Plato Charmides Lexicon

A Philological and Philosophical Reading Companion

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Introduction

Scope and purpose

This lexicon accompanies the complete *Charmides*, 153a–176d, in the supplied *Charmides Edition 2*: John Burnet's Greek text, identified there as the Oxford edition of 1903 in its corrected 1909 impression, with the English translation and notes of Diotimos Editions, 2026. Its 173 articles explain the dialogue's substantive vocabulary, distinctions, images, persons and argumentative moves. It is meant to be used beside the dialogue, whether the reader begins with Greek or English.

The controlling question is what *sōphrosynē* is. The supplied translation consistently calls it **temperance**. The English word keeps the successive proposals attached to one subject, but it does not carry the Greek word's full range: sound judgement, restraint, self-command, moderation, decorum and awareness of one's limits can all matter. Neither a modern rule about alcohol nor a ready-made theory of rational self-control should be substituted for the virtue under investigation. The dialogue tests proposed accounts, often changing their formulation as it goes; it does not finish by certifying a definition.

A useful lexicon must therefore explain more than a word's usual translation. It must show who uses it, in which construction, for what purpose, under which concession, and with what result. The adjective *kalos* connects physical beauty, admirable conduct and a premise in a refutation. *Prattein* can concern action, one's affairs or faring well. Knowledge of a subject, knowledge that someone knows, knowledge of other kinds of

knowledge, and knowledge that relates to itself are different claims. The articles make these transitions visible rather than presenting a glossary of interchangeable English equivalents.

This is a comprehensive reading and philological lexicon, not a token-by-token morphological concordance or a new critical edition. Distinctive minor words receive attention when they alter the scene, argument, translation or tone. Ordinary repetitions and every case form do not become separate articles. Modern analytical headings are used as finding aids and identified as such; they are not passed off as expressions coined by Plato. The supplementary indexes let the reader move from an original form, an English label, a passage or a theme to the relevant explanation.

How to use an article

Each article follows the series' five-part structure.

The word explains the lexical family and the distinctions needed to read the passages. Greek forms are supplied with readable transliterations. Inflected forms are sometimes retained because they are the forms actually encountered. Printed contextual grave accents and additional accents before enclitics are retained where relevant rather than silently regularized into dictionary citation forms. A dictionary form supplied for orientation is distinguished where it differs from the attested expression. Transliteration helps identification; it is not a pronunciation course or a substitute for the Greek accents and breathings.

In the Charmides follows the term through the dramatic and philosophical work it performs. A character's assertion is attributed to that character. A

conditional assumption remains conditional. Cross-dialogue parallels illuminate a local question without making the *Republic*, *Phaedrus* or *Apology* an unspoken supplement to what the *Charmides* establishes.

The places gives annotated Stephanus references. The annotations explain the contribution of each passage, rather than supplying a string of unexplained numbers. These are selected places within comprehensive coverage: an article need not list every ordinary repetition of its word. References to the apparatus or modern editorial matter are marked as such.

In this edition identifies the supplied translation's choices and relevant textual or interpretive qualifications. The Greek text, an apparatus variant, an English expansion and a modern explanatory note are different sorts of evidence. The lexicon does not make an apparatus reading part of Plato's continuous text merely because the edition prints it at the foot of a page.

See also joins related articles, including contrasts. A link between modesty and temperance does not endorse their identification; a link between medicine and knowledge does not imply that medical expertise answers every question about benefit. Supplementary documentation appears as true footnotes in Word and the PDF, and linked notes in the EPUB and Markdown.

The original-forms and English-aliases index provides lexical access. Within it, a Greek vocabulary register gives 568 individually explained lemma, family and phrase records, each with printed forms and passage references. These records make the smaller lexical details directly accessible alongside the 173 five-part articles. The register distinguishes dictionary headwords from their actual inflected attestations; its record count is not a claim that

each label is a different dictionary lemma. Additional brief reading glosses retain useful forms beyond that register. The passage index traverses all 118 extant Stephanus letter sections from 153a to 176d; there is no section 153e. The thematic index offers overlapping routes through ethics, inquiry, drama, history, language and the arts. The contents and indexes in the paginated versions give this lexicon's article-opening pages. Those page numbers are different from Stephanus references, which identify Plato's text across editions.

Coverage and its limits

The vocabulary audit traversed all 8,322 Greek tokens in the dialogue, comprising 2,134 observed written forms. Of these forms, 1,229 have explicit lexical attestations in the articles or vocabulary material, 505 are assigned to explained inflectional or lexical families, and 400 are routine grammatical or deictic forms for which separate entries would add no distinctive local explanation. Argumentatively important particles, pronouns, constructions and small verbs are retained where they matter. No observed form remains without a recorded disposition in that audit. These are coverage-accounting categories, not a claim that every inflection receives an independent definition or that a dictionary can remove all interpretive uncertainty.

All 568 records in the Greek register contain local explanations; none is merely a direction to another heading. Some original labels identify an inflection, a phrase variant or a grouped family rather than a distinct lemma, and the lexical identification and notes make that status explicit. Further brief entries supplement this register with additional words, senses and contexts. Identical explanations are consolidated only where the

Greek form, references and relevant contextual links are also covered. The full articles carry the sustained interpretations; the compact entries preserve vocabulary that would otherwise be easy to overlook.

The conversation and its readers

Socrates narrates a visit to the palaestra of Taureas after returning from the campaign at Potidaea. He reports the conversation to an unnamed listener. Chaerephon welcomes him; Critias introduces his young relative and ward Charmides; Socrates first questions the boy and then the guardian. Narration matters: Socrates tells us how he felt, what he inferred about other people and how their behaviour appeared to him. Those narrative judgements should not be turned into a neutral transcript of everyone's intentions.

The opening joins war, admiration, erotic disturbance, physical illness and the proposed care of the soul. Socrates admits that Charmides' appearance unsettles him. The remedy for the headache brings in a charm, attributed to a Thracian physician of Zalmoxis, and the claim that beautiful words produce temperance in the soul. The treatment is presented through nested reported speech and a medical pretence arranged by Critias. It is philosophically important without being a clinical recommendation or a historical record of Socrates' medical training.

The ending returns to the charm but leaves the headache behind. Charmides wants continuing contact with Socrates; Critias orders it; the language of persuasion and obedience ends in playful threats of force. The invitation to keep examining oneself is thus entangled with authority, dependence and coercion. A reading that notices only the inconclusive definition misses this

dramatic outcome. A reading that treats the final joke as a transparent prophecy also exceeds what the dialogue says.

External history adds a disturbing perspective. Critias later became a leader of the Thirty; Charmides was among the Ten governing the Piraeus. Xenophon reports their deaths in the fighting at Munychia in 403 BCE. They were not holders of the same office. The dialogue never recounts this later history, and its historical resonances remain a matter of interpretation. Even the dramatic date of the homecoming from Potidaea requires care: the campaign's different stages make the familiar alternatives of 432 and 429 BCE more than a trivial choice of year. The relevant articles separate the text's evidence from reconstruction.[1]

A map of the argument

153a–154e — Arrival and the object of attention. News of war gives way to questions about philosophy, wisdom and beauty. The crowd's response to Charmides establishes an atmosphere in which reputation is powerful before anyone has examined what the boy possesses.

154e–158c — Soul, body and the charm. Socrates redirects the proposed inspection of the body towards an examination of the soul. The physician's story connects the health of parts with the condition of the whole; temperance is said to arise through beautiful words.

[1] Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.4.19 names Critias among the Thirty and Charmides son of Glaucon among the Ten in the Piraeus. Plato, *Symposium* 219e–220e supplies related testimony about Socrates at Potidaea; Thucydides 1.56–66 and 2.70 distinguish the revolt and surrender. These sources should not be collapsed into a single unqualified dramatic date.

Praise of Charmides' family intensifies the question of whether his inner condition matches his appearance.

158c–159a — From possession to an account. Charmides cannot easily affirm his temperance without boasting or deny it without contradicting his admirers. Socrates proposes inquiry. Possession of the virtue is said to produce some awareness and opinion that the Greek-speaking boy can express. This is an assumption governing the proposed test, not yet a demonstrated equivalence between possessing virtue and being able to define it.

159b–160d — Quietness tested. Charmides associates temperance with orderly, quiet behaviour. Socrates introduces examples in which speed and vigour are fine, while temperance has been agreed to be fine. The movement from calm bearing to slowness deserves scrutiny. The conclusion denies quietness a privileged claim to identify temperance; it does not establish haste as the virtue.

160e–161b — Modesty tested. The next answer identifies temperance with shame or modesty. An adapted Homeric line about the needy supplies a case where modesty is not good. Because temperance has been agreed to be good, the proposed identity fails on the argument's terms. This does not show that shame is worthless in every setting.

161b–162e — One's own business and a change of speaker. Charmides offers a saying he has heard. Socrates tests literal applications to writing names and producing one's own equipment. The examples expose the need to say what counts as one's own and what "doing" means. Charmides draws Critias into defending the saying; the

definition has become a test of its reputed author as well as of its content.

163a–164d — Doing, making, working and awareness. Critias differentiates the verbs and interprets Hesiod so that good, beneficial productions count as work and action properly so called. Temperance becomes doing good things. Socrates asks whether someone can act beneficially without knowing that he has done so. Critias will not admit temperance without self-knowledge, and retracts rather than accepting that consequence.

164d–166c — Self-knowledge and the craft analogy. Critias interprets the Delphic command “Know thyself” as the god’s greeting and as equivalent to being temperate. Socrates asks what the proposed knowledge produces. Critias replies that some kinds of knowledge, such as calculation and geometry, have no external product of the kind a builder makes. Socrates accordingly distinguishes a knowledge’s subject matter from a separately produced work. A question about an object is not simply a repeated demand for a product.

166c–167b — Knowledge of knowledge and two tests. Critias identifies temperance as knowledge of other kinds of knowledge and of itself. Socrates adds lack of knowledge and articulates the ambitious ability to assess oneself and others. Two questions follow: whether such knowledge is possible, and, even if possible, whether it benefits its possessor. The transition from knowing oneself to a knowledge that knows itself is a central issue, not a harmless change of wording.

167c–169c — Self-relation examined. Sight, hearing, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion supply analogies; greater and smaller, double and half, and other relative terms expose difficulties. Some self-relations appear

impossible, others disputable. Socrates expressly leaves the general question open and declines to settle the case of knowledge. These passages do not warrant the blanket conclusion that Plato has proved all self-reference impossible.

169d–171c — A concession and the limit of discrimination. The existence of knowledge of knowledge is granted for the inquiry. But being able to recognize knowledge as knowledge is distinguished from knowing its particular subject. The person who knows only knowledge cannot, on the stated account, test a medical claim by discussing health and disease. Testing what a doctor says and does requires the relevant expertise. This criticizes the proposed all-purpose discriminator; it does not refute every ordinary capacity to recognize an expert.

171d–172c — The attractive political picture and a smaller benefit. Socrates reconstructs the hoped-for life without error, in which agents do what they know and entrust the rest to those who know. He then asks whether a more modest benefit remains: easier learning, clearer understanding and better examination within subjects already learned. This possibility is entertained, not elaborated into an agreed final theory. It must not disappear from a summary that jumps directly from failure to worthlessness.

172c–174d — The dream and the question of which knowledge. The inquiry grants the stronger capacity again and imagines reliable experts in navigation, medicine, war, manufacture and prophecy. Even knowledgeable action does not by itself settle happiness. The question becomes which knowledge makes the difference. Critias names knowledge of good and bad. Ordinary crafts retain their characteristic outputs without

it, while the contribution described as doing well and beneficially is withdrawn. Craft success and overall benefit are thereby distinguished.

174d–175e — Supervision challenged and failure acknowledged. Critias tries to save temperance through its authority over the knowledge of good. Socrates asks how a knowledge restricted to knowledge can perform another expertise's beneficial work. The account fails to secure the benefit demanded of temperance. The review of concessions at 175b–d is deliberately severe; it does not amount to a final demonstration that temperance itself has no value. Socrates continues to call it a great good and blames the inquiry.

176a–176d — Commitment without a definition. Charmides does not know whether he possesses temperance, since its nature has not been discovered. He nevertheless wants the charm. Critias treats his obedience as a sign of temperance. Their final exchange with Socrates leaves the reader to assess the relation between examination, submission and force.

Distinctions worth keeping open

Second-order and reflexive knowledge. A knowledge of other kinds of knowledge takes knowledge as its object. A knowledge of itself is reflexive. Critias joins the two; an account that mentions only one can conceal the demands placed on the other. Likewise, the human possessor's knowing himself does not follow without argument merely from a knowledge's knowing itself.

Knowing that and knowing what. These are useful modern labels for the discriminations made around 170a–d. They are not a simple ancient anticipation of a contemporary theory of propositional knowledge. The

local issue is whether knowing that knowledge is present identifies its subject and licenses examination of a specific claim. At 175c the wording concerning knowing what one does not know is particularly delicate: the qualification “that one does not know” must be retained.

Possibility and benefit. Failure to establish the first is not the same as proof of impossibility. Granting existence for argument does not establish it. The later challenge to benefit examines increasingly generous concessions and cannot simply be read backwards as the conclusion of the earlier analogies.

Fine, good and beneficial. The dialogue uses these together but does not make them a single word. Fine or beautiful appearance, good character, correct performance, a useful product and a beneficial life can come apart in precisely the examples under discussion. The articles preserve the changes in the standard of evaluation.

Socratic practice and Critias’ formula. The language of examining knowledge and ignorance resembles the Socrates of the *Apology*. Whether the *Charmides* attacks that practice, distinguishes it from Critias’ overambitious account, or prompts a deeper reconstruction is disputed. It is reasonable to study the difference between Socrates’ avowed uncertainty and Critias’ authority; it is not reasonable to declare a single resolution as the dialogue’s explicit last word. A major recent commentary by Voula Tsouna develops a distinction between Socratic recognition of limits and Critias’ expansive claim. That is a

named interpretation, not a substitute for the primary argument.[2]

Knowledge of good and bad. Its importance at 174b–d is unmistakable, but its content is not defined there. The passage can supply a constructive direction without delivering a finished account of ethical knowledge. Nor does the appearance of the same theme elsewhere in Plato cancel this dialogue's ending in perplexity.

Text and documentation

The Greek has been checked against the Perseus digital Burnet text across the dialogue. A targeted comparison with images of a printed Burnet volume III also confirmed important readings at 156d, 170a–b, 174d and 175c. The exact impression of that scanned copy has not been established, and the sample is not a full print collation. The supplied edition itself reports using Perseus, so agreement between these files is corroboration of textual fidelity, not an independent manuscript collation. The apparatus belongs to Burnet's edition and the supplied transcription; this lexicon does not claim to replace either a modern critical apparatus or specialist textual scholarship. Individual qualifications are given where they affect an article.

Angle brackets and square brackets have editorial meanings. At 167a–b the supplied English marks supplemented words in the statement of what one knows. At 169a Burnet brackets "except knowledge"; at 174d he

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[2] Voula Tsouna, *Plato's Charmides An Interpretative Commentary* (Cambridge, 2022), chapter 1, "Introduction," pp. 1–56, doi:10.1017/9781009036610.001. The introduction expressly surveys competing readings and presents its own distinction between two conceptions of self-knowledge. The lexicon's local analyses remain accountable to the cited dialogue passages.

brackets words rendered “the beneficial” if retained. Such material cannot be used without qualification to prove that the argument already assumes its disputed conclusion. The supplied edition also records uncertain apparatus characters and an unidentified siglum Θ. Lexical interpretation should not turn that admitted uncertainty into a confident identification.

The sources below provide ways to check the text and to pursue arguments beyond this lexicon. The articles’ ancient references identify the passage used; external parallels are contextual unless explicitly stated otherwise. The supplied multi-dialogue lexicon was consulted as a comparison for coverage, while the explanations here were developed from the *Charmides*. It is not cited as an authority for Greek meanings or disputed interpretations.

Plato, *Charmides*, in John Burnet, ed., *Platonis Opera*, vol. III (Oxford, 1903); supplied *Charmides Edition 2* identifies the corrected 1909 impression and provides the Diotimos Editions translation (2026)

Perseus Digital Library Greek text: Burnet’s *Charmides*, for passage-level comparison

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott and Henry Stuart Jones, *A Greek–English Lexicon*

Voula Tsouna, Plato’s Charmides An Interpretative Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2022), especially the open-access introduction

Plato’s Shorter Ethical Works, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, section on the *Charmides*, for a concise philosophical orientation

Episteme and Techne, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, for the relation between knowledge, craft, subject matter and productive result

Lexicon

Abaris the Hyperborean

Ἀβάριδος τοῦ Ὑπερβορέου (Abaridos tou Hyperboreou)

The word. Abaridos is the genitive of Abaris, qualified as Hyperborean. “Hyperborean” identifies a figure from the far northern people of Greek legendary geography, not a modern nationality.

In the Charmides. Socrates names Abaris only as a source of charms that Charmides would not need if he already possessed temperance. The pairing with Zalmoxis extends the exotic northern repertoire of healing, but adds no new treatment and no episode from Abaris’ life. The immediate inference is conditional and economical: an already sufficient soul needs no such preliminary remedy.

Herodotus 4.36 mentions the story of Abaris carrying an arrow round the earth while fasting, but declines to narrate it at length. Later traditions make much more of his relation to Apollo and Pythagoras. Those traditions explain why a name could carry an aura of extraordinary religious power, but they should not be retrojected wholesale into this passing allusion.

The entry is especially useful as a guard against overreading. The Charmides does not say that Socrates met Abaris, learned a charm directly from him, or possesses an immortalizing arrow. It groups famous healers in a hypothetical assurance that the possession of temperance would make even their charms redundant.[3]

[3] Herodotus, Histories 4.36: online source. His brief reference is earlier than the fuller later Pythagorean legends.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158b–c. The possible sufficiency of Charmides' temperance would dispense with the charms of Abaris as well as Zalmoxis

In this edition. "Of Abaris the Hyperborean" follows the double genitive. Abaris enters the text only here; the additional biographical details belong to the edition's note and comparative ancient testimony.

See also. Zalmoxis; Charm; Immortalizing; Thracians.

Acceptance and taking over

ἀποδέχῃ (apodechēi); ἀποδέχομαι (apodechomai); παραδέχῃ (paradechēi); παραδέχομαι (paradechomai)

The word. Apodechesthai can mean to receive or accept an account; paradechesthai can mean to receive something handed on or take it over. In this dialogue their objects and settings make acceptance of a proposition different from assuming responsibility for an argument.

In the Charmides. Charmides approves the doctors' account that part and whole must be treated together, encouraging Socrates to continue the charm-story. Critias later accepts that medicine produces health. Both are local agreements that enable a next step; neither commits the speaker to every conclusion that may eventually be drawn. By contrast, at the handover from Charmides, Socrates asks Critias to take over the account, and Critias explicitly does so. The interpersonal transfer makes its alleged author answer for it. At 169b Socrates withholds acceptance that knowledge of knowledge is temperance even if its existence is conceded: benefit must first be examined. The verb therefore helps mark the difference

between granting a hypothesis and endorsing its identification with the virtue.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156c. Charmides accepts the medical account concerning part and whole.

162e. Critias accepts responsibility for the argument previously offered by Charmides.

165d. Critias accepts the claim that medicine produces health.

169b. Socrates withholds identification of knowledge of knowledge with temperance pending a test of benefit.

In this edition. “Accept” and “take over” preserve a useful distinction between the two compounds. They should be indexed beside, but not flattened into, every form of agreement or concession.

See also. Agreement and concession; Hypothesis; Critias; Beneficial and harmful.

Adequacy and deficiency

ἱκανῶς (hikanōs); ἱκανὸς (hikanos); ἐνδεὴς (endeēs)

The word. Hikanos and its adverb concern sufficiency, adequacy or capability relative to a task or standard. Endeēs means lacking or deficient. The terms do not automatically specify a measurable quantity, still less a doctrine of degrees of virtue.

In the Charmides. Before the definitions begin, the practical question is whether Charmides possesses enough temperance to dispense with the charm. His apparent endowment is not yet verified. Socrates later invokes adequacy in another register: determining which powers can relate to themselves requires someone

capable of making the relevant distinctions, and he does not trust himself to be such a person. This refusal is more precise than a universal profession of ignorance. The closing request returns to the original therapeutic scale: Charmides wants daily charming until Socrates says it is enough. The beginning asks whether enough virtue is already present; the ending entrusts the determination of enough treatment to a teacher whose inquiry has just failed to define the virtue. That tension should remain visible rather than being resolved into either complete surrender or a certified course of instruction.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158b–158c. Sufficiency and deficiency determine whether the remedy needs to be preceded by the charm.

169a. Socrates disclaims adequate ability to settle the general issue of self-related powers.

176b. Charmides requests daily charming until Socrates judges it sufficient.

In this edition. The range “well enough endowed,” “temperate enough,” “adequately,” “capable” and “enough” reflects related Greek uses. None supplies a numerical threshold for temperance.

See also. Temperance; Charm; Possibility and impossibility; Power and capacity.

Advice and greeting

συμβουλὴν (symboulēn); συμβουλεύσαιμι (symbouleusaimi); πρόσρησις (prosrēsis); χαῖρε (chaire); ὑποτιθέμενος (hypotithemenos)

The word. Symboulē is advice or counsel, and symbouleuein is to advise. Prosrēsis names an address or greeting. Chaire, literally an imperative to rejoice or be

glad, functions as a conventional greeting; its etymological sense should not obscure its ordinary social use. The different verb hypotithesthai can also mean advising; it introduces Cydias' poetic warning at 155d.

In the Charmides. Cydias is described as advising another person to beware the beautiful boy figured as a lion (155d–e). His warning gives Socrates a way to describe his own vulnerability.

Critias' interpretation of Delphi depends on changing the speech act performed by the inscription. "Know thyself," he says, is the god's greeting rather than advice. He equates it with "Be temperate," making the god correct the greeting commonly used by human beings. Other dedicators, on his reconstruction, mistook it for counsel and added useful advice of their own. This is Critias' inventive reading, not the dialogue's certified history of the inscriptions. At the close Socrates offers advice conditionally: if Charmides already possesses temperance, he should consider himself happier and treat Socrates as incapable of inquiry. Charmides does not simply accept that conclusion; he renews his request for the charm. Human advice remains open to the addressee's response. The contrast is especially telling beside Critias' subsequent command.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155d–155e. Cydias' advice warns the lover through the fawn-and-lion image.

164d–165b. Critias distinguishes the divine greeting from the advice he attributes to later dedicators.

176a–176b. Socrates' conditional advice does not prevent Charmides from requesting continued instruction.

In this edition. The translation keeps "Rejoice!" so that Critias' manipulation of an everyday greeting remains

audible. The passage does not prohibit happiness or establish a Platonic rule for greetings. “Advising” at 155d represents ὑποτιθέμενος, whereas the advice at 165a and 176a uses the συμβουλ- family.

See also. Delphi and Apollo; Knowing oneself; Moderation and excess; Persuasion and obedience; Cydias; Deliberation and decision.

Agreement and concession

ὁμολογῶ (homologō); συγχωρήσωμεν (synchōrēsōmen); ὁμολογία (homologia); συνομολογοῦντες (synomologountes); συμπλάττοντες (symplattontes); συγχωρῶν (synchōrōn)

The word. Homologein is agree, acknowledge or admit; synchōrein is concede or grant, sometimes simply agree. Homologia is the agreement or acknowledged proposition. At 175d synomologountes and symplattontes combine agreeing together with fashioning together, exposing the jointly constructed character of the failed account.

In the Charmides. The verb family first appears literally in the seating scramble: each person makes room for Charmides while pushing the neighbour beside him (155c). Later, granting room to an argument becomes conceding a proposition. This lexical connection does not make every concession a covert act of physical coercion, but it keeps the dialogue’s ordinary language behind its logical use.

The dialogue’s arguments develop through assent, but assent has different epistemic strengths. Charmides readily agrees that temperance is fine (159c), whereas Critias’ “perhaps not” about a doctor’s awareness (164b) is more guarded. A speaker can accept a conditional

consequence, grant a possibility for discussion, or endorse a proposition as true; these should not be conflated.

At 165c Socrates says he will decide whether to agree only after considering the claim. Agreement is therefore supposed to follow examination. At 169d the order is deliberately different: to move discussion forward they grant the possibility of knowledge of knowledge while leaving whether it exists for later. At 172c–d Socrates grants still more, restoring the knowledge of contents previously denied to the proposed expertise. These are controlled concessions, not a quiet reversal of the preceding argument.

The retrospect at 175b–d emphasizes the cost. They have agreed to things the logos did not establish and have fashioned a temperance that still turns out unbeneficial. The generosity of the concessions is ironic. One interpretive consequence is decisive: an account of Plato's conclusions cannot simply collect the propositions Critias and Socrates agree to. It must preserve which were provisional and which the closing discussion explicitly criticizes.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155c. The participle describes physically making room for Charmides before later argumentative uses of the verb family.

159c. Fineness accepted as a criterion

164b–d. Qualified assent and subsequent retraction

165b–c. Socrates postpones assent until examination

169d. Possibility conceded provisionally

172c–d. The stronger discriminatory power restored for argument

175b–d. Unwarranted agreements retrospectively criticized

In this edition. The edition distinguishes “concede” from “agree” where synchōrein plainly marks a concession, but the distinction is contextual rather than a strict one-word rule. “Made up between us” at 175d gives symplattontes its pointed force.

See also. Hypothesis; Retraction; Necessity and consequence; Argument and account; Knowledge of knowledge.

Anacreon

Ἀνακρέοντος (Anakreontos)

The word. Anakreontos is the genitive of Anacreon, the lyric poet. The dialogue invokes his name as testimony to the public celebration of Charmides’ paternal house.

In the Charmides. Anacreon appears only once, paired with Solon and followed by an indefinite company of other poets. Their encomia have, Socrates says, handed down the family’s pre-eminence in beauty and excellence. This associates the present spectacle of Charmides with an older poetic economy of praise: beauty is seen, admired, and preserved in celebrated words.

No particular poem by Anacreon is quoted or identified. Accordingly, the local passage cannot securely determine which named ancestor each poet praised, or whether every predicate in Socrates’ collective summary was present in every poem. What matters dramatically is the accumulation of prestigious witnesses before Charmides must speak for himself. The later insistence that one examine the truth of an account rather than merely its author’s identity gives this earlier appeal to famous

names a useful counterpoint, without making it a straightforward repudiation of lyric poetry.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157e–158a. Anacreon is named among the poets who praised the paternal family

In this edition. The English “celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon” renders an inherited encomiastic reputation; it should not be expanded into a fabricated quotation or an exact attribution of an unidentified surviving fragment.

See also. Solon; Dropides and ancestral Critias; Erotic attraction; House, lineage and nobility.

Anger and indignation

ὀργισθῆναι (orgisthēnai); ἀγανακτῶ (aganaktō)

The word. Orgizesthai means becoming angry; aganaktein can mean feeling vexed, indignant or aggrieved. Both express adverse emotional responses, but their targets and grounds differ. The dialogue does not present them as a single passion opposed by a technical definition of self-control.

In the Charmides. Critias seems to Socrates to become angry with Charmides when the boy teases him about the borrowed definition (162d). The comparison is to a poet angered by an actor’s poor handling of his compositions. Socrates marks it as his perception of Critias, and the image connects emotional investment with ownership of one’s account. The man defending temperance is visibly struggling with the public treatment of his own words.

Socrates’ later aggrievement has a different stated object. He is less troubled for himself than for Charmides if the young man’s temperance is to bring him no benefit;

he is also vexed on behalf of the charm if his careful learning has been for something worthless (175d–e). He immediately rejects that conclusion and blames himself as an investigator. The emotion dramatises his continuing commitment to the virtue's value, rather than refuting an argument by feeling alone.

These scenes invite comparison without licensing a simplistic diagnosis that one speaker has emotions and the other has none. Both are affected; what differs is the relationship of their responses to reputation, inquiry and willingness to acknowledge failure.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

162c–d. Critias' anger accompanies the public challenge to his own formula

175d–e. Socrates voices aggrievement for Charmides and the apparent uselessness of the charm

In this edition. The edition uses "angry" for the org- verb and "aggrieved" for ἀγανακτῶ. Translating both simply "angry" would obscure the contrasting emotional situations.

See also. Reputation and ambition; Praise and blame; Temperance; Beneficial and harmful.

Argument and account

λόγος (logos); διδόναι λόγον (didonai logon); ὑπέχειν λόγον (hypechein logon); τῷ λόγῳ (tōi logōi)

The word. Logos can be speech, statement, account, argument or an articulated explanation. The text does not use it with one technical sense throughout. Logon didonai is to give an account; hypechein logon, to answer for or

submit to questioning about an account. The dative logōi can mean by argument or in discussion.

In the Charmides. The charm is identified with beautiful logoi at 157a. That context invites a connection between speech and psychic treatment, but it does not independently demonstrate that every subsequent argument is curative. At 158b Critias' logos is his report about Charmides' character; at 161c the argument under examination is a proposition whose truth should matter more than its author.

When Charmides wants Critias to answer for the third definition, the phrase hypechein logon describes responsibility for defending it (162c). Critias later offers to give an account of self-knowledge (165b), but initially mistakes Socrates' questioning for disagreement with an already known answer. Socrates counters that a logos must be examined before assent is given.

At 166e the logos becomes the shared object of attention: let the outcome of testing determine what happens, rather than the reputations of the speakers. Later it is almost an independent authority that refuses concessions the men nonetheless grant (175b–c). This personification dramatizes a distinction between what they wish to secure and what follows from their claims. At 176a Socrates even imagines being judged incapable of investigating anything by logos. The continuing desire for his company prevents that self-deprecation from functioning as a simple rejection of rational discussion.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157a. Beautiful logoi identified with charms

162c. Responsibility to answer for a definition

165b–166e. Giving an account and testing it before agreement

175b–176a. The argument's resistance and Socrates' ironic self-criticism

In this edition. "Words", "account" and "argument" translate different local functions of logos. Keeping the Greek family in mind reveals continuities, but forcing one English rendering everywhere would obscure the medical tale, interpersonal testimony and explicit inference.

See also. Inquiry; Definition; Refutation; Agreement and concession; Language and naming; Charm.

Athens

Ἀθήνησιν (Athēnēsin)

The word. Athēnēsin is the locative form "at Athens." The city is the social setting presupposed by Socrates' homecoming and explicitly named during his praise of Charmides' family.

In the Charmides. Socrates says that no one present could easily identify two Athenian houses whose union would produce finer offspring than the houses from which Charmides descends. Naming Athens fixes the field of aristocratic comparison: the encomium measures the youth against the city's families, then enlarges the maternal family's prestige through Pyrilampes' foreign embassies.

Athens is also the implied civic background for the palaestra's company and its habits of education and courtship. The later city governed by temperance, however, is a hypothesis expressed with the common noun polis; it is not explicitly a blueprint for an actual Athenian administration. Readers who know Critias' and Charmides' later oligarchic roles may apply that

background, but it should not be substituted for the hypothetical grammar of the argument.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157e–158a. Athens is explicitly named in the comparison of the two ancestral houses

171e–172d. A city is considered hypothetically as an object of temperate management, without being explicitly named Athens

In this edition. The English “two houses in Athens” preserves the locative. The proper-name form is distinct from polis, “city,” and should not make every later generic city-reference an additional lexical occurrence of Athens.

See also. House, lineage and nobility; Palaestra; Great King and Asia; Household and city; Critias; Charmides.

Athletics

παλαίειν (palaiein); πυκτεύειν (pykteuein); παγκρατιάζειν (pankratiazein); θεῖν (thein); ἅλλεσθαι (hallesthai)

The word. Palaiein is to wrestle, pykteuein to box, pankratiazein to engage in the pancration, thein to run, and hallesthai to leap or jump. These infinitives name performances rather than a single abstract doctrine of physical education.

In the Charmides. The athletic list at 159c–d arises naturally in a palaestra. Socrates asks whether quick, agile wrestling is finer than slow and quiet performance, then extends the question to boxing, pancration, running, and jumping. Charmides agrees to the advantages of speed and nimbleness. The examples lead to the provisional conclusion that bodily quickness rather than

quietness would better meet the already conceded standard of fineness.

The logical target is a universal account of temperance as quietness. The passage does not turn athletic speed into a sufficient definition of virtue; Socrates next includes mental performances and eventually grants, for argumentative purposes, that quiet actions might be equally often fine. Either way, quietness has not been singled out as what makes temperance fine.

The contest between quick and slow must also be distinguished from reckless violence. The text praises able performance in recognized exercises, not uncontrolled aggression. The ending's threat of force belongs to another context and cannot be justified simply by the earlier concessions about athletic skill. The dialogue's physical setting gives the argument concrete examples without collapsing bodily accomplishment into moral excellence.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159c–d. Wrestling, boxing, pancration, running, and jumping test the first definition

160b–d. The conclusion is moderated so that the failure of exclusive quietness does not require a universal superiority of speed

In this edition. "Nimbly" renders ὀξέως in the athletic setting; the same sharpness family later describes the soul. The edition's note supplies a brief explanation of pancration; detailed competition rules are unnecessary to the argument and are not stated in the Greek.

See also. Palaestra; Body; Quietness; Quickness and slowness; Schooling and the letter-master.

Attention and sense

τὸν νοῦν (ton noun); ἐννοήσας (ennoēsas); ἄνοιαν (anoian)

The word. Nous here occurs in the idiom prosechein ton noun, to apply one's mind or pay attention. Ennoein means to consider or take thought; anoia is folly or lack of sense. Their presence does not introduce a separate theory of an immaterial cosmic Intellect.

In the Charmides. The uses of attention move from spectatorship to self-examination to scrutiny of an argument. Socrates notices that even the youngest boys stare at Charmides; later he tells Charmides to attend more closely and look into himself; finally he asks Critias to attend to the account rather than the personal identity of whoever is refuted. The object of attention changes, and that change is philosophically more important than an abstract definition of nous. The instruction to Charmides includes considering what sort of person temperance makes him and collecting those thoughts into an answer. In the medical story, meanwhile, separating the treatment of the head from the body is called folly. This negative expression concerns a practical failure to understand relations between part and whole. The terms should not all be translated as technical cognition of a single kind.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154c. Socrates attends to the boys' collective gaze.

156c. The medical account calls treatment of the head in isolation folly.

160d. Charmides is asked to attend, look within and consider the effect of temperance.

166e. Critias is asked to attend to the argument itself rather than the person refuted.

In this edition. “Watched,” “pay attention,” “consider” and “sheer folly” are contextually different renderings. Their variation is appropriate; the lexical family should still remain searchable.

See also. Perception; Knowing oneself; Whole and part; Refutation.

Babbling and self-deprecation

ληρεῖν (lērein); λῆρον (lēron)

The word. Lērein means to talk nonsense or babble. Lēros names nonsense or idle talk and can be applied to a person as a disparaging description. In the two passages here Socrates directs the language towards himself; it is not an authorial label for philosophy as a whole.

In the Charmides. Before telling the dream, Socrates says he thinks he is talking nonsense. He does not stop there. He immediately insists that what is coming into view must be examined rather than casually passed over by anyone who cares about himself. Self-deprecation thus accompanies an obligation to continue investigating a disconcerting result. Calling the speech nonsense is not an instruction for the reader to disregard the argument that follows.

At 176a the description becomes part of conditional advice. If Charmides already possesses temperance, Socrates would advise him to count Socrates a babbler incapable of inquiry and himself correspondingly happy. The condition matters: Socrates has just refused to conclude that temperance is worthless, and Charmides cannot certify his own possession of it. The youth therefore asks to continue with the charm. The passage leaves a tension between Socrates’ avowed investigative

failure and his continuing attraction as a teacher. Neither literal dismissal of Socrates nor an assumption that every admission is insincere adequately captures the exchange.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

173a. Socrates' self-deprecation is followed by the insistence that the apparent problem must still be examined.

175e–176b. Conditional advice to discount Socrates is answered by Charmides' request for continued charming.

In this edition. "Talking nonsense" renders the verb; "a babbler" personalizes the noun as the context requires. Both should retain Socrates as the speaker and target of the disparagement.

See also. The dream hypothesis; Inquiry; Care and neglect; Advice and greeting; Inferiority and poor performance.

Basile

Βασίλης (Basilēs)

The word. Basilēs is the genitive of the divine name Basilē. It must be distinguished from basileus, "king," and from the adjective basilikos, "royal," which enters the manuscript variants. The dialogue names a hieron, a shrine or sacred precinct, associated with her.

In the Charmides. Basile's shrine is the single topographical marker fixing Taureas' palaestra: the exercise ground stands opposite it. The passing reference assumes an Athenian audience able to recognize the locality, but supplies neither a myth nor ritual instructions. An independently preserved Athenian decree, IG I³ 84, regulates property associated with

Kodros, Neleus, and Basile in 418/17 BCE. It provides external evidence for the cultic name and context, without proving the exact position of every structure in the dialogue's scene.

The proper name is textually less straightforward than the English suggests. Burnet's apparatus reports variation between forms of Basile's name and "royal." The entry therefore belongs to both dramatic geography and textual transmission: accepting Burnet's text yields a named goddess, not a generic royal sanctuary.[4]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153a. Basile's shrine is the landmark opposite the palaestra

153a (apparatus). At a4 the manuscripts vary between the divine name and a form meaning royal

In this edition. "Shrine of Basile" follows Burnet's Βασίλης. The edition's note supplies the separate epigraphic connection with Kodros and Neleus; those names do not occur in the dialogue itself.

See also. Taureas; Palaestra; Delphi and Apollo.

Being and nature

οὐσίαν (ousian); πέφυκεν (pephyken); τῶν ὄντων (tōn ontōn)

The word. Ousia is a noun of being or nature; the perfect pephyken can say that something is naturally constituted or disposed in a certain way; ta onta means the things that are. The local construction determines their force. These

[4] IG I³ 84, Decree on the administration of the property of Kodros, Neleus and Basile, translated by Stephen Lambert, Nikolaos Papazarkadas, and Robin Osborne: online source.

expressions should not automatically be capitalized as the names of a system of transcendent entities.

In the Charmides. At 168d Socrates argues that a thing exercising its power in relation to itself must have the character towards which that power is directed. Hearing that heard itself would need sound, and sight that saw itself would need colour. Ousia here names the relevant character or nature on the object-side of the relation. It is not a newly introduced substance standing behind the examples. At 169a the question becomes whether any of the things that are is naturally capable of directing its own power towards itself, or whether some are and others are not. Socrates explicitly leaves the classification unresolved. Elsewhere the things that are supply the broad field in which inquiry seeks clarity and within which temperance must be identified. This language articulates what the investigation aims to determine; it does not resolve the disputed account by silently invoking another dialogue's ontology.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

166d. Making clear how each of the things that are stands is presented as a common good.

168d–168e. The self-related power would need the character appropriate to its object.

169a–169b. The natural possibility of self-relation is left unsettled.

175b. The inquiry has failed to find which of the things that are bears the name temperance.

In this edition. The translation's "character" for ousia at 168d keeps the immediate relation in view. Readers looking up "substance" or "essence" should not assume those more technical English uses settle the passage.

See also. Power and capacity; Self-relation; Sight and colour; Language and naming.

Belief and opinion

δόξα (doxa); δοξάζειν (doxazein); οἴεται (oietai); δοκεῖ (dokei)

The word. Doxa is opinion or belief; doxazein is to form or hold an opinion. Dokein can mean seem, appear, be thought or think, according to construction. Oiesthai likewise expresses thinking or supposing. The dialogue does not assign every occurrence of these everyday verbs to a single technical faculty opposed to knowledge.

In the Charmides. Opinion has an indispensable constructive role at the beginning of inquiry. If temperance is present, Socrates argues, it should give Charmides some awareness from which an opinion about it arises (158e–159a). The boy is asked to state what it seems to him to be. A revisable opinion is the starting material for examination, not something excluded from conversation because it falls short of knowledge. Charmides' repeated "it seems" appropriately marks provisional assent.

The social dimension is equally important. Critias reports that Charmides is thought exceptionally temperate (157d); Charmides fears contradicting this reputation (158d). Such assessments may be true, but the fact of their being held does not settle the definition. At 166d Socrates fears a specific mismatch: supposing himself to know when he does not. The problem is therefore not belief as such but false epistemic self-ascription.

Doxa becomes one of the relational analogies at 168a. Socrates asks about an opinion of opinions and itself

which has no opinion about the things ordinary opinions concern. This matches the restrictive structure of Critias' proposed knowledge. The negative answer is part of an investigation, not a worked-out impossibility proof for all higher-order belief. In particular, the text repeatedly reports what someone thinks about another's thought. The contested construction excludes the usual objects rather than merely adding a reflective one.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157d–159a. Reputation, first-person opinion, and entry into examination

166c–167a. Believing oneself to know and the proposed power to detect that mistake

168a. Opinion of opinions as a parallel for knowledge of knowledge

In this edition. "Thought", "think", "seems" and "opinion" preserve different English functions of the Greek family. They should not all be standardized to the technical noun "belief". "In my opinion" at 159a is a requested report to be tested, not an endorsement by the narrator.

See also. Perception; Knowledge; Pretence and imposture; Inquiry; Same and different.

Beneficial and harmful

ὠφέλιμον (ōphelimon); ὠφελίμως (ōphelimōs); ὠφελία (ōphelia); ὠφελεῖν (ōphelein); ἀνωφελὲς (anōpheles); βλαβερὰ (blabera); βλαβερῶς (blaberōs)

The word. The ōphel- family expresses benefiting, benefit and what is beneficial; the adverb ōphelimōs qualifies the way something is done. Anōpheles negates benefit. Blabera and blaberōs identify harmful things and harmful acting. Benefit is relational: the text can specify the doctor

and patient as beneficiaries, or speak of benefit “for us.” These words assess what an activity contributes, and are not interchangeable with knowing its technique, acting correctly within it, or being admired for it. The edition usually reserves “use” and “useful” for other Greek words, without suggesting that the underlying ordinary meanings are wholly unrelated.

In the Charmides. Benefit first becomes a defining criterion when Critias interprets Hesiod. Only productions made finely and beneficially deserve to count as works, and harmful things are classified as alien rather than one’s own (163c). The doctor example immediately tests the consequences. Treating someone successfully can benefit both doctor and patient, yet the doctor may not know whether he has acted beneficially or harmfully (164a–c). Under Critias’ current definition the beneficial act would be temperate even without such awareness. His refusal of that conclusion forces the move to self-knowledge.

When temperance is approached as expertise, medicine provides an apparently straightforward beneficial product: health (165c–d). Critias objects that not every knowledge produces a separate object of that kind. Socrates thereafter asks not simply for a physical product but whether the proposed knowledge would benefit us at all. This is a distinct question from whether self-directed knowledge is possible (167b, 169b). A logically coherent capacity would not become the virtue merely by existing.

The inquiry then progressively separates suggested benefits. The grand prospect is living without error, assigning tasks to people who know them and managing household and city successfully (171d–172a). A more modest possibility is easier learning and better examination within fields already learned (172b–c).

Neither should be erased: the text does contemplate a limited benefit even as Socrates pursues the stronger question. He grants the expansive powers once more and asks whether knowledgeable life is thereby happy.

At 174c–d the other crafts retain their immediate achievements even when knowledge of good and bad is removed. What is lost is their achievement's occurring well and beneficially. Benefit has become the decisive work of knowledge of value. Critias argues that knowledge of knowledge could benefit indirectly by governing this knowledge; Socrates replies by assigning the benefit-producing work to the distinct expertise that has just received it (174d–175a). The exchange exposes a problem about mediation: knowing or ruling an expertise is not automatically being able to do its work. It does not independently establish that every indirect contribution to benefit is impossible.

The verdict that the hypothesised temperance is a craftsman of no benefit belongs to this restrictive account. Socrates' subsequent refusal to believe that temperance really leaves Charmides without benefit (175d–e) prevents the verdict from becoming a nihilistic conclusion about virtue. The failed definition and the continuing expectation of benefit must remain distinguishable.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

163c. Beneficial making is called work; harmful things are called alien

164a–c. The doctor can benefit without knowing how he has acted

165c–e. Health is offered as medicine's beneficial work

167b. Possibility and benefit are made separate tests

169b–c. Benefit is required before the proposed knowledge is accepted as temperance

171d–172d. Grand and more modest benefits are explored

174c–175a. Knowledge of value receives the work of benefiting; supervision does not automatically transfer it

175b–e. The useless result is blamed on the inquiry, while the virtue's value is reaffirmed

In this edition. The regular renderings "beneficial," "benefit" and "of no benefit" make the final verdict answer the earlier test. At 175b "of no use" translates ἀνωφελές to preserve the play with ὄφελος; at 172d "benefit" represents ὀνήσει, a form of another verb. Burnet brackets ἡ ὠφελίμη at 174d7, so the edition does not translate that disputed extra phrase as part of the argument.

See also. Good and bad; Use and profit; Happiness and doing well; Work and working; Ruling and supervision; Correctness and error.

Blessedness

μακάριον (makarion); μακάριόν σε (makarion se); ὦ μακάριε (ō makarie)

The word. Makarios calls someone blessed, fortunate or enviably well placed. As a vocative, ō makarie can be a familiar address, without a literal judgment that the hearer enjoys supreme happiness. This flexible ordinary usage differs from treating blessedness as a separately defined state. The dialogue uses the adjective but does not develop a technical opposition between makariotēs and eudaimonia.

In the Charmides. After praising Charmides' parentage and appearance, Socrates says that if his temperance is equally adequate, his mother bore a blessed child (158b). The blessing is conditional: excellence of soul is needed to

complete the congratulation. At 175e–176a he returns to the adjective after the inquiry fails, insisting that temperance is a great good and that Charmides is blessed if he has it. The same condition survives the collapse of the definitions.

By contrast the vocative at 157a and 166d is a form of personal address. Reading every occurrence as an assertion of achieved flourishing would erase the dialogue's irony and conversational ease. At the ending, however, the predicate carries genuine ethical weight: Socrates refuses to allow the failure of an account to overturn the value he attributes to possessing the virtue.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157a. The vocative occurs in Socrates' reported account of the charm

158b. Charmides receives a conditional blessing tied to temperance

166d. Socrates addresses Critias encouragingly with the vocative

175e–176a. Blessedness is again conditional on genuine possession of temperance

In this edition. The edition renders the predicate "blessed" and the vocative more colloquially as "my dear fellow." This is contextual translation, not inconsistency about a philosophical definition.

See also. Happiness and doing well; Temperance; Good and bad; Praise and blame.

Body

σῶμα (sōma); σώματος (sōmatos); σώματα (sōmata)

The word. Sōma is body. The dialogue distinguishes the body from its parts, from its visible form, and from the soul. These are different contrasts: a head is part of a body, whereas the soul's relation to it is developed through an analogy rather than anatomical inclusion.

In the Charmides. The body is first present dramatically in the palaestra, where Charmides' appearance draws universal attention and the suggestion of undressing precedes Socrates' proposal to inspect his soul. In the medical story, the body becomes the whole required for treating the head, then the subordinate term in the requirement to treat the soul as well. Its changing position within the analogy is important: what counts as a whole relative to an eye or head need not be the ultimate whole human being.

In the test of quietness, writing, music, wrestling, boxing, running, and jumping supply bodily performances in which the quick and agile are praised. Socrates then moves to mental performances, eventually summarizing both "things concerning soul" and "things concerning body." The distinction organizes examples; it does not imply that every named skill can be exercised without the other dimension.

In the dream, reliable physicians would leave human beings healthier in their bodies, while genuine pilots and generals would improve survival. Later medicine still produces health when knowledge of good and bad is imaginatively removed. The body is thus neither dismissed as worthless nor offered as a sufficient measure of happiness. The inquiry asks what makes its successful preservation beneficial in the fuller sense.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156b–157a. Body is whole relative to head and eyes but requires treatment with the soul

159c–160b. Bodily and mental performances are compared in the refutation of quietness

173b. The dream promises healthier bodies

174c–175a. Health remains medicine's distinctive product rather than that of higher-order knowledge

In this edition. Sōma should not be confused with eidos or idea when these mean visible form or appearance. The edition uses "body" for the physical subject and "figure" or "looks" for the aspect admired.

See also. Soul; Whole and part; Face and bodily appearance; Athletics; Health and disease.

Builder and house-building

τὸ οἰκοδομεῖν (to oikodomein); τὴν οἰκοδομικήν (tēn oikodomikēn); οἰκήσεις (oikēseis); τὸ οἰκοδομικόν (to oikodomikon)

The word. Oikodomein means build, especially build houses; oikodomikē names the art. Oikēseis are dwellings. To oikodomikon can designate what belongs to building or the building field. This vocabulary must be distinguished from managing a household and governing a city.

In the Charmides. House-building first appears among ordinary crafts that perform work for others (161e). It helps expose the implausibility of identifying temperance with literally making only one's own things. At 165d it is an exemplary productive expertise: knowledge of building produces dwellings. Critias then contrasts a

house, the builder's product, with the absence of such a product in calculation or geometry.

At 170c building returns on the object side of the distinction. A person knows matters of house-building through the building art, not simply through temperance construed as knowledge of knowledge. This recurrence usefully separates product from field: the house is made, while the relevant building matters are known.

The dialogue also imagines well-managed households under temperance at 171e–172a. The shared house vocabulary should not blur the two functions. Constructing a dwelling and directing the life of a household are not assigned the same expertise by the passage.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

161e–162a. Building for others within ordinary craft activity

165d–e. Dwelling as a product of building

170c. The building field known by its own expertise

171e–172a. Household management as a different context

In this edition. "Knowledge of how to build" at 165d follows Burnet's τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν. His apparatus records a different substantive construction in B; the printed text identifies the activity, not simply the building product.

See also. Craft and expertise; Product and object of knowledge; Knowledge of knowledge; Household and city.

Calculation and geometry

λογιστική (logistikē); λογιστικῆς τέχνης (logistikēs technēs); γεωμετρικῆς (geōmetrikēs); τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ τοῦ περιττοῦ (tou artiou kai tou perittou); πλήθους (plēthous)

The word. Logistikē is the expertise of calculation or reckoning; geōmetrikē is the geometrical art. Artion and peritton here designate even and odd; plēthos quantity or multitude. The genitive phrase at 166a concerns how these stand quantitatively in relation to themselves and one another.

In the Charmides. Critias introduces calculation and geometry at 165e as counterexamples to the claim that every knowledge produces something like a house or cloak. Their importance is methodological: their recognized status as arts permits him to reject a uniform product requirement without abandoning the claim that temperance is knowledge. Socrates accepts this point and substitutes an object requirement (166a).

Calculation is then specified by its field, the even and odd in their quantitative relations. Those objects are different from calculation itself. “In relation to themselves” here need not mean a number is greater than itself: comparisons within numerical classes and comparisons between them are at issue. The later impossible self-comparisons must not be read back into this description as though the dialogue had already refuted its mathematical example.

Calculation reappears at 174b when Socrates asks which of an ideally knowledgeable person’s expertises contributes most to happiness. Critias rejects it as the required answer. Nothing in that rejection says calculation is false, useless for every purpose or not

genuine knowledge. It fails to be the knowledge whose specific object explains doing well and benefit.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

165e–166a. Calculation and geometry defeat the uniform product requirement

166a. Calculation defined by even and odd in quantitative relations

168b–e. Comparative numerical relations used to test self-relation

174b. Calculation rejected as the happiness-producing expertise

In this edition. At 165e the apparatus gives λογικῆς in B against the printed λογιστικῆς. The printed argument concerns calculation, not a discipline called “logic”. Avoid imposing a simple modern contrast between practical reckoning and pure mathematical theory on logistikē.

See also. Product and object of knowledge; Weighing; Greater and smaller; Double and half; Knowledgeable living.

Callaeschrus

Καλλαίσχρου (Kallaischrou)

The word. Kallaischrou is the patronymic genitive naming Critias’ father. Its English spelling varies; Callaeschrus and Kallaischros designate the same person.

In the Charmides. The narrative first locates Socrates beside “Critias the son of Callaeschrus.” This differentiates the living respondent from other men named Critias, especially the ancestor invoked in the later encomium. At 169b Socrates again addresses him as son of Callaeschrus,

this time when asking him to show that knowledge of knowledge is both possible and beneficial.

The return to the patronymic can sound ceremonious after the increasingly abstract argument, reminding the reader of the socially situated man charged with meeting the challenge. It does not itself furnish an argument from descent. Callaeschrus has no speaking part, and the dialogue gives no independent account of his profession, politics, or writings. A lexicon should retain this limit rather than infer a biography from the prestige of his son's family.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153c. Patronymic identification of Critias

169b. Socrates addresses the respondent as son of Callaeschrus before challenging his definition

In this edition. Both occurrences are the same Greek genitive. The edition's English "son of Callaeschrus" at 169b supplies an ordinary English formulation for the vocative παῖ with the patronymic.

See also. Critias; Dropides and ancestral Critias; House, lineage and nobility.

Care and neglect

κήδεται (kēdetai); ἐπιμελείας (epimeleias); ἀμελοῖεν (ameloien); τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν (tēn epimeleian)

The word. Kēdesthai expresses concern or care for someone, here oneself. Epimeleia denotes care, attention or application, and amelein neglecting or failing to attend. These are related practical attitudes rather than one uniform Greek technical expression for the care of the

self. The medical and intellectual contexts determine what attention requires.

In the Charmides. The Thracian story criticises treating parts while neglecting the whole that needs care (156e). That medical formulation prepares an ethical concern without by itself giving a systematic doctrine of selfhood. At 162e Socrates invokes Critias' age and application or study as reasons to expect him to know what Charmides could reasonably fail to understand. Attention is something cultivated, not simply a privilege of being older.

The most direct statement comes at 173a. Socrates admits that his new doubts may sound nonsensical, yet says that anyone who cares for himself even a little must examine what comes to light rather than let it pass at random. Caring is manifested by staying with a difficulty that threatens an attractive conclusion. It does not mean assuming that one's present view is correct or preserving one's reputation from challenge.

This passage connects self-concern with the discipline of inquiry without equating care and knowledge of knowledge. The agent who cares may still not know. The proper response is further scrutiny, whereas Critias' earlier concealment of perplexity protected public esteem at the expense of that scrutiny.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156e. The therapeutic account opposes attending to the whole to neglect

162e. Critias' study or application is invoked as a basis for expected understanding

173a. Care for oneself requires examining the troubling appearance

In this edition. At 156e “neglect” follows ἀμελοῖεν, a variant in T and the Stobaeus quotation that Burnet accepts; the principal B and T readings have ἀγνοοῖεν, “fail to know.” The care/neglect opposition is therefore specific to the accepted text, not common to every recorded witness. “Cares for oneself” at 173a renders κήδεται rather than ἐπιμελεῖται.

See also. Knowing oneself; Common good; Examination; Reputation and ambition; Whole and part.

Chaerephon

Χαιρεφῶν (Chairephōn); Χαιρεφῶντι (Chairephōnti)

The word. Chairephōn is Socrates’ friend, who speaks in the opening scene. His name should not be confused with the greeting chaire discussed later: the local characterization depends on his actions and the adjective manikos, not on an expressed etymology of his name.

In the Charmides. Chaerephon is the first person to address the returned Socrates. He leaps up, runs to him, takes his hand, and asks how he survived the battle. The narrator’s description of him as manikos, “mad,” is immediately enacted by energetic affection and alarm. Nothing here establishes a medical diagnosis or the philosophical divine madness described in other dialogues.

He also brings Socrates into the seated company beside Critias and solicits the story of the campaign. Later he directs attention to Charmides’ face and proposes the striking comparison between face and naked body: were the boy to undress, the body’s beauty would make him seem faceless. Socrates takes this invitation as the occasion to propose examining the soul first. Chaerephon

thus helps open both movements of the prologue, reunion after war and erotic inspection leading toward conversation.

The dialogue gives him no further substantive part after the opening praise. Other Platonic evidence supplies a significant connection: Apology 21a calls him Socrates' longstanding associate, characterizes his impetuosity, and tells of his question to the Delphic oracle. That parallel supports recognition of the vigorous personality, but importing the oracle episode into this scene would turn a comparison into an unspoken premise.[5]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153b–c. The excited welcome, survival question, and invitation to report the battle

154c–d. Questions about Charmides' face and the beauty of his body

In this edition. "Madman that he is" renders manikos in the narrative register of personal characterization. It should not be expanded into a clinical claim or a settled judgment that his behavior lacks all reason.

See also. Socrates; Madcap and madness; Face and bodily appearance; Delphi and Apollo.

Charm

ἐπῳδὴ (epōidē); ἐπῳδῆς (epōidēs); ἐπᾴδοι (epāidoi); ἐπᾴδεσθαι (epāidesthai); ἐπῳδαῖς (epōidais)

The word. Epōidē is an incantation, a song or utterance sung over someone; the related verb is epāidein. The active verb describes administering the charm, while the

[5] Plato, Apology 21a, explicitly describes Chaerephon's impetuosity and the Delphic inquiry: online source.

middle-passive can describe being charmed. It is distinct from pharmakon, the material remedy with which it is first paired. “Charm” therefore does not initially mean merely pleasing manners or personal attractiveness.

In the Charmides. The charm is the dialogue’s most persistent framing image. Critias suggests that Socrates pose as a doctor who knows a remedy for Charmides’ head. Asked what that remedy is, Socrates names a leaf but immediately adds an indispensable incantation. Used together they produce health; without the charm the leaf does no good. The spoken requirement exceeds the excuse that brought the young man over.

Charmides at first treats the charm as a transferable text that he can copy down. Socrates asks whether he means to do so by persuasion or without it. The question makes the would-be patient a participant whose approach matters; the prescription is not simply an object he can appropriate. Once Charmides acknowledges Socrates’ identity and acquaintance with Critias, Socrates explains its power through an extended medical analogy.

Good doctors treat the eyes with the head and the head with the whole body. The Thracian doctor from whom Socrates says he learned the charm teaches, on Zalmoxis’ authority, that the body must in turn be treated with the soul. The crucial identification occurs at 157a: the charms for the soul are beautiful words, logoi kaloi, and from such words temperance comes to be in souls. This gives the incantation philosophical content without specifying a fixed verse, sacred name, tune, or ritual formula. The dialogue never prints a separate charm for recitation.

It is consequently natural to interpret the ensuing conversation as the treatment promised by the medical story. The identification should nevertheless be made

with care. “Beautiful words” can include discourse and arguments; the passage does not explicitly say that every refutation is curative or that the exact conversation which follows has successfully generated temperance. The story supplies an educational aspiration and a mode of encounter, while the argument leaves the central virtue undefined. The failure of a definition need not entail the failure of every benefit from continued examination, but neither is benefit demonstrated merely by calling the examination a charm.

The oath protects the priority of this treatment. Wealth, birth, and beauty are not reasons to give the bodily remedy first. Conversely, if Charmides already has adequate temperance, charms of Zalmoxis or Abaris would be superfluous. The required inquiry into his condition therefore motivates the question of what temperance is. Charm and definition are linked by the problem of diagnosis, rather than by a declaration that knowing a definition is itself the whole cure.

After the argument’s apparent defeat, Socrates remembers the charm with special concern: he would have learned it earnestly for something worthless if temperance brought no benefit. He refuses that conclusion and blames his own investigation. Charmides then asks to be charmed every day until Socrates says that it is enough. Critias interprets this as proof of temperance and commands adherence, while the young man threatens force if Socrates resists. The charm thus closes the work as an undertaking still to continue, not a completed medical success. The passage renews

philosophical attachment while leaving the tension between persuasion, obedience, and coercion unresolved.[6]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155b–e. The medical pretext develops into a remedy dependent upon a charm

156a–b. Charmides proposes copying the charm; Socrates insists on persuasion and explains its power

156d–157c. The Thracian provenance, beautiful words, priority of the soul, and oath

157d–158c. Reputed existing temperance might make charms unnecessary

175e–176b. Socrates revisits the charm's value and Charmides requests daily treatment

In this edition. The edition distinguishes "charm" from "remedy" throughout. The remedy and headache do not reappear at the ending; it is specifically the charm that returns. At 157c4 the infinitive for charming depends on a corrected reading, recorded in the apparatus, but the priority of submitting the soul to treatment is clear in the surrounding passage.

See also. Remedy and leaf; Zalmoxis; Soul; Whole and part; Doctor and medicine; Persuasion and obedience; Temperance; Argument and account.

[6] The pairing of spoken incantation and physical treatment has an early literary parallel in Odyssey 19.457–458, where Odysseus' wound is bound and its bleeding checked with an incantation. The parallel supplies context without proving that Socrates' reported recipe was an actual medical prescription.

Charmides

Χαρμίδης (Charmidēs); Χαρμίδην (Charmidēn); Χαρμίδη (Charmidē)

The word. Charmidēs is the youth after whom the dialogue is named, identified as the son of Glaucon and Critias' cousin. The dialogue gives relative age descriptions, not a numerical age. Terms such as pais, meirakion, and neaniskos must therefore not be converted into a precise modern age classification.

In the Charmides. Charmides initially enters as an object of collective attention. Lovers precede and follow him; even the youngest boys look at him. His face, stature, and bodily form are praised before he has said anything. Critias adds that he is a philosopher and poet, then assures Socrates that he is outstanding in temperance. The conversation systematically tests the transition from visible and reported excellence to a virtue the possessor ought to recognize and explain.

His complaint is a heavy head on rising. Critias uses it to introduce him to Socrates, and Charmides accepts the apparent offer of treatment. When he proposes copying the charm, Socrates insists upon persuasion. Charmides knows Socrates' name, recalls his association with Critias, and reports his reputation among his own contemporaries. The introduction is thus not an encounter between a wholly unknown teacher and an uninformed child.

Asked whether he already possesses temperance, Charmides gives a socially intelligent answer: denial would contradict Critias and other admirers, while affirmation would amount to objectionable self-praise. His blush is interpreted by Socrates as becoming to his age. This behavior can look like a specimen of conventional

modesty before he defines temperance as quietness and then as modesty. Yet the argument does not accept a socially fitting performance as sufficient evidence of what the virtue is.

His third answer is borrowed: temperance is doing one's own business. He resists the suggestion that the identity of the original speaker matters, and Socrates explicitly agrees that truth, not authorship, is the issue. But Charmides then exploits authorship dramatically. A sly laugh and a glance toward Critias make the older man defend his own formula. Socrates presents the youth as deliberately transferring responsibility for the account. Charmides is neither merely passive nor uniformly overawed by his guardian.

After Critias takes over, Charmides does not contribute to the central sequence of epistemological arguments. His return at 176a is therefore important. He does not pretend that the adults' unsuccessful inquiry has left him knowing whether he possesses temperance. Nor does he accept Socrates' suggestion that he may dispense with the charm. He requests daily treatment until Socrates judges it sufficient. This is a practical commitment to continuing association, not a recovered definition or an assertion that the charm has already cured him.

The close complicates this willingness. Critias makes compliance evidence of temperance, and Charmides bases his obedience on the guardian's command while threatening force against Socrates. The scene leaves open whether philosophical attraction, conventional obedience, or unexamined domination will direct him. External historical evidence identifies Charmides son of Glaucon as one of the Ten governing the Piraeus under the oligarchy and records his death in battle in 403. This knowledge can

darken the exchange, but Plato does not narrate that future or state that the day's inquiry caused it.[7]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154a–155a. Entrance, relationship to Critias, appearance, and reported intellectual promise

155b–156b. Head complaint, request to copy the charm, and recognition of Socrates

157c–159b. Reputation for temperance, family praise, blush, and first answer

159b–162d. Three proposed accounts and transfer of responsibility to Critias

176a–d. Acknowledged uncertainty, request for daily charms, obedience, and threatened force

In this edition. The title, Greek name, and speaker labels do not mean that Charmides supplies all the definitions. From 162e the sustained respondent is Critias. "In other people's opinion as well as his own" at 154e–155a qualifies the claim that Charmides is poetic and should not become an authorial certification of literary achievement.

See also. Critias; Glaucon; Youth and age; Guardian and cousin; Modesty and shame; Quietness; Charm; Force and compulsion.

[7] Xenophon, Hellenica 2.4.19, identifies Charmides son of Glaucon among the Ten in the Piraeus and among the dead: online source. He was not one of the Thirty. Xenophon gives different conversational portraits in Memorabilia 3.7 and Symposium 4.29–32. They are comparative testimonies, not missing episodes of this dialogue.

Clear and obscure

σαφές (saphes); σαφέστερον (saphesteron); δῆλον (dēlon); ἐναργέστερα (enargestera); καταφανὲς (kataphanes)

The word. Saphēs means clear or plain, especially of speech and understanding. Dēlos means evident or manifest. Enargesteros means more clear or vividly apparent; kataphanēs, thoroughly manifest. These expressions can signal a claim to obviousness, a request for intelligibility or an improved apprehension; their occurrence does not certify an inference as actually proven.

In the Charmides. Socrates asks Critias to define more clearly after the distinctions between making, working and doing (163d). Critias himself admits that the preceding discussion had established nothing very clear when he changes to self-knowledge (165b). At 166d Socrates presents making things manifest as a common good, linking clarity to a shared inquiry rather than private victory.

Critias' response to aporia reveals the opposite behavior: he says nothing clear and covers his difficulty (169c–d). The lack of clarity is narratively connected to unwillingness to acknowledge inability. Yet clarity is also distinguished from the immense supervisory powers claimed for temperance. At 172b Socrates asks whether reflective knowledge might make learned things clearer, a possible modest educational benefit.

Repeated "clearly" or "it is evident" should be read with the local argument. At 159a, for example, the link between possessing virtue and having an articulable opinion is introduced as clear but is still a methodological assumption. The lexicon should not amplify that

rhetorical confidence into an independently established theorem.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158e–159a. An allegedly clear starting assumption

163d–165b. Clear definition requested; earlier obscurity acknowledged

166d. Manifest truth as a common good

169c–d. Critias conceals his difficulty in unclear speech

172b. Greater clarity proposed as a limited benefit

In this edition. The edition uses “clear”, “plain” and “come to light” for several overlapping families. These renderings do not introduce a technical doctrine of evident impressions or later criteria of truth.

See also. Definition; Perplexity; Truth and falsehood; Learning and teaching.

Cloak

ἱματίου (himatiou); ἱμάτιον (himation); ἀμπεχόνην (ampechonēn)

The word. Himation is a cloak or mantle; ampechonē is clothing or what is worn about one. The same ordinary garment can function as something seen in a dramatic encounter, an item made by a craft, and a possession whose quality matters in a hypothetical life.

In the Charmides. Socrates’ glimpse inside Charmides’ cloak at 155d is the immediate occasion for his erotic discomposure. The Greek does not identify every anatomical detail that he sees. An account can acknowledge the plainly erotic effect without supplying an anatomical description the narrative omits.

The cloak later enters a very different argument. A city would be badly arranged if everyone had to weave and wash his own cloak as well as make his own equipment. This shows the absurdity of construing doing one's own business as making every personal possession oneself. At 165e the cloak is an example of the product that weaving leaves behind, unlike the separate material products Critias says cannot be demanded of calculation or geometry.

In the dream, clothing made by genuine craftsmen forms part of a well-provisioned life; later weaving continues to clothe people even in the imagined absence of knowledge of good and bad. The repeated garment helps hold abstract distinctions close to ordinary embodied needs. Its technical production is one question, its benefit to the wearer another.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155d. Socrates sees inside Charmides' cloak and is overwhelmed

161e–162a. Weaving and washing one's own cloak illustrate the extreme self-sufficiency rule

165e. A cloak is weaving's separately identifiable product

173b–174c. Expertly made clothing and weaving's continued efficacy figure in the benefit test

In this edition. "Cloak" is used for himation; the later broader "clothing" renders a different noun. The entry does not equate the garment with a modern fitted coat or assume that Socrates names precisely what was visible beneath it.

See also. Erotic attraction; Doing one's own business; Craft and expertise; Body.

Common good

κοινὸν (koinon); κοινῇ (koinēi)

The word. Koinon means common or shared, and the adverbial dative koinēi means together or jointly. In the expression “common good” the adjective qualifies a good available beyond one disputant’s advantage. The dialogue does not use the phrase as the title of a comprehensive political theory or define collective welfare against private rights.

In the Charmides. Socrates first proposes jointly examining whether Charmides has temperance, avoiding both an unwanted self-declaration by the boy and unexamined doctoring by himself (158d–e). Cooperative inquiry is therefore a practical alternative to the demands created by reputation.

At 166d Socrates says making each thing clear as it really is is a common good for practically everyone. This follows Critias’ accusation that Socrates is trying to refute him personally. Socrates says he examines first for his own sake and possibly also for his friends, because he fears thinking he knows when he does not. He then asks Critias to attend to the argument without fixating on whose view is refuted.

The shared good is intelligibility and freedom from a false estimate of one’s knowledge, rather than victory over a rival. It is a positive statement of the inquiry’s purpose, but it does not by itself demonstrate that Critias’ proposed knowledge of knowledge can accomplish that purpose. The later analysis must still test the capacity separately.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158d–e. Joint inquiry is proposed in place of an embarrassing self-assessment

166c–e. Clarification is defended as a shared good rather than a personal victory

In this edition. “A common good … for practically all men” preserves both κοινόν and Socrates’ qualification σχεδόν τι. The phrase is not an assertion that every refutation benefits everyone under every circumstance.

See also. Good and bad; Examination; Refutation; Friendship and companionship; Reputation and ambition.

Contagious yawning

χασμωμένους (chasmōmenous); συμπάσχουσιν (sympaschousin); ἁλῶναι (halōnai); ἀπορίας (aporias)

The word. Chasmōmenous describes people yawning, sympaschein undergoing the same experience along with another, and halōnai being caught. The simile transfers an involuntarily shared bodily response to the spread of perplexity between interlocutors.

In the Charmides. At 169c Critias sees Socrates unable to settle the general problem of self-related capacities and appears to catch the same difficulty, just as people facing a yawner yawn too. The narrator portrays shared perplexity as an event, not merely as a conclusion explicitly admitted by both parties. Critias’ reputation for brilliance makes him unwilling to confess it, so his words become unclear and concealing.

The image distinguishes experiencing a difficulty from owning it intellectually. Socrates has stated his lack of confidence and asked for help. Critias undergoes a similar

predicament but does not acknowledge the inability to make the required distinctions. Socrates' next concession, granting the possibility of knowledge of knowledge for now, permits the inquiry to move on; it does not represent a solution already produced by Critias.

The capture verb also recalls Socrates' erotic capture at 155e. Both figures are vulnerable to an experience they do not simply command, but their responses differ. The parallel is illuminating without reducing philosophical perplexity to a merely bodily contagion.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

169c–d. Critias catches perplexity, conceals it, and is rescued procedurally by a provisional concession

155e. The earlier erotic capture supplies a verbal parallel

In this edition. Burnet keeps ἀναγκασθῆναι, "to be compelled," at 169c6, while recording Badham's deletion and wondering about an alternative meaning infected. The text printed in this edition therefore uses a contagion simile without actually printing a technical verb for infection.

See also. Perplexity; Critias; Socrates; Lion and fawn; Agreement and concession.

Conversation

διαλέγεσθαι (dialegesthai); διαλεξόμενος (dialexomenos); διαλέξεται (dialexetai)

The word. Dialegesthai is to converse or discuss. Although the family later supports technical uses of "dialectic," not every occurrence here names a formally specified philosophical method. The future forms likewise describe anticipated conversation in context.

