Minos Lexicon

A Philological and Philosophical Reading Companion

October 2026

Contents

- Introduction and argument map (p. 5)
- Full articles (p. 15)
- Defined vocabulary register (p. 148)
- Contextual phrase glosses (p. 242)
- Lexical index (p. 256)
- Passage index (p. 288)
- Thematic index (p. 304)
- Source guide and notes (p. 308)

Full article contents

- Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15)
- Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18)
- Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20)
- Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23)
- Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25)
- Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28)
- Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30)
- Cookery and the preparation of dishes (p. 34)
- Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36)
- Decent and base (p. 38)
- Distribution and tending (p. 41)
- Divine movement disclosure and need (p. 43)
- Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45)
- Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48)
- Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50)
- Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52)
- Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55)
- Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57)

- Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60)
- Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62)
- Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64)
- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)
- Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69)
- Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72)
- Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74)
- Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician (p. 77)
- Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83)
- Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85)
- Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88)
- Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)
- Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99)
- Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101)
- Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104)
- Right and apparent law (p. 106)
- Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109)
- Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111)
- Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114)
- Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116)
- Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending (p. 119)
- Sophist, virtue, and the content of good education (p. 121)
- Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124)
- Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126)

- Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128)
- Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131)
- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)
- Variation of customs and the companion’s objection (p. 136)
- Weight and the judgment of what is heavier (p. 139)
- What is and the things that are (p. 141)
- What is due and fitting to a recipient (p. 143)
- Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145)

Introduction and argument map

Minos asks what law is, then asks who can give it well. The conversation moves from what people accept and what cities decree to the discovery of what is, from the writings of experts to the distributions of a good ruler, and from disagreement about customs to disagreement about the reputation of an ancient king. Its last question is nevertheless still open: what does the good lawgiver distribute to a soul to make it better? The preceding praise of Minos does not supply the answer that the two speakers cannot give.

This lexicon is a companion to the supplied Diotimos Editions Greek and English Minos of 2026. It explains the words, persons, examples, argumentative transitions, and textual choices that matter in that edition. Its article form follows the earlier Theages Lexicon: The word, In the work, The places, In this edition, and See also. Full articles develop relations and difficulties; a defined vocabulary register gives shorter, context-specific explanations with actual Greek forms; subsidiary phrase glosses explain constructions that lose force when broken into individual words. Three indexes provide routes by vocabulary, passage, and theme.

The levels should be used together. An index pointer is not another lexical definition, and the same word can need several contextual records without becoming several different headwords. Conversely, a single English rendering can conceal distinctions worth recovering: the edition's "finding" translates both εὕρεσις, the activity or result invoked in the definition of law, and εὕρημα, the city's invention of tragedy. Repeated terms acquire new tasks as the conversation proceeds. "Opinion" first

describes a city's judgment and later the public standing that poets can damage; "distribute" joins agriculture, music, bodily training, kingship, and Homer's allocation of praise.

Title authorship and the speaking situation

The printed title is ΜΙΝΩΣ ἢ ΠΕΡΙ ΝΟΜΟΥ, "Minos, or On Law." Minos is not a speaker. He enters the conversation only when its search for old and good lawgivers reaches Crete. The title makes his later rehabilitation prominent, while the subtitle identifies the subject with which Socrates begins. Both belong to the transmitted framing of the work; neither authorizes treating every familiar theme of Plato's political philosophy as a word or doctrine present here.

The supplied Introduction places the work, following the ancient catalogue reported by Diogenes Laertius, first in the ninth tetralogy, before Laws, Epinomis, and Letters. Ancient inclusion and modern doubts about authorship are distinct facts. The edition describes the dispute without deciding it; this companion does likewise. "The dialogue," "its Socrates," and "the argument" are therefore more accurate subjects for interpretive claims than an unqualified "Plato believes." The dramatic Socrates is also not automatically a historical source for what the historical Socrates said on a particular occasion.

There are two interlocutors, Socrates and an unnamed companion. The speaker list's ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ supplies the label "Comp." in the English. The conversation gives neither a narrated setting nor a secure dramatic date. The companion identifies with Athenian usages and an Athenian account of Minos; Socrates eventually speaks as

one of the Athenians who retaliate against Minos in tragedy. These first-person affiliations matter more to the argument than an invented biography of the unnamed man. The closing mention of their age gives a reason for shame at ignorance, not their precise ages.

The estimate concerning Lycurgus' laws at 318c is explicitly qualified and depends on an uncertain chronology. It cannot securely date either the conversation or its composition. Nor does the transition from short questions to an extended account of Minos introduce a new narrator: the claims about Homer, Zeus, education, law, and tragedy remain statements made by Socrates to his companion.

How to read the Greek and the references

Stephanus references identify the ancient work, not a page of this lexicon. "315a" means the a section of page 315 in the traditional numbering; "315a–b" crosses into the next section. The supplied edition also reproduces Burnet's lines and line numbers. A quotation that crosses a section boundary retains a range rather than being forced into the section in which it ends. The passage index includes every section actually present; 313d and 313e are not manufactured to fill a numerical sequence.

Greek headwords normally appear in a recognizable dictionary form, but the register separately prints the form actually found in the dialogue. These are different kinds of evidence. A nominative headword can organize a genitive or accusative occurrence; it does not claim that the nominative itself occurs there. An explanatory phrase heading can collect a construction rather than a single lemma. Editorial reading articles are identified as such.

Words found only in a title, a speaker label, an apparatus alternative, or an explanatory note do not become attested spoken vocabulary by proximity to the dialogue.

The places sections use short Greek citations to locate the interpretive claim. Semicolons between separately presented extracts are editorial separators, not reproductions of a Greek question mark; an ellipsis marks an omission within an extract. Continuous text is restored where a word is divided at the end of a printed line. Conventional acute and grave accents may differ when a form is cited independently; the register preserves the source's printed form. Angle brackets remain significant: they identify editorial supplements, especially the answer concerning the Persians at 316a and the relative pronoun at 321d. The companion follows the supplied reading text and reports consequential alternatives; it is not a new critical edition or manuscript collation.

The English follows the supplied translation when it identifies a rendering. Explanatory English may be fuller than a translation equivalent. "Law" is retained for νόμος even in the musical passages, because that consistency lets the reader follow the dialogue's movement between civic rule and nome. "Accept" keeps the recurrence of νομίζειν visible, but cannot reproduce its audible relation to νόμος. "Distributor" and "tend" expose different uses of the νέμειν family. No single gloss replaces attention to the object, construction, speaker, and argumentative situation.

The path of the argument

The question and the first proposal 313a to 314b

Socrates asks what law is "for us." The companion asks which law he means. The examples of gold and stone distinguish the shared character under inquiry from the

different instances that possess it: Socrates asks what law is as a whole. The companion offers “what is accepted.” Socrates separates speech from spoken things, sight from visible things, and hearing from audible things, then uses the same pattern to separate law from accepted things. That sequence establishes a demand for explanation; whether the analogy itself settles the relation between law and custom remains a question for the reader.

Sight and hearing then become examples of perception revealing objects. Knowledge reveals what is learned; medicine finds what is healthy or sickly; prophecy, “as the prophets say,” finds what the gods intend. Law is invited into this explanatory field. The qualification about prophets belongs to Socrates’ wording and should survive any summary. The sequence does not silently equate all perception, knowledge, craft, and law.

Resolution opinion and what law wishes 314b to 315b

The companion turns to resolutions and decrees, calling law a resolution of the city. Socrates recasts that as political opinion. They agree that law and justice are fine and beneficial, whereas lawlessness and injustice destroy; an indiscriminately defined civic resolution can be base, so it cannot yet be law as they have characterized it. If law is opinion, Socrates proposes, it must be decent opinion; decent opinion is accepted as true opinion, and true opinion as discovery of what is. The conclusion says that law “wishes” to be that discovery.

Several commitments are doing work. The moral characterization of law narrows what will count as law. The move from decent to true opinion is assented to rather than independently demonstrated. Law’s being opinion remains conditional in the formulation at 314e. Most importantly, βούλεται distinguishes what law is directed

toward from what people succeed in discovering. The companion's objection states the definition without that verb; Socrates immediately restores it. Human failure and law's aim are thus separated before the argument turns to actual differences in practice.

Different customs and common inquiry 315b to 316c

The companion's evidence is both geographical and historical: Carthaginians, Greeks in Lycaea, descendants of Athamas, and changing Athenian funeral usages. The Greek examples prevent a simple contrast between Greek rightness and foreign error. The funeral examples show that even "we" do not always follow the same usages. These are his reported examples, not ethnographic discoveries independently established by this lexicon.

Socrates proposes putting the inquiry in common instead of exchanging separate long speeches. The resulting questions obtain agreement that just things are just, heavier things heavier, and fine things fine. Persians, Carthage, and Lycaea enter as sites of such agreement. The human sacrifices themselves are not individually reassessed. The step to "what is" gives a common standard and connects missing it with missing the lawful, but agreement about predicates does not by itself identify every contested practice correctly. The companion's continuing inability to be persuaded at 316b–c preserves this pressure within the dialogue.

Expert writings and right law 316c to 317d

Medical writings introduce an identifiable craft and practitioners who know their subject. Those who know, Greek or non-Greek, are said to accept the same things about the same things, always. Writings and lawful usages of medicine, agriculture, gardening, and cookery prepare

the application to the ordering of cities. The relevant writers are statesmen and kingly men who know how to rule.

The standard becomes explicit: what is right is lawful; what is not right is lawless, however much it seems law to the ignorant. This is not a denial that people use the name “law” for bad enactments. Socrates expressly distinguishes that use from the standard being defended. Nor is the argument a historical survey proving that practitioners never disagree: its force depends on “those who know” and “the same things.” At 317d Socrates recapitulates law as the finding of what is, now without “wishes.” The wording should be compared with the earlier formulation rather than silently made identical to it.

Fitting distribution and the king 317d to 318a

A good farmer distributes seeds fittingly to soils; a good musician distributes strokes for tunes; a trainer distributes the food appropriate to bodies. The recurring language of νόμος and νομεύς gives a practical shape to law’s rightness. Distribution is not merely division into equal shares. It requires a discriminating fit between what is supplied and what receives it.

The herdsman sense of the family then comes forward. A trainer tends the human herd with respect to the body; the shepherd and oxherd tend their respective animals. The king’s laws are assigned to human souls. Socrates presses for agreement, and receives it, but the precise contents that improve souls are not yet specified. The final exchange will return to exactly this gap.

Surviving music and the oldest civic laws 318b to 318d

Marsyas and Olympus exemplify good old lawgiving in music. Their surviving tunes are called divine and are said to move and reveal those in need of the gods. Socrates then asks for an old king whose lawful usages similarly survive as divine. The companion thinks of Sparta and Lycurgus, but their best usages are said to have come from Crete. Antiquity, survival, divine association, and goodness become linked questions, without being simply interchangeable meanings of a single word.

Minos and the education given by Zeus 318d to 320d

The companion accepts Rhadamanthys' justice but repeats a harsh picture of Minos. Socrates attributes that picture to Attic tragedy and opposes Homer and Hesiod. His solemn warning about praising and blaming good people makes the question of interpretation also a question of piety.

Homer's "nine-yearly confidant" becomes, in Socrates' reading, one who repeatedly meets Zeus in words for education. The unusual ἐννέωρος is uncertain in Homer; the lexicon distinguishes the quoted word from Socrates' construction of its meaning.[1] His explanation of ὀαριστής through ὅαροι similarly belongs to the argument, rather than independently proving every detail of a lost educational history. The alternative drinking-companion reading is opposed through Minos' legislative practice and presumed consistency of belief and action. The specific Cretan law prohibits drinking with one another to

[1] At 319b–e the poetic quotation and Socrates' explanation must be distinguished. The supplied note reports several possible senses of ἐννέωρος in Homer; the conversation itself interprets the phrase through repeated association in words and education by Zeus.

drunkenness; it must not be carelessly enlarged into a prohibition of every kind of drinking.

Rhadamanthys is assigned an educated but subordinate judicial function; Talos guards written laws in the villages. Socrates explains the name “bronze” through bronze tablets. Hesiod’s scepter becomes Zeus’ education by which Minos guided Crete. These are the dialogue’s versions of the figures, and should not be replaced by other familiar versions of their myths.

Poetry reputation and the sign of stability 320d to 321c

The companion asks why Minos acquired his bad reputation. Socrates explains poets’ power over opinion and makes Athenian tragedy a vehicle of vengeance for war and tribute. His praise of epic poets and his warning about poetic power coexist: the dialogue does not apply one simple verdict to every poet or every poetic representation. Its account of tragedy’s antiquity is also an assertion in this conversation, not a secure chronology established here.

Minos’ unmoved laws are offered as the greatest sign of his goodness and discovery of the truth about civic administration. The companion calls the account reasonable; Socrates continues conditionally, “if what I say is true.” The evidential language matters. A persuasive account, an offered sign, and a completed proof should not be flattened into one category. The passage closes by returning to the lawgiver as distributor and shepherd.

The last question 321c to 321d

Food and labors name the body’s improving distributions: one supports growth, the others exercise and firm the body. The corresponding psychic question receives no

answer. Socrates includes both speakers in the shame that their souls appear ignorant of what is within them, where their good and poor condition lies. Their earlier confidence about kingly law does not excuse this ignorance.

The ending does not retract every earlier distinction. It does prevent treating the dialogue as if it had delivered a complete account of psychic education. Zeus, virtue, words, law, and good distribution have all been named; identifying their precise effective content remains the unresolved demand. A good reading keeps both the positive argument and this limit in view.

Using the companion

A first reading can follow the argument map and passage index alongside the dialogue. A second can follow a word family across articles: law and acceptance; finding and discovery; opinion and reputation; rightness and fitting distribution; education and association; praise, evidence, and poetic authority. The final question is a useful test of every proposed synthesis: does it explain what the text actually establishes, or does it supply the answer that the speakers leave unsaid?

The register is selective in the scholarly sense, not arbitrary in extent. It aims to define every substantive item needed for the dialogue's examples, distinctions, reasoning, and cultural setting, with useful ordinary words where their local force matters. It does not pad the count with every repeated particle or claim to replace a complete grammatical concordance. The phrase glosses complement it by treating the small constructions that materially affect an inference, qualification, comparison, or turn of speech.

Full articles

The 54 full articles are arranged alphabetically by English heading. The defined register contains 392 consolidated Greek headwords or expressions and 463 contextual records. The phrase section contains 43 subsidiary glosses. These are different levels of explanation; repeated index pointers are navigation, not additional entries.

Accepting, custom, and what is accepted

νομίζειν (nomizein); τὰ νομιζόμενα (ta nomizomena); συννομίζειν (synnomizein)

The word. Nomizein belongs to the family of nomos, “law” or “custom.” It can mean to hold or observe as customary, recognize or accept, or consider something to be the case. The passive participle ta nomizomena names “what is accepted.” Its range matters more here than a single dictionary equivalent: an established practice and a judgment about something are not automatically the same kind of acceptance. Synnomizein adds the idea of accepting in common.

In the work. The companion first offers ta nomizomena as an apparently obvious answer to “What is law?” (313b). Socrates does not initially ask whether particular customs are good. He distinguishes what is accepted from that by which it is accepted, using speech, sight, and hearing as analogies. The deliberately repetitive formula “what is accepted is accepted by law” then makes law look like an activity, capacity, or source rather than the collected contents of a community’s practice (314a). That is an argumentative construction. The etymological relationship alone does not prove that nomos operates like sight.

The companion's later examples return nomizein to its customary range. Different peoples sacrifice differently; the Athenians have changed their treatment of the dead. These are practices communities observe and regard as legitimate, not simply descriptions they assent to. Socrates' ensuing questions move toward judgment: do people accept just things as just, greater weights as heavier, and what is as being? (315e–316b). A reader should hear the continuity of the word while noticing the change of examples. The argument gains force from a common root and exposes itself to an objection about whether agreement in the correct application of a predicate answers disagreement about which practices deserve it.

The next restriction is decisive: those who know accept the same things about the same things (316d). The companion himself supplies synnomizein when conceding agreement among knowledgeable Greeks and barbarians. The relevant community is now formed by knowledge rather than residence, ancestry, or enacted custom. Doctors write what they accept as being, and their writings become "laws of medicine."

Minos provides a final personal application. Socrates says that what Minos accepted as fine he established as lawful usages for his citizens, and that he did not accept one thing but do something contrary to it (320a–b). Acceptance, conduct, and legislation are brought into alignment through the presumed goodness of the lawgiver. This does not turn every sincere belief into law: the preceding argument requires rightness, and Socrates still owes an account of what genuinely improves the soul. The word thus joins three distinct questions: what people observe, what they take to be true or good, and what a good lawgiver embodies in action.

The places.

- **313b.** τὰ νομιζόμενα — The companion's first answer, "what is accepted"
- **314a.** νόμῳ τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται — Socrates' threefold repetition of the law-family
- **315d.** κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομίζομεν — The companion denies that people always accept things in the same way
- **315e.** νομίζεις τὰ δίκαια ἄδικα εἶναι — A question about what the companion accepts as just or unjust
- **316b.** τὰ ὄντα νομίζεται εἶναι — Acceptance now has a claim about what is as its content
- **316d.** συννομίζειν καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους — Knowing Greeks and barbarians accept in common
- **320a.** ἃ ἐνόμιζεν καλὰ εἶναι, ταῦτα νόμιμα ἔθηκεν — Minos' accepted judgments become established usages

In this edition. "Accept" is maintained throughout, with "what is accepted" and "accept in common." This preserves repetition but cannot reproduce the audible relation to "law." Reading every occurrence as either mere social convention or purely private belief would remove the very range through which the discussion moves.

See also. Law and the demand for a definition; Variation of customs and the companion's objection; Weight and the judgment of what is heavier; Knowledge and those who know.

Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent

ὁμολογεῖν (homologein); συμβαίνειν (symbainein); πείθεσθαι (peithesthai); φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai); δοκεῖν (dokein)

The word. Homologein is to agree or acknowledge together; symbainein can mean to come together and, in discussion, come to terms. Peithesthai is to be persuaded. Dokein and phainesthai mark what seems or appears to someone. These ordinary conversational verbs identify different levels of commitment. Agreement with an answer, apparent plausibility, and settled persuasion need not coincide.

In the work. At 313c the companion says that law and accepted things now appear different to him. His assent registers the effect of Socrates' analogy; it does not establish a permanent willingness to follow every consequence Socrates will draw. After the definition as discovery, he immediately challenges the discrepancy between that definition and changing laws. The work repeatedly gives him both roles: respondent to particular questions and author of a continuing objection.

At 315d–e Socrates proposes a common inquiry as the way they might agree. The possibility is cautiously expressed, and he allows the companion to choose which man asks questions. The companion's willingness to answer authorizes a conversational procedure, not assent to a predetermined result. This matters because the sequence about just things, weights, and fine things secures many short affirmative replies but does not dissolve his dissatisfaction.

His statement at 316b–c is especially exact: things appear lawful “as you put it,” yet when he thinks about ceaseless legal change he cannot be persuaded. The qualification distinguishes the local attractiveness of a formulation from its adequacy to the original phenomenon. It would therefore be misleading to report 316b as a completed refutation of the objection. The subsequent craft argument is needed precisely because assent and persuasion have come apart.

Socrates later declares that they rightly agreed that law is the finding of what is (317d); the companion answers that it appears so. Near the end he calls Socrates’ account of Minos reasonable, after which Socrates himself makes the next question conditional upon his having spoken truly (321b). These qualifications do not make every claim insincere or empty. They prevent a summary from silently promoting the interlocutor’s conversational concessions into demonstrated knowledge.

The final admission is different again. The companion cannot say what the good lawgiver gives the soul. The dialogue has achieved enough agreement to locate a question, but not enough knowledge to answer it. Its affirmative middle and questioning end belong together.

The places.

- **313c.** Ἄλλο μοι νῦν ἐφάνη — The things now appear different to the companion
- **315e.** οὐδὲν μή ποτε συμβῶμεν; τάχ’ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιμεν — Coming to terms is contrasted with the possibility of agreement through common inquiry
- **316b–c.** ὡς σὺ λέγεις; οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι — The companion distinguishes how an argument sounds from being persuaded

- **317d.** Ὀρθῶς ἄρα ὡμολογήσαμεν; Φαίνεται — Socrates' retrospective claim receives an appearance-qualified response
- **321b.** εἰκότα τὸν λόγον εἰρηκέναι; εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω — Reasonableness is followed by a condition concerning truth

In this edition. The short responses are translated individually: "I think so," "It appears so," "Yes," and "I say so" are not silently standardized. Their variation helps readers distinguish a speaker's precise response from the proposition Socrates has put forward.

See also. Common inquiry and the long speech; True opinion and the unproved bridge; Changing laws and the draughts image.

Association, learning, and education over time

συνουσία (synousia); συνουσιαστής (synousiastēs); συγγίγνεσθαι (syngignesthai); φοιτᾶν (phoitan); μανθάνειν (manthanein); παιδεία (paideia)

The word. Synousia is being together or association; syngignesthai means to come to be with or associate with someone. Synousiastēs names a participant in that association. None of these words by itself specifies teaching, sex, drinking or any other single activity. The local qualifications supply the content. Phoitan is to go repeatedly or frequent a place; manthanein is to learn. Paideia names education or training, while the associated verb paideuein means to educate.

In the work. Association becomes the explanatory bridge between divine authority and human lawgiving. Socrates takes Minos' relation to Zeus to be association "in words,"

and then gives that association an educational purpose. The distinction is essential: the interpretation does not rest merely on Minos being near a god. It involves speech, repeated attendance, learning and demonstration of previous learning (319c–e).

The sequence of tenses and purposes makes the education sustained. Minos used to attend; on a visit he would learn some things and show others that he had learned in the previous period. The future participles μαθησόμενος and ἀποδειξόμενος describe purposes of going, and the pluperfect ἐμεμαθήκει locates earlier learning before the later visit. Displaying acquired learning is not here identical with the companion's "proof" from variable customs at 315d, even though the words belong to the same show-or-demonstrate family. The local object is what Minos has learned.

At 320b Socrates states the account in its most compressed form: the association was through words, for education, toward virtue. These phrases give medium, educational purpose and ethical direction. The resulting laws are said to make Crete happy, with Sparta sharing the benefit after adopting them. This is Socrates' claim about the efficacy of the laws, not a narrated survey of Cretan and Spartan welfare.

Education is then transmitted through a second relationship. Rhadamanthys has been educated by Minos, but only for a defined service within the kingly craft. Teaching is therefore both a source of qualification and a relation whose scope must be specified. The sequence Zeus –Minos–Rhadamanthys does not imply that every pupil receives all the teacher's competence.

The final question checks the explanatory sufficiency of this account. Earlier education vocabulary certainly

prepares a possible direction of answer: the soul may be improved through appropriate instruction and formation. But the interlocutors do not actually identify what the good lawgiver distributes to it. “Education” as a general description must not be inserted as a completed answer that the dialogue deliberately does not give (321d).

The places.

- **319c.** συγγίγνεσθαι ἐνάτῳ ἔτει τῷ Διὶ ἐν λόγοις — Association is expressly qualified as taking place in words
- **319c.** φοιτᾶν παιδευθησόμενον — Recurrent attendance has the purpose of receiving education
- **319e.** τὰ μὲν μαθησόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀποδειξόμενος — Learning and displaying previous learning are differentiated
- **319e.** ἐμεμαθήκει παρὰ τοῦ Διός — The earlier learning has Zeus as its source
- **320b.** διὰ λόγων ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ εἰς ἀρετήν — Medium, educational purpose and ethical direction are all specified
- **320c.** ἐπεπαίδευτο μέντοι οὐχ ὅλην τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην — Rhadamanthys’ education has a limited scope

In this edition. “Being with,” “come to be with,” and “one who is with” preserve the family rather than assigning every member the generic label “education.” The separately retained educational words show how Socrates interprets the association. “To show” translates the later purpose at the cave without introducing an unattested formal examination system.

See also. Oaristēs and enneōros · Sophist and virtue · Rhadamanthys and Talos · The unanswered final question

Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement

σῶμα (sōma); ψυχή (psychē); βελτίων (beltiōn); τροφή (trophē); πόνος (ponos); αὔξειν (auxein); γυμνάζειν (gymnazein); συνιστάναι (synistanai)

The word. Sōma is body and psychē soul. Beltiōn is the comparative “better”; it states improvement without by itself naming its content. Trophē is nourishment or food, ponos labor or exertion. Auxein is to make grow, gymnazein to exercise or train, and synistanai to bring together or establish; in this bodily setting the edition renders the last “giving it firmness.” The contrasts specify forms of benefit rather than merely distinguishing material from immaterial objects.

In the work. The soul appears before the close when Socrates asks whose laws are best for human souls and elicits the answer “the king’s” (318a). The preceding examples have assigned food to the trainer, sheep to the shepherd and cattle to the oxherd. This establishes a proposed corresponding expert for the human soul but does not yet identify exactly what that expert distributes.

At 321c Socrates restarts with a hypothetical third party asking the two speakers what a good lawgiver and distributor supplies to the body in order to improve it. The familiar bodily case receives a compact answer: food and labors. Their functions are differentiated. Food makes the body grow; exertions exercise and consolidate it. Good distribution therefore does not mean indiscriminately supplying pleasant things. A beneficial regimen can contain demanding activity, and its parts can work in different ways.

The next hypothetical question asks for the corresponding distributions to the soul. The wording does not simply ask who the expert is: the king has already been named. Nor does it ask for an encomium of that expert: Minos has just received one. It asks what the things are that the good lawgiver and distributor allocates so as to make the recipient better. The form presses the earlier analogy toward an explanatory specificity available in the bodily case but still lacking in the psychic one.

Several earlier passages bear on the question without constituting its spoken answer. The interpretation of Zeus' association with Minos emphasized words, education and virtue; the laws were said to produce civic happiness; tragedy was said to lead souls. Yet the last exchange does not select one of these as the precise answer, show how it should be distributed, or distinguish beneficial psychic influence from effective but harmful influence. The companion says he can no longer answer. Supplying "virtue," "education" or "true beliefs" as if printed here would close an opening the work leaves exposed.

The last sentence makes souls the subjects of knowing and inquiry as well as the recipients of distribution. Their own good and poor qualities are within their concern, yet they have examined bodily and other matters while failing to know those internal matters. This is a reversal of priority, not a denial that knowledge of the body is genuine or useful.

The places.

- **318a.** οἱ δὲ τοῦ τίνος νόμοι ἄριστοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων; — The earlier analogy asks whose laws best serve souls

- **321c.** διανέμων ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ — The bodily distributor's activity is measured by improvement
- **321c.** τροφήν τε καὶ πόνους — Food and labors are the available answer
- **321c.** τῇ μὲν αὔξων, τοῖς δὲ γυμνάζων καὶ συνιστὰς τὸ σῶμα αὐτό — Their distinct bodily functions are stated
- **321d.** ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν βελτίω αὐτὴν ποιεῖ — The same demand is now directed toward the soul
- **321d.** τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ φλαῦρον — The final sentence locates good and poor within the souls' own sphere

In this edition. "Food and labors" preserves the pairing rather than substituting a generic "health regimen." "Soul" is the attested psychē, unlike works in which a commentator imports that noun. The supplied relative ⟨ἃ⟩ at 321d remains editorially marked in the Greek and English. Its presence clarifies the relative clause; it supplies no answer to the question.

See also. Distribution · Trainers and herds · Education and association · Tragedy and vengeance · Shame and ignorance

Changing laws and the draughts image

μετατιθέναι (metatithenai); μεταπεττεύειν (metapetteuein); ἀκίνητος (akinētos)

The word. Metatithenai is to move, transfer, or change; in the middle it can describe changing one's arrangements. Metapetteuein evokes moving pieces in a board game. Akinētos is unmoved or unchanging. The first two words occur where the companion insists on observable legal

instability; the last becomes Socrates' principal sign of Minos' success.

In the work. The companion's objection has two temporal levels. At 315a he asks why laws change if what is has been discovered. At 315c–d he supplies practices that earlier Athenians followed and present Athenians do not. After Socrates' questions about universal judgments, he returns to the same difficulty: "we never stop changing our laws up and down" (316b–c). The persistence of the objection is part of the dialogue, not a lapse that a sympathetic interpretation should omit.

Socrates answers with the striking suggestion that the things moved about as at draughts are the same. The image distinguishes the identity of what is being moved from its current arrangement, but the speech does not elaborate a formal model of legislation as a game. Nor does it specify which concrete pieces correspond to which legal institutions. Its immediate function is to lead into writings about health. The explanatory burden is carried by the next claim: genuine knowers accept and write the same things about the same things.

At 317b changing usages about the same matters becomes evidence of lack of knowledge. Socrates' answer therefore does more than discover a stable pattern beneath institutional change. It restricts the title "law" to what is right, calling the incorrect "lawless" even when people think it law. Apparent counterexamples are sorted by competence and correctness. This protects the proposed invariance, but it raises the question of how actual good laws are to be recognized independently of their stability.

That question becomes acute with Minos. His laws' immobility is called the greatest sign that he discovered well the truth concerning a city's administration (321b).

Earlier, knowledge was said to imply sameness; here enduring sameness is evidence for knowledge. Those directions of inference are not interchangeable without further support. Socrates also invokes poetic testimony, divine education, and the happiness of Crete and Sparta, but the text offers no comparative investigation of legal persistence. The companion's assent is to a reasonable argument, and the close still asks what makes souls better.

The image thus belongs to a larger tension between the familiar alteration of rules and the desired stability of what is right. The dialogue states a strong standard for genuine law; it does not provide an administrative rule that legislators must never revise any provision under changed circumstances. Its repeated qualification is "about the same things."

The places.

- **315a.** οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρώμεθα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν — The companion joins changing rules to an unchanged subject matter
- **316b–c.** ἄνω κάτω μετατιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους — Ceaseless alteration "up and down"
- **316c.** ταῦτα μεταπεττευόμενα ὅτι ταὐτά ἐστιν — Socrates' things moved about as at draughts
- **317b.** Οὐδὲ μεταθήσονταί ποτε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα νόμιμα — Knowers will not successively replace usages concerning the same matters
- **321b.** ἀκίνητοι αὐτοῦ οἱ νόμοι εἰσίν — The laws of Minos are unmoved

In this edition. "Moved about as at draughts" translates the image without identifying the ancient board game with modern draughts in every rule or detail. The note

identifies petteia as a game with pieces moved from place to place. “Unmoved” retains the physical vocabulary at the later claim about Minos.

See also. Sameness, difference, and the same subject; Expert writings; Rightness and law; Oldest laws.

Common inquiry and the long speech

σκέμμα (skemma); σκοπεῖν (skopein); κοινός (koinos); κοινῇ (koinēi); μακρὸς λόγος (makros logos)

The word. Skemma is what is being considered or examined; skopein is to look into or examine. Koinos means common or shared, and koinēi means in common or jointly. Makros logos is a long speech or extended account. None of these expressions names a complete philosophical method by itself. Here their force comes from the contrast between speaking separately and making an object of inquiry shared.

In the work. Socrates’ first instruction is already to look into what he is asking (313a). The companion must distinguish a question about a particular law from a question about law as a whole. After the sensory analogies Socrates again proposes that they examine the matter in a particular way (313c). Inquiry is therefore not simply an open exchange of examples: it includes attention to the form of the question and to what an answer is supposed to explain.

At 315d the companion has made his most substantial speech. Human sacrifice and earlier Athenian burial customs support a claim of difference across peoples and periods. Socrates does not answer each instance. He says that the companion may be speaking rightly and that he himself may have missed it, but that separate long speeches will not bring them to agreement. Making the

skemma common may do so. The concession is provisional, yet it keeps the proposal from being a bare assertion of superior knowledge.

The companion is offered a real grammatical choice: he can ask Socrates questions or answer Socrates' questions. He chooses to answer. Shared inquiry thus concerns reciprocal access to the object, not merely the identity of the questioner. Nevertheless, the actual questioning strongly shapes the issue. Socrates replaces the disputed classification of practices with questions about calling just things just and heavier things heavier. The method secures shared propositions while leaving open whether those propositions meet the objection.

The dialogue itself later contains a long Socratic account of Minos, poets, and education. The criticism at 315d cannot therefore be flattened into a prohibition on length, a claim that only one-line responses count as philosophy, or a guarantee that questioning always reaches truth. Its local target is the uncoordinated alternation of private assertions. A substantial speech can contribute to the inquiry, and a series of short answers can fail to persuade, as the companion explicitly says at 316c.

The final challenge revives the shared pronouns: what could "we" answer, and what do the souls of "each of us" fail to know? Socrates does not leave the companion alone with the shame. Shared inquiry eventually produces a shared recognition of an unanswered question concerning the soul.

The places.

- **313a.** σκόπει γὰρ δὴ ὃ τυγχάνω ἐρωτῶν σε — Attend to what is actually being asked
- **313c.** ἐπισκεψώμεθ' αὐτὸ ὧδε — A proposal to examine the matter in a specified way

- **315d.** κατὰ σαυτὸν λέγῃς ἅ σοι δοκεῖ μακρῷ λόγῳ — Speaking separately at length about what seems so to oneself
- **315e.** ἐὰν δὲ κοινὸν τεθῇ τὸ σκέμμα — Making the examined matter common
- **315e.** κοινῇ μετ’ ἐμοῦ σκόπει — An invitation to examine together, by asking or answering
- **321d.** τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἑκατέρου — The final deficiency concerns the soul of each participant

In this edition. “What is looked into” keeps skemma close to the recurring verbs of looking and examining. “Long speech” retains logos in its conversational sense; it should not be read as a separate technical category called “the Long Discourse.”

See also. Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent; Law and the demand for a definition; Variation of customs and the companion’s objection.

Companion and the conduct of Socrates

Editorial reading article; Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs), Socrates, and the speaker-list designation ἑταῖρος (hetairos), companion.

The word. The supplied Greek speaker list names ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ and ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ, and the speeches use ΣΩ. and ΕΤ. The designation “companion” is a paratextual identification of an unnamed speaker. It should not be confused with συνουσιαστής, the “one who is with” Zeus in Socrates’ interpretation of Homer, or with συνουσία, the association later described as education toward virtue. The present article concerns the construction of the conversation, not a newly discovered occurrence of ἑταῖρος in its spoken Greek.

The companion addresses Socrates by name, while Socrates uses ὦ βέλτιστε, “my excellent friend.” The latter is the vocative of a superlative, but as a form of address it need not certify the addressee’s moral perfection. Its recurrence accompanies courtesy, correction, a warning about impiety, and the advice not to antagonize poets. The immediate speech gives the address its tone.

In the work. Socrates initiates the inquiry and usually directs the short questions. The companion nevertheless makes contributions that structure the entire argument. He asks which law Socrates means, proposes accepted usages and civic resolutions, objects to the definition from the actual variety of customs, offers concrete cases, and explicitly says that he cannot be persuaded when legal change remains before his mind. Later he supplies Rhadamanthys’ favorable reputation, Minos’ unfavorable one, and the question of why that unfavorable report arose. He is neither a named historical authority nor a merely silent recipient of a finished doctrine.

His relation to his own community is significant. He contrasts “with us” and Carthaginian sacrifice, remembers earlier Athenian burial practices through reports, and voices a picture of Minos that Socrates identifies as Attic. Socrates, for his part, eventually says that “we” take vengeance on Minos in tragedy. This shared civic position gives the conversation a self-critical possibility: Athenians can be both interpreters of law and inheritors of a retaliatory story about a lawgiver. It does not warrant assuming that every Athenian held a single belief about Minos.

At 315d–e Socrates says that separate long speeches will not bring them to agreement and proposes a common inquiry. The companion can either question him or

answer him. The option matters: common inquiry is initially offered as a relation of participation, not simply as submission to questioning. The companion chooses to answer. Even after the resulting agreement on just, heavy, and fine things, he preserves his objection about change. Agreement to individual propositions and persuasion by their use are therefore distinguished by the dramatic exchange itself.

The later account of Minos is much longer than the short-question sequence. That is a change in manner, but not a reason to declare Socrates guilty of exactly the procedure he criticized. His criticism concerns each man speaking separately what seems true to him without putting the inquiry in common. The Minos account responds to questions, cites purported evidence, and receives an assessment from the companion. Whether those features are sufficient to answer the earlier methodological concern is a legitimate interpretive question. The lexicon need not settle it by equating every long speech with an illicit monologue.

The force of the companion's answers varies. "Yes," "necessarily," "it appears so," "a reasonable argument," and "I can no longer say" are not interchangeable. Socrates' own qualifications also vary, from "perhaps" to a pointed "say so" at 318a. The latter makes the transition to kingly care of souls conspicuously assertive. At 321b Socrates himself makes the continuation conditional on the truth of what he has said. The dialogue allows a reader to follow degrees of confidence rather than treating its sequence of assents as one unbroken proof.

The final shame is shared. Socrates says "for the soul of each of us," including himself in the failure to identify the soul's improving distributions. That inclusion does not

make all earlier speeches identical in status, but it prevents attributing the closing ignorance exclusively to the companion. The two speakers can name what improves a body and still be unable to name the corresponding psychic provision. Their conversation ends at that precise demand.

The places.

- **313a.** Ὁ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν; — Socrates starts with the shared “for us,” while the companion asks which of the laws he means
- **315d–e.** ἐὰν δὲ κοινὸν τεθῇ τὸ σκέμμα, τάχ’ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιμεν — putting the inquiry in common is presented as a possible route to agreement
- **315e.** εἰ δ’ αὖ βούλει, ἀποκρινόμενος — answering is offered as an alternative to the companion’s questioning Socrates
- **316c.** οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι — the companion says he cannot be persuaded by the argument as it stands before his continuing experience of change
- **318a.** οὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως; φάθι — Socrates presses the assignment of the best laws for souls to the king
- **321b.** εἰκότα τὸν λόγον εἰρηκέναι — the companion calls Socrates’ account reasonable, before the conditional continuation
- **321d.** τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἑκατέρου — the closing reproach concerns the soul of each speaker

In this edition. “Comp.” preserves the lack of a personal name. The introduction’s identification of an Athenian companion is an inference from the first-person customs and the Attic account, not information from an otherwise missing narrator. The edition reproduces Burnet’s run-in exchanges from 314c onward: a dash and a fresh speaker

abbreviation can change the voice within the same printed paragraph. A reader should track those abbreviations before attributing a sentence to Socrates. The small-cap labels, title, and abbreviated names belong to the printed apparatus of reading; they do not all supply spoken lexical attestations.

See also. Common inquiry; Agreement and persuasion; Minos; Reputation and poets; Shame and ignorance; Reading the text and apparatus

Cookery and the preparation of dishes

μάγειρος (mageiros); μαγειρικός (mageirikos); ὄψον (opson); σκευασία (skeuasia)

The word. Mageiros is a cook; mageirikos means belonging to cooking. Opson is prepared food or a dish, especially food accompanying the staple part of a meal. The local phrase is general enough that “dishes” is preferable to automatically restricting it to fish or one particular ingredient. Skeuasia is preparation or making ready. Its genitive here names what the cook’s knowledge is directed toward.

In the work. The cook follows the gardener in the sequence of knowledgeable writers (316e–317a). Socrates asks whose writings and lawful usages concern the preparation of dishes. The companion identifies cooks; Socrates calls the rules laws of cookery and then asks whether they belong to those who know how to rule that preparation. Cookery thereby provides a second, independent non-political use of “rule” immediately before the question about ruling cities.

The parenthetical “as they say” belongs to Socrates’ question whether cooks know how (317a). It should not be expanded into a wholesale rejection of the profession, but

neither should it be silently removed from the dialogue's attribution. The companion answers that they do know how. The exchange is quick and does not test a named cook or a specific recipe.

Cookery reappears when Socrates formulates the distinction between right and lawful on one side and wrong and lawless on the other (317b). A rule's correctness is assessed in its own field, whether medical, culinary, or horticultural. The example is thus doing more than enlarging a list of crafts: it helps detach nomos from exclusively civic enactment and makes the standard apply across disparate practical domains.

No polemic against cookery as mere flattery is developed here. Importing such a contrast from another dialogue would obscure the local argument, which treats the cook as the possessor of the relevant know-how. Conversely, it would be too strong to infer that every text on cooking or every person called a cook has thereby been certified as knowledgeable. The operative qualification remains actual ability to direct the preparation.

The places.

- **316e.** τὰ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας συγγράμματά τε καὶ νόμιμα — The subject is the preparation of dishes
- **316e.** Μαγείρων — The companion supplies the practitioners' name
- **316e.** Μαγειρικοὶ ἄρα οὗτοι νόμοι — Socrates extends the designation "laws" to the culinary rules
- **316e–317a.** ὄψου σκευασίας ἄρχειν — "Rule" concerns directing preparation rather than holding civic office

- **317a.** Ἐπίστανται δέ, ὥς φασιν, οἱ μάγειροι — The claim about cooks' competence includes Socrates' qualification "as they say"
- **317b.** τὸ μαγειρικόν — Cookery returns among the fields in which rightness makes a rule lawful

In this edition. "Preparation of dishes," "cooks," and "laws of cookery" keep the ordinary practical vocabulary clear. The translation retains "rule" for archein even in this unfamiliar combination, allowing the transfer into civic rule to remain audible.

See also. Farming and gardens · Rule and the ordering of a city · Right and apparent law · Craft and the limits of the analogy

Craft and the limits of the analogy

τέχνη (technē); ἰατρική (iatrikē); βασιλικός (basilikos)

The word. Technē is a craft, art, or organized practical expertise. Its range is broader than modern "technology," and it does not by itself identify a manual trade. The dialogue explicitly names the craft of medicine, Zeus' educational craft, and the kingly craft. Other activities are presented through their practitioners, writings, rules, and competent performance without a fresh occurrence of technē at every step.

In the work. The first explicit generalization is that craft is a finding of things (314b). Medicine finds what is healthy and sickly; prophecy is introduced as finding what the gods have in mind, with the qualification "as the prophets say." These examples belong to Socrates' attempt to determine what kind of activity law might be. They precede the companion's return to civic resolutions and decrees.

The longer craft sequence begins at 316c. Medicine provides a recognizable written body of subject-specific judgments; gardening and cooking then supply the construction “know how to rule”; governing cities inherits this construction at 317a. At 317d a new sequence examines distribution: the farmer fits seeds to soil, musicians fit strokes to tunes, and the trainer fits food to bodies. Herding then leads to the king whose laws are best for human souls (318a). These are related stages, not one repeated argument. The first connects law with knowledgeable writing; the second connects it with fitting allocation and beneficial care.

The analogy gains force from its determinate objects. A doctor concerns health; a gardener gardens; a shepherd sheep. To call political rule a comparable expertise raises the question of its proper object and good. “The souls of men” provides an object, but the final question exposes the still-missing account of what improves that object. The ending does not erase the analogy. It makes clear how much remains to be supplied before an expert name becomes an explanation.

The later distinction between the whole kingly craft and service to it adds a further limit (320b–c). Rhadamanthys can be a good judge without possessing the complete competence attributed to Minos. Nor does the presence of a divine teacher simply equate every named practitioner with Zeus: Socrates is interpreting a particular poetic description of Minos’ education. The lexicon therefore uses “craft model” as a description of an argumentative procedure, not as a Greek phrase spoken in the dialogue or as a warrant for a complete modern theory of technocratic government.

The places.

