p. 32) — "being initiated into".

See: Initiation and mysteries (p. 57)

νᾶμα

nama · Streams received through hearing · lemma

Flowing water used as an image for material received from other speakers.

The streams belong to others, and hearing is the channel by which Socrates says he was filled. The qualification that he has forgotten how and from whom he heard prevents the image from identifying a source. Phaedrus wants the performance and dismisses the question of provenance.

Attested: ναμάτων (235c–d · Burnet p. 12) — "streams". Plural, qualified as other people's.

See: Memory and reminding (p. 123); Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Socrates (p. 152)

νέκταρ

nektar · Nectar · lemma

The drink given to the divine horses.

The driver supplies nectar in addition to ambrosia after returning within heaven. The feeding concludes the orderly divine circuit against which the difficulties of other souls are measured.

Attested: νέκταρ (247e · Burnet p. 29) — "nectar".

See: Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55); Nourishment (p. 69)

νεοτελής

neotelēs · Newly perfected · lemma

Newly initiated or perfected.

The person who is not newly perfected, or has been corrupted, does not move swiftly from a present likeness to beauty itself. The negative condition prepares the contrast with the freshly perfected spectator.

Attested: νεοτελὴς (250e · Burnet p. 33) — "newly perfected". Qualified by μὴ, "not".

See: Beauty (p. 42); Initiation and mysteries (p. 57)

Νέστωρ · Ὀδυσσεύς

Nestōr · Odysseus · Nestor and Odysseus · paired proper names

Heroic speaker-names used playfully for alleged authors of rhetorical crafts at Troy.

Phaedrus does not recognize the supposed handbooks and suggests that Socrates means contemporary teachers under heroic names. Socrates answers "perhaps" and passes on. The passage should not be presented as evidence that Homeric heroes historically wrote manuals of rhetoric.

Attested: Νέστορος (261b · Burnet p. 47) — "Nestor".

Attested: Ὀδυσσέως (261b · Burnet p. 47) — "Odysseus". Paired with Nestor in the playful handbook attribution.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

νομή

nomē · Pasture · lemma

Pasturage or food obtained by grazing.

The pasture proper to the soul's best part comes from the meadow of truth. The image makes the object of vision sustaining and explains why the souls strain to see it.

Attested: νομὴ (248b · Burnet p. 30) — "pasture".

See: Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55); Nourishment (p. 69)

νομίζω

nomizō · Hold or believe · lemma

To regard something as so, including a socially accepted valuation.

Lysias' speaker opens by saying how he holds the proposed relationship advantageous. Socrates later accepts what is customarily held about the local legends while pursuing self-inquiry. In the final prayer he asks to regard the wise person as rich. The verb records a stance; it does not itself prove the stance true.

Attested: νομίζω (230e · Burnet p. 6) — "I hold". The interested speaker's estimate of advantage.

Attested: νομιζομένῳ (230a · Burnet p. 5) — "what is held". Received belief about the legends.

Attested: νομίζοιμι (279c · Burnet p. 73) — "may I hold". Socrates' wished-for valuation of wealth.

See: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Opinion and seeming (p. 105); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74)

νοσέω

noseō · Be sick · lemma

To be ill, used both playfully of speech-hunger and polemically of love.

Socrates imagines himself as sick for hearing speeches; Lysias' lovers supposedly admit sickness rather than temperance. Phaedrus later permits Socrates to assume the lover is sicker for the proposed contest. The palinode distinguishes human disease from divine departure, so the hostile diagnosis cannot be treated as the dialogue's unqualified final account of love.

Attested: *νοσοῦντι* (228b · Burnet p. 2) — "the one who is sick". Socrates' playful self-description.

Attested: *νοσεῖν* (231d · Burnet p. 7) — "are sick". Reported admission in Lysias' argument.

Attested: *νοσεῖν* (236a–b · Burnet p. 13) — "is sicker". Comparative premise Phaedrus grants for the speech.

See: Desire (p. 16); Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

νοῦς

nous · Sense and intellect · lemma

Intelligent apprehension; practical sense, or intellect as the soul's pilot.

The first speech's recovered lover has "sense"; the prophetic wordplay also speaks of sense. In the vision, intellect alone beholds the colourless reality. Later the sensible farmer shows that the ordinary sense remains active beside the more exalted one. At 235a Socrates applies his mind to the rhetorical side of Lysias' speech: the English "paying attention" renders the whole construction with prosechein.

Attested: *νοῦν* (235a · Burnet p. 11) — "paying attention". Phrase-level: *τὸν νοῦν προσείχον*, applying the mind; "attention" is not the noun's sole lexical sense.

Attested: *νοῦν* (241a · Burnet p. 20) — "sense".

Attested: *νοῦν* (244c · Burnet p. 25) — "sense". Within the playful derivation of oionoïstikē.

Attested: *νῷ* (247c · Burnet p. 29) — "intellect".

Attested: *νοῦν* (276b · Burnet p. 69) — "sense".

See: Intellect and seeing (p. 60)

Νύμφαι

Nymphai · Nymphs · lemma

The divine inhabitants associated with the riverside shrine.

Socrates identifies some Nymphs among the sanctuary's recipients, then attributes his growing rhetorical excitement to the place and warns he may be seized by them. Later he credits the Nymphs of Achelous with greater craft in speeches than Lysias. These are internal attributions in the dramatic conversation.

Attested: Νυμφῶν (230b · Burnet p. 5) — "Nymphs". Genitive naming the sanctuary's divinities.

Attested: *νυμφόληπτος* (238d · Burnet p. 16) — "taken by the nymphs". Compound adjective describing a possible state of Socrates.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Socrates (p. 152)

ὀδοντοφυέω

odontophyeō · Cut teeth · lemma

To grow teeth or teethe.

Teething is the explicit bodily comparison for the itching and vexation of wing-growth. The comparison explains pain accompanying new growth rather than treating pain alone as proof of destruction.

Attested: ὀδοντοφυούντων (251c · Burnet p. 34) — "those cutting teeth".

See: Longing and yearning (p. 25); Wing and flight (p. 85)

ὁδός

hodos · Road · lemma

A road or route, literal and methodological.

Acumenus recommends walking along roads rather than running-tracks. Later Socrates asks whether a shorter and smoother road to rhetoric can replace the long rough one. This is an intelligible extension from travel to procedure: the relevant question is whether the supposed shortcut reaches the destination.

Attested: ὁδοὺς (227a · Burnet p. 1) — "roads". The doctor's walking advice.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Leisure and walking (p. 139); Likelihood and the plausible (p. 99)

οἶστρος

oistros · Gadfly or maddening goad · word family

A stinging goad that drives restless attendance.

The first speech's older lover is driven by necessity and a gadfly, repeatedly enjoying sight, hearing and touch of the beloved. The edition explains the insect sense and its extension to a maddening impulse. The later wing-growth description uses the related verb for the whole soul's painful agitation.

Attested: οἴστρου (240c–d · Burnet p. 19) — "a gadfly". The goad driving the lover.

Attested: οἰστρᾷ (251d · Burnet p. 34) — "is gadfly-stung". The soul's agitation during obstructed wing-growth.

See: Desire (p. 16); Longing and yearning (p. 25); Pleasure and pain (p. 33)

οἰωνιστική

oiōnistikē · Reading bird-signs · lemma

Divination from birds and other signs, here contrasted with god-given madness.

The invented older name oionoïstikē is connected with supposition, sense and information; the supposedly newer spelling dignifies it with omega. The two names are part of Socrates' explanation and joke, not a securely established linguistic history.

Attested: οἰωνιστικὴν (244d · Burnet p. 25) — "oiōnistikē".

Attested: οἰονοϊστικὴν (244c · Burnet p. 25) — "oionoïstikē".

See: Madness and divine possession (p. 66)

ὁλόκληρος

holoklēros · Whole and intact · lemma

Entire, undamaged or lacking nothing.

Both the viewers and the apparitions are called whole in the former vision. The viewers had not yet suffered the evils that would later await them; the apparitions are further described as simple, unmoving and happy.

Attested: ὁλόκληροι (250c · Burnet p. 32) — "whole ourselves".

Attested: ὁλόκληρα (250c · Burnet p. 32) — "whole". Of the apparitions, not the viewers.

See: Being and reality (p. 45); Initiation and mysteries (p. 57)

Ὀλύμπιον

Olympion · Olympieion · lemma

The landmark near the house where Phaedrus heard Lysias.