In the Charmides. Socrates proposes conversation as the way to inspect Charmides' soul. Critias assures him the boy is willing, and the presence of the guardian makes the exchange socially proper. Socrates then admits that the confidence with which he expected an easy conversation vanished when Charmides sat beside him. The verb therefore belongs to both a philosophical invitation and the vulnerability of its speaker. Charmides' quietness definition includes talking in an orderly manner, making conversational conduct itself one of the behaviours under examination. Much later the hypothetical examiner of a doctor faces a difficulty about what he can discuss: under the proposed separation of kinds of knowledge, medical subject matter is not supplied by knowledge of knowledge alone. Conversation requires an object and appropriate competence; the mere ability to question someone does not yet establish the authority to assess every answer.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154e–155a. Conversation is offered as inspection of the soul and permitted in the guardian's presence.

155c. Socrates loses his anticipated ease of conversation.

159b. Talking quietly is part of Charmides' proposed account.

170e–171b. The doctor example tests what subject an examiner can competently discuss.

In this edition. The translation's ordinary "talk" and "have a conversation" fit the social passages. Automatically replacing them with "practise dialectic" would make the text more technical than its wording demands.

See also. Stripping the soul; Argument and account; Question and answer; Craft and expertise.

Correctness and error

ὀρθῶς (orthōs); ὀρθότητος (orthotētos); ἁμάρτημα (hamartēma); ἁμαρτίας (hamartias); ἀναμάρτητοι (anamartētoi)

The word. Orthōs means rightly or correctly, and orthotēs is rightness or correctness. The hamart- family names a mistake or error; anamartētoi means without error. In this dialogue these terms concern treatment, speech, inquiry and action. “Sin” would impose a specialised theological sense on hamartia that this context does not require. Equally, technical correctness is not yet identical with goodness or benefit for life.

In the Charmides. The Thracian account calls it a mistake to practise medicine for temperance and bodily health separately (157b). Correct treatment requires attending to the relevant whole. During the argument, the interlocutors repeatedly judge claims correctly or incorrectly stated; these conversational approvals do not by themselves establish the adequacy of the final theory.

At 171b a doctor is examined through what is said and done in medicine: whether his statements are true and his actions are performed correctly. The distinction between truth of claims and rightness of performance is explicit. Such assessment requires medical competence, not only a general capacity to recognise knowledge.

The next imagined regime removes mistakes altogether. Those who possess temperance and those they rule would be anamartētoi, with error excluded and correctness taking the lead (171d–172a). Here technical reliability appears to ensure happiness. Socrates then reopens that very inference. The dream grants expert performance yet still asks which knowledge makes it good and beneficial (173d–174d). Thus an error-free activity in its technical

field can fail to establish the value of its result for human life.

Finally Socrates locates the apparent error in their inquiry rather than announcing that temperance itself is valueless (175a–e). The work's repeated pursuit of correctness remains active even in failure: recognising that an argument has not earned its concessions is part of responsible examination.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157b. Treating temperance and health separately is called a mistake

164c–165b. Critias retracts earlier statements rather than admit a conclusion he rejects

171b. A practitioner's true statements and correct actions require domain-specific evaluation

171d–172a. Error-free life and the leadership of correctness are imagined

173d–175e. Correct expertise is separated from benefit, and the inquiry's failure is acknowledged

In this edition. "Rightly" and "correctly" translate ὀρθῶς in different English settings. "Rightly" can also render δικαίως, as at 175a, so English wording alone is not a concordance. The edition's "without error" preserves the negative adjective at 171d without recasting it as moral impeccability.

See also. Good and bad; Beneficial and harmful; Happiness and doing well; Justice and the just; Truth and falsehood; Examination.

Craft and expertise

τέχνης (technēs); τέχνῃ (technēi); δημιουργοί (dēmiourgoi); τεχνικῶς (technikōs)

The word. Technē is an art, craft or organized expertise; dēmiourgos is a practitioner or craftsman. Technikōs means expertly, in accordance with craft. These words include medicine, navigation and mathematical arts as well as manual manufacture. The dialogue's usage does not support a fixed opposition in which technē means mere practical skill and epistēmē exclusively theoretical knowledge.

In the Charmides. Crafts first expose a difficulty with "doing one's own business". Reading other people's names, healing others and making goods for them are ordinary competent activities, not automatically meddling (161d–162a). A city's well-being would not be secured by requiring everyone to manufacture every item he uses. Critias' distinction between making and doing attempts to rescue the formula by restricting ethically valued action rather than by denying ordinary productive interdependence.

At 165c–166b crafts provide the model for interrogating temperance as knowledge. Medicine and house-building yield identifiable results; calculation and geometry show why not every expertise needs a separate tangible product. Socrates then shifts to what each expertise knows. This distinction prevents the craft analogy from being reduced to the crude demand that every virtue manufacture something.

At 170e–171c the practitioner becomes the model for competent examination: a medical claimant must be assessed in medical statements and acts. A person equipped only with a separate knowledge of knowledge is

no more qualified than any other outsider to do that. The limitation derives from the agreed partition of expertise by subject matter.

The dream imagines all human work allocated to genuine experts (173a–c). Its attraction is concrete: better health, safety, equipment, clothing and shoes. Yet its adequacy as a complete account of a good life is questioned. At 174c–d the crafts retain their ordinary functions when knowledge of good and bad is removed; their successful functioning alone does not determine whether those results benefit us. Socrates' final description of temperance as no craftsman of benefit (175a) deliberately brings the practical model back to bear on Critias' supervisory proposal.

The dialogue thus uses expertise as a model, modifies it and tests its limits. It does not simply identify moral understanding with a manual trade, nor simply reject the relevance of skilled knowledge to virtue.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

161d–163c. Craft production for others and Critias' lexical defense

165c–166b. Productive and mathematical examples

170e–171c. The expert as competent examiner

173a–174d. Expert performance distinguished from benefit

174e–175a. Craftsman of health and craftsman of benefit

In this edition. The edition mainly uses "craft", with "art" in "the art of calculation". "Expertly made" at 173c translates technikōs, not an evaluation that the resulting life is ethically good in every respect.

See also. Product and object of knowledge; Calculation and geometry; Fellow expert; Doing and action; Making and production; Good and bad.

Critias

Κριτίαν (Kritian); Κριτίας (Kritias); Κριτία (Kritia); Κριτίου (Kritiou)

The word. Kritias names the main adult respondent, identified as Callaeschrus' son. An ancestral Critias, son of Dropides, is mentioned separately at 157e. Recurrence of the name within the family makes the patronymic essential; the two references must not be conflated.

In the Charmides. Critias mediates Socrates' approach to Charmides. He supplies the youth's pedigree, praises his intellectual and moral promise, summons him through an attendant, and devises the doctor's pretext. As cousin and guardian he legitimates the adult conversation while also shaping the expectations under which his ward must answer. His assurances that Charmides is exceptionally temperate are public claims about his own household as well as compliments to the boy.

The shift at 162c–e exposes how this social authority interacts with argument. After Charmides offers the formula about doing one's own business, Critias initially denies being its source. Socrates' subsequent narration, however, concludes that it almost certainly came from him. When the youth glances at him and jokes that its author may not understand it, Critias can no longer contain himself. His concern to shine before both Charmides and the assembled company is the narrator's diagnosis. The simile of poet and inept actor represents his attempt to reclaim an account mishandled in another person's mouth.

His successive defenses are not interchangeable. First he separates making from doing and working, appealing to Hesiod and reserving the latter terms for beneficial production. Then he rejects the implication that a temperate person might be unaware of being temperate. Rather than concede it, he explicitly withdraws his earlier position and offers knowing oneself, supported by an interpretation of the Delphic inscription. When Socrates asks for the product of such knowledge, Critias correctly challenges the assumption that every expertise leaves a separate tangible product. His mathematical counterexamples force a move from products to objects. The ensuing claim, that temperance alone knows itself and other kinds of knowledge, is therefore a further specification that must itself be tested.

Critias' philosophical contributions are substantial even when his dramatic posture is unflattering. He identifies good and bad as the knowledge most relevant to happiness at 174b. He also attempts to distinguish supervisory benefit from direct production at 174d–e. Neither contribution should be erased by treating him simply as a villain whose arguments are empty. Conversely, his commitment to knowledge is not enough to exempt his reasoning from scrutiny. At 169c–d he shares Socrates' perplexity but hides it to preserve his reputation. At 166c he charges Socrates with seeking his personal refutation, prompting a defense of inquiry in which the identity of the defeated party should not matter.

At the end he interprets Charmides' willingness to remain with Socrates as proof of temperance and turns it into a command. That closure gives obedience an immediate criterion after conceptual definition has failed. Readers acquainted with his subsequent political career can hear a dangerous concentration of authority in this

exchange. Xenophon identifies Critias as one of the Thirty and records his death in the same battle as Charmides. The historical evidence establishes the later connection; the extent to which Plato intends accusation, apology, tragic irony, or some combination remains an interpretive question. No claim that Socrates endorses the later regime follows from the present conversation.[8]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153c. Socrates is seated beside Critias son of Callaeschrus

154a–158b. He introduces, praises, and arranges the examination of his ward

161b–163e. Authorship is teased into the open and the formula receives a lexical defense

164c–166e. He replaces the earlier account with self-knowledge and then knowledge of knowledge

169b–d. He is addressed by patronymic and depicted concealing perplexity

174b–175a. Knowledge of good and bad and the attempted defense of supervisory benefit

176b–d. He commands Charmides to submit to the charm

In this edition. The edition's biographical notes supply the subsequent oligarchic history; it is not spoken in the dialogue. At 162d the referent of "he had been refuted" is grammatically debatable, so the narrator's description should not be paraphrased as an unambiguous formal verdict against one named person.

[8] For the later political identification and death, Xenophon, Hellenica 2.4.19: online source. Dramatic works and fragments transmitted under Critias' name have contested attributions; the local poet–actor simile does not independently settle their authorship.

See also. Charmides; Callaeschrus; Dropides and ancestral Critias; Poet and actor; Guardian and cousin; Delphi and Apollo; Knowledge of knowledge; Good and bad.

Cydias

Κυδίαν (Kydian)

The word. Kydian is the accusative of Cydias, the poet Socrates calls exceptionally wise in ta erōtika, matters of love. His name introduces the quoted warning about a fawn approaching a lion.

In the Charmides. Socrates recollects Cydias precisely when the sight of Charmides leaves him on fire and beside himself. The quoted counsel warns someone not to approach a lion as a fawn and become a portion of meat. Socrates then applies it to his own sense of capture. The quotation supplies a miniature model of erotic experience in which the conventionally pursuing older lover becomes vulnerable prey.

The praise “wisest” is therefore experiential and comic. Cydias has articulated a danger that Socrates suddenly feels, not established the technical knowledge examined in the dialogue’s second half. Charmides’ beauty and Socrates’ loss of ease give the poetry its point before the medical fiction helps redirect the encounter.

The poet’s biography is obscure. The supplied edition identifies the quotation as the secure fragment conventionally numbered PMG 714 and notes a separate ancient attribution to a Cydias of Hermione. Those external scraps should not be synthesized into a confident life. For understanding this dialogue, the securely

available authorial fact is Plato's attribution of these words to Cydias.[9]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155d–e. Socrates invokes Cydias while describing erotic discomposure and applies the image to himself

155d (apparatus). The wording of the quotation varies, especially at d6–7

In this edition. Burnet letterspaces the quotation; the edition represents that with italics. Its apparatus records a badly divergent reading in B and Cobet's proposal αἰτεῖσθαι in place of αἱρεῖσθαι. Interpretation should follow the printed text while acknowledging that the fragment's exact wording is not uniformly transmitted.

See also. Lion and fawn; Erotic attraction; Fire and renewed confidence; Poet and actor.

Definition

τί φῂς εἶναι σωφροσύνην (ti phēis einai sōphrosynēn); ὅρισαι (horisai); διορίζομαι (diorizomai); ὥρισται (hōristai)

The word. The question "what do you say temperance is?" requests an account of the virtue, not simply an instance or a claim to possess it. Horizein and diorizein mean delimit, distinguish or define; at 163d–e they ask for a clearer statement. At 171a delimitation concerns what makes a particular knowledge the particular field it is.

In the Charmides. The opening move connects a definition to examination of a person: by hearing Charmides' opinion Socrates hopes to estimate whether

[9] Fragment designation: D. L. Page, Poetae Melici Graeci (Oxford, 1962), no. 714, as identified in the supplied edition. No additional biography is inferred here from that numbering.

temperance is present in him (159a). The connection is provisional. Neither the ability to say a definition nor inability to defend one is independently proved equivalent to possessing or lacking the virtue.

Charmides' first two answers identify temperance with a kind of quietness and with shame. The arguments compare the proposed definiens with agreed features of temperance, especially its fineness and goodness. Critias' revision at 163d–e is more explicit about naming: he may use words as he pleases, but must say clearly to what he applies them. A verbal stipulation is therefore allowed; obscurity about the referent or consequences is not.

At 171a the definition of a particular knowledge turns on its objects. Medicine is this knowledge rather than another because it concerns the healthy and diseased. That principle explains why abstract identification of knowledge cannot by itself identify medical knowledge.

At the end Charmides reasons that he cannot know whether he has the virtue when its identity has not been discovered (176a). This expresses the unresolved dependence of self-assessment on an adequate account, rather than retrospectively proving that the boy lacks temperance. The dialogue asks what makes a definition adequate while declining to provide a final successful one.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159a–b. Initial what-is question and first answer

163d–e. Clear definition requested after lexical distinctions

171a. Knowledge individuated by its field

175b–176a. Failure to identify the named virtue and its personal consequence

In this edition. At 159a the edition's "what it is, and what sort of thing" reflects the combination of identity and character in the preliminary proposal. Neither expression requires a reference to separately existing Platonic Forms in this dialogue.

See also. Question and answer; Language and naming; Same and different; Product and object of knowledge; Temperance.

Deliberation and decision

βουλεύεσθαι (bouleuesthai); βουλεύεσθον (bouleuesthon); βεβουλεύμεθα (bebouleumetha); βουλεύου (bouleuou); βουλή (boulē)

The word. Bouleuesthai means deliberating or taking counsel; context can give it the more suspicious sense of planning or plotting. Boulē is counsel or deliberation. The present describes an activity under way, whereas bebouleumetha is perfect: a decision has been reached. The verb is different from boulesthai, wishing or wanting, although the two can appear close together in a discussion of action.

In the Charmides. Deliberation first supplies a mental example against quietness. People praise the person who thinks things through and finds a result easily and quickly, rather than the one who proceeds laboriously (160a–b). This is a comparison of successful performances, not the claim that every slow decision is bad or that one should act without consideration.

At the end Socrates asks the two aristocrats, using a dual form, what they are planning to do. Charmides replies that they have already decided (176c). The perfect closes off the consultation Socrates' question seemed to

invite. He tells Socrates in turn to deliberate about what he will do, but Socrates answers that no counsel remains when force cannot be opposed (176c–d).

The comic exchange brings a serious distinction into focus: a decision can be settled for its makers without having been justified to the person affected. The earlier praise of effective deliberation does not license this substitution of resolve for an examined account. The dialogue ends with a practical arrangement, yet without a completed shared definition of the virtue the arrangement is meant to cultivate.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

160a–b. Easy and quick deliberation is praised among the soul's activities

176c–d. A completed decision displaces further consultation and Socrates says no counsel remains

In this edition. "Plotting" in the closing exchange conveys the playful conspiratorial context, while "take counsel" carries the same verb into Socrates' response. The perfect "we've finished plotting" matters: it is not simply a repetition of the present question.

See also. Quickness and slowness; Force and compulsion; Persuasion and obedience; Advice and greeting; Wish.

Delphi and Apollo

ἐν Δελφοῖς (en Delphois); τοῦ θεοῦ (tou theou); τὸ ἱερὸν (to hieron); γράμμα (gramma); πρόσρησις (prosrēsis); Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη (Engyē para d' atē)

The word. En Delphois means "at Delphi." Apollo is identified in the speech as "the god," without the proper name Apollōn being uttered. Gramma here is an

inscription or written saying; prosrēsis an address or greeting. These senses must be distinguished from the schoolroom grammata, letters. Engyē is a pledge or surety, and atē is ruin or disaster. The maxim quoted at 165a is conventionally understood as a warning about standing surety for another, although the supplied note records other ancient applications. Here it exemplifies the useful counsel Critias attributes to later dedicators; the Greek noun is not itself an imperative.

In the Charmides. Critias invokes Delphi after refusing to accept that a temperate person could fail to know himself. He equates temperance with knowing oneself and agrees with the person who dedicated the corresponding inscription. He then offers an interpretation of its social function. The god greets each entrant with the equivalent of “Be temperate,” expressed enigmatically as “Know thyself,” instead of the customary human greeting “Rejoice.”

This is explicitly Critias’ reading: he repeatedly marks what seems to him to have been the dedicator’s intention. It does not follow that the inscription was historically installed for exactly this purpose, or that Socrates accepts its proposed equivalence before inquiry. The speech gives the new definition prestige and a memorable verbal shape; it does not relieve Critias of accounting for it.

Critias also claims that later dedicators misunderstood the first maxim as advice and competed by adding “Nothing too much” and “Pledge, and ruin is near.” Thus the speech distinguishes a divine greeting from human counsel and tells a miniature history of misinterpretation. Its chronological and motivational claims belong to the character’s exposition, not to a securely documented sequence of Delphic building inscriptions.

The sanctuary setting has a dramatic echo. Socrates earlier called the formula about doing one's own business a riddle; Critias now makes riddling speech characteristic of the god as prophet. At 166d Socrates' invitation to "say goodbye" to who is refuted reuses the chairein vocabulary the Delphic speech had displaced. Such local correspondences encourage attention to how sacred authority and ordinary conversation are intertwined.[10]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

164d–165b. Critias interprets the inscription and contrasts divine greeting with human advice

166d–e. Socrates' "say goodbye to" returns to the greeting's verbal family

In this edition. The translation "Rejoice!" deliberately exposes the literal force of χαῖρε rather than replacing it with a neutral "Hello." "Apollo" is explanatory identification, not an attested Greek name in this passage. The Greek singular gramma at first names one inscription; later grammata refers to additional sayings.

See also. Knowing oneself; Temperance; Riddle; Advice and greeting; Oath and divine invocations; Critias.

Desire as a relative

ἐπιθυμία (epithymia); ἡδονῆς (hēdonēs); τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν (tōn allōn epithymiōn)

The word. Epithymia is desire or appetite; hēdonē pleasure. In this local example desire is treated as directed toward pleasure. The statement functions as a premise of

[10] Plato, Protagoras 343a–b, presents Know thyself and Nothing too much as dedications associated with the Seven Sages; this is a useful parallel to, not confirmation of, Critias' special greeting theory.

an analogy, not a complete account of every human motive.

In the Charmides. At 167e Socrates asks whether there is a desire directed at itself and other desires but at no pleasure. Critias answers emphatically that there is not. The precise restriction matters. A modern example of wanting to want something does not automatically contradict the passage: such a second-order desire may still concern an anticipated pleasure, the value of its object, or the satisfaction of an ordinary first-order desire. Socrates' hypothetical excludes the normal object altogether.

The passage belongs to a sequence extending beyond sensory powers to wishes, love, fear and opinion. That breadth is intended to make the supposed exception for knowledge require explanation. But at 168a Socrates explicitly refuses to insist that the proposed knowledge does not exist. The negative answer about desire is an accepted analogy, not a completed universal argument against higher-order attitudes.

The erotic prologue supplies a dramatic context in which desire is far from an empty abstraction. It is reasonable to hear an echo, but the epithymia example itself does not analyze Socrates' attraction or identify it with Critias' knowledge.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

167e. Desire for desires but for no pleasure rejected

168a. The analogies do not yet settle the possibility of knowledge of knowledge

In this edition. The edition distinguishes "desire" for epithymia from "wish" for boulēsis and "love" for erōs.

Preserving those terms makes the three assigned objects, pleasure, good and beautiful, visible.

See also. Wish; Love as a relative; Self-relation; Perception.

Discovery

ἀνευρίσκων (aneuriskōn); ἐξευρίσκοντες (exeuriskontes); εὑρεῖν (heurein); ἐξευρεῖν (exheurein)

The word. The heuriskō family concerns finding or discovering, with compounds that can emphasize finding out or locating. The aorist infinitives heurein and exheurein should not be confused with separate technical faculties. Finding may concern an expert, an answer or truth.

In the Charmides. The first refutation praises ready discovery as an example against identifying temperance with slowness. The political picture later supposes that people can locate those who possess the knowledge they lack and entrust work to them. By the end, discovery is what has failed: the inquirers cannot determine what temperance names, the personified inquiry has not found the truth, and Charmides cannot know whether he possesses the virtue when its nature has not been discovered. These objects of finding are importantly different. The inability to find a definition does not entail that no useful observation occurred; nor does a wish to find an expert establish an infallible method of expert selection.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

160a–160b. Quick discovery is praised among mental activities.

171e. The imagined error-free life includes finding knowledgeable agents.

175b–175d. The inquiry has failed to find what temperance is and to discover the truth.

176a–176b. Charmides links his uncertainty about possession to the unsuccessful search for the virtue's nature.

In this edition. English "find," "find out" and "discover" translate related verbs across different kinds of object. The repeated family marks an aim of inquiry, not a promised success.

See also. Inquiry; Definition; Examination; Perplexity.

Disgrace

ὄνειδος (oneidos)

The word. Oneidos names reproach, a disgrace or what brings reproach. In Critias' use it is a predicate applied to a work or product: something may count as a disgrace. This is distinct from aidōs, the felt restraint of modesty, and from aischros, the adjective ugly or shameful. Keeping the terms apart reveals the transition from personal feeling to a public evaluation of occupations and their results.

In the Charmides. Critias invokes Hesiod's claim that work is no disgrace (163b). He then asks whether the poet could have counted cobbling, selling salt fish or sitting in a brothel as work and still meant that none of it was disgraceful. His selection mixes everyday manual occupations with an intentionally shocking example. It reveals the judgments Critias expects his audience to share; it is not a neutral Platonic classification of all labour as degrading.

To preserve the dictum he reserves “work” for productions that are fine and beneficial, whereas a production made without the fine can be a disgrace (163b–c). The interpretation consequently builds a positive evaluation into the definition of work. Socrates does not contest the social list directly but asks Critias to make the intended activity clear. The resulting definition is tested through beneficial medical action rather than settled by the prestige of the quoted poet.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

163b–c. The repeated word frames Critias’ interpretation of Hesiod and his distinction between work and production

In this edition. “Disgrace” preserves the same noun through the Hesiodic citation and Critias’ explanation. At 163b “to sit in a brothel” is an interpretive rendering of the euphemistic ἐπ’ οἰκήματος καθημένῳ; the Greek does not explicitly add “for hire.”

See also. Work and working; Making and production; Modesty and shame; Ugly and shameful; Worth and honour.

Doctor and medicine

ἰατρός (iatros); ἰατρῷ (iatrōi); ἰατρική (iatrikē); ἰατρικῆς (iatrikēs); ἰατρικός (iatrikos)

The word. Iatros is a doctor or physician. Iatrikē, with an understood technē, is the medical art or expertise; iatrikos is an adjective that can designate a medical practitioner. The dialogue identifies medicine by its object, the healthy and diseased, and by its product, health. These two criteria are related but not identical.

In the Charmides. Medicine first enters as an impersonation. Critias tells his attendant that he wishes to introduce Charmides to a doctor and invites Socrates to pretend to know a headache remedy. Socrates accepts, but the role grows into an account of good Greek doctors, a purported Thracian teacher, and conditions for treating the soul before the body. At 158e he says that joint inquiry will keep him from undertaking his doctoring without examination. The language connects philosophical inquiry with treatment while leaving the original medical credential a pretext.

At 164a–c the doctor supplies a different problem. A physician who makes someone healthy does something beneficial and, under Critias' definition of doing good, acts temperately. But must the physician know when the action is beneficial and when not? Critias allows "perhaps not." The resulting difficulty is not simply whether a medical practitioner knows any medicine. It is whether technical action, its benefit, and the agent's recognition of having acted temperately necessarily coincide. The passage does not state one precise reason for possible ignorance, so a lexicon should not settle it by inventing an exclusively diagnostic, predictive, or moral failure.

At 165c–d medicine is the first model for asking what a knowledge knows and what it accomplishes. It knows the healthy and produces health, a fine work and no small benefit. Critias' mathematical counterexamples challenge the demand that every knowledge have such a separate product, but do not remove the question of a determinate object. Medicine thereafter serves as a stable domain-specific expertise against which the scope of knowledge of knowledge is tested.

The central examination at 170b–171c asks whether a possessor of only second-order knowledge can distinguish

a real physician from a pretender. The distinction requires attention to medical claims and performances: are the words true and the actions correct concerning healthy and diseased things? Without medical knowledge, the proposed higher-order expert cannot follow that test. If he can, he is a physician in addition to being temperate. This is a restriction of the isolated definition, not a rule that lay people can never form justified practical judgments about doctors by any means whatsoever.

The deliberately odd conclusion at 170e–171a, that the physician does not know medicine, follows from the negotiated division of objects: medicine is itself a knowledge, and knowledge of knowledge has been assigned to temperance alone. It should be reported as a pressure generated by that arrangement, not as Socrates' unqualified belief that physicians lack their own expertise.

Finally, Socrates temporarily restores the dream's power to exclude false experts. Bodily health improves, but living knowledgeably has not yet been shown sufficient for happiness. At 174c medicine remains effective even when knowledge of good and bad is removed. At 174e–175a Socrates again assigns health to medicine rather than allowing supervisory knowledge to claim every subordinate art's work. The contrast separates technical effectiveness, human benefit, and the possible benefits of supervision. The argument's eventual impasse should prevent turning any one of these distinctions into an unquestioned final doctrine.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155b–158e. The medical impersonation, healing story, and need for prior examination

164a–c. Beneficial medical action may not include the agent's awareness of its benefit or temperance

165c–d. Medicine knows the healthy and produces health

170b–171c. Only domain-specific knowledge can test medical statements and actions as such

173b. The dream provisionally excludes false doctors

174b–175a. Medicine's product is distinguished from the knowledge that makes technical achievements beneficial

In this edition. The edition carefully retains "knowledge of the healthy" at 165c and later, instead of substituting "knowledge of health." It uses "doctoring" once for Socrates' apparent practice at 158e. The distinction between the professional, the art, its object, and its result should remain visible.

See also. Health and disease; Charm; Whole and part; Knowledge of knowledge; The dream hypothesis; Beneficial and harmful; Craft and expertise.

Doing and action

πράττειν (prattein); πράξεις (praxeis); πρᾶξιν (praxin); πράξει (praxei); δρῶν (drōn)

The word. Prattein is the Attic form corresponding to the lemma πράσσω and means doing, performing or conducting affairs. Praxis names action, activity or the doing of something; its inflected forms are quoted here from the text. Dran is another verb for doing, used without Critias' proposed technical restriction. Neither the verb nor the noun automatically denotes morally good action. The dialogue itself repeatedly speaks of doing bad things and acting harmfully, and Critias has to stipulate the narrower meaning he wants.

In the Charmides. Action first appears as a style: Charmides defines temperance as doing everything in a quiet and orderly way (159b). Socrates compares quiet

and quick actions across bodily and mental tasks, finally asking what manner of action could consistently mark a fine life (160b–d). The third definition shifts to what is done: one's own affairs (161b).

Socrates initially treats reading, writing, healing, building and weaving as cases of doing something (161d–e). Critias resists the inference from making other people's products to doing other people's affairs. He distinguishes making, working and doing, reserving doing for good production (163b–e). This is a local semantic proposal in defence of his account, not Plato's adoption of a permanent technical opposition between praxis and production. Socrates accepts the stipulated terminology only so that the proposed activity can be clearly tested.

In the doctor example the adverbs carry the evaluation: someone may have acted beneficially or harmfully without knowing how he has acted (164b–c). Later the imagined expert society would restrict its members to actions they could perform correctly (171e), but technical correctness still has to answer to the further demand for good and beneficial outcomes (174c–d). Thus different questions attach to one action: whose affair is it, is it competently performed, does it benefit, and does its agent know its character?

At the conclusion Charmides promises to do what Critias orders and threatens to carry it through by force (176b–d). The ordinary verbs return after the technical analysis without a settled definition of temperate doing. The reader must judge their relation to the ideal the conversation has pursued; obedience or resolve alone has not been proved sufficient.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159b–160d. Actions are evaluated by their manner and fineness

161b–163e. Prattein becomes the disputed term in successive definitions

164b–c. Acting beneficially is separated from knowing how one has acted

171e–172a. Correct action is the promise of expertise-guided life

173d–174d. Knowledgeable acting is distinguished from doing well and benefiting

176b–d. The final promise and threat return to practical conduct

In this edition. The edition normally maintains “do” for πράττειν where its contrast with ποιεῖν, “make,” and ἐργάζεσθαι, “work,” is contested. Elsewhere ordinary English idiom may render a different verb as “do.” In particular, “do well” translates εὖ πράττειν, whose sense includes faring well as well as good performance.

See also. Making and production; Work and working; Doing good things; Doing one’s own business; Happiness and doing well; Correctness and error.

Doing good things

τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν (tēn tōn agathōn praxin); τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις (tas tōn agathōn poiēseis); ὁ τἀγαθά (ho tagatha)

The word. The expression names the doing of good things, with τῶν ἀγαθῶν a substantivised genitive plural specifying what is done. It does not explicitly say “having good intentions” or “doing what one believes good.” Nor does it restrict the goods to possessions. The examples

include beneficial professional activity and its effects on persons. The contracted τἀγαθά is τὰ ἀγαθά, “the good things.”

In the Charmides. Socrates extracts this definition from Critias’ defence of doing one’s own business (163d–e). After allowing him to distinguish making, working and doing as he pleases, he asks for the underlying activity: is temperance doing or making good things? Critias emphatically says so, contrasting the person who produces good things with one who produces bad things. Socrates does not reply that good action is irrelevant to temperance; he says the proposal might be true and examines one implication.

The difficulty is awareness. A doctor can act beneficially for himself and a patient yet fail to know whether his treatment or its consequences benefit (164a–c). If the definition classifies an act by its benefit, the doctor would act temperately while not knowing that he does. Critias refuses that combination and prefers retracting earlier concessions. The account therefore fails to satisfy his further demand that temperance include knowing oneself.

This leaves an important distinction open: an agent can produce a good result, possess technical knowledge and still lack the evaluative or self-directed understanding Critias requires. The discussion does not establish that accidental good fortune is virtue, nor that all good action is necessarily conscious moral expertise. Rather, it discovers a question a result-based formula has not answered. Knowledge of good and bad later returns to that gap from the cognitive side, but is not formally adopted as a replacement definition.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

163c–e. Critias' terminology is reformulated as an explicit definition by good action

164a–d. Beneficial medical action without awareness conflicts with his requirement of self-knowledge

174b–d. Knowledge of good and bad supplies the later evaluative counterpart

In this edition. The repeated "doing of good things" makes the definition explicit while preserving the earlier distinction from "making." Translating the phrase simply "virtue is goodness" would suppress both its active character and the ensuing question about the agent's knowledge.

See also. Good and bad; Doing and action; Making and production; Beneficial and harmful; Knowing oneself; What ought to be done.

Doing one's own business

τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν (to ta heautou prattein); τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν (to ta hautou prattein)

The word. The formula literally means doing one's own things. The articular infinitive τὸ … πράττειν makes the activity a candidate answer to the question "What is temperance?" The neuter plural τὰ ἑαυτοῦ leaves its noun unexpressed: affairs, tasks and things are all possible expansions in appropriate contexts. That latitude permits the dialogue's shift between attending to one's proper business and producing items belonging to oneself. The reflexives ἑαυτοῦ and αὐτοῦ are alternative forms, not different theories of ownership.

In the Charmides. Charmides offers the formula as something he has heard, rather than his next inward

discovery (161b). Socrates suspects Critias is its author but agrees that the truth of the statement, not its source, is what must be tested (161c). The origin nevertheless matters dramatically: Charmides eventually prods the older man into defending his own words.

Socrates first interprets the formula through ordinary making and performing. Schoolboys write friends' and enemies' names without becoming meddlesome; a teacher does not write only his own name. Nor would a city be well managed if everyone were required to weave and wash his own cloak, cobble his own shoes and manufacture his own exercise equipment (161d–162a). The result expressly concerns doing one's own things "of this kind and in this way" (162a), a qualification often lost in accounts that say the phrase itself is simply disproved. Socrates concludes that it must be a riddle requiring interpretation.

Critias provides one by separating making from doing and by treating only good and beneficial things as genuinely one's own (163a–d). The own/other distinction is no longer primarily about whose name is written or who owns a shoe. Good production counts as appropriate activity, while harmful production counts as alien. Socrates accepts a clear stipulation of vocabulary for purposes of discussion and reformulates the answer as doing good things (163e). The next objection concerns the agent's knowledge of that goodness, not whether all cooperative work is meddling.

The theme returns without the exact slogan in the imagined knowledgeable city (171d–172a): each person does what he understands and entrusts other matters to competent people. This resembles a division of tasks rather than isolated self-sufficiency. It too must meet the final question of whether technically correct activity

ensures benefit and happiness. The dialogue therefore both rejects a crude proprietary reading and tests a more promising account of proper action; it does not hand the reader an uncomplicated political rule.

The same formula is central to justice in Republic IV. That parallel is illuminating precisely because the Charmides has not identified it with justice here, nor supplied the Republic's account of different functions within city and soul. Importing that later context would answer a question this dialogue deliberately leaves open.[11]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

161b–c. Charmides offers the borrowed formula and its truth is distinguished from its authorship

161d–162a. Schooling and manufacture expose the inadequacy of a literal self-sufficiency reading

162a–e. The formula becomes a riddle and Critias assumes its defence

163a–e. Critias redefines doing and one's own in terms of good production

171d–172d. The ideal of assigning tasks by knowledge is itself subjected to the benefit test

In this edition. "Doing one's own business" gives the phrase its ordinary idiomatic force. The edition then preserves "do" where Socrates broadens the verb's application, and "working and doing his own" at 162a for ἐργάζεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν. Readers should not silently replace that second pair with "making and doing," since

[11] Compare Republic 433a–b for justice as doing one's own work and not meddling, with the further interpretation at 443c–e. Republic IV is available in Paul Shorey's translation through Perseus: online source. The parallel is not evidence that the Charmides itself has established the Republic's doctrine.

Critias' subsequent distinction depends on which verbs have been introduced.

See also. One's own and what belongs to others; Meddling; Doing and action; Doing good things; Household and city; Justice and the just.

Double and half

διπλάσιον (diplasion); ἡμίσεος (hēmiseos); τῶν τε ἄλλων διπλασίων (tōn te allōn diplasiōn)

The word. Diplasion means double or twice as much; hēmisy, represented by the genitive hēmiseos here, means half. "Double of" and "half of" identify reciprocal places within one ratio. Half is not merely any smaller quantity.

In the Charmides. At 168c Socrates extends the greater/smaller test. Something double of other doubles and itself would have to be double of itself considered as half, because only a half can be the correlate of a double in that relation. The same item would occupy both proportional roles relative to itself.

The example strengthens the specificity of the relational reasoning. It is not enough to say that the object shares some general quality with the subject; it must possess precisely the role required by the subject's power. That thought is generalized at 168d when self-hearing requires sound and self-seeing colour.

One need not supply modern exceptional arithmetic cases to the text's ordinary ratios of quantities. Its concern is the structure of the comparisons its participants recognize, followed by the open question whether knowledge behaves similarly. The double example establishes a difficulty in a particular relational family,

not a general theorem that everything related to itself is contradictory.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

168c. Double and half exemplify incompatible reflexive ratio roles

168d. The general object-condition drawn from these examples

In this edition. The edition's "as of halves" makes explicit the role of the genitive hēmiseos. It should not be reduced to "double things are halves", which loses the correlativity.

See also. Greater and smaller; Self-relation; Power and capacity; Calculation and geometry.

Draughts

τὸ πεττευτικόν (to petteutikon); πεττευτικόν (petteutikon)

The word. To petteutikon means what belongs to playing a board game with pieces, or the relevant skill. "Draughts" is a conventional approximate English rendering; it should not identify the ancient game with every rule of modern draughts or checkers. The noun petteia is a useful lemma-family lookup term rather than the displayed form here.

In the Charmides. At 174b Socrates asks whether the hypothetical all-knowing person is made happy by the knowledge of draughts. Critias responds with incredulity. The question is deliberately deflationary: an impressive inventory of past, present and future truths still leaves us needing to select which knowledge contributes to living well.

The example need not be a dismissal of the game as involving no real competence. Its point depends on acknowledging a skill whose possession, however genuine, is insufficient to explain happiness. Calculation follows and is rejected too; health receives a stronger claim before good and bad is finally named.

The board-game association also bears on the earlier verb for taking back a claim, treated under Retraction. Any sustained reading of the dialogue as a game in which Socrates traps his opponents is interpretive. The text's immediate lesson is narrower: mastery can be genuine without being the decisive knowledge of value.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

174a–b. Draughts proposed and rejected as the knowledge chiefly making the complete knower happy

In this edition. "Draughts? What draughts?" preserves Critias' abrupt reaction. The translation uses a recognizable game name without providing evidence for an exact reconstruction of its rules.

See also. Omniscience; Calculation and geometry; Knowledgeable living; Retraction.

Dreams, horn and ivory

ὄναρ (onar); διὰ κεράτων (dia keratōn); δι' ἐλέφαντος (di' elephantos)

The word. Onar is a dream. Keras, represented here by the plural keratōn, is horn; elephas, represented by elephantos, can mean ivory as well as the animal. In this paired allusion it means ivory. The gates themselves are supplied by knowledge of the Homeric story, not named by a Greek word for gate in this sentence.

In the Charmides. Socrates introduces the hypothesis of a life wholly governed by expertise as his dream, asking whether it has passed through horn or ivory. The allusion is to Penelope's account in Odyssey 19.560–567: dreams through horn are fulfilled, whereas those through ivory deceive. The phrase signals that the attractive vision requires examination. Socrates is not claiming prophetic certainty or reporting that he actually dreamed during the night.

The hypothesis temporarily grants the proposed supervisory knowledge all the capacities earlier questioned: pretended experts are exposed, true practitioners supply reliable services, and even genuine prophets may be distinguished from impostors. The resulting life is knowledgeably organized. Its goodness and happiness remain precisely what is to be tested.

The allusion therefore has a disciplined argumentative role. It permits imaginative generosity while withholding assent to the vision's final promise. The material contrast of horn and ivory does not itself specify which premise is false or establish that all technical knowledge is deceptive. Its force is to keep the vivid scenario provisional.

Because medicine, seamanship, generalship, and crafts provide recognizably desirable results, readers can feel the dream's attraction before Socrates asks what particular knowledge makes such a life happy. The poetic frame supports this alternation of invitation and doubt. The formal argument of the hypothesis should be followed independently of any attempt to decode every Homeric detail.[12]

[12] Homer, Odyssey 19.560–567, is the source of the two gates: online source.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

173a–d. Socrates calls the fully expert life a dream and introduces the horn/ivory uncertainty

In this edition. “Ivory” is correct here; “elephant” would miss the Homeric reference. The edition explains the absent gate-image in a note rather than inserting a developed retelling into Socrates’ speech.

See also. The dream hypothesis; Homer; Knowledge of knowledge; Happiness and doing well; Good and bad.

Dropides and ancestral Critias

Δρωπίδου (Drōpidou); Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου (Kritiou tou Drōpidou)

The word. Drōpidou is the genitive of Dropides. The phrase Kritiou tou Drōpidou means “of Critias, the son of Dropides.” It names an ancestor through whom Socrates designates Charmides’ paternal house, not the present Critias’ father.

In the Charmides. At 157e Socrates praises the paternal family as the house of Critias son of Dropides, celebrated by Anacreon, Solon, and many poets for beauty, excellence, and the other things customarily called happiness. This is a lineage claim inside an encomium. Its immediate use is to make Charmides’ apparent promise seem fitting to his inheritance; the later inquiry must determine whether he actually possesses the virtue with which the family is credited.

The genealogy reaches further back than the participants’ immediate relationships. The dialogue separately names Callaeschrus as the present Critias’ father and Glaucon as Charmides’ father. Identifying

every generation between these men and the ancestral Critias requires evidence and reconstruction beyond the Charmides. The supplied notes offer a usual modern reconstruction, but the present passage does not count those generations.

Timaeus 20e–21a also links Solon, Dropides, and an older Critias in its account of an inherited story. That is valuable comparative testimony, although the identity and chronology of the Critias who speaks in the Timaeus have themselves been debated. The safe local conclusion is a celebrated ancestral connection, not a completely secure reconstructed family tree derived from one sentence.[13]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155a. Socrates invokes the family's kinship with Solon

157e–158a. The paternal house is designated by Critias son of Dropides and its poetic praise

In this edition. The note's genealogical reconstruction belongs to the editorial layer. The patronymic τοῦ Δρωπίδου must not be transferred from the ancestor to the dialogue's respondent.

See also. Critias; Callaeschrus; Glaucon; Solon; Anacreon; House, lineage and nobility.

[13] Plato, Timaeus 20e–21a, supplies the comparative Solon–Dropides–Critias tradition: online source. The parallel should be used without pretending that disputed generational identities are settled by the Charmides.

Erotic attraction

ἐρασταὶ (erastai); ἐρᾶν (eran); τὰ ἐρωτικά (ta erōtika); ἔρως (erōs); ἐρώτων (erōtōn)

The word. Erastēs names a lover or admirer; eran is to love erotically, and erōs the corresponding passion or relation. Ta erōtika means matters of love. The dialogue later distinguishes erōs, directed toward the beautiful, from epithymia, desire for pleasure, and boulēsis, wish for the good. Those local distinctions should not be collapsed into one undifferentiated term for wanting.

In the Charmides. Charmides enters preceded and followed by erastai. Socrates describes the company as overwhelmed by his appearance and includes himself among the admirers. The scene recognizes differences of age and role in male courtship without specifying an exact numerical age for Charmides or narrating a sexual encounter. The immediate action is looking, crowding, speaking, and seeking proximity.

The narrator's self-exposure is essential. He calls himself an unreliable measure of youthful beauty and reports that seeing within the boy's cloak sets him on fire. He has imagined that conversation would be easy, but desire interrupts that composure. Cydias' fawn-and-lion image reverses the expected distribution of strength: the older would-be pursuer feels caught by the beautiful youth. Charmides is not merely a passive object in the scene, for his look and his question make the supposed expert struggle to answer.

The movement toward philosophy is not an assertion that bodily beauty has ceased to matter. Socrates has already proposed stripping the soul before the body, and his medical story offers verbal treatment. Charmides' approval gradually restores Socrates' confidence. One

may read the recovery as a practical exercise in temperance, but the text does not label it the solution to the inquiry or define temperance as the complete elimination of desire. Attraction is redirected into sustained conversation, while the continuing playful power of the attractive youth remains evident at the close.

Erōs returns at 167e in the series testing knowledge of knowledge. Could there be a love directed to no beautiful thing, but only to itself and other loves? Critias denies it. The example depends on the stipulated ordinary object of love, the beautiful, and gains dramatic force from the prologue's richly specific attraction. It is not a separate argument that reflective affection or delight in being in love can never occur; it tests a purported capacity abstracted from the objects by which that capacity is recognized. Nor does the unsuccessful erotic analogy alone prove that knowledge cannot know knowledge: Socrates expressly continues the inquiry.

The ending again exchanges the positions of pursuer and pursued. Charmides wants daily association, Critias commands it, and Socrates is told he cannot resist. That reversal completes the comic frame while placing attraction beside obedience and coercion. Treating the scene as either wholly innocent educational symbolism or a single straightforward erotic confession would lose the tension Plato sustains.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154a–c. Charmides' lovers accompany him and the assembled company responds to his appearance

155c–156d. Socrates narrates erotic discomposure and recovery of conversational confidence

167e. Love of the beautiful supplies one analogy in the examination of self-related capacities

176b–d. The desired continuing association reverses the initial direction of pursuit

In this edition. The edition renders erastai as “lovers,” not merely neutral friends, and ta erōtika as “the ways of love.” The noun erōs at 167e should retain its relation to the beautiful without importing the full theory developed in the Symposium.

See also. Fine and beautiful; Charmides; Lion and fawn; Fire and renewed confidence; Stripping the soul; Desire as a relative; Wish; Self-relation.

Escaping notice

λεληθέναι (lelēthenai); λάθω (lathō); λανθάνοι (lanthanoi)

The word. The lanthanō family expresses escaping someone’s notice. With a participle it can describe doing or being something without its being noticed. The perfect lelēthenai, aorist subjunctive lathō and present optative lanthanoi have different grammatical roles but belong to the same family.

In the Charmides. Critias claims that the distinctive character of temperance cannot have escaped Socrates: he suspects a deliberate attempt to defeat him rather than a genuine inquiry. Socrates answers with a different use of unnoticedness. He examines himself because he fears thinking he knows something without actually knowing it, and doing so without recognizing the discrepancy. The danger is thus not ignorance alone but ignorance concealed from the person who has it. No confession that all his beliefs are false follows. The later dream turns the same concern outward: under the imagined supervision of temperance, a pretended pilot, physician or general would not pass undetected. That promised social detection

exceeds what the preceding examination had secured; it is restored as a hypothesis for testing benefit. The three contexts connect accusation of concealed purpose, vigilance over oneself and the imagined screening of experts.[14]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

166c. Critias says that his proposed difference between temperance and other sciences has not escaped Socrates.

166d. Socrates fears unwittingly supposing that he knows what he does not.

173a–173b. In the dream, a person falsely professing expertise would not go unnoticed.

In this edition. The edition varies “escaped,” “without noticing” and “escape our notice” according to the construction. Preserving the repeated underlying family reveals a connection obscured by separate English lookup words.

See also. Lack of knowledge; Refutation; Pretence and imposture; The dream hypothesis.

Evidence and proof

τεκμαίρομαι (tekmairomai); τεκμήριον (tekmērion); ἔνδειξαι (endeixai); δεῖξαι (deixai); ἀποδεῖξαί σε (apodeixai se; bracketed by Burnet)

The word. Tekmairesthai is to infer from an indication; tekmērion is a sign or evidence on which a conclusion rests. Deiknynai and endeiknynai mean show or make evident. “Proof” can be an English rendering without

[14] For the participial construction and its translation by an English adverb plus verb, see LSJ, s.v. λανθάνω, A.2, Scaife ATLAS. The application to unnoticed ignorance here is grounded in 166d.

implying the later technical sense of demonstrative deduction.

In the Charmides. Socrates asks for things that can be pointed out when comparing productive crafts and mathematics (165e–166a). An identifiable product and an identifiable object are different kinds of demonstration. At 169b he asks Critias first to show the possibility of reflective knowledge and then its benefit. The demand is not fulfilled: Critias' perplexity leads instead to a provisional concession.

At 172c Socrates says he infers a problem from the strange consequences coming into view. This is a diagnostic use of evidence inside an unresolved inquiry, not a claim to final demonstration. At the end Critias says Charmides' submission to Socrates' daily charm will be a tekmērion of his temperance (176b). That proposed behavioral evidence does not repair the unanswered definition. Indeed, its placement invites scrutiny of whether obedience to an authority is adequate evidence of the very virtue they could not identify.

These episodes keep evidence plural: products one can indicate, reasons for suspecting a difficulty, and conduct offered as a sign of character. Treating every "show" as a formal proof would collapse the differences the dialogue exploits.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

165e–166b. Pointing to products and identifying objects

169b–d. A requested demonstration gives way to concession

172c. An inference from problematic consequences

176b. Critias offers compliance as evidence of temperance

169b (apparatus). Burnet brackets ἀποδεῖξαί σε

In this edition. The form apodeixai se is present within Burnet's deletion brackets at 169b and is not translated as accepted text. The English "proof" at 176b renders tekmērion, evidence or a sign; it should not be retrojected as a successful logical demonstration.

See also. Agreement and concession; Recognition and discrimination; Examination; Truth and falsehood; Persuasion and obedience.

Examination

ἐξετάσαι (exetasai); ἐξετάσει (exetasei); ἐπισκοπεῖν (episkopein); πεῖραν λαβεῖν (peiran labein); διερευνῴμην (diereunōimēn)

The word. Exetazein means examine or test closely. Episkopein and related compounds mean inspect; peiran labein is to make a trial or put something to the test. Diereunan intensifies investigation. Examination is not identical to refutation: a test may establish competence, reveal limits, or leave the matter undecided.

In the Charmides. At 166c–d Socrates says he would scrutinize his own assertions for the same reason he refutes another: to avoid unnoticed false confidence. At 167a the power to examine oneself and others is ascribed to the temperate person. Socrates formulates the claim, Critias agrees, and later arguments examine whether their proposed knowledge could provide it.

At 170d that promise is curtailed. Knowing merely that a claimant has some knowledge does not establish that he knows the thing he professes. The medical test at 171a–b specifies two kinds of evidence: what the person says, considered for truth, and what he does, considered for correctness. The examiner needs competence in the

relevant field to follow either. This prevents "examination" from being reduced to catching verbal inconsistency while ignoring subject-specific performance.

At 172b a qualified role is again proposed: reflective knowledge might enable better examination concerning subjects the examiner has himself learned. This is much weaker than an all-purpose tribunal of expertise. The contrast is useful when comparing the passage with Socrates' actual questioning. His practice need not make the same claim to complete expertise that Critias' imagined supervisory knowledge does. Whether Plato intends precisely that distinction remains interpretive.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

166c–e. Self-scrutiny and attention to the argument

167a. Expansive power to examine self and others proposed

170d–171c. Object-sensitive examination of claims and performances

172b. Possible improvement in examination within a learned field

In this edition. "Examine" is kept for exetazein at 167a, 170d and 172b. At 171b it also translates a compound of skopein; the English continuity marks the activity without implying that the Greek uses only one verb.

See also. Refutation; Recognition and discrimination; Fellow expert; Evidence and proof; Knowing that and knowing what.

Face and bodily appearance

εὐπρόσωπος (euprosōpos); ἀπρόσωπος (aprosōpos); εἶδος (eidos); ἰδέαν (idean); μέγεθος (megethos)

The word. Euprosōpos means fair-faced; aprosōpos literally without a face. Eidos and idea here name visible form, figure, or appearance. Megethos is size or stature. These local uses of eidos and idea must not automatically become references to separately existing Platonic Forms.

In the Charmides. Chaerephon asks Socrates whether Charmides has a beautiful face, then says that if he undressed he would seem faceless, because his whole bodily figure is so beautiful. Aprosōpos is comic comparative hyperbole: the admired body would eclipse an already extraordinary face. It is not a report of deformity. Socrates has also been struck by the boy's stature, and the combined effect is affirmed by the reaction of adults and children.

The vocabulary then supports a contrast between visible and nonvisible excellence. Socrates wants to inspect the soul before the figure, and later distinguishes the observed qualities of Charmides' appearance from the alleged temperance and other virtues still to be tested. Critias' confidence that the youth excels "not only in appearance" is a claim, not an evidential bridge from one domain to the other.

At 175d Socrates again brings together the youth's appearance and supposed temperance of soul. The framing returns the abstract inquiry to a person whom everyone can see and admire, while acknowledging that the relevant virtue remains uncertain. Physical evidence has been richly supplied; the corresponding moral and intellectual judgment cannot simply be read off it.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154b–e. Stature, face, bodily form, and the proposal to inspect soul first

157d–158b. Critias' praise and Socrates' distinction between visible looks and alleged inner excellence

175d–e. The final lament again joins appearance and the claimed temperance of soul

In this edition. "Figure" and "looks" are appropriately concrete renderings of eidos and idea in this context. Capitalizing them as "Form" or "Idea" would suggest a metaphysical doctrine the local grammar and scene do not state.

See also. Fine and beautiful; Body; Erotic attraction; Stripping the soul; Charmides.

Fear as a relative

φόβον (phobon); φοβεῖται (phobeitai); τῶν δεινῶν (tōn deinōn)

The word. Phobos is fear; phobeisthai is to fear. Ta deina names dreadful or fearful things. The verb is constructed with an accusative object in this example.

In the Charmides. At 167e–168a Socrates asks whether Critias has ever noticed a fear that fears itself and other fears but none of the dreadful things. Critias replies that he has not noticed one. The form of the response matters: a denial of encountered cases is not by itself a deductive impossibility proof.

As with the other analogies, the restriction excludes the attitude's normal objects. "Fear of fear" can make ordinary psychological sense when fear itself is regarded as dreadful because of its effects. Such a case does not

obviously satisfy the additional requirement that the hypothetical fear fear no dreadful thing. The argument should not be simplified to a general dismissal of recursive emotion.

Fear also describes Socrates' concern about false epistemic confidence at 166d and mistaken inquiry at 172e. Those fears have determinate objects and so illustrate precisely the ordinary structure the hypothetical removes.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

166d. Socrates fears mistakenly thinking he knows

167e–168a. Fear of fears excluding dreadful things

172e. Fear that the inquiry is not being conducted correctly

In this edition. "Have you ever yet come across" renders the question about noticing such a fear. It preserves a weaker evidential formulation than "have you proved impossible".

See also. Self-relation; Desire as a relative; Belief and opinion; Possibility and impossibility.

Fellow expert

τὸν αὐτοῦ ὁμότεχνον (ton hautou homotechnon)

The word. Homotechnos means someone practising the same craft. The phrase "his own fellow craftsman" at 171c refers to the temperate person's fellow expert in the proposed field. It does not refer back to the doctor's colleague in a way that restores universal medical competence to the temperate examiner.

In the Charmides. The summary at 171c says that if temperance is only knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, it cannot distinguish a real practitioner of any particular craft from a pretender or someone mistakenly confident, except its own fellow craftsman, as other practitioners can. The exception is easy to overlook because it occurs inside an otherwise negative conclusion.

Its role is to preserve domain-relative examination. Just as a medical practitioner is competent to judge medical claims, someone expert in the proposed second-order field would, under the concession, judge someone claiming that same field. This does not automatically provide first-order medical or navigational knowledge.

The neighboring suggestion at 172b extends this idea in a qualified way: reflective awareness might improve examination of subjects its possessor has learned. The combination of domain competence and reflection is distinct from a universal supervisory science with no knowledge of the domains it supervises.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

171c. Same-field exception to the failure of universal certification

172b. Possible benefit when reflection accompanies acquired subject knowledge

In this edition. The edition explicitly renders “the temperate man’s own fellow craftsman”, clarifying the reflexive’s reference. Reading it as merely the doctor’s fellow doctor obscures the force of the exception.

See also. Examination; Recognition and discrimination; Craft and expertise; Knowledge of knowledge.

Fine and beautiful

καλός (kalos); καλόν (kalon); κάλλος (kallos); καλῶς (kalōs); καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός (kalos kai agathos); τοὺς καλούς (tous kalous)

The word. Kalos can praise bodily beauty, attractive form, admirable conduct or a fine result. Kallos is the noun for beauty, and kalōs often means finely, well or appropriately. The Greek adjective therefore crosses distinctions English commonly marks with “beautiful,” “fine,” “noble” and sometimes “right.” Its recurring use does not entail that bodily attractiveness and moral worth are identical. It instead supplies a flexible language of admiration through which their relationship can become a question. The opposite aischros similarly spans ugliness and shamefulness.

In the Charmides. Socrates’ opening question asks whether the young have become outstanding in wisdom, beauty or both (153d). This already permits beauty and wisdom to diverge. Charmides’ celebrated looks then dominate the gathering, while Socrates proposes examining the soul before the body (154b–e). Critias’ claim that the boy is kalos kai agathos in soul as well extends an established compliment about a fine person into the specific comparison between bodily and psychic quality. The narrative tests the compliment rather than certifying it.

The charm’s beautiful words (157a) preserve kalos while shifting attention from the object of desire to speech that could benefit a soul. The family encomium and Charmides’ becoming blush continue to mingle visible attractiveness, good birth and expected character (157e–158c). The dialogue thus prepares the formal premise that

temperance belongs among the fine things (159c) with a series of concrete experiences of admiration.

That premise drives the first definition's refutation. Fine performances include quick writing, nimble wrestling, rapid learning and effective deliberation, so quietness cannot claim exclusive association with the fine (159c–160d). Kalos here assesses excellence of performance as well as propriety of bearing. No separate account is provided of what makes all these cases fine, and the argument must not be recast as an explicit theory that beauty is speed.

Later Critias reserves "work" for what is made finely and beneficially (163c); medicine produces health as a fine work (165d), and the proposed knowledge of oneself is asked to show a fine work worthy of its name (165e). The pair kalōs and ōphelimōs is important: admiration and benefit are connected in the proposed account but not silently identified by the vocabulary. At 171e–172a well-run households and correctly conducted actions are imagined under temperance; their value must then survive the stricter test concerning knowledge of good and bad.

The final self-criticism calls temperance what has been agreed to be finest of all (175a–b). That highly positive status clashes with the conclusion that the proposed knowledge yields no benefit. Socrates treats the mismatch as evidence of failure in the investigation. Kalos consequently remains a criterion to which an adequate account must answer, not a complete answer on its own. The visible beauty of Charmides supplies an invitation to inquire into his soul; it never replaces the inquiry.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153d–155a. Beauty, wisdom and the soul are distinguished amid praise of Charmides

157a. Beautiful words are said to produce temperance

157e–158c. Family beauty and a becoming blush frame expectations about character

159c–160d. The fineness of temperance tests the definition as quietness

163c–165e. Fine production and a fine work become standards in the craft analogy

171e–172a. Fine and good action initially connect competent management with happiness

175a–b. The virtue's supreme fineness conflicts with the inquiry's negative result

In this edition. "Beautiful" in the dramatic opening and "fine" in the argument translate the same adjective. The literal "beautiful and good" at 154e preserves a phrase whose conventional social force could otherwise hide its play on the boy's beauty. The adverb καλῶς should not always be mechanically translated "beautifully": for instance approval of an argument or praise of its correctness naturally receives "well" or "right" in context.

See also. Ugly and shameful; Good and bad; Temperance; Modesty and shame; Work and working; Charm.

Fire and renewed confidence

ἐφλεγόμην (ephlegomēn); ἀνεζωπυρούμην (anezōpyroumēn); θρασύτης (thrasytēs); ἀνεθάρρησά (anetharrēsa)

The word. Phlegesthai supplies the image of burning; anezōpyroumēn means that Socrates was being rekindled

or revived into flame. Thrasytēs is boldness or confidence, with a range that can include overconfidence; anetharrēsa marks taking heart again. The vocabulary describes the course of a conversation, not a literal fire.

In the Charmides. Socrates begins confident that he can speak easily with Charmides. Once the youth sits beside him, that confidence is knocked away, and the erotic glimpse sets him burning. He says he is no longer in his own possession. The doctor is initially less composed than the patient he has proposed to examine.

Charmides' assent to the analogy of good medical treatment reverses the state. Socrates takes courage again, his earlier boldness gathers, and he is rekindled. The fire metaphor is reused for renewed conversational confidence rather than merely repeated as unaltered sexual excitement. This is a subtle account of changing affect within inquiry: recovery happens through the other's response, not through a narrated act of passionless withdrawal.

The sequence can support a reading of Socrates as redirecting desire into philosophical engagement. It should not, however, become a proof that thrasytēs is itself temperance or that desire has been permanently extinguished. The dialogue dramatizes a recovery of effective speech while leaving the virtue's definition to the ensuing questions.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155c–e. Earlier boldness collapses and erotic fire leaves Socrates beside himself

156c–d. Charmides' approval restores confidence, narrated as rekindling

In this edition. The edition's "I was on fire" and "I was rekindled" preserve the image across the page break. Rendering the second simply "I recovered" would lose a deliberate lexical and imaginative connection.

See also. Erotic attraction; Socrates; Charm; Temperance.

Fitting and appropriate

πρέπει (prepei); ἔπρεψεν (eprepsen); οἰκεῖα (oikeia)

The word. Prepei means it is fitting or becoming; eprepsen is its past form. It expresses an appraisal relative to a person, age or circumstance. Oikeia can likewise be translated appropriate, but belongs to the vocabulary of what is one's own and is given a specific evaluative use by Critias. These two families should not be treated as a single Greek technical term.

In the Charmides. At 154e Socrates says a good condition of soul would be fitting for someone of Charmides' family. The remark expresses the expectation being placed on his upbringing, rather than verifying that inheritance guarantees character. At 158c the boy's bashfulness is called becoming for his age. Its fitness is specifically contextual, and Socrates' approval of it can coexist with the later rejection of modesty as a complete definition of temperance.

Critias' oikeia at 163c–d does a different job: he assigns appropriateness to fine and beneficial productions and alienness to harmful ones. This is an argumentative reclassification intended to save doing one's own business. The path from social becomingness to what truly benefits a person is therefore a question the dialogue develops, not an identity already settled by a common English translation.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154e. Good psychic character is said to befit Charmides' family

158c. Bashfulness becomes the youth at his age

163c–d. Critias assigns an evaluative sense to oikeia

In this edition. The edition distinguishes "ought to be" at 154e and "was becoming" at 158c from "appropriate to one" for οἰκεῖα. Keeping the Greek forms visible prevents ordinary English "proper" from concealing different arguments.

See also. Modesty and shame; One's own and what belongs to others; What ought to be done; Fine and beautiful; Good men.

Force and compulsion

Βιάσῃ (Biasēi); βιασομένου (biasomenou); βιαζομένῳ (biazomenōi); ἀναγκασθήσεται (anankasthēsetai); ἀναγκάζῃ (anankazēi); ἀναγκασθῆναι (anankasthēnai)

The word. Biazesthai means using force or constraining someone; its forms dominate the last exchange. Anankazein means compelling or forcing and can describe social pressure, an unavoidable effect or a practical necessity. The related noun anankē often expresses logical necessity elsewhere, but not every occurrence of compulsion in the narrative is a logical entailment, and not every necessity in the argument is personal coercion.

In the Charmides. Critias initially welcomes the headache because it will force Charmides to improve his mind as well (157c–d). Socrates, by contrast, proposes cooperative inquiry so that the boy will not be forced to say what he does not wish to say about his own

temperance (158d–e). The distinction concerns how an educational opportunity is framed, not whether all difficulty or constraint is unacceptable.

At 169c Critias is said to be forced into perplexity by seeing Socrates perplexed, like someone catching a yawn. This is an involuntary reaction in the narration, not an assault and not a doctrine of involuntary wrongdoing. The accepted reading is itself textually questioned in Burnet's apparatus.

The closing threat makes force explicit. Socrates asks whether Charmides will use force without even granting him a preliminary hearing; Charmides invokes Critias' order, and Socrates says no one could oppose the boy if he acts forcibly (176c–d). Nothing physically violent is narrated at that point. The exchange can be both playful in its immediate situation and troubling in its vocabulary of command and denied hearing. The historical careers of the two aristocrats can intensify that irony, but the text's own minimum is already clear: consent and reasoned agreement have not supplied the final settlement.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157c–d. Critias imagines the headache forcing intellectual improvement

158d–e. Socrates offers inquiry without forcing an unwanted declaration

169c. Compulsion describes Critias' caught perplexity

176c–d. Charmides threatens force and Socrates gives way

In this edition. At 169c Burnet prints ἀναγκασθῆναι although the apparatus reports Badham's deletion and Burnet's possible alternative ἀναπλησθῆναι, "be infected." The final βιάζεσθαι language is secure in its practical meaning; the edition's "Count on force" renders

Charmides' participial assurance, not a narration that violence has occurred.

See also. Persuasion and obedience; Deliberation and decision; Willingness and refusal; Ruling and supervision; Preliminary hearing.

Friendship and companionship

φίλε (phile); φίλων (philōn); φίλον (philon); ἐπιτηδείων (epitēdeiōn); ἑταῖρε (hetaire)

The word. Philos supplies both the substantive "friend" and familiar forms of address; its neuter philon can mean pleasing or welcome. Epitēdeioi can designate associates or friends, while hetairos is a companion. These words are related in use without being identical in construction or social force.

In the Charmides. Friendly address pervades a conversation that includes embarrassment, teasing and sharp refutation. Socrates addresses his unnamed listener as a companion and repeatedly calls his interlocutors friends. Such vocatives do not by themselves prove intimacy or erase the unequal positions of adult and youth. The school exercise at 161d places friends beside enemies: writing either person's name is ordinary learning, so friendship cannot determine whether the act counts as doing one's own business. More consequentially, Socrates at 166d explains that scrutiny is undertaken chiefly for his own sake, and perhaps also for his other friends or associates. He immediately broadens the justification to a good common to nearly all people. Friendship therefore belongs to the stated purposes of examination, not merely to polite address. The cautious "perhaps" is worth keeping: the primary avowed motive is protection against his own unrecognized ignorance. At

158e the impersonal construction with philon makes a proposal welcome or desirable; it does not identify a new friend.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154b. The narrator addresses his unnamed listener as hetaire.

158e. “If it is welcome to you” asks whether Charmides wants the joint examination.

161d. Friends’ and enemies’ names are both written in the school exercise.

166c–166e. Socrates places friends or associates beside himself as possible beneficiaries of scrutiny, then invokes the common good.

In this edition. English “friend” gathers more than one Greek expression. The translation’s “other friends” at 166d renders epitēdeiōn, so a search restricted to the phil- family would miss a philosophically important occurrence.

See also. Common good; Refutation; Inquiry; Conversation.

Glaucon

Γλαύκωνος (Glaukōnos)

The word. Glaukōnos is the genitive of Glaukōn, used in the patronymic identifying Charmides. This Glaucon is the father of Charmides, not the younger Glaucon who is Socrates’ major interlocutor in the Republic.

In the Charmides. Critias introduces Charmides as the son of “our uncle Glaucon” and his own cousin. Later Socrates calls the youth “dear son of Glaucon” while completing the praise of his ancestry. Glaucon is not a

speaker and is not said to be present. His function is genealogical: his name identifies the branch of the household into which the promising boy was born.

The distinction between generations prevents a common confusion in reading Plato's family network. External biographical tradition makes Charmides the maternal uncle of Plato and his brother Glaucon; the latter therefore bears the name of an older relative. The Charmides does not set out this complete family tree. What it directly establishes is the older Glaucon's relationship to Charmides and Critias. The fact that Critias is guardian need not be embellished into a detailed account of Glaucon's death or the legal arrangements of the estate, neither of which the passage supplies.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154b. Critias identifies Charmides as Glaucon's son and his own cousin

158b. Socrates addresses Charmides by his father's name

In this edition. The translation's "our uncle" follows Critias' ἡμετέρου θείου. The plural possessive does not make the older Glaucon Socrates' uncle.

See also. Charmides; Critias; Guardian and cousin; House, lineage and nobility.

Godsend

Ἕρμαιον (hermaion)

The word. Hermaion is a lucky find or windfall, associated in its name with Hermes. It is used predicatively: the trouble in Charmides' head would turn out to be a godsend. Hermes is not separately named as an acting character.

In the Charmides. Critias responds to the treatment story by welcoming an unexpected benefit from the bodily complaint. If the headache forces Charmides to become better in mind as well, the apparent misfortune has provided a fortunate opening for education. The humor depends on the turn from head to dianoia, the young man's mind or understanding.

The remark is conditional. No improvement has yet been demonstrated, and Critias immediately complicates the need for it by insisting that Charmides is already exceptionally temperate. The apparent godsend therefore introduces the question of whether the treatment is needed at all. It does not settle whether the subsequent inconclusive conversation has made the boy better or predict his later political choices.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157c–d. Critias calls the head complaint a potential godsend because it may lead to mental improvement

In this edition. "Godsend" conveys the favorable surprise of the Greek. A flat "advantage" would lose both the unexpectedness and the divine association; a claim that Hermes personally caused the headache would add more than the sentence says.

See also. Head and headache; Charm; Soul; Critias; Beneficial and harmful.

Good and bad

ἀγαθόν (agathon); τὸ ἀγαθόν (to agathon); τὰ ἀγαθὰ (ta agatha); κακόν (kakon); τὸ κακόν (to kakon); τὰ κακὰ (ta kaka); ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ (agathou te kai kakou)

The word. Agathon and kakon are neuter singular forms of the adjectives “good” and “bad”; with the article they can name what is good or bad. Their plurals can mean good or bad things, outcomes or actions according to context. The masculine forms can praise or condemn people, and a good doctor can simply be a competent doctor. The pairing therefore spans evaluative, practical and ethical judgments without automatically distinguishing a special class of “moral goods” from everything useful. Nor does the substantivised τὸ ἀγαθόν by itself establish that the speaker is discussing a separately existing Form of the Good. The relevant question is what the passage makes good or bad, for whom, and in what respect.

In the Charmides. Three widely separated passages create the main arc. The Thracian physician’s account attributes the body’s and the whole person’s bad and good conditions to the soul (156e). Critias later defines temperance as doing good things (163e). Finally he identifies knowledge of good and bad as the knowledge that makes us happy (174b). These are related concerns, but they have different speakers, grammatical constructions and argumentative tasks. The medical story is Socrates’ reported account; the action definition is Critias’ proposal; the final knowledge is introduced within a highly concessive thought experiment.

The first explicit ethical test of goodness occurs in the refutation of modesty. Socrates elicits that temperate men are good and that temperance makes its possessors good

(160e–161a). Goodness is thus more than looking socially admirable. The Homeric example supplies a situation in which modesty is not good for someone, whereas temperance is treated as reliably good. The test does not give a general definition of goodness. Indeed the step from making people good to being good is compressed enough that Burnet records proposed repairs at 160e11. A lexicon should register the premise actually used rather than manufacture a completed ethical theory behind it.

At 163c–e Critias connects good with the fine and beneficial. His explanation reassigns “one’s own” and “appropriate” to what benefits, and makes good production count as proper doing. Socrates allows terminology to be stipulated if its application is clear. He does not endorse the definition merely because he reformulates it. The doctor then reveals the distinction between a good result and the agent’s awareness that it is good (164a–c). This small example anticipates the later distinction between possessing technical competence and knowing whether the resulting condition is beneficial.

Socrates’ own ethical commitment remains explicit but provisional in form: he “divines” that temperance is beneficial and good (169b). When a knowledge-guided household or city is imagined, goodness first seems to follow from the removal of technical mistakes. Socrates then withdraws that easy agreement (171d–172e). The withdrawal is essential: a reader who stops with the orderly city misses the dialogue’s examination of the standard by which its successes count as good.

At 174a–b even imagined comprehensive knowledge of past, present and future must be analysed by kind. Critias does not say that all knowledge contributes equally to happiness. Knowledge of health is more relevant than calculation, but the decisive answer is knowledge of good

and bad. Socrates sharpens this to the claim that this knowledge, rather than all other sciences together, makes doing well and happiness possible (174b–c). The next test removes it while retaining the crafts. Doctors can still make people healthy, cobblers supply shoes, pilots and generals save lives; what disappears is those achievements' occurring well and beneficially (174c–d). Technical success therefore does not, within the test, supply its own sufficient criterion of value.

This is not a denial that health, survival or competent work can be good. It distinguishes the craft's immediate accomplishment from the knowledge that would establish its contribution to a good life. The passage does not spell out a procedure for using that knowledge, identify its possessor, or settle whether it is one virtue or all virtue. Critias tries to give temperance a share in its benefit through supervision; Socrates insists that the two knowledges have different objects and work (174d–175a). That restriction is part of the disputed argument, not a settled account of all relationships between expertise and its governance.

