Plato Alcibiades I Lexicon

A Philological and Philosophical Reading Companion

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Introduction

This lexicon accompanies the complete *Alcibiades I*, 103a–135e, in the supplied Diotimos Editions Greek and English volume of 2026. It explains the dialogue's vocabulary in the course of its arguments, its dramatic action and its particular translation. The central question is how someone who wants to govern others can learn what it means to care for himself. The inquiry moves through the young Alcibiades' confidence, his inability to defend that confidence, his imagined foreign rivals, and the claim that care must be directed towards the soul. It ends with a beginning of care and a warning about the city's power, not with proof that the education has succeeded.

The title retains the dialogue's traditional attribution to Plato. That attribution is disputed. Neither its presence in the ancient corpus nor its usefulness as an introduction to philosophy settles who wrote it. Statements about what the dialogue says do not presuppose a decision about authorship. Where an article speaks of the author, the reference is to the writer of this work, whoever that was.

The text and the edition

The controlling source is the supplied *Alcibiades I Edition2*: John Burnet's Greek text, identified in its final editorial material as the Oxford edition of 1901, second edition 1910, in a later impression printed by John Johnson; the facing translation and notes are by Diotimos Editions, 2026. Earlier block-by-block production notes are part of the supplied file's history, not an authority to override its final Editorial Note. The Greek text, translation, apparatus, explanatory notes, introductory essays and glossary are distinct layers. An ancient word

printed in the dialogue is not the same evidence as a modern explanation of it in the notes.

The Greek has been compared throughout with the public Perseus transcription of Burnet's second volume. This comparison gives a useful check on transcription and precise Stephanus divisions. It does not supply an independent manuscript witness: both digital texts derive from Burnet. The principal difference is a six-word phrase at 104a, present in the supplied text and missing from the Perseus transcription; several further differences concern accents or breathings. The lexicon follows the supplied text. A further visual check against a scanned 1946 impression of Burnet's second volume confirmed the printed text and apparatus at 120a9, 130c–d and 133c1–17. These targeted checks do not amount to a complete collation of printed impressions or medieval manuscripts.[1]

Burnet's square brackets mark words he regarded as intrusive, while angle brackets mark words supplied from conjecture or another witness. The supplied translation generally omits the former and renders the latter. A lexical form in a rejected passage therefore cannot be cited without qualification as a word translated on the English page. Articles discussing such material identify its textual status. The most consequential case is the extended image of god as the finest mirror at 133c8–17: it is supplied from Eusebius, absent from the principal

[1] Perseus Digital Library, *Platonis Opera*, vol. 2, edited by John Burnet, Oxford, 1910, text identifier tlg0059.tlg013.perseus-grc2. The public TEI transcription is available through the Perseus canonical Greek repository. It was used to check the supplied Greek and Stephanus segmentation, with the supplied edition controlling differences. A public scan of the 1946 impression supplied the separate printed checks: PDF pages 335, 353 and 358–359, corresponding to 120a9, 130c–d and 133c1–17. Its imprint lists 1901 as the first edition and reprints through 1946; it is not claimed to be the same physical impression underlying the supplied volume.

manuscripts B and T, and disputed. The divine likeness of the soul's knowing region at 133b–c is already present before those supplied lines. Rejecting the extension would not remove all divine language from the argument.

How to use the book

The 175 main articles are arranged under English headwords. Each begins with Greek forms, a readable transliteration and, where useful, a labelled dictionary lemma or phrase. An attested inflection and the dictionary form under which one might look it up are kept distinct. The five recurring divisions are **The word**, **In Alcibiades I**, **The places**, **In this edition** and **See also**. They move from local lexical meaning to the work done by the expression, then to annotated passages, translation or textual issues, and connected readings. An analytical English heading is not a claim that an identically named Greek technical noun occurs in the dialogue.

The first index combines original forms, transliterations and English aliases. Its Greek vocabulary register contains 499 individually defined and attested records. These short records give useful meanings in their own right; following their links is optional. A register record may identify a lemma, a phrase or a carefully labelled family. Its count must not be mistaken for the number of full articles or for a count of distinct dictionary lemmas. There are also 202 further contextual glosses and 1792 lexical access labels. These labels are finding aids, not additional definitions. The counts of articles, register records, contextual glosses and access labels describe different kinds of material and should not be added into a claim about distinct Greek lemmas.

The passage index traverses all 162 extant Stephanus letter sections, 103a–135e. The short first page contains

only 103a and 103b; there are no missing entries for 103c–e. Ranges in an article identify the stretch of discussion being interpreted. They do not assert that every form displayed in that article occurs in every section of the range. The compact register supplies exact sample attestations. The thematic index offers overlapping routes through ethics, knowledge, education, political ambition, the body, love, divine guidance, images and historical persons. The printed contents and indexes also give this lexicon's page numbers; those locators should not be confused with Stephanus references to the dialogue.

A map of the argument

103a–105e: An unusual lover and an unlimited ambition. Socrates explains a long silence by a divine opposition which has now ceased. He recounts the advantages on which Alcibiades relies, then imagines an ambition too large to be satisfied even by European supremacy. His claim to be indispensable is also a lover's claim. At this point the prospect of education is entangled with competition for influence over the young man.

106a–107d: What qualifies an adviser? Socrates offers questions rather than a long display speech. Knowledge is said to come through learning or discovery, both requiring a desire to acquire what one does not suppose one already knows. Alcibiades' acknowledged education does not cover building, shipbuilding, medicine or divination. He identifies the city's affairs, especially war and peace, as his intended advisory domain.

107d–109c: Better in what respect? Examples from wrestling and music make Alcibiades specify the expertise that determines what is better. In warfare and peace the decisive standard becomes justice. The transition is not merely from ignorance of a name to knowledge of it: the

young man must say what warrants a proposed course of action and what sort of understanding he claims.

109d–112d: Where was justice learned? Alcibiades cannot name a time before he thought he knew what was just, so cannot account for discovering it. The many provide a possible alternative source. Their shared command of ordinary Greek is granted, but their violent disagreements over justice make them poor teachers of that subject. Epic and recent battles illustrate the disagreement. The many are not dismissed as incapable of teaching anything.

112e–113c: Whose conclusion is it? Counting and spelling examples establish that the respondent supplies the answer. Socrates presses Alcibiades to accept responsibility for the admissions from which his ignorance follows. The altered quotation from Euripides makes that responsibility a dramatic accusation. It does not erase the questioner's control over the sequence of questions.

113d–116d: Justice and advantage. Alcibiades argues that public deliberation is about advantage, which he separates from justice. The rescue of comrades distinguishes courage, through which an action is fine, from injury or death, through which it is bad. Socrates asks whether the contrary judgments hold in the same respect. The argument then connects fine action with doing well and happiness, and combines the accepted links from just to fine, good and advantageous. Its dependence on the respondent's premises and the ambiguity of doing well must remain visible.

116e–119a: Ignorance that thinks it knows. Alcibiades' unstable answers become the symptom of a specific ignorance. Acknowledged inability need not lead

to error: someone who knows he cannot steer or cook can leave the task to another. The dangerous condition is nonknowledge coupled with a belief in knowledge, especially about the greatest practical questions. Pericles' ability to teach is challenged, despite his association with recognized intellectual figures; Zeno provides the contrasting example of named pupils.

119b–124b: The scale of the rivals. Alcibiades thinks natural superiority will suffice against uneducated politicians. Socrates shifts the comparison to Spartan and Persian rulers. Royal ancestry, training, wealth and institutional discipline expose the inadequacy of that confidence. The speech is an exhortation built from exaggerated contrasts and imagined royal judgments, not a neutral ethnographic inventory. The command to know oneself first concerns where Alcibiades stands relative to those he intends to confront.

124b–127e: Good at what and good for whom? Socrates includes himself in the need for care. The apparent ideal of the fine and good man is tested through the ordinary structure of being good at something. Alcibiades names good counsel as the knowledge of civic rule and friendship or concord as its product. Differences of expertise within a household make the proposed connection with doing one's own business difficult. His admission that he does not know what he is saying opens a new possibility for care while he is still young.

127e–129b: Caring for a thing and its belongings. Shoes and feet, rings and fingers, clothes and the body distinguish care of an object from care of what belongs to it. The proper craft is what makes its own object better. To identify the craft of caring for oneself, the inquiry must determine what oneself is. The Delphic command is no

longer satisfied by a competitive assessment of social resources.

129b–130e: The user and the body. Speech, cutting tools, musical instruments and bodily organs establish the proposed difference between a user and what is used. The body is ruled; the soul rules. Of soul, body and their combination, the soul is accordingly identified as the human being. Socrates immediately qualifies the result as adequate rather than precise, because the self itself has not yet been examined with the intended exactness. The practical conclusion supports the claim that the conversation addresses soul to soul.

131a–132c: The true beloved and the dangerous people. Bodily knowledge and concern for possessions are separated from self-knowledge and care. Socrates says he loves Alcibiades himself and will remain when admirers of bodily bloom leave. Yet Alcibiades may become a lover of the people. The erotic warning, Homeric quotation and image of educational antidotes join the inner question to the public ambition from which the discussion began.

132c–133c: Seeing oneself. An eye sees its reflection in another eye, at the region responsible for sight. A soul is analogously directed towards soul, particularly its knowing and wise region. This is not a recommendation to inspect physical appearance indefinitely, nor an explicit complete theory of introspection. The retained divine comparison and the supplied god-as-mirror extension must be interpreted with their different textual standing in view.

133c–134c: Revising the concession and governing well. Knowing oneself is treated as temperance. The earlier concession that someone might know what

belongs to him while not knowing himself is now revised: discriminating self, its own and what belongs to its own requires the relevant connected understanding. Error in those relations damages private and public conduct. The city needs virtue; material power alone cannot supply happiness. The aspiring ruler must acquire what he proposes to impart.

134d–135c: Virtue before license. Orientation towards what is divine and bright is opposed to godless darkness. The sick tyrant and the unskilled helmsman show how unrestricted power can damage oneself and others. The conclusion recommends justice and temperance rather than the mere ability to do whatever one wishes. Before acquiring virtue, being ruled by someone better is said to be preferable. The ethical contrast between freedom and slavery uses ancient social categories that must not be silently modernized.

135c–e: A promise under a warning. Alcibiades expects Socrates to release him from his shameful state; Socrates adds the condition of divine willingness. Their roles as pursuer and attendant are reversed, and the stork image makes love reciprocal. Alcibiades promises to begin caring for justice. Socrates wishes him success but fears that the city's strength will defeat them both. Nothing in the closing exchange demonstrates a completed or permanent conversion.

Distinctions that govern the reading

The dramatic speaker and the author. Socrates' claims, Alcibiades' concessions, imagined royal speeches, poetic quotations and editorial explanations do not have identical authority. A claim made to awaken ambition may function differently from a premise established by

the questioning. The articles identify these shifts rather than attributing every statement indiscriminately to Plato.

The meanings of good and fine. Being good at shoes differs from being good without qualification. A beautiful body and a fine action share the *kalos* family without being the same object of evaluation. Courage in a rescue and death resulting from it are distinguished before the relation between the fine and the good is argued. The inference should neither be flattened into a slogan nor silently repaired into a more familiar modern theory.

Ignorance and self-recognition. The dialogue condemns more than a lack of information. Alcibiades' presumption blocks learning and makes him intervene where he should defer. Recognition of that condition is progress, but does not itself deliver all the expertise he lacks. His perplexity and final willingness are stages of an educational relationship, not substitutes for its completion.

Care and possession. A person, that person's body, and the body's equipment are distinguished through relations of use and ownership. The inquiry later revises what it allowed about knowing these levels separately. Care is therefore not reducible to maintenance of belongings, but neither does the final argument make material relationships irrelevant to knowledge.

Provisional identity and exact inquiry. The soul's identification as the person provides the needed direction for care, yet the text expressly postpones greater precision. Neither an unqualified dualist dogma nor a dismissal of the soul conclusion captures this combination. The difficult expressions for the self itself and each thing itself remain interpretive problems with consequences for the argument.

Self-knowledge and the other. The eye analogy directs the eye towards another eye and the soul towards soul. It gives a relational image rather than merely commanding private inward inspection. How the divine comparison completes that image is partly a textual question and partly an interpretive one. The disputed supplied lines must not be made the only foundation for claims already present before them.

Scope and scholarly use

This reading lexicon covers concepts, ordinary words with argumentative force, examples, social roles, names and images. It is not a token-by-token morphological concordance. Smaller candidates receive definitions and exact attestations; related senses are grouped where that clarifies a passage.

Checks include the supplied text, a complete digital Greek comparison, targeted printed verification and an independent omission and argument review. They do not constitute external human peer review or manuscript collation. For disputed textual and authorship questions, consult critical editions and specialist scholarship. Denyer's commentary is an important reference, not an authority followed throughout.[2]

[2] Nicholas Denyer, ed., *Plato Alcibiades*, Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics, Cambridge University Press, 2001. Publisher's record. The supplied edition discusses Denyer's defence of authenticity and his rejection of the additional mirror passage; those are distinct judgments and need not stand or fall together.

Lexicon

Account and definition

τί ἐστιν (ti estin); ὅτι ἐστί (hoti esti); ὀνομάζεις (onomazeis); καλεῖς (kaleis)

The word. Questions of what something is and what one calls it seek clarification of an object's identity or an expression's content. The verbs ὀνομάζειν and καλεῖν mean naming or calling. They need not demand a formal definition of genus and differentia. Their local function is to move from an unexamined commendation or label to the standard or object actually intended.

In Alcibiades I. At 108b–109a Socrates asks Alcibiades to name the better in the several activities. Gymnastic and musical provide examples of a governing standard; the corresponding political standard proves harder. The request is not satisfied by repeating "better." Alcibiades must say in what respect the activity is better and toward what it is directed.

At 124e–125e the same method unpacks "good men," "managing affairs," and "ruling." Each broad expression must be specified by its object and the knowledge relevant to it. A civic title cannot secure the competence it claims. At 126d–127d "friendship" and "concord" similarly need an account of what they are, what they concern, and which craft produces them. The failure is exposed through conflicting applications rather than by a definition merely declared incorrect.

At 127e the explicit "what is caring for oneself?" begins a more constructive inquiry. At 129b–130d it leads from the object of care to what we ourselves are. Socrates

nevertheless distinguishes the account achieved from the fuller question of the self itself. The dialogue thus repeatedly demands intelligible content while acknowledging that one practical identification can fall short of a fully precise definition.

The Greek forms listed are ordinary question and naming expressions, not an attested technical noun for definition. Their importance lies in how they force words of approval, authority, and identity to bear a determinate meaning.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

108b–109a. Naming the better requires specification of its governing standard

124e–125e. Goodness and rule are clarified by their objects

126d–127d. Friendship and concord fail to receive a coherent account

127e–130d. The definition of care leads to the self, with an explicit limit on precision

In this edition. The edition alternates “what is,” “what do you mean,” and “what do you call” according to the Greek construction. These are not interchangeable everywhere: naming an activity and identifying what the person actually is are related but distinct questions.

See also. Argument; Knowing; Care for oneself; The self itself and each self.

Achaemenes

Ἀχαιμένους (Achaimenous)

The word. The ancestor from whom Socrates says the Persian kings descend, parallel to Heracles for the Spartans.

In Alcibiades I. The paired genealogies invite Alcibiades to compare his own family with dynasties said to be continuously royal. Socrates traces the family of Achaemenes, like that of Heracles, to Perseus son of Zeus. Alcibiades responds by asserting his own descent from Eurysaces and Zeus, which occasions Socrates' comic claim to Daedalus. Achaemenes thus belongs to an escalating comparison of pedigree rather than a detached genealogical notice. The dialogue neither explains the intervening generations nor provides an account of Persian origins independent of this rhetorical use.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

120e. The Persian ancestor is named in the paired dynastic genealogy.

In this edition. The apparatus records omission of part of the paired clause by B's first hand and its presence in T and a later hand of B. Burnet prints the full comparison.

See also. Heracles and the Heraclids; Perseus; Ancestry, nature and upbringing.

Adequacy and precision

ἱκανῶς (hikanōs); ἀκριβῶς (akribōs); μετρίως (metriōs); ἐξαρκεῖ (exarkei)

The word. Ἱκανῶς means sufficiently, ἀκριβῶς precisely or exactly, and μετρίως moderately or adequately. Ἐξαρκεῖ

says that something suffices. At 130c these words establish different standards of argumentative achievement. “Adequate” is not a synonym for false, and “precise” is not merely more persuasive. An account can serve the present inquiry while leaving its larger explanatory object unexamined.

In Alcibiades I. After the elimination of body and composite, Socrates asks whether Alcibiades needs a clearer proof that soul is the human being. Alcibiades says the account is sufficient. Socrates accepts that, even if it is not precise but only adequate, it suffices for them. Exact knowledge is deferred until they discover what they have passed over because it needs much examination. At 130d he identifies the omitted inquiry as the self itself and distinguishes it from the question of each thing itself.

This is an explicit limitation supplied by the principal speaker, not a difficulty imposed only by later commentators. It governs how the result should be used. The following conclusions about conversation, care, and love proceed on the working identification of the person with soul; they do not wait for a complete solution of selfhood. At 132b Socrates recapitulates that what they are has been agreed “fairly well,” again resisting the strongest possible epistemic claim.

The cautious language also belongs to the dialogue’s shared method. Alcibiades’ satisfaction does not automatically produce precision, and Socrates does not pretend that it does. The partners distinguish enough agreement to advance from the fuller investigation needed to settle the original issue. This is compatible with strong practical demands: one should care for soul and acquire virtue. Provisionality qualifies the grounding of the identification without reducing every ensuing recommendation to idle speculation.

The broader lesson is interpretive discipline. The proposition “the human being is soul” should neither be quoted as an unqualified final metaphysical theorem nor dismissed as something the dialogue retracts. It is retained as adequate, with its limits named.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

130c–130d. Sufficiency is distinguished from precision, and the omitted inquiry is identified

132b. The working account is recalled as fairly well agreed

In this edition. Burnet prints ἀλλὰ καὶ μετρίως, absent from B but present in T and W according to the supplied apparatus. The edition renders the contrast “if not precisely, then adequately at least.” It also keeps “perhaps that will suffice” at 130d, preserving the qualification.

See also. The self itself and each self; Soul; Proof; Agreement as evidence.

Admission

ὁμολογήσειέν (homologēseien); συγχωρῶ (synchōrō); τῶν ὡμολογημένων (tōn hōmologēmenōn)

The word. An admission acknowledges a proposition or grants a point. Ὁμολογεῖν can mean agreeing with someone and, in a suitable context, admitting something one might prefer to conceal. Συγχωρεῖν means conceding or granting. The two words belong to a conversational practice of committing oneself, not a rule that any concession automatically establishes truth.

In Alcibiades I. At 109c Alcibiades says that even someone who intended to wage war against people acting justly would not admit it. The verb marks a gap between

intention and public acknowledgment. Socrates uses the accepted constraints of what can be said honorably to bring the discussion toward justice. A reader should not confuse the refusal to admit an unjust intention with proof that no such intention exists.

At 113b the things agreed become premises from which Alcibiades must recognize himself as the speaker of the resulting verdict. Admission now concerns accountability for one's own answers. The technique reappears at 116d after the argument about justice and advantage.

At 119b Alcibiades concedes that most politicians are uneducated but initially draws an excuse for his own neglect. This shows why agreement with a criticism is not enough: the practical conclusion drawn from it may still be wrong. At 133d Socrates himself corrects an earlier agreement about specialist knowledge. The dialogue thus treats concessions as revisable commitments within inquiry. They must be followed through and, where necessary, withdrawn rather than protected simply because both speakers once accepted them.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

109c. Admission is distinguished from a concealed intention

113a–113c. Agreed answers make the respondent responsible for the conclusion

119b. A conceded criticism is initially used to excuse neglect

133d–133e. Socrates expressly corrects an earlier agreement

In this edition. "Admit" at 109c and "agree" elsewhere can render the same ὁμολογ- family. "Concede" at 119b renders συγχωρῶ. Neither should be automatically

translated as “confess,” which could add a personal or religious coloring absent from the particular exchange.

See also. Question and answer; Agreement as evidence; Refutation; Knowledge of one’s own and others.

Advantage

τὰ συμφέροντα (ta sympheronta); συμφέρει (sympherei); συνοίσει (synoisei); ἐλυσιτέλησεν (elysitelēsen)

The word. Τὰ συμφέροντα is the substantivized participial expression for advantageous things or courses: what benefits those concerned, what works to their advantage. The verb’s future συνοίσει and perfect συνήνεγκεν belong to the same family as συμφέρει. At 113d the distinct verb ἐλυσιτέλησεν expresses having profited or found something worthwhile. The dialogue does not introduce a technical division between private utility and public interest by vocabulary alone; one must ask whose advantage and what action are under consideration.

In Alcibiades I. At 113d Alcibiades makes his most plausible attempt to recover his position as a political adviser. The Greeks, he says, think questions of justice obvious and generally deliberate instead about what will be advantageous if they act. He appeals to experience: some have profited from great wrongdoing, others have acted justly without advantage. This is his claim, not a neutral description endorsed by Socrates. It combines an assertion about actual deliberation with an ethical distinction and an implied claim that Alcibiades understands expediency even if he cannot explain justice.

Socrates initially separates these issues. Even granting that just and advantageous things differ, Alcibiades still owes an account of knowing what benefits human beings

and why. The same learning-or-discovery questions apply. Socrates declines to repeat them at length because Alcibiades dislikes a reused argument; he does not concede expertise in advantage. He then asks Alcibiades to demonstrate that justice and advantage differ. Being unable to persuade one competent interlocutor would be an awkward preparation for persuading the Assembly.

The subsequent proof works through evaluative links, not through a survey of political outcomes. All just things are conceded fine. Alcibiades resists the further identification of fine and good by invoking rescue in battle: rescuers may die, while men who fail to help survive. Socrates separates the courage displayed from the wounds or death incurred. Rescue is fine insofar as courageous, and courage is a good Alcibiades would not exchange away; its bad aspect is different. At this point the explicit result is qualified: nothing fine is bad insofar as it is fine. A single course can still have good and bad aspects.

At 116b Socrates adds another route. Fine conduct is doing well; those who do well are happy through possessing goods, which they acquire by doing well and finely. Because εὖ πράττειν can mean both acting well and faring well, this step binds right conduct to success in living. At 116c the conclusion is generalized: whatever is found fine will also be found good, “from this argument at least.” Good things are then conceded advantageous. Recalling the earlier premise that just actions are fine produces the conclusion that just things are advantageous at 116d.

Readers should distinguish the conclusion the speakers accept from a proof that every immediate external consequence of a just act is favorable. The rescue example expressly preserves death and injury as bad. Nor does the

chain establish the converse proposition that anything apparently profitable is just. Socrates' recap at 116d–e speaks of just and advantageous things as the same, but the stated inferential route establishes that the just is advantageous through the fine and good; it does not separately test every candidate advantage. The ethical pressure is to reconsider what counts as genuine benefit, rather than to guarantee military survival.

The practical result is diagnostic. Alcibiades cannot maintain his original distinction under questioning, yet does not possess a settled replacement. At 117a he includes advantageous and nonadvantageous things among the matters on which he wanders; at 118a these are among the greatest matters. Later arguments about the benefits of virtue and the ruinous effects of unrestricted power continue this problem in different vocabulary. Advantage is therefore a hinge between political calculation and self-examination, not a self-sufficient alternative to justice.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

113d–114b. Alcibiades distinguishes profit and advantage from justice; Socrates challenges both his knowledge and the distinction

114d–115a. Socrates promises that the respondent will hear from himself that just things are advantageous

115b–116a. The rescue example establishes aspect-qualified relations among fine, good, and bad

116b–116e. Doing well and happiness lead to the accepted justice-to-advantage inference and renewed perplexity

117a–118a. Advantageous and nonadvantageous matters belong to the unstable judgments of greatest consequence

In this edition. The consistent "advantageous" preserves a term that "useful," "profitable," and "beneficial" might

otherwise scatter. “Profited” at 113d renders λυσιτελεῖν, not a second occurrence of συμφέρειν. The supplied καί at 114e8 makes the promise “just things are also advantageous”; Burnet takes it from Stobaeus. The distinct value terms in the intermediate proof should remain distinct even where its conclusion connects them.

See also. Justice and injustice; Fine conduct; Good and bad; Doing well; Happiness and wretchedness; Benefit and harm.

Aesop

Αἰσώπου μῦθον (Aisōpou mython); ἀλώπηξ (alōpēx); λέοντα (leonta)

The word. Aesop is named as the source of the fox-and-lion fable used to picture the one-way movement of money into Sparta.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates says the signs of money entering Lacedaemon are visible, while signs of it leaving cannot be found. The fable is invoked through what the fox said to the lion, without a full retelling of the animals’ encounter. Its force is the readable trace: inward tracks support the claim of accumulation and the absence of outward tracks reinforces it. The analogy is witty but does not independently prove the comparative totals Socrates asserts. The dialogue employs a recognizable story as an image of hoarding within the larger humiliation of Alcibiades’ financial confidence.[3]

[3] The supplied edition, note 44 on 123a, identifies Aesop, fable 142 in Perry’s numbering, and compares Horace, Epistles 1.1.73–75. The cave narrative is the note’s explanation of the abbreviated allusion.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

122e–123a. Gold and silver accumulate in Sparta; the fable supplies the tracks image.

In this edition. The cave and the sick lion's pretence are supplied in the explanatory note, not narrated in the Greek passage. Burnet records proposals to delete parts of the allusion but retains them in his text.

See also. Lion's tracks and hoarded money; Wealth and property; Sparta and Lacedaemon.

Agreement as evidence

ὁμολογεῖν (homologein); μὴ διαφέρεσθαι (mē diapheresthai); τεκμήριον (tekmērion)

The word. Ὁμολογεῖν is agreeing or saying the same; διαφέρεσθαι is disagreeing. Agreement can be interpersonal or a person's consistency with himself. In the teaching argument it supplies evidence of competence, while disagreement supplies a test against the claimed competence. This evidential use must be distinguished from the partners' assent to a premise and from political concord, ὁμόνοια.

In Alcibiades I. At 111a–b Socrates obtains two requirements: teachers must first know their subject, and knowers agree rather than disagree about it. The many satisfy the test for ordinary Greek usage. Their speech and their reaching for the same kinds of objects demonstrate a stable public practice. They fail the proposed test in expert discrimination and, most dramatically, in disputes over justice that produce war and death.

The argument is not simply that whatever a majority agrees upon is true. Its direction is principally from

knowledge to agreement and from conspicuous disagreement to doubt about knowledge. The many's success in language is supported by coordinated use, not by counting votes. Nor does conflict by itself identify which of the opposing parties is right; it undermines the appeal to the entire many as reliable teachers.

Within the dialogue, agreement has another role: it registers commitments from which conclusions are drawn. Those agreements can later be corrected. At 133d Socrates expressly retracts the concession that specialists can know their own while not knowing themselves. Agreement therefore functions as a working basis for inquiry, not an untouchable guarantee.

These distinctions help with the later concord argument. Knowing the same subject is there used to explain like-mindedness, but the resulting problems about friendship are not solved by simply repeating the earlier linguistic consensus. Similar vocabulary operates at different argumentative levels.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

111a–112d. Agreement and disagreement test the competence of the many as teachers

113a–113c. Agreements establish the respondent's commitments

126c–127d. Knowledge and concord are tested in a new civic and household argument

133d–133e. A previous agreement is expressly corrected

In this edition. The edition keeps "agree," "disagree," and "concord" separate for ὁμολογεῖν, διαφέρεσθαι, and ὁμόνοια. Collapsing these as "agreement" throughout would obscure the shift from evidential consistency to the definition of civic friendship.

See also. Admission; Language; Teachers; Concord; Knowledge of one's own and others.

Alcibiades

Ἀλκιβιάδη (Alkibiadē); Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ καλὸς (Alkibiadēs ho kalos)

The word. The young Athenian addressed by Socrates; the title-name is also a recurrent object of definition. Socrates distinguishes Alcibiades himself from his face, body, family connections and possessions, so identifying the person is part of the argument rather than merely its preliminary setting.

In Alcibiades I. At the opening Alcibiades possesses almost everything that might establish a young aristocrat's superiority: conspicuous beauty and height, powerful relations on both sides, Pericles as guardian, and wealth. Socrates presents these as the young man's own grounds for needing nobody. His resistance to lovers is consequently a miniature political victory: proud suitors have been defeated by greater pride. The portrait is admiring as well as critical. Socrates does not deny his looks, and at the close expressly distinguishes fear of the city's strength from distrust of Alcibiades' nature.

The decisive lack is preparation for the public role he proposes to assume. His education in letters, music and wrestling is not denied; what is challenged is the unearned extension of that competence into knowledge of justice and the advantageous. His remembered certainty during childhood games makes the difficulty biographical: he cannot identify a period in which he recognized ignorance and therefore sought the relevant understanding. When he later concedes that most politicians are uneducated, he initially treats their

deficiency as a reason to avoid training himself. Socrates redirects his competition toward foreign kings before redirecting it more fundamentally toward care.

Alcibiades is an active respondent rather than a blank recipient of teaching. He accuses Socrates of teasing and insolence, proposes the distinction between justice and advantage, admits his confusion, suggests friendship and concord as political goods, and finally asks what he must do. His acknowledgement that he does not know what he is saying occurs twice, at 116e and 127d. These are changes in his self-assessment, not independent evidence that every intervening Socratic inference is sound.

The name becomes philosophically charged at 130e: Socrates says his words address Alcibiades, not the young man's face. At 133d the example returns: one cannot know that Alcibiades' belongings belong to him without knowing Alcibiades. These moves depend on the preceding provisional account of the person; the dialogue itself acknowledges at 130c–d that its investigation has not precisely established the self itself.

The final role reversal promises a continuing relationship. Alcibiades will attend Socrates and begin caring for justice. The dialogue does not narrate the successful completion of that programme. Socrates wishes for perseverance and fears that the city may prevail over both of them. A historical reader may hear a warning about later events, but the dramatic action ends with an intention and an apprehension.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103a–105e. The lover's approach inventories the young man's advantages and unlimited hopes.

106e–107a. Alcibiades confirms the limited list of his lessons.

110a–110d. Socrates recalls confident accusations in childhood games.

116e. First admission of not knowing what he is saying.

119b–119c. Natural superiority is offered as a substitute for training.

123d. He is described as not yet quite twenty.

127d–127e. Renewed perplexity is made an opportunity appropriate to his age.

130c–130e. The provisional account of the human being changes what the name addresses.

133d. The person and the attribution of his belongings are linked.

135d–135e. Promise of attendance and justice is followed by Socrates' fear.

In this edition. The edition leaves authorship disputed and supplies historical background separately. Its account of Alcibiades' later career must not be inserted as something reported by the two speakers. "Alcibiades the beautiful" preserves the collision between a prestigious public description and his newly exposed ignorance.

See also. Socrates; Love and the lover; Ambition and hope; Dramatic time and setting; Beauty and bloom; Care for oneself; Perplexity; The self itself and each self.

Ambition and hope

ἐλπίδα (elpida); ἐπιθυμεῖς (epithymeis); μείζω κτήσασθαι (meizō ktēsasthai); δυναστεύειν (dynasteuein); ὀνόματος (onomatos); διανοήματα (dianoēmata)

The word. Ambition is an editorial umbrella for the hopes, desires and designs attributed to Alcibiades. Elpis is hope or expectation; epithymein is desiring;

dynasteuein here is holding power. The dialogue does not introduce a single technical noun equivalent to the modern psychological category.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates makes the young man's refusal of limits the test of his attention to him. If acquisition beyond his present advantages were impossible, he says, Alcibiades would choose death; if rule were limited to Europe, he would still not be satisfied. The imagined god's alternatives expose an aspiration to fill virtually everyone with his name and power. These are Socrates' hypothetical reconstructions, not statements by Alcibiades of a specific military plan or a literal intention to harm himself. Alcibiades permits the conversation to proceed on the assumption rather than separately endorsing each formulation.

The corresponding Socratic hope is power with Alcibiades by demonstrating his indispensability. Their relation thus begins inside the young man's aspiration rather than with an immediate order to renounce it. But the inquiry transforms the requirements of success. Education cannot be avoided merely because local rivals are weak; foreign kings possess larger inherited resources; care and craft become necessary. By the final pages the acquisition to be sought is justice, temperance and virtue, not unrestricted ability to do whatever one wants.

The ending does not say Alcibiades has become permanently unambitious. He promises a new first task, care for justice, within an ongoing relation. Socrates' last fear identifies the unresolved competition between that education and the city's influence. Hope is therefore the dialogue's motivating resource and one of its uncertainties.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104c–106c. The lover's persistence reveals and engages the young man's hopes.

119b–124b. Competitive ambition is redirected toward real preparation.

134c–135b. The required acquisition changes from unlimited power to virtue.

135d–135e. A new intention is expressed without a guaranteed future.

In this edition. "Ambition" is a thematic label, not an assertion that a particular Greek lemma occurs. "Have in mind," "hope," "desire" and "mean to" should retain their local differences in paraphrase.

See also. Honour, fame and worth; Royal comparison; Love and the lover; Dramatic time and setting; Power; License; Virtue and vice.

Amestris

Ἀμήστριδι (Amēstridi)

The word. Xerxes' wife and the Persian king's mother, imagined by Socrates as an assessor of Alcibiades' chances.

In Alcibiades I. Her response is a hypothetical speech constructed by Socrates, not reported correspondence or an actual encounter. Told that Deinomache's son intends to contend with her son, she would naturally suppose he must possess care and wisdom. Learning instead of his youth, lack of education and refusal to train, she would be astonished. If his supporters cited beauty, height, family, wealth and natural aptitude, she would think them mad when comparing those resources with her own court's.

Socrates gives an enemy's mother an imagined grasp of what the ambitious Athenian needs to understand about himself. Her shaming power is heightened by the question why the enemies' women should judge the requirements better than the men proposing to oppose them.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

123c–124a. The imagined royal-maternal judgement leads toward the Delphic demand.

In this edition. The note recounts external stories of Amestris; these are unnecessary to the present argument and are not implied by Socrates' imagined speech. Its repeated conditional forms must be retained in any paraphrase.

See also. Deinomache; Artaxerxes; Lampido and the Spartan royal family; Royal comparison.

Anaxagoras

Ἀναξαγόρᾳ (Anaxagorāi)

The word. One of the wise associates named in Alcibiades' defence of Pericles' education.

In Alcibiades I. The name occurs beside Pythocleides, followed by the assertion that Pericles still keeps company with Damon. It supplies a recognizable association rather than an exposition of natural philosophy. Nothing here licenses importing Anaxagoras' account of mind or matter into the argument about the human being at 129–130. The dramatic significance is that even a prestigious educational lineage does not answer Socrates' next demand: name someone Pericles himself has made wise.

A catalogue of teachers and a demonstration of teachable understanding are treated as different sorts of evidence.[4]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

118c. Alcibiades cites Anaxagoras among the wise men associated with Pericles.

In this edition. The edition's note identifies him as the natural philosopher of Clazomenae; neither that location nor his doctrines are stated in the dialogue.

See also. Pericles and Xanthippus; Pythocleides; Damon.

Ancestry, nature and upbringing

γένους (genous); φύσει (physei); γενναίοις γένεσιν (gennaiois genesin); εὖ φύντας (eu phyntas); τραφῶσιν (traphōsin); τροφῇ (trophēi)

The word. Genos denotes family, stock or lineage; physis natural endowment; trophē rearing or upbringing. Being wellborn and being well reared are distinct conditions in the comparison, even when the speakers suppose they are mutually reinforcing.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades initially relies on his family's strength and later says he will surpass local politicians by nature, so learning is unnecessary. Socrates first challenges the scale of comparison and then asks whether better natures are likely to arise in noble families. Alcibiades agrees, as he does to the proposition that good natural endowment joined to good upbringing yields completeness in virtue. These are agreed premises in a

[4] The supplied edition, note 30 on 118c, is the source for the identification "of Clazomenae" and the designation natural philosopher. No Anaxagorean doctrine is stated here.

rhetorically targeted comparison, not a separately established universal theory of biological superiority.

The royal pedigrees, Alcibiades' reply and Socrates' Daedalus joke show how easily a prestigious remote ancestry can be matched. Socrates introduces continuous kingship and carefully managed succession to strengthen the distinction. Yet birth is still not the whole matter: the speech proceeds to rearing, teachers and practice. At the close Socrates does not distrust Alcibiades' nature; he fears the strength of the city. The drama accordingly preserves both capacity and vulnerability. A good beginning does not make education dispensable or guarantee its success.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104a–104b. Family standing and connections enter the inventory of advantages.

119b–119c. Natural superiority is invoked to avoid training.

120d–122b. Wellborn nature, rearing and dynastic continuity form the countercomparison.

123e–124a. Poor rearing offsets the young man's claimed resources.

135e. Nature is not blamed for the feared failure.

In this edition. The edition uses family and nature without turning them into modern racial or genetic categories. The aristocratic assumptions should remain attributed to the exchange, and the sequence from nature to upbringing should not be collapsed.

See also. Pride and high-mindedness; Education and training; Royal comparison; Daedalus and Hephaestus; Virtue and vice; Becoming better.

Argos

Ἄργους (Argous)

The word. Argos is named with Lacedaemon as a realm of the royal genealogy traced back to Zeus.

In Alcibiades I. The geographical name supports Socrates' distinction between a remote heroic ancestor and a line of ancestors who actually held kingship. The Spartans' predecessors are said to be kings of Argos and Lacedaemon, while the Persian line ruled Persia and often Asia. Argos does not serve as the scene of the conversation or as a current policy question. Its local argumentative role is to attach rule over named places to pedigree, thereby making continuity of political standing more substantial than Alcibiades' bare assertion that his family too descends from Zeus.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

121a. Argos belongs to the account of continuing royal succession.

In this edition. The passage supplies no independent chronology of Argive kings; details of heroic genealogy from other sources should not be inserted into its single comparative claim.

See also. Heracles and the Heraclids; Ancestry, nature and upbringing.

Argument

λόγος (logos); τοῦ λόγου (tou logou); ἐνὶ λόγῳ (heni logōi)

The word. Λόγος has a wide range: speech, statement, account, explanation, or argument. Its meaning must be read from the particular construction. At 104a it names

the account by which Alcibiades thinks himself superior to his lovers; at 113e–114a it is the reusable reasoning that tests a claim to knowledge. At 129c the dative λόγῳ names speech as the means of conversation.

In Alcibiades I. The dialogue repeatedly lets an argument acquire an apparent independence from either participant's personal authority. At 118b Alcibiades' own logos accuses him; at 131c a conclusion about the lover of soul follows "from the argument." Such expressions make the chain of commitments, rather than the prestige of Socrates, the immediate ground of assent. They do not mean the chain has become infallible.

At 113e–114a Socrates refuses the idea that a previously used argument is worn out. If the same structure bears on another claim, it remains relevant. Alcibiades' attempted shift from justice to advantage does not remove the question of where his knowledge came from. Socrates then chooses to examine a different contention, the supposed opposition of justice and advantage, rather than mechanically repeat every question.

The phrase "by this argument" can also mark a limit. At 125b a shoemaker is good and bad by the same domain-relative reasoning, which exposes the inadequacy of Alcibiades' undifferentiated appeal to good men. At 130c–d the reasoning about soul is retained while its precision is expressly limited. Following a logos requires both attending to its force and tracking its scope.

The range of senses matters for the user argument. Saying that Socrates uses λόγος there means that he uses speech, not that the person must be identical with a detached faculty called Logos. The same Greek word supports the dialogue's reasoning and names the verbal

medium through which it occurs, but those uses should not be conflated.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104a. Logos names Alcibiades' grounds for superiority

113e–114a. An argument remains usable despite familiarity

118b. The argument accuses its own respondent

125b. A domain-relative conclusion is qualified by "this argument"

129b–130e. Speech is used in conversation and distinguished from its personal user

In this edition. "Argument," "speech," and "words" render different local uses of λόγος. The edition's variation is semantically necessary. A lexicon should not replace every occurrence with the philosophical-sounding "reason" or treat every ordinary idiom as a technical doctrine.

See also. Proof; Speech and dialogue; Account and definition; Question and answer; Adequacy and precision.

Arithmetic and measurement

ἀριθμητικός (arithmētikos); ἀριθμητικήν (arithmētikēn); μετρητικήν (metrētikēn); σπιθαμῆς (spithamēs); πήχεος (pēcheos); σταθμοῦ (stathmou)

The word. Ἀριθμητικός is the person skilled in numbers, and ἀριθμητική names arithmetic. Μετρητική is measurement. Σπιθαμή and πῆχυς are a span and a cubit; σταθμός in this context concerns weight. These examples concern determinate comparison and stable judgments, not a developed philosophy of mathematical objects.

In Alcibiades I. At 114c the arithmetician can persuade one person and many about numbers. Socrates uses this to challenge the assumption that private discussion differs essentially from public explanation: knowledge of a subject should remain available regardless of audience size. The simple comparison between one and two at 112e–113a had already isolated responsibility for an answer, but the craft example's immediate role is the stability of expertise across audiences.

At 126c–d arithmetic returns as the knowledge that produces concord about numbers. Cities, private persons, and an individual with himself all come under the same standard. Measuring similarly establishes which is greater, a span or a cubit; the comparison extends to weight. The examples give "concord" determinate content: agreement on a subject grounded in a relevant craft.

This is a model for a question, not yet an answer about politics. Socrates wants to know the corresponding civic subject and craft. Alcibiades' move from mathematical agreement to family affection exposes problems when household partners possess different expertise. Nothing here claims that arithmetic by itself reconciles civic interests or makes spouses share every practical judgment. Its argumentative role is to show what an intelligible account of agreement would need to specify.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

112e–113a. One and two exemplify the respondent's responsibility for a stated answer

114c. An arithmetician's competence addresses one or many listeners

126c–126d. Arithmetic, lengths, and weight supply models of concord grounded in expertise

In this edition. The edition's "measurement" names the craft, while "span," "cubit," and "weight" identify the comparisons it governs. The phrase at 126d does not introduce an independently named weighing craft; it says that weight is analogous.

See also. Concord; Craft and expertise; Good counsel; Persuasion; Question and answer.

Artaxerxes

Ἀρτοξέρξῃ (Artoxerxēi)

The word. The Persian king, son of Xerxes, against whom Alcibiades imagines competing; Burnet's Greek spells the name Artoxerxes.

In Alcibiades I. At 121b Socrates imagines Alcibiades exhibiting Salamis, Aegina and his ancestry to the king and receiving laughter rather than admiration. At 123c–d the imagined audience shifts to the king's mother: she would wonder what resource Alcibiades could possibly rely upon. Thus Artaxerxes is not present or consulted; he supplies the external scale against which familiar Athenian advantages appear small. Care and wisdom emerge as the only plausible means of competition once property, looks and noble birth have been relativized.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

121b. A hypothetical genealogical display to the king invites ridicule.

123c–123d. Amestris is imagined assessing the challenger to her son.

In this edition. Burnet's apparatus explicitly confirms ἀρτοξέρξῃ as the reading of B and T. The English uses the

conventional Artaxerxes. The edition identifies Artaxerxes I in its note; the dialogue identifies him by his father.

See also. Amestris; Royal comparison; Salamis and Aegina.

Athens and the Athenians

Ἀθηναίοις (Athēnaiois); Ἀθηναίων (Athēnaiōn)

The word. The city and citizen body before which Alcibiades intends to appear as an adviser; the Greek commonly names the Athenians rather than the place-name Athens.

In Alcibiades I. Athens is initially the greatest Greek city in the portrait of Alcibiades' advantages. Its public deliberation supplies the practical test for his knowledge: what could he properly advise its people about? Yet the city's prominence does not secure its politicians' education, and the faults of local competitors do not excuse his own deficiencies. The object of ambition later becomes a potential corrupter, figured as a handsome beloved at 132a. Finally the city's strength appears as the force Socrates fears may overcome both interlocutors. This movement makes the civic setting integral to the drama: the private conversation aims to prepare a future adviser for the public body that can also undo that preparation.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104a–104b. The city magnifies Alcibiades' inherited advantages.

105a–107d. The approaching appearance and subject of advice are tested.

118b–120b. Local politicians are criticized as a misleading competitive standard.

132a. The people becomes a seductive and potentially corrupting beloved.

135e. The city's strength supplies the final apprehension.

In this edition. "City" and "people" are not automatically interchangeable: polis can name the whole civic community, while dēmos can point to the assembled or political people. The edition's historical accounts of later Athenian events remain note-level background.

See also. Lover of the people; Dramatic time and setting; Ambition and hope.

Attention

προσέχων τὸν νοῦν (prosechōn ton noun); οὐ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν (ou prosechōn ton noun); ἐννοεῖς (ennoeis)

The word. Προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν is directing or applying the mind, hence paying attention. Ἐννοεῖν can mean noticing, taking in, or thinking of a point. These expressions concern an agent's active cognitive engagement; they do not by themselves imply possession of the knowledge to which the engagement should lead.

In Alcibiades I. At 105a Socrates says that his account of Alcibiades' ambitions will show how continuously he has kept his mind on him. The claim concerns attentive knowledge of the young man's aims. It also explains why Socrates can use those ambitions to make the need for education intelligible.

At 118e Alcibiades assigns responsibility for his own failure to his lack of attention. This is a significant qualification within the test of Pericles' teaching: education depends on a receptive learner as well as a competent teacher. Socrates nevertheless asks for other

successful pupils rather than accepting this single explanation as sufficient vindication of Pericles.

The interrogative “Do you take in?” at 117d marks another dimension of attention. Alcibiades must grasp the connection between his changing answers and mistakes in action, not merely hear the words. The dialogue’s repeated requests to answer, examine, and be eager to say seek this kind of active understanding. Attention is therefore an enabling condition of learning and care, while neither being their complete content nor guaranteeing their success.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

105a. Socrates claims sustained attention to Alcibiades’ ambitions

117d. The respondent is asked to take in the practical significance of the diagnosis

118e. Alcibiades explains his own educational failure through inattention

In this edition. The full phrase “pay attention” should not be reduced to a technical account of νοῦς. In this idiom the noun participates in an ordinary description of directing one’s mind, unlike the subject-specific “medical sense” of 135a.

See also. Teachers; Learning; Care and neglect; Intelligence.

Authorship and attribution

The word. Authorship asks who composed the dialogue; attribution is its transmission under Plato's name. These editorial questions differ from the identity of the fictional speakers and from whether a particular word or passage is textually authentic.

In Alcibiades I. The supplied edition presents Alcibiades I within the Platonic corpus but explicitly leaves its authorship disputed. A lexicon following that edition should accordingly distinguish the dialogue's claims, Socrates' statements, Alcibiades' replies, and an interpreter's reconstruction. Calling every proposition "Plato's doctrine" would assume both authorial identity and direct endorsement of a speaker's local argument.

The Introduction reports strong ancient attribution and an important place in later philosophical teaching, including Thrasyllus' tetralogical arrangement as preserved by Diogenes Laertius (3.59), Iamblichus' teaching sequence, and the commentaries of Proclus and Olympiodorus. It also describes the modern dispute beginning with Schleiermacher and gives examples of arguments about style, dramatic manner and doctrine. Those reports orient the reader; the present lexicon does not reproduce them as the result of an independent survey or claim that ancient reception by itself settles composition. Equally, modern suspicion does not make the dialogue philosophically incoherent by definition.

Two distinctions are especially important for reading this edition. The first is between date of scene and date of writing. The young Alcibiades, living Pericles and imminent political appearance provide dramatic clues; they do not identify the author or establish when the text was composed. The second is between authorship of the

whole and the authenticity of individual passages. The Eusebian mirror extension at 133c8–17 can be disputed even by a reader who accepts the dialogue as Plato's; adopting or rejecting those lines does not by itself decide the larger question.

The argument's own reservations must be respected independently of attribution. At 130c–d Socrates calls the account adequate rather than precise and says a larger inquiry has been passed over. At the end the success of education remains uncertain. Neither feature should be removed to make the dialogue fit a preferred picture of a Platonic or non-Platonic author. The most reliable procedure for this lexicon is to explain what the particular passage says, how it functions and what the printed text depends on, then mark broader historical conclusions as editorial.[5]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103a (editorial). The opening identifies speakers, not an author; corpus attribution is an editorial matter.

130c–130d. The dialogue itself acknowledges the provisional precision of its central argument.

133c8–17 (apparatus). The local authenticity dispute is distinct from the authorship of the whole.

135e. The ending leaves educational perseverance unsettled.

[5] Nicholas Denyer, ed., Plato: Alcibiades (Cambridge University Press, 2001), DOI 10.1017/CBO9781139167079. The publisher's verified description confirms that the introduction discusses authenticity; no page-specific argument is attributed without consulting it. online source The supplied edition's Introduction, "The dialogue" and "What is most exposed," supplies its account of ancient arrangement, reception and modern dispute. These claims are treated as the edition's editorial account, not as newly verified conclusions of this lexicon.

In this edition. The supplied Introduction, “What is most exposed,” is the authority for this entry’s report of the edition’s stance. No Greek form is attached because “authorship and attribution” is an editorial topic, not spoken technical vocabulary. This lexicon claims no new external manuscript collation or human specialist adjudication.

See also. Textual transmission and editorial signs; Dramatic time and setting; God and the divine; Adequacy and precision.

Beauty and bloom

κάλλιστός (kallistos); κάλλει (kallei); ἰδέας (ideas); ἀνθοῦν (anthoun); ὥρας (hōras); ἀνθεῖν (anthein)

The word. Beauty belongs to the kalos family, which can also mean fine or noble; bloom and prime describe the temporary attractiveness of the body and then the developing excellence of the person. Idea at 119c means appearance or looks here, not an independently asserted metaphysical Form.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates grants Alcibiades’ outstanding looks at 104a. The concession matters because the later correction is not that every source of his confidence is imaginary. It is that visible advantages do not establish the understanding required to advise. The expert at 107b is to be heard whether beautiful or ugly, wellborn or lowborn. At 113b “Alcibiades the beautiful” is placed beside the acknowledgement that he does not know justice, producing a sharp mismatch between social description and competence. At 119c Socrates calls his reluctance to train unworthy of his appearance: the compliment presses him toward a more demanding standard.

The royal speech again relativizes beauty by describing painstaking attention to a prince's bodily formation and imagining Amestris unimpressed by Athenian claims. The decisive change occurs at 131c–132a. The body stops blooming and its lovers depart, but Alcibiades himself is said to begin blooming. Socrates accordingly urges him to become as beautiful as possible. The retained word allows ethical improvement and attractiveness to resonate rather than treating "beautiful" and "fine" as wholly unrelated Greek categories. That resonance does not erase the argument's distinction between the person and bodily possessions.

The ending protects the beautiful man from having his present slavish condition named outright. Praise there remains teasing pressure, not a verdict that physical charm already confers freedom or virtue. The people's handsome face is the corresponding danger: visible appeal can still draw the learner away.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104a. Outstanding beauty and height are conceded.

107b. A knowledgeable adviser need not be beautiful.

113b. The beautiful name-holder is said not to know justice.

119c. Appearance becomes the standard a complacent proposal fails to match.

121d. Royal attendants shape the heir for beauty.

123e. Beauty is among the inadequate resources imagined before Amestris.

131c–132a. Bodily fading and personal flowering separate kinds of attraction.

135c. Socrates avoids naming an unbefitting state in a beautiful man.

In this edition. The edition divides a single Greek family between beautiful of persons and fine of conduct, while preserving beautiful at 131d. This entry concerns the dramatic and erotic use; the formal argument linking the fine and good requires its own analysis.

See also. Love and the lover; Lover of the people; Honour, fame and worth; Fine conduct; Body; Becoming better.

Becoming better

βέλτιον ποιῇ (beltion poiēi); βελτίους ποιοῦμεν (beltious poioumen); ὅτι βέλτιστοι γενοίμεθα (hoti beltistoi genoimetha); ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον (epi to beltion)

The word. The comparative βέλτιον and its inflections express being or making better; βέλτιστος is best. In the care argument improvement is a relation between an activity and its object. Right care is not identified by effort alone, by the owner's satisfaction, or by an increase in possessions. It must improve the thing whose care is claimed.

In Alcibiades I. At 124b–d Socrates proposes joint deliberation about becoming as good as possible. The question immediately becomes "in what virtue?" because an unspecified desire to improve has no determinate standard. Alcibiades' attempted political specification then fails to produce a coherent account of civic friendship.

At 128b Socrates restarts from the modest criterion of right care: making something better. Shoes become better through one craft, feet and body through another. The point is not that improvement has a single physical measure. Each object has the kind of good relevant to it,

and the appropriate craft must be identified in relation to that object.

The transition to self is consequently conditional. To know which practice improves oneself one must know what one is. The soul argument supplies an adequate working object, and the eye analogy directs attention to soul's excellence, wisdom. The final discussion translates improvement into acquiring justice and temperance rather than expanding one's license to act.

At 131d the lover of soul stays so long as the soul moves toward the better. That condition prevents Socrates' fidelity from being read as unconditional endorsement of whatever Alcibiades becomes. The dialogue ends with the same temporal problem: a beginning in care must be carried through despite civic pressure. Becoming better is a sustained direction, not an achievement guaranteed by one persuasive conversation.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

124b–125a. Joint improvement requires specifying the excellence sought

128b–129a. Making the object better defines right care and requires knowing the object

131c–131d. The soul's movement toward the better conditions the lover's continued presence

134c–135e. Improvement means acquiring virtue and sustaining care for justice

In this edition. The edition uses "better" for both βέλτιον and ἄμεινον in the larger dialogue. This entry concentrates on the improvement construction rather than treating every comparative as a definition of self-care.

See also. Care for oneself; Better and best; Soul; Virtue and vice; Temperance.

Befitting

πρέπει (prepei); πρεπωδέστερον (prepōdesteron); δουλοπρέπειαν (douloprepeian); ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς (eleutheroprepōs)

The word. Πρέπει says that something suits or befits someone; πρεπωδέστερον is "more befitting." The compounds concerning slaves and free persons evaluate conduct or condition by what suits those statuses. They do not merely describe outward resemblance.

In Alcibiades I. At 124d Alcibiades agrees that giving up or going soft would not be befitting. Socrates can appeal to the young man's existing sense of what suits his aspirations in order to keep the inquiry going. The more elaborate sequence appears at 135b–c: before virtue, being ruled by one's better is better than ruling; the better is finer, and the finer more befitting. Vice consequently befits a slave, virtue a free person.

This chain links an assessment of benefit to the social language of propriety. It is not simply an appeal to how aristocrats already behave. Alcibiades must accept that his current ethical condition fails the standard appropriate to the status of which he is proud. The contrast becomes especially sharp when Socrates avoids naming the condition too bluntly in the presence of a beautiful young man.

The compounds should therefore be kept visible. Saying merely "vice is slavery" would lose the argument's explicit intermediate question about fittingness and collapse an evaluative comparison into an asserted identity.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

124d. Perseverance in inquiry is said to be befitting

135b–135c. Better leads to finer, then more befitting, and finally to the free/slave ethical contrast

In this edition. The edition uses a series of “befit” renderings rather than alternating without explanation between “appropriate,” “proper,” and “servile.” This makes the progression into δουλοπρέπεια and ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς traceable.

See also. Freedom and slavery; Better and best; Fine conduct.

Belief

δόξα (doxa); δοξάζεις (doxazeis); οἴησιν (oiēsin); οἶμαι (oimai); ἡγῇ (hēgēi)

The word. Δόξα is opinion or judgment, and δοξάζειν forming or holding a judgment. Οἴεσθαι and ἡγεῖσθαι express thinking or supposing; οἴησις names a supposition. These expressions do not all signal the same epistemic defect. A speaker may cautiously say “I think” about something correct. The bad state identified in the dialogue is specifically an opinion of knowledge held without the relevant knowledge.

In Alcibiades I. At 117b Socrates asks whether Alcibiades’ opinion wanders about how to ascend to heaven. It does not, because Alcibiades does not suppose that he knows. The practical examples ask whether he forms his own judgment about preparing a dish or steering, or entrusts these matters to the expert. Opinion is here the exercise of judgment under a claim of competence, not a separately defined lower faculty opposed to an intelligible world.

At 120c–d the noun οἴησις refers to Alcibiades' supposition that the foreign kings differ little from other people. Socrates criticizes it in two stages: it discourages care, and it is false when their resources are compared. Harmful effect and falsity are presented as distinct criticisms. The first does not by itself prove the second.

Throughout the dialogue both speakers use "I think," "it seems," and similar expressions to qualify answers or inferences. These should not be read as confessions that every proposition is merely subjective. Nor should Alcibiades' assent expressed through seeming be silently strengthened into demonstrative certainty. The language makes the evolving, sometimes hesitant state of agreement audible.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

117b–117d. Opinion and personal judgment are tested against acknowledged ignorance

120c–120e. An opinion about rivals is criticized as harmful and false

130c–130d. Qualified judgment accompanies an explicitly provisional result

In this edition. The edition distinguishes "opinion" for δόξα and "notion" for οἴησις at 120c–d while usually using "think" for οἴεσθαι and ἡγεῖσθαι. No comprehensive theory of belief is supplied by these translations.

See also. Conceit of knowledge; Wandering; Agreement as evidence; Adequacy and precision.

Benefit and harm

βλαβήσεσθαι (blabēsesthai); ὀνήσεσθαι (onēsesthai); κακουργοτάτη (kakourgotatē); διαφθαρῆναι (diaphtharēnai)

The word. Βλάπτεσθαι concerns being harmed; ὀνίνασθαι receiving benefit or gain. The comparative ethical discussions also describe ignorance as especially harmful through κακουργοτάτη and bodily destruction through διαφθαρῆναι. These terms overlap in practical effect with advantage and disadvantage but are not the same Greek family.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades says at 114e that answering Socrates will do him no harm. Socrates' reply that he is a prophet plays with the consequence of the ensuing refutation: his confident opinions will be unsettled. The edition's note offers the Socratic interpretation that refutation can cure rather than injure. The dialogue's explicit words are the assurance of no harm and the ironic response, not a developed medical theory of argument.

At 120d the same assurance is made practical. If Alcibiades judged his rivals formidable he would care for himself more; that care would not harm him, he agrees, but benefit him greatly. His dismissive estimate is therefore already bad in one respect, independently of the further question whether it is false: it discourages preparation that would help him.

The final medicine and ship cases clarify what can go wrong when effective power is mistaken for benefit. Unchecked action without understanding can ruin the agent and those dependent on him (134e–135a). Benefit is therefore not measured simply by getting to do what one wishes. Equally, losing a conceited opinion or accepting

guidance need not count as harm. The important question is the actual improvement or deterioration of the person and the people affected.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

114e–115a. Alcibiades expects no harm from answering; Socrates calls him a prophet

118a. Ignorance about the greatest matters is described as most harmful

120c–120d. Self-care is acknowledged to benefit rather than harm

134e–135a. Unchecked incompetence causes bodily or collective destruction

In this edition. “Gain a great deal” at 120d renders ὀνήσεσθαι rather than συμφέρειν. The note at 115a labels its curative reading as an interpretation. “Corrupted” at 132a and “ruined” of the body at 135a share the φθείρειν family but have different immediate objects.

See also. Advantage; Doing well; Power; Medicine; Care for oneself.

Better and best

βέλτιον (beltion); ἄμεινον (ameinon); βέλτιστοι (beltistoi); ἄριστοι (aristoi); βελτίονος (beltionos)

The word. Βέλτιον and ἄμεινον are two forms used for “better”; βέλτιστος and ἄριστος supply forms of “best.” They evaluate comparatively but do not alone specify the standard, domain, or purpose of comparison. Personal address such as “best of men” may be teasing or conventional rather than a verdict on someone’s virtue.

In Alcibiades I. The questions at 107d–109c deliberately repeat “better” across war, peace, wrestling, lyre-playing,

and food. Alcibiades can agree that one should act at the better time or to the better extent without being able to say what makes it better. Socrates seeks the governing specification: gymnastic, musical, healthier, and finally more just. The repeated comparative is the instrument by which apparently acceptable advice is shown to lack content.

At 124b–e the aspiration becomes shared: how can Socrates and Alcibiades become as good as possible, and in what excellence? That question cannot be answered merely by ranking Alcibiades above uneducated rivals. The comparison must answer to the competence and virtue required by the work.

At 128b–e right care is characterized as making its object better. Different crafts improve shoes and feet, and one cannot identify the craft that improves oneself without knowing what oneself is. The comparative thus connects the early expertise test with the later inquiry into care.

Finally, at 135b someone without virtue does better to be ruled by a better person than to rule. What is better is also finer and more befitting. The argument reverses Alcibiades' preferred ranking: being in command is not necessarily the better condition for him now. Throughout, "better" is a question to be specified, not a self-explanatory synonym for whatever increases power.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

107d–109c. Repeated comparison demands a domain-specific standard

124b–125b. Becoming best requires identifying the desired excellence

128b–128e. Care is assessed by improvement of its proper object

135b–135c. The better, finer, and more befitting connect education to justified subordination

In this edition. Both βέλτιον and ἄμεινον remain "better," preserving the argument's repetition. "Best of men" in Socratic address should be interpreted with the local irony, especially when followed by an accusation of ignorance, rather than indexed as evidence of established goodness.

See also. Craft and expertise; Fine conduct; Virtue and vice; Befitting; Care for oneself.

Body

σῶμα (sōma); σώματος (sōmatos); παντὶ τῷ σώματι (panti tō sōmati)

The word. Σῶμα is the body, including the hands, eyes, and other bodily members through which a human being acts. The dialogue distinguishes it both from the soul that uses it and from material things used in tending it. "Body" is not synonymous with "everything material": a ring or cloak belongs to the body but is not one of its parts. This layered distinction supports the inquiry into what care actually benefits.

In Alcibiades I. At first bodily beauty and stature are among Alcibiades' accepted advantages. Their reality is not denied: Socrates grants that anyone can see them. Their inadequacy as qualifications to advise the city is another matter. The later argument revises their importance, rather than discovering that they were imaginary.

The care analogies establish that a body has its own appropriate improvement. Gymnastics attends to feet, hands, and the body; shoemaking, engraving, and

weaving attend to associated objects. This is a distinction between objects of expertise, not a rejection of bodily health. Indeed, the examples would fail if improving the body were not an intelligible and valuable activity.

At 129d–130c bodily members are brought under the user–instrument relation. A craftsman uses hands and eyes as well as external tools, and the whole body is then treated as what a human being uses. The body is said to be ruled rather than ruling itself. It therefore cannot, on the agreed criterion, be the human being under investigation. The exclusion is an argumentative result dependent on that criterion; it is not an independent physiological demonstration.

The body's status as something "of" the person explains the later contrasts. A doctor or trainer, considered solely in that capacity, knows bodily matters rather than the person himself; bodily tending is not sufficient care of the self. The bodily lover likewise attends to something belonging to Alcibiades and leaves when its bloom fades. None of these claims says that all doctors lack self-knowledge in every respect or that every affection for bodily beauty is identical with corruption. The qualification "insofar as" a practitioner exercises that craft is crucial.

At 132c bodily care can be entrusted to others, while the soul receives primary attention. At 135a the example of a sick man with unrestricted license returns to bodily danger: without medical sense his body will be ruined. The dialogue thus continues to treat bodily welfare seriously, even after denying that the body exhausts the human person.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104a. Beauty and stature are genuine but limited advantages

128a–128d. Body is separated from its belongings as an object of care

129d–130c. Whole body is used and ruled; body and composite are excluded as the self

131a–132c. Bodily expertise and attachment are distinguished from knowing and caring for the person

135a. Uninformed license threatens bodily destruction

In this edition. The edition preserves the distinction between knowing "something about the body" at 131a and knowing "what belongs to the body" at 131b. Flattening both into the latter wording would collapse two levels of the argument.

See also. Soul; Composite person; What belongs to oneself; Possessions of possessions; User and instrument.

Building and shipbuilding

οἰκοδομίας (oikodomias); Οἰκοδόμος (Oikodomos); ναυπηγίας (naupēgias); ναυπηγεῖσθαι (naupēgeisthai)

The word. Οἰκοδομία is building and οἰκοδόμος a builder. Ναυπηγία is shipbuilding; ναυπηγεῖσθαι here concerns having ships built. Constructing a ship is distinct from piloting it, just as deciding civic policy is distinct from either craft.

In Alcibiades I. At 107a Socrates rules out building as the topic of Alcibiades' intended address: a builder would advise the Athenians better. When Alcibiades later says he will speak about their own affairs, Socrates tests whether that means what ships to have built (107c). The young

man admits shipbuilding is excluded because he does not know it.

The two examples establish an important restriction. A matter's belonging to the city does not make it the proper subject of every aspiring politician. Collective ownership or public consequences do not abolish differences of knowledge. Alcibiades must state which kind of civic business he understands rather than claiming authority over the whole category.

The dialogue later criticizes walls, warships, and dockyards without virtue as insufficient for civic happiness (134b). That does not reverse the builder's expertise. It places the city's use and valuation of material resources under an additional ethical requirement.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

107a. A builder gives better advice about building

107c. Alcibiades admits that lack of shipbuilding knowledge excludes this civic subject

134b. Built defenses and naval resources cannot secure happiness without virtue

In this edition. The distinction between "building ships" and "piloting" is lexical as well as practical. The infinitive ναυπηγεῖσθαι concerns what vessels the Athenians should have constructed; it should not be translated as knowing how to sail them.

See also. Craft and expertise; Piloting and seafaring; Deliberation and advice; City and citizens.

Callias and Calliades

Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου (Kallian ton Kalliadou)

The word. Callias, son of Calliades, is the second named pupil said to have benefited from Zeno's company.

In Alcibiades I. The full patronymic matters because Callias is not a uniquely identifying first name in Athenian literature. Socrates puts him beside Pythodorus and says each paid one hundred minae and became wise and distinguished. His contribution to the argument is the same kind of concrete, named educational result that Alcibiades cannot supply for Pericles. The passage does not describe his political career or identify him with another Callias. Calliades is mentioned only as his father.[6]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

119a. The patronymic identifies the second pupil in Socrates' comparison.

In this edition. The note says he is usually identified with the general killed at Potidaea. Because it explicitly presents a usual identification, it should not be made an unqualified dialogue fact; that later event is not narrated here.

See also. Zeno; Pythodorus and Isolochus; Minae and plethra.

[6] The supplied edition, note 32 on 119a, presents the identification with the general in Thucydides 1.61–63 as the usual one, not as an explicit identification by this dialogue.

Care and neglect

ἀμελήσας (amelēsas); ἀμελεῖν (amelein); μέλει (melei); ἐπιμελέστατα (epimelestata); θεραπεύει (therapeuei)

The word. Ἀμελεῖν is to take no care or neglect; μέλει expresses that something is a concern to someone. The superlative adverb ἐπιμελέστατα means with the greatest care or attentiveness. Θεραπεύειν means tending, attending, or serving. These families overlap in practical attention but are not simple synonyms. The dialogue uses them to distinguish the presence of concern, the activity of tending, and the properly directed improvement called care for oneself.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades first complains of Socrates' conspicuously careful presence wherever he goes. At 104d the adverb belongs to a lover's persistent attention, before self-care becomes the philosophical demand. At 113c Socrates turns neglect against Alcibiades: he means to teach what he does not know after neglecting to learn. Neglect here is not merely an absence of anxious feeling. It is a failure to undertake the preparation his intended action requires.

At 120b Socrates ironically urges him to look at mediocre politicians and neglect himself, neither learning nor training. The surrounding argument makes the irony unmistakable. At 122b the complaint that almost no one cares about an Athenian's upbringing, except a lover, contrasts private educational neglect with the elaborate preparation attributed to royal rivals. These are parts of Socrates' motivational speech, not a neutral census of every household's affection.

Tending has a more variable object. At 126b organs and the city are better tended when the relevant good is present. At 131b–c someone tending body or money does

not by that fact tend the self. At 135e the love Socrates has fostered is itself to be tended in return. The verb can therefore serve bodily, material, civic, and affectionate contexts.

The common question is not merely how much attention is expended, but whether its object and purpose are right. Energetic maintenance of possessions may coexist with neglect of self. Equally, delegating bodily and financial care at 132c is not neglect if it frees attention for the soul and entrusts the auxiliary tasks appropriately.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104d. Socrates' attendance is described as exceptionally careful

113c. Teaching without knowledge follows neglected learning

120b–122b. Ironic neglect and deficient educational concern motivate preparation

126b. Tending concerns the improvement of organs and city

131b–132c. Tending body or money is distinguished from care of soul

135e. Love is to be tended reciprocally

In this edition. The edition keeps the care family audible through "care for," "take no care," and "care about," and generally uses "tend" for θεραπεύειν. "If you care to" is avoided for ordinary wishing, since it would introduce the key care vocabulary where the Greek does not.