- **314b.** ἡ γάρ που τέχνη ἡμῖν εὕρεσίς ἐστιν τῶν πραγμάτων — The first general account joins craft and finding
- **316c.** τίνος τέχνης — The question asks to which craft the medical writing belongs
- **316e–317a.** κήπων ἄρχειν; ὄψου σκευασίας ἄρχειν; πόλεων ἄρχειν — A shared verbal construction carries the comparison into civic rule
- **318a.** ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων — Human souls are identified as the recipients of the king's best laws
- **319c.** ἡ τέχνη αὕτη παγκάλη ἐστί — Socrates praises the craft associated with Zeus as educator
- **320b–c.** οὐχ ὅλην τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην — Rhadamanthys' training is explicitly less than the whole kingly craft

In this edition. Technē is "craft." The translation does not add the noun where the Greek instead names an activity or practitioner. The article accordingly distinguishes the word's actual occurrences from the broader interpretive description "craft analogy."

See also. Medicine and health · Rule and the ordering of a city · Distribution and tending · Knowledge and knowing how

Decent and base

χρηστός (chrēstos); πονηρός (ponēros); φαῦλος (phaulos); φλαῦρος (phlauros)

The word. Chrēstos means useful, serviceable, or good, and of people can mean decent or upright. Ponēros is bad,

base, or morally worthless. The dialogue also uses phaulos for the sorry fellow whose conduct contradicts his accepted judgment, and phlauros for what is poor within a soul. These words overlap in evaluation without becoming interchangeable technical terms.

In the work. At 314e the pair chrēstos–ponēros divides the class of civic resolutions. The companion accepts that some resolutions are decent and others base. Since he has already agreed that law is fine and good, a base resolution cannot count as law. The result is initially negative: an institutional description is insufficient because it includes morally defective enactments.

Socrates then carries the same pair into opinion. If law is opinion, and not base opinion, it must be decent opinion. The companion further agrees that the decent opinion is the true one. It is important to preserve the successive subjects: resolutions, opinion, truth. The adjective's favorable force helps the transition, but does not by itself establish that every practically good opinion is true or that every true opinion has the value required of law. Those identifications are agreed in the exchange rather than independently demonstrated.

At 319a the terms return in a different task: learning to distinguish decent from base people before praising or censuring them. Socrates' warning against impiety makes the good human being most sacred and the base person most polluted. The question about law's quality has become a question about the quality of the supposed lawgiver. Minos' bad reputation is not to settle that question without examining its source.

Phaulos enters the argument at 320b when Socrates refuses to make Minos someone who thinks one thing fine yet acts otherwise. This is a premise of consistency

attributed to a good man; the work does not narrate an independent audit of Minos' private conduct. At 321d phlauros locates poor as well as good things within the speakers' own souls. The close brings the evaluation back from resolutions and heroic reputations to the investigators themselves.

The places.

- **314e.** τὰ μὲν χρηστὰ δόγματα, τὰ δὲ πονηρά — Decent and base resolutions
- **314e.** εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί — The inference about decent opinion is conditional upon law being opinion
- **314e.** Δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν; οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής; — Socrates proposes truth as the relevant goodness of opinion
- **319a.** διαγιγνώσκειν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἄνδρας — Learning to distinguish decent and base men
- **319a.** μιαρώτατον ὁ πονηρός — The base person is called most polluted
- **320b.** ὥσπερ γε φαῦλος ἄνθρωπος — The inconsistent sorry fellow whom Socrates refuses to make Minos resemble
- **321d.** τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ φλαῦρον — Good and poor things within the souls under examination

In this edition. "Decent" and "base" preserve chrēstos and ponēros as a pair and leave "good" for agathos. Phaulos is "sorry" at 320b, while phlauros is "poor" at 321d. The apparatus records a spelling variation for the latter; it is not a second moral condition or a license to substitute the earlier word into the final sentence.

See also. Good, fine, and shameful; True opinion and the unproved bridge; Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion.

Distribution and tending

νέμειν (nemein); διανέμειν (dianemein); διανομή (dianomē); νομεύς (nomeus); ἀπονέμειν (aponemein)

The word. Nemein means to distribute, allot, or deal out; it also means to pasture or tend animals. Dianemein emphasizes distributing among recipients, while dianomē is the distribution. Nomeus can name a distributor or a herdsman. Aponemein is to allot or assign, used later of the privilege Homer gives Minos. The family is related to nomos. The dialogue makes the words resonate together without pausing to state a formal etymological derivation.

In the work. After reaffirming law as the finding of what is, Socrates proposes another thing to view within it (317d). The new question is who knows how to distribute seeds on soil. The farmer is a good nomeus, and his nomoi and dianomai are right. Law is now placed beside an activity with material, recipients, and a standard of appropriate assignment.

The sequence passes from seeds and soils to musical strokes and tunes, then to food and bodies. At each stage competence belongs to the person who can give what is due. With the trainer and the “human herd,” the pastoral sense becomes explicit (318a). The shepherd’s and oxherd’s laws are best for the animals they tend; the king’s are best for human souls. This is not merely a pun detached from the reasoning. The shared vocabulary carries an account of governance as the knowledgeable fitting of provisions and direction to those governed.

Nevertheless, the linguistic connection does not independently prove the political conclusion. A shared family of words helps organize the comparison; it does not show what the king must distribute to souls or identify which historical king actually knows how. Those are precisely the matters toward which the dialogue next moves.

The family returns at two different levels. Homer is said to have "distributed" the honor of Zeus' education to Minos alone (319c): that is an allocation made by a poet's representation. Minos himself is later called a good distributor, and the best ancient lawgivers are distributors and shepherds of men (321b–c). The final question asks what the distributor gives to the soul. The word survives to the end, but the corresponding object cannot be named by the companion. That unresolved specification is more exact than the broad claim that political order is beneficial.

The places.

- **317d.** διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ γῇ τὰ σπέρματα — Seed distribution begins the sequence
- **317d.** νομεὺς ἀγαθὸς τούτων — The farmer is a good distributor of these particular things
- **317d.** οἱ τούτου νόμοι καὶ διανομαὶ — Laws and distributions are coupled explicitly
- **317d.** καὶ τὰ ἄξια νεῖμαι — The musical question includes being good at distributing what is due
- **318a.** τὴν τῶν προβάτων ἀγέλην κράτιστος νέμειν — Nemein takes its ordinary pastoral object
- **319c.** ἀπένειμεν Ὅμηρος — Homer assigns the exceptional privilege of divine education

- **321b–c.** νομεὺς ἀγαθός; νομῆς τε καὶ ποιμένες ἀνδρῶν — The argument's distributor becomes a description of the ancient lawgivers
- **321d.** διανέμων ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν — The ending asks for the contents of distribution to the soul

In this edition. Nemein and dianemein are "distribute," and nomeus "distributor"; with a herd as object, nemein becomes "tend." At 317d Burnet retains the infinitive νεῖμαι. The translation therefore says "and good at distributing what is due," rather than silently adopting the finite verb "distributes" proposed by Boeckh. The editorial detail affects the construction, not the basic sequence of examples.

See also. What is due · Farming and gardens · Music and nomes · Trainers and herds

Divine movement disclosure and need

θεῖος (theios); κινεῖν (kinein); ἐκφαίνειν (ekphainein); χρεία (chreia)

The word. Theios means divine or connected with the gods; its superlative theiotatos means most divine. Kinein is to move, including emotional or spiritual movement in this musical context. Ekphainein is to bring to light, display, or reveal. Chreia is need or use; the expression en chreiai einai with a genitive here means to be in need of something or someone. The gods are the object of that need.

In the work. The tunes of Marsyas and Olympus are described as uniquely able to move and reveal those in need of the gods (318b). Grammatically, the people are the objects of both verbs. The tunes do not merely convey a proposition about the gods, and the sentence does not say

that they disclose the gods themselves. They reveal a condition of their hearers.

This is a distinctive kind of evidence in a dialogue that has already associated law with discovery and expertise. At 314a–b perception and knowledge reveal their objects; here music makes a human need evident through its effect. The shared family of disclosure is suggestive, but no explicit equation turns musical response into propositional knowledge or correct civic legislation.

The sentence's next claim is survival: these tunes alone remain, "as being divine" (318b–c). Socrates immediately asks for the comparable kingly lawgiver whose usages still remain as divine. Divinity, efficacy, and endurance therefore mediate the move from music to old law. The description is Socrates' argument for choosing an example, not independent proof that every surviving custom is divine.

The supplied note brings in Symposium 215c, where the tunes are said to possess hearers and reveal their need of gods and initiations. The Minos' own wording stops at movement, disclosure, and need of the gods. "Initiations" and a term for possession should not be added to its lexical register as though they were attested here. The distinction matters because the comparison can illuminate the passage without replacing it.

The places.

- **318b.** τὰ αὐλήματα θειότατά ἐστι — The tunes receive the superlative divine designation
- **318b.** μόνα κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφαίνει — The singular verbs take the neuter plural tunes as their subject

- **318b.** τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντας — The people in need of the gods are what music moves and reveals
- **318b–c.** καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν μόνα λοιπά, ὡς θεῖα ὄντα — The tunes' continuing survival is joined to their divinity
- **318c.** τὰ νόμιμα μένει ὡς θεῖα ὄντα — The next question transfers the persistence-and-divinity pattern to a king's usages

In this edition. "Move and reveal" preserves both actions; "those who are in need of the gods" preserves their personal object and the genitive's meaning. The translation does not replace the phrase with a diagnosis of madness, religious conversion, or emotional susceptibility. Its note clearly separates the fuller Symposium parallel from the wording of the Minos.

See also. Marsyas and Olympus · Revealing and finding · Music and nomes · Oldest laws and their persistence

Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct

συμπόσιον (symposion); συμπότης (sympotēs); συμπαιστής (sympaistēs); παιδιά (paidia); οἶνος (oinos); μέθη (methē); φαῦλος (phaulos)

The word. Symposion is a drinking party or drinking together; sympotēs a fellow drinker; sympaistēs a companion in play. Paidia means play or amusement and is distinct from paideia, education, although the nearby forms make their contrast particularly noticeable. Oinos is wine, methē drunkenness. Phaulos can mean poor, inferior or contemptible; here the edition's "sorry fellow"

characterizes someone whose actions contradict his accepted standards.

In the work. Socrates reports that some people understand Minos' title of Zeus' confidant as drinking-companionship and shared play (319e). His rebuttal adduces an institutional sign: Cretans and, after learning from them, Spartans abstain from drinking parties and wine-associated play. He then states a particular law attributed to Minos: not to drink with one another to drunkenness (320a).

The broader cultural claim and the precise law are not identical formulations. The law's phrase eis methēn specifies the endpoint or extent of the joint drinking that is prohibited. An entry that glossed this specific Greek clause as "no drinking," or as a complete prohibition of all drinking parties without qualification, would remove information the sentence expressly retains. The source's English translation gives the limitation correctly, even though its outline compresses the point more broadly.

The argument then turns from institutions to character. Minos is assumed to have enacted as lawful for his citizens what he accepted as fine. Socrates refuses to imagine him as a sorry fellow who believes one thing and does another contrary to it. Therefore, he concludes, the association with Zeus was verbal and educational, toward virtue. This is a reconstruction of conduct from law under an assumption of integrity. It is not an eyewitness report of what occurred in the cave, and it does not show that a lawgiver's prescriptions always reveal his private conduct regardless of character.

The contrast between play and education also has a precise scope. The rejected account makes drinking and play the meaning of the divine intimacy. Socrates does not

undertake a general examination of whether any play can educate or any regulated drinking can be beneficial. The edition's parallels from the Laws concern local customs about drinking parties; they are contextual comparisons, not a license to import that dialogue's full treatment of wine here.

The places.

- **319e.** συμπότην καὶ συμπαιστὴν εἶναι τοῦ Διός — The rival interpretation makes Minos Zeus' fellow drinker and playmate
- **320a.** ἀπέχονται συμποσίων καὶ ταύτης τῆς παιδιᾶς — Socrates' general statement concerns drinking parties and this kind of play
- **320a.** μὴ συμπίνειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς μέθην — The actual law prohibits joint drinking to the point of drunkenness
- **320a.** ἃ ἐνόμιζεν καλὰ εἶναι, ταῦτα νόμιμα ἔθηκεν — His accepted standards and his prescriptions are aligned
- **320b.** ἐποίει δὲ ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἐνόμιζεν — The proposed inconsistency between conduct and conviction is denied
- **320b.** διὰ λόγων ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ εἰς ἀρετήν — Education replaces the disputed convivial interpretation

In this edition. The full English clause, "not to drink with one another to the point of drunkenness," should govern this entry. The distinct words paidia and paideia remain "play" and "education." Phaulos at 320b should not be silently substituted for the printed phlauros, "poor," in the final sentence at 321d.

See also. Oaristēs and enneōros · Education and association · Accepting and custom · Evidence and stability

Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness

ἁμαρτάνειν (hamartanein); ἐξαμαρτάνειν (examartanein); λανθάνειν (lanthanein)

The word. Hamartanein is to miss or go wrong; with a genitive it can name the object or standard missed. Examartanein is a compound for making a mistake or doing wrong, here with constructions identifying the person against whom one errs. Lanthanein means to escape notice. The dialogue ranges from possible oversight in argument to error about what is, offensive speech, and a politically costly mistake. These are related kinds of failure, not one undifferentiated notion of sin.

In the work. Socrates allows at 315d that the companion may be speaking rightly and that the matter has escaped him. The perfect lelēthen locates the possible failure in his own awareness. This acknowledgment precedes his proposal for common examination; it is not an admission that he has accepted every conclusion of the companion's speech.

At 316b hamartanein receives its central philosophical use: whoever misses what is misses the lawful. The parallel genitives give the two failures the same verbal structure. The conclusion makes truth relevant to lawfulness, following the questions about correct judgments. But the text has not examined a particular sacrificial act to establish whether it is in fact just or holy. Its rule tells us that error matters without giving a procedure that resolves every contested case.

The later compound examartanein adds interpersonal and religious stakes. One can err against gods and divine human beings in word or deed (318e), and the companion is warned not to err verbally against Minos as a hero and

son of Zeus (319b). Correctly identifying a good person has become a responsibility. Speech based on inherited reputation may itself be wrong even when it repeats what many people say.

Socrates then uses the same compound about Minos' own mistake: making war on Athens and incurring its hatred exposed him to the poets' power (320e–321a). The context makes this a mistake with reputational consequences. It is not presented as a retraction of the claim that Minos was a good lawgiver, and the text does not explicitly adjudicate the justice of the war. The difference matters: error in managing one's reputation, false judgment of a person's goodness, and missing the truth relevant to law are not simply identical offenses.

The places.

- **315d.** ἐμὲ δὲ τοῦτο λέληθεν — The possibility that the companion's point has escaped Socrates
- **316b.** Ὅς ἂν ἅρα τοῦ ὄντος ἁμαρτάνῃ, τοῦ νομίμου ἁμαρτάνει — Missing what is means missing the lawful
- **318e.** εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν — Mistakes against gods in speech and action
- **319b.** εἰς ἥρω Διὸς υἱὸν λόγῳ ἐξαμαρτάνῃς — The companion's danger in speaking about Minos
- **320e.** ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως — Minos' mistake introduces the account of war and hostile poets
- **321a.** τοῦτο οὖν ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως — The point is repeated as incurring Athenian hatred

In this edition. Hamartanein is "miss," while examartanein is "make a mistake." The distinction retains the target-like construction at 316b without forcing the

later uses into a single modern moral or theological vocabulary.

See also. What is and the things that are; Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness; Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent.

Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law

τεκμήριον (tekmērion); σημεῖον (sēmeion); εἰκώς (eikōs); ἀκίνητος (akinētos); ἀλήθεια (alētheia); οἴκησις (oikēsis)

The word. Tekmērion is evidence, an indication used to support a conclusion; sēmeion is a sign. Eikōs means likely, reasonable or fitting, and the accusative εἰκότα qualifies the argument the companion has heard. Akinētos means unmoved or unchanged. Alētheia is truth. Oikēsis can concern habitation or the conduct of settled life; in the phrase about a city's oikēsis the supplied edition renders it "administration." These words express grounds and assessments, not one uniform technical category of proof.

In the work. Socrates labels the Cretan drinking practice a possible tekmērion against those who understand Minos as Zeus' drinking-companion (319e–320a). Its force depends upon additional propositions: Minos enacted the law, enacted what he regarded as fine, and did not privately practice the contrary. Calling it evidence does not eliminate those dependencies.

The greatest sēmeion for Minos' being good and lawful, a good distributor, comes later: his laws are unmoved (321b). The sign connects the exemplary narrative to the earlier craft argument. There, genuine knowers were said not to write different prescriptions about the same things or keep changing their lawful usages (317b). Here endurance is read as the trace of having discovered the

truth of what is concerning civic administration. The wording is therefore not merely antiquarian admiration for old institutions. Stability is being connected to the earlier standard of knowledge and correctness.

The direction of the inference deserves attention. From the claim that good knowledge issues in stable prescriptions, the dialogue turns toward identifying good knowledge through the stability of prescriptions. The latter requires that alternative explanations of endurance not defeat the evidential inference. The text neither investigates such alternatives nor supplies an inventory of unchanged Cretan laws. A lexicon can explain why the sign matters without announcing that longevity alone proves justice or truth.

Nor is the companion's acceptance expressed as an exhaustive verification. He says the argument seems reasonable. Socrates follows with "if what I say is true," and the companion replies that the Cretans appear to use the oldest laws. This graded language matters: the sequence brings agreement, but it does not narrate independent historical research or abolish the difference between plausibility and truth.

The final return to the soul adds a further limit. The lawgivers have been accepted as good, and the stability of their laws cited as evidence; the question what beneficial content is actually distributed to souls nevertheless remains unanswered. A judgment of a lawgiver's standing is not yet a complete account of the operation and object of lawgiving.

The places.

- **319e.** τῷδε ἄν τις τεκμηρίῳ χρῷτο — The drinking practice is introduced as evidence one might use

- **321b.** τοῦτο μέγιστον σημεῖον — Socrates identifies his greatest sign
- **321b.** ἀκίνητοι αὐτοῦ οἱ νόμοι εἰσίν — The claimed stability of Minos' laws supplies that sign
- **321b.** τοῦ ὄντος περὶ πόλεως οἰκήσεως ἐξευρόντος εὖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν — Their endurance is attributed to successful discovery of civic truth
- **321b.** εἰκότα τὸν λόγον εἰρηκέναι — The companion assesses the account as reasonable
- **321b.** εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω; Φαίνονται — Conditional truth and appearance qualify the ensuing agreement

In this edition. "Evidence," "sign," "reasonable," and "unmoved" should remain distinct. "The truth of what is" preserves the explicit connection with the earlier definition. "Administration of a city" follows the edition rather than turning oikēsis into a claim about housebuilding or housing policy.

See also. Sameness and difference · Expert writings · What is · Drinking and consistency · Shame and ignorance

Expert writings and the authority of a text

σύγγραμμα (syngramma); συγγράφειν (syngraphein)

The word. A syngramma is something written: a composition, treatise, or written account. The verb syngraphein means to write or compose. Neither word by itself guarantees truth, expertise, official enactment, or legal force. Those further qualifications have to be supplied by the dialogue's account of the writer and the subject. The plural syngrammata can therefore cover

medical writings, instructions for cultivation or cooking, and writings concerning the organization of a city.

In the work. The turn to writing begins with an ordinary question about the companion's experience: has he ever encountered a writing about the health of sick people (316c)? He recognizes the field as medicine. Socrates then identifies its practitioners as those who have knowledge of the relevant matters, obtains agreement that knowledgeable people accept the same things about the same subjects, and asks whether doctors write what they also accept as being. The authority of the writing is thus traced through knowledge and its subject matter. It is not derived from the bare fact of inscription.

Calling these writings "laws of medicine" is a further step (316e). Socrates extends the designation to farming, gardening, and cookery before reaching the writings about the ordering of cities. Only here does he add that these are writings "which people call laws" (317a–b). The sequence begins outside ordinary civic legislation and brings its criterion of competence back to the case everyone recognizes as law. It does not report a historical practice by which every medical treatise was formally enacted as a statute.

The same noun remains in use when Socrates distinguishes right kingly law from an incorrect text that merely seems to be law to the ignorant (317c). A document's status as a syngramma survives this rejection; its status as law does not. This distinction is especially important beside the companion's earlier appeal to resolutions and decrees. Writtenness cannot restore the civic authority that the argument has already subjected to a standard of truth and goodness.

There is a later, different instance of writing when Talos carries laws written on bronze tablets (320c). That narrative supplies a medium and a bearer for already attributed laws. The middle argument supplies a test of what deserves the name law. Reading the two together shows why the presence of a written code is relevant without being sufficient.

The places.

- **316c.** συγγράμματι περὶ ὑγιείας τῶν καμνόντων — The first writing has a determinate practical subject: the health of the sick
- **316d–e.** οἱ ἰατροὶ συγγράφουσι περὶ ὑγιείας ἅπερ καὶ νομίζουσιν εἶναι — What doctors write is linked to what they accept as being
- **316e.** ἰατρικοὶ νόμοι ταῦτα τὰ συγγράμματα — The medical writings receive the designation “laws”
- **317a–b.** βασιλέων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν συγγράμματα — The relevant civic writings are attributed to kings and good men
- **317b.** οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα συγγράψουσι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν — The future tense states the consistency expected of those who know how
- **317c.** ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι τοῖς περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων — Written accounts of just and unjust things remain subject to the distinction between right and wrong

In this edition. Syngramma is consistently “writing,” not automatically “code,” “treatise,” or “statute.” This restrained rendering lets the argument itself confer, or withhold, the further title “law.” At 317b Burnet prints συγγράψουσι, “will write,” rather than the present

συγγράφουσι recorded for F. The edition follows the future in its statement of what competent writers will not do.

See also. Knowledge and knowing how · Right and apparent law · Resolution and opinion · Craft and the limits of the analogy

Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation

γεωργός (geōrgos); γεωργικός (geōrgikos); κηπουρός (kēpouros); κηπουρικός (kēpourikos); κῆπος (kēpos); ἐργασία (ergasia); γῆ (gē); σπέρμα (sperma)

The word. Geōrgos is a farmer and geōrgikos means agricultural or belonging to farming. Kēpouros is a gardener; kēpourikos is the corresponding adjective. Kēpos is a garden and ergasia its working or cultivation. Gē can be earth, land, or soil; in the seed-distribution example its different individual instances are soils to which particular seeds are suited. Sperma is a seed, here used in the ordinary agricultural plural.

In the work. Farming and gardening occur beside one another, but they do different work. Agricultural writings are accepted as agricultural laws in a single exchange (316e). Gardens then receive a fuller treatment: writings and lawful usages concern their working; these belong to gardeners; gardeners know how to “rule” gardens. The verb prepares for the move to ruling cities, while the practical object prevents “rule” from meaning political office throughout the sequence.

The farmer returns after the definition of law has been reaffirmed (317d). This time there is no discussion of a treatise. Socrates asks who knows how to distribute seeds on soil. The competent farmer distributes to each soil the seeds due to it, and his laws and distributions are right.

The case gives actual content to distribution: recipient, material, and fit can all be named.

“Each soil” is important. The model does not simply require putting the same seed everywhere. It combines a stable standard of knowledgeable correctness with differentiated treatment of recipients. This does not settle the companion’s entire objection about different peoples and changing laws; Socrates does not explicitly apply the difference between soils to political circumstances. It does show that sameness of knowledge and rightness need not mean an identical allocation to every object.

The city analogy should not be elaborated into an unstated theory that citizens are plants or that political education is cultivation. The text’s actual steps are more specific: writings can embody field-specific rules; a skilled practitioner can govern an activity; a distributor gives what is fitting to the recipient. Those are substantial connections without an additional botanical allegory.

The places.

- **316e.** τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα γεωργικοὶ νόμοι — Agricultural writings are admitted as laws of farming
- **316e.** τὰ περὶ κήπων ἐργασίας συγγράμματα καὶ νόμιμα — Gardens supply a practical subject for writings and lawful usages
- **316e.** Τῶν ἐπισταμένων κήπων ἄρχειν — Gardening becomes an example of knowledgeable rule
- **317d.** διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ γῇ τὰ σπέρματα — The farmer’s expertise is tested through distributing seeds
- **317d.** τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ διανέμει — Distribution is differentiated according to each soil

- **317d.** Ὁ γεωργὸς ἄρα νομεὺς ἀγαθὸς τούτων — The farmer receives the broader designation “good distributor”

In this edition. The translation uses “farming” and “gardening,” preserving the two related fields. It renders gē as “soil” in the allocation example and axia as “due,” so that the fit of the seeds to each recipient is visible. The ordinary agricultural nouns should not be entered as specialized political technical terms merely because Socrates uses them in an analogy.

See also. Distribution and tending · What is due · Rule and the ordering of a city · Sameness and difference

Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings

ἀποθανόντες (apothanontes); νεκρός (nekros); ἐκφορά (ekphora); προσφάττειν (prosphattein); ἐγχυτίστριαι (enchytistriai); θάπτειν (thaptein)

The word. Apothanontes are those who have died; nekros is the dead person or corpse. Ekphora is a carrying out, here the carrying out of the body for burial. Prosphattein describes slaughtering in connection with or before something. Thaptein is to bury or perform burial. Enchytistriai is a rare word whose exact sense is uncertain; the edition takes it as women who pour offerings.

In the work. The companion uses funerary practice to close off an easy response to his foreign examples (315c–d). If different laws belonged only to non-Greeks, Socrates might be thought able to appeal to a shared Greek practice. The companion has already named Greek sacrifices; he now narrows the comparison still further to “ourselves.” Earlier Athenians had practices present Athenians no

longer observe. Difference exists within one community across time.

His report distinguishes two earlier stages. In the more recent past, victims were slaughtered before the carrying out of the corpse and the specialized women were summoned. People earlier still buried their dead in the house itself. He concludes that “we” do none of these things. The vocabulary of prior times is part of the proof: the example is not a claim that all those practices were simultaneous, or that domestic burial is the current Athenian norm.

The word hiereia identifies sacrificial victims but does not here identify them as human beings. The transition from the preceding human sacrifices does not authorize translating the Athenian funerary clause as human sacrifice. This distinction preserves the argument’s actual breadth: the companion does not need every difference of custom to be equally horrifying. Ordinary changes in ritual suffice to challenge a definition that seems to require always using the same laws.

His evidence is presented as something heard and already known to both speakers, rather than an eyewitness account or an antiquarian demonstration. The edition’s notes provide assistance, but the dialogue does not supply dates, name particular lawgivers responsible for the changes, or distinguish statutory repeal from abandonment of a custom. Those gaps limit historical reconstruction, not the clarity of the argumentative function.

Socrates never returns to determine which Athenian funeral practice was correct. His response turns first to shared inquiry and universal judgments, then to expertise. This example consequently remains a useful test of

whether a reader thinks the later distinction between genuine law and apparent law answers the companion's historical concern.

The places.

- **315c.** περὶ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας — The subject is former practice concerning the dead
- **315c.** ἱερεῖά τε προσφάττοντες πρὸ τῆς ἐκφορᾶς τοῦ νεκροῦ — Slaughtered victims before the corpse is carried out
- **315c.** ἐγχυτιστρίας μεταπεμπόμενοι — Sending for the specialist women
- **315d.** ἔθαπτον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας — The still earlier practice of burial within the house
- **315d.** ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιοῦμεν — The companion distinguishes present practice from both earlier stages

In this edition. Burnet prints ἐγχυτιστρίας, supported by the two manuscripts reported in his apparatus. The edition's note explains "women who pour offerings" by ancient lexical testimony and records the different vulgate spelling ἐγχυτριστρίας, associated with a pot and an interpretation involving bones placed in an urn. The latter is an apparatus reading, not the spoken form adopted here. Neither sense should be presented as beyond doubt.

See also. Variation of customs and the companion's objection; Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities; Changing laws and the draughts image.

Good, fine, and shameful

ἀγαθός (agathos); καλός (kalos); αἰσχρός (aischros); κάλλιστος (kallistos); αἴσχιστος (aischistos)

The word. Agathos is good; kalos is fine, admirable, or beautiful; aischros is shameful or ugly. The superlatives kallistos and aischistos intensify the valuation. English "fine" here is not confined to attractive appearance. The words appraise justice, law, judgments, practices, people, and eventually the speakers' own intellectual condition.

In the work. Socrates' decisive instruction at 314d is that law must be thought of as something fine and sought as a good. The speakers first agree that lawful people are just and lawless people unjust; justice and law are then called most fine, their opposites most shameful. Preservation and destruction of cities provide a practical contrast. On this basis the class of actual resolutions is filtered: a base one cannot be law.

The direction of reasoning matters. Socrates does not survey legislation and discover empirically that every enactment benefits its city. He asks the companion to adopt a favorable normative conception of law and uses it to reject an overinclusive account. The question "what is law?" thereby becomes inseparable from what law should successfully be. The companion's later objections arise because his customary and civic senses continue to include rules Socrates' evaluative conception can exclude.

At 316a–b fine things are said to be accepted as fine everywhere, as shameful things are as shameful. The formula gives a common standard or correct predication; it does not identify a list of practices universally agreed to be fine. The earlier sacrifices make the distinction vivid: knowing that "fine things are fine" is different from

determining whether an actual community's ritual is fine. The weight analogy supports correct judgment without itself settling that moral classification.

The later argument puts goodness in an agent and a benefit. Kings and good men write laws; the farmer and trainer are good distributors because they allocate appropriately; the king's laws are said to be best for souls. Socrates also predicates goodness of Minos and links it to divine education. Yet the final question asks what distributions actually make the soul better. The dialogue's favorable account of law has not supplied that content.

Its last use of shame is therefore self-directed. Socrates calls it shameful that their souls appear not to know what is within them while having examined bodily matters (321d). This is not a denial that law should be good. It exposes the difference between agreeing upon goodness as the standard and being able to explain how the standard is achieved.

The places.

- **314d.** κάλλιστον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ὁ νόμος — Justice and law are most fine
- **314d.** Αἴσχιστον δὲ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ ἡ ἀνομία — Their opposites receive the contrary evaluation
- **314d.** ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν — Law is to be sought as a good
- **316a–b.** Τὰ μὲν καλά, ὡς ἔοικε, πανταχοῦ νομίζεται καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχρά — The universal form of correct valuation
- **320a.** ἃ ἐνόμιζεν καλὰ εἶναι — What Minos accepted as fine is connected with his legislation
- **321d.** αἰσχρόν γε τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἑκατέρου — Shame finally attaches to the soul of each inquirer

In this edition. “Good,” “fine,” and “shameful” remain distinct. “Decent” translates chrēstos, a further favorable adjective needed for the transition from resolutions to opinion. Treating all favorable terms as the same English “good” would conceal how the inference moves.

See also. Decent and base; Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness; True opinion and the unproved bridge; Distribution.

Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry

Ὅμηρος (Homēros); Ἡσίοδος (Hēsiodos); ἔπος (epos); ἐγκώμιον (enkōmion); ἀπονέμειν (aponemein)

The word. Epos can be a word or utterance and here names a verse. Enkōmion is a eulogy or encomium, speech in praise of someone. Aponemein means to allot or distribute; Socrates uses it of the privilege Homer assigns to Minos. The poet’s presentation thus becomes a distribution of honor, a distinct application of the distributing vocabulary central to the argument about law.

In the work. Socrates answers the companion’s inherited view of Minos by ranking sources: Homer and Hesiod are more persuasive than all the makers of tragedy together (318e). He does not give a general rule that poetry is reliable. The later warning about poets’ power over opinion shows why each use requires attention to whose poetry, what it says, and why it may say it.

The first quotation combines Homer’s notice of Crete’s ninety cities with the two lines describing Cnossus and Minos (*Odyssey* 19.178–179 in the supplied note). The quoted line contains the difficult enneōros and oaristēs. Socrates’ prose turns those words into a recurring educational encounter with Zeus. The verse itself does not

state all the narrative details that follow: the cave, learning new things and displaying the previous period's learning belong to the interpretation developed in his speech. The rare privilege is then called a supreme encomium, and the second occurrence of the verse reiterates the proposed sense.

The Nekyia supplies a different kind of support. Socrates reports Homer's depiction of Minos judging with a golden scepter and contrasts the absence of a corresponding depiction of Rhadamanthys in that scene. This passage is summarized rather than quoted as a second block of epic. Hesiod is then quoted in three lines praising Minos' exceptional kingship and possession of Zeus' scepter (320d). Socrates immediately identifies the scepter with Zeus' education. Again, the interpretation and the quoted words are separate levels of evidence. The source's note identifies the lines as Hesiod fragment 144 Merkelbach–West, preserved through this passage; the quotation is not a second surviving continuous Hesiodic narrative independently described here.

Finally, Homer returns in the formula "shepherd of the people" (321c). It connects the old lawgivers to a good general and the earlier herding analogy. It does not provide the missing answer about what a lawgiver distributes to a soul. Poetry has supplied models and honorific descriptions, while the final examination still demands an articulated account.

The places.

- **318e.** πιθανώτεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ τραγῳδοποιοί — Socrates ranks Homer and Hesiod above the tragedians in persuasiveness
- **319b.** ἔνι Κνωσὸς μεγάλη πόλις, ἔνθα τε Μίνως — The first quoted verse locates Minos at Cnossus

- **319c.** τοῦτο τὸ γέρας; ἀπένειμεν Ὅμηρος — Homer is said to distribute a privilege to Minos
- **319d.** τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ἔπος — Socrates explicitly announces what he takes the verse to mean
- **320d.** ὃς βασιλεύτατος γένετο θνητῶν βασιλήων — Hesiod's quoted superlative praises Minos among mortal kings
- **321c.** ποιμένα λαῶν — The Homeric formula concludes the identification of rulers as shepherds

In this edition. The verse, prose quotation fragments and surrounding interpretation are typographically distinguished. The translation of πολέων at 320d is "many," an epic genitive of the adjective, not "cities." The edition's notes supply the ancient references; this companion does not claim fresh collation of Homer or Hesiod.

See also. Oaristēs and enneōros · Reputation and poets · Distribution · Scepters and guardians

Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness

δίκαιος (dikaios); δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosynē); ἄδικος (adikos); ἀδικία (adikia); νόμιμος (nomimos); τὰ νόμιμα (ta nomima); ἄνομος (anomos); ἀνομία (anomia)

The word. Dikaios is just; dikaiosynē is justice. Adikos and adikia give the corresponding negatives. Nomimos is lawful or in accordance with law or custom, while ta nomima can name a people's usages or recognized rules. Anomos and anomia are lawless and lawlessness. The family likeness of nomos and nomimos is explicit in the Greek; their relation to justice is a further claim made in the discussion.

In the work. At 314c–d Socrates begins with persons: the wise are wise by wisdom, the just just by justice, and lawful people lawful by law. The sequence then crosses from verbal relation to substantive appraisal: lawful people are just and lawless people unjust. That step is agreed by the companion, but it is not simply contained in the morphology of the Greek. An argument that merely records the words' shared roots has not yet proved the identity of legality and justice.

The next step makes law and justice fine and preserving, their opposites shameful and destructive. This prepares the exclusion of base civic resolutions from law. The early connection between justice and lawfulness is therefore not incidental praise; it determines which putative laws can survive the proposed definition.

The companion's Carthaginian example keeps a different possibility in view: people can take a practice to be holy and lawful "for them" when Athenians regard it as unholy (315b–c). Ta nomima elsewhere names inherited or practical usages without by itself resolving their rightness. The phrase can describe the rules of gardening or cookery, and the lasting usages attributed to ancient lawgivers. Its meaning must be read in the particular claim being made.

At 315e Socrates shifts from just persons to just things. Asking whether just things are unjust or just secures a correct identity of predication. It does not establish that different peoples identify the same concrete acts as just. The general conclusion that whoever misses what is misses the lawful makes correctness essential, and the craft argument later states the restriction openly: what is not right is lawless, however much it seems law to those without knowledge (317c).

This is a strongly evaluative account of law, but the dialogue does not formulate a program of civil disobedience, give a test for citizens to apply against every enacted rule, or discuss punishments for refusing obedience. The claim concerns what genuinely deserves to be called law. Its practical content is sharpened by the question of which lawgiver makes souls better, left unanswered at the end.

The places.

- **314c.** οἱ δίκαιοι δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοι; οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι — The opening parallel concerns persons and the qualities by which they are characterized
- **314d.** Οἱ δὲ νόμιμοι δίκαιοι; Οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἄδικοι — The substantive connection between lawful and just
- **315b–c.** ὡς ὅσιον ὂν καὶ νόμιμον αὐτοῖς — The companion reports what Carthaginians regard as holy and lawful for themselves
- **315e.** τὰ μὲν δίκαια δίκαια, τὰ δὲ ἄδικα ἄδικα — Correct predication concerning just and unjust things
- **316b.** τοῦ νομίμου ἁμαρτάνει — Missing the lawful is joined to missing what is
- **317c.** ἔστιν γὰρ ἄνομον — What is not right is called lawless despite its appearance as law

In this edition. “Lawful,” “lawful usages,” “lawless,” and “lawlessness” preserve a family of English words. The masculine οἱ νόμιμοι at 314c–d should be understood as lawful people; the neuter usages and the substantivized “lawful” elsewhere should not be indiscriminately turned into persons. Burnet prints ἄνομοι at 314d, with ἀνόμιμοι reported as a variant in F.

See also. Law and the demand for a definition; Good, fine, and shameful; Rightness and law; Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities.

Kings and statesmen

βασιλεύς (basileus); βασιλικός (basilikos); πολιτικός (politikos)

The word. Basileus is a king; basilikos means kingly or belonging to a king. Used substantivally in the plural, hoi basilikoi names "the kingly men." Politikos means civic or political; hoi politikoi are those concerned with governing the city, rendered "statesmen." The adjective appears earlier in the phrase "political opinion." A title, an adjective of qualification, and the activities to which they refer must not be treated as automatically identical.

In the work. The first political description belongs to opinion: Socrates restates the companion's resolution of a city as political opinion (314c). Later "the statesmen and the kingly men" are identified as those who know how to rule cities (317a). Their writings, which people call laws, are then described as writings of kings and good men. Goodness and competence are central to the identification; it is not a blanket endorsement of whatever any reigning monarch writes.

At 317c the adjective qualifies the law itself: what is right is kingly law. This places basilikos within the argument's normative restriction. The following distribution sequence then asks whose laws are best for human souls and gives the answer "the king's" (318a). These connections build a demanding conception of kingly rule: it is knowledgeable, right, and beneficial to its appropriate recipients.

The transition to Minos and Rhadamanthys seeks good kings of old who can occupy this conceptual role (318c–d).

Their status is not simply settled by the shared title. The companion accepts Rhadamanthys as just while reporting Minos as harsh and unjust, and Socrates must mount a defense. Later Rhadamanthys' knowledge is limited to service within the kingly craft, especially judging, rather than the whole of it (320b–c). Thus the work both joins and differentiates persons within kingly administration.

It remains necessary to distinguish the dialogue's account from a general constitutional argument for monarchy. Socrates does not compare procedures of royal and non-royal government or show that hereditary office supplies knowledge. The kingly designation identifies the best governing competence within the analogy and then supplies the terms in which Minos is praised. Whether that praise successfully establishes the requisite competence is a question the reader must still assess.

The places.

- **314c.** Δόξαν, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον — "Political" first qualifies the opinion proposed as law
- **317a.** οἱ πολιτικοί τε καὶ οἱ βασιλικοί — Statesmen and kingly men are named as those who know how to rule cities
- **317a–b.** βασιλέων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν συγγράμματα — Kingship and goodness accompany the attribution of the writings
- **317c.** τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ βασιλικός — Kingly law is restricted to what is right
- **318a.** οὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως — The best laws for human souls are assigned to the king
- **318d.** ἀγαθοὶ βασιλῆς — Socrates asks for good kings among the Cretans

- **320c.** ὑπηρεσίαν τῇ βασιλικῇ — Rhadamanthys' education is in service to the kingly craft

In this edition. "Kingly" keeps the adjective distinct from the noun "king" and from an anachronistic assumption that "royal" merely denotes court status. "Statesmen" and "statesmen's writings" preserve the substantive use of politikos. The edition does not silently substitute "philosophers" for any of these expressions.

See also. Rule and the ordering of a city · Right and apparent law · Trainers and herds · Oldest laws and their persistence · Minos · Rhadamanthys and Talos

Knowledge and knowing how

ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn); ἀνεπιστήμων (anepistēmōn); ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai); εἰδέναι (eidenai); ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

The word. Epistēmōn describes someone knowledgeable or competent in a subject; anepistēmōn denies that competence. Epistasthai can mean to know, understand, or know how, and here repeatedly governs an activity expressed by an infinitive or carried over from a preceding question. Eidenai, the infinitive belonging to oida, is the more ordinary verb "know." Epistēmē is knowledge, already introduced at 314b as revealing what is learned. These words overlap, but their local constructions distinguish a person's competence, a practical ability, and the fact of knowing something.

In the work. Socrates begins with people knowledgeable "about these things," the health of the sick, and names them doctors (316c). His next question is whether knowledgeable people accept the same things about the same things. The domain restriction is explicit again when he asks about Greeks and barbarians: "about whatever

they know" (316d). The argument does not make all people who bear a professional name infallible about everything. Its claim concerns actual knowledge of the matter in question.

The companion accepts a strong necessity: knowers must agree with one another, whether Greek or barbarian, and at all times. Agreement is not established by surveying conflicting medical authorities. It follows from the accepted conception of knowing the same reality. The force of "always" matters when Socrates later identifies changes about the same subjects as evidence of lack of knowledge (317b). That conclusion relies on the same-subject qualification; the dialogue does not work through changing circumstances, newly available evidence, or justified correction of earlier ignorance.

Epistasthai becomes especially prominent in the passage from gardens and cooking to cities. Gardeners know how to rule gardens; cooks know how to rule the preparation of dishes; statesmen and kingly men know how to rule cities. Naming a field and the corresponding practitioners secures quick answers, but the dialogue has not yet demonstrated an individual's civic competence. The subsequent turn to Minos will seek a bearer for the role established abstractly here.

The close prevents the reader from casually attributing the requisite knowledge to the speakers. They can identify the bodily provisions of a good distributor, yet cannot say what he distributes to improve the soul (321c–d). The language of knowing returns as an acknowledged lack concerning what matters within themselves. The ideal of knowledgeable rule has been articulated more fully than its human possession has been demonstrated.

The places.

- **314b.** δηλούσῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ — Knowledge is introduced as revealing the things learned
- **316c.** τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας περὶ τούτων — Medical competence is bounded by its subject
- **316d.** περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῶσι — The agreement of Greeks and barbarians concerns what they know
- **316e.** Τῶν ἐπισταμένων κήπων ἄρχειν — Knowing how is specified by an activity and its object
- **317b.** ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ἢ ἀνεπιστήμονας — Socrates makes competence and its absence the alternatives for assessing inconsistent rule-makers
- **317c.** τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν — Apparent law can deceive those who do not know
- **317d.** τίς ἐπιστήμων διανεῖμαι — The question about the farmer concerns competence to distribute seeds
- **321d.** φαίνεσθαι μὴ εἰδυίας — The final charge concerns the souls' apparent ignorance of what is within them

In this edition. The translation keeps "one who has knowledge" for epistēmōn, "without knowledge" for anepistēmōn, "know how" for epistasthai, and "know" for eidenai. "Know how" also appears where its infinitive is understood from the previous turn. These choices help the reader hear the practical construction without turning every use of "know" into a separate philosophical faculty.

