Lexicon of the Meditations

Key Words and People in Marcus Aurelius' Meditations

Diotimos Editions

2026

Contents

About this Lexicon....3
How an entry is built....4
References, quotations and the Greek....5
Manuscripts and editors....5
Mind and moral practice....6
Assent and judgement....6
Attention and self-examination....18
Contentment and self-sufficiency....33
Courage and endurance....47
Definition and analysis....60
Desire and aversion....72
Disposition and frame of mind....85
Good, bad and indifference....96
Harm....108
Impression....116
Impulse....127
Learning, practice and correction....136
Mind and reason....152
Moral choice and freedom....163
Obstacle and reservation....176
Pain and pleasure....187
Philosophy....201
Present action....213
Principles and reminders....225
Resentment and welcome....237

Ruling centre....250
Self-respect and shame....259
Simplicity and sincerity....268
Temperance and self-mastery....282
Tranquillity....296
Virtue and excellence....310
Wisdom and discernment....320
Nature and the whole....332
Affinity and the alien....332
Body and flesh....345
Breath....358
Cause and matter....368
Change....380
Cosmos and order....390
Daimon....404
Death....413
Dissolution....429
Elements....441
Fate and allotment....453
Gods....469
Interconnection....484
Living being....498
Natural beauty....509
Nature....520
Necessity and chance....532
Prayer....547
Providence and atoms....554
Recurrence and repetition....565
Soul....577
Substance....590
Time and eternity....601
Whole and part....614
Fellowship and the human world....626
Anger....626
Beneficence....637
Care and tolerance....649
Citizenship....659
Common advantage....672
Court and office....683
Drama and role....698
Duty and fitting action....707
Exemplary lives....715
Fault and ignorance....726
Friendship....742

Gratitude....751
Human work....759
Inner retreat and citadel....775
Justice....785
Kindness and correction....800
Kinship and cooperation....813
Love and affection....828
Parents and education....840
Reputation and praise....854
Speech and silence....868
Truth and falsehood....883
People....897
Alexander the grammarian....897
Alexander the Platonist....901
Annius Verus....906
Antoninus Pius....911
Apollonius....918
Catulus....922
Diognetus....924
Domitia Lucilla....928
Epictetus....932
Faustina....938
Fronto....943
Lucius Verus....947
Maximus....951
Rusticus....956
Severus....960
Sextus....964
Socrates....968
Index of Greek Words....975

About this Lexicon

This Lexicon accompanies the Diotimos Editions facing-page edition of Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations*, which prints J. H. Leopold's Greek text of 1908 with a new English translation and notes. Its ninety entries are of two kinds. Seventy-three are articles on the words that carry Marcus' thought, from the ruling centre and the daimon to resentment and welcome; seventeen are on the people he names or plainly means, his family, his teachers, the emperor who adopted him, and the two philosophers, Socrates and Epictetus, who stand behind the book. The

entries are grouped under four headings, Mind and moral practice, Nature and the whole, Fellowship and the human world, and People, and are alphabetical within each.

How an entry is built

Each article opens with its headword and a line giving every Greek word it treats, with every rendering the edition uses for it. **At a Glance** says in four short paragraphs what the word is, what Marcus does with it, how the edition renders it, and where to begin reading. **Meaning** gives the word's sense in the Greek of Marcus' time and the family it belongs to. **Use in the book** follows the word through the twelve books and argues what Marcus makes of it; where a reading is the compiler's and not the text's, it is marked "can be read as". **Places to read** lists the passages in the order of the book, each with one sentence on what it says there. Where the word occurs in about fifty chapters or fewer, every chapter is listed; where it is commoner, the list gives the passages where it is discussed or carries the argument, and its opening sentence says exactly what is included and what is left out. Where the material allows, **Epictetus and the Stoics**, **Other ancient sources** and **Later readings** set the word beside the school's teaching and Marcus' readers. **Translation in this edition** sets out how the English renders the Greek, place by place where the renderings differ. Then each Greek word has a sub-entry of its own, listing every form and every place in which it occurs ("Attested"), with a gloss; each word has its sub-entry in one entry only, and any other entry that treats it points there. **See also** names the related entries.

The People entries follow the same plan. At a Glance says who the person was and what Marcus says of him or her; Meaning gives the name and the identification, as certain or as probable as the edition's notes and the ancient sources allow; Use in the book gathers what Marcus says into a portrait; Places to read lists every place where the person is named or plainly meant; and the name has its sub-entry like any other word.

A passage that matters to several entries is told in full in one of them, its home, and the others give it a clause and point there: "(4.3.2; see Inner retreat and citadel)". Each

entry is meant to be read on its own, so persons and editors are introduced at their first mention in every entry.

References, quotations and the Greek

References are to book and chapter, with the section where the edition divides a chapter (4.3.2), as printed in its margins. Quotations of the *Meditations* are the edition's English, word for word; words that an editor has supplied stand in angle brackets, as they do in the edition. Greek is cited as Leopold prints it, with a transliteration at its first mention in each entry (ᾳ, ῃ, ῳ are given as āi, ēi, ōi, and upsilon as y); in the sub-entries a final grave accent becomes acute and forms are given in citation form. Translations of other ancient texts are the compiler's own; outside sources are cited by author, work and place in the footnotes.

Where Marcus' words at a place rest not on the manuscripts but on an editor's correction or supplement, an argument built on those words says so and names the editor, and the sub-entry or Translation in this edition gives the manuscripts' reading. The lines of Places to read are written so that they hold on the manuscripts' reading as well.

Manuscripts and editors

The text of the *Meditations* rests on two principal witnesses and a number of books of excerpts. **P** is the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, edited by Wilhelm Xylander at Zurich in 1558 or 1559; the printed book is itself the witness. **A** is the Vatican manuscript, nearly complete but with a number of omissions. **D** is the Darmstadt manuscript, a book of excerpts; **X** is Leopold's sign for the books of excerpts generally. The edition knows them through Leopold's apparatus.

The editors and scholars whose readings the entries name are these. Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor. Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar (1643). Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor (1652), whose edition carried the notes of Claudius Salmasius, the seventeenth-century French scholar. Gilles Ménage, the seventeenth-century French scholar. Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar.

Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus, the eighteenth-century German scholar who edited the *Meditations* at Leipzig (1775). Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802. Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century (1816). Capel Lofft, whose edition of the *Meditations* appeared in 1863. P. Scaphidiotes, whose critical notes on the *Meditations* appeared at Athens in 1881. Johannes Stich, whose Teubner text appeared in 1882. August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar (1882). H. I. Polak, whose notes on the text appeared in *Hermes* in 1886. G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations* (1894). Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, the German classical scholar (1902). P. Hoffmann, whose critical notes appeared in 1904. P. Fournier, who edited Auguste Couat's French translation of the *Meditations* (1904). Herbert Richards and A. J. Kronenberg, whose notes on Marcus appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905. John Jackson, whose English translation appeared at Oxford in 1906. K. F. W. Schmidt, whose notes on the text appeared in *Hermes* in 1907. J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints; his testimonia are the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it.

The ancient lives of Marcus, his family and his teachers are cited from the *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, by the name of the life (*Marcus*, *Pius*, *Verus*, *Hadrian*) and section.

At the back of the volume, the Index of Greek Words gives every Greek word that has a sub-entry, with the entry in which it stands.

Mind and moral practice

Assent and judgement

What the mind grants and what it makes of things · Meditations

συγκατάθεσις, synkatathesis, "assent"; *συγκατατίθεσθαι, synkatatithesthai*, "assent"; *ἀπροπτωσία, aproptōsia*, "freedom from rash assent"; *ἀπρόπτωτος, aproptōtos*, "free from rash assent", "freedom from rash assent"; *προπτωτικός, proptōtikos*, "rash in assent"; *μετάπτωτος, metaptōtos*, "liable to waver"; *ὑπόληψις, hypolēpsis*,

"opinion"; *ὑπολαμβάνειν, hypolambanein*, "form an opinion", "opinion"; *ὑπολῃπτικός, hypolēptikos*, "of forming opinions", "by forming an opinion"; *κρίσις, krisis*, "judgement"; *κρίνειν, krinein*, "judge", "decisions reached"; *κρίμα, krima*, "verdict"; *καταληπτικός, katalēptikos*, "with a firm grasp", "what can be firmly grasped", "firmly grasping"

At a Glance

The word. Συγκατάθεσις is assent, the mind's acceptance of an impression as true, and ἀπροπτωσία freedom from rash assent. Ὑπόληψις is opinion, what one takes a thing to be. Κρίσις is judgement, the act of deciding, and κρίμα the verdict it gives.

In the *Meditations*. Assent is the school's word, used where Marcus recalls his teachers, the school's doctrines or Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded; his own word is opinion, which comes in forty chapters. Harm and trouble lie in the opinion and the verdict, not in the thing (4.7, 8.47, 11.16), and "all is opinion, and this is in your power" (12.22). Yet "all our assent is liable to waver" (5.10.1), and Marcus would rejoice to be refuted (6.21).

In this edition. Συγκατάθεσις and συγκατατίθεσθαι are "assent", ἀπροπτωσία "freedom from rash assent", ὑπόληψις "opinion" and ὑπολαμβάνειν "form an opinion", κρίσις "judgement" and κρίνειν "judge"; κρίμα is "verdict", kept apart from "judgement".

A place to read. 12.22, where taking away the opinion brings calm, as to one who has rounded the headland: "all things still, and a bay without waves".

Meaning

Συγκατάθεσις (*synkatathesis*) comes from συγκατατίθεσθαι (*synkatatithesthai*), to lay down together with another, and so to agree. The Stoics made it the name of the act by which the mind accepts an impression as true, an act which, unlike the impression, is in our power.[1] Ἀπροπτωσία (*aproptōsia*), from προπίπτειν (*propiptein*), "to fall forward", is not falling headlong into assent; the Stoics defined it as the knowledge of when one should assent and

[1] Cicero, *Academica* 1.40–42, Varro's account of Zeno: assent (*adsensio*) "placed in us and voluntary" (1.40); the grasp (*comprehensio*), knowledge, and opinion, arising from ignorance, "weak and shared with the false and the unknown" (1.41); rashness (*temeritas*) and opinion removed from the wise man (1.42).

when not.[2] Ὑπόληψις (*hypolēpsis*), from ὑπολαμβάνειν (*hypolambanein*), "to take up", is what one takes a thing to be. Κρίσις (*krisis*), from κρίνειν (*krinein*), "to separate, decide", is judging; κρίμα (*krima*) is what is decided.

Marcus' usage falls into two groups. Assent comes in five chapters, all tied to the school: a lesson of Junius Rusticus, one of his Stoic teachers (1.7.3), doctrines "heard and assented to" (4.3.2), the Stoics' own admission (5.10.1), and the three fields of Epictetus (8.7, 11.37). Opinion, noun and verb, comes in forty chapters. For the Stoics opinion (δόξα, *doxa*) was weak assent;[3] in Marcus δόξα is fame or repute, and ὑπόληψις can be right: "I can form about this the opinion one must" (7.2), "the present opinion, firmly grasping" (9.6).

Use in the book

Marcus was taught to be slow to assent before he met the doctrine. From Diognetus, his painting master, he had "to disbelieve what wonder-workers and charlatans say about incantations and the driving out of spirits" (1.6); from Rusticus, "to read carefully, and not be content with taking things in roughly as a whole, nor quickly assent to those who talk round a subject" (1.7.3). The formula comes at 8.7: a rational nature journeys well when "in impressions, it assents to nothing false or unclear". Assent is the last of Epictetus' three fields, which 8.7 gives in reverse order, as the edition's note says; at 11.37 Marcus quotes Epictetus: "One must find, he said, an art concerning assent" (see Impulse). Marcus tells himself, "Revere the faculty of forming opinions. Everything lies in it … And this promises freedom from rash assent, affinity with men, and following the gods" (3.9). Freedom from rash assent is third in the constitution of man (7.55), and justice depends on it (11.10; see Justice).

Marcus does not claim the security the school promised. Things are veiled, and even "to the Stoics themselves, at least, they seem hard to grasp firmly; and all our assent is liable to waver; for where is the man who never wavers?" (5.10.1). The man who never wavers, the edition's note explains, is the Stoic wise man. Marcus does not answer by suspending judgement: he passes on to the cheapness of

[2] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.46–47.

[3] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.151–152: knowledge is the secure grasp unshakable by reason, opinion (δόξα) "weak and false assent", and the grasp between them the assent to an impression that can be grasped; knowledge is found only in the wise, opinion only in the base. Compare Cicero, *Academica* 1.41–42.

things and rests in two things alone (5.10.1–2; see Daimon). His opinions stay open: "If anyone can refute me and show me that I am not forming opinions or acting rightly, I will rejoice to shift position" (6.21).

The book's most repeated claim is that trouble lies in the opinion. At 4.7 it is a chain of three: "Take away the opinion, 'I have been harmed' is taken away; take away 'I have been harmed', the harm is taken away." "Vexations come only from the opinion within" (4.3.4; see Change), and what is bad for a man subsists "where that in you is which forms opinions about bad things" (4.39). The opinions Marcus would remove are of good and bad: that pain is bad (8.28), that money is a good (10.30); the ruling centre is not to "add of itself the opinion that it is good or bad" (5.26; see Ruling centre). Things "stay still, and it is we who generate the judgements about them and, as it were, write them in ourselves, though it is open to us not to write them" (11.16). "It is open" is a refrain: "It is open to you to form no opinion about this …; for things themselves have no nature that can produce our judgements" (6.52).

Κρίμα, the verdict, is the judgement once given. "If you are distressed because of something external, it is not that which vexes you but your own verdict about it; and to wipe this out at once is in your power" (8.47). Distress at one's own disposition calls for setting the principle right, and distress at a sound act left undone for doing it. The soul makes the things around it such as its verdicts are (5.19); "let the verdict about them be quiet, and they will remain still" (11.11). The same holds when others do wrong. Marcus must "consider at once with what opinion of good or bad he did wrong" (7.26), and among his heads against anger is that our opinions, not men's actions, vex us, and that the anger goes when the judgement is let go (11.18.3; see Anger). A two-line note ends, "But perhaps he did not do wrong" (9.38).

The slogan begins as a quotation. "That everything is opinion. For what was said to Monimus the Cynic is plain; and plain too is the use of the saying, if one receives its pith as far as it is true" (2.15). Monimus, a pupil of Diogenes the Cynic, had said that all that is supposed is smoke;[4] Marcus takes its pith with a limit. In Book XII it returns bare (12.8,

[4] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 6.83, quoting Menander's comedy *The Groom*: "he said that all that is supposed is smoke" (τὸ ὑποληφθὲν τῦφον εἶναι πᾶν), with the participle of ὑπολαμβάνειν.

12.26), and as a command with its reward: “That all is opinion, and this is in your power. Take away, then, the opinion when you want, and, as for one who has rounded the headland, calm, all things still, and a bay without waves” (12.22). “Throw out the opinion: you are preserved” (12.25). Taken with 2.15 and 11.16, the late slogan can be read as keeping its limit: the things are there and stay still; what is opinion, and in one’s power, is the good or bad laid on them.

Places to read

Every chapter in which συγκατάθεσις or συγκατατίθεσθαι, ἀπροπτωσία, ἀπρόπτωτος or προπτωτικός, ὑπόληψις or ὑποληπτικός, κρίσις or κρίμα occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The verbs ὑπολαμβάνειν, “form an opinion”, and κρίνειν, “judge”, which occur in twenty-two further sections, are listed in full in their sub-entries, as are the places of καταληπτικός.

1.7.3 From Rusticus Marcus learned to read carefully and not to assent quickly to those who talk round a subject.

2.12 Among the things for the mind to attend to: who they are whose opinions and voices confer good repute, and that dying, stripped of its impressions, will no longer be thought anything but a work of nature.

2.15 “That everything is opinion”: the saying said to Monimus the Cynic is useful if its pith is received as far as it is true.

3.6.3 Marcus is to choose the better and hold to it, and, where it is advantageous to him only as a living being, to declare it and guard the judgement without vanity.

3.9 The faculty of forming opinions is to be revered, for everything lies in it; and this promises freedom from rash assent, affinity with men and following the gods.

4.3.2 Marcus is to reckon up the verdict that rational beings exist for one another, and recall what he has heard and assented to about pain and pleasure.

4.3.4 Vexations come only from the opinion within: “life is opinion”.

4.7 If the opinion is taken away, "I have been harmed" is taken away, and with it the harm.

4.49.2 Nothing that happens prevents a man from being free from rash assent, or from the other virtues.

5.10.1 Things are hard to grasp firmly even for the Stoics, and all human assent is liable to waver.

5.19 Things do not touch the soul; it makes them such as the verdicts it thinks itself worthy of.

5.26 The ruling centre is not to resist natural sensation, but it is not to add the opinion that it is good or bad.

6.52 It is open to form no opinion and not be vexed, for things cannot produce our judgements.

7.16 The ruling centre does not frighten itself by forming an opinion, and the little soul will suffer nothing, for Marcus will not bring it to such a judgement.

7.55 Freedom from rash assent and from being deceived is third in the rational constitution.

7.62 Whoever looks into the springs of men's opinion and impulse will neither blame them nor need their testimony.

7.68 The understanding keeps itself in true judgement about what surrounds it, and judgement tells each thing what it is in substance.

