From the book
The Summary of Physics Restored
Attributed to Jean d’Espagnet · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordThe author calls the forms of plants and animals rational, but immediately distinguishes their manner of being rational from the human manner.
- In the bookOrderly growth, timely reproduction, skilled activity, and self-preservation become signs of a form's inward knowledge. The claim is qualified by differences among plant, animal, and human powers.
- In this edition“Rational” renders rationales; it does not silently supply human reasoning. The plant sensitive power in canon 179 stands in tension with the denial of animal sensation in 157 and 171.
- A place to readRead 171, 177, and 179–180 together: the list of living powers is intelligible only when its explicit distinctions and its unresolved pressure points are kept visible.
Meaning
This article concerns the vocabulary of cognition as applied beyond the human intellect. Scientia is knowledge, cognitio or apprehensio a knowing or apprehending, and rationalis a relation to reason or ordered ratio. The local definition is restrictive: forms are rational in a manner proper to themselves and according to their own powers and character. The argument therefore does not simply attribute the human intellect to every plant. It also does more than describe organisms as inert objects behaving regularly.
Use in the book
The account begins before the explicit declaration of rationality. Canon 157 grants plants a soul or spirit of growth while denying sensation and animal movement. Canon 159 distinguishes animals by their sensitive soul. The difference is not erased when canon 171 attributes a dim knowledge of origin to specific forms generally. There the human soul turns towards uncreated light through contemplation; other animals turn towards their heavenly origin by instinct and an imperfect recollection; plants lift their heads towards the air but remain within their bodily bounds. The author again denies them animal sensation and movement, explaining their limited power through his reading of the creation sequence.
Canon 177 introduces a further hierarchy within knowing. Sensation apprehends outwardly, imagination inwardly; intellect is a third light given to humanity, permitting a more perfect knowledge through causes. These distinctions occur within an argument that luminous form explains reproductive multiplication. The opening inference is marked probable, even though the later reasoning is expressed more confidently. The comparison between knowing and illumination is doing argumentative work, not merely ornamenting a settled physiological account.
Canon 179 then states that animal and plant forms are rational, expressly “not in the human manner.” Plants' vital endowments include multiplication, nutrition, growth, movement, and sensitive powers. Their knowledge is inferred from seasonal anticipation, coordinated changes, the differentiation of roots, stems, leaves, flowers, and fruit, the assimilation of nourishment, and the communication of generative power to seed. The grammatical subject throughout is the specific form and its powers. The author does not present a botanical experiment isolating conscious thought in a plant.
There is nevertheless a genuine textual difficulty. Sensitiuæ appears among plant powers in 179, whereas sensation and animal movement were denied in 157 and 171. The latter passage can help distinguish a broader sensitivity from specifically animal sensation, but the book does not give a fully explicit reconciliation. A responsible entry records the difference rather than deleting one statement or pretending that the same English word settles it.
Canon 180 moves to animals. The evidence ranges from seasonal mating and well-distributed nourishment to affect, acute senses, trainability, obedience, foresight, food-getting, shelter, and avoidance of danger. Even religious observance is attributed to many animals. These are the author's examples and interpretations, not conclusions adopted by the lexicon. The closing ship image unifies the list: form is the principle of motion, rest, action, and life, entrusted with its body's care as a sailor with a vessel. Knowledge belongs to a wider claim about inward governance. It explains organised activities without assigning the same faculty, dignity, or degree of comprehension to every living kind.
Places to read
- Canon 157; 1653, p. 113LatinPlant growth distinguished from sensation and animal movement.
- Canon 159; 1653, p. 114LatinSensitive soul marks the animal level.
- Canon 165; 1653, pp. 116, 117LatinIrrationalis elsewhere means lack of common measure, not the absence of reasoning.
- Canon 171; 1653, pp. 120, 121LatinDim knowledge of origin; human contemplation, animal instinct, and plant limits.
- Canon 177; 1653, pp. 125, 126, 127LatinSensation, imagination, and intellect distinguished in the argument from luminosity.
- Canon 179; 1653, pp. 127, 128LatinPlant rationality expressly qualified; the sensitive-power difficulty.
- Canon 180; 1653, pp. 128, 129LatinAnimal knowledge illustrated by activities and the governing sailor image.
Translation in this edition
The edition's “kinds of apprehension and knowledge” in 179 keeps cognitiones and scientias plural: the text recognises differentiated endowments, not one univocal faculty. In the list of powers, sensitiuæ is rendered through “sensation”; the modern annotation asks readers to compare 171 rather than removing the tension. Religiosus cultus in 180 is translated as “religious observance,” preserving the strong historical attribution. In 171 irrationality is not at issue; elsewhere, in 165, irrationalis concerns lack of common measure between luminous form and dark matter, a different sense that should not contaminate this article.
Proper manner — sibi proprio
In their own proper manner: the immediate limit upon nonhuman rationality. — Canon 179; 1653, pp. 127, 128.
Vital gifts — dona vitalia
Vital gifts, the powers according to which living kinds are differentiated. — Canon 179; 1653, pp. 127, 128.
Kinds of apprehension — cognitiones
Kinds of apprehension assigned to forms, not an unqualified claim to human intellect. — Canon 179; 1653, pp. 127, 128.
Foreknowledge — prænotione
Foreknowledge, inferred here from plants' fitting activity at appointed seasons. — Canon 179; 1653, pp. 127, 128.
Nutritive powers — nutritiuæ
Nutritive powers, included among the ordered capacities of plants. — Canon 179; 1653, pp. 127, 128.
Powers of growth — augmentatiuæ
Powers of increase or growth, distinguished within the vital endowments. — Canon 179; 1653, pp. 127, 128.
Imagination — Imaginatiuam
The imaginative faculty, responsible for inward apprehension in the twofold account. — Canon 177; 1653, pp. 125, 126, 127.
Intellect — Intellectum
Intellect, the third light God gives to human beings. — Canon 177; 1653, pp. 125, 126, 127.
Instinct — instinctus
Instinct, here credited with foretelling future conditions. — Canon 180; 1653, pp. 128, 129.
Religious observance — religiosus cultus
Religious observance, the author's attribution to many animals. — Canon 180; 1653, pp. 128, 129.
Sailor — nautæ
To a sailor: the comparison clarifies the form's care of its body. — Canon 180; 1653, pp. 128, 129.