See also. Expert writings · Craft and the limits of the analogy · Kings and statesmen · What is · Shame and ignorance

Law and the demand for a definition

νόμος (nomos); τὸ πᾶν (to pan); τὸ ὅλον (to holon); τὸ νόμος εἶναι (to nomos einai)

The word. Nomos covers law, custom, established usage, and, in the musical examples later in the dialogue, a traditional nome. “Law” is therefore a necessary but not exhaustive English guide. The phrases to pan and to holon ask for the whole subject. “Being law” specifies the respect in which particular laws are to be considered together.

In the work. The opening question asks what law is “for us.” The companion initially hears a request to identify one law among several. Socrates corrects that hearing with gold and stone: different pieces do not differ in the respect in which they are gold or stone. Likewise, each law is law equally, not more or less. The demand is for what makes the whole class intelligible, not for a list of enactments or the identification of one disputed provision.

This initial sameness claim should not be confused with the later claim that knowers have the same judgments about the same matters. Here Socrates brackets differences among instances to ask what it is to be law. Later he questions whether varying rules all qualify as genuine laws. The apparent simplicity of the opening thus conceals a revision of the class: what ordinary speakers call law may be excluded when it fails the standard of correctness.

The companion offers two answers from recognizable public life. First law is what is accepted; then it is resolutions and decrees, a resolution of the city. Socrates treats the first as confusing a source or capacity with its objects, and the second as overinclusive because resolutions can be base. He retains opinion conditionally,

identifies decent opinion with true opinion, and concludes that law wishes to be the discovery of what is (315a).

The remaining discussion tests the consequences of that proposal. Diversity and change produce resistance; knowledge and the crafts are introduced to show a stable standard; rightness distinguishes law from what only appears law. Distribution then shifts the inquiry toward what a competent lawgiver does for recipients. Minos offers a supposed historical and poetic instance. The closing question asks what is distributed to a soul to make it better.

No final summary should erase that trajectory by quoting the formula at 315a as an independently established and fully explained definition. Socrates strengthens it at 317d, omitting "wishes," and applies it to Minos at 321b. Yet its conditions are partly secured through the companion's concessions, and its beneficial content remains unarticulated. The opening demand for a general answer survives the hero's rehabilitation: identifying a praised lawgiver is not the same as specifying the good his legislation gives the soul.

The places.

- **313a.** Ὁ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν; — The question that opens the work
- **313a.** κατὰ τὸ νόμος εἶναι — The respect under which laws are compared
- **313b.** τὸ πᾶν τί ἐστιν νόμος — The demand for law as a whole
- **314c.** τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο, νόμος, δόγμα πόλεως εἶναι — The companion's whole-class answer in civic terms
- **315a.** Ὁ νόμος ἄρα βούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις — Socrates' qualified discovery formula

- **317d.** νόμον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν — Its later, stronger recapitulation
- **318b.** ἐν τοῖς αὐλητικοῖς νόμοις — The musical range of nomos becomes explicit

In this edition. Nomos is always "law," including the musical occurrences, so that the repetition stays visible. The supplied introduction raises authorship as an unresolved question; this entry describes what the dialogue's speakers argue and does not use a blanket attribution to "Plato's doctrine" to settle it.

See also. Accepting, custom, and what is accepted; Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion; Law's wishing and human achievement; Music and nomes.

Law's wishing and human achievement

βούλεσθαι (boulesthai); δύνασθαι (dynasthai); ἐθέλειν (ethelein)

The word. Boulesthai ordinarily means to wish or want. Predicated of a thing, it can express what it means or tends to be. Dynasthai is to be able; ethelein expresses willingness. The dialogue uses human wishes in ordinary requests as well as the remarkable assertion that law itself "wishes." The grammatical continuity does not require imagining law as a conscious person.

In the work. Socrates' conclusion at 315a is not simply "law is discovery." It is that law wishes to be the discovery of what is. The companion's immediate objection restates the proposal with "is" and asks why people change laws if reality has been discovered. That sharpening of the formula makes the difference between an aim or defining tendency and a successful achievement visible in the conversation itself.

Socrates answers by repeating the wish. Law wishes no less to be discovery, while people who do not always use the same laws are not always able to discover what law wishes, namely what is (315a–b). The failure is assigned to human ability, not to variation in law's object. This gives Socrates a way to retain a stable orientation toward truth while recognizing unsuccessful human attempts.

It would nevertheless be too simple to turn the sentence into a settled doctrine that every enactment is law provided it merely aspires to truth. The later craft argument is more restrictive: what is not right is lawless, even if ignorant people call it law (317c). In the recapitulation Socrates says that they agreed law is the finding of what is, without boulesthai (317d). The work moves between an account of what law aims to be and a criterion of what successfully deserves the name. Its language leaves a tension a responsible reading should preserve.

Ordinary requests elsewhere show the verb's everyday force. Socrates lets the companion ask or answer if he wishes; the companion is willing to answer whatever Socrates wishes (315e). Socrates later asks whether the companion wants a reminder about old musical lawgivers (318b), and says that if he is willing to consider tragedy he will find it an old Athenian invention (321a). These are acts or dispositions of speakers. The law's "wish" belongs to the explanatory language of the argument, not to another dramatic character.

At the end neither man's willingness suffices to produce the answer about the soul. The companion says he can no longer state it. That limitation does not duplicate the precise law-formula, but it brings the contrast between an

acknowledged aim and an achieved understanding back to the investigators.

The places.

- **315a.** βούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις — Law wishes to be discovery
- **315a.** εἰ ὁ νόμος ἐστὶν τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις — The companion's objection uses "is"
- **315a–b.** Βούλεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁ νόμος — Socrates insists that the wish remains
- **315b.** οὐκ ἀεὶ δύναναται ἐξευρίσκειν ὃ βούλεται ὁ νόμος, τὸ ὄν — Human ability fails to attain the object law wishes
- **315e.** ἐθέλω; ὅτι ἄν βούλῃ — The companion's willingness to answer and Socrates' wish about the question
- **317d.** νόμον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν — The recapitulation no longer contains the verb of wishing

In this edition. "Wishes to be" deliberately keeps the verb literal. The note acknowledges "means to be" and "tends to be" as possible ways of understanding this use. The choice preserves the wording on which Socrates' reply depends without pretending that one English phrase resolves all of the philosophical difficulty.

See also. Law and the demand for a definition; What is and the things that are; True opinion and the unproved bridge; Rightness and law.

Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician

Μαρσύας (Marsyas); Ὄλυμπος (Olympos); Φρύξ (Phryx); παιδικά (paidika)

The word. Marsyas and Olympus are personal names; Phryx means Phrygian. The plural paidika is used substantivally for a beloved, here Olympus as the beloved of Marsyas. The form is plural in grammar but refers to one person. It is not the similar noun paidia, “play,” which appears later in the discussion of drinking parties.

In the work. Socrates asks his companion to name a good lawgiver of old in flute music (318b). When the companion does not immediately supply a name, Socrates offers to remind him and gives Marsyas together with Olympus. The question and its answer are framed as received report: “is it Marsyas, then, as is said.” The dialogue does not narrate their lives or establish their historical dates.

The pair’s role depends on their tunes. These are called the most divine, able uniquely to move and reveal those in need of the gods, and still surviving as divine (318b–c). The emphasis lies on a tradition’s effective presence, not merely on its inventor’s fame. The example immediately prepares the question about a king of old whose lawful usages remain.

“The Phrygian” is worth retaining. Earlier actual knowledge was said to agree among Greeks and barbarians (316d). The musical model now includes a named figure identified by a non-Greek place of origin. The text does not make an explicit argument from Olympus’ ethnicity, but it would be misleading to present its expertise as restricted to Greek practitioners. Shortly

afterward the search for oldest political laws is expressly limited to “among the Greeks” (318c–d).

The edition’s note identifies Marsyas as the satyr who challenged Apollo, and Olympus as his pupil and beloved, associated with flute-tunes still played in classical times. These identifications supply background rather than additional events spoken here. In particular, the punishment of Marsyas is not narrated in the Minos, and it should not be imported as an unmentioned moral of the example. The operative claim is the divine force and endurance of the tunes.

The places.

- **318b.** ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ βούλει σε ὑπομνήσω — Socrates offers a reminder rather than assuming the companion’s ready knowledge
- **318b.** ὁ Μαρσύας λέγεται — Marsyas is introduced through what is said
- **318b.** τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτοῦ Ὄλυμπος ὁ Φρύξ — Olympus is identified as beloved and Phrygian
- **318b.** Τούτων δὴ καὶ τὰ αὐλήματα θειότατά ἐστι — Their tunes, rather than a narrated biography, supply the evidence that matters

In this edition. The translation uses the conventional English “Olympus,” while the transliteration Olympos follows the Greek. “His beloved” accurately gives the personal reference of paidika. The note compares the account of the tunes in Symposium 215c and the mention of Olympus in Aristotle’s Politics 8.5, 1340a; those parallels are supplied background, not quotations newly spoken in this dialogue.

See also. Music and nomes · Divine movement and disclosure · Knowledge and knowing how · Oldest laws and their persistence

Medicine and the health of the sick

ἰατρός (iatros); ἰατρική (iatrikē); ἰατρικός (iatrikos); ὑγίεια (hygieia); ὑγιεινός (hygieinos); νοσώδης (nosōdēs); κάμνειν (kamnein)

The word. Iatros is a doctor; iatrikē, with “craft” understood or supplied by the surrounding sentence, is medicine; iatrikos means medical or belonging to medicine. Hygieia is health. Hygieinos describes what is healthy or conducive to health, while nosōdēs marks what is sickly or associated with disease. Kamnein can mean to be weary or suffer; in the phrase tōn kamnontōn it identifies sick people.

In the work. Medicine first appears as an example of finding: healthy and sickly things are found by medicine, as the gods’ intentions are said to be found by prophecy (314b). The relevant contrast is between a discipline and the objects it makes accessible. This is not yet a theory of legislation by doctors.

At 316c the example returns in a more concrete form, a writing about the health of the sick. The companion can identify the kind of expertise to which such a writing belongs, so Socrates can move from a familiar subject to its qualified knower. “Doctors” names those knowledgeable about these matters. The passage does not introduce a named medical author, a particular treatment, a school of medicine, or a dispute between methods.

The crucial addition is that doctors write what they accept as being, and that these writings are therefore medical laws (316d–e). A medical norm is intelligible here through

the subject's realities and the practitioner's knowledge. When Socrates later says that whatever is right is lawful "for each," medicine is the first example again (317b). Its role is to make a field-specific criterion of correctness appear natural before that criterion is applied to city government.

Medicine should be kept distinct from the trainer's activity. The sick and their health provide the writing example; the trainer supplies appropriate food to human bodies in the distribution example. The last answer adds labors and bodily exercise (321c). The fields are connected through care and competent ordering, but the dialogue does not erase their distinct practitioners or identify every bodily benefit with medical treatment.

The places.

- **314b.** τὰ μὲν ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἰατρικῇ — Medicine is the means of finding what is healthy and sickly
- **316c.** περὶ ὑγιείας τῶν καμνόντων — Health is considered in relation to those who are sick
- **316c.** ἰατροὺς καλεῖς τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας περὶ τούτων — The professional name is attached to relevant knowledge
- **316e.** Ἰατρικὰ ἄρα καὶ ἰατρικοὶ νόμοι — Both the writings and their rules are identified as medical
- **317b.** τὸ ἰατρικόν — The medical case exemplifies the rule that what is right is lawful in its own field

In this edition. The translation distinguishes the "health" about which doctors write, the "sick" whose health is considered, and the "healthy" and "sickly" things medicine finds. "Laws of medicine" preserves the dialogue's extension of nomos rather than smoothing it into "medical principles."

See also. Expert writings · Right and apparent law · Trainers and herds · Revealing and finding

Minos and the disputed good lawgiver

Μίνως (Minōs); ἄγριος (agrios); χαλεπός (chalepos); ἄδικος (adikos)

The word. Minos is a personal name, not an abstract term for law. The forms Μίνως, Μίνων, Μίνω, and Μίνῳ belong to the name as printed at different points. Agrios means wild or savage, chalepos difficult or harsh, and adikos unjust. These are the companion's reported characterizations, immediately placed in dispute. A lexicon must identify their speaker before assigning them to the king as established attributes.

In the work. Minos enters after the discussion has already sought a definition of law, distinguished right prescriptions from merely apparent law, and identified the king as the best distributor for souls. He therefore supplies a proposed historical or traditional exemplar of a description already constructed. The companion accepts Rhadamanthys' reputation for justice but objects to Minos. Socrates replies that this is an Attic and tragic story, opening a contest over the sources from which the judgment comes (318d–e).

The defense has several different supports. Socrates interprets Homer's verse as testimony that Minos alone among the heroes received education from Zeus; explains a Cretan drinking law as consistent with educational rather than convivial association; distinguishes Minos' full kingly expertise from Rhadamanthys' judicial service; interprets Hesiod's scepter as education; and attributes the hostile Athenian reputation to poetic revenge. Finally the persistence of the laws is called the greatest sign of their

maker's goodness (319b–321b). These steps should not be compressed into a single independent proof. They depend on a reading of poetry, reported institutions, assumptions about good character and an explanation of hostile testimony.

Socrates does not deny that Minos fought Athens or compelled it to pay tribute. His claim is that making enemies of such powerful makers of reputation explains the adverse report. The "mistake" is consequently described through its reputational consequences; the passage does not investigate the justice of that war or tribute. The Minotaur and the identities of the tribute's victims are supplied by the edition's contextual note, not narrated in the dialogue.

Nor does the praise settle every question raised by the opening definition. The companion calls Socrates' account reasonable, and Socrates' next question retains the condition "if what I say is true" (321b). After the exemplary lawgivers have been called shepherds of men, the partners still cannot identify what the good distributor supplies to souls. Minos' example directs the inquiry toward education while leaving its decisive content unformulated.

The places.

- **318d.** Μίνως καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς, οἱ Διὸς καὶ Εὐρώπης παῖδες — Socrates identifies the two Cretan rulers and their parentage
- **318d.** τὸν δὲ Μίνων ἄγριόν τινα καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἄδικον — The companion reports the hostile characterization
- **319c.** ὑπὸ Διὸς πεπαιδεῦσθαι — Education by Zeus is the privilege Socrates finds in Homer

- **321a–b.** κακοδοξότερος γέγονεν — The outcome is worse reputation, not an admission that Minos became morally worse
- **321b.** εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω — Socrates explicitly makes the next inference conditional on his account being true

In this edition. The title names Minos, but he never speaks. “Savage,” “harsh,” and “unjust” preserve three distinguishable charges. The introduction and notes distinguish the account actually given from later mythographic parallels. No historical biography of one securely identifiable Cretan king is established here.

See also. Homer and Hesiod · Reputation and poets · Evidence and stability · The body and the soul

Music nomes and skill in law

νόμος (nomos); νομικός (nomikos); αὐλητής (aulētēs); αὐλητικός (aulētikos); κιθαριστής (kitharistēs); κροῦμα (krouma); μέλος (melos); αὔλημα (aulēma)

The word. Besides law and custom, nomos can name a traditional musical form, a nome. The supplied edition describes it as a type of melody sung with the cithara or flute, or played on the flute alone. Aulētēs is a flute-player and kitharistēs a cithara-player. Krouma is a stroke or instrumental sound; melos here is a tune, not the word’s bodily sense “limb.” Aulēma is a flute-tune or piece performed on the flute. The superlatives nomikōtatos and aulētikōtatos mean most skilled in law and most skilled in flute-playing within the local comparison.

In the work. Music enters between farming and bodily training (317d–e). Socrates asks who distributes strokes to tunes and who is good at distributing what is due. The

companion names the flute-player and cithara-player. Socrates then says that the one most skilled in law in these matters is the most skilled flute-player. The musical sense of nomos makes the transition more than an arbitrary extension of political language, but the argument still links successful performance with right distribution.

The next musical passage makes the special sense explicit by asking for an old good lawgiver in the “laws for the flute” (318b). Marsyas and Olympus supply the answer. Their tunes’ continuing power then becomes a model for asking which king’s usages still remain as divine (318b–c). Music connects the abstract discussion of competent allocation to the search for ancient and enduring laws.

The wordplay should not be dissolved in either direction. Translating every musical nomos merely as “composition” would conceal the recurrence of law; reading it solely as a legal regulation imposed on performers would conceal a familiar musical meaning. The two senses cooperate. The particular phrase about strokes also resists overprecision: the text does not give a score, a rhythmical theory, or a mechanical explanation of flute technique.

The criterion of expertise changes emphasis across the sequence. At 317d–e it is right assignment within performance; at 318b–c it is the exceptional power and survival of particular tunes. Their survival prepares the later appeal to the stability of Minos’ laws, but artistic endurance and legal truth are not shown to be identical simply because both can be called nomoi.

The places.

- **317d.** κρουμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέλη ἀγαθὸς νομεύς — The musical practitioner distributes strokes or sounds to tunes

- **317d–e.** Οἱ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ καὶ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ — Both flute-player and cithara-player are named
- **317e.** Ὁ νομικώτατος ἄρα ἐν τούτοις, οὗτος αὐλητικώτατος — Skill in law and excellence in flute-playing meet within this domain
- **318b.** ἐν τοῖς αὐλητικοῖς νόμοις νομοθέτης — The musical nome supports the expression “lawgiver” in flute music
- **318b.** τὰ αὐλήματα θειότατά ἐστι — The tunes of Marsyas and Olympus are described as most divine

In this edition. Nomos remains “law,” including the musical occurrences; the notes explain “nome.” “Strokes” renders kroumata without pretending that the passage identifies a modern instrumental action. “Most skilled in law” is retained for nomikōtatos, allowing the verbal bridge to remain visible even where English sounds less idiomatic than Greek.

See also. Marsyas and Olympus · Divine movement and disclosure · Distribution and tending · Law and its definition

Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation

ὀαριστής (oaristēs); ὄαροι (oaroi); ἐννέωρος (enneōros); ἐνάτῳ ἔτει (enatō etei); ἐννεετηρίς (enneetēris)

The word. Oaristēs means an intimate associate or familiar friend, rendered “confidant”; oaroi are familiar converse or confidences. Enneōros is the difficult adjective in Homer’s description of Minos. The edition’s note records the uncertainty of its Homeric sense and the alternatives “at nine years old” or “after nine years” reported in LSJ. The expressions “in the ninth year,” “every ninth year,”

and “in the preceding nine-year period” belong to Socrates’ elaboration. These are not interchangeable attestations of a wholly unproblematic Homeric adjective.

In the work. The pivotal line says that Minos was king, enneōros, Zeus’ oaristēs (319b, repeated 319d). Socrates joins the difficult temporal adjective to the intimate association and interprets the relation as recurring meetings with Zeus in words. His argument is explicit: oaroi are logoi, and an oaristēs is someone who associates in words (319e). The linguistic explanation establishes how he wants “confidant” understood; it does not by itself prove that every familiar conversation is educational or that the Homeric adjective can have no other sense.

Socrates fills out this reading with a pattern of visits to Zeus’ cave. Minos goes to learn some things and to display what he learned in the preceding period. The recurrent training coheres with the dialogue’s account of lawgiving as expertise and with the need to apply what one knows. It also supplies a reason to regard Minos as especially honored: direct instruction from Zeus has been allotted to him alone among the heroes in Homer’s portrayal.

The rival interpretation makes the confidant a drinking-companion and playfellow of Zeus. Socrates challenges it through a reported Cretan law and an assumption about consistency of conviction and conduct. That move is significant: the discussion does not remain a dictionary dispute. What the word can mean is assessed in relation to the kind of man and lawgiver Minos is taken to be. A reader may follow the internal coherence of this construction while recognizing that the law, the character assumption and the educational meaning support one another.

Care is also needed with the chronology. The lexicon need not impose a modern schedule on expressions using ancient ordinal and period vocabulary. The dialogue says “in the ninth year,” “every ninth year,” and speaks of the preceding enneetēris; it is enough to preserve those forms and the recurrent sense. Certainty about the precise calendar interval would exceed the supplied explanation.

The places.

- **319b; 319d.** ἐννέωρος βασίλευε Διὸς μεγάλου ὀαριστής — The quoted Homeric line, given twice
- **319c.** συγγίγνεσθαι ἐνάτῳ ἔτει τῷ Διὶ ἐν λόγοις — Socrates’ prose reading of the relationship and timing
- **319e.** οἱ γὰρ ὄαροι λόγοι εἰσίν — His explanation of familiar converse
- **319e.** ὀαριστὴς συνουσιαστής ἐστιν ἐν λόγοις — The gloss makes the confidant an associate in words
- **319e.** δι’ ἐνάτου ἔτους; τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐννεετηρίδι — The recurrent visits and the preceding period
- **319e.** συμπότην καὶ συμπαιστὴν — The rival interpretation, reported and rejected

In this edition. “Nine-yearly confidant” deliberately lets the English reader see Socrates’ chosen attachment of the adjective. The accompanying note prevents that rendering from being mistaken for an uncontested translation of Homer. “Confidences,” “confidant,” and “one who is with another in words” retain the stages of the explanatory move.

See also. Homer and Hesiod · Education and association · Drinking and consistency · Evidence and stability

Oldest laws and their persistence

παλαιός (palaios); μένειν (menein); λοιπός (loipos); ἀκίνητος (akinētos); νομοθέτης (nomothetēs)

The word. Palaios means old or ancient; palaiotatos, oldest. Menein is to remain, persist, or stay; loipos describes what is left. Akinētos means unmoved or unchanging. Nomothetēs is a lawgiver, one who establishes laws. These words do not themselves make antiquity a sufficient mark of goodness. Their argumentative relation must be followed through the comparison between surviving music, old civic usages, and Minos' allegedly stable laws.

In the work. At 318b Socrates asks for a good old lawgiver in music. He then emphasizes that the tunes remain and asks for the corresponding good kingly lawgiver whose lawful usages remain as divine. Only after this does he ask which Greeks use the oldest laws (318c). The question about age arises within a search already qualified by goodness and divine persistence.

The companion proposes the Spartans and Lycurgus. Socrates answers that these arrangements are perhaps not yet three hundred years old, or slightly older, and asks where their best usages came from. "From Crete, they say" leads to the Cretans' priority (318c–d). This is a claim about transmission and comparative antiquity among Greeks, not a demonstrated chronology of every people in the world.

At 321b persistence becomes the "greatest sign" of Minos' goodness: his laws are unmoved because he discovered well the truth concerning civic administration. This takes up the earlier account of knowers who do not change what they write about the same matters (317b). The account

forms a chain: knowledge is stable; right rules express knowledge; the stability of Minos' rules is offered as a sign of his discovery. A reader may accept the first claim while questioning whether observed endurance alone proves the last. The dialogue gives the argument, but does not systematically exclude alternative reasons why customs might persist.

It is also important that the conclusion remains part of an exchange. The companion calls the argument reasonable; Socrates then frames his next question "if what I say is true" (321b). The final failure to specify the soul's provisions prevents the narrative of ancient authority from closing every philosophical question. Age and persistence help nominate exemplary lawgivers; they do not supply the missing account of psychic improvement.

The places.

- **318b.** τίς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν — The search combines antiquity with goodness from its outset
- **318b–c.** μόνα λοιπά, ὡς θεῖα ὄντα — The musical example joins survival and divinity
- **318c.** οὗ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ νόμιμα μένει — A king is sought whose lawful usages still persist
- **318c.** τίνες παλαιοτάτοις νόμοις χρῶνται τῶν Ἑλλήνων — Comparative antiquity is expressly bounded to the Greeks
- **321b.** ἀκίνητοι αὐτοῦ οἱ νόμοι εἰσίν — The stability of Minos' laws is offered as the greatest sign
- **321b.** εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω — Socrates' concluding question retains an explicit condition

In this edition. "Old," "oldest," "remain," "left," and "unmoved" keep distinct the age of a practice, its survival,

and its freedom from alteration. “Lawgiver” is also used in the musical example. The edition does not render every appeal to antiquity as “tradition” or silently remove the qualifiers in the estimate of Lycurgus’ date.

See also. Sparta Crete and Lycurgus · Change and the draughts image · Knowledge and knowing how · Divine movement and disclosure · Evidence and stability

Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination

ψέγειν (psegein); ἐπαινεῖν (epainein); ἀσεβεῖν (asebein); εὐλαβεῖσθαι (eulabeisthai); προμήθεια (promētheia); διαγιγνώσκειν (diagignōskein); ἱερός (hieros); μιαρός (miaros)

The word. Psegein is to censure or blame; epainein to praise. Asebein is to act impiously. Eulabeisthai means to be wary or take care, and promētheia forethought. Diagignōskein is to distinguish or discern. Hieros means sacred, miaros polluted or foul. The religious vocabulary intensifies the responsibility involved in evaluating persons; it does not make every favorable report true.

In the work. Before presenting his poetic evidence, Socrates warns the companion against joining the many in impiety (318e–319a). Offence against gods comes first, then against divine human beings. The danger is explicitly both verbal and practical: one can go wrong in word as well as deed. Repeating an inherited story is therefore not ethically weightless.

The practical demand is forethought before either censure or praise, so that one does not speak wrongly. The symmetry is important. The warning is not merely “never criticize a revered figure”; it also prohibits praising someone opposed to the god’s goodness. To avoid both mistakes one must learn to distinguish decent people from

base ones. The passage places religious caution together with a demand for discrimination, although the present identification of Minos as one of the good remains something Socrates is about to argue.

The god is said to be indignant when someone censures a person like himself or praises someone contrary to himself. The reference of “himself” and the explanation that follows are best understood through the stated ethical likeness: the good person is like the god. The comparison with stones, wood, birds and snakes then extends sacred standing to human beings and gives the good human being the highest place among the examples; the base person is correspondingly most polluted (319a). This is an evaluative hierarchy, not a claim that all human conduct deserves religious exemption from inquiry.

A reader should also distinguish different forms of praise. The careful assessment urged here is one thing; Homer’s supposed supreme eulogy of Minos is evidence Socrates develops; and the poets’ capacity to manufacture good or bad reputation is a further problem (320e). Praise is neither dismissed wholesale nor trusted indiscriminately. Its justice depends upon the character of its object and the reliability of its grounds.

The language of caution returns when Socrates warns against provoking poets if one cares about reputation. The recurrence moves from the moral-religious danger of false evaluation to the practical danger of becoming its target. That shift makes the warning at the end more pointed than a generic instruction to respect artists.

The places.

- **318e.** καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν — Error or offence can occur in speech and in action

- **318e–319a.** προμήθειαν ποιεῖσθαι; ψέξειν ἢ ἐπαινέσεσθαι — Both blame and praise require forethought
- **319a.** μανθάνειν διαγιγνώσκειν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἄνδρας — The required learning is discrimination between kinds of character
- **319a.** νεμεσᾷ γὰρ ὁ θεός — Socrates invokes the god's indignation
- **319a.** ἱερώτατόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀγαθός — The good human being is called most sacred among the stated examples
- **319a.** μιαρώτατον ὁ πονηρός — The base person occupies the opposite pole

In this edition. "Censure," "praise," "impious," "forethought," "sacred," and "polluted" preserve the speech's different registers. Chrēstos and ponēros remain "decent" and "base," while agathos is "good"; the religious setting does not erase those lexical distinctions.

See also. Decent and base · Zeus and Europa · Reputation and poets · Error and missing

Reading the text and apparatus

Editorial reading article; the supplied Greek text, its apparatus, and the distinction between an adopted reading and a reported alternative.

The word. A reading text is the sequence of words an editor prints for continuous reading. An apparatus records evidence and editorial alternatives keyed to that text. The two are not a single continuous speech. "Attested in the supplied dialogue" in this lexicon means present in its printed Greek reading text, including expressly marked supplements. It does not mean that every manuscript has

the word, or that a fresh inspection of the manuscripts has established it as original.

The distinction matters especially in a lexical companion. At 315c the reading text has ἐγχυτιστρίας, whereas the apparatus gives an alternative spelling associated with a different interpretation of the funeral attendants. At 317d the infinitive νεῖμαι remains in the text even though Boeckh's νέμει is reported. At 321d φλαῦρον is the reading printed, with φαῦρον reported for F. A register that indiscriminately collects both text and apparatus would create false spoken attestations and erase the editorial decisions it ought to explain.

In the work. The supplied edition identifies its Greek as Burnet's fifth Oxford volume, first published in 1907, reproduced from a later impression issued no earlier than October 1936. The latter date is inferred in its Editorial Note from the bound publisher's list, not printed as a date of a new critical edition. The same note reports an undated title page, John Johnson as printer, and the dated prefatory materials. The companion preserves that description without pretending to have established a different printing history.

The title "Minos, or On Law," speaker list, marginal Stephanus references, and lineation orient reading. They also show why a local reference must be assigned from the actual margin, rather than from the nearest paragraph heading in a digital transcription. Burnet's pages and Stephanus sections often cut across speeches and sentences. A phrase can begin on one physical page or in one section and finish in the next. The page titles in the supplied edition express ranges; the Greek margin determines the precise reference.

Angle brackets record supplementation. At 316a the companion’s answer “Among the Persians too” is added from earlier printed editions and is absent from A and F as reported. Hermann’s alternative treatment removes Socrates’ question and changes the preceding expression. The reading adopted by Burnet maintains the short question-and-answer form; it must not be called the unanimous manuscript wording. At 321d the relative ἃ is supplied, making explicit the relative construction in the question about improving the soul. The English keeps the supplement visible.

Other changes require a more local explanation. At 317d διαθεώμεθα is Hermann’s conjecture, printed by Burnet; A and F are reported with different forms. The lexicon can explain “let us view” as the reading of this edition while separately reporting its editorial status. Likewise, the apparatus’s form of a name or accent is not automatically a correction that should be inserted into the printed Greek. The source explains several places where Burnet prints a normalized form while reporting the witnesses’ spelling.

The principal sigla are A and F. The supplied Editorial Note identifies A as Parisinus graecus 1807 and F as the Vienna manuscript traditionally cited as Vindobonensis 55, suppl. phil. Gr. 39. A² marks correction in A. Statements about these witnesses here are inherited from that editorial account. Stobaeus is cited for an excerpt of 317c–318a; an excerpt witness is not an additional complete manuscript of the dialogue. The ancient Alexander cited at 313a remains unidentified in the supplied edition. Supplying a familiar Alexander’s surname would make the explanation appear more complete while exceeding its evidence.

A few typographical details can otherwise mislead a reader. A colon can separate variant readings, but it can

also occur inside a reported manuscript reading; the source distinguishes these uses. The sign ÷ at 319d5 reports a mark associated with an erased space in A, not an instruction to divide a sentence or a modern mathematical operation. The apparatus also preserves small printed irregularities rather than silently regularizing them. None of these features should become an independent philosophical inference about the dialogue.

The source's English is another layer of evidence. It deliberately repeats "law," "accept," "opinion," "distributor," and related terms to preserve the argument's recurrence. Its outline and notes are interpretive aids, and an outline can compress a sentence more broadly than the Greek permits. Thus the specific drinking law at 320a must be read from the Greek and its facing translation, not enlarged from a shorthand summary. A lexical companion needs fidelity to the reading text even when an ancillary summary is easier to quote.

The places.

- **315c.** ἐγχυτιστρίας — the funeral attendants' designation is printed with this spelling; its meaning remains qualified in the note
- **316a.** ⟨ET. Καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις⟩ — the companion's reply concerning the Persians is supplied and visibly bracketed
- **317d.** διαθεώμεθα — the adopted conjecture introduces the further consideration of distribution
- **317d.** τὰ ἄξια νεῖμαι — the printed infinitive is retained rather than silently replaced by the finite verb reported in the apparatus

- **319d.** ἁπάντων — the apparatus notices the erased-space mark before A's form; the mark does not belong to Socrates' utterance
- **321d.** ⟨ἃ⟩ — the relative in the last question is an editorial supplement
- **321d.** τὸ φλαῦρον — the final contrast is with what is poor, not a silently substituted φαῦλον

In this edition. The Greek text and translation are the primary local evidence; the Introduction, Key Words, Outline, Glossary, Editorial Note, and production record are distinguished from them. The latter record describes checks undertaken for the supplied edition. This lexicon does not claim those checks as its own independent manuscript or photographic collation. Its verification concerns its fidelity to the supplied files, the precision of its references and forms, and the integrity of its own artifacts. For the edition's stated limits, see the source guide and its discussion of unresolved identifications and later textual scholarship.[2]

See also. Law and its definition; Funerary customs; Fitting distribution; Homeric confidant and nine year interval; Drinking and consistency; Shame and ignorance; Source guide and notes

[2] The source's descriptions of manuscripts, print history, photographic checks, and reviewer work are descriptions of that edition's preparation. Fidelity to its supplied reading text does not establish an author's original wording, resolve the authorship dispute, or constitute a new collation of manuscript witnesses.

Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion

φήμη (phēmē); δόξα (doxa); εὐδόκιμος (eudokimos); κακόδοξος (kakodoxos); ποιητής (poiētēs); εὐλογεῖν (eulogein); κακηγορεῖν (kakēgorein)

The word. Phēmē is a report, saying or reputation spread among people. Doxa can mean an opinion or the standing someone has in others' opinion. Eudokimos means well thought of; kakodoxos ill reputed, with the comparative κακοδοξότερος expressing worse reputation. Poiētēs is a maker, here a poet. Eulogein and kakēgorein are speaking well and speaking ill of someone. None of these terms makes reputation identical with the person's actual goodness.

In the work. The companion's first defense of his view of Minos is simply that this is what people say (318e). After Socrates has developed the educational portrait, the companion turns the discrepancy into a question: why has the report of an uneducated and harsh Minos spread abroad? The question acknowledges the existence of both accounts rather than yet deciding how the hostile one arose (320d–e).

Socrates answers through the poets' capacity to shape opinion. They can work in either direction, praising or speaking ill of the people they portray. Minos incurred the hostility of Athens, a city rich in wisdom and poets of many kinds, by waging war against it. Tragedy then provides the medium of revenge. The explanation makes public evaluation responsive to power, emotion and the interests of those controlling a memorable representation.

This late use of doxa recalls the opening attempt to identify law with political opinion, but its immediate object is

different. At 314c–315a opinion concerns what a city accepts or judges; at 320e it concerns how persons stand in public estimation. The edition's repeated "opinion" makes the connection audible while preserving the need to distinguish the senses. Socrates' attempt to find truth beneath variable accepted usages is now joined by an attempt to find a man's worth beneath his public image.

The explanation is itself part of Socrates' argument. The work does not give independent testimony from a tragedian admitting a propaganda program. Nor does the fact that a hostile party can influence reputation alone prove the complete falsity of every adverse depiction. The strongest separate sign Socrates adduces is the stability of Minos' laws. His account offers a reason to distrust an apparently obvious consensus and then directs attention to a different kind of evidence.

The advice to avoid the hatred of poetic men has a wry practical force. Someone concerned with being well thought of should reckon with their influence. That does not make the concern a sufficient ethical standard, or turn the dialogue into advice to flatter poets. The gap between good character and favorable report is precisely what makes the warning possible.

The places.

- **318e.** οὐ ταῦτα λέγεται περὶ Μίνω; — The companion appeals to current report
- **320d–e.** αὕτη ἡ φήμη κατεσκέδασται — He asks why the report has been spread abroad
- **320e.** τοῦ εὐδόκιμον εἶναι — Being well thought of is the concern named in Socrates' practical warning
- **320e.** οἱ γὰρ ποιηταὶ μέγα δύνανται εἰς δόξαν — The poets' power acts upon opinion

- **320e.** ἢ εὐλογοῦντες ἢ κακηγοροῦντες — Their influence can produce praise or ill report
- **321a–b.** κακοδοξότερος γέγονεν — Minos has acquired worse standing in opinion

In this edition. “Report,” “opinion,” “well thought of,” and “held in worse opinion” distinguish the family without losing its relations. “Speaking ill” translates the reading κακηγοροῦντες printed by Burnet; κατηγοροῦντες is an apparatus variant and should not generate a separate attested accusation here.

See also. Resolution and opinion · Praise and piety · Tragedy and vengeance · Evidence and stability

Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion

δόγμα (dogma); ψήφισμα (psēphisma); δόξα (doxa); πολιτικός (politikos); πόλις (polis)

The word. Dogma is something decided or resolved upon; psēphisma is a measure passed by vote. Doxa is opinion, with a further range that includes the opinion others hold of a person. Dogma and doxa both belong with dokein, “seem” or “seem good.” Political opinion is opinion of or concerning the city. The shared verbal family makes Socrates’ move intelligible; it does not abolish the difference between a public decision and a belief.

In the work. After Socrates asks whether law is a perception, revealing, or finding, the companion answers with the familiar “these resolutions and decrees” (314b). He appears to return from the proposed explanatory categories to identifiable civic acts. His summary, “a resolution of the city,” is an answer about institutional source and authoritative decision.

Socrates immediately reformulates it as political opinion, and the companion assents (314c). The reformulation lets the discussion assess law by truth and falsity in a way that "measure passed by vote" alone does not invite. One should therefore retain both speakers' wording. It is the companion who supplies the civic account, and Socrates who turns the verbal relation into a bridge toward an epistemic account.

The following exchange accepts that law is fine and good, then distinguishes decent resolutions from base ones. A resolution cannot be law simply because the city resolved upon it. This objection attacks the sufficiency of the proposed definition; it does not deny that cities issue resolutions or that some resolutions can meet the required standard. Nor does the text introduce a historical technical distinction by which one Athenian procedure always yields nomoi and another yields psēphismata. Its argument is broader and evaluative.

Socrates remains attracted to opinion "of some kind," but makes the next step conditional: if law is opinion, it is the decent opinion. The true-opinion account inherits that condition. Treating the initial dogma–doxa move as a completed proof would hide one of the dialogue's exposed transitions.

At 317a the city returns as the object of a craft, and law as the writing of competent statesmen and kings. The relevant source is now knowledgeable rule rather than the bare fact that a city has decided. At 320e doxa returns as reputation: poets influence what people think of Minos. The full work therefore explores both the possibility of true opinion and the vulnerability of public opinion to persuasive representation. It never makes civic popularity a guarantee of truth.

The places.

- **314b.** Τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίσματα — The companion names familiar public decisions
- **314c.** δόγμα πόλεως εἶναι — His whole-class definition
- **314c.** Δόξαν, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον — Socrates restates the definition as political opinion
- **314e.** ὅτι νόμος ἐστὶ δόγμα πόλεως — The formula rejected as too simple
- **314e.** δόξα γέ τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται ὁ νόμος εἶναι — Socrates retains some kind of opinion as a plausible account
- **320e.** οἱ γὰρ ποιηταὶ μέγα δύνανται εἰς δόξαν — The later power of poets over opinion

In this edition. "Resolution," "decree," and "opinion" stay distinct. The note connects dogma with the language of what seemed good to a deciding body. The common English "opinion" at the end keeps visible the recurrence of doxa, while the context distinguishes a person's reputation from the proposition "law is political opinion."

See also. True opinion and the unproved bridge; Decent and base; Rule and the city; Reputation and poets.

Revealing, finding, and discovery

δηλοῦν (dēloun); δήλωσις (dēlōsis); εὑρίσκειν (heuriskein); εὕρεσις (heuresis); ἐξευρίσκειν (exeuriskein); ἐξεύρεσις (exeuresis); πράγματα (pragmata)

The word. Dēloun is to make clear or reveal; dēlōsis is a revealing. Heuriskein is to find, with heuresis naming a finding. Exeuriskein and exeuresis are the compound forms, rendered "discover" and "discovery." Pragmata

here are things or matters disclosed or found. No single modern category such as “scientific discovery” exhausts these words’ uses.

In the work. Socrates’ sensory comparison expands into a set of possible explanations for law (313c–314b). Sight is perception that reveals things through the eyes; hearing reveals sounds through the ears. Learning brings another model: knowledge reveals what is learned. Finding supplies a further one: medicine finds what is healthy and sickly, and prophecy, according to the prophets, what the gods have in mind. Socrates calls craft “our finding of things.”

The alternatives are tentative explanatory models rather than a completed classification of all cognition. The question is what law is by which accepted things are accepted. The companion does not choose one of the options as stated; he answers with resolutions and decrees. Yet finding returns after the discussion of decent and true opinion, now in the compound exeuresis. The earlier craft-language has prepared the central definition without having by itself established it.

The progression matters in the opposite direction too. At 315a true opinion is called discovery of what is; at 315b fallible humans may fail to discover what law wishes; at 317d the shorter heuresis appears when Socrates restates law as finding. The source does not mark that change as a new theory. The English’s two renderings preserve the lexical distinction while the argument’s continuity discourages inventing a sharp technical opposition between “finding” and “discovery.”

Near the end Socrates claims Minos discovered well the truth concerning civic administration (321b). The general formula has acquired a domain and a supposed successful

agent. Tragedy, meanwhile, is called an old Athenian heurēma, a finding or invention (321a). That noun can concern the origination of a practice, while the central formula concerns getting hold of what is. The common root does not make tragedy a discovery of moral truth.

The disclosure language also persists when Socrates reads Homer and when musical performances reveal those in need of the gods. Those later uses show that revealing need not be a physical sensation. The crucial issue throughout is what is made manifest and with what warrant. The ending acknowledges a limit: the law's discoverable good for the soul has not yet been stated.

The places.

- **314a.** αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλούσῃ τὰ πράγματα — Sight as revealing through the eyes
- **314b.** πότερον αἰσθήσει τινὶ ἢ δηλώσει — Law considered as perception or revealing
- **314b.** ἡ γάρ που τέχνη ἡμῖν εὕρεσίς ἐστιν τῶν πραγμάτων — Craft as our finding of things
- **315a.** ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις — True opinion as discovery of what is
- **317d.** τοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν — The unprefixed noun in the restatement
- **321a.** τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως εὕρημα — Tragedy as this city's finding
- **321b.** ἐξευρόντος εὖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν — Successful discovery in the claim about Minos

In this edition. The distinction "find/finding" and "discover/discovery" is deliberate and maintained. At 314a Burnet prints "things," τὰ πράγματα, rather than the vulgate "colors" reported in the apparatus. A lexicon

following this edition should not quietly narrow the object of sight to the alternative reading.

See also. Speech, perception, and their objects; What is and the things that are; Craft analogy; Evidence and stability.

Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities

Ῥαδάμανθυς (Rhadamanthys); Τάλως (Talōs); ὑπηρεσία (hypēresia); ἐπιστατεῖν (epistatein)

The word. Rhadamanthys and Talos are personal names. Hypēresia is service or subordinate assistance; epistatein is to stand over, supervise or preside. The vocabulary distinguishes the possession of a whole directing craft from an assigned function within its administration. It does not make subordinate service contemptible: Rhadamanthys is expressly called a good man and a good judge.

In the work. The companion initially contrasts the two brothers: Rhadamanthys, people say, was just, whereas Minos was savage and unjust (318d). Socrates later reverses the apparent evidential priority. In his account of Homer, it is Minos who is depicted judging with a golden scepter in the Nekyia, and Minos who associates with Zeus. Rhadamanthys receives neither of those descriptions there (319d). This is a statement about Homer’s depiction as Socrates presents it, not a denial that other traditions can describe Rhadamanthys as an underworld judge.