Knowledge of good and bad is consequently a strong interpretive lead, not the dialogue's announced final definition. The last explicit judgment remains that temperance is a great good despite the inquiry's failure (175e). What is left open is how the virtue, knowledge of

value, self-knowledge and effective guidance of life fit together.[15]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154e. Critias' "beautiful and good" applies a social and ethical commendation to Charmides

156b–e. Good doctors and the good and bad proceeding from the soul illustrate different evaluative uses

160e–161b. Temperance makes people good; modesty is not good in every case

163c–164c. Doing good is defined and tested against beneficial action without awareness

166d. Making things clear as they are is called a common good

169b. Socrates affirms his expectation that temperance is beneficial and good

171d–172e. The goodness of technically correct life is first assumed, then questioned

174a–175a. Knowledge of good and bad is distinguished from technical sciences and knowledge of knowledge

175e–176a. Temperance remains a great good despite the negative outcome

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[15] Modern interpretations differ about how positively to read the final knowledge. Justin Clark's article explicitly proposes identifying temperance with knowledge of good and bad applied to particular operations of the soul: "Knowledge and Temperance in Plato's Charmides," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, published online 2018, online source. That is an interpretive proposal, not a definition explicitly adopted in the dialogue. As printed, the question at 160e makes producing good people necessary for a thing to be good; the ensuing conclusion treats temperance's making people good as sufficient for its goodness. The converse is not supplied in that question, although it is expressly assumed in the renewed conditional at 161a. Burnet's apparatus at 160e11 records Schanz's suspected lacuna and Goldbacher's supplement; neither is incorporated into the printed text. This is a compressed or textually troubled inference, not a completed ethical theory.

In this edition. “Good and bad,” rather than “good and evil,” preserves the Greek pairing across the medical prologue, action definition and final epistemic argument. It avoids prematurely making all instances narrowly moral. Yet this translation choice does not exclude ethical goodness: the character of good men and the worth of an entire life are plainly at stake. In 174e τἀγαθόν is the crasis of τὸ ἀγαθόν; it is not a different technical concept.

See also. Temperance; Beneficial and harmful; Happiness and doing well; Doing good things; Good men; Fine and beautiful; Ruling and supervision; Common good.

Good men

ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες (agathoi andres); ἀγαθοὺς (agathous); καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός (kalos kai agathos)

The word. Agathoi andres means good men, with both words masculine plural. In the compact phrase kalos kai agathos, “fine/beautiful and good,” the conjunction joins a conventional commendation of a person’s standing and character. Neither expression is a neutral description of membership in a social class, and neither gives a definition of goodness simply by being uttered.

In the Charmides. Critias guarantees at 154e that Charmides is beautiful and good in soul as well as impressive in body. Socrates’ examination puts substance behind what could remain an easy compliment. At 160e the premise that temperate men are good becomes a criterion for testing the definition as modesty. What makes men good is taken to be good itself; temperance is said to make its possessors good and not bad (161a).

The movement from a praised individual to a general claim about the virtue matters. Publicly being called a

good young man does not answer what temperance is, and the ensuing argument does not demonstrate that Charmides already has it. Nor does the masculine wording prove that the quality cannot belong to women; the local discussion is framed around a boy and the men examining him. A lexical account should report that frame without deriving an unattested exclusion from it.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154e. Critias extends the "beautiful and good" compliment to Charmides' soul

160e–161a. The goodness of temperate men becomes a premise against the identity with modesty

In this edition. The literal "beautiful and good" keeps the connection with the preceding praise of the boy's looks. The attested expanded form καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός should not be silently replaced in the forms list by the familiar contraction καλὸς κἀγαθός.

See also. Good and bad; Fine and beautiful; Virtue and excellence; Temperance; Modesty and shame.

Great King and Asia

μέγαν βασιλέα (megan basilea); τῇ ἠπείρῳ (tēi ēpeirōi); πρεσβεύων (presbeuōn)

The word. Megas basileus, "Great King," is the conventional royal designation used here of the Persian ruler; the attested phrase has the accusative megan basilea after para. Ēpeiros means mainland or continent, here the Asian mainland in the setting of Pyrilampes' embassies. Presbeuōn means acting as an ambassador.

In the Charmides. The Persian court appears only through the reputation of Charmides' maternal uncle.

Socrates says that Pyrilampes was admired for beauty and stature whenever he visited the Great King or another ruler on the continent. This external horizon magnifies a family encomium within an intensely local Athenian setting.

No king is named and no individual mission dated. The conversation's disputed chronology does not justify attaching a specific monarch to every embassy in the retrospective plural "whenever." Nor does the sentence compare constitutions or offer a theory of Persian kingship. Its function is to make admiration of Pyrilampes appear geographically extensive, supporting the claim that the maternal household is no less distinguished than the paternal.

The lexical contrast with Zalmoxis deserves notice. Both a Persian ruler and the Thracian god-king are called basileus, but their places in the dialogue differ sharply: one anchors aristocratic diplomatic prestige; the other authorizes the medical story about treating the soul. The shared ordinary noun does not imply that Plato has identified their authority or doctrine.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158a. The Great King and other rulers of the continent are destinations of Pyrilampes' embassies

In this edition. "Continent" follows the Greek and the note identifies Asia. "Great King" should remain a title without an invented proper name. The apparatus records variation and an editorial proposal to delete the repeated phrase about rulers on the continent; Burnet retains it.

See also. Pyrilampes; Zalmoxis; House, lineage and nobility.

Greater and smaller

τὸ μεῖζόν (to meizon); ἐλάττονός (elattonos); ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον (heautou meizon); πλέον (pleon); ἔλαττον (elatton)

The word. Meizon and elatton express greater and smaller; pleon and elatton also more and less. These comparatives require a correlate, often supplied by a genitive. Their logical importance here lies in what occupies each side of the comparison, not merely in naming two contrary qualities.

In the Charmides. At 168b Socrates compares knowledge's being of something with the greater's being greater than something. If it is greater, its correlate is smaller. Suppose an alleged greater is greater than other greater things and itself, while not greater than the ordinary objects of greater things. The self-comparison entails being both greater and smaller than itself (168c).

This is not the harmless claim that one object can be great in one context and small in another. It is the repeated identity of the correlate that creates the incompatibility. The argument adds more/less, heavier/lighter and older/younger, displaying a family of analogous relations rather than relying on one size example.

At 168e Socrates treats magnitudes and quantities as wholly resistant to the relevant self-relation. But he immediately distinguishes capacities such as sight and motion, about which judgments may differ. Accordingly the comparative reductio serves as a test case for the broader problem; it does not automatically settle whether knowing can be reflexive.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

168b–c. Greater requires smaller as correlate; self-comparison reverses the same relation

168c–e. Parallel comparisons and the distinction between impossible and disputed cases

In this edition. “The greater” can sound like the name of a Platonic Form in English. Here the immediate function is predicative and relational. The argument itself does not require identifying it with a separately existing Form of Greatness.

See also. Double and half; Self-relation; Necessity and consequence; Weighing.

Guardian and cousin

ἐπιτρόπου (epitropou); ἐπιτρόπῳ (epitropōi); ἀνεψιόν (anepsion); ἀνεψιοῦ (anepsiou)

The word. Epitropos is someone entrusted with responsibility, here a guardian. Anepsios means cousin in the stated relationship between Critias and Charmides. The two words designate distinct roles: kinship explains a family connection, guardianship an authority over the youth.

In the Charmides. Critias identifies Charmides as his cousin at 154b. Socrates then says that even if Charmides were younger there would be nothing improper in his conversing with the adults in Critias’ presence, since Critias is simultaneously guardian and cousin. The juxtaposition legitimates the proposed association in social terms. The conversation is public and supervised, not presented as a clandestine removal from the household.

At the end, the guardian's role becomes an explicit ground for obedience. Critias commands Charmides to let Socrates charm him and to remain with him. Charmides says that he would act terribly if he did not obey his guardian and do what he orders. This supplies a practical direction after the inquiry has failed to establish a definition. Yet it also brings together compliance with education and the threatened coercion of the educator: the command is invoked to justify force if Socrates resists.

The word therefore belongs to both the opening's reassuring propriety and the ending's ambiguous authority. It need not imply that the dialogue provides a full description of Athenian guardianship law, Charmides' legal age, or management of his inheritance. None is stated. Nor should epitropos be confused with phylax, a guard, or with the metaphor of temperance "standing guard" over knowledge: the social office here is specific.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154b. The cousin relationship is explicitly identified

155a. Guardian and cousin are named together as grounds for propriety

176b–c. Critias' command and Charmides' expressed duty of obedience

In this edition. "Guardian" is preferable here to a generic "supervisor," because it preserves the personal and familial relation. The edition keeps the pairing with "cousin" and the return of "guardian" at the close.

See also. Charmides; Critias; House, lineage and nobility; Persuasion and obedience; Force and compulsion; Preliminary hearing.

Happiness and doing well

εὐδαιμονίᾳ (eudaimoniāi); εὐδαίμονας (eudaimonas); εὐδαιμονεῖν (eudaimonein); εὖ πράττειν (eu prattein); εὐδαιμονέστερον (eudaimonesteron)

The word. Eudaimonia names happiness or a fortunate, successful condition of life; the adjective eudaimōn and verb eudaimonein describe being happy. The comparative eudaimonesteron means happier. This family is not restricted to a passing pleasurable feeling. Eu prattein, "do well," is a different expression, capable of referring to successful or good action and to faring well. Its flexibility is central to the inference from correct performances to a happy life. Neither grammatical expression supplies, by itself, the philosophical conditions of happiness; those are precisely what the later discussion tests.

In the Charmides. The noun first belongs to family encomium. Charmides' paternal house is celebrated for beauty, excellence and the other things conventionally called happiness (157e–158a). The phrase "the other so-called happiness" keeps some distance from the inherited package of aristocratic advantages. It need not be read as a wholesale dismissal, but it makes conspicuous that fortunate birth and public admiration are not yet a philosophical account of living well.

The decisive transition occurs at 171d–172a. If temperance could distinguish expertise from its absence, people would refrain from undertakings they did not understand and assign them to experts. Error would disappear, rightness would lead, everyone would act finely and well, and those who did well would be happy. The repeated eu prattein joins performance to condition of life. It is tempting to read this as a straightforward Socratic proof that expertise guarantees happiness. The

next stages forbid that shortcut: the very powers assumed have not been secured, and Socrates explicitly questions the agreement that acting only with knowledge must be a great good (172d–e).

His dream gives the stronger hypothesis a generous trial. Genuine experts would make human beings healthier, keep them alive in dangerous circumstances and supply expertly made possessions; genuine prophets could even provide knowledge of the future. He concedes that such a world would live and act knowledgeably, but says they have not yet established that it would do well and be happy (173c–d). The issue is no longer mere error avoidance. It is which knowledge gives successful activities their value for life.

Critias rejects leather-cutting, metalworking and the like as sufficient answers. Even the imagined person who knows all past, present and future events owes happiness to a particular knowledge, not indifferently to everything known. Critias identifies knowledge of good and bad (174a–b). When this is removed, the crafts still achieve their own results, but what is lost is their occurring well and beneficially (174c–d). The happiness question has thereby transformed an inquiry into competent performance into one about evaluative understanding.

The conclusion preserves both desire for happiness and uncertainty about its precise connection with the proposed virtue. Socrates tells Charmides that genuine temperance would make him blessed, and that he should be happier in proportion as he is more temperate, even if Socrates' inquiry has proved inadequate (175e–176a). This is a continuing ethical commitment, not a derived definition of happiness. The boy's inability to say whether he possesses temperance also prevents the exchange from

certifying his happiness on the basis of beauty, lineage or reputation.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157e–158a. Happiness belongs to the conventional praise of Charmides' family

171d–172a. A proposed chain joins knowledgeable action, doing well and happiness

172d–173d. Socrates withdraws the easy agreement and tests it in his dream

173d–174c. The knowledge relevant to happiness must be specified as knowledge of good and bad

175e–176a. Socrates reaffirms the connection between genuine temperance and a happier life

In this edition. The edition's "do well" preserves the double use of εὖ πράττειν instead of resolving it into either moral action or prosperity in every occurrence. "Happy" is therefore to be read alongside the question of an entire life, rather than reduced to mood. The sole noun-form in the family encomium is dative εὐδαιμονίᾳ; the headword's dictionary form εὐδαιμονία is not being quoted as the local inflection.

See also. Good and bad; Beneficial and harmful; Temperance; Blessedness; Doing and action; Wealth and possessions.

Head and headache

κεφαλὴν (kephalēn); κεφαλῆς (kephalēs); βαρύνεσθαί (barynesthai); ἀσθενείας (astheneias); ὀφθαλμοὺς (ophthalmous)

The word. Kephalē is the head. Charmides' symptom is expressed by barynesthai, feeling weighed down or

heavy, and called astheneia, a weakness or complaint. “Headache” is a convenient contextual label, but the wording is not a detailed clinical diagnosis.

In the Charmides. Critias says that Charmides recently complained of a heavy head when getting up in the morning. That provides the socially acceptable reason to call him over. The actual cause, duration, severity, and treatment outcome are never established. Nothing warrants explaining the symptom as a hangover, a moral defect, or a particular disease.

The head then occupies the middle of Socrates’ analogy: sore eyes require attention to the head, and the head requires treatment of the whole body. Critias later jokes that the trouble in the head is a godsend if it forces an improvement in the youth’s mind as well. The joke depends on the movement from physical occasion to intellectual benefit, without identifying head and soul.

Once the question becomes the nature of temperance, the original complaint falls out of the record. The ending returns to the charm, not to a medical report that the headache has vanished. This absence is part of the frame’s transformation and should be preserved in any summary of its outcome.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155b. Critias reports the morning heaviness and proposes the medical pretext

156b–157a. Eyes and head are linked to body and soul in the therapeutic analogy

157c–d. Critias welcomes mental improvement occasioned by the head complaint

In this edition. The translation gives “his head feels rather heavy” at the first report and later uses “trouble

with his head." This should not be rephrased as intellectual weakness: the Greek is describing the bodily complaint that occasions discussion.

See also. Remedy and leaf; Whole and part; Godsend; Body.

Health and disease

ὑγίειαν (hygieian); ὑγιείας (hygieias); ὑγιεινοῦ (hygieinou); ὑγιᾶ (hygiā); νοσώδους (nosōdous); νοσήματα (nosēmata)

The word. Hygieia is health, a condition and a product of medicine. Hygieinon is the substantivized adjective "the healthy," medicine's object; hygiēs describes someone healthy or sound. Nosēmata are diseases, while nosōdes names what is diseased or disease-related. The abstract product and the domain of expertise should not be flattened into one English expression.

In the Charmides. The initial treatment promises that the remedy, with its charm, will make the patient healthy. The Thracian teaching explains why many diseases escape Greek doctors: they fail to attend adequately to the whole. Temperance generated in souls is then said to make the provision of health to head and body easier. This is a reported order of therapeutic dependence, not an identification of physical health with virtue.

The ensuing argument progressively separates health from other claims. At 164a–c making someone healthy is the physician's paradigmatic action, but the agent's knowledge that he has acted beneficially is not simply guaranteed. At 165c–d medicine knows the healthy and makes health. At 170e–171b healthy and diseased things define the material on which medical words and actions are tested. The object is thus broad enough to include

recognizing disease, not merely praising the result of successful treatment.

In the dream of complete expertise, people become healthier in body. Critias at 174b grants that knowing the healthy contributes more to happiness than knowing calculation, but names knowledge of good and bad as decisive. The removal test then preserves medicine's capacity to make us healthy while removing the beneficialness of the result. The dialogue thereby resists an automatic inference from health to happiness, without asserting that health is itself an evil or that medicine has ceased to function.

That distinction reaches the final refutation. Temperance, defined as knowledge of knowledge, is not the producer of health, since that task belongs to another art. The question is whether it can nevertheless claim a distinct benefit, especially through supervision. Its failure within the argument does not rescind the ordinary difference between being ill, being treated competently, and being well.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155e–157b. Health is the treatment's promised result and diseases occasion the whole-person critique

164a–c. Making healthy and knowingly benefiting are tested for equivalence

165c–d. Health as product is distinguished from the healthy as object

170a–171b. Healthy and diseased things delimit medical expertise

173b–174d. Improved health is granted without granting happiness from expertise alone

174e–175a. Health is assigned to medicine rather than to knowledge of knowledge

In this edition. The edition makes an important terminological choice by keeping “health” and “the healthy” distinct. The Greek alternates spellings ὑγίεια and related genitive forms as printed; they belong to one lexical family, not different technical conditions.

See also. Doctor and medicine; Body; Whole and part; Good and bad; Happiness and doing well.

Hearing and sound

ἀκοή (akoē); φωνῆς (phōnēs); ἀκούει (akouei); φωνὴν ἐχούσης (phōnēn echousēs)

The word. Akoē is hearing; akouein is to hear. Phōnē can mean voice or sound; in the relational analogy its function is the audible object. It is not restricted here to articulate speech.

In the Charmides. After sight, Socrates asks about hearing that hears itself, other hearings and non-hearings, but hears no sound (167d). The form repeats the restrictive proposal: a capacity directed only at capacities, excluding its ordinary field. Critias again says no.

At 168d hearing illustrates the generalized object-condition. If it hears itself, it must hear itself as having sound; it could not hear otherwise. This differs from the greater/smaller contradiction. The required sound is a consequence needing further assessment, not by itself an explicit logical inconsistency.

The text’s closing qualification is consequently essential. Hearing and sight are among cases whose self-relation may seem incredible to some but not others (168e–169a). Socrates still calls for a discriminating classification. The analogy gives a problem that any reflective-knowledge account must address; it does not

permit a final declaration that all higher-order cognition is as impossible as being greater than oneself.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

167d. Hearing of hearings with no sound

168d. Self-hearing requires sound in the hearing itself

168e–169a. Hearing included among disputed rather than simply disproven cases

In this edition. The edition uses “sound”, appropriately widening phōnē beyond human voice in this argument. Rendering it “speech” would introduce a linguistic restriction that the example does not state.

See also. Sight and colour; Perception; Self-relation; Power and capacity.

Hesiod

Ἡσιόδου (Hēsiodou); Ἡσίοδον (Hēsiodon)

The word. Hēsiodos is the poet whose statement about work Critias cites. The transmitted phrase is used in indirect quotation: ergon ouden einai oneidos, that no work is a reproach or disgrace.

In the Charmides. Critias invokes Hesiod to authorize his distinction between making, doing, and working. The maxim “work is no disgrace,” from Works and Days 311, might appear to license every occupation. Critias refuses that result, listing cobbling, selling salt fish, and sitting in a brothel as activities he will not place under honorable work. He therefore makes “work” a selective evaluative term: what is made finely and beneficially counts as work, whereas harmful things are alien rather than properly one’s own.

This is Critias' interpretation of Hesiod, not an independently quoted Hesiodic analysis of the three Greek verbs. The difference is philosophically important. The authority of a familiar verse assists a new stipulation about vocabulary, and Socrates answers that he will allow the verbal assignments if the intended claim is made clear. The discussion then proceeds to the explicit definition of temperance as doing good things.

The neighboring Homeric appeal is handled differently. Homer supplies a counterexample to Charmides; Hesiod is made to support a revised account by distinguishing senses of work. External Socratic testimony adds a striking parallel: Xenophon's Memorabilia reports an accusation that Socrates used the same Hesiodic line to sanction discreditable gain, and replies by restricting good work. That resemblance establishes a shared interpretive controversy, but it does not license treating Critias' speech here as a transcript of the historical Socrates' teaching.[16]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

163b–c. Critias uses Hesiod to separate making from honorable working and doing

163d–e. Socrates converts the interpretive speech into a clearer claim about doing good

In this edition. Burnet brackets δ' in the indirect quotation at 163b4. Its presence in the poetic line does not require it to stand in Plato's converted syntax. The edition distinguishes "make," "do," and "work" so that Critias' maneuver remains visible.

[16] Hesiod, Works and Days 311, is the cited line; the supplied edition gives that standard modern line number. Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.56–57, reports the accusation and restrictive defense: online source. This is comparative evidence, not proof that Critias has correctly interpreted Hesiod.

See also. Doing and action; Good and bad; Poet and actor; Prodicus; Critias; Making and production; Work and working.

Homer

Ὁμήρῳ (Homērōi)

The word. Homērōi is the dative of Homer, the poet appealed to as an authority at 161a. Homeric material also enters through an unannounced allusion to the gates of dreams at 173a, where the poet is not named.

In the Charmides. Socrates asks Charmides whether he trusts Homer's statement that modesty is not good when present with a man in need. Charmides accepts the line, and the concession supplies a counterexample to the equation of modesty with temperance: temperance is agreed to be good, whereas modesty can fail to be so. The argument's immediate force is the interlocutor's acceptance of the poet's judgment, not an independently demonstrated general theory of shame.

The source is Odyssey 17.347, in the episode in which the disguised Odysseus is to beg from the suitors. That context makes the inhibition at issue practical: a needy beggar cannot let reticence prevent him from seeking food. Whether this particular inhibition exhausts the aidōs intended by Charmides is a question for evaluating the refutation. The verse as Plato gives it differs from the familiar Homeric text: the ending "to be present" supports the repeated language of a quality being present in someone. An edition should report the difference rather than silently standardize Plato's quotation to Homer.

A later Homeric image works differently. Socrates asks whether his dream has come through horn or ivory,

echoing Penelope's distinction between truthful and deceptive dreams. The quotation about modesty is recruited as an accepted premise; the dream allusion marks uncertainty about a hypothesis. Together they show that the dialogue's poetic borrowings do not all have one evidential status.[17]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

161a–b. A Homeric line is accepted as a counterexample to modesty's unconditional goodness

173a. Socrates alludes to the Homeric gates of dreams without naming the poet

In this edition. The edition retains "to be present," corresponding to παρεῖναι in Plato's quoted line, and explains the difference from the usual Odyssey text. The named occurrence of Homer is 161a; 173a is an allusion, not a second attestation of the name.

See also. Modesty and shame; Good and bad; Dreams, horn and ivory; Hesiod; Poet and actor.

House, lineage and nobility

οἰκίας (oikias); οἰκίαι (oikiai); συγγενείας (syngeneias); γενναῖον (gennaion); οὐκ ἀγεννῶς (ouk agennōs)

The word. Oikia can mean a dwelling, household, or family line; its sense must be set by context. In the prologue it often designates the houses from which Charmides descends. Syngeneia is kinship; gennaios can mean wellborn or nobly constituted. Ouk agennōs, "not ignobly," can credit someone's manner of answering without itself proving noble ancestry.

[17] Odyssey 17.347 is the direct source; compare Plato, Laches 201b, for the same adaptation of the line. For the dream passage, Odyssey 19.560–567: online source.

In the Charmides. Socrates first appeals to the household at 154e: Charmides ought to be well endowed in soul, being a member of Critias' family. After the account of the charm, the expectation becomes an extended encomium of the paternal and maternal houses. Poets have celebrated the former; Pyrilampes' admired embassies distinguish the latter. Their union is said to promise unusually fine offspring.

The logic is expectational rather than demonstrative. At 158b Socrates differentiates what is visible in Charmides' appearance from the conditional claim that he has adequate natural gifts for temperance and the other virtues. The examination is necessary precisely because familial reputation has not answered whether this particular person possesses the virtue or can explain it.

The repeated vocabulary of nobility also creates a tension with the therapeutic oath. No one, the Thracian insists, is to be rich, wellborn, or beautiful enough to evade treatment of the soul. Charmides meets the conspicuous social qualifications, but they do not purchase an exemption. The authority of an admired lineage is respected rhetorically and restricted procedurally.

When Charmides gives his careful answer rather than either boasting or contradicting his guardian, the narrator says he replies ouk agennōs. The edition's "did his breeding credit" makes the family echo audible. This is a judgment about the grace of his immediate response, not a proof that sōphrosynē is genetically inherited. Later oikia appears in the thought experiment about well-managed households; that political-economic use should not automatically be read as genealogical praise.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154e–155a. Soul, family expectation, and kinship with Solon

157b–c. Wellborn status is explicitly denied the power to override therapeutic conditions

157e–158b. The two houses and their union receive an encomium

158c–d. Charmides answers “not ignobly”

171e–172d. Household becomes an object of the hypothetical management by temperance

In this edition. At 157e5 the apparatus distinguishes οἰκία, household or house, from B’s οὐσία, property or substance. At 158b1 Burnet adopts Madvig’s “fallen short” in a difficult ancestral comparison; the unqualified compliment depends on that textual choice.

See also. Glaucon; Callaeschrus; Dropides and ancestral Critias; Pyrilampes; Guardian and cousin; Fine and beautiful; Ruling and supervision.

Household and city

οἰκία (oikia); πόλις (polis); οἰκεῖσθαι (oikeisthai); οἰκουμένη (oikoumenē); πολιτευομένη (politeuomenē); διοικήσεως (dioikēseōs)

The word. Oikia can mean house, household or family; polis names a city as a political community. Oikeisthai can describe how a household or community is inhabited or managed, while politeuesthai concerns political organisation or governance. Dioikēsis names management or administration. The dialogue moves between the family that gives Charmides his social standing, houses as craft products, and households or

cities as organised settings for action. These are related uses, not a single fixed referent.

In the Charmides. The first political example rejects a crude reading of doing one's own business. Socrates asks whether a city would run well under a law requiring every citizen to manufacture all his own necessities (161e–162a). Charmides says no, while agreeing that a temperately managed city would be managed well. The example depends on the inadequacy of isolated self-sufficiency; it does not present a constitution or a detailed economic division of labour.

Household and city later become the main beneficiaries of the imagined knowledge-guided life (171e–172a). People would do what they knew and delegate the rest to experts. The house in this context is an organised group, unlike the houses produced by building at 165d. Socrates immediately goes on to question whether such administration is sufficient for good life, even if its technical competence is granted (172c–d).

The political dimension therefore expands the problem of temperance beyond an individual's outward composure. It asks what personal or supervisory knowledge could make collective action go well. The dialogue offers no unconditional endorsement of rule by someone who merely knows that knowledge exists. Its final appeal to knowledge of good and bad shows why efficient organisation cannot settle its own ethical aim.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154e. Oikia is family or house in the praise of Charmides' lineage

157e–158a. Oikia is family or house in the praise of Charmides' lineage

161e–162a. A self-sufficiency law is tested against good civic management

165d–e. Houses are the products of house-building

171e–172d. Household and city become sites of hypothetical expert management and its benefit test

In this edition. The English differentiates “family,” “house,” and “household” by context. At 171e Burnet prints οἰκουμένη; the apparatus records οἰκονομουμένη in T. Both support a management context, but the variant should not be silently cited as the accepted text.

See also. Doing one’s own business; Ruling and supervision; Work and working; Happiness and doing well; Good and bad.

Hypothesis

ὑποθέμενος (hypothemenos); ὑπετιθέμεθα (hypetithemetha); θῶμεν (thōmen); εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα (ei hoti malista)

The word. The hypothesis vocabulary appears here chiefly as verbs: to put down, suppose or lay down. Hypothemenos describes one who has posited a definition; thōmen, “let us posit”, constructs an imagined case. Ei hoti malista introduces an emphatic supposition, often “even if entirely” or “suppose as fully as possible”. The noun “hypothesis” is an analytical headword, not a claim that Plato announces a formal method under that name.

In the Charmides. At 160d the fineness of temperance is described as something laid down in the argument. At 163a Socrates asks whether someone who posits “doing one’s own business” can accept the consequences being

drawn. Such starting points are subject to examination; being posited does not guarantee being true.

The later argument distinguishes granting an account its strongest case from establishing that case. Possibility is granted at 169d. At 172c–d both possibility and the original power to identify what people know are restored. The dream then imagines those powers operating fully in social life. At 174a a person knowing all past, present and future things is posited to isolate the question of which knowledge makes him happy.

This procedure permits an especially strong test: even with controversial capacities granted, the intended benefit may fail to follow. Conversely, the scenario's consequences must not be cited as unconditional claims about human psychology, social institutions or the actuality of prophecy. The repeated supposition markers identify the local argumentative status.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

160d. Fineness as an agreed starting point

163a. A definition described as posited

169d. Possibility assumed to advance the inquiry

172c–174a. Strong concessions and imagined complete knowledge

In this edition. "Even if", "let us grant" and "let us suppose" carry indispensable logical information. At 174a Burnet prints θῶμεν, "let us posit"; the apparatus records φῶμεν, "let us say", as a proposed alternative, not the adopted text.

See also. Agreement and concession; The dream hypothesis; Possibility and impossibility; Omniscience.

Immortalizing

ἀπαθανατίζειν (apathanatizein)

The word. Apathanatizein is a causative infinitive, “to make immortal.” In its sentence it depends on legontai, “they are said,” and is qualified by kai: the doctors are reputed “even” to immortalize. That grammar matters as much as the unusual verb.

In the Charmides. The claim heightens the authority of the Thracian doctors from whom Socrates says he learned his charm. Their reputation exceeds curing a headache and even ordinary bodily health. Yet no explanation, demonstration, or argument for immortality follows. The reported instruction concerns the soul’s priority in therapy and the production of temperance through beautiful words.

Herodotus’ account of the Getae supplies a useful comparison: immortality language there concerns their understanding of death and going to Zalmoxis. Plato’s compound verb may recall that ethnographic language, but the local text does not identify its precise ritual mechanism. It would be particularly misleading to cite this infinitive as an argument in the Charmides for the soul’s natural indestructibility. No such argument is supplied here.[18]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156d. Socrates reports the doctors’ extraordinary reputation before explaining the charm

In this edition. “Who are said even to make one immortal” preserves the evidential restraint and

[18] Compare Herodotus 4.94–96 for the Getae and Zalmoxis: online source. The comparison does not settle the literal force of Plato’s medical fiction.

intensification. Turning it into “who make the soul immortal” both removes the reporting qualification and inserts an object the Greek does not specify.

See also. Zalmoxis; Thracians; Soul; Charm.

Inferiority and poor performance

φαῦλος (phaulos); φαυλότερον (phauloteron); φαῦλον (phaulon)

The word. Phaulos can mark something as poor, inferior or of little account. The relevant standard comes from context. It need not mean morally wicked. The comparative adverb phauloteron evaluates performance rather than a person’s entire character.

In the Charmides. Socrates remembers that Charmides was no negligible figure even as a child. The negated adjective works as an understated compliment in a conversation dominated by conspicuous praise. At 172b the question is whether examiners lacking the proposed knowledge would perform more weakly and poorly than those who possess it; this occurs in the exploration of a possible modest benefit, not an established ranking of actual people. At 175e Socrates describes himself as a poor inquirer rather than accepting that temperance is worthless. The adjective assigns the apparent failure to his investigative performance. It should not be turned into a literal authorial verdict that Socrates has no philosophical competence.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154b. The negated adjective recalls the young Charmides as already worth noticing.

172b. The comparative evaluates examination in a hypothetical account of a smaller benefit.

175e. Socrates calls himself a poor inquirer while preserving the claim that temperance is good.

In this edition. The edition's colloquial "nothing to sniff at," "poorly" and "poor inquirer" show why a single English equivalent cannot carry all three settings.

See also. Charmides; Examination; Perplexity; Temperance.

Inquiry

ζητῶ (zētō); ζήτησις (zētēsis); σκοπεῖν (skopein); σκέψις (skepsis); σκεπτέον (skepteon); ζητητήν (zētētēn)

The word. Zētein is to seek, search or inquire; zētēsis is the inquiry. Skopein and skeptesthai mean consider, inspect or look into; skepsis is a consideration or investigation. These verbs overlap, but their objects and dramatic setting distinguish searching for a definition, inspecting an argument, and testing a person's claim. "Skepticism" as a later school should not be read into skepsis.

In the Charmides. Inquiry begins as a shared alternative to forcing Charmides to praise or condemn himself. Socrates proposes that they look together into whether he has temperance (158d–e). The willingness of both participants matters: he offers to leave it if the boy does not wish to proceed. Once the method is chosen, Charmides supplies opinions for testing.

The inquiry's stated criterion is truth rather than authorship. When Charmides asks why it matters who originated the third definition, Socrates agrees that what must be inspected is whether it is true (161c). Critias' entry tests that commitment because intellectual ownership, reputation and anger increasingly matter to

him. Socrates insists at 165b–c that he does not question from concealed possession of the answer; he seeks because he does not know. At 166d–e he asks both men to attend to the argument rather than whose reputation suffers.

The investigation has an explicit order at 167b: first whether the proposed reflective knowledge is possible, then whether it benefits. The first question is not resolved, so Socrates provisionally suspends it at 169d to advance the second. Inquiry here includes revisiting assumptions, distinguishing questions and admitting a blocked route. The later dream is another controlled alteration of assumptions rather than a report of settled doctrine.

Finally zētēsis is personified as an insolent agent that defeats its accommodating partners (175c–d). Socrates calls himself a poor inquirer (175e), refusing to identify the disappointing result with the worthlessness of temperance. This is a limit upon both dogmatic and purely skeptical readings. The dialogue shows an inquiry failing to secure its definition while displaying reasons to continue examining oneself and the argument.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158d–159a. Shared inquiry and its initial method

161c. Truth rather than the identity of the speaker

165b–166e. Socrates explains why and how he inquires

167b–169d. Two questions distinguished; possibility provisionally conceded

172c–173a. Renewed scrutiny despite an initially strange result

175b–176b. Failure of the inquiry and desire for further conversation

In this edition. The edition generally keeps “look into” for the skop-/skep- family and “inquire” for zēt-. At 172c “our search has been to no useful purpose” criticizes their procedure or result; it does not simply designate temperance itself as useless.

See also. Examination; Refutation; Perplexity; Argument and account; Hypothesis; Truth and falsehood.

Insolence of the inquiry

ὑβριστικῶς (hybristikōs); κατεγέλασεν (kategelasen); συμπλάττοντες (symplattontes)

The word. Hybristikōs means in an insolent or outrageous manner. The adverb here modifies what the inquiry has shown. Kategelasen describes its laughing at or mocking; symplattontes describes the partners’ fashioning something together. The grammatical agents distinguish the inquirers’ construction from the inquiry’s unruly result.

In the Charmides. At 175d Socrates makes the inquiry behave like a person. It encountered cooperative, simple-minded partners, yet failed to find the truth and mocked it instead. What the partners had jointly proposed as temperance has been exposed as unbeneficial. This is not a calm final report that temperance has been proved worthless. It dramatizes a failure of the proposed account, intensified by Socrates’ immediate insistence that the virtue is a great good. The partners’ “fashioning together” admits their role in the definitions and concessions. Treating the inquiry as an aggressor is correspondingly comic and self-implicating: the speakers cannot simply blame a wholly external force for the position they constructed. The passage can also resonate with the closing coercive exchange, but that resonance does not

make every occurrence of insolence a coded historical accusation.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

175b–175e. The retrospective account of excessive concessions culminates in an insolent, mocking inquiry and Socrates' renewed affirmation of temperance's value.

In this edition. The English personification should be retained. Translating the adverb as though it directly described Critias' conduct would change the grammatical target.

See also. Simple-mindedness; Argument and account; Perplexity; Force and compulsion.

Justice and the just

δικαίου (dikaiou); τὸ δίκαιον (to dikaion); δίκαιον (dikaion); δικαίως (dikaiōs); ἀδικῶ (adikō)

The word. Dikaios and its neuter dikaion concern what is just, right or fitting; the adverb dikaiōs means justly or rightly. Adikō can mean doing wrong, and intransitively being in the wrong; the local idiom at 156a qualifies a claim as possibly mistaken. The abstract noun dikaiosynē is not the term used in this dialogue. Its absence matters because the famous definition of justice by doing one's own business elsewhere in Plato can otherwise be imported as if explicitly stated here.

In the Charmides. The early uses are conversational. At 156a Charmides qualifies his recognition of Socrates with εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε, idiomatically "if I am not mistaken." The supplied translation instead reads it as a courtesy about wronging Socrates by failing to recognize him. The Greek gives no explicit object "you," and the expression should

not bear the weight of a developed claim about injustice. Socrates then says it is only right for so well-born a youth to excel (157d–e). The latter is part of an elaborate compliment, not a proof that justice consists in inherited privilege.

A more determinate use occurs at 170a–b: knowledge of the healthy belongs to medicine, knowledge of the just to political expertise. Merely recognising knowledge does not supply either of those contents. The just is thus a field requiring substantive understanding, parallel in the argument to the healthy. Socrates does not define it here or explain how political knowledge relates to the final knowledge of good and bad.

At 175a he says he rightly blamed himself for an inquiry that achieved nothing useful. This adverbial use concerns justified self-criticism. Across the examples the word-family offers judgments of rightness at different levels; it does not resolve the political and ethical questions by itself.[19]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156a. Charmides qualifies his recognition with an idiom of being in the wrong; the supplied translation interprets it as a respectful reference to injustice.

157d–e. Socrates calls excellence fitting for Charmides' lineage

170a–b. The just is the object of political knowledge, distinct from knowledge as such

175a. Socrates says he rightly blamed his own investigation

[19] LSJ, s.v. ἀδικέω, under the intransitive use, explicitly cites Charmides 156a for εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε as a qualification meaning "if I am not mistaken"; see the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy lexicon collection. This lexical caution is distinct from the supplied translation's contextual courtesy rendering.

In this edition. The edition uses “the just” at 170b, “right” in the encomium and “rightly” in the self-criticism. “Doing one’s own business” at 161b is proposed as temperance, not explicitly as justice; the Republic parallel belongs in comparison, not in the translation.

See also. Doing one’s own business; Good and bad; Correctness and error; Ruling and supervision; What ought to be done.

Knowing oneself

γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν (gignōskein heauton); Γνῶθι σαυτόν (Gnōthi sauton); ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην (heautou epistēmēn); αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν (autos heauton)

The word. The person is the grammatical object in gignōskein heauton, “to know oneself”. Gnōthi sauton is the second-person imperative, “know yourself”, conventionally “know thyself”. Heautou is masculine or neuter genitive; in Critias’ explanation at 165c–d it means knowledge of oneself as a person. Heautēs at 166c is feminine and refers instead to knowledge itself. The shift is lexical and argumentative, not merely a choice among English pronouns.

In the Charmides. Self-directed attention precedes the famous maxim. Charmides is asked to look into himself and consider what temperance makes him like (160d). This continues the initial proposal that possessing the virtue supplies a felt basis for an opinion about it (158e–159a). A person’s inward response may begin inquiry without already yielding its correct definition. The dialogue therefore introduces reflective access before Critias turns it into an exclusive kind of knowledge.

The immediate transition at 164b–d is more precise than a general appeal to introspection. A doctor may act beneficially without knowing whether the action will benefit; under Critias' current definition, he thereby acts temperately without recognizing that he does. Socrates formulates this as not knowing himself, how he acted, and not knowing himself, that he is temperate. The person is the direct object followed by a clause specifying what is unknown about him. Critias refuses the possibility of a temperate person ignorant of himself, retracts earlier commitments, and says temperance virtually is knowing oneself.

His Delphic speech supplies an interpretation of an inscription, not a philosophical proof (164d–165b). The god, he says, greets entrants with "Know thyself", meaning "Be temperate", rather than the human greeting "Rejoice". He contrasts this greeting with the supposedly later counsels "Nothing too much" and "Pledge, and ruin is near". The implied identity of self-knowledge and temperance is Critias' thesis, explicitly presented as what he and the inscription say. The reader should not turn this dramatic claim into an uncontested meaning of Apollo's maxim.

Socrates begins from the plausible requirement that a knowing be knowledge of something. Critias answers "of oneself" (165c). When asked for a product, he correctly distinguishes mathematical from productive expertise; when asked for a separate object, he introduces the exceptional knowledge of itself and all other knowledge (166c). The object has changed from the person to knowledge. The text provides no independent identification of the entire person with knowledge. Reading this as a straightforward doctrine that the true self is intellect would import an argument the dialogue has not made.

At 167a the personal and epistemic formulations are joined: knowing oneself is knowing what one knows and does not know, with parallel power to examine others. At 169e Critias does attempt a bridge. Possessors of speed are fast, possessors of beauty beautiful, possessors of knowledge knowing; therefore possessors of self-knowing knowledge know themselves. This analogy is not straightforward. “Self” refers to the knowledge in one clause and the person in the conclusion. Moreover, being characterized by what one possesses does not generally transfer every relational property of the possession to its possessor. Socrates says this is not the point he disputes, then challenges the inference to identifying epistemic contents. His tactical concession cannot be treated as an independently demonstrated theory of personal identity.

The later diagnosis sharpens the stakes. To know that one has some knowledge, without knowing what one knows, falls short of the self-assessment initially promised (170b–d). Conversely, admitting that one cannot answer a question can be an honest epistemic achievement without amounting to the complete second-order science Critias envisages. This is why the resemblance to Socratic examination invites competing interpretations rather than settles them.

The ending returns the issue to Charmides (176a–b). He cannot say whether he possesses temperance when the adults cannot say what it is; nevertheless, he recognizes a need for further treatment. One may read this as a practical beginning of self-knowledge through acknowledged uncertainty, but Plato does not label it the successful definition. Critias immediately treats obedience to Socrates as evidence of temperance, leaving the

relation between understanding oneself and submitting to another unresolved.[20]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158e–159a. Possession of virtue, awareness, and an opinion

160d–e. Charmides asked to look into himself

164b–165b. Unknown quality of an action leads into the Delphic account

165c–166c. Shift from personal self-knowledge to knowledge knowing itself

167a. Self-knowledge identified with knowing epistemic limits

169e–170d. Possession analogy and its restricted result

176a–b. Charmides does not know whether he has the virtue

In this edition. The edition's "does not know himself — how he has acted" at 164c deliberately preserves the person as object. "Does not know of himself" would misleadingly suggest unaided cognition. At 169e both epistēmē and gnōsis appear; the English uses "knowledge" for both, leaving the decisive reflexive contrast to the pronouns.

See also. Knowledge of knowledge; Knowing that and knowing what; Perception; Lack of knowledge; Definition; Delphi and Apollo; Temperance.

[20] For focused discussion of the change from knowing oneself to knowledge of itself, see Voula Tsouna, Plato's Charmides: An Interpretative Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2022), chapter 8, "Socrates and Critias Debate the Technê Analogy", pp. 170–186: online source.

Knowing that and knowing what

ὅτι οἶδεν (hoti oiden); ὃ οἶδεν (ho oiden); ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν (ha te oiden kai ha mē oiden); ὅτου (hotou)

The word. The distinction turns on the difference between a content clause, hoti oiden, “that he knows”, and a relative construction, ho oiden or ha oiden, “what he knows” or “the things he knows”. Hotou asks “of what?” In this entry “knowing that” means knowing that a person has knowledge; it is not the modern general category of propositional knowledge contrasted with knowing how. The dialogue’s question is whether knowledge can identify epistemic status without identifying the field or content whose status it is.

In the Charmides. At 167a Socrates’ summary offers a robust capacity: a temperate person examines what he himself and others know, including what someone merely thinks he knows. It is important that the promised power concerns particular epistemic claims. Knowing simply that a person is knowledgeable in some respect would not settle whether his current claim to medical expertise is genuine.

Once knowledge of knowledge has been granted, Socrates asks what it could distinguish (170a). Critias agrees that its task extends only to determining which is knowledge and which is not. The fields of the healthy and the just belong instead to medicine and statesmanship. Unless a person also knows those fields, he might identify that he or another has some knowledge, but not its content (170b). Socrates introduces music and house-building as further examples (170c): he knows what is harmonious by music, what belongs to building by building. Temperance’s second-order object cannot silently confer every first-order expertise.

This yields the expressly weakened reformulation at 170d: knowing that one knows and that one does not know, rather than what one knows and does not know. The text then applies it to a professed doctor. To establish that this person has medicine, one must test statements and performances concerning the healthy and diseased (171a–b). Merely recognizing some epistemic competence would not identify it as the competence claimed.

There is an interpretive difficulty within the weakened proposal itself. What exactly can it mean to know that one does not know, while not specifying anything one does not know? A charitable reading takes the passage as isolating epistemic status from a determinate field for the sake of Critias' hypothesis, not as asserting that such empty status-awareness exists. Another reading argues that separating knowledge from every content has already made the purported capacity unintelligible. The dialogue leaves possibility conceded rather than proven, so neither reading should present the weaker capacity as Plato's established psychological doctrine.

At 175b–c the concluding retrospect complicates rather than abolishes the distinction. Socrates says they granted access to the works of other knowledges so that a person might know, of things he knows, that he knows them, and of things he does not know, that he does not know them. He calls the latter problematic because it seems to know in some way things entirely unknown. The difference between knowing a subject matter and knowing one's ignorance of it is precisely what needs defending. It would be careless to replace this qualified puzzle with the flat contradiction "he both knows and does not know the same thing in the same respect".

The distinction also limits an attractive contemporary paraphrase: "metacognition". Some metacognition is

about particular answers, methods or limitations and therefore includes content-specific cognition. Critias' proposed expertise is restricted to knowledge as its sole object. The argument tests the stronger abstraction, not every recognizable activity we now call metacognitive.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

167a–b. Original content-sensitive claim and statement of the two questions

170a–d. Explicit separation between knowing that and knowing what

170e–171c. Failure to certify expertise without its subject matter

175b–c. Qualified puzzle about knowing one's ignorance

In this edition. At 167b Burnet prints the supplied words ⟨ὅτι οἶδε καὶ⟩, "that one knows it and"; the edition marks their supplementation. At 170b–c the first ὅτι in "what it is he knows" functions interrogatively, while nearby ὅτι clauses state that he knows. Greek accentuation and context, not an invariant English equivalent, determine the sense. At 175c the translation preserves "in some way or other" and "not at all".

See also. Knowledge of knowledge; Lack of knowledge; Recognition and discrimination; Product and object of knowledge; Fellow expert.

Knowledge

ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē); ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai); εἰδέναι (eidenai); γιγνώσκειν (gignōskein); γνῶσιν (gnōsin)

The word. Epistēmē can mean knowledge, a determinate body of knowledge, or competent expertise. Its plural does not mean a collection of isolated true propositions:

medicine, house-building and calculation are counted as kinds of knowledge. Epistasthai is its related verb. Eidenai, the infinitive belonging to oida, also means to know; gignōskein may mean know, recognize or discern; gnōsis, occurring in the possession analogy at 169e, is knowing or knowledge. Their differing constructions matter more here than a rigid division into three species of cognition. The text moves among them in the same formulas.

In the Charmides. The dialogue places knowledge inside ordinary life before making it a philosophical problem. Socrates knows Charmides from earlier years (154a–b); the boy knows Socrates' name (156a); knowing how to speak Greek is enough to be asked for an intelligible statement of one's opinion (159a). None of these usages implies infallible philosophical understanding of an essence. Equally, epistasthai can introduce practical competence: Critias asks Socrates to pretend to know a headache remedy (155b). A lexicon must preserve this ordinary range alongside the later technical concentration.

At 165c the argument becomes explicit. If temperance is a knowing, it must be a knowledge, and a knowledge of something. Critias says its object is oneself. Socrates first compares medicine and house-building, which have identifiable products; when mathematical counterexamples defeat that requirement, he asks instead for an identifiable subject matter different from the knowledge itself. Object and product are distinct tests. Calculation has the even and odd as its objects although it does not produce them as a builder produces houses.

Critias' answer makes knowledge itself the object of the proposed temperance (166c–e). This is not yet an assertion that every ordinary knowledge knows itself. Quite the

reverse: Critias distinguishes ordinary fields, which know something other than themselves, from the unique knowledge that knows both itself and the others. The subsequent inquiry depends on retaining that exclusivity, and several surprising consequences result from it. The doctor knows the healthy and diseased but, under the agreed restriction, does not know medicine as knowledge (170e–171a). The point is not that doctors lack medical competence. It exposes the strain produced by assigning all cognition of cognition to a separate faculty.

At 170a–171c a knowledge is individuated by its field: to determine whether someone possesses medicine rather than some knowledge or other requires examination of medical claims and performances. The proposed knowledge of knowledge has no automatic access to these. At 172b, however, Socrates tentatively allows that second-order awareness might improve learning and scrutiny when combined with first-order learning. This modest possibility should not disappear under a blanket claim that all epistemic reflection is useless.

The final movement distinguishes knowledgeable performance from beneficial life. Even an imagined person knowing past, present and future must be asked which knowledge makes that life good (173d–174b). No ranking of knowledge solely by extent answers the question. The dialogue neither supplies a general definition of epistēmē nor concludes that knowledge is worthless: it interrogates what a particular reflective knowledge could know, do and contribute.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154a–b. Ordinary knowledge of Charmides as a person

159a. Knowing how to speak Greek and articulating an opinion

165c–166c. Knowledge, its product, and its object distinguished

169e–171c. Knowing verbs and gnōsis in the self-knowledge argument

173d–174d. Knowledgeable activity distinguished from benefit

In this edition. The edition consistently translates epistēmē as "knowledge" and its plural as "kinds of knowledge"; "science" would suggest a narrower modern category. It also translates all three main knowing verbs as "know" where the recurring formula requires continuity. Gnōsis is not a hidden fourth technical faculty merely because it is a different noun.

See also. Knowledge of knowledge; Knowing oneself; Knowing that and knowing what; Craft and expertise; Product and object of knowledge; Knowledgeable living.

Knowledge of knowledge

ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης (epistēmēn epistēmēs); ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη (epistēmōn epistēmē); αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς (autē heautēs)

The word. The genitive epistēmēs identifies the object: knowledge whose object is knowledge. At 166c Critias specifies knowledge of the other knowledges and itself; at 166e Socrates adds lack of knowledge. "Second-order" is a useful modern label for the first feature, "reflexive" for the second. They must be distinguished: an expertise that studies other expertises need not therefore study itself, and awareness that one knows need not itself provide the content of what one knows.

In the Charmides. Critias introduces the proposal to resist Socrates' demand for an object outside temperance. Ordinary knowledges concern something other than

themselves; temperance alone, he says, knows both the others and itself (166b–c). After an exchange about the purpose of refutation he repeats the definition (166e). Socrates then adds knowledge of ignorance and obtains agreement to an extensive practical interpretation: the temperate person knows himself, can determine what he knows and does not know, and can similarly assess other people's true and merely apparent expertise (167a). This is the proposed package, not an achieved result.

The first test asks whether such a capacity can exist. Socrates constructs analogies of sight seeing sights but no colours, hearing hearing hearings but no sounds, and affective attitudes directed at themselves while excluding their normal objects (167c–168a). He then considers genuinely relational predicates. Something greater than itself would also be smaller than itself; a capacity acting upon itself must possess the character appropriate to its own object. These examples expose difficulties but do not prove a universal prohibition on self-relation. Socrates explicitly distinguishes impossible cases from disputed ones and says he cannot decide the classification required for knowledge (168e–169b).

Accordingly, 169d grants possibility for the sake of progress. Critias argues that possessing self-knowing knowledge makes its possessor self-knowing, just as beauty makes its possessor beautiful (169e). Socrates provisionally leaves that bridge unchallenged and attacks the further inference to identifying one's epistemic contents. On the agreed separation of fields, a knowledge concerned only with knowledge could at most identify that there is knowledge. It could not identify whether it is medicine, music or house-building without knowing those subject matters (170a–d). Its diagnostic promise therefore fails: distinguishing a real doctor from a pretender requires medical evaluation (170e–171c).

The result is conditional and has a precise target. The dialogue does not show that reflective awareness in combination with medical training could never assess a doctor. At 171c the temperate person can judge a fellow practitioner of the stipulated second-order expertise; at 172b Socrates even proposes improved learning and examination within an acquired subject as a possible modest benefit. What has failed is the expansive power initially extracted from a domain-independent, exclusively second-order expertise.

Socrates next grants more than the argument has earned (172c–d): restore both the existence of reflective knowledge and the original ability to discriminate what people know. The dream of 173a–d depicts reliable assignment of tasks to genuine experts, excluding impostors and perhaps admitting genuine prophecy. It establishes knowledgeable living under these assumptions, not yet happiness. Asked which knowledge matters, Critias names knowledge of good and bad (174b). This has a different object from knowledge of knowledge.

Critias' final rescue is managerial: temperance rules all knowledge and therefore also the knowledge that benefits us (174d–e). Socrates answers by returning to the division of labour among expertises. Knowing about medicine does not produce health; knowing about knowledge of good does not automatically produce benefit. Whether this answer improperly neglects indirect or coordinating benefit is an important interpretive question. The dialogue raises it rather than supplying a developed theory of coordination. In particular, the earlier concession that not every knowledge produces a separate object makes the final appeal to productive function worth scrutinizing.

At 175b–d Socrates recounts both excessive concessions and the failure of the resulting construction. That retrospect is stronger in rhetoric than the earlier suspension of judgment: “the argument did not allow” knowledge of knowledge to exist is not the same as a completed proof that every reflexive knowledge is impossible. Finally he maintains that temperance itself is a great good (175e). The failure belongs to the tested account and the inquiry, and cannot simply be converted into Plato’s denial of self-knowledge.

Interpretive alternatives remain open. One reading sees Critias’ absolute supervisory expertise as a distortion of Socratic recognition of limits; another takes the dialogue to test the adequacy of Socrates’ own epistemic self-description. Both must explain why Socrates’ professed aim at 166c–d resembles the powers promised at 167a, and why that resemblance does not by itself establish identity between his practice and Critias’ theory.[21]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

166b–167a. Definition, addition of ignorance, and extensive diagnostic promise

167b–169d. Possibility tested but not finally decided; provisional concession

169e–171c. Possession analogy and limits of domain-independent diagnosis

172b–d. Modest possible benefit followed by a stronger concession

[21] For a developed interpretation distinguishing Socratic acknowledgment of human limits from Critias’ expansive “science of science”, see Voula Tsouna, Plato’s Charmides: An Interpretative Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2022), chapter 1, “Introduction”, especially its statement of the interpretive thesis: online source. This is an identified interpretation, not a report of scholarly unanimity.

173a–175a. Dream, knowledge of good and bad, and failed supervisory rescue

175b–e. Retrospective criticism and retained confidence in temperance

In this edition. “Of itself” translates a feminine reflexive referring to epistēmē; “of oneself” earlier refers to the person. Burnet deletes πλὴν ἐπιστήμης, “except knowledge”, at 169a, preventing a prematurely assumed exception. The addition at 167b and the conjectural case forms at 170a–b deserve separate attention; the edition is a particular critical text, not an unmediated transcript.

See also. Knowing oneself; Knowing that and knowing what; Lack of knowledge; Self-relation; Product and object of knowledge; The dream hypothesis; Good and bad; Agreement and concession; Fellow expert.

Knowledgeable living

ἐπιστημόνως (epistēmonōs); ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα (epistēmonōs zōnta); ἐπιστημονέστερον (epistēmonesteron); τέλος (telos)

The word. Epistēmonōs is the adverb of being knowledgeable: knowingly, knowledgeably or with expertise. The comparative epistēmonesteron marks a greater degree. The word specifies the epistemic manner of acting or living, not by itself whether the action is good for the agent. At 173d Critias calls knowledgeable action a telos of doing well: a culmination, crowning condition or completion in the local claim. It is not an exposition of an Aristotelian final cause.

In the Charmides. At 173c–d Socrates grants that the imagined human race, served only by genuine experts and guarded against ignorance, would act and live

knowledgeably. He withholds the further inference that it would thereby fare well and be happy. Critias protests that knowledgeable action seems essential to doing well.

Socrates' response is not to praise ignorance. He asks the omitted question: knowledgeable about what? Cutting leather, working bronze, wool and wood are real expert activities, but Critias does not accept that possessing them as such establishes a happy life. The argument therefore shifts from the adverb alone to the field that gives it significance.

Prophetic and then all-encompassing temporal knowledge extend the case (173e–174a). Even for the maximally knowledgeable person, Socrates asks which knowledge makes him happy. Critias answers good and bad (174b). The later concession that other crafts still function without that knowledge proves the distinction's point: epistemic reliability within a field and beneficial use or outcome are not coextensive.

This passage must not be compressed to "knowledge does not make us happy". Its more exact question is whether knowledge described only generically, or accumulated in many technical fields, accounts for benefit without specifying knowledge of value.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

173c–d. Knowledgeable life conceded while happiness remains unproven

173d–174a. The question "knowledgeably about what?"

174a–d. Extent of knowledge distinguished from knowledge of good and bad

In this edition. "Knowledgeably" deliberately keeps epistēmē audible. "Wisely" would import the very

favorable evaluation the argument asks whether epistemic competence warrants.

See also. Knowledge; Omniscience; The dream hypothesis; Good and bad; Happiness and doing well; Craft and expertise.

Lack of knowledge

ἀνεπιστημοσύνης (anepistēmosynēs); ἀγνοεῖν (agnoein); ἀγνοῶν (agnoōn); μὴ αὐτὸς εἰδέναι (mē autos eidenai)

The word. Anepistēmosynē is lack of epistēmē, explicitly paired with it in the account of temperance. Agnoein means not to know, to be ignorant or fail to recognize; negative forms of eidenai express not knowing without introducing a separate faculty. Lack of expertise, an unrecognized limitation, a false claim to expertise and the admission of ignorance are different conditions.

In the Charmides. The opposition first becomes ethically consequential when Critias rejects temperance without awareness of being temperate (164a–d). At 165b–c Socrates insists that he inquires because he himself does not know. At 166c–d he identifies the danger more exactly: thinking that he knows when he does not, without noticing the discrepancy. The point is not that the word “ignorance” itself always implies culpable self-deception. Acknowledged ignorance motivates examination; unacknowledged ignorance makes examination necessary.

Knowledge of lack of knowledge enters at Socrates’ suggestion (166e): if temperance knows knowledge, will it not also know its absence? Critias immediately agrees. This agreement should not be treated as a proved universal principle that every knowledge of one condition

knows its contrary. Its subsequent content is precisely what is tested. At 167a it promises identification of false epistemic confidence in oneself and others; at 170d the claim is reduced to identifying that one does not know, without determining what one does not know.

The dream makes ignorance an intrusive assistant that temperance would prevent from slipping into human undertakings (173d). Personification highlights the attraction of complete expert supervision. Yet eliminating technical ignorance still does not explain the value of the resulting life. That requires attention to good and bad (174b–d).

At 175c Socrates raises a final puzzle about knowing ignorance: can one know in any way what one does not know at all? This is not an unqualified denial that someone can recognize inability to answer a question. The contrast between total lack of acquaintance and partial identification of an unknown field is left undeveloped. Charmides' candid "I don't know" at 176a, followed by his wish to continue, makes it especially inappropriate to present the whole dialogue as proving that acknowledging ignorance is impossible.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

164a–d. Critias rejects temperate action unknown to its agent

165b–166d. Socratic ignorance and fear of unnoticed false confidence

166e–167a. Lack of knowledge added as an object of temperance

170a–d. Limits of knowing ignorance without its field

173d. Ignorance excluded from the imagined expert-governed life

175c–176a. Final puzzle and Charmides' admitted uncertainty

In this edition. "Lack of knowledge" keeps the verbal connection to epistēmē audible. At 156e "they do not know the whole" belongs to a manuscript alternative, ἀγνοοῖεν; Burnet prints ἀμελοῖεν, "they neglect". That variant must not be quoted as the accepted dialogue text.

See also. Knowing oneself; Knowing that and knowing what; Pretence and imposture; Escaping notice; Perplexity.

Language and naming

ἑλληνίζειν (hellēnizein); ὀνομάτων (onomatōn); τοὔνομα (tounoma); ῥήματα (rhēmata); νομοθέτης (nomothetēs)

The word. Hellēnizein means speak Greek in the opening methodological remark. Onoma is a name or word; rhēmata the spoken expressions. Tounoma contracts to onoma. Nomothetēs literally means lawgiver; at 175b it is applied to the imagined giver of the name temperance. The alternative "name-giver" is a variant, not Burnet's printed reading.

In the Charmides. At 159a Socrates links having an opinion with being able to express it because Charmides can speak Greek. Linguistic competence makes participation possible; it does not guarantee a correct definition. The ensuing failures are partly failures to explicate what ordinary expressions mean and how their senses interact.

The third definition makes this explicit. At 161d Socrates separates what its author meant from how the words sound under his proposed literal construction. Critias then distinguishes making, doing and working,

appealing to Hesiod (163b–c). Socrates compares this with Prodicus' distinctions between names and allows Critias to assign terms as he likes, provided he clearly identifies what each denotes (163d). The concession rejects a merely verbal quarrel without granting that a stipulated vocabulary makes its philosophical consequences true.

The last complaint returns to naming: they cannot find to which existing thing the lawgiver assigned the name temperance (175b). The question about the referent survives the defeat of the proposed accounts. It does not imply that the word has no ordinary use or that its first historical inventor can be identified.

A useful reading distinction is therefore threefold: knowing how to use Greek, understanding a particular formulation, and justifying the account expressed. The dialogue passes from the first through the second toward the third, without establishing that any two are automatically equivalent.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159a. Greek competence permits an opinion to be expressed

161d–162b. Words distinguished from intended meaning

163b–e. Prodicean distinctions and permitted verbal stipulation

175b. The unresolved name and its intended referent

175b (apparatus). Later manuscripts offer ὀνοματοθέτης in place of νομοθέτης

In this edition. At 175b the edition retains "lawgiver" for nomothetēs and explains the variant "name-giver" in a note. At 163d "word" is often the clearest rendering of onoma because the issue includes verbs of doing and making, not only proper names.

See also. Definition; Argument and account; Understanding and quick-wittedness; Same and different; Prodicus; Riddle.

Learning and teaching

μανθάνειν (manthanein); διδάσκειν (didaskein); εὐμαθία (eumathia); δυσμαθία (dysmathia); μαθήματος (mathēmatos); προσδίδαξον (prosdidaxon)

The word. Manthanein means learn and, in appropriate contexts, understand; didaskein means teach. Eumathia and dysmathia are ease and difficulty in learning. Mathēma is what is learned or a subject of learning, not necessarily a mathematical discipline. Prosdidaxon, "teach me further", requests an additional explanation.

In the Charmides. Socrates reports learning the charm from a Thracian doctor and being taught both remedy and incantations (156d, 157a–b). This claimed transmission gives the ensuing conversation an educational frame without establishing the historical existence of that teacher. Later Socrates wonders whether his painstaking learning was for nothing if temperance has no value (175e).

At 159e easy learning is equated with quick learning, difficult learning with quiet and slow learning. Teaching quickly and vigorously is also judged finer. These are agreed comparisons within the argument against identifying virtue with quietness; they are not an independently defended theory of pedagogy. At 168a Socrates describes Critias' knowledge as knowledge of no mathēma, no ordinary subject of learning. Translating mathēma here as "mathematics" would destroy the point: the purported knowledge excludes all ordinary subject matters.

The crucial constructive possibility occurs at 172b. Someone who possesses knowledge of knowledge might learn another subject more easily and see more clearly because he also observes the knowledge involved. He might examine others better about what he himself has learned. This is explicitly a proposal, greeted by "perhaps", and the dialogue soon moves to stronger concessions. Nevertheless, it identifies a possible educational benefit distinct from universal certification of expertise.

At 173d Socrates asks Critias to teach him one small thing more: knowledgeable about what? The request invites him to specify the content missing from the abstract praise of knowledgeable living. It dramatizes the difference between deference to claimed wisdom and demanding an answer one can inspect.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156d–157b. Socrates' reported learning and the Thracian's teaching

159e. Easy and difficult learning, vigorous teaching

168a. No ordinary subject of learning assigned to reflexive knowledge

172b–c. Tentative improvement in learning and examination

173d–e. "Teach me" introduces the question about knowledge's specific field

175e. Learning the charm reconsidered in light of the failed account

In this edition. The edition renders manthanein by "understand" where Socrates cannot follow an asserted identity (170a) and "learn" where acquisition is at issue. This contextual variation should not be erased for mechanical consistency.

See also. Understanding and quick-wittedness; Knowledge of knowledge; Product and object of knowledge; Knowledgeable living; Charm.

Lion and fawn

λέοντος (leontos); νεβρὸν (nebron); μοῖραν (moiran); κρεῶν (kreōn); ἑαλωκέναι (healōkenai); θρέμματος (thremmatos)

The word. Leōn is a lion and nebros a fawn. Moira kreōn is a portion of meat, while thremma, represented by thremmatos, is a creature or something reared. Healōkenai is the perfect infinitive of being caught or captured. The image changes an erotic approach into the danger of predation.

In the Charmides. Socrates cites Cydias while describing the effect of Charmides' look and bodily beauty. The poetic warning envisages a fawn approaching a lion and, on the edition's construal, becoming a portion of meat. Socrates immediately says he felt captured by such a creature.

The reversal is the point. In the surrounding courtship, older admirers have gathered around a young man; the person who might expect to pursue now feels helpless before the other's attraction. The image dramatizes the discrepancy between social initiative and experienced power. It does not make Charmides literally violent, though the final threat of force gives readers reason to remember earlier images of irresistible strength.

The capture vocabulary has another echo at 169c: Critias is caught by perplexity after watching Socrates' perplexity. The erotic and intellectual situations are not identical, but the common verb lets vulnerability pass from narrator to respondent. A force that seemed external

and personal in the prologue is reimagined as an argumentative predicament shared between speakers.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155d–e. The Cydias quotation and Socrates' declaration that he has been caught

169c. Critias is later caught by perplexity, repeating the capture family

155d (apparatus). The quoted wording is textually variable at d6–7

In this edition. The line's syntax and textual variants require caution: Burnet prints αἱρεῖσθαι while recording Cobet's αἰτεῖσθαι, and B has a drastically different phrase. The edition's "to be caught as a portion of meat" makes its construal explicit; it is not a word-for-word equivalent of every transmitted version.

See also. Cydias; Erotic attraction; Contagious yawning; Perplexity; Force and compulsion.

Love as a relative

ἔρωτα (erōta); ἔρως (erōs); καλοῦ (kalou); τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων (tōn allōn erōtōn)

The word. Erōs names love or erotic desire; in this example it is construed with a genitive identifying the beloved object. Kalou, "of something beautiful", supplies the ordinary object that the hypothetical love excludes.

In the Charmides. Socrates' question at 167e asks whether a love could love itself and the other loves while loving nothing beautiful. Critias says no. The example belongs to a deliberately varied series of capacities and attitudes, each defined through an ordinary field that the proposed reflexive version would abandon.

The dialogue has already made erotic attraction vivid through Charmides' entrance and Socrates' response. The philosophical example can therefore carry dramatic resonance without becoming another description of the prologue. Its argument is about what such a love would be of, not a moral judgment that the earlier attraction is or is not temperate.

The line also should not be made to bear the complete theory of erōs from the Symposium. Here love's direction toward the beautiful is accepted for the analogy; no account of reproduction, ascent, immortality or philosophical desire is developed. Nor is "love of love" in ordinary language an immediate counterexample, since that phrase commonly retains beautiful persons, experiences or imagined satisfactions as its content. The hypothetical pointedly removes them.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

167e. Love of loves and itself, but of nothing beautiful, denied

In this edition. "Love" rather than "desire" retains the contrast with epithymia a few lines earlier. The genitive kalou is adjectival and supplies an object, not necessarily the technical phrase "the Form of Beauty".

See also. Desire as a relative; Wish; Self-relation; Fine and beautiful; Erotic attraction.

Lyre and music

κιθαρίζειν (kitharizein); κιθαριστοῦ (kitharistou); μουσικῇ (mousikēi); ἁρμονικὸν (harmonikon)

The word. Kitharizein is to play the lyre or kithara, and kitharistēs the associated teacher or player. Mousikē can

cover a broad field of cultivated arts, but at 170c it is specified by its object, to harmonikon, the harmonious. The local argument does not present a mathematical theory of harmony.

In the Charmides. Lyre-playing stands among the familiar performances invoked against quietness. Socrates asks whether playing quickly is finer than playing slowly, and Charmides agrees. The passage uses a recognized skill to challenge a universal identification of temperance with quiet behavior. It does not offer an independent treatise on tempo or prove that every musical work should be played as fast as possible.

The lyre-master then appears beside the letter-master in the examples of understanding instruction. This links performance to a teachable art and provides a setting for the supposed fineness of quick comprehension. At 170c music receives a new philosophical role: one knows the harmonious by music, not by knowledge of knowledge. Its determinate content exemplifies why the general recognition that there is knowledge does not establish what someone knows.

The occurrences therefore connect education with epistemic specialization. Familiarity with a cultivated skill makes the earlier examples accessible, but the later distinction refuses to let unspecified intellectual authority substitute for the skill's own domain.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159c. Lyre-playing is used as an example in the refutation of quietness

160a. Understanding at the lyre-master's exemplifies quick comprehension

170c. The harmonious is known by music rather than by the higher-order knowledge alone

In this edition. “Lyre” gives a readable name for the instrument-family without claiming that the text identifies a particular surviving instrument. “The harmonious” at 170c keeps the object distinct from the expertise that knows it.

See also. Schooling and the letter-master; Quietness; Knowledge of knowledge; Product and object of knowledge; Poet and actor.

Madcap and madness

μανικὸς (manikos)

The word. The adjective manikos characterizes someone as mad, frenzied or wildly excitable. Its force has to be judged from the action it accompanies. Here it is a description in Socrates’ narration, not a diagnosis or the name of a kind of inspired knowledge.

In the Charmides. Chaerephon is introduced through a rapid sequence of actions: he leaps up, runs to Socrates and grasps his hand, urgently asking how he survived the battle. Calling him manikos gives the greeting its familiar, exuberant tone. The reader learns something about the relationship before receiving any formal description of Chaerephon. The adjective also makes the dialogue begin with conspicuous animation, well before quiet behaviour is proposed as the mark of temperance. That juxtaposition may sharpen a reader’s attention, but the dialogue does not argue that Chaerephon’s excitement either proves or disproves his virtue. Later Platonic discussions of divine madness should not be imported into this single familiar epithet.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153b. Socrates calls Chaerephon manikos while reporting his excited welcome and concern about the battle.

In this edition. The supplied “madman that he is” is colloquial and habitual in tone. Reading it as a claim about mental illness, or as an instance of a later doctrine of inspired madness, would add something the passage does not establish.

See also. Chaerephon; Quietness; Temperance.

Making and production

ποιεῖν (poiein); ποίησιν (poiēsin); ποιήσεις (poiēseis); ποίημα (poiēma); ποιήματα (poiēmata)

The word. Poiein can mean making, producing, bringing about or simply doing. Poiēsis denotes a making or production; poiēma is what has been made, including a composition. The dialogue exploits these ordinary connections. It would be misleading to translate every poiein as manufacture: making someone healthy, causing shame and doing what someone orders all use this flexible causative or practical vocabulary.

In the Charmides. Critias’ first defence relies on keeping making distinct from doing. Craftsmen may make other people’s things without ceasing to be temperate (162e–163a); he has not agreed, he protests, that doing others’ affairs has the same consequence. He then assigns poiēsis the wider range. A production can be disgraceful, whereas a work properly so called is fine and beneficial (163b–c). Making therefore includes both what his preferred usage counts as doing and what it excludes.