See also. Care for oneself; Learning; Attention; What belongs to oneself; Possessions of possessions.

Care for oneself

τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (to heautou epimeleisthai); ἐπιμέλειαν (epimeleian); ψυχῆς ἐπιμελητέον (psychēs epimelēteon)

The word. To care for oneself is to make oneself the object of sustained attention and improvement. The middle verb ἐπιμελεῖσθαι takes a genitive specifying what is looked after; that object matters more than any modern association of "self-care" with comfort. The noun ἐπιμέλεια names the care or attention itself. At 128b Socrates obtains an operational criterion: care is right when it makes its object better. The phrase therefore combines an activity, a beneficiary, and a standard of success. None can be supplied merely by feeling solicitous.

In Alcibiades I. The demand develops before its definition. At 119a Socrates asks whether Alcibiades will leave himself as he is or undertake some care. Alcibiades accepts the criticism of the politicians but draws the wrong practical conclusion: their incompetence makes his own preparation unnecessary. Socrates redirects his competitive ambition toward stronger rivals. Care becomes the resource that can compensate for disadvantages of upbringing and resources, linked first with wisdom at 123d and then with craft at 124b. This is a motivational approach to self-care, not its final account.

At 124b–d Alcibiades finally asks what care he should undertake. Socrates deliberately includes himself: both men need care, and all human beings need it. The form of the conversation changes from an apparently self-sufficient young man being inspected by a superior to an inquiry they must conduct together. Socrates' exceptional divine guardian does not turn this into a claim that he

himself needs no education. Care remains a task for the speaking partners.

The decisive question is delayed until the failure to define civic excellence and concord. At 127e–128a Socrates warns that one may think one is caring for oneself while actually looking after something else. The warning repeats the earlier structure of epistemic conceit: conviction that one is doing the right thing may conceal the absence of the required knowledge. Shoes and feet supply the controlled example. Improving shoes is not identical with improving feet; the first belongs to shoemaking, the second to bodily training. The difference extends from a thing and its belongings to oneself and one's belongings.

This separation establishes why self-knowledge must precede intelligent care. One cannot identify the craft that improves a shoe without knowing what a shoe is; likewise one cannot identify the care of oneself while ignorant of what one is. The argument then identifies the human being, provisionally, with the soul that uses and rules the body. At 132b–c the practical consequence is made explicit: care is to be directed to the soul, while care of bodies and money may be entrusted to others. The latter tasks do not vanish; they cease to define the primary work of becoming good.

The eye analogy gives a direction for such care rather than a detailed curriculum. The soul must attend to soul, especially the region of knowing and intelligence. The ensuing identification of self-knowledge with temperance connects this activity to discovering one's own goods and acting well. Self-care is consequently neither private withdrawal nor permission to privilege one's wishes over other people's needs. At 134c the person who will care for a city must first possess the virtue to be shared with its

citizens. Personal and political care are ordered by the same requirement of knowledgeable goodness.

The last promise is especially important: Alcibiades says he will begin caring for justice, not merely thinking about his own identity. That promise translates the inquiry into an ethical direction without certifying its completion. Socrates wishes him perseverance and fears the city's power. The dialogue thus ends with care begun, vulnerable, and still needing to continue.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

119a–120d. Neglected preparation becomes the need to take care of oneself

123d–124d. Care is paired with wisdom and craft; Socrates includes himself in its need

127e–129a. Right care improves its object; care of oneself is distinguished from care of possessions

132b–133c. Care is directed to soul and its knowing excellence

134c–135e. Care for the city presupposes personal virtue; Alcibiades promises care for justice

In this edition. The edition consistently uses "care for," keeping ἐπιμελεῖσθαι distinct from therapeutic tending and from ordinary wishing. At 127e–128a its parenthesis is a warning that "we may perhaps fail to notice," not a factual assertion that this happens often. The qualification matters: the inquiry must guard against misidentifying care's object.

See also. Self-knowledge; What belongs to oneself; Becoming better; Soul; Temperance; Care and neglect.

City and citizens

πόλις (polis); τῆς πόλεως (tēs poleōs); πολιτῶν (politōn); πολίταις (politais); πολιτείας (politeias); πολιτικός (politikos)

The word. Πόλις is the city as an organized community, not merely its buildings. Πολῖται are citizens; πολιτεία at 125d–e is what citizens participate in, rendered "the life of the city." The adjective πολιτικός at 133e characterizes a statesman or politically competent person. The phrase τὰ τῆς πόλεως denotes civic affairs. None of these terms alone specifies a constitutional theory.

In Alcibiades I. The city is first the arena of Alcibiades' hoped-for distinction and power. He expects to show the Athenians his unprecedented worth and become greatest among them before extending his influence elsewhere (105a–c). Socrates turns that aspiration into a question about qualifications: what civic business will he advise on, and what knowledge entitles him to do so? The city's assembly does not convert general prestige into competence. It seeks the relevant expert when questions concern building or health, and war and peace require a standard of judgment too.

Alcibiades initially treats other Athenian politicians as his rivals. Socrates's ship comparison recasts them as potential collaborators, with the opposing cities' leaders as the actual competitors (119d–120a). This is part of the strategy for enlarging his sense of what preparation requires. Yet the city itself is also dangerous: flatterers seek its favor without truly ruling it (120b), and love of the people can corrupt capable men (132a).

When political excellence is directly examined, the city is defined through relations among persons. Its inhabitants have dealings with one another, make use of

one another, and participate in political life (125c–e). The "use" formulation is not allowed to suffice: ships and choruses also coordinate persons. Alcibiades must identify what distinguishes civic rule and how it improves those who share in the community. He proposes good counsel, ordering and preservation, friendship, and concord, but cannot give a consistent account.

At 133e–134c the requirement of self-knowledge is extended to civic affairs. Someone ignorant of his own affairs cannot understand those of others or cities, so cannot become a statesman; his mistakes harm those for whom he acts. Civic happiness is therefore not secured by fortifications, a fleet, dockyards, population, or size without virtue. Alcibiades must share virtue with citizens, and acquire it himself before claiming to impart it. The city and individual become parallel recipients of justice and temperance rather than unrestricted authority.

The last line makes the civic setting irreducible to an abstract analogy. Socrates fears the city's strength will overpower both him and Alcibiades (135e). The community that needs virtuous government can also undermine the education necessary for it. This does not resolve into a general instruction to abandon politics. Socrates has been trying to prepare the young man to enter it properly, but he doubts whether their shared undertaking can survive its pressures. The city is therefore simultaneously the object of care, the place in which judgment has public consequences, and a force able to deform its aspiring ruler.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

105a–105c. The city is the first arena of Alcibiades' ambition

106c–109c. The right to advise the city is tested by subject-specific expertise and justice

119d–120b. Internal rivals are recast as allies; flatterers fail to exercise true civic rule

125c–127d. Citizens' dealings and shared political life are examined through counsel, friendship, and concord

133e–134e. Civic competence requires self-knowledge and virtue, and cities must act justly and temperately

135e. The city's strength threatens the educational undertaking

In this edition. "The city's affairs," "statesman," and "the life of the city" render related but grammatically different expressions. "Life of the city" at 125d–e should not automatically become a particular "constitution." At 134b the limiting ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, "without virtue," is essential to the criticism of walls and ships.

See also. Deliberation and advice; Good counsel; Civic friendship; Power; Virtue and vice; Rule and being ruled.

Civic friendship

φιλία (philia); φιλίαν (philian); φιλῶν (philōn); φιλοῦνται (philountai)

The word. Φιλία is friendship or an affectionate relation; φιλεῖν means to love in such a relation. Here it includes bonds between fellow citizens, parents and children, siblings, and spouses. It overlaps in ordinary life with erotic attachment but is not the same lexical family as ἔρως and ἐραστής, which organize Socrates' role as lover.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades identifies friendship among citizens as the condition by which a city becomes better tended and ordered, paired with the absence of hatred and faction (126b–c). This answer is constructive: he recognizes that the city requires a quality of relations among its people, not merely resources or coercive

strength. It also provides the proposed result of the ruler's good counsel. The test is whether he can explain that result precisely enough to identify a political craft.

Socrates asks whether friendship is concord or discord, and Alcibiades chooses concord. Their next examples make concord depend on knowledge shared within a subject. Alcibiades responds by pointing to loving family relationships. A father loves his son, a mother her child, brothers one another, and husband and wife each other. But the household's division of work allows one partner to know what the other does not. If affection requires shared specialist understanding, it will be absent precisely where husband and wife perform their separate tasks.

Alcibiades protests that doing one's own business is what creates friendship and civic order. He also accepts that such conduct is just, and that just citizens must be friends. Socrates concludes that friendship seems now present, now absent in the same people, under Alcibiades' account (127d). The impasse concerns the proposed identification and its application; it is not a denial that the relatives genuinely love each other. The text needs the familiarity of these attachments for the difficulty to bite.

The passage can thus be read as uncovering a difference between practical interdependence and agreement in expert judgments, but that is a diagnosis of the problem, not a solution explicitly adopted by the speakers. The dialogue leaves the successful definition of civic friendship unstated. It instead brings Alcibiades to recognize that he does not know what he is saying and must begin caring for himself.

Elsewhere friends are not philosophical abstractions: family connections are among Alcibiades' presumed advantages at 104a–b, and helping friends in battle

supplies the test case of courageous action at 115b–116a. The civic argument broadens this ordinary relational vocabulary into a possible account of what makes a whole city good. Its failure shows why a politician must do more than invoke the name of a valued relation.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104a–104b. Friends and kin are counted among Alcibiades' social advantages

115b–116a. Helping friends in battle is fine through courage despite the risk of death

126b–126e. Friendship is proposed as civic improvement and illustrated through familial love

127a–127d. Identification with concord clashes with specialized work and just conduct

In this edition. "Friendship" renders φιλία, while the corresponding verb appears as "love" and "be loved." The entry does not treat every occurrence of English "love" as belonging to this family. Socrates' oath by Zeus Philios at 109d is a religious use of the friendship family, treated under the divine and personal entries rather than as a definition of civic philia.

See also. Concord; Good counsel; Faction and hatred; Doing one's own business; Love and the lover; Courage and cowardice.

Cleinias, brother of Alcibiades

Κλεινίαν (Kleinian); ἀδελφόν (adelphon)

The word. Cleinias here is Alcibiades' brother, another ward of Pericles, not the father named in the opening patronymic.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates proposes the brother as a possible example of someone Pericles has made wise. Alcibiades answers with a dismissive description of Cleinias as mad; Socrates provisionally repeats the description and asks why Alcibiades himself has been left in his present condition. The passage records Alcibiades' characterization in an argumentative exchange. It is not a clinical diagnosis or independent biographical evidence. The brother's function is to block the easy defence that the failure of Pericles' own sons tells nothing about his ability to educate others. Alcibiades then blames his own inattention, so the conversation moves from exceptional pupils back to the person being questioned.[7]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104b. Pericles is guardian to Alcibiades and his brother.

118e. The brother is named and rejected as evidence of successful education.

In this edition. The supplied note calls this the younger brother by reference to the Protagoras. The present dialogue itself says brother without specifying the relative ages.

See also. Cleinias, father of Alcibiades; Pericles' sons; Education and training.

Cleinias, father of Alcibiades

Κλεινίου (Kleiniou)

The word. Cleinias is Alcibiades' father; the genitive in "son of Cleinias" identifies the young man by his paternal

[7] The supplied edition, note 3 on 104b, compares Plato, Protagoras 320a–b, for the younger brother and Pericles' arrangements. The relative age is external to the present passage.

line. He must be distinguished from Alcibiades' brother of the same name.

In Alcibiades I. The opening patronymic gives the first spoken identification of the addressee. The father's arrangements also explain Pericles' guardianship at 104b. At 112c Socrates moves from poetic wars to battles within family memory: Alcibiades' father died at Coronea. The example therefore makes the consequences of disagreement about justice personal rather than remote. Nothing in the dialogue supplies a rounded biography or dates his birth. His name returns in the full identification "Alcibiades the beautiful, son of Cleinias" when Socrates restates the young man's ignorance, and again when Socrates describes his own exclusive claim to be Alcibiades' lover.[8]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103a. The dialogue opens with the paternal address.

104b. The father left Pericles as guardian.

112c. The father's death at Coronea illustrates lethal disagreement.

113b. Patronymic and beauty are included in the diagnosis.

131e. Alcibiades' patronymic is paired with Socrates' own parentage.

In this edition. Burnet brackets Κλεινίας after "your father" at 112c; the edition accordingly omits that repetition in English. The identification is secure from the other passages and does not require treating the bracketed word as accepted text.

[8] The supplied edition, note 1 on 103a, cites Plutarch, Alcibiades 1 for the death at Coronea; note 20 on 112c explains Burnet's brackets around the repeated name. These references are reported from the edition, not a new collation of Plutarch.

See also. Cleinias, brother of Alcibiades; Coronea; Pericles and Xanthippus.

Clothes and repeated arguments

σκευαρίων (skeuariōn); κατατετριμμένων (katatetrimmenōn); ἀμπίσχοιο (ampischoio); καθαρὸν (katharon); ἄχραντον (achranton); τρυφᾷς (tryphāis); γεύσαιο (geusaio)

The word. Little garments worn threadbare become the image of an argument rejected because it has been used before. Clean and unsoiled evidence continues the clothing metaphor; tasting the same argument again changes to the language of fastidious consumption.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades anticipates Socrates' question about how he learned the advantageous, because the same dilemma has already undermined his claimed knowledge of justice. Socrates complains that the young man treats an effective proof like a worn garment he will no longer put on. Novelty is being demanded where relevance and validity should matter. The joke is therefore attached to a precise methodological resistance, not merely to an unexplained taste for fashionable clothes.

Socrates first insists that the old question would apply and then temporarily lets it go because Alcibiades is too fastidious to enjoy the same argument. He offers a new route by testing whether the just and advantageous differ. That concession does not certify that the first argument was worn out or that Alcibiades knows the advantageous. The luxury vocabulary also anticipates the later Persian display that will outdo the young aristocrat's material standards.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

113d–114b. The change of topic produces a demand for fresh proofs and the clothes/food rebuke.

In this edition. The edition's "little garments" preserves the diminutive and its "taste" retains the change of metaphor. These clothes should not be confused with the literal cloak-making or body-care examples later in the dialogue.

See also. Luxury and adornment; Alcibiades; Pride and high-mindedness; Proof; Refutation; Argument.

Comic poet, unnamed

τοῦ κωμῳδοποιοῦ (tou kōmōidopoiou)

The word. The unnamed maker of comedy whose words Socrates uses to say that even the neighbours scarcely notice ordinary births.

In Alcibiades I. The comic quotation cuts across the grand account of the Persian heir's birth. His arrival is celebrated throughout the king's domain and thereafter by all Asia on the anniversary; the births of "us," Socrates and Alcibiades together, attract almost no notice. The joke reduces private Athenian status without singling out Alcibiades for all the ridicule. Its contrast is public recognition, not a claim that either speaker literally lacked family care or neighbours. The poet remains unnamed, so identifying him requires evidence beyond the spoken text.[9]

[9] The supplied edition, note 39 on 121d, explicitly leaves the comic poet unnamed and reports only that some editors assign the words to the comic poet Plato. No play-title or fragment-number is invented here.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

121c–121d. The royal birthday festival is contrasted with the comic line about neighbours.

In this edition. The edition says some editors have assigned the line to the comic poet Plato, but gives no settled attribution. It must not be presented as a verified quotation from Plato the philosopher or from an identified comic play.

See also. Royal comparison; Honour, fame and worth; Authorship and attribution.

Composite person

συναμφότερον (synamphoteron); τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο (to holon touto); συνάρχοντος (synarchontos)

The word. Συναμφότερον means the two taken together. At 130a Socrates glosses it by “this whole,” with soul and body as its two constituents. It is a candidate answer to the question what a human being is, rather than the dialogue’s final name for the person. Συνάρχειν, “share in ruling,” states the condition that the ensuing argument requires for this candidate to succeed.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates offers three alternatives: soul, body, or the combination. The list is treated by the speakers as exhaustive. Body alone is quickly excluded because it has already been assigned the role of what is ruled. Alcibiades then tentatively accepts that the combination might rule the body and so be the person. Socrates rejects this as the least acceptable answer: if one of the two does not share in rule, there is no way for both together to rule.

The crucial step concerns the attribution of a function to a composite. It assumes that the whole cannot be the relevant ruler unless both constituents participate in ruling. A reader may question that assumption; complex agents often act through one of their components. The text does not investigate that objection. Its local force is to reserve primary agency for soul, under the description of the person as what rules the body.

The distinction must therefore not be treated as a complete analysis of embodied personhood. The proof's own qualification follows immediately: it is adequate for the current purpose, while exact knowledge awaits the larger inquiry into the self itself. Nor does rejection of the composite show that human life proceeds without bodies. The dialogue has established precisely the opposite practical relationship, a soul using a body. The issue is what counts as the authoritative self to be known and improved.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

130a. Soul, body, and their combination form the three candidates

130b–130c. The combination is excluded because body does not share in ruling

130c–130d. The resulting identification is sufficient but not precise

In this edition. “The two together” accurately renders συναμφότερον without introducing the technical vocabulary of a later substance theory. The supplied apparatus at 130b11 distinguishes the printed συνάρχοντος from a reading meaning simply “ruling”; the shared prefix makes the argument about joint rule explicit.

See also. Human being; Soul; Body; Ruling the body; Adequacy and precision.

Conceit of knowledge

οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι (oiesthai eidenai); οἴει αὐτὰ εἰδέναι (oiei auta eidenai); οἰόμενοι δ’ εἰδέναι (oiomenoi d’ eidenai)

The word. The expression means thinking or supposing that one knows. Its content need not be false merely because the verb οἴεσθαι is used: the decisive qualification is that the person does not in fact know. The dangerous state consists of that combination, ignorance plus a mistaken self-assessment. “Conceit” here names false entitlement to knowledge, not vanity in every sense and not a Greek noun appearing in the formula.

In Alcibiades I. The structure first obstructs the acquisition of knowledge. At 106d–e Alcibiades agrees that he would not willingly seek or learn what he thought he already knew. Socrates applies the concession to justice at 109e–110c. Even as a child Alcibiades accused others loudly and confidently of wrongdoing. He takes these remembered judgments as evidence of knowledge; Socrates takes them as evidence that the conviction of knowledge preceded any identifiable search. Confidence therefore closes the route by which its absence might be remedied.

The failure of the appeal to the many produces the personal verdict at 113b: Alcibiades does not know justice, thinks he does, and proposes to advise Athens about it. Socrates insists that the verdict follows from Alcibiades’ own answers. The charge is consequently more than an older lover’s disparaging opinion. The young man has committed himself to the premises that expose his entitlement as unsupported.

The systematic diagnosis follows the argument about justice and advantage. Alcibiades gives incompatible answers and confesses that he no longer knows what he is saying. Socrates first tests whether all ignorance produces wandering. It does not. Alcibiades does not know how to ascend to heaven, prepare a dish, or steer a ship, but neither supposes that he possesses the relevant knowledge. In the practical examples he can hand the matter over to someone who knows and refrain from improvising.

At 117d–118a Socrates distinguishes three positions: actual knowers, nonknowers who know that they do not know, and nonknowers who think they know. Mistakes are assigned to the third. The important mechanism is attempted action under false assurance: we undertake a task when we believe we know what we are doing. Acknowledged ignorance can stop the intervention and permit delegation; unacknowledged ignorance cannot.

The passage should be read as the speakers' agreed explanatory argument, with its strong premises visible. It treats genuine knowledge as excluding the relevant errors and successful deference as protecting the acknowledged nonknower. It does not examine every accidental failure, deceptive expert, or mixed practical situation. To translate its claim into the unrestricted modern thesis that every human error is caused solely by overconfidence would exceed what the examples establish.

The state is worst when its objects are the greatest matters: justice, the fine, the good, and advantage. Alcibiades' proposed authority amplifies the risk, because his mistakes would affect citizens as well as himself. The problem is therefore epistemic and ethical together. He is not blamed simply for having been born without

knowledge, but challenged for acting as though the required understanding were already his.

The later self-care inquiry repeats this structure in another form. One may think one is caring for oneself while actually improving something else. Accurate identification of self and good is needed to break that error. The remedy is not a permanent performance of uncertainty about everything: Alcibiades does know ordinary facts and learned skills. It is the discrimination of what he knows from what he must still learn, followed by the work of inquiry.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106d–106e. Supposed knowledge blocks willingness to seek or learn

109e–110d. Childhood confidence cannot establish a discovery of justice

113b–113c. Alcibiades' answers expose knowledge he claims but lacks

116e–118b. Contradiction and practical examples diagnose the dangerous state

127e–128a. Supposed self-care can likewise conceal failure to care for the actual self

In this edition. The edition distinguishes "think one knows," "not know," and "be ignorant." The third is not intrinsically more culpable by lexical definition; the combination of ignorance with false assurance produces the culpable state. No separate term for "double ignorance" is imposed on the Greek.

See also. Ordinary ignorance; Disgraceful ignorance; Wandering; Error; Seeking; Self-knowledge.

Concord

ὁμόνοιαν (homonoian); ὁμονοοῦσιν (homonoousin); ὁμονοεῖ (homonoei); διχόνοιαν (dichonoian)

The word. Ὁμόνοια names concord, a being of one mind; διχόνοια is discord or division of mind. The verb ὁμονοεῖν describes being in concord, with others or even with oneself. In this dialogue it must be distinguished from ὁμολογεῖν, assenting to a statement, and from the wider idea of personal friendship. Whether concord is adequate to explain that friendship is exactly the question under examination.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades first specifies the city's good as friendship arising among citizens and hatred and faction disappearing (126c). Asked whether friendship means concord or discord, he naturally chooses concord. The obviousness of the opposition is not proof that friendship has been adequately defined. Socrates asks what kind of concord it is, what its subject matter is, and which craft produces it.

Arithmetic and measurement sharpen these questions. Cities agree about numbers through arithmetic; the same holds for private persons and each person with himself. Measuring decides which is bigger, a span or a cubit; weighing offers a parallel case. These examples connect stable agreement to a determinate expertise with identifiable objects. They also prevent the mere size of the group from making its knowledge a different kind: one mind, several citizens, and whole cities can share the same mathematical competence.

When pressed for the corresponding civic concord, Alcibiades shifts to close relationships: parents and children, siblings, husband and wife (126e). Socrates accepts the household as a test but retains the expertise-

based standard. The wife who knows wool-working and the husband who does not cannot share the relevant expert judgment; conversely, a wife who has not learned hoplite fighting cannot agree knowledgeably with her trained husband about it. The dialogue presents the gendered allocation as an assumption of this exchange, explicitly tracing the division to Alcibiades' account at 127a. It does not investigate which subjects women or men could learn under other arrangements.

The challenge then turns on scope. They lack concord "in these" subjects, and therefore friendship in those respects if friendship is concord. Each performs the assigned task, yet on the current definition the performance does not produce the shared knowledge that friendship requires. Alcibiades nevertheless insists at 127b that precisely this division of activity makes the city well ordered and creates friendship. It is just, he adds, for each to do his own business, and citizens' just action must produce friendship. The same people now appear both to have and not have friendship under his set of answers.

At 127d Socrates describes the result as inability to understand what the required friendship or concord is and in whom it occurs. This is a genuine unresolved point in the argument as presented. The lexicon should neither convert the attempted definition into a doctrine that affection is shared craft knowledge nor announce that specialized work necessarily makes family love impossible. Those are conclusions obtained from premises Alcibiades cannot maintain together. Another conception of agreement, a different account of friendship, or a distinction between concord about ends and agreement about techniques might respond, but the dialogue does not explicitly choose one here.

The episode is politically consequential because Alcibiades wanted good counsel to order and preserve the city. Without specifying its beneficial condition, he cannot identify the ruler's knowledge. Concord is therefore not merely a warm civic slogan: the questioning reveals how much its apparent familiarity leaves undecided. The move to care for oneself begins after Alcibiades admits this failure, rather than after he has supplied a successful account of civic harmony.[10]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

126c–126d. Arithmetic, measuring, and weighing model craft-based concord across persons and cities

126e–127a. Family relationships are tested by the unequal craft knowledge of husband and wife

127a–127d. Doing one's own business seems both to exclude and produce the friendship identified with concord

126d (apparatus). Burnet prints Bekker's αὐτή at d10 for "the same," relating civic and individual concord

127c (apparatus). The first περὶ τούτων is bracketed by Burnet and excluded from the translation

In this edition. "Concord" consistently marks this family, while "agree" is reserved for ὁμολογεῖν. At 127c the edition asks about concord among people of whom some know about the matters and others do not. At 126d its "the same" rests on a conjecture; the note gives the distinct textual bases of both choices.

[10] Diotimos Editions (2026), note at 126d10 identifies "the same" as Bekker's conjecture αὐτή, printed by Burnet: B has αὐτή with a different breathing, T and Olympiodorus αὐτῇ, and older printed texts αὖτη. Diotimos Editions (2026), note at 127c3 explains a different intervention: Burnet brackets the first περὶ τούτων, which the English accordingly omits. These local choices affect the relation of individual and civic concord and the formulation of the knowledge objection; neither supplies a solution to the aporia.

See also. Civic friendship; Good counsel; Doing one's own business; Arithmetic and measurement; Wool-working and weaving; Hoplite fighting.

Cookery

ὄψου σκευασίας (opsou skeuasias); σκευάζειν (skeuazein)

The word. Ὄψον is a prepared accompaniment or dish; σκευασία its preparation. The infinitive σκευάζειν means to prepare. This passage does not name a separate cookery craft with τέχνη or identify a professional cook by title.

In Alcibiades I. At 117c Socrates asks Alcibiades about preparing a dish. He knows that he does not know how to do it. Consequently he does not oscillate between confident opinions about the recipe but leaves the work to someone who knows. The example supports a precise distinction: lack of knowledge alone does not generate the bewildered errors under examination; false presumption of knowledge does.

Its ordinariness is useful. One need not turn all ignorance into shame or demand mastery of every activity. There are competent ways to act while lacking a particular skill, especially acknowledging the lack and entrusting that task to another. The pilot example immediately generalizes this responsible deference to a setting with obvious physical stakes.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

117c. Known ignorance about preparing food leads to competent delegation rather than wandering opinion

In this edition. “Preparing a dish” is appropriately modest. Calling it a fully described theory of cookery would supply details the dialogue does not give.

See also. Craft and expertise; Piloting and seafaring; Conceit of knowledge.

Coronea

Κορωνείᾳ (Korōneiai)

The word. The later battle-site at which Alcibiades’ father died, according to Socrates.

In Alcibiades I. Coronea follows Tanagra in the sequence from familiar poetic conflicts to a family loss. Socrates says that disagreement over justice caused these deaths and battles too. Alcibiades agrees, allowing his father’s fate to be included in the criticism of the many as teachers of justice. This gives the methodological argument emotional pressure without pausing for a lament: the young man’s confident appeal to ordinary opinion must confront the cost of disagreement among the very people he would cite as authorities. The passage does not say that his father’s death establishes which party was just.[11]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

112c. Coronea is named as later than Tanagra and the place of the father’s death.

In this edition. Burnet brackets the repeated father’s name Κλεινίας; the English does not translate it. The edition’s note offers the external date 447 or 446 BC, while the dialogue itself supplies only the relative sequence.

[11] The supplied edition, notes 1 and 20, places Cleinias’ death at Coronea in 447 or 446 BC. The alternative dates are preserved rather than silently resolved.

See also. Cleinias, father of Alcibiades; Tanagra and Boeotia.

Courage and cowardice

ἀνδρεία (andreia); δειλία (deilia); δειλὸς (deilos); ἀνδρειότατος (andreiotatos)

The word. Ἀνδρεία names courage or bravery; δειλία its opposed cowardice, with δειλός describing the cowardly person. The superlative ἀνδρειότατος identifies the most courageous tutor in the account of Persian education. Although connected linguistically with "man," the ethical noun is not interchangeable with ἀνδρεῖον at 127a, where a subject of instruction is called men's work.

In Alcibiades I. Courage is the crucial accepted good in the argument about fine and advantageous action. At 115b Socrates identifies the attempt to rescue a comrade or kinsman whom one ought to save as courage. The obligation matters: the example is not a general celebration of risk-taking, and the text does not offer a comprehensive definition of courage. It isolates the admirable feature of an undertaking whose consequences can include wounds and death.

Alcibiades initially treats this as evidence that fine actions may be bad. Socrates distinguishes the courageous attempt from death, then asks what Alcibiades would exchange courage for. His answer is absolute: he would not accept even life as a coward. Socrates draws out a ranking in which cowardice is a very great bad, placed alongside death, while life and courage are opposed goods. The point is to secure Alcibiades' valuation from his own avowal. A reader should not replace these premises with a later thesis that death is no bad at all.

Because courage is good, the rescue is good precisely in the respect in which it was called fine. Its deaths and wounds supply a different respect in which it is bad. The argument thus blocks the unqualified inference from "the courageous act has a bad consequence" to "its courage is bad." It does not show that every courageous rescue is safe, or remove all grounds for calling an undertaking bad in another respect.

Courage returns in the royal comparison. The most courageous Persian tutor prepares the prince to be fearless, treating fear as slavery (121e–122a); Spartan courage belongs to the list of qualities before which Alcibiades would seem a child (122c). These are presented as educational ideals in Socrates' competitive exhortation. They are not developed into a theory distinguishing rational from irrational fear. The contrast with Alcibiades' refusal to live as a coward is useful: he already values courage intensely, yet lacks the disciplined formation that the speech attributes to his rivals.[12]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

115b–116a. Courage identifies the fine and good aspect of rescue, while wounds and death are treated separately

121e–122a. The most courageous Persian tutor prepares the prince to be unafraid

122c. Courage is among the Spartan qualities held up against Alcibiades

In this edition. "Courage" should not be collapsed into mere audacity or into the separate verb θαρρεῖν, "take

[12] Diotimos Editions (2026), notes at 115d and 115e distinguish two additions printed by Burnet: the brief answer at 115d2 is Dobree's conjectural supplement, without a supporting witness even in Stobaeus; the answer and explicit courage/death ranking at 115e5–7 come from Stobaeus, Anthology 3.1.193, but are absent from B, T, and Proclus. Their evidential status is therefore different.

heart," at 127d. The printed ranking of courage and death includes supplied material whose two different textual bases are explained in the note.

See also. Fine conduct; Good and bad; War and peace; Freedom and slavery.

Craft and expertise

τέχνη (technē); τὴν τέχνην (tēn technēn); τέχνῃ (technēi); δημιουργοὶ (dēmiourgoi)

The word. Τέχνη is an art or craft: an organized, learnable competence whose subject and standards can be identified. The dialogue includes making shoes and building ships, but also music, medicine, piloting, arithmetic, and measuring. It therefore exceeds modern "handicraft" and does not mean only knowledge that produces a separate material artifact. Δημιουργοί are craftsmen or practitioners, considered in relation to their specialized work.

In Alcibiades I. Craft provides Socrates' most persistent model for asking what Alcibiades knows. At 107a–c an audience seeks the builder, prophet, or doctor appropriate to the problem, not the most beautiful or wealthy speaker. The examples undermine the substitution of social prestige for competence. They do not assume that every question confronting the Assembly belongs to one of these already named occupations; identifying Alcibiades' proposed expertise remains the task.

At 108b–e Socrates makes the normative function of craft explicit. What happens correctly according to the craft supplies the better in an activity. Gymnastics governs the better in wrestling, music in lyre-playing, singing, and stepping. Socrates asks Alcibiades to supply

the analogous standard for war and peace. The answer becomes the more just (109c). No separate named craft of justice is thereby fully described. The analogies establish a burden to explain standards, not a completed classification of politics as a trade.

At 124b craft and care are the resources by which Alcibiades could surpass the foreign rivals whose advantages he cannot match. When the inquiry resumes, the local character of expertise becomes restrictive. A shoemaker is intelligent and good about shoes, but not about cloaks (125a–b). Piloting and chorus-training can organize people making use of other people, so that description does not yet identify civic rule. Even “good counsel” applies to a pilot. Expertise must be specified by the object, task, and beneficial condition it secures.

Arithmetic and measurement introduce a further feature: competent judgments should support concord within their domain (126c–d). The same craft can make a person agree with himself, people agree with one another, and cities agree. Yet extending this model directly to friendship generates the household difficulty: spouses can cooperate while possessing different specialized knowledge. The dialogue leaves the resulting account of civic concord unresolved, illustrating a limit in transferring craft models without examining their relational assumptions.

The self-care argument uses another craft distinction. Shoemaking improves shoes; gymnastics improves feet. Ring-engraving cares for what belongs to the hand; training cares for the hand itself (128b–d). Improving a possession cannot simply count as improving its possessor. To identify the craft that improves oneself, one must know what oneself is. The subsequent user–instrument analysis is likewise illustrated by craftsmen: a

shoemaker uses cutters, hands, and eyes; the worker differs from what he works with (129c–e).

At 131a–b these distinctions produce a limitation on specialist self-knowledge. A doctor as doctor knows bodily matters, and craftsmen's skills concern the body's provisions; neither skill by itself establishes knowledge of the self. The qualification "as" or "insofar as" is crucial: the text does not demonstrate that a practicing doctor can never acquire philosophical understanding. Its disparaging description of crafts as menial must also be reported as the dialogue's social evaluation, not adopted as the lexicon's judgment.

Finally, at 133d–e Socrates corrects the earlier concession that specialists could know their own without themselves: discerning self, one's own, and what belongs to one's own seems to be the work of one person and one craft. This is not an announcement that one expert can make shoes, sail ships, and practise medicine without learning their different skills. The claim concerns recognition of the relation between the person and the things properly called his. Keeping it distinct from local technical knowledge prevents an apparent contradiction from being "solved" by erasing either passage.

Craft is therefore both a standard of accountable competence and an analogy whose limits require care. The dialogue repeatedly asks what a skill knows, does, improves, and permits its possessor to teach or judge. It

never licenses assuming that the possession of just any craft supplies the virtue required to govern.[13]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

107a–108e. Expert advisers and the craft-specific meaning of the better set the initial standard

124b–127d. Craft, local goodness, coordinated rule, and concord shape the unresolved search for civic expertise

128b–129b. Distinct crafts improve a thing and its belongings, motivating inquiry into the self

129c–129e. Craft tools and bodily instruments illustrate user and used

131a–131b. Specialist knowledge does not by itself establish self-knowledge

133d–133e. The earlier concession is revised: one discernment relates self, own, and own's belongings

In this edition. The stable "craft" keeps the argument's repeated τέχνη visible across manual, mathematical, and directive activities. The edition's "virtue of piloting" at 125c preserves functional excellence. At 133e "one craft" must be read with κατιδεῖν, discern or comprehend, and with the explicit correction immediately preceding it.

See also. Better and best; Good counsel; Doing one's own business; Menial crafts; Production, work, and action; Care for oneself.

[13] At 133d12 Burnet prints Stobaeus' ἄλλους δέ, "and others," where B and T have ἀλλ' οὐ, "but not." Diotimos Editions (2026), note identifies the backward reference to the doctor, trainer, and craftsmen at 131a–c. The correction of the earlier concession is explicit in the printed text; it should not be silently omitted to preserve an uncomplicated ladder of unrelated specialist knowledges.

Cyrus

Κύρου (Kyrou)

The word. The Persian ruler named with Xerxes as almost the only predecessor Alcibiades supposedly thinks worth mentioning.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates uses Cyrus to expose the geographical and reputational scale of the young man's desire. Even supremacy in Europe would be insufficient if Asia remained inaccessible. The comparison is put into Socrates' reconstruction of Alcibiades' hopes; Alcibiades permits the questioning to proceed on that basis rather than independently giving a historical judgement on Cyrus. The name supplies a model of exceptional dominion. The dialogue does not narrate Cyrus' conquests or describe his education, and the later account of the Persian heir should not be read as a biography of Cyrus.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

105b–105c. The hypothetical limit to Europe introduces Cyrus and Xerxes as benchmarks.

In this edition. The edition's note identifies Cyrus the Great and gives historical background. The spoken passage contains only the name and its place in Alcibiades' supposed estimate of past greatness.

See also. Xerxes; Europe and Asia; Ambition and hope.

Daedalus and Hephaestus

Δαίδαλον (Daidalon);Ἥφαιστον (Hēphaiston)

The word. Daedalus is the ancestor Socrates claims for his own family; the line is then traced to Hephaestus, son of Zeus.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates repeats Alcibiades' "ours too" with comic exactness. A claim that seemed to distinguish the ambitious aristocrat can also be made by the questioner. The important distinction, Socrates immediately says, is not the final divine ancestor but the intervening succession: the foreign houses consist of kings sprung from kings, whereas Socrates and Alcibiades and their fathers are private persons. The genealogy is therefore both affiliative and deflationary. It puts the two Athenians on a common footing and undermines the assumption that a distant divine connection supplies present political competence. The dialogue does not state that Socrates works as a craftsman; interpreting the joke in that occupational light depends on the edition's external note.[14]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

121a. Socrates matches Alcibiades' genealogy and then introduces the private/royal distinction.

In this edition. The supplied note explains Daedalus as the legendary craftsman and connects Socrates' family to stone-working through other sources. These are explanatory background, not additional propositions spoken here.

See also. Eurysaces and Aeacus; Zeus and Zeus of Friendship; Socrates; Ancestry, nature and upbringing.

[14] The supplied edition, note 37 on 121a, compares Euthyphro 11b–c, Diogenes Laertius 2.18 and Apollodorus 3.14.6, 3.15.8. These are the note's sources for the craft and genealogy background.

Damon

Δάμωνι (Damōni)

The word. Pericles' continuing companion in the pursuit of wisdom, according to Alcibiades.

In Alcibiades I. Damon's name differs from the earlier names in the list because the association is explicitly present: even now, at his age, Pericles keeps company with him for this purpose. The detail depicts education as something a mature statesman may continue rather than a childhood stage he has simply completed. It also contributes to the dramatic chronology by treating Pericles as alive and active. Socrates' response again asks for evidence of education transmitted to another person; he does not discuss Damon's own ideas or deny the reported association.[15]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

118c. The present-tense association completes Alcibiades' defence.

In this edition. The supplied note calls Damon a theorist of music. His field is not specified in the spoken passage, and no musical doctrine should be ascribed to him here.

See also. Pericles and Xanthippus; Dramatic time and setting.

[15] The supplied edition, note 30 on 118c, identifies Damon as a music theorist by reference to Plutarch, Pericles 4–6.

Deinomache

Δεινομάχης (Deinomachēs)

The word. Alcibiades' mother, named in a double parental address and in the imaginary comparison between Athenian and Persian wealth.

In Alcibiades I. At 105d Socrates calls Alcibiades the son of Cleinias and Deinomache as he states that the young man needs him. The pairing complements the earlier reference to allies and relatives on both sides of the family. At 123c her adornment, valued by Socrates at perhaps fifty minae at most, is placed against the enormous revenues assigned to a Persian royal woman's ornaments. This is an imagined report to Amestris, not a scene in which Deinomache or Amestris speaks. The maternal name helps cut an apparently magnificent Athenian household down to size when viewed from the Persian court. Any tender or teasing overtone in the first address remains an interpretation, not the lexical meaning of the name.[16]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104b. Maternal relatives contribute to Alcibiades' confidence.

105d. Socrates names both parents.

123c. Her adornment is priced within the hypothetical address to Amestris.

In this edition. The apparatus at 105d reports the alternative Δεινομένης; Burnet prints Δεινομάχης. The edition's genealogical identification as an Alcmaeonid

[16] The supplied edition, note 7 on 105d, cites Plutarch, Alcibiades 1 for Deinomache's family and labels the tender or teasing interpretation of the address as conjectural.

comes from its external note, not from a statement in the dialogue.

See also. Amestris; Luxury and adornment; Minae and plethra.

Deliberation and advice

βουλεύεσθαι (bouleuesthai); συμβουλεύσων (symbouleusōn); σύμβουλος (symboulos); συμβουλή (symboulē); κοινὴ βουλή (koinē boulē)

The word. Βουλεύεσθαι means to deliberate, considering what to do. Συμβουλεύειν means to advise; a σύμβουλος is an adviser, and συμβουλή advice. These roles are related but not identical: the Athenians deliberate, while Alcibiades proposes to stand up and advise them. Κοινὴ βουλή is shared deliberation or counsel.

In Alcibiades I. At 106c Socrates imagines intercepting Alcibiades on his way to the speaking platform. The question is what the citizens are deliberating about such that he is entitled to advise. Alcibiades accepts the criterion: he will speak on matters he knows better than the audience. The subsequent examples do not establish that he must know every civic craft. They ask what distinctive subject his advisory competence concerns.

Building, divination, health, and shipbuilding reveal the need for relevant expertise. Wealth, lineage, height, and beauty have no authority to decide those questions. When Alcibiades specifies war, peace, and other civic affairs, Socrates asks for the standard of “better” that would guide the recommendation (107d–109c). Good advice requires more than eloquence and favorable reception; it requires understanding what the advice is meant to improve.

At 113d Alcibiades says public deliberation generally concerns advantage because justice is considered obvious. Socrates refuses to let that shift exempt his asserted expertise from examination. At 114b–d he offers himself as an Assembly of one: the same knowledgeable person should be able to persuade an individual and a crowd about the same matters. That claim removes the excuse that private questioning is irrelevant preparation for public address, without supplying a complete theory of persuasion.

The phrase “let us deliberate together” marks a different use of the same family. Alcibiades says it at 119b while deciding whether to care for himself, although he immediately uses the incompetence of rivals as an excuse to avoid preparation. Socrates repeats it at 124b with a sharper object: how both of them can become as good as possible. The deliberative activity Alcibiades meant to direct in public is now applied to his own formation.

Near the end, the Delphic inscription is itself imagined as advising an eye to see itself (132d). Advice is thus not restricted to a political speech; its worth depends on helping its addressee orient action through understanding. The dialogue lets Socrates practice such counsel while requiring Alcibiades to recognize why he is not yet fit to give it to the city.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106c–109c. The adviser must identify his subject and the standard of better action

113d–114d. Advantage becomes the asserted subject of deliberation; private persuasion is tested as preparation for public speaking

119b. Alcibiades asks for common deliberation about his preparation

124b–124c. Socrates repeats the invitation as shared inquiry into becoming better

132d. The inscription is imagined as advising an eye

In this edition. The edition distinguishes “deliberate,” “advise,” and “recommend” (παραινεῖν). At both 119b and 124b it follows Stephanus’ κοινὴ βουλή rather than the manuscripts’ κοινῇ βουλῇ. The matched translations preserve Socrates’ return of Alcibiades’ earlier invitation.

See also. Good counsel; War and peace; Justice and injustice; Craft and expertise; Persuasion.

Delphi and Pytho

ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματι (en Delphois grammati); ἐν Πυθοῖ νεών (en Pythoi neōn); Δελφικοῦ γράμματος (Delphikou grammatos)

The word. Delphi, also called Pytho, is the location of the inscription commanding self-knowledge. Gramma here is something written, the inscription, rather than a letter of the alphabet.

In Alcibiades I. The first appeal comes at the close of the royal comparison. Socrates tells Alcibiades to listen both to him and to the writing at Delphi: know yourself, for these are your real opponents. Self-knowledge initially bears on an accurate recognition of one’s resources and deficiencies. The imperative does not leave the young man in passive modesty; it tells him why care and craft are necessary.

At 129a the inscription is revisited after distinguishing care of a person from care of possessions. Socrates asks whether knowing oneself is easy and whether the dedicator at the temple in Pytho was a person of no

account. The question presupposes the importance of the injunction while reopening its difficulty. Alcibiades has found it alternately accessible and extremely hard. No named dedicator is established here.

At 130e the injunction is interpreted as bidding the hearer know the soul; at 132c–d Socrates proposes what he suspects the Delphic words mean by recasting their advice to an eye as “see yourself.” The shift from a familiar maxim to a problem requiring an explanatory model is crucial. The authority of the inscription does not deliver a complete answer without investigation. Socrates marks his account as an interpretation, and the earlier inquiry into the person was explicitly only adequate, not precise.

The site therefore unites admonition, inquiry and interpretation. It should not be reduced to a slogan about acknowledging social rank, nor expanded into an independently stated theology that the dialogue never supplies. The wisdom of the saying is treated as something to work out in the conversation.[17]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

124a–124b. The inscription joins Socrates’ demand to recognize the actual rivals.

129a. The dedication at Pytho introduces the difficulty of self-knowledge.

130e. The command is interpreted in relation to the soul.

132c–132d. Socrates offers a proposed interpretation through the example of sight.

[17] The supplied edition, notes 48 and 59, identifies the temple as Apollo’s and compares Charmides 164d–165a and Protagoras 343a–b. This article’s analysis concerns the injunction’s successive uses within Alcibiades I.

In this edition. The edition prints “know thyself” as Socrates’ command continuous with his speech, not an inserted quotation followed by a second command. Its notes identify the temple as Apollo’s and connect the maxim with other dialogues; Apollo’s personal name is not spoken here.

See also. God and the divine; Royal comparison; Dramatic time and setting; Know thyself; Self-knowledge; Soul looking into soul.

Discovery

ἐξηῦρες (exēures); εὑρεῖν (heurein); εὑρεθείη (heuretheiē); εὕρωμεν (heurōmen)

The word. Εὑρίσκειν means to find or discover; the compound ἐξευρίσκειν emphasizes finding out. In the initial acquisition dilemma discovery is contrasted with learning from another person. Elsewhere finding can mean arriving at a result in the present argument. The lexical family therefore names success in an inquiry without specifying a single method or guaranteeing the result’s ultimate precision.

In Alcibiades I. When Alcibiades cannot name a teacher of justice, Socrates accepts that he might know through discovering it himself. Discovery is not dismissed as impossible. The next question asks whether he sought, and seeking is tied to thinking that he did not already know. Alcibiades can identify no such period: even his childhood protests in games expressed confident judgment. On the agreed premises he cannot claim justice as a personal discovery.

This argument concerns an absent history of inquiry, not a demonstrated inability of human beings to discover

justice. Its conditional form matters. Socrates says Alcibiades could discover if he sought. The refutation removes an unsupported claim of acquisition and opens the need for genuine investigation.

The family returns positively at 129b, where Socrates asks how the self itself might be discovered. This is an object of joint inquiry, not a reminiscence of what either partner has already found. At 130c–d exact knowledge is deferred until the omitted object is discovered. Discovery thus remains possible and necessary even after the practical soul argument has been accepted.

At 116c “whatever we find fine” means whatever the current reasoning identifies as fine will also be found good. That use concerns argumentative recognition, not an independent biographical route of acquiring moral expertise. Keeping both senses prevents the lexicon from making every instance of finding mean solitary invention.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106d–106e. Discovery is one alternative to learning from others

109e–110d. Alcibiades cannot establish a prior search and thus cannot justify claimed discovery

116c. Finding describes the result reached within an argument

129b–130d. The self itself remains an object to be discovered for precise knowledge

In this edition. “Discover” consistently distinguishes the inquiry verb from “learn.” At 116c the edition appropriately uses “find,” since the sense is finding that a thing has a property. It does not treat the compound ἐξευρίσκειν as naming an entirely different faculty.

See also. Seeking; Learning; The self itself and each self; Adequacy and precision.

Disgraceful ignorance

ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία (hē eponeidistos amathia); ἀμαθίᾳ (amathiai); τῇ ἐσχάτῃ (tē eschatē)

The word. Ἀμαθία is lack of learning or understanding and can carry the reproach of stupidity. The dialogue's phrase ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία means the ignorance open to reproach, rendered "the disgraceful stupidity." It is not a medical diagnosis or an assertion of permanently limited intellectual capacity. In context the reproach falls on not knowing while thinking one knows, especially about the matters on which a would-be ruler intends to act.

In Alcibiades I. At 118a Socrates names the state just isolated by the argument. This ignorance causes bad things and is the disgraceful amathia. He then asks when it is most harmful and shameful: when it concerns the greatest objects. Justice, the fine, the good, and advantage are supplied as those objects. The seriousness of the judgment depends both on false confidence and on the practical importance of the field.

At 118b the diagnosis becomes personal. Socrates says Alcibiades is living with the most extreme amathia, as the argument and Alcibiades himself accuse him. The language of "living with" gives the ignorance an intimate, persistent presence. It explains his rush into politics before education. Socrates nevertheless extends the condition to most current politicians and includes a qualification for a few possible exceptions. The passage targets a civic pattern as well as an individual.

The dialogue subsequently treats the condition as remediable. Alcibiades must not use the ignorance of others as an excuse for neglect; he must undertake care. At 127d–e recognition of his shameful state is met with encouragement because he is at an age suitable for correction. Calling the earlier condition stupidity should not obscure that educational possibility or invite contempt for someone simply because he lacks schooling.

The word's force is sharper than ordinary "not knowing," but the sharpness arises through the diagnosis already established. A lexicon should not make every occurrence of ignorance equivalent to amathia or treat the label as proof independent of the argument.[18]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

117d–118a. The mistaken self-assessment is isolated and named reproachable amathia

118b–118c. The diagnosis is applied to Alcibiades and most politicians

127d–127e. Recognition of a shameful condition opens the prospect of care

In this edition. The edition retains Burnet's καί at 118a4: this ignorance causes bad things "and is" the disgraceful stupidity. Removing the conjunction would silently follow a conjecture reported but not printed. At 118b6 Burnet prints "most extreme" from B and Olympiodorus; T has "most shameful."

See also. Conceit of knowledge; Ordinary ignorance; Error; Learning; Care and neglect.

[18] The supplied edition's note 29 compares the reproachable ignorance with Apology 29b. The present article rests on Alcibiades I 117d–118b and does not require treating the two passages as an identical theory of every kind of error.

Divination

μαντικῆς (mantikēs); Μάντις (Mantis); Μαντικὸς (Mantikos); μαντείᾳ (manteiai)

The word. Μαντική is divination as a competence, μάντις a diviner or prophet, and μαντικός an adjective meaning skilled in or disposed to prophecy. Μαντεία names divination or a prophetic pronouncement. The terms move between a recognized advisory practice and teasing or qualified claims within the conversation.

In Alcibiades I. At 107b divination is one of the subjects on which a specialist would advise better than Alcibiades. The diviner's height, beauty, birth, or wealth makes no difference to the relevant expertise. The example is part of an argument about the basis for advice; Socrates does not here offer a philosophical validation of every practice of divination.

At 115a the adjective becomes ironic. Alcibiades has said that answering will do him no harm, and Socrates replies that he is a prophet. The coming argument will unsettle his opinions. The edition's note suggests that this may be truer than he knows because refutation can be beneficial, while marking that explanation as interpretive.

At 127e Socrates invokes his own divination conditionally: if Alcibiades answers, if the god wills, and if his prophetic judgment deserves trust, both will be better. The qualifications prevent turning the line into a guaranteed prediction. It expresses hopeful educational judgment under divine dependence. The ending's fear about the city's strength confirms why an unconditional forecast of success would misread this language.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

107b. A diviner is the proper specialist regardless of physical or social advantages

114e–115a. Socrates ironically calls Alcibiades prophetic about the absence of harm

127e. Socrates tentatively predicts improvement through continued answering, if the god wills

In this edition. The edition distinguishes the craft noun μαντική from μαντεία, though both receive “divination” in English. The capitalized forms shown follow the beginnings of Socrates’ speeches. The curative interpretation of the irony is the edition’s note’s comparison with Gorgias 475d, not a sentence explicitly spoken here.

See also. Deliberation and advice; Craft and expertise; Benefit and harm; God and the divine.

Divine likeness

θειότερον (theioteron); τῷ θεῷ (tōi theōi); πᾶν τὸ θεῖον (pan to theion); ἔοικεν (eoiken)

The word. Θεῖος means divine; θειότερον is its comparative, more divine. Ἔοικεν expresses likeness here: the knowing region of soul resembles the god. Resemblance is not identity. The phrase πᾶν τὸ θεῖον, all that is divine, broadens the object of cognition, while the following “god and intelligence” specifies its terms in a compressed construction.

In Alcibiades I. At 133c1–6 Socrates asks whether anything in soul is more divine than the region concerned with knowing and intelligent thinking. Alcibiades can name none. Socrates concludes that this region resembles the god, and that looking into it and knowing the divine

enables one to know oneself most of all. These claims belong to the text before the supplied divine-mirror passage.

This distinction is central to responsible interpretation. The supplement may intensify the divine object's superiority by calling god purer, brighter, and the finest mirror. It does not introduce divinity into an otherwise entirely secular analogy. Conversely, the preceding likeness claim does not by itself contain every stronger claim made by the supplement. A part of soul resembling the god is not yet the statement that god is a clearer mirror than that part.

The expression "region" should also be handled cautiously. The dialogue singles out knowing and intelligence as soul's best activity. It does not provide a full anatomy of incorporeal parts or equate a particular named psychological faculty with a separately existing deity. The argument needs an excellent, divine-like focus for self-understanding; its complete metaphysical status remains unstated.

At 134d–e the bright divine becomes an orientation of action. Just and temperate conduct looks toward it, whereas unjust conduct looks toward what is godless and dark. That contrast gives the knowing imagery ethical force. It does not merely praise abstract contemplation independently of the city's needs.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

133b–133c6. Wisdom and intelligence identify soul's most divine region and its likeness to god

133c1–5 (apparatus). Alternative readings affect the description of the region and the phrase about god and intelligence

134d–134e. Divine brightness and godless darkness orient contrary kinds of action

In this edition. Burnet prints θειότερον from T and W; B has νοερώτερον, “more intellectual,” while Cobet proposes κυριώτερον, “having more authority.” At 133c4 the printed θεῷ, “god,” differs from T’s θείῳ, “divine.” The article describes the printed reading and does not silently combine these alternatives.

See also. Soul looking into soul; God as mirror; Intelligence; Temperance; Self-knowledge.

Divine opposition

δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα (daimonion enantiōma); ἐναντιοῦται (enantioutai); ἐφῆκεν (ephēken)

The word. A divine opposition is the restraint Socrates gives as the cause of his long silence toward Alcibiades. Daimonion qualifies the opposition as divine or supernatural; it is not here the name of a separate demon or a full theory of daimones.

In Alcibiades I. The opening explicitly contrasts a human cause with a certain divine opposition. Socrates says Alcibiades will discover its power later as well; now it no longer opposes him, and he has come forward with hope that it will not oppose him in future. The account authorizes the timing of this particular encounter, not a claim that every subsequent assertion is exempt from examination.

At 105d–106a Socrates describes the restraining agency as the god. He thinks he was not permitted to converse earlier because Alcibiades was too young and not yet filled with the ambition that now makes him ready to listen. The sign’s role is thus connected to a pedagogical

opportunity. Socrates' own explanation contains "I think" and "as it seems to me"; the lexicon should preserve the difference between his experience of restraint and his interpretation of why it occurred.

At 124c the god becomes Socrates' guardian, better and wiser than Pericles. This comparison does not eliminate Socrates' stated need for care and education; it identifies the support on which he relies in saying Alcibiades' distinction will come through him. Alcibiades answers that he is joking, and Socrates allows "perhaps" while insisting on their shared need. The divine claim belongs inside the interplay of solemnity and irony rather than outside the drama as a narrator's certified fact.

The framing returns through divine-will clauses at 127e and 135d. Socrates predicts improvement if Alcibiades answers and the god wills; at the end he corrects the young man's dependence on Socrates' wish alone. This does not undo the value of the promised relationship. It prevents the lover or teacher from being treated as the sole controller of its success. The last fear of the city completes the qualification: permission to begin is not a narrated guarantee of perseverance or a secure future.

The dialogue never calls the opposition a voice or describes its childhood origin. Those features belong to the edition's comparison with the Apology. They may illuminate the allusion but should not silently replace the specific presentation here.[19]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103a–103b. Divine restraint and its cessation explain the opening approach.

[19] The supplied edition, note 2 on 103a, compares Apology 31c–d and 40a–c. The voice and childhood details belong to that comparison; the actual wording here is divine opposition.

105d–106a. Socrates calls the agency the god and interprets the earlier prohibition pedagogically.

124c–124d. The god becomes the better guardian; Alcibiades detects joking.

127e. Improvement is qualified by divine willing and Socrates' divination.

135d–135e. Divine willing and fear prevent a guarantee of success.

In this edition. The edition calls this Socrates' sign in explanatory prose, but the actual initial phrase is divine opposition. Its notes compare the Apology; this entry does not import that dialogue's detailed account as if repeated here.

See also. God and the divine; Socrates; Guardian and tutor; Dramatic time and setting; Divination.

Doing one's own business

τὰ αὑτῶν πράττουσιν (ta hautōn prattousin); τὰ αὑτοῦ (ta hautou); ὁ χρηματιστής (ho chrēmatistēs)

The word. The phrase τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν means doing one's own things, affairs, or business. Its plural forms apply to groups. "One's own" is relational: the expression does not by itself determine whether what belongs to a person is an assigned task, a possession, the body, or the person's proper concern. The dialogue exploits that unresolved relation in two distinct contexts.

In Alcibiades I. The phrase first enters the political inquiry at 127a, in Socrates' analysis of household expertise. A husband and wife need not share knowledge of wool-working or hoplite fighting. If concord requires shared knowledge and friendship is concord, they lack friendship in the very respects in which each performs

the work assigned to him or her. Socrates describes that performance as doing their own business. The phrase therefore initially labels a specialization whose consequences create trouble for Alcibiades' definition of friendship.

At 127b Alcibiades makes a positive claim in precisely the same vocabulary: cities are well ordered and friendship comes to be because each does his or her own business. At 127c he agrees that these actions are just, and that citizens acting justly must become friends. These propositions conflict with his prior identification of friendship with expert concord. Socrates does not pronounce that specialization is unjust. He asks what friendship could be if Alcibiades' account makes it both present and absent among the same people.

The source's note appropriately compares the formula's appearance in Charmides and Republic, but the local argumentative status must govern interpretation. Here no successful definition of temperance or justice is established through it. Alcibiades defends its civic value while unable to reconcile that value with his other answers. Reading "doing one's own business" as the Republic's completed account of justice would conceal the actual aporia. Conversely, treating this passage as a simple rejection of every division of labor would go beyond the premises tested.

At 131c Socrates makes a different use of the expression. The preceding inquiry has distinguished the person, the person's body, and the body's possessions or provisions. Whoever tends money tends something still further removed from himself than his body. The money-maker, Socrates concludes, is no longer doing his own business. Ordinary usage would regard attending to one's property as an especially clear case of minding one's

business; the revised account of what the person is makes that usage questionable.

The point is not that earning money is somebody else's assigned occupation or that money never belongs legally to its owner. It is that exclusive care for possessions fails to reach the person whose good is supposed to justify the activity. The phrase moves from the allocation of functions within a household or city to the identification of the proper object of personal care. Those are different arguments, linked by the ambiguity of "own."

The later correction at 133d–e further cautions against a rigid division of knowledges. The speakers reconsider their earlier concession that someone can know the body's affairs without knowing himself: discerning oneself, one's own, and what belongs to one's own now appears to belong to one person and one craft. This revisits the cognitive relation between the levels without cancelling the difference between tending shoes and tending a foot. Properly doing one's own business cannot be settled by pointing to an object under one's control; it requires an account of the agent and of the relation between the activity and that agent's good.[20]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

127a–127d. Separate household tasks are called one's own business; Alcibiades claims such conduct is just and friendship-producing, leaving a contradiction with his definition of concord

[20] Diotimos Editions (2026), note at 127a compares Charmides 161b–163c and Republic 433a–b. The comparison is useful precisely because the speakers and argumentative outcomes differ: the present text places the formula in Alcibiades' attempted defense of civic friendship and then reaches perplexity. No conclusion from the other dialogues has been imported as its definition here.

131b–131c. The money-maker is said not to be doing his own business because money lies beyond the immediate care of the self

133d–133e. The prior separation of what people can know at the different levels is explicitly reconsidered

In this edition. The edition keeps "what is one's own" stable so that the practical phrase's connection with the later self/own distinction remains visible. The money-maker at 131c is described in terms of tending money; the text does not there say that he knows the distant objects he tends.

See also. Concord; Civic friendship; Justice and injustice; What belongs to oneself; Care for oneself; Production, work, and action.

Doing well

εὖ πράττει (eu prattei); εὖ πράττοντες (eu prattontes); ἡ εὐπραγία (hē eupragia); κακῶς πράττειν (kakōs prattein)

The word. Εὖ πράττειν means both to act or conduct affairs well and to fare well, succeed, or prosper. Its negative counterpart κακῶς πράττειν similarly joins bad doing and bad fortune. Εὐπραγία names the condition or activity of doing well. The ambiguity belongs to ordinary Greek usage and becomes philosophically active here; choosing only "behave morally" or only "enjoy success" would prejudge the argument.

In Alcibiades I. At 116b Socrates offers a fresh way to connect fine and good after analyzing rescue in battle. Whoever does finely, he asks, also does well; those who do well are happy; happiness is through acquiring good things; and these are acquired through doing well and finely. Doing well is therefore good and fine. The passage

takes advantage of the fact that the same expression can speak about the quality of an agent’s conduct and the prosperity of that agent’s life.

This is not a simple restatement of the rescue analysis. That argument left rescue good in respect of courage and bad in respect of death. The new chain seeks a general relation between fineness and goodness through successful living. A careful reader should notice the work done by the idiom instead of silently translating the first occurrence “act rightly” and the next “prosper,” as if a premise linking them had been separately established. The edition keeps “do well” at both points precisely to let the problem remain audible.

The same verbal family carries the final political inference. At 134a someone who does not know what he is doing will make mistakes, do badly in private and public, and be wretched; those for whom he acts suffer too. At 134d–e just and temperate agents are expected to act rightly and do well, and Socrates offers a conditional guarantee of happiness. At 135a–b incompetent license aboard ship supplies the destructive counterpart: doing badly follows forms of rule that lack virtue.

The dialogue therefore treats quality of action and quality of life as inseparable questions, while its language can make their connection seem easier than a fully explicit proof would. Alcibiades wanted political actions to secure advantage. Socrates directs attention to the competence and character required for such actions genuinely to succeed. Neither the diction nor the closing warning supports a promise that just agents will meet no external setbacks. Socrates himself fears that the city can overpower the educational undertaking. “Doing well” names the ethical success being sought, but its

achievement remains conditional on the care and virtue the young man still lacks.[21]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

116b–116c. The dual sense of doing well links fine action, happiness, and good things

134a–134b. Ignorant action leads to doing badly and wretchedness for agent and beneficiaries

134d–134e. Just and temperate action grounds Socrates' conditional guarantee of happiness

135a–135b. Rule without virtue is said to entail doing badly

In this edition. The English "do well" retains the idiom's ambiguity instead of silently deciding which sense operates at each step. At 134a–e the translation alternates "act" and "do" where English needs it, while the Greek repeatedly uses πράττειν. Εὐπραγία at 116b is also "doing well," keeping the nominal and verbal forms connected.

See also. Good and bad; Fine conduct; Happiness and wretchedness; Production, work, and action; Advantage.

[21] Diotimos Editions (2026), note at 116b, identifies both acting well and faring well in εὖ πράττειν and observes that the argument trades on both senses. Retaining that ambiguity makes the inference open to inspection; the lexical fact by itself does not establish that right conduct guarantees prosperity.

Dramatic time and setting

The word. Dramatic time is the date implied for the conversation, distinct from the date of composition, the dates of later historical events, and the dates of manuscripts or printed editions. Setting here is primarily the private encounter before Alcibiades enters public political life.

In Alcibiades I. The dialogue supplies relative clues but no calendar date. Alcibiades expects to come before the Athenians within a very few days; he is not yet quite twenty; Pericles is alive and still associates with Damon. Socrates says he has observed him for years without speaking and is now allowed to approach. At 118b the two are explicitly alone. No narrator describes a precise street, house, gymnasium or time of day, and named locations in the royal comparison should not be mistaken for the physical scene.

The supplied Introduction proposes about 433–432 BC by combining age and Pericles' life with external chronology. It also acknowledges that the details do not all agree. The chief internal difficulty it identifies is Lampido's family: the dialogue describes her father, husband and son as men who have all been kings, whereas the note places Agis' accession later than the proposed scene. Consequently an exact dramatic year should not be presented as securely established by all the clues. Nor is the proposed dramatic period a date of authorship.

Two sorts of time organize the encounter more securely than a reconstructed year. First is educational timeliness: earlier Alcibiades could not usefully listen; now his ambition makes him reachable; recognizing ignorance at his present age still permits care, unlike the more difficult

hypothetical case of fifty. Second is the future left open by the ending. Alcibiades says from this day he will attend Socrates and begin caring for justice. Socrates wishes him perseverance and fears the city's strength.

The edition interprets these fears against the later careers of both men. That is retrospective dramatic irony: knowledge supplied by the reader and historical notes, not a report by the speakers of already completed events. It would be an error to make the ending a simple prediction fulfilled within the dialogue, since no subsequent action is narrated. The text's immediate achievement is a new resolution under acknowledged risk.[22]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103a–103b. Years of silence end in the present approach.

105a–105b. The appearance before the people is expected within a few days.

118b–118c. Only two interlocutors are present; Pericles still associates with Damon.

123d. Alcibiades is not yet quite twenty.

124a (editorial). The royal-family description produces the chronology problem discussed in the note.

127d–127e. Current youth is contrasted with recognizing the condition at fifty.

135d–135e. The new beginning is joined to fear about the future.

In this edition. This is an editorial category, not an attested technical Greek expression. Historical dates

[22] The supplied Introduction, "A note on the persons," offers the approximate dramatic dating; note 47 on 124a gives the Agis difficulty. Note 77 on 135e supplies historical background for the ending and carefully distinguishes a charge reported by Xenophon (Memorabilia 1.2.12) from evidence that the charge was made at Socrates' trial.

reported by the supplied notes have not been used to force a consistency the edition itself denies. “Dramatic irony” describes a reading of the ending, not an additional Greek noun in it.

See also. Alcibiades; Damon; Lampido and the Spartan royal family; Divine opposition; Authorship and attribution.

Draughts

τὰ πεττευτικά (ta petteutika); πεττεύειν (petteuein)

The word. Πεττεύειν is to play a board game with pieces; τὰ πεττευτικά concerns what belongs to skilled play. “Draughts” is the conventional rendering here, not a warrant to reconstruct the ancient game as exactly identical to modern checkers.

In Alcibiades I. At 110e Socrates denies that the many can teach what counts as good play and what does not, even though the subject is less serious than justice. Alcibiades replies that they can teach things more serious than draughts, notably speaking Greek. That reply forces Socrates to distinguish the crowd’s successful informal teaching in one area from its lack of expertise in another.

The game’s role is therefore comparative, not simply dismissive. A relatively trivial subject can demand specialized competence that general familiarity does not supply. The passage does not prove that knowledge of justice is impossible for many people; it challenges the assumption that the many’s existence as a group makes them reliable teachers of any subject.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

110e–111a. Inability to teach competent board play contrasts with the many's acknowledged teaching of ordinary Greek

In this edition. The source's note compares Republic 333b as another use of the game to illustrate specialized competence. The present argument supplies no rules of play, so the English name should remain an approximate identification.

See also. Craft and expertise; Teachers; Learning; Justice and injustice.

Education and training

παιδευθῆναι (paideuthēnai); ἀπαίδευτοι (apaideutoi); παιδείαν (paideian); ἀσκεῖν (askein); ἀσκήσεως (askēseōs); παρασκευὴν (paraskeuēn); Γύμνασαι (Gymnasai)

The word. Education is formation through teaching and learning; training is repeated preparation or practice; paraskeuē is preparation or equipment. The dialogue can call Alcibiades uneducated for political life while acknowledging that he has acquired specific school subjects.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates' inventory of letters, lyre-playing and wrestling at 106e is not a claim that Alcibiades has learned nothing at all. It establishes the limited domains in which instruction can be identified. When political advice is proposed, the pertinent teacher or discovery of the required standard cannot be supplied. "Uneducated" at 118b and 123d therefore marks a failure relative to the intended task and its greatest objects, not the absence of literacy or every practical ability.