At 320b–c Socrates gives Rhadamanthys a positive but derivative qualification: he had been educated by Minos. The education comprised enough of the kingly craft to preside in courts, not the whole craft. He served Minos as guardian of the laws in the town. The sequence of grounds

matters: good judgment can be acknowledged while the comprehensive lawgiving and educational competence remain with Minos. Rhadamanthys is not simply expelled from the class of good lawgivers, since the conclusion again joins him with Minos among the best ancient lawgivers (321b–c). The text combines shared traditional attribution with a differentiated account of functions.

Talos supplies the corresponding administration outside the town. He travels through the villages three times a year, guarding the laws and carrying them written on bronze tablets. Socrates explains the name or description "bronze" from this equipment. The result is a civic interpretation of a marvellous figure: the narrative gives Talos written laws and a regular circuit rather than describing a bronze body. The edition's note compares Apollonius and Apollodorus, but their different circuits and frequencies must not be imported into the present account. Here the expressly stated frequency is three times in the year.

The division between town and the rest of Crete also makes law concrete. The lawgiver's knowledge does not eliminate courts, custodians, writing or territorial administration. The passage is nevertheless not a constitution of Crete: no appointment process, appeal procedure or independent account of the guardians' authority is supplied.

The places.

- **318d.** Ῥαδάμανθύν γέ φασιν — The companion explicitly appeals to what people say
- **319d.** οὐ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν — Socrates differentiates Homer's depiction of Minos from Rhadamanthys
- **320b–c.** ἐπεπαίδευτο γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ Μίνω — Rhadamanthys' education is attributed to Minos

- **320c.** ἀλλ’ ὑπηρεσίαν τῇ βασιλικῇ — Service to the kingly craft is distinguished from possessing the whole craft
- **320c.** ὅσον ἐπιστατεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις — The practical competence is presiding in courts
- **320c.** ὁ γὰρ Τάλως τρὶς περιῄει τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ κατὰ τὰς κώμας — Talos’ circuit is through the villages three times yearly

In this edition. “Service to the kingly craft” keeps the hierarchy explicit without calling the service itself deficient. The bronze-tablet explanation belongs to Socrates’ speech. The mythographic comparisons in note 24 identify other accounts and do not silently correct this one.

See also. Kingly expertise · Scepters and guardians · Minos · Education and association

Right and apparent law

ὀρθός (orthos); ὀρθῶς (orthōs); νόμιμος (nomimos); ἄνομος (anomos); δοκεῖν (dokein)

The word. Orthos means straight or right, and in the argument correct; orthōs is “rightly.” Nomimos means lawful or in accordance with law; anomos is lawless. Dokein marks seeming, thinking, or being thought to be. The decisive passage opposes what is right to what only seems to have the status of law. There is no separate Greek noun corresponding to a developed theory of “apparent law”; that English phrase names the distinction made in the sentence.

In the work. Rightness initially characterizes the asking and answering of questions: the companion would not have asked rightly by seeking which gold Socrates means

(313a), and it is not right to identify law so simply with a city resolution once base resolutions have been admitted (314e). At 317b–c the same family of words becomes the decisive criterion for the thing under inquiry.

Socrates first applies the criterion to each practical domain. Whatever is right is lawful, whether medical, culinary, or horticultural; what is not right is no longer lawful and becomes lawless. He then applies it to writings about justice, injustice, and the ordering of a city. Correctness is not one desirable quality that a law may happen to lack while retaining the same status. Within this argument, its absence disqualifies the text from being law at all.

The phrase “to those who do not know” identifies the audience of the misleading appearance (317c). The text can be called law, encountered as law, and taken to be law while failing the Socratic standard. This is the sharpest answer to the companion’s evidence of inconsistent usages: examples of wrong enactments need not refute law’s relation to truth, because they are excluded from the category. The cost is that the ordinary civic use of nomos has been restricted. The dialogue does not revisit each alleged sacrifice or funeral rule to determine its correctness individually.

The recapitulation at 317d accordingly says that law is the finding of what is. Unlike 315a–b, this sentence contains no “wishes.” It should not be quoted as though the earlier qualification remained verbally present, nor should the earlier statement be rewritten without it. The development is an interpretive issue: the crafts have supplied the criterion under which Socrates now states the definition without qualification, while the practical identification of

genuinely knowledgeable civic rule remains to be explored.

The places.

- **313a.** οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐρέσθαι — Rightness first concerns the question's form
- **314e.** Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἀποκρίνεσθαι οὕτως ἁπλῶς — A simple answer is rejected as inadequate
- **317b.** ὃ μὲν ἂν ὀρθὸν ᾖ, νόμιμον αὐτὸ φήσομεν — Rightness licenses the predicate "lawful"
- **317c.** Ἄνομον ἄρα γίγνεται — What fails the test becomes lawless within the argument
- **317c.** ὃ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν — The appearance of law is assigned to those lacking knowledge
- **317d.** Ὀρθῶς ἄρα ὡμολογήσαμεν νόμον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν — The recapitulation makes an unqualified identification and uses "finding"

In this edition. "Right" and "rightly" preserve orthos and orthōs throughout the dialogue. "Lawless," rather than simply "illegal," is important at 317c: the defect concerns failure to be genuine law, not merely violation of a separate enacted statute. The edition distinguishes the "finding" here from the "discovery" at 315a.

See also. Law wishes · What is · Expert writings · Justice and lawfulness

Rule and the ordering of a city

ἄρχειν (archein); ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai); πόλις (polis); διοίκησις (dioikēsis); διοικεῖν (dioikein); διακόσμησις (diakosmēsis); οἴκησις (oikēsis)

The word. Archein means to rule, govern, or direct. In the middle voice it also means to begin within this dialogue: Sparta began using the Cretan laws (320b), and tragedy is said not to have begun with Thespis or Phrynichus (321a). In the sequence at 316e–317a its genitives specify what is directed: gardens, the preparation of dishes, or cities. Polis is a city understood as a civic community. Dioikēsis is its ordering or administration; dioikein is to administer or manage it. Diakosmēsis emphasizes arrangement or orderly disposition. Oikēsis has a range connected with dwelling and management; the edition renders its late civic use “administration.” These words are related ways of naming practical civic order, not a list of distinct constitutional institutions.

In the work. Socrates carries archein from gardening and cooking into city rule (316e–317a). The repeated question is who knows how. The city is not merely the largest object in a series: its writings concern the just and unjust and how the community should be ordered (317c). This gives political correctness an explicitly ethical subject matter. It prevents the account from being reduced to successful control or efficient organization without regard to justice.

The sequence also changes the place of the city in the definition of law. Earlier the companion had proposed a resolution of the city as the answer (314b–c). At 317a–c the city is the subject to be well ordered by a qualified knower. Institutional origin is no longer sufficient. A civic writing must be right about the matters it orders if it is to deserve the name law.

This is a criterion rather than a constitutional blueprint. The dialogue does not explain how a city selects its experts, who judges disputes about expertise, or how an ordinary citizen recognizes a correct rule before possessing the knowledge that would verify it. Those absences matter because the distinction between law and apparent law can be stated more readily than administered.

At 321b Socrates returns to the administration of a city when he praises Minos as having discovered its truth. The historical narrative is therefore offered as an instance of the competence described in the middle argument. The final inquiry shifts attention from the city's administration to the soul's improvement, leaving open how the former achieves the latter in detail.

The places.

- **316e.** κήπων ἄρχειν — The first explicit use in the sequence concerns directing gardens
- **316e–317a.** ὄψου σκευασίας ἄρχειν — The same verb governs a process of preparation
- **317a.** περὶ πόλεως διοικήσεως — The civic writings concern the city's ordering
- **317a.** τῶν ἐπισταμένων πόλεων ἄρχειν — Ruling cities is assigned to those who know how
- **317c.** περὶ πόλεως διακοσμήσεώς τε καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὡς χρὴ πόλιν διοικεῖν — Arrangement is joined to the normative question how a city should be ordered
- **320b.** ἀφ' οὗ ἤρξατο τούτοις χρῆσθαι — In a different construction, the middle verb means "began" using the laws
- **321b.** περὶ πόλεως οἰκήσεως — Minos' alleged discovery concerns civic administration

In this edition. “Rule,” “ordering,” “arrangement,” and “administration” preserve the lexical distinctions while keeping the subject coherent. At 321b the edition deliberately renders oikēsis “administration of a city.” It does not turn the passage into a claim about founding, housing, or the physical construction of a settlement.

See also. Kings and statesmen · Expert writings · Right and apparent law · Justice and lawfulness

Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities

θύειν (thyein); θυσία (thysia); ὅσιος (hosios); ἀνόσιος (anosios); Καρχηδόνιοι (Karchēdonioi); Λυκαία (Lykaia); Ἀθάμας (Athamas); Κρόνος (Kronos)

The word. Thyein is to sacrifice, and thysia a sacrifice or sacrificial rite. Hosios means holy or religiously permitted; anosios is unholy. The named communities are the Carthaginians, the people in Lycaea, and the descendants of Athamas. Kronos is the divine name under which the companion describes the Carthaginian recipient. These are culturally situated terms in a speaker’s example, not conclusions of the lexicon’s own historical investigation.

In the work. The companion begins with a severe contrast: for “us,” sacrificing human beings is not law but unholy; Carthaginians sacrifice them as holy and lawful for themselves, some even sacrificing their own sons to Cronus (315b–c). The phrase “as perhaps you too have heard” marks the report as received knowledge. The lexicon should attribute it to the speaker rather than turn it into a freshly verified account of every Carthaginian community or period.

The next examples change the geography without changing the argumentative function. The people in

Lycaea and Athamas' descendants perform striking sacrifices though they are Greeks. The companion's wording does not repeat the explicit human object in this second clause, but the continuation and the edition's notes identify the allusion to human sacrifice. A quotation should preserve that distinction between what is stated in the clause and what its context supplies.

The contrast is meant to show that disagreement is not exhausted by Greek versus non-Greek identity. The subsequent Athenian burial examples show that it is not exhausted by geography either. Holy and lawful are paired in the Carthaginian description because the companion's objection concerns rules actually recognized as legitimate by practitioners. He is not arguing that every sacrifice is truly just merely because someone approves it.

Socrates does not answer by determining whether those sacrifices are holy. Carthage and Lycaea reappear as places where greater weights are regarded as heavier (316a). Their return is pointed: they are admitted into a common world of correct judgment despite their different rituals. Yet establishing agreement about weight does not itself settle the classification of a sacrificial act. The reader should not invent a missing case-by-case refutation.

Religion later enters from the other side: Socrates warns against wronging divine human beings by speech and presents Minos' laws as grounded in Zeus' education. The dialogue thus neither treats religious claims as automatically authoritative nor dismisses them collectively as mere superstition. Their force depends on judgments of truth and goodness that are themselves being examined.

The places.

- **315b.** ἀνθρώπους θύειν ἀλλ’ ἀνόσιον — Human sacrifice is described as unholy for the speakers’ community
- **315b–c.** Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ θύουσιν ὡς ὅσιον ὂν καὶ νόμιμον αὐτοῖς — The companion’s contrary report about Carthaginians
- **315c.** τοὺς αὑτῶν ὑεῖς τῷ Κρόνῳ — Their own sons and the god named as recipient
- **315c.** οἱ ἐν τῇ Λυκαίᾳ οὗτοι; οἱ τοῦ Ἀθάμαντος ἔκγονοι — The two Greek examples
- **315c.** οἵας θυσίας θύουσιν Ἕλληνες ὄντες — The emphatic appeal to sacrifices performed by Greeks
- **316a.** καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι καὶ ἐν Λυκαίᾳ — The locations return in the question about weight

In this edition. Lycaea is treated as the region of Mount Lycaeus in Arcadia, not as the name of a festival. The supplied notes identify the Athamas allusion with Herodotus 7.197 and give ancient parallels for the other reports. These are the edition’s contextual references, not claims of a new collation or independent archaeological verification. “Holy” and “unholy” keep hosios distinct from the later vocabulary of sacred persons and impiety.

See also. Variation of customs and the companion’s objection; Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings; Weight and the judgment of what is heavier; Praise and piety.

Sameness, difference, and the same subject

ταὐτόν (tauton); ταὐτά (tauta); ὅμοιος (homoios); διαφέρειν (diapherein); ἄλλος (allos); ἕτερος (heteros)

The word. Tauton and tauta are contracted forms meaning “the same thing” and “the same things.” Homoios means like or similar, and its adverb homoiōs can mean equally. Diapherein is to differ. Allos and heteros express otherness in different constructions. The argument repeatedly specifies what is the same, in what respect, for which people, and over which times; omitting those qualifications changes its claims.

In the work. The gold and stone comparison introduces sameness in a specified respect (313a–b). Stones may differ in weight or shape, but they do not differ insofar as each is stone. Socrates applies that form to law: each law is equally law, not one more than another. The premise establishes the intended level of definition. It does not yet say that every law commands the same behavior.

The companion’s objection concerns a different sameness. If law discovers what is, why do people not always use the same laws about the same things? (315a). His examples compare communities and periods. The recurring phrases “different people different ones” and “different ones at different times” distinguish social distribution from temporal change. The fact that every member of a class is a law does not by itself answer whether their contents conflict.

Socrates’ response initially appeals to invariant correct predication: just things are just, greater weights heavier, fine things fine. The next stage introduces knowing subjects, who accept the same things about the same

things (316d). Here the two accusative and prepositional expressions have different roles: the same accepted judgments concern the same subject matter. The qualification permits attention to the object known; it is not a claim that medicine, farming, and politics all have identical rules.

At 317b changing rules about the same matters becomes a mark of ignorance. The earlier draughts image suggests that apparent movement may obscure something stable, but does not specify all the conditions under which cases should count as the same. The later distributive examples introduce differentiated recipients: each soil receives the seeds due to it, bodies receive fitting nourishment. Uniform correctness need not mean giving every recipient an undifferentiated ration.

The dialogue's strongest formulation consequently joins stability with fit. A good distributor's practice is right in relation to its objects; genuine knowledge does not alternate arbitrarily on an unchanged matter. Yet the work does not articulate a developed theory of how context changes relevant conditions. Its final question about the soul prevents that absent theory from being assumed already complete.

The places.

- **313a.** διαφέρει νόμος νόμου κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο — Difference is restricted to a specified respect
- **313b.** νόμος γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστιν ὁμοίως — Each is equally law
- **313b.** οὐχ ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἧττον — Degrees of being law are excluded in the opening comparison

- **315a.** τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις χρώμεθα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν — The objection concerns the same laws about the same things
- **315b.** ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις; ἄλλοι ἄλλοις — Difference over times and among people
- **316d.** ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν νομίζουσιν — The later claim about knowledgeable judgment
- **317d.** τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ διανέμει — Right allocation distinguishes the needs of different soils

In this edition. “Same,” “different,” and “equally” are retained where they carry the argument. Tauta without an accent may resemble the transliteration of ταῦτα, “these things”; the Greek distinguishes ταὐτά, “the same things,” from ταῦτα. The draughts sentence brings both into close proximity.

See also. Law and the demand for a definition; Changing laws and the draughts image; Weight and the judgment of what is heavier; The due and fitting.

Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws

σκῆπτρον (skēptron); δικάζειν (dikazein); δικαστής (dikastēs); δικαστήριον (dikastērion); νομοφύλαξ (nomophylax); φυλάττειν (phylattein); γραμματεῖον (grammateion)

The word. A skēptron is a staff or scepter that marks authority. Dikazein is to judge or give judgment; a dikastēs is a judge and a dikastērion a court. Nomophylax combines law with guarding and means guardian of the laws. Phylattein is to guard, keep or watch over. Grammateion names a writing tablet; the tablets carried by Talos are described as bronze.

In the work. The golden scepter first appears in Socrates' report of the Nekyia, where Homer represents Minos judging (319d). It contributes to the positive portrayal of Minos and to his contrast with Rhadamanthys in that Homeric scene. The text does not quote a detailed set of judgments, identify the laws applied, or derive Minos' justice merely from possessing a costly object. The scepter belongs to the represented exercise of authority.

The Cretan account then distinguishes the originating kingly craft from judicial and custodial functions. Rhadamanthys presides in courts and guards the laws in the town; Talos makes a circuit of the villages and guards them there. The rules are not only held in the ruler's mind. They are written on tablets and carried into the territory where they operate. In the earlier craft analogy, writings express what experts know; here writing also permits the laws to be present in their guardian's rounds.

The bronze explanation is carefully material. Talos is called bronze because he carries laws inscribed on bronze tablets. The adjective attached to the tablets and the epithet attached to the man form the explanatory link. Reading the passage as though Socrates simply repeated the bronze-bodied guardian of another version would miss this transformation.

Hesiod's scepter receives a more explicit interpretation at 320d. Socrates says it means nothing other than Zeus' education, by which Minos guided Crete. The material emblem becomes the sign of an acquired capacity to direct. The verb euthynein, to guide or straighten, continues the association of rule with right direction. This is Socrates' explanation of the verse, not the literal replacement of the word scepter with "education" inside Hesiod's quotation.

These details qualify any reading in which the dialogue's definition of law as discovery renders enactment and administration irrelevant. Expertise remains the claimed source of good law, but the exemplar has courts, written rules and guardians. Their presence does not, however, settle the dialogue's remaining problem about the precise benefit distributed to souls.

The places.

- **319d.** δικάζοντα χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα — Minos is represented judging with a golden scepter
- **320c.** δικαστὴς ἀγαθὸς ἐλέχθη εἶναι — Rhadamanthys was called a good judge
- **320c.** νομοφύλακι γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐχρῆτο ὁ Μίνως — Minos uses Rhadamanthys as guardian of the laws
- **320c.** ἐν χαλκοῖς γραμματείοις ἔχων γεγραμμένους τοὺς νόμους — Talos carries laws written on bronze tablets
- **320c.** ὅθεν χαλκοῦς ἐκλήθη — The equipment explains the designation "bronze"
- **320d.** παιδείαν τὴν τοῦ Διός, ᾗ εὔθυνε τὴν Κρήτην — Socrates identifies the scepter's meaning with education that guided Crete

In this edition. The translation retains "scepter," the edition's American spelling, "guardian of the laws," and "bronze tablets." "Kingly craft" remains distinct from its service. The scepter's educational interpretation is kept in Socrates' prose after the verse.

See also. Rhadamanthys and Talos · Expert writings · Homer and Hesiod · Right law

Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending

αἰσχύνεσθαι (aischynesthai); αἰσχρός (aischros); ἡλικία (hēlikia); εἰδέναι (eidenai); σκέπτεσθαι (skeptesthai); φλαῦρος (phlauros)

The word. Aischynesthai is to be ashamed; aischros can mean ugly, disgraceful or shameful. Hēlikia is age or stage of life. Eidenai is to know, and skeptesthai to examine or look into something. Phlauros means poor, inferior or bad. “Ignorance” in the heading describes the phrase “not knowing”; the final passage does not need to contain a separate noun agnoia for the condition to be philosophically decisive.

In the work. The dialogue ends not with a recitation of the definition already reached but with a failure to answer the question that should make good lawgiving intelligible. What does the good lawgiver distribute to a soul to make it better? Socrates asks what response they could give without being ashamed for themselves and their age. The plural implicates both speakers. This is not simply a victorious examiner shaming an ignorant opponent (321d).

The companion’s reply is exact in its limit: “This I can no longer say.” The “no longer” marks the point where the preceding chain of affirmative answers stops supplying a ready continuation. It need not mean that he once possessed the answer and has forgotten it. Nor does it retract every earlier agreement or claim that no answer is possible. What the dramatic exchange establishes is that he cannot now state it.

Socrates’ final diagnosis includes himself. It is shameful for the soul of each that their souls appear not to know the things within them, where their own good and poor are

present, although they have investigated bodily and other matters. The sentence contrasts a neglected internal object with examined external objects. The reproach is epistemic and ethical together: what is closest to the standards of their own improvement has not received an adequate account.

The reference to age increases the demand for responsibility but supplies no exact age for the unnamed companion. The work never identifies him as a child, youth, mature official or elderly man. One should therefore avoid supplying a biography from the force of the rebuke. It is enough that the speakers treat their stage of life as making such ignorance embarrassing.

The closing movement is often described as aporetic, a useful interpretive label for the impasse. It is not necessary to invent an occurrence of aporia in the Greek. The impasse also should not erase the constructive work already done. The dialogue has rejected certain definitions, proposed discovery of what is, developed expertise and distribution, and offered an educational reading of Minos. What remains open is how those resources become a determinate account of the beneficial contents and practice of lawgiving for souls. The final shame gives that unresolved question urgency.

The places.

- **321d.** τί ἂν ἀποκρινάμενοι οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθεῖμεν — Socrates asks for an answer that would not leave them ashamed
- **321d.** καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας αὐτῶν — Both themselves and their age are at issue
- **321d.** Οὐκέτι τοῦτ’ ἔχω εἰπεῖν — The companion’s inability concerns this final demand

- **321d.** αἰσχρόν γε τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἑκατέρου — The shame belongs to each speaker's soul
- **321d.** τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐταῖς φαίνεσθαι μὴ εἰδυίας — The souls appear not to know the matters within them
- **321d.** τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐσκέφθαι — They have nevertheless investigated bodily and other matters

In this edition. "This I can no longer say" preserves the local object and the transition. "Our souls" makes the later plural construction intelligible; "the things within them" avoids the misleading technical phrase "things in themselves." "Poor" renders the printed φλαῦρον, which should not be silently regularized to the φαῦλος of 320b.

See also. The body and the soul · Knowledge · Common inquiry · Good and fine · Sophist and virtue

Sophist, virtue, and the content of good education

σοφιστής (sophistēs); παιδεύειν (paideuein); ἀρετή (aretē); ἀπαίδευτος (apaideutos); εὐδαιμονεῖν (eudaimonein)

The word. Sophistēs can name a master of wisdom or skill and, in the classical educational setting described by the supplied edition, a teacher of the sort commonly called a sophist. The term is not intrinsically a charge of dishonest reasoning. Aretē is excellence or virtue, the good quality toward which the education here aims. Apaideutos is uneducated or untrained. Eudaimonein means to be happy or prosper; it is a verb describing the claimed condition of Crete and Sparta, not an occurrence of a separately defined noun for happiness.

In the work. The assertion that Zeus is a sophist is Socrates' explanation of Homer, not a quoted phrase in the

epic line. He calls the corresponding craft exceptionally fine and takes Minos' repeated visits to Zeus as attendance for instruction (319c). The word sophistes thus performs positive work in the argument: the teacher's craft qualifies the lawgiver. Importing a generic Platonic condemnation of sophists would reverse the local evaluation.

This does not establish the institutional details of divine teaching. No fee, curriculum, advertised profession or class of students is mentioned. The comparison "as by a sophist" clarifies the educational relation without turning Zeus into a fully described contemporary paid teacher. The scope of Minos' instruction must likewise be taken from the argument about kingly craft, not filled in from the curricula of other dialogues.

The phrase "education towards virtue" at 320b gives the association an explicitly ethical end. It excludes the rival proposal that the relevant companionship consisted in wine and play. It also connects the individual's formation to the city's life: Minos enacts what he accepts as fine, and the laws are credited with enduring happiness. The dialogue does not define aretē independently, list its parts or explain the precise causal sequence by which each law develops it. The word names an end whose content still requires inquiry.

The hostile report that Minos was apaideutos therefore strikes at the central qualification just established. It is more than an insult to manners: it contradicts the portrayal of him as Zeus' educated associate and a teacher of Rhadamanthys. Socrates replies by explaining the production of that reputation, not by accepting the report and lowering the standard for lawgiving.

The closing admission prevents the education story from becoming a complete theory of civic formation. It remains

possible to praise a teacher and name virtue as an end while being unable to state what must be distributed to the soul. The work places those levels of understanding next to one another rather than identifying them.

The places.

- **319c.** ὁ Ζεὺς σοφιστής ἐστιν — The positive predication occurs in Socrates' interpretive prose
- **319c.** ἡ τέχνη αὕτη παγκάλη ἐστί — He commends the relevant craft as very fine
- **319c.** ὡς ὑπὸ σοφιστοῦ ὄντος τοῦ Διός — Minos attends Zeus as an educator
- **320b.** ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ εἰς ἀρετήν — Virtue is the stated direction of the education
- **320b.** ἥ τε Κρήτη τὸν πάντα χρόνον εὐδαιμονεῖ — Socrates claims enduring happiness for Crete
- **320e.** ὡς ἀπαιδεύτου τινὸς καὶ χαλεποῦ ὄντος — The companion asks why a contrary report of Minos has spread

In this edition. "Sophist," "education," "educate," "uneducated," "virtue," and "happy" retain the local word choices. They should not be silently replaced by "deceiver," "civilized," a complete doctrine of excellence, or an economic measurement of prosperity.

See also. Education and association · Craft analogy · Reputation and poets · Shame and ignorance

Sparta Crete and Lycurgus

Λακεδαιμόνιος (Lakedaimonios); Λακεδαίμων (Lakedaimōn); Λυκοῦργος (Lykourgos); Κρήτη (Krētē); Κρής (Krēs)

The word. Lakedaimonios is a Lacedaemonian or Spartan; Lakedaimōn names Lacedaemon. Lykourgos is Lycurgus, the Spartan lawgiver named by the companion. Krētē is Crete, and Krēs, plural Krētes, a Cretan. The dialogue's geographical language is concrete: particular communities use laws, learn practices from one another, and are said to benefit from them.

In the work. The companion first answers the question about the oldest Greek laws by proposing the Lacedaemonians and Lycurgus (318c). Socrates does not deny that Lycurgus is a lawgiver. He challenges the claim of greatest antiquity, giving the deliberately loose estimate "not yet three hundred years, perhaps, or a little more." The language is unsuitable as a precise date for either the dialogue's composition or its dramatic setting.

Socrates then changes the question from age alone to origin: where did the best Spartan usages come from? The companion answers, by report, from Crete (318c–d). The result establishes the route to Minos and Rhadamanthys. The best Spartan laws are presented as derivative; Crete provides the older source to be examined.

The relation returns in the interpretation of Minos' association with Zeus (320a–b). Cretans, followed by Lacedaemonians who learned from them, are described as abstaining from drinking parties and the wine-related play in question. Minos' specific law forbids drinking together to the point of drunkenness. Socrates uses this practice to reject the interpretation of Zeus' confidant as a drinking-

companion, and then says that Crete and Lacedaemon have prospered through the divine laws. The relation between the communities thus serves both the narrative of legal transmission and an argument about the lawgiver's character.

The source of a custom and its correctness remain different questions. The earlier craft argument rejected ethnic boundaries as the basis of knowledge, while this passage names a particular line of transmission. Nothing requires the reader to turn Cretan origin by itself into proof of truth. Socrates' fuller case adds the claimed education of Minos and the persistence of his laws.

The places.

- **318c.** Λακεδαιμονίους λέγεις καὶ Λυκοῦργον τὸν νομοθέτην — The companion proposes a people and their named lawgiver
- **318c.** οὐδέπω ἴσως ἔτη τριακόσια ἢ ὀλίγῳ τούτων πλείω — The estimate remains explicitly approximate
- **318c–d.** τούτων τῶν νομίμων τὰ βέλτιστα πόθεν ἥκει — The inquiry shifts to the origin of the best usages
- **318d.** Φασί γε ἐκ Κρήτης — Cretan origin is given as what people say
- **320a.** Λακεδαιμόνιοι δεύτεροι, μαθόντες παρὰ Κρητῶν — Sparta follows Crete by learning the relevant practice
- **320b.** ἥ τε Κρήτη τὸν πάντα χρόνον εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ Λακεδαίμων — Socrates attributes the communities' happiness to the laws

In this edition. The translation retains "Lacedaemonians" in the spoken text and identifies Sparta in explanatory material. Its note points to Herodotus 1.65 and Aristotle,

Politics 2.10, 1271b for the tradition of Cretan legal origins, and to Plutarch, Lycurgus 1 for the disputed chronology. These are the edition's background references, not independent dates established by this lexicon.

See also. Oldest laws and their persistence · Kings and statesmen · Knowledge and knowing how · Custom and variation · Drinking and consistency

Speech, perception, and their objects

λόγος (logos); τὰ λεγόμενα (ta legomena); ὄψις (opsis); τὰ ὁρώμενα (ta horōmena); ἀκοή (akoē); τὰ ἀκουόμενα (ta akouomena); αἴσθησις (aisthēsis)

The word. Logos here is speech, contrasted with the things spoken. Opsis is sight, and akoē hearing; their passive participles identify things seen and heard. Aisthēsis is perception. These nouns and participles let Socrates distinguish an activity or capacity from its objects or contents. Logos has other uses later, including argument, extended speech, and the words exchanged in education; this opening use should not be replaced by a generic translation such as "Reason."

In the work. The companion's first definition makes law "what is accepted." Socrates asks whether speech is the things spoken, sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard (313b–c). Once the companion distinguishes each pair, he distinguishes law from accepted things too. The pattern is grammatically clear and rhetorically forceful. Its philosophical leverage depends on accepting the analogy between law and the capacities in the examples.

Socrates then asks what the relevant capacity is. Sight is perception that reveals through the eyes; hearing perception that reveals sounds through the ears. The repeated instrumental construction, "by sight," "by

hearing," "by law," invites an account of that through which the objects become manifest or accepted. It is not merely a request to rename a heap of cases.

The move is not an account of sense organs in physiological detail. Nor does the source assert that all laws are literally sensations or that lawmaking occurs in a special sensory faculty. Perception is one candidate model, joined by revealing and finding. Medicine and prophecy then introduce crafts whose objects are known or discovered through an expertise. The argument passes from the structure of a relation to possible accounts of its explanatory term.

The speech example is less straightforward than the sensory pair: speech and things spoken can overlap in ordinary usage in ways sight and visible objects do not. The dialogue does not pause over that complication. Its purpose is to make the companion withdraw his first equation and ask what law itself is. A careful commentary can register the analogy's demand without pretending that grammatical similarity proves all the relations identical.

Logos continues to matter. The companion's long speech presents evidence for variation; Socrates' argument later rehabilitates Minos; Minos' association with Zeus is construed as an association "in words." The word that first illustrates the difference between activity and content becomes a medium through which judgments are examined and education is claimed. The closing inability to give an answer exposes the limit of merely possessing a persuasive account.

The places.

- **313b.** λόγος σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα — The first analogy asks whether speech is its spoken contents

- **313b.** ὄψις τὰ ὁρώμενα, ἢ ἀκοὴ τὰ ἀκουόμενα — Sight and hearing with their objects
- **313c.** ἄλλο δὴ νόμος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ νομιζόμενα — The distinction is transferred to law
- **313c–314a.** ὄψει φατὲ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι — The instrumental pattern: visible things are seen by sight
- **314a.** διὰ τῶν ὤτων δηλούσῃ ἡμῖν τὰς φωνάς — Hearing reveals sounds through the ears
- **319c.** συγγίγνεσθαι ἐνάτῳ ἔτει τῷ Διὶ ἐν λόγοις — The later educational use of words

In this edition. “Speech,” “sight,” “hearing,” and “perception” preserve the different terms. The heard objects become “sounds” in the definition of hearing. At 314a the Greek is τὰ πράγματα, “things,” for sight’s objects; the alternative “colors” belongs to the apparatus and is not silently adopted.

See also. Accepting, custom, and what is accepted; Revealing, finding, and discovery; Common inquiry and the long speech; Association and education.

Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance

τραγῳδία (tragōidia); τραγῳδοποιός (tragōidopoios); μῦθος (mythos); δημοτερπής (dēmoterpēs); ψυχαγωγικός (psychagōgikos); ἐντείνειν (enteinein); τιμωρεῖσθαι (timōreisthai); δασμός (dasmos)

The word. Tragōidia is tragedy, and tragōidopoios a maker of tragedy. Mythos is a tale or story; the word here identifies the tradition behind a judgment rather than serving as a universal opposite to reason. Dēmoterpēs means pleasing to the people; psychagōgikos means

capable of leading or moving souls. Enteinein is to stretch or strain; timōreisthai in the middle is to exact vengeance or requital. Dasmos is an imposed tribute or levy.

In the work. The description of Minos as savage and unjust is first called an Attic and tragic tale (318d). Socrates eventually explains the Athenian perspective through the city's grievance. Minos compelled the Athenians to pay tribute; Athenians respond by subjecting him to tragic representation. The first-person plural "we" makes Socrates include his own city in the charge rather than blaming some distant people whose practices are easy to dismiss.

The passage names tragedy as both exceptionally pleasing to the people and exceptionally capable of leading souls (321a). Popular appeal and influence over the soul explain its effectiveness in producing reputation. Psychagōgikos here therefore must not automatically be translated as morally improving or philosophically educational. A medium can move souls while participating in revenge. The vocabulary also creates a pointed proximity to the final problem: the dialogue can identify a force acting strongly upon souls before it can state what the good lawgiver should distribute to make them better.

Socrates says tragedy is a very ancient Athenian finding, not an invention beginning with Thespis or Phrynichus. This is the speech's claim, whose function is to make the revenge old enough to accompany the Minos story. The supplied note records the tradition crediting Thespis as the first tragic poet and naming Phrynichus among his early successors. A lexicon should preserve the tension rather than present Socrates' assertion as an independently established chronology of theater. He offers no surviving play or date to demonstrate it.

The metaphor of stretching Minos out is deliberately strong. The edition notes the verb's use elsewhere for putting a story into verse and reports "attack" as a lexical interpretation here; it labels a play on the verse sense as possible. The words can thus be explained without deciding that a single pun or stage action is certainly intended. In any case, the expressed aim is requital for the tribute.

The tribute's contents remain unspecified in the spoken text. The edition supplies the wider Minotaur tradition in its note, but the present phrase merely says "that tribute." Reading young victims, the labyrinth or Theseus directly into the lexical definition would turn contextual information into nonexistent dialogue.

The places.

- **318d.** Ἀττικόν, ὦ βέλτιστε, λέγεις μῦθον καὶ τραγικόν — The source of the hostile portrait is characterized as Attic and tragic
- **321a.** οὐχ ὡς οἴονται ἀπὸ Θέσπιδος ἀρξαμένη οὐδ' ἀπὸ Φρυνίχου — Socrates rejects the commonly assumed starting points
- **321a.** τῆς πόλεως εὕρημα — Tragedy is called the city's finding or invention
- **321a.** δημοτερπέστατόν τε καὶ ψυχαγωγικώτατον — Its popular appeal and soul-leading capacity receive superlatives
- **321a.** ἐντείνοντες ἡμεῖς τὸν Μίνων τιμωρούμεθα — The Athenian "we" names the vengeful representation
- **321a.** ἠνάγκασε τοὺς δασμοὺς τελεῖν ἐκείνους — Minos' compulsory tribute is the stated grievance

In this edition. “The most able to lead souls” keeps the force of psychagōgikos visible without endorsing the resulting direction. “Stretch out” preserves the image and leaves its more specific interpretation to the note. Heurēma, “finding,” is an achieved invention here, distinct from heuresis as the activity or result of finding in the earlier definition of law.

See also. Reputation and poets · Homer and Hesiod · The body and the soul · Revealing and finding

Trainers herds and the care of bodies

παιδοτρίβης (paidotribēs); τροφή (trophē); σῶμα (sōma); ἀγέλη (agelē); ἀνθρώπειος (anthrōpeios); ποιμήν (poimēn); βουκόλος (boukolos); πρόβατον (probaton); βοῦς (bous)

The word. Paidotribēs is a physical trainer. Trophē is food or nourishment, and sōma the body. Agelē is a herd; anthrōpeios means human. Poimēn is a shepherd, boukolos an oxherd, probaton here a sheep, and bous an ox or bovine animal. The passage deliberately brings human bodily training and animal tending together through the shared language of distribution and pastoral care.

In the work. Socrates asks who is best at distributing food to human bodies, and the companion answers “a trainer” (317e–318a). Before the name is supplied, Socrates has established the criterion: the best distributor gives the food due to the recipient, and his distributions and laws are best. The name identifies the practitioner of the activity already described.

The next phrase is striking: this person is best at tending “the human herd in its body.” The bodily limitation matters. It is not yet a statement that the trainer rules the entire person or supplies the best laws for souls. Sheep and

oxen follow, each with the appropriate herdsman. Only then does Socrates ask whose laws are best for the souls of human beings and press for the answer “the king’s” (318a).

The analogy is organized by beneficiaries as well as by rulers. The shepherd’s laws are best “for the sheep,” and the oxherd’s “for the oxen.” Read within the preceding appeal to right and good law, the example presents rule as competent care for those governed. Yet the text does not separately investigate the possible conflict between a herder’s purposes and an animal’s interests. Nor does the image establish that citizens lack reason or that political coercion is justified. Those would be further arguments.

The trainer’s case remains available at the end because its provisions can be specified. Food makes the body grow; labors exercise and strengthen it (321c). The corresponding provisions for the soul cannot be given. Bodily expertise thus supplies both the route toward the political analogy and the contrast that exposes the speakers’ unfinished knowledge.

The places.

- **317e.** τροφὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σώματα διανεῖμαι — The trainer is introduced through allocation of food to bodies
- **317e–318a.** Παιδοτρίβης — The companion names the relevant practitioner
- **318a.** τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀγέλην τοῦ σώματος νέμειν — Human herding is expressly qualified by the body
- **318a.** Οἱ τοῦ ποιμένος ἄρα νόμοι ἄριστοι τοῖς προβάτοις — The sheep are named as beneficiaries of the shepherd’s laws

- **318a.** Οἱ δὲ τοῦ βουκόλου τοῖς βουσί — The oxherd's competence has its own recipients
- **318a.** ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων — The question then moves to the souls of men
- **321c.** τροφήν τε καὶ πόνους — The ending can name the body's provisions

In this edition. Paidotribēs is "trainer." The translation keeps the unusual "human herd in its body" instead of silently rewriting it as a conventional phrase about physical education. Burnet prints σώματος at 318a; the apparatus records a correction in A, but that does not authorize replacing the printed construction with a different Greek text. "Tend" supplies the pastoral sense of nemein.

See also. Distribution and tending · What is due · Kings and statesmen · Medicine and health · Body and soul

True opinion and the unproved bridge

ἀληθής (alēthēs); ἀληθὴς δόξα (alēthēs doxa); ἀλήθεια (alētheia); χρηστὴ δόξα (chrēstē doxa)

The word. Alēthēs is true, and alētheia truth. Doxa is opinion; a true opinion is an opinion that is true, while chrēstē doxa calls an opinion decent or good. The expressions are first distinguished verbally and then equated by the speakers. Their equivalence in the argument is not a dictionary identity that can be assumed before the questions are asked.

In the work. At 314e Socrates has ruled out base resolutions because law has been admitted to be fine and good. He nevertheless says that law appears to him to be some kind of opinion. He concludes conditionally that if law is opinion, it is the decent kind. The companion

assents. Socrates then asks what decent opinion is: is it not the true kind? The companion again assents. A further question identifies true opinion as discovery of what is, and the discovery formula for law follows.

These steps must be separated. The argument that a base resolution is not law does not prove that law is opinion. Nor does the exclusion of base opinion, without additional assumptions, establish the precise relation between an opinion's truth and its beneficial civic function. The companion's affirmative answers supply the bridge. The dialogue makes the agreement visible; a lexicon should make its argumentative cost visible too.

The discovery formula does not immediately identify law with expert knowledge. The first noun is doxa, and its truth is what matters in this stretch. Later the crafts introduce epistēmones and those who know how, people whose agreement is attributed to knowledge (316c–317d). The text does not provide a separate account of how true opinion becomes knowledge, or a formal distinction between a correct guess and an understanding of reasons. Importing such an account from another dialogue would go beyond this work's expressed argument.

Truth returns in the historical application. Minos is said to have discovered the truth concerning civic administration, and the persistence of his laws is used as evidence. The companion calls the explanation reasonable, and Socrates asks what follows if he is speaking truly (321b). That condition matters: plausibility of an account and truth of its premises remain distinguishable even in the passage praising a model lawgiver.

The ending presents no contradiction in calling law true-directed while admitting ignorance about the soul. It shows that the accepted formula is not yet the sought

content. One can agree that genuine law should be a true discovery and still be unable to say what the lawgiver distributes to make the soul better.

The places.

- **314e.** εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί — The conditional status of law as opinion
- **314e.** Δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν; οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής; — The bridge from decent to true opinion is put as a question
- **315a.** ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις — True opinion is identified with discovery of what is
- **317b.** Ἀληθῆ λέγεις — The companion's ordinary response, "What you say is true"
- **321b.** τοῦ ὄντος περὶ πόλεως οἰκήσεως ἐξευρόντος εὖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν — Truth in the claim about Minos' civic achievement
- **321b.** εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω — Socrates' explicit condition on the closing inference about old laws

In this edition. The transition from "decent" to "true" stays visible rather than being smoothed into two occurrences of "correct." The source's introduction itself identifies this as an exposed step and notes the continuing condition "if law is opinion." The article explains that vulnerability without deciding that the whole argument is either conclusive or worthless.

See also. Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion; Decent and base; What is and the things that are; Knowledge and those who know.

Variation of customs and the companion's objection

ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις (allote allois); ἄλλοι ἄλλοις (alloi allois); βάρβαροι (barbaroi); Ἕλληνες (Hellēnes); ἀπόδειξις (apodeixis)

The word. "Different ones at different times" and "different people different ones" express temporal and social variation. Barbaroi are non-Greek peoples in the Greek speakers' terminology, contrasted with Hellēnes, Greeks. Apodeixis is a showing or proof. The companion calls his examples abundant material for proof; the word's presence does not mean the text has supplied a modern historical survey.

In the work. The objection begins from a consequence of Socrates' formula, not from an isolated attachment to conventionalism. If law discovers what is, and the things that are have been discovered, why do people not use the same laws about the same things? (315a). The companion is pressing the relation between successful discovery and stable practice. Socrates replies that law's aim remains stable while people can fail to discover it.

The companion then develops his case in a carefully narrowing sequence. Carthaginian human sacrifice differs from Athenian practice; Greek sacrifices in Lycaea and among Athamas' descendants show that difference crosses more than the Greek/non-Greek boundary; earlier Athenian funeral customs differ from the present practices of the same people. The argument has spatial, cultural, and temporal dimensions. Each stage makes the phenomenon harder to explain away as merely somebody else's strangeness.

He describes these as laws and accepted customs in the ordinary sense in which a community recognizes and follows them. Socrates increasingly reserves genuine law for what is right. The debate is thus partly about the extension of the word nomos: should every recognized practice count, or only successful apprehensions of what is? Calling the companion a moral relativist without qualification would obscure this narrower and stronger contribution. He establishes or assumes diversity; he does not explicitly prove that there can be no objective answer about the practices.

Socrates responds in two stages. First he seeks common judgments about just, heavy, and fine things, moving from disputed cases to formulations the companion will accept. The companion remains unpersuaded. The crafts then provide a restricted class of authoritative judges: those who know. Their agreement is said to extend across Greeks and barbarians and across time (316d). The second response no longer depends simply on everybody's actual opinions coinciding.

Neither response supplies a direct judgment on the sacrifices or domestic burials. The historical examples disappear from the discussion except for the renewed place names in the weight questions. This is a genuine feature of the work: the later normative distinction may be read as answering why different practices need not all be true laws, while leaving the companion's concrete cases unresolved.

The places.