The restriction is rhetorical and evaluative. It is not a theory that making necessarily has an external product while action necessarily has its end in itself. The Charmides neither formulates that distinction nor applies Critias' usage consistently as an authorial technical vocabulary. Socrates explicitly allows him to choose the name, provided he explains what he means, and asks whether doing or making good things is the proposed definition (163d–e).

The family also supplies a dramatic echo: Critias has been compared to a poet whose own compositions, poiēmata, an actor mishandles (162d). He claims authority over his account much as over an authored product. Elsewhere producing effects is indispensable to the virtue question: temperance is said to make people bashful or good, medicine makes them healthy, and a knowledge is asked to make its possessor happy. These uses establish what the proposed cause brings about without assuming every effect is a separable manufactured object.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

160e–161a. Temperance is discussed as making its possessors bashful or good

162d. Poiēmata are the poet's compositions in Socrates' comparison

162e–163e. Making is separated from doing and restricted good production

164a–b. The doctor makes a patient healthy

174a–e. Happiness, health and craft products are considered as effects of kinds of knowledge

In this edition. "Making," "doing" and "working" remain distinct in the disputed passage. The edition's "makes someone healthy" also preserves the causative construction ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖν. The dictionary noun ποίησις is

represented by its attested accusative and plural forms above; the lexicon does not imply that an isolated nominative formula occurs.

See also. Doing and action; Work and working; Doing good things; Good men; Craft and expertise.

Manliness and courage

ἀνδρείως (andreiōs); ἀνδρικῶς (andrikōs)

The word. Andreiōs and andrikōs are related adverbs formed in the family of anēr, “man.” The first can mean manfully or courageously, the second in a manly manner. The abstract noun andreia, “courage,” does not occur in the dialogue proper. The local phrases concern how Charmides is to answer, not a separately proposed definition of courage.

In the Charmides. Socrates asks the youth to look within and state his view well and manfully; Charmides considers the question very manfully and answers that temperance is modesty (160d–e). The repeated root makes the sequence gently comic. An exhortation to bold answering yields an account of the restraint and bashfulness expected of a youth. The two attitudes need not be incompatible: thoughtful willingness to answer may itself require courage without abolishing respect.

The opening battle at Potidaea provides a wider possible resonance, but the Charmides does not narrate Socrates’ battlefield heroism or name courage there. Reading the war setting as a manifestation of the virtue relies on interpretation and, for particular deeds, information from other dialogues. The lexical evidence in this work is the two adverbs, not a hidden treatise on military valour.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153b–d. The battle provides narrative context but does not explicitly introduce the courage vocabulary

160d–e. The paired adverbs frame the request for a second definition and its bashful answer

In this edition. “Like a man” and “very much like a man” make the verbal echo audible. Translating the first merely “confidently” and the second “carefully” would remove the deliberate repetition and the tension with modesty.

See also. Modesty and shame; Temperance; Fire and renewed confidence; Socrates.

Manual trades and social contempt

σκυτοτομοῦντι (skytotomounti); ταριχοπωλοῦντι (tarichopōlounti); ἐπ’ οἰκήματος καθημένῳ (ep’ oikēmatos kathēmenōi)

The word. The first two participles identify a person cutting leather or making shoes and one selling preserved fish. The third phrase, literally sitting at or in a room, is used of the brothel setting in this passage. The Greek adjective commonly translated “banausic” or “menial” is not present here; those English labels describe an attitude inferred from Critias’ examples.

In the Charmides. Critias invokes three occupations while arguing that Hesiod cannot have meant every kind of making when he said work is no disgrace. The force of the examples depends on expecting the audience to recognize socially discreditable activities. This expectation belongs to Critias’ argument and should not be reported as Plato’s endorsement of a fixed ranking of occupations. His ensuing lexical reconstruction makes fine and beneficial production count as genuine work. The later

discussion presses in a different direction: technically successful crafts still fail to establish happiness merely by being forms of knowledge. Leatherwork, metalwork, weaving and carpentry are examples of expertise whose relation to living well must be explained. A craft may thus be socially disparaged, technically real and insufficient for happiness; these are three separate assessments.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

163b–163c. Critias uses socially charged occupations to support his restricted reading of Hesiodic work.

173d–174c. Ordinary crafts reappear when Socrates asks which knowledge is responsible for happiness.

In this edition. The supplied “sit in a brothel” explains the Greek idiom rather than translating a separate noun for prostitution. A reader should not infer that the unattested word banausos occurs simply because the social issue is present.

See also. Work and working; Hesiod; Craft and expertise; Good and bad.

Maximal concession

ὅτι μάλιστα (hoti malista); εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα (ei hoti malista)

The word. The idiom hoti malista intensifies a claim or degree; in these conditional settings it presses an assumption as far as the argument needs. Its translation depends on what is being intensified. It is not a formula that turns every condition into an accepted truth.

In the Charmides. At 160c Socrates strengthens the rival case for quietness: suppose quiet actions are fine no less often than quick ones. At 166c he allows Critias’ description of him to stand in its strongest form, even if he

is refuting him as vigorously as possible; he then distinguishes that activity from the hostile motive Critias imputes. The concession is about refutation, not about the existence of knowledge of knowledge.

At 167b the phrase helps divide two questions: even if the proposed knowledge is entirely possible, its benefit still needs investigation. At 169b existence, maximally granted, would not by itself license identifying it with temperance. At 169d the same force sustains the provisional grant while Socrates asks whether the promised discrimination follows. These are deliberate suspensions of a disputed question.

At 172e–173a the assumption is strengthened again before the dream: let temperance be as defined and govern us as fully as possible. The scope shifts from possibility to the imagined operation of the faculty. Critias finally employs the idiom in his defence of supervision at 174d: if temperance is, in the fullest sense, knowledge of knowledges and oversees them, it should benefit through ruling the knowledge of good. Socrates' response contests what follows from that status. In each case the idiom marks argumentative generosity or intensity; it does not remove the need to track the precise antecedent and the conclusion proposed from it.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

160c. The objection grants the strongest relevant comparison on behalf of quiet action.

166c–166d. Refutation at its most forceful is separated from a personally hostile purpose.

167b. Maximal possibility leaves benefit as a further question.

169b–169d. Existence is entertained or granted without an established identification with temperance.

172e–173a. The dream assumes full operation of the proposed governing expertise.

174d–174e. Critias intensifies the premise of his final supervisory defence.

In this edition. The edition varies “at the very most,” “as hard as I can,” “entirely possible,” “most certainly,” “as fully as could be” and “in the fullest sense.” Keeping one mechanical English wording throughout would obscure the changing scope.

See also. Hypothesis; Agreement and concession; Possibility and impossibility; Knowledge of knowledge; The dream hypothesis; Ruling and supervision.

Meddling

ἐπολυπραγμονεῖτε (epolypragmoneite)

The word. The imperfect plural ἐπολυπραγμονεῖτε asks whether the boys were being meddlesome or busying themselves with too many affairs. Its lexical family is commonly represented by the lemma πολυπραγμονέω, “meddle,” and the noun πολυπραγμοσύνη, but that noun is not spoken in this dialogue. The contrast with doing one’s own business is the relevant local meaning; an inventory should not turn the missing abstract noun into an attested Greek head-form.

In the Charmides. Socrates asks whether the pupils were being busybodies when they wrote other people’s names, including their enemies’ (161d–e). Charmides rejects the suggestion. Writing a name is certainly doing something, and it is not confined to one’s own name; nevertheless it is not the inappropriate interference that the moral contrast is meant to condemn. The example exposes the need to

distinguish an activity's object from whether performing it exceeds the agent's proper business.

The word thus identifies the vice an ordinary hearer would understand the slogan to exclude. It does not settle which interventions are legitimate, or prove that all participation in others' affairs is wrong. The subsequent crafts and city examples make productive cooperation indispensable. Its single occurrence is philosophically substantial because it reveals the gap between a socially intelligible warning against interference and the over-literal wording Socrates tests.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

161d–e. Writing others' names is agreed not to count as meddling or intemperance

In this edition. "Were you being busybodies" preserves the personal and potentially comic force of the question. The noun "meddling" is a convenient English lookup label, not a quotation of πολυπραγμοσύνη from the Greek dialogue.

See also. Doing one's own business; One's own and what belongs to others; Doing and action.

Memory and recollection

μεμνῆσθαι (memnēsthai); ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι (anamimnēiskesthai); μέμνημαι (memnēmai); ἀνεμνήσθην (anemnēsthēn)

The word. Memnēsthai is to remember or retain in memory. Anamimnēiskesthai emphasizes recalling or bringing back to mind. The noun anamnēsis is a convenient related lookup label, not the form used in

these passages. No special metaphysical account follows from the presence of the verb.

In the Charmides. Charmides remembers Socrates associating with Critias when he himself was a child (156a). This ordinary social memory establishes familiarity and allows Socrates to speak more frankly about the charm. At 159e recollecting and remembering are paired among mental activities said to be finer when vigorous and quick. The distinction is roughly between retrieving and retaining, but the text does not develop a technical psychology of memory.

The most consequential act of recollection is Charmides' third answer: he has just remembered hearing someone say that temperance is doing one's own business (161b). Recollection supplies an available formula, not knowledge of its truth or understanding of its meaning. His admission at 162b exposes the gap between recalling a saying and being able to account for it.

These uses should not be assimilated to the recollection arguments of other dialogues. Nothing here says that the soul knew before birth, that mathematical knowledge is recovered from a prenatal condition, or that remembering this formula is evidence for immortality. The ordinary lexical range is philosophically productive enough: memory brings a claim into discussion, while examination must determine what it means and whether it withstands scrutiny.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156a. Charmides remembers Socrates from childhood

159e. Remembering and recollecting in the comparison of quick and slow mental activity

161b–162b. A remembered saying introduced without secure understanding

In this edition. “Recollecting and remembering” retains the two Greek verbs at 159e. “I have just remembered” at 161b translates an aorist of recollection, not a reference to the later technical theory often called “recollection”.

See also. Learning and teaching; Understanding and quick-wittedness; Argument and account; Doing one’s own business.

Moderation and excess

Μηδὲν ἄγαν (Mēden agan); μέτρια (metria)

The word. Mēden agan is the maxim “Nothing too much,” with the adverb agan expressing excess. Metria is the neuter plural of metrios, measured, moderate or reasonable; in a conversational judgment it can mean sensible things to say. The presence of these expressions does not establish that the dialogue defines temperance as a mathematical mean or a fixed middle between opposite passions.

In the Charmides. Critias cites “Nothing too much” among the Delphic inscriptions set up, in his account, after the original “Know thyself” (165a). His purpose is not to interpret this second maxim in detail. He argues that its dedicators mistook the first inscription for advice rather than the god’s greeting and then offered comparable advice of their own. The maxim remains recognisable as a standard expression of restraint while its authority is positioned within Critias’ particular story.

At 166e Critias approves Socrates’ request that he attend to the argument rather than to which man is being refuted, saying he speaks metria. Here measuredness belongs to the manner and fairness of the proposal. The word is useful evidence for the virtue’s ordinary ethical

surroundings, but it is not a fresh definition added to the formal sequence.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

165a. The Delphic maxim appears within Critias' account of the inscriptions

166e. Critias calls Socrates' proposal reasonable or measured

In this edition. "Nothing too much" preserves the aphorism's breadth. "Talking sense" for μέτρια λέγειν is idiomatic and should not be confused with an occurrence of the separate noun φρόνησις.

See also. Temperance; Knowing oneself; Advice and greeting; Order and orderly conduct; Delphi and Apollo.

Modesty and shame

αἰδώς (aidōs); αἰσχύνεσθαι (aischynesthai); αἰσχυντηλὸν (aischyntēlon); τὸ αἰσχυντηλὸν (to aischyntēlon); ᾐσχύνετο (ēischyneto)

The word. Aidōs names a restraining sense of shame, respect or regard for what is fitting before others. It can inhibit behaviour before any wrong has occurred; it is not limited to remorse after wrongdoing. The aischyn- family expresses being ashamed or bashful, and the substantivised adjective to aischyntēlon can denote someone's bashfulness. These related expressions are brought together by Charmides' definition, not merged into a universal philosophical distinction between guilt, modesty and shame. Social regard may help someone behave well, but its reliability is what the dialogue asks about.

In the Charmides. The dramatic instance precedes the abstract noun. Asked whether he is temperate, Charmides blushes; Socrates remarks that his bashfulness suits his age and makes him more beautiful (158c). The boy's reply is socially careful: he would avoid both praising himself and contradicting his guardian. Thus modest behaviour is attractive and intelligible before it is examined as a definition.

At 160e Charmides says temperance makes a person feel shame and be bashful, and is precisely aidōs. Socrates tests the identity through goodness rather than through appearance. If temperance makes its possessors good, it is itself good. Yet Homer says aidōs is no good for a man in need (161a). Charmides accepts the authority, allowing the conclusion that shame can be either good or bad, whereas temperance is being treated as good. A quality whose benefit depends on the situation cannot, on those premises, simply be the virtue.

The quotation's context sharpens the limitation: the disguised Odysseus is to overcome a beggar's reluctance and seek food. It does not prove that all modesty is bad, nor does Socrates claim this. Conversely, one may question whether a situational inhibition of begging captures everything Charmides intends by the respectful bearing of a well-raised youth. The argument is effective against an unrestricted identity; its treatment of the full social virtue remains debatable.

Shame returns with Critias in two revealingly different circumstances. At 164c–d he says he would not be ashamed to retract a mistaken earlier statement rather than admit temperance without self-knowledge. Later he is ashamed before the audience to admit that he cannot answer Socrates' challenge and therefore conceals his perplexity (169c–d). The contrast provides concrete

evidence for the definition's difficulty. Shame need not protect truth or self-knowledge; concern for one's appearance can prevent acknowledging ignorance. The narrative does not tell us that all concern for others' judgment should disappear. It shows why that concern alone cannot ensure the intellectual and ethical quality being sought.[22]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158c–d. Charmides' blush and reluctance to praise himself portray age-appropriate bashfulness

160e. The second definition identifies temperance with aidōs and its bashful effects

161a–b. The Homeric needy man supplies a case in which shame is not good

164c–d. Critias professes that he would not be ashamed to retract error

169c–d. Shame before an admiring audience prevents Critias from admitting perplexity

In this edition. The edition uses "modesty" for αἰδώς and "bashfulness" for τὸ αἰσχυντηλόν at 158c. These are connected but not the same Greek form: the Key Words' shorthand must not be mistaken for an occurrence of αἰδώς at the blush. The Homeric line quoted in Plato ends παρεῖναι, "to be present," whereas the standard Odyssey text has προσαιτεῖ, "beggar"; Plato's wording supports the subsequent language of virtue's presence.

See also. Temperance; Ugly and shameful; Fine and beautiful; Good and bad; Reputation and ambition; Praise and blame.

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[22] For the moral and social range of αἰδώς, see LSJ as reproduced in the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy's Classical Language Dictionaries: online source. For the narrative context of the Homeric citation, compare Odyssey 17.344–352, online source.

Necessity and consequence

ἀνάγκη (anankē); ἀναγκαῖον (anankaion); συμβαίνειν (symbainein); συμβαίνει (symbainei)

The word. Anankē means necessity or constraint; anankaion, necessary. Symbainein can mean happen, result or follow. In argumentative contexts the latter marks an alleged consequence; it does not by itself guarantee valid deduction. Physical or social compulsion belongs to other local uses of the necessity family.

In the Charmides. The initial procedure invokes necessity: if temperance is present, it must provide some awareness (159a). Later Critias refuses the consequence that a temperate person might be ignorant of himself, even if earlier concessions appear to necessitate it (164c–d). The response shows a familiar option in argument: retract a premise rather than accept the conclusion.

At 168b–d repeated acknowledgments of necessity support the relational sequence. A greater requires a smaller correlate, and self-application requires the relevant object-character. At 169e Critias says personal self-knowledge follows from possessing self-knowing knowledge, but Socrates challenges a further necessity: why must its possessor know what he knows and does not know?

The distinction between a consequence claimed and a consequence secured reappears at 175b. They granted many things that did not follow in their argument. The closing audit therefore invites attention to the individual steps, not just to the presence of “necessarily” in the dialogue. Character assent is evidence of a commitment being made, not the reader’s warrant to skip assessing it.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159a. Necessary awareness alleged at the outset

164c–d. Critias rejects a consequence by offering to retract

168b–d. Necessity in the relational tests

169d–170a. What follows from possessing reflective knowledge questioned

175b. Unwarranted consequences retrospectively acknowledged

In this edition. The same family also describes coercion, as when Critias is forced into perplexity at 169c. A translation must distinguish logical necessity from psychological or social constraint rather than flatten all cases into formal entailment.

See also. Agreement and concession; Retraction; Self-relation; Force and compulsion.

No less and equal comparison

οὐχ ἧττον (ouch hētton); οὐδὲν ἧττον (ouden hētton); ὁμοίως (homoiōs); μηδὲν ἐλάττους (mēden elattous)

The word. Hētton is the comparative adverb “less”; negation can deny inferiority without asserting superiority. Homoiōs means similarly or alike. Elattous is an inflected comparative meaning fewer or lesser. These ordinary comparative expressions perform distinct argumentative work, and the dimension being compared must be specified.

In the Charmides. The first refutation ends with a carefully weakened comparison. Even if quiet actions prove fine no less often than vigorous ones, quietness has no exclusive title to be temperance. The premise that temperance is fine cannot select the quiet over the quick

when quick actions are no less fine. This is not a conclusion that quiet actions are never fine, or that speed always wins. The comparative structure blocks one identification without supplying the opposite definition.

The school example similarly refuses a privileged restriction: pupils write enemies' names no less than their own or friends' names. The point concerns the activity's object, not equal affection for the people named. In the final knowledge argument Socrates asks whether every kind of knowledge contributes alike to happiness; Critias denies it. This answer motivates the search for the relevant knowledge rather than allowing "knowledge" to function as an undifferentiated good. When knowledge of good and bad is hypothetically removed, Critias agrees that the crafts would produce their characteristic results no less effectively. The very next qualification removes the well and beneficially. Undiminished technical output is therefore not undiminished happiness or benefit. A reader who lets "no less" carry the latter claim has reversed the contrast the example is constructed to draw.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

160b–160d. The comparison defeats quietness's exclusive claim without proving it never fine.

161d. Writing others' names is no less ordinary than writing one's own.

174a–174b. Critias denies that all knowledges contribute alike to happiness.

174c–174d. Craft outputs remain undiminished while beneficial use or outcome is withheld.

In this edition. The edition's "no fewer," "no less," "just as much" and "alike" should be read with their respective objects. Their grammatical similarity does not make their standards of comparison interchangeable.

See also. Quietness; Quickness and slowness; Good and bad; Beneficial and harmful; Happiness and doing well.

Oath and divine invocations

ὀμώμοκα (omōmoka); νὴ Δία (nē Dia); μὰ Δία (ma Dia); Ἡράκλεις (Hērakleis); νὴ τὸν κύνα (nē ton kyna); τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι (to triton tōi sōtēri)

The word. Omōmoka is the perfect "I have sworn," marking a continuing obligation from an oath. Nē and ma introduce familiar oath formulas; in their contexts the former commonly reinforces affirmation and the latter often accompanies negation. Divine exclamations and proverbial invocations need not have the same binding force as an expressly sworn undertaking.

In the Charmides. The strongest obligation in the prologue is Socrates' oath to the Thracian. Having sworn, he says he must obey the teacher's instruction not to treat the head before the soul. The oath protects a condition of treatment against pressure from wealth, good birth, or beauty. Its force belongs to the reported medical arrangement; the text does not give the wording of a historical professional oath or identify it as the Hippocratic Oath.

Ordinary conversation is also punctuated by Zeus-invocations. Socrates, Charmides, and Critias use these formulas to insist, deny, recognize, or react. Their occurrence is not evidence that every following proposition has been solemnly proved. Socrates' "Heracles!" at 154d answers the extravagant praise of Charmides with an extravagant exclamation and the description of an invincible young man.

At 167a “the third time, for the Savior” introduces a renewed attempt to examine the proposed knowledge. The phrase draws on a familiar ritual-proverbial pattern of a third offering or cup to Zeus Soter. Its local point is a hopeful restart. Counting all earlier definitions and forcing them into exactly three stages would mistake the conversational formula for a formal table of contents.

“By the dog” at 172e accompanies Socrates’ acknowledgment that his own doubts sound strange. The oath has close parallels in other Platonic dialogues, but the Charmides does not explain the dog as an Egyptian god, Rhadamanthine practice, or comic substitute for Zeus. Those are comparative ancient explanations. Here it marks characteristic Socratic speech at the transition toward the dream.

Across these uses, religious language supports constraint, excitement, assurance, and hope without supplying one uniform authority for the argument. The sworn medical commitment is specific; the Delphic interpretation is contested through examination; ordinary oaths accompany concessions that may later be withdrawn.[23]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154b–d. Zeus and Heracles are invoked during recognition and praise of Charmides

157b–c. Socrates says his sworn obligation requires compliance with the Thracian’s conditions

161c–162b. Zeus-oaths punctuate the discussion of the borrowed definition

[23] Plato, Gorgias 482b, explicitly calls the dog the god of the Egyptians; Apology 22a offers another Socratic use of the oath. The explanation in the former should not be presented as words spoken in the Charmides. Compare Republic 583b and Philebus 66d for the third-for-the-Savior formula. The local use is proverbial and does not establish a drinking-party setting.

167a–b. The third-for-the-Savior formula introduces renewed testing

172e. Socrates swears by the dog while acknowledging a troubling implication

176a. Charmides invokes Zeus while disclaiming knowledge of his own temperance

In this edition. At 157c1 Burnet prints the perfect ὀμώμοκα while recording the aorist ὤμοσα in other witnesses. The perfect in the translation, “I have sworn,” suits the continuing obligation. The explanatory identification of the Savior with Zeus comes from the proverbial background; the local phrase does not spell out Zeus’ name.

See also. Thracians; Charm; Delphi and Apollo; Persuasion and obedience; The dream hypothesis.

Oil-flask and strigil

λήκυθον (lēkython); στλεγγίδα (stlengida)

The word. Lēkythos is an oil-flask; stlengis a strigil, the scraper associated with cleaning the body after exercise. The text gives the accusatives lēkython and stlengida in a list of objects that every person would have to make under an implausibly literal rule of self-sufficiency.

In the Charmides. Socrates asks whether a city would be well managed if each person had to weave and wash his own cloak, make his own footwear, and provide his own oil-flask, strigil, and other belongings on the same principle. Charmides rejects the arrangement. The everyday objects test “doing one’s own business” by pushing possession into a demand for universal personal production.

The equipment is especially well chosen for the scene. Those gathered at a palaestra can recognize the flask and scraper as ordinary requirements of exercise, just as they can recognize the value of a specialist who makes them. The example is not an inventory of luxuries; it is a concrete way to show why a user's owning an object does not mean that making it must be his exclusive business.

Neither object returns as a symbolic instrument with a secret technical meaning. Their modest specificity is their philosophical value: familiar kit makes the strained interpretation of a general formula visibly unworkable.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

161e–162a. The equipment is included in the hypothetical rule that everyone make only his own belongings

In this edition. The edition's "oil-flask" makes the use of lēkythos intelligible, while "strigil" is explained in a note. The forms in the Greek are singular accusatives, not names of separate branches of knowledge.

See also. Palaestra; Athletics; Cloak; Doing one's own business; Craft and expertise.

Omniscience

τὰ γεγονότα πάντα (ta gegonota panta); τὰ νῦν ὄντα (ta nyn onta); μηδὲν ἀγνοοῖ (mēden agnooi)

The word. "Omniscience" is a modern convenient headword for the hypothetical person who knows all future, past and present things and is ignorant of nothing (174a). No single Greek noun corresponding to this English title is used here. The text expresses completeness by a sequence of temporal objects and a negative qualification.

In the Charmides. Socrates introduces the person after Critias has included a prophet among those who live knowledgeably and well. The new hypothesis adds all past and present things to knowledge of the future, then stipulates ignorance of nothing. It maximizes epistemic extent so that Critias cannot propose someone still more knowledgeable (174a).

The next question does the philosophical work: which of this person's knowledges makes him happy? Critias denies that they all contribute alike, rejects draughts and calculation, gives health a stronger claim, and finally names good and bad. The sequence separates quantity of known material from the particular content that accounts for benefit.

The example is not an argument for the actual possibility of a human omniscient knower, nor a theology of divine omniscience. It is explicitly posited for inquiry. One interpretive challenge is whether knowing all things must already include normative truth; the dialogue's next question effectively distinguishes that component within the imagined totality rather than assuming that total extent explains its practical importance.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

173e–174a. The prophet enlarged into a hypothetical knower of all times

174a–b. Specific contributions of the knowledges compared

In this edition. "Let us suppose there is such a man" prevents the complete-knower description from being mistaken for Plato's claim that one exists. "Everything that has happened" and "what is now" are distinct temporal additions, not merely synonyms for foreknowledge.

See also. Prophecy; Knowledgeable living; Hypothesis; Good and bad.

One's own and what belongs to others

τὰ ἑαυτοῦ (ta heautou); τὰ αὐτοῦ (ta hautou); οἰκεῖα (oikeia); ἀλλότρια (allotria); τὰ τῶν ἄλλων (ta tōn allōn)

The word. The substantivised phrases τὰ ἑαυτοῦ and τὰ αὐτοῦ mean one's own things or affairs, with the referent supplied by context. Τὰ τῶν ἄλλων means others' things. Allotria marks what belongs to others or is alien; oikeia can mean one's own, belonging with one or appropriate to one. Their opposition allows a transition from possession to propriety. The kinship of οἰκεῖα with household vocabulary helps explain its ordinary range, but the argument must be read from the distinctions Critias actually states rather than from etymology.

In the Charmides. In the first test, the expressions have concrete referents. Pupils write names belonging to friends and enemies; artisans make articles that will belong to other people; a hypothetical law tells citizens not to touch others' things (161d–163a). If temperance demanded avoidance of everything associated with another, ordinary skilled cooperation would become impossible.

Critias changes the terms of membership. On his interpretation of Hesiod, beneficial and fine productions alone are oikeia, while all harmful ones are allotria (163c). Socrates restates his usage by connecting what is appropriate and one's own with good things (163d). An item can consequently be "alien" on this account even when one has made it, because the relevant criterion is its harmfulness rather than legal title. The proposal does not announce a general abolition of ownership or a rule about

distributing property. It reinterprets the slogan under examination.

The own/other language also turns back on its defender. Critias reacts like a poet whose own compositions have been badly delivered by an actor (162d). His proprietary anxiety over the definition is visible while its account of one's own remains obscure. At 174e each expertise again has its own work. Here the opposition determines a field of competence: medicine's work is health, and the evaluative knowledge has been assigned benefit. The reflexive vocabulary therefore moves among possession, authorial responsibility, proper conduct and characteristic function; the differences should remain explicit.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

161d–163a. Names, manufactured goods and cooperative work test the ordinary possessive sense

162d. The poet's own compositions provide a pointed dramatic echo

163c–d. Oikeia and allotria are redescribed by goodness and harmfulness

174e–175a. Each expertise is allotted its own work

In this edition. The edition uses "appropriate to one" for οἰκεῖα at 163c–d and "belonging to others" for ἀλλότρια. This is deliberately more explicit than translating both the possessive phrase and the adjective as "one's own." "His own fellow craftsman" at 171c concerns the temperate person's own specialty, not the other craftsman's specialty.

See also. Doing one's own business; Meddling; Doing good things; Work and working; Fitting and appropriate; Knowledge of knowledge.

Only and nothing else

μόνη (monē); μόνον (monon); ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός (allou de oudenos)

The word. Monē, a feminine adjective, can mark a particular knowledge as the only one of its kind. Monon also functions adverbially to restrict what is known or what follows. “Of nothing else” restricts an object-domain. These uses of exclusiveness are not equivalent merely because English can render all of them with “only.”

In the Charmides. Critias at 166c and 166e singles out temperance as uniquely knowing itself and the other knowledges. The uniqueness claim concerns which faculty has this characteristic. Socrates’ restatement then restricts its objects: it concerns itself, other knowledges and ignorance, rather than the first-order subjects of those knowledges. The exclusion is crucial to the analogies of sight without colour and hearing without sound. A faculty that also retained its ordinary subject matter would not be the same hypothesis.

At 170c–d a further “only” marks the limited result: under the separation of domains the possessor recognizes that knowledge is present, not what it concerns. This is a restriction on the promised discrimination. It should not be confused with a general definition of all reflective awareness. At 174b–c the exclusive expression shifts again: Socrates identifies knowledge of good and bad alone as the decisive knowledge in the happiness argument, rather than all the other sciences together. Finally at 174e he recalls that temperance was assigned knowledge and lack of knowledge as its only objects, and nothing else. That last restriction drives the objection to Critias’ proposed supervisory benefit. A lexicon that drops

the exclusive phrases makes the refutation look broader, and less intelligible, than the stipulated account permits.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

166c–166e. Critias claims uniqueness for the knowledge that knows itself and other knowledges.

167b–168a. The analogies preserve exclusion of ordinary first-order objects.

170c–170d. The result is limited to recognizing that someone knows, not the field known.

174b–174c. The source of happiness is narrowed to knowledge of good and bad.

174e–175a. The stipulated restriction of temperance's objects supports the final objection.

In this edition. The edition's "alone," "only," "nothing but" and "of nothing else" deserve separate attention to grammatical scope. They are not ornamental repetitions.

See also. Knowledge of knowledge; Knowing that and knowing what; Self-relation; Product and object of knowledge; Good and bad.

Order and orderly conduct

κοσμίως (kosmiōs); κόσμιος (kosmios; bracketed at 160c)

The word. Kosmiōs means in an orderly, decorous or well-behaved manner. It is the adverb actually used in Charmides' first definition. The related adjective kosmios appears at 160c only as text Burnet brackets as spurious. The broad noun kosmos, familiar from discussions of order or the world, is not an expressed theoretical term here. Orderly public conduct must therefore be distinguished from an imported cosmology or a systematic account of psychic order.

In the Charmides. Charmides first says temperance is doing everything kosmiōs and quietly, illustrating this with walking and speaking (159b). The adverb gives the proposal its social and normative aspect: not merely absence of motion or sound, but a suitable bearing. He then summarises the whole answer as a kind of quietness. Socrates' refutation chiefly pursues quietness in its opposition to quick and effective performance, and does not independently define or refute orderliness.

This omission matters when judging the argument. If the initial conjunction permits quick yet well-regulated activity, the later contrast with slowness has not exhausted it. Conversely Charmides himself authorises the compression into quietness. The exchange leaves a tension between the richer description of conduct and the compressed definiens that receives the direct test. Readers should not repair the argument by asserting that orderliness has silently been demonstrated equivalent to either speed or stillness.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159b. The first proposal joins orderly behaviour with quietness

160c (apparatus). Burnet deletes κόσμιος from the later sentence about the quiet life

In this edition. "In an orderly way" translates the adverb at 159b. The omission of "orderly" at 160c follows Burnet's brackets rather than a failure to translate an accepted word. Keeping the two textual statuses separate is essential.

See also. Quietness; Quickness and slowness; Fitting and appropriate; Temperance.

Palaestra

παλαίστραν (palaistran); παλαίστρᾳ (palaistrai); διατριβάς (diatribas)

The word. Palaistra is a wrestling-school or exercise ground. Diatribai, in Socrates' opening description, are accustomed haunts or ways of spending time. Although a palaestra belongs to the broader culture of gymnastic training, the text's word should not be silently replaced by the name of a particular gymnasium.

In the Charmides. The conversation occurs in Taureas' palaestra opposite Basile's shrine. Socrates goes there eagerly after a long absence and finds many familiar people alongside strangers. This makes the place a center of conversation and acquaintance as well as training. The narrative names no formal class assembled for a scheduled lesson with Socrates.

The mixed company shapes the inquiry. Charmides enters among young admirers, the children stare, adults make room on the bench, and everyone gathers in a circle around Socrates and the youth. Public attention increases the attraction of appearing wise and the embarrassment of admitting perplexity. Critias' later concern for reputation is not an abstract personality trait detached from this audience.

The place also supplies material and conceptual examples. Literal athletic undressing permits Socrates' metaphor of stripping the soul. Wrestling, boxing, and other bodily performances enter the test of quietness. The oil-flask and strigil later make extreme personal self-sufficiency visibly absurd through equipment natural to the present setting.

The palaestra is therefore more than scenery. It brings bodies, education, erotic admiration, household supervision, and competitive display into one space. Yet the setting does not automatically certify Socrates as a paid teacher or the dialogue as a formal institutional curriculum. Its philosophical conversation develops from an ordinary encounter.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153a–c. Socrates returns to the familiar exercise ground and is welcomed

154a–155d. The crowd, admiration, bench comedy, and encircling audience establish the setting's social pressures

159c–d. Athletic performances become argumentative examples

161e–162a. Exercise equipment supplies examples of goods not sensibly made by every user

In this edition. "Wrestling-school" is the edition's consistent contextual rendering. "Gymnasium" is an English lookup aid, not a claim that γυμνάσιον occurs in this scene. The topographical reference identifies Taureas and Basile without giving a secure modern street address.

See also. Taureas; Basile; Athletics; Oil-flask and strigil; Stripping the soul; Erotic attraction.

Perception

αἴσθησίν τινα (aisthēsin tina); αἰσθήσεων μὲν αἴσθησις (aisthēseōn men aisthēsis); αἰσθάνονται (aisthanontai)

The word. Aisthēsis is perception, sensing or awareness; aisthanesthai is to perceive or notice. The indefinite phrase aisthēsin tina at 159a means "some perception" or "some sense". It need not identify a special introspective

organ. At 167d the plural aisthēseis groups sense capacities such as sight and hearing.

In the Charmides. At 159a the virtue's presence is said to supply a perception from which an opinion about what it is and what it is like could arise. This modest sequence is significant: possessing, being aware, opining and articulating are distinguishable steps. Socrates does not say that feeling temperate already amounts to an adequate philosophical definition. Indeed, the sequence immediately produces answers that fail examination.

The direction of inquiry becomes explicitly inward at 160d, when Charmides is invited to look into himself. One may connect that instruction to the earlier aisthēsis, but the connection is interpretive; Plato does not develop an account of introspection in sensory physiology.

At 167c–d sight and hearing supply separate examples, followed by the general question whether any perception perceives perceptions and itself while perceiving none of the normal perceptible objects. The final restriction is essential. This is stronger than asking whether a perceiver can notice that he perceives. Socrates later suspends judgment about the possible self-relation of sight and hearing (168e). Consequently the negative answers here do not establish a finished Platonic denial of awareness of perception.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156c. Socrates asks whether Charmides has noticed the doctors' practice

158e–159a. Aisthēsis mediates between possession of virtue and opinion

160d. Inward-looking instruction

167c–d. Generalized perception-of-perception analogy

168d–169a. Self-perception would require the relevant sensible character; judgment remains qualified

In this edition. The edition uses “some sense” at 159a and “sense” in the generalizing question at 167d. Neither rendering warrants silently substituting “sense-datum”, a modern category absent from this inquiry.

See also. Sight and colour; Hearing and sound; Belief and opinion; Knowing oneself; Self-relation.

Perplexity

ἀπορῶ (aporō); ἀπορίας (aporias); ἠπόρουν (ēporoun); εὐπορώτερος (euporōteros)

The word. Aporein is to be at a loss, lack a resource or have no way forward. Aporia names that difficulty. The contrast with euporōteros, “better provided with a way through”, is explicit at 167b. The spatial resonance is real, but every occurrence need not depict a literal blocked road.

In the Charmides. Socrates first describes himself as at a loss when Charmides sits beside him and his confidence collapses (155c), and again when explaining how he had struggled to introduce the charm (156b). These uses are social and erotic before they are technical. They show that a confession of incapacity is not confined to the formal closing of a philosophical argument.

At 167b Socrates announces a determinate intellectual difficulty and offers to state where it lies: whether a knowledge could know knowledge and ignorance while excluding ordinary objects. He asks whether Critias can find a better route. At 169c perplexity spreads like a yawn. Socrates is visibly at a loss; Critias, accustomed to esteem, will not confess his inability and conceals it with unclear

speech. The episode distinguishes undergoing perplexity from acknowledging it honestly.

The final failure is often called the dialogue's aporia, but it is more exact to say that no adequate definition has been secured. Socrates still believes temperance a great good, and Charmides wants continued conversation. Interpretively, acknowledged perplexity may prepare renewed inquiry, whereas concealed perplexity protects reputation at the expense of clarity. The narrative strongly supports that contrast without proving that every experience of aporia automatically improves its subject.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155c–156b. Socrates' social and erotic loss of resource

167b–c. Explicitly stated philosophical difficulty

169c–d. Perplexity as contagious yawning; Critias conceals it

175b–176b. Unresolved definition followed by continued need for the charm

In this edition. At 167b the edition expands the shared poros imagery into "way through". At 169c it keeps Burnet's ἀναγκασθῆναι, "to be forced"; the apparatus records a proposed deletion and Burnet's alternative suggestion, "infected". The latter is not the printed text.

See also. Inquiry; Clear and obscure; Knowing oneself; Refutation; Modesty and shame.

Persuasion and obedience

πείθῃς (peithēis); πείθω (peithō); πείσει (peisei); πείθεσθαι (peithesthai); πείθομαι (peithomai); πειθοίμην (peithoimēn)

The word. The active peithein means to persuade; the middle-passive peithesthai can mean to be persuaded,

trust or obey. The sense depends on the relation between speaker and addressee. Greek can therefore let the same family move from persuasion by a person or argument to compliance with an authority. “Obey” and “be persuaded” are not two unrelated acts that the English reader may safely separate throughout this dialogue.

In the Charmides. Charmides initially assumes he will copy Socrates’ charm. Socrates asks whether that will happen only if the boy persuades him or even without persuasion, and Charmides laughingly accepts the condition (156a). The small exchange asserts Socrates’ participation as something to be secured, not simply commanded.

In the Thracian story the same family governs Socrates’ responsibilities. No one, however rich, wellborn or beautiful, is to persuade him to treat the head before the soul; he says he has sworn an oath and must obey the healer’s instructions (157b–c). The target of persuasion is resisted because of another accepted authority. This is presented as Socrates’ reported commitment within the therapeutic story, not a general rule that obedience always outranks reason.

The ending returns to the ambiguity. Charmides is not wholly persuaded by Socrates’ account of failure and asks for continued charming (176a–b). Shortly afterwards he declares that he must obey Critias as his guardian (176b–c). His demand upon Socrates then moves toward force, and Socrates yields (176c–d). The verbal continuity highlights different sources of assent: an argument can remain unpersuasive, a guardian’s command can nevertheless receive compliance, and the other’s consent can be overridden in play.

Because the scene is comic and affectionate, one should not describe a completed physical assault that the text does not narrate. But its language does prevent obedience from becoming an uncomplicated final definition of temperance. Critias treats compliance as evidence of the virtue while the dialogue has not established that correct judgment follows from deference to him.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156a. Socrates makes persuasion a condition of sharing the charm

157b–c. The healer forbids contrary persuasion, and Socrates promises obedience

176a–c. Charmides moves from not being persuaded by Socrates to obeying Critias

176c–d. The exchange turns from persuasion toward threatened force

In this edition. The edition explicitly alternates "persuade," "be persuaded" and "obey" to keep the family visible across the frame. The apparatus at 156a records H. Richards' proposed futures against the printed present forms; the choice does not eliminate the principle that Charmides is to secure Socrates' assent.

See also. Force and compulsion; Willingness and refusal; Ruling and supervision; Temperance; Guardian and cousin.

Philosophy and wisdom

φιλοσοφίας (philosophias); σοφίᾳ (sophiai); φιλόσοφός (philosophos); σοφὸς (sophos); σοφώτατον (sophōtaton)

The word. Philosophia is philosophy, the pursuit or cultivation of wisdom; philosophos characterizes someone

disposed toward it. Sophia is wisdom or skillful understanding, and sophos wise or expert. Context determines whether the word is praise, an established reputation or a claim being teased. It is not a fixed synonym for the proposed epistēmē of epistēmē.

In the Charmides. Socrates returns from campaign and asks how philosophy is doing and whether the young have become outstanding in wisdom, beauty or both (153d). The pairing establishes an evaluative contrast that the drama immediately tests: Charmides' visible beauty is readily attested, while his soul must be encountered through discussion. Critias calls him philosophos and poetically gifted (154e–155a). The claim is a characterization to be explored, not proof that he possesses a philosopher's settled knowledge.

Socrates' description of Cydias as most wise in erotic matters (155d) gives wisdom a pointedly local object. The poet's warning suddenly seems apt to Socrates' own predicament. Later the person from whom Charmides heard the third definition is reputedly wise (161b–162b); that reputation makes Socrates infer, teasingly, that the words must conceal a riddle rather than a crude absurdity. Charmides then asks whether their author understands them at all.

The movement is from socially attributed wisdom to an examined account. Socrates' own willingness to admit ignorance and uncertainty suggests one possible contrast with Critias' intellectual prestige, but the dialogue supplies no final lexical definition of sophia. A reader should not equate every occurrence of "wise" with perfect moral knowledge or read "philosopher" as a professional institutional title.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153d. Philosophy and the question about wisdom and beauty

154e–155a. Charmides described as philosophical and poetic

155d. Cydias' expertise in erotic matters

161b–162b. Reputed wisdom and the enigmatic third answer

In this edition. The edition keeps "wisdom", "wise" and "philosopher" distinct from "knowledge". The affectionate or ironic settings qualify the praise but do not make sophos invariably sarcastic.

See also. Knowledge; Inquiry; Riddle; Learning and teaching; Fine and beautiful; Cydias.

Pilot and navigation

κυβερνήτης (kybernētēs); κυβερνητικὴ (kybernētikē); ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ (en tēi thalattēi)

The word. Kybernētēs is the pilot or steersman; kybernētikē the corresponding expertise of navigating or steering. Its immediate field here is literal maritime danger. Modern "cybernetics" is a linguistic descendant, not a concept explained by this passage.

In the Charmides. The pilot leads the list of experts whose false claim would be exposed in the dream (173b). If the hypothetical temperance governed us completely, no one pretending to be a pilot could deceive us, and we would be safer at sea. This gives the diagnostic fantasy a practical and high-stakes example.

At 174c the pilot's art reappears after knowledge of good and bad is hypothetically removed. It still prevents

death at sea; its proper technical function has not disappeared. The subtraction test nevertheless says that these results' occurring well and beneficially would be lost without knowledge of good and bad (174c–d). How that knowledge secures the benefit is not explained.

The recurrence therefore supports the division between technical success and value. It is not evidence that navigation is worthless or that survival has no ordinary benefit. The argument asks whether reliable survival, taken simply as a technical achievement, exhausts the explanation of doing well. Nor is there an explicit ship-of-state allegory here, even though political management is discussed nearby.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

173b. False pilot excluded and maritime safety imagined

174c–d. Navigation retains its function without knowledge of good and bad

In this edition. The edition uses "pilot" consistently rather than changing to "captain" at the second occurrence. That continuity lets the reader recognize the same expertise in the dream and the subtraction test.

See also. The dream hypothesis; Pretence and imposture; Craft and expertise; Good and bad.

Poet and actor

ποιητικός (poiētikos); ποιητῶν (poiētōn); ποιητὴς (poiētēs); ὑποκριτῇ (hypokritēi); ποιήματα (poiēmata)

The word. Poiētēs is a poet or maker, poiētikos poetic or gifted at poetry, and poiēmata things made, here poetic compositions. Hypokritēs denotes an actor or performer

in the simile at 162d; it does not mean a hypocrite in the modern moral sense.

In the Charmides. Poetic reputation enters before formal examination. Critias calls Charmides philosophical and, in others' opinion and his own, highly poetic. Socrates answers by invoking the family's kinship with Solon. Later the household's inherited excellence is certified by named poets and their encomia. Poetry helps establish the admired youth's social and educational credentials.

The poet–actor simile changes its function. When Charmides transfers his borrowed definition back to Critias, the older man seems angry like a poet whose actor mistreats his compositions. The analogy distinguishes author from performer while showing the author's investment in "his own" work. That phrase resonates with the definition under dispute, doing one's own things. The apparently impersonal formula has become someone's intellectual property and a source of personal embarrassment.

The simile does not settle whether Critias wrote a particular tragedy. Ancient attributions of dramatic works to him are contested. What is secure locally is the narrator's portrayal of a man who reacts possessively to the performance of an account. Nor does it establish that Charmides is only a mindless reciter: his teasing is purposeful and successful in bringing the author into the discussion.

Quoted poets then become active resources of argument. Cydias supplies an image, Homer an accepted counterexample, Hesiod an interpretive warrant. The dialogue does not treat these uses as equivalent. Poetry can disclose an experience, confer prestige, or furnish

material for scrutiny; the distinction between those roles is part of the reader's work.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154e–155a. Charmides' reported poetic ability and the connection to Solon

157e–158a. Poetic encomia supply inherited family prestige

162c–d. Critias is compared to a poet angered by an actor's handling of his own compositions

163b–d. Hesiod's verse is interpreted in a lexical defense

In this edition. The edition renders hypokritēs as "actor" and poiēmata as "the poet's own verses," preserving both the theatrical situation and the echo of one's own. Modern "hypocrite" would import the wrong meaning.

See also. Critias; Charmides; Cydias; Homer; Hesiod; Solon; Anacreon; Doing and action; Making and production; Work and working.

Possibility and impossibility

δυνατόν (dynaton); ἀδύνατον (adynaton); οἷόν τε (hoion te); ἀπιστίαν (apistian)

The word. Dynaton and adynaton mean possible/capable and impossible/incapable. Hoion te likewise expresses possibility. Apistia is disbelief or lack of confidence, not logical impossibility. The distinction becomes explicit in the self-relation argument.

In the Charmides. At 167b Socrates separates two questions: whether knowing what one knows and does not know is possible, and, if possible, whether it benefits. This order prevents the attractiveness of a power from serving as proof of its existence.

The analogies make the proposal seem impossible, but Socrates immediately cautions against insisting that it does not exist (168a). At 168e the text differentiates wholly impossible reflexive comparisons of magnitudes and quantities from capacities whose self-application is strongly doubted. Sight, hearing, self-motion and self-burning heat do not receive the same unqualified verdict as being greater than oneself.

Socrates asks for an adequate classification and admits he cannot supply it (169a–b). At 169d possibility is then granted so that another line of testing can proceed. Neither that concession nor the later dream establishes actuality. Conversely, the final complaint that the argument did not permit the concession (175b) should not erase the earlier refusal to claim a completed impossibility proof.

The lexical distinction is therefore a guide to reading the structure: puzzling, implausible, impossible, possible by concession and actually demonstrated are five different statuses, although several can be described loosely as “problematic”.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

167b. Possibility distinguished from benefit

168a. Explicit refusal to insist upon nonexistence

168e–169b. Impossibility and disbelief distinguished

169d. Possibility granted without resolution

175b. The unearned concession recalled

In this edition. “Would raise disbelief in some people” at 169a is deliberately weaker than “is impossible”. The edition’s emphatic “even if entirely possible” marks the strength of a supposition, not proof of possibility.

See also. Power and capacity; Self-relation; Hypothesis; Agreement and concession.

Potidaea and the campaign

Ποτειδαίας (Poteidaias); Ποτειδαίᾳ (Poteidaiai); στρατοπέδου (stratopedou); μάχης (machēs); στρατιᾶς (stratias)

The word. Poteidaia is the place-name Potidaea. Stratopedon denotes an army camp and can designate the army encamped; machē is battle. At 156d epi stratias identifies the campaign as the setting in which Socrates says he learned the Thracian remedy.

In the Charmides. The dialogue begins on the day after Socrates' homecoming from the army at Potidaea. The people at home have recently heard of a severe battle and the deaths of many acquaintances. Chaerephon's immediate question is how Socrates survived, answered with a dry appeal to his visible presence. Socrates narrates that he supplied military news but does not reproduce it; the recorded conversation turns instead to philosophy and young Athenians.

The campaign subsequently furnishes a claimed provenance for the charm. Socrates says that he learned it from a Thracian doctor while on military service. This is part of the medical story he constructs after agreeing to Critias' pretext. The narrative does not independently establish that a historical Thracian physician taught Socrates this doctrine. It does explain how an encounter with foreign healing can be introduced naturally by a man just returned from the northern campaign.

Externally, Thucydides reports the fighting associated with Potidaea's revolt, the ensuing siege, and its eventual

surrender. The major battle preceding the siege belongs to 432 BCE, while surrender falls in the winter of 430/29. The Charmides itself supplies no calendar date, and its combination of prolonged absence, recent fighting, and homecoming has generated competing chronological reconstructions. It is safer to record that ambiguity than to print “429” or “432” as an explicit Platonic date.

The martial frame also has a local verbal afterlife. Critias calls the young men preceding Charmides prodromoi, “forerunners,” a word available for an advance guard. The attractive youth becomes “invincible,” and the lover imagines himself captured. Later the hypothetical organization of expertise promises safety at sea and in war. These associations permit a reading in which survival, mastery, and vulnerability run through the dialogue; none proves a hidden military allegory governing every example.[24]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153a–d. Homecoming, severe battle, deaths, and transition from war news to philosophy

154a. The admirers entering first are called forerunners

156d. The claimed Thracian teacher was encountered on campaign

173b. Reliable expertise would improve bodily health and survival in war and at sea

174c. Generalship and navigation continue to preserve life even when knowledge of good and bad is removed

In this edition. The introductory chronology in the supplied edition is explicitly disputed. “Army at Potidaea” is appropriately less specific than a translation that inserts

[24] Thucydides 1.56–66 supplies the revolt, battle, and siege context: online source. Thucydides 2.70 records the surrender: online source. These passages date military events, not the fictional conversation explicitly.

the date of the siege's conclusion. Burnet's apparatus at 156d4 records strateias in Stobaeus beside stratias in the principal witnesses.

See also. Socrates; Thracians; Charm; Lion and fawn; Great King and Asia; Dreams, horn and ivory.

Power and capacity

δύναμιν (dynamin); δύναται (dynatai); δυνατὸς (dynatos); οἷός τε (hoios te); οὐσίαν (ousian)

The word. Dynamis is power, capacity or efficacy; dynasthai means be able. Dynatos and hoios te express capability or possibility according to context. Ousia at 168d names the being, nature or character a thing must possess to serve as the object of its own power; it is not a synonym of dynamis.

In the Charmides. Socrates first mentions the charm's power when describing his difficulty explaining it to Charmides (156b). The question is what the charm can accomplish, rather than a technical ontology of capacities.

At 168b the notion becomes central. Knowledge has a certain power such that it is of something; the greater has a power such that it is greater than something. Socrates asks what follows if a thing directs its own power toward itself. It must have the object-character the power requires: the relatively greater must be relatively smaller, self-hearing must have sound, self-seeing colour (168b–d).

The contrast between dynamis and ousia is thus operational within a relation. The first is what the thing does or is capable of in relation to something; the second is what the related object must be like. At 169a the unanswered question is which powers can relate to

themselves. Socrates does not assert a universal ban or guarantee.

Later ability-language marks the practical stakes: could the temperate person actually distinguish a doctor from a pretender (170d–171c)? The possession of an impressive name for a power does not establish that it can perform the promised task.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156b. Power of the charm

168b–169b. Relational power and the character required of its object

170d–171c. Claimed ability to certify expertise tested

In this edition. The edition uses “power” for dynamis and “character” for ousia at 168d. Translating the latter by the same word as the former would erase the conditional claim that exercising a power on oneself requires an appropriate object-character.

See also. Self-relation; Possibility and impossibility; Sight and colour; Greater and smaller; Recognition and discrimination.

Praise and blame

ἐπαινέσαντος (epainesantos); ἐπαινῶ (epainō); ἐπαίνου (epainou); ἐγκεκωμιασμένη (enkekōmiasmenē); ᾐτιώμην (ēitiōmēn)

The word. Epainein means praising or approving, and epainos is praise. Enkōmiazein gives fuller celebratory praise; the family encomium is described with its perfect passive participle. Aitiasthai can mean blaming or accusing, here expressed in Socrates’ self-blame. These are acts of appraisal directed at people, performances or

judgments, not automatically evidence that the praised quality is genuinely present.

In the Charmides. Charmides' approval of the doctors' principle restores Socrates' confidence after his erotic discomposure (156d). Socrates then rehearses the poets' praise of the boy's lineage (157e–158a), magnifying the public expectations already surrounding him. Asked whether he is temperate, Charmides recognises a social trap: admitting it would be praising himself and might appear offensive; denying it would contradict his guardian and other admirers (158d). Socrates replaces this demand for self-advertisement with cooperative inquiry.

Praise also supplies an ordinary criterion within the first refutation. Rapid and easy success in inquiry and deliberation is thought worthy of praise (160a–b). It is one accepted judgment among the examples, not proof that whatever the audience praises is morally best.

At 175a Socrates says he rightly blamed himself for an inquiry that has produced no useful result. The direction is noteworthy: he does not blame the boy for the failure or conclude that temperance deserves condemnation. Praise and blame are thus redistributed by the examination. Public acclaim becomes a starting point requiring scrutiny, while self-criticism can keep inquiry open when reputation would encourage concealment.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156d. Charmides' approval restores Socrates' confidence

157e–158a. Poetic encomium establishes the family's inherited reputation

158d. The boy fears that self-praise will be offensive

160a–b. Efficient deliberation is said to merit praise

175a–e. Socrates blames his inquiry while preserving his estimate of temperance

In this edition. “Praise” and “approval” may represent the same ἐπαιν- family in different settings. The final “blame myself” is ᾐτιώμην, whereas “disgrace” in the Hesiod passage is ὄνειδος. Those distinct terms should not be collapsed into one moral vocabulary.

See also. Reputation and ambition; Modesty and shame; Worth and honour; Disgrace; Temperance.

Precision

ἀκριβοῖς (akribois)

The word. Akribois is the second-person singular present of akriboō, to ascertain or know accurately. The form is verbal: it asks about the boy’s certainty, not about the phonetic precision with which he pronounces a name.

In the Charmides. When Charmides addresses Socrates by name, Socrates checks that he has it right. Charmides qualifies his recognition with an idiom meaning “if I am not mistaken,” then explains that Socrates is often discussed among his contemporaries and that he remembers him from childhood. The supplied translation instead presents the first phrase as a courtesy: “I’d be doing you an injustice if I didn’t.” Exact recognition here belongs to acquaintance and reputation. The exchange grounds the ensuing conversation in prior social knowledge while letting Socrates relax into a fuller explanation of the charm. It should not be conflated with the later technical problem of discriminating knowledge

from ignorance, even though both raise questions about the warrant for recognition.[25]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156a. Socrates asks whether Charmides is sure of his name; the boy appeals to reputation and memory.

In this edition. The supplied "you are sure you have my name right" captures the verb's practical force. The ordinary phrase "talking sense" elsewhere need not belong to this same Greek family. The idiom εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε need not assert an injustice against Socrates; see Justice and the just.

See also. Memory and recollection; Reputation and ambition; Language and naming.

Preliminary hearing

ἀνάκρισίν (anakrisin)

The word. Anakrisis is an examination or questioning, with the legal sense of a preliminary hearing before a case proceeds. The accusative anakrisin appears in Socrates' question whether Charmides will deny him even this opportunity before using force.

In the Charmides. At the close, Charmides and Critias have already decided that the youth will remain with Socrates for daily charming. When Socrates asks what they are planning, Charmides answers that their deliberation is complete. Socrates then asks whether force will be used and whether he will receive no preliminary hearing. The language comically turns an educational

[25] LSJ, s.v. ἀκριβόω, cites Charmides 156a for the sense of being sure about something; see Scaife ATLAS.

courtship into a legal situation in which the apparent defendant is not allowed to be heard.

The joke also sharpens the contrast between argumentative examination and coercion. A dialogue organized around asking questions ends with Socrates requesting an opportunity for questioning and being told that the guardian's command suffices. The scene remains playful, but the historical careers of Critias and Charmides permit a darker resonance concerning authority and the denial of a hearing.

No actual lawsuit, magistrate, formal indictment, or sentence appears. The term's institutional background explains the metaphor; it does not make the exchange a transcript of legal procedure. Likewise, an echo of Socrates' later trial is a possible interpretive association, not a prediction explicitly made by the text.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

176c–d. Socrates requests a preliminary hearing when Charmides announces force and relies on Critias' command

In this edition. "Preliminary hearing" preserves the legal coloring that a generic "chance to answer" would soften. The accent on the printed ἀνάκρισίν reflects its immediate syntax, not a different lexical item.

See also. Force and compulsion; Persuasion and obedience; Guardian and cousin; Critias; Charmides; Examination.

Presence and possession

παρούσης (parousēs); ἔνεστιν (enestin); μετέχειν (metechein); ἕχῃ (echēi)

The word. Pareinai describes being present; eneinai being in; echein having; metechein having a share in or partaking of. In these passages they are ordinary ways of speaking about possessing a quality. Their occurrence alone does not establish a technical metaphysics of participation.

In the Charmides. The medical story says that temperance, once present in the soul, facilitates health. Socrates next asks whether Charmides has a sufficient share of it. The proposed test at 159a assumes that the virtue's being in him yields some awareness and opinion. The subsequent instructions ask what sort of person its presence makes him. Critias later relies on a related pattern: possessing speed makes someone fast, beauty makes someone beautiful, and knowledge makes someone knowing. He uses this to move from possessing a knowledge that knows itself to the possessor's knowing himself. That transition is contested territory, even though Socrates provisionally sets it aside to question the next inference. At the end the original practical question returns: is temperance present in Charmides, and does he need the charm? The lexicon therefore distinguishes possession, awareness of possession, an account of what is possessed, and the effect it has. They are linked in the inquiry but not proved identical.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157a. The presence of temperance is connected with the proposed treatment of the body.

158b–159a. Having a share in temperance leads to the proposed test through awareness and opinion.

160d. Charmides is asked what temperance makes him by being present.

169e–170a. Critias argues from a possessor's quality to self-knowledge.

175e–176b. Possession and need remain questions after the definitions fail.

In this edition. The supplied translation appropriately varies "present," "possess," "have" and "share." Reading metechein here as a fully developed theory of participation in Forms would outrun the local argument.

See also. Temperance; Knowing oneself; Knowledge of knowledge; Belief and opinion.

Pretence and imposture

προσποιούμενον (prospoioumenon); προσποιήσασθαι (prospoiēsasthai); ἐξαπατῷ (exapatōi); ἀλαζόνας (alazonas); φάσκων (phaskōn)

The word. Prospoieisthai means pretend, profess or lay claim to something. Phaskein is to assert or claim and does not itself imply falsity. Exapatan means deceive thoroughly or mislead. Alazōn is a pretender or boastful impostor. The vocabulary differentiates assertion, deliberate disguise and actual deception.

In the Charmides. Critias' opening scheme asks Socrates to pretend to know a headache remedy (155b). The dialogue therefore places a staged claim to expertise at the entrance to the conversation that will later test the detection of false experts. This does not prove that every detail of Socrates' healing account is false, but it keeps the dramatic status of his role in view.

At 170d–171c the proposed temperate examiner cannot tell whether someone possesses the expertise he claims. The summary carefully includes a person who merely pretends and a person who thinks he knows. Deception of others and mistaken self-confidence are separate possibilities; successful examination must address both.

The dream grants the otherwise unsecured power. No false pilot, doctor, general or other professed knower would deceive us or escape notice (173b), and temperance would reject impostors among diviners (173c). The point is counterfactual: the argument has not shown that such a supervisory expertise exists. Even granting its success, the question whether the resulting knowledgeable life is beneficial remains.

The prologue and dream thus frame two different uses of pretence. One arranges a personal encounter; the other threatens public safety and the reliability of expertise. It is interpretation, not a lexical equivalence, to decide how strongly the former should undermine trust in Socrates' subsequent story.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155b–e. The initial pretense of knowing a remedy

170d–171c. Pretended and merely supposed expertise distinguished

173b–c. False experts excluded in the conceded ideal case

In this edition. "Pretends or thinks he does" at 171c preserves the crucial disjunction. "Impostors" at 173c translates alazonas; one should not use it indiscriminately for every person who lacks knowledge.

See also. Lack of knowledge; Examination; Pilot and navigation; Prophecy; The dream hypothesis.

Prodicus

Προδίκου (Prodikou)

The word. Prodikou is the genitive of Prodicus, invoked as someone who distinguishes between names or expressions: peri onomatōn diairountos. The local reference concerns semantic discriminations, not a biographical narrative.

In the Charmides. Socrates says he has heard Prodicus make countless distinctions between words immediately after Critias separates making, doing, and working. The comparison puts Critias' elaborate lexical defense in a recognizable intellectual setting. Its tone is teasing, but its procedural conclusion is accommodating: Critias may assign each term as he wishes, provided that he makes clear the thing to which he applies it.

The point is therefore not that all distinctions are useless or that ordinary Greek fixes philosophical usage beyond challenge. Socrates asks to separate the terminological decision from the substantive proposal. Once "doing" has been reserved for the making of good things, does Critias define temperance as that activity? The answer can then be examined without disputing the vocabulary at every step.

The dialogue provides no payment, lesson date, or account of an encounter with Prodicus. Other Platonic works make the sophist's discriminations a recurring subject, but the Charmides needs only the audience's recognition of the habit. It would be misleading to label

every distinction in the subsequent argument “Prodicean” merely because this one comparison occurs.[26]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

163d–e. Socrates recalls Prodicus and grants terminological freedom subject to clarity

In this edition. “Countless distinctions between words” renders μυρία τινὰ… περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιροῦντος without making myria a literal tally of ten thousand. Here onomata is broader than personal names.

See also. Critias; Hesiod; Doing and action; Definition; Argument and account; Making and production; Work and working.

Product and object of knowledge

ἔργον (ergon); τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη (tinos estin epistēmē); ἄλλο αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπιστήμης (allo autēs tēs epistēmēs); τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ (tou hygieinou)

The word. An ergon can be a work, result or function. “Of what is it knowledge?” asks for the object or field, expressed by a genitive. The two constructions do not ask the same question: health is produced by medicine, whereas the healthy is what medicine knows. “Productive” and “nonproductive” are explanatory labels for the contrast made here, not a fully codified classification introduced by Plato in this dialogue.

In the Charmides. Socrates initially asks what temperance accomplishes: medicine produces health, house-building produces houses, so what fine work

[26] Compare Plato, Protagoras 337a–c and Laches 197d for the characterization of Prodicus as a discriminator of neighboring expressions. Those passages are parallels, not additional occurrences in the Charmides.

worthy of its name does temperance produce (165c–e)? Critias challenges the uniform demand. Calculation and geometry do not offer a work of the same sort as a house or cloak. Socrates accepts the objection (166a), making the ensuing change of question explicit: even these knowledges have objects distinct from themselves. Calculation concerns the even and odd; weighing the heavier and lighter. Lack of a tangible product therefore does not entail lack of an object.

Critias then denies that temperance must share this latter structure. Its object is knowledge itself and the other knowledges (166b–c). He does not answer by giving a new ordinary field. The uniqueness he claims exposes the account to the later analogies of powers and objects.

At 170b–171a the object criterion individuates expertise. Knowing the healthy identifies medicine; knowing what concerns building identifies house-building. Knowledge that only recognizes knowledge does not inherit those fields. To ascertain which expertise a claimant possesses, the examiner must assess the appropriate objects in speech or practice. This is the central function of the field restriction, rather than a general denial that an expertise can ever discuss its own methods.

At 174c–175a the language of work and production returns. Ordinary crafts continue to make their characteristic contributions without knowledge of good and bad, but the beneficial quality of those contributions is lost. Critias says temperance benefits indirectly by ruling this knowledge too; Socrates responds that the work of benefit belongs to the other expertise. An interpretive problem arises: if nonproductive knowledge was admitted earlier, why must temperance now be a producer of benefit? One answer distinguishes needing a

tangible external product from needing some beneficial function. A further question remains whether supervision could supply such a function indirectly. The text gives the objection and reply but no general account of indirect epistemic benefit.

The distinctions must therefore be kept threefold: what a knowledge is about, what it characteristically does, and whether what it does benefits us. Equating any two of these erases a principal engine of the argument.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

165c–e. Medicine's health and building's houses as works

165e–166b. Mathematical objection and shift from product to object

166b–c. Critias claims a unique reflexive object

170b–171b. Objects distinguish one knowledge from another

174c–175a. Technical work, benefit, and the supervisory rescue

In this edition. The edition maintains "the healthy" for to hygieinon and "health" for hygieia. Its "works of the other kinds of knowledge" at 175b follows erga and should not be silently changed to "the other kinds of knowledge themselves".

See also. Knowledge; Knowledge of knowledge; Craft and expertise; Calculation and geometry; Beneficial and harmful; Good and bad.

Prophecy

μαντικὴν (mantikēn); μάντεις (manteis); προφήτας (prophētas); μαντεύομαι (manteuomai); τῶν μελλόντων (tōn mellontōn)

The word. Mantikē is divination; mantis a diviner or seer. Prophētēs here describes a spokesman or foreteller of future things. Manteuomai means I divine, and can express a conjecture or anticipatory hunch. The lexical family ranges from a proposed expertise to Socrates' deliberately non-demonstrative avowal.

In the Charmides. Critias describes Apollo's enigmatic greeting as the speech of a mantis at 164e. Socrates later says he "divines" that temperance is beneficial and good (169b). The latter wording acknowledges conviction without presenting the missing proof; any ironic echo of Critias' divine authority is an interpretation.

In the dream Socrates offers an additional concession: let divination be knowledge of the future, and let temperance distinguish true diviners from impostors (173c). This is not an unconditional assertion that prediction is a science or that any particular oracle is reliable. It strengthens the imagined regime of expert action by granting control over a field where false claims are especially consequential.

At 173e–174a the prophet becomes a candidate for the person who lives knowledgeably and well. Socrates then expands the example to someone knowing past and present as well as future. Even that greater extent of knowledge does not answer which knowledge makes life good. Prophecy's chronological range is therefore separated from the normative issue eventually answered by knowledge of good and bad.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

164e. Apollo speaks enigmatically as a prophet

169b. Socrates' prophetic hunch about temperance

173c. Divination admitted as knowledge under a concession

173e–174b. Future knowledge expanded into complete temporal knowledge and then evaluated

In this edition. The edition's "prophetic hunch" at 169b distinguishes Socrates' manteuomai from a demonstrated conclusion. "Let us grant" at 173c is equally important: the passage does not settle the epistemic standing of actual divination.

See also. Riddle; The dream hypothesis; Omniscience; Pretence and imposture; Good and bad.

Pyrilampes

Πυριλάμπους (Pyrilampous)

The word. Pyrilampous is the genitive of Pyrilampes, identified as Charmides' maternal uncle. The name appears in praise of the maternal household, balancing the encomium of the paternal line.

In the Charmides. Socrates reports that whenever Pyrilampes went as ambassador to the Great King or another ruler on the continent, no man there was thought more handsome or larger. This is diplomatic distinction presented through bodily appearance. The formulation is explicitly reportorial: "it is said" and "was thought" locate the claim in reputation, just as other people report Charmides' beauty and temperance.

The two sides of the family are praised in different registers. The paternal house receives inherited poetic

encomium; the maternal uncle's embassies produce admiration abroad. Both are gathered into Socrates' expectation that Charmides will be first in everything. Yet the expectation remains conditional with respect to the soul: visible beauty is one thing, sufficient natural equipment for temperance another.

The supplied editorial material adds Pyrilampes' later connection with Plato's mother. That wider family history is relevant to Plato's choice of people but is not given in the spoken praise. Plutarch's later account also mentions Pyrilampes in connection with peacocks and comic gossip about Pericles. Such evidence should not be imported as a hidden allegation inside the present diplomatic compliment.[27]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158a–b. Pyrilampes' foreign embassies and admired appearance support praise of the maternal house

In this edition. The rendering "bigger" preserves the bodily sense available in μείζων beside καλλίων. "Greater" alone risks turning a praise of impressive stature into an unqualified ranking of political or moral greatness.

See also. Great King and Asia; House, lineage and nobility; Face and bodily appearance; Charmides.

Question and answer

ἐρωτῶ (erōtō); ἀποκρίνασθαι (apokrinasthai); ἀπόκρισιν (apokrisin); τὸ ἐρωτώμενον (to erōtōmenon)

The word. Erōtan is ask or question; apokrinesthai is answer, and apokrisis an answer. The vocabulary

[27] For the distinct later anecdotal tradition, Plutarch, Pericles 13: online source. Its comic allegations are not dialogue evidence.

describes the conversational form rather than a named technical procedure. “The thing asked” can identify the specific issue to which a response must be relevant.

In the Charmides. Ordinary questions about the battle open the dialogue, followed by Socrates’ questions about philosophy and the young men (153c–d). Questioning is thus an exchange between people before it becomes a test of definitions. Charmides initially cannot answer whether he is temperate without either boasting or discrediting his admirers (158c–d). Socrates shifts from that socially loaded alternative to examining what temperance is.

The short answers in the argument record assent, uncertainty, resistance or a request for clarification. They are not interchangeable ticks in a logical proof. Critias’ “what’s to stop them?” at 163a resists an alleged consequence; his agreement that reflective knowledge has only a generic discriminating function at 170a materially narrows the proposal.

Socrates explicitly asks for an answer according to how things appear to the respondent, independent of who is being refuted (166d–e). Conversely Critias often suspects that the questioner knows an answer he is withholding (165b). This tension concerns the authority of the question itself: does it invite shared inquiry or display superior knowledge? The text states Socrates’ preferred understanding but also dramatizes how hard it is to sustain.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153c–d. Reciprocal questioning before the philosophical discussion

158c–159b. Difficulty answering and reformulation of the question

163a–b. Resistance to the question’s assumed equivalence

165b–166e. Questioning without claimed possession of the answer

In this edition. The edition's repeated "he said" and brief affirmative replies preserve the conversational pacing. Their repetition should not be treated as evidence that every premise has received independent support beyond local assent.

See also. Agreement and concession; Definition; Examination; Refutation.

Quickness and slowness

ταχύ (tachy); ταχέως (tacheōs); ταχυτὴς (tachytēs); τάχος (tachos); βραδέως (bradeōs); βραδυτῆτός (bradytētos); ὀξύτης (oxytēs); σφόδρα (sphodra)

The word. The tach- family denotes speed or quickness; bradeōs and bradytēs denote slow performance and slowness. Oxys and oxytēs add sharpness, acuteness or nimbleness, depending on whether bodily movement or mental capacity is in question. Sphodra is an intensifying adverb that in these contrasts contributes force or vigour. These are related axes of performance, not exact synonyms: speed, agility, ease, force and quietness can vary independently.

In the Charmides. Socrates introduces quick writing and reading as finer than quiet or slow performance, then adds nimble wrestling and other bodily actions (159c–d). The formulation gradually puts quickness and acuteness on one side, quietness, difficulty and slowness on the other. It is a comparison of successful performances in specific activities, not an unrestricted recommendation to hurry.

Mental examples repeat the pattern: learning easily is taken as learning quickly, recollection is praised when vigorous and swift, and quick-wittedness is called an acuteness of soul (159e–160a). Deliberation that reaches its result easily and quickly receives praise (160a–b). The possibility that good deliberation sometimes requires time is not investigated here; the examples function as accepted counterinstances to identifying temperance with a uniformly quiet pace.