8.7 A rational nature journeys well when, in impressions, it assents to nothing false or unclear.

8.16 To shift position and follow correction is free, an activity according to one's own impulse and judgement.

8.28 The soul can refuse to form the opinion that pain is bad, for every judgement, impulse, desire and avoidance is within.

8.40 Whoever takes away his opinion about what seems to distress him stands safe; anything else in him that is in a bad way may form its own opinion.

8.44 What later men echo of Marcus, or what opinion they have of him, is nothing to him.

8.47 Distress at an external thing is one's own verdict about it, which is in one's power to wipe out.

9.6 The present opinion firmly grasping, the present action social and the present disposition well pleased with all that happens are enough.

9.13 Marcus threw out every circumstance, for it was within, in the opinions.

9.21 A stop of activity, impulse and opinion is a kind of death, and nothing bad.

9.32 Many superfluous vexations lie wholly in one's opinion and can be stripped away, and a view of the whole universe makes room.

10.3 One can bear whatever one's own opinion can make bearable, by the impression that it is advantageous or a duty.

10.33.3 Without opinion and the giving in of reason itself, the knocks of life do nothing bad.

11.3 Readiness for death should come from a judgement of its own, not from bare opposition, like the Christians'.

11.9 Marcus is to keep steady judgement and action, and mildness towards those who obstruct him.

11.10 Justice is not kept if we are easily deceived, rash in assent and liable to waver.

11.11 If the verdict about things pursued and fled is quiet, they stay still.

11.16 Things produce no opinion of themselves; we generate the judgements about them and write them in ourselves, though we need not.

11.18.3 One has not firmly grasped whether others do wrong; not their acts but our opinions vex us, and to let go of the judgement ends anger.

11.21 As opinion is alike only about goods of one kind, the common ones, so one must set before oneself a target that is social and civic.

11.37 Marcus quotes Epictetus: one must find an art concerning assent.

12.1.1 Neither another's vice nor opinion nor voice nor the flesh's sensation is to impede Marcus.

12.4 Each man loves himself most, yet sets less store by his own opinion of himself than by others'.

12.8 Among the things Marcus is to look at is that all is opinion.

12.22 All is opinion and in one's power; if the opinion is taken away, there is calm and a bay without waves.

12.25 "Throw out the opinion: you are preserved", and no one prevents it.

12.26 Among the things a man has forgotten when he is aggrieved is that all is opinion.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Zeno, the founder of the school, as Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, reports him in the *Academica*, his dialogue on knowledge, joined to the impressions the mind's assent, which he held to be in us and voluntary. Assent to an impression that declared its object plainly was a grasp (κατάληψις, *katalēpsis*); a grasp that reason could not shake was knowledge; opinion, which arose from ignorance, was weak and shared with the false and the unknown, and the wise man was to be free of it and of all rashness.[5] Diogenes Laertius, in his *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, puts freedom from rash assent first among the virtues of dialectic, and defines knowledge as a secure grasp, or a state in receiving impressions "unshakable by reason" (ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου, *ametaptōton hypo logou*), the word behind "the man who never wavers" at 5.10.1.[6] Epictetus made assent the third of his three fields of training (see Impulse): the field "concerning freedom from deception and from heedlessness, and in general concerning assents", which belongs to those already making progress, "so that not even in sleep may an unexamined impression slip past unnoticed".[7] Marcus' "so that nothing slips in that is not firmly grasped" (7.54) can be read as an echo of it. The mind, Epictetus taught, cannot assent to what appears false; its nature is "to nod to what is true, to be displeased with what is false, and to hold back from what is unclear"; compare the "false or unclear" of 8.7.[8] For the passions he used Marcus' word: "when someone provokes you, know that it is your own opinion (ὑπόληψις) that has provoked

[5] Cicero, *Academica* 1.40–42, Varro's account of Zeno: assent (*adsensio*) "placed in us and voluntary" (1.40); the grasp (*comprehensio*), knowledge, and opinion, arising from ignorance, "weak and shared with the false and the unknown" (1.41); rashness (*temeritas*) and opinion removed from the wise man (1.42).

[6] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.46–47.

[7] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.2.1–5.

[8] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.28.1–4.

you".[9] Aulus Gellius, the Roman writer of the second century, read in the lost fifth book of the *Discourses* that impressions strike even the wise man unbidden, so that he pales for a moment; but he "does not assent nor add opinion" (οὐ συγκατατίθεται οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει, *ou synkatatithetai oude prosepidoxazei*), where the fool assents and adds.[10] Marcus' rule at 8.49, to stay with the first impressions "and add nothing yourself from within" (see Impression), can be read as the same line; the word for adding opinion, προσδοξάζειν (*prosdoxazein*), comes at 7.64, with Epicurus' saying on pain: "do not add opinion".

Translation in this edition

Συγκατάθεσις (5.10.1) and συγκατατίθεσθαι (1.7.3, 4.3.2, 8.7; the articular infinitive at 11.37) are "assent" throughout. "Rash assent" in the English renders words built on προπίπτειν, which have no word for assent in them: ἀπροπτωσία "freedom from rash assent" (3.9), ἀπρόπτωτος "free from rash assent" (4.49.2) and, with the article, "freedom from rash assent" (7.55), and προπτωτικός "rash in assent" (11.10). Μετάπτωτος and μεταπτωτικός are "liable to waver" (5.10.1, 11.10), ἀμετάπτωτος "the man who never wavers" (5.10.1). Ὑπόληψις is "opinion" at all its twenty-six occurrences, and ὑπολαμβάνειν "form an opinion" ("form the opinion that", "forms opinions about", "form no opinion"), except at 7.26, where the participle is rendered by the noun: "with what opinion of good or bad he did wrong". Ὑποληπτικὴ δύναμις is "the faculty of forming opinions" (3.9), ὑποληπτικῶς "by forming an opinion" (7.16). "Opinion" in the English renders other words three times: οἴεσθαι, "hold opinions" (1.9.1), προσδοξάζειν, "add opinion" (7.64), and δοκεῖν, "have some opinion" (9.27). Κρίσις is "judgement" at all eleven of its occurrences, and κρίνειν "judge", except at 1.16.1, where τῶν ἐξητασμένως κριθέντων is "decisions reached after thorough examination". Κρίμα is "verdict" at all four places (4.3.2, 5.19, 8.47, 11.11), so that "verdict" renders κρίμα alone and is never used for κρίσις. "Judgement" also stands for ἄκριτον, "without judgement" (2.17.1) and "lack of judgement" (4.3.3); "judge yourself unworthy" at 5.3 renders ἀπαξιοῦν; "judging" at 7.45, in Socrates' words, renders ἡγεῖσθαι; and "judges" are κριταί (9.18) and a δικαστής (12.36).

[9] Epictetus, *Handbook* 20.

[10] Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 19.1.15–20.

Καταληπτικός and its adverb are “with a firm grasp” (1.9.2, 11.18.3), “what can be firmly grasped” (4.22) and “firmly grasping” (9.6).

ἀπροπτωσία

Attested: ἀπροπτωσίαν (*aproptōsian*; 3.9). Freedom from rash assent: not falling forward into assent. The faculty of forming opinions “promises freedom from rash assent, affinity with men, and following the gods” (3.9); the edition’s note gives the Stoic definition, the knowledge of when to assent and when not. Lemma: ἀπροπτωσία.

ἀπρόπτωτος

Attested: ἀπρόπτωτον (*aproptōton*; 4.49.2, 7.55). Free from rash assent; with the article, freedom from rash assent. Nothing that happens prevents a man from being “free from rash assent, free from deceit” (4.49.2); “Third in the rational constitution is freedom from rash assent and from being deceived” (7.55). Lemma: ἀπρόπτωτος.

καταληπτικός

Attested: καταληπτικῶς (*katalēptikōs*; 1.9.2, 11.18.3), καταληπτικόν (*katalēptikon*; 4.22), καταληπτική (*katalēptikē*; 9.6). Able to grasp or to be firmly grasped: the Stoic term for an impression that can be accepted as true, as the edition’s notes at 1.9.1 and 4.22 say. Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch’s nephew, ordered the principles necessary for life “with a firm grasp and by method” (1.9.2); “in every impression preserve what can be firmly grasped” (4.22); “the present opinion, firmly grasping” (9.6); one must first learn much “so that one may pronounce anything with a firm grasp about another’s action” (11.18.3). Its negatives ἀκατάληπτος, “incapable of being firmly grasped” (5.10.1) and “not firmly grasped” (7.54), and δυσκατάληπτος, “hard to grasp firmly” (5.10.1), and the noun κατάληψις, “a firm grasp” (6.30.2), are separate lemmas. Lemma: καταληπτικός.

κρίμα

Attested: κρῖμα (*krima*; 4.3.2, 8.47, 11.11), κριμάτων (*krimatōn*; 5.19). A verdict, what the mind has decided. Of a held conclusion: “Reckon up the verdict that rational living beings have come to be for one another” (4.3.2); of a finding on things: “it is not that which vexes you but your own

verdict about it" (8.47), and "let the verdict about them be quiet, and they will remain still" (11.11). Lemma: κρίμα.

κρίνω

Attested: κριθέντων (*krithentōn*; 1.16.1), κρίνει (*krinei*; 4.11, 7.72), κρίνειν (*krinein*; 4.11), κρινέτω (*krinetō*; 4.39), κρῖνε (*krine*; 5.3), κρίνωμεν (*krinōmen*; 6.41), κρίνων (*krinōn*; 8.38, 10.30), κρίνῃ (*krinēi*; 8.48), κρῖνον (*krinon*; 10.32), κρίνοντες (*krinontes*; 12.34). To separate, decide, judge. "If we judge only what is in our power to be good and bad, no cause is left either to accuse God or to take an enemy's stand against a man" (6.41), where "judge" is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts for the manuscripts' κινῶμεν (*kinōmen*), "we move"; "What then, when it judges about something both with reason and after looking all round it?" (8.48). Lemma: κρίνω.

κρίσις

Attested: κρίσιν (*krisin*; 3.6.3, 7.16, 7.68, 8.16, 11.18.3), κρίσεων (*kriseōn*; 6.52), κρίσει (*krisei*; 7.68), κρίσις (*krisis*; 8.28), κρίσεως (*kriseōs*; 11.3, 11.9), κρίσεις (*kriseis*; 11.16). Judgement, the act of deciding. "For every judgement and impulse and desire and avoidance is within, and nothing climbs up so far" (8.28); "it is we who generate the judgements about them" (11.16); readiness for death is to "come from a judgement of its own, not from bare opposition, like the Christians" (11.3), where the edition's note reports the dispute over whether the last words are Marcus'. Lemma: κρίσις.

μετάπτωτος

Attested: μεταπτώτῃ (*metaptōtē*; 5.10.1). Liable to fall the other way, to waver. "All our assent is liable to waver; for where is the man who never wavers?" (5.10.1). "The man who never wavers" renders ἀμετάπτωτος (*ametaptōtos*; 5.10.1), and μεταπτωτικοί (*metaptōtikoi*; 11.10), "liable to waver", stands beside "rash in assent"; both are separate lemmas. Lemma: μετάπτωτος.

προπτωτικός

Attested: προπτωτικοί (*proptōtikoi*; 11.10). Apt to fall forward, rash in assent. "What is just will not be kept if we are either at odds over things indifferent, or easily deceived

and rash in assent and liable to waver" (11.10). Lemma: προπτωτικός.

συγκατάθεσις

Attested: συγκατάθεσις (*synkatathesis*; 5.10.1). Assent. Things seem hard to grasp firmly even to the Stoics, "and all our assent is liable to waver" (5.10.1). Lemma: συγκατάθεσις.

συγκατατίθημι

Attested: συγκατατίθεσθαι (*synkatatithesthai*; 1.7.3, 11.37), συγκατέθου (*synkatethou*; 4.3.2), συγκατατιθεμένη (*synkatatithemenē*; 8.7). In the middle, to assent. Rusticus taught Marcus not to "quickly assent to those who talk round a subject" (1.7.3); a rational nature journeys well when "in impressions, it assents to nothing false or unclear" (8.7); and, in Epictetus' words, "One must find, he said, an art concerning assent" (11.37). Lemma: συγκατατίθημι.

ὑπολαμβάνω

Attested: ὑπολαβεῖν (*hypolabein*; 1.15.3, 7.14), ὑπολήψεται (*hypolēpsetai*; 2.12, 10.11, 10.32), ὑπολάμβανε (*hypolambane*; 4.11), ὑπολαμβάνον (*hypolambanon*; 4.39 twice, 7.16), ὑπολαμβανέτω (*hypolambanetō*; 4.39), ὑποληπτέον (*hypolēpteon*; 5.12), ὑπολαμβάνειν (*hypolambanein*; 5.34, 6.19, 6.52, 7.2, 8.28, 10.33.1), ὑπολαμβάνω (*hypolambanō*; 6.21), ὑπολαμβάνει (*hypolambanei*; 6.51), ὑπολάβω (*hypolabō*; 7.14), ὑπολαβών (*hypolabōn*; 7.26), ὑπολαμβάνεις (*hypolambaneis*; 7.26 twice), ὑπολαβέτω (*hypolabetō*; 8.40). To take up; to suppose, to form an opinion. "Let this, then, form no opinion, and all is well" (4.39); "I, if I do not form the opinion that what has happened is bad, am not yet harmed; and it is open to me not to form it" (7.14). Lemma: ὑπολαμβάνω.

ὑποληπτικός

Attested: ὑποληπτικήν (*hypolēptikēn*; 3.9), ὑποληπτικῶς (*hypolēptikōs*; 7.16). Of forming opinions. "Revere the faculty of forming opinions" (3.9); the ruling centre "will not of itself, by forming an opinion, turn itself into such turnings" (7.16). Lemma: ὑποληπτικός.

ὑπόληψις

Attested: ὑπολήψεις (*hypolēpseis*; 2.12, 11.18.3), ὑπόληψις (*hypolēpsis*; 2.15, 3.9, 4.3.4, 9.6, 11.21, 12.1.1, 12.8, 12.22, 12.26), ὑπολήψεως (*hypolēpseōs*; 4.3.4, 7.62, 9.21,

10.33.3), ὑπόληψιν (*hypolēpsin*; 4.7, 5.26, 8.40, 8.44, 11.16, 12.4, 12.22, 12.25), ὑπολήψεσιν (*hypolēpsesin*; 9.13), ὑπολήψει (*hypolēpsei*; 9.32, 10.3). Opinion, what one takes a thing to be. “Take away the opinion, ‘I have been harmed’ is taken away” (4.7); “The universe is alteration; life is opinion” (4.3.4); “That all is opinion, and this is in your power” (12.22). Lemma: ὑπόληψις.

See also

Anger; Change; Daimon; Impression; Impulse; Justice; Principles and reminders; Ruling centre; Truth and falsehood.

Attention and self-examination

Watching over one’s own soul · Meditations

προσέχειν, prosechein, “pay heed”; *προσοχή, prosochē*, “heedfulness”; *προσεκτικός, prosektikos*, “heedfulness”; *ἐφιστάνειν, ephistanein*, “attend”, “attend to”, “comes”, “find”, “comes upon”, “standing by”; *ἐπίστασις, epistasis*, “attention”; *ἀνεπιστάτως, anepistatōs*, “without attending”; *ἐπιστροφή, epistrophē*, “attention”; *παρακολουθεῖν, parakolouthein*, “keep track of”; *παρακολούθησις, parakolouthēsis*, “keeping track”; *παρακολουθητικός, parakolouthētikos*, “that keeps track”, “keeping track”; *ἀπαρακολουθήτως, aparakolouthētōs*, “without attention”; *δυσπαρακολούθητος, dysparakolouthētos*, “dull at keeping track”; *ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, enthymeisthai*, “consider”; *παρενθυμεῖσθαι, parenthymeisthai*, “disregard”; *ἀπαρενθύμητος, aparenthymētos*, “freedom from disregard”, “without disregarding”; *παρατηρεῖν, paratērein*, “watch”; *παρατήρησις, paratērēsis*, “watching over”; *παραφυλάσσειν, paraphylassein*, “watch”, “watch for”, “watch closely”, “be on the lookout for”; *ἐξετάζειν, exetazein*, “examine”, “thorough examination”; *ἐξέτασις, exetasis*, “examination”; *ἐξεταστής, exetastēs*, “examiner”; *ἀνεξέταστος, anexetastos*, “without examination”; *ἐπανερωτᾶν, epanerōtan*, “question yourself”; *ἐπερωτᾶν, eperōtan*, “question yourself”; *σκοπεῖν, skopein*, “look at”; *σκέπτεσθαι, skeptesthai*, “look at”, “look next at”; *σκέψις, skepsis*, “inquiry”; *περιβλέπεσθαι, periblepesthai*, “look round”, “glance round”

At a Glance

The word. Προσέχειν is to hold the mind towards a thing, ἐφιστάνειν to set it upon a thing, παρακολουθεῖν to follow alongside with understanding. Ἐνθυμεῖσθαι is to turn a thing over in the mind, ἐξετάζειν to test it closely.

