

Lysis Lexicon

Greek words and their meanings in Plato

A word focused reading companion to the complete dialogue

203a–223b

Based on the Greek text of John Burnet in the supplied Diotimos Editions 2026 Greek and English edition

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The main body is a lexicon of Greek words and a small number of explicitly identified phrases. Entries begin with a definition, then explain the sense in this dialogue. The three indexes offer alphabetical transliteration, passage, and thematic routes into the same entries.

Reading guide

The *Lysis* asks what a friend is while showing people already engaged in affection, courtship, companionship, and shared inquiry. Its closing acknowledgment of failure matters to every entry: an explanation tested by Socrates is not automatically a doctrine endorsed by the dialogue. The speakers believe themselves friends, yet have not discovered what the friend is (223b).

How to use an entry

Headwords are ordered by the Greek alphabet, ignoring accents and breathings. Dictionary forms identify inflected words in the text; a headword need not occur in exactly that grammatical form. Related words receive separate entries when the distinction is useful, and tightly linked minor terms may share an entry. Phrases are labelled as phrases. This is a substantial reading lexicon, not a word by word concordance of every particle or inflection.

The opening line gives transliteration, grammatical category, and a stable entry number. “Example” quotes the edition’s adopted Greek, with its own precise Stephanus reference and a short explanatory gloss. “Passages” gives additional places relevant to the discussion; it is selective, not an exhaustive occurrence list. “See also” links related and contrasting

entries. Entry numbers and printed page locators remain useful in a paper copy; digital links lead directly to entries.

Transliteration uses ē and ō for eta and omega, y for upsilon, and ph, th, and ch for phi, theta, and chi. Initial rough breathing is represented by h. Transliteration is a reading aid, not a pronunciation guide. Greek accents belong to the headword or quoted inflection; changes of accent in connected speech are preserved in examples.

Distinctions to keep in view

Friend and dear. φίλος may name the person loving, the person loved, a mutual friend, or a valued thing. The supplied translation consistently says “friend”, including where ordinary English would prefer “dear”. The lexicon explains the different senses without concealing that repeated Greek word.

Love and desire. φιλέω is broad affection or attachment; ἐράω and ἔρω concern the lover’s desire; φιλία names friendship or affection; ἐπιθυμία includes wanting and bodily appetite. Their connection is argued, not secured by translating them all as “love”.

Like and akin. ὅμοιος means similar, ἐναντίος opposite, and οἰκεῖος one’s own or akin. The last account depends on distinguishing affinity from likeness and does not finally succeed in doing so.

Good and bad. κακός can mean harmful or deficient, as with illness and ignorance; it need not mean moral evil. Having something bad present does not always mean already having become bad. The intermediate phrase “neither good nor bad” changes explanatory role as the argument develops.

Cause and purpose. διὰ with an accusative identifies what prompts attachment, while ἔνεκα in the central examples identifies the end sought. At 220e the Greek itself shifts to “for the sake of an enemy”; that shift should not be silently corrected.

No unannounced technical system. Words for figure, presence, sufficiency, and inquiry do not by themselves establish a theory of Forms, participation, self-sufficiency, or dialectic. The entries distinguish what the text says from possible interpretative extensions.

Argument map

These stages locate the vocabulary. They are a map of the inquiry's changing proposals, not a sequence of settled conclusions.

Courtship and speech

203a–206e

Hippothales' praise of Lysis prompts Socrates to ask how a lover should speak. Hunting, song, pride, and usefulness already shape the question of becoming dear to someone.

Companions in the wrestling school

206e–207d

The boys' play and familiar companionship precede the theoretical inquiry. Questions about age, ancestry, and wealth give way to the claim that friends share things.

Parental love and competence

207d–210e

Lysis' parents love him but restrict his actions. The examples shift from age and status to understanding, trust, usefulness, and the provocative promise that wisdom would make everyone friendly and akin.

Who is a friend of whom

211a–213d

Socrates prizes acquiring friends. The argument tests loving, being loved, and reciprocal love, using lovers, infants, animals, and wisdom to expose the instability of a single narrow definition.

Likeness and the good

213d–215c

Poets and writers on nature supply likeness as a principle. Bad people and then the supposed sufficiency of good people create difficulties for it.

Opposition and need

215c–216b

A rival account appeals to complementary needs and opposites. Its unrestricted form would also make friendship and enmity, or good and bad, friendly to one another.

The intermediate and the good

216c–218c

What is neither good nor bad is proposed as loving the good because badness is present. Medicine, coloured hair, and ignorance distinguish presence from transformation. An apparent discovery is celebrated.

The first friend

218c–220b

Suspicion reopens the inquiry. Distinguishing cause from purpose leads through chains of valued means toward a first friend. The father, son, wine, and vessel illustrate the relation of means to ends.

Desire without badness

220b–221d

If all attachment existed only to remedy badness, it would disappear with badness. Desires can instead be beneficial, harmful, or neither, so badness is challenged as the universal cause.

Lack and what is akin

221d–222b

Desire is linked to lack, deprivation, and what belongs or is naturally akin. A conclusion favorable to the genuine lover receives only hesitant assent from the boys.

The unresolved ending

222b–223b

Akin must differ from like, but the alternatives return to old difficulties. The tutors end the gathering. Socrates includes himself among the boys' friends while admitting that the definition has not been found.

Greek lexicon

268 entries arranged by Greek headword. Definitions come first; discussion is proportionate to the word's work in the dialogue.

A · B · Γ · Δ · Ε · Ζ · Η · Θ · Ι · Κ · Λ · Μ · Ν · Ξ · Ο · Π · Ρ · Σ · Τ · Υ · Φ · Χ · Ψ · Ω

A

ἀγαθός

agathos · adjective · E001

Good; beneficial or excellent; of a person, good in character.

The masculine ὁ ἀγαθός can mean a good person, whereas the neuter τὸ ἀγαθόν means what is good or the good. The argument moves between these constructions. Keeping the difference visible prevents a claim about good people from being silently treated as a claim about every good thing.

At 210d, Lysis will be useful and good if he becomes wise. At 214c–215c, the proposed friendship of the good with the good is examined through likeness and sufficiency: insofar as each is good and sufficient, what need makes either cherish the other? This is a difficulty raised against a proposed explanation of friendship, not a settled rejection of friendship between good people.

At 216d–218c, the good becomes the object sought by what is neither good nor bad; medicine is beneficial and good, and health is later explicitly called good (219a). The sequence tests both the source of attachment and what it aims at. The hypothesis that the good is loved solely because of badness is challenged by desires that need not be bad (220b–221d). Identifying the good with what is akin at 222d revives a difficulty already encountered. No separately established doctrine of a transcendent Good is announced here.

Example ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἀγαθόν (217b). beneficial and good.

Passages 210c–d; 214c–215c; 216d–218c; 219a; 220b–221d; 222d

See also κακός (E126); καλός (E127); μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν (E158); οἰκεῖος (E168); ὠφέλιμος (E268)

ἀγαπάω

agapaō · verb · E002

Cherish; prize; set store by.

At 214e–215b, the argument passes from a lack of benefit or need to a lack of cherishing, and from not cherishing to not loving. This verb supplies an evaluative step: the other

matters to the person who loves. It is not a separate technical species of love opposed to friendship or erotic love.

The person who does not know is said to cherish and love the knower (215d); later, cherishing the good because of the bad is reconsidered (220d). The related adverb ἀγαπητῶς qualifies Socrates' possession of his apparent argumentative quarry at 218c, rendered "if only just" in the edition.

Example Ὁ δὲ μὴ του δεόμενος οὐδέ τι ἀγαπῶν ἄν (215a–b). One who needs nothing would not cherish anything either.

Passages 214e–215b; 215d; 218c; 220d

See also φιλέω (E242); ἱκανός (E122); χρεία (E259); δέομαι (E060)

ἄγνοια

agnoia · feminine noun · E003

Ignorance; lack of knowledge.

The noun is explicitly called a bad thing in the comparison with the presence of badness. Yet having ignorance does not always make a person so bad that love of wisdom is impossible.

Those who still think that they do not know what they do not know retain the capacity to philosophize. The crucial difference is therefore not between possessing every answer and possessing none, but between manners of being affected by ignorance. The word should not be treated as interchangeable with the stronger descriptions ἀμαθής and ἀγνώμων in this passage.

Example τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, τὴν ἄγνοιαν (218a). This bad thing, ignorance.

Passages 218a–b

See also ἀμαθής (E020); ἀγνώμων (E004); φιλοσοφῶ (E252); ἡγέομαι (E110)

ἀγνώμων

agnōmōn · adjective · E004

Without judgment; lacking discernment.

The plural ἀγνώμονες describes what those who merely possess ignorance have not yet become through it. It stands beside ἀμαθεῖς as a condition that would block their love of wisdom.

The causal phrase ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, "through it," refers to ignorance and recalls the distinction between a harmful thing's being present and its making the bearer bad. The adjective is not a separate named class of philosophers or a diagnosis of all intellectual error.

Example μήπω δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὄντες ἀγνώμονες (218a). But not yet being without judgment through it.

Passages 218a–b

See also ἄγνοια (E003); ἀμαθής (E020); παρουσία (E188)

ἄγρα

agra · noun, feminine · E005

Quarry, game; what is being hunted.

The accusative ἄγραν is the object made harder to catch by the inept hunter. It identifies the pursued object, whereas θηρευτής names the pursuer. In Socrates' analogy the quarry corresponds to the beloved, whose pride the lover's praise increases. The lexical contrast helps display the one-sided, strategic form of the initial courtship advice without turning that perspective into a definition of friendship.

Example δυσάλωτοτέραν τὴν ἄγραν ποιοῖ (206a). he makes the quarry harder to catch.

Passages 206a

See also θηρευτής (E116); δυσάλωτος (E072); αἰρέω (E012)

ἀγωνιάω

agōniaō · verb · E006

Be anxious or in suspense; be in agony over an outcome.

Socrates observes Hippothales ἀγωνιῶντα while he listens to the questioning of Lysis. The present participle presents an ongoing emotional state, accompanied by the disturbance expressed in τεθορυβημένον.

The context is the lover's investment in how his beloved receives Socrates' treatment, together with his desire not to be noticed. The word's competitive coloring suits the earlier capture and victory imagery, but the passage describes anxious attention rather than an actual athletic contest. It motivates Socrates' decision not to expose Hippothales by addressing him.

Example αὐτὸν ἀγωνιῶντα καὶ τεθορυβημένον (210e). him anxious and thrown into confusion.

Passages 210e

See also θορυβέω (E117); ἀπεχθάνομαι (E033); νίκη (E162)

ἀδικέω

adikeō · verb · E007

Do wrong; wrong or injure someone.

The verb explains why one wicked person becomes more hostile to another through closer association: he does wrong. Active and passive participles then distinguish wrongdoers from those wronged.

The claim that such parties cannot be friends is used to challenge the unrestricted friendship of like with like. The verb is relational here, specifying action against another person; it should not be collapsed into merely possessing the adjective “bad.”

Example ἀδικοῦντας δὲ καὶ ἀδικουμένους (214c). Those doing wrong and those being wronged.

Passages 214c

See also ἄδικος (E008); ἐχθρός (E108); πονηρός (E199)

ἄδικος

adikos · adjective · E008

Unjust; a person or thing characterized by injustice.

The unjust is opposed to the just at 216b, as part of the objection to making every opposite a friend of its opposite. At 222d the unjust person’s supposed friendship with the unjust exposes the return of an earlier difficulty.

The paired δίκαιος, “just,” supplies the positive side of the contrast. These moral adjectives help test proposed rules; the dialogue does not give separate definitions of justice and injustice.

Example τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ (216b). The just to the unjust.

Passages 216b; 222d

See also ἀδικέω (E007); σώφρων (E224); κακός (E126)

ἀδύνατος

adynatos · adjective; impersonal neuter · E009

Impossible; unable or incapable, according to construction.

The neuter ἀδύνατον commonly introduces an infinitive: it is impossible for specified things to stand in a proposed relation. It excludes friendship between wrongdoer and injured party at 214c and between bad and good at 217c, before reappearing in the test of a supposed cause at 221c.

These impossibilities depend on what the interlocutors have accepted in the argument. They should not all be presented as independent conclusions endorsed by the dialogue as a whole. The word often records the constraint that drives the next experiment in definition.

Example ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἔφραμεν κακὸν ἀγαθῷ φίλον εἶναι (217c). For we said that bad cannot be a friend to good.

Passages 213b; 214c; 217c; 219b; 221c

See also ἀνάγκη (E026); ὁμολογέω (E173); ἐξελέγχω (E084)

ᾄδω

aidō · verb · E010

Sing; perform or circulate praise in song.

Hippothales does not merely speak or write: he sings to his beloved, making his companions endure his remarkable voice. Ctesippus says that the whole city already sings the family's achievements, and that old women sing its ancestral legends.

Socrates then redirects the performance: praise of the beloved can become the lover's own victory-song. The repeated verb binds public reputation, conventional inherited material, and private courtship together. Its aorist passive participle ᾄσθέντα means the things that have been sung.

Example ποιεῖς τε καὶ ᾄδεις εἰς σαυτὸν ἐγκώμιον (205d). you compose and sing a song of praise about yourself.

Passages 204d; 205c; 205d; 205e; 206c

See also ᾠδή (E265); ἐγκώμιον (E073); ποίημα (E195)

αἰνίττομαι

ainittomai · verb · E011

Speak in a riddle; convey something indirectly.

The verb describes Socrates' proposed reading of the claim that like is friend to like. He suggests that its speakers mean only the good, since the bad are unstable and unlike even themselves.

The wording marks interpretation: Socrates is extracting a restricted meaning from an apparently broad poetic or philosophical statement. It does not establish that the original speakers intended that restricted account. The interpretation itself then becomes the next proposal to be tested.

Example Τοῦτο τοίνυν αἰνίττονται (214d). This, then, is what they convey in a riddle.

Passages 214d

See also ποιητής (E197); συνήμι (E219); ὅμοιος (E172)

αἰρέω

haireō · verb · E012

Take, capture, win; here, secure the beloved.

The second-aorist subjunctive ἔλῃς asks what happens if Hippothales “catches” his beloved. Socrates then advises the accomplished lover not to praise the beloved before he has caught him.

The verb introduces the hunting imagery developed through a hunter, quarry, and difficulty of capture. It describes the lover’s pursuit from his strategic perspective. It does not itself establish a reciprocal relationship or justify equating erotic success with friendship: that connection remains something the dialogue has to investigate.

Example ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἔλῃς τὰ παιδικὰ (205e). for if you catch your beloved.

Passages 205e; 206a

See also θεραπευτής (E116); ἄγρα (E005); δυσάλωτος (E072); νίκη (E162)

αἰτία

aitia · feminine noun · E013

Cause; what accounts for something’s occurring.

At 221c the proposed cause is tested by imagined removal: if badness were the cause of friendship, friendship should not remain after badness disappeared. Desires that are not bad would remain, so the argument seeks another cause.

The related neuter αἶτιον occurs in the same test, “the bad were the cause.” At 221d desire is proposed as the cause of friendship. This is an explicit proposal within an unfinished inquiry, not a final definition. The causal test assumes that removing the relevant cause would remove its effect; the reader should track that assumption rather than silently supply a modern theory of causation.

The related αἶτιον already appears at 209b–c, when Socrates asks the reason why Lysis is permitted some activities and prevented from others. Causal questioning thus begins in ordinary practical examples.

Example ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς φιλίας αἰτία (221d). Desire is the cause of friendship.

Passages 221c–d; 209b–c

See also διά (E062); ἐπιθυμία (E089); ἀπόλλυμι (E036); ἔνεκα (E081)

Ἀκαδήμεια

Akadēmeia · proper noun, feminine · E014

Academy; the place from which Socrates is walking.

The genitive Ἀκαδημείας marks Socrates' starting point, repeated when Hippothales asks where he has come from. In this opening it names a physical location, paired with the Lyceum as his intended destination. The dialogue does not describe an institution of philosophical teaching there; importing the later sense of "Plato's Academy" would obscure the immediate dramatic geography.

Example ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας εὐθὺς Λυκείου (203a). from the Academy straight toward the Lyceum.

Passages 203a; 203b

See also Λύκειον (E146); παλαίστρα (E184)

ἀκολουθέω

akolouthēō · verb · E015

Follow; keep up; conform to an earlier statement.

At 218e the verb promises that an example may help Menexenus follow the explanation. At 219c the subject is the developing claim: it must follow the earlier agreement by making one friend depend on another.

The shift connects pedagogical understanding with argumentative consistency. In one case a listener follows a speaker; in the other a new statement follows what has already been granted. The verb itself does not mean that the premises have been proved true.

Example εἴπερ ἀκολουθήσει τῇ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίᾳ (219c). If it is to follow the earlier agreement.

Passages 218e; 219c

See also ἔπομαι (E093); ὁμολογία (E174); ἀρχή (E041)

ἄλειφω

aleiphō · verb · E016

Smear; coat a surface with something.

The colour example uses active, passive, and compound forms to distinguish applying a material, the thing coated, and what is spread on it. τὸ ἀλειφθὲν is the coated thing; τὸ ἐπαλειφθὲν is what has been applied.

This grammatical distinction is essential to the question whether the bearer becomes the same kind of thing as the coating. The edition notes textual corrections in the surrounding sentence, so the printed forms should be followed rather than silently harmonized.

Example τῷ ἀλειφθέντι τὸ ἐπαλειφθέν (217c). What is smeared on, to the thing smeared.

Passages 217c–d

See also ψιμύθιον (E263); χρώμα (E262); παρουσία (E188)

ἀλλήλων

allēlōn · reciprocal pronoun · E017

Of one another; with case changes, to or towards one another.

The pronoun makes reciprocity explicit where φίλος alone may leave the direction of affection unclear. At 212b ἀμφοτέροι ἀλλήλων φίλοι means that both are friends of each other; ἀλλήλους φιλοῦσιν at 212c means that each loves the other.

Its force matters again in the closing admission that Socrates and the boys think themselves friends of one another. An ordinary mutual relationship has survived the failure to define it. Do not substitute a reflexive sense, “of themselves,” for the reciprocal sense when reading these clauses.

Example ἀμφοτέροι ἄρα ἀλλήλων φίλοι γίνονται (212b). Then both become friends of one another.

Passages 212b–c; 214c; 215a–c; 221e; 223b

See also ἀμφοτέρος (E023); ἀντιφιλέω (E031); φίλος (E251)

ἀλλότριος

allotrios · adjective · E018

Another’s; alien; not belonging or not akin.

At 210c οἱ ἀλλότριοι are strangers, contrasted with parents and closer kin; ἀλλότρια are things belonging to others, from which the uncomprehending person gains no benefit. At 222c calling the bad alien and the good akin to everything is one option offered for testing. The boys instead choose each kind as akin to its own kind; neither option becomes a secure definition.

Example τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον (222c). the bad alien.

Passages 210b–c; 222c

See also οἰκεῖος (E168); ἀγαθός (E001); κακός (E126)

ἀλογία

alogia · feminine noun · E019

Want of sense; an unreasonable or absurd result.

At 206b Hippothales calls it a great want of sense to describe someone harmed by his own poetry as a good poet. The word later marks another result the speakers find unacceptable.

Socrates calls it πολλή ἀλογία to be an enemy to a friend and a friend to an enemy, then strengthens the objection to ἀδύνατον, “impossible.” The noun expresses the unacceptability of the result before that stronger logical description is added.

This is not a technical name for every failed argument, nor an assertion that a person lacks speech. Its local work is evaluative: a proposed account of who counts as φίλος has produced a relationship description that the speakers will not accept.

Example καίτοι πολλή ἀλογία (213b). And yet it is a great want of sense.

Passages 213b; 206b

See also ἀδύνατος (E009); ἐχθρός (E108); φίλος (E251)

ἀμαθής

amathēs · adjective · E020

Unlearned; without understanding.

Socrates says that no one bad and ἀμαθής loves wisdom. He then distinguishes people who possess ignorance but have not yet been made ἀμαθεῖς by it.

The contrast gives the adjective a stronger local force than merely lacking some information. These people would no longer recognize their lack in the way required for inquiry. The passage does not license applying the term indiscriminately to every beginner or learner.

Example κακὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀμαθῆ οὐδένα φιλοσοφεῖν (218a). For no one bad and unlearned loves wisdom.

Passages 218a–b

See also ἄγνοια (E003); ἀγνώμων (E004); φιλοσοφείω (E252)

ἄμουσία

amousia · noun, feminine · E021

Lack of musical cultivation or skill; a failure in the art of speech and song.

Socrates calls it πολλή ἄμουσία when speeches and songs make the beloved wild instead of charming him. The word’s musical coloring matters because Hippothales has been composing and singing, but its criticism extends beyond technical execution.

The performance fails to understand or achieve its appropriate effect. The next argument makes the poet’s self-harm evidence against calling him good at his craft. Translate with room for “uncultivated ineptness,” rather than supposing that Socrates has measured Hippothales’ ability to stay in tune.

Example πολλή ἄμουσία (206b). a great lack of musical cultivation.

Passages 206b

See also κηλέω (E134); ἐξαγριαίνω (E082); ποιητής (E197)

ἀμφισβητέω

amphisbēteō · verb · E022

Dispute a claim; disagree about which of two has it.

Menexenus answers “we dispute it” when Socrates asks which boy is older. The present ἀμφισβητοῦμεν presents the disagreement as a familiar feature of their relationship. Socrates extends the teasing comparison to noble birth and beauty.

The verb establishes playful rivalry within an acknowledged friendship; it does not imply that the two are enemies. It also prepares for Menexenus’ later reputation as argumentative, although the immediate question concerns comparative status and age rather than a developed philosophical thesis.

Example Ἀμφισβητοῦμεν (207c). We dispute it.

Passages 207c

See also ἐριστικός (E097); ἡλικία (E113)

ἀμφοτέρως

amphoteros · adjective/pronoun · E023

Both of two; the two together.

The plural ἀμφοτέροι and the dual ἄμφω keep the two parties in view during the first definition test. The question is whether the affection of just one party makes both friends, or whether both must love before either is a friend.

The contrasts with μόνος, “alone,” ἕτερος, “one or the other,” and οὐδέτερος, “neither of the two,” are the logical machinery of the passage. A loose translation such as “people” would conceal which proposed condition applies to one party and which to both.

Example ἂν μὴ ἀμφοτέροι φιλῶσιν, οὐδέτερος φίλος (212d). Unless both love, neither is a friend.

Passages 212b–d

See also ἀλλήλων (E017); ἀντιφιλέω (E031); φίλος (E251)

ἀναγιγνώσκω

anagignōskō · verb · E024

Read; carry out an entrusted literate task.

Lysis' parents call on him first when they want something read or written. In this activity he may choose how to proceed because he possesses the relevant knowledge. The present infinitive ἀναγιγνώσκειν and the passive infinitive ἀναγνώσθηναι belong to the same verb.

Reading supplies a successful counterexample to his claim that mere youth explains all restrictions. It is a practical skill within the household, not yet the reading of a particular philosophical or poetic authority. The passage does not identify the documents his parents ask him to read.

Example ἀναγιγνώσκειν ὡσαύτως ἔξεστιν (209b). you are allowed to read in the same way.

Passages 209a; 209b

See also γράφω (E058); ἐπίσταμαι (E091); ἐπιτρέπω (E092)

ἀναγκάζω

anankazō · verb · E025

Compel; in the passive, be compelled or constrained.

At 205d Ctesippus says that Hippothales forces the others to listen to his recital and songs. The later uses turn from an overbearing speaker to the pressure exerted by practical need.

In the opposites theory the poor person is “compelled” to be a friend to the rich person because aid is needed. In the medical analogy it is disease that constrains the body to welcome medicine.

This is a practical or circumstantial necessity, unlike the bare argumentative assent ἀνάγκη. The verb connects a condition of need with an orientation towards a remedy or helper. It does not by itself show that affection is free, reciprocal, morally good, or sufficient for friendship.

Example Ἀναγκάζεται δέ γε σῶμα διὰ νόσον (217b). A body is compelled, because of disease.

Passages 215d; 217b; 205d

See also ἀνάγκη (E026); ἐπικουρία (E090); νόσος (E163); ἰατρική (E119)

ἀνάγκη

anankē · feminine noun; impersonal expression · E026

Necessity; with an infinitive, it is necessary or one must.

The bare reply Ἀνάγκη means “necessarily” or “it must be so.” It often acknowledges what follows from an accepted premise rather than describing physical pressure. At 219c

necessity governs the choice between abandoning the sequence and reaching a starting point that no longer refers onward.

The related adjective ἀναγκάιος appears in the impersonal neuter ἀναγκαῖον. At 222a it qualifies the controversial conclusion that a genuine lover must be loved by his beloved. The vocabulary marks the claimed strength of the inference; the boys' hesitant assent and the ensuing re-examination prevent treating that claim as a settled result.

Example οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν (216b). Must we not agree?

Passages 213b; 214b; 216b; 217a; 219c–d; 222a

See also ἀναγκάζω (E025); ἀδύνατος (E009); ὁμολογέω (E173)

ἀναπεμπάζομαι

anapempazomai · verb · E027

Count over; review a series item by item.

Socrates asks to count over everything said, like the wise people in the law courts. The aorist middle infinitive ἀναπεμπάσασθαι introduces the final catalogue of rejected candidates.

The verb names retrospective review, not a fresh proof. Its mildly comic legal comparison makes the many previous proposals into an inventory, and the following admission that he cannot remember them all underscores the inquiry's accumulated difficulty.

Example τὰ εἰρημένα ἅπαντα ἀναπεμπάσασθαι (222e). To count over everything that has been said.

Passages 222e

See also λόγος (E145); ἐξελέγχω (E084); καταγέλαστος (E129)

ἀνεψιός

anepsios · noun, masculine · E028

Cousin.

The accusative ἀνεψιόν identifies Menexenus as Ctesippus' cousin. This relationship explains why Lysis, Menexenus' companion, is also familiar with Ctesippus and can be approached through him. It supplies a specific genealogical link within the social group. Do not translate it as “nephew” in this passage or confuse it with the broader vocabulary of companionship and affinity.

Example τὸν τούτου ἀνεψιὸν Μενέξενον (206d). this man's cousin Menexenus.

Passages 206d

See also συνήθης (E218); ἐταῖρος (E104); συγγένεια (E215)

ἀνόμοιος

anomoios · adjective · E029

Unlike; dissimilar.

At 214c–d, bad people are described as unlike even themselves, unstable rather than consistently similar. At 215d the rival explanation makes the most dissimilar things friendly because of complementary needs. Unlike does not automatically mean opposite: the argument strengthens dissimilarity into opposition at 215e, and then tests the stronger thesis. The summary of rejected candidates includes the unlike at 222e.

Example αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἀνόμοιον (214d). unlike itself.

Passages 214c–d; 215d–216b; 222e

See also ὁμοιος (E172); ἐναντίος (E079); πονηρός (E199)

ἀντιλογικός

antilogikos · adjective; substantival plural · E030

Practised in contradiction; one who argues against a claim.

The imagined ἀντιλογικοί are called “all-wise” and pictured as eagerly leaping on the assertion that opposites are friends. Their objection asks whether enmity is not the opposite of friendship.

The description has a teasing dramatic tone, but the objection is taken seriously and used to reject the unrestricted proposition. The word should not by itself identify a particular historical group or demonstrate that every act of contradiction is merely dishonest.

Example οἱ πάσσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί (216a). The all-wise men, the masters of contradiction.

Passages 216a–b

See also ἀποκρίνομαι (E035); ἔχθρα (E107); ἐξελέγχω (E084)

ἀντιφιλέω

antiphileō · verb · E031

Love in return; in the passive, be loved in return.

The prefix ἀντι- marks the return of affection, not opposition to love. At 212b Socrates distinguishes loving someone from being loved back by that same person. The passive ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι therefore names what the original lover receives; the active ἀντιφιλιῶσιν at 212d names the response attributed to the horses. Preserve this difference when following the switches between lover and beloved.

The verb tests whether reciprocity belongs to the definition of φίλος. If a lover can receive no affection, or even hatred, one person’s loving does not automatically establish a mutual

relation. Yet requiring a return from every object of affection would exclude horse-lovers and even lovers of wisdom unless horses and wisdom responded. That deliberately awkward consequence exposes a difficulty in transferring an interpersonal condition to every use of the φίλ- vocabulary.

The passage does not establish a final doctrine that all friendship must, or need not, be reciprocal. It successively tries these alternatives. In particular, a claim about what can be called dear to someone is not automatically a claim about a fully reciprocal friendship.

Example οὐκ ἔστιν φιλοῦντα μὴ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι (212b). Is it not possible to love without being loved back?

Passages 212b–d; 213a–c

See also φιλέω (E242); φίλος (E251); μισέω (E160); ἀλλήλων (E017)

ἀνωφελής

anōphelēs · adjective · E032

Of no benefit; unhelpful or unprofitable.

The plural ἀνωφελεῖς describes people in the respects in which they do not provide benefit. Socrates asks whether anyone will love them or be their friend in those matters, after the contrast between activities entrusted to the knowledgeable and activities withheld from the uncomprehending.

The limiting phrase ἐν οἷς, “in the things in which,” matters: the sentence begins with a domain-specific failure to help. The following generalizations about usefulness and affection are argumentative steps, not all contained in the adjective itself. The privative word belongs with the benefit vocabulary and should be distinguished lexically from ἄχρηστος, “useless,” even though their local roles are closely connected.

Example ἐν οἷς ἂν ὦμεν ἀνωφελεῖς (210c). In the things in which we are of no benefit.

Passages 210c

See also ὠφελία (E267); ὠφέλιμος (E268); ἄχρηστος (E047); φρονέω (E255)

ἀπεχθάνομαι

apechthanomai · verb · E033

Become hateful or objectionable to someone.

Hippothales positions himself behind other onlookers because he fears becoming hateful to Lysis if noticed. The present optative ἀπεχθάνοιτο appears in the reported fear and takes a dative for the person whose hostility is feared.

The word names a possible adverse reaction rather than an established state of enmity between them. It gives dramatic weight to the earlier warning that bad courtship can

alienate its target. Socrates later remembers this desire for concealment and stops himself from publicly addressing Hippothales.

Example δεδιώς μὴ αὐτῷ ἀπεχθάνοιτο (207b). fearing that he might become hateful to him.

Passages 207b

See also ἐξαγριαίνω (E082); ὀκνέω (E171); ἀγωνιάω (E006)

ἀποδυτήριον

apodytērion · noun, neuter · E034

Changing-room.

The genitive ἀποδυτηρίου identifies the room whose corner contains the odd-and-even game. It belongs within the wrestling-school, contrasted with its open courtyard. Lysis initially stands among the spectators there. The noun gives the physical arrangement through which the boys, young men, and Socrates can see one another and gradually assemble; it does not denote the wrestling-school as a whole.

