Time, flux and the moment

Divisibility

infinitely divisible

Time cut without end into smaller parts, and every impression with it: the step by which the Conclusion's analysis reduces the real to a vanishing moment

From the book

The Renaissance

Walter Pater · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe quality of being divisible; to be infinitely divisible is to admit of division without end.
  • In The RenaissanceAnalysis assures us that each impression is limited by time, "and that as time is infinitely divisible, each of them is infinitely divisible also" (CON §3).
  • In this editionThe edition has no note on the phrase.
  • A place to readCON §3.

Meaning

That magnitude and time can be divided without end was the ground of the paradoxes of Zeno of Elea, in which the runner never reaches the end of the course because he must first cross half of it, and half of the half, without end. Aristotle answered that the infinitely divisible is only potentially divided, and that motion is real.1 The question of the present moment was given its classic form by Augustine of Hippo in the eleventh book of his Confessions (about 400): the present is only what can be divided into no smaller part, and it flies from future into past so swiftly that it has no extent at all, and we can say that time is only because it tends not to be.2

Use in the book

The phrase comes in the sentence that takes the Conclusion's analysis to its last step. Impressions have been shut in the individual mind (CON §3; see Wall of personality). "Analysis goes a step further still, and assures us that those impressions of the individual mind to which, for each one of us, experience dwindles down, are in perpetual flight; that each of them is limited by time, and that as time is infinitely divisible, each of them is infinitely divisible also; all that is actual in it being a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it, of which it may ever be more truly said that it has ceased to be than that it is" (CON §3).

The argument is a syllogism hidden in a sentence. Every impression takes time; time is infinitely divisible; so every impression is infinitely divisible, and what is actual in it at any instant is less than any part we can name. The last clause turns the logic into a paradox about being. Of the moment it is "more truly said that it has ceased to be than that it is": the present is always already past. Augustine had said almost the same thing of time itself, and Pater, who does not name him, can be read as giving the Christian philosopher's perplexity a new setting. Augustine looked from the vanishing present to the eternal; Pater looks from it to the next impression.

The paragraph does not stop at nothing. The next sentence finds a remainder, "a single sharp impression" (CON §3; see Tremulous wisp), and what is real in our life fines itself down to a tremulous wisp re-forming on the stream. And the next paragraph builds the ethic on the paradox. If the moment is gone while we try to apprehend it, then to apprehend it at all requires the fullest attention: every moment some form "grows perfect in hand or face" (CON §4; see Moment), and the moment that is infinitely small is also the only place where perfection is found.

The idea of division runs through the book in a gentler key. The essays praise discrimination, the finer and finer division of what the rough eye sees as one (see Discriminate), and the Winckelmann essay praises the arts that can refine upon a single moment of passion, "unravelling its subtlest threads" (WIN §33; see Romantic arts). Divisibility is the same refinement carried to its limit, and the Conclusion can be read as finding at the limit both the dissolution of the self and the reason for its intensity.

Places to read

The paragraph in which "infinitely divisible" occurs, with its 1873 text and the paragraph of the arts that refine upon a single moment, in the order of the book.

  1. WIN §33Painting, by the flushing of colour in the face, and music, by its subtle range of tones, can refine most delicately upon a single moment of passion.
  2. CON §3As time is infinitely divisible, each impression is infinitely divisible also; all that is actual in it is a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it.
  3. C73 §4In 1873 the sentence opens a paragraph of its own, and analysis "tells us" what it assures us in 1893.

Elsewhere in Pater

Marius the Epicurean (1885) gives the thought to Marius himself, the later disciple of Heraclitus and the Cyrenaic Aristippus, in whom "the abstract apprehension that the little point of this present moment alone really is, between a past which has just ceased to be and a future which may never come" becomes a resolve to live in the present.3

Source note

1. Aristotle, Physics VI.2, 233a21–31; VIII.8, 263a4–b9.

2. Augustine, Confessions XI.14.17–15.20: ut scilicet non vere dicamus tempus esse, nisi quia tendit non esse?

3. Walter Pater, Marius the Epicurean (London, 1885), chapter VIII, "Animula Vagula".