In the *Meditations*. Attention has a direction: those who do not keep track of the movements of their own soul "are bound to be unhappy" (2.8). Impressions of what others are doing draw Marcus away from watching over his own ruling centre (3.4.1), and self-examination is a question put "at every turn": "To what use, then, am I now putting my own soul?" (5.11). Attention has its measure (4.32.2), and its time is short (11.16).

In this edition. Ἐφιστάνειν is "attend" wherever it concerns the mind, and ἐπίστασις "attention"; προσέχειν is "pay heed", προσοχή and τὸ προσεκτικόν "heedfulness"; παρακολουθεῖν is always "keep track of", ἐνθυμεῖσθαι always "consider", ἐξετάζειν "examine"; παρατηρεῖν and παραφυλάσσειν are "watch", "watch for" or "watch closely", once "be on the lookout for" (11.19).

A place to read. 5.11, where Marcus tells himself to ask at every turn to what use he is now putting his soul, and to examine what he now has in his ruling centre.

Meaning

Προσέχειν (*prosechein*), from πρός (*pros*), "towards", and ἔχειν (*echein*), "to hold", is to hold the mind towards something, and προσοχή (*prosochē*) is heed. Ἐφιστάνειν (*ephistanein*), a later form of ἐφιστάναι (*ephistanai*), "to set upon", is to set the mind on a thing and stop at it, and ἐπίστασις (*epistasis*) is that stopping; the verb can also mean to come upon or stand by (6.30.4, 12.4). Παρακολουθεῖν (*parakolouthein*) is to follow alongside, and so to follow with the understanding. Ἐνθυμεῖσθαι (*enthymeisthai*), from θυμός (*thymos*), "spirit", is to take a thing to heart and turn it over. Ἐξετάζειν (*exetazein*) is to test closely, to examine. Σκοπεῖν (*skopein*) is to look at with a view to something, from the root of σκοπός (*skopos*), "target" (see Impulse). Παρατηρεῖν (*paratērein*) and παραφυλάσσειν (*paraphylassein*) are to watch closely.

Use in the book

The rule is given at 2.8: "Not attending to what goes on in another's soul has not easily been seen to make anyone

unhappy; but those who do not keep track of the movements of their own soul are bound to be unhappy." The halves are not matched: the first is a guarded observation, the second a necessity. At 3.4.1 Marcus is not to waste what is left of life on impressions about other people, unless he refers them to some common good, impressions "of what so-and-so is doing and why, what he is saying, considering, scheming, and everything of that kind that makes you wander from watching over your own ruling centre". The gain is reckoned at 4.18: "How much leisure he gains who does not look at what the neighbour said or did or thought, but only at what he himself is doing, that this very thing may be just and holy …". "Leisure" is there the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has "lack of leisure". Three times Marcus forbids himself to "look round": at others' ruling centres (5.3, 7.55), and to see whether anyone will know (9.29; see Ruling centre).

Attention to others is not forbidden. It is given work, and the work comes home. When someone does wrong, Marcus is to "consider at once with what opinion of good or bad he did wrong", and, seeing it, he will pity him: either he still holds that opinion, or one like it, and must forgive, or he holds it no longer and will more easily be kindly (7.26; see Anger). He is to attend continually to the ruling centres of those whose testimony he wants (7.62), and at another's ruling centre "to attend whether it is ignorance or design" (9.22; see Ruling centre). "Accustom yourself," he writes, "to be at what another says, without disregarding it, and as far as possible be inside the soul of the speaker" (6.53). And the habit of asking about everything anyone does ends with a turn: "But begin from yourself, and examine yourself first" (10.37).

Self-examination is a set of questions. "To what use, then, am I now putting my own soul? At every turn question yourself on this, and examine what I now have in this part which they call the ruling centre; and whose soul, then, do I now have? A child's? An adolescent's? A silly woman's? A tyrant's? A brute's? A beast's?" (5.11). "At each action question yourself: how does this stand with me? Shall I regret it?" (8.2). The questions go to particulars, one at a time: at each present hardship, "what is there in the work that is unbearable and insupportable?" (8.36; see Self-

respect and shame); “Attending, one by one, to each of the things you do, question yourself whether death is a terrible thing because of being deprived of this” (10.29). The test of 3.4.2 is another such question: whether he could answer at once and frankly if asked “What are you thinking now?” (see Simplicity and sincerity).

Outward, attention is exact. “One must keep track of what is said word by word, and what is done impulse by impulse; and in the one case see at once to what target the reference is, in the other watch for what is meant” (7.4). “Stretch the thought alongside what is said. Let the mind enter into what comes about and what brings it about” (7.30). “Pay heed to the underlying thing, or the principle, or the activity, or what is meant” (8.22). The rule for his own acts is the same: “First: not at random, nor without reference. Second: to make the leading back to nothing other than the social end” (12.20); in Book II the soul does violence to itself when it does whatever it does “at random and without attention” (2.16; see Impulse). “Sensible”, one of the names Marcus gives himself, “was meant to signify for you attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard” (10.8.1; see Self-respect and shame).

Attention has a measure: “the attention given to each action, too, has its own worth and proportion; for so you will not lose heart, if you do not busy yourself with lesser things more than is befitting” (4.32.2). Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, took a measured care of his body, “so that through his own heedfulness he seldom needed the doctor’s art” (1.16.5). It has a term: “such heedfulness will be for a short time, and then life will have ceased” (11.16). And it can fail before life does. If a man begins to dote, “attending to the very question whether one must now take oneself out of life” is quenched first, and the keeping track of things gives out before death (3.1; see Mind and reason).

Attention in the *Meditations* is less a method than a direction. It may rest on anything (5.23, 6.48), but what it finds about others comes home: the wrongdoer’s opinion is one Marcus may share, the question put to another is put first to himself. Self-examination is attention turned on the use Marcus is now making of his own soul.

Places to read

The passages where the words of attention and examination are discussed or carry the argument, in the

order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; every place is given in the sub-entries. With them stand 7.30, 8.2 and 12.20, where none of these words occurs. The adjective προσεχής (*prosechēs*), "adjacent", "near" (9.23, 11.8), is left out.

1.11 From Fronto, his teacher of rhetoric, Marcus learned to attend to the envy, double-dealing and pretence of a tyrant.

1.16.1 His adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, held unshaken to decisions reached after thorough examination.

1.16.5 His father took a measured care of his body, so that through his own heedfulness he seldom needed doctors or medicines.

2.8 Not attending to another's soul has not easily been seen to make anyone unhappy, but those who do not keep track of the movements of their own soul are bound to be unhappy.

2.12 The intelligent faculty is to attend to how cheap the objects of sense are, to what death is, and to how man touches God.

2.16 The soul does violence to itself when it does anything at random and without attention.

3.1 If a man begins to dote, attending to whether he must now leave life is quenched first, and the keeping track of things gives out before death; so one must hurry.

3.4.1 Impressions of what others are doing, saying and considering, unless referred to the common good, make Marcus wander from watching over his own ruling centre.

3.5 Marcus is not to act unwillingly, unsocially, without examination, or pulled two ways.

3.6.2 The daimon within examines the impressions.

4.18 He who looks only at what he himself is doing, not at what his neighbour said or did or thought, does not glance round at a black character.

4.32.2 The attention given to each action has its own worth and proportion, and Marcus will not lose heart if he does not busy himself with lesser things more than is befitting.

5.5 Marcus could long ago have been rid of his faults and been found fault with, if at all, only as rather slow and dull at keeping track; this too must be trained, not disregarded.

5.6.2 The man who has done good passes on to another, as if without attention; an objector says that one must keep track of this very thing.

5.11 Marcus is to ask himself at every turn to what use he is now putting his soul, and examine what he now has in his ruling centre, whether a child's soul, a tyrant's or a beast's.

5.23 Marcus is to consider often the speed with which all things are carried past.

5.28 Told that the man with foul breath has reason and can understand, if he attends, how he offends, Marcus answers that he too has reason, and is to show and remind.

6.42 All work together towards one outcome, some knowingly and keeping track, others without attending.

6.48 To gladden himself Marcus is to consider the merits of those who live alongside him.

6.53 Marcus is to accustom himself to be at what another says, without disregarding it, and as far as possible inside the speaker's soul.

7.4 What is said must be kept track of word by word, what is done impulse by impulse, watching for the target and for what is meant.

7.26 When someone does wrong, Marcus is to consider at once with what opinion of good or bad he did it, and he will pity him.

7.30 Marcus is to stretch his thought alongside what is said, and let his mind enter into what comes about and what brings it about.

7.55 Marcus is not to look round at others' ruling centres, but straight at what nature is guiding him to.

7.58 Leaving others' turnings to them, Marcus is to be wholly intent on how to use what happens; only he must pay heed, and want to be honourable in his own eyes in everything he does.

7.62 Marcus is to attend continually to who those are whose testimony he wants, and what ruling centres they have.

7.66 In judging Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, one must look at what sort of soul he had.

8.2 At each action Marcus is to ask himself how it stands with him, and whether he will regret it.

8.22 Marcus is to pay heed to the underlying thing, or the principle, or the activity, or what is meant.

8.36 At each present hardship Marcus is to question himself what in the work is unbearable, for he will be ashamed to admit it.

9.3.2 If he wants an unphilosophical precept, what will make Marcus most at ease towards death is attention to the underlying things from which he is about to stand apart, and to the sort of characters he is about to leave.

9.22 Marcus is to run to another man's ruling centre to attend whether it is ignorance or design.

10.2 Marcus is to watch what his nature seeks, first as governed by nature alone, then as a living being.

10.8.1 Marcus is to pay heed that he is never renamed; "sensible" was to mean attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard.

10.11 Marcus is to acquire a method of observing how all things change into one another, and pay heed to it perpetually.

10.18 Attending to each underlying thing, Marcus is to conceive it as already dissolving and in change.

10.29 Attending to each of the things he does, Marcus is to question himself whether death is terrible because it deprives him of this.

10.37 Marcus is to accustom himself to ask, of everything done by anyone, what the doer refers it to, but to begin from himself and examine himself first.

11.16 Life is lived most honourably by treating indifferent things as indifferent; such heedfulness will be for a short time.

11.19 Four turnings of the ruling centre are to be watched for perpetually and wiped away when detected.

11.37 Marcus copies Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded: in the field of the impulses one must guard heedfulness, so that they be with reservation, social and according to worth.

12.4 No one, if a god or a sensible teacher bade him consider nothing within himself that he would not at once bring out, would endure it for a single day.

12.20 First, nothing at random or without reference; second, to lead everything back to the social end.

12.27 Marcus is to recall those who were very indignant or very famous, and then attend: where are all those things now?

Epictetus and the Stoics

One discourse of Epictetus bears the title "On attention", Περὶ προσοχῆς (*Peri prosochēs*). When a man lets his attention go for a little, he says, he must not imagine that he will take it up again whenever he wishes, but keep ready to hand that because of the day's slip everything after it must go worse. First the hardest habit of all grows up, that of not attending, and then the habit of putting attention off. No part of life is exempt: "Will attending make you do it worse, and not attending better?" No carpenter does better work, and no helmsman steers more safely, for not attending. To be without fault already is impossible; what is possible is to be perpetually intent on not erring, and one must be glad if, never slackening this attention, one keeps clear of a few faults. To say "Tomorrow I will attend" is to say, "Today I will be shameless, untimely, mean; it will lie with others to pain me; today I will rage and envy."[11] Marcus' line at 8.22, "you want to become good tomorrow rather than to be good today", which Leopold prints in the same chapter as "Pay heed", can be read as the same reproach; Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus, the eighteenth-century German scholar who edited the *Meditations* at Leipzig, began a new chapter with it. Παρακολουθεῖν was for Epictetus what sets man apart. The other animals use impressions; man keeps track of the use. "Use is one thing, keeping track another": God needed the animals as users of impressions, and us as those who keep track of the use, and he brought man in as a spectator of God himself and of his works, "and not a

[11] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.12 (title) and 4.12.1–5, 4.12.19–20.

spectator only but their interpreter".[12] Marcus' "faculty that keeps track and knows" (5.9), τῆς παρακολουθητικῆς καὶ ἐπιστημονικῆς δυνάμεως (*tēs parakolouthētikēs kai epistēmonikēs dynameōs*), has Epictetus' words for the faculty God gave to men, παρακολουθητικὴ δύναμις, and can be read as taking them from him. Epictetus also set attention among the occupations of the man who can be sufficient to himself (see Contentment and self-sufficiency).

Other ancient sources

At his trial, in Plato's *Apology*, Socrates says that the god had posted him, as he believed, to live philosophizing and examining himself and others, ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους (*exetazonta emauton kai tous allous*), and that to leave that post for fear of death would be terrible.[13] Later, proposing his penalty, he tells the court that the greatest good for a man is to talk each day about virtue and the other things they had heard him discuss while examining himself and others, "and that a life without examination is not worth living for a man", ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ (*ho de anexetastos bios ou biōtos anthrōpōi*).[14] Marcus' "begin from yourself, and examine yourself first" (10.37) and his command not to act "without examination", ἀνεξέταστος (3.5), can be read as Socrates' examination brought down to the single act. Epictetus applied the saying to impressions (see Impression), and recommended the Pythagorean review of each day's acts before sleep (see Principles and reminders).

Translation in this edition

Ἐφιστάνειν is "attend" or "attend to" at all twelve places where it concerns the mind (1.11, 2.8, 2.12, 3.1, 5.28, 7.62, 7.66, 9.22, 10.18, 10.29, 11.6.2, 12.27); in its other sense it is "comes" (5.33), "find" (6.30.4), "comes upon" (11.1.1) and "standing by" (12.4). Ἐπίστασις is "attention" (9.3.2, 10.8.1) and ἀνεπιστάτως "without attending" (6.42). "Attend" renders no other word. "Attention" also renders ἐπιστροφή (4.32.2), and "without attention" ἀπαρακολουθήτως (2.16, 5.6.2). Παρακολουθεῖν is always "keep track of", with "keeping track" for παρακολούθησις (3.1), "that keeps track" and "keeping track" for παρακολουθητικός and its adverb

[12] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.6.13–14 and 1.6.19.

[13] Plato, *Apology* 28e–29a.

[14] Plato, *Apology* 38a.

(5.9, 6.42), and “dull at keeping track” for δυσπαρακολουθητότερος (5.5). Προσέχειν is “pay heed” at all five of its places, and προσοχή (1.16.5, 11.16) and τὸ προσεκτικόν (11.37) are “heedfulness”. Ἐνθυμεῖσθαι is “consider” at all twelve of its places, and “consider” renders no other word. Παρενθυμεῖσθαι is “disregard” (5.5, 6.20), ἀπαρενθυμήτως “without disregarding it” (6.53) and τὸ ἀπαρενθύμητον “freedom from disregard” (10.8.1); “disregard” also renders ὑπερόρασις (*hyperorasis*) at 8.26, “disregard of the motions of sense”. Παρατηρεῖν is “watch” (10.2) and παρατήρησις “watching over” (3.4.1); παραφυλάσσειν is “watch for” (3.2.1, 7.4), “watch closely” (4.10, 6.45), “watch” (9.9.3) and “be on the lookout for” (11.19). “Watch” renders other verbs at 4.3.4, 8.57 and 9.33. Ἐξετάζειν is “examine” (3.6.2, 5.11, 10.10, 10.37), and its adverb ἐξητασμένως “after thorough examination” (1.16.1); ἐξέτασις is “examination” (3.6.3), ἐξεταστής “examiner” (6.30.3) and ἀνεξέταστος “without examination” (3.5). “Question yourself” renders ἐπανερωτᾶν (5.11), ἐπερωτᾶν (8.36, 9.21, 10.29) and ἐρωτᾶν (*erōtan*; 8.2); “ask yourself” renders πυνθάνεσθαι (*pynthanesthai*; 9.42.1, 10.13, 11.2). Σκοπεῖν is “look at” (3.2.2, 7.44, 7.66, 8.7, 10.12), σκέπτεσθαι “look next at” (7.46) and “look at” (8.34), and σκέψις “inquiry” (6.44.2, 8.60); “look at” is shared with βλέπειν (*blepein*), ὁρᾶν (*horan*) and other verbs of seeing. Περιβλέπεσθαι is “look round” (5.3, 7.55, 9.29) and, of a black character, “glance round” (4.18). Ἐπιθεωρεῖν (*epitheōrein*) is “look over” the records of past ages (4.32.2) and “observe from above” (9.30), and ἐπιθεώρησις (*epitheōrēsis*) “observation” (8.26); the verb is a compound of θεωρεῖν (*theōrein*), “observe”, under which the Glossary records it.

ἀνεξέταστος

Attested: ἀνεξέταστος (*anexetastos*; 3.5). Unexamined, without examination. “Do not act unwillingly, or unsocially, or without examination, or pulled two ways” (3.5). Lemma: ἀνεξέταστος.

ἀνεπίστατος

Attested: ἀνεπιστάτως (*anepistatōs*; 6.42). Heedless; the adverb is “without attending”. “We all work together towards one outcome, some knowingly and keeping track, others without attending” (6.42). Lemma: ἀνεπίστατος.

