Lexicon of the Pensées

Words and arguments in Blaise Pascal's Pensées and accompanying texts

Diotimos Editions

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About these entries

This lexicon accompanies the Diotimos Editions French and English publication proof of Blaise Pascal's Pensées dated 24 October 2026. It follows the specified Brunschvicg corpus: 983 reading units, including the separately numbered bis and ter additions. The Mémorial and the Questions on miracles are treated as accompanying texts, not silently incorporated into the apologetic fragments. The latter preserve Pascal's prefatory request and questions alongside replies by Martin de Barcos.

The entries explain how a word works in a particular sentence, example or argument, then follow its changing uses elsewhere. Heart does not always mean emotion; reason is not always a demonstration; figure can concern an interpretive relation rather than an ornamental image. A headword gathers these relations without making every occurrence say the same thing. The substantial articles develop the sixty topics in the supplied edition's brief companion lexicon, while a separately explained register makes further words, objects, people and phrases available for consultation.

The form follows the supplied Charmides exemplar: a short orientation, sustained explanation, annotated passages in source order, attention to the wording of this edition, and cross-references. The references are selected attestations and interpretive connections established through reading the complete supplied corpus. They are not an exhaustive list of every occurrence, a lemma-frequency study or a claim to represent every surviving paper by Pascal.

The French and its paired Diotimos English translation are the textual basis. The supplied annotations inform local readings and qualifications; their reports about manuscripts, historical editions and critical scholarship are identified as reports rather than presented as new collation for this lexicon. Brunschvicg's arrangement is an editorial sequence, not Pascal's finished plan. The fragmentary and sometimes exploratory character of the writing remains important even when an entry draws several passages together.

Pascal's Christian apologetic arguments are explained as arguments. The lexicon distinguishes a cited biblical statement, an observation about its transmission, and a theological inference drawn from it. Collective judgments about Jewish people, Muslims, pagans or religious opponents remain attributable to the source's polemical voices; they are not adopted as neutral historical descriptions. A question, objection, quoted speaker and defended conclusion likewise retain their different functions.

The Mémorial is read in the paper-D version supplied by the edition. Its final Etc. is part of that text. The longer ending and other readings reported from the lost parchment's copy E are not imported into D. In the Questions

on miracles, a reply by Barcos is not labeled as Pascal's own conclusion. The mixed hands and editorial display labels in B958 (Brunschvicg 958) also require local attribution rather than a single undifferentiated authorial voice.

Using this lexicon

Each substantial article opens with At a Glance and continues through Meaning, Use in the book, Places to Read, In this edition and See also. The French forms at its head provide lexical routes into the discussion. A printed form is attested in the cited passage; a phrase is a group of words; a lemma is a dictionary form rather than necessarily the exact inflection printed. An editorial alias supplies an English or organizing label without claiming that label as Pascal's wording.

B means the Brunschvicg fragment label printed in the supplied book. Bis and ter identify separate reading units, not notes attached to an integer-numbered fragment. Brunschvicg fragments 16, 603 and 854 are absent from the declared historical corpus and are not gaps filled from another edition. References do not silently substitute Lafuma or Sellier numbers. They identify the supplied reading, including its disclosed local corrections and conjectures.

MEM (Mémorial paper D) identifies the supplied Mémorial, paper D. QM-PREF (Pascal, Pascal's questions to Martin de Barcos, abbé de Saint-Cyran, with Barcos's replies. The author of each contribution is stated separately. The source groups questions V and VI under one reply.) identifies Pascal's prefatory request. The other QM labels identify a numbered question group, with Q for Pascal's question and R for Barcos's reply. The source groups questions V and VI with one reply; their joined label preserves that arrangement. These companion labels are navigation aids used here, not a newly attributed historical numbering.

Links on passage identifiers lead to this lexicon's source-ordered passage index. Read the full bilingual passage in the supplied book. Printed page numbers following an entry title refer to pages of this lexicon, not to the proof, an early manuscript or a historical edition. The form and English lookups give additional ways to find the same explanations; a cross-reference indicates a useful relationship, not synonymy.

Passage identifiers link to the source-ordered index within this lexicon. B labels are the supplied Brunschvicg numbers; MEM (Mémorial paper D) and QM labels distinguish the accompanying texts. Printed page numbers in contents and lookup entries belong to this companion.

Argument map

Kinds of judgment

The opening fragments distinguish the grasp of many subtle principles from explicit demonstration. Both discernment and reasoning require a sound judgment, but their objects and procedures differ. Later passages on imagination and first principles complicate any simple division between thought and feeling.

Passages: B1 (Brunschvicg 1); B2 (Brunschvicg 2); B3 (Brunschvicg 3); B4 (Brunschvicg 4); B82 (Brunschvicg 82); B95 (Brunschvicg 95); B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

Read with: Discernment (p. 113); Geometry (p. 121); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Imagination (p. 127); First principles (p. 118); Heart (p. 124).

A life between scales

Pascal moves from the disproportion of the human being to the peculiar greatness of thought. Vulnerability to physical forces does not settle the value of a being able to know that vulnerability. The account of wretchedness also makes the recognition of a lost or unmet greatness part of its evidence.

Passages: B72 (Brunschvicg 72); B194 (Brunschvicg 194); B347 (Brunschvicg 347); B348 (Brunschvicg 348); B365 (Brunschvicg 365); B397 (Brunschvicg 397); B398 (Brunschvicg 398).

Read with: Infinity (p. 183); Thinking (p. 195); Greatness (p. 177); Wretchedness (p. 198); Death (p. 168).

Occupation and self regard

Diversion concerns what an occupation keeps a person from confronting, not merely the pleasure of an amusement. The hunt, a game, office and royal attendance test the difference between wanting an object and wanting the pursuit. Self-love and dependence on another's judgment connect this inquiry with social life.

Passages: B100 (Brunschvicg 100); B139 (Brunschvicg 139); B142 (Brunschvicg 142); B143 (Brunschvicg 143); B165 (Brunschvicg 165); B172 (Brunschvicg 172); B425 (Brunschvicg 425).

Read with: Diversion (p. 174); Boredom (p. 166); Desire (p. 171); Self-love (p. 192); Self (p. 189); Honor (p. 47).

Law custom and power

The changes of law across places and times unsettle claims that existing rules transparently display justice. Pascal nevertheless distinguishes natural justice from the uncertain grounds of custom, and distinguishes the need for political ranks from imagination's attachment of respect to particular people. His concern about civil war complicates the practical conclusion.

Passages: B294 (Brunschvicg 294); B298 (Brunschvicg 298); B304 (Brunschvicg 304); B310 (Brunschvicg 310); B320bis (Brunschvicg 320bis); B330 (Brunschvicg 330).

Read with: Justice (p. 50); Law (p. 53); Force (p. 44); Custom (p. 110); Opinion (p. 59); Tyranny (p. 65).

Choosing and becoming capable of belief

The wager is an extended exchange about action under uncertainty. The objection to choosing, the stake and possible gain, and the difficulty of believing must be followed in sequence. Other passages distinguish reason's proper use, customary practice and the gift of faith; they do not make a calculated decision identical with saving conviction.

Passages: B233 (Brunschvicg 233); B234 (Brunschvicg 234); B240 (Brunschvicg 240); B252 (Brunschvicg 252); B268 (Brunschvicg 268); B278 (Brunschvicg 278); B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

Read with: Wager (p. 100); Probability (p. 62); Reason (p. 133); Custom (p. 110); Faith (p. 79); Conversion (p. 76).

Contradiction and the human condition

Greatness and wretchedness place pressure on rival philosophical accounts of humanity. The Christian interpretation of fall and restoration supplies Pascal's proposed explanation, but a description of disorder, a doctrinal premise and an appeal to grace remain distinct steps. Religious knowledge does not make self-sufficient wisdom the cure.

Passages: B425 (Brunschvicg 425); B430 (Brunschvicg 430); B434 (Brunschvicg 434); B435 (Brunschvicg 435); B460 (Brunschvicg 460); B527 (Brunschvicg 527); B556 (Brunschvicg 556).

Read with: Contradiction (p. 107); Fall (p. 12); Sin (p. 32); Concupiscence (p. 41); Grace (p. 85); Mediation (p. 17); Humility (p. 140).

Texts figures and testimony

Pascal's scriptural dossiers gather predictions, citations, objections and claims about the preservation of texts. Figurative interpretation relates an

earlier sign to a fulfillment; it does not simply erase the earlier text. The Ezra dossier contains conflicting testimony, while the discussion of Jewish witnesses must be read with its theological and polemical assumptions visible.

Passages: B571 (Brunschvicg 571); B572 (Brunschvicg 572); B632 (Brunschvicg 632); B633 (Brunschvicg 633); B675 (Brunschvicg 675); B676 (Brunschvicg 676); B685 (Brunschvicg 685); B737 (Brunschvicg 737).

Read with: Scripture (p. 94); Figurative meaning (p. 82); Prophecy (p. 23); Witness (p. 38); Jews (p. 145); Truth (p. 162).

Different orders of greatness

The greatness of bodies, minds and charity cannot be measured by one scale. Archimedes and Christ supply differently visible examples, while the closing insistence on charity's supernatural order prevents intellectual achievement from becoming its sufficient cause. The supplied reading of the sentence about wisdom includes a disclosed conjecture.

Passages: B793 (Brunschvicg 793); B795 (Brunschvicg 795).

Read with: Three orders (p. 35); Charity (p. 73); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Greatness (p. 177); Mind (p. 130); World (p. 67).

Miracles and the criteria of belief

Pascal tests how doctrine and miraculous signs can support or challenge one another. The questions to Barcos ask about an effect's relation to the natural power of its means and about deception and Church authority. Read the questions separately from the replies, and distinguish these theological criteria from a modern experimental finding.

Passages: B803 (Brunschvicg 803); B806 (Brunschvicg 806); B825 (Brunschvicg 825); B843 (Brunschvicg 843); QM-I-Q (Question I, Question — Blaise Pascal); QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos); QM-II-Q (Question II, Question — Blaise Pascal); QM-II-R (Question II, Reply — Martin de Barcos); QM-VII-Q (Question VII, Question — Blaise Pascal); QM-VII-R (Question VII, Reply — Martin de Barcos); QM-VIII-Q (Question VIII, Question — Blaise Pascal); QM-VIII-R (Question VIII, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

Read with: Miracle (p. 20); Religion (p. 29); Church (p. 137); Faith (p. 79); Truth (p. 162).

Devotional witness beside the fragments

The Mémorial moves through fire, certainty, joy, separation and renunciation. Its biblical addresses and repeated names do not take the form

of the wager or a geometrical proof. Its placement beside the Pensées illuminates shared vocabulary without turning a separately transmitted devotional record into the planned conclusion of the apologetic book.

Passages: MEM (Mémorial paper D).

Read with: Joy (p. 148); Peace (p. 154); Prayer (p. 91); Repentance (p. 159); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115).

Christ and the scriptural argument

Fall

Fall · Pensées

première nature — first nature [phrase]; *déchue de Dieu* — fallen away from God [phrase]; *leur chute* — their fall [phrase]; *deux états de la nature de l'homme* — two states of human nature [phrase]; *état de votre création* — state in which you were created [phrase]; *corrompue* — corrupted [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. A loss of an originally good condition, not the creation of an originally evil creature.

In the book. Pascal uses two states to account for aspirations to truth and happiness together with present incapacity.

In this edition. Fall is a guideword; the source also says corruption, first nature, and fallen away from God.

A place to read. B430 (Brunschvicg 430) for the narrated change; B434 (Brunschvicg 434) for its admitted difficulty; B656 (Brunschvicg 656) for Adam as a figure.

Meaning

The word-family of falling can describe losing a place, declining from a condition, or becoming estranged from God. In Pascal's theological account these are related but not interchangeable. The original condition supplies the measure of a loss; corruption explains why the present condition cannot simply be treated as that measure. A remaining desire for happiness is not itself the power to recover happiness. Conversely, present weakness does not establish that human beings have always been nothing more than their weakness. The title gathers this explanatory distinction without making every occurrence of falling a reference to Adam.

Use in the book

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) makes divine Wisdom speak. This is a prosopopoeia within an apologetic plan, not an unmarked autobiographical assertion by Pascal. Wisdom describes humanity as created holy, innocent, and illuminated, then as attempting to become its own center and to find happiness independently of divine help. The punishment has the form of abandonment to the self that claimed independence. Creatures once subject to humanity now dominate it: some through strength, others through the sweetness that attracts desire. The latter domination is called more terrible,

because attachment can look like willing possession while functioning as servitude.

The two natures are consequently not two equally original substances fighting within a person. B430 (Brunschvicg 430) distinguishes the first nature from a second nature made by blindness and concupiscence. What survives of the first is an impotent instinct toward its happiness. B660 (Brunschvicg 660) again says that concupiscence has become natural and formed a second nature. The language of becoming matters: the disorder feels native without being attributed to the goodness of creation. The brief attribution to "Rabbis" in B660 (Brunschvicg 660) does not identify a verified rabbinic text and should not be made to carry an independent historical argument.

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) exposes rather than conceals the intellectual cost. Pascal explicitly asks how an act committed long before a child existed can make that child guilty. He calls transmitted sin shocking to ordinary reason and justice. His answer is comparative: without this incomprehensible mystery, the human being is still more incomprehensible. This is not a claim that the mechanism has been demonstrated or that the objection was merely silly. The explanatory appeal to the divided human condition remains joined to submission to religious authority.

B441 (Brunschvicg 441) describes what happens once Christianity discloses the principle of corruption: the reader now sees its marks everywhere, within and outside humanity. The direction of this statement must be preserved. It reports nature read through a principle, rather than a neutral inventory that mechanically proves the principle before any interpretation has occurred. B406 (Brunschvicg 406) gives the loss a concrete shape: a person fallen from his place searches anxiously for it. The image connects displacement with the restless effort to establish importance.

The later scriptural dossier extends the two-state account into typology. B644 (Brunschvicg 644) calls Adam a witness and custodian of a promised Savior, while B656 (Brunschvicg 656) makes Adam a figure of the one to come and contrasts six days of formation with six ages. These are Pascal's Christian arrangements of biblical history, including inherited chronology, not independently verified reconstructions. In B765 (Brunschvicg 765) the two states of humanity stand beside the two natures in Christ and his two advents. The parallel explains why contrary descriptions need not be contradictory: their subjects or states differ. It does not make the human Fall identical with Christ's distinction of human and divine natures.

Places to Read

B406 (Brunschvicg 406) — The fallen person searches for a lost place; pride does not repair the displacement.

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) — Wisdom narrates creation, presumption, abandonment, and the surviving instinct for happiness.

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) — The transmission of sin is admitted to offend ordinary reason before its explanatory necessity is claimed.

B441 (Brunschvicg 441) — The principle of corruption changes the way nature is read.

B644 (Brunschvicg 644) — Adam becomes witness and keeper of the promise in a providential history.

B656 (Brunschvicg 656) — Adam and Christ are compared through two formations and the counterfactual of no sin.

B660 (Brunschvicg 660) — Concupiscence has become a second nature.

B765 (Brunschvicg 765) — Two human states are placed beside Christ's two natures and two advents.

In this edition

"Corrupted" and "fallen away from God" preserve distinct emphases in B441 (Brunschvicg 441). The first concerns a damaged condition; the second a lost relation. The edition retains the source's chronological claims as historical premises and identifies Wisdom's speaking role in B430 (Brunschvicg 430). Its brackets and unfinished prompts should not be converted into a seamless doctrinal treatise. Inherited guilt belongs to Pascal's theological account, not an uncontested conclusion about human origins.

See also

Sin (p. 32); Greatness (p. 177); Wretchedness (p. 198); Pride (p. 157); Redemption (p. 26).
Contents

Jesus Christ

Jesus Christ · Pensées

Jésus-Christ — Jesus Christ [printed form]; *Réparateur* — one who remedies the human condition [printed form]; *Sauveur* — Savior [printed form]; *modèle de toutes conditions* — model for every condition [phrase]; *vie* — life [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. The person in whom knowledge of God, human need, and the remedy for that need are joined.

In the book. Christ is the center of scriptural reading, the object of evidence, and the speaker addressed in devotion.

In this edition. Jesus, Christ, Savior, Restorer, and mediator are related names and offices, not empty stylistic variants.

A place to read. B547 (Brunschvicg 547) and B548 (Brunschvicg 548) establish the center; B766 (Brunschvicg 766) unfolds the offices; B793 (Brunschvicg 793) distinguishes the order of holiness.

Meaning

Pascal does not insert Jesus Christ as one example of a general religious ideal already known without him. He makes Christ the meeting point through whom God and humanity become knowable together. The name accordingly occurs in different grammatical and literary roles: Christ is foretold, acts, suffers, teaches, is represented by figures, and speaks in the devotional dialogue. These roles must not be flattened into a single abstract principle. "Center" names the relation of many arguments to a person; it does not remove their differences in evidence or genre.

Use in the book

B547 (Brunschvicg 547) ties the necessary mediator to knowledge of both God and misery. Knowing God without recognizing one's iniquities can become an occasion to glorify oneself. The Restorer is known as the one who repairs that very misery. B548 (Brunschvicg 548) extends the relation to self-knowledge, life, and death. These are strong Christian claims about intelligibility and salvation, not a denial that people outside Christianity possess any ordinary information about themselves. Their target is a knowledge thought sufficient while remaining detached from the remedy.

The double relation orders Scripture. B740 (Brunschvicg 740) says both Testaments regard Christ as their center—the Old as the one it awaits, the New as its model. B739 (Brunschvicg 739) offers a miniature historical pattern: prophets predict but are not predicted; later saints are predicted but do not predict; Christ is both predicted and predicting. B743 (Brunschvicg 743) asks why Ruth and Tamar are preserved in the scriptural narratives. Such questions make even a genealogy or a difficult story part of the inquiry into the center, rather than irrelevant material surrounding a few explicitly doctrinal verses.

B766 (Brunschvicg 766) supplies the most crowded list of offices: Savior, father, priest, victim, food, king, sage, lawgiver, afflicted, and poor. The list is not random honorific accumulation. A people must be brought forth, led, fed, reconciled, freed from sin, and made a temple. Christ is both the one who offers and the offering, and the food by which the people is sustained. B768 (Brunschvicg 768) tests the difference between figure and fulfillment through Joseph: Joseph foretells the two prisoners' futures, whereas Christ acts in saving. Resemblance does not eliminate the difference of agency.

Humiliation is not a defect accidentally attached to this greatness. B765 (Brunschvicg 765) joins a humbled God to victory over death through death. B792 (Brunschvicg 792) contrasts the enormous recognition provided by the two peoples with Christ's lack of enjoyment of worldly brilliance: obscurity, rejection, betrayal, denial, and abandonment occupy his life. B793 (Brunschvicg 793) then argues that judging his holiness by royal power or scientific invention applies the wrong measure. Archimedes does not need battles to make his discoveries great; Christ does not need discoveries or a throne to manifest holiness.

The devotional writing makes these relations immediate without becoming another historical proof. In B553 (Brunschvicg 553) the meditation on the sleeping friends becomes Christ's consoling address to a sinner. The text's change of speaker is decisive: "I" can name the contemplated Christ rather than Pascal. B785 (Brunschvicg 785) makes Christ a model in the father, brother, poor person, rich person, priest, and prince; divine glory and mortal lowliness allow this range. MEM (Mémorial paper D) concentrates the personal relation through repeated naming of Jesus Christ and the confession of having fled, renounced, and crucified him. Neither passage licenses turning suffering into a simple ideal of passive acquiescence to every human demand.

Places to Read

B547 (Brunschvicg 547) — The mediator and Restorer join knowledge of God to recognition of misery.

B548 (Brunschvicg 548) — The claim extends to self-knowledge, life, and death.

B553 (Brunschvicg 553) — Meditation changes into a devotional dialogue with Christ.

B739 (Brunschvicg 739) — Christ is both foretold and himself a foreteller.

B740 (Brunschvicg 740) — Both Testaments take Christ as their center in different ways.

B766 (Brunschvicg 766) — A sequence of offices describes what Christ does for a people.

B768 (Brunschvicg 768) — Joseph predicts; Christ effects salvation.

B785 (Brunschvicg 785) — Christ as model in different human conditions.

B792 (Brunschvicg 792) — The two peoples' brilliance makes Christ recognizable, though his life enjoys no worldly prestige.

B793 (Brunschvicg 793) — Holiness cannot be measured by intellectual or political achievement.

MEM (Mémorial paper D) — Repeated naming belongs to confession and prayer, not a new apologetic proof.

In this edition

The edition distinguishes "sacrificing priest" from "sacrificial victim" in B766 (Brunschvicg 766), where French sacrificateur and hostie name different roles held together. Réparateur in B547 (Brunschvicg 547) is rendered by its remedial sense, not silently equated with every other title. In B793 (Brunschvicg 793) the repaired phrase locating wisdom in God is conjectural and bracketed in the French. The Mémorial is printed from paper witness D and remains a distinct devotional record, not a chapter assigned by Pascal to the apologetic dossiers.

See also

Mediation (p. 17); Redemption (p. 26); Prophecy (p. 23); Three orders (p. 35); Hidden God (p. 88); Scripture (p. 94).

Contents

Mediation

Mediation · Pensées

médiateur — mediator [printed form]; *communication avec Dieu* — communion with God [phrase]; *commerce* — communion or living relation [printed form]; *le réconcilier à Dieu* — reconcile the people to God [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. The relation through which estranged humanity can approach God, not merely a message passed between parties.

In the book. Pascal joins the mediator's necessity to conversion, self-knowledge, sacrifice, and continuing communion.

In this edition. Commerce and communication can name relationship; MEM (Mémorial paper D)'s English "communion" is an explanatory supply.

A place to read. B470 (Brunschvicg 470) for the need; B547 (Brunschvicg 547) for the named mediator; B668 (Brunschvicg 668) and B766 (Brunschvicg 766) for what he effects.

Meaning

A mediator stands between parties, but Pascal's emphasis is on overcoming a separation that the estranged party cannot overcome alone. Commerce in B470 (Brunschvicg 470) is not economic trade; communication in B547 (Brunschvicg 547) is not simply information delivered. Both concern access, participation, and relation. Mediation therefore includes what Christ discloses and what he does: the condition that obstructs communion must be recognized and remedied. It is not a

neutral bridge between already self-sufficient partners, nor a device for knowing God while leaving the knower's own orientation unchanged.

Use in the book

B470 (Brunschvicg 470) begins with an imagined promise: if someone saw a miracle, they would convert. Pascal questions the speaker's knowledge of the conversion they promise. They picture a conversation with God on familiar terms, but true conversion acknowledges dependence, deserved disfavor, and the opposition between God and themselves. The mediator is introduced at the point where ordinary sociability fails. A spectacular event is not sufficient simply because it impresses the observer; the observer must understand what change of relation is being asked.

B547 (Brunschvicg 547) names Jesus Christ as that mediator and makes knowing God inseparable from knowing misery. Its sequence joins the promised and arrived mediator to Scripture, original sin, prophecy, doctrine, and morality. Mediation is consequently not an extra devotional step after a complete philosophical proof. Pascal's objection to those who claim knowledge of God without Christ is also moral: they can turn the alleged knowledge into their own glory. The Restorer teaches the knower to recognize the damage that requires restoration.

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) draws the distinction more extensively. Merely considering a powerful, eternal maker leaves aside the mystery of the Redeemer, who unites human and divine natures and reconciles humanity to God. Pascal calls the reduced account deism and refuses to make it his apologetic target. The two natures belong to Christ; corruption and capacity belong to humanity's condition. Keeping those subjects distinct prevents the misleading suggestion that mediation works because God is himself corrupt or because ordinary human nature is already divine without grace.

The exchange of what is proper and alien appears sharply in B668 (Brunschvicg 668). Christ adopts sins that the passage explicitly calls foreign to him; virtues belong to him and are foreign to us. The account makes prayers and virtues acceptable through their relation to Christ. It does not say that Christ committed the wrong acts he assumes. The repeated pronouns and bracketed supplies are unusually important here: to detach "sins of Jesus Christ" from the distinction between assumption and personal wrongdoing would reverse the passage's intended account.

B766 (Brunschvicg 766) gives mediation institutional and sacrificial shape. The same person forms a people, leads and feeds it, makes it God's temple, reconciles it to God, offers himself, and is both priest and victim. B553 (Brunschvicg 553) describes his presence through Scripture, the Church, inspirations, priests, and the prayer of the faithful. These are instruments and relations of presence, not replacements for the acting Christ. B881 (Brunschvicg 881) correspondingly distinguishes the Church's

teaching from God's inspiring: outward instruction prepares; it does not itself produce the inward gift.

MEM (Mémorial paper D) ends by returning from the fear of separation to the ways taught in the Gospel. The first formulation concerns finding God; the second concerns preserving the relation. The English makes the latter intelligible as keeping communion with him. This is a useful explanation of the relation, but no French noun phrase meaning "our communion" stands in that line. Reading it with B547 (Brunschvicg 547) is illuminating only if the translation's addition remains visible.

Places to Read

B470 (Brunschvicg 470) — An imagined easy conversion gives way to acknowledgment of the mediator's necessity.

B547 (Brunschvicg 547) — Knowledge, proof, morality, and communion converge in Christ.

B553 (Brunschvicg 553) — Christ's devotional speech names several modes of presence.

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) — The Redeemer's two natures distinguish Christian mediation from deism.

B668 (Brunschvicg 668) — Christ assumes sins described as alien to him.

B766 (Brunschvicg 766) — Reconciliation is linked to people, temple, priest, and victim.

B881 (Brunschvicg 881) — Church teaching and divine inspiration are distinct operations.

MEM (Mémorial paper D) — Finding and keeping the relation are directed to the Gospel's ways.

In this edition

"Mediator" keeps Pascal's specifically Christian claim explicit. The English "communion" at B470 (Brunschvicg 470) and B547 (Brunschvicg 547) renders a living relation rather than conversational ease or commercial exchange. At MEM (Mémorial paper D), however, "our communion with him" is supplied to explain the compressed Il ne se conserve. That noun phrase is not literal French, and the longer closing lines of the lost parchment's transmitted version do not belong to the paper text.

See also

Conversion (p. 76); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Grace (p. 85); Redemption (p. 26); Church (p. 137); Prayer (p. 91).
Contents

Miracle · Pensées

miracle — miracle [printed form]; *force naturelle des moyens* — natural power of the means [phrase]; *discerne* — distinguishes or establishes standing [printed form]; *signes* — signs [printed form]; *miracles* — miracles [printed form]; *faux* — false [printed form]; *vrais* — true or genuine [printed form]; *signa* — signs [printed form]; *manque de charité* — lack of charity [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. An effect exceeding natural power in the relevant respect, and a sign whose evidential meaning must be judged.

In the book. Definitions, biblical tests, reported cures, and church controversy form related but distinct inquiries.

In this edition. The questions are Pascal's; the replies and their scholastic distinctions are Martin de Barcos's.

A place to read. B803 (Brunschvicg 803) and B804 (Brunschvicg 804) for the problem; B843 (Brunschvicg 843) for reciprocal judgment; QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos) and QM-III-R (Question III, Reply — Martin de Barcos) for distinctions.

Meaning

Miracle can name an extraordinary effect, its attributed divine source, or its evidential function. Pascal does not consistently collapse these into one usage. B819 (Brunschvicg 819) explicitly observes that biblical words translated as miracle can instead mean fear or an image. B804 (Brunschvicg 804) defines a miracle relative to the natural power of the means employed. This is a theological classification within an account of created powers, not a medical verification of a particular cure. A marvel's impressiveness and a true sign's authority therefore remain questions that must be distinguished.

Use in the book

The opening reciprocity of B803 (Brunschvicg 803) is deliberately difficult: miracles distinguish doctrine and doctrine distinguishes miracles. A rule rejecting every sign unless the doctrine is already independently proved would make miracles useless; accepting every prodigy would admit false signs. Pascal invokes failed prediction and enticement to idolatry as Mosaic tests, then asks whether the same rule applies at different times. The unfinished objections show an inquiry in progress, not a smoothly completed theory that can be restated without its tensions.

B808 (Brunschvicg 808) presses miracles' priority during Christ's life, even using "never" and "always." B829 (Brunschvicg 829) and B838

(Brunschvicg 838) explain the temporal argument: before death, resurrection, and the conversion of nations, the whole prophetic pattern had not yet been fulfilled. B838 (Brunschvicg 838) calls that subsequently fulfilled pattern an enduring miracle. Yet B808 (Brunschvicg 808) says prophecy is not called miracle in John's numbering of signs. The two remarks concern different uses: a Gospel's naming of particular signs and an apologetic characterization of continuing fulfillment. Neither should be deleted to give the vocabulary artificial consistency.

B843 (Brunschvicg 843) adds the relation of divine truthfulness to evidence. People owe reception to God's message; God's promises exclude leaving sincere recipients necessarily bound to hidden falsehood. Pascal asks forgiveness for the word "duty," which is not an authority imposed above God. The doctrine's apparent incompatibility with an earlier revelation must be examined, not merely alleged. A prior warning about deceptive signs, or a clearer competing sign, changes the evidential situation. B821 (Brunschvicg 821) distinguishes testing, which provides occasions without necessity, from leading into an unavoidable false conclusion.

These arguments serve a contemporary dispute. In B839 (Brunschvicg 839) a thorn associated with Christ's crown and the reported cures at Port-Royal become evidence against accusations directed at that house. B841 (Brunschvicg 841) speaks of girls accused of receiving false teaching and presents healing as their vindication. The relic, house, and afflicted bodies are not decorative examples: they locate the argument in an actual conflict of interpretation. Describing Pascal's conviction does not certify the relic's identity, the reported medical outcome, or its supernatural cause.

Nor does miracle mechanically equal conversion. B805 (Brunschvicg 805) distinguishes inward grace from outward miracles; B851 (Brunschvicg 851) explicitly writes of miracles with and without grace. B826 (Brunschvicg 826) makes lack of charity a cause both of rejecting true signs and believing false ones. In the appended Questions, Pascal asks whether an effect must exceed all created nature or merely the natural force of its means. Barcos distinguishes supernatural substance from supernatural manner (QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos)), then reports Aquinas's further distinction between subject and natural order (QM-III-R (Question III, Reply — Martin de Barcos)). Mud, a robe's edge, a relic, and a single touch make the relation between effect and instrument concrete.

Speaker boundaries become crucial in the questions about heretics. Barcos says no true miracle can confirm error (QM-IV-R (Question IV, Reply — Martin de Barcos)), but allows genuine miracles through heretics when they confirm truth (QM-QuestionsVandVI-R (Questions V and VI, Reply — Martin de Barcos); QM-VIII-R (Question VIII, Reply — Martin de Barcos)). He makes God the sole author and performer (QM-VII-R (Question VII, Reply — Martin de Barcos)). These replies qualify any

blanket formula that a person labeled heretical can never be associated with a genuine miracle. The relevant object is the truth confirmed, not a general certification of every belief held by an instrument.

Places to Read

B803 (Brunschvicg 803) — Reciprocal discernment produces the problem of rules and evidential usefulness.

B804 (Brunschvicg 804) — Definition by the natural power of the means employed.

B808 (Brunschvicg 808) — Miracles' priority is pressed, while prophecy is distinguished from John's numbered signs.

B821 (Brunschvicg 821) — Testing is distinguished from unavoidable deception.

B838 (Brunschvicg 838) — Fulfilled prophecy becomes an enduring miracle.

B839 (Brunschvicg 839) — The Holy Thorn and Port-Royal locate the argument in controversy.

B843 (Brunschvicg 843) — Doctrine, signs, prior warnings, and divine truthfulness are considered together.

B851 (Brunschvicg 851) — Outward miracles are explicitly distinguished from inward grace.

QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos) — Barcos distinguishes substance and manner of production.

QM-III-R (Question III, Reply — Martin de Barcos) — Barcos reports distinctions concerning the subject and the order of nature.

QM-IV-R (Question IV, Reply — Martin de Barcos) — Barcos: a true miracle cannot confirm error, regardless of its human instrument.

QM-QuestionsVandVI-R (Questions V and VI, Reply — Martin de Barcos) — Barcos allows miracles through heretics when they confirm truth, distinguishing agent from claim.

QM-VIII-R (Question VIII, Reply — Martin de Barcos) — Barcos treats such rare signs as marks of the Church's truth, not approval of heretical error.

In this edition

Miracle and sign remain related but non-identical English words. The edition also retains the incompleteness of B804 (Brunschvicg 804) and the absolute formulations of B808 (Brunschvicg 808) rather than silently harmonizing them. All QM replies belong to Martin de Barcos, not Pascal. The historical religious categories and supernatural explanations are the document's assertions, not independent empirical findings.

See also

Prophecy (p. 23); Witness (p. 38); Charity (p. 73); Faith (p. 79); Church (p. 137); Supernatural in manner (p. 258); Natural power of the means (p. 240).

Contents

Prophecy

Prophecy · Pensées

prophéties — prophecies [printed form]; *prédiction* — prediction [printed form]; *équivoques* — ambiguous [printed form]; *sentiment intérieur et immédiat* — inward and immediate sense [phrase]; *prédire* — foretell [printed form]; *accomplir* — fulfill [printed form]; *événement* — event or outcome [printed form]; *chronologistes* — chronologists [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Earlier speech understood through a later fulfillment; locally also speech from an immediate inward sense of God.

In the book. Pascal connects wording, preservation, chronology, interpretation, and the history that he reads as fulfillment.

In this edition. The chronological estimates and Christian identifications remain Pascal's claims, not editorial discoveries.

A place to read. B706 (Brunschvicg 706) for continuing evidence; B723 (Brunschvicg 723) for chronological difficulty; B732 (Brunschvicg 732) for a different sense of prophesying.

Meaning

Prophecy ordinarily concerns what is foretold, but the word is not exhausted by prediction. B732 (Brunschvicg 732) defines prophesying as speaking of God from an inward and immediate sense rather than outward proofs. Elsewhere the verb prédire concerns future events, and accomplir their coming to pass or fulfillment. The relation between them is an argument, not merely a resemblance between two sentences. An earlier text, its preservation, the identification of the event, and the interpretation

joining them all matter. Pascal's dossier repeatedly investigates these connections, even where its compressed conclusions sound categorical.

Use in the book

B693 (Brunschvicg 693) stages the search amid a mute universe as waking on a frightening deserted island. Competing religions cannot be accepted merely because each asserts authority and threatens unbelief. The Christian claim that draws the speaker's attention is prophecy. B694 (Brunschvicg 694) makes prediction the crown of the evidence because it resists an appeal to chance. The argument's movement from conflicting religions to one true religion is Pascal's apologetic conclusion; contradiction alone would show only that conflicting claims cannot all be true.

B706 (Brunschvicg 706) calls prophecies the greatest proof of Jesus Christ. Its importance lies not only in a prophet's accurate anticipation but in a whole history of transmission. Prophetic books were, on Pascal's account, spread with Jewish communities before Christianity's expansion. B710 (Brunschvicg 710) makes an entire people's enduring testimony more significant than one isolated author's prediction. Custody of a text, however, is not assent to the Christian interpretation placed on it. The distinction is essential to understanding the hostile-witness argument and to identifying its limits.

The time and manner of fulfillment are treated differently. B758 (Brunschvicg 758) says the time is clear while the promised goods are given in figures: the heart calls good what it loves, so worldly expectation can misconstrue spiritual deliverance. Yet B723 (Brunschvicg 723) admits that Daniel's seventy weeks are ambiguous at their beginning and disputed among chronologists at their end, estimating a range of two hundred years. This difficulty should remain beside the declarations of clarity. The estimate remains Pascal's, and the passage does not resolve the admitted chronological uncertainty.

Concrete objects carry the prophetic reasoning. B711 (Brunschvicg 711) records Jacob crossing his arms over Ephraim and Manasseh and Joseph directing that his bones be carried to a future land. B722 (Brunschvicg 722) collects Daniel's metallic statue, mixed iron-and-clay feet, and a stone cut without hands that grows into a mountain. B734 (Brunschvicg 734) applies the small stone's growth to Christ. B727 (Brunschvicg 727) offers a checklist including birthplace, stone, garment, gall, pierced hands and feet, resurrection, and reception by the nations. These notes combine biblical passages with Christian identifications and sometimes parenthetical historical explanations; they are not independent modern accounts of the cited histories.

Fulfillment also changes the observer's position. B698 (Brunschvicg 698) says prophecies are understood when the events have happened. B838

(Brunschvicg 838) argues that miracles were needed while the promised conversion of nations was still in progress; afterward its fulfillment could function as an enduring miracle. B739 (Brunschvicg 739) gives Christ the double position of one predicted and one predicting. The distinction allows Pascal to connect the temporal order of evidence with its form, without pretending that a hearer before the events possessed every argument available to a later reader.

Prediction does not authorize unlimited hidden meanings. B687 (Brunschvicg 687) rejects unwarranted numerical mysteries assigned to Hebrew letters and the philosopher's stone. B684 (Brunschvicg 684) requires an interpretation that handles contrary passages, not merely congenial ones. These restraints remain internal to Pascal's Christian reading, whose premise is scriptural coherence. They are nevertheless real constraints: a striking ingenuity or an isolated resemblance is not automatically a prophecy fulfilled.

Places to Read

B684 (Brunschvicg 684) — Interpretation must address contrary passages, not only matching ones.

B687 (Brunschvicg 687) — Numerical and esoteric inventions are distinguished from an authorized spiritual sense.

B693 (Brunschvicg 693) — Prophecy becomes a proposed answer to the problem of competing religious authority.

B698 (Brunschvicg 698) — Events coming to pass make the earlier words intelligible.

B706 (Brunschvicg 706) — Preservation and worldwide distribution form part of the proof.

B711 (Brunschvicg 711) — Crossed hands and Joseph's bones enter the dossier of particular predictions.

B722 (Brunschvicg 722) — Daniel's statue, stone, and weeks are assembled with interpretive explanations.

B723 (Brunschvicg 723) — The chronological ambiguity is expressly acknowledged.

B732 (Brunschvicg 732) — Prophesying means immediate inward speech of God.

B758 (Brunschvicg 758) — Clear time versus figurative manner: the good loved by the heart shapes recognition.

B838 (Brunschvicg 838) — Fulfilled history is characterized as an enduring miracle.

In this edition

"Foretold," "prediction," and "fulfillment" keep the temporal relation explicit. B732 (Brunschvicg 732)'s immediate sense is not silently restricted to foretelling. The edition translates the French and Latin excerpts actually supplied, preserving their unfinished boundaries and older biblical locators; it does not substitute complete passages from a modern Bible. Numbers, historical identifications, and assertions of universal conversion remain features of Pascal's argument.

See also

Figurative meaning (p. 82); Scripture (p. 94); Witness (p. 38); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Miracle (p. 20); Heart (p. 124).
Contents

Redemption

Redemption · Pensées

rédemption — redemption [printed form]; *racheté* — ransomed [printed form]; *Rédempteur* — Redeemer [printed form]; *libérateur* — deliverer [printed form]; *racheter* — redeem [printed form]; *péchés* — sins [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Rescue from sin and estrangement, figured through release, healing, sacrifice, and ransom.

In the book. Christ's saving action must be distinguished from a mere offer and from an immediate removal of every bodily misery.

In this edition. B781 (Brunschvicg 781) is a disputation with objections and a tentative "perhaps," not one unqualified doctrinal statement.

A place to read. B553 (Brunschvicg 553) for the devotional encounter; B692 (Brunschvicg 692) for the true enemy; B781 (Brunschvicg 781) for the reach of redemption.

Meaning

The family rédemption, rédempteur, racheter retains the sense of costly release or buying back, but Pascal's account is not confined to a transaction. It includes freeing the enslaved, healing the sick, reconciling the estranged, and restoring a damaged condition. These images specify different aspects of a remedy humanity cannot supply for itself. The object of release matters: a political enemy, bodily captivity, guilt, and an attachment that separates a person from God cannot be treated as synonyms merely because the same language of liberation can be used of them.

Use in the book

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) makes the Redeemer the distinction between Christianity and a merely powerful divine maker. Christ's union of human and divine natures is directed toward drawing humanity from corruption and reconciling it to God. Knowing misery without a Redeemer tends toward despair; knowing God without misery tends toward pride. Redemption is therefore not an optional hopeful conclusion appended to a wholly negative anthropology. The remedy belongs to the account of what is wrong, and makes acknowledgment of the wrong bearable without making it harmless.

B692 (Brunschvicg 692) works through the word "enemies." If deliverance means rescue from Egyptians or Babylonians alone, Pascal says he cannot show the Christian fulfillment. If it means rescue from iniquities, explicit references to sins determine the ambiguous language. His claim is asymmetric: sins can be called enemies, but external enemies cannot simply be called sins. The promised deliverer accordingly addresses the passions and concupiscence that estrange the person from God. This is Pascal's Christian interpretation of the prophetic promises, not a neutral exhaustion of what those texts can mean.

The distinction is sharpened in B553 (Brunschvicg 553). The voice of Christ tells the addressee that bodily chains may remain while spiritual servitude is being relieved. The meditation also contrasts Adam's garden of delight with Christ's garden of torment. Sleeping disciples do not initiate their own rescue: Christ acts for their salvation while they sleep, and the meditation extends that priority to people before birth and during sin. The language is deliberately striking, including Christ's saving himself; the edition does not silently rewrite it into a tidier formula.

B766 (Brunschvicg 766) places release within a whole set of offices. Christ forms a people, engraves laws in its heart, offers himself, and is both priest and spotless victim. B768 (Brunschvicg 768) compares Joseph's sale and imprisonment with Christ's rejection and crucifixion. Joseph predicts release to one prisoner; Christ effects salvation. The same scene of apparent defeat can become the means of rescue, but the figure and its fulfillment are distinguished by the efficacy of the acting person, not merely by a similarity of suffering.

The scope of saving action remains a difficult question. B774 (Brunschvicg 774) says Christ offered the cross for all, while B775 (Brunschvicg 775) warns that Latin omnes cannot always be given the same scope. B781 (Brunschvicg 781) then stages a reply and counterreply. One speaker compares the Redeemer to someone who ransoms all willing to come, although some die on the way. The objection is that Christ, unlike that imagined rescuer, has both powers: to ransom and to prevent death. The answering qualification says "perhaps" when distinguishing his capacity

as Redeemer from mastery of all. Erasing these shifts would turn a working exchange into a settled definition it does not supply.

The final paragraph of B781 (Brunschvicg 781) asks what doctrinal language does to a hearer. Saying that Christ did not die for all may encourage people immediately to put themselves among the exceptions and despair. Pascal wants hope encouraged instead. This practical concern does not settle every question raised by the preceding exchange; it shows that the form of teaching belongs to pastoral responsibility. B737 (Brunschvicg 737) gives a contrasting first-person result: the speaker reaches toward his Deliverer and awaits death in peace while enduring present goods and evils.

Places to Read

B553 (Brunschvicg 553) — The garden, sleeping disciples, and spiritual deliverance make saving agency concrete.

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) — The Redeemer prevents both self-sufficient pride and hopeless misery.

B678 (Brunschvicg 678) — A spiritual Redeemer belongs to the interpretation of two advents.

B692 (Brunschvicg 692) — The argument distinguishes external enemies from iniquities.

B737 (Brunschvicg 737) — The apologetic sequence turns into reaching toward a personal Deliverer.

B766 (Brunschvicg 766) — Redemption is linked to reconciliation, priesthood, and sacrifice.

B768 (Brunschvicg 768) — Joseph's prediction is distinguished from Christ's saving act.

B774 (Brunschvicg 774) — The cross is said to be offered for all.

B775 (Brunschvicg 775) — The scope of universal wording must be judged locally.

B781 (Brunschvicg 781) — Offer, perseverance, objection, and the danger of despair remain distinct.

In this edition

"Redeem," "redeemer," and "redemption" preserve the family, while "deliverer" translates libérateur and "Restorer" or a remedial phrase translates réparateur. In B781 (Brunschvicg 781) the ransom comparison remains a comparison under challenge, not a complete theory of salvation. In B553 (Brunschvicg 553) the devotional voices and the severe language of sins assumed by Christ must remain visible. The account's polemical exclusions are theological claims, not independent assessments of the worth of people outside Christianity.

See also

Jesus Christ (p. 14); Mediation (p. 17); Grace (p. 85); Sin (p. 32); Repentance (p. 159).

Contents

Religion

Religion · Pensées

religion — religion [printed form]; *religion chrétienne* — Christian religion [phrase]; *religion accommodée* — an accommodating religion [phrase]; *les trois marques de la religion* — the three marks of religion [phrase]; *aimable* — lovable [printed form]; *vraie* — true [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. A form of worship, teaching, and life judged by its account of humanity and the good it promises.

In the book. The comparison seeks a specifically Christian conclusion, while distinguishing a religion's sources from its corrupt practice.

In this edition. Singular religion often means Christianity; the word does not make the fragments a neutral survey of traditions.

A place to read. B187 (Brunschvicg 187) for the order of persuasion; B430 (Brunschvicg 430) for the criteria; B556 (Brunschvicg 556) for the Redeemer rather than deism.

Meaning

Religion names both Pascal's own faith and competing claims about worship, salvation, and happiness. It can also name an institutional practice or an accommodated system people choose because it is easy. Context therefore determines whether the word concerns doctrines, texts, a community, or a way of life. Pascal's tests are substantive rather than merely institutional: an account must recognize human greatness and misery, identify the true good, and explain the remedy for the disorders that obstruct it. These criteria already express the shape of his Christian project.

Use in the book

B187 (Brunschvicg 187) separates several stages of persuasion. People may despise religion, hate it, and fear that it is true. The response is not immediately to prove what they fear. Pascal first proposes showing that religion is not contrary to reason and deserves respect because it knows humanity; next making it lovable because it promises the true good; only then showing it true. The distinction between wishing and proving matters. A desirable promise does not become true merely because it is desirable, while a proof addressed to someone who refuses to consider its object may not be heard.

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) develops the criteria through the opposed diseases of pride and concupiscence. An account that makes people equal to God may feed presumption; one that makes them no more than animals may encourage absorption in sensory goods. Divine Wisdom is then given a voice that explains two human states and a remedy not originating in the self. The comparison includes polemical accounts of philosophers and Islam. Those descriptions belong to Pascal's construction of the alternatives and should not be repeated as independently established summaries of other traditions.

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) clarifies what the argument is not trying to prove. Christianity is not exhausted by a great, powerful, eternal maker, a guarantor of geometrical truths, or a providence securing pleasant years. It concerns the Redeemer, corruption, reconciliation, and love. Pascal calls mere creator-belief deism and regards it as dangerously incomplete. The visibility and concealment of God must consequently be assessed against both human capacity and human estrangement. A world that displayed only unambiguous divine possession would not communicate the loss the argument asks people to recognize.

The comparison does not permit judging a religion only by its worst interpreters. B601 (Brunschvicg 601) distinguishes holy books from later or popular tradition and explicitly applies the distinction to Christianity and casuistry. B607 (Brunschvicg 607) criticizes Christians who expect sacraments to dispense them from loving God as well as Jewish readers whom he labels carnal. B609 (Brunschvicg 609) then divides each religion into kinds of adherents. The taxonomy remains Christian and polemical, but its internal distinctions prevent a crude identification of all members of a community with one alleged disposition.

In B693 (Brunschvicg 693) competing self-assertions are insufficient: anyone can call himself a prophet. The proposed evidence is prophecy rather than threat or mere authority. B844 (Brunschvicg 844) groups perpetuity, a good life, and miracles as three marks. These are distinguishable: historical continuity is not moral quality, and neither is simply an extraordinary event. Pascal's accusation is that his contemporary opponents destroy all three by

probabilism, lax morality, and evasion of miracles. The marks function as claims to examine, not automatic proof that the accused have failed them.

The later polemic gives religion an uncomfortable social use. B956 (Brunschvicg 956) stages the reasoning that people naturally want religion, but a gentle one: open impiety and severe austerity are both difficult to sustain, whereas accommodation can endure. This belongs to the self-defense Pascal attributes to his opponents, not his recommendation for successful religious marketing. B855 (Brunschvicg 855) similarly accuses them of disposing of religion in favor of friends or against enemies. The standard is therefore not mere durability or popularity; a durable institution can still betray the good it claims to guard.

Places to Read

B187 (Brunschvicg 187) — Respect, lovability, and truth are separate stages in the projected order.

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) — A true religion must explain both human states and provide remedies.

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) — Christianity is distinguished from mere creator-belief by redemption.

B601 (Brunschvicg 601) — Foundational books and their treatment by adherents must be distinguished.

B607 (Brunschvicg 607) — Carnal Christian as well as Jewish interpretation is criticized.

B609 (Brunschvicg 609) — Different adherents are distinguished within each religion.

B693 (Brunschvicg 693) — Competing self-assertions do not by themselves ground belief.

B844 (Brunschvicg 844) — Perpetuity, good life, and miracles form three distinct marks.

B855 (Brunschvicg 855) — Religion is accused of being used for factional advantage.

B956 (Brunschvicg 956) — An accommodating religion is presented as attractive to worldly desire.

In this edition

The English preserves the strong comparative and exclusive language as Pascal's. It does not reclassify every historical use under a modern generic idea of interchangeable religions. In the later dossiers, staged first-person defenses and satirical exclamations must not be assigned to Pascal as sincere policy recommendations. The modern heading "Islam" supplies a lookup aid for his historical labels, not a claim that he supplies a comprehensive account.

See also

Search (p. 97); Faith (p. 79); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Paganism (p. 151); Islam (p. 142); Jews (p. 145); Morality (p. 56).

Contents

Sin

Sin · Pensées

péché — sin [printed form]; *transmission du péché* — transmission of sin [phrase]; *péchés cachés* — hidden sins [phrase]; *pécheurs* — sinners [printed form]; *pécheur* — sinner [printed form]; *nés* — born [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Culpable disorder in relation to God, including acts and the inherited orientation within which acts occur.

In the book. Pascal connects self-deification, pride, sloth, concealment, and the need for a remedy beyond unaided willing.

In this edition. Sin is not a synonym for intellectual error, bodily illness, or misfortune.

A place to read. B434 (Brunschvicg 434) for transmitted sin; B492 (Brunschvicg 492) for self-deification; B553 (Brunschvicg 553) for disclosure joined to healing.

Meaning

Péché can concern a particular act, a continuing attachment, or the inherited condition called original sin. Pécheur names the person in that relation, not simply a person who lacks information. Pascal's diagnosis involves truth and justice as well as desire: to demand the central place for oneself is both false, because it is undeserved, and unjust, because everyone makes an incompatible demand. The wrong act, the will's orientation, the pain that may follow, and the theological explanation of how that orientation becomes ours are distinct aspects of this diagnosis.

Use in the book

B492 (Brunschvicg 492) identifies the instinct to make oneself God as an injustice into which people are born. Its pressure lies in the conjunction of inability and obligation: we cannot free ourselves of it, and must free ourselves of it. The demand prepares the need for grace; it is not a claim that contradiction disappears once an adequate technique of self-improvement has been found. The passage's claim that no other religion has diagnosed the matter is Pascal's apologetic assertion, not a comprehensive historical finding.

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) confronts inherited sin's hardest implication. How can the first human being's act make a remote descendant guilty, especially a child incapable of willing? Pascal calls this contrary to ordinary reason and justice before arguing that without the mystery we cannot understand ourselves. His account does not treat a child's personal act as identical to Adam's act. Nor does it offer a transparent causal mechanism of transmission. The unresolved intellectual offense is part of the argument's form and should not be suppressed by a confident summary of "human nature."

The apparent oppositions of sinner and righteous person require local attention. B771 (Brunschvicg 771) says Christ calls sinners to repentance while leaving the righteous in their sins. The reversal targets the claim to sufficient health or righteousness, not the proposition that moral goodness is itself an evil. B862 (Brunschvicg 862) explains how apparently opposed names can apply within the righteous because the old and new person coexist. The same name may refer to different relations or conditions, and the same person may require both rebuke and hope.

B497 (Brunschvicg 497) names pride and sloth as two sources of sins, then assigns different corrective roles to justice and mercy. Justice lowers pride even when the works appear holy; mercy invites penitence and good works, rather than permitting carelessness. The conclusion reverses a familiar excuse: effort is necessary because mercy exists, not merely because mercy might be absent. B884 (Brunschvicg 884) attacks purification without penitence and justification without charity as empty separations. In both places the missing relation, not the comforting vocabulary alone, determines the criticism.

B553 (Brunschvicg 553) makes recognition gradual. The devotional Christ says that complete knowledge of one's sins would make the addressee lose heart, but the one who discloses them can also heal them. The person is told to do penance for hidden sins and for the hidden malice in known ones. This does not celebrate ignorance; it joins disclosure to a remedial action that prevents despair. B668 (Brunschvicg 668) supplies another vital distinction: Christ adopts sins that remain alien to him. Calling them his by assumption is not assigning him their commission.

The practical controversies show how sin can be disguised through argument. B895 (Brunschvicg 895) warns that conscience can accompany evil done cheerfully; the agent's conviction is not enough. B921 (Brunschvicg 921) contrasts saints who examine their best actions for guilt with opponents who invent distinctions to excuse their worst. B948 (Brunschvicg 948) rejects the inference that a corruptible judge must be wrong in this instance. Neither a good self-description nor a bad reputation settles a particular act. Pascal's polemic repeatedly demands reasons rather than labels, even while making strong accusations of his own.

Places to Read

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) — The difficulty of transmitted sin is acknowledged rather than hidden.

B492 (Brunschvicg 492) — Self-deification is an inherited injustice both obligatory and impossible to remove unaided.

B497 (Brunschvicg 497) — Justice addresses pride; mercy combats sloth by inviting action.

B553 (Brunschvicg 553) — Disclosure of hidden sins is joined to the promise of healing.

B668 (Brunschvicg 668) — Assumed sins are explicitly distinguished from what is proper to Christ.

B771 (Brunschvicg 771) — The reversal of sick and healthy, sinners and righteous, exposes self-sufficiency.

B862 (Brunschvicg 862) — Apparently contrary names can apply to different aspects of a person.

B884 (Brunschvicg 884) — Purification without repentance and justification without charity are attacked.

B895 (Brunschvicg 895) — Conscience does not by itself guarantee that an act is good.

B921 (Brunschvicg 921) — Self-scrutiny and self-excusing casuistry are contrasted.

In this edition

"Sin" keeps the theological relation visible; substituting "mistake" would reduce disorder of the will to a cognitive error, while "guilt" alone would obscure the distinction between condition and action. The edition retains the striking "made sin" language in B553 (Brunschvicg 553) and identifies its devotional voices. Its severe self-directed language concerns repudiation of self-centeredness, not an instruction to injure oneself or to equate illness with personal culpability.

See also

Fall (p. 12); Self-love (p. 192); Pride (p. 157); Grace (p. 85); Repentance (p. 159); Redemption (p. 26).

Contents

Three orders

Three orders · Pensées

trois ordres différents de genre — three orders different in kind [phrase]; *corps* — bodies [printed form]; *esprits* — minds [printed form]; *charité* — charity, Christian love [printed form]; *la chair, l'esprit, la volonté* — flesh, mind, will [phrase]; *trois ordres* — three orders [phrase]; *chair* — flesh [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Different kinds of greatness, not positions on one continuous scale of quantity or prestige.

In the book. Kings, Archimedes, and Christ reveal what each order can display and what it cannot produce.

In this edition. Intellectual greatness in B793 (Brunschvicg 793) must not be confused with the supernatural order of charity.

A place to read. B793 (Brunschvicg 793) is the central account; B460 (Brunschvicg 460) offers a related but differently phrased threefold distinction.

Meaning

Ordre here concerns a domain and its proper measure. Bodily force, intellectual achievement, and charity do not become interchangeable by enlargement. A vast collection of bodies cannot amount to a thought; a vast collection of thoughts cannot amount to a movement of true charity. This does not deny all relations among the orders: the distance from bodies to minds itself figures the further distance to charity. But an analogy is not a common unit of measurement. Pascal's "infinitely more infinite" expresses

the theological disproportion and should not be treated as a mathematical computation.

Use in the book

B793 (Brunschvicg 793) begins with the relation between seeing and valuing. Worldly grandeur has no brilliance for someone absorbed in intellectual inquiry. Intellectual greatness is in turn invisible to kings, the rich, and commanders insofar as they judge by fleshly power. Wisdom is invisible to both worldly and merely inquisitive observers. The orders therefore concern not only objects but the capacity and orientation of the observer. Failure to admire does not prove absence of worth; it may expose the inappropriateness of the measure being applied.

The image of empire is repeated without becoming literal political rule. Great minds have their empire, victory, and brilliance, but are seen by minds rather than bodily eyes. Saints likewise have their own glory without needing either worldly or intellectual grandeur. Those other forms of greatness add nothing to or subtract nothing from holiness as holiness. The argument is not that a saint cannot be learned or a ruler cannot be good; it is that learning and rank do not constitute the good that makes a saint holy.

Archimedes supplies the central intellectual example. He does not need battles to make his inventions visible to minds, and playing the prince in geometrical books would be irrelevant. Pascal says he was a prince, but the edition identifies that as Pascal's assertion rather than an independently verified biographical fact. The force of the example does not require accepting the historical claim: a proof is not improved by the social title of its author. External display is simply not what demonstrates the achievement.

Jesus Christ supplies the third-order example. He has neither possessions nor an outward production of learning; he invents no scientific discovery and does not rule as a king. Yet his humility, patience, holiness, freedom from sin, and relation to God constitute magnificence for the eyes of the heart. The repeated "holy" gives the passage a different emphasis from the inventor's achievement. The scandal of Christ's lowliness arises when readers demand evidence of a kind of greatness he is not there to display.

The examples lead to the claims about production. Bodies, even including the stars and kingdoms, do not know themselves or their world; the least mind does. All minds and all their productions cannot yield the least movement of charity because charity is supernatural. The argument is about difference of kind and divine gift, not a competition to accumulate the greatest stock of natural capacity. It also explains why pride in intellectual accomplishment cannot be cured merely by adding still more accomplishment.

B460 (Brunschvicg 460) must be read alongside, not substituted for, B793 (Brunschvicg 793). It names flesh, mind, and will, with body, intellectual inquiry, and justice as their objects. Its emphasis falls on characteristic disorders: concupiscence, curiosity, and pride. It allows that pride can attach to possessions or learning while identifying wisdom as its proper temptation if someone imagines having made himself wise. God alone gives wisdom, so glory belongs in God. The two fragments are related through their refusal of self-sufficiency, but their terms and immediate arguments differ. A rigid universal table would erase that difference.

Places to Read

B460 (Brunschvicg 460) — Flesh, mind, and will are distinguished through objects and characteristic temptations.

B547 (Brunschvicg 547) — Knowledge of God without recognition of misery can become self-glorification.

B765 (Brunschvicg 765) — Contrary descriptions of Christ require distinction of natures and advents.

B785 (Brunschvicg 785) — Christ's divine greatness and mortal lowliness give him a relation to every condition.

B786 (Brunschvicg 786) — Worldly historians scarcely perceive the kind of importance Christ has.

B792 (Brunschvicg 792) — Brilliance and disgrace coexist without Christ enjoying worldly prestige.

B793 (Brunschvicg 793) — The central argument distinguishes measures, observers, and capacities of production.

B862 (Brunschvicg 862) — The refusal to exclude one truth for another provides a related model of disciplined distinction.

In this edition

The English renders the relevant spirituelles in B793 (Brunschvicg 793) as "intellectual," since calling the middle order simply "spiritual" could confuse it with supernatural charity. The clause about wisdom being nowhere except in God uses the edition's expressly disclosed conjecture, nulle [part] sinon [en] Dieu; it is not a recovered manuscript reading. "Their abandonment" remains deliberately unresolved in the supplied edition. Orders here must also be distinguished from ordre as the arrangement of an argument or a sequence of instruction.

See also

Charity (p. 73); Greatness (p. 177); Mind (p. 130); Geometry (p. 121); Tyranny (p. 65); Pride (p. 157); The heart's order (p. 267).
Contents

Witness · Pensées

témoins — witnesses [printed form]; *témoignage* — testimony [printed form]; *témoins suspects* — suspect witnesses [phrase]; *dépositaires* — custodians [printed form]; *témoin* — witness [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. A person, community, or preserved record through which a claim is supported and whose credibility must be tested.

In the book. Independence, exposure to risk, transmission, and motives shape Pascal's evidential reasoning.

In this edition. Witnessing is not itself proof of every interpretation assigned to the evidence preserved.

A place to read. B593 (Brunschvicg 593) for papers and detailed inquiry; B750 (Brunschvicg 750) for independent custodians; B801 (Brunschvicg 801) for the conspiracy hypothesis.

Meaning

Témoin names the witness; témoignage the testimony given. A witness can attest an event, preserve a text, disclose a disposition through action, or serve unwittingly as evidence in another person's argument. Those functions are not identical. Pascal's apologetic often seeks testimony that cannot be explained as collusion by Christian claimants. Yet independence from a claimant establishes neither the claimant's interpretation nor the entire historical narrative attached to it. The distinction between preserving evidence and consenting to its proposed meaning is therefore indispensable.

Use in the book

B593 (Brunschvicg 593) opens with the stark preference for histories whose witnesses would let their throats be cut, but it does not end there. The issue is a competing history of China, and the final instruction is to examine the matter in detail and put papers on the table. Willingness to suffer may support sincerity; it cannot replace chronological or documentary inquiry. Pascal also invokes his scheme of light and obscurity, so the fragment combines a demand for evidence with a theological interpretation of difficulties.

B596 (Brunschvicg 596) contrasts widely sung psalms and testimony surrounding Christ with the assertion that Muhammad testifies only to himself. The criterion is independent and enduring attestation; the comparison is Pascal's polemical allegation, not a comprehensive account of Islamic transmission. B597 (Brunschvicg 597) moves to authorship and citation from century to century, including adversarial writers. Its claim that

the Qur'an names Matthew is erroneous according to the edition's note. The structure of the testimony argument remains intelligible, but this particular dilemma rests on a factual premise the edition rejects.

Jewish preservation of Scripture supplies Pascal's most sustained example. B710 (Brunschvicg 710) treats a whole people's continuity as collective witness. B750 (Brunschvicg 750) states the counterfactual sharply: if all had converted, only suspect witnesses would remain; if all had been exterminated, none would remain. In his argument continuing disagreement preserves independence. This does not mean the custodians consent to Christian fulfillment, and it must not become a theory assigning contemporary Jewish people an instrumental role in someone else's religion. It is a historically situated Christian apologetic construction.

The construction contains important local qualifications. B760 (Brunschvicg 760) begins by saying not all Jews reject Christ; it distinguishes those he calls saints from those he labels carnal. The same fragment then makes sweeping and unsupported claims about the sole reason found throughout rabbinic writings. Both must be visible: retaining the qualification does not validate the generalization, and identifying the generalization does not justify erasing the qualification. B762 (Brunschvicg 762) makes acceptance and rejection alike evidence within the scheme, which also exposes how strongly interpretation governs what is counted as corroboration.

The apostles raise a different problem. B801 (Brunschvicg 801) invites the reader to follow through a deliberate conspiracy: twelve people falsely claiming resurrection would face inducement, imprisonment, torture, and death, and one defection could ruin the scheme. B802 (Brunschvicg 802) asks whether they were deceived or deceivers and what sustained them after Christ's death. These are arguments about proposed explanations of testimony. They do not independently narrate or verify the fate of each apostle, and sincerity alone would not settle every possible error in a report.

The later controversies transfer the method. In B953 (Brunschvicg 953) Pascal says the Society's own Constitutions can serve like the books carried by witnesses whose interests differ from the claimant's. B929 (Brunschvicg 929) insists that someone alleging propositions in a book must show the pages. B941 (Brunschvicg 941) tersely marks testimony concerning oneself as null. B784 (Brunschvicg 784), meanwhile, says Christ did not accept testimony from demons or uncalled witnesses: not every apparently favorable utterance is proper support. Witness is thus a role disciplined by source, occasion, and authority, not a neutral pile of supportive statements.

Places to Read

B593 (Brunschvicg 593) — Risk and sincerity are joined to the demand for papers and detailed inquiry.

B596 (Brunschvicg 596) — Pascal alleges a contrast in independent attestation between Christ and Muhammad.

B597 (Brunschvicg 597) — Textual authorship and hostile testimony enter an argument containing a faulty premise about Matthew.

B710 (Brunschvicg 710) — A whole people is treated as the enduring custodian of prophetic testimony.

B750 (Brunschvicg 750) — Conversion of all or extermination would remove the desired independent witnesses.

B760 (Brunschvicg 760) — A local qualification about Jewish acceptance coexists with sweeping polemic.

B784 (Brunschvicg 784) — Not every offered testimony is accepted as appropriate.

B801 (Brunschvicg 801) — The conspiracy hypothesis is tested through motives and pressures.

B929 (Brunschvicg 929) — A contested claim about a book requires locating its words or sense.

B953 (Brunschvicg 953) — The Society's own documents become evidence against it in Pascal's analogy.

In this edition

"Witness" and "testimony" preserve the relation between person and report without turning either into an automatic demonstration. The edition's B844 (Brunschvicg 844) note supplies a limitation missing from the compressed principal sentence about martyrdom: the issue is false miracles claimed as directly witnessed, not a denial that witnesses ever suffer. That gloss belongs to the edition's note; sincerity, authenticity, transmission, and interpretation remain distinct.

See also

Prophecy (p. 23); Miracle (p. 20); Jews (p. 145); Islam (p. 142); Truth (p. 162); Scripture (p. 94).
Contents

Conduct and political order

Concupiscence

Concupiscence · Pensées

concupiscence — disordered desire; concupiscence [printed form]; *concupiscences* — disordered desires [printed form]; *figmentum malum* — evil formation [phrase]; *cupidité* — cupidity [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Desire is disordered when it makes a created or private good its governing end.

In the book. An admirable public order can be drawn from concupiscence without its inward source being healed.

In this edition. The English uses both "disordered desire" and "concupiscence"; neither is restricted to sexual appetite.

A place to read. B451 (Brunschvicg 451) and B453 (Brunschvicg 453) distinguish useful arrangements from charity.

Meaning

Concupiscence names a direction of desire, not simply the fact that someone wants something intensely. Its objects include pleasure, knowledge, reputation, possession and command. What joins these appetites in Pascal's diagnosis is their power to turn a person from God toward a good treated as sufficient in itself. In B430 (Brunschvicg 430), the personified Wisdom calls pride and concupiscence the principal diseases: pride withdraws humanity from God, while concupiscence binds it to the earth. The text does not condemn every desire under the same name; the search for truth and the love of God remain desirable.

The related cupidité at B571 (Brunschvicg 571) makes the relation between end and means especially clear. Cupidity can coexist with belief in God, and charity can coexist with earthly possessions. The decisive difference is that cupidity uses God and enjoys the world, whereas charity reverses that relation. A person's professed religious belief or outward circumstances therefore do not by themselves identify the governing love.

Use in the book

The political fragments first show what can be made from corrupt motives. B334 (Brunschvicg 334) distributes actions between concupiscence, producing voluntary acts, and force, producing involuntary ones. This compressed generalization describes the human springs examined under "Reason for effects"; it should not cancel the distinct account of

action through grace elsewhere. B402 (Brunschvicg 402) finds human greatness even in concupiscence, because people have drawn an admirable ordering from it and made an image of charity. B403 (Brunschvicg 403) similarly praises the beautiful order without praising its source as good.

B451 (Brunschvicg 451) supplies the correction that the word "image" requires. Concupiscence has been made to serve the public good, yet Pascal calls the result a false image of charity and says hatred remains underneath. B453 (Brunschvicg 453) concedes admirable rules of government, morality and justice, then distinguishes covering the ugly foundation from removing it. These passages do not deny the usefulness of institutions; their question is whether socially useful conduct proves inward love. Rules can restrain competing desires, coordinate advantages and prevent injury without changing the final good for which people act.

B452 (Brunschvicg 452) gives a small, uncomfortable test: pitying unfortunate people can win a reputation for tenderness while giving them nothing. The fragment does not say every expression of sympathy is counterfeit. It says that sympathy, considered merely as a pleasing social performance, is not necessarily contrary to concupiscence. B455 (Brunschvicg 455)'s exchange with Miton develops the same distinction between removing the self's inconvenience to others and removing its injustice. Pleasant manners can conceal the claim to be the center of everything.

Desire also affects inquiry. B423 (Brunschvicg 423) wants people to hate the concupiscence that determines them, so that it neither blinds their choice nor obstructs them after choosing. The target is not a reasoned conclusion disliked by the apologist, but the prior attachment that governs attention and the subsequent resistance to acting on what has been recognized. In B544 (Brunschvicg 544), the God of Christians makes the soul feel its self-love and concupiscence as obstacles it cannot cure by itself. Recognition of the obstacle is already connected with divine action.

The imagery of B458 (Brunschvicg 458) gives this movement a visible form. The desires to feel, know and rule become rivers of fire that burn rather than irrigate. Those commended are not immersed or carried away: they sit humbly above the rivers and reach toward the one who will raise them. B459 (Brunschvicg 459) tests a pleasure by asking whether it is stable or passing. The image belongs to a Christian meditation on exile and the heavenly homeland, not to a literal map of the faculties. It makes instability, attachment and hoped-for release intelligible together.

Places to Read

B334 (Brunschvicg 334) — Voluntary and involuntary action are assigned to disordered desire and force.

B402 (Brunschvicg 402) — An admirable social ordering becomes an image of charity.

B423 (Brunschvicg 423) — Concupiscence can blind a choice and obstruct fidelity to it.

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) — Divine Wisdom describes concupiscence as attachment to the earth.

B451 (Brunschvicg 451) — Public benefit is distinguished from its inward motive.

B452 (Brunschvicg 452) — Sympathy can purchase a reputation without a gift.

B453 (Brunschvicg 453) — Rules cover the corrupt foundation without removing it.

B458 (Brunschvicg 458) — Three desires become three rivers of fire.

B571 (Brunschvicg 571) — Using and enjoying disclose whether cupidity or charity governs.

In this edition

At B334 (Brunschvicg 334) the edition translates concupiscence as "disordered desire"; at B402 (Brunschvicg 402) and B451 (Brunschvicg 451) it retains the theological noun. These are local renderings of the same French word, not two separate faculties. The Latin figmentum malum at B453 (Brunschvicg 453) is followed in English by "evil formation." B458 (Brunschvicg 458) translates libido sentiendi, libido sciendi and libido dominandi as desires to feel, know and rule. The terms concern their disordered orientation here; the vocabulary does not make all knowledge or every exercise of authority intrinsically vicious.

See also

Charity (p. 73); Desire (p. 171); Grace (p. 85); Self-love (p. 192); Morality (p. 56).
Contents

Force · Pensées

force — force; strength [printed form]; *plus fort* — strongest [phrase]; *cordes de nécessité* — cords of necessity [phrase]; *force de sa grâce* — power of his grace [phrase]; *reconnaissante* — readily recognizable [printed form]; *la pure force l'a fait* — sheer force has done it; disclosed critical reading [phrase]; *pouvoir* — to be able [lemma]

At a Glance

The word. Force makes an action happen; that effectiveness does not establish its justice.

In the book. Conquest, inherited respect and the limits of coercion are distinguished rather than collapsed.

In this edition. Force also names argumentative strength and the power of grace, so its political sense is not universal.

A place to read. B298 (Brunschvicg 298) and B304 (Brunschvicg 304) move from coercion to its social stabilization.

Meaning

Force can mean strength, an effective capacity, or the pressure that compels outward obedience. In the political fragments its presence is more readily recognized than the justice of its use. That makes it an important condition of rule, but not an adequate moral title. B298 (Brunschvicg 298) begins with different predicates: it is just to follow what is just, necessary to follow what is strongest. The necessity of yielding to a stronger party does not supply the missing judgment about right.

Pascal also writes of the force of an argument and of grace. These uses should not all be read through physical coercion. B550 (Brunschvicg 550) attributes transformed dispositions to the "power of his grace," while the closing prayer of B233 (Brunschvicg 233) joins the discourse's strength with the writer's kneeling lowliness. The word gathers capacities that require different accounts of their object and mode of operation.

Use in the book

B298 (Brunschvicg 298)'s opening refuses both powerless justice and unjust force. Justice without force is contradicted by the wicked; force without justice is accused and tyrannical. The desired conjunction could be achieved by making the just strong or the strong just. The ending then narrates an unequal contest: force contradicts justice, pronounces justice unjust and declares itself just. Since justice could not be made strong, the strong were made just. Reading this as the author's uncomplicated endorsement of

might would erase the distinctions on which the fragment depends. It describes how power appropriates a contested title.

B304 (Brunschvicg 304) offers a deliberately imagined formation of social ranks. Everyone wants to dominate, but only some can. Conflict produces a stronger party, whose masters then prescribe how the force they possess will pass on—through election, hereditary succession or another arrangement. At this point imagination begins its work. The general need for different ranks is called a cord of necessity; attachment of respect to these particular people is a cord of imagination. The sketch is an explanatory construction, not documentary evidence for the actual founding of every state.

B303 (Brunschvicg 303) stages an assertion, objection and reply about whether force or opinion is the world's queen. Opinion uses force, the objection says; force makes opinion, answers the reply. A solitary tightrope performer can be outnumbered by a faction declaring that his accomplishment is not beautiful. The example makes social power visible within a judgment of taste. It does not prove that each judgment arises from an explicit threat. B311 (Brunschvicg 311) then gives opinion and imagination a gentle, voluntary reign lasting for a time, while force reigns always: opinion is queen, force tyrant. Voluntary consent and coercive support can cooperate without becoming identical.

The brocade and footmen of B315 (Brunschvicg 315) show why apparently superficial distinctions matter. Refusing the salute can bring a flogging; the fine clothing signifies a real capacity to punish. Pascal's reply to Montaigne therefore does not turn expensive fabric into intrinsic virtue. It identifies an effective power missed when the situation is compared only to two differently harnessed horses. B320bis (Brunschvicg 320bis) similarly defends an otherwise unreasonable rule of succession because contest over who is most capable would provoke civil war.

Force nevertheless has limits. B332 (Brunschvicg 332) says it rules only outward actions and can do nothing in the kingdom of the learned. The strong person who demands love is trying to obtain by force what belongs to another kind of merit. Likewise, refusing fear to someone merely because that person lacks ability confuses the domains in the opposite direction. To recognize force where it exists is not to grant it universal competence.

B334 (Brunschvicg 334) pairs force with concupiscence as the source of involuntary and voluntary actions respectively. This short political diagnosis should be read beside, not substituted for, the account of grace. B498 (Brunschvicg 498) distinguishes the tyrannical violence of captors from the loving force of a mother rescuing her child. Pain alone does not settle whether an action enslaves or releases; the analogy asks whose end is served and who has a rightful claim.

Places to Read

B233 (Brunschvicg 233) — The final prayer joins the discourse's strength with kneeling lowliness.

B298 (Brunschvicg 298) — Justice and force must be joined, but force appropriates the name of justice.

B303 (Brunschvicg 303) — A dialogue makes the power of a faction bear on aesthetic opinion.

B304 (Brunschvicg 304) — Imagined conquest gives way to rules of succession and inherited respect.

B311 (Brunschvicg 311) — Opinion's voluntary reign differs from force's enduring rule.

B315 (Brunschvicg 315) — Brocade and attendants signify a capacity to punish.

B332 (Brunschvicg 332) — Force governs outward actions, not every form of recognition.

B334 (Brunschvicg 334) — Force is paired with involuntary action.

B498 (Brunschvicg 498) — The rescue analogy contrasts rightful and tyrannical violence.

B550 (Brunschvicg 550) — The same word names the power of grace in a first-person account.

In this edition

The edition keeps "force" for the repeated political term and uses "power" in force de sa grâce (B550 (Brunschvicg 550)). Pouvoir in B304 (Brunschvicg 304) appears in the verbs of being able to dominate; it is not the exact noun behind every English "power." The reading la pure force l'a fait in B304 (Brunschvicg 304) is a disclosed adoption from the modern critical text, replacing the defective wording of the historical printing. In B298 (Brunschvicg 298), reconnaissante is rendered "readily recognizable," not grateful.

See also

Justice (p. 50); Tyranny (p. 65); Opinion (p. 59); Imagination (p. 127); Grace (p. 85).

Contents

Honor · Pensées

honneur — honor [printed form]; *estime* — esteem [printed form]; *honorer* — to honor [printed form]; *gloire* — glory; social renown [printed form]; *réputation* — reputation [printed form]; *être imaginaire* — imaginary being [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. Honor concerns recognition; esteem concerns the value placed on someone.