Phaedrus locates Epicrates' gathering in the house of Morychus near the Olympieion. The edition identifies it as the temple of Olympian Zeus. The building fixes the conversation's urban point of departure, distinct from the riverside sanctuary where most of the action occurs.

Attested: Ὀλυμπίου (227b · Burnet p. 1) — "Olympieion". Genitive after "near".

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Lysias (p. 142)

ὄμνυμι

omnymi · Swear · lemma

To utter an oath by a named witness.

Phaedrus' present "I swear" performs the act it describes. Socrates later treats the completed swearing as decisive and gives up resisting. The scene shows how the force of an utterance can change what the listener is willing to do even before its promised future action occurs.

Attested: ὄμνυμι (236d · Burnet p. 14) — "I swear". First-person present performing the oath.

Attested: ὀμώμοκας (236e · Burnet p. 14) — "have sworn". Perfect: the commitment now stands.

See: Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30); Phaedrus (p. 148)

ὁμόζυξ

homozyx · Yoke-fellow · lemma

A partner under the same yoke.

The bad horse abuses its fellow and the charioteer as cowards after their retreat. In the beloved's soul the yoke-fellow joins the driver in resisting gratification with modesty and reason. It is a relational description within the team.

Attested: ὁμόζυγα (254c · Burnet p. 38) — "yoke-fellow".

Attested: ὁμόζυξ (256a · Burnet p. 40) — "yoke-fellow".

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47)

ὁμόπτερος

homopteros · Alike-winged · lemma

Having wings alike or together.

The lesser pair's promise is not that they are already fully winged. They travel together in a bright life and, when they acquire wings, acquire them alike for love's sake.

Attested: ὁμοπτέρους (256e · Burnet p. 41) — "have them alike". The English supplies "wings" from the adjective's context.

See: Fate and choice of life (p. 52); Wing and flight (p. 85)

ὁμώνυμος

homōnymos · Of the same name · dictionary headword

Sharing a name, without thereby sharing all the same qualities.

Socrates first compares paired bodily parts called left and right, then the left love and the divine love discovered by the other speech. Their shared name does not cancel the difference between what is censured and what is praised.

Attested: ὁμώνυμον (266a · Burnet p. 54) — "of the same name".

See: Definition and agreement (p. 90); Form, collection and division (p. 94)

ὄνειδος

oneidos · Reproach · lemma

A mark or charge of shame, either feared or justified.

Lysias appeals to the boy's fear of reproach under established custom. At the end Socrates makes ignorance about good and evil a reproach even if the whole public praises the writer. The movement separates reputational exposure from a defect that public approval cannot cure.

Attested: ὄνειδός (231e · Burnet p. 7) — "reproach". The boy's feared public consequence.

See: Shame and shamelessness (p. 37); Truth (p. 116); Writing and letters (p. 132)

ὄνου σκιά

onou skia · An ass's shadow · phrase in citation form

A trivial object, used as the lesser term in the comparison with civic harm.

Socrates moves from an absurd encomium of an ass as though it were a horse to a rhetorician ignorant of good and bad persuading an equally ignorant city. The civic case is not merely about a negligible shadow: its consequence is doing bad things instead of good. The phrase is proverbial in the edition's note.

Attested: ὄνου σκιᾶς (260c · Burnet p. 46) — "an ass's shadow".

See: Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Truth (p. 116)

ὀργή

orgē · Anger · lemma

A hostile or punitive response, to be governed rather than simply indulged.

The non-lover promises little anger slowly formed over serious faults instead of great enmity over small ones. The bad horse later angrily reviles its companions. At the palinode's close Socrates asks Love not to remove or damage his erotic craft through anger, acknowledging a divine recipient capable of responding to offence.

Attested: ὀργὴν (233c · Burnet p. 9) — "anger". The non-lover's measured promise.

Attested: ὀργῇ (254c · Burnet p. 38) — "anger". The bad horse reviles the others.

Attested: ὀργήν (257a · Burnet p. 41) — "anger". The response Socrates asks Love to forgo.

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

ὀρθοέπεια

orthoepeia · Correctness of diction · dictionary headword

Right or correct verbal expression.

Socrates identifies this as a Protagorean accomplishment when Phaedrus asks about Protagoras' contributions. The dialogue does not specify a full grammar here; the local point is another impressive specialty within the handbook tradition.

Attested: Ὀρθοέπειά (267c · Burnet p. 56) — "correctness of diction".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

ὅρκος

horkos · Oath · lemma

A sworn commitment that binds the speaker to a stated course.

Phaedrus turns his threat into an oath, hesitating playfully over the divine witness before choosing the plane tree. The first speech later exposes a darker instability: a lover's many oaths cannot make him keep promises once his state changes. Swearing can intensify a commitment without ensuring wise or durable conduct.

Attested: ὅρκος (236d · Burnet p. 14) — "oath". Phaedrus declares what his speech will be.

Attested: ὅρκων (240e · Burnet p. 19) — "oaths". The lover's promises are accompanied by many oaths.

See: Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30)

ὄστρακον

ostrakon · Shell that changes the chase · lemma

A shell used to picture the reversal of pursuer and pursued.

The recovered lover now flees while the boy pursues his promised repayment. Socrates compares the change to a shell falling the other way. The edition explains a children's chase game decided by the fall of a two-coloured shell; the immediate argumentative point is the reversal of positions.

Attested: ὀστράκου (241b · Burnet p. 20) — "shell". Genitive absolute: the shell has fallen the other way.

See: Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Love and the lover (p. 28)

ὄστρεον

ostreon · Oyster · lemma

An oyster, used as the comparison for bodily enclosure.

The speakers' former purity is contrasted with now carrying the body, bound in it like an oyster. Burnet's agreement is plural "we bound", not the alternative reading making the body the thing bound.

Attested: ὀστρέου (250c · Burnet p. 33) — "oyster".

See: Initiation and mysteries (p. 57); Soul (p. 82)

Οὐρανία

Ourania · Urania · proper name

The Muse named after Calliope in the tale.

Urania joins Calliope in receiving reports about those who live in philosophy. The name's heavenly association fits the immediately stated concern with heaven, but the speech also includes divine and human discourse.

Attested: Οὐρανίᾳ (259d · Burnet p. 45) — "Urania".

See: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135)

οὐρανός

ouranos · Heaven · lemma

Heaven or the sky, pictured as a circuit with an inside, a vault and a back.

The procession ranges within heaven and reaches its outer surface to contemplate what lies beyond. Heaven is therefore not identical with the colourless object of knowledge that the souls seek.

Attested: οὐρανὸν (246b · Burnet p. 27) — "heaven".

Attested: οὐρανοῦ (247c · Burnet p. 29) — "heaven".

See: Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55)

οὐσία

ousia · Substance as wealth · lemma, economic sense

Property or financial resources, not here the being of a thing.

Lysias' lover fears people who possess substance because their money may outdo him. Socrates' first lover resents the beloved's substance because it makes him harder to catch and handle. The same Greek noun is used for what each thing is at 237c; the wealth sense must be recovered from the economic construction here.

Attested: οὐσίαν (232c · Burnet p. 8) — "substance". Possessions measured by money.

Attested: οὐσίαν (240a · Burnet p. 18) — "substance". Gold or other property that supports independence.

Attested: οὐσίας (252a · Burnet p. 34) — "substance". Wealth neglected by the newly affected lover.

See: Being and reality (p. 45); Benefit and harm (p. 12); Jealousy and possession (p. 23)

οὐσία

ousia · Being, substance and property · lemma

What something is or has: being or substance; also one's property.

At 245e the phrase concerns soul's substance and account; at 247c it concerns the reality accessible to intellect. The lover's neglected ousia at 252a is his material substance or property. The English repeats "substance", but the local referents differ.

Attested: οὐσίαν (245e · Burnet p. 27) — "substance".

Attested: οὐσία (247c · Burnet p. 29) — "substance".

Attested: οὐσίας (252a · Burnet p. 34) — "substance".

See: Being and reality (p. 45)

ὀφθαλμία

ophthalmia · Eye-disease · lemma

An inflammation or disease of the eyes.

The beloved resembles someone who has caught an eye-disease from another and cannot explain its cause. The simile describes unrecognized transmission through the eyes, not an assertion that love is an ophthalmological diagnosis.

Attested: ὀφθαλμίας (255d · Burnet p. 39) — "eye-disease".