- **315a.** εἰ τὰ ὄντα γε ἡμῖν ἐξηύρηται — The objection assumes successful discovery and tests its consequences

- **315b.** εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ νόμοις χρώμεθα ἢ ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις — Socrates explicitly frames temporal variation
- **315b.** καὶ εἰ ἅπαντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἢ ἄλλοι ἄλλοις — He also frames difference among people
- **315c.** βάρβαροι ἄνθρωποι; Ἕλληνες ὄντες — The companion refuses to confine the examples to non-Greeks
- **315d.** πολλὴ γὰρ εὐρυχωρία τῆς ἀποδείξεως — His claim of abundant room for proof
- **315d.** οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομίζομεν οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἄνθρωποι — The combined temporal and interpersonal conclusion
- **316d.** καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους — The later knowledge-based agreement crosses the same cultural division

In this edition. “Barbarian” carries the ancient Greek classification, not an editorial judgment that the people are uncivilized. The edition reports ancient parallels in its notes while preserving the dialogue’s attribution of the examples to the companion. Its introduction explicitly asks whether Socrates answers those cases or sets them aside.

See also. Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities; Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings; Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent; Expert writings.

Weight and the judgment of what is heavier

ἕλκειν (helkein); βαρύτερος (baryteros); κουφότερος (kouphoteros); πλεῖον (pleion); ἔλαττον (elatton)

The word. Helkein ordinarily means to draw or pull; in the weighing expression here, things "draw more," that is, weigh more. Baryteros is heavier, kouphoteros lighter. Pleion and elatton specify more and less. These comparative words provide an apparently uncontroversial case of a property correctly predicated of its objects.

In the work. The weight example occurs between questions about justice and a statement about the fine and shameful (316a–b). Socrates asks whether things weighing more are accepted as heavier and those weighing less as lighter, or the opposite. The companion rejects the opposite. Socrates then asks whether this also holds in Carthage and Lycaea, the very places just named for their unsettling sacrificial customs.

The geographical repetition has argumentative purpose. Ritual differences do not put those communities outside all common judgment. The same comparative standard can apply there and here. The example gives nomizein a clearly cognitive use: accepting a relation of weight as what it is, not enacting a local ordinance that makes one object heavier.

The inference to justice requires care. If "things weighing more" already specifies the same feature as "heavier," the question receives an easy answer by correctly understanding the expressions. It does not show that all observers invariably estimate every object's weight accurately. Likewise, agreeing that just things are just does not establish that every community correctly identifies

every concrete just act. Socrates' generalization to what is depends on distinguishing correct acceptance from mistaken acceptance, the latter appearing immediately as "missing" what is.

The passage is therefore stronger as an illustration of a common standard of correctness than as an empirical survey proving universal agreement. That interpretation fits the next stage, in which Socrates limits the authoritative agreement to those who know. It also preserves the companion's continued dissatisfaction: his objection concerned contested practices, and the weight question has not adjudicated any of them.

The example does not introduce a complete doctrine of moral measurement. No units, scales, or quantitative calculus of justice appear. Its local achievement is to make invariant correct judgment familiar before Socrates applies that structure more widely.

The places.

- **316a.** τὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα νομίζεται — Things weighing more are accepted as heavier
- **316a.** τὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα — Those weighing less as lighter
- **316a.** ἢ τοὐναντίον — The opposite predication is explicitly offered and rejected
- **316a.** καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι καὶ ἐν Λυκαίᾳ — The return of the companion's sacrificial locations
- **316a–b.** πανταχοῦ νομίζεται καλὰ — The ensuing extension to fine things everywhere

In this edition. "Weigh more" is the contextual sense of the participle, not a generic action of dragging. Burnet prints πλεῖον, while the apparatus reports πλείονα in F. The comparative relation, rather than an alleged

distinction between those variants' physical theories, is what the dialogue uses.

See also. Sameness, difference, and the same subject; Accepting, custom, and what is accepted; What is and the things that are; Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities.

What is and the things that are

τὸ ὄν (to on); τὰ ὄντα (ta onta); τὰ μὴ ὄντα (ta mē onta); εἶναι (einai)

The word. To on is the neuter participle of "be" with the article: what is, what exists, or what is the case. Ta onta is the plural, the things that are; ta mē onta its negative. The construction can bear substantial philosophical weight, but it does not by itself designate a separate realm of Forms. Its precise object in this dialogue is clarified by the examples and the claims made about law.

In the work. At 315a Socrates calls true opinion the discovery of what is and law something that wishes to be that discovery. The companion immediately pluralizes the expression: if "the things that are" have been discovered, why do the laws vary? Socrates' reply returns to the singular: what law wishes is what is, but people may fail to discover it. The stable object and variable human attainment are distinguished.

At 316b Socrates generalizes from judgments about justice, weight, and the fine: the things that are are accepted as being, not the things that are not. The next sentence introduces error: someone who misses what is misses the lawful. Read together, these sentences cannot sensibly mean that no human being ever has a false belief. Rather, the discussion treats acceptance insofar as it correctly grasps its object, and then names a failure to achieve that

correctness. How far the universal language proves rather than assumes the relevant common standard remains a question.

The examples keep the phrase connected to what is true of a subject. Things that weigh more really are heavier; just things are to be called just. A “discovery of what exists” read only as the inventory of physical objects would not capture the prescriptive and evaluative work the phrase is doing. Conversely, a complete metaphysics of immutable moral entities is not set out. The dialogue proceeds through analogies and criteria of right judgment rather than defining being in general.

The craft argument gives the object a practical setting: what a knowledgeable doctor, gardener, cook, or statesman gets right about the matters of that craft. At 321b the truth of what is is specifically connected with administration of a city. The lawgiver’s discovery is therefore not detached contemplation in the argument’s own presentation. It should result in right distributions and benefit to human souls.

The last question marks the remaining gap. Socrates and the companion cannot specify what is distributed to the soul to make it better. Knowing that genuine law must answer to what is does not yet mean that they have discovered what is in the relevant case. The phrase supplies the claimed standard and goal; it does not substitute for the inquiry the goal requires.

The places.

- **315a.** τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις — What is as the object of true opinion’s discovery
- **315a.** τὰ ὄντα γε ἡμῖν ἐξηύρηται — The companion’s challenge supposes the things that are already discovered

- **315b.** ὃ βούλεται ὁ νόμος, τὸ ὄν — What is as the object law wishes
- **316b.** τὰ ὄντα νομίζεται εἶναι, οὐ τὰ μὴ ὄντα — The universal formula of correct acceptance
- **316b.** τοῦ ὄντος ἁμαρτάνῃ — The possibility of missing the object
- **317d.** τοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν — The phrase in the restated account of law
- **321b.** τοῦ ὄντος περὶ πόλεως οἰκήσεως — The object is related specifically to civic administration

In this edition. “What is” and “the things that are” keep the participial construction visible. The translation does not replace it everywhere with “reality,” “facts,” or “Being,” each of which would settle a range of interpretation too early. This article likewise uses those broader English descriptions only to explain the local alternatives, not as additional Greek attestations.

See also. True opinion and the unproved bridge; Revealing, finding, and discovery; Law’s wishing and human achievement; Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness.

What is due and fitting to a recipient

ἄξιος (axios); ἕκαστος (hekastos)

The word. Axios means worthy, deserving, of corresponding value, or appropriate. Its neuter plural axia can mean the things due or fitting; the precise force depends on what is allocated and to whom. Hekastos means each. Together the words sharpen the distribution examples: competent allocation is not indiscriminate giving, but assigning the relevant things to each recipient.

In the work. The farmer distributes “the seeds that are due to each soil” (317d). The phrase is relational. Neither the soil nor the seed has to be imagined as a claimant to a moral right. The agricultural point is that the seed is appropriate to this soil. The same expression then governs the musician’s allocation of strokes to tunes, and the feminine singular refers back to the food appropriate to human bodies (317d–e).

These examples give the idea of good distribution a criterion beyond the act of dividing something up. One can distribute badly. The distributor’s knowledge must govern the fit among what is given, its recipient, and the activity’s good. This is why Socrates moves directly from the appropriate assignment to the rightness or excellence of the resulting laws and distributions.

The examples also place a useful limit on the earlier language of sameness. An expert can accept the same truth about how to cultivate while distributing different seeds to different soils. The dialogue does not explicitly formulate a theory of context-sensitive political rules from this fact, but the reader should not flatten its model into identical treatment of unlike cases. Its demand is for consistent knowledge of the same matters, not for one undifferentiated provision to every recipient.

When the sequence reaches souls, the corresponding appropriate object remains unnamed. Calling the king the best distributor does not yet answer what each soul needs. The final question draws out that gap rather than filling it with an abstract word such as “justice” or “virtue.” Such terms matter elsewhere, but they are not the answer spoken at 321d.

The places.

- **317d.** τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ — Worth or appropriateness is determined in relation to each soil
- **317d.** καὶ τὰ ἄξια νεῖμαι — The musical distributor must allot what is due
- **317e.** οὐχ ὅσπερ τὴν ἀξίαν — The feminine adjective supplies “the due food” from the preceding τροφήν
- **317e.** Αἱ τούτου ἄρα διανομαὶ καὶ οἱ νόμοι βέλτιστοι — The excellence of distribution follows the appropriate assignment

In this edition. “Due” is maintained across seed, music, and food examples. The reader should hear the common relation without assuming that it denotes monetary value, a legal entitlement, or moral desert in every case. In the food question the Greek leaves the noun understood; the English likewise lets “what is due” pick it up from the preceding clause.

See also. Distribution and tending · Sameness and difference · Farming and gardens · Right and apparent law

Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships

Ζεύς (Zeus); Εὐρώπη (Eurōpē); παῖς (pais); υἱός (huios); ἥρως (hērōs); φίλιος (philios)

The word. Zeus has a strongly varying inflection: Ζεύς, Διός and Διί are forms of the same name; Ζηνός appears in Hesiod’s quoted verse. Pais can mean a child or a son or daughter in relation to a parent, not necessarily a person who is still young. The form ὑόν at 319b belongs to the son-word conventionally cited as huios. Hērōs is a hero; philios

means friendly or belonging to friendship and functions as an epithet of Zeus in the closing oath.

In the work. Socrates introduces Minos and Rhadamanthys as the sons of Zeus and Europa (318d). This ancestry makes the later warning against careless censure especially pointed. The companion, “a human being, the son of a human being,” is being warned against verbal offence toward a hero who is Zeus’ son (319b). Yet descent alone does not account for the extraordinary praise. Socrates emphasizes that Minos, among Zeus’ heroic sons, uniquely received Zeus’ education as Homer is here interpreted. The distinction is between being born from a divine father and being taught by him.

Zeus consequently occupies several related roles: ancestor, teacher, source of the royal scepter’s authority, and the god against whom speech and conduct must not err. Socrates’ general claim that the good human being resembles the god gives an ethical dimension to divine standing (319a). This is more than a catalogue of supernatural pedigrees: the warning requires discrimination between good and base persons, and the interpretation of poetry makes education decisive. Conversely, the argument does not derive the truth of every inherited story merely from divine ancestry.

Europa is named only in the identification of the brothers. The dialogue gives no account of her arrival in Crete, abduction or relation to the wider Talos myth. The edition’s note explains that Homer calls the mother a daughter of Phoenix without naming Europa; Socrates’ wording therefore should not be represented as a verbatim Homeric genealogy.

At 321c Socrates invokes Zeus Philios, Zeus of Friendship, as he restarts the examination with a hypothetical

question about the body. The oath is not an additional proof of Minos' legislation, nor does it introduce a fresh divine revelation. It marks the direct relation between the two present speakers after the long discussion of divine and heroic association. The work ends with their own intellectual responsibility, not with Zeus supplying their missing answer.

The places.

- **318d.** οἱ Διὸς καὶ Εὐρώπης παῖδες — The brothers' parentage in Socrates' identification
- **319b.** εἰς ἥρω Διὸς ὑὸν λόγῳ ἐξαμαρτάνῃς — The danger is a verbal offence toward Zeus' heroic son
- **319c.** ὁ Ζεὺς σοφιστής ἐστιν — Socrates calls Zeus a sophist in his educational interpretation
- **320d.** Ζηνὸς ἔχων σκῆπτρον — The quoted epic name is another form of Zeus
- **321c.** πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου — The closing inquiry begins with Zeus of Friendship

In this edition. "Sons" identifies the filial relation without inferring childhood. "Zeus of Friendship" explains the epithet rather than leaving it as a second personal name. The notes identify external parallels while keeping Europa's naming distinct from Homer's wording.

See also. Praise and piety · Sophist and virtue · Scepters and guardians · The body and the soul

Defined vocabulary register

Each entry gives a context-sensitive definition, an actual form printed in the dialogue, and its Stephanus location. Dictionary forms and observed forms are deliberately distinct. Multiple inflections or uses can belong to one headword. Persons and places are included where they do work in the conversation; ordinary vocabulary is defined where its local sense matters. The register is a reading lexicon, not an unfiltered token concordance.

A good ἀγαθός

ἀγαθός (agathos)

A good. The character under which Socrates says law must be sought, rather than a report that every enactment is beneficial. Attested: ἀγαθὸν (314d). Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60).

Ablest κράτιστος

κράτιστος (kratistos)

Ablest. Most capable at the specified tending of a herd. The superlative evaluates practical competence rather than brute political dominance. Attested: κράτιστος (318a). Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131).

Abstain ἀπέχεσθαι

ἀπέχεσθαι (apechesthai)

Abstain. To keep away from or abstain, with a genitive; used in Socrates' broad claim about Cretan and Spartan drinking customs. Attested: ἀπέχονται (320a). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

Accept in common συννομίζειν

συννομίζειν (synnomizein)

Accept in common. To share an acceptance or judgment. The compound describes agreement among genuine knowers across Greek and non-Greek communities. Attested: συννομίζειν (316d). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Administration οἴκησις

οἴκησις (oikēsis)

Administration. Civic administration in the claim that Minos discovered its truth. The edition does not render the word here as a physical dwelling. Attested: οἰκήσεως (321b). Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109).

Age ἡλικία

ἡλικία (hēlikia)

Age. Age or stage of life; increases the speakers' responsibility without identifying the unnamed companion's exact age. Attested: ἡλικίας (321d). Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending (p. 119).

Akin ἀδελφός

ἀδελφός (adelphos)

Akin. Literally sibling-related, here figuratively kindred or corresponding: Hesiod says things akin to the preceding account of Minos. Attested: ἀδελφὰ (320c). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Always ἀεί

ἀεί (aei)

Always. The temporal invariance challenged by the companion and later attributed to knowledgeable

judgment. Attested: ἀεὶ (315a). Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114).

Am willing ἐθέλειν

ἐθέλειν (ethelein)

Am willing. The companion volunteers to answer, choosing the respondent's role. Attested: ἐθέλω (315e). Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74).

Ample room εὐρυχωρία

εὐρυχωρία (eurychōria)

Ample room. The abundance of material the companion claims for proving variation of customs. Attested: εὐρυχωρία (315d). Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

Appeared φαίνεσθαι

φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

Appeared. The companion reports that law and accepted things now appear different after the analogy. Attested: ἐφάνη (313c). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18).

Appear. The companion acknowledges how things appear in Socrates' formulation while withholding full persuasion. Attested: φαίνεται (316b). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18).

Appears καταφαίνεσθαι

καταφαίνεσθαι (kataphainesthai)

Appears. Socrates' own qualified acceptance that law is some kind of opinion. Attested: καταφαίνεται (314e). True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133).

Are present within ἔνειναι

ἔνειναι (eneinai)

Are present within. To be in or present within something; good and poor are located within the souls whose self-directed knowledge is lacking. Attested: ἔνεστι (321d). Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23).

Are temperate σωφρονεῖν

σωφρονεῖν (sōphronein)

Are temperate. To be sound-minded or temperate; the condition introduces Socrates' practical warning to avoid a poet's hatred. Attested: σωφρονῇς (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Arrangement διακόσμησις

διακόσμησις (diakosmēsis)

Arrangement. Orderly disposition or arrangement of the city, joined to the question how a city ought to be administered. Attested: διακοσμήσεώς (317c). Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109).

As a whole τὸ πᾶν

τὸ πᾶν (to pan)

As a whole. The scope of the definition requested for law, as opposed to a particular law. Attested: τὸ πᾶν (313b). Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72).

Ask ἐρωτᾶν

ἐρωτᾶν (erōtan)

Ask. The companion asks which of the laws Socrates means; the ensuing correction concerns the question's scope. Attested: ἐρωτᾷς (313a). Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72).

Athamas Ἀθάμας

Ἀθάμας (Athamas)

Athamas. The ancestor whose descendants supply a second Greek sacrificial example. Attested: Ἀθάμαντος (315c). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Attic Ἀττικός

Ἀττικός (Attikos)

Attic. Belonging to Attica or Athens; qualifies the tale that produces the companion's adverse image of Minos. Attested: Ἀττικόν (318d). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Base πονηρός

πονηρός (ponēros)

Base. The defective class of resolutions that the favorable account of law must exclude. Attested: πονηρά (314e). Decent and base (p. 38).

Be able δύνασθαι

δύνασθαι (dynasthai)

Be able. Human capacity to discover is separated from law's stable wish. Attested: δύνανται (315b). Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74).

Be about to μέλλειν

μέλλειν (mellein)

Be about to. Marks prospective praise or blame: the speaker should exercise forethought when about to evaluate a man, before potentially mistaken words are spoken. Attested: μέλλῃς (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Be ashamed αἰσχύνεσθαι

αἰσχύνεσθαι (aischynesthai)

Be ashamed. To feel shame; Socrates includes both speakers in the demand for an answer they could give without embarrassment. Attested: αἰσχυνθεῖμεν (321d). Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending (p. 119).

Be impious ἀσεβεῖν

ἀσεβεῖν (asebein)

Be impious. To act impiously; Socrates presents careless hostile speech about divine human beings as a religious as well as evaluative danger. Attested: ἀσεβῇς (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Be in fact asking τυγχάνειν

τυγχάνειν (tynchanein)

Be in fact asking. The participial construction specifies the question Socrates is presently putting, rather than a claim about accidental legislation. Attested: τυγχάνω ἐρωτῶν (313a). Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72).

Be persuaded πείθεσθαι

πείθεσθαι (peithesthai)

Be persuaded. The conviction the companion says he cannot attain despite agreeing with the preceding formulations. Attested: πεισθῆναι (316c). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18).

Be put τιθέναι

τιθέναι (tithenai)

Be put. Passive subjunctive in making the object of inquiry common; not here the later enactment of laws. Attested: τεθῇ (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Set down. To establish or enact; Minos is said to make lawful usages for his citizens from what he accepts as fine. Attested: ἔθηκεν (320a). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

Be seen ὁρᾶν

ὁρᾶν (horan)

Be seen. Passive form in the claim that visible things are seen by sight. Attested: ὁρᾶσθαι (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

Be sick κάμνειν

κάμνειν (kamnein)

Be sick. Here to suffer illness; the substantival participle identifies the sick people whose health is the subject of the writing. Attested: καμνόντων (316c). Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79).

Be wary εὐλαβεῖσθαι

εὐλαβεῖσθαι (eulabeisthai)

Be wary. To take care or guard against a danger; the warning concerns offence in speech and action, before its later application to provoking poets. Attested: εὐλαβεῖσθαι (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Began ἄρχεσθαι

ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai)

Began. The middle verb means to begin: Lacedaemon is said to have been happy since it began using the Cretan laws. This is distinct from governing a city in 317a. Attested: ἤρξατο (320b). Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109).

Beginning. Beginning or originating, of tragedy, whose origin Socrates denies should be assigned to Thespis or Phrynichus. The middle participle has no local sense of ruling. Attested: ἀρξαμένη (321a). Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109).

Being law τὸ νόμος εἶναι

τὸ νόμος εἶναι (to nomos einai)

Being law. The precise respect in which Socrates says a law does not differ from another law. Attested: τὸ νόμος εἶναι (313a). Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72).

Being with συνουσία

συνουσία (synousia)

Being with. Association or being together, here expressly through words, for education toward virtue; the general word does not itself mean a drinking party. Attested: συνουσία (320b). Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20).

Beloved παιδικά

παιδικά (paidika)

Beloved. A substantival neuter plural naming one beloved person, Olympus in relation to Marsyas. It is not the noun for play used later. Attested: παιδικὰ (318b). Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician (p. 77).

Best ἄριστος

ἄριστος (aristos)

Best. Best at allocating appropriate nourishment to bodies; a comparative evaluation tied to a defined task and recipient. Attested: ἄριστος (317e). What is due and fitting to a recipient (p. 143).

Better βελτίων

βελτίων (beltiōn)

Better. Improved or better; the comparative states the lawgiver's intended effect on the soul without specifying what makes it better. Attested: βελτίω (321d). Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23).

Birds ὄρνεον

ὄρνεον (orneon)

Birds. Birds, one class in Socrates' list of things people acknowledge as sacred; the comparison then extends to human goodness. Attested: ὄρνεα (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Bodies σῶμα

σῶμα (sōma)

Bodies. The bodily recipients of appropriate food. The sequence distinguishes this field from the later question about laws for souls. Attested: σώματα (317e). Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131).

Body. The body as recipient of beneficial distribution, specifically food and exertion in the closing example. Attested: σῶμα (321c). Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23).

Briefly βραχύς

βραχύς (brachys)

Briefly. Short or brief, in the idiom through few words; qualifies Homer's compact praise and later the available bodily answer. Attested: βραχέων (319c). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Bronze χαλκοῦς

χαλκοῦς (chalkous)

Bronze. Made of bronze; first describes the law tablets, and then, by Socrates' explanation, supplies Talos' epithet. Attested: χαλκοῖς (320c). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Buried θάπτειν

θάπτειν (thaptein)

Buried. The still earlier practice of burying the dead inside the house itself. Attested: ἔθαπτον (315d). Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57).

Call or name καλεῖν

καλεῖν (kalein)

Call or name. Assign the occupational name doctors to people knowledgeable about the relevant matters. Attested: καλεῖς (316c). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Call laws. People give the name laws to the civic writings in the analogy; ordinary naming remains distinguishable from the subsequent test of whether a writing is right. Attested: καλοῦσι (317a). Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52).

Cares μέλειν

μέλειν (melein)

Cares. To be a concern to someone, with a dative; the person's concern here is being well thought of. Attested: μέλει (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Carrying out ἐκφορά

ἐκφορά (ekphora)

Carrying out. The funeral's carrying out of the corpse, before which victims were slaughtered. Attested: ἐκφορᾶς (315c). Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57).

Carthage Καρχηδών

Καρχηδών (Karchēdōn)

Carthage. The place now included in the shared judgment about weight after its inhabitants' different sacrifices were cited. Attested: Καρχηδόνι (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier (p. 139).

Carthaginians Καρχηδόνιος

Καρχηδόνιος (Karchēdonios)

Carthaginians. The people used in the companion's first contrasting sacrificial example. Attested: Καρχηδόνιοι (315b). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Cave ἄντρον

ἄντρον (antron)

Cave. The cave of Zeus to which Minos repeatedly goes in Socrates' elaboration of the Homeric verse. Attested:

ἄντρον (319e). Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85).

Censure ψέγειν

ψέγειν (psegein)

Censure. To blame or criticize; Socrates urges forethought before censuring a person, just as before praising one. Attested: ψέξειν (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Changing μετατιθέναι

μετατιθέναι (metatithenai)

Changing. The repeated alteration of laws to which the companion appeals. Attested: μετατιθέμενοι (316c). Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25).

Cithara-player κιθαριστής

κιθαριστής (kitharistēs)

Cithara-player. A player of the cithara, paired with the flute-player as a knowledgeable distributor of musical strokes or sounds. Attested: κιθαριστοῦ (317e). Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83).

Citizens πολίτης

πολίτης (politēs)

Citizens. Members of the civic community for whom Minos enacts what he accepts as fine; the word identifies the recipients of his lawful prescriptions. Attested: πολίταις (320a). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

City πόλις

πόλις (polis)

City. The civic body to which the companion attributes the resolution proposed as law. Attested: πόλεως (314c). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99).

City. The civic community whose ordering forms the subject of political writings; here it is the object of competent government, not simply the institutional source of a decree. Attested: πόλεως (317a). Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109).

Clear δῆλος

δῆλος (dēlos)

Clear. Socrates presents the connection between what Minos accepted as fine and what he enacted for his citizens as clear; this asserted clarity is part of his reasoning against the convivial interpretation. Attested: δῆλον (320a). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

Cnossus Κνωσός

Κνωσός (Knōsos)

Cnossus. The great Cretan city named in the quoted Homeric line locating Minos' kingship. Attested: Κνωσὸς (319b). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Come across ἐντυγχάνειν

ἐντυγχάνειν (entynchanein)

Come across. To encounter or come upon something. Socrates asks whether the companion has encountered a medical writing, grounding the next analogy in a recognizable experience. Attested: ἐνέτυχες (316c). Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52).

Come from ἥκειν

ἥκειν (hēkein)

Come from. To have arrived or come; in the question about the source of the best Spartan lawful usages, it concerns their provenance. Attested: ἥκει (318d). Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124).

Come to be with συγγίγνεσθαι

συγγίγνεσθαι (syngignesthai)

Come to be with. To associate or come together, specified here as a recurring relation with Zeus in words. Attested: συγγίγνεσθαι (319c). Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20).

Come to terms συμβαίνειν

συμβαίνειν (symbainein)

Come to terms. The agreement Socrates says alternating separate speeches will not achieve. Attested: συμβῶμεν (315e). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18).

Common or shared κοινός

κοινός (koinos)

Common or shared. The condition in which the object under examination is made available to both speakers. Attested: κοινὸν (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Compelled ἀναγκάζειν

ἀναγκάζειν (anankazein)

Compelled. To force or require; Minos compelled Athens to pay tribute, the stated ground of the city’s revenge. Attested: ἠνάγκασε (321a). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Confidant ὀαριστής

ὀαριστής (oaristēs)

Confidant. A familiar friend or intimate associate in Homer's verse; Socrates interprets the relation specifically as association in words for education. Attested: ὀαριστής (319b). Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85).

Confidences ὅαροι

ὅαροι (oaroi)

Confidences. Familiar converse or confidences, which Socrates glosses as words in explaining oaristēs. Attested: ὅαροι (319e). Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85).

Cooks μάγειρος

μάγειρος (mageiros)

Cooks. Those responsible for preparing dishes, named as possessing the corresponding writings and lawful usages. Attested: Μαγείρων (316e). Cookery and the preparation of dishes (p. 34).

Corpse νεκρός

νεκρός (nekros)

Corpse. The dead body carried out in the Athenian funeral example. Attested: νεκροῦ (315c). Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57).

Countless things μυρίος

μυρίος (myrios)

Countless things. The companion claims that many further examples of variable practice could be given; not an exact count of ten thousand. Attested: μυρία (315d).

Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

Courts δικαστήριον

δικαστήριον (dikastērion)

Courts. Places or institutions of judgment, in which Rhadamanthys has learned to preside. Attested: δικαστηρίοις (320c). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Craft τέχνη

τέχνη (technē)

Craft. The finding of things ascribed to practical expertise in Socrates' exploratory account of what kind of thing law might be. Attested: τέχνη (314b). Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36).

Craft. An organized expertise to which a writing can belong. The question identifies medicine as the relevant field; the word is not inserted afresh for every later practitioner. Attested: τέχνης (316c). Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36).

Cretans Κρής

Κρής (Krēs)

Cretans. The people from whom the Lacedaemonians are said to have learned the relevant abstention from drinking parties. Attested: Κρητῶν (320a). Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124).

Crete Κρήτη

Κρήτη (Krētē)

Crete. The island from which, according to the companion's report, the best Spartan lawful usages came.

Attested: Κρήτης (318d). Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124).

Cronus Κρόνος

Κρόνος (Kronos)

Cronus. The god named in the companion's Greek account as recipient of the Carthaginian sacrifice. Attested: Κρόνῳ (315c). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Decent χρηστός

χρηστός (chrēstos)

Decent. The favorable class of resolutions contrasted with base ones. Attested: χρηστὰ (314e). Decent and base (p. 38).

Decrees ψήφισμα

ψήφισμα (psēphisma)

Decrees. Measures passed by vote in the companion's second answer about law. Attested: ψηφίσματα (314b). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99).

Deed ἔργον

ἔργον (ergon)

Deed. An action or deed, paired with word to show that the warned-against offense is possible in conduct as well as speech. Attested: ἔργῳ (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Descendants ἔκγονος

ἔκγονος (ekgonos)

Descendants. The descendants of Athamas, not Athamas himself, are named as practitioners. Attested: ἔκγονοι

(315c). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Destroys ἀπολλύναι

ἀπολλύναι (apollynai)

Destroys. The harmful effect attributed to injustice and lawlessness. Attested: ἀπόλλυσι (314d). Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60).

Differ διαφέρειν

διαφέρειν (diapherein)

Differ. Differ in the specified respect of being law, not necessarily in every feature or command. Attested: διαφέρει (313a). Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114).

Different ἄλλος

ἄλλος (allos)

Different. One thing as distinct from another in the separation of a capacity or activity from its objects; the word carries the companion's acknowledgment that law and accepted things now appear different. Attested: ἄλλο (313c). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

Different ones at different times ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις

ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις (allote allois)

Different ones at different times. Temporal variation in the laws used by people. Attested: ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις (315b). Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

Different people different ones ἄλλοι ἄλλοις

ἄλλοι ἄλλοις (alloi allois)

Different people different ones. Variation of laws from one community or group to another. Attested: ἄλλοι ἄλλοις (315b). Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

Different replacements ἕτερος

ἕτερος (heteros)

Different replacements. Different lawful usages substituted successively concerning the same subjects; Socrates denies such repeated alteration of people who actually know. Attested: ἕτερα (317b). Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25).

Discovery ἐξεύρεσις

ἐξεύρεσις (exeuresis)

Discovery. The compound noun used for true opinion's relation to what is and for what law wishes to be. Attested: ἐξεύρεσις (315a). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

Dishes ὄψον

ὄψον (opson)

Dishes. Food prepared as a dish, commonly an accompaniment to a staple. The passage is not restricted to a named ingredient or recipe. Attested: ὄψου (316e). Cookery and the preparation of dishes (p. 34).

Distinguish διαγιγνώσκειν

διαγιγνώσκειν (diagignōskein)

Distinguish. To discern the difference between things, here decent and base people; the demanded learning

supports responsible evaluation. Attested: διαγιγνώσκειν (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Distribute διανέμειν

διανέμειν (dianemein)

Distribute. To allocate or apportion, here seeds on soil. The infinitive specifies what the knowledgeable farmer can do. Attested: διανεῖμαι (317d). Distribution and tending (p. 41).

Distributes. The farmer's assigning suitable seeds to each soil, making the recipient-specific allocation concrete. Attested: διανέμει (317d). Distribution and tending (p. 41).

Distribute νέμειν

νέμειν (nemein)

Distribute. The aorist infinitive in the question about distributing the musical strokes that are due. Burnet prints an infinitive, not Boeckh's proposed finite verb. Attested: νεῖμαι (317d). Distribution and tending (p. 41).

Tend. To pasture or care for a herd. The pastoral sense joins the earlier allocations to the shepherd's and oxherd's activity. Attested: νέμειν (318a). Distribution and tending (p. 41).

Distributed ἀπονέμειν

ἀπονέμειν (aponemein)

Distributed. To assign or allot; here Homer grants Minos the exceptional privilege of having been educated by Zeus. This is the poet's allocation of an honor in his representation. Attested: ἀπένειμεν (319c). Distribution and tending (p. 41).

Distributions διανομή

διανομή (dianomē)

Distributions. Allocations made by the competent farmer and evaluated as right alongside his laws. The noun belongs to the family linking nomos with distributing. Attested: διανομαὶ (317d). Distribution and tending (p. 41).

Distributor νομεύς

νομεύς (nomeus)

Distributor. One who allots or distributes, here the farmer. The word also supports the transition to the herdsman's care in 318a. Attested: νομεὺς (317d). Distribution and tending (p. 41).

Do or practice ποιεῖν

ποιεῖν (poiein)

Do or practice. The companion says present Athenians do none of the earlier funerary things just listed. Attested: ποιοῦμεν (315d). Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57).

Represent in poetry. Homer has made or represented Minos judging with a golden scepter in the Nekyia; this concerns poetic portrayal, not Homer causing a historical judgment. Attested: πεποίηκε (319d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Make better. The lawgiver's distribution is assessed by whether it makes the soul better; the question still asks which provisions accomplish that improvement. Attested: ποιεῖ (321d). Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23).

Doctors ἰατρός

ἰατρός (iatros)

Doctors. The practitioners named as those knowledgeable about the medical matters under discussion. The definition concerns relevant competence, not merely a claimed professional title. Attested: ἰατροὺς (316c). Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79).

Drink together συμπίνειν

συμπίνειν (sympinein)

Drink together. To drink with others; the law forbids doing so to the point of drunkenness, not unqualifiedly every instance of drinking. Attested: συμπίνειν (320a). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

Drinking parties συμπόσιον

συμπόσιον (symposion)

Drinking parties. A drinking party or social drinking; Socrates claims Cretans and Spartans abstain from such gatherings and wine-related play. Attested: συμποσίων (320a). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

Drinking-companion συμπότης

συμπότης (sympotēs)

Drinking-companion. A fellow drinker; one part of the rival explanation of Zeus' confidant rejected by Socrates. Attested: συμπότην (319e). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

Drunkenness μέθη

μέθη (methē)

Drunkenness. Intoxication, the endpoint named in the prohibition against joint drinking; this limitation must not be dropped from the law's sense. Attested: μέθην (320a). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

Due ἄξιος

ἄξιος (axios)

Due. Fitting or appropriate to the recipient, first the seeds suited to each soil and then the musical strokes due to tunes. It does not automatically mean moral desert or a legal entitlement. Attested: ἄξια (317d). What is due and fitting to a recipient (p. 143).

Due food. The feminine adjective picks up the preceding word for food: the right nourishment for the bodies receiving it. Attested: ἀξίαν (317e). What is due and fitting to a recipient (p. 143).

Dwelling round περικτίων

περικτίων (periktiōn)

Dwelling round. Dwelling around or neighboring; describes the people over whom Minos rules in the Hesiodic quotation. Attested: περικτιόνων (320d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Each ἕκαστος

ἕκαστος (hekastos)

Each. Individually each recipient soil. The distributive expression allows different appropriate allocations within one competent practice. Attested: ἑκάστῃ (317d). What is due and fitting to a recipient (p. 143).

Earlier people πρότερος

πρότερος (proteros)

Earlier people. The generation earlier still than those who used the sacrificial and specialist-women practices. Attested: πρότεροι (315d). Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57).

Preceding. Earlier or previous, specifying the nine-year period in which Minos had acquired the learning he now shows. Attested: προτέρᾳ (319e). Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85).

Ears οὖς

οὖς (ous)

Ears. The organs through which hearing reveals sounds. Attested: ὤτων (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

Education παιδεία

παιδεία (paideia)

Education. Education or training, the purpose assigned to Minos' verbal association with Zeus; virtue supplies its stated direction. Attested: παιδείᾳ (320b). Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20).

Equally ὁμοίως

ὁμοίως (homoiōs)

Equally. Each law is equally law in Socrates' opening comparison. Attested: ὁμοίως (313b). Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114).

Eulogize ἐγκωμιάζειν

ἐγκωμιάζειν (enkōmiazein)

Eulogize. To praise in an encomium; Socrates announces how Homer and Hesiod praise Minos. Attested: ἐγκωμιάζουσι (319b). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Eulogy ἐγκώμιον

ἐγκώμιον (enkōmion)

Eulogy. A statement in praise of someone; Socrates treats Homer's brief description as an exceptional eulogy of Minos. Attested: ἐγκώμιον (319c). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Europa Εὐρώπη

Εὐρώπη (Eurōpē)

Europa. The mother named by Socrates in identifying Minos and Rhadamanthys; the dialogue does not narrate her myth. Attested: Εὐρώπης (318d). Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145).

Everywhere πανταχοῦ

πανταχοῦ (pantachou)

Everywhere. The geographical universality claimed for accepting fine things as fine. Attested: πανταχοῦ (316a). Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60).

Evidence τεκμήριον

τεκμήριον (tekmērion)

Evidence. An indication used to support a conclusion; the drinking law is proposed as evidence against the convivial interpretation of Minos' association. Attested: τεκμηρίῳ

(319e). Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50).

Exercising γυμνάζειν

γυμνάζειν (gymnazein)

Exercising. To train or exercise; one effect of the labors distributed for bodily improvement. Attested: γυμνάζων (321c). Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23).

Eyes ὀφθαλμός

ὀφθαλμός (ophthalmos)

Eyes. The bodily organs through which sight reveals things. Attested: ὀφθαλμῶν (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

Farmer γεωργός

γεωργός (geōrgos)

Farmer. The practitioner who knows how to distribute seeds on soil, matching the seed to each recipient soil. Attested: Γεωργός (317d). Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55).

Finding εὕρεσις

εὕρεσις (heuresis)

Finding. What Socrates calls craft in relation to its objects; the unprefixed noun precedes the central discovery formula. Attested: εὕρεσίς (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

Finding εὕρημα

εὕρημα (heurēma)

Finding. Something found or invented, here tragedy as an ancient Athenian invention; distinct from the finding-noun heuresis used of law. Attested: εὕρημα (321a). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Finding out by asking πυνθάνεσθαι

πυνθάνεσθαι (pynthanesthai)

Finding out by asking. One of the roles offered to the companion: ask Socrates questions in the common examination. Attested: πυνθανόμενός (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Fit or be appropriate ἁρμόττειν

ἁρμόττειν (harmottein)

Fit or be appropriate. A base resolution would not fittingly be law given the preceding favorable premises. Attested: ἁρμόττοι (314e). Decent and base (p. 38).

Flute-player αὐλητής

αὐλητής (aulētēs)

Flute-player. The instrumental practitioner whose musical laws and distributions are right, named alongside the cithara-player. Attested: αὐλητοῦ (317e). Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83).

Flute-tunes αὔλημα

αὔλημα (aulēma)

Flute-tunes. Pieces played on the flute, specifically the tunes attributed to Marsyas and Olympus and praised for their divine effect. Attested: αὐλήματα (318b). Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83).

Food τροφή

τροφή (trophē)

Food. The nourishment distributed to human bodies by the practitioner identified as the trainer. Its fit to the recipient determines the excellence of his allocation. Attested: τροφὴν (317e). Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131).

Food. Nourishment, one part of the bodily distributor's provision; its expressly stated function is to make the body grow. Attested: τροφήν (321c). Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23).

Forethought προμήθεια

προμήθεια (promētheia)

Forethought. Care taken in advance; necessary before praising or censuring someone so that the judgment is not wrong. Attested: προμήθειαν (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Gardeners κηπουρός

κηπουρός (kēpouros)

Gardeners. Practitioners who know how to work and direct gardens; the companion names them as the owners of the relevant writings and usages. Attested: Κηπουρῶν (316e). Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55).

Gardens κῆπος

κῆπος (kēpos)

Gardens. Cultivated gardens, the objects both of work and of the competent direction attributed to gardeners. Attested: κήπων (316e). Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55).

General στρατηγός

στρατηγός (stratēgos)

General. A military commander, whom Socrates calls a shepherd of the people through a Homeric formula; the term is not a named Athenian officeholder here. Attested: στρατηγόν (321c). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Giving firmness συνιστάναι

συνιστάναι (synistanai)

Giving firmness. To bring together or establish; here consolidating or giving firmness to the body through exertion. Attested: συνιστὰς (321c). Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23).

Go repeatedly φοιτᾶν

φοιτᾶν (phoitan)

Go repeatedly. To attend or frequent a place; Minos' visits have an educational purpose rather than being a single accidental encounter. Attested: φοιτᾶν (319c). Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20).

Gods θεός

θεός (theos)

Gods. The beings whose intentions the prophets claim their craft discloses. Attested: θεοὶ (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

Gold χρυσός

χρυσός (chrysos)

Gold. One of the material examples showing how instances can share what they are despite other

differences. Attested: χρυσός (313a). Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114).

Golden χρυσοῦς

χρυσοῦς (chrysous)

Golden. Made of gold; describes the scepter held by Minos in Socrates' report of the Nekyia. Attested: χρυσοῦν (319d). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Greatly μέγας

μέγας (megas)

Greatly. The neuter form is used adverbially with being able: the poets have great power over opinion, whether praising or speaking ill of a person. Attested: μέγα (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Greatest. The superlative ranks the immobility of Minos' laws as Socrates' strongest sign of his goodness and discovery; ranking a sign does not make it an independently completed proof. Attested: μέγιστον (321b). Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50).

Greeks Ἕλλην

Ἕλλην (Hellēn)

Greeks. The identity of the Lycaean and Athamas examples that blocks reducing the difference to Greeks versus non-Greeks. Attested: Ἕλληνες (315c). Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

Guardian of the laws νομοφύλαξ

νομοφύλαξ (nomophylax)

Guardian of the laws. A keeper or guardian of laws; the function in which Minos uses Rhadamanthys in the town.

Attested: νομοφύλακι (320c). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Guarding φυλάττειν

φυλάττειν (phylattein)

Guarding. To guard or preserve; Talos' recurring task is keeping the laws in the villages he visits. Attested: φυλάττων (320c). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Guided εὐθύνειν

εὐθύνειν (euthynein)

Guided. To guide or direct straight; Socrates says Zeus' education was the means by which Minos directed Crete. Attested: εὔθυνε (320d). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Had asked ἀνέρομαι

ἀνέρομαι (aneromai)

Had asked. Socrates' hypothetical question about what gold is, used to explain the demand for a definition. Attested: ἀνηρόμην (313a). Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72).

Had been educated παιδεύειν

παιδεύειν (paideuein)

Had been educated. To educate; the passive pluperfect says Rhadamanthys had received education from Minos, later limited to judicial service. Attested: ἐπεπαίδευτο (320b). Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20).

Hard or difficult χαλεπός

χαλεπός (chalepos)

Hard or difficult. The companion denies that knowing about variation of laws is difficult; this is not the later harshness attributed to Minos. Attested: χαλεπὸν (315b). Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

Harsh. Difficult or harsh in character; part of the adverse report about Minos, not a settled judgment shared by both speakers. Attested: χαλεπὸν (318d). Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81).

Has been spread abroad κατασκεδάννυσθαι

κατασκεδάννυσθαι (kataskedannysthai)

Has been spread abroad. To be scattered or spread widely; the perfect describes the established circulation of the report about Minos. Attested: κατεσκέδασται (320d–e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Has escaped notice λανθάνειν

λανθάνειν (lanthanein)

Has escaped notice. The possible oversight Socrates allows concerning the companion's argument. Attested: λέληθεν (315d). Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48).

Have been discovered ἐξευρίσκειν

ἐξευρίσκειν (exeuriskein)

Have been discovered. Perfect passive form in the companion's supposition that discovery has already been achieved. Attested: ἐξηύρηται (315a). Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74).

Discover. What people do not always manage to do: attain what law wishes, what is. Attested: ἐξευρίσκειν (315b). Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74).

Have in mind διανοεῖσθαι

διανοεῖσθαι (dianoeisthai)

Have in mind. What the gods think or intend, as the prophets claim; not Socrates' direct assertion of access to divine intentions. Attested: διανοοῦνται (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

Think about. How law is to be considered: as something fine. Attested: διανοεῖσθαι (314d). Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60).

Have looked into σκέπτεσθαι

σκέπτεσθαι (skeptesthai)

Have looked into. To examine or investigate; the perfect infinitive marks bodily and other matters as already investigated in contrast to the neglected internal matters. Attested: ἐσκέφθαι (321d). Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending (p. 119).