In the book. The pursuit of reputation exposes vanity and also reveals how highly people value another mind's judgment.

In this edition. Honor is not a synonym for integrity, and social glory is not the blessed glory of theological passages.

A place to read. B147 (Brunschvicg 147) and B404 (Brunschvicg 404) display the paradox of preferring a place in others' minds.

Meaning

Honneur names standing, recognition and the response a person claims or receives. Estime is the act or result of valuation; réputation is the character circulated about someone; gloire often names the renown desired from others. They overlap without being interchangeable. One may receive a respectful salute without being esteemed for wisdom, and may possess the reputation of a virtue without the virtue itself. Pascal's inquiry depends on preserving those gaps.

The verb honorer also belongs to a practical question: what response is due to a person of high birth, and for what reason? It need not mean admiring that person's intrinsic excellence. B335 (Brunschvicg 335) says noblemen should be honored, but not because birth is an actual advantage of the person. The outward action can remain while its justification changes.

Use in the book

B147 (Brunschvicg 147) divides the life a person actually has from an imagined life in other minds. We labor to embellish and preserve this second being, sometimes neglecting the first. Even tranquility, generosity and fidelity become possessions to announce. The extreme example is willingness to be cowardly in order to gain a reputation for bravery. The conclusion that anyone unwilling to die for honor would be infamous keeps the social pressure audible: reputation is not merely a private fancy one can abandon without consequences.

The political fragments explain those consequences. B324 (Brunschvicg 324) defends resentment at a slap and desire for glory by the essential

advantages bound up with them; a person who shows no response can become a target for injuries and privations. The claim is practical, not a declaration that offended pride is charity. B315 (Brunschvicg 315)'s brocade and footmen make another practical basis explicit: the man who is not saluted may order a flogging. B322 (Brunschvicg 322) measures nobility's advantage as thirty years of recognized standing gained without effort. It identifies an acceleration of social credit, not thirty years of moral accomplishment.

B323 (Brunschvicg 323) unsettles the objection to being honored for an office by asking whether ordinary love itself reaches beyond borrowed qualities. Beauty can vanish without the person dying; judgment or memory can be lost without loss of the self. The final appeal against mocking officeholders does not solve the metaphysical question of what the self is. It extends the difficulty: if love already attaches to qualities, official recognition is not uniquely exposed to this criticism.

B337 (Brunschvicg 337) arranges five responses to high birth. Ordinary people honor it; the half-able despise it as chance; the able honor it through a thought held in reserve; the devout with more zeal than knowledge again despise it; perfect Christians honor it by a higher light. Agreement in conduct therefore does not prove agreement in understanding. B338 (Brunschvicg 338) supplies a Christian rationale for obedience to arrangements called follies: respect is directed to God's ordering, not to folly as such. This is Pascal's theological account, not an inference that every superior is inwardly just.

The desire for esteem also becomes evidence of greatness. B400 (Brunschvicg 400) says the human soul is valued so highly that its contempt is intolerable. B401 (Brunschvicg 401) contrasts horses: rivalry in a race does not make the heavier, more ill-shaped horse surrender its oats in the stable. Human recognition reaches beyond the particular performance into claims on other goods. In B404 (Brunschvicg 404), the pursuit of glory is simultaneously the greatest baseness and a mark of excellence. Possessions, health and comfort do not satisfy unless one also occupies a favorable place in human reason. Even writers who reduce people to animals still want those people to admire and believe them.

This double assessment keeps criticism from becoming a simple demand for indifference to every judgment. A desire can disclose the worth assigned to thought while being wrongly governed. B452 (Brunschvicg 452)'s reputation for tenderness without giving anything and B499 (Brunschvicg 499)'s imitation of Teresa's illuminating words rather than her humility show how easily the recognition of goodness can be detached from goodness. Pascal asks both what is being honored and whether the response reaches the quality that makes it worthy.

Places to Read

B147 (Brunschvicg 147) — The imagined life can be preferred to real character.

B315 (Brunschvicg 315) — A salute responds to socially embodied force.

B322 (Brunschvicg 322) — Nobility gives recognition without equivalent personal effort.

B323 (Brunschvicg 323) — The problem of borrowed qualities reaches love and officeholding alike.

B324 (Brunschvicg 324) — Glory and response to insult have practical consequences.

B337 (Brunschvicg 337) — Five levels of judgment alternate over the same outward honor.

B400 (Brunschvicg 400) — The demand for esteem witnesses to the value assigned to the soul.

B401 (Brunschvicg 401) — A horse's excellence does not command its companion's oats.

B404 (Brunschvicg 404) — Glory reveals baseness and excellence together.

B499 (Brunschvicg 499) — Admiring illumination can miss the humility God values.

In this edition

"Honor," "esteem," "reputation" and "glory" follow different French words here. Gloire at B404 (Brunschvicg 404) is social renown; in the sequence law, grace and glory at B643 (Brunschvicg 643) it is a final blessed state. Honnêteté likewise needs context: the edition's "honorable worldly conduct" at B542 (Brunschvicg 542) is not automatically charity. The article's forms are selected attestations, not a count of all the honor vocabulary.

See also

Opinion (p. 59); Self-love (p. 192); Greatness (p. 177); Justice (p. 50); World (p. 67).
Contents

Justice · Pensées

justice — justice; righteousness [printed form]; *équité* — equity [printed form]; *juste* — just [printed form]; *justes* — righteous people [printed form]; *injustice* — injustice [printed form]; *injuste* — unjust [printed form]; *crimina* — charges; accusations in this altered quotation [printed form]; *scelera* — crimes [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Justice names a rightful order, not merely whatever force or custom currently supports.

In the book. Pascal attacks confidence in human judgments while continuing to invoke justice as their measure.

In this edition. The same French family serves civic right, personal righteousness and exact judgment in different contexts.

A place to read. B294 (Brunschvicg 294), B298 (Brunschvicg 298) and B375 (Brunschvicg 375) must be read together.

Meaning

Justice belongs to several connected questions: what one person owes another; why a law binds; whether a judgment is right; and how a person stands before God. The political critique does not settle all these questions by giving the word a single skeptical definition. In B294 (Brunschvicg 294) Pascal both asserts natural laws and says corrupted reason has corrupted access to them. In B375 (Brunschvicg 375) he distinguishes the existence of justice, as God has revealed it, from his former belief that "our justice" was essentially just and available to his secure judgment.

Juste can describe a just arrangement or a righteous person, but elsewhere it qualifies accurate reasoning. The title gathers ethical and theological uses without converting every instance of the French adjective into a claim about moral merit. Conversely, English "righteousness" may represent the same justice that elsewhere appears as "justice."

Use in the book

B294 (Brunschvicg 294) begins by asking on what someone will found the world he wishes to govern. Individual caprice produces confusion; justice is not securely known. Borders and times expose changes in what counts as lawful or virtuous. A river can separate those permitted to kill one another because their princes quarrel. The point is not merely that local habits differ, but that people treat a contingent boundary as if it supplied moral truth. The exaggerated sweep of the examples belongs to Pascal's challenge to legal confidence.

The fragment then considers rival foundations: a legislator's authority, the sovereign's convenience, or received custom. Following custom is called the safest course under this uncertainty. Yet the text also says there are undoubtedly natural laws. The criticism is therefore of the authority claimed for our prevailing rules and our ability to establish their grounds, not a straightforward assertion that no right or wrong exists. The warning against exposing usurpation further complicates the argument: a rule introduced without reason may have become reasonable as a support of civil peace.

B298 (Brunschvicg 298) distinguishes justice from force before asking how to unite them. Powerless justice cannot secure compliance; force without justice is tyrannical. The conclusion that the strong have been made just records force's successful claim to the title. It does not retrospectively erase the accusation against unjust force. B320bis (Brunschvicg 320bis) gives the practical justification for hereditary succession: choosing the most virtuous and capable would immediately invite rival claims and civil conflict. The accepted rule is justified relative to human disorder and the danger of war, not because a royal child must possess the greatest merit.

B325 (Brunschvicg 325) and B326 (Brunschvicg 326) distinguish obedience to laws as laws from belief in their intrinsic justice. Pascal thinks ordinary people generally obey on the latter ground, making them vulnerable to revolt when the law's weakness is exposed. His proposed instruction is openly concerned with stability, and its qualification—if people can be made to understand it—matters. These fragments do not offer a modern constitutional theory, or a general adjudication of every possible resistance to injustice.

Justice also tests the courteous self. In B455 (Brunschvicg 455), Miton's obliging behavior removes the inconvenience of self-love, but not its desire to be the center and master of others. The distinction is between becoming less troublesome and ceasing to make an unjust claim. B477 (Brunschvicg 477) extends the demand toward the general whole: natural and civil communities must themselves recognize a wider whole rather than treating their own interest as final. B482 (Brunschvicg 482)'s thinking members illustrate why withholding nourishment from the body is both unjust and self-defeating.

Divine justice has another role. B497 (Brunschvicg 497) pairs it with mercy: justice humbles pride, however holy the works; mercy invites work and resists sloth. Neither term may be used to authorize despair or complacency. B534 (Brunschvicg 534)'s righteous people consider themselves sinners, while sinners consider themselves righteous. The paradox concerns self-knowledge before a standard one does not possess as a personal achievement. Thus the text's uncertainty about human justice does not make indifference to injustice its conclusion.

Places to Read

B294 (Brunschvicg 294) — Changing laws expose the instability of claimed equity; natural laws are nevertheless asserted.

B298 (Brunschvicg 298) — Justice and force are distinguished before their attempted conjunction.

B320bis (Brunschvicg 320bis) — Civil peace gives a practical rationale for hereditary succession.

B326 (Brunschvicg 326) — Obedience to law is separated from a declaration that rulers are just.

B363 (Brunschvicg 363) — The collected Latin extract has scelera, unlike B294 (Brunschvicg 294)'s crimina.

B375 (Brunschvicg 375) — Revealed justice is distinguished from confidence in our own judgments.

B455 (Brunschvicg 455) — Courtesy can remove inconvenience without removing injustice.

B477 (Brunschvicg 477) — The inclination to make oneself the whole violates order.

B482 (Brunschvicg 482) — A thinking member's duty and happiness require the good of the body.

B497 (Brunschvicg 497) — Justice humbles pride while mercy counters sloth.

B534 (Brunschvicg 534) — Righteousness is not secure self-certification.

In this edition

B294 (Brunschvicg 294)'s "charges are pursued" translates the source's crimina in an altered Latin quotation; B363 (Brunschvicg 363) has the different scelera, translated "crimes." The distinction is disclosed in the edition and should not be flattened into one quotation. B513 (Brunschvicg 513)'s promised justice is "righteousness" in English. B375 (Brunschvicg 375) preserves source brackets and the abrupt reference to Arcesilaus rather than turning it into an independently verified philosophical biography.

See also

Law (p. 53); Force (p. 44); Truth (p. 162); Charity (p. 73); Self (p. 189).
Contents

Law · Pensées

lois — laws [printed form]; *lois naturelles* — natural laws [phrase]; *loi* — law [printed form]; *Deux lois* — two laws [phrase]; *loi vocale* — oral law [phrase]; *parce qu'elles sont lois* — because they are laws [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. A law may be an established civic rule, a natural norm, or the scriptural law.

In the book. The reason to obey, the justice of a rule and the power to fulfill it are separate questions.

In this edition. "Law" does not import a modern constitutional framework or make all scriptural uses merely political.

A place to read. B326 (Brunschvicg 326) concerns obedience; B520 (Brunschvicg 520) and B522 (Brunschvicg 522) concern instruction and grace.

Meaning

Loi and lois name rules with different origins and ends. Civic laws coordinate a community even when their justice is disputed. Natural laws at B294 (Brunschvicg 294) are asserted to exist, though prevailing customs do not give secure access to them. The scriptural law instructs and commands, figures a fulfillment, and becomes the subject of Pascal's argument about grace. The same noun does not make these functions interchangeable.

A law can be considered as an obligation, as a transmitted book, or as an institution practiced through ceremonies. B619 (Brunschvicg 619) and B620 (Brunschvicg 620) connect a people's endurance with the preservation of its law. B642 (Brunschvicg 642) asks whether that law has one meaning or two. B522 (Brunschvicg 522) asks a different question: does what commands an act also give the power required to perform it?

Use in the book

B294 (Brunschvicg 294) challenges confidence in civil legislation by moving across frontiers and periods. What a jurisdiction declares just can change with climate or time; the quarrel of two princes can authorize killing between people with no personal quarrel. Pascal considers the authority of legislators, sovereign convenience and custom as proposed foundations. His claim that law is law and nothing more concerns its established authority when intrinsic justice cannot be securely demonstrated. It does not make every legal rule equally good, or erase the fragment's explicit assertion of natural laws.

B325 (Brunschvicg 325) makes the motive for obedience central. People follow custom because they believe it just, whereas Pascal argues that received laws should be followed as received laws. Antiquity is consequently evidence of established authority, not proof of truth. B326 (Brunschvicg 326) warns that merely telling the people their laws are unjust threatens the ground on which they obey. The alternative instruction is conditional on being understood. Neither passage can be reduced to "old laws are true"; both distinguish legal stability from the justice imagined to support it.

The succession rule of B320bis (Brunschvicg 320bis) shows why a convention can become reasonable. The best family does not qualify a ship's pilot. Choosing a queen's first son to govern would likewise seem ridiculous and unjust, but competition among claimants to greatest virtue and ability brings immediate conflict. An indisputable designation prevents that contest. The law's rationale lies in the disordered subjects it governs and the evil of civil war, rather than a demonstrated equivalence of birth and competence.

B380 (Brunschvicg 380) then exposes a difficulty in applying sound maxims. Grant that inequality is necessary and the concession can be extended toward tyranny; grant that the mind needs relaxation and it can be extended toward excess. Laws try to set boundaries where things and the restless mind do not supply an easy dividing line. This does not make all restraint pointless. It shows why a true general maxim does not mechanically determine a measured action in every case.

The theological fragments distinguish instruction from fulfillment. B520 (Brunschvicg 520) says the law did not destroy nature but instructed it; grace does not destroy law but makes it be practiced. B522 (Brunschvicg 522) sharpens the distinction: law obliged people to what it did not give, whereas grace gives what it obliges. Obligation and enabling gift remain different, so inability is neither a discovery that there is no duty nor a reason to claim unaided power. B523 (Brunschvicg 523) places the whole of morality within concupiscence and grace.

Two laws are said to order the Christian commonwealth better than political legislation (B484 (Brunschvicg 484)). The edition identifies them in a note as love of God and neighbor, without inserting the expansion into Pascal's short sentence. In the scriptural dossier B610 (Brunschvicg 610), love of God becomes the criterion by which he interprets circumcision, sacrifice, temple and covenant. B607 (Brunschvicg 607) applies the criticism of literal or outward religion to Christians as well as Jews: sacraments imagined to operate everything without their recipients are no more adequate than an exclusively temporal Messiah.

The law's historical continuity is also an apologetic claim. B620 (Brunschvicg 620) praises its antiquity, rigor and preservation; the citation of Josephus and Philo gives Pascal's sources, not independent verification of

every historical superlative. B635 (Brunschvicg 635)'s "oral law" belongs to notes drawn from the Christian Pugio fidei. Those records must not be mistaken for a corrected modern account of rabbinic law.

Places to Read

B294 (Brunschvicg 294) — Civil variation, natural law and the established authority of custom.

B320bis (Brunschvicg 320bis) — A determinate succession rule is defended against civil conflict.

B326 (Brunschvicg 326) — Laws are to be obeyed as laws, not because rulers are necessarily just.

B380 (Brunschvicg 380) — Good maxims require boundaries that are difficult to determine.

B484 (Brunschvicg 484) — Two laws order the Christian commonwealth.

B520 (Brunschvicg 520) — Law instructs nature; grace enables the practice of law.

B522 (Brunschvicg 522) — Commanding and giving are distinguished.

B607 (Brunschvicg 607) — Outward religious observance is tested by love of God.

B610 (Brunschvicg 610) — A Christian dossier interprets institutions through their spiritual end.

B620 (Brunschvicg 620) — The antiquity and preservation of Mosaic law are offered as evidence.

In this edition

The English consistently permits "law" to carry civic and scriptural senses, with context deciding. "Oral law" at B635 (Brunschvicg 635) renders loi vocale, not a statute spoken aloud on one occasion. At B619 (Brunschvicg 619) Pascal's "Twelve Tables of Athens" is retained and corrected in a note: the Twelve Tables were Roman. His proposed borrowing from Mosaic law is an ancient apologetic argument, not an established chain of legal transmission.

See also

Justice (p. 50); Custom (p. 110); Grace (p. 85); Figurative meaning (p. 82); Scripture (p. 94).
Contents

Morality · Pensées

morale — morality; moral teaching [printed form]; *morale du jugement* — morality of judgment [phrase]; *principe de la morale* — principle of morality [phrase]; *bonne volonté* — good will [phrase]; *vraie morale* — true morality [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. Morality concerns right judgment, conduct and the teaching that directs them.

In the book. Thinking well matters, but admirable rules and exceptional feats do not guarantee a transformed will.

In this edition. B4 (Brunschvicg 4)'s disputed relative clause is resolved explicitly by this translation, not silently assumed.

A place to read. Read B347 (Brunschvicg 347) beside B352 (Brunschvicg 352), B381 (Brunschvicg 381) and B482 (Brunschvicg 482).

Meaning

Morale may name moral teaching, the practice of judging conduct, or a purported system of deciding what is good. The word does not automatically designate a self-contained modern academic discipline. Pascal's provocation that true morality makes light of morality at B4 (Brunschvicg 4) is explained by a contrast between judgment and intellect. His criticism is directed at a kind of moral claim or method, not at the duty to live well.

B347 (Brunschvicg 347) names thinking well the principle of morality. The emphasis is not simply on possessing thought as a mark of species or rank. A thinking being can still think foolishly, as B365 (Brunschvicg 365) insists. Dignity supplies a responsibility for the ordering of thought, not an exemption from the evaluation of its actual exercise.

Use in the book

The thinking reed is physically vulnerable: a vapor or a drop of water can kill it. What distinguishes it from the universe that crushes it is knowledge of its death and of the universe's advantage. Pascal concludes not that bodily weakness is irrelevant, but that we must raise ourselves through thought rather than through space and duration. B348 (Brunschvicg 348) similarly refuses landownership as the measure of dignity. The moral imperative follows from what thought can do and from how readily it can fail.

The short sequence about virtue tests the difference between an occasional achievement and a stable capacity. B350 (Brunschvicg 350) accuses the Stoics of inferring that what can be done sometimes can always

be done. Glory may produce extraordinary effort like a feverish movement that health cannot imitate. B351 (Brunschvicg 351) describes the soul as leaping to heights where it cannot remain, and B352 (Brunschvicg 352) proposes ordinary conduct rather than exceptional effort as the measure of virtue. These are criticisms of unwarranted inference, not a denial that the exceptional action occurred.

B353 (Brunschvicg 353) complicates any simple preference for moderation. Pascal admires Epaminondas's extreme courage together with extreme gentleness: greatness lies in reaching opposed virtues, not in one extreme alone. He then concedes that the appearance of breadth may be rapid movement, like a burning brand tracing a shape. Even that would show agility. B357 (Brunschvicg 357) warns that pursuing virtues to extremes can allow vices to enter at both small and large scales. The good cannot be found by merely turning every approved quality up to its greatest intensity.

The difficulty of judgment becomes an image of perspective in B381 (Brunschvicg 381). Too young or old, too near to one's work or too distant from it, one misses the right position. Painting can assign its viewpoint, but who assigns the corresponding point in truth and morality? B382 (Brunschvicg 382) and B383 (Brunschvicg 383) shift to a ship: common movement appears stationary, and people aboard can think the shore is moving. Morality needs a fixed point, yet agreement among moving observers does not supply one. The questions expose the difficulty without themselves providing a complete decision procedure.

B453 (Brunschvicg 453) acknowledges admirable rules of morality drawn from concupiscence, then says their corrupt foundation is covered rather than removed. B482 (Brunschvicg 482)'s thinking members develops a different account of order. A member needs intelligence to know its union with the body and good will to consent to the whole soul's guidance. Keeping nourishment to itself would make it unjust and miserable together. The analogy connects duty with happiness without treating self-isolation as the natural unit of moral calculation.

B523 (Brunschvicg 523) condenses the theological account into concupiscence and grace. Knowledge of duty does not by itself make the will able to carry it out; B520 (Brunschvicg 520) says grace makes the law be practiced. B497 (Brunschvicg 497) likewise makes mercy an incentive to effort, not permission for laziness. B499 (Brunschvicg 499) distinguishes an outward act from the manner and end in which it is performed: fasting with complacency can be worse than not fasting and being humbled. The casuistical fragments later ask whether a defensible opinion can safely authorize an act. Across these contexts, good conduct is not reduced to the possession of rules, visible achievements or institutional permission.

Places to Read

B4 (Brunschvicg 4) — True morality and the morality of judgment are distinguished from an intellectual counterpart.

B347 (Brunschvicg 347) — Thinking well concludes the thinking-reed argument.

B350 (Brunschvicg 350) — Occasional capacity does not establish constant power.

B352 (Brunschvicg 352) — Ordinary conduct is proposed as the measure of virtue.

B353 (Brunschvicg 353) — Opposed virtues and the burning-brand comparison qualify a simple account of extremes.

B381 (Brunschvicg 381) — Moral judgment lacks the assigned viewpoint available in painting.

B383 (Brunschvicg 383) — A harbor becomes the desired fixed point for moral judgment.

B453 (Brunschvicg 453) — Admirable rules can conceal an unchanged foundation.

B482 (Brunschvicg 482) — Intelligence and good will order thinking members toward their body.

B523 (Brunschvicg 523) — Concupiscence and grace provide the theological summary.

In this edition

At B4 (Brunschvicg 4) the edition attaches "which has no rules" to the morality of the intellect; its note records that Brunschvicg attached the relative clause to judgment instead. The article follows this supplied English while preserving the dispute. The "universal soul" of B482 (Brunschvicg 482) first belongs to the comparison with the soul governing a whole individual body; it need not denote a cosmic soul shared by humanity. The larger analogy is developed explicitly through membership in Christ at B483 (Brunschvicg 483).

See also

Thinking (p. 195); Discernment (p. 113); Probability (p. 62); Charity (p. 73); Grace (p. 85).
Contents

Opinion · Pensées

opinion — opinion [printed form]; *opinions très saines* — very sound opinions [phrase]; *pensée de derrière* — a thought held in reserve [phrase]; *Raison des effets* — reason for effects [phrase]; *selon notre opinion* — in our opinion [phrase]; *empire fondé sur l'opinion* — rule founded on opinion [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. Opinion is an individual or shared judgment, often effective beyond what its reasons warrant.

In the book. The people can judge soundly while locating the truth of their judgment in the wrong place.

In this edition. Public valuation is not a modern poll; "sound" does not always describe a sound understanding.

A place to read. B324 (Brunschvicg 324), B328 (Brunschvicg 328) and B335 (Brunschvicg 335) show successive qualifications of the same verdict.

Meaning

Opinion includes beliefs about truth, judgments of beauty and valuations of persons. It is not merely a tentative private guess contrasted with certain knowledge. In the political fragments it has authority: people act, confer honor and recognize rank through it. The question is therefore both whether the judgment is true and what makes it effective.

Pascal further distinguishes a sound practical opinion from a sound account of its reasons. B335 (Brunschvicg 335) says truth is in the people's opinions, but not at the point where they imagine it. Honoring a nobleman can be right without making noble birth an intrinsic personal advantage. The distinction prevents the practical vindication of a custom from vindicating every belief that supports it.

Use in the book

B303 (Brunschvicg 303) dramatizes disagreement about opinion's power. The first voice calls force the world's queen; the objection says opinion employs force; the reply says force makes opinion. The tightrope example gives the reply a social mechanism: a person capable of a difficult feat may stand alone against a stronger faction that denies its beauty. Collective judgment is not independent of the group's capacity to sustain it. Yet the objection remains intelligible, since force itself is used in the service of what people value.

B311 (Brunschvicg 311) distinguishes modes and durations of rule. Opinion and imagination reign gently and voluntarily for a time; force

reigns always. Opinion is consequently likened to a queen and force to a tyrant. This is not a chronology in which one always entirely replaces the other. B304 (Brunschvicg 304)'s imagined founding of social distinctions shows imagination preserving force in a chosen group after conquest establishes dominance. A person may consent to a rank whose original establishment depended on coercion.

B324 (Brunschvicg 324) calls the people's opinions very sound and lists apparently unreflective preferences. Hunting and diversion can be chosen over poetry for reasons the half-learned fail to grasp. Outward distinctions such as wealth and nobility may have a practical rationale. Resenting a slap can avert further injuries, and acting for an uncertain outcome is not automatically foolish. The examples do not share one intrinsic excellence; they share a relation to circumstances that the immediate critic overlooks.

B328 (Brunschvicg 328) then announces another reversal. First, esteem for inessential things exposed human vanity; next, the practical grounds of those opinions overturned the criticism. Now the second conclusion must itself be qualified: people remain vain because they do not sense the truth where it is. The movement is not an invitation to alternate assertions indefinitely for amusement. It separates the outward judgment, its effective grounds and the believer's understanding. A true result reached through a false account does not make the account true.

B336 (Brunschvicg 336) names a thought held in reserve: one judges through it while speaking like the people. B337 (Brunschvicg 337) situates this distinction within a gradation of responses to high birth. People, half-able critics, able observers, zealous but insufficiently instructed devotees and perfect Christians alternate between honoring and despising it. The same public response appears at several levels, for different reasons. To identify a speaker's position from the response alone would therefore miss the argument's central distinction.

B327 (Brunschvicg 327) contrasts natural ignorance with a learned ignorance that knows itself. Those between the two extremes have enough learning to despise ordinary judgment but not enough to understand its basis. Pascal's praise of the people here is accordingly not a doctrine that the majority is always correct. B378 (Brunschvicg 378) makes the majority bite those departing from the middle, and B384 (Brunschvicg 384) says neither contradiction nor its absence supplies a mark of truth. Numbers, unanimity and opposition all require a further judgment.

Opinion also reaches into self-valuation. B400 (Brunschvicg 400) and B404 (Brunschvicg 404) ask why another soul's esteem matters so intensely, while B147 (Brunschvicg 147) shows people trading actual character for reputation. These passages explain why opinion's authority is not confined to formal politics: it shapes what is sought as happiness. The practical force

of a valuation remains distinct from its truth and from the inward love that seeks it.

Places to Read

B147 (Brunschvicg 147) — Life in others' minds can displace care for real character.

B303 (Brunschvicg 303) — Assertion, objection and reply connect force with social valuation.

B304 (Brunschvicg 304) — Imagination stabilizes the ranks established by conflict.

B311 (Brunschvicg 311) — Voluntary opinion and coercive force have different reigns.

B324 (Brunschvicg 324) — Several ordinary opinions are vindicated through their practical grounds.

B327 (Brunschvicg 327) — Learned ignorance differs from a smattering of self-satisfied learning.

B328 (Brunschvicg 328) — The vindication of the people is itself qualified.

B335 (Brunschvicg 335) — Truth can lie in an opinion but not where its holder locates it.

B337 (Brunschvicg 337) — Different levels of understanding can produce the same public honor.

B384 (Brunschvicg 384) — Agreement and contradiction do not establish truth.

In this edition

"Very sound" renders très saines at B324 (Brunschvicg 324); B328 (Brunschvicg 328) deliberately repeats and then qualifies that description. Pensée de derrière is "a thought held in reserve," not an additional opinion announced to the public. Raison des effets is a working heading for explanations of puzzling effects; it does not authorize reading all nearby fragments as a finished continuous proof. The voices of B303 (Brunschvicg 303) are an assertion, an objection and a reply, as the edition's note explains.

See also

Force (p. 44); Honor (p. 47); Imagination (p. 127); Custom (p. 110); Truth (p. 162).
Contents

Probability · Pensées

probabilité — probability; moral probabilism in context [printed form]; *probable* — probable; defensible [printed form]; *sûr* — safe [printed form]; *plus sûr* — safer [phrase]; *auteurs graves* — weighty authorities [phrase]; *quam primum* — as soon as possible; unfinished label [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. A probable moral opinion is one claimed to be defensible enough to authorize action.

In the book. Pascal asks whether support from authorities can provide the safety of conscience attributed to it.

In this edition. This doctrinal sense differs from the calculation of chances in the wager.

A place to read. B917 (Brunschvicg 917), B920 (Brunschvicg 920) and B922 (Brunschvicg 922) test safety, authority and selective caution.

Meaning

Probabilité in these polemical fragments concerns moral probabilism: the standing of an opinion supported by reasons or recognized authorities, and the permission to act on it. It does not ordinarily mean a numerical likelihood assigned to a future event. Probable, vrai and sûr therefore mark different questions. Is an opinion defensible? Is it true? Does following it make the agent safe? Pascal attacks the passage from the first answer to the last.

Safety here concerns conscience and the promised religious end of conduct. It is not physical safety alone. B922 (Brunschvicg 922) nevertheless uses food that might poison someone and a lawsuit that might be lost to reveal how people demand stronger assurance when their own favored interests are involved. The comparison joins the senses without making them identical.

Use in the book

B917 (Brunschvicg 917) begins from the saints' ardor in seeking truth. If merely probable opinions were safe, Pascal argues, that exertion would have been useless. He adds the fear of saints who had always followed the safer course, naming Teresa's obedience to her confessor. The argument does not imply that fear by itself proves a doctrine false. It sets the claimed sufficiency of authorized opinion against lives still marked by searching, obedience and anxiety. Following a counselor does not become a guarantee that dispenses the person from humility.

B918 (Brunschvicg 918) states the social attraction in a sharp antithesis: remove probability and one can no longer please the world; introduce it and one can no longer displease the world. This is a polemical diagnosis of accommodation, not a neutral definition accepted by every advocate of probabilism. B919 (Brunschvicg 919) makes the alleged exchange explicit. Powerful people want flattery; Jesuits want the powerful people's favor. Pascal casts teachers and disciples as mutually responsive to appetites rather than to truth. His accusation must remain attributed to him, not become a factual judgment about every member of a religious order.

B920 (Brunschvicg 920) extends the criticism even to good maxims. If they remain founded on the same human authority, he says, they can be more just and reasonable without being holier. The image is a graft on wild stock: outward fruit does not establish a transformed foundation. This resembles B453 (Brunschvicg 453)'s distinction between admirable civic rules and the concupiscence from which they were drawn. In neither case is the practical difference between a better and a worse rule denied; the distinction concerns holiness and source.

The final note in B920 (Brunschvicg 920) examines a change in the meaning of safety. Pascal alleges that the disputed teachers no longer mean a path that leads to heaven without danger of failing to arrive by it. They mean a path from which the traveler can remain in no danger of departing. Staying consistently on an approved road is substituted for reaching the destination. The two negatives are essential: the charge is not that the traveler lacks a stable rule, but that stability within the rule has been confused with security of the end.

B922 (Brunschvicg 922) returns to sincere search for God by comparison with cherished affairs. A mere probability that food is harmless or a lawsuit will succeed without attention does not satisfy the person who cares intensely about those outcomes. Pascal then makes a conditional concession: even if weighty authors and reasons sufficed, the authors and reasons invoked would fail their own standard. He names Molina and Lessius as competing authorities and asks whether contrary rationales can both have the claimed force. This is an attack on the offered warrants, not solely on the abstract existence of authority.

The fragment's unfinished examples show how redescription may evade a prohibition: going to a field to await someone is called walking rather than dueling. Usury, simony, revenge and other headings follow with their proposed exceptions left unwritten. The surviving text leaves the proposed exceptions unspecified. Nor should the rejection of probabilism be mistaken for a rejection of every action under uncertainty. B234 (Brunschvicg 234) expressly argues that sea voyages, battles and work for tomorrow can be reasonable without certainty. The issue is what grounds a practical choice and what kind of assurance is claimed for it.

Places to Read

B234 (Brunschvicg 234) — Reasonable action for uncertain outcomes is defended in a different argumentative setting.

B453 (Brunschvicg 453) — Admirable rules can retain an unchanged inward foundation.

B499 (Brunschvicg 499) — Teresa's humility is distinguished from the illumination people admire.

B917 (Brunschvicg 917) — The saints' search tests the claim that the probable is safe.

B918 (Brunschvicg 918) — Probabilism is accused of accommodating worldly wishes.

B919 (Brunschvicg 919) — The alleged mutual interests of teachers and powerful patrons are named.

B920 (Brunschvicg 920) — Good maxims and the altered criterion of a safe path are examined.

B922 (Brunschvicg 922) — Food, litigation and casuistical exceptions test selective standards of assurance.

In this edition

The English keeps "probability" and "probable," with the moral setting supplied by context and annotation. "Weighty authorities" translates auteurs graves, not statistical evidence. In B922 (Brunschvicg 922), quam primum is translated "the as-soon-as-possible" and remains an unfinished label; the repeated "but not..." clauses are not completed. B920 (Brunschvicg 920) belongs to a compressed sequence on censure, Port-Royal and the Provincial Letters, so its changes of addressee should not be mistaken for an impersonal textbook exposition.

See also

Morality (p. 56); Truth (p. 162); Wager (p. 100); Law (p. 53); Search (p. 97).

Contents

Tyranny · Pensées

tyrannie — tyranny [printed form]; *domination* — domination [printed form]; *tyranniques* — tyrannical [printed form]; *tyran* — tyrant [printed form]; *violence impétueuse et tyrannique* — impetuous and tyrannical violence [phrase]; *unité* — unity [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Tyranny claims a kind of rule not warranted by the power or merit possessed.

In the book. The wish to rule everywhere can occur in a strong person, an admired person, an institution or the self.

In this edition. The term is broader than a political regime but stronger than a merely verbal inconsistency.

A place to read. B332 (Brunschvicg 332) gives the central definition; B455 (Brunschvicg 455) and B871 (Brunschvicg 871) extend the problem.

Meaning

B332 (Brunschvicg 332) defines tyranny as a desire for domination that is universal and outside its proper order. An order is a sphere within which a particular capacity or excellence has its appropriate claim. Force can command outward actions without deserving love; charm can attract love without deserving fear; knowledge can deserve belief without acquiring every other kind of authority. Tyranny tries to cross these boundaries by demand.

The definition is relational. A merit is not unreal merely because it does not confer universal power. Pascal says it is unjust to refuse the duties that actually correspond to merits, just as it is unjust to demand different duties. His criticism therefore opposes both usurpation and the refusal to acknowledge a limited claim because some unrelated excellence is absent.

Use in the book

The rooms of B332 (Brunschvicg 332) make the argument concrete. Strong people, beautiful people, gifted minds and the devout each reign at home, nowhere else. When the strong and the beautiful compete to master one another, they confuse kinds of mastery. Not even force can rule everywhere: it governs outward actions but cannot establish learning in the kingdom of the learned. The examples “I am beautiful, therefore I should be feared” and “I am strong, therefore I should be loved” show the invalid transition becoming an unjust demand.

The converse matters equally. “He is not strong, therefore I will not esteem him” denies esteem for the absence of a different qualification; “he is

not able, therefore I will not fear him" mistakes lack of intellectual ability for lack of power. Pascal's allocation of responses is not an assurance that every beautiful or strong person is morally good. It is an analysis of what kind of response that quality, considered as such, can support.

B298 (Brunschvicg 298) supplies the political counterpart: force without justice is tyrannical. Its effectiveness is recognizable, while justice remains disputed, and force can seize the name of justice for itself. B311 (Brunschvicg 311) similarly calls force the world's tyrant while opinion is its queen. The contrast does not make gentleness sufficient for justice. A voluntary response can still arise from illusion or misplaced desire; B325 (Brunschvicg 325) observes that people would regard custom as tyranny if they did not believe it just. The appearance of rightful rule is itself part of the problem.

B380 (Brunschvicg 380) warns against an uncontrolled enlargement of a valid concession. There must be inequality, but granting that can open the way to the highest domination and tyranny. The task is to mark limits rather than pretend the initial maxim settles every extension. B430 (Brunschvicg 430) explicitly rejects subjecting belief tyrannically or asking for assent without reason. The passage also refuses to account for every mystery. Its proposed middle course is to establish authority through recognizable divine marks and then teach what the hearer cannot discover unaided. That is the claim made within Pascal's apologetic voice, not a warrant for any speaker who demands trust.

The self can be a tyrant without holding office. B455 (Brunschvicg 455) says each self would like to enslave all the others and make itself the center of everything. Miton's pleasant conduct removes trouble but leaves the inward injustice. This brings tyranny close to concupiscence: a socially acceptable manner may coexist with the desire for universal priority. The complaint is not against the existence of an individual person, but against the person's claim to occupy the place of the whole.

B498 (Brunschvicg 498) distinguishes two violences through the image of a child taken from robbers by its mother. The child's pain does not make the rescue equivalent to the captivity. The captors' violent retention is called tyrannical, the mother's liberation loving and rightful. B871 (Brunschvicg 871) then refuses a false choice within the Church: multitude without unity is confusion; unity not dependent on the multitude is tyranny. The head is considered as the whole under one aspect and as a part under another. Neither truth may abolish the other. Tyranny thus names an authority that detaches itself from the relation that makes it rightful.

Places to Read

B298 (Brunschvicg 298) — Force without justice is called tyrannical.

B311 (Brunschvicg 311) — Opinion is queen while force is tyrant.

B325 (Brunschvicg 325) — Custom's acceptance depends on what people believe about its justice.

B332 (Brunschvicg 332) — Different rooms, merits and duties define the limits of rule.

B380 (Brunschvicg 380) — Necessary inequality does not authorize unlimited domination.

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) — The passage rejects imposing belief tyrannically.

B455 (Brunschvicg 455) — The self seeks to become the center and tyrant of others.

B498 (Brunschvicg 498) — Captivity and rescue are distinguished despite the pain of both.

B871 (Brunschvicg 871) — Unity without dependence on the multitude becomes tyranny.

In this edition

The edition retains "tyranny" rather than reducing it to confusion or inconsistency, because the faulty inference becomes a demand on others. Ordre at B332 (Brunschvicg 332) is "proper order," a sphere of warranted response. It should be compared with, but not automatically equated to, the body–mind–charity sequence of B793 (Brunschvicg 793). B871 (Brunschvicg 871)'s final observation about France and councils describes Pascal's ecclesiastical controversy, not present church law.

See also

Force (p. 44); Justice (p. 50); Three orders (p. 35); Self (p. 189); Church (p. 137).
Contents

World

World · Pensées

monde — world; society [printed form]; *vanité du monde* — the world's vanity [phrase]; *jouit du monde* — enjoys the world [phrase]; *Le monde subsiste* — the world subsists [phrase]; *grandeurs* — forms of greatness; social distinction [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Monde can mean the created world, human society or the worldly good treated as final.

In the book. The world absorbs attention, sustains social order and supplies signs of both corruption and redemption.

In this edition. Not every monde is the physical universe, and criticism of worldly attachment is not hatred of creation.

A place to read. B146 (Brunschvicg 146), B327 (Brunschvicg 327), B556 (Brunschvicg 556) and B571 (Brunschvicg 571) bring the distinct senses into view.

Meaning

The range of monde is important because the same English "world" can sound more uniform than Pascal's uses are. The world may be the human scene that dances, governs and seeks recognition; the community whose judgments keep institutions going; the created order interpreted through Christian claims; or the goods loved in opposition to God. These senses interact without being identical.

Tout le monde commonly means everyone, not the physical totality of things. Conversely, B556 (Brunschvicg 556)'s question why the world subsists is explicitly theological and cosmological. The lexicon therefore follows the local subject and verb rather than defining monde once as either society or universe.

Use in the book

B146 (Brunschvicg 146) begins with the human duty to think as one should: about oneself, one's author and one's end. The question "What does the world think about?" then produces dancing, playing the lute, singing, composing verse, riding at the ring, fighting and becoming king. The list mixes amusements and serious ambition because the common defect is not their identical social importance. It is the failure to ask what being a king or a human being means. B161 (Brunschvicg 161) calls the world's vanity visible yet strangely unrecognized: even saying it is foolish to pursue greatness seems surprising.

The social world is not simply dismissed as irrational. B327 (Brunschvicg 327) says it judges well from natural ignorance; the half-learned who despise it can judge worse. B324 (Brunschvicg 324) vindicates several ordinary practices through reasons their immediate critics miss. B328 (Brunschvicg 328) then qualifies that vindication: the opinions may be sound although people locate their truth incorrectly. "The world" here is the field of judgments and practices requiring explanation, not a single speaker whose every belief Pascal endorses.

The world's esteem can become an imagined second life. B147 (Brunschvicg 147) shows actual virtues transferred into reputation, and B404 (Brunschvicg 404) finds that health and possessions do not satisfy without a favorable place in other minds. This explains why turning away from the world is not merely leaving a location or abandoning goods. One can renounce possessions and still pursue admiration for doing so. B499

(Brunschvicg 499) warns that the very qualities pleasing to God and people may please them for different reasons: Teresa's humility and her illumination are not the same object of approval.

B498 (Brunschvicg 498) portrays the world as retaining the person whom God draws toward piety. The mother-and-robbers analogy makes the divided attachment painful: the resistance, not the liberating good itself, explains the tearing of the heart. This is a moral and theological personification of worldly captivity, not a claim that physical creation is evil in its existence. B580 (Brunschvicg 580) calls nature God's image, with perfections showing the likeness and defects showing that it is only an image.

B571 (Brunschvicg 571) offers the clearest distinction between goods and their use. Cupidity can coexist with faith in God; charity can coexist with earthly possessions. Cupidity uses God and enjoys the world, while charity does the reverse. Enjoyment here means treating something as the final good. Thus charity does not require that created things cease to exist or serve human life. It changes the end toward which their use is directed. The same passage calls creatures, though good, enemies when they turn the righteous away from God: their role depends on the end sought.

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) interprets the persistence of the world through Christ. If its sole purpose were an incontestable display of deity, Pascal argues, God would shine everywhere without concealment. Instead, its order teaches both corruption and redemption, so what appears marks neither total absence nor wholly manifest presence, but a God who hides himself. B584 (Brunschvicg 584) says the world subsists for mercy and judgment toward people understood as estranged rather than newly innocent. These are claims within Pascal's Christian explanation. They do not turn the ordinary meaning of "world" into a theological verdict wherever the word occurs, but show how his account of ends joins social life, nature and salvation.

Places to Read

B146 (Brunschvicg 146) — Society's occupations are set against reflection on origin and end.

B147 (Brunschvicg 147) — A life in others' minds can displace the real one.

B161 (Brunschvicg 161) — The world's visible vanity remains difficult to acknowledge.

B327 (Brunschvicg 327) — Natural ignorance can judge more soundly than partial learning.

B404 (Brunschvicg 404) — Earthly advantages do not satisfy without human esteem.

B498 (Brunschvicg 498) — The world holds back the person whom grace draws.

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) — The world's subsistence is interpreted through corruption and redemption.

B571 (Brunschvicg 571) — Using and enjoying distinguish cupidity from charity.

B580 (Brunschvicg 580) — Nature is an image of God, not God himself.

B584 (Brunschvicg 584) — The world is said to subsist for mercy and judgment.

In this edition

"World" is retained when social and theological senses interact. At B146 (Brunschvicg 146) the plural activities establish a human collective subject; at B556 (Brunschvicg 556) the argument concerns the order and persistence of creation. "Enjoys" at B571 (Brunschvicg 571) should not be reduced to a momentary pleasant sensation: paired with "uses," it identifies the final good. The edition's broad "earthly goods" and "possessions" help distinguish created objects from a disordered attachment to them.

See also

Diversion (p. 174); Desire (p. 171); Honor (p. 47); Charity (p. 73); Hidden God (p. 88).
Contents

Faith and interpretation

Body and members

Body and members · Pensées

membres pensants — thinking members [phrase]; *corps* — body [printed form]; *membre séparé* — separated member [phrase]; *nourriture* — nourishment [printed form]; *âme universelle* — universal soul; soul of the whole body in the comparison [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. A thinking member receives life from a whole and finds its own good through that relation.

In the book. The bodily analogy reorders self-love, willing, duty and happiness, and is explicitly applied to Christ.

In this edition. The argument is hypothetical and theological, not a physiological account of conscious hands or a required world soul.

A place to read. Read the sequence beginning B473 (Brunschvicg 473) through its explicit application at B483 (Brunschvicg 483).

Meaning

Corps is a body; membre is a part whose life and function depend on belonging to it. Pascal asks the reader to imagine a body full of thinking members. The hypothetical addition matters: ordinary hands and feet do not possess the independent knowledge and will assigned to them for the argument. The device lets him ask how a part would love itself if it understood the whole through which it lives.

The sequence begins with a bare invitation at B473 (Brunschvicg 473) and a working instruction at B474 (Brunschvicg 474): start there in ordering the love owed to oneself. It does not begin by declaring every form of self-love forbidden. Its task is to identify the right measure of that love, given membership in a whole.

Use in the book

B475 (Brunschvicg 475) imagines feet and hands with particular wills. Their order lies in submission to the first will governing the whole body; outside it they are disordered and unhappy. The conclusion is not that the member must pursue another's good at the expense of any good of its own. In willing the body's good it brings about its own. B480 (Brunschvicg 480) adds that happiness requires both having a will and conforming it to the body. The imagined freedom is corrected through relation, not replaced with simple inertness.

B476 (Brunschvicg 476) describes a foot discovering that it belongs to a body whose life it has received. Its former belief in self-sufficiency gives way to regret, shame and prayers to remain attached. The extremity of consenting to be cut off if necessary tests whether the whole is truly taken as the final good. This is a theological thought experiment, not advice to harm a body. The language makes dependence intelligible through a member that would already perish without the sustaining whole.

B477 (Brunschvicg 477) extends the relation into natural and civil communities. A community that coordinates its members must itself tend toward a more general body. The demand to tend toward the general whole prevents a collective self from simply reproducing the individual's claim to be everything. The fragment does not supply a detailed political constitution; it gives a direction of moral ordering beyond the private or group center.

B481 (Brunschvicg 481) contrasts the deaths of martyrs with admired Spartan deaths. The martyrs are "our members," and their resolve can shape ours not only by example but, Pascal cautiously says, perhaps by having merited ours. The modal word matters: the claim of a possible spiritual bond exceeds ordinary imitation without declaring the mechanism proved. The comparison with wealth received through a father or husband rather than the mere sight of a rich stranger illustrates the difference between a shared relation and an external example.

B482 (Brunschvicg 482) joins intelligence and good will. A thinking member could recognize the happiness of its union and consent to the directing soul. If it retained nourishment instead of passing it to others, its apparent self-benefit would make it miserable and unjust. Duty and blessedness have the same relational object. The physiological language of spirits pouring into the parts belongs to the comparison; it does not establish that Pascal is proposing one cosmic soul animating all human beings.

B483 (Brunschvicg 483) finally names the application. The separated member imagines itself a whole and seeks to become its own center, yet lacks a principle of life in itself. Coming to know itself is like returning home. It loves itself for the body and as the soul loves the hand; love beyond that measure is unjust. Pascal explicitly identifies the member with a member of Jesus Christ and the body with Christ. The concluding comparison with the three Persons is an analogy of unity, not a complete account of the Trinity. The sequence thus gives a positive account of ordered self-love alongside the more severe language of hating the self that claims independent finality.

Places to Read

B473 (Brunschvicg 473) — The body of thinking members is first proposed.

B474 (Brunschvicg 474) — A working instruction makes the analogy a beginning for ordered self-love.

B475 (Brunschvicg 475) — The member's own good is found through the body's good.

B476 (Brunschvicg 476) — Discovered dependence produces repentance, prayer and submission.

B477 (Brunschvicg 477) — Communities must themselves acknowledge a wider whole.

B480 (Brunschvicg 480) — The member must have a will and conform it to the body.

B481 (Brunschvicg 481) — Shared membership distinguishes martyrs' example from an external heroic example.

B482 (Brunschvicg 482) — Intelligence, good will and shared nourishment join duty with happiness.

B483 (Brunschvicg 483) — The analogy becomes explicit membership in Jesus Christ.

In this edition

"Thinking members" renders membres pensants, not an anatomical assertion that limbs already think. "Universal soul" at B482 (Brunschvicg 482) is explained by the immediate individual-body comparison; the edition's note warns against assuming a world soul. The Latin at B483 (Brunschvicg 483) adapts the scriptural expression of being one spirit with the Lord. In B481 (Brunschvicg 481) "may have merited" preserves peut-être rather than converting a proposed relation into certainty.

See also

Will (p. 103); Charity (p. 73); Self-love (p. 192); Church (p. 137); Prayer (p. 91).

Contents

Charity

Charity · Pensées

charité — charity; Christian love [printed form]; *mouvement de vraie charité* — stirring of true charity [phrase]; *cupidité* — cupidity [printed form]; *s'éloignant de la charité* — moving away from charity [phrase]; *surnaturelle* — supernatural [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Charity is love ordered to God, not simply pleasant behavior or helpful consequences.

In the book. It gives religious life its end and belongs to an order that bodily power and intellect cannot produce.

In this edition. The theological noun is retained; almsgiving is a possible act, not the whole meaning.

A place to read. B571 (Brunschvicg 571) explains use and enjoyment; B793 (Brunschvicg 793) distinguishes the order of charity.

Meaning

Charité names the love by which God is treated as the final good and other goods are rightly related to him. It includes love of the neighbor, but is not exhausted by almsgiving, sympathy or sociable manners. Pascal can admire the public effects of conduct while denying that charity is its source. The distinction asks not only what is done but what is loved through the doing.

B571 (Brunschvicg 571) compares charity with cupidity through the verbs user and jouir. Cupidity uses God and enjoys the world; charity does the reverse. The comparison expressly allows cupidity to coexist with faith in God and charity with earthly goods. What distinguishes the two is therefore neither a bare religious profession nor the simple presence or absence of possessions. It is the end that governs their use.

Use in the book

B402 (Brunschvicg 402) acknowledges human greatness in making an admirable ordering from concupiscence and turning it into an image of charity. B451 (Brunschvicg 451) supplies the necessary qualification: a public good drawn from self-interested desires can be only a false image of charity, with hatred remaining underneath. B453 (Brunschvicg 453) similarly distinguishes covering a corrupt foundation from removing it. The outward likeness is real enough to explain the social order; it is not evidence that the inward difference has disappeared.

B452 (Brunschvicg 452) gives the small example of pity that wins a reputation for tenderness without giving anything. B455 (Brunschvicg 455)'s Miton removes the inconvenience of the self through obliging conduct, yet leaves its demand to be the center. Charity is not simply a more polished form of that bargain. The body-and-members sequence proposes a different direction of love: a member loves itself rightly by loving the body through which and for which it lives. B483 (Brunschvicg 483) explicitly identifies this membership with Jesus Christ. The analogy makes legitimate self-love possible without making the separate self the final end.

The distinctive order becomes explicit in B793 (Brunschvicg 793). Bodily greatness cannot produce thought; bodies and minds together cannot produce a stirring of true charity. The latter is supernatural, and the distance to it is described through the deliberately excessive phrase "infinitely more

infinite." Kings, the rich and captains may not see intellectual greatness; both worldly and merely inquisitive minds may fail to see holiness. Each failure is a mismatch of measures, not proof that the unseen excellence is absent.

Archimedes and Christ supply different examples. Archimedes's discoveries do not gain mathematical value from princely display. Christ's holiness does not require possessions, royal command or an outward achievement of learning. His humility and patience are not deficiencies in the order he comes to manifest. Pascal therefore asks that his life, Passion, obscurity and death be considered by the appropriate measure. Charity is not placed at the top of a single scale on which enough wealth or knowledge might eventually become holiness.

Charity also governs truth's use. B582 (Brunschvicg 582) says truth outside charity can become an idol, while immediately adding that falsehood is still less to be loved. The warning does not authorize a kindly lie or make accuracy dispensable. It rejects devotion to an isolated possession of truth apart from the love and divine ordering to which it belongs. The following paragraph similarly warns against making an idol of total obscurity: the preferred state of the knower can itself become the object loved instead of God.

B668 (Brunschvicg 668) begins by defining departure as departure from charity. It then relates prayer and virtue to Christ and asks readers to change their rule of judgment from their own will to God's. Its strong account of events as manifestations of divine will belongs to that theological argument. B194 (Brunschvicg 194) gives the practical consequence for an opponent: even the indifferent unbeliever must not be abandoned, because grace may enlighten that person and the believer may fall. Charity thus governs not only the conclusion defended but the continuing regard owed to the person who does not yet accept it.

Places to Read

B194 (Brunschvicg 194) — The closing appeal refuses to abandon unbelievers who remain capable of grace.

B402 (Brunschvicg 402) — Social order can become an image of charity.

B451 (Brunschvicg 451) — That image can be false because its inward source remains hatred.

B452 (Brunschvicg 452) — Tender reputation need not involve giving.

B455 (Brunschvicg 455) — Miton's courtesy removes inconvenience but not the self's unjust demand to be the center.

B483 (Brunschvicg 483) — Love of self is ordered through membership in Christ.

B571 (Brunschvicg 571) — The use/enjoyment distinction identifies the governing end.

B582 (Brunschvicg 582) — Truth itself can become an idol outside charity.

B668 (Brunschvicg 668) — Charity, prayer and the change of the rule of judgment are joined.

B793 (Brunschvicg 793) — Charity belongs to an order not produced by accumulated bodies or minds.

In this edition

The edition retains "charity" to keep the supernatural and scriptural connections visible. B668 (Brunschvicg 668) says Christ adopted sins that are alien to him; it does not say he committed those sins. B793 (Brunschvicg 793)'s statement that wisdom is "nowhere except in God" follows a disclosed conjectural repair, with bracketed French words, not a claimed recovered manuscript reading. Its language of infinite distances is an analogy between orders, not a numerical calculation.

See also

Concupiscence (p. 41); Grace (p. 85); Three orders (p. 35); Body and members (p. 71); Truth (p. 162).
Contents

Conversion

Conversion · Pensées

conversion véritable — true conversion [phrase]; *convertis* — converted; converts [printed form]; *conversion* — conversion [printed form]; *convertir* — to convert [printed form]; *se convertir* — to be converted [phrase]; *médiateur* — mediator [printed form]; *tait* — malformed source token in the phrase about worship; not read as an instruction to remain silent [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Conversion changes the person's relation to God, not only a professed opinion.

In the book. Evidence, imagination, the will and grace are distinguished within the account of change.

In this edition. The concrete Christian meaning is preserved rather than replaced with generic self-improvement.

A place to read. B470 (Brunschvicg 470) asks what the promised change actually consists in.

Meaning

Conversion and convertir name a turning whose depth is tested by what a person knows, loves and depends upon. Acknowledging that God exists is not the whole of it. B470 (Brunschvicg 470) describes true conversion through abasement before God, recognition of inability without him and acknowledgment that communion requires a mediator. The term therefore concerns a relationship and a changed governing end, not merely adoption of a new label.

Pascal distinguishes wanting or imagining the change from its accomplishment. B275 (Brunschvicg 275) says people often mistake imagination for the heart and believe themselves converted as soon as they think of conversion. The warning leaves room for beginnings and preparation, but denies that a vivid representation of one's future religious state is already that state.

Use in the book

B470 (Brunschvicg 470) begins with a reported promise: if people had seen a miracle, they would convert. Pascal asks how they can be certain of performing an act they do not understand. Their imagined worship is an exchange or conversation on terms they picture to themselves; his account begins instead with the wrong done to God and the dependence of the worshiper. The point is not that every miracle is evidentially useless. It is that recognition of extraordinary power does not by itself establish the change of will and relation called conversion.

B280 (Brunschvicg 280)'s distance between knowing God and loving him states the gap tersely. B504 (Brunschvicg 504) shows the gap within ordinary conduct: when reproving servants, the righteous person desires their conversion through God's spirit and prays for God to bless the correction. Rebuke is not omitted, but the speaker does not identify the force of a reprimand with the power to change its hearer. Human action and dependence on God remain together.

B498 (Brunschvicg 498) describes why entering piety can hurt. The pain comes, Pascal argues, from impiety still resisting the piety beginning in the person, not from piety as such. The heart is torn between contrary efforts. A child pulled from robbers by its mother provides the comparison: the violence of release is not the tyrannical violence of detention. The analogy does not make every painful experience a sign of conversion. It explains the particular conflict Pascal attributes to natural vice resisting supernatural grace.

The dialogue in B233 (Brunschvicg 233) makes inability to believe an explicit objection after the wager's calculation. The respondent does not simply tell the interlocutor to decide that belief has happened. He proposes learning from those who were similarly bound, diminishing passions and

beginning religious practices. The provocative abêtira is preserved by the edition as "make you beastlike." Whatever interpretation one gives that difficult term, the exchange makes preparation and habit part of the movement toward faith rather than a mathematical proof that belief is now present. The final kneeling prayer further refuses the writer's self-sufficiency.

B587 (Brunschvicg 587) and B588 (Brunschvicg 588) distinguish persuading or convincing from converting. Miracles, prophecy and wisdom can establish the character of witnesses and prepare the mind; Pascal says they are not the effective power that makes a person know and love God. He assigns that efficacy to the cross. The distinction allows the apologist to use reasons without claiming that reasons alone generate the saving result. It also explains why the same evidence can be discussed under both the wisdom and the apparent folly of religion.

B553 (Brunschvicg 553) turns this doctrine into a devotional exchange. Christ's consoling voice says that the addressee would not seek him without already having found him and calls the conversion his own concern. The human response fears losing heart at knowledge of sin; the reply joins disclosure with the promise of healing. Those lines are speech within Pascal's meditation, not a direct autobiographical report from every person who seeks. B550 (Brunschvicg 550) offers a first-person description of changed conduct—fidelity, nonretaliation and care for others—and attributes it to the Redeemer's grace. The outward acts matter, but their claimed source prevents them becoming grounds for self-glory.

Places to Read

B233 (Brunschvicg 233) — The inability to believe is answered through practice, reduced passions and prayer.

B275 (Brunschvicg 275) — Imagining conversion is not the same as a converted heart.

B280 (Brunschvicg 280) — Knowing and loving God are separated by a great distance.

B470 (Brunschvicg 470) — The promise to convert after a miracle is tested against conversion's meaning.

B498 (Brunschvicg 498) — Resistance to grace explains the pain of entering piety.

B504 (Brunschvicg 504) — Correction of servants is joined with prayer for their conversion.

B520 (Brunschvicg 520) — The grammatical noun "converts" occurs in the account of baptismal faith.

B550 (Brunschvicg 550) — A first-person account attributes changed conduct to grace.

B553 (Brunschvicg 553) — Christ's consoling voice takes responsibility for conversion within a meditation.

B587 (Brunschvicg 587) — Preparatory wisdom is distinguished from effective transforming power.

B588 (Brunschvicg 588) — Coming to convince and coming to convert are not identical tasks.

In this edition

The malformed French phrase about worship at B470 (Brunschvicg 470) is translated according to its intelligible reference to God; the edition does not treat tait as an instruction to remain silent. B553 (Brunschvicg 553) changes voice: Christ begins the consoling speech at "Take comfort," and the human speaker responds "Lord." B520 (Brunschvicg 520)'s convertis is "converts," while B275 (Brunschvicg 275)'s être convertis is "be converted"; the grammatical uses should not be conflated into an institutional classification alone.

See also

Faith (p. 79); Grace (p. 85); Mediation (p. 17); Prayer (p. 91); Will (p. 103).

Contents

Faith

Faith · Pensées

foi — faith [printed form]; *don de Dieu* — gift of God [phrase]; *croire* — to believe [printed form]; *Dieu sensible au cœur* — God perceptible to the heart [phrase]; *credo* — I believe [printed form]; *scio* — I know [printed form]; *cœur* — heart [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Faith is a gift distinct from proof, though proof can be its instrument.

In the book. The heart's conviction, rational preparation and the conduct of belief have different roles.

In this edition. Foi and croire usually become "faith" and "believe"; neither denotes any intense feeling whatever.

A place to read. B248 (Brunschvicg 248) and B282 (Brunschvicg 282) explain how reasoning can serve a gift it cannot confer.

Meaning

Foi names religious faith in the central doctrinal fragments; croire is the broader verb of believing. Pascal does not define faith simply as accepting an

unsupported statement. He distinguishes the source and efficacy of the conviction from the human means that may prepare, transmit or support it. B248 (Brunschvicg 248) calls proof human and faith God's gift, then immediately allows proof to be an instrument. The conjunction is essential: a limit on proof's power is not a ban on giving reasons.

B278 (Brunschvicg 278) locates the sensing of God in the heart rather than reason. The heart is not simply a synonym for an emotion opposed to all knowledge. B282 (Brunschvicg 282) uses it for apprehension of first principles on which reasoning itself depends, before turning to the gift of religion. The analogy does not make every immediate conviction divine; it distinguishes modes of knowing and their appropriate demands.

Use in the book

B248 (Brunschvicg 248) ends with a verbal distinction: faith makes one say not scio but credo, not "I know" but "I believe." This does not abolish every certainty or every use of knowledge in the surrounding fragments. It identifies the character of the confession being discussed. The scriptural cues about living by faith and faith through hearing place reception and dependence within the account. The pronouns of the first sentence are compressed in French, but the next sentence explicitly says God puts faith in the heart.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) first defends natural principles against a skeptical demand for demonstrations. The inability to prove that one is not dreaming does not by itself establish universal uncertainty. Principles are sensed and propositions inferred; neither faculty should demand that the other operate in its own way. The last paragraph then distinguishes those to whom God has given religion through the heart from those addressed through reasoning while that gift is awaited. Without the further gift, faith remains merely human and, in Pascal's account, useless for salvation. The word can therefore be qualified rather than treated as an identical achievement wherever it occurs.

B287 (Brunschvicg 287) considers Christians who do not know the prophecies and proofs. They can judge as well as learned believers through the heart's inclination, yet may lack the means to convince an unbeliever who makes a similar claim. Pascal distinguishes the believer's conviction from the publicly available defense undertaken by someone who knows the evidence. His assertion that prophecy confirms those believers' inspiration belongs to the apologetic argument; the mere fact of someone's confidence is not presented as a universally sufficient public criterion.

Faith also affects action. B504 (Brunschvicg 504)'s righteous person acts through faith even in correcting servants, praying for conversion and expecting help beyond personal rebuke. B516 (Brunschvicg 516) reads Paul's exclusion of boasting to mean that faith is not in our power like works

of the law. B520 (Brunschvicg 520) calls the faith received at baptism the source of Christian and converted life. B523 (Brunschvicg 523) links faith with Jesus Christ and Adam, while morality is summarized through concupiscence and grace. These condensed statements place the gift within an account of fall and restoration rather than isolating it as assent to one proposition.

The relation to evidence remains deliberately double. B273 (Brunschvicg 273) says that submitting everything to reason would remove mystery and the supernatural, while violating reason's principles would make religion absurd. B564 (Brunschvicg 564) likewise says the proofs are not absolutely compelling, yet belief in them cannot be dismissed as unreasonable. Pascal attributes the following of them to grace and flight from them to concupiscence. That is his theological explanation of unequal response, not a numerical estimate of every individual's sincerity.

B588 (Brunschvicg 588) distinguishes coming to convince from coming to convert. Signs and wisdom can prepare and render unbelief culpable in Pascal's argument, but the cross makes believers believe. B233 (Brunschvicg 233)'s interlocutor who admits the wager's force yet cannot believe dramatizes the same nonidentity. An argument about the course it is reasonable to pursue does not automatically generate the faith toward which that course is directed.

Places to Read

B233 (Brunschvicg 233) — Admitting a practical argument does not remove the interlocutor's inability to believe.

B248 (Brunschvicg 248) — Faith is gift, proof its possible instrument.

B273 (Brunschvicg 273) — Mystery and the principles of reason must both be preserved.

B278 (Brunschvicg 278) — God is sensed by the heart, not discursive reason.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) — First principles and the gift of religion illuminate distinct modes of conviction.

B287 (Brunschvicg 287) — A believer's conviction differs from the ability to persuade an opponent.

B504 (Brunschvicg 504) — Faith directs the smallest ordinary actions.

B516 (Brunschvicg 516) — The exclusion of boasting bears on faith's source.

B520 (Brunschvicg 520) — Baptismal faith is called the source of Christian life.

B564 (Brunschvicg 564) — The noncompelling proofs and their unequal reception are explained through grace and concupiscence.

B588 (Brunschvicg 588) — Conviction by signs is distinguished from conversion through the cross.

In this edition

The English resolves B248 (Brunschvicg 248)'s pronouns as "proof is human, faith a gift of God," following the explicit next sentence. "Perceptible" at B278 (Brunschvicg 278) renders sensible, not the modern sense of reasonable or prudent. At B282 (Brunschvicg 282), "the heart's direct sense" preserves sentiment's cognitive role. These are the supplied edition's choices; no external English translation is substituted. The generalization about other religions in B279 (Brunschvicg 279) remains Pascal's comparison rather than an independent survey.

See also

Heart (p. 124); Reason (p. 133); Grace (p. 85); Conversion (p. 76); Wager (p. 100).

Contents

Figurative meaning

Figurative meaning · Pensées

figure — figure; prefiguration [printed form]; *figurée* — figured; prefigured [printed form]; *sens spirituel* — spiritual meaning [phrase]; *sens littéral* — literal meaning [phrase]; *chiffre* — cipher [printed form]; *image* — image [printed form]; *peinture* — picture [printed form]; *sens caché* — hidden meaning [phrase]; *figures* — figures [printed form]; *démonstratives* — demonstrative [printed form]; *Figuratifs* — Figurative Meanings; proposed chapter heading [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. A figure is an expression, event or institution that points to a reality beyond its immediate form.

In the book. Visible deliverance and material goods are read through spiritual fulfillment, with distinctions among kinds of evidence.

In this edition. Figure is not everywhere replaceable by metaphor or decorative symbol.

A place to read. B571 (Brunschvicg 571), B643 (Brunschvicg 643), B650 (Brunschvicg 650) and B678 (Brunschvicg 678) explain the different relations involved.

Meaning

Figure can name a representation, a prefiguring event or an institution read as a sign of a further fulfillment. The relation is not limited to a literary

ornament added to an otherwise complete literal assertion. A deliverance, a promised land, sacrifice or covenant can carry a spiritual meaning in Pascal's Christian reading. The visible occurrence is not necessarily denied because it also signifies something beyond itself.

The vocabulary includes image, peinture, sens caché, sens spirituel and chiffre. Each analogy adds a different feature: an image resembles, a portrait makes an absent object present in a qualified way, a cipher requires a key, and a figure may precede what fulfills it. B643 (Brunschvicg 643) further says grace is both a figure of glory and its principle or cause. Not every relation in the sequence is therefore mere resemblance.

Use in the book

B571 (Brunschvicg 571) asks why prophecy should speak through figures. Pascal's answer combines transmission and concealment. In his account, prophecies had to be carried with fidelity by witnesses not suspected of favoring the later Christian claim. Their temporal wording secured preservation, while a spiritual sense was hidden beneath it. The collective description of the Jewish people as carnal belongs to his Christian polemic; it is not a neutral account of Jewish interpretation. The same fragment distinguishes righteous recipients from those whose desires fix the promises on earthly goods.

The concealment is not total. Pascal says many passages can fit both senses, while some disclose the spiritual meaning unambiguously. These clearer places are supposed to govern the interpretation of the others. His example is the word enemy: what counts as an enemy depends on the final good desired. A carnal reader takes it as the Babylonians; the righteous reader takes it as the passions that obstruct God. Creatures remain good in themselves yet can become enemies by turning the person from that end.

B642 (Brunschvicg 642) formulates the question as whether the prophecies have one meaning or two. It lists proposed evidence from Scripture, rabbis, Kabbalah and the key supplied by Christ and the apostles. The list is a projected argument, not the full presentation of all its proofs. Its attribution to Maimonides of prophecy concerning "Jesus Christ" is Pascal's Christian identification of the Messiah, not Maimonides's profession of Christianity.

B643 (Brunschvicg 643) develops the visible/invisible relation through deliverance. The healing of the paralytic serves as a model: visible power to heal manifests authority to forgive. The Red Sea and other deliverances similarly show, in Pascal's argument, the power to form an invisibly holy people. The object was not merely fertile land. The sequence extends from law to grace to glory: grace fulfills an earlier figure, but itself points beyond its present state and causes or begins what it figures. The direction of the relation must be retained.

B648 (Brunschvicg 648) guards against two opposite errors, taking everything literally and taking everything spiritually. B650 (Brunschvicg 650) adds a distinction of evidential strength: some figures are clear and demonstrative, others far-fetched and persuasive only to readers already convinced on other grounds. Pascal does not grant every resemblance equal force. His reply to rival apocalyptic interpreters depends on his claim to possess stronger examples, not merely on finding their weaker examples equally strained.

B678 (Brunschvicg 678) brings the portrait and cipher together. A portrait carries presence and absence; the reality excludes the absence. To decide whether law and sacrifice are reality or figure, one must examine what the prophets say, particularly promises of permanence beside declarations of change. The intercepted letter is an analogy for a clear wording that also announces its own hidden sense. Christ and the apostles are said to lift the seal and reveal the spiritual reign, the passions as enemies and two advents, of humiliation and glory. This is a disciplined interpretive claim within Christian theology, not a license to invent any concealed meaning that removes a difficulty.

Places to Read

B570 (Brunschvicg 570) — A working instruction relocates the explanation of why figures are used.

B571 (Brunschvicg 571) — Concealment, preservation and the reader's final end are connected.

B607 (Brunschvicg 607) — Literal or outward religion is criticized among Christians as well as Jews.

B610 (Brunschvicg 610) — A dossier rereads institutions through love of God.

B642 (Brunschvicg 642) — Two senses and six proposed lines of evidence organize the question.

B643 (Brunschvicg 643) — Visible deliverances figure invisible goods; grace also causes the glory it figures.

B648 (Brunschvicg 648) — Total literalism and total spiritualization are both errors.

B650 (Brunschvicg 650) — Demonstrative figures differ from parallels persuasive only to existing believers.

B678 (Brunschvicg 678) — Portrait and cipher explain presence, absence and the claimed interpretive key.

In this edition

"Figurative Meanings" translates the proposed heading Figuratifs at B570 (Brunschvicg 570) and B572 (Brunschvicg 572); it is not the title of a completed chapter by Pascal. "Figure," "image" and "cipher" retain distinct French terms. The repeated law–grace–glory relations at B643 (Brunschvicg 643) are preserved, including the claim of causality. The supplied edition translates biblical wording as Pascal quotes or adapts it, rather than inserting a standard English Bible text.

See also

Scripture (p. 94); Prophecy (p. 23); Redemption (p. 26); Charity (p. 73); Grace (p. 85).

Contents

Grace

Grace · Pensées

grâce — grace [printed form]; *grâce surnaturelle* — supernatural grace [phrase]; *mouvements de grâce* — movements of grace [phrase]; *seconde naissance* — second birth [phrase]; *par grâce, non par nature* — by grace, not by nature [phrase]; *grâce de leur Rédempteur* — their Redeemer's grace [phrase]; *premier effet* — first effect; compressed notes about prayer's dependence [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. Grace is divine action and gift enabling what fallen human beings cannot supply from themselves.

In the book. It answers incapacity while preserving action, dependence, fear and hope.

In this edition. The theological term is not reduced to helpful circumstance or personal charm.

A place to read. B435 (Brunschvicg 435), B513 (Brunschvicg 513) and B522 (Brunschvicg 522) show restoration without self-sufficiency.

Meaning

Grâce names God's gift and enabling action within Pascal's account of creation, corruption and redemption. The person remains capable of being restored without possessing the restoration as a natural power. B430 (Brunschvicg 430) says union with God is by grace, not by nature; B510 (Brunschvicg 510) says humanity is unworthy but not incapable of being made worthy. That passive possibility is central: "can be made" is not equivalent to "can make itself."

The word also marks a relation to obligation. B522 (Brunschvicg 522) says the law required what it did not give, whereas grace gives what it requires. This does not remove duty; it explains how fulfilling duty differs from simply knowing or being commanded to perform it. The distinction rejects both an unaided self-sufficiency and the claim that dependence makes action pointless.

Use in the book

B435 (Brunschvicg 435) opposes two incomplete views of humanity. Those who see excellence without corruption escape sloth through pride; those who see infirmity without dignity avoid vanity by falling into despair. Pascal attributes to Christianity the ability to remove both vices rather than drive out one through the other. The righteous still carry the source of corruption and remain subject to error, misery, death and sin; the impious are still capable of the Redeemer's grace. Elevation must not become boasting, and abasement must not become hopelessness.

B507 (Brunschvicg 507)'s list—movements of grace, hardness of heart, outward circumstances—does not give a finished causal theory. Its brevity matters. B508 (Brunschvicg 508) supplies a clearer assertion: making a human being a saint must be the work of grace. B490 (Brunschvicg 490) warns against modeling God on people who merely reward merit already present, rather than forming it. Together these notes distinguish an offered opportunity or external stimulus from the transformation of the person.

The distinction is developed through law and action. B520 (Brunschvicg 520) says law instructs nature and grace makes law be practiced. B521 (Brunschvicg 521) contrasts first birth with the grace of a second birth in a polemic against Pelagians. The phrase that grace is "in some sense natural" follows its perpetual presence alongside nature; it does not cancel the distinction or make grace an innate capacity acquired at first birth. B523 (Brunschvicg 523) summarizes morality through concupiscence and grace, while B524 (Brunschvicg 524) insists on the double capacity to receive and lose grace as a remedy against despair and pride.

Prayer itself belongs within the gift. B513 (Brunschvicg 513) gives creatures the dignity of causality through prayer, teaches them the source of virtue and joins merit to labor. Its parenthesis then says God gives prayer to whom he pleases, retaining preeminence. The objection that people might claim prayer from themselves is therefore addressed, not overlooked. Divine promises establish what God owes according to those promises; the fragment does not convert grace into a prior human entitlement.

B498 (Brunschvicg 498) makes resistance to grace experientially painful. The heart is torn because natural vice opposes supernatural grace. The rescuing mother and the robbers illustrate the difference between liberation and retention, even when both involve a painful pull. B497 (Brunschvicg

497) gives the practical counterpart: mercy invites good works and combats sloth. Dependence on grace is not permission to remain inactive, just as effort is not proof that the needed help originated in the person.

B550 (Brunschvicg 550) describes transformed feelings and conduct in a first-person voice, then assigns all glory to grace. The statement of being freed from these evils must be held beside B435 (Brunschvicg 435)'s continuing vulnerability rather than converted into a general doctrine that living believers can no longer sin. B643 (Brunschvicg 643) adds a further relation: grace, figured by law, figures glory, and is also its principle or cause. The present gift is real but not the final end. This forward direction prevents the distinction between grace and nature from becoming the whole of Pascal's account; grace itself has a fulfillment beyond its present operation.

Places to Read

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) — Union with God is attributed to grace rather than nature.

B435 (Brunschvicg 435) — Grace and continuing corruption produce humility and hope together.

B490 (Brunschvicg 490) — God must not be modeled only as a rewarder of pre-existing merit.

B497 (Brunschvicg 497) — Mercy is offered as a reason for effort rather than sloth.

B498 (Brunschvicg 498) — Natural vice resists supernatural grace in the heart's conflict.

B507 (Brunschvicg 507) — A compressed list places grace beside hardness and circumstances.

B510 (Brunschvicg 510) — Humanity can be made worthy without making itself worthy.

B513 (Brunschvicg 513) — Prayer participates in causality while remaining a divine gift.

B514 (Brunschvicg 514) — The interrupted first-effect notes pursue dependence without offering a finished demonstration.

B520 (Brunschvicg 520) — Grace enables the practice of law rather than destroying it.

B521 (Brunschvicg 521) — First and second birth distinguish nature and grace in a polemical setting.

B522 (Brunschvicg 522) — Grace gives what law could command without giving.

B524 (Brunschvicg 524) — Receiving and losing grace answer the paired dangers of pride and despair.

B550 (Brunschvicg 550) — Changed conduct is attributed to the power of grace.

B643 (Brunschvicg 643) — Grace is both a figure and a principle or cause of glory.

In this edition

"Grace" remains consistent in these theological contexts. The edition does not expand B507 (Brunschvicg 507) into a settled account of how each listed factor operates. B514 (Brunschvicg 514)'s broken notes on a "first effect" are expressly difficult and should not be silently reconstructed as a smooth proof. "Pelagians" in B521 (Brunschvicg 521) identifies Pascal's theological opponents within the dispute over nature's power; it is not a neutral label for every person who values effort.

See also

Faith (p. 79); Prayer (p. 91); Conversion (p. 76); Concupiscence (p. 41); Will (p. 103).