The negative conclusion is explicitly weaker than "quickness is temperance." Even if fine quiet actions were as numerous as fine quick ones, the proposed identification would still lack its distinguishing basis (160c–d). At 169e speed returns in a different argument: a possessor of speed is fast, just as a possessor of beauty is beautiful. Critias uses such cognate predicates to support his claim about possessing self-knowing knowledge. The argument now concerns attribution from a quality to its possessor, not the ethical merits of speed.[28]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159c–160d. Bodily and mental performances test the moral significance of their pace

169e. Having speed and being fast exemplify Critias' attribution principle

In this edition. The edition differentiates "quickly," "slowly," "nimbly," "sharpness" and "vigorously," allowing the cluster's changing emphasis to be seen. At 159d Burnet brackets βραδέα, "slow"; its absence from the translation does not remove the unbracketed occurrences of slowness elsewhere in the argument.

[28] The printed ταχυτὴς has the regular ancient ultima accent of ταχυτής, genitive -ῆτος; compare the entry in the Centre for the Greek Language's Liddell–Scott resource: online source. The supplied reading is also confirmed by the Burnet page image, online source.

See also. Quietness; Order and orderly conduct; Fine and beautiful; Deliberation and decision; Learning and teaching.

Quietness

ἡσυχιότης (hēsychiotēs); ἡσυχῇ (hēsychēi); ἡσύχιος (hēsychios); ἡσυχία (hēsychia)

The word. The adverbial dative hēsychēi means quietly or calmly; hēsychiotēs is a noun for the corresponding quality, quietness. Hēsychios describes a quiet person, action or life, and hēsychia provides the related noun at 160a. Quietness can concern unobtrusive and composed behaviour as well as inactivity or a lack of speed. It is not lexically identical with bradytēs, slowness. That distinction matters because Charmides introduces the former and Socrates soon treats it together with the latter.

In the Charmides. Charmides' first answer gives an entire style of conduct: doing everything orderly and quietly, with walking through the streets and talking as his examples (159b). Its formulation fits public deportment; he is describing the manner of a well-behaved young person, not calculating the fastest way to complete a task. He then compresses the proposal into "a kind of quietness." Socrates acknowledges that ordinary speakers call quiet people temperate and tests that reputation against another agreed judgment: temperance is fine.

The examples move through the boy's education and bodily exercises. Copying letters, reading, playing the lyre, wrestling and running are better performed quickly or nimbly than slowly and laboriously (159c–d). The soul supplies parallel cases: learning, teaching, remembering, understanding and finding a result in deliberation (159e–

160b). This movement does not equate all bodily speed with virtue. It challenges quietness's exclusive claim to be the fine quality called temperance.

There is nevertheless a pressure point in the argument. "Quietly" in the initial description can mean controlled or unostentatious; "slowly" and "with difficulty" in the counterexamples suggest inefficiency. A fast action can be calm, and a slow one can be agitated. The edition rightly flags the possible shift of sense. A careful reading should allow both the ordinary overlap and the inadequacy of treating the terms as perfect synonyms.

Socrates' final fallback makes the negative result more robust than the earlier comparisons alone. Even if quiet actions were fine just as often as vigorous quick ones, there would be no basis for identifying temperance with quiet action rather than its apparent opposite (160b–d). This shows underdetermination, not a definition of temperance as speed. The temperate life has to be fine, but no single pace captures that requirement. Charmides' next pause before answering also prevents the drama from simply abolishing thoughtful stillness: his second proposal emerges after reflection rather than instant response (160e).

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159b. Charmides proposes orderly and quiet conduct, summarised as a kind of quietness

159c–d. Bodily examples contrast quiet and slow performance with quick and nimble performance

159e–160b. Learning and deliberation provide corresponding examples for the soul

160b–d. Even parity between fine quiet and fine quick actions cannot establish the proposed identity

In this edition. “Quietly” is preserved even where English might naturally substitute “slowly,” making the argumentative movement visible. At 160c Burnet brackets κόσμιος, “orderly,” in the sentence about the quiet life; the English accordingly does not silently reinstate the adjective. The definition should be cited from the unbracketed κοσμίως at 159b.

See also. Order and orderly conduct; Quickness and slowness; Fine and beautiful; Temperance; Deliberation and decision.

Rascal

ὦ μιαρέ (ō miare)

The word. Miare is the masculine vocative of miaros, a word capable of strong abuse connected with foulness or pollution. In these two exchanges its conversational force is teasing reproach. A mechanically literal rendering would make the accusation much more solemn than its dramatic use warrants.

In the Charmides. Socrates directs the same address first at Charmides and then at Critias. At 161b he recognizes that the boy’s newly remembered definition probably comes from his guardian. The phrase exposes the source behind an apparently fresh answer, but Socrates immediately insists that the truth of the claim matters more than its author. At 174b Critias finally names knowledge of good and bad as the knowledge chiefly responsible for happiness. Socrates then teasingly accuses him of dragging the conversation in circles while concealing that answer. The repetition connects ward and guardian at two moments when a supposedly independent reply reveals an unstated dependence. It does not establish that either speaker knowingly planned

a deception; the reproach is part of Socrates' staging of the discovery.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

161b–161c. The address accompanies Socrates' guess that Charmides borrowed the definition from Critias.

174b–174c. The same address follows Critias' identification of knowledge of good and bad.

In this edition. "You rascal!" usefully preserves the repeated register. The lexical background of pollution should not turn this banter into a charge of religious contamination.

See also. Doing one's own business; Good and bad; Pretence and imposture; Critias.

Reading and writing

γράφειν (graphein); ἀναγιγνώσκειν (anagignōskein); γράμματα (grammata); ὄνομα (onoma); ἀπογράψομαι (apograpsomai); ἑλληνίζειν (hellēnizein)

The word. Graphein is to write; anagignōskein in these examples is to read. Grammata can mean written letters, whereas gramma elsewhere names an inscription. Apograpsomai, "I shall copy down," makes the charm something Charmides initially expects to transcribe. Hellēnizein means to speak Greek, not necessarily to possess advanced literary education.

In the Charmides. Writing first appears in Charmides' practical plan to obtain the charm in written form. Socrates' response moves the issue from textual acquisition to persuasion and then to the nature of the treatment. The dialogue never supplies a written incantation for copying.

Before the formal inquiry, Socrates assumes that because Charmides can speak Greek he can articulate the opinion that the presence of temperance would give him. The move distinguishes a familiar linguistic capacity from the harder task of answering well. It is not an assertion that literacy alone yields philosophical understanding, and the subsequent failures make any equation of speaking the language with knowing virtue doubtful.

Reading and writing then perform two distinct argumentative services. At 159c, quickly writing equivalent letters and reading fluently are agreed finer than doing them slowly. At 161d–e, writing another person's name is used against a crude interpretation of doing one's own things. It would be absurd to treat such a school exercise as meddling simply because the written name belongs to an enemy or friend.

The Delphic gramma returns written language to the question of interpretation. Recognizable words do not explain themselves: Critias offers a contested account of what the inscription means and does. Across copying, school exercises, and sacred inscriptions, the text distinguishes possessing marks, performing a skill, and giving an adequate account of significance.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156a. Charmides proposes copying the charm

159a. Speaking Greek supports the request to articulate an opinion

159c. Writing and reading are examples of skilled rapid performance

161d–e. Other people's names expose a literalized reading of one's own business

164d–165a. An inscription requires interpretation as greeting or counsel

In this edition. At 159c τὰ ὅμοια γράμματα is rendered “copy out the letters.” The Greek comparison presupposes equivalent letters; it does not praise indiscriminate haste or explicitly prescribe a copying technology. The reading verb is distinct from gignōskein, knowing, despite its related formation.

See also. Schooling and the letter-master; Delphi and Apollo; Knowing oneself; Doing one’s own business; Charm.

Recognition and discrimination

διαιρεῖν (diairein); διακρίνειν (diakrinein); διαγνώσεσθαι (diagnōsesthai); γνώσεται (gnōsetai); διελέσθαι (dielesthai); ἐπαΐει (epaiei); ἐπακολουθῆσαι (epakolouthēsai)

The word. Diairein means divide or distinguish, diakrinein separate or discriminate, and diagignōskein distinguish by recognition or judgment. In this dialogue the relevant forms concern classifying powers and identifying expertise. They should not automatically be read as the formal method of collection and division developed elsewhere.

In the Charmides. The “great man” of 169a would need to discriminate which powers can apply to themselves and whether knowledge belongs among them. Socrates’ admitted inability is a failure to settle that classification, not a denial that distinctions can be made at all.

At 170a the proposed knowledge of knowledge is restricted to discriminating knowledge from what is not knowledge. It cannot thereby distinguish one specialized knowledge from another. At 170e the point is operationalized as telling a true doctor from someone who merely presents himself as one. Correct identification

requires following the relevant claims and acts about health and disease (171a–b).

There are therefore two levels of discrimination: generic epistemic status and a specific kind of expertise. The argument's force depends on showing why the first is not yet the second. The exception at 171c, one's own fellow expert, reinforces rather than abolishes the field requirement. Expertise can recognize expertise within its own domain; a universal certifying power requires more than the generic name of knowledge.

Two smaller verbs specify the competence required. At 170e epaiein means understand or have expert acquaintance: the doctor understands the healthy and diseased. At 171b epakolouthein means follow, here follow and assess the relevant claims and performances. These are neither mere auditory following nor a complete theory of demonstration. They explain why recognizing an expert is tied to substantive grasp. Dielesthai at 169a–b is the aorist infinitive of diairein, marking the classification Socrates cannot settle; it should not be confused with diakrinein and diagignōskein in the later certification problem.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

169a–b. Classification of self-relating powers left unresolved

170a. Knowledge/nonknowledge discrimination delimited

170e–171c. Recognizing a genuine practitioner requires the relevant field

In this edition. At 170a7 Burnet prints διαιρεῖν from a correcting hand in T against διευρεῖν reported in the principal witnesses. The adopted verb supports "distinguish"; it should not be cited as though the transmission were uniform.

See also. Knowing that and knowing what; Fellow expert; Examination; Same and different.

Refutation

ἐλέγχειν (elenchein); ἐξεληλεγμένος (exelēlegmenos); ἐλεγχόμενος (elenchomenos)

The word. Elenchein is to test and expose, challenge or refute. The traditional scholarly term “elenchus” names a practice visible here, although the displayed forms are verbs and participles. Their objects include people and arguments. Exposure before an audience is part of their force; refutation is not merely an abstract logical symbol.

In the Charmides. At 162c–d Charmides provokes Critias by presenting the third answer as refuted. Socrates compares the resulting anger to a poet’s anger at an actor mishandling his verses. The image connects ownership of a statement to the risk of intellectual humiliation. The reference of the participle “refuted” is not completely settled by the Greek: translators can take Charmides as exhibiting his own defeat or presenting Critias as defeated through his formula.

Critias directly accuses Socrates of seeking to refute him instead of investigating the subject (166c). Socrates answers that even if he does refute Critias, the motive is the same as in examining his own assertions: avoiding the illusion of knowledge. He then asks them to disregard whether Critias or Socrates is refuted and attend to the tested argument (166d–e). This exchange supplies a methodological ideal and reveals its dramatic difficulty.

The actual refutations depend on acknowledged commitments. Temperance is fine, hence cannot simply be whatever is quieter; it is good, while shame is not good

in every relevant circumstance. Critias can reject a consequence by withdrawing something he earlier admitted, as at 164d. Thus an inconsistency among accepted claims does not automatically identify which original claim is false, and the dialogue does not claim that defeating successive proposals supplies a complete positive account.

Nor should refutation be equated with hostile victory. Socrates' ethical description gives it a cooperative purpose. But the ensuing anger, concealment of perplexity and final coercive joke keep the difference between that purpose and interpersonal effects in view.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159b–161b. Tests of the first two definitions

162c–d. Refutation, authorship and injured reputation

164c–d. A rejected consequence leads to withdrawal of commitments

166c–e. Critias' accusation and Socrates' defense of refutation

In this edition. "Refute" retains the combative force without deciding that every elenchein names a formal proof of falsity. The participle at 162d is left referentially open in the edition, which should not be silently resolved in a lexical quotation.

See also. Examination; Agreement and concession; Retraction; Argument and account; Perplexity; Truth and falsehood.

Remedy and leaf

φάρμακον (pharmakon); φαρμάκῳ (pharmakōi); φύλλον (phyllon); δόσεως (doseōs)

The word. Pharmakon is a substance or preparation with an active effect, here a remedy. Its broader Greek range includes harmful drugs and poisons, but neither meaning is the local default. Phyllon is a leaf; dosis, represented by doseōs, is a giving or administration, not a measured modern pharmaceutical dose.

In the Charmides. Charmides' heavy head provides Critias with the pretext for introducing him to an apparent doctor. Socrates claims to know a pharmakon and, when asked what it is, says that it is a certain leaf. The botanical species, preparation, quantity, and route of administration are not specified. The account is therefore no basis for identifying a real headache treatment or reconstructing a medical recipe.

The material remedy is deliberately subordinated to the charm. At first Socrates says that it is ineffective without the accompanying incantation. After the whole-person account, he refuses to apply it unless the soul is first submitted to the Thracian's treatment. If sufficient temperance is already present, however, the remedy should be given directly. Its withheld administration gives the inquiry practical urgency: assessing the soul is a condition of treating the head.

The remedy is not reported as actually administered. Nor does it return in the epilogue, where Charmides asks for daily charming. The narrative has moved from a particular bodily complaint and an unspecified leaf to an ongoing relation of philosophical education. That movement should not erase the initial distinction between material pharmakon and verbal epōidē.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155b–e. The proposed doctor claims knowledge of a remedy and calls it a leaf

157b–c. Application of the remedy is made conditional on prior treatment of the soul

158b–c. Immediate administration is appropriate only if temperance is already sufficient

In this edition. “Remedy” is the edition’s context-sensitive rendering; “poison” would be unwarranted here. “Before the remedy is given” translates the genitive phrase involving dosis without inserting a dosage instruction.

See also. Charm; Head and headache; Treatment and regimen; Whole and part.

Reputation and ambition

φιλοτίμως (philotimōs); εὐδοκιμῶν (eudokimōn); δοκεῖ (dokei); λόγος (logos)

The word. Philotimōs describes eagerness for honour or distinction; eudokimōn describes enjoying a good reputation or esteem. The associated abstract nouns are useful lookup labels but are not thereby quoted as the dialogue’s local forms. Reputation is also expressed through dokein, seeming or being thought to be, and at 156a through logos in the idiom that Socrates is much talked about. These uses are social appraisals, distinct from doxa as a cognitive state in the argument.

In the Charmides. Charmides arrives already thought the most beautiful, and Critias insists he is also thought exceptionally temperate (154a,157d). The repeated language of being thought something ensures that the inquiry begins with reputation, not verified possession. Charmides later makes that distinction himself when he

cannot comfortably confirm or deny the account others give of him.

Critias' concern with standing becomes explicit at 162c. He is tense and eager to distinguish himself before the boy and the company, and finally takes over the defence of his definition. At 169c his habitual public esteem helps explain why he is ashamed to acknowledge perplexity. Socrates reports a conflict between preserving a reputation for understanding and honestly admitting that understanding has run out.

The vocabulary should not be made uniformly pejorative. Wishing to do well before others can prompt serious engagement, and public esteem can be deserved. The local problem is that concern for being admired obstructs a truthful account of one's present knowledge. That makes Critias' reaction especially relevant to his definition of temperance as self-knowledge.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154a. Charmides is introduced through his reputation for beauty; the claim about exceptional temperance comes later at 157d.

157d. Charmides' beauty and temperance are initially given as reputations

156a. Charmides says Socrates is much talked about among his peers

162c–d. Critias' eagerness to shine contributes to his intervention

169c–d. Established esteem and shame help explain concealed perplexity

In this edition. "Eager to shine" translates φιλοτίμως rather than a noun for vanity. "Used to being admired" interprets εὐδοκιμῶν ἑκάστοτε. Calling this simply "pride"

is an explanatory English label and should not be mistaken for the separate Greek vocabulary of hubris.

See also. Praise and blame; Modesty and shame; Knowing oneself; Perplexity; Worth and honour.

Retraction

ἀναθείμην (anatheimēn); ἀναθέντι (anathenti); ἀφίημι (aphiēmi)

The word. Anatithenai in the active can mean set up or dedicate; the middle form anatheimēn at 164c–d means take back or retract. Aphiēmi, “I let go” or “give up”, marks Critias’ abandonment of the preceding discussion at 165a–b.

In the Charmides. Critias would sooner retract an earlier agreement than allow that a person ignorant of himself can be temperate (164c–d). This is an intelligible dialectical move: when accepted claims yield an unacceptable result, one may revise the claims. It is also revealing about his priorities. He does not identify and repair one precise faulty premise before launching the new self-knowledge account.

The verbal transition is pointed. His taking back, anatheimēn, is immediately followed by agreement with whoever dedicated, anathenti, the Delphic inscription. The same verb moves from retracting a position to setting up an authoritative saying. The edition notes an association of the middle with taking back a move at a board game; the local wordplay does not require us to imagine an actual game being played.

At 165a–b Critias explicitly gives up the previous claims while maintaining that it was unclear which speaker was more correct. Retraction thus allows a restart without

admitting a detailed diagnosis of failure. Later, when perplexed about reflective knowledge, he refuses even to acknowledge his inability (169c). The contrast between revising an account and shielding one's reputation remains dramatically active.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

164c–d. Earlier agreements offered for retraction

164d. The same verb family introduces the dedication at Delphi

165a–b. Critias abandons earlier discussion and offers the new account

In this edition. The English "take back" and "dedicated" cannot reproduce the shared anatithēmi stem unaided. The middle form should be transliterated anatheimēn; no separate technical doctrine is implied by the wordplay.

See also. Agreement and concession; Refutation; Draughts; Knowing oneself; Delphi and Apollo.

Riddle

αἴνιγμα (ainigma); αἰνίγματι (ainigmati); Ἠινίττετο (ēinitteto); αἰνιγματωδέστερον (ainigmatōdesteron)

The word. Ainigma is a riddle or enigmatic saying; ainittesthai is to speak indirectly or in riddles. Ainigmatōdesteron, the comparative adverb at 164e, means more enigmatically or rather riddlingly. A riddle invites interpretation beyond its surface phrasing; its obscurity is not itself evidence of wisdom.

In the Charmides. Socrates calls doing one's own business a riddle at 161c because, taken in the unrestricted practical sense he tests, it gives unacceptable consequences. At 162a–b he again proposes that its

reputedly wise author must have intended something other than such an absurd reading. The gesture can be heard as charitable interpretation or teasing pressure: if the author is wise, explain the intended sense.

Charmides' reply punctures the defense. Perhaps even the author does not know what he meant (162b). Critias' anger and entry show how claiming depth can become entangled with protecting personal authority.

At 164e Critias himself turns riddling into divine style. Apollo says "Know thyself" but means "Be temperate", speaking as a prophet would. The recurrence invites comparison with the earlier rescued formula. It does not settle whether Critias' exegesis is correct. His assertion must still become an account that withstands questions. The riddle motif therefore stages the difference between interpreting prestigious words and showing their truth.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

161c–162b. Three descriptions of the third definition as a riddle

164e–165a. Critias' enigmatic divine greeting

In this edition. "Rather riddlingly" preserves the comparative at 164e. The edition explicitly notes the three earlier echoes; a gloss should not count only the first occurrence and miss the repetition that prepares Critias' speech.

See also. Language and naming; Knowing oneself; Prophecy; Definition; Delphi and Apollo.

Ruling and supervision

ἄρχοι (archoi); ἤρχοντο (ērchonto); ἄρχουσα (archousa); ἐπιστατοῦσαν (epistatousan); ἐπιστατεῖ (epistatei); ἡγουμένη (hēgoumenē)

The word. Archein means ruling or being in charge; its middle-passive forms can describe being ruled. Epistatein means standing over, supervising or presiding over something; hēgeisthai means leading or guiding. These verbs create a supervisory model for temperance. Supervision must not be confused with merely recognising that something is knowledge, nor with possessing all the subject-matter knowledge of those supervised. That distinction is part of what the dialogue tests.

In the Charmides. At 171d–172a Socrates reconstructs an attractive prospect: those possessing temperance and everyone under their rule would live without error. They would attempt only what they knew and entrust other tasks to experts; household, city and any sphere ruled by temperance would therefore go well. This is conditional on powers the preceding argument has failed to establish. Socrates then questions even the further assumption that such knowledgeable management automatically yields a great good (172d–e).

The dream grants extensive supervision once more. Temperance would prevent impostors from deceiving us and keep lack of knowledge from intruding into our activities (173a–d). It could preside even over prophecy and distinguish true prophets from pretenders. This is the maximal favourable case, not a power already demonstrated for second-order knowledge.

Critias' last defence makes the supervisory issue explicit. If temperance presides over every knowledge, it

must also rule knowledge of good and bad and thereby benefit us (174d–e). Socrates replies that medicine, not temperance, produces health, and that benefit has similarly been assigned as another knowledge's work (174e–175a). The dispute concerns how benefit is credited. Direct production and supervision are distinguishable; it remains a substantive question whether the latter can contribute indirectly to a work it does not itself perform. The conversation ends without developing a complete account of that relationship.

The epilogue gives an embodied counterpart. Critias orders Charmides to submit to Socrates' charm, and Charmides invokes his guardian's command as grounds for forcing Socrates (176b–d). The right to command and the possession of understanding have not thereby been shown identical. Reading the ending beside the conditional dream makes the difference between knowledgeable guidance and accepted personal authority particularly visible.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

171d–172a. Temperance is imagined ruling persons, household and city without error

172d–173d. Its benefit is questioned even under a generous supervisory hypothesis

174d–175a. Critias appeals to rule over knowledge of good and bad; Socrates denies automatic transfer of its work

176b–d. A guardian's commands shape the final exchange

In this edition. The edition varies "rule," "preside," "guide" and "stand guard" with the Greek verbs. They are not all occurrences of ἄρχειν: the guardian image at 173d uses φυλάττουσα. The repetition of ruling at 174e explicitly extends Critias' claim to evaluative knowledge.

See also. Household and city; Knowledge of knowledge; Good and bad; Beneficial and harmful; Persuasion and obedience; Force and compulsion.

Same and different

ταὐτόν (tauton); ἕτερον (heteron); ἄλλο (allo); ὁμοία (homoia); ὁμοιότητά (homoiotēta)

The word. Tauton is “the same”, a contraction of to auto. Heteron and allo mean other or different, while homoion means like or similar. Likeness is not identity. The ordinary vocabulary becomes argumentative when a proposed definition or analogy requires two items to be treated as the same.

In the Charmides. At 163a–b Critias denies that making and doing are the same, thus resisting an inference based on treating them alike. Socrates permits his vocabulary provided the application is clear. At 165e Critias objects that different knowledges are not uniformly alike in having tangible products. Socrates accepts the difference but asks for a common structure of being knowledge of something other than itself (166a–b).

Critias locates temperance’s uniqueness at precisely that point: the other knowledges know other things, whereas this one knows itself and them (166b–c). At 169e–170a another identity claim is challenged. Critias says knowing oneself and knowing what one knows and does not know are the same; Socrates asks why. Apparent verbal proximity has not established equivalence.

The dialogue thus uses sameness and difference at several levels: meanings of verbs, structure of expertise, identity of the knower and object, and equivalence of definitions. It supplies no separate theory of the Forms

Same and Different. The local comparisons are demanding enough without importing one.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

163a–b. Making and doing denied to be identical

165e–166c. Likeness and difference among knowledges

169e–170b. Claimed equivalence of forms of self-knowledge questioned

In this edition. “Other” may indicate another object, another expertise or an alternative account. The edition’s contextual nouns often make these references clear; they should be preserved when quoting a short phrase whose Greek pronoun alone could be ambiguous.

See also. Definition; Product and object of knowledge; Self-relation; Knowing oneself.

Schooling and the letter-master

γραμματιστοῦ (grammatistou); γραμματιστὴν (grammatistēn); κιθαριστοῦ (kitharistou); διδάσκειν (didaskein)

The word. Grammatistēs is the elementary teacher of letters, represented here by genitive and accusative forms. Kitharistēs is the teacher or practitioner of the lyre. Didaskein means to teach. The schoolroom sense of grammata is letters or writing, not the later discipline called grammatical scholarship.

In the Charmides. Socrates tests Charmides’ first definition by returning him to familiar educational activities. At the letter-master’s, is it finer to write equivalent letters quickly or quietly? What of reading, lyre-playing, wrestling, and the other bodily exercises? He then turns from outward performance to learning,

teaching, and understanding what is said at the letter-master's and lyre-master's. The examples assume shared experiences rather than introduce an unfamiliar professional syllabus.

Their argumentative role is narrow. If temperance is fine, but many fine performances are quick, quietness cannot simply be its defining character. The examples do not demonstrate that haste is always educationally best. The change from calm conduct in streets and conversation to speed in skilled performance is precisely a point a reader should inspect.

Schooling returns in the test of doing one's own business. A teacher writes, reads, and teaches names other than his own; boys write the names of enemies as well as friends. The classroom makes the literalized restriction to one's own things impossible to maintain without condemning an innocent ordinary exercise. That is a semantic counterexample, not an argument that civic education ought to privilege enemies.

The sequence lets familiar education become an object of philosophical scrutiny. A young person who has practiced the skills can evaluate examples, but possessing those accomplishments does not yet answer what makes a life temperate or happy.[29]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159c–160a. Literacy and music instruction provide examples in the first refutation

161d–e. Writing and reading other people's names test the formula about one's own affairs

[29] Compare Plato, Protagoras 325e–326d for the connected account of letters, music, and bodily training. It provides contextual support while the Charmides uses the activities for a different argumentative purpose.

In this edition. “Writing-master” renders grammatistēs, but the teacher also teaches reading. “Grammar teacher” in its modern sense would be too narrow or misleading. The edition’s note compares the curriculum described in Protagoras; that comparison does not mean the noun paideia is attested here.

See also. Reading and writing; Lyre and music; Athletics; Learning and teaching; Quietness; Doing one’s own business.

Self-relation

πρὸς ἑαυτὸ (pros heauto); αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς (autē heautēs); αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν (autē heautēn); πρὸς ἄλλο (pros allo)

The word. The reflexive pronoun marks identity between the subject and the object or correlate: something exercises its own power “in relation to itself”. “Reflexivity” and “self-relation” are analytical labels. “Self-reference” is less exact where the issue is a power operating on itself rather than an expression referring to itself.

In the Charmides. Critias’ proposal combines two distinct relations: knowledge knowing other knowledges and knowledge knowing itself. Socrates’ first analogies preserve both, adding a further exclusion. Sight would see itself and other sights but no colours, hearing itself and other hearings but no sounds (167c–d). This is not just the claim that an ordinary capacity could have an additional reflexive exercise. It removes its normal objects and assigns only capacities as objects. The affective analogies repeat that structure.

The next stage isolates a general condition on self-application (168b–d). If a thing exercises its power on itself, it must itself have the character the power requires

in its object. A greater thing is greater than a smaller; if it is greater than itself, it must also be smaller than itself. Likewise double and half, more and less, heavier and lighter, older and younger. These comparisons concern the same thing in the same relation; ordinary cases of one person being older than someone but younger than someone else are irrelevant.

The sensory examples give a different kind of consequence. Hearing that hears itself would need sound; sight that sees itself would need colour. Socrates does not straightforwardly derive a formal contradiction from being both sight and coloured, as he does from the incompatible comparative positions. At 168e he expressly distinguishes cases deemed wholly impossible from those that provoke disbelief in some people but perhaps not others. Motion moving itself and heat burning itself belong to the latter discussion.

A “great man” would have to determine whether no powers can apply to themselves, whether some can and some cannot, and, if so, where knowledge belongs (169a). Socrates disclaims competence to settle that classification. The transition at 169d grants possibility; it is not a proof of either unrestricted reflexivity or its universal impossibility.

Two common interpretive shortcuts are therefore unsafe. First, the failure of “greater than itself” does not by itself establish the failure of “knows itself”: the argument explicitly calls for discrimination among kinds of power. Second, modern examples of awareness of awareness do not automatically answer the challenge, because Critias’ proposed knowledge excludes other objects and is credited with complete diagnostic authority. A satisfactory defense must specify the content and limits of the reflective power.

The personal inference at 169e raises a separate reflexive issue. A person possessing a knowledge that knows itself is said to know himself. The first reflexive refers to the knowledge, the second to the possessor. Socrates leaves that inference unchallenged at this point, but it must not be smuggled into the preceding relational tests as if the relata were unchanged.

No appeal to a full theory of Forms is required to identify these questions. The text analyzes powers, their objects, comparative predicates and the conditions of self-application. Connections with other Platonic accounts may illuminate it, but its own conspicuous suspension of judgment must remain visible.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

166c–167a. Other-directed and reflexive cognition combined

167c–168a. Capacity-only analogies excluding ordinary objects

168b–d. Self-application requires the character proper to the object

168e–169b. Impossible and disputed cases distinguished; classification left open

169d–e. Possibility granted; reflexive shifts from knowledge to its possessor

In this edition. Burnet deletes “except knowledge” at 169a. Restoring it without qualification makes the statement assume an exception before asking whether knowledge belongs among exceptions. At 168d ousia is translated “character”, naming the nature or property required of the object, not necessarily a separately existing entity.

See also. Knowledge of knowledge; Knowing oneself; Greater and smaller; Double and half; Sight and colour; Hearing and sound; Power and capacity; Possibility and impossibility.

Sight and colour

ὄψις (opsis); χρῶμα (chrōma); ἄχρων (achrōn); ὁρᾷ (horāi)

The word. Opsis names sight or a visual capacity; horan is to see. Chrōma is colour; achrōn, colourless. In the analogy, sight is identified through the sort of object it sees. This entry concerns the epistemological example rather than the prologue's erotic looking.

In the Charmides. At 167c–d Socrates asks whether there could be a sight of sights, itself and non-sights which sees none of the colours ordinary sights see. Critias denies the example. "No colour" is indispensable: Socrates is not merely asking whether someone can see an eye, or whether normal seeing can coexist with awareness that one sees. He is constructing a capacity isolated from the objects that ordinarily define it.

At 168d the argument becomes conditional: if sight sees itself, it must itself have some colour, because sight cannot see the colourless. The consequence is an object-condition on self-application. The text does not immediately state that being coloured and being sight are formally contradictory. Instead it later classifies self-seeing among the cases that many doubt, as distinct from impossible reflexive numerical comparisons (168e–169a).

The distinction guards against two overreadings. The example does not present a physiological theory of vision, and it does not finally prohibit every reflective visual awareness. Its task is to make Critias clarify how a

knowledge can have knowledge rather than an ordinary learned field as its object.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

167c–d. Sight of sight excluding colours

168d–169a. Colour required for self-seeing; possibility left under qualified doubt

In this edition. The repeated English “sight” mirrors the Greek repetition rather than distinguishing the organ, the act and its object by new technical nouns. The text says colour, not shape or a general modern category of visual information.

See also. Perception; Hearing and sound; Self-relation; Knowledge of knowledge.

Simple-mindedness

εὐήθης (euēthēs); εὐηθικῶν (euēthikōn); ἠλιθίου (ēlithiou)

The word. Euēthēs can describe an uncomplicated or ingenuous character and, in a depreciatory setting, a simpleton. The related euēthikos at 175c characterizes the partners as easy or naive. Ēlithios is more directly foolish. The local irony matters more than a derivation treated as a definition.

In the Charmides. When “doing one’s own business” has produced implausible examples, Socrates declines to suppose that its author was a simpleton and asks whether Charmides heard it from a fool. The boy’s answer, that the source was thought very wise, prepares the pressure on Critias. The contrast is between an apparently foolish literal interpretation and the reputation of the person behind the saying. At the close Socrates applies the related adjective to the inquirers themselves. They have made

exceptionally generous concessions, and the personified inquiry still fails to discover the truth. Their simplicity is associated with not being hard to handle; it is not offered as their intellectual virtue or as proof that the concessions were sound. The shift from a definition's defended author to its accommodating examiners belongs to the dialogue's self-mocking account of failure.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

162a–162b. Socrates refuses to treat the saying's author as a simpleton and asks whether its source was foolish.

175c–175d. The partners become the simple-minded and tractable parties in the personification of the inquiry.

In this edition. The supplied "simpleton" and "simple-minded" preserve the lexical connection without making the words identical. "Simple" here is not a metaphysical predicate meaning uncompounded.

See also. Riddle; Agreement and concession; Insolence of the inquiry; Philosophy and wisdom.

Socrates

Σώκρατες (Sōkrates); Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs)

The word. Sōkratēs is the name of the principal speaker and first-person narrator. The vocative Sōkrates, used by his interlocutors, differs from the nominative in its accent. Socrates speaks as "I" in the narration and as a participant in the conversation he recalls; neither voice should simply be identified with Plato's own assertions.

In the Charmides. Socrates arrives as a survivor before he appears as an examiner. He returned from the army at Potidaea on the previous evening, finds his accustomed associates, answers questions about the fighting, and then

asks about philosophy and promising young men. The move from military experience to conversation is quick, but the opening's report of acquaintances killed in battle is real within the fiction. It gives bodily survival a place before the final argument asks whether expertise that preserves life necessarily benefits its possessor.

His narration is deliberately compromising. He denies that he can reliably discriminate among beautiful youths, joins the scramble to seat Charmides nearby, and confesses that a glimpse inside the boy's cloak leaves him burning and beside himself. His recovery is also narrated: approval of the medical analogy restores his confidence. Reading this as an enacted victory of self-control is plausible, but the dialogue never declares that it has thereby exhibited a correct definition of temperance. The confession is more exact than an idealized picture of a philosopher immune to desire.

Socrates accepts Critias' proposal to pose as a doctor. He then transforms the pretext into a requirement that the soul receive treatment before the head. This role makes his authority unstable in productive ways. He is ostensibly the expert who has learned a remedy, but his actual procedure is to investigate whether the patient needs it. He does not independently certify Charmides' temperance from his appearance or reputation. At 158e–159a he asks the youth to formulate what the virtue is; at 165b–c he tells Critias that his questions arise from not knowing, and that agreement must follow examination rather than willingness to gratify an interlocutor.

The fullest statement of his purpose comes at 166c–e. Even if he refutes Critias, he says, the aim is the same as when he examines himself: to avoid unawares thinking that he knows what he does not know. Personal victory should therefore give way to attention to the argument.

This declaration is relevant to, but not identical with, the definition of temperance as knowledge of knowledge. The definition proposes a special cognitive capacity whose possibility and usefulness must be established; the narrated practice displays an examiner's motives and conduct. Treating the latter as already proving the former would prejudge the central inquiry.

Socrates repeatedly allows provisional concessions in order to continue. At the end he acknowledges their cost, describes the inquiry as defeated, and calls himself a poor investigator rather than announcing that temperance is worthless. Charmides nevertheless wants his continuing company. The final agreement to submit to the youth's and guardian's threatened force completes the reversal of the initially confident adult approaching an admired boy. It can be read simultaneously as comic courtship, renewed philosophical attachment, and an ominous exchange for readers who know the two aristocrats' later careers. The last of these is historical dramatic irony, not an explicit prediction by the narrator.[30]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153a–d. The returned soldier narrates his welcome and asks about philosophy and the young

154b–156d. Self-deprecating erotic narration, medical impersonation, and recovery of confidence

158d–159a. Joint investigation replaces self-praise or reputational certification

165b–c. He disclaims prior knowledge of the answers he requests

[30] For a complementary Platonic account of Socrates' campaign service, see Symposium 219e–220e; this is external to the Charmides, not part of its narrative. The contrast with Socratic examination in Apology 21b–23b is interpretively important but does not settle whether Critias' proposed higher-order knowledge accurately describes that activity.

166c–e. Refutation is defended as examination for his own and others' benefit

175b–176d. He admits argumentative failure, maintains the value of temperance, and accepts continued association

In this edition. The edition preserves direct addresses to an unnamed listener, including "my friend" and "my noble friend." These are part of Socrates' retrospective telling, not additional spoken contributions by a fifth interlocutor. At 153a Burnet prints the plural ἥκομεν, "we had got back"; it should not be silently changed into a solitary return.

See also. Potidaea and the campaign; Erotic attraction; Charm; Doctor and medicine; Critias; Charmides; Knowledge of knowledge; Refutation.

Solon

Σόλωνος (Solōnos)

The word. Solōnos is the genitive of Solon, named as a distinguished family connection and as a poet who celebrated Charmides' ancestral house. The local name refers to the Athenian poet and lawgiver, although the passage foregrounds poetry and kinship rather than legislation.

In the Charmides. When Critias describes Charmides as philosophical and poetic, Socrates replies that the family's fine gift reaches back to its kinship with Solon. The compliment connects a youth's reported aptitude to a prestigious poetic kinsman. It is not an assessment of surviving poems by Charmides. Later Solon appears with Anacreon among the poets who praised the paternal house for its beauty, excellence, and reputed happiness.

The two mentions are strategically placed before the examination of temperance. They make inherited reputation a powerful expectation, then leave the question of the individual's virtue to inquiry. Even the phrase "everything else called happiness" prevents an effortless equation of noble family prosperity with the more exact account of happiness demanded later.

Solon's authority should be distinguished from that of Homer and Hesiod in the subsequent refutations. No Solonian verse is quoted here to prove a proposition about temperance. His name supplies cultural and genealogical prestige. The eventual "lawgiver" who gave the name temperance at 175b is anonymous; nothing in that passage identifies him as Solon.[31]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155a. Family kinship with Solon answers Critias' praise of Charmides as a poet

157e–158a. Solon is among the poets said to have celebrated the ancestral house

In this edition. "Kinship" renders συγγένεια. The Greek does not say that Solon personally taught the present Charmides or Critias, nor identify him with the final hypothetical name-giver.

See also. Dropides and ancestral Critias; Anacreon; Poet and actor; House, lineage and nobility; Language and naming.

[31] Timaeus 20e describes Solon as related to and closely connected with Dropides: online source. This corroborates the family tradition at the level of another Platonic narrative.

Soul

ψυχήν (psychēn); ψυχῆς (psychēs); ψυχαῖς (psychais)

The word. Psychē names the soul, the dimension of a person in which character and mental activities are located. Its role in this dialogue must be inferred from particular uses: it is praised, metaphorically stripped, treated, and described as the seat of learning and inquiry. The noun alone does not import Plato's later divisions of the soul or arguments for its immortality.

In the Charmides. The soul first interrupts a competition in bodily praise. Socrates says that Charmides would be irresistible if one small thing were added: a good natural constitution of soul. Critias assures him that the youth is beautiful and good in that respect too. Socrates proposes undressing this very aspect before the body's form, a metaphor whose practical realization is conversation. Soul is therefore not introduced as an invisible substance requiring an independent metaphysical demonstration; it names what must be examined if a beautiful person's excellence is not to be assessed only by sight.

In the healing story, soul becomes the indispensable condition of whole-person treatment. The Thracian says that everything good and bad for the body and for the entire human being starts from it and flows onward. Eyes, head, and body provide an analogy for this priority. The account gives the soul causal and therapeutic prominence, but its sweeping claim remains part of reported instruction. The dialogue does not present clinical evidence, and the stated dependence should not be turned into a modern claim that every bodily illness is caused by the patient's moral defects.

Treatment of the soul is verbal: beautiful words generate temperance in it. The youth is asked to submit it

to charming before receiving the remedy for his head. This requirement differs from simply assenting to a teacher's authority, because the next step is a joint inquiry into whether the virtue is present and what it is. The relation between a soul's being well constituted, its possessing temperance, and its ability to explain temperance is placed under examination rather than settled by the initial compliments.

The first refutation then distinguishes activities of soul from activities of body. Quick learning, teaching, recollection, understanding, inquiry, and deliberation are taken as cases in which speed or sharpness can be fine. Quick-wittedness is called a sharpness of the soul. This is a functional contrast within ordinary capacities. It does not establish separate spatial parts, a hierarchy of rational and appetitive substances, or a doctrine of recollection from a previous existence.

At the end Socrates speaks conditionally of Charmides as beautiful in appearance and supremely temperate in soul, protesting the apparent lack of benefit from such an endowment. Charmides' reply withdraws any certainty that he has the virtue. The continuation of charming consequently preserves care of the soul as an open practical task despite definitional failure.

The relation between soul and body is neither an invitation to ignore the body nor an identification of the two. The body is the occasion for treatment and remains an acknowledged good of medical expertise. The philosophical problem is how bodily and technical success relate to a person's good as a whole. This is why health

can remain a genuine product of medicine at 174c even when knowledge of good and bad is absent.[32]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154d–155a. The soul's natural quality and its metaphorical stripping are distinguished from visible bodily beauty

156e–157c. The Thracian doctrine places soul before body in treatment and makes beautiful words its remedy

159e–160b. Learning, understanding, and deliberation supply activities and excellences of soul

175d–176b. The claimed temperance of Charmides' soul is revisited and continued charming requested

In this edition. The edition generally renders psychē as "soul." At 157c–d Critias instead uses dianoia, rendered "mind," when he welcomes the prospect that the headache will improve the youth mentally. That local change of word should not be hidden by treating every mental term as an interchangeable synonym.

See also. Body; Whole and part; Stripping the soul; Charm; Temperance; Learning and teaching; Health and disease.

Statue

ἄγαλμα (agalma); ἐθεῶντο (etheōnto)

The word. Agalma can name an object of delight or honor, especially a statue or sacred image. In the phrase hōsper agalma, "as if [he were] a statue," it functions as an

[32] Comparisons with Phaedrus 245c–e or Laws 895e–896a must be explicitly comparative: the Charmides does not define the soul as self-moving motion. At 168e–169a it leaves the general problem of self-related capacities open.

explicit simile. Etheōnto is the imperfect of beholding or contemplating a spectacle.

In the Charmides. Socrates singles out the boys' reaction to Charmides: not even the smallest looks elsewhere, and all gaze at him as at an agalma. The comparison elevates the beautiful youth into an absorbing public spectacle. Its possible religious coloring belongs naturally beside the shrine opposite the palaestra, but the text neither calls Charmides a god nor reports an act of worship.

The stillness of a beautiful image also differs from the person who will shortly speak, laugh, hesitate, and manipulate his guardian's involvement. Socrates' proposal to inspect the soul asks what admiration of the visible figure leaves unexamined. The image therefore makes the initial dominance of looking especially vivid without itself condemning beauty or images.

A comparative reader may recall the divine agalmata said to be inside Socrates in the Symposium. That is an illuminating reversal of outer appearance and inward value, but no hidden statue within Charmides is described here. The present simile remains a local account of how the watching boys behold him.[33]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154c. All the boys gaze at Charmides as at a statue

In this edition. "Statue" is the edition's rendering. Its note explains the frequent sacred application of agalma; the additional formulation "as worshippers gaze" is interpretive explanation, not another phrase in the Greek.

[33] Compare Plato, Symposium 215b and 216e–217a for the distinct image of divine agalmata within Socrates. The relation is comparative, not a second local meaning of Charmides' body.

See also. Face and bodily appearance; Stripping the soul; Basile; Erotic attraction.

Strangeness and absurdity

ἄτοπον (atopon); ἄτοπα (atopa); ἀλογώτερον (alogōteron)

The word. Atopos can mark something as strange, odd or out of place. Alogōteros is a comparative describing something as more unreasonable or absurd. An expression of surprise is not itself a proof of contradiction; the strength of the conclusion must be read from the surrounding reasoning.

In the Charmides. Charmides finds it odd to speak against himself by denying the virtue others praise in him. Later Socrates calls the proposed self-related knowledge strange and supports that reaction with analogies, while expressly warning against insisting too soon that it does not exist. At 172c–e both speakers register strangeness when the imagined benefits of knowledge are questioned. The response signals that a familiar expectation is under pressure, not that an inference may be skipped. Finally Socrates uses the stronger comparative language of absurdity in his retrospective discussion of knowing, in some way, what one does not know at all. The qualification about knowing that one does not know must remain in view; otherwise the reader manufactures a simpler contradiction than the text presents. Tracking these terms helps separate social awkwardness, initial perplexity, argumentative difficulty and a stated objection.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158d. Charmides describes the awkwardness of denying his own temperance.

167c–168b. The strange proposal is examined without prematurely denying its possibility.

172c–173a. Unexpected doubts about benefit prompt repeated expressions of strangeness.

175c. The review of knowing ignorance calls the concession exceptionally unreasonable.

In this edition. The edition uses “odd,” “strange” and “absurd” according to context. The word atopos does not by itself mean logically impossible.

See also. Possibility and impossibility; Perplexity; Knowing that and knowing what; The dream hypothesis.

Stripping the soul

ἀποδῦναι (apodynai); ἀπεδύσαμεν (apedysamen); ἐθεασάμεθα (etheasametha)

The word. Apodynai is to strip or undress. Socrates takes the same verbal family from Chaerephon’s proposal about Charmides’ body and applies it metaphorically to the soul. Etheasametha means that we looked at or inspected; the proposal transfers the language of visual examination into conversation.

In the Charmides. The setting makes literal undressing intelligible: Charmides is in a palaestra, and the praise concerns the body that exercise would expose. Socrates does not initially reject the invitation. He asks whether the youth’s soul is well constituted and proposes stripping “this very thing” before the body’s appearance. The priority matters: inward examination is to precede the visual display that the company has been imagining.

The practical counterpart follows at once. At his age Charmides should be willing to converse, and Critias

confirms that he is philosophical and poetic. Socrates then asks that he be called over. The metaphor does not imply that a soul can literally be seen or that the examiner already knows its hidden condition. It identifies conversation as a means of exposing and testing what mere beauty leaves unexamined.

The transfer also anticipates the medical story, where the soul must receive treatment before the head. Both frames reverse the company's immediate priority without denying the body its place. Later questioning reveals uncertainty, borrowed formulas, pride, and intellectual promise; none amounts to a completed inventory of a separable inner object. "Stripping the soul" is therefore an image of access through encounter and answerability, not a declaration that transparent self-knowledge has been achieved.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154d–155a. Chaerephon's literal undressing is redirected to the soul and conversation

156e–158c. The later medical story similarly gives soul priority over the bodily request

In this edition. The edition deliberately repeats "strip" to keep the transfer visible. It does not replace the second instance with a neutral "examine," which would conceal the physical source of the metaphor.

See also. Soul; Body; Palaestra; Erotic attraction; Charm; Examination.

Taureas

Ταυρέου (Taureou)

The word. Taureou is the genitive of Taureas: the palaestra is identified as "Taureas'." The name gives a local establishment an intelligible designation, rather than introducing an additional participant.

In the Charmides. Socrates locates the conversation in Taureas' wrestling-school opposite Basile's shrine. The naming has the precision of a familiar rendezvous: he is returning to his customary haunts after an absence. Taureas neither speaks nor is explicitly said to be present. The possessive designation does not, by itself, establish his exact occupation, property arrangements, or a biographical connection with the principal speakers.

Keeping this modest limit matters. The environment is philosophically significant because bodies are trained and displayed there, older men and youths gather there, and the athletic equipment later used as examples belongs naturally to it. Those implications arise from the palaestra and its occupants, not from a recoverable career of Taureas.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

153a. The named palaestra is located opposite Basile's shrine

In this edition. The English expands the possessive into "the wrestling-school of Taureas." The Greek has his name only in the genitive in this passage.

See also. Palaestra; Basile; Potidaea and the campaign.

Temperance

σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē); σώφρων (sōphrōn); σωφρονεῖν (sōphronein); σωφρόνως (sōphronōs); Σωφρόνει (Sōphronei)

The word. Sōphrosynē is the feminine abstract noun naming the virtue under investigation; sōphrōn describes its possessor, sōphronein means to be or behave temperately, and sōphronōs means temperately. The imperative Sōphronei is Critias' proposed divine greeting. The ordinary word encompasses good sense, moderation, restraint and fitting conduct. These overlapping uses explain why a boy can identify it with quiet behaviour and an older man with knowing oneself. Neither "temperance" in the modern sense of abstaining from alcohol nor "self-control" understood as a fully articulated struggle between parts of the soul exhausts the term here. The dialogue asks which account, if any, captures what these uses are about.

In the Charmides. The virtue enters before the definition. In Socrates' account of Thracian healing, beautiful words engender temperance in the soul, enabling bodily treatment to succeed (157a–b). Critias promptly claims that Charmides already possesses it in exceptional measure. Socrates then makes possession a practical issue: if the boy has enough temperance, he needs no preliminary charm; otherwise the soul must be treated first. What began as a compliment becomes a question whose answer matters for what to do.

Charmides cannot comfortably declare himself either temperate or intemperate: one answer is self-praise, the other contradicts his admirers. Socrates therefore asks for his opinion of what temperance is, assuming that its presence would give him some awareness of it (158c–

159a). This is an investigative proposal, not a demonstrated rule that anyone who has a virtue can define it. The boy's answers test familiar outward manifestations. Quietness fails to distinguish temperate conduct from admirable quickness (159b–160d); modesty fails because shame can obstruct a needy person's good (160e–161b). Neither argument establishes that a temperate person must be noisy, hasty or shameless. What fails is the attempted identification of the whole virtue with a feature whose value varies with the circumstances.

The third answer, doing one's own business, shifts from manner to the sphere of action. Taken to demand that people produce only what belongs to themselves, it would destroy sensible cooperation (161b–162b). Critias rescues the phrase by making "one's own" mean good and by reserving "doing" for beneficial production. Temperance then becomes doing good things (163b–e). Yet a craftsman might produce a beneficial result without knowing that he has done so. Critias refuses to admit temperance without self-knowledge and abandons the earlier account (164a–165b). This is a change of proposal, not an established inference from good action to a completed theory of virtue.

The long second half examines the new account. Critias' knowing oneself becomes knowledge of itself and of the other knowledges, then knowledge also of lack of knowledge (166c–167a). Its ambitious promise is that the temperate person can identify what he and others know or do not know. Socrates distinguishes two burdens of proof: whether such a knowledge is possible and whether it benefits its possessor (167b). The possibility question remains unresolved; existence is subsequently granted for the argument. The benefit question exposes a restriction: recognition that knowledge is present does not by itself

identify its subject or certify a doctor's competence (170a–171c).

Even an ideal regime in which everyone acts with expertise does not automatically establish happiness. At 174b–d Critias identifies knowledge of good and bad as the knowledge that makes life beneficial. Under the definitions now in force this is distinct from knowledge of knowledge. Critias' attempt to make temperance beneficial by supervising it is answered by assigning each expertise its own work (174d–175a). This answer raises, rather than finally settles, the problem of how supervisory and subordinate knowledge contribute to benefit.

The closing verdict must therefore be read at two levels. The inquiry has failed to discover what temperance is; it has even relied on concessions the argument did not justify (175b–d). But Socrates explicitly continues to regard temperance as a great good and attributes failure to his own inquiry (175e–176a). The dialogue does not conclude that virtue is useless. Nor does it formally replace the failed account with "knowledge of good and bad," although that knowledge supplies an important positive direction for interpretation. Charmides' willingness to continue with the charm keeps education open. Critias' claim that obedience will prove his ward's temperance, followed by joking threats of force, leaves the relation between genuine virtue, reputation and submission to authority dramatically unsettled.[34]

[34] For the breadth of the ordinary word, see LSJ, s.v. σωφροσύνη, available through Scaife ATLAS: online source. Its range of senses is lexical evidence, not a solution to the dialogue's definitional question. For further interpretation, see Paul Woodruff, "Plato's Shorter Ethical Works," §14, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online source; Voula Tsouna, Plato's Charmides: An Interpretative Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2022), online source. These are modern discussions, distinct from the dialogue's own unresolved conclusion.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157a–158c. Temperance is the promised effect of the charm and the excellence Critias attributes to Charmides

158c–159a. Possession is investigated through the boy's own account

159b–161b. Quietness and modesty are proposed and tested

161b–165b. Doing one's own business becomes doing good, then gives way to knowing oneself

166c–169d. Critias defines reflexive knowledge; possibility and benefit are separated

170a–172d. Its proposed powers of identification and supervision are restricted

173a–175a. The dream and knowledge of good and bad test the proposed virtue's benefit

175b–176d. Aporia, renewed affirmation of value, and an unresolved dramatic conclusion

In this edition. The edition consistently uses "temperance," "temperate" and "be temperate," enabling the changing proposals to remain proposals about one Greek family. Its rendering "Be temperate!" at 164e should be read as Critias' interpretation of the Delphic maxim, not a second inscription quoted from the sanctuary. At 157d Burnet prints σωφρονέστατος from T and a variant in W; B's alternative πολυφρενέστατος concerns sagacity. The text's repeated conditionals and concessions are as important as its consistent terminology.

See also. Quietness; Modesty and shame; Doing one's own business; Doing good things; Knowing oneself; Knowledge of knowledge; Good and bad; Beneficial and harmful; Persuasion and obedience.

Tentative assent

ἴσως (isōs); τάχα (tacha); ἔοικεν (eoiken); κινδυνεύει (kindyneuei)

The word. Isōs and tacha can express possibility or hesitation; eoiken often marks what seems to be the case. Kindyneuei, from a verb also used of risk, can function in conversation as a guarded "it looks that way." These expressions do not all have the same force, and none should automatically be translated as a categorical affirmation.

In the Charmides. Charmides answers "perhaps" when Socrates suggests that his ability to speak Greek should enable him to express his opinion about temperance (159a). The reply leaves room between being asked for an account and confidently possessing one. In the quietness argument his guarded assent at 160b accepts the direction of the examples without becoming an independent proof of their adequacy. At 165a Critias himself imagines that someone might think the Delphic command different from the injunction to be temperate; the possible alternative belongs to his reconstruction of other people's interpretation.

The weakened epistemic result at 170c–d is repeatedly framed through seeming and guarded agreement. The interlocutors have provisionally allowed the faculty under discussion, so these replies should not be transformed into Plato's unconditional endorsement of an actual psychology. Most conspicuously, at 172c Critias allows that the lesser benefits suggested at 172b may be all they can obtain; Socrates answers that perhaps this is so, and perhaps the inquiry has sought nothing useful. The competing possibilities prevent a simple summary in which a final positive theory has already been secured.

They also explain why interpreters differ about how completely the lesser-benefit possibility is dismissed. The lexical caution is modest: preserve the hesitation and then examine the argument, rather than treating every short reply as either a theorem or a refusal.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159a. Charmides cautiously answers the proposal that he can state his opinion.

160b. The assessment of quick and quiet actions receives guarded assent.

165a. Critias allows a possible alternative interpretation of the Delphic command.

170c–170d. The restricted knowing-that result is accepted with language of appearance and qualification.

172b–172c. The suggestion of a lesser benefit is entertained without an unqualified final settlement.

In this edition. The edition's "perhaps," "it seems so," "it looks that way" and "apparently" preserve different conversational shades. The ordinary tentative use of kindyneuein does not mean that each speaker is literally describing physical danger.

See also. Agreement and concession; Belief and opinion; Clear and obscure; Knowledge of knowledge; Strangeness and absurdity.

The dream hypothesis

τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ (to emon onar); κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας (kata tas epistēmas); ἐπιστατοῦσαν (epistatousan); φυλάττουσα (phylattousa)

The word. Onar means dream. Here "the dream hypothesis" names the hypothetical social world narrated

at 173a–d, not a second Greek term. Kata tas epistēmas means according to the kinds of knowledge; epistatousan and phylattousa present temperance as presiding and keeping guard.

In the Charmides. The dream follows a deliberate restoration of two unearned claims: knowledge of knowledge can exist, and its possessor can know what people do and do not know (172c–d). Socrates asks what would happen if temperance of that kind ruled as fully as possible. No false pilot, doctor or general could deceive us; genuine craftsmen would provide reliable goods and services; if divination too were conceded as knowledge, authentic prophets could replace impostors.

The scenario consequently grants effective expert selection rather than deriving it from the earlier argument. It should not be represented as a successful answer to the diagnostic objection at 170d–171c. Its purpose is to isolate a new problem: even if the diagnostic power worked, would the resulting life be beneficial and happy?

Socrates agrees it would be knowledgeable, because ignorance could not intrude into the human undertaking (173d). He does not yet agree it would be good. The ensuing question about which field of knowledge matters leads to good and bad (174b). The dream therefore tests sufficiency of reliable technical control for a good life.

The image's uncertainty is also explicit: Socrates does not know through which dream-gate it has come. The literary source is treated separately under Dreams, horn and ivory. Argumentatively, the uncertainty warns that a coherent-looking ideal scenario and its attractive consequences do not by themselves establish the thesis for which they are offered.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

172c–d. The two strong concessions framing the scenario

173a–d. Reliable expert assignment imagined under temperance

173d–174b. Knowledgeable life distinguished from happiness

In this edition. The edition preserves the conditional structure and grants. “Standing guard” personifies temperance; it does not supply an independently described institution capable of the promised monitoring.

See also. Dreams, horn and ivory; Agreement and concession; Knowledge of knowledge; Knowledgeable living; Good and bad; Pretence and imposture.

Thracians

Θρᾳκῶν (Thraikōn); Θρᾷξ (Thraix); Θρᾳκὸς (Thraikos)

The word. The ethnic adjective Thrāix, “Thracian,” appears as both a plural identifying the doctors and a singular naming Socrates’ claimed teacher. Thrace itself is not separately mapped in the conversation. The supplied text unusually prints the singular with a grave accent at 156d6, as Burnet does.

In the Charmides. The unnamed Thracian connects the opening military return with the therapeutic story. Socrates says that he met him on campaign. The man first agrees with good Greek medical practice and then corrects what it leaves out: the soul must be treated, not merely the body. The contrast is therefore not a blanket rejection of Greek medicine in favor of foreign magic. The reported teacher appropriates one Greek principle, treating a part through the whole, and extends its scope.

He also sets conditions of transmission. Socrates is to give no remedy to someone who refuses the prior charm, however rich, wellborn, or beautiful the person may be. Socrates' oath turns the foreigner's instruction into a limit on the admired youth's power to obtain special treatment. At 175e it is the charm learned from this Thracian that Socrates remembers with concern, after the definition attached to it has appeared useless.

The man remains unnamed, and his existence is not independently verified within the scene. "The Thracian says" must not become "the historical Thracian medical profession believed." The story's philosophical and dramatic coherence can be studied without deciding that question.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156d–157c. The claimed campaign teacher delivers the healing doctrine and binds Socrates to its conditions

175e. Socrates recalls the charm learned from the Thracian

In this edition. The edition's Θρᾲξ at 156d6 preserves Burnet's unusual accent rather than silently correcting it to the expected Θρᾷξ. This orthographic caution does not alter the ethnic identification.

See also. Potidaea and the campaign; Zalmoxis; Charm; Oath and divine invocations; Treatment and regimen.

Treatment and regimen

θεραπεύειν (therapeuein); ἰᾶσθαι (iasthai); διαίταις (diaitais); ἐπιμέλειαν (epimeleian)

The word. Therapeuein means to attend to or treat; iasthai to heal or cure. Diaita is a way of living and,

medically, a regimen; diaitais is dative plural. Epimeleia is care or attention. The words overlap in the medical scene but need not all imply that a cure has already been achieved.

In the Charmides. Socrates says that good doctors turn to regimens for the whole body when treating the head and eyes. This distinguishes a comprehensive management of bodily conditions from an isolated application to the painful part. “Regimen” is more exact than “diet” if the latter is understood only as a list of foods: the Greek does not specify nutritional instructions here.

The paired verbs therapeuein and iasthai emphasize both attending to the condition and bringing about health. The Thracian then extends the language of treatment to the soul: beautiful words treat it by generating temperance. The expression is medical in its framing and educational in its means. Socrates’ requirement that Charmides first submit his soul makes participation, not simply ingestion of a remedy, part of the therapy.

At 156e the printed text criticizes Greek doctors for neglecting what they should care for. This local opposition of care and neglect is textually qualified: the main manuscript reading emphasizes not knowing the whole, whereas Burnet follows a variant meaning neglect. Either reading exposes a deficiency in attending to the relevant human context; neither permits an indiscriminate charge against every Greek physician.

The ordinary ethical instruction to care for oneself at 173a is related but separate. It motivates taking an apparent difficulty seriously in inquiry, not a new medical regimen. The medical vocabulary prepares that concern without making all self-care a bodily cure.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156b–c. Good doctors use regimens for the whole body in treating parts

156e–157c. The soul's treatment and the doctor's conditions extend the therapeutic vocabulary

156e (apparatus). Care is contrasted with a textually disputed neglect/not-knowing

In this edition. "Treat" and "heal" preserve a useful distinction between attending to a case and securing its successful outcome. The edition's "regimen" avoids reducing diaita to food alone.

See also. Whole and part; Doctor and medicine; Soul; Charm; Care and neglect.

Truth and falsehood

ἀληθὲς (alēthes); ἀλήθειαν (alētheian); ψευδῆ (pseudē); ἀληθινοῖς (alēthinois)

The word. Alēthēs means true; alētheia truth. Pseudēs means false or untruthful and can characterize a person. Alēthinos means genuine or real in contrast to a pretender. These contrasts overlap in the dialogue but distinguish truth of assertions from genuineness of a practitioner.

In the Charmides. Charmides fears that denying his temperance will show Critias and his other admirers to be false (158d). The English "liar" gives the personal sting, though a false assessment need not be deliberate lying. At 161c Socrates explicitly removes personal origin as the test: examine whether what is said is true. This is repeated when Critias takes over the account (162e).

At 171b the medical examiner considers whether claims are true and performances correct. The different predicates matter: evaluating expertise involves more than determining that a speaker is socially credible. At 173c the dream imagines use of genuine craftsmen and true prophets, contrasting authentic competence with imposture.

In the final passage the inquiry fails to discover truth and instead mocks it (175c–d). This is personified disappointment at the fate of their account, not an assertion that truth itself is relative or unknowable. Socrates retains the conviction that temperance is a great good. The dialogue's unresolved conclusion distinguishes failure to establish the truth in this investigation from abandonment of truth as its standard.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158d. Charmides' fear of discrediting those who praise him

161c–162e. Truth prioritized over authorship

171b. Truth of statements and correctness of acts as separate tests

173c. Genuine expertise in the dream

175c–e. Truth not discovered by the completed inquiry

In this edition. "True", "truly" and "genuine" can render related alēth- forms in different functions. "Liar" at 158d is forceful personal English; the Greek adjective itself does not settle whether Critias' error would be intentional.

See also. Belief and opinion; Pretence and imposture; Refutation; Correctness and error; Evidence and proof.

Ugly and shameful

αἰσχρὸν (aischron); τοῦ αἰσχροῦ (tou aischrou)

The word. Aischros is the evaluative opposite of kalos: it can describe what looks ugly as well as what is shameful, base or improper. The neuter substantive to aischron names the ugly or shameful. It is related to the language of shame but is not itself a word for feeling ashamed. The distinction is between an evaluation of something and a person's emotional response to that evaluation.

In the Charmides. Socrates says there would be nothing aischron in Charmides speaking with him in his guardian's presence, even if the boy were younger (155a). Here the concern is propriety in a social setting. In the first refutation the same family describes bodily actions performed with difficulty and quietly, in contrast to the quick and nimble performances classed with the fine (159d). English "ugly" brings out their ungainly appearance.

The range reveals why the shared premise that temperance is kalon can move between graceful performance and admirable character without a marked change of Greek adjective. It does not establish their identity. In particular a clumsy movement has not thereby been proved a moral vice, and an appropriate conversation has not thereby been declared physically beautiful. The lexicon must preserve the common evaluative opposition while keeping the local object of appraisal visible.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155a. Conversation with the youth before his guardian is said not to be improper

159d. Laborious quiet bodily actions are assigned to the ugly rather than the fine

In this edition. The edition's "improper" at 155a and "ugly" at 159d translate the same adjective in different contexts. "Disgrace" in Critias' Hesiodic interpretation renders ὄνειδος, a different noun, and should be looked up separately.

See also. Fine and beautiful; Modesty and shame; Disgrace; Fitting and appropriate.

Understanding and quick-wittedness

συνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα (synienai ta legomena); ἀγχίνοια (anchinoia); ὀξύτης τίς ἐστιν τῆς ψυχῆς (oxytēs tis estin tēs psychēs); ἐνόει (enoei); συλλογισάμενος (syllogisamenos)

The word. Synienai ta legomena is to understand what is being said. Anchinoia names quickness of apprehension; Socrates glosses it by oxytēs, sharpness, of soul. Noein and its compounds can mean thinking, noticing or having something in mind; enoei at 161d and 162b–d asks what a speaker meant. These are related functions, not identical technical terms.

In the Charmides. Socrates moves from bodily speed to mental excellence at 159e–160a. Quick learning, lively teaching, ready memory and swift comprehension seem finer than their sluggish counterparts. Anchinoia makes the transition particularly clear: the value of intellectual acuity puts pressure on the claim that temperance simply is quietness. The comparison does not establish that haste invariably improves understanding; the argument selects cases accepted by Charmides and later qualifies its conclusion by allowing that some quiet actions may be fine (160b–d).

The dialogue then tests the difference between repeating a formula and understanding it. At 161d Socrates assumes the author of “doing one’s own business” cannot mean exactly what the words seem to say under his literal construction. At 162b Charmides admits he does not know the meaning and mischievously suggests that its author may not know either. Critias’ anger draws out the epistemic point: a hearer’s failure of comprehension does not itself prove the speaker’s ignorance (162d).

There is also a practical counterpoint. Charmides pauses and considers before answering at 160e, immediately after quick apprehension has been praised. The narrator’s amused description prevents us from treating the preceding exchange as a simple educational command always to respond quickly.

At 160d Socrates asks Charmides to gather or reckon together these considerations, syllogisamenos, before answering. The form is related to the later noun “syllogism”, but here it does not introduce an Aristotelian formal deduction with a specified logical figure. It describes thinking through the observations about what the virtue makes its possessor like.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159e–160b. Sharpness and understanding in the argument against quietness

160d–e. Pause and inward consideration before the second definition

161d–162d. What the author meant distinguished from the hearer’s understanding

In this edition. “Quick-wittedness” is the specific rendering of anchinoia; “understanding” renders synienai. “What he meant” for forms of noein marks

communicative intention rather than an account of the later philosophical intellect or Nous.

See also. Learning and teaching; Memory and recollection; Language and naming; Quietness; Definition.

Use and profit

ὄφελος (ophelos); χρησίμη (chrēsimē); χρησίμους (chrēsimous); χρηστὸν (chrēston); ὀνήσεσθαι (onēsesthai); ὀνήσει (onēsei); ὀνήσῃ (onēsēi); χρῷτο αὐτῷ (chrōito autōi); χρῆσθαι (chrēsthai)

The word. Ophelos names use, advantage or help, often in the phrase "no use." Chrēsimos means useful or serviceable; chrēstos can likewise mean good for a purpose or of use. The verb represented by onēsei, onēsesthai and onēsēi is the family of ὀνίνημι, benefiting or deriving benefit. Its "profit" need not mean a commercial gain. These words overlap in ordinary evaluation with the ōphel- family but are separate lexical items. A separate family, chraomai, means using something or employing someone: the remedy at 155e and genuine craftsmen at 173c. This activity is not identical with the further question whether it benefits the user.

In the Charmides. The leaf is of no use without its accompanying charm (155e). Use is conditional on the right treatment of the whole person. At 165a the Delphic dedicators are said to have set up useful advice; at 165c Socrates asks what use medicine is and answers by identifying its beneficial work. These different uses introduce the general demand that a proposed resource should contribute something.

The doctor and other craftsmen may not know whether they will derive benefit from their work (164b). "Profit"

here opens an evaluative uncertainty, not necessarily a question about professional fees. The same verb asks whether the maximally granted knowledge would benefit us at all (172d), and whether Charmides would gain anything from possessing temperance (175e).

The negative judgment at 172c concerns the inquiry: perhaps they have sought to no useful purpose. Socrates repeats the thought at 175a and makes a wordplay at 175b between temperance's appearing of no use and his own being of any use at inquiry. This does not prove that temperance is useless; his self-criticism explicitly resists that outcome. The recurrence links the practical worth of the virtue with the adequacy of the way it has been investigated.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

155e. The proposed treatment combines singing the charm with using the remedy.

155e. The remedy has no use without the charm

164b. A craftsman may not know whether his work will profit him

165a–d. Useful advice and the use of medicine provide distinct contexts

172c–d. The inquiry's utility and the hypothesised knowledge's benefit are questioned

175a–e. Socrates makes the use-wordplay and rejects the virtue's apparent worthlessness

173c. The dream assumes that people employ genuine craftsmen, without yet establishing happiness.

In this edition. The edition normally reserves "benefit" for the ὠφελ- family and "use" for ὄφελος and χρηστ-/χρησιμ-. Exceptions are visible: ὀνήσει is "benefit" at 172d, while ἀνωφελές is "of no use" at 175b for the

verbal play. “Profit” for ὀνίνημι should not be expanded into an unattested theory of financial gain.

See also. Beneficial and harmful; Good and bad; Happiness and doing well; Work and working; Wealth and possessions.

Virtue and excellence

ἀρετῇ (aretēi)

The word. Aretē denotes excellence or virtue; the dialogue’s explicit form is the dative singular aretēi. It occurs in praise of a family rather than in a formal division of virtues. “Virtue” is an appropriate English rendering, but the reader should not infer that every use of the word carries a developed doctrine of cardinal virtues or a complete account of their unity.

In the Charmides. At 157e–158a Socrates recalls the poetic celebration of Charmides’ paternal house for beauty, excellence and the remaining reputed elements of happiness. Aretē stands among inherited expectations and public praise. The subsequent inquiry asks what the particular excellence called temperance really is and whether Charmides possesses it; noble ancestry is not allowed to settle the issue.

The noun’s relative rarity contrasts with the dialogue’s sustained ethical activity. Temperance is praised, proposed as a cause of good character and tested for benefit throughout without repeated invocation of the generic term “virtue.” At 174b the knowledge of good and bad could have implications beyond a single excellence, but the dialogue does not explicitly identify all virtues or supply a catalogue. A full lexical reading consequently

separates the general ethical problem from the very limited distribution of aretē itself.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157e–158a. Aretē occurs in the encomium of Charmides' paternal family

In this edition. "Virtue" translates the actual dative ἀρετῇ. Discussion of temperance as a virtue elsewhere in this lexicon is explanatory English, not a claim that Plato repeats ἀρετή at every such passage.

See also. Temperance; Good men; Happiness and doing well; Praise and blame; Good and bad.

Wealth and possessions

πλούσιον (plousion); τὰ χρήματα (ta chrēmata); τὰ σκεύη (ta skeuē)

The word. Plousios means rich. Chrēmata can name possessions, resources or money, but its local context decides which English sense is appropriate. Skeuē denotes equipment or implements. The plurality of material resources should not be confused with the abstract possession of temperance or knowledge, for which the dialogue uses other constructions.

In the Charmides. The Thracian healer forbids Socrates to let anyone's wealth, good birth or beauty persuade him to bypass treatment of the soul (157b–c). These advantages cannot override the relevant therapeutic requirement. Because Charmides is the attractive well-connected pupil before him, the instruction also bears on Socrates' own temptation to favour this particular candidate.

The dream at 173b–c includes expertly made clothing, footwear, equipment and possessions among the benefits

expected from genuine craftsmen. Chrēmata here belongs to the list of produced resources, not specifically to coins or investment capital. The later question is whether such technical achievements ensure doing well and happiness. They do not automatically provide the knowledge of good and bad on which benefit is made to depend.