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14)

ὄψις

opsis · Sight and visible appearance · lemma

The faculty or act of seeing; also what is presented to sight.

The pre-bodily procession enjoys a blessed sight; bodily sight is the keenest perception, yet does not see intelligence. At 254b the darling's flashing appearance moves the charioteer's memory toward beauty.

Attested: ὄψιν (250b · Burnet p. 32) — "sight".

Attested: ὄψις (250d · Burnet p. 33) — "sight".

Attested: ὄψιν (254b · Burnet p. 37) — "appearance".

See: Beauty (p. 42); Intellect and seeing (p. 60)

πάλαισμα

palaisma · Wrestling bout · lemma

A wrestling action or bout; here one of three truly Olympian contests.

The philosophical pair have won one of three at death. The edition suggests that the three may correspond to the repeated lives of 249a, but marks that connection as interpretation rather than the sentence's express explanation.

Attested: παλαισμάτων (256b · Burnet p. 40) — "bouts".

See: Fate and choice of life (p. 52); Philosophy (p. 71)

Παλαμήδης

Palamēdēs · The Eleatic Palamedes · proper name used as an epithet

A playful designation for a speaker who makes the same things appear under contrary descriptions.

The epithet "Eleatic" distinguishes this figure from the heroic names first used in the banter. The edition reports the usual identification as Zeno, but labels it an interpretation. The argument needs only the stated capacity to present like and unlike, one and many, staying and moving, broadening the field beyond public rhetoric.

Attested: Παλαμήδην (261d · Burnet p. 48) — "Palamedes". Qualified in the text by "Eleatic".

See: Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112); Similarity and deception (p. 114)

παράδειγμα

paradeigma · Example · dictionary headword

An example by which an otherwise bare account can be examined.

Phaedrus requests examples of craft and craftlessness. The speeches already performed supply them. At 264e Socrates says Lysias' speech can profit a reader who does not attempt to imitate its faults: an example may teach by contrast, not only as a model to copy.

Attested: παραδείγματα (262c · Burnet p. 49) — "examples".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Definition and agreement (p. 90); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

παρέπαινος · παράψογος

parepainos · parapsogos · Incidental praise and censure · paired technical nouns

Praise or blame introduced alongside the principal material.

Evenus is associated with incidental praise; some also say he puts incidental censures into metre for the sake of memory. The report-status differs between the two claims and is preserved. Metrical memorability is an aid to retaining technique, not evidence that the whole rhetorical craft has been acquired.

Attested: παρεπαίνους (267a · Burnet p. 56) — "incidental praises".

Attested: παραψόγους (267a · Burnet p. 56) — "incidental censures". Socrates attributes the metrical practice to what some say of Evenus.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Memory and reminding (p. 123)

παρρησία

parrēsia · Unrestrained frankness · lemma

Freedom or openness of speech, here excessive and disgraceful.

The drunken lover gives untimely praise and unbearable censure, using a frankness described as overfull and thrown wide open. In this local accusation frankness lacks judgement and restraint. The noun should therefore not automatically be read as a philosophical virtue merely because honest speech can be valuable elsewhere.

Attested: παρρησίᾳ (240e · Burnet p. 19) — "frankness". Dative governed by "using"; negatively qualified.

See: Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30); Shame and shamelessness (p. 37); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

Περικλῆς

Periklēs · Pericles · proper name

The orator proposed as a model of unusually complete rhetorical preparation.

Socrates thinks his natural ability was supplemented by inquiry into nature through Anaxagoras. Pericles drew what was appropriate from that inquiry into speaking-craft. The qualified praise does not mean that merely possessing lofty terminology makes someone a good orator.

Attested: Περικλῆς (269e · Burnet p. 59) — "Pericles".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

περιφορά

periphora · Revolution · lemma

A carrying round in a circuit.

The souls stand on heaven's back while its revolution carries them around. The divine mind's contemplation lasts until the revolution returns it to the same point. Motion and sustained viewing are coordinated, not treated as opposites.

Attested: περιφορά (247c · Burnet p. 29) — "revolution".

Attested: περιφορὰ (247d · Burnet p. 29) — "revolution".

See: Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55)

πηγή

pēgē · Spring · lemma

A source from which water, motion or an imagined stream flows.

The cold spring under the plane tree is tested by Socrates' foot. The same source-word later helps describe what moves itself as the spring of motion and the stream that passes between the lovers. The concrete spring is therefore one useful starting-point for following the dialogue's explanatory water imagery.

Attested: πηγὴ (230b · Burnet p. 5) — "spring". A physical source beneath the plane tree.

Attested: πηγὴ (245c · Burnet p. 26) — "spring". Self-motion as source of other motion.

Attested: πηγή (255c · Burnet p. 39) — "spring". Source of the imagined stream of longing.

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Leisure and walking (p. 139); Self-motion and immortality (p. 79)

πίστωσις · ἐπιπίστωσις

pistōsis · epipistōsis · Confirmation and further confirmation · paired technical nouns

Establishing credibility, with an additional confirmatory stage.

Socrates attributes this multiplication of parts to Theodorus. The prefixed second name marks an added stage, but the dialogue does not set out a detailed independent procedure for it. Both belong to the preliminary devices subsequently distinguished from complete rhetoric.

Attested: πίστωσιν (266e · Burnet p. 55) — "confirmation".

Attested: ἐπιπίστωσιν (266e · Burnet p. 55) — "further confirmation". Paired with confirmation in Theodorus' catalogue.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

πλάτανος

platanos · Plane tree · lemma

The tall, shady tree under which the men settle.

Phaedrus points to it as a suitable stopping-place; Socrates praises its height and spread. It then becomes the witness Phaedrus playfully invokes in an oath to withhold future speeches. The same object shelters inquiry and assists the pressure that elicits Socrates' first performance.

Attested: πλάτανον (229a · Burnet p. 3) — "plane tree". Phaedrus points out the tree.

Attested: πλάτανος (230b · Burnet p. 5) — "plane tree". Its shade and height are praised.

Attested: πλάτανον (236d–e · Burnet p. 14) — "plane tree". Proposed object of Phaedrus' oath.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Persuasion and compulsion (p. 30)

πνεῦμα

pneuma · Breeze and breath · lemma

Moving air: a moderate breeze, a violent gust or a rebounding breath.

Phaedrus welcomes a moderate breeze. The proposed rationalization of Oreithyia's abduction makes a gust of Boreas push her from the rocks. In the palinode a breath rebounding from a solid surface illustrates the return of beauty's stream. The word's local force follows the motion described.

Attested: πνεῦμα (229b · Burnet p. 4) — "breeze". The pleasant moderate air.

Attested: πνεῦμα (229c · Burnet p. 4) — "a gust". The imagined natural cause of Oreithyia's fall.

Attested: πνεῦμα (255c · Burnet p. 39) — "a breath". One term of the rebounding-stream comparison.

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Leisure and walking (p. 139); Myth and rationalization (p. 144)

πόα

poa · Grass · lemma

Grass providing a place to sit or recline.

Phaedrus first values the grass as a place to sit or lie down. Socrates later notices its gentle upward slope, enough to support the reclining head comfortably. His detailed bodily appreciation complicates the picture of someone interested only in urban conversation.

Attested: πόα (229b · Burnet p. 4) — "grass". Phaedrus describes the site.

Attested: πόας (230c · Burnet p. 5) — "grass". Socrates praises its convenient slope.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Pleasure and pain (p. 33)

πόθος

pothos · Yearning · word family

Yearning, especially for something absent or beyond immediate possession.

The speech is lengthened by yearning for the former vision. The soul later runs toward the beloved in yearning and wants to lie as near as possible to its yearning, where the desire also stands for its object. At 255d the beloved yearns and is yearned for when the lover is absent.

Attested: ποθεῖς (234c · Burnet p. 10) — "yearn for". An ordinary wish for an omitted point to be supplied, not specifically erotic yearning.

Attested: πόθῳ (250c · Burnet p. 33) — "in yearning".

Attested: πόθου (252a · Burnet p. 34) — "yearning".

Attested: ποθεῖ (255d · Burnet p. 39) — "yearns". A form of ποθέω, the related verb.

See: Longing and yearning (p. 25)

πολυήκοος · πολυγνώμων · ἀγνώμων

polyēkoos · polygnōmōn · agnōmōn · Hearing much and judging little · contrasted adjective family

Hearing much, having much judgement, and lacking judgement: three contrasted descriptions of writing's pupils.