Example τοῦ ἀποδυτηρίου ἐν γωνίᾳ (206e). in a corner of the changing-room.

Passages 206e

See also παλαίστρα (E184); ἀρτιάζω (E040)

ἀποκρίνομαι

apokrinomai · verb · E035

Answer; respond to a question.

The future ἀποκρινούμεθα at 216b asks how the group will answer the imagined masters of contradiction. It makes the boys responsible for defending the proposal that opposites are friends, rather than merely agreeing with its attractive examples.

The response is constrained by the accepted opposition between friendship and enmity. In this context answering is a public argumentative obligation: a claim must withstand an interlocutor's question, even when that interlocutor is only being imagined.

Example οἷς τί ἀποκρινούμεθα (216b). What shall we answer them?

Passages 216a–b

See also ἐρωτάω (E102); ἀντιλογικός (E030); ὁμολογέω (E173)

ἀπόλλυμι

apollymi · verb · E036

Destroy; in the middle/intransitive forms, perish or disappear.

The forms ἀπόληται and ἀπολομένου belong to the imagined removal of badness and to the test of a proposed cause. “Perish” here need not describe a person’s death: bad things or a cause can be the grammatical subject.

The compound συναπόλλυσθαι asks why things that are not bad should perish together with bad things. Distinguishing the two sets allows Socrates to retain morally neutral desires in the thought experiment and challenge the claim that badness alone explains friendship.

Example καὶ ἐὰν ἀπόληται τὰ κακά (221b). Even if bad things perish.

Passages 220e–221c

See also αἰτία (E013); ἐπιθυμία (E089); βλέπω (E050)

ἀπομνημονεύω

apomnēmoneuō · verb · E037

Recall, remember accurately enough to recount.

Socrates asks Lysis to recall the preceding exchange as fully as possible so that he can explain it clearly to Menexenus. If he forgets part, he may ask Socrates again on their next meeting.

The aorist infinitive ἀπομνημονεῦσαι follows the imperative “try.” This is an active educational task: attentive listening should become the ability to reproduce and explain an argument. Socrates does not promise that Lysis has mastered everything already. The invitation to ask again makes accurate recollection revisable rather than an exercise in unquestioning repetition.

Example ἀπομνημονεῦσαι αὐτὰ ὅτι μάλιστα (211a–211b). to recall it as fully as possible.

Passages 211a–b

See also νοῦς (E164); μανθάνω (E151); φιλήκοος (E243)

ἀπορία

aporia · feminine noun · E038

A lack of a way through; difficulty or perplexity.

The related verb ἀπορέω first describes Lysis hesitating to approach alone (207a). The noun occurs explicitly at 216c: Socrates is made dizzy by the argument’s difficulty. It names an experience of inquiry, not a theory that nothing can be known. At 213c the printed text

gives Menexenus' οὐ πᾶν εὐπορῶ, "I do not find much of a way through"; ἀπορῶ is an apparatus variant, not Burnet's adopted wording.

The ending is aptly called aporetic as an interpretative description. Socrates says at 222e that he no longer has anything to say, and at 223b that they have not yet managed to discover what the friend is. Neither sentence uses the noun ἀπορία. The "not yet" leaves the inquiry unfinished; it does not erase the friendship the speakers believe they share.

The related adjective ἄπορος at 223b describes the tutors as impossible to deal with. Its practical sense gives the closing scene an ironic echo of the argumentative impasse without proving that the tutors symbolize a philosophical doctrine.

Example τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀπορίας (216c). the difficulty of the argument.

Passages 207a; 213c; 216c; 222e–223b

See also εὐπορέω (E106); ζητέω (E109); λόγος (E145)

ἀποστερέω

apostereō · verb · E039

Deprive; rob someone or something of a possession or capacity.

At 217e a presence of badness that actually makes its bearer bad deprives it of desire and friendship for the good. The object is the bearer, while the genitives identify what it loses.

The verb is stronger than saying that badness accompanies desire. It describes the loss of the very orientation that previously directed the neither-good-nor-bad towards good. That distinction motivates the analogy between merely coated hair and hair genuinely changed by age.

Example ἀποστερεῖ αὐτὸ τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας (217e). Deprives it of desire.

Passages 217e

See also ἀφαιρέω (E045); παρουσία (E188); ἐπιθυμία (E089); κακός (E126)

ἀρτιάζω

artiazō · verb · E040

Play odd and even.

The imperfect ἡρτιάζον describes an ongoing game in the changing-room. Its players use many knucklebones, taking them from little containers, and draw a group of spectators that includes Lysis. The edition translates the activity as playing "odd and even." Keep it distinct from the more general ἀστραγαλίζω, which merely identifies knucklebone play without specifying this particular game.

Example ἡρτιάζον ἀστραγάλοις παμπόλλοις (206e). they played odd and even with very many knucklebones.

Passages 206e

See also ἀστραγαλίζω (E043); ἀστράγαλος (E044)

ἀρχή

archē · feminine noun · E041

Rule or authority; a beginning or explanatory starting point.

At 209d ἡ τῆς Ἀσίας ἀρχή is rule over Asia, inherited by the Great King's eldest son. The same noun later shifts from political authority to an explanatory starting point.

At 219c the chain of friends loved for the sake of other friends must reach “some starting point” that no longer directs the explanation to a further friend. The noun names what terminates the explanatory referral, even though it is called the beginning.

The local force is explanatory rather than simply chronological. Nothing in the word alone establishes a separately existing Form or a complete metaphysical doctrine. The passage introduces a stopping point needed by the present argument and then continues to ask what such a friend would be.

Example ἀφικέσθαι ἐπὶ τινὰ ἀρχήν (219c). Arrive at some starting point.

Passages 219c–d; 209d

See also ἐπαναφέρω (E087); τελευτάω (E228); πρῶτον φίλον (E204); ἄρχω (E042); βασιλεύς (E048)

ἄρχω

archō · verb · E042

Rule, govern, exercise control; in the passive, be ruled.

Socrates asks whether Lysis is allowed to rule himself, then elicits the tutor and teachers who rule him. The free boy's being ruled by a slave sharpens the paradox. Material ownership likewise fails to guarantee actual control of wealth or body.

At 210b knowledge promises the opposite position: freedom and rule over others in the matters understood. The verb often takes a genitive of the person or thing controlled. Its local meaning is practical authority, not simply “begin,” another possible sense outside these examples.

Example σὲ αὐτὸν ἐῷσιν ἄρχειν σεαυτοῦ (208c). do they allow you yourself to rule yourself?

Passages 208b–e; 209a; 210b

See also ἐπιτρέπω (E092); δοῦλος (E071); ἐλεύθερος (E077); ὑπήκοος (E234)

ἀστραγαλίζω

astragalizō · verb · E043

Play knucklebones.

The participle ἀστραγαλίζοντας describes the boys whom Socrates finds after the sacrificial observances. Some play in the courtyard; others use large numbers of knucklebones for an odd-and-even game in a corner of the changing-room.

The verb locates the discussion in ordinary festive play and gives Lysis something to leave when he approaches Socrates. It is not itself a metaphor for argument or evidence of gambling for money. The supplied description specifies play and equipment but makes no such wager explicit.

Example ἀστραγαλίζοντάς τε δὴ καὶ κεκοσμημένους ἅπαντας (206e). all playing knucklebones and adorned.

Passages 206e

See also ἀρτιάζω (E040); ἀστράγαλος (E044); Ἑρμαῖα (E098)

ἀστράγαλος

astragalos · noun, masculine · E044

Knucklebone used as a gaming piece.

The dative plural ἀστραγάλοις identifies the pieces used in the odd-and-even game. They are numerous and drawn from small baskets or bags, while others stand around watching. The concrete equipment makes the opening scene precise and distinguishes it from wrestling, despite the venue. The plural does not here name a bodily joint in a medical example.

Example ἡρτιάζον ἀστραγάλοις παμπόλλοις (206e). they played odd and even with very many knucklebones.

Passages 206e

See also ἀστραγαλίζω (E043); ἀρτιάζω (E040); ἀποδυτήριον (E034)

ἀφαιρέω

aphaireō · verb; here middle/passive form · E045

Take away; deprive, or have something taken away.

At 221e the form ἀφαιρήται stands in the claim that a thing becomes deficient in whatever is taken away from it. The taking-away image provides the step from lack to the proposal that desire concerns what is one's own or akin.

The inference deserves attention: lacking something is presented through removal, which suggests a prior relation to what is missing. The verb itself does not establish that every

desire literally restores a possession formerly held. The next claim about the οἰκεῖον is the conclusion drawn from this formulation, not part of its dictionary meaning.

Example Ἐνδεὲς δὲ γίγνεται οὗ ἂν τι ἀφαιρῇται (221e). A thing becomes deficient in whatever is taken away from it.

Passages 221e

See also ἐνδεής (E080); οἰκεῖος (E168); ἐπιθυμία (E089); ἀποστερέω (E039)

ἄφρων

aphrōn · adjective · E046

Without understanding; lacking the judgment relevant to a task.

Socrates calls Lysis still ἄφρων because he still needs a teacher. The word is set against μεγαλόφρων, proud, and the preceding play on μέγα φρονεῖν, thinking highly of oneself, and φρονεῖν, understanding.

The local argument removes a reason for self-importance rather than diagnosing general irrationality or permanent stupidity. The word ἔτι, “still,” leaves room for education to change the boy’s situation. Translate with the shared language of understanding intact, since the force of the exchange depends on the verbal connection between knowledge and pride.

Example εἴπερ ἄφρων ἔτι (210d). if you are still without understanding.

Passages 210d

See also φρονέω (E255); μεγαλόφρων (E154); διδάσκαλος (E068)

ἄχρηστος

achrēstos · adjective · E047

Useless; of no service.

Socrates jokingly applies the word to himself outside his claimed ability to recognize lovers (204b–c). At 210c he argues that no one loves another καθ’ ὅσον ἂν ἢ ἄχρηστος, “insofar as he is useless”: the qualification limits the claim, within the lesson on understanding and trust. At 220c the remedial hypothesis would make the good useless if badness vanished. At 222b–c likeness considered simply as likeness is again called useless, reproducing the difficulty of 214e–215a.

Example τὸ δὲ ἄχρηστον φίλον (222b–c). the useless [as] a friend.

Passages 204b–c; 210c; 220c; 222b–c

See also χρήσιμος (E261); ωφέλιμος (E268); ὅμοιος (E172)

B

βασιλεύς

basileus · noun, masculine · E048

King; here the Great King, ruler of Asia.

The title ὁ μέγας βασιλεύς introduces the most socially elevated test of the competence argument. Even he would trust knowledgeable outsiders rather than his own heir in preparing a dish or treating the heir's eyes.

The illustration deliberately opposes supreme rank and hereditary succession to task-specific understanding. The king remains hypothetical within this conversation: Socrates and Lysis do not visit his court. The noun names the ruler, while the statement that Asia's rule passes to his eldest son specifies why the comparison is striking.

Example τί ἄρα ὁ μέγας βασιλεύς (209d). What, then, about the Great King?

Passages 209d; 209e–210a

See also ἐπιτρέπω (E092); ἰατρός (E121); σκευασία (E208)

βλάβη

blabē · feminine noun · E049

Harm; damage done or suffered.

At 214e βλάβη is paired with ὠφελία, benefit, in the question what one like thing can do to another that it cannot do to itself. The construction βλάβην ποιῆσαι means “do harm.”

The noun names an effect, while βλάπτω names harming or being harmed and βλαβερός characterizes something as harmful. Keeping these related forms together conceptually helps with the later inquiry into harmless hunger, but βλάβη itself occurs here in the earlier test of what like can provide for like. The argument moves from this supposed lack of distinctive effect to a lack of assistance and cherishing.

Example τίνα βλάβην ἂν ποιῆσαι δύναίτο (214e). What harm could it do?

Passages 214e

See also βλάπτω (E050); ὠφελία (E267); ἐπικουρία (E090); ὅμοιος (E172)

βλάπτω

blaptō · verb · E050

Harm; damage; in the passive, be harmed.

At 206b the poet who harms himself through his poetry supplies the first example: harmful effects count against the success of a supposed skill.

Harm is paired with benefit in the examination of what like can do for like at 214e and in the test of desire at 221a–b. A hungry or thirsty person can be harmed, benefited, or affected in neither way.

The noun βλάβη and the adjective/adverb βλαβερός/βλαβερῶς name harm or harmfulness. These forms help distinguish the existence of a desire from its bad effects. That distinction allows Socrates to question the claim that removing badness would remove all desire and therefore all friendship.

Example ἔστιν πεινῶντα βλάπτεσθαι (221a). It is possible to be harmed while hungry.

Passages 214e; 220c; 221a–b; 206b

See also πεινάω (E189); διψάω (E070); ὠφελέω (E266); κακός (E126)

βούλομαι

boulomai · verb, middle in form · E051

Want, wish; desire an outcome or choose an action.

The verb links parental intention and the boy’s proposed freedom. His parents want him happy, but do not allow him to do whatever he wants with horses, himself, or his mother’s tools. In the areas he knows, he can choose the sequence of letters or the treatment of strings.

The repeated “whatever one wants” tests the scope of permission. In these exchanges βούλομαι overlaps ordinary wanting without being explicitly opposed to ἐπιθυμέω as rational versus irrational desire. Such a technical distinction would exceed this passage.

Example ἃ βούλει ποιεῖν (207e). to do what you want.

Passages 207d; 207e; 208a–e; 209b; 210b

See also ἐπιθυμέω (E088); ἐπιτρέπω (E092); εὐδαίμων (E105)

Γ

γενναῖος

gennaios · adjective · E052

Noble, well-born, fine; used of lineage, love, and physique.

Socrates calls Hippothales’ love γενναῖον after learning whose son Lysis is. He later suggests that the boys might dispute which is γενναϊότερος, “nobler-born,” and calls Lysis’ body noble or fine.

The adjective’s social coloring matters: attractive appearance, distinguished descent, and wealth surround the boy before his understanding is tested. Its application to the body should not be flattened into a claim about ancestry alone. The opening question about

nobility also remains distinct from the subsequently attempted questions about justice and wisdom.

Example ὁπότερος γενναιότερος (207c). which of the two is nobler-born.

Passages 204e; 207c; 209a

See also πλοῦτος (E194); συγγένεια (E215); σῶμα (E223)

γένος

genos · neuter noun · E053

Kind; class or category.

The plural γένη introduces good, bad, and neither-good-nor-bad as “some three kinds, as it were.” The qualifying ὥσπερ and ἅττα keep the classification provisional.

The noun organizes the possibilities available to the current argument. It is not, solely by being used here, a technical assertion about three metaphysical genera. The classifications are applied across body, soul, and other things as the inquiry develops.

Example ὥσπερ εἰς τρία ἅττα εἶναι γένη (216d). There are, as it were, some three kinds.

Passages 216d

See also ἀγαθός (E001); κακός (E126); σῶμα (E223); ψυχή (E264)

γῆρας

gēras · neuter noun · E054

Old age; ageing.

Old age is the alternative to the application of white lead. It brings the same apparent colour to the hair, but now the hairs are said to have become white rather than merely to look white.

The noun supplies the example’s second manner of presence. The contrast does not require a claim that every natural process is genuine and every artificial one deceptive; its particular task is to show that something present can affect its bearer in importantly different ways.

Example ὅταν δὲ, ὦ φίλε, τὸ γῆρας (217d). But when, my friend, old age.

Passages 217d

See also χρῶμα (E262); θρίξ (E118); γίγνομαι (E055)

γίγνομαι

gignomai · verb · E055

Become; come to be; turn out in a certain condition.

The question at 212a–b asks how one person becomes a friend of another. The verb also carries the change central to the colour and moral analogy: having something present does not always mean having become that kind of thing.

At 217e the distinction between not yet being bad and already having become bad concerns the bearer’s condition, not merely the presence of an external influence. Translate according to the actual construction: “become” often matters here, although some conversational uses are naturally rendered “turn out.”

Example ἔστιν δ’ ὅτε ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον γέγονεν (217e). But sometimes it has already become such.

Passages 212a–b; 217b–e; 221e

See also παρουσία (E188); φαίνομαι (E237); ἀφαιρέω (E045)

γινώσκω

gignōskō · verb · E056

Know; come to identify or recognize someone or something.

Socrates presents his ability to know a lover and a beloved quickly as a god-given exception to his otherwise paltry abilities. The aorist infinitive γνῶναι is a form of γινώσκω, as is ἔγνων in his statement that hearing Lysis’ name did not enable him to identify the boy.

The passive γινώσκεσθαι then describes the father’s being well known and the boy’s being identifiable by his appearance. These uses concern discernment of persons and social familiarity. They should not be confused with a claim that Socrates already possesses a definition of friendship.

The edition consistently translates this verb as “know”; explaining its identifying force here does not require imposing a universal distinction between it and οἶδα.

Example γνῶναι ἐρῶντά τε καὶ ἐρώμενον (204c). To know a lover and a beloved.

Passages 204c; 204e

See also οἶδα (E167); ἐραστής (E095); ἐρώμενος (E100); εἶδος (E074)

γνήσιος

gnēsios · adjective · E057

Genuine; authentic.

The genuine lover is contrasted with the προσποιητός, the pretended one. Socrates infers that such a lover must be loved by the beloved, from the proposed necessity of loving what is naturally akin.

The adjective strengthens the distinction within courtship but does not itself prove the conclusion. The boys assent only barely, Hippothales reacts with pleasure, and Socrates immediately re-examines whether the akin differs from the like. “Genuine” is part of an attractive but still insecure result.

Example τῷ γνησίῳ ἐραστῇ (222a). For the genuine lover.

Passages 222a–b

See also προσποιητός (E201); ἐραστής (E095); οἰκεῖος (E168); ἀνάγκη (E026)

γράφω

graphō · verb · E058

Write; set down letters in an order one understands.

Socrates pairs writing with reading as a task Lysis’ parents already entrust to him. Within it he can decide which letter to write first and which second. Γράφειν is the present infinitive; γραφῆναι, in the preceding sentence, means “to be written.”

The example is narrow and concrete. It illustrates informed control over an activity, not unlimited freedom to assert whatever one wishes. The associated γράμματα here are the letters being ordered, not a title for all literature or advanced learning.

Example ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ πρῶτον τῶν γραμμάτων γράφειν (209b). to write whichever of the letters you want first.

Passages 209a; 209b

See also ἀναγιγνώσκω (E024); ἐπιτρέπω (E092); ἐπίσταμαι (E091)

Δ

δεινός

deinos · adjective · E059

Dreadful, formidable, impressively capable; the sense changes with context.

Ctesippus calls Hippothales’ prose dreadful and his singing more dreadful still. The same adjective marks Socrates’ mock alarm at a free boy ruled by a slave. At 211c it describes Menexenus as formidable in argument, a pupil of Ctesippus.

The range should not be forced into one English gloss. “Terrible” suits the tedious performance, while “formidable” better preserves the mixture of ability and apprehension in the description of Menexenus. The local object of admiration or alarm determines the evaluative force.

Example δεινὸς γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος (211c). for the fellow is formidable.

Passages 204d; 208c; 211c

See also ἐριστικός (E097); μαθητής (E149); καταγέλαστος (E129)

δέομαι

deomai · verb, middle in form · E060

Be in need of; require something or need to do something.

The verb commonly takes a genitive naming what is needed. At 215a οὐδενὸς δεόμενος, “needing nothing,” is inferred from the good person’s supposed sufficiency. At 217a the healthy body needs neither medicine nor benefit, and at 220c–d absence of harm is imagined to remove the need for benefit. These constructions express the dependence on help that the argument links with affection.

The same verb has ordinary conversational and educational uses: Socrates does not need to hear Hippothales’ metre (205a–b); needing a teacher exposes Lysis’ incomplete understanding (210d); Socrates finally needs to review the discussion (222e).

Distinguish this personal construction, someone needing something, from impersonal δεῖ, “it is necessary.” Need can supply a reason for seeking another person or a good, but the verb alone does not establish that every friendship is merely instrumental.

Example Ὁ δέ γε ἰκανὸς οὐδενὸς δεόμενος (215a). And the sufficient person is in need of nothing.

Passages 205a–b; 210d; 215a–b; 217a; 220c–d; 222e

See also ἰκανός (E122); ἰκανότης (E123); χρεία (E259); ἐνδεής (E080); ἀνάγκη (E026)

δεσπότης

despotēs · noun, masculine · E061

Master; someone exercising authority over another.

Socrates says that Lysis’ father willingly sets very many δεσπότας and rulers over him. The plural sums up the tutor and teachers just named, intensifying the joke that a loved and legally free son lives under constant control.

The word carries the coloring of a master’s authority, already heightened by the references to slaves and service. It need not mean a political despot. In this household argument it dramatizes dependence on others rather than classifying a form of government.

Example Παμπόλλους ἄρα σοι δεσπότας (208d). Very many masters over you, then.

Passages 208d

See also ἄρχω (E042); δοῦλος (E071); παιδαγωγός (E180)

διά

dia · preposition · E062

Through; with the accusative, because of or on account of.

Its causal use becomes decisive at 218d–219b. The sick person is attached to the doctor because of illness but for the sake of health. *διά* with the accusative identifies the occasion or explanatory condition; *ἔνεκα* names the end sought. Treating both as a vague “for” conceals the structure of the proposal.

The earlier phrase *διά κακοῦ παρουσίαν* means “because of the presence of badness”: the accusative governed by *διά* is *παρουσίαν*, while *κακοῦ* depends on that noun. At 221c the proposal that badness is the cause is explicitly reconsidered. At 220e the Greek itself says *ἐχθροῦ ἔνεκα*, “for the sake of an enemy”; do not silently rewrite that phrase as *διά*.

Example *διά νόσον ἔνεκα ὑγείας* (218e). because of illness, for the sake of health.

Passages 217b; 218d–219b; 220b–e; 221c–d

See also *ἔνεκα* (E081); *αἰτία* (E013); *παρουσία* (E188)

διαθρύπτω

diathryptō · verb · E063

Pamper, spoil through indulgence.

The participle *διαθρύπτοντα* describes Hippothales’ way of treating his beloved, paired with puffing him up and opposed to humbling and reducing his self-importance. Its application is interpersonal: lavish praise indulges the boy’s favorable opinion of himself.

The word does not imply that Socrates denies Lysis all pleasure or affection. His own conversation leaves Lysis eager for more. The contrast is between two forms of address and their effects, rather than a simple rule that harshness is good and kindness bad.

Example *χαυνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα* (210e). puffing him up and pampering him.

Passages 210e

See also *χαυνόω* (E257); *ταπεινώ* (E226); *ἐπαινέω* (E086)

διαλέγομαι

dialegomai · verb · E064

Converse; discuss a subject with others.

At 206c Hippothales asks how one should converse with a beloved, and Socrates proposes demonstrating it. The verb then describes conversation among the seated group (207a) and Socrates' exchange with Lysis and Menexenus (210e–211c).

The natural philosophers at 214b are described as people who discuss and write about nature and the whole. The pairing with γράφοντες distinguishes spoken discussion from written treatment while joining both as sources of claims to be examined.

The word need not be translated as a name for a formal technical method. Here it identifies discussion of a subject; Socrates still asks whether those who discuss it have spoken well. Their activity and reputation do not settle the truth of their statement.

Example οἱ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου διαλεγόμενοι (214b). Those who discuss nature and the whole.

Passages 214b; 206c; 207a; 210e–211c

See also φύσις (E256); σύγγραμμα (E216); σκοπέω (E210); λόγος (E145); προσφιλής (E202)

διάνοια

dianoia · noun, feminine · E065

Thought, meaning, or intellectual content of the compositions.

Socrates asks to hear Hippothales' διάνοια rather than his meters or a lyric. The genitive διανοίας continues the construction with “hear”: what matters is what Hippothales means and the attitude toward his beloved expressed in his language.

The passage therefore supports “thought” or “content,” not a technical division of cognitive faculties. Socrates is seeking enough information to assess the lover's manner of address. Attention shifts from poetic form to whether the utterance helps or harms its speaker's purpose.

Example ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας (205b). but rather the thought.

Passages 205b

See also ποίημα (E195); ποίησις (E196); λόγος (E145)

διατριβή

diatribē · noun, feminine · E066

Occupation, way of spending time; here, chiefly conversation.

Socrates asks both what the place is and what the διατριβή is. Hippothales distinguishes the wrestling-school from the activity taking place there: mostly talk, which they would gladly share with Socrates.

The cognate verb διατρίβομεν describes their spending time in the venue. Neither the noun nor the verb requires an organized course of instruction. The invitation makes conversation a shared social occupation before it becomes a tightly directed examination of love and friendship.

Example ἡ δὲ διατριβὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἐν λόγοις (204a). the occupation is mostly conversation.

Passages 204a

See also παλαίστρα (E184); λόγος (E145); μεταδίδωμι (E157)

διαφέρω

diapherō · verb · E067

Differ; make a difference.

The inquiry into loving begins with “does it make no difference?” whether the friend is lover or beloved. Menexenus’ initial “no difference” licenses a test that shows how consequential the direction of affection can be.

At 222b Socrates asks whether the akin differs in any way from the like. Here a genuine difference is required if the new proposal is to avoid an earlier objection. The verb thus frames both an initially neglected distinction and a final distinction that has not yet been secured.

Example Εἰ μὲν τι τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ ὁμοίου διαφέρει (222b). If the akin differs in some way from the like.

Passages 212a–b; 222b

See also οἰκεῖος (E168); ὅμοιος (E172); ἀντιφιλέω (E031)

διδάσκαλος

didaskalos · noun, masculine · E068

Teacher; a person from whom the boy needs instruction.

Lysis’ tutor leads him εἰς διδασκάλου, an idiomatic expression meaning to the teacher’s place. Socrates counts teachers among those who exercise authority over the boy. At 210d needing a teacher becomes evidence that Lysis does not yet understand.

The word therefore moves from an ordinary educational role to an argument against self-importance. It does not imply that every teacher is infallible, and the passage does not identify a full curriculum. Reading, writing, and lyre-playing nevertheless supply concrete examples of acquired skills.

Example Εἰ δ' ἄρα σὺ διδασκάλου δέῃ (210d). And if you need a teacher.

Passages 208c; 208d; 210d

See also παιδαγωγός (E180); μαθητής (E149); μανθάνω (E151)

δίκαιος

dikaios · adjective · E069

Just; acting rightly toward others.

Socrates is about to ask which boy is δικαιότερος, “more just,” and wiser when Menexenus is called away. Unlike the comparisons of age, birth, beauty, and wealth, this question never receives an answer in the opening exchange.

The occurrence therefore marks an intended shift toward evaluative qualities, but does not supply a definition of justice or a verdict on either boy. The lexical entry should preserve the interruption: attributing a developed argument about justice to this adjective would overstate the text.

At 216b the just is opposed to the unjust as a counterexample to the rule that opposites are friends. This later logical use draws on an accepted contrast without defining justice.

Example ὁπότερος δικαιοτέρος καὶ σοφώτερος (207d). which of the two was more just and wiser.

Passages 207d; 216b

See also σοφός (E213); γενναῖος (E052); ἀμφισβητέω (E022); ἄδικος (E008); ἐναντίος (E079)

διψᾶω

dipsaō · verb · E070

Be thirsty; thirst.

Thirst is paired with hunger in the examination of whether desire depends on badness. The noun δίψα denotes the condition, while participial διψῶντα describes the person experiencing it.

The argument distinguishes desiring beneficially, harmfully, or neither way. Thirst therefore supplies a familiar bodily example whose value cannot simply be read from the fact that it is a desire. Its role is argumentative, not a medical recommendation about drinking or deprivation.

Example καὶ δίψα δὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι (221a). And thirst too, and the other desires.

Passages 220e–221b

See also πεινάω (E189); ἐπιθυμία (E089); βλάπτω (E050)

δοῦλος

doulos · noun and adjective, masculine · E071

Slave; one legally unfree.

Lysis identifies both the muleteer and his tutor as slaves. Socrates emphasizes that a slave is trusted with tasks the son cannot perform and that the free boy is ruled by someone legally unfree.

The distinction matters literally within the household, even as Socrates uses it to challenge assumptions about freedom and authority. The related δουλεύω, “be in slavery” or “serve,” expands the language of dependence in the happiness argument. Do not erase the underlying status difference by translating every occurrence merely as “servant.”

Example ἐλεύθερον ὄντα ὑπὸ δούλου ἄρχεσθαι (208c). to be free and yet ruled by a slave.

Passages 208b; 208c

See also ἐλεύθερος (E077); παιδαγωγός (E180); ὀρεοκόμος (E177); ἄρχω (E042)

δυσάλωτος

dysalōtos · adjective · E072

Hard to capture or win.

The comparative δυσαλωτότεροι describes beautiful boys made more boastful by praise; δυσαλωτοτέραν immediately describes the quarry a bad hunter frightens away. The shared adjective makes the transfer from erotic pursuit to hunting unmistakable.

The difficulty is represented as partly created by the pursuer himself. Praise is not merely ineffective: it changes its object in a way that obstructs success. Retain the sense of capture in the translation, while recognizing that the application to a beloved is a strategic metaphor.

Example δυσαλωτοτέραν τὴν ἄγρην ποιοῖ (206a). he makes the quarry harder to catch.

Passages 206a

See also αἰρέω (E012); ἄγρᾱ (E005); θηρευτής (E116)

E

ἐγκώμιον

enkōmion · noun, neuter · E073

Song of praise; encomium.

Socrates claims that Hippothales is composing an ἐγκώμιον of himself when he celebrates his beloved. If he wins such a distinguished boy, the praise adorns his own success; if the boy escapes, it measures the greatness of his loss.

The term therefore changes its apparent target without changing its wording: ostensibly praise of Lysis, effectively prospective praise of Hippothales. The athletic language of winning strengthens the irony. Calling these poems “compliments” alone would miss their elaborate, public, victory-song character.

Example εἰς σαυτὸν ἐγκώμιον (205d). a song of praise about yourself.

Passages 205d; 205e

See also ὥδή (E265); νίκη (E162); ἐπαινέω (E086); κόσμος (E137)

εἶδος

eidōs · noun, neuter · E074

Visible figure or appearance.

Ctesippus says that Socrates is far from failing to know Lysis’ εἶδος: the boy is recognizable by his figure alone, although his own name remains less familiar than his father’s. The noun directs attention to visible appearance and the recognizability of an attractive person.

At 222a it appears again among the respects in which people might be akin, alongside soul, character, and ways of life. Neither occurrence by itself introduces a transcendent Form. Keep the ordinary descriptive sense distinct from later philosophical uses readers may associate with this familiar Greek word.

Example τὸ εἶδος ἀγνοεῖν τοῦ παιδός (204e). to fail to know the boy’s figure.

Passages 204e; 222a

See also καλός (E127); γενναῖος (E052); σῶμα (E223); ψυχή (E264); ἥθος (E112); οἰκεῖος (E168)

εἶδωλον

eidōlon · neuter noun · E075

Image; likeness that may stand in for something else.