Contents

Hidden God

Hidden God · Pensées

Dieu caché — hidden God [phrase]; *Deus absconditus* — hidden God [phrase]; *Dieu qui se cache* — God who hides himself [phrase]; *caché en partie* — partly hidden [phrase]; *s'est caché* — has hidden himself [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. Hiddenness means neither simple absence nor an openly compelling presence available on identical terms to everyone.

In the book. Pascal connects mixed light and obscurity with corruption, redemption and the disposition of the seeker.

In this edition. The biblical Latin is translated; the theological argument remains Pascal's, not an independently verified diagnosis of every unbeliever.

A place to read. B194 (Brunschvicg 194), B242 (Brunschvicg 242) and B586 (Brunschvicg 586) state the central distinctions.

Meaning

Dieu caché and Deus absconditus name a God whose disclosure does not abolish concealment. The verb se cacher can make the concealment an action; it is not merely an observer's accidental lack of information. Pascal uses the idea to explain why the world offers signs without the incontestable visibility demanded by some critics. His account joins two claims: God can

be recognized, and fallen human beings do not possess an unveiled view on their own terms.

Hiddenness is therefore a relation between manifestation and the person addressed. B557 (Brunschvicg 557) denies both that everything reveals God and that everything hides him. It joins divine concealment from those who put God to the test with disclosure to those who seek him, and grounds the contrast in humanity's corruption and original capacity. This theological distinction does not by itself establish the sincerity or insincerity of a particular seeker.

Use in the book

B194 (Brunschvicg 194) begins by asking critics to learn what the religion they attack actually claims. If it professed an unveiled sight of God, lack of that sight would count against it. But if it teaches both concealment and signs available to sincere seeking, a complaint from acknowledged indifference establishes neither the failure of search nor the absence of signs. Pascal also identifies a genuine challenge to its claim: a person who had made every effort, including examination of what the Church offers, yet found no satisfaction. His confidence that no reasonable person can finally make that report is part of the argument, not an independently established survey of seekers.

B242 (Brunschvicg 242) criticizes a different strategy: telling those without faith or grace that the slightest natural object or the movement of planets immediately reveals God. Believers may already see creation that way; the intended unbelieving audience may instead find darkness. Treating the conclusion as obvious risks making religion's proofs look weak. The metaphors of daylight at noon and water in the sea make the point: no one promises those findings as rewards for a difficult search. Scriptural seeking presupposes a different kind of evidence.

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) describes a calibrated manifestation. God could have overcome the most hardened resistance with unmistakable splendor, but the gentle advent did not take that form. Neither wholly irresistible publicity nor total concealment from sincere seekers would suit the purpose described. There is enough light for those wishing to see and enough obscurity for the contrary disposition. The fragment contains personified speech and abrupt returns to argument; this late explanation should not automatically be assigned to the speaking Wisdom.

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) expands the account through the two Christian claims of corruption and redemption. A world existing only to display a creator would, Pascal argues, show divinity incontestably. The actual world teaches both the need for healing and the possibility of it. It bears the character of a God who hides himself: enough is seen to know a good has been lost, not enough to suppose it securely possessed. B559 (Brunschvicg

559) then reasons from occasional manifestation to continuing existence, but its inference presupposes the claimed manifestation; it does not turn any absence of evidence into positive evidence by itself.

B578 (Brunschvicg 578) and B586 (Brunschvicg 586) prevent the mixture from being assigned only to unbelievers. The elect need obscurity to be humbled as well as clarity to be enlightened. Without obscurity people would not feel corruption; without light they would not hope for remedy. B585 (Brunschvicg 585) makes religious plurality and the presence of martyrs outside Christianity part of the concealment requiring explanation. Pascal does not claim Christian martyrdom is the only martyrdom in the world.

B582 (Brunschvicg 582) supplies an important correction to fascination with darkness itself. A person can make an idol of total obscurity and resent a partly obscure state because it fails to match that preferred ideal. The duty is directed to God's ordering, not to hiddenness as an attractive possession. Even the hidden God is therefore not a warrant for abandoning discrimination among clearer and less clear claims.

Places to Read

B194 (Brunschvicg 194) — The religion's two claims distinguish indifference from a serious challenge by unsuccessful seeking.

B242 (Brunschvicg 242) — Natural evidence is not equally obvious to believer and unbeliever.

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) — Manifestation is described as tempered to differing dispositions.

B518 (Brunschvicg 518) — An abrupt note links uncertainty of judgment and the hidden God.

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) — The world teaches corruption and redemption through mixed presence and absence.

B557 (Brunschvicg 557) — Neither universal concealment nor universal disclosure is affirmed.

B559 (Brunschvicg 559) — The inference to continuing divine existence presupposes an appearance rather than mere absence.

B578 (Brunschvicg 578) — Obscurity humbles the elect as well as blinding others.

B582 (Brunschvicg 582) — Obscurity itself must not become an idol.

B585 (Brunschvicg 585) — Religious plurality belongs to the claimed concealment.

B586 (Brunschvicg 586) — Both light and obscurity are described as useful for humanity.

B591 (Brunschvicg 591) — The diagram places Christ above an arch, pagans and Muhammad to either side, and ignorance of God below.

In this edition

Deus absconditus recalls Isaiah 45:15 and is translated "hidden God." At B518 (Brunschvicg 518) the edition preserves "uncertainty of judgment" without substituting uncertainty about salvation or about purgatory's duration: the compressed note does not settle that question. B194 (Brunschvicg 194)'s long first-person speech of indifference is staged by the argument, not automatically Pascal's confession. B591 (Brunschvicg 591) is a spatial diagram of Christ, pagans, Muhammad and ignorance of God, not continuous prose.

See also

Search (p. 97); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Faith (p. 79); Scripture (p. 94); Grace (p. 85).
Contents

Prayer

Prayer · Pensées

prière — prayer [printed form]; *prières* — prayers [printed form]; *prie* — prays; asks [printed form]; *dignité de la causalité* — dignity of causality [phrase]; *mérite* — merit [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Prayer is an address to God through which dependence and real participation in action are joined.

In the book. Even the ability to pray is not treated as an independent possession.

In this edition. The verb can also mean asking human beings, as in the meditation on Jesus.

A place to read. B513 (Brunschvicg 513) states the purposes of prayer and confronts the objection about its source.

Meaning

Prière is more specific than a wish entertained inwardly. It is an appeal that asks from another what the speaker does not hold independently. In the central theological fragments its object can be the ability to love and follow God, not merely an external advantage. B491 (Brunschvicg 491) lists prayer among the remedies for concupiscence and incapacity. The direction of the will itself can become the thing requested.

Prier also means to ask or entreat. In B553 (Brunschvicg 553) Jesus asks his friends for company and support, and later is said to have prayed to human beings without being heard. The wording keeps the human failure to answer in view; it does not identify the disciples as divine recipients of worship.

Use in the book

B513 (Brunschvicg 513) asks why God established prayer and gives three purposes. Creatures receive the dignity of causality; they learn from whom they hold virtue; and they are made to merit other virtues through labor. Prayer therefore does not merely reassure the petitioner that action matters. Within Pascal's account it really participates in an effect. Yet the parenthesis immediately reserves God's preeminence: he gives prayer to whom he pleases. Creaturely causality is derived rather than independent.

The objection is then voiced that people may think prayer comes from themselves. Pascal answers through the relation between unbelief, faith and virtue. If one cannot simply possess the virtues even with faith, one cannot plausibly make faith an unaided acquisition; the distance from unbelief to faith is greater. The subsequent note that "merit" is ambiguous leads to short Latin examples of meriting, being worthy, eating unworthily and being deemed worthy. They test different uses rather than forming one smooth sentence or one unqualified theory of entitlement.

Promises determine the obligation spoken of next. God owes according to his promises: righteousness is promised to prayers, while prayers are promised only to the children of the promise. The order matters. It does not begin with an independent human act that places God in debt before any gift or promise. B514 (Brunschvicg 514) continues with compressed and difficult notes about asking and a first effect; their broken logic should not be tidied into a certainty the surviving text does not offer.

The body analogy of B476 (Brunschvicg 476) gives petition an emotional and ethical setting. A foot that discovers its dependence on the body would regret its former uselessness and pray to be retained within the whole. Its submission is not a loss of a previously self-originating life; it is recognition of the life already received. B504 (Brunschvicg 504) brings dependence into ordinary correction: a righteous person reproves servants, prays for their conversion and asks God to bless the correction. Speech and prayer cooperate, while the speaker refuses to regard rebuke as sufficient by itself.

B497 (Brunschvicg 497) insists that mercy calls forth effort rather than excusing inactivity. B553 (Brunschvicg 553) similarly says mercy is implored not to leave people at peace in their vices but to deliver them from those vices. Jesus' prayer in agony is presented through fear, submission and eventual offering of himself when the Father's will is known. The invitation to pray longer follows that suffering. In the later devotional dialogue, Christ

tells the addressee to pray confidently because conversion is his concern. The assurance does not remove the practice of prayer; it changes the ground on which it is undertaken.

Prayer also frames the apologist's own work. B233 (Brunschvicg 233) ends by saying the discourse was made by someone who knelt before and after it, asking the infinite Being to bring the interlocutor into the same submission for the hearer's good and God's glory. Argument is thus enclosed within an appeal for what argument alone cannot effect. B668 (Brunschvicg 668) makes the relation to Christ still stronger: prayers and virtues are unacceptable apart from his prayers and virtues. The measure is not the independent prestige of the person praying, but the love and mediation in which the act participates.

Places to Read

B233 (Brunschvicg 233) — The wager discourse ends with the writer's prayer before and after composing it.

B476 (Brunschvicg 476) — The dependent member prays to remain within the body.

B491 (Brunschvicg 491) — Prayer is named a remedy for incapacity to love and follow God.

B497 (Brunschvicg 497) — Mercy invites effort and good works.

B504 (Brunschvicg 504) — Correction of servants is joined with prayer for its effect.

B513 (Brunschvicg 513) — Causality, received virtue, labor, merit and promises are distinguished.

B514 (Brunschvicg 514) — Unfinished notes pursue prayer's dependence on a first effect.

B553 (Brunschvicg 553) — Prayer in agony and the devotional exchange join submission with confidence.

B555 (Brunschvicg 555) — The divine voice allows that its guidance may answer the director's prayers.

B668 (Brunschvicg 668) — Prayer is related to participation in Christ rather than personal sufficiency.

In this edition

"Causality" at B513 (Brunschvicg 513) is retained because the text grants participation in an effect, not only an appearance of usefulness. The irregular Latin Qui mandicat indignas is interpreted as the familiar expression for eating unworthily, with the irregularity disclosed. B491 (Brunschvicg 491)'s claim that no other religion asks God for love and obedience is Pascal's apologetic comparison, not an independently verified account of religious prayer. The Latin snippets and unfinished clauses of B514 (Brunschvicg 514) remain fragmentary.

See also

Grace (p. 85); Humility (p. 140); Repentance (p. 159); Conversion (p. 76); Body and members (p. 71).

Contents

Scripture

Scripture · Pensées

Écriture — Scripture [printed form]; *livres* — books [printed form]; *sens* — meaning [printed form]; *littéralement* — literally [printed form]; *spirituellement* — spiritually [printed form]; *sacrifices* — sacrifices [printed form]; *sens littéral* — literal meaning [phrase]; *chiffre* — cipher [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Scripture is the biblical corpus read through distinctions of voice, genre, wording and fulfillment.

In the book. Its unity is sought through Christ without making every statement literal or every statement spiritual.

In this edition. The edition translates Pascal's surviving citations, including abbreviations and defects, rather than importing a standard English Bible.

A place to read. B648 (Brunschvicg 648) and B678 (Brunschvicg 678) state both the limits and the positive interpretive claim.

Meaning

Écriture names the scriptural writings as an authoritative whole; livres can identify the books in their material transmission and public custody. Sens concerns what the words or institutions mean. These different emphases allow Pascal to ask both whether a text has been preserved and how a preserved text should be understood. Fidelity of copying does not, in his argument, automatically give its custodians the Christian meaning he attributes to it.

The corpus includes narrative, law, prophecy, prayers and figurative promises. B648 (Brunschvicg 648) explicitly names two errors: taking everything literally and taking everything spiritually. Neither a flat literalism nor unrestricted spiritualization can substitute for attention to what a passage says and how its parts are related.

Use in the book

B548 (Brunschvicg 548) assigns Scripture a single object, Jesus Christ, and makes that center necessary for understanding God, life, death and ourselves. This is Pascal's theological account of unity, not a neutral description shared by all readers of the biblical books. B532 (Brunschvicg 532) shows a more local function: passages console every condition and also frighten every condition. A selected promise must not abolish the warning appropriate to the same person. B567 (Brunschvicg 567) similarly asks that an opposing truth be remembered when one truth is stated.

B568 (Brunschvicg 568) takes the form of objections and replies about what is dictated by the Holy Spirit and what the Church has decided. Its abrupt exchanges and stray notes should not be transformed into a finished doctrine of inspiration. The first objection is not simply Pascal asserting his own settled conclusion. The final provocation about Gospel prophecies turning people away from belief belongs with the theme of light and obscurity: scriptural material can expose a disposition as well as supply information.

B571 (Brunschvicg 571) explains prophetic concealment through Pascal's account of transmission. A spiritual meaning is covered by temporal promises in many places and disclosed in some. He argues that the unambiguous spiritual places should guide the ambiguous ones. The word enemy becomes an example: its referent depends on what is taken as the final good. B610 (Brunschvicg 610) assembles a scriptural dossier around love of God, the interior meaning of circumcision and the rejection or transformation of institutions. The conclusions about replacement and Rome are Pascal's Christian readings, not literal parts of every citation he supplies.

B678 (Brunschvicg 678) asks whether law and sacrifices are reality or figure by examining the prophets' own statements. How can the covenant be called eternal and also be said to change? A portrait and an intercepted cipher provide models for the answer. The clear surface can represent a further reality; an announcement that the sense is veiled can invite a search for a coherent double meaning. Christ and the apostles are said to reveal that key through spiritual redemption and two advents. The argument requires both the alleged tensions and the claimed authority of the key; it is not mere free association.

The book's preservation matters independently. B630 (Brunschvicg 630) points to Masorah and details of letters; B631 (Brunschvicg 631) stresses fidelity to a book containing adverse testimony about its own custodians. Pascal infers sincerity from preservation against honor. That inference does not independently prove every statement contained in the text. The historical and collective characterizations remain part of his apologetic argument, including its anti-Jewish claims, rather than the lexicon's account of Jewish self-understanding.

B632 (Brunschvicg 632) assembles competing accounts of Ezra. A story of lost books restored through inspiration is set against claims that he read an existing book, alongside overlapping Greek and Latin quotations about restoration and the Seventy's translation. B633 (Brunschvicg 633) continues the objections; B634 (Brunschvicg 634) argues conditionally that either accepting or rejecting the restoration story can support the religious case. The dossier is valuable precisely because it preserves claims and counterclaims. It should not be cited as an uncomplicated assertion that Ezra certainly recreated the entire Bible from memory.

Places to Read

B532 (Brunschvicg 532) — Scripture gives consolation and warning to every condition.

B548 (Brunschvicg 548) — Christ is named as the corpus's single object.

B568 (Brunschvicg 568) — Objections and replies concern inspiration and the Church's decision.

B571 (Brunschvicg 571) — Clear spiritual places govern ambiguous temporal wording in Pascal's account.

B610 (Brunschvicg 610) — Scriptural citations form a Christian argument about love and institutions.

B630 (Brunschvicg 630) — Masorah and letter details exemplify textual care.

B631 (Brunschvicg 631) — A book preserved against the custodians' honor supplies an argument from adverse testimony.

B632 (Brunschvicg 632) — The Ezra dossier preserves disputed restoration accounts.

B633 (Brunschvicg 633) — Further objections challenge the restoration story and correct the Josephus reference.

B634 (Brunschvicg 634) — A conditional reply argues that either reception of the restoration story supports the religious case.

B642 (Brunschvicg 642) — Two senses are proposed as the central interpretive question.

B648 (Brunschvicg 648) — Both total literalism and total spiritualization are rejected.

B678 (Brunschvicg 678) — Portrait and cipher develop the claimed interpretive key.

In this edition

Capitalized "Scripture" follows Écriture in this context. Biblical numbering and abbreviated incipits remain those of the source; older "IV Kings" corresponds to modern 2 Kings. B631 (Brunschvicg 631) says the book is placed in the ark, while the annotation notes that Deuteronomy places it beside the ark. B632 (Brunschvicg 632) translates its overlapping Greek and Latin extracts without suppressing repetition. Its corrected instrumentum judaicæ litteraturæ and B633 (Brunschvicg 633)'s XI, 1 are disclosed local repairs, not evidence of a new manuscript collation.

See also

Figurative meaning (p. 82); Prophecy (p. 23); Jews (p. 145); Truth (p. 162); Witness (p. 38).

Contents

Search

Search · Pensées

chercher — to seek; to search [printed form]; *recherche* — search; inquiry [printed form]; *cherchent en gémissant* — seek with groaning [phrase]; *cherchez-la* — seek it [printed form]; *chercher et le suivre* — seek and follow him [phrase]; *cherché* — searched [printed form]; *le chercher* — seeking him [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. Seeking is sustained attention and effort directed toward a truth or good not yet possessed.

In the book. Pascal distinguishes reasonable unhappy seekers from both secure believers and the indifferent.

In this edition. The language includes practical investigation and an inward orientation; neither replaces the other.

A place to read. B194 (Brunschvicg 194) and B257 (Brunschvicg 257) prevent doubt itself from being confused with refusal to search.

Meaning

Chercher is the ordinary verb of looking for something; recherche can name an inquiry, a pursuit or the search for the true good. Pascal's objects include truth, happiness, a person's proper place and God. The act is not

self-authenticating: people can search in the wrong place or with desires that predetermine what they are willing to find. Yet uncertainty does not make inquiry pointless or unreasonable.

B257 (Brunschvicg 257) gives the clearest classification. Those serving God after finding him are reasonable and happy; those neither finding nor seeking are foolish and unhappy; those seeking without finding are unhappy and reasonable. The middle category is essential. A person need not pretend to have reached the end in order for the search to possess rational dignity.

Use in the book

B194 (Brunschvicg 194) attacks a failure of proportion between the stakes of an inquiry and the effort devoted to it. A few hours reading Scripture or questioning an ecclesiastic are treated as if they exhausted the matter. Pascal distinguishes this performance from the serious occupation of those who groan sincerely under doubt and spare no effort to escape it. He responds to the latter with compassion. The attack on indifference is severe, but its severity should not be transferred indiscriminately to every unconvinced reader.

The same fragment states what would challenge the religion's claim: a thorough search, including examination of what the Church offers, that brought no satisfaction. Pascal hopes to show such a report cannot reasonably stand. The stated challenge and Pascal's confidence in answering it remain distinct; sincere search is not simply defined here as whatever succeeds. The final appeal also refuses to abandon indifferent people, who remain capable of grace and may become fuller in faith than the speaker. The relation between seeker and believer is not fixed beyond change.

B421 (Brunschvicg 421) approves those who seek with groaning rather than those who merely praise humanity, merely blame it or choose diversion. B422 (Brunschvicg 422) even values exhaustion from an unsuccessful search for the true good because it can lead someone to stretch out their arms to the Deliverer. Failure is not praised as an end in itself: it can expose the inadequacy of the means tried. B423 (Brunschvicg 423) then asks for a willingness to follow truth wherever found, free of the concupiscence that can blind a choice or obstruct it afterward.

B425 (Brunschvicg 425) describes the universal pursuit of happiness, through very different outward actions, and argues that finite objects fail to fill the lost good. B427 (Brunschvicg 427) pictures humanity searching everywhere for its lost place in impenetrable darkness. B464 (Brunschvicg 464) and B465 (Brunschvicg 465) reject both a simple retreat within oneself and an outward chase after diversion as sufficient. These are not contradictions in the bare instruction to search. They distinguish the desired end from mistaken locations and from the unaided power claimed by philosophical prescriptions.

B242 (Brunschvicg 242) makes hiddenness part of the search's logic. Finding daylight at noon or water in the sea would not require the scriptural promise that seekers will find. Pascal therefore resists treating God's evidence as universally obvious in natural objects. B574 (Brunschvicg 574) says the greatness of religion warrants effort when it is obscure. B593 (Brunschvicg 593), faced with China as an obscuring historical difficulty, ends with a concrete demand: examine the detail and put the papers on the table. The theological appeal to light and darkness does not eliminate documentary comparison.

The devotional dialogue adds another order of priority. At B553 (Brunschvicg 553) Christ's voice says the speaker would not seek him without already having found him; B555 (Brunschvicg 555) varies this with already possessing him. These lines address an anxious interlocutor within prayer, giving the initiative to grace. They do not erase B257 (Brunschvicg 257)'s category of people who seek without finding at the level of their present recognized condition. They describe search itself as possible evidence of a gift preceding its conscious completion, within the particular Christian relation the meditation imagines.

Places to Read

B194 (Brunschvicg 194) — Serious investigation is distinguished from a few hours represented as exhaustive search.

B242 (Brunschvicg 242) — The promise to seekers presupposes something other than daylight-like obviousness.

B257 (Brunschvicg 257) — Unsuccessful seekers remain reasonable.

B421 (Brunschvicg 421) — Seeking with groaning is contrasted with praise, blame and diversion.

B422 (Brunschvicg 422) — An exhausted search is valued insofar as it turns toward a deliverer.

B423 (Brunschvicg 423) — The seeker must be ready to follow truth rather than be governed by appetite.

B425 (Brunschvicg 425) — Universal pursuit of happiness is interpreted through the lost true good.

B465 (Brunschvicg 465) — Neither inward retreat nor outward diversion suffices.

B553 (Brunschvicg 553) — The divine voice gives seeking a prior relation to finding.

B555 (Brunschvicg 555) — The devotional voice varies prior finding with prior possession and allows unseen guidance.

B574 (Brunschvicg 574) — The greatness of religion is offered as a reason to take trouble.

B593 (Brunschvicg 593) — A historical difficulty calls for detailed comparison of the papers.

In this edition

"Seek" and "search" follow the object and setting rather than naming two fixed French concepts. B194 (Brunschvicg 194)'s staged first-person speech of indifference must not be read as Pascal's unmediated self-report. B553 (Brunschvicg 553) and B555 (Brunschvicg 555) contain a divine speaking voice within a meditation; their consolation is not a neutral psychological test. The repeated "all their heart" in B194 (Brunschvicg 194) concerns the scope of the commitment claimed, not an independently measured quantity of effort.

See also

Hidden God (p. 88); Wager (p. 100); Desire (p. 171); Happiness (p. 180); Conversion (p. 76).
Contents

Wager

Wager · Pensées

parier — to wager [printed form]; *gagez* — wager; stake [printed form]; *vous êtes embarqué* — you are already aboard [phrase]; *règle des partis* — rule for dividing stakes [phrase]; *abêtira* — will make beastlike [printed form]; *croix ou pile* — heads or tails [phrase]; *Infini — rien* — Infinite—nothing; fragment heading [phrase]; *parti* — course or terms of play, according to context [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. The wager asks how to commit a life under uncertainty, not whether calculation proves God exists.

In the book. A dialogue moves from abstention to stakes, from stakes to inability to believe, and then to practice and prayer.

In this edition. The successive odds are argumentative cases, not an established numerical probability of God.

A place to read. Read all of B233 (Brunschvicg 233), including its objections and its ending, then B234 (Brunschvicg 234).

Meaning

The familiar title "Wager" gathers parier, gager and the language of gain, loss, chance and choice. B233 (Brunschvicg 233) itself begins "Infinite—nothing." Its opening distinguishes knowing that something exists from knowing its nature, and contrasts finite things, infinity and God. A further

change of register then explicitly proposes speaking according to natural light. The ensuing practical argument should not be mistaken for a demonstration that resolves the metaphysical question it says reason cannot settle.

The form is an exchange. The interlocutor does not initially choose atheism as an established truth; the objection is to choosing at all when neither side can be rationally determined. The reply that one is already aboard denies that abstention escapes the situation. That denial is an important premise, not an incidental nautical decoration.

Use in the book

The calculation distinguishes possible losses—truth and the good—from what is staked—reason and will, knowledge and blessedness. Since the choice is unavoidable within the argument, the respondent says reason is no more injured by choosing one side than the other. Attention then turns to blessedness: if the wager that God exists wins, the gain is everything; if it loses, the loss is nothing. The interlocutor nevertheless worries about staking too much. That objection prevents the opening comparison from standing as the whole discussion.

The respondent tests different ratios and rewards: two or three lives for one, equal chances, very many chances, and finally an infinite life infinitely happy against a finite stake. The versions should be followed in their sequence rather than collapsed into a supposed measured chance that God exists. Pascal argues that a finite number of chances of loss does not balance the infinite gain at issue. His assertions of demonstration belong to that comparison under its stated conditions; they do not independently verify all its religious alternatives and outcomes.

Another objection distinguishes certain exposure of one's stake from uncertain receipt of the gain. The reply observes that every player risks something certainly for an uncertain result, often without acting irrationally. The uncertainty must be assessed through the relation of chances and stakes, not treated as an infinite barrier simply because it is uncertainty. B234 (Brunschvicg 234) extends the point to sea voyages, battles and work for tomorrow. If one acted only for certainty, ordinary practical life would cease. The rule for dividing stakes gives Pascal a model of rational action without certainty.

The interlocutor then asks whether anything lies beneath the game, and the reply points to Scripture and the rest. This brief answer leaves an evidential inquiry beyond the calculation. More importantly, the interlocutor says that although compelled to wager, they cannot believe. The argument has not silently converted an admitted prudential conclusion into actual faith. The response now concerns obstacles, passions and the path followed by people formerly in a similar condition.

Religious practices are proposed: acting as if one believed, taking holy water and having masses said. The difficult promise that this will make one believe and abêtira is answered by the interlocutor's fear. The response explains the practice through diminution of passions. The edition deliberately retains the animal provocation as "make you beastlike," while noting that habituation through the embodied automaton, humiliation and reduced self-reliance all inform its disputed interpretation. It should neither be softened into effortless enlightenment nor expanded into a settled demand to become irrational in every respect.

The ending reassesses the supposed sacrifice of present life. The respondent promises fidelity, humility, gratitude, beneficence and other goods, while acknowledging the loss of what he calls poisoned pleasures, glory and delights. This is a further claim about the life proposed, not a premise that can simply be removed from the exchange. Finally the writer says he knelt before and after composing the discourse, praying for the interlocutor's good and God's glory. The practical argument is joined to dependence on a gift it cannot manufacture. B248 (Brunschvicg 248)'s distinction between human proof and divine faith clarifies why that ending matters.

Places to Read

B194 (Brunschvicg 194) — The stakes of a search concern the whole conduct of life and its end.

B233 (Brunschvicg 233) — The complete exchange moves through abstention, comparative stakes, objections, practice and prayer.

B234 (Brunschvicg 234) — Reasonable action for uncertain outcomes is defended through the rule for dividing stakes.

B248 (Brunschvicg 248) — Proof can be an instrument without being identical to faith.

B257 (Brunschvicg 257) — Seeking without yet finding can be reasonable.

B275 (Brunschvicg 275) — Imagining oneself converted does not establish conversion.

B324 (Brunschvicg 324) — Working for the uncertain, going to sea and crossing a plank belong among sound ordinary judgments.

B392 (Brunschvicg 392) — Wagering language also appears in a philosophical discussion of shared ideas.

In this edition

"Already aboard" renders vous êtes embarqué and makes existing involvement explicit. The coin image is croix ou pile, translated "heads or tails." Règle des partis is the mathematical "rule for dividing stakes," not a rule for political parties. B233 (Brunschvicg 233)'s preliminary comparison of human and divine justice is retained in the source's order despite a noted textual difficulty; it is not silently reversed. The chapter's probabilities must also be distinguished from moral probabilism in B917 (Brunschvicg 917) and B922 (Brunschvicg 922).

See also

Infinity (p. 183); Faith (p. 79); Custom (p. 110); Search (p. 97); Probability (p. 62).
Contents

Will

Will · Pensées

volonté — will [printed form]; *volonté propre* — self-will [phrase]; *volonté particulière* — particular will [phrase]; *consentir* — to consent [printed form]; *la volonté de Dieu* — the will of God [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. The will directs pursuit and consent; self-will makes its own satisfaction the ruling end.

In the book. A will can know a duty yet lack the power to order the heart, and can be restored without being abolished.

In this edition. Voluntary action is not the same as independence from every influence or prior gift.

A place to read. B472 (Brunschvicg 472), B475 (Brunschvicg 475) and B482 (Brunschvicg 482) trace the change from self-rule to ordered consent.

Meaning

Volonté names willing and the direction of action. It is not identical to discursive reasoning: B340 (Brunschvicg 340) grants animals a will while denying that the calculating machine gives any sign of one. In moral and religious contexts the question is not only whether a person wills, but what good governs that will and how it can be rightly directed. Volonté propre is the will claimed as one's own governing principle, rather than every instance of individual choice indiscriminately.

B425 (Brunschvicg 425) says the will makes no movement except toward happiness, even where people choose radically different means. The universality is Pascal's claim about the end of willing, not an approval of

each means. B571 (Brunschvicg 571) similarly allows two people to use the same objects under different governing loves: cupidity and charity distinguish ends rather than merely inventories of possessions.

Use in the book

B334 (Brunschvicg 334) assigns voluntary actions to concupiscence and involuntary ones to force within a compressed diagnosis of social conduct. Voluntariness alone therefore does not establish justice. B471 (Brunschvicg 471) says attachment to a mortal person can be unjust even when willing and pleasurable, because the person is not the other's final end. B455 (Brunschvicg 455) likewise finds the self tyrannical in its wish to make every other person serve it. A freely offered response can still be directed toward an inadequate object.

B472 (Brunschvicg 472) gives self-will a striking test: even power to obtain everything it wanted would not satisfy it, whereas renunciation of it brings satisfaction. The body analogy explains what such renunciation can mean without eliminating willing altogether. B475 (Brunschvicg 475) imagines feet and hands with particular wills. They find their order by submitting to the first will governing the whole body; in willing its good they accomplish their own. B480 (Brunschvicg 480) explicitly says members must have a will and conform it to the body in order to be happy. The alternative is not a body of wholly unwilled mechanisms.

B482 (Brunschvicg 482) adds intelligence and good will. A member must recognize the happiness of union and consent to the whole soul's guidance. If it uses intelligence to retain nourishment for itself, it becomes unjust and miserable together. B483 (Brunschvicg 483) then identifies the larger analogy with membership in Jesus Christ: self-love is corrected by loving oneself as the body loves the member. The change concerns relation and measure, not the bare extinction of a person.

Knowledge of the path is nevertheless not the power to walk it. B466 (Brunschvicg 466) says that even if Epictetus saw the way perfectly—willing what God wills—he does not lead people into it; Christ alone does. B467 (Brunschvicg 467) rejects the inference from the existence of steadfast Christians to everyone's unaided capacity to order the heart. B522 (Brunschvicg 522)'s distinction of law and grace applies here: the command can tell a will what to do without supplying what it needs to do it.

B581 (Brunschvicg 581) says God wishes to dispose the will more than the mind. Perfect clarity would help the mind and harm the will by leaving pride unlowered. This is a claim about the kind of transformation sought, not a general preference for confusion. B498 (Brunschvicg 498) portrays the contrary pulls of vice and grace within the heart; B513 (Brunschvicg 513) makes even prayer a received action while granting it causal dignity. Finally B668 (Brunschvicg 668) proposes changing the rule of judgment from our

will to God's. Its account of events as manifestations of divine will is the theological premise for that practical demand, not a neutral rule for reading every occurrence.

Places to Read

B334 (Brunschvicg 334) — Voluntariness and force are distinguished without making voluntary action automatically just.

B340 (Brunschvicg 340) — Animals are granted will, unlike the calculating machine.

B425 (Brunschvicg 425) — Different actions are referred to the common pursuit of happiness.

B455 (Brunschvicg 455) — The self's claim to rule everyone gives self-will its tyrannical form.

B466 (Brunschvicg 466) — Knowing the path of willing God's will is not the power to lead someone onto it.

B467 (Brunschvicg 467) — Recognizing duty does not give unaided power to order the heart.

B471 (Brunschvicg 471) — Willing and pleasurable attachment can still be unjust.

B472 (Brunschvicg 472) — Self-will cannot secure satisfaction even through unlimited success.

B475 (Brunschvicg 475) — Particular wills are ordered through the good of the whole body.

B476 (Brunschvicg 476) — The dependent member's willing submission extends to the body's need.

B480 (Brunschvicg 480) — Members require a will, not merely the absence of one.

B482 (Brunschvicg 482) — Intelligence must be joined with good will and consent.

B483 (Brunschvicg 483) — Self-love is ordered by the love of the body and explicitly applied to Christ.

B498 (Brunschvicg 498) — The will's divided attachment appears as resistance between vice and grace.

B513 (Brunschvicg 513) — Prayer is both a causal action and a received gift.

B522 (Brunschvicg 522) — Command and enabling gift are not identical.

B571 (Brunschvicg 571) — The governing end, rather than the inventory of objects, distinguishes cupidity and charity.

B581 (Brunschvicg 581) — The disposition of the will is distinguished from intellectual clarity.

B668 (Brunschvicg 668) — The governing rule changes from one's own will to God's.

In this edition

"Self-will" renders volonté propre at B472 (Brunschvicg 472); "particular will" renders volonté particulière in the hypothetical members at B475 (Brunschvicg 475). The distinction is not a claim that every particular act is necessarily selfish. "Consent" at B482 (Brunschvicg 482) names agreement with the directing will, while B476 (Brunschvicg 476) extends the imagined member's submission even to being cut off if the body requires it. These are steps in an analogy, not literal instructions about bodily injury.

See also

Body and members (p. 71); Grace (p. 85); Concupiscence (p. 41); Charity (p. 73); Reason (p. 133).
Contents

Judgment and inquiry

Contradiction

Contradiction · Pensées

Contradiction — being contradicted; contradiction [printed form]; *contredites* — contradicted [printed form]; *contrariétés* — contrarieties [printed form]; *sujet de contradiction* — subject of contradiction [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. An opposition between speakers, claims, or tendencies; these are not automatically the same kind of contradiction.

In the book. Disagreement cannot decide truth, while human oppositions expose the inadequacy of one-sided descriptions.

In this edition. B384 (Brunschvicg 384) begins with 'Being contradicted'; B434 (Brunschvicg 434) makes humanity a 'subject of contradiction'.

A place to read. B384 (Brunschvicg 384) for the evidential rule; B434 (Brunschvicg 434) for the opposed accounts of humanity.

Meaning

Contradiction may be what someone meets when contradicted, not a formal inconsistency within a proposition. B384 (Brunschvicg 384) makes this distinction indispensable: certain things encounter denials, whereas false things can pass unchallenged. Contrariété also gathers opposed tendencies, as when humanity is both credulous and incredulous, timid and rash (B125 (Brunschvicg 125)). Such a list need not assert that the same judgment is affirmed and denied at precisely the same time and in the same respect. It asks how these different dispositions belong to one kind of creature. The inquiry concerns the relation between its capacities, conduct, aspirations, and failures.

Use in the book

The practical sting of disagreement appears in B80 (Brunschvicg 80). A challenge to our reasoning irritates us more than a mistaken report of a headache because we are less secure about having chosen truth than about our present bodily condition. Another person may see the contrary with the same apparent assurance; a thousand mockers intensify the difficulty. Pascal explains the disturbance disagreement produces without granting either the solitary thinker or the multitude an automatic victory. B384 (Brunschvicg 384) supplies the explicit correction: neither contradiction nor its absence is a reliable mark of truth or falsehood. The point blocks both an appeal to

consensus and the romantic assumption that opposition itself proves an exceptional insight.

Elsewhere contradiction belongs to the relation between a doctrine and the person asserting it. B377 (Brunschvicg 377) notices that a discourse on humility can serve pride, and that Pyrrhonism can be asserted dogmatically. The manner of speaking may undermine the attitude professed. B404 (Brunschvicg 404) similarly makes the person who lowers humanity to animal status still seek human admiration and belief. The contradiction here is exposed through conduct and desire, not merely by comparing two sentences. B405 (Brunschvicg 405) sharpens the trap: pride either conceals misery or boasts of knowing it. Even a correct recognition of a fault may become material for the fault's renewal.

The opposed schools in B394 (Brunschvicg 394) each start from something true but reach false conclusions by failing to admit the truth of opposing principles. B416 (Brunschvicg 416) shows the resulting circle: evidence for greatness becomes evidence for misery because the greater the original height, the more miserable the fall; awareness of misery in turn attests greatness. B420 (Brunschvicg 420)'s speaker accordingly promises to contradict both boasting and self-abasement until the hearer understands the human predicament. This is a directed practice of correction, not a recommendation to oppose every claim indiscriminately. B423 (Brunschvicg 423) gives the positive discrimination it seeks: love the capacity for good without loving baseness; acknowledge its emptiness without despising the capacity itself.

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) unfolds the largest confrontation. Its opening states the Pyrrhonians' arguments, including doubts about origin and dreaming; these are reported strengths of a position, not an unqualified declaration that Pascal endorses every premise. The dogmatists answer that sincere doubt of natural principles is impossible. Nature prevents complete skepticism in practice, while reason prevents an unsupported claim to complete possession of truth. The successive descriptions of humanity as judge and earthworm, keeper of truth and sink of error, intensify this impasse. Pascal then turns to God's teaching and the distinction between creation or grace and corruption. This is his proposed religious explanation, not a conclusion supplied by the word contradiction itself. It keeps the two sides together by distinguishing conditions rather than announcing that incompatible propositions are true without qualification.

Places to Read

B80 (Brunschvicg 80) — Contradictory judgments trouble confidence differently from a mistaken report about bodily health.

B125 (Brunschvicg 125) — The human inventory pairs contrary dispositions.

B377 (Brunschvicg 377) — The manner of asserting a doctrine can contradict the attitude it professes.

B384 (Brunschvicg 384) — Contradiction and its absence fail as sufficient tests of truth.

B394 (Brunschvicg 394) — True opposing principles can expose false one-sided conclusions.

B405 (Brunschvicg 405) — Pride can boast of recognizing the very misery it would otherwise conceal.

B416 (Brunschvicg 416) — Greatness and misery become evidence for one another.

B420 (Brunschvicg 420) — The inquirer is contradicted whether boasting or abasing himself.

B423 (Brunschvicg 423) — Love and hatred of self are discriminated through capacity and baseness.

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) — Rival philosophical strengths lead into the account of humanity's divided condition.

In this edition

Public disagreement, incompatible claims, and contrary tendencies must remain distinct. At B384 (Brunschvicg 384) the first English sentence interprets the French noun through the passive phrase “Being contradicted”; the later sentence retains “Contradiction.” At B424 (Brunschvicg 424) contrariétés is “contrarieties,” while the heading at B125 (Brunschvicg 125) is “Contradictions.” These local choices do not create a single technical dialectic. B434 (Brunschvicg 434) must be read with its reported arguments, questions, and concluding theological claims intact; extracting its skeptical opening alone reverses the movement of the passage.

See also

Reason (p. 133); Greatness (p. 177); Wretchedness (p. 198); Contrarieties (p. 215).
Contents

Custom · Pensées

coutume — custom [printed form]; *première coutume* — first custom [phrase]; *habitude* — habit [printed form]; *automate* — automaton [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Repeated practice becomes a disposition, often with the apparent immediacy of nature.

In the book. Custom both entrenches unexamined beliefs and helps make a recognized conviction practically available.

In this edition. Coutume and habitude are related but not interchangeable in every sentence.

A place to read. B93 (Brunschvicg 93) and B252 (Brunschvicg 252), with B245 (Brunschvicg 245) for the limit of religious habituation.

Meaning

Coutume includes inherited public ways and patterns acquired through repetition. Habitude stresses the settled disposition that repetition produces. Neither word guarantees truth: people can become accustomed to a mistake as thoroughly as to a sound practice. Yet Pascal does not treat acquired dispositions as merely external conventions laid over an untouched natural self. Custom can change what feels natural, what the body anticipates, and what the mind finds easy to believe. His problem is therefore both critical and practical: how can one recognize habituation's influence, and how should a being who cannot live by continuous demonstration use it?

Use in the book

B89 (Brunschvicg 89) provocatively calls custom our nature, moving from faith and fear of hell to the soul's familiarity with number, space, and movement. B92 (Brunschvicg 92) asks whether natural principles are accustomed principles received, in childhood, from parents. A different custom can supply a different apparent nature, although the passage also allows resistant dispositions. B93 (Brunschvicg 93) makes the familiar phrase "second nature" unstable: if a child's supposedly natural love can fade, why exclude custom from nature, and why not suspect that first nature is an earlier custom? This is a question pressed through a particular example, not a demonstrated account of the acquisition of every principle.

The social examples give the issue a visible shape. In B97 (Brunschvicg 97) the praise and contempt heard during childhood help make masons, soldiers, and roofers. People love truth and reject folly but misapply those attractive names to occupations valued around them. The ending

nevertheless admits that nature sometimes overcomes custom. B96 (Brunschvicg 96) describes a narrower intellectual obstruction: habitual bad explanations can make people resist better ones when discovered. B308 (Brunschvicg 308) explains the apparent majesty of a king seen alone by his association with guards and drums. Familiar accompaniments have bent the human machine toward respect; their effect remains when they are absent.

Custom also supplies political stability without proving intrinsic justice. B294 (Brunschvicg 294) questions the authority acquired by established laws and warns that exposing their beginnings can destroy obedience without supplying a secure replacement. Its assertion that natural laws exist must remain alongside its attack on prevailing customs. B301 (Brunschvicg 301) says old laws remove a root of diversity because they offer a shared rule, not because age proves their soundness. These passages distinguish the practical consequences of agreement from the evidence for a norm's truth. B252 (Brunschvicg 252) then turns the same power toward belief. We are as much automaton as mind, so proofs addressed to the mind do not exhaust persuasion. Custom produces deeply held convictions across religions and occupations; its general efficacy therefore cannot establish Christianity's truth. Pascal's constructive instruction comes with a sequence: once the mind has seen where truth lies, habit should steep the whole person in that conviction. Keeping every proof before attention at every moment is impossible. The body can otherwise pull against an intellectual assent, leaving the person divided. The final contrast between slow reasoning and immediately available sentiment concerns the continuing readiness of conviction, not a new proof of its object.

The religious limits are explicit nearby. B245 (Brunschvicg 245) names reason, custom, and inspiration, reserving the saving effect for inspiration. B248 (Brunschvicg 248) calls proof an instrument rather than the divine giver of faith. B249 (Brunschvicg 249) and B250 (Brunschvicg 250) reject both trusting outward observance by itself and proudly refusing it. The practices proposed to the interlocutor in B233 (Brunschvicg 233) belong to this difficult conjunction of reasoning, diminished passions, embodied repetition, and requested grace. They must not be summarized as a claim that any repeated behavior manufactures saving faith on demand.

Places to Read

B89 (Brunschvicg 89) — Custom is called nature across belief and familiar objects of thought.

B92 (Brunschvicg 92) — Different customs reshape apparent natural principles, with limits set by disposition.

B93 (Brunschvicg 93) — First and second nature are questioned through the fading of natural love.

B96 (Brunschvicg 96) — Habitual bad explanations obstruct reception of better ones.

B97 (Brunschvicg 97) — Praise and contempt help distribute occupations, with a qualification for resistant nature.

B233 (Brunschvicg 233) — The wager dialogue turns from assent to obstacles and religious practice.

B245 (Brunschvicg 245) — Reason and custom remain distinct from saving inspiration.

B249 (Brunschvicg 249) — Trusting formal observances and refusing them are distinguished errors.

B252 (Brunschvicg 252) — The automaton and mind must be inclined together after truth is recognized.

B294 (Brunschvicg 294) — Established custom's authority and the danger of exposing its beginnings.

B301 (Brunschvicg 301) — A shared old rule secures agreement without proving its superior soundness.

B308 (Brunschvicg 308) — A king's retinue remains effective in imagination when absent.

In this edition

"Custom" does not simply mean prejudice, and "habit" does not mean an entirely mindless routine. In B252 (Brunschvicg 252) the edition translates sentiment as "Direct apprehension," making the final paragraph's cognitive force explicit. The parenthesis about baptism is part of the source and prevents flattening its comparison of Christians and pagans into complete equivalence. B233 (Brunschvicg 233)'s abêtira remains the provocative "make you beastlike"; the local note allows the automaton to illuminate it without claiming that this settles all its force. The numbered fragments offer related approaches, not a continuous finished chapter.

See also

Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Imagination (p. 127); Mind (p. 130); Automaton and machine (p. 207); First and second nature (p. 223).

Contents

Discernment · Pensées

finesse — discernment [printed form]; *esprits fins* — discerning minds [phrase]; *choses de finesse* — matters requiring discernment [phrase]; *d'un seul regard* — at a single glance [phrase]; *esprit de finesse* — discerning mind [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. A delicacy of apprehension able to register many subtle considerations together.

In the book. Discernment needs both clear perception and sound reasoning; geometrical skill does not automatically provide either in ordinary affairs.

In this edition. Finesse is 'discernment' in B1 (Brunschvicg 1) and B4 (Brunschvicg 4), not simply cleverness or emotional intelligence.

A place to read. B1 (Brunschvicg 1), then B3 (Brunschvicg 3) and B4 (Brunschvicg 4), for the contrasting habits and their qualifications.

Meaning

Finesse in the opening fragments names an intellectual delicacy. The relevant principles are not hidden in a specialist science: they are in ordinary use and before everyone's eyes. Their difficulty is that they are numerous and fine enough to escape notice. Pascal's visual vocabulary—good sight, clear vision, a single glance—describes this mode of apprehension, while sentir supplies the more direct sensing that sight alone cannot fully express. Neither vocabulary makes the process infallible. Missing a principle can spoil the judgment, and seeing the principles still leaves the further task of reasoning correctly from them.

Use in the book

B1 (Brunschvicg 1) organizes the contrast around access to principles. Geometry's principles are palpable and distinct once the inquirer turns toward them, but lack of familiarity can prevent that turn. Discernment's principles are familiar yet difficult to isolate. A geometer may fail to see what lies before him; a discerning person may refuse the patient work of entering a speculative subject through definitions. Pascal consequently describes reciprocal obstacles, not an elite endowed with all insight opposite an inferior calculating class. Each could possess the other capacity if the required adjustment of sight were made. Minds that judge falsely possess neither merely by being quick or formally orderly.

The central paragraph gives the operation its strongest positive description. Delicate things must often be taken together at once because

enumerating their countless principles would be an endless enterprise. Yet Pascal immediately qualifies the contrast with successive reasoning: it holds "at least up to a certain point," and the mind really does reason, tacitly, naturally, without a technique. Discernment is therefore not an absence of reasoning. What fails is the attempt to impose the visible order of a geometrical demonstration on every judgment. The difficulty of communicating a sense of the matter to someone who lacks it is real, but does not turn private conviction into proof.

B3 (Brunschvicg 3) compresses this into a conflict of acquired habits. Those used to direct apprehension want to penetrate everything at a glance; those used to principles search for an explicit sequence everywhere. The repeated emphasis on being accustomed explains their mutual incomprehension. It also leaves open cultivation rather than describing immutable human species. B6 (Brunschvicg 6) develops the educational problem: conversation can form or spoil both mind and sense of things, yet good selection of conversation already requires a formed judgment. Pascal marks the circle without handing the reader an effortless rule for escaping it.
B4 (Brunschvicg 4) places finesse with judgment and geometry with intellect. Its opening analogies to true eloquence and true morality resist merely ostentatious or rule-bound performances. But the fragment cannot safely be used to assert that discernment is straightforwardly the ruleless faculty: the disputed relative clause is attached by this English edition to the morality of the intellect. The local translation and note must control an interpretation of this particular volume, even where another edition punctuates or explains the sentence differently.

The later criticism of premature reasons is a necessary check. B276 (Brunschvicg 276) reports Roannez's belief that an immediately pleasing or offensive thing is responding to reasons discovered afterward. Pascal's reply reverses the causal account: perhaps the reasons are found because the thing already offends. That does not cancel B1 (Brunschvicg 1)'s account of sound tacit judgment, but prevents us from calling every first reaction discernment. B274 (Brunschvicg 274) likewise makes fancy difficult to distinguish from direct apprehension. The positive account therefore remains demanding: good sight, adequate attention to relevant considerations, and a just mind must work together. Speed, sensitivity, or social assurance alone is insufficient.

Places to Read

B1 (Brunschvicg 1) — The full comparison: subtle principles, simultaneous apprehension, and tacit reasoning.

B3 (Brunschvicg 3) — Habitual direct judgment and habitual reasoning fail to understand one another.

B4 (Brunschvicg 4) — Discernment belongs to judgment within a textually disputed formulation.

B6 (Brunschvicg 6) — Conversation forms or spoils the very capacities needed to choose it well.

B7 (Brunschvicg 7) — Greater understanding recognizes more individuality among people.

B274 (Brunschvicg 274) — Fancy and direct apprehension resist an easy discriminating test.

B276 (Brunschvicg 276) — Roannez's explanation of an immediate reaction receives a competing causal account.

In this edition

The edition renders esprit de finesse as "discerning mind," while esprits fins becomes "discerning minds" or "people of discernment" according to syntax. Those choices preserve a capacity and its possessors without turning the French adjective into a rigid personality label. At B1 (Brunschvicg 1) "The mind does perform the reasoning" translates the explicit qualification after the ridicule of geometrical treatment. Omitting it would turn the central distinction into a false opposition between inference and feeling. The forms above are selected printed attestations, not a claim that every use of finesse throughout the volume has this cognitive sense.

See also

Geometry (p. 121); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); First principles (p. 118); Mind (p. 130); At a single glance (p. 206); Exact inference and breadth (p. 220).

Contents

Feeling and apprehension

Feeling and apprehension · Pensées

sentiment — direct sense; direct apprehension [printed form]; *sentiments* — feelings [printed form]; *sentent* — sense [printed form]; *sentiment du cœur* — the heart's direct sense [phrase]; *sentir* — to sense; to feel [printed form]; *se concluent* — are inferred [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Sentiment ranges from feeling to immediately available awareness; sentir is not confined to emotion.

In the book. Memory, joy, subtle judgment, first principles, and faith reveal related but distinct uses.

In this edition. The edition varies ‘feeling,’ ‘sense,’ ‘awareness,’ and ‘direct apprehension’ with the local task.

A place to read. B95 (Brunschvicg 95) and B282 (Brunschvicg 282), checked against B274 (Brunschvicg 274)'s difficulty of distinguishing fancy.

Meaning

The French family sentir, sentiment, sentiments crosses an English division between affective feeling and cognitive apprehension. B95 (Brunschvicg 95) deliberately places memory and joy together and adds that even geometrical propositions become sentiments. A blanket replacement by emotion would make the mathematics unintelligible; a blanket replacement by intuition would erase the affective examples. Feeling and apprehension therefore need to be considered together rather than assigned to one separate faculty. The sense must be inferred from what is apprehended or felt, how it is acquired, and what argumentative role the passage gives it.

Use in the book

In B1 (Brunschvicg 1) sentir helps describe principles too numerous and delicate to be handled like geometrical definitions. They are sensed rather than fully laid out, and good judgment follows this sentiment. The passage does not make sensitivity sufficient: clear apprehension and correct reasoning remain necessary. B3 (Brunschvicg 3) then describes people accustomed to judging by a direct sense of things, contrasted with those proceeding through principles. B6 (Brunschvicg 6) adds that both sense and mind can be formed or spoiled by conversation. The directness of a judgment thus does not by itself establish an untouched natural authority.
B95 (Brunschvicg 95) complicates any fixed opposition between sentiment and acquired reasoning. The printed English says geometrical propositions “become feelings.” Its note explains the extended cognitive sense: what required inference can become immediately or habitually present. The sentence continues in both directions, saying reason makes feelings natural and natural feelings are erased by reason. It presents a traffic between articulated judgment and settled apprehension, not a permanent partition between one rational organ and one emotional organ.

B252 (Brunschvicg 252) develops the practical importance of readiness. Reason acts slowly and needs many principles kept before it; sentiment acts in an instant and is ready to act. The instruction to place faith in direct apprehension responds to the instability of having to reconstruct proofs continually. Yet its surrounding account of custom does not make every ready belief true, and B245 (Brunschvicg 245) distinguishes inspiration's saving work from reason and repetition. B274 (Brunschvicg 274) presses the unresolved difficulty directly: fancy resembles the apprehension opposed to

it, rival speakers rename one another's conviction, and reason itself bends. B275 (Brunschvicg 275)'s mistake of imagination for heart shows why religious confidence also requires scrutiny.

At B282 (Brunschvicg 282) the contrast is more precise. First principles are sensed, propositions inferred, and both routes are certain. The heart's knowing space, time, movement, and numbers is not a geometrical proof abbreviated into emotion; it supplies beginnings on which argument rests. The comparison is reciprocal: reason should not demand a proof of every beginning, and the heart should not demand immediate apprehension of every demonstrated proposition. Nature gives little knowledge by the first route and leaves the rest to reasoning. The final paragraph then distinguishes divine giving of religion through the heart's sense from the human persuasion available through argument. It is a transition to faith, not an erasure of the earlier distinctions.

Other contexts make awareness itself the issue. B164 (Brunschvicg 164) says the undiverted young feel their nothingness without knowing it: painful exposure and articulated understanding do not coincide. B399 (Brunschvicg 399) states that misery requires sentiment, contrasting a ruined house with a human being. There the edition says “awareness.” B276 (Brunschvicg 276), finally, distinguishes a reported explanation from Pascal's reply: Roannez attributes his first response to subsequently discovered reasons, while Pascal suspects the response generates the reasons. The passage does not let an interpreter certify a first impression simply by supplying a later argument for it.

Places to Read

B1 (Brunschvicg 1) — Subtle principles are sensed, yet sound judgment still requires correct reasoning.

B3 (Brunschvicg 3) — Sentiment names direct apprehension contrasted with successive inference.

B6 (Brunschvicg 6) — Sense as well as mind can be cultivated or damaged.

B95 (Brunschvicg 95) — Memory, joy, and geometrical propositions share the extended vocabulary.

B164 (Brunschvicg 164) — Feeling nothingness is distinguished from knowing it.

B252 (Brunschvicg 252) — Direct apprehension supplies readiness where discursive attention wavers.

B274 (Brunschvicg 274) — Fancy and direct apprehension can be confused.

B275 (Brunschvicg 275) — Imagination is mistaken for heart in supposed conversion.

B276 (Brunschvicg 276) — An immediate reaction may generate its later reasons rather than follow them.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) — Sensed principles and inferred propositions have different routes to certainty.

B399 (Brunschvicg 399) — Sentiment becomes awareness in the distinction between a ruined house and human misery.

In this edition

The listed glosses identify particular contexts rather than universal replacements. In B282 (Brunschvicg 282) "Principles are sensed" corresponds to Les principes se sentent; the complete statement about propositions requires its separate verb se concluent. In B95 (Brunschvicg 95) the English preserves "feelings," and the apparatus guards against the modern narrow emotional reading. Cœur remains a distinct printed noun even when the phrase sentiment du cœur joins the two families. Keeping their separate lookup routes prevents an English "feeling" from being silently reassigned to every occurrence of "heart."

See also

Discernment (p. 113); Heart (p. 124); Custom (p. 110); First principles (p. 118); Awareness and felt nothingness (p. 207); Roannez and reasons afterward (p. 253).

Contents

First principles

First principles · Pensées

premiers principes — first principles [phrase]; *principes se sentent* — principles are sensed [phrase]; *propositions se concluent* — propositions are inferred [phrase]; *instinct* — instinct [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Beginnings on which an argument rests, rather than conclusions established by that same argument.

In the book. Pascal distinguishes certainty from universal demonstrability without licensing every immediate conviction.

In this edition. B282 (Brunschvicg 282)'s principles differ in role from the ultimate origins sought in B72 (Brunschvicg 72).

A place to read. B282 (Brunschvicg 282) for mathematical examples and the reciprocal limits of heart and reason.

Meaning

A principe is a starting point, ground, or source. It need not always mean an axiom in a formal system. The distinction matters when B1 (Brunschvicg 1) speaks of principles in everyday affairs, B72 (Brunschvicg 72) challenges claims to ultimate beginnings of nature, and B282 (Brunschvicg 282) identifies first principles known through the heart. The shared vocabulary relates these inquiries without making their objects identical. An argument needs something on which to rest; that dependence is not itself a defect. The defect would be to suppose that whatever is accepted first must already have been proved by the argument which depends upon it.

Use in the book

The opening comparison of geometry and discernment begins with the apprehension of principles before the drawing of consequences (B1 (Brunschvicg 1)). In geometry the beginnings can be clearly set out, though unfamiliar to ordinary attention. In subtle human matters their number and delicacy make omission likely. Both contexts require sound reasoning after adequate apprehension. B2 (Brunschvicg 2) adds that depth in following consequences from a few principles differs from breadth in holding many principles without confusion. These distinctions prevent “first principles” from becoming a label for an undifferentiated rational talent possessed by one class of thinkers.

B72 (Brunschvicg 72) moves the word toward the limits of explanation. Sciences expand indefinitely both in their consequences and in the subtlety of their principles. What is offered as an ultimate beginning may rest on something further; calling a visible point indivisible because sight cannot resolve it does not establish its indivisibility. The finite inquirer cannot simply claim access to the nothingness from which things arise or the infinity into which they extend. Pascal here attacks a pretension to comprehend nature's ultimate grounds. Reading this beside B282 (Brunschvicg 282) requires attention to the question asked, not the assumption that the two fragments must employ principle in an identical technical sense.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) argues against converting inability to demonstrate into uncertainty about everything. We know we are not dreaming, it says, despite our inability to prove that by reason. Space, time, movement, and numbers exemplify first principles whose certainty is as firm as that of reasoned results. The heart senses three dimensions and the infinity of numbers; reason subsequently demonstrates the proposition about no two square numbers one of which is double the other. The latter concerns positive integer squares, as the edition's note specifies. The difference is in the route to knowledge, not the confidence due to it.

The prohibition is reciprocal. It is ridiculous for reason to require the heart to supply demonstrations of every first principle; it would be equally ridiculous for the heart to require direct apprehension of every demonstrated proposition. Thus the passage humbles reason's wish to judge everything but preserves its indispensable work. The wish that all knowledge could be immediate is followed by a decisive restriction: nature grants very little of that kind, and the rest requires reasoning. The final religious paragraph adds that a human argument cannot itself confer the heart's divinely given faith. It does not turn mathematical beginnings into a proof that every theological conviction is equally self-evident.

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) subjects natural principles to a further argumentative pressure. Its opening reports the Pyrrhonians' claim that natural feeling cannot certify the truth of principles when human origin is uncertain. The dogmatists' strongest response is that actual sincere doubt of them is impossible. Pascal does not merely repeat either side: nature blocks complete skepticism, reason undermines dogmatic possession, and the ensuing appeal is to divine instruction. The report of skeptical objections must therefore be distinguished from B282 (Brunschvicg 282)'s direct defense of certainty and from B434 (Brunschvicg 434)'s own concluding theological explanation. The volume preserves these different argumentative settings rather than resolving them into one completed epistemological treatise.

Places to Read

B1 (Brunschvicg 1) — Apprehending principles and reasoning from them are distinct requirements.

B2 (Brunschvicg 2) — Following few principles deeply differs from grasping many without confusion.

B72 (Brunschvicg 72) — Ultimate grounds and indefinitely extending scientific principles expose human disproportion.

B95 (Brunschvicg 95) — Demonstrated propositions can become immediately available apprehensions.

B252 (Brunschvicg 252) — Reasoning falters when its many principles cease to be present.

B281 (Brunschvicg 281) — The compressed cue joins heart, instinct, and principles.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) — First principles support reason without being demonstrated by it.

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) — The rival philosophical accounts of natural principles are staged before the appeal to God.

In this edition

The edition keeps "first principles" rather than replacing the heart by "axioms" or a modern theory of intuition. Its exact antithesis is "Principles are sensed; propositions are inferred," translating two clauses rather than assigning the whole to sentir. At B72 (Brunschvicg 72) principle can point to origins as well as argumentative premises; at B487 (Brunschvicg 487) God is called the principle of all things in a religious assertion. The same English expression consequently does not guarantee one philosophical function everywhere.

See also

Geometry (p. 121); Heart (p. 124); Reason (p. 133); Infinity (p. 183); Principles and consequences (p. 250).

Contents

Geometry

Geometry · Pensées

géométrie — geometry [printed form]; *géomètres* — geometers [printed form]; *esprit de géométrie* — geometrical mind [phrase]; *preuves* — proofs [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. A demonstrative discipline whose explicit principles provide a model, not the measure of every judgment.

In the book. Its rigor makes the contrast with discernment possible; its breadth and limits complicate a simple hierarchy of minds.

In this edition. Geometry and geometers are retained rather than generalized into science and scientists.

A place to read. B1 (Brunschvicg 1) and B2 (Brunschvicg 2), read as two distinct comparisons.

Meaning

Geometry supplies Pascal with a determinate activity: it knows what it aims to produce, works from principles, and demonstrates consequences. B33 (Brunschvicg 33) identifies its object as proofs, contrasting that intelligible aim with the disputed charm sought by poetry. It is therefore more than a flattering synonym for clear thought. The specificity lets Pascal describe how a successful practice fails when applied without discrimination to a different subject. The geometer's ability is genuine; the mistake is to infer that mastery of explicit demonstration ensures every kind of perception, understanding, or conduct.

Use in the book

In B1 (Brunschvicg 1) the geometrical principles are tangible and broad once brought before the mind, but removed from ordinary use. The first obstacle is directing attention toward them. A sound mind that grasps them should reason soundly from them. The discerning mind faces the reverse difficulty: its principles are ordinary but subtle, numerous, and hard to isolate. The exclusive geometer insists on definitions before principles in matters where the relevant considerations must be perceived together. This demand makes him ridiculous not because definitions or deductions are worthless, but because the subject does not admit their familiar handling. Conversely, the exclusively discerning person lacks patience for speculative beginnings unknown in everyday life.

B2 (Brunschvicg 2) must not be treated as a repetition with interchangeable labels. Its example of the effects of water distinguishes penetrating consequences from a small number of principles from holding many principles without confusion. The first is esprit de justesse, rendered "a mind for exact inference"; the second is the geometrical mind. One can be strong and narrow or broad and weak. Geometry therefore appears on the side of breadth in this comparison, although its principles appeared comparatively palpable in B1 (Brunschvicg 1). The descriptions are compatible once their differing contrasts are kept visible; forcing every fragment into a single pair of intellectual types destroys that precision.

The writing fragments also oppose specialization to a cultivated person's adaptability. B34 (Brunschvicg 34) says broadly cultivated people are not labeled poets or geometers, though they possess those abilities and can judge their practitioners. B36 (Brunschvicg 36) imagines the mathematician treating another person as a proposition. The joke targets an inability to meet human needs, not the truth of mathematics. B37 (Brunschvicg 37) would prefer some knowledge of everything to exhaustive knowledge of one thing if both cannot be had. These passages locate geometrical accomplishment within a life whose demands exceed specialist competence.

The discipline is limited in two further ways. B72 (Brunschvicg 72) describes geometry as having an infinity of infinities of propositions to expose, placing even rigorous inquiry within the disproportion between finite intelligence and inexhaustible objects. B61 (Brunschvicg 61) says mathematics preserves order but is useless in its depths; B144 (Brunschvicg 144)'s first-person reflection turns from abstract sciences toward the study of humanity, then questions whether even that study gives happiness. These are evaluative judgments about human purpose and communication, not refutations of mathematical results. The order a science achieves does not decide the worth of every use to which a person puts it.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) gives geometry its positive epistemic setting. Reason demonstrates a proposition concerning square numbers from

beginnings known in another way; the certainty of the result does not require reason to demonstrate every first principle. B95 (Brunschvicg 95) meanwhile says geometrical propositions become sentiments, showing that learned results can become readily apprehended. Finally, B793 (Brunschvicg 793) places Archimedes' discoveries within intellectual greatness. Royal display could add nothing to their proper force, and discoveries cannot by accumulation produce charity. Geometry keeps its genuine achievement, while its rank and limits depend on the order being considered.

Places to Read

B1 (Brunschvicg 1) — Geometry's explicit principles and the errors of geometrizing subtle judgment.

B2 (Brunschvicg 2) — The geometrical mind's breadth is distinguished from exact inference's depth.

B33 (Brunschvicg 33) — Proofs are identified as geometry's object.

B34 (Brunschvicg 34) — Broad cultivation uses specialist abilities without making them a permanent label.

B36 (Brunschvicg 36) — A specialist risks treating another person as a proposition.

B61 (Brunschvicg 61) — Mathematical order is distinguished from its value for human life.

B72 (Brunschvicg 72) — The discipline's inexhaustible propositions enter the account of infinity.

B95 (Brunschvicg 95) — Geometrical propositions become sentiments.

B144 (Brunschvicg 144) — The study of abstract sciences and the study of humanity are assessed by their human purpose.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) — A demonstrated mathematical proposition differs from its sensed principles.

B793 (Brunschvicg 793) — Archimedes exemplifies intellectual greatness irreducible to royal display.

In this edition

The edition's "geometrical mind" is not an authorized substitute for every occurrence of esprit. B2 (Brunschvicg 2)'s "mind for exact inference" translates its own phrase, esprit de justesse, and marks a distinction that changes the comparison. In B1 (Brunschvicg 1) "geometrically" belongs to a criticized transfer of method, not a general rejection of disciplined inference. B793 (Brunschvicg 793)'s statement that Archimedes was a prince remains Pascal's historical assertion, as its note cautions; the argumentative contrast does not certify that biography.

See also

Discernment (p. 113); First principles (p. 118); Mind (p. 130); Reason (p. 133); Three orders (p. 35); Exact inference and breadth (p. 220).

Contents

Heart

Heart · Pensées

cœur — heart [printed form]; *connaissances du cœur* — knowledge of the heart [phrase]; *Le cœur a ses raisons* — The heart has its reasons [phrase]; *Dieu sensible au cœur* — God perceptible to the heart [phrase]; *raisons* — reasons [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. A center of immediate knowing, attachment, and religious response, not a synonym for emotion alone.

In the book. The heart knows principles, loves, hardens, and receives faith; its dispositions can also be corrupt.

In this edition. Heart remains heart; sentiment and raison are separately traced.

A place to read. B277 (Brunschvicg 277) and B282 (Brunschvicg 282), with B275 (Brunschvicg 275)'s warning about imagined conversion.

Meaning

Cœur changes its work with the sentence. It is the heart that senses principles, loves universal being or itself, receives divinely given faith, and can be hollow, unjust, or hardened. The word's unity does not justify substituting one modern psychological faculty for every use. In particular, the familiar opposition between head and heart can mislead: B282 (Brunschvicg 282) assigns the heart a role in knowing mathematical beginnings, while B100 (Brunschvicg 100) locates self-concealment and aversion to truth in the human heart. Its immediacy is neither mere irrationality nor a guarantee of moral purity.

Use in the book

B277 (Brunschvicg 277)'s first sentence has its setting in love and choice. After saying that the heart has reasons unknown to reason, Pascal says it naturally loves universal being and itself according to where it gives itself, and can harden against either. The concluding question addresses someone who has retained self-love while rejecting the other attachment: does that person love himself through reason? The challenge examines the grounds and direction of attachment. It does not confer authority on every impulse, and it is not specifically a maxim about romantic love. The same vocabulary of reasons operates differently from an explicit chain of demonstration.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) gives the heart's knowing its clearest sustained explanation. It knows first principles, such as space, time, movement, and numbers, on which reasoning must rely. The inability to prove that we are not dreaming is not, in this argument, sufficient to abolish certainty. The heart senses that space has three dimensions and that numbers are infinite; reason demonstrates propositions afterward. Each route has its proper work. Demanding a proof of every sensed beginning would be as inappropriate as demanding an immediate sense of every inferred result. The paragraph then sharply limits the scope of such knowledge: nature gives little through instinct and direct apprehension; most knowledge requires reasoning.

The religious transition at the end of B282 (Brunschvicg 282) should remain a transition. Those given religion through the heart's direct sense are rightly convinced; those without that gift can be addressed through reasoning while awaiting God's giving it. B278 (Brunschvicg 278) defines faith as God perceptible to the heart rather than to reason. B248 (Brunschvicg 248) similarly distinguishes a human proof, sometimes the instrument of faith, from the faith God puts in the heart. B185 (Brunschvicg 185) separates reasons reaching the mind and grace reaching the heart from force and threats, which produce terror instead of religion. These passages make the heart's religious condition dependent on a gift, not simply on the intensity with which someone reports conviction.

Nor does heart exclude order. B283 (Brunschvicg 283) answers the objection that Scripture lacks it by distinguishing the mind's sequence of principle and demonstration from an order of charity. Repeated digressions can refer each point to the intended end, keeping that end present. In this edition Christ, Paul, and Augustine seek to “warm, not instruct.” The contrast concerns the mode and end of address; it does not declare that their words contain no intelligible teaching. B280 (Brunschvicg 280)'s distance between knowing God and loving him makes the difference between intellectual information and attachment explicit.

The counterexamples stop the reader from sentimentalizing the word. B100 (Brunschvicg 100) calls the heart unjust when it wants undeserved esteem and resists correction. B139 (Brunschvicg 139) places boredom's

natural roots in its depths. B275 (Brunschvicg 275) says people mistake imagination for heart and think themselves converted when merely thinking of conversion. B284 (Brunschvicg 284) and B286 (Brunschvicg 286) describe a changed orientation toward God, while B423 (Brunschvicg 423) discriminates between a capacity worth loving and baseness that should not be loved. "Follow the heart" would be an inadequate summary of a vocabulary that makes the heart itself something needing inclination, judgment, and transformation.

Places to Read

B100 (Brunschvicg 100) — An unjust heart conceals faults and resents correction.

B185 (Brunschvicg 185) — Reasons, grace, and coercion reach persons in importantly different ways.

B248 (Brunschvicg 248) — God gives faith in the heart; proof may serve as its instrument.

B275 (Brunschvicg 275) — Imagination can be mistaken for heart in supposed conversion.

B277 (Brunschvicg 277) — The heart's reasons are considered through self-love and universal being.

B278 (Brunschvicg 278) — Faith is defined through God's perceptibility to the heart.

B280 (Brunschvicg 280) — Knowing God is distinguished from loving him.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) — The heart supplies first principles and enters the concluding account of faith.

B283 (Brunschvicg 283) — The heart has an order directed toward charity and an end.

B286 (Brunschvicg 286) — An inward disposition hears its need and incapacity articulated by religion.

In this edition

At B277 (Brunschvicg 277) the English retains the repeated “naturally” and the movement of giving and hardening; neither attachment is reduced to a detached proof. At B282 (Brunschvicg 282) “heart's direct sense” translates the combined phrase sentiment du cœur, not cœur alone. B283 (Brunschvicg 283) follows the historical base's échauffer, “warm,” as its note states, rather than silently substituting a different critical reading. These local qualifications matter more than imposing a single theoretical definition. Knowing beginnings and loving an object remain distinct uses, connected by the surrounding argument.

See also

Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); First principles (p. 118); Reason (p. 133); Faith (p. 79); Self-love (p. 192); Conversion (p. 76); The heart’s order (p. 267).

Contents

Imagination

Imagination · Pensées

imagination — imagination [printed form]; *faculté imaginante* — imagining faculty [phrase]; *leur imagination* — their imagination [phrase]; *cordes d’imagination* — cords of imagination [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. A power shaping appearance, valuation, confidence, and respect without marking truth reliably.

In the book. Its social, bodily, and religious effects extend beyond fantasy or artistic invention.

In this edition. Imagination names the power; illusion is only one of its results.

A place to read. B82 (Brunschvicg 82) for the sustained inquiry, B275 (Brunschvicg 275) for the danger within supposed conversion.

Meaning

Imagination makes things present and persuasive, enlarges or diminishes their value, and connects an object with impressions that may exceed its own merits. B82 (Brunschvicg 82) calls it deceptive precisely because it is not invariably false. If it always lied, reversing its verdict would supply a dependable rule; instead it stamps truth and falsehood alike. The problem is therefore not simply to reject everything imagined. Imagination's influence often concerns how we attend, feel, and value before a proposition is consciously judged. Pascal addresses the wisest as well as the foolish,

removing the easy refuge of supposing that intelligence automatically escapes it.

Use in the book

B82 (Brunschvicg 82)'s examples move from authority to bodily disturbance. The venerable magistrate arrives at a sermon with reason and professed charity prepared, but the preacher's odd face, hoarse voice, or bad shave may destroy his gravity regardless of the truths announced. The great philosopher on a sufficiently broad plank above a precipice knows his safety and nevertheless pales or sweats. Tone of voice alters the force of speech; a lawyer's bold gestures improve the apparent merits of a paid case. In these examples argument may remain consciously available while failing to control the person's response.

Robes, ermine, caps, spacious gowns, and imposing courts produce respect for judges, physicians, and learned doctors. Pascal sharply distinguishes such display from effective justice or healing. Yet force is not merely another costume: soldiers and kings possess means of compulsion, and their armed retinues make even the firmest tremble. B304 (Brunschvicg 304) later gives an imagined sequence in which conquest first establishes a dominant party and imagination then helps perpetuate succession. B308 (Brunschvicg 308) explains why a king's face can retain its terrible majesty when his attendants are absent: habitual association carries the retinue into thought. These related claims distinguish force, custom, and imagination while showing their cooperation.

The source is attentive to evaluative scale. B84 (Brunschvicg 84) makes imagination swell small things until they fill the soul and reduce great things to its own measure, including when speaking of God. B85 (Brunschvicg 85)'s concealed small fortune becomes a mountain, then another turn of imagination permits disclosure. B195bis (Brunschvicg 195bis) applies the distortion to time: repeated attention enlarges the present, neglect diminishes eternity, and the two reverse their apparent importance. These are not accounts of imagination inventing only non-existent objects. It can falsify the proportion assigned to realities the thinker already acknowledges.

Nor is the untrained person's first impression a secure alternative. B82 (Brunschvicg 82) stages rival accusations concerning the void: one side blames childhood sensation, the other learned instruction. Their mutual stories of conditioning do not establish which is correct. Novelty can deceive as effectively as old impressions. B105 (Brunschvicg 105) even questions whether silence leaves another person's judgment untouched, since silence, face, or tone may be interpreted as a cue. B274 (Brunschvicg 274)'s difficulty in distinguishing fancy from direct apprehension and B275 (Brunschvicg 275)'s imagined conversion extend the scrutiny to claims of inward

certainty. Thinking about becoming converted is not the same as a changed heart.

Imagination nevertheless serves the inquiry itself. B72 (Brunschvicg 72) explicitly sends it beyond sight in the contemplation of great and small, using nested universes within a mite to dislodge finite presumption. The exercise is not an observational report. B199 (Brunschvicg 199) asks the reader to imagine condemned prisoners in order to recognize mortality. These deliberate images do not make the faculty generally reliable; their local purpose is to expose what ordinary valuation conceals. The function of an image, rather than the noun alone, determines its place in the argument.

Places to Read

B72 (Brunschvicg 72) — Imagination exceeds sight in a directed exercise on disproportion.

B82 (Brunschvicg 82) — Persuasion, professional display, bodily fear, and rival accounts of the void.

B84 (Brunschvicg 84) — Small and great objects are distorted in valuation.

B85 (Brunschvicg 85) — A small possession is magnified into a mountain and then revalued.

B105 (Brunschvicg 105) — Presentation and even silence can alter another's judgment.

B195bis (Brunschvicg 195bis) — Attention magnifies the present and neglect diminishes eternity.

B199 (Brunschvicg 199) — An expressly imagined scene makes the human condition visible.

B274 (Brunschvicg 274) — Fancy and direct apprehension resist a simple discriminating rule.

B275 (Brunschvicg 275) — Thinking of conversion is confused with conversion of the heart.

B304 (Brunschvicg 304) — Imagination helps hold power after an imagined initial conquest.

B308 (Brunschvicg 308) — Custom makes a king's absent retinue effective in his face.

In this edition

The edition keeps “imagination” and “imagining faculty” at B82 (Brunschvicg 82) rather than replacing them throughout by illusion. Fantaisie is often “fancy,” a related but separately printed term, and should not be silently indexed as if it were the same word. B304 (Brunschvicg 304) adopts la pure force l’a fait, with the historical reading recorded in its annotation; the sequence of force before imaginative perpetuation depends on that checked wording. The number of janissaries at B82 (Brunschvicg 82) remains part of Pascal's rhetorical picture, not an independently verified historical statistic.