Thamus predicts that pupils who become hearers of much without teaching will seem to have much judgement though, for the most part, they

lack it. The seeming belongs to the second description and the qualification "for the most part" to the third; removing either would overstate the claim.

Attested: πολυήκοοι (275a · Burnet p. 67) — "hearers of much".

Attested: πολυγνώμονες (275a–b · Burnet p. 67) — "men of much judgement". They will seem so, according to Thamus.

Attested: ἀγνώμονες (275b · Burnet p. 67) — "without judgement". Thamus qualifies the claim: for the most part.

See: Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Writing and letters (p. 132)

πόνος

ponos · Toil · lemma

Costly effort or suffering, whose value depends on its purpose.

Lysias' lover adds past toil to his account of what the beloved owes. The first speech contrasts soft living with vigorous toils, while the palinode calls the beautiful one the doctor of the lover's greatest toils. The term can therefore be a burden invoked for repayment, a discipline neglected, or distress awaiting relief.

Attested: πόνον (231a · Burnet p. 6) — "toil". What the lover adds into his reckoning.

Attested: πόνων (239c · Burnet p. 18) — "toils". Vigorous training lacking in the soft beloved.

Attested: πόνων (252b · Burnet p. 34) — "toils". The distress for which the beloved is called the only doctor.

See: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Pleasure and pain (p. 33)

πορεύομαι

poreuomai · Go or journey · lemma

To make one's way, from a short walk to a mythical journey.

Phaedrus is on his way for a walk in the opening answer. The palinode employs the same family for heavenly journeys; at the end Socrates asks whether they should go only after praying. The verb gives the final departure continuity with the original purpose of going out.

Attested: πορεύομαι (227a · Burnet p. 1) — "I am on my way". Phaedrus describes his immediate activity.

Attested: πορεύονται (247a–b · Burnet p. 28) — "journey". Movement towards the heavenly banquet.

Attested: πορεύεσθαι (279b · Burnet p. 73) — "be on one's way". Departure after prayer.

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50); Leisure and walking (p. 139); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74)

πότιμος; ἁλμυρός; ἀποκλύζω

potimos; halmyros; apoklyzō · Fresh-water speech and salty hearing · image phrase and word family

An image of cleansing hearing through a new, drinkable speech.

Socrates desires to rinse away the brine left in the ears by the hostile speeches. "Drinkable" qualifies the corrective speech, while "salty" qualifies the hearing to be washed. The image gives the palinode a sensory and purifying task, without making water itself the argument for divine love.

Attested: ποτίμῳ λόγῳ (243d · Burnet p. 23) — "with a speech of fresh water". Dative phrase: the means of the washing.

Attested: ἁλμυρὰν (243d · Burnet p. 23) — "the brine". Adjective qualifying hearing across the page break.

Attested: ἀποκλύσασθαι (243d · Burnet p. 24) — "to rinse away". The washing Socrates desires.

See: Palinode and purification (p. 146); Pleasure and pain (p. 33)

πρᾷος

praios · Gentle · lemma

Mild or considerate in character, opposed to the lover imagined by the hostile speeches.

Socrates asks what a noble and gentle lover would think of hearing that all lovers are jealous and harmful. The imagined hearer is a counterexample that helps expose the speeches' inadequate range. His gentleness matters because he knows an attachment unlike the possessive kind the speakers have described.

Attested: πρᾷος (243c · Burnet p. 23) — "gentle". The hypothetical listener's character.

See: Love and the lover (p. 28); Palinode and purification (p. 146); Shame and shamelessness (p. 37)

προάγω

proagō · Lead on · lemma

To go before and guide onward.

"Lead on" passes between the friends during their search for a place to sit. In the playful reconstruction of the morning, Phaedrus is already delighted at having found a companion and tells him to lead on. The direction of physical leadership and the direction of conversational desire do not always coincide.

Attested: Πρόαγε (227c · Burnet p. 1) — "Lead on". Phaedrus' imperative to Socrates.

Attested: Πρόαγε (229a · Burnet p. 3) — "Lead on". Socrates now asks Phaedrus to guide and look for a seat.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Phaedrus (p. 148)

Πρόδικος

Prodikos · Prodicus · proper name

The teacher represented as preferring measured speeches to both long and short extremes.

In Socrates' reported anecdote Prodicus laughs at the rival claims and says he alone discovered the craft of needed speeches, which must be moderate. Phaedrus' "most wisely" maintains the catalogue's elevated, possibly teasing tone; the passage does not itself establish the exclusive claim.

Attested: Πρόδικος (267b · Burnet p. 56) — "Prodicus".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108)

προοίμιον

prooimion · Preamble · dictionary headword

The introductory part placed at the beginning of a speech.

Socrates recalls it as the first refinement in the handbooks. Its placement is acknowledged but the larger discussion asks whether knowing such named parts supplies the whole craft. A correct label and conventional position cannot replace knowledge of subject and hearer.

Attested: προοίμιον (266d · Burnet p. 55) — "preamble".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

προσαρμόττω

prosarmottō · Fit one to another · dictionary headword

Adjust or suit each kind of speech to the corresponding kind of soul.

The rhetorician must explain the causes through which one soul is persuaded and another remains unpersuaded. Matching is therefore not merely decorative congruity. It connects differentiated recipients, differentiated speeches and a causal account of their interaction.

Attested: προσαρμόττων (271b · Burnet p. 61) — "suiting".

See: Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

προσφέρω

prospherō · Apply or bring to · dictionary headword

Bring an intervention to the nature on which it is to act.

In the comparison at 270b drugs and food are applied to body, speeches and lawful ways of life to soul. The verb does not itself supply either recipient or benefit: those come from the sentence's objects and complements. Preserving that division prevents the medical analogy from becoming an identity of substances.

Attested: προσφέρων (270b · Burnet p. 60) — "applying".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Drug, remedy and enchantment (p. 119); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

Πρωταγόρας

Prōtagoras · Protagoras · proper name represented by related adjective

The teacher whose contributions Phaedrus asks to include in the catalogue.

The source uses a possessive adjective, "Protagorean things". Socrates answers with correctness of diction and unspecified further beautiful accomplishments. The indefinite extension should not be converted into a reconstructed list of doctrines absent from this exchange.

Attested: Πρωταγόρεια (267c · Burnet p. 56) — "Protagorean things".

Neuter plural adjective for Protagorean accomplishments.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

πτερόν

pteron · Wing · lemma

Wing or feather.

The myth begins with a winged team, then describes the wing's power to lift weight toward the gods. At 251b the shaft grows from a root throughout the soul: the account deliberately crosses feather and plant imagery.

Attested: πτεροῦ (246d · Burnet p. 28) — "of the wing".

Attested: πτερὰ (248b · Burnet p. 30) — "wings".

Attested: πτερά (251c · Burnet p. 34) — "wings".

See: Wing and flight (p. 85)

πτερορρυέω

pterorrhyeō · Shed wings · lemma

To lose or shed one's wings.

A perfect winged soul travels aloft; one that has shed its wings settles in an earthy body. In the ordinance, forgetfulness and vice weigh it down before its wings fall away. The order matters: the falling is narrated through failures of vision, following and nourishment.

Attested: πτερορρυήσασα (246c · Burnet p. 27) — "that has lost its wings".

Attested: πτερορρυήσῃ (248c · Burnet p. 30) — "loses its wings".

See: Wing and flight (p. 85)

πτεροφυέω

pterophyeō · Put forth wings · lemma

To sprout or grow wings.

Socrates compares the soul beginning to grow wings to the pain of teething. The beloved too begins wing-growth when the stream returns to him. Regrowth belongs to both persons, though the account distinguishes their awareness and desire.

Attested: πτεροφυεῖν (251c · Burnet p. 34) — "to put forth wings".

Attested: πτεροφυεῖν (255d · Burnet p. 39) — "putting forth wings".

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14); Wing and flight (p. 85)

πτεροφύτορ᾽ ἀνάγκην

pterophytor᾽ anankēn · Wing-growing necessity · phrase

A necessity that makes wings grow, in the quoted verse naming Love.

The phrase explains the proposed name Pterōs by the compulsive growth already described. Burnet prints the wing-growing adjective from Stobaeus; the apparatus lists different compounds in B and T. The elided phrase is retained as printed, rather than silently replacing its adjective with a different reading.

Attested: πτεροφύτορ᾽ ἀνάγκην (252b · Burnet p. 35) — “wing-growing necessity”.