Health ὑγίεια

ὑγίεια (hygieia)

Health. The condition or good about which a medical writing speaks, specifically the health of people who are sick. Attested: ὑγιείας (316c). Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79).

Healthy ὑγιεινός

ὑγιεινός (hygieinos)

Healthy. Healthy or conducive to health, among the things medicine is said to find. The neuter plural names such

things, not a group of healthy persons. Attested: ὑγιεινὰ (314b). Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79).

Hearing ἀκοή

ἀκοή (akoē)

Hearing. The capacity distinguished from heard objects and explained through the ears. Attested: ἀκοὴ (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

Heavier βαρύτερος

βαρύτερος (baryteros)

Heavier. The correct comparative predicate for things weighing more. Attested: βαρύτερα (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier (p. 139).

Held in worse opinion κακόδοξος

κακόδοξος (kakodoxos)

Held in worse opinion. Ill reputed; its comparative expresses Minos' worsened public standing, not a demonstrated worsening of his character. Attested: κακοδοξότερος (321a). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Herd ἀγέλη

ἀγέλη (agelē)

Herd. A group of animals under a herder's care, applied first to human bodies and then literally to sheep. Attested: ἀγέλην (318a). Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131).

Hero ἥρως

ἥρως (hērōs)

Hero. The heroic standing assigned to Minos as Zeus' son; this strengthens Socrates' warning about verbal offence. Attested: ἥρω (319b). Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145).

Hesiod Ἡσίοδος

Ἡσίοδος (Hēsiodos)

Hesiod. The poet whose quoted praise of Minos and Zeus' scepter supplies a second poetic source, interpreted by Socrates in educational terms. Attested: Ἡσίοδος (320c). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Holy ὅσιος

ὅσιος (hosios)

Holy. The contrary evaluation attributed to Carthaginian practitioners, not an endorsement by the lexicon. Attested: ὅσιον (315b). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Homer Ὅμηρος

Ὅμηρος (Homēros)

Homer. The poet Socrates invokes as a more persuasive witness than the tragedians; quoted verse and Socrates' interpretation must remain distinct. Attested: Ὅμηρος (319b). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

House οἰκία

οἰκία (oikia)

House. The domestic location of burial attributed to an earlier generation. Attested: οἰκίᾳ (315d). Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57).

Human ἀνθρώπειος

ἀνθρώπειος (anthrōpeios)

Human. Qualifying the herd tended in respect of the body. The unusual expression supplies the transition from physical training to animal tending. Attested: ἀνθρωπείαν (318a). Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131).

I know εἰδέναι

εἰδέναι (eidenai)

I know. The companion identifies medicine as the craft to which the writing belongs; his knowledge here is a specific identification. Attested: Οἶδα (316c). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Know. The ordinary verb for knowing, in the explicit restriction “about whatever they know.” Agreement among Greeks and barbarians is bounded by this condition. Attested: εἰδῶσι (316d). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Those who know. People actually knowing the matter, whom the companion says must accept the same things in common. Attested: εἰδότας (316d). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Know. In the negative phrase, those who do not know and therefore take an incorrect civic writing to be law. Attested: εἰδόσιν (317c). Right and apparent law (p. 106).

Knowing. To know; the negative phrase describes the souls as appearing not to know the things within them, not an unqualified denial of all knowledge. Attested: εἰδυίας (321d). Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending (p. 119).

I say so φημί

φημί (phēmi)

I say so. The companion explicitly assents after Socrates prompts him to say that the king's laws are best for human souls; the form expresses a conversational commitment, not an independent proof. Attested: Φημὶ (318a). Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30).

If law is opinion εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί

εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί (eiper doxa nomos esti)

If law is opinion. The explicit condition retained in the step from excluding base opinion to identifying decent opinion. Attested: εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί (314e). True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133).

In common κοινῇ

κοινῇ (koinēi)

In common. The manner of the proposed inquiry, whether the companion questions or answers. Attested: κοινῇ (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Incur hatred ἀπεχθάνεσθαι

ἀπεχθάνεσθαι (apechthanesthai)

Incur hatred. To become hated or make an enemy of someone; Minos' hostility with Athens explains his adverse poetic reputation in Socrates' account. Attested:

ἀπεχθάνεσθαι (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Injustice ἀδικία

ἀδικία (adikia)

Injustice. The moral opposite of justice, grouped with lawlessness as shameful and destructive. Attested: ἀδικία (314d). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Is accepted νομίζειν

νομίζειν (nomizein)

Is accepted. The passive verb in the root-play that what is accepted is accepted by law. Attested: νομίζεται (314a). Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15).

Accept. Accept or observe things in the same way, which the companion denies happens invariably within or across communities. Attested: νομίζομεν (315d). Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15).

Accept or take to be. The companion's judgment that just things are just, a cognitive use following the discussion of customary practices. Attested: νομίζεις (315e). Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15).

Is found εὑρίσκειν

εὑρίσκειν (heuriskein)

Is found. The passive verb of finding, illustrated through medicine and prophecy. Attested: εὑρίσκεται (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

Is happy εὐδαιμονεῖν

εὐδαιμονεῖν (eudaimonein)

Is happy. To be happy or prosper; Socrates attributes Crete's enduring happiness to the divine laws, without

giving a separate welfare assessment. Attested: εὐδαιμονεῖ (320b). Sophist, virtue, and the content of good education (p. 121).

Is heard ἀκούειν

ἀκούειν (akouein)

Is heard. The hearing example's passive verb, used with hearing as its means. Attested: ἀκούεται (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

Have heard. The companion marks his report of Carthaginian sacrifice as something Socrates may also have heard. Attested: ἀκήκοας (315c). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Is indignant νεμεσᾶν

νεμεσᾶν (nemesan)

Is indignant. To feel righteous indignation; Socrates says the god resents blame of the good and praise of the contrary kind. Attested: νεμεσᾷ (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Is learned μανθάνειν

μανθάνειν (manthanein)

Is learned. Learning is explained through knowledge that reveals the things learned. Attested: μανθάνεται (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

To learn. To acquire learning; the future participle gives one purpose of Minos' visit, alongside showing what he had previously learned. Attested: μαθησόμενος (319e). Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20).

It seems ἔοικα

ἔοικα (eoika)

It seems. A qualification attached to Socrates' reformulation of resolution as political opinion. Attested: ἔοικε (314c). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18).

Judge δικαστής

δικαστής (dikastēs)

Judge. One who gives judgment; Rhadamanthys is called good in this office through his education for judicial service. Attested: δικαστὴς (320c). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Judging δικάζειν

δικάζειν (dikazein)

Judging. To give judgment; Socrates describes Homer as depicting Minos exercising this activity while holding the golden scepter. Attested: δικάζοντα (319d). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Just people δίκαιος

δίκαιος (dikaios)

Just people. Persons characterized by justice; the masculine forms precede the later questions about just things. Attested: δίκαιοι (314c). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Just things. The neuter things or acts to which Socrates asks the companion to apply the predicate just. Attested: δίκαια (315e). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Justice δικαιοσύνη

δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosynē)

Justice. The quality by which just people are just; later paired with law as fine and preserving. Attested: δικαιοσύνῃ (314c). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Kingliest βασιλεύτατος

βασιλεύτατος (basileutatos)

Kingliest. An emphatic superlative in Hesiod's verse, praising Minos as preeminent among mortal kings. Attested: βασιλεύτατος (320d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Kingly men βασιλικός

βασιλικός (basilikos)

Kingly men. Men characterized as kingly in the identification of those who know how to govern cities. The qualification depends on the competence under discussion. Attested: βασιλικοί (317a). Kings and statesmen (p. 67).

Kingly. Qualifying genuine law: a correct civic writing is kingly law; an incorrect one fails to be law despite its appearance. Attested: βασιλικός (317c). Kings and statesmen (p. 67).

Kings βασιλεύς

βασιλεύς (basileus)

Kings. The kings whose writings, joined with those of good men, are identified as the political writings people call laws. The argument is normatively restricted. Attested: βασιλέων (317a). Kings and statesmen (p. 67).

King. The practitioner to whom the best laws for human souls are assigned at the end of the distribution-and-

herding sequence. Attested: βασιλέως (318a). Kings and statesmen (p. 67).

Kings. The form in the question about good ancient Cretan kings, answered by naming Minos and Rhadamanthys. Attested: βασιλῆς (318d). Kings and statesmen (p. 67).

Know how ἐπίστασθαι

ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai)

Know how. To possess the practical understanding required to direct a field or activity, here the ruling of gardens. Attested: ἐπισταμένων (316e). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Those who know how. Competent practitioners, with the relevant activity understood from the preceding discussion. Their writings are expected to be consistent about the same subjects. Attested: ἐπιστάμενοι (317b). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Know or recognize γιγνώσκειν

γιγνώσκειν (gignōskein)

Know or recognize. Recognize that the same people change laws and different people have different ones. Attested: γνῶναι (315b). Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

Knowledge ἐπιστήμη

ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

Knowledge. Knowledge conceived here as revealing what is learned; an early candidate model for the activity of law. Attested: ἐπιστήμῃ (314b). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Labors πόνος

πόνος (ponos)

Labors. Exertions or demanding exercises; paired with food as the bodily regimen's training and strengthening component. Attested: πόνους (321c). Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23).

Lacedaemon Λακεδαίμων

Λακεδαίμων (Lakedaimōn)

Lacedaemon. Sparta, said to have been happy since beginning to use the Cretan laws. The claim belongs to Socrates' praise of those laws. Attested: Λακεδαίμων (320b). Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124).

Lacedaemonians Λακεδαιμόνιος

Λακεδαιμόνιος (Lakedaimonios)

Lacedaemonians. The Spartans, proposed by the companion as the people using the oldest Greek laws before Socrates traces their best usages to Crete. Attested: Λακεδαιμονίους (318c). Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124).

Law νόμος

νόμος (nomos)

Law. The common object of Socrates' opening question, to be defined as a whole rather than identified as one particular enactment. Attested: νόμος (313a). Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72).

Laws or accepted customs. The practices different peoples use and the same people change over time in the companion's objection. Attested: νόμοις (315b). Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

By law. Instrumental dative, parallel to by sight and by hearing, inviting an explanation of law as the means of

acceptance. Attested: νόμῳ (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

Laws for the flute. Here law also carries the recognized musical sense nome, a traditional type of melody or composition. Both senses matter to the analogy. Attested: νόμοις (318b). Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83).

The lawful τὸ νόμιμον

τὸ νόμιμον (to nomimon)

The lawful. The standard or object missed when someone misses what is; not the plural customs of a particular people. Attested: τοῦ νομίμου (316b). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Lawful people νόμιμος

νόμιμος (nomimos)

Lawful people. People lawful by law, then agreed to be just; the connection with justice is an additional premise. Attested: νόμιμοι (314c). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Lawful. What the companion says Carthaginians consider their sacrifice to be for themselves. Attested: νόμιμον (315c). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Lawful. A status accorded to what is right in a specified practical field. The criterion is correctness, not simply customary acceptance. Attested: νόμιμον (317b). Right and apparent law (p. 106).

Lawful things τὰ νόμιμα

τὰ νόμιμα (ta nomima)

Lawful things. What appears lawful to the companion when put in Socrates' terms, despite his unresolved

objection about change. Attested: νόμιμα (316b). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18).

Lawgiver νομοθέτης

νομοθέτης (nomothetēs)

Lawgiver. A maker or establisher of laws, first sought here in the musical domain of flute nomes, then among ancient kings. Attested: νομοθέτης (318b). Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88).

Lawless people ἄνομος

ἄνομος (anomos)

Lawless people. Those characterized by lawlessness and then identified as unjust. Attested: ἄνομοι (314d). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Lawless. What an incorrect rule becomes under the argument's restriction of genuine law to what is right. It need not mean merely prohibited by a separate civic statute. Attested: Ἄνομον (317c). Right and apparent law (p. 106).

Lawlessness ἀνομία

ἀνομία (anomia)

Lawlessness. The condition by which lawless people are lawless, later paired with injustice as destructive. Attested: ἀνομίᾳ (314d). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Left λοιπός

λοιπός (loipos)

Left. Remaining or surviving, said of the divine tunes still present. Survival is then used as a model for the persistence of laws. Attested: λοιπά (318c). Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88).

Less ἔλαττον

ἔλαττον (elatton)

Less. The lesser amount of weight in the weighing comparison. Attested: ἔλαττον (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier (p. 139).

Less ἧττον

ἧττον (hētton)

Less. The contrary degree likewise excluded from being law in the opening comparison. Attested: ἧττον (313b). Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114).

Let us examine ἐπισκέπτεσθαι

ἐπισκέπτεσθαι (episkeptesthai)

Let us examine. The shared proposal to investigate what law might be through the perception examples. Attested: ἐπισκεψώμεθ’ (313c). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Lighter κουφότερος

κουφότερος (kouphoteros)

Lighter. The correct comparative predicate for things weighing less. Attested: κουφότερα (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier (p. 139).

Like ὅμοιος

ὅμοιος (homoios)

Like. Similar; the good person is described as like the god, explaining why unjust censure provokes divine indignation. Attested: ὅμοιον (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Long μακρός

μακρός (makros)

Long. Qualifies the speech each person might give separately without jointly examining the matter. Attested: μακρῷ (315d). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Look closely at ἀθρεῖν

ἀθρεῖν (athrein)

Look closely at. Socrates invites a renewed examination together, now through a medical writing. Attested: ἄθρει (316c). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Look into or examine σκοπεῖν

σκοπεῖν (skopein)

Look into or examine. The companion is told to examine what Socrates is actually asking. Attested: σκόπει (313a). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Looks as though κινδυνεύειν

κινδυνεύειν (kindyneuein)

Looks as though. The companion's tentative conclusion that law is a resolution of the city; no physical danger is meant. Attested: κινδυνεύει (314b). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99).

Lycaea Λυκαία

Λυκαία (Lykaia)

Lycaea. The district of Mount Lycaeus in the edition's explanation, used as a Greek sacrificial example rather than the name of a festival. Attested: Λυκαίᾳ (315c). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Lycurgus Λυκοῦργος

Λυκοῦργος (Lykourgos)

Lycurgus. The Spartan lawgiver named by the companion. The approximate estimate of his laws' age supplies no secure dramatic date. Attested: Λυκοῦργον (318c). Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124).

Make a mistake against ἐξαμαρτάνειν

ἐξαμαρτάνειν (examartanein)

Make a mistake against. To err or do wrong against someone; with εἰς and its object, the warning concerns wrongs in word and deed against gods and then divine human beings. Attested: ἐξαμαρτάνειν (318e). Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48).

Make a consequential mistake. The mistake Socrates attributes to Minos in incurring Athenian hostility and exposing his reputation to the poets' vengeance; the passage does not thereby revoke the claim that he was a good lawgiver. Attested: ἐξήμαρτεν (321a). Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48).

Makers of tragedy τραγῳδοποιός

τραγῳδοποιός (tragōidopoios)

Makers of tragedy. Tragic poets, whose collective authority Socrates ranks below Homer and Hesiod in the dispute about Minos. Attested: τραγῳδοποιοί (318e). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Making grow αὔξειν

αὔξειν (auxein)

Making grow. To increase or make grow; the bodily effect attributed to nourishment in the final analogy. Attested:

αὔξων (321c). Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23).

Many πολύς

πολύς (polys)

Many. Epic genitive plural of many in the quotation, referring to those ruled; the edition expressly distinguishes it from a genitive of cities. Attested: πολέων (320d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Marsyas Μαρσύας

Μαρσύας (Marsyas)

Marsyas. The legendary musician named as an old good lawgiver in flute music, with Olympus. His contest with Apollo belongs to background, not to the narrated action here. Attested: Μαρσύας (318b). Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician (p. 77).

Means σημαίνειν

σημαίνειν (sēmainein)

Means. To signify or indicate; marks Socrates' proposed interpretation of the epic verse, rather than a further verbatim quotation. Attested: σημαίνει (319d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Medicine ἰατρική

ἰατρική (iatrikē)

Medicine. The craft by which what is healthy and sickly is found. Attested: ἰατρικῇ (314b). Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79).

Medicine. The medical craft to which the writing belongs; the feminine adjective functions with craft supplied from

the question. Attested: ἰατρικῆς (316c). Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79).

Men of old παλαιός

παλαιός (palaios)

Men of old. Ancient people among whom Socrates seeks a good musical lawgiver; age is joined to an independent qualification of goodness. Attested: παλαιῶν (318b). Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88).

Oldest. The superlative qualifying laws used by a Greek people. The scope is explicitly among Greeks, not all human societies. Attested: παλαιοτάτοις (318c). Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88).

Mentioning μιμνῄσκεσθαι

μιμνῄσκεσθαι (mimnēiskesthai)

Mentioning. To recall or mention; the participle introduces Hesiod's mention of Minos by name before the quoted praise. Attested: μνησθεὶς (320d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Might agree ὁμολογεῖν

ὁμολογεῖν (homologein)

Might agree. The possible outcome of shared examination, stated tentatively rather than guaranteed. Attested: ὁμολογήσαιμεν (315e). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18).

Minos Μίνως

Μίνως (Minōs)

Minos. The Cretan king whom Socrates defends as a good lawgiver educated by Zeus; his hostile Athenian reputation

is disputed, not silently accepted. Attested: Μίνως (318d). Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81).

Miss ἁμαρτάνειν

ἁμαρτάνειν (hamartanein)

Miss. With what is as its object, the failure that Socrates links directly to missing the lawful. Attested: ἁμαρτάνῃ (316b). Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48).

More μᾶλλον

μᾶλλον (mallon)

More. Socrates excludes one instance's being more law than another in the respect being defined. Attested: μᾶλλον (313b). Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114).

More πλεῖον

πλεῖον (pleion)

More. The greater amount of weight in the weighing comparison. Attested: πλεῖον (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier (p. 139).

More impious ἀσεβής

ἀσεβής (asebēs)

More impious. The comparative adjective intensifies Socrates' warning about wrongs against gods and divine human beings; it is distinct from the verb describing acting impiously. Attested: ἀσεβέστερόν (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

More persuasive πιθανός

πιθανός (pithanos)

More persuasive. Persuasive or credible; Socrates ranks Homer and Hesiod above the tragedians, a comparative

assessment of sources. Attested: πιθανώτεροί (318e). Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50).

Mortal θνητός

θνητός (thnētos)

Mortal. Subject to death; qualifies the kings among whom the quoted Hesiodic Minos is said to be supreme. Attested: θνητῶν (320d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Most able to lead souls ψυχαγωγικός

ψυχαγωγικός (psychagōgikos)

Most able to lead souls. Capable of moving or leading souls; the superlative marks tragic influence, without guaranteeing that its direction is ethically improving. Attested: ψυχαγωγικώτατον (321a). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Most delightful to the people δημοτερπής

δημοτερπής (dēmoterpēs)

Most delightful to the people. People-pleasing; the superlative identifies tragedy's exceptional popular appeal as a condition of its reputational influence. Attested: δημοτερπέστατόν (321a). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Most divine θεῖος

θεῖος (theios)

Most divine. The superlative evaluation of the tunes of Marsyas and Olympus, connected with their effect on hearers and their survival. Attested: θειότατά (318b). Divine movement disclosure and need (p. 43).

Divine. Qualifying enduring tunes and then a king's continuing lawful usages; the parallel motivates the search for an ancient civic lawgiver. Attested: θεῖα (318c). Divine movement disclosure and need (p. 43).

Divine human beings. Qualifies human beings against whom wrongful speech and action are warned against after wrongs against gods; the argument immediately connects sacred human standing with goodness. Attested: θείους (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Most fine καλός

καλός (kalos)

Most fine. The superlative appraisal of justice and law that makes goodness a condition of the definition. Attested: κάλλιστον (314d). Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60).

Fine things. The objects said to be accepted as fine everywhere; the formula does not specify every disputed practice that belongs to the class. Attested: καλά (316a). Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60).

Most polluted μιαρός

μιαρός (miaros)

Most polluted. Polluted or foul; the superlative applied to the base person opposes the sacred standing of the good person. Attested: μιαρώτατον (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Most shameful αἰσχρός

αἰσχρός (aischros)

Most shameful. The contrary superlative applied to injustice and lawlessness. Attested: Αἴσχιστον (314d). Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60).

Shameful things. The contrary objects, to be accepted as shameful rather than fine. Attested: αἰσχρὰ (316b). Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60).

Shameful. Disgraceful or shameful, here the condition of souls that have examined other matters while appearing ignorant of their own. Attested: αἰσχρόν (321d). Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending (p. 119).

Most skilled flute-player αὐλητικός

αὐλητικός (aulētikos)

Most skilled flute-player. The superlative describing the musician most proficient at flute-playing, equated locally with being most skilled in law. Attested: αὐλητικώτατος (317e). Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83).

For the flute. Pertaining to flute-playing, qualifying the musical laws or nomes in which an old good lawgiver is sought. Attested: αὐλητικοῖς (318b). Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83).

Most skilled in law νομικός

νομικός (nomikos)

Most skilled in law. The superlative applied first to musical competence and then to the trainer's domain. In the musical use it exploits nomos as both law and nome. Attested: νομικώτατος (317e). Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83).

Move κινεῖν

κινεῖν (kinein)

Move. To move or stir hearers through music. The people in need of the gods, not the gods themselves, are the verb's object. Attested: κινεῖ (318b). Divine movement disclosure and need (p. 43).

Moved about as at draughts μεταπεττεύειν

μεταπεττεύειν (metapetteuein)

Moved about as at draughts. Socrates' board-game image for things whose movements may obscure their sameness; no full theory of the game is supplied. Attested: μεταπεττευόμενα (316c). Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25).

My excellent friend βέλτιστος

βέλτιστος (beltistos)

My excellent friend. Socrates' courteous form of address to the unnamed companion, not a verified ranking of his virtue. Attested: βέλτιστε (315d). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Best. The excellent laws and distributions of the practitioner who gives appropriate food. The form here is a predicate, unlike the courteous address "my excellent friend" elsewhere. Attested: βέλτιστοι (317e). What is due and fitting to a recipient (p. 143).

Name ὄνομα

ὄνομα (onoma)

Name. The designation of the practitioner best at tending sheep; the companion supplies shepherd, fixing the appropriate expert's identity by the activity. Attested: ὄνομα (318a). Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131).

Name. Minos' name as mentioned in Hesiod's account, introducing the quoted praise; the noun identifies whom the poetic passage concerns. Attested: ὀνόματος (320d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Necessity ἀνάγκη

ἀνάγκη (anankē)

Necessity. The necessity asserted for agreement among people who know the same matters. It expresses the force of the accepted premise, not a report of coercion. Attested: ἀνάγκη (316d). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Need χρεία

χρεία (chreia)

Need. Need or want in the expression “being in need of the gods.” It identifies a condition disclosed by the musical response. Attested: χρείᾳ (318b). Divine movement disclosure and need (p. 43).

Nekyia Νέκυια

Νέκυια (Nekyia)

Nekyia. The calling-up of the dead, the ancient name used for Odyssey 11 in the supplied note; Socrates refers to its Minos scene. Attested: Νεκυίᾳ (319d). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Nine-year period ἐννεετηρίς

ἐννεετηρίς (enneetēris)

Nine-year period. The period of earlier learning whose results Minos displays at his next visit to Zeus; preserve the source’s temporal wording. Attested: ἐννεετηρίδι (319e). Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85).

Nine-yearly ἐννέωρος

ἐννέωρος (enneōros)

Nine-yearly. The uncertain Homeric adjective that Socrates takes with confidant and explains by recurring

ninth-year meetings; his reading is not the only possible Homeric sense. Attested: ἐννέωρος (319b). Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85).

Ninety ἐνενήκοντα

ἐνενήκοντα (enenēkonta)

Ninety. The number of Cretan cities in Homer's phrase as cited by Socrates; part of the poetic description, not a fresh civic census. Attested: ἐνενήκοντα (319b). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Ninth ἔνατος

ἔνατος (enatos)

Ninth. The ordinal in Socrates' prose explanation of Minos' recurring association with Zeus in the ninth year. Attested: ἐνάτῳ (319c). Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85).

Non-Greek or barbarian peoples βάρβαρος

βάρβαρος (barbaros)

Non-Greek or barbarian peoples. The Greek cultural category that the companion says does not exhaust legal difference. Attested: βάρβαροι (315c). Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

Odyssey Ὀδύσσεια

Ὀδύσσεια (Odysseia)

Odyssey. The Homeric poem whose Nekyia supplies Socrates' reported picture of Minos giving judgment with a golden scepter. Attested: Ὀδυσσείας (319d). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Of cookery μαγειρικός

μαγειρικός (mageirikos)

Of cookery. Culinary; Socrates calls the practitioners' rules laws of cookery before applying the same construction to cities. Attested: Μαγειρικοὶ (316e). Cookery and the preparation of dishes (p. 34).

Of every sort παντοδαπός

παντοδαπός (pantodapos)

Of every sort. Of many kinds or sorts; describes the poets in Athens and the range of its capacity to influence reputation. Attested: παντοδαποὶ (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Of Friendship φίλιος

φίλιος (philios)

Of Friendship. An epithet of Zeus invoked in Socrates' oath before the final questions about bodily and psychic improvement. Attested: φιλίου (321c). Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145).

Of gardening κηπουρικός

κηπουρικός (kēpourikos)

Of gardening. Pertaining to gardening; the adjective identifies the practical domain of the laws under discussion. Attested: Κηπουρικοὶ (316e). Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55).

Of medicine ἰατρικός

ἰατρικός (iatrikos)

Of medicine. Medical; here qualifying the laws identified with doctors' writings about health. Attested: ἰατρικοὶ (316e). Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79).

Olympus Ὄλυμπος

Ὄλυμπος (Olympos)

Olympus. The Phrygian musician named as Marsyas' beloved and associated with the enduring divine flute-tunes. Attested: Ὄλυμπος (318b). Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician (p. 77).

On farming γεωργικός

γεωργικός (geōrgikos)

On farming. Agricultural, qualifying the writings that Socrates asks the companion to acknowledge as laws of farming. Attested: γεωργικὰ (316e). Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55).

One who is with συνουσιαστής

συνουσιαστής (synousiastēs)

One who is with. A person who associates with another; Socrates uses it to explain Minos' relationship to Zeus. Attested: συνουσιαστὴν (319e). Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20).

Opinion δόξα

δόξα (doxa)

Opinion. Socrates' reformulation of the civic resolution, preparing the question of its truth. Attested: Δόξαν (314c). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99).

Opinion; reputation. Public estimation of a person, which poets can influence favorably or adversely; distinguish this reputational sense from the earlier opinion about what is lawful. Attested: δόξαν (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

The opposite τοὐναντίον

τοὐναντίον (tounantion)

The opposite. The reversed identification of heavy and light, explicitly rejected by the companion. Attested: τοὐναντίον (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier (p. 139).

Oppositely ἐναντίως

ἐναντίως (enantiōs)

Oppositely. In the contrary way; describes the person opposed to the god whom it would be wrong to praise. Attested: ἐναντίως (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Order a city διοικεῖν

διοικεῖν (dioikein)

Order a city. To administer or manage the city; the accompanying "should" makes the question normative rather than merely descriptive. Attested: διοικεῖν (317c). Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109).

Ordering διοίκησις

διοίκησις (dioikēsis)

Ordering. Management or administration of a city; the subject to which the political writings and lawful usages belong. Attested: διοικήσεως (317a). Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109).

Overturns ἀνατρέπειν

ἀνατρέπειν (anatrepein)

Overturns. A second destructive verb for what injustice and lawlessness do to cities and other things. Attested: ἀνατρέπει (314d). Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60).

Oxen βοῦς

βοῦς (bous)

Oxen. Cattle, the beneficiaries explicitly named in the claim about the oxherd's laws. Attested: βουσί (318a). Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131).

Oxherd βουκόλος

βουκόλος (boukolos)

Oxherd. The cattle-tender whose laws are best for the oxen, following the shepherd's parallel relation to sheep. Attested: βουκόλου (318a). Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131).

Pay τελεῖν

τελεῖν (telein)

Pay. To discharge an obligation or pay what is due, here the tribute imposed by Minos. Attested: τελεῖν (321a). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

People ἄνθρωπος

ἄνθρωπος (anthrōpos)

People. The fallible human users of laws, distinguished from what law itself wishes. Attested: ἄνθρωποι (315b). Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74).

People λαός

λαός (laos)

People. People collectively in the Homeric shepherd formula; the epic expression links good leadership with the preceding herding analogy. Attested: λαῶν (321c). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Perception αἴσθησις

αἴσθησις (aisthēsis)

Perception. The explanatory kind to which sight and hearing are assigned. Attested: αἰσθήσει (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

Persians Πέρσης

Πέρσης (Persēs)

Persians. A specifically named non-Greek people in the question about whether just things are accepted as just; the reply is supplied in the printed text, but the name also occurs in Socrates' transmitted question. Attested: Πέρσαις (316a). Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

Phrygian Φρύξ

Φρύξ (Phryx)

Phrygian. The geographical or ethnic designation identifying Olympus. It prevents the example from being silently treated as exclusively Greek. Attested: Φρύξ (318b). Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician (p. 77).

Phrynichus Φρύνιχος

Φρύνιχος (Phrynichos)

Phrynichus. An early tragic poet named with Thespis among the supposed starting points Socrates rejects for Athenian tragedy. Attested: Φρυνίχου (321a). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Play παιδιά

παιδιά (paidia)

Play. Play or amusement associated here with wine; distinct from paideia, education, which describes Socrates'

preferred account of the association. Attested: παιδιᾶς (320a). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

Playfellow συμπαιστής

συμπαιστής (sympaistēs)

Playfellow. A companion in play, paired with drinking-companion in the rival interpretation of Minos' association. Attested: συμπαιστὴν (319e). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

Poetic ποιητικός

ποιητικός (poiētikos)

Poetic. Concerned with making poetry; identifies the kind of person whose enmity Socrates warns the reputation-conscious to avoid. Attested: ποιητικῷ (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Poetry ποίησις

ποίησις (poiēsis)

Poetry. Poetic making or poetry, the larger category within which Socrates distinguishes tragedy and other kinds. Attested: ποιήσεως (320e). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Poets ποιητής

ποιητής (poiētēs)

Poets. Makers of poetry whose praise or hostile portrayal has power over people's opinions and reputations. Attested: ποιηταὶ (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Political πολιτικός

πολιτικός (politikos)

Political. Qualifies the opinion Socrates says the companion has offered as law. Attested: πολιτικὴν (314c). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99).

Statesmen. Men identified as knowing how to rule cities. The substantive plural names practitioners rather than an abstract discipline called political science. Attested: πολιτικοί (317a). Kings and statesmen (p. 67).

Statesmen's. Pertaining to civic practitioners; the adjective qualifies their writings, which ordinary people call laws. Attested: Πολιτικὰ (317a). Kings and statesmen (p. 67).

Poor φλαῦρος

φλαῦρος (phlauros)

Poor. Poor, inferior or bad; paired with good as a quality present within the souls. Keep this printed form distinct from phaulos at 320b. Attested: φλαῦρον (321d). Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending (p. 119).

Praise ἔπαινος

ἔπαινος (epainos)

Praise. Praise given for Minos' singular educational privilege; its extent is emphasized rather than a new quality independently proved. Attested: ἔπαινος (319d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Praises ἐπαινεῖν

ἐπαινεῖν (epainein)

Praises. To commend or praise; praise of a person contrary to the god's goodness is included among the

evaluative errors Socrates warns against. Attested: ἐπαινῇ (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Preparation σκευασία

σκευασία (skeuasia)

Preparation. The preparing or making ready of food; this practical process is what the cook knows how to direct. Attested: σκευασίας (316e). Cookery and the preparation of dishes (p. 34).

Preserves σῴζειν

σῴζειν (sōizein)

Preserves. The beneficial effect attributed to justice and law upon cities and everything else. Attested: σῴζει (314d). Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60).

Preside ἐπιστατεῖν

ἐπιστατεῖν (epistatein)

Preside. To supervise or preside, specifically in the courts; this is the practical competence attributed to Rhadamanthys. Attested: ἐπιστατεῖν (320c). Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104).

Privilege γέρας

γέρας (geras)

Privilege. An honor or privileged distinction, specifically education by Zeus, said to be assigned by Homer to Minos alone among the heroes. Attested: γέρας (319c). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Proof ἀπόδειξις

ἀπόδειξις (apodeixis)

Proof. The companion's name for the demonstration supplied by many examples of variation. Attested: ἀποδείξεως (315d). Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

Prophecy μαντική

μαντική (mantikē)

Prophecy. The craft offered, with the qualification as the prophets say, as another example of finding. Attested: μαντικῇ (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

Prophets μάντις

μάντις (mantis)

Prophets. The claimants cited for prophecy's knowledge of what the gods have in mind. Attested: μάντεις (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

Quite clear κατάδηλος

κατάδηλος (katadēlos)

Quite clear. The claimed clarity that law, if opinion, must be the decent kind after base opinion is excluded. Attested: κατάδηλον (314e). True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133).

Ready to hand πρόχειρος

πρόχειρος (procheiros)

Ready to hand. A definition the companion may already have available to give; not a claim that the inquiry is trivial. Attested: πρόχειρον (313b). Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72).

Reasonable εἰκώς

εἰκώς (eikōs)

Reasonable. Likely, fitting or reasonable; the companion's assessment of Socrates' account is not a claim to have independently verified each premise. Attested: εἰκότα (321b). Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50).

Remain μένειν

μένειν (menein)

Remain. To persist into the present, said of the lawful usages of the old king Socrates asks the companion to identify. Attested: μένει (318c). Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88).

Remind ὑπομιμνῄσκειν

ὑπομιμνῄσκειν (hypomimnēskein)

Remind. To bring something to another's recollection; Socrates offers to supply the ancient musical example when the companion does not think of it. Attested: ὑπομνήσω (318b). Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician (p. 77).

Report φήμη

φήμη (phēmē)

Report. A saying or reputation spread abroad; the companion asks why the hostile account of Minos persists after Socrates' defense. Attested: φήμη (320d). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Resolutions δόγμα

δόγμα (dogma)

Resolutions. The civic decisions offered by the companion as law, later divided into decent and base. Attested: δόγματα (314b). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99).

Reveal ἐκφαίνειν

ἐκφαίνειν (ekphainein)

Reveal. To bring to light or make manifest; the tunes reveal those who are in need of the gods. The sentence does not specify a doctrine transmitted to them. Attested: ἐκφαίνει (318b). Divine movement disclosure and need (p. 43).

Revealing δηλοῦν

δηλοῦν (dēloun)

Revealing. The participle describes perception's making its objects manifest. Attested: δηλούσῃ (314a). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

Revealing δήλωσις

δήλωσις (dēlōsis)

Revealing. One proposed model of law's explanatory role, alongside perception and finding. Attested: δηλώσει (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

Rhadamanthys Ῥαδάμανθυς

Ῥαδάμανθυς (Rhadamanthys)

Rhadamanthys. Minos' brother, introduced as a good king and later assigned judicial service learned from Minos rather than the whole kingly craft. Attested: Ῥαδάμανθυς

(318d). Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104).

Right ὀρθός

ὀρθός (orthos)

Right. Correct in the relevant field. Socrates makes this the condition for calling a medical, culinary, or gardening rule lawful. Attested: ὀρθὸν (317b). Right and apparent law (p. 106).

Right. The predicate applied to the farmer's laws and distributions because he assigns appropriate seeds to each soil. Attested: ὀρθαί (317d). Right and apparent law (p. 106).

Rightly ὀρθῶς

ὀρθῶς (orthōs)

Rightly. Correctly framing a question: asking which gold is inappropriate when what gold is has been asked. Attested: ὀρθῶς (313a). Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72).

Rightly. Socrates provisionally allows that the companion's account of variation may be right and have escaped him. Attested: ὀρθῶς (315d). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Rightly. Qualifying the agreement now recapitulated: law is the finding of what is. Unlike 315a–b, this sentence contains no verb "wishes.". Attested: Ὀρθῶς (317d). Right and apparent law (p. 106).

Room to exceed ὑπερβολή

ὑπερβολή (hyperbolē)

Room to exceed. A going beyond or excess; the claim that praise allows no surpassing means that it could not be

made higher. Attested: ὑπερβολὴν (319d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Rule ἄρχειν

ἄρχειν (archein)

Rule. To direct or govern, here with gardens as the object. This non-political application prepares for the same verb applied to cities. Attested: ἄρχειν (316e). Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109).

Rule cities. To govern cities, made the object of knowing how. The repeated construction connects civic rule with directing gardens and food preparation. Attested: ἄρχειν (317a). Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109).

Ruled ἀνάσσειν

ἀνάσσειν (anassein)

Ruled. An epic verb of lordship, used in Hesiod's quoted praise of Minos' rule over neighboring people. Attested: ἤνασσε (320d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Sacred ἱερός

ἱερός (hieros)

Sacred. Sacred or set apart for a god; the examples of sacred objects lead to Socrates' claim that the good human being is most sacred. Attested: ἱεροὺς (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Sacrifice θύειν

θύειν (thyein)

Sacrifice. In the first example the explicit object is human beings, considered unholy by the speakers' community.

Attested: θύειν (315b). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Sacrifices θυσία

θυσία (thysia)

Sacrifices. The striking rites performed by the Greek groups in the companion's next example. Attested: θυσίας (315c). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Sacrificial victims ἱερεῖον

ἱερεῖον (hiereion)

Sacrificial victims. Victims slaughtered before a funeral; this clause does not identify them as human beings. Attested: ἱερεῖά (315c). Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57).

The same thing τὸ αὐτό

τὸ αὐτό (to auto)

The same thing. The common character of laws insofar as each is law; not yet sameness of every rule's content. Attested: ταὐτόν (313b). Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114).

The same things. What Socrates says the apparently shuffled things remain. Attested: ταὐτά (316c). Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114).

Savage ἄγριος

ἄγριος (agrios)

Savage. Wild or savage; one of the companion's reported charges against Minos, which Socrates calls an Attic tragic tale. Attested: ἄγριόν (318d). Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81).

Say or mean λέγειν

λέγειν (legein)

Say or mean. Specify which gold is meant in Socrates' hypothetical exchange; the point is about the intended subject. Attested: λέγω (313a). Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72).

Scepter σκῆπτρον

σκῆπτρον (skēptron)

Scepter. A staff marking authority, golden in Homer's depiction; Hesiod's scepter of Zeus is subsequently interpreted by Socrates as divine education. Attested: σκῆπτρον (319d). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Second δεύτερος

δεύτερος (deuteros)

Second. The warning puts wrongs against divine human beings second after wrongs against gods, ordering the objects of religious caution. Attested: δεύτερον (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Following second. The Lacedaemonians follow the Cretans in the drinking practice, having learned it from them; the ordering concerns transmission, not a claim of second-best moral worth. Attested: δεύτεροι (320a). Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124).

Seeds σπέρμα

σπέρμα (sperma)

Seeds. Actual agricultural seeds, the material allocated by the farmer. The dialogue does not make them an explicit allegory for citizens or political teachings. Attested:

σπέρματα (317d). Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55).

Seek ζητεῖν

ζητεῖν (zētein)

Seek. The inquiry into law is instructed to seek it as a good. Attested: ζητεῖν (314d). Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60).

Seem or be thought δοκεῖν

δοκεῖν (dokein)

Seem or be thought. Socrates asks how the proposed equations appear to the companion; the verb marks his judgment. Attested: δοκεῖ (313b). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18).

We think. Socrates qualifies the description of people who fail always to use the same laws. Attested: δοκοῦμεν (315b). Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74).

Sending for μεταπέμπεσθαι

μεταπέμπεσθαι (metapempesthai)

Sending for. Summoning the specialist women as part of the older Athenian funerary practice. Attested: μεταπεμπόμενοι (315c). Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57).

Service ὑπηρεσία

ὑπηρεσία (hypēresia)

Service. Subordinate service to the kingly craft, the limited scope of Rhadamanthys' education; service is not here a denial of his goodness. Attested: ὑπηρεσίαν (320c). Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104).

Sheep πρόβατον

πρόβατον (probaton)

Sheep. The animals whose herd is tended by a shepherd, supplying the literal pastoral case in the analogy. Attested: προβάτων (318a). Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131).

Shepherd ποιμήν

ποιμήν (poimēn)

Shepherd. The practitioner who tends sheep; his laws are said to be best for the sheep he cares for. Attested: Ποιμήν (318a). Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131).

Should χρή

χρή (chrē)

Should. The impersonal expression of what is necessary or ought to be done, in the question how a city should be ordered. Attested: χρὴ (317c). Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109).

Sickly νοσώδης

νοσώδης (nosōdēs)

Sickly. Sickly or associated with disease, contrasted with what is healthy as an object discerned by medicine. Attested: νοσώδη (314b). Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79).

Sight ὄψις

ὄψις (opsis)

Sight. The capacity or activity distinguished from visible objects and then explained as perception through the eyes. Attested: ὄψις (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

Sign σημεῖον

σημεῖον (sēmeion)

Sign. A sign supporting an assessment; the stability of Minos' laws is called the greatest sign that he was a good distributor. Attested: σημεῖον (321b). Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50).

Slaughtering victims before προσφάττειν

προσφάττειν (prosphattein)

Slaughtering victims before. The former Athenian action preceding the carrying out of the corpse. Attested: προσφάττοντες (315c). Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57).

Snakes ὄφις

ὄφις (ophis)

Snakes. Snakes, named with stones, wood and birds as recognized sacred things in the comparison with good human beings. Attested: ὄφεις (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

So simply ἁπλῶς

ἁπλῶς (haplōs)

So simply. The insufficiency of answering without qualification that law is a civic resolution. Attested: ἁπλῶς (314e). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99).

Socrates Σωκράτης

Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs)

Socrates. The named speaker who initiates the definition of law, directs most of the questioning, defends Minos, and includes himself in the final shame at not knowing the soul's improving provisions; here addressed by his

companion. Attested: Σώκρατες (313b). Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30).

Soil γῆ

γῆ (gē)

Soil. The soil on which seeds are distributed; “each soil” makes the recipient-specific character of the farmer’s task explicit. Attested: γῇ (317d). Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55).

Sons παῖς

παῖς (pais)

Sons. Children in relation to their parents, here the sons of Zeus and Europa; the noun does not establish their age in the story. Attested: παῖδες (318d). Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145).

Sons υἱός

υἱός (huios)

Sons. The victims described as some Carthaginians’ own sons; the form is the source’s form of the word for son. Attested: ὑεῖς (315c). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Son. The son-word used of Minos as Zeus’ son in the warning against speaking wrongly about a hero; the printed form is ὑόν. Attested: ὑὸν (319b). Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145).

Sophist σοφιστής

σοφιστής (sophistēs)

Sophist. A teacher or master of wisdom or skill; Socrates applies the name positively to Zeus as Minos’ educator.

Attested: σοφιστής (319c). Sophist, virtue, and the content of good education (p. 121).

Sorry φαῦλος

φαῦλος (phaulos)

Sorry. Inferior or contemptible; describes the inconsistent man Minos is assumed not to be, who does things contrary to his accepted standards. Attested: φαῦλος (320b). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

Soul ψυχή

ψυχή (psychē)

Soul. The soul as recipient of lawgiving intended to improve it; the precise beneficial distributions are left unnamed by the final exchange. Attested: ψυχὴν (321d). Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23).