The plural εἶδωλα describes the other things called friends for the sake of the first friend, qualified by ὥσπερ, “as it were.” Socrates fears that these images may deceive the speakers about what is truly a friend.

The word belongs to a comparison within the inquiry. It invites a distinction between derivative and final objects of concern, but it does not by itself settle that secondary friends are wholly unreal, or supply a developed theory of Forms. Keep the comparative qualification visible.

Example ὥσπερ εἶδωλα ἄττα ὄντα αὐτοῦ (219d). Being, as it were, certain images of it.

Passages 219d

See also ἐξαπατάω (E083); πρῶτον φίλον (E204); ῥῆμα (E205)

ἐλέγχω

elenchō · verb · E076

Refute, expose an error through questioning or argument.

Socrates asks Lysis to assist him if Menexenus attempts ἐλέγχειν, “to refute” him. Here the prospective target is Socrates, which playfully reverses the expectation that Socrates will conduct the examination.

The immediate context stresses Menexenus’ contentiousness and Ctesippus’ influence, not a formal description of a named Socratic method. The verb should therefore be translated for the action performed rather than turned automatically into the abstract technical noun “elenchus.” The possibility of refutation is linked to the speaker’s risk of becoming ridiculous.

Example εἰάν με ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρῇ ὁ Μενέξενος (211b). if Menexenus attempts to refute me.

Passages 211b

See also ἐριστικός (E097); καταγέλαστος (E129); κολάζω (E136)

ἐλεύθερος

eleutheros · adjective · E077

Free; legally free, or free to act within an area of understanding.

The first contrast is social status: Socrates asks whether the muleteer is slave or free, and calls it striking that a free boy is ruled by a slave. At 210b the same adjective describes the freedom that knowledgeable people will have in the matters they understand.

This shift is central to the example. Legal freedom has not automatically given Lysis practical independence; competence can win permission and authority. Keep both senses visible rather than translating the earlier social status as if it already meant intellectual autonomy.

Example αὐτοί τε ἐλεύθεροι ἐσόμεθα ἐν αὐτοῖς (210b). we ourselves will be free in these matters.

Passages 208b; 208c; 210b

See also δοῦλος (E071); ἐπιτρέπω (E092); ἄρχω (E042)

ἔμπληκτος

emplēktos · adjective · E078

Capricious; erratic.

The bad are described as ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους, capricious and unaccountable. This supports the suggestion that they are not like even themselves and therefore cannot supply a straightforward example of like befriending like.

The paired adjective ἀστάθμητος stresses the inability to find a stable measure or account of them in the edition's rendering. These descriptions serve an interpretive restriction of the likeness thesis, rather than an independently developed psychological theory of wrongdoing.

Example ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους (214c–d). Capricious and unaccountable.

Passages 214c–d

See also κακός (E126); ἀνόμοιος (E029); αἰνίττομαι (E011)

ἐναντίος

enantios · adjective · E079

Opposite; contrary.

At 215e–216a, the claim that unlike things supply one another's needs becomes the stronger claim that what is most opposite is most friendly. Dry and wet, cold and hot, bitter and sweet, sharp and blunt supply examples; the empty desires filling, and the full emptying. The explanatory proposal is that each wants its opposite, which nourishes it.

The test at 216a–b substitutes enmity and friendship, injustice and justice, lack of restraint and self-restraint, bad and good. If opposition as such produces friendship, these pairs too must be friendly. That consequence defeats the unrestricted thesis. The argument does not prove that no unlike or complementary pair can ever be friends. ἐναντιότης, “opposition”, makes the crucial qualification explicit: friendship supposedly occurs in virtue of opposition itself.

Example κατὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητα (216b). in virtue of opposition.

Passages 215e–216b; 218b

See also ὅμοιος (E172); ἀνόμοιος (E029); ἐχθρός (E108)

ἐνδεής

endeēs · adjective · E080

In need of; deficient in; lacking.

The neuter τὸ ἐνδεές means what is deficient, or the thing that lacks. At 221d–e it supplies the bridge from desire to affinity: what desires desires what it lacks; what lacks is attached to that of which it is deficient; it becomes deficient in what is taken away.

The first step establishes a relation between desirer and desired object. The next step introduces deprivation and leads to οἰκείον. This is an argumentative transition needing scrutiny, not a definition that makes every ordinary lack the loss of something once possessed. The dialogue does not separately demonstrate that all desire is restoration. The noun ἔνδεια is not substituted here for the adjective actually printed.

Example οὗ ἃν ἐνδεές ᾗ (221d–e). that of which it is deficient.

Passages 221d–e

See also ἐπιθυμέω (E088); ἀφαιρέω (E045); οἰκεῖος (E168)

ἔνεκα

heneka · preposition with genitive · E081

For the sake of; for the purpose of; on account of.

In the doctor example the phrase ἔνεκα ὑγείας gives health as the end, while διὰ νόσον identifies illness as the condition prompting attachment (218e). Repeated “for the sake of” relations then generate the demand for a first friend, beyond which reference to another friend no longer continues (219c–d).

The father’s care for wine and its vessel is for the sake of his son, illustrating the distinction between subordinate means and the end that matters (219d–220b). Yet at 220e the text says that the real friend has appeared as a friend ἐχθροῦ ἔνεκα, “for the sake of an enemy”. The phrase shifts the earlier wording and should be preserved rather than harmonized away. Its local force belongs to the problem being exposed.

The position after its genitive, as in ἐπικουρίας ἔνεκα at 215d, does not change its basic function.

Example οὗ ἔνεκα (219d). for the sake of which.

Passages 215d; 218d–220e

See also διὰ (E062); πρῶτον φίλον (E204); ἀρχή (E041)

ἐξαγριαίνω

exagriainō · verb · E082

Make wild, alienate, provoke an unsociable response.

The infinitive is opposed directly to κηλεῖν. A lover's speeches and songs ought to captivate their hearer; if instead they make him wild, they display a serious lack of musical or cultural skill.

Its force continues the hunting image, in which the pursuer scares away his own quarry. "Anger" may capture part of the effect but narrows the image too much. The practical point is that the lover makes his beloved less approachable through the very performance intended to attract him.

Example μὴ κηλεῖν ἀλλ' ἐξαγριαίνειν (206b). not to charm but to make wild.

Passages 206b

See also κηλέω (E134); ἀμουσία (E021); δυσάλωτος (E072)

ἐξαπατάω

exapataō · verb · E083

Deceive; lead into a false impression.

The passive at 215c raises the possibility that the speakers have been deceived about the whole question. At 219b–d they are warned that the present formulation, and the things called friends for another's sake, may deceive them.

The deceptive agents need not be dishonest persons: an argument or an image-like secondary object can misdirect judgment. In the regress passage the danger is to mistake a derivative object of concern for what is genuinely and finally valued.

Example μὴ ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατήσῃ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον (219b–c). So that what is now being said may not deceive us.

Passages 215c; 219b–d

See also εἶδωλον (E075); ὑποψία (E236); ἀρχή (E041)

ἐξελέγχω

exelenchō · verb · E084

Refute; show a proposal to fail under examination.

At 222d Socrates recalls that they thought they had refuted the claim that the good alone is a friend to the good. The infinitive ἐξελέγξει depends on "we thought"; the qualification matters because their earlier reasoning is now being re-used.

The word refers to what the previous exchange seemed to establish, not to personal humiliation as an end in itself. In the closing review it prevents the speakers from accepting a familiar answer simply because it has returned in altered vocabulary.

Example ὥομεθα ἐξελέγξει ἡμᾶς αὐτούς (222d). We thought that we ourselves had refuted this.

Passages 222d

See also ὁμολογέω (E173); σκοπέω (E210); ἀδύνατος (E009)

ἐξευρίσκω

exeuriskō · verb · E085

Find out; discover the answer to an inquiry.

The perfect ἐξηυρήκαμεν at 218b announces a discovery: the speakers believe they have found what the friend is and is not. That confidence is immediately interrupted by Socrates' suspicion.

The final infinitive ἐξευρεῖν at 223b returns to the same goal in a negative formulation: they have not yet been able to find out what the friend is. The repeated verb binds the premature success to the final acknowledgment of unfinished inquiry. Neither form denotes merely meeting or obtaining an actual friend.

Example οὐπω δὲ ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ φίλος οἷοί τε ἐγενόμεθα ἐξευρεῖν (223b). but we have not yet been able to find out what the friend is.

Passages 218b; 223b

See also ζητέω (E109); σκοπέω (E210); ὑποψία (E236)

ἐπαινέω

epaineō · verb · E086

Praise; enhance another person in speech.

Socrates warns against praising the beloved before winning him. Praise, especially when it “builds up” its recipient, fills beautiful boys with pride and boastfulness and makes them harder to catch.

The objection is local and practical: Hippothales' manner of praise works against his own aim. It is not a blanket ban on favorable judgment. The opening calls Miccus an admirer of Socrates, using the related noun ἐπαινέτης, without condemning him. Later Socrates' treatment of Lysis supplies a pointedly different conversational method.

Example οὐκ ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἐρώμενον (206a). he does not praise the beloved.

Passages 206a

See also ἐγκώμιον (E073); μεγαλαυχία (E153); ταπεινός (E226)

ἐπαναφέρω

epanapherō · verb · E087

Carry back or refer onward to something else.

The future ἐπανοίσει describes what the proposed starting point will no longer do: refer the account to another friend. It makes the regress concrete as movement from one object of concern to a further object for whose sake the first is valued.

The negation οὐκέτι is crucial. The desired starting point does not supply one more link in the same sequence; it stops this particular kind of referral. The verb is the passage's actual language for that movement, rather than an unattested technical noun for infinite regress.

Example ἢ οὐκέτ' ἐπανοίσει ἐπ' ἄλλο φίλον (219c). Which will no longer refer on to another friend.

Passages 219c

See also ἀρχή (E041); τελευτάω (E228); ἔνεκα (E081)

ἐπιθυμέω

epithymeō · verb · E088

Desire; want; have an appetite for.

Lysis desires to approach the conversation (207a), and his parents restrict things he desires to do (207e–209a). Socrates desires to acquire friends (211d–e). These personal and practical uses precede desire's role in explaining friendship.

The desired object commonly stands in the genitive: at 221d–e, the thing desired is what the desirer lacks. The participle τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν means what desires, not desire as an abstract noun. Keeping subject and object distinct matters to the proposal that the desirer is a friend to what it desires.

At 215e the verb explains the supposed attraction of opposites; at 217b–e it describes reaching toward the good; at 221a–b it includes hunger and thirst whose effects may be beneficial, harmful, or neither. At 221e–222a the language returns to one person's attraction to another. No one of these uses by itself makes desire either virtuous or vicious.

Example τό γε ἐπιθυμοῦν (221d). what desires.

Passages 207a; 207e–209a; 211d–e; 215e; 217b–e; 221a–222a

See also ἐπιθυμία (E089); ἐνδεής (E080); φιλέω (E242); ἐράω (E096)

ἐπιθυμία

epithymia · feminine noun · E089

Desire; appetite; wanting.

The word can name bodily appetites without declaring them bad. At 217e, badness that has not yet made its subject bad stimulates desire for the good; badness that does transform the subject deprives it of that desire. At 220e–221b, hunger and thirst help separate desire itself from its beneficial or harmful effects.

That distinction overturns the proposal that badness must be the sole cause of attachment. Desires that are neither good nor bad could remain even if bad things disappeared. At 221d Socrates consequently asks whether desire is the cause of friendship: the desirer would be a friend to what is desired at the time of desiring.

At 221e, ἔρως, φιλία, and ἐπιθυμία are named together as directed toward what is akin. The coordination relates the words without making them interchangeable in every context. This proposed explanation is exposed to the difficulties about affinity and likeness at 222b–d.

Example ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς φιλίας αἰτία (221d). desire [as] the cause of friendship.

Passages 217e; 220e–221e; 222b–d

See also ἐπιθυμέω (E088); ἔρως (E101); φιλία (E244); ἐνδεής (E080)

ἐπικουρία

epikouria · feminine noun · E090

Aid; assistance.

At 215a things alike are supposed to have no aid to supply one another beyond what each can supply itself. The absence of such assistance is used to question whether they could cherish each other.

The opposite theory immediately reverses the pattern: the weak person turns to the strong for aid. Both uses make the dependence of friendship on practical help explicit. The noun names the offered help, not friendship itself, so the step from aid to affection remains an argumentative step.

Example μηδεμίαν ἐπικουρίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα (215a). Having no aid to offer one another.

Passages 215a; 215d

See also χρεία (E259); ὠφελία (E267); ἀναγκάζω (E025)

ἐπίσταμαι

epistamai · verb · E091

Know; understand; know how to do something.

Knowledge repeatedly means practical competence. Hippothales' knowledge of what a lover should say is tested (204e–205a), and Lysis' parents allow him to act where he knows how but prevent him where he does not (209a–c). The contrast is not simply possession of facts versus ignorance; it concerns trustworthy performance in a specific domain.

At 210a, knowledge of medicine would justify control even over another person's eyes. Do not turn such examples into a claim that technical skill settles every moral question. The argument deliberately pushes the relation between competence, trust, usefulness, and affection.

Example ταῦτα μὲν ἐπίσταμαι, ἐκεῖνα δ' οὐ (209c). I know these things, but not those.

Passages 204e–205a; 205b; 209a–c; 210a

See also φρονέω (E255); μανθάνω (E151); σοφός (E213)

ἐπιτρέπω

epitrepō · verb · E092

Entrust, permit; give someone control of a task or property.

The verb carries the questioning from permission to trust. Lysis is not entrusted with horses or his own supervision, while a hired driver, muleteer, and tutor receive authority. His parents do entrust reading, writing, and musical operations to him because he knows them.

Socrates then extends the same criterion from father to neighbor, city, and Great King. The relevant constructions specify a person entrusted and an activity or thing entrusted.

Permission here follows assessed competence, rather than wealth, free status, or age alone.

Example ἐπιτρέψει σοι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ (209c). he will entrust both himself and his possessions to you.

Passages 208a–c; 209a–e; 210a–c

See also ἄρχω (E042); ἐπίσταμαι (E091); ἡλικία (E113); ἐλεύθερος (E077)

ἔπομαι

hepomai · verb · E093

Follow; keep up with an explanation.

The ordinary sense appears when Hippothales invites Socrates to come along (204a) and when Lysis follows Menexenus to the group (207b). The later use transfers following from bodily movement to comprehension.

Menexenus uses the first-person ἔπομαι to say that he is not quite following the compressed question about the thing for whose sake a friend is a friend. The immediate issue is comprehension, not unwillingness to agree.

Socrates responds with the concrete example of the sick person and the doctor, adding that the example may help him too understand his own words. Following an argument is presented as a shared task, and the exchange gives a practical reason for the medical analogy.

Example Οὐ πάννυ, ἔφη, ἔπομαι (218e). I am not quite following, he said.

Passages 218d–e; 204a; 207b

See also ἀκολουθέω (E015); ἰατρός (E121); ἐρωτάω (E102)

ἔπος

epos · neuter noun · E094

Word or saying; here, a line of verse.

The dative plural ἔπεσιν refers to the quoted verse in which the god brings like to like. Socrates asks whether Lysis has encountered these verses, before turning to written treatments of nature.

The word identifies the poetic form of the source, whereas the argument must still determine what the saying means and whether it holds. In this occurrence “verses” is more informative than the broad translation “words.”

Example τούτοις τοῖς ἔπεσιν (214b). These verses.

Passages 214b

See also ποιητής (E197); σύγγραμμα (E216); αἰνίττομαι (E011)

ἐραστής

erastēs · masculine noun · E095

Lover; the person who is in love.

Hippothales is the dramatic example: his praise and desire focus on Lysis. The word names a role in courtship and need not imply that the beloved reciprocates. At 212b–c lovers may think they are unloved or even hated.

At 222a the “genuine” rather than “pretended” lover is said necessarily to be loved by his darling. This startling conclusion is drawn from the current affinity argument; Lysis and Menexenus only just nod, and Hippothales is delighted. The following examination destabilizes the account. It should not be presented as a norm obliging someone to return another’s desire.

Example τῷ γνησίῳ ἐραστῇ (222a). the genuine lover.

Passages 204e–205c; 212b–c; 222a–b

See also ἐρώμενος (E100); παιδικά (E181); γνήσιος (E057); ἀντιφιλέω (E031)

ἐράω

eraō · verb · E096

Be in love; desire as a lover.

The contracted infinitive is ἐρᾶν, the usual citation form in the edition’s English notes. Hippothales does not deny being in love with Lysis (205a). At 221b and 221e–222a, the verb joins desire and φιλεῖν in the final proposed explanation by affinity.

Distinguish ἐρᾶν from φιλεῖν: the latter is used broadly of parental affection, attachment to things, and the relation under examination. The dialogue connects the two verbs, but their different ranges remain important.

Example τὸ ἐρᾶν (205a). being in love.

Passages 204b–c; 205a; 221b; 221e–222a

See also ἔρω (E101); ἐραστής (E095); ἐρώμενος (E100); φιλέω (E242)

ἐριστικός

eristikos · adjective · E097

Contentious, fond of disputing.

Socrates warns Lysis that Menexenus is ἐριστικός and may attempt to refute him. Lysis agrees enthusiastically: that is precisely why he wants Socrates to converse with his companion and discipline him.

The adjective describes a conversational disposition, supported by the identification of Menexenus as Ctesippus’ pupil. It need not designate membership in a formal “eristic school.” The exchange is playful, but it anticipates an audience alert to victory and defeat in argument, contrasting with Lysis’ eagerness to listen and learn.

Example ὅτι ἐριστικός ἐστιν (211b). that he is contentious.

Passages 211b

See also ἐλέγχω (E076); κολλάω (E136); μαθητής (E149); ἀμφισβητέω (E022)

Ἑρμαῖα

Hermaia · proper noun, neuter plural · E098

Hermaea; the festival being celebrated at the wrestling-school.

The celebration explains why the boys and young men are mixed together in the same place. On entering, Socrates finds that the sacrifices and associated preparations have largely finished and the adorned boys are playing. The festival is therefore an active

condition of the meeting, not merely a decorative date. The supplied edition identifies it as the festival of Hermes.

The festival returns at the close: the tutors seem to have been drinking at the Hermaea and insist on taking the boys home (223a–b). It thus frames both the opportunity for conversation and its practical ending.

Example ὥς Ἑρμαῖα ἄγουσιν (206d). since they are celebrating the Hermaea.

Passages 206d; 223a–b

See also παλαίστρα (E184); ἀστραγαλίζω (E043)

ἐρυθρίαω

erythriaō · verb · E099

Blush; reveal embarrassment visibly.

Hippothales blushes when Socrates asks who is beautiful in his eyes; he blushes still more after Socrates announces that his love is already far advanced. The aorist ἤρυθρίασεν reports the visible response, while Ctesippus uses present ἐρυθριᾷς to tease him about it.

The blush answers the question without naming Lysis. It contrasts the lover's current reluctance to speak with his habitual, excessive public praise. Read it as a narrated bodily reaction, not a named ethical doctrine of shame.

Lysis also blushes at 213d, after involuntarily agreeing that the inquiry has gone wrong. Here attentive intellectual engagement, rather than the concealment of a beloved's name, precedes the visible embarrassment.

Example Καὶ ὃς ἐρωτηθεὶς ἤρυθρίασεν (204b). And, when asked, he blushed.

Passages 204b; 204c; 204d; 213d

See also ὀκνέω (E171); καταγέλαστος (E129)

ἐρώμενος

erōmenos · present middle/passive participle used as a noun · E100

Beloved; the person who is loved erotically.

From ἐράω, this participle identifies the recipient of a lover's desire. At 206a Socrates advises against praising the beloved before winning him; at 222a he asks what affinity the desirer has with the beloved in soul, character, ways, or figure.

Do not confuse ἐρώμενος with φιλούμενος. Both may be translated “loved”, but the latter is the broader passive participle of φιλέω and is central to the logical alternatives at 212a–213c. Nor does being a beloved entail returning affection.

Example τῷ ἐρωμένῳ (222a). to the beloved.

Passages 204b–c; 206a; 222a

See also ἐράω (E096); ἐραστής (E095); φιλέω (E242); παιδικά (E181)

ἔρως

erōs · masculine noun · E101

Erotic love; a lover's desire.

The opening makes the noun concrete in Hippothales' attraction to Lysis (204b–205a). Praise, embarrassment, concealment, and the wish to win the beloved frame the inquiry into friendship. Socrates' own eagerness for acquiring friends is described with the related adverb ἐρωτικῶς at 211e.

The noun returns at 221e beside friendship and desire: all three are proposed as directed toward what is akin. This return ties the apparently abstract inquiry back to the dramatic courtship. It does not erase their lexical differences: ἔρως denotes the lover's desire, φιλία the relation or affection, and ἐπιθυμία wanting in a wider range, including appetite.

The outcome at 222a–b seems briefly favorable to Hippothales, but the argument resumes and ends without a definition. Reading the last affinity proposal as a certified theory of erotic reciprocity would disregard that sequence.

Example ὁ τε ἔρως καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία (221e). love and friendship and desire.

Passages 204b–205a; 211e; 221e–222b

See also ἐράω (E096); φιλία (E244); ἐπιθυμία (E089); οἰκεῖος (E168)

ἐρωτάω

erōtaō · verb · E102

Ask; put a question to someone.

The command to question Menexenus introduces the extended inquiry at 211d. At 217e τοῦτο ... ἐρωτῶ identifies exactly what the colour analogy is intended to ask: whether something becomes like whatever is present to it.

The noun ἐρώτημα at 221a describes the speculative question about what would remain if badness disappeared. Socrates then narrows the discussion to what they know about existing desires. Asking is thus both the method of instruction and an activity whose useful scope can itself be examined.

Example Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ νῦν δὴ (217e). This, then, is what I am asking now.

Passages 211d; 217e; 221a

See also ἀποκρίνομαι (E035); σκοπέω (E210); ἐξευρίσκω (E085)

ἔστιάω*hestiaō · verb · E103***Entertain at a meal; in the middle, feast or enjoy a banquet.**

Ctesippus asks why Socrates and Lysis are feasting all by themselves instead of sharing their conversation. The second-person dual ἔστιᾱσθον addresses the two together and makes their private exchange into a metaphorical banquet.

No actual meal is being described at this point. The figure treats conversation as something pleasurable and shareable, returning to the opening offer to share the wrestling-school's talk. It also brings the private whisper between Socrates and Lysis back into the hearing of the larger group.

Example αὐτῷ μόνῳ ἔστιᾱσθον (211c). you two feast all by yourselves.

Passages 211c–d

See also μεταδίδωμι (E157); διατριβή (E066); λόγος (E145)

ἑταῖρος*hetairos · masculine noun · E104***Companion; associate; member of a familiar circle.**

Miccus is Socrates' companion (204a), and Lysis is Menexenus' closest companion (206d). Socrates would prefer acquiring a companion to Darius' gold (211e). These uses convey association without serving as a definition of φίλος.

The address ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε at 213b combines the words: friend and companion. At 216a, ὦ ἑταῖρε seems to address the unnamed listener of Socrates' narration rather than one of the boys; that identification is a contextual reading. The edition consistently reserves “companion” for ἑταῖρος and “friend” for φίλος.

Example ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε (213b). my friend and companion.

Passages 204a; 206d; 211e; 213b; 216a

See also φίλος (E251); φιλέταιρος (E241); συνουσία (E220)

εὐδαίμων*eudaimōn · adjective · E105***Happy, flourishing; the condition Lysis' parents want for him.**

Socrates begins the parental-love argument by asking whether Lysis' parents wish him to be as happy as possible. Lysis accepts both their affection and their wish. Socrates then tests happiness against slavery, restrictions, and inability to do what one desires.

The superlative εὐδαιμονέστατον intensifies the parents' aim; the related verb εὐδαιμονοίης means “you might be happy.” The passage initially treats unrestricted action as a proposed

sign of happiness, but moves toward knowledgeable freedom. Do not turn its opening questions into an already established definition of flourishing.

Example ὥς εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι (207d). to be as happy as possible.

Passages 207d; 207e; 208e

See also μακάριος (E150); ἐλεύθερος (E077); βούλομαι (E051)

εὐπορέω

euporeō · verb · E106

Have a way through; be able to proceed or find an answer.

Menexenus says οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶ, “I do not have much of a way through,” after the competing accounts of who counts as friend have failed. The negation is essential: the passage does not say that he has succeeded.

The verb gives a concrete sense of having a route or resources for continuing. It anticipates the difficult-road image of the inquiry at 213e. The edition prints εὐπορῶ, not ἀπορῶ, at this place; a lexicon should preserve the word actually printed rather than replace it with the more familiar vocabulary of perplexity.

Example οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶ ἔγωγε (213c). I do not see much of a way through myself.

Passages 213c

See also ἀπορία (E038); σκέψις (E209); ἐξευρίσκω (E085)

ἔχθρα

echthra · feminine noun · E107

Enmity; hostility.

The noun names the relation or condition corresponding to ἐχθρός. In the account supported by Hesiod it joins envy and rivalry as the alleged outcome of resemblance. The later objection treats enmity as the extreme opposite of friendship.

This is a decisive test of the general assertion that opposites are friends: taken without qualification, the assertion would make friendship and enmity friendly to one another. The noun is therefore more than a label for unpleasant feelings; it supplies a counterexample to an unrestricted rule about opposites.

Example οὐκ ἐναντιώτατον ἔχθρα φιλίας (216a–b). Is enmity not most opposite to friendship?

Passages 215d; 216a–b

See also ἐχθρός (E108); φιλία (E244); φθόνος (E240); φιλονικία (E249)

ἐχθρός

echthros · adjective; substantival adjective · E108

Hostile; an enemy; in the neuter, something hostile or inimical.

At 213a–c ἐχθρός belongs to the puzzle of who receives the name friend or enemy when affection and hatred run in different directions. The adjective does not itself settle whether hostility is felt, received, or mutual.

In the medical argument disease is called ἐχθρόν (219a), so “enemy” can designate an adverse thing rather than a hostile person. The phrase διὰ τὸ ἐχθρόν, “because of the enemy,” then describes a proposed cause of friendship. At 220e the wording changes to ἐχθροῦ ἔνεκα, “for the sake of an enemy.” That change is part of the difficulty under examination and should not silently be translated away.

Example Ἡ δὲ νόσος ἐχθρόν (219a). And disease is an enemy.

Passages 213a–c; 214c; 216a–b; 219a–b; 220e

See also ἔχθρα (E107); μισέω (E160); φίλος (E251); νόσος (E163)

Z

ζητέω

zēteō · verb · E109

Seek; search for; inquire into.

At 213d, the failure of the first alternatives leads to the question whether they were seeking in the right way at all. Lysis’ spontaneous assent and blush show that he has been actively following the inquiry. The verb directs attention to method, not simply to the absence of an answer.

Compare the final ἐξευρεῖν, “find out”, at 223b: seeking has occurred, but discovery has not yet been achieved. A search-word should not be turned into a guarantee that the last proposal is the intended solution.

Example οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐζητοῦμεν (213d). we were not seeking rightly.

Passages 213d–e; 223b

See also σκέπτομαι (E207); ἐξευρίσκω (E085); ἀπορία (E038)

H

ἡγέομαι

hēgeomai · verb · E110

Think or judge; regard something as having a certain value.

At 218b those who still judge that they do not know what they do not know remain capable of loving wisdom. The participle ἡγούμενοι describes their assessment of their own knowledge.

At 219d–e the same verb helps describe the father’s valuation of his son and his belief that wine would save him. Context distinguishes an opinion about facts from an appraisal of importance. Neither use should be reduced to the verb’s separate sense “lead.”

Example ἔτι ἡγούμενοι μὴ εἰδέναι ἅ μὴ ἴσασιν (218b). Still believing they do not know what they do not know.

Passages 218b; 219d–e; 208b; 209c–210a

See also ἄγνοια (E003); προτιμάω (E203); περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι (E190)

ἡδονή

hēdonē · feminine noun · E111

Pleasure; delight.

Hippothales changes colours from pleasure when the argument appears to guarantee that a genuine lover is loved by his beloved. The noun explains his visible emotional reaction.

This dramatic pleasure should not be confused with proof of the conclusion. The boys’ reluctant nods and Socrates’ immediate re-examination give the reader reasons to distinguish what pleases a listener from what has been securely established.

Example ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς (222b). From pleasure.

Passages 222b

See also χρῶμα (E262); γνήσιος (E057); ἐραστής (E095)

ἥθος

ēthos · neuter noun · E112

Character; a characteristic disposition.

At 222a ἥθος is one possible respect in which a lover might be akin to the beloved. The phrase κατὰ τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος specifies some character or disposition of the soul.

The word is part of an exploratory list, alongside *τρόποι* and *εἶδος*. It identifies a possible basis of affinity without proving that every shared disposition produces friendship. The surrounding argument still has to distinguish kinship from the likeness already rejected.

Example κατὰ τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος (222a). In some character of the soul.

Passages 222a

See also *ψυχή* (E264); *τρόπος* (E229); *εἶδος* (E074); *οἰκεῖος* (E168)

ἡλικία

hēlikia · noun, feminine · E113

Age; especially the age sufficient for independent responsibility.

Lysis initially explains his restrictions by saying he is not yet of age. Socrates counters that the parents already trust him with reading, writing, and lyre-playing without waiting for him to reach the required age.

The phrase *ἡλικίαν ἔχω* means to be of age in this context, rather than merely to possess an age. The argument relocates the relevant threshold from years to demonstrated understanding. It does not supply a numerical age for Lysis or establish that age never matters in any activity.

Example Οὐ γάρ πω, ἔφη, ἡλικίαν ἔχω (209a). For I am not yet of age, he said.

Passages 209a; 209c

See also *ἐπιτρέπω* (E092); *ἐπίσταμαι* (E091); *διδάσκαλος* (E068)

ἡνίοχος

hēniochos · noun, masculine · E114

Charioteer; the driver entrusted with the horses.

When Socrates asks whether Lysis may take the reins in his father's racing chariot, the boy names a paid *ἡνίοχος* as the person allowed to drive. The answer sets practical responsibility against family ownership and the son's status.

Socrates emphasizes that the father even pays this hired person for the authority denied to his own son. The driver is not identified as a slave. Preserve that distinction from the muleteer and tutor, whose enslaved status is explicitly established in the next examples.

Example Ἔστιν τις ἡνίοχος παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς (208a). There is a charioteer employed by my father.

Passages 208a

See also *μισθός* (E161); *ἐπιτρέπω* (E092); *ἵπποτροφία* (E125)

Θ

θεραπεύω*therapeuō · verb · E115***Tend, attend to, care for.**

The verb describes the care that someone else gives Lysis' body, paired with ποιμαίνει, “shepherds.” Socrates uses the pair to show that the boy's movements and bodily care are managed by others despite his distinguished physique.