ἀπαρακολούθητος

Attested: ἀπαρακολουθήτως (*aparakolouthētōs*; 2.16, 5.6.2). Without following, unheeding; the adverb is "without attention". The soul does violence to itself when it "does whatever it does at random and without attention" (2.16); but of the man who has done good and passes on to another, "One must, then, be among those who do this in a way without attention" (5.6.2), where the word is no fault (see Beneficence). Lemma: ἀπαρακολούθητος.

ἀπαρενθύμητος

Attested: ἀπαρενθυμήτως (*aparenthymētōs*; 6.53), ἀπαρενθύμητον (*aparenthymēton*; 10.8.1). Not disregarding; with the article, freedom from disregard. "Accustom yourself to be at what another says, without disregarding it" (6.53), where "at what another says" is the correction πρὸς τῷ … λεγομένῳ of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which Leopold prints, for P's πρὸς τὸ … λεγομένῳ and the πρὸς τῶν … λεγομένου of A, the Vatican manuscript; "'sensible' was meant to signify for you attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard" (10.8.1). Lemma: ἀπαρενθύμητος.

δυσπαρακολούθητος

Attested: δυσπαρακολουθητότερος (*dysparakolouthētoteros*; 5.5). Hard to follow; of a man, slow to follow, dull at keeping track. Marcus could long ago have been rid of grumbling and flattery, "and only, if at all, been found fault with as rather slow and rather dull at keeping track" (5.5). Lemma: δυσπαρακολούθητος.

ἐνθυμέομαι

Attested: ἐνθυμεῖται (*enthymeitai*; 3.4.1), ἐνθυμεῖσθαι (*enthymeisthai*; 4.21.2, 12.4), ἐνθυμηθῇς (*enthymēthēis*; 5.9), ἐνθυμοῦ (*enthymou*; 5.23, 6.38, 6.48, 7.26), ἐνθυμήθητι (*enthymēthēti*; 6.25), ἐνθυμούμενος (*enthymoumenos*; 9.28, 12.32), ἐνθυμηθῆναι (*enthymēthēnai*; 9.42.3). To take to heart, to consider. Its objects are mostly large: "Consider often the speed with which the things that are and that come to be are carried past and withdrawn" (5.23); "Consider often the binding together of all things in the universe" (6.38); "one who considers the waves upon waves of changes and alterations, and the speed, will despise everything mortal" (9.28). But

also near: “consider the merits of those who live alongside you” (6.48); “consider at once with what opinion of good or bad he did wrong” (7.26). At 12.4 P has ἐνθυμεῖσθαι διανοεῖσθαι without the “and”. Lemma: ἐνθυμέομαι.

ἐξετάζω

Attested: ἐξητασμένως (*exētasmenōs*; 1.16.1), ἐξετάζοντος (*exetazontos*; 3.6.2), ἐξετάζειν (*exetazein*; 5.11), ἐξετάζῃς (*exetazēis*; 10.10), ἐξέταζε (*exetaze*; 10.37). To examine, to test closely; the adverb of the perfect participle is “after thorough examination”. His father held unshaken to “decisions reached after thorough examination” (1.16.1); the daimon within “examines the impressions” (3.6.2); Marcus is to “examine what I now have in this part which they call the ruling centre” (5.11), and to “begin from yourself, and examine yourself first” (10.37). Lemma: ἐξετάζω.

ἐξέτασις

Attested: ἐξέτασιν (*exetasin*; 3.6.3). Examination, scrutiny. Whether the good is what is advantageous to him as a rational being or as a living being, Marcus is to “see that you make the examination safely” (3.6.3). Lemma: ἐξέτασις.

ἐξεταστής

Attested: ἐξεταστής (*exetastēs*; 6.30.3). An examiner. Antoninus “was an exact examiner of characters and actions, and not a reproacher” (6.30.3). Lemma: ἐξεταστής.

ἐπανερωτάω

Attested: ἐπανερωτᾶν (*epanerōtan*; 5.11). To question again, to put a question to. “To what use, then, am I now putting my own soul? At every turn question yourself on this” (5.11). Lemma: ἐπανερωτάω.

ἐπερωτάω

Attested: ἐπερώτα (*eperōta*; 8.36, 9.21, 10.29). To put a question to. Marcus questions himself at each present hardship, “what is there in the work that is unbearable and insupportable?” (8.36); at each change of his life, “Is it anything terrible?” (9.21); and at each of the things he does, “whether death is a terrible thing because of being deprived of this” (10.29). At 10.29 P and A have the simple ἐρώτα. Lemma: ἐπερωτάω.

ἐπίστασις

Attested: ἐπίστασις (*epistasis*; 9.3.2), ἐπίστασιν (*epistasin*; 10.8.1). A stopping at a thing, attention. What will make Marcus most at ease towards death is “attention to the underlying things from which you are about to stand apart” (9.3.2); “sensible” means “attention that discerns each thing” (10.8.1). Lemma: ἐπίστασις.

ἐπιστροφή

Attested: ἐπιστροφή (*epistrophē*; 4.32.2). A turning towards, regard, attention. “The attention given to each action, too, has its own worth and proportion” (4.32.2), its συμμετρία (*symmetria*). Lemma: ἐπιστροφή.

ἐφίστημι

Attested: ἐπιστῆσαι (*epistēsai*; 1.11), ἐφιστάνειν (*ephistanein*; 2.8, 3.1, 12.27), ἐφιστάναι (*ephistanai*; 2.12, 7.62), ἐφιστάνων (*ephistanōn*; 5.28, 10.29), ἐφίσταται (*ephistatai*; 5.33), ἐπιστῇ (*epistēi*; 6.30.4, 11.1.1), ἐπιστήσειεν (*epistēseien*; 7.66), ἐπιστήσῃς (*epistēsēis*; 9.22), ἐφιστάντα (*ephistanta*; 10.18), ἐπίστησον (*epistēson*; 11.6.2), ἐπιστάς (*epistas*; 12.4). To set upon; of the mind, to attend; of times and persons, to come upon, to stand by. Marcus has the forms of ἐφιστάναι and of the later present ἐφιστάνειν. “Not attending to what goes on in another’s soul has not easily been seen to make anyone unhappy” (2.8); “Attend continually to who these are by whom you want to be borne witness to” (7.62); “then attend: where are all those things now?” (12.27). At 2.8 A and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have the perfect ἐφεστηκέναι. Of an hour, “so that your last hour may find you with as good a conscience as it found him” (6.30.4); of a god, “standing by someone” (12.4). Lemma: ἐφίστημι.

παρακολουθέω

Attested: παρακολουθοῦντας (*parakolouthountas*; 2.8), παρακολουθεῖν (*parakolouthein*; 5.6.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.24). To follow alongside; to follow with the understanding, to keep track of. “Those who do not keep track of the movements of their own soul are bound to be unhappy” (2.8); “One must keep track of what is said word by word, and what is done impulse by impulse” (7.4); among the trifles of life one must “keep track of this: that each is worth as much as the things he has taken seriously” (7.3). Lemma: παρακολουθέω.

παρακολούθησις

Attested: παρακολούθησιν (*parakolouthēsin*; 3.1). The keeping track of things, understanding as it follows. One must hurry “because the conceiving of things and the keeping track of them give out before it” (3.1). Lemma: παρακολούθησις.

παρακολουθητικός

Attested: παρακολουθητικῆς (*parakolouthētikēs*; 5.9), παρακολουθητικῶς (*parakolouthētikōs*; 6.42). Able to keep track. “The sureness and the smooth flow, in everything, of the faculty that keeps track and knows” (5.9); “some knowingly and keeping track, others without attending” (6.42). Lemma: παρακολουθητικός.

παρατηρέω

Attested: παρατήρει (*paratērei*; 10.2), παρατηρητέον (*paratērēteon*; 10.2). To watch closely. “Watch what your nature seeks, as of one governed by nature alone”; “Next one must watch what your nature as a living being seeks” (10.2). Lemma: παρατηρέω.

παρατήρησις

Attested: παρατηρήσεως (*paratērēseōs*; 3.4.1). Close watching. Impressions of what others are doing are “everything of that kind that makes you wander from watching over your own ruling centre” (3.4.1). Lemma: παρατήρησις.

παραφυλάσσω

Attested: παραφυλάσσειν (*paraphylassein*; 3.2.1, 7.4), παραφυλάσσῃς (*paraphylassēis*; 4.10), παραφύλασσε (*paraphylasse*; 4.10), παραφυλάξας (*paraphylaxas*; 6.45), παραφυλάσσων (*paraphylassōn*; 9.9.3), παραφυλακτέον (*paraphylakteon*; 11.19). To keep watch beside, to watch closely. “That everything that happens, happens justly: you will find it so if you watch closely” (4.10); “in the other watch for what is meant” (7.4); “Four turnings of the ruling centre above all one must be on the lookout for perpetually” (11.19). Lemma: παραφυλάσσω.

παρενθυμέομαι

Attested: παρενθυμουμένῳ (*parenthymoumenōi*; 5.5), παρενθυμώμεθα (*parenthymōmetha*; 6.20). To pass over in thought, to disregard. Slowness at keeping track “one must

train, not disregarding it" (5.5); of those who train with us, "let us disregard much" (6.20). Lemma: παρενθυμέομαι.

περιβλέπω

Attested: περιβλέπεσθαι (*periblepesthai*; 4.18), περιβλέπου (*periblepou*; 5.3, 7.55, 9.29). In the middle voice, to look round about one. "Do not look round at others' ruling centres, but look straight there, at what nature is guiding you to" (7.55); "do not look round to see whether anyone will know" (9.29). At 4.18, "not to glance round at a black character", A omits the clause. Lemma: περιβλέπω.

προσεκτικός

Attested: προσεκτικόν (*prosektikon*; 11.37). Attentive; with the article, heedfulness. In the words of Epictetus that Marcus copies, "in the field of the impulses guard heedfulness, so that they be with reservation, so that they be social, so that they be according to worth" (11.37; see Impulse). Lemma: προσεκτικός.

προσέχω

Attested: προσεῖχον (*proseichon*; 6.55), πρόσεχε (*proseche*; 7.58, 8.22, 10.8.1, 10.11). To hold the mind towards, to pay heed. "Pay heed to the underlying thing, or the principle, or the activity, or what is meant" (8.22); "only pay heed" (7.58); "pay heed that you are never renamed" (10.8.1). At 6.55, as the edition's note says, the first person "would I pay heed" suits the correction of Herbert Richards, whose notes on Marcus Aurelius appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905, ἐνεργοίην, "I myself might", which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' ἐνεργοίη, "he himself might". Lemma: προσέχω.

προσοχή

Attested: προσοχήν (*prosochēn*; 1.16.5), προσοχή (*prosochē*; 11.16). Heed, heedfulness. His father took a measured care of his body, "so that through his own heedfulness he seldom needed the doctor's art" (1.16.5), where Leopold's testimonia, the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it, compare the Suda, the Byzantine lexicon, under the word; "such heedfulness will be for a short time" (11.16). Lemma: προσοχή.

σκέπτομαι

Attested: σκεπτέον (*skepteon*; 7.46), σκέψαι (*skepsai*; 8.34). To look at, to consider. In the words of Plato's *Gorgias* that Marcus copies, the true man "must look next at the way in which he may best live this time he is going to live" (7.46); "But look at the kindness with which he has honoured man" (8.34). Lemma: σκέπτομαι.

σκέψις

Attested: σκέψις (*skepsis*; 6.44.2), σκέψιν (*skepsin*; 8.60). A looking into, inquiry. If the gods take counsel about nothing, "it is open to me to take counsel about myself, and mine is the inquiry about what is advantageous" (6.44.2); the mind, "when it turns about in inquiry, is carried straight on no less" (8.60). Lemma: σκέψις.

σκοπέω

Attested: σκοποίη (*skopoiē*; 3.2.2), σκοπεῖν (*skopein*; 7.44, 7.66, 10.12), σκόπει (*skopei*; 8.7). To look at with a view to something, to consider. Of Socrates, "one must look at this: what sort of soul Socrates had" (7.66); "when it is possible to look at what must be done" (10.12). At 7.59 Leopold prints σκάπτε, "Dig within", the correction of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802; P has βλέπε and D σκόπει, both "look", and A σκέπε, as the edition's note records. Lemma: σκοπέω.

See also

Anger; Beneficence; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Daimon; Impression; Impulse; Mind and reason; Principles and reminders; Ruling centre; Self-respect and shame; Simplicity and sincerity.

Contentment and self-sufficiency

Having enough in one's own act · Meditations

ἀρκεῖσθαι, arkeisthai, "be content"; *ἀρκεῖν, arkein*, "be enough", "suffice", "be strong enough"; *ἐξαρκεῖν, exarkein*, "be sufficient", "stay equal to"; *αὐτάρκης, autarkēs*, "self-sufficient", "self-sufficiency"; *αὐτάρκεια, autarkeia*, "self-sufficiency"; *ἀπροσδεής, aprosdeēs*, "no need of", "not needing", "free of need", "lacking nothing"; *ἀνενδεής, anendeēs*, "not needing", "without want"; *ὀλιγοδεής, oligodeēs*, "need little", "needing little"; *εὐαρεστεῖν,*

euarestein, “be well pleased”; *εὐάρεστος*, *euarestos*, “well pleased”; *εὐαρεστικός*, *euarestikos*, “well pleased”; *δυσαρεστεῖν*, *dysarestein*, “be discontented”; *δυσαρέστησις*, *dysarestēsis*, “discontent”; *στέργειν*, *stergein*, “cherish”; *στερκτικός*, *sterktikos*, “cherishing”

At a Glance

The word. Ἀρκεῖν is to be enough, and in the middle voice, ἀρκεῖσθαι, to be content with what is enough. Αὐτάρκης is sufficient in oneself; εὐαρεστεῖν is to be well pleased, δυσαρεστεῖν its opposite, and στέργειν to hold dear.

In the *Meditations*. Contentment has two objects: the good man is “pleased with what is allotted from the whole, and content with his own just action and kindly disposition” (4.25). The rational ruling centre is content with itself when it acts justly (7.28). Self-sufficiency is lost by honouring what others can take away (6.16.4), and what is enough is little: “to settle the present well” (6.2).

In this edition. Ἀρκεῖσθαι is always “be content”, and the active ἀρκεῖν “be enough”, once “suffice” and once “be strong enough”; αὐτάρκης is “self-sufficient” (with the article, “self-sufficiency”) and αὐτάρκεια “self-sufficiency”; εὐαρεστεῖν is “be well pleased”, δυσαρεστεῖν “be discontented” and στέργειν “cherish”.

A place to read. 4.25, where Marcus tells himself to try how the life of the good man goes for him, pleased with what is allotted and content with his own just action.

Meaning

Ἀρκεῖν (*arkein*) is to ward off, to hold out, and so to be enough; in the middle and passive, ἀρκεῖσθαι (*arkeisthai*) is to be satisfied with what is enough. Αὐτάρκης (*autarkēs*), from αὐτός (*autos*), “self”, and the same root, is sufficient in oneself, needing nothing besides, and αὐτάρκεια (*autarkeia*) is that state. Εὐαρεστεῖν (*euarestein*), from εὖ (*eu*), “well”, and ἀρέσκειν (*areskein*), “to please”, is to be well pleased, and δυσαρεστεῖν (*dysarestein*), with δυσ- (*dys-*), “ill”, is to be displeased. Στέργειν (*stergein*) is the settled affection of kin, and so to be fond of a thing and acquiesce in it. Ὀλιγοδεής (*oligodeēs*), from ὀλίγος (*oligos*), “little”, and δεῖσθαι (*deisthai*), “to need”, is needing little.

Use in the book

Marcus' commonest word is the middle ἀρκεῖσθαι, and its commonest object is the self. "It is the nature of the rational ruling centre to be content with itself when it acts justly and, on that very account, has calm" (7.28; see Ruling centre). "Every nature is content with itself when it journeys well" (8.7). "Reason and the art of reasoning are faculties content with themselves and with the works that belong to them" (5.14), and the ruling centre becomes unconquerable when, drawn together into itself, it is content with itself (8.48; see Ruling centre). Marcus' self-sufficiency can be read as living mostly in the verb: the noun comes once (3.11.2) and the adjective twice (1.16.2, 6.16.4), but the verb with the self as its object five times (3.6.1, 5.14, 7.28, 8.7, 8.48).

4.25 divides contentment between two objects: "Try how the life of the good man, too, goes for you, the man who is pleased with what is allotted from the whole, and content with his own just action and kindly disposition." So too the man who has put off the body is "content with these two things: if he himself acts justly in what is now being done, and loves what is now allotted to him" (10.11), in the correction of John Jackson, whose English translation appeared at Oxford in 1906, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts. For what is allotted Marcus has other words. It is always in his power "to be piously well pleased with the present conjuncture" (7.54; see Gods), and "one must cherish what happens to you" (5.8.5; see Fate and allotment). The opposite is discontent. Remembering that he is a part of the whole, he writes, "in so far as I am a part I shall be discontented with nothing allotted from the whole" (10.6.1), and, in so far as he remembers it, "I shall be well pleased with everything that results" (10.6.2; see Whole and part). Discontent cuts something off from the connection and continuity of the whole, as far as lies in a man (5.8.5), and makes him an abscess on the universe (4.29; see Citizenship).