Alcibiades initially draws a complacent conclusion from the same diagnosis applied to politicians. If his competitors are amateurs, why undergo the labour of training? The athletic comparison is already his: educated competitors would have to be approached like athletes after appropriate preparation. Socrates preserves the agonistic framework but changes the rivals. A would-be naval commander must look beyond his own crew to opposing leaders; an Athenian leader must consider Spartan and Persian rulers. Learning what admits learning and practising what needs practice then appear as requirements of the very greatness Alcibiades desires.

The foreign education passage dramatizes sustained preparation. The royal child is attended from birth, learns riding and hunting at seven, and receives four selected tutors at twice seven. The point is not an independently verified schedule for every historical prince, but a contrast between coherent formation and the casual appointment of Zopyrus. Socrates also says that an Athenian lover may be the one person who takes a young man's education seriously.

At 124c Socrates includes himself in the need to be educated; the inquiry becomes joint. At 127d–e the admission of shameful ignorance is treated as timely rather than hopeless: Alcibiades' age is appropriate for recognizing the problem, whereas discovering it at fifty would make care difficult. This is an encouragement within the dramatic situation, not a scientific age-limit on learning.

The final precaution before politics is "exercise first" and learn what one must know, going in with antidotes against corruption. Training is thus not merely preparation to defeat competitors. Its later purpose is protection of the person who will encounter public desire

and power. The closing promise begins this work without narrating a completed education.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106e–107a. Named school subjects establish real but limited competence.

118b–119c. Political ignorance and the temptation to rely on natural superiority are exposed.

119d–120c. Competition supplies the demand for learning, practice and preparation.

121d–122b. The staged upbringing of the Persian heir contrasts with Zopyrus.

124b–124d. Both interlocutors are included in the need for care and education.

127d–127e. Recognition at the present age makes improvement possible.

132a–132b. Preparation becomes protection against civic corruption.

In this edition. The translation distinguishes “train” for askein from “exercise” for gymnazesthai. Both carry bodily associations, but neither should be reduced to literal athletics where the context is political and ethical preparation.

See also. Guardian and tutor; Four royal tutors; Spartan disciplines; Lover of the people; Learning; Teachers; Knowledge and teachability; Riding and hunting.

Erchia

Ἐρχίασιν (Erchiasin)

The word. The place where Alcibiades’ landed holding is located; the Greek form is locative, “at Erchia.”

In Alcibiades I. Socrates puts the young man's land, not even three hundred plethra, beside the very large tracts reportedly assigned to a Persian royal woman's adornment. The number forms part of the information an imagined messenger might give Amestris. Its effect is relational rather than an assertion that Alcibiades is poor: a substantial local holding can look tiny on the royal scale. Erchia makes the comparison concrete by locating the familiar estate, while the Persian report names entire districts after ornaments.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

123b–123d. The royal ornament estates are contrasted with Alcibiades' land at Erchia.

In this edition. The note calls Erchia an Attic deme east of Athens and offers an approximate modern acreage. The dialogue itself specifies the place and upper limit, not an exact surveyed area or modern conversion.

See also. Minae and plethra; Wealth and property; Amestris.

Error

ἁμαρτήματα (hamartēmata); ἁμαρτάνοντες (hamartanontes); ἀναμάρτητοι (anamartētoi); ἐξαμαρτάνων (examartanōn)

The word. The ἁμαρτ- family means making a mistake, failing, or going wrong. At 117d the plural ἁμαρτήματα explicitly concerns action: mistakes "in doing." The privative adjective ἀναμάρτητος means without making mistakes in the relevant respect. The words should not automatically be translated as theological sin or reduced to merely incorrect verbal answers.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates uses practical examples to connect error with false confidence. A nonexpert who knows his limits can leave cooking or steering to the expert. Someone who incorrectly supposes that he knows instead undertakes the action himself. The tripartite distinction at 117e–118a assigns error to this third class, since genuine knowers and appropriately deferential nonknowers have been excluded.

The claim is strong and relies on idealized premises. It assumes that the knowledgeable agent does not commit the relevant error and that the nonknower successfully entrusts the matter to knowledge. The dialogue does not survey accidental mishaps, incomplete expertise, or mistaken identification of an expert. These limits should be stated without hiding the inference the speakers accept.

At 134a the theme returns after the account of self-knowledge. Someone ignorant of self and relevant affairs will not know what he is doing; he will make mistakes and do badly, both privately and publicly. Others for whom he acts will suffer too. Error consequently supplies the bridge between epistemic failure and the danger of political power.

The two arguments belong together. The earlier passage shows why admitting a limit can protect action; the later one shows why an aspiring ruler cannot substitute unlimited license for the understanding he lacks. The remedy is knowledge where possible and appropriate dependence where it is not yet possessed.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

117d–118a. Mistakes in action are linked with ignorance that thinks it knows

134a. A manager's ignorance harms himself and those for whom he acts

134e–135b. Medical, nautical, and political examples show the danger of power without understanding

In this edition. "Make mistakes" preserves the practical sense. "Without making mistakes" at 117e concerns the matters handed over to others; it should not be expanded into the claim that an acknowledged nonknower is universally morally infallible.

See also. Conceit of knowledge; Ordinary ignorance; Wandering; Intelligence.

Euripides

Εὐριπίδου (Euripidou)

The word. The tragic poet cited when Socrates insists that Alcibiades has heard the unwelcome conclusion from himself.

In Alcibiades I. The quotation closes a brief argument about responsibility for an answer. In arithmetic or spelling, the answerer is the person who states the answer; similarly, Alcibiades has himself supplied the admissions exposing his ignorance. Socrates then invokes Euripides to phrase the reversal memorably. The source note locates the words in Hippolytus, where Phaedra makes the nurse utter the name she herself avoids. That dramatic background lends an additional intimacy to a conversation already framed as courtship, but the immediate argumentative work is clear without importing

the whole tragedy: eliciting an utterance and making it are distinguished.[23]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

113a–113c. Questions about who speaks culminate in the Euripidean quotation.

In this edition. At 113c Burnet prints Proclus' οὐκ against BT's ἀλλ' οὐκ; the apparatus explicitly compares Hippolytus 352. The named tragic characters belong to the explanatory note, not to the words of Alcibiades I.

See also. Love and the lover; Alcibiades.

Europe and Asia

Εὐρώπῃ (Eurōpēi); Ἀσίαν (Asian); Ἀσίας (Asias)

The word. The continental names mark the successive geographical limits that Socrates says Alcibiades' ambition refuses to accept.

In Alcibiades I. The imagined god first tests whether Alcibiades would live without acquiring more than he has. A second restriction permits supremacy in Europe but forbids crossing into Asia; Socrates says even this would not satisfy him. The movement is therefore hypothetical, not an itinerary or a report of a planned expedition. In the royal comparison Asia recurs as the vast area over which Persian kings may rule and whose inhabitants celebrate the heir's birthday. Both uses turn scale into an instrument of correction: Alcibiades wants a worldwide name but has not prepared himself to contend with rulers whose resources already extend beyond his local world.

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[23] Euripides, Hippolytus 352, is cited directly in Burnet's apparatus at 113c3. The supplied edition's note 21 supplies the scene involving Phaedra and the nurse.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

105b–105c. A divine hypothetical enlarges the scale of ambition.

121a. Persian dynastic rule extends at times to Asia.

121c–121d. All Asia is depicted as observing the royal birthday.

In this edition. Burnet prints Ἀσίαν at 105c against B's Ionic-looking ἀσίην in the apparatus. The names should not be supplied with modern geopolitical boundaries absent from the dialogue.

See also. Ambition and hope; Cyrus; Xerxes; Royal comparison.

Eurysaces and Aeacus

Εὐρυσάκη (Eurysakē); Αἰακοῦ (Aiakou)

The word. Eurysaces is the ancestor Alcibiades names when claiming descent from Zeus; Aeacus is a still earlier ancestor whose homeland Socrates adds to the comparison.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades answers the royal pedigrees with "ours too," insisting that his own family goes back to Eurysaces and ultimately Zeus. Socrates does not dispute this claim; he first mirrors it with his own Daedalian genealogy and then relativizes it. Displaying Eurysaces' Salamis and Aeacus' Aegina to Artaxerxes, he says, would bring ridicule. The ancestral names therefore do not simply endorse Alcibiades' noble standing. They illustrate how a familiar basis of prestige can remain genuine on its

own terms yet fail to confer the superiority demanded by his ambition.[24]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

121a. Alcibiades names Eurysaces in his genealogical rejoinder.

121b. Aeacus and the two ancestral homelands enter the comparison.

In this edition. The source note supplies Ajax as a link in the pedigree, but Ajax is not named in the dialogue. The relation to Zeus is asserted here; the intermediate genealogy is not narrated.

See also. Salamis and Aegina; Ancestry, nature and upbringing; Daedalus and Hephaestus.

Eye

ὀφθαλμὸς (ophthalmos); ὄμματι (ommati); ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὀφθαλμὸν θεώμενος (ophthalmos ara ophthalmon theōmenos)

The word. Ὀφθαλμός and ὄμμα both mean eye. The dialogue uses both within the same analogy without assigning them separate philosophical faculties. The eye is at once an instrument through which a person works and the subject of a hypothetical instruction to see itself. Keeping those contexts apart avoids turning every occurrence into an already established symbol of self-knowledge.

In Alcibiades I. At 116e the number of one's eyes is an example of secure ordinary knowledge. Alcibiades would

[24] The supplied edition, note 36 on 121a, cites Plutarch, Alcibiades 1 and supplies the links through Ajax and Aeacus. Ajax is not a named figure in the present dialogue.

not unwillingly alternate between two and three as he does between ethical answers. At 129d eyes join hands among the bodily means used by a craftsperson. They are distinguished from their user and help extend the argument from external tools to the whole body.

At 132d–133b an eye is imagined as if it were a person commanded to see itself. It looks into an eye opposite and sees a reflected image in the best, seeing region. The personification is explicitly introduced by the comparison "as though it were a man." It should not be turned into the assertion that an isolated organ independently possesses human self-consciousness.

The choice of another eye adds more than the presence of a reflective surface. It gives a counterpart of the same kind, and a region whose excellence matches the subject's own. That prepares the soul-to-soul analogy. Yet the dialogue does not name the particular eye as Socrates' or Alcibiades', and it does not describe an actual staged moment of mutual gazing. Such a scene may be imagined by a reader but is not reported in the dialogue.

The eye thus serves three distinct arguments: reliable identification, bodily instrumentality, and reflexive vision through an appropriate counterpart. Their relationship is illuminating precisely because their functions are not identical.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

116e–117a. The number of eyes exemplifies stable knowledge

129d–129e. Eyes are bodily means used by craftspeople

132d–133b. A hypothetical self-seeing eye models the direction of self-knowledge

In this edition. The edition renders both ὀφθαλμός and ὄμμα as “eye.” The singular-to-singular relation in ὀφθαλμὸς ὀφθαλμὸν matters: the example is one eye observing an eye, not a claim that an eye turns physically inward to look at itself directly.

See also. Sight; Pupil; Mirror; User and instrument; Soul looking into soul.

Faction and hatred

τὸ μισεῖν (to misein); στασιάζειν (stasiazein); διχόνοιαν (dichonoian)

The word. Μισεῖν is to hate; στασιάζειν is to engage in faction or be divided by civic conflict. The attested verb, rather than the unattested abstract headword στάσις, carries the meaning at 126c. Διχόνοια, discord, is a related but distinct contrary to concord.

In Alcibiades I. Asked what must be present or absent for the city to be better ordered and tended, Alcibiades names friendship as the desirable presence and hatred and faction as the absences (126c). The pairing distinguishes an antagonistic disposition from its political expression in divided collective life. The city-improving result he seeks is relational, like the earlier contrast of health with disease, not merely the accumulation of resources.

Socrates does not dispute the desirability of removing these conditions. He asks whether friendship is concord or discord and then subjects concord to the test of determinate expertise. The analysis fails to identify what knowledge produces the required civic unity. Thus the text provides a clear diagnosis of the conditions opposed to civic well-being but no completed account of a technique for eliminating faction.

The entry should not convert every disagreement in the dialogue into faction. The many's disagreement about justice can cause war (112a–d), but the verb here names conflict within the desired ordering of civic relationships.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

126b–126c. Friendship's presence and hatred and faction's absence are proposed as conditions of a better city

In this edition. "Faction" translates a verbal expression, "to be factious," while "discord" answers ὁμόνοια in the next question. Registering στάσις as a lemma may help lookup, but the actual form in this passage is στασιάζειν.

See also. Civic friendship; Concord; City and citizens; War and peace.

Failure to notice

λέληθας (lelēthas); λεληθέναι ἐμαυτὸν (lelēthenai emauton); λάθωμεν (lathōmen)

The word. Λανθάνειν means to escape notice. With a participle it can describe doing or being something without its being noticed by oneself or another. The construction distinguishes a condition from awareness of that condition. In the self-care argument this gap permits someone to lack knowledge or neglect the self while sincerely believing otherwise.

In Alcibiades I. At 109d Socrates asks whether Alcibiades' ignorance has escaped his own notice or his lessons escaped Socrates'. The paired alternatives frame the acquisition problem without yet determining which explanation is correct. The first concerns self-awareness;

the second concerns Socrates' observation of the young man's education.

At 127d Alcibiades makes the first alternative his own. He may have been in a shameful condition for a long time without noticing it himself. Recognition is not the creation of the defect but its discovery. Socrates responds that his age makes the discovery timely and care possible.

The inquiry into self-care immediately repeats the danger. At 127e–128a the speakers may perhaps fail to notice that they are not caring for themselves while thinking they are. At 132b Socrates recalls this fear when the soul has been identified: mistaking the object could make them care for something else unknowingly. The risk is more subtle than openly choosing possessions over self. It is misdescribing one's own practice as adequate self-care.

The verb therefore supplies a precise connection between epistemic conceit and practical misdirection. Awareness matters because it makes correction possible, but awareness alone does not yet provide the missing knowledge of what one is or how one should become better.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

109d. The paired possibilities are unnoticed ignorance or unobserved learning

127d–127e. Alcibiades recognizes a previously unnoticed shameful condition

127e–128a. Mistaken confidence in one's self-care is posed as a danger

132b. Socrates recalls the risk of caring for the wrong object

In this edition. At 127e–128a πολλάκις after the warning μή is rendered “perhaps,” not “often.” The edition accordingly presents a danger the inquiry must avoid, rather than claiming frequent observed failures in self-care.

See also. Conceit of knowledge; Perception; Care for oneself; Perplexity.

Farming and harvesting

θεριζόντων (therizontōn); γεωργοὶ (geōrgoi)

The word. Θερίζειν is to harvest; γεωργοί are farmers or cultivators. The first expression identifies people in a particular activity, while the second names practitioners whose expertise concerns the body’s external provisions.

In Alcibiades I. At 125b harvesting is one candidate activity of the people whom Alcibiades’ good ruler would govern. He excludes it, as he excludes sick people and sailors, in the effort to isolate political competence. The mention shows how underspecified “ruling men” remains without an account of what those men are doing.

At 131a–b farmers join the other craftsmen in the class whose expertise knows things further removed from the self than bodily matters: provisions through which the body is tended. The classification is about the craft’s object, not an assertion that farmers never know themselves in any respect. The subsequent description of these crafts as menial invokes a social hierarchy the dialogue adopts and reworks through its argument about self-knowledge.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

125b. Harvesters illustrate a group defined by a practical task other than the civic activity sought

131a–131b. Farming expertise is directed toward the body's provisions, not by itself toward the self

In this edition. The edition uses "farmers" for γεωργοί and "men harvesting" for θεριζόντων, preserving the difference between occupation and current action. It does not name a specific agricultural art at the earlier occurrence.

See also. Craft and expertise; Menial crafts; Rule and being ruled; Production, work, and action.

Fine conduct

καλά (kala); καλόν (kalon); καλῶς (kalōs); καλοὶ κἀγαθοί (kaloi kagathoi)

The word. Καλός ranges across beauty, fineness, and admirable or noble quality. The neuter καλόν can name what is fine; καλῶς qualifies doing or speaking as fine or well. The adjective does not acquire a wholly separate Greek form when its subject changes from a beautiful youth to admirable conduct. Καλοὶ κἀγαθοί combines "fine and good" in a conventional description of respectable men. It is neither automatically a definition of moral excellence nor a warrant that those so designated understand it.

In Alcibiades I. Fine conduct becomes a bridge in the examination of justice and advantage. At 109c Alcibiades says that war against those doing just things does not seem fine. The remark follows his recognition that a speaker would not admit recommending such a war. Fine conduct here is connected to public avowability and

honorable presentation, but the later argument asks whether this accepted appraisal can withstand closer ethical analysis.

At 115a Alcibiades agrees that all just actions are fine. He refuses the claim that all fine actions are good, however, and also allows shameful actions to be good. His example is recognizable without any abstract ethical theory: those who rescue friends in battle may be wounded or killed, whereas men who fail to rescue them can return safe. The counterexample turns on a distinction between the honorable appearance or character of an undertaking and the fortunes of its agent.

Socrates does not simply answer that death is good. He distinguishes respects of evaluation. The rescue is fine in respect of the courageous attempt to save those whom one ought to save, and bad in respect of wounds and death. Courage and death are different. Since Alcibiades would not accept life without courage, courage is identified as one of the greatest goods. The fineness of rescue therefore attaches to an acknowledged good. At 116a the resulting statement remains explicit about scope: nothing fine is bad insofar as it is fine, and nothing shameful good insofar as shameful. This leaves a composite action open to different evaluations for different features.

The next argument, at 116b–c, goes beyond the rescue analysis. Someone acting finely does well; doing well leads into happiness and the acquisition of goods. The speakers then identify fine and good again and state that whatever they find fine they will find good, on the basis of this argument. The reader should not erase the shift from aspect-qualified predication to a more general claim. Nor should the passage be recast as a full theory of Beauty or a declaration that visible attractiveness invariably benefits

its possessor. Its immediate objects are actions and the standards Alcibiades employs in political speech.

The conventional social description “fine and good” is itself subjected to examination at 124e–125b. Alcibiades initially identifies the desired excellence with what the fine and good Athenians do. Socrates asks whether these are intelligent men and in what they are intelligent. Shoemaking supplies the limiting case: a person can be good at shoes but bad at cloaks. The prestigious phrase cannot tell them which political competence they seek. Its ordinary familiarity is precisely why it must be unpacked.

The moral and bodily senses continue to interact after the main argument. Socrates urges Alcibiades to become as beautiful as possible while speaking about the improvement of the soul at 131d; political corruption will make him uglier at 132a. At the end, Socrates avoids bluntly naming the youth’s slavish condition “where a beautiful man is concerned” (135c). The language lets physical distinction and ethical deficiency confront one another. The dialogue never treats a handsome appearance as sufficient evidence of fine character; the same young man’s beauty makes that insufficiency dramatically vivid.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

109c. Alcibiades calls unjust war unfine in the context of what an adviser would acknowledge

115a–116a. Just actions are fine; rescue in battle leads to the crucial “insofar as” qualification

116b–116d. Fine conduct is linked with doing well, goodness, and advantage

124e–125b. The social description “fine and good” fails to identify a specific political excellence

131d–132a. Beauty language shifts to improvement or corruption of the person

135b–135c. The finer is called more befitting, while the beautiful Alcibiades is confronted with a slavish condition

In this edition. The edition generally uses “beautiful” of appearance and “fine” of conduct, while preserving “fine and good” for καλοὶ κἀγαθοί. That is readable English but divides a Greek word the argument and drama keep connected. “Well said” translates καλῶς in conversational appraisal; it should not automatically be promoted into a technical assertion about moral fineness.

See also. Good and bad; Advantage; Courage and cowardice; Shame and the shameful; Beauty and bloom; Befitting.

Four royal tutors

τέτταρες (tettares); σοφώτατος (sophōtatos); δικαιότατος (dikaiotatos); σωφρονέστατος (sōphronestatos); ἀνδρειότατος (andreiotatos); εὐνούχων (eunouchōn); ἐφόρων (ephorōn)

The word. Four adult Persians, judged the best in wisdom, justice, temperance and courage, are the “royal tutors” assigned to the heir at fourteen in Socrates’ account. They are distinct from the eunuchs supervising infancy and from the Spartan ephors guarding royal succession.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates describes education as beginning before formal lessons. The Spartan ephors publicly guard royal wives to protect the dynasty’s descent; the Persian king’s wife is said to be guarded by fear. When the Persian heir is born, distinguished eunuchs are charged with his care and bodily formation. At seven the boys begin riding

instruction and hunting; at twice seven the four tutors take over. Each superlative has a different educational task. The wisest teaches Magian lore, explained as service of the gods, and royal matters. The most just teaches lifelong truthfulness. The most temperate teaches freedom from domination by pleasure, making rule over oneself the first condition of genuine kingship. The most courageous makes the pupil fearless, since fear is characterized as enslavement.

This description gives concrete content to education rather than merely praising foreign nobility. It also prepares the later connection between virtue and freedom. Nevertheless, the account belongs to Socrates' persuasive comparison and should not be certified as the actual constitution of Persian education. The four are said to be the selected best men; the passage does not assert that they are selected from some separately defined larger college of the best. The immediate antithesis with Zopyrus supplies its dramatic purpose.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

121b–121c. Spartan ephors and Persian fear protect royal succession.

121d. Eunuchs provide early attendance and physical formation.

121e. Seven and fourteen mark successive stages of the programme.

122a–122b. Four tutors' differentiated tasks lead into the Zopyrus contrast.

In this edition. The translation preserves "twice seven" and identifies the four themselves as those judged best. "Ephors" and "eunuchs" refer to different peoples and functions; conflating them would erase the contrast. The

ethical vocabulary is developed separately in its own entries.

See also. Zoroaster and Horomazes; Guardian and tutor; Zopyrus and Thrace; Education and training; Temperance; Courage and cowardice; Freedom and slavery; Riding and hunting.

Freedom and slavery

ἐλεύθερος (eleutheros); δοῦλον (doulon); δουλεύειν (douleuein); Δουλοπρεπὲς (Douloprepes); Ἐλευθεροπρεπὲς (Eleutheroprepes); ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς (eleutheroprepōs)

The word. Ἐλεύθερος and δοῦλος mark free and enslaved status. Δουλεύειν means to serve or be a slave. The compound adjectives δουλοπρεπής and ἐλευθεροπρεπής mean befitting a slave or a free person; the adverb ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς asks whether one's condition is in a free-person-befitting way. This vocabulary can make ethical judgments by analogy with social status without simply reporting a person's legal condition.

In Alcibiades I. The dialogue takes actual slavery for granted in its social world. Socrates asks whether Pericles has made anyone wiser, slave or free (119a); Zopyrus is the aged household slave appointed as Alcibiades' attendant (122b); slaves and helots appear among the Spartans' resources (122d). These usages must not be dissolved into metaphor. Conversely, the moralized uses cannot be read as new legal classifications.

In the Persian education speech, the prince must learn not to be ruled by pleasures so that he becomes accustomed to freedom and real kingship (122a). He is to rule what is within himself rather than serve it. Courage training is similarly described through freedom from fear,

since fear makes him a slave. Socrates thereby makes someone born to the highest rank need education before he can be genuinely free. This prepares the eventual reversal directed at Alcibiades.

At 135b the argument begins with a conditional comparison: before acquiring virtue, a man, not just a child, does better to be ruled by his better than to rule. What is better is finer, and what is finer more befitting. Being subordinate is therefore presented as fitting for the bad person; vice is slave-befitting and virtue free-person-befitting. The conclusion follows a claim about ethical benefit, not a demonstration that existing systems of enslavement distribute people according to virtue.

The terminology nevertheless retains its coercive social force. Alcibiades' pride depends on noble birth, resources, and command. To describe his present condition as inappropriate to a free man undercuts precisely the social assurance with which he intended to enter politics. Socrates asks him whether he now perceives his condition; he says he does very sharply. When asked how he will escape it, he appeals to Socrates' will, which Socrates corrects to the god's will (135c–d).

The proposed escape is educational rather than a legal manumission. Alcibiades will attend Socrates and begin to care for justice. The ending even plays with the reversal of the attendant's role, since the paidagōgos was a slave who accompanied a child. Such language makes voluntary submission to care compatible with movement toward genuine freedom. Its sting depends on maintaining the difference between unrestricted power and the ethical capacity to govern oneself and others well.

The text should therefore not be recruited either for a modern theory of equal civic rights that it does not state

or for an unqualified thesis that all legally enslaved people deserve their status. Its immediate target is the untrained free-born aspirant to rule. He can possess social freedom while lacking the virtue that the argument calls befitting it.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

119a. Slave and free are ordinary social categories in the challenge about Pericles' pupils

122a–122b. Royal self-rule is opposed to enslavement to pleasure and fear; Zopyrus is an actual household slave

122d. Slaves and helots are included among Spartan resources

135b–135e. Ethical subordination, slave-befitting vice, and free-person-befitting virtue lead into Alcibiades' promise of care

In this edition. "Befits a slave" and "befits a free man" translate compounds, not the bare nouns "slavery" and "freedom." The distinction matters at 135c, where the question concerns Alcibiades' present ethical condition. The edition's "man" in these phrases should be read with the gendered social vocabulary of the exchange, without treating it as a universal modern rights formulation.

See also. Befitting; Virtue and vice; Rule and being ruled; License; Temperance.

God and the divine

θεὸν (theon); Θεός (Theos); θειότερον (theioteron); θεῖον (theion); θεοφιλῶς (theophilōs); ἄθεον (atheon); ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ (ean theos ethelēi)

The word. Theos is god; theios is divine, with a comparative meaning more divine. Acting theophilōs is

acting in a way dear to the gods, whereas atheon is godless. The dialogue uses divine language for restraint, hypothetical authority, moral orientation and self-knowledge without explicitly identifying every occurrence with one named deity.

In Alcibiades I. The opening god-language has several distinct functions. One of the gods appears in Socrates' imagined offer to Alcibiades, testing whether he could accept limits on acquisition and domination. The god connected with Socrates' delayed approach is a restraining and then permitting power. Zeus and the Muses are explicitly named in different local settings: oaths, pedigrees and a clue to naming music. The Persian educational description defines Magian lore as service of the gods. These uses should not be merged into a single doctrinal assertion simply because English can render all their divine nouns similarly.

At 124c Socrates' guardian is the god, identified by the same earlier prohibition. The statement grounds his trust without claiming that he personally needs no further care. At 127e his prediction that both men will improve is doubly cautious: if the god wills, and if his divination deserves trust. At 135d he insists on the same qualification when Alcibiades says escape from his present condition depends on Socrates' will. The divine frame limits personal mastery of the educational outcome.

At 133c the argument turns to what is most divine in the soul, the region concerned with knowing and understanding. In Burnet's printed text it resembles the god, and looking into it and knowing the divine provides the strongest self-recognition. Here divinity functions within the explanatory analogy, not merely as an oath or the name of a sign. The basic claim occurs before the large

supplied passage, though its wording is itself textually variable.

The further comparison of god to a purer, brighter and finest mirror is printed in angle brackets from Eusebius at 133c8–17 and absent from B and T. Its status must always accompany any account that depends specifically on this extension. Rejecting or bracketing it does not remove every divine term from the surrounding argument: the resemblance claim stands in the main text immediately before it. Conversely, retaining it in this edition does not establish universal scholarly agreement about authenticity.

At 134d–e divine brightness and godless darkness become opposed orientations of action. Just and temperate action is dear to the gods and allows the agents to see themselves and their goods; injustice turns toward darkness and self-ignorance. The passage links the visual and ethical vocabulary, but it gives no independent exposition of a divine metaphysics. In particular, it does not explicitly name Apollo, Zeus or a later theological first principle as the unique referent of every singular god.[25]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

105a–105c. A hypothetical god imposes limits on ambition.

105d–106a. The restraining god permits the approach.

122a. Service of the gods belongs to royal religious education.

124c. The god is named as Socrates' guardian.

127e. Divine willing qualifies the prediction of improvement.

[25] For the local readings, see the supplied Burnet apparatus at 133c1, c4, c5 and c8–17, and edition notes 69–70. Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11.27.5, is identified there as the source of the supplied extension.

133c1–7. The main text connects the divine region of the soul and the god.

133c8–17 (apparatus). The supplied mirror extension elaborates the divine comparison.

134d–134e. Divine brightness and godless darkness orient action.

135d. Socrates corrects the formula to divine willing.

In this edition. At 133c1 Burnet prints θειότερον from TW against B's νοερώτερον; at 133c4 he prints θεῷ against T's θείῳ. The Eusebian extension has a separate, larger transmission problem. Lower-case "god" in this translation is not an argument for either polytheism or monotheism by capitalization alone.

See also. Divine opposition; Zeus and Zeus of Friendship; Delphi and Pytho; Zoroaster and Horomazes; Textual transmission and editorial signs; Divine likeness; God as mirror; Self-knowledge.

God as mirror

εἰς τὸν θεὸν (eis ton theon); καλλίστῳ ἐνόπτρῳ (kallistōi enoptrōi); καθαρώτερόν (katharōteron); λαμπρότερον (lamproteron)

The word. The phrase describes god as the finest reflective medium through which the person would see and know himself. Καθαρώτερον and λαμπρότερον mean purer and brighter; their comparative force establishes a superiority to the best region of the human soul. This is a distinctive extension of the eye analogy, not the lexical meaning of θεός wherever that word occurs in the dialogue.

In Alcibiades I. The passage occupies 133c8–17 in Burnet's text and is printed in angle brackets. Its

comparison begins with the superiority of ordinary mirrors to the reflecting surface in the eye. They are clearer, purer, and brighter. God is then said to stand in the same relation to the best in our soul. By looking into god, the speakers would use him as the finest mirror, and among human objects they would look into soul's virtue. The result would be the fullest seeing and knowing of themselves.

The supplement matters philosophically because it distinguishes the divine object from even the best human reflection and assigns it superiority. The preceding text at 133c1–6 says that the knowing region of soul resembles the god and that attention to the divine leads to self-knowledge. The supplied sentences are a further comparative step, not merely a repetition in other words.

Its textual status must remain explicit. According to Burnet's apparatus as supplied here, the four speeches are absent from B and T and supplied from Eusebius. The apparatus also says that Julian and Stobaeus read something of the kind. That notice is weaker than a verified verbatim quotation from all three witnesses. The edition's own concluding record says it has not located Julian's passage. The authenticity of the supplement is disputed, so the lexicon cannot present it as undisputed manuscript wording.

The correct response is neither to suppress it nor to build the whole dialogue's theology upon it unconditionally. This edition translates it as part of its reading text, and readers need to know what argument it contributes. They also need to see what remains without it: the eye-to-eye analogy, soul's wisdom, and divine likeness. The subsequent question identifying self-knowledge with temperance begins after the closing

bracket and can follow the preceding transmitted material.

The language is also more careful than a bare equation "God is a mirror." The speakers would use god as the finest mirror in their act of looking. The instrumental construction and potential mood describe a proposed cognitive orientation. They do not specify which deity is meant through a new mythological identification or explain a concrete visual experience of seeing god.[26]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

133c1–6. The preceding divine-likeness argument provides the comparison's background

133c8–17. The supplied four speeches make god the superior mirror

133c8–17 (apparatus). Burnet supplies the passage from Eusebius and notes approximate parallels

133c18–20. After the supplement the discussion returns to self-knowledge as temperance

In this edition. The English translates the angle-bracketed supplement, following Burnet. The source notes locate Eusebius at Preparation for the Gospel 11.27.5 but acknowledge an unverified Julian reference. "Using him as the finest mirror" retains the construction better than "using that finest mirror."

See also. Mirror; Divine likeness; Soul looking into soul; Self-knowledge; Temperance.

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[26] Textual status is reported from the supplied Burnet apparatus and edition notes. This entry does not claim a new collation of B or T, or verification of the unresolved Julian parallel. The edition's note 70 and its concluding "What remains undone" must be read together: the Eusebius location is supplied, while the reported Julian parallel remains unlocated there. The claim is textual dependence in Burnet's edition, not independent verification of all ancient witnesses.

Good and bad

ἀγαθόν (agathon); ἀγαθός (agathos); κακόν (kakon); κακός (kakos); πονηρός (ponēros)

The word. Ἀγαθός means good, but its scope must be supplied: good at a craft, good as a person, or a good thing to possess. Κακός supplies its ordinary contrary, bad. The neuter plurals designate good or bad things without specifying whether they are qualities, actions, possessions, or outcomes. Πονηρός is a related adverse appraisal, rendered "worthless" of incompetence at 125a and "wicked" in the childhood accusation at 110b. These are contextual differences, not a single technical classification of evil.

In Alcibiades I. The dialogue repeatedly makes apparently clear evaluative language require an answer to "good in what respect?" In the opening inquiry a good adviser is someone who knows the subject on which he advises (106d). Neither wealth nor physical attractiveness supplies that knowledge. The same restriction returns more sharply when Alcibiades wants the virtue of good men at 124e. Socrates asks what they are good at. Alcibiades' answer, managing affairs, only relocates the question: riding and seafaring are affairs too. Naming respectable Athenians does not determine an expertise.

The shoemaker example at 125a–b prevents an easy transition from local competence to unqualified personal goodness. The shoemaker is intelligent about producing shoes and good at that work; he is unintelligent about producing cloaks and bad at that. Thus the same person is good and bad by that argument. Alcibiades refuses to describe the good men he seeks as bad as well, and eventually identifies their capacity as ruling citizens who share in political life. This shows why domain-qualified

goodness is insufficient to state his aspiration. It does not mean that the craftsman is wicked for failing to know every craft.

The earlier rescue argument also turns on respecting evaluative scope. At 115b–e courageous rescue is good in respect of courage and bad in respect of wounds and death. Alcibiades' ranking establishes courage as a great good: he says he would not be willing to live as a coward. Socrates obtains the parallel ranking of life and courage among the best, death and cowardice among the worst. The result is not the familiar doctrine that only vice is bad and death indifferent. That doctrine would contradict the admissions used here. The argument instead separates good and bad features of one undertaking so that its fineness need not be the respect in which it is bad.

The inference at 116b–d places goodness between fineness and advantage. Fine action is linked to doing well and happiness; happiness involves acquiring good things; good things are conceded advantageous. Justice reaches advantage through these intermediaries. The route is dialectical, built from Alcibiades' answers, and followed by his confession of not knowing what he says. The articles on Fine conduct and Doing well mark the argumentative qualifications that a bare equation of good, fine, and advantageous would conceal.

The later discussion makes the agent's identity and orientation relevant to recognizing goods. At 133c–d Socrates asks how someone ignorant of himself could know his own bad and good things. At 134a–b bad action and bad fortune are connected to ignorance, and bad people are called wretched; riches alone cannot remove that condition. At 134c–e justice and temperance guide knowledge of one's goods and the prospect of doing well. These passages relocate the assessment of goods from

visible resources to the condition of the agent who governs their use.

Yet the text does not eliminate its earlier ordinary uses of good. Good land, competent teaching, a better guardian, and piloting excellence remain intelligible. What is challenged is the inference that an admired possession, birth, office, or isolated skill makes its possessor good in the sense required to govern a city. The lexicon must therefore preserve both continuities and restrictions: the dialogue connects personal goodness with knowledge and virtue, but earns that connection by asking which competence and whose good are at stake.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106d–107c. Good advice is subject-specific and independent of wealth or appearance

110b. The boy Alcibiades confidently calls another child wicked and unjust

115a–116d. Good and bad are distinguished by aspect before goodness is used in the justice-to-advantage inference

124e–125b. A shoemaker can be good at shoes and bad at cloaks, exposing the ambiguity of “good men”

133c–134b. Recognizing one’s goods requires self-knowledge; bad people are described as wretched

134c–134e. Just and temperate action leads to knowledge of one’s goods and doing well

In this edition. “Good” and “bad” are the edition’s stable renderings of ἀγαθός and κακός; it avoids translating the latter as “evil.” Πονηρός receives “wicked” in a boy’s accusation and “worthless” in a craft comparison. The title’s two terms cover an evaluative family, not a doctrine that all uses denote precisely the same kind of property.

See also. Fine conduct; Advantage; Doing well; Virtue and vice; Craft and expertise; Happiness and wretchedness.

Good counsel

Εὐβουλίαν (Euboulian); εὐβουλία (euboulia); ἀβουλία (aboulia); εὐβούλους (euboulous)

The word. Εὐβουλία is good counsel or sound deliberation; ἀβουλία is lack of it. The word can describe practical judgment within a determinate craft as well as the political capacity Alcibiades seeks. Calling someone εὔβουλος, "of good counsel," is therefore incomplete without identifying the matters and ends on which that person judges well.

In Alcibiades I. The expression is Alcibiades' answer at 125e to the question what knowledge enables one to rule people who share in political life. It arrives only after less precise descriptions have failed. Being good at affairs does not distinguish politics from riding or seafaring; ruling men who use other men does not distinguish it from controlling a ship's coordinated crew or a chorus. Good counsel is intended to identify the specifically civic competence missing from those answers.

Socrates immediately refuses to let the name settle the matter. Pilots' knowledge is not want of counsel; it too is good counsel, Alcibiades agrees, with respect to keeping people safe at sea. The counterexample shows that the positive prefix in εὐβουλία supplies an evaluation, not yet a distinct subject matter. Political counsel must have a purpose and a beneficial condition it brings about.

Alcibiades says its purpose is to order the city better and keep it safe. Socrates asks what comes to be present or absent when this occurs, comparing bodily health and

disease, eyes' sight and blindness, ears' hearing and deafness (126a–b). The question is about the city-improving state the craft would procure, not just about the craft's title or the leader's prestige. Alcibiades proposes friendship among citizens together with the removal of hatred and faction. He identifies that friendship with concord.

The resulting problem belongs to good counsel itself. If concord means agreement grounded in shared expertise, different household specialists need not have it about each other's work. Yet Alcibiades also believes their doing their respective work is just and creates friendship. At 127d Socrates can identify neither what the required friendship or concord is nor in whom it occurs. He explicitly reconnects the impasse with being wise and of good counsel: those are the qualifications they wanted in order to become good men.

Thus εὐβουλία is a proposed name whose content remains under examination. It is not a settled definition of political knowledge supplied by Socrates. The subsequent turn to care and self-knowledge responds to this failure to identify the expertise Alcibiades needs. The dialogue does not return with a technical civic science called euboulia and a fully enumerated product. It does insist later that a ruler must first acquire virtue and be capable of sharing it with citizens (134b–c). That demand clarifies the educational burden that the appealing name "good counsel" had concealed.

The shift from public deliberation to shared inquiry also matters. Alcibiades asks to deliberate together at 119b; Socrates returns that invitation at 124b. Their actual good use of counsel begins in examining what they lack. The linguistic family therefore links the Assembly's decisions, the search for a ruler's competence, and the

intimate conversation that unsettles a would-be ruler's certainty.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

125d–126a. Alcibiades proposes good counsel as political knowledge; piloting proves that the name is not uniquely political

126a–126c. The desired civic result is specified as friendship without hatred and faction

126c–127d. Concord and differentiated expertise lead to aporia about the content of good counsel

119b. Alcibiades asks for joint deliberation

124b. Socrates repeats the invitation to deliberate together about becoming better

In this edition. The edition keeps "good counsel" distinct from "wisdom," "intelligence," and ordinary "advice." At 125e1 the printed τις is unaccented, while the translation reads an interrogative question about the knowledge of chorus-training; the question answered with Εὐβουλίαν follows at 125e4–6. Political good counsel should not be located in the earlier misaccented question.

See also. Deliberation and advice; Concord; Civic friendship; Craft and expertise; City and citizens.

Greeks and barbarians

Ἕλλησι (Hellēsi); βαρβάροις (barbarois); Ἑλλάδι (Helladi); βαρβαρίζοντες (barbarizontes)

The word. Greeks and non-Greek peoples delimit the expanding audience of power and reputation; barbarizein means speaking like a barbarian in the insult directed at uncultured Athenian politicians.

In Alcibiades I. The opening sets Pericles' influence across Greece and among powerful non-Greek nations. Alcibiades' supposed ambition extends over both, and the royal comparison later demands that he take non-Greek rulers seriously as competitors with superior resources and elaborate education. Consequently "barbarian" is not simply a synonym for deficient virtue throughout the dialogue. At 120b, however, speaking like barbarians becomes an insult to supposedly Athenian politicians who flatter rather than govern. Its polemical use belongs to Socrates' characterization of their lack of culture. The tension is deliberate: civic identity alone guarantees neither education nor political competence, while a foreign court may supply a devastating standard of comparison.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104b–105c. Influence and ambition encompass Greek and non-Greek peoples.

120b. Barbarizing speech marks the criticized local politicians.

122a–124b. Foreign education and resources challenge Greek complacency.

In this edition. The translation preserves "barbarians" as the Greek contrast-category. It should be explained as the speakers' cultural vocabulary, not endorsed as a neutral judgement about peoples.

See also. Europe and Asia; Persia; Slave's hair; Royal comparison.

Guarantor

ἐγγυήσασθαι (engyēsasthai); ἐγγυητής (engyētēs); Ἀσφαλὴς (Asphalēs)

The word. A guarantor undertakes assurance for an outcome; Socrates is willing to guarantee happiness under the stated condition of just and temperate action, and Alcibiades calls him secure or reliable.

In Alcibiades I. The exchange follows the claim that looking toward the divine and bright enables agents to see themselves and their own goods and act well. Socrates' assurance is conditional on acting in that manner. It is not a contractual pledge that Alcibiades will in fact become virtuous, nor an unconditional prophecy of his political success. Alcibiades' reply is a compact expression of confidence with a comic possibility: the supplied note recalls the dangerous proverbial reputation of giving pledges. The ending then makes the limit explicit, since Socrates still fears that the city may defeat their resolve. The local guarantee concerns the consequence of the stipulated conduct, while the final anxiety concerns whether that conduct will endure.[27]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

134d–134e. Socrates guarantees happiness if the stated manner of action is maintained.

135e. The final apprehension leaves perseverance uncertain.

In this edition. The edition retains the repeated guarantor-family words. The Delphic proverb mentioned

[27] The supplied edition, note 73 on 134e, compares the Delphic pledge saying discussed at Charmides 165a. The proverb is not spoken in Alcibiades I.

in its note is a contextual comparison, not a quotation spoken in this exchange.

See also. God and the divine; Dramatic time and setting; Honour, fame and worth; Happiness and wretchedness.

Guardian and tutor

ἐπίτροπον (epitropon); ἐπίτροπος (epitropos); παιδαγωγοὺς (paidagōgous); παιδαγωγὸν (paidagōgon); παιδαγωγήσω (paidagōgēsō)

The word. Epitropos is a guardian entrusted with another's affairs; paidagōgos is an attendant or tutor responsible for a young person. The words designate different relations, and the dialogue uses both metaphorically as well as socially.

In Alcibiades I. Pericles was left as guardian to Alcibiades and his brother. His political power is initially counted among Alcibiades' advantages, yet guardianship does not establish that he has made his wards wise. The Persian "royal tutors" are selected adult exemplars of four virtues; Zopyrus, by contrast, is the aged household slave Pericles appointed to attend Alcibiades. A paidagōgos need not be identical with a schoolteacher, and the contrast exploits differences within the role rather than making the word itself an assurance of educational excellence.

At 124c Socrates calls the god his own guardian, superior to Pericles. This transfers the model of responsible guidance while retaining Socrates' need for education. At 135d Alcibiades promises to tutor or attend Socrates from that day forward. The point is that he will now follow the older man, reversing the opening pursuit. It does not mean he has suddenly become Socrates' expert instructor. The role that seemed lowly in the Zopyrus

portrait becomes a freely adopted expression of attachment and care.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104b. Pericles' guardianship is established.

118e–119a. The educational results of that guardianship are tested.

121e–122b. Royal tutors are contrasted with Zopyrus.

124c. The god is Socrates' better guardian.

135d. The verb of tutoring or attending expresses reversed pursuit.

In this edition. The edition expands the last verb as attending "as a tutor attends a boy," avoiding the misleading modern suggestion that Alcibiades now gives Socrates academic lessons.

See also. Pericles and Xanthippus; Zopyrus and Thrace; Four royal tutors; Stork and reciprocal love.

Gymnastics and wrestling

γυμναστική (gymnastikē); γυμναστικόν (gymnastikon); παλαίειν (palaiein); παιδοτρίβης (paidotribēs); Γύμνασαι (Gymnasai)

The word. Γυμναστική names the craft of bodily training; γυμναστικόν describes what accords with it. Παλαίειν is wrestling. The παιδοτρίβης is the trainer who directs bodily exercise. Γυμνάζεσθαι, represented by the command Γύμνασαι, can extend from exercise to preparation for a demanding activity.

In Alcibiades I. Wrestling is one of the skills Alcibiades admits having learned, alongside letters and lyre-playing (106e). That education does not itself qualify him to advise

the Assembly. Socrates at 107e–108c nonetheless makes training the first model of well-grounded advice: a trainer judges whom one should wrestle or spar with, when, how, and how much. Naming the better "gymnastic" ties correct practice to a determinate expertise.

The same craft later distinguishes care for a body from care for its equipment. Shoes are improved by shoemaking, feet by gymnastics; the hands and body receive training while rings and clothing receive other crafts' attention (128c–d). This is a statement about different primary objects of improvement, not a claim that shoes have no effect on feet.

At 131a a trainer, insofar as trainer, does not thereby know himself. His expertise addresses the body, which the preceding argument has distinguished from the person using it. At 132b Socrates tells Alcibiades to exercise before entering politics. In context the command follows the imagery of stripping the attractive people for inspection and accompanies learning and protection against corruption. It extends the language of preparation without claiming that literal athletic conditioning is the whole cure for political ignorance.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106e–107a. Wrestling belongs to Alcibiades' admitted schooling

107e–108e. Training exemplifies a craft with a standard of better action

128c–128d. Gymnastics improves body and limbs rather than their possessions

131a. The trainer's knowledge as trainer is not self-knowledge

132b. The exercise command becomes preparation for political exposure

In this edition. The edition preserves the adjective–craft connection with “gymnastic” and “gymnastics.” “Train” elsewhere often renders the different ἀσκεῖν family; the particular exercise command at 132b is Γύμνασαι.

See also. Craft and expertise; Better and best; Shoemaking; Body; Education and training.

Happiness and wretchedness

εὐδαίμονες (eudaimones); εὐδαίμονα (eudaimona); εὐδαιμονήσειν (eudaimonēsein); ἄθλιος (athlios); ἀθλιότητος (athliotētos)

The word. Εὐδαίμων describes a flourishing or happy person; the verb εὐδαιμονεῖν means to live or be happy in this substantial sense. The word is not merely a report of a cheerful feeling. Ἄθλιος and ἀθλιότης name the opposed wretched condition. The abstract noun εὐδαιμονία is a useful lookup label but is not required as an attested headword when the dialogue uses adjective and verb.

In Alcibiades I. At 116b happiness enters through doing well. Those who do well are happy through acquiring goods, and are said to acquire them by doing well and finely. Happiness links quality of conduct with a successful condition of life. Because “doing well” carries both meanings, the inference deserves scrutiny rather than being presented as a self-evident definition of happiness.

The final political sequence gives the term its broadest scope. Ignorance of oneself prevents proper understanding of one’s affairs and those of others; ignorant action leads to errors and doing badly. Both the agent and those for whom he acts become wretched (134a). Temperance and goodness are therefore made

necessary to happiness. Becoming wealthy does not by itself remove wretchedness. Cities too seek happiness, and material power without virtue cannot supply it (134b).

Socrates' guarantee at 134e is conditional: if Alcibiades and the city act justly and temperately, looking toward the divine and knowing their own goods, they will do well and be happy. It is not a prophecy of Alcibiades' actual political future. The subsequent examples show why granting wishes without competence would frustrate the desired end: the unchecked patient ruins his body, and the unskilled controller of a ship destroys his companions. Accordingly virtue, rather than tyranny, is what should be procured if they are to be happy (135b).

The final fear that the city may overpower both speakers leaves fulfillment of the condition unestablished. The dialogue distinguishes the proposed requirements of happiness from the question whether Alcibiades will consistently meet them. Its ending should not be read as a completed conversion followed by assured good fortune.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

116b. Happiness through acquiring goods mediates between fine conduct and goodness

134a–134b. Ignorance and bad action make agents and those they serve wretched; riches alone do not cure this

134d–135b. Socrates conditionally connects happiness with just, temperate, virtuous government

In this edition. The edition's "happy" means a good condition of life, not merely a mood. At 134b4 it follows ἀθλιότητος, "wretchedness," in T and W; Burnet records B's ματαιότητος as an alternative. The happiness guarantee concerns both Alcibiades and the city, reflected in the plural address of 134d–e.

See also. Doing well; Good and bad; Virtue and vice; License; City and citizens.

Heracles and the Heraclids

Ἡρακλέους (Hērakleous); Ἡρακλειδῶν (Hērakleidōn)

The word. Heracles is the heroic ancestor assigned to the Spartan royal line; Heraclids are his descendants and the family from which the kings are supposed to be born.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates includes the Spartan genealogy in the argument that Alcibiades' rivals are not inferior in birth. The line is traced through Heracles to Perseus and Zeus. At 121b–c the supposed public guarding of royal wives by ephors is explained as a means of preserving Heraclid descent. These are claims within Socrates' encomiastic comparison, not a modern historical verification of biological lineage. Their argumentative purpose is to show that good birth, carefully protected and joined to good upbringing, cannot simply be claimed as an exclusively Athenian advantage.[28]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

120e. Heracles anchors the Spartan line.

121b–121c. Guarding royal wives is related to Heraclid succession.

In this edition. The ancient genealogical parallels in the supplied note belong to external background. The present entry records how Socrates uses the genealogy, without treating mythic ancestry as historical proof.

[28] The supplied edition, note 35 on 120e, cites Herodotus 6.53, 7.61 and 7.150 for related genealogical traditions. Mythic descent is being analysed as a claim used by the speakers.

See also. Perseus; Zeus and Zeus of Friendship; Royal comparison.

Homer and epic conflict

Ὁμήρου (Homērou); Ὀδυσσείας (Odysseias); Ἰλιάδος (Iliados); Ἀχαιοῖς (Achaiois); Τρωσὶν (Trōsin); Πηνελόπης (Pēnelopēs); Ὀδυσσεῖ (Odyssei); Ἐρεχθέως (Erechtheōs)

The word. Homer's two epics and their antagonists are evidence that disagreement about justice can end in killing. A separate Homeric phrase about Erechtheus later supports an erotic portrait of the Athenian people.

In Alcibiades I. At 112b Socrates appeals to what Alcibiades has heard, particularly the Iliad and Odyssey. The Achaeans and Trojans, and Penelope's suitors and Odysseus, are paired examples of opposing parties whose battles and deaths arise from disagreement over justice. The assertion is Socrates' characterization of the poems for a specific argument, accepted by Alcibiades; it is not a claim that every episode has only that subject. Penelope appears as the woman whose suitors are named, without further characterization. At 132a the quotation "the people of great-hearted Erechtheus" changes register. The supplied note identifies its epic dēmos as land, whereas Socrates exploits the Athenian political sense, people, to give the populace a handsome face that a prospective lover should inspect stripped. Erechtheus is thus a quoted ancestral name in the civic-erotic image, not a new participant.[29]

[29] The supplied edition, note 66 on 132a, identifies Iliad 2.547 and explains the change from land to people in dēmos. The quotation is visibly marked in Burnet's text; no separate consultation of the Homeric apparatus is claimed.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

112b. The two epics and their opposing sides supply familiar lethal disagreements.

132a. The quoted name of Erechtheus accompanies the personified people.

In this edition. Burnet letterspaces the Homeric words at 132a; the supplied note identifies Iliad 2.547. The difference between the quoted epic meaning of dēmos and Socrates' current use is essential and must not be flattened into a claim that Homer already meant the democratic assembly.

See also. Lover of the people; Athens and the Athenians; Coronea; Tanagra and Boeotia.

Honour, fame and worth

τιμᾶσθαι (timasthai); ἄξιος (axios); ἀνάξιον (anaxion); ἠξίωσας (ēxiōsas); τιμῇ (timēi); ὀνομαστὸς (onomastos); ἐπιφάνεια (epiphaneia); φιλοτιμίας (philotimias)

The word. Timē is honour; being honoured and loving honour concern public valuation. Axios and its relatives express worth, fitness or deserving, while onomastos and epiphaneia concern being renowned or conspicuous. These are connected measures of standing, not interchangeable names for virtue.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates says Alcibiades hopes to prove himself worthy of unparalleled honours and thereby become supremely powerful. The vocabulary then describes Socrates' corresponding claim to be worth everything to Alcibiades. This initial parallel makes value to an audience a live question: what would actually justify either claim?

The contest passage intensifies the language of worth. Alcibiades' proposal to dispense with training is unworthy of his advantages; his choice of rivals is something he has thought fit; Socrates ironically calls it worthy of him to settle for beating ordinary soldiers. A fine deed must be worthy both of himself and the city. Honour thus becomes a lever for education rather than merely the reward he seeks.

The Persian attendants receive great honour for shaping the young prince, and love of honour belongs to the Spartan catalogue. These uses prevent a simplistic equation of all honour-seeking with vice. The problem is whether recognition follows preparation and service or substitutes for them. At 124b–c fame among Greeks and barbarians is explicitly something Alcibiades passionately desires, and Socrates promises distinction through his guidance. The ensuing inquiry tests what must precede it, while the ending withholds an achieved public success.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

105b–105e. Unparalleled honour and being worth everything connect the two ambitions.

119c–119e. A chain of worth-terms makes the rebuke ironic and cumulative.

121d–121e. Royal attendants are honoured for their care.

122c. Love of honour is among Spartan strengths.

124b–124c. Fame and distinction are made dependent on care and guidance.

In this edition. The English keeps repeated "worthy" language where possible; replacing each with a different synonym would conceal the irony. "Distinction" renders epiphaneia here and does not imply a divine apparition.

See also. Ambition and hope; Pride and high-mindedness; Royal comparison; Befitting.

Hoplite fighting

ὁπλιτικῆς (hoplitikēs); Ἀνδρεῖον (Andreion); ἀνδρεῖα (andreia)

The word. Ὁπλιτική names armed or hoplite fighting as a learned subject. The adjective ἀνδρεῖον in this context means belonging to men, not the abstract virtue courage, ἀνδρεία. The similar-looking neuter plural ἀνδρεῖα at 127a likewise qualifies subjects as men's subjects.

In Alcibiades I. At 127a armed fighting supplies the reciprocal case to wool-working. Just as an untrained husband cannot possess his wife's expert concord about her work, a wife who has not learned armed fighting cannot share her husband's knowledge of it. Alcibiades accepts the gendered division of subjects.

Socrates uses that division to expose a difficulty in the account of friendship as concord: distinct roles need not entail shared expertise, yet Alcibiades also claims that performing one's own role generates friendship. The example is therefore part of an aporia about agreement and affection, not a demonstration of women's intrinsic inability to learn combat or a comprehensive program for military education.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

126e–127b. Hoplite fighting reverses the wool-working example in the test of spouses' shared expertise

In this edition. The local ἀνδρεῖον and ἀνδρεῖα are translated "a man's" and "men's"; indexing them indiscriminately under courage would miss their syntax

and function. The separate courage argument uses the abstract noun ἀνδρεία at 115b–e.

See also. Wool-working and weaving; Concord; Courage and cowardice; Doing one's own business.

Household management

οἰκονομικός (oikonomikos); γυνὴ ἀνδρί (gynē andri); πατήρ (patēr)

The word. Οἰκονομικός at 133e describes someone competent to manage a household. The dialogue supplies the adjective, not an extended technical account of οἰκονομία. A household includes relations, work, and resources; translating the word as "economist" would import a modern disciplinary sense.

In Alcibiades I. Household relations first provide Alcibiades' familiar model for civic friendship and concord (126e). Parents love children, brothers relate to brothers, and spouses to one another. Socrates then uses the differing skills conventionally assigned to spouses to test whether friendship really is knowledgeable agreement on the same subject. Wool-working and armed fighting expose a difficulty in Alcibiades' definition rather than a failure of family relations as such.

At 133e–134a the household manager and statesman are paired as roles unavailable to someone ignorant of himself and consequently of his own affairs and others'. The argument continues through errors, doing badly in private and public, and harm to those for whom the ignorant agent acts. Managing a household is therefore not exempt from the ethical conditions imposed on public rule.

The pairing also limits an overly political reading of the dialogue's conclusion. Alcibiades wants to rule a city, but his lack of self-understanding would impair an apparently smaller and more familiar responsibility too. Conversely, private competence is not established merely by owning property: the money-maker's concentration on possessions at 131c does not amount to caring for himself.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

126e–127c. Household affection and specialized work test the account of civic concord

131b–131c. Tending possessions is distinguished from tending oneself

133e–134a. Self-ignorance excludes both statesmanship and household management

In this edition. "Household manager" gives the adjective οἰκονομικός its contextual personal force. It must not be confused with διοικεῖν, "order" or "administer," used of the city and body at 126a–b, despite their related household vocabulary.

See also. City and citizens; Civic friendship; Doing one's own business; Wool-working and weaving.

Human being

ὁ ἄνθρωπος (ho anthrōpos); ἄνθρωπος (hanthrōpos); ἄνθρωπον (anthrōpon)

The word. Ἄνθρωπος denotes a human being. In the question at 129e, "What on earth is man?", it names the person whose identity is being investigated. It should be distinguished from ἀνήρ, which often means an adult man and appears in the dialogue's social and political descriptions. The crasis ἄνθρωπος combines the article

with ἄνθρωπος; its rough breathing marks the contraction and is not a different lexical item.

In Alcibiades I. The inquiry moves from the ordinary identity of the speakers to the general question of the human being. Socrates and Alcibiades first agree who is speaking and who is listening. They then distinguish a user from speech, tools, bodily members, and the body as a whole. The term “human being” is introduced at the generalization: the human being uses the whole body and therefore differs from it. Asked what such a being is, Alcibiades cannot say; Socrates offers the functional description “what uses the body.”

This description is strengthened to ruling the body and then identified with soul. The sequence matters. “Human being” does not begin as a stipulated synonym for soul. The identification is obtained by treating use and rule as the person’s defining function, accepting three exhaustive candidates, and eliminating two. Its adequacy is then expressly distinguished from precision.

The practical return from the general noun to a named individual comes at 130e. Socrates addresses Alcibiades rather than his face, and that Alcibiades is identified with soul. The move makes the generic account bear upon personal care and affection. It does not provide a theory of how one soul is individuated from every other or a complete definition of human nature. The result is sufficient to challenge the young man’s reliance on bodily and inherited advantages.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

128a. The generic human being appears in the question about care

129e–130c. The user of the body is identified as the human being and then as soul

130d–130e. The account is applied to Socrates addressing Alcibiades

In this edition. The edition uses “man” for ἄνθρωπος, including the generic philosophical question. At 128a2, 128a5, 129e3, and 129e7 it preserves Burnet’s ἄνθρωπος, where the apparatus records manuscript ἄνθρωπος. A lexicon should neither lose the article nor multiply these spellings into separate concepts.

See also. Soul; Body; Composite person; The self itself and each self.

Intelligence

φρονίμους (phronimous); ἄφρονας (aphronas); φρονεῖν (phronein); φρόνησιν (phronēsin); νοῦν (noun)

The word. The φρον- family describes intelligent understanding and its absence: φρόνιμος is intelligent, ἄφρων unintelligent, φρονεῖν to think intelligently, and φρόνησις intelligence or understanding. Νοῦς, rendered “sense” in the concluding examples, is a related but separate word. Neither family should automatically be assigned a later technical meaning of practical wisdom or a metaphysical Intellect.

In Alcibiades I. At 125a Socrates unpacks Alcibiades’ reference to the fine and good. Are these the intelligent or unintelligent? Once intelligence is accepted, it is specified by domain: the shoemaker is intelligent in shoes but not in cloaks. The same person is therefore good in one respect and bad in another. “Intelligent” here is not an all-purpose commendation that establishes fitness to rule. It is the ability to understand the activity at issue.

At 133c the knowing region of soul is characterized by knowing and intelligent thinking; the next sentence

names god and intelligence in its description of the divine. The context is now the soul's best activity, toward which self-knowledge is directed. It would nevertheless overstate the text to turn φρόνησις into the name of a distinct independently existing entity. The sentence's theological and psychological relations remain compressed, and the apparatus reports relevant variation.

The final cases use νοῦς in an equally practical way. A sick person without medical sense will misuse his license; a would-be helmsman without the corresponding sense and excellence endangers all aboard. These applications confirm that power requires understanding directed to its proper object. They do not infer that the political ruler must personally possess every specialist skill. Earlier, recognizing one's ignorance rightly permits delegation.

The movement across the dialogue is from competence within a domain to the understanding needed to order one's life and authority. A lexicon must preserve that development and the distinct Greek families, rather than translating all of them indiscriminately as wisdom.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

125a–125b. Intelligence is relative to the task, as in shoes and cloaks

133c1–6. Knowing and intelligent thinking mark the divine region of soul

134e–135a. Medical and nautical sense constrain the safe exercise of license

In this edition. The edition uses "intelligence" for φρόνησις, "wise" for σοφός, and "sense" for νοῦς in the final examples. At 133c5 the words θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν are printed, while their omission in Olympiodorus is recorded. B's "more intellectual" at 133c1 is an alternative to, not the printed equivalent of, "more divine."

See also. Wisdom; Knowing; Divine likeness; Temperance; Ordinary ignorance.

Justice and injustice

τὰ δίκαια (ta dikaia); τὰ ἄδικα (ta adika); δικαιότερον (dikaioteron); δικαιοσύνην (dikaiosynēn); ἀδικοῦντας (adikountas)

The word. The adjective δίκαιος names the just or right; neuter plurals such as τὰ δίκαια name just things, actions, or what is just, rather than an independently introduced entity called Justice. The comparative δικαιότερον asks what is more just. The noun δικαιοσύνη names justice as a quality to acquire and care for. The active verb ἀδικεῖν means to wrong or act unjustly; passive forms mean to be wronged. These grammatical differences matter: judging a particular wrong, knowing the just, and possessing justice are related tasks, not interchangeable assertions.

In Alcibiades I. Justice enters as the proposed standard of the political competence Alcibiades claims. Having agreed that peace and war must be undertaken with the right people, at the right time, and for the right duration, he must say what their "better" consists in. At 109a–b he names deception, force, and deprivation as grievances. Socrates does not treat suffering these things as enough to establish injustice: he asks whether they were suffered justly or unjustly. Alcibiades himself calls that difference complete and decisive. The first task is therefore discriminating the moral character of a grievance, not simply recognizing an injury to oneself.

The next concession is deliberately more awkward. Asked whether he will recommend war against wrongdoers or just actors, Alcibiades says no one would admit recommending war against those acting justly.

Socrates calls such a course unlawful or contrary to accepted right; Alcibiades adds that it does not appear fine. The argument moves through what a public speaker can acknowledge. At 109c Socrates obtains assent that the better in questions of war is the more just, but the exchange has not yet supplied an account of justice or shown that speakers act on the standards their speeches profess.

The educational inquiry exposes this gap. Alcibiades has asserted his understanding of injustice since his childhood games. His confidence that he was wronged is precisely what Socrates questions, rather than independent proof that he knew. If learning requires recognition of a lack, the young man’s unbroken certainty gives him no identifiable discovery of justice. His appeal to the many produces a second problem: unlike ordinary word use, on which speakers agree, just and unjust persons and actions generate disagreement intense enough to cause war. Homeric conflicts and the battles at Tanagra and Coronea are presented as evidence of this instability. They are not instances of a definition that the dialogue has already established.

At 113d Alcibiades tries to separate political advantage from justice. Socrates answers through a sequence of his interlocutor’s concessions: just actions are fine, fine actions good, good things advantageous. The resulting claim at 116d is that just things are advantageous. Its force depends on the intervening treatment of goodness and fine action, including the difficult movement from good-in-a-respect to an unrestricted conclusion. The article on Advantage follows that movement. Here it is essential that the result does not give Alcibiades a new store of political knowledge. He immediately admits that his answers fluctuate. Justice remains something he has to learn to judge.

At 127c another attractive formula is tested: each person doing his or her own business is said to be just. Alcibiades also expects justice to produce friendship. Yet his identification of friendship with shared expert agreement has made specialized work exclude friendship. The text ends this exchange in perplexity, not with the definition of justice as specialization that a reader might import from the Republic.

Justice returns decisively at 134c, paired with temperance as what Alcibiades must procure for himself and the city in place of unrestricted rule. Just and temperate action is then associated with looking toward the divine and bright, understanding one's goods, and doing well. At 135e Alcibiades promises to begin caring for justice. The ending thus changes its position in his life: what he initially presumed to know becomes the object of sustained care. Socrates' fear of the city's strength keeps that promise prospective. Neither the final commitment nor the earlier chain of admissions licenses treating Alcibiades as already just or the ethical program as already fulfilled.[30]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

109a–109c. The distinction between just and unjust suffering supplies the proposed standard for deliberating about war

109d–113c. Alcibiades cannot establish how he learned or discovered the justice he confidently judges

113d–116e. The attempted separation of justice from advantage is refuted through Alcibiades' concessions, followed by his admission of instability

[30] Diotimos Editions (2026), note at 109c6 explains that Burnet rejects τὸ δίκαιον as an addition. The remaining plural ταῦτα is thus interpreted through the preceding lawful/fine exchange. The lexicon follows that printed text while retaining the note's caution that the antecedent is interpretive.

127a–127d. Doing one's own business, justice, and friendship produce an unresolved contradiction

134c–134e. Justice and temperance replace unrestricted authority as the proper goal

135e. Alcibiades undertakes to care for justice; Socrates fears the city may defeat that undertaking

In this edition. "Just," "unjust," and "do wrong" keep the family recognizable. At 109c6 the translated plural "these things" follows Burnet without the bracketed τὸ δίκαιον, as the note explains. The final δικαιοσύνη is a virtue to be cared for, whereas earlier τὰ δίκαια often designates matters of judgment or action.

See also. Advantage; Fine conduct; Good and bad; Doing one's own business; Virtue and vice; Deliberation and advice.

Kinship and connections

φίλους (philous); συγγενεῖς (syngeneis); ὑπηρετοῖεν (hypēretoien); συγγενὴς (syngenēs)

The word. Friends and kinsmen are social connections on whom Alcibiades expects to rely; syngenēs specifically indicates shared kinship, whereas philos need not. Serving or assisting describes the practical support they might provide.

In Alcibiades I. The opening inventory carefully includes both paternal and maternal relatives and friends, numerous and distinguished on each side. Their value is not only prestige: Socrates says they would serve Alcibiades if anything were needed. This is an imagined network of assistance supporting his confidence that he needs no one. Pericles' guardianship then stands above the whole list as the largest source of power. At 105e

Socrates counters with a sharply different claim: no guardian, kinsman or other person can hand over the desired power except himself, with divine help. The argument will test what such help must involve. Connections may supply access, influence and assistance without supplying knowledge of justice or competent care. This use of friendship as an available social resource should be distinguished from Alcibiades' later proposed definition of civic friendship as concord.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104b. The two sides of the family furnish numerous friends and relatives who could assist.

105d–105e. Socrates asserts the insufficiency of guardians and kinsmen for the desired achievement.

In this edition. The edition keeps "friends and kinsmen" distinct. No particular person should be inserted into the unnamed maternal or paternal groups simply because external biographies identify additional relatives.

See also. Deinomache; Cleinias, father of Alcibiades; Pericles and Xanthippus; Ancestry, nature and upbringing; Civic friendship.

Know thyself

γνῶθι σαυτόν (gnōthi sauton); τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτόν (to gnōnai heauton); ἰδὲ σαυτόν (ide sauton)

The word. Γνῶθι is the singular aorist imperative of γιγνώσκειν: come to know, recognize, know. With σαυτόν it addresses one person reflexively. The familiar "Know thyself" is a command, not itself an explanation of either the self or the appropriate method of knowing it. The dialogue repeatedly interprets that command. Its hypothetical visual counterpart, ἰδὲ σαυτόν, "See thyself,"

is invented within the inquiry to clarify how self-directed cognition could work.

In Alcibiades I. The first invocation is deliberately concrete. At 124a–b Socrates tells Alcibiades to listen both to him and to the inscription at Delphi, and to know himself: his real rivals are the Spartan and Persian kings. Self-knowledge here includes a corrected estimate of one's position, preparation, and resources. It is not introduced as detached inward contemplation. Alcibiades has mistaken inherited advantages and local superiority for adequate qualification to govern.