Here θεραπεύω is broader than medically treating a disease. No illness of Lysis is alleged. The later hypothetical eye-treatment supplies a medical example, but should not retroactively force that specialized meaning onto this ordinary vocabulary of attendance, upbringing, and supervision.

Example ἄλλος ποιμαίνει καὶ θεραπεύει (209a). another person shepherds and tends it.

Passages 209a

See also σῶμα (E223); παιδαγωγός (E180); ἰατρός (E121)

θηρευτής*thēreutēs · noun, masculine · E116***Hunter; a figure for courtship and for inquiry.**

Socrates asks what sort of hunter would scare away the game he was pursuing. Hippothales calls such a hunter φαῦλος, poor at the task. The analogy makes him agree to a criticism of his own praise before that criticism is explicitly applied.

The associated participle θηρεύων means “while hunting.” The scene tests practical competence by whether one's activity advances or defeats its end. The hunter is an illustrative role, and the passage does not present a literal hunting expedition.

At 218c Socrates himself is “like a hunter”, pleased to possess the answer he has been hunting. The immediate arrival of suspicion turns apparent capture into renewed pursuit. The image connects strategic courtship with the search for a secure account.

Example Ποῖός τις οὖν ἂν σοι δοκεῖ θηρευτῆς εἶναι (206a). What sort of hunter would he seem to you?

Passages 206a; 218c

See also ἄγρα (E005); δυσάλωτος (E072); φαῦλος (E239); ἐξευρίσκω (E085); ὑποψία (E236); λανθάνω (E142)

θορυβέω

thorybeō · verb · E117

Disturb, throw into confusion; in the passive, be unsettled.

The perfect passive participle τεθορυβημένον describes Hippothales as unsettled by what has been said. It is paired with his ongoing anxiety and explains why Socrates remembers the lover's wish to stay concealed.

The passage applies the verb to an individual's emotional disturbance, not to a noisy public crowd. The perfect participle presents the resulting state. Hippothales' reaction supplies a second audience for the questions ostensibly addressed only to Lysis and makes the effect of Socratic speech dramatically visible.

Example τεθορυβημένον ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων (210e). thrown into confusion by what was being said.

Passages 210e

See also ἀγωνιάω (E006); ταπεινόω (E226); ἀπεχθάνομαι (E033)

θρίξ

thrix · feminine noun · E118

Hair; an individual hair, with plural often referring to the hair collectively.

The passage uses the accusative plural τρίχας of the boy's fair hair. The changing stem explains why the form does not look exactly like the dictionary headword.

The plural controls feminine adjectives and pronouns throughout the analogy: the hairs appear white after coating and become white through old age. Tracking that agreement helps separate the hair itself from the whitening material applied to it.

Example τὰς τρίχας ψιμυθίῳ ἀλείψειεν (217d). Might smear the hair with white lead.

Passages 217d–e

See also ξανθός (E165); λευκός (E143); γῆρας (E054)

I

ιατρική

iatrikē · feminine substantival adjective · E119

Medicine; the medical art or practice.

Medicine is labelled beneficial and good in the example at 217b. The body welcomes it because disease is present, while a healthy body has no need of it.

At 219a–c medicine is a friend for the sake of health, so it becomes the first clear example of a derivative object of affection in the regress. The word names the healing practice, not a drug or the doctor as a person. Those different medical nouns perform connected but distinct jobs in the analogy.

Example ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἀγαθόν (217b). But medicine is beneficial and good.

Passages 217a–b; 219a–c

See also ἰατρός (E121); ὑγίεια (E232); νόσος (E163); φάρμακον (E238)

ἰατρικός

iatrikos · adjective · E120

Skilled in medicine; possessing medical competence.

The accusative plural ἰατρικούς describes what the Great King might suppose Socrates and Lysis to be. On that assumption he would allow them to treat his son's eyes, because he believed them to understand correctly.

The word is adjectival here, not the feminine substantive ἰατρική used for the medical art elsewhere. The supposition is crucial: Socrates has not claimed that either speaker actually has medical training. This hypothetical competence explains the king's permission without turning their imagined treatment into medical advice.

Example εἰ ὑπολαμβάνοι ἰατρικούς εἶναι (210a). if he supposed us to be skilled in medicine.

Passages 210a

See also ἰατρός (E121); ἐπιτρέπω (E092)

ἰατρός

iatros · noun, masculine · E121

Doctor; a practitioner believed competent to treat an illness.

Socrates asks whether the Great King would let his son touch his own ailing eyes without regarding him as a doctor. The expected answer is no. By contrast, outsiders thought skilled in medicine would be allowed even to open the eyes and sprinkle ash into them.

The passage tests trust in expertise, not the merits of a particular remedy. The edition prints ἰατρὸν here, with an adjectival variant recorded in its apparatus; the following ἰατρικούς is itself an adjective meaning medically skilled.

At 215d the sick person and doctor illustrate complementary need. At 217a and 218e their relation becomes the example of attachment because of disease and for the sake of health. The doctor is a person, whereas ἰατρική names medical practice; the movement between them does not establish reciprocal affection.

Example μὴ ἰατρὸν ἡγούμενος (210a). not regarding him as a doctor.

Passages 210a; 215d; 217a; 218e

See also ἰατρικός (E120); ἐπιτρέπω (E092); σκευασία (E208); ἰατρική (E119); κάμνω (E128); νόσος (E163); ὑγίεια (E232)

ἱκανός

hikanos · adjective · E122

Capable, adequate; sufficient, including sufficient for oneself.

At 204a Miccus is a capable teacher; at 204e Lysis can be recognized by his figure alone. The adverb ἱκανῶς at 209d means understanding well enough to be entrusted with the Athenians' affairs.

At 215a the good person, precisely insofar as good, is said to be ἱκανὸς αὐτῷ, “sufficient for himself.” From sufficiency the argument moves to needing nothing, cherishing nothing, and therefore not loving.

The adjective also helps describe the healthy body at 217a through the adverb ἱκανῶς: it is in an adequate state and needs no medical assistance. These are local premises and analogies. The passage uses ἱκανός and ἱκανότης, not an attested instance of αὐτάρκης, for the claim commonly summarized as self-sufficiency.

Example ἱκανὸς ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ (215a). Would be sufficient for himself.

Passages 215a–b; 217a; 204a; 204e; 209d

See also ἱκανότης (E123); χρεία (E259); ἐνδεής (E080); ὑγίεια (E232); δέομαι (E060)

ἱκανότης

hikanotēs · feminine noun · E123

Sufficiency; adequacy.

The noun occurs when Socrates draws out what it would mean for a good person to be sufficient for himself: he would need nothing κατὰ τὴν ἱκανότητα, by reason of that sufficiency.

This formulation supplies the hinge from goodness to absence of need. The next steps infer absence of cherishing and loving. The noun does not independently prove that real good people lack every sort of need, nor does it resolve whether friendship can have grounds other than utility.

Example οὐδενὸς δεόμενος κατὰ τὴν ἱκανότητα (215a). Needing nothing by reason of sufficiency.

Passages 215a

See also ἱκανός (E122); ἀγαπάω (E002); χρεία (E259); δέομαι (E060)

Ἴπποθάλης

Hippothalēs · proper noun, masculine · E124

Hippothales; the young man in love with Lysis.

His repetitive poems and praise provoke Socrates' demonstration of another way of speaking to a beloved. He listens from concealment and later delights in the proposal that the genuine lover must be loved in return. The narrative records his reaction without granting the proposal final authority.

Example ὁ δὲ Ἴπποθάλης (222b). Hippothales, however.

Passages 203a; 204b–206c; 207b; 210e; 222b

See also ἐραστής (E095); ἐγκώμιον (E073); παιδικά (E181)

ἵπποτροφία

hippotrophia · noun, feminine · E125

Horse-breeding or maintaining horses.

The plural ἵπποτροφίας belongs to the catalogue of Lysis' family achievements, alongside wealth and equestrian victories. It is an expensive and prestigious activity in the scene's social vocabulary. The edition's note explains that the racing victory belonged to the owner. Distinguish this family prestige from the actual skill of the hired charioteer whom Lysis' parents trust with their horses.

Example πλούτους τε καὶ ἵπποτροφίας καὶ νίκας (205c). wealth, horse-breeding, and victories.

Passages 205c

See also πλοῦτος (E194); νίκη (E162); ἡνίοχος (E114)

Κ

κακός

kakos · adjective · E126

Bad; harmful or deficient; of a person, bad in character.

The range is wider than moral wickedness. Illness is κακόν at 217a–b, ignorance is a bad thing at 218a, and desires can be bad in their harmful operation without every desire being bad (221a–b). Translating every occurrence as “evil” can obscure the examples.

In the likeness argument, bad people are unstable and incapable of true friendship under the proposal being considered (214c–d). In the intermediate account, the presence of something bad must be distinguished from its having made the subject bad: a body can

suffer illness without being classified as bad in the relevant sense; a person can have ignorance yet still recognize the lack of knowledge.

At 220b–221d the bad’s explanatory role is tested. If all attachment depended on it, eliminating it would eliminate attachment; desires that remain neither good nor bad furnish a counterexample. The later return to bad persons friendly to bad persons at 222c–d exposes the difficulty of identifying affinity simply with belonging to the same class.

Example Νόσος μὲν δὴ κακόν (217b). illness, then, is bad.

Passages 214c–d; 217a–218b; 220b–221d; 222c–d

See also πονηρός (E199); ἀγαθός (E001); παρουσία (E188); μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν (E158)

καλός

kalos · adjective · E127

Beautiful; fine; admirable.

Lysis’ appearance and Hippothales’ praise give the word an immediate personal setting. The καλοί at 206a are the beautiful ones whom praise makes proud and harder to win. At 207a Lysis is conspicuously beautiful, “beautiful and good” in the familiar evaluative phrase.

At 216c, a proverb supplies τὸ καλὸν φίλον, “the beautiful [is] a friend/dear”. Socrates pictures the object as smooth and slippery, eluding capture, and then says that the good is beautiful. This is a provisional turn in the search for the friend. It does not establish that beauty and goodness are synonymous in all the dialogue’s uses.

Example τὸ καλὸν φίλον (216c). the beautiful [is] dear or a friend.

Passages 204b; 206a; 207a; 216c–d

See also ἀγαθός (E001); φίλος (E251); θεραπευτής (E116)

κάμνω

kamnō · verb · E128

Be ill; be in a suffering or weakened condition.

The substantival participle ὁ κάμνων means “the sick person.” It identifies the one who seeks the doctor and thus gives the medical argument a human subject before it is reformulated in terms of body, disease, medicine, and health.

The participle describes the person’s present condition. It should not be treated as a fixed moral classification: the sick person is not thereby one of the people the argument calls thoroughly bad.

Example Ἀλλ’ ὁ κάμνων οἶμαι διὰ τὴν νόσον (217a). But the sick person, I think, because of the disease.

Passages 215d; 217a; 218e

See also ἰατρός (E121); νόσος (E163); σῶμα (E223)

καταγέλαστος

katagelastos · adjective · E129

Ridiculous; liable to be laughed at.

Ctesippus applies the word to the lover’s inability to say anything distinctive about the boy. Socrates then calls Hippothales ridiculous for praising himself before he has won, and warns that failure will make the ambitious praise look more absurd.

At 211c Socrates playfully fears that Menexenus will make him ridiculous in argument. The adjective marks exposure to an audience’s laughter across poetic and conversational performance. It is not simply a synonym for false: the embarrassment depends on self-presentation and an unmet claim.

At 223b Socrates includes himself and both boys among those made ridiculous: they think they are friends, yet have not discovered what a friend is. The word closes the dialogue by distinguishing their lived association from success in defining it.

Example ὦ καταγέλαστε Ἱππόθαλες (205d). You ridiculous Hippothales.

Passages 205b; 205c; 205d; 205e; 211c; 223b

See also ἐγκώμιον (E073); ἐλέγχω (E076); δεινός (E059); ἀλλήλων (E017); ἐξευρίσκω (E085); φίλος (E251)

καταλογάδην

katalogadēn · adverb · E130

In prose; in ordinary unmetrical narration.

Ctesippus distinguishes what Hippothales recounts καταλογάδην from the poems and written compositions with which he drenches his companions. The adverb identifies the form of the speech, not its subject. Prose and poetry alike concern Lysis.

The joke is comparative: the prose is dreadful, but becomes almost tolerable beside the poems, and singing makes matters worse still. Avoid translating the word simply as “in detail,” which would lose the contrast among narrated prose, composed verse, and performed song.

Example ἃ μὲν καταλογάδην διηγεῖται (204d). what he recounts in prose.

Passages 204d

See also ποίημα (E195); σύγγραμμα (E216); ᾄδω (E010)

κέλης

kelēs · noun, masculine · E131

Racehorse; a single riding-horse, opposed here to a chariot team.

Κέλησι is the dative plural paired with τεθρίπποις in the report of family victories. The distinction specifies different forms of equestrian prestige rather than multiplying examples of mere possessions. The edition renders it “racehorses.” This is not the same word as the ordinary ἵππος, though both occur in the larger cluster of horse-related vocabulary.

Example τεθρίπποις τε καὶ κέλησι (205c). with four-horse chariots and racehorses.

Passages 205c

See also τέθριππος (E227); ἵπποτροφία (E125)

κενός

kenos · adjective · E132

Empty.

The substantival neuter τὸ κενόν is “the empty” or “what is empty.” It is said to desire πλήρωσις, filling, while the full desires emptying.

This example differs slightly from simple pairs of adjectives: the empty is directed towards a process that changes its condition. It helps express need and replenishment within the opposites theory, but should not automatically be equated with the later claim that every desire arises from something taken away.

Example τὸ δὲ κενὸν πληρώσεως (215e). And the empty, of filling.

Passages 215e

See also πλήρωσις (E193); πλήρης (E192); κένωσις (E133); ἐπιθυμία (E089)

κένωσις

kenōsis · feminine noun · E133

Emptying; the process of making empty.

The genitive κενώσεως names what the full is said to desire in the account of attraction between opposites. Its form and sense answer πλήρωσις, filling.

The word should be read in this concrete sequence of changing bodily or natural conditions. The dialogue does not attach a separate ethical or theological meaning to emptying.

Example τὸ πλήρες δὲ κενώσεως (215e). And the full desires emptying.

Passages 215e

See also πλήρης (E192); πλήρωσις (E193); κενός (E132)

κηλέω

kēleō · verb · E134

Charm, enchant, captivate.

Κηλεῖν is the desirable effect of speeches and songs in Socrates' criticism of Hippothales. It is sharply opposed to ἐξαγριαίνειν, making the listener wild or hostile. The hunter comparison has already explained why frightening the pursued object defeats the pursuer's purpose.

The verb gives speech and music an affective power. Here that power is assessed through courtship rather than offered as a general account of rational persuasion. A song can fail through what it produces in its audience, even while expressing intense admiration.

Example μὴ κηλεῖν ἀλλ' ἐξαγριαίνειν (206b). not to charm but to make wild.

Passages 206b

See also ἐξαγριαίνω (E082); ἀμουσία (E021); ὥδῃ (E265)

κοινός

koinos · adjective · E135

Common, shared; belonging to friends together.

Socrates cites the saying κοινὰ τὰ γε φίλων, "friends' things are common," to avoid asking which boy is richer. If their claim to friendship is true, their possessions should not make a difference between them.

The neuter plural κοινά is predicative, not an abstract noun meaning community. The proverb is used as a conversational premise rather than investigated as a detailed rule of ownership. It contrasts the competitive comparisons of age, birth, and beauty with friendship's proposed sharing of material advantages.

Example κοινὰ τὰ γε φίλων λέγεται (207c). friends' things are said to be common.

Passages 207c

See also φίλος (E251); πλοῦτος (E194); χρῆμα (E260)

κολάζω*kolazō · verb · E136***Discipline, check, bring someone into line.**

Lysis denies that he wants Socrates made ridiculous; he wants Socrates to κολάσῃς Menexenus. The aorist subjunctive states the purpose of the requested conversation. In context the correction will come through questioning and exposing overconfidence.

The verb can carry punitive force, but “punish” alone risks making this playful exchange sound like a request for physical retaliation. Lysis remains attached to his companion and wishes to hear the discussion. The correction he imagines belongs to the competitive, educational dynamics of their friendship.

At 212e–213a the passive κολάζεται describes children being punished by a parent. Even a child who hates the parent at that moment remains dear to the parent, testing whether being loved requires loving back.

Example ἀλλ’ ἵνα αὐτὸν κολάσῃς (211c). but so that you may discipline him.

Passages 211c; 212e–213a

See also ἐλέγχω (E076); ἐριστικός (E097); ταπεινός (E226); φιλέω (E242); μισέω (E160)

κόσμος*kosmos · noun, masculine · E137***Ornament, distinction; something that enhances its possessor.**

Socrates says that, if Hippothales wins Lysis, what he has said and sung will be κόσμος for him. The meaning is an adornment or credit attached to success, not “world” or “cosmic order.”

The surrounding contrast is reputational: an impressive beloved makes the successful lover look impressive, while failure leaves the same praise as evidence of what he lost. The cognate κεκοσμημένους later describes the boys as adorned for the festival, offering a literal counterpart to the figurative ornament of praise.

Example κόσμος σοι ἔσται τὰ λεχθέντα (205e). what has been said will be an ornament for you.

Passages 205e; 206e

See also ἐγκώμιον (E073); νίκη (E162)

κρονικός

kronikos · adjective · E138

Cronian; antiquated, as though from the age of Cronus.

Ctesippus calls Hippothales' ancestral legends κρονικώτερα, "more Cronian still," than the already familiar family achievements. The comparative is a comic judgment on stale material. It prepares the story about an ancestor born from Zeus who entertained Heracles. The supplied edition explains the allusion to Cronus' ancient age; the word is not a neutral chronological label and should retain its mocking tone.

Example ἔτι τούτων κρονικώτερα (205c). things still more Cronian than these.

Passages 205c

See also πρόγονος (E200); ξενισμός (E166); καταγέλαστος (E129)

κτάομαι

ktaomai · verb · E139

Acquire; get something for oneself.

Socrates describes friendship through the language of acquisition: some people want horses, dogs, gold, or honours, while he especially wants friends. He credits the boys with having acquired one another quickly and thoroughly, then professes not to know how a friend is acquired.

The related nouns κτήμα, "possession," and κτήσις, "acquisition," belong to this same opening comparison. The language expresses the high value Socrates puts on friendship and establishes the question he will ask; it should not be taken as a settled claim that a friend is property in the same sense as gold.

Example τοῦτο τὸ κτήμα ταχὺ καὶ ῥαδίως κτᾶσθαι (212a). to acquire this possession quickly and easily.

Passages 211d–212a

See also φιλέταιρος (E241); φίλος (E251); ἐπιθυμία (E089)

Κτήσιππος

Ktēsippos · proper noun, masculine · E140

Ctesippus; Hippothales' teasing companion and Menexenus' cousin.

He exposes Hippothales' repeated praise of Lysis and helps make the meeting possible. Menexenus' argumentative reputation is linked with being his pupil. His interventions give the opening its mocking tone; they are not neutral statements of the dialogue's philosophical conclusions.

Example ὁ οὖν Κτήσιππος (204c). then Ctesippus.

Passages 203a; 204c–205d; 206d–e; 211b–c

See also ἐριστικός (E097); μαθητής (E149); καταγέλαστος (E129)

κῶνειον

kōneion · neuter noun · E141

Hemlock.

The son’s hypothetical drinking of hemlock creates the emergency that explains the father’s concern for wine and its vessel. The participle πεπωκότα marks that the drinking has already occurred within the imagined case.

The noun is a concrete element of an example about what is finally valued. The edition does not require an autobiographical allusion or provide evidence that wine is an effective antidote. The explanatory point lies in the father’s belief and purpose.

Example αὐτὸν κῶνειον πεπωκότα (219e). That he had drunk hemlock.

Passages 219e

See also οἶνος (E170); προτιμάω (E203); ἔνεκα (E081)

Λ

λανθάνω

lanthanō · verb · E142

Escape notice; remain unnoticed by someone.

At 210e Hippothales wants to remain unnoticed by Lysis; Socrates suppresses a remark that would expose him. This concrete social use precedes the friend’s figurative elusiveness in the argument.

At 216c Socrates asks whether the friend is escaping their notice by being none of the things they have so far proposed. The construction takes the people who fail to notice as its object: ἡμᾶς means “us.”

The word depicts failure of attention or recognition, rather than proving that the object cannot be known. It leads directly to a new possibility, the neither-good-nor-bad as friend of the good. The elusive-object imagery soon becomes physical in the description of something smooth that slips past them.

Example μὴ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς λανθάνει τὸ φίλον (216c). Whether the friend is escaping our notice still more.

Passages 216c; 210e

See also σκέπτομαι (E207); ἐξευρίσκω (E085); φαίνομαι (E237)

λευκός

leukos · adjective · E143

White.

The feminine plural λευκαί agrees with τρίχες, hairs. Fair hair coated with white lead appears white, while aged hair is said to have become white through the presence of white.

The apparently simple colour adjective therefore serves a precise contrast between seeming and being. The example also mentions ξανθός, fair or blond, and μέλας, black. Calling the coated hair neither white nor black does not erase its original fair colour; the point concerns what the coating has and has not made it become.

Example οὔτε τι λευκαὶ οὔτε μέλαιναί εἰσιν (217d). They are neither white at all nor black.

Passages 217d–e

See also λευκότης (E144); ξανθός (E165); ψιμύθιον (E263); φαίνομαι (E237)

λευκότης

leukotēs · feminine noun · E144

Whiteness.

Socrates says whiteness would be present to hair smeared with white lead, yet the hair would not thereby itself be white. The noun is used explicitly; it need not be supplied by an interpreter.

The example separates the presence of a quality from a particular manner of possessing it. Old age subsequently produces white hair in another way. The passage does not identify λευκότης as a separately existing Form or explain a full theory of predication: it gives an analogy for two effects of the presence of badness.

Example παρείη γ' ἂν αὐταῖς λευκότης (217d). Whiteness would be present to them.

Passages 217d

See also λευκός (E143); παρουσία (E188); χρώμα (E262); φαίνομαι (E237)

λόγος

logos · masculine noun · E145

Speech; talk; account; argument.

The setting is a place where time is spent largely in talk (204a). Hippothales' speeches and songs are judged by what they do to the beloved (205a–206c); Socrates' questioning offers another kind of speech. The noun therefore has a dramatic and pedagogical life before it names the arguments defining friendship.

In the inquiry, a λόγος can support a proposal, forbid a combination, or be reconsidered. At 218c–d apparently successful arguments become suspect, like boastful people; at 222c the

speakers are “drunk” with the argument in Burnet’s adopted reading. At 222d–e earlier arguments return and are counted over.

Translate according to function. “Reason” as a faculty is not automatically intended whenever λόγος appears, and “doctrine” would make these provisional accounts sound more settled than they are.

Example ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου (222c). under the influence of the argument.

Passages 204a; 205a–206c; 216c; 218c–d; 222b–e

See also ἀπορία (E038); σκέπτομαι (E207); ὁμολογέω (E173)

Λύκειον

Lykeion · proper noun, neuter · E146

Lyceum; Socrates’ intended destination.

Λυκείου is genitive after εὐθύ, “straight toward.” Socrates is walking from the Academy outside the city wall when Hippothales diverts him into the newly built wrestling-school. The named destination supplies a route and a setting for the chance encounter. It should not here be read as the title of Aristotle’s later philosophical school.

Example ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας εὐθὺ Λυκείου (203a). from the Academy straight toward the Lyceum.

Passages 203a; 203b

See also Ἀκαδήμεια (E014); παλαίστρα (E184)

λύρα

lyra · noun, feminine · E147

Lyre; the musical instrument Lysis is permitted to handle.

The accusative λύραν names the instrument Lysis takes up in Socrates’ second counterexample to the explanation by age. His parents allow him to tighten and loosen strings, pluck them, and strike them with the plectrum.

This is music as learned practical competence, contrasted with Hippothales’ ineffective singing. The instrument is not merely a cultural ornament: the freedom to operate it depends on knowing what one is doing. No claim is made that Lysis’ musical knowledge extends to every other household or political responsibility.

Example τὴν λύραν λάβης (209b). when you take up the lyre.

Passages 209b

See also χορδή (E258); πλῆκτρον (E191); ἀμουσία (E021)

Λύσις

Lysis · proper noun, masculine · E148

Lysis; the boy after whom the dialogue is named.

Son of Democrates of Aexone, he is Hippothales' beloved and Menexenus' closest companion. He first answers questions about parental love and authority, then actively follows the inquiry into friendship. His blush, eagerness to listen, and later silence are part of the characterization, not evidence for an unspoken final theory.

Example ὁ δὲ Λύσις ἐσίγησεν (222a). but Lysis was silent.

Passages 204e; 206c–207b; 207d–210e; 213d; 222a–b

See also παιδικά (E181); ἐταῖρος (E104); φιλήκοος (E243)

M

μαθητής

mathētēs · noun, masculine · E149

Pupil, learner; one formed by another's teaching or example.

Menexenus is called Κτησίππου μαθητής, “Ctesippus' pupil,” to explain why he is formidable in argument. The characterization connects his contentious style with an older participant already shown teasing Hippothales.

The noun marks an educational relationship, but this short remark does not prove a formal school arrangement, a fee, or a fixed course of study. It is part of Socrates' mock hesitation before speaking with Menexenus. Distinguish the person learning from μανθάνω, the act of learning or grasping what is said.

Example Κτησίππου μαθητής (211c). Ctesippus' pupil.

Passages 211c

See also διδάσκαλος (E068); μανθάνω (E151); ἐριστικός (E097)

μακάριος

makarios · adjective · E150

Happy, blessed; emphatic language for the life desired for Lysis.

Socrates uses μακάριον while restating the apparent paradox that parents who want Lysis happy nevertheless prevent his doing what he wants. He repeats μακάριος when imagining whether the mother lets him handle her wool-working equipment so that he can be happy.

The adjective reinforces the preceding εὐδαίμων without introducing a separate theory of blessedness. Its slightly elevated force contributes to the playful mismatch between a

sweeping promise of happiness and the mundane question whether a boy may touch a loom.

Example ἵν' αὐτῇ μακάριος ᾖς (208d). so that you may be happy for her.

Passages 207e–208a; 208d

See also εὐδαίμων (E105); βούλομαι (E051); ταλασιουργία (E225)

μανθάνω

manthanō · verb · E151

Learn; understand; grasp what is being said.

At 211d Socrates presents Lysis as not following part of the talk, a playful pretext for questioning Menexenus. At 217d the boy says οὐ μανθάνω when the first account of a colour's presence is unclear; Socrates answers with the concrete example of whitening hair.

Both uses concern following or understanding an account. Here a profession of not understanding invites clarification, rather than necessarily admitting blameworthy ignorance.

Example Οὐ μανθάνω (217d). I do not understand.

Passages 211d; 217c–d

See also ἐπίσταμαι (E091); φρονέω (E255); ἄγνοια (E003)

μαντεύομαι

manteuomai · verb · E152

Divine; offer a conjecture as though divining.

Socrates introduces the new threefold proposal as an act of divining. The compound ἀπομαντεύομαι appears beside μαντεύομαι in the same stretch. Both mark the tentative manner in which he puts forward the neither-good-nor-bad as friend of the good.

The dramatic vocabulary should not be turned into a claim that the answer has divine authority. Socrates immediately tells the boys to hear the considerations behind it, and the proposal must still pass through the medical and colour examples and the later causal tests.

Example πρὸς ἃ δὲ λέγων μαντεύομαι, ἄκουσον (216d). Hear what I am speaking of when I divine it.

Passages 216d

See also γένος (E053); σκέπτομαι (E207); ὑποψία (E236)

μεγαλαυχία

megalauchia · noun, feminine · E153

Boastfulness, inflated self-importance.

The genitive μεγαλαυχίας depends on “are filled”: praise fills the beautiful boys with pride and boastfulness. The next sentence uses the comparative adjective μεγαλαυχότεροι, “more boastful,” to explain why they become harder to win.

This is an effect produced in the listener by the lover’s language, so the word belongs to the causal criticism of bad courtship. It should not be confused with greatness of character. The contrasting lesson later brings Lysis down rather than enlarging his opinion of himself.

Example φρονήματος ἐμπίμπανται καὶ μεγαλαυχίας (206a). they are filled with pride and boastfulness.

Passages 206a

See also ἐπαινέω (E086); δυσάλωτος (E072); μεγάλοφρων (E154)

μεγαλόφρων

megalophrōn · adjective · E154

Proud, thinking highly of oneself.

Socrates concludes that Lysis cannot be μεγαλόφρων if he is still ἄφρων, without understanding. The word echoes the preceding μέγα φρονεῖν, “think highly of oneself,” and draws attention to the shared φρον- element in pride and understanding.

The sense here is not a commendation of magnanimity or noble-mindedness. It belongs to the reduction of Lysis’ self-importance, the practical demonstration Socrates has promised Hippothales. The argument depends partly on the play between having understanding and forming a grand opinion of oneself.

Example Οὐδ’ ἄρα μεγαλόφρων εἶ (210d). So you are not proud either.

Passages 210d

See also φρονέω (E255); ἄφρων (E046); μεγαλαυχία (E153); ταπεινός (E226)

μεθύω

methyō · verb · E155

Be drunk; be intoxicated.

At 222c Socrates says that they are, as it were, drunk with the argument. The comparison introduces a provisional concession that akin and like are different.

The edition prints μεθύομεν from a manuscript’s marginal reading and notes the alternative μυθεύομεν, “we are telling stories.” The entry follows the printed text while keeping that

editorial fact visible. The metaphor anticipates the actual drinking attributed to the tutors at the end, without making the speakers themselves literally drunk.

Example ὥσπερ μεθύομεν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου (222c). As though we are drunk with the argument.

Passages 222c

See also συγχωρέω (E217); λόγος (E145); ὄναρ (E175)

Μενέξενος

Menexenos · proper noun, masculine · E156

Menexenus; Lysis' companion and Ctesippus' cousin.

He is about Lysis' age and joins the conversation after play. Socrates questions him about who becomes a friend of whom; Socrates calls him contentious, and Lysis emphatically agrees. His assent and difficulties must be distinguished from Socrates' proposals and from Lysis' reactions. No identification with a namesake in another dialogue is needed to follow his role here.

Example ὁ Μενέξενος (207a). Menexenus.

Passages 206d; 207a–d; 211b–d; 212a–213d; 222a–b

See also ἐριστικός (E097); ἐταῖρος (E104); ἀνεψιός (E028)

μεταδίδωμι

metadidōmi · verb · E157

Give a share, share something with someone.

At the opening Hippothales says the group would gladly share its talk with Socrates. At 211d Ctesippus complains that Socrates and Lysis are not sharing their conversation with the others, and Socrates answers that they must share it.