Sounds φωνή

φωνή (phōnē)

Sounds. The immediate objects made manifest through hearing; not a divine voice in this passage. Attested: φωνάς (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

Speaking ill κακηγορεῖν

κακηγορεῖν (kakēgorein)

Speaking ill. To speak badly of someone; the reading printed in the dialogue, distinct from the accusation-word reported as an apparatus variant. Attested: κακηγοροῦντες (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Speaking well εὐλογεῖν

εὐλογεῖν (eulogein)

Speaking well. To speak favorably of someone; one direction in which poets can shape reputation. Attested: εὐλογοῦντες (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Speech λόγος

λόγος (logos)

Speech. The activity or expression contrasted with the things spoken in Socrates' first analogy. Attested: λόγος (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

A long speech. An extended statement of one's own view, criticized when it alternates with another separate speech without common examination. Attested: μακρῷ λόγῳ (315d). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Argument; account. An articulated account or argument, here the explanation about Minos that the companion calls reasonable; not an isolated word. Attested: λόγον (321b). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Words. Speech or conversation, which Socrates uses to gloss confidences and to specify the educational medium of Minos' association with Zeus. Attested: λόγοι (319e). Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20).

Stone λίθος

λίθος (lithos)

Stone. The second material example for sameness in the respect under definition. Attested: λίθος (313b). Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114).

Stop παύεσθαι

παύεσθαι (pauesthai)

Stop. The companion's denial that people ever stop changing laws. Attested: παυόμεθα (316c). Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25).

Stretching out ἐντείνειν

ἐντείνειν (enteinein)

Stretching out. To stretch or strain; describes the Athenians' treatment of Minos in tragedy, with an attack sense and a possible verse-making play noted by the edition. Attested: ἐντείνοντες (321a). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Strokes κροῦμα

κροῦμα (krouma)

Strokes. Instrumental strokes or sounds to be allocated to tunes by a skilled musician; the passage does not specify a modern mechanical action. Attested: κρουμάτων (317d). Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83).

Tablets γραμματεῖον

γραμματεῖον (grammateion)

Tablets. Writing tablets on which Talos carries the laws; their bronze material explains his designation as bronze. Attested: γραμματείοις (320c). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Take or suppose to be ὑπολαμβάνειν

ὑπολαμβάνειν (hypolambanein)

Take or suppose to be. Socrates asks which explanatory model they should most take law to belong to. Attested:

ὑπολάβοιμεν (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

Take. To suppose or interpret; introduces the rival reading of Minos as Zeus' drinking-companion and playmate. Attested: ὑπολαμβάνουσι (319e). Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85).

Take vengeance τιμωρεῖσθαι

τιμωρεῖσθαι (timōreisthai)

Take vengeance. To exact requital or revenge; the first-person plural includes Socrates' city in the retaliatory portrayal of Minos. Attested: τιμωρούμεθα (321a). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Tale μῦθος

μῦθος (mythos)

Tale. A story or tale, here the Attic tragic account of Minos; the term does not by itself establish a universal opposition between myth and reason. Attested: μῦθον (318d). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Talos Τάλως

Τάλως (Talōs)

Talos. The guardian who visits Cretan villages three times a year carrying laws on bronze tablets; this explains the description bronze in Socrates' account. Attested: Τάλως (320c). Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104).

Tell or explain φράζειν

φράζειν (phrazein)

Tell or explain. Socrates promises to explain how Homer and Hesiod eulogize Minos, with the stated purpose of

preventing the companion's verbal error against a hero. Attested: φράσω (319b). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Thespis Θέσπις

Θέσπις (Thespis)

Thespis. An early tragic poet whom Socrates denies to be tragedy's starting point; the edition's note records the traditional first-poet attribution. Attested: Θέσπιδος (321a). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Things πρᾶγμα

πρᾶγμα (pragma)

Things. What sight reveals in Burnet's printed text; the alternative colors belongs to the apparatus. Attested: πράγματα (314a). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

The things heard τὰ ἀκουόμενα

τὰ ἀκουόμενα (ta akouomena)

The things heard. Hearing's objects in the analogy separating law from accepted contents. Attested: τὰ ἀκουόμενα (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

The things learned τὰ μανθανόμενα

τὰ μανθανόμενα (ta manthanomena)

The things learned. The objects of learning in Socrates' extension of the capacity–object pattern. Attested: τὰ μανθανόμενα (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101).

The things seen τὰ ὁρώμενα

τὰ ὁρώμενα (ta horōmena)

The things seen. The visible objects, not the capacity of sight by which they are seen. Attested: τὰ ὁρώμενα (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

The things spoken τὰ λεγόμενα

τὰ λεγόμενα (ta legomena)

The things spoken. The contents or objects of speech, distinguished from speech itself for the analogy with accepted things. Attested: τὰ λεγόμενα (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

The things that are τὰ ὄντα

τὰ ὄντα (ta onta)

The things that are. The companion's plural expression for what would have been discovered if law were successful discovery. Attested: τὰ ὄντα (315a). What is and the things that are (p. 141).

The things that are not τὰ μὴ ὄντα

τὰ μὴ ὄντα (ta mē onta)

The things that are not. The negative counterpart in the formula that what is is accepted as being. Attested: τὰ μὴ ὄντα (316b). What is and the things that are (p. 141).

Think of or recognize ἐννοεῖν

ἐννοεῖν (ennoein)

Think of or recognize. Socrates suggests that the companion has not recognized the sameness of the things being moved about. Attested: ἐννοεῖς (316c). Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25).

Those who have died ἀποθνῄσκειν

ἀποθνῄσκειν (apothnēiskein)

Those who have died. The dead whose earlier Athenian funerary treatment the companion describes. Attested: ἀποθανόντας (315c). Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57).

Those who have knowledge ἐπιστήμων

ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

Those who have knowledge. People competent about the specified matters, here medical ones. The surrounding phrase limits the scope of their knowledge. Attested: ἐπιστήμονας (316c). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Has the knowledge. Competent to perform the named action, distributing seeds on soil. The infinitive makes the practical scope explicit. Attested: ἐπιστήμων (317d). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Three hundred τριακόσιοι

τριακόσιοι (triakosioi)

Three hundred. The approximate number of years mentioned for the Spartan arrangements. “Perhaps” and the allowance of a little more prohibit treating it as an exact chronological anchor. Attested: τριακόσια (318c). Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124).

Three times τρίς

τρίς (tris)

Three times. The frequency of Talos’ circuit within each year in this account; not the three-times-daily circuit of another mythographic version. Attested: τρὶς (320c). Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104).

Time χρόνος

χρόνος (chronos)

Time. In the phrase for all time, gives the sweeping temporal extent Socrates attributes to Crete's happiness under the laws; it is his claim, not a chronology verified by the lexicon. Attested: χρόνον (320b). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

To show ἀποδείκνυσθαι

ἀποδείκνυσθαι (apodeiknysthai)

To show. To display or demonstrate, here what Minos had learned before; the text does not specify a formal examination procedure. Attested: ἀποδειξόμενος (319e). Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20).

Town ἄστυ

ἄστυ (asty)

Town. The town in which Rhadamanthys guards the laws, contrasted with the rest of Crete administered through Talos' circuit. Attested: ἄστυ (320c). Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104).

Tragedy τραγῳδία

τραγῳδία (tragōidia)

Tragedy. The Athenian poetic form presented as especially popular and capable of leading souls, and as a means of retaliating against Minos. Attested: τραγῳδία (321a). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Tragic τραγικός

τραγικός (tragikos)

Tragic. Belonging to tragedy; locates the hostile Minos narrative in its poetic medium. Attested: τραγικόν (318d). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

Trainer παιδοτρίβης

παιδοτρίβης (paidotribēs)

Trainer. The physical trainer named as best at the specified bodily distribution and at tending the human herd in its body. Attested: Παιδοτρίβης (317e–318a). Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131).

Tribute δασμός

δασμός (dasmos)

Tribute. A levy or tribute Minos compelled Athens to pay; the dialogue does not specify its contents in this clause. Attested: δασμοὺς (321a). Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128).

True ἀληθής

ἀληθής (alēthēs)

True. The proposed identifying quality of decent opinion, accepted by the companion rather than separately demonstrated. Attested: ἀληθής (314e). True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133).

True opinion ἀληθὴς δόξα

ἀληθὴς δόξα (alēthēs doxa)

True opinion. An opinion identified with discovery of what is in the step leading to the account of law. Attested: ἀληθὴς δόξα (315a). True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133).

Truth ἀλήθεια

ἀλήθεια (alētheia)

Truth. Truth, explicitly linked with what is in the account of Minos' discovery concerning civic administration. Attested: ἀλήθειαν (321b). Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50).

Tunes μέλος

μέλος (melos)

Tunes. Musical tunes or melodic units, the recipients of the allotted instrumental strokes. The bodily sense "limbs" is not operative here. Attested: μέλη (317d). Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83).

Uneducated ἀπαίδευτος

ἀπαίδευτος (apaideutos)

Uneducated. Untrained or lacking education; part of the hostile report that conflicts with the picture of Minos as Zeus' pupil. Attested: ἀπαιδεύτου (320e). Sophist, virtue, and the content of good education (p. 121).

Unholy ἀνόσιος

ἀνόσιος (anosios)

Unholy. The Athenian evaluation of sacrificing human beings in the companion's report. Attested: ἀνόσιον (315b). Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111).

Unjust people ἄδικος

ἄδικος (adikos)

Unjust people. The moral characterization of lawless people accepted in the exchange. Attested: ἄδικοι (314d). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Unjust things. The contrary class in the question whether just and unjust things are to be called what they are. Attested: ἄδικα (315e). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Unmoved ἀκίνητος

ἀκίνητος (akinētos)

Unmoved. Unchanged or stable, the predicate of Minos' laws offered as the greatest sign that he was a good distributor who had discovered civic truth. Attested: ἀκίνητοι (321b). Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88).

Up and down ἄνω κάτω

ἄνω κάτω (anō katō)

Up and down. The restless or wholesale character of changes to law in the companion's description. Attested: ἄνω κάτω (316c). Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25).

Use χρῆσθαι

χρῆσθαι (chrēsthai)

Use. Use laws about the same matters, the practical behavior whose variation the companion invokes. Attested: χρώμεθα (315a). Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136).

Employ. Minos uses Rhadamanthys as a guardian of laws in the town; the verb with a dative here describes employing a person in a function, rather than a community's observing a law. Attested: ἐχρῆτο (320c). Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104).

Verse ἔπος

ἔπος (epos)

Verse. An utterance or line of verse, here the repeated Homeric line whose meaning Socrates proceeds to explain. Attested: ἔπος (319d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Very fine πάγκαλος

πάγκαλος (pankalos)

Very fine. Altogether or exceptionally fine; the adjective commends Zeus' educational craft, not the physical beauty of the god. Attested: παγκάλη (319c). Sophist, virtue, and the content of good education (p. 121).

View further διαθεᾶσθαι

διαθεᾶσθαι (diatheasthai)

View further. To examine or view a further aspect of law; this is Hermann's conjecture adopted in the supplied reading text, introducing the distribution sequence rather than a unanimously transmitted form. Attested: διαθεώμεθα (317d). Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92).

Villages κώμη

κώμη (kōmē)

Villages. Villages through which Talos passes while guarding the laws; the local units of his rural circuit. Attested: κώμας (320c). Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104).

Virtue ἀρετή

ἀρετή (aretē)

Virtue. Excellence or virtue, the end toward which the stated education is directed; the dialogue does not

separately define its components. Attested: ἀρετήν (320b). Sophist, virtue, and the content of good education (p. 121).

Waging war πολεμεῖν

πολεμεῖν (polemein)

Waging war. To make war; Minos' action toward Athens is acknowledged and made the cause of the city's hostility. Attested: πολεμήσας (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Was king βασιλεύειν

βασιλεύειν (basileuein)

Was king. To reign or exercise kingship; the imperfect in the Homeric verse belongs to the description Socrates interprets educationally. Attested: βασίλευε (319b). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

We would have answered ἀποκρίνεσθαι

ἀποκρίνεσθαι (apokrinesthai)

We would have answered. The hypothetical joint answer defining sight as a kind of perception. Attested: ἀπεκρινάμεθ' (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126).

Answer. The companion chooses to answer Socrates' questions in the common inquiry. Attested: ἀποκρίνεσθαι (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Weighing ἕλκειν

ἕλκειν (helkein)

Weighing. In the weighing idiom, things drawing more weigh more; not a generic description of dragging objects. Attested: ἕλκοντα (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier (p. 139).

Well thought of εὐδόκιμος

εὐδόκιμος (eudokimos)

Well thought of. Held in good public estimation; the state sought by people warned against incurring poets' hatred. Attested: εὐδόκιμον (320e). Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97).

Went round περίειμι

περίειμι (perieimi)

Went round. To go around on a circuit; the imperfect describes Talos' recurring administration of the villages. Attested: περιᾔει (320c). Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104).

What is τὸ ὄν

τὸ ὄν (to on)

What is. The object of discovery, encompassing what is so rather than only a list of physically existing objects. Attested: τοῦ ὄντος (315a). What is and the things that are (p. 141).

What is accepted τὰ νομιζόμενα

τὰ νομιζόμενα (ta nomizomena)

What is accepted. The companion's first proposed definition, covering things held or observed as customary. Attested: τὰ νομιζόμενα (313b). Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15).

What is looked into σκέμμα

σκέμμα (skemma)

What is looked into. The matter jointly examined, rather than one speaker's private long account. Attested: σκέμμα (315e). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

The whole τὸ ὅλον

τὸ ὅλον (to holon)

The whole. The companion echoes Socrates' demand to identify law as a whole. Attested: τὸ ὅλον (314c). Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72).

Wine οἶνος

οἶνος (oinos)

Wine. Wine, specifying the kind of play discussed in the convivial interpretation; the exact law next prohibits drinking together to drunkenness. Attested: οἶνος (320a). Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45).

Wisdom σοφία

σοφία (sophia)

Wisdom. The quality by which wise people are wise in Socrates' opening verbal parallel. Attested: σοφίᾳ (314c). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Wise people σοφός

σοφός (sophos)

Wise people. The first class of persons in the sequence wise by wisdom, just by justice, lawful by law. Attested: σοφούς (314c). Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64).

Wishes βούλεσθαι

βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

Wishes. Predicated of law in the qualified definition; identifies what law aims or means to be without making it a conscious person. Attested: βούλεται (315a). Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74).

You wish. Socrates' human wish concerning what the companion will answer, distinct from law's figurative

wish. Attested: βούλῃ (315e). Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74).

Without knowledge ἀνεπιστήμων

ἀνεπιστήμων (anepistēmōn)

Without knowledge. Lacking the relevant knowledge; the judgment Socrates elicits about those who change their rules about the same matters. Attested: ἀνεπιστήμονας (317b). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69).

Women who pour offerings ἐγχυτίστρια

ἐγχυτίστρια (enchytistria)

Women who pour offerings. Rare, uncertain designation for the summoned funerary women; the supplied translation follows a libation interpretation and retains Burnet's spelling. Attested: ἐγχυτιστρίας (315c). Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57).

Wonderful or surprising θαυμαστός

θαυμαστός (thaumastos)

Wonderful or surprising. Socrates says there is nothing surprising if the companion is right and the point has escaped him. Attested: θαυμαστόν (315d). Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28).

Wonderful. Remarkable or wonderful, qualifying the praise implied by Minos' education from Zeus in Socrates' interpretation. Attested: θαυμαστός (319d). Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62).

Wood ξύλον

ξύλον (xylon)

Wood. Wood or wooden objects, listed among sacred things before Socrates gives superior sacred standing to

the good human being. Attested: ξύλα (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90).

Working ἐργασία

ἐργασία (ergasia)

Working. Practical work or cultivation, here the working of gardens that forms the subject of writings and lawful usages. Attested: ἐργασίας (316e). Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55).

Write συγγράφειν

συγγράφειν (syngraphein)

Write. To set down a written account. Doctors write what they also accept as being about health, connecting the writing with the knower's judgment. Attested: συγγράφουσι (316d). Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52).

Will write. The future form used in the claim that actual knowers will not write different things at different times about the same subjects. Attested: συγγράψουσι (317b). Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52).

Writing σύγγραμμα

σύγγραμμα (syngramma)

Writing. A written work encountered by the companion, here concerning the health of the sick. The noun itself guarantees neither truth nor legal authority. Attested: συγγράμματι (316c). Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52).

Writings. Written accounts concerning civic ordering, assigned to those who know how to rule cities. Socrates subsequently distinguishes right law from an incorrect

writing merely taken as law. Attested: συγγράμματά (317a). Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52).

Written γράφειν

γράφειν (graphein)

Written. To write or inscribe; the perfect passive participle describes the laws as already written on Talos' bronze tablets. Attested: γεγραμμένους (320c). Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116).

Year ἐνιαυτός

ἐνιαυτός (eniautos)

Year. A year, in the time expression fixing Talos' three annual circuits through the villages. Attested: ἐνιαυτοῦ (320c). Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104).

Years ἔτος

ἔτος (etos)

Years. Units of elapsed time in the loose estimate that the Spartan arrangements are perhaps not yet three hundred years old or slightly more. Attested: ἔτη (318c). Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124).

Zeus Ζεύς

Ζεύς (Zeus)

Zeus. The god interpreted by Socrates as Minos' educator; his nominative Zeus and oblique forms Dios, Dii and epic Zēnos name the same god. Attested: Ζεὺς (319c). Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145).

Contextual phrase glosses

These expressions deserve to be read as constructions or turns of argument. They supplement the full articles and defined vocabulary register. The Greek follows the supplied reading text; ellipses indicate omitted words, and translations here sometimes unfold a construction more fully than a short lexical equivalent can. The section references belong to Minos; page locators in the indexes belong to this companion.

What law is for us

313a: Ὁ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν; The dative ἡμῖν introduces the question “for us,” not an established doctrine that law is whatever a particular group happens to decide. The companion initially hears a request to identify one of several laws; Socrates then asks for what makes each law law. The phrase sets up the tension between a shared inquiry and the plurality of laws without resolving it at the first line. See Law and its definition.

In respect of being law

313a: κατὰ τὸ νόμος εἶναι. The preposition with the articular infinitive specifies a respect under which things are compared. Laws need not have identical contents or histories to be alike “in being law.” The gold and stone examples depend on that restriction. Removing it would make Socrates assert an indiscriminate sameness that the words do not require. See Sameness and difference.

Neither more nor less law

313b: οὐχ ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δ’ ἧττον. The balanced clauses say that one is not law to a greater degree and another to a

lesser degree, with the predicate understood from the preceding statement. This concerns the common character under inquiry. It does not already establish that every rule in ordinary usage is equally just; later Socrates excludes wrong rules from law in the strict sense. See Law and its definition.

What kind of thing the means is

314a: τίνι ὄντι τῇ ὄψει ὁρᾶται; The question asks what sight is, such that visible things are seen by it. The instrumental dative is repeated for hearing and law. Socrates is seeking an explanatory account of the means, not merely naming its objects. The construction gives the analogy its structure while leaving open whether law works like a perceptual capacity. See Speech and perception.

As the prophets say

314b: ὥς φασιν οἱ μάντεις. This parenthetic qualification attributes the claim about discovering divine intentions to prophets. It does not make the whole analogy ironic or false, but it prevents treating the example as an unqualified guarantee of divinatory access supplied by the narrator. There is no narrator making such a guarantee. The words are Socrates' qualification inside a hypothetical answer. See Revealing and finding.

It looks as though

314b–c: ὥστε κινδυνεύει … νόμος, δόγμα πόλεως εἶναι. Here κινδυνεύει expresses a tentative appearance or likelihood, translated "it looks as though." It does not mean that law faces physical danger. The companion's second proposal is presented as an emerging account, then recast

by Socrates through the related word “opinion.” Its tentativeness should survive a paraphrase. See Resolution and opinion.

If law is opinion

314e: εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί. The conditional qualifies the claim that law must be the decent opinion. Socrates has said that law also appears to him to be some kind of opinion, but the inference is still framed “if law is opinion.” The argument first excludes the base kind; it does not derive the whole identification simply from law’s being good. See True opinion.

Wishes none the less

315a: Βούλεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον. The phrase insists that law’s orientation toward discovery remains despite the objection from divergent practice. The following δέ turns to the human beings who fail to discover. The contrast is between the aim assigned to law and the variable attainment of people, not between two different gods or two grades of legislative force. See What law wishes.

And even their own sons

315c: καὶ ταῦτα ἔνιοι αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱεῖς. The combination heightens the example: some, what is more, even sacrifice their own sons. The reflexive αὐτῶν fixes whose sons are meant. The clause belongs to the companion’s report of Carthaginian practice, introduced with an appeal to what Socrates may have heard. It must not be generalized into a claim that every Carthaginian did so. See Sacrifice and holiness.

Not only foreign peoples

315c: καὶ μὴ ὅτι βάρβαροι ἄνθρωποι … ἀλλὰ καὶ. The idiom expands the evidence from non-Greek peoples to Greeks themselves. Lycaea and the descendants of Athamas are not accidental ornament: they block a simple explanation of difference as foreignness. The point then turns inward again to earlier Athenian funeral usages. See Variation in customs.

Countless examples and room for proof

315d: μυρία δ’ ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν. The potential construction says that one could cite countless examples of this kind. It is the companion’s claim of evidential abundance, not an actual presentation of every case. His following phrase about room for proof reinforces confidence in the divergence objection. Socrates’ change of method answers the manner of inquiry before it answers the individual cases. See Common inquiry.

Putting the inquiry in common

315e: ἐὰν δὲ κοινὸν τεθῇ τὸ σκέμμα. The passive subjunctive makes the shared placement of what is examined a condition for possible agreement. The continuation τάχ’ ἄν ὁμολογήσαιμεν remains modest: “we might perhaps agree.” The common object and the possible agreement are related but not identical; making an inquiry collaborative is not itself proof of its conclusion. See Common inquiry.

Asking or answering

315e: πυνθανόμενός τι παρ’ ἐμοῦ … εἰ δ’ αὖ βούλει, ἀποκρινόμενος. Socrates explicitly offers the companion

two roles, asking something of him or answering him. The companion chooses the latter. This matters when evaluating the method: the proposal is not worded as a demand that only Socrates may ask questions. The subsequent distribution of speech results from the choice made in the conversation. See Companion and Socrates.

Among the Persians too

316a: ⟨ΕΤ. Καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις⟩. This is an editorially supplied answer, printed within angle brackets. It repeats the location in Socrates' preceding question and completes the agreement about just and unjust things. The addition helps the question-and-answer sequence, but the supplied apparatus says that A and F do not have it. The brackets are evidence about transmission, not a sign that the Persians are hypothetical people. See Reading the text and apparatus.

Whoever misses what is

316b: Ὃς ἂν … ἁμαρτάνῃ. The relative with ἄν and subjunctive gives a general condition: whoever misses what is misses the lawful. The genitive marks what is missed. The sentence connects correctness about the object with lawfulness, but does not identify which of the companion's disputed sacrifices meets the condition. Its scope is general; the unworked applications still matter. See Error and missing.

In the way you put it

316b: Οὕτω μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ λέγεις. The companion grants that matters appear lawful under Socrates' formulation, then contrasts this with his inability to be persuaded when he thinks of constant legal change.

The μέν anticipates that reservation. An editor who extracts only the assent produces a stronger agreement than the complete response supplies. See Agreement and persuasion.

Up and down and moved like pieces

316c: ἄνω κάτω μετατιθέμενοι; μεταπεττευόμενα. The first expression conveys repeated rearrangement; the second introduces a board-game image in Socrates' reply. These are separately cited expressions, not a single continuous Greek clause. Their vividness should not make the game a technical constitutional model: the argumentative question is whether what is being rearranged is nevertheless the same. See Change and draughts.

About what they know

316d: περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῶσι. The relative clause restricts the asserted agreement of Greek and non-Greek experts to matters they know. It does not say that every practitioner is correct about every subject. The restriction is essential to the move from ethnic variety to common knowledgeable judgment. See Knowledge.

Those who really know

317b: οἵ γε ἐπιστάμενοι. The particle γε emphasizes the class under discussion: those who know, at least. The claim that they do not write different things at different times about the same matters is not a neutral census of everyone called a doctor or statesman. It relies on the description of them as possessors of the relevant knowledge. See Expert writings.

What seems law to those who do not know

317c: ὃ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν. The relative clause identifies the wrong rule by the appearance it has to non-knowers. Socrates does not deny that it is called law in ordinary life; he rejects that appearance as a sufficient condition for genuine law. The clause is the text's own acknowledgment of the gap between public naming and the stricter standard. See Right law.

The things due to each recipient

317d: τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ. The distributive dative "to each soil" and the evaluative adjective "due" or "fitting" make allocation recipient-sensitive. The right seed is not identified merely by giving every plot the same portion. The construction prepares the analogous questions about musical strokes and bodily food, then makes the missing psychic object at the end particularly important. See Due and fitting.

Say so

318a: φάθι. This imperative follows Socrates' question whether the king's laws are best for human souls. The companion answers Φημὶ δή, "I say so." The push toward assent is unusually explicit. It is part of the dialogue's manner and helps locate the inference being secured; it is not additional evidence that the kingly craft's psychic contents have already been explained. See Kings and statesmen.

Still even now

318b–c: ἔτι καὶ νῦν. The temporal phrase links old musical compositions and old lawful usages with continued presence in the speakers' time. Their survival is part of the bridge from musical lawgivers to kings. Persistence is not simply the dictionary meaning of "divine," though Socrates presents these cases as surviving in virtue of divinity. See Oldest laws.

As being divine

320b: ἅτε θείοις οὖσιν. The participial phrase gives the reason as Socrates presents it: the laws benefit Crete and Sparta as divine laws. A causal construction in a speaker's account reports his explanatory claim; it does not independently establish divine provenance. Compare the related "as being divine" language around survival at 318b–c. See Evidence and stability.

Not by Homer and Hesiod at any rate

318e: Οὔκουν ὑπό γε Ὁμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου. Socrates' negative answer is restricted by the agents he names. He does not deny that the harsh story is told about Minos; he denies that these selected poets are its authorities. This distinction allows the companion's report to remain a real fact about reception while Socrates disputes its truth and pedigree. See Homer and Hesiod.

In word and deed

318e: καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ. The paired datives cover verbal and practical wrongdoing against gods and divine people. Speech about Minos is therefore morally consequential within Socrates' warning. The phrase does not make a

mistaken literary interpretation equivalent in every respect to every wrongful act; it broadens the field in which caution and correct discrimination are needed. See Praise and piety.

The one like himself

319a: τὸν ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιον. In the warning about divine indignation, the reflexive refers to the god: the censured person is like the god. The subsequent explanation identifies that person as the good man. Taking the reflexive instead as the censurer's likeness would change the moral account. The point grounds respect in goodness, not simply in the fame or age of the person discussed. See Praise and piety.

Human child and son of Zeus

319b: ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου εἰς ἥρω Διὸς υὸν. The compressed contrast sets the companion's human descent against Minos' heroic and divine descent. The surrounding clause warns against verbal error. Socrates is heightening the seriousness of his promised account, not giving the companion a newly disclosed personal genealogy. See Zeus and Europa.

In words and as a sophist

319c: ἐν λόγοις; ὡς ὑπὸ σοφιστοῦ ὄντος τοῦ Διός. The first extract locates Minos' association in discourse; the second presents Zeus under the description of a sophist who educates. They are two parts of Socrates' explanation of Homer's line, not additional words in that line. The explanatory expansion is precisely what the reader must distinguish from the evidence it interprets. See Association and education.

No other hero received this privilege

319c: οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ἀπένειμεν … ἄλλῳ ἢ Μίνῳ. The construction makes the distribution of this particular Homeric honor exclusive to Minos. The honor in question is education by Zeus. It does not say that Homer gives no honor to any other hero, or that no other hero is a child of Zeus. The scope of “this privilege” is indispensable. See Homer and Hesiod.

Learning some things and showing others

319e: τὰ μὲν μαθησόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀποδειξόμενος. The paired future participles express purposes of Minos’ visits: to learn some things and demonstrate others already learned in the previous interval. The relation is not mere attendance, and the second half should not disappear into a generalized “education.” Socrates imagines both acquisition and accountable display of learning. See Association and education.

Every ninth year

319e: δι’ ἐνάτου ἔτους. The periodic expression belongs to Socrates’ elaboration of *ἐννέωρος*. It makes repeated visits explicit in his account. That explicit prose does not retroactively eliminate the uncertainty of the Homeric adjective when considered on its own. Nor should it be converted into a modern calendar schedule without attending to ancient ways of counting an interval. See Confidant and nine yearly.

They say nothing

319e: οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. The idiom rejects the alternative interpreters’ claim as empty or unsound; it does not mean

that they are literally silent. They have just been described as construing the confidant as a drinking-companion and playfellow. Socrates proposes evidence against that construal, so the idiom marks an argumentative rejection rather than an absence of testimony. See Drinking and consistency.

To the point of drunkenness

320a: εἰς μέθην. The endpoint limits the specific Cretan rule quoted after the infinitive “not to drink together.” The law is not accurately restated as “never drink wine” or as an unrestricted prohibition of all gatherings. Socrates also makes a broader statement about Cretan and Spartan abstention from symposia, but the two formulations must remain distinct.[3] See Drinking and consistency.

Accepting one thing and doing another

320b: ἐνόμιζεν μὲν ἕτερα, ἐποίει δὲ ἄλλα παρ’ ἃ ἐνόμιζεν. The balanced clauses describe the inconsistency Socrates refuses to attribute to Minos. The last phrase makes the action contrary to what was accepted, not merely different in vocabulary. This assumption helps infer Minos’ conduct and association from his enactments; its argumentative role should not be hidden as if the biographical conclusion were separately documented. See Drinking and consistency.

[3] At 320a the exact clause μὴ συμπίνειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς μέθην includes the limiting phrase “to drunkenness.” The accompanying claim about who abstains from symposia is not identical in scope to this particular rule.

Enough to preside in the courts

320c: οὐχ ὅλην τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην … ὅσον ἐπιστατεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. Rhadamanthys' education has a limited scope: service to kingship sufficient for presiding in courts. This preserves both his goodness as a judge and Minos' superiority in comprehensive kingly expertise. "Not the whole" is not "none," and "service" is not a second complete kingship. See Rhadamanthys and Talos.

Hence he was called bronze

320c: ὅθεν χαλκοῦς ἐκλήθη. "Hence" points backward to Talos carrying laws written on bronze tablets. Socrates explains the epithet by the material of the legal record, within this account. Replacing that causal explanation with a bronze body imports another version of the myth and removes the present passage's connection between written law and guardianship. See Scepter and guarding.

In return for the tribute

321a: ἀνθ' ὧν ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασε τοὺς δασμοὺς τελεῖν ἐκείνους. The phrase explains retaliatory motivation: the Athenians' tragic treatment of Minos answers his compelling them to pay that tribute. Socrates does not deny the exaction when he defends Minos' goodness. The demonstrative presupposes the story known to the participants; it does not spell out the Minotaur narrative in the spoken text. See Tragedy and vengeance.

If what I say is true

321b: εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. Socrates places the next inference under a truth condition immediately after the companion has called his account reasonable. The

sequence distinguishes plausibility, truth, and what follows if the account is true. It need not be read as total withdrawal, but it must not be edited out of a presentation of the argument's confidence. See Evidence and stability.

By Zeus of Friendship

321c: πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου. The invocation accompanies the final renewed question and addresses the god as guardian of friendship. It is neither another speaker nor a new proof of the body's and soul's needs. In a conversation now returning from Minos' divine education to the two speakers' own limits, the oath gives the turn personal urgency. See Zeus and Europa.

Answering well and briefly

321c: καλῶς τε καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀποκρινόμενοι. The phrase describes the answer they could give about bodily improvement: food and labors. Its brevity is possible because the objects and their effects can be named. The contrast with the following psychic question is therefore not merely a contrast between long and short speeches, but between an available concise explanation and an unavailable one. See Body and soul.

No longer able to say

321d: Οὐκέτι τοῦτ' ἔχω εἰπεῖν. The construction with ἔχω and infinitive expresses being able to state an answer. Οὐκέτι marks the limit reached after the preceding agreements and the easy bodily answer. The companion is not forgetting his own name or refusing all discussion; he cannot say what the lawgiver distributes to the soul so as to improve it. See Shame and ignorance.

What is within the souls

321d: τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐταῖς … τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος. The paired objects contrast the souls' own contents with bodily matters. The feminine plural pronouns belong to the souls of the two speakers. The phrase is not the technical expression "things in themselves." Socrates' reproach concerns an asymmetry of inquiry: apparent ignorance of what is internally good or poor alongside investigation of bodies and other things. See Shame and ignorance.

Lexical index

The Greek sequence links to each consolidated register headword. The English sequence offers another route to the same definitions. Article headings appear in the full contents. Page numbers refer to the matching PDF of this companion; Stephanus references in the entries refer to Minos.

Greek headwords

- ἀγαθός (p. 148) — a good
- ἀγέλη (p. 181) — herd
- ἄγριος (p. 218) — savage
- ἀδελφός (p. 149) — akin
- ἀδικία (p. 185) — injustice
- ἄδικος (p. 233) — unjust people; unjust things
- ἀεί (p. 149) — always
- Ἀθάμας (p. 152) — athamas
- ἀθρεῖν (p. 194) — look closely at
- αἴσθησις (p. 209) — perception
- αἰσχρός (p. 200) — most shameful; shameful things; shameful
- αἰσχύνεσθαι (p. 153) — be ashamed
- ἀκίνητος (p. 234) — unmoved
- ἀκοή (p. 181) — hearing
- ἀκούειν (p. 186) — is heard; have heard
- ἀλήθεια (p. 233) — truth
- ἀληθής (p. 232) — true
- ἀληθὴς δόξα (p. 232) — true opinion

- ἄλλοι ἄλλοις (p. 166) — different people different ones
- ἄλλος (p. 165) — different
- ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις (p. 165) — different ones at different times
- ἁμαρτάνειν (p. 198) — miss
- ἀναγκάζειν (p. 161) — compelled
- ἀνάγκη (p. 203) — necessity
- ἀνάσσειν (p. 217) — ruled
- ἀνατρέπειν (p. 207) — overturns
- ἀνεπιστήμων (p. 239) — without knowledge
- ἀνέρομαι (p. 178) — had asked
- ἀνθρώπειος (p. 183) — human
- ἄνθρωπος (p. 208) — people
- ἀνομία (p. 192) — lawlessness
- ἄνομος (p. 192) — lawless people; lawless
- ἀνόσιος (p. 233) — unholy
- ἄντρον (p. 158) — cave
- ἄνω κάτω (p. 234) — up and down
- ἄξιος (p. 170) — due; due food
- ἀπαίδευτος (p. 233) — uneducated
- ἀπέχεσθαι (p. 148) — abstain
- ἀπεχθάνεσθαι (p. 184) — incur hatred
- ἁπλῶς (p. 222) — so simply
- ἀποδείκνυσθαι (p. 231) — to show
- ἀπόδειξις (p. 213) — proof
- ἀποθνῄσκειν (p. 230) — those who have died

- ἀποκρίνεσθαι (p. 236) — we would have answered; answer
- ἀπολλύναι (p. 165) — destroys
- ἀπονέμειν (p. 167) — distributed
- ἀρετή (p. 235) — virtue
- ἄριστος (p. 156) — best
- ἁρμόττειν (p. 174) — fit or be appropriate
- ἄρχειν (p. 217) — rule; rule cities
- ἄρχεσθαι (p. 155) — began; beginning
- ἀσεβεῖν (p. 153) — be impious
- ἀσεβής (p. 198) — more impious
- ἄστυ (p. 231) — town
- Ἀττικός (p. 152) — attic
- αὔλημα (p. 174) — flute-tunes
- αὐλητής (p. 174) — flute-player
- αὐλητικός (p. 201) — most skilled flute-player; for the flute
- αὔξειν (p. 195) — making grow
- βάρβαρος (p. 204) — non-greek or barbarian peoples
- βαρύτερος (p. 181) — heavier
- βασιλεύειν (p. 236) — was king
- βασιλεύς (p. 188) — kings; king
- βασιλεύτατος (p. 188) — kingliest
- βασιλικός (p. 188) — kingly men; kingly
- βέλτιστος (p. 202) — my excellent friend; best
- βελτίων (p. 156) — better
- βουκόλος (p. 208) — oxherd

- βούλεσθαι (p. 238) — wishes; you wish
- βοῦς (p. 208) — oxen
- βραχύς (p. 157) — briefly
- γέρας (p. 212) — privilege
- γεωργικός (p. 206) — on farming
- γεωργός (p. 173) — farmer
- γῆ (p. 223) — soil
- γιγνώσκειν (p. 189) — know or recognize
- γραμματεῖον (p. 226) — tablets
- γράφειν (p. 241) — written
- γυμνάζειν (p. 173) — exercising
- δασμός (p. 232) — tribute
- δεύτερος (p. 219) — second; following second
- δῆλος (p. 160) — clear
- δηλοῦν (p. 215) — revealing
- δήλωσις (p. 215) — revealing
- δημοτερπής (p. 199) — most delightful to the people
- διαγιγνώσκειν (p. 166) — distinguish
- διαθεᾶσθαι (p. 235) — view further
- διακόσμησις (p. 151) — arrangement
- διανέμειν (p. 167) — distribute; distributes
- διανοεῖσθαι (p. 180) — have in mind; think about
- διανομή (p. 168) — distributions
- διαφέρειν (p. 165) — differ
- δικάζειν (p. 187) — judging
- δίκαιος (p. 187) — just people; just things
- δικαιοσύνη (p. 188) — justice
- δικαστήριον (p. 163) — courts

- δικαστής (p. 187) — judge
- διοικεῖν (p. 207) — order a city
- διοίκησις (p. 207) — ordering
- δόγμα (p. 215) — resolutions
- δοκεῖν (p. 220) — seem or be thought; we think
- δόξα (p. 206) — opinion; opinion; reputation
- δύνασθαι (p. 152) — be able
- ἐγκωμιάζειν (p. 172) — eulogize
- ἐγκώμιον (p. 172) — eulogy
- ἐγχυτίστρια (p. 239) — women who pour offerings
- ἐθέλειν (p. 150) — am willing
- εἰδέναι (p. 183) — i know; know; those who know; knowing
- εἰκώς (p. 214) — reasonable
- εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί (p. 184) — if law is opinion
- ἕκαστος (p. 170) — each
- ἔκγονος (p. 164) — descendants
- ἐκφαίνειν (p. 215) — reveal
- ἐκφορά (p. 158) — carrying out
- ἔλαττον (p. 193) — less
- ἕλκειν (p. 236) — weighing
- Ἕλλην (p. 177) — greeks
- ἐναντίως (p. 207) — oppositely
- ἔνατος (p. 204) — ninth
- ἔνειναι (p. 151) — are present within
- ἐνενήκοντα (p. 204) — ninety
- ἐνιαυτός (p. 241) — year
- ἐννεετηρίς (p. 203) — nine-year period

- ἐννέωρος (p. 203) — nine-yearly
- ἐννοεῖν (p. 229) — think of or recognize
- ἐντείνειν (p. 226) — stretching out
- ἐντυγχάνειν (p. 160) — come across
- ἐξαμαρτάνειν (p. 195) — make a mistake against; make a consequential mistake
- ἐξεύρεσις (p. 166) — discovery
- ἐξευρίσκειν (p. 179) — have been discovered; discover
- ἔοικα (p. 187) — it seems
- ἐπαινεῖν (p. 211) — praises
- ἔπαινος (p. 211) — praise
- ἐπισκέπτεσθαι (p. 193) — let us examine
- ἐπίστασθαι (p. 189) — know how; those who know how
- ἐπιστατεῖν (p. 212) — preside
- ἐπιστήμη (p. 189) — knowledge
- ἐπιστήμων (p. 230) — those who have knowledge; has the knowledge
- ἔπος (p. 235) — verse
- ἐργασία (p. 240) — working
- ἔργον (p. 164) — deed
- ἐρωτᾶν (p. 151) — ask
- ἕτερος (p. 166) — different replacements
- ἔτος (p. 241) — years
- εὐδαιμονεῖν (p. 185) — is happy
- εὐδόκιμος (p. 237) — well thought of
- εὐθύνειν (p. 178) — guided

- εὐλαβεῖσθαι (p. 154) — be wary
- εὐλογεῖν (p. 225) — speaking well
- εὕρεσις (p. 173) — finding
- εὕρημα (p. 174) — finding
- εὑρίσκειν (p. 185) — is found
- εὐρυχωρία (p. 150) — ample room
- Εὐρώπη (p. 172) — europa
- Ζεύς (p. 241) — zeus
- ζητεῖν (p. 220) — seek
- ἥκειν (p. 161) — come from
- ἡλικία (p. 149) — age
- ἥρως (p. 182) — hero
- Ἡσίοδος (p. 182) — hesiod
- ἧττον (p. 193) — less
- θάπτειν (p. 157) — buried
- θαυμαστός (p. 239) — wonderful or surprising; wonderful
- θεῖος (p. 199) — most divine; divine; divine human beings
- θεός (p. 176) — gods
- Θέσπις (p. 228) — thespis
- θνητός (p. 199) — mortal
- θύειν (p. 217) — sacrifice
- θυσία (p. 218) — sacrifices
- ἰατρική (p. 196) — medicine
- ἰατρικός (p. 205) — of medicine
- ἰατρός (p. 169) — doctors
- ἱερεῖον (p. 218) — sacrificial victims

- ἱερός (p. 217) — sacred
- κακηγορεῖν (p. 224) — speaking ill
- κακόδοξος (p. 181) — held in worse opinion
- καλεῖν (p. 157) — call or name; call laws
- καλός (p. 200) — most fine; fine things
- κάμνειν (p. 154) — be sick
- Καρχηδόνιος (p. 158) — carthaginians
- Καρχηδών (p. 158) — carthage
- κατάδηλος (p. 213) — quite clear
- κατασκεδάννυσθαι (p. 179) — has been spread abroad
- καταφαίνεσθαι (p. 150) — appears
- κῆπος (p. 175) — gardens
- κηπουρικός (p. 205) — of gardening
- κηπουρός (p. 175) — gardeners
- κιθαριστής (p. 159) — cithara-player
- κινδυνεύειν (p. 194) — looks as though
- κινεῖν (p. 201) — move
- Κνωσός (p. 160) — cnossus
- κοινῇ (p. 184) — in common
- κοινός (p. 161) — common or shared
- κουφότερος (p. 193) — lighter
- κράτιστος (p. 148) — ablest
- Κρής (p. 163) — cretans
- Κρήτη (p. 163) — crete
- Κρόνος (p. 164) — cronus
- κροῦμα (p. 226) — strokes
- κώμη (p. 235) — villages

- Λακεδαιμόνιος (p. 190) — lacedaemonians
- Λακεδαίμων (p. 190) — lacedaemon
- λανθάνειν (p. 179) — has escaped notice
- λαός (p. 208) — people
- λέγειν (p. 219) — say or mean
- λίθος (p. 225) — stone
- λόγος (p. 225) — speech; a long speech; argument; account; words
- λοιπός (p. 192) — left
- Λυκαία (p. 194) — lycaea
- Λυκοῦργος (p. 195) — lycurgus
- μαγειρικός (p. 205) — of cookery
- μάγειρος (p. 162) — cooks
- μακρός (p. 194) — long
- μᾶλλον (p. 198) — more
- μανθάνειν (p. 186) — is learned; to learn
- μαντική (p. 213) — prophecy
- μάντις (p. 213) — prophets
- Μαρσύας (p. 196) — marsyas
- μέγας (p. 177) — greatly; greatest
- μέθη (p. 170) — drunkenness
- μέλειν (p. 158) — cares
- μέλλειν (p. 152) — be about to
- μέλος (p. 233) — tunes
- μένειν (p. 214) — remain
- μεταπέμπεσθαι (p. 220) — sending for
- μεταπεττεύειν (p. 202) — moved about as at draughts