See: Longing and yearning (p. 25); Wing and flight (p. 85)

πτερόω

pteroō · Grow wings · lemma

To furnish with wings; in the middle or passive, to become winged.

At 249c it is the philosopher’s mind that “grows wings”, explained by its keeping near divine objects through memory as far as possible. At 256d the honour-loving pair have started to grow wings but leave the body still wingless.

Attested: πτεροῦται (249c · Burnet p. 31) — “grows wings”.

Attested: πτεροῦσθαι (256d · Burnet p. 40) — “to grow wings”.

See: Philosophy (p. 71); Wing and flight (p. 85)

πτέρωμα

pterōma · Plumage · lemma

A covering or equipment of wings.

The soul’s plumage increases through the beautiful, wise and good, and wastes through their opposites. The singular collective noun emphasizes the winged equipment as a whole.

Attested: πτέρωμα (246e · Burnet p. 28) — “plumage”.

See: Nourishment (p. 69); Wing and flight (p. 85)

Πτέρως

Pterōs · Pterōs · proper name

The comic divine name for Love, made to suggest wings.

Socrates quotes two supposed stored-away verses of the Homeridae: mortals name him Erōs, immortals Pterōs. He anticipates laughter and says one line is insolent and not very metrical, then allows belief or disbelief in the verses while insisting on the described cause and experience. The edition treats possible Platonic authorship of the verses as interpretation, not an established source identification.

Attested: Πτέρωτα (252b · Burnet p. 35) — "Pterōs". Accusative form in the quoted divine naming.

See: Longing and yearning (p. 25); Wing and flight (p. 85)

Πῶλος

Pōlos · Polus · proper name

The teacher whose verbal resources are described as Muse-shrines of speeches.

Doubling, maxim-speech and image-speech form the local list. The extravagant title presents a wealth of expression, while the subsequent investigation distinguishes these resources from the organization and knowledge of the art itself.

Attested: Πώλου (267b · Burnet p. 56) — "Polus".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

ῥεῦμα

rheuma · Stream · lemma

A flowing current.

The current of beauty flows into the lover, then rebounds toward the beautiful one through his eyes. Its path explains the beloved's own wing-growth and love in the narrative.

Attested: ῥεύματος (255c · Burnet p. 39) — "stream".

Attested: ῥεῦμα (255c · Burnet p. 39) — "stream".

See: Counter-love and mirror (p. 14)

ῥῆμα

rhēma · Expression or wording · dictionary headword

A spoken expression or the particular words in which something is said.

Phaedrus distinguishes remembering Lysias' exact expressions from recounting the thought in summary (228d). At 271c Socrates says stating the

expressions themselves is not easy, but offers the requirements for writing by craft. The distinction leaves room for an account of method without pretending to supply every exact formula.

Attested: ῥήματα (228d · Burnet p. 3) — "expressions".

Attested: ῥήματα (271c · Burnet p. 62) — "expressions". The exact formulations are distinguished from the requirements for masterly writing.

See: Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Memory and reminding (p. 123)

ῥίζα

rhiza · Root · lemma

The root from which the wing's shaft begins growing.

A botanical term applied to the wing: the source of renewed growth is within the soul, while the nourishing flow of visible beauty comes through the eyes.

Attested: ῥίζης (251b · Burnet p. 33) — "root".

See: Nourishment (p. 69); Wing and flight (p. 85)

ῥυθμίζω

rhythmizō · Bring into rhythm · lemma

To shape, order or train into a patterned condition.

Lovers imitate their god themselves and bring the beloved into rhythm as they lead him toward the god's way of life and figure. The surrounding verbs of persuading and leading show that likeness is cultivated, not just admired.

Attested: ῥυθμίζοντες (253b · Burnet p. 36) — "bringing the darling into rhythm". Phrase-level: the object "the darling" is supplied by adjacent τὰ παιδικά, not contained in the verb itself.

See: Divine following and imitation (p. 50)

Σαπφώ

Sapphō · Sappho · lemma

The poet named as a possible source of better things about love.

Socrates says he must have heard something from Sappho the beautiful, Anacreon the wise or certain writers, but cannot say precisely from whom. The uncertainty is part of his speech. Naming Sappho does not permit a

particular argument in his ensuing performance to be assigned to one of her poems.

Attested: Σαπφοῦς (235c · Burnet p. 12) — "Sappho". Genitive in the possible-source list.

See: Love and the lover (p. 28); Memory and reminding (p. 123); Socrates (p. 152)

σαφής · βέβαιος

saphēs · bebaios · Clear and firm · paired adjectives

Intelligible and secure; qualities a reader may mistakenly expect a written text to guarantee.

Socrates criticizes the assumption that a craft can be left in letters and received as something clear and firm by that fact alone. The criticism concerns knowledge's security and responsive possession, not a claim that every inscription is literally illegible or every written sentence vague.

Attested: σαφὲς (275c · Burnet p. 68) — "clear".

Attested: βέβαιον (275c · Burnet p. 68) — "firm". Part of the expectation challenged by Socrates.

See: Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96); Writing and letters (p. 132)

σέβομαι

sebomai · Revere · lemma

To feel and express reverential awe.

The freshly initiated lover reveres the godlike appearance as a god. At 254b it is grammatically the memory that sees beauty, fears and falls back in reverence. Reverence thus links recognition with restraint rather than guaranteeing possession of the beloved.

Attested: σέβεται (251a · Burnet p. 33) — "reveres".

Attested: σεφθεῖσα (254b · Burnet p. 37) — "in reverence".

See: Reverence (p. 35)

Σειρήν

Seirēn · Siren · lemma

A Siren, the alluring singer used in a nautical comparison.

Socrates proposes sailing past the cicadas as past Sirens, unenchanted, by continuing their conversation. The comparison is to be accomplished through wakeful speech, not simply by refusing to hear sound.
Attested: Σειρῆνας (259a · Burnet p. 44) — “Sirens”.

See: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135)

στγάω

sigaō · Keep silent · dictionary headword

Remain silent, either from inability to answer or from knowledgeable restraint.

The painted offspring keep silent when questioned. The living speech, by contrast, knows when and before whom to be silent. The same family can therefore mark two different conditions: unresponsiveness and discriminating control. Silence is not inherently ignorance.
Attested: στγᾷ (275d · Burnet p. 68) — “keep silent”.

Attested: στγᾶν (276a · Burnet p. 68) — “keeping silent”. The living account knows appropriate speaking and silence.

See: Living speech and defence (p. 121); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108)

σίδηρος

sidēros · Iron · dictionary headword

Iron, used as an example of a comparatively agreed name.

Socrates asks whether all think of the same thing when someone says the name of iron or silver. The example prepares the contrast with just and good, which provoke disputes. The passage is a conversational classification for rhetoric, not a chemical analysis of metals.
Attested: σιδήρου (263a · Burnet p. 50) — “iron”.

See: Definition and agreement (p. 90)

σκιά

skia · Shade · lemma

Shelter from direct sun; also a condition contrasted with healthy outdoor training.

Shade is attractive at the riverside in the summer heat. In the first speech, however, the lover’s preferred boy is reared in mingled shade rather than clear

sunlight and lacks vigorous training. The physical feature has no fixed moral sign: its value depends on use and context.

Attested: *σκιά* (229b · Burnet p. 4) — "Shade". A benefit of the proposed site.

Attested: *σκιᾷ* (239c · Burnet p. 18) — "shade". The soft bodily upbringing preferred by the harmful lover.

See: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Leisure and walking (p. 139)

Σοφοκλῆς · Εὐριπίδης

Sophoklēs · Euripidēs · Sophocles and Euripides · paired proper names

The tragic poets asked to judge whether isolated speech-effects constitute tragedy.

The imaginary visitor can make speeches long or short, pitiable or frightening. Phaedrus thinks the poets would laugh at confusing this with the art's fitting composition. Socrates then imagines a gentler correction that grants the prerequisite skills without granting mastery.

Attested: *Σοφοκλεῖ* (268c · Burnet p. 58) — "Sophocles".

Attested: *Εὐριπίδῃ* (268c · Burnet p. 58) — "Euripides". Paired with Sophocles as competent judge of tragic composition.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

Στησίχορος

Stēsichoros · Stesichorus · lemma

The poet whose recanting song provides Socrates' corrective model.