The thing shared is expressed in the genitive, τῶν λόγων, and the recipient in the dative. The repeated verb frames conversation as a common pleasure rather than a private possession. The verbal adjective μεταδοτέον expresses the obligation to make the exchange accessible to the surrounding listeners.

Example ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταδίδοτον τῶν λόγων (211c–211d). but you do not share the conversation with us.

Passages 204a; 211d

See also ἐστιάω (E103); διατριβή (E066); κοινός (E135)

μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν

mēte agathon mēte kakon · coordinated adjective phrase · E158

Neither good nor bad.

This is an attested phrase, not a single technical noun. With τό it denotes what falls into neither evaluative class. Equivalent word orders and οὔτε ... οὔτε occur. At 216d, Socrates tentatively distinguishes three kinds: good, bad, and neither.

The body considered simply as body is neither good nor bad (217b). Because illness is present, it welcomes medicine, which is beneficial and good. The essential qualification is that a bad thing may be present without yet making the bearer bad; the colour analogy explains the distinction (217c–e). The application to philosophy identifies those who have ignorance but still believe they do not know what they do not know (218a–b). It does not commend indifference to goodness or ignorance.

The initial account says that the intermediate is a friend of the good because of the presence of bad. It is first celebrated, then reopened at 218c. Later, desires themselves can be neither good nor bad and can survive the imagined disappearance of bad things (221a–b). That revision undermines badness as the sole cause of attachment. The phrase therefore has more than one explanatory role across the dialogue; it should not be treated as one unchanging doctrine of a neutral class.

Example τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν (216c). what is neither good nor bad.

Passages 216c–218c; 219a–b; 220b–221b; 222c

See also ἀγαθός (E001); κακός (E126); παρουσία (E188); φιλοσοφίᾳ (E252); ἐπιθυμία (E089)

Μίκκος

Mikkos · proper noun, masculine · E159

Miccus; the teacher at the wrestling school.

He is described as Socrates' companion and admirer, and Socrates calls him a capable teacher. The name locates the conversation within an existing social and educational circle. The supplied dialogue gives no developed account of his teaching.

Example Σὸς ἐταῖρός γε (204a). your companion, certainly.

Passages 204a

See also σοφιστής (E212); ἐταῖρος (E104); παλαίστρα (E184)

μισέω*miseō · verb · E160***Hate; in the passive, be hated.**

The verb supplies a stronger counterexample than a mere absence of reciprocal love: a lover may actually be hated by the beloved. The active participle ὁ μισῶν is the hater, whereas ὁ μισούμενος is the person hated. Their contrast parallels ὁ φιλῶν and ὁ φιλούμενος.

At 213a–c the argument transfers each proposed definition of friend to the corresponding account of enemy. This produces the offensive-sounding result that one can be a friend to an enemy or an enemy to a friend. Keep the direction of the verb visible rather than treating all its participles as the single noun “enemy.” Burnet’s printed wording here includes readings discussed in the edition’s notes.

Example Καὶ ὁ μισούμενος ἐχθρὸς ἄρα (213a). Then the person hated is an enemy too.

Passages 212b–c; 213a–c

See also ἀντιφιλέω (E031); ἐχθρός (E108); φιλέω (E242)

μισθός*misthos · noun, masculine · E161***Wage, payment for service.**

The charioteer receives a μισθός from Lysis’ father. Socrates then calls him μισθωτός, “hired,” and stresses that the father pays money for the very freedom of action he withholds from Lysis. The payment underscores how valuable skilled service can be. It is neither an athletic prize nor a gift to the beloved; its local role is remuneration for the driver’s work.

Example μισθὸν φέρων (208a). receiving a wage.

Passages 208a

See also ἡνίοχος (E114); ἐπιτρέπω (E092); χρῆμα (E260)

N**νίκη***nikē · noun, feminine · E162***Victory; a success publicly celebrated.**

Νίκας first denotes equestrian victories at Pytho, the Isthmus, and Nemea, achievements that Hippothales repeats in his poems about Lysis’ family. Socrates promptly recasts the lover as a competitor praising himself before victory.

The associated perfect νενικηκέναι, “to have won,” and participle νενικηκότι, “as a winner,” make success in courtship resemble success in an athletic contest. Keep the analogy visible without supposing that the text literally treats a relationship as a race or reports an actual erotic victory.

Example ἵπποτροφίας καὶ νίκας Πυθοῖ (205c). horse-breeding and victories at Pytho.

Passages 205c; 205d–e

See also ἵπποτροφία (E125); ἐγκώμιον (E073); αἰρέω (E012)

νόσος

nosos · feminine noun · E163

Disease; sickness.

Disease is classified as bad and later as an enemy. It explains why the otherwise neutral body turns towards medicine: the body is a friend of medicine because of disease, and for the sake of health.

This role must be kept apart from health’s role as the proposed end. The related noun νόσημα at 220d calls badness an illness in the comparison of good to a remedy. These medical words support a hypothesis about affection that is subsequently challenged by desires that need not be harmful.

Example Νόσος μὲν δὴ κακόν (217b). Disease, then, is bad.

Passages 217a–c; 218e–219b; 220d

See also ὑγίεια (E232); ἰατρική (E119); φάρμακον (E238); αἰτία (E013)

νοῦς

nous · noun, masculine · E164

Mind, sense, understanding; also attention in an idiom.

At 205b–c the phrase τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν means paying attention to the boy; at 211a Socrates says Lysis has been paying attention to the argument. The accusative νοῦν is part of that ordinary idiom.

At 210b acquiring νοῦς means attaining the understanding needed for responsible action. The term supports the competence argument without requiring a technical theory of intellect. Distinguish this local sense from mere desire: a person can want an activity while lacking the judgment that would persuade others to entrust it to him.

The attention idiom recurs while Lysis follows the discussion (213d) and when Socrates warns against deception (219b). At 223a ἐν νῷ εἶχον means “I had it in mind”, introducing his unfulfilled plan to question someone older.

Example νοῦν μὴ κτησώμεθα (210b). we do not acquire sense.

Passages 205b–c; 210b; 211a; 213d; 219b; 223a

See also φρονέω (E255); ἐπίσταμαι (E091); ἀπομνημονεύω (E037)

Ξ

ξανθός

xanthos · adjective · E165

Fair; blond, here of hair.

The original colour of the boy's hair is specified as fair before the hypothetical application of white lead. The feminine accusative ξανθάς agrees with τὰς τρίχας.

This starting colour matters: the hair can bear a white coating without having changed from its original state in the way ageing would change it. The adjective supplies the baseline for the analogy rather than a moral evaluation or a general symbolism of colour.

Example ξανθάς οὖσας τὰς τρίχας (217d). Your hair being fair.

Passages 217d

See also λευκός (E143); θρίξ (E118); ἀλείφω (E016)

ξενισμός

xenismos · noun, masculine · E166

Receiving or entertaining a guest.

The accusative ξενισμόν names the reception of Heracles narrated in Hippothales' poem. The ancestral host's relationship with Heracles supplies the occasion for the story. The noun designates an act of hospitality, not an abstract definition of friendship. In this scene it contributes to praise of family distinction, and Ctesippus presents the tale as well-worn material rather than new insight into Lysis.

Example τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ξενισμόν (205c). the entertaining of Heracles.

Passages 205c

See also συγγένεια (E215); πρόγονος (E200)

Ο

οἶδα

oida · verb, perfect in form with present meaning · E167

Know; be aware of or understand something.

The dictionary form means “I know,” despite its perfect morphology. Forms encountered in the dialogue include infinitival εἰδέναι, participial εἰδότα, plural ἴσμεν and ἴσασιν, and

future εἶσομαι. Their difference in appearance does not make them separate vocabulary items.

Socrates knows from Hippothales' reaction that he is in love (204b), but says he does not know how one person becomes a friend of another (212a). At 218b those capable of loving wisdom still judge that they do not know what they do not know: εἰδέναι and ἴσασιν here belong to this same verb.

At 221a “who knows?” about a world without badness is followed by what “we know” about present hunger. The verb can therefore mark both a limit and a secure starting point for further inquiry. Its uses overlap ordinary expressions of understanding elsewhere in the dialogue; a rigid hierarchy separating οἶδα from every other knowledge verb is not supplied by the text.

Example μὴ εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ ἴσασιν (218b). Not to know what they do not know.

Passages 204b; 205a–b; 211d; 212a; 215d; 216c; 218b; 218e; 221a

See also γινώσκω (E056); ἐπίσταμαι (E091); φρονέω (E255); ἄγνοια (E003); ἡγέομαι (E110)

οἰκεῖος

oikeios · adjective · E168

One's own; belonging, related, or naturally akin.

At 210c–d the word ranges from familial nearness, even something closer than one's parents, to the claim that everyone will be a friend and akin to the wise, useful Lysis. At 221e–222a it becomes a proposed explanation of attachment: desire is directed toward what belongs or is akin to the desirer.

The inference passes through lack and deprivation. It does not establish that every desire literally recovers a former possession. Nor must “akin” mean blood relationship: the possible natural affinity concerns soul, a character of soul, ways, or visible figure. The qualifying πη, “in some way”, makes the relation less definite than a full account of its nature would be.

At 222b–d, its distinction from likeness remains unstable. If it means like, the earlier uselessness argument returns. If each kind is akin to its own kind, bad persons can be friends of bad persons; if the akin is identified with the good, the earlier problem about good persons returns. The word is a promising candidate, not the dialogue's final doctrine.

Example φύσει πη οἰκεῖοί (221e). by nature akin in some way.

Passages 210b–d; 221e–222d

See also ἀλλότριος (E018); ὅμοιος (E172); ἐνδεής (E080); ἀφαιρέω (E045); φύσις (E256)

οἰκονομία

oikonomia · noun, feminine · E169

Household management.

The neighbor would let Lysis manage his house if he believed Lysis understood οἰκονομία better than he did. The cognate infinitive οἰκονομεῖν names the activity to be entrusted. Together they make the criterion of understanding independent of the parent-child relation.

The supplied edition follows Burnet's readings for "manage" and "management"; its apparatus records variants meaning "build" and "building." Keep the printed household-management sense, rather than silently substituting construction. Nor should the modern sense of national "economics" displace the immediate task of running a house.

Example βέλτιον περὶ οἰκονομίας ἑαυτοῦ φρονεῖν (209d). understand household management better than [the neighbour] does.

Passages 209d

See also ἐπιτρέπω (E092); ὄρος (E178); ἄρχω (E042)

οἶνος

oinos · masculine noun · E170

Wine.

Wine first appears as the object named in the compound φίλοινος. In the father-and-son comparison it becomes a supposed rescue measure: the father would value it if he believed it would save his son after drinking hemlock.

The conditional εἴπερ and the father's belief matter. The passage illustrates a hierarchy of concern; it does not establish a reliable treatment for poisoning. The wine's vessel is valued through the wine, and the wine through the son, making successive instrumental attachments concrete.

Example ἄρα περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῖτ' ἂν οἶνον (219e). Would he set great store by wine?

Passages 219e–220a

See also φίλοινος (E247); κώνειον (E141); παρασκευάζω (E185); ἔνεκα (E081)

ὀκνέω

okneō · verb · E171

Hesitate, shrink from doing something.

Ctesippus accuses Hippothales of hesitating to tell Socrates his beloved's name, although everyone else has heard it endlessly. Later Lysis wants to approach the speakers but hesitates to come alone; Menexenus' arrival makes it easy for him to join.

The verb thus marks two different social inhibitions. It need not imply refusal, settled cowardice, or lack of interest. Lysis' hesitation coexists explicitly with desire to approach, and is resolved by the presence of his companion.

Example ὥκνει μόνος προσιέναι (207a). he hesitated to approach alone.

Passages 204c; 207a

See also ἐρυθριάω (E099); ἐπιθυμέω (E088)

ὅμοιος

homoios · adjective · E172

Like; similar.

At 214a–b a poetic saying and writings about nature support the proposition that like is a friend to like. The first test concerns bad persons: their harmful conduct and instability undermine the general claim. A charitable reinterpretation limits genuine likeness and friendship to the good (214c–d).

The next objection explicitly asks about likeness insofar as it is likeness. What benefit can one similar thing give another that the other cannot give itself? The subsequent difficulty about good persons rests on their supposed sufficiency rather than merely on resemblance (214e–215c). These qualifications are essential: the argument does not simply announce that friends must have nothing in common.

The word returns at 222b–d when the akin must be distinguished from the like. ὁμοιότης, “likeness”, makes the respect under consideration explicit at 222b. Comparative language such as ὥσπερ, “just as”, and ἔοικε, “it seems/resembles”, is not automatically an occurrence of this lexical family.

Example καθ’ ὅσον ὅμοιος (214e). insofar as [he or it is] like.

Passages 214a–215c; 215d–216b; 222b–e

See also ἀνόμοιος (E029); ἐναντίος (E079); οἰκεῖος (E168); ἱκανός (E122)

ὁμολογέω

homologeō · verb · E173

Agree; acknowledge or concede a statement.

The verb gives a statement the status of something jointly accepted in the conversation. Its perfect forms, such as ὡμολόγηται and τὰ ὡμολογημένα, refer to what has already been agreed and can therefore be used in further questioning.

Agreement is not a guarantee of truth. Socrates' suspicion at 218c is precisely that what they have agreed may be false; later he asks whether it is acceptable to agree that the useless is a friend. Translate the verb as an act of assent rather than as “prove,” and keep track of whose assent has supplied the premise.

Example ὥς οὐκ ἀληθὴ εἶη τὰ ὁμολογημένα ἡμῖν (218c). That what we had agreed might not be true.

Passages 213b; 216b; 218c; 221c; 222b–c

See also ὁμολογία (E174); συγχωρέω (E217); ἀνάγκη (E026)

ὁμολογία

homologia · feminine noun · E174

Agreement; an acknowledged premise.

At 219c the expression τῇ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίᾳ, “the earlier agreement,” looks back to the acceptance that a friend is a friend for the sake of something friendly or dear. If the next step is to follow that agreement, health must likewise be desired for the sake of another friend.

The noun makes the regress intelligible: each new item inherits a condition already accepted for the previous one. It denotes a commitment within the exchange, not a separately demonstrated philosophical law.

Example εἴπερ ἀκολουθήσει τῇ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίᾳ (219c). If it is to follow the earlier agreement.

Passages 219c

See also ὁμολογέω (E173); ἀκολουθέω (E015); ἀρχή (E041)

ὄναρ

onar · neuter noun used adverbially · E175

A dream; here, in a dream.

The phrase ὄναρ πεπλουτηκέναι describes the fear that their apparent intellectual wealth has existed only in a dream. The perfect infinitive means “to have become rich.”

The image follows the hunter’s pleasure and marks the reversal from apparent success to suspicion. It is a vivid comparison for a possibly insubstantial discovery, not a general claim that ordinary experience is dreaming.

Example κινδυνεύομεν ὄναρ πεπλουτηκέναι (218c). It looks as if we have been rich in a dream.

Passages 218c

See also ὑποψία (E236); θηρευτής (E116); ἐξευρίσκω (E085)

ὄργανον

organon · noun, neuter · E176

Tool, implement; here an instrument for wool-working.

The genitive plural ὀργάνων gathers the mother's wool-working implements after specific tools have been named. Lysis is forbidden to handle them, making equipment a concrete test of whether family membership confers practical permission. The term here is material and ordinary. It does not denote a bodily organ, a logical instrument, or an abstract "organon" of knowledge.

Example τῶν περὶ ταλασιουργίαν ὀργάνων (208d). the implements for wool-working.

Passages 208d

See also ταλασιουργία (E225); ἐπιτρέπω (E092)

ὄρεοκόμος

oreokomos · noun, masculine · E177

Muleteer; the person who tends and manages the mules.

Lysis says that the ὄρεοκόμος may strike the mules although he himself may not. Socrates immediately asks whether this worker is slave or free, and Lysis answers that he is a slave. The noun names a practical role distinct from the paid charioteer. It makes the trust argument sharper: even someone of lower legal status receives task-specific authority withheld from the owner's son.

Example τῷ ὄρεοκόμῳ (208b). to the muleteer.

Passages 208b

See also ἡνίοχος (E114); δοῦλος (E071); ἐπιτρέπω (E092)

ὅρος

horos · noun, masculine · E178

Boundary, standard, determining criterion.

Socrates asks whether the neighbor has the same ὅρος as the father in deciding whether to entrust affairs to Lysis. The governing condition has just been stated: Lysis must be thought to understand the task better than the person handing it over.

"Standard" fits this use better than a physical boundary or a formal definition. The word marks the transfer of a criterion from one social relation to another, beginning the argument's widening from family to neighbor, city, and royal household.

Example ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ὅσπερ τῷ πατρὶ (209c). the same standard as for the father.

Passages 209c

See also ἐπιτρέπω (E092); οἰκονομία (E169); φρονέω (E255)

ὄφελος

ophelos · noun, neuter · E179

Benefit, advantage, use obtained from something.

Socrates says Lysis gets no ὄφελος from his great wealth because others exercise control over it. The thought carries on to his fine body, which someone else tends. The noun names the advantage that possession ought to yield but here seems not to yield.

This practical use should be kept distinct from the adjective χρήσιμος and from the abstract noun ὠφελία. Its role is to expose a gap between owning something and being able to benefit from it, preparing the appeal to understanding as the condition of effective control.

Example οὐδὲν ὄφελος (208e). no benefit.

Passages 208e

See also χρήμα (E260); σῶμα (E223); χρήσιμος (E261); ὠφελία (E267)

II

παιδαγωγός

paidagōgos · noun, masculine · E180

Tutor or boy-escort; the household supervisor who takes the boy to lessons.

Lysis points to his παιδαγωγός when asked who rules him. He explicitly says the man is one of their slaves. Asked what this rule consists in, he replies that the tutor leads him to his teacher, bringing out the word's boy-leading sense.

The role should be distinguished from the διδάσκαλος who teaches and the παιδοτρίβης who supervises physical training. Rendering it “pedagogue” in its modern sense of an instructor would collapse distinctions that support Socrates' account of the boy's multiple authorities.

At 223a–b the boys' tutors arrive with their brothers and call them home. Their supervisory authority ends the gathering when the argument remains unfinished. Their foreign-sounding Greek and apparent drinking at the festival contribute to the comic interruption.

Example Ὅδε, παιδαγωγός (208c). This man, my tutor.

Passages 208c; 208d; 223a–b

See also διδάσκαλος (E068); παιδοτρίβης (E182); δοῦλος (E071); συνουσία (E220); ὑποβαρβαρίζω (E235); καταγέλαστος (E129)

παιδικά

paidika · neuter plural adjective used as a noun · E181

Darling; the boy who is the object of a lover's courtship.

Usually with τὰ, the plural form refers to one beloved person, here Lysis, rather than to several children. Hippothales wants to know what speech or conduct will make him dear to his darling (206c); Socrates' conversation with Lysis supplies the demonstration (210e).

The term recurs in the problem of unreturned affection (212b–c) and in the claim about the genuine lover at 222a. Preserve its courtship sense while distinguishing it from παῖς, the ordinary word for boy or child.

Example τὰ παιδικά (205a). one's darling.

Passages 205a–206c; 210e; 212b–c; 222a

See also ἐραστής (E095); ἐρώμενος (E100); παῖς (E183); προσφιλής (E202)

παιδοτρίβης

paidotribēs · noun, masculine · E182

Physical trainer of boys.

The παιδοτρίβης sends for Menexenus and thereby interrupts Socrates' comparison of the two boys. His role belongs to the wrestling-school and its supervision of youthful activity. Socrates thinks Menexenus is taking part in the sacrificial arrangements.

Do not confuse this trainer with the παιδαγωγός who escorts and supervises Lysis or the διδάσκαλος to whose premises the boy is taken. The distinct roles help make the later claim that Lysis has many rulers socially concrete rather than merely rhetorical.

Example καλεῖν τὸν παιδοτρίβην (207d). that the physical trainer was calling him.

Passages 207d

See also παιδαγωγός (E180); διδάσκαλος (E068); παλαίστρα (E184)

παῖς

pais · noun, masculine or feminine according to reference · E183

Child; boy in this dialogue; son in an address naming the father.

The boys, παῖδες, mingle with the young men at the festival (206d). In addressing Lysis or Menexenus as a named man's παῖς, Socrates means "son" (207b–c, 209a). The word marks youth and family relationship, whereas τὰ παιδικά identifies a beloved's courtship role.

The related diminutive παιδίον appears as παιδίᾱ in the example of newborn children who remain dear to parents even without loving them back (212e–213a). That example extends the inquiry beyond the older boys conversing with Socrates.

Example Ὡ παῖ Δημοφῶντος (207b–c). Son of Demophon.

Passages 206d; 207b–c; 209a; 212e–213a

See also παιδικά (E181); παιδαγωγός (E180); ἡλικία (E113); φιλέω (E242)

παλαίστρα

palaistra · noun, feminine · E184

Wrestling-school; the setting of the conversation.

Hippothales identifies the enclosed space as a newly built παλαίστρα and immediately explains that their time there is spent mostly in conversation. Athletic setting and intellectual activity are thus joined from the outset.

Inside are a courtyard, a changing-room, boys playing knucklebones, and spectators; the festival allows boys and young men to mix. The word names the whole venue, rather than simply the surface on which wrestlers compete or a formal philosophical school.

Example Παλαίστρα, ἔφη, νεωστὶ ὠκοδομημένη (204a). A wrestling-school, he said, newly built.

Passages 204a; 206d; 206e

See also διατριβή (E066); ἀποδυτήριον (E034); παιδοτρίβης (E182)

παρασκευάζω

paraskeuazō · verb · E185

Prepare; provide; procure something for a purpose.

The repeated passive forms at 219e–220a designate the things provided for the sake of something further: the wine, its vessel, and other resources. The repetition deliberately separates what is prepared from that for which it is prepared.

The verb gives the regress discussion a practical setting. One need not begin with abstract objects: an ordinary act of procuring a means already makes the question “for the sake of what?” intelligible.

Example ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔνεκά του παρασκευαζομένοις (219e). On the things provided for the sake of something.

Passages 219e–220a

See also ἔνεκα (E081); σπουδή (E214); τελευτάω (E228)

πάρειμι

pareimi · verb · E186

Be present; be there or at hand.

The participle τὸ παρόν means what is present. At 217c–e a colour can be present on something without the thing itself possessing that colour in the stronger sense intended: whitening paste makes fair hair look white, whereas old age makes it white.

The proposed distinction concerns how the quality is present. It is used to explain how badness can be present without yet making the subject bad. The passage should not be made into a general denial that paint has a colour, or into an independently established theory of participation in Forms.

Example οἷον τὸ παρόν (217e). such as what is present.

Passages 217c–e

See also παρουσία (E188); λευκότης (E144); φαίνομαι (E237); κακός (E126)

παροιμία

paroimia · feminine noun · E187

Proverb; a traditional saying.

The ancient proverb that the beautiful is dear is recalled while Socrates describes his dizziness over the argument. It offers a fresh verbal starting point after the failures of likeness and opposition.

The saying's traditional status is not a substitute for proof. Socrates immediately develops a conjecture about the beautiful and good and asks the boys to hear its grounds. The noun signals inherited authority whose implications still have to be examined.

Example κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν παροιμίαν (216c). According to the ancient proverb.

Passages 216c

See also καλός (E127); ποιητής (E197); μαντεύομαι (E152)

παρουσία

parousia · feminine noun · E188

Presence; being present in or with something.

At 217b the intermediate becomes a friend of the good because of the presence of bad. The noun does not by itself mean complete assimilation: the following illustration distinguishes having a colour present from actually becoming like that colour (217c–e).

White lead on fair hair produces an appearance of whiteness; age produces hair that is white in the intended sense. Correspondingly, ignorance can be present without the person having become so unknowing as to lack awareness of it. At 218b–c this explanation seems to

solve the problem, but the inquiry immediately resumes. “Presence” is therefore the vocabulary of a tested model, not proof of a finished metaphysical theory.

Example διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν (217b). because of the presence of badness.

Passages 217b–218c

See also πάρεμι (E186); μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν (E158); ἄγνοια (E003); λευκότης (E144)

πεινάω

peinaō · verb · E189

Be hungry; hunger.

Hunger tests whether every desire must disappear with badness. Socrates allows the possibility of hunger that is not harmful and notes that even now a hungry person may be harmed or benefited.

The noun πείνη appears in the same discussion. Neither noun nor verb itself means a morally bad appetite: harmfulness is a further qualification. This lexical distinction supports the possibility of desires that are neither good nor bad and hence survive the imagined removal of badness.

Example οὐδὲ πεινῆν ἔτι ἔσται (220e). will there no longer be any hungering either?

Passages 220e–221b

See also διψάω (E070); ἐπιθυμία (E089); βλέπω (E050); ἀπόλλυμι (E036)

περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι

peri pollou poieisthai · verbal idiom · E190

Set great store by; value highly.

The idiom occurs when Socrates asks whether self-sufficient people could value one another, and again in the father’s concern for his son. Its comparative form, περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι, asks which thing is valued more.

At 219d–220a the expression distinguishes the son from the wine and vessel procured for him. All may receive attention, but they do not occupy the same place in the explanation of that attention. Translate the idiom as valuation, not as literally making something “about much.”

Example τίς μηχανὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἀλλήλους (215b). What means is there for them to value one another highly?

Passages 215b–c; 219d–220a

See also σπουδή (E214); προτιμάω (E203); ἔνεκα (E081); φίλος (E251)

πλῆκτρον

plēktron · noun, neuter · E191

Plectrum; the implement used to strike the lyre's strings.

The dative πλήκτρῳ indicates the instrument with which the strings are struck. It stands alongside plucking them and adjusting their tension as an operation Lysis is trusted to perform. The word names a small practical implement rather than a general musical technique. Its role parallels, with a different outcome, the wool-working tools Lysis must not touch.

Example κρούειν τῷ πλήκτρῳ (209b). to strike with the plectrum.

Passages 209b

See also λύρα (E147); χορδή (E258); ὄργανον (E176)

πλήρης

plērēs · adjective · E192

Full.

The passage has the neuter τὸ πλήρες, “the full,” which is said to desire κένωσις, emptying. It completes the pair with the empty desiring filling.

The reversal prevents the example from suggesting that increase is always beneficial or wanted. What is desired depends on the present condition. This remains an illustration of the reported opposites theory, whose universal application is challenged in the next exchange.

Example τὸ πλήρες δὲ κενώσεως (215e). And the full, of emptying.

Passages 215e

See also κενός (E132); κένωσις (E133); πλήρωσις (E193)

πλήρωσις

plērōsis · feminine noun · E193

Filling; the process of making full.

The genitive πληρώσεως gives the object of desire attributed to the empty. It denotes a process, whereas πλήρες denotes the resulting condition of fullness.

The distinction is useful when reading the list of opposites: desire is not always directed towards another object described by an opposing adjective. Here it is directed towards changing a condition.

Example τὸ δὲ κενὸν πληρώσεως (215e). And the empty desires filling.

Passages 215e

See also κενός (E132); πλήρης (E192); κένωσις (E133)

πλοῦτος

ploutos · noun, masculine · E194

Wealth; here a subject of family praise.

The plural πλούτους appears in Ctesippus' list of familiar accomplishments celebrated by Hippothales: ancestral wealth, horse-breeding, and victories at major games. Wealth contributes to the social attractiveness of the beloved's family, but says nothing distinctive about the boy himself.

Compare the adjective πλουσιώτερος, "richer," in Socrates' teasing comparison of the two friends. He declines to pursue that comparison because friends supposedly have things in common. Later χρήματα denotes the wealth Lysis possesses without being allowed to manage it.

Example πλούτους τε καὶ ἵπποτροφίας (205c). wealth and horse-breeding.

Passages 205c; 207c

See also ἵπποτροφία (E125); χρήμα (E260); κοινός (E135)

ποίημα

poiēma · noun, neuter · E195

Poem; a particular composed work.

Ctesippus complains about the ποιήματα with which Hippothales overwhelms his listeners. A specific poem later recounts the family ancestor's reception of Heracles. Here the noun denotes the products of composing, whereas ποίησις names the activity and ποιητής the maker.

These poems are conspicuous for inherited family praise rather than distinctive observation of Lysis. Socrates declines to hear the meters themselves: he wants the thought and the lover's way of addressing the boy, which are relevant to the poem's effect.

At 221d the word returns as a comparison for the argument itself: perhaps what they called a friend was idle talk, "like a long poem put together". The earlier excessive poems of courtship now have an argumentative counterpart; the comparison questions the adequacy of an elaborate account.

Example ἐν ποιήματί τινι διήγει (205c). he was recounting it in a certain poem.

Passages 204d; 205c; 221d

See also ποίησις (E196); ποιητής (E197); διάνοια (E065); ἐγκώμιον (E073); ὕθλος (E233); αἰτία (E013)

ποίησις

poiēsis · noun, feminine · E196

Poetry or poetic composition; the activity of making poems.

Socrates warns Hippothales not to make himself liable to all these charges through his ποίησις. He then imagines a man harmed by his own poetry and asks whether that man could count as a good poet.

The noun names the activity or medium responsible for the outcome, distinct from a particular ποίημα. The local argument tests art by consequences for its maker. It does not establish that every poem is reducible to personal advantage or that self-praise is poetry's only possible function.

Example διὰ τὴν ποίησιν (206b). because of the poetry.

Passages 206b

See also ποίημα (E195); ποιητής (E197); ἄμουσία (E021)

ποιητής

poiētēs · noun, masculine · E197

Poet; a maker of verse and a source of traditional sayings.

Socrates questions whether someone whose poetry harms himself can be called an ἀγαθὸς ποιητής. Hippothales agrees that this would make no sense. The adjective's application concerns competence at a practice: the composer defeats the end toward which his composing is directed.

The noun therefore helps link the earlier complaint about irritating poems to the practical-expertise examples that follow. It remains “poet” here, rather than the unrestricted “maker,” because the preceding songs, meters, and encomia determine the kind of making at issue.

At 212e a poet's verse supports calling loved children, horses, dogs, and a foreign guest φίλοι. At 213e–214a the poets are approached as fathers and guides of wisdom. Their words offer starting points, but Socrates still interprets and tests their claims.

Example ἀγαθὸς ποτ' ἐστὶν ποιητής (206b). he is ever a good poet.

Passages 206b; 212d–e; 213e–214a

See also ποίησις (E196); ποίημα (E195); ἄμουσία (E021); ἔπος (E094); αἰνίττομαι (E011)

πολέμιος

polemios · adjective · E198

Hostile; at enmity.

The superlative πολειμώτατοι states the reported claim that like is most hostile to like and the good to the good. It is deliberately the reverse of the previous proposal that like is friend to like.

The following occupational examples explain the hostility through competition. The adjective here does not require literal warfare. Its force is the extreme antagonism alleged between similar rivals in the alternative theory.