At 129a the inscription becomes the subject of a difficulty. Is knowing oneself easy, so that its dedicator was insignificant, or difficult and not available to everyone? Alcibiades has experienced both impressions. Socrates shifts attention from difficulty to necessity: knowing what one is is required to identify the care that improves oneself. The maxim now leads into an inquiry about the identity of the human being.

The provisional soul argument yields the first interpretive answer. At 130e whoever enjoins self-knowledge bids us come to know soul, because soul rather than body has been identified as the person. That is already a substantial revision of the initial competitive estimate. Yet naming the object is not enough. At 132c–d Socrates asks whether they have failed to understand what the inscription says and advises. He presents the eye analogy as what he suspects it means, preserving the exploratory status of the explanation.

If an eye were told to see itself, it would have to look toward something in which both that object and the eye could appear. Mirrors and the reflecting region of another eye supply the model. The soul must likewise attend to

soul, especially its excellence of wisdom. Thus the command is unfolded through a relation to another appropriate object rather than by an unexplained inward glance.

The command's authority does not relieve the speakers of inquiry. Socrates invokes the Delphic words, asks what they mean, gives a provisional interpretation, and tests its consequences for conduct. Their ultimate practical significance is knowledge of one's own good and the virtue necessary for governing. The ending also checks personal dependence: Alcibiades' promise that escape will occur if Socrates wishes is corrected to "if god wills." This does not provide a second definition of the inscription, but it prevents the dialogue's religious framing from being reduced to unconditional confidence in a human teacher.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

124a–124b. The Delphic command corrects Alcibiades' estimate of his rivals and resources

129a–129b. Its difficulty and relation to care lead to the question of the self

130e. The command is interpreted as requiring knowledge of soul

132c–133b. The hypothetical command to the eye develops the method of self-knowledge

In this edition. Burnet prints γνῶθι σαυτόν at 124a–b without quotation marks, and the edition accordingly makes it Socrates' own command as well as the inscription's. Adding a separate "know" after a quoted motto would obscure that construction. "Thyself" signals the traditional formula; the surrounding prose uses ordinary "oneself."

See also. Self-knowledge; The self itself and each self; Sight; Soul looking into soul; Temperance.

Knowing

εἰδέναι (eidenai); ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai); γιγνώσκειν (gignōskein); γνωρίσαι (gnōrisai); ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

The word. The dialogue uses several overlapping words for knowing. Εἰδέναι expresses being in possession of knowledge; ἐπίστασθαι often concerns knowing a subject or how to do something; γιγνώσκειν can mean knowing, recognizing, or coming to know. Γνωρίσαι at 130e emphasizes coming to know soul. These tendencies are not rigid technical boundaries: the dialogue interchanges εἰδέναι and ἐπίστασθαι within the same arguments. The noun ἐπιστήμη names knowledge, including the knowledge required to govern a shared activity.

In Alcibiades I. Knowing first appears as the qualification for giving advice. Alcibiades agrees at 106c–d that he should advise the Athenians about what he knows better than they. Socrates then asks how that knowledge was acquired: from someone else or through personal discovery. The inquiry's demand is not satisfied by Alcibiades' confidence, ancestry, or association with a famous guardian. It requires an accountable relation to the subject matter.

The scope of knowing is repeatedly tested. Ordinary speakers know which objects are stones or pieces of wood and can teach Greek usage; they need not know which horses run well or which people are healthy. A shoemaker can be intelligent and good in shoes while lacking competence in cloaks. These examples distinguish identification from expert discrimination and one field of expertise from another. It is misleading to summarize all

of them as a single contrast between theoretical “knowing that” and practical “knowing how.” The Greek asks which subject is understood and to what extent.

At 117b–118a the distinction becomes reflexive. Knowledge of a topic, acknowledged ignorance of it, and ignorance mistaken for knowledge are separated. The second state has a practical advantage over the third because it allows reliance on a competent person. The text expressly says that one can know that one does not know. It does not follow that such a person has acquired the missing craft, or that self-awareness alone gives expertise.

The later self-inquiry raises a different question: what must one know in order to identify the care appropriate to oneself? An adequate account identifies the person with soul, but Socrates postpones precise knowledge of the self itself. The eye analogy then directs the soul toward its knowing excellence. At 133d–e knowledge of what belongs to a person as belonging to that person requires knowledge of the owner. Knowing a bodily condition as a doctor and understanding its place in one’s own good are therefore not simply identical achievements.

The political conclusion follows this richer sense of knowledge. A ruler ignorant of self and good will not know what he is doing and will err. Knowing is a condition of competent action, not merely a set of true verbal responses. Yet the conversation does not supply a general definition of knowledge, distinguish every epistemic state systematically, or prove that all apparent expertise depends on a completed metaphysics of the self. Its local arguments should be read at the level each actually establishes.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106c–106e. Knowledge qualifies advice and prompts the acquisition dilemma

111a–111e. Naming ordinary things is distinguished from expert discrimination

117b–118a. Knowledge, acknowledged ignorance, and false confidence are separated

125a–125e. Knowledge and intelligence are specified by domain

128e–133e. Self-knowledge grounds the discernment of appropriate care and one's own good

In this edition. The shared English "know" is deliberate. It preserves continuity where the argument shifts among εἰδέναι, ἐπίστασθαι, and γιγνώσκειν. Translating each by a fixed modern epistemological category would add a distinction the dialogue has not consistently drawn.

See also. Learning; Discovery; Conceit of knowledge; Ordinary ignorance; Self-knowledge; Knowledge and teachability.

Knowledge and teachability

τεκμήριον (tekmērion); ἄλλον σοφὸν (allon sophon); ἄλλον οἷοί τ' ὦσιν ἀποδεῖξαι ἐπιστάμενον (allon hoioi t' ōsin apodeixai epistamenon)

The word. This heading names the evidential connection developed at 118c–d rather than a single Greek technical term. Someone who knows should be able to make another knowledgeable in the same matter. The successful pupil is a τεκμήριον, evidence or a sign, of the teacher's knowledge. The issue is demonstrated educational efficacy, not merely an ability to speak confidently about a subject.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades argues that Pericles became wise through association with recognized wise men. Socrates asks whether Alcibiades has seen a person wise in anything who could not make someone else wise in that very thing. Letters, lyre-playing, and training make the test plausible. The writing teacher both knows and produces knowledgeable pupils; Alcibiades, having learned, should also be able to teach.

The test then reaches Pericles. Alcibiades objects that the sons are simpletons, his brother is mad, and he himself failed to attend. These replies introduce the pupil's contribution: an unsuccessful pupil need not straightforwardly prove an ignorant teacher. Socrates accordingly asks for any Athenian or foreigner, slave or free, who became wiser through Pericles' company. Alcibiades cannot supply one. The conclusion is a failure of the offered evidence, not a demonstration that every failed lesson disproves the teacher's expertise.

The later demand that a statesman first acquire the virtue he will share with citizens resonates with this test. One cannot give what one does not have. Still, the dialogue does not explicitly solve every problem about whether virtue can be taught or guarantee that a virtuous teacher will overcome every student's character and political environment. The final fear about the city's influence is a reminder of precisely such limits.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

118c–119a. The ability to educate another tests the reputation of Pericles

134b–134c. The person who will share virtue must first possess it

135e. The ending withholds a guarantee that good influence will prevail

In this edition. At 118d “turn out another who knows” renders ἀποδεῖξαι ἐπιστάμενον. The verb here means producing or showing someone as knowledgeable; it is not simply the logical proving of a proposition.

See also. Teachers; Wisdom; Learning; Proof; Virtue and vice.

Knowledge of one’s own and others

τὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου γιγνώσκειν ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐστίν (ta Alkibiadou gignōskein hoti Alkibiadou estin); μιᾶς τέχνης (mias technēs); τὰ τῶν ἄλλων (ta tōn allōn)

The word. The issue is knowing something as belonging to a person, expressed at 133d by knowing Alcibiades’ things “that they are Alcibiades’.” This relational content differs from identifying or technically manipulating the same object in isolation. Μιᾶς τέχνης, “of one craft,” characterizes the unified discernment of oneself, one’s own, and what belongs to one’s own. The passage does not name that craft as an additional ordinary trade.

In Alcibiades I. At 131a–c the discussion provisionally distributes objects of knowledge among levels. A doctor or trainer knows the body, classed as the person’s own; farmers and other craftspeople know what serves the body, farther removed from the self. None has self-knowledge merely by exercising that craft. Those claims initially allow lower-level knowledge without knowledge of the owner.

After the eye analogy, Socrates reopens the concession. Without knowing oneself and being temperate, can one know one’s own bad and good? Alcibiades cannot see how. Socrates gives the named example: someone who does not know Alcibiades cannot know what is Alcibiades’

as Alcibiades'. If the owner is unknown, the relation of belonging is not adequately known. The same applies to the next level of belongings.

At 133d–e Socrates explicitly says the earlier agreement was not quite right. It is for one person and one craft to discern all three: self, own things, and their belongings. This is a real revision, not merely a repetition of the previous hierarchy. The text itself invites the reader to track a developing argument instead of turning the first concession into the final doctrine.

The most conservative interpretation preserves both the revision and the demonstrated competence of the specialists. Doctors can recognize bodily conditions and shoemakers can repair shoes, as the earlier examples assume. The later question asks for those objects understood in their relation to a person's good and identity. This contextual distinction explains why the dialogue can rely on expertise while denying its completeness. It is an interpretation of the shift, not a separate distinction formally defined by Socrates.

The consequence extends outward. Someone ignorant of his own is ignorant in the same manner of what belongs to others, and then of cities. Such a person cannot become a statesman or household manager. Self-knowledge is accordingly a condition of rightly understanding affairs whose management affects others; it is not a permission to ignore them. The argument's connective phrase "in the same way" carries the extension, and the reader may still ask how much has been established about each new domain.

This passage is especially useful against two simplifications. The dialogue does not permanently assign self, body, and external goods to three independent

knowledges. Neither does it straightforwardly deny every piece of ordinary specialist knowledge. Its explicit correction concerns whether those objects can be known as one's own without knowing the person to whom they belong.[31]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

131a–131c. Specialists are initially credited with knowledge of lower levels without self-knowledge

133c18–133d9. The question of one's own good introduces knowledge of belonging as belonging

133d10–133e3. Socrates retracts the earlier agreement and assigns all levels to one discerning craft

133e–134a. Ignorance extends to others and cities, excluding competent management

In this edition. The edition's repeated "what is one's own" makes the retraction visible. At 133d12 Burnet prints ἄλλους δέ from Stobaeus, "and others," against the manuscripts' "but not"; the supplied note identifies the earlier doctor, trainer, and craft examples as the reference.

See also. What belongs to oneself; Possessions of possessions; Self-knowledge; Temperance; Knowing.

[31] The supplied edition's note 71 explicitly links the correction to 131a–c and reports Stobaeus' reading at 133d12. The proposed distinction between technical recognition and knowing an object as belonging to its owner is an interpretation of the local wording, not an independently attested ancient commentary.

Knucklebones

ἀστραγαλίζοις (astragalizois); παιδιὰν (paidian); παίζοις (paizois)

The word. To play knucklebones is the concrete childhood activity in Socrates' recollection; paidia and paizein name the broader category of play. The game is evidence about Alcibiades' past confidence, not itself a definition of justice.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates says he often heard the young Alcibiades at school or elsewhere, during knucklebones or other games, loudly accusing another boy of acting unjustly. The recollection answers the search for a time before he thought he knew justice. Alcibiades does not retreat into the claim that he was only playing: he insists that he clearly recognized being wronged. The example therefore links early social certainty with present political presumption. It does not prove that every complaint was false, but shows that Alcibiades cannot identify a prior recognition of ignorance from which deliberate discovery could begin.[32]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

110a–110d. Childhood play supplies the remembered certainty that blocks a proposed route to learning.

In this edition. The edition's note tells a wagon anecdote from Plutarch. That separate story is not part of Socrates' recollection in this dialogue and is not needed to understand the logical function of the game.

[32] The supplied edition, note 17 on 110b, cites Plutarch, Alcibiades 2.2–3 for the separate wagon story; that anecdote is not silently added to this dialogue's recollection.

See also. Alcibiades; Education and training; Conceit of knowledge; Discovery.

Lampido and the Spartan royal family

Λαμπιδώ (Lampidō); Λεωτυχίδου (Leōtychidou); Ἀρχιδάμου (Archidamou); Ἄγιδος (Agidos)

The word. Lampido is identified as daughter of Leotychides, wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis; the three men are described as having been kings.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates imagines Lampido, like Amestris, wondering that a badly reared young man proposes to compete with her son. The three-generation identification gives her authority within the dynastic world against which Alcibiades is being measured. Her family is not an incidental pedigree: it embodies the continuous royal preparation that Socrates contrasts with his and Alcibiades' private status. None of these four figures appears as a speaker, and no actual statement by Lampido is reported. The rhetorical comparison ends by asking whether the enemies' women understand the requirements of competition better than the Athenians themselves.[33]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

123e–124a. Lampido and the three royal relations complete the imagined foreign appraisal.

In this edition. The supplied note identifies Agis II and observes that his accession in 427/6 falls after the proposed dramatic period. The wording "all of whom

[33] The supplied edition, note 47 on 124a, compares Herodotus 6.71 and Plutarch, Agesilaus 1, and gives the accession of Agis as 427/6. This is the note's basis for the chronological caution, not a date supplied in the dialogue.

have been kings" therefore creates a chronological difficulty; it must not be used to assert a fully consistent exact dramatic year. Lampito is an alternative form reported in the note, not Burnet's spoken form here.

See also. Amestris; Sparta and Lacedaemon; Dramatic time and setting.

Language

τὸ ἑλληνίζειν (to hellēnizein); λίθος (lithos); ξύλον (xylon); ποῖοι ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν (poioi anthrōpoi eisin)

The word. Ἑλληνίζειν means to speak Greek. In the argument at 111a–d it is exemplified by recognizing and naming ordinary kinds: stone, wood, human being, and horse. The claim is not that this list exhausts linguistic competence. It isolates a publicly shared ability that the many successfully teach without a single identifiable instructor.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades supplies language as a counterexample to Socrates' dismissal of the many as teachers. He learned Greek from them but cannot name his teacher. Socrates accepts the point. The inability to identify one master therefore does not by itself disprove learning; competence can be acquired through a distributed community.

The agreement of ordinary speakers is tested through action as well as words. Asked for stone or wood, they say the same things and reach toward the same objects. They agree with themselves and one another, and cities do not fight about these identifications. This stable common practice makes them plausible teachers of the relevant usage.

The argument then distinguishes identifying a kind from expert judgment about its members. Knowing which things are horses does not establish which horses run well; recognizing people does not establish which are healthy or sickly. Socrates uses that difference to block the inference that ordinary speakers can teach justice simply because they teach language. Shared vocabulary is not a substitute for expertise in evaluating what that vocabulary describes.

The passage should not be turned into a full theory of linguistic meaning or a proof that moral words lack meaning whenever people dispute them. The many do use words for justice, but their disagreement undermines Alcibiades' appeal to them as teachers of just conduct. The issue is the epistemic authority of instruction, not the possibility of speaking at all.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

110e–111a. Alcibiades introduces Greek speech as learning from the many

111b–111d. Verbal and practical agreement supports ordinary identifications

111d–112d. Expert discrimination and justice exceed the demonstrated competence

In this edition. "Speak Greek" is narrower and more faithful here than an unrestricted "know language." At 111c μανθάνω means Socrates understands what Alcibiades intends by the example; it does not claim that Socrates is now learning Greek.

See also. Teachers; Agreement as evidence; Knowing; Learning.

Lawful conduct

νόμιμον (nomimon)

The word. Νόμιμον means lawful or in accordance with accepted rule or custom. The adjective belongs to the sphere of νόμος, but the dialogue here neither cites a statute nor develops a general theory of law.

In Alcibiades I. At 109b–c Socrates asks whether Alcibiades will advise war against those doing wrong or against those doing what is just. Alcibiades responds that even someone intending the latter would not admit it. Socrates then says it is not lawful; Alcibiades adds that it does not seem fine either. The attribution matters: “lawful” is Socrates’ contribution, not a term first offered by Alcibiades.

The exchange supplies a publicly recognized restraint on advocacy. It also permits a question about its strength: the unwillingness to admit unjust policy is not identical with unwillingness to pursue it. Socrates nevertheless uses the accepted standards to elicit the claim that the better in war is the more just. One should preserve that movement rather than recasting the passage as a statement that a particular written law settles foreign policy.

The term’s occurrence is brief but structurally important because it stands beside fineness as the answer to which Alcibiades’ speeches must conform.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

109b–109c. Socrates calls war against just actors unlawful after Alcibiades says no adviser would admit recommending it

In this edition. At 109c6 Burnet brackets τὸ δίκαιον after “these things.” Without the insertion, the plural can look back to the unlawful and unfine character just named; the edition’s note identifies this as a reading of the passage rather than an indisputable definition of the reference.

See also. Justice and injustice; Fine conduct; War and peace; Deliberation and advice.

Learning

μανθάνειν (manthanein); ἔμαθες (emathes); μαθήσεως (mathēseōs); μάθημα (mathēma)

The word. Μανθάνειν means to learn, normally from another person in the acquisition argument; in conversational replies it can also mean to understand. Μάθημα names something learned or a subject of instruction, and μάθησις the activity or process of learning. A word’s occurrence does not itself establish formal schooling: the acquisition of ordinary Greek from many people also counts as learning.

In Alcibiades I. At 106d Socrates divides Alcibiades’ claimed knowledge into what he learned from others and what he discovered himself. He then asks whether either could occur without willingness to learn or seek. The question is directed at this young man’s entitlement to advise, rather than offered as a complete theory of every possible route to human knowledge. His known schooling in letters, lyre-playing, and wrestling does not cover the justice on which political decisions depend.

At 110d Alcibiades revises his earlier claim to discovery and says he learned as others did, from the many. His example of Greek speech is a serious answer. It shows that inability to name one teacher does not prove absence of

learning. Socrates accepts that example and tests the competence of the proposed teachers in each domain. What fails is the inference from their teaching language to their teaching justice.

The need to learn returns after the diagnosis of ignorance. Alcibiades initially treats learning as unnecessary trouble because the local politicians are uneducated. Socrates counters with more demanding rivals, and at 123d preparation requires learning, care, and training together. At 132b learning is an antidote against political corruption. The word thus links acquisition of understanding to a disciplined change in readiness for action.

Its conversational uses should remain distinct. Alcibiades' "I don't understand" at 128a–b reports failure to follow Socrates' immediate question about feet and shoes, not a biographical denial of education. Socrates' inability to "learn" what Alcibiades means by friendship at 127d likewise concerns the missing content of the answer. These moments show that learning can take place in the present dialogue, while preserving the different issue of who taught a claimed expertise.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106d–107a. The acquisition dilemma and Alcibiades' schooling

110d–111c. Learning from the many is valid for Greek but must be tested by subject

119b–120b. Alcibiades resists the trouble of learning; Socrates rebukes neglect

127d–128b. The verb also expresses understanding a speaker's meaning

132b. Required learning protects the prospective politician

In this edition. The edition normally uses “learn” but renders μανθάνω by “understand” when conversational comprehension is meant. It keeps πυνθάνεσθαι as “find out,” preventing an ordinary inquiry for information from being confused with this acquisition argument.

See also. Discovery; Seeking; Teachers; Knowing; Knowledge and teachability.

License

ἐξουσία (exousia); ἐξουσίαν (exousian); ἐξουσίας (exousias); ἐξουσίαις (exousiais)

The word. Ἐξουσία is the permission, authority, or effective freedom to act as one chooses. “License” here emphasizes its unrestricted exercise, not a document granting legal permission. It differs from virtue-grounded freedom and from ἀρχή, the position or activity of rule, though the two can combine.

In Alcibiades I. The expression appears at the end, but it answers the ambition Socrates described at the beginning: Alcibiades wants power enabling him to do anything at all (105e). At 134c Socrates says neither the young man nor the city should procure license or rule to do whatever they wish; they should procure justice and temperance. The issue is not whether the wish is intense or the power effective, but whether the agent can judge and act well.

At 134e–135a the contrast is tested in accessible cases. A sick man with no medical understanding can ruin his body when his power prevents rebuke. Someone aboard ship who lacks piloting sense and excellence can destroy himself and his companions if free to do whatever seems right to him. These examples distinguish being

unimpeded from being benefited. The consequences extend beyond the person exercising the license.

At 135a–b the conclusion generalizes to the city and forms of rule: without virtue, license leads to doing badly. The argument does not deny every permission to act or demand that competence requires no freedom of operation. It rejects making unrestricted choice the goal independently of the knowledge and virtue that would orient choice. The alternative is first acquiring virtue and, until then, being ruled by someone better.

This is why translating ἐξουσία simply as “freedom” can be misleading alongside ἐλευθεροπρεπές, free-person-befitting virtue. The dialogue is able to criticize unchecked liberty of action while recommending a different freedom constituted by not being mastered by defective judgment or desire.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

134c. License and rule to do whatever one wishes are displaced by justice and temperance

134e–135a. The unchecked patient and unskilled controller aboard ship exemplify license without understanding

135a–135b. Rule and license lacking virtue lead to doing badly

In this edition. “License” consistently distinguishes ἐξουσία from “rule” and from the free/slave vocabulary. The phrase at 134e contains an ἄν supplied in Burnet from a later Laurentian manuscript; this is a local textual supplement, not a separate substantive claim about authority.

See also. Tyranny; Rule and being ruled; Freedom and slavery; Power; Medicine; Piloting and seafaring.

Lion’s tracks and hoarded money

ἴχνη (ichnē); εἰσιόντος (eisiontos); ἐξιόντος (exiontos)

The word. Tracks entering but never leaving are the sign in the Aesopic image; applied to currency, they picture accumulation in Sparta.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates has claimed that precious metals flow into Lacedaemon over many generations from Greeks and non-Greeks but go out nowhere. The fox’s observation to the lion gives that claim a memorable visible form. The money is treated like creatures whose inward journey leaves traces but whose return never appears. The edition’s note supplies the familiar cave setting and the lion’s deadly pretence; those details should not be called words narrated by Socrates here.

The image compresses a claim about stock into a story about flow: repeated inward movement and absent outward movement are supposed to explain exceptional holdings. It is not an audited account of revenue, and the colourful analogy cannot independently verify Socrates’ totals. The king’s receipts and tribute then reinforce the hierarchy within Sparta before the whole Spartan fortune is itself dwarfed by Persian wealth. The joke contributes to a deliberately escalating scale.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

122e–123b. A one-way inflow of money leads to the tracks comparison and then royal wealth.

In this edition. Burnet retains the explanatory phrase about the fox speaking to the lion and the words specifying the direction of the tracks while recording deletion proposals. “Lion’s cave” is a useful lookup title from the allusion’s explanation, not an attested Greek noun phrase in this passage.

See also. Aesop; Wealth and property; Sparta and Lacedaemon.

Looking and examining

σκοπούμενος (skopoumenos); σκόπει (skopei); σκέψεως (skepseōs); βλέπειν (blepein)

The word. Σκοπεῖν and σκοπεῖσθαι are to look into, inspect, or examine; σκέψις is the examination. Βλέπειν is looking, often with a directional phrase. The dialogue exploits the proximity of intellectual examination and directed vision without making them identical in every context. The word skepsis here means inquiry, not commitment to a later skeptical school.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates begins as an observer who has watched Alcibiades' conduct toward his lovers. He repeatedly invites examination: of what "better" means, of the time when Alcibiades thought himself ignorant, of courage as a good, and of the belief that rival kings are ordinary competitors. These imperatives slow assertion into a test of its content.

At 124d examination is explicitly shared. Both need care, and they must look into the matter together. At 130c–d much further examination is the reason the self itself has been passed over. The term consequently marks both the work actually performed and the depth still outstanding.

In the eye analogy the literal direction of looking becomes the model for knowledge. Soul must look into soul; action later looks toward the divine or toward the godless and dark. This is not merely a decorative metaphor added to a finished account. The choice of

object is the argument: one cannot expect to find oneself by attending indiscriminately to anything whatever.

The reader should nevertheless preserve the different verbs. Examining whether an argument follows is not literally gazing, and seeing a reflected face does not itself establish a psychology of introspection. The translation's repeated "look into" makes the connection audible while the Greek register shows where the analogy crosses from inquiry to sight.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103b. Socrates' prior observation grounds his account of Alcibiades

109a–110c. Examination seeks the standard of better action and a history of learning

124d. The partners undertake inquiry together

130c–130d. The omitted self itself requires extensive examination

132d–134e. Directed visual looking models knowledge and ethical orientation

In this edition. The edition uses "look into" for both the inquiry family and βλέπειν εἰς in the eye passage. At 132d5, where the families meet, Σκόπει becomes "Consider." This local adjustment should not conceal which Greek verb is operating.

See also. Seeking; Self-knowledge; Sight; Soul looking into soul; Adequacy and precision.

Love and the lover

ἐραστής (erastēs); ἔρωτος (erōtos); ἐρᾷ (erāi); ἔρως (erōs)

The word. Erastēs is a lover; erōs names the love or desire, and eran the activity of loving or desiring. The family marks the relation between Socrates and Alcibiades, but extends to the young man's pursuit of fame and, in a compound, to attachment to the people. It is not identical with philia, the friendship tested as political concord.

In Alcibiades I. Love is the condition of the conversation before it becomes its explicit subject. Socrates identifies himself as the first of Alcibiades' lovers and the only one who has not left. The youth has defeated the others by greater pride, while Socrates has kept attending him without speaking. Alcibiades himself wanted to ask what this persistent man hopes to achieve. Their encounter is therefore reciprocal in curiosity before it becomes reciprocal in love.

Socrates' initial account of his persistence closely resembles the beloved's political ambition. Alcibiades wants to prove he is worth everything to the city and thereby gain power; Socrates wants to prove he is worth everything to Alcibiades and gain power with him. The parallel is deliberately strong, but it does not mean their proposed practices are identical. The actual service requested is answering questions, and what follows tests the young man's ability to know and care before ruling. Socrates also ties his intervention to the god's permission.

The long delay, Socrates says, makes sense because Alcibiades can now listen. The lover thus measures the right moment for address rather than merely the duration of attraction. At 119c he is indignant on behalf of both Alcibiades and his own love when the beloved proposes

settling for superiority over poorly educated local politicians. At 122b the lover is almost the only person said to care about the young Athenian's upbringing. These claims join eros to the labour of education, without eliminating its teasing or possessive features.

The distinction at 131c–132a gives a retrospective explanation. A person who loves Alcibiades' body loves something belonging to Alcibiades; a lover of the soul loves the person himself, according to the provisional account just accepted. Bodily bloom fades, but Alcibiades is beginning to bloom in another sense. Socrates can therefore remain when the others leave. His promise is not unconditional: it is tied to movement toward the better and threatened by corruption through the people. The new account transforms the reason for loving rather than announcing that physical beauty has never mattered to the drama.

Eros also names dangerous redirections. Fame among Greeks and barbarians is something Alcibiades loves with unmatched intensity at 124b. At 132a the people becomes a handsome rival beloved. The question is not simply whether the young man loves, but what he loves and whether that relation encourages care or subordination to appearances and applause.

The ending changes the asymmetry. Alcibiades will now follow and attend Socrates; Socrates' love has hatched another winged love that may care for it in return. The stork image makes reciprocity explicit without claiming their educational positions have become identical. Nor does the promise settle the future: the final fear remains. Love creates a possible route into care for justice, whose completion the dialogue withholds.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103a–106a. First lover, defeated rivals, silence and reciprocal hopes frame the encounter.

119c. The proposal to avoid training offends Socrates on behalf of his love.

122b. The lover is singled out as caring for a young Athenian's formation.

124b. Desire for reputation is described with the same erotic verb.

131c–132a. The persistent lover is distinguished from lovers of the beloved's belongings.

135d–135e. Attendance reverses and reciprocal love is imagined as a stork's young.

In this edition. The edition consistently renders the erotic family as lover and love. The historical Athenian convention of an older male lover and younger beloved is supplied as contextual orientation; it must not obscure the dialogue's own transformation of roles or be confused with the unrelated senses of "pupil."

See also. Alcibiades; Socrates; Lover of the people; Beauty and bloom; Stork and reciprocal love; Soul; Body; What belongs to oneself; Civic friendship.

Lover of the people

δημεραστὴς (dēmerastēs); εὐπρόσωπος (euprosōpos); ἀποδύντα (apodunta); ἀλεξιφάρμακα (alexipharmaka); κολακεύσοντες (kolakeusontes)

The word. Dēmerastēs combines the people, dēmos, with the lover: one erotically attached to the populace. The related portrait calls the people handsome-faced, says it must be viewed stripped, and prescribes preparatory

“antidotes.” Flattering is a separate verb for courting approval rather than governing well.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates’ fear at 132a is that Alcibiades will become a lover of the Athenian people and be corrupted. He has just promised to remain as the lover of the young man himself, provided improvement continues. The people now appears as a competing object of desire capable of changing that trajectory. Its danger is not established by a constitutional classification of democracy; the immediate concern is a relationship in which political attractiveness can displace the work of becoming better.

The handsome face borrows a Homeric phrase about the dēmos of Erechtheus. The edition explains that dēmos in the quoted epic line denotes the land, while here Socrates takes it as the political people. The verbal transfer permits a civic body to be pictured as an attractive youth. Stripping then asks the future lover to judge more than the appealing surface. It belongs to the figurative evaluation of the people, not to a literal instruction to undress a person or a reference to a scene that occurs in the dialogue.

The immediately following command, “exercise first,” keeps the bodily and educational imagery linked. Alcibiades must learn before entering public affairs, taking antidotes so he will not suffer harm. Alexipharmaka are protective or counteracting remedies in this image; the dialogue does not name literal drugs. The practical content of the precaution is preparation and care.

An earlier passage supplies the matching political vice. Meidias and his like have come to flatter the city rather than rule it. Flattery names service to the city’s appetite

for gratification or approval within the criticism; it should not be equated with ordinary persuasion, which the dialogue also treats as a legitimate function of expertise. Together, flattering the city and becoming its lover show why a merely ambitious relation to the public can leave the would-be leader governed by what he hoped to govern.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

120b. Uncultured politicians are said to come to flatter the city.

131e–132b. Persistence in love is threatened by the people, whose attraction requires scrutiny and preparation.

135e. The city's power returns as the last threat.

In this edition. The edition renders the compound literally, preserving the erotic force. The supplied Homeric note prevents treating the quoted dēmos as already democratic in the epic. "Antidotes" carries a medical image, not a named curriculum whose contents have all been settled.

See also. Love and the lover; Homer and epic conflict; Athens and the Athenians; Education and training; City and citizens; Care for oneself.

Luxury and adornment

τρυφὰς (tryphas); ἐσθῆτας (esthētas); ἱματίων (himatiōn); μύρων (myrōn); ἁβρότητα (habrotēta); κόσμον (kosmon); ζώνην (zōnēn); καλύπτραν (kalyptran)

The word. Luxury includes soft or elaborate living; habrotēs is refinement or sumptuousness in the Persian display. Kosmos here is adornment, not a cosmological

world-order. A girdle and veil give their names to lands whose revenues are said to support royal decoration.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates asks Alcibiades to contemplate Persian wealth, luxuries, robes, trailing cloaks, perfumed anointings, crowds of attendants and refinement. Each visible detail translates the abstract resource difference into a display the young aristocrat can appreciate. The argument does not simply condemn these objects as bad. It turns Alcibiades' own confidence in external advantages against him by showing that other people can vastly exceed him on those terms.

The reported traveller's account at 123b–c makes the comparison comic through scale. A large, good district almost a day's journey across is called the royal wife's Girdle; another is her Veil; further places are set aside for her adornment. Names of small objects become names of enormous revenue-producing areas. Against them Socrates sets Deinomache's actual adornment, perhaps fifty minae at most, and Alcibiades' estate at Erchia. The report is attributed to a man Socrates calls trustworthy; the dialogue does not itself independently verify the grants.

The same language of luxury has already appeared as a criticism of Alcibiades' appetite for intellectual novelty. At 114a he is "fastidious," unwilling to taste an argument again. The connection lets dress and consumption carry a pedagogical point: cultivated preferences can become excuses not to submit a familiar belief to the same effective test.[34]

[34] The supplied edition, note 45 on 123b–c, compares Xenophon, Anabasis 1.4.9, on villages assigned to Parysatis "for her girdle," and Herodotus 2.98 on an Egyptian ruler's wife's shoe revenues. These parallels explain the report but are not part of Socrates' unnamed traveller's testimony.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

113e–114a. Luxury of taste becomes a figure for refusing a repeated argument.

122b–122c. The Persian display is catalogued.

123b–123c. Royal adornment districts dwarf a local household's ornaments.

In this edition. The edition distinguishes "orderliness" in the Spartan catalogue from "adornment" here, although the language is related. "Girdle" and "Veil" are names attributed to the inhabitants in the traveller's report, not mapped administrative districts established by the editor.

See also. Clothes and repeated arguments; Wealth and property; Minae and plethra; Deinomache.

Medicine

ἰατρὸν (iatron); ἰατρὸς (iatros); νοῦν ἰατρικὸν (noun iatrikon); ὑγιείας (hygieias); νόσου (nosou)

The word. Ἰατρός is a doctor; ἰατρικός describes medical understanding. Health, ὑγίεια, and disease, νόσος, supply a clear contrast between the beneficial condition a craft fosters and the harmful condition it removes. Medical language here is illustrative, not a source of particular treatment advice.

In Alcibiades I. At 107b–c the doctor is the correct adviser when citizens ask how people in the city can be healthy. Poverty and wealth make no difference to that competence. At 108e Socrates adds that Alcibiades can identify healthier food as better even though he does not claim medical skill; this makes his inability to name the better in his professed political domain more shameful.

The many can name what kind of thing a person is without being reliable judges of whether people are healthy or sickly (111d–112a). At 126a health's presence and disease's absence model the specific condition by which the city too should be improved. These are separate uses of the analogy: one concerns criteria for expertise, the other its beneficial result.

At 131a the doctor as doctor knows bodily matters, not thereby the self. That qualification limits the scope of medical expertise rather than discrediting it within its domain. The unchecked patient at 134e–135a demonstrates the cost of rejecting that domain: lacking medical sense while preventing rebuke is likely to ruin his body. Political power without virtue is then judged through a similarly destructive mismatch of authority and competence.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

107b–108e. Medical competence determines health advice and the meaning of healthier food

111d–112a. Ordinary recognition does not establish medical expertise

126a. Health and disease model presence and absence of a city-improving condition

131a. A doctor's professional knowledge is distinguished from self-knowledge

134e–135a. The uncorrectable patient without medical sense illustrates destructive license

In this edition. The edition's "medical sense" renders νοῦν ἰατρικόν, not the bare possession of intelligence in every sphere. The claim at 131a includes καθ' ὅσον ἰατρός, "insofar as he is a doctor"; omitting it would overstate the limitation.

See also. Craft and expertise; License; Benefit and harm; Tyranny; Good counsel.

Meidias

Μειδίαν (Meidian)

The word. The Athenian named as a contemptible local political comparator and marked with the epithet “quail-tapper.”

In Alcibiades I. Socrates has just argued that Alcibiades’ real contest is with Spartan and Persian rulers. He then reverses into transparent mock advice: of course Alcibiades should look instead to Meidias and similar men, neglect himself and enter politics unprepared. The surrounding depiction of uncultured flatterers makes the irony unmistakable. Meidias is neither a teacher nor an interlocutor. His value as an example lies precisely in the discrepancy between the young aristocrat’s grand ambitions and his readiness to measure himself against a locally unimpressive standard.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

120a–120c. Meidias heads the sarcastic alternative to preparation for serious rivals.

In this edition. The epithet is textually contested: Burnet prints ὀρτυγοκόπον against BT’s ὀρτυγοτρόφον. The edition’s comedy and game references belong to its explanatory note; see Quail-tapping for the lexical difference.

See also. Quail-tapping; Slave’s hair; Royal comparison.

Menial crafts

βάναυσοι (banausoi); δημιουργοὶ (dēmiourgoi)

The word. Βάναυσος is a disparaging term applied to manual or artisan work. Here the plural βάναυσοι describes the crafts as "menial." Δημιουργοί names the practitioners without itself carrying the same explicit judgment. The lexicon reports the ancient evaluation rather than endorsing it.

In Alcibiades I. At 131a–b Socrates distinguishes doctors and trainers, whose professional objects are bodily matters, from farmers and other craftsmen, whose expertise concerns the body's provisions. Neither kind of expertise, insofar as it is that expertise, supplies self-knowledge. If self-knowledge is temperance, none becomes temperate by that craft alone. Socrates then says this is why such crafts are thought menial and not a good man's subjects.

The formulation ties a familiar social judgment to the inquiry's newly established distinction of objects. It should not be paraphrased as the claim that craftsmen are incapable of virtue or can never learn to know themselves. The qualifying phrases concern what their existing crafts themselves supply. Nor does the remark cancel their usefulness: earlier examples repeatedly granted artisans and other experts superior authority within their own domains.

The tension is important. Craft provides the model of accountable competence against aristocratic pretension, yet its restricted scope is finally invoked in a socially disparaging judgment. A source-grounded account should let both features stand. At 133d–e the speakers also revise the prior allowance that one can know one's own things

while wholly ignorant of oneself, complicating any simple fixed hierarchy of separate knowledges.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

131a–131b. The crafts' limited cognitive objects are used to explain their description as menial

133d–133e. The earlier allowance of knowledge of possessions without self-knowledge is revised

In this edition. "Are thought to be" preserves δοκοῦσιν and makes clear that the passage invokes a social appraisal. The edition's note compares Xenophon, Oeconomicus 4.2–3, and Aristotle, Politics 1337b8–15; those parallels should not be taken as the literal argument of Alcibiades I.

See also. Craft and expertise; Farming and harvesting; Medicine; Gymnastics and wrestling; Freedom and slavery.

Messene

Μεσσήνης (Messēnēs); Μεσσήνην (Messēnēn); εἱλωτικῶν (heilōtikōn)

The word. Messene names the land contributing to Spartan resources; helotic refers to the enslaved or dependent workers included among possessions in the same comparison.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates says the Spartans' own territory together with Messene surpasses Athenian holdings in extent and excellence; he then adds slaves, helots, horses and grazing animals. The land is an economic basis of the royal comparison rather than scenery. The list also exposes the social assumptions of the speech: human dependants are counted alongside property and livestock

as resources of their possessors. A lexicon should describe that assumption without endorsing it. The precise civic or legal status of helots is not analysed in the dialogue.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

122d–122e. Land, helotic dependants and grazing wealth enlarge the comparison.

In this edition. The edition interprets Messene as Messenia and explains the historical labour system in a note. The Greek here gives the resource list but not a constitutional account of helotry.

See also. Sparta and Lacedaemon; Wealth and property.

Minae and plethra

ἑκατὸν μνᾶς (hekaton mnas); μνῶν πεντήκοντα (mnōn pentēkonta); γῆς πλέθρα (gēs plethra); τριακόσια (triakosia)

The word. Minae are monetary units in the comparison; plethra are measures of land area here. The figures mark a paid education, the value of adornments, and the size of an estate, not interchangeable quantities.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates says each named pupil paid Zeno one hundred minae. Later Deinomache's adornment is valued at perhaps fifty minae, at the very most, while Alcibiades' land at Erchia is not even three hundred plethra. The qualifications are part of the point: the second amount is a generous upper estimate, and the third is an upper bound, not an exact valuation or survey. The educational example supplies named evidence of investment; the property examples show how even large local resources fall short on a royal scale. The juxtaposition also warns against a simplistic equation of

all payment with knowledge: Socrates reports the pupils' improvement as well as the fee.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

119a. Each Zeno pupil is said to have paid a hundred minae.

123c. Maternal adornment and the Erchia estate receive qualified upper limits.

In this edition. The edition's note explains a mina as a hundred drachmas and a land plethron as a hundred-foot square, adding an approximate acreage. Modern monetary equivalents would import unstable and misleading comparisons; none is needed to understand the contrast.

See also. Zeno; Deinomache; Erchia; Wealth and property.

Mirror

κάτοπτρά (katoptra); κατόπτρῳ (katoptrōi); ἐνόπτρῳ (enoptrōi); ἔνοπτρον (enoptron, lemma)

The word. Κάτοπτρον and ἔνοπτρον both mean mirror or reflective medium in this passage. Their use does not establish two competing philosophical theories of reflection. The mirror enables a viewer to see himself by looking at something other than himself; the eye's reflective region supplies a bodily example. In the supplied extension, god becomes the finest mirror.

In Alcibiades I. At 132e Alcibiades proposes mirrors and things like them as objects in which one can see both the object and oneself. Socrates then asks whether the eye itself contains something of that sort. The move takes an ordinary artificial mirror as the starting example and transfers its reflective function to the eye opposite.

The main analogy narrows attention to the region in which the eye's virtue, sight, occurs. Soul must likewise look into soul, especially its wisdom. At this stage the text does not yet call god a mirror. It says the best knowing region of soul resembles the god and that attending to the divine permits self-knowledge.

The four supplied speeches at 133c8–17 then compare ordinary mirrors with the mirror in the eye: the former are clearer, purer, and brighter. God similarly exceeds the best region in the human soul. Looking into god would therefore be using him as the finest mirror, with soul's virtue the relevant object among human things. The optical comparison thus acquires a hierarchy in which the divine offers a better reflective standard.

These textual stages must be distinguished. The ordinary mirror and eye reflection belong to the transmitted argument; the explicit divine mirror is printed by Burnet in angle brackets from Eusebius. One may discuss the supplied passage as part of this edition's reading text while acknowledging its disputed authenticity. Removing it would remove that explicit comparison, not every mention of god or every relation between the divine and self-knowledge.

The metaphor also has a limit. A literal mirror returns an appearance; the philosophical use aims at knowledge of the person's authoritative and excellent activity. The dialogue relies on the analogy to direct attention, not to explain a physical reflection of an incorporeal soul.[35]

[35] Burnet's angle brackets enclose four speeches, 133c8–17, as a single supplied passage. The bracket does not extend backward over the eye analogy or forward over the question about temperance at 133c18.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

132d–133a. Ordinary mirrors lead to the reflecting region of another eye

133b–133c6. Soul's knowing region and its divine likeness extend the analogy without yet naming god a mirror

133c8–17. The supplied speeches explicitly compare god to the finest mirror

133c8–17 (apparatus). Burnet supplies the passage from Eusebius; B and T omit it

In this edition. Both κάτοπτρον and ἔνοπτρον are rendered "mirror." The extra lemma is marked as a lemma rather than falsely presented as a nominative attestation. At 133c13 "using him as the finest mirror" conveys the instrumental dative and should not be flattened into an unqualified naming formula.

See also. Eye; Pupil; Soul looking into soul; Divine likeness; God as mirror.

Muses

Μούσας (Mousas)

The word. The goddesses whose name supplies the clue to identifying the craft of music, song and stepping in time.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades has failed to name the general craft to which lyre-playing, singing and rhythmic movement belong. Socrates asks which goddesses own that craft; Alcibiades answers the Muses and then recognizes music. The divine name functions as a linguistic and educational prompt within the search for the proper name of "the better" in an activity. It is not an appeal to inspiration as a replacement for expertise. The immediate successful answer is then used to expose the

difficulty of naming the equivalent standard for war and peace.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

108c–108e. The Muses lead from an unanswered question to the words music and musically.

In this edition. The edition capitalizes the Muses as proper divine names and explains mousikē as including poetry and dance as well as music. The dialogue itself names the relevant activities before asking the question.

See also. Education and training; God and the divine.

Music and chorus-training

Μουσικήν (Mousikēn); Μουσικῶς (Mousikōs); κιθαρίζειν (kitharizein); κιθαριστὴς (kitharistēs); χοροδιδασκαλία (chorodidaskalia); χορευταῖς (choreutais)

The word. Μουσική is the Muses' art, including song, instrumental playing, and rhythmic step in this passage. Κιθαρίζειν means playing the lyre; κιθαριστής is the player or teacher. Χοροδιδασκαλία is chorus-training, a directing expertise concerned with coordinated performance rather than merely personal instrumental skill.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades learned lyre-playing but refused the pipes (106e). At 108a–e Socrates combines accompanying a song on the lyre with singing and stepping at the correct time and to the right extent. Asked to name the art containing these actions, Alcibiades needs the clue of the Muses before identifying music. The exchange distinguishes possession of familiar accomplishments from the ability to articulate the standard governing them. "Musically" then provides the

parallel to “gymnastically” in the search for what better war-making would be.

At 118c–d music teachers furnish examples of experts who can impart their knowledge. At 125c–e music reappears in a specifically directive form: pipers lead people in song and employ dancers, while chorus-training supplies the relevant ruling competence. This is why simply defining political excellence as ruling people who use other people fails. Coordinated human activity already occurs within a chorus.

At 129c–e the lyre-player and what he plays with exemplify the distinction between a user and instruments; the generalization extends to the hands and eyes with which craftsmen work. The musical art thus participates in three different arguments: correct performance, the organization of participants, and the difference between agent and means. These functions should not be merged into a claim that music itself supplies the political or self-directed knowledge under investigation.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106e–107a. Lyre lessons and refusal of pipes mark Alcibiades’ actual schooling

108a–108e. Song, lyre, and step belong to the musical craft and its standard of correctness

118c–118d. The lyre teacher illustrates transmissible expertise

125c–125e. Chorus-training directs participants, testing a proposed description of civic rule

129c–129e. The lyre-player is distinguished from instruments and bodily means

In this edition. The edition’s note explains that mousikē is wider than modern instrumental music alone. At 125d

“the virtue of chorus-training” answers “the virtue of piloting”; suppressing the repeated excellence-language would weaken the comparison.

See also. Craft and expertise; Rule and being ruled; Good counsel; User and instrument.

Ordinary ignorance

ἀγνοεῖν (agnoein); ἄγνοια (agnoia); μὴ εἰδέναι (mē eidenai); γιγνώσκεις δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι (gignōskeis de hoti ouk epistasai)

The word. Ἀγνοεῖν is to be ignorant or fail to know; ἄγνοια is ignorance. The separate phrase μὴ εἰδέναι simply negates knowing. “Ordinary ignorance” here distinguishes lack of a subject’s knowledge from the more dangerous combination of that lack with a conviction that one knows. The Greek noun ἄγνοια can describe the dangerous state too when its qualifying phrase specifies it.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates challenges Alcibiades’ assumption that every nonknower must wander in judgment. Ignorance of how to ascend to heaven is a counterexample. More practically, Alcibiades knows that he lacks culinary or navigational expertise and can leave those matters to the competent person. This is explicit second-order awareness: knowing that one does not know a subject. It does not amount to knowing that subject.

The practical safety of such ignorance comes from restraint and delegation. The person does not act on a fabricated expertise. The argument therefore offers an alternative to both omniscience and reckless independence: recognize a limit and rely on the relevant knower. Its claim that such people live without mistakes is

tied to handing these matters over, not to a guarantee that they never err in any respect.

Ignorance remains a limitation even when acknowledged. At 128e–129b ignorance of what one is prevents knowledge of the appropriate care of oneself. Alcibiades must proceed to inquiry rather than regard confession as a completed education. The dialogue values awareness of ignorance because it removes a barrier to correction and proper action.

At 133e–134a ignorance of one's own affairs extends to others and civic affairs. That final warning concerns an aspiring actor and ruler. It should not erase the earlier demonstration that acknowledged ignorance can appropriately refrain from acting. The text distinguishes ignorance itself, the self-assessment attached to it, and the practical conduct that follows.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

117b–117e. Acknowledged ignorance differs from wandering and permits deference

128e–129b. Ignorance of the self prevents identification of proper care

133e–134a. Uninformed management produces error

In this edition. "Be ignorant" and "not know" are kept distinct in the English, though they overlap semantically. The adjective "ordinary" is an explanatory heading, not a claim that the dialogue supplies a special name for a harmless class.

See also. Conceit of knowledge; Knowing; Error; Self-knowledge.

Peparethos

Πεπαρηθίοις (Peparēthiois)

The word. The Peparethians, paired with the Athenians as a possible audience for a political adviser.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates asks whether Alcibiades would laugh at anyone who stood up before either people and declared that just things can sometimes be bad, after agreeing that the just and advantageous are the same. The lesser-known audience makes the conclusion portable: the required consistency is not peculiar to the ambitions and prestige of Athens. The dialogue does not stage a visit to the island or attribute a distinctive constitutional view to its inhabitants. Its role is the deliberately wide applicability of the test of advice.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

116d–116e. The alternative audience extends the rebuke beyond Athens.

In this edition. The supplied note identifies the island with modern Skopelos and interprets the pair as a great city or a small one. That explanatory geography is not an additional assertion by Socrates.

See also. Athens and the Athenians; Ambition and hope.

Perception

αἰσθάνεσθαι (aisthanesthai); αἰσθόμενος (aisthomenos); αἰσθανόμενον (aisthanomenon); αἰσθάνῃ (aisthanēi)

The word. Αἰσθάνεσθαι is to perceive, notice, or become aware. Its objects here include advantages, comparative deficiencies, and one’s own condition. It is not restricted to an external sense perception, and its use does not

supply a general theory of sensation. In the educational turns it names the recognition that one's present state requires action.

In Alcibiades I. The royal comparison aims to make Alcibiades perceive how far he falls short and where he stands. At 122c–d the same verb covers shame at inferior resources and recognition of his position. These perceptions can motivate care, but they are still tied to the competitive framework from which Socrates begins.

At 127d–e the focus changes to Alcibiades' shameful lack of understanding. Socrates says his present age is the right time to perceive that condition. Alcibiades asks what the person who perceives it must do. The answer is to keep responding and examine self-care. Perception of the defect is therefore a beginning, with practical and intellectual work still ahead.

At 135c Alcibiades says he perceives his condition very keenly. That awareness culminates in a promise to attend Socrates and care for justice. The ending does not establish that intensity of recognition guarantees endurance. Socrates' final fear about the city's power leaves the distinction between present awareness and sustained change intact.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

122c–122d. The comparison is intended to make Alcibiades perceive his deficiencies and position

127d–127e. Perception of one's condition creates an opportunity for care

135c–135e. Keen awareness leads to commitment, whose endurance remains uncertain

In this edition. The edition generally uses "perceive," keeping it distinct from the "notice" involved in escaping

notice. In the comic description at 121d, however, αἰσθάνονται is naturally “notice”: even the neighbors barely notice an ordinary birth.

See also. Failure to notice; Perplexity; Care for oneself; Attention.

Pericles and Xanthippus

Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου (Periklea ton Xanthippou); Περικλῆς (Periklēs)

The word. Pericles, identified as the son of Xanthippus, is Alcibiades’ guardian and his most important example of political power. Xanthippus appears here only as Pericles’ patronymic.

In Alcibiades I. Pericles first figures as an advantage Alcibiades already possesses: a guardian who can act as he pleases in Athens, throughout Greece, and among powerful non-Greek peoples. Yet Alcibiades’ ambition, as Socrates presents it, is to receive honours surpassing even his guardian’s. Pericles thus supplies both support and the benchmark to be exceeded.

The later educational test separates political reputation from demonstrable transmission of understanding. Socrates allows that Pericles may be an exception to the general ignorance of politicians. Alcibiades defends him by naming Pythocleides, Anaxagoras and Damon as teachers or associates. Socrates does not simply deny those associations: he asks what pupils Pericles has himself made wise. The sons, Cleinias and Alcibiades supply no agreed example; neither can Alcibiades name another Athenian or foreigner, slave or free. Within this exchange, inability to produce such an example counts

against the claim, although it is not an independent historical survey of Pericles' educational effects.

At 122b the contrast sharpens: Pericles assigned the aged household slave Zopyrus as Alcibiades' attendant, whereas the Persian heir receives four outstanding royal tutors. At 124c Socrates calls the god his own guardian, better and wiser than Pericles. The force of the comparison depends on keeping guardianship, political eminence and successful moral education distinct. Pericles' initial power does not settle what Alcibiades most needs.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104b. Pericles' guardianship and wide political influence underwrite Alcibiades' pride.

105b. The young man expects honours beyond those of Pericles.

118b–119a. Possible wisdom is tested by the production of a wise pupil.

122b. Pericles assigned Zopyrus.

124c. Socrates contrasts the god's guardianship with Pericles'.

In this edition. At 124c Burnet's apparatus reports Proclus' addition of θεῖος, "uncle," after "your"; it is not in the printed dialogue. Do not silently turn the accepted text's guardian into a specified family relationship.

See also. Guardian and tutor; Pericles' sons; Pythocleides; Anaxagoras; Damon; Zopyrus and Thrace; Teachers; Knowledge and teachability; Power.

Pericles’ sons

τὼ Περικλέους ὑεῖ (tō Perikleous hyei)

The word. The two sons of Pericles; the Greek dual marks two sons, although their personal names are not spoken here.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates begins the test of Pericles’ educational success with those closest to him. Alcibiades responds that the two sons turned out simpletons, an objection that shifts blame from teacher to pupils. Socrates accepts the description for the moment and widens the search to Cleinias, then to Alcibiades, and finally to anyone at all. The sons’ role is consequently methodological: they are the first proposed evidence in a test of whether reputed wisdom can make another wise. Their alleged limitations are voiced by Alcibiades and should not be converted into the lexicon’s unqualified judgement about historical persons.[36]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

118d–118e. The sons are the first candidates in Socrates’ test.

In this edition. The note identifies them as Xanthippus and Paralus using other dialogues. These names are editorial background, not attested spoken forms in Alcibiades I. Xanthippus the son must not be confused with Pericles’ father named at 104b.

See also. Pericles and Xanthippus; Cleinias, brother of Alcibiades.

[36] The names Xanthippus and Paralus are supplied in the edition’s note 31 on 118e, with comparisons to Meno 94b and Protagoras 319e–320a. They are not spoken in Alcibiades I.

Perplexity

ἀποροῦντος (aporountos); οὐκ οἶδ’ ἔγωγε οὐδ’ ὅτι λέγω (ouk oid’ egōge oud’ hoti legō); ἀτόπως ἔχοντι (atopōs echonti)

The word. Ἀπορεῖν is to be at a loss or unable to find a way forward. At 110b its participle appears negatively: the child Alcibiades was not hesitant about justice. The later confessions of not knowing what one is saying describe a related experience without using the noun ἀπορία. “Perplexity” is therefore a useful thematic heading, not the name of a technical state explicitly defined in those later lines.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades’ childhood certainty provides the initial contrast. He protested injustice loudly, not as someone puzzled about its nature. Only after his claims have been tested does he experience the destabilization that might initiate inquiry. At 116e his answers no longer cohere; he feels strangely disposed and cannot identify his condition. Socrates explains it through wandering and conceit of knowledge.

At 127d the confession recurs after the unsuccessful account of friendship and concord. This time Alcibiades adds that his shameful condition may have escaped him for a long time. Socrates answers with encouragement rather than a fresh insult: recognition has arrived at an age when care is possible. The next step is to continue answering and examine what caring for oneself means.

The dialogue therefore uses perplexity as an educational turning point, not simply as a terminal defeat. Yet the positive movement does not erase every unresolved issue. The self itself remains unexamined with precision, and the final promise of ethical care is shadowed by fear of political corruption. One should

distinguish that continuing openness from the two local moments of confusion and from the claim that the entire dialogue ends in complete ignorance.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

110b. Childhood accusation is contrasted with being at a loss

116e–117a. Contrary answers produce the first explicit confession of confusion

127d–127e. Renewed perplexity becomes recognition and an invitation to care

130c–130d. The larger question of the self remains unresolved with precision

In this edition. The edition repeats “I don’t even know what I am saying” at 116e and 127d. Replacing the second with “what I mean” would weaken the deliberate verbal recurrence. “Aporia” is not inserted as an attested noun into the forms list.

See also. Wandering; Refutation; Failure to notice; Adequacy and precision.

Perseus

Περσέα τὸν Διὸς (Persea ton Dios)

The word. Perseus, son of Zeus, is the common heroic point to which Socrates traces the Spartan and Persian dynastic families.

In Alcibiades I. The two royal lines are not merely called noble; their genealogies are taken to a divine source through a named hero. The move provokes Alcibiades’ matching claim for his own house. Socrates then distinguishes having a remote divine ancestor from an unbroken sequence of kings. Perseus therefore helps

expose the inadequacy of pedigree taken alone: a common ultimate origin does not remove differences in inherited office, resources and upbringing. The genealogical assertions belong to the speakers' competitive exchange; the dialogue does not demonstrate them by independent evidence.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

120e–121a. Royal descent reaches Perseus and Zeus, provoking the Athenian rejoinder.

In this edition. The supplied note explains related traditions from Herodotus. The lexicon retains the dialogue's particular wording rather than harmonizing it with a reconstructed mythology.

See also. Achaemenes; Heracles and the Heraclids; Zeus and Zeus of Friendship.

Persia

Περσῶν (Persōn); Περσίδος (Persidos); μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ (megalōi basilei)

The word. Persia is the royal country and people whose king is the Great King. The title functions as an understood identification before Artaxerxes is explicitly named.

In Alcibiades I. The Persian comparison combines inherited sovereignty, a carefully reared heir, royal religious and ethical tutors, visible luxury and an almost unimaginable resource base. The result is not that Alcibiades should merely copy Persian court life. Socrates uses what he admires, including riches and splendour, to demonstrate that he cannot win on those grounds, and then points to care and craft as his plausible means of

surpassing rivals. The description is mainly Socrates' extended speech, with conditional imaginings and an explicitly reported traveller's story inside it. These different evidential forms must not be compressed into a single verified ethnography.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

120a. The Great King is identified as one of Athens' repeated opponents.

120e–122c. Dynasty, upbringing, tutors and luxury are compared.

123b–123e. Royal revenues and Amestris' imagined judgement dwarf the Athenian household.

In this edition. "The king" within the comparison normally means the Persian king, whereas "the kings" can mean the Spartan rulers or the two sets of dynasties. The context, not the noun alone, determines the reference.

See also. Artaxerxes; Four royal tutors; Luxury and adornment; Royal comparison.

Persuasion

πείθειν (peithein); πεισθῆναι (peisthēnai); πεπεισμένος (pepeismenos); πειθόμενος (peithomenos)

The word. Πείθειν is to persuade. Passive or middle forms can express being persuaded, trusting, or obeying. The dialogue moves between bringing someone to accept a claim and urging him to heed advice. Persuasion is neither automatically knowledge nor automatically deception; the argument asks what can legitimately produce it.

In Alcibiades I. At 114b–d Socrates tells Alcibiades to treat him as the Assembly. The prospective public adviser

must persuade individuals there too. Teachers of letters and arithmetic are used to support the claim that the same knowledgeable person can persuade one or many about the same subject. The difference of audience size is treated as secondary to knowledge of what is said.

The claim has a polemical purpose. Alcibiades cannot excuse failure to answer one interlocutor by appealing to his imagined success before a crowd. Socrates is not offering a comprehensive sociological theory that audiences never differ in susceptibility or circumstances. He is demanding that public confidence survive a private test of its content.

At 114e Socrates explains why the respondent should speak. Alcibiades would be most fully persuaded if he himself says that the conclusion holds. He is told not to believe another person's assertion unless he hears the point from his own answers. The intended conviction is therefore tied to participation and ownership, although the quality of the underlying inference still matters.

At 124a the same family takes the form of listening to Socrates and the Delphic inscription. Here being persuaded shades into heeding a practical injunction. The sequence joins accepting reasons with acting upon them, without identifying the two. Alcibiades can assent during the conversation while the durability of his changed conduct remains uncertain.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

114b–114d. Persuading one and many is tested through teachers' subject knowledge

114e. The respondent's own speech is presented as the strongest route to conviction

124a–124b. Heeding Socrates and the inscription introduces the command to know oneself

In this edition. “Persuade” renders the active verb, while “listen to” at 124a renders πειθόμενος. The change reflects context rather than a new Greek root. At 114c–d the question expects agreement that audience size is the proposed difference; reversing its polarity would change the exchange.

See also. Question and answer; Teachers; Proof; Know thyself.

Piloting and seafaring

κυβερνήτῃ (kybernētēi); Κυβερνητική (Kybernētikē); κυβερνᾶν (kybernan); ναυτιλίας (nautilias); κελευστῶν (keleustōn); ἐρέταις (eretais)

The word. Κυβερνᾶν is to steer or pilot; κυβερνήτης is the pilot and κυβερνητική the relevant craft. Ναυτιλία is seafaring or a voyage. Κελευσταί are boatswains who direct the rowers’ timing; ἐρέται are rowers. The distinctions make a ship a coordinated group, not just a solitary person holding a tiller.

In Alcibiades I. At 117c–d the passenger who recognizes his ignorance leaves the question of moving the tiller to the pilot and remains quiet. This example distinguishes acknowledged ignorance from the presumptuous ignorance that produces mistakes. At 119d a more ambitious shipboard comparison challenges Alcibiades’ choice of rivals: being the best pilot among one’s shipmates is not enough when the trireme must fight an enemy. The proper benchmark is the opposing leader’s skill.

At 125c–126a the ship tests the proposed definition of political rule as directing people who use other people. Boatswains direct rowers, yet Alcibiades agrees that the

relevant virtue is piloting. The craft governs those sharing a voyage, and it possesses good counsel toward keeping them safe at sea. Thus neither coordinated human command nor good counsel alone singles out political expertise. One must specify its civic object and end.

At 135a the analogy becomes lethal. Someone lacking sense and virtue in piloting but free to do whatever seems good to him would destroy himself and his shipmates. The dependent group is essential: the damage caused by ignorant authority cannot be confined to the ruler. This case supports the conclusion that all rule without virtue leads to doing badly.

The stages give the nautical examples unusual coherence. First one should entrust a task to a recognized expert; next an aspirant to command must prepare against serious opposition; then he must identify the distinct expertise required; finally unchecked authority without it exposes everyone to ruin. The comparison supports accountable rule, without making technical navigation a sufficient qualification for governing a city.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

117c–117d. The uninformed passenger responsibly defers to a pilot

119d–119e. Naval combat redirects competition toward opposing leaders

125c–126a. Crew organization and safety specify the pilot's craft and good counsel

135a–135b. Unskilled unrestricted command threatens the entire ship and models bad civic rule

In this edition. The edition's note identifies the κελευστής as the one giving time to a trireme's rowers. "Virtue of piloting" preserves ἀρετή in both the role analysis and the

final disaster example; “mere skill” would hide this connection.

See also. Craft and expertise; Good counsel; Rule and being ruled; License; War and peace.

Possessions of possessions

τὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων (ta tōn hēmeterōn); τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ (ta tōn heautou); πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτῶν (porrōterō tōn heautōn)

The word. This is a relational description, not the name of a special class of substances. The things belonging to what is one’s own are one stage farther from the self: if body belongs to the person, objects that serve the body belong to what is already his own. “Farther off” makes that order vivid. It does not specify physical distance or a measurable degree of unreality.

In Alcibiades I. The distinction is prepared by shoes belonging to feet, rings to fingers, and clothing to bodies. Once soul is identified as the person, it becomes possible to order soul, body, and bodily equipment as three levels. At 131a–b the craftsman’s knowledge reaches the equipment used to tend the body; medical and gymnastic knowledge concern the body itself. The money-maker’s activity is then described as tending things still farther off than one’s own. The point is one of priority: success in accumulating or maintaining an auxiliary good does not establish improvement of the self.

At 133d–e the complete triad is named: oneself, one’s own, and what belongs to one’s own. This occurs in the very passage that retracts the earlier concession that specialists could know the lower levels without knowing themselves. The relations are not removed; they must be understood together by one knower and one craft. A

simple chart of three independent bodies of knowledge would therefore misrepresent the final position.

"Possessions of possessions" is a compact English heading only. The Greek can encompass instruments, bodily equipment, and relevant goods without asserting a legal ownership claim about every item. Its function is to prevent the most indirect concern, such as money-making, from being mistaken for the care of the person whose good it should ultimately serve.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

128a–128d. Shoes, rings, and clothing supply nested relations of belonging

131a–131c. Craft products and money are placed farther from the self than body

133d–133e. The three levels are integrated under one discerning craft

In this edition. The edition's expanded "what belongs to what is one's own" is less elegant than a single noun but keeps the nested genitives visible. "The money-maker knows possessions of possessions" is not the wording of 131c: that passage describes what he tends; the knowledge claim about craftsmen occurs earlier.

See also. What belongs to oneself; Knowledge of one's own and others; User and instrument; Care for oneself.

Power

δύναμιν (dynamin); δυνάμεως (dynameōs); δυνήσεσθαι (dynēsesthai); δυναστεύειν (dynasteuein); ῥώμην (rhōmēn)

The word. Δύναμις is capacity or power, made specific by its bearer and effects. Forms of δύνασθαι express being able; δυναστεύειν at 105b expresses holding power. The

city's closing ῥώμη is its strength or force, a different noun. None necessarily names a constitutional office.

In Alcibiades I. The first δύναμις belongs to Socrates' divine opposition, whose power Alcibiades will learn later (103a). Alcibiades' presumed source of worldly power is Pericles, who can do what he wants in Athens and far beyond it (104b). At 105b–c Socrates attributes even larger hopes to the young man: greatest power at home, then among Greeks and barbarians, and a name and influence extending to practically everyone.

Socrates answers with an initially parallel claim. As Alcibiades expects greatest power in the city, Socrates expects greatest power with Alcibiades by proving indispensable to him (105d–e). The teacher's claim exploits the aspirant's vocabulary, but the conversation gradually changes what that power would need to accomplish. Being able to address the Assembly does not entail knowing what should be advised.

The final argument explicitly subordinates command to virtue. Unrestricted capacity to implement one's wishes can produce ruin when those wishes lack knowledgeable direction (134c–135b). In the last line, however, Socrates does not say that rational understanding automatically overcomes all competing power. He fears the city's ῥώμη will get the better of both speakers. The work of education remains exposed to political influence.

This trajectory distinguishes effective capacity, beneficial capacity, and capacity to resist corruption. Alcibiades originally assumes their coincidence; the dialogue makes him examine it. "Power" is accordingly not a uniformly negative term, but its value cannot be determined apart from knowledge, character, and the object toward which it is exercised.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103a. Power is predicated of the divine opposition

104b–105e. Pericles' influence, Alcibiades' ambitions, and Socrates' claimed influence are compared

134c–135b. Unrestricted agency without virtue is challenged

135e. The city's strength threatens both speakers

In this edition. The translation's "power" chiefly represents δύναμις and its verbal family. "Strength" at 135e preserves the different ῥώμη. The parallel at 105e is power "with you" against power "in the city," not Socrates' claim to hold the same civic office Alcibiades desires.

See also. City and citizens; License; Tyranny; Virtue and vice.

Pride and high-mindedness

μεγαλοφρόνων (megalophronōn); φρονήματι (phronēmati); ὑπερπεφρόνηκας (hyperpephronēkas); μέγα φρονεῖν (mega phronein); μεγαλαυχούμενος (megalauchoumenos); μεγαλόφρονα (megalophrona); μεγαλοφροσύνην (megalophrosynēn)

The word. These expressions describe elevated self-estimation, pride, boasting and high-mindedness. Sharing the root of thinking does not make them synonyms of knowledge or intelligence; their value depends on what the confidence is directed toward and whether it is deserved.

In Alcibiades I. The opening lovers are high-minded, but Alcibiades surpasses them in pride. He looks down on them because he thinks he needs nobody, and his

vaunting is based on a list of advantages. Wealth, Socrates adds, is what he prides himself on least. The account is both a social contest and an explanation of why a different lover's approach is necessary.

At 119d Socrates turns Alcibiades' high-minded self-image against his small choice of rivals. A person who imagines himself so exalted should not be content to exceed unimpressive local politicians. Later the same semantic family appears positively in the catalogue of Spartan strengths. The text therefore does not condemn every form of elevated spirit as identical vanity. It asks whether one's scale of aspiration is matched by discipline and accurate appraisal. The final statement that Socrates does not distrust Alcibiades' nature also keeps criticism of his present conceit from becoming a denial of his capacity.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103b–104c. Pride defeats the suitors and rests on perceived self-sufficiency.

119c–119e. The high-minded man is shamed for choosing small rivals.

122c. High-mindedness joins the Spartan catalogue.

In this edition. Burnet's apparatus at 104c records φρόνειν as printed in one apparatus lemma; the dialogue has φρονεῖν. The edition preserves the range from pride to high-mindedness rather than imposing one moral valuation on all occurrences.