The dialogue thus neither denounces material resources as intrinsically bad nor certifies their sufficiency for a good life. It places inherited and acquired advantages under a more searching assessment of soul, knowledge and use.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

157b–c. Wealth cannot justify bypassing the soul's treatment

173b–c. Expertly made equipment and possessions form part of the dream's technical success

174b–d. Technical results remain distinct from their beneficial contribution to life

In this edition. "Possessions" at 173c translates χρήματα, not a form of κτᾶσθαι. "Rich" at 157b is one member of a three-part description and should not be made the sole source of the temptation Socrates is instructed to resist.

See also. Happiness and doing well; Good and bad; Use and profit; One's own and what belongs to others; Presence and possession.

Weighing

ἡ στατικὴ (hē statikē); σταθμοῦ (stathmou); τὸ βαρύ τε καὶ κοῦφον (to bary te kai kouphon)

The word. Statikē is the art of weighing; stathmos is weight in this example. Bary and kouphon mean heavy

and light. The adjective “static” in modern mechanics is a misleading guide to the immediate meaning.

In the Charmides. At 166b weighing supplies a second example after calculation. The heavier and lighter weight, or heavy and light, are different from the art by which they are assessed. Socrates needs only the distinction between a competence and its object; he is not explaining the construction of a balance or a theory of gravity.

The choice prepares the relational argument. At 168c something heavier than itself would also be lighter than itself. A weighing expertise is perfectly intelligible because its field includes comparative weights, while an impossible self-comparison within that field would require one object to occupy incompatible sides of the relation. These are different claims. Knowledge about a relation should not be confused with a thing’s standing in that relation to itself.

The small example therefore links the craft analogy to the systematic testing of powers. It shows why the new question at 166a–b is about what a knowledge is of, independently of whether it leaves behind a manufactured product.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

166b. Weighing and its distinct field

168c. Heavier and lighter among incompatible self-comparisons

In this edition. The repeated statikē at 166b is retained by Burnet though the apparatus records a proposed deletion. The edition’s repetition, “weighing is the weighing of…”, reflects the Greek construction rather than a new technical definition.

See also. Calculation and geometry; Product and object of knowledge; Greater and smaller; Power and capacity.

What ought to be done

τὰ δέοντα (ta deonta); δεῖν (dein); δοτέον (doteon); ἐπᾳστέον (epāisteon)

The word. Ta deonta is the neuter plural participle of the impersonal verb dei, “it is necessary” or “one ought.” It names what is required or what ought to be done. The dialogue also uses verbal adjectives such as doteon, “to be given,” and epāisteon, “a charm must be sung,” to express the required next step. Such constructions range from practical necessity to normative requirement; they do not automatically establish a theory of duty independent of benefit.

In the Charmides. In the doctor example Socrates asks whether someone who benefits himself and the patient does ta deonta, and whether doing these things is temperate (164a–b). Critias agrees. The phrase links beneficial action with proper action under his current definition. It does not explain how to determine what is required when benefit is uncertain. That uncertainty immediately drives the question whether the practitioner knows how he has acted.

The medical frame has already presented conditional prescriptions: if Charmides has temperance, the remedy should be administered; if he lacks it, charming must come first (158b–c). The practical conclusion depends on a diagnosis which the inquiry has not secured. Likewise the impersonal requirement to examine what appears, if one cares for oneself, binds intellectual investigation to responsible action (173a). “Ought” here can require inquiry rather than a confident command.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

158b–c. The needed treatment is expressed through conditional verbal adjectives of obligation

164a–b. Beneficial treatment is accepted as doing what one ought

173a. Care for oneself requires examining the puzzling appearance

In this edition. "Does what he ought" interprets τὰ δέοντα idiomatically. It should not be confused with the separate "one's own" formula: the doctor's action becomes proper through the conceded benefit, not simply through ownership of its materials or patient.

See also. Doing good things; Beneficial and harmful; Fitting and appropriate; Care and neglect; Justice and the just.

White measuring-line

λευκὴ στάθμη (leukē stathmē); σταθμητόν (stathmēton)

The word. Stathmē is a measuring or marking line used in building. Leukē makes it white. Stathmēton is related to measuring or estimation, and Socrates' surrounding self-description plays on the shared root. The comparison concerns reliability of judgment, not a proposed science of measurement.

In the Charmides. Before affirming Charmides' extraordinary appearance, Socrates warns his listener that he himself supplies no dependable measure in these matters: nearly every youth of the relevant age looks beautiful to him. He calls himself a white measuring-line toward the beautiful. A line without visible contrast fails to discriminate effectively, so the image marks the narrator's susceptibility and self-deprecation.

The disclaimer does not erase the subsequent judgment. Socrates goes on to say that even to him Charmides was astonishing, and he describes the universal response of the room. The scene therefore both undercuts his authority as a selective connoisseur and supplies wider dramatic evidence for the youth's reputation.

The contrast with later inquiry is suggestive. Initial aesthetic perception comes with an avowedly unreliable personal standard; the examination of temperance demands an account capable of surviving questions. It is unnecessary, however, to force the white line into a complete allegory of epistemology. Its first function is a compact joke by a narrator who includes his own weaknesses in the story.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154b–c. Socrates disclaims reliable discrimination of youthful beauty before describing Charmides

154b (apparatus). The apparatus records a variant ἀστάθμητον beside the printed σταθμητόν

In this edition. The Greek says only "a white line." The edition adds "on white stone" to complete the proverbial image for English readers and explicitly discloses the addition. That phrase must not be quoted as though Plato wrote λίθος here.

See also. Socrates; Erotic attraction; Face and bodily appearance; Fine and beautiful.

Whole and part

ὅλου (holou); μέρος (meros); παντὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ (panti tōi anthrōpōi)

The word. Holos means whole or entire; meros means a part. The medical analogy changes the reference of the whole as it proceeds: the head is wider than the eyes, the body wider than the head, and treatment of the human being cannot disregard the soul. “Whole” here is not a technical name for the universe.

In the Charmides. Socrates begins with an example Charmides accepts as familiar. A good doctor will not treat painful eyes on their own, but includes the head; treating the head in isolation from the whole body is similarly foolish. The prescription then turns to regimen for the entire body so that the part may be treated with the whole. At this stage the argument concerns interdependence within bodily treatment.

The Thracian doctor extends rather than simply repeats it. As one should not treat eyes without head or head without body, one should not treat body without soul. Greek doctors fail to cure many diseases because they neglect the whole; when the whole is in bad condition its part cannot fare well. Good and bad are then said to flow from the soul into the body and entire person. The explicit claim is the necessity of attending to soul. The sentence about “the whole” does not itself give an anatomical definition that would make soul one organ among others.

Readers may therefore speak cautiously of whole-person treatment, provided they distinguish the claim from modern medical holism and retain its fictional speaker. It is not an empirical demonstration that all disease has a psychological cause. Nor is it a claim that correcting bodily conditions is pointless: the story

continues to promise a bodily remedy, conditional on the necessary prior treatment.

The analogy also has a structural consequence for the inquiry. Charmides cannot receive the desired local cure until the more comprehensive question is addressed, but the comprehensive question proves much harder to answer. Later the argument distinguishes knowledge of a limited technical domain from knowledge of good and bad. This creates a suggestive parallel between local success and human benefit, although the dialogue never formally derives the later epistemology from the earlier medical image.

Textually, the crucial sentence at 156e is constructed by editorial choices. Burnet prints a genitive “of the whole” and the verb “neglect,” while the principal manuscripts give wording that supports “do not know the whole.” The printed reading emphasizes failure of care; the alternative emphasizes failure of knowledge. Both make an adequate relation to the whole indispensable, but their verbal emphases should not be fused without notice.[35]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156b–c. The eyes, head, and entire body establish the part–whole medical analogy

156e–157a. The analogy is extended to soul and the entire human being

156e (apparatus). Burnet’s τοῦ ὅλου and the variant ἀμελοῖεν determine the wording about neglecting the whole

[35] Phaedrus 270c–d is a comparative Platonic passage on Hippocratic medicine and the nature of the whole. It should not be used to decide without argument exactly what “whole” means here, or to attribute this specific Thracian doctrine to all Hippocratic writers.

157b–c. The order of treatment becomes a binding condition for giving the remedy

In this edition. At 156e4 “of the whole” is Burnet’s conjectural τοῦ ὅλου; “neglect” follows a reading recorded as a variant in T and in Stobaeus. The main B and T reading is ἀγνοοῖεν, “would not know.” The edition rightly flags the intervention rather than presenting its wording as unanimous manuscript evidence.

See also. Soul; Body; Doctor and medicine; Treatment and regimen; Health and disease; Good and bad.

Willingness and refusal

ἐθέλει (ethelei); ἐθέλω (ethelō); βούλῃ (boulēi); βούλει (boulei); ἤθελεν (ēthelen)

The word. Ethelein and boulesthai express willingness, wanting or choice to do something. The dialogue uses them in ordinary conversational conditions rather than as the terms of a systematic voluntary/involuntary distinction. The technical paired adjectives hekōn and akōn are not supplied by this text. An English lookup under “voluntary” should therefore lead to the actual language of willingness without inventing an unattested doctrine.

In the Charmides. The prologue asks whether Charmides would be willing to strip and assumes he is old enough to be willing to converse (154d–e). The medical story then makes treating his head conditional on his willingness to let his soul receive the charm (157c). At 158e Socrates offers to investigate with him if he wishes, or leave the matter if he does not. The boy actively accepts.

Willingness also marks intellectual limits. Charmides initially hesitates to answer (159b). Socrates says Critias

treats him as though he already knew and would agree if he chose; he insists that he must first investigate (165b–c). Later Critias is unwilling to acknowledge his inability before the audience (169c). Wanting to affirm, deny or conceal something does not decide its truth.

The closing promise to continue with Socrates is eager, but it is also placed under the guardian's command and directed at a Socrates jokingly deprived of refusal (176b–d). This juxtaposition prevents consent from being treated as a single uncomplicated fact shared equally by everyone in the scene.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154d–e. Willingness frames both bodily exposure and conversation

157c. Treatment and inquiry are offered conditionally on Charmides' willingness

158e. Treatment and inquiry are offered conditionally on Charmides' willingness

159b. The boy hesitates before giving his first definition

165b–c. Socrates denies that agreement is merely a matter of willingness

169c–d. Critias resists openly admitting his inability

176b–d. A willing pupil and a commanding guardian confront Socrates with threatened force

In this edition. The edition uses "will," "want," and "be willing" as ordinary English requires. Neither that variation nor the lexical difference between βούλομαι and ἐθέλω establishes a formal partition between rational and irrational choice in this dialogue.

See also. Persuasion and obedience; Force and compulsion; Deliberation and decision; Wish; Agreement and concession.

Wish

βούλησις (boulēsis); βούλεται (bouletai); τὰς ἄλλας βουλήσεις (tas allas boulēseis)

The word. Boulēsis is wishing or a wish; boulesthai is to wish or want. At 167e the noun names an attitude whose object is a good. The text elsewhere uses wanting in ordinary conversational settings, but it does not formally classify all those uses under a developed psychology of rational desire.

In the Charmides. Socrates asks whether a wish could wish for itself and the other wishes while wishing for no good (167e). The expected negative answer parallels desire without pleasure and love without beauty. The structure of the analogy matters more than a modern distinction between voluntary intention and passive longing.

The phrasing does not say that all actual wishes succeed, nor that whatever someone wishes must in fact be good. Its immediate work is to identify the object toward which a wish is directed under the speakers' agreed description. Whether "good" here means genuinely good or apparently good is not separately worked out.

For that reason the line should not be cited as a complete theory of the will or as a denial that one can wish to have different wishes. It challenges the more austere proposal of an attitude whose entire object consists in attitudes, while excluding anything good. The later knowledge of good and bad is a different epistemic proposal, not simply boulēsis elevated into a science.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

167e. Wish of wishes excluding any good offered as an impossible-looking analogy

In this edition. “Wish” separates boulēsis from nearby epithymia. Boulē, counsel or deliberation, and bouleuesthai, to deliberate, belong to a related verbal field but must not be substituted for the attitude tested here.

See also. Desire as a relative; Love as a relative; Good and bad; Deliberation and decision; Willingness and refusal.

Work and working

ἔργον (ergon); ἔργα (erga); ἐργάζεσθαι (ergazesthai); ἐργασίας (ergasias); ἀπεργάζεται (apergazetai)

The word. Ergon can be a work, deed, task, function or achieved result; its plural erga need not designate physical objects. Ergazesthai means working or performing work, and ergasia denotes that activity. Apergazesthai adds the force of accomplishing or producing an effect. Context must decide whether a work is bodily performance, a manufactured object, health, or the function of benefiting. The word is neither uniformly a product nor uniformly an assigned social occupation.

In the Charmides. The first refutation includes running and jumping among the body’s works (159c–d). At 161e craftsmen produce works of their skills, and the imaginary self-sufficient citizen is told to work at and do his own things (162a). These uses provide the vocabulary that Critias will restrict.

His appeal to Hesiod makes “work” an evaluative category. If work is no disgrace, he argues, the term cannot include every production indiscriminately. Only

what is made finely and beneficially is work; harmful and disgraceful productions are excluded (163b–c). The inference represents Critias' reading of Hesiod, supported by a selective description of occupations. The poem's authority does not establish the semantic restriction by itself. Socrates responds by demanding a clear definition rather than contesting each word.

The question changes when temperance is proposed as knowledge. Health is medicine's fine work; houses are the work of house-building. Socrates asks for a comparable work of temperance, worthy of its name (165c–e). Critias correctly points out that calculation and geometry do not provide the same kind of independently displayable result as a cloak or house (165e–166a). Socrates consequently turns to their objects of knowledge. The objection concerns "such a work," not the blanket assertion that mathematical understanding never accomplishes anything.

Ergon returns when actual expertise must be assessed by what its possessor says and does, and at the conclusion when benefit is assigned to knowledge of good and bad (174d–175a). Each craft has its own work. The question whether supervising expertise can contribute indirectly to its achievement then becomes acute: assigning the direct work to medicine does not by itself explain every possible contribution of its supervision. The final account nevertheless excludes benefit from temperance construed as bare knowledge of knowledge. The review at 175b–c recalls that knowledge of other sciences' works had been conceded without adequate argument. Keeping "work"

broad enough for these different functions is necessary to follow the reasoning.[36]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

159c–d. The body's works include athletic actions

161e–163c. Craft products and Hesiod's work become the subject of Critias' semantic restriction

165c–166a. A fine work is requested; mathematics supplies counterexamples to a uniform product model

174d–175a. Benefit is allotted as the work of the knowledge of good and bad

175b–c. Knowing the other sciences' works is identified as an unjustified concession

In this edition. "Work" and "works" maintain the recurrent ἔργον family, while "produces" often renders ἀπεργάζεται. At 163b Burnet brackets the particle δέ in the indirect citation of Hesiod; this does not remove the contrast between work and disgrace. The more complete Hesiodic sentence contrasts work with idleness, a contrast Critias does not quote in full.

See also. Doing and action; Making and production; Disgrace; Beneficial and harmful; Craft and expertise; Knowledge of knowledge.

[36] Hesiod, Works and Days 311, contrasts work with idleness; see the public-domain translation at online source. A revealing ancient parallel is Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.56–57, where an accusation about Socrates' use of the same line is answered by restricting work to good activity: online source. This parallel does not prove who borrowed from whom.

Worth and honour

ἄξιος (axios); ἄξιον (axion); ἀξίου (axiou); ἀτιμάσῃς (atimasēis)

The word. Axios assesses worth or desert and often takes a genitive specifying what is merited: praise, a name, or value in some respect. Atimazein means dishonouring or treating something as unworthy. These expressions evaluate a claim on esteem, not simply an object's monetary price. The context must supply what standard of worth is at issue.

In the Charmides. Efficient deliberation is called worthy of praise at 160a–b. In the craft analogy Socrates asks what fine work temperance produces that is worthy of its name (165d–e). A prestigious word creates an expectation that its referent can justify the honour it receives. At 173d Critias protests that if knowledgeable acting is slighted, one will struggle to find anything else that completes doing well. Socrates' reply is not to demean knowledge indiscriminately, but to ask which kind matters.

The final complaint about learning the charm for a thing worth nothing (175e) turns this demand on the whole inquiry. Socrates rejects the conclusion that temperance has no worth. Thus an honorific reputation initiates the test, but neither the name nor the offended sense that it deserves respect can replace a reasoned account of benefit.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

160a–b. The effective deliberator merits praise

165d–e. Temperance is asked to produce a fine work worthy of its name

173d. Critias resists slighting knowledgeable action

175e. Socrates refuses to believe the charm concerns something worthless

In this edition. “Worthy,” “worth” and “slight” bring out related evaluative roles while preserving different Greek roots. “Worth nothing” at 175e concerns μηδενὸς ἀξίου πράγματος, not a claim that the charm has no market price.

See also. Praise and blame; Reputation and ambition; Work and working; Beneficial and harmful; Good and bad.

Youth and age

παῖς (pais); παῖδας (paidas); μειράκιον (meirakion); νεανίσκος (neaniskos); ἡλικίας (hēlikias); ἡλικιῶται (hēlikiōtais)

The word. Pais can mean a child or boy, a son, and in address a servant; the context distinguishes them. Meirakion and neaniskos designate a young male at overlapping stages of youth. Hēlikia is age or age-group, and hēlikiōtai are contemporaries. These words do not establish a precise numerical age.

In the Charmides. Socrates remembers Charmides as still a child before his departure; Critias says he had not then reached the relevant age, and Socrates expects that he is now quite a meirakion. The spectacle includes older lovers, grown men, and children, even the smallest of whom look toward the newcomer. Plato makes differences of age and role visible without supplying dates of birth.

Age also regulates expectations. Socrates proposes conversation because Charmides is now old enough to be willing to converse. His modest blush is becoming to his

hēlikia, and Critias qualifies his general excellence by the years he has attained. When Critias takes over the argument, Socrates excuses the younger man's ignorance by age and expects more of the older man's age and attention to the subject. Those judgments can be conventional, ironic, or both; they are not a universal theory that philosophical knowledge simply increases with years.

The schoolroom examples are effective because they draw on skills that the youth knows from experience. At the same time Charmides is not an anonymous novice: he remembers Socrates' earlier association with Critias and knows his reputation among contemporaries. The closing decision to seek daily conversation gives youth a forward-looking educational possibility rather than merely a deficient status.

A separate social use occurs when Critias calls his attendant pai at 155b. The vocative addresses a servant, not Charmides himself. Confusing the two would misstage the summoning scene.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

154a–c. Charmides' maturation and the several age-groups watching him

154e–155b. Age, supervised conversation, and the distinct attendant addressed as boy

156a. Charmides recalls childhood and reports Socrates' reputation among his contemporaries

157d–158c. Praise and bashfulness are qualified by age

162d–e. Socrates contrasts the youth's understandable ignorance with Critias' expected competence

In this edition. The edition varies "boy," "young man," and "youngster" appropriately. Those English choices

should not be converted into a fixed age of sixteen, eighteen, or twenty. The source's chronology does not resolve that numerical question.

See also. Charmides; Guardian and cousin; Schooling and the letter-master; Palaestra; Modesty and shame.

Zalmoxis

Ζάλμοξις (Zalmoxis); Ζαλμόξιδος (Zalmoxidos)

The word. Zalmoxis is the name of the figure whom the unnamed Thracian doctor calls "our king, who is a god." The genitive Zalmoxidos identifies the doctors associated with him and, later, the charms attributed to him. Ancient spelling varies; the edition follows Burnet's Zalmoxis rather than silently standardizing Zamolxis.

In the Charmides. Socrates introduces Zalmoxis at 156d through a carefully nested report. Socrates says he learned the charm from a Thracian doctor on campaign; that doctor says that Zalmoxis teaches the priority of the soul in healing. The local chain of authority is therefore not a direct divine revelation to Socrates. It also occurs within the doctor's impersonation agreed with Critias. These narrative conditions should remain attached to the doctrine rather than disappear when it is cited as "Plato's psychosomatic theory."

The teaching begins from a concession to good Greek doctors: eyes require treatment of the head, and the head requires attention to the whole body. The Thracian extension makes the soul indispensable. Good and bad flow from it to the body and the entire human being; beautiful words generate temperance, after which bodily health can more readily be provided. Zalmoxis thus represents a claimed authority superior to incomplete

Greek treatment, but the philosophical work is done by the movement from bodily part to human whole.

At 158b Zalmoxis is paired with Abaris the Hyperborean. If Charmides already has sufficient temperance, even charms associated with such impressive names would be unnecessary. The decisive consideration is the patient's condition, not the prestige of the foreign healer. At the close Socrates returns to the Thracian charm, not to a newly revealed doctrine about Zalmoxis.

Herodotus 4.94–96 gives an independent account of the Getae's belief in going to Zalmoxis after death and records a Greek rationalizing story involving Pythagoras, while distancing himself from its chronology. That testimony supplies cultural background for the extraordinary reputation of Zalmoxis' doctors. It does not prove that the specific medical teaching reported in the Charmides was historically practiced by a Thracian school, or that Plato endorses every story Herodotus records.[37]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

156d–157b. The Thracian doctor attributes the whole-person healing doctrine to his divine king

158b. Charms of Zalmoxis and Abaris are unnecessary if the youth already has temperance

156d (apparatus). The witnesses differ over Zalmoxis/Zamolxis and doctors/citizens

In this edition. At 156d5 the principal text has "doctors," whereas Stobaeus has "citizens." At d5 and d8 the apparatus records Ζαμόλξιδος and Ζάμολξις beside the printed forms. Neither difference authorizes an

[37] Herodotus, Histories 4.94–96, is independent comparative evidence: online source. Its nested reports and Herodotus' reservations should be retained.

unqualified historical description of a known professional order.

See also. Thracians; Abaris the Hyperborean; Immortalizing; Charm; Whole and part; Soul.

Original forms and English aliases

Greek expressions, transliterations and English lookup labels lead to the articles that explain them. A label is a finding aid: related terms sharing an article are not necessarily synonyms. Inflected forms retain their accents; cross-references connect related words rather than multiplying their grammatical forms into articles.

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Greek vocabulary register

The alphabetic headwords below are dictionary lemmas, lexical families or phrase labels. Each is followed by an attested form, a local explanation and Stephanus references. A dictionary headword need not itself occur in that exact grammatical form. Several records can belong to one fuller article, and a grouped family is not a claim that its members are synonyms.

Ἄβαρις. Attested: Ἀβάριδος (abaridos). Abaris, the Hyperborean figure whose charms are said to be unnecessary if Charmides already has temperance. References: 158b. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἄβαρις. See Abaris the Hyperborean, 21.

ἀγαθός. Attested: ἀγαθὸν / ἀγαθόν / ἀγαθὰ / ἀγαθοῦ (agathon / agathon / agatha / agathou). Good; may qualify people, actions or outcomes, while knowledge of good and bad emerges as the claimed condition of benefit. References: 160e, 161a, 167e, 169b, 172a, 173a, 175e, 174b, 174c, 156e, 163d, 163e, 174d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀγαθός. See Good and bad, 123.

ἄγαλμα. Attested: ἄγαλμα (agalma). A statue or image admired as a spectacle; the crowd gazes at Charmides as if he were one. References: 154c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄγαλμα. See Statue, 274.

ἀγανακτέω. Attested: ἀγανακτῶ (aganaktō). Be indignant or distressed; Socrates expresses disappointment chiefly on Charmides' behalf after the unsuccessful inquiry. References: 175d, 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀγανακτέω. See Anger and indignation, 29.

ἀγγέλλω. Attested: ἤγγελταί (ēngeltai). News has been reported; Chaerephon distinguishes what Athens has heard from an eyewitness account. References: 153b.

Lexical identification: lemma: ἀγγέλλω. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

ἀγεννής. Attested: ἀγεννῶς (agennōs). Ignobly or in an ungenerous manner, here negated; Socrates commends the manner of Charmides' spoken answer after his blush. References: 158c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀγεννής. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

ἀγνοέω. Attested: ἀγνοεῖν / ἀγνοῶν / ἀγνοεῖ (agnoein / agnoōn / agnoei). Not know or fail to recognize; especially whether someone can act temperately without knowing himself or what he does. References: 162e, 164a, 170c, 164c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀγνοέω. See Lack of knowledge, 171.

ἄγνωτος. Attested: ἀγνῶτας (agnōtas). People personally unknown to Socrates in the gathering. References: 153a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄγνωτος. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

ἀγχίνοια. Attested: ἀγχίνοια (anchinoia). Quick-wittedness, explicitly explained as a kind of sharpness of soul in the comparison with quietness. References: 160a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀγχίνοια. See Understanding and quick-wittedness, 293.

ἀγωνιάω. Attested: ἀγωνιῶν (agōniōn). Be anxiously engaged or on edge; Critias' competitive concern over the answer is visible before he joins the debate. References: 162c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀγωνιάω. See Reputation and ambition, 252.

ἅδην. Attested: ἅδην (hadēn). To satiety, to their fill; they have had enough of hearing the campaign news. References: 153d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἅδην. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

ἀδικέω. Attested: εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε (ei mē adikō ge). Unless I am mistaken; an idiomatic qualification of Charmides' recognition of Socrates' name, not a confession of wrongdoing. References: 156a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀδικέω. See Truth and falsehood, 290.

ἀδύνατος. Attested: ἀδύνατον / ἀδύνατα / ἀδύνατος (adynaton / adynata / adynatos). Impossible, or unable when predicated of a person; distinguishes an impossible self-relation from someone's inability to explain it. References: 156e, 167c, 168e, 175c, 176a, 169c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀδύνατος. See Possibility and impossibility, 219.

αἰδώς. Attested: αἰδὼς / αἰδώς (aidōs / aidōs). Modesty or a restraining sense of shame; Charmides proposes it as temperance, but Socrates cites Homer's needy man to show that it is not invariably good. References: 160e, 161a, 161b. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰδώς. See Modesty and shame, 192.

αἴνιγμα. Attested: αἰνίγματι / αἴνιγμα (ainigmati / ainigma). A riddle or enigmatic statement; the formula "doing one's own business" requires an interpretation beyond its apparently literal wording. References: 161c, 162b. Lexical identification: lemma: αἴνιγμα. See Riddle, 255.

αἰνιγματώδης. Attested: αἰνιγματωδέστερον (ainigmatōdesteron). More enigmatically, or rather riddlingly; Critias says the god expresses "Be temperate" through the apparently different wording "Know thyself". References: 164e. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰνιγματώδης. See Riddle, 255.

αἰνίττομαι. Attested: ᾐνίττετο (ēinitteto). Was speaking in riddles; Socrates infers that the author of "doing one's own business" cannot have intended literal self-sufficient

manufacture. References: 162a. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰνίττομαι. See Riddle, 255.

αἰσθάνομαι. Attested: ᾔσθησαι / αἰσθάνονται / αἰσθανομένη (ēisthēsai / aisthanontai / aisthanomenē). To notice or perceive: Charmides is asked whether he has noticed the doctors' practice; later the verb specifies what a hypothetical sense would perceive, namely other senses rather than their ordinary objects. References: 156c, 167d. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰσθάνομαι. See Perception, 209.

αἴσθησις. Attested: αἴσθησίν / αἰσθήσεων / αἴσθησις / αἰσθήσεις (aisthēsin / aisthēseōn / aisthēsis / aisthēseis). A sense or awareness, initially of temperance supposedly present within oneself; later sensory perception, whose normal objects distinguish it from the proposed perception of perceptions. References: 159a, 167d. Lexical identification: lemma: αἴσθησις. See Perception, 209.

αἰσχρός. Attested: αἰσχρὸν / αἰσχροῦ (aischron / aischrou). Improper or shameful; at 155a Socrates says conversation with the boy is not improper in his guardian's presence. In the bodily-performance comparison, the word marks what is ugly or poor as the opposite of fine. References: 155a, 159d. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰσχρός. See Ugly and shameful, 292.

αἰσχύνομαι. Attested: αἰσχύνεσθαι / αἰσχυνθείην / ᾐσχύνετο (aischynesthai / aischyntheiēn / ēischyneto). To feel shame: the effect attributed to temperance by Charmides, the embarrassment Critias denies about retracting an error, and the embarrassment that later keeps him from admitting perplexity. References: 160e, 164d, 169c. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰσχύνομαι. See Modesty and shame, 192.

αἰσχυντηλός. Attested: αἰσχυντηλὸν (aischyntēlon). Bashful or disposed to feel shame; describes Charmides' becoming blush and then the disposition he says temperance produces. References: 158c, 160e. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰσχυντηλός. See Modesty and shame, 192.

αἰτιάομαι. Attested: ᾐτιώμην (ēitiōmēn). Blamed or reproached; Socrates says he rightly blamed himself for conducting an inquiry into temperance that has proved fruitless. References: 175a. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰτιάομαι. See Praise and blame, 224.

αἴτιος. Attested: αἴτιον (aition). Responsible for, or the reason for; neglect of the whole is given as the reason many diseases elude Greek doctors. References: 156e. Lexical identification: lemma: αἴτιος. See Whole and part, 304.

ἀκοή. Attested: ἀκοή / ἀκοὴ / ἀκοήν (akoē / akoē / akoēn). Hearing, considered as a capacity ordinarily directed toward sound. References: 168d, 168e, 167d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀκοή. See Hearing and sound, 139.

ἀκολουθέω. Attested: ἀκολουθήσοντος (akolouthēsontos). Intending to follow; Charmides commits himself to attendance on Socrates. References: 176b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀκολουθέω. See Charmides, 58.

ἀκόλουθος. Attested: ἀκόλουθον (akolouthon). An attendant who is told to summon Charmides; distinct from the philosophic following at the close. References: 155b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀκόλουθος. See Guardian and cousin, 131.

ἀκούω. Attested: ἀκούει / ἤκουσα (akouei / ēkousa). Hear; may concern received testimony as well as the sensory capacity examined in the reflexivity analogy. References:

167d, 161b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀκούω. See Hearing and sound, 139.

ἀκριβόω. Attested: ἀκριβοῖς (akribois). Know or ascertain accurately; Socrates asks whether Charmides is certain of his name. References: 156a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀκριβόω. See Precision, 226.

ἀλαζών. Attested: ἀλαζόνας (alazonas). Pretenders or impostors; those falsely professing prophetic expertise in the imagined supervised society. References: 173c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀλαζών. See Pretence and imposture, 230.

ἀλγέω. Attested: ἀλγῶν (algōn). Suffer pain; the example concerns someone whose eyes hurt and whose treatment must also address the head. References: 156b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀλγέω. See Head and headache, 135.

ἀλήθεια. Attested: ἀλήθειαν (alētheian). Truth, the object which the inquiry finally fails to find despite the partners' generous concessions. References: 175d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀλήθεια. See Truth and falsehood, 290.

ἀληθής. Attested: ἀληθῆ / ἀληθὲς (alēthē / alēthes). True or truthful; applies to reports and claims, without making the speaker's confidence proof of them. References: 153c, 164a, 171b, 161c, 162c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀληθής. See Truth and falsehood, 290.

ἅλλομαι. Attested: ἅλλεσθαι (hallesthai). Leap or jump; an athletic performance in which agility is contrasted with slowness. References: 159c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἅλλομαι. See Athletics, 33.

ἄλλος. Attested: ἄλλο (allo). Other or different; distinguishes making from doing and a knowledge from

the object it knows. References: 166a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄλλος. See Same and different, 259.

ἀλλότριος. Attested: ἀλλοτρίων / ἀλλότρια (allotriōn / allotria). Belonging to others or alien; contrasted with one's own things and, in Critias' reinterpretation, with what is good and appropriate. References: 162a, 163c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀλλότριος. See One's own and what belongs to others, 203.

ἄλογος. Attested: ἀλογώτερον (alogōteron). More unreasonable or absurd; Socrates' retrospective assessment of the overly generous concession about knowing one's ignorance. References: 175c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄλογος. See Strangeness and absurdity, 276.

ἁμάρτημα. Attested: ἁμάρτημα (hamartēma). An error or mistaken practice; the healer identifies separating temperance from health as the specific error. References: 157b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἁμάρτημα. See Correctness and error, 68.

ἁμαρτία. Attested: ἁμαρτίας (hamartias). Error; its removal is part of the optimistic picture of action governed by temperance. References: 171e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἁμαρτία. See Correctness and error, 68.

ἄμαχος. Attested: ἄμαχον (amachon). Unbeatable or irresistible; praise of the boy's beauty becomes conditional on his soul's quality. References: 154d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄμαχος. See Fine and beautiful, 112.

ἀμελέω. Attested: ἀμελοῖεν (ameloien). Neglect or disregard; the Thracian criticizes doctors for failing to attend to the whole. References: 156e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀμελέω. See Care and neglect, 51.

ἀμήχανος. Attested: ἀμήχανόν (amēchanon). Extraordinary or impossible to deal with; intensifies the description of Charmides' look. References: 155d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀμήχανος. See Socrates, 267.

ἀμπεχόνη. Attested: ἀμπεχόνην (ampechonēn). Clothing or covering for the body; part of the dream's material provisions. References: 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀμπεχόνη. See Craft and expertise, 70.

ἀμφισβητέω. Attested: ἀμφισβητῶ (amphisbētō). Dispute or contest; Socrates distinguishes the point he is not contesting from the further inference he challenges. References: 169e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀμφισβητέω. See Argument and account, 30.

ἄν. Attested: ἂν (an). Particle marking a potential or conditional consequence; crucial to separating a supposed case from an unconditional assertion. References: 167b, 171d. Lexical identification: particle: ἄν. See Hypothesis, 147.

ἀναγιγνώσκω. Attested: ἀναγιγνώσκειν (anagignōskein). Read; schoolroom and craft examples test whether temperance can mean simply doing what belongs to oneself. References: 159c, 161e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀναγιγνώσκω. See Reading and writing, 245.

ἀναγκάζω. Attested: ἀναγκασθήσεται / ἀναγκάζῃ (anankasthēsetai / anankazēi). Compel or force; the ailment may compel improvement of Charmides' mind, while Socrates avoids forcing him to praise or condemn himself. References: 157c, 158e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀναγκάζω. See Force and compulsion, 117.

ἀναγκαῖος. Attested: ἀναγκαῖον (anankaion). Necessary or unavoidable; describes what treatment or an inference requires, rather than a distinct named virtue. References:

156b, 164c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀναγκαῖος. See Necessity and consequence, 195.

ἀνάγκη. Attested: ἀνάγκη (anankē). Necessity; ranges from compulsion by an oath to a consequence said to follow from a supposition. References: 157c, 168b, 168c, 168d, 169e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνάγκη. See Necessity and consequence, 195.

ἀναζωπυρέω. Attested: ἀνεζωπυρούμην (anezōpyroumēn). I was being rekindled; Socrates regains conversational boldness after the boy accepts the medical analogy. References: 156d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀναζωπυρέω. See Fire and renewed confidence, 114.

Ἀνακρέων. Attested: Ἀνακρέοντος (anakreontos). Anacreon, the lyric poet invoked as a witness to praise of Charmides' paternal family. References: 157e. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἀνακρέων. See Anacreon, 28.

ἀνάκρισις. Attested: ἀνάκρισίν (anakrisin). Preliminary examination or hearing; Socrates invokes a legal-sounding opportunity to question before yielding to force. References: 176c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνάκρισις. See Preliminary hearing, 227.

ἀναμάρτητος. Attested: ἀναμάρτητοι (anamartētoi). Free from error; a promised result of the life governed by knowledge of knowledge. References: 171d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀναμάρτητος. See Correctness and error, 68.

ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι. Attested: ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι / ἀνεμνήσθην (anamimnēiskesthai / anemnēsthēn). Recall or bring back to mind; used of memory performance and of a previously heard definition. References: 159e, 161b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι. See Memory and recollection, 189.

ἀνατίθημι. Attested: ἀναθείμην / ἀναθέντες (anatheimēn / anathentes). Take back or retract in the middle, but set up or dedicate in the active; Critias' retraction precedes the Delphic dedications. References: 164d, 165a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνατίθημι. See Retraction, 254.

ἀνδρείως. Attested: ἀνδρείως (andreiōs). Manfully or courageously; Socrates encourages an unhesitating answer rather than defining courage itself. References: 160e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνδρείως. See Manliness and courage, 184.

ἀνδρικῶς. Attested: ἀνδρικῶς (andrikōs). In a manly manner; describes Charmides' deliberate reflection before he proposes shame as temperance. References: 160e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνδρικῶς. See Manliness and courage, 184.

ἀνεπιστημοσύνη. Attested: ἀνεπιστημοσύνης / ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ (anepistēmosynēs / anepistēmosynēi). Lack of knowledge or expertise; proposed together with knowledge as temperance's object. References: 166e, 167c, 169b, 171c, 174e, 170a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνεπιστημοσύνη. The datives at 170a–b are Burnet's adopted conjectural construction; see the source and textual note. See Lack of knowledge, 171.

ἀνερυθριάω. Attested: ἀνερυθριάσας (anerythriasas). Blush or redden; Charmides' visible bashfulness becomes evidence in Socrates' playful appraisal of him. References: 158c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνερυθριάω. See Modesty and shame, 192.

ἀνερωτάω. Attested: ἀνηρώτων (anērōtōn). Ask or inquire; the opening transition from campaign news to questions about philosophy and the young. References: 153d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνερωτάω. See Question and answer, 238.

ἀνευρίσκω. Attested: ἀνευρίσκων (aneuriskōn). Find out or discover; the comparison asks whether mental searching is better performed sharply or quietly. References: 160a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνευρίσκω. See Discovery, 83.

ἀνεψιός. Attested: ἀνεψιόν / ἀνεψιοῦ (anepsion / anepsiou). Cousin; the stated family relationship of Charmides and Critias, distinct from guardianship. References: 154b, 155a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνεψιός. See Guardian and cousin, 131.

ἄνοια. Attested: ἄνοιαν (anoian). Folly or lack of sense; characterizes trying to treat the head independently of the body. References: 156c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄνοια. See Attention and sense, 35.

ἀνωφελής. Attested: ἀνωφελὲς (anōpheles). Unbeneficial or useless; the inquiry's shocking apparent verdict on the temperance provisionally constructed. References: 175b, 175d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνωφελής. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

ἄξιος. Attested: ἄξιον / ἄξιος (axion / axios). Worthy or deserving, with the relevant standard supplied by context: praise, attention or benefit. References: 165e, 160a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄξιος. See Worth and honour, 312.

ἀπαθανατίζω. Attested: ἀπαθανατίζειν (apathanatizein). Make immortal; a reported reputation of Zalmoxis' doctors, not a demonstrated therapeutic achievement. References: 156d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπαθανατίζω. See Immortalizing, 149.

ἀπεργάζομαι. Attested: ἀπεργάζεται / ἀπεργάζοιτο (apergazetai / apergazoito). Accomplish or produce; used of an action's result, a craft's work, and the good that temperance is supposed to bring about. References: 160e,

165c, 173a, 160d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπεργάζομαι. See Product and object of knowledge, 233.

ἀπιστέω. Attested: ἀπιστεῖται (apisteitai). Is doubted or distrusted; some cases seem impossible, whereas others provoke doubts, a weaker verdict. References: 168e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπιστέω. See Possibility and impossibility, 219.

ἀπιστία. Attested: ἀπιστίαν (apistian). Disbelief or doubt; a response to the suggested reflexive powers, distinguished from demonstrated impossibility. References: 169a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπιστία. See Possibility and impossibility, 219.

ἀπογράφω. Attested: Ἀπογράψομαι (apograpsomai). I shall copy it down; Charmides initially treats the charm as transferable written words. References: 156a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπογράφω. See Charm, 54.

ἀποδείκνυμι. Attested: ἀποδεῖξαί (apodeixai). Show or establish; the verb occurs in words secluded by Burnet at 169b and must not be quoted as unqualified accepted text. References: 169b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποδείκνυμι. Burnet secludes ἀποδεῖξαί σε at 169b. See Evidence and proof, 104.

ἀποδέχομαι. Attested: ἀποδέχῃ / ἀποδέχομαι (apodechēi / apodechomai). Accept or approve an account; acceptance of a local premise is distinguished from endorsing the entire identification of temperance. References: 156c, 165d, 169b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποδέχομαι. See Acceptance and taking over, 22.

ἀποδίδωμι. Attested: ἀπέδομεν (apedomen). Assign or attribute: cognition of knowledge is assigned to temperance at 170e, whereas benefit is assigned to another expertise at 175a. References: 170e, 175a. Lexical

identification: lemma: ἀποδίδωμι. See Knowledge of knowledge, 165.

ἀποδύω. Attested: ἀποδῦναι / ἀπεδύσαμεν (apodynai / apedysamen). Strip or undress; transferred from the proposed display of Charmides' body to conversational inspection of his soul. References: 154d, 154e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποδύω. See Stripping the soul, 277.

ἀποθνῄσκω. Attested: ἀποθνῄσκειν (apothnēiskein). To die; navigation and generalship still avert death in the subtraction test, although Socrates says these results' occurring well and beneficially would be lost without knowledge of good and bad (174c–d). References: 174c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποθνῄσκω. See Craft and expertise, 70.

ἀποκρίνομαι. Attested: ἀποκρινόμενος / ἀποκρίνωμαι (apokrinomenos / apokrinōmai). Answer or respond; distinguishes the respondent's task from the questioner's claim to knowledge. References: 153b, 158d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποκρίνομαι. See Question and answer, 238.

ἀπόκρισις. Attested: ἀπόκρισιν / ἀποκρίσεως (apokrisin / apokriseōs). An answer or reply; Critias is drawn into defending the answer that Charmides has borrowed from him. References: 162c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπόκρισις. See Question and answer, 238.

ἀποκρύπτω. Attested: ἀποκρυπτόμενος (apokryptomenos). Concealing; the teasing accusation that Critias had kept the decisive qualification hidden. References: 174b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποκρύπτω. See Rascal, 244.

ἀπολαύω. Attested: ἀπολαυσόμεθα (apolausometha). We shall enjoy or derive advantage from; asks what benefit

this account of temperance leaves us. References: 172c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπολαύω. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

ἀπολείπω. Attested: ἀπολειψομένου (apoleipsomenou). Intending to leave off or fall away; negated in the promise not to abandon the daily practice. References: 176b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπολείπω. See Charmides, 58.

ἀποπληρόω. Attested: ἀποπληρώσαις (apoplērōsais). Satisfy fully or convince; the requested demonstration must establish both possibility and usefulness. References: 169c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποπληρόω. See Evidence and proof, 104.

ἀπορέω. Attested: ἠπόρουν / ἀποροῦντος (ēporoun / aporountos). Be at a loss or without a way forward; applies both to Socrates' erotic embarrassment and to philosophical perplexity. References: 155c, 156b, 169c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπορέω. See Perplexity, 211.

ἀπορία. Attested: ἀπορίας / ἀπορίαν (aporias / aporian). Perplexity or lack of a way forward; spreads between the interlocutors and motivates a renewed attempt. References: 169c, 169d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπορία. See Perplexity, 211.

ἀποστερέω. Attested: ἀποστερήσωμεν (aposterēsōmen). Deprive or withhold; Socrates proposes not withdrawing the previously granted strong account. References: 172d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποστερέω. See Agreement and concession, 26.

ἀπροσδόκητος. Attested: ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου (ex aprosdokētou). Unexpectedly; marks the surprise of Socrates' return. References: 153b. Lexical identification:

lemma: ἀπροσδόκητος. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

ἀπρόσωπος. Attested: ἀπρόσωπος (aprosōpos). Literally ‘without a face’; hyperbolically says that Charmides’ face would become insignificant beside his undressed body. References: 154d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπρόσωπος. See Face and bodily appearance, 108.

ἅπτω. Attested: ἅπτεσθαι (haptesthai). To touch or have dealings with; here to concern oneself with what belongs to others. References: 162a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἅπτω. See One’s own and what belongs to others, 203.

ἀπών. Attested: ἀπούσης (apousēs). Absent; describes what would happen to the benefits claimed for other knowledges if knowledge of good and bad were missing. References: 174d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄπειμι (be absent); participial lookup ἀπών. See Presence and possession, 229.

ἀρετή. Attested: ἀρετῇ (aretēi). Excellence or virtue; part of the praise of Charmides’ ancestral house, not a formal taxonomy of virtues. References: 158a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀρετή. See Virtue and excellence, 297.

ἁρμονικός. Attested: ἁρμονικὸν (harmonikon). The harmonious, or the domain of harmony; identifies the object of musical expertise. References: 170c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἁρμονικός. See Lyre and music, 179.

ἄρτιος. Attested: ἀρτίου (artiou). Even, in the arithmetical sense; paired with odd as a domain of calculation. References: 166a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄρτιος. See Calculation and geometry, 49.

ἄρχω. Attested: ἄρχοι / ἤρχομεν / ἄρχουσα (archoi / ērchomen / archousa). Rule or direct; the hypothetical

supervisory power assigned to temperance must still be tested for benefit. References: 171e, 173a, 174e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄρχω. See Ruling and supervision, 257.

ἀσθένεια. Attested: ἀσθενείας / ἀσθένεια (astheneias / astheneia). Weakness or ailment; the bodily complaint that provides the pretext for Socrates' medical conversation. References: 155b, 157c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀσθένεια. See Health and disease, 137.

ἀσθενής. Attested: ἀσθενέστερον (asthenesteron). More weakly or less effectively; qualifies the examination of others by people lacking the proposed knowledge of knowledge. References: 172b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀσθενής. See Inferiority and poor performance, 150.

ἀσκέπτως. Attested: ἀσκέπτως (askeptōs). Without examination; Socrates refuses to proceed to medical treatment before investigating whether Charmides possesses temperance. References: 158e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀσκέπτως. See Inquiry, 151.

ἀσπάζομαι. Attested: ἠσπάζοντο (ēspazonto). They greeted or welcomed him; social recognition before philosophical questioning. References: 153b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀσπάζομαι. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

ἄτη. Attested: ἄτη (atē). Ruin or disastrous consequence; the warning that accompanies the Delphic maxim about giving a pledge. References: 165a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄτη. See Moderation and excess, 191.

ἀτιμάζω. Attested: ἀτιμάσῃς (atimasēis). Dishonour or set little value on; Critias objects to Socrates' apparently

dismissive treatment of knowledgeable living. References: 173d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀτιμάζω. See Worth and honour, 312.

ἄτοπος. Attested: ἄτοπον / ἄτοπα (atopon / atopa). Strange, odd or out of place; marks a difficulty requiring examination rather than itself proving impossibility. References: 158d, 167c, 168a, 172e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄτοπος. See Strangeness and absurdity, 276.

ἀφίημι. Attested: ἀφίημι (aphiēmi). I let go or relinquish; Critias abandons the preceding discussion before defending self-knowledge. References: 165b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀφίημι. See Retraction, 254.

ἀφορίζω. Attested: ἀφορίζεσθαι (aphorizesthai). Delimit or distinguish; narrows the question to which kind of knowledge makes its possessor happy. References: 173e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀφορίζω. See Definition, 76.

ἄχρως. Attested: ἄχρων (achrōn). Colourless; qualifies the imagined sight that would see itself without possessing its normal visible feature. References: 168d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄχρως. See Sight and colour, 265.

βαδίζω. Attested: βαδίζειν (badizein). To walk, specifically walking in the streets; Charmides includes orderly, quiet everyday movement in his first description of temperance. References: 159b. Lexical identification: lemma: βαδίζω. See Order and orderly conduct, 206.

βαδισμός. Attested: βαδισμῷ (badismōi). Walking as an activity; Socrates says quietness has no special claim to temperance in walking, speech or any other practice. References: 160c. Lexical identification: lemma: βαδισμός. See Order and orderly conduct, 206.

βαρύνω. Attested: βαρύνεσθαί (barynesthai). To feel heavy or weighed down; Charmides reports heaviness in his

head on rising in the morning, prompting the proposed treatment. References: 155b. Lexical identification: lemma: βαρύνω. See Head and headache, 135.

βαρύς. Attested: βαρυτέρου / βαρύ / βαρύτερον (baryterou / bary / baryteron). Heavy or heavier in weight; names the object of weighing and then a comparative relation whose application to itself would also require being lighter. References: 166b, 168c. Lexical identification: lemma: βαρύς. See Weighing, 299.

βασιλεύς. Attested: βασιλεύς / βασιλέα (basileus / basilea). King; Zalmoxis is the Thracian doctor's king and god, whereas "Great King" in Pyrilampes' embassy refers to the Persian ruler. References: 156d, 158a. Lexical identification: lemma: βασιλεύς. See Great King and Asia, 128.

Βασίλη. Attested: Βασίλης (basilēs). Basile, the goddess whose shrine locates Taureas' wrestling-school; the genitive names the shrine's divine patron, not a king. References: 153a. Lexical identification: lemma: Βασίλη. See Basile, 37.

βελτίων. Attested: βελτίων (beltiōn). Better; Critias jokes that treatment of Charmides' head will compel him to become better in mind as well. References: 157d. Lexical identification: lemma: βελτίων. See Inferiority and poor performance, 150.

βιάζομαι. Attested: βιάσῃ / βιασομένου / βιαζομένῳ (biasēi / biasomenou / biazomenōi). To use force or compel; the closing exchange playfully threatens Socrates with compulsory companionship and contrasts coercion with his opportunity to answer. References: 176c, 176d. Lexical identification: lemma: βιάζομαι. See Force and compulsion, 117.

βίος. Attested: βίος / βίῳ / βίον (bios / biōi / bion). Life or a course of living: a supposedly temperate quiet life, the imagined error-free life under knowledgeable rule, and the life in which temperance should benefit Charmides. References: 160b, 160c, 171d, 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: βίος. See Knowledgeable living, 169.

βλαβερός. Attested: βλαβερὰ (blabera). Harmful things; Critias treats all such things as alien to a person rather than properly his own, in redefining “one’s own” ethically. References: 163c. Lexical identification: lemma: βλαβερός. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

βλαβερῶς. Attested: βλαβερῶς (blaberōs). Harmfully; describes the possible result of a doctor’s action, which the doctor may fail to recognize, in the test of whether good action entails self-knowledge. References: 164b. Lexical identification: lemma: βλαβερῶς. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

βουλεύομαι. Attested: βουλεύεσθαι / βουλευόμενός / βουλεύεσθον / βεβουλεύμεθα / βουλεύου (bouleuesthai / bouleuomenos / bouleuesthon / bebouleumetha / bouleuou). To deliberate or take counsel; quick deliberation is praised in the quietness argument, while the closing present and perfect forms contrast planning with a decision already reached. References: 160a, 176c. Lexical identification: lemma: βουλεύομαι. See Deliberation and decision, 78.

βουλή. Attested: βουλή (boulē). Counsel or deliberation; Socrates says none remains when Charmides has decided to act and use force. References: 176d. Lexical identification: lemma: βουλή. See Deliberation and decision, 78.

βούλησις. Attested: βούλησις / βουλήσεις (boulēsis / boulēseis). A wish or act of wishing; the example asks

whether a wish could be directed only at itself and other wishes, with no good as its object. References: 167e. Lexical identification: lemma: βούλησις. See Wish, 308.

βούλομαι. Attested: βούλει / βούλεται (boulei / bouletai). To want or wish; Socrates will not force Charmides to say what he does not want to say, and the later analogy asks what a wish wants as its object. References: 158e, 167e. Lexical identification: lemma: βούλομαι. See Willingness and refusal, 306.

βραδέως. Attested: βραδέως (bradeōs). Slowly; Socrates pairs this adverb with quietness in comparing learning, teaching and remembering with quick, vigorous performance. References: 159e. Lexical identification: lemma: βραδέως. See Quickness and slowness, 240.

βραδύς. Attested: βραδέα (bradea). Slow performances; the neuter plural describes bodily actions done laboriously and quietly. Burnet brackets βραδέα as deleted at 159d: its local meaning is recorded here without treating it as an accepted reading. References: 159d. Lexical identification: lemma: βραδύς. βραδέα at 159d is bracketed for deletion in the supplied Burnet text. See Quickness and slowness, 240.

βραδυτής. Attested: βραδυτῆτός (bradytētos). Slowness; the quality whose bodily and mental performances have appeared less fine than those of speed and sharpness. References: 160b. Lexical identification: lemma: βραδυτής. See Quickness and slowness, 240.

γέλως. Attested: γέλωτα (gelōta). Laughter; Charmides' arrival produces it as the seated admirers crowd and shove one another to make room beside themselves. References: 155b. Lexical identification: lemma: γέλως. See Charmides, 58.

γενναῖος. Attested: γενναῖον (gennaion). Wellborn or of noble family; one of the advantages that must not persuade Socrates to treat a head before treating its owner's soul. References: 157b. Lexical identification: lemma: γενναῖος. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

γεννάω. Attested: γεννήσειαν (gennēseian). To beget or produce offspring; the rhetorical praise asks what union of two Athenian houses could be expected to produce finer children than Charmides' parents. References: 157e. Lexical identification: lemma: γεννάω. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

γένος. Attested: γένος (genos). Race or kind, here the human race; names the collective beneficiaries imagined as living under temperance's supervision. References: 173c. Lexical identification: lemma: γένος. See The dream hypothesis, 285.

γεωμετρική. Attested: γεωμετρικῆς (geōmetrikēs). The geometrical art; paired with calculation as expertise for which Critias challenges Socrates to point to a product comparable with a house or cloak. References: 165e. Lexical identification: lemma: γεωμετρική. See Calculation and geometry, 49.

γιγνώσκω. Attested: γνῶναι / γιγνώσκειν / γιγνώσκει / γιγνώσκων / γιγνῶσκόν / γνώσεται / γιγνώσκῃ / γιγνώσκοι (gnōnai / gignōskein / gignōskei / gignōskōn / gignōskon / gnōsetai / gignōskēi / gignōskoi). To know or recognize; ranges from understanding what a phrase means to recognizing one's action, oneself, or another's knowledge. The later argument distinguishes recognizing that knowledge exists from knowing its particular subject matter. References: 162b, 164b, 169e, 170b, 170d, 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: γιγνώσκω. See Knowledge, 162.

γιγνώσκω ἑαυτόν. Attested: γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν / γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν / γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν / ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν / γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν (gignōskei heauton / gignōskein heauton / gignōskein auton heauton / heauton auton gignōskein / gignōskein hauton). Knowing oneself; the doctor's recognition of how he has acted prepares Critias' definition of temperance. Later its identification with knowledge of knowledge and with knowing what one knows becomes the disputed inference. References: 164c, 164d, 165b, 167a, 169d. Lexical identification: phrase template: γιγνώσκω + personal reflexive; lemma: γιγνώσκω. See Knowing oneself, 156.

Γλαύκων. Attested: Γλαύκωνος (glaukōnos). Glaucon, Charmides' father and Critias' uncle, named to identify the young man's family. References: 154b. Lexical identification: lemma: Γλαύκων. See Glaucon, 120.

γνῶθι σαυτόν. Attested: Γνῶθι σαυτόν (gnōthi sauton). "Know thyself"; the Delphic imperative which Critias interprets as the god's greeting and as equivalent to "Be temperate," rather than merely practical advice. References: 164e, 165a. Lexical identification: phrase template: γνῶθι σαυτόν. See Knowing oneself, 156.

γνώριμος. Attested: γνωρίμους / γνωρίμων (gnōrimous / gnōrimōn). Personally known or familiar; describes Socrates' acquaintances at the palaestra and those reported killed in the battle. References: 153a, 153c. Lexical identification: lemma: γνώριμος. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

γνῶσις. Attested: γνῶσιν (gnōsin). Knowledge or knowing; Critias argues that possessing knowledge makes its possessor knowing, and extends this pattern to self-knowing knowledge and the person who possesses it.

References: 169e. Lexical identification: lemma: γνῶσις. See Knowledge, 162.

γράμμα. Attested: γράμματα / γράμμα / γράμματά (grammata / gramma / grammata). Written letters in the schoolroom example; a written inscription or its words in Critias' discussion of the Delphic maxims. References: 159c, 164d, 165a. Lexical identification: lemma: γράμμα. See Reading and writing, 245.

γραμματιστής. Attested: γραμματιστοῦ / γραμματιστὴν / γραμματιστὴς (grammatistou / grammatistēn / grammatistēs). The elementary teacher of letters; his lessons illustrate quick performance and understanding, while writing other people's names tests the literal interpretation of doing only one's own things. References: 159c, 160a, 161d. Lexical identification: lemma: γραμματιστής. See Schooling and the letter-master, 260.

δέδοικα. Attested: ἐδεδοίκη (ededoikē). Had been afraid; Socrates retrospectively vindicates his earlier fear that the inquiry into temperance was leading to no useful result. References: 175a. Lexical identification: lemma: δέδοικα. See Fear as a relative, 109.

δείκνυμι. Attested: δεῖξαι (deixai). To point out or show; Critias asks for visible products of mathematical expertise, and Socrates instead offers to specify each expertise's object. References: 166a. Lexical identification: lemma: δείκνυμι. See Evidence and proof, 104.

δεινός. Attested: δεινῶν / δεινὰ (deinōn / deina). Dreadful or fearful things, the ordinary objects of fear; in the closing expression δεινὰ … ποιοίην, terrible or outrageous conduct would be disobeying one's guardian. References: 168a, 176b. Lexical identification: lemma: δεινός. See Fear as a relative, 109.

Δελφοί. Attested: Δελφοῖς (delphois). Delphi, the sanctuary where the inscription “Know thyself” was dedicated; Critias appeals to its divine authority. References: 164d. Lexical identification: lemma: Δελφοί. See Delphi and Apollo, 79.

δέον. Attested: δέοντα (deonta). What ought to be done or what is required; the beneficial doctor is said to do these things, connecting useful treatment with Critias’ account of temperate action. References: 164b. Lexical identification: lemma: δέω (impersonal δεῖ); τὰ δέοντα is the substantivized participle. See What ought to be done, 301.

δή. Attested: δὴ (dē). An emphatic or connective particle, here marking steps presented as following or already established in the distinction between possessing knowledge and identifying its specific field. References: 171a. Lexical identification: lemma: δή. See Argument and account, 30.

δηλόω. Attested: δήλου (dēlou). Make clear; Socrates permits Critias’ preferred terminology provided he clearly identifies what each word is being applied to. References: 163d. Lexical identification: lemma: δηλόω. See Clear and obscure, 61.

δημιουργός. Attested: δημιουργοὺς / δημιουργῶν / δημιουργοί / δημιουργοῖς / δημιουργός (dēmiourgous / dēmiourgōn / dēmiourgoi / dēmiourgois / dēmiourgos). A craftsman or practitioner of an expertise; examples include professionals making things for others, genuine experts in the imagined well-run society, and the ironic denial that temperance is a producer of benefit. References: 162e, 164a, 164b, 171c, 173c, 174e, 175a. Lexical identification: lemma: δημιουργός. See Craft and expertise, 70.

διαγιγνώσκω. Attested: διαγνώσεσθαι (diagnōsesthai). To recognize or distinguish correctly; identifying the genuine doctor as opposed to a pretender requires testing the appropriate subject matter. References: 170e. Lexical identification: lemma: διαγιγνώσκω. See Recognition and discrimination, 247.

διαιρέω. Attested: διαιροῦντος / διαιρήσεται / διελέσθαι / διαιρεῖν (diairountos / diairēsetai / dielesthai / diairein). To distinguish or separate: Prodicus distinguishes words, an adequate thinker must distinguish kinds of self-related powers, and knowledge of knowledge can at most distinguish knowledge from what is not knowledge. References: 163d, 169a, 169c, 170a. Lexical identification: lemma: διαιρέω. See Recognition and discrimination, 247.

δίαιτα. Attested: διαίταις (diaitais). Regimens or prescribed ways of living; doctors direct these toward the whole body in trying to heal an affected part. References: 156c. Lexical identification: lemma: δίαιτα. See Treatment and regimen, 288.

διακρίνω. Attested: διακρίνειν / διακρῖναι (diakrinein / diakrinai). To discriminate between; the issue is whether temperance alone can tell a genuine expert from a person who lacks expertise but pretends to have it. References: 170e, 171c. Lexical identification: lemma: διακρίνω. See Recognition and discrimination, 247.

διαλέγομαι. Attested: διαλέγεσθαι / διαλεξόμενος / διαλέξεται (dialegesthai / dialexomenos / dialexetai). To converse or discuss; used of meeting Charmides, of the orderly speech in his proposed virtue, and of the subject on which one must question a doctor to assess his expertise. References: 154e, 155a, 155c, 159b, 170e. Lexical identification: lemma: διαλέγομαι. See Conversation, 66.

διαμαρτύρομαι. Attested: διεμαρτυρόμεθα (diemartyrometha). We solemnly declared or expressly stipulated; Socrates recalls their agreement that temperance knows only knowledge and lack of knowledge, not the crafts' separate objects. References: 174e. Lexical identification: lemma: διαμαρτύρομαι. See Agreement and concession, 26.

διανοέομαι. Attested: διανοούμενος (dianooumenos). Having in mind or intending; Critias reconstructs what the dedicator of the Delphic inscription intended the god's greeting to mean. References: 164e. Lexical identification: lemma: διανοέομαι. See Advice and greeting, 24.

διάνοια. Attested: διάνοιαν (dianoian). Mind or mental disposition; Critias welcomes the headache because it may force Charmides to improve this as well as his physical condition. References: 157c. Lexical identification: lemma: διάνοια. See Soul, 272.

διασκέπτομαι. Attested: διασκεψάμενος (diaskepsamenos). Having considered or thought it over; Charmides pauses and reflects to himself before proposing that temperance is modesty. References: 160e. Lexical identification: lemma: διασκέπτομαι. See Inquiry, 151.

διατίθημι. Attested: διατιθέντι (diatithenti). Handling or treating, here badly; Critias' anger is compared with a poet's anger at an actor who mishandles his verses. References: 162d. Lexical identification: lemma: διατίθημι. See Poet and actor, 217.

διατριβή. Attested: διατριβάς (diatribas). Accustomed haunts or places where Socrates spends his time; he returns to these familiar activities and meeting places after the campaign. References: 153a. Lexical identification: lemma: διατριβή. See Socrates, 267.

διαφέρω. Attested: διαφέροντες / διαφέρειν / διαφέρει (diapherontes / diapherein / diapherei). To excel or stand out, in wisdom, beauty or character; to make a difference in identifying a statement's speaker; and to differ, when Critias distinguishes temperance from other forms of knowledge. References: 153d, 157d, 161c, 166b. Lexical identification: lemma: διαφέρω. See Same and different, 259.

διδάσκω. Attested: διδάσκων / διδάσκειν (didaskōn / didaskein). To teach; the Thracian teaches Socrates the remedy and charms, while school lessons supply examples of teaching quickly and of writing names belonging to others. References: 157b, 159e, 161d. Lexical identification: lemma: διδάσκω. See Learning and teaching, 175.

δίδωμι. Attested: δίδωμι / δῶμεν / δόντες / δώσεις (didōmi / dōmen / dontes / dōseis). To give or grant: Socrates allows Critias freedom in assigning words, grants disputed epistemic claims for the argument, and asks whether Charmides will grant him a preliminary hearing. References: 163d, 172d, 176c. Lexical identification: lemma: δίδωμι. See Agreement and concession, 26; Preliminary hearing, 227.

διερευνάω. Attested: διερευνῴμην (diereunōimēn). To scrutinize or investigate thoroughly; Socrates says he would investigate his own statements to avoid unnoticed false claims to knowledge. References: 166d. Lexical identification: lemma: διερευνάω. See Examination, 106.

διηγέομαι. Attested: διήγησαι / διηγούμην (diēgēsai / diēgoumēn). To recount or narrate; Chaerephon asks for the campaign story and Socrates tells the gathering the news from the camp. References: 153c. Lexical

identification: lemma: διηγέομαι. See Argument and account, 30.

διισχυρίζομαι. Attested: διισχυριζώμεθα / διισχυρίσασθαι (diischyrizōmetha / diischyrisasthai). To assert firmly or insist; Socrates declines to pronounce knowledge of knowledge impossible before examination, and later declines to guarantee that it can exist. References: 168a, 169b. Lexical identification: lemma: διισχυρίζομαι. See Hypothesis, 147.

δίκαιος. Attested: δίκαιον / δικαίου (dikaion / dikaiou). Right or fitting in the praise of Charmides' expected excellence; the just, as a field of knowledge, in the later distinction between statesmanship and knowledge of knowledge. References: 157d, 170b. Lexical identification: lemma: δίκαιος. See Justice and the just, 154.

διοίκησις. Attested: διοικήσεως (dioikēseōs). Management or administration; the proposed benefit of temperance is reconsidered as it guides the management of household and city. References: 172d. Lexical identification: lemma: διοίκησις. See Household and city, 145.

διορίζω. Attested: διορίζομαι (diorizomai). I define or delimit explicitly; Critias restates his position that temperance is the doing of good things. References: 163e. Lexical identification: lemma: διορίζω. See Definition, 76.

διπλάσιος. Attested: διπλάσιόν / διπλασίων / διπλάσιον (diplasion / diplasiōn / diplasion). Double or twice as much; the attempted double-of-itself relation would also require the same thing to be its own half. References: 168c. Lexical identification: lemma: διπλάσιος. See Double and half, 95.

δοκέω. Attested: δοκεῖς / δοκοῦντος (dokeis / dokountos). To seem, be thought or be expected; Critias says Socrates

will soon recognize the youth reputed most beautiful, marking social estimation rather than established knowledge. References: 154a. Lexical identification: lemma: δοκέω. See Belief and opinion, 40.

δόξα. Attested: δόξα / δόξαν / δοξῶν (doxa / doxan / doxōn). An opinion or belief; first Charmides' impression of what temperance is, later the hypothetical opinion whose objects would be opinions rather than their usual subjects. References: 159a, 168a. Lexical identification: lemma: δόξα. See Belief and opinion, 40.

δοξάζω. Attested: δοξάζειν / δοξάζουσιν / δοξάζουσαν (doxazein / doxazousin / doxazousan). To form or hold an opinion; Charmides should be able to articulate his impression of temperance, whereas the later analogy imagines an opinion holding opinions only about opinions. References: 159a, 168a. Lexical identification: lemma: δοξάζω. See Belief and opinion, 40.

δόσις. Attested: δόσεως (doseōs). Giving or administration of the remedy; the charm must precede it if Charmides is still deficient in temperance, without implying a measured pharmaceutical dose. References: 158c. Lexical identification: lemma: δόσις. See Remedy and leaf, 251.

δοτέος. Attested: δοτέον (doteon). To be given, or must be administered; the remedy for Charmides' head could be given immediately if he already possessed sufficient temperance. References: 158b. Lexical identification: lemma: δοτέος (verbal adjective of δίδωμι). See What ought to be done, 301.

δράω. Attested: δρῶντες / δράσουσιν / δρᾷς (drōntes / drasousin / drais). To do or perform an action; applied to writing other people's names, conducting an examination, and submitting to Socrates' daily charm, without Critias' restricted sense of morally good "doing". References: 161e,

172b, 176b. Lexical identification: lemma: δράω. See Doing and action, 88.

Δρωπίδης. Attested: Δρωπίδου (drōpidou). Dropides, father of the ancestral Critias through whom Socrates identifies Charmides' paternal house; not the present speaker's father. References: 157e. Lexical identification: lemma: Δρωπίδης. See Dropides and ancestral Critias, 99.

δύναμις. Attested: δύναμιν / δύναμις (dynamin / dynamis). Power or capacity; first the charm's therapeutic efficacy, then the object-directed ability by which knowledge or a relative is what it is and which might or might not apply to itself. References: 156b, 168b, 168d, 168e, 169a. Lexical identification: lemma: δύναμις. See Power and capacity, 223.

δυνατός. Attested: δυνατόν / δυνατὸν (dynaton / dynaton). Possible or capable; the inquiry separates whether knowledge of knowledge can exist from whether, even if possible, it would benefit its possessor. References: 167b, 169a, 169d, 172c. Lexical identification: lemma: δυνατός. See Possibility and impossibility, 219.

δυσμαθία. Attested: δυσμαθία (dysmathia). Difficulty or slowness in learning; Socrates identifies it with learning quietly and slowly, as the inferior alternative to easy learning. References: 159e. Lexical identification: lemma: δυσμαθία. See Learning and teaching, 175.

ἑαυτοῦ. Attested: ἑαυτοῦ (heautou). Of oneself or one's own; a masculine/neuter reflexive, distinct from feminine ἑαυτῆς when knowledge itself is the antecedent. References: 163a, 168b. Lexical identification: reflexive pronoun: ἑαυτοῦ, genitive masculine/neuter. See Knowing oneself, 156.

ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμη. Attested: ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην (heautou epistēmēn). Knowledge of oneself as a person; must be distinguished from knowledge whose object is knowledge itself. References: 165d. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμη. See Knowledge of knowledge, 165.

ἐγγύη. Attested: Ἐγγύη (engyē). A pledge or surety; the maxim warns that giving security brings ruin near. References: 165a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐγγύη. See Moderation and excess, 191.

ἐγκωμιάζω. Attested: ἐγκεκωμιασμένη (enkekōmiasmenē). Celebrated in encomium or praise; the ancestry is presented through poets' commendation. References: 157e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐγκωμιάζω. See Praise and blame, 224.

ἐθέλω. Attested: ἐθέλω (ethelō). Be willing or wish; Socrates proposes a joint inquiry if Charmides agrees. References: 158e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐθέλω. See Willingness and refusal, 306.

εἰ δυνατόν. Attested: εἰ δυνατόν (ei dynaton). Whether it is possible; introduces the first question about knowing what one knows and does not know, before the independent question of its benefit. References: 167b. Lexical identification: phrase template: εἰ δυνατόν. See Hypothesis, 147.

εἶδος. Attested: εἶδος / εἴδους (eidos / eidous). Visible bodily form or figure; Charmides' body is praised, and Socrates proposes examining his soul before looking at that bodily appearance. References: 154d, 154e. Lexical identification: lemma: εἶδος. See Face and bodily appearance, 108.

εἰκῇ. Attested: εἰκῇ (eikēi). At random or without due consideration; Socrates says an apparent difficulty must be examined rather than casually passed over if one cares for oneself. References: 173a. Lexical identification: lemma: εἰκῇ. See Inquiry, 151.

εἰκός. Attested: εἰκότων / εἰκός (eikotōn / eikos). Likely or reasonable: the expected quality of offspring from Charmides' two houses, and the excellence fittingly expected from such ancestry. References: 157e, 158a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔοικα; εἰκός is its neuter perfect participle. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

εἴπερ. Attested: εἴπερ (eiper). If indeed, or if as assumed; adds emphasis to a conditional premise, such as temperance's goodness, knowledge's relation to ignorance, or the requirements of a capacity acting on itself. References: 161a, 166e, 167a, 168d, 170c, 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: εἴπερ. See Hypothesis, 147.

ἐκπλήσσω. Attested: ἐκπεπληγμένοι (ekpeplēgmenoi). Struck with amazement; the onlookers' stunned response to the boy. References: 154c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐκπλήσσω. See Fine and beautiful, 112.

ἐλάττων. Attested: ἔλαττον / ἐλάττονός (elatton / elattonos). Smaller or less; the correlate of greater in the test of whether a relative can have its power toward itself. References: 168c, 168b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐλάττων. See Greater and smaller, 130.