Example οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πολειμώτατοι (215c). The good are most hostile to the good.

Passages 215c

See also ἐχθρός (E108); φθόνος (E240); φιλονικία (E249)

πονηρός

ponēros · adjective · E199

Wicked; bad in conduct; troublesome.

At 214b–c, the closer one wicked person comes to another, the more hostile he becomes, because he does wrong. The word puts harmful conduct in the foreground. The argument then uses κακός in the wider discussion of instability and badness.

The two words overlap, but κακός also covers illness and ignorance later in the dialogue. Do not import the specifically interpersonal wickedness of this example into every later use of “bad”.

Example πονηρὸς τῷ πονηρῷ (214b–c). the wicked person to the wicked person.

Passages 214b–c

See also κακός (E126); ἀδικέω (E007); ἐχθρός (E108)

πρόγονος

progonos · masculine noun · E200

Ancestor; a forebear.

Hippothales celebrates Lysis’ ancestors, their wealth, and their athletic victories. A particular ancestor is said to have received Heracles because both were sons of Zeus (205c–d). Ctesippus presents this as familiar inherited praise, rather than anything distinctive Hippothales has noticed about Lysis himself. The word locates the claimed distinction in family descent; the later questioning turns toward the boy’s own understanding.

Example ὁ πρόγονος αὐτῶν (205c). their ancestor.

Passages 205c–d

See also συγγένεια (E215); ξενισμός (E166); κρονικός (E138); γενναῖος (E052)

προσποιητός

prospoiētos · adjective · E201

Pretended; assumed rather than genuine.

The word qualifies the lover rejected by the contrast “genuine and not pretended.” It is the authenticity of the lover’s stance that is being marked, not the truth or falsity of a particular sentence.

The contrast does not give a practical test for deciding who is genuine. Its role is to make the proposed result about being loved back specifically concern the authentic lover, within a line of reasoning that Socrates goes on to question.

Example καὶ μὴ προσποιήτω (222a). And not a pretended one.

Passages 222a

See also γνήσιος (E057); ἐραστής (E095); ἀντιφιλέω (E031)

προσφιλής

prophilēs · adjective · E202

Welcome, dear, favorably received; a person made an object of affection.

Hippothales asks what conversation or action could make someone προσφιλής to his beloved. The adjective takes the dative παιδικοῖς, specifying the person whose affection or favor is sought. The edition renders the phrase “become a friend to,” but the Greek lemma here is προσφιλής, not φίλος.

The distinction matters for close reading: this practical request launches Socrates’ demonstration before the later explicit investigation of friendship. It asks how to become welcome to a particular beloved without yet defining the relation or establishing reciprocal affection.

Example προσφιλής παιδικοῖς γένοιτο (206c). might become dear to his beloved.

Passages 206c

See also φίλος (E251); παιδικά (E181); κηλέω (E134)

προτιμάω

protimaō · verb · E203

Value before or above something else; prefer in valuation.

The father values his son above all his other possessions. The prefix *προ-* is reflected in the priority expressed by the verb: the point is not merely that the son is valued, but that other resources matter in relation to him.

This prepares the comparison of son, wine, and cup. The verb helps identify the final object of concern while avoiding the inference that every useful means must be valued equally with its end.

Example πατήρ ὑὸν ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων χρημάτων προτιμᾷ (219d). A father values his son above all his other possessions.

Passages 219d

See also περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι (E190); σπουδῇ (E214); κτάομαι (E139)

πρῶτον φίλον

prōton philon · neuter adjective phrase · E204

First friend; what is primarily dear or valued.

The phrase appears at 219d as the endpoint of a series of “for the sake of” relations. Medicine is valued for health; if health too is valued for something else, the inquiry must either give up or reach a starting point that no longer refers on to another friend. “First” marks explanatory priority, not the first friend acquired in time.

The father’s concern for his poisoned son illustrates the difference between an end and the wine and vessel treated as valuable for that end (219d–220a). At 220b the really friendly or dear is that in which the so-called friendships terminate. The example does not establish that every person has exactly one ultimate object, nor does the phrase itself identify a separately existing Form.

Socrates next asks whether this is the good and whether it is loved because of the bad (220b–e). The latter explanation is then challenged by desires that are not bad (221a–d). The regress argument and its proposed stopping point remain part of an unfinished inquiry. It is more accurate to explain what role the “first friend” would play than to announce what it definitively is.

Example ὃ ἐστὶν πρῶτον φίλον (219c–d). what is first friend.

Passages 219c–220b; 220c–221d

See also φίλος (E251); ἔνεκα (E081); ἀρχή (E041); εἶδωλον (E075); τελευτάω (E228)

P

ῥῆμα

rhēma · neuter noun · E205

Word; an expression in speech.

At 220b the dative ῥήματι qualifies calling secondary things friends: apparently the speakers call them so “in word.” This is contrasted with φίλον τῷ ὄντι, what is really a friend.

The contrast concerns the status of the designation in this particular argument, not a general rejection of language. The edition notes that the wording immediately before ῥήματι depends on an editorial correction; its printed text supports the contrast between another friend and the thing finally valued.

Example ῥήματι φαινόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτό (220b). We appear to say it in word.

Passages 220a–b

See also εἶδωλον (E075); τελευτάω (E228); φίλος (E251)

Σ

σημαίνω

sēmainō · verb · E206

Indicate; signify or point out.

The argument “indicates” that friends are those who are good, after the saying about like has been read as a riddle about good people. The verb presents the current inference as a sign or indication available to the speakers.

This local result is immediately questioned. “Indicate” should therefore retain its argumentative setting rather than become an assurance that the dialogue has disclosed a final meaning of friendship.

Example ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει (214d–e). For the argument indicates to us.

Passages 214d–e

See also λόγος (E145); αἰνίττομαι (E011); ὑποψία (E236)

σκέπτομαι

skeptomai · verb · E207

Consider; inspect; examine a proposal.

Forms such as σκεψώμεθα and σκέψασθε invite joint consideration or ask the boys to attend to a distinction. At 217c the latter introduces the question whether the presence of a quality makes its bearer that same kind of thing.

The compound ἐπισκέπτομαι occurs at 222b when Socrates wants to inspect the argument after the flattering result about the genuine lover. Examination reopens an apparently attractive conclusion; it is not reserved for positions already known to be false.

Example Σκέψασθε δὴ ὃ λέγω (217c). Now consider what I am saying.

Passages 216c; 217c; 219b; 222b

See also σκοπέω (E210); σκέψις (E209); ὑποψία (E236)

σκευασία

skeuasias · noun, feminine · E208

Preparation; here the preparing of a dish.

The genitive σκευασίας follows περί in the hypothetical demonstration that Socrates and Lysis understand the preparation of food better than the king's son. The practical test concerns adding ingredients to boiling meat or broth.

The noun identifies a particular area of competence, rather than knowledge generally or a high-status art. This lowly culinary example is intentionally paired with royal authority. Even a handful of salt is permitted to those regarded as knowledgeable, whereas the heir would be prevented from adding a little.

Example περί ὄψου σκευασίας (209e). about preparing a dish.

Passages 209e

See also βασιλεύς (E048); ἐπιτρέπω (E092); ἰατρός (E121)

σκέψις

skepsis · feminine noun · E209

Examination; the process of looking into a question.

The noun occurs in the comparison of inquiry to a difficult road. It denotes their present investigation, including the possibility of having taken an unhelpful route.

It should not be loaded with the meaning of a later philosophical school or a general commitment to disbelief. Socrates' practical response to the difficult σκέψις is to turn towards another source of possible answers, the poets, and examine their claims.

Example ὥσπερ ὁδὸς ἡ σκέψις (213e). The examination is like a road.

Passages 213e

See also σκοπέω (E210); σκέπτομαι (E207); εὐπορέω (E106)

σκοπέω

skopeō · verb · E210

Look at closely; examine or consider.

At 206b Σκόπει δὴ is a warning, “look to it”, addressed to Hippothales about his poetry’s effects. Later the verb directs philosophical attention.

The verb turns looking into the activity of inquiry. At 213e Socrates says that correct examination would not have left them wandering, and redirects the inquiry towards the poets. At 218d σκοπῶμεν introduces a fresh examination of the apparent solution.

The emphasis is on the act and direction of attention, not on the possession of a doctrine. Its road imagery at 213e connects examining with choosing a route that may succeed or mislead. The related σκέψις there names the examination itself.

Example εἰ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκοποῦμεν (213e). If we had been examining correctly.

Passages 213e–214a; 218d; 206b

See also σκέπτομαι (E207); σκέψις (E209); ἐξευρίσκω (E085)

σοφία

sophia · feminine noun · E211

Wisdom; the knowledge or understanding desired by the lover of wisdom.

At 212d wisdom is humorously required to return affection if the general demand for reciprocity is to apply to philosophers. The noun makes explicit the object contained in the compound φιλόσοφος: a person can love wisdom without wisdom acting as a responding person.

At 214a the poets are called fathers and guides of wisdom. This is a description of their cultural authority and their place as starting points for inquiry, not a guarantee that each poetic statement is true.

The later account of loving wisdom at 218a–b distinguishes already being wise from possessing ignorance while recognizing that one does not know. That distinction concerns the subject’s relation to wisdom; the dialogue does not supply a separate definition of σοφία as a technical body of doctrine.

Example ἂν μὴ ἡ σοφία αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλήῃ (212d). Unless wisdom loves them back.

Passages 212d; 214a

See also σοφός (E213); φιλόσοφος (E254); φιλοσοφέω (E252); ἀντιφιλέω (E031)

σοφιστής

sophistēs · noun, masculine · E212

Sophist; a skilled or knowledgeable teacher.

Socrates calls Miccus an ἱκανὸς σοφιστής after being told that he teaches at the wrestling-school and admires Socrates. The immediate assessment is favorable: Miccus is “no paltry man,” but competent.

This local usage does not establish the hostile sense that “sophist” sometimes carries in English. The entry belongs with the opening’s vocabulary of teaching and ability. It names a person exercising skill, not a theory of sophistry or a sharply defined school opposed to Socrates.

Example ἀλλ’ ἱκανὸς σοφιστής (204a). but a capable sophist.

Passages 204a

See also διδάσκαλος (E068); φαῦλος (E239)

σοφός

sophos · adjective · E213

Wise; skilled; knowledgeable.

The opening can apply wisdom to knowing how to conduct courtship (206a); at 210d becoming wise is linked with usefulness and others’ affection. The “wisest” authors about nature supply a claim that is examined rather than accepted on authority (214b).

At 218a, those already wise, whether gods or humans, do not love wisdom in the sense of seeking what they lack. This does not imply that they despise knowledge. The argument depends on the difference between possessing wisdom and reaching for it. At 222e the “wise men in the law courts” furnish a comparison for recapitulating an argument, not a certification of forensic expertise as philosophy.

Example τοὺς ἤδη σοφούς (218a). those already wise.

Passages 206a; 210d; 214b; 218a–b; 222e

See also φιλοσοφέω (E252); ἐπίσταμαι (E091); φρονέω (E255); σοφία (E211)

σπουδή

spoudē · feminine noun · E214

Earnest concern; serious attention or effort.

The father’s σπουδή is directed ultimately towards his son, although it is expressed through securing wine and a vessel. Socrates uses the noun to identify what the whole practical effort is really about.

The related perfect ἐσπουδασμένη reinforces the concern expended. The distinction is between concern resting on the things prepared and concern directed to that for whose sake they are prepared. This is an account of priority in valuation, not a denial that instrumental objects receive any care.

Example πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη σπουδὴ (219e). All such earnest concern.

Passages 219e

See also παρασκευάζω (E185); περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι (E190); προτιμάω (E203)

συγγένεια

syngeneia · noun, feminine · E215

Family relationship, relationship by descent.

The relationship to Heracles explains why the ancestor entertained him: the ancestor too was said to be a son of Zeus. The noun is specific genealogical vocabulary in a story of family prestige.

It should remain distinct from οἰκεῖος, the broader term rendered “akin” elsewhere in the dialogue. The supplied edition deliberately translates συγγένεια as “relationship.” Nothing in this early occurrence establishes that biological kinship is the explanation of friendship subsequently being sought; it belongs first to Hippothales’ inherited praise material.

Example διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους συγγένειαν (205c). because of the relationship to Heracles.

Passages 205c

See also πρόγονος (E200); ξενισμός (E166); οἰκεῖος (E168)

σύγγραμμα

syngramma · noun, neuter · E216

Written composition.

The plural συγγράμματα accompanies ποιήματα in Ctesippus’ complaint about Hippothales’ literary production. The corresponding infinitive συγγράφειν appears in Hippothales’ denial that he composes for his beloved. The passage distinguishes ordinary spoken narration, compositions, and singing, but does not supply a catalogue of genres. “Treatise” would be misleadingly specialized here: the works belong to the lover’s repeated celebration of Lysis.

At 214b the same noun names the writings of the wisest people, who discuss nature and the whole. Their claim that like is friend to like is examined alongside poetic authority. These writers are not named; proposed historical identifications remain interpretations.

Example ποιήματα ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρήσῃ καταντλεῖν καὶ συγγράμματα (204d). he attempts to drench us with poems and compositions.

Passages 204d; 205a; 214b

See also ποίημα (E195); καταλογάδην (E130); ἔπος (E094); φύσις (E256); διαλέγομαι (E064)

συγχωρέω

synchōreō · verb · E217

Grant; concede; agree to allow a proposal.

The boys grant the proposed definition at 218c. At 222c Socrates invites them to grant that the akin differs from the like, while describing their state as drunkenness with the argument.

The later use is especially important: granting a distinction provisionally does not establish that it has been satisfactorily explained. The dialogue proceeds to test the grant and immediately returns to difficulties encountered earlier. Keep the tentative argumentative force of “let us grant” rather than translating it as a completed discovery.

Example συγχωρήσωμεν καὶ φῶμεν (222c). Let us grant and say.

Passages 218c; 222c; 210c

See also ὁμολογέω (E173); διαφέρω (E067); οἰκεῖος (E168); ὅμοιος (E172)

συνήθης

synēthēs · adjective · E218

Familiar with, on accustomed terms with.

Lysis is συνήθης with Ctesippus through Ctesippus’ cousin Menexenus. Hippothales offers this connection as a fallback route for bringing Lysis into the conversation: if he does not approach by himself, Ctesippus can call him.

The adjective specifies an existing social familiarity, not necessarily the intimate relation conveyed by saying that Lysis is Menexenus’ closest companion. It makes the encounter socially plausible and distinguishes different degrees and routes of connection within the group around the wrestling-school.

Example Κτησίππῳ συνήθης ἐστὶν (206d). he is familiar with Ctesippus.

Passages 206d

See also ἀνεψιός (E028); ἐταῖρος (E104)

συνίημι

syniēmi · verb · E219

Understand; grasp the sense of something.

Socrates allows that the saying about like may be wholly true while “we do not understand.” The verb locates the possible failure in interpretation rather than immediately in the poets’ words.

This charitable starting point leads to the proposal that “like” really means good people, since bad people are inconsistent. The ensuing examination shows that a more favourable interpretation still requires testing; understanding an intended meaning and accepting it as true are different achievements.

Example ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς οὐ συνίεμεν (214b). But we do not understand.

Passages 214b

See also αἰνίττομαι (E011); σημαίνω (E206); ποιητής (E197)

συνουσία

synousia · feminine noun · E220

Being together; a gathering or association.

The noun names the conversational gathering that Socrates and the others break up after yielding to the boys’ tutors. The local sense is ordinary social presence together.

It should not be given a sexual meaning in this sentence. The assembly ends for practical reasons while the philosophical question remains unresolved, making the dissolution of the συνουσία different from a resolution of the argument.

Example διελύσαμεν τὴν συνουσίαν (223b). We broke up the gathering.

Passages 223b

See also παιδαγωγός (E180); φιλία (E244); ἐξευρίσκω (E085)

συστέλλω

systellō · verb · E221

Draw together, reduce, take down; here restrain inflated self-estimation.

The participle συστέλλοντα is paired with ταπεινοῦντα in Socrates’ unspoken lesson to Hippothales. Both describe the effect of his questions on Lysis, who has acknowledged his need for teaching and given up the claim to pride.

The verb’s contraction image contrasts with χαννοῦντα, puffing up, and διαθρύπτοντα, pampering. It is not a demand that Lysis remain permanently inhibited or silent: immediately afterward the boy eagerly wants the conversation to continue. The reduction concerns confidence unsupported by understanding.

Example ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα (210e). humbling him and taking him down.

Passages 210e

See also ταπεινώ (E226); χαυνώ (E257); διαθρύπτω (E063)

Σωκράτης

Sōkratēs · proper noun, masculine · E222

Socrates; narrator and principal questioner.

He recounts the entire encounter to an unnamed listener. His reported questions move between Hippothales, Lysis, and Menexenus. His final inclusion of himself among the boys' friends is compatible with his admission that their definition has failed; dramatic participation and theoretical success are distinct.

Example ὦ Σώκράτες (203a). Socrates, as a form of address.

Passages 203a–b; 204b–c; 211d–212a; 223b

See also λόγος (E145); ζητέω (E109); φίλος (E251)

σῶμα

sōma · noun, neuter · E223

Body; the embodied person or bearer of bodily conditions.

Socrates says that Lysis benefits no more from his fine body than from his wealth, since someone else shepherds and tends it. The genitive σώματος depends on the preceding expression about obtaining no benefit.

The body is thus something the boy possesses without fully controlling, paralleling the wealth managed by others. The remark develops the paradox of restricted freedom; it is not a general doctrine that the body is alien or worthless. Its attractive quality is acknowledged even as its governance becomes the issue.

At 217a–b the body, insofar as it is a body, is neither good nor bad: disease is the bad present to it, and medicine the good it welcomes. The bearer is therefore distinguished from its condition. At 218b–c the hypothesis extends to soul and body; at 219a and 220c the body continues to test causal need and the imagined removal of badness.

Example οὔτε τοῦ σώματος οὔτω γενναίου ὄντος (209a). nor from your body, fine as it is.

Passages 208e–209a; 217a–b; 218b–c; 219a; 220c

See also χρῆμα (E260); γενναῖος (E052); θεραπεύω (E115); ψυχή (E264); νόσος (E163); ἰατρική (E119); ὑγίεια (E232)

σώφρων

sōphrōn · adjective · E224

Temperate; self-controlled.

The neuter τὸ σῶφρον is placed opposite τὸ ἀκόλαστον, the intemperate or unrestrained. This pair follows just and unjust in the test of the claim that opposites must be friends.

The example relies on an accepted moral opposition without supplying a full account of temperance. Its function is restrictive: physical pairs such as hot and cold do not authorize the same conclusion about every ethical opposite.

Example τὸ σῶφρον τῷ ἀκόλαστῳ (216b). The temperate to the intemperate.

Passages 216b

See also ἄδικος (E008); ἐναντίος (E079); ἀγαθός (E001)

T

ταλασιουργία

talasiourgia · noun, feminine · E225

Wool-working; the practical craft illustrated by the mother's tools.

Socrates asks whether Lysis may handle the tools involved in his mother's ταλασιουργία. The surrounding objects include wool, loom, batten, and shuttle. Lysis laughs and says that touching them would get him beaten.

The example widens practical competence beyond male-coded driving and supervision to a task controlled by his mother. The word identifies a specific craft, not domestic work indiscriminately. Its philosophical work comes from the analogy: wanting to use an implement and belonging to the household do not establish a right to operate it.

Example τῶν περὶ ταλασιουργίαν ὀργάνων (208d). the implements for wool-working.

Passages 208d

See also ὄργανον (E176); ἐπιτρέπω (E092); τύπτω (E231)

ταπεινός

tapeinoō · verb · E226

Humble, lower someone's self-estimation.

The participle ταπεινοῦντα belongs to the advice Socrates almost speaks aloud to Hippothales: this is how one should converse with a beloved, humbling and taking him down rather than puffing him up. It retrospectively identifies a practical effect of the questioning of Lysis.

The verb does not name an abstract virtue of humility. It describes what a speaker does to an interlocutor's inflated confidence. Socrates withholds the remark to protect Hippothales' concealment, so the advice reaches the narrated audience without being publicly delivered to the lover.

Example ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα (210e). humbling him and taking him down.

Passages 210e

See also συστέλλω (E221); χαυνόω (E257); μεγαλόφρων (E154)

τέθριππος

tethrippos · adjective; substantivized neuter · E227

With four horses; a four-horse chariot.

The dative plural τεθρίπποις names one kind of racing entry with which Lysis' family won victories. Paired with κέλησι, it distinguishes chariot competition from races on single horses. It is a concrete item in the catalogue of inherited prestige, not a distinct philosophical example. The later chariot-driving question gives practical force to the family's earlier association with equestrian wealth.

Example τεθρίπποις τε καὶ κέλησι (205c). with four-horse chariots and racehorses.

Passages 205c

See also κέλης (E131); ἵπποτροφία (E125); ἡνίοχος (E114)

τελευτάω

teleutaō · verb · E228

End; come to a conclusion or terminate in something.

At 220b all the so-called friendships end in the thing that is really a friend. The verb describes the destination of derivative attachments: the cup and wine matter because of the person they are meant to save.

This is not the ordinary temporal ending of a friendship, or the death of a friend. The construction εἰς ὃ gives the point in which the sequence terminates. The same vocabulary returns at 220d when Socrates tests whether that final object still depends on an enemy.

Example εἰς ὃ πᾶσαι αὐτὰι αἱ λεγόμεναι φιλῖαι τελευτῶσιν (220b). In which all these so-called friendships end.

Passages 220b; 220d

See also ἀρχή (E041); ἐπαναφέρω (E087); πρῶτον φίλον (E204)

τρόπος

tropos · masculine noun · E229

Way; manner; in the plural, ways or habits of character.

The noun often introduces the manner in which something happens: Socrates does not know how one person becomes a friend of another, and the colour example distinguishes ways in which a quality can be present.

At 222a τρόπους appears among the possible respects of affinity to a beloved and means ways or characteristic manners. Context determines whether “way” means an explanatory manner or a person’s habits. The same English rendering need not fit every occurrence.

Example ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος (222a). or in ways or in figure.

Passages 212a; 217e; 222a

See also ἥθος (E112); εἶδος (E074); παρουσία (E188)

τροφή

trophē · feminine noun · E230

Food; nourishment.

The speaker whose theory Socrates reports calls the opposite nourishment for its opposite. The examples include dry and wet, cold and hot, bitter and sweet, sharp and blunt, the empty seeking filling and the full emptying.

The noun makes the proposed attraction between opposites vivid by imagining one as supplying what the other needs. It is part of the theory under examination, not a final claim that every opposition is nourishing. Friendship and enmity soon provide the counterexample that breaks the unrestricted rule.

Example τροφήν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ (215e). For the opposite is nourishment for its opposite.

Passages 215e

See also κενός (E132); πλήρης (E192); ἐναντίος (E079); ἐπιθυμία (E089)

τύπτω

typtō · verb · E231

Strike, beat; used of animals and of punishment.

Socrates asks whether Lysis may strike the mules with a whip; the permitted person is instead the muleteer. Lysis later says that he would himself be beaten if he touched his mother’s equipment.

The shift turns the boy from imagined agent to possible recipient of a blow. His reply pairs τυπτοίμην and ἀπτοίμην, “I might be beaten” and “I might touch,” a rhyme noted by the

edition. The exchange is comic, but its concrete threat also reinforces how little control the supposedly favored son possesses.

Example τυπτοίμην ἂν εἰ ἀπτοίμην (208e). I would be beaten if I touched them.

Passages 208b; 208e

See also ὀρεοκόμος (E177); ταλασιουργία (E225); κολάζω (E136)

Υ

ὕγεια

hygieia · feminine noun · E232

Health.

Health is the good for whose sake the sick person values the doctor and medicine. It contrasts with disease, the bad condition because of which medical help is sought.

Once health too is called φίλον, Socrates asks whether it must be valued for something further. Thus a familiar medical goal initiates the question of an ultimate goal. The related verb ὑγιαίνω, including τὸ ὑγιαῖνον σῶμα, describes being healthy rather than acquiring or seeking health.

Example διὰ νόσον ἔνεκα ὑγείας (218e). Because of disease, for the sake of health.

Passages 217a; 218e; 219a–c

See also νόσος (E163); ἱατρική (E119); ἔνεκα (E081); διὰ (E062)

ῥθλος

hythlos · masculine noun · E233

Idle talk; empty chatter.

Socrates asks whether what they previously called a friend was some ῥθλος, like a long assembled poem. The noun supplies a deliberately deflationary description of an account that had briefly appeared successful.

This is a provisional self-criticism within the continuing inquiry, not proof that everything previously discussed was useless. The language registers the danger of mistaking an extended verbal construction for an adequate explanation.

Example ῥθλος τις ἦν (221d). Was some idle talk.

Passages 221d

See also ποίημα (E195); λόγος (E145); ὑποψία (E236)

ὑπήκοος

hypēkoos · adjective · E234

Subject to, under another's authority.

The plural ὑπήκοοι states the consequence of lacking understanding: in those matters we shall be subject to others. It contrasts directly with being free and rulers of others in the areas we understand.

The genitive ἄλλων identifies the people to whom we are subject. The word is not introduced as a general description of political subjects; it is qualified by ἐν αὐτοῖς, “in those matters.” Dependence is task-specific in the argument, just as the freedom promised through competence is task-specific.

Example ἐσόμεθα ἄλλων ὑπήκοοι (210c). we shall be subject to others.

Passages 210c

See also ἐλεύθερος (E077); ἄρχω (E042); ἐπιτρέπω (E092)

ὑποβαρβαρίζω

hypobarbarizō · verb · E235

Speak somewhat foreign-sounding or imperfect Greek.

The participle ὑποβαρβαρίζοντες describes the tutors as they express annoyance and continue calling the boys. The edition renders the manner as “in their half-foreign Greek.”

The word describes their speech in the scene, not an inability to communicate: their demand to go home is effective. It helps give the interruption a particular dramatic sound, and should not be expanded into unsupported claims about the tutors' precise origins.

Example ὑποβαρβαρίζοντες ἡγανάκτουν (223a). They expressed annoyance in imperfect Greek.

Passages 223a

See also παιδαγωγός (E180); συνουσία (E220)

ὑποψία

hypopsia · feminine noun · E236

Suspicion; a misgiving about an apparent result.

A very strange suspicion interrupts Socrates' pleasure at having caught the answer. Its content is specified: what they have agreed may not be true. The noun thus names the impulse to reopen inquiry rather than a settled counterargument.

The cognate verb ὑποπτεύω already appears at 214e, when Socrates is troubled by the proposed friendship of the good. Both occurrences separate shared confidence from adequate examination; an attractive agreement remains open to scrutiny.

Example ἀτοπωτάτη τις ὑποψία εἰσῆλθεν (218c). A very strange suspicion came in.

Passages 214e; 218c

See also ὁμολογέω (E173); σκέπτομαι (E207); θηρευτής (E116)

Φ

φαίνομαι

phainomai · verb · E237

Appear; seem; become apparent.

At 217d the contrast between being white and appearing white is explicit: white lead makes fair hair look white without making the hair itself white in the way old age does. The optative φαίνονται expresses the appearance under the hypothetical treatment.

Elsewhere the conversational reply φαίνεται can mean “apparently” or “it appears so,” and a form of the verb may introduce a newly emerging conclusion. Do not import the sharp appearance/reality contrast of the hair example into every ordinary assent, or translate every assent as certainty.

Example πότερον τότε λευκαὶ εἶεν ἢ φαίνονται ἄν (217d). Would they then be white, or appear so?

Passages 213a; 217d; 221b–d; 222a

See also λευκός (E143); χρῶμα (E262); ὑποψία (E236)

φάρμακον

pharmakon · neuter noun · E238

Remedy; a treatment used against an illness.

At 220d the good is compared to a remedy and badness to an illness. If the illness were absent, no remedy would be needed. This presses the consequence of making badness the sole cause of affection for the good.

The word here has the positive role “remedy”; the passage does not call it a poison or develop a theory about an inherent ambiguity of drugs. The analogy is soon tested by desires that could persist without badness, so its explanatory reach remains in question.

Example νοσήματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν δεῖ φαρμάκου (220d). Where there is no illness, there is no need of a remedy.

Passages 220d

See also νόσος (E163); ἰατρική (E119); χρεία (E259); αἰτία (E013)

φαῦλος

phaulos · adjective · E239

Paltry, poor, or inadequate; context determines the failing.

The adjective first appears in a denial: Miccus is not φαῦλος. Socrates then describes himself as φαῦλος in other matters, reserving one special ability, quickly recognizing lover and beloved. This self-depreciation makes his claim of erotic expertise more striking.

At 206b it describes a poor hunter who scares away his quarry. The shared point is inadequacy or poor performance, not a fixed moral class equivalent in every occurrence to κακός. The different contexts should remain visible.

Example εἰμὶ δ' ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φαῦλος (204b). in other respects I am paltry.

Passages 204a; 204b; 206b

See also σοφιστής (E212); θηρευτής (E116); ἄχρηστος (E047)

φθόνος

phthonos · masculine noun · E240

Envy.

Envy joins rivalry and enmity in the reported claim that the most similar people are the most hostile to one another. The quoted competition between members of the same occupation supplies the context.

The noun names one of the emotions supposed to follow from similarity, not the conclusion of the dialogue about similar friends. Socrates reports the opposing theory as a fresh possibility and subsequently tests its broader assertion about opposites.

Example φθόνου τε καὶ φιλονικίας (215d). Of envy and rivalry.

Passages 215d

See also φιλονικία (E249); ἔχθρα (E107); πολέμιος (E198)

φιλέταιρος

philetairos · adjective · E241

Fond of companions; a lover of companionship.

Socrates applies the compound to himself after saying that he would prefer a companion to Darius' gold, or even to Darius himself. The second element is ἐταῖρος, "companion," and the whole word is the culmination of his enthusiastic comparison of acquisitions.

The self-description introduces his professed ignorance about how friends become friends. Enthusiasm for companionship is not yet knowledge of friendship's nature. The edition's "friend of companions" deliberately keeps the connection with the other φίλ-words audible.

Example οὕτως ἐγὼ φιλέταιρός τις εἰμι (211e). So much a lover of companions am I.

Passages 211e

See also ἐταῖρος (E104); κτάομαι (E139); φίλος (E251)

φιλέω

phileō · verb · E242

Love; feel affection for; be attached to.

The usual contracted infinitive is φιλεῖν. The verb has a broad range: parents love Lysis (207d), people love horses, wine, exercise, and wisdom (212d), and the body is said to love medicine (217b). These are not all erotic relations.

The active participle ὁ φιλῶν means the one loving; the passive ὁ φιλούμενος means the one loved. At 212a–213c their relation to φίλος is tested in both directions. A person can love without being loved back, or can even be hated. ἀντιφιλέω explicitly supplies reciprocal love; reciprocity should not be smuggled into φιλέω alone.