See also

Custom (p. 110); Heart (p. 124); Opinion (p. 59); Force (p. 44); Conversion (p. 76); The plank above a precipice (p. 270); Robes, fur, and square caps (p. 254); Fancy and resistance (p. 221).

Contents

Mind

Mind · Pensées

esprit — mind; intellect [printed form]; *esprit juste* — accurate mind [phrase]; *plus d’esprit* — greater understanding [phrase]; *gens d’esprit* — people of intellect [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. Intellectual capacity, its operation or character, and sometimes the person possessing it.

In the book. Minds vary in breadth, exactness, attention, and disposition; accomplishment does not assure self-knowledge or charity.

In this edition. Mind, intellect, understanding, and spirit follow different contexts of esprit.

A place to read. B1 (Brunschvicg 1) and B7 (Brunschvicg 7) for intellectual discrimination; B793 (Brunschvicg 793) for its distinct order.

Meaning

Esprit cannot always be carried by one English noun. It names a person's mind, a manner of thinking, an intellectual ability, and people considered through that ability. In religious phrases it can mean spirit. Reading its function requires attention to what it does and what it contrasts with: geometry and discernment, heart and demonstration, automaton and conscious conviction, bodies and intellectual greatness, or the divine spirit poured out on believers. None of these pairings automatically supplies the meaning of all the others.

Use in the book

B1 (Brunschvicg 1) treats minds as formed habits of attending and reasoning. A geometer can reason soundly yet fail to apprehend the subtle principles of ordinary affairs; a discerning person can see them together yet recoil from unfamiliar definitions. An esprit juste must judge accurately from principles actually apprehended. The compliment does not mean that the person already has a morally just opinion about every subject. B2 (Brunschvicg 2) distributes capacities further: depth from few principles and breadth across many can exist separately. A mind may be strong but narrow, or broad but weak. Pascal thus resists a single scale of intelligence on which competence in one task certifies all others.

B7 (Brunschvicg 7) gives this diversity an interpersonal result. Greater understanding finds more original people, while ordinary observers see no difference. Intellectual refinement here means perceiving particularity rather than imposing an abstract sameness. B34 (Brunschvicg 34)'s broadly cultivated person similarly has no single professional label and speaks to the matter at hand. B36 (Brunschvicg 36) mocks the mathematician who would treat someone as a proposition and the soldier who would treat him as a besieged fortress. These images concern the whole person's responsiveness, not a denial that mathematics or military ability is real.

The mind is also exposed to formation and distortion. Conversation cultivates or spoils it and the sense of things (B6 (Brunschvicg 6)), while choosing good conversation already requires the capacity being cultivated. B47 (Brunschvicg 47) shows place and audience drawing more from a speaker's mind than he finds alone. B99 (Brunschvicg 99) says the will does not directly create belief: instead it turns the mind toward a favored aspect and away from disliked qualities, so judgment follows what is selectively seen. This intermediate mechanism matters. Describing the passage as “we believe whatever we want” loses the mind's continuing activity and the role of restricted attention.

B252 (Brunschvicg 252) distinguishes mind from automaton without allowing their separation in practice. Reasons convince the mind, custom inclines the embodied mechanism, and each can pull differently. Reasoned conviction needs support because it cannot maintain every proof in attention continually. B283 (Brunschvicg 283) distinguishes the mind's order of principle and demonstration from the heart's order directed to charity. B282 (Brunschvicg 282) makes the dependence reciprocal: reasoning rests on sensed beginnings, while immediate knowledge is too limited to replace inference. The mind is neither sovereign over all knowledge nor dispensable.

B793 (Brunschvicg 793) gives intellect a greatness of its own. Minds see Archimedes' discoveries in a way eyes do not, and royal display adds nothing to mathematical achievement. All bodies cannot produce a little thought

within the passage's account of distinct orders. Yet the accumulated products of bodies and minds cannot produce the least movement of charity, which is supernatural. Intellectual greatness is therefore genuinely above bodily magnitude without being the highest end. The English distinction between “intellectual” and “spiritual” is especially important here: greatness of esprit in the middle order is not already sanctity. B365 (Brunschvicg 365)'s contrast between thought's admirable nature and ridiculous defects likewise prevents intellectual capacity from being confused with its rightful exercise.

Places to Read

B1 (Brunschvicg 1) — Minds differ through their access to principles and their habits of reasoning.

B2 (Brunschvicg 2) — Breadth and exact inferential depth can be possessed separately.

B6 (Brunschvicg 6) — Conversation both forms and spoils mind and apprehension.

B7 (Brunschvicg 7) — Greater understanding recognizes more individual originality.

B36 (Brunschvicg 36) — Specialist vision can misconstrue another person's needs.

B47 (Brunschvicg 47) — Place and audience draw more from a speaker than solitary writing.

B99 (Brunschvicg 99) — Will directs the mind's attention rather than simply making belief.

B252 (Brunschvicg 252) — Mind and automaton require coordinated persuasion.

B283 (Brunschvicg 283) — The mind's demonstrative order differs from the heart's order.

B365 (Brunschvicg 365) — Thought’s admirable nature does not excuse its actual defects.

B793 (Brunschvicg 793) — Intellect has a distinct greatness, but cannot generate supernatural charity.

In this edition

At B7 (Brunschvicg 7) plus d'esprit becomes "greater our understanding," not a quantitative claim about possessing more of a substance called mind. B1 (Brunschvicg 1)'s esprit juste is rendered through accurate or sound judgment, not uniformly through moral "justice." In B793 (Brunschvicg 793) gens d'esprit is "people of intellect," while esprit de Dieu in B287 (Brunschvicg 287) is "God's spirit." Keeping these phrases distinct avoids importing a rigid heart-versus-head psychology or collapsing the middle and highest of the three orders. The selected forms are a guide to these local choices, not an exhaustive dictionary of esprit.

See also

Geometry (p. 121); Discernment (p. 113); Heart (p. 124); Thinking (p. 195); Three orders (p. 35); Will and directed attention (p. 284); Broad cultivation (p. 210).

Contents

Reason

Reason · Pensées

raison — reason; a reason [printed form]; *raisonnement* — reasoning [printed form]; *principes de la raison* — reason's principles [phrase]; *démarche de la raison* — reason's step [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. A capacity for inference and judgment, and also a particular ground or explanation.

In the book. Its proper exercise includes discerning where to affirm, doubt, or submit, rather than abolishing judgment.

In this edition. Reason and reasoning remain distinct; the heart's 'reasons' are not silently turned into demonstrations.

A place to read. B267 (Brunschvicg 267), B268 (Brunschvicg 268), and B273 (Brunschvicg 273), then the fuller argument at B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

Meaning

Raison names both the faculty and a ground for believing, choosing, or explaining. Raisonnement names reasoning or an argument's discursive movement. The distinction lets Pascal expose reason's failures through reasons and defend its use while refusing its claim to unlimited jurisdiction. A particular explanation may be sound without making the faculty universally self-sufficient. Conversely, the recognition of limits cannot excuse violating the principles that make an argument intelligible. The short

fragments often sharpen one side of this balance, so adjacent and later qualifications matter more than an isolated maxim.

Use in the book

The opening inquiry does not make geometry the only form of reason. B1 (Brunschvicg 1) explicitly says that the discerning mind reasons tacitly, naturally, without a technique, even when it cannot enumerate the relevant principles. B2 (Brunschvicg 2) distinguishes strength in following consequences from breadth in holding many beginnings. These are differences within intellectual judgment. B40 (Brunschvicg 40) warns that the apparent clarity of a proof can depend on which proposition is offered as the example and which is assigned the burden of being proved. B276 (Brunschvicg 276) tests another danger: a displeasing first response may generate reasons afterward rather than respond to reasons already working unseen.

B82 (Brunschvicg 82) portrays reason buffeted by imagination: a philosopher's assurance does not abolish bodily fear, and social display affects valuation. B99 (Brunschvicg 99) gives the will a selective role, turning attention toward the side it likes. Such accounts explain why an actual reasoner may fail without showing that every valid inference is invalid. B294 (Brunschvicg 294)'s critique of corrupted reason and variable law even retains the assertion that natural laws exist. B345 (Brunschvicg 345) gives reason a commanding authority different from a master's coercion: disobedience makes the person a fool rather than merely exposing him to punishment.

The balancing maxims are explicit. B253 (Brunschvicg 253) names two excesses, excluding reason and admitting reason alone. B267 (Brunschvicg 267) makes reason's final step recognition that infinitely many things exceed it, first in nature and then in the supernatural. Not reaching that recognition is weakness. B268 (Brunschvicg 268) specifies the practical discrimination: doubt, affirm, or submit where each belongs. Universal assertion mistakes what demonstration can do; universal doubt fails to recognize submission; universal submission fails to judge. B270 (Brunschvicg 270) attributes to Augustine the thought that reason submits only after judging submission appropriate. The surrender claimed is not the absence of all judgment.

B273 (Brunschvicg 273) states the theological boundary in both directions. If everything is made subject to reason, mystery and the supernatural disappear; if reason's principles are violated, religion becomes absurd. B265 (Brunschvicg 265) similarly says faith speaks beyond what the senses say, not against what they see. These formulations do not themselves decide every disputed case, but they prevent a crude summary in which Pascal praises irrational contradiction. B282 (Brunschvicg 282) offers a specific division of work: the heart knows first principles and reason derives

propositions. Each can be certain; neither may demand that all knowledge take its own form.

B233 (Brunschvicg 233) requires a final distinction. The interlocutor is initially asked to reason under a stipulated inability to settle God's existence by natural light. Reason then enters the practical assessment of an unavoidable stake. This does not retrospectively turn that assessment into a deductive proof of God's existence, and the dialogue finally acknowledges that inability to believe may persist despite argumentative assent. B245 (Brunschvicg 245) and B248 (Brunschvicg 248) explain the limit in religious terms: proofs and custom have their work, but faith's saving effect is God's gift. B434 (Brunschvicg 434)'s report of skeptical and dogmatic strengths is another staged conflict, not an instruction to attribute every skeptical premise directly to Pascal's settled voice.

Places to Read

B1 (Brunschvicg 1) — Tacit reasoning belongs even to discernment's immediate judgment.

B40 (Brunschvicg 40) — The assigned role of example or proposition to be proved affects apparent clarity.

B99 (Brunschvicg 99) — The will's selective attention conditions what the mind judges.

B233 (Brunschvicg 233) — The wager separates a disputed existence claim from practical reasoning under uncertainty.

B253 (Brunschvicg 253) — Excluding reason and admitting only reason are both excesses.

B265 (Brunschvicg 265) — Faith is placed above the senses, not against what they see.

B267 (Brunschvicg 267) — Reason recognizes the reality of what exceeds it.

B268 (Brunschvicg 268) — Affirmation, doubt, and submission each require discrimination.

B270 (Brunschvicg 270) — Reason judges when its submission is appropriate.

B273 (Brunschvicg 273) — Mystery must not be confused with violating reason's principles.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) — Reason depends on sensed principles while retaining its indispensable inferential work.

B345 (Brunschvicg 345) — Reason’s authority differs from a master’s capacity to punish.

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) — Rival philosophical claims are presented before the appeal to divine instruction.

In this edition

The French raisons in B277 (Brunschvicg 277) remains “reasons,” preserving the heart's grounds without pretending that every such ground is a formulated syllogism. B267 (Brunschvicg 267)'s démarche is a “step,” not reason's destruction or cessation. The edition's B268 (Brunschvicg 268) annotation verifies faillent and explains the three failures, so its positive demand for judgment must not be replaced by blanket submission. In B233 (Brunschvicg 233) “Reason can determine nothing here” belongs to the natural-light stage of a dialogue; here cannot legitimately be expanded into a denial of reason's use throughout the volume.

See also

First principles (p. 118); Heart (p. 124); Faith (p. 79); Geometry (p. 121); Contradiction (p. 107); Wager (p. 100); Affirm, doubt, submit (p. 205).
Contents

Church

Church · Pensées

Église — Church [printed form]; *assemblée visible* — visible assembly [phrase]; *unité* — unity [printed form]; *multitude* — multitude [printed form]; *enseigne* — teaches [printed form]; *pape* — pope [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. The visible Christian body that preserves and teaches truth, not simply a building or the pope considered alone.

In the book. Pascal holds continuity, plurality, authority, and criticism together within a contested Catholic allegiance.

In this edition. Ecclesiastical terms belong to seventeenth-century controversy; they are not statements of present church law.

A place to read. B857 (Brunschvicg 857) for visibility; B871 (Brunschvicg 871) for unity and multitude; B881 (Brunschvicg 881) for the limits of teaching.

Meaning

Église can identify the whole Christian community, its governing and teaching body, or an assembly. Pascal's Catholic argument treats its continuity as a sign of divine truth, but neither every member nor every official act is thereby equated with that truth. A body can contain internal opponents; an office can be invoked after its holder has been misled. These distinctions are essential to understanding how Pascal can defend the Church while attacking decisions, moral teaching, and claims of authority made within it. The criticism is not simply an abandonment of institutional religion.

Use in the book

B857 (Brunschvicg 857) locates truth in a visible assembly without demanding a uniformity of opinion that would eliminate all obscurity. The true has always been present, Pascal argues, whereas no false opinion has always been present. This is a claim of continuity, not a claim that every current opinion is correct. B858 (Brunschvicg 858) correspondingly calls church history the history of truth. B859 (Brunschvicg 859) gives the confidence a concrete image: a ship battered by a storm is bearable when one is assured it will not sink. The storm is real, and the assurance is theological, not a denial of the suffering caused by persecution.

B871 (Brunschvicg 871) considers the same body under two aspects. As unity, its head the pope is "as the whole"; as multitude, he is only a part. The Fathers can speak differently because they consider different relations. A multitude without unity becomes confusion; a unity that does not depend on the multitude becomes tyranny. B874 (Brunschvicg 874) warns against extracting a few patristic words while ignoring actions and canons, and criticizes both exclusive papal concentration and rejection of unity. The categories are relational rather than an invitation to select whichever authority currently supports one's party.
B870 (Brunschvicg 870) uses a sovereign court to describe delegated forgiveness. A royal pardon must be registered, but the court does not create an independent power to pardon against the king. Likewise the Church is associated with divine forgiveness without being able to bind or absolve apart from God. The analogy distinguishes source and instrument while preserving the instrument's real role. It should not be modernized into a comparison with an elected legislature: the parlement is a historical high court.

The limits of ecclesial operation are explicit in B881 (Brunschvicg 881). The Church teaches and God inspires, both described as infallible, but teaching prepares for grace or condemnation and does not itself inspire. B905 (Brunschvicg 905) develops another limit: God knows inward penitence; the Church judges its outward signs in works. Because the Church cannot read hearts, a skilfully concealed hypocrite can be received by human judgment without being received by God. Pascal objects when the distinction is manipulated to deprive the Church of every criterion, inward and outward alike.

The polemics over Port-Royal rely on a separation between shared communion and disputed claims. B891 (Brunschvicg 891) says internal divisions do not separate the parties from a common altar. B832 (Brunschvicg 832) distinguishes tradition from a pope allegedly prepossessed by misleading information. B867 (Brunschvicg 867) makes conformity to the ancient Church a corrective measure rather than identifying the latest practice with immutable truth. B885 (Brunschvicg 885) consequently objects to treating current discipline as so perfect that wishing to reform it becomes a crime. These arguments locate dissent inside a claim of fidelity, not outside the Church by definition.

The same distinctions limit a reader's use of Pascal's accusations. B840 (Brunschvicg 840) classes Jews, heretics, and bad Christians as three kinds of enemies; its trajectory turns inward toward the Jesuits. B889 (Brunschvicg 889) differentiates corrupt casuists from the pastors he regards as true custodians. These are his contested classifications, not a neutral chart of religious communities. B865 (Brunschvicg 865) even reproaches Jansenists more than Jesuits for failing to profess both opposed truths. The fragments

should not be arranged into an unqualified endorsement of every position associated with Pascal's own side.

Places to Read

B832 (Brunschvicg 832) — Tradition is distinguished from a judgment allegedly obtained by misleading the pope.

B857 (Brunschvicg 857) — Visible continuity coexists with diversity of opinion.

B859 (Brunschvicg 859) — The Church is figured as a storm-tossed ship that will not perish.

B865 (Brunschvicg 865) — Pascal's criticism can fall more heavily on Jansenists than on Jesuits.

B867 (Brunschvicg 867) — The ancient Church supplies a corrective principle.

B870 (Brunschvicg 870) — Delegated forgiveness is compared with registering a royal pardon.

B871 (Brunschvicg 871) — Headship and multitude are held together against confusion and tyranny.

B881 (Brunschvicg 881) — Teaching prepares; divine inspiration is not the same operation.

B891 (Brunschvicg 891) — Dispute does not necessarily mean separation from the common altar.

B905 (Brunschvicg 905) — Inward judgment and visible penitential evidence are assigned different roles.

In this edition

"Church" is capitalized for the institution; "assembly" keeps its visible gathering intelligible. The edition identifies the historical sense of parlement and the polemical meaning of "papists" and "Huguenots." B958 (Brunschvicg 958) requires an additional attribution boundary: the Latin-column excerpts belong to another hand, while the adjoining comments in the French column are Pascal's, including their occasional Latin formulas. Neither the table nor the ecclesiastical dossier should be given one undifferentiated voice.

See also

Truth (p. 162); Peace (p. 154); Tyranny (p. 65); Charity (p. 73); Miracle (p. 20); Repentance (p. 159).
Contents

Humility · Pensées

humilité — humility [printed form]; *humblement* — humbly [printed form]; *humiliations* — humiliations [printed form]; *humble* — humble [printed form]; *humbles* — humble people [printed form]; *mortification* — mortification [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Truthful acknowledgment of dependence, not a performance of worthlessness or a new possession to display.

In the book. Humility counters pride, receives wisdom as gift, and can itself be counterfeited in speech or collective prestige.

In this edition. Humility and outward humiliations are connected but not interchangeable.

A place to read. B377 (Brunschvicg 377) for the manner of speaking; B698 (Brunschvicg 698) for preparation; B901 (Brunschvicg 901) for humility itself as gift.

Meaning

Humilité concerns the orientation in which a person receives truth, greatness, and grace. Humiliation concerns being brought low, often by circumstances or other people. An outward lowering can prepare inward humility without producing it automatically. Pascal's language accordingly asks not only what a person says about the self but how and why it is said. One can describe lowliness in a way that elevates oneself above those supposedly less lucid, less austere, or less orthodox. The remedy must therefore reach the desire that appropriates even its own diagnosis.

Use in the book

B377 (Brunschvicg 377) makes the problem visible through adverbs. Few speak humbly about humility, chastely about chastity, or doubtfully about skepticism. The subject of a speech does not determine the disposition displayed in speaking. The same discourse feeds pride in a vainglorious hearer and humility in a humble one. This is more exact than saying that all discussions of virtue are hypocritical: reception and manner vary. The fragment's harsh closing judgment about self-disguise exposes the distance between the declared subject and the acting self.

B493 (Brunschvicg 493) places humility beside mortification as remedies for pride and concupiscence. The paired arrangement should not be mistaken for a permission to erase bodily life or human worth. It answers a diagnosis of distorted relations to God and created satisfactions. B430 (Brunschvicg 430) insists on two human states, so lowering the self by

penitence is not a claim that humanity's created nature is worthless. Conversely, the divine elevation comes by grace rather than by a natural identity with God. Humility must preserve both sides rather than turn either greatness or misery into a complete account.

Apparent humility can itself become presumption. In B430 (Brunschvicg 430) the objection that God could not unite himself with so low a creature is criticized for pretending to measure the limits of divine mercy. If the objector really knows so little, how can the objector know that God cannot make himself lovable and knowable? The correction does not demand an inflated self-estimate. It asks that acknowledged limitation apply also to one's confident claim about what God cannot give.

B460 (Brunschvicg 460) locates a special danger in wisdom. Someone may possess learning and still be wrong to glory in it, but if one grants that a person made himself wise, the claim to glory appears justified. Pascal therefore insists that God alone gives wisdom. B901 (Brunschvicg 901) turns the same issue into a short question: from "he gives grace to the humble," does it follow that he did not also give humility? Temporal or verbal order is not proof of independent origination. The receiving disposition cannot automatically be converted into a self-produced title to the gift.

B698 (Brunschvicg 698) says outward penances prepare for inward penitence as humiliations prepare for humility. "Prepare" must retain its modest force. B793 (Brunschvicg 793) then gives Christ's humility as a positive greatness of the order of holiness, not a failure in the political or intellectual order. B792 (Brunschvicg 792)'s brilliance and disgrace show why external abasement cannot settle worth. The image of worldly defeat becomes readable only through the relevant order; social humiliation is not simply identical with holiness.

Finally, B931 (Brunschvicg 931) observes that one person's humility can make many people proud. A community can appropriate an individual's virtue as a source of collective self-exaltation. B957 (Brunschvicg 957)'s staged corporate defense claims to know how to rise without vanity; the voice belongs to Pascal's satirical representation of his opponents, not his own self-certification. These late uses extend the early problem of manner: the adjective "humble," an admired exemplar, or a corporate profession does not prove the disposition.

Places to Read

B377 (Brunschvicg 377) — The manner of speaking can contradict the virtue named.

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) — Two states preserve created greatness while exposing apparent humility as possible presumption.

B460 (Brunschvicg 460) — Wisdom received from God defeats the claim to have made oneself wise.

B493 (Brunschvicg 493) — Humility and mortification are named as remedies.

B698 (Brunschvicg 698) — Outward humiliation prepares for, but is not identical with, humility.

B792 (Brunschvicg 792) — Christ's disgrace does not measure the greatness manifested through his life.

B793 (Brunschvicg 793) — Humility belongs positively to Christ's order of holiness.

B901 (Brunschvicg 901) — The gift of grace does not imply that humility is independently produced.

B931 (Brunschvicg 931) — An individual's humility can become material for collective pride.

B957 (Brunschvicg 957) — A satirical institutional voice claims to rise without vanity.

In this edition

The edition keeps humblement as an adverb so that B377 (Brunschvicg 377)'s criticism concerns the act of speaking, not merely a dictionary definition. It distinguishes humiliations from humilité in B698 (Brunschvicg 698). The theological language of making oneself nothing or hating self-love concerns the surrender of the self's claim to be its own center; it is not a recommendation of self-harm or a guarantee that imposed degradation improves someone.

See also

Pride (p. 157); Grace (p. 85); Self-love (p. 192); Prayer (p. 91); Three orders (p. 35); Repentance (p. 159).

Contents

Islam

Islam · Pensées

Mahomet — Muhammad [printed form]; *Alcoran* — Qur'an [printed form]; *religion mahométane* — Muslim religion [phrase]; *Turcs* — Turks, Pascal's historical label here for Muslims [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. A modern lookup title for Pascal's historically named and selectively represented religious opponent.

In the book. His comparisons concern prophecy, authority, testimony, worldly success, reading, and the good promised.

In this edition. The article reports Christian apologetic allegations; it is not an account of Islam in its own terms.

A place to read. B595 (Brunschvicg 595) and B596 (Brunschvicg 596) for authority; B599 (Brunschvicg 599) for opposed paths of success; B601 (Brunschvicg 601) with its translation note.

Meaning

Pascal's usual named term is Mahomet, rendered Muhammad, with Alcoran for the Qur'an and religion mahométane for the Muslim religion. "Islam" provides a recognizable entry title without pretending that he uses that modern English guideword. The passages are terse materials for a Christian apology, often organized as contrasts rather than inquiries into Muslim interpretation. Their argumentative role can be explained precisely while the truth of their historical premises remains a separate issue. A primary source's confident assertion does not certify its account of another religion.

Use in the book

B595 (Brunschvicg 595) alleges a lack of authority and asks what reasons could make up for it. Its answer reduces the claimant's message to a demand to be believed. B596 (Brunschvicg 596) contrasts that alleged self-attestation with the psalms sung throughout the earth and with Christ's refusal to rely on his own testimony. The desired marks are independent, durable, widely accessible witnesses. Pascal's representation of Muhammad as alone is a polemical compression, not an adequate history of the people, documents, or traditions through which Islam was transmitted.

B597 (Brunschvicg 597) moves from personal testimony to textual attribution. It argues that the Gospel's attribution to Matthew is no weaker than the Qur'an's attribution to Muhammad because the Gospel is cited over successive centuries, including by opponents. It then claims the Qur'an calls Matthew a good man and builds a dilemma from that claim. The edition explicitly corrects the factual premise: Matthew is not named in the Qur'an. Its note relates Pascal's construction to a more general claim reported through Grotius about honoring apostles. This is a concrete error to identify, not a difficulty to hide behind a vague warning about historical context.

B598 (Brunschvicg 598) asks that the comparison be judged through the clear passages before invoking hidden mysteries. Pascal grants, for argument's sake, that Christian scriptural obscurities might look as bizarre as those he attributes to Muhammad; he then claims a superiority of admirable clear passages and fulfilled prophecy. The logical distinction is between resemblance in one feature and equality in every relevant feature. His

ridicule of the promised paradise expresses Pascal's Christian judgment of the good, rather than a neutral description of Muslim belief.

B599 (Brunschvicg 599) opposes success by apparently favorable human means to success despite apparently ruinous means. Killing is contrasted with the deaths of Christ's followers; absence of prediction with prediction; prohibition of reading with apostolic instruction to read. The conclusion is counterfactual: on the human explanation Pascal assigns to Muhammad's success, Christianity should have perished. This is his proposed explanation of contrasting trajectories, not a balanced historical comparison of conquest, martyrdom, and transmission.

The reading claim needs particular care. B599 (Brunschvicg 599) does not specify what reading is forbidden. B601 (Brunschvicg 601) has an ambiguous pronoun that the English takes to mean Muhammad's own book. The edition's note identifies another possible antecedent, the biblical book just mentioned, and explains that the earlier Christian polemic concerned the Old and New Testaments. It also states that a ban on the Qur'an itself for its followers would be erroneous. The printed English choice therefore remains alongside an unresolved French antecedent; neither establishes a reliable generalization about Muslim reading practices.

B601 (Brunschvicg 601)'s larger checklist asks about foretelling, miracles, mysteries, morality, and happiness. It also distinguishes Jewish holy books from popular treatment and immediately applies the distinction to Christian casuists. The argument is thus capable of internal comparison even while its account of Islam remains sharply selective. B844 (Brunschvicg 844) later uses "Turks" in a contrast between inherited belief and direct witnessing under threat of martyrdom. The issue there is the evidential value of sincerity, not an invitation to treat all Muslims as one psychology or to assume that willingness to die establishes the truth of a belief.

Places to Read

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) — Islam appears in a polemical comparison of proposed goods and remedies.

B595 (Brunschvicg 595) — The alleged absence of authority generates a demand for reasons.

B596 (Brunschvicg 596) — Independent, enduring testimony is set against alleged self-attestation.

B597 (Brunschvicg 597) — The textual argument contains the mistaken claim that Matthew is named in the Qur'an.

B598 (Brunschvicg 598) — Clear passages are made the measure of how obscurities should be judged.

B599 (Brunschvicg 599) — Human success and apparent human defeat are contrasted.

B600 (Brunschvicg 600) — Miracle and prediction are used as distinguishing marks.

B601 (Brunschvicg 601) — The checklist of foundations includes the ambiguous reading claim.

B844 (Brunschvicg 844) — "Turks" occurs in the discussion of inherited belief, eyewitness claims, and martyrdom.

In this edition

Muhammad and Qur'an supply recognizable English names while the French forms remain retrievable. B597 (Brunschvicg 597)'s factual difficulty and B601 (Brunschvicg 601)'s pronoun ambiguity are expressly disclosed in the supplied edition. No new manuscript collation or independent history of Islam is claimed here. Where Pascal's categories are hostile or universal, explanatory prose attributes them to his Christian argument rather than presenting them as definitions of a people or religion.

See also

Witness (p. 38); Religion (p. 29); Paganism (p. 151); Prophecy (p. 23); Truth (p. 162).
Contents

Jews

Jews · Pensées

Juifs — Jews [printed form]; *Juifs charnels* — carnal Jews, Pascal's interpretive category [phrase]; *spirituels* — spiritual readers or adherents [printed form]; *témoins suspects* — suspect witnesses [phrase]; *vrais Juifs* — true Jews in Pascal's theological classification [phrase]; *loi ancienne* — old law [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. A people, texts, prophets, and interpretive communities placed within Pascal's Christian account of fulfillment.

In the book. The same corpus combines esteem for scriptural custody, qualified distinctions, and hostile collective polemic.

In this edition. His categories do not supply neutral definitions of Jewish identity or Judaism.

A place to read. B607 (Brunschvicg 607) and B609 (Brunschvicg 609) for internal distinctions; B675 (Brunschvicg 675) for law and interpretation; B750 (Brunschvicg 750) for the witness argument.

Meaning

Juifs does not have one uniform reference throughout the fragments. It can name biblical Israel, prophets, a community preserving books, contemporaries of Christ in Gospel narratives, or later custodians who reject the Christian interpretation. Charnels and spirituels are Pascal's theological classifications, not ethnographic subdivisions. Distinguishing these uses is necessary both for accuracy and for reading the polemic critically. His claims remain historically situated Christian interpretations, not neutral descriptions of Jewish people, ancient or living.

Use in the book

B607 (Brunschvicg 607) begins by warning that someone who judges Jewish religion by the crude will know it badly. The Holy Books and prophetic tradition supply its proper evidence. The parallel is immediate: Christianity is divine in Gospel, apostles, and tradition, but ridiculous in those who handle it badly. Pascal then opposes a merely temporal Messiah to the carnal Christian expectation that sacraments will dispense the believer from loving God. He says neither is the true religion. The criticism therefore crosses communal boundaries even though he defines the truth in Christian terms.

B609 (Brunschvicg 609) makes that scheme explicit by naming two kinds within each religion. Spiritual Jews become, in his phrase, Christians of the old law, while crude Christians become Jews of the new law. These equations belong to his theology of continuity and fulfillment; Jewish readers need not accept them. Their point is not that a historical identity changes whenever someone behaves well or badly, but that attachment to worldly goods and love of God can divide adherents within an inherited community. The terminology remains asymmetrical and polemical.

The figurative dossier gives the classification a textual function. B675 (Brunschvicg 675) distinguishes the doctrine of the Jewish law, which it calls true because it commands love and worship of one God, from the false doctrine Pascal attributes to its interpreters. B670 (Brunschvicg 670) gathers manna, land, kings, temple, sacrifice, and circumcision under a spiritual end of charity. These are Christian readings of Jewish Scripture, not demonstrations that Jewish traditions themselves lack spiritual interpretation. B676 (Brunschvicg 676) explicitly places the same veil over bad Christians and anyone who does not renounce self-centeredness.

The witness argument assigns continued non-Christian custody an evidential role. B710 (Brunschvicg 710) treats a whole people as a durable witness, while B750 (Brunschvicg 750) says universal conversion would leave only suspect witnesses and extermination would leave none. Pascal means that texts preserved by people not wishing to serve his claim are less open to suspicion of collusion. Preservation of Scripture nevertheless differs

from assent to Christian fulfillment. A later Christian interpretation cannot simply be counted as something the preserving community itself testifies to.

Some local qualifications coexist with much harsher generalizations. B760 (Brunschvicg 760) starts, "but not all," distinguishing those who receive Christ from those who reject him. It then claims that all rabbinic writings offer only one reason for rejection, a sweeping assertion the edition refuses to validate. B761 (Brunschvicg 761) assigns responsibility for Christ's death collectively to Jews. That rhetoric must be identified as historical Christian polemic, not carried forward as an assignment of collective guilt. Recognizing these problems does not require pretending that Pascal's prose is gentler than it is.

The later Catholic disputes reuse the analogy. B829 (Brunschvicg 829) compares disagreement among Christ's hearers with disagreement among Christians of Pascal's own time. B905 (Brunschvicg 905) says some people retained within the Church are so dissolute that Jewish synagogues and philosophical schools would have expelled them. B953 (Brunschvicg 953) compares the Society's own documents with books borne by independent Jewish custodians. These transfers make the community an argumentative example in several directions. They also warn against treating every occurrence as a freestanding statement about Judaism rather than asking what controversy Pascal is addressing.

Places to Read

B607 (Brunschvicg 607) — Jewish and Christian religion are both distinguished from their crude interpreters.

B609 (Brunschvicg 609) — Carnal and spiritual adherents are arranged within Pascal's Christian scheme.

B670 (Brunschvicg 670) — Concrete biblical goods are interpreted as figures ordered to charity.

B675 (Brunschvicg 675) — The doctrine of the law is distinguished from that attributed to its interpreters.

B676 (Brunschvicg 676) — The veil is expressly extended to bad Christians.

B710 (Brunschvicg 710) — A whole people is treated as the bearer of enduring testimony.

B750 (Brunschvicg 750) — The non-colluding-witness argument depends on preservation and disagreement.

B760 (Brunschvicg 760) — "Not all" qualifies rejection, while a later sweeping claim remains polemical.

B761 (Brunschvicg 761) — The collective charge concerning Christ's death requires explicit historical attribution.

B905 (Brunschvicg 905) — Jewish synagogues become a critical comparison against lax Christian discipline.

In this edition

"Jews" is retained rather than replaced by a euphemism that would hide the source's polemic. The edition distinguishes supersessionist interpretation, claims about witnesses, and collective accusations from independent historical findings. Its notes also identify mediated rabbinic material, such as excerpts reached through the Pugio fidei, rather than presenting Pascal's dossier as a newly verified direct reading of rabbinic sources.

See also

Scripture (p. 94); Figurative meaning (p. 82); Witness (p. 38); Prophecy (p. 23); Religion (p. 29); Charity (p. 73).
Contents

Joy

Joy · Pensées

joie — joy [printed form]; *pleurs de joie* — tears of joy [phrase]; *joie future* — future joy [phrase]; *reconnaissante* — grateful [printed form]; *confiance* — confidence [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. A positive response whose object and companions matter more than intensity alone.

In the book. Joy can coexist with fear, penitence, dependence, tears, and present suffering.

In this edition. It is not a constant psychological test of faith or a synonym for every pleasure.

A place to read. B530 (Brunschvicg 530) for incomplete responses; B737 (Brunschvicg 737) for joy amid affliction; MEM (Mémorial paper D) for repetition and tears.

Meaning

Joie names joy, but Pascal does not isolate it as an emotion that validates its own cause. The question is what the person rejoices in, what the response leaves out, and how it relates to love and knowledge. Joy can accompany consolation, confidence, gratitude, and hope; it can also be incomplete if it excludes due fear or awareness of dependence. Distinguishing it from bonheur, félicité, plaisir, and repos prevents every favorable feeling from

being reduced to one undifferentiated happiness. In the religious passages, joy is especially a relation to a good loved and received.

Use in the book

B530 (Brunschvicg 530) gives two reported responses after confession. One person leaves joyful and confident; another remains afraid. Pascal does not choose one as simply correct. Each lacks the other's feeling, and the two combined would make one good person. The little narrative is important because it resists a mechanical test: joy by itself does not prove presumption, and fear by itself does not prove fidelity. The appropriate response holds together mercy and the seriousness of sin rather than making one sentiment cancel the other.

B544 (Brunschvicg 544) gives joy an object. God makes the soul feel that he is its only good and that its joy lies in loving him. In the same movement, self-love and concupiscence become intolerable obstacles. The joy is therefore not a cheerful refusal to look at disorder. Love reveals what blocks love; awareness of that blockage belongs to the same transformation. B556 (Brunschvicg 556) similarly joins humility, joy, confidence, and love in the description of the God of Christians, explicitly named as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

B666 (Brunschvicg 666) distinguishes the joyful figures of the Old Testament from the penitential means offered in the New. Yet it immediately qualifies the contrast through the paschal lamb eaten with bitter herbs. The concrete meal prevents a simplistic separation into an old world of pleasure and a new world of pain. The promised end can be joy while the means of reaching it require repentance. Conversely, a figure of joy can already contain bitterness. The short biblical cues remain a working sequence, not a fully developed history of religious emotion.

B737 (Brunschvicg 737) turns an apologetic chain into personal confession. The speaker reaches toward his Deliverer, awaits death in peace, and meanwhile lives with joy both in the goods received and in evils understood as sent for his good. This is a statement of trust within Pascal's Christian interpretation, not the claim that affliction ceases to hurt. B859 (Brunschvicg 859)'s storm-tossed ship offers a related image of pleasure conditioned by assurance that the vessel will not perish. The assurance changes the relation to danger; it does not erase the storm.

MEM (Mémorial paper D) gives joy its most concentrated verbal form. Certainty, feeling, joy, and peace follow the isolated word "Fire"; later joy is repeated three times and joined to tears. The record also confesses separation, fleeing, renunciation, and crucifixion of Christ, and asks never again to be separated. Its joy therefore does not exclude penitence or fear of loss. The repeated name of Jesus Christ and the scriptural words locate the

experience in a particular devotional relation, rather than a general state of exaltation.

The English line about keeping communion interprets the final turn toward the ways taught in the Gospel. Renunciation is called complete and gentle, so joy is not opposed to relinquishment. B856 (Brunschvicg 856) asks that the family made happy by the miracle also be made grateful: received happiness calls for acknowledgment rather than self-possession. Together these passages show why neither suffering nor delight can be used as an effortless badge of holiness. The response must be read with its object, its source, and what it asks the person to do.

Places to Read

B530 (Brunschvicg 530) — Joy and fear after confession are each incomplete without the other.

B544 (Brunschvicg 544) — Joy in loving God reveals the obstacles of self-love and concupiscence.

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) — Humility, joy, confidence, and love belong to one account of divine communion.

B666 (Brunschvicg 666) — Future joy and penitential means are qualified by the bitter herbs of the paschal meal.

B737 (Brunschvicg 737) — The speaker professes joy amid goods and afflictions while awaiting death in peace.

B856 (Brunschvicg 856) — A happy family is asked to become a grateful one.

B859 (Brunschvicg 859) — Pleasure aboard the storm-tossed ship depends on assurance, not absence of danger.

MEM (Mémorial paper D) — Joy, tears, confession, and the fear of separation remain in one devotional record.

In this edition

The Mémorial follows surviving paper D. Its opening sequence includes paix; the lost parchment's version transmitted through copy E has a different sequence and a longer close. The two witnesses therefore yield distinct records, not a single continuous wording. "Fire" is left as the isolated word written, not converted into an assertion that Pascal saw a visible apparition. "Feeling" in the opening can include felt apprehension or conviction, not merely passing emotion.

See also

Charity (p. 73); Repentance (p. 159); Peace (p. 154); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Self-love (p. 192); Grace (p. 85).

Contents

Paganism

Paganism · Pensées

païens — pagans [printed form]; *religion naturelle* — natural religion [phrase]; *idolâtres* — idolaters [printed form]; *gentium* — of the Gentiles [printed form]; *Gentils* — Gentiles [printed form]; *épicuriens* — Epicureans [printed form]; *adorateurs* — worshipers [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. A historical Christian category for several different non-Christian beliefs and practices, not one religion.

In the book. Pascal contrasts natural worship, idolatry, philosophical persuasion, and the conversion he attributes to Christ.

In this edition. Pagans and Gentiles preserve historical categories; they are not neutral descriptions of a uniform people.

A place to read. B609 (Brunschvicg 609) for differences within the category; B724 (Brunschvicg 724) for conversion; QM-XII-R (Question XII, Reply — Martin de Barcos) for Barcos on oracles.

Meaning

Païens gathers a range of persons under a Christian classificatory term. Gentils often names the nations in contrast with the Jewish people, especially in scriptural citations and accounts of conversion. Idolâtres concerns worship directed toward idols. These words overlap in Pascal's argument without being interchangeable definitions. Philosophical monotheists, worshipers of animals, readers of oracles, imperial powers, and converts can enter under the larger category for different purposes. The title "Paganism" is a useful retrieval heading, not the voice of a single tradition describing itself.

Use in the book

B609 (Brunschvicg 609) explicitly distinguishes worshipers of animals from worshipers of one God in natural religion. The division refutes a reading that makes every use of pagan imply denial of one God. B556 (Brunschvicg 556) assigns an account of the maker of geometrical truths and the order of elements to pagans and Epicureans, contrasting that limited account with the Redeemer. This is Pascal's schematic comparison. It should not become an independently verified description of every ancient philosophical school, still less an identification of all non-Christian thought with one system.

B601 (Brunschvicg 601) frames a problem of transmission. The claim that pagan religion once had support from speaking oracles is met by questions about the books, their authors' credibility, and their preservation from corruption. The interest here is evidential rather than merely dismissive: how does a later reader know what was said? The Questions appendix returns to the issue when Pascal asks whether oracles were miraculous (QM-XII-Q (Question XII, Question — Blaise Pascal)). Barcos replies by classifying the alleged miracles of pagans and idols with operations of demons and magicians (QM-XII-R (Question XII, Reply — Martin de Barcos)). The answer is Barcos's theological judgment, distinct from Pascal's question and from any independent verification of supernatural agents.

The prophetic dossier makes the nations' conversion a central claimed fulfillment. B724 (Brunschvicg 724) compares a small number of cultivated hearers whom Plato could not persuade with multitudes moved by a secret power through a few words. Renounced possessions, abandoned luxurious homes, desert austerity, and kings submitting to the cross are the concrete signs Pascal selects. His "hundred million" and assertion that no pagan had worshiped the Jewish God during a long earlier period are rhetorical historical claims preserved by the edition, not verified population counts or generalizations.

B769 (Brunschvicg 769) similarly claims the conversion was reserved for the Messiah's grace, not achieved by Solomon, prophets, Plato, or Socrates. B783 (Brunschvicg 783) dramatizes opposition by the learned, wise, and kings: some write, some condemn, some kill, yet powerless people prevail. The contrast supports his argument that the growth cannot be explained by ordinary strength alone. Its universals should not be silently upgraded into a complete historical narrative. They are selected and emphatic components of an apology.

Jewish and Gentile history are related, not simply separated. B774 (Brunschvicg 774) contrasts Moses for one people with Christ for all and says the cross was offered for all. B730 (Brunschvicg 730) places Jerusalem and Rome as former centers of different worship becoming centers of the Church. This is a Christian supersessionist account in which earlier worship

is fulfilled and displaced. B741 (Brunschvicg 741) even calls Job pagan while reading his book as directed toward Christ. The designation therefore does not always exclude an individual from Pascal's retrospective account of true expectation.

The later moral disputes turn the comparison against Christians. B905 (Brunschvicg 905) says Jewish synagogues and philosophical sects would expel people tolerated by lax Christian discipline. B886 (Brunschvicg 886) recalls a prophet and pagans making similar criticisms of Israel, denying that resemblance of speech alone refutes the prophet. B930 (Brunschvicg 930) distinguishes resemblance to pagans in faults from resemblance to martyrs in suffering. Outward persecution, social membership, or an apparently good moral building cannot settle the inward foundation. B921 (Brunschvicg 921)'s image of a beautiful building on a bad foundation expresses that last contrast with particular force.

Places to Read

B556 (Brunschvicg 556) — Natural order and a creator are distinguished from the Redeemer.

B601 (Brunschvicg 601) — Oracular testimony raises questions of authorship and preservation.

B609 (Brunschvicg 609) — Natural monotheism and animal worship are distinguished within the category.

B724 (Brunschvicg 724) — Renunciation and conversion are offered as effects beyond philosophical persuasion.

B741 (Brunschvicg 741) — Job is called pagan and still interpreted as directed toward Christ.

B774 (Brunschvicg 774) — The scope of Christ's work is contrasted with Moses' particular people.

B783 (Brunschvicg 783) — Apparently powerless Christians are placed against learned and political powers.

B886 (Brunschvicg 886) — Shared criticism with pagans is not by itself a refutation.

B905 (Brunschvicg 905) — Non-Christian communities become a rebuke to lax Christian discipline.

QM-XII-R (Question XII, Reply — Martin de Barcos) — Barcos, answering Pascal, gives a theological classification of pagan wonders.

In this edition

The edition uses "pagans" and "Gentiles" according to the local wording rather than inserting a present-day religion's name. Latin scriptural excerpts are translated in their surviving abbreviated form. The universal claims and the contrast with Plato remain Pascal's argumentative assertions. Barcos's answer about oracles is identified by speaker, and no direct verification of ancient oracular practice is claimed.

See also

Religion (p. 29); Islam (p. 142); Jews (p. 145); Redemption (p. 26); Witness (p. 38); Prophecy (p. 23).
Contents

Peace

Peace · Pensées

paix — peace [printed form]; *repos* — peace or repose [printed form]; *sûreté de conscience* — security of conscience [phrase]; *temps de guerre* — time for war [phrase]; *temps de paix* — time of peace [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. A good judged by what it secures, not simply the absence of disagreement.

In the book. Inward peace, ecclesiastical concord, and political security are related without having identical grounds.

In this edition. The analogy with war does not supply a general permission for physical violence.

A place to read. B908 (Brunschvicg 908) distinguishes peace from assurance; B930 (Brunschvicg 930) joins truth to charity; B949 (Brunschvicg 949) asks when peace serves its end.

Meaning

Paix can name absence of conflict, concord within a community, or the inward peace of a relation to God. Repos can mean rest or repose and is rendered "peace" where conscience's settled condition is in view. Sûreté concerns security or assurance. These terms need not rise and fall together: someone can lack a settled demonstration while sincerely seeking, or enjoy a false quiet bought by ignoring the truth. Pascal's religious and polemical uses ask what good a peace protects, and whether the apparent agreement preserves or sacrifices that good.

Use in the book

B908 (Brunschvicg 908) makes the distinction in two sentences. Truth alone gives assurance; sincere pursuit of truth gives peace. The person's relation to inquiry is therefore not identical with possession of its result. The opening play on whether probability probably assures challenges moral probabilism, not mathematical probability as such. B909 (Brunschvicg 909) refuses to let a whole company of authorities secure conscience in error. Mere relief from anxiety, or an adviser's permission, does not establish that the proposed conduct is right.

B737 (Brunschvicg 737) presents a different peace: the speaker awaits death through grace and hope of eternal union with the Deliverer. It coexists with present joy amid both gifts and affliction. MEM (Mémorial paper D) places peace beside certainty, feeling, and joy, then moves through confession and fear of separation. These passages do not define peace as the absence of moral concern. The relation that comforts also exposes the need for repentance and for continuing in the Gospel's ways.

The contested peace of the Church requires another distinction. B930 (Brunschvicg 930) rejects preserving peace at truth's expense, but immediately rejects preserving truth by wounding charity. Neither value becomes an excuse to abolish the other. Piety is not never opposing one's brothers; zeal is not any vehemence produced by the conviction that one is right. The fragment frames polemical conduct between two obligations, even while Pascal defends his own harsh writing as humane enough. His self-assessment remains a contested position within the controversy, not a conclusion independently established by the passage.

B949 (Brunschvicg 949) develops the argument through an analogy with a state. Civil peace is intended to secure the people's goods. Allowing plunder simply to avoid disturbing repose would defeat that end. Ecclesiastical peace similarly guards truth, described as the Church's good and the treasure where its heart is. When error is established at truth's expense, refusal to dispute can become betrayal. Conversely, disturbing peace where truth reigns is also called a crime. The passage does not make conflict intrinsically virtuous.

There can therefore be a time for peace and a time for war, but not a time for truth and a time for error. The difference of temporal appropriateness is controlled by an unchanging end. Pascal invokes sayings about Christ's peace and division to explain the contrast. The edition notes that his word "war" is an argumentative synthesis, not a verbatim quotation of one Gospel verse. Transferring the passage straight into a modern justification for violent force would ignore its immediate ecclesiastical object and the paired limit of charity in B930 (Brunschvicg 930).

Several shorter notes make false peace concrete. B934 (Brunschvicg 934) asks whether the acceptance of corrupt morals deserves the name peace,

while refusal is called war. B945 (Brunschvicg 945) invokes a false peace that must not undo what conflict has secured and distinguishes admitting possible error from falsely swearing that an error occurred. B891 (Brunschvicg 891), however, insists that internal disagreement does not separate people from the same altar. Peace cannot require false testimony, but disagreement need not be transformed into schism. The problem is to preserve communion without making concealment its price.

Places to Read

B737 (Brunschvicg 737) — Peace before death is grounded in grace and hope of union.

B891 (Brunschvicg 891) — Internal divisions do not necessarily divide the common altar.

B908 (Brunschvicg 908) — Peace from sincere search is distinguished from assurance supplied by truth.

B909 (Brunschvicg 909) — Authorities cannot make conscience secure in error.

B930 (Brunschvicg 930) — Truth and charity jointly limit both peaceful accommodation and polemical zeal.

B934 (Brunschvicg 934) — Calling acceptance of corruption "peace" is questioned.

B945 (Brunschvicg 945) — False peace and an ambiguous demand to sign are challenged.

B949 (Brunschvicg 949) — Peace is evaluated through the good it exists to preserve.

MEM (Mémorial paper D) — Peace stands with joy, confession, and the fear of separation.

In this edition

"Peace," "repose," and "security" are not mechanically assigned to one invariant French term. At B908 (Brunschvicg 908) the English "peace" renders repos; at MEM (Mémorial paper D) it renders paix. The Mémorial's peace belongs to paper D's wording and should not be overwritten with the parchment version's differing opening. B949 (Brunschvicg 949)'s war analogy remains within a seventeenth-century argument about protecting truth in the Church.

See also

Truth (p. 162); Charity (p. 73); Church (p. 137); Joy (p. 148); Repentance (p. 159); Probability (p. 62).
Contents

Pride · Pensées

orgueil — pride [printed form]; *se glorifie* — glories or boasts [phrase]; *superbe* — arrogance or pride [printed form]; *nous élever sans vanité* — raise ourselves without vanity [phrase]; *tombé de sa place* — fallen from one's place [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. A claim to self-sufficient greatness that can appropriate even humiliation and the knowledge of defects.

In the book. Pride hides misery, boasts of understanding it, and turns gifts or collective virtues into titles to superiority.

In this edition. Orgueil, superbe, and vanité overlap but do not erase every local difference of emphasis.

A place to read. B405 (Brunschvicg 405) for pride's double escape; B460 (Brunschvicg 460) for wisdom as gift; B931 (Brunschvicg 931) for collective appropriation.

Meaning

Pride is not merely pleasure in an achievement. In Pascal's diagnosis it concerns the self's claim to be its own center, source of worth, and sufficient good. The claim can survive criticism because it changes the material on which it feeds. Outward success, knowledge, wisdom, austerity, and even accurate recognition of wretchedness can all be converted into self-exaltation. A definition limited to loud boasting would therefore miss the quieter pride that enjoys being more perceptive about human limitation than other people are.

Use in the book

B405 (Brunschvicg 405) states the double movement with unusual economy. Pride counterbalances all miseries either by hiding them or, when it discovers them, by glorying in knowing them. The second possibility explains why self-analysis is not automatically self-correction. Someone can make a true statement about weakness and use the truth for a false relation to the self. B406 (Brunschvicg 406) then calls the result a strange monster: the person fallen from his place searches anxiously for it. The triumph over misery is itself a further sign of displacement, not evidence that the original loss has been repaired.

B377 (Brunschvicg 377) makes speech the testing ground. Discourse on humility feeds pride in the vainglorious and humility in the humble. Its subject does not guarantee its manner. The same applies to skeptical discourse spoken with dogmatic assertion. Pride here is not refuted merely

by learning the right propositions, because the will can enlist those propositions in its pursuit of distinction. The adverbial test—speaking humbly, chastely, doubtfully—directs attention to how an apparent virtue is performed.

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) gives this disorder a theological history. Divine Wisdom says humanity wanted to become its own center and independent of help. The result is abandonment to itself and subjection to creatures, including the sweet domination of pleasures. Yet the same fragment criticizes an apparent humility that declares God unable to communicate with such a low creature. Claiming to know the limits of divine mercy becomes another presumption. Pride can thus inhabit both an inflated and an apparently abased image of humanity.

B460 (Brunschvicg 460) distinguishes characteristic temptations of flesh, mind, and will. Possessions or knowledge can occasion glory, but wisdom offers the especially dangerous claim that the person has made himself wise. Pascal denies that origin: God alone gives wisdom, so glory belongs in God. B793 (Brunschvicg 793)'s distinction of orders reinforces the point. Intellectual achievement does not become charity by increasing in amount, and holiness is not acquired by transferring the prestige of learning or political rank into a new domain.

The religious remedy is correspondingly not a new achievement to possess. B493 (Brunschvicg 493) names humility, and B497 (Brunschvicg 497) gives divine justice the role of lowering pride even in apparently holy works. B547 (Brunschvicg 547) warns that people claiming knowledge of God without recognition of misery glorify themselves rather than God. The issue is the knower's relation to the gift, not simply whether the subject studied is exalted. A theological vocabulary can therefore conceal the same self-sufficiency it is supposed to oppose.

The later polemic extends the diagnosis to institutions. B931 (Brunschvicg 931) says one person's humility makes many proud: a group can appropriate its member's virtue. B927 (Brunschvicg 927) accuses the Society of assigning itself such importance that it excuses in its own cause what it condemns in an individual. B957 (Brunschvicg 957) stages the boast of knowing how to rise without vanity. That first-person plural is a satirical voice attributed to opponents, not Pascal's own assurance of purity. His aggressive self-defense in B921 (Brunschvicg 921) also keeps open the question whether the diagnostic category could apply beyond the enemies it names.

Places to Read

B377 (Brunschvicg 377) — The virtue named in speech may differ from the disposition of the speaker.

B405 (Brunschvicg 405) — Pride conceals misery or boasts of knowing it.

B406 (Brunschvicg 406) — The apparently triumphant person is still anxiously displaced.

B430 (Brunschvicg 430) — Self-centering and apparent humility can both become presumption.

B460 (Brunschvicg 460) — The claim to have made oneself wise is answered by wisdom as divine gift.

B493 (Brunschvicg 493) — Humility is named as a remedy rather than a display.

B497 (Brunschvicg 497) — Justice lowers pride even in apparently holy works.

B547 (Brunschvicg 547) — Knowledge of God can be appropriated for self-glorification.

B931 (Brunschvicg 931) — An individual's humility may feed collective pride.

B957 (Brunschvicg 957) — The institutional claim to rise without vanity belongs to a staged defense.

In this edition

"Pride" renders orgueil and, according to context, superbe; "vanity" remains useful for vanité when display, emptiness, or the pursuit of esteem is prominent. The terms are related without being mechanically interchangeable. The severe language concerns the self's false claim to independence and centrality. Its explanatory force should not be converted into an instruction to despise every accomplishment or to diagnose another person's inward motives without evidence.

See also

Humility (p. 140); Self-love (p. 192); Greatness (p. 177); Wretchedness (p. 198); Three orders (p. 35); Grace (p. 85).

Contents

Repentance

Repentance · Pensées

pénitence — repentance or penance [printed form]; *contrition* — contrition [printed form]; *absolution* — absolution [printed form]; *marques de regret* — signs of regret [phrase]; *bonnes œuvres* — good works [phrase]; *contrit* — contrite [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. A turning from sin that joins inward sorrow, changed conduct, and orientation toward sacramental practice.

In the book. Mercy invites effort; inward penitence and outward signs neither replace nor simply duplicate each other.

In this edition. Pénitence can name repentance, disciplinary penance, or the sacrament; context decides.

A place to read. B497 (Brunschvicg 497) for mercy's active demand; B905 (Brunschvicg 905) for visible signs; B923 (Brunschvicg 923) for contrition seeking the sacrament.

Meaning

Pénitence ranges from the inward turning of repentance to acts of penance and the sacrament of penance. Contrition emphasizes the sincere inward sorrow and turning that makes the sacramental relation genuine. Absolution names forgiveness pronounced or granted; it is not simply a synonym for the penitent's feeling. Pascal's interest lies in their relations: neither an outward rite performed without conversion nor an inward claim deliberately detached from its proper expression is sufficient. The vocabulary therefore has to be read through subjects, agents, and the direction of seeking.

Use in the book

B497 (Brunschvicg 497) begins with people who use confidence in mercy to remain careless and avoid good works. Pascal reverses the excuse. Justice lowers pride; mercy combats sloth by inviting penitence and action. The Ninevites' uncertain hope of mercy provides a concrete model of doing penance rather than waiting passively for reassurance. The reason to exert oneself is not that God might lack mercy but that mercy opens a meaningful possibility of return. The two divine qualities address different disorders and must not be used to neutralize each other.

B661 (Brunschvicg 661) presents penitence as the mystery openly declared to the Jews and by John the Baptist, before the other mysteries. Pascal draws an order for the individual from an order he sees in religious history. B698 (Brunschvicg 698) then distinguishes outward penances from inward penitence, as humiliations are distinguished from humility. The former prepare for the latter. The verb prevents a merely mechanical equation: disciplinary practice can dispose a person without guaranteeing an inward state.

B553 (Brunschvicg 553) gives the relation a devotional voice. Christ's disclosure of sins is joined to his power to heal, so knowledge need not terminate in despair. The addressee is told to do penance for hidden sins and for the concealed malice within known ones. The meditation also says mercy is implored not to leave people peacefully in their vices but to free them. This is repentance's relation to consolation: comfort can make acknowledgment possible without excusing persistence in the wrong.

The institutional argument of B905 (Brunschvicg 905) distinguishes divine and human judgment. God sees penitence in the heart and absolves; the Church sees it in works. It cannot see an inward disposition directly, but that limitation does not abolish its responsibility to examine visible conduct. A skilful hypocrite may deceive human judgment without deceiving God. Pascal opposes the maneuver that excludes inward judgment because only God knows it and excludes outward judgment because God looks inward, leaving the Church with no criterion at all.

B904 (Brunschvicg 904) criticizes turning an exceptional order into a rule without exception. If the ancients sometimes gave absolution before penitence, that does not automatically authorize eliminating the ordinary relation. B923 (Brunschvicg 923) gives the more fundamental account: absolution alone does not remit sins without contrition, yet contrition is not genuine unless it seeks the sacrament. The two clauses prevent both sacramental automatism and a supposedly self-sufficient inward feeling. "Seeks" matters: the fragment compares a contrite person without the sacrament with an unrepentant person possessing its outward administration.

B923 (Brunschvicg 923)'s subsequent comparison with marriage and Lot's daughters is a difficult extension of the same concern with intention and outward form. The edition preserves it as Pascal's comparison, not an endorsement of every circumstance in the biblical narrative. B530 (Brunschvicg 530) supplies a less extreme practical balance: joy and confidence after confession need fear, and fear needs joy and confidence. MEM (Mémorial paper D) similarly joins tears of joy to confession of having fled and renounced Christ. Repentance is neither unbroken self-accusation nor effortless relief; it directs a person toward a changed relation whose consoling and demanding aspects remain together.

Places to Read

B497 (Brunschvicg 497) — Mercy is a reason for effort and penitence, not carelessness.

B530 (Brunschvicg 530) — Joy and fear after confession each need the other.

B553 (Brunschvicg 553) — Disclosure of hidden sins is accompanied by the offer of healing.

B661 (Brunschvicg 661) — Penitence precedes other mysteries in Pascal's proposed order.

B698 (Brunschvicg 698) — Outward penances prepare for inward penitence.

B904 (Brunschvicg 904) — Exceptional precedence of absolution must not abolish the rule.

B905 (Brunschvicg 905) — The Church judges visible signs without claiming to read hearts.

B923 (Brunschvicg 923) — Contrition and seeking the sacrament are mutually related.

MEM (Mémorial paper D) — Confession of separation occurs within a record of joy and renunciation.

In this edition

"Repentance" clarifies the inward turn; "penance" identifies the sacrament or an outward practice where appropriate. Contrition remains a distinct term so that sorrow is not flattened into punishment and absolution not flattened into a feeling. The edition preserves B923 (Brunschvicg 923)'s troubling biblical comparison while explaining its local purpose. It also preserves the different speakers in B553 (Brunschvicg 553) rather than attributing the consoling Christ-voice directly to Pascal as ordinary narration.

See also

Sin (p. 32); Grace (p. 85); Joy (p. 148); Humility (p. 140); Church (p. 137); Conversion (p. 76).

Contents

Truth

Truth · Pensées

vérité — truth [printed form]; *vérité essentielle* — essential truth [phrase]; *vraie en partie* — true in part [phrase]; *amour de la vérité* — love of truth [phrase]; *vrai* — true [printed form]; *première règle* — first rule [phrase]; *dernière fin* — final end [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. What judgment seeks and must answer to, not merely what a person sincerely or confidently believes.

In the book. Partial truths, hidden truth, institutional custody, and love of truth form distinct but connected problems.

In this edition. Plain truth and true preserve the vocabulary without making certainty, authority, and truth synonyms.

A place to read. B385 (Brunschvicg 385) for partial truth; B843 (Brunschvicg 843) for its contested recognition; B949 (Brunschvicg 949) for its governing place.

Meaning

Vérité can concern a proposition, a faithful interpretation, an accurate understanding of the self, or divine truth as the end of religious life. Vrai can distinguish a genuine miracle from a counterfeit, the intended sense from a misreading, or the inward reality from a merely outward likeness. The recurrence of the words does not make these objects identical. Each requires its own evidence and distinctions. Pascal's insistence that truth has final authority is not equivalent to the claim that anyone invoking it already possesses it without error.

Use in the book

B384 (Brunschvicg 384) rejects contradiction and its absence as sufficient marks. Certain things are disputed; false things can pass undisputed. B385 (Brunschvicg 385) presses the problem further through the contrast between essential truth, entirely pure, and human possession of truths mixed with falsehood. Its series of examples about chastity, marriage, and killing tests absolute claims under changing relations. These objections are not separate moral commandments. The skeptical pressure asks how a partial judgment can be mistaken for an unmixed final account.

The scriptural argument supplies a disciplined response to partial selection. B684 (Brunschvicg 684) demands an interpretation that handles contrary passages, not merely a set that agree. B687 (Brunschvicg 687) limits the invention of meanings not warranted by the text. Neither rule makes interpretation mechanical: Pascal also assumes scriptural coherence and supplies a specifically Christian reconciliation. The method nevertheless exposes a real failure of selective quotation. A congenial sentence cannot settle the whole question by making inconvenient sentences disappear.

B862 (Brunschvicg 862) gives the structure an ecclesiastical form. Error often follows not from asserting something wholly false but from holding one truth while excluding another. Christ's humanity and divinity, or sacramental presence and figure, are his examples. B863 (Brunschvicg 863) states the danger tersely: following one truth does not excuse failing to follow another. The same demand can be turned on Pascal's own allies, as B865 (Brunschvicg 865) reproaches Jansenists for failing to profess both sides. Truth is not made coextensive with a faction's most convenient formula.

In B843 (Brunschvicg 843) truth wanders unrecognized, veiled among human opinions. Rival speakers can use a true maxim to block either doctrine or miracles: first demand signs, then dismiss signs in the name of doctrine. Pascal answers by distinguishing times, prior warnings, and apparent incompatibilities. B864 (Brunschvicg 864) makes love of truth necessary amid established falsehood. The love is a condition of honest

recognition, not a replacement for evidence or a promise that intense conviction is always correct.

The later polemical dossier repeatedly distinguishes factual claims from authoritative labels. B929 (Brunschvicg 929) asks whether the disputed propositions or their sense are actually in Jansenius and demands pages rather than repetition of the charge. B945 (Brunschvicg 945) distinguishes swearing that one may have erred from swearing that one has erred. B948 (Brunschvicg 948) refuses both shortcuts: condemnation alone does not establish justice, and a judge's corruptibility alone does not establish injustice in a particular verdict. These fragments show why fallibility, textual fact, and doctrinal judgment cannot be substituted for one another.

B908 (Brunschvicg 908) distinguishes assurance supplied by truth from peace supplied by sincere search. B930 (Brunschvicg 930) then joins love of truth to the duty of charity: neither peace at truth's expense nor defense of truth by wounding charity is right. B949 (Brunschvicg 949) makes truth the Church's entrusted treasure and the standard by which peace or conflict is justified. There can be different times for those actions but no legitimate season for falsehood. The governing norm is firm while its application still requires judgment. Pascal's own claims, strong accusations, and historical premises remain subject to the evidential distinctions his writing demands.

Places to Read

B384 (Brunschvicg 384) — Disagreement and agreement are insufficient tests of truth.

B385 (Brunschvicg 385) — Pure truth is contrasted with the mixed and partial character of human judgment.

B684 (Brunschvicg 684) — An interpretation must account for contrary passages.

B843 (Brunschvicg 843) — True general rules can be used selectively to block the recognition of truth.

B862 (Brunschvicg 862) — Heresy is analyzed as exclusion of one truth in favor of another.

B864 (Brunschvicg 864) — Love of truth is required amid obscurity and established falsehood.

B908 (Brunschvicg 908) — Truth's assurance differs from the peace of sincere seeking.

B929 (Brunschvicg 929) — A claim about a book must be established in its words or sense.

B945 (Brunschvicg 945) — Possible error does not establish actual error.

B948 (Brunschvicg 948) — Neither condemnation itself nor judges' corruptibility decides the justice of this verdict.

B949 (Brunschvicg 949) — Truth is the first rule and final end governing peace and conflict.

In this edition

"Truth" and "true" remain deliberately plain. "Certainty" concerns a knower's assurance, while truth concerns what is the case; institutional authority and personal sincerity must likewise be distinguished from both. In B843 (Brunschvicg 843) the edition follows a disclosed modern reading of the compressed phrase about reciprocal duty and acknowledges uncertainty about the scope of "suspect." Such qualifications model the difference between preserving a text and claiming more certainty than its evidence allows.

See also

Contradiction (p. 107); Reason (p. 133); Scripture (p. 94); Peace (p. 154); Charity (p. 73); Witness (p. 38).

Contents

The human condition

Boredom

Boredom · Pensées

ennui — boredom [printed form]; *s'ennuierait* — would be bored [printed form]; *cause d'ennui* — cause of boredom [phrase]; *sans application* — without application [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. The distress exposed when absorbing occupation falls away, not merely a shortage of entertainment.

In the book. Boredom makes an unhappy condition felt, yet can prompt the search that diversion postpones.

In this edition. Boredom belongs beside darkness, sadness, resentment, and despair without becoming identical to them.

A place to read. B131 (Brunschvicg 131) for its emergence; B139 (Brunschvicg 139) and B171 (Brunschvicg 171) for its place in diversion.

Meaning

Ennui may describe weariness, distress, or boredom. Its force depends on what is removed and what then comes to awareness. B128 (Brunschvicg 128) uses it for the distress of leaving a newly absorbing occupation; B131 (Brunschvicg 131) makes it the state emerging from complete repose. The latter passage surrounds it with nothingness, abandonment, insufficiency, dependence, powerlessness, and emptiness. "Boredom" therefore needs that context rather than a modern image of a person simply wanting a more entertaining afternoon. Yet replacing every instance by despair would collapse the distinct words Pascal deliberately places in sequence.

Use in the book

B127 (Brunschvicg 127)'s compressed inventory joins inconstancy, boredom, and restlessness. B129 (Brunschvicg 129) says human nature lies in movement and complete rest is death; B130 (Brunschvicg 130) answers the laborer's or soldier's complaint about toil by proposing that he be given nothing to do. The challenge is not that hardship is unreal. It is that removing a burden may expose another misery rather than producing secure happiness. B128 (Brunschvicg 128) gives a small-scale version: a person formerly content at home becomes wretched on returning after several days of gambling or a new attraction. Desire has altered the condition under which an old occupation satisfies.

B131 (Brunschvicg 131) imagines rest stripped of passions, business, diversion, and application. The person then feels the deficiencies ordinarily kept out of view, and boredom, darkness, grief, resentment, and despair arise from within. This is not a description of an external event causing each emotion successively, nor a clinical classification of every person's experience. It states the human condition as Pascal is arguing it. B164 (Brunschvicg 164) adds an important epistemic distinction: deprived of diversion, young people feel their nothingness without knowing it. Exposure to a condition is not yet an adequate interpretation of it.

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) pursues the point through an apparently ideal case. The king possesses what others envy but, left without diversion, must consider rebellion, illness, and death. Even if present threats seemed excluded, boredom would rise on its own authority from the heart's depths. This makes the analysis more radical than the claim that poor circumstances cause discontent. The possibility of unrest remains within the subject. A billiard cue and ball can nevertheless distract from a thousand essential causes of sadness, displaying both the condition's gravity and the slightness of the means that temporarily conceal it.

The gambler illustrates why mere leisure is not the solution. Give him the money he might win on condition that he not play, and he is unhappy; let him play without stakes, and he remains bored. An absorbing passion must be generated through the imagined importance of the result. The hunt similarly matters more than possession of a hare. Yet B139 (Brunschvicg 139) refuses a simplistic rebuke: telling someone to rest contentedly assumes that he already possesses a condition he can contemplate without distress. The apparent remedy presupposes the happiness being sought.

B171 (Brunschvicg 171) gives boredom an unexpected possible use. Without diversion it would drive us toward a more solid way out; diversion consoles but prevents the inquiry and carries us unnoticed toward death. This does not identify boredom itself as salvation or prove that everyone exposed to it will search well. It explains why removing the discomfort too efficiently can conceal the need for a remedy. B264 (Brunschvicg 264) offers a different local comparison: repeated eating and sleeping do not weary us because hunger and need return; spiritual things become wearying without corresponding hunger. The vocabulary thus also asks what renews a meaningful appetite, not only how entertainment can be multiplied.

Places to Read

B127 (Brunschvicg 127) — Boredom belongs with inconstancy and restlessness in the human inventory.

B128 (Brunschvicg 128) — New attractions make a former occupation distressing.

B129 (Brunschvicg 129) — Movement belongs to the present human condition; complete rest is called death.

B130 (Brunschvicg 130) — Removing toil poses a challenge rather than automatically granting happiness.

B131 (Brunschvicg 131) — Complete inactivity exposes dependence and emptiness.

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) — The king, gambler, hunt, and inner roots of boredom develop its mechanism.

B164 (Brunschvicg 164) — Feeling nothingness is distinguished from knowing it.

B171 (Brunschvicg 171) — Boredom may prompt a search that diversion postpones.

B264 (Brunschvicg 264) — Renewed hunger explains why some repeated acts do not weary us.

In this edition

The English varies by context: ennui is "distress" in B128 (Brunschvicg 128) but "boredom" in B131 (Brunschvicg 131). B139 (Brunschvicg 139)'s formulation about no cause of boredom concerns the absence of a particular external cause, while the passage itself gives an inward basis in human constitution. Reading it as a claim that boredom has literally no explanation would contradict that sentence's purpose. This account of vulnerability neither condemns every recreation nor supplies a medical diagnosis.

See also

Diversion (p. 174); Death (p. 168); Wretchedness (p. 198); Happiness (p. 180); Rest and repose (p. 252); Billiard cue and ball (p. 208).

Contents

Death

Death · Pensées

mort — death [printed form]; *mourir* — to die [printed form]; *condamnés à la mort* — condemned to death [phrase]; *dernier acte* — final act [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. An unavoidable end that reshapes present conduct through its anticipation, neglect, or concealment.

In the book. Images of prisoners, a final act, and fragile life challenge the refusal to examine what follows death.

In this edition. Death stays concrete; imagined scenes and staged voices are identified as such.

A place to read. B199 (Brunschvicg 199) and B200 (Brunschvicg 200), then B347 (Brunschvicg 347)'s dignity in knowing that one dies.

Meaning

Mort is an event awaiting the living, a state whose nature is disputed, and an object of present thought. These are related but not identical. A person can know that death is inevitable without knowing what follows it, and can possess that knowledge without attending to it. Pascal repeatedly works upon this gap between acknowledged fact and practical attention. His religious argument insists that uncertainty about the end makes inquiry urgent rather than dispensable. That claim must be distinguished from a completed proof of every consequence he asks the reader to consider.

Use in the book

The diversion fragments make mortality a cause of restlessness and a hidden destination. B139 (Brunschvicg 139) traces agitation beyond inability to stay in a room to a weak and mortal condition. The king cannot use rank to prevent illness and death, but his attendants can prevent sustained thought of them. B168 (Brunschvicg 168) says that, unable to cure death, misery, and ignorance, people decided not to think about them. B169 (Brunschvicg 169) similarly contrasts the impossible project of making oneself immortal with the available strategy of preventing reflection. The consolation changes attention, not the event awaiting the subject.

B166 (Brunschvicg 166) turns the distinction sharply: death without thinking of it is easier to bear than the thought of death without danger. Immediate danger and imagined danger do not have equal emotional effects. B215 (Brunschvicg 215) consequently tells the reader to fear death outside danger, not within it, joining prior reflection to courage in the emergency. B175 (Brunschvicg 175) warns that bodily self-knowledge is unreliable: some healthy people think themselves near death, while others fail to perceive impending illness. None of these remarks gives a modern medical test; each exposes a failure to align certainty, perception, fear, and conduct.

B199 (Brunschvicg 199) explicitly asks the reader to imagine prisoners in chains, some killed daily before the rest. Those remaining see their own condition in their fellows and await their turn. It is an image of the human condition, not a reported historical episode. B200 (Brunschvicg 200) changes the thought experiment: a prisoner has an hour to discover and perhaps revoke a sentence but plays cards instead. Here the scandal is not mortality alone but neglect of a potentially decisive inquiry. Pascal then interprets such blindness theologically. The initial scene illustrates the charge; it does not independently demonstrate that interpretation.

B194 (Brunschvicg 194) and B195 (Brunschvicg 195) place the uncertainty about immortality before the proofs of religion. The long first-person speech in B194 (Brunschvicg 194) is staged as an indifferent person's reasoning: it moves from not knowing origin or destiny to refusing investigation. Treating it as Pascal's straightforward autobiography would lose the target of the argument. The passage distinguishes the sincere seeker, who merits compassion, from proud neglect. Its closing appeal also insists that unbelievers remain capable of grace and that believers may fall into blindness. The urgency does not authorize treating the two groups as permanently fixed kinds of people.

The concrete images remain severe: life alone stands between us and heaven or hell (B213 (Brunschvicg 213)); the final act ends under thrown earth (B210 (Brunschvicg 210)); companionship cannot die in our place (B211 (Brunschvicg 211)). Yet death also enters the argument for dignity. B347 (Brunschvicg 347)'s reed can be killed by a vapor or drop of water, but knows that it dies and understands the universe's advantage over it. Knowledge neither stops death nor makes the body stronger. It establishes a different kind of nobility and leads to the work of thinking well. Mortality both humiliates the person and reveals what unknowing nature lacks.

Places to Read

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) — Diversion keeps a mortal condition from sustained attention.

B166 (Brunschvicg 166) — Danger and the thought of death have different effects.

B168 (Brunschvicg 168) — Avoiding thought substitutes for curing death, misery, and ignorance.

B171 (Brunschvicg 171) — Diversion brings people imperceptibly toward death.

B175 (Brunschvicg 175) — People misjudge their own proximity to death.

B194 (Brunschvicg 194) — A staged indifferent voice is contrasted with sincere seeking.

B199 (Brunschvicg 199) — Condemned prisoners are explicitly an image of humanity.

B200 (Brunschvicg 200) — A possible reprieve makes the neglected inquiry urgent.

B210 (Brunschvicg 210) — The play's final act ends in burial.

B211 (Brunschvicg 211) — Other people cannot die in our place.

B215 (Brunschvicg 215) — Reflection outside danger is distinguished from courage within it.

B347 (Brunschvicg 347) — Knowing that one dies distinguishes the fragile reed from what kills it.

In this edition

"The final act" and "the play" in B210 (Brunschvicg 210) preserve a theatrical comparison without reducing the event to metaphor. B199 (Brunschvicg 199)'s imperative "Imagine" and closing identification as an image must accompany any quotation. In B194 (Brunschvicg 194) the alternatives belong to a polemical account of the indifferent person's predicament; they should not be represented as an exhaustive neutral survey of beliefs about the afterlife. These harsh judgments belong to Pascal's theological argument, not to the ordinary meanings of death and dying.

See also

Diversion (p. 174); Thinking (p. 195); Infinity (p. 183); Wager (p. 100); Search (p. 97); Condemned prisoners (p. 214); The final act (p. 265).
Contents

Desire

Desire · Pensées

désir — desire [printed form]; *avidité* — avidity [printed form]; *recherchent* — seek [printed form]; *voudrions* — would like [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Movement toward what appears a good, ranging from ordinary appetite to the wish for truth and happiness.

In the book. One common end can produce opposed actions; changing conditions alter what seems satisfying.

In this edition. Desire is not automatically the same word or diagnosis as concupiscence.