In Socrates' story Stesichorus understands why speaking badly of Helen cost him his sight, composes a palinode and sees again. Socrates then playfully assigns the coming speech to Stesichorus son of Euphemus of Himera. The story grounds the dramatic act of recantation; it is not offered here as independently verified biography.

Attested: *Στησίχορος* (243a · Burnet p. 23) — "Stesichorus". Subject contrasted with Homer in recognizing the purification.

Attested: *Στησιχόρου* (244a · Burnet p. 24) — "Stesichorus". The name to which the corrective speech is attributed.

See: Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Palinode and purification (p. 146)

στρογγύλος

strongylos · Rounded · dictionary headword

Rounded or smoothly finished, here of Lysias' words.

Socrates separates the clarity and finish of the expressions from whether the composer has said what the subject requires. The praise is therefore qualified by its object: rounded wording does not settle completeness or truth of thought.

Attested: στρογγύλα (234e · Burnet p. 11) — "rounded".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101)

συγγνώμη

syngnōmē · Pardon · lemma

Allowance for an error or fault, with attention to its cause.

Lysias' speaker promises pardon for involuntary acts while trying to prevent voluntary wrongs. Socrates asks Love for pardon of the earlier speech. Later imagined experts urge the men to pardon confused teachers rather than insult them. Pardon thus accompanies discrimination and correction, not an assertion that nothing was wrong.

Attested: συγγνώμην (233c · Burnet p. 9) — "pardon". For involuntary actions.

Attested: συγγνώμην (257a · Burnet p. 41) — "pardon". Socrates petitions Love about the first speech.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Palinode and purification (p. 146)

συγκορυβαντιάω

synkorybantiaō · Share a Corybantic frenzy · lemma

To take part with someone in an ecstatic excitement.

Socrates' imagined account makes Phaedrus delighted to find a companion for the frenzy of hearing and telling speeches. The compound includes the sense of joining in. The edition explains the Corybants as frenzied dancers; here the cultic image is applied humorously to a pair of eager speech-lovers.

Attested: *συγκορυβαντιῶντα* (228b · Burnet p. 2) — "a partner in his Corybantic frenzy". Substantivized participle naming the desired companion.

See: Desire (p. 16); Madness and divine possession (p. 66); Phaedrus (p. 148)

συγχωρέω

synchōreō · Concede or allow · dictionary headword

Yield a point or agree to it within an exchange.

Phaedrus concedes Socrates' distinction between discovery and arrangement, then permits a shared premise for the rival speech. The concession concerns the argumentative procedure and the starting allowance; it is not a proof that every claim against love is true.

Attested: Συγχωρῶ (236a · Burnet p. 13) — "I concede".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Definition and agreement (p. 90)

συντομία

syntomia · Concision · dictionary headword

Cutting speech short or expressing it compactly.

Tisias and Gorgias are credited with both concision and lengths without limit. Prodicus responds that the appropriate speech is neither simply long nor simply short but measured. The contrast prepares the later subordination of stylistic devices to occasion.

Attested: *συντομίαν* (267a–b · Burnet p. 56) — "concision".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Opportunity and fitting speech (p. 108)

σύστασις

systasis · Putting together · dictionary headword

A composition formed by fitting parts into a whole.

Phaedrus says tragedy is the putting-together of the listed kinds of speeches so that they fit one another and the whole. The hypothetical claimants know how to produce effects but not this composition. The statement continues the earlier model of a speech as an animal with an ordered body.

Attested: *σύστασιν* (268d · Burnet p. 58) — "putting together".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

Τεισίας

Teisias · Tisias · proper name

A teacher whose account of rhetorical likelihood receives explicit examination.

He is first paired with Gorgias as preferring likelihoods to truths. Later Socrates attributes to his writing the case of the weak but manly attacker and mighty but cowardly victim. The reply rejects the alleged shortcut because finding plausible resemblances itself requires knowledge of truth.

Attested: Τεισίαν (267a · Burnet p. 56) — "Tisias".

Attested: Τεισίας (273a · Burnet p. 64) — "Tisias". The teacher named in the likelihood example.

See: Likelihood and the plausible (p. 99); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

τεῖχος

teichos · Wall · lemma

The city wall, marking the walk's movement out of town.

The opening destination is outside the wall. Socrates' imagined walk to Megara reaches another wall and turns back; Phaedrus later marvels that Socrates scarcely leaves even Athens' wall. The repeated boundary establishes the unusual setting without requiring that the entire dialogue occur in a wilderness.

Attested: τείχους (227a · Burnet p. 1) — "wall". Phaedrus is heading outside it.

Attested: τείχει (227d · Burnet p. 2) — "wall". The endpoint in Socrates' extravagant Megara walk.

Attested: τείχους (230d · Burnet p. 5) — "wall". Phaedrus' comment on Socrates' habits.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Socrates (p. 152)

τεκμήριον

tekmērion · Evidence · dictionary headword

A piece of evidence or sign used to support a judgement.

At 266e evidence is the third item in the handbook sequence, distinct there from likelihoods. Earlier speakers also invoke evidence in ordinary argument; the label does not guarantee that a proposed inference is sound merely because it has been named.

Attested: τεκμήρια (266e · Burnet p. 55) — “pieces of evidence”.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Knowledge and ignorance (p. 96)

τέλεος

teleos · Perfect and complete · lemma

Brought to completion; in a ritual context, perfected or initiated.

The wording at 249c repeatedly combines perfect rites, being perfected and becoming perfect. At 278a complete living teaching is called perfect; that later adjective does not by itself identify a ritual initiation.

Attested: τελέους (249c · Burnet p. 31) — “perfect”.

Attested: τέλεος (249c · Burnet p. 31) — “perfect”.

Attested: τέλεον (278a · Burnet p. 71) — “perfect”.

See: Initiation and mysteries (p. 57)

τελετή

teletē · Rite and initiation · lemma

A rite, especially a rite bringing an initiate to fulfilment.

Purificatory madness obtains rites; philosophical recollection is expressed as perfection in perfect rites; and the true lover’s formative labour is called a rite at 253c. The last wording depends on the correction printed by Burnet, against teleutē, “end”, in B and T.

Attested: τελετῶν (244e · Burnet p. 25) — “rites”.

Attested: τελετὰς (249c · Burnet p. 31) — “rites”.

Attested: τελετή (253c · Burnet p. 36) — “rite”.

See: Initiation and mysteries (p. 57)

Τερψιχόρα

Terpsichora · Terpsichore · proper name

The Muse honoured through dances in the cicada tale.

The cicadas’ report makes those who honour her in dances more dear to her. This is the first concrete example of their general office of reporting the right honour to the right Muse.

Attested: Τερψιχόρᾳ (259c · Burnet p. 45) — “Terpsichore”.

See: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135)

τέττιξ

tettix · Cicada · lemma

The singing insect given a reporting office in Socrates' tale.

The cicadas first belong to the riverside chorus. At midday they can laugh at sleepers or admire conversational wakefulness; their myth makes them former human singers who now report to the Muses who honours them.

Attested: τεττίγων (230c · Burnet p. 5) — "cicadas".

Attested: τέττιγες (258e · Burnet p. 44) — "cicadas".

See: Cicadas and Muses (p. 135)

τίκτω

tiktō · Give birth · dictionary headword

Generate or bring forth, figuratively of a craft's products.

Thamus calls Theuth father of letters and contrasts producing an invention with judging its consequences. The parenthood metaphor later returns when written speech needs its father's help. It marks responsibility and attachment without making the inventor's affection proof of benefit.

Attested: τεκεῖν (274e · Burnet p. 67) — "give birth".

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Living speech and defence (p. 121); Writing and letters (p. 132)

τίμιος

timios · Precious or valuable · dictionary headword

Of worth; in the comparative, more precious than an author's written products.

Socrates distinguishes an author possessing resources more valuable than what he wrote from one whose serious achievement is only the product's assembly. The value is tested through knowledge and defence, not by the market price or physical durability of the manuscript.

Attested: τιμιώτερα (278d · Burnet p. 72) — "more precious".

See: Living speech and defence (p. 121); Wisdom and the names of a writer (p. 130)

τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν

to hauto kinoun · What moves itself · phrase

The self-moving, distinguished from what both moves something else and is moved by something else.

The article and participle make the expression a substantive. Its not abandoning itself supplies the argument for uninterrupted motion; its identification with soul is articulated at 245e–246a. This is an argumentative phrase, not a printed abstract noun meaning "self-motion".

Attested: τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν (245c · Burnet p. 26) — "what moves itself".