See also. Ambition and hope; Spartan disciplines; Beauty and bloom; Conceit of knowledge.

Private person and amateur

ἰδιωτικῶς (idiōtikōs); ἰδιῶται (idiōtai); ἰδιώτῃ (idiōtēi)

The word. Idiōtēs is a private person as opposed to a ruler or civic body; idiōtikōs can describe an amateur or untrained condition. Context, not the shared stem alone, determines whether public status or lack of special preparation is emphasized.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades says the existing politicians entered civic affairs as amateurs and infers that he need not trouble to train. The criticism at 119b is inadequate preparation, not the claim that they hold no public influence. At 121a Socrates says he and Alcibiades and their fathers are private persons, contrasting them with continuously royal dynasties. Here private status does not mean that none has ever performed public service or that all are incapable: it denies inherited kingship in the comparison. At 126c–d private people and cities can each achieve agreement in calculable matters through the same expertise. At 134e the contrast again concerns scale, a private individual or an entire city exposed to the consequences of unrestricted power without sense. The family therefore moves between nonroyal standing, individual agency and amateur competence; translating every occurrence as “ignorant person” would destroy those distinctions.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

119b. The adverb describes politicians’ amateur preparation.

121a. Private status contrasts with hereditary royal succession.

126c–126d. Individuals and cities can share the same ground of agreement.

134e–135a. The consequences of unwise license apply at private and civic scale.

In this edition. The edition uses “as amateurs” in the first context and “private person” elsewhere. The modern English insult “idiot” is not an adequate equivalent for these uses.

See also. Royal comparison; Education and training; Ancestry, nature and upbringing; Power; City and citizens.

Production, work, and action

πρᾶξιν (praxin); πράξεων (praxeōn); πράττειν (prattein); ἐργασίαν (ergasian); ἐργάζονται (ergazontai); ἔργον (ergon); ποιεῖν (poiein)

The word. Πράττειν ranges from acting or doing to conducting affairs; πρᾶξις names a doing or action. Ἐργάζεσθαι and ἐργασία concern working or producing, and ἔργον a work, deed, or task. Ποιεῖν can mean making but also simply doing. The vocabulary in this dialogue does not establish a rigid technical opposition between action and production.

In Alcibiades I. At 115e Socrates speaks of rescue as fine in respect of the πρᾶξις of courage and bad in respect of that of death. The phrasing is striking because “doing death” is not a normal English action description. The next question speaks of an action producing something bad or good. The terminology connects an undertaking with its aspects and results, but one should not extract a fully theorized distinction between a pure action and its external product from the changing verbs.

The craft comparison at 125a uses ἐργασία for producing shoes and cloaks. Here the products delimit the competence: the shoemaker is good at one making and

not the other. At 125c Socrates asks whether the people to be ruled are doing nothing or doing something, with ποιεῖν functioning as a broad verb of activity rather than a specialized theory of fabrication. Their dealings with one another are then specified as political life.

At 128b–e making something better is the criterion of correct care. Crafts are distinguished by what they improve, not exclusively by what new object they manufacture. The shoemaker's tools and bodily instruments at 129c–e support the user–used distinction: hands and eyes are what craftsmen work with, not the craftsmen themselves.

Political activity is repeatedly described as doing the city's affairs, and εὖ πράττειν links acting well to faring well. These continuities matter more here than a textbook dichotomy between productive and practical knowledge. Each local use asks who acts, on what, with what means, under which competence, and to what effect.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

115e–116a. The same rescue involves the doing of courage and the doing of death in different respects

124e–125c. Managing affairs, craft production, and doing something are successively specified

128b–128e. Correct care makes its proper object better

129c–129e. Working with tools, hands, and eyes supports the distinction of user and used

134a–134e. Political action and doing well remain linked through πράττειν

In this edition. The edition consistently translates πρᾶξις as "doing" in the rescue argument, even in the awkward phrase "doing of death." Elsewhere English "make," "do," "act," "work," and "manage" must be traced to their local

Greek rather than assumed to mark philosophical categories.

See also. Doing well; Craft and expertise; Shoemaking; Doing one's own business; User and instrument.

Proof

ἀποδεῖξαι (apodeixai); ἀποδείξεις (apodeixeis); τεκμήριον (tekmērion); ἐνδείξασθαι (endeixasthai)

The word. Ἀποδεικνύναι is to show, demonstrate, or prove; ἀπόδειξις a demonstration or proof. Τεκμήριον is evidence or an evidential sign. Ἐνδείκνυσθαι likewise means showing or displaying. Context determines whether the showing is an inference, evidence of ability, or a public display of worth. The dialogue does not reserve these words for formal demonstration from first principles.

In Alcibiades I. At 106b Socrates promises to show why Alcibiades needs him through the short service of answering. At 111d–e disagreement functions as evidence that proposed teachers lack the relevant knowledge. At 118d the production of another knowledgeable person supplies evidence for a teacher's competence. These are diagnostic signs drawn from practice, not interchangeable with a deductive chain of propositions.

At 113e–114b Alcibiades anticipates the earlier acquisition argument and wants something new. Socrates ridicules the demand as though proofs were garments worn out by use or food no longer pleasant to taste. An argument's validity does not expire merely because it is familiar. He nevertheless offers a new route and invites Alcibiades to prove his own position either by questioning or by speech.

At 130c Socrates asks whether the soul identification needs to be proved more clearly. Alcibiades says it is sufficient, but Socrates distinguishes sufficient showing from precision and postpones the larger inquiry. The proof vocabulary therefore does not itself certify final certainty. The content, premises, and expressly stated limits of each demonstration must be inspected.

The range matters for translation. To “turn out” another knowledgeable person at 118d is a practical result described with ἀποδεῖξαι, whereas proving a claim at 114b is argumentative. Both are forms of making something manifest, but the lexicon should not force one English sense onto every occurrence.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106b. Socrates offers a showing through responsive inquiry

111d–111e. Disagreement is evidence against competence

113e–114b. The demand for new proofs is mocked; alternative forms of demonstration are offered

118d. A knowledgeable pupil supplies evidence of expertise

130c–130d. A proof may suffice without achieving precision

In this edition. The edition distinguishes “prove,” “demonstrate,” and “show” according to construction, and uses “evidence” for τεκμήριον. At 113e Burnet retains the references to different proofs and fresh evidence while recording proposals to delete them.

See also. Adequacy and precision; Knowledge and teachability; Agreement as evidence; Argument.

Pupil

κόρην (korēn); εἴδωλον (eidōlon); ἐμφαίνεται (emphainetai)

The word. Κόρη can mean girl or doll and also the pupil of an eye. At 133a the word is connected with the small image of the observer visible in the opposite eye. Εἴδωλον names that image or likeness, while ἐμφαίνεται says that the face appears within the reflecting surface. Here “pupil” means the eye’s pupil, not a student or learner.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates asks Alcibiades whether he has noticed that the face of someone looking into an eye appears in the eye opposite as in a mirror. The wording joins the anatomical region and the visible miniature figure that explains its designation. This makes the example immediately accessible while preparing the claim that the eye sees itself through what is best in another eye.

The image must not be inflated into an independent metaphysical entity. Nothing in this passage identifies the little εἴδωλον with a Platonic Form or establishes a general hierarchy of images and originals. It is the observer’s visible likeness used to explain the possibility of reflexive seeing.

The textual caution is unusually specific. Burnet prints the phrase about what is called the pupil, while his apparatus records Schleiermacher’s deletion of that clause and T’s alternative κορυφήν. The dispute concerns the wording of the anatomical explanation; it does not permit a reader to describe the entire eye analogy as absent from the manuscripts.[37]

[37] The supplied edition’s note 68 discusses the girl/doll sense of κόρη and its Latin parallel pupilla. The local visual explanation is sufficient for the argument; no additional historical etymology is needed for this entry.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

132e–133a. The observer's face appears in the opposite eye as an image

133a2 (apparatus). The clause about the pupil is printed but its deletion and an alternative reading are reported

In this edition. The edition's note explains the girl/doll sense behind κόρη and gives the English "pupil" a visual context. Its note attributes deletion only to "the thing we also call the pupil," not to the whole sentence or analogy.

See also. Eye; Sight; Mirror; Language.

Pythocleides

Πυθοκλείδῃ (Pythokleidēi)

The word. One of the wise men with whom Pericles is said to have associated; the dative is governed by the verb of keeping company.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades names Pythocleides first when defending the possibility that Pericles is wise. His point is that Pericles did not become wise spontaneously: he sought the company of wise people. The list strengthens the distinction between inherited eminence and acquired formation, but Socrates immediately changes the evidential direction by asking whether Pericles can in turn educate anyone else. Pythocleides does not appear as a speaker and receives no doctrine or individualized teaching in this dialogue.[38]

[38] The supplied edition, note 30 on 118c, cites Plutarch, Pericles 4–6 for the identities and intellectual fields of the three named associates.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

118c. Alcibiades includes him in Pericles' intellectual associations.

In this edition. The supplied note identifies Pythocleides as a music teacher, citing Plutarch. That specialization is note-level background; the dialogue itself calls the listed associates wise.

See also. Pericles and Xanthippus; Anaxagoras; Damon.

Pythodorus and Isolochus

Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου (Pythodōron ton Isolochou)

The word. Pythodorus, identified by his father Isolochus, is one of the two pupils Socrates attributes to Zeno.

In Alcibiades I. He is named as an example of becoming wise and distinguished through another person's company. Each of the two pupils, Socrates says, paid a hundred minae. The patronymic distinguishes the individual without providing a biography of either father or son. The point is the availability of a named case: Socrates can answer the question he asks Alcibiades about Pericles. Isolochus has no independent argumentative role beyond identification, and the dialogue says nothing about his occupation, standing or relation to Zeno.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

119a. Pythodorus and his father are named in the educational counterexample.

In this edition. The supplied note connects Pythodorus with the setting of Plato's Parmenides. That is a cross-dialogue identification, not a scene or circumstance narrated here.

See also. Zeno; Callias and Calliades.

Quail-tapping

ὀρτυγοκόπον (ortygokopon)

The word. The epithet printed for Meidias means quail-tapper or quail-striker, a person associated with striking the bird in a game. The manuscript alternative means quail-breeder.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates names Meidias immediately after establishing foreign kings as the serious rivals. The sudden drop from royal competition to a comic local figure exposes the smallness of Alcibiades' proposed standard. The compound supplies a ridiculous image without requiring a detailed description of the game. The source note reports a version in which a quail is flicked on the head to test whether it will remain in place and connects Meidias with comic mockery. The dialogue itself does not narrate a bout or say that Alcibiades participates. Its target is comparison with a man framed as unworthy of the young politician's grand aspiration.[39]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

120a–120b. Meidias receives the epithet in Socrates' sarcastic instruction about whom to emulate.

In this edition. Burnet prints ὀρτυγοκόπον from Olympiodorus, Athenaeus and a scholiast; B and T have ὀρτυγοτρόφον, quail-breeder. The distinctive joke in this edition depends on the adopted reading. This is a direct textual choice, not a licence to replace either form by a loosely related bird-game.

[39] The supplied edition, note 34 on 120a–c, cites Aristophanes, Birds 1297–99 for comic Meidias and Pollux 9.107–9 for the game. Burnet's apparatus at 120a9 is the direct source for the competing epithet readings.

See also. Meidias; Royal comparison; Slave's hair.

Question and answer

ἐρώτησίς (erōtēsis); ἀπόκρισις (apokrisis); ὁ ἐρωτῶν (ho erōtōn); ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος (ho apokrinomenos)

The word. Ἐρώτησις is a question or questioning, ἀπόκρισις an answer. Their participles identify the questioner and respondent. In this dialogue the roles carry argumentative responsibility: a respondent who assents to a proposition has said it, even when the questioner selected the topic and framed the alternatives. This is a claim about commitment in conversation, not denial that questions can guide or pressure an answer.

In Alcibiades I. At 106b Socrates replaces the expectation of a long speech with one short service: Alcibiades is to answer what he is asked. The demand gives the conversation its working form. Socrates can test Alcibiades' own claims rather than merely deliver an assessment for him to accept or reject.

The method becomes its own object at 112e–113c. Alcibiades attributes the verdict of ignorance to Socrates. Socrates counters with elementary examples: if asked whether two exceeds one and by how much, Alcibiades supplies the answer; the same is true when asked to spell Socrates' name. In question and answer, the respondent is the one saying the proposition. The political diagnosis has accordingly come from Alcibiades' commitments.

At 114b Socrates offers Alcibiades either role: prove his claim through questions or make a speech. Alcibiades declines. Socrates returns to answering because hearing the conclusion from himself is supposed to persuade him most fully. That explanation exposes the positive point of

the procedure: the goal is ownership of a reasoned judgment, not passive submission to a speaker's authority.

The same instruction recurs at 127e after Alcibiades recognizes his predicament. Continued response is the immediate path toward improvement, with divine permission explicitly acknowledged. The conversation later identifies its own activity as soul speaking to soul through words. Questioning thereby becomes an instance of the care under investigation.

None of this absolves the questioner from scrutiny. Socrates chooses analogies and obtains premises that may be challenged, including those in the composite argument. The dialogue itself shows that agreements can require correction. The reader should therefore track both the respondent's commitments and the reasoning that connects them.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106b–106c. The initial pact replaces a long speech with responsive inquiry

112e–113c. Arithmetic and spelling establish responsibility for answers

114b–114e. Both argumentative formats are offered; answering is defended as persuasive

127e. The instruction to answer is renewed as a route to improvement

130d–130e. The exchange is understood as soul-to-soul conversation

In this edition. The edition keeps the recurrence "Answer what you are asked" at 106b and 127e. At 113a7 the two abstract nouns name the very activity being practiced; translating them loosely as "discussion" would conceal the division of roles on which the argument turns.

See also. Refutation; Persuasion; Admission; Speech and dialogue; Argument.

Refutation

τἀναντία ἀποκρίνῃ (tanantia apokrinēi); ἄκων (akōn); ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ (ho logos sou katēgorei)

The word. “Refutation” is an analytical name for the procedure enacted here; the forms listed are the dialogue’s actual language of answering opposites unwillingly and being accused by the argument. The noun ἔλεγχος is not claimed as an attested headword. The local procedure tests whether a person’s commitments can stand together and whether he can justify the knowledge on which he proposes to act.

In Alcibiades I. The first major test asks where Alcibiades acquired knowledge of justice. Neither independent discovery nor learning from competent teachers can be established. The second begins from his claim that justice and advantage differ. Through his own answers Socrates obtains a chain connecting the just, fine, good, and advantageous. At the end Alcibiades is committed to a conclusion opposed to his initial assertion.

The method’s personal force depends on the question-and-answer analysis at 113a–c. Alcibiades cannot simply attribute the result to Socrates as an external accusation. His answers supplied the commitments, and at 118b both the argument and Alcibiades himself are said to accuse him. This is why his confession of instability matters: he experiences a conflict within what he himself is prepared to say.

The procedure’s success should be stated with discrimination. Exposing incompatible commitments

establishes a problem in the respondent's claim to knowledge. It does not, solely by that fact, prove that every premise or every inference proposed by Socrates is beyond criticism. The argument about fine and good uses shifts between acting and faring well; the self argument later openly distinguishes adequacy from precision. The lexicon must describe these steps rather than simply call their conclusions refuted or demonstrated without explanation.

Nor is the endpoint humiliation alone. At 127d Alcibiades' inability to state a consistent account of friendship leads to recognition and then encouragement. The conversation redirects him toward care and justice. Refutation is preparatory: it disrupts the false confidence that prevented learning. The dramatic ending withholds the assurance that this moment of recognition will permanently govern his conduct.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

109d–113c. The alleged sources of knowledge of justice fail under questioning

114e–117a. Alcibiades answers against his initial claim and confesses instability

118b. Argument and respondent are both said to accuse Alcibiades

127b–127e. The conflict over friendship produces renewed recognition and encouragement

In this edition. The edition's note at 115a interprets Socrates' joking reassurance through the thought that refutation can cure rather than harm. That is an editorial comparison, not a word-for-word definition offered in the dialogue. The present entry does not import an unattested ἔλεγχος into the Greek register.

See also. Question and answer; Conceit of knowledge; Perplexity; Argument; Adequacy and precision.

Riding and hunting

ἱππικά (hippika); ἱππικοὺς (hippikous); ἵππους (hippous); θήρας (thēras)

The word. Τὰ ἱππικά concerns horsemanship; οἱ ἱππικοί are those skilled in it. Θῆραι are hunts or hunting activities. The dialogue mentions the practices as parts of education or as examples of a specialized domain, without detailing their techniques.

In Alcibiades I. At 121e the Persian princes, on reaching seven, go to horses and their teachers and begin to hunt. These activities belong to Socrates' contrast between elaborate royal formation and Alcibiades' neglected upbringing. The claim is part of that rhetorical comparison, not an independent historical investigation of Persian curricula.

At 124e horsemanship returns when Socrates asks what sort of affairs good men manage. Alcibiades excludes it because otherwise they would seek horsemen. The point is the specificity of competence: familiarity with the general phrase "managing affairs" does not distinguish political work from the affairs of horses or the sea.

The examples link the competitive aspirations of the royal speech with the stricter demand for a named expertise. Prestige in a culturally admired activity does not eliminate the need to identify the different knowledge required for civic rule.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

121e. Riding and hunting are stages of the Persian prince's upbringing in Socrates' comparison

124e. Horsemanship is excluded while specifying the affairs in which Alcibiades wants to be good

In this edition. The edition translates the plural ἱππικά idiomatically as "horsemanship." It gives no standalone lesson or technical description of hunting, and none should be inferred from the brief curriculum notice.

See also. Craft and expertise; Good and bad; Four royal tutors; Deliberation and advice.

Ring-engraving

δακτυλιογλυφίᾳ (daktylioglyphiai); δακτύλιον (daktylion); δακτυλίους (daktylious)

The word. Δακτυλιογλυφία is ring-engraving; δακτύλιος a ring. The dative δακτυλιογλυφίᾳ specifies the craft by which the ring, rather than the hand or finger wearing it, is cared for.

In Alcibiades I. At 128a Socrates introduces the ring as something belonging to a finger, preparing the distinction between a thing and what is its own. At 128c he pairs gymnastics for the hand with ring-engraving for what belongs to the hand. The example makes the distinction repeatable across body parts and possessions rather than resting on shoes alone.

At 128e Socrates asks whether one could know what craft improves rings while ignorant of a ring. Alcibiades agrees that this is impossible. The question supplies the parallel for identifying the craft that improves oneself: the proper object must first be understood. Nothing in the

example implies that rings possess selves in the personal sense; “each thing itself” and its belongings are the relevant relations.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

128a. The ring is introduced as a possession of the finger

128c–128e. Ring-engraving distinguishes care of a possession from care of its bodily bearer and supports the object-knowledge requirement

In this edition. Burnet prints δακτυλιογλυφίᾳ from T; B has δακτυλογλυφίᾳ. The extra syllable should not be silently removed from the attested headword when following this edition.

See also. Craft and expertise; Shoemaking; Gymnastics and wrestling; What belongs to oneself.

Royal comparison

βασιλέας (basileas); ἀνταγωνιστάς (antagōnistas); συναγωνιστάς (synagōnistas); ἀντίπαλοι (antipaloi); περιγενοίμεθα (perigenoimetha); ἀγῶνα (agōna)

The word. The royal comparison is an editorial name for Socrates’ extended account of Alcibiades’ real rivals. Agōn is a contest; antagonists compete against one, fellow-contestants compete on one’s side; antipaloi are opponents. Perigignesthai means to surpass or prevail over.

In Alcibiades I. The speech answers a precise mistake. Alcibiades accepts that most local politicians are uneducated but concludes that he can surpass them by natural gifts without training. Socrates does not initially abandon competition as a motive. He asks what the correct competition is. A pilot preparing for naval battle

cannot measure himself only against his shipmates; opposing commanders matter. Similarly, a prospective Athenian leader must look to the rulers of Sparta and Persia.

This distinction is practical as well as verbal. Those whom Alcibiades treats as rivals within the city ought to be outclassed sufficiently to become collaborators against external enemies. Socrates' mock advice to look to Meidias and take no care of himself exposes how the original standard trivializes the young man's own ambition. The terms for opponent and fellow-contestant thus prevent "rival" from becoming an indiscriminate label for everyone in politics.

When Alcibiades doubts the exceptional standing of the foreign rulers, Socrates offers two replies. First, thinking them formidable would encourage beneficial care even before the belief's truth has been established. Second, Socrates proposes a comparison from likelihood: lineage, upbringing, education, discipline and wealth all count against the Athenian's complacency. These different arguments, motivational usefulness and comparative plausibility, should not be merged into one proof.

The long description moves from heroic descent to guarded succession, infancy, royal tutors, Persian luxury, Spartan virtues and wealth, and finally an imagined judgement by the mothers of rival kings. Its variety matters. Different resources are selected to defeat different grounds of Alcibiades' pride, while the foreign women's imagined common sense shames his refusal to prepare. The speech contains assertions, a reported traveller's testimony and hypothetical speeches; these retain different evidential status.

The result is not that the strongest or richest dynasty must be morally best. Socrates says only care and craft could let the Athenians prevail, and the Delphic injunction makes accurate assessment the transition to a new inquiry. After the comparison, the question becomes what becoming good and caring for oneself actually involve. By the final pages even unlimited rule is rejected as the primary acquisition: virtue must precede responsible power. The competitive framework has recruited Alcibiades into a programme that revises the terms on which he hoped to win.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

119b–119e. Amateur local rivals are replaced through the naval-command analogy.

120a–120d. Kings become the true rivals; fear of them would motivate care.

120d–121c. Comparative likelihood leads to birth and succession.

121d–123b. Education, virtues and resources are set against Athenian advantages.

123c–124b. Imagined royal women's judgement ends in Delphi and care with craft.

In this edition. "Royal comparison" is not an attested Greek technical name. Burnet prints his own corrections at 119e7 and 124b3; the edition's "whether ever" and "by care, at least" follow those readings. The speech is a rhetorical intervention, not a source-critically verified ethnography.

See also. Ambition and hope; Four royal tutors; Spartan disciplines; Wealth and property; Delphi and Pytho; Power; Craft and expertise; Care for oneself.

Rule and being ruled

ἄρχειν (archein); ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai); ἀρχή (archē); ἀρχὴν (archēn); ἄρχουσα (archousa)

The word. Ἄρχειν means to rule or govern in the relevant passages; ἄρχεσθαι is to be ruled. The noun ἀρχή names rule or authority. The same verbal family can also mean to begin, so Alcibiades' ἄρξομαι at 135e means "I shall begin," not "I shall rule." Context, not a uniform English equivalent, determines the sense.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades at 125b identifies good men as those able to rule in the city. Socrates asks over whom and in what activity. Horses, sick people, sailors, and harvesters all invite different forms of direction. Even governing men who use other men does not uniquely identify politics: boatswains employ rowers and pipers lead dancers. The rule Alcibiades means concerns citizens sharing political life and dealings. This inquiry demands an intelligible task and competence, not simply the possession of command.

The account of the Persian prince had already introduced a reflexive dimension. He must be free of enslavement to pleasures, a genuine king ruling what is within himself first (122a). In the subsequent analysis of the human being, rule connects the user of the body with soul: the soul uses the body by ruling it (130a). The body is ruled, and a compound of soul and body is rejected as the ruler because one member has no share in ruling. Socrates expressly treats this result as adequate rather than precise at 130c–d. A lexical connection between political rule and bodily agency should not be turned into a complete argument that every city has the structure of a soul.

The end makes rule conditional on education. Someone intending to govern not only himself and his affairs but the city must first acquire virtue, since he cannot share what he lacks (134c). Rule to do whatever one wishes is therefore not the immediate goal. Justice and temperance must be procured instead. This does not abolish the distinction between competent government and mere private self-care: the ruler's responsibility extends to the people affected by his acts.

Shipboard command and the domineering patient show the danger of authority without the right knowledge (134e–135b). When no one can correct an incompetent controller, desire becomes destructive. Forms of rule and license lacking virtue lead to doing badly. Socrates consequently says it is better for a person without virtue to be ruled by someone better than to rule, explicitly extending the point to adults as well as children.

The qualification "before one has virtue" is important. The argument is educational and directed at Alcibiades' present condition; it does not simply assign a permanent subordinate class by birth. Nonetheless the following movement into slave-befitting language is socially and ethically forceful, and should not be softened away. It attacks the young aristocrat's assumption that high status entitles him to rule now. The prospective ruler must first accept the direction that can make him fit to govern.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

122a. Royal education presents rule over oneself as a condition of genuine kingship

125b–125e. The activity and subjects of political rule must be distinguished from other coordinated work

130a–130d. Ruling the body figures in the provisional identification of the person with soul

134c–135c. Rule without virtue is dangerous, and the unqualified adult benefits from being ruled by someone better

In this edition. The edition uses “rule” for ἀρχή and “license” for ἐξουσία, preserving the paired terms at 134c and 135a–b. The rule/begin ambiguity should not be manufactured into a doctrine: at 135e Alcibiades simply promises to begin caring for justice. “By one’s better” at 135b is comparative and evaluative; the passage does not name a constitutional office.

See also. License; Tyranny; Freedom and slavery; Virtue and vice; City and citizens; Soul.

Ruling the body

ἄρχουσα (archousa); τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχον (to tou sōmatos archon); ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai)

The word. Ἄρχειν means to rule or govern; the corresponding passive is to be ruled. In 130a–b it describes the relation of soul to body. The participle ἄρχουσα is feminine because its subject is ψυχή. The phrase “what rules the body” then functions as a criterion for identifying the human being. This local use is connected with, but not identical to, the dialogue’s political question of who is qualified to rule a city.

In Alcibiades I. The argument has already identified the human being as what uses the body. Socrates asks whether anything other than soul uses it; after Alcibiades says no, he adds “by ruling it?” and receives assent. Use has thus become governing use. The body cannot be the person because it is ruled rather than its own ruler. The composite of soul and body is also excluded because body

does not share in rule. Soul remains as the authoritative source of bodily action.

The inference depends on the governing criterion. It should not be summarized as merely "the body is material, therefore the self is immaterial"; materiality is not the stated premise. Nor does the passage identify distinct psychic parts and explain how one rules another. The internal mastery taught to the Persian prince at 122a is relevant background, but no formal psychology is supplied here.

The contrast later acquires an ethical complication. A soul may rule its body and still lack virtue; the identification of agency does not prove the excellence of its exercise. At 135b an adult without virtue is better ruled by someone better than ruling on his own. The human being's position as bodily governor must therefore be joined to the knowledge that makes governance good. This is why the proof of soul's primacy begins, rather than completes, the inquiry into care.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

122a. The temperate ruler first masters what is within himself

130a–130d. Bodily government identifies soul as the authoritative self

135a–135b. Rule without knowledge ruins its subjects; a person lacking virtue should accept better rule

In this edition. "Rule" preserves the continuity with political ἄρχειν. "Control" can clarify the immediate bodily application, but would conceal the way the same vocabulary exposes the difference between possessing authority and exercising it well.

See also. User and instrument; Soul; Composite person; Temperance; Rule and being ruled.

Salamis and Aegina

Σαλαμῖνα (Salamina); Αἴγιναν (Aiginan)

The word. The ancestral homelands associated respectively with Eurysaces and the earlier Aeacus.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates imagines Alcibiades presenting these places along with his ancestors to Artaxerxes and asks how much laughter the display would earn. The islands are therefore viewed through a deliberately altered perspective: what supports an impressive Athenian pedigree looks small before a Persian king. The point is not that the places have no civic or ancestral value, but that such value cannot by itself satisfy Alcibiades' ambition to contend at an imperial scale. The dialogue gives no description of their settlements or current political status.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

121b. The ancestral homelands become exhibits in an imagined presentation to Artaxerxes.

In this edition. The English names are conventional forms of the Greek accusatives. This passage does not say the conversation occurs on either island, or that Alcibiades currently owns them.

See also. Eurysaces and Aeacus; Artaxerxes; Royal comparison.

Seeking

ζητεῖν (zētein); ζητήσαις (zētēsais); ζητοῦμεν (zētoumen)

The word. Ζητεῖν is to seek, search for, or inquire into. Its object can be information, an answer, a person with the requisite expertise, or the thing whose identity is in question. It differs from finding: a search is the activity directed toward an answer, while discovery is its possible achievement.

In Alcibiades I. The acquisition argument puts a motivational condition on seeking. Alcibiades agrees that he would not have been willing to seek what he thought he knew. Socrates later uses that concession to ask when he searched for justice. His inability to name a period of acknowledged ignorance deprives him of the claimed discovery. The obstacle is therefore conviction of completed knowledge, not lack of intelligence or the impossibility of the subject.

This condition is not the paradox that inquiry cannot begin without already knowing its object. The dialogue does not develop that problem. It asks whether Alcibiades recognized enough of a lack to undertake a search. The requirement is modest but disruptive: he must stop confusing confident judgments with an acquired understanding of their standard.

The word recurs within the constructive account. At 130b the body is rejected as “what we are seeking.” Here the sought object has been specified as the authoritative human self, and successive candidates are tested. The search can make progress without yet achieving the fuller precision postponed at 130c–d.

At 107c the Athenians “will seek” a doctor as adviser. This ordinary practical use complements the

philosophical one: recognizing the limit of one's own competence directs one toward the right source rather than toward unsupported personal pronouncement.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

106d–106e. Willingness to seek is blocked by thinking one already knows

107c. The city seeks a doctor for medical advice

109e–110c. Alcibiades cannot identify the search preceding his supposed discovery

130b. The body is not the self being sought

In this edition. The edition keeps "seek" for ζητεῖν. The word should not be replaced everywhere by "research," which suggests institutions and procedures not present in the text, or by "doubt," which describes a different state from active inquiry.

See also. Discovery; Learning; Conceit of knowledge; Looking and examining.

Self-knowledge

τὸ ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκειν (to heauton gignōskein); γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν (gignōskein hauton); γνώσεσθαι αὐτήν (gnōsesthai hautēn)

The word. Self-knowledge is expressed by a knowing verb with a reflexive object: the knower and what is known are the same person. That grammatical structure does not specify the content of the knowledge. The dialogue moves among knowing one's situation, what one is, one's soul, and one's own good. These are related tasks, not interchangeable descriptions of a single introspective episode.

In Alcibiades I. The first problem is a failure of self-assessment. Alcibiades is convinced that he knows enough to advise Athens, yet cannot account for his knowledge of justice. The diagnosis at 117b–118b is already reflexive: he does not know but thinks he knows. Knowing that one does not know would avert reckless action by permitting deference to genuine expertise. This is an important form of accurate self-assessment, but the later inquiry goes beyond it. It asks what the self to be cared for actually is.

At 128e–129a knowledge of the object is made a condition of identifying the craft that improves it. Accordingly one cannot know the proper care of oneself without knowing what one is. The ensuing user argument identifies the human being with soul, explicitly on an adequate rather than fully precise basis. Knowing oneself must therefore concern soul, not merely one's bodily constitution, external possessions, or social distinction.

This result should not be mistaken for completed self-knowledge. Saying "I am soul" does not itself show how soul becomes known. The eye analogy answers that next question. An eye finds a reflected image through looking into another eye's seeing region. Correspondingly soul must look into soul, especially where wisdom arises. At 133c the relevant region is characterized by knowing and intelligence and its likeness to the divine. The inquiry is directed toward the activity that makes soul excellent, not toward an inventory of passing feelings.

There is room for different interpretations of the other soul and of the divine object. The text does not name a particular human interlocutor in the crucial formula, although the dialogue's own soul-to-soul conversation makes an interpersonal interpretation attractive. Nor does the grammar compel a purely solitary exercise. The phrase "and into anything else which this resembles"

leaves a wider field, developed by divine likeness and, in the supplied lines, by god as mirror. These alternatives should be kept visible instead of being collapsed into one asserted procedure.

At 131b self-knowledge enters a conditional identification with temperance, and at 133c that identification is recalled as agreed. The resulting knowledge is practical. Without it one cannot know one's own bad and good, because one does not adequately know whose good is in question. At 133d–e Socrates corrects the earlier concession that specialists could know one's belongings while lacking knowledge of oneself. Knowing what is one's own as one's own belongs to the same comprehensive discernment.

The extension to others and cities prevents a narrowly private reading. A person ignorant of his own affairs will be ignorant of others' affairs in the same way and unfit to manage a household or city. Conversely, just and temperate action looks toward the divine and discloses one's own goods. The dialogue links reflexive understanding to responsible action, without supplying a general thesis that every kind of knowledge must know itself. In particular, it does not define a science whose only objects are knowledge and ignorance. Its concern is the person, the good of that person, and the authority needed to act well.

The final promise of care for justice marks the beginning of a response, not certification that Alcibiades now possesses stable self-knowledge. Socrates' fear about the city's influence preserves the difference between recognizing a need and sustaining the inquiry and conduct that meet it.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

117b–118b. Accurate awareness of ignorance is contrasted with false confidence

128e–130e. Knowing the object of care leads to the provisional identification of self with soul

131b. Self-knowledge is conditionally identified with temperance

132c–133e. The eye analogy and subsequent correction explain knowledge of self and belongings

134a–135e. Self-knowledge governs practical and political competence; continued care remains at issue

In this edition. The edition translates several knowing verbs by "know"; their contexts, rather than a fixed English division, carry the argument. At 132c7 the printed αὐτό, "it," is Schleiermacher's correction of manuscript αὐτά, "them"; the neuter points back to the soul under the preceding "this."

See also. Know thyself; Conceit of knowledge; The self itself and each self; Temperance; Soul looking into soul; Knowledge of one's own and others.

Shame and the shameful

αἰσχρόν (aischron); αἰσχύνῃ (aischynēi); αἰσχυνθείης (aischyntheiēs); αἴσχιστα (aischista); αἰσχίων (aischiōn)

The word. Αἰσχρός describes what is ugly, shameful, or discreditable; αἰσχύνεσθαι is to feel shame or be ashamed. The superlative αἴσχιστα can characterize an extremely shameful condition, while αἰσχίων is "uglier" or "more shameful." The evaluative adjective and the experience of shame should be distinguished: a person can occupy a shameful state before noticing it.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates first presses shame as an educational lever at 108e–109a. Alcibiades could identify healthier food as better despite not claiming medicine, but cannot state the standard in the political field where he intends to claim expertise. Asked whether that failure is shameful and whether he feels ashamed, he agrees. The challenge targets a mismatch between public profession and actual understanding.

At 115a–116a the shameful is the contrary of the fine within the argument about good action. Alcibiades initially allows shameful conduct to be good, thinking of people who avoid the dangers of rescuing comrades. Socrates' analysis distinguishes respects: nothing shameful is good insofar as it is shameful. The lexical opposition should therefore not be flattened into an assertion that every shameful act has no attractive consequence.

The royal comparison uses shame more socially. Alcibiades would feel ashamed by comparison with Persian luxury (122c), while Socrates calls it shameful that enemy women understand the necessary preparation better than the young men themselves (124a). These provocations exploit his existing ambitions and sensitivities; they do not make luxury the final criterion of virtue.

At 127d Alcibiades recognizes that he may long have been in a most shameful state without noticing. Socrates answers with encouragement: his present age is an appropriate time to recognize the problem and care for himself. Shame is useful insofar as it makes correction possible, rather than as an end of humiliation. The later warning that public corruption would make Alcibiades uglier (132a) again uses a word shared with bodily appearance to name ethical deterioration.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

108e–109a. Shame exposes the mismatch between claimed political knowledge and inability to state its standard

115a–116a. The shameful is tested against goodness and distinguished by evaluative respect

122c–124a. Royal comparison provokes shame about insufficient preparation

127d–127e. Recognition of a shameful state becomes an occasion for hopeful care

132a. The young man could grow uglier through civic corruption

In this edition. The English divides “ugly” from “shameful,” though Greek uses one adjective. The “disgraceful stupidity” at 118a employs ἐπονείδιστος, a different term of reproach, alongside the statement that such ignorance is most shameful; it is not another inflection of αἰσχρός.

See also. Fine conduct; Good and bad; Conceit of knowledge; Care for oneself; Beauty and bloom.

Shoemaking

σκυτοτόμος (skytotomos); Σκυτική (Skytikē); σκυτικῇ (skytikēi); ὑποδήματα (hypodēmata); τομεῖ (tomei); σμίλῃ (smilēi)

The word. Σκυτοτόμος names the shoemaker or leather-cutter; σκυτική the leather-working or shoemaking craft in the present examples. Ὑποδήματα are shoes. The cutter and knife, τομεύς and σμίλη, appear in the instrumental forms τομεῖ and σμίλῃ as implements used in cutting.

In Alcibiades I. At 125a–b the shoemaker demonstrates domain-specific competence. He understands the production of shoes and is good at it, while lack of understanding makes him bad at producing cloaks. The same man is good and bad in different respects. Alcibiades' desired "good men" must therefore be characterized more precisely than by the possession of any practical skill.

At 128a–e the shoe belongs to the foot, but the craft that improves the shoe differs from the craft improving the foot. Shoemaking and gymnastics separate caring for possessions from caring for their possessor. The inference depends on the proper primary object of the craft, not on denying that suitable footwear can help bodily use. Socrates then asks how one could know the improving craft without knowing what a shoe is, preparing the corresponding question about oneself.

At 129c–e the worker uses a cutter, knife, hands, and eyes. These successive instruments support the distinction between the user and what is used. Shoemaking has therefore become a model not just of productive skill but of agency itself. The argument goes on to identify the user of the body with soul, while explicitly qualifying that conclusion as adequate rather than precise at 130c–d. The humble example supports that inquiry without independently proving all its later metaphysical claims.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

125a–125b. The shoemaker is good at one productive task and bad at another

128a–128e. Shoes and feet have distinct improving crafts; identifying the craft requires knowing its object

129c–129e. A shoemaker differs from tools, hands, and eyes used in work

In this edition. The edition renders σκυτική "shoemaking" because shoes are the explicit product under discussion. At 129c7 Burnet prints τομεῖ, the implement, rather than the first hand of B's τομῇ; the supplied apparatus cautions that B's reading is itself uncertain.

See also. Good and bad; Craft and expertise; Gymnastics and wrestling; User and instrument; What belongs to oneself.

Sight

ὄψις (opsis); ὄψεως (opseōs); ᾧ ὁρᾷ (hōi horāi); ἰδὲ σαυτόν (ide sauton)

The word. Ὄψις names sight, the activity or capacity of seeing; in an appropriate context it can also name the eye or its visible region. The verbs ὁρᾶν and forms such as ἰδεῖν express seeing. In the central analogy sight is the eye's excellence, just as wisdom is the soul's. This functional comparison must be distinguished from the reflected image that lets an observer see himself.

In Alcibiades I. The earlier example at 126b establishes an uncomplicated relation between an organ and its improvement. Eyes become better when sight is present and blindness absent, as bodies benefit from health. That example prepares the later claim that an eye has a characteristic excellence. It does not yet concern self-seeing.

At 132d Socrates proposes sight as the available model for understanding the Delphic command. Imagine an eye receiving the instruction "See thyself." It must direct itself toward something in which both the object and its own reflection can be seen. Ordinary mirrors supply an initial

answer; the mirror-like surface of another eye then gives a case in which like attends to like.

At 133a–b the argument concentrates on the region with which the eye sees and in which its excellence arises. The visual faculty supplies the analogue for wisdom. A soul is to look especially toward its corresponding knowing excellence. The point is not that knowledge is a material image in an organ. The analogy links the choice of a suitable reflective object with attention to the function that makes the subject good at its characteristic activity.

The passage leaves an important distinction between literal and figurative seeing. The face appears in the opposite eye, but the philosophical conclusion concerns a soul knowing itself. The resemblance provides a model, not a scientific identity of processes. At 134d the imagery returns in practical orientation: acting toward the divine and bright enables one to see and know oneself and one's goods.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

126b. Sight and absence of blindness make eyes better

132d–133a. The command to see oneself produces the reflection example

133b. Sight is the eye's excellence and the analogue for soul's wisdom

134d. Seeing and knowing recur in the account of good action

In this edition. The edition uses "sight" for ὄψις at 126b and 133b, but "eye" at 133a where the reflecting region is intended. A mechanically uniform rendering would be less faithful to the local construction.

See also. Eye; Pupil; Mirror; Soul looking into soul; Looking and examining.

Silence and following

οὐδὲ προσεῖπον (oude proseipon); παρών (parōn); σιγῶν εἶπου (sigōn heipou)

The word. Socrates' silence means not addressing Alcibiades, despite persistent presence and following. Following is initially the lover's attendance; the final reversal promises that the beloved will take up that position.

In Alcibiades I. The opening distinguishes Socrates from other lovers who talked so much that they became nuisances. He has not even spoken, yet he has not gone away. Alcibiades' reply complicates that claim to unobtrusiveness: Socrates himself is a nuisance through being continually present wherever the young man is. The two descriptions make pursuit and attention conspicuous without narrating a particular journey or assigning the scene a location. Socrates' knowledge of the youth's lessons later depends on this watchfulness. At 106a Alcibiades explicitly contrasts the former silent following with the greater strangeness of the present speech. At the close, the young man promises to become the attendant. What changes is not simply who talks more, but who actively seeks the other's company and commits to continued care. The divine opposition explains why the initial attention did not earlier become conversation; the stork image imagines how it may become reciprocal.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103a–103b. Unbroken pursuit is distinguished from years of non-address.

104c–104d. Alcibiades calls continual presence a nuisance and admits his own intended approach.

106a. Silent following is explicitly recalled.

135d–135e. The attendant role is reversed and reciprocal tending is imagined.

In this edition. The phrase “in all these years I have not even spoken” describes this relationship in the dialogue, not a claim that Socrates was generally mute or inactive. The edition’s “followed me about” is the local social sense of the verb.

See also. Divine opposition; Love and the lover; Guardian and tutor; Stork and reciprocal love; Attention; Speech and dialogue.

Slave’s hair

ἀνδραποδώδη (andrapodōdē); τρίχα (tricha); ἀμουσίας (amousias); ἀποβεβληκότες (apobeblēkotes)

The word. The image attributes slave-like hair to the souls of uncultured politicians. Amousia is lack of culture or education; casting the hair off is figurative shedding of an immature or degrading condition.

In Alcibiades I. The deliberately incongruous bodily feature is placed on the soul. Socrates says women would describe the politicians this way, marking the phrase as a reported expression within his mockery. They have not yet cast off the hair, still speak like barbarians, and seek to flatter the city rather than govern. The cluster gives an image of civic authority assumed before formation: the politicians look grown-up enough for office but remain unprepared in the part that matters.

The joke supports the need for education but is also socially disparaging. A lexicon should register its use of slave status as a term of humiliation without treating that valuation as a judgement about real enslaved people. Nor should it invent a precise custom behind the hair: the supplied edition expressly says the custom is uncertain. The conceptual contrast with later virtue and freedom can be noted, but the concrete practice cannot be recovered from this line alone.[40]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

120b. The soul-hair, lack of culture, barbarizing speech and flattery form one derisive portrait.

In this edition. The translation preserves the bodily incongruity and the attribution to women. Explanations in terms of a particular shaving, depilation or initiation practice would exceed the source's acknowledged evidence.

See also. Meidias; Quail-tapping; Lover of the people; Education and training.

Socrates

Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs); Σώκρατες (Sōkrates)

The word. The sole interlocutor of Alcibiades, presented as his first and persistent lover, questioner and prospective guide. "Socrates" can denote the person speaking, contrasted with the words and bodily means he uses.

[40] The supplied edition, note 34 on 120a–c, explicitly marks the custom behind slave's hair as uncertain. No proposed shaving or depilation practice is adopted without further evidence.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates begins with an apparent incongruity: he has remained an attentive lover for years without speaking. His account of a divine impediment explains the delay, while his exact knowledge of Alcibiades' schooling and ambitions demonstrates the attention that silence concealed. Once he speaks, his immediate proposal is modest, to answer questions; his wider claim is extraordinarily large, that Alcibiades cannot fulfil his aspirations without him and the god.

His dramatic methods include praise, mock outrage, hypothetical conversations with a god or royal women, quotations from poetry, and jokes drawn from clothes, games and animals. He can describe Alcibiades' advantages as genuine while denying that they authorize political advice. He also repeatedly makes the respondent responsible for the agreed answers. The teasing intimacy permits an unusually direct diagnosis of shameful ignorance: at 118b he stresses that only the two of them are present.

The claim to guide is qualified in two ways. At 124b–d Socrates insists that he too needs education and care; his advantage is a better guardian, the god, rather than an assertion that he already possesses every virtue. At 130c–d he accepts a sufficient but imprecise account of the person and explicitly leaves a larger investigation unfinished. These qualifications should not be erased by presenting him as a lecturer delivering an unqualified philosophical system.

The account of the lover at 131c–132a explains why he remains when others depart. Their interest was in what belongs to Alcibiades; his is directed to Alcibiades himself. This persistence is conditional on improvement and avoidance of corruption, rather than an unconditional endorsement of whatever the beloved becomes. At the

end he welcomes reciprocal attendance, yet corrects “if you wish” to “if god wills” and fears the power of the city. His presence establishes a possibility of education, not a narrated guarantee of success.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103a–104e. Silence, divine restraint and the difficult beginning of the lover’s speech.

105d–106b. A sweeping claim of indispensability leads to the request for answers.

118b. The privacy of the two-person encounter permits the diagnosis.

124b–124d. Socrates includes himself in the need for care.

129b–129c. Socrates speaking by means of speech illustrates user and instrument.

131c–132a. He identifies himself as the persistent lover.

135d–135e. Divine willing, reciprocal love and fear qualify the ending.

In this edition. The edition’s Greek speaker abbreviation is ΣΩ.; it is editorial identification, not an additional spoken name. Socrates’ historical trial and execution belong to the supplied notes and reception of the ending, not to events narrated here.

See also. Alcibiades; Divine opposition; God and the divine; Love and the lover; Sophroniscus and Phaenarete; Daedalus and Hephaestus; Question and answer; Knowledge and teachability; Adequacy and precision.

Sophroniscus and Phaenarete

Σωφρονίσκου (Sōphroniskou); Φαιναρέτης (Phainaretēs)

The word. The parents by whom Socrates identifies himself when declaring that he alone has genuinely loved Alcibiades.

In Alcibiades I. The full parental identification balances the earlier address to Alcibiades as son of Cleinias and Deinomache. Its position matters: Socrates has just separated loving the person from loving the body that belongs to the person, and then names the two parties to the durable relationship. Their mothers' names occur as part of this deliberate symmetry. The passage gives neither parent an independent role, profession or speech. It should therefore not be treated as introducing a theory of midwifery or an occupational genealogy into this local argument, even though other dialogues make such connections available.[41]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

131e. Socrates' full parentage accompanies his claim to be the sole true lover.

In this edition. The source note identifies Sophroniscus elsewhere and calls Phaenarete a midwife by reference to the Theaetetus. That profession is not stated in Alcibiades I.

See also. Socrates; Deinomache; Love and the lover.

[41] The supplied edition, note 63 on 131e, compares Laches 180d for Sophroniscus and Theaetetus 149a for Phaenarete's midwifery. The present passage names both without occupations.

Soul

ψυχή (psychē); τὴν ψυχήν (tēn psychēn); ψυχῆς (psychēs)

The word. Ψυχή is rendered “soul”: the living person’s inward source of activity, judgment, and character. Its relevant role is not supplied by a doctrine of immortality. In this dialogue soul is what uses and rules the body, what is addressed in genuine conversation, and what can become better or be corrupted. The word occurs before the argument has established these roles, so its early uses should not be read as already proving the later identification of the human being with soul.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates initially describes Alcibiades’ supposed advantages as extending from body to soul. The young man’s “nature of soul” subsequently appears among the assets on which he wrongly relies in competition with the kings. Soul can therefore designate the character or capacities he already possesses, before philosophical care has transformed them. At 117b the soul’s wandering names instability of judgment; at 120b its uncultivated condition is pictured as still bearing a slave’s hair. Neither passage is a developed psychology, but both make the state of soul relevant to practical competence.

The argument at 129b–130c begins from agency. A speaker uses speech; a craftsman uses tools, hands, and eyes; a human being uses the whole body. The user and the used are conceded to be different. Soul is then accepted as what uses the body and does so by ruling it. Since the human being has been identified as the bodily ruler, body is excluded, and the composite is excluded on the further assumption that a whole cannot count as ruling if one of its components does not share the rule. Soul remains.

This identification is not presented without reservation. At 130c–d Socrates calls the result adequate rather than precise and postpones the question of the self itself. His practical justification is that nothing of ourselves has greater authority than soul. The passage thus authorizes a working identification for the inquiry into care, while preserving a gap between that result and a complete account of selfhood. It does not prove that soul can exist separately after death, nor does it offer a classification of its parts like those familiar from other dialogues.

Conversation immediately provides the human application. Socrates is not addressing Alcibiades' face; he is addressing Alcibiades, identified as his soul. The Delphic command consequently directs one to come to know soul. Bodily expertise does not by itself amount to this knowledge, and material prosperity lies still farther from it. The comparison of lovers then tests what they value: someone attached to the body loves something belonging to Alcibiades; the lover of soul loves Alcibiades himself and stays while that soul develops toward the better.

At 132b–c the practical object of care is now expressly soul. But knowing that label is not yet knowing how to know it. The eye analogy directs soul toward soul, especially the region in which its excellence, wisdom, comes to be. At 133c knowing and intelligence characterize this most divine region. One should not convert the local term "region" into a fully articulated theory of separate psychic faculties. What matters for the argument is a functional center: soul becomes intelligible through its best activity, rather than through bodily appearance or external possessions.

The end gives that inward focus public consequences. To know soul and oneself is to be temperate; without such knowledge a person cannot identify his own good or

competently manage other people's affairs. Justice and temperance, rather than unrestricted power, must guide action. Soul is therefore not an excuse to ignore embodied and civic life. Its primacy supplies the proposed basis for ordering them, and its continuing susceptibility to corruption explains why Socrates' final confidence remains qualified.[42]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104a. Soul appears in the initial catalogue of supposed advantages

117b. Wandering is predicated of soul

129e–130d. Soul is identified as user and ruler; the proof is expressly qualified

130d–132c. Conversation, love, and care are redirected to soul

133b–133c. Wisdom and intelligence identify the soul's best and most divine region

In this edition. "Soul" consistently renders ψυχή. At 133c1 the printed comparative is θειότερον, "more divine"; B instead reads νοερώτερον, "more intellectual," and Cobet proposes κυριώτερον, "having more authority." These are alternative readings, not three cumulative descriptions asserted at that line.

See also. Body; Human being; The self itself and each self; Ruling the body; Soul looking into soul; Divine likeness.

[42] At 133c1 the supplied apparatus attributes θειότερον to T and W, νοερώτερον to B, and κυριώτερον to Cobet. Only the first is the reading printed and translated in this edition; the alternatives should not be quoted as a sequence of the dialogue's own claims.

Soul looking into soul

εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλεπτέον (eis psychēn autēi blepteon); ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετή (hē psychēs aretē); σοφία (sophia)

The word. The verbal adjective βλεπτέον expresses what must be done: the soul must look into soul if it is to know itself. The dative αὐτῇ marks the soul for which that requirement holds. The formula does not specify a named individual's soul or state in so many words that the other soul must be Socrates'. Its local force is directional and functional: the appropriate object is soul, especially the region where its excellence, wisdom, arises.

In Alcibiades I. The formula at 133b is the interpretive climax of the visual analogy. An eye sees itself by looking into another eye, especially the region with which the counterpart sees. The same pattern is proposed for soul: attend to a being of the relevant kind and especially to its best characteristic activity. This supplies an answer to a problem the user argument alone left unresolved. Identifying the person as soul tells us what needs care; it does not yet tell us how that object can be known.

The dialogue's own form gives the analogy an immediate setting. At 130d–e Socrates and Alcibiades have described their conversation as soul addressing soul through words. A reader can therefore understand their exchange as a candidate instance of the attention now prescribed. Socrates' concern for Alcibiades' moral improvement, rather than his fading bodily bloom, reinforces that connection. Nevertheless, the text does not explicitly say at 133b "look into Socrates' soul," and a lexicon should label that identification as an interpretation rather than a quotation.

The restriction to the region of wisdom matters. The command is not simply to inspect any desire, memory, or

mood in either person. It directs the knower toward what makes soul excellent, just as sight makes the eye excellent. The corresponding phrase “and into anything else which this in fact resembles” broadens the analogy beyond a solely interpersonal exchange. The following passage identifies the knowing region as most divine and like the god.

The text therefore supports both an interpersonal dimension and a normative direction toward the divine. It does not require that every route be collapsed into one. The explicitly divine mirror belongs to the supplied 133c8 –17; the preceding relation to the divine is already present before those lines. The distinction prevents two opposite errors: reducing the passage to ordinary conversation alone, or claiming that the transmitted text has no religious dimension without the supplement.

The analogy leaves questions open. It does not specify a complete procedure for separating wisdom from its appearance in another person, nor explain every step by which attending to another soul gives knowledge of one’s own. Those difficulties should not be hidden by slogans such as “know yourself through a friend.” Its more limited direction is clear: the self is not best discovered through external possessions or a bodily image but through soul’s knowing excellence and its proper counterpart or standard.

The practical sequel brings this direction back to action. Self-knowledge is temperance, and knowing oneself makes it possible to identify one’s own good and act competently for others. The soul-to-soul instruction is therefore a stage in moral and civic education, not an isolated mystical claim detached from the preceding question of care.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

130d–130e. The existing conversation is described as soul addressing soul

131c–132c. Concern for soul replaces attachment merely to body

133b–133c6. The eye analogy directs soul toward soul's wisdom and divine likeness

133c8–17. A supplied extension gives the divine mirror priority

133c18–134a. Self-knowledge is applied to temperance and practical discernment

In this edition. The edition's "look into a soul" preserves the anarthrous Greek rather than naming a particular partner. It also retains σοφία, "wisdom," as the specification of soul's excellence, though Burnet reports a proposal to delete the word.

See also. Self-knowledge; Eye; Sight; Wisdom; Divine likeness; God as mirror; Speech and dialogue.

Sparta and Lacedaemon

Λακεδαιμονίοις (Lakedaimoniois); Λακεδαίμονι (Lakedaimoni)

The word. Lacedaemon and the Lacedaemonians are the Greek names rendered in context as Sparta and the Spartans, one of the two principal external standards for Alcibiades' intended leadership.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates says Athens repeatedly fights the Spartans and the Great King, so the kings of those peoples, not merely Athenian politicians, should define Alcibiades' contest. The subsequent picture combines royal ancestry, attention to succession, a catalogue of virtues, land and

dependent labour, private precious-metal holdings and royal receipts. It is a competitive encomium framed to dislodge complacency, not a balanced description of Spartan institutions. Its assertions about wealth are particularly emphatic and should remain attributed to Socrates. Sparta also marks a scale within the scale: immensely wealthy beside other Greeks, it becomes negligible beside Persia.[43]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

112c. Spartans are among those killed in the example of Tanagra.

120a–121c. Spartan kings become true rivals and examples of dynastic continuity.

122c–123b. Virtues, resources and accumulation are catalogued.

In this edition. The edition notes a tension between this portrait of gold and silver in private hands and external traditions of Spartan prohibitions. The lexicon records the contrast rather than reconciling it by inventing an unstated historical explanation.

See also. Royal comparison; Spartan disciplines; Wealth and property; Lampido and the Spartan royal family.

[43] The supplied edition, note 43 on 122e, notes the tension with Xenophon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians 7.5–6 and Plutarch, Lycurgus 9. It does not settle the tension by revising Socrates' claim.

Spartan disciplines

κοσμιότητα (kosmiotēta); εὐχέρειαν (euchereian); εὐκολίαν (eukolian); εὐταξίαν (eutaxian); καρτερίαν (karterian); φιλοπονίαν (philoponian); φιλονικίαν (philonikian); φιλοτιμίας (philotimias)

The word. The catalogue attributes orderliness (kosmiotēs), readiness or facility (euchereia), easy temper (eukolia), good discipline (eutaxia), endurance (karteria), love of toil (philoponia), love of victory (philonikia), and ambitions for honour (philotimiai) to the Spartans, alongside temperance, high-mindedness and courage.

In Alcibiades I. Each item contributes a different feature of trained conduct. Orderliness describes a decorous or regulated manner; good discipline stresses ordered collective conduct rather than merely looking respectable. Readiness concerns ease or facility in meeting demands; easy temper is a disposition that does not make those demands needlessly difficult. Endurance is the capacity to hold out, while love of toil makes arduous effort something actively embraced rather than only suffered. Love of victory gives training an explicitly competitive direction; love of honour looks toward valued recognition. These are contextual glosses of a catalogue, not definitions formally argued by Socrates one by one.

Socrates says that considering these qualities would make Alcibiades think himself a child. The comparison answers his claim that natural superiority over untrained politicians makes practice unnecessary. Spartan competitors possess not simply noble ancestry but sustained forms of behaviour. The catalogue also balances the immediately preceding Persian display of luxury: Alcibiades is outmatched in refinement on one side and discipline on the other. The later inquiry still has to

establish what virtue and political preparation require, so the list should not be treated as the dialogue's exhaustive, final taxonomy of excellences.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

122c–122d. The Spartan catalogue makes Alcibiades a child by comparison.

In this edition. The edition's "readiness" and "easy temper" keep the adjacent terms distinct. The attested spelling φιλονικίαν concerns victory; it should not silently be replaced with a different spelling and then glossed solely as contentiousness. The ending of φιλοτιμίας is plural within the catalogue.

See also. Royal comparison; Education and training; Pride and high-mindedness; Honour, fame and worth; Temperance; Courage and cowardice.

Speech and dialogue

διαλέγεσθαι (dialegesthai); διάλογοι (dialogoi); προσομιλεῖν (prosomilein); λόγῳ χρῆσθαι (logōi chrēsthai)

The word. Διαλέγεσθαι is talking or conversing with another; διάλογοι are conversations. Προσομιλεῖν at 130d means conversing or associating in address. Λόγῳ χρῆσθαι is using speech. These expressions describe interpersonal activity before they become premises in the self argument. "Dialectic" as a complete technical science should not be read into every occurrence of the ordinary verb.

In Alcibiades I. The opening contrasts other lovers' talk with Socrates' long silence. Speech becomes possible when the divine opposition no longer prevents it and Alcibiades is ready to listen. The problem is therefore not simply

whether words can be produced, but whether this conversation can benefit its hearer rather than occur in vain.

At 106b dialogue takes the specific form of questioning and answering instead of the long speech Alcibiades expects. At 110a Socrates asks him to answer truly so the conversations will not be futile. Truthfulness and participation are conditions of their value. The later challenge to persuade one person as well as a crowd ties private conversation to Alcibiades' projected public speech.

At 129b–c the present exchange becomes evidence. Socrates speaks, Alcibiades hears, and speech is what the speaker uses. The distinction of a user from a means then extends through craft tools to body. After soul is identified as the person, the conversation is redescribed as soul addressing soul through words. Socrates is speaking to Alcibiades, not merely to his face.

This reflexive use of the ongoing activity matters: the inquiry into the self is enacted by the selves it is trying to understand. It does not follow that every conversation constitutes adequate care or that verbal fluency proves wisdom. The opening lovers talked without helping, and Alcibiades can give answers whose implications he has not understood. The dialogue's value depends on what it makes intelligible and how the participants respond.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103a–106b. Silence, readiness to listen, and the choice of responsive conversation

110a. True answers are required for conversations not to be futile

129b–129c. The present act of speaking supplies the first user–means distinction

130d–130e. The exchange is interpreted as soul-to-soul address

In this edition. The edition renders διαλέγεσθαι by “talk” or “talk with,” and προσομιλεῖν by “converse.” At 110a3 Burnet prints διάλογοι while reporting Cobet’s λόγοι. The forms should not be silently interchanged in a quotation.

See also. Question and answer; User and instrument; Argument; Soul; Attention.

Stork and reciprocal love

πελαργοῦ (pelargou); ἐννεοττεύσας (enneotteusas); ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον (erōta hypopteron); θεραπεύσεται (therapeusetai)

The word. The stork is the bird to which Socrates compares his own love. Nesting or hatching a winged love in Alcibiades leads to being tended in return. The image joins generation, reciprocity and care.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades has announced that the two will change parts: he will now attend Socrates. Socrates recasts the promise as a small animal fable about his love, which has produced a winged offspring and will itself receive care. The supplied note explains the traditional belief that young storks feed their aged parents, making the reversal intelligible. The dialogue’s actual words do not narrate that natural history; they rely on the reader recognizing it.

The image does not say Socrates has ceased to guide or Alcibiades has completed his education. It celebrates a new motive for continuing the relation. The return of tending is especially apt after the distinctions about what genuinely deserves care. Yet the immediately following exchange prevents a sentimental ending: Alcibiades

promises to care for justice, and Socrates hopes he will persist but fears the city's strength. The stork therefore expresses reciprocal commitment at the moment it begins, not a guarantee that the offspring will fulfil it.[44]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

135d–135e. The promise of reversed attendance becomes the stork comparison and then care for justice.

In this edition. The article uses the note's traditional explanation while keeping it separate from the text's compact allusion. Burnet prints the singular participle ἐννεοττεύσας from B against T's plural-looking variant in the apparatus. "Winged" modifies the love produced in Alcibiades.

See also. Love and the lover; Guardian and tutor; Alcibiades.

Tanagra and Boeotia

Τανάγρᾳ (Tanagrāi); Βοιωτῶν (Boiōtōn)

The word. Tanagra is the named battle-site; the Boeotians are one of the peoples whose dead Socrates includes with Athenians and Spartans.

In Alcibiades I. The example moves the argument about disagreement over justice from Homeric stories to recent human memory. Socrates characterizes the quarrel behind the fighting as about the just and unjust and receives Alcibiades' assent. That characterization is part of his case that people who disagree so violently cannot

[44] The supplied edition, note 76 on 135e, cites Aristotle, History of Animals 615b23–24 and Aristophanes, Birds 1353–57, for the tradition of young storks supporting their parents. Those references are reported from the source edition.

serve as reliable teachers of justice. The dialogue does not separately analyse military aims or assign sole responsibility to a particular side. Boeotia is represented by its people in the Greek, not by a description of its geography.[45]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

112c–112d. Tanagra precedes Coronea as an example of disagreement ending in deaths.

In this edition. The source note dates Tanagra and cites Thucydides. The spoken text names the site and combatant peoples without giving a year; those two layers should remain distinct.

See also. Coronea; Homer and epic conflict; Athens and the Athenians.

Teachers

διδάσκαλος (didaskalos); διδασκάλους (didaskalous); διδάσκειν (didaskein); διδασκαλίαν (didaskalian)

The word. A διδάσκαλος is a teacher; διδάσκειν is to teach, and διδασκαλία instruction or teaching. The dialogue tests the title through knowledge of the relevant subject and the ability to bring about knowledge in another. The title is neither secured by social standing nor confined to a single professional who can be named.

In Alcibiades I. At 109d Socrates asks who taught Alcibiades to distinguish the more just from the more unjust. His invitation to become that teacher's pupil as well gives the challenge a conversational edge: if such knowledge is available, it should withstand inquiry into

[45] The supplied edition, note 20 on 112c, dates Tanagra to 457 BC with reference to Thucydides 1.107–108. The dialogue gives no numerical date.

its source. Alcibiades responds first with discovery and then with the many as teachers.

The many are not rejected in every capacity. They are good teachers of Greek because they know the ordinary identifications they convey and agree in word and action. Their disagreement about specialist judgments, and especially justice, prevents that success from being generalized. The crucial qualification is always teachers of what. Socrates' initial dismissiveness is refined by Alcibiades' valid counterexample.

At 118c–119a the relation is reversed as a test of the supposed knower. Someone who knows should be able to make another know. Pericles' prestige and famous associates do not supply the required evidence if no pupil can be identified. Alcibiades offers failures in potential pupils as explanations, then confesses his own inattention. Socrates broadens the search to avoid resting the entire test on the family alone.

The dialogue's own pedagogical stance is more cautious than a simple teacher transmitting a finished doctrine. Socrates asks for answers, includes himself in the need for care, and qualifies the soul argument's precision. Teaching is sought and tested, but the conversation's immediate effect is to expose false entitlement and direct a shared inquiry. The final reversal of attendance expresses Alcibiades' willingness to remain with Socrates, not certification that the whole educational task is done.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

109d–111b. A teacher of justice is demanded; the many's capacity is evaluated by subject

111b–112d. Agreement and conflict test the proposed teachers' knowledge

118c–119a. Pericles' claim is tested through identifiable pupils

124b–124d. Socrates includes himself in the need for education and care

In this edition. Teacher must be distinguished from παιδαγωγός, the attendant or tutor who escorts and supervises a boy. The Persian "royal tutors" are given explicit instructional functions, but that special description does not make every Athenian attendant a διδάσκαλος.

See also. Learning; Language; Agreement as evidence; Knowledge and teachability; Attention.

Temperance

σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē); σώφρων (sōphrōn); σωφρόνως (sōphronōs); ὁ σωφρονέστατος (ho sōphronestatos)

The word. Σωφροσύνη names a virtue of sound-minded, measured, self-governing conduct; σώφρων describes its possessor, and σωφρόνως the manner of acting with it. The English "temperance" is broader here than moderation in alcohol. Within this dialogue the word receives a distinctive connection with knowing oneself. Its earlier association with freedom from domination by pleasure should be retained alongside that later intellectual account.

In Alcibiades I. The virtue first appears in the idealized account of Persian royal education. One of the four selected tutors is "the most temperate." He teaches the prince not to be ruled by any pleasure, so that the future ruler becomes genuinely free and kingly, ruling what is within himself rather than being enslaved by it. This is an account of training and self-government delivered by

Socrates as part of the comparison meant to shame Alcibiades into preparation. It is not yet a formal definition of temperance. The Spartan catalogue at 122c lists temperance among several admired qualities, again before its philosophical identification is tested.

At 131b Socrates introduces a conditional: if temperance is knowing oneself, then the medical, gymnastic, and productive crafts do not make their practitioners temperate simply in virtue of their specialist knowledge. The qualification matters. He does not say that a doctor cannot also be temperate, only that bodily expertise as such does not amount to knowing the self. Nor does the sentence establish that all skill is worthless. It marks the limit of specialist competence in relation to the person who uses it.

The identification is recalled after the eye analogy. At 133c Socrates asks whether they agreed that knowing oneself is temperance, and Alcibiades assents. The dialogue now treats that identification as a premise for consequences concerning one's own good. Without self-knowledge and temperance one cannot know what belongs to oneself as one's own, and therefore cannot competently discern other people's or cities' affairs. The earlier concession of separate specialist knowledge is corrected at 133d–e. This qualification prevents a simple opposition between an inward virtue and entirely self-sufficient external crafts.

At 134a–b temperance becomes a necessary condition of happiness. The argument runs through ignorance, mistakes, bad action and bad fortune, and wretchedness. Wealth cannot remove the relevant wretchedness; becoming temperate can. The conclusion is not that an ascetic disposition guarantees every desired external outcome. It is that the good management of life cannot be

secured merely by resources in the absence of the understanding that directs them.

The political conclusion at 134c pairs temperance with justice. Alcibiades must procure these virtues for himself and the city, rather than unrestricted license to do whatever he wishes. Just and temperate action looks toward what is divine and bright and thereby permits knowledge of oneself and one's own good. The earlier royal ideal of freedom from subjection to pleasure and the later requirement of self-knowledge thus converge in an account of responsible rule: command over others without knowledgeable self-government is dangerous.

The dialogue does not undertake an independent argument that every ordinary use of σωφροσύνη means self-knowledge. It progressively makes that identification within this conversation. Nor should the account be replaced with the different proposals and problems examined in the Charmides. That dialogue can supply a useful comparison, but this one's particular movement is from self-care and the soul to knowledge of one's own good and the conditions of political action.[46]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

121e–122a. The temperate tutor teaches freedom from rule by pleasure

122c. Temperance appears among the Spartan virtues

131b. A conditional identification with self-knowledge limits the claims of specialist crafts

[46] The supplied edition compares the self-knowledge identification with Critias' proposal in Charmides 164d–165a. That comparison locates a related formula; it does not license importing the Charmides' entire examination of knowledge of knowledge into the argument here.

133c–134b. The identification is recalled and made necessary for knowing one's good and escaping wretchedness

134c–134d. Justice and temperance replace unrestricted power as the proper political aim

In this edition. "Temperance" is used consistently for the noun, with "temperate" and "temperately" for its adjective and adverb. The conditional εἰ at 131b and the retrospective question at 133c should both be preserved: the former introduces the identification, the latter treats it as an agreement, rather than providing a fresh proof.