A place to read. B109 (Brunschvicg 109) for shifting desires and B425 (Brunschvicg 425) for the universal pursuit of happiness.

Meaning

Désir can name wanting an object, a state, esteem, knowledge, or happiness. Avidité adds an image of eager, unsatisfied appetite. Neither should automatically be replaced by sin or selfishness: Pascal can seek to awaken a desire for truth, even while criticizing the direction of other desires. Concupiscence is the more specific theological vocabulary for disordered inclination. The object, the manner of pursuit, and the end toward which it is ordered determine how a particular desire functions. The human description at B126 (Brunschvicg 126) joins dependence with desire

for independence and need, already revealing a tension between aspiration and condition.

Use in the book

B109 (Brunschvicg 109) explains why a desired state can disappoint without the person simply choosing the wrong object once. While healthy, we imagine illness with healthy people's desire for walks and diversions still attached; when ill, nature gives desires appropriate to the new state. Anticipated happiness likewise borrows pleasures from a condition we do not occupy. If we reach it, our desires change again. B110 (Brunschvicg 110) compresses the source of inconstancy into a felt falsity of present pleasures and ignorance of absent pleasures' vanity. The absent object benefits from not yet being tested under the actual conditions of possession.

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) gives this instability a structure of pursuit. People imagine that obtaining an office will permit rest, while the occupation and agitation are what protect them from themselves. The gambler must want to win something he would not want as a gift on condition of not playing. Desire, anger, and fear invest a constructed object with enough importance to absorb attention. Yet the account also gives the aspiration to rest a different source: a remaining instinct of the greatness of first nature. The confused project seeks rest through agitation by combining this aspiration with the felt need to escape present misery.

The wish for esteem reveals a similar disproportion. B148 (Brunschvicg 148) says we want the whole earth and future generations to know us, yet five or six neighbors' esteem satisfies. B147 (Brunschvicg 147) describes exchanging actual virtue for its admired appearance. B150 (Brunschvicg 150) carries the scrutiny into the writer and reader of an attack on vanity: each may desire credit for exposing it. The analysis therefore does not provide an innocent observer who can classify everyone else's motives while exempting his own activity.

B425 (Brunschvicg 425) states the largest generalization: everyone seeks happiness, without exception, even when opposite means are chosen. Going to war and staying away express the same desire under different views. Pascal includes self-destructive conduct in this claim, not to recommend it, but to distinguish the sought end from what actually accomplishes it. The passage then asserts that unaided efforts have not attained the true good. Its explanation of the unsatisfied appetite as an empty trace of former happiness is part of his Christian argument. The infinite abyss and the infinite, immutable object interpret the condition the universal claim describes; they are not a modern empirical diagnosis inferred solely from the existence of wanting.

Desire can also be redirected toward inquiry. B187 (Brunschvicg 187)'s proposed order first makes religion respectable, then lovable, so that good

people wish it true before its truth is shown. Wishing does not replace the later demonstration. B194 (Brunschvicg 194) distinguishes indifference from the sincere desire to find truth, while B423 (Brunschvicg 423) asks that desire be freed from passions that would blind selection or impede following what is found. B277 (Brunschvicg 277) finally places attachment in the heart's giving and hardening. The question is not whether desire can be eliminated from the person, but whether its object and order can change.

Places to Read

B109 (Brunschvicg 109) — Imagined happiness borrows pleasures from an absent state whose desires would differ.

B110 (Brunschvicg 110) — Present and absent pleasures are unequally known.

B126 (Brunschvicg 126) — Need and dependence coexist with desire for independence.

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) — Rest is pursued through agitation and an absorbing object of passion.

B147 (Brunschvicg 147) — The desire for reputation can sacrifice the actual virtue it advertises.

B148 (Brunschvicg 148) — Universal ambitions accept small local satisfactions.

B150 (Brunschvicg 150) — Writer and reader are included in the desire for credit.

B187 (Brunschvicg 187) — A wish that religion be true is distinguished from showing its truth.

B194 (Brunschvicg 194) — Sincere desire for truth differs from proud indifference.

B423 (Brunschvicg 423) — The inquirer should desire truth without passions governing the choice.

B425 (Brunschvicg 425) — A universal desire for happiness receives an account of lost and infinite good.

In this edition

At B425 (Brunschvicg 425) désir is “desire,” avidité is “avidity,” and recherchent d’être heureux is “seek to be happy.” These are aligned parts of the argument, not interchangeable French headwords. B148 (Brunschvicg 148)'s voudrions is the conditional wanting of “would like”; it supplies an exact attestation for the theme without pretending that désir is printed there. The heading to B425 (Brunschvicg 425) and its theological interpretation remain visible, and desire remains distinct from the theological diagnosis of concupiscence.

See also

Happiness (p. 180); Self-love (p. 192); Concupiscence (p. 41); Diversion (p. 174); Search (p. 97); World (p. 67); Present and absent pleasures (p. 249).
Contents

Diversion

Diversion · Pensées

divertissement — diversion [printed form]; *divertissements* — diversions [printed form]; *se divertit* — diverts himself [phrase]; *nous amuse* — amuses us [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. An occupation that turns attention from one's vulnerable condition, whether playful or socially serious.

In the book. Diversion consoles but can prevent the search for a firmer remedy.

In this edition. Entertainment is too narrow: offices, war, and intellectual work can divert.

A place to read. B139 (Brunschvicg 139) for the full mechanism and B171 (Brunschvicg 171) for its double consequence.

Meaning

Divertissement is defined by what happens to attention, not merely by a list of amusements. Games and hunting are obvious examples, but office, war, conversation, scholarship, and the study of other people's folly can have the same function. The verb divertir keeps the movement of turning away close to the noun. Consequently an activity's seriousness or prestige does not establish whether it is a diversion. One must ask what the person is avoiding, what object absorbs him, and whether the occupation is mistaken for a lasting good.

Use in the book

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) opens with the inability to remain quietly in a room, but immediately deepens the explanation. The cause of restless undertakings itself has a reason: the weak, mortal, unhappy condition exposed by sustained reflection. Quoting the room as if Pascal merely prescribed staying home omits this second movement. The king provides a test because rank gathers advantages that should seem sufficient. Left to himself, he considers possible rebellion and unavoidable illness and death. His attendants' decisive service is to prevent him from thinking about himself, not to make him immortal.

The hunt distinguishes object from process. Possession of a hare would not shield the hunter from the sight of mortality; pursuit does. Pascal therefore rebukes the superficial philosopher as well as the distracted participant. Advising rest assumes the very happiness missing from the condition. The participant's deeper error is to believe possession of the sought thing will satisfy, rather than recognize the temporary function of absorbing activity. The two secret instincts—escape from present misery and a remaining aspiration to the rest of first nature—combine into the confused project of reaching rest through agitation.

The gambler prevents a second simplification. If gain alone mattered, giving him the expected winnings would satisfy; if mere motion or amusement mattered, playing without stakes would suffice. Neither does. He must construct an object of passion, becoming excited by the hope of a result whose bare possession would not satisfy him. The bereaved hunter similarly ceases to think of his sorrows while watching for a boar, but his loss has not disappeared. The passage describes happiness “for that time,” an alteration of occupied attention rather than a repaired condition.

The analysis reaches its own observers. Those who exhaust themselves noting such behavior merely to show that they know it can be the greatest fools because their knowledge has not made them wiser. B143 (Brunschvicg 143) extends diversion into upbringing: honor, property, friendships, languages, and exercises fill life with care; free time is then filled with games. Its apparent recommendation to keep people occupied is part of the exposing exchange, ending with a judgment on the hollow heart, not an uncomplicated program for education. B142 (Brunschvicg 142) carefully excludes Christian kings considered as Christians from the claim about kings merely as kings.

B170 (Brunschvicg 170) states the dependence created by pleasure from outside. An interlocutor asks whether being cheered by diversion is not itself happiness; the reply emphasizes the accidents that can interrupt it. B171 (Brunschvicg 171) then names diversion both consolation and the greatest misery, because it chiefly prevents reflection and brings the person imperceptibly to death. Boredom might otherwise prompt a more solid

remedy. That possibility does not sanctify every distress, but clarifies why comfort can obstruct inquiry. B11 (Brunschvicg 11)'s specific warning about theater belongs to a further Christian moral criticism, and its local apparatus identifies the text's compositional qualification. It should neither replace the broader attentional account nor be silently treated as an unqualified autograph fragment.

Places to Read

B11 (Brunschvicg 11) — The theater supplies a specific Christian warning about passions and self-love.

B135 (Brunschvicg 135) — Struggle attracts more than possession of a completed result.

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) — The room, king, hunt, gambler, and observing scholar expose diversion's mechanisms.

B140 (Brunschvicg 140) — Play interrupts grief, while permanent strain is also criticized.

B142 (Brunschvicg 142) — Royal happiness is tested, with the qualification about kings as Christians.

B143 (Brunschvicg 143) — Education and social duties can create uninterrupted occupation.

B168 (Brunschvicg 168) — Not thinking substitutes for curing death, misery, and ignorance.

B170 (Brunschvicg 170) — External consolation leaves happiness dependent on accidents.

B171 (Brunschvicg 171) — Consolation can postpone the search and carry the person unnoticed toward death.

In this edition

"Diversion" preserves the range and turning-aside force of divertissement. B171 (Brunschvicg 171)'s nous amuse is "amuses us," not another printed occurrence of the noun, so the forms remain separately identified. B139 (Brunschvicg 139)'s billard names the cue, not the table, and B140 (Brunschvicg 140)'s chasse first names a tennis technicality before the fragment shifts to hunting. These small distinctions matter because the examples are compressed rather than one continuous story. Temporary consolation is real, but it does not by itself provide the lasting remedy Pascal seeks.

See also

Boredom (p. 166); Death (p. 168); Happiness (p. 180); Thinking (p. 195); Search (p. 97); The hunt and the catch (p. 268); Remaining in a room (p. 252); Playing, stakes, and absorption (p. 247).

Contents

Greatness

Greatness · Pensées

grandeur — greatness [printed form]; *grand* — great [printed form]; *grand seigneur* — great lord [phrase]; *roi dépossédé* — dispossessed king [phrase]; *grandeurs* — worldly greatness; distinctions [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. Social elevation, intellectual dignity, or a capacity disclosed even in experienced failure.

In the book. Knowing misery attests greatness; neither praise nor abasement alone adequately describes humanity.

In this edition. Greatness is not confined to rank, nor replaced everywhere by dignity.

A place to read. B397 (Brunschvicg 397) and B409 (Brunschvicg 409), then B793 (Brunschvicg 793)'s distinct measures of greatness.

Meaning

Grandeur changes with the order and comparison in view. It can mean rank and worldly splendor, the dignity of thought, or the human capacity revealed by dissatisfaction with a fallen condition. The plurality is not accidental: Pascal repeatedly contrasts forms of greatness that people mistake for one another. The greatness found in knowledge of misery does not consist in bodily power, secure happiness, or possession of the good one desires. It is precisely a capacity that can remain visible in the experience of lacking those things.

Use in the book

B397 (Brunschvicg 397) makes awareness decisive. A tree does not know itself miserable; the person who does is miserable but also great in knowing it. B399 (Brunschvicg 399) similarly contrasts human awareness with a ruined house, which is not itself miserable. The claim is not that reflection removes suffering, nor that every painful thought is wise. It distinguishes the felt and understood condition of a subject from damage considered without such awareness. B347 (Brunschvicg 347)'s thinking reed gives the same contrast a cosmic scale: the universe can crush the person, but does not know its victory; the person knows both death and the advantage of what kills him.

The dispossessed king in B398 (Brunschvicg 398) interprets misery as a loss relative to a former dignity. B409 (Brunschvicg 409) develops the analogy instead of leaving it as a decorative metaphor. Not being king distresses a dispossessed king, whereas an ordinary person has no such deprivation. Former consulship and lost kingship are distinguished through the condition assigned to each; one mouth is not felt as a loss like one eye, and lacking three eyes is not ordinarily grieved. These examples show that misery depends on a standard of what belongs to a being. Pascal uses that relation to argue that humanity has fallen from a better nature. The analogy belongs to his theological account rather than independently proving its history.

The desire for esteem provides more troubling evidence. B400 (Brunschvicg 400) gives a high value to another soul's judgment. B404 (Brunschvicg 404) calls the pursuit of glory both the greatest baseness and the greatest mark of excellence, because earthly comfort cannot satisfy without a favorable place in human reason. Even those who despise humanity wish it to believe and admire them. The desire that exposes vanity also reveals the valuation of intellectual recognition. B405 (Brunschvicg 405) prevents the analyst from turning this recognition into complacency: pride can boast of having uncovered its own miseries.

B416 (Brunschvicg 416) describes the endless exchange between those deriving misery from greatness and those deriving greatness from misery. B418 (Brunschvicg 418) says either side alone is dangerous; ignorance of both is worse. B420 (Brunschvicg 420)'s corrective speaker lowers the boastful and praises the abased, while B423 (Brunschvicg 423) specifies what should be loved and hated: the capacity for good is not the baseness currently filling it. The intended result is not an arithmetic average between flattery and contempt. It is a two-sided understanding of capacity and actual condition that neither philosophy of self-exaltation nor simple degradation provides.

There is greatness even in drawing social order from concupiscence (B402 (Brunschvicg 402), B403 (Brunschvicg 403)), though an image of

charity is not charity itself. B793 (Brunschvicg 793) finally separates bodily, intellectual, and supernatural orders. Archimedes needs no royal display for discoveries to shine before minds; Christ's holiness cannot be measured by wealth or inventions. The “infinitely more infinite” distance to charity expresses a difference of kind, not a numerical scale. The same word greatness therefore guides the reader among incompatible measures rather than inviting worldly success to be read as evidence of every excellence.

Places to Read

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) — The aspiration to rest is linked with a remaining greatness of first nature.

B347 (Brunschvicg 347) — The thinking reed's knowledge supplies dignity without bodily strength.

B397 (Brunschvicg 397) — Knowing misery is itself a human greatness.

B398 (Brunschvicg 398) — A dispossessed king images the relation of loss to dignity.

B399 (Brunschvicg 399) — Awareness distinguishes human misery from a ruined house.

B402 (Brunschvicg 402) — Social ordering from concupiscence resembles charity without sharing its source.

B404 (Brunschvicg 404) — The pursuit of glory reveals baseness and a high valuation of human reason.

B409 (Brunschvicg 409) — Royal and bodily examples explain deprivation relative to a nature.

B416 (Brunschvicg 416) — Greatness and misery become arguments for one another.

B418 (Brunschvicg 418) — Greatness and baseness must be shown together.

B423 (Brunschvicg 423) — Capacity for good and the baseness within it require different judgments.

B793 (Brunschvicg 793) — Each order has a greatness not supplied by the others.

In this edition

At B397 (Brunschvicg 397) the edition uses “misery” and “miserable,” while other passages use “wretchedness”; the conceptual relation remains the same without making the English invariant. Grandeurs can name worldly distinctions rather than the dignity argued from thought. The source's remarks about Perseus and Aemilius Paulus are historical examples within Pascal's reasoning, not independently established biographies here. The royal metaphor interprets deprivation within the religious argument rather than independently establishing the history of a fall.

See also

Wretchedness (p. 198); Thinking (p. 195); Fall (p. 12); Self-love (p. 192); Three orders (p. 35); The dispossessed king (p. 263); The tree that does not know misery (p. 275).

Contents

Happiness

Happiness · Pensées

heureux — happy [printed form]; *bonheur* — happiness [printed form]; *Félicité* — happiness [printed form]; *béatitude* — blessedness [printed form]; *vrai bien* — true good [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. The end people seek through different means, distinguished from temporary pleasure and secure possession of the true good.

In the book. Diversion gives a dependent respite; the universal desire for happiness receives a religious explanation through lost good.

In this edition. Happiness, blessedness, pleasure, and good are related terms, not identical forms.

A place to read. B139 (Brunschvicg 139), B170 (Brunschvicg 170), and B425 (Brunschvicg 425) for pursuit, dependence, and the proposed remedy.

Meaning

Happiness is both what people seek and a contested description of what they possess. Heureux, bonheur, félicité, and béatitude overlap but do not perform the same work in every context. A person can be happy for a time while diverted, apparently fortunate through rank, or said to seek a secure blessedness that neither occupation nor possession supplies. Pascal's analysis consequently needs a distinction between the direction of desire, a felt moment of relief, and the lasting good claimed as its adequate object. Calling every pleasure false would lose the fact that diversion really changes felt experience.

Use in the book

B425 (Brunschvicg 425) states that all people seek to be happy without exception. Opposite actions, such as going to war or staying away, can proceed from the same desire joined to different judgments about means. The argument is about the will's end, not approval of each method. The passage then claims that without faith no one has reached the point all seek. Its universal complaint across ages, ranks, health, and learning serves the religious diagnosis. These are Pascal's general claims, not the results of a statistical survey.

B109 (Brunschvicg 109) helps explain why a new condition does not reliably deliver the expected satisfaction. We imagine it by combining present desires with absent pleasures, but the desires change when the condition changes. B172 (Brunschvicg 172) supplies a temporal version: the present is treated as preparation for a future that becomes the end, so we continually hope to live rather than live. B148 (Brunschvicg 148)'s desire for universal recognition, satisfied by a few neighbors, shows that actual gratification may be small and unstable even where aspiration is immense.
B139 (Brunschvicg 139) examines apparent solutions in detail. Kingship collects the advantages people envy, but an undiverted king remains mortal and exposed to fears. A hunter wants pursuit rather than a purchased hare; a gambler needs both play and an object of passion, not the winnings alone or entirely unstaked amusement. Their relief is real during absorption, but they misunderstand its source if they expect possession to yield permanent repose. Two instincts produce the confused plan: present misery drives external occupation while an echo of original greatness points toward rest. Rest is therefore simultaneously desired as happiness and unbearable in the unrepaired condition.

B170 (Brunschvicg 170) asks directly whether being cheered by diversion counts as happiness. The reply rejects its adequacy because it comes from outside and remains vulnerable to accidents. B171 (Brunschvicg 171) adds that this consolation may obstruct the search for something more solid. B174 (Brunschvicg 174)'s Solomon and Job represent knowing the vanity of pleasures and the reality of suffering from opposite circumstances. Great fortune and great affliction can therefore disclose the same absence of secure good rather than establishing wholly separate human conditions.

B425 (Brunschvicg 425) interprets the unfilled desire as the mark of a former happiness. Its infinite abyss can be filled only by an infinite, immutable object, identified as God. The fragment also reports thinkers approaching the idea of a universal good that all can possess without division, envy, or involuntary loss; their reasoning is left unfinished. The move from shared aspiration to lost nature and divine remedy belongs to Pascal's theological argument. B257 (Brunschvicg 257) then supplies a practical classification: those who have found and serve God are reasonable

and happy; sincere seekers are unhappy but reasonable; those neither finding nor seeking are foolish and unhappy. Happiness and reasonableness are therefore not simply interchangeable, and present unhappiness does not by itself condemn the seeker's conduct.

Places to Read

B60 (Brunschvicg 60) — The projected work pairs wretchedness without God and happiness with God.

B109 (Brunschvicg 109) — Changing desires frustrate an imagined transfer of pleasures between states.

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) — The king, hunter, and gambler test what actually gives temporary satisfaction.

B148 (Brunschvicg 148) — Huge ambitions coexist with small satisfactions.

B170 (Brunschvicg 170) — Externally supplied cheer remains dependent and vulnerable.

B171 (Brunschvicg 171) — Temporary consolation can obstruct a more solid remedy.

B172 (Brunschvicg 172) — Future happiness is pursued at the cost of present living.

B174 (Brunschvicg 174) — Abundance and affliction reveal different aspects of the same condition.

B257 (Brunschvicg 257) — A sincere seeker can be reasonable while still unhappy.

B425 (Brunschvicg 425) — Universal aspiration is interpreted through lost happiness and the true good.

In this edition

The edition's "blessedness" often renders béatitude, especially where B233 (Brunschvicg 233) distinguishes the interlocutor's knowledge from his ultimate interest. "Happiness" covers bonheur and félicité in the cited contexts but does not make plaisir the same source word. B139 (Brunschvicg 139) explicitly grants happiness for the duration of diversion, while B170 (Brunschvicg 170) denies that such dependence is adequate happiness. Keeping the scope of each sentence visible explains the contrast without either denying all felt pleasure or making temporary relief Pascal's proposed final remedy.

See also

Desire (p. 171); Diversion (p. 174); Boredom (p. 166); Wretchedness (p. 198); Faith (p. 79); Search (p. 97); Rest and repose (p. 252); The universal good (p. 276).

Contents

Infinity

Infinity · Pensées

infini — infinity; infinite [printed form]; *infinis* — infinities [printed form]; *fini* — finite [printed form]; *néant* — nothingness [printed form]; *deux abîmes* — two abysses [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. What exceeds finite limits, not merely an extremely large quantity.

In the book. Cosmic disproportion, numerical reasoning, divine incomprehensibility, and the wager require distinct uses.

In this edition. Infinity, infinite, and nothingness preserve the local grammar; theological comparisons are not modern calculations.

A place to read. B72 (Brunschvicg 72) and B233 (Brunschvicg 233), including the wager's preliminaries before its practical dialogue.

Meaning

Infini can be an adjective or name the infinite; fini marks what has a limit. Néant can mean nothing or nothingness, and its relation to infinity is not reducible to the numeral zero. Pascal uses these terms to unsettle human scale as the presumed measure of reality. Knowing that finite bounds do not exhaust an object differs from comprehending its nature. An imaginative approach to natural vastness, a claim about number, an analogy concerning God, and the infinite gain posited in a practical argument therefore require separate explanations.

Use in the book

B72 (Brunschvicg 72) begins by making the familiar world change size. Earth becomes a point relative to the sun's circuit, that circuit a finer point within the heavens, and imagination continues beyond what sight reaches. The visible universe is then only an imperceptible stroke within nature. The infinite sphere, with center everywhere and circumference nowhere, frustrates a privileged standpoint. The movement reverses through a mite: its limbs, veins, fluids, drops, and vapors lead toward an ever smaller limit, then imagined universes open within the diminished atom. The source's annotation properly calls this a thought experiment, not a record of microscopic observation.

Humanity is a nothing beside infinity and a whole beside nothingness, occupying a middle without comprehending either extreme. The change in comparison explains how the same body can be imperceptible and colossal without a contradiction in its actual size. B72 (Brunschvicg 72) then applies the disproportion to knowledge: sciences extend through innumerable consequences and increasingly subtle principles. A stopping point imposed by our senses is not necessarily nature's ultimate division. The human wish to build on an unchanging foundation is answered by the image of cracking ground. This discipline of scale does not require denying every local piece of knowledge; it attacks the pretension to possess origins and totality.

B121 (Brunschvicg 121) offers a smaller distinction: finite years, days, spaces, and numbers recur, producing a kind of infinity and eternity without each individual thing being infinite or eternal. B205 (Brunschvicg 205) and B206 (Brunschvicg 206) make vast duration and space frightening to a situated first-person voice. These compressed statements should not automatically be read as a comprehensive autobiographical creed. B231 (Brunschvicg 231)'s infinitely moving point likewise challenges the inference from incomprehensibility to impossibility; it is an imagined construction, not an observed physical phenomenon.

B233 (Brunschvicg 233) begins before the wager proper with number, time, dimensions, and the finite's relation to infinity. The infinite number is neither even nor odd in the ordinary finite sense; the passage itself explicitly limits the familiar alternative to finite numbers. Its point is the difference between knowing that something exists and knowing its nature. God then presents a further difference, having neither extension nor limits. The text distinguishes natural light, faith's knowledge of existence, and glory's promised knowledge of nature. An analogy with mathematical infinity therefore does not turn God's being into a quantity. The comparison between human and divine justice must also remain in the printed order, which the note records as difficult rather than silently reversing.

The ensuing dialogue asks how to act when natural reasoning does not settle God's existence. An infinite gain is contrasted with a finite stake under

successive assumptions about chances. The coin and ratios belong to stages of that argument; they do not independently establish a numerical probability of God's existence. The interlocutor's inability to believe survives his assent to the reasoning and leads to practice and passions. Finally B793 (Brunschvicg 793)'s “infinitely more infinite” distance between intellect and charity names a supernatural difference of kind. Neither that excess nor the wager should be smoothed into a modern mathematical theorem detached from its theological conditions.

Places to Read

B72 (Brunschvicg 72) — The great and minute expose human disproportion and the limits of inquiry.

B121 (Brunschvicg 121) — Finite repetitions produce a kind of infinity without making each unit infinite.

B205 (Brunschvicg 205) — A situated life is set against immense space and duration.

B206 (Brunschvicg 206) — Infinite spaces receive the compressed response of fear.

B231 (Brunschvicg 231) — An imagined moving point challenges a claim of impossibility.

B233 (Brunschvicg 233) — Finite and infinite comparisons prepare and structure the wager dialogue.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) — The infinity of numbers is known among the heart's principles.

B425 (Brunschvicg 425) — The infinite abyss images unsatisfied desire and the proposed infinite good.

B793 (Brunschvicg 793) — Infinite distance expresses the difference between orders, especially charity.

In this edition

B72 (Brunschvicg 72)'s phrase “taking four from zero leaves zero” is retained by this edition with a warning about its historical sense, not endorsed as ordinary modern arithmetic. Néant elsewhere must likewise not be made a uniform synonym for mathematical zero. B233 (Brunschvicg 233) preserves the difficult preliminary justice comparison and the different probability scenarios; quoting only “win everything” would omit necessary assumptions. Natural, numerical, and practical uses remain distinct, with their exact limits supplied by the local notes.

See also

First principles (p. 118); Reason (p. 133); Wager (p. 100); Greatness (p. 177); The mite and nested universes (p. 269); The infinite sphere (p. 268); The infinitely moving point (p. 269).

Contents

Nature

Nature · Pensées

nature — nature [printed form]; *première nature* — first nature [phrase]; *seconde nature* — second nature [phrase]; *nature est corrompue* — nature is corrupt [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. Created order, a being's constitution or inclination, and human nature considered in different conditions.

In the book. Nature can mean what custom reshapes, what supports reason, or an original condition contrasted with corruption.

In this edition. The recurrent noun does not erase changes of referent and argumentative perspective.

A place to read. B93 (Brunschvicg 93), B139 (Brunschvicg 139), B282 (Brunschvicg 282), and B434 (Brunschvicg 434) for contrasting but connected uses.

Meaning

Nature is not one uncomplicated term opposed everywhere to culture, reason, or grace. B72 (Brunschvicg 72) asks humanity to contemplate nature's immensity; B93 (Brunschvicg 93) asks what human nature is when custom can alter it; B139 (Brunschvicg 139) invokes the greatness of first nature; B434 (Brunschvicg 434) contrasts creation and corruption. Elsewhere nature gives present desires, produces recurrence, or supports reason against complete skepticism. These uses may be related by Pascal's account of creation and fallen humanity, but their immediate grammatical

subjects and local functions must be kept distinct. “Natural” does not by itself mean morally right, original, unalterable, or adequate for salvation.

Use in the book

The customary and the natural first become difficult to separate through ordinary inheritance. B92 (Brunschvicg 92) asks whether natural principles are accustomed principles acquired from parents. B93 (Brunschvicg 93) turns the conventional expression second nature into a challenge: if the first can be erased, why deny that it too may be an earlier custom? B97 (Brunschvicg 97) nevertheless allows nature sometimes to resist habituation and retain a person's instinct. The statements do not provide a simple conclusion that there is no nature at all. They expose how readily people call acquired dispositions natural and how imperfectly that label establishes their authority.

Present nature also accommodates changing conditions. B109 (Brunschvicg 109) says illness brings passions and desires suited to illness, while fear often imports those of health into an imagined sick state. B129 (Brunschvicg 129) associates our nature with movement. B131 (Brunschvicg 131) describes the distress of undiverted rest. Yet B139 (Brunschvicg 139) says a secret instinct remaining from the greatness of first nature directs us toward happiness in repose. The two senses must not be collapsed into a flat contradiction about whether rest is natural. The fragment's account distinguishes the present misery that drives agitation from the remaining aspiration to a good no longer possessed securely.

Nature as a whole supplies another field. B72 (Brunschvicg 72)'s vast and minute worlds make the human inquirer recognize disproportion. B119 (Brunschvicg 119) compares seed and principle, branches and consequences, as works of the same master; B121 (Brunschvicg 121) sees finite recurrences producing a kind of infinity. These are observations and analogies within the text, not a general authorization to transfer every property of living agents to matter. B75 (Brunschvicg 75) mocks explaining the void through bodily fear and asks whether insensible bodies possess the organs required for the passions attributed to them. The limit of a natural explanation depends on the kind of being described.

In inquiry, nature neither simply agrees with nor simply defeats reason. B282 (Brunschvicg 282) says nature grants a little immediate knowledge and leaves the rest to reasoning. B434 (Brunschvicg 434) says it supports powerless reason by preventing complete practical doubt, while reason exposes dogmatic claims to possession of truth. The religious turn then distinguishes humanity in creation or grace from humanity in corruption. The statement that humanity infinitely surpasses humanity points beyond its present unaided condition rather than promising that every natural desire can fulfill itself.

B423 (Brunschvicg 423) gives this distinction an ethical form. The capacity for good belongs to a nature worth loving; its emptiness and baseness should not therefore be loved. B485 (Brunschvicg 485) similarly directs self-hatred at concupiscence rather than abolishing every possible self-relation. Reading "nature" carefully thus protects both sides of the argument: it prevents current habit from becoming an unquestionable norm, and prevents the account of corruption from erasing every capacity, aspiration, or form of knowledge. The several senses explain why the same word can ground a demand, describe a limit, and name a condition requiring restoration.

Places to Read

B72 (Brunschvicg 72) — Nature's great and minute scales expose the finite inquirer's disproportion.

B75 (Brunschvicg 75) — Inanimate bodies must not simply be assigned animal fears and organs.

B92 (Brunschvicg 92) — Natural principles are questioned through inherited habituation.

B93 (Brunschvicg 93) — The distinction between first and second nature is destabilized.

B97 (Brunschvicg 97) — Nature sometimes resists custom's occupational shaping.

B109 (Brunschvicg 109) — Desires change with the present bodily state.

B119 (Brunschvicg 119) — Seed and principle supply an analogy of fruitful natural and intellectual beginnings.

B121 (Brunschvicg 121) — Finite recurrences produce a kind of infinity.

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) — Present misery and an instinct of first nature explain opposed movements.

B282 (Brunschvicg 282) — Nature grants limited immediate knowledge and leaves other knowledge to reasoning.

B423 (Brunschvicg 423) — A capacity for good is distinguished from its empty and base condition.

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) — Creation, corruption, and grace provide distinct conditions of human nature.

In this edition

Nature normally remains “nature,” but its repeated spelling should not lead the reader to assign every occurrence the same referent. B139 (Brunschvicg 139)'s “first nature” carries an explicitly religious dimension in its note, whereas B93 (Brunschvicg 93)'s “first custom” questions the supposed naturalness of acquired dispositions. The volume presents working fragments with different immediate purposes. Their relation can be explained without silently turning each occurrence into either an assertion of pristine nature or a total denial of human powers.

See also

Custom (p. 110); Wretchedness (p. 198); Greatness (p. 177); First principles (p. 118); Fall (p. 12); First and second nature (p. 223); The void and rival conditioning (p. 277).

Contents

Self

Self · Pensées

le moi — the self [printed form]; *moi-même* — myself [printed form]; *chaque moi* — every self [phrase]; *centre du tout* — center of everything [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. The person called I, questioned as an object of love and as a claimant to universal centrality.

In the book. Changing qualities unsettle personal love; courtesy can conceal domination without removing its injustice.

In this edition. Self preserves the substantive moi without importing a later technical psychology of the ego.

A place to read. B323 (Brunschvicg 323)'s question and B455 (Brunschvicg 455)'s exchange with Miton.

Meaning

The substantive moi turns the first-person pronoun into a question: what is the self that someone claims to love? Elsewhere the same term names the person's orientation toward others, especially the demand to be the center of everything. These questions concern identity and moral order without being identical. A claim about what survives loss of beauty is not already a condemnation of all care for oneself; the condemnation of self-centered domination is not a complete metaphysical theory of personal substance. Pascal's different fragments must be permitted to ask different questions.

Use in the book

B323 (Brunschvicg 323) begins with a window spectator. If I pass, the observer need not have come to see me in particular. Mere inclusion in someone's field of vision is not personal intention. The example then gives way to love of beauty: smallpox can destroy beauty without killing the person, yet love directed at that beauty ceases. Judgment and memory create the same difficulty because I can lose them without losing myself. The question of where the self is—neither identifiable with these bodily nor mental qualities—remains pressing rather than resolved by an announced hidden essence.

The next possibility also fails: love of the soul's substance abstracted from every quality would be impossible and unjust. Pascal concludes that people love qualities, not persons, then turns the discomfort against mockery of those honored for offices. If all loved qualities are in some sense borrowed, a social title is not uniquely exposed. This unsettling conclusion should not be rewritten into the comforting claim that genuine love invariably reaches an unchanging core. Nor does it prove that no kind of personal love can ever exist in every context of the volume. Its exact problem is how ordinary love reaches a person through perishable qualities.

B122 (Brunschvicg 122) and B123 (Brunschvicg 123) give the problem a temporal setting. Time heals because offender and offended change; the person loved ten years ago and the lover himself are no longer the same in the relevant respects. B147 (Brunschvicg 147) adds another division, between actual being and the imaginary being maintained in others' minds. We may abandon the real virtue to acquire its reputation. These observations do not all make the same claim about numerical identity. They show how attachment and recognition depend on changing characteristics and social images.

B455 (Brunschvicg 455) stages a moral dispute with Miton. The initial charge that the self is hateful receives a defense through obliging behavior. Pascal distinguishes removing the inconvenience caused to others from removing the injustice of making oneself the center of the whole. Courteous conduct can disarm rivals' self-interest without changing that inward claim. The phrase “every self” belongs to this diagnosis of competing centers and would-be tyrants, not to a neutral dictionary definition of any first-person consciousness. B457 (Brunschvicg 457) identifies the false step: being a whole to oneself, so that one's death ends the world for oneself, does not make one everything to everyone.

The volume also preserves a legitimate orientation toward oneself. B66 (Brunschvicg 66) requires self-knowledge for regulating life; B423 (Brunschvicg 423) says to love the capacity for good while hating its baseness. B483 (Brunschvicg 483)'s member discovers that it belongs to a body and loves itself for that body, rather than posing as an independent

whole. B469 (Brunschvicg 469) states that the self consists in thought while arguing its contingency; this is a distinct claim within an argument about necessary being. Taken together, these passages prevent “the self is hateful” from being flattened into a prohibition on every self-relation. The demand is to distinguish truthful knowledge and ordered love from an unjust claim to supremacy.

Places to Read

B66 (Brunschvicg 66) — Self-knowledge has a practical role in regulating life.

B122 (Brunschvicg 122) — Time changes the parties to grief and quarrel.

B123 (Brunschvicg 123) — Both lover and beloved change over time.

B147 (Brunschvicg 147) — The imaginary self in others' minds competes with real being.

B323 (Brunschvicg 323) — Love of perishable qualities unsettles the question of whom one loves.

B423 (Brunschvicg 423) — The capacity for good is distinguished from the baseness within it.

B455 (Brunschvicg 455) — Miton's courtesy removes inconvenience but not the self's unjust centrality.

B457 (Brunschvicg 457) — Being a whole to oneself is confused with being everything to everyone.

B469 (Brunschvicg 469) — The thinking self is considered as contingent rather than necessary.

B483 (Brunschvicg 483) — The member learns an ordered love of itself within the body.

In this edition

The English "self" usually follows substantive le moi; ordinary pronouns remain pronouns when the French speaks directly as I or myself. B323 (Brunschvicg 323)'s "borrowed qualities" renders qualités empruntées, not a supplied technical doctrine of accidents. In B455 (Brunschvicg 455) the speaker boundary matters: the defense through courtesy is the reply under examination, not Pascal's settled account of sufficient reform. B323 (Brunschvicg 323) does not supply a finished theory of identity; the later body-and-member passages provide a distinct continuation rather than a retroactive solution.

See also

Self-love (p. 192); Charity (p. 73); Thinking (p. 195); Tyranny (p. 65); Borrowed qualities (p. 209); Miton and obliging behavior (p. 239); Imaginary being in others' minds (p. 230).

Contents

Self-love

Self-love · Pensées

amour-propre — self-love [printed form]; *soi-même* — oneself [printed form]; *se faire Dieu* — make themselves God [phrase]; *illusion volontaire* — voluntary illusion [phrase]

At a Glance

The word. An attachment demanding its own primacy and resisting a truthful estimate of itself.

In the book. It recruits concealment, flattery, and selective judgment, yet self-interest can also be addressed to awaken inquiry.

In this edition. Self-love is not interchangeable with responsible self-care or modern self-esteem.

A place to read. B100 (Brunschvicg 100) for the social mechanism and B492 (Brunschvicg 492) for its theological diagnosis.

Meaning

Amour-propre in B100 (Brunschvicg 100) loves and considers itself alone while confronting an object full of defects. It wants greatness, happiness, perfection, love, and esteem, but sees smallness, misery, and imperfection. The central injustice is not simply wanting good things. It is wanting others to value the person beyond his true worth and resenting the truth that prevents this. The same orientation connects private evasion with a social economy of mutual flattery. Pascal's diagnosis is therefore broader than

unusual vanity in a few people, while remaining distinct from every possible act of caring for oneself.

Use in the book

B100 (Brunschvicg 100) first describes a failed attempt to annihilate correcting truth. Unable to destroy the truth itself, self-love suppresses its presence in its own knowledge and other people's. This adds a voluntary illusion to the original defect. The reciprocity test is pointed: we do not want others to deceive us or demand undeserved esteem, so our own equivalent demand is unjust. A person who reveals an actual fault did not create it and may help remove the ignorance that protects it. The imagined response of an equitable heart supplies the contrast with the resentment Pascal finds in ordinary conduct.

Confession then tests resistance under limited exposure. Catholic practice, as the passage presents it, requires opening the heart to one person bound by secrecy rather than public disclosure to everyone. Resenting even that condition reveals how deep concealment runs. Pascal links resistance to religious division in Europe, but the edition marks this as his polemical explanation rather than an established history of the Reformation. The lexical point is the movement from wanting to be admired to treating the truth about oneself as an enemy.

The argument widens into relationships. Those who depend on someone's favor avoid an unwelcome corrective service; the person who wants flattery receives it. Rank intensifies the incentive because powerful affection is useful and powerful dislike dangerous. A prince can become Europe's laughingstock without hearing the truth himself. But lesser fortunes share the pattern: mutual interest supports mutual deception. The passage's sweeping conclusions about friendship belong to this critique, not to a count or independently surveyed claim about all relationships. B101 (Brunschvicg 101)'s remark about fewer than four friends similarly intensifies the thought experiment.

B82 (Brunschvicg 82) supplies a revealing qualification. An attempt to avoid self-interest may become unjust in the opposite direction, as a fair case loses because a relative recommends it. Correcting self-love is not achieved by automatically reversing every preference associated with oneself. B99 (Brunschvicg 99)'s will redirects attention toward a favored aspect rather than simply inventing belief. B150 (Brunschvicg 150) turns suspicion back on the writer and reader who want credit for exposing vanity. The critique includes its own possible appropriation as a new means of distinction.

B492 (Brunschvicg 492) names the underlying demand as making oneself God. It is false that the self deserves this supremacy, unjust to demand it, and impossible for all competing selves to achieve it. Pascal then describes a born injustice from which we cannot free ourselves yet must be freed,

locating the need for remedy in his religious argument. B455 (Brunschvicg 455) separately distinguishes polite concealment from removal of the injustice. Yet B194 (Brunschvicg 194) can appeal to an interest of self-love to make the indifferent person take eternity seriously. That appeal does not pronounce the motive fully healed: it uses an existing concern to begin a search. B423 (Brunschvicg 423) and B483 (Brunschvicg 483) finally allow a discriminating love of one's capacity and of oneself as a member, preventing the vocabulary from becoming a blanket denial of any rightful self-regard.

Places to Read

B82 (Brunschvicg 82) — Overcorrecting self-interest can create a contrary injustice.

B99 (Brunschvicg 99) — The will favors a side and directs the mind's attention toward it.

B100 (Brunschvicg 100) — Self-love resists correction and organizes concealment and flattery.

B101 (Brunschvicg 101) — A hypothetical disclosure of private remarks exposes fragile friendship.

B150 (Brunschvicg 150) — Even writing and reading against vanity can seek glory.

B194 (Brunschvicg 194) — Self-interest is appealed to as an initial motive for serious inquiry.

B423 (Brunschvicg 423) — One may love the capacity for good without loving its baseness.

B455 (Brunschvicg 455) — Social pleasantness does not remove the claim to be everyone's center.

B483 (Brunschvicg 483) — Love of oneself as a member is ordered toward the body rather than independent supremacy.

B492 (Brunschvicg 492) — The desire to make oneself God is diagnosed as an inborn injustice.

In this edition

The edition keeps the hyphenated term “self-love.” “Self-esteem” would change its evaluative setting and obscure the claim to excessive valuation, while “selfishness” alone would narrow the mechanism to obvious acts of advantage. In B100 (Brunschvicg 100) the hypothetical feelings of a just heart are distinguished from the contrary disposition actually criticized. B492 (Brunschvicg 492)'s comparative claim about religions remains Pascal's apologetic assertion, not an independent survey of religious traditions. The theological diagnosis requires the accompanying distinctions about self-interest, overcorrection, and ordered love.

See also

Self (p. 189); Pride (p. 157); Truth (p. 162); Conversion (p. 76); Charity (p. 73); Flattery and rank (p. 224); The one person who hears confession (p. 269); Voluntary illusion (p. 282).

Contents

Thinking

Thinking · Pensées

pensée — thought [printed form]; *penser* — to think [printed form]; *roseau pensant* — thinking reed [phrase]; *bien penser* — thinking well [phrase]; *songer* — to think about [printed form]; *Travaillons* — Let us work [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. The capacity and activity through which a vulnerable person knows, judges, and reflects on an end.

In the book. Thought gives dignity, but its proper exercise is a task rather than an automatic possession.

In this edition. Thought, thinking, and particular thoughts follow the French syntax and local object.

A place to read. B347 (Brunschvicg 347) and B365 (Brunschvicg 365), read with B146 (Brunschvicg 146)'s account of what thought should begin from.

Meaning

Pensée may name the activity of thought, its capacity, or a particular thought occupying attention. Penser names thinking, while songer often emphasizes considering or attending to something. These terms overlap without being identical printed forms. Pascal's concern is not simply whether the mind is busy: a life can be full of calculations, plans, and reflections while avoiding the subject it most needs to examine. Thought's

dignity therefore concerns both what a human being can do and the demand to direct that power rightly.

Use in the book

B146 (Brunschvicg 146) says humanity is made to think and locates dignity, merit, and duty in thinking as it should. The proposed order begins with oneself, one's author, and one's end. Dancing, music, verse, tournaments, combat, and seeking kingship fill the contrasting inventory. Their fault in the fragment is not that they contain no thought, but that they absorb it without asking what being a king or a human being means. B145 (Brunschvicg 145) makes single-minded absorption useful according to the world rather than God. The condition that enables concentration also makes diversion possible.

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) develops that ambivalence. A bereaved person watching the hunt is free for the moment from thoughts of grief; an official's duties leave no hour to think about himself. Even a scholar studying such behavior may seek only the reputation of knowing it. B171 (Brunschvicg 171) accordingly makes diversion the consolation that prevents the reflection which might prompt a firmer remedy. B172 (Brunschvicg 172) adds a temporal displacement: the present is usually treated as a means to a future happiness rather than lived as an end. The capacity to anticipate becomes a way of indefinitely postponing life.

B339 (Brunschvicg 339) asks what is necessary to conceiving a human being. It can conceive a person without hands, feet, or even a head: only experience teaches that the head is more necessary than the feet; without thought, by contrast, the being would be a stone or beast. This is an argument about the concept employed, not medical evidence that headlessness permits human life. B346 (Brunschvicg 346) condenses the thesis into thought making human greatness. B347 (Brunschvicg 347) then deliberately chooses the frail reed as its figure. The smallest vapor or drop of water can kill it; no total cosmic assault is required. Thought does not compensate by making the reed physically invulnerable.

Its distinction is awareness. Even crushed by the universe, the person knows that he dies and understands the universe's advantage, whereas the universe knows nothing of it. Dignity belongs to a different order from magnitude or duration, which we cannot fill. The conclusion therefore calls for work: thinking well is the principle of morality. B348 (Brunschvicg 348) repeats the point through the double comprendre. The universe contains me spatially; I comprehend it intellectually. Acquiring more land does not increase that dignity, which depends on ordering thought rather than enlarging one's physical share.

B365 (Brunschvicg 365) prevents this account from becoming self-congratulation. Thought is admirable and incomparable by nature, yet its

defects can make it ridiculous and contemptible. Capacity and accomplishment must be judged separately. B381 (Brunschvicg 381) likewise warns that both too little and too much attention can distort judgment, just as a painting can be viewed from too near or too far. B793 (Brunschvicg 793) finally places thought above bodies but below supernatural charity: bodies cannot produce a little thought in its account of kinds, and bodies plus minds cannot produce a movement of charity. Thinking is thus a genuine human distinction and moral responsibility, not a sufficient name for the highest good.

Places to Read

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) — Absorbing thought can divert even the observer who studies diversion.

B145 (Brunschvicg 145) — One occupying thought prevents another from becoming present.

B146 (Brunschvicg 146) — Thought should begin with oneself, one's author, and one's end.

B171 (Brunschvicg 171) — Diversion interrupts thought that might prompt the search for a remedy.

B172 (Brunschvicg 172) — Thought abandons the present for imagined future satisfaction.

B339 (Brunschvicg 339) — Thought is indispensable to the human being as conceived in the fragment.

B347 (Brunschvicg 347) — The fragile reed's knowledge grounds dignity and the duty to think well.

B348 (Brunschvicg 348) — Spatial containment differs from intellectual comprehension.

B365 (Brunschvicg 365) — Thought's admirable nature coexists with contemptible defects.

B381 (Brunschvicg 381) — Too much or too little attention distorts judgment like a badly chosen viewing distance.

B793 (Brunschvicg 793) — Thought’s distinct order remains below supernatural charity.

In this edition

At B347 (Brunschvicg 347) bien penser is “thinking well,” not merely “having good thoughts.” The phrase retains the active demand expressed by Travaillons. B348 (Brunschvicg 348) necessarily uses two English verbs, “contains” and “comprehend,” for the repeated French comprendre; its note explicitly records this loss and preservation of sense. Pensées as a title does not promise a completed systematic treatise, and the fragments' projected orders and unfinished transitions should not be polished into one. Thought's nature and its actual defects require separate judgments.

See also

Mind (p. 130); Greatness (p. 177); Death (p. 168); Diversion (p. 174); Self (p. 189); The thinking reed (p. 275); Present time and hoped-for living (p. 249).

Contents

Wretchedness

Wretchedness · Pensées

misère — wretchedness; misery [printed form]; *misérable* — miserable [printed form]; *déchu* — fallen [printed form]; *malheureux* — unhappy [printed form]

At a Glance

The word. A condition of insufficiency encompassing error, dependence, mortality, and disappointed aspiration, not poverty alone.

In the book. Knowing misery can attest the greatness that makes the deprivation felt.

In this edition. Misery, wretchedness, miserable, and unhappy preserve related but distinct words and local emphases.

A place to read. B397 (Brunschvicg 397) and B409 (Brunschvicg 409), with B434 (Brunschvicg 434)'s religious explanation of the divided condition.

Meaning

Misère reaches beyond lack of possessions. It can include ignorance, weakness, mortality, unhappy dependence, and failure to attain a good one nevertheless desires. Misérable names the subject's condition; malheureux may emphasize unhappiness or misfortune. Their relation to grandeur is central. The human being experiences not merely a brute deficiency but a lack measured against an aspiration or capacity. Pascal's Christian account interprets that lack as a damaged condition. This argument is neither a

clinical judgment about a particular reader nor a claim that worldly hardship is insignificant.

Use in the book

B60 (Brunschvicg 60)'s outline pairs human wretchedness without God with happiness with God, then restates the plan as corrupted nature shown through nature and a Restorer shown through Scripture. It establishes the projected relation between diagnosis and religious remedy. The early observations supply many different experiences of lack: shifting desires in B109 (Brunschvicg 109), the dependence and need of B126 (Brunschvicg 126), the boredom exposed by inactivity in B131 (Brunschvicg 131). Material comfort cannot remove the condition. B139 (Brunschvicg 139)'s king and disgraced officials may retain wealth and servants while becoming unable to bear undiverted reflection.

The same fragment identifies mortality as the deeper reason for restless pursuits. Diversion provides a real temporary change of attention, but B171 (Brunschvicg 171) calls that consolation itself the greatest misery because it prevents thought and a search for something more solid. Thus an activity can relieve felt misery while sustaining the condition that makes relief necessary. B174 (Brunschvicg 174) pairs Solomon and Job, abundance and extreme affliction, as opposed experiential routes to understanding it. The first knows pleasures' vanity, the second the reality of evils. The pairing denies that only destitution or catastrophe can disclose the subject.

B397 (Brunschvicg 397) makes knowing oneself miserable both misery and greatness. B399 (Brunschvicg 399) insists on awareness, excluding a ruined house from misery in this sense. B398 (Brunschvicg 398)'s dispossessed king and B409 (Brunschvicg 409)'s fuller comparisons explain why a deprivation is not simply the absence of any imaginable advantage. Ordinary people do not grieve not being kings as a deposed king does; lacking a third eye is not like losing one's sight. What counts as loss depends on what properly belongs to the being. Pascal infers a better original nature from the pain of a present condition that resembles animals while remaining experienced as a falling short.

B416 (Brunschvicg 416) shows how greatness and misery continually become evidence for one another. A greater height makes a fall worse; consciousness of the fall reveals a surviving greatness. B418 (Brunschvicg 418) accordingly warns against showing only one side. B423 (Brunschvicg 423) distinguishes the natural capacity for good, which should not be despised, from its present emptiness and baseness. This discriminating account is more precise than either celebrating human potential without qualification or representing the person as nothing but contemptible. B420 (Brunschvicg 420)'s alternating praise and humiliation aims to prevent repose in either partial description.

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) brings rival philosophical explanations to an impasse before proposing creation, corruption, and grace as the key. If humanity had never been corrupted, it would securely enjoy truth and happiness; if it had never been other than corrupt, it would have no idea of either. The transmission of sin is then acknowledged as deeply offensive to human reason before being claimed as necessary for self-understanding. This is the theological explanation Pascal advances, not a proof contained in the ordinary meaning of misery. B425 (Brunschvicg 425)'s empty trace of former happiness supplies a related account of desire. Both explanations retain that argumentative status; the images do not certify themselves.

Places to Read

B60 (Brunschvicg 60) — A working outline joins the diagnosis of wretchedness to a proposed religious remedy.

B131 (Brunschvicg 131) — Dependence and emptiness emerge when occupation ceases.

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) — Rank and material comfort do not abolish mortal unhappiness.

B171 (Brunschvicg 171) — Diversion consoles misery while postponing a more solid remedy.

B174 (Brunschvicg 174) — Solomon and Job exemplify opposed experiences of the same condition.

B397 (Brunschvicg 397) — Knowledge of misery attests greatness without removing misery.

B399 (Brunschvicg 399) — The ruined house distinguishes damage from aware misery.

B409 (Brunschvicg 409) — Deprivation is measured against what properly belongs to a being.

B416 (Brunschvicg 416) — The reciprocal inference from greatness and misery explains the philosophers' circle.

B418 (Brunschvicg 418) — Greatness and baseness must be represented together.

B423 (Brunschvicg 423) — A capacity worth loving is distinguished from its empty condition.

B434 (Brunschvicg 434) — Creation, corruption, and grace are offered as the divided condition's explanation.

In this edition

"Wretchedness" avoids reducing misère to economic poverty, but the edition also uses "misery," including in B397 (Brunschvicg 397) and B409 (Brunschvicg 409). There is no invariant English equivalent. Malheureux is generally "unhappy" in these examples, and déchu carries the fallen condition in B409 (Brunschvicg 409); neither should be silently counted as an occurrence of misère. The dispossessed king remains an analogy within the argument. Its precise relation between status and deprivation does not mean that the metaphor alone establishes the doctrine of the Fall.

See also

Greatness (p. 177); Boredom (p. 166); Death (p. 168); Fall (p. 12); Happiness (p. 180); The ruined house (p. 272); Solomon and Job (p. 257).
Contents

Compact register

These shorter entries explain further local words, images, people and distinctions. Some supply a useful way into a major article; others preserve a detail that would disappear under an abstract heading. Their attestations are selected. Read an account of a historical belief or a theological claim as an explanation of the source, not as independent confirmation of that belief.

A book that forms a people

un livre reçu d'un peuple — a book received by a people [phrase]; *qui forme un peuple* — one that forms a people [phrase]

B594 (Brunschvicg 594) briefly distinguishes a book received by a people from one that forms a people. B628 (Brunschvicg 628) develops a related contrast between an individual's work cast into society and a book made by a people itself. Pascal uses the relation between text and community to argue for antiquity and continuity, contrasting it with stories whose later readers no longer know whether they began as fiction. This is a proposed criterion within his apologetic history, not a general proof that every community's inherited narrative is true or contemporaneous with its events.

Places to read. B594 (Brunschvicg 594); B628 (Brunschvicg 628).

See also. Scripture (p. 94); Witness (p. 38); Jews (p. 145).

A dance of spirits

ballet des esprits — dance of spirits [phrase]; *nerfs touchés* — nerves touched [phrase]

Esprits here names subtle bodily or animal spirits in a historical physiological explanation, not immaterial minds. Pascal asks how the felt quality of pleasure, warmth, light or sound can seem so remote from an account of particles moving and nerves being touched. The comparison does not simply deny bodily mechanism; it emphasizes the surprising distance between experience and its explanation. The final sentence returns to nerves despite differences in the smallness of the particles and the nerves affected. Reading every esprit as "mind" would destroy that local argument.

Places to read. B368 (Brunschvicg 368).

See also. Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Mind (p. 130); Nature (p. 186).

A heretic confirming truth

pour confirmer une vérité — to confirm a truth [phrase]

Barcos allows that declared heretics can be associated with genuine miracles when these confirm truth. His answer must be read beside the earlier refusal of any true miracle confirming error, not treated as its contradiction. QM-VIII-R (Question VIII, Reply — Martin de Barcos) explains that such events would mark the Church because they confirm what it teaches rather than the heretics' error. The category heretic remains a Catholic polemical classification in the exchange. The distinction neither validates all beliefs of the person through whom an event occurs nor permits ignoring the proposition at issue. It is a particularly important qualification to Pascal's compressed formulas elsewhere.

Places to read. QM-IV-R (Question IV, Reply — Martin de Barcos); QM-QuestionsVandVI-R (Questions V and VI, Reply — Martin de Barcos); QM-VIII-R (Question VIII, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Church (p. 137); Truth (p. 162).

A safe path or merely staying on it?

sûr — safe [printed form]

Pascal accuses the casuists of changing the meaning of safety. A path was supposed to lead to heaven without danger of failing to arrive by it; it becomes safe merely because one is not in danger of leaving the path. Remaining consistent with an approved procedure is therefore substituted for reaching the right end. The repeated negatives make the distinction easy to lose, but they are the point. This criticism concerns security of conscience under probabilist moral reasoning, not a numerical calculation of physical risk. It complements B908 (Brunschvicg 908)'s distinction between assurance grounded in truth and peace grounded in sincere search.

Places to read. B920 (Brunschvicg 920).

See also. Probability (p. 62); Morality (p. 56); Peace (p. 154).

A scrap of a hood

Un bout de capuchon — a scrap of a hood [phrase]

The tiny piece of religious clothing is said to arm twenty-five thousand monks. The disproportion between object and mobilized body gives the sentence its force: corporate allegiance can concentrate power around a small outward sign. The number is Pascal's transmitted claim, not a verified membership count. The prefixed 751 remains an unexplained cue in the source. The image belongs with the later dossiers about religious institutions

and their solidarity, but the fragment does not itself narrate a particular battle or identify a named hood.

Places to read. B955 (Brunschvicg 955).

See also. Church (p. 137); Force (p. 44); The habit makes the doctrine (p. 266).

A single subject and its parts

suppôt — single subject [printed form]; *campagne* — countryside [printed form]

Suppôt names an individual considered as a whole. B115 (Brunschvicg 115) asks what happens when a human being is dissected into head, heart, stomach, veins, blood, and further components. A distant town or countryside similarly resolves into houses, tiles, leaves, grass, ants, and ants' legs as one approaches. The common name encloses indefinitely rich detail rather than making it disappear. The example does not say that wholes are unreal. It shows why a unity sufficient for one purpose cannot automatically substitute for knowledge of its constituent differences or determine the appropriate scale of inquiry.

Places to read. B115 (Brunschvicg 115).

See also. Mind (p. 130); Infinity (p. 183); Nature (p. 186).

A slap

soufflet — slap [printed form]; *injures et de nécessités* — insults and privations [phrase]

The response to a slap is one of B324 (Brunschvicg 324)'s examples of an ordinary opinion with a practical rationale missed by its critics. Pascal says a person who receives it without showing resentment may be overwhelmed by further injuries and privations. Desire for glory similarly has other advantages attached to it. The fragment does not identify resentment with inward charity or establish a general instruction to retaliate. It explains why an outwardly vain concern can protect essential interests within a society whose judgments affect how someone is treated.

Places to read. B324 (Brunschvicg 324).

See also. Honor (p. 47); Opinion (p. 59); Force (p. 44).

A thought held in reserve

pensée de derrière — thought held in reserve [phrase]

The phrase names the underlying judgment through which one is to judge everything while speaking as the people do. B337 (Brunschvicg 337) gives its concrete setting: the able honor high birth, but not for the reason

ordinary people do. Their public response matches without their understanding matching. The phrase should not be converted into a free-standing permission for every deception. It belongs to the distinction between an effective social practice and the truth of the explanation its participants give. Later stages in B337 (Brunschvicg 337) further qualify even the able person's position.

Places to read. B336 (Brunschvicg 336); B337 (Brunschvicg 337).

See also. Opinion (p. 59); Honor (p. 47); Custom (p. 110).

Affirm, doubt, submit

douter — doubt [printed form]; *assurer* — affirm [printed form]; *soumettre* — submit [printed form]; *faillent* — fail to follow [printed form]

B268 (Brunschvicg 268) identifies three appropriate activities rather than one universal posture. Affirming everything as demonstrative mistakes demonstration; doubting everything fails to recognize submission; submitting in everything fails to judge. Knowing when each is fitting manifests reason's strength. The printed verb faillent is verified in the edition's note against a faulty transcription, preserving the structure of the three failures. B270 (Brunschvicg 270) adds that reason submits when it judges it should. The conjunction therefore does not license either indiscriminate skepticism or obedience without discrimination, even within the religious argument.

Places to read. B268 (Brunschvicg 268); B270 (Brunschvicg 270).

See also. Reason (p. 133); Faith (p. 79); First principles (p. 118).

All: scope and exclusions

omnes — all [printed form]

Pascal warns that interpreting the Latin universally in every occurrence can be heretical, while refusing that scope where required can also be heretical. He applies the issue to the Eucharist and original sin, using the historical polemical label Huguenots. The underlying lexical point is scope: the same word does not determine its own domain independently of context. B778 (Brunschvicg 778) explains another comprehensive Gospel expression as including people of every condition. B781 (Brunschvicg 781) then makes the totality of redemption a subject of disputation. The qualified domains in these passages prevent every occurrence of "all" from being read as the same unrestricted numerical assertion.

Places to read. B775 (Brunschvicg 775).

See also. Redemption (p. 26); Sin (p. 32); Scripture (p. 94).

Archimedes and intellectual brilliance

Archimède — Archimedes [printed form]; *spirituelles* — intellectual, in the middle-order contrast [printed form]; *nulle [part] sinon [en] Dieu* — nowhere except in God; the edition's bracketed conjecture [phrase]

Archimedes shows how intellectual greatness can shine without political spectacle. His inventions are offered to minds rather than his battles to eyes, and playing the prince in a geometrical book would not improve its argument. Pascal's claim that he was a prince remains a historical assertion of the source, not a verified biographical addition. The example prepares the further claim that Christ's holiness requires neither princely power nor scientific discovery. The comparison does not place invention and charity on one scale; it illustrates why the proper evidence of one order cannot be demanded as the measure of another.

Places to read. B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

See also. Three orders (p. 35); Geometry (p. 121); Greatness (p. 177).

Assertion before knowledge

cognitioni assertionem præcurrere — assertion running ahead of knowledge [phrase]

One of B364 (Brunschvicg 364)'s Latin extracts calls assertion's running ahead of knowledge shameful. It is a collected maxim, not a premise connected grammatically to every other sentence in the fragment. Nearby extracts concern respect for oneself and ignorance; the edition's note identifies the final fragment with Seneca's discussion of preventing occupations from beginning. Their shared critical interest does not make them one continuous argument by Pascal. The phrase usefully names a recurring pressure in the Pensées: confidence can outrun what the speaker can establish. The abbreviated attribution "Cic." is retained as a source cue rather than expanded into a modern citation without checking.

Places to read. B364 (Brunschvicg 364).

See also. Reason (p. 133); Truth (p. 162); Discernment (p. 113).

At a single glance

d'un seul regard — at a single glance [phrase]; *d'une vue* — at a glance [phrase]

The visual phrase names a way of apprehending numerous considerations together rather than successively enumerating them. B1 (Brunschvicg 1) requires this in delicate matters because their principles cannot usually be handled in geometry's explicit order. Yet it qualifies the contrast: the mind does reason, tacitly and naturally. B3 (Brunschvicg 3)

describes the failure of people habituated to this mode when they demand the same immediacy from propositions requiring definitions. A glance therefore is not necessarily a lucky guess or a privileged revelation. It can be an exact apprehension, but its adequacy depends on what is actually seen and on sound judgment afterward.

Places to read. B1 (Brunschvicg 1); B3 (Brunschvicg 3).

See also. Discernment (p. 113); Geometry (p. 121); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115).

Automaton and machine

automate — automaton [printed form]; *machine* — machine [printed form]

The automaton is the habitual, embodied side of a person, contrasted with mind but not detachable from it. B252 (Brunschvicg 252) says proof alone convinces the mind while custom inclines this mechanism, which may carry the mind along unnoticed. Belief remains unstable if these two parts pull opposite ways. B246 (Brunschvicg 246)'s projected discourse on preparing the machine belongs to the removal of obstacles and seeking through reason; it is not a title proving the existence of a separate finished treatise. B308 (Brunschvicg 308) shows the machine bent toward respect and terror through kings' familiar retinues, demonstrating that its readiness is not itself a mark of truth.

Places to read. B246 (Brunschvicg 246); B252 (Brunschvicg 252); B308 (Brunschvicg 308).

See also. Custom (p. 110); Mind (p. 130); Faith (p. 79).

Awareness and felt nothingness

sentiment — awareness [printed form]; *sentent* — feel [printed form]; *sans le connaître* — without knowing it [phrase]

B399 (Brunschvicg 399) says there is no misery without awareness: a ruined house is not miserable in the way a person is. B164 (Brunschvicg 164) adds that the young deprived of diversion feel their nothingness without knowing it. The two fragments distinguish affected consciousness from an adequately understood account of that condition. Sentiment therefore cannot uniformly mean either an irrational emotion or fully articulated knowledge. B397 (Brunschvicg 397)'s greatness in knowing oneself miserable develops a further step. The capacity that makes loss painful can also make the loss an object of reflection, without thereby removing it.

Places to read. B164 (Brunschvicg 164); B397 (Brunschvicg 397); B399 (Brunschvicg 399).

See also. Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Wretchedness (p. 198); The ruined house (p. 272).

Babylon and Zion

fleuves de Babylone — rivers of Babylon [phrase]; *sainte Sion* — holy Zion [phrase]; *porches de Hiérusalem* — porches of Jerusalem [phrase]

Babylon's rivers flow, fall and carry away; Zion is stable and nothing falls there. Pascal asks whether a pleasure passes: if so, it is a river of Babylon. Sitting above rather than in the rivers joins humility with safety, while standing in Jerusalem belongs to the hoped-for end. The edition identifies the fragment as a condensation of Augustine's exposition of the exile psalm. The geographical names are used spiritually to distinguish passing attachments from the heavenly homeland; the passage is not a factual description of the two earthly cities.

Places to read. B458 (Brunschvicg 458); B459 (Brunschvicg 459).

See also. Concupiscence (p. 41); World (p. 67); Peace (p. 154).

Barcosba / Bar Kokhba

Barcosba — Bar Kokhba [printed form]

The French printed form belongs to a compressed list of messianic claimants and expectations alongside Herod and an unnamed other figure. The English supplies the recognizable form Bar Kokhba. Pascal also names Suetonius, Tacitus, and Josephus as cues about widespread expectation, then returns to the apparent opposition between Judah retaining and losing the scepter. The note does not provide a complete account of this person's life or establish that every listed claimant belongs to one chronological moment.

Places to read. B753 (Brunschvicg 753).

See also. Prophecy (p. 23); Jews (p. 145); Witness (p. 38).

Billiard cue and ball

billard — billiard cue [printed form]; *balle* — ball [printed form]

The edition identifies billard as the implement used to strike the ball. The example opposes a thousand substantial causes of unhappiness to the tiny object capable of diverting the person from them. The cue does not remove those causes; it occupies attention. The nearby account of a gambler shows why bare motion alone may not suffice: a person must invest an object with the passion needed to remain absorbed. Keeping the small physical objects visible preserves Pascal's scale contrast and avoids replacing the cue with an imagined elaborate entertainment apparatus.

Places to read. B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

See also. Boredom (p. 166); Diversion (p. 174); Playing, stakes, and absorption (p. 247).

Bitter herbs

laitues sauvages — wild lettuces [phrase]; *cum amaritudinibus* — with bitter things [phrase]

The herbs accompany the paschal lamb and are immediately glossed by the Latin with bitter things. Their bitterness qualifies Pascal's contrast between Old Testament figures of future joy and New Testament means of penitence. The image does not leave the earlier figure wholly pleasant or make later penitence the opposite of its joyful end. A small element of a meal carries that qualification more precisely than an abstract opposition of joy and suffering would. The fragment is a set of biblical reminders, so the food should not be turned into a detailed reconstruction of ritual practice beyond what is printed.

Places to read. B666 (Brunschvicg 666).

See also. Joy (p. 148); Repentance (p. 159); Lamb and the taking away of sins (p. 233).

Blood and the ligature

circulation du sang — circulation of blood [phrase]; *ligature* — ligature [printed form]

B96 (Brunschvicg 96) observes that habitual bad explanations make people unwilling to accept good ones when discovered. Its example concerns blood circulation and why a vein swells below a ligature. The fragment records the explanatory dispute only as an example; it does not reproduce the competing accounts or license their reconstruction from a few words. The intellectual point is that familiarity with a reason can become an obstacle to recognizing a better reason for the same effect. This concrete medical illustration does not supply present medical advice or a complete history of circulation theory.

Places to read. B96 (Brunschvicg 96).

See also. Custom (p. 110); Reason (p. 133); Effects and causes (p. 218).

Borrowed qualities

qualités empruntées — borrowed qualities [phrase]

B323 (Brunschvicg 323)'s argument passes from beauty lost without the person's death to memory and judgment that can also disappear. The self cannot simply be identified with the qualities through which it is loved, yet

love of an abstract soul irrespective of every quality is rejected as impossible and unjust. The final phrase extends the discomfort to offices and honors: people should not uniquely mock these social qualities when all ordinary love depends on qualities in this way. "Borrowed" does not settle the metaphysical location of the self. It names the problem the fragment has made hard to evade.

Places to read. B323 (Brunschvicg 323).

See also. Self (p. 189); Imaginary being in others' minds (p. 230).

Broad cultivation

gens universels — people of broad cultivation [phrase]; *honnête homme* — cultivated person [phrase]

The cultivated person is not simply an honest person or an expert in every trade. B34 (Brunschvicg 34) describes someone whose accomplishments appear when the occasion calls for them, rather than advertising one permanent professional label. B35 (Brunschvicg 35)'s "Nothing in excess" warns against one quality dominating the whole. B36 (Brunschvicg 36) turns the failure comic: a mathematician might treat a person as a proposition, a soldier as a besieged fortress. The ideal concerns adaptable judgment and responsiveness to human needs. It does not deny the worth of particular skills; their proper use is precisely what should become visible at the right moment.

Places to read. B34 (Brunschvicg 34); B35 (Brunschvicg 35); B36 (Brunschvicg 36).

See also. Mind (p. 130); Geometry (p. 121); Discernment (p. 113).

Cabale, circle, and intriguers

Cabale — Kabbalah in this local source list [printed form]; *cabale* — circle sharing a secret [printed form]; *cabalistes* — political intriguers [printed form]

The same French family cannot receive one mechanical English equivalent. B642 (Brunschvicg 642) lists Kabbalah as a proposed witness to meanings beyond the literal, within Pascal's Christian argument. B691 (Brunschvicg 691) instead imagines a social circle whose members understand a secret double meaning. B935 (Brunschvicg 935) calls the Jesuits poor cabalistes in worldly politics: the English correctly makes them intriguers, not practitioners of Jewish mysticism. Each use needs its local object and argumentative setting. The first list does not establish that the rabbinic authorities endorse Pascal's identification of the Messiah with Jesus Christ, and the later political use does not make a claim about Kabbalah at all.

Places to read. B642 (Brunschvicg 642); B691 (Brunschvicg 691); B935 (Brunschvicg 935).

See also. Figurative meaning (p. 82); Religion (p. 29); Church (p. 137).

Carnal and spiritual

Juifs charnels — carnal Jews [phrase]; *Chrétiens charnels* — carnal Christians [phrase]; *spirituels* — spiritual [printed form]

The contrast concerns the goods toward which religious expectation is directed. B607 (Brunschvicg 607) criticizes a merely temporal Messiah and Christian sacraments imagined to do everything without the recipient, placing both failures under the same demand to love God. B608 (Brunschvicg 608) and B609 (Brunschvicg 609) impose a Christian interpretive scheme on Jewish and pagan history, with different affections within each group. "Carnal" is therefore not simply a synonym for Jewish, bodily or sexually active. The historical generalizations remain Pascal's, while the inclusion of carnal Christians is essential to the local distinction.

Places to read. B607 (Brunschvicg 607); B608 (Brunschvicg 608); B609 (Brunschvicg 609).

See also. Charity (p. 73); Figurative meaning (p. 82); Religion (p. 29).

Certainty in the Mémorial

Certitude — certainty [printed form]

The paper text repeats certainty before feeling, joy, and peace. Here the word belongs to an intense devotional acknowledgment rather than the final line of a geometrical demonstration. The surrounding biblical names and repeated Jesus Christ identify what the certainty concerns. It should not be generalized into a claim that every strong feeling guarantees truth. The supplied edition follows paper D: the parchment version known through copy E has a different sequence, including vue, and must not silently replace this wording. The record's subsequent fear of separation also shows that certainty does not abolish concern about continuing in the relation.

Places to read. MEM (Mémorial paper D).

See also. Faith (p. 79); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Truth (p. 162).

Chest and compressed maxims

coffre — chest [printed form]

B20 (Brunschvicg 20) compares a maxim containing all moral precepts to a chest in which they remain hidden and useless until opened. Once explained, the precepts emerge in the very confusion the compressed

formula was meant to avoid. The objection is not that concise sayings can never guide action, but that enclosing many distinctions in one phrase does not itself explain them. B82 (Brunschvicg 82) later gives a different chest: one believed empty because nothing is seen within it, used in rival arguments about the void. The same concrete noun serves different questions of enclosure and unseen content.

Places to read. B20 (Brunschvicg 20); B82 (Brunschvicg 82).

See also. Reason (p. 133); First principles (p. 118); The void and rival conditioning (p. 277).

Cipher and intercepted letter

un chiffre à double sens — a cipher with a double meaning [phrase]

Pascal imagines intercepting an important letter that has an intelligible surface yet also declares its meaning hidden and contains apparent contrarieties. He infers that another sense must be sought. The analogy differs from a portrait: a portrait visibly presents an absent object, while a cipher requires a key to another meaning. Christ and the apostles supply the key in Pascal's Christian reading. The conclusion rests on his premise that the textual tensions signal an intended coherent sense. It is not permission to invent any hidden meaning that an ingenious reader can make fit a few phrases.

Places to read. B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

See also. Figurative meaning (p. 82); Scripture (p. 94); Portrait, presence, and absence (p. 248).

Circumcision of the heart

circoncision du cœur — circumcision of the heart [phrase]; *incirconcis de cœur* — uncircumcised in heart [phrase]; *circoncira leur cœur* — will circumcise their heart [phrase]

In B610 (Brunschvicg 610)'s scriptural dossier, circumcision is treated as a sign whose inward significance concerns removal of the heart's hardness and love of God. Pascal gathers commands to be circumcised in heart, a promise that God will perform this action, and judgments against those uncircumcised in heart. The dossier distinguishes an outward rite from the interior relation it is taken to signify, rather than making every biblical mention merely metaphorical. B689 (Brunschvicg 689) restates Moses' promise: God will circumcise the people's heart to make them capable of loving him. The divine agent and enabling purpose distinguish this promise from a self-created moral achievement or a surgical claim about the organ. B690 (Brunschvicg 690) uses such a decisive statement to interpret otherwise ambiguous discourse; B672 (Brunschvicg 672) argues from

reception of the Holy Spirit by the uncircumcised to the rite's lack of necessity. These related uses remain distinct. The broader conclusions about replacement and the end of institutions belong to Pascal's Christian interpretation, not a neutral replacement of Jewish meanings or the self-description of all Jewish readers.

Places to read. B610 (Brunschvicg 610); B672 (Brunschvicg 672); B689 (Brunschvicg 689); B690 (Brunschvicg 690).

See also. Figurative meaning (p. 82); Scripture (p. 94); Law (p. 53); Heart (p. 124); Grace (p. 85).

Cleobuline

Cléobuline — Cleobuline [printed form]

The reader enjoys the character's passion because she does not recognize her own error; if she were not deceived, she would displease. The annotation identifies the character in Scudéry's Artamène ou le Grand Cyrus. What matters locally is the difference between a spectator's awareness and the character's self-knowledge. Pascal does not summarize her whole story or make this an unrestricted rule for all fiction. The short observation belongs beside his account of theater's emotional effects and natural speech's power to reveal a truth already present in the hearer without having been noticed.

Places to read. B13 (Brunschvicg 13); B14 (Brunschvicg 14).

See also. Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Self (p. 189); Theater and represented passions (p. 278).

Complete and gentle renunciation

Renonciation totale et douce — renunciation, complete and gentle [phrase]

The two adjectives belong together. Total renunciation does not here receive the adjective harsh or reluctant; its gentleness belongs to the relation to God expressed in the record. The line follows the statement about keeping to the Gospel's ways and precedes the paper witness's final Etc. The edition does not import the lost parchment version's additional lines about discipline and submission. This matters because those lines would give the conclusion a different explicit scope. The phrase describes a devotional relinquishment, not a general endorsement of coercion, and should be read with the joy and confession that have led to it.

Places to read. MEM (Mémorial paper D).

See also. Conversion (p. 76); Joy (p. 148); World (p. 67).

Condemned prisoners

chaînes — chains [printed form]; *condamnés à la mort* — condemned to death [phrase]

The reader is told to imagine prisoners whose companions are killed each day before them. Those left see their own condition in the others and await their turn. B199 (Brunschvicg 199) expressly labels the scene an image of the human condition; it is not testimony to a particular execution. Its force comes from making a familiar abstract certainty visible as shared anticipation. B200 (Brunschvicg 200) changes the structure by allowing time to investigate a sentence and obtain a reprieve. The first emphasizes mortality and recognition, the second the irrational neglect of an inquiry that could matter decisively.

Places to read. B199 (Brunschvicg 199); B200 (Brunschvicg 200).

See also. Death (p. 168); Search (p. 97); Piquet in the dungeon (p. 246).

Conscience and wrongdoing

par conscience — out of conscience [phrase]

The short fragment says evil is never done so fully and cheerfully as when done out of conscience. Its provocation distinguishes the agent's conscientious conviction from the truth of the judgment directing action. It does not say that conscience should be ignored or that all conscientious action is evil. Elsewhere Pascal asks what can secure conscience and refuses to equate permission from numerous authorities with truth. Read in that setting, the sentence exposes a danger of moral self-assurance: believing oneself obligated can intensify an act rather than excuse its object from examination.