ἐλέγχω. Attested: ἐλέγχειν / ἐξεληλεγμένος / ἐλεγχόμενος (elenchein / exelēlegmenos / elenchomenos). Examine, expose or refute; applied to speakers and arguments, with public embarrassment distinct from the search for truth. References: 166c, 162d, 166e. Lexical identification: lemmas: ἐλέγχω; related compound ἐξελέγχω. The perfect ἐξεληλεγμένος belongs to the related compound ἐξελέγχω;

it is displayed here as part of the refutation family. See Refutation, 249.

ἐλέφας. Attested: ἐλέφαντος (elephantos). Ivory; one of the two materials in the Homeric allusion to dream-gates, not the elephant as an animal here. References: 173a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐλέφας. See Dreams, horn and ivory, 97.

Ἕλλην. Attested: Ἕλληνες (hellēnes). Greeks, contrasted with the Thracian source of the expanded healing account. References: 156d. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἕλλην. See Thracians, 287.

ἑλληνίζω. Attested: ἑλληνίζειν (hellēnizein). Speak Greek; Socrates says shared command of the language should enable Charmides to state his view. References: 159a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἑλληνίζω. See Conversation, 66.

ἐμβλέπω. Attested: ἐμβλέψας (emblepsas). Looking into or at; directed reflexively to oneself before the second definition, rather than constituting a theory of inward vision. References: 160d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐμβλέπω. See Knowing oneself, 156.

ἐμμένω. Attested: ἐμμένομεν (emmenomen). We stand by or remain with an account; Socrates notes that Critias has qualified his earlier claim. References: 173e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐμμένω. See Argument and account, 30.

ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ. Attested: ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ (en emautou). In possession or control of myself; the negated idiom describes Socrates' loss of composure at Charmides' appearance. References: 155d. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ. See Erotic attraction, 101.

ἐναντιόομαι. Attested: ἐναντιώσομαι (enantiōsomai). I shall oppose or resist; Socrates' final answer is that he will not resist. References: 176d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐναντιόομαι. See Force and compulsion, 117.

ἐναργής. Attested: ἐναργέστερα (enargestera). Clearer or more manifest; the comparative concerns the improved grasp of particular knowledge attributed to the temperate learner. References: 172b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐναργής. See Clear and obscure, 61.

ἐνδεής. Attested: ἐνδεὴς (endeēs). Lacking or deficient; Charmides would be contradicting his guardian if he said he lacked temperance. References: 158c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐνδεής. See Adequacy and deficiency, 23.

ἐνδείκνυμι. Attested: ἐνδειξαίμην / ἔνδειξαι (endeixaimēn / endeixai). Show or make evident; concerns the charm's power and the requested account of temperance. References: 156b, 169b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐνδείκνυμι. See Evidence and proof, 104.

ἐννοέω. Attested: ἐννοήσας / ἐννόει (ennoēsas / ennoei). Consider or take thought; Charmides is invited to reflect, and Critias to notice the structure of a proposed capacity. References: 160d, 167c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐννοέω. See Understanding and quick-wittedness, 293.

ἐντολή. Attested: ἐντολὰς (entolas). Instructions or injunctions of the foreign teacher, requiring the soul to be treated first. References: 157c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐντολή. See Thracians, 287.

ἐξαιρέω. Attested: ἐξελεῖν (exelein). Take out or remove; the thought experiment subtracts knowledge of good and bad from the other expertises. References: 174c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξαιρέω. See Good and bad, 123.

ἐξαπατάω. Attested: ἐξαπατῷ (exapatōi). Deceive or mislead; false experts would be unable to deceive in the imagined life governed by temperance. References: 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξαπατάω. See Pretence and imposture, 230.

ἔξαρνος. Attested: ἐξάρνῳ (exarnōi). In denial, refusing to acknowledge; Charmides is reluctant either to affirm or to deny his temperance. References: 158c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔξαρνος. See Modesty and shame, 192.

ἐξετάζω. Attested: ἐξετάσαι / ἐξετάζοντες (exetasai / exetazontes). Examine or test closely; especially a person's professed expertise and whether it is genuine. References: 167a, 170d, 172b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξετάζω. See Examination, 106.

ἐξευρίσκω. Attested: ἐξευρίσκοντες / ἐξευρεῖν (exeuriskontes / exeurein). Find out or discover; used of identifying competent people and of finding temperance's nature. References: 171e, 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξευρίσκω. See Discovery, 83.

ἐπ᾽ οἰκήματος. Attested: ἐπ᾽ οἰκήματος (ep' oikēmatos). At or in a room; the conventional brothel-setting expression is one of Critias' disparaged occupations. References: 163b. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: ἐπ᾽ οἰκήματος. See Manual trades and social contempt, 185.

ἐπᾴδω. Attested: ἐπᾴδοι / ἐπᾷσαι / ἐπᾴδειν (epaidoi / epaisai / epaidein). Sing or utter a charm over someone; accompanies the material remedy and later becomes the proposed continuing treatment. References: 155e, 157c, 176b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπᾴδω. See Charm, 54.

ἐπαινέω. Attested: ἐπαινῶ (epainō). Praise; Charmides would risk self-praise by agreeing that he is temperate. References: 158d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπαινέω. See Praise and blame, 224.

ἔπαινος. Attested: ἐπαίνου (epainou). Praise; quick mental performances are said to deserve approval when quiet ones do not. References: 160a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔπαινος. See Praise and blame, 224.

ἐπαΐω. Attested: ἐπαΐει (epaiei). Understands or has expertise in; restricts the doctor's competence to health and disease. References: 170e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπαΐω. See Knowledge, 162.

ἐπακολουθέω. Attested: ἐπακολουθῆσαι (epakolouthēsai). Follow intelligently; grasp whether the doctor's claims and actions are correct. References: 171b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπακολουθέω. See Examination, 106.

ἐπαχθής. Attested: ἐπαχθὲς (epachthes). Burdensome or offensive to others; self-praise might sound presumptuous. References: 158d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπαχθής. See Modesty and shame, 192.

ἐπιδεής. Attested: ἐπιδεὴς (epideēs). In need of or deficient in; part of Charmides' dilemma over admitting that he lacks temperance. References: 158c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιδεής. See Adequacy and deficiency, 23.

ἐπιδείκνυμι. Attested: ἐπέδειξάς (epedeixas). Display or present; Socrates asks Critias to call Charmides over and introduce him for conversation. References: 155a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιδείκνυμι. See Evidence and proof, 104.

ἐπιεικῶς. Attested: ἐπιεικῶς (epieikōs). Fairly or reasonably accurately; qualifies Socrates' confirmation of the battle report. References: 153c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιεικῶς. See Truth and falsehood, 290.

ἐπιθυμία. Attested: ἐπιθυμία (epithymia). Desire; in the relational example its normal object is pleasure, contrasted with a supposed desire only for desires. References: 167e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιθυμία. See Desire as a relative, 81.

ἐπικαλύπτω. Attested: ἐπικαλύπτων (epikalyptōn). Covering up; Critias speaks unclearly to conceal his perplexity. References: 169d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπικαλύπτω. See Perplexity, 211.

ἐπιμέλεια. Attested: ἐπιμέλειαν / ἐπιμελείας (epimeleian / epimeleias). Care or attention; directed to the whole in medicine and invoked as a reason to expect a considered answer from Critias. References: 156e, 162e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιμέλεια. See Care and neglect, 51.

ἐπισκέπτομαι. Attested: ἐπισκεψώμεθα / ἐπισκέψεται / ἐπισκεψάμενοι (episkepsōmetha / episkepsetai / episkepsamenoi). Examine or consider; used for testing possibility, benefit and the consistency of concessions. References: 167b, 171b, 175c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπισκέπτομαι. See Inquiry, 151.

ἐπισκοπέω. Attested: ἐπισκοπεῖν (episkopein). Inspect or examine; part of the proposed power to assess oneself and others. References: 167a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπισκοπέω. See Examination, 106.

ἐπίσταμαι. Attested: ἐπίστασθαι / ἐπισταίμην / ἐπίσταται (epistasthai / epistaimēn / epistatai). Know or possess expertise; its subject matter must be supplied rather than inferred from the verb alone. References: 170d, 155e.

Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπίσταμαι. See Knowledge, 162.

ἐπιστατέω. Attested: ἐπιστατοῦσαν / ἐπιστατεῖ (epistatousan / epistatei). Supervise or preside over; the role temperance is imagined to exercise over particular expertises. References: 173c, 174d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιστατέω. See Ruling and supervision, 257.

ἐπιστήμη. Attested: ἐπιστήμη / ἐπιστήμης / ἐπιστήμας (epistēmē / epistēmēs / epistēmas). Knowledge or a determinate expertise; its object and benefit are recurrent questions rather than fixed by the noun. References: 165c, 166a, 166e, 167b, 167c, 168a, 168b, 169a, 170a, 170b, 171a, 171c, 172a, 174e, 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιστήμη. See Knowledge, 162.

ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης. Attested: ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης (epistēmēn epistēmēs). Knowledge of knowledge; the genitive identifies knowledge itself as the object of a proposed knowledge. References: 169d. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης. See Knowledge of knowledge, 165.

ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστημῶν. Attested: ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη (epistēmōn epistēmē). Knowledge of knowledges; the reversed printed word order expresses the proposed oversight of other expertises. References: 166c. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστημῶν. See Knowledge of knowledge, 165.

ἐπιστημόνως. Attested: ἐπιστημόνως (epistēmonōs). Knowledgeably or with expertise; a manner of living that is not yet shown sufficient for happiness. References: 173d, 173e, 174b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιστημόνως. See Knowledge, 162.

ἐπιστήμων. Attested: ἐπιστήμων / ἐπιστημόνων (epistēmōn / epistēmonōn). Knowledgeable or expert; says that a person possesses knowledge without by itself identifying the content. References: 175c, 170e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιστήμων. See Knowledge, 162.

ἐπιτάσσω. Attested: ἐπιτάττει (epitattei). Give an order; Critias' command directs Charmides to submit to Socrates' charming. References: 176c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιτάσσω. See Ruling and supervision, 257.

ἐπιτήδειος. Attested: ἐπιτηδείων (epitēdeiōn). Associates or friends; people with whom Socrates wants to examine truth for a shared good. References: 166d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιτήδειος. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

ἐπιτρέπω. Attested: ἐπετρέπομεν (epetrepomen). Allow or permit; in the imagined community, people under the temperate rulers would be allowed to act only in fields they knew. References: 171e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιτρέπω. See Ruling and supervision, 257.

ἐπίτροπος. Attested: ἐπιτρόπου / ἐπιτρόπῳ (epitropou / epitropōi). Guardian, someone entrusted with responsibility; specifies Critias' authority over Charmides. References: 155a, 176c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπίτροπος. See Guardian and cousin, 131.

ἐπῳδή. Attested: ἐπῳδὴ / ἐπῳδῆς (epōidē / epōidēs). An incantation or spoken charm; later identified with beautiful words that bring temperance to the soul. References: 155e, 156b, 156d, 175e, 176a, 176b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπῳδή. See Charm, 54.

ἐραστής. Attested: ἐρασταὶ (erastai). Lovers or admirers; the youths attending Charmides' conspicuous entrance.

References: 154a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐραστής. See Erotic attraction, 101.

ἐράω. Attested: ἐρᾶν (eran). Love or desire erotically; describes the spectators' response to Charmides. References: 154c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐράω. See Erotic attraction, 101.

ἐργάζομαι. Attested: ἐργάζεσθαι (ergazesthai). Work or perform work; its relation to making and doing becomes disputed in Critias' interpretation of Hesiod. References: 163b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐργάζομαι. See Work and working, 309.

ἐργασία. Attested: ἐργασίας (ergasias). Working or work; Critias gives the word a restricted favorable sense that ordinary craft examples put under pressure. References: 163b, 163c, 173e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐργασία. See Work and working, 309.

ἔργον. Attested: ἔργον / ἔργα / ἔργων (ergon / erga / ergōn). Work, deed, task or result; the meaning varies between physical performance, crafted products and a knowledge's function. References: 163b, 163c, 165d, 165e, 174d, 174e, 175a, 159c, 175b, 161e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔργον. See Work and working, 309.

ἐρευνάω. Attested: ἐρευνῶν (ereunōn). Search or investigate; Critias says Socrates has reached the feature that distinguishes temperance from other knowledges. References: 166b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐρευνάω. See Inquiry, 151.

ἔριον. Attested: ἐρίων (eriōn). Wool; one of the materials of ordinary expert work. References: 173e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔριον. See Craft and expertise, 70.

Ἕρμαιον. Attested: Ἕρμαιον (hermaion). A lucky find or godsend; Charmides' head complaint would unexpectedly

provide the occasion for care of his soul. References: 157c. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἕρμαιον. See Godsend, 121.

ἔρως. Attested: ἔρως (erōs). Erotic love; in the reflexive-capacity example its normal object is beauty. References: 167e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔρως. See Love as a relative, 178.

ἐρωτικός. Attested: ἐρωτικά (erōtika). Matters of erotic love; the field in which Socrates calls Cydias exceptionally wise. References: 155d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐρωτικός. See Erotic attraction, 101.

ἑταῖρος. Attested: ἑταῖρε (hetaire). Companion or familiar addressee; Socrates' conversational address need not imply a formal association. References: 154b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἑταῖρος. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

ἕτερος. Attested: ἕτερον / ἑτέρα (heteron / hetera). Other or different; distinguishes a knowledge from its object or one field of knowledge from another. References: 166b, 171a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἕτερος. See Same and different, 259.

εὖ. Attested: εὖ (eu). Well; at the decisive turn from technical performance to benefit, it qualifies how the crafts' results must come about if they are to contribute to a good life. References: 174c. Lexical identification: adverb: εὖ. See Happiness and doing well, 133.

εὖ γε. Attested: εὖ γε (eu ge). Well, with γε emphasizing that qualification; Socrates isolates the crafts' results coming about well and beneficially, which would be lost without knowledge of good and bad. Here εὖ γε is not the congratulatory formula "well done". References: 174c. Lexical identification: phrase template: εὖ γε. See Happiness and doing well, 133.

εὖ πράττειν. Attested: εὖ πράττειν / εὖ πράττοντας / εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν (eu prattein / eu prattontas / eu an prattoimen). To do well and to fare well or prosper; the phrase links successful action to happiness, but Socrates later denies that knowledgeable performance alone secures this outcome. References: 172a, 173d, 174b. Lexical identification: phrase template: εὖ πράττειν. See Happiness and doing well, 133.

εὐδαιμονέω. Attested: εὐδαιμονοῖμεν / εὐδαιμονεῖν (eudaimonoimen / eudaimonein). To be happy or flourish; Socrates distinguishes this desired outcome from merely acting knowledgeably, assigning it to knowledge of good and bad. References: 173d, 174c. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐδαιμονέω. See Happiness and doing well, 133.

εὐδαιμονία. Attested: εὐδαιμονίᾳ (eudaimoniai). Happiness or good fortune; the conventional ensemble of admired advantages celebrated in Charmides' paternal family, rather than an established philosophical definition of happiness. References: 158a. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐδαιμονία. See Happiness and doing well, 133.

εὐδαίμων. Attested: εὐδαίμονας / εὐδαίμονα / εὐδαίμονες / εὐδαιμονέστερον (eudaimonas / eudaimona / eudaimones / eudaimonesteron). Happy or flourishing; the argument tests whether knowledgeable action guarantees happiness, and the conclusion reaffirms Charmides' happiness conditionally upon genuine temperance. References: 172a, 173e, 174a, 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐδαίμων. See Happiness and doing well, 133.

εὐδοκιμέω. Attested: εὐδοκιμῶν (eudokimōn). Enjoying esteem or being well regarded; Critias' accustomed reputation makes him ashamed to admit before the gathering that he cannot answer Socrates' challenge.

References: 169c. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐδοκιμέω. See Reputation and ambition, 252.

εὐήθης. Attested: εὐήθης (euēthēs). Simple-minded or naive; Socrates says the author of the formula cannot have been so simple as to intend the untenable literal interpretation. References: 162b. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐήθης. See Simple-mindedness, 266.

εὐηθικός. Attested: εὐηθικῶν (euēthikōn). Naive or easy-going; Socrates ironically describes the disputants' readiness to make generous concessions that nevertheless fail to secure a beneficial definition. References: 175c. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐηθικός. See Simple-mindedness, 266.

εὐλαβέομαι. Attested: εὐλαβεῖσθαι (eulabeisthai). To beware or be on one's guard; introduces Cydias' warning against approaching the beautiful beloved as a vulnerable fawn approaches a lion. References: 155d. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐλαβέομαι. See Lion and fawn, 177.

εὐμαθία. Attested: εὐμαθία (eumathia). Ease or facility in learning; judged finer than difficulty in learning and identified by Socrates with learning quickly. References: 159e. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐμαθία. See Learning and teaching, 175.

εὔπορος. Attested: εὐπορώτερος (euporōteros). Better provided with a way through a difficulty; Socrates asks whether Critias can find a solution where he himself is at a loss. References: 167b. Lexical identification: lemma: εὔπορος. See Perplexity, 211.

εὐπρόσωπος. Attested: εὐπρόσωπος (euprosōpos). Fair-faced or handsome of face; Chaerephon praises Charmides' face before saying the beauty of his body

would eclipse it. References: 154d. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐπρόσωπος. See Face and bodily appearance, 108.

εὑρίσκω. Attested: εὑρήσομεν / εὕροιμεν / εὑρεῖν (heurēsomen / heuroimen / heurein). To find or discover; concerns discovering the meaning of a puzzling definition, finding a supposed self-related greater, and the final failure to identify what temperance names. References: 161c, 168b, 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: εὑρίσκω. See Discovery, 83.

ἐχθρός. Attested: ἐχθρῶν (echthrōn). Enemies; the schoolchildren write their enemies' names as well as their own and their friends'. References: 161d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐχθρός. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

ἔχω. Attested: ἔχει / ἔχῃ / ἔχοντι (echei / echēi / echonti). Have or possess; the analogy asks whether having knowledge of knowledge makes its possessor knowledgeable about particular things. References: 169e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔχω. See Presence and possession, 229.

Ζάλμοξις. Attested: Ζαλμόξιδος / Ζάλμοξις (zalmoxidos / zalmoxis). Zalmoxis, called "our king, who is a god" by the Thracian doctor; his doctors teach healing through the soul, and his charms are recalled when Charmides' need for treatment is considered. References: 156d, 158b. Lexical identification: lemma: Ζάλμοξις. See Zalmoxis, 315.

ζητέω. Attested: ζητῶ / ζητοῦμεν / ζητεῖν (zētō / zētoumen / zētein). To inquire or search for an answer; Socrates presents himself as a co-inquirer who does not know, then questions whether their search has achieved anything useful and finally doubts his own ability to inquire by

argument. References: 165b, 172c, 175b, 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: ζητέω. See Inquiry, 151.

ζήτησις. Attested: ζητήσεσιν / ζήτησιν / ζήτησις (zētēsesin / zētēsin / zētēsis). Inquiry or search; includes the soul's investigations, Critias' complaint about Socrates' method, and the personified inquiry that mocks their concessions and fails to find the truth. References: 160a, 165e, 175d. Lexical identification: lemma: ζήτησις. See Inquiry, 151.

ζητητής. Attested: ζητητήν (zētētēn). An inquirer or searcher; Socrates calls himself a poor one, assigning the failure to his investigation rather than concluding that temperance is worthless. References: 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: ζητητής. See Inquiry, 151.

ἡγέομαι. Attested: ἡγουμένης / ἡγουμένη (hēgoumenēs / hēgoumenē). Lead or guide; rightness or knowledge guides the action of the imagined well-managed community. References: 172a, 172d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡγέομαι. See Ruling and supervision, 257.

ἡδονή. Attested: ἡδονῆς (hēdonēs). Pleasure; the ordinary object of desire in the reflexivity example. References: 167e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡδονή. See Desire as a relative, 81.

ἠλίθιος. Attested: ἠλιθίου (ēlithiou). Foolish or stupid; Socrates questions whether the source of Charmides' definition could really have meant its absurd literal interpretation. References: 162b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἠλίθιος. See Simple-mindedness, 266.

ἡλικία. Attested: ἡλικίᾳ / ἡλικίας (hēlikiai / hēlikias). Age or age-group; marks youthful maturity and comparison with contemporaries without specifying a numerical age. References: 154a, 157d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡλικία. See Youth and age, 313.

ἡλικιώτης. Attested: ἡλικιώταις (hēlikiōtais). Contemporaries or people of the same age-group; Charmides says Socrates is widely talked about among them. References: 156a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡλικιώτης. See Youth and age, 313.

ἥμισυς. Attested: ἡμίσεος (hēmiseos). Half; the correlate that something double must be double of in the relational argument. References: 168c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἥμισυς. See Double and half, 95.

Ἡρακλῆς. Attested: Ἡράκλεις (hērakleis). Heracles, invoked in an exclamation of amazement rather than introduced as an acting character. References: 154d. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἡρακλῆς. See Oath and divine invocations, 198.

Ἡσίοδος. Attested: Ἡσιόδου / Ἡσίοδον (hēsiodou / hēsiodon). Hesiod, the poet Critias invokes for the maxim that work is no disgrace. References: 163b, 163c. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἡσίοδος. See Hesiod, 140.

ἡσυχῇ. Attested: ἡσυχῇ (hēsychēi). Quietly or calmly; the adverbial dative describes the orderly manner of action proposed as temperance. References: 159b, 159e. Lexical identification: adverbial dative: ἡσυχῇ. See Quietness, 242.

ἡσυχία. Attested: ἡσυχία (hēsychia). Quietness, calm or lack of haste; the noun joins the comparison of quick and quiet mental activities. References: 160a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡσυχία. See Quietness, 242.

ἡσύχιος. Attested: ἡσύχιοι / ἡσυχίου (hēsychioi / hēsychiou). Quiet or calm; qualifies lives and activities whose merit is compared with quick performance. References: 160c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡσύχιος. See Quietness, 242.

ἡσυχιότης. Attested: ἡσυχιότης / ἡσυχιότητος (hēsychiotēs / hēsychiotētos). The quality of quietness; Charmides' first proposed account of temperance. References: 159b, 159d, 160b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡσυχιότης. See Quietness, 242.

ἡττάομαι. Attested: ἡττώμεθα (hēttōmetha). We are defeated; Socrates describes the inquiry's failure as a collective defeat. References: 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡττάομαι. See Inquiry, 151.

θαρρέω. Attested: θαρρῶν (tharrōn). Take courage or be confident; Socrates encourages Critias to answer honestly and attend to the argument instead of worrying about whose person is refuted. References: 166d. Lexical identification: lemma: θαρρέω. See Fear as a relative, 109.

θαυμάζω. Attested: θαυμάζω (thaumazō). I wonder or find it surprising; Socrates challenges whether Critias really thinks people can be temperate without knowing that they are. References: 164a. Lexical identification: lemma: θαυμάζω. See Inquiry, 151.

θαυμαστός. Attested: θαυμαστὸς / θαυμαστὸν (thaumastos / thaumaston). Remarkable or marvelous; Charmides' stature and beauty strike Socrates, while the adult admirers' reaction is less surprising than the children's gaze. References: 154c. Lexical identification: lemma: θαυμαστός. See Fine and beautiful, 112.

θεάομαι. Attested: ἐθεῶντο (etheōnto). They gazed at or contemplated; the boys look continuously at Charmides as though he were a statue. References: 154c. Lexical identification: lemma: θεάομαι. See Statue, 274.

θεῖος. Attested: θείου (theiou). Uncle; the kinship noun identifies Glaucon as Critias' uncle and Charmides' father, not as a "divine" man. References: 154b. Lexical

identification: lemma: θεῖος. See Guardian and cousin, 131.

θεός. Attested: θεὸς / θεοῦ (theos / theou). A god or the god; Zalmoxis is described as divine by his doctor, while the singular at Delphi denotes the sanctuary's god as speaker of the greeting. References: 156d, 164d. Lexical identification: lemma: θεός. See Delphi and Apollo, 79.

θεραπεύω. Attested: θεραπεύειν / θεραπεῦσαι / θεραπεύεσθαι (therapeuein / therapeusai / therapeuesthai). To attend to or treat; doctors treat the head with the eyes and the whole body with its parts, while the Thracian account gives priority to treating the soul through charms. References: 156b, 156c, 157a. Lexical identification: lemma: θεραπεύω. See Treatment and regimen, 288.

θερμότης. Attested: θερμότης (thermotēs). Heat; the proposed case of heat burning itself is one of the self-applying powers whose possibility Socrates leaves disputed. References: 168e. Lexical identification: lemma: θερμότης. See Self-relation, 262.

θέω. Attested: θεῖν (thein). To run; one of the bodily activities in which quick, nimble performance is judged finer than slow and laborious performance. References: 159c. Lexical identification: lemma: θέω. See Athletics, 33.

θνῄσκω. Attested: τεθνάναι (tethnanai). To have died; the infinitive reports acquaintances killed in the battle from which Socrates has returned. References: 153c. Lexical identification: lemma: θνήσκω. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

θορυβέω. Attested: τεθορυβημένοι (tethorybēmenoi). Thrown into agitation or excitement; the admirers' response to Charmides' entrance, accompanying their

astonishment. References: 154c. Lexical identification: lemma: θορυβέω. See Erotic attraction, 101.

Θρᾷξ. Attested: Θρᾳκῶν / Θρᾲξ / Θρᾳκὸς (thraikōn / thraix / thraikos). Thracian; the plural identifies the doctors associated with Zalmoxis, while the singular names Socrates' unnamed teacher, whose charm he recalls at the end. References: 156d, 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: Θρᾷξ. See Thracians, 287.

θρασύτης. Attested: θρασύτης (thrasytēs). Boldness or confidence; Socrates loses his easy assurance in conversation when Charmides sits beside him, then recovers it as the boy accepts the medical account. References: 155c, 156d. Lexical identification: lemma: θρασύτης. See Fire and renewed confidence, 114.

θρέμμα. Attested: θρέμματος (thremmatos). Creature or beast; Socrates applies it to the beautiful Charmides within the lion-and-fawn comparison, saying he himself has been caught by such a creature. References: 155e. Lexical identification: lemma: θρέμμα. See Lion and fawn, 177.

ἰάομαι. Attested: ἰᾶσθαι / ἰᾶται (iasthai / iatai). Heal or cure; distinguished from merely applying a treatment and later used in the example of medical doing. References: 156b, 156c, 161e, 164b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἰάομαι. See Doctor and medicine, 85.

ἰατρική. Attested: ἰατρική / ἰατρικὴ / ἰατρικῆς (iatrikē / iatrikē / iatrikēs). Medicine or the medical art; specified both by its object, the healthy and diseased, and by its product, health. References: 165c, 170b, 174e, 171a, 174c, 171b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἰατρική. See Doctor and medicine, 85.

ἰατρός. Attested: ἰατρῷ / ἰατρός / ἰατρὸς (iatrōi / iatros / iatros). Doctor or physician; a craft expert used throughout to test knowledge, recognition and benefit. References: 155b, 164a, 170e, 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἰατρός. See Doctor and medicine, 85.

ἰδέα. Attested: ἰδέᾳ / ἰδέας / ἰδέαν (ideai / ideas / idean). Visible form or appearance; refers to Charmides' bodily looks rather than a separately existing metaphysical Form. References: 157d, 158b, 175d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἰδέα. See Face and bodily appearance, 108.

ἱερόν. Attested: ἱεροῦ / ἱερὸν (hierou / hieron). Shrine or sacred precinct; first Basile's sanctuary opposite the palaestra, later Apollo's at Delphi. References: 153a, 164e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἱερόν. See Delphi and Apollo, 79.

ἱκανός. Attested: ἱκανὸς (hikanos). Sufficiently capable or competent for a task; Socrates doubts his ability to settle the general problem of self-related powers. References: 169a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἱκανός. See Adequacy and deficiency, 23.

ἱμάτιον. Attested: ἱματίου (himatiou). Cloak or mantle; the garment within which Socrates catches sight of Charmides' body. References: 155d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἱμάτιον. See Cloak, 62.

ἰσχυρός. Attested: ἰσχυραί (ischyrai). Vigorous or forceful; qualifies actions in the comparison with quiet conduct. References: 160c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἰσχυρός. See Quickness and slowness, 240.

κακός. Attested: κακὰ / κακοὺς / κακόν / κακοῦ (kaka / kakous / kakon / kakou). Bad or harmful, contrasted with good; ranges from bodily and human ills in the soul-treatment story to bad action and the bad as the object of

the knowledge needed for beneficial living. References: 156e, 161a, 163e, 174b, 174c, 174d. Lexical identification: lemma: κακός. See Good and bad, 123.

Καλλαῖσχρος. Attested: Καλλαίσχρου (kallaischrou). Callaeschrus, father of the present Critias; the patronymic distinguishes him from the ancestral Critias son of Dropides. References: 153c. Lexical identification: lemma: Καλλαῖσχρος. See Callaeschrus, 50.

κάλλος. Attested: κάλλει / κάλλος (kallei / kallos). Beauty; initially the excellence sought in the youths and praised in Charmides and his ancestry, later the quality whose possession makes a person beautiful in Critias' analogy for knowing oneself. References: 153d, 154c, 157e, 169e. Lexical identification: lemma: κάλλος. See Fine and beautiful, 112.

καλός. Attested: καλῶν / καλλίστου / καλούς / καλόν / κάλλιστον / κάλλιον / καλὸν / καλοῦ (kalōn / kallistou / kalous / kalon / kalliston / kallion / kalon / kalou). Beautiful or fine; praises visible beauty, good family qualities and therapeutic words, and evaluates actions and temperance. The argument depends on temperance being fine, while the later love analogy takes something beautiful as love's object. References: 154a, 157a, 157b, 159c, 160e, 163c, 167e. Lexical identification: lemma: καλός. See Fine and beautiful, 112.

καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός. Attested: καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός (kalos kai agathos). Beautiful and good; a conventional compliment to a well-bred, admirable person, applied here to Charmides' soul as well as his appearance, with the social praise still requiring examination. References: 154e. Lexical identification: phrase template: καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός. See Fine and beautiful, 112.

καταγελάω. Attested: κατεγέλασεν (kategelasen). Laughed at or mocked; Socrates personifies their failed inquiry as making a mockery of truth despite the partners' accommodating concessions. References: 175d. Lexical identification: lemma: καταγελάω. See Insolence of the inquiry, 153.

κατανοέω. Attested: κατανενόηκας (katanenoēkas). Have noticed or observed; Socrates asks whether Critias has ever encountered a fear whose objects are only itself and other fears. References: 167e. Lexical identification: lemma: κατανοέω. See Attention and sense, 35.

καταφανής. Attested: καταφανὲς (kataphanes). Manifest or plainly apparent; Socrates calls it a shared good for people that each thing should become evident as it actually is. References: 166d. Lexical identification: lemma: καταφανής. See Clear and obscure, 61.

κατέχω. Attested: κατέχων (katechōn). Holding himself back or restraining himself; Critias struggles to contain his competitive eagerness before intervening in the discussion. References: 162c. Lexical identification: lemma: κατέχω. See Reputation and ambition, 252.

κελεύω. Attested: κελεύεις / κελεύω (keleueis / keleuō). To order or command; Charmides agrees to obey his guardian's instruction to remain with Socrates for the charm. References: 176c. Lexical identification: lemma: κελεύω. See Ruling and supervision, 257.

κέρας. Attested: κεράτων (keratōn). Horn; Socrates asks whether his dream has come through horn or ivory, invoking the Homeric distinction between truthful and deceptive dreams. References: 173a. Lexical identification: lemma: κέρας. See Dreams, horn and ivory, 97.

κεφαλή. Attested: κεφαλὴν / κεφαλῆς (kephalēn / kephalēs). Head; the site of Charmides' morning heaviness and the proposed remedy, before Socrates makes its treatment depend on the soul's condition. References: 155b. Lexical identification: lemma: κεφαλή. See Head and headache, 135.

κήδομαι. Attested: κήδεται (kēdetai). Cares for or is concerned about; even a little concern for oneself requires examining the difficulty that has appeared rather than ignoring it. References: 173a. Lexical identification: lemma: κήδομαι. See Care and neglect, 51.

κιθαρίζω. Attested: κιθαρίζειν (kitharizein). To play the lyre; a schoolroom skill in which quick performance is preferred to slow, quiet performance. References: 159c. Lexical identification: lemma: κιθαρίζω. See Lyre and music, 179.

κιθαριστής. Attested: κιθαριστοῦ (kitharistou). The lyre teacher or master; his lessons join those of the letter-master as settings where quick understanding is praised. References: 160a. Lexical identification: lemma: κιθαριστής. See Lyre and music, 179.

κινδυνεύω. Attested: κινδυνεύει / κινδυνεύοντας (kindyneuei / kindyneuontas). To seem likely, in the tentative assent to the comparison of quickness and quietness; to be in danger, in the imagined rescue of people at sea under genuine expert guidance. References: 160b, 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: κινδυνεύω. See Tentative assent, 284.

κίνησις. Attested: κίνησις (kinēsis). Motion; the possibility of motion moving itself is considered among capacities that may act on themselves, without a settled verdict here. References: 168e. Lexical identification: lemma: κίνησις. See Self-relation, 262.

κοινῇ. Attested: κοινῇ (koinēi). Together or jointly; Socrates proposes a shared inquiry into whether Charmides possesses temperance so that neither must make an unsupported claim. References: 158d. Lexical identification: lemma: κοινῇ. See Common good, 64.

κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. Attested: κοινὸν οἴει ἀγαθὸν (koinon oiei agathon). A common or shared good; Socrates says that making clear how each thing stands benefits nearly everyone, explaining why examination is not merely a contest against Critias. References: 166d. Lexical identification: phrase template: κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

κόσμιος. Attested: κοσμίως / κόσμιος (kosmiōs / kosmios). Orderly or decorous; the candidate gathers the adjective at 160c with its adverb κοσμίως at 159b. The adjective is printed in editorially deleted text at 160c and must not be treated as an unqualified accepted reading. References: 159b, 160c. Lexical identification: lemma family: κόσμιος (adjective), κοσμίως (adverb). κοσμίως at 159b is accepted; κόσμιος at 160c is bracketed for deletion. See Order and orderly conduct, 206.

κοσμίως. Attested: κοσμίως (kosmiōs). In an orderly or decorous manner; Charmides qualifies everyday conduct by this adverb, coupling it with quietness in his initial account of temperance. References: 159b. Lexical identification: lemma: κοσμίως. See Order and orderly conduct, 206.

κοῦφος. Attested: κουφοτέρου / κοῦφον / κουφότερον (kouphoterou / kouphon / kouphoteron). Light or lighter in weight; the correlate of heavy in weighing and in the argument that something heavier than itself would also be lighter than itself. References: 166b, 168c. Lexical identification: lemma: κοῦφος. See Weighing, 299.

Κριτίας. Attested: Κριτίαν (kritian). Critias, son of Callaeschrus, beside whom Socrates sits on his return; he later introduces his cousin and ward Charmides and takes over the discussion. References: 153c. Lexical identification: lemma: Κριτίας. See Critias, 72.

κτάομαι. Attested: κέκτησαι (kektēsai). You possess or have acquired; the perfect of κτάομαι has a present possessive force as Socrates proposes testing whether Charmides has temperance. References: 158d. Lexical identification: lemma: κτάομαι. See Presence and possession, 229.

κυβερνήτης. Attested: κυβερνήτης (kybernētēs). A pilot or navigator; the dreamed rule of temperance would prevent an unqualified claimant to this expertise from deceiving the community. References: 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: κυβερνήτης. See Pilot and navigation, 216.

κυβερνητική. Attested: κυβερνητικὴ (kybernētikē). The art of piloting or navigation; it would still prevent death at sea without knowledge of good and bad, but Socrates says these results' occurring well and beneficially would be lost (174c–d). References: 174c. Lexical identification: lemma: κυβερνητική. See Pilot and navigation, 216.

Κυδίας. Attested: Κυδίαν (kydian). Cydias, the poet whose warning about a fawn approaching a lion Socrates recalls when overwhelmed by Charmides' beauty. References: 155d. Lexical identification: lemma: Κυδίας. See Cydias, 75.

κύων. Attested: κύνα (kyna). Dog; the accusative in Socrates' oath "by the dog," uttered as he admits how strange his doubts about temperance's benefit sound. References: 172e. Lexical identification: lemma: κύων. See Oath and divine invocations, 198.

λανθάνω. Attested: λεληθέναι / λάθω / λανθάνοι (lelēthenai / lathō / lanthanoi). To escape notice; Critias denies Socrates can have missed the definition's special feature, Socrates fears unnoticed false pretensions to knowledge, and the dream imagines impostors unable to pass undetected. References: 166c, 166d, 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: λανθάνω. See Escaping notice, 103.

λέγω. Attested: λεγομένοις / λεγόμενα / λέγεται (legomenois / legomena / legetai). To say or state; at 171b the examination of a doctor tests whether the things said are true, alongside whether the things done are correct. References: 171b. Lexical identification: lemma: λέγω. See Conversation, 66.

λέξις. Attested: λέξει (lexei). Speaking or verbal expression; quietness has no privileged claim to temperance in speech any more than in walking or other activities. References: 160c. Lexical identification: lemma: λέξις. See Conversation, 66.

λευκός. Attested: λευκὴ (leukē). White; describes Socrates' metaphorical measuring-line, which cannot provide a discriminating measure of the beautiful youths he admires. References: 154b. Lexical identification: lemma: λευκός. See White measuring-line, 302.

λέων. Attested: λέοντος (leontos). Lion; the dangerous beautiful beloved in Cydias' warning, against whom the approaching lover is figured as a fawn. References: 155d. Lexical identification: lemma: λέων. See Lion and fawn, 177.

λήκυθος. Attested: λήκυθον (lēkython). An oil-flask; one of the everyday objects each citizen would have to make for himself under an absurdly literal law of doing only one's own business. References: 161e. Lexical identification: lemma: λήκυθος. See Oil-flask and strigil, 200.

ληρέω. Attested: ληρεῖν (lērein). To talk nonsense or babble; Socrates tentatively applies it to himself just before presenting the dream that tests whether a wholly knowledgeable life would be beneficial. References: 173a. Lexical identification: lemma: ληρέω. See Babbling and self-deprecation, 36.

λῆρος. Attested: λῆρον (lēron). A babbler or source of nonsense; Socrates says that, if Charmides genuinely has temperance, the boy should regard Socrates as incapable of successful inquiry rather than devalue the virtue. References: 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: λῆρος. See Babbling and self-deprecation, 36.

λογιστική. Attested: λογιστικῆς / λογιστική (logistikēs / logistikē). Calculation or the art of reckoning; unlike a productive craft it has no comparable manufactured result, but its proper object is even and odd quantities in their relations. References: 165e, 166a. Lexical identification: lemma: λογιστική. See Calculation and geometry, 49.

λογιστικός. Attested: λογιστικόν (logistikon). What belongs to calculation, or calculation as a field of expertise; proposed and rejected as the special knowledge that makes a person happy. References: 174b. Lexical identification: lemma: λογιστικός. See Calculation and geometry, 49.

λόγον διδόναι. Attested: διδόναι λόγον (didonai logon). To give an account or reasoned explanation; Critias offers to defend his new definition that temperance is knowing oneself if Socrates does not agree. References: 165b. Lexical identification: phrase template: λόγον διδόναι. See Argument and account, 30.

λόγος. Attested: λόγος / λόγου / λόγον / λόγους / λόγων / λόγῳ (logos / logou / logon / logous / logōn / logōi). Talk,

statement, account or argument. Socrates is much talked about at 156a; doctors' reasoning and therapeutic beautiful words follow; later the term names the propositions, discussion and argumentative constraints that guide or resist their proposed definitions. References: 156a, 156c, 157a, 160b, 162e, 164c, 166c, 166e, 169d, 173e, 175b, 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: λόγος. See Argument and account, 30.

λοιδορέω. Attested: λοιδορουμένους (loidoroumenous). Exchanging abuse or insults with one another; the young men's noisy entrance provides the setting for Charmides' arrival. References: 154a. Lexical identification: lemma: λοιδορέω. See Youth and age, 313.

μάθημα. Attested: μαθήματος (mathēmatos). A subject or object of learning; the imagined knowledge of knowledge would know none of the ordinary subjects of learning, only knowledge itself and other knowledges. References: 168a. Lexical identification: lemma: μάθημα. See Learning and teaching, 175.

μακάριος. Attested: μακάριε / μακάριόν / μακάριον (makarie / makarion / makarion). Blessed or fortunate when predicated of Charmides as a possessor of virtue; in the vocative "my dear fellow" it serves as a familiar address within the healing story. References: 157a, 158b, 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: μακάριος. See Blessedness, 44.

μανθάνω. Attested: μανθάνειν / μανθάνω / μανθάνῃ / μαθήσεται / μάθῃ (manthanein / manthanō / manthanēi / mathēsetai / mathēi). To learn or understand; quick learning is praised, Socrates says he does not understand Critias' claimed equivalence, and the later discussion considers whether knowledge of knowledge would make learning easier. References: 159e, 170a, 172b. Lexical

identification: lemma: μανθάνω. See Learning and teaching, 175.

μανικός. Attested: μανικὸς (manikos). Madcap or excitable; the affectionate characterization of Chaerephon fits his jumping up, running toward Socrates and seizing his hand. References: 153b. Lexical identification: lemma: μανικός. See Madcap and madness, 181.

μαντεύομαι. Attested: μαντεύομαι (manteuomai). I divine or have a prophetic hunch; Socrates avows, without presenting a proof, that temperance must be something good and beneficial. References: 169b. Lexical identification: lemma: μαντεύομαι. See Prophecy, 236.

μαντική. Attested: μαντικὴν (mantikēn). Divination or the prophetic art; provisionally treated as knowledge of future events in the dream of a society whose experts are all genuine. References: 173c. Lexical identification: lemma: μαντική. See Prophecy, 236.

μάντις. Attested: μάντις / μάντεις / μάντιν (mantis / manteis / mantin). A diviner or seer; Critias likens the god's enigmatic greeting to a seer's speech, and Socrates' dream later assumes genuine seers who know future events. References: 164e, 173c, 174a. Lexical identification: lemma: μάντις. See Prophecy, 236.

μάχη. Attested: μάχης / μάχη (machēs / machē). Battle or fighting; the recent engagement at Potidaea prompts Chaerephon's anxious greeting and request for an eyewitness account. References: 153b. Lexical identification: lemma: μάχη. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

μεγαλοπρεπῶς. Attested: μεγαλοπρεπῶς (megaloprepōs). Magnificently or lavishly; ironic description of the disputants' extravagant concessions, made without testing

whether the claims were possible. References: 175c. Lexical identification: lemma: μεγαλοπρεπῶς. See Maximal concession, 186.

μέγας. Attested: μεγάλου (megalou). Great, in intellectual stature or ability; Socrates says it takes a great man to decide adequately which capacities can be related to themselves. References: 169a. Lexical identification: lemma: μέγας. See Self-relation, 262.

μέγεθος. Attested: μέγεθος / μεγέθη (megethos / megethē). Size or stature, when Charmides' appearance is admired; magnitudes, in the later class of quantities for which the examined self-relations are impossible. References: 154c, 168e. Lexical identification: lemma: μέγεθος. See Greater and smaller, 130.

μείζων. Attested: μεῖζόν / μεῖζον / μειζόνων / μείζω (meizon / meizon / meizonōn / meizō). Greater or larger; a comparative relation requiring something smaller as its correlate, so that a thing greater than itself would also have to be smaller than itself. References: 168b, 168c. Lexical identification: lemma: μείζων. See Greater and smaller, 130.

μειράκιον. Attested: μειράκιον (meirakion). A young man or youth; Socrates expects the Charmides he knew as a child to have grown into this stage, without specifying an exact age. References: 154b. Lexical identification: lemma: μειράκιον. See Youth and age, 313.

μέλλω. Attested: μέλλοντος / μελλόντων / μέλλοντα / μέλλουσιν (mellontos / mellontōn / mellonta / mellousin). To be going to occur; the substantivized forms designate future events, the proposed objects of divination and one part of a hypothetical person's all-encompassing knowledge. References: 173c, 174a. Lexical identification: lemma: μέλλω. See Prophecy, 236.

μέρος. Attested: μέρος (meros). A part; the medical examples insist that a part's good condition cannot be secured independently of the larger whole to which it belongs. References: 156c, 156e. Lexical identification: lemma: μέρος. See Whole and part, 304.

μετέχω. Attested: μετέχειν (metechein). To have a share in or partake of; Socrates asks whether Charmides already has enough temperance or is still deficient. References: 158c. Lexical identification: lemma: μετέχω. See Adequacy and deficiency, 23.

μέτριος. Attested: μέτρια (metria). Reasonable or sensible things to say; Critias accepts Socrates' request to attend to the argument, not to which of them suffers refutation. References: 166e. Lexical identification: lemma: μέτριος. See Attention and sense, 35.

μηδὲν ἄγαν. Attested: μηδὲν ἄγαν (mēden agan). "Nothing too much"; the Delphic maxim urging avoidance of excess, which Critias treats as a later piece of advice distinguished from the greeting "Know thyself". References: 165a. Lexical identification: phrase template: μηδὲν ἄγαν. See Moderation and excess, 191.

μιαρός. Attested: μιαρέ (miare). You rascal; teasing reproach addressed to Charmides for repeating Critias' formula and later to Critias for withholding the crucial knowledge of good and bad. References: 161b, 174b. Lexical identification: lemma: μιαρός. See Rascal, 244.

μιμνῄσκομαι. Attested: μέμνημαι / μεμνῆσθαι (memnēmai / memnēsthai). To remember or retain in memory; Charmides remembers Socrates' earlier companionship with Critias, and remembering is later compared with recollection as an activity better performed quickly. References: 156a, 159e. Lexical

identification: lemma: μιμνῄσκομαι. See Memory and recollection, 189.

μοῖρα. Attested: μοῖραν (moiran). A portion or allotted share; within Cydias' quotation the approaching fawn risks becoming a portion of meat, an image of erotic capture. References: 155d. Lexical identification: lemma: μοῖρα. See Lion and fawn, 177.

μόνον. Attested: μόνον (monon). Only or merely; restricts the proposed temperance to knowing that someone knows or does not know, without identifying what the knowledge is about. References: 170d. Lexical identification: lemma: μόνος; μόνον is restrictive or adverbial neuter. See Only and nothing else, 205.

μουσική. Attested: μουσικῇ (mousikēi). Musical expertise; it knows what concerns harmony, a specific subject matter not supplied by knowledge of knowledge alone. References: 170c. Lexical identification: lemma: μουσική. See Lyre and music, 179.

νεανίσκος. Attested: νεανίσκους (neaniskous). Young men; the group entering the palaestra and exchanging insults, followed by the crowd around Charmides. References: 154a. Lexical identification: lemma: νεανίσκος. See Youth and age, 313.

νεβρός. Attested: νεβρὸν (nebron). A fawn; the vulnerable lover in Cydias' image, approaching the lion-like beloved and risking capture. References: 155d. Lexical identification: lemma: νεβρός. See Lion and fawn, 177.

νέος. Attested: νέων / νεώτερον (neōn / neōteron). Young; the plural names the young people about whom Socrates asks on returning, while "younger" is the reciprocal comparative paired with "older" in the self-relation

argument. References: 153d, 168c. Lexical identification: lemma: νέος. See Youth and age, 313.

νοέω. Attested: ἐνόει (enoei). Had in mind or meant; asks for a speaker's intended sense of "doing one's own business," which may differ from a literal hearing of his words. References: 161d, 162b, 162d. Lexical identification: lemma: νοέω. See Understanding and quick-wittedness, 293.

νομοθέτης. Attested: νομοθέτης (nomothetēs). Lawgiver, here imagined as the original giver of a name; Socrates says they have failed to discover which reality received the name "temperance". References: 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: νομοθέτης. See Language and naming, 173.

νόμος. Attested: νόμου (nomou). Law; the hypothetical rule requiring every citizen to make all his own possessions tests the literal reading of doing one's own business. References: 161e. Lexical identification: lemma: νόμος. See Household and city, 145.

νόσημα. Attested: νοσήματα (nosēmata). Diseases; the conditions said to elude Greek doctors because they fail to attend adequately to the whole person. References: 156e. Lexical identification: lemma: νόσημα. See Health and disease, 137.

νοσώδης. Attested: νοσῶδες / νοσώδους / νοσώδεσιν (nosōdes / nosōdous / nosōdesin). Diseased or disease-related; together with the healthy, this specifies medicine's subject matter and the field in which a doctor must be examined. References: 170e, 171a, 171b. Lexical identification: lemma: νοσώδης. See Health and disease, 137.

νοῦς. Attested: νοῦν (noun). Mind or attention in the idiom “apply the mind”; Socrates attends to the boys’ reaction, urges Charmides to consider himself, and tells Critias to follow the argument. References: 154c, 160d, 166e. Lexical identification: lemma: νοῦς. See Attention and sense, 35.

ξένος. Attested: ξένου (xenou). The stranger or foreign visitor; Socrates refers back to the unnamed Thracian doctor whose instructions require treating the soul before the head. References: 157c. Lexical identification: lemma: ξένος. See Thracians, 287.

ξύλον. Attested: ξύλων (xylōn). Wood or timber; one of the materials worked by ordinary crafts, whose knowledgeable practitioners are not thereby shown to be happy. References: 173e. Lexical identification: lemma: ξύλον. See Craft and expertise, 70.

οἶδα. Attested: οἶδα / εἰδέναι / οἶσθα / εἰδὼς / οἶδεν / οἶδε / εἰδόσιν / εἴσεται / οἶδέν / εἰδείην (oida / eidenai / oistha / eidōs / oiden / oide / eidosin / eisetai / oiden / eideiēn). To know; the argument distinguishes actual and supposed knowledge, knowing that one knows, and knowing the particular things known. The forms also express personal ignorance or familiarity. At 167b οἶδε stands in supplied text; εἰδέναι in deleted text at 172c is excluded from the displayed attestations. References: 162b, 162d, 165b, 166d, 167a, 167b, 169e, 170a, 170b, 170c, 170d, 172a, 172c, 175c, 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: οἶδα. οἶδε at 167b occurs in the supplied words ⟨ὅτι οἶδε καὶ⟩. The deleted εἰδέναι at 172c is not listed as an accepted attestation; accepted εἰδέναι also occurs in that section. See Knowledge, 162.

οἰκεῖος. Attested: οἰκεῖα / οἰκεῖά (oikeia / oikeia). One’s own or appropriate to oneself; Critias assigns this description to good and beneficial things, making it an

ethical qualification rather than simple private ownership. References: 163c, 163d. Lexical identification: lemma: οἰκεῖος. See One's own and what belongs to others, 203.

οἰκέω. Attested: οἰκοῦσα / οἰκοῖτο / οἰκουμένη / οἰκεῖσθαι (oikousa / oikoito / oikoumenē / oikeisthai). To be managed or administered, of a city or household; the discussion contrasts good management with literal private self-sufficiency and later imagines management under temperance. References: 162a, 171e. Lexical identification: lemma: οἰκέω. See Household and city, 145.

οἴκησις. Attested: οἰκήσεις (oikēseis). Dwellings or houses; the concrete product Socrates names when asked what the building art accomplishes. References: 165d. Lexical identification: lemma: οἴκησις. See Builder and house-building, 47.

οἰκία. Attested: οἰκίας / οἰκίαι / οἰκία (oikias / oikiai / oikia). House or household; first Charmides' family and ancestral line, later the domestic unit that temperance is imagined as administering well. References: 154e, 157e, 158a, 171e, 172d. Lexical identification: lemma: οἰκία. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

οἰκοδομέω. Attested: οἰκοδομεῖν (oikodomein). To build houses; an example of craft production that plainly counts as doing something, even when the resulting house belongs to another. References: 161e. Lexical identification: lemma: οἰκοδομέω. See Builder and house-building, 47.

οἰκοδομική. Attested: οἰκοδομικήν / οἰκοδομικῆς / οἰκοδομικὸν / οἰκοδομικῇ / οἰκοδομικόν (oikodomikēn / oikodomikēs / oikodomikon / oikodomikēi / oikodomikon). House-building or the builder's expertise; its product is a dwelling, while its particular subject matter cannot be

known merely through knowledge of knowledge. References: 165d, 165e, 170c. Lexical identification: lemma family: οἰκοδομικός; feminine οἰκοδομική names the art, neuter οἰκοδομικόν its subject matter. See Builder and house-building, 47.

οἴομαι. Attested: οἴει / οἶμαι / οἰόμενος / οἴεται / οἰόμενον (oiei / oimai / oiomenos / oietai / oiomenon). To think, suppose or believe; marks an interlocutor's present judgment and, crucially, the possibility that someone thinks he knows what he does not know. References: 159a, 166d, 167a, 171c. Lexical identification: lemma: οἴομαι. See Belief and opinion, 40.

ὀκνέω. Attested: ὤκνει (ōknei). He hesitated or hung back before answering; marks the boy's reluctance. References: 159b. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀκνέω. See Question and answer, 238.

ὅλος. Attested: ὅλου (holou). Whole or entire; the reference expands from head to body and the human being in the medical analogy. References: 156c, 156e. Lexical identification: lemma: ὅλος. See Whole and part, 304.

Ὅμηρος. Attested: Ὁμήρῳ (homērōi). Homer, the poetic authority invoked against the claim that shame is always good. References: 161a. Lexical identification: lemma: Ὅμηρος. See Homer, 142.

ὄμνυμι. Attested: ὀμώμοκα (omōmoka). Have sworn; Socrates presents himself as bound by an oath to the healer's conditions. References: 157c. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄμνυμι. See Oath and divine invocations, 198.

ὅμοιος. Attested: ὁμοία / ὁμοίων / ὅμοιος (homoia / homoiōn / homoios). Similar or alike; Critias denies that

temperance or the other knowledges should all be treated as alike. References: 165e, 170a. Lexical identification: lemma: ὅμοιος. See Same and different, 259.

ὁμοιότης. Attested: ὁμοιότητά (homoiotēta). Similarity or likeness; Critias accuses Socrates of seeking a similarity to other knowledges where temperance differs from them. References: 166b. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁμοιότης. See Same and different, 259.

ὁμοίως. Attested: ὁμοίως (homoiōs). Equally or alike; asks whether all the omniscient person's knowledges contribute equally to happiness. References: 174a. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁμοίως. See Same and different, 259.

ὁμολογέω. Attested: ὁμολογεῖς / ὁμολογῶ / ὡμολογήσαμεν (homologeis / homologō / hōmologēsamen). Agree, acknowledge or admit; a local concession whose scope must be kept distinct from accepting the whole argument. References: 158c, 165b, 165c, 172d, 172e. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁμολογέω. See Agreement and concession, 26.

ὁμολογία. Attested: ὁμολογία (homologia). Agreement or agreed proposition; the final review criticizes what their common concession has committed them to. References: 175c. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁμολογία. See Agreement and concession, 26.

ὁμότεχνος. Attested: ὁμότεχνον (homotechnon). Fellow practitioner of the same craft; limits the examiner's competence to another expert in the proposed same field. References: 171c. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁμότεχνος. See Fellow expert, 110.

ὄναρ. Attested: ὄναρ (onar). Dream; introduces a conjectural vision of life wholly organized by knowledge

rather than an established conclusion. References: 173a. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄναρ. See Dreams, horn and ivory, 97.

ὄνειδος. Attested: ὄνειδος (oneidos). Reproach or disgrace; the evaluative term in Critias' citation and restriction of Hesiod's maxim about work. References: 163b, 163c. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄνειδος. See Disgrace, 84.

ὀνίνημι. Attested: ὀνήσεσθαι / ὀνήσει / ὀνήσῃ (onēsesthai / onēsei / onēsēi). Benefit or receive benefit, according to voice and construction; asks what advantage a craft or temperance confers on a person. References: 164b, 172d, 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀνίνημι. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

ὄνομα. Attested: ὄνομα / ὀνομάτων / τοὔνομα (onoma / onomatōn / tounoma). Name or word; ranges from written personal names to disputed terminology and the naming of temperance. References: 161d, 163d, 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄνομα. See Language and naming, 173.

ὀνομάζω. Attested: ὀνομάζειν (onomazein). Name or call; Socrates reformulates Critias' terminology about doing good things. References: 163e. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀνομάζω. See Language and naming, 173.

ὀξύς. Attested: ὀξέως / ὀξύτατον (oxeōs / oxytaton). Sharp, keen or nimble; in context it commends prompt bodily or mental performance. References: 159d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀξύς. See Quickness and slowness, 240.

ὀξύτης. Attested: ὀξύτης / ὀξύτητος (oxytēs / oxytētos). Sharpness or acuteness; explicitly used to explain quick-wittedness of soul. References: 160a, 160b. Lexical

identification: lemma: ὀξύτης. See Quickness and slowness, 240.

ὁράω. Attested: ὁρᾷ (horai). See; the sensory capacity normally has visible colours as its object. References: 167d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁράω. See Sight and colour, 265.

ὀργίζομαι. Attested: ὀργισθῆναι (orgisthēnai). Become angry; Critias reacts to Charmides as a poet might to a performer mistreating his work. References: 162d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀργίζομαι. See Anger and indignation, 29.

ὀρθότης. Attested: ὀρθότητος (orthotētos). Correctness or rightness; personified as guiding the error-free life envisaged under temperance. References: 172a. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀρθότης. See Correctness and error, 68.

ὀρθῶς. Attested: ὀρθῶς (orthōs). Rightly or correctly; qualifies a performance, account or inquiry without by itself proving that it benefits its agent. References: 171b, 172e. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀρθῶς. See Correctness and error, 68.

ὁρίζω. Attested: ὅρισαι / ὡρίσθη / ὁριζόμεθα (horisai / hōristhē / horizometha). Delimit or define; specify what temperance is or what makes a field of knowledge distinct. References: 163d, 171a, 173a. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁρίζω. See Definition, 76.

ὅτι μάλιστα. Attested: ὅτι μάλιστα (hoti malista). As fully or as much as possible; strengthens the provisional supposition without converting it into an established conclusion. References: 160c, 166c, 167b, 172e. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: ὅτι μάλιστα. See Hypothesis, 147; Maximal concession, 186.

οὐδὲν ἧττον. Attested: οὐδὲν ἧττον (ouden hētton). No less, or just as much; children write others' names no less than their own, and crafts retain their technical effects no less when knowledge of good and bad is removed. References: 161d, 174c. Lexical identification: phrase template: οὐδὲν ἧττον. See No less and equal comparison, 196.

οὐσία. Attested: οὐσίαν (ousian). Being, nature or character; a capacity applied to itself must possess the property toward which that capacity is ordinarily directed, as self-hearing would have to possess sound. References: 168d. Lexical identification: lemma: οὐσία. See Being and nature, 38.

ὄφελος. Attested: ὄφελος (ophelos). Use or advantage; the leaf without the charm and the allegedly useless temperance both prompt the question of practical benefit. References: 155e, 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄφελος. See Use and profit, 295.

ὄχλος. Attested: ὄχλον (ochlon). A crowd or throng following the youths; part of Charmides' public display. References: 154a. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄχλος. See Charmides, 58.

ὄψις. Attested: ὄψις / ὄψεις (opsis / opseis). Sight or vision; an analogy for a capacity supposed to take itself and other instances of its kind as objects. References: 167c, 167d, 168d, 168e. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄψις. See Sight and colour, 265.

πάγκαλος. Attested: πάγκαλός (pankalos). Beautiful in every respect, or altogether beautiful; Chaerephon says Charmides' bodily form is so fine that it would eclipse even his face. References: 154d. Lexical identification: lemma: πάγκαλος. See Face and bodily appearance, 108.

παγκρατιάζω. Attested: παγκρατιάζειν (pankratiazein). To compete in the pancration; the athletic performance is grouped with boxing as an example where energetic quickness is preferable to quiet slowness. References: 159c. Lexical identification: lemma: παγκρατιάζω. See Athletics, 33.

παῖς. Attested: παῖς / Παῖ (pais / pai). Boy or child when recalling Charmides' earlier age; "boy" as an address to Critias' attendant, whom he orders to summon Charmides. References: 154b, 155b. Lexical identification: lemma: παῖς. See Youth and age, 313.

παλαίστρα. Attested: παλαίστραν (palaistran). A wrestling-school or exercise ground; Taureas' establishment is the gathering place to which Socrates returns and where the conversation takes place. References: 153a. Lexical identification: lemma: παλαίστρα. See Palaestra, 208.

παλαίω. Attested: παλαίειν (palaiein). To wrestle; nimble performance is judged finer than a slow and quiet manner in the testing of Charmides' first definition. References: 159c. Lexical identification: lemma: παλαίω. See Athletics, 33.

παντὸς μᾶλλον. Attested: παντὸς τοίνυν μᾶλλον / παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον (pantos toinyn mallon / pantos ara mallon). Most certainly or beyond all else; an emphatic expression of conviction, used when Socrates identifies a riddle and when he concludes that knowledge of knowledge cannot discriminate particular experts. References: 162b, 171c. Lexical identification: phrase template: παντὸς μᾶλλον. See Precision, 226.

παραδέχομαι. Attested: παραδέχῃ / παραδέχομαι (paradechēi / paradechomai). To take over or accept responsibility for; Critias assumes the account first offered

by Charmides so that he can answer for it himself. References: 162e. Lexical identification: lemma: παραδέχομαι. See Acceptance and taking over, 22.

παραδίδωμι. Attested: παρεδίδομεν / παραδιδοῖεν (paredidomen / paradidoien). To hand over or entrust; in the imagined well-ordered life people delegate work they do not know how to do to those who possess the relevant expertise. References: 171e, 172d. Lexical identification: lemma: παραδίδωμι. See Ruling and supervision, 257.

παρακελεύομαι. Attested: παρακελεύεσθαι (parakeleuesthai). To exhort or urge one another; Critias says people should enjoin temperance rather than use "rejoice" as their customary greeting. References: 164e. Lexical identification: lemma: παρακελεύομαι. See Advice and greeting, 24.

παρεῖναι. Attested: παρεῖναι / παρῇ (pareinai / parēi). To be present with someone; Homer's modesty is no good companion to a needy man, whereas temperance is said to make good the people in whom it is present. References: 161a. Lexical identification: lemma: πάρειμι; παρεῖναι is the infinitive. See Presence and possession, 229.

παρρησιάζομαι. Attested: παρρησιάσομαι (parrēsiasomai). I shall speak more frankly or openly; Charmides' prior familiarity with Socrates allows the latter to explain the charm's nature more freely. References: 156a. Lexical identification: lemma: παρρησιάζομαι. See Conversation, 66.

παρών. Attested: παρούσης / παροῦσα (parousēs / parousa). Present or being present; the charm generates temperance whose presence enables bodily health, and Charmides is asked to consider what kind of person temperance's presence makes him. References: 157a,

160d. Lexical identification: lemma: πάρειμι; παρών is the participle. παρών and παρεῖναι are participle and infinitive of the same verb πάρειμι. Both lookup records are retained for their explicitly stated local contexts. See Presence and possession, 229.

πατρῷος. Attested: πατρῴα (patrōia). Paternal or inherited from the father; qualifies the household of Critias son of Dropides in the praise of Charmides' lineage. References: 157e. Lexical identification: lemma: πατρῷος. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

πείθομαι. Attested: πείθεσθαι / πείσομαι / πείθομαι / πειθοίμην (peithesthai / peisomai / peithomai / peithoimēn). To be persuaded or obey; Socrates obeys his oath-bound teacher, Charmides does not accept Socrates' self-deprecating counsel and says he still needs the charm, and he then promises obedience to his guardian. References: 157c, 176b, 176c. Lexical identification: lemma: πείθομαι. See Persuasion and obedience, 212.

πείθω. Attested: πείθῃς / πείθω / πείσει (peithēis / peithō / peisei). To persuade; Charmides must persuade Socrates to give him the charm, while Socrates has been warned not to let anyone's wealth, birth or beauty persuade him to bypass treatment of the soul. References: 156a, 157b. Lexical identification: lemma: πείθω. See Persuasion and obedience, 212.

πεῖρα. Attested: πεῖραν (peiran). A trial or test; to determine which particular knowledge a doctor has, the examiner must test what it is knowledge of. References: 171a. Lexical identification: lemma: πεῖρα. See Examination, 106.

περιέλκω. Attested: περιέλκεις (perielkeis). You drag around; Socrates teases Critias for leading him in a circle while concealing that the knowledge needed for

happiness is specifically knowledge of good and bad. References: 174b. Lexical identification: lemma: περιέλκω. See Conversation, 66.

περιττός. Attested: περιττοῦ (perittou). Odd, as opposed to even; names one class of quantities that calculation studies in relation to itself and the other. References: 166a. Lexical identification: lemma: περιττός. See Calculation and geometry, 49.

πεττευτικός. Attested: πεττευτικόν (petteutikon). The skill or subject matter of playing a board game with pieces, conventionally “draughts”; an expertise Critias rejects as the knowledge that chiefly makes a person happy. References: 174b. Lexical identification: lemma: πεττευτικός. See Draughts, 96.

πιστεύω. Attested: πιστεύεις / πιστεύω (pisteueis / pisteuō). To trust or believe; Charmides is asked whether he trusts Homer’s statement, whereas Socrates says he does not trust himself to settle the general classification of self-related powers. References: 161a, 169a. Lexical identification: lemma: πιστεύω. See Belief and opinion, 40.

πλῆθος. Attested: πλήθους / πλήθη (plēthous / plēthē). Quantity or multitude; in calculation it concerns numerical relations of even and odd, and in the self-relation argument quantities belong to the cases judged impossible. References: 166a, 168e. Lexical identification: lemma: πλῆθος. See Calculation and geometry, 49.

πλούσιος. Attested: πλούσιον (plousion). Rich; material wealth is one of the advantages that must not persuade Socrates to administer the head remedy without the prior treatment of the soul. References: 157b. Lexical identification: lemma: πλούσιος. See Wealth and possessions, 298.

ποιέω. Attested: ποιεῖν / ποιοῦντες / ποιοῦντας (poiein / poiountes / poiountas). To make or produce; craftsmen can make things belonging to others, and Critias insists that agreement about their making does not yet establish agreement about their doing. References: 162e, 163a, 163b. Lexical identification: lemma: ποιέω. See Making and production, 182.

ποίημα. Attested: ποιήματα / ποίημα (poiēmata / poiēma). A thing made or composition; first the poet's verses mishandled by an actor, later any made product that Critias says may be disgraceful unless made with what is fine. References: 162d, 163c. Lexical identification: lemma: ποίημα. See Making and production, 182.

ποίησις. Attested: ποίησιν / ποιήσεις (poiēsin / poiēseis). Making or production; Critias distinguishes it from working and doing, reserving "doings" for makings of good and beneficial things. References: 163b, 163d, 163e. Lexical identification: lemma: ποίησις. See Making and production, 182.

ποιητής. Attested: ποιητῶν / ποιητὴς (poiētōn / poiētēs). A poet; poets celebrate Charmides' lineage, and Critias' irritation at the boy is compared with a poet's anger at an actor who spoils his verses. References: 157e, 162d. Lexical identification: lemma: ποιητής. See Poet and actor, 217.

ποιητικός. Attested: ποιητικός (poiētikos). Poetically gifted or inclined to poetry; Critias reports that Charmides is thought a poet both by others and by himself. References: 155a. Lexical identification: lemma: ποιητικός. See Poet and actor, 217.

πόλις. Attested: πόλις / πόλεως (polis / poleōs). City or civic community; the thought experiments ask whether it could be well managed under literal self-sufficiency and

then under temperance's knowledgeable supervision. References: 161e, 171e, 172d. Lexical identification: lemma: πόλις. See Household and city, 145.

πολιτεύω. Attested: πολιτευομένη (politeuomenē). Being governed or administered as a civic community; the hypothetical city comes under the rule of temperance alongside a well-run household. References: 171e. Lexical identification: lemma: πολιτεύω. See Household and city, 145.

πολιτική. Attested: πολιτική (politikē). Statesmanship or political expertise; provisionally identified as knowledge of the just, distinct from medicine's subject and from knowledge of knowledge. References: 170b. Lexical identification: lemma: πολιτική. See Household and city, 145.

πολυπραγμονέω. Attested: ἐπολυπραγμονεῖτε (epolypragmoneite). Were meddling or acting as busybodies; Socrates asks whether children become meddlers merely by writing other people's names, exposing an over-literal interpretation of "one's own business". References: 161d. Lexical identification: lemma: πολυπραγμονέω. See Meddling, 188.

πορίζω. Attested: πορίζειν (porizein). To provide or procure; once temperance has arisen in the soul, the Thracian account says it becomes easy to provide health for the head and the rest of the body. References: 157b. Lexical identification: lemma: πορίζω. See Treatment and regimen, 288.

Ποτείδαια. Attested: Ποτειδαίας (poteidaias). Potidaea, the place from whose military camp Socrates has returned; the name establishes the campaign background of his homecoming. References: 153a. Lexical

identification: lemma: Ποτείδαια. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

πρᾶξις. Attested: πράξεις / πράξεων / πράξεως / πρᾶξιν / πράξει (praxeis / praxeōn / praxeōs / praxin / praxei). Action or doing; quiet and quick actions are compared, Critias distinguishes doing from making, and “the doing of good things” becomes his revised definition before the imagined error-free course of action. References: 160c, 163b, 163c, 163d, 163e, 172a. Lexical identification: lemma: πρᾶξις. See Doing and action, 88.

πράττω. Attested: πράττειν / ἐπράττετε / πράττοντας / πράττοντες / πραττομένοις / πραττόμενα / πράττεται / πράξειν (prattein / eprattete / prattontas / prattontes / prattomenois / prattomena / prattetai / praxein). To do, act or conduct affairs; used of orderly behavior and performing work for others, then contested by Critias’ restriction to good action. Later it describes professional practice, governance and the closing threat to act by force. References: 159b, 161e, 162a, 163a, 163b, 171b, 171e, 176d. Lexical identification: lemma: πράττω. See Doing and action, 88.

πρέπω. Attested: πρέπει / ἔπρεψεν (prepei / eprepsen). To be fitting or appropriate; good character should suit Charmides’ family, and his bashfulness suits his youth. References: 154e, 158c. Lexical identification: lemma: πρέπω. See Fitting and appropriate, 116.

πρεσβεύω. Attested: πρεσβεύων (presbeuōn). Going or serving as an ambassador; Pyrilampes’ diplomatic visits to the Great King and other rulers provide the setting for praise of his appearance. References: 158a. Lexical identification: lemma: πρεσβεύω. See Great King and Asia, 128.

πρέσβυς. Attested: πρεσβύτερον (presbyteron). Older; a comparative requiring a younger correlate, so that being older than oneself would also entail being younger than oneself. References: 168c. Lexical identification: lemma: πρέσβυς. See Youth and age, 313.

Πρόδικος. Attested: Προδίκου (prodikou). Prodicus, invoked as a practitioner of minute distinctions between words when Critias separates making, doing and working. References: 163d. Lexical identification: lemma: Πρόδικος. See Prodicus, 232.