See also. Self-knowledge; Wisdom; Intelligence; Justice and injustice; Happiness and wretchedness; Rule and being ruled.

Textual transmission and editorial signs

The word. Textual transmission concerns the witnesses and editorial decisions through which the printed Greek is available. An apparatus records variant readings and proposals; it is not another speech in the dialogue. Angle brackets mark supplied text and square brackets text rejected by Burnet in the conventions of this edition.

In Alcibiades I. The supplied volume identifies its Greek as Burnet's Oxford text, volume II, first published in 1901 and in a second edition of 1910, reproduced from a later impression. It follows Burnet's printed reading rather than silently adopting a modern critical text. The translation includes what he supplies in angle brackets and excludes what he brackets as spurious. Consequently the Greek displayed on a page, the accepted dialogue text, the apparatus alternatives and the translated English do not always contain the same strings.

The principal manuscript sigla are B, T and W. The edition identifies B as the Bodleian Plato, T as the Venice manuscript and W as the Vienna manuscript; smaller letters and numbered forms can denote correcting hands. Ancient quotations and commentaries also supply evidence. Proclus and Olympiodorus are commentators; Stobaeus preserves excerpts; Eusebius supplies the large mirror extension; Athenaeus and a scholiast help support the quail-tapper reading. A reading ascribed to a witness is not the same thing as an editor’s conjecture, and a commentary’s variant does not automatically have priority over direct manuscripts.

Specific decisions materially affect interpretation. At 112c the repeated name Cleinias is bracketed although the father’s identity is independently clear. At 120a the quail-tapper epithet is printed from indirect witnesses against the manuscripts’ quail-breeder. At 121b the apparatus confirms the unusual Artoxerxes spelling rather than correcting it to the conventional English form. At 133c the choice “more divine” already varies against “more intellectual,” before the large supplied passage begins. The extended god-as-mirror exchange is absent from B and T and printed from Eusebius; Burnet’s note that Julian and Stobaeus read something similar is a report of his apparatus, not proof that every witness has the same wording.

The smaller supply signs also deserve attention. An answer at 115d is conjecturally supplied, while speeches at 115e and 128a–b are supplied from Stobaeus. Conjecture and quotation are different grounds for printing missing words. Likewise, a proposal to delete a phrase, merely recorded in the apparatus, is not an adopted deletion. The edition’s note at 133a distinguishes Schleiermacher’s proposal about the pupil phrase from Burnet’s actual retained wording.

The supplied editorial record acknowledges limits: it has not collated the manuscripts anew, does not report all readings proposed since 1910, and leaves several ancient witness references unlocated. Its final description of the impression supersedes an older date-range left in the block-history notes. A lexicon can check its Greek and references against the supplied text without claiming that this verifies the manuscripts or the whole history of scholarship. Editorial precision means preserving those levels rather than removing uncertainty for a smoother narrative.[47]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

105d1 (apparatus). Burnet's bracketed explanation is excluded from the English.

112c4 (apparatus). The repeated father's name is rejected in the printed text.

115d2 (apparatus). An affirmative answer is supplied by conjecture.

115e5–7 (apparatus). Two speeches are supplied from Stobaeus.

120a9 (apparatus). Quail-tapper is adopted against the direct manuscripts' quail-breeder.

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[47] The supplied edition, Editorial Note, "The Greek text," "The witnesses" and "Abbreviations," supplies the witness identifications and sign conventions. Its final Note on this Edition, "What remains undone," expressly limits the collation and several indirect-witness identifications. The final Editorial Note says the later impression was printed in the 1925–1945 range and issued no earlier than January 1935. An older 1925–1946 range remains in the block-history record; the final statement is the relevant one, and this lexicon does not claim to have inspected the physical imprint. The supplied Editorial Note identifies modern apparatus names collectively: Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, K. F. Hermann, Schanz, Nürnberger, Schleiermacher, Heindorf, Buttmann, F. A. Wolf, Dobree, Heusde, Hirschig, Schneider, Struve, Cobet, Madvig and Apelt. They are editors or critics cited for readings and proposals, not persons named by the dialogue's speakers.

121b3 (apparatus). Artoxerxes is explicitly confirmed as the manuscript spelling.

128a13–128b1 (apparatus). The cloaks and bedclothes exchange is supplied from Stobaeus.

133a2 (apparatus). A proposed deletion of the pupil phrase is reported but not adopted.

133c1–17 (apparatus). Variants in the divine language precede a major supplied extension.

In this edition. The names Burnet, Stephanus, Bekker, Schleiermacher, Cobet and others belong to editorial history, not the dramatic cast. Latin apparatus forms such as Iulianus, Priscianus and Ficinus designate Julian, Priscian and Ficino. Their appearance does not create attested Greek vocabulary or a new interlocutor. This entry reports the supplied Editorial Note's identifications without claiming independent verification of every witness.

See also. Authorship and attribution; Quail-tapping; Artaxerxes; God and the divine; Cleinias, father of Alcibiades; God as mirror; Pupil.

The self itself and each self

αὐτὸ ταὐτό (auto tauto); αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό (auto to auto); αὐτὸ ἕκαστον (auto hekaston)

The word. The emphatic αὐτό, "itself," combines at 129b with ταὐτό, the contracted form of τὸ αὐτό. The latter can express "the same" or substantivize "itself." The edition's "the self itself" is an interpretive rendering of this compressed Greek, not a simple dictionary noun for a personal ego. At 130d the phrase is written out as αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό. It is contrasted with αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, "each thing itself," the object actually investigated. Preserving this

contrast is essential: the dialogue distinguishes its original question from the inquiry it has completed.

In Alcibiades I. The question arises from a practical problem. If one does not know what one is, one cannot know which craft will make one better. At 129a Alcibiades admits that self-knowledge has sometimes seemed universally accessible and sometimes extraordinarily difficult. Socrates refuses to make the practical requirement depend on settling its ease. Knowing oneself may permit knowledge of proper care; ignorance cannot. He then asks how the self itself could be discovered, because discovering it might disclose what "we ourselves" are.

The conversation does not answer that original question directly. Socrates turns to the present speakers: who is talking, who is listening, and by what means? Speech is used by a speaker; craft tools are used by craftspeople; hands and eyes, and finally the whole body, are also used. The user is distinguished from what is used. Soul is then identified as what uses and rules the body. Elimination of body and the body–soul composite leaves soul as the human being, if the human being is anything.

At 130c–d Socrates explicitly limits the result. Alcibiades finds the proof sufficient, and Socrates allows an adequate account to suffice for their present purpose. Exact knowledge awaits an investigation passed over because it requires much examination. That investigation is precisely the self itself. What they have considered instead is "what each thing itself is." The achieved identification of the person with soul therefore cannot silently be substituted for a complete definition of the phrase at 129b.

The distinction admits several interpretations. The original phrase may ask for selfhood as such, with the

subsequent argument isolating the self of a particular human being. It may distinguish a general explanatory account from the identification of individual selves. Other readings treat the larger object as a principle of reason or connect it with the divine. These are possibilities recorded by the edition's note, not conclusions delivered by the dialogue. The text neither announces a separately existing Form of the Self nor identifies the phrase straightforwardly with god. It also does not simply erase the distinction by saying that "the self itself" meant the soul all along.

The wording of the printed text helps restrain interpretation. At 130d Burnet prints "instead of the self" and then αὐτὸ ἕκαστον. He does not print the expanded contrast proposed by Schleiermacher, "instead of the self itself," or Stallbaum's "the self by itself." Those conjectures occur in the apparatus. Even "each thing itself" is textually mediated: Burnet follows Stephanus' neuter αὐτό against the manuscripts' masculine αὐτόν. A reader should therefore distinguish the accessible argument from the exact philosophical weight assigned to a highly compressed and contested sentence.

What is secure is the practical status of the result. Nothing belonging to us has more authority than soul, Socrates says; they may accordingly treat their conversation as soul addressing soul. That is enough to redirect love, knowledge, and care. It is not a license to claim that every ontological problem about the self has been resolved. The article's combined heading keeps the

unresolved larger question and the more limited achievement visible together.[48]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

128e–129b. Knowing what we are is required for care; the self itself is proposed as the object of discovery

129b–130c. The user argument identifies the human being with soul

130c–130d. Socrates distinguishes the adequate identification from the uncompleted precise inquiry

130d (apparatus). Stephanus' αὐτό is printed; expansions by Schleiermacher and Stallbaum remain reported alternatives

In this edition. "The self itself" at 129b and 130d is the edition's rendering. Its note explicitly refuses to settle the major interpretations. The exact contrast printed at 130d is ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, not an expanded conjectural formula. The appearance of the same words in contracted and uncontracted form does not establish a change of doctrine.

See also. Soul; Human being; User and instrument; Adequacy and precision; Self-knowledge.

[48] The disputed authorship of Alcibiades I makes it especially important not to treat this compressed passage as an uncomplicated statement of a settled Platonic doctrine. The article follows the supplied text without deciding authorship. The supplied edition's notes 60 and 61 distinguish the interpretive possibilities of αὐτὸ ταὐτό from the text actually printed at 130d. The latter follows Stephanus' neuter αὐτό; the expansions of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum are apparatus proposals. No interpretation of "the self itself" is adopted as certain here.

Tyranny

τυραννοῦντι (tyrannounti); τυραννίδα (tyrannida)

The word. Τυραννεῖν is to act or rule as a tyrant; τυραννίς names tyranny. Here the vocabulary emphasizes a power that cannot be checked or corrected. Its first appearance concerns an individual patient rather than a formally described constitution.

In Alcibiades I. At 134e–135a Socrates imagines a sick person who may do whatever he wishes, lacks medical understanding, and tyrannizes so that no one can rebuke him. The consequence is likely bodily ruin. The dramatic force lies in making tyranny ridiculous and dangerous at the scale of a single sick body. Being able to silence correction is no advantage if correction is what competent care requires.

The ship example follows: unchecked control without piloting sense and virtue will kill the controller and his companions. Socrates generalizes to cities and forms of authority that lack virtue, then concludes that one should procure virtue, not tyranny, for oneself or one's city if happiness is the aim (135b). Both beneficiary and audience broaden: the ambition for unanswerable power imperils the people subject to it as well as its holder.

The passage does not present a classification of constitutions or assert that every monarchy is tyranny. Earlier royal education could be used as a positive challenge to Alcibiades, while the end attacks unqualified and uncorrectable command. Its target is the equation of maximal power with a successful life. Until Alcibiades has virtue, being guided by someone better is preferable to exercising that power himself.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

134e–135a. The sick man tyrannizes by preventing rebuke, despite lacking medical judgment

135a–135b. The destructive ship analogy leads to the explicit rejection of tyranny as the desired possession

In this edition. The edition deliberately keeps “is a tyrant” for the patient’s τυραννοῦντι, so that the bodily example’s link to the political conclusion remains visible. “Domineers” would capture the immediate behavior but hide the repeated family of words.

See also. License; Rule and being ruled; Medicine; Piloting and seafaring; Happiness and wretchedness.

User and instrument

ὁ χρώμενος (ho chrōmenos); χρῆσθαι (chrēsthai); ὀργάνοις (organois)

The word. Χρῆσθαι, a middle verb taking the dative, means to use or make use of. Ὁ χρώμενος substantivizes its participle: “the user.” Ὄργανα are tools or instruments. The user–used distinction is a relation between an agent and a means of acting; the verb by itself does not imply exploitation, ownership, or material separation. At 125c–d it describes people making use of one another in civic activity; at 129c–e it becomes the pivot of the argument about the self.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates first asks about the conversation occurring before them. He speaks with Alcibiades by using speech. That description opens a distinction between the speaker and the medium. The craftsman’s external tools then provide an easier case: the person cutting is not the knife or cutter with which he cuts. The lyre-player and what he plays with yield another instance.

Alcibiades agrees to generalize: the user and what he uses are always different.

The next step extends instrumentality inward. The shoemaker uses hands as well as tools, and eyes as well as hands. Craftspeople are accordingly different from their bodily organs. A human being uses the whole body, so the human being differs from the body. Soul is accepted as what uses it. At 130a the relation of use is immediately glossed through ruling: soul uses the body as its ruler.

Several distinctions are worth keeping. First, the dialogue does not initially call the body an ὄργανον; it brings bodily members and the whole body under the broader relation of use. The instrument label is a useful description of the analogy, not a reason to put an unattested phrase into the text. Second, the move from individual tools to the whole body is an inference, not a lexical truth contained in χρῆσθαι. Third, the move from use to rule introduces an additional criterion that drives the elimination of the composite. Readers may accept the ordinary examples while still asking whether the generalized premises are strong enough.

The vocabulary returns after the proof. At 130d–e the two souls converse using words; speech is a medium through which one person addresses another rather than the person himself. In the supplied mirror passage at 133c, the god is used as the finest mirror. The recurrence does not make god a bodily tool. It demonstrates the verb's broad instrumental construction: different kinds of things can serve as means in different activities.

The dialogue's own account of the proof's limited precision prevents this chain from being inflated into a complete metaphysics of tools and persons. Its secure role is methodological and practical. It makes Alcibiades

distinguish himself from the media, organs, and possessions through which he acts, and thereby prevents their improvement from automatically counting as care of himself.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

125c–125d. Civic participants make use of one another

129b–130a. Speech, craft tools, bodily members, and whole body form the sequence of use

130d–130e. Souls converse through words

133c8–17. The supplied passage describes using god as a mirror

In this edition. The edition uses “use” for the central argument and “make use of” for civic relations. Its “user” is an agent, not a modern technological role. The supplied status of the god-as-mirror occurrence must be retained when tracing the verb across the dialogue.

See also. Ruling the body; Soul; Body; Composite person; Speech and dialogue; God as mirror.

Virtue and vice

ἀρετή (aretē); ἀρετήν (aretēn); κακία (kakia); ἀρετῇ (aretēi)

The word. Ἀρετή is excellence: the quality by which something is good in its relevant function or condition. It can be predicated of land, a craft, an eye, or a human soul. “Virtue” is therefore appropriate only if its modern restriction to moral character is not imposed on every occurrence. Κακία at the close names the opposed bad condition or vice. Its contrast with virtue does not turn every earlier κακός into a claim about vicious character.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates initially speaks of attaining excellence within Alcibiades’ own competitive horizon.

Good natural endowment together with good upbringing produces completeness in virtue (120e). The royal comparison then presents justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom through the four Persian tutors, and enumerates Spartan qualities. These accounts are part of a speech intended to make Alcibiades recognize the inadequacy of his preparation. They do not yet give a philosophical definition of virtue or a guarantee that the royal models possess it without qualification.

At 124e the question becomes exact: in what virtue do the two speakers want to become best? Alcibiades says the virtue of good men, then of managing affairs. Socrates refuses these formulations until the relevant domain is identified. The ensuing craft comparisons make the broad reach of ἀρετή conspicuous. Piloting has its virtue, as does chorus-training (125c–d). To rule men who make use of other men is not enough to distinguish politics from these activities. Virtue cannot function as an honorific label whose content everyone already knows.

The eye-and-soul analogy adds another relation between excellence and characteristic activity. The eye's virtue is sight, and the region into which a soul should look is where its virtue, wisdom, arises (133b). The text thereby directs the search toward cognitive excellence. This follows an argument identifying the human being with soul, but that argument is expressly accepted as adequate rather than precise at 130c–d. Nothing in this lexical history requires silently supplementing the dialogue with a developed metaphysics of the virtues.

The decisive political claim is that cities require virtue if they are to be happy (134b). Walls, warships, dockyards, population, and size are not sufficient without it. The grammar matters: the claim is about resources without virtue, not a practical order to demolish defenses or

abolish material provision. Alcibiades must give citizens a share of virtue to manage their affairs rightly, and must first acquire what he would share. The familiar standard used against purported teachers returns in political form: possessing authority cannot substitute for possessing the quality one intends to impart.

At 134c justice and temperance specify what should be procured instead of license and rule to do whatever one wishes. The final ship and medical examples bring expertise and virtue together without making them identical in every respect. A person lacking the sense and virtue of piloting will endanger everyone if given unrestricted control. Rule deprived of virtue therefore produces bad results. Alcibiades' original aim of acquiring maximal power is subordinated to making himself and the city good.

The conclusion places virtue and vice in a deliberately provocative social vocabulary. Before possessing virtue, an adult as well as a child benefits from being ruled by someone better (135b). What is better is finer and more befitting; vice is then called slave-befitting and virtue free-man-befitting. This is an ethical reversal of Alcibiades' presumed superiority. It is not evidence that the dialogue has established every legal slave vicious or every citizen virtuous. Alcibiades, who possesses the prestigious civic position, is made to recognize an unfree condition in himself.

The final promise remains an undertaking, not a certificate of completion. Alcibiades will care for justice, and Socrates hopes he will persevere. The last fear concerns the city's capacity to overcome them both. Virtue is the necessary orientation of political ambition, but whether that orientation will survive political life is the dramatic question left open.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

120e–122c. Virtue appears through upbringing and the royal comparison

122d. The same noun describes the excellence of land

124e–125e. The desired virtue must be distinguished from the specific excellences of piloting and chorus-training

133b. Sight is the eye's virtue; wisdom is called the soul's virtue

134b–135c. Virtue is required for civic happiness, imparting good government, and genuine freedom

In this edition. The edition uses "excellence" for land at 122d but "virtue" for crafts and persons, including "the virtue of piloting." At 133b10 Burnet prints σοφία, "wisdom," while recording Heusde's proposal to delete it; the printed text should not be paraphrased as if the apposition were absent. The disputed supplement at 133c repeats the soul's virtue but is not the first introduction of it.

See also. Good and bad; Justice and injustice; Temperance; Craft and expertise; Freedom and slavery; Rule and being ruled.

Wandering

πλανᾶσθαι (planasthai); πλανᾷ (planāi); πλανᾶταί σου ἡ δόξα (planatai sou hē doxa)

The word. Πλανᾶσθαι means to wander or go astray. Here it describes unstable judgment, particularly giving different or opposed answers about the same ethical subject. The image concerns being unable to keep a coherent course in thought; it is not literal travel, and it does not name all uncertainty indiscriminately.

In Alcibiades I. At 112d Socrates already connects Alcibiades' wandering about justice with his inability to establish either learning or discovery. The phenomenon becomes explicit after the second argument: Alcibiades says that as Socrates questions him one thing seems right at one time and another at another. Socrates contrasts this with simple knowledge, such as knowing how many eyes and hands one has. Unwillingly answering opposites is evidence of lack of knowledge in the matter.

The next correction is decisive. Not all lack of knowledge produces wandering. Alcibiades' opinion does not fluctuate about how to ascend to heaven because he claims no such knowledge. The soul wanders where ignorance is combined with an attempt to judge as though knowledgeable. The culinary and nautical cases make that practical: one who acknowledges ignorance can leave the decision to someone competent.

Wandering is therefore a symptom within a diagnostic argument, not a synonym for ignorance. It also differs from an honest change of view after new evidence. The dialogue describes answers that conflict despite the speaker's intention to speak knowledgeably. The productive outcome is not to forbid revision but to recognize the condition and begin the inquiry that false assurance had prevented.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

112d. Wandering accompanies the failed account of Alcibiades' knowledge of justice

116e–117b. Contrary answers are contrasted with stable answers in known matters

117b–118a. Acknowledged ignorance provides the counterexample that sharpens the diagnosis

In this edition. The edition retains “wander” across the argumentative sequence. The subject varies: soul at 117b, opinion in the next example, and Alcibiades himself in second-person questions. These are coordinated descriptions of unstable judgment, not separate wandering faculties.

See also. Conceit of knowledge; Belief; Perplexity; Refutation.

War and peace

πολέμου (polemou); πολεμεῖν (polemein); εἰρήνης (eirēnēs); εἰρήνην (eirēnēn); μάχαι (machai)

The word. Πόλεμος names war and πολεμεῖν making or waging war. Εἰρήνη is peace; making peace and maintaining it are expressed by different verbs with the noun. Μάχη is a battle or fight, a particular conflict within the broader condition of war. The dialogue’s moral argument concerns decisions about these activities rather than technical strategy.

In Alcibiades I. At 107d Alcibiades selects war and peace as the matters on which he will advise the Athenians. Socrates immediately disaggregates the decision: with whom to make peace, against whom to fight, in what way, when, and for how long. Each choice requires a standard of better. Athletic and musical comparisons expose the difficulty of claiming expertise while unable to name its governing criterion.

The war grievances at 109a–c bring justice into view. Deception, coercion, and deprivation do not suffice as descriptions; one must know whether the suffering was just or unjust. Alcibiades admits that recommending war against people doing just things would be publicly

indefensible, and accepts that the relevant better is the more just. The discussion does not establish a systematic law of justified war or identify a particular contemporary enemy as unjust.

At 112a–d warfare becomes evidence against the many's expertise in justice. Disagreement about just and unjust matters produces lethal conflict in the Homeric poems and in the historical battles named by Socrates. Coronea makes the issue personal because Alcibiades' father died there. The inference is that a group so divided cannot be assumed competent to teach justice, not that every disagreement about justice must lead to war.

The rescue case at 115b–116a uses the immediate danger of battle to test fine and good action. Later, naval combat and foreign kings enlarge the standard of preparation beyond defeating untrained fellow citizens (119d–120a). Warfare thus supplies the initial political ambition, the cost of defective moral judgment, and the exemplary situation in which noble conduct may have disastrous consequences.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

107d–109c. War and peace require a criterion governing persons, timing, manner, and duration

112a–112d. Lethal conflicts illustrate the many's unstable judgment of justice

115b–116a. Battlefield rescue tests the relations among fine action, courage, injury, and death

119d–120a. Sea battle and foreign rulers redirect Alcibiades toward formidable external opponents

In this edition. The edition keeps the "better" in war connected verbally with the "better" in peace and in the craft analogies. It does not insert a distinct technical

expression such as “just-war theory.” At 109c the public-admission context must be retained when explaining how the more just becomes the proposed standard.

See also. Justice and injustice; Deliberation and advice; Courage and cowardice; Advantage; Piloting and seafaring.

Wealth and property

πλουσίων (plousiōn); πλούτους (ploutous); κτήσει (ktēsei); χρυσίον (chrysion); ἀργύριον (argyrion); νομίσματος (nomismatos); φόρος (phoros); χρήματα (chrēmata); χρηματιστής (chrēmatistēs)

The word. Ploutos is wealth, chrēmata money or material resources, and ktēsis possession or acquisition. Gold, silver, currency and tribute name distinct constituents or movements of resources. A chrēmatistēs is a person engaged in making money; the word is not itself a technical name for the person or soul.

In Alcibiades I. Wealth is initially one of Alcibiades’ real advantages, although Socrates thinks he takes least pride in it. Already at 107b wealth is set apart from expertise: the useful adviser in a particular subject is the person who knows, not the person who is rich. Poverty would not disqualify a competent doctor from advising the city. Thus financial standing is neither denied nor accepted as a universal warrant for leadership.

The royal comparison deliberately reintroduces the resource scale. Spartan holdings include land of great extent and quality, enslaved people and helots, horses and other livestock. Gold and silver are said to accumulate in private hands over generations, and the kings receive substantial receipts and tribute. The Aesopic tracks image

pictures a one-way flow. Yet Spartan wealth, great beside other Greeks', is said to be nothing beside Persian resources. The queen's ornament districts and the numerical comparison with Deinomache and Erchia complete the effect. These are Socrates' emphatic claims within persuasion, not figures supported by an independent statistical inquiry in the dialogue.

The later argument changes the issue from how much one has to what the object of one's care is. At 131b–c tending money is described as tending things still further removed than one's own body. The money-maker consequently is not "doing his own business" in the newly sharpened sense. This is a joke on ownership language, not the legal assertion that he is handling somebody else's property. It depends on the provisional identification of the person with soul and the separation of a person, what belongs to that person, and what serves those belongings.

At 132c bodily and monetary care can be entrusted to others. At 134b becoming rich does not free someone from wretchedness; becoming temperate does. The civic analogue is equally important: walls, ships, dockyards, numbers and size do not secure happiness without virtue. The conclusion is not that material resources can never be useful. It denies that accumulating them settles the human and political question to which they must be subordinated.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

104b–104c. Wealth belongs to the initial inventory of confidence.

107b–107c. Financial standing does not identify the right adviser.

122d–123c. Land, labour, animals, precious metals, tribute and royal revenues are compared.

131b–131c. Tending money is distinguished from care of the person; money-making is mocked through the idiom of own business.

132c. Care of money can be handed over.

134a–134b. Riches and civic equipment are insufficient for happiness without virtue.

In this edition. The edition sometimes uses money where the broader resources-sense of chrēmata remains relevant. The later person/possession argument is not a claim that the early estate and wealth cease to belong legally to Alcibiades.

See also. Luxury and adornment; Minae and plethra; Lion's tracks and hoarded money; Royal comparison; What belongs to oneself; Possessions of possessions; Doing one's own business; Happiness and wretchedness.

What belongs to oneself

τὰ αὑτοῦ (ta hautou); τῶν σαυτοῦ (tōn sautou); τὰ ἡμέτερα (ta hēmetera)

The word. A neuter plural article with a possessive or reflexive genitive can name "the things of" someone: what belongs to that person, his affairs, or his possessions. The expression does not by grammar alone mean material property. Its referent must be learned locally. In the inquiry into care, body can count as one's own while shoes or money occupy a further level. Elsewhere "their own affairs" can mean the city's business.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades initially thinks caring for what is one's own amounts to caring for oneself. The shoe–foot and ring–hand comparisons expose the inference's weakness. Each object has belongings, but the skill that improves the object is different from the skill that

improves those belongings. A possessive relationship therefore cannot substitute for an identity relationship. The question is not whether shoes matter to their wearer; it is whether repairing shoes is the very same activity as improving the person.

The argument identifying the person with soul gives this distinction a striking application. Body is something belonging to the person. Medical and gymnastic expertise initially count as knowledge of one's own rather than of oneself. Farmers and other craftspeople reach things further removed, which serve the body. The distinction becomes erotic as well: the bodily lover loves something of Alcibiades, whereas the lover of soul loves Alcibiades.

There is, however, a later correction. At 133d–e Socrates says that their earlier agreement was not quite right. Knowing a thing as Alcibiades' requires knowing Alcibiades; knowing what is one's own as one's own requires self-knowledge. One craft must discern the whole relational series. This does not abolish the different objects or say that shoemaking and bodily training have become the same practice. It revises the claim that adequate knowledge of the belonging relation can exist independently of knowledge of its owner.

The correction is indispensable to the political conclusion. Ignorance of one's own extends to ignorance of other people's and of cities' affairs. Conversely, looking toward the divine makes it possible to know oneself and one's own goods. The phrase therefore carries a movement from possession to informed practical relation. It should not be restricted to a catalogue of assets, nor assimilated without argument to the separate ethical formula "doing one's own business."

The places. Selected annotated passages.

107c–107d. The possessive phrase initially designates the Athenians' affairs

128a–128e. Care of belongings is separated from care of their owner

131a–131c. Body is provisionally classed as one's own; craft products are further removed

133c–133e. Knowledge of what is one's own as one's own requires knowledge of oneself

134c–134d. The distinction informs care for the city and knowledge of one's own goods

In this edition. The repeated rendering "what is one's own" preserves the retrospective correction at 133d. At 131a the doctor's bodily knowledge must not be translated as knowledge of external things belonging to the body. At 133d12 Burnet follows Stobaeus' "and others," making the reference back to the two kinds of specialist explicit.

See also. Possessions of possessions; Knowledge of one's own and others; Care for oneself; Body; Doing one's own business.

Wisdom

σοφός (sophos); σοφία (sophia); σοφώτερος (sophōteros)

The word. Σοφός can mean wise, knowledgeable, or skilled in a particular matter; σοφία is the corresponding wisdom. The dialogue's early examples include people wise in letters or other teachable skills. The word therefore does not automatically designate a comprehensive philosophical achievement. At 133b wisdom is expressly named as the soul's excellence, giving it a more focused role in the self-knowledge argument.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades appeals to Pericles' association with wise men at 118c, defending the possibility that his guardian is an exception to the politicians' ignorance. Socrates tests that claim through transmission: can Pericles make someone else wise as a writing teacher does? The argument does not begin from a list of celebrated associates or a reputation. It asks for evidence in an educated pupil. At 119a the inability to name such a pupil destabilizes Alcibiades' appeal to Pericles without establishing a general impossibility of political education.

Wisdom next figures in the comparative account of preparation. The imagined Persian queen would suppose that care and wisdom must be Alcibiades' resources; Socrates then pairs care with craft at 124b. At 124c Socrates calls his own guardian better and wiser than Pericles, locating his confidence in the god rather than claiming complete independent wisdom.

At 133b wisdom supplies the functional center of the eye analogy. As sight is the eye's virtue, wisdom is the soul's virtue. A soul wishing to know itself must look especially toward the region where that excellence arises. The subsequent knowing and intelligence vocabulary explains why this region is most divine. The word here is not merely another item in the earlier tutor catalogue: it is what makes the relevant self-reflective cognition possible.

The article's different contexts should not be flattened. A person may be called σοφός in one teachable subject without thereby possessing the comprehensive self-knowledge the final argument requires. Conversely, the later language of soul's wisdom does not cancel the genuine skill of the elementary teacher. The dialogue develops from domain-specific knowledge to the question of what makes its human possessor good.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

118c–119a. Wisdom is tested through the ability to educate another

123d–124c. Care and wisdom counter inherited advantages; Socrates' divine guardian is wiser

133b–133c. Wisdom is the soul's excellence in the eye analogy

In this edition. The edition reserves "wisdom" and "wise" for σοφία and σοφός, distinguishing them from "intelligence" and "intelligent" for the φρον- family. At 133b10 Burnet prints σοφία while reporting Heusde's deletion; an interpretation following the deletion should not be passed off as the text of this edition.

See also. Intelligence; Knowledge and teachability; Teachers; Soul looking into soul; Temperance.

Wonder and strangeness

θαυμάζειν (thaumazein); θαυμάζω (thaumazō); ἀτοπώτερος (atopōteros); ἀτόπως (atopōs)

The word. Wonder is the response to something puzzling or unexpected; atopos and its forms describe strangeness or being out of the ordinary. Neither word by itself is the technical name of the argumentative impasse, though the drama links them to changing self-understanding.

In Alcibiades I. Alcibiades' first puzzle is another person: why has Socrates alone persisted in loving him while remaining silent? Socrates correctly anticipates that wonder, and Alcibiades says he had intended to ask about it. Once Socrates speaks, the young man finds him stranger still. Speech therefore does not immediately dissolve the puzzle; it enlarges it through a surprising claim of indispensability. At 116e strangeness turns

inward. Alcibiades now says he is like someone in a strange state, giving different answers at different times, and admits that he does not know what he is saying. The difference matters: an intriguing lover has become the means of discovering an unrecognized problem in the respondent himself. Wonder also returns in the imagined reactions of Amestris and Lampido, whose bafflement concerns his lack of preparation. It is thus a recurrent dramatic response to mismatches between claim, expectation and reality rather than a single philosophical doctrine about wonder.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

103a–104d. The persistence and silence of the lover provoke wonder.

106a. Beginning to speak makes Socrates appear stranger.

116e. Alcibiades describes his own unstable condition as strange.

123c–124a. The royal women are imagined wondering at his challenge.

In this edition. The edition's "strange state" preserves the echo of Socrates' earlier strangeness without equating the adjective with a medical condition. The royal women's wonder remains hypothetical, not a reported historical reaction.

See also. Socrates; Alcibiades; Amestris; Ambition and hope; Perplexity; Wandering.

Wool-working and weaving

ταλασιουργίας (talasiourgias); ὑφαντικῇ (hyphantikēi); ἱματίων (himatiōn)

The word. Ταλασιουργία is wool-working, the preparation and working of wool; ὑφαντική is weaving. They are related textile activities, but the dialogue uses the words at different stages of its argument. Ἱμάτια are garments or cloaks, treated as products belonging to the body's provisions.

In Alcibiades I. At 126e wool-working is the example of a subject the wife knows and the husband does not. Alcibiades agrees that they cannot have the requisite shared expert concord about it. Socrates adds that the husband need not learn it, calling it a woman's subject, and then reverses the roles with hoplite fighting. The accepted allocation generates a problem for identifying all friendship with shared specialist knowledge. It is not itself an argument that the spouses cannot love one another.

Weaving appears at 128c–d as the craft caring for things belonging to the body, in contrast with gymnastics caring for the body itself. Clothing production had also distinguished the shoemaker's ignorance from his competence about shoes at 125a. Here textile work helps specify objects of expertise and care.

The entry therefore must preserve two differences: wool-working need not be identical with the narrower operation of weaving, and the gendered household example does different argumentative work from the body–belongings distinction. In both cases the familiarity of the activity makes an abstract claim testable.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

125a–125b. Cloak production marks a competence the shoemaker lacks

126e–127a. Wool-working tests shared knowledge between differently trained spouses

128c–128d. Weaving improves the body's belongings, unlike bodily training

In this edition. The edition distinguishes "wool-working" from "weaving." Its supplied question about cloaks and bedclothes at 128a13–b1 comes from Stobaeus in Burnet's angle brackets; weaving itself at 128c15 is in the main transmitted sequence.

See also. Concord; Doing one's own business; Shoemaking; Hoplite fighting; What belongs to oneself.

Xerxes

Ξέρξου (Xerxou)

The word. Xerxes is both a benchmark of imperial renown and a link in the Persian royal family used in the comparison.

In Alcibiades I. His first appearance is paired with Cyrus among figures supposedly worthy of Alcibiades' notice. Later Artaxerxes is identified as his son, and Amestris as his wife and the current king's mother. These references make the comparison a dynastic one: the scale of ambition is measured not only in territory or money but also against established royal succession. No Persian invasion is narrated in the dialogue. The relation of Xerxes to the named king and queen is its relevant spoken information.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

105c. Cyrus and Xerxes delimit Alcibiades' supposed admiration.

121b. Artaxerxes is called son of Xerxes.

123c. Amestris is identified as Xerxes' wife.

In this edition. The supplied note adds reign dates and the invasion of Greece as historical orientation. Those dates are not supplied by the speakers.

See also. Cyrus; Artaxerxes; Amestris.

Zeno

Ζήνωνος (Zēnōnos); Ζήνωνι (Zēnōni)

The word. A named teacher whose association with two paying pupils is offered by Socrates as a contrast with Pericles' unproved educational success.

In Alcibiades I. Socrates can name Pythodorus and Callias as men made wise and distinguished through Zeno's company, and specifies that each paid him a hundred minae. The example is pointed because Alcibiades cannot produce a comparable pupil for Pericles from any social class or city. The fee adds the dimension of costly, deliberate training; it is not presented as the definition of wisdom or as proof that payment itself caused understanding. The dialogue gives no account of Zeno's paradoxes and does not use them in the argument. The rhetorical endorsement belongs to Socrates' comparison in this local exchange.[49]

[49] The supplied edition, note 32 on 119a, compares Parmenides 127b–c and contrasts the fee with Evenus' five minae in Apology 20b. This entry uses the fee actually stated in Alcibiades I.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

119a. Two named pupils and their fees are adduced as evidence.

In this edition. The edition identifies Zeno as Zeno of Elea in a note. “Wise and distinguished” renders the speaker’s description; it should not be expanded into a historical certification of everything the pupils believed.

See also. Pythodorus and Isolochus; Callias and Calliades; Minae and plethra; Education and training.

Zeus and Zeus of Friendship

Δία (Dia); Διὸς (Dios); τὸν Φίλιον (ton Philion)

The word. Zeus is invoked in oaths and appeals and named as the ultimate source of prestigious genealogies. Philios, “of friendship,” is the divine title in Socrates’ emphatic denial that he is merely teasing.

In Alcibiades I. At 109d Alcibiades takes the request for a teacher of justice as mockery. Socrates swears by the god of friendship shared by both of them that he is serious. The oath makes the erotic and friendly relationship support the demand for an answer, even while the exchange retains its teasing tone. Later Zeus is the endpoint of competing pedigrees: Perseus, Eurysaces and Hephaestus provide different routes to the same divine ancestor. The effect is partly comic, since Socrates can match an aristocrat’s ultimate ancestry while denying that the two Athenians have the continuous royal status of their opponents. Ordinary invocations such as “by Zeus” and “for Zeus’ sake” should be distinguished from these substantial genealogical uses, and from the less specifically named god associated with Socrates’ sign.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

109d. Socrates swears by the shared god of friendship.

120e–121a. Royal and Athenian genealogies converge on Zeus.

129b. An appeal for attention invokes Zeus.

In this edition. The edition renders Φίλιος by the explanatory “god of Friendship.” At 129b πρὸς Διός is an appeal, not the same construction as the oath with μά. The dialogue does not identify every occurrence of “the god” as Zeus.

See also. God and the divine; Daedalus and Hephaestus; Eurysaces and Aeacus.

Zopyrus and Thrace

Ζώπυρον τὸν Θρᾷκα (Zōpyron ton Thrāika)

The word. Zopyrus is the Thracian household slave whom Pericles appointed as Alcibiades’ tutor or attendant. “The Thracian” is his ethnic designation.

In Alcibiades I. Zopyrus appears at the sharpest turn in the description of Persian princely education. Four selected men in their prime, each outstanding in a virtue, are juxtaposed with an old household slave described as the least useful because of age. The derogatory comparison is Socrates’ rhetoric; it does not establish that Zopyrus had no care for his charge or that the dialogue has measured his pedagogical abilities. The term for his role also returns through its verb at the ending, when Alcibiades promises to attend Socrates. This connection turns a supposedly lowly office into a chosen expression of attachment.

The places. Selected annotated passages.

122a–122b. Persian royal tutors are contrasted with Pericles' appointment of Zopyrus.

135d. The verb of tutoring or attending returns in Alcibiades' promise.

In this edition. The note explains that an Athenian paidagōgos escorted and supervised a boy rather than necessarily teaching school subjects. Thrace itself is not described as a place visited or ruled by either speaker.

See also. Guardian and tutor; Four royal tutors; Education and training.

Zoroaster and Horomazes

Ζωροάστρου (Zōroastrou); Ὡρομάζου (Hōromazou); μαγείαν (mageian); θεῶν θεραπεία (theōn therapeia)

The word. Zoroaster is named as "of Horomazes" in the description of Magian instruction; the edition takes the relation as sonship. Mageia is immediately glossed within the dialogue as service of the gods.

In Alcibiades I. The wisest royal tutor teaches this religious lore and the kingly arts. The immediate explanation of mageia restricts its sense in this context: it is not introduced as harmful sorcery or theatrical illusion. Religious training and royal competence stand together in the account of the future ruler's formation. The passage says nothing about the content of the rites, a doctrinal system or a precise historical date for Zoroaster. Its importance is comparative: Alcibiades' rivals have instruction presented as extending to religion and rule,

whereas his own inadequate preparation is about to be exposed through the Zopyrus contrast.[50]

The places. Selected annotated passages.

121e–122a. The first tutor's subject joins religious service and kingly matters.

In this edition. The name Ζωροάστρου is divided across Burnet pages in the supplied text and is reconstructed here as the same word. The note identifies Horomazes with Ahura Mazda and cautions that sonship is a Greek formulation. This entry does not convert that formulation into an account of Persian self-understanding.

See also. Four royal tutors; God and the divine; Persia.

[50] The supplied edition, note 40 on 122a, gives the Horomazes/Ahura Mazda identification and compares Herodotus 1.101 and 1.132 on the Magi. The immediate gloss "service of the gods" is in the dialogue itself.

Original forms and English aliases

Greek expressions, transliterations and English lookup labels lead to the articles that explain them. A label is a finding aid: related terms sharing an article are not necessarily synonyms. Inflected forms retain their accents; cross-references connect related words rather than multiplying their grammatical forms into articles.

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Greek vocabulary register

The alphabetic headwords below are dictionary lemmas, lexical families or phrase labels. Each is followed by attested forms paired with their exact Stephanus references and a local explanation. A dictionary headword need not itself occur in that exact grammatical form. Several records can belong to one fuller article, and a grouped family is not a claim that its members are synonyms.

ἀβουλία. Attested: ἀβουλία (aboulia; 125e). Lack of counsel or poor deliberation; piloting is not bad counsel simply because Alcibiades reserves good counsel as a name for civic knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀβουλία. See Good counsel, 149.

ἁβρότης. Attested: ἁβρότητα (habrotēta; 122c). Refinement, delicacy or luxury; the encompassing term for the Persian material display that should make Alcibiades recognize his insufficiency. Lexical identification: lemma: ἁβρότης. See Luxury and adornment, 199.

ἀγαθός. Attested: ἀγαθὸς (agathos; 106d); ἀγαθὰ (agatha; 115c); Ἀγαθός (agathos; 125a). At 106d: Good as an adviser in matters one knows. At 115c: Good things Alcibiades

says he wishes to have. At 125a: Good at shoe production: explicitly domain-qualified competence. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀγαθός. See Good and bad, 146.

Ἄγις. Attested: Ἄγιδος (agidos; 124a). Agis, Lampido's son, included among the kings in her family. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἄγις. See Lampido and the Spartan royal family, 184.

ἀγνοέω. Attested: ἀγνοεῖν (agnoein; 110c). At 110c: Be ignorant of justice, a condition Alcibiades cannot recall acknowledging before his supposed discovery. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀγνοέω. See Ordinary ignorance, 212.

ἄγνοια. Attested: ἄγνοια (agnoia; 118a). At 118a: Ignorance qualified by the preceding false opinion of knowledge; this specified state is said to cause bad things. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄγνοια. See Conceit of knowledge, 79.

ἀγών. Attested: ἀγῶνα (agōna; 120a). Contest or struggle, the competition whose proper scale Alcibiades has misunderstood. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀγών. See Royal comparison, 246.

ἀδελφός. Attested: ἀδελφόν (adelphon; 118e). Brother, here identifying Cleinias' relationship to Alcibiades. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀδελφός. See Cleinias, brother of Alcibiades, 72.

ἄδικος / ἀδικέω / ἀδίκημα. Attested: ἀδικοῦντας (adikountas; 109b); ἠδικούμην (ēdikoumēn; 110c); ἀδικήματα (adikēmata; 113d). At 109b: Those doing wrong, proposed as appropriate targets of the city's war. At 110c: I was being wronged, the boy Alcibiades' confidently asserted judgment. At 113d: Wrongful deeds from which Alcibiades says some agents have profited. Lexical

identification: family label: ἄδικος / ἀδικέω / ἀδίκημα. See Justice and injustice, 169.

ἀδύνατος. Attested: ἀδύνατον (adynaton; 129a). At 129a: Impossible to identify the craft improving self while ignorant of what one is, the negative side of the care requirement. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀδύνατος. See Care for oneself, 65.

ἄθεος. Attested: ἄθεον (atheon; 134e). Godless or without the divine; the object of unjust orientation is called godless and dark, not presented as a classification of a modern philosophical atheist. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄθεος. See Divine likeness, 106; God and the divine, 140.

Ἀθηναῖος. Attested: Ἀθηναίοις (athēnaiois; 105b); Ἀθηναίων (athēnaiōn; 105a). Athenian; the citizen body Alcibiades wants to advise and later fears being corrupted by. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἀθηναῖος. See Athens and the Athenians, 43.

ἄθλιος / ἀθλιότης. Attested: ἄθλιος (athlios; 134a); ἀθλιότητος (athliotētos; 134b). At 134a: Wretched as a result of doing badly through ignorance. At 134b: Wretchedness from which merely becoming wealthy does not free one. Lexical identification: family label: ἄθλιος / ἀθλιότης. See Happiness and wretchedness, 157.

Αἰακός. Attested: Αἰακοῦ (aiakou; 121b). Aeacus, an earlier ancestor whose homeland is Aegina. Lexical identification: lemma: Αἰακός. See Eurysaces and Aeacus, 126.

Αἴγινα. Attested: Αἴγιναν (aiginan; 121b). Aegina, Aeacus' ancestral homeland. Lexical identification: lemma: Αἴγινα. See Salamis and Aegina, 253.

ᾄδω / ᾠδή. Attested: ᾄδειν (aidein; 108c); ᾠδῆς (ōidēs; 125d). At 108c: To sing correctly as part of music. At 125d: Song in which participants are directed by the chorus-training expertise. Lexical identification: family label: ᾄδω / ᾠδή. See Music and chorus-training, 210.

αἰσθάνομαι. Attested: αἰσθανόμενον (aisthanomenon; 127e); αἰσθάνῃ (aisthanēi; 135c). At 127e: The person aware of his condition, who asks what he must now do to improve it. At 135c: Perceive one's present unfree condition, a recognition that leads to Alcibiades' promise of continued care. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰσθάνομαι. See Perception, 214.

αἰσχρός / αἰσχύνω. Attested: αἰσχρόν (aischron; 108e); αἰσχύνῃ (aischynēi; 109a); αἴσχιστα (aischista; 127d). At 108e: Shameful inability to name the better in one's professed sphere of expertise. At 109a: Being ashamed when one cannot explain the subject on which one claims to advise. At 127d: In a most shameful condition, which Alcibiades now fears he has long failed to perceive. Lexical identification: family label: αἰσχρός / αἰσχύνω. See Shame and the shameful, 258.

Αἴσωπος. Attested: Αἰσώπου μῦθον (aisōpou mython; 123a). Aesop, named as the source of the fox-and-lion fable. Lexical identification: lemma: Αἴσωπος. See Aesop, 27.

ἀκούω. Attested: ὁ ἀκούων (ho akouōn; 129b). At 129b: The hearer, Alcibiades, distinguished from Socrates the speaker when the ongoing conversation becomes the basis of the self argument. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀκούω. See Speech and dialogue, 278.

ἀκριβῶς. Attested: ἀκριβῶς (akribōs; 130c). At 130c: Exactly or with full precision, the stronger standard deferred until the omitted inquiry is undertaken. Lexical

identification: lemma: ἀκριβῶς. See Adequacy and precision, 20.

ἀκροχειρίζομαι. Attested: ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι (akrocheirizesthai; 107e). At 107e: To spar or engage at the hands, an exercise whose appropriate partners and manner need the trainer's judgment. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀκροχειρίζομαι. See Gymnastics and wrestling, 155.

ἄκων. Attested: ἄκων (akōn; 117a). Unwillingly or against one's intention; contradictory answers are treated as revealing ignorance when they occur unintentionally. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄκων. See Refutation, 242.

ἀλεξιφάρμακον. Attested: ἀλεξιφάρμακα (alexipharmaka; 132b). Counteracting or protective remedy; a metaphor for preparation against civic corruption. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀλεξιφάρμακον. See Lover of the people, 197.

ἀληθής. Attested: τἀληθῆ (talēthē; 110a). At 110a: True answers about Alcibiades' past self-assessment, required if the conversations are not to be futile. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀληθής. See Question and answer, 240.

Ἀλκιβιάδης. Attested: Ἀλκιβιάδη (alkibiadē; 104e); Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ καλὸς (alkibiadēs ho kalos; 113b). Alcibiades, the young Athenian interlocutor; the second attestation adds the social description beautiful. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἀλκιβιάδης. See Alcibiades, 30.

ἄλλος. Attested: ἄλλο (allo; 129c). At 129c: Different: the user and the thing used are initially distinguished before the same relation is extended to bodily organs. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄλλος. See User and instrument, 295.

ἀλώπηξ. Attested: ἀλώπηξ (alōpēx; 123a). Fox, the observer of one-way tracks in the alluded-to fable. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀλώπηξ. See Aesop, 27.

ἀμαθία. Attested: ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία (hē eponeidistos amathia; 118a). At 118a: Reproachable lack of understanding, named after the ignorance that thinks it knows has been isolated. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀμαθία. See Disgraceful ignorance, 103.

ἁμαρτάνω. Attested: ἁμαρτάνοντες (hamartanontes; 117e). At 117e: Those making mistakes in the practical contrast between knowers, deferential nonknowers, and falsely confident nonknowers. Lexical identification: lemma: ἁμαρτάνω. See Error, 122.

ἁμάρτημα. Attested: ἁμαρτήματα (hamartēmata; 117d). At 117d: Mistakes in action, rather than merely an incorrect statement, which Socrates links to conceit of knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: ἁμάρτημα. See Error, 122.

ἀμείνων / ἄριστος. Attested: ἄμεινον (ameinon; 107e); ἀρίστοις (aristois; 115e). At 107e: Better as the measure of how long war or peace should last. At 115e: Among the best things, the classification Alcibiades grants courage. Lexical identification: family label: ἀμείνων / ἄριστος. The attestation ἀρίστοις at 115e occurs in wording supplied by Burnet from Stobaeus; the preceding exchange already states the opposing values. See Better and best, 56.

ἀμελέω. Attested: ἀμελήσας (amelēsas; 113c); ἀμελεῖν (amelein; 120b). At 113c: Having neglected to learn: Socrates makes Alcibiades' lack of preparation the reason his attempt to teach is reckless. At 120b: To take no care of oneself, ironically recommended when mediocre politicians are chosen as one's standard. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀμελέω. See Care and neglect, 63.

Ἄμηστρις. Attested: Ἀμήστριδι (amēstridi; 123c). Amestris, Xerxes' wife and the king's mother, imagined as assessing Alcibiades. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἄμηστρις. See Amestris, 34.

ἀμουσία. Attested: ἀμουσίας (amousias; 120b). Lack of culture or education, the stated reason for the unshed soul-hair. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀμουσία. See Slave's hair, 265.

ἀμπίσχω / ἀμπέχω. Attested: ἀμπίσχοιο (ampischoio; 113e). To put on or wear, in the metaphor of arguments as clothes. Lexical identification: family label: ἀμπίσχω / ἀμπέχω. See Clothes and repeated arguments, 75.

ἀμφισβητέω. Attested: ἀμφισβητοῦσιν (amphisbētousin; 111c). To dispute or contest; cities do not quarrel over the ordinary identification of wood and stone as they do over justice. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀμφισβητέω. See Agreement as evidence, 28.

ἀνάγκη. Attested: ἀνάγκη (anankē; 106e). At 106e: Necessarily: assent to a conclusion inferred from the acquisition premises, rather than an independent proof of those premises. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνάγκη. See Admission, 22.

ἀναμάρτητος. Attested: ἀναμάρτητοι (anamartētoi; 117e). Free from error; nonexperts avoid mistakes in the specified matters by leaving them to those who know, not by possessing universal expertise themselves. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀναμάρτητος. See Error, 122.

Ἀναξαγόρας. Attested: Ἀναξαγόρᾳ (anaxagorai; 118c). Anaxagoras, a wise associate of Pericles. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἀναξαγόρας. See Anaxagoras, 35.

ἀνάξιος. Attested: ἀνάξιον (anaxion; 119c). Unworthy, the rebuke to Alcibiades' refusal of training. Lexical

identification: lemma: ἀνάξιος. See Honour, fame and worth, 161.

ἀνδράποδον. Attested: ἀνδραπόδων (andrapodōn; 122d). At 122d: Enslaved persons counted among the resources held by the Spartans. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνδράποδον. See Freedom and slavery, 138.

ἀνδραποδώδης. Attested: ἀνδραποδώδη (andrapodōdē; 120b). Slave-like, qualifying the figurative hair still on uncultured souls. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνδραποδώδης. See Slave's hair, 265.

ἀνδρεία / ἀνδρεῖος. Attested: ἀνδρεία (andreia; 115b); ἀνδρειότατος (andreiotatos; 122a). At 115b: Courage in the attempt to save those whom one ought to save. At 122a: Most courageous, the fourth Persian tutor's distinguishing excellence. Lexical identification: family label: ἀνδρεία / ἀνδρεῖος. See Courage and cowardice, 87.

ἀνδρεῖος. Attested: ἀνδρειότατος (andreiotatos; 122a). Courageous; the superlative identifies the tutor who makes the prince unafraid. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνδρεῖος. See Four royal tutors, 136.

ἀνδρεῖος / γυναικεῖος (subjects). Attested: γυναικεῖον (gynaikeion; 126e); ἀνδρεῖα (andreia; 127a). At 126e: A woman's subject, the description assigned to wool-working in the argument. At 127a: Men's subjects, a gendered classification distinct from the abstract virtue courage. Lexical identification: family label: ἀνδρεῖος / γυναικεῖος (subjects). See Hoplite fighting, 163.

ἀνθέω. Attested: ἀνθοῦν (anthoun; 131c); ἀνθεῖν (anthein; 131e). To bloom. To bloom or flower, first of bodily youth and then of the person's developing promise. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνθέω. See Beauty and bloom, 48.

ἄνθρωπος. Attested: ἄνθρωπος (hanthrōpos; 129e); ὁ ἄνθρωπος (ho anthrōpos; 129e). At 129e: The human being considered as user of the whole body; the form includes the contracted article. At 129e: The person whose identity is being sought, first specified functionally as what uses the body. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄνθρωπος. See Human being, 165.

ἀνταγωνιστής. Attested: ἀνταγωνιστάς (antagōnistas; 119d). Opponent or contestant against one, distinguished from allies on one's own side. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνταγωνιστής. See Royal comparison, 246.

ἀντίπαλος. Attested: ἀντίπαλοι (antipaloi; 124b). Rival or opponent, the actual competitors identified by the royal comparison. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀντίπαλος. See Royal comparison, 246.

ἄξιος. Attested: ἄξιος (axios; 105b). Worthy or deserving, initially of honour and later of appropriate achievement. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄξιος. See Honour, fame and worth, 161.

ἀξιόω. Attested: ἠξίωσας (ēxiōsas; 119c). To deem worthy or think fit, here in selecting the local men as rivals. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀξιόω. See Honour, fame and worth, 161.

ἀπαίδευτος. Attested: ἀπαίδευτοι (apaideutoi; 119b). Uneducated for the task, of political actors rather than necessarily people unable to read. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπαίδευτος. See Education and training, 119.

ἀποβάλλω. Attested: ἀποβεβληκότες (apobeblēkotes; 120b). To cast off, here the figurative slave-like hair. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποβάλλω. See Slave's hair, 265.

ἀποδείκνυμι. Attested: ἄλλον οἷοί τ’ ὦσιν ἀποδεῖξαι ἐπιστάμενον (allon hoioi t’ ōsin apodeixai epistamenon; 118d); ἀποδεῖξαι (apodeixai; 113e). At 118d: Be able to turn out another knowledgeable person, offered as evidence of the teacher’s own knowledge. At 113e: Prove the defect in a claim by an already used argument; demonstration need not be newly invented to remain applicable. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποδείκνυμι. See Knowledge and teachability, 178.

ἀπόδειξις. Attested: ἀποδείξεις (apodeixeis; 113e). At 113e: Proofs Alcibiades is said to demand as new and unworn, although a sound earlier argument would remain applicable. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπόδειξις. See Proof, 234.

ἀποδύω. Attested: ἀποδύντα (apodynta; 132a). To strip or undress; the attractive people must be inspected without their surface covering before Alcibiades gives himself over to them. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποδύω. See Lover of the people, 197.

ἀποκρίνομαι. Attested: ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος (ho apokrinomenos; 113a). At 113a: The respondent who gives and thereby owns the answer in Socrates’ account of dialogue. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποκρίνομαι. See Question and answer, 240.

ἀπόκρισις. Attested: ἀπόκρισις (apokrisis; 113a). An answer or act of replying; the respondent, rather than the questioner, owns the answer in Socrates’ account. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπόκρισις. See Question and answer, 240.

ἀπορέω. Attested: ἀποροῦντος (aporountos; 110b). At 110b: Being puzzled about justice, expressly denied of the confident child Alcibiades during games. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπορέω. See Perplexity, 219.

ἄρα. Attested: ἄρα (ara; 129e). At 129e: Marks the inference from the user–used distinction to the human being's difference from his own body. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄρα. See Argument, 38.

Ἄργος. Attested: Ἄργους (argous; 121a). Argos, a realm named in the Spartan royal genealogy. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἄργος. See Argos, 38.

ἀργύριον. Attested: ἀργύριον (argyrion; 122e). Silver, paired with gold in the accumulation claim. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀργύριον. See Wealth and property, 304.

ἀρετή. Attested: ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετή (hē psychēs aretē; 133b); ἀρετῇ (aretēi; 122d); ἀρετή (aretē; 125c, 133b); ἀρετήν (aretēn; 134c). At 133b: The soul's excellence, specified as wisdom in the printed text and matched to sight in the eye. At 122d: The excellence or quality of Spartan land. At 125c: The specific excellence of piloting. At 133b: Excellence of the eye as sight and of the soul as wisdom. At 134c: Virtue the future ruler must acquire before sharing it with citizens. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀρετή. See Soul looking into soul, 273; Virtue and vice, 297.

ἀριθμός / ἀριθμητική / ἀριθμητικός. Attested: ἀριθμητικός (arithmētikos; 114c); ἀριθμητικήν (arithmētikēn; 126c). At 114c: The expert in number who can persuade one person or many. At 126c: Arithmetic as the craft producing concord about numbers. Lexical identification: family label: ἀριθμός / ἀριθμητική / ἀριθμητικός. See Arithmetic and measurement, 40.

Ἀρτοξέρξης. Attested: Ἀρτοξέρξῃ (artoxerxēi; 121b). Artaxerxes, in Burnet's Artoxerxes spelling; the Persian king identified as son of Xerxes. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἀρτοξέρξης. See Artaxerxes, 42.

Ἀρχίδαμος. Attested: Ἀρχιδάμου (archidamou; 124a). Archidamus, Lampido's husband, included among the kings in her family. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἀρχίδαμος. See Lampido and the Spartan royal family, 184.

ἄρχω. Attested: ἄρχουσα (archousa; 130a); ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai; 130b). At 130a: Soul using the body by ruling it; this governing relation strengthens the earlier description of use. At 130b: The body's status as governed, used to exclude it as the governing human self. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄρχω. See Ruling the body, 251.

ἄρχω / ἀρχή. Attested: ἄρχειν (archein; 125b); ἄρχουσα (archousa; 130a); ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai; 135b). At 125b: Rule over people in the city, Alcibiades' first specification of good men's capacity. At 130a: Ruling the body, the manner in which soul uses it. At 135b: Being ruled by a better person before one has acquired virtue. Lexical identification: family label: ἄρχω / ἀρχή. See Rule and being ruled, 249.

Ἀσία. Attested: Ἀσίαν (asian; 105c); Ἀσίας (asias; 121a). Asia, the next scale of ambition and the vast royal domain in the comparison. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἀσία. See Europe and Asia, 125.

ἀσκέω. Attested: ἀσκεῖν (askein; 119b). To train or practise, the labour Alcibiades initially thinks unnecessary. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀσκέω. See Education and training, 119.

ἄσκησις. Attested: ἀσκήσεως (askēseōs; 120b). Training or practice, required in matters that need it. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄσκησις. See Education and training, 119.

ἀστραγαλίζω. Attested: ἀστραγαλίζοις (astragalizois; 110b). To play knucklebones, the childhood setting for Alcibiades' confident accusations. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀστραγαλίζω. See Knucklebones, 183.

ἀσφαλής. Attested: Ἀσφαλὴς (asphalēs; 134e). Secure or reliable; Alcibiades calls Socrates a reliable guarantor after the promise that right action will bring happiness. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀσφαλής. See Guarantor, 153.

ἄτοπος. Attested: ἀτόπως (atopōs; 116e); ἀτοπώτερος (atopōteros; 106a). At 116e: Strangely disposed: Alcibiades describes the disturbing condition in which his answers keep changing. Strange or unusual: Socrates becomes stranger by speaking, and Alcibiades later calls his own condition strange. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄτοπος. See Perplexity, 219; Wonder and strangeness, 310.

αὐλέω / αὐλητής. Attested: αὐλεῖν (aulein; 106e); αὐλητῶν (aulētōn; 125c). At 106e: Playing the pipes, the subject Alcibiades refused to learn. At 125c: Pipers who lead song and employ dancers in the example of organized human activity. Lexical identification: family label: αὐλέω / αὐλητής. See Music and chorus-training, 210.

αὐτὸ ἕκαστον. Attested: αὐτὸ ἕκαστον (auto hekaston; 130d). At 130d: What the speakers have actually examined, contrasted with the self itself; Burnet prints Stephanus' neuter correction. Lexical identification: phrase label: αὐτὸ ἕκαστον. See The self itself and each self, 290.

αὐτὸ ταὐτό. Attested: αὐτὸ ταὐτό (auto tauto; 129b); αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό (auto to auto; 130d). At 129b: The difficult proposed object of inquiry, rendered the self itself, whose discovery might disclose what we ourselves are. At 130d: The uncontracted form names the original inquiry that

Socrates says remains to be examined precisely. Lexical identification: phrase label: αὐτὸ ταὐτό. See The self itself and each self, 290.

ἄφρων. Attested: ἄφρων (aphrōn; 125a). At 125a: Lacking understanding in a specified field, as a shoemaker does in making cloaks despite competence in shoes. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄφρων. See Intelligence, 167.

Ἀχαιμένης. Attested: Ἀχαιμένους (achaimenous; 120e). Achaemenes, ancestor of the Persian royal line in Socrates' comparison. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἀχαιμένης. See Achaemenes, 20.

Ἀχαιός. Attested: Ἀχαιοῖς (achaiois; 112b). Achaean, one side in the epic war example. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἀχαιός. See Homer and epic conflict, 160.

ἄχραντος. Attested: ἄχραντον (achranton; 114a). Unstained or unsullied; an exaggerated requirement for pristine evidence continues the joke about refusing to reuse an argument. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄχραντος. See Clothes and repeated arguments, 75.

βαίνω / ἐμβαίνω. Attested: ἐμβαίνειν (embainein; 108c). At 108c: To step correctly as part of the musical activity. Lexical identification: family label: βαίνω / ἐμβαίνω. See Music and chorus-training, 210.

βάνανσος. Attested: βάνανσοι (banausoi; 131b). At 131b: Menial, the social appraisal attached to crafts that do not themselves supply self-knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: βάνανσος. See Menial crafts, 204.

βαρβαρίζω. Attested: βαρβαρίζοντες (barbarizontes; 120b). To speak like a barbarian, used disparagingly of uncultured Athenian politicians. Lexical identification: lemma: βαρβαρίζω. See Greeks and barbarians, 151.

βάρβαρος. Attested: βαρβάροις (barbarois; 105b). Non-Greek person or people in the speakers' cultural terminology. Lexical identification: lemma: βάρβαρος. See Greeks and barbarians, 151.

βασιλεύς. Attested: βασιλέας (basileas; 120a). King, identifying the Spartan and Persian rulers as the relevant opponents. Lexical identification: lemma: βασιλεύς. See Royal comparison, 246.

βέλτιστος. Attested: βέλτιστοι γενοίμεθα (beltistoi genoimetha; 124c). At 124c: Become as good as possible, the shared aim that immediately requires specification of the excellence intended. Lexical identification: superlative corresponding to βελτίων: βέλτιστος. See Becoming better, 50.

βελτίων. Attested: βέλτιον ποιῇ (beltion poiēi; 128b). At 128b: Make a thing better, the operational condition for calling care of it right. Lexical identification: comparative of ἀγαθός: βελτίων. See Becoming better, 50.

βελτίων / βέλτιστος. Attested: βέλτιον (beltion; 107d); βέλτιστοι (beltistoi; 124c); βελτίονος (beltionos; 135b). At 107d: Better as the as-yet-unspecified standard governing whom to fight. At 124c: As good as possible, the shared aim whose relevant excellence still needs identification. At 135b: A better person whose rule benefits someone who has not yet acquired virtue. Lexical identification: family label: βελτίων / βέλτιστος. See Better and best, 56.

βλάπτω. Attested: βλαβήσεσθαι (blabēsesthai; 114e, 120d). To harm or injure. At 114e: To be harmed, a result Alcibiades does not expect from answering. At 120d: To be harmed by caring for oneself, a possibility Alcibiades rejects. Lexical identification: lemma: βλάπτω. See Benefit and harm, 55.

βλέπω. Attested: εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλεπτέον (eis psychēn autēi blepteon; 133b). At 133b: Soul must look into soul to know itself, especially toward its region of wisdom. Lexical identification: lemma: βλέπω. See Soul looking into soul, 273.

βοηθέω / βοήθεια. Attested: βοήθειαν (boētheian; 115b). At 115b: Help given in battle to comrade or kin, evaluated by courage and by wounds or death in different respects. Lexical identification: family label: βοηθέω / βοήθεια. See Courage and cowardice, 87.

Βοιωτός. Attested: Βοιωτῶν (boiōtōn; 112c). Boeotian, one of the peoples whose dead are included in the battle example. Lexical identification: lemma: Βοιωτός. See Tanagra and Boeotia, 281.

βουλεύω / βουλή. Attested: βουλεύεσθαι (bouleuesthai; 106c); κοινὴ βουλή (koinē boulē; 119b); κοινὴ βουλὴ (koinē boulē; 124b). At 106c: The citizens' deliberating about a proposed course of action. At 119b: Shared deliberation about Alcibiades' preparation. At 124b: Socrates' return of the invitation to deliberate together about becoming better. Lexical identification: family label: βουλεύω / βουλή. See Deliberation and advice, 97.

γενέθλια. Attested: γενέθλια (genethlia; 121c). Birthday festival or observances, described as an annual celebration throughout Asia. Lexical identification: lemma: γενέθλια. See Royal comparison, 246.

γενναῖος. Attested: γενναίοις (gennaiois; 120d). Wellborn or noble, describing families in the likelihood argument. Lexical identification: lemma: γενναῖος. See Ancestry, nature and upbringing, 36.

γένος. Attested: γένους (genous; 104a); γενναίοις γένεσιν (gennaiois genesin; 120d–120e). Family or lineage; the

composite second phrase specifies wellborn families. Lexical identification: lemma: γένος. See Ancestry, nature and upbringing, 36.

γεύομαι. Attested: γεύσαιο (geusaio; 114a). To taste, changing the image from clothing to consumption of arguments. Lexical identification: lemma: γεύομαι. See Clothes and repeated arguments, 75.

γεωργός. Attested: γεωργοὶ (geōrgoi; 131a). At 131a: Farmers whose craft knows provisions for tending the body. Lexical identification: lemma: γεωργός. See Farming and harvesting, 132.

γῆ. Attested: γῆς (gēs; 123c). Land, quantified in plethra in the estate comparison. Lexical identification: lemma: γῆ. See Minae and plethra, 206.

γιγνώσκω. Attested: γνῶθι (gnōthi; 124a); τὸ ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκειν (to heauton gignōskein; 131b); γιγνώσκεις δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι (gignōskeis de hoti ouk epistasai; 117c). At 124a: Know: the singular imperative introducing the Delphic command, completed by its reflexive object at 124b. At 131b: Knowing oneself, conditionally identified with temperance rather than bodily or productive expertise. At 117c: Knowing that one does not know a subject, the self-awareness that permits appropriate deference. Lexical identification: lemma: γιγνώσκω. See Know thyself, 173.

γνωρίζω. Attested: γνωρίσαι (gnōrisai; 130e). At 130e: Come to know soul: the object demanded by the Delphic injunction after the self is provisionally identified. Lexical identification: lemma: γνωρίζω. See Knowing, 176.

γράμμα. Attested: γράμματι (grammati; 124a). Inscription or writing, here the Delphic command rather than a single

alphabetic letter. Lexical identification: lemma: γράμμα. See Delphi and Pytho, 99.

γυμνάζω. Attested: Γύμνασαι (gymnasai; 132b). To exercise or train; the command here is preparatory learning before public affairs. Lexical identification: lemma: γυμνάζω. See Education and training, 119.

γυμναστική / γυμναστικός / γυμνάζω. Attested: γυμναστικὴ (gymnastikē; 108b); γυμναστικῇ (gymnastikēi; 128c); Γύμνασαι (gymnasai; 132b). At 108b: The craft governing correct wrestling. At 128c: By gymnastics, the craft that improves feet and hands. At 132b: Exercise first, a preparation-command before entering politics. Lexical identification: family label: γυμναστική / γυμναστικός / γυμνάζω. See Gymnastics and wrestling, 155.

Δαίδαλος. Attested: Δαίδαλον (daidalon; 121a). Daedalus, the craftsman-ancestor claimed by Socrates in the pedigree joke. Lexical identification: lemma: Δαίδαλος. See Daedalus and Hephaestus, 93.

δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα. Attested: δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα (daimonion enantiōma; 103a). Divine opposition, the restraint Socrates says delayed his approach. Lexical identification: phrase label: δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα. See Divine opposition, 108.

δαιμόνιος. Attested: δαιμόνιον (daimonion; 103a). Divine or supernatural, qualifying the opposition rather than naming a separate demon. Lexical identification: lemma: δαιμόνιος. See Divine opposition, 108.

δακτυλιογλυφία / δακτύλιος. Attested: δακτύλιον (daktylion; 128a); δακτυλιογλυφίᾳ (daktylioglyphiai; 128c). At 128a: A ring belonging to a finger. At 128c: Ring-engraving as the craft tending the hand’s possession

rather than the hand. Lexical identification: family label: δακτυλιογλυφία / δακτύλιος. See Ring-engraving, 245.

Δάμων. Attested: Δάμωνι (damōni; 118c). Damon, with whom Pericles is said still to associate for wisdom. Lexical identification: lemma: Δάμων. See Damon, 95.

δειλία / δειλός. Attested: δειλὸς (deilos; 115d); δειλία (deilia; 115d). At 115d: Cowardly, a condition in which Alcibiades says he would not consent to live. At 115d: Cowardice, ranked as an extreme bad by Alcibiades. Lexical identification: family label: δειλία / δειλός. See Courage and cowardice, 87.

Δεινομάχη. Attested: Δεινομάχης (deinomachēs; 105d). Deinomache, mother of Alcibiades. Lexical identification: lemma: Δεινομάχη. See Deinomache, 96.

Δελφοί / Δελφικός. Attested: ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματι (en delphois grammati; 124a); Δελφικοῦ γράμματος (delphikou grammatos; 132c). Delphi and Delphic: the place and adjective specifying the inscription on self-knowledge. Lexical identification: family label: Δελφοί / Δελφικός. See Delphi and Pytho, 99.

δῆλος. Attested: δῆλον (dēlon; 117a). At 117a: Evident from the conflicting answers that Alcibiades lacks knowledge, a claim of inferential disclosure. Lexical identification: lemma: δῆλος. See Proof, 234.

δηλόω. Attested: δηλῶσαι (dēlōsai; 125c). At 125c: Make clear what activity the men governed by civic rule perform, rather than leave the object of rule unspecified. Lexical identification: lemma: δηλόω. See Account and definition, 18.

δημεραστής. Attested: δημεραστὴς (dēmerastēs; 132a). Lover of the people, the potentially corrupting political-

erotic attachment Socrates fears. Lexical identification: lemma: δημεραστής. See Lover of the people, 197.

δημιουργός. Attested: δημιουργοὶ (dēmiourgoi; 131a). At 131a: Practitioners whose professional objects are provisions by which the body is tended. Lexical identification: lemma: δημιουργός. See Craft and expertise, 89.

διαγιγνώσκω. Attested: διαγιγνώσκειν (diagignōskein; 109d). At 109d: Tell the more just from the more unjust, the discriminatory competence that Alcibiades' supposed teacher should have taught. Lexical identification: lemma: διαγιγνώσκω. See Knowing, 176.

διαλέγομαι. Attested: διαλέγεσθαι (dialegesthai; 129c). At 129c: Talk with another by using speech, the initial activity analyzed in the user argument. Lexical identification: lemma: διαλέγομαι. See Speech and dialogue, 278.

διάλογος. Attested: διάλογοι (dialogoi; 110a). At 110a: Conversations that will be futile unless Alcibiades answers truthfully about his past conviction of knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: διάλογος. See Speech and dialogue, 278.

διανόημα. Attested: διανοήματα (dianoēmata; 105a). Design or intended thought, in Socrates' reconstruction of Alcibiades' plans. Lexical identification: lemma: διανόημα. See Ambition and hope, 32.

διαφέρομαι. Attested: διαφέρεσθαι (diapheresthai; 111b). At 111b: Disagree about the object one claims to know, used as evidence against the competence of proposed teachers. Lexical identification: lemma: διαφέρομαι. See Agreement as evidence, 28.

διαφθείρω. Attested: διαφθαρῆναι (diaphtharēnai; 135a). At 135a: The body's being ruined by an ignorant patient's unrestricted choices. Lexical identification: lemma: διαφθείρω. See Benefit and harm, 55.

διδασκαλία. Attested: διδασκαλίαν (didaskalian; 111a). At 111a: Teaching or instruction by the many, praised in the domain of Greek usage for which they show competence. Lexical identification: lemma: διδασκαλία. See Teachers, 282.

διδάσκαλος. Attested: διδάσκαλον (didaskalon; 111a). At 111a: An identifiable individual teacher, whose absence does not disprove learning Greek from the many. Lexical identification: lemma: διδάσκαλος. See Teachers, 282.

διδάσκω. Attested: διδάσκειν (didaskein; 111a). At 111a: Teach a subject, an activity requiring that the prospective teacher first know it. Lexical identification: lemma: διδάσκω. See Teachers, 282.

δίκαιος. Attested: δικαιότατος (dikaiotatos; 121e). Just; the superlative identifies the tutor responsible for truthfulness. Lexical identification: lemma: δίκαιος. See Four royal tutors, 136.

δίκαιος / δικαιοσύνη. Attested: δικαιότερον (dikaioteron; 109c); δικαιοσύνην (dikaiosynēn; 134c); δικαιοσύνης (dikaiosynēs; 135e). At 109c: The more just, accepted as the standard of better decisions about making war or not. At 134c: Justice as a virtue to procure for oneself and the city instead of unrestricted power. At 135e: Justice as the announced object of Alcibiades' future care. Lexical identification: family label: δίκαιος / δικαιοσύνη. See Justice and injustice, 169.

διοικέω / οἰκέω. Attested: διοικεῖν (dioikein; 126a); οἰκεῖσθαι (oikeisthai; 127b). At 126a: To order or

administer the city better and preserve it. At 127b: To be well ordered, said of cities in connection with friendship and doing one's own business. Lexical identification: family label: διοικέω / οἰκέω. See Household management, 164.

διχόνοια. Attested: διχόνοιαν (dichonoian; 126c). At 126c: Discord, the alternative to concord rejected when defining friendship. Lexical identification: lemma: διχόνοια. See Concord, 82.

δοκέω. Attested: δοκεῖ (dokei; 116e). At 116e: Something seems one way at one time and another way later, expressing Alcibiades' unstable responses. Lexical identification: lemma: δοκέω. See Belief, 53.

δόξα. Attested: δόξα (doxa; 117b). At 117b: The judgment that could wander, but does not do so about a subject Alcibiades knows he does not know. Lexical identification: lemma: δόξα. See Belief, 53.

δοξάζω. Attested: δοξάζεις (doxazeis; 117c). At 117c: Form one's own judgment about a practical task instead of entrusting it to a person with the requisite knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: δοξάζω. See Belief, 53.

δοῦλος / δουλεύω / δουλοπρεπής. Attested: δοῦλον (doulon; 119a); δουλεύων (douleuōn; 122a); Δουλοπρεπὲς (douloprepes; 135c). At 119a: An actual slave, contrasted with a free person among possible pupils of Pericles. At 122a: Being enslaved to what is within oneself rather than ruling it. At 135c: Slave-befitting, said of vice after the argument for beneficial subordination. Lexical identification: family label: δοῦλος / δουλεύω / δουλοπρεπής. See Freedom and slavery, 138.

δρομικός. Attested: δρομικοί (dromikoi; 111d). Good at running or fitted for racing; distinguishing runners

among humans or horses demands more than knowing which objects are humans or horses. Lexical identification: lemma: δρομικός. See Craft and expertise, 89.

δύναμις / δύναμαι. Attested: δύναμιν (dynamin; 104b); δυνήσεσθαι (dynēsesthai; 105b). At 104b: Pericles as the political power available to Alcibiades. At 105b: Will have greatest power, Alcibiades' hoped-for position in the city. Lexical identification: family label: δύναμις / δύναμαι. See Power, 227.

δυναστεύω. Attested: δυναστεύειν (dynasteuein; 105b). To exercise dominant power; hypothetical command of Europe would still leave Alcibiades' imagined appetite unsatisfied. Lexical identification: lemma: δυναστεύω. See Power, 227; Ambition and hope, 32.

ἐγγυάω. Attested: ἐγγυήσασθαι (engyēsasthai; 134e). To pledge or stand guarantee, here of happiness conditional on the right manner of action. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐγγυάω. See Guarantor, 153.

ἐγγυητής. Attested: ἐγγυητής (engyētēs; 134e). Guarantor, the role in which Alcibiades expresses confidence in Socrates. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐγγυητής. See Guarantor, 153.

ἐθέλω. Attested: ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ (ean theos ethelēi; 135d). To will or wish; the conditional phrase subordinates success to divine willing. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐθέλω. See God and the divine, 140.

εἴδωλον. Attested: εἴδωλον (eidōlon; 133a). At 133a: A likeness of the person looking into the opposite eye, not a separately asserted metaphysical Form. Lexical identification: lemma: εἴδωλον. See Pupil, 236.

εἰκάζω. Attested: εἰκάζω (eikazō; 105c). To conjecture or guess; Socrates insists that his diagnosis of Alcibiades' hope is knowledge rather than mere guessing. Lexical identification: lemma: εἰκάζω. See Knowing, 176.

εἱλωτικός. Attested: εἱλωτικῶν (heilōtikōn; 122d). At 122d: Helot slaves or dependents specifically included in the comparison of Spartan resources. Helotic, describing a category of dependants counted among Spartan resources. Lexical identification: lemma: εἱλωτικός. See Freedom and slavery, 138; Messene, 205.

εἰρήνη. Attested: εἰρήνης (eirēnēs; 107d); εἰρήνην (eirēnēn; 108d). At 107d: Peace as a subject of civic deliberation. At 108d: Maintaining peace as an activity whose better needs specification. Lexical identification: lemma: εἰρήνη. See War and peace, 302.

εἴσειμι. Attested: εἰσιόντος (eisiontos; 123a). To go in or enter, of money flowing into Lacedaemon. Lexical identification: lemma: εἴσειμι. See Lion's tracks and hoarded money, 192.

ἑκατόν. Attested: ἑκατὸν (hekaton; 119a). One hundred, the number of minae each named pupil paid Zeno. Lexical identification: lemma: ἑκατόν. See Minae and plethra, 206.

ἐλεύθερος / ἐλευθεροπρεπής. Attested: ἐλεύθερος (eleutheros; 122a); Ἐλευθεροπρεπὲς (eleutheroprepes; 135c); ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς (eleutheroprepōs; 135c). At 122a: Free from subjection to pleasures in the royal educational ideal. At 135c: Befitting a free person, the predicate granted to virtue. At 135c: In a condition befitting a free person, the standard applied to Alcibiades' present state. Lexical identification: family label: ἐλεύθερος / ἐλευθεροπρεπής. See Freedom and slavery, 138.

Ἑλλάς. Attested: Ἑλλάδι (helladi; 104b). Greece, the field of Pericles' influence in the initial portrait. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἑλλάς. See Greeks and barbarians, 151.

Ἕλλην. Attested: Ἕλλησι (hellēsi; 105b). Greek, delimiting one part of the intended audience of power and fame. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἕλλην. See Greeks and barbarians, 151.

ἑλληνίζω. Attested: τὸ ἑλληνίζειν (to hellēnizein; 111a). At 111a: Ordinary Greek speech learned from the many without a single named teacher, the valid counterexample Alcibiades offers. Lexical identification: lemma: ἑλληνίζω. See Language, 185.

ἐλπίς. Attested: ἐλπίδα (elpida; 104c). Hope or expectation, the motive Alcibiades asks about in Socrates' persistence. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐλπίς. See Ambition and hope, 32.

ἐμφαίνομαι. Attested: ἐμφαίνεται (emphainetai; 133a). At 133a: The observer's face appears in the opposite eye as in a mirror. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐμφαίνομαι. See Pupil, 236.

ἐναντιόομαι. Attested: ἐναντιοῦται (enantioutai; 103b). To oppose, of the divine restraint now no longer preventing speech. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐναντιόομαι. See Divine opposition, 108.

ἐναντίος. Attested: τἀναντία (tanantia; 117a). At 117a: Opposed answers given unwillingly, evidence that Alcibiades lacks stable knowledge of the subject. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐναντίος. See Refutation, 242.

ἐναντίωμα. Attested: ἐναντίωμα (enantiōma; 103a). An opposition or impediment, the restraint that prevented

Socrates from speaking. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐναντίωμα. See Divine opposition, 108.

ἐναργής. Attested: ἐναργέστατα (enargestata; 132c). Clear or manifest; the superlative asks how the object of self-knowledge can be understood with the greatest clarity. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐναργής. See Self-knowledge, 255.

ἐνδείκνυμι. Attested: ἐνδείξασθαι (endeixasthai; 106b). At 106b: Show Alcibiades the point by obtaining answers, rather than providing the long speech he expects. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐνδείκνυμι. See Proof, 234.

ἐννεοττεύω. Attested: ἐννεοττεύσας (enneotteusas; 135e). To nest or hatch young within; Socrates' love has hatched a responsive love in Alcibiades, preparing the stork comparison. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐννεοττεύω. See Stork and reciprocal love, 280.

ἐννοέω. Attested: ἐννοεῖς (ennoeis; 117d); ἐννενόηκας (ennenoēkas; 132e). At 117d: Take in the connection between mistakes in action and ignorance that thinks it knows. At 132e: Have noticed the reflection in another eye, the ordinary observation on which the analogy draws. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐννοέω. See Attention, 44.

ἔνοπτρον. Attested: ἐνόπτρῳ (enoptrōi; 133c). At 133c: A mirror used for reflection; in the supplied lines god would be used as the finest one. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔνοπτρον. This attestation at 133c belongs to the Eusebius passage supplied by Burnet in angle brackets, not to the text preserved in B and T. See Mirror, 207.

ἐξαμαρτάνω. Attested: ἐξαμαρτάνων (examartanōn; 134a). At 134a: Making mistakes in managing affairs, leading to bad action and bad fortune for oneself and

others. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξαμαρτάνω. See Error, 122.

ἐξαρκέω. Attested: ἐξαρκεῖ (exarkei; 130c). At 130c: It suffices for us: the current account can support further practical inquiry despite its limited precision. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξαρκέω. See Adequacy and precision, 20.

ἔξειμι. Attested: ἐξιόντος (exiontos; 123a). To go out or leave, the money movement whose tracks cannot be found. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔξειμι. See Lion's tracks and hoarded money, 192.

ἐξευρίσκω. Attested: ἐξηῦρες (exēures; 106d). At 106d: Discovered for oneself, contrasted with learning from others in the acquisition dilemma. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξευρίσκω. See Discovery, 101.

ἐξηγέομαι. Attested: ἐξηγήσασθαι (exēgēsasthai; 124b). To explain or set out; Alcibiades now asks Socrates to explain what kind of care is needed. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξηγέομαι. See Care for oneself, 65.

ἐξουσία. Attested: ἐξουσίαν (exousian; 134c); ἐξουσία (exousia; 135a). At 134c: Unrestricted authority to do whatever one wishes, rejected as the primary aim for self and city. At 135a: Permission to act without restraint aboard ship despite lack of piloting competence. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξουσία. See License, 190.

ἔοικα. Attested: ἔοικεν (eoiken; 133c). At 133c: The knowing region of soul resembles the god; likeness is asserted, not identity. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔοικα. See Divine likeness, 106.

ἑορτάζω. Attested: ἑορτάζουσι (heortazousi; 121c). To hold festival, of the kingdom's celebration when the royal heir

is born. Lexical identification: lemma: ἑορτάζω. See Royal comparison, 246.

ἐπιεικῶς. Attested: ἐπιεικῶς (epieikōs; 132b). At 132b: The degree to which what we are has been agreed, recalling the explicitly qualified soul identification. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιεικῶς. See Adequacy and precision, 20.

ἐπιθυμέω. Attested: ἐπιθυμεῖς (epithymeis; 104d). To desire, here Alcibiades' wish to discover Socrates' purpose. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιθυμέω. See Ambition and hope, 32.

ἐπιμέλεια. Attested: ἐπιμέλειαν (epimeleian; 128b). At 128b: Right care is attention that makes its actual object better, not simply time or effort expended on something associated with it. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιμέλεια. See Care for oneself, 65.

ἐπιμελέομαι. Attested: τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (to heautou epimeleisthai; 127e); ψυχῆς ἐπιμελητέον (psychēs epimelēteon; 132c). At 127e: To attend to oneself as the object needing improvement; the subsequent inquiry tests whether this is confused with attending to belongings. At 132c: The verbal adjective states that soul must receive care, after soul has been provisionally identified as the person. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιμελέομαι. See Care for oneself, 65.

ἐπιμελής. Attested: ἐπιμελέστατα (epimelestata; 104d). At 104d: With the greatest care or attentiveness: Alcibiades describes Socrates' persistent attendance wherever he goes. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιμελής. See Care and neglect, 63.

ἐπίσταμαι. Attested: ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai; 106d). At 106d: Know what one would otherwise need to seek or

learn; the verb overlaps with εἰδέναι rather than naming a separate faculty. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπίσταμαι. See Knowing, 176.

ἐπιστήμη. Attested: ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē; 125e). At 125e: The knowledge by which a shared activity is governed; political knowledge requires specification just as chorus-training does. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιστήμη. See Knowing, 176.

ἐπίτροπος. Attested: ἐπίτροπον (epitropon; 104b); ἐπίτροπος (epitropos; 124c). Guardian, of Pericles for Alcibiades and metaphorically the god for Socrates. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπίτροπος. See Guardian and tutor, 154.

ἐπιφάνεια. Attested: ἐπιφάνεια (epiphaneia; 124c). Prominence or distinction; Socrates says Alcibiades' rise to conspicuous public standing will occur through his help. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιφάνεια. See Honour, fame and worth, 161.

ἐπονείδιστος. Attested: ἐπονείδιστος (eponeidistos; 118a). Reproachable or disgraceful; it qualifies the unlearnedness that wrongly takes itself to be knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπονείδιστος. See Disgraceful ignorance, 103.

ἑπτέτης. Attested: ἑπτέτεις (hepteteis; 121e). Seven years old, the age for riding and hunting in the account of the royal boys. Lexical identification: lemma: ἑπτέτης. See Four royal tutors, 136.

ἐραστής. Attested: ἐραστής (erastēs; 103a). Lover, specifically Socrates and Alcibiades' other suitors. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐραστής. See Love and the lover, 195.

ἐράω. Attested: ἐρᾷ (erai; 131c). To love or desire; here to love Alcibiades' soul. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐράω. See Love and the lover, 195.

ἔργον / ἐργάζομαι / ἐργασία. Attested: ἔργον (ergon; 119e); ἐργασίαν (ergasian; 125a); ἐργάζονται (ergazontai; 129e). At 119e: A fine deed worthy of Alcibiades and the city. At 125a: Production of shoes or cloaks, domains that delimit craft competence. At 129e: Work with bodily means such as hands and eyes. Lexical identification: family label: ἔργον / ἐργάζομαι / ἐργασία. See Production, work, and action, 232.

ἐρέτης. Attested: ἐρέταις (eretais; 125c). A rower; the boatswain's use of rowers gives a concrete example of coordinating people within a specialized activity. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐρέτης. See Piloting and seafaring, 224.

Ἐρεχθεύς. Attested: Ἐρεχθέως (erechtheōs; 132a). Erechtheus, the named ancestral figure in the Homeric phrase used of the Athenian people. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἐρεχθεύς. See Homer and epic conflict, 160.

Ἐρχία. Attested: Ἐρχίασιν (erchiasin; 123c). Erchia, where Alcibiades' land is situated; the attestation is locative. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἐρχία. See Erchia, 121.

ἔρως. Attested: ἔρωτος (erōtos; 104c); ἔρως (erōs; 135e). Love or erotic desire, from which the reciprocal love at the ending is generated. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔρως. See Love and the lover, 195.

ἐρωτάω. Attested: ὁ ἐρωτῶν (ho erōtōn; 113a). At 113a: The questioner, whose selected question elicits but is distinguished from the respondent's asserted proposition. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐρωτάω. See Question and answer, 240.

ἐρώτησις. Attested: ἐρώτησίς (erōtēsis; 113a). A question or act of questioning; paired with response to distinguish the questioner from the person asserting the answer. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐρώτησις. See Question and answer, 240.

ἐσθής. Attested: ἐσθῆτας (esthētas; 122c). Clothing or dress; Persian refinement includes elaborate clothing alongside perfumes and numerous attendants. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐσθής. See Luxury and adornment, 199.

ἔσχατος. Attested: τῇ ἐσχάτῃ (tēi eschatēi; 118b). At 118b: Of the most extreme kind, qualifying the amathia with which Alcibiades is said to live. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔσχατος. See Disgraceful ignorance, 103.

ἕτερος. Attested: ἕτερον (heteron; 129d). At 129d: Different, the relational separation conceded between a user and what that user uses. Lexical identification: lemma: ἕτερος. See User and instrument, 295.

εὖ πράττω / εὐπραγία. Attested: εὖ πράττει (eu prattei; 116b); εὐπραγία (eupragia; 116b). At 116b: Acts well and fares well, the dual sense connecting fine conduct to happiness. At 116b: Doing well, the activity or condition said to be fine. Lexical identification: family label: εὖ πράττω / εὐπραγία. See Doing well, 113.

εὐβουλία / εὔβουλος. Attested: Εὐβουλίαν (euboulian; 125e); εὐβούλους (euboulous; 127d). At 125e: Alcibiades' proposed name for knowledge of ruling citizens. At 127d: Of good counsel, the qualification whose content remains uncertain at the friendship impasse. Lexical identification: family label: εὐβουλία / εὔβουλος. See Good counsel, 149.

εὐδαίμων / εὐδαιμονέω. Attested: εὐδαίμονες (eudaimones; 116b); εὐδαιμονήσειν (eudaimonēsein;

134e). At 116b: Happy or flourishing, said of those who do well through acquiring goods. At 134e: Will be happy, Socrates' conditional guarantee for just and temperate action. Lexical identification: family label: εὐδαίμων / εὐδαιμονέω. See Happiness and wretchedness, 157.

εὐκολία. Attested: εὐκολίαν (eukolian; 122c). Easy temper or manageable disposition, distinct from readiness. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐκολία. See Spartan disciplines, 277.

εὐνοῦχος. Attested: εὐνούχων (eunouchōn; 121d). Eunuch, the kind of attendant charged with the royal child's early care and bodily formation. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐνοῦχος. See Four royal tutors, 136.

εὐπρόσωπος. Attested: εὐπρόσωπος (euprosōpos; 132a). Fair-faced or attractive in appearance; the people are imagined as a handsome beloved whose apparent charm needs closer examination. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐπρόσωπος. See Lover of the people, 197.

Εὐριπίδης. Attested: Εὐριπίδου (euripidou; 113c). Euripides, cited for the line transferring responsibility for an utterance to its speaker. Lexical identification: lemma: Εὐριπίδης. See Euripides, 124.

εὑρίσκω. Attested: εὑρεῖν (heurein; 109e); εὑρεθείη (heuretheiē; 129b). At 109e: Discover independently, a possible route to knowledge if preceded by an actual search. At 129b: Might be discovered: the self itself is posed as an object still awaiting inquiry. Lexical identification: lemma: εὑρίσκω. See Discovery, 101.

Εὐρυσάκης. Attested: Εὐρυσάκη (eurysakē; 121a). Eurysaces, Alcibiades' named heroic ancestor. Lexical identification: lemma: Εὐρυσάκης. See Eurysaces and Aeacus, 126.

Εὐρώπη. Attested: Εὐρώπῃ (eurōpēi; 105b). Europe, an imagined limit of dominion Alcibiades would refuse to accept. Lexical identification: lemma: Εὐρώπη. See Europe and Asia, 125.

εὐταξία. Attested: εὐταξίαν (eutaxian; 122c). Good discipline or well-ordered conduct, especially collective order. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐταξία. See Spartan disciplines, 277.

εὐχέρεια. Attested: εὐχέρειαν (euchereian; 122c). Readiness or facility in meeting demands, a Spartan strength in the comparison. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐχέρεια. See Spartan disciplines, 277.

εὐχέρεια / εὐκολία. Attested: εὐχέρειαν (euchereian; 122c); εὐκολίαν (eukolian; 122c). At 122c: Spartan readiness or ease in conduct in the comparative catalogue. At 122c: Spartan easy temper, one of the qualities Alcibiades is urged to measure himself against. Lexical identification: family label: εὐχέρεια / εὐκολία.

ἐφίημι. Attested: ἐφῆκεν (ephēken; 106a). To permit or let someone proceed; the god has now allowed the approach because Alcibiades would listen. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐφίημι. See Divine opposition, 108.

ἔφορος. Attested: ἐφόρων (ephorōn; 121b). Ephor, the Spartan official said to guard royal wives for the integrity of succession. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔφορος. See Four royal tutors, 136.

Ζεύς. Attested: Δία (dia; 121a); Διὸς (dios; 120e). Zeus, the divine ancestor in the competing pedigrees; also invoked in oaths and appeals elsewhere. Lexical identification: lemma: Ζεύς. See Zeus and Zeus of Friendship, 315.

Ζήνων. Attested: Ζήνωνος (zēnōnos; 119a); Ζήνωνι (zēnōni; 119a). Zeno, the teacher of two named paying

pupils. Lexical identification: lemma: Ζήνων. See Zeno, 314.

ζητέω. Attested: ζητεῖν (zētein; 106d); ζητοῦμεν (zētoumen; 130b). At 106d: Search for what one lacks; willingness to do so is blocked when one already thinks one knows. At 130b: What we are seeking: the authoritative self, from which body is excluded under the agreed criterion. Lexical identification: lemma: ζητέω. See Seeking, 254.

ζώνη. Attested: ζώνην (zōnēn; 123b). Girdle, used as the name of an extensive royal revenue district in the traveller's report. Lexical identification: lemma: ζώνη. See Luxury and adornment, 199.

Ζώπυρος. Attested: Ζώπυρον τὸν Θρᾷκα (zōpyron ton thraika; 122b). Zopyrus, the Thracian household slave appointed to attend Alcibiades. Lexical identification: lemma: Ζώπυρος. See Zopyrus and Thrace, 316.

Ζωροάστρης. Attested: Ζωροάστρου (zōroastrou; 122a). Zoroaster, named as of Horomazes in the Persian tutor's religious lore. Lexical identification: lemma: Ζωροάστρης. See Zoroaster and Horomazes, 317.

ἡγέομαι. Attested: ἡγῇ (hēgēi; 115e). At 115e: Consider life and courage best and their opposites worst, an evaluative commitment used in the fine–good argument. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡγέομαι. See Belief, 53.

ἡδονή. Attested: ἡδονῶν (hēdonōn; 122a). At 122a: Pleasures none of which the prince should be ruled by, according to the temperate tutor's educational charge. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡδονή.

ᾗ. Attested: ᾗ γε καλόν (hēi ge kalon; 115c). At 115c: Insofar as it is fine, restricting the predicate to the aspect under examination rather than the whole act without

qualification. Lexical identification: lemma: ᾗ. See Account and definition, 18.

ἡλικία. Attested: ἡλικίαν (hēlikian; 127e). Age or time of life, treated as making the present recognition of ignorance timely. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡλικία. See Education and training, 119.

Ἡρακλεῖδαι. Attested: Ἡρακλειδῶν (hērakleidōn; 121c). Heraclids, descendants of Heracles whose royal succession the ephors are said to protect. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἡρακλεῖδαι. See Heracles and the Heraclids, 159.

Ἡρακλῆς. Attested: Ἡρακλέους (hērakleous; 120e). Heracles, heroic ancestor of the Spartan kings. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἡρακλῆς. See Heracles and the Heraclids, 159.

Ἥφαιστος. Attested: Ἥφαιστον (hēphaiston; 121a). Hephaestus, son of Zeus, to whom Socrates traces Daedalus. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἥφαιστος. See Daedalus and Hephaestus, 93.

θάνατος / ἀποθνῄσκω. Attested: θάνατος (thanatos; 115c); θάνατον (thanaton; 115e). At 115c: Death as a consequence distinct from the courage of rescue. At 115e: Death ranked among the worst things in Alcibiades' accepted evaluation. Lexical identification: family label: θάνατος / ἀποθνῄσκω. The attestation θάνατον at 115e occurs in wording supplied by Burnet from Stobaeus; the preceding exchange already states the opposing values. See Courage and cowardice, 87.

θαυμάζω. Attested: θαυμάζειν (thaumazein; 103a); θαυμάζω (thaumazō; 104d). To wonder or be astonished, first at Socrates' persistent silence. Lexical identification: lemma: θαυμάζω. See Wonder and strangeness, 310.

θεάομαι. Attested: θεώμενος (theōmenos; 133a). At 133a: Observing an eye as counterpart, preceding the more focused looking into its seeing region. Lexical identification: lemma: θεάομαι. See Eye, 127.

θεῖος. Attested: θειότερον (theioteron; 133c); θεῖον (theion; 133c). At 133c: More divine: the comparative marks the preeminence of soul's knowing region in Burnet's printed reading. Divine; the comparative at 133c calls the knowing region more divine. Lexical identification: lemma: θεῖος. See Divine likeness, 106; God and the divine, 140.

θεός. Attested: τῷ θεῷ (tōi theōi; 133c); θεὸν (theon; 105d); Θεός (theos; 124c). At 133c: The god to whom the knowing region of soul is said to be like, before the supplied mirror extension. God, particularly the agency Socrates calls his guardian and associated with his sign. Lexical identification: lemma: θεός. See Divine likeness, 106; God and the divine, 140.

θεοφιλῶς. Attested: θεοφιλῶς (theophilōs; 134d). In a way dear to the god or pleasing to gods; just and temperate action is given this divine orientation. Lexical identification: lemma: θεοφιλῶς. See God and the divine, 140.

θεραπεύω. Attested: θεραπεύει (therapeuei; 131b); θεραπεύσεται (therapeusetai; 135e). At 131b: To tend a body: an activity directed to something belonging to the person, distinguished here from tending the self. At 135e: To be tended in return: the love Socrates fosters is pictured as receiving reciprocal care from its offspring. To tend or care for, here love being tended in return. Lexical identification: lemma: θεραπεύω. See Care and neglect, 63; Stork and reciprocal love, 280.

θερίζω. Attested: θεριζόντων (therizontōn; 125b). To reap or harvest; directing harvesters is another specialized activity distinguished from civic rule. Lexical identification: lemma: θερίζω. See Farming and harvesting, 132.

θεῶν θεραπεία. Attested: θεῶν θεραπεία (theōn therapeia; 122a). Service of the gods, the dialogue's explicit gloss on the Magian subject of instruction. Lexical identification: phrase label: θεῶν θεραπεία. See Zoroaster and Horomazes, 317.

θήρα. Attested: θήρας (thēras; 121e). At 121e: Hunting activities begun by Persian princes at the riding stage of their upbringing. Lexical identification: lemma: θήρα. See Riding and hunting, 244.

Θρᾷξ. Attested: Θρᾷκα (thraika; 122b). Thracian, the ethnic designation of Zopyrus. Lexical identification: lemma: Θρᾷξ. See Zopyrus and Thrace, 316.

θρίξ. Attested: τρίχα (tricha; 120b). Hair, impossibly located on the soul in the disparaging image. Lexical identification: lemma: θρίξ. See Slave's hair, 265.

ἰατρός / ἰατρικός. Attested: ἰατρὸν (iatron; 107c); ἰατρικὸν (iatrikon; 135a). At 107c: The doctor whom citizens seek when deliberating about health. At 135a: Medical, qualifying the understanding lacked by the unchecked patient. Lexical identification: family label: ἰατρός / ἰατρικός. See Medicine, 201.

ἰδέα. Attested: ἰδέας (ideas; 119c). Appearance or visible form; Socrates calls Alcibiades' complacency unworthy of his looks and other advantages, not unworthy of a metaphysical Form. Lexical identification: lemma: ἰδέα. See Beauty and bloom, 48.

ἰδιώτης. Attested: ἰδιῶται (idiōtai; 121a, 126c); ἰδιώτῃ (idiōtēi; 134e). Private person: nonroyal individual at 121a; individual rather than city at 134e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἰδιώτης. See Private person and amateur, 231.

ἰδιωτικός / ἰδιωτικῶς. Attested: ἰδιωτικῶς (idiōtikōs; 119b). Amateur or untrained in manner, of politicians entering public affairs without proper preparation. Lexical identification: family label: ἰδιωτικός / ἰδιωτικῶς. See Private person and amateur, 231.

ἱκανῶς. Attested: ἱκανῶς (hikanōs; 130c). At 130c: Enough for Alcibiades' present acceptance of the soul argument; sufficiency is immediately distinguished from precision. Lexical identification: lemma: ἱκανῶς. See Adequacy and precision, 20.

Ἰλιάς. Attested: Ἰλιάδος (iliados; 112b). The Iliad, one of the named poems heard by Alcibiades. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἰλιάς. See Homer and epic conflict, 160.

ἱμάτιον. Attested: ἱματίων (himatiōn; 122c). Cloak or outer garment, here trailing as part of the courtly display. Lexical identification: lemma: ἱμάτιον. See Luxury and adornment, 199.

ἱμάτιον / στρῶμα. Attested: ἱματίων (himatiōn; 125a); στρώματα (strōmata; 128a). At 125a: Cloaks whose production the shoemaker does not understand. At 128a: Bedclothes belonging to the body in the speech supplied from Stobaeus. Lexical identification: family label: ἱμάτιον / στρῶμα. The question containing this form is supplied by Burnet from Stobaeus at 128a13–b1 and is translated in this edition. See Wool-working and weaving, 312.

ἱππικός. Attested: ἱππικά (hippika; 124e). At 124e: Affairs of horsemanship, a domain whose experts would be the horsemen. Lexical identification: lemma: ἱππικός. See Riding and hunting, 244.

Ἰσόλοχος. Attested: Ἰσολόχου (isolochou; 119a). Father of Pythodorus, named only as a patronymic. Lexical identification: lemma: Ἰσόλοχος. See Pythodorus and Isolochus, 238.

ἴσως. Attested: ἴσως (isōs; 130d). At 130d: Perhaps the limited investigation will suffice, preserving caution about the identification reached. Lexical identification: lemma: ἴσως. See Adequacy and precision, 20.

ἴχνος. Attested: ἴχνη (ichnē; 123a). A track or footprint; visible incoming tracks without outgoing tracks turn the accumulation of money into the lion-and-fox image. Lexical identification: lemma: ἴχνος. See Lion’s tracks and hoarded money, 192.

καθ’ ὅσον. Attested: καθ’ ὅσον καλόν (kath’ hoson kalon; 116a). At 116a: To the extent that it is fine, the scope restriction preserved when excluding the bad from the fine as fine. Lexical identification: phrase label: καθ’ ὅσον. See Account and definition, 18.

καθαρός. Attested: καθαρώτερόν (katharōteron; 133c); καθαρὸν (katharon; 113e). At 133c: Purer than the best region of human soul, an attribute of god in the supplied comparison with clearer mirrors. Clean, required by the fastidious recipient for a supposedly new proof. Lexical identification: lemma: καθαρός. This attestation at 133c belongs to the Eusebius passage supplied by Burnet in angle brackets, not to the text preserved in B and T. See God as mirror, 143; Clothes and repeated arguments, 75.

καθοράω. Attested: κατιδεῖν (katidein; 133e). At 133e: Discern oneself, one's own, and their belongings together; the infinitive is assigned to one person and one craft. Lexical identification: lemma: καθοράω. See Knowledge of one's own and others, 180.

κακία. Attested: κακία (kakia; 135c). At 135c: The bad ethical condition said to be slave-befitting. Lexical identification: lemma: κακία. See Virtue and vice, 297.

κακός. Attested: κακόν (kakon; 115c); Κακὸς (kakos; 125b). At 115c: Bad as a proposed evaluation of courage, before Alcibiades ranks it among goods. At 125b: Bad at making cloaks, said of the otherwise competent shoemaker. Lexical identification: lemma: κακός. See Good and bad, 146.

κακοῦργος. Attested: κακουργοτάτη (kakourgotatē; 118a). Harmful or capable of the worst mischief; the superlative marks ignorance as most damaging when it concerns the greatest practical matters. Lexical identification: lemma: κακοῦργος. See Benefit and harm, 55.

κακῶς πράττω. Attested: κακῶς πράξει (kakōs praxei; 134a); κακῶς πράττειν (kakōs prattein; 135b). At 134a: Will act or fare badly as a consequence of errors in private and public affairs. At 135b: Doing badly as the consequence of rule and license lacking virtue. Lexical identification: phrase label: κακῶς πράττω. See Doing well, 113.

καλέω. Attested: καλεῖς (kaleis; 108b). At 108b: Name the better in a specified activity, requiring Alcibiades to identify the relevant standard. Lexical identification: lemma: καλέω. See Account and definition, 18.

Καλλιάδης. Attested: Καλλιάδου (kalliadou; 119a). Father of Callias, identifying Zeno's pupil. Lexical identification: lemma: Καλλιάδης. See Callias and Calliades, 62.

Καλλίας. Attested: Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου (kallian ton kalliadou; 119a). Callias, named with his father Calliades as one of Zeno's pupils. Lexical identification: lemma: Καλλίας. See Callias and Calliades, 62.

κάλλος. Attested: κάλλει (kallei; 123e). Beauty, one of the resources the imagined Persian queen would find inadequate. Lexical identification: lemma: κάλλος. See Beauty and bloom, 48.

καλός. Attested: κάλλιστός (kallistos; 104a). Beautiful; the superlative grants Alcibiades exceptional bodily attractiveness. Lexical identification: lemma: καλός. See Beauty and bloom, 48.

καλὸς κἀγαθός. Attested: καλοὶ κἀγαθοί (kaloi kagathoi; 124e). At 124e: The respectable Athenian men whose affairs Alcibiades initially proposes as the model of the desired competence. Lexical identification: phrase label: καλὸς κἀγαθός. See Fine conduct, 133.

καλός / καλῶς. Attested: καλά (kala; 115a); καλόν (kalon; 115c); καλῶς (kalōs; 116b). At 115a: Fine actions, a description Alcibiades grants to all just actions. At 115c: Fine in a specified respect, particularly the courage in rescue. At 116b: Finely, qualifying action in the argument connecting it with doing well. Lexical identification: family label: καλός / καλῶς. See Fine conduct, 133.

καλύπτρα. Attested: καλύπτραν (kalyptran; 123c). Veil, likewise used as a revenue district's name. Lexical identification: lemma: καλύπτρα. See Luxury and adornment, 199.

καρτερία. Attested: καρτερίαν (karterian; 122c). Endurance, the ability to persist under difficulty. Lexical identification: lemma: καρτερία. See Spartan disciplines, 277.

καρτερία / φιλοπονία. Attested: καρτερίαν (karterian; 122c); φιλοπονίαν (philoponian; 122c). At 122c: Spartan endurance or steadfast capacity to bear difficulty. At 122c: Spartan love of toil, opposed to Alcibiades' reluctance to prepare. Lexical identification: family label: καρτερία / φιλοπονία.

κατὰ ταὐτόν. Attested: κατὰ ταὐτόν (kata tauton; 115c). At 115c: In the same respect: helping friends is not fine and bad under the identical aspect, since courage and death differ. Lexical identification: phrase label: κατὰ ταὐτόν. See Account and definition, 18.

κατατρίβω. Attested: κατατετριμμένων (katatetrimmenōn; 113e). To wear down or wear threadbare, figuratively applied to arguments already used. Lexical identification: lemma: κατατρίβω. See Clothes and repeated arguments, 75.

κατηγορέω. Attested: ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ (ho logos sou katēgorei; 118b). At 118b: The argument accuses Alcibiades through his own commitments, giving the diagnosis a basis beyond Socrates' authority. Lexical identification: lemma: κατηγορέω. See Refutation, 242.

κάτοπτρον. Attested: κατόπτρῳ (katoptrōi; 133a). At 133a: A reflecting surface used as the comparison for the image appearing in another eye. Lexical identification: lemma: κάτοπτρον. See Mirror, 207.

κελευστής. Attested: κελευστῶν (keleustōn; 125c). At 125c: Boatswains directing rowers, an example of people making use of people. Lexical identification: lemma: κελευστής. See Piloting and seafaring, 224.

κιθαρίζω / κιθαριστής. Attested: κιθαρίζειν (kitharizein; 106e); κιθαριστὴς (kitharistēs; 129c). At 106e: Playing the lyre, a subject Alcibiades has learned. At 129c: The lyre-

player distinguished from the things used in playing. Lexical identification: family label: κιθαρίζω / κιθαριστής. See Music and chorus-training, 210.

κινδυνεύω. Attested: κινδυνεύει (kindyneuei; 133e). At 133e: It seems or looks like it: Alcibiades' qualified assent to one craft discerning self and belongings. Lexical identification: lemma: κινδυνεύω. See Admission, 22.

Κλεινίας. Attested: Κλεινίου (kleiniou; 103a); Κλεινίαν (kleinian; 118e). Cleinias: father of Alcibiades in the opening patronymic; his distinct brother of the same name at 118e. Lexical identification: lemma: Κλεινίας. See Cleinias, father of Alcibiades, 73; Cleinias, brother of Alcibiades, 72.

κολακεύω. Attested: κολακεύσοντες (kolakeusontes; 120b). To flatter; the criticized politicians court the city's approval instead of governing it. Lexical identification: lemma: κολακεύω. See Lover of the people, 197.

κόρη. Attested: κόρην (korēn; 133a). At 133a: The pupil of the eye, connected by the sentence with the miniature image of the observer. Lexical identification: lemma: κόρη. See Pupil, 236.

κορυφή. Attested: κορυφὴν (koryphēn; 133a2; apparatus). At 133a2: T's alternative reading where Burnet prints pupil; it is recorded as a textual variant and does not define the reflecting region in this edition's reading text. Lexical identification: lemma: κορυφή. See Pupil, 236.

Κορώνεια. Attested: Κορωνείᾳ (korōneiai; 112c). Coronea, the later battle where Alcibiades' father died. Lexical identification: lemma: Κορώνεια. See Coronea, 86.

κοσμιότης. Attested: κοσμιότητα (kosmiotēta; 122c). Orderliness or decorous regulated conduct in the Spartan

catalogue. Lexical identification: lemma: κοσμιότης. See Spartan disciplines, 277.

κοσμιότης / εὐταξία. Attested: κοσμιότητα (kosmiotēta; 122c); εὐταξίαν (eutaxian; 122c). At 122c: Spartan orderliness presented as a quality before which Alcibiades is a child. At 122c: Good discipline in the catalogue of Spartan advantages. Lexical identification: family label: κοσμιότης / εὐταξία.

κόσμος. Attested: κόσμον (kosmon; 123c). Adornment or ornament, the support of which is assigned to royal revenue lands. Lexical identification: lemma: κόσμος. See Luxury and adornment, 199.

κρήγυος. Attested: κρήγυοι (krēgyoi; 111e). Useful, good or serviceable; the many fail as worthwhile teachers of racing ability when their judgments conflict. Lexical identification: lemma: κρήγυος. See Craft and expertise, 89.

κτάομαι. Attested: μείζω κτήσασθαι (meizō ktēsasthai; 105a). To acquire for oneself, in the imagined test of whether Alcibiades could accept no greater acquisition. Lexical identification: lemma: κτάομαι. See Ambition and hope, 32.

κτῆσις. Attested: κτήσει (ktēsei; 122d). Possession or acquisition, here of enslaved people and other resources. Lexical identification: lemma: κτῆσις. See Wealth and property, 304.

κυβερνάω / κυβερνήτης / κυβερνητική. Attested: κυβερνήτῃ (kybernētēi; 117d); κυβερνητικὴ (kybernētikē; 125c); κυβερνητικῆς (kybernētikēs; 135a). At 117d: The pilot to whom an ignorant passenger properly entrusts steering. At 125c: Piloting excellence that directs the coordinated crew. At 135a: Piloting virtue lacking in the

destructive unchecked controller. Lexical identification: family label: κυβερνάω / κυβερνήτης / κυβερνητική. See Piloting and seafaring, 224.

κυριώτερος. Attested: κυριώτερόν (kyriōteron; 130d); κυριώτερον (kyriōteron; 133c1; apparatus). At 130d: Having greater authority: Socrates says nothing of ourselves has more authority than soul, supporting the practical adequacy of the identification. At 133c1: Having more authority: Cobet's conjecture in place of the printed more divine, echoing the authoritative soul at 130d but not adopted by Burnet. Lexical identification: comparative of κύριος. See Soul, 270.

Κῦρος. Attested: Κύρου (kyrou; 105c). Cyrus, one of the rulers supposedly worthy of Alcibiades' admiration. Lexical identification: lemma: Κῦρος. See Cyrus, 93.

κωμῳδοποιός. Attested: τοῦ κωμῳδοποιοῦ (tou kōmōidopoiou; 121d). Comic poet, left unnamed in the quotation about unnoticed births. Lexical identification: lemma: κωμῳδοποιός. See Comic poet, unnamed, 76.

Λακεδαιμόνιος. Attested: Λακεδαιμονίοις (lakedaimoniois; 120a). Lacedaemonian or Spartan, one of the peoples furnishing Alcibiades' actual rivals. Lexical identification: lemma: Λακεδαιμόνιος. See Sparta and Lacedaemon, 275.

Λακεδαίμων. Attested: Λακεδαίμονι (lakedaimoni; 122e). Lacedaemon or Sparta, the place into which money is said to flow. Lexical identification: lemma: Λακεδαίμων. See Sparta and Lacedaemon, 275.

Λαμπιδώ. Attested: Λαμπιδώ (lampidō; 123e). Lampido, the Spartan royal woman imagined as assessing the challenger to her son. Lexical identification: lemma: Λαμπιδώ. See Lampido and the Spartan royal family, 184.

λαμπρός. Attested: λαμπρότερον (lamproteron; 133c); λαμπρὸν (lampron; 134d). At 133c: Brighter than the best in our soul, the second comparative quality in the supplied divine-mirror argument. At 134d: The bright object toward which just and temperate action looks, continuing the cognitive imagery in ethics. Lexical identification: lemma: λαμπρός. This attestation at 133c belongs to the Eusebius passage supplied by Burnet in angle brackets, not to the text preserved in B and T. See God as mirror, 143.

λανθάνω. Attested: λεληθέναι ἐμαυτὸν (lelēthenai emauton; 127d); λάθωμεν (lathōmen; 128a). At 127d: Having escaped one's own notice while in a shameful condition, which Alcibiades now recognizes. At 128a: Fail to notice that one is caring for something other than self while believing one is practicing self-care. Lexical identification: lemma: λανθάνω. See Failure to notice, 130.

λέγω. Attested: ὅτι λέγω (hoti legō; 116e). At 116e: What one is saying, the content Alcibiades confesses he no longer understands amid changing answers. Lexical identification: lemma: λέγω. See Perplexity, 219.

λέων. Attested: λέοντα (leonta; 123a). Lion, addressee of the fox's observation in the fable. Lexical identification: lemma: λέων. See Aesop, 27.

Λεωτυχίδης. Attested: Λεωτυχίδου (leōtychidou; 124a). Leotychides, Lampido's father, included among the kings in her family. Lexical identification: lemma: Λεωτυχίδης. See Lampido and the Spartan royal family, 184.

λίθος. Attested: λίθος (lithos; 111b). A stone; agreement about which object is a stone illustrates ordinary shared linguistic competence. Lexical identification: lemma: λίθος. See Language, 185.

λόγος. Attested: τοῦ λόγου (tou logou; 114a); λόγῳ (logōi; 129b). At 114a: The course of reasoning Alcibiades runs ahead of when anticipating the acquisition questions about advantage. At 129b: Speech as the means Socrates uses in talking to Alcibiades, distinguished from the person using it. Lexical identification: lemma: λόγος. See Argument, 38.

λυσιτελέω. Attested: ἐλυσιτέλησεν (elysitelēsen; 113d). To pay or prove profitable; Alcibiades claims that committing great wrongs has paid many people, motivating his separation of justice from advantage. Lexical identification: lemma: λυσιτελέω. See Advantage, 24.

μαγεία. Attested: μαγείαν (mageian; 122a). Magian lore, immediately glossed as service of the gods rather than harmful sorcery. Lexical identification: lemma: μαγεία. See Zoroaster and Horomazes, 317.

μάθημα. Attested: μάθημα (mathēma; 126e). At 126e: A subject of instruction, here wool-working, assigned within the interlocutors' gendered division of household skills. Lexical identification: lemma: μάθημα. See Learning, 188.

μάθησις. Attested: μαθήσεως (mathēseōs; 120b). At 120b: Learning as required preparation; Socrates' ironic speech rebukes neglect of matters needing it. Lexical identification: lemma: μάθησις. See Learning, 188.

μανθάνω. Attested: μανθάνειν (manthanein; 106d); μανθάνω (manthanō; 128a). At 106d: Learning from another, one branch of the proposed account of how Alcibiades could have acquired knowledge. At 128a: Understand the immediate question about feet and their belongings; not a claim about one's entire educational history. Lexical identification: lemma: μανθάνω. See Learning, 188.

μαντική / μάντις / μαντεία. Attested: μαντικῆς (mantikēs; 107b); Μαντικὸς (mantikos; 115a); μαντείᾳ (manteiai; 127e). At 107b: Divination as a subject requiring an expert adviser. At 115a: Prophetic, the ironic description of Alcibiades' assurance that answering will not harm him. At 127e: Socrates' cautiously qualified prediction of improvement through continued inquiry. Lexical identification: family label: μαντική / μάντις / μαντεία. See Divination, 105.

μάχη. Attested: μάχαι (machai; 112b). At 112b: Battles arising from disagreements over justice in the Homeric examples. Lexical identification: lemma: μάχη. See War and peace, 302.

μέγα φρονέω. Attested: μέγα φρονεῖν (mega phronein; 104c). To think highly of oneself or pride oneself, here on wealth. Lexical identification: phrase label: μέγα φρονέω. See Pride and high-mindedness, 229.

μεγαλαυχέω. Attested: μεγαλαυχούμενος (megalauchoumenos; 104c). To boast or vaunt oneself on supposed advantages. Lexical identification: lemma: μεγαλαυχέω. See Pride and high-mindedness, 229.

μεγαλοφροσύνη. Attested: μεγαλοφροσύνην (megalophrosynēn; 122c). High-mindedness, included as a strength in the Spartan catalogue. Lexical identification: lemma: μεγαλοφροσύνη. See Pride and high-mindedness, 229.

μεγαλόφρων. Attested: μεγαλοφρόνων (megalophronōn; 103b); μεγαλόφρονα (megalophrona; 119d). High-minded or proud, of defeated lovers and Alcibiades' elevated self-image. Lexical identification: lemma: μεγαλόφρων. See Pride and high-mindedness, 229.

μέγας βασιλεύς. Attested: μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ (megalōi basilei; 120a). Great King, the understood title for the Persian ruler. Lexical identification: phrase label: μέγας βασιλεύς. See Persia, 221.

μέγεθος. Attested: μεγέθει (megethei; 123e). Stature or bodily size, an advantage listed with beauty but insufficient for expert authority. Lexical identification: lemma: μέγεθος. See Beauty and bloom, 48.

Μειδίας. Attested: Μειδίαν (meidian; 120a). Meidias, the local politician used as a derisively small standard of rivalry. Lexical identification: lemma: Μειδίας. See Meidias, 203.

μειράκιον. Attested: μειράκιον (meirakion; 123e). Lad or youth, the diminutive by which the imagined Amestris questions Alcibiades' confidence. Lexical identification: lemma: μειράκιον. See Amestris, 34.

μέλω. Attested: μέλει (melei; 122b). At 122b: It is a concern to someone: Socrates claims that hardly anyone except a lover concerns himself with an Athenian youth's education. Lexical identification: lemma: μέλω. See Care and neglect, 63.

Μεσσήνη. Attested: Μεσσήνης (messēnēs; 122d); Μεσσήνην (messēnēn; 122e). Messene, the territory contributing to the wealth claimed for Sparta. Lexical identification: lemma: Μεσσήνη. See Messene, 205.

μετρητική. Attested: μετρητικήν (metrētikēn; 126d). At 126d: Measurement as the craft determining which of two lengths is greater. Lexical identification: lemma: μετρητική. See Arithmetic and measurement, 40.

μετρίως. Attested: μετρίως (metriōs; 130c). At 130c: To a moderate but sufficient degree, qualifying the achieved proof rather than dismissing it as worthless. Lexical

identification: lemma: μετρίως. See Adequacy and precision, 20.

μιμέομαι. Attested: μιμεῖσθαι (mimeisthai; 108b). At 108b: Imitate Socrates' model answer by naming the craft-relative better, a pedagogical use of analogy in questioning. Lexical identification: lemma: μιμέομαι. See Account and definition, 18.

μισέω. Attested: μισεῖν (misein; 126c). At 126c: Hating one another, a condition to be removed for civic improvement. Lexical identification: lemma: μισέω. See Faction and hatred, 129.

μνᾶ. Attested: ἑκατὸν μνᾶς (hekaton mnas; 119a); μνῶν πεντήκοντα (mnōn pentēkonta; 123c). Mina, a monetary unit in the educational fee and the valuation of adornments. Lexical identification: lemma: μνᾶ. See Minae and plethra, 206.

Μοῦσα. Attested: Μούσας (mousas; 108c). Muse; in the plural, the goddesses whose name helps Alcibiades identify music. Lexical identification: lemma: Μοῦσα. See Muses, 209.

μουσική / μουσικός. Attested: Μουσικήν (mousikēn; 108d); Μουσικῶς (mousikōs; 108d). At 108d: The Muses' craft encompassing lyre, song, and step. At 108d: Musically, the manner of performing correctly according to this craft. Lexical identification: family label: μουσική / μουσικός. See Music and chorus-training, 210.

μῦθος. Attested: μῦθον (mython; 123a). Fable or story, here the Aesopic lion-and-fox allusion. Lexical identification: lemma: μῦθος. See Aesop, 27.

μύρον. Attested: μύρων (myrōn; 122c). Scented oil or perfume; its application contributes to the Persian court's

refinement and expense. Lexical identification: lemma: μύρον. See Luxury and adornment, 199.

ναυπηγία / ναυπηγέω. Attested: ναυπηγίας (naupēgias; 107c). At 107c: The construction of the city's ships, excluded because Alcibiades lacks the skill. Lexical identification: family label: ναυπηγία / ναυπηγέω. See Building and shipbuilding, 60.

ναυτιλία / ναυτικός. Attested: ναυτικὰ (nautika; 124e); ναυτιλίας (nautilias; 125d). At 124e: Seafaring affairs, excluded as the specific competence Alcibiades seeks. At 125d: A voyage shared by participants whom the pilot's craft directs. Lexical identification: family label: ναυτιλία / ναυτικός. See Piloting and seafaring, 224.

νεώς. Attested: νεών (neōn; 129a). A temple; the Delphic temple contains the dedication whose command directs the inquiry towards the self. Lexical identification: lemma: νεώς. See Delphi and Pytho, 99.

νοερός. Attested: νοερώτερον (noerōteron; 133c1; apparatus). At 133c1: More intellectual: B's alternative to the printed more divine, not a second predicate asserted by the dialogue. The article discusses the text actually printed. Lexical identification: lemma: νοερός. See Divine likeness, 106.

νομίζω. Attested: νομίζειν (nomizein; 130d). At 130d: Hold the provisional account that the partners converse soul to soul; a working interpretation following the adequate proof. Lexical identification: lemma: νομίζω. See Adequacy and precision, 20.

νόμιμος. Attested: νόμιμον (nomimon; 109c). At 109c: Lawful or in accord with accepted right, denied of waging war against those acting justly. Lexical identification: lemma: νόμιμος. See Lawful conduct, 187.

νόμισμα. Attested: νομίσματος (nomismatos; 123a). Coinage or money in circulation; the Aesopic image represents its movement into Sparta as one-way traffic. Lexical identification: lemma: νόμισμα. See Wealth and property, 304.

νόσος / νοσέω. Attested: νόσου (nosou; 126a); νοσοῦντι (nosounti; 134e). At 126a: Disease whose absence contributes to the body's good order. At 134e: A sick person given unchecked freedom despite lack of medical understanding. Lexical identification: family label: νόσος / νοσέω. See Medicine, 201.

νοῦς. Attested: νοῦν ἰατρικὸν (noun iatrikon; 135a). At 135a: Medical sense lacking in the sick person who insists on unrestricted license; its absence makes bodily ruin likely. Lexical identification: lemma: νοῦς. See Intelligence, 167.

Ξάνθιππος. Attested: Ξανθίππου (xanthippou; 104b). Father of Pericles, named only as a patronymic in the dialogue. Lexical identification: lemma: Ξάνθιππος. See Pericles and Xanthippus, 216.

Ξέρξης. Attested: Ξέρξου (xerxou; 105c). Xerxes, imperial benchmark and father of the Persian king. Lexical identification: lemma: Ξέρξης. See Xerxes, 313.

ξύλον. Attested: ξύλον (xylon; 111b). Wood or a piece of wood; paired with stone as an ordinary object speakers reliably identify, unlike contested justice. Lexical identification: lemma: ξύλον. See Language, 185.

Ὀδύσσεια. Attested: Ὀδυσσείας (odysseias; 112b). The Odyssey, one of the named poems heard by Alcibiades. Lexical identification: lemma: Ὀδύσσεια. See Homer and epic conflict, 160.

Ὀδυσσεύς. Attested: Ὀδυσσεῖ (odyssei; 112b). Odysseus, opposed to Penelope's suitors in the example. Lexical identification: lemma: Ὀδυσσεύς. See Homer and epic conflict, 160.

οἴαξ. Attested: οἴακα (oiaka; 117d). A tiller or steering lever; deciding which way to move it requires the pilot's expertise rather than the passenger's uninformed guess. Lexical identification: lemma: οἴαξ. See Piloting and seafaring, 224.

οἶδα. Attested: εἰδέναι (eidenai; 106e). At 106e: Possess knowledge of a subject, distinguished from merely supposing one has it in the acquisition argument. Lexical identification: lemma: οἶδα. See Knowing, 176.

οἴησις. Attested: οἴησιν (oiēsin; 120c). A supposition or belief; Alcibiades' dismissive estimate of foreign rulers is tested for both its harmful effect and its plausibility. Lexical identification: lemma: οἴησις. See Belief, 53.

οἰκέτης. Attested: οἰκετῶν (oiketōn; 122b). At 122b: Household slaves among whom the aged Zopyrus is described as least useful. Lexical identification: lemma: οἰκέτης. See Freedom and slavery, 138.

οἰκοδομία / οἰκοδόμος. Attested: οἰκοδομίας (oikodomias; 107a); Οἰκοδόμος (oikodomos; 107a). At 107a: Building as a civic topic requiring the builder's advice. At 107a: The builder, competent to advise better than Alcibiades in this domain. Lexical identification: family label: οἰκοδομία / οἰκοδόμος. See Building and shipbuilding, 60.

οἰκονομικός. Attested: οἰκονομικός (oikonomikos; 133e). At 133e: Competent in household management, a capacity requiring self-understanding as civic competence does. Lexical identification: lemma: οἰκονομικός. See Household management, 164.

οἴομαι. Attested: οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι (oiesthai eidenai; 117d); οἶμαι (oimai; 130c). At 117d: Suppose oneself to know while lacking knowledge, the mistaken self-assessment used to explain practical errors. At 130c: Socrates' ordinary qualification of a judgment, showing that this verb alone does not invariably mark false pretension to knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: οἴομαι. See Conceit of knowledge, 79.

ὅλος. Attested: τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο (to holon touto; 130a). At 130a: This whole: Socrates' explanatory phrase for soul and body taken together as one candidate account of the person. Lexical identification: lemma: ὅλος. See Composite person, 77.

Ὅμηρος. Attested: Ὁμήρου (homērou; 112b). Homer, whose epics are invoked as familiar examples of lethal disagreement. Lexical identification: lemma: Ὅμηρος. See Homer and epic conflict, 160.

ὄμμα. Attested: ὄμματι (ommati; 132d). At 132d: The eye hypothetically addressed as though it were a human being receiving advice to see itself. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄμμα. See Eye, 127.

ὅμοιος. Attested: ὅμοιον (homoion; 133b). At 133b: Resembling the relevant knowing region, allowing the analogy to extend beyond a single human soul. Lexical identification: lemma: ὅμοιος. See Divine likeness, 106.

ὁμολογέω. Attested: ὁμολογήσειέν (homologēseien; 109c); τῶν ὡμολογημένων (tōn hōmologēmenōn; 113b). At 109c: Admit publicly an intention to wage war against those acting justly, an acknowledgment Alcibiades says would be withheld. At 113b: The things agreed, from which Alcibiades recognizes responsibility for the propositions stated in his answers. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁμολογέω. See Admission, 22.

ὁμόνοια / ὁμονοέω. Attested: ὁμόνοιαν (homonoian; 126c); ὁμονοοῦσιν (homonoousin; 126c); ὁμονοεῖν (homonoein; 126e). At 126c: Concord proposed as the meaning of civic friendship. At 126c: Cities agree about numbers through arithmetic. At 126e: The expert agreement a husband lacking wool-working cannot share with his wife. Lexical identification: family label: ὁμόνοια / ὁμονοέω. See Concord, 82.

ὀνίνημι. Attested: ὀνήσεσθαι (onēsesthai; 120d). To benefit or receive advantage; Alcibiades agrees that caring for himself would benefit him rather than harm him. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀνίνημι. See Benefit and harm, 55.

ὄνομα. Attested: ὀνόματος (onomatos; 105c). Name or renown, which Alcibiades is imagined wanting to spread among all people. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄνομα. See Ambition and hope, 32.

ὀνομάζω. Attested: ὀνομάζεις (onomazeis; 108e). At 108e: Give the name for the better in war and peace, analogous to the musical and gymnastic standards. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀνομάζω. See Account and definition, 18.

ὀνομαστός. Attested: ὀνομαστὸς (onomastos; 124b). Renowned or famous by name; the promised fame among Greeks and barbarians depends on the education Alcibiades would otherwise neglect. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀνομαστός. See Honour, fame and worth, 161.

ὁπλιτική. Attested: ὁπλιτικῆς (hoplitikēs; 127a). At 127a: Armed fighting, a learned subject the wife is assumed not to share with the husband. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁπλιτική. See Hoplite fighting, 163.

ὁράω. Attested: ἰδὲ σαυτόν (ide sauton; 132d). At 132d: See yourself: the hypothetical command to an eye used to

interpret the Delphic maxim. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁράω. See Sight, 262.

ὄργανον. Attested: ὀργάνοις (organois; 129c). At 129c: External craft tools, such as cutter and knife, whose difference from the craftsman is initially uncontroversial. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄργανον. See User and instrument, 295.

ὀρτυγοκόπος. Attested: ὀρτυγοκόπον (ortygokopon; 120a). Quail-tapper or quail-striker, the epithet Burnet adopts for Meidias. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀρτυγοκόπος. See Quail-tapping, 239.

ὀρτυγοτρόφος. Attested: ὀρτυγοτρόφον (ortygotrophon; 120a9; apparatus). Quail-breeder, the reading of B and T reported in the apparatus but not printed as the dialogue reading. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀρτυγοτρόφος. See Quail-tapping, 239.

ὀφθαλμός. Attested: ὀφθαλμὸς (ophthalmos; 133a). At 133a: The eye imagined as seeing itself through another eye and its best, seeing region. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀφθαλμός. See Eye, 127.

ὄψις. Attested: ὄψις (opsis; 133b); ὄψει (opsei; 133a). At 133b: The eye's characteristic excellence, corresponding to wisdom in soul. At 133a: The opposite eye's reflecting region in which the observer's face appears. Lexical identification: lemma: ὄψις. See Sight, 262.

ὄψον / σκευασία / σκευάζω. Attested: ὄψου σκευασίας (opsou skeuasias; 117c). At 117c: Preparing a dish, an activity Alcibiades knows he does not know. Lexical identification: family label: ὄψον / σκευασία / σκευάζω. See Cookery, 85.

παγχάλεπος. Attested: παγχάλεπον (panchalepon; 129a). Extremely difficult; Alcibiades' strong alternative estimate

of knowing oneself contrasts with his occasional belief that anyone can do it. Lexical identification: lemma: παγχάλεπος. See Self-knowledge, 255.

πάθημα. Attested: τὸ πάθημα (to pathēma; 116e). At 116e: The condition of instability Alcibiades experiences but cannot yet identify, distinct from the grievance sense earlier in the dialogue. Lexical identification: lemma: πάθημα. See Perplexity, 219.

πάθος. Attested: πάθος (pathos; 118b). At 118b: The troubling condition diagnosed as extreme amathia, something Alcibiades has undergone and now must recognize. Lexical identification: lemma: πάθος. See Disgraceful ignorance, 103.

παιδαγωγέω. Attested: παιδαγωγήσω (paidagōgēsō; 135d). To attend as a tutor attends a boy; Alcibiades promises to follow Socrates in reversed roles. Lexical identification: lemma: παιδαγωγέω. See Guardian and tutor, 154.

παιδαγωγός. Attested: παιδαγωγοὺς (paidagōgous; 121e); παιδαγωγὸν (paidagōgon; 122b). Tutor or attending guardian of a young person, contrasting royal exemplars with Zopyrus. Lexical identification: lemma: παιδαγωγός. See Guardian and tutor, 154.

παιδεία. Attested: παιδείαν (paideian; 122b). Education or formation, particularly the contrasted upbringing of political rivals. Lexical identification: lemma: παιδεία. See Education and training, 119.

παιδεύω. Attested: παιδευθῆναι (paideuthēnai; 118b). To educate or form; Alcibiades is rushing into politics before receiving the relevant formation. Lexical identification: lemma: παιδεύω. See Education and training, 119.

παιδιά. Attested: παιδιὰν (paidian; 110b). Play or game, the broader class containing knucklebones. Lexical identification: lemma: παιδιά. See Knucklebones, 183.

παιδοτρίβης. Attested: παιδοτρίβης (paidotribēs; 107e, 131a). At 107e: The expert bodily trainer who advises better than Alcibiades. At 131a: The trainer as such, whose competence does not itself supply self-knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: παιδοτρίβης. See Gymnastics and wrestling, 155.

παίζω. Attested: παίζοις (paizois; 110b). To play, here in childhood games; elsewhere the related idea of joking colours the exchange. Lexical identification: lemma: παίζω. See Knucklebones, 183.

παλαίω / προσπαλαίω. Attested: παλαίειν (palaiein; 106e); προσπαλαίειν (prospalaiein; 107e). At 106e: Wrestling among the lessons Alcibiades has actually taken. At 107e: To wrestle with suitable opponents as the trainer advises. Lexical identification: family label: παλαίω / προσπαλαίω. See Gymnastics and wrestling, 155.

παράδειγμα. Attested: παράδειγμα (paradeigma; 132d). An example or model; sight supplies the proposed model through which the command to know oneself is interpreted. Lexical identification: lemma: παράδειγμα. See Sight, 262.

παραινέω. Attested: παραινῶν (parainōn; 107b); παραινεῖν (parainein; 132d). To exhort or advise. At 107b: The person recommending a course, whose wealth is irrelevant to medical advice. At 132d: What the imagined inscription recommends to an eye told to see itself. Lexical identification: lemma: παραινέω. See Deliberation and advice, 97.

παρασκευή. Attested: παρασκευὴν (paraskeuēn; 120c). Preparation or equipment; Socrates' ironic exhortation exposes how absurd it is to enter politics without every needed preparation. Lexical identification: lemma: παρασκευή. See Education and training, 119.

πάρειμι. Attested: παρών (parōn; 104d). To be present or in attendance; Socrates has kept close by even without speaking, making silence a form of sustained attention. Lexical identification: lemma: πάρειμι. See Silence and following, 264.

πείθω. Attested: πείθειν (peithein; 114b); πεπεισμένος (pepeismenos; 114e); πειθόμενος (peithomenos; 124a). At 114b: Bring a person to accept a claim; Socrates asks why knowledge should persuade a crowd if it cannot persuade one person. At 114e: Fully convinced through one's own answers, the educational purpose Socrates assigns to the respondent's speech. At 124a: Heeding Socrates and the Delphic inscription, a practical response expressed with the persuasion family. Lexical identification: lemma: πείθω. See Persuasion, 222.