Places to read. B895 (Brunschvicg 895).

See also. Morality (p. 56); Truth (p. 162); Probability (p. 62).

Containment and comprehension

comprend — contains [printed form]; *comprends* — comprehend [printed form]; *comprendre* — comprehend [printed form]

B348 (Brunschvicg 348) repeats the same French verb with opposed relations: through space the universe contains and engulfs the person, while through thought the person comprehends the universe. English needs two verbs to preserve that difference. The verbal repetition does not establish equal powers of physical and intellectual possession; its point is the different ground of dignity. B72 (Brunschvicg 72) also uses comprendre in the inquiry into understanding extremes, where finite humanity's limits are

emphasized. The later intellectual claim must therefore not be inflated into complete knowledge of every part or ultimate principle of nature.

Places to read. B72 (Brunschvicg 72); B348 (Brunschvicg 348).

See also. Thinking (p. 195); Infinity (p. 183); Greatness (p. 177).

Contrarieties

Contrariétés — Contradictions; Contrarieties [printed form]; *contredis* — contradict [printed form]

B125 (Brunschvicg 125) pairs credulity with incredulity and timidity with rashness as natural human tendencies. Such contrarieties do not necessarily assert one proposition and its negation in the same respect. B423 (Brunschvicg 423) then discriminates what seems a contradiction in self-relation: love the capacity for good, not the baseness within it; despise its emptiness, not the capacity. B420 (Brunschvicg 420)'s speaker contradicts both boasting and self-abasement to prevent repose in a one-sided account. The movement seeks an adequate description of the divided subject, not the indiscriminate celebration of inconsistency or the suspension of every distinction.

Places to read. B125 (Brunschvicg 125); B420 (Brunschvicg 420); B423 (Brunschvicg 423).

See also. Contradiction (p. 107); Greatness (p. 177); Wretchedness (p. 198).

Contrition seeking the sacrament

contrition — contrition [printed form]

Contrition is the inward penitential disposition without which absolution alone does not remit sins in Pascal's account. Yet he immediately says it is not genuine unless it seeks the sacrament. The qualification blocks both an outward ceremony treated as automatic and an inward feeling treated as independent of its proper expression. The comparison of a contrite person without the sacrament with an unrepentant person receiving it does not remove that seeking. The term therefore cannot simply be glossed remorse or punishment. The fragment's later marriage comparison serves the same intention-and-form problem while remaining a difficult analogy to assess in its own terms.

Places to read. B923 (Brunschvicg 923).

See also. Repentance (p. 159); Church (p. 137); Sin (p. 32).

Conversation and the circle of cultivation

conversations — conversations [printed form]; *un cercle* — a circle [phrase]

Good and bad conversation form or spoil both mind and the sense of things. The difficulty is circular: choosing well requires the very cultivation the choice is meant to provide. B6 (Brunschvicg 6) acknowledges that fortunate people escape without explaining a universally available procedure. The passage makes social formation relevant to cognitive judgment, not merely manners. B47 (Brunschvicg 47) adds that an audience and place can draw more from a speaker's mind than solitary writing does. Conversation can therefore enable thought as well as corrupt it; its influence cannot be decided from sociability or isolation alone.

Places to read. B6 (Brunschvicg 6); B47 (Brunschvicg 47).

See also. Mind (p. 130); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Custom (p. 110).

Covenant

pactum meum — my covenant [phrase]; *fœdere sempiterno* — everlasting covenant [phrase]; *alliance* — covenant [printed form]

B612 (Brunschvicg 612) excerpts the divine promise of a covenant and the corresponding command to keep it. Its Latin is abbreviated, so the English does not expand it into the complete biblical verse. B610 (Brunschvicg 610) and B678 (Brunschvicg 678) then ask how promises of an enduring covenant relate to statements that it will change. Pascal uses that tension to argue for a figurative or spiritual meaning fulfilled in Christ. The covenant vocabulary therefore carries both obligation and promised relation, while the claimed Christian resolution is an interpretation rather than a conclusion supplied by the word alone.

Places to read. B610 (Brunschvicg 610); B612 (Brunschvicg 612); B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

See also. Law (p. 53); Scripture (p. 94); Figurative meaning (p. 82).

Cromwell and the small stone

Cromwell — Cromwell [printed form]; *grain de sable* — grain of sand [phrase]; *uretère* — ureter [printed form]

A tiny bodily obstruction overturns an enormous projected political future in B176 (Brunschvicg 176). Pascal contrasts plans to ravage Christendom and establish a dynasty with a stone lodged in the ureter, followed by death and restoration of the king. The edition retains the account as his historical assertion, not a certified medical explanation of

Cromwell's death or an independently established counterfactual history. Its local force is the disproportion between apparent worldly power and bodily contingency. Reading the image accurately requires preserving both the small physical object and the conditional political prospects it interrupts.

Places to read. B176 (Brunschvicg 176).

See also. Death (p. 168); Greatness (p. 177); Infinity (p. 183).

Crossed hands

il met ses bras en croix — he crosses his arms [phrase]

Jacob crosses his arms to place his right hand on the younger Ephraim and his left on the elder Manasseh. Joseph's objection makes the reversal explicit rather than accidental. Jacob insists that he knows what he is doing, and Pascal reads the later growth of Ephraim as the fulfillment of this particular prediction. The action gives a bodily form to preference and blessing. Although the arms form a cross, the immediate account concerns the two children and their descendants; an additional crucifixion typology is not stated in this fragment.

Places to read. B711 (Brunschvicg 711).

See also. Prophecy (p. 23); Joseph's bones (p. 232).

Defensible, probable, and supported by authority

Probabilité — probability in moral-theological discussion [printed form]; *Tueri quis potest* — one can defend it [phrase]; *probabilis est* — it is probable [phrase]; *autore non caret* — it does not lack an authority [phrase]

B958 (Brunschvicg 958) pairs abbreviated Latin excerpts in another hand with Pascal's comments. Under Probabilité, his comment records three short Latin clauses: a position can be defended, is probable, and has an authority. Their juxtaposition concerns moral-theological defensibility and cited support, not a numerical likelihood or a calculation of chances. The fragment does not spell out a complete inference among the clauses. Nor do the boundary words of the adjacent letter extract authorize reconstructing its missing sentences. Keeping the two hands and the gaps visible prevents the whole table from becoming a continuous statement by Pascal. The supplied edition follows the apparatus's corrected reading here: "one," not "devout."

Places to read. B958 (Brunschvicg 958).

See also. Probability (p. 62); Church (p. 137); Truth (p. 162).

Deism

déisme — deism [printed form]; *athéisme* — atheism [printed form]

Pascal distinguishes Christianity from worship of God merely as a great, powerful and eternal maker. He calls that deism and places it close to atheism in distance from the Christian religion's central account of corruption and redemption. His argument does not deny that a person might form a concept of a creator; it says such knowledge without Christ is barren for salvation. The distinction explains why criticisms of insufficient natural evidence need not, in his view, address Christianity's actual claim. The evaluations are Pascal's theological ones, not neutral rankings of belief systems.

Places to read. B556 (Brunschvicg 556).

See also. Religion (p. 29); Hidden God (p. 88); Mediation (p. 17).

Different chambers

Diverses chambres — different chambers [phrase]; *royaume des savants* — kingdom of the learned [phrase]

The chambers of the strong, beautiful, gifted and devout give each kind of excellence a local domain. Tyranny begins when a ruler of one room demands mastery everywhere. Force can secure outward actions, but it cannot establish learning in the kingdom of the learned; beauty does not create a claim to fear. The metaphor is not merely a recommendation that people stay physically separate. Their meetings expose the need to distinguish kinds of recognition. Pascal also condemns refusing a warranted response because a person lacks an unrelated qualification.

Places to read. B332 (Brunschvicg 332).

See also. Tyranny (p. 65); Force (p. 44); Three orders (p. 35).

Effects and causes

effets — effects [printed form]; *causes* — causes [printed form]; *Rem viderunt, causam non viderunt* — They saw the thing; they did not see the cause [phrase]

B234 (Brunschvicg 234) distinguishes noticing an effect from understanding why it occurs. Pascal says Augustine recognized action for uncertain outcomes and Montaigne recognized custom's force and offense at a limping mind, but they did not see the respective reasons he invokes. The contrast compares sight with intellectual explanation, then acknowledges that even effects may be seen by the mind. It is therefore an analogy between levels of understanding, not a literal division assigning every effect to the eyes. The

claims about these predecessors remain Pascal's judgments rather than independently established histories of their thought.

Places to read. B234 (Brunschvicg 234); B235 (Brunschvicg 235).

See also. Reason (p. 133); The powers of a key and hook (p. 270); Exact inference and breadth (p. 220).

Enemies and iniquities

ennemis — enemies [printed form]

B692 (Brunschvicg 692) makes the word's ambiguity the subject of an argument. Enemies may mean external peoples or the sins that separate humanity from God. Pascal argues that an explicit promise of release from sins fixes the intended sense of the ambiguous promise: sins can be called enemies, whereas external opponents cannot simply be called iniquities. His reading makes the Messiah a spiritual deliverer rather than merely a victorious ruler. The inference belongs to Christian interpretation of the prophetic texts. Keeping the repeated word visible lets the reader follow the distinction instead of having translation silently resolve it before the argument begins.

Places to read. B692 (Brunschvicg 692).

See also. Redemption (p. 26); Figurative meaning (p. 82); Sin (p. 32).

Epaminondas

Épaminondas — Epaminondas [printed form]; *bénignité* — gentleness [printed form]

Epaminondas is named for extreme courage joined to extreme gentleness. Pascal does not admire an excess of one virtue without its opposed excellence: otherwise the apparent rise is a fall. The example prevents "the middle" from being understood merely as a weak amount of every virtue. The following qualification matters equally: perhaps the soul does not hold both extremes simultaneously but passes rapidly between them. Even so, it shows agility if not breadth. The fragment is a moral comparison using a named figure, not a full historical assessment of his career.

Places to read. B353 (Brunschvicg 353).

See also. Morality (p. 56); Greatness (p. 177).

Evil leaven

mauvais levain — evil leaven [phrase]; *cœur de pierre* — heart of stone [phrase]

B446 (Brunschvicg 446) gathers rabbinic materials under Pascal's heading about original sin. Evil leaven is described through names such as enemy,

stumbling block and heart of stone, and through images of a king ruling the members or besieging a city. The edition explains that the dossier comes through Raymond Martin's Christian Pugio fidei. Rabbinic teaching about an evil inclination should therefore not be simply identified with Christian inherited original sin. The images are evidence for Pascal's reading and source use, not an unmediated modern account of the cited Jewish works.

Places to read. B446 (Brunschvicg 446).

See also. Concupiscence (p. 41); Sin (p. 32); Scripture (p. 94).

Exact inference and breadth

esprit de justesse — mind for exact inference [phrase]; *amplitude d'esprit* — breadth of mind [phrase]

B2 (Brunschvicg 2) distinguishes following the consequences of a few principles deeply from grasping many principles without confusing them. Its example of the effects of water belongs to the first capacity, called esprit de justesse; the geometrical mind supplies the second. A person may thus be strong and narrow or broad and weak. This is not simply B1 (Brunschvicg 1)'s contrast between geometry and discernment repeated under new names. The local English "mind for exact inference" keeps the depth of consequence-following visible, while "breadth of mind" describes a different intellectual demand. Neither capacity alone establishes universal competence.

Places to read. B2 (Brunschvicg 2).

See also. Geometry (p. 121); Mind (p. 130); Discernment (p. 113).

Ezra and restoration

Esdras — Ezra [printed form]; *instrumentum judaicæ litteraturæ* — body of Jewish writings [phrase]

B632 (Brunschvicg 632) gathers claims and counterclaims about whether Ezra restored lost Scripture through inspiration. Pascal distinguishes that story from Ezra's reading an existing book and quotes authorities on both preservation and restoration. The long dossier is not a straightforward endorsement of one narrative. B634 (Brunschvicg 634) then argues conditionally that the authority supporting the restoration story also supports scriptural holiness, while rejecting it leaves another route to the case. The corrected Latin phrase for the body of Jewish writings is disclosed by the edition; its presence does not establish a new historical collation.

Places to read. B632 (Brunschvicg 632); B633 (Brunschvicg 633); B634 (Brunschvicg 634).

See also. Scripture (p. 94); Witness (p. 38); Truth (p. 162).

False windows and symmetry

fausses fenêtres — false windows [phrase]; *Symétrie* — symmetry [printed form]

Forced verbal antitheses resemble false windows installed for symmetry: balanced figures replace accurate speech as the governing rule. B27 (Brunschvicg 27) makes a formal success capable of being an intellectual failure. B28 (Brunschvicg 28) separately considers why symmetry pleases in objects grasped at a glance and relates lateral symmetry to the human figure, distinguishing width from height and depth. The two fragments should not become a blanket rejection of symmetry. Their distinction is between a relation appropriate to an object and a pattern imposed at the cost of what the speech must truthfully say.

Places to read. B27 (Brunschvicg 27); B28 (Brunschvicg 28).

See also. Discernment (p. 113); Truth (p. 162); Portrait and added ornament (p. 247).

Fancy and resistance

fantaisie — fancy [printed form]

Fantaisie can give an aversion great weight without supplying a right to follow it. B86 (Brunschvicg 86)'s croaker and noisy eater prompt the question whether a response should be obeyed because it is natural; the answer is resistance. B274 (Brunschvicg 274) makes fancy resemble the direct apprehension opposed to it, so that rival speakers can dispute which one they possess. The term should therefore remain distinct from imagination as a printed form, even though their problems overlap. Neither naturalness nor immediacy settles the correctness of a reaction, and finding a universal discriminating rule remains difficult.

Places to read. B86 (Brunschvicg 86); B274 (Brunschvicg 274).

See also. Imagination (p. 127); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Reason (p. 133).

Fear and joy after confession

confession — confession [printed form]; *joie et confiance* — joy and confidence [phrase]; *crainte* — fear [printed form]

One person reports joy and confidence after confession, another continuing fear. Pascal thinks the two together would make one good person, because each lacks the other's feeling. The comparison does not dismiss joy as presumption or fear as unbelief in every case. It calls for the paired dispositions required by the account of mercy and judgment. B532 (Brunschvicg 532) similarly says Scripture supplies consolation and warning

for every condition. The fragment is an observation about incomplete responses, not a formula for measuring the correct intensity of a penitent's emotions.

Places to read. B530 (Brunschvicg 530); B532 (Brunschvicg 532).

See also. Repentance (p. 159); Grace (p. 85); Joy (p. 148).

Feverish efforts

mouvements fiévreux — feverish movements [phrase]; *santé* — health [printed form]

A powerful appetite for glory can produce achievements that do not establish a stable human capacity. Pascal compares them to feverish movements that health cannot imitate. His objection to the Stoics is an inference from what some people can sometimes do to what everyone can always do. B351 (Brunschvicg 351) describes the soul briefly leaping to a height where it cannot remain; B352 (Brunschvicg 352) judges virtue by ordinary conduct rather than extraordinary exertion. The fever image questions durability and generalization, not whether the impressive act ever occurred.

Places to read. B350 (Brunschvicg 350); B351 (Brunschvicg 351); B352 (Brunschvicg 352).

See also. Morality (p. 56); Honor (p. 47); Will (p. 103).

Figure and cause

figure de la gloire — figure of glory [phrase]; *gloire* — glory; final blessed state in the law–grace–glory sequence [printed form]; *principe ou la cause* — principle or cause [phrase]

Grace is figured by law and itself figures glory, because it is not the final end. Pascal adds that grace is also the principle or cause of the glory it figures. That addition prevents the sequence from being read as a chain of merely decorative resemblances. An earlier sign can be fulfilled while the fulfillment remains ordered toward something further. The distinction is local and explicit; it does not license treating every biblical figure as an efficient cause of what it represents. The article on figurative meaning follows these different relations rather than collapsing them into "symbol."

Places to read. B643 (Brunschvicg 643).

See also. Grace (p. 85); Figurative meaning (p. 82); Redemption (p. 26).

Finding and keeping

Il ne se conserve — the relation is kept or preserved [phrase]; *Il ne se trouve* — he is found [phrase]

The Mémorial first says that God is found only through the Gospel's ways, then uses this compressed clause near its end. The English renders the latter by supplying our communion with him, avoiding the misleading impression that God is an object kept in custody. That noun phrase is an interpretation, not literal French vocabulary present in the line. The two verbs distinguish finding from continuing in the relation. Keeping the supplied words visible as supplied prevents a false lexical claim while preserving the translation's intelligibility. The passage concerns the paper text's close, not the longer version transmitted from the parchment.

Places to read. MEM (Mémorial paper D).

See also. Mediation (p. 17); Scripture (p. 94); Complete and gentle renunciation (p. 213).

Fire

Feu — fire [printed form]

The isolated word stands after the dated and timed opening of the Mémorial and before the names of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Its position gives it exceptional force without explaining the physical character of what happened. The supplied edition does not infer a visible apparition from the word alone. Reading it as an ordinary report of combustion would be equally unwarranted. It introduces a devotional record whose subsequent language concerns certainty, apprehension, joy, peace, separation, and Jesus Christ. The meaningful lineation is preserved, but is not claimed as a facsimile of the manuscript's spatial arrangement.

Places to read. MEM (Mémorial paper D).

See also. Joy (p. 148); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Jesus Christ (p. 14).

First and second nature

seconde nature — second nature [phrase]; *première coutume* — first custom [phrase]

The familiar expression second nature becomes an unsettling question in B93 (Brunschvicg 93). If custom can destroy supposedly natural filial love, what establishes the priority or purity of the first nature? Pascal fears it may be a first custom. B92 (Brunschvicg 92) meanwhile acknowledges dispositions that different habituations do not erase, and B97 (Brunschvicg 97) allows nature to overcome custom. These qualifications prevent the

question from becoming a completed proof that nothing natural exists. B139 (Brunschvicg 139)'s first nature has a further religious role, naming an original greatness whose remaining instinct seeks rest. Identical ordinal language does not guarantee identical argumentative function.

Places to read. B92 (Brunschvicg 92); B93 (Brunschvicg 93); B97 (Brunschvicg 97); B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

See also. Custom (p. 110); Nature (p. 186).

Flattery and rank

flattés — flattered [printed form]; *s'entre-flatter* — flatter one another [printed form]

Self-love wants praise more than correction; those interested in winning its favor learn to supply it. B100 (Brunschvicg 100) explains why increasing rank can increase distance from truth: offending a powerful person's affection carries greater cost, while preserving it offers greater advantage. The ruler can therefore be the last to hear what everyone says. The mechanism is not confined to courts, since ordinary relationships also have interests in being liked. Pascal's sweeping indictment describes this reciprocal distortion, not evidence that every compliment is false or that every relationship has been independently examined.

Places to read. B100 (Brunschvicg 100).

See also. Self-love (p. 192); Self (p. 189); The one person who hears confession (p. 269).

Flowing away

Écoulement — Flowing away [printed form]; *écouler* — flowing away [printed form]

B212 (Brunschvicg 212) makes the felt passing of everything one possesses horrible. Its brief wording names an experience of losing one's hold rather than specifying only money, only time, or one historical event. Read beside B172 (Brunschvicg 172), it extends the distress of the escaping present to the whole field of possession; beside B210 (Brunschvicg 210) and B211 (Brunschvicg 211), it belongs to a sequence confronting an end that social standing cannot remove. The sentence supplies no developed river allegory. The motion is not simply observed externally: the person feels it as a loss of what was theirs.

Places to read. B172 (Brunschvicg 172); B210 (Brunschvicg 210); B211 (Brunschvicg 211); B212 (Brunschvicg 212).

See also. Death (p. 168); Happiness (p. 180); Present time and hoped-for living (p. 249).

Forgetfulness of the world

Oubli du monde — forgetfulness of the world [phrase]

The phrase continues with the exclusion of everything except God. In the Mémorial it describes a concentrated devotional orientation, not a medical diagnosis of memory loss and not a rule forbidding every ordinary responsibility. Its immediate sequel directs the finding of God to the ways taught in the Gospel. The record later returns to remembered separation and confessed wrongdoing, so forgetfulness here plainly does not abolish all memory. Read with renunciation at the close, it names the displacement of the world as the governing object of attention and desire. The scope belongs to this record, not a complete account of Pascal's daily conduct.

Places to read. MEM (Mémorial paper D).

See also. World (p. 67); Desire (p. 171); Conversion (p. 76).

Fountain of living water

fontem aquae vivae — fountain of living water [phrase]

The Latin phrase occurs in a citation from Jeremiah about forsaking God. The fountain is the object abandoned, not a possession independently produced by the speaker. In the Mémorial it follows the confession of having separated oneself and precedes the anxious question whether God will leave the speaker. The image thus joins life-giving source to the acknowledged direction of departure. Its scriptural provenance is given in the edition's note; the English translates the quoted words rather than inserting a full modern Bible verse. Reading the image with the subsequent prayer against eternal separation preserves its relational and penitential force.

Places to read. MEM (Mémorial paper D).

See also. Repentance (p. 159); Mediation (p. 17); Separating and being separated (p. 254).

Genealogies

généalogies — genealogies [printed form]; *générations* — generations [printed form]

Pascal gives genealogies two evidential roles. B578 (Brunschvicg 578) treats Christ's lineage as sufficiently visible amid other lines without being obtrusively isolated. B624 (Brunschvicg 624) and B626 (Brunschvicg 626) argue that long lives and few generations preserve memory by letting children talk with ancestors for longer. The number of intermediaries, not merely elapsed years, is said to determine obscurity. These claims depend on Pascal's biblical chronology and on assumptions about reliable transmission.

They do not independently establish the historical ages or uninterrupted accuracy of every remembered event.

Places to read. B578 (Brunschvicg 578); B624 (Brunschvicg 624); B626 (Brunschvicg 626).

See also. Witness (p. 38); Scripture (p. 94); Prophecy (p. 23).

God as sole author of miracles

le seul auteur et opérateur des miracles — the sole author and performer of miracles [phrase]

Barcos answers the question about concealed heretics by denying them a greater power than openly declared heretics. Nothing is hidden from God, whom he calls the sole author and performer of true miracles. The definition preserves a difference between a person through whom a sign occurs and the principal agent producing it. It also makes concealed affiliation irrelevant to deceiving the divine judge. The qualification true miracles remains necessary: Barcos is not saying that every extraordinary claim is divine. This reply should not be assigned to Pascal merely because it appears beside his question in the appended document.

Places to read. QM-VII-R (Question VII, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Church (p. 137); A heretic confirming truth (p. 203).

God of the patriarchs

Dieu d'Abraham, Dieu d'Isaac, Dieu de Jacob — God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob [phrase]

The three names identify the God addressed through a scriptural history, followed by the contrast with philosophers and scholars and then by God of Jesus Christ. The contrast concerns the relation disclosed and lived in the record; it is not a factual claim that no philosopher can read Scripture or believe. The edition notes the biblical echoes while translating the phrases afresh. B556 (Brunschvicg 556) similarly names the Christian God as the God of these patriarchs while distinguishing love and consolation from a merely abstract maker. The proper names therefore should remain visible rather than disappear into the generic word deity.

Places to read. MEM (Mémorial paper D).

See also. Jesus Christ (p. 14); Mediation (p. 17); Religion (p. 29).

God's spirit and intellect

esprit de Dieu — God's spirit [phrase]; *gens d'esprit* — people of intellect [phrase]

The shared noun esprit does not erase the distinction between divine spirit and human intellectual ability. B287 (Brunschvicg 287) invokes God's spirit poured out on believers in an argument from prophecy; B793 (Brunschvicg 793) places people of intellect in an order distinct from supernatural charity. Its intellectual greatness is real but does not create the divine gift by accumulation. English "spirit" is therefore appropriate in the first phrase and "intellect" in the second. The local difference prevents a reader from treating every spiritual-looking French adjective as already referring to holiness or from collapsing the three orders into two.

Places to read. B287 (Brunschvicg 287); B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

See also. Mind (p. 130); Faith (p. 79); Three orders (p. 35).

Going and returning

itus et reditus — going and returning [phrase]; *allées et venues* — comings and goings [phrase]

The Latin phrase describes nature's uneven advances: forward, back, farther, less far and farther again. A zigzag drawing follows the sea and sun examples in B355 (Brunschvicg 355) and is part of the supplied source. It makes variation visible, rather than providing a measured graph with axes or exact quantities. B354 (Brunschvicg 354) applies comings and goings to human nature, inventions and the world's goodness and wickedness. These fragments resist an image of uninterrupted progress, while the nearby discussion of boredom explains why unbroken grandeur or eloquence can lose its felt effect.

Places to read. B354 (Brunschvicg 354); B355 (Brunschvicg 355).

See also. Morality (p. 56); Boredom (p. 166); Nature (p. 186).

Governing a ship

gouverner un vaisseau — to govern a ship [phrase]; *meilleure maison* — best family [phrase]

The ship tests whether family standing qualifies someone for a task. B320 (Brunschvicg 320) says one does not choose the passenger from the best family to govern it. B320bis (Brunschvicg 320bis) repeats the example before defending hereditary succession for a different reason: rival claims to be most virtuous and capable would provoke civil conflict. The analogy does not establish that a prince is competent because of birth. It exposes the initial absurdity of that criterion, then asks why a determinate rule may

nevertheless be reasonable under human disorder. Practical stability and technical expertise remain distinct.

Places to read. B320 (Brunschvicg 320); B320bis (Brunschvicg 320bis).

See also. Law (p. 53); Justice (p. 50); Force (p. 44).

Grapes and particularity

muscats — muscats [printed form]; *Condrieu* — Condrieu [printed form]; *Desargues* — Desargues [printed form]; *ente* — graft [printed form]

B114 (Brunschvicg 114) narrows from fruit to grapes, muscats, Condrieu, Desargues's produce, one graft, one bunch, and finally individual grapes. Each apparent class contains further difference. The names are part of that increasingly precise localization, not invitations to supply an unsupported biography or wine history. The fragment then turns from diverse objects to variable judgment: a maker needs distance from his work, but how much remains uncertain. The progression complements B7 (Brunschvicg 7)'s claim that greater understanding finds more original persons. Discernment recognizes particularity rather than stopping at the first convenient collective name.

Places to read. B7 (Brunschvicg 7); B114 (Brunschvicg 114).

See also. Discernment (p. 113); Mind (p. 130); A single subject and its parts (p. 204).

Hands and feet

pieds et les mains — feet and hands [phrase]; *volonté première* — primary will [phrase]

Feet and hands receive hypothetical particular wills so that Pascal can ask how a member should love and direct itself. Its order lies in submission to the primary will of the whole body, and its own good is obtained by willing the body's good. The example is not a physiological assertion that ordinary limbs think independently. B480 (Brunschvicg 480) insists that happiness requires a will conformed to the body, not simply the disappearance of willing. The image provides a positive account of ordered self-love alongside the criticism of a self that wants to be the whole.

Places to read. B475 (Brunschvicg 475); B480 (Brunschvicg 480).

See also. Body and members (p. 71); Will (p. 103); Self-love (p. 192).

Harbor and fixed point

point fixe — fixed point [phrase]; *port* — harbor [printed form]

Those on a moving ship can think people on the shore are moving away. B382 (Brunschvicg 382) similarly makes someone who stops reveal the

others' headlong movement toward excess. B383 (Brunschvicg 383) then asks where a harbor can be found in morality. Shared language and apparent stability do not settle which party departs from nature, since both can accuse the other. The nautical analogy makes the need for a fixed point concrete without itself identifying the complete moral standard. The harbor is a position for judging movement, not merely a refuge from argument.

Places to read. B382 (Brunschvicg 382); B383 (Brunschvicg 383).

See also. Morality (p. 56); Opinion (p. 59); Truth (p. 162).

Heresy as exclusion

l'exclusion — exclusion [phrase]

Pascal locates a common source of heresy in retaining one truth while excluding another thought incompatible with it. His examples include Christ's humanity and divinity, and Eucharistic presence and figure. The error is not necessarily the positive assertion first made: affirming humanity or figurative meaning is not itself what he condemns. The exclusion does the damage. This gives a precise logical role to a polemical category, while the doctrinal judgments remain Pascal's Catholic judgments. It also explains why a correct quotation may fail to refute an opponent who actually accepts it alongside another truth the critic has ignored.

Places to read. B862 (Brunschvicg 862).

See also. Church (p. 137); Contradiction (p. 107); Truth (p. 162).

Hope and present enjoyment

espérance — hope [printed form]; *jouissance effective* — actual enjoyment [phrase]

Christian hope for an infinite good is said to include some actual enjoyment as well as fear. Pascal contrasts it with a subject hoping for a kingdom of which that subject possesses nothing. The hoped-for good is holiness or freedom from injustice, and the believer already has something of it. The claim neither identifies the partial possession with its full completion nor removes the accompanying fear. It explains why the expectation is not simply a projection toward an entirely absent external possession, and belongs beside the account of grace as a figure of glory.

Places to read. B540 (Brunschvicg 540); B643 (Brunschvicg 643).

See also. Grace (p. 85); Happiness (p. 180); Faith (p. 79).

Idols of truth and obscurity

idole de la vérité — idol of truth [phrase]; *idole de l'obscurité* — idol of obscurity [phrase]

B582 (Brunschvicg 582) warns that even truth, taken outside charity, can become an idol. It immediately refuses the opposite error: falsehood is still less to be loved. The second paragraph makes total obscurity another possible idol when someone resents a partly obscure state because it does not match a preferred spiritual ideal. The two warnings prevent either clarity or darkness from becoming a possession loved apart from God's ordering. They do not erase the difference between truth and falsehood or make every obscure assertion worthy of reverence.

Places to read. B582 (Brunschvicg 582).

See also. Truth (p. 162); Charity (p. 73); Hidden God (p. 88).

If

Si — if [printed form]; *Si volumus* — if we wish [phrase]; *In quacumque die* — on whatever day [phrase]

B636 (Brunschvicg 636) says "If does not signify indifference" and appends incomplete references to Malachi and Isaiah, followed by two Latin cues. The note is too compressed to recover a complete doctrine of freedom, grace or conditional obligation from it. Its useful lexical point is narrower: a conditional form does not by itself establish that the alternatives stand in a state of indifference. The supplied English preserves the gaps rather than constructing the absent argument. Wider uses of indifference must be checked in their own passages instead of imported to fill these cues.

Places to read. B636 (Brunschvicg 636).

See also. Will (p. 103); Grace (p. 85); Scripture (p. 94).

Imaginary being in others' minds

être imaginaire — imaginary being [phrase]; *le véritable* — the real one [phrase]

B147 (Brunschvicg 147) distinguishes the life we have in our own being from the imagined life maintained in others' ideas. We labor to beautify the second and may sacrifice actual virtue to its reputation, becoming cowards if that secured fame for courage. The contrast is not simply between solitude and society: a real quality can be transferred into a story about oneself and valued chiefly for that representation. The example exposes why esteem and identity are unstable partners. The imaginary being is an object of sustained work, but that work can neglect the person it supposedly honors.

Places to read. B147 (Brunschvicg 147).

See also. Self (p. 189); Self-love (p. 192); Imagination (p. 127).

In whose name?

en son propre nom — in his own name [phrase]

Pascal asks whether the Antichrist will perform signs in Jesus Christ's name or his own. Barcos answers (QM-XI-R (Question XI, Reply — Martin de Barcos)) that he comes and acts in his own name and against Christ, with the purpose of destroying faith and the Church; he therefore denies these are true miracles. The relation expressed by in the name of concerns authority and allegiance, not merely the audible pronunciation of a word. The exchange makes an openly opposed claim different from a concealed claim of conformity. The question and reply must not be merged into one voice, and the theological future described is the document's premise.

Places to read. QM-XI-Q (Question XI, Question — Blaise Pascal); QM-XI-R (Question XI, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Religion (p. 29); God as sole author of miracles (p. 226).

Indifference, impartiality, and suspension

indifférence — indifference [printed form]; *indifférent* — disinterested [printed form]; *indifférents* — impartial; indifferent [printed form]

The family has importantly different objects. B194 (Brunschvicg 194) and B195 (Brunschvicg 195) attack indifference to seeking the truth about one's end; B296 (Brunschvicg 296) instead asks for a disinterested third-party judge of war, and B477 (Brunschvicg 477) imagines persons reasonable and impartial. B434 (Brunschvicg 434)'s reported Pyrrhonians are neutral, indifferent, and suspending judgment. These senses are not interchangeable moral diagnoses. B636 (Brunschvicg 636)'s compressed note says "If does not signify indifference," but does not develop a complete doctrine of freedom. B940 (Brunschvicg 940) concerns a belief making no practical difference to the heart in a polemical contrast. An English lookup for indifference must therefore lead to the local relation, not just religious unconcern.

Places to read. B194 (Brunschvicg 194); B195 (Brunschvicg 195); B296 (Brunschvicg 296); B434 (Brunschvicg 434); B477 (Brunschvicg 477); B636 (Brunschvicg 636); B940 (Brunschvicg 940).

See also. Reason (p. 133); Self-love (p. 192); Search (p. 97).

Joseph as figure

Joseph — Joseph [printed form]

Joseph is compared with Christ through paternal love, being sent to brothers, innocence, sale, rejection, and eventual rescue of those who sought his destruction. The prison between two criminals is placed beside the cross between two thieves. Pascal also marks decisive differences: Joseph predicts another's release and asks to be remembered; Christ saves, and the saved man asks him to remember. The comparison is therefore not a list of identical episodes. It specifies relations of action, recipient, and efficacy, showing how resemblance can establish a figure while the difference between prediction and fulfillment remains essential.

Places to read. B768 (Brunschvicg 768).

See also. Jesus Christ (p. 14); Redemption (p. 26); Figurative meaning (p. 82).

Josephus

Josèphe — Josephus [printed form]; *contre Apion* — Against Apion [phrase]

Josephus is invoked for the antiquity and excellence of Mosaic law at B620 (Brunschvicg 620) and for claims bearing on the Ezra restoration story at B633 (Brunschvicg 633). His authority is not treated identically in every context: B629 (Brunschvicg 629) says he conceals his nation's shame, contrasting that with Moses' failure to conceal his own. The named source therefore belongs to a discriminating, though polemical, argument about testimony. Pascal's proposed dependence of Greek and Roman law on Mosaic law comes through an apologetic tradition, not an independently established borrowing history supplied by this lexicon.

Places to read. B620 (Brunschvicg 620); B629 (Brunschvicg 629); B633 (Brunschvicg 633).

See also. Law (p. 53); Scripture (p. 94); Witness (p. 38).

Joseph's bones

ses os — his bones [phrase]

Joseph, dying, directs his descendants to carry his bones when they enter the promised land. In Pascal's dossier the remains become a concrete pledge directed beyond the speaker's lifetime and present possession. The example belongs with Jacob's distribution of a future land and Moses' provisions before entry: their actions are read as expressing confidence in what has not yet happened. The stated two-hundred-year interval belongs to Pascal's inherited chronological account and is not independently verified here.

Bones are not merely an emblem of mortality in this setting; they tie bodily remains, descendants, movement, and promised place together.

Places to read. B711 (Brunschvicg 711).

See also. Prophecy (p. 23); Death (p. 168); Joseph as figure (p. 232).

Joshua and the name Jesus

Josué — Joshua [printed form]; *ce nom* — this name [phrase]

Pascal says he believes Joshua is the first of God's people to bear this name, as Jesus Christ is the last. The supplied note explains that Joshua and Jesus are related forms of the same name. Pascal turns their position into a Christian typological correspondence, rather than supplying a complete survey of everyone who historically bore either form. The opening "I believe" should remain audible. The compressed reference to first and last belongs to the figure Pascal is proposing and should not become an unqualified modern historical assertion.

Places to read. B627 (Brunschvicg 627).

See also. Jesus Christ (p. 14); Figurative meaning (p. 82); Scripture (p. 94).

Lamb and the taking away of sins

agnus Dei — lamb of God [phrase]

The Latin phrase belongs to the key Pascal supplies for his scriptural cipher: the lamb of God takes away the world's sins. The animal image is thus specified by a saving action, not merely by gentleness or innocence. B782 (Brunschvicg 782) contrasts earlier lambs with the one who removes sins, and B766 (Brunschvicg 766) joins victim and priest in Christ. These uses connect sacrifice to fulfillment while retaining the difference between a figure and what Pascal takes as its reality. The fragment supplies only this short citation, not a complete biblical scene.

Places to read. B681 (Brunschvicg 681).

See also. Redemption (p. 26); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Priest and sacrificial victim (p. 249).

Languages as ciphers

chiffres — ciphers [printed form]; *déchiffrable* — can be deciphered [printed form]

B45 (Brunschvicg 45) compares languages with ciphers in which words replace words rather than letters replacing letters. The specific level of substitution matters: Pascal is not saying that an unfamiliar language is literally made by substituting each character of French. His short inference is

that an unknown language can be deciphered. The observation belongs to an early sequence attentive to words, arrangement, and intended force. It does not offer a complete decipherment method or prove that every unknown historical language can in practice be recovered without evidence. The claim concerns intelligible relations hidden beneath unfamiliar signs.

Places to read. B45 (Brunschvicg 45).
See also. Reason (p. 133); Truth (p. 162).

Learned ignorance

ignorance savante — learned ignorance [phrase]; *ignorance naturelle* — natural ignorance [phrase]
B327 (Brunschvicg 327) sets natural ignorance at one end of learning and an ignorance that knows itself at the other. Great souls traverse what humans can know and return to a recognition of not knowing. Those between the extremes possess a smattering of learning and act like experts, despising practices whose reasons they have not understood. The circular image therefore distinguishes two outwardly similar states by self-knowledge. It does not claim that no learning is useful or that every uninstructed opinion is true. Its immediate task is to qualify the half-learned criticism of the social world.

Places to read. B327 (Brunschvicg 327).
See also. Opinion (p. 59); Reason (p. 133); Custom (p. 110).

Liancourt's pike and frog

brochet — pike [printed form]; *grenouille* — frog [printed form]; *Liancourt* — Liancourt [printed form]

The fragment is a reminder of a story: the pike and frog always do the same thing, never otherwise and never another act showing intelligence. Pascal supplies neither the full incident nor its experimental conditions. The repetition matters to the neighboring contrast of instinct and intelligence, especially B342 (Brunschvicg 342)'s hypothetical animal that could request help beyond its usual hunting signals. The surviving reminder does not support reconstruction of the full anecdote. The names and creatures serve as a cue for a reported example, not a self-contained proof of every claim about animal minds.

Places to read. B341 (Brunschvicg 341); B342 (Brunschvicg 342).
See also. Thinking (p. 195); Reason (p. 133); Will (p. 103).

Make you beastlike

abêtira — make you beastlike [printed form]

The provocative verb occurs when the wager's interlocutor admits inability to believe despite argumentative assent. Acting as believers do is proposed, with holy water and masses, and the interlocutor immediately voices fear of the result. The answer speaks of diminished passions. The edition keeps the connection with bête rather than disguising it as a neutral promise of greater intelligence. Its annotation allows comparison with B252 (Brunschvicg 252)'s embodied automaton but does not settle every interpretive difficulty. The passage concerns practice, humiliation, and obstacles to belief, not a simple claim that irrationality itself produces saving faith.

Places to read. B233 (Brunschvicg 233); B252 (Brunschvicg 252).

See also. Custom (p. 110); Faith (p. 79); Wager (p. 100); Automaton and machine (p. 207).

Manna

la manne — manna [phrase]

Manna is one of the visible goods through which Pascal says God displayed the power to give invisible goods. It appears with departure from Egypt, the sea, defeated kings, and Abraham's genealogy. The later interpretation of true bread from heaven depends on that relation between a received bodily provision and a spiritual good, not on denying that feeding is a real benefit. B670 (Brunschvicg 670) also makes it an object in the earthly expectation Pascal criticizes. The crucial question is where the reader's desire stops: the sign itself or the good it figures. This is his Christian typology, not an exhaustive account of manna's scriptural meanings.

Places to read. B675 (Brunschvicg 675).

See also. Figurative meaning (p. 82); Redemption (p. 26); Desire (p. 171).

Martyrdom and claimed eyewitness

qu'on dit avoir vus — that one says one has seen [phrase]

The phrase belongs to a compressed comparison between inherited belief and direct claims to have witnessed miracles. The principal sentence is too compressed to stand as a simple denial that witnesses ever suffer. The supplied edition's note explains the historical editor's limiting gloss: the issue is miracles claimed as witnessed but actually false, and martyrdom is evidence of sincerity. That gloss must remain identified as supplied, not inserted as words Pascal printed. Sincerity is still distinct from the truth of

every interpretation or inherited belief. The distinction also qualifies the stark preference for costly witnesses in B593 (Brunschvicg 593).

Places to read. B844 (Brunschvicg 844).

See also. Witness (p. 38); Miracle (p. 20); Islam (p. 142).

Masking and naming

Masquer — Masking [printed form]; *déguiser* — disguising [printed form]; *capitale du royaume* — capital of the kingdom [phrase]

B49 (Brunschvicg 49) mocks inflated substitutes for king, pope, bishop, or Paris, but its ending qualifies the complaint: some contexts require Paris, others "capital of the kingdom." The fault is not every periphrasis; it is a substitution that masks what should be plainly named. B50 (Brunschvicg 50) adds that words confer dignity on meanings rather than merely receiving dignity from them. The lexicon of disguise therefore touches expression as well as the self-concealment of B100 (Brunschvicg 100). In each setting the surface can change what is apprehended, though the source does not make all indirect language inherently false.

Places to read. B49 (Brunschvicg 49); B50 (Brunschvicg 50); B100 (Brunschvicg 100).

See also. Self-love (p. 192); Imagination (p. 127); Natural style and the person (p. 240).

Masorah and letters

Massor — Masorah [printed form]; *lettres défectueuses et finales* — defective and final letters [phrase]

Massor points to the Masorah, the tradition of textual notes preserving the Hebrew biblical text. Pascal couples it with defective and final letters as signs of care for written detail. The fragment does not specify every letter form or spelling in view, so those details should not be supplied as if stated. Its larger argument praises fidelity to a book containing accusations against its custodians, even at cost to their honor. That is an inference from adverse testimony to sincerity, not independent proof of all the book's contents.

Places to read. B630 (Brunschvicg 630); B631 (Brunschvicg 631).

See also. Scripture (p. 94); Witness (p. 38); Jews (p. 145).

May have erred / have erred

je puis m'être trompé — I may have been mistaken [phrase]; *je me suis trompé* — I have been mistaken [phrase]

The speaker is willing to swear that error is possible but not that error has actually occurred. The modal difference is the entire point: acknowledging

fallibility supplies no proof of the disputed fact. A demand to move from may have to have would require a different belief and different evidence. The next sentence distinguishes not believing from swearing without belief, making the issue one of truthful testimony as well as logic. The exchange belongs to the signature controversy and should not be detached into a claim that one's present belief is immune to correction.

Places to read. B945 (Brunschvicg 945).

See also. Truth (p. 162); Witness (p. 38); Signing and consent (p. 256).

Melchizedek's order

l'ordre de Melchisédech — the order of Melchizedek [phrase]

The phrase identifies a priesthood Pascal calls eternal and distinct from the earlier priesthood. Here order does not mean the three domains of bodily, intellectual, and charitable greatness, nor the arrangement of an argument. It concerns a priestly pattern in the Christian reading of Scripture associated with Hebrews. The same list joins a new and eternal covenant to a Messiah both glorious and unrecognized. The proper name is thus part of the account of continuity through transformation, not merely an ornamental allusion. The short working note does not supply a complete historical account of ancient priestly institutions.

Places to read. B736 (Brunschvicg 736).

See also. Redemption (p. 26); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Scripture (p. 94).

Memory

mémoire — memory [printed form]

B369 (Brunschvicg 369) calls memory necessary for every operation of reason. The maxim is short, but the neighboring failures to retain a thought make the dependence concrete. A person may know what they wished to write only through the record that it escaped them; writing then teaches weakness instead of preserving the original thought. Memory also appears at B323 (Brunschvicg 323) among qualities someone might lose without losing the self. These uses distinguish a necessary support of thinking from a complete definition of the person who thinks, without supplying a general psychology of memory.

Places to read. B323 (Brunschvicg 323); B369 (Brunschvicg 369); B370 (Brunschvicg 370); B372 (Brunschvicg 372).

See also. Thinking (p. 195); Reason (p. 133); Self (p. 189).

Merit and worthiness

Mérite — merit [printed form]; *Meruit* — merited [printed form]; *Non sum dignus* — I am not worthy [phrase]; *Dignare me* — deem me worthy [phrase]; *Qui mandicat indignas* — malformed source wording interpreted as whoever eats unworthily [phrase]

B513 (Brunschvicg 513) explicitly calls merit an ambiguous word and then collects short Latin examples of meriting, being worthy, eating unworthily and being deemed worthy. They are not one continuous sentence. Their place follows the objection that someone might regard prayer as self-originating, and precedes the statement that God owes according to his promises. Worthiness must therefore be considered with its source and context, not simply read as an independent human claim on God. The visibly irregular phrase about eating is translated by its familiar sense, with the malformed source wording disclosed.

Places to read. B513 (Brunschvicg 513).

See also. Prayer (p. 91); Grace (p. 85); Humility (p. 140).

Miracle with respect to natural order

quoad ordinem naturæ — with respect to the order of nature [phrase]

The Latin label belongs to Barcos's report of Aquinas. The effect may be naturally possible in this subject, yet not by these means or with this speed. Healing a curable fever in an instant by a single touch is the example. The qualification that the disease need not be incurable is essential: incurability is not the only measure of the extraordinary. This distinguishes the category from a miracle defined solely as an effect no created nature could ever produce in any circumstances. The explanation is doctrinal and classificatory; it does not establish that a particular reported healing occurred.

Places to read. QM-III-R (Question III, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Miracle with respect to the subject (p. 238); Touch and immediacy (p. 279).

Miracle with respect to the subject

quoad subjectum — with respect to the subject receiving the effect [phrase]

Barcos reports this as part of Aquinas's division of the second kind of miracle. Nature can produce life in general, but not life in a dead body: the subject in which the effect occurs makes the difference. Subject here means the recipient or underlying thing, not the topic of a sentence or an individual's subjective feeling. The example distinguishes what a power can

do absolutely from what it can do under a particular condition. Barcos's account should remain attributed, since the appendix does not supply a newly checked passage from Aquinas establishing every detail of the report.

Places to read. QM-III-R (Question III, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Death (p. 168); Miracle with respect to natural order (p. 238).

Miton and obliging behavior

Miton — Miton [printed form]; *obligeamment* — obligingly [printed form]

Miton's defense in B455 (Brunschvicg 455) appeals to behaving obligingly toward everyone, so that others no longer have cause to hate the self. Pascal's reply distinguishes the self's inconvenient effects from its inward injustice in making itself the center of everything. Courtesy may remove an opponent's grievance without removing that unjust orientation: socially agreeable behavior is not yet transformed love. The interlocutor's defense and the reply therefore advance different standards of reform. B448 (Brunschvicg 448) likewise grants that Miton sees corruption while denying that he knows why humanity cannot rise higher. B192 (Brunschvicg 192) supplies a compressed instruction to reproach him for not bestirring himself. These cues identify an interlocutor and clarify the argument; they do not provide a personal biography or make his name simply a label for obvious cruelty.

Places to read. B192 (Brunschvicg 192); B455 (Brunschvicg 455); B448 (Brunschvicg 448).

See also. Self (p. 189); Self-love (p. 192); Tyranny (p. 65); Charity (p. 73).

Mud and healing

de la boue — mud [phrase]

Mud is Barcos's concrete example of a means lacking the natural capacity to accomplish the healing attributed to it. He recalls Christ healing the eyes of the man born blind and places the case under a supernatural manner of production. The point is not that mud is an exotic substance; its ordinary material character sharpens the disproportion between instrument and effect. This is Barcos's scriptural illustration of a theological distinction. The agent, Christ, and the material means must remain distinct, since the theological account locates the miracle's source beyond the material.

Places to read. QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Supernatural in manner (p. 258).

Narrative coolness

froideur — coolness or lack of self-advertising agitation [printed form]

The term concludes Pascal's account of the Gospel historians' restraint. He argues that their failure to advertise their own modesty supports the view that it was uncontrived rather than staged for praise. Coolness therefore does not mean indifference to Christ's suffering. It concerns the manner of narrating and the absence of a claimed promotional motive. The absence of invective is Pascal's universal claim about these accounts; it remains an interpretation to test against the texts. Read with naïveté, the word belongs to an inquiry into style as evidence, not a modern clinical description of affect.

Places to read. B798 (Brunschvicg 798).

See also. Witness (p. 38); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Naturalness of speech (p. 241).

Natural power of the means

force naturelle des moyens — natural power of the means employed [phrase]

Pascal proposes that an effect is miraculous when it surpasses the natural force of the means used. A relic's contact and words invoking Jesus are contrasted with employing the devil's own power to expel a devil. In the latter case, on the proposed account, the effect does not exceed the means. The distinction is relative to the instrument and its capacity, not simply to what unaided human beings can accomplish. Barcos's brief reply (QM-II-R (Question II, Reply — Martin de Barcos)) compares the devil's abilities to an animal's abilities: inability in humans does not automatically make another creature's act miraculous. Both arguments presuppose the document's theological account of created powers.

Places to read. QM-II-Q (Question II, Question — Blaise Pascal); QM-II-R (Question II, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); God as sole author of miracles (p. 226).

Natural style and the person

style naturel — natural style [phrase]; *un auteur* — an author [phrase]; *un homme* — a person [phrase]

B29 (Brunschvicg 29)'s surprise is finding a person where one expected an author; the reverse surprise disappoints the reader with good taste. The contrast is not between a text and its actual maker, but between recognizable human speech and a performance insistently displaying authorship. The Latin reproach, translated as speaking more like a poet than a human being,

sharpens that distinction. The fragment ends by honoring those who show nature able to speak even about theology. Naturalness here is an achievement of expression, not merely the absence of revision, learning, or literary form.

Places to read. B29 (Brunschvicg 29).

See also. Mind (p. 130); Nature (p. 186); Portrait and added ornament (p. 247).

Naturalness of speech

naïveté — uncontrived naturalness [printed form]

Pascal admires the conjunction of simplicity and clarity in Christ's great sayings. The speech is so simple that it seems uncontrived, yet sufficiently clear to reveal the thought. Naïveté does not mean gullibility or intellectual deficiency here. The word names a manner of expression whose lack of display becomes part of Pascal's argument about the speaker. B798 (Brunschvicg 798) extends the consideration to Gospel narration and lack of self-advertising. These are literary judgments offered as evidence within the apology, not an automatic rule that simple writing is always truthful or that elaborate writing is always deceptive.

Places to read. B797 (Brunschvicg 797).

See also. Jesus Christ (p. 14); Witness (p. 38); Truth (p. 162).

Nobility's advantage

noblesse — nobility [printed form]; *trente ans gagnés sans peine* — thirty years gained without effort [phrase]

Nobility gives an eighteen-year-old standing, recognition and respect another person might have earned at fifty. The arithmetic makes a social acceleration visible: inherited position grants credit before equivalent personal labor. It neither denies that the credit has practical effects nor identifies those effects with moral worth. B335 (Brunschvicg 335) distinguishes honoring noblemen from believing birth an actual advantage of the person; B337 (Brunschvicg 337) then shows the same outward honor arising from several levels of understanding. B322 (Brunschvicg 322)'s thirty years are an emphatic comparison, not a measured law of social mobility.

Places to read. B322 (Brunschvicg 322); B335 (Brunschvicg 335); B337 (Brunschvicg 337).

See also. Honor (p. 47); Opinion (p. 59); Justice (p. 50).

Numerical identity and necessary conditions

condition nécessaire — necessary condition [phrase]; *condition suffisante* — sufficient condition [phrase]; *idem numero* — the very same individual, numerically identical [phrase]; *de numero* — numerical, concerning identity [phrase]

Numerical identity means being the very same thing, not merely the same kind of thing or something with a similar function. B512 (Brunschvicg 512) criticizes an inference from the soul's being necessary for a human body to any matter united with that soul becoming that same body. Pascal responds that union is necessary but not sufficient: the left arm is not the right. Examples involving a body or river in China test the disputed account rather than establish miraculous duplication as Pascal's own doctrine. The fragment partly presents a view under criticism, so its last apparent conclusions cannot all be assigned to Pascal as settled claims. The logical vocabulary distinguishes necessary conditions from sufficient ones while asking what makes a body numerically identical.

Places to read. B512 (Brunschvicg 512).

See also. Reason (p. 133); Body and members (p. 71); Contradiction (p. 107); Wholly the body / the whole body (p. 284).

Opposed winds

deux vents contraires — two contrary winds [phrase]; *contrepoids* — counterweight [printed form]

Two opposed winds hold someone upright, but removing either makes the person fall into the other. Pascal compares this with an apparent virtue sustained by the counterweight of two vices rather than by its own strength. The image distinguishes a stable-looking result from an inwardly sufficient capacity. It should be read beside the later claim that Christianity removes both pride and sloth instead of merely driving one out with the other. The bodily balance is an analogy for moral dependence, not a physical claim that winds ordinarily keep people standing.

Places to read. B359 (Brunschvicg 359); B435 (Brunschvicg 435).

See also. Morality (p. 56); Concupiscence (p. 41); Grace (p. 85).

Oracles

oracles — oracles [printed form]

Pascal asks whether oracles were miraculous; he does not assert their supernatural status in posing the question. Barcos's answer (QM-XII-R (Question XII, Reply — Martin de Barcos)) classes pagan and idolatrous miracles with operations of demons and magicians, denying that they were

miraculous in the required sense. The words therefore belong to a theological judgment in the correspondence, not an independently verified history of oracular practice. B601 (Brunschvicg 601) approaches the related problem through transmission: what books attest the oracles, how credible are their authors, and how securely were the books preserved? These are distinct questions about classification and evidence and should remain distinct.

Places to read. QM-XII-Q (Question XII, Question — Blaise Pascal); QM-XII-R (Question XII, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Paganism (p. 151); Witness (p. 38); Miracle (p. 20).

Ordinary conduct

son ordinaire — a person's ordinary conduct [phrase]; *efforts* — efforts [printed form]

The capacity of someone's virtue is to be measured by the ordinary course of conduct rather than exceptional efforts. The brief maxim qualifies admiration for spectacular self-command. Its neighbors explain why: the soul can leap to a height without remaining there, and the desire for glory can mobilize unusual strength. The rule does not forbid effort or deny the merit of a particular deed. It refuses to treat one performance as sufficient evidence of a settled power available across circumstances and times.

Places to read. B350 (Brunschvicg 350); B351 (Brunschvicg 351); B352 (Brunschvicg 352).

See also. Morality (p. 56); Will (p. 103); Honor (p. 47).

Outward striving

conatus recedendi — outward striving [phrase]

The Latin expression names an effort to move away, invoked in a mechanical account of light. The supplied English translates it inside the French sentence as "outward striving." It belongs to the same inquiry as heat explained by moving particles and pleasure by a dance of bodily spirits: why does the experienced sensation seem so unlike the proposed physical account? The fragment preserves a historical model rather than endorsing it as the edition's present account of light. No immaterial will should be inferred merely from the term "striving."

Places to read. B368 (Brunschvicg 368).

See also. Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Nature (p. 186); Reason (p. 133).

Papers on the table

mettre papiers sur table — put the papers on the table [phrase]; *cherchez-la* — seek it [printed form]

Faced with China as a historical difficulty, Pascal insists that the matter cannot be settled in the large: the evidence must be examined in detail and papers put on the table. The fragment also appeals to the paired purposes of blinding and enlightening and calls for clarity to be sought within the obscurity. The final concrete instruction matters because that theological framework does not itself supply the documentary comparison. The famous opening about witnesses willing to die is part of this same demand for credible testimony, not a complete historical inquiry already performed.

Places to read. B593 (Brunschvicg 593).

See also. Search (p. 97); Witness (p. 38); Truth (p. 162).

Parlement and registered pardon

parlement — sovereign high court [printed form]

The parlement is the court in Pascal's analogy of delegated forgiveness, not a modern elected parliament. A royal pardon still needs formal registration, yet the court cannot act independently against the king's pardon or issue one without him. Pascal uses the relation to explain the Church's association with divine absolution: a real ministerial role remains dependent on its source. The analogy supplies both limits and duties, rather than making the institution useless. The verbs of absolving and binding must therefore be read with their agents. A rebellious court illustrates the failure of delegated authority to remain a proper instrument.

Places to read. B870 (Brunschvicg 870).

See also. Church (p. 137); Repentance (p. 159); Mediation (p. 17).

Pedants' gowns

robes de pédants — gowns of pedants [phrase]; *hôpital de fous* — hospital of madmen [phrase]

Pascal objects to imagining Plato and Aristotle only in imposing scholarly gowns. He pictures them laughing with friends and treats their political writing as the least serious part of their lives, like regulating a hospital of madmen. These are elements of his polemical portrait, not verified claims about the actual motives of the Laws or Politics. The image explains political prudence as entering the governed people's assumptions to moderate their folly as well as possible. It belongs beside the defense of workable institutions under human disorder, rather than a simple rejection of political thought.

Places to read. B331 (Brunschvicg 331).
See also. Law (p. 53); World (p. 67); Morality (p. 56).

Perpetual motion and emotional equilibrium

mouvement perpétuel — perpetual motion [phrase]

B181 (Brunschvicg 181) imagines a secret of rejoicing in good without being upset by the contrary evil, then names the achievement perpetual motion. The immediate subject is affective dependence: caring about a success makes its failure painful, and innumerable accidents can cause failure. The phrase is an analogy for the sought uninterrupted state, not an engineering proposal or a description of an actual machine. B182 (Brunschvicg 182) complicates outward cheerfulness by asking whether asymmetric joy may conceal satisfaction at another's loss. A calm surface does not by itself prove the impossible equilibrium has been attained.

Places to read. B181 (Brunschvicg 181); B182 (Brunschvicg 182).
See also. Happiness (p. 180); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Desire (p. 171).

Perpetuity

Perpétuité — perpetuity [printed form]; *sans interruption* — without interruption [phrase]

Pascal claims an uninterrupted religion through expectation and worship of the Messiah, from the patriarchs to the Church. B613 (Brunschvicg 613) makes endurance despite repeated opposition the striking fact, while B614 (Brunschvicg 614) contrasts it with states that survive by bending their laws. The assertion depends on identifying the earlier biblical faith as Christian expectation; it is not a neutral chronology of all religions. The claim that no state lasted a thousand years is likewise a sweeping premise in the contrast, not an established chronological rule. Perpetuity names the continuity Pascal is arguing for, not an independently verified universal history.

Places to read. B613 (Brunschvicg 613); B614 (Brunschvicg 614); B616 (Brunschvicg 616); B617 (Brunschvicg 617).
See also. Religion (p. 29); Prophecy (p. 23); Church (p. 137).

Perspective

perspective — perspective [printed form]; *point indivisible* — indivisible point [phrase]

A painting has a proper viewing point; too near, too far, too high or too low distorts the view. Pascal places this beside being too young or old and judging one's own work too soon or too late. Perspective can assign the right

point in painting, but who assigns it in truth and morality? The question is not answered by merely saying everyone has a viewpoint. It asks for a warranted measure of distance and relation when the practical object does not supply the clear construction available in the art.

Places to read. B381 (Brunschvicg 381).

See also. Morality (p. 56); Discernment (p. 113); Truth (p. 162).

Philo

Philon juif — Philo the Jew [phrase]; *Philon Juif* — Philo the Jew [phrase]; *De la monarchie* — On Monarchy [phrase]

Philo is cited when Pascal describes the Christian and Jewish commonwealths as having God alone for master. B620 (Brunschvicg 620) also invokes him in defense of the antiquity and perfection of Mosaic law. B632 (Brunschvicg 632)'s Ezra dossier includes an assertion attributed to Philo about continuity of the language and script. These are distinct uses of a named ancient Jewish authority within Pascal's Christian argument. The references should not be converted into evidence that Philo endorsed all the later Christian conclusions Pascal draws from them, nor into an unexamined modern account of each attribution.

Places to read. B611 (Brunschvicg 611); B620 (Brunschvicg 620); B632 (Brunschvicg 632).

See also. Law (p. 53); Scripture (p. 94); Witness (p. 38).

Piquet in the dungeon

piquet — piquet [printed form]; *cachot* — dungeon [printed form]

The card game occupies a prisoner during the single hour in which he could learn whether sentence has been passed and, if necessary, have it revoked. B200 (Brunschvicg 200) calls this choice contrary to nature, then interprets the analogous human blindness through God's hand. The hypothetical availability of a reprieve is essential; without it the argument would concern merely distracting oneself from an unalterable fate. The image does not by itself establish the theological explanation drawn from it. It makes negligence intelligible as a failure of concern before the religious inference is added.

Places to read. B200 (Brunschvicg 200).

See also. Death (p. 168); Diversion (p. 174); Search (p. 97).

Playing the lute

jouer du luth — to play the lute [phrase]

The lute is one example of an accomplishment established as beautiful through human weakness. B329 (Brunschvicg 329)'s final qualification—an evil only because of our weakness—makes the claim relational rather than an independent condemnation of the instrument. B146 (Brunschvicg 146) includes lute playing among the occupations that absorb the world without reflection on human origin and end. The target there is misplaced attention, not a worked-out theory that music is intrinsically wrong. The concrete accomplishment helps explain why judgments of beauty and serious purpose need to be assessed by the condition and ends of the people making them.

Places to read. B146 (Brunschvicg 146); B329 (Brunschvicg 329).

See also. World (p. 67); Opinion (p. 59); Diversion (p. 174).

Playing, stakes, and absorption

jouer — play [printed form]; *gain* — gain [printed form]; *se pipe lui-même* — deceive himself [phrase]

B139 (Brunschvicg 139) tests two inadequate explanations of gambling. Give the player his possible winnings without playing, and he is unhappy; allow play without any stake, and he is bored. He needs an object of passion, imagining a victory sufficient to stir desire, anger, and fear. The account concerns the mechanism of diversion, not advice to gamble. B233 (Brunschvicg 233) later uses a game and stakes for a different argumentative task, action under uncertainty concerning God. The shared imagery should not erase that distinction or turn the practical wager into an endorsement of recreational self-deception.

Places to read. B139 (Brunschvicg 139); B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

See also. Diversion (p. 174); Wager (p. 100); Desire (p. 171).

Portrait and added ornament

tableau — picture [printed form]; *portrait* — portrait [printed form]

Eloquence is a painting of thought; adding beyond the completed representation makes a picture instead of a portrait. B26 (Brunschvicg 26)'s distinction concerns fidelity to the thing represented versus ornamental production that displaces it. A picture is not condemned in every possible setting: the criticism belongs to speech meant to portray thought. B25 (Brunschvicg 25) supplies the positive constraint that pleasing material must itself be drawn from truth. The comparison helps explain why extra language may reduce rather than improve an argument's accuracy, and why

an impressive verbal surface cannot substitute for the specific thought it claims to express.

Places to read. B25 (Brunschvicg 25); B26 (Brunschvicg 26).

See also. Truth (p. 162); False windows and symmetry (p. 221); Natural style and the person (p. 240).

Portrait, presence, and absence

Un portrait porte absence et présence — a portrait bears absence and presence [phrase]

A portrait presents the person or thing figured while also indicating that it is not the reality itself. Pascal joins this double relation to pleasure and displeasure, then contrasts the reality that excludes absence and displeasure. The example introduces his question whether laws and sacrifices are final realities or pictures of something else. Looking at an image is not nothing, but stopping at it can miss what it represents. The concrete visual relation is thus different from a cipher, although both help explain mediated meaning. The analogy supplies a proposed way to read Scripture, not a claim that every image has one concealed theological meaning.

Places to read. B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

See also. Figurative meaning (p. 82); Cipher and intercepted letter (p. 212).

Pouring, shedding, overturning

versé — tipped over [printed form]; *renversé* — overturned [printed form]; *Répandre* — Shed [printed form]; *verser* — pour [printed form]

B53 (Brunschvicg 53) puts two pairs under the qualification "according to the intention." A carriage can be described as tipped over or overturned; liquid can be shed or poured. The local note explains that the French pairs carry distinctions English cannot exactly reproduce: renverser adds destructive force, while répandre can suggest wider diffusion. The point is how a chosen word shapes the account, not that an object changes physically when renamed. The reference to Le Maître's plea remains a particular cue in the fragment; it should not be expanded into an invented quotation of that speech.

Places to read. B53 (Brunschvicg 53).

See also. Masking and naming (p. 236); Languages as ciphers (p. 233).

Present and absent pleasures

plaisirs présents — present pleasures [phrase]; *plaisirs absents* — absent pleasures [phrase]

B110 (Brunschvicg 110) derives inconstancy from an asymmetry: present pleasures have been experienced as false, while the vanity of absent pleasures is not yet known. B109 (Brunschvicg 109) explains the mechanism more fully. We imagine a new state by borrowing its pleasures into our present desires, overlooking that the desires themselves would change. Disappointment therefore need not end the search, since another absent possibility can again seem exempt. The fragments analyze how expectation renews itself despite experience, not a simple proof that every particular pleasure is nonexistent or that people consciously know all their future dissatisfactions.

Places to read. B109 (Brunschvicg 109); B110 (Brunschvicg 110).

See also. Desire (p. 171); Happiness (p. 180).

Present time and hoped-for living

temps présent — present time [phrase]; *nous espérons de vivre* — we hope to live [phrase]

B172 (Brunschvicg 172) says thought escapes into a past it would retain and a future it would hasten. The present usually wounds; if pleasant, it is regretted as slipping away. Even attention to it often serves arrangements for a future beyond our control. The conclusion that we hope to live instead of living concerns this structure of postponed happiness. It is not a simple ban on memory or practical planning. B195bis (Brunschvicg 195bis) adds that imagination can magnify the present relative to eternity; the two fragments address different comparative distortions rather than assigning one fixed psychological size to present time.

Places to read. B172 (Brunschvicg 172); B195bis (Brunschvicg 195bis).

See also. Thinking (p. 195); Happiness (p. 180); Imagination (p. 127).

Priest and sacrificial victim

sacrificateur — sacrificing priest [printed form]; *hostie* — sacrificial offering or victim [printed form]

The list of Christ's offices joins the priest who offers to the victim or offering that is offered. French hostie is therefore not simply another name for the officiating priest. Pascal makes Christ give his own body and blood while also speaking of bread and wine, bringing scriptural figure, self-offering, and Eucharistic practice into one compressed sequence. The verbs clarify the relation: he offers himself for the people he forms and reconciles.

The unity of roles does not erase their distinction. A translation that used sacrifice indiscriminately for both agent and object would lose the passage's central structure.

Places to read. B766 (Brunschvicg 766).

See also. Jesus Christ (p. 14); Redemption (p. 26); Mediation (p. 17).

Principles and consequences

principes — principles [printed form]; *conséquences* — consequences [printed form]; *graine* — seed [printed form]

B119 (Brunschvicg 119) pairs a seed cast into good earth with a principle cast into a good mind: each produces. Roots, branches, and fruits stand beside principles and consequences under the same master's direction. The natural image links fruitful intellectual work to conditions of reception, not merely possession of a premise. The fragment also says numbers imitate space despite their different natures. This is an analogy of relations, not an assertion that numbers, plants, and minds are made of the same substance. It should illuminate the movement from beginnings to results without replacing actual demonstrations.

Places to read. B119 (Brunschvicg 119).

See also. First principles (p. 118); Reason (p. 133); Nature (p. 186).

Proximate power

pouvoir prochain — proximate power [phrase]

The phrase belongs to working notes on the controversy over the ability to act rightly. Pascal's satirical questions ask how recently a disputed formula became an article of faith and whether its introduction itself manufactured a heresy. The notes do not provide a stable technical definition endorsed by every party. The important local point is that apparent verbal agreement can conceal incompatible claims about actual capacity. The printed expression is a cue to this controversy, not a settled account of the theological relation of will and grace. It belongs with sufficient grace, not with physical proximity.

Places to read. B925 (Brunschvicg 925).

See also. Grace (p. 85); Will (p. 103); Church (p. 137).

Pugio and rabbinic reading notes

Pugio — the Pugio fidei used as a source [printed form]; *Mischna* — Mishnah [printed form]; *Gemara* — Gemara [printed form]; *Talmud* — Talmud [printed form]; *Pugio fidei* — expanded work title supplied by the edition [editorial alias]

B635 (Brunschvicg 635) is a chronology of rabbinic literature whose page references Pascal expressly says come from the Pugio. The supplied edition identifies this as Pugio fidei, the Christian polemical intermediary also used for the dossier at B446 (Brunschvicg 446). The notes distinguish Mishnah and Gemara and say that the Talmud comprises both, while collecting historical names, dates and attributions. These details and universal claims about observance remain Pascal's historical reading notes, not a corrected modern bibliography or a reliable universal description of Jewish practice. The explicit intermediary prevents the fragment from being mistaken for evidence that Pascal directly verified every underlying rabbinic text or for an attribution of the intermediary's Christian claims to those authorities themselves. The edition represents the source's list typography without dropping its named items.

Places to read. B446 (Brunschvicg 446); B635 (Brunschvicg 635).

See also. Scripture (p. 94); Jews (p. 145); Witness (p. 38).

Putting away a book

je serrais mon livre — I put my book away [phrase]; *je me défiais* — I mistrusted [phrase]

The recollection begins with a childhood act of putting away a book, then breaks off amid a contrast between believing it had been put away and mistrusting something. The surviving words do not identify all the missing actions or conclusions. In the neighboring sequence, memory and the escape of thoughts expose human weakness; that context makes the fragment intelligible without licensing a reconstructed story. The ellipses belong to the supplied source and should remain visible as a limit on what can be said about the incident.

Places to read. B369 (Brunschvicg 369); B370 (Brunschvicg 370); B371 (Brunschvicg 371); B372 (Brunschvicg 372).

See also. Thinking (p. 195); Reason (p. 133).

Remaining in a room

chambre — room [printed form]; *demeurer en repos* — remain at rest [phrase]

The inability to stay quietly in a room is B139 (Brunschvicg 139)'s first discovery about restless undertakings, not its final explanation. Pascal then asks why remaining is unbearable and locates the reason in a weak, mortal, unhappy condition. Quoting only the room risks turning the diagnosis into an uncomplicated instruction to stay home. The imagined person already has enough to live on, so necessity alone does not explain going to sea or seeking siege and office. The room removes absorbing activity and becomes a test of whether the person's own condition can be contemplated contentedly.

Places to read. B138 (Brunschvicg 138); B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

See also. Diversion (p. 174); Boredom (p. 166); Rest and repose (p. 252).

Respect as inconvenience

Incommodez-vous — Inconvenience yourself [phrase]

B317 (Brunschvicg 317) interprets a deliberately inconvenient gesture as a sign: if one accepts a cost even when it provides no practical service, one signals willingness to bear a cost when service is needed. Respect also distinguishes its recipient; if it consisted in sitting comfortably, everyone could receive it without distinction. The explanation supplies a reason for an apparently empty convention without proving the recipient's inward superiority. B317bis (Brunschvicg 317bis) preserves the formulation under vanity, and B319 (Brunschvicg 319) explains visible precedence through the peace it can secure. Costly recognition and intrinsic worth therefore remain separate questions.

Places to read. B317 (Brunschvicg 317); B317bis (Brunschvicg 317bis); B319 (Brunschvicg 319).

See also. Custom (p. 110); Opinion (p. 59); Greatness (p. 177).

Rest and repose

repos — rest [printed form]; *repos entier* — complete rest [phrase]

Rest has opposed values depending on the condition of the person who rests. B129 (Brunschvicg 129) calls complete rest death; B131 (Brunschvicg 131) exposes misery when occupation stops. Yet B139 (Brunschvicg 139) identifies a remaining instinct of first nature that recognizes happiness in rest rather than tumult. The confused human project tries to reach that repose through agitation. Advising immediate contentment therefore assumes the repaired condition it purports to produce. B170 (Brunschvicg 170)

contrasts dependent diversion with the happiness attributed to saints and God. The lexical distinction is not simply activity bad, inactivity good: it concerns what a person would encounter in undiverted attention.

Places to read. B129 (Brunschvicg 129); B131 (Brunschvicg 131); B139 (Brunschvicg 139); B170 (Brunschvicg 170).

See also. Boredom (p. 166); Diversion (p. 174); Happiness (p. 180); Nature (p. 186).

Rivers as moving roads

rivières — rivers [printed form]; *chemins qui marchent* — roads that move [phrase]

The river is a road that moves while carrying us where we want to go. B17 (Brunschvicg 17)'s single sentence joins a stable route with movement normally assigned to the traveler. The image is concrete and self-contained: it should not be made into an allegory of salvation or historical progress without further evidence. Its usefulness in the early language sequence is its economy, allowing an ordinary object to be seen through an unexpected relation. The apparent paradox depends on changing which thing performs the movement, not on asserting that roads literally acquire legs.

Places to read. B17 (Brunschvicg 17).

See also. Thinking (p. 195); Portrait and added ornament (p. 247).

Roannez and reasons afterward

M. de Roannez — Mr. de Roannez [phrase]; *Les raisons me viennent après* — Reasons come to me afterward [phrase]

Roannez reports that something first pleases or offends him without his knowing why, and that later reasons explain the original reaction. Pascal replies with a different causal account: perhaps the reasons are discovered because the thing offends, rather than the offense arising from reasons already active. The disagreement must remain attributed to its speakers. The fragment neither proves that every immediate judgment is prejudice nor warrants treating every later justification as a faithful discovery of tacit reasoning. Read with B1 (Brunschvicg 1), it distinguishes the possibility of sound discernment from automatic confidence in one's first response.

Places to read. B276 (Brunschvicg 276).

See also. Discernment (p. 113); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Reason (p. 133).

Robes, fur, and square caps

robes rouges — red robes [phrase]; *hermines* — ermine [printed form]; *bonnets carrés* — square caps [phrase]

Judicial and learned dress gives authority an impressive appearance before the actual capacity to judge or heal is tested. B82 (Brunschvicg 82) makes robes, fur, caps, and spacious gowns instruments of imagination. The contrast with soldiers and royal guards matters: force supplies a different and more effective ground of fear than professional costume alone. B310 (Brunschvicg 310)'s soldier sending a senior judge's cap out the window turns that difference into an image. Clothing can also signify real resources, as B316 (Brunschvicg 316)'s servants and labor show. The source does not make every visible distinction an equally empty illusion.

Places to read. B82 (Brunschvicg 82); B310 (Brunschvicg 310); B316 (Brunschvicg 316).

See also. Imagination (p. 127); Force (p. 44); Opinion (p. 59).

Scaramouche and the Doctor

Scaramouche — Scaramouche [printed form]; *docteur* — Doctor [printed form]

The paired notes contrast a theatrical figure occupied with one thing and the Doctor who keeps speaking for a quarter of an hour after saying everything. The apparatus identifies figures of Italian comic performance, but the fragment itself offers compressed observations rather than a developed theory of dramatic types. The Doctor's surplus speech is driven by desire to speak, not by remaining matter. Read beside the comments on eloquence and authorial display, the joke distinguishes verbal abundance from communicative purpose. It also gives a concrete example of attention occupied by an impulse that outlasts its ostensible task.

Places to read. B12 (Brunschvicg 12).

See also. Desire (p. 171); Thinking (p. 195); Portrait and added ornament (p. 247).

Separating and being separated

Je m'en suis séparé — I have separated myself from him [phrase]; *Que je n'en sois jamais séparé* — may I never be separated from him [phrase]

The reflexive confession assigns the departure to the speaking self. It is followed first by fear of eternal separation and later by the prayer never to be separated. These forms should not be flattened into a single passive state: the record both acknowledges an action and asks for preservation from its final consequence. The intervening verbs of fleeing, renouncing, and crucifying

Christ give the confession its Christian object. The repetitions belong to the devotional structure and are not redundant narrative information to be removed. Joy remains present in the same text, so separation is confessed within an address of hope.

Places to read. MEM (Mémorial paper D).

See also. Sin (p. 32); Repentance (p. 159); Mediation (p. 17).

Shared nourishment

nourriture — nourishment [printed form]; *retenir en eux-mêmes* — to retain within themselves [phrase]

A thinking member might misuse intelligence to hold nourishment within itself rather than pass it to other members. Pascal calls this both unjust and miserable: it undermines the relation through which the member itself lives. The example makes duty and happiness converge on the whole body's good. It is not an account of an independent organ accumulating wealth, but an analogy that exposes the self-defeating nature of treating a dependent part as its own final end. The subsequent fragment applies the member-body relation explicitly to Jesus Christ.