Self-sufficiency is defined by what a man does not need. What is to be honoured, in his view, is "to move and to hold still according to one's own constitution" (6.16.2). "Will you not stop honouring many other things too? Then you will be neither free nor self-sufficient nor free from passion; for it is necessary to envy, to be jealous, to look askance at those who can take those things away, to plot against those who have what you honour" (6.16.4). Its loss is social: whoever

needs what others can take is set against them, and often blames even the gods. The ruling centre is, so far as in it lies, “free of need, unless it makes a want for itself” (7.16; see Ruling centre). Respect for his own understanding, by contrast, will make him pleasing to himself and in accord with the gods (6.16.5; see Self-respect and shame).

Self-sufficiency is not doing everything oneself. “Is my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is sufficient, I use it for the work as a tool given by the nature of the whole. If it is not sufficient, either I yield the work to the one who can accomplish it better, if it is not otherwise a duty, or I do it as I can, taking on as well the one who can, with the use of my ruling centre, do what is now opportune and useful for the fellowship” (7.5). Sufficiency here is measured against a work, and the work against what is “useful in common”. This can be read as the book’s line: Marcus may be helped in a task, but his good is his own.

What is enough is little. “And until its time comes, what is enough? What else but to revere the gods and speak well of them, and to do good to men …” (5.33). Of dying, “it is enough, then, here too to settle the present well” (6.2; see Present action); “even three hours like that are enough” (6.23; see Time and eternity). And of a kindness: “Is it not enough that you did something according to your nature, but you seek a reward for it?” (9.42.4; see Beneficence).

Contentment with what is present does not mean refusing to enjoy it. “Do not think of things absent as already there, but reckon up the most favourable of things present, and for their sake remind yourself how they would be sought after if they were not present. At the same time, however, be on your guard that by being so glad of them you do not grow used to valuing them, so as to be troubled if ever they are not present” (7.27). His adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, had “self-sufficiency in everything and cheerfulness” (1.16.2), and Marcus remembers “how content he was with little, in housing, bedding, clothing, food, service” (6.30.3). In inquiry, however, being content is a fault. Antoninus did not abandon an investigation early, “content with the impressions that came first to hand” (1.16.2), and Rusticus, the Stoic, taught him to read carefully, “and not be content with taking things in roughly as a whole” (1.7.3).

Contentment in the *Meditations* is not resignation. It is earned by the act, which suffices when it is just, and joined to a welcome for what is allotted. At 10.1 it is still a question:

“will you be content with the present condition, and feel pleasure in all that is present …?”

Places to read

Every chapter in which ἀρκεῖν or ἐξαρκεῖν occurs, in any of their senses, or αὐτάρκης, αὐτάρκεια, ἀπροσδεής, ἀνενδεής, ὀλιγοδεής, εὐαρεστεῖν and its adjectives, δυσαρεστεῖν, δυσαρέστησις, στέργειν or στερκτικός, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with 7.27, where none of them stands. Ἀρέσκεσθαι (*areskesthai*), “be pleased”, ἀσπάζεσθαι (*aspazesthai*), “welcome”, and the words of affection built on στοργή (*storgē*) are left out.

1.5 From his tutor Marcus learned to bear hardship and need little.

1.7.3 Rusticus, the Stoic, taught Marcus to read carefully and not be content with taking things in roughly as a whole.

1.16.2 His adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, did not abandon an investigation early, content with the impressions that came first to hand, and had self-sufficiency in everything and cheerfulness.

2.3 A few sentences on providence and nature are to be enough for Marcus, and to be his principles.

2.5 Marcus will give himself leisure if he does each act as the last of his life, without, among other things, discontent with what has been apportioned to him.

2.13 It is enough to be with the daimon within and to serve it, keeping it pure of passion, aimlessness and discontent with what comes from gods and men.

2.17.2 Philosophy lies in keeping the daimon within inviolate, doing nothing at random or falsely, not needing another to do or not do anything, and receiving what happens as coming from where it came itself.

3.1 If a man lives longer, it is unclear whether his understanding will stay equal to the comprehension of affairs.

3.5 Marcus is to have cheerfulness, and no need of help from outside or of the peace that others give; one must be upright, not held upright.

3.6.1 If Marcus finds anything better than justice, truth, self-control, courage and an understanding content with itself where it makes him act by right reason, he is to turn to it with his whole soul.

3.11.2 Among the virtues a thing that presents itself may call for are gentleness, courage, truth, good faith, artlessness and self-sufficiency.

3.12 If Marcus does the work in hand by right reason, expecting nothing and fleeing nothing, but content with present activity according to nature and with heroic truth in what he says, he will live well.

4.3.1 The brief and elementary things within will suffice, as soon as they present themselves, to send Marcus back not resenting what he returns to.

4.25 Marcus is to try how the life of the good man goes for him, pleased with what is allotted from the whole and content with his own just action and kindly disposition.

4.29 A beggar is he who needs another, and an abscess on the universe he who separates himself from the reason of the common nature by being discontented with what happens.

4.32.2 One must recall those one has known who, dragged about after empty things, neglected to do what accords with their own constitution, to cling to it and be content with it.

5.1.2 Nature has given measures for rest and for eating and drinking, and Marcus goes beyond what is enough in them, but not in actions.

5.5 Among the qualities wholly in Marcus' power are not complaining of one's lot and needing little.

5.8.5 One must cherish what happens, for two reasons; the whole is maimed if anything is cut off from its continuity, and whoever is discontented cuts it off, as far as lies in him.

5.14 Reason and the art of reasoning are faculties content with themselves and with their own works.

5.15 If the things that do not fall to a man as a man were goods, the man who presents himself as not needing them would not be praiseworthy.

5.31 Marcus is to remember what he has come through, and what he has been strong enough to endure.

5.33 Until his time comes, what is enough is to revere the gods and speak well of them, and to do good to men.

6.2 Dying too is one of the actions of life, and it is enough here too to settle the present well.

6.16.4 If Marcus goes on honouring many other things, he will be neither free nor self-sufficient nor free from passion, but must envy and plot against those who have them.

6.23 Of using things with greatness of mind and men socially, even three hours are enough.

6.30.3 Antoninus was an exact examiner of characters and actions, and content with little in housing, bedding, clothing, food and service.

6.44.1 If the gods took no counsel about Marcus individually, they took it about the common affairs, and what follows from these he ought to welcome and cherish.

6.45 Whatever happens to each is advantageous to the whole, and that would be enough.

6.49 As Marcus cherishes the amount of substance marked off for him, so too with time.

6.50 When force stands in the way of a just act, Marcus is to pass over to being well pleased and free from distress.

7.5 If his understanding is sufficient for a work, Marcus uses it as a tool; if not, he yields the work to one more able or takes him on as a helper.

7.16 The ruling centre is, so far as in it lies, free of need, unless it makes a want for itself.

7.27 Marcus is not to think of things absent as already there, but to reckon up the best of things present, and guard against valuing them so as to be troubled if they are absent.

7.28 It is the nature of the rational ruling centre to be content with itself when it acts justly, and on that very account to have calm.

7.31 Of the saying of Democritus, the atomist philosopher of the fifth century BC, that all things are by convention and in reality only the elements, it is enough to remember that all things are by convention.

7.54 It is always in Marcus' power to be piously well pleased with the present conjuncture.

7.64 Whenever Marcus is discontented with drowsiness, heat or lack of appetite, he is to say that he is giving in to pain.

7.66 In Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, one must look at whether he could be content to be just in what concerns men and holy in what concerns gods.

8.1 If he has truly seen where the matter lies, Marcus is to let go of how he will seem, and be content if he lives the rest of life as his nature wants.

8.7 Every nature is content with itself when it journeys well.

8.32 Marcus is to be content if each action, so far as possible, provides its own, and to be well pleased with a hindrance.

8.45 Wherever he is thrown, Marcus will have his daimon serene, that is, content, if it fares and acts according to its own constitution.

8.48 The ruling centre becomes unconquerable when, drawn together into itself, it is content with itself.

8.50 It is enough to avoid the briars, without asking why they exist; the nature of the whole is content with its own space, material and art.

9.3.1 Marcus is not to despise death, but to be well pleased with it, as one of the things nature wants.

9.6 Enough: a present opinion firmly grasping, a present action social, and a present disposition well pleased with everything that happens from the cause outside.

9.26 Marcus has endured countless things through not being content with his ruling centre doing what it was made to do.

9.29 Marcus is not to hope for the Republic of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, but to be content if the smallest thing goes forward.

9.42.4 Marcus asks whether it is not enough to have done something according to his nature, without seeking a reward for it.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever taste the loving and cherishing disposition, be full and

without want, and be content with the present condition.

10.6.1 In so far as he is a part, Marcus will be discontented with nothing allotted from the whole.

10.6.2 In so far as he remembers that he is a part of such a whole, Marcus will be well pleased with everything that results.

10.11 The man who has put off the body is content with two things, acting justly in what is now being done and loving what is now allotted to him.

10.28 Everyone who is distressed or discontented at anything is like the piglet being sacrificed, kicking and squealing.

10.31 Marcus asks why it is not enough for him to pass through this brief span in good order.

10.34 To one steeped in the true principles even a line of Homer is enough as a reminder of freedom from distress and from fear.

11.1.1 The rational soul attains its end wherever life is cut short, and makes what it set before itself full and lacking nothing for itself.

11.18.5 Strength and courage belong to the mild man, not to the man who is indignant and discontented.

11.21 A saying about having one and the same target of life is not enough unless one adds what sort the target must be.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, reports that the Stoics held virtue to be self-sufficient for happiness, αὐτάρκη ... πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν (*autarkē ... pros eudaimonian*), as Zeno, the founder of the school, says, and Chrysippus, its third head, in the first book of *On Virtues*, and Hecaton of Rhodes, a later Stoic, in the second book of *On Goods*. An argument given in the name of one of them, "he says", runs from a part to the whole: if greatness of soul is enough to set a man above everything, and greatness of soul is a part of virtue, virtue too will be self-sufficient for happiness, despising even what seems troublesome. Panaetius and Posidonius, Stoics of the second and first centuries BC, denied it, and said virtue needs health too, and

means, and strength.[15] Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, takes up the formula that the wise man is content with himself, and says that many take it wrongly, as if it shut him up inside his own skin: he is content with himself for living happily, not for living, and for living he needs many things. He gives Chrysippus' distinction: the wise man has use for hands and eyes and much else, but he lacks nothing, for lacking belongs to necessity, and for the wise man nothing is necessary.[16] Marcus' question at 7.5, whether his understanding is sufficient for a work, and his readiness to take on a helper, can be read in the light of that distinction. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, asks what solitude is, and answers that being alone is not being forsaken, or Zeus would weep at the conflagration for want of Hera and Athena. One must be prepared for it, "to be able to be sufficient to oneself, to be able to be with oneself", αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀρκεῖν (*auton heautōi arkein*), as Zeus is with himself and at rest and considers his own government; so we too should be able to talk to ourselves, need no one else and be at no loss for occupation: to attend to the divine government and our own relation to other things, to look at how we stood towards what happens before and how we stand now, and what still hurts us.[17] Marcus' "content with itself" (7.28, 8.48) is the same verb in the middle voice, and can be read as Epictetus' sufficiency turned on the ruling centre.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon, the Athenian soldier and writer whose *Memorabilia* record conversations of Socrates, has Antiphon the sophist tell Socrates that he lives as no slave would stay to live, on the poorest food and drink, in one cloak summer and winter, without shoes; Socrates answers that Antiphon seems to think happiness is luxury and expense, whereas he holds that "to need nothing is divine, and to need as little as possible is nearest to the divine".[18] Marcus' word for the quality his tutor taught him and that he counts wholly in his power, ὀλιγοδεής, "needing little" (1.5, 5.5), is built from the same verb of needing. Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, wrote to Menoeceus that "we think

[15] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.127–128.

[16] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 9.13–14.

[17] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.13 (title), 3.13.1 and 3.13.4–8.

[18] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.6.2 and 1.6.10.

self-sufficiency a great good, not so that we may always make do with little, but so that, when we lack much, little may content us", ἀρκώμεθα (*arkōmetha*), being truly convinced that luxury gives most pleasure to those who need it least.[19] Antoninus, who was content with little (6.30.3), can be read as answering to both.

Translation in this edition

Ἀρκεῖσθαι, the middle and passive of ἀρκεῖν, is "be content" at all twenty of its places (1.7.3, 1.16.2, 3.6.1, 3.12, 4.25, 4.32.2, 5.14, 6.30.3, 7.28, 7.66, 8.1, 8.7, 8.32, 8.45, 8.48, 8.50, 9.26, 9.29, 10.1, 10.11), and "content" renders no other word but ἐνδιατριπτικόν (*endiatriptikon*), "content to stay in the same places" (1.16.7). The active ἀρκεῖν is "be enough" (2.3, 2.13, 5.1.2, 5.33, 6.2, 6.23, 6.45, 7.31, 7.66, 8.50, 9.6, 9.42.4, 10.31, 10.34, 11.21), "suffice" (4.3.1) and "be strong enough" (5.31). Ἐξαρκεῖν is "be sufficient" (7.5) and "stay equal to" (3.1). Αὐτάρκης is "self-sufficient" (6.16.4), and with the article "self-sufficiency" (1.16.2), the word that also renders αὐτάρκεια (3.11.2). Ὀλιγοδεής is "need little" (1.5) and "needing little" (5.5). Ἀπροσδεής is "no need of" (3.5 twice), "not needing" (5.15), "free of need" (7.16) and "lacking nothing" (11.1.1); ἀνενδεής is "not needing" (2.17.2) and "without want" (10.1). Their opposites are ἐνδεής (*endeēs*), "needs" (4.29) and "in need of" (6.16.4), and ἔνδεια (*endeia*), "a want" (7.16). Εὐαρεστεῖν is "be well pleased" (7.54, 8.32, 9.3.1, 10.6.2), as are εὐάρεστος (6.50) and εὐαρεστικός (9.6); ἀρέσκεσθαι is "be pleased" (3.4.4, 4.25, 5.27). Δυσαρεστεῖν is "be discontented" (4.29, 5.8.5, 7.64, 10.6.1, 10.28, 11.18.5) and δυσαρέστησις "discontent" (2.5, 2.13); the Glossary lists δυσαρέστησις in its entry for δυσχεραίνειν (*dyscherainein*), "resent". Στέργειν is "cherish" (5.8.5, 6.44.1, 6.49) and στερκτικός "cherishing" (10.1); the words of affection built on στοργή, φιλόστοργος (*philostorgos*) and its kin, are rendered by "affection" and its family (1.9.3, 1.11, 1.17.4, 1.17.8, 2.5, 6.30.1, 11.18.4). Ἀσπάζεσθαι is always "welcome" (3.4.3, 3.16.2, 4.33, 5.8.3, 5.8.4, 6.44.1, 8.7, 10.6.2, 10.36). Ἀγαπᾶν (*agapan*) does not occur; its adjective ἀγαπητικόν (*agapētikon*) is "love" at 1.13.

[19] Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus*, in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 10.130.

ἀνενδεής

Attested: ἀνενδεῆ (*anendeē*; 2.17.2), ἀνενδεής (*anendeēs*; 10.1). Lacking nothing, not in want. Philosophy lies in keeping the daimon within "not needing another to do or not do anything" (2.17.2; see Daimon); Marcus asks his soul, "Will you ever, then, be full and without want …?" (10.1). Lemma: ἀνενδεής.

ἀπροσδεής

Attested: ἀπροσδεές (*aprosdees*; 3.5 twice, 7.16, 11.1.1), ἀπροσδεῆ (*aprosdeē*; 5.15). Needing nothing besides, free of need. Marcus is to have "no need of help from outside, and no need of the peace that others give" (3.5); "The ruling centre is, so far as in it lies, free of need, unless it makes a want for itself" (7.16); the rational soul makes what it set before itself "full and lacking nothing for itself" (11.1.1; see Soul). Of the things that do not fall to a man as a man, 5.15 argues that, if they were goods, the man "who presents himself as not needing them" would not be praiseworthy. Lemma: ἀπροσδεής.

ἀρκέω

Attested: ἀρκεῖσθαι (*arkeisthai*; 1.7.3, 3.6.1, 4.32.2, 7.28, 7.66, 8.32, 9.26), ἀρκεσθείς (*arkestheis*; 1.16.2), ἀρκείτω (*arkeitō*; 2.3), ἀρκεῖ (*arkei*; 2.13, 5.33, 6.2, 7.31, 7.66, 8.50, 9.6, 9.42.4, 10.31, 10.34, 11.21), ἀρκούμενος (*arkoumenos*; 3.12, 6.30.3, 10.11), ἀρκέσει (*arkesei*; 4.3.1), ἀρκουμένου (*arkoumenou*; 4.25), ἀρκοῦντα (*arkounta*; 5.1.2), ἀρκούμεναι (*arkoumenai*; 5.14), ἤρκεσας (*ērkesas*; 5.31), ἀρκοῦσι (*arkousi*; 6.23), ἤρκει (*ērkei*; 6.45), ἀρκέσθητι (*arkesthēti*; 8.1), ἀρκεῖται (*arkeitai*; 8.7, 8.50), ἀρκούμενον (*arkoumenon*; 8.45), ἀρκεσθῇ (*arkesthēi*; 8.48), ἀρκοῦ (*arkou*; 9.29), ἀρκεσθήσῃ (*arkesthēsēi*; 10.1). To be enough; to be strong enough; in the middle and passive, to be content. "Let this be enough for you" (2.3); "what is enough?" (5.33); "Every nature is content with itself when it journeys well" (8.7); the ruling centre is unconquerable "when, drawn together into itself, it is content with itself" (8.48). At 3.6.1 A, the Vatican manuscript, has ἑαυτήν and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, αὐτήν for ἑαυτῇ, so that "with itself" stands only in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed; and "content with fate in what is allotted without choice" is the correction of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802, which Leopold

adopts; the manuscripts have καὶ ἐν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ, so that the understanding is content with itself also "in fate". At 10.11 "if he himself acts justly … and loves" is Jackson's correction, which Leopold prints; P has the infinitives, and A the imperatives. Lemma: ἀρκέω.