προσδιδάσκω. Attested: προσδίδαξον (prosdidaxon). Teach me in addition; Socrates asks Critias for the further specification of what one must know, rather than accepting “living knowledgeably” as sufficient. References: 173d. Lexical identification: lemma: προσδιδάσκω. See Learning and teaching, 175.

προσεπίσταμαι. Attested: προσεπίστηταί (prosepistētai). Knows in addition; knowledge of the healthy or the just must be added to knowledge of knowledge if one is to identify those particular domains. References: 170b. Lexical identification: lemma: προσεπίσταμαι. See Knowledge, 162.

προσέχω. Attested: προσέσχον / προσέχων (proseschon / prosechōn). To apply or direct, in “apply the mind”: Socrates notices the boys’ reactions, asks Charmides to attend more carefully to himself, and tells Critias to attend to the argument. References: 154c, 160d, 166e. Lexical identification: lemma: προσέχω. See Attention and sense, 35.

προσκαθοράω. Attested: προσκαθορῶντι (proskathorōnti). Seeing or surveying in addition; the tentative learning benefit is that a learner sees the knowledge as well as each particular thing learned.

References: 172b. Lexical identification: lemma: προσκαθοράω. See Learning and teaching, 175.

προσποθέω. Attested: προσποθῶ (prospothō). I still desire or long to know; Socrates asks which among an all-knowing person's kinds of knowledge actually makes that person happy. References: 174a. Lexical identification: lemma: προσποθέω. See Inquiry, 151.

προσποιέομαι. Attested: προσποιήσασθαι / προσποιούμενον / προσποιούμενός (prospoiēsasthai / prospoioumenon / prospoioumenos). To pretend or profess; Socrates adopts the role of one who knows a head remedy, whereas the later argument concerns false claims to professional expertise and the problem of exposing them. References: 155b, 170e, 171c, 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: προσποιέομαι. See Pretence and imposture, 230.

πρόσρημα. Attested: προσρήματος (prosrēmatos). A form of address or greeting; Critias argues that the customary "rejoice" is not the right greeting for the god's temple. References: 164e. Lexical identification: lemma: πρόσρημα. See Advice and greeting, 24.

πρόσρησις. Attested: πρόσρησις / πρόσρησιν (prosrēsis / prosrēsin). An address or greeting; Critias interprets the Delphic "Know thyself" as the god's greeting to those entering rather than as advice alone. References: 164d, 165a. Lexical identification: lemma: πρόσρησις. See Advice and greeting, 24.

προτίθημι. Attested: προτιθέμενον (protithemenon). What is put forward or proposed; Socrates explains that he investigates each proposed claim with Critias because he himself does not know the answer. References: 165b. Lexical identification: lemma: προτίθημι. See Hypothesis, 147.

προφήτης. Attested: προφήτας (prophētas). Spokesmen or foretellers; genuine seers are installed as interpreters of future events under the dreamed supervision of temperance. References: 173c. Lexical identification: lemma: προφήτης. See Prophecy, 236.

πυκτεύω. Attested: πυκτεύειν (pykteuein). To box; one of the athletic activities in which the question asks whether quick and vigorous performance is finer than quiet slowness. References: 159c. Lexical identification: lemma: πυκτεύω. See Athletics, 33.

πυνθάνομαι. Attested: πεπυσμένοι (pepysmenoi). Having learned or heard news; the Athenians have only recently received the report of the battle at Potidaea, unlike Socrates' firsthand experience. References: 153b. Lexical identification: lemma: πυνθάνομαι. See Question and answer, 238.

Πυριλάμπης. Attested: Πυριλάμπους (pyrilampous). Pyrilampes, Charmides' maternal uncle, praised for his exceptional appearance during embassies to the Great King and elsewhere. References: 158a. Lexical identification: lemma: Πυριλάμπης. See Pyrilampes, 237.

ῥῆμα. Attested: ῥήματα (rhēmata). Spoken words or expressions; Socrates asks whether the definition's author uttered them as a riddle. References: 161d. Lexical identification: lemma: ῥῆμα. See Conversation, 66.

σαφής. Attested: σαφῶς (saphōs). Clearly or accurately; Chaerephon says the gathering has not yet heard the whole campaign story plainly and asks Socrates for an account. References: 153c. Lexical identification: lemma family: σαφής (adjective), σαφῶς (attested adverb). See Clear and obscure, 61.

σκέπτομαι. Attested: σκεπτέον / σκέψαι / σκεψάμενος / σκέψωμαι (skepteon / skepsai / skepsamenos / skepsōmai). To consider or examine; Socrates and Charmides investigate possession and definitions of temperance, and Socrates postpones agreement with Critias until he has considered the proposal. References: 158d, 161b, 161c, 165c. Lexical identification: lemma: σκέπτομαι; includes the related verbal adjective σκεπτέος. See Inquiry, 151.

σκεῦος. Attested: σκεύη (skeuē). Equipment, implements or utensils; part of the material provision imagined as well made when a society employs genuine craftsmen. References: 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: σκεῦος. See Wealth and possessions, 298.

σκέψις. Attested: σκέψις (skepsis). Examination or method of inquiry; Socrates proposes eliciting Charmides' own opinion as the best way to investigate the temperance supposedly present in him. References: 158e. Lexical identification: lemma: σκέψις. See Inquiry, 151.

σκληρός. Attested: σκληρῶν (sklērōn). Hard or difficult to deal with; negated in Socrates' ironic description of the disputants as accommodating rather than resistant to concessions. References: 175d. Lexical identification: lemma: σκληρός. See Simple-mindedness, 266.

σκοπέω. Attested: σκοπεῖν / σκόπει / σκοποίμην / σκοπῶμεν / σκοπῶ / σκοπούμενος / σκοποῖμεν (skopein / skopei / skopoimēn / skopōmen / skopō / skopoumenos / skopoimen). To look into or examine; the repeated direction keeps attention on the truth of definitions, the grounds for agreement, the doctor's competence and the usefulness of the proposed virtue. References: 158e, 161b, 162e, 163e, 165c, 166d, 171a, 171b, 172e, 175a. Lexical identification: lemma: σκοπέω. See Inquiry, 151.

σκυτική. Attested: σκυτικὴ (skytikē). The leatherworking or shoemaking craft; it would still supply footwear without knowledge of good and bad, but Socrates says these results' occurring well and beneficially would be lost (174c–d). References: 174c. Lexical identification: lemma: σκυτική. See Manual trades and social contempt, 185.

σκῦτος. Attested: σκυτῶν (skytōn). Hides or leather; cutting leather is Socrates' first pointed example when he asks what specific expertise would make a knowledgeable life happy. References: 173d. Lexical identification: lemma: σκῦτος. See Manual trades and social contempt, 185.

σκυτοτομέω. Attested: σκυτοτομεῖν / σκυτοτομοῦντι (skytotomein / skytotomounti). To cut leather or make shoes; literal private manufacture of one's footwear is demanded by the hypothetical law, and Critias later includes cobbling among trades he disparages. References: 161e, 163b. Lexical identification: lemma: σκυτοτομέω. See Manual trades and social contempt, 185.

Σόλων. Attested: Σόλωνος (solōnos). Solon, named first as a family connection associated with poetry, then as a poet who celebrated Charmides' paternal house. References: 155a, 157e. Lexical identification: lemma: Σόλων. See Solon, 270.

σοφία. Attested: σοφίᾳ (sophiai). Wisdom; one of the excellences Socrates asks whether the young men have acquired during his absence, paired with beauty. References: 153d. Lexical identification: lemma: σοφία. See Philosophy and wisdom, 214.

σοφός. Attested: σοφῶν / σοφὸς (sophōn / sophos). Wise; describes the supposed source of the formula "doing one's own business," with Socrates' attribution and Charmides'

reply carrying a teasing reference to Critias. References: 161c, 162b. Lexical identification: lemma: σοφός. See Philosophy and wisdom, 214.

σπουδή. Attested: σπουδῇ / σπουδῆς (spoudēi / spoudēs). Eagerness or earnest effort; the admirers shove energetically to seat Charmides beside them, while Socrates later recalls taking great pains to learn the charm. References: 155c, 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: σπουδή. See Reputation and ambition, 252.

στάθμη. Attested: στάθμη (stathmē). A measuring or marking line; Socrates' "white line" image makes fun of his inability to discriminate impartially among beautiful youths. References: 154b. Lexical identification: lemma: στάθμη. See White measuring-line, 302.

σταθμητός. Attested: σταθμητόν (stathmēton). Measurable or reliable as a measure; Socrates' self-description οὐδὲν σταθμητόν presents him as no dependable judge before the joke of the white measuring-line. References: 154b. Lexical identification: lemma: σταθμητός. See White measuring-line, 302.

σταθμός. Attested: σταθμοῦ (stathmou). Weight; the greater or lesser weight that the art of weighing concerns, distinct from that art itself. References: 166b. Lexical identification: lemma: σταθμός. See Weighing, 299.

στατική. Attested: στατικὴ / στατική / στατικῆς (statikē / statikē / statikēs). The art of weighing; its objects are heavier and lighter weights, so it supplies an example of expertise directed toward something other than itself. References: 166b. Lexical identification: lemma: στατική. See Weighing, 299.

στλεγγίς. Attested: στλεγγίδα (stlengida). A strigil or scraper for cleaning the body after exercise; paired with

the oil-flask among objects each citizen would absurdly have to manufacture for himself. References: 161e. Lexical identification: lemma: στλεγγίς. See Oil-flask and strigil, 200.

στρατηγική. Attested: στρατηγικὴ (stratēgikē). Generalship or military expertise; it would still prevent death in war without knowledge of good and bad, but Socrates says these results' occurring well and beneficially would be lost (174c–d). References: 174c. Lexical identification: lemma: στρατηγική. See Craft and expertise, 70.

στρατηγός. Attested: στρατηγὸς (stratēgos). A general or military commander; one of the practitioners whose false claim to expertise would be detected in Socrates' dream of rule by temperance. References: 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: στρατηγός. See Craft and expertise, 70.

στρατόπεδον. Attested: στρατοπέδου (stratopedou). The military camp or army encampment; Socrates returns from it at Potidaea before resuming his accustomed Athenian haunts. References: 153a. Lexical identification: lemma: στρατόπεδον. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

συγγένεια. Attested: συγγενείας (syngeneias). Kinship or family connection; Socrates links Charmides' poetic gift with the family's relationship to Solon. References: 155a. Lexical identification: lemma: συγγένεια. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

συγχωρέω. Attested: συγχωρῶν / συγχωρεῖς / συγχωρῶ / συγχωρήσαιμ' / συγχωρῆσαί / συγχωρήσωμεν / συγχωρήσαντες / συγκεχωρήκαμεν / συνεχωρήσαμεν (synchōrōn / synchōreis / synchōrō / synchōrēsaim' / synchōrēsai / synchōrēsōmen / synchōrēsantes / synkechōrēkamen / synechōrēsamen). To make room, in

the crowded seating scene; then to agree, concede or grant an argumentative claim. The final review stresses that some generous concessions were made despite the argument's resistance. References: 155c, 162e, 164d, 166b, 169c, 169d, 172c, 175b, 175c. Lexical identification: lemma: συγχωρέω. See Agreement and concession, 26.

συλλήβδην. Attested: συλλήβδην (syllēbdēn). Summarily or taking together; Charmides compresses his examples into "a kind of quietness," while Socrates later considers all the senses together. References: 159b, 167d. Lexical identification: lemma: συλλήβδην. See Inquiry, 151.

συλλογίζομαι. Attested: συλλογισάμενος (syllogisamenos). Having put together or reckoned up the considerations; Charmides is asked to combine his reflections on what temperance makes him before stating its nature. References: 160d. Lexical identification: lemma: συλλογίζομαι. See Inquiry, 151.

συμβαίνω. Attested: συμβαίνειν / συμβαίνει / συμβαίνονθ' (symbainein / symbainei / symbainonth'). To follow or result; Critias resists an unwelcome consequence, later claims that self-knowledge follows from the proposed knowledge, and Socrates finally admits they conceded claims that did not follow in the argument. References: 164c, 169d, 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: συμβαίνω. See Necessity and consequence, 195.

συμβουλεύω. Attested: συμβουλεύσαιμι (symbouleusaimi). I would advise; Socrates says that, if Charmides really has temperance, he should regard Socrates as a poor inquirer and himself as correspondingly happier. References: 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: συμβουλεύω. See Advice and greeting, 24.

συμβουλή. Attested: συμβουλὴν / συμβουλὰς (symboulēn / symboulas). Advice or counsel; Critias says later

dedicators misread “Know thyself” as advice and added their own useful maxims on that understanding. References: 165a. Lexical identification: lemma: συμβουλή. See Advice and greeting, 24.

συμπάσχω. Attested: συμπάσχουσιν (sympaschousin). Undergo the same experience together: Critias catches Socrates’ perplexity as a watcher catches another person’s yawn. References: 169c. Lexical identification: lemma: συμπάσχω. See Contagious yawning, 65.

συμπλάττω. Attested: συμπλάττοντες (symplattontes). Fashion together: the interlocutors jointly construct the account whose benefit the inquiry fails to establish. References: 175d. Lexical identification: lemma: συμπλάττω. See Agreement and concession, 26.

σύμφημι. Attested: συνέφασαν (synephasan). They assented together; the onlookers join Chaerephon’s praise. References: 154d. Lexical identification: lemma: σύμφημι. See Fine and beautiful, 112.

συνεργός. Attested: συνεργὸν (synergon). A co-worker or accomplice; ignorance is personified as a would-be collaborator excluded from action. References: 173d. Lexical identification: lemma: συνεργός. See Lack of knowledge, 171.

συνήθης. Attested: συνήθεις (synētheis). Customary or familiar; qualifies the haunts to which Socrates returns. References: 153a. Lexical identification: lemma: συνήθης. See Socrates, 267.

συνίημι. Attested: συνιέναι (synienai). Understand what is said; a mental performance in which quickness seems preferable to slowness. References: 160a. Lexical identification: lemma: συνίημι. See Understanding and quick-wittedness, 293.

συνομολογέω. Attested: συνομολογοῦντες (synomologountes). Agree together; retrospectively characterizes the partners' common concessions. References: 175d. Lexical identification: lemma: συνομολογέω. See Agreement and concession, 26.

σφοδρός. Attested: σφόδρα / σφοδρῶν (sphodra / sphodrōn). Vigorously or intensely; the adjective's adverb is used for forceful teaching and recollection, and the adjective for vigorous actions. References: 159e, 160c. Lexical identification: lemma: σφοδρός. See Quickness and slowness, 240.

σῴζω. Attested: σῴζεσθαι (sōizesthai). To be preserved or brought safely through danger; a benefit of genuine navigational and military competence. References: 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: σῴζω. See Craft and expertise, 70.

σῶμα. Attested: σῶμα / σώματος (sōma / sōmatos). Body; considered both as a whole with parts and in its relation to the soul. References: 156c, 156e, 159d, 160b. Lexical identification: lemma: σῶμα. See Body, 46.

σωφρονέω. Attested: σωφρονεῖν / σωφρονεῖς / Σωφρόνει (sōphronein / sōphroneis / sōphronei). Be or behave temperately; Critias reinterprets the Delphic greeting as the imperative 'be temperate'. References: 163a, 164a, 164e, 170d, 176b. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφρονέω. See Temperance, 280.

σωφρόνως. Attested: σωφρόνως (sōphronōs). Temperately; qualifies a city's administration or a person's manner of acting, rather than naming another virtue. References: 162a, 164c. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφρόνως. See Temperance, 280.

σωφροσύνη. Attested: σωφροσύνη / σωφροσύνης (sōphrosynē / sōphrosynēs). Temperance or sound-minded self-restraint, the virtue whose proposed definitions the dialogue examines. References: 158b, 158e, 159a, 159d, 160c, 161a, 167a, 170d, 172e, 157b, 157d, 171d, 172c. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφροσύνη. See Temperance, 280.

σώφρων. Attested: σώφρων / σώφρονας (sōphrōn / sōphronas). Temperate or sound-minded; describes the possessor of the virtue under investigation. References: 158b, 167a, 159b. Lexical identification: lemma: σώφρων. See Temperance, 280.

τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. Attested: τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν (ta hautou prattein). Do one's own things or business; the contracted reflexive wording of the third proposed definition. References: 162a. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. The contracted reflexive αὑτοῦ and the full reflexive ἑαυτοῦ give two attested wordings of the same expression. See Doing one's own business, 92.

τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. Attested: τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν (ta heautou prattein). Do one's own things or business; the uncontracted reflexive wording of the same proposed definition. References: 161b. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. See Doing one's own business, 92.

ταριχοπωλέω. Attested: ταριχοπωλοῦντι (tarichopōlounti). Sell preserved fish; one of the occupations Critias disparages when interpreting Hesiod. References: 163b. Lexical identification: lemma: ταριχοπωλέω. See Manual trades and social contempt, 185.

ταὐτόν. Attested: ταὐτόν / ταὐτὸν (tauton / tauton). The same; crasis of τὸ αὐτό, used in identifying things or questioning whether two accounts coincide. References: 170a. Lexical identification: crasis: τὸ αὐτό; pronoun lemma: αὐτός. See Same and different, 259.

τάχος. Attested: τάχος / τάχους (tachos / tachous). Speed or quickness; a bodily or mental quality whose possession makes its possessor quick. References: 169e, 160b. Lexical identification: lemma: τάχος. See Quickness and slowness, 240.

ταχύς. Attested: ταχὺ (tachy). Quick or swiftly performed; an evaluative example whose merit depends on the activity. References: 159d. Lexical identification: lemma: ταχύς. See Quickness and slowness, 240.

ταχυτής. Attested: ταχυτὴς (tachytēs). Quickness, contrasted with slow or quiet performance when testing the first definition of temperance. References: 159d. Lexical identification: lemma: ταχυτής. See Quickness and slowness, 240.

τεκμαίρομαι. Attested: τεκμαίρομαι (tekmairomai). Infer from an indication; Socrates explains why the assumed usefulness of temperance now seems doubtful. References: 172c. Lexical identification: lemma: τεκμαίρομαι. See Evidence and proof, 104.

τεκμήριον. Attested: τεκμήριον (tekmērion). A sign or piece of evidence: Critias treats Charmides' continued submission to charming as evidence of temperance. References: 176b. Lexical identification: lemma: τεκμήριον. See Evidence and proof, 104.

τέλος. Attested: τέλος (telos). Completion or crowning condition: Critias presents knowledgeable action as a culminating condition of doing well. References: 173d.

Lexical identification: lemma: τέλος. See Knowledgeable living, 169.

τέχνη. Attested: τέχνης / τέχνῃ (technēs / technēi). Craft, art or skilled practice; a determinate expertise with its own work or domain. References: 161e, 165e, 171c, 175a. Lexical identification: lemma: τέχνη. See Craft and expertise, 70.

τεχνικῶς. Attested: τεχνικῶς (technikōs). With craft competence; describes well-made goods in the imagined life supervised by temperance. References: 173c. Lexical identification: lemma: τεχνικῶς. See Craft and expertise, 70.

τινός. Attested: τινός (tinos). ‘Of something’: the indefinite genitive marks a knowledge’s object without yet identifying its field. References: 165c. Lexical identification: lemma: τις (indefinite pronoun); genitive τινός. See Product and object of knowledge, 233.

τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι. Attested: τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι (to triton tōi sōtēri). ‘The third to the Saviour’: a proverbial ritual invocation marking the renewed attempt at a definition. References: 167a. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι. See Oath and divine invocations, 198.

τομή. Attested: τομῆς (tomēs). Cutting; with σκυτῶν, leather-cutting, the first craft example testing which knowledge contributes to happiness. References: 173d. Lexical identification: lemma: τομή. See Manual trades and social contempt, 185.

τοπάζω. Attested: τοπάσωμεν (topasōmen). Form a conjecture or estimate; the proposed diagnosis starts from an opinion, not a guaranteed insight. References: 159a.

Lexical identification: lemma: τοπάζω. See Belief and opinion, 40.

τυγχάνω. Attested: τυγχάνει (tynchanei). With οὖσα, medicine is in fact a knowledge; not necessarily an accidental or chance classification. References: 171a. Lexical identification: lemma: τυγχάνω. See Knowledge, 162.

ὑβριστικῶς. Attested: ὑβριστικῶς (hybristikōs). Insolently or outrageously; the inquiry is personified as mocking the partners by showing their account unbeneficial. References: 175d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑβριστικῶς. See Insolence of the inquiry, 153.

ὑγιαίνω. Attested: ὑγιαίνειν (hygiainein). Be healthy; medicine retains this result in the subtraction test, although Socrates says its occurring well and beneficially would be lost without knowledge of good and bad (174c–d). References: 174c, 174e. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑγιαίνω. See Health and disease, 137.

ὑγίεια. Attested: ὑγίειαν / ὑγιείας / ὑγίεια (hygieian / hygieias / hygieia). Health; the condition produced by medicine, distinct from the healthy as medicine's object. References: 157a, 165d, 157b, 175a. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑγίεια. See Health and disease, 137.

ὑγιεινός. Attested: ὑγιεινοῦ / ὑγιεινὸν / ὑγιεινόν (hygieinou / hygieinon / hygieinon). The healthy or health-related; the domain that medical knowledge recognizes, contrasted with what is diseased. References: 165c, 170a, 171a, 170b, 170c, 170e, 174b. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑγιεινός. See Health and disease, 137.

ὑγιής. Attested: ὑγιᾶ / ὑγιέσιν (hygia / hygiesin). Healthy or sound; describes the person or body rather than medical

expertise itself. References: 155e, 164a, 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑγιής. See Health and disease, 137.

Ὑπερβόρεος. Attested: Ὑπερβορέου (hyperboreou). Hyperborean; the legendary northern identity attached to Abaris, not a modern nationality. References: 158b. Lexical identification: lemma: Ὑπερβόρεος. See Abaris the Hyperborean, 21.

ὑπερφυῶς. Attested: ὑπερφυῶς (hyperphyōs). Extraordinarily, beyond the ordinary measure; an emphatic assent to the boy's attractiveness. References: 154d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑπερφυῶς. See Fine and beautiful, 112.

ὑπέχω λόγον. Attested: ὑπέχειν λόγον (hypechein logon). Answer for an account or submit it to questioning; Charmides tries to transfer that responsibility to Critias. References: 162c. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: ὑπέχω λόγον. See Argument and account, 30.

ὑπογελάω. Attested: ὑπεγέλα (hypegela). He smiled slightly or slyly; Charmides glances toward Critias while disclaiming knowledge of the saying. References: 162b. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑπογελάω. See Critias, 72.

ὑποδεής. Attested: ὑποδεεστέρα (hypodeestera). Inferior or falling short; negated in the praise of Charmides' maternal house as not inferior to his paternal one. References: 158a. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑποδεής. See Inferiority and poor performance, 150.

ὑπόδεσις. Attested: ὑπόδεσιν (hypodesin). Footwear; paired with clothing among the well-made products of genuine craftsmen. References: 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑπόδεσις. See Craft and expertise, 70.

ὑποκριτής. Attested: ὑποκριτῇ (hypokritēi). Actor or performer; the simile casts Charmides as a performer of Critias' poorly defended composition. References: 162d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑποκριτής. See Poet and actor, 217.

ὑπολαμβάνω. Attested: ὑπέλαβον (hypelabon). I supposed or inferred; Socrates' inference that Critias supplied the definition. References: 162c. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑπολαμβάνω. See Belief and opinion, 40.

ὑποτίθημι. Attested: ὑποθέμενος / ὑπετιθέμεθα / ὑπετέθη (hypothemenos / hypetithemetha / hypetethē). Lay down or suppose an account; introduces a definition or a case provisionally accepted for examination. References: 163a, 171d, 160d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑποτίθημι. See Hypothesis, 147.

ὑφαίνω. Attested: ὑφαίνειν (hyphainein). To weave; the city's absurd rule would require each person to weave his own cloak. References: 161e. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑφαίνω. See Doing one's own business, 92.

ὑφαντική. Attested: ὑφαντικῆς (hyphantikēs). The weaving craft; its cloak is a determinate product used as a comparison with mathematical expertise. References: 165e. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑφαντική. See Product and object of knowledge, 233.

φαίνομαι. Attested: φαίνεται (phainetai). Appear or seem; marks how Charmides' arrival presents itself to the observer, not a separate proof of what he is. References: 154a. Lexical identification: lemma: φαίνομαι. See Belief and opinion, 40.

φάρμακον. Attested: φάρμακον (pharmakon). A remedy; initially the material treatment associated with a leaf, distinguished from the spoken charm. References: 155b,

155c, 155e, 157b. Lexical identification: lemma: φάρμακον. See Remedy and leaf, 251.

φαῦλος. Attested: φαῦλος / φαυλότερον / φαῦλον (phaulos / phauloteron / phaulon). Poor, inferior or of little account; the comparative evaluates performance, while Socrates later belittles his own inquiry. References: 154b, 172b, 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: φαῦλος. See Inferiority and poor performance, 150.

φθέγγομαι. Attested: ἐφθέγξατο (ephthenxato). Utter or pronounce; Socrates asks whether the author of the definition spoke it as a riddle. References: 161d. Lexical identification: lemma: φθέγγομαι. See Conversation, 66.

φίλος. Attested: φίλε / φίλων / φίλον (phile / philōn / philon). Friend, friendly person or familiar address; the neuter can mean welcome or pleasing, as context requires. References: 155a, 155c, 157c, 158b, 160c, 169a, 172b, 173d, 174c, 161d, 158e. Lexical identification: lemma: φίλος. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

φιλοσοφία. Attested: φιλοσοφίας (philosophias). Philosophy, the cultivation or pursuit of wisdom, among the pursuits Socrates asks about on returning. References: 153d. Lexical identification: lemma: φιλοσοφία. See Philosophy and wisdom, 214.

φιλόσοφος. Attested: φιλόσοφός (philosophos). Philosophically inclined; Critias praises Charmides' disposition toward philosophy and poetry. References: 154e. Lexical identification: lemma: φιλόσοφος. See Philosophy and wisdom, 214.

φιλοτίμως. Attested: φιλοτίμως (philotimōs). With concern for honour or reputation; describes Critias' tense investment in Charmides' answer and the audience's

judgment. References: 162c. Lexical identification: lemma: φιλοτίμως. See Reputation and ambition, 252.

φλέγω. Attested: ἐφλεγόμην (ephlegomēn). I was burning; Socrates describes the force of erotic excitement. References: 155d. Lexical identification: lemma: φλέγω. See Fire and renewed confidence, 114.

φοβέομαι. Attested: φοβούμενος / φοβοίμην (phoboumenos / phoboimēn). Fear or be apprehensive; Socrates fears unrecognized ignorance and later worries that the inquiry is mistaken. References: 166d, 172e. Lexical identification: lemma: φοβέομαι. See Fear as a relative, 109.

φόβος. Attested: φόβον / φόβους (phobon / phobous). Fear; in the reflexivity example it is directed toward frightening things, not simply toward itself. References: 167e, 168a. Lexical identification: lemma: φόβος. See Fear as a relative, 109.

φρόνιμος. Attested: φρόνιμος (phronimos). Sensible or prudent; Critias invokes Hesiod and anyone sensible as people who would call the doer of his own business temperate. References: 163c. Lexical identification: lemma: φρόνιμος. See Philosophy and wisdom, 214.

φύλλον. Attested: φύλλον (phyllon). A leaf, the unidentified material ingredient of Socrates' proposed remedy. References: 155e. Lexical identification: lemma: φύλλον. See Remedy and leaf, 251.

φύω. Attested: πέφυκεν / πέφυκας / πεφυκώς (pephyken / pephykas / pephykōs). Be naturally constituted or disposed; perfect forms describe Charmides' disposition and the natural relations of powers. References: 169a, 158b, 154e. Lexical identification: lemma: φύω. See Being and nature, 38.

φωνή. Attested: φωνὴν / φωνῆς (phōnēn / phōnēs). Sound or voice, the ordinary object of hearing in the test of self-related capacities. References: 168d, 167d. Lexical identification: lemma: φωνή. See Hearing and sound, 139.

χαίρω. Attested: χαῖρε (chaire). ‘Rejoice’ or ‘be glad’, conventionally ‘greetings’; Critias contrasts this greeting with an injunction to be temperate. References: 164d. Lexical identification: lemma: χαίρω. See Advice and greeting, 24.

χαλκός. Attested: χαλκοῦ (chalkou). Bronze or copper as a craftsman’s material; not a claim that all work requires philosophical knowledge. References: 173e. Lexical identification: lemma: χαλκός. See Craft and expertise, 70.

Χαρμίδης. Attested: Χαρμίδην / Χαρμίδης (charmidēn / charmidēs). Charmides, son of Glaucon and cousin of Critias, the admired youth whose character becomes the first subject of the inquiry. References: 154b. Lexical identification: lemma: Χαρμίδης. See Charmides, 58.

χασμάομαι. Attested: χασμωμένους (chasmōmenous). Yawn; the bodily response supplies a simile for the involuntary transmission of perplexity. References: 169c. Lexical identification: lemma: χασμάομαι. See Contagious yawning, 65.

χείρων. Attested: χείρων (cheirōn). Inferior or worse; Critias says Charmides is inferior to no contemporary in other respects, with the qualification appropriate to his age. References: 157d. Lexical identification: lemma: χείρων. See Inferiority and poor performance, 150.

χράομαι. Attested: χρῷτο / κεχρημένῳ / χρῆσθαι (chrōito / kechrēmenōi / chrēsthai). Use or make use of a remedy or genuine craftspeople; the Homeric perfect κεχρημένῳ instead means being in need and belongs to the verb’s

want-or-need sense. References: 155e, 161a, 173c. Lexical identification: lemma: χράομαι. See Use and profit, 295.

χρῆμα. Attested: χρήματα (chrēmata). Things one uses or possessions in this context; the reference is broader than money alone. References: 173c. Lexical identification: lemma: χρῆμα. See Wealth and possessions, 298.

χρήσιμος. Attested: χρησίμους / χρησίμη (chrēsimous / chrēsimē). Useful or serviceable; qualifies Delphic advice and raises the question of what medicine contributes. References: 165a, 165c. Lexical identification: lemma: χρήσιμος. See Use and profit, 295.

χρηστός. Attested: χρηστὸν (chrēston). Good, useful or serviceable; asks whether the inquiry has found anything practically worthwhile. References: 172c, 175a. Lexical identification: lemma: χρηστός. See Use and profit, 295.

χρῶμα. Attested: χρῶμα (chrōma). Colour; the normal object of sight, omitted by the imagined sight that sees only itself and other sights. References: 167d. Lexical identification: lemma: χρῶμα. See Sight and colour, 265.

χωρίς. Attested: χωρὶς ἑκατέρου (chōris hekaterou). Separately from each of the two; the error is treating temperance and health in isolation. References: 157b. Lexical identification: lemma: χωρίς. See Whole and part, 304.

ψευδής. Attested: ψευδῆ (pseudē). False or untruthful; Charmides risks contradicting Critias' praise if he denies possessing temperance. References: 158d. Lexical identification: lemma: ψευδής. See Truth and falsehood, 290.

ψυχή. Attested: ψυχήν / ψυχὴν / ψυχῆς (psychēn / psychēn / psychēs). Soul, the bearer of character and mental activity; it is examined, praised and treated

through words. References: 154e, 157a, 160b, 175d, 156e. Lexical identification: lemma: ψυχή. See Soul, 272.

ὠφελέω. Attested: ὠφελοῖ / ὠφελήσει (ōpheloi / ōphelēsei). Benefit or help; asks whether temperance contributes an advantage distinct from the products of particular crafts. References: 169b, 174d, 174e, 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: ὠφελέω. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

ὠφελία. Attested: ὠφελία / ὠφελίας / ὠφελίαν (ōphelia / ōphelias / ōphelian). Benefit or advantage; the practical contribution sought from temperance after the question of its possibility. References: 167b, 171d, 175a, 165d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὠφελία. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

ὠφελίμη. Attested: ὠφελίμη (ōphelimē). Beneficial or useful, feminine; an inflectional/textual duplicate of ὠφέλιμος, present only in Burnet's secluded phrase at 174d. References: 174d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὠφέλιμος; feminine inflection ὠφελίμη. The words ἡ ὠφελίμη are secluded by Burnet at 174d; this is a qualified textual reading, not a separately attested dictionary lemma. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

ὠφέλιμος. Attested: ὠφέλιμος / ὠφέλιμον (ōphelimos / ōphelimon). Beneficial or useful; qualifies the contribution attributed to temperance or another knowledge, separately from technical competence. References: 174d, 175a, 171d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὠφέλιμος. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

ὠφελίμως. Attested: ὠφελίμως (ōphelimōs). Beneficially; qualifies how an action is done and must not be reduced to mere technical correctness. References: 163c, 174d. Lexical identification: lemma: ὠφελίμως. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

Further Greek reading vocabulary

The following brief entries cover additional substantive words and idioms. They give local senses and sample attestations; they are not additional five-part articles. A related article offers context without replacing the gloss. Dictionary lemmas are labelled when supplied alongside an inflected text form.

ἄγων (agōn). Leading or bringing; Chaerephon guides Socrates to his seat. References: 153c. Lemma: ἄγω. See Chaerephon, 53.

αἱρεῖσθαι (haireisthai). Middle/passive infinitive of αἱρέω; the edition construes the fawn as caught as a portion of meat. The syntax and the conjecture αἰτεῖσθαι require caution. References: 155d. Lemma: αἱρέω. See Lion and fawn, 177.

αἴτιον (aition). A cause or reason: neglect of the whole explains failures of treatment in the Thracian doctor's account. References: 156e. Lemma: αἴτιος. See Whole and part, 304.

ἁμῶς (hamōs). In some way or other; qualifies the problematic claim to know in some respect what one does not know. References: 175c. Lemma: ἁμῶς. See Knowing that and knowing what, 160.

ἀνακεῖσθαι (anakeisthai). Be set up or dedicated; describes the Delphic inscription's presence as a greeting. References: 164d. Lemma: ἀνάκειμαι. See Delphi and Apollo, 79.

ἀναπηδήσας (anapēdēsas). Having sprung up; marks the energy of Chaerephon's welcome. References: 153b. Lemma: ἀναπηδάω. See Chaerephon, 53.

ἀνδρῶν (andrōn). Adult men, distinguished from the boys who also gaze at Charmides. References: 154c. Lemma: ἀνήρ. See Youth and age, 313.

ἀνεζωπυρούμην (anezōpyroumēn). I was being rekindled; Socrates regains conversational boldness after the boy accepts the medical analogy. References: 156d. Lemma: ἀναζωπυρέω. See Socrates, 267.

ἀνέροιτο (aneroito). Asked or inquired; relates to Socrates' answering each person's questions about the campaign. References: 153d. Lemma: ἀνέρομαι. See Question and answer, 238.

ἀνήγετο (anēgeto). Was raising himself or moving to speak; introduces Charmides' question as Socrates becomes flustered. References: 155d. Lemma: ἀνάγω. See Erotic attraction, 101.

ἀνθρώπῳ (anthrōpōi). Human being or person; the healer extends the claim about body and soul to the whole person. References: 156e. Lemma: ἄνθρωπος. See Whole and part, 304.

ἀνιστάμενος (anistamenos). Getting up; the morning action associated with Charmides' head complaint. References: 155b. Lemma: ἀνίστημι. See Head and headache, 135.

ἀπέδομεν (apedomen). We assigned or attributed; knowing knowledge itself was allocated exclusively to temperance. References: 170e. Lemma: ἀποδίδωμι. See Knowledge of knowledge, 165.

ἀπέφαινε (apephaine). Showed or made out; the personified inquiry exposed the agreed temperance as unbeneficial. References: 175d. Lemma: ἀποφαίνω. See Insolence of the inquiry, 153.

ἀπήγγελται (apēngeltai). Has been reported; Socrates confirms the news brought back from the battle. References: 153c. Lemma: ἀπαγγέλλω. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

ἀπιέναι (apienai). Go away or depart; fixes the battle shortly before Socrates' return. References: 153b. Lemma: ἄπειμι (go away). See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

ἀποβλέψας (apoblepsas). Having looked toward; Critias turns his gaze to the doorway, while Socrates later directs attention toward an argument's consequences. References: 153d. Lemma: ἀποβλέπω. See Attention and sense, 35.

ἀποτρέπειν (apotrepein). Turn away or exclude; the supervisory temperance would prevent impostors from serving as prophets. References: 173c. Lemma: ἀποτρέπω. See Pretence and imposture, 230.

ἄριστε (ariste). My excellent fellow; a courteous vocative used within a probing question, not a proof of excellence. References: 168d. Lemma: ἄριστος. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

ἀρχῆς (archēs). Beginning; 'from the beginning' calls for a fresh statement of the definition. References: 163d. Lemma: ἀρχή. See Definition, 76.

ἀρχομένου (archomenou). Beginning; distinct from the governing sense of the same verb, here Critias starts his explanation. References: 163d. Lemma: ἄρχω (begin). See Conversation, 66.

ἀσθενοῖ (asthenoi). Be unwell; Critias reports Charmides' recent complaint as the pretext for a medical introduction. References: 155b. Lemma: ἀσθενέω. See Health and disease, 137.

ἀσμένως (hasmenōs). Gladly; Socrates is pleased to return to his accustomed haunts after the campaign. References: 153a. Lemma: ἀσμένως. See Socrates, 267.

ἀφιγμένος (aphigmenos). Having arrived; Socrates returns after a period away, before visiting his usual haunts. References: 153a. Lemma: ἀφικνέομαι. See Socrates, 267.

ἀφίημι (aphiēmi). I let go or relinquish; Critias abandons the preceding discussion before defending self-knowledge. References: 165b. Lemma: ἀφίημι. See Agreement and concession, 26.

βαδίζειν (badizein). To walk; ordinary gait is one example in Charmides' proposed quiet deportment. References: 159b. Lemma: βαδίζω. See Quietness, 242.

βαδισμῷ (badismōi). Walking or gait; repeated as a field in which quietness is not necessarily the finest performance. References: 160c. Lemma: βαδισμός. See Quietness, 242.

βαρύνεσθαί (barynesthai). To feel a heaviness or be weighed down in the head; the reported morning complaint. References: 155b. Lemma: βαρύνω. See Doctor and medicine, 85.

βέλτιστε (beltiste). My good fellow; a polite or pointed vocative, not a considered ranking of Critias' moral worth. References: 162d. Lemma: βελτίων. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

βελτίων (beltiōn). Better; Critias imagines that treatment of the head will improve the boy's mind as well. References: 157d. Lemma: βελτίων. See Soul, 272.

βλέπομεν (blepomen). Look toward or have in view; Socrates suggests that they may be expecting an

exaggerated benefit from temperance. References: 172c. Lemma: βλέπω. See Inquiry, 151.

γέγονεν (gegonen). Has become or grown; ordinary becoming or occurrence, here the change in Charmides since Socrates last saw him. References: 154b. Lemma: γίγνομαι. See Youth and age, 313.

γελάσας (gelasas). Having laughed; Charmides responds playfully to the question whether persuasion is required before receiving the charm. References: 156a. Lemma: γελάω. See Persuasion and obedience, 212.

γέλωτα (gelōta). Laughter; the seating scramble provoked by Charmides' arrival makes the company laugh. References: 155b. Lemma: γέλως. See Charmides, 58.

γεννάδα (gennada). My good fellow; a familiar vocative addressed by Socrates to his unnamed listener, not a proof of the listener's noble ancestry. References: 155d. Lemma: γεννάδας. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

γένος (genos). The human race or kind; the dream describes humanity organized under the proposed knowledge. References: 173c. Lemma: γένος. See Knowledge of knowledge, 165.

γνωρίμους (gnōrimous). People personally known to Socrates; acquaintances, not automatically intimate friends. References: 153a. Lemma: γνώριμος. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

δεῖσθαι (deisthai). Be in need of; Charmides says he still needs the charm despite the unsuccessful search for a definition. References: 176b. Lemma: δέομαι. See Charm, 54.

δὴ (dē). An inferential or emphatic particle; here marks the step now reached in distinguishing having knowledge from identifying its field. References: 171a. Lemma: δή. See Argument and account, 30.

διακειμένους (diakeimenous). Those disposed or situated in this way; refers back to people whose actions supposedly proceed without error under right guidance. References: 172a. Lemma: διάκειμαι. See Knowledgeable living, 169.

διανοούμενος (dianooumenos). Intending or having in mind; Critias infers what the dedicator of the Delphic inscription meant. References: 164e. Lemma: διανοέομαι. See Advice and greeting, 24.

διατιθέντι (diatithenti). Handling or treating badly; a performer mangles the poet's own work in the simile for Critias' anger. References: 162d. Lemma: διατίθημι. See Poet and actor, 217.

διατριβάς (diatribas). Familiar places or occupations in which Socrates spends his time; his accustomed haunts, not necessarily formal philosophical schools. References: 153a. Lemma: διατριβή. See Socrates, 267.

διαφέρει (diapherei). Makes a difference; Charmides challenges the relevance of the speaker's identity to the truth of the saying. References: 161c. Lemma: διαφέρω. See Truth and falsehood, 290.

διαφεύγειν (diapheugein). Escape; diseases elude Greek doctors because, according to the Thracian account, they neglect the whole. References: 156e. Lemma: διαφεύγω. See Whole and part, 304.

δίδωμι (didōmi). I allow or grant; Socrates permits Critias to assign words as he wishes, provided their reference is

made clear. References: 163d. Lemma: δίδωμι. See Definition, 76.

διεζῶμεν (diezōmen). We would live through or lead our lives; part of the conditional picture of an error-free life. References: 171d. Lemma: διαζάω. See Knowledgeable living, 169.

διεληλύθαμεν (dielēlythamen). Have gone through; summarizes the examples already examined before separating the impossible from the doubtful. References: 168e. Lemma: διέρχομαι. See Inquiry, 151.

διεμαρτυρόμεθα (diemartyrometha). We expressly maintained or insisted; recalls the agreed restriction of temperance to knowledge of knowledge. References: 174e. Lemma: διαμαρτύρομαι. See Knowledge of knowledge, 165.

διήγησαι (diēgēsai). Tell or recount the events; a request for a fuller narrative, before the inquiry about the youths. References: 153c. Lemma: διηγέομαι. See Argument and account, 30.

διισχυριζώμεθα (diischyrizōmetha). Assert confidently or insist; Socrates refuses yet to insist that the strange faculty is impossible. References: 168a. Lemma: διισχυρίζομαι. See Possibility and impossibility, 219.

δόσεως (doseōs). Giving or administration of the remedy; the charm is to precede this act. References: 158c. Lemma: δόσις. See Remedy and leaf, 251.

δοτέον (doteon). To be given, or requiring to be given: the verbal adjective states that the remedy should then be supplied. References: 158b. Lemma: δοτέος. See Remedy and leaf, 251.

δύνασθαι (dynasthai). Be able; the charm's supposed power extends beyond healing the head alone. References: 156b. Lemma: δύναμαι. See Power and capacity, 223.

δῶμεν (dōmen). Let us grant; the argument proceeds by explicitly allowing a disputed supposition. References: 172d. Lemma: δίδωμι. See Agreement and concession, 26.

ἐγγίγνεσθαι (engignesthai). Arise or come to be within; beautiful words produce temperance in souls in the healer's account. References: 157a. Lemma: ἐγγίγνομαι. See Charm, 54.

ἐγκεκωμιασμένη (enkekōmiasmenē). Celebrated in encomium or praise; the ancestry is presented through poets' commendation. References: 157e. Lemma: ἐγκωμιάζω. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

ἐδεδοίκη (ededoikē). I had been afraid; Socrates recalls his misgiving about the adequacy of his inquiry. References: 175a. Lemma: δέδοικα. See Inquiry, 151.

ἐθεῶντο (etheōnto). They gazed at him; the verb emphasizes sustained spectatorship in the statue comparison. References: 154c. Lemma: θεάομαι. See Statue, 274.

εἰκῇ (eikēi). At random or heedlessly; one should not dismiss an emerging doubt without scrutiny. References: 173a. Lemma: εἰκῇ. See Inquiry, 151.

εἶναί (einai). Be; the copular infinitive predicates blessedness of Charmides, conditionally on his possession of temperance. References: 176a. Lemma: εἰμί. See Being and nature, 38.

εἴπερ (eiper). If indeed or if it is the case that; makes the goodness inference depend on the agreed claim that

temperance makes people good. References: 161a. Lemma: εἴπερ. See Good and bad, 123.

εἰσῆλθον (eisēlthon). I entered; Socrates goes into Taureas' palaestra. References: 153a. Lemma: εἰσέρχομαι. See Palaestra, 208.

εἰσιόντα (eisionta). Entering or coming in; the participle describes Socrates as the company first sees him. References: 153b. Lemma: εἴσειμι. See Socrates, 267.

ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων (ek tōn eikotōn). On grounds of likelihood; the praise of Charmides' expected excellence rests on an inference from his ancestry. References: 157e. Lemma: εἰκός. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

ἐκβήσεται (ekbēsetai). Will turn out or come to an outcome; Socrates asks Critias to attend to where examination leads the argument. References: 166e. Lemma: ἐκβαίνω. See Refutation, 249.

ἐλθὼν (elthōn). Having come; describes Charmides' approach before he sits between Socrates and Critias. References: 155c. Lemma: ἔρχομαι. See Charmides, 58.

ἐναντίον (enantion). In the presence of; Socrates says that even a younger boy could properly converse with them while his guardian and cousin was present. References: 155a. Lemma: ἐναντίον. See Guardian and cousin, 131.

ἐνετέλλετο (enetelleto). Enjoined or charged; the healer insists that no patient's wealth, birth or beauty should override the order of treatment. References: 157b. Lemma: ἐντέλλομαι. See Treatment and regimen, 288.

ἐνόμισα (enomisa). I thought or judged; Socrates regards Cydias as wise about love, while Critias later attributes a

semantic judgment to Hesiod. References: 155d. Lemma: νομίζω. See Belief and opinion, 40.

ἐνοῦσαν (enousan). Being within; the argument supposes that temperance present in Charmides should give him some awareness of it. References: 159a. Lemma: ἔνειμι. See Presence and possession, 229.

ἐξεκέκοπτο (exekekopto). Had been knocked out; Socrates' earlier confidence is abruptly lost in Charmides' presence. References: 155c. Lemma: ἐκκόπτω. See Fire and renewed confidence, 114.

ἐπιρρεῖν (epirrein). Flow upon or into; the metaphor presents good and bad conditions as flowing from soul to body. References: 156e. Lemma: ἐπιρρέω. See Soul, 272.

ἐπισχὼν (epischōn). Having paused; Charmides stops to reflect before giving the second definition. References: 160e. Lemma: ἐπέχω. See Inquiry, 151.

ἐπιχειρεῖν (epicheirein). Attempt or undertake; used of treatment and, later, the attempt to examine or act. References: 156b. Lemma: ἐπιχειρέω. See Treatment and regimen, 288.

ἑπόμενον (hepomenon). Following; describes the crowd accompanying the youths, while at 173d Socrates uses the verb for following an argument so far. References: 154a. Lemma: ἕπομαι. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

ἔροιο (eroio). You might ask; a form of asking used in Socrates' hypothetical question about medicine's usefulness. References: 165c. Lemma: ἔρομαι. See Question and answer, 238.

ἑσπέρας (hesperas). In the evening; specifies the time of Socrates' return on the previous day. References: 153a. Lemma: ἑσπέρα. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

ἐσώθης (esōthēs). You were saved or survived; Chaerephon asks how Socrates came through the battle alive. References: 153b. Lemma: σῴζω. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

ἔτικτεν (etikten). Bore or gave birth to; Socrates calls Charmides fortunate in his birth, conditionally upon the adequacy of his soul. References: 158b. Lemma: τίκτω. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

εὐλαβεῖσθαι (eulabeisthai). To be on one's guard; Cydias warns the fawn against entering the lion's presence. References: 155d. Lemma: εὐλαβέομαι. See Lion and fawn, 177.

ἐφλεγόμην (ephlegomēn). I was burning; Socrates describes the force of erotic excitement. References: 155d. Lemma: φλέγω. See Erotic attraction, 101.

ἐώθει (eōthei). Was pushing; each seated admirer tries to create a place for Charmides beside himself. References: 155c. Lemma: ὠθέω. See Erotic attraction, 101.

ἐῶντος (eōntos). Allowing or permitting; negated, the argument did not warrant the concessions nevertheless made. References: 175b. Lemma: ἐάω. See Agreement and concession, 26.

ζῴη (zōiē). Would live; knowledgeable living is granted provisionally while its sufficiency for happiness remains unproved. References: 173d. Lemma: ζάω. See Knowledgeable living, 169.

ἦ δ' ὅς (ē d' hos). He said; the parenthetic speech formula uses a form of the old verb 'say', distinct from the interrogative or emphatic particle ἦ. References: 153b. Lemma: ἠμί. See Conversation, 66.

ἡγῇ (hēgēi). Do you think or regard; a cognitive use of the middle distinct from the guiding or governing sense. References: 161d. Lemma: ἡγέομαι (consider). See Belief and opinion, 40.

ἥδιον (hēdion). More gladly or with greater pleasure; Socrates would prefer to examine the definition with Critias as its responsible defender. References: 162e. Lemma: ἡδύς. See Conversation, 66.

ᾖα (ēia). I was going; the imperfect describes Socrates' movement toward his accustomed places. References: 153a. Lemma: εἶμι (go). See Socrates, 267.

ᾐτιώμην (ēitiōmēn). I blamed or found fault with; Socrates turns the failed inquiry's blame on himself. References: 175a. Lemma: αἰτιάομαι. See Inquiry, 151.

ἥκομεν (hēkomen). We had arrived or returned; the opening verb establishes Socrates' return from Potidaea. References: 153a. Lemma: ἥκω. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

ἡμέραι (hēmerai). Days; in the idiom ὅσαι ἡμέραι, day after day, marking Charmides' proposed continued attendance. References: 176b. Lemma: ἡμέρα. See Charm, 54.

ἠμφιέσθαι (ēmphiesthai). Be clothed; the continuing product of weaving in the test that separates craft outcomes from benefit. References: 174c. Lemma: ἀμφιέννυμι. See Cloak, 62.

ἦν δ' ἐγώ (ēn d' egō). I said; the conventional parenthetic formula uses the speech verb ἠμί, not the homographic imperfect 'I/he was' of εἰμί. References: 153c. Lemma: ἠμί. See Conversation, 66.

ἠνέσχετο (ēnescheto). Endured or put up with; negated, it explains why Critias can no longer tolerate Charmides' teasing. References: 162d. Lemma: ἀνέχομαι. See Anger and indignation, 29.

θαρρῶν (tharrōn). Take courage or be confident; Socrates encourages answering without personal defensiveness. References: 166d. Lemma: θαρρέω. See Refutation, 249.

θαυμάζω (thaumazō). I wonder or find it surprising; introduces the consequence that a temperate person might not know he is temperate. References: 164a. Lemma: θαυμάζω. See Strangeness and absurdity, 276.

θαυμαστὸς (thaumastos). Striking or marvelous; Socrates' first impression of Charmides' size and beauty. References: 154c. Lemma: θαυμαστός. See Fine and beautiful, 112.

θείου (theiou). Uncle; here a kinship noun, not the adjective meaning divine. References: 154b. Lemma: θεῖος. See Guardian and cousin, 131.

θρέμματος (thremmatos). A creature or animal; resumes the lion-and-fawn imagery while reversing the apparent roles of hunter and prey. References: 155e. Lemma: θρέμμα. See Lion and fawn, 177.

θύραν (thyran). Door or entrance; the direction toward which Critias looks before Charmides appears. References: 154a. Lemma: θύρα. See Palaestra, 208.

ἰσχυρὰ (ischyra). Fierce or severe; qualifies the reported battle. References: 153b. Lemma: ἰσχυρός. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

κάειν (kaein). Burn or heat; asks whether heat could exercise its power upon itself. References: 168e. Lemma: καίω. See Self-relation, 262.

καθεζόμενος (kathezomenos). Sit down or be seated; Chaerephon invites Socrates to sit and give his account. References: 153c. Lemma: καθέζομαι. See Palaestra, 208.

καθημένων (kathēmenōn). Sitting or seated; the seated company jostles to make room for Charmides. References: 155c. Lemma: κάθημαι. See Erotic attraction, 101.

καθίζει (kathizei). Seats or makes sit; Chaerephon places Socrates next to Critias. References: 153c. Lemma: καθίζω. See Palaestra, 208.

καθιστάναι (kathistanai). Appoint or establish; genuine seers would be installed as interpreters of future events. References: 173c. Lemma: καθίστημι. See Prophecy, 236.

κάλει (kalei). Call or summon; elsewhere the verb names or designates something, as in the dispute over doing and making. References: 155b. Lemma: καλέω. See Language and naming, 173.

καταφαίνεται (kataphainetai). Appears or becomes evident; strange consequences seem to emerge from the present account of temperance. References: 172c. Lemma: καταφαίνομαι. See Strangeness and absurdity, 276.

κατεβάλομεν (katebalomen). We knocked down; the scramble for a place beside Charmides pushes one man sideways off his seat. References: 155c. Lemma: καταβάλλω. See Erotic attraction, 101.

κατέλαβον (katelabon). Found or came upon; Socrates encounters a mixed company of familiar and unfamiliar people. References: 153a. Lemma: καταλαμβάνω. See Friendship and companionship, 119.

κατεσκευασμένον (kateskeuasmenon). Organized or equipped; describes the human community furnished with genuine experts in the dream hypothesis. References: 173c. Lemma: κατασκευάζω. See The dream hypothesis, 285.

κατέχων (katechōn). Holding himself back; Critias can no longer restrain his intervention. References: 162c. Lemma: κατέχω. See Critias, 72.

κέκτησαι (kektēsai). You possess or have acquired; the perfect describes Charmides' present possession of temperance, still to be investigated. References: 158d. Lemma: κτάομαι. See Presence and possession, 229.

κινδυνεύει (kindyneuei). It seems likely or looks that way; a cautious assent, not a literal danger. References: 160b. Lemma: κινδυνεύω. See Agreement and concession, 26.

κινδυνεύοντας (kindyneuontas). Being in danger, here at sea and in war; the literal sense differs from the hesitant assent at160b. References: 173b. Lemma: κινδυνεύω. See Pilot and navigation, 216.

κινεῖν (kinein). Move; tests whether motion itself could be what moves itself. References: 168e. Lemma: κινέω. See Self-relation, 262.

κοινῇ (koinēi). Together or jointly; Socrates proposes a shared examination rather than forcing a self-assessment. References: 158d. Lemma: κοινῇ. See Inquiry, 151.

κωλύσει (kōlysei). Prevent or hinder; navigation would still prevent death at sea, even without knowledge of good and bad. References: 174c. Lemma: κωλύω. See Pilot and navigation, 216.

λαβόμενος (labomenos). Taking hold; Chaerephon seizes Socrates' hand in greeting. References: 153b. Lemma: λαμβάνω. See Chaerephon, 53.

λείπεται (leipetai). Remains; Socrates says that no deliberation is left when Charmides proposes to use force. References: 176d. Lemma: λείπω. See Force and compulsion, 117.

λήκυθον (lēkython). An oil flask; one of the everyday objects that the absurd self-production rule would require each citizen to make. References: 161e. Lemma: λήκυθος. See Doing one's own business, 92.

ληρεῖν (lērein). To talk nonsense; Socrates introduces his dream with a self-deprecating warning. References: 173a. Lemma: ληρέω. See The dream hypothesis, 285.

λῆρον (lēron). A babbler or worthless talker, applied by Socrates to himself if Charmides already possesses the virtue. References: 176a. Lemma: λῆρος. See Socrates, 267.

λοιδορουμένους (loidoroumenous). Exchanging abuse or teasing; the young men enter noisily, not as decorous philosophical respondents. References: 154a. Lemma: λοιδορέω. See Youth and age, 313.

μεγαλοπρεπῶς (megaloprepōs). Magnificently or generously; ironizes how sweeping a concession the interlocutors made. References: 175c. Lemma: μεγαλοπρεπῶς. See Agreement and concession, 26.

μεγάλου (megalou). Great or outstanding; a person of considerable intellectual capacity is needed to settle reflexive powers. References: 169a. Lemma: μέγας. See Self-relation, 262.

μεγαλωστὶ (megalōsti). Greatly or on a grand scale; intensifies the benefit imagined from possessing the

proposed temperance. References: 171d. Lemma: μεγαλωστί. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

μέτρια (metria). Reasonable or measured; Critias accepts the request to attend to the argument. References: 166e. Lemma: μέτριος. See Argument and account, 30.

μητρὸς (mētros). Mother; introduces the maternal family line in the praise of Charmides' ancestry. References: 158a. Lemma: μήτηρ. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

μόγις (mogis). With difficulty or barely; Socrates struggles to answer after losing his composure. References: 155e. Lemma: μόγις. See Erotic attraction, 101.

νεανίαν (neanian). Young man; another youth-term used of Charmides, without fixing his numerical age. References: 155a. Lemma: νεανίας. See Youth and age, 313.

ξένου (xenou). The foreigner or stranger, namely the Thracian teacher; no claim that he is a technical guest-friend is required. References: 157c. Lemma: ξένος. See Thracians, 287.

ξύλων (xylōn). Wood or timber; another object of craft expertise. References: 173e. Lemma: ξύλον. See Craft and expertise, 70.

ὁδοῖς (hodois). Roads or streets; walking in public is an example of the decorous quietness Charmides proposes. References: 159b. Lemma: ὁδός. See Order and orderly conduct, 206.

οἷός τε (hoios te). Able or capable; this predicative idiom introduces the power to examine oneself and others. References: 167a. Lemma: οἷός τε. See Possibility and impossibility, 219.

ὀμμάτων (ommatōn). Eyes; an alternative noun for the organ whose treatment illustrates the dependence of part on whole. References: 156c. Lemma: ὄμμα. See Whole and part, 304.

ὀφθαλμοῖς (ophthalmois). Eyes; the bodily organ figures in Charmides' gaze and in the doctor's analogy of eye, head and body. References: 155d. Lemma: ὀφθαλμός. See Head and headache, 135.

παθεῖν (pathein). Have undergone or experienced; here the later dedicators supposedly made the mistake of construing a greeting as advice. References: 165a. Lemma: πάσχω. See Delphi and Apollo, 79.

παρακαθεζόμενος (parakathezomenos). Sitting down beside; describes Socrates joining Critias and the gathering. References: 153c. Lemma: παρακαθέζομαι. See Palaestra, 208.

παράσχῃ (paraschēi). Provide or allow; the patient must submit the soul to treatment before receiving the bodily remedy. References: 157b. Lemma: παρέχω. See Treatment and regimen, 288.

παρεγενόμην (paregenomēn). I was present or arrived on the scene; Socrates confirms firsthand participation in the battle. References: 153c. Lemma: παραγίγνομαι. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

παρεδίδομεν (paredidomen). We would hand over or entrust; tasks would be assigned to the people who know how to do them. References: 171e. Lemma: παραδίδωμι. See Ruling and supervision, 257.

παρεμπίπτουσαν (parempiptousan). Slipping in or intruding; personified ignorance would be prevented from joining the community's work. References: 173d. Lemma: παρεμπίπτω. See Lack of knowledge, 171.

παριέναι (parienai). Pass over or disregard; one should not neglect an apparent difficulty carelessly when one cares about oneself. References: 173a. Lemma: πάρειμι (pass by). See Care and neglect, 51.

παρρησιάσομαι (parrēsiasomai). I shall speak more frankly; Socrates now explains the charm's conditions openly to Charmides. References: 156a. Lemma: παρρησιάζομαι. See Conversation, 66.

πεπονθότα (peponthota). Being in the same condition; a perfect participle describes another person with the supposed awareness of knowing and not knowing. References: 171d. Lemma: πάσχω. See Knowing oneself, 156.

περιέλκεις (perielkeis). You drag me around; playful complaint that Critias has delayed specifying knowledge of good and bad. References: 174b. Lemma: περιέλκω. See Rascal, 244.

περιέρρεον (perierreon). Were flowing around; figuratively describes the audience crowding in a circle around Socrates and Charmides. References: 155d. Lemma: περιρρέω. See Erotic attraction, 101.

πιστεύεις (pisteueis). Trust or believe; Socrates asks whether Charmides accepts Homer's saying as well spoken. References: 161a. Lemma: πιστεύω. See Homer, 142.

πιστεύω (pisteuō). Trust or have confidence; Socrates does not trust his own ability to settle the reflexivity question. References: 169a. Lemma: πιστεύω. See Self-relation, 262.

πλύνειν (plynein). Wash; alongside weaving one's own cloak, illustrates the burdens of doing every task oneself.

References: 161e. Lemma: πλύνω. See Doing one's own business, 92.

πολέμῳ (polemōi). War; the general's expertise is expected to keep people safe, alongside navigation and medicine. References: 173b. Lemma: πόλεμος. See Craft and expertise, 70.

πορίζειν (porizein). To provide or procure; health is made available after temperance has arisen in the soul. References: 157b. Lemma: πορίζω. See Health and disease, 137.

πράγματος (pragmatos). Thing, affair or matter; Socrates would have studied something of no worth if the charm brought no benefit. References: 175e. Lemma: πρᾶγμα. See Worth and honour, 312.

πρόδρομοί (prodromoi). Forerunners; the young admirers' arrival heralds Charmides' entrance. References: 154a. Lemma: πρόδρομος. See Charmides, 58.

προΐοι (proioi). Go forward or make progress; the inquiry tentatively advances by granting the disputed possibility. References: 169d. Lemma: πρόειμι. See Inquiry, 151.

προσαγορεύει (prosagoreuei). Addresses or greets; Critias explains how the god speaks to visitors through the inscription. References: 164e. Lemma: προσαγορεύω. See Advice and greeting, 24.

προσέλθῃ (proselthēi). Approach or come to; a patient presents himself to doctors with painful eyes. References: 156b. Lemma: προσέρχομαι. See Doctor and medicine, 85.

προσιών (prosiōn). Approaching or coming up; announces Charmides' imminent arrival. References: 154a. Lemma: πρόσειμι (go toward). See Charmides, 58.

προσκαθορῶντι (proskathorōnti). Seeing in addition; noticing the relevant knowledge alongside the subject being learned. References: 172b. Lemma: προσκαθοράω. See Knowledge of knowledge, 165.

προσοίσω (prosoisō). I will apply or bring to; Socrates will apply the remedy to the head only after the soul has been charmed. References: 157c. Lemma: προσφέρω. See Remedy and leaf, 251.

προσὸν (proson). Present in addition; Socrates asks whether Charmides' beauty is accompanied by a further quality of soul. References: 154d. Lemma: πρόσειμι (be present). See Soul, 272.

προσποθῶ (prospothō). I still want to know; asks the further question of which knowledge makes the omniscient person happy. References: 174a. Lemma: προσποθέω. See Happiness and doing well, 133.

προσφέρῃ (prospherēi). You treat or approach; Socrates objects that Critias addresses him as though he already knew the answer. References: 165b. Lemma: προσφέρω. See Question and answer, 238.

προύβαλεν (proubalen). Put forward or proposed; the definition's author is pictured as setting a riddle. References: 162b. Lemma: προβάλλω. See Riddle, 255.

προυκαλούμην (proukaloumēn). Was inviting or challenging; Socrates had called on Critias to distinguish possible from impossible self-relations. References: 169c. Lemma: προκαλέομαι. See Examination, 106.

προφαίνεσθαι (prophainesthai). Show itself or come into view; the disturbing consequences must be examined despite Socrates' uncertainty. References: 172e. Lemma: προφαίνομαι. See Strangeness and absurdity, 276.

ῥᾳδίως (rhaidiōs). Easily; Critias challenges Socrates to find another completion of doing well besides knowledgeable action. References: 173d. Lemma: ῥᾴδιος. See Knowledgeable living, 169.

σκεύη (skeuē). Equipment or implements, as useful products of competent craftsmanship. References: 173b. Lemma: σκεῦος. See Craft and expertise, 70.

σκληρῶν (sklērōn). Hard or exacting; contrasted with the interlocutors' easygoing generosity toward the argument. References: 175d. Lemma: σκληρός. See Simple-mindedness, 266.

σκυτικὴ (skytikē). The leatherworking or shoemaking craft; it would still supply footwear without knowledge of good and bad, but Socrates says these results' occurring well and beneficially would be lost (174c–d). References: 174c. Lemma: σκυτική. See Craft and expertise, 70.

σκυτῶν τομῆς (skytōn tomēs). Cutting hides; a deliberately concrete craft task used to test which expertise produces happiness. References: 173d. Lemma: σκῦτος; τομή. See Craft and expertise, 70.

σμικρόν (smikron). Small or slight; with 'great', denies any degree of abandoning the proposed treatment. References: 176b. Lemma: σμικρός. See Adequacy and deficiency, 23.

σπουδῇ (spoudēi). With eagerness; each man pushes his neighbor to have Charmides beside him. References: 155c. Lemma: σπουδή. See Charmides, 58.

στλεγγίδα (stlengida). A strigil, the scraper used after exercise; paired with the oil flask in the self-production counterexample. References: 161e. Lemma: στλεγγίς. See Doing one's own business, 92.

στρατηγὸς (stratēgos). A general or military commander whose genuine expertise would be distinguished from imposture. References: 173b. Lemma: στρατηγός. See Pretence and imposture, 230.

συλλήβδην (syllēbdēn). In summary or taken together; introduces the compact formulation of quietness, and at 167d gathers the senses under a single test. References: 159b. Lemma: συλλήβδην. See Definition, 76.

συλλογισάμενος (syllogisamenos). Having reckoned or considered the points together; an invitation to gather one's observations, not a technical Aristotelian syllogism. References: 160d. Lemma: συλλογίζομαι. See Inquiry, 151.

συμβαίνειν (symbainein). To follow or result from the concessions; marks inferential consequence, not a mere coincidence. References: 164c. Lemma: συμβαίνω. See Argument and account, 30.

συμφέρομαι (sympheromai). I agree with; here a middle verb of agreement with the dedicator of the Delphic saying, not the impersonal sense 'be advantageous'. References: 164d. Lemma: συμφέρω. See Agreement and concession, 26.

συνελθοῦσαι (synelthousai). Having come together; the paternal and maternal houses are brought together in Charmides' descent. References: 157e. Lemma: συνέρχομαι. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

συνηγείρετο (synēgeireto). Was rising or reviving again; Socrates' boldness returns as Charmides approves the medical account. References: 156d. Lemma: συνεγείρω. See Fire and renewed confidence, 114.

συνόντα (synonta). Being with or associating with; Charmides remembers Socrates' company with Critias.

References: 156a. Lemma: σύνειμι (be with). See Friendship and companionship, 119.

συστῆσαι (systēsai). Introduce or bring into contact; Critias proposes to introduce Charmides to Socrates as a doctor. References: 155b. Lemma: συνίστημι. See Doctor and medicine, 85.

τεθνάναι (tethnanai). To have died; the reported deaths of acquaintances in battle. References: 153c. Lemma: θνῄσκω. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

τεθορυβημένοι (tethorybēmenoi). Thrown into agitation or excitement; describes the admirers' collective response. References: 154c. Lemma: θορυβέω. See Fine and beautiful, 112.

τίθεσθαι (tithesthai). Set or assign; Socrates allows Critias to choose names provided that he makes their referents clear. References: 163d. Lemma: τίθημι. See Language and naming, 173.

τὸ εὖ γε (to eu ge). Doing something well in the beneficial sense is singled out; competent production alone survives the subtraction of knowledge of good and bad. References: 174c. Lemma: εὖ. See Good and bad, 123.

τρεπόμενοι (trepomenoi). Turning toward or directing attention to; doctors treat the whole body through regimens rather than the isolated part. References: 156c. Lemma: τρέπω. See Treatment and regimen, 288.

τρέπωμαι (trepōmai). Turn or proceed to; Socrates avoids beginning medical treatment without first examining temperance. References: 158e. Lemma: τρέπω. See Treatment and regimen, 288.

τρόπῳ (tropōi). Way or manner; Socrates wonders how to make the charm's power clear to Charmides. References: 156b. Lemma: τρόπος. See Charm, 54.

τυγχάνουσιν (tynchanousin). With a supplementary participle, establishes what people are in fact doing or being; here they are the boy's advance party and admirers. References: 154a. Lemma: τυγχάνω. See Truth and falsehood, 290.

ὑόν (hyon). Son; the contracted accusative identifies Charmides as Glaucon's son. References: 154b. Lemma: υἱός. See Glaucon, 120.

ὑπάρχει (hyparchei). Belongs to or is already present for; Socrates says poetic distinction has long belonged to the family through Solon. References: 155a. Lemma: ὑπάρχω. See House, lineage and nobility, 143.

ὑπεκίνει (hypekinei). Was stirring or prompting; Charmides provokes Critias into taking responsibility for the answer. References: 162d. Lemma: ὑποκινέω. See Critias, 72.

ὑποβεβηκέναι (hypobebēkenai). Have fallen behind or come short of; negated in praise of Charmides' appearance compared with his predecessors. References: 158b. Lemma: ὑποβαίνω. See Fine and beautiful, 112.

ὑποδεδέσθαι (hypodedesthai). Be shod or have footwear on; a practical product of shoemaking remains even when knowledge of good and bad is removed. References: 174c. Lemma: ὑποδέω. See Manual trades and social contempt, 185.

ὑποδήματα (hypodēmata). Footwear or shoes; one of the goods every person would have to produce under a literal self-sufficiency rule. References: 161e. Lemma: ὑπόδημα. See Manual trades and social contempt, 185.

φάναι (phanai). Say or assert; the common speech verb can report agreement, a claim, or a retraction without itself certifying truth. References: 164d. Lemma: φημί. See Conversation, 66.

φέρῃς (pherēis). Apply or refer; Socrates asks what thing Critias applies each name to. References: 163d. Lemma: φέρω. See Language and naming, 173.

φράσαντος (phrasantos). Having said or explained; Critias identifies Socrates as knowing a remedy. References: 155c. Lemma: φράζω. See Doctor and medicine, 85.

χαλεπὸν (chalepon). Difficult; Socrates treats understanding the proposed formula as the task of solving a riddle. References: 162b. Lemma: χαλεπός. See Riddle, 255.

χειρός (cheiros). Hand; Chaerephon takes Socrates by it in his excited welcome. References: 153b. Lemma: χείρ. See Chaerephon, 53.

χρή (chrē). It is necessary or one ought; an impersonal expression used to press how Hesiod's claim should be understood. References: 163b. Lemma: χρή. See What ought to be done, 301.

χρήματα (chrēmata). Things one uses or possessions in this context; the reference is broader than money alone. References: 173c. Lemma: χρῆμα. See Craft and expertise, 70.

χρόνου (chronou). Time; διὰ χρόνου marks the interval since Socrates was last among his usual associates. References: 153a. Lemma: χρόνος. See Potidaea and the campaign, 221.

ὡρμῆσθαι (hōrmēsthai). Have originated or set out; the healer says bodily goods and harms start from the soul. References: 156e. Lemma: ὁρμάω. See Soul, 272.

ὠφελίμη (ōphelimē). Beneficial or useful, in the feminine form within Burnet's secluded phrase [ἡ ὠφελίμη]; not part of his accepted text. References: 174d. Lemma: ὠφέλιμος. Secluded by Burnet; retained here only as an explicitly qualified textual reading. See Beneficial and harmful, 41.

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