Places to read. B482 (Brunschvicg 482); B483 (Brunschvicg 483).

See also. Body and members (p. 71); Charity (p. 73); Justice (p. 50).

Shem's chain of witnesses

Sem — Shem [printed form]; *Lamech* — Lamech [printed form]; *Adam* — Adam [printed form]; *Jacob* — Jacob [printed form]

B625 (Brunschvicg 625) constructs a chain from Shem, who saw Lamech and Jacob, through those who saw Moses. Its short conclusion treats creation and flood as thereby true, adding that this is conclusive among certain people who understand it. The argument relies on accepting the overlapping lifespans and the trustworthiness of transmission, not merely on seeing four names printed together. B624 (Brunschvicg 624) explains the intended advantage of few generations. This compact record preserves the shape of the claimed chain without presenting the genealogy as an independently verified historical chronology.

Places to read. B624 (Brunschvicg 624); B625 (Brunschvicg 625).

See also. Witness (p. 38); Scripture (p. 94); Fall (p. 12).

Signing and consent

signature — signature or act of signing [printed form]; *signer* — to sign [printed form]; *consentement* — consent [printed form]

The passage asks what a required signature means and insists that the signers be allowed to explain it if ambiguity would otherwise remain. Pascal notes that many people take signing to mark consent. The physical or legal act cannot therefore be treated as empty while its public meaning conveys assent. He compares different documentary situations, but the inference breaks off before reaching a conclusion. The immediate issue is a contested religious declaration, not current legal advice. Its ethical force concerns truthful profession: a demand for formal compliance does not automatically resolve whether the proposition affirmed is believed.

Places to read. B945 (Brunschvicg 945).

See also. Truth (p. 162); Church (p. 137); Witness (p. 38).

Slowly and gently

doucement — slowly [printed form]; *douceur* — gently [printed form]

B69 (Brunschvicg 69) and B69bis (Brunschvicg 69bis) say that reading too quickly or too slowly prevents understanding. Doucement therefore concerns pace here, not kindness or a quiet emotional manner; the repeated unit at B69bis (Brunschvicg 69bis) adds the cue of two infinities and a middle. B185 (Brunschvicg 185) uses the related douceur for the gentleness of divine conduct, contrasting reasons and grace with force and threats. That difference matters to English lookup: one familiar translation cannot be carried unchanged across the family. The first use tests a proportion suitable for reading, the second distinguishes persuasion and religious transformation from the production of terror.

Places to read. B69 (Brunschvicg 69); B69bis (Brunschvicg 69bis); B185 (Brunschvicg 185).

See also. Reason (p. 133); Heart (p. 124); At a single glance (p. 206).

Sneezing, intercourse, and agency

éternuement — Sneezing [printed form]; *besogne* — sexual intercourse [printed form]

B160 (Brunschvicg 160) says sneezing absorbs the soul's functions as intercourse does, yet observers do not draw the same conclusion about servitude because agency and attraction differ. Even deliberately provoking a sneeze may aim at another end rather than the sneeze itself. The following comparison of pain and pleasure likewise turns on mastery: choosing pain can be submission to one's own decision, whereas succumbing to tempting

pleasure subjects one to that pleasure. The local note confirms the sexual sense of besogne. The fragment's moral distinction is not reducible to greater intensity or to whether a sensation is pleasant.

Places to read. B160 (Brunschvicg 160).
See also. Greatness (p. 177); Reason (p. 133); Desire (p. 171).

Solomon and Job

Salomon — Solomon [printed form]; *Job* — Job [printed form]
B174 (Brunschvicg 174) pairs the happiest and unhappiest biblical figures as those who best knew and spoke of human wretchedness. Solomon knows pleasures' vanity through abundance; Job knows the reality of evils through affliction. Their opposed circumstances become complementary routes to the same condition. The fragment does not claim that the two underwent identical experiences or that prosperity is materially indistinguishable from suffering. It prevents wretchedness from being restricted to one social or emotional situation, while leaving the content of each person's knowledge distinct. The names function as argumentative examples rather than full biographical entries.

Places to read. B174 (Brunschvicg 174); B174bis (Brunschvicg 174bis).
See also. Wretchedness (p. 198); Happiness (p. 180).

Stone without hands

la pierre taillée sans mains — the stone cut without hands [phrase]
In Pascal's Daniel dossier the stone strikes the statue's feet, destroys its mixed materials, grows into a mountain, and fills the earth. The lack of human cutting marks the difference between this kingdom and the empires represented by metals. B734 (Brunschvicg 734) applies the small beginning and subsequent growth to Christ. The image supplies scale, action, and an origin not attributed to ordinary human workmanship. The biblical rendering and its parenthetical identifications belong to Pascal's assembled Christian interpretation; they should not be treated as a verified neutral chronology of empires merely because names and dates appear beside them.

Places to read. B722 (Brunschvicg 722).
See also. Prophecy (p. 23); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Two advents (p. 280).

Sufficient grace

grâce suffisante — sufficient grace [phrase]
The expression appears in an ironic sequence about competing descriptions of grace. Pascal imagines degrees descending toward nothing and places the disputed grace near the lowest step. The attack is on language

that appears to provide ability while, in his view, leaving the decisive capacity absent or differently understood. It is not a neutral definition that sufficient simply means useless. The neighboring references to named theologians, censure, and proximate power show a working polemical dossier, not an exhaustive statement of the opponents' developed positions.

Places to read. B925 (Brunschvicg 925).

See also. Grace (p. 85); Will (p. 103); Proximate power (p. 250).

Supernatural in manner

quoad modum — with respect to the manner of production [phrase]

Barcos's second class concerns effects produced by means without the natural power to produce them. Mud applied to blind eyes, bending over Peter's mother-in-law, and the edge of a robe are his Gospel examples. Healing need not be absolutely beyond every natural process to count as miraculous in this respect: the relevant means, speed, or perfection exceed the natural order described. Barcos calls most Gospel miracles instances of this second kind. This is his reply, not a phrase supplied by Pascal's question. QM-IX-R (Question IX, Reply — Martin de Barcos) later uses the same label for the few reported miracles associated with heretics.

Places to read. QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Natural power of the means (p. 240).

Supernatural in substance

quoad substantiam — with respect to substance [phrase]

Barcos, replying to Pascal, reports a distinction among miracles supernatural in their substance and those supernatural in the manner of production. His examples of the first are two bodies penetrating one another and one body present in two places at the same time. These examples concern the kind of effect, not merely the speed of a familiar process. The reply is a theological classification attributed to theologians, not an experimental report verifying either occurrence. Pascal's preceding question asks whether a miracle must exceed all created nature; the reply explains distinctions relevant to that question rather than turning the question itself into an assertion.

Places to read. QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Supernatural in manner (p. 258).

Take comfort

Consolez-vous — take comfort [printed form]; *Console-toi* — take comfort [printed form]

B517 (Brunschvicg 517) offers comfort through expecting nothing from oneself rather than treating the self as the source of what is awaited. B553 (Brunschvicg 553) gives a related consolation in Christ's voice within a devotional exchange: the addressee would not seek him without already having found him. The change of voice is important; this is not an unmarked continuation of Pascal's descriptive remarks about the Passion. Comfort does not eliminate prayer or repentance. It redirects hope toward an enabling gift and joins the disclosure of sin with the possibility of healing.

Places to read. B517 (Brunschvicg 517); B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

See also. Grace (p. 85); Search (p. 97); Prayer (p. 91).

Tears of joy

pleurs de joie — tears of joy [phrase]

Tears follow three successive repetitions of joy. They are therefore not simply the opposite of the joy just named. The expression makes a bodily response part of the devotional acknowledgment while the surrounding sequence moves toward confession of separation. Elsewhere Pascal joins joy to fear after confession rather than choosing one feeling as sufficient (B530 (Brunschvicg 530)). MEM (Mémorial paper D)'s tears likewise need not be reduced either to sorrow alone or to self-validating exaltation. Their object is the divine relation articulated through scriptural phrases and the repeated name of Jesus Christ. The edition keeps this paper-text sequence without importing the parchment's longer conclusion.

Places to read. MEM (Mémorial paper D).

See also. Joy (p. 148); Repentance (p. 159); Body and members (p. 71).

Temple and inward worship

temple — temple [printed form]

Christ's work in B766 (Brunschvicg 766) includes making his people God's temple. The building word is thereby applied to a community made holy and reconciled, not only to masonry. B670 (Brunschvicg 670) contrasts temples made by hands with the pure and humbled heart, while the scriptural dossiers gather warnings against reliance on an outward temple. The relation does not make every physical place irrelevant; it asks what the visible institution serves. In the Port-Royal polemic (B841 (Brunschvicg 841)), Pascal again says God makes a place his temple through the healing he

attributes to him. These differing applications should be distinguished rather than fused into one architectural definition.

Places to read. B766 (Brunschvicg 766); B841 (Brunschvicg 841).

See also. Church (p. 137); Figurative meaning (p. 82); Mediation (p. 17).

Tennis and arrangement

paume — tennis [printed form]; *disposition* — arrangement [printed form]; *chasse* — chase [printed form]

B22 (Brunschvicg 22) defends novelty of arrangement through a shared tennis ball: the players use the same object, but one places it better. Old thoughts can form another body of discourse, just as old words can form different thoughts. In B140 (Brunschvicg 140) chasse instead has the technical court-game sense "chase"; the bereaved player's attention is absorbed by returning a served ball. The fragment then moves to catching a hare without finishing one continuous narrative. Keeping these uses distinct prevents a literal hunt from being inserted into the tennis sentence, while preserving the wider relation between play, placement, and occupation.

Places to read. B22 (Brunschvicg 22); B140 (Brunschvicg 140).

See also. Diversion (p. 174); Thinking (p. 195); The hunt and the catch (p. 268).

Testing versus leading into error

tenter — to put to the test [printed form]; *induire en erreur* — lead into an unavoidable false conclusion in the defined sense [phrase]

Pascal defines testing as providing occasions that impose no necessity. Someone who does not love God may take the occasion wrongly, but is not compelled to do so. Leading into error, by contrast, would put the person under a necessity to conclude and follow falsehood. This special definition explains later claims that foretold signs of the Antichrist cannot lead into error in that stronger sense: warning provides grounds for resistance. The distinction does not deny ordinary deception. It prevents the later argument about divine truthfulness from being misread as saying that no one is ever actually misled.

Places to read. B821 (Brunschvicg 821).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Truth (p. 162); In whose name? (p. 231).

The amphibious creature of the fable

cet animal amphibie de la fable — that amphibious creature of the fable [phrase]; *Voltigerod* — allusive place-name, unresolved here [printed form]

The creature is described as maintaining an ambiguous position between fish and birds. Pascal uses it in an accusation of double heart and double tongue: allegiances and words change with advantage. The immediate point is opportunistic ambiguity, not a scientific classification of amphibians. The supplied edition leaves the fable's creature and the place-name Voltigerod allusive rather than identifying them with certainty. The creature's role is to make opportunistic changes of allegiance visible; its zoological identity and complete story remain unspecified.

Places to read. B924 (Brunschvicg 924).

See also. Truth (p. 162); Self-love (p. 192); World (p. 67).

The burning brand

tison de feu — burning brand [phrase]; *agilité* — agility [printed form]; *étendue* — breadth [printed form]

A moving point of fire can seem to occupy a continuous extent. Pascal uses that appearance as a possible qualification of his claim that a great soul reaches opposed virtues at once. Perhaps it occupies only one point and moves suddenly to the other. He grants the possibility, then preserves a smaller conclusion: rapid passage shows agility even if it does not demonstrate breadth. The concession is part of the argument, not an embarrassment to be omitted. The image distinguishes what an appearance proves from what it may merely suggest.

Places to read. B353 (Brunschvicg 353).

See also. Morality (p. 56); Greatness (p. 177); Discernment (p. 113).

The calculating machine

machine d'arithmétique — calculating machine [phrase]; *volonté* — will [printed form]

The machine produces effects closer to thought than anything animals do, yet gives no basis for attributing will to it. Animals, by contrast, are granted a will. The two comparisons must be kept separate: thought-like performance and willing are not measured along one uncomplicated scale. B340 (Brunschvicg 340) does not simply equate the machine with a human mind or place all living beings on one side against mechanisms on the other. Its concise distinction belongs beside the neighboring examples testing whether animal routines arise through intelligence rather than instinct.

Places to read. B340 (Brunschvicg 340).

See also. Thinking (p. 195); Will (p. 103); Reason (p. 133).

The closed mem

le mem fermé — the closed mem [phrase]; *tsade finals* — final tsades [phrase]; *he deficientes* — missing hes [phrase]

Mem is a Hebrew letter, and its closed written form is invoked in a rejected numerical interpretation. Pascal says Scripture does not authorize assigning it the proposed value as a mystery; he could as arbitrarily invent mysteries in final tsades or missing hes. B688 (Brunschvicg 688) repeats that he is not claiming the mem is mysterious. B758 (Brunschvicg 758) uses the example to distinguish moral disposition from the technical interpretation of a date. The objection limits esoteric ingenuity, including the appeal to the philosopher's stone; it does not reject every spiritual sense. The concrete letter is thus a boundary case for legitimate interpretation.

Places to read. B687 (Brunschvicg 687).

See also. Scripture (p. 94); Figurative meaning (p. 82); Prophecy (p. 23).

The common altar

ne nous séparent pas d'autel — do not separate us from a common altar [phrase]

Pascal says the divisions under discussion do not separate the parties from the altar. The phrase distinguishes disagreement within Catholic communion from schism. Its context rejects identifying the Jesuits' doctrine, as he attacks it, with the Church's doctrine itself. The altar is therefore a concrete sign of shared sacramental belonging, not proof that every disputed teaching is equally true. Read beside B930 (Brunschvicg 930), the phrase allows defense of truth without making communal rupture the necessary form of every disagreement. It is a claim about the controversy's boundaries, not a statement that all religious differences everywhere are merely verbal.

Places to read. B891 (Brunschvicg 891).

See also. Church (p. 137); Peace (p. 154); Charity (p. 73).

The cup

calice — cup [printed form]; *avec soumission* — with submission [phrase]

In the meditation on Jesus' agony, the cup is what he asks to pass, and even that petition is made with submission. Pascal says he asks once for its passing and twice for its coming if necessary. The immediate setting joins fear of death, uncertainty concerning the Father's will and the subsequent going forward once it is known. The image therefore does not simply

contrast a weak first prayer with a strong later will. It makes dependence and obedience audible within the prayer itself, before the text asks the reader to pray longer.

Places to read. B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

See also. Prayer (p. 91); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Will (p. 103).

The dispossessed king

roi dépossédé — dispossessed king [phrase]; *Persée* — Perseus [printed form]; *Paul Émile* — Aemilius Paulus [phrase]

Loss of kingship is a misery for someone whose condition was to be king, not ordinarily for someone who never held that status. B409 (Brunschvicg 409) expands B398 (Brunschvicg 398)'s compressed image by contrasting Perseus, expected to remain king, with Aemilius Paulus, whose consulship was not expected to last forever. B410 (Brunschvicg 410) adds the harsh report that Perseus was reproached for continuing to live. Bodily parallels distinguish having one mouth from having only one eye, and never having three eyes from losing all sight. Lack is thus measured against a standard of what belongs to a being. Pascal uses felt misery to infer deprivation of a better nature and applies the image to the Fall; neither the metaphor nor the historical names independently establish that theological history.

Places to read. B398 (Brunschvicg 398); B409 (Brunschvicg 409); B410 (Brunschvicg 410).

See also. Greatness (p. 177); Wretchedness (p. 198); Fall (p. 12).

The divine seal

son sceau — his seal [phrase]

The seal is Barcos's image for divine authentication. If a true miracle confirmed an error, God would approve that error under his seal, acting as a false witness or, more strongly, a false judge. The reply excludes that possibility regardless of whether the human instrument is Catholic, heretical, holy, or wicked. The object confirmed therefore matters more than a blanket certification of the instrument's character. Seal does not name a physical object inspected in the exchange; it supplies a juridical analogy for the evidential role of a true miracle within Barcos's account of divine truthfulness.

Places to read. QM-IV-R (Question IV, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Truth (p. 162); Miracle (p. 20); Witness (p. 38).

The dreaming craftsman

artisan — craftsman [printed form]; *douze heures* — twelve hours [phrase]

Pascal imagines a craftsman dreaming every night for twelve hours that he is king and compares him with a king dreaming the reverse. If the dream recurred consistently, he thinks their happiness could be nearly alike. The hypothetical repetition also applies to being pursued by enemies and dreading sleep. The claim concerns how continuity shapes the force of experience; it is not a report that ordinary dreams actually have this regularity. B386 (Brunschvicg 386) ends by calling life a slightly less changeable dream, preserving a comparative difference rather than simply equating waking and sleeping.

Places to read. B386 (Brunschvicg 386).

See also. Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Happiness (p. 180); Reason (p. 133).

The eldest son

fils aîné du roi — king's eldest son [phrase]; *guerre civile* — civil war [phrase]

The king's eldest son supplies an indisputable designation where virtue and ability would be disputed. Pascal first calls hereditary selection unreasonable by comparison with choosing a ship's governor. He then argues that people's disorder makes a clear rule reasonable, because everyone would otherwise claim the highest merit. The reasoning turns on avoidance of civil war, called the greatest evil here, not on a proof of inherited personal excellence. The edition's note clarifies that the pronoun in "because people are ... so" refers to disordered people, not to intrinsically just royal succession.

Places to read. B320bis (Brunschvicg 320bis).

See also. Law (p. 53); Honor (p. 47); Opinion (p. 59).

The enchantment of trifles

Fascinatio nugacitatis — The enchantment of trifles [phrase]

B203 (Brunschvicg 203) places the Latin cue before a practical experiment: act as though only eight days of life remained, so that passion does no harm. The shortened horizon tests how ordinary attractions would change under an acknowledged end. B204 (Brunschvicg 204) and B204bis (Brunschvicg 204bis) then extend the commitment from eight days to a hundred years or an entire life, rather than making the brief imagined period a permanent excuse for postponement. The fragment does not supply a full

account of the Latin phrase's provenance. Its local role is to interrupt enchantment by small things through a different scale of attention.

Places to read. B203 (Brunschvicg 203); B204 (Brunschvicg 204); B204bis (Brunschvicg 204bis).

See also. Death (p. 168); Diversion (p. 174); Thinking (p. 195).

The escaped thought

Pensée échappée — escaped thought [phrase]; *elle m'échappe* — it escapes me [phrase]

B370 (Brunschvicg 370) records the failure it meant to prevent: instead of writing the thought, the writer writes that it escaped. B372 (Brunschvicg 372) then finds another instruction in the loss. Forgetfulness recalls weakness, itself continually forgotten, and can teach as much as the missing idea when the aim is self-knowledge. This is not a claim that every forgotten proposition is worthless. The fragments make the act of composing vulnerable to the very instability it describes. Source brackets and the "Digression" cue in B370 (Brunschvicg 370) remain signs of the unfinished record, not new editorial omissions.

Places to read. B370 (Brunschvicg 370); B372 (Brunschvicg 372).

See also. Thinking (p. 195); Self (p. 189); Wretchedness (p. 198).

The final act

dernier acte — final act [phrase]; *comédie* — play [printed form]

However fine the rest of the play, its last act is bloody and ends with earth thrown upon the head. B210 (Brunschvicg 210)'s dramatic compression makes burial interrupt the apparent success of a life. Comédie here is the play whose course is compared with life, not necessarily a comic entertainment and not the same local use as the theater warning in B11 (Brunschvicg 11). The ending does not provide a full account of the afterlife. It forces the worldly narrative to include its physical conclusion rather than treating the attractive preceding scenes as the whole.

Places to read. B210 (Brunschvicg 210).

See also. Death (p. 168); Diversion (p. 174); Theater and represented passions (p. 278).

The golden apple

pomme d'or — golden apple [phrase]; *Iliade* — Iliad [printed form]; *Homère* — Homer [printed form]

The apple evokes the myth associated with the judgment of Paris. In B628 (Brunschvicg 628) Pascal treats Troy and Agamemnon alongside it as

parts of a romance originally received as fiction, then imagines later generations mistaking inherited familiarity for history. The surrounding account contrasts Homer's individual work with a book made by a people. Pascal's presentation of the Iliad's original status and reception is his polemical construction, not a neutral finding of modern Homeric scholarship. The bracketed apple comparison remains part of the source's own unfinished textual form.

Places to read. B628 (Brunschvicg 628).

See also. Scripture (p. 94); Witness (p. 38); Imagination (p. 127).

The great Pan

Le grand Pan est mort — the great Pan is dead [phrase]

The entire fragment places this reported death under the heading Prophecies. The edition identifies Pan as a god of ancient Greek religion and explains that Pascal records the report as material for an argument about pagan religion's ending. The fragment does not narrate the event, establish its date, or verify that such a death occurred. Its brevity is itself significant: it is a source reminder awaiting use, not a completed demonstration. The name can be identified, but the supplied fragment does not support an elaborate narrative or a settled interpretation of the report.

Places to read. B695 (Brunschvicg 695).

See also. Paganism (p. 151); Prophecy (p. 23).

The habit makes the doctrine

L'habit fait la doctrine — the habit makes the doctrine [phrase]

Habit here is religious clothing, not an acquired routine. The epigram accuses institutional affiliation of deciding whether a proposition is accepted: the garment appears to authorize what the words themselves should establish. The surrounding notes about censure, Arnauld, and sufficient grace make this a polemical complaint about judgment. It should not be confused with Pascal's analyses of coutume or habitude elsewhere. The compact image works because a visible sign of membership is allowed to substitute for examination. It neither establishes the guilt of every religious order nor means that clothing literally produces a theological proposition.

Places to read. B925 (Brunschvicg 925).

See also. Church (p. 137); Opinion (p. 59); Truth (p. 162).

The heart's order

ordre de la charité — order of charity [phrase]; *échauffer* — to warm [printed form]; *digression* — digressing [printed form]; *L'ordre* — order or arrangement [phrase]; *l'ordre de la charité* — the order of charity [phrase]

B283 (Brunschvicg 283) answers the objection that Scripture lacks order by distinguishing the mind's procedure through principle and demonstration from the heart's order. One does not prove a claim to be loved by enumerating love's causes. Christ, Paul, and Augustine are said to follow the order of charity: successive points and digressions are related to the end so that it remains visible. The supplied edition follows échauffer as "warm," rather than silently substituting another critical reading. "Not instruct" belongs to this contrast of aim and method, not a claim that the writings communicate no knowledge. This rhetorical and pedagogical order differs both from the three kinds of greatness in B793 (Brunschvicg 793) and from a later editor's arrangement of Pascal's fragments.

Places to read. B283 (Brunschvicg 283); B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

See also. Heart (p. 124); Reason (p. 133); Charity (p. 73); Three orders (p. 35); Scripture (p. 94).

The Holy Thorn

une épine de la couronne — a thorn from the crown [phrase]

The relic supplies the specific instrument in Pascal's defense of the reported Port-Royal healing. He stresses that it belongs to the Savior's Passion and works by the power of the blood shed for humanity, rather than by an unknown private power of a claimant. This is why its identity matters to his evidential reasoning. His interpretation does not independently establish the relic's provenance or the cure's medical and supernatural status. The distinction between material instrument and divine agent also links the passage to the Questions on miracles, where the natural force of a relic's contact is expressly examined.

Places to read. B839 (Brunschvicg 839).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Witness (p. 38); Redemption (p. 26).

The horse's oats

avoine — oats [printed form]; *émulation à la course* — rivalry in a race [phrase]

Horses may compete in a race, but the heavier, more ill-shaped horse does not thereafter surrender its oats to its companion. Pascal contrasts this with the continuing deference humans demand after an admired success. His point is the extension from a particular excellence to claims on other goods

and standing. The observation is not a systematic account of animal social behavior; it is a comparison within the argument about glory. Human desire for esteem can expose vanity while also showing the great value assigned to another mind's recognition.

Places to read. B401 (Brunschvicg 401); B404 (Brunschvicg 404).

See also. Honor (p. 47); Greatness (p. 177); Opinion (p. 59).

The hunt and the catch

la chasse — the hunt [phrase]; *la prise* — the catch [phrase]; *lièvre* — hare [printed form]

The hunter may not want a hare offered for sale or as a gift, although he eagerly pursues it. B139 (Brunschvicg 139) distinguishes the possession sought in his account from the activity that actually occupies him. The hunt shields attention from death and misery; the captured animal by itself does not. Pascal criticizes both the hunter's mistaken expectation of lasting satisfaction and the philosopher who thinks recommending immediate rest solves the problem. The gentleman and his huntsman also value the occupation differently. This is a concrete argument about function and perspective, not a claim that hunting has one identical motive for every participant.

Places to read. B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

See also. Diversion (p. 174); Desire (p. 171); Happiness (p. 180).

The infinite sphere

sphère infinie — infinite sphere [phrase]; *centre est partout* — center is everywhere [phrase]; *circonférence nulle part* — circumference nowhere [phrase]

The sphere with center everywhere and circumference nowhere removes a fixed privileged standpoint from the finite observer's imagination. It appears within B72 (Brunschvicg 72)'s movement beyond visible astronomical scale, where the conceived object continually exceeds what thought can furnish. The phrase is not presented as a measurable globe or a modern cosmological model. Pascal makes imagination's loss in the thought a perceptible mark of divine omnipotence, within his argument. The image should remain tied to that exercise in disproportion rather than being treated as a complete geometrical definition or a claim that every physical object is spherical.

Places to read. B72 (Brunschvicg 72).

See also. Infinity (p. 183); Nature (p. 186).

The infinitely moving point

point se mouvant — point moving [phrase]; *vitesse infinie* — infinite speed [phrase]

A point moving everywhere at infinite speed is proposed to someone who calls infinity without parts impossible. B231 (Brunschvicg 231) imagines it one in all places and wholly in each. The conclusion is modestly directed at learning: present incomprehension should not become a claim that nothing more remains to know. The construction is not an observed physical motion or a demonstrated description of God's essence. B232 (Brunschvicg 232) condenses the same vocabulary into a series of cues. Its role is to unsettle a prohibition based on limited conception, not to abolish all distinctions between finite bodies and God.

Places to read. B231 (Brunschvicg 231); B232 (Brunschvicg 232).

See also. Infinity (p. 183); Reason (p. 133).

The mite and nested universes

ciron — mite [printed form]; *raccourci d'atome* — diminished atom [phrase]

B72 (Brunschvicg 72) moves into the mite's limbs, joints, veins, blood, fluids, drops, and vapors, then asks the reader to imagine universes within the smallest reached object. The same sequence can be repeated without rest. This is an exercise exposing the limit of finite imagination, not a report that Pascal observed literal miniature solar systems inside an insect. Its reverse scale makes our body colossal relative to an unreachable nothingness after it seemed imperceptible within the universe. The comparison changes the body's relation to its frame, not the body's actual size.

Places to read. B72 (Brunschvicg 72).

See also. Infinity (p. 183); Nature (p. 186).

The one person who hears confession

un seul — one exception [phrase]; *secret inviolable* — inviolable secrecy [phrase]

B100 (Brunschvicg 100)'s one person is the Catholic confessor, as the edition's note identifies him. The passage emphasizes a limited and protected disclosure: sins need not be exposed indiscriminately to everyone, but one listener must be allowed to see the person truthfully and is bound to secrecy. Resistance even to this condition supports the charge against self-love. Pascal's further claim that such resistance helped produce Europe's religious divisions remains his polemical explanation. The example concerns

concealment and truthful acknowledgment within protected confession, not public disclosure of private matters.

Places to read. B100 (Brunschvicg 100).

See also. Self-love (p. 192); Truth (p. 162).

The parrot's beak

bec du perroquet — parrot's beak [phrase]; *net* — clean [printed form]

Pascal notes a parrot wiping its beak even when the beak is clean. The short observation occurs among fragments distinguishing instinct from reasoning. Its point is that the repeated action persists when the immediate condition that would explain it as deliberate cleaning is absent. The text offers a single observation, not a general account of parrots' intelligence or an experimental series. It is a small concrete instance whose argumentative force comes from its place beside the repeated pike-and-frog behavior and the hypothetical request about the rope.

Places to read. B341 (Brunschvicg 341); B342 (Brunschvicg 342); B343 (Brunschvicg 343); B344 (Brunschvicg 344).

See also. Reason (p. 133); Thinking (p. 195).

The plank above a precipice

planche — plank [printed form]; *précipice* — precipice [printed form]

A philosopher knows that the plank is wider than necessary for safety but becomes overcome by imagination when a precipice lies below. B82 (Brunschvicg 82) separates a reasoned judgment from its ability to govern bodily response. The philosopher's learning is not denied; its insufficiency in this encounter is the point. B183 (Brunschvicg 183) supplies a different precipice: people run toward it after blocking their own view. In the first scene an imagined danger overrides a judgment of safety; in the second concealment prevents attending to danger. The two images expose opposite failures of attention and response.

Places to read. B82 (Brunschvicg 82); B183 (Brunschvicg 183).

See also. Imagination (p. 127); Death (p. 168); Reason (p. 133).

The powers of a key and hook

Vertu apéritive — opening power [phrase]; *attractive* — attracting [printed form]; *clé* — key [printed form]; *croc* — hook [printed form]

The opening power of a key and attracting power of a hook give learned explanatory language ordinary objects. Vertu here means an operative capacity, not moral virtue. The comedy lies in how little may have been explained by renaming what the tool does in a more impressive vocabulary.

The adjective attractive belongs to the hook; it should not be treated as the modern psychological meaning of an attractive person. This compressed fragment makes the adequacy of an explanation itself a question, linking exact word choice with the broader distinction between observing an effect and identifying its cause.

Places to read. B55 (Brunschvicg 55).

See also. Reason (p. 133); Effects and causes (p. 218).

The Red Sea

mer Rouge — Red Sea [phrase]; *image de la Rédemption* — image of Redemption [phrase]

The Red Sea opens B643 (Brunschvicg 643) as an image of redemption. Pascal then compares visible deliverances with the healing of the paralytic, where bodily restoration manifests authority to forgive sins. The point is that power exercised over visible goods can disclose power to give invisible holiness and glory. The narrative is not treated as merely a geographical escape into fertile land. This is Pascal's Christian figural reading, and the analogy requires attention to the direction from visible sign to invisible good rather than an arbitrary resemblance between unrelated events.

Places to read. B643 (Brunschvicg 643).

See also. Redemption (p. 26); Figurative meaning (p. 82); Grace (p. 85).

The robe's edge

le bord de sa robe — the edge of his robe [phrase]

Barcos recalls the woman suffering a flow of blood touching Christ's garment. The robe's edge is the contacted instrument in the example, not an autonomous healer. Its ordinary natural capacity is contrasted with the healing attributed to the encounter, making it an example of supernatural manner rather than necessarily supernatural substance. The grammar also matters: the woman touches the robe; Christ is not described as touching her with it. The edition preserves the concrete scene in its account of means and effects. The example does not independently establish medical efficacy for garments or replicas.

Places to read. QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Touch and immediacy (p. 279); Supernatural in manner (p. 258).

The ruined house

maison ruinée — ruined house [phrase]; *Ego vir videns* — I am the man who sees [phrase]

A ruined house is not miserable because it lacks awareness. B399 (Brunschvicg 399) distinguishes damage considered externally from the human experience of misery; it does not make bodily deprivation unreal. The shortened Latin cue from Lamentations stops at seeing, and the supplied edition preserves that abbreviation rather than supplying the rest of the verse as Pascal's words. Awareness of misery is the point of the allusion. Beside B397 (Brunschvicg 397)'s unknowing tree, knowledge of wretchedness is both a painful condition and a mark of greatness. B347 (Brunschvicg 347)'s unknowing universe provides a related contrast, but the house's particular force is that misery requires feeling.

Places to read. B399 (Brunschvicg 399); B397 (Brunschvicg 397); B347 (Brunschvicg 347).

See also. Wretchedness (p. 198); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Awareness and felt nothingness (p. 207); Greatness (p. 177).

The scepter

sceptre — scepter [printed form]

The scepter signifies Judah's royal authority in Pascal's Christian reading of the Messiah prophecy. B637 (Brunschvicg 637) says Babylonian captivity did not interrupt it because return was promised; B639 (Brunschvicg 639) contrasts that episode with the later destruction, which he calls without promised restoration, prophets, kings or hope. Those negations belong to his theological interpretation of Jewish history, not the lexicon's description of Jewish belief or future possibilities. The record distinguishes the political emblem and the argument made from it, while retaining the different roles assigned to the two destructions.

Places to read. B637 (Brunschvicg 637); B638 (Brunschvicg 638); B639 (Brunschvicg 639).

See also. Prophecy (p. 23); Jews (p. 145); Scripture (p. 94).

The sealed book

livre scellé — sealed book [phrase]; *sceau* — seal [printed form]

B641 (Brunschvicg 641) depicts the Jewish people as carrying and loving books whose Christian meaning Pascal says they do not understand. The sealed book gives a visible form to that claim of concealed sense. It remains a polemical Christian interpretation, not a neutral judgment on Jewish reading. B678 (Brunschvicg 678) makes Christ and the apostles the revealers

of the seal and veil, within an analogy of a cipher with two meanings. Preservation and interpretation are therefore distinct: possession of the written witness is not, in Pascal's account, identical with recognition of its fulfillment.

Places to read. B641 (Brunschvicg 641); B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

See also. Scripture (p. 94); Figurative meaning (p. 82); Witness (p. 38).

The Seventy

Septante — the Seventy [printed form]; *uniformité* — uniformity [printed form]

The Seventy are the traditional translators of the Greek Scriptures known as the Septuagint. B632 (Brunschvicg 632) quotes accounts of their agreement and links that inspired translation with a story of Ezra's restoration of lost writings. Greek and Latin extracts overlap but are not identical; the supplied edition translates both rather than suppressing repetition. The report belongs inside a dossier in which Pascal disputes the restoration tradition. It should not be lifted out as proof that he unconditionally endorses every quoted assertion about miraculous agreement or textual recovery.

Places to read. B632 (Brunschvicg 632).

See also. Scripture (p. 94); Witness (p. 38).

The side from which one sees

côté — side [printed form]; *tous les côtés* — every side [phrase]

To correct usefully, B9 (Brunschvicg 9) begins by acknowledging the truth available from another person's side, then shows where that perspective fails. The person may accept having missed other sides more readily than being wholly mistaken. Pascal tentatively relates this to limits of human vision and the truth of immediate sensory apprehension. The note distinguishes apprehension from judgments subsequently attached to it. B99 (Brunschvicg 99) gives the image a more critical use: the will keeps the mind looking at a favored side. Neither passage means every complete proposition becomes true merely because someone prefers its perspective.

Places to read. B9 (Brunschvicg 9); B99 (Brunschvicg 99).

See also. Reason (p. 133); Self-love (p. 192); Will and directed attention (p. 284).

The soldier and the Carthusian

soldat — soldier [printed form]; *chartreux* — Carthusian [printed form]; *dépendant* — dependent [printed form]

The soldier and monk endure similarly demanding obedience, but their relation to it differs. The soldier keeps hoping to become master, even though captains and princes remain dependent; the Carthusian vows never to be otherwise than dependent. Pascal says the difference lies in that hope rather than in perpetual servitude itself. The negation must remain local: he is not denying the monk all religious hope. The comparison distinguishes actual conditions from the imagined future through which people accept or resist them.

Places to read. B539 (Brunschvicg 539).

See also. Will (p. 103); Humility (p. 140); Hope and present enjoyment (p. 229).

The spiritual guide

conducteur — guide [printed form]; *directeur* — director [printed form]

The divine speaking voice in B555 (Brunschvicg 555) says it counsels the addressee because the human guide cannot speak, and perhaps does so in answer to that guide's prayers. The modal "perhaps" should not disappear. Guidance can therefore operate without being visibly recognized, but the human director is not simply replaced or declared unnecessary. B553 (Brunschvicg 553) also tells the speaker to consult the director when even sacred words become occasions of vanity or curiosity. These fragments distinguish the literary divine voice, the person receiving it and the human spiritual guide.

Places to read. B553 (Brunschvicg 553); B555 (Brunschvicg 555).

See also. Prayer (p. 91); Search (p. 97); Humility (p. 140).

The storm-tossed ship

un vaisseau battu de l'orage — a ship battered by a storm [phrase]

The pleasure of being aboard depends on assurance that the ship will not perish. Pascal applies the scene to persecutions troubling the Church. The storm remains a storm: the image changes the relation to danger through confidence in the vessel's preservation rather than denying the force of the waves. It also distinguishes the security of the whole from comfort at each moment. Read with B861 (Brunschvicg 861)'s Church sustained by God alone, the assurance is theological. It is not an empirical guarantee that every individual escapes suffering or that anyone's actual dangerous voyage should be undertaken without care.

Places to read. B859 (Brunschvicg 859).
See also. Church (p. 137); Joy (p. 148); Peace (p. 154).

The sun's sponge

Spongia solis — The sun's sponge [phrase]

The Latin words stand as a short cue before an observation about repeated effects. When an occurrence is always seen alike, people infer natural necessity, as with tomorrow's daylight. Pascal then says nature often contradicts us and does not submit to its own rules. The edition deliberately retains the translated heading without supplying a fuller explanation of the sponge. The cue does not specify a solar mechanism or hidden allegory. The nearby B90 (Brunschvicg 90) quotation distinguishes familiarity from understanding: frequent appearances cease to astonish even when their cause remains unknown.

Places to read. B90 (Brunschvicg 90); B91 (Brunschvicg 91).
See also. Custom (p. 110); Nature (p. 186); Reason (p. 133).

The thinking reed

roseau pensant — thinking reed [phrase]; *goutte d'eau* — drop of water [phrase]

The reed combines extreme physical fragility with thought: a vapor or a drop of water suffices to kill a human being, without the entire universe arming itself against him. Thought does not reverse that vulnerability. The person knows death and the universe's advantage, while the universe knows neither. B347 (Brunschvicg 347) turns this dignity into a practical demand to think well, calling it the principle of morality; dignity is not gained by filling space or duration. B348 (Brunschvicg 348) likewise places dignity in the ordering of thought rather than possession of land or spatial magnitude. The image joins weakness and greatness without making reflective awareness a shield against physical destruction or an automatic guarantee of sound judgment.

Places to read. B347 (Brunschvicg 347); B348 (Brunschvicg 348).
See also. Thinking (p. 195); Greatness (p. 177); Death (p. 168); Morality (p. 56).

The tree that does not know misery

arbre — tree [printed form]

The tree's function in B397 (Brunschvicg 397) is sharply limited: it does not know itself miserable. The person who does has a misery the tree lacks and a greatness in that knowledge. The comparison does not rest on people

being physically stronger or healthier than trees, nor does it claim that naming suffering ends it. B399 (Brunschvicg 399)'s ruined house supplies a related non-aware object. Together the examples distinguish damage or condition from awareness of it, and then awareness from the reflective knowledge through which the greatness argument becomes possible.

Places to read. B397 (Brunschvicg 397); B399 (Brunschvicg 399).

See also. Greatness (p. 177); Thinking (p. 195); Wretchedness (p. 198).

The universal good

bien universel — universal good [phrase]; *sans diminution et sans envie* — without diminution and without envy [phrase]

Near its unfinished end, B425 (Brunschvicg 425) reports thinkers who approach the true good by rejecting privately divisible objects. A universal good must be available to all at once without diminishing another's share, generating envy, or being lost against the possessor's will. This differs from merely collecting every desirable private possession. The passage's broader argument identifies God as the infinite, immutable object adequate to the infinite abyss of desire. The reported philosophical reasoning remains incomplete, however; its unfinished conclusion should not be silently filled in as if Pascal had supplied a full demonstration there.

Places to read. B425 (Brunschvicg 425).

See also. Happiness (p. 180); Desire (p. 171); Charity (p. 73).

The unreachable rope

Rongez cette corde — gnaw through this rope [phrase]

The imagined animal asks companions to gnaw a rope that hurts it and lies beyond its reach. Pascal argues conditionally: if hunting calls came from intelligence rather than instinct, an animal should also be able to speak about something that concerns it still more. The request is not reported as something an animal actually said. Its role is to test transfer from a familiar signaling pattern to a new need. The example thus depends on the difference between repeated useful behavior and flexible speech about another circumstance.

Places to read. B342 (Brunschvicg 342).

See also. Reason (p. 133); Thinking (p. 195); Will (p. 103).

The variable organ

orgues — organ [printed form]; *marches* — keys [printed form]

The person resembles an organ, but not a familiar instrument whose pipes follow an expected progression. B111 (Brunschvicg 111) makes its

arrangement strange, changing, and variable; playing ordinary organs does not guarantee harmonies here. The supplied term marches is rendered "keys" within this musical comparison. Read with B112 (Brunschvicg 112)'s diverse qualities and inclinations, the image denies a simple, stable formula for producing human responses. It does not prove that people lack all regularity. Its practical demand is to know the arrangement actually before one rather than mechanically transferring a previously successful pattern.

Places to read. B111 (Brunschvicg 111); B112 (Brunschvicg 112).

See also. Mind (p. 130); Feeling and apprehension (p. 115); Desire (p. 171).

The veil over the books

Le voile — the veil [phrase]

The veil names the obstruction to recognizing the scriptural meaning Pascal defends. This short fragment expressly extends it from Jews to bad Christians and to everyone who does not renounce self-centeredness. The qualification is crucial: the image is not simply a designation of one community's innate blindness. Its function is interpretive and moral, relating reading to the heart's attachment. The severe demand to hate oneself concerns the self's claim to be center and end, not physical self-injury. Elsewhere the breaking of the veil belongs to Christ's disclosure of a spiritual meaning, preserving the relation between concealment and revelation.

Places to read. B676 (Brunschvicg 676).

See also. Jews (p. 145); Scripture (p. 94); Self-love (p. 192); Hidden God (p. 88).

The void and rival conditioning

vide — void [printed form]; *horreur* — horror [printed form]

B82 (Brunschvicg 82) stages two opposing explanations of belief in the void: childhood perception of an empty chest is accused of misleading the senses, while learned denial is accused of corrupting common sense. Each blames the other's conditioning, and the reciprocal accusation alone settles nothing. B75 (Brunschvicg 75) instead attacks the explanation that inanimate bodies fear the void, asking what in emptiness could frighten them and what organs could execute such a response. The lexical distinction is between an alleged empty space and the passion assigned to bodies. Rejecting anthropomorphic explanation does not itself complete a physical theory.

Places to read. B75 (Brunschvicg 75); B82 (Brunschvicg 82).

See also. Nature (p. 186); Custom (p. 110); Reason (p. 133).

The wheel and its center

roue — wheel [printed form]; *centre* — center [printed form]

The great and the small share accidents, troubles, and passions, but their positions on a wheel make the same movement disturb them differently. B180 (Brunschvicg 180) places one at the top and the other nearer the center. The image distinguishes a common human condition from unequal exposure to its motions. It does not say rank removes vulnerability; indeed elevation can increase agitation. Read beside the king without diversion and the stone interrupting political power, the wheel supplies a different proportional image, one concerned with position and disturbance rather than the total amount of wealth or prestige.

Places to read. B180 (Brunschvicg 180).

See also. Greatness (p. 177); Wretchedness (p. 198).

Theater and represented passions

comédie — theater [printed form]; *sentiments* — feelings [printed form]

B11 (Brunschvicg 11) warns that a natural, delicate theatrical representation can awaken passions while persuading an innocent spectator of their harmlessness. Self-love desires the same effects and sacrifices the spectacle portrays. The term comédie means theater generally here, not only humorous drama. The edition's annotation identifies a text composed by Madame de Sablé and revised by Pascal, retained within Brunschvicg's corpus; it should not be presented without that qualification as an independently surviving autograph. The moral warning about this particular diversion is distinct from B139 (Brunschvicg 139)'s wider explanation of absorbed attention, which includes serious work.

Places to read. B11 (Brunschvicg 11).

See also. Diversion (p. 174); Self-love (p. 192); Desire (p. 171).

Three desires and rivers of fire

libido sentiendi — desire to feel [phrase]; *libido sciendi* — desire to know [phrase]; *libido dominandi* — desire to rule [phrase]; *fleuves de feu* — rivers of fire [phrase]

The Latin triad glosses the scriptural concupiscence of flesh, concupiscence of eyes and pride of life. The three become rivers of fire burning the earth rather than watering it. The blessed are neither immersed nor swept away, but seated low and secure, reaching toward the one who will raise them. Their tears concern the remembered homeland rather than the passing goods carried by the current. The image describes disordered

attachment in a Christian meditation; it does not identify every act of sensing, learning or governing as inherently evil.

Places to read. B458 (Brunschvicg 458); B460 (Brunschvicg 460); B461 (Brunschvicg 461).

See also. Concupiscence (p. 41); Pride (p. 157); Charity (p. 73).

Three marks of religion

perpétuité, la bonne vie, les miracles — perpetuity, a good life, miracles [phrase]

The three marks concern different dimensions: continuity, moral life, and extraordinary attestation. Pascal accuses his opponents of damaging each through probabilism, their moral teaching, and denial either of miracles or of their evidential consequence. The list should not be confused with the three orders of greatness. Nor does the naming of marks by itself prove that a particular institution possesses them. It sets out what the polemic claims must be preserved and what it accuses opponents of undermining. B844bis (Brunschvicg 844bis)'s short reference to Molina as novelty belongs to the continuity issue, not a full exposition of his theology.

Places to read. B844 (Brunschvicg 844); B844bis (Brunschvicg 844bis).

See also. Religion (p. 29); Miracle (p. 20); Morality (p. 56).

Touch and immediacy

un seul attouchement — a single touch [phrase]

Touch names an instrument or mode through which an effect is said to occur; it is not identical with the power that produces the effect. Barcos combines a single touch with instantaneous healing to explain what exceeds the order of nature, even if the illness is not incurable. Pascal's own question similarly uses contact with a relic (QM-II-Q (Question II, Question — Blaise Pascal)). Thus the smallness or familiarity of the physical act is central to the example. The account concerns the disproportion between ordinary means and attributed outcome. It does not establish a general therapeutic rule that contact with a sacred object cures disease.

Places to read. QM-III-R (Question III, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Miracle with respect to natural order (p. 238); The Holy Thorn (p. 267).

Tradition as corrective source

la tradition — tradition [phrase]

Tradition is the higher principle inherited from the ancient Church by which a present error could be corrected. Pascal's asymmetry is temporal:

the ancient Church did not look toward and presuppose the future Church as later believers look back toward it. This gives the earlier witness a special role rather than making every contemporary practice authoritative simply because it exists. B832 (Brunschvicg 832) likewise distinguishes tradition from an office holder's allegedly prejudiced decision. The claim remains part of Pascal's Catholic controversy and should not be converted into the rule that everything old is true or that every innovation is false without examination.

Places to read. B867 (Brunschvicg 867).

See also. Church (p. 137); Truth (p. 162); Witness (p. 38).

Two advents

deux avènements — two advents [phrase]

Pascal distinguishes a coming in misery to lower proud humanity from a coming in glory to raise the humbled. The distinction reconciles descriptions that would conflict if assigned to the same manner and time without qualification. B757 (Brunschvicg 757) says the first advent's time is predicted because it is hidden, while the second will be manifest and its time is not given. These claims belong to his Christian interpretation of prophecy. They should not be collapsed into two natures in Christ or two human states, although B765 (Brunschvicg 765) places those paired distinctions together as sources of the apparent contrarieties.

Places to read. B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

See also. Prophecy (p. 23); Humility (p. 140); Jesus Christ (p. 14).

Two gardens

jardin — garden [printed form]; *délices* — delights [printed form]; *supplices* — torments [printed form]

The meditation contrasts Adam's garden of delights with Jesus' garden of torments. In the first, Adam lost himself and humanity; in the second, the text strikingly says Jesus saved himself and humanity. The contrast makes an event and place into a Christian correspondence, while the edition preserves rather than conventionalizes the unusual wording. The night, sleeping friends and unshared suffering then develop the second garden. It is neither a geographical comparison nor a neutral account of the two stories, but a devotional reading of fall and redemption.

Places to read. B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

See also. Fall (p. 12); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Redemption (p. 26); Figurative meaning (p. 82).

Two laws

Deux lois — two laws [phrase]; *République chrétienne* — Christian commonwealth [phrase]

Two laws are said to order the entire Christian commonwealth better than political legislation. Pascal does not name them in this very short fragment. The supplied annotation identifies love of God and love of the neighbor, as the first Port-Royal edition explicitly did, but leaves that explanation outside the translated sentence. The distinction matters for quotation: the expanded wording is explanatory rather than printed French here. In the surrounding member-body sequence, rightly directed love gives order to parts and whole without requiring a separate rule for every imaginable act.

Places to read. B474 (Brunschvicg 474); B483 (Brunschvicg 483); B484 (Brunschvicg 484).

See also. Law (p. 53); Charity (p. 73); Body and members (p. 71).

Two supernatural foundations

la grâce, les miracles — grace and miracles [phrase]

Pascal distinguishes an inward foundation from an outward one and calls both supernatural. The contrast prevents an outward sign from being identified with the inward change of the heart. B851 (Brunschvicg 851) makes the distinction still more explicit by noting miracles with grace and miracles without grace. Thus an impressive occurrence cannot be treated as automatic conversion, even when classified as a true miracle. Conversely, grace is not merely an additional public spectacle. The pair concerns different modes of divine action in Pascal's theology, and should not be replaced by a modern opposition of irrational feeling and objective fact.

Places to read. B805 (Brunschvicg 805).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Grace (p. 85); Faith (p. 79).

Unity and multitude

L'unité et la multitude — unity and multitude [phrase]; *papistes* — papists, the polemical label for exclusive papal partisans [printed form]; *huguenots* — Huguenots, French Reformed Protestants [printed form]

The pair names two aspects of the same Church. B871 (Brunschvicg 871) makes the pope as the whole when the Church is considered as unity, but one part when it is considered as multitude. Neither aspect abolishes the other: plurality without unity becomes confusion, unity detached from plurality tyranny. B874 (Brunschvicg 874) extends the point to interpretation of ecclesiastical authorities, requiring actions and canons

rather than a few extracted words. These are arguments within Pascal's Catholic controversy, not a modern constitution for any organization. The distinction is relational and cannot be reduced to a simple choice between one ruler and many people.

Places to read. B874 (Brunschvicg 874).

See also. Church (p. 137); Tyranny (p. 65); Contradiction (p. 107).

Use and enjoyment

use de Dieu — uses God [phrase]; *jouit du monde* — enjoys the world [phrase]; *user* — to use as a means [lemma]; *jouir* — to enjoy as an end [lemma]

Cupidity uses God and enjoys the world; charity reverses the relation. The distinction concerns means and final good, not simply whether an act feels pleasant. Pascal explicitly says cupidity can coexist with faith in God and charity with earthly goods. An inventory of beliefs or possessions therefore does not by itself reveal which love governs. The same paragraph uses the final end to determine what counts as an enemy: creatures, though good, become enemies when they turn the righteous from God. The relation explains words as well as conduct.

Places to read. B571 (Brunschvicg 571).

See also. Charity (p. 73); Concupiscence (p. 41); Figurative meaning (p. 82); World (p. 67).

Vapor and a drop of water

vapeur — vapor [printed form]; *goutte d'eau* — drop of water [phrase]

The two small agents of death puncture the imagined need for the whole universe to mobilize against a person. They establish the weakness of the reed before Pascal distinguishes its knowledge from the unknowing physical power that destroys it. Neither is introduced as a precise medical explanation of an illness. Their scale is the point: something slight can end the life whose thought comprehends the larger whole. The ensuing dignity does not cancel the death, but changes the measure by which the human and the crushing universe are compared.

Places to read. B347 (Brunschvicg 347).

See also. Death (p. 168); Greatness (p. 177); Thinking (p. 195).

Voluntary illusion

illusion volontaire — voluntary illusion [phrase]

Being flawed is one evil; refusing to acknowledge the flaw adds another. B100 (Brunschvicg 100) names this addition voluntary illusion. The self

cannot destroy a correcting truth in itself, so it tries to eliminate that truth from its own and others' awareness. The phrase marks an active relation to ignorance rather than mere absence of information. It also gives the reciprocity argument its force: the person who resents deception by others nevertheless wants them deceived in his favor. A truthful correction can therefore be a benefit even when self-love experiences it as injury.

Places to read. B100 (Brunschvicg 100).

See also. Self-love (p. 192); Truth (p. 162); Flattery and rank (p. 224).

Watch and rule

montre — watch [printed form]; *règle* — rule [printed form]

The watch contrasts a shared measure with the felt duration of bored and absorbed spectators. One says two hours have passed, another three quarters of an hour; the speaker's watch gives an hour and a half. His opponents mistake measured judgment for whim because they do not know its basis. The example concerns judging a work by a rule rather than mere response. It does not supply that aesthetic rule in full, nor establish that a watch-like criterion has already been found for every moral judgment. The supplied brackets in the opening sentence remain part of the edition's text.

Places to read. B5 (Brunschvicg 5).

See also. Discernment (p. 113); Reason (p. 133); Boredom (p. 166).

When miracle does not mean miracle

Miracle ne signifie pas toujours miracle — miracle does not always mean miracle [phrase]; *les légèretés* — frivolities [phrase]; *crainte* — fear [printed form]; *Portentum* — portent [printed form]; *simulacrum* — image [printed form]; *Vatable* — Vatablus, the cited scholarly source [printed form]

This is an expressly lexical warning. Pascal notes that a biblical word translated as miracle can mean fear, and that portentum can mean an image; he also records légèretés in the Hebrew and Vatable beside a phrase about false prophets. The technical category under discussion therefore cannot simply be imposed wherever the translated word appears. The comparisons are Pascal's reported philological observations, not independently verified findings from a collation of Hebrew witnesses. These alternatives show that the argument concerns semantic range, not only whether supernatural events exist.

Places to read. B819 (Brunschvicg 819).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Scripture (p. 94).

Which is clearer?

Lequel est le plus clair — which is clearer [phrase]

The repeated question compares competing signs rather than declaring every reported miracle decisive in isolation. Pascal first sets Gospel accusations about sabbath observance beside a healing, then compares a doctrinal accusation against Port-Royal with the reported extraordinary cures there. The question asks which alleged evidence is more evident and whether the supposed incompatibility has actually been established. Its polemical application is Pascal's, not an independent verification of the house's claims. The comparative adjective matters: the inquiry is about relative evidential clarity under a specific dispute, not an abstract opposition between reason and belief.

Places to read. B834 (Brunschvicg 834).

See also. Miracle (p. 20); Witness (p. 38); Discernment (p. 113).

Wholly the body / the whole body

toute le corps — wholly the body [phrase]; *tout le corps* — the whole body [phrase]

B512 (Brunschvicg 512)'s unusual opening distinguishes something being wholly Christ's body from its being the whole of Christ's body: the entirety of something becoming his body is not the same as its becoming the entirety of his body. The difference in French construction is preserved by "wholly" versus "the whole," not normalized into equivalent translations. The supplied note identifies these remarks as criticism of a theory of Eucharistic bodily identity connected with Descartes, rather than an uninterrupted statement of Pascal's own positive theory. The subsequent examples of soul and body, fire and wood, and left and right arm test what union does or does not establish. In particular, union may be necessary without being sufficient to establish bodily identity.

Places to read. B512 (Brunschvicg 512).

See also. Body and members (p. 71); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Reason (p. 133); Church (p. 137); Numerical identity and necessary conditions (p. 242).

Will and directed attention

volonté — will [printed form]; *créance* — belief [printed form]; *détourne l'esprit* — turns the mind away [phrase]

B99 (Brunschvicg 99) calls the will one of belief's principal organs while explicitly denying that it forms belief directly. Its liking fixes attention on a favored side and prevents examination of unwelcome qualities. The mind

then judges what it sees there. This mediation matters: the account is more precise than the slogan that people believe whatever they want. It connects partial truth, preference, and neglected evidence without erasing the activity of judgment. B9 (Brunschvicg 9)'s useful correction supplies the complementary practice of acknowledging a true aspect before showing the aspects that a person has failed to consider.

Places to read. B9 (Brunschvicg 9); B99 (Brunschvicg 99).

See also. Mind (p. 130); Reason (p. 133); Self-love (p. 192).

Word for word

totidem — word for word [printed form]

The Latin shorthand marks the allegation that condemned propositions occur in Jansenius in the same words. Pascal distinguishes that textual fact from condemning a heretical meaning wherever it occurs. He reports Arnauld as accepting the doctrinal condemnation while refusing to assert a location he has not found, and asks opponents to produce the pages. This distinction does not by itself settle the historical controversy. It shows why agreement that a proposition is wrong does not prove that a particular author wrote it. The movement from words to sense in the dossier must remain visible rather than be treated as one unchanged accusation.

Places to read. B929 (Brunschvicg 929).

See also. Truth (p. 162); Witness (p. 38); Church (p. 137).

Source forms and phrases

This lookup records every form registered in the entries and distinguishes printed forms, phrases, dictionary lemmas and editorial aliases. The references are selected attestations, not a frequency count or complete concordance. A label present only in a diagram is identified in its explanation; a supplied editorial term is not attributed to Pascal's continuous prose.

abêtira [printed form] — make you beastlike. Make you beastlike (p. 235). B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

abêtira [printed form] — will make beastlike. Wager (p. 100). B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

absolution [printed form] — absolution. Repentance (p. 159). B923 (Brunschvicg 923).

accomplir [printed form] — fulfill. Prophecy (p. 23). B675 (Brunschvicg 675).

Adam [printed form] — Adam. Shem's chain of witnesses (p. 255). B625 (Brunschvicg 625).

adorateurs [printed form] — worshipers. Paganism (p. 151). B609 (Brunschvicg 609).

agilité [printed form] — agility. The burning brand (p. 261). B353 (Brunschvicg 353).

agnus Dei [phrase] — lamb of God. Lamb and the taking away of sins (p. 233). B681 (Brunschvicg 681).

aimable [printed form] — lovable. Religion (p. 29). B187 (Brunschvicg 187).

Alcoran [printed form] — Qur'an. Islam (p. 142). B597 (Brunschvicg 597); B601 (Brunschvicg 601).

allées et venues [phrase] — comings and goings. Going and returning (p. 227). B354 (Brunschvicg 354).

alliance [printed form] — covenant. Covenant (p. 216). B610 (Brunschvicg 610); B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

âme universelle [phrase] — universal soul; soul of the whole body in the comparison. Body and members (p. 71). B482 (Brunschvicg 482).

amour de la vérité [phrase] — love of truth. Truth (p. 162). B945 (Brunschvicg 945).

amour-propre [printed form] — self-love. Self-love (p. 192). B100 (Brunschvicg 100); B492 (Brunschvicg 492).

amplitude d'esprit [phrase] — breadth of mind. Exact inference and breadth (p. 220). B2 (Brunschvicg 2).

arbre [printed form] — tree. The tree that does not know misery (p. 275). B397 (Brunschvicg 397).

Archimède [printed form] — Archimedes. Archimedes and intellectual brilliance (p. 206). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

artisan [printed form] — craftsman. The dreaming craftsman (p. 264). B386 (Brunschvicg 386).

assemblée visible [phrase] — visible assembly. Church (p. 137). B857 (Brunschvicg 857).

assurer [printed form] — affirm. Affirm, doubt, submit (p. 205). B268 (Brunschvicg 268).

athéisme [printed form] — atheism. Deism (p. 218). B556 (Brunschvicg 556).

attractive [printed form] — attracting. The powers of a key and hook (p. 270). B55 (Brunschvicg 55).

auteurs graves [phrase] — weighty authorities. Probability (p. 62). B922 (Brunschvicg 922).

automate [printed form] — automaton. Automaton and machine (p. 207). B252 (Brunschvicg 252).

automate [printed form] — automaton. Custom (p. 110). B252 (Brunschvicg 252).

autore non caret [phrase] — it does not lack an authority. Defensible, probable, and supported by authority (p. 217). B958 (Brunschvicg 958).

avec soumission [phrase] — with submission. The cup (p. 262). B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

avidité [printed form] — avidity. Desire (p. 171). B425 (Brunschvicg 425).

avoine [printed form] — oats. The horse's oats (p. 267). B401 (Brunschvicg 401).

balle [printed form] — ball. Billiard cue and ball (p. 208). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

ballet des esprits [phrase] — dance of spirits. A dance of spirits (p. 202). B368 (Brunschvicg 368).

Barcosba [printed form] — Bar Kokhba. Barcosba / Bar Kokhba (p. 208). B753 (Brunschvicg 753).

béatitude [printed form] — blessedness. Happiness (p. 180). B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

bec du perroquet [phrase] — parrot's beak. The parrot's beak (p. 270). B343 (Brunschvicg 343).

bénignité [printed form] — gentleness. Epaminondas (p. 219). B353 (Brunschvicg 353).

besogne [printed form] — sexual intercourse. Sneezing, intercourse, and agency (p. 256). B160 (Brunschvicg 160).

bien penser [phrase] — thinking well. Thinking (p. 195). B347 (Brunschvicg 347).

bien universel [phrase] — universal good. The universal good (p. 276). B425 (Brunschvicg 425).

billard [printed form] — billiard cue. Billiard cue and ball (p. 208). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

bonheur [printed form] — happiness. Happiness (p. 180). B425 (Brunschvicg 425).

bonne volonté [phrase] — good will. Morality (p. 56). B482 (Brunschvicg 482).

bonnes œuvres [phrase] — good works. Repentance (p. 159). B497 (Brunschvicg 497).

bonnets carrés [phrase] — square caps. Robes, fur, and square caps (p. 254). B82 (Brunschvicg 82).

brochet [printed form] — pike. Liancourt's pike and frog (p. 234). B341 (Brunschvicg 341).

Cabale [printed form] — Kabbalah in this local source list. Cabale, circle, and intriguers (p. 210). B642 (Brunschvicg 642).

cabale [printed form] — circle sharing a secret. Cabale, circle, and intriguers (p. 210). B691 (Brunschvicg 691).

cabalistes [printed form] — political intriguers. Cabale, circle, and intriguers (p. 210). B935 (Brunschvicg 935).

caché en partie [phrase] — partly hidden. Hidden God (p. 88). B586 (Brunschvicg 586).

cachot [printed form] — dungeon. Piquet in the dungeon (p. 246). B200 (Brunschvicg 200).

calice [printed form] — cup. The cup (p. 262). B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

campagne [printed form] — countryside. A single subject and its parts (p. 204). B115 (Brunschvicg 115).

capitale du royaume [phrase] — capital of the kingdom. Masking and naming (p. 236). B49 (Brunschvicg 49).

cause d'ennui [phrase] — cause of boredom. Boredom (p. 166). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

causes [printed form] — causes. Effects and causes (p. 218). B234 (Brunschvicg 234).

ce nom [phrase] — this name. Joshua and the name Jesus (p. 233). B627 (Brunschvicg 627).

centre [printed form] — center. The wheel and its center (p. 278). B180 (Brunschvicg 180).

centre du tout [phrase] — center of everything. Self (p. 189). B455 (Brunschvicg 455).

centre est partout [phrase] — center is everywhere. The infinite sphere (p. 268). B72 (Brunschvicg 72).

Certitude [printed form] — certainty. Certainty in the Mémorial (p. 211). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

cet animal amphibie de la fable [phrase] — that amphibious creature of the fable. The amphibious creature of the fable (p. 261). B924 (Brunschvicg 924).

chaînes [printed form] — chains. Condemned prisoners (p. 214). B199 (Brunschvicg 199).

chair [printed form] — flesh. Three orders (p. 35). B460 (Brunschvicg 460).

chambre [printed form] — room. Remaining in a room (p. 252). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

chaque moi [phrase] — every self. Self (p. 189). B455 (Brunschvicg 455).

charité [printed form] — charity; Christian love. Charity (p. 73). B402 (Brunschvicg 402); B451 (Brunschvicg 451); B571 (Brunschvicg 571); B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

charité [printed form] — charity, Christian love. Three orders (p. 35). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

chartreux [printed form] — Carthusian. The soldier and the Carthusian (p. 274). B539 (Brunschvicg 539).

chasse [printed form] — chase. Tennis and arrangement (p. 260). B140 (Brunschvicg 140).

chemins qui marchent [phrase] — roads that move. Rivers as moving roads (p. 253). B17 (Brunschvicg 17).

cherché [printed form] — searched. Search (p. 97). B194 (Brunschvicg 194).

cherchent en gémissant [phrase] — seek with groaning. Search (p. 97). B421 (Brunschvicg 421).

chercher [printed form] — to seek; to search. Search (p. 97). B194 (Brunschvicg 194); B257 (Brunschvicg 257).

chercher et le suivre [phrase] — seek and follow him. Search (p. 97). B584 (Brunschvicg 584).

cherchez-la [printed form] — seek it. Papers on the table (p. 244). B593 (Brunschvicg 593).

cherchez-la [printed form] — seek it. Search (p. 97). B593 (Brunschvicg 593).

chiffre [printed form] — cipher. Figurative meaning (p. 82). B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

chiffre [printed form] — cipher. Scripture (p. 94). B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

chiffres [printed form] — ciphers. Languages as ciphers (p. 233). B45 (Brunschvicg 45).

choses de finesse [phrase] — matters requiring discernment. Discernment (p. 113). B1 (Brunschvicg 1).

Chrétiens charnels [phrase] — carnal Christians. Carnal and spiritual (p. 211). B607 (Brunschvicg 607).

chronologistes [printed form] — chronologists. Prophecy (p. 23). B723 (Brunschvicg 723).

circoncira leur cœur [phrase] — will circumcise their heart. Circumcision of the heart (p. 212). B689 (Brunschvicg 689).

circoncision du cœur [phrase] — circumcision of the heart. Circumcision of the heart (p. 212). B610 (Brunschvicg 610).

circonférence nulle part [phrase] — circumference nowhere. The infinite sphere (p. 268). B72 (Brunschvicg 72).

circulation du sang [phrase] — circulation of blood. Blood and the ligature (p. 209). B96 (Brunschvicg 96).

ciron [printed form] — mite. The mite and nested universes (p. 269). B72 (Brunschvicg 72).

clé [printed form] — key. The powers of a key and hook (p. 270). B55 (Brunschvicg 55).

Cléobuline [printed form] — Cleobuline. Cleobuline (p. 213). B13 (Brunschvicg 13).

coffre [printed form] — chest. Chest and compressed maxims (p. 211). B20 (Brunschvicg 20).

cognitioni assertionem præcurrere [phrase] — assertion running ahead of knowledge. Assertion before knowledge (p. 206). B364 (Brunschvicg 364).

comédie [printed form] — play. The final act (p. 265). B210 (Brunschvicg 210).

comédie [printed form] — theater. Theater and represented passions (p. 278). B11 (Brunschvicg 11).

commerce [printed form] — communion or living relation. Mediation (p. 17). B470 (Brunschvicg 470).

communication avec Dieu [phrase] — communion with God. Mediation (p. 17). B547 (Brunschvicg 547).

comprend [printed form] — contains. Containment and comprehension (p. 214). B348 (Brunschvicg 348).

comprendre [printed form] — comprehend. Containment and comprehension (p. 214). B72 (Brunschvicg 72).

comprends [printed form] — comprehend. Containment and comprehension (p. 214). B348 (Brunschvicg 348).

conatus recedendi [phrase] — outward striving. Outward striving (p. 243). B368 (Brunschvicg 368).

concupiscence [printed form] — disordered desire; concupiscence. Concupiscence (p. 41). B334 (Brunschvicg 334); B402 (Brunschvicg 402); B451 (Brunschvicg 451).

concupiscences [printed form] — disordered desires. Concupiscence (p. 41). B430 (Brunschvicg 430); B461 (Brunschvicg 461).

condamnés à la mort [phrase] — condemned to death. Condemned prisoners (p. 214). B199 (Brunschvicg 199).

condamnés à la mort [phrase] — condemned to death. Death (p. 168). B199 (Brunschvicg 199).

condition nécessaire [phrase] — necessary condition. Numerical identity and necessary conditions (p. 242). B512 (Brunschvicg 512).

condition suffisante [phrase] — sufficient condition. Numerical identity and necessary conditions (p. 242). B512 (Brunschvicg 512).

Condrieu [printed form] — Condrieu. Grapes and particularity (p. 228). B114 (Brunschvicg 114).

conducteur [printed form] — guide. The spiritual guide (p. 274). B555 (Brunschvicg 555).

confession [printed form] — confession. Fear and joy after confession (p. 221). B530 (Brunschvicg 530).

confiance [printed form] — confidence. Joy (p. 148). B530 (Brunschvicg 530).

connaissances du cœur [phrase] — knowledge of the heart. Heart (p. 124). B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

consentement [printed form] — consent. Signing and consent (p. 256). B945 (Brunschvicg 945).

consentir [printed form] — to consent. Will (p. 103). B476 (Brunschvicg 476); B482 (Brunschvicg 482).

conséquences [printed form] — consequences. Principles and consequences (p. 250). B119 (Brunschvicg 119).

Console-toi [printed form] — take comfort. Take comfort (p. 259). B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

Consolez-vous [printed form] — take comfort. Take comfort (p. 259). B517 (Brunschvicg 517).

Contradiction [printed form] — being contradicted; contradiction. Contradiction (p. 107). B384 (Brunschvicg 384).

contrariétés [printed form] — contrarieties. Contradiction (p. 107). B424 (Brunschvicg 424).

Contrariétés [printed form] — Contradictions; Contrarieties. Contrarieties (p. 215). B125 (Brunschvicg 125); B423 (Brunschvicg 423).

contre Apion [phrase] — Against Apion. Josephus (p. 232). B620 (Brunschvicg 620).

contredis [printed form] — contradict. Contrarieties (p. 215). B420 (Brunschvicg 420).

contredites [printed form] — contradicted. Contradiction (p. 107). B384 (Brunschvicg 384).

contrepoids [printed form] — counterweight. Opposed winds (p. 242). B359 (Brunschvicg 359).

contrit [printed form] — contrite. Repentance (p. 159). B923 (Brunschvicg 923).

contrition [printed form] — contrition. Contrition seeking the sacrament (p. 215). B923 (Brunschvicg 923).

contrition [printed form] — contrition. Repentance (p. 159). B923 (Brunschvicg 923).

conversations [printed form] — conversations. Conversation and the circle of cultivation (p. 216). B6 (Brunschvicg 6).

conversion [printed form] — conversion. Conversion (p. 76). B504 (Brunschvicg 504); B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

conversion véritable [phrase] — true conversion. Conversion (p. 76). B470 (Brunschvicg 470).

convertir [printed form] — to convert. Conversion (p. 76). B588 (Brunschvicg 588).

convertis [printed form] — converted; converts. Conversion (p. 76). B275 (Brunschvicg 275); B520 (Brunschvicg 520).

cordes de nécessité [phrase] — cords of necessity. Force (p. 44). B304 (Brunschvicg 304).

cordes d'imagination [phrase] — cords of imagination. Imagination (p. 127). B304 (Brunschvicg 304).

corps [printed form] — body. Body and members (p. 71). B475 (Brunschvicg 475); B483 (Brunschvicg 483).

corps [printed form] — bodies. Three orders (p. 35). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

corrompue [printed form] — corrupted. Fall (p. 12). B441 (Brunschvicg 441).

côté [printed form] — side. The side from which one sees (p. 273). B9 (Brunschvicg 9).

coutume [printed form] — custom. Custom (p. 110). B93 (Brunschvicg 93).

crainte [printed form] — fear. Fear and joy after confession (p. 221). B530 (Brunschvicg 530).

crainte [printed form] — fear. When miracle does not mean miracle (p. 283). B819 (Brunschvicg 819).

créance [printed form] — belief. Will and directed attention (p. 284). B99 (Brunschvicg 99).

credo [printed form] — I believe. Faith (p. 79). B248 (Brunschvicg 248).

crimina [printed form] — charges; accusations in this altered quotation. Justice (p. 50). B294 (Brunschvicg 294).

croc [printed form] — hook. The powers of a key and hook (p. 270). B55 (Brunschvicg 55).

croire [printed form] — to believe. Faith (p. 79). B287 (Brunschvicg 287); B588 (Brunschvicg 588).

croix ou pile [phrase] — heads or tails. Wager (p. 100). B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

Cromwell [printed form] — Cromwell. Cromwell and the small stone (p. 216). B176 (Brunschvicg 176).

cum amaritudinibus [phrase] — with bitter things. Bitter herbs (p. 209). B666 (Brunschvicg 666).

cupidité [printed form] — cupidity. Charity (p. 73). B571 (Brunschvicg 571).

cupidité [printed form] — cupidity. Concupiscence (p. 41). B571 (Brunschvicg 571).

cœur [printed form] — heart. Faith (p. 79). B278 (Brunschvicg 278).

cœur [printed form] — heart. Heart (p. 124). B277 (Brunschvicg 277); B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

cœur de pierre [phrase] — heart of stone. Evil leaven (p. 219). B446 (Brunschvicg 446).

de la boue [phrase] — mud. Mud and healing (p. 239). QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

De la monarchie [phrase] — On Monarchy. Philo (p. 246). B611 (Brunschvicg 611).

de numero [phrase] — numerical, concerning identity. Numerical identity and necessary conditions (p. 242). B512 (Brunschvicg 512).

déchiffrable [printed form] — can be deciphered. Languages as ciphers (p. 233). B45 (Brunschvicg 45).

déchu [printed form] — fallen. Wretchedness (p. 198). B409 (Brunschvicg 409).

déchue de Dieu [phrase] — fallen away from God. Fall (p. 12). B441 (Brunschvicg 441).

déguiser [printed form] — disguising. Masking and naming (p. 236). B49 (Brunschvicg 49).

déisme [printed form] — deism. Deism (p. 218). B556 (Brunschvicg 556).

délices [printed form] — delights. Two gardens (p. 280). B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

démarche de la raison [phrase] — reason's step. Reason (p. 133). B267 (Brunschvicg 267).

demeurer en repos [phrase] — remain at rest. Remaining in a room (p. 252). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

démonstratives [printed form] — demonstrative. Figurative meaning (p. 82). B650 (Brunschvicg 650).

dépendant [printed form] — dependent. The soldier and the Carthusian (p. 274). B539 (Brunschvicg 539).

dépositaires [printed form] — custodians. Witness (p. 38). B762 (Brunschvicg 762).

dernier acte [phrase] — final act. Death (p. 168). B210 (Brunschvicg 210).

dernier acte [phrase] — final act. The final act (p. 265). B210 (Brunschvicg 210).

dernière fin [phrase] — final end. Truth (p. 162). B949 (Brunschvicg 949).

Desargues [printed form] — Desargues. Grapes and particularity (p. 228). B114 (Brunschvicg 114).

désir [printed form] — desire. Desire (p. 171). B425 (Brunschvicg 425).

détourne l'esprit [phrase] — turns the mind away. Will and directed attention (p. 284). B99 (Brunschvicg 99).

Deus absconditus [phrase] — hidden God. Hidden God (p. 88). B194 (Brunschvicg 194); B518 (Brunschvicg 518); B585 (Brunschvicg 585).

deux abîmes [phrase] — two abysses. Infinity (p. 183). B72 (Brunschvicg 72).

deux avènements [phrase] — two advents. Two advents (p. 280). B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

deux états de la nature de l'homme [phrase] — two states of human nature. Fall (p. 12). B765 (Brunschvicg 765).

Deux lois [phrase] — two laws. Law (p. 53). B484 (Brunschvicg 484).

Deux lois [phrase] — two laws. Two laws (p. 281). B484 (Brunschvicg 484).

deux vents contraires [phrase] — two contrary winds. Opposed winds (p. 242). B359 (Brunschvicg 359).

Dieu caché [phrase] — hidden God. Hidden God (p. 88). B242 (Brunschvicg 242).

Dieu d'Abraham, Dieu d'Isaac, Dieu de Jacob [phrase] — God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. God of the patriarchs (p. 226). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

Dieu qui se cache [phrase] — God who hides himself. Hidden God (p. 88). B556 (Brunschvicg 556).

Dieu sensible au cœur [phrase] — God perceptible to the heart. Faith (p. 79). B278 (Brunschvicg 278).

Dieu sensible au cœur [phrase] — God perceptible to the heart. Heart (p. 124). B278 (Brunschvicg 278).