αὐτάρκεια

Attested: αὐταρκείας (*autarkeias*; 3.11.2). Self-sufficiency. Among the virtues a thing that presents itself may call for: "gentleness, courage, truth, good faith, artlessness, self-sufficiency and the rest" (3.11.2; see Impression). Lemma: αὐτάρκεια.

αὐτάρκης

Attested: αὔταρκες (*autarkes*; 1.16.2), αὐτάρκης (*autarkēs*; 6.16.4). Sufficient in oneself; with the article, self-sufficiency. His father had "self-sufficiency in everything and cheerfulness" (1.16.2); "Then you will be neither free nor self-sufficient nor free from passion" (6.16.4), where A and D have the word in the question before it. Lemma: αὐτάρκης.

δυσαρεστέω

Attested: δυσαρεστεῖν (*dysarestein*; 4.29), δυσαρεστῇς (*dysarestēis*; 5.8.5, 7.64), δυσαρεστήσω (*dysarestēsō*; 10.6.1), δυσαρεστοῦντα (*dysarestounta*; 10.28), δυσαρεστοῦντι (*dysarestounti*; 11.18.5). To be displeased, discontented. "You cut it off, as far as lies in you, whenever you are discontented" (5.8.5); "in so far as I am a part I shall be discontented with nothing allotted from the whole" (10.6.1); "everyone who is distressed or discontented at anything whatever is like the piglet being sacrificed" (10.28). Lemma: δυσαρεστέω.

δυσαρέστησις

Attested: δυσαρεστήσεως (*dysarestēseōs*; 2.5, 2.13). Discontent. Marcus is to do each act as the last of his life, without "discontent with what has been apportioned to you" (2.5), and to keep the daimon pure of "discontent with what comes from gods and men" (2.13). Lemma: δυσαρέστησις.

ἐξαρκέω

Attested: ἐξαρκέσει (*exarkesei*; 3.1), ἐξαρκεῖ (*exarkei*; 7.5 three times). To be quite enough, to be equal to. It is unclear, if a man lives longer, "whether the understanding will stay equal to the comprehension of affairs" (3.1); "Is my

understanding sufficient for this or not?" (7.5). Lemma: ἐξαρκέω.

εὐαρεστέω

Attested: εὐαρεστεῖν (*euarestein*; 7.54), εὐαρεστήσει (*euarestēsei*; 8.32), εὐαρέστει (*euarestei*; 9.3.1), εὐαρεστήσω (*euarestēsō*; 10.6.2). To be well pleased. "To be piously well pleased with the present conjuncture" (7.54); "by being well pleased with the hindrance itself" (8.32); "Do not despise death, but be well pleased with it" (9.3.1); "I shall be well pleased with everything that results" (10.6.2). Lemma: εὐαρεστέω.

εὐαρεστικός

Attested: εὐαρεστική (*euarestikē*; 9.6). Disposed to be well pleased. "The present disposition, well pleased with everything that happens from the cause outside" (9.6), where "from the cause outside" is the correction of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, which Leopold prints. Lemma: εὐαρεστικός.

εὐάρεστος

Attested: εὐάρεστον (*euareston*; 6.50). Well pleasing; with the article, being well pleased. "If, however, someone uses force and stands in your way, pass over to being well pleased and free from distress" (6.50). Lemma: εὐάρεστος.

ὀλιγοδεής

Attested: ὀλιγοδεές (*oligodees*; 1.5, 5.5). Needing little. From his tutor Marcus learned "to bear hardship and need little" (1.5); "needing little" stands among the qualities "wholly in your power" (5.5). Lemma: ὀλιγοδεής.

στέργω

Attested: στέργειν (*stergein*; 5.8.5, 6.44.1), στέργεις (*stergeis*; 6.49). To hold dear, to acquiesce gladly in. "So for two reasons one must cherish what happens to you" (5.8.5); what follows from the gods' counsel "I ought to welcome and cherish" (6.44.1); "for as you cherish the amount of substance marked off for you, so too with time" (6.49). Lemma: στέργω.

στερκτικός

Attested: στερκτικῆς (*sterktikēs*; 10.1). Disposed to cherish. “Will you ever, then, taste the loving and cherishing disposition?” (10.1). Lemma: στερκτικός.

See also

Beneficence; Citizenship; Daimon; Fate and allotment; Gods; Impression; Obstacle and reservation; Present action; Ruling centre; Self-respect and shame; Soul; Time and eternity; Tranquillity; Virtue and excellence; Whole and part.

Courage and endurance

Bearing what happens · Meditations

ἀνδρεία, andreia, “courage”; *ἀνδρεῖος, andreios*, “courageous”; *ἀνδρικός, andrikos*, “manly”; *θαρρεῖν, tharrein*, “take courage”, “with good courage”; *δειλία, deilia*, “cowardice”; *ὑπομένειν, hypomenein*, “endure”; *ὑπομενετικός, hypomenetikos*, “endurance”; *ἐγκαρτερεῖν, enkarterein*, “hold out”; *καρτερικός, karterikos*, “more hardily”; *ἀντέχειν, antechein*, “hold out”, “hold out against”, “hold fast to”, “cling to”; *φέρειν, pherein*, “bear”, “tolerate”, “bring”, “carry”, “contribute”, “make for”, “goes against”, “lead”, “getting”; *φερέπονος, phereponos*, “bear hardship”, “the bearing of hardship”; *φορητός, phorētos*, “bearable”; *ἀφόρητος, aphorētos*, “unbearable”; *ἀνεκτός, anektos*, “bearable”, “supportable”; *ἀνύποιστος, anypoistos*, “insupportable”; *τλῆναι, tlēnai*, “bear”; *ἀνατλῆναι, anatlēnai*, “endure”; *γενναῖος, gennaios*, “noble”; *γενναίως, gennaiōs*, “nobly”; *γεννικός, gennikos*, “more nobly”; *ἀγεννής, agennēs*, “mean-spirited”

At a Glance

The word. Ἀνδρεία, from ἀνήρ, “man”, is manliness and so courage, for the Stoics one of the four primary virtues. Ὑπομένειν is to stay behind or abide, and so to endure; φέρειν is to carry, to bring and to bear; γενναῖος is true to its birth, noble.

In the *Meditations*. Courage by name stands in lists of the virtues and is once claimed for gentleness against rage (11.18.5). Marcus’ own word is “bear”: “Nothing happens to anyone that he is not by nature able to bear” (5.18), and “to bear it nobly is good fortune” (4.49.2). Holding firm is not enough by itself: steadiness can come from ignorance

(5.18), and Marcus has “endured countless things” through not being content with his ruling centre doing these things as it was made (9.26).

In this edition. Ὑπομένειν is always “endure” and ὑπομενετικόν “endurance”; φέρειν, where it means to endure, is “bear” with what happens as its object and “tolerate” with a person; φορητός is “bearable” and ἀφόρητος “unbearable”; ἀνδρεία is “courage”, ἀνδρικός “manly” and γενναίως “nobly”.

A place to read. 4.49.2, where Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just and self-controlled, and gives himself the principle that to bear it nobly is good fortune.

Meaning

Ἀνδρεία (*andreia*), from ἀνήρ (*anēr*), “man”, is manliness, and so the courage of the man who holds his ground; the Stoics counted it among their four primary virtues and made it a kind of knowledge (see Virtue and excellence). Ὑπομένειν (*hypomenein*) is to stay behind, to await, and so to abide or endure; ἐγκαρτερεῖν (*enkarterein*), to hold out, and καρτερικός (*karterikos*), hardy, belong to καρτερός (*karteros*), “strong”, “staunch”. Φέρειν (*pherein*) is to carry, and so both to bring and to bear. Γενναῖος (*gennaios*), from γέννα (*genna*), “birth”, is true to one’s breeding, noble; ἀγεννής (*agennēs*) is base-born, mean-spirited.

Marcus’ words of endurance are mostly ordinary. Ὑπομένειν is often to bring oneself to something: of Claudius Maximus, the Stoic among his teachers, he records that no one would ever have “endured to form the opinion that he was better than he” (1.15.3), and “one can hardly endure even oneself” (5.10.1). The courage words stand in lists. What carries his teaching is φέρειν, with its adjectives φορητός (*phorētos*), “bearable”, and ἀφόρητος (*aphorētos*), “unbearable”.

Use in the book

Courage by name is rare. It stands in four lists of the virtues (3.6.1, 3.11.2, 5.12, 8.1; see Virtue and excellence), and it carries an argument once, against anger: what is mild and gentle is manly, “and it is this that has a share in strength and sinews and courage, not the man who is indignant and discontented” (11.18.5; see Anger). The soldier’s courage Marcus copies from Plato’s *Apology*, in the

words of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, at his trial:[20] an objector does not speak well if he thinks "that a man of even a little use ought to take into account the risk of living or dying" (7.44), and wherever a man posts himself or is posted by a commander he is to "stay and run the risk, taking into account neither death nor anything else before what is shameful" (7.45); the "he must" that governs these words is wanting in the manuscripts of Marcus, and J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, supplies it, as Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, proposed and as Plato's text has it. For his own post he gives himself a command: the god within him is to guard a man "who has taken up his post such as one would be who waits for the recall from life, ready to be released" (3.5; see Daimon).

His own word is "bear". At the end of the chapter of the headland (4.49.1; see Tranquillity), he asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-controlled and the rest (see Virtue and excellence), and gives himself a principle for "everything that leads you towards distress": "not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune" (4.49.2). The ground of the principle is nature. "Nothing happens to anyone that he is not by nature able to bear" (5.18), in Leopold's text, which follows the excerpt manuscripts here. "Nothing can happen to any man that is not a human occurrence, nor to an ox that is not of an ox's kind …"; "For the common nature did not bring you anything unbearable" (8.46). One root serves both sides: nature did not "bring", ἔφερεν (*epheren*), anything "unbearable", ἀφόρητον; 8.46 can be read as putting the doctrine into the grammar. Of what comes in a way one is not by nature able to bear, Marcus says only, "do not resent it; for it will perish when it has consumed you", and he ends by making the bearable depend on one's own opinion (10.3; see Pain and pleasure). The test is put to each thing as it comes: at each present hardship Marcus is to ask "what is there in the work that is unbearable and insupportable?" (8.36; see Self-respect and shame).

Holding firm is not by itself a virtue. 5.18 goes on: "The same things happen to another, and either because he does not know they have happened, or because he is showing off greatness of mind, he stands steady and remains unhurt. It is a terrible thing, then, that ignorance and the wish to please

[20] Plato, *Apology* 28b and 28d, as the edition's note at 7.45 records.

should be stronger than wisdom." Steadiness can come from ignorance or display, as abstaining from wrong can come "through cowardice or courting of fame" (11.18.2; see Anger). That Socrates "passed the night in the frost more hardily" is "not enough"; what must be looked at is whether he could be content to be just and holy, "neither receiving anything allotted from the whole as something strange nor enduring it as unbearable" (7.66; see Body and flesh). To endure a thing as unbearable is the fault, and 9.26 can be read as Marcus finding it in himself: "You have endured countless things through not being content with your ruling centre doing these things, as it was made. But no more" (9.26).

Bearing is a skill, trained against what cannot be foreseen. "The art of living is more like wrestling than dancing, in standing ready and not falling before what falls upon one and was not foreseen" (7.61). Marcus learned it from his teachers: from his tutor "to bear hardship and need little" (1.5); from Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic whom the emperor Antoninus Pius summoned to teach him, "to be always the same, in sharp pangs, in the loss of a child, in long illnesses", and that "the same man can be most intense and yet relaxed" (1.8.1; see Pain and pleasure). In Antoninus, his adoptive father, he records "endurance of the accusations some brought against him" (1.16.3). The bearing of hardship is among the qualities "wholly in your power" (5.5), and he is to remember "what you have been strong enough to endure" (5.31). Φέρειν serves for men too: "either teach, then, or tolerate" (8.59). Courage in the *Meditations* is less daring than bearing; and bearing is not toughness, which ignorance or vanity can supply, but the judgement, held at each thing as it falls, that nothing nature brings is beyond a man's nature to bear.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ἀνδρεία, ἀνδρεῖος or a word of the sub-entries occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with 7.44, 7.45 and 7.61, which treat courage and endurance without the words. Φέρειν is listed only where it means to bear what happens or to tolerate a person, and ἀντέχειν only where it means to hold out (1.17.7, 8.36); their other places are given in the sub-entries.

1.5 From his tutor Marcus learned to bear hardship and need little.

1.15.3 No one would ever have endured to form the opinion that he was better than Maximus.

1.16.3 Antoninus Pius showed endurance of the accusations some brought against him over his sparing use of the empire's funds.

1.16.10 To be strong, to hold out and to keep sober, in each case, is the mark of a man with a sound and unconquerable soul, as in the illness of Maximus.

1.17.7 Among his debts to the gods Marcus counts that his body has held out so long in such a life.

3.6.1 If Marcus finds in human life anything better than justice, truth, self-control and courage, he is to turn to it with his whole soul.

3.11.2 Among what Marcus is to take in about each thing that presents itself is what virtue is needed towards it, such as gentleness or courage.

4.47 If a god told him that he would die tomorrow or the day after, Marcus would not make much of the difference unless he were utterly mean-spirited, and he is to believe it no great thing that death should come after very many years rather than tomorrow.

4.49.2 At everything that leads towards distress Marcus is to use the principle that this is not a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune.

5.5 The bearing of hardship is among the qualities wholly in Marcus' power, for which want of talent is no excuse.

5.10.1 Of those who live alongside one it is hard to bear with even the most refined, and one can hardly endure even oneself.

5.12 Whoever has conceived of wisdom, self-control, justice and courage as truly goods could not listen to the comic poet's phrase about the goods.

5.18 Nothing happens to anyone that he is not by nature able to bear; another stands steady through ignorance or display, and it is terrible that these should be stronger than wisdom.

5.31 Marcus is to remember what he has come through and what he has been strong enough to endure.

6.10 If all is unity, order and providence, Marcus reveres, stands steady and takes courage in the one who governs.

6.12 Thanks to philosophy the things at court seem bearable to Marcus, and he bearable among them.

6.30.3 Antoninus tolerated those who blamed him unjustly, not blaming them in return.

6.35 Craftsmen do not endure to stand apart from the reason of their craft, and Marcus asks whether it is not terrible if man respects his own reason less than they respect theirs.

7.33 On pain: the unbearable carries off, the lasting is bearable.

7.44 In words of Plato's *Apology*, Socrates says that a man of any use should not take into account the risk of living or dying, but look only at whether he acts justly.

7.45 Wherever a man is posted, Socrates says, he must stay and run the risk, taking nothing into account before what is shameful.

7.46 In words of Plato's *Gorgias*, Socrates bids his hearer see whether the noble and the good are not something other than preserving and being preserved.

7.51 In two lines of an unknown tragedy, the wind that blows from the gods must be borne, in toils without lament.

7.61 The art of living is more like wrestling than dancing, in standing ready and not falling before what is not foreseen.

7.64 In most pains Marcus is to let the saying of Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, help him, that pain is neither unbearable nor eternal, if he remembers its limits and adds no opinion.

7.66 Socrates' hardihood in the frost and his noble resistance are not enough; what matters is whether he could be content to be just and holy, enduring nothing allotted as unbearable.

8.1 Nothing is good for a man which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous and free.

8.36 At each present hardship Marcus is to ask what in the work is unbearable and insupportable; the present grows small if he marks its bounds and convicts the understanding if it cannot hold out against it bare.

8.46 Nothing can happen to a man that is not a human occurrence, and the common nature has brought him nothing unbearable.

8.59 Men have come to be for one another, and Marcus is either to teach them or to tolerate them.

9.3.2 One must not take offence at men, but care for them and tolerate them mildly, remembering that the release will not be from men who share one's principles.

9.26 Marcus has endured countless things through not being content with his ruling centre doing these things as it was made.

10.3 Whatever happens is either such as Marcus is by nature able to bear or not, and in neither case is he to resent it; he is by nature able to bear everything that his own opinion can make bearable, by the impression that it is advantageous to him or his duty.

10.8.3 If he perceives that he is falling out of his names and not keeping the mastery, Marcus is to go away with good courage into some corner, or out of life, simply and freely.