Attested: τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν (245e · Burnet p. 27) — "what itself moves itself". Phrase continues across the printed line break; the reflexive is preserved.

See: Self-motion and immortality (p. 79)

τὸ ὂν ὄντως

to on ontōs · What really is · phrase

Being in the full or genuine sense invoked by the heavenly vision.

The adverb strengthens the participle: "what really is". The expression contrasts the soul's object of prior seeing with what people now say are beings. It does not erase the dialogue's ordinary uses of "is" or turn every thing called real into a separate technical entity.

Attested: τὸ ὂν ὄντως (249c · Burnet p. 31) — "what really is".

Attested: τὰ ὄντα ὄντως (247e · Burnet p. 29) — "the other things that really are". The English "other" comes from τἆλλα immediately before.

See: Being and reality (p. 45)

τρέφω

trephō · Nourish and rear · lemma

To feed, sustain or bring up.

The wing is nourished by the divine qualities; the mind by intellect and untainted knowledge. Rearing also explains the bad horse's burden: it weighs down the charioteer who has not reared it well.

Attested: τρέφεταί (246e · Burnet p. 28) — "is nourished".

Attested: τεθραμμένος (247b · Burnet p. 28) — "reared".

Attested: τρεφομένη (247d · Burnet p. 29) — “is nourished”.

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47); Nourishment (p. 69)

τροφή

trophē · Nourishment · lemma

Food or sustaining nutriment.

Unsuccessful souls resort to nourishment of opinion; beauty’s incoming nourishment swells the growing wing. Literal bodily nourishment reappears in the analogy of medicine and rhetoric. The senses should be read in their constructions, not collapsed into one substance.

Attested: τροφῇ (248b · Burnet p. 30) — “nourishment”.

Attested: τροφῆς (251b · Burnet p. 33) — “nourishment”.

Attested: τροφὴν (270b · Burnet p. 60) — “nourishment”.

See: Nourishment (p. 69)

τύπος

typos · Mark or imprint · dictionary headword

A written mark that provides an external prompt.

Thamus speaks of recollection prompted from outside by marks belonging to others, rather than from within by oneself. The verb for recollecting applies on both sides; the distinction concerns the source and exercise of the activity, not two categorically unrelated mental verbs.

Attested: τύπων (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “marks”.

See: Memory and reminding (p. 123); Writing and letters (p. 132)

Τυφών

Typhōn · Typhon · name and contextual wordplay

The monstrous comparison through which Socrates poses his question about himself.

Socrates asks whether he is a more intricate and more fuming beast than Typhon or a gentler and simpler animal sharing a divine portion. The edition explains the monster and the wordplay on fuming and unfuming. The comparison makes myth serve self-examination instead of merely becoming its object.

Attested: Τυφῶνος (230a · Burnet p. 5) — “Typhon”. Genitive after the comparatives.

Attested: ἐπιτεθυμμένον (230a · Burnet p. 5) — "fuming". The participial adjective in the name-play.

Attested: ἀτύφου (230a · Burnet p. 5) — "unfuming". The contrary quality in the divine portion.

See: Myth and rationalization (p. 144); Self-knowledge (p. 150)

ὑδάτιον

hydation · Little stream and little waters · lemma

A diminutive water-word for the river's small, accessible waters.

Phaedrus proposes wetting their bare feet in the little stream, then admires its clean, transparent waters as a place where girls could play. The diminutive suits the intimacy of the walk and the local question; it does not itself carry the later philosophical significance of beauty's streams.

Attested: ὑδάτιον (229a · Burnet p. 3) — "little stream". Accusative in the route along the water.

Attested: ὑδάτια (229b · Burnet p. 4) — "little waters". Plural describing their inviting appearance.

See: Leisure and walking (p. 139); Myth and rationalization (p. 144)

ὑπερουράνιος

hyperouranios · Beyond heaven · lemma

Above or beyond heaven.

The place beyond heaven is introduced as beyond any worthy poetic hymn, then populated not by coloured bodies but by the substance accessible only to intellect. Its location is part of a deliberately explanatory likeness.

Attested: ὑπερουράνιον (247c · Burnet p. 29) — "beyond heaven".

See: Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55)

ὑποδήλωσις

hypodēlōsis · Insinuation · dictionary headword

An indirect indication or suggestion, named as Evenus' invention.

Socrates says Evenus first found it, together with incidental praises. The passage reports a claim of invention in a playful roll-call; it does not demonstrate historical priority or explain a complete operating method.

Attested: ὑποδήλωσίν (267a · Burnet p. 56) — “insinuation”.

See: Craft and expertise (p. 87); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

ὑπόσχεσις

hyposchesis · Promises · lemma

Undertakings about future action.

The former lover cannot make good his sworn pledges and promises once he has another ruling state. The boy expects continuity because the earlier acts and words were addressed to him by apparently the same person. The passage tests whether a commitment governed by appetite can survive that appetite’s end.

Attested: ὑποσχέσεις (241a–b · Burnet p. 20) — “promises”. Plural joined to sworn pledges.

See: Gratifying and gratitude (p. 21); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

ὑποτίθεμαι

hypotithemai · Set down as an assumption · middle dictionary headword of ὑποτίθημι

Place a proposition beneath an argument as its starting supposition.

Phaedrus says he will allow Socrates to assume that the lover is sicker than the non-lover. This permission explains what can be shared with Lysias while competing in other material. It should not be rewritten as an established conclusion; the palinode later challenges the simple equation of love’s madness with harm.

Attested: ὑποτίθεσθαι (236b · Burnet p. 13) — “assume”.

See: Definition and agreement (p. 90); Madness and divine possession (p. 66)

ὑπουράνιος

hypouranios · Beneath heaven · lemma

Under heaven.

The ascending gods reach the topmost vault beneath heaven. The honour-loving pair later escape the underground journey after beginning the journey beneath heaven. Burnet prints the latter reading, not the suggested alteration to “beyond heaven”.

Attested: ὑπουράνιον (247b · Burnet p. 28) — “beneath heaven”.

Attested: ὑπουρανίου (256d · Burnet pp. 40–41) — “beneath heaven”. The printed word crosses the P40/P41 page boundary: ὑπου- / ρανίου.

See: Heaven and beyond heaven (p. 55)

ὕσπληξ

hysplēx · Starting-rope · lemma

The starting barrier or rope in a race.

The driver falls back as if from a starting-rope when the renewed sight repeats his overwhelming experience. The simile intensifies the recoil before the bit is wrenched back; it does not locate the beloved in an actual racecourse.

Attested: ὕσπληγος (254e · Burnet p. 38) — “starting-rope”.

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47)

φαίνομαι

phainomai · Appear · dictionary headword

Come to appear or be presented in a particular way to hearers.

The Eleatic Palamedes makes the same things appear like and unlike, one and many, staying and moving. The appearance is grammatically relative to those hearing; the wording does not assert that all those contrary properties simply coexist in the same respect. Elsewhere the verb also marks ordinary judgements that seem warranted.

Attested: φαίνεσθαι (261d · Burnet p. 48) — “appear”.

See: Opinion and seeming (p. 105); Similarity and deception (p. 114)

Φαρμάκεια

Pharmakeia · Pharmaceia · lemma

The companion with whom Oreithyia plays in the proposed explanation.

Socrates’ hypothetical account places Oreithyia beside Pharmaceia when the gust strikes. The edition calls Pharmaceia a local nymph and notes the name’s connection with drugs or spells. The occurrence is a proper name; it should not be substituted for the common noun pharmakon in claims about writing.

Attested: Φαρμακείᾳ (229c · Burnet p. 4) — "Pharmaceia". Dative after "with" in the hypothetical story.

See: Drug, remedy and enchantment (p. 119); Myth and rationalization (p. 144)

φιλόκαλος

philokalos · Lover of the beautiful · lemma

One who loves beauty or beautiful things.

The word appears beside lover of wisdom and someone musical and erotic in the first rank of embodiment, assigned to the soul that has seen most. The list brings these capacities into proximity without supplying a complete identity between them.

Attested: φιλοκάλου (248d · Burnet p. 30) — "lover of the beautiful".

See: Beauty (p. 42); Philosophy (p. 71)

φιλοσοφέω

philosopheō · Pursue wisdom · lemma

To engage in philosophy or love wisdom.