At 215a–b the absence of need is made to imply an absence of cherishing and then of loving. At 221b–d desire and erotic love are taken to involve loving their objects, prompting a revised account of the cause of friendship. The English “love” should therefore be read with its grammatical subject, object, and immediate argument. It does not identify a single settled psychological theory.

Example ὁ μὲν φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ φιλεῖται (212c). the one loves, the other is loved.

Passages 207d; 212a–213c; 215a–b; 217b; 221b–d

See also φίλος (E251); φιλία (E244); ἀντιφιλέω (E031); ἐράω (E096); μισέω (E160)

φιλήκοος

philēkoos · adjective · E243

Fond of hearing; eager to listen to conversation.

Hippothales predicts that Lysis will approach Socrates because he is exceptionally φιλήκοος. The immediate object of this fondness is conversation: Socrates need only sit and talk with Ctesippus.

The description anticipates Lysis’ repeated looks toward the speakers and his later wish to hear another discussion even after his own questioning ends. It denotes a disposition toward listening, not established expertise or a formal commitment to a philosophical school. The boy’s initial hesitation shows that intellectual attraction can coexist with social shyness.

Example φιλήκοος γάρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, διαφερόντως ἐστίν (206c–206d). for he is exceptionally fond of hearing, Socrates.

Passages 206c–d

See also ὀκνέω (E171); διατριβή (E066); ἀπομνημονεύω (E037)

φιλία

philia · feminine noun · E244

Friendship; affection; the relation of being friends.

At 207c the boys' friendship is already treated as a fact of their lives. The theoretical inquiry later asks what can explain such a relation. At 214d "true friendship" is associated with the proposed friendship of good persons, but the adequacy of that proposal is immediately tested.

The noun also applies beyond reciprocal personal friendship. At 217e it names attachment to the good; at 219a medicine has gained the body's friendship for the sake of health. At 220b the plural "so-called friendships" names attachments that lead toward what is really dear. The noun belongs to the broad inquiry about φίλον rather than one modern definition of friendship.

At 221d–e desire is proposed as its cause, and friendship is placed beside erotic love and desire as directed toward the akin. The ending does not deny that the speakers are friends; it withholds a successful definition of what a friend is.

Example ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς φιλίας αἰτία (221d). desire [as] the cause of friendship.

Passages 207c; 214d; 215d; 217e–219a; 220b; 221d–e; 223b

See also φίλος (E251); φιλέω (E242); ἔρω (E101); ἐπιθυμία (E089)

φίλιππος

philippos · adjective · E245

Fond of horses; a horse-lover.

The plural φίλιπποι begins the list that tests whether everything loved must love in return. If reciprocity were required across the entire φίλ- vocabulary, a horse-lover would count as such only if the horses loved him back.

The compound describes the person's attachment, and does not by itself assert a mutual personal friendship. Its familiarity gives the reductive consequence its force. Horses also appeared among the desirable possessions at 211d–e and appear again in the quoted verse at 212e.

Example Οὐδ' ἄρα φίλιπποί εἰσιν (212d). Then there are no horse-lovers either.

Passages 212d

See also ἀντιφιλέω (E031); φιλόρτυξ (E250); φιλογυμναστής (E246)

φιλογυμναστής

philogymnastēs · masculine noun · E246

Lover of exercise or athletic training.

The plural φιλογυμνασταί is the penultimate item before φιλόσοφοι in the list at 212d. It extends the examples from animals and drink to an activity.

That placement helps the transition to loving wisdom: an attachment to an activity can be named with a φίλ- compound without treating the activity as an affectionate respondent. The word also suits the dialogue's wrestling-school setting, but its immediate work is to test the proposed requirement of reciprocal affection.

Example φιλογυμνασταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι (212d). Lovers of exercise and lovers of wisdom.

Passages 212d

See also φίλοινοις (E247); φιλόσοφος (E254); ἀντιφιλέω (E031)

φίλοινοις

philoinos · adjective · E247

Fond of wine; a wine-lover.

The plural φίλοινοι supplies a particularly sharp item in the reciprocity test, because wine is an object of enjoyment rather than an obvious partner in an exchange of affection.

The word demonstrates the breadth of the φίλ- compounds: a fondness can have a thing as its object. The later wine in the father-and-son example has a different role, as a supposed means of rescue. The shared object should not obscure the difference between enjoying wine and valuing it for an ulterior purpose.

Example καὶ φίλοινοι καὶ φιλογυμνασταὶ (212d). And wine-lovers and lovers of exercise.

Passages 212d

See also φιλογυμναστής (E246); ἀντιφιλέω (E031); οἶνος (E170)

φιλοκύων

philokyōn · adjective · E248

Fond of dogs; a dog-lover.

The plural φιλόκυνες appears in the list of attachments that would become problematic if every loved object had to reciprocate. The compound marks the dog-lover's orientation towards dogs.

Dogs connect this list with both Socrates' catalogue of possessions and the poet's hunting dogs in the following quotation. The inference being tested concerns the meaning and range of φίλος and its compounds; it does not require a general claim about whether animals can feel affection.

Example οὐδ' αὖ φιλόκυνές γε (212d). Nor again dog-lovers.

Passages 212d–e

See also φίλιππος (E245); ἀντιφιλέω (E031); φίλος (E251)

φιλονικία

philonikia · feminine noun · E249

Rivalry; eagerness to compete or prevail.

The noun occurs between envy and enmity in the account of competition among those most alike. Its φίλο- element does not make the whole word another kind of mutual friendship: it describes an inclination towards contest.

The term helps explain why a similarity-based account can be challenged through examples of competitors in the same field. It belongs to the reported argument, whose conclusion that opposites are most friendly proves too broad.

Example καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ ἔχθρας (215d). And rivalry and enmity.

Passages 215d

See also φθόνος (E240); ἔχθρα (E107); ἀντιλογικός (E030)

φιλόρτυξ

philortyx · adjective · E250

Fond of quails; a quail-lover.

The passage has the plural φιλόρτυγες, a form whose stem differs from the dictionary nominative. It belongs with horse-lovers, dog-lovers, wine-lovers, and lovers of exercise in the test of reciprocity.

The quail is already one of Socrates' examples of a prized acquisition at 211e. Here the word's role is lexical and argumentative: the person's fondness is enough for the familiar compound, whereas requiring the bird's answering affection would strain its ordinary application.

Example οὐδὲ φιλόρτυγες (212d). Nor quail-lovers.

Passages 212d

See also φίλιππος (E245); φιλοκύων (E248); ἀντιφιλέω (E031)

φίλος

philos · adjective, also used as a noun · E251

Friend; dear, loved, or valued; an attached or affectionate person.

The adjective does not by itself settle the direction of the relation. At 212a–213c Socrates tests whether φίλος names the person loving, the person loved, or both when affection is

reciprocal. The active and passive alternatives depend on the participles of φιλέω, not on a change in the spelling of φίλος.

With things, especially neuter φίλον, “dear” or “valued” often makes the ordinary sense clearer than English “friend”. The edition nevertheless uses “friend” consistently so that the same Greek word remains visible. That translation policy should not make wine, wisdom, medicine, or health into persons capable of returning affection. Solon’s verse at 212e and the parents’ φίλτατα, “dearest”, at 213a make the ordinary affective sense especially clear.

Grammatical gender matters. ὁ φίλος can designate a friend or the person called a friend; τὸ φίλον can designate what is dear or valued. Dative and genitive constructions both express relations, which this edition usually marks as “friend to” and “friend of”. Grammar alone does not resolve the philosophical alternatives.

The final ὁ φίλος asks what the friend is, while the speakers still take themselves to be friends. At 223b no tested definition has been secured. Vocative ὦ φίλε, “my friend”, elsewhere may simply be a familiar mode of address.

Example ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος (212a–b). the one loving [a friend] of the one loved, or the one loved of the one loving.

Passages 206a; 212a–213c; 216c–218c; 219c–220b; 223b

See also φιλέω (E242); φιλία (E244); πρῶτον φίλον (E204); ἐταῖρος (E104); ἀντιφιλέω (E031)

φιλοσοφέω

philosophēō · verb · E252

Love wisdom; pursue wisdom through inquiry.

At 218a–b neither the already wise nor those made bad by ignorance are said to philosophize. Those remaining have ignorance but are not yet without judgment or unlearned through it: they still believe that they do not know what they do not know. The verb describes an active orientation toward a good not yet possessed.

The distinction is not between education and no education in a merely social sense. What matters is the relation to one’s own ignorance. Awareness of not knowing keeps desire for wisdom possible; presumed possession and disabling ignorance close off that desire in the model being tested.

This application supports the proposal that what is neither good nor bad loves the good because of badness present within it. Socrates’ apparent discovery at 218b is immediately reopened at 218c. The account is important without being exempt from the dialogue’s ensuing examination.

Example τοὺς ἤδη σοφοὺς μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν (218a). those already wise no longer love wisdom.

Passages 218a–b

See also φιλοσοφία (E253); φιλόσοφος (E254); ἄγνοια (E003); μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν (E158)

φιλοσοφία

philosophia · feminine noun · E253

Love of wisdom; philosophy; eagerness for inquiry.

Socrates is pleased with Lysis' φιλοσοφία at 213d, after the boy has followed the argument closely and involuntarily offered a judgment about its failure. The noun here praises an intellectual disposition displayed in conversation, not membership in a school or possession of a body of doctrines.

It belongs with the “friends of wisdom” at 212d and the account of who loves wisdom at 218a–b, but those passages use different members of the same word family.

Example ἐκείνου ἡσθεὶς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ (213d). pleased with his love of wisdom.

Passages 213d

See also φιλοσοφέω (E252); φιλόσοφος (E254); σοφός (E213)

φιλόσοφος

philosophos · adjective or noun · E254

Loving wisdom; a lover or friend of wisdom.

At 212d φιλόσοφοι stands in a deliberately varied series with lovers of horses, quails, dogs, wine, and exercise. Requiring every loved object to love back would make wisdom's lovers impossible unless wisdom returned their affection.

The example tests reciprocity as a universal requirement for φίλον. It does not make philosophers equivalent to wine-lovers in character; the shared feature is the grammatical and affective relation to an object of attachment.

Example φιλόσοφοι, ἂν μὴ ἡ σοφία αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλήῃ (212d). lovers of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them back.

Passages 212d

See also φιλοσοφέω (E252); φιλοσοφία (E253); ἀντιφιλέω (E031); φίλος (E251)

φρονέω

phroneō · verb · E255

Understand; have sound judgment; know what one is doing.

The questioning of Lysis connects understanding with freedom to act and with being entrusted with things (209c–210c). Age alone is not the decisive criterion: others yield authority when they believe he understands better.

The examples concern specific activities such as cooking and medicine. At 210d, μέγα φρονεῖν, “think highly of oneself”, is played against μήπω φρονεῖ, “does not yet understand”; μεγαλόφρων, “proud”, against ἄφρων, “without understanding”. Lysis’ need for a teacher becomes a reason for humility. The wordplay continues the practical argument without introducing a fully articulated theory of practical wisdom.

Example βέλτιον αὐτοῦ φρονεῖν (209c). understand better than [his father] does.

Passages 209c–210d

See also ἐπίσταμαι (E091); σοφός (E213); ἄφρων (E046); χρήσιμος (E261); μεγαλόφρων (E154)

φύσις

physis · feminine noun · E256

Nature; in the dative φύσει, by nature or naturally.

At 214b nature and the whole are the subjects discussed by the wise writers whose claims about like are being tested. At 221e–222a φύσει qualifies the proposed kinship of friends and the obligation to love what is naturally akin.

The two uses should be distinguished: the first names a subject of cosmological inquiry, the second the ground of a proposed relationship. Neither use establishes that whatever occurs naturally is morally right. In the final argument the meaning and relation of “akin” and “like” still need examination.

Example φύσει πη οἰκεῖοί ἐσθ’ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς (221e). You are by nature in some way akin to one another.

Passages 214b; 221e–222a

See also οἰκεῖος (E168); γένος (E053); ψυχή (E264); ἦθος (E112)

X

χαυνόω

chaunoō · verb · E257

Puff up, inflate; make someone conceited through praise.

Socrates contrasts his own humbling conversation with Hippothales’ χαυνοῦντα, “puffing up,” of the beloved. The participle looks back to the prediction that praise fills beautiful boys with pride and makes them difficult to win.

The image concerns an expansion of self-opinion without the understanding that could support it. It is coupled with pampering, not offered as an analysis of physical weakness or material porosity. The term helps the reader connect the apparently independent family-and-knowledge argument with the earlier instruction in courtship.

Example χαυνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα (210e). puffing him up and pampering him.

Passages 210e

See also ταπεινώ (E226); συστέλλω (E221); μεγαλυχία (E153)

χορδή

chordē · noun, feminine · E258

String of the lyre.

The genitive plural χορδῶν identifies the strings that Lysis may tighten or loosen as he chooses. Plucking and striking complete the sequence of permitted musical operations. The concrete noun keeps the example focused on trained handling of an instrument. Socrates' point is the boy's discriminating control of a familiar task, not a generalized freedom from parental oversight.

Example ἥν ἄν βούλῃ τῶν χορδῶν (209b). whichever of the strings you want.

Passages 209b

See also λύρα (E147); πλῆκτρον (E191); ἐπιτρέπω (E092)

χρεία

chreia · feminine noun · E259

Use; need or service that something supplies.

At 215b the allegedly self-sufficient good people have no use for one another when together. This helps Socrates question how they could set great store by one another.

At 220d the same noun appears in the unsettling proposal that the good has no use for its own sake, if its only value is as a remedy for badness. The noun's practical force matters: the inquiry is testing whether value and affection can be reduced to needed service.

Example αὐτὸ δ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔνεκα οὐδεμίαν χρεῖαν ἔχει (220d). But for its own sake it has no use.

Passages 215b; 220d

See also χρήσιμος (E261); ἰκανός (E122); φάρμακον (E238); ἔνεκα (E081); δέομαι (E060)

χρῆμα

chrēma · noun, neuter; commonly plural · E260

Thing possessed; in the plural, wealth or property.

The genitive plural χρημάτων denotes the considerable wealth from which Lysis seems to obtain no benefit because everyone else controls it. Socrates places it beside the boy's fine body, likewise supervised by others.

The local contrast is between having resources and effectively using them. The noun itself does not mean usefulness, despite the surrounding argument about benefit and control. Distinguish it from χρήσιμος, “useful,” and from the earlier πλοῦτος, which appears among the family achievements recited by Hippothales.

At 219d a father values his son above all his other wealth; the term returns within the distinction between what matters finally and the resources provided for its sake.

Example τῶν χρημάτων τοσούτων ὄντων (208e). from your wealth, great as it is.

Passages 208e; 219d–220a

See also πλοῦτος (E194); σῶμα (E223); ἐπιτρέπω (E092); χρήσιμος (E261)

χρήσιμος

chrēsimos · adjective · E261

Useful; serviceable; able to supply a benefit.

At 210c–d usefulness is linked to understanding, goodness, and being welcomed as a friend. In the likeness argument, the question is what service one like thing can render another simply by being like (214e–215a). At 220c the good risks becoming useless if its only function is to remove badness.

The word raises a question about the ground of affection. It should not be made into a blanket authorial claim that friendship is mere exploitation. The father who prizes his son above the wine and vessel needed to save him (219d–220a) distinguishes an object loved from the means useful for its sake.

Example χρήσιμος γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἔσῃ (210d). for you will be useful and good.

Passages 210c–d; 214e–215a; 220c

See also ἄχρηστος (E047); ὠφέλιμος (E268); ἀγαθός (E001); χρεία (E259)

χρῶμα

chrōma · neuter noun · E262

Colour; colouring material according to context.

The hair example moves from colouring material put on something to the colour that old age produces in the hair itself. The noun χρώα, also printed in the example, denotes colour or complexion in the question about what the coated thing is like.

The distinction is between an applied appearance and a genuine change in the bearer. At 222b χρώματα returns in Hippothales’ changing colours from pleasure, a bodily reaction to the conclusion about a genuine lover. That dramatic use is not another statement of the technical distinction tested in the hair example.

Example τὸ γῆρας αὐταῖς ταῦτόν τοῦτο χρῶμα ἐπαγάγη (217d). Old age brings this same colour upon them.

Passages 217c–e; 222b

See also λευκότης (E144); ἀλείφω (E016); ψιμύθιον (E263); γῆρας (E054)

Ψ

ψιμύθιον

psimythion · neuter noun · E263

White lead, used here as a white coating.

The dative ψιμυθίῳ names the material with which someone hypothetically smears the boy's fair hair. It supplies whiteness on the hair without, in the example's terms, making the hair itself white.

The material makes the distinction between application and transformation visible. The passage is an analogy about the presence of a quality, not practical advice to use white lead or a claim that all changes produced externally are merely apparent.

Example ψιμυθίῳ ἀλείψειεν (217d). Might smear it with white lead.

Passages 217d

See also ἀλείφω (E016); λευκότης (E144); χρῶμα (E262)

ψυχή

psychē · feminine noun · E264

Soul; the inner or psychic aspect of a person.

At 218b the proposed account of friendship is extended to soul as well as body. At 222a the possible affinity is in the soul, in some character of the soul, in ways, or in figure. The edition treats the last item as visible figure; the list need not consist solely of psychic attributes.

The noun does not come with a developed psychology in this dialogue. Its local function is to ensure that the inquiry is not confined to bodily need and to indicate possible dimensions of affinity between people. The list at 222a should not be inflated into a formal set of faculties.

Example ἢ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν (222a). Either in respect of the soul.

Passages 218b–c; 220c; 222a

See also σῶμα (E223); ἦθος (E112); τρόπος (E229); εἶδος (E074)

Ω

ὥδή

*ōidē · noun, feminine · E265***Song; a sung composition.**

Socrates says that Hippothales' songs bear above all on Hippothales himself, because their eventual significance depends on whether he secures the beloved. At 206b songs are paired with speeches as means that ought to charm rather than estrange the listener.

The noun is broader than ἐγκώμιον, which specifies a song's praising function. In the argument the decisive question is the song's effect. Attractive form or enthusiastic performance cannot by itself establish that a composition succeeds at its intended work.

Example εἰς σὲ τείνουσιν αὗται αἱ ὥδαί (205e). these songs bear on you.

Passages 205e; 206b

See also ᾄδω (E010); ἐγκώμιον (E073); κηλέω (E134)

ὠφελέω

*ōpheléō · verb · E266***Benefit; help; be of service to.**

At 221a a person who is hungry may be harmed or benefited. This separates appetite from its outcome: desiring is not automatically harmful. The related adjective ἀνωφελής, "of no benefit", figures in the friendship question at 210c, and the adverb ὠφελίμως, "beneficially", qualifies desire at 221b.

The passive ὠφελεῖσθαι means receive benefit; the active does not in itself specify whether the help is material, bodily, or intellectual.

Example ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ὠφελεῖσθαι (221a). it is also possible to be benefited.

Passages 210c; 221a–b

See also ὠφελία (E267); ὠφέλιμος (E268); βλάπτω (E050); ἀνωφελής (E032)

ὠφελία

*ōphelia · feminine noun · E267***Benefit; help; advantage.**

At 214e Socrates asks what benefit a like thing can give another that the latter could not give itself. At 220c–d, if nothing harmed us, the proposed remedial model would leave no need of benefit. The noun is paired with harm, not restricted to financial profit.

Burnet prints ὠφελία here; retain the edition's spelling rather than silently replacing it with the familiar alternative ὠφέλεια. The distinct noun ὄφελος appears earlier at 208e.

Example τίνα ὠφελίαν (214e). what benefit.

Passages 214e; 220c–d

See also ὠφελέω (E266); ὠφέλιμος (E268); ὄφελος (E179); βλάβη (E049)

ὠφέλιμος

ōphelimos · adjective · E268

Beneficial; helpful.

Medicine is ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἀγαθόν, beneficial and good, at 217a–b. The related adverb ὠφελίμως at 221b describes desiring beneficially, in contrast with harmfully or neither.

The adjective emphasizes the benefit produced, while χρήσιμος emphasizes service or use; they overlap without being mechanically interchangeable. Its local application should not be expanded into a claim that every possible medical intervention is good.

Example ὠφελίμως ἐπιθυμεῖν (221b). to desire beneficially.

Passages 217a–b; 221b

See also χρήσιμος (E261); ὠφελία (E267); ὠφελέω (E266); ἐπιθυμέω (E088)

Lexical index

Alphabetical by transliteration. Each line supplies the Greek headword, a short English cue, the stable entry number, and the printed page. Use the Greek lexicon itself for Greek alphabetical order.

- achrēstos · ἄχρηστος · Useless (E047, p. 25)
 adikeō · ἀδικέω · Do wrong (E007, p. 9)
 adikos · ἄδικος · Unjust (E008, p. 9)
 adynatos · ἀδύνατος · Impossible (E009, p. 9)
 agapaō · ἀγαπάω · Cherish (E002, p. 6)
 agathos · ἀγαθός · Good (E001, p. 6)
 agnoia · ἄγνοια · Ignorance (E003, p. 7)
 agnōmōn · ἀγνώμων · Without judgment (E004, p. 7)
 agōniaō · ἀγωνιάω · Be anxious or in suspense (E006, p. 8)
 agra · ἄγρα · Quarry, game (E005, p. 8)
 aidō · ἄδω · Sing (E010, p. 10)
 ainittomai · αἰνίττομαι · Speak in a riddle (E011, p. 10)
 aitia · αἰτία · Cause (E013, p. 11)
 Akadēmeia · Ἀκαδήμεια · Academy (E014, p. 12)
 akolouthēō · ἀκολουθέω · Follow (E015, p. 12)
 aleiphō · ἀλείφω · Smear (E016, p. 12)
 allēlōn · ἀλλήλων · Of one another (E017, p. 13)
 allotrios · ἀλλότριος · Another's (E018, p. 13)
 alogia · ἀλογία · Want of sense (E019, p. 13)
 amathēs · ἀμαθής · Unlearned (E020, p. 14)
 amousia · ἀμουσία · Lack of musical cultivation or skill (E021, p. 14)
 amphisbēteō · ἀμφισβητέω · Dispute a claim (E022, p. 15)
 amphoteros · ἀμφοτέρος · Both of two (E023, p. 15)
 anagignōskō · ἀναγιγνώσκω · Read (E024, p. 16)
 anankazō · ἀναγκάζω · Compel (E025, p. 16)
 anankē · ἀνάγκη · Necessity (E026, p. 16)
 anapempazomai · ἀναπεμπάζομαι · Count over (E027, p. 17)
 anepsios · ἀνεψιός · Cousin (E028, p. 17)
 anomoiōs · ἀνόμοιος · Unlike (E029, p. 18)
 anōphelēs · ἀνωφελής · Of no benefit (E032, p. 19)
 antilogikos · ἀντιλογικός · Practised in contradiction (E030, p. 18)

antiphileō · ἀντιφιλέω · Love in return (E031, p. 18)

apechthanomai · ἀπεχθάνομαι · Become hateful or objectionable to someone (E033, p. 19)

aphaireō · ἀφαιρέω · Take away (E045, p. 24)

aphrōn · ἄφρων · Without understanding (E046, p. 25)

apodytērion · ἀποδυτήριον · Changing-room (E034, p. 20)

apokrinomai · ἀποκρίνομαι · Answer (E035, p. 20)

apollymi · ἀπόλλυμι · Destroy (E036, p. 21)

apomnēmoneuō · ἀπομνημονεύω · Recall, remember accurately enough to recount (E037, p. 21)

aporia · ἀπορία · A lack of a way through (E038, p. 21)

apostereō · ἀποστερέω · Deprive (E039, p. 22)

archē · ἀρχή · Rule or authority (E041, p. 23)

archō · ἄρχω · Rule, govern, exercise control (E042, p. 23)

artiazō · ἀρτιάζω · Play odd and even (E040, p. 22)

astragalizō · ἀστραγαλίζω · Play knucklebones (E043, p. 24)

astragalos · ἀστράγαλος · Knucklebone used as a gaming piece (E044, p. 24)

basileus · βασιλεύς · King (E048, p. 26)

blabē · βλάβη · Harm (E049, p. 26)

blaptō · βλάπτω · Harm (E050, p. 26)

boulomai · βούλομαι · Want, wish (E051, p. 27)

chaunoō · χαννόω · Puff up, inflate (E257, p. 114)

chordē · χορδή · String of the lyre (E258, p. 115)

chreia · χρεία · Use (E259, p. 115)

chrēma · χρῆμα · Thing possessed (E260, p. 115)

chrēsimos · χρήσιμος · Useful (E261, p. 116)

chrōma · χρῶμα · Colour (E262, p. 116)

deinos · δεινός · Dreadful, formidable, impressively capable (E059, p. 30)

deomai · δέομαι · Be in need of (E060, p. 31)

despotēs · δεσπότης · Master (E061, p. 31)

dia · διά · Through (E062, p. 32)

dialegomai · διαλέγομαι · Converse (E064, p. 33)

dianoia · διάνοια · Thought, meaning, or intellectual content of the compositions (E065, p. 33)

diapherō · διαφέρω · Differ (E067, p. 34)

diathryptō · διαθρύπτω · Pamper, spoil through indulgence (E063, p. 32)

diatribē · διατριβή · Occupation, way of spending time (E066, p. 34)

didaskalos · διδάσκαλος · Teacher (E068, p. 34)

dikaios · δίκαιος · Just (E069, p. 35)

dipsaō · διψάω · Be thirsty (E070, p. 35)

doulos · δοῦλος · Slave (E071, p. 36)
 dysalōtos · δυσάλωτος · Hard to capture or win (E072, p. 36)
 echthra · ἔχθρα · Enmity (E107, p. 51)
 echthros · ἐχθρός · Hostile (E108, p. 52)
 eidōlon · εἶδωλον · Image (E075, p. 37)
 eidos · εἶδος · Visible figure or appearance (E074, p. 37)
 elenchō · ἐλέγχω · Refute, expose an error through questioning or argument (E076, p. 38)
 eleutheros · ἐλεύθερος · Free (E077, p. 38)
 emplēktos · ἔμπληκτος · Capricious (E078, p. 39)
 enantios · ἐναντίος · Opposite (E079, p. 39)
 endeēs · ἐνδεής · In need of (E080, p. 40)
 enkōmion · ἐγκώμιον · Song of praise (E073, p. 37)
 epaineō · ἐπαινέω · Praise (E086, p. 42)
 epanapherō · ἐπαναφέρω · Carry back or refer onward to something else (E087, p. 43)
 epikouria · ἐπικουρία · Aid (E090, p. 44)
 epistamai · ἐπίσταμαι · Know (E091, p. 45)
 epithymeō · ἐπιθυμέω · Desire (E088, p. 43)
 epithymia · ἐπιθυμία · Desire (E089, p. 44)
 epitrepō · ἐπιτρέπω · Entrust, permit (E092, p. 45)
 epos · ἔπος · Word or saying (E094, p. 46)
 eraō · ἐράω · Be in love (E096, p. 47)
 erastēs · ἐραστής · Lover (E095, p. 46)
 eristikos · ἐριστικός · Contentious, fond of disputing (E097, p. 47)
 erōmenos · ἐρώμενος · Beloved (E100, p. 48)
 erōs · ἔρως · Erotic love (E101, p. 49)
 erōtaō · ἐρωτάω · Ask (E102, p. 49)
 erythriaō · ἐρυθρίαώ · Blush (E099, p. 48)
 ēthos · ἦθος · Character (E112, p. 53)
 eudaimōn · εὐδαίμων · Happy, flourishing (E105, p. 50)
 euporeō · εὐπορέω · Have a way through (E106, p. 51)
 exagriainō · ἐξαγριαίνω · Make wild, alienate, provoke an unsociable response (E082, p. 41)
 exapataō · ἐξαπατάω · Deceive (E083, p. 41)
 exelenchō · ἐξελέγχω · Refute (E084, p. 41)
 exeuriskō · ἐξευρίσκω · Find out (E085, p. 42)
 gennaios · γενναῖος · Noble, well-born, fine (E052, p. 27)
 genos · γένος · Kind (E053, p. 28)
 gēras · γῆρας · Old age (E054, p. 28)

gignomai · γίγνομαι · Become (E055, p. 29)
 gignōskō · γινώσκω · Know (E056, p. 29)
 gnēsios · γνήσιος · Genuine (E057, p. 30)
 graphō · γράφω · Write (E058, p. 30)
 haireō · αἰρέω · Take, capture, win (E012, p. 11)
 hēdonē · ἡδονή · Pleasure (E111, p. 53)
 hēgeomai · ἡγέομαι · Think or judge (E110, p. 53)
 hēlikia · ἡλικία · Age (E113, p. 54)
 heneka · ἕνεκα · For the sake of (E081, p. 40)
 hēniochos · ἡνίοχος · Charioteer (E114, p. 54)
 hepomai · ἔπομαι · Follow (E093, p. 45)
 Hermaia · Ἑρμαῖα · Hermaea (E098, p. 47)
 hestiaō · ἐστιάω · Entertain at a meal (E103, p. 50)
 hetairos · ἐταῖρος · Companion (E104, p. 50)
 hikanos · ἱκανός · Capable, adequate (E122, p. 58)
 hikanotēs · ἱκανότης · Sufficiency (E123, p. 58)
 Hippothalēs · Ἱπποθάλης · Hippothales (E124, p. 59)
 hippotrophia · ἵπποτροφία · Horse-breeding or maintaining horses (E125, p. 59)
 homoiōs · ὅμοιος · Like (E172, p. 79)
 homologeō · ὁμολογέω · Agree (E173, p. 79)
 homologia · ὁμολογία · Agreement (E174, p. 80)
 horos · ὅρος · Boundary, standard, determining criterion (E178, p. 81)
 hygieia · ὑγίεια · Health (E232, p. 104)
 hypēkoos · ὑπήκοος · Subject to, under another's authority (E234, p. 105)
 hypobarbarizō · ὑποβαρβαρίζω · Speak somewhat foreign-sounding or imperfect Greek (E235, p. 105)
 hypopsia · ὑποψία · Suspicion (E236, p. 105)
 hythlos · ὕθλος · Idle talk (E233, p. 104)
 iatrikē · ἰατρική · Medicine (E119, p. 56)
 iatrikos · ἰατρικός · Skilled in medicine (E120, p. 57)
 iatros · ἰατρός · Doctor (E121, p. 57)
 kakos · κακός · Bad (E126, p. 59)
 kalos · καλός · Beautiful (E127, p. 60)
 kamnō · κάμνω · Be ill (E128, p. 60)
 katagelastos · καταγέλαστος · Ridiculous (E129, p. 61)
 katalogadēn · καταλογάδην · In prose (E130, p. 61)
 kēleō · κηλέω · Charm, enchant, captivate (E134, p. 63)
 kelēs · κέλης · Racehorse (E131, p. 62)

kenos · κενός · Empty (E132, p. 62)
kenōsis · κένωσις · Emptying (E133, p. 62)
koinos · κοινός · Common, shared (E135, p. 63)
kolazō · κολάζω · Discipline, check, bring someone into line (E136, p. 64)
kōneion · κώνειον · Hemlock (E141, p. 66)
kosmos · κόσμος · Ornament, distinction (E137, p. 64)
kronikos · κρονικός · Cronian (E138, p. 65)
ktaomai · κτάομαι · Acquire (E139, p. 65)
Ktēsippos · Κτήσιππος · Ctesippus (E140, p. 65)
lanthanō · λανθάνω · Escape notice (E142, p. 66)
leukos · λευκός · White (E143, p. 67)
leukotēs · λευκότης · Whiteness (E144, p. 67)
logos · λόγος · Speech (E145, p. 67)
Lykeion · Λύκειον · Lyceum (E146, p. 68)
lyra · λύρα · Lyre (E147, p. 68)
Lysis · Λύσις · Lysis (E148, p. 69)
makarios · μακάριος · Happy, blessed (E150, p. 69)
manteuomai · μαντεύομαι · Divine (E152, p. 70)
manthanō · μανθάνω · Learn (E151, p. 70)
mathētēs · μαθητής · Pupil, learner (E149, p. 69)
megalauchia · μεγαλαυχία · Boastfulness, inflated self-importance (E153, p. 71)
megalophrōn · μεγαλόφρων · Proud, thinking highly of oneself (E154, p. 71)
Menexenos · Μενέξενος · Menexenus (E156, p. 72)
metadidōmi · μεταδίδωμι · Give a share, share something with someone (E157, p. 72)
mēte agathon mēte kakon · μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν · Neither good nor bad (E158, p. 73)
methyō · μεθύω · Be drunk (E155, p. 71)
Mikkos · Μίκκος · Miccus (E159, p. 73)
miseō · μισέω · Hate (E160, p. 74)
misthos · μισθός · Wage, payment for service (E161, p. 74)
nikē · νίκη · Victory (E162, p. 74)
nosos · νόσος · Disease (E163, p. 75)
nous · νοῦς · Mind, sense, understanding (E164, p. 75)
oida · οἶδα · Know (E167, p. 76)
ōidē · ᾠδή · Song (E265, p. 118)
oikeios · οἰκεῖος · One's own (E168, p. 77)
oikonomia · οἰκονομία · Household management (E169, p. 78)
oinos · οἶνος · Wine (E170, p. 78)

okneō · ὀκνέω · Hesitate, shrink from doing something (E171, p. 78)

onar · ὄναρ · A dream (E175, p. 80)