Dignare me [phrase] — deem me worthy. Merit and worthiness (p. 238). B513 (Brunschvicg 513).

dignité de la causalité [phrase] — dignity of causality. Prayer (p. 91). B513 (Brunschvicg 513).

digression [printed form] — digressing. The heart's order (p. 267). B283 (Brunschvicg 283).

directeur [printed form] — director. The spiritual guide (p. 274). B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

discerne [printed form] — distinguishes or establishes standing. Miracle (p. 20). B803 (Brunschvicg 803).

disposition [printed form] — arrangement. Tennis and arrangement (p. 260). B22 (Brunschvicg 22).

Diverses chambres [phrase] — different chambers. Different chambers (p. 218). B332 (Brunschvicg 332).

divertissement [printed form] — diversion. Diversion (p. 174). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

divertissements [printed form] — diversions. Diversion (p. 174). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

docteur [printed form] — Doctor. Scaramouche and the Doctor (p. 254). B12 (Brunschvicg 12).

domination [printed form] — domination. Tyranny (p. 65). B332 (Brunschvicg 332); B380 (Brunschvicg 380).

don de Dieu [phrase] — gift of God. Faith (p. 79). B248 (Brunschvicg 248); B279 (Brunschvicg 279).

doucement [printed form] — slowly. Slowly and gently (p. 256). B69 (Brunschvicg 69); B69bis (Brunschvicg 69bis).

douceur [printed form] — gently. Slowly and gently (p. 256). B185 (Brunschvicg 185).

douter [printed form] — doubt. Affirm, doubt, submit (p. 205). B268 (Brunschvicg 268).

douze heures [phrase] — twelve hours. The dreaming craftsman (p. 264). B386 (Brunschvicg 386).

d'un seul regard [phrase] — at a single glance. At a single glance (p. 206). B1 (Brunschvicg 1).

d'un seul regard [phrase] — at a single glance. Discernment (p. 113). B1 (Brunschvicg 1).

d'une vue [phrase] — at a glance. At a single glance (p. 206). B3 (Brunschvicg 3).

échauffer [printed form] — to warm. The heart's order (p. 267). B283 (Brunschvicg 283).

Écoulement [printed form] — Flowing away. Flowing away (p. 224). B212 (Brunschvicg 212).

écouler [printed form] — flowing away. Flowing away (p. 224). B212 (Brunschvicg 212).

Écriture [printed form] — Scripture. Scripture (p. 94). B548 (Brunschvicg 548); B568 (Brunschvicg 568).

effets [printed form] — effects. Effects and causes (p. 218). B234 (Brunschvicg 234).

efforts [printed form] — efforts. Ordinary conduct (p. 243). B352 (Brunschvicg 352).

Église [printed form] — Church. Church (p. 137). B857 (Brunschvicg 857).

Ego vir videns [phrase] — I am the man who sees. The ruined house (p. 272). B399 (Brunschvicg 399).

elle m'échappe [phrase] — it escapes me. The escaped thought (p. 265). B372 (Brunschvicg 372).

empire fondé sur l'opinion [phrase] — rule founded on opinion. Opinion (p. 59). B311 (Brunschvicg 311).

émulation à la course [phrase] — rivalry in a race. The horse's oats (p. 267). B401 (Brunschvicg 401).

en son propre nom [phrase] — in his own name. In whose name? (p. 231). QM-XI-Q (Question XI, Question — Blaise Pascal).

ennemis [printed form] — enemies. Enemies and iniquities (p. 219). B692 (Brunschvicg 692).

ennui [printed form] — boredom. Boredom (p. 166). B131 (Brunschvicg 131).

enseigne [printed form] — teaches. Church (p. 137). B881 (Brunschvicg 881).

ente [printed form] — graft. Grapes and particularity (p. 228). B114 (Brunschvicg 114).

Épaminondas [printed form] — Epaminondas. Epaminondas (p. 219). B353 (Brunschvicg 353).

épicuriens [printed form] — Epicureans. Paganism (p. 151). B556 (Brunschvicg 556).

équité [printed form] — equity. Justice (p. 50). B294 (Brunschvicg 294).

équivoques [printed form] — ambiguous. Prophecy (p. 23). B723 (Brunschvicg 723).

Esdras [printed form] — Ezra. Ezra and restoration (p. 220). B632 (Brunschvicg 632); B633 (Brunschvicg 633); B634 (Brunschvicg 634).

espérance [printed form] — hope. Hope and present enjoyment (p. 229). B540 (Brunschvicg 540).

esprit [printed form] — mind; intellect. Mind (p. 130). B1 (Brunschvicg 1).

esprit de Dieu [phrase] — God's spirit. God's spirit and intellect (p. 227). B287 (Brunschvicg 287).

esprit de finesse [phrase] — discerning mind. Discernment (p. 113). B1 (Brunschvicg 1).

esprit de géométrie [phrase] — geometrical mind. Geometry (p. 121). B2 (Brunschvicg 2).

esprit de justesse [phrase] — mind for exact inference. Exact inference and breadth (p. 220). B2 (Brunschvicg 2).

esprit juste [phrase] — accurate mind. Mind (p. 130). B1 (Brunschvicg 1).

esprits [printed form] — minds. Three orders (p. 35). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

esprits fins [phrase] — discerning minds. Discernment (p. 113). B1 (Brunschvicg 1).

estime [printed form] — esteem. Honor (p. 47). B400 (Brunschvicg 400).

état de votre création [phrase] — state in which you were created. Fall (p. 12). B430 (Brunschvicg 430).

étendue [printed form] — breadth. The burning brand (p. 261). B353 (Brunschvicg 353).

éternuement [printed form] — Sneezing. Sneezing, intercourse, and agency (p. 256). B160 (Brunschvicg 160).

être imaginaire [phrase] — imaginary being. Honor (p. 47). B147 (Brunschvicg 147).

être imaginaire [phrase] — imaginary being. Imaginary being in others' minds (p. 230). B147 (Brunschvicg 147).

événement [printed form] — event or outcome. Prophecy (p. 23). B706 (Brunschvicg 706).

faculté imaginante [phrase] — imagining faculty. Imagination (p. 127). B82 (Brunschvicg 82).

faillent [printed form] — fail to follow. Affirm, doubt, submit (p. 205). B268 (Brunschvicg 268).

fantaisie [printed form] — fancy. Fancy and resistance (p. 221). B86 (Brunschvicg 86); B274 (Brunschvicg 274).

Fascinatio nugacitatis [phrase] — The enchantment of trifles. The enchantment of trifles (p. 264). B203 (Brunschvicg 203).

fausses fenêtres [phrase] — false windows. False windows and symmetry (p. 221). B27 (Brunschvicg 27).

faux [printed form] — false. Miracle (p. 20). B803 (Brunschvicg 803).

Félicité [printed form] — happiness. Happiness (p. 180). B60 (Brunschvicg 60).

Feu [printed form] — fire. Fire (p. 223). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

figmentum malum [phrase] — evil formation. Concupiscence (p. 41). B453 (Brunschvicg 453).

Figuratifs [printed form] — Figurative Meanings; proposed chapter heading. Figurative meaning (p. 82). B570 (Brunschvicg 570); B572 (Brunschvicg 572).

figure [printed form] — figure; prefiguration. Figurative meaning (p. 82). B643 (Brunschvicg 643).

figure de la gloire [phrase] — figure of glory. Figure and cause (p. 222). B643 (Brunschvicg 643).

figurée [printed form] — figured; prefigured. Figurative meaning (p. 82). B643 (Brunschvicg 643).

figures [printed form] — figures. Figurative meaning (p. 82). B650 (Brunschvicg 650).

fils aîné du roi [phrase] — king's eldest son. The eldest son (p. 264). B320bis (Brunschvicg 320bis).

finesse [printed form] — discernment. Discernment (p. 113). B1 (Brunschvicg 1).

fini [printed form] — finite. Infinity (p. 183). B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

flattés [printed form] — flattered. Flattery and rank (p. 224). B100 (Brunschvicg 100).

fleuves de Babylone [phrase] — rivers of Babylon. Babylon and Zion (p. 208). B459 (Brunschvicg 459).

fleuves de feu [phrase] — rivers of fire. Three desires and rivers of fire (p. 278). B458 (Brunschvicg 458).

foi [printed form] — faith. Faith (p. 79). B248 (Brunschvicg 248); B278 (Brunschvicg 278); B516 (Brunschvicg 516).

fontem aquae vivae [phrase] — fountain of living water. Fountain of living water (p. 225). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

force [printed form] — force; strength. Force (p. 44). B298 (Brunschvicg 298); B332 (Brunschvicg 332).

force de sa grâce [phrase] — power of his grace. Force (p. 44). B550 (Brunschvicg 550).

force naturelle des moyens [phrase] — natural power of the means. Miracle (p. 20). B804 (Brunschvicg 804).

force naturelle des moyens [phrase] — natural power of the means employed. Natural power of the means (p. 240). QM-II-Q (Question II, Question — Blaise Pascal).

froideur [printed form] — coolness or lack of self-advertising agitation. Narrative coolness (p. 240). B798 (Brunschvicg 798).

fœdere sempiterno [phrase] — everlasting covenant. Covenant (p. 216). B612 (Brunschvicg 612).

gagez [printed form] — wager; stake. Wager (p. 100). B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

gain [printed form] — gain. Playing, stakes, and absorption (p. 247). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

Gemara [printed form] — Gemara. Pugio and rabbinic reading notes (p. 251). B635 (Brunschvicg 635).

généalogies [printed form] — genealogies. Genealogies (p. 225). B578 (Brunschvicg 578); B626 (Brunschvicg 626).

générations [printed form] — generations. Genealogies (p. 225). B624 (Brunschvicg 624).

gens d'esprit [phrase] — people of intellect. God's spirit and intellect (p. 227). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

gens d'esprit [phrase] — people of intellect. Mind (p. 130). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

gens universels [phrase] — people of broad cultivation. Broad cultivation (p. 210). B34 (Brunschvicg 34).

Gentils [printed form] — Gentiles. Paganism (p. 151). B730 (Brunschvicg 730).

gentium [printed form] — of the Gentiles. Paganism (p. 151). B774 (Brunschvicg 774).

géomètres [printed form] — geometers. Geometry (p. 121). B1 (Brunschvicg 1).

géométrie [printed form] — geometry. Geometry (p. 121). B1 (Brunschvicg 1).

gloire [printed form] — glory; final blessed state in the law–grace–glory sequence. Figure and cause (p. 222). B643 (Brunschvicg 643).

gloire [printed form] — glory; social renown. Honor (p. 47). B401 (Brunschvicg 401); B404 (Brunschvicg 404).

goutte d'eau [phrase] — drop of water. The thinking reed (p. 275). B347 (Brunschvicg 347).

goutte d'eau [phrase] — drop of water. Vapor and a drop of water (p. 282). B347 (Brunschvicg 347).

gouverner un vaisseau [phrase] — to govern a ship. Governing a ship (p. 227). B320 (Brunschvicg 320).

grâce [printed form] — grace. Grace (p. 85). B435 (Brunschvicg 435); B507 (Brunschvicg 507); B522 (Brunschvicg 522).

grâce de leur Rédempteur [phrase] — their Redeemer's grace. Grace (p. 85). B435 (Brunschvicg 435).

grâce suffisante [phrase] — sufficient grace. Sufficient grace (p. 257). B925 (Brunschvicg 925).

grâce surnaturelle [phrase] — supernatural grace. Grace (p. 85). B498 (Brunschvicg 498).

grain de sable [phrase] — grain of sand. Cromwell and the small stone (p. 216). B176 (Brunschvicg 176).

graine [printed form] — seed. Principles and consequences (p. 250). B119 (Brunschvicg 119).

grand [printed form] — great. Greatness (p. 177). B397 (Brunschvicg 397).

grand seigneur [phrase] — great lord. Greatness (p. 177). B398 (Brunschvicg 398).

grandeur [printed form] — greatness. Greatness (p. 177). B397 (Brunschvicg 397).

grandeurs [printed form] — worldly greatness; distinctions. Greatness (p. 177). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

grandeurs [printed form] — forms of greatness; social distinction. World (p. 67). B161 (Brunschvicg 161).

grenouille [printed form] — frog. Liancourt's pike and frog (p. 234). B341 (Brunschvicg 341).

guerre civile [phrase] — civil war. The eldest son (p. 264). B320bis (Brunschvicg 320bis).

habitude [printed form] — habit. Custom (p. 110). B252 (Brunschvicg 252).

he deficientes [phrase] — missing hes. The closed mem (p. 262). B687 (Brunschvicg 687).

hermines [printed form] — ermine. Robes, fur, and square caps (p. 254). B82 (Brunschvicg 82).

heureux [printed form] — happy. Happiness (p. 180). B425 (Brunschvicg 425).

Homère [printed form] — Homer. The golden apple (p. 265). B628 (Brunschvicg 628).

honnête homme [phrase] — cultivated person. Broad cultivation (p. 210). B35 (Brunschvicg 35).

honneur [printed form] — honor. Honor (p. 47). B147 (Brunschvicg 147).

honorer [printed form] — to honor. Honor (p. 47). B335 (Brunschvicg 335).

hôpital de fous [phrase] — hospital of madmen. Pedants' gowns (p. 244). B331 (Brunschvicg 331).

horreur [printed form] — horror. The void and rival conditioning (p. 277). B75 (Brunschvicg 75).

hostie [printed form] — sacrificial offering or victim. Priest and sacrificial victim (p. 249). B766 (Brunschvicg 766).

huguenots [printed form] — Huguenots, French Reformed Protestants. Unity and multitude (p. 281). B874 (Brunschvicg 874).

humble [printed form] — humble. Humility (p. 140). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

humblement [printed form] — humbly. Humility (p. 140). B377 (Brunschvicg 377).

humbles [printed form] — humble people. Humility (p. 140). B377 (Brunschvicg 377).

humiliations [printed form] — humiliations. Humility (p. 140). B698 (Brunschvicg 698).

humilité [printed form] — humility. Humility (p. 140). B377 (Brunschvicg 377); B493 (Brunschvicg 493).

idem numero [phrase] — the very same individual, numerically identical. Numerical identity and necessary conditions (p. 242). B512 (Brunschvicg 512).

idolâtres [printed form] — idolaters. Paganism (p. 151). B736 (Brunschvicg 736).

idole de la vérité [phrase] — idol of truth. Idols of truth and obscurity (p. 230). B582 (Brunschvicg 582).

idole de l'obscurité [phrase] — idol of obscurity. Idols of truth and obscurity (p. 230). B582 (Brunschvicg 582).

ignorance naturelle [phrase] — natural ignorance. Learned ignorance (p. 234). B327 (Brunschvicg 327).

ignorance savante [phrase] — learned ignorance. Learned ignorance (p. 234). B327 (Brunschvicg 327).

il met ses bras en croix [phrase] — he crosses his arms. Crossed hands (p. 217). B711 (Brunschvicg 711).

Il ne se conserve [phrase] — the relation is kept or preserved. Finding and keeping (p. 223). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

Il ne se trouve [phrase] — he is found. Finding and keeping (p. 223). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

Iliade [printed form] — Iliad. The golden apple (p. 265). B628 (Brunschvicg 628).

illusion volontaire [phrase] — voluntary illusion. Self-love (p. 192). B100 (Brunschvicg 100).

illusion volontaire [phrase] — voluntary illusion. Voluntary illusion (p. 282). B100 (Brunschvicg 100).

image [printed form] — image. Figurative meaning (p. 82). B643 (Brunschvicg 643).

image de la Rédemption [phrase] — image of Redemption. The Red Sea (p. 271). B643 (Brunschvicg 643).

imagination [printed form] — imagination. Imagination (p. 127). B82 (Brunschvicg 82).

In quacumque die [phrase] — on whatever day. If (p. 230). B636 (Brunschvicg 636).

incirconcis de cœur [phrase] — uncircumcised in heart. Circumcision of the heart (p. 212). B610 (Brunschvicg 610).

Incommodez-vous [phrase] — Inconvenience yourself. Respect as inconvenience (p. 252). B317 (Brunschvicg 317).

indifférence [printed form] — indifference. Indifference, impartiality, and suspension (p. 231). B195 (Brunschvicg 195); B636 (Brunschvicg 636).

indifférent [printed form] — disinterested. Indifference, impartiality, and suspension (p. 231). B296 (Brunschvicg 296).

indifférents [printed form] — impartial; indifferent. Indifference, impartiality, and suspension (p. 231). B477 (Brunschvicg 477); B434 (Brunschvicg 434).

induire en erreur [phrase] — lead into an unavoidable false conclusion in the defined sense. Testing versus leading into error (p. 260). B821 (Brunschvicg 821).

infini [printed form] — infinity; infinite. Infinity (p. 183). B72 (Brunschvicg 72); B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

Infini — rien [phrase] — Infinite—nothing; fragment heading. Wager (p. 100). B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

infinis [printed form] — infinities. Infinity (p. 183). B72 (Brunschvicg 72).

injures et de nécessités [phrase] — insults and privations. A slap (p. 204). B324 (Brunschvicg 324).

injuste [printed form] — unjust. Justice (p. 50). B298 (Brunschvicg 298).

injustice [printed form] — injustice. Justice (p. 50). B455 (Brunschvicg 455).

instinct [printed form] — instinct. First principles (p. 118). B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

instrumentum judaicæ litteraturæ [phrase] — body of Jewish writings. Ezra and restoration (p. 220). B632 (Brunschvicg 632).

itus et reditus [phrase] — going and returning. Going and returning (p. 227). B355 (Brunschvicg 355).

Jacob [printed form] — Jacob. Shem's chain of witnesses (p. 255). B625 (Brunschvicg 625).

jardin [printed form] — garden. Two gardens (p. 280). B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

je me défiais [phrase] — I mistrusted. Putting away a book (p. 251). B371 (Brunschvicg 371).

je me suis trompé [phrase] — I have been mistaken. May have erred / have erred (p. 236). B945 (Brunschvicg 945).

Je m'en suis séparé [phrase] — I have separated myself from him. Separating and being separated (p. 254). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

je puis m'être trompé [phrase] — I may have been mistaken. May have erred / have erred (p. 236). B945 (Brunschvicg 945).

je serrais mon livre [phrase] — I put my book away. Putting away a book (p. 251). B371 (Brunschvicg 371).

Jésus-Christ [printed form] — Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ (p. 14). B547 (Brunschvicg 547); B740 (Brunschvicg 740); B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

Job [printed form] — Job. Solomon and Job (p. 257). B174 (Brunschvicg 174).

joie [printed form] — joy. Joy (p. 148). B530 (Brunschvicg 530); B544 (Brunschvicg 544); MEM (Mémorial paper D).

joie et confiance [phrase] — joy and confidence. Fear and joy after confession (p. 221). B530 (Brunschvicg 530).

joie future [phrase] — future joy. Joy (p. 148). B666 (Brunschvicg 666).

Joseph [printed form] — Joseph. Joseph as figure (p. 232). B768 (Brunschvicg 768).

Josèphe [printed form] — Josephus. Josephus (p. 232). B620 (Brunschvicg 620); B629 (Brunschvicg 629); B633 (Brunschvicg 633).

Josué [printed form] — Joshua. Joshua and the name Jesus (p. 233). B627 (Brunschvicg 627).

jouer [printed form] — play. Playing, stakes, and absorption (p. 247). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

jouer du luth [phrase] — to play the lute. Playing the lute (p. 247). B329 (Brunschvicg 329).

jouir [lemma] — to enjoy as an end. Use and enjoyment (p. 282). B571 (Brunschvicg 571).

jouissance effective [phrase] — actual enjoyment. Hope and present enjoyment (p. 229). B540 (Brunschvicg 540).

jouit du monde [phrase] — enjoys the world. Use and enjoyment (p. 282). B571 (Brunschvicg 571).

jouit du monde [phrase] — enjoys the world. World (p. 67). B571 (Brunschvicg 571).

Juifs [printed form] — Jews. Jews (p. 145). B607 (Brunschvicg 607).

Juifs charnels [phrase] — carnal Jews. Carnal and spiritual (p. 211). B607 (Brunschvicg 607); B608 (Brunschvicg 608).

Juifs charnels [phrase] — carnal Jews, Pascal's interpretive category. Jews (p. 145). B607 (Brunschvicg 607).

juste [printed form] — just. Justice (p. 50). B298 (Brunschvicg 298).

justes [printed form] — righteous people. Justice (p. 50). B534 (Brunschvicg 534).

justice [printed form] — justice; righteousness. Justice (p. 50). B294 (Brunschvicg 294); B298 (Brunschvicg 298); B513 (Brunschvicg 513).

la chair, l'esprit, la volonté [phrase] — flesh, mind, will. Three orders (p. 35). B460 (Brunschvicg 460).

la chasse [phrase] — the hunt. The hunt and the catch (p. 268). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

la grâce, les miracles [phrase] — grace and miracles. Two supernatural foundations (p. 281). B805 (Brunschvicg 805).

la manne [phrase] — manna. Manna (p. 235). B675 (Brunschvicg 675).

la pierre taillée sans mains [phrase] — the stone cut without hands. Stone without hands (p. 257). B722 (Brunschvicg 722).

la prise [phrase] — the catch. The hunt and the catch (p. 268). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

la pure force l'a fait [phrase] — sheer force has done it; disclosed critical reading. Force (p. 44). B304 (Brunschvicg 304).

la tradition [phrase] — tradition. Tradition as corrective source (p. 279). B867 (Brunschvicg 867).

la volonté de Dieu [phrase] — the will of God. Will (p. 103). B668 (Brunschvicg 668).

laitues sauvages [phrase] — wild lettuces. Bitter herbs (p. 209). B666 (Brunschvicg 666).

Lamech [printed form] — Lamech. Shem's chain of witnesses (p. 255). B625 (Brunschvicg 625).

le bord de sa robe [phrase] — the edge of his robe. The robe's edge (p. 271). QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

le chercher [phrase] — seeking him. Search (p. 97). B257 (Brunschvicg 257).

Le cœur a ses raisons [phrase] — The heart has its reasons. Heart (p. 124). B277 (Brunschvicg 277).

Le grand Pan est mort [phrase] — the great Pan is dead. The great Pan (p. 266). B695 (Brunschvicg 695).

le mem fermé [phrase] — the closed mem. The closed mem (p. 262). B687 (Brunschvicg 687).

le moi [printed form] — the self. Self (p. 189). B323 (Brunschvicg 323).

Le monde subsiste [phrase] — the world subsists. World (p. 67). B584 (Brunschvicg 584).

le réconcilier à Dieu [phrase] — reconcile the people to God. Mediation (p. 17). B766 (Brunschvicg 766).

le seul auteur et opérateur des miracles [phrase] — the sole author and performer of miracles. God as sole author of miracles (p. 226). QM-VII-R (Question VII, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

le véritable [phrase] — the real one. Imaginary being in others' minds (p. 230). B147 (Brunschvicg 147).

Le voile [phrase] — the veil. The veil over the books (p. 277). B676 (Brunschvicg 676).

Lequel est le plus clair [phrase] — which is clearer. Which is clearer? (p. 284). B834 (Brunschvicg 834).

les légèretés [phrase] — frivolities. When miracle does not mean miracle (p. 283). B819 (Brunschvicg 819).

Les raisons me viennent après [phrase] — Reasons come to me afterward. Roannez and reasons afterward (p. 253). B276 (Brunschvicg 276).

les trois marques de la religion [phrase] — the three marks of religion. Religion (p. 29). B844 (Brunschvicg 844).

lettres défectueuses et finales [phrase] — defective and final letters. Masorah and letters (p. 236). B630 (Brunschvicg 630).

leur chute [phrase] — their fall. Fall (p. 12). B644 (Brunschvicg 644).

leur imagination [phrase] — their imagination. Imagination (p. 127). B275 (Brunschvicg 275).

Liancourt [printed form] — Liancourt. Liancourt's pike and frog (p. 234). B341 (Brunschvicg 341).

libérateur [printed form] — deliverer. Redemption (p. 26). B692 (Brunschvicg 692).

libido dominandi [phrase] — desire to rule. Three desires and rivers of fire (p. 278). B458 (Brunschvicg 458).

libido sciendi [phrase] — desire to know. Three desires and rivers of fire (p. 278). B458 (Brunschvicg 458).

libido sentiendi [phrase] — desire to feel. Three desires and rivers of fire (p. 278). B458 (Brunschvicg 458).

lièvre [printed form] — hare. The hunt and the catch (p. 268). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

ligature [printed form] — ligature. Blood and the ligature (p. 209). B96 (Brunschvicg 96).

littéralement [printed form] — literally. Scripture (p. 94). B648 (Brunschvicg 648).

livre scellé [phrase] — sealed book. The sealed book (p. 272). B641 (Brunschvicg 641).

livres [printed form] — books. Scripture (p. 94). B571 (Brunschvicg 571); B632 (Brunschvicg 632).

loi [printed form] — law. Law (p. 53). B520 (Brunschvicg 520); B522 (Brunschvicg 522).

loi ancienne [phrase] — old law. Jews (p. 145). B609 (Brunschvicg 609).

loi vocale [phrase] — oral law. Law (p. 53). B635 (Brunschvicg 635).

lois [printed form] — laws. Law (p. 53). B294 (Brunschvicg 294); B326 (Brunschvicg 326).

lois naturelles [phrase] — natural laws. Law (p. 53). B294 (Brunschvicg 294).

l'exclusion [phrase] — exclusion. Heresy as exclusion (p. 229). B862 (Brunschvicg 862).

L'habit fait la doctrine [phrase] — the habit makes the doctrine. The habit makes the doctrine (p. 266). B925 (Brunschvicg 925).

L'ordre [phrase] — order or arrangement. The heart's order (p. 267). B283 (Brunschvicg 283).

l'ordre de la charité [phrase] — the order of charity. The heart's order (p. 267). B283 (Brunschvicg 283).

l'ordre de Melchisédech [phrase] — the order of Melchizedek. Melchizedek's order (p. 237). B736 (Brunschvicg 736).

L'unité et la multitude [phrase] — unity and multitude. Unity and multitude (p. 281). B874 (Brunschvicg 874).

M. de Roannez [phrase] — Mr. de Roannez. Roannez and reasons afterward (p. 253). B276 (Brunschvicg 276).

machine [printed form] — machine. Automaton and machine (p. 207). B246 (Brunschvicg 246).

machine d'arithmétique [phrase] — calculating machine. The calculating machine (p. 261). B340 (Brunschvicg 340).

Mahomet [printed form] — Muhammad. Islam (p. 142). B595 (Brunschvicg 595); B599 (Brunschvicg 599).

maison ruinée [phrase] — ruined house. The ruined house (p. 272). B399 (Brunschvicg 399).

malheureux [printed form] — unhappy. Wretchedness (p. 198). B409 (Brunschvicg 409).

manque de charité [phrase] — lack of charity. Miracle (p. 20). B826 (Brunschvicg 826).

marches [printed form] — keys. The variable organ (p. 276). B111 (Brunschvicg 111).

marques de regret [phrase] — signs of regret. Repentance (p. 159). B905 (Brunschvicg 905).

Masquer [printed form] — Masking. Masking and naming (p. 236). B49 (Brunschvicg 49).

Massor [printed form] — Masorah. Masorah and letters (p. 236). B630 (Brunschvicg 630).

mauvais levain [phrase] — evil leaven. Evil leaven (p. 219). B446 (Brunschvicg 446).

médiateur [printed form] — mediator. Conversion (p. 76). B470 (Brunschvicg 470).

médiateur [printed form] — mediator. Mediation (p. 17). B470 (Brunschvicg 470).

meilleure maison [phrase] — best family. Governing a ship (p. 227). B320 (Brunschvicg 320).

membre séparé [phrase] — separated member. Body and members (p. 71). B483 (Brunschvicg 483).

membres pensants [phrase] — thinking members. Body and members (p. 71). B473 (Brunschvicg 473); B474 (Brunschvicg 474); B482 (Brunschvicg 482).

mémoire [printed form] — memory. Memory (p. 237). B369 (Brunschvicg 369).

mer Rouge [phrase] — Red Sea. The Red Sea (p. 271). B643 (Brunschvicg 643).

Mérite [printed form] — merit. Merit and worthiness (p. 238). B513 (Brunschvicg 513).

mérite [printed form] — merit. Prayer (p. 91). B513 (Brunschvicg 513).

Meruit [printed form] — merited. Merit and worthiness (p. 238). B513 (Brunschvicg 513).

mettre papiers sur table [phrase] — put the papers on the table. Papers on the table (p. 244). B593 (Brunschvicg 593).

miracle [printed form] — miracle. Miracle (p. 20). B804 (Brunschvicg 804).

Miracle ne signifie pas toujours miracle [phrase] — miracle does not always mean miracle. When miracle does not mean miracle (p. 283). B819 (Brunschvicg 819).

miracles [printed form] — miracles. Miracle (p. 20). B803 (Brunschvicg 803).

Mischna [printed form] — Mishnah. Pugio and rabbinic reading notes (p. 251). B635 (Brunschvicg 635).

misérable [printed form] — miserable. Wretchedness (p. 198). B397 (Brunschvicg 397).

misère [printed form] — wretchedness; misery. Wretchedness (p. 198). B171 (Brunschvicg 171).

Miton [printed form] — Miton. Miton and obliging behavior (p. 239). B455 (Brunschvicg 455); B448 (Brunschvicg 448).

modèle de toutes conditions [phrase] — model for every condition. Jesus Christ (p. 14). B785 (Brunschvicg 785).

moi-même [printed form] — myself. Self (p. 189). B323 (Brunschvicg 323).

monde [printed form] — world; society. World (p. 67). B146 (Brunschvicg 146); B327 (Brunschvicg 327); B556 (Brunschvicg 556).

montre [printed form] — watch. Watch and rule (p. 283). B5 (Brunschvicg 5).

morale [printed form] — morality; moral teaching. Morality (p. 56). B4 (Brunschvicg 4); B347 (Brunschvicg 347); B482 (Brunschvicg 482).

morale du jugement [phrase] — morality of judgment. Morality (p. 56). B4 (Brunschvicg 4).

mort [printed form] — death. Death (p. 168). B199 (Brunschvicg 199).

mortification [printed form] — mortification. Humility (p. 140). B493 (Brunschvicg 493).

mourir [printed form] — to die. Death (p. 168). B175 (Brunschvicg 175).

mouvement de vraie charité [phrase] — stirring of true charity. Charity (p. 73). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

mouvement perpétuel [phrase] — perpetual motion. Perpetual motion and emotional equilibrium (p. 245). B181 (Brunschvicg 181).

mouvements de grâce [phrase] — movements of grace. Grace (p. 85). B507 (Brunschvicg 507).

mouvements fiévreux [phrase] — feverish movements. Feverish efforts (p. 222). B350 (Brunschvicg 350).

multitude [printed form] — multitude. Church (p. 137). B871 (Brunschvicg 871).

muscats [printed form] — muscats. Grapes and particularity (p. 228). B114 (Brunschvicg 114).

naïveté [printed form] — uncontrived naturalness. Naturalness of speech (p. 241). B797 (Brunschvicg 797).

nature [printed form] — nature. Nature (p. 186). B93 (Brunschvicg 93).

nature est corrompue [phrase] — nature is corrupt. Nature (p. 186). B60 (Brunschvicg 60).

ne nous séparent pas d'autel [phrase] — do not separate us from a common altar. The common altar (p. 262). B891 (Brunschvicg 891).

néant [printed form] — nothingness. Infinity (p. 183). B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

nerfs touchés [phrase] — nerves touched. A dance of spirits (p. 202). B368 (Brunschvicg 368).

nés [printed form] — born. Sin (p. 32). B492 (Brunschvicg 492).

net [printed form] — clean. The parrot's beak (p. 270). B343 (Brunschvicg 343).

noblesse [printed form] — nobility. Nobility's advantage (p. 241). B322 (Brunschvicg 322).

Non sum dignus [phrase] — I am not worthy. Merit and worthiness (p. 238). B513 (Brunschvicg 513).

nourriture [printed form] — nourishment. Body and members (p. 71). B482 (Brunschvicg 482).

nourriture [printed form] — nourishment. Shared nourishment (p. 255). B482 (Brunschvicg 482).

nous amuse [phrase] — amuses us. Diversion (p. 174). B171 (Brunschvicg 171).

nous élever sans vanité [phrase] — raise ourselves without vanity. Pride (p. 157). B957 (Brunschvicg 957).

nous espérons de vivre [phrase] — we hope to live. Present time and hoped-for living (p. 249). B172 (Brunschvicg 172).

nulle [part] sinon [en] Dieu [phrase] — nowhere except in God; the edition's bracketed conjecture. Archimedes and intellectual brilliance (p. 206). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

obligeamment [printed form] — obligingly. Miton and obliging behavior (p. 239). B455 (Brunschvicg 455).

omnes [printed form] — all. All: scope and exclusions (p. 205). B775 (Brunschvicg 775).

opinion [printed form] — opinion. Opinion (p. 59). B303 (Brunschvicg 303); B311 (Brunschvicg 311).

opinions très saines [phrase] — very sound opinions. Opinion (p. 59). B324 (Brunschvicg 324).

oracles [printed form] — oracles. Oracles (p. 242). QM-XII-Q (Question XII, Question — Blaise Pascal).

ordre de la charité [phrase] — order of charity. The heart's order (p. 267). B283 (Brunschvicg 283).

orgueil [printed form] — pride. Pride (p. 157). B405 (Brunschvicg 405); B460 (Brunschvicg 460).

orgues [printed form] — organ. The variable organ (p. 276). B111 (Brunschvicg 111).

Oubli du monde [phrase] — forgetfulness of the world. Forgetfulness of the world (p. 225). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

pactum meum [phrase] — my covenant. Covenant (p. 216). B612 (Brunschvicg 612).

païens [printed form] — pagans. Paganism (p. 151). B556 (Brunschvicg 556); B609 (Brunschvicg 609).

paix [printed form] — peace. Peace (p. 154). B930 (Brunschvicg 930); B949 (Brunschvicg 949); MEM (Mémorial paper D).

pape [printed form] — pope. Church (p. 137). B871 (Brunschvicg 871).

papistes [printed form] — papists, the polemical label for exclusive papal partisans. Unity and multitude (p. 281). B874 (Brunschvicg 874).

par conscience [phrase] — out of conscience. Conscience and wrongdoing (p. 214). B895 (Brunschvicg 895).

par grâce, non par nature [phrase] — by grace, not by nature. Grace (p. 85). B430 (Brunschvicg 430).

parce qu'elles sont lois [phrase] — because they are laws. Law (p. 53). B326 (Brunschvicg 326).

parier [printed form] — to wager. Wager (p. 100). B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

parlement [printed form] — sovereign high court. Parlement and registered pardon (p. 244). B870 (Brunschvicg 870).

parti [printed form] — course or terms of play, according to context. Wager (p. 100). B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

Paul Émile [phrase] — Aemilius Paulus. The dispossessed king (p. 263). B409 (Brunschvicg 409).

paume [printed form] — tennis. Tennis and arrangement (p. 260). B22 (Brunschvicg 22).

péché [printed form] — sin. Sin (p. 32). B434 (Brunschvicg 434).

péchés [printed form] — sins. Redemption (p. 26). B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

péchés cachés [phrase] — hidden sins. Sin (p. 32). B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

pécheur [printed form] — sinner. Sin (p. 32). B929 (Brunschvicg 929).

pécheurs [printed form] — sinners. Sin (p. 32). B771 (Brunschvicg 771).

peinture [printed form] — picture. Figurative meaning (p. 82). B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

pénitence [printed form] — repentance or penance. Repentance (p. 159). B497 (Brunschvicg 497); B923 (Brunschvicg 923).

pensée [printed form] — thought. Thinking (p. 195). B347 (Brunschvicg 347); B365 (Brunschvicg 365).

pensée de derrière [phrase] — thought held in reserve. A thought held in reserve (p. 204). B336 (Brunschvicg 336); B337 (Brunschvicg 337).

pensée de derrière [phrase] — a thought held in reserve. Opinion (p. 59). B336 (Brunschvicg 336); B337 (Brunschvicg 337).

Pensée échappée [phrase] — escaped thought. The escaped thought (p. 265). B370 (Brunschvicg 370).

penser [printed form] — to think. Thinking (p. 195). B146 (Brunschvicg 146).

Perpétuité [printed form] — perpetuity. Perpetuity (p. 245). B613 (Brunschvicg 613); B616 (Brunschvicg 616); B617 (Brunschvicg 617).

perpétuité, la bonne vie, les miracles [phrase] — perpetuity, a good life, miracles. Three marks of religion (p. 279). B844 (Brunschvicg 844).

Persée [printed form] — Perseus. The dispossessed king (p. 263). B409 (Brunschvicg 409).

perspective [printed form] — perspective. Perspective (p. 245). B381 (Brunschvicg 381).

Philon juif [phrase] — Philo the Jew. Philo (p. 246). B611 (Brunschvicg 611).

Philon Juif [phrase] — Philo the Jew. Philo (p. 246). B620 (Brunschvicg 620).

pieds et les mains [phrase] — feet and hands. Hands and feet (p. 228). B475 (Brunschvicg 475).

piquet [printed form] — piquet. Piquet in the dungeon (p. 246). B200 (Brunschvicg 200).

plaisirs absents [phrase] — absent pleasures. Present and absent pleasures (p. 249). B110 (Brunschvicg 110).

plaisirs présents [phrase] — present pleasures. Present and absent pleasures (p. 249). B110 (Brunschvicg 110).

planche [printed form] — plank. The plank above a precipice (p. 270). B82 (Brunschvicg 82).

pleurs de joie [phrase] — tears of joy. Joy (p. 148). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

pleurs de joie [phrase] — tears of joy. Tears of joy (p. 259). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

plus d'esprit [phrase] — greater understanding. Mind (p. 130). B7 (Brunschvicg 7).

plus fort [phrase] — strongest. Force (p. 44). B298 (Brunschvicg 298).

plus sûr [phrase] — safer. Probability (p. 62). B917 (Brunschvicg 917).

point fixe [phrase] — fixed point. Harbor and fixed point (p. 228). B382 (Brunschvicg 382); B383 (Brunschvicg 383).

point indivisible [phrase] — indivisible point. Perspective (p. 245). B381 (Brunschvicg 381).

point se mouvant [phrase] — point moving. The infinitely moving point (p. 269). B231 (Brunschvicg 231).

pomme d'or [phrase] — golden apple. The golden apple (p. 265). B628 (Brunschvicg 628).

porches de Hiérusalem [phrase] — porches of Jerusalem. Babylon and Zion (p. 208). B459 (Brunschvicg 459).

port [printed form] — harbor. Harbor and fixed point (p. 228). B383 (Brunschvicg 383).

Portentum [printed form] — portent. When miracle does not mean miracle (p. 283). B819 (Brunschvicg 819).

portrait [printed form] — portrait. Portrait and added ornament (p. 247). B26 (Brunschvicg 26).

pour confirmer une vérité [phrase] — to confirm a truth. A heretic confirming truth (p. 203). QM-QuestionsVandVI-R (Questions V and VI, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

pouvoir [lemma] — to be able. Force (p. 44). B304 (Brunschvicg 304).

pouvoir prochain [phrase] — proximate power. Proximate power (p. 250). B925 (Brunschvicg 925).

précipice [printed form] — precipice. The plank above a precipice (p. 270). B82 (Brunschvicg 82).

prédiction [printed form] — prediction. Prophecy (p. 23). B694 (Brunschvicg 694).

prédire [printed form] — foretell. Prophecy (p. 23). B710 (Brunschvicg 710).

premier effet [phrase] — first effect; compressed notes about prayer's dependence. Grace (p. 85). B514 (Brunschvicg 514).

première coutume [phrase] — first custom. Custom (p. 110). B93 (Brunschvicg 93).

première coutume [phrase] — first custom. First and second nature (p. 223). B93 (Brunschvicg 93).

première nature [phrase] — first nature. Fall (p. 12). B430 (Brunschvicg 430).

première nature [phrase] — first nature. Nature (p. 186). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

première règle [phrase] — first rule. Truth (p. 162). B949 (Brunschvicg 949).

premiers principes [phrase] — first principles. First principles (p. 118). B72 (Brunschvicg 72); B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

preuves [printed form] — proofs. Geometry (p. 121). B33 (Brunschvicg 33).

prie [printed form] — prays; asks. Prayer (p. 91). B504 (Brunschvicg 504); B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

prière [printed form] — prayer. Prayer (p. 91). B491 (Brunschvicg 491); B513 (Brunschvicg 513).

prières [printed form] — prayers. Prayer (p. 91). B476 (Brunschvicg 476); B513 (Brunschvicg 513).

principe de la morale [phrase] — principle of morality. Morality (p. 56). B347 (Brunschvicg 347).

principe ou la cause [phrase] — principle or cause. Figure and cause (p. 222). B643 (Brunschvicg 643).

principes [printed form] — principles. Principles and consequences (p. 250). B119 (Brunschvicg 119).

principes de la raison [phrase] — reason's principles. Reason (p. 133). B273 (Brunschvicg 273).

principes se sentent [phrase] — principles are sensed. First principles (p. 118). B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

probabilis est [phrase] — it is probable. Defensible, probable, and supported by authority (p. 217). B958 (Brunschvicg 958).

Probabilité [printed form] — probability in moral-theological discussion. Defensible, probable, and supported by authority (p. 217). B958 (Brunschvicg 958).

probabilité [printed form] — probability; moral probabilism in context. Probability (p. 62). B917 (Brunschvicg 917); B918 (Brunschvicg 918); B920 (Brunschvicg 920).

probable [printed form] — probable; defensible. Probability (p. 62). B917 (Brunschvicg 917); B922 (Brunschvicg 922).

prophéties [printed form] — prophecies. Prophecy (p. 23). B706 (Brunschvicg 706).

propositions se concluent [phrase] — propositions are inferred. First principles (p. 118). B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

Pugio [printed form] — the Pugio fidei used as a source. Pugio and rabbinic reading notes (p. 251). B635 (Brunschvicg 635).

Pugio fidei [editorial alias] — expanded work title supplied by the edition. Pugio and rabbinic reading notes (p. 251). B635 (Brunschvicg 635).

qualités empruntées [phrase] — borrowed qualities. Borrowed qualities (p. 209). B323 (Brunschvicg 323).

quam primum [phrase] — as soon as possible; unfinished label. Probability (p. 62). B922 (Brunschvicg 922).

Que je n'en sois jamais séparé [phrase] — may I never be separated from him. Separating and being separated (p. 254). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

qui forme un peuple [phrase] — one that forms a people. A book that forms a people (p. 202). B594 (Brunschvicg 594).

Qui mandicat indignas [phrase] — malformed source wording interpreted as whoever eats unworthily. Merit and worthiness (p. 238). B513 (Brunschvicg 513).

quoad modum [phrase] — with respect to the manner of production. Supernatural in manner (p. 258). QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

quoad ordinem naturæ [phrase] — with respect to the order of nature. Miracle with respect to natural order (p. 238). QM-III-R (Question III, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

quoad subjectum [phrase] — with respect to the subject receiving the effect. Miracle with respect to the subject (p. 238). QM-III-R (Question III, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

quoad substantiam [phrase] — with respect to substance. Supernatural in substance (p. 258). QM-I-R (Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

qu'on dit avoir vus [phrase] — that one says one has seen. Martyrdom and claimed eyewitness (p. 235). B844 (Brunschvicg 844).

raccourci d'atome [phrase] — diminished atom. The mite and nested universes (p. 269). B72 (Brunschvicg 72).

racheté [printed form] — ransomed. Redemption (p. 26). B781 (Brunschvicg 781).

racheter [printed form] — redeem. Redemption (p. 26). B430 (Brunschvicg 430).

raison [printed form] — reason; a reason. Reason (p. 133). B267 (Brunschvicg 267); B277 (Brunschvicg 277).

Raison des effets [phrase] — reason for effects. Opinion (p. 59). B328 (Brunschvicg 328); B335 (Brunschvicg 335).

raisonnement [printed form] — reasoning. Reason (p. 133). B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

raisons [printed form] — reasons. Heart (p. 124). B277 (Brunschvicg 277).

recherche [printed form] — search; inquiry. Search (p. 97). B194 (Brunschvicg 194); B462 (Brunschvicg 462).

recherchent [printed form] — seek. Desire (p. 171). B425 (Brunschvicg 425).

reconnaissante [printed form] — readily recognizable. Force (p. 44). B298 (Brunschvicg 298).

reconnaissante [printed form] — grateful. Joy (p. 148). B856 (Brunschvicg 856).

Rédempteur [printed form] — Redeemer. Redemption (p. 26). B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

rédemption [printed form] — redemption. Redemption (p. 26). B781 (Brunschvicg 781).

règle [printed form] — rule. Watch and rule (p. 283). B5 (Brunschvicg 5).

règle des partis [phrase] — rule for dividing stakes. Wager (p. 100). B234 (Brunschvicg 234).

religion [printed form] — religion. Religion (p. 29). B187 (Brunschvicg 187).

religion accommodée [phrase] — an accommodating religion. Religion (p. 29). B956 (Brunschvicg 956).

religion chrétienne [phrase] — Christian religion. Religion (p. 29). B556 (Brunschvicg 556).

religion mahométane [phrase] — Muslim religion. Islam (p. 142). B601 (Brunschvicg 601).

religion naturelle [phrase] — natural religion. Paganism (p. 151). B609 (Brunschvicg 609).

Rem viderunt, causam non viderunt [phrase] — They saw the thing; they did not see the cause. Effects and causes (p. 218). B235 (Brunschvicg 235).

Renonciation totale et douce [phrase] — renunciation, complete and gentle. Complete and gentle renunciation (p. 213). MEM (Mémorial paper D).

renversé [printed form] — overturned. Pouring, shedding, overturning (p. 248). B53 (Brunschvicg 53).

Répandre [printed form] — Shed. Pouring, shedding, overturning (p. 248). B53 (Brunschvicg 53).

Réparateur [printed form] — one who remedies the human condition. Jesus Christ (p. 14). B547 (Brunschvicg 547).

repos [printed form] — peace or repose. Peace (p. 154). B908 (Brunschvicg 908).

repos [printed form] — rest. Rest and repose (p. 252). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

repos entier [phrase] — complete rest. Rest and repose (p. 252). B129 (Brunschvicg 129).

République chrétienne [phrase] — Christian commonwealth. Two laws (p. 281). B484 (Brunschvicg 484).

réputation [printed form] — reputation. Honor (p. 47). B147 (Brunschvicg 147); B452 (Brunschvicg 452).

retenir en eux-mêmes [phrase] — to retain within themselves. Shared nourishment (p. 255). B482 (Brunschvicg 482).

rivières [printed form] — rivers. Rivers as moving roads (p. 253). B17 (Brunschvicg 17).

robes de pédants [phrase] — gowns of pedants. Pedants' gowns (p. 244). B331 (Brunschvicg 331).

robes rouges [phrase] — red robes. Robes, fur, and square caps (p. 254). B82 (Brunschvicg 82).

roi dépossédé [phrase] — dispossessed king. Greatness (p. 177). B398 (Brunschvicg 398).

roi dépossédé [phrase] — dispossessed king. The dispossessed king (p. 263). B398 (Brunschvicg 398); B409 (Brunschvicg 409).

Rongez cette corde [phrase] — gnaw through this rope. The unreachable rope (p. 276). B342 (Brunschvicg 342).

roseau pensant [phrase] — thinking reed. The thinking reed (p. 275). B347 (Brunschvicg 347); B348 (Brunschvicg 348).

roseau pensant [phrase] — thinking reed. Thinking (p. 195). B347 (Brunschvicg 347).

roue [printed form] — wheel. The wheel and its center (p. 278). B180 (Brunschvicg 180).

royaume des savants [phrase] — kingdom of the learned. Different chambers (p. 218). B332 (Brunschvicg 332).

sacrificateur [printed form] — sacrificing priest. Priest and sacrificial victim (p. 249). B766 (Brunschvicg 766).

sacrifices [printed form] — sacrifices. Scripture (p. 94). B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

sainte Sion [phrase] — holy Zion. Babylon and Zion (p. 208). B459 (Brunschvicg 459).

Salomon [printed form] — Solomon. Solomon and Job (p. 257). B174 (Brunschvicg 174).

sans application [phrase] — without application. Boredom (p. 166). B131 (Brunschvicg 131).

sans diminution et sans envie [phrase] — without diminution and without envy. The universal good (p. 276). B425 (Brunschvicg 425).

sans interruption [phrase] — without interruption. Perpetuity (p. 245). B613 (Brunschvicg 613); B617 (Brunschvicg 617).

sans le connaître [phrase] — without knowing it. Awareness and felt nothingness (p. 207). B164 (Brunschvicg 164).

santé [printed form] — health. Feverish efforts (p. 222). B350 (Brunschvicg 350).

Sauveur [printed form] — Savior. Jesus Christ (p. 14). B766 (Brunschvicg 766).

Scaramouche [printed form] — Scaramouche. Scaramouche and the Doctor (p. 254). B12 (Brunschvicg 12).

sceau [printed form] — seal. The sealed book (p. 272). B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

scelera [printed form] — crimes. Justice (p. 50). B363 (Brunschvicg 363).

sceptre [printed form] — scepter. The scepter (p. 272). B637 (Brunschvicg 637); B639 (Brunschvicg 639).

scio [printed form] — I know. Faith (p. 79). B248 (Brunschvicg 248).

se concluent [printed form] — are inferred. Feeling and apprehension (p. 115). B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

se convertir [phrase] — to be converted. Conversion (p. 76). B275 (Brunschvicg 275).

se divertit [phrase] — diverts himself. Diversion (p. 174). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

se faire Dieu [phrase] — make themselves God. Self-love (p. 192). B492 (Brunschvicg 492).

se glorifie [phrase] — glories or boasts. Pride (p. 157). B405 (Brunschvicg 405).

se pipe lui-même [phrase] — deceive himself. Playing, stakes, and absorption (p. 247). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

seconde naissance [phrase] — second birth. Grace (p. 85). B521 (Brunschvicg 521).

seconde nature [phrase] — second nature. First and second nature (p. 223). B93 (Brunschvicg 93).

seconde nature [phrase] — second nature. Nature (p. 186). B93 (Brunschvicg 93).

secret inviolable [phrase] — inviolable secrecy. The one person who hears confession (p. 269). B100 (Brunschvicg 100).

selon notre opinion [phrase] — in our opinion. Opinion (p. 59). B303 (Brunschvicg 303).

Sem [printed form] — Shem. Shem's chain of witnesses (p. 255). B625 (Brunschvicg 625).

sens [printed form] — meaning. Scripture (p. 94). B642 (Brunschvicg 642); B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

sens caché [phrase] — hidden meaning. Figurative meaning (p. 82). B571 (Brunschvicg 571); B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

sens littéral [phrase] — literal meaning. Figurative meaning (p. 82). B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

sens littéral [phrase] — literal meaning. Scripture (p. 94). B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

sens spirituel [phrase] — spiritual meaning. Figurative meaning (p. 82). B571 (Brunschvicg 571).

sentent [printed form] — feel. Awareness and felt nothingness (p. 207). B164 (Brunschvicg 164).

sentent [printed form] — sense. Feeling and apprehension (p. 115). B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

sentiment [printed form] — awareness. Awareness and felt nothingness (p. 207). B399 (Brunschvicg 399).

sentiment [printed form] — direct sense; direct apprehension. Feeling and apprehension (p. 115). B3 (Brunschvicg 3); B252 (Brunschvicg 252).

sentiment du cœur [phrase] — the heart's direct sense. Feeling and apprehension (p. 115). B282 (Brunschvicg 282).

sentiment intérieur et immédiat [phrase] — inward and immediate sense. Prophecy (p. 23). B732 (Brunschvicg 732).

sentiments [printed form] — feelings. Feeling and apprehension (p. 115). B95 (Brunschvicg 95).

sentiments [printed form] — feelings. Theater and represented passions (p. 278). B11 (Brunschvicg 11).

sentir [printed form] — to sense; to feel. Feeling and apprehension (p. 115). B1 (Brunschvicg 1).

Septante [printed form] — the Seventy. The Seventy (p. 273). B632 (Brunschvicg 632).

ses os [phrase] — his bones. Joseph's bones (p. 232). B711 (Brunschvicg 711).

Si [printed form] — if. If (p. 230). B636 (Brunschvicg 636).

Si volumus [phrase] — if we wish. If (p. 230). B636 (Brunschvicg 636).

signa [printed form] — signs. Miracle (p. 20). B826 (Brunschvicg 826).

signature [printed form] — signature or act of signing. Signing and consent (p. 256). B945 (Brunschvicg 945).

signer [printed form] — to sign. Signing and consent (p. 256). B945 (Brunschvicg 945).

signes [printed form] — signs. Miracle (p. 20). QM-XI-Q (Question XI, Question — Blaise Pascal).

simulacrum [printed form] — image. When miracle does not mean miracle (p. 283). B819 (Brunschvicg 819).

soi-même [printed form] — oneself. Self-love (p. 192). B100 (Brunschvicg 100).

soldat [printed form] — soldier. The soldier and the Carthusian (p. 274). B539 (Brunschvicg 539).

son ordinaire [phrase] — a person's ordinary conduct. Ordinary conduct (p. 243). B352 (Brunschvicg 352).

son sceau [phrase] — his seal. The divine seal (p. 263). QM-IV-R (Question IV, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

songer [printed form] — to think about. Thinking (p. 195). B171 (Brunschvicg 171).

soufflet [printed form] — slap. A slap (p. 204). B324 (Brunschvicg 324).

soumettre [printed form] — submit. Affirm, doubt, submit (p. 205). B268 (Brunschvicg 268).

sphère infinie [phrase] — infinite sphere. The infinite sphere (p. 268). B72 (Brunschvicg 72).

spirituellement [printed form] — spiritually. Scripture (p. 94). B648 (Brunschvicg 648).

spirituelles [printed form] — intellectual, in the middle-order contrast. Archimedes and intellectual brilliance (p. 206). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

spirituels [printed form] — spiritual. Carnal and spiritual (p. 211). B609 (Brunschvicg 609).

spirituels [printed form] — spiritual readers or adherents. Jews (p. 145). B609 (Brunschvicg 609).

Spongia solis [phrase] — The sun's sponge. The sun's sponge (p. 275). B91 (Brunschvicg 91).

style naturel [phrase] — natural style. Natural style and the person (p. 240). B29 (Brunschvicg 29).

sujet de contradiction [phrase] — subject of contradiction. Contradiction (p. 107). B434 (Brunschvicg 434).

superbe [printed form] — arrogance or pride. Pride (p. 157). B460 (Brunschvicg 460).

supplices [printed form] — torments. Two gardens (p. 280). B553 (Brunschvicg 553).

suppôt [printed form] — single subject. A single subject and its parts (p. 204). B115 (Brunschvicg 115).

sûr [printed form] — safe. A safe path or merely staying on it? (p. 203). B920 (Brunschvicg 920).

sûr [printed form] — safe. Probability (p. 62). B917 (Brunschvicg 917); B920 (Brunschvicg 920).

sûreté de conscience [phrase] — security of conscience. Peace (p. 154). B908 (Brunschvicg 908).

surnaturelle [printed form] — supernatural. Charity (p. 73). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

Symétrie [printed form] — symmetry. False windows and symmetry (p. 221). B28 (Brunschvicg 28).

s'éloignant de la charité [phrase] — moving away from charity. Charity (p. 73). B668 (Brunschvicg 668).

s'ennuierait [printed form] — would be bored. Boredom (p. 166). B139 (Brunschvicg 139).

s'entre-flatter [printed form] — flatter one another. Flattery and rank (p. 224). B100 (Brunschvicg 100).

s'est caché [phrase] — has hidden himself. Hidden God (p. 88). B194 (Brunschvicg 194).

tableau [printed form] — picture. Portrait and added ornament (p. 247). B26 (Brunschvicg 26).

tait [printed form] — malformed source token in the phrase about worship; not read as an instruction to remain silent. Conversion (p. 76). B470 (Brunschvicg 470).

Talmud [printed form] — Talmud. Pugio and rabbinic reading notes (p. 251). B635 (Brunschvicg 635).

témoignage [printed form] — testimony. Witness (p. 38). B596 (Brunschvicg 596).

témoin [printed form] — witness. Witness (p. 38). B644 (Brunschvicg 644).

témoins [printed form] — witnesses. Witness (p. 38). B593 (Brunschvicg 593); B750 (Brunschvicg 750).

témoins suspects [phrase] — suspect witnesses. Jews (p. 145). B750 (Brunschvicg 750).

témoins suspects [phrase] — suspect witnesses. Witness (p. 38). B750 (Brunschvicg 750).

temple [printed form] — temple. Temple and inward worship (p. 259). B766 (Brunschvicg 766).

temps de guerre [phrase] — time for war. Peace (p. 154). B949 (Brunschvicg 949).

temps de paix [phrase] — time of peace. Peace (p. 154). B949 (Brunschvicg 949).

temps présent [phrase] — present time. Present time and hoped-for living (p. 249). B172 (Brunschvicg 172).

tenter [printed form] — to put to the test. Testing versus leading into error (p. 260). B821 (Brunschvicg 821).

tison de feu [phrase] — burning brand. The burning brand (p. 261). B353 (Brunschvicg 353).

tombé de sa place [phrase] — fallen from one's place. Pride (p. 157). B406 (Brunschvicg 406).

totidem [printed form] — word for word. Word for word (p. 285). B929 (Brunschvicg 929).

tous les côtés [phrase] — every side. The side from which one sees (p. 273). B9 (Brunschvicg 9).

tout le corps [phrase] — the whole body. Wholly the body / the whole body (p. 284). B512 (Brunschvicg 512).

toute le corps [phrase] — wholly the body. Wholly the body / the whole body (p. 284). B512 (Brunschvicg 512).

transmission du péché [phrase] — transmission of sin. Sin (p. 32). B434 (Brunschvicg 434).

Travaillons [printed form] — Let us work. Thinking (p. 195). B347 (Brunschvicg 347).

trente ans gagnés sans peine [phrase] — thirty years gained without effort. Nobility's advantage (p. 241). B322 (Brunschvicg 322).

trois ordres [phrase] — three orders. Three orders (p. 35). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

trois ordres différents de genre [phrase] — three orders different in kind. Three orders (p. 35). B793 (Brunschvicg 793).

tsade finals [phrase] — final tsades. The closed mem (p. 262). B687 (Brunschvicg 687).

Tueri quis potest [phrase] — one can defend it. Defensible, probable, and supported by authority (p. 217). B958 (Brunschvicg 958).

Turcs [printed form] — Turks, Pascal's historical label here for Muslims. Islam (p. 142). B844 (Brunschvicg 844).

tyran [printed form] — tyrant. Tyranny (p. 65). B455 (Brunschvicg 455).

tyrannie [printed form] — tyranny. Tyranny (p. 65). B332 (Brunschvicg 332); B871 (Brunschvicg 871).

tyranniques [printed form] — tyrannical. Tyranny (p. 65). B332 (Brunschvicg 332).

un auteur [phrase] — an author. Natural style and the person (p. 240). B29 (Brunschvicg 29).

Un bout de capuchon [phrase] — a scrap of a hood. A scrap of a hood (p. 203). B955 (Brunschvicg 955).

un cercle [phrase] — a circle. Conversation and the circle of cultivation (p. 216). B6 (Brunschvicg 6).

un chiffre à double sens [phrase] — a cipher with a double meaning. Cipher and intercepted letter (p. 212). B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

un homme [phrase] — a person. Natural style and the person (p. 240). B29 (Brunschvicg 29).

un livre reçu d'un peuple [phrase] — a book received by a people. A book that forms a people (p. 202). B594 (Brunschvicg 594).

Un portrait porte absence et présence [phrase] — a portrait bears absence and presence. Portrait, presence, and absence (p. 248). B678 (Brunschvicg 678).

un seul [phrase] — one exception. The one person who hears confession (p. 269). B100 (Brunschvicg 100).

un seul attouchement [phrase] — a single touch. Touch and immediacy (p. 279). QM-III-R (Question III, Reply — Martin de Barcos).

un vaisseau battu de l'orage [phrase] — a ship battered by a storm. The storm-tossed ship (p. 274). B859 (Brunschvicg 859).

une épine de la couronne [phrase] — a thorn from the crown. The Holy Thorn (p. 267). B839 (Brunschvicg 839).

uniformité [printed form] — uniformity. The Seventy (p. 273). B632 (Brunschvicg 632).

unité [printed form] — unity. Church (p. 137). B871 (Brunschvicg 871).

unité [printed form] — unity. Tyranny (p. 65). B871 (Brunschvicg 871).

uretère [printed form] — ureter. Cromwell and the small stone (p. 216). B176 (Brunschvicg 176).

use de Dieu [phrase] — uses God. Use and enjoyment (p. 282). B571 (Brunschvicg 571).

user [lemma] — to use as a means. Use and enjoyment (p. 282). B571 (Brunschvicg 571).

vanité du monde [phrase] — the world's vanity. World (p. 67). B161 (Brunschvicg 161).

vapeur [printed form] — vapor. Vapor and a drop of water (p. 282). B347 (Brunschvicg 347).

Vatable [printed form] — Vatablus, the cited scholarly source. When miracle does not mean miracle (p. 283). B819 (Brunschvicg 819).

vérité [printed form] — truth. Truth (p. 162). B949 (Brunschvicg 949).

vérité essentielle [phrase] — essential truth. Truth (p. 162). B385 (Brunschvicg 385).

versé [printed form] — tipped over. Pouring, shedding, overturning (p. 248). B53 (Brunschvicg 53).

verser [printed form] — pour. Pouring, shedding, overturning (p. 248). B53 (Brunschvicg 53).

Vertu apéritive [phrase] — opening power. The powers of a key and hook (p. 270). B55 (Brunschvicg 55).

vide [printed form] — void. The void and rival conditioning (p. 277). B82 (Brunschvicg 82).

vie [printed form] — life. Jesus Christ (p. 14). B548 (Brunschvicg 548).

violence impétueuse et tyrannique [phrase] — impetuous and tyrannical violence. Tyranny (p. 65). B498 (Brunschvicg 498).

vitesse infinie [phrase] — infinite speed. The infinitely moving point (p. 269). B231 (Brunschvicg 231).

volonté [printed form] — will. The calculating machine (p. 261). B340 (Brunschvicg 340).

volonté [printed form] — will. Will (p. 103). B340 (Brunschvicg 340); B425 (Brunschvicg 425); B475 (Brunschvicg 475).

volonté [printed form] — will. Will and directed attention (p. 284). B99 (Brunschvicg 99).

volonté particulière [phrase] — particular will. Will (p. 103). B475 (Brunschvicg 475).

volonté première [phrase] — primary will. Hands and feet (p. 228). B475 (Brunschvicg 475).

volonté propre [phrase] — self-will. Will (p. 103). B472 (Brunschvicg 472).

Voltigerod [printed form] — allusive place-name, unresolved here. The amphibious creature of the fable (p. 261). B924 (Brunschvicg 924).

voudrions [printed form] — would like. Desire (p. 171). B148 (Brunschvicg 148).

vous êtes embarqué [phrase] — you are already aboard. Wager (p. 100). B233 (Brunschvicg 233).

vrai [printed form] — true. Truth (p. 162). B857 (Brunschvicg 857).

vrai bien [phrase] — true good. Happiness (p. 180). B425 (Brunschvicg 425).

vraie [printed form] — true. Religion (p. 29). B187 (Brunschvicg 187).

vraie en partie [phrase] — true in part. Truth (p. 162). B385 (Brunschvicg 385).

vraie morale [phrase] — true morality. Morality (p. 56). B4 (Brunschvicg 4).

vrais [printed form] — true or genuine. Miracle (p. 20). B803 (Brunschvicg 803).

vrais Juifs [phrase] — true Jews in Pascal's theological classification. Jews (p. 145). B607 (Brunschvicg 607).

English lookup

English entry titles and the English glosses attached to registered forms lead back to their explanations. A gloss is a lookup aid, not a claim that one English equivalent fits every occurrence.

a book received by a people — A book that forms a people (p. 202).

A book that forms a people — A book that forms a people (p. 202).

a cipher with a double meaning — Cipher and intercepted letter (p. 212).

a circle — Conversation and the circle of cultivation (p. 216).

A dance of spirits — A dance of spirits (p. 202).

A heretic confirming truth — A heretic confirming truth (p. 203).

a person — Natural style and the person (p. 240).

a person's ordinary conduct — Ordinary conduct (p. 243).

a portrait bears absence and presence — Portrait, presence, and absence (p. 248).

A safe path or merely staying on it? — A safe path or merely staying on it? (p. 203).

A scrap of a hood — A scrap of a hood (p. 203).

a scrap of a hood — A scrap of a hood (p. 203).

a ship battered by a storm — The storm-tossed ship (p. 274).

A single subject and its parts — A single subject and its parts (p. 204).

a single touch — Touch and immediacy (p. 279).

A slap — A slap (p. 204).

a thorn from the crown — The Holy Thorn (p. 267).

a thought held in reserve — Opinion (p. 59).

A thought held in reserve — A thought held in reserve (p. 204).

absent pleasures — Present and absent pleasures (p. 249).

absolution — Repentance (p. 159).

accurate mind — Mind (p. 130).

actual enjoyment — Hope and present enjoyment (p. 229).

Adam — Shem's chain of witnesses (p. 255).

Aemilius Paulus — The dispossessed king (p. 263).

affirm — Affirm, doubt, submit (p. 205).

Affirm, doubt, submit — Affirm, doubt, submit (p. 205).

Against Apion — Josephus (p. 232).

agility — The burning brand (p. 261).

all — All: scope and exclusions (p. 205).

All: scope and exclusions — All: scope and exclusions (p. 205).

allusive place-name, unresolved here — The amphibious creature of the fable (p. 261).

ambiguous — Prophecy (p. 23).

amuses us — Diversion (p. 174).
an accommodating religion — Religion (p. 29).
an author — Natural style and the person (p. 240).
Archimedes — Archimedes and intellectual brilliance (p. 206).
Archimedes and intellectual brilliance — Archimedes and intellectual brilliance (p. 206).
are inferred — Feeling and apprehension (p. 115).
arrangement — Tennis and arrangement (p. 260).
arrogance or pride — Pride (p. 157).
as soon as possible; unfinished label — Probability (p. 62).
Assertion before knowledge — Assertion before knowledge (p. 206).
assertion running ahead of knowledge — Assertion before knowledge (p. 206).
at a glance — At a single glance (p. 206).
at a single glance — At a single glance (p. 206); Discernment (p. 113).
At a single glance — At a single glance (p. 206).
atheism — Deism (p. 218).
attracting — The powers of a key and hook (p. 270).
automaton — Automaton and machine (p. 207); Custom (p. 110).
Automaton and machine — Automaton and machine (p. 207).
avidity — Desire (p. 171).
awareness — Awareness and felt nothingness (p. 207).
Awareness and felt nothingness — Awareness and felt nothingness (p. 207).
Babylon and Zion — Babylon and Zion (p. 208).
ball — Billiard cue and ball (p. 208).
Bar Kokhba — Barcosba / Bar Kokhba (p. 208).
Barcosba / Bar Kokhba — Barcosba / Bar Kokhba (p. 208).
because they are laws — Law (p. 53).
being contradicted; contradiction — Contradiction (p. 107).
belief — Will and directed attention (p. 284).
best family — Governing a ship (p. 227).
billiard cue — Billiard cue and ball (p. 208).
Billiard cue and ball — Billiard cue and ball (p. 208).
Bitter herbs — Bitter herbs (p. 209).
blessedness — Happiness (p. 180).
Blood and the ligature — Blood and the ligature (p. 209).
bodies — Three orders (p. 35).
body — Body and members (p. 71).
Body and members — Body and members (p. 71).
body of Jewish writings — Ezra and restoration (p. 220).
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Boredom — Boredom (p. 166).

boredom — Boredom (p. 166).
born — Sin (p. 32).
Borrowed qualities — Borrowed qualities (p. 209).
borrowed qualities — Borrowed qualities (p. 209).
breadth — The burning brand (p. 261).
breadth of mind — Exact inference and breadth (p. 220).
Broad cultivation — Broad cultivation (p. 210).
burning brand — The burning brand (p. 261).
by grace, not by nature — Grace (p. 85).
Cabale, circle, and intriguers — Cabale, circle, and intriguers (p. 210).
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capital of the kingdom — Masking and naming (p. 236).
Carnal and spiritual — Carnal and spiritual (p. 211).
carnal Christians — Carnal and spiritual (p. 211).
carnal Jews — Carnal and spiritual (p. 211).
carnal Jews, Pascal's interpretive category — Jews (p. 145).
Carthusian — The soldier and the Carthusian (p. 274).
cause of boredom — Boredom (p. 166).
causes — Effects and causes (p. 218).
center — The wheel and its center (p. 278).
center is everywhere — The infinite sphere (p. 268).
center of everything — Self (p. 189).
certainty — Certainty in the Mémorial (p. 211).
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chains — Condemned prisoners (p. 214).
charges; accusations in this altered quotation — Justice (p. 50).
Charity — Charity (p. 73).
charity, Christian love — Three orders (p. 35).
charity; Christian love — Charity (p. 73).
chase — Tennis and arrangement (p. 260).
chest — Chest and compressed maxims (p. 211).
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Christian commonwealth — Two laws (p. 281).
Christian religion — Religion (p. 29).
chronologists — Prophecy (p. 23).
Church — Church (p. 137).
cipher — Figurative meaning (p. 82); Scripture (p. 94).
Cipher and intercepted letter — Cipher and intercepted letter (p. 212).
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circle sharing a secret — Cabale, circle, and intriguers (p. 210).

circulation of blood — Blood and the ligature (p. 209).
Circumcision of the heart — Circumcision of the heart (p. 212).
circumcision of the heart — Circumcision of the heart (p. 212).
circumference nowhere — The infinite sphere (p. 268).
civil war — The eldest son (p. 264).
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Cleobuline — Cleobuline (p. 213).
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communion or living relation — Mediation (p. 17).
communion with God — Mediation (p. 17).
Complete and gentle renunciation — Complete and gentle renunciation (p. 213).
complete rest — Rest and repose (p. 252).
comprehend — Containment and comprehension (p. 214).
Concupiscence — Concupiscence (p. 41).
Condemned prisoners — Condemned prisoners (p. 214).
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confidence — Joy (p. 148).
Conscience and wrongdoing — Conscience and wrongdoing (p. 214).
consent — Signing and consent (p. 256).
consequences — Principles and consequences (p. 250).
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contrition — Contrition seeking the sacrament (p. 215); Repentance (p. 159).
Contrition seeking the sacrament — Contrition seeking the sacrament (p. 215).
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converted; converts — Conversion (p. 76).

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cords of imagination — Imagination (p. 127).
cords of necessity — Force (p. 44).
corrupted — Fall (p. 12).
counterweight — Opposed winds (p. 242).
countryside — A single subject and its parts (p. 204).
course or terms of play, according to context — Wager (p. 100).
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covenant — Covenant (p. 216).
craftsman — The dreaming craftsman (p. 264).
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Cromwell and the small stone — Cromwell and the small stone (p. 216).
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B544 — Brunschvicg 544. Concupiscence (p. 41); Joy (p. 148).

B547 — Brunschvicg 547. Jesus Christ (p. 14); Mediation (p. 17); Pride (p. 157); Three orders (p. 35).

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B553 — Brunschvicg 553. Conversion (p. 76); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Mediation (p. 17); Prayer (p. 91); Redemption (p. 26); Repentance (p. 159); Search (p. 97); Sin (p. 32); Take comfort (p. 259); The cup (p. 262); The spiritual guide (p. 274); Two gardens (p. 280).

B555 — Brunschvicg 555. Prayer (p. 91); Search (p. 97); The spiritual guide (p. 274).

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B556 — Brunschvicg 556. Deism (p. 218); God of the patriarchs (p. 226); Hidden God (p. 88); Joy (p. 148); Mediation (p. 17); Paganism (p. 151); Redemption (p. 26); Religion (p. 29); World (p. 67). Argument map: Contradiction and the human condition.

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B614 — Brunschvicg 614. Perpetuity (p. 245).

B616 — Brunschvicg 616. Perpetuity (p. 245).

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B619 — Brunschvicg 619. Law (p. 53).

B620 — Brunschvicg 620. Josephus (p. 232); Law (p. 53); Philo (p. 246).

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B633 — Brunschvicg 633. Ezra and restoration (p. 220); Josephus (p. 232); Scripture (p. 94). Argument map: Texts figures and testimony.

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B782 — Brunschvicg 782. Lamb and the taking away of sins (p. 233).

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B785 — Brunschvicg 785. Jesus Christ (p. 14); Three orders (p. 35).

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B908 — Brunschvicg 908. A safe path or merely staying on it? (p. 203); Peace (p. 154); Truth (p. 162).

B909 — Brunschvicg 909. Peace (p. 154).

B917 — Brunschvicg 917. Probability (p. 62); Wager (p. 100).

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B920 — Brunschvicg 920. A safe path or merely staying on it? (p. 203); Probability (p. 62).

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B935 — Brunschvicg 935. Cabale, circle, and intriguers (p. 210).

B940 — Brunschvicg 940. Indifference, impartiality, and suspension (p. 231).

B941 — Brunschvicg 941. Witness (p. 38).

B945 — Brunschvicg 945. May have erred / have erred (p. 236); Peace (p. 154); Signing and consent (p. 256); Truth (p. 162).

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B953 — Brunschvicg 953. Jews (p. 145); Witness (p. 38).

B955 — Brunschvicg 955. A scrap of a hood (p. 203).

B956 — Brunschvicg 956. Religion (p. 29).

B957 — Brunschvicg 957. Humility (p. 140); Pride (p. 157).

B958 — Brunschvicg 958. Church (p. 137); Defensible, probable, and supported by authority (p. 217). About these entries.

Mémorial

MEM — Mémorial paper D. Certainty in the Mémorial (p. 211); Complete and gentle renunciation (p. 213); Finding and keeping (p. 223); Fire (p. 223); Forgetfulness of the world (p. 225); Fountain of living water (p. 225); God of the patriarchs (p. 226); Jesus Christ (p. 14); Joy (p. 148); Mediation (p. 17); Peace (p. 154); Repentance (p. 159); Separating and being separated (p. 254); Tears of joy (p. 259). Argument map: Devotional witness beside the fragments. Using this lexicon.

Questions on miracles

QM-PREF — Pascal, Pascal's questions to Martin de Barcos, abbé de Saint-Cyran, with Barcos's replies. The author of each contribution is stated separately. The source groups questions V and VI under one reply. Using this lexicon.

QM-I-Q — Question I, Question — Blaise Pascal. Argument map: Miracles and the criteria of belief.

QM-I-R — Question I, Reply — Martin de Barcos. Miracle (p. 20); Mud and healing (p. 239); Supernatural in manner (p. 258); Supernatural in substance (p. 258); The robe's edge (p. 271). Argument map: Miracles and the criteria of belief.

QM-II-Q — Question II, Question — Blaise Pascal. Natural power of the means (p. 240); Touch and immediacy (p. 279). Argument map: Miracles and the criteria of belief.

QM-II-R — Question II, Reply — Martin de Barcos. Natural power of the means (p. 240). Argument map: Miracles and the criteria of belief.

QM-III-R — Question III, Reply — Martin de Barcos. Miracle (p. 20); Miracle with respect to natural order (p. 238); Miracle with respect to the subject (p. 238); Touch and immediacy (p. 279).

QM-IV-R — Question IV, Reply — Martin de Barcos. A heretic confirming truth (p. 203); Miracle (p. 20); The divine seal (p. 263).

QM-QuestionsVandVI-R — Questions V and VI, Reply — Martin de Barcos. A heretic confirming truth (p. 203); Miracle (p. 20).

QM-VII-Q — Question VII, Question — Blaise Pascal. Argument map: Miracles and the criteria of belief.

QM-VII-R — Question VII, Reply — Martin de Barcos. God as sole author of miracles (p. 226); Miracle (p. 20). Argument map: Miracles and the criteria of belief.

QM-VIII-Q — Question VIII, Question — Blaise Pascal. Argument map: Miracles and the criteria of belief.

QM-VIII-R — Question VIII, Reply — Martin de Barcos. A heretic confirming truth (p. 203); Miracle (p. 20). Argument map: Miracles and the criteria of belief.

QM-IX-R — Question IX, Reply — Martin de Barcos. Supernatural in manner (p. 258).

QM-XI-Q — Question XI, Question — Blaise Pascal. In whose name? (p. 231); Miracle (p. 20).

QM-XI-R — Question XI, Reply — Martin de Barcos. In whose name? (p. 231).

QM-XII-Q — Question XII, Question — Blaise Pascal. Oracles (p. 242); Paganism (p. 151).

QM-XII-R — Question XII, Reply — Martin de Barcos. Oracles (p. 242); Paganism (p. 151).