10.15 Marcus would have men see a true man living according to nature; if they do not tolerate him, they may kill him, for that is better than to live so.

11.6.1 Tragedies were brought on as reminders that what happens comes about so by nature, and that even those who cry out "Alas, Cithaeron!", the cry of Oedipus in the tragedy of Sophocles, the Athenian poet, bear it.

11.18.2 Even when Marcus abstains from certain wrongs, he has the state inclined to them, if it is through cowardice or courting of fame that he abstains.

11.18.5 It is not raging that is manly but what is mild and gentle, and it is this that has a share in strength and sinews and courage.

12.4 If a god or a sensible teacher bade a man think nothing that he would not at once bring out aloud, he would not endure it even for one day.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports the Stoic definitions. Courage is knowledge of what is to be chosen, what is to be guarded against, and what is neither; among the virtues ranked under the four primary ones stand endurance, καρτερία (*karteria*), knowledge or a settled state concerning what one must abide by, what not, and what neither, and greatness of soul, μεγαλοψυχία (*megalopsychia*), knowledge or a state that lifts one above what befalls bad and good men alike; cowardice, δειλία (*deilia*), stands among the primary vices, and the vices are kinds of ignorance (see Fault and ignorance).[21] Marcus' "great-souled" at 4.49.2, and his rule that nothing is either bad or good "which can happen equally to a bad man and a good" (4.39), can be read beside that last definition. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, argues from what God has given, where 5.18 and 10.3 argue from what a man is by nature able to bear. "Come, have you not been given powers by which you will bear all that befalls? Have you not been given greatness of soul? Courage? Endurance?" God gave men powers, he says, by which they will bear whatever comes, neither humbled nor broken by it; to sit lamenting instead is ἀγέννεια (*agenneia*), meanness of spirit, and impiety follows on it, for it ends in blaming the gods.[22] His verb for bearing, φέρειν, is Marcus' own, and his ἀγέννεια the noun of Marcus' "mean-spirited" (4.47); Marcus' "by nature able to bear" can be read as the same argument made from nature. He too uses the athlete's bout. "Circumstances are what show men for what they are. So when one falls upon you, remember that God, like a trainer, has set you against a rough young man", that he may win at Olympia, "and that does not come about without sweat".[23] Marcus' wrestler, "not falling before what falls upon one" (7.61), can be read as the same figure. The *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of his teaching, has a practice of finding, for

[21] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.92–93.

[22] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.6.28–29 and 1.6.37–42.

[23] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.24.1–2.

each thing that befalls, the faculty against it, endurance against toil (see Virtue and excellence).

Other ancient sources

Plato's *Laches*, in which Socrates and the Athenian generals Laches and Nicias look for what courage is, asks whether endurance without wisdom can be courage. Laches proposes that courage is "a kind of endurance of the soul". Socrates answers that not every endurance can be courage: endurance with wisdom is fine and good, endurance with folly damaging and injurious, so that on Laches' own account wise endurance would be courage. Yet when Socrates asks whether the soldier who holds out knowing that help is coming and the ground is in his favour is braver than the man on the other side who is willing to stand and hold out, Laches chooses the second, though his endurance is the more foolish; and Socrates shows him that they are now calling courage the foolish endurance they had agreed was shameful and harmful. He proposes that they at least endure in the inquiry, so that courage itself may not laugh at them for not seeking it courageously.[24] Marcus' "It is a terrible thing, then, that ignorance and the wish to please should be stronger than wisdom" (5.18) can be read as taking Socrates' side of that question: steadiness that comes from not knowing is no virtue.

Translation in this edition

Ἀνδρεία is "courage" (3.6.1, 3.11.2, 5.12, 11.18.5) and ἀνδρεῖος "courageous" (8.1); their sub-entries are under Virtue and excellence. Ἀνδρικός is "manly" (11.18.5), θαρρεῖν "take courage" (6.10) and "with good courage" (10.8.3), and δειλία "cowardice" (11.18.2). Ὑπομένειν is "endure" at all six of its places, and ὑπομενετικόν, with the article, "endurance" (1.16.3); "endured" at 9.26 renders ἀνέτλης, the aorist of ἀνατλῆναι. "Put up with", of things, and "bear with", of persons, render ἀνέχεσθαι (*anechesthai*; see Care and tolerance). Φέρειν is "bear" where a man bears what happens (4.49.2, 5.18, 10.3 six times, 11.6.1) and "tolerate" where its object is a person (6.30.3, 8.59, 9.3.2, 10.15). In its other senses it is "bear" of fruit and offspring (4.48.2, 5.6.1 twice, 5.6.2, 8.15 twice, 9.10 twice, 11.1.1); "bring", mostly of nature, the whole or the seasons bringing what happens (2.3, 4.23, 4.24, 4.29 twice, 5.8.3 twice, 5.8.4 twice, 8.46,

[24] Plato, *Laches* 192b–194a.

9.3.1, 10.20 twice, 12.1.1, 12.5, 12.32); “carry” and “be carried” (2.10, 4.43, 5.4, 5.16 twice, 6.27, 7.8, 8.6, 8.60 twice, 9.1.2, 9.29, 10.33.2, 10.33.3, 11.20.2, 12.16, 12.23 twice); “contribute” (8.1, 8.17), “make for” (1.16.4), “goes against” (2.16), “lead” (11.18.5) and, of teeth and beard, “getting” (9.3.1). In the sense of enduring, “bear” renders φέρειν alone, except in the tragic verse of 7.51, where it is τλῆναι; φερέπονος is given with the same verb, “bear hardship” (1.5) and “the bearing of hardship” (5.5). Φορητός is “bearable” (7.33, 10.3), and so is ἀνεκτός at 6.12, of the things at court and of Marcus among them; beside φορητόν at 10.3, ἀνεκτόν is “supportable”, as ἀνύποιστον is “insupportable” beside ἀφόρητον at 8.36. Ἀφόρητος is “unbearable” at all five places. “Hold out” renders ἐγκαρτερεῖν (1.16.10) and the active of ἀντέχειν (“held out”, 1.17.7; “hold out against”, 8.36), whose middle voice is “hold fast to” (3.6.3) and “cling to” (6.35, 10.36). Καρτερικώτερον is “more hardily” and γεννικώτερον “more nobly” (7.66); γενναίως is “nobly” (4.49.2), τὸ γενναῖον “the noble” (7.46), and ἀγεννής “mean-spirited” (4.47).

ἀγεννής

Attested: ἀγεννής (*agennēs*; 4.47). Ill-born, base; mean-spirited. If a god told Marcus that he would die tomorrow or the day after, he would no longer make much of the difference, “unless you are utterly mean-spirited” (4.47). Lemma: ἀγεννής.

ἀνατλάω

Attested: ἀνέτλης (*anetlēs*; 9.26). To bear up, to endure to the end. “You have endured countless things through not being content with your ruling centre doing these things, as it was made” (9.26). Lemma: ἀνατλάω.

ἀνδρικός

Attested: ἀνδρικόν (*andrikon*; 11.18.5). Manly, of a man. In fits of anger it is to be ready to hand “that it is not raging that is manly, but what is mild and gentle” (11.18.5). Lemma: ἀνδρικός.

ἀνεκτός

Attested: ἀνεκτά (*anekta*; 6.12), ἀνεκτός (*anektos*; 6.12), ἀνεκτόν (*anekton*; 10.3). That can be borne, tolerable. Philosophy is the mother to whom Marcus is to return, “thanks to whom the things there seem bearable to you and

you bearable among them" (6.12); one's own opinion can make a thing "bearable and supportable" (10.3), where ἀνεκτόν is "supportable". Lemma: ἀνεκτός.

ἀντέχω

Attested: ἀντισχεῖν (*antischein*; 1.17.7), ἀντέχου (*antechou*; 3.6.3), ἀντέχονται (*antechontai*; 6.35), ἀντέχειν (*antechein*; 8.36), ἀντέχοιτο (*antechoito*; 10.36). In the active, to hold out, to hold out against; in the middle, to hold fast to, to cling to. Marcus counts among his debts to the gods "that my body has held out so long in such a life" (1.17.7), and the understanding is to be convicted "if it cannot hold out against this, bare as it is" (8.36). In the middle: "choose the better simply and freely, and hold fast to it" (3.6.3); craftsmen "cling to the reason of their craft" (6.35); "Why, then, should anyone cling to a longer stay here?" (10.36). Lemma: ἀντέχω.

ἀνύποιστος

Attested: ἀνύποιστον (*anypoiston*; 8.36). Not to be borne up under, insupportable. At each present hardship Marcus is to ask, "what is there in the work that is unbearable and insupportable?" (8.36). Lemma: ἀνύποιστος.

ἀφόρητος

Attested: ἀφόρητον (*aphorēton*; 7.33, 7.64, 7.66, 8.36, 8.46). Unbearable. "On pain: the unbearable carries off, the lasting is bearable" (7.33); in Epicurus' saying, pain is "neither unbearable nor eternal" (7.64); Socrates is to be judged, among other things, by whether he could avoid "enduring it as unbearable" (7.66); "For the common nature did not bring you anything unbearable" (8.46). Lemma: ἀφόρητος.

γενναῖος

Attested: γενναῖον (*gennaion*; 7.46); the adverb γενναίως (*gennaiōs*; 4.49.2). True to its birth, noble. "Not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune" (4.49.2); in words of Plato's *Gorgias* that Marcus copies, "see whether the noble and the good are not something other than preserving and being preserved" (7.46). Lemma: γενναῖος.

γεννικός

Attested: γεννικώτερον (*gennikōteron*; 7.66). Of good breed, noble; the comparative serves as an adverb. Socrates, ordered to fetch the man of Salamis, "seemed to resist more nobly" (7.66), and it is "not enough". Leopold reports γενικώτερον in A, the Vatican manuscript. Lemma: γεννικός.

δειλία

Attested: δειλίαν (*deilian*; 11.18.2). Cowardice, for the Stoics one of the primary vices. Even when Marcus abstains from certain wrongs, he has the state inclined to them, "even if it is through cowardice or courting of fame or some such bad thing that you abstain from similar wrongs" (11.18.2). Lemma: δειλία.

ἐγκαρτερέω

Attested: ἐγκαρτερεῖν (*enkarterein*; 1.16.10). To hold out, to persevere. "To be strong and to hold out, and to keep sober, in each case, is the mark of a man with a sound and unconquerable soul" (1.16.10). The verb is Gataker's correction, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have ἔτι καρτερεῖν (*eti karterein*), "to hold out still". Lemma: ἐγκαρτερέω.

θαρρέω

Attested: θαρρῶ (*tharrō*; 6.10), θαρρῶν (*tharrōn*; 10.8.3). To be of good courage, to take heart. "But if the other is the case, I revere, I stand steady, and I take courage in the one who governs" (6.10); if he perceives that he is falling out of his names and not keeping the mastery, Marcus is to "go away with good courage into some corner where you will have the mastery" (10.8.3). Lemma: θαρρέω.

καρτερικός

Attested: καρτερικώτερον (*karterikōteron*; 7.66). Able to hold out, hardy; the comparative serves as an adverb. It is "not enough" that Socrates "passed the night in the frost more hardily" (7.66). Leopold reports the superlative καρτερικώτατα in A and in the books of excerpts that he calls X. Lemma: καρτερικός.

τλάω

Attested: τλῆναι (*tlēnai*; 7.51). To bear, to suffer. In two lines of an unknown tragedy that Marcus copies, "But the

wind that blows from the gods / one must bear, in toils without lament" (7.51). Lemma: τλάω.

ὑπομενετικός

Attested: ὑπομενετικόν (*hypomenetikon*; 1.16.3). Able to endure; with the article, endurance. Among Antoninus' qualities is "endurance of the accusations some brought against him over such things" (1.16.3). Leopold reports ἐπιμενετικόν in D, the Darmstadt manuscript. Lemma: ὑπομενετικός.

ὑπομένω

Attested: ὑπέμεινεν (*hypemeinen*; 1.15.3), ὑπομένει (*hypomenei*; 5.10.1), ὑπομεῖναι (*hypomeinai*; 5.31), ὑπομένουσιν (*hypomenousin*; 6.35), ὑπομένων (*hypomenōn*; 7.66), ὑπομενεῖ (*hypomenei*; 12.4). To stay behind, to abide; to endure, and so to bring oneself to a thing. Four times it is to bring oneself to a thing: of Maximus no one would ever have "endured to form the opinion that he was better than he" (1.15.3); "one can hardly endure even oneself" (5.10.1); craftsmen "do not endure to stand apart" from the reason of their craft (6.35); and a man bidden to say aloud all he thinks "will not endure this even for one day" (12.4). Twice it is endurance of what happens: Marcus is to remember "what you have been strong enough to endure" (5.31), and Socrates is to be judged by whether he could avoid "enduring it as unbearable" (7.66). At 1.15.3 Leopold reports the optative ὑπομείνειεν ἄν in A. Lemma: ὑπομένω.

φερέπονος

Attested: φερέπονον (*phereponon*; 1.5, 5.5). Bearing toil, hardy; with the article, the bearing of hardship. From his tutor Marcus learned "to bear hardship and need little" (1.5); "the bearing of hardship" is among the qualities "wholly in your power" (5.5), where Leopold reports that A and D omit the word. Lemma: φερέπονος.

φέρω

Attested: φέρουσι (*pherousi*; 1.16.4, 9.3.1), φέρει (*pherei*; 2.3, 4.24, 4.29, 5.4, 5.8.4, 8.1, 8.15 twice, 8.17, 9.10 twice, 9.29, 10.20 twice, 11.1.1, 11.18.5, 12.32), φερόμενος (*pheromenos*; 2.10, 9.1.2, 12.23 twice), φέρηται (*pherētai*; 2.16), φέρουσιν (*pherousin*; 4.23, 10.15, 11.6.1), ἤνεγκεν (*ēnenken*; 4.29, 12.5), ἐνεχθήσεται (*enechthēsetai*; 4.43, 10.33.3), ἐνεγκοῦσαν (*enenkousan*; 4.48.2), φέρειν

(*pherein*; 4.49.2, 5.18, 8.6, 9.3.2, 10.3 five times, 12.16), ἐνεγκούσῃ (*enenkousēi*; 5.6.1), ἐνηνοχέναι (*enēnochenai*; 5.6.1), ἐνεγκεῖν (*enenkein*; 5.6.2, 9.3.1), ἔφερεν (*epheren*; 5.8.3, 5.8.4, 6.30.3, 8.46), ἐφέρετο (*ephereto*; 5.8.3), φέρεται (*pheretai*; 5.16 twice, 8.60 twice, 11.20.2), φέρονται (*pherontai*; 6.27), φέρων (*pherōn*; 7.8), φέρε (*phere*; 8.59, 10.3), φέρεσθαι (*peresthai*; 10.33.2), ἔφερε (*ephere*; 12.1.1). To carry, to bring, to bear. Nature "brings" what happens and a man "bears" it: "For the common nature did not bring you anything unbearable" (8.46); "Nothing happens to anyone that he is not by nature able to bear" (5.18); "to bear it nobly is good fortune" (4.49.2). Of persons it is to tolerate: "either teach, then, or tolerate" (8.59). At 5.18 Leopold prints the reading of the books of excerpts (X); P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, and A have ὃ οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνο πέφυκεν φέρειν αὐτῷ (*ho ouchi ekeino pephyken pherein autōi*), which can be read as "which that is not of a nature to bring him", with the verb meaning "bring", not "bear". Lemma: φέρω.

φορητός

Attested: φορητόν (*phorēton*; 7.33, 10.3). Bearable. "On pain: the unbearable carries off, the lasting is bearable" (7.33); a man is by nature able to bear everything "which it rests with your own opinion to make bearable and supportable" (10.3). Lemma: φορητός.

See also

Anger; Body and flesh; Care and tolerance; Daimon; Fault and ignorance; Nature; Pain and pleasure; Self-respect and shame; Tranquillity; Virtue and excellence.

Definition and analysis

Seeing a thing for what it is · Meditations

ὅρος, horos, "definition", "limit", "limits", "bounds"; *ὁρίζειν, horizein*, "determine"; *ἀφορίζειν, aphorizein*, "mark off"; *περιορίζειν, periorizein*, "mark … bounds", "confine"; *ὑπογραφή, hypographē*, "description"; *περιγράφειν, perigraphein*, "circumscribe", "set"; *περιγραφή, perigraphē*, "circumscription"; *διαίρεσις, diairesis*, "division"; *διαιρεῖν, diairein*, "divide", "distinctly", "in its parts"; *καταμερίζειν, katamerizein*, "divide"; *διαρθροῦν, diarthroun*, "analysis", "articulate"; *γυμνός, gymnos*, "naked"; *γυμνότης, gymnotēs*,

“nakedness”; *ἀπογυμνοῦν, apogymnoun*, “strip … bare”; *περιαιρεῖν, periairein*, “take away”, “strip away”; *ψιλός, psilos*, “bare”, “barely”, “merely”

At a Glance

The word. Ὅρος is a boundary-stone, and so a limit and a definition, which marks off what a thing is; ὑπογραφή is a rough outline, a description; διαίρεσις is a cutting apart, division. The Stoics treated definition and division in logic.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus names definition once, when he tells himself always to make “a definition or description” of whatever presents itself (3.11.1; see Impression). Elsewhere the method goes by other words: things are stripped bare of their story (6.13), divided into their parts (11.2) and seen naked (12.2, 12.8), and their bounds are marked (8.36), as the mind marks its own (5.26, 7.55, 7.67).