ōpheleō · ὠφελέω · Benefit (E266, p. 118)

ōphelia · ὠφελία · Benefit (E267, p. 118)

ōphelimos · ὠφέλιμος · Beneficial (E268, p. 119)

ophelos · ὄφελος · Benefit, advantage, use obtained from something (E179, p. 82)

oreokomos · ὀρεοκόμος · Muleteer (E177, p. 81)

organon · ὄργανον · Tool, implement (E176, p. 81)

paidagōgos · παιδαγωγός · Tutor or boy-escort (E180, p. 82)

paidika · παιδικά · Darling (E181, p. 83)

paidotribēs · παιδοτρίβης · Physical trainer of boys (E182, p. 83)

pais · παῖς · Child (E183, p. 83)

palaistra · παλαίστρα · Wrestling-school (E184, p. 84)

paraskeuazō · παρασκευάζω · Prepare (E185, p. 84)

pareimi · πάρεμι · Be present (E186, p. 85)

paroimia · παροιμία · Proverb (E187, p. 85)

parousia · παρουσία · Presence (E188, p. 85)

peinaō · πεινάω · Be hungry (E189, p. 86)

peri pollou poieisthai · περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι · Set great store by (E190, p. 86)

phainomai · φαίνομαι · Appear (E237, p. 106)

pharmakon · φάρμακον · Remedy (E238, p. 106)

phaulos · φαῦλος · Paltry, poor, or inadequate (E239, p. 107)

philēkoos · φιλήκοος · Fond of hearing (E243, p. 108)

phileō · φιλέω · Love (E242, p. 108)

philetairos · φιλέταιρος · Fond of companions (E241, p. 107)

philia · φιλία · Friendship (E244, p. 109)

philippos · φίλιππος · Fond of horses (E245, p. 109)

philogymnastēs · φιλογυμναστής · Lover of exercise or athletic training (E246, p. 110)

philoinos · φίλινος · Fond of wine (E247, p. 110)

philokyōn · φιλοκύων · Fond of dogs (E248, p. 110)

philonikia · φιλονικία · Rivalry (E249, p. 111)

philortyx · φιλόρτυξ · Fond of quails (E250, p. 111)

philos · φίλος · Friend (E251, p. 111)

philosophēō · φιλοσοφέω · Love wisdom (E252, p. 112)

philosophia · φιλοσοφία · Love of wisdom (E253, p. 113)

philosophos · φιλόσοφος · Loving wisdom (E254, p. 113)

phroneō · φρονέω · Understand (E255, p. 113)

phthonos · φθόνος · Envy (E240, p. 107)
 physis · φύσις · Nature (E256, p. 114)
 plēktron · πλῆκτρον · Plectrum (E191, p. 87)
 plērēs · πλήρης · Full (E192, p. 87)
 plērōsis · πλήρωσις · Filling (E193, p. 87)
 ploutos · πλοῦτος · Wealth (E194, p. 88)
 poiēma · ποίημα · Poem (E195, p. 88)
 poiēsis · ποίησις · Poetry or poetic composition (E196, p. 89)
 poiētēs · ποιητής · Poet (E197, p. 89)
 polemios · πολέμιος · Hostile (E198, p. 90)
 ponēros · πονηρός · Wicked (E199, p. 90)
 progonos · πρόγονος · Ancestor (E200, p. 90)
 prosphilēs · προσφιλής · Welcome, dear, favorably received (E202, p. 91)
 prospoiētos · προσποιητός · Pretended (E201, p. 91)
 protimaō · προτιμάω · Value before or above something else (E203, p. 92)
 prōton philon · πρῶτον φίλον · First friend (E204, p. 92)
 psimythion · ψιμύθιον · White lead, used here as a white coating (E263, p. 117)
 psychē · ψυχή · Soul (E264, p. 117)
 rhēma · ῥῆμα · Word (E205, p. 93)
 sēmainō · σημαίνω · Indicate (E206, p. 93)
 skepsis · σκέψις · Examination (E209, p. 94)
 skeptomai · σκέπτομαι · Consider (E207, p. 94)
 skeuasia · σκευασία · Preparation (E208, p. 94)
 skopeō · σκοπέω · Look at closely (E210, p. 95)
 Sōkratēs · Σωκράτης · Socrates (E222, p. 100)
 sōma · σῶμα · Body (E223, p. 100)
 sophia · σοφία · Wisdom (E211, p. 95)
 sophistēs · σοφιστής · Sophist (E212, p. 96)
 sophos · σοφός · Wise (E213, p. 96)
 sōphrōn · σώφρων · Temperate (E224, p. 101)
 spoudē · σπουδή · Earnest concern (E214, p. 96)
 synchōreō · συγχωρέω · Grant (E217, p. 98)
 synēthēs · συνήθης · Familiar with, on accustomed terms with (E218, p. 98)
 syngeneia · συγγένεια · Family relationship, relationship by descent (E215, p. 97)
 syngramma · σύγγραμμα · Written composition (E216, p. 97)
 syniēmi · συνίημι · Understand (E219, p. 99)
 synousia · συνουσία · Being together (E220, p. 99)

systellō · συστέλλω · Draw together, reduce, take down (E221, p. 99)
talasiourgia · ταλασιουργία · Wool-working (E225, p. 101)
tapeinoō · ταπεινών · Humble, lower someone's self-estimation (E226, p. 101)
teleutaō · τελευτάω · End (E228, p. 102)
tethrippos · τέθριππος · With four horses (E227, p. 102)
therapeuō · θεραπεύω · Tend, attend to, care for (E115, p. 55)
thēreutēs · θηρευτής · Hunter (E116, p. 55)
thorybeō · θορυβέω · Disturb, throw into confusion (E117, p. 56)
thrix · θρίξ · Hair (E118, p. 56)
trophē · τροφή · Food (E230, p. 103)
tropos · τρόπος · Way (E229, p. 103)
typtō · τύπτω · Strike, beat (E231, p. 103)
xanthos · ξανθός · Fair (E165, p. 76)
xenismos · ξενισμός · Receiving or entertaining a guest (E166, p. 76)
zēteō · ζητέω · Seek (E109, p. 52)

Passage index

Stephanus pages and sections, not the pages of this lexicon. An entry is listed under the sections explicitly cited in its passage list. Broad reference ranges may concern an argument's context rather than an occurrence of the headword in every section.

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203a Ἀκαδήμεια (E014, p. 12); Ἴπποθάλης (E124, p. 59); Κτήσιππος (E140, p. 65); Λύκειον (E146, p. 68); Σωκράτης (E222, p. 100)

203b Ἀκαδήμεια (E014, p. 12); Λύκειον (E146, p. 68); Σωκράτης (E222, p. 100)

204

204a διατριβή (E066, p. 34); ἔπομαι (E093, p. 45); ἐταῖρος (E104, p. 50); ἱκανός (E122, p. 58); λόγος (E145, p. 67); μεταδίδωμι (E157, p. 72); Μίκκος (E159, p. 73); παλαίστρα (E184, p. 84); σοφιστής (E212, p. 96); φαῦλος (E239, p. 107)

204b ἄχρηστος (E047, p. 25); ἐράω (E096, p. 47); ἐρυθρίαω (E099, p. 48); ἐρώμενος (E100, p. 48); ἔρω (E101, p. 49); Ἴπποθάλης (E124, p. 59); καλός (E127, p. 60); οἶδα (E167, p. 76); Σωκράτης (E222, p. 100); φαῦλος (E239, p. 107)

204c ἄχρηστος (E047, p. 25); γινώσκω (E056, p. 29); ἐράω (E096, p. 47); ἐρυθρίαω (E099, p. 48); ἐρώμενος (E100, p. 48); ἔρω (E101, p. 49); Ἴπποθάλης (E124, p. 59); Κτήσιππος (E140, p. 65); ὀκνέω (E171, p. 78); Σωκράτης (E222, p. 100)

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204e γενναῖος (E052, p. 27); γινώσκω (E056, p. 29); εἶδος (E074, p. 37); ἐπίσταμαι (E091, p. 45); ἐραστής (E095, p. 46); ἔρω (E101, p. 49); ἱκανός (E122, p. 58); Ἴπποθάλης (E124, p. 59); Κτήσιππος (E140, p. 65); Λύσις (E148, p. 69)

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205a δέομαι (E060, p. 31); ἐπίσταμαι (E091, p. 45); ἐραστής (E095, p. 46); ἐράω (E096, p. 47); ἔρω (E101, p. 49); Ἴπποθάλης (E124, p. 59); Κτήσιππος (E140, p. 65); λόγος (E145, p. 67); οἶδα (E167, p. 76); παιδικά (E181, p. 83); σύγγραμμα (E216, p. 97)

205b δέομαι (E060, p. 31); διάνοια (E065, p. 33); ἐπίσταμαι (E091, p. 45); ἐραστής (E095, p. 46); Ἴπποθάλης (E124, p. 59); καταγέλαστος (E129, p. 61); Κτήσιππος (E140, p. 65); λόγος (E145, p. 67); νοῦς (E164, p. 75); οἶδα (E167, p. 76); παιδικά (E181, p. 83)

205c ᾄδω (E010, p. 10); ἐραστής (E095, p. 46); Ἴπποθάλης (E124, p. 59); ἵπποτροφία (E125, p. 59); καταγέλαστος (E129, p. 61); κέλῃς (E131, p. 62); κρονικός (E138, p. 65); Κτήσιππος (E140, p. 65); λόγος (E145, p. 67); νίκη (E162, p. 74); νοῦς (E164, p. 75); ξενισμός (E166, p. 76); παιδικά (E181, p. 83);

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205e ἄδω (E010, p. 10); αἰρέω (E012, p. 11); ἐγκώμιον (E073, p. 37); Ἴπποθάλῃς (E124, p. 59); καταγέλαστος (E129, p. 61); κόσμος (E137, p. 64); λόγος (E145, p. 67); νίκη (E162, p. 74); παιδικά (E181, p. 83); ὥδῃ (E265, p. 118)

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206a ἄγρα (E005, p. 8); αἰρέω (E012, p. 11); δυσάλωτος (E072, p. 36); ἐπαινέω (E086, p. 42); ἐρώμενος (E100, p. 48); θηρευτής (E116, p. 55); Ἴπποθάλῃς (E124, p. 59); καλός (E127, p. 60); λόγος (E145, p. 67); μεγαλαυχία (E153, p. 71); παιδικά (E181, p. 83); σοφός (E213, p. 96); φίλος (E251, p. 111)

206b ἀλογία (E019, p. 13); ἀμουσία (E021, p. 14); βλάπτω (E050, p. 26); ἐξαγριαίνω (E082, p. 41); Ἴπποθάλῃς (E124, p. 59); κηλέω (E134, p. 63); λόγος (E145, p. 67); παιδικά (E181, p. 83); ποίησις (E196, p. 89); ποιητής (E197, p. 89); σκοπέω (E210, p. 95); φαῦλος (E239, p. 107); ὥδῃ (E265, p. 118)

206c ἄδω (E010, p. 10); διαλέγομαι (E064, p. 33); Ἴπποθάλῃς (E124, p. 59); λόγος (E145, p. 67); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); παιδικά (E181, p. 83); προσφιλής (E202, p. 91); φιλήκοος (E243, p. 108)

206d ἀνεψιός (E028, p. 17); Ἑρμαῖα (E098, p. 47); ἐταῖρος (E104, p. 50); Κτήσιππος (E140, p. 65); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); παῖς (E183, p. 83); παλαίστρα (E184, p. 84); συνήθης (E218, p. 98); φιλήκοος (E243, p. 108)

206e ἀποδυτήριον (E034, p. 20); ἀρτιάζω (E040, p. 22); ἀστραγαλίζω (E043, p. 24); ἀστράγαλος (E044, p. 24); κόσμος (E137, p. 64); Κτήσιππος (E140, p. 65); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); παλαίστρα (E184, p. 84)

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207a ἀπορία (E038, p. 21); διαλέγομαι (E064, p. 33); ἐπιθυμέω (E088, p. 43); καλός (E127, p. 60); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); ὀκνέω (E171, p. 78)

207b ἀπεχθάνομαι (E033, p. 19); ἔπομαι (E093, p. 45); Ἴπποθάλῃς (E124, p. 59); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); παῖς (E183, p. 83)

207c ἀμφισβητέω (E022, p. 15); γενναῖος (E052, p. 27); κοινός (E135, p. 63); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); παῖς (E183, p. 83); πλοῦτος (E194, p. 88); φιλία (E244, p. 109)

207d βούλομαι (E051, p. 27); δίκαιος (E069, p. 35); εὐδαίμων (E105, p. 50); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); παιδοτρίβης (E182, p. 83); φιλέω (E242, p. 108)

207e βούλομαι (E051, p. 27); ἐπιθυμέω (E088, p. 43); εὐδαίμων (E105, p. 50); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); μακάριος (E150, p. 69)

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208a βούλομαι (E051, p. 27); ἐπιθυμέω (E088, p. 43); ἐπιτρέπω (E092, p. 45); ἡνίοχος (E114, p. 54); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); μακάριος (E150, p. 69); μισθός (E161, p. 74)

208b ἄρχω (E042, p. 23); βούλομαι (E051, p. 27); δοῦλος (E071, p. 36); ἐλεύθερος (E077, p. 38); ἐπιθυμέω (E088, p. 43); ἐπιτρέπω (E092, p. 45); ἡγέομαι (E110, p. 53); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); ὀρεοκόμος (E177, p. 81); τύπτω (E231, p. 103)

208c ἄρχω (E042, p. 23); βούλομαι (E051, p. 27); δεινός (E059, p. 30); διδάσκαλος (E068, p. 34); δοῦλος (E071, p. 36); ἐλεύθερος (E077, p. 38); ἐπιθυμέω (E088, p. 43); ἐπιτρέπω (E092, p. 45); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); παιδαγωγός (E180, p. 82)

208d ἄρχω (E042, p. 23); βούλομαι (E051, p. 27); δεσπότης (E061, p. 31); διδάσκαλος (E068, p. 34); ἐπιθυμέω (E088, p. 43); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); μακάριος (E150, p. 69); ὄργανον (E176, p. 81); παιδαγωγός (E180, p. 82); ταλασιουργία (E225, p. 101)

208e ἄρχω (E042, p. 23); βούλομαι (E051, p. 27); ἐπιθυμέω (E088, p. 43); εὐδαίμων (E105, p. 50); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); ὄφελος (E179, p. 82); σῶμα (E223, p. 100); τύπτω (E231, p. 103); χρῆμα (E260, p. 115)

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209a ἀναγινώσκω (E024, p. 16); ἄρχω (E042, p. 23); γενναῖος (E052, p. 27); γράφω (E058, p. 30); ἐπιθυμέω (E088, p. 43); ἐπίσταμαι (E091, p. 45); ἐπιτρέπω (E092, p. 45); ἡλικία (E113, p. 54); θεραπεύω (E115, p. 55); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); παῖς (E183, p. 83); σῶμα (E223, p. 100)

209b αἰτία (E013, p. 11); ἀναγινώσκω (E024, p. 16); βούλομαι (E051, p. 27); γράφω (E058, p. 30); ἐπίσταμαι (E091, p. 45); ἐπιτρέπω (E092, p. 45); λύρα (E147, p. 68); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); πλῆκτρον (E191, p. 87); χορδή (E258, p. 115)

209c αἰτία (E013, p. 11); ἐπίσταμαι (E091, p. 45); ἐπιτρέπω (E092, p. 45); ἡγέομαι (E110, p. 53); ἡλικία (E113, p. 54); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); ὄρος (E178, p. 81); φρονέω (E255, p. 113)

209d ἀρχή (E041, p. 23); βασιλεύς (E048, p. 26); ἐπιτρέπω (E092, p. 45); ἡγέομαι (E110, p. 53); ἱκανός (E122, p. 58); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); οἰκονομία (E169, p. 78); φρονέω (E255, p. 113)

209e βασιλεύς (E048, p. 26); ἐπιτρέπω (E092, p. 45); ἡγέομαι (E110, p. 53); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); σκευασία (E208, p. 94); φρονέω (E255, p. 113)

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210a βασιλεύς (E048, p. 26); ἐπίσταμαι (E091, p. 45); ἐπιτρέπω (E092, p. 45); ἡγέομαι (E110, p. 53); ἱατρικός (E120, p. 57); ἱατρός (E121, p. 57); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); φρονέω (E255, p. 113)

210b ἀλλότριος (E018, p. 13); ἄρχω (E042, p. 23); βούλομαι (E051, p. 27); ἐλεύθερος (E077, p. 38); ἐπιτρέπω (E092, p. 45); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); νοῦς (E164, p. 75); οἰκεῖος (E168, p. 77); φρονέω (E255, p. 113)

210c ἀγαθός (E001, p. 6); ἀλλότριος (E018, p. 13); ἀνωφελής (E032, p. 19); ἄχρηστος (E047, p. 25); ἐπιτρέπω (E092, p. 45); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); οἰκεῖος (E168, p. 77); συγχωρέω (E217, p. 98); ὑπήκοος (E234, p. 105); φρονέω (E255, p. 113); χρήσιμος (E261, p. 116); ὠφελέω (E266, p. 118)

210d ἀγαθός (E001, p. 6); ἄφρων (E046, p. 25); δέομαι (E060, p. 31); διδάσκαλος (E068, p. 34); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); μεγάλωφρων (E154, p. 71); οἰκεῖος (E168, p. 77); σοφός (E213, p. 96); φρονέω (E255, p. 113); χρήσιμος (E261, p. 116)

210e ἀγωνιάω (E006, p. 8); διαθρύπτω (E063, p. 32); διαλέγομαι (E064, p. 33); θορυβέω (E117, p. 56); Ἱπποθάλης (E124, p. 59); λανθάνω (E142, p. 66); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); παιδικά (E181, p. 83); συστέλλω (E221, p. 99); ταπεινός (E226, p. 101); χαυνός (E257, p. 114)

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211a ἀπομνημονεύω (E037, p. 21); διαλέγομαι (E064, p. 33); νοῦς (E164, p. 75)

211b ἀπομνημονεύω (E037, p. 21); διαλέγομαι (E064, p. 33); ἐλέγχω (E076, p. 38); ἐριστικός (E097, p. 47); Κτήσιππος (E140, p. 65); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72)

211c δεινός (E059, p. 30); διαλέγομαι (E064, p. 33); ἐστιάω (E103, p. 50); καταγέλαστος (E129, p. 61); κολάζω (E136, p. 64); Κτήσιππος (E140, p. 65); μαθητής (E149, p. 69); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72)

211d ἐπιθυμέω (E088, p. 43); ἐρωτάω (E102, p. 49); ἐστιάω (E103, p. 50); κτάομαι (E139, p. 65); μανθάνω (E151, p. 70); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); μεταδίδωμι (E157, p. 72); οἶδα (E167, p. 76); Σωκράτης (E222, p. 100)

211e ἐπιθυμέω (E088, p. 43); ἔρω (E101, p. 49); ἐταῖρος (E104, p. 50); κτάομαι (E139, p. 65); Σωκράτης (E222, p. 100); φιλέταιρος (E241, p. 107)

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212a γίγνομαι (E055, p. 29); διαφέρω (E067, p. 34); κτάομαι (E139, p. 65); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); οἶδα (E167, p. 76); Σωκράτης (E222, p. 100); τρόπος (E229, p. 103); φιλέω (E242, p. 108); φίλος (E251, p. 111)

212b ἀλλήλων (E017, p. 13); ἀμφοτέρω (E023, p. 15); ἀντιφιλέω (E031, p. 18); γίγνομαι (E055, p. 29); διαφέρω (E067, p. 34); ἐραστής (E095, p. 46); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); μισέω (E160, p. 74); παιδικά (E181, p. 83); φιλέω (E242, p. 108); φίλος (E251, p. 111)

212c ἀλλήλων (E017, p. 13); ἀμφοτέρω (E023, p. 15); ἀντιφιλέω (E031, p. 18); ἐραστής (E095, p. 46); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); μισέω (E160, p. 74); παιδικά (E181, p. 83); φιλέω (E242, p. 108); φίλος (E251, p. 111)

212d ἀμφοτέρω (E023, p. 15); ἀντιφιλέω (E031, p. 18); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); ποιητής (E197, p. 89); σοφία (E211, p. 95); φιλέω (E242, p. 108); φίλιππος (E245, p. 109); φιλογυμναστής (E246, p. 110); φίλοινο (E247, p. 110); φιλοκύν (E248, p. 110); φιλόρτυξ (E250, p. 111); φίλος (E251, p. 111); φιλόσοφος (E254, p. 113)

212e κολάζω (E136, p. 64); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); παῖς (E183, p. 83); ποιητής (E197, p. 89); φιλέω (E242, p. 108); φιλοκύν (E248, p. 110); φίλος (E251, p. 111)

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213a ἀντιφιλέω (E031, p. 18); ἐχθρός (E108, p. 52); κολάζω (E136, p. 64); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); μισέω (E160, p. 74); παῖς (E183, p. 83); φαίνομαι (E237, p. 106); φιλέω (E242, p. 108); φίλος (E251, p. 111)

213b ἀδύνατος (E009, p. 9); ἀλογία (E019, p. 13); ἀνάγκη (E026, p. 16); ἀντιφιλέω (E031, p. 18); ἐταῖρος (E104, p. 50); ἐχθρός (E108, p. 52); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); μισέω (E160, p. 74); ὁμολογέω (E173, p. 79); φιλέω (E242, p. 108); φίλος (E251, p. 111)

213c ἀντιφιλέω (E031, p. 18); ἀπορία (E038, p. 21); εὐπορέω (E106, p. 51); ἐχθρός (E108, p. 52); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); μισέω (E160, p. 74); φιλέω (E242, p. 108); φίλος (E251, p. 111)

213d ἐρυθρία (E099, p. 48); ζητέω (E109, p. 52); Λύσις (E148, p. 69); Μενέξενος (E156, p. 72); νοῦς (E164, p. 75); φιλοσοφία (E253, p. 113)

213e ζητέω (E109, p. 52); ποιητής (E197, p. 89); σκέψις (E209, p. 94); σκοπέω (E210, p. 95)

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214a ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79); ποιητής (E197, p. 89); σκοπέω (E210, p. 95); σοφία (E211, p. 95)

214b ἀνάγκη (E026, p. 16); διαλέγομαι (E064, p. 33); ἔπος (E094, p. 46); ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79); πονηρός (E199, p. 90); σοφός (E213, p. 96); σύγγραμμα (E216, p. 97); συνήμι (E219, p. 99); φύσις (E256, p. 114)

214c ἀγαθός (E001, p. 6); ἀδικέω (E007, p. 9); ἀδύνατος (E009, p. 9); ἀλλήλων (E017, p. 13); ἀνόμοιος (E029, p. 18); ἔμπληκτος (E078, p. 39); ἐχθρός (E108, p. 52); κακός (E126, p. 59); ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79); πονηρός (E199, p. 90)

214d ἀγαθός (E001, p. 6); αἰνίττομαι (E011, p. 10); ἀνόμοιος (E029, p. 18); ἔμπληκτος (E078, p. 39); κακός (E126, p. 59); ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79); σημαίνω (E206, p. 93); φιλία (E244, p. 109)

214e ἀγαθός (E001, p. 6); ἀγαπάω (E002, p. 6); βλάβη (E049, p. 26); βλάπτω (E050, p. 26); ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79); σημαίνω (E206, p. 93); ὑποψία (E236, p. 105); χρήσιμος (E261, p. 116); ὠφελία (E267, p. 118)

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215a ἀγαθός (E001, p. 6); ἀγαπάω (E002, p. 6); ἀλλήλων (E017, p. 13); δέομαι (E060, p. 31); ἐπικουρία (E090, p. 44); ἱκανός (E122, p. 58); ἱκανότης (E123, p. 58); ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79); φιλέω (E242, p. 108); χρήσιμος (E261, p. 116)

215b ἀγαθός (E001, p. 6); ἀγαπάω (E002, p. 6); ἀλλήλων (E017, p. 13); δέομαι (E060, p. 31); ἱκανός (E122, p. 58); ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79); περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι (E190, p. 86); φιλέω (E242, p. 108); χρεία (E259, p. 115)

215c ἀγαθός (E001, p. 6); ἀλλήλων (E017, p. 13); ἐξαπατάω (E083, p. 41); ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79); περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι (E190, p. 86); πολέμιος (E198, p. 90)

215d ἀγαπάω (E002, p. 6); ἀναγκάζω (E025, p. 16); ἀνόμοιος (E029, p. 18); ἔνεκα (E081, p. 40); ἐπικουρία (E090, p. 44); ἔχθρα (E107, p. 51); ἱατρός (E121, p. 57); κάμνω (E128, p. 60); οἶδα (E167, p. 76); ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79); φθόνος (E240, p. 107); φιλία (E244, p. 109); φιλονικία (E249, p. 111)

215e ἀνόμοιος (E029, p. 18); ἐναντίος (E079, p. 39); ἐπιθυμέω (E088, p. 43); κενός (E132, p. 62); κένωσις (E133, p. 62); ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79); πλήρης (E192, p. 87); πλήρωσις (E193, p. 87); τροφή (E230, p. 103)

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216a ἀνόμοιος (E029, p. 18); ἀντιλογικός (E030, p. 18); ἀποκρίνομαι (E035, p. 20); ἐναντίος (E079, p. 39); ἐταῖρος (E104, p. 50); ἔχθρα (E107, p. 51); ἐχθρός (E108, p. 52); ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79)

216b ἄδικος (E008, p. 9); ἀνάγκη (E026, p. 16); ἀνόμοιος (E029, p. 18); ἀντιλογικός (E030, p. 18); ἀποκρίνομαι (E035, p. 20); δίκαιος (E069, p. 35); ἐναντίος (E079, p. 39); ἔχθρα (E107, p. 51); ἐχθρός (E108, p. 52); ὅμοιος (E172, p. 79); ὁμολογέω (E173, p. 79); σώφρων (E224, p. 101)

216c ἀπορία (E038, p. 21); καλός (E127, p. 60); λανθάνω (E142, p. 66); λόγος (E145, p. 67); μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν (E158, p. 73); οἶδα (E167, p. 76); παροιμία (E187, p. 85); σκέπτομαι (E207, p. 94); φίλος (E251, p. 111)

216d ἀγαθός (E001, p. 6); γένος (E053, p. 28); καλός (E127, p. 60); μαντεύομαι (E152, p. 70); μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν (E158, p. 73); φίλος (E251, p. 111)

216e ἀγαθός (E001, p. 6); μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν (E158, p. 73); φίλος (E251, p. 111)

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πονηρός (E199, p. 90); σῶφρων (E224, p. 101); φαῦλος (E239, p. 107); φιλοσοφέω (E252, p. 112)

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Source and textual notes

Base edition: Plato, *Lysis*, Greek text of John Burnet, Oxford 1903, second impression corrected January 1909, with English translation and notes by Diotimos Editions, 2026. The supplied edition covers the complete dialogue, 203a–223b. This companion follows that edition’s adopted Greek and uses its English and notes to identify the local argument and textual decisions.

The short English glosses attached to Greek examples explain the cited wording; they are not presented as verbatim quotations of the edition’s translation. Dictionary headwords normalize inflections, while quoted examples preserve the source’s words. Line breaks and line-end word divisions are removed for continuous reading. References are to Stephanus pages and sections.

Burnet’s square brackets mark words deleted from his adopted text; angle brackets mark supplied words. Apparatus alternatives are not silently treated as running text. Particularly consequential examples include εὐπορῶ at 213c, the active hatred wording at 213a–c, the description of ignorance at 218a–b, the supplied words in 219a–b, and μεθύομεν at 222c. Entries discuss relevant differences locally.

The interpretative restraint of the lexicon is deliberate: the final account of affinity remains exposed to objections, the first friend is not securely identified with a named ultimate object, and the characters’ failure to define friendship is not a denial of their actual attachment. The dramatic scenes belong to the evidence for reading the words.

The text and apparatus used here are those supplied in the edition. This companion is not a new critical edition or an independent collation of manuscripts.

Lexical reference aids

Liddell Scott Jones Greek English Lexicon via the Perseus Scaife Atlas

Perseus *Lysis* Greek vocabulary listing

Lexical aids support the normalization of difficult headwords. The supplied running Greek remains the authority for quotation and passage location; automatically generated vocabulary analyses are not treated as a substitute for checking an entry.