πειράομαι. Attested: πειρῶ (peirō; 108b). At 108b: Try to imitate the explanatory answer, an invitation to active effort rather than passive reception. Lexical identification: lemma: πειράομαι. See Question and answer, 240.

πελαργός. Attested: πελαργοῦ (pelargou; 135e). Stork, the image of reciprocal care for the love that generated another love. Lexical identification: lemma: πελαργός. See Stork and reciprocal love, 280.

πεντήκοντα. Attested: πεντήκοντα (pentēkonta; 123c). Fifty, the generous upper estimate of minae for Deinomache's ornaments. Lexical identification: lemma: πεντήκοντα. See Minae and plethra, 206.

Πεπαρήθιος. Attested: Πεπαρηθίοις (peparēthiois; 116d). Peparethian, an alternative civic audience used to extend the test of advice beyond Athens. Lexical identification: lemma: Πεπαρήθιος. See Peparethos, 214.

περιγίγνομαι. Attested: περιγενοίμεθα (perigenoimetha; 124b). To surpass or prevail over, attainable in the comparison through care and craft. Lexical identification: lemma: περιγίγνομαι. See Royal comparison, 246.

Περικλῆς. Attested: Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου (periklea ton xanthippou; 104b); Περικλῆς (periklēs; 105b). Pericles, Alcibiades' guardian; at 104b he is identified through his father Xanthippus. Lexical identification: lemma: Περικλῆς. See Pericles and Xanthippus, 216.

Περσεύς. Attested: Περσέα τὸν Διὸς (persea ton dios; 120e). Perseus, son of Zeus, to whom the two royal pedigrees are traced. Lexical identification: lemma: Περσεύς. See Perseus, 220.

Πέρσης. Attested: Περσῶν (persōn; 120a). Persian; the people of the Great King and the royal tutors. Lexical identification: lemma: Πέρσης. See Persia, 221.

Περσίς. Attested: Περσίδος (persidos; 121a). Persia, the country of the dynasty's continuing rule. Lexical identification: lemma: Περσίς. See Persia, 221.

πεττεύω / πεττευτικός. Attested: πεττευτικά (petteutika; 110e). At 110e: Good and bad board-game play, which the many cannot competently teach. Lexical identification: family label: πεττεύω / πεττευτικός. See Draughts, 118.

Πηνελόπη. Attested: Πηνελόπης (pēnelopēs; 112b). Penelope, whose suitors are one side in the Odyssey example. Lexical identification: lemma: Πηνελόπη. See Homer and epic conflict, 160.

πιστεύω. Attested: πιστεύειν (pisteuein; 127e). At 127e: Trust Socrates' tentative divination that continued answering will improve both partners, with divine permission acknowledged. Lexical identification: lemma: πιστεύω. See Question and answer, 240.

πλανάομαι. Attested: πλανᾶσθαι (planasthai; 117a). At 117a: Waver in answers about ethical matters, the instability subsequently traced to ignorance combined with false confidence. Lexical identification: lemma: πλανάομαι. See Wandering, 300.

πλέθρον. Attested: γῆς πλέθρα (gēs plethra; 123c). Plethron, here a land-area measure rather than merely a linear distance. Lexical identification: lemma: πλέθρον. See Minae and plethra, 206.

πλούσιος. Attested: πλουσίων (plousiōn; 104c). Rich, one of Alcibiades' acknowledged social advantages. Lexical identification: lemma: πλούσιος. See Wealth and property, 304.

πλοῦτος. Attested: πλούτους (ploutous; 122b). Wealth, the resources compared among Athenians, Spartans and Persians. Lexical identification: lemma: πλοῦτος. See Wealth and property, 304.

ποιέω. Attested: ποιούντων (poiountōn; 125c); ποιεῖ (poiei; 128b). At 125c: Doing something, a broad activity-description that still fails to specify political subjects. At 128b: Makes something better, the criterion of correct care. Lexical identification: lemma: ποιέω. See Production, work, and action, 232.

πόλεμος / πολεμέω. Attested: πολέμου (polemou; 107d); πολεμεῖν (polemein; 109c). At 107d: War as a subject of civic deliberation. At 109c: Making war or not under a

standard identified as the more just. Lexical identification: family label: πόλεμος / πολεμέω. See War and peace, 302.

πόλις. Attested: πόλις (polis; 126b); πόλεως (poleōs; 135e). At 126b: The organized community whose good condition the ruler's craft must explain. At 135e: The city as the powerful force that may overpower both speakers. Lexical identification: lemma: πόλις. See City and citizens, 68.

πολίτης / πολιτεία / πολιτικός. Attested: πολιτείας (politeias; 125d); πολιτῶν (politōn; 127c); πολιτικός (politikos; 133e). At 125d: Shared civic life in which the people governed participate. At 127c: Citizens whose just action is expected to create friendship. At 133e: A statesman, a role excluded for someone ignorant of himself and civic affairs. Lexical identification: family label: πολίτης / πολιτεία / πολιτικός. See City and citizens, 68.

πονηρός. Attested: πονηρός (ponēros; 110b, 125a). At 110b: Wicked, the child Alcibiades' accusation against another boy in play. At 125a: Worthless or incompetent in a subject one does not understand. Lexical identification: lemma: πονηρός. See Good and bad, 146.

πορρωτέρω. Attested: πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτῶν (porrōterō tōn heautōn; 131a). At 131a: Farther from the self than its immediate belongings: the equipment by which craftsmen tend the body. Lexical identification: lemma: πορρωτέρω. See Possessions of possessions, 226.

πράττω / πρᾶξις. Attested: πρᾶξιν (praxin; 115e); πράττειν (prattein; 124e). At 115e: A doing of courage or death, the different respects in which rescue is evaluated. At 124e: Managing affairs, the initially underspecified field of Alcibiades' desired excellence. Lexical identification: family label: πράττω / πρᾶξις. See Production, work, and action, 232.

πρέπω / πρεπώδης. Attested: πρέπει (prepei; 124d); πρεπωδέστερον (prepōdesteron; 135b). At 124d: It is befitting, used to reject giving up the shared inquiry. At 135b: More befitting, inferred from finer and used in the free/slave ethical contrast. Lexical identification: family label: πρέπω / πρεπώδης. See Befitting, 52.

προσεῖπον / προσαγορεύω. Attested: οὐδὲ προσεῖπον (oude proseipon; 103a). To address or speak to; Socrates says he has not even addressed Alcibiades during the past years. Lexical identification: family label: προσεῖπον / προσαγορεύω. See Silence and following, 264.

προσέχω. Attested: οὐ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν (ou prosechōn ton noun; 118e). At 118e: Failing to pay attention, Alcibiades' own explanation of why Pericles has not educated him adequately. Lexical identification: lemma: προσέχω. See Attention, 44.

προσομιλέω. Attested: προσομιλεῖν (prosomilein; 130d). To converse or associate with someone; the two speakers use words in a soul-to-soul encounter after distinguishing user and instrument. Lexical identification: lemma: προσομιλέω. See Speech and dialogue, 278.

Πυθόδωρος. Attested: Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου (pythodōron ton isolochou; 119a). Pythodorus, named with his father Isolochus as one of Zeno's pupils. Lexical identification: lemma: Πυθόδωρος. See Pythodorus and Isolochus, 238.

Πυθοκλείδης. Attested: Πυθοκλείδῃ (pythokleidēi; 118c). Pythocleides, a wise associate of Pericles. Lexical identification: lemma: Πυθοκλείδης. See Pythocleides, 237.

Πυθώ. Attested: ἐν Πυθοῖ νεών (en pythoi neōn; 129a). Pytho, the other name for the place of the temple and

inscription. Lexical identification: lemma: Πυθώ. See Delphi and Pytho, 99.

πυνθάνομαι. Attested: πυθοίμην (pythoimēn; 104d). At 104d: Find out what Socrates' persistent attendance means; an inquiry for information distinct from the technical learning–discovery dilemma. Lexical identification: lemma: πυνθάνομαι. See Learning, 188.

ῥᾴδιος. Attested: ῥᾴδιον (rhaidion; 129a). Easy; Alcibiades alternates between finding self-knowledge easy for everyone and extremely difficult, while Socrates insists on its necessity either way. Lexical identification: lemma: ῥᾴδιος. See Self-knowledge, 255.

ῥώμη. Attested: ῥώμην (rhōmēn; 135e). At 135e: The city's strength, feared as capable of defeating the educational undertaking. Strength, the city's power that Socrates fears will overcome both of them. Lexical identification: lemma: ῥώμη. See Power, 227; Dramatic time and setting, 116.

Σαλαμίς. Attested: Σαλαμῖνα (salamina; 121b). Salamis, Eurysaces' ancestral homeland. Lexical identification: lemma: Σαλαμίς. See Salamis and Aegina, 253.

σαφής. Attested: σαφέστερα (saphestera; 133c). At 133c: Clearer: ordinary mirrors are compared favorably with the eye's mirror in the supplied passage. Lexical identification: lemma: σαφής. This attestation at 133c belongs to the Eusebius passage supplied by Burnet in angle brackets, not to the text preserved in B and T. See Mirror, 207.

σιγάω / ἕπομαι. Attested: σιγῶν εἶπου (sigōn heipou; 106a). To remain silent / to follow; the phrase recalls Socrates' earlier pursuit without conversation. Lexical identification: family label: σιγάω / ἕπομαι. See Silence and following, 264.

σκέπτομαι. Attested: σκέψαι (skepsai; 116b). At 116b: Consider another line of reasoning connecting doing finely with doing well. Lexical identification: lemma: σκέπτομαι. See Looking and examining, 193.

σκευάριον. Attested: σκευαρίων (skeuariōn; 113e). Little garment or article of dress, the diminutive in the used-argument analogy. Lexical identification: lemma: σκευάριον. See Clothes and repeated arguments, 75.

σκέψις. Attested: σκέψεως (skepseōs; 130d). At 130d: The extensive inquiry needed by the self itself, explaining why exact knowledge has been postponed. Lexical identification: lemma: σκέψις. See Looking and examining, 193.

σκοπέω. Attested: σκόπει (skopei; 109a). At 109a: Look into what the better in war and peace tends toward, rather than repeat a confident unexamined judgment. Lexical identification: lemma: σκοπέω. See Looking and examining, 193.

σκοτεινός. Attested: σκοτεινὸν (skoteinon; 134e). Dark or obscure; paired with godless as the contrary of the bright divine orientation associated with self-knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: σκοτεινός. See Divine likeness, 106.

σκυτοτόμος / σκυτική. Attested: σκυτοτόμος (skytotomos; 125a); Σκυτική (skytikē; 128b). At 125a: The shoemaker intelligent about producing shoes. At 128b: Shoemaking, the craft improving shoes rather than feet. Lexical identification: family label: σκυτοτόμος / σκυτική. See Shoemaking, 260.

σκώπτω. Attested: Σκώπτεις (skōpteis; 109d). To tease or mock, Alcibiades' response to the request for his teacher of justice. Lexical identification: lemma: σκώπτω. See Socrates, 266.

σοφία. Attested: σοφία (sophia; 133b). At 133b: The soul's excellence, corresponding to sight as the eye's excellence in the self-knowledge analogy. Lexical identification: lemma: σοφία. See Wisdom, 308.

σοφός. Attested: σοφὸς (sophos; 118c); σοφώτατος (sophōtatos; 121e). At 118c: Knowledgeable in a subject, as the writing teacher is; the local claim is tested through the ability to make another knowledgeable. Wise; the superlative identifies the tutor responsible for religious lore and royal matters. Lexical identification: lemma: σοφός. See Wisdom, 308; Four royal tutors, 136.

σπιθαμή / πῆχυς. Attested: σπιθαμῆς (spithamēs; 126d); πήχεος (pēcheos; 126d). At 126d: A span, one of two lengths whose relative size is settled by measuring. At 126d: A cubit, compared with a span in the measurement example. Lexical identification: family label: σπιθαμή / πῆχυς. See Arithmetic and measurement, 40.

σταθμός. Attested: σταθμοῦ (stathmou; 126d). Weight or weighing; another measurable domain in which the relevant art produces agreement. Lexical identification: lemma: σταθμός. See Arithmetic and measurement, 40.

στασιάζω. Attested: στασιάζειν (stasiazein; 126c). At 126c: Engaging in faction, opposed to the friendship that should improve the city. Lexical identification: lemma: στασιάζω. See Faction and hatred, 129.

συγγενής. Attested: συγγενεῖς (syngeneis; 104b); συγγενὴς (syngenēs; 105e). Kinsman or relative, the family relation distinguished from friendship. Lexical identification: lemma: συγγενής. See Kinship and connections, 172.

συγχωρέω. Attested: συγχωρῶ (synchōrō; 119b). To concede or agree; Alcibiades accepts the diagnosis that most politicians are uneducated while drawing the wrong

practical inference from it. Lexical identification: lemma: συγχωρέω. See Admission, 22.

συμβουλεύω / σύμβουλος / συμβουλή. Attested: συμβουλεύσων (symbouleusōn; 106c); σύμβουλος (symboulos; 106d); συμβουλή (symboulē; 107b). At 106c: Intending to stand up as adviser to the Athenians. At 106d: A good adviser in the matters he actually knows. At 107b: Advice belonging to the knowledgeable person rather than to the rich person. Lexical identification: family label: συμβουλεύω / σύμβουλος / συμβουλή. See Deliberation and advice, 97.

συμφέρω. Attested: τὰ συμφέροντα (ta sympheronta; 113d); συμφέροντά (sympheronta; 116d). At 113d: What is advantageous, proposed by Alcibiades as the real subject of political deliberation. At 116d: Advantageous, the predicate the argument establishes for just things. Lexical identification: lemma: συμφέρω. See Advantage, 24.

συναγωνιστής. Attested: συναγωνιστάς (synagōnistas; 119d). A fellow contender or ally in a struggle; one's own compatriots should support the real contest rather than define its highest standard. Lexical identification: lemma: συναγωνιστής. See Royal comparison, 246.

συναμφότερον. Attested: τὸ συναμφότερον (to synamphoteron; 130b). At 130b: The composite of soul and body, considered and rejected as the body's ruler because body does not share in ruling. Lexical identification: substantivized neuter of συναμφότερος. See Composite person, 77.

συνάρχω. Attested: συνάρχοντος (synarchontos; 130b). To rule jointly; the body is denied a share in ruling, the premise used to exclude the soul-body composite as the ruling person. Lexical identification: lemma: συνάρχω. See Composite person, 77.

συνίημι. Attested: συνίεμεν (syniemen; 132c). To understand or grasp what is meant; Socrates asks whether they failed to understand the Delphic inscription despite its good advice. Lexical identification: lemma: συνίημι. See Know thyself, 173.

σχῆμα. Attested: σχῆμα (schēma; 135d). A role, configuration or manner; Alcibiades proposes an exchange of roles in which he becomes the one who attends Socrates. Lexical identification: lemma: σχῆμα. See Guardian and tutor, 154.

σῴζω. Attested: σῶσαι (sōsai; 115b); σῴζεσθαι (sōizesthai; 126a). To save or bring to safety. At 115b: To save those whom the rescuer ought to save. At 126a: Being kept safe, the stated end of piloting and of the proposed political counsel. Lexical identification: lemma: σῴζω. See War and peace, 302.

Σωκράτης. Attested: Σωκράτης (sōkratēs; 129b); Σώκρατες (sōkrates; 104c). Socrates, Alcibiades' persistent lover and questioner. Lexical identification: lemma: Σωκράτης. See Socrates, 266.

σῶμα. Attested: παντὶ τῷ σώματι (panti tōi sōmati; 129e); σῶμα (sōma; 130b). At 129e: The whole body used by a human being, extending the instrumental relation beyond hands and eyes. At 130b: The body is ruled rather than its own ruler, so it fails the adopted criterion for identifying the person. Lexical identification: lemma: σῶμα. See Body, 58.

σωφρονέω. Attested: ὁ σωφρονήσας (ho sōphronēsas; 134b). At 134b: The person who has become temperate, contrasted with the person who has become rich as escaping the relevant wretchedness. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφρονέω. See Temperance, 284.

Σωφρονίσκος. Attested: Σωφρονίσκου (sōphroniskou; 131e). Sophroniscus, father named in Socrates' full self-identification. Lexical identification: lemma: Σωφρονίσκος. See Sophroniscus and Phaenarete, 269.

σωφρόνως. Attested: σωφρόνως (sōphronōs; 134d). At 134d: The manner of action paired with justice and directed toward the divine and bright. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφρόνως. See Temperance, 284.

σωφροσύνη. Attested: σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē; 131b). At 131b: The virtue conditionally equated with self-knowledge, which specialist knowledge alone does not secure. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφροσύνη. See Temperance, 284.

σώφρων. Attested: ὁ σωφρονέστατος (ho sōphronestatos; 121e); σώφρων (sōphrōn; 131b); σωφρονέστατος (sōphronestatos; 121e). At 121e: The most temperate royal tutor, charged with teaching the prince not to be ruled by pleasure. At 131b: Possessing temperance: the adjective occurs in the qualified claim that a craftsman is not temperate simply by his craft. Temperate; the superlative identifies the tutor who teaches freedom from domination by pleasures. Lexical identification: lemma: σώφρων. See Temperance, 284; Four royal tutors, 136.

τὰ αὐτοῦ. Attested: τὰ αὐτοῦ (ta hautou; 131a); τὰ ἡμέτερα (ta hēmetera; 133d). At 131a: What belongs to the person, provisionally including the body as distinct from the self identified with soul. At 133d: Our own things considered as ours: knowledge of this relation is said to require knowledge of ourselves. Lexical identification: phrase label: τὰ αὐτοῦ. See What belongs to oneself, 306.

τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν. Attested: τὰ αὐτῶν πράττουσιν (ta hautōn prattousin; 127a); τὰ αὐτοῦ (ta hautou; 131c). At 127a: Doing assigned household work, which separates

spouses' expertise. At 131c: One's own business, provocatively denied of the money-maker whose care concerns possessions. Lexical identification: phrase label: τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν. See Doing one's own business, 110.

τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. Attested: τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ (ta tōn heautou; 133e). At 133e: The third level in the series self, own things, and what belongs to those things, assigned to one comprehensive discernment. Lexical identification: phrase label: τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. See Possessions of possessions, 226.

ταλασιουργία. Attested: ταλασιουργίας (talasiourgias; 126e). At 126e: Wool-working known by the wife but not the husband in the test of concord. Lexical identification: lemma: ταλασιουργία. See Wool-working and weaving, 312.

Τάναγρα. Attested: Τανάγρᾳ (tanagrai; 112c). Tanagra, the battle-site named before Coronea. Lexical identification: lemma: Τάναγρα. See Tanagra and Boeotia, 281.

ταὐτόν. Attested: ταὐτόν (tauton; 129c). At 129c: The same: talking is identified with using speech, before speaker and used speech are distinguished. Lexical identification: contraction of τὸ αὐτό. See Speech and dialogue, 278.

τάχα. Attested: τάχ' (tach'; 129a). At 129a: Possibly know proper self-care after knowing oneself; the positive result is cautiously proposed, unlike the negative impossibility. Lexical identification: lemma: τάχα. See Care for oneself, 65.

τεκμήριον. Attested: τεκμήριον (tekmērion; 111d). At 111d: An evidential sign of lack of competence, here the proposed teachers' disagreement about expert judgments. Lexical identification: lemma: τεκμήριον. See Proof, 234.

τέτταρες. Attested: τέτταρες (tettares; 121e). Four, specifying the selected royal tutors. Lexical identification: lemma: τέτταρες. See Four royal tutors, 136.

τέχνη. Attested: τέχνη (technē; 108b); τέχνῃ (technēi; 124b); τέχνης (technēs; 133e). At 108b: The determinate expertise whose standards make performance correct. At 124b: Craft as a necessary means of surpassing formidable rivals. At 133e: One craft's discernment relating oneself, one's own, and what belongs to one's own. Lexical identification: lemma: τέχνη. See Craft and expertise, 89.

τιμάω. Attested: τιμᾶσθαι (timasthai; 105b). To honour; Alcibiades expects to deserve unprecedented honours. Lexical identification: lemma: τιμάω. See Honour, fame and worth, 161.

τιμή. Attested: τιμῇ (timēi; 121e). Honour, here awarded to attendants for their care of the royal child. Lexical identification: lemma: τιμή. See Honour, fame and worth, 161.

τομεύς / σμίλη. Attested: τομεῖ (tomei; 129c); σμίλῃ (smilēi; 129c). At 129c: A cutter used by the shoemaker and distinct from its user. At 129c: A knife used in cutting, another implement distinct from the worker. Lexical identification: family label: τομεύς / σμίλη. See Shoemaking, 260.

τόπος. Attested: τὸν τόπον (ton topon; 133b). At 133b: The region of eye or soul in which its characteristic excellence arises; the analogy does not supply a full anatomy of soul. Lexical identification: lemma: τόπος. See Soul looking into soul, 273.

τραῦμα / ἕλκος. Attested: τραύματα (traumata; 115b); ἕλκη (helkē; 115b). At 115b: Wounds incurred by men helping companions in battle. At 115b: Wounds as the

respect in which the otherwise courageous undertaking is called bad. Lexical identification: family label: τραῦμα / ἕλκος. See Courage and cowardice, 87.

τρέφω. Attested: τραφῶσιν (traphōsin; 120e). To rear or bring up; good natural endowment is joined to good upbringing. Lexical identification: lemma: τρέφω. See Ancestry, nature and upbringing, 36.

τριακόσιοι. Attested: τριακόσια (triakosia; 123c). Three hundred; Alcibiades' landed area is stated to fall below this number of plethra. Lexical identification: lemma: τριακόσιοι. See Minae and plethra, 206.

τροφή. Attested: τροφῇ (trophēi; 121b). Rearing or upbringing, compared across Athenian and royal households. Lexical identification: lemma: τροφή. See Ancestry, nature and upbringing, 36.

τρυφάω. Attested: τρυφᾷς (tryphais; 114a). To be fastidious or luxurious in taste, here refusing a repeated argument. Lexical identification: lemma: τρυφάω. See Clothes and repeated arguments, 75.

τρυφή. Attested: τρυφὰς (tryphas; 122c). Luxury or soft living, an object in the Persian display. Lexical identification: lemma: τρυφή. See Luxury and adornment, 199.

Τρώς. Attested: Τρωσὶν (trōsin; 112b). Trojan, the other side named with the Achaeans. Lexical identification: lemma: Τρώς. See Homer and epic conflict, 160.

τυραννέω / τυραννίς. Attested: τυραννοῦντι (tyrannounti; 135a); τυραννίδα (tyrannida; 135b). At 135a: The sick man domineering so that no one can rebuke him. At 135b: Tyranny as a possession to reject in favor of virtue if happiness is sought. Lexical identification: family label: τυραννέω / τυραννίς. See Tyranny, 294.

ὕβρις. Attested: ὕβρεως (hybreōs; 114d). Insolence, the word Socrates playfully takes up for his attempt to persuade the opposite. Lexical identification: lemma: ὕβρις. See Socrates, 266.

ὑβριστής. Attested: Ὑβριστὴς (hybristēs; 114d). Insolent or outrageous person, Alcibiades' accusation when challenged to practise persuading Socrates. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑβριστής. See Socrates, 266.

ὑγίεια / ὑγιής / ὑγιεινός. Attested: ὑγιεινότερον (hygieinoteron; 108e); ὑγιείας (hygieias; 126a). At 108e: Healthier, the specification of what makes one food better. At 126a: Health's presence as the body-improving condition. Lexical identification: family label: ὑγίεια / ὑγιής / ὑγιεινός. See Medicine, 201.

υἱός / ὑός. Attested: τὼ Περικλέους ὑεῖ (tō perikleous hyei; 118e). Son; the dual phrase identifies Pericles' two sons, whose personal names are not supplied in the dialogue. Lexical identification: family label: υἱός / ὑός. See Pericles' sons, 218.

ὑπερφρονέω. Attested: ὑπερπεφρόνηκας (hyperpephronēkas; 104a). To think oneself above or look down on others; Socrates reconstructs the reasoning behind Alcibiades' contempt for his lovers. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑπερφρονέω. See Pride and high-mindedness, 229.

ὑπηρετέω. Attested: ὑπηρετοῖεν (hypēretoien; 104b). To render service or help; numerous relatives and friends could serve Alcibiades if need arose. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑπηρετέω. See Kinship and connections, 172.

ὑπόδημα. Attested: ὑπόδημα (hypodēma; 128a); ὑποδήματα (hypodēmata; 128b). At 128a: A shoe as

something belonging to a foot. At 128b: Shoes as the objects improved by shoemaking. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑπόδημα. See Shoemaking, 260.

ὑπολαμβάνω. Attested: ὑπελάβομεν (hypelabomen; 132d). At 132d: Understand what the hypothetical instruction to an eye recommends, turning a command into a question about its practical meaning. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑπολαμβάνω. See Account and definition, 18.

ὑπόπτερος. Attested: ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον (erōta hypopteron; 135e). Winged, modifying the love hatched in Alcibiades. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑπόπτερος. See Stork and reciprocal love, 280.

ὑποπτεύω. Attested: ὑποπτεύω (hypopteuō; 132d). To suspect or conjecture; Socrates introduces his interpretation of the inscription as what he suspects it means, rather than as a cited divine explanation. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑποπτεύω. See Know thyself, 173.

ὑφαντική. Attested: ὑφαντικῇ (hyphantikēi; 128c). At 128c: Weaving as care for the body's belongings rather than the body itself. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑφαντική. See Wool-working and weaving, 312.

Φαιναρέτη. Attested: Φαιναρέτης (phainaretēs; 131e). Phaenarete, mother named in Socrates' full self-identification. Lexical identification: lemma: Φαιναρέτη. See Sophroniscus and Phaenarete, 269.

φαίνομαι. Attested: φαίνεται (phainetai; 133a). At 133a: It appears so, Alcibiades' acceptance of the eye's self-seeing through another eye, rather than a separate demonstration. Lexical identification: lemma: φαίνομαι. See Admission, 22.

φιλία / φιλέω. Attested: φιλία (philia; 126c); φιλῶν (philōn; 126e); φιλοῦνται (philountai; 127a). At 126c:

Friendship among citizens proposed as what makes the city better. At 126e: A father loving his son, an example of the relationship Alcibiades calls concord. At 127a: Being loved by husbands, apparently denied in the respect of separate expertise under the tested definition. Lexical identification: family label: φιλία / φιλέω. See Civic friendship, 70.

Φίλιος. Attested: τὸν Φίλιον (ton philion; 109d). Of friendship: the epithet of the god by whom Socrates denies he is merely teasing. Lexical identification: lemma: Φίλιος. See Zeus and Zeus of Friendship, 315.

φιλονικία. Attested: φιλονικίαν (philonikian; 122c). Love of victory, giving the Spartan disciplines a competitive aim. Lexical identification: lemma: φιλονικία. See Spartan disciplines, 277.

φιλονικία / φιλοτιμία. Attested: φιλονικίαν (philonikian; 122c); φιλοτιμίας (philotimias; 122c). At 122c: Spartan love of victory in the educational comparison. At 122c: Spartan ambitions for honour, presented as advantages Alcibiades must reckon with. Lexical identification: family label: φιλονικία / φιλοτιμία.

φιλοπονία. Attested: φιλοπονίαν (philoponian; 122c). Love of toil, an active appetite for sustained effort rather than merely enduring it. Lexical identification: lemma: φιλοπονία. See Spartan disciplines, 277.

φίλος. Attested: φίλους (philous; 104b). Friend, here an available social connection rather than the later proposed civic concord. Lexical identification: lemma: φίλος. See Kinship and connections, 172.

φιλοτιμία. Attested: φιλοτιμίας (philotimias; 122c). Love of honour or honour-seeking ambitions, included among Spartan strengths. Lexical identification: lemma:

φιλοτιμία. See Honour, fame and worth, 161; Spartan disciplines, 277.

φόρος. Attested: φόρος (phoros; 123a). Tribute or payment, here paid to Spartan kings. Lexical identification: lemma: φόρος. See Wealth and property, 304.

φρονέω. Attested: φρονεῖν (phronein; 133c). At 133c: Intelligent thinking, coupled with knowing to characterize the soul's most divine region. Lexical identification: lemma: φρονέω. See Intelligence, 167.

φρόνημα. Attested: φρονήματι (phronēmati; 103b). Pride or elevated spirit, in which Alcibiades outdoes his lovers. Lexical identification: lemma: φρόνημα. See Pride and high-mindedness, 229.

φρόνησις. Attested: φρόνησιν (phronēsin; 133c). At 133c: Intelligence named with god in the compressed description of the divine object relevant to self-knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: φρόνησις. See Intelligence, 167.

φρόνιμος. Attested: φρονίμους (phronimous; 125a). At 125a: Understanding a relevant matter; Socrates unpacks the label fine and good by asking whether it denotes the intelligent. Lexical identification: lemma: φρόνιμος. See Intelligence, 167.

φύσις. Attested: φύσει (physei; 119c). Natural endowment, claimed as a sufficient basis for defeating uneducated rivals. Lexical identification: lemma: φύσις. See Ancestry, nature and upbringing, 36.

φύω / εὖ φύομαι. Attested: εὖ φύντας (eu phyntas; 120e). To grow or be naturally endowed; here being well endowed by nature. Lexical identification: family label: φύω / εὖ φύομαι. See Ancestry, nature and upbringing, 36.

χαλεπός. Attested: χαλεπόν (chalepon; 129a). At 129a: Difficult, the opposed possibility for knowing oneself, which does not remove the necessity of the task. Lexical identification: lemma: χαλεπός. See Self-knowledge, 255.

χορευτής. Attested: χορευταῖς (choreutais; 125d). At 125d: Dancers or chorus members used by the leading performers. Lexical identification: lemma: χορευτής. See Music and chorus-training, 210.

χοροδιδασκαλία / χοροδιδασκαλικός. Attested: Χοροδιδασκαλικὴ (chorodidaskalikē; 125d); χοροδιδασκαλία (chorodidaskalia; 125e). At 125d: The particular excellence governing coordinated choral performance. At 125e: Knowledge enabling direction of participants in song. Lexical identification: family label: χοροδιδασκαλία / χοροδιδασκαλικός. See Music and chorus-training, 210.

χράομαι. Attested: ὁ χρώμενος (ho chrōmenos; 129d); χρῆσθαι (chrēsthai; 129c); χρωμένων ἀλλήλοις (chrōmenōn allēlois; 125c). At 129d: The user, distinguished from what he uses; the participle supplies the agent in the self argument. At 129c: To use speech in talking; this ordinary instrumental description begins the distinction of person from means. At 125c: People making use of one another within civic dealings, before use acquires its role in the argument about body. Lexical identification: lemma: χράομαι. See User and instrument, 295.

χρῆμα. Attested: χρήματα (chrēmata; 131b). Money or material resources, the object of care distinguished from the person. Lexical identification: lemma: χρῆμα. See Wealth and property, 304.

χρηματιστής. Attested: χρηματιστής (chrēmatistēs; 131c). Money-maker, mocked as no longer doing his own

business in the revised sense of self-care. Lexical identification: lemma: χρηματιστής. See Wealth and property, 304.

χρυσίον. Attested: χρυσίον (chrysion; 122e). Gold, said to accumulate in Sparta. Lexical identification: lemma: χρυσίον. See Wealth and property, 304.

ψευδής. Attested: ψευδής (pseudēs; 120d). At 120d: False, a separate criticism of Alcibiades' belief about royal rivals after its harmful effect on preparation has been established. Lexical identification: lemma: ψευδής. See Belief, 53.

ψυχή. Attested: ψυχή (psychē; 130a); τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν (tēi psychēi pros tēn psychēn; 130d). At 130a: What uses the body and rules it; accepted as the candidate remaining after body and composite are excluded. At 130d: Soul to soul: the persons conversing are distinguished from the words they use and the faces they possess. Lexical identification: lemma: ψυχή. See Soul, 270.

ὥρα. Attested: ὥρας (hōras; 131e). The season or bloom of youthful beauty; what belongs to Alcibiades loses its attractive season just as Alcibiades himself begins to bloom. Lexical identification: lemma: ὥρα. See Beauty and bloom, 48.

Ὡρομάζης. Attested: Ὡρομάζου (hōromazou; 122a). Horomazes, the name attached as parentage to Zoroaster in the Greek account. Lexical identification: lemma: Ὡρομάζης. See Zoroaster and Horomazes, 317.

Further Greek reading vocabulary

The following brief entries cover additional substantive words and idioms. They give local senses and sample attestations; they are not additional five-part articles. A

related article offers context without replacing the gloss. Dictionary lemmas are labelled when supplied alongside an inflected text form.

ἀγανακτῶ (aganaktō). To be indignant or resent an affront; Socrates professes indignation both for Alcibiades and for his own love at the low standard of rivalry proposed. References: 119c. Lemma: ἀγανακτέω.

ἀγαπητός (agapētos). Welcome or to be valued; Socrates, as the sole lover of Alcibiades himself, is presented as someone whose presence deserves appreciation. References: 131e. Lemma: ἀγαπητός.

ἀγαπῶντα (agapōnta). To be content with or satisfied by; if Alcibiades were satisfied with his existing advantages, Socrates says he would already have departed. References: 104e. Lemma: ἀγαπάω.

ἀδεᾶ (adea). Without fear or apprehension; paired with fearless in the courage tutor's educational task. References: 122a. Lemma: ἀδεής.

ἀδύνατον (adynaton). Impossible or beyond one's capacity; the fulfilment of Alcibiades' plans without Socrates is asserted to be impossible. References: 105d. Lemma: ἀδύνατος.

ἀθλητάς (athlētas). A trained competitor or athlete; prepared political rivals would demand preparation from anyone who intended to contend with them. References: 119b. Lemma: ἀθλητής.

ἀθρόους (hathroous). Assembled together or in a group; the public speaker addresses people collectively while Socrates' conversational partner addresses them one at a time. References: 114d. Lemma: ἀθρόος.

αἰτιᾷ (aitiai). To blame or accuse; Alcibiades blames Socrates for conclusions which his own answers have supplied. References: 113c. Lemma: αἰτιάομαι.

αἴτιον (aition). A cause or responsible explanation; the reason for Socrates' silence is said to be divine rather than human. References: 103a. Lemma: αἴτιος.

ᾄττεις (aitteis). To rush or dart; Alcibiades rushes towards politics before receiving the education his ambition requires. References: 118b. Lemma: ᾄττω.

ἀκοῆς (akoēs). Hearing; a capacity whose presence improves ears, giving a model for naming the good a political craft would produce. References: 126b. Lemma: ἀκοή.

ἀκόλουθα (akoloutha). Following or consistent with what has been said; the examples of royal nurture are claimed to indicate the rest of its character without an exhaustive account. References: 122b. Lemma: ἀκόλουθος.

ἀλοιφὰς (aloiphas). An anointing or rubbing with oil; specifically the scented anointings in the Persian luxury comparison. References: 122c. Lemma: ἀλοιφή.

ἀναβήσῃ (anabēsēi). To go up or ascend; not knowing how to reach heaven supplies an example of ignorance Alcibiades openly acknowledges. References: 117b. Lemma: ἀναβαίνω.

ἀναθεὶς (anatheis). To dedicate or set up in a sanctuary; the person who dedicated the self-knowledge inscription is tested against the possibility that its demand might be trivial. References: 129a. Lemma: ἀνατίθημι.

ἀναπλάττοντας (anaplattontas). To mould or shape anew; the attendants shape the child's limbs in Socrates'

account of bodily nurture. References: 121d. Lemma: ἀναπλάσσω.

ἀναφέρων (anapherōn). To refer or trace something back to a source; Alcibiades traces his learning to ordinary people rather than a named specialist. References: 110e. Lemma: ἀναφέρω.

ἀνθρώπειον (anthrōpeion). Human; the cause of the delay is expressly denied to be human before being called a divine opposition. References: 103a. Lemma: ἀνθρώπειος.

ἀνίστασαι (anistasai). To rise or stand up; Alcibiades is imagined rising to address a deliberative assembly. References: 106c. Lemma: ἀνίστημι.

ἀντιτάττεσθαι (antitattesthai). To draw up against or oppose; Alcibiades is imagined arraying himself against the Persian king. References: 123c. Lemma: ἀντιτάσσω.

ἀντιτιθέντες (antitithentes). To set opposite for comparison; Socrates proposes to put the Athenians' resources beside the royal rivals' advantages. References: 120e. Lemma: ἀντιτίθημι.

ἀξιοπίστου (axiopistou). Trustworthy or worthy of belief; Socrates identifies the traveller who described the Persian queen's estates as a credible informant. References: 123b. Lemma: ἀξιόπιστος.

ἀπαλλάττομαι (apallattomai). To withdraw or give up one's pursuit; Socrates alone has not left Alcibiades when his other lovers have stopped. References: 103a. Lemma: ἀπαλλάττομαι.

ἀπεργάζεται (apergazetai). To bring about or produce a result; the bad description is assigned to an action insofar

as it produces something bad. References: 115e. Lemma: ἀπεργάζομαι.

ἀπιστῶν (apistōn). To distrust or withhold confidence; Socrates expressly denies that his closing fear comes from distrusting Alcibiades' natural character. References: 135e. Lemma: ἀπιστέω.

ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου (apo tou automatou). Spontaneously or by itself; Pericles is said not to have become wise without instruction and intellectual company. References: 118c. Lemma: ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου.

ἀπογιγνομένου (apogignomenou). To depart or cease to be present; removing disease illustrates the kind of absent bad condition sought in the civic analogy. References: 126a. Lemma: ἀπογίγνομαι.

ἀποκτεινύναι (apokteinynai). To kill; disputes about justice, unlike ordinary medical classifications, reach the point of reciprocal killing. References: 112a. Lemma: ἀποκτείνω.

ἀπολειφθήσῃ (apoleiphthēsēi). To fall short of or be left behind; lacking care and craft would also leave Alcibiades short of the renown he seeks. References: 124b. Lemma: ἀπολείπω.

ἀπόλοιντο (apolointo). To perish or be destroyed; unrestricted control of a ship without navigational knowledge endangers all aboard. References: 135a. Lemma: ἀπόλλυμι.

ἀπορρητέον (aporrēteon). To give up or abandon the effort; the verbal adjective with negation says they must not give up after admitting their need. References: 124d. Lemma: ἀπαγορεύω.

ἀποφεύξῃ (apopheuxēi). To escape or get free of; Socrates asks how Alcibiades will escape his present unfree condition. References: 135c. Lemma: ἀποφεύγω.

ἄρρητον (arrēton). Unspoken or left unsaid; Socrates refuses to leave the wealth comparison unexamined if Alcibiades relies on money. References: 122d. Lemma: ἄρρητος.

ἄφοβον (aphobon). Fearless; the courageous tutor prepares the heir not to become a slave through fear. References: 122a. Lemma: ἄφοβος.

ἀχρειότατον (achreiotaton). Useless or unserviceable; the superlative depreciates the aged slave assigned to Alcibiades, sharpening the contrast with royal educators. References: 122b. Lemma: ἀχρεῖος.

βῆμα (bēma). The speaker’s platform; Socrates imagines intercepting Alcibiades as he approaches it to advise the Athenians. References: 106c. Lemma: βῆμα.

βοσκήματα (boskēmata). A grazing animal or head of livestock; livestock joins land, horses and enslaved labor in the account of Spartan agricultural wealth. References: 122d. Lemma: βόσκημα.

βραχὺ (brachy). Short or brief; the small service requested of Alcibiades is to answer the questions put to him. References: 106b. Lemma: βραχύς.

γείτονες (geitones). A neighbour; the comic quotation says that ordinary births barely attract even neighbours’ notice, contrasting with a royal heir’s public celebration. References: 121d. Lemma: γείτων.

γενεὰς (geneas). A generation; money is said to have entered Sparta for many generations without leaving again. References: 122e. Lemma: γενεά.

γήρως (gērōs). Old age; Zopyrus is described as least useful among the household slaves because of age, a harsh judgment placed in Socrates' comparison. References: 122b. Lemma: γῆρας.

δακτύλιον (daktylion). A ring; it belongs to the finger but improving the ring is not thereby improving the finger. References: 128a. Lemma: δακτύλιος.

δακτύλου (daktylou). A finger; the ring's owner in the local example makes the relation between bodily part and external equipment explicit. References: 128a. Lemma: δάκτυλος.

δεινοὺς (deinous). Formidable or fearsome; regarding rivals as formidable would encourage greater care rather than complacency. References: 120d. Lemma: δεινός.

δέξαιό (dexaio). To accept or choose for oneself; Alcibiades is asked whether he would choose goods or bad things, beginning a test of courage's value. References: 115c. Lemma: δέχομαι.

δῆλον (dēlon). Manifest or evident; Socrates treats Alcibiades' striking appearance as something anyone can see, in contrast with untested wisdom. References: 104a. Lemma: δῆλος.

δημοσίᾳ (dēmosiai). Publicly or at the civic level; cities as well as individuals agree in the elementary linguistic cases. References: 111c. Lemma: δημοσίᾳ.

διαβῆναι (diabēnai). To cross over; passage into Asia marks the further geographical expansion Alcibiades is imagined to demand. References: 105c. Lemma: διαβαίνω.

διατελέσαι (diatelesai). To persist or carry something through to its end; Socrates wishes that Alcibiades will

sustain the care for justice he has just promised to begin. References: 135e. Lemma: διατελέω.

διαφθαρῇς (diaphtharēis). To corrupt or ruin; Socrates fears the Athenian people's effect on Alcibiades, setting a condition on the beloved's continued improvement. References: 132a. Lemma: διαφθείρω.

διαφορᾶς (diaphoras). Difference or dispute; the noun names the quarrel over right and wrong around which the epic examples are organized. References: 112b. Lemma: διαφορά.

διέγνωκας (diegnōkas). To distinguish or make out; Alcibiades ironically grants that Socrates has diagnosed his thoughts so decisively that denial would not persuade him. References: 106a. Lemma: διαγιγνώσκω.

διελθεῖν (dielthein). To go through or recount; Socrates proposes to enumerate the grounds of Alcibiades' self-confidence. References: 104a. Lemma: διέρχομαι.

διοικεῖν (dioikein). To administer, order or manage; Alcibiades says good counsel should order the city better and preserve it. References: 126a. Lemma: διοικέω.

ἐᾶν (ean). To allow or permit; Socrates explains that the god formerly did not allow him to converse with Alcibiades. References: 105d. Lemma: ἐάω.

εἴθισαι (eithisai). To accustom; Alcibiades is accustomed to hearing long speeches, the format Socrates initially declines. References: 106b. Lemma: ἐθίζω.

ἕλκη (helkē). A wound or bodily lesion; paired with death as a harmful consequence distinguished from courage in evaluating rescue. References: 115b. Lemma: ἕλκος.

ἐλλόγιμος (ellogimos). Notable or highly regarded; Zeno's paying pupils are described as both wise and distinguished, a claim about their reputed educational outcome. References: 119a. Lemma: ἐλλόγιμος.

ἕλξεις (helxeis). A trailing or dragging; the trailing of robes is a visible detail in the catalogue of Persian luxury. References: 122c. Lemma: ἕλξις.

ἐμμελέτησον (emmeletēson). To practise upon or rehearse with; Socrates offers himself as the audience on whom Alcibiades can practise proving his political claim. References: 114d. Lemma: ἐμμελετάω.

ἐμπλήσεις (emplēseis). To fill completely; Alcibiades imagines filling virtually all humanity with his name and power. References: 105c. Lemma: ἐμπίμπλημι.

ἐμφαίνεται (emphainetai). To appear within or be reflected; an observer's face appears in the eye opposite, providing the visible basis of the pupil analogy. References: 133a. Lemma: ἐμφαίνω.

ἐνδεὴς (endeēs). In need of or lacking; Alcibiades' claim to need no person is the opening expression of his supposed self-sufficiency. References: 104a. Lemma: ἐνδεής.

ἐνδειξάμενος (endeixamenos). To display or demonstrate; Alcibiades expects a public display of his worth to confer exceptional political power. References: 105b. Lemma: ἐνδείκνυμι.

ἔνδοθεν (endothen). From inside or from home; leaving the house would have been needed for lessons and, Socrates implies, noticed. References: 106e. Lemma: ἔνδοθεν.

ἐνοχλεῖς (enochleis). To trouble or bother someone; Alcibiades calls Socrates' constant silent attendance an annoyance, while admitting curiosity about its purpose. References: 104d. Lemma: ἐνοχλέω.

ἐξ ἴσου (ex isou). On equal terms or at an equal level; cowardice is ranked alongside being dead in Alcibiades' ordering of the worst things. References: 115d. Lemma: ἐξ ἴσου.

ἐξαρκεῖν (exarkein). To suffice or be enough; Alcibiades' complacent claim is that his present condition already supplies what the contest needs. References: 123e. Lemma: ἐξαρκέω.

ἐξειλεγμένοι (exeilegmenoi). To select or pick out; the four royal educators have been chosen as the best mature Persians in their respective virtues. References: 121e. Lemma: ἐκλέγω.

ἐξῃρημένους (exēirēmenous). To set apart or assign specially; desirable lands have been earmarked for the royal wife's adornment. References: 123c. Lemma: ἐξαιρέω.

ἐπαινοῖντ' (epainoint'). To praise or commend; Socrates explicitly allows praise of the many as teachers of Greek, limiting the force of his criticism of them. References: 111a. Lemma: ἐπαινέω.

ἕπεται (hepetai). To follow as a consequence; doing badly follows offices and powers that fall short of virtue. References: 135b. Lemma: ἕπομαι.

ἐπιδεῖξαι (epideixai). To exhibit or demonstrate; Alcibiades is challenged to show that justice sometimes fails to confer advantage. References: 114d. Lemma: ἐπιδείκνυμι.

ἐπιθέσθαι (epithesthai). To set upon or undertake; the middle infinitive describes Alcibiades' projected intervention in the affairs of Asia. References: 105c. Lemma: ἐπιτίθημι.

ἐπιπλήττοι (epiplēttoi). To rebuke or check someone; the sick tyrant's power forbids correction and so prevents useful medical restraint. References: 135a. Lemma: ἐπιπλήσσω.

ἐπιτάττων (epitattōn). To enjoin or command; the giver of the self-knowledge injunction is interpreted as commanding knowledge of the soul. References: 130e. Lemma: ἐπιτάσσω.

ἐπιτρέπεις (epitrepeis). To entrust or leave something to another; acknowledged lack of knowledge allows Alcibiades to defer to the person who knows. References: 117c. Lemma: ἐπιτρέπω.

ἐπιχειρεῖν (epicheirein). To undertake or attempt; Alcibiades intends to teach without knowing, exposing the gap between ambition and preparation. References: 113c. Lemma: ἐπιχειρέω.

ἐπιχείρημα (epicheirēma). An undertaking or attempted enterprise; the contemplated entry into political teaching is the reckless project at issue, not a formal logical proof. References: 113c. Lemma: ἐπιχείρημα.

ἐπιχωρίους (epichōrious). Local or belonging to the place; the local inhabitants use the names of royal adornments for the supporting estates. References: 123b. Lemma: ἐπιχώριος.

ἔσχατα (eschata). Extreme or ultimate; doing the worst things to themselves describes the lethal endpoint of opponents' dispute over justice. References: 112d. Lemma: ἔσχατος.

ἑταίρῳ (hetairōi). A companion or comrade; the endangered fellow soldier is someone whom the rescuer is expected to help. References: 115b. Lemma: ἑταῖρος.

εὔελπις (euelpis). Hopeful or of good hope; Socrates expects that the divine opposition will not return. References: 103b. Lemma: εὔελπις.

εὐλάβειαν (eulabeian). Caution or a precaution; the lover's warning becomes a demand for protective preparation before entering political life. References: 132a. Lemma: εὐλάβεια.

ἔφθης (ephthēs). To anticipate or get ahead of another; Socrates has narrowly beaten Alcibiades to the question the young man was planning to ask. References: 104d. Lemma: φθάνω.

ζωὴ (zōē). Life or being alive; paired with courage in opposition to death and cowardice, while Alcibiades rejects merely living as a coward. References: 115d. Lemma: ζωή.

ἠλιθίω (ēlithiō). Simple-minded or foolish; Alcibiades disparages Pericles' two sons when they are proposed as evidence of their father's teaching. References: 118e. Lemma: ἠλίθιος.

ἡμερησίαν (hēmerēsian). Lasting a day or covering a day's travel; the reported stretch of fertile land approaches a full day's journey. References: 123b. Lemma: ἡμερήσιος.

ἡσυχίαν (hēsychian). Quiet or noninterference; keeping quiet while entrusting steering to the pilot exemplifies restraint grounded in awareness of ignorance. References: 117d. Lemma: ἡσυχία.

θαρρεῖν (tharrein). To take heart or be confident; Socrates encourages Alcibiades after the admission of his unrecognized shameful condition, because recognizing it while young permits care. References: 127d. Lemma: θαρρέω.

θεραπόντων (therapontōn). An attendant or servant; the multitude following a Persian magnate makes Alcibiades' own resources look small. References: 122c. Lemma: θεράπων.

ἰδίᾳ (idiai). Privately or individually; ordinary speakers are consistent with themselves as individuals, while cities likewise agree publicly about ordinary words. References: 111c. Lemma: ἰδίᾳ.

καινὰ (kaina). New or novel; the demand for fresh arguments is mocked as a desire for new clothes, not accepted as a refutation of old evidence. References: 113e. Lemma: καινός.

καμνόντων (kamnontōn). To be ill or suffer bodily distress; ruling sick persons is excluded as the political expertise Alcibiades means. References: 125b. Lemma: κάμνω.

κατὰ μόνας (kata monas). One-to-one or alone; persuading one hearer is compared with persuading a larger audience about the same known subject. References: 114b. Lemma: κατὰ μόνας.

καταβιῶναι (katabiōnai). To pass or spend one's life; the issue is whether Alcibiades would consent to a life confined to his present advantages. References: 104e. Lemma: καταβιόω.

καταγελῴης (katagelōiēs). To laugh at or ridicule; Alcibiades is asked how he would judge an adviser whose

claim contradicts the conclusion he has just accepted. References: 116d. Lemma: καταγελάω.

κατανενόηκα (katanenoēka). To observe and come to understand; Socrates claims to have taken in Alcibiades' treatment of his lovers during the silent interval. References: 103b. Lemma: κατανοέω.

καταντικρὺ (katantikry). Directly opposite; the seeing surface of the person facing one contains the reflected image. References: 133a. Lemma: καταντικρύ.

καταφεύγεις (katapheugeis). To take refuge in; Alcibiades resorts to the many as his teachers when other accounts of his knowledge fail. References: 110e. Lemma: καταφεύγω.

καταφρονηθέντας (kataphronēthentas). To look down upon or reckon inferior; Socrates envisages allies so far surpassed that they cooperate instead of competing for leadership. References: 119e. Lemma: καταφρονέω.

κατέλιπε (katelipe). To leave behind or appoint when departing; Cleinias left Pericles as guardian for his sons. References: 104b. Lemma: καταλείπω.

κατηγορήσω (katēgorēsō). To bring an accusation or lay something to someone's charge; Socrates playfully indicts Alcibiades before Alcibiades himself for his further ambitions. References: 105a. Lemma: κατηγορέω.

κατιδεῖν (katidein). To discern or see comprehensively; the revised argument assigns discrimination of self, its own and its possessions to one person and one craft. References: 133e. Lemma: attested expression: κατιδεῖν.

κατορθοῦντας (katorthountas). To straighten or set right; paired with moulding as part of the royal infant's bodily formation. References: 121d. Lemma: κατορθόω.

κεκράτηκας (kekratēkas). To prevail over or defeat; Alcibiades has conquered his lovers in the opening contest of pride. References: 104c. Lemma: κρατέω.

κοινὴ βουλή (koinē boulē). A shared decision or matter for joint counsel; Alcibiades invites Socrates to consider together whether and how he should care for himself. References: 119b. Lemma: κοινὴ βουλή.

κοινῇ (koinēi). Together or in common; Socrates invites Alcibiades to inspect the difference between acknowledged and unacknowledged ignorance jointly. References: 117c. Lemma: κοινῇ.

κοινωνούντων (koinōnountōn). To share or participate in something; civic participants share a political community as sailors share a voyage and choristers a song. References: 125d. Lemma: κοινωνέω.

κομιδῇ (komidēi). Entirely or thoroughly; Alcibiades gives emphatic assent to the soul conclusion before Socrates qualifies its precision. References: 130c. Lemma: κομιδῇ.

κτῆσιν (ktēsin). Acquisition or possession; happiness is connected with acquiring good things in the argument linking doing finely and doing well. References: 116b. Lemma: κτῆσις.

κτητέον (ktēteon). To be acquired; the verbal adjective makes Alcibiades' own acquisition of virtue prior to responsible civic care. References: 134c. Lemma: κτητέος.

κωλύει (kōlyei). To prevent or stand in the way; Alcibiades asks what prevents him from knowing advantage, anticipating the renewed test of how he learned it. References: 113e. Lemma: κωλύω.

κωφότητος (kōphotētos). Deafness; its removal is paired with the arrival of hearing in the examples of successful care. References: 126b. Lemma: κωφότης.

λείπεται (leipetai). To remain as an alternative; after body and composite are excluded, soul remains unless the human being is nothing at all. References: 130c. Lemma: λείπω.

λήγει (lēgei). To cease or come to an end; the body's blooming ends and bodily lovers depart, unlike the lover of an improving soul. References: 131c. Lemma: λήγω.

λήψεις (lēpseis). A receipt or taking; the kings' especially large receipts help account for their comparative wealth. References: 123a. Lemma: λῆψις.

μαθήματα (mathēmata). A subject of learning or an accomplishment; the text's disparagement of manual arts denies them the standing of subjects suitable for a good man. References: 131b. Lemma: μάθημα.

μαλθακιστέον (malthakisteon). To become soft or lose one's nerve; Socrates forbids shrinking from the shared work of becoming better. References: 124d. Lemma: μαλθακίζομαι.

μανικὸν (manikon). Mad or senseless; the attempt to teach what one has not troubled to learn receives this emphatic practical criticism. References: 113c. Lemma: μανικός.

μάτην (matēn). In vain or without effect; the earlier delay avoided a conversation that Alcibiades was not yet prepared to hear fruitfully. References: 105e. Lemma: μάτην.

μέλη (melē). A limb or bodily member; the infant's limbs are the objects of the attendants' physical shaping. References: 121d. Lemma: μέλος.

μεταδιδόναι (metadidonai). To give a share of or impart; a ruler cannot impart virtue to citizens unless he first possesses it. References: 134c. Lemma: μεταδίδωμι.

μηχανᾶσθαι (mēchanasthai). To contrive or devise means; the royal attendants must actively devise ways to make the infant as beautiful as possible. References: 121d. Lemma: μηχανάομαι.

μηχανὴ (mēchanē). A means or possible way; the phrase denies any way for the composite to rule when one component has no share in ruling. References: 130b. Lemma: μηχανή.

μνήμην (mnēmēn). Memory or recollection; Socrates appeals to his recollection of Alcibiades' actual lessons rather than assuming an unlimited education. References: 106e. Lemma: μνήμη.

μνημονεύεις (mnēmoneueis). To remember; Socrates recalls the earlier agreement about justice so it can be joined to the newly accepted links. References: 116c. Lemma: μνημονεύω.

μόγις (mogis). With difficulty; the joke that Socrates may find stopping as hard as starting makes his belated approach potentially inexhaustible. References: 104e. Lemma: μόγις.

μοχθηροί (mochthēroi). Poor, bad or deficient; disagreement would expose the many as poor teachers of health-related distinctions. References: 111e. Lemma: μοχθηρός.

ναυμαχεῖν (naumachein). To fight a naval battle; a warship's pilot must measure himself against enemy pilots, not merely against his own crew. References: 119d. Lemma: ναυμαχέω.

νέμεται (nemetai). To graze or pasture; the middle form describes livestock feeding in Messenian territory. References: 122e. Lemma: νέμω.

νοσώδεις (nosōdeis). Sickly or subject to disease; contrasted with healthy people in the test of teachers' discriminating knowledge. References: 111e. Lemma: νοσώδης.

νύκτωρ (nyktōr). By night; Socrates' comic claim to know Alcibiades' movements rules out an unnoticed course of study after dark. References: 106e. Lemma: νύκτωρ.

ὄγκῳ (onkōi). Weight, grandeur or prestige; the imposing scale of royal descent is contrasted with Alcibiades' locally esteemed ancestry. References: 121b. Lemma: ὄγκος.

οἰκείῳ (oikeiōi). Someone of one's own circle, such as a relative; the rescue example includes ties of kinship as well as comradeship. References: 115b. Lemma: οἰκεῖος.

ὀκνῶ (oknō). To hesitate or shrink from doing something; Socrates hesitates to name Alcibiades' condition until their privacy makes bluntness possible. References: 118b. Lemma: ὀκνέω.

ὁρμῶσιν (hormōsin). To move or direct oneself towards; competent speakers converge on the same objects when asked for stone or wood. References: 111c. Lemma: ὁρμάω.

ὀρρωδῶ (orrōdō). To dread or fear; Socrates' final apprehension concerns the city's strength rather than

distrust of Alcibiades' nature. References: 135e. Lemma: ὀρρωδέω.

οὐρανόν (ouranon). Heaven or sky; the deliberately remote destination helps separate admitted ignorance from the unstable opinions of presumed knowledge. References: 117b. Lemma: οὐρανός.

ὄχλου (ochlou). Trouble or nuisance; the lovers made themselves bothersome by addressing Alcibiades, whereas Socrates remained silent. References: 103a. Lemma: ὄχλος.

ὄψου (opsou). A relish or prepared dish eaten with the staple meal; its preparation is a domestic expertise Alcibiades admits he lacks. References: 117c. Lemma: ὄψον.

πάθημα (pathēma). Something suffered or a condition one undergoes; Alcibiades' disordered answering becomes a condition whose nature he does not yet understand. References: 116e. Lemma: πάθημα.

παραγιγνομένου (paragignomenou). To become present or arise; the question asks which condition's presence makes a body or city better managed. References: 126a. Lemma: παραγίγνομαι.

παραδοῦναι (paradounai). To hand over or impart; neither guardian nor kinsman can transmit the desired power, Socrates claims, as he can with the god's help. References: 105e. Lemma: παραδίδωμι.

παραμένων (paramenōn). To remain beside someone; Socrates contrasts his constancy with the departure of Alcibiades' bodily admirers. References: 131d. Lemma: παραμένω.

παρήλθομεν (parēlthomen). To pass by or leave aside; they have deferred the fuller inquiry into the self itself because it requires extensive examination. References: 130d. Lemma: παρέρχομαι.

πέμποιμεν (pempoimen). To send someone to another for instruction; the many would be an appropriate destination for learning the ordinary matters they know. References: 111d. Lemma: πέμπω.

πεντηκονταετής (pentēkontaetēs). Fifty years old; this hypothetical age contrasts with Alcibiades' youth to emphasize the timeliness of recognizing his need. References: 127e. Lemma: πεντηκονταετής.

πεπαυμένων (pepaumenōn). To stop or cease; the perfect participle presents the other lovers' pursuit as already ended. References: 103a. Lemma: παύω.

πεπέρανται (peperantai). To bring to completion or establish so far; the inquiry has reached a sufficient agreement about what the interlocutors are, allowing the question of care to proceed. References: 132b. Lemma: περαίνω.

περιμενοῦντι (perimenounti). To wait or stay for something; Alcibiades is asked to remain and hear Socrates out. References: 104d. Lemma: περιμένω.

περιορᾷ (periorai). To overlook or allow something to remain; Socrates asks why Pericles lets Alcibiades continue in his present uneducated state. References: 118e. Lemma: περιοράω.

πέφευγεν (pepheugen). To flee or take flight; the defeated lover's withdrawal is described as flight, giving courtship the vocabulary of a contest. References: 103b. Lemma: φεύγω.

πεφοίτηκα (pephoitēka). To attend or frequent a teacher; Alcibiades acknowledges having attended no instructors beyond the listed subjects. References: 106e. Lemma: φοιτάω.

πήχεος (pēcheos). A cubit, a forearm-based measure; knowledge of measurement settles its comparison with a span for individuals and cities alike. References: 126d. Lemma: πῆχυς.

πιστεύσῃς (pisteusēis). To trust or believe someone; Socrates tells Alcibiades not to trust another speaker unless his own answers establish the claim. References: 114e. Lemma: πιστεύω.

ποδῶν (podōn). A foot; feet and their shoes supply the first concrete distinction between something and what belongs to it. References: 128a. Lemma: πούς.

πόθεν (pothen). From where or from what source; the question asks Alcibiades to account for the acquisition of his supposed knowledge. References: 110d. Lemma: πόθεν.

ποιήματά (poiēmata). A poetic composition; the Iliad and Odyssey are invoked as poems concerning conflict over justice and injustice. References: 112b. Lemma: ποίημα.

πορρωτέρω (porrōterō). Further away or more remote; artisans’ objects of knowledge lie farther from the self than even its body in the relational hierarchy. References: 131a. Lemma: πορρωτέρω.

προδρομὰς (prodromas). A running ahead or anticipation; Alcibiades tries to forestall Socrates’ familiar question about the source of his knowledge. References: 114a. Lemma: προδρομή.

προθυμοῦ (prothymou). To make an eager effort; Socrates urges Alcibiades not to tire of answering but to try to articulate the intended civic concord. References: 126e. Lemma: προθυμέομαι.

προθύμως (prothymōs). Eagerly or willingly; Socrates expects an attentive hearing because Alcibiades himself wants to know what he has in mind. References: 104d. Lemma: προθύμως.

προσεῖπον (proseipon). To address or speak to someone; this aorist expresses the personal approach that Socrates says he has withheld for years. References: 103a. Lemma: attested expression: προσεῖπον.

προσέχων γέ σοι τὸν νοῦν (prosechōn ge soi ton noun). To direct one's attention to someone; Socrates claims continuing close attention as the basis for knowing Alcibiades' ambitions. References: 105a. Lemma: προσέχω τὸν νοῦν.

προσθήσω (prosthēsō). To add; Socrates appends wealth to the catalogue of Alcibiades' existing advantages. References: 104b. Lemma: προστίθημι.

σιγῶν (sigōn). To remain silent; Alcibiades recalls Socrates following without speech and now finds his explanation even stranger. References: 106a. Lemma: σιγάω.

σκευασίας (skeuasias). Preparation or making ready; the preparation of a dish provides a clear case for leaving an unfamiliar task to someone competent. References: 117c. Lemma: σκευασία.

σμίλῃ (smilēi). A knife or fine cutting tool; a concrete implement in the shoemaker analogy, not a metaphorical name for reason. References: 129c. Lemma: σμίλη.

σπιθαμῆς (spithamēs). A span measured by the outstretched hand; comparing it with the cubit exemplifies agreement grounded in measurement. References: 126d. Lemma: σπιθαμή.

σπουδαίους (spoudaious). Serious, competent or worthy; the many are challenged as reliable teachers of justice, rather than merely criticized for lacking solemn manners. References: 110e. Lemma: σπουδαῖος.

στέρεσθαι (steresthai). To be deprived of or do without; willingness to lose courage is tested by asking what compensation Alcibiades would accept. References: 115d. Lemma: στερέω.

στρατιωτῶν (stratiōtōn). A soldier; being better than ordinary soldiers is distinguished from being able to rival opposing commanders. References: 119e. Lemma: στρατιώτης.

στρώματα (strōmata). Bedding or a covering spread out; paired with clothes as equipment belonging to the body in a supplied question printed by Burnet. References: 128a. Lemma: στρῶμα. This attestation belongs to Burnet's supplied question at 128a; the edition translates it.

συμβαλλόντων (symballontōn). To have dealings or enter relations with others; civic rule concerns people interacting with one another in a shared city. References: 125c. Lemma: συμβάλλω.

συμπόλλους (sympollous). Very many together; the larger audience does not, in Socrates' argument, change the competence needed to persuade about something known. References: 114c. Lemma: σύμπολυς.

συνναυτῶν (synnautōn). A fellow sailor or shipmate; superiority to one's own crew is an inadequate measure

of preparation for combat. References: 119d. Lemma: συνναύτης.

συνοικεῖς (synoikeis). To dwell or live together with; Alcibiades is pictured as cohabiting with extreme unlearnedness, making ignorance a persistent companion. References: 118b. Lemma: συνοικέω.

σφαλέντες (sphalentes). To slip, go wrong or miss the object; a mistaken account of the self could lead them to care for something else without noticing. References: 132b. Lemma: σφάλλω.

τελέους (teleous). Complete or fully developed; good birth joined to good upbringing is said to bring persons to maturity in excellence within the royal comparison. References: 120e. Lemma: τέλεος.

τέλος (telos). Completion or fulfilment; Socrates claims that Alcibiades' designs cannot reach their end without him. References: 105d. Lemma: τέλος.

τέμνει (temnei). To cut; the shoemaker's cutting distinguishes the agent from the cutting implements and then from the hands and eyes employed. References: 129c. Lemma: τέμνω.

τολμητέον (tolmēteon). To dare or venture; the verbal adjective says that Socrates must nevertheless venture to reveal his intention. References: 104e. Lemma: τολμάω.

τομεῖ (tomei). A cutting tool; one of the shoemaker's implements through which the user is distinguished from what he uses. References: 129c. Lemma: τομεύς.

τόπον (topon). A place or region; the eye's seeing region and the soul's wise region are the relevant locations in the analogy, without a specified anatomical theory of soul. References: 133b. Lemma: τόπος.

τραύματα (traumata). A wound; injury incurred while rescuing another supplies the respect in which an otherwise courageous action may be called bad. References: 115b. Lemma: τραῦμα.

τροφοῦ (trophou). A nurse or person who rears a child; Socrates contrasts a nurse of little standing with the selected attendants assigned to a Persian heir. References: 121d. Lemma: τροφός.

τυφλότητος (typhlotētos). Blindness; its departure and sight's presence make eyes better, illustrating a determinate improvement rather than a vague claim of better care. References: 126b. Lemma: τυφλότης.

ὑγιεινοὶ (hygieinoi). Healthy or conducive to health according to context; here distinguishing healthy people from unhealthy ones requires relevant expertise. References: 111e. Lemma: ὑγιεινός.

ὑπάρχοντά (hyparchonta). To be available or belong to someone; the existing advantages on which Alcibiades relies extend from bodily features to personal and social resources. References: 104a. Lemma: ὑπάρχω.

ὑπερβληθεὶς (hyperblētheis). To surpass or outdo; each proud lover has been exceeded by Alcibiades in pride and has fled. References: 103b. Lemma: ὑπερβάλλω.

ὑπηρέτημα (hypēretēma). A service or act of assistance; answering is introduced as the limited assistance that makes Socrates' demonstration possible. References: 106b. Lemma: ὑπηρέτημα.

ὑποδεέστεροι (hypodeesteroi). Inferior or less well endowed; Alcibiades' admirers are represented as beaten because they fall below his own estimate of himself. References: 104c. Lemma: ὑποδεέστερος.

ὑπομένω (hypomenō). To remain or hold one's ground; Socrates stays in the courtship after others have fled. References: 104c. Lemma: ὑπομένω.

ὑπόπτερον (hypopteron). Winged; the returning love is pictured as a fledgling able to care for the love that brought it forth. References: 135e. Lemma: ὑπόπτερος.

ὑποψίαν (hypopsian). Suspicion; Socrates says the Persian king's power leaves no suspicion that a royal heir could have another father. References: 121c. Lemma: ὑποψία.

φαυλότερα (phaulotera). Inferior, ordinary or less important; the rules of draughts are judged less serious than justice, yet the many cannot competently teach even those rules. References: 110e. Lemma: φαῦλος.

φρουρεῖται (phroureitai). To guard or keep watch over; the Persian queen is said to be guarded by fear itself rather than by an ordinary watch. References: 121c. Lemma: φρουρέω.

χαλεπὸν (chalepon). Difficult or troublesome; addressing a beloved who is not inferior to his lovers is represented as a demanding undertaking. References: 104e. Lemma: χαλεπός.

χειρός (cheiros). A hand; a ring belongs to a finger of the hand, while caring for the hand itself requires a different expertise from caring for its ornament. References: 128a. Lemma: χείρ.

χρὴ (chrē). It is necessary or one ought; impersonal expression used for what a good teacher must possess: those who teach must first know their subject. References: 111a. Lemma: χρή.

ψεύδῃ (pseudēi). To speak falsely; Socrates grants that Alcibiades is not lying about his beauty and stature, without granting the adequacy of those advantages for rule. References: 104a. Lemma: ψεύδομαι.

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