In this edition. Ὅρος is “definition” at 3.11.1 and elsewhere “limit”, “limits” or “bounds”; ὑπογραφή is “description” and διαίρεσις “division”; περιγράφειν is “circumscribe”, περιορίζειν “mark … bounds”, γυμνός “naked” and ἀπογυμνοῦν “strip … bare”. “Analysis” renders διαρθροῦν (3.1), and “analysing” μερισμός (2.12).

A place to read. 11.2, where song is taken apart into its notes and dancing into its motions and poses, “except for virtue and what comes from virtue”.

Meaning

Ὅρος (*horos*) is first a boundary or the stone that marks it, then any limit, and in logic a definition, which sets the bounds of what a word covers. Ὑπογραφή (*hypographē*) is a sketch in outline, and διαίρεσις (*diairesis*), from διαιρεῖν (*diairein*), “to take apart”, is division. The edition’s note at 3.11.1 gives the Stoic distinction: a definition differs from an outline description, which gives a thing’s character in rough. Marcus counts among his debts that he did not sit down to “resolving syllogisms” (1.17.9; see Philosophy), yet tells himself, “Perpetually, and on every impression if it can be done, study nature, study the passions, practise dialectic” (8.13). His logic is turned on what presents itself, and his definition is a way of seeing what a thing is “in its substance, naked” (3.11.1).

Use in the book

At 6.13 Marcus reduces dishes, wine, purple and sex to what they are made of: the Falernian, among the most prized Italian wines, "is the juice of a bunch of grapes", and sexual intercourse "a rubbing of entrails and an expulsion of a drop of mucus with a kind of convulsion". Such impressions go "right through them, so as to see what sort of things they are". The rule follows: "So one must do through the whole of life, and, where things give the impression of being all too worthy of belief, one must strip them bare, see their cheapness clearly, and take away the story on which they pride themselves." The descriptions are not abuse; each is true. What they remove is the story, ἱστορία (*historia*), the prestige laid over the thing, and their target is vanity, which bewitches a man most when he thinks himself busiest with serious things. Marcus adds, "See, at any rate, what Crates says of Xenocrates himself": probably, as the edition's note suggests, Crates the Cynic on the solemn head of Plato's Academy, in a saying now lost.

Division does the same to a whole that overpowers. "A delightful song, and dancing, and the pancratium you will despise, if you divide the tuneful voice into each of its notes and ask yourself of each one whether you are overcome by it; for you will be abashed"; and so with dancing and with the pancratium, the contest of wrestling and boxing. Then the rule: "In general, then, except for virtue and what comes from virtue, remember to run to the particular parts and, by the division of them, to come to contempt; and carry the same over to the whole of life too" (11.2). The shame that answers the question put to each note can be read as showing that the power lay in the run of the whole. The exception can be read as the measure of the method: virtue is not undone by being taken apart, as a song is.

The verbs of bounding carry the method to time and to the self. Marcus must perceive "that a limit of time has been set for you" (2.4), where the limit is a ὅρος and "set" is περιγεγραμμένος (*perigegrammenos*), drawn round. The present "is made small if you mark its bounds alone and convict the understanding, if it cannot hold out against this, bare as it is" (8.36; see Time and eternity). The same verbs bound the mind. The ruling centre is to "circumscribe itself and confine those things undergone to the parts" (5.26; see Ruling centre); "it is peculiar to rational and intelligent motion to mark its own bounds and never to be overcome by the

motion of sense or of impulse" (7.55); and "Nature did not so blend with the compound as not to permit one to mark one's own bounds" (7.67). This can be read as one act seen from two sides: to define a thing is to draw its line, and the mind that draws lines round things draws one round itself.

What the method leaves is the thing naked. "God sees all ruling centres naked of the material vessels and husks and dross", and if Marcus makes a habit of seeing so, "you will strip away from yourself the great distraction" (12.2; see Gods). He is to "look at the causal parts naked of the husks" (12.8; see Cause and matter); of those who censure and extol he is to "believe that you see their little souls naked" (9.34); and he asks whether his own soul will ever be "good and simple and one and naked" (10.1; see Soul).

The power is fragile: "the analysis of what presents itself" is among the first things dotage quenches (3.1; see Mind and reason). The same verb names what the rational soul does to itself: it "sees itself, articulates itself" (11.1.1; see Soul). "The preservation of life" is "to see each thing through and through" (12.29; see Cause and matter). The method does bring contempt, and Marcus means it to reach "the whole of life too" (11.2); but it stops at virtue, and what it seeks is what 6.13 asks: "to see what sort of things they are".

Places to read

Every chapter in which ὅρος, ὁρίζειν, ἀφορίζειν, περιορίζειν, ὑπογραφή, περιγράφειν, περιγραφή, διαίρεσις, διαιρεῖν, καταμερίζειν, διαρθροῦν, γυμνός, γυμνότης, ἀπογυμνοῦν or περιαιρεῖν occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with 1.17.9 and 2.12, where "resolving" renders ἀναλύειν (*analyein*) and "analysing" μερισμός (*merismos*), and 3.15, 8.13 and 12.29, which treat the method without these words. Ἡμίγυμνος (*hēmigymnos*), "half-naked" (4.30), is left out.

1.17.9 Among the gifts of the gods Marcus counts that, when he craved philosophy, he did not sit down to writing treatises or resolving syllogisms.

2.4 Marcus must at last perceive what universe he is part of, and that a limit of time has been set for him.

2.12 Whoever looks at dying by itself and strips away by analysis the impressions attached to it will hold it nothing but a work of nature.

3.1 In dotage the analysis of what presents itself is among the powers quenched first.

3.11.1 Marcus is always to make a definition or description of whatever presents itself, so as to see it distinctly, naked, as a whole and in its parts, and to tell himself its own name and the names of the things of which it was compounded and into which it will be resolved.

3.15 Men do not know how many things are meant by stealing, sowing, buying, keeping quiet and seeing what must be done, which is done not with the eyes but with another kind of sight.

4.3.3 Against a little fame Marcus is to look, among other things, at the narrowness of the place within which it is circumscribed.

4.21.2 The inquiry into the truth about where the dead and the eaten find room is a division into the material and the causal.

4.24 Most of what we say and do is not necessary, and one who takes it away will be more at leisure; unnecessary impressions are to be taken away too.

5.24 Of all eternity a brief and momentary interval has been marked off for Marcus.

5.26 The ruling centre is to circumscribe itself and confine what the flesh undergoes to the parts.

5.33 Of all that lies within the bounds of the bit of flesh and the little breath, Marcus is to remember that it is neither his nor in his power.

6.13 Impressions of food, wine, purple and sex reach to the things themselves; whatever looks all too worthy of belief is to be stripped bare, its cheapness seen and its story taken away.

6.49 To resent one's span of years is like resenting one's weight: as Marcus cherishes the amount of substance marked off for him, so too with time.

7.29 Among seven commands Marcus is to circumscribe the present of time and to divide and distribute the underlying thing into the causal and the material.

7.55 It is peculiar to rational and intelligent motion to mark its own bounds and never to be overcome by the motion of sense or of impulse.

7.64 In most pains the saying of Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, is to help, that

pain is neither unbearable nor eternal, if one remembers the limits and does not add opinion.

7.67 Nature did not so blend with the compound as not to permit one to mark one's own bounds and bring one's own things under one's own power.

8.13 Marcus is to study nature, study the passions and practise dialectic perpetually, and on every impression if it can be done.

8.36 The present is made small if Marcus marks its bounds alone and convicts the understanding, if it cannot hold out against it, bare as it is.

8.50 The nature of the whole, having marked its own bounds, changes into itself whatever within it decays and makes new things from it.

9.1.4 By an original impulse of providence towards this world-order, generative powers of such subsistences, changes and successions were marked off.

9.8 One soul has been divided among the irrational living beings, and one intelligent soul portioned out among the rational.

9.25 Marcus is to look at the quality of the cause, circumscribed from the material, and mark the bounds of the time for which the thing can by nature subsist.

9.32 Many superfluous things that vex Marcus lie wholly in his opinion, and he can strip them away.

9.34 Marcus is to look at what others' ruling centres are and what they take seriously, and to believe that he sees their little souls naked.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever be good and simple and one and naked, more manifest than the body that surrounds it.

11.1.1 The rational soul sees itself, articulates itself and makes itself such as it wills.

11.2 A song, dancing and the pancratium will be despised if Marcus divides each into its parts; except for virtue and what comes from it, he is to come to contempt by division and carry this over to the whole of life.

11.8 A man split off from one man has fallen away from the whole fellowship, and such a division, happening often, makes reunion hard.

11.16 The soul treats as making no difference the things that make no difference if it observes each of them in its parts and as a whole.

11.27 The Pythagoreans' precept is to look up at the heaven at dawn and be reminded of order, purity and nakedness, for there is no veil on a star.

12.2 God sees ruling centres naked of their material vessels and husks; if Marcus makes a habit of the same, he will strip away from himself the great distraction.

12.8 Marcus is to look at the causal parts naked of the husks, and at what pain, pleasure, death and fame are.

12.10 Marcus is to see things as such, dividing them into material, cause and reference.

12.17 Marcus' impulse is to be towards seeing what produces each impression, unfolding it by dividing it into cause, material, reference and time.

12.23 Nature gives the due time and the limit, sometimes one's own nature in old age, but in any case the nature of the whole.

12.29 The preservation of life is to see each thing through and through, its material and its causal part, and to do what is just and say what is true.

12.30 There is one soul, even if it is parted among countless natures and individual circumscriptions.

12.36 The complete is determined by him who was then the cause of the compounding and now of the dissolution.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports that some Stoics made the part of logic concerned with definitions an aid to knowing the truth, "for it is through concepts that things are grasped".[25] He gives two definitions of definition: in the first book of his *On Definitions* the Stoic Antipater called it a statement produced by analysis that answers exactly to its object, and

[25] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.41–42.

Chrysippus, the third head of the school, in his own *On Definitions*, an account of what is peculiar to a thing; an outline description is a statement that leads one into things in rough, or a definition that conveys a definition's force more simply.[26] Division cuts a genus into the species next below it: of living beings some are rational, some irrational. Counter-division cuts a genus by negation: of the things that are, some are good, some not good. Subdivision divides again: of the things not good, some are bad, some indifferent. Partition, μερισμός, Marcus' word for "analysing" at 2.12, sorts a genus under heads: of goods, some concern the soul, some the body.[27] Marcus' division at 11.2 can be read as the school's instrument turned from sorting kinds to judging worth. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, defends the study of logic as the measure of everything else. He asks whether only Chrysippus, Zeno, the school's founder, and Cleanthes, his successor, say so; whether Antisthenes, the companion of Socrates, does not say it, and who it is that has written that "education begins with the examination of names"; whether Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, does not say it too, and of whom Xenophon, the Athenian soldier and writer, records that he started from the examination of names, asking what each one means.[28] Marcus' rule to tell himself a thing's own name and the names of what it was compounded from (3.11.1), and his remark that men "do not know how many things are meant by stealing, sowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what must be done" (3.15), can be read as that examination.

Translation in this edition

Ὅρος is "definition" once (3.11.1), where it stands beside ὑπογραφή, "description", and elsewhere "limit" (2.4, 12.23), "limits" (7.64) and "bounds" (5.33); ὁρίζειν is "is determined" (12.36), the English making Marcus' active verb passive. Ἀφορίζειν is "mark off" (5.24, 6.49, 9.1.4). Περιορίζειν is "mark … bounds" (7.55, 7.67, 8.36, 8.50, 9.25) and, with the things undergone as its object, "confine" (5.26). Περιγράφειν is "circumscribe" (4.3.3, 5.26, 7.29,

[26] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.60, where Chrysippus' words are printed in a correction drawn from a scholion on the grammarian Dionysius Thrax.

[27] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.61–62.

[28] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.17.10–12.

9.25), and at 2.4 the perfect participle is “has been set”, of a limit; περιγραφή is “circumscriptions” (12.30). Διαίρεσις is “division” at all three places (4.21.2, 11.2, 11.8). Διαιρεῖν is “divide” (7.29, 9.8, 12.10, 12.17), and the adverb διῃρημένως (*diēirēmenōs*) “distinctly” (3.11.1) and “in its parts” (11.16). Καταμερίζειν is “divide” (11.2); μερίζειν (*merizein*), “distribute” beside “Divide” at 7.29, has its sub-entry under Whole and part, as has μερισμός (*merismos*), “analysing” (2.12). Διαρθροῦν is “the analysis of” (3.1) and “articulates” (11.1.1). Ἀναλύειν (*analyein*) is “resolving” of syllogisms (1.17.9) and “be resolved” of what is compounded (3.11.1, 4.32.2; see Dissolution). Γυμνός is always “naked”, γυμνότης “nakedness” (11.27) and ἀπογυμνοῦν “strip them bare” (6.13); ἡμίγυμνος is “half-naked” (4.30). Ψιλός (*psilos*) is “bare” (4.45, 8.36, 10.28, 11.3) and “barely” (7.13), and κατὰ ψιλόν (*kata psilon*) is “merely” (4.46, 6.14). Περιαιρεῖν is “take away” (4.24, 6.13) and “strip away” (9.32, 12.2); “strips away” at 2.12 renders διαλύειν (*dialyein*; see Dissolution). Ἱστορία (*historia*) is “the story” at 6.13 and “the inquiry” in “the inquiry into the truth” at 4.21.2, and εὐτέλεια (*euteleia*) is “cheapness” (6.13). Τῦφος (*typhos*) is “vanity” in “For vanity is a terrible deceiver” (6.13; see Simplicity and sincerity).

ἀπογυμνόω

Attested: ἀπογυμνοῦν (*apogymnoun*; 6.13). To strip bare. Where things give the impression of being all too worthy of belief, “one must strip them bare, see their cheapness clearly, and take away the story on which they pride themselves” (6.13). Lemma: ἀπογυμνόω.

ἀφορίζω

Attested: ἀφώρισται (*aphōristai*; 5.24, 6.49), ἀφορίσασα (*aphorisasa*; 9.1.4). To mark off by a boundary, to set apart. Of the all-embracing eternity “a brief and momentary interval has been marked off for you” (5.24); “as you cherish the amount of substance marked off for you, so too with time” (6.49); and, of the original impulse of providence towards this world-order, “marked off generative powers of such subsistences and changes and successions” (9.1.4). Lemma: ἀφορίζω.

γυμνός

Attested: γυμνόν (*gymnon*; 3.11.1), γυμνά (*gymna*; 9.34, 12.2, 12.8), γυμνή (*gymnē*; 10.1). Naked, stripped. A thing is to be seen "in its substance, naked" (3.11.1); "God sees all ruling centres naked of the material vessels and husks and dross" (12.2); "Look at the causal parts naked of the husks" (12.8); "believe that you see their little souls naked" (9.34); and Marcus asks his soul, "Will you ever, then, soul, be good and simple and one and naked, more manifest than the body that surrounds you?" (10.1). Lemma: γυμνός.

γυμνότης

Attested: γυμνότητος (*gymnotētos*; 11.27). Nakedness. In the Pythagoreans' precept one looks up at the heaven at dawn to be reminded "of order and purity and nakedness; for there is no veil on a star" (11.27; see Cosmos and order). Lemma: γυμνότης.

διαίρεσις

Attested: διαίρεσις (*diairesis*; 4.21.2), διαιρέσει (*diairesei*; 11.2), διαίρεσιν (*diairesin*; 11.8). Division, a taking apart; also a separation. "What, in this case, is the inquiry into the truth? A division into the material and the causal" (4.21.2); "by the division of them, to come to contempt" (11.2); of a man split off from his fellows, "the matter of such a division" (11.8). Lemma: διαίρεσις.

διαιρέω

Attested: διῃρημένως (*diēirēmenōs*; 3.11.1, 11.16), δίελε (*diele*; 7.29), διῄρηται (*diēirētai*; 9.8), διαιροῦντα (*diairounta*; 12.10, 12.17). To take apart, divide; the adverb from the perfect participle is "distinctly" or "in its parts". "Divide and distribute the underlying thing into the causal and the material" (7.29); "Into the irrational living beings one soul has been divided" (9.8); "unfolding it by dividing it into the cause, the material, the reference, the time" (12.17). Lemma: διαιρέω.

διαρθρόω

Attested: διαρθροῦν (*diarthroun*; 3.1), διαρθροῖ (*diarthroi*; 11.1.1). To divide at the joints, to articulate; and so to analyse. In dotage "the analysis of what presents itself" is quenched first (3.1); the rational soul "sees itself, articulates itself, makes itself such as it wills" (11.1.1). Lemma: διαρθρόω.

καταμερίζω

Attested: καταμερίσῃς (*katamerisēis*; 11.2). To divide into portions. A song will be despised "if you divide the tuneful voice into each of its notes" (11.2). A, the Vatican manuscript, omits "if you divide the tuneful voice". Lemma: καταμερίζω.