- μετατιθέναι (p. 159) — changing
- μιαρός (p. 200) — most polluted
- μιμνῄσκεσθαι (p. 197) — mentioning
- Μίνως (p. 197) — minos
- μῦθος (p. 227) — tale
- μυρίος (p. 162) — countless things
- νεκρός (p. 162) — corpse
- Νέκυια (p. 203) — nekyia
- νέμειν (p. 167) — distribute; tend
- νεμεσᾶν (p. 186) — is indignant
- νομεύς (p. 168) — distributor
- νομίζειν (p. 185) — is accepted; accept; accept or take to be
- νομικός (p. 201) — most skilled in law
- νόμιμος (p. 191) — lawful people; lawful
- νομοθέτης (p. 192) — lawgiver
- νόμος (p. 190) — law; laws or accepted customs; by law; laws for the flute
- νομοφύλαξ (p. 177) — guardian of the laws
- νοσώδης (p. 221) — sickly
- ξύλον (p. 239) — wood
- ὀαριστής (p. 162) — confidant
- ὄαροι (p. 162) — confidences
- Ὀδύσσεια (p. 204) — odyssey
- οἴκησις (p. 149) — administration
- οἰκία (p. 183) — house
- οἶνος (p. 238) — wine
- Ὄλυμπος (p. 206) — olympus

- Ὅμηρος (p. 182) — homer
- ὅμοιος (p. 193) — like
- ὁμοίως (p. 171) — equally
- ὁμολογεῖν (p. 197) — might agree
- ὄνομα (p. 202) — name
- ὁρᾶν (p. 154) — be seen
- ὀρθός (p. 216) — right
- ὀρθῶς (p. 216) — rightly
- ὄρνεον (p. 156) — birds
- ὅσιος (p. 182) — holy
- οὖς (p. 171) — ears
- ὀφθαλμός (p. 173) — eyes
- ὄφις (p. 222) — snakes
- ὄψις (p. 221) — sight
- ὄψον (p. 166) — dishes
- πάγκαλος (p. 235) — very fine
- παιδεία (p. 171) — education
- παιδεύειν (p. 178) — had been educated
- παιδιά (p. 209) — play
- παιδικά (p. 155) — beloved
- παιδοτρίβης (p. 232) — trainer
- παῖς (p. 223) — sons
- παλαιός (p. 197) — men of old; oldest
- πανταχοῦ (p. 172) — everywhere
- παντοδαπός (p. 205) — of every sort
- παύεσθαι (p. 226) — stop
- πείθεσθαι (p. 153) — be persuaded
- περίειμι (p. 237) — went round

- περικτίων (p. 170) — dwelling round
- Πέρσης (p. 209) — persians
- πιθανός (p. 198) — more persuasive
- πλεῖον (p. 198) — more
- ποιεῖν (p. 168) — do or practice; represent in poetry; make better
- ποίησις (p. 210) — poetry
- ποιητής (p. 210) — poets
- ποιητικός (p. 210) — poetic
- ποιμήν (p. 221) — shepherd
- πολεμεῖν (p. 236) — waging war
- πόλις (p. 160) — city
- πολίτης (p. 159) — citizens
- πολιτικός (p. 211) — political; statesmen; statesmen's
- πολύς (p. 196) — many
- πονηρός (p. 152) — base
- πόνος (p. 190) — labors
- πρᾶγμα (p. 228) — things
- πρόβατον (p. 221) — sheep
- προμήθεια (p. 175) — forethought
- προσφάττειν (p. 222) — slaughtering victims before
- πρότερος (p. 171) — earlier people; preceding
- πρόχειρος (p. 213) — ready to hand
- πυνθάνεσθαι (p. 174) — finding out by asking
- Ῥαδάμανθυς (p. 215) — rhadamanthys
- σημαίνειν (p. 196) — means
- σημεῖον (p. 222) — sign

- σκέμμα (p. 237) — what is looked into
- σκέπτεσθαι (p. 180) — have looked into
- σκευασία (p. 212) — preparation
- σκῆπτρον (p. 219) — scepter
- σκοπεῖν (p. 194) — look into or examine
- σοφία (p. 238) — wisdom
- σοφιστής (p. 223) — sophist
- σοφός (p. 238) — wise people
- σπέρμα (p. 219) — seeds
- στρατηγός (p. 176) — general
- συγγίγνεσθαι (p. 161) — come to be with
- σύγγραμμα (p. 240) — writing; writings
- συγγράφειν (p. 240) — write; will write
- συμβαίνειν (p. 161) — come to terms
- συμπαιστής (p. 210) — playfellow
- συμπίνειν (p. 169) — drink together
- συμπόσιον (p. 169) — drinking parties
- συμπότης (p. 169) — drinking-companion
- συνιστάναι (p. 176) — giving firmness
- συννομίζειν (p. 149) — accept in common
- συνουσία (p. 155) — being with
- συνουσιαστής (p. 206) — one who is with
- σῴζειν (p. 212) — preserves
- Σωκράτης (p. 222) — socrates
- σῶμα (p. 156) — bodies; body
- σωφρονεῖν (p. 151) — are temperate
- τὰ ἀκουόμενα (p. 228) — the things heard
- τὰ λεγόμενα (p. 229) — the things spoken

- τὰ μανθανόμενα (p. 228) — the things learned
- τὰ μὴ ὄντα (p. 229) — the things that are not
- τὰ νομιζόμενα (p. 237) — what is accepted
- τὰ νόμιμα (p. 191) — lawful things
- τὰ ὄντα (p. 229) — the things that are
- τὰ ὁρώμενα (p. 229) — the things seen
- Τάλως (p. 227) — talos
- τεκμήριον (p. 172) — evidence
- τελεῖν (p. 208) — pay
- τέχνη (p. 163) — craft
- τιθέναι (p. 154) — be put; set down
- τιμωρεῖσθαι (p. 227) — take vengeance
- τὸ αὐτό (p. 218) — the same thing; the same things
- τὸ νόμιμον (p. 191) — the lawful
- τὸ νόμος εἶναι (p. 155) — being law
- τὸ ὅλον (p. 238) — the whole
- τὸ ὄν (p. 237) — what is
- τὸ πᾶν (p. 151) — as a whole
- τοὐναντίον (p. 207) — the opposite
- τραγικός (p. 232) — tragic
- τραγῳδία (p. 231) — tragedy
- τραγῳδοποιός (p. 195) — makers of tragedy
- τριακόσιοι (p. 230) — three hundred
- τρίς (p. 230) — three times
- τροφή (p. 175) — food
- τυγχάνειν (p. 153) — be in fact asking
- ὑγίεια (p. 180) — health
- ὑγιεινός (p. 180) — healthy

- υἱός (p. 223) — sons; son
- ὑπερβολή (p. 216) — room to exceed
- ὑπηρεσία (p. 220) — service
- ὑπολαμβάνειν (p. 226) — take or suppose to be; take
- ὑπομιμνῄσκειν (p. 214) — remind
- φαίνεσθαι (p. 150) — appeared; appear
- φαῦλος (p. 224) — sorry
- φήμη (p. 214) — report
- φημί (p. 184) — i say so
- φίλιος (p. 205) — of friendship
- φλαῦρος (p. 211) — poor
- φοιτᾶν (p. 176) — go repeatedly
- φράζειν (p. 227) — tell or explain
- Φρύνιχος (p. 209) — phrynichus
- Φρύξ (p. 209) — phrygian
- φυλάττειν (p. 178) — guarding
- φωνή (p. 224) — sounds
- χαλεπός (p. 179) — hard or difficult; harsh
- χαλκοῦς (p. 157) — bronze
- χρεία (p. 203) — need
- χρή (p. 221) — should
- χρῆσθαι (p. 234) — use; employ
- χρηστός (p. 164) — decent
- χρόνος (p. 231) — time
- χρυσός (p. 176) — gold
- χρυσοῦς (p. 177) — golden
- ψέγειν (p. 159) — censure
- ψήφισμα (p. 164) — decrees

- ψυχαγωγικός (p. 199) — most able to lead souls
- ψυχή (p. 224) — soul

English headwords

- a good (p. 148) — ἀγαθός
- a long speech (p. 225) — λόγος
- ablest (p. 148) — κράτιστος
- abstain (p. 148) — ἀπέχεσθαι
- accept (p. 185) — νομίζειν
- accept in common (p. 149) — συννομίζειν
- accept or take to be (p. 185) — νομίζειν
- administration (p. 149) — οἴκησις
- age (p. 149) — ἡλικία
- akin (p. 149) — ἀδελφός
- always (p. 149) — ἀεί
- am willing (p. 150) — ἐθέλειν
- ample room (p. 150) — εὐρυχωρία
- answer (p. 236) — ἀποκρίνεσθαι
- appear (p. 150) — φαίνεσθαι
- appeared (p. 150) — φαίνεσθαι
- appears (p. 150) — καταφαίνεσθαι
- are present within (p. 151) — ἔνειναι
- are temperate (p. 151) — σωφρονεῖν
- argument; account (p. 225) — λόγος
- arrangement (p. 151) — διακόσμησις
- as a whole (p. 151) — τὸ πᾶν
- ask (p. 151) — ἐρωτᾶν
- Athamas (p. 152) — Ἀθάμας

- Attic (p. 152) — Ἀττικός
- base (p. 152) — πονηρός
- be able (p. 152) — δύνασθαι
- be about to (p. 152) — μέλλειν
- be ashamed (p. 153) — αἰσχύνεσθαι
- be impious (p. 153) — ἀσεβεῖν
- be in fact asking (p. 153) — τυγχάνειν
- be persuaded (p. 153) — πείθεσθαι
- be put (p. 154) — τιθέναι
- be seen (p. 154) — ὁρᾶν
- be sick (p. 154) — κάμνειν
- be wary (p. 154) — εὐλαβεῖσθαι
- began (p. 155) — ἄρχεσθαι
- beginning (p. 155) — ἄρχεσθαι
- being law (p. 155) — τὸ νόμος εἶναι
- being with (p. 155) — συνουσία
- beloved (p. 155) — παιδικά
- best (p. 156) — ἄριστος
- best (p. 202) — βέλτιστος
- better (p. 156) — βελτίων
- birds (p. 156) — ὄρνεον
- bodies (p. 156) — σῶμα
- body (p. 156) — σῶμα
- briefly (p. 157) — βραχύς
- bronze (p. 157) — χαλκοῦς
- buried (p. 157) — θάπτειν
- by law (p. 190) — νόμος
- call laws (p. 157) — καλεῖν

- call or name (p. 157) — καλεῖν
- cares (p. 158) — μέλειν
- carrying out (p. 158) — ἐκφορά
- Carthage (p. 158) — Καρχηδών
- Carthaginians (p. 158) — Καρχηδόνιος
- cave (p. 158) — ἄντρον
- censure (p. 159) — ψέγειν
- changing (p. 159) — μετατιθέναι
- cithara-player (p. 159) — κιθαριστής
- citizens (p. 159) — πολίτης
- city (p. 160) — πόλις
- clear (p. 160) — δῆλος
- Cnossus (p. 160) — Κνωσός
- come across (p. 160) — ἐντυγχάνειν
- come from (p. 161) — ἥκειν
- come to be with (p. 161) — συγγίγνεσθαι
- come to terms (p. 161) — συμβαίνειν
- common or shared (p. 161) — κοινός
- compelled (p. 161) — ἀναγκάζειν
- confidant (p. 162) — ὀαριστής
- confidences (p. 162) — ὄαροι
- cooks (p. 162) — μάγειρος
- corpse (p. 162) — νεκρός
- countless things (p. 162) — μυρίος
- courts (p. 163) — δικαστήριον
- craft (p. 163) — τέχνη
- Cretans (p. 163) — Κρής
- Crete (p. 163) — Κρήτη

- Cronus (p. 164) — Κρόνος
- decent (p. 164) — χρηστός
- decrees (p. 164) — ψήφισμα
- deed (p. 164) — ἔργον
- descendants (p. 164) — ἔκγονος
- destroys (p. 165) — ἀπολλύναι
- differ (p. 165) — διαφέρειν
- different (p. 165) — ἄλλος
- different ones at different times (p. 165) — ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις
- different people different ones (p. 166) — ἄλλοι ἄλλοις
- different replacements (p. 166) — ἕτερος
- discover (p. 179) — ἐξευρίσκειν
- discovery (p. 166) — ἐξεύρεσις
- dishes (p. 166) — ὄψον
- distinguish (p. 166) — διαγιγνώσκειν
- distribute (p. 167) — διανέμειν
- distribute (p. 167) — νέμειν
- distributed (p. 167) — ἀπονέμειν
- distributes (p. 167) — διανέμειν
- distributions (p. 168) — διανομή
- distributor (p. 168) — νομεύς
- divine (p. 199) — θεῖος
- divine human beings (p. 199) — θεῖος
- do or practice (p. 168) — ποιεῖν
- doctors (p. 169) — ἰατρός
- drink together (p. 169) — συμπίνειν

- drinking parties (p. 169) — συμπόσιον
- drinking-companion (p. 169) — συμπότης
- drunkenness (p. 170) — μέθη
- due (p. 170) — ἄξιος
- due food (p. 170) — ἄξιος
- dwelling round (p. 170) — περικτίων
- each (p. 170) — ἕκαστος
- earlier people (p. 171) — πρότερος
- ears (p. 171) — οὖς
- education (p. 171) — παιδεία
- employ (p. 234) — χρῆσθαι
- equally (p. 171) — ὁμοίως
- eulogize (p. 172) — ἐγκωμιάζειν
- eulogy (p. 172) — ἐγκώμιον
- Europa (p. 172) — Εὐρώπη
- everywhere (p. 172) — πανταχοῦ
- evidence (p. 172) — τεκμήριον
- exercising (p. 173) — γυμνάζειν
- eyes (p. 173) — ὀφθαλμός
- farmer (p. 173) — γεωργός
- finding (p. 173) — εὕρεσις
- finding (p. 174) — εὕρημα
- finding out by asking (p. 174) — πυνθάνεσθαι
- fine things (p. 200) — καλός
- fit or be appropriate (p. 174) — ἁρμόττειν
- flute-player (p. 174) — αὐλητής
- flute-tunes (p. 174) — αὔλημα
- following second (p. 219) — δεύτερος

- food (p. 175) — τροφή
- for the flute (p. 201) — αὐλητικός
- forethought (p. 175) — προμήθεια
- gardeners (p. 175) — κηπουρός
- gardens (p. 175) — κῆπος
- general (p. 176) — στρατηγός
- giving firmness (p. 176) — συνιστάναι
- go repeatedly (p. 176) — φοιτᾶν
- gods (p. 176) — θεός
- gold (p. 176) — χρυσός
- golden (p. 177) — χρυσοῦς
- greatest (p. 177) — μέγας
- greatly (p. 177) — μέγας
- Greeks (p. 177) — Ἕλλην
- guardian of the laws (p. 177) — νομοφύλαξ
- guarding (p. 178) — φυλάττειν
- guided (p. 178) — εὐθύνειν
- had asked (p. 178) — ἀνέρομαι
- had been educated (p. 178) — παιδεύειν
- hard or difficult (p. 179) — χαλεπός
- harsh (p. 179) — χαλεπός
- has been spread abroad (p. 179) — κατασκεδάννυσθαι
- has escaped notice (p. 179) — λανθάνειν
- has the knowledge (p. 230) — ἐπιστήμων
- have been discovered (p. 179) — ἐξευρίσκειν
- have heard (p. 186) — ἀκούειν
- have in mind (p. 180) — διανοεῖσθαι

- have looked into (p. 180) — σκέπτεσθαι
- health (p. 180) — ὑγίεια
- healthy (p. 180) — ὑγιεινός
- hearing (p. 181) — ἀκοή
- heavier (p. 181) — βαρύτερος
- held in worse opinion (p. 181) — κακόδοξος
- herd (p. 181) — ἀγέλη
- hero (p. 182) — ἥρως
- Hesiod (p. 182) — Ἡσίοδος
- holy (p. 182) — ὅσιος
- Homer (p. 182) — Ὅμηρος
- house (p. 183) — οἰκία
- human (p. 183) — ἀνθρώπειος
- I know (p. 183) — εἰδέναι
- I say so (p. 184) — φημί
- if law is opinion (p. 184) — εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί
- in common (p. 184) — κοινῇ
- incur hatred (p. 184) — ἀπεχθάνεσθαι
- injustice (p. 185) — ἀδικία
- is accepted (p. 185) — νομίζειν
- is found (p. 185) — εὑρίσκειν
- is happy (p. 185) — εὐδαιμονεῖν
- is heard (p. 186) — ἀκούειν
- is indignant (p. 186) — νεμεσᾶν
- is learned (p. 186) — μανθάνειν
- it seems (p. 187) — ἔοικα
- judge (p. 187) — δικαστής
- judging (p. 187) — δικάζειν

- just people (p. 187) — δίκαιος
- just things (p. 187) — δίκαιος
- justice (p. 188) — δικαιοσύνη
- king (p. 188) — βασιλεύς
- kingliest (p. 188) — βασιλεύτατος
- kingly (p. 188) — βασιλικός
- kingly men (p. 188) — βασιλικός
- kings (p. 188) — βασιλεύς
- know (p. 183) — εἰδέναι
- know how (p. 189) — ἐπίστασθαι
- know or recognize (p. 189) — γιγνώσκειν
- knowing (p. 183) — εἰδέναι
- knowledge (p. 189) — ἐπιστήμη
- labors (p. 190) — πόνος
- Lacedaemon (p. 190) — Λακεδαίμων
- Lacedaemonians (p. 190) — Λακεδαιμόνιος
- law (p. 190) — νόμος
- the lawful (p. 191) — τὸ νόμιμον
- lawful (p. 191) — νόμιμος
- lawful people (p. 191) — νόμιμος
- lawful things (p. 191) — τὰ νόμιμα
- lawgiver (p. 192) — νομοθέτης
- lawless (p. 192) — ἄνομος
- lawless people (p. 192) — ἄνομος
- lawlessness (p. 192) — ἀνομία
- laws for the flute (p. 190) — νόμος
- laws or accepted customs (p. 190) — νόμος
- left (p. 192) — λοιπός

- less (p. 193) — ἔλαττον
- less (p. 193) — ἧττον
- let us examine (p. 193) — ἐπισκέπτεσθαι
- lighter (p. 193) — κουφότερος
- like (p. 193) — ὅμοιος
- long (p. 194) — μακρός
- look closely at (p. 194) — ἀθρεῖν
- look into or examine (p. 194) — σκοπεῖν
- looks as though (p. 194) — κινδυνεύειν
- Lycaea (p. 194) — Λυκαία
- Lycurgus (p. 195) — Λυκοῦργος
- make a consequential mistake (p. 195) — ἐξαμαρτάνειν
- make a mistake against (p. 195) — ἐξαμαρτάνειν
- make better (p. 168) — ποιεῖν
- makers of tragedy (p. 195) — τραγῳδοποιός
- making grow (p. 195) — αὔξειν
- many (p. 196) — πολύς
- Marsyas (p. 196) — Μαρσύας
- means (p. 196) — σημαίνειν
- medicine (p. 196) — ἰατρική
- men of old (p. 197) — παλαιός
- mentioning (p. 197) — μιμνῄσκεσθαι
- might agree (p. 197) — ὁμολογεῖν
- Minos (p. 197) — Μίνως
- miss (p. 198) — ἁμαρτάνειν
- more (p. 198) — μᾶλλον
- more (p. 198) — πλεῖον

- more impious (p. 198) — ἀσεβής
- more persuasive (p. 198) — πιθανός
- mortal (p. 199) — θνητός
- most able to lead souls (p. 199) — ψυχαγωγικός
- most delightful to the people (p. 199) — δημοτερπής
- most divine (p. 199) — θεῖος
- most fine (p. 200) — καλός
- most polluted (p. 200) — μιαρός
- most shameful (p. 200) — αἰσχρός
- most skilled flute-player (p. 201) — αὐλητικός
- most skilled in law (p. 201) — νομικός
- move (p. 201) — κινεῖν
- moved about as at draughts (p. 202) — μεταπεττεύειν
- my excellent friend (p. 202) — βέλτιστος
- name (p. 202) — ὄνομα
- necessity (p. 203) — ἀνάγκη
- need (p. 203) — χρεία
- Nekyia (p. 203) — Νέκυια
- nine-year period (p. 203) — ἐννεετηρίς
- nine-yearly (p. 203) — ἐννέωρος
- ninety (p. 204) — ἐνενήκοντα
- ninth (p. 204) — ἔνατος
- non-Greek or barbarian peoples (p. 204) — βάρβαρος
- Odyssey (p. 204) — Ὀδύσσεια
- of cookery (p. 205) — μαγειρικός
- of every sort (p. 205) — παντοδαπός

- of Friendship (p. 205) — φίλιος
- of gardening (p. 205) — κηπουρικός
- of medicine (p. 205) — ἰατρικός
- oldest (p. 197) — παλαιός
- Olympus (p. 206) — Ὄλυμπος
- on farming (p. 206) — γεωργικός
- one who is with (p. 206) — συνουσιαστής
- opinion (p. 206) — δόξα
- opinion; reputation (p. 206) — δόξα
- the opposite (p. 207) — τοὐναντίον
- oppositely (p. 207) — ἐναντίως
- order a city (p. 207) — διοικεῖν
- ordering (p. 207) — διοίκησις
- overturns (p. 207) — ἀνατρέπειν
- oxen (p. 208) — βοῦς
- oxherd (p. 208) — βουκόλος
- pay (p. 208) — τελεῖν
- people (p. 208) — ἄνθρωπος
- people (p. 208) — λαός
- perception (p. 209) — αἴσθησις
- Persians (p. 209) — Πέρσης
- Phrygian (p. 209) — Φρύξ
- Phrynichus (p. 209) — Φρύνιχος
- play (p. 209) — παιδιά
- playfellow (p. 210) — συμπαιστής
- poetic (p. 210) — ποιητικός
- poetry (p. 210) — ποίησις
- poets (p. 210) — ποιητής

- political (p. 211) — πολιτικός
- poor (p. 211) — φλαῦρος
- praise (p. 211) — ἔπαινος
- praises (p. 211) — ἐπαινεῖν
- preceding (p. 171) — πρότερος
- preparation (p. 212) — σκευασία
- preserves (p. 212) — σῴζειν
- preside (p. 212) — ἐπιστατεῖν
- privilege (p. 212) — γέρας
- proof (p. 213) — ἀπόδειξις
- prophecy (p. 213) — μαντική
- prophets (p. 213) — μάντις
- quite clear (p. 213) — κατάδηλος
- ready to hand (p. 213) — πρόχειρος
- reasonable (p. 214) — εἰκώς
- remain (p. 214) — μένειν
- remind (p. 214) — ὑπομιμνῄσκειν
- report (p. 214) — φήμη
- represent in poetry (p. 168) — ποιεῖν
- resolutions (p. 215) — δόγμα
- reveal (p. 215) — ἐκφαίνειν
- revealing (p. 215) — δηλοῦν
- revealing (p. 215) — δήλωσις
- Rhadamanthys (p. 215) — Ῥαδάμανθυς
- right (p. 216) — ὀρθός
- rightly (p. 216) — ὀρθῶς
- room to exceed (p. 216) — ὑπερβολή
- rule (p. 217) — ἄρχειν

- rule cities (p. 217) — ἄρχειν
- ruled (p. 217) — ἀνάσσειν
- sacred (p. 217) — ἱερός
- sacrifice (p. 217) — θύειν
- sacrifices (p. 218) — θυσία
- sacrificial victims (p. 218) — ἱερεῖον
- the same thing (p. 218) — τὸ αὐτό
- the same things (p. 218) — τὸ αὐτό
- savage (p. 218) — ἄγριος
- say or mean (p. 219) — λέγειν
- scepter (p. 219) — σκῆπτρον
- second (p. 219) — δεύτερος
- seeds (p. 219) — σπέρμα
- seek (p. 220) — ζητεῖν
- seem or be thought (p. 220) — δοκεῖν
- sending for (p. 220) — μεταπέμπεσθαι
- service (p. 220) — ὑπηρεσία
- set down (p. 154) — τιθέναι
- shameful (p. 200) — αἰσχρός
- shameful things (p. 200) — αἰσχρός
- sheep (p. 221) — πρόβατον
- shepherd (p. 221) — ποιμήν
- should (p. 221) — χρή
- sickly (p. 221) — νοσώδης
- sight (p. 221) — ὄψις
- sign (p. 222) — σημεῖον
- slaughtering victims before (p. 222) — προσφάττειν
- snakes (p. 222) — ὄφις

- so simply (p. 222) — ἁπλῶς
- Socrates (p. 222) — Σωκράτης
- soil (p. 223) — γῆ
- son (p. 223) — υἱός
- sons (p. 223) — παῖς
- sons (p. 223) — υἱός
- sophist (p. 223) — σοφιστής
- sorry (p. 224) — φαῦλος
- soul (p. 224) — ψυχή
- sounds (p. 224) — φωνή
- speaking ill (p. 224) — κακηγορεῖν
- speaking well (p. 225) — εὐλογεῖν
- speech (p. 225) — λόγος
- statesmen (p. 211) — πολιτικός
- statesmen’s (p. 211) — πολιτικός
- stone (p. 225) — λίθος
- stop (p. 226) — παύεσθαι
- stretching out (p. 226) — ἐντείνειν
- strokes (p. 226) — κροῦμα
- tablets (p. 226) — γραμματεῖον
- take (p. 226) — ὑπολαμβάνειν
- take or suppose to be (p. 226) — ὑπολαμβάνειν
- take vengeance (p. 227) — τιμωρεῖσθαι
- tale (p. 227) — μῦθος
- Talos (p. 227) — Τάλως
- tell or explain (p. 227) — φράζειν
- tend (p. 167) — νέμειν
- Thespis (p. 228) — Θέσπις

- things (p. 228) — πρᾶγμα
- the things heard (p. 228) — τὰ ἀκουόμενα
- the things learned (p. 228) — τὰ μανθανόμενα
- the things seen (p. 229) — τὰ ὁρώμενα
- the things spoken (p. 229) — τὰ λεγόμενα
- the things that are (p. 229) — τὰ ὄντα
- the things that are not (p. 229) — τὰ μὴ ὄντα
- think about (p. 180) — διανοεῖσθαι
- think of or recognize (p. 229) — ἐννοεῖν
- those who have died (p. 230) — ἀποθνῄσκειν
- those who have knowledge (p. 230) — ἐπιστήμων
- those who know (p. 183) — εἰδέναι
- those who know how (p. 189) — ἐπίστασθαι
- three hundred (p. 230) — τριακόσιοι
- three times (p. 230) — τρίς
- time (p. 231) — χρόνος
- to learn (p. 186) — μανθάνειν
- to show (p. 231) — ἀποδείκνυσθαι
- town (p. 231) — ἄστυ
- tragedy (p. 231) — τραγῳδία
- tragic (p. 232) — τραγικός
- trainer (p. 232) — παιδοτρίβης
- tribute (p. 232) — δασμός
- true (p. 232) — ἀληθής
- true opinion (p. 232) — ἀληθὴς δόξα
- truth (p. 233) — ἀλήθεια
- tunes (p. 233) — μέλος
- uneducated (p. 233) — ἀπαίδευτος

- unholy (p. 233) — ἀνόσιος
- unjust people (p. 233) — ἄδικος
- unjust things (p. 233) — ἄδικος
- unmoved (p. 234) — ἀκίνητος
- up and down (p. 234) — ἄνω κάτω
- use (p. 234) — χρῆσθαι
- verse (p. 235) — ἔπος
- very fine (p. 235) — πάγκαλος
- view further (p. 235) — διαθεᾶσθαι
- villages (p. 235) — κώμη
- virtue (p. 235) — ἀρετή
- waging war (p. 236) — πολεμεῖν
- was king (p. 236) — βασιλεύειν
- we think (p. 220) — δοκεῖν
- we would have answered (p. 236) — ἀποκρίνεσθαι
- weighing (p. 236) — ἔλκειν
- well thought of (p. 237) — εὐδόκιμος
- went round (p. 237) — περίειμι
- what is (p. 237) — τὸ ὄν
- what is accepted (p. 237) — τὰ νομιζόμενα
- what is looked into (p. 237) — σκέμμα
- the whole (p. 238) — τὸ ὅλον
- will write (p. 240) — συγγράφειν
- wine (p. 238) — οἶνος
- wisdom (p. 238) — σοφία
- wise people (p. 238) — σοφός
- wishes (p. 238) — βούλεσθαι
- without knowledge (p. 239) — ἀνεπιστήμων

- women who pour offerings (p. 239) — ἐγχυτίστρια
- wonderful (p. 239) — θαυμαστός
- wonderful or surprising (p. 239) — θαυμαστός
- wood (p. 239) — ξύλον
- words (p. 225) — λόγος
- working (p. 240) — ἐργασία
- write (p. 240) — συγγράφειν
- writing (p. 240) — σύγγραμμα
- writings (p. 240) — σύγγραμμα
- written (p. 241) — γράφειν
- year (p. 241) — ἐνιαυτός
- years (p. 241) — ἔτος
- you wish (p. 238) — βούλεσθαι
- Zeus (p. 241) — Ζεύς

Passage index

Every Stephanus section actually present in the supplied dialogue appears below. Each section points to articles that quote or discuss it; contextual definitions and phrase glosses carry their own precise attestations. A cited range remains a range. These are routes to explanation, not claims that each article exhaustively quotes each section.

313a

- Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28)
- Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30)
- Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Right and apparent law (p. 106)
- Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114)

313b

- Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15)
- Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72)
- Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114)
- Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126)

313c

- Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18)
- Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28)
- Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101)
- Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126)

314a

- Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15)
- Divine movement disclosure and need (p. 43)
- Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101)
- Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126)

314b

- Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36)
- Divine movement disclosure and need (p. 43)
- Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69)
- Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79)
- Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99)
- Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101)
- Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109)

314c

- Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30)
- Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64)
- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)
- Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72)
- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)
- Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99)
- Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109)

314d

- Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60)
- Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64)

- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)

314e

- Decent and base (p. 38)
- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)
- Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99)
- Right and apparent law (p. 106)
- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)

315a

- Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25)
- Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72)
- Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74)
- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)
- Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101)
- Right and apparent law (p. 106)
- Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114)
- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)
- Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136)
- What is and the things that are (p. 141)

315b

- Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64)
- Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74)
- Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101)

- Right and apparent law (p. 106)
- Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111)
- Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114)
- Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136)
- What is and the things that are (p. 141)

315c

- Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25)
- Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57)
- Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111)
- Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136)

315d

- Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15)
- Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18)
- Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20)
- Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25)
- Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28)
- Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30)
- Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48)

- Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57)
- Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136)

315e

- Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15)
- Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18)
- Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28)
- Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30)
- Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64)
- Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74)

316a

- Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15)
- Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111)
- Weight and the judgment of what is heavier (p. 139)

316b

- Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15)
- Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18)
- Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25)
- Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48)
- Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60)
- Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64)
- Weight and the judgment of what is heavier (p. 139)

- What is and the things that are (p. 141)

316c

- Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18)
- Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25)
- Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28)
- Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30)
- Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36)
- Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52)
- Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69)
- Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79)
- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)

316d

- Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15)
- Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52)
- Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69)
- Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician (p. 77)
- Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79)
- Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114)
- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)
- Variation of customs and the companion’s objection (p. 136)

316e

- Cookery and the preparation of dishes (p. 34)
- Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36)
- Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52)

- Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55)
- Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69)
- Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79)
- Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109)
- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)

317a

- Cookery and the preparation of dishes (p. 34)
- Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36)
- Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52)
- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)
- Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99)
- Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109)
- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)

317b

- Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25)
- Cookery and the preparation of dishes (p. 34)
- Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50)
- Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52)
- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)
- Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69)
- Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79)
- Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88)
- Right and apparent law (p. 106)
- Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109)
- Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114)

- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)

317c

- Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52)
- Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64)
- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)
- Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69)
- Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Right and apparent law (p. 106)
- Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109)
- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)

317d

- Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18)
- Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36)
- Distribution and tending (p. 41)
- Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55)
- Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69)
- Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72)
- Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74)
- Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101)
- Right and apparent law (p. 106)
- Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114)
- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)

- What is and the things that are (p. 141)
- What is due and fitting to a recipient (p. 143)

317e

- Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131)
- What is due and fitting to a recipient (p. 143)

318a

- Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23)
- Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30)
- Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36)
- Distribution and tending (p. 41)
- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131)

318b

- Divine movement disclosure and need (p. 43)
- Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72)
- Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74)
- Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician (p. 77)
- Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83)
- Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88)

318c

- Divine movement disclosure and need (p. 43)
- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)
- Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician (p. 77)
- Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83)
- Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88)
- Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124)

318d

- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)
- Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician (p. 77)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88)
- Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104)
- Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124)
- Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128)
- Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145)

318e

- Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48)
- Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90)
- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)

319a

- Decent and base (p. 38)
- Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90)
- Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145)

319b

- Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48)
- Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85)
- Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145)

319c

- Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20)
- Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36)
- Distribution and tending (p. 41)
- Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85)
- Sophist, virtue, and the content of good education (p. 121)
- Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126)
- Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145)

319d

- Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20)
- Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104)
- Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116)

319e

- Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20)
- Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45)
- Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85)

320a

- Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15)
- Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45)

- Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50)
- Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124)

320b

- Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15)
- Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20)
- Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36)
- Decent and base (p. 38)
- Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45)
- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104)
- Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109)
- Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending (p. 119)
- Sophist, virtue, and the content of good education (p. 121)
- Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124)

320c

- Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20)

- Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36)
- Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52)
- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104)
- Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116)

320d

- Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)
- Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116)
- Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145)

320e

- Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90)
- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)
- Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99)
- Sophist, virtue, and the content of good education (p. 121)

321a

- Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48)
- Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)
- Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101)
- Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109)
- Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128)

321b

- Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18)
- Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25)
- Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30)
- Distribution and tending (p. 41)
- Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50)
- Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88)
- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)
- Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101)
- Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104)
- Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109)
- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)
- What is and the things that are (p. 141)

321c

- Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23)
- Distribution and tending (p. 41)
- Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62)
- Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69)
- Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79)
- Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104)
- Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131)
- Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145)

321d

- Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20)
- Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23)
- Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28)
- Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30)
- Decent and base (p. 38)
- Distribution and tending (p. 41)
- Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45)
- Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60)
- Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending (p. 119)
- What is due and fitting to a recipient (p. 143)

Thematic index

These groups collect related questions without making them all one settled doctrine. An article may appear in several groups because the same vocabulary changes its work across the conversation.

Asking what law is

- Law and the demand for a definition (p. 72)
- Accepting, custom, and what is accepted (p. 15)
- Speech, perception, and their objects (p. 126)
- Revealing, finding, and discovery (p. 101)
- Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion (p. 99)
- Law's wishing and human achievement (p. 74)
- What is and the things that are (p. 141)

Goodness justice and truth

- Good, fine, and shameful (p. 60)
- Decent and base (p. 38)
- Justice, lawfulness, and lawlessness (p. 64)
- True opinion and the unproved bridge (p. 133)
- Right and apparent law (p. 106)
- Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness (p. 48)

Diversity and shared inquiry

- Variation of customs and the companion's objection (p. 136)
- Sacrifice, holiness, and the cited communities (p. 111)

- Funerary customs and the women who pour offerings (p. 57)
- Common inquiry and the long speech (p. 28)
- Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18)
- Sameness, difference, and the same subject (p. 114)
- Weight and the judgment of what is heavier (p. 139)
- Changing laws and the draughts image (p. 25)
- Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30)

Knowledge writings and practical arts

- Expert writings and the authority of a text (p. 52)
- Knowledge and knowing how (p. 69)
- Craft and the limits of the analogy (p. 36)
- Medicine and the health of the sick (p. 79)
- Farming gardens and differentiated cultivation (p. 55)
- Cookery and the preparation of dishes (p. 34)
- Rule and the ordering of a city (p. 109)
- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)

Fitting distribution and care

- Distribution and tending (p. 41)
- What is due and fitting to a recipient (p. 143)
- Trainers herds and the care of bodies (p. 131)
- Music nomes and skill in law (p. 83)
- Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23)
- Scepters, courts, and guardians of written laws (p. 116)

Antiquity divinity and durable law

- Oldest laws and their persistence (p. 88)
- Sparta Crete and Lycurgus (p. 124)
- Marsyas Olympus and the Phrygian musician (p. 77)
- Divine movement disclosure and need (p. 43)
- Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50)
- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)

Education association and virtue

- Association, learning, and education over time (p. 20)
- Sophist, virtue, and the content of good education (p. 121)
- Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85)
- Drinking, play, and consistency of law and conduct (p. 45)
- Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104)
- Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23)
- Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending (p. 119)

Poetic authority and interpretation

- Homer, Hesiod, and the authority of quoted poetry (p. 62)

- Oaristēs, enneōros, and the limits of an interpretation (p. 85)
- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)
- Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128)
- Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination (p. 90)
- Zeus, Europa, and divine relationships (p. 145)

Political exemplar and reputation

- Minos and the disputed good lawgiver (p. 81)
- Rhadamanthys, Talos, and divided responsibilities (p. 104)
- Kings and statesmen (p. 67)
- Reputation, report, and the poets' power over opinion (p. 97)
- Tragedy, tribute, and Athenian vengeance (p. 128)
- Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50)

Evidence textual limits and the ending

- Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent (p. 18)
- Evidence, plausibility, and the stability of law (p. 50)
- Companion and the conduct of Socrates (p. 30)
- Reading the text and apparatus (p. 92)
- Body, soul, and the demand to specify improvement (p. 23)
- Shame, age, ignorance, and the unanswered ending (p. 119)

Source guide and notes

The supplied edition

Plato, Minos, Greek and English, Diotimos Editions, 2026. The title page identifies John Burnet's Oxford text of 1907 in a later impression printed by John Johnson and issued no earlier than 1936. The supplied Markdown, DOCX, PDF, bilingual EPUB, and English EPUB preserve the reading edition in different forms. The bilingual Greek and English text, explanatory notes, Key Words, Outline, Glossary, Editorial Note, and Note on this Edition have distinct evidential roles. The dialogue's printed Greek determines local lexical attestation; the English determines the rendering attributed to this edition; the apparatus records alternatives and editorial choices; introductory and explanatory prose gives context and interpretation.

The supplied Theages Lexicon is the model for article architecture, graduated lexical explanation, and three-index navigation. It is not evidence for a meaning in Minos. The content and extent of this companion derive from Minos itself, including its examples and its unresolved questions.

The earlier files remain source documents. This companion neither revises their reading text nor silently incorporates every variant into it. Its citations are to Stephanus sections, with physical page locators reserved for navigation inside the companion. Its matching PDF supplies stable pagination; Word can repaginate when edited, and EPUB page displays depend on the reading application. The linked sections remain usable across formats.

Ancient references identified by the edition

The following are guides to principal parallels and testimonia named in the supplied edition. They distinguish contextual references from the passages of Minos being explained. Their listing does not claim a fresh collation of every work or establish that two passages have identical purposes.

- Diogenes Laertius 3.60 and 3.62: the ancient catalogue and classification; 2.122: Simon's reported dialogues, including one On Law
- Homer, Odyssey 19.174 and 19.178–179: Crete, its cities, Cnossus, and Minos as the confidant of Zeus; Odyssey 11.568–570: Minos judging the dead with a golden scepter
- Homer, Iliad 14.321–322: Zeus' reference to the daughter of Phoenix; Iliad 2.243: an example of the "shepherd of the people" formula
- Hesiod, fragment 144 in Merkelbach–West: the verses quoted at Minos 320d, preserved through this passage
- Plato, Republic 565d and Pausanias 8.2.3: the tradition associated with Mount Lycaeus
- Herodotus 7.197: the descendants of Athamas at Halus; 1.173: Europa and Minos; 1.65: the Cretan connection of Spartan laws
- Diodorus Siculus 20.14: the Carthaginian sacrifice reported for 310 BC; the reference is contextual testimony, not the dramatic date of Minos
- Aristotle, Politics 8.5, 1340a: the melodies of Olympus; 2.10, 1271b: Cretan and Spartan institutions

- Plato, Symposium 215c: Marsyas and Olympus, music that moves and reveals those in need of the gods and initiations
- Plato, Laws 1.637a and 1.639d: Spartan and Cretan attitudes toward drinking parties
- Plato, Phaedo 60d: putting a story into verse, relevant to the possible verbal play in “stretch out”
- Plutarch, Lycurgus 1: uncertainty about the lawgiver’s date; Theseus 15–16: Athenian tribute and theatrical hostility to Minos
- Apollonius of Rhodes, Argonautica 4.1638–1648, and Apollodorus, Library 1.9.26: other versions of Talos, to be distinguished from the bronze-tablet explanation in Minos
- Suda ε 191: senses connected with the uncertain funeral-attendant word; θ 282 and φ 762: Thespis and Phrynichus
- Stobaeus, Anthology 4.2, in Wachsmuth–Hense, volume IV, pages 120–121: the excerpt of Minos 317c–318a identified by the supplied Editorial Note
- Plato, Euthyphro 6b, Gorgias 500b and 519e, and Alcibiades I 109d: Socratic oaths by Zeus of Friendship

Modern lexical explanations and alternative interpretations reported by the supplied notes are attributed there to Liddell–Scott–Jones, especially for the musical sense of νόμος, the Homeric ἐννέωρος, the funeral-attendant designation, and ἐντείνω. This lexicon preserves the distinction between an uncertain Homeric expression and Socrates’ interpretation of it. An etymological or lexical possibility does not by itself prove the whole historical narrative that a speaker builds upon it. The

normalized register heading Νέκυια was checked against the Liddell–Scott–Jones entry in Perseus; the attested form Νεκυί᾽α remains as printed in the dialogue.

Consequential cautions

The law at 320a is a prohibition on drinking together to drunkenness. The surrounding claim about abstention from drinking parties is broader, and the edition's outline compresses the specific law too far. The companion therefore follows the actual Greek and translation when it states that rule.

The Homeric ἐννέωρος remains uncertain outside the interpretation developed by Socrates. The reading "nine-yearly confidant" displays his construal; it is not proof that every ancient use of the word means a ninth-year educational visit. The dialogue's Talos is a guardian carrying laws on bronze tablets, not automatically the bronze-bodied figure of another narrative. The quoted Hesiodic πολέων means "many" in the supplied interpretation, not "cities." These small distinctions change the account materially.

The funeral-attendant word at 315c remains uncertain in sense and differs in spelling from the vulgate alternative. The additions at 316a and 321d remain marked as additions. The conjecture at 317d is reported as such. The Alexander in Burnet's apparatus remains unidentified, and the source does not supply the number of the Stobaean excerpt within its chapter. Those gaps are not filled by guesses.

The edition reports no fresh collation against the manuscripts and no systematic incorporation of proposals after Burnet's 1907 edition. This companion does not extend those claims. Nor does its source-led audit amount

to independent specialist review of the whole textual tradition. A reliable reader's aid can identify what the supplied text says, how the argument uses it, and where the evidence ends without claiming to settle every larger dispute.

Questions left open

The dialogue does not prove that every enacted rule is good, supply a historical census of all legal customs, separately refute the human-sacrifice cases, or give an exhaustive account of how to identify the genuine political expert. Its defense of Minos depends on a selection and interpretation of poetic evidence, an assumption of consistency between his beliefs and enactments, and the offered sign of durable law. The qualified responses and the final ignorance remain part of the work.

The final question asks what the lawgiver distributes to the soul to improve it. An answer such as "virtue," "education," or "true laws" may express a reader's synthesis, but the speakers do not supply it there. The lexicon preserves the unresolved question so that the earlier terms can be reread under its pressure.