The exception to the long return concerns the person who has philosophized without guile. Later Socrates summons arguments to persuade Phaedrus that without loving wisdom sufficiently he cannot speak adequately about anything. The verb joins the palinode's life to the methodological demand made upon speech.

Attested: φιλοσοφήσαντος (249a · Burnet p. 31) — "has loved wisdom". The printed word is rejoined across a line-ending hyphen.

Attested: φιλοσοφήσῃ (261a · Burnet p. 47) — "loves wisdom".

See: Philosophy (p. 71)

φιλοσοφία

philosophia · Philosophy · lemma

Love or pursuit of wisdom, also a way of living shaped by that pursuit.

The first speech's possessive lover blocks divine philosophy; the palinode's true lovers cultivate it together. The palinode's concluding prayer turns Lysias toward philosophy so that Phaedrus can live with wisdom-loving speeches. It is an activity and commitment before it becomes a title.

Attested: φιλοσοφίᾳ (239b · Burnet p. 17) — "philosophy".

Attested: φιλοσοφίας (249a · Burnet p. 31) — “philosophy”.

Attested: φιλοσοφίαν (256a · Burnet p. 40) — “philosophy”.

Attested: φιλοσοφίαν (257b · Burnet p. 41) — “philosophy”.

See: Philosophy (p. 71)

φιλόσοφος

philosophos · Lover of wisdom · lemma

A person devoted to wisdom rather than claiming completed wisdom.

The first embodied rank includes a philosopher; the philosopher’s mind grows wings by memory. At the dialogue’s close the title is proposed for one who can defend and exceed his writings, while the name “wise” is reserved as appropriate to a god.

Attested: φιλοσόφου (248d · Burnet p. 30) — “lover of wisdom”.

Attested: φιλοσόφου (249c · Burnet p. 31) — “lover of wisdom”.

Attested: φιλόσοφον (278d · Burnet p. 72) — “lover of wisdom”.

See: Philosophy (p. 71)

φρονέω

phroneō · Think, understand and be proud · lemma

To think or be minded; with an intensifier, to think highly of oneself.

The proudest politicians are those thinking the greatest things of themselves at 257e. At 266b Socrates pursues collection and division so that he can speak and be intelligent. The same verb’s construction distinguishes boastful self-estimation from the aspiration to understanding.

Attested: φρονοῦντες (257e · Burnet p. 42) — “are proudest”. The phrase includes μέγιστον: literally those thinking most highly.

Attested: φρονεῖν (266b · Burnet p. 54) — “to be intelligent”.

See: Intellect and seeing (p. 60)

φρόνησις

phronēsis · Intelligence · lemma

Intelligence or understanding.

At 250d Socrates denies that intelligence is seen by bodily sight. The formidable loves it would cause if it supplied an equally clear visual image are hypothetical; the sentence explains beauty’s exceptional visibility.

Attested: φρόνησις (250d · Burnet p. 33) — “intelligence”.

See: Beauty (p. 42); Intellect and seeing (p. 60)

φυτεύω

phyteuō · Plant · dictionary headword

Set something in suitable ground so that it may grow.

The dialectical practitioner takes a fitting soul and plants accounts with knowledge. The account must be capable of helping itself and the planter and of carrying seed onward. The image emphasizes recipient, care and generative result, not instantaneous transfer of a finished object.

Attested: φυτεύῃ (276e · Burnet p. 70) — “plants”.

See: Dialectic and conversation (p. 92); Sowing, gardens and seeds (p. 127)

χαλινός

chalinos · Bit · lemma

The horse’s bit, part of its bridle.

The bad horse first suffers from the bit, then bites on it as it drags the driver forward; repeated wrenching back bloodies its tongue and jaws. The concrete violence describes painful training inside the mythical likeness.

Attested: χαλινοῦ (254c · Burnet p. 38) — “bit”.

Attested: χαλινόν (254d · Burnet p. 38) — “bit”.

See: Charioteer and horses (p. 47)

χαλκοῦς

chalkous · Bronze · dictionary headword

Made of bronze, describing the speaking maiden of the tomb inscription.

The maiden’s durable material accompanies a promise to announce Midas’ burial as long as water flows and trees flourish. The poem supplies an example of lines Socrates says can stand in different orders. The material is not presented as a solution to writing’s later inability to answer.

Attested: Χαλκῆ (264d · Burnet p. 52) — “of bronze”.

See: Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Writing and letters (p. 132)

χαρακτήρ

charaktēr · Distinguishing mark · dictionary headword

A feature by which a class can be recognized.

The would-be rhetorician must grasp a mark of each kind of subject: those over which the multitude necessarily wander and those over which they do not. The word belongs to the proposed classification of contested and uncontested matters, not here to an individual's moral character.

Attested: χαρακτῆρα (263b · Burnet p. 50) — "distinguishing mark".

See: Definition and agreement (p. 90); Rhetoric and soul-leading (p. 112)

χρυσός

chrysos · Gold · word family

Precious metal used to measure desire, reward and possession.

Phaedrus says a worthy recital would be dearer than much gold and offers golden statues for a superior speech. The final prayer asks for a quantity of gold only a temperate man could carry. These changes move the metal from an extravagant incentive to a measure governed by character.

Attested: χρυσίον (228a · Burnet p. 2) — "gold". The diminutive noun for the wealth Phaedrus values below the accomplishment.

Attested: χρυσῆν (235d · Burnet p. 12) — "golden". The promised likeness at Delphi.

Attested: χρυσοῦ (279c · Burnet p. 73) — "gold". The quantity asked for in the final prayer.

See: Desire (p. 16); Phaedrus (p. 148); Prayer and inner beauty (p. 74); Temperance and self-control (p. 40)

χύδην

chydēn · Pell-mell · adverb

In a heap or without articulated order.

Socrates asks whether Lysias' material appears thrown together in this fashion. His test is whether the second item must occupy the second place or whether some reason dictates the sequence. The question targets arrangement, not every individual sentence's elegance.

Attested: χύδην (264b · Burnet p. 52) — "pell-mell".

See: Logos: speech, account and reason (p. 101); Nature, whole and part (p. 103)

ψυχή

psychē · Soul · lemma

Soul, the bearer of life, experience, thought and formation.

At 245c the demonstration is announced for soul divine and human. At 246b–c soul is distinguished from the mortal animal formed when soul and earthy body are fixed together. Later it is precisely the recipient whose nature rhetoric must know, not merely a poetic name for emotional effect.

Attested: Ψυχὴ πᾶσα (245c · Burnet p. 26) — "All soul". Phrase-level rendering; πᾶσα permits "all soul" or "every soul", while the headword ψυχή means soul.

Attested: ψυχὴ (245e–246a · Burnet p. 27) — "soul".

Attested: ψυχῆς (270b · Burnet p. 60) — "of the soul".

See: Soul (p. 82)

ὠδίς

ōdis · Birth-pang · lemma

A pang of childbirth, transferred to the soul's painful growth.

On seeing the beloved and channelling in longing, the soul gains breathing-space and ceases from goads and birth-pangs. The obstetric image develops the account of a new growth struggling through closed passages.

Attested: ὠδίνων (251e · Burnet p. 34) — "birth-pangs".

See: Longing and yearning (p. 25); Wing and flight (p. 85)

ὥρα

hōra · Season, time and youth · lemma

An appropriate time or season, including a person's youthful prime.

The stream walk suits this season of year and hour of day. In the erotic speeches the same noun means the beloved's youth, the period a merely appetitive admirer wants to enjoy. The change is ordinary semantic range: the noun alone does not specify a biological age or a fixed duration.

Attested: ὥραν (229a · Burnet p. 3) — "season". Qualified by year and day.

Attested: ὥρας (234a · Burnet p. 10) — "youth". What an admirer might merely enjoy.

Attested: ὥρᾳ (240d · Burnet p. 19) — "youth". Denied of the older admirer's appearance.

See: Benefit and harm (p. 12); Leisure and walking (p. 139); Love and the lover (p. 28)

Ὠρείθυια

Ōreithyia · Oreithyia · lemma

The girl carried off by Boreas in the story Phaedrus asks about.

Phaedrus links her story to the inviting stream-side place. Socrates relocates the traditional site farther downriver and then supplies a possible natural explanation without undertaking to establish it. The edition identifies her as the daughter of Erechtheus; that biographical detail belongs to its note.

Attested: Ὠρείθυιαν (229b · Burnet p. 4) — "Oreithyia". Accusative: the person reported as carried away.

See: Myth and rationalization (p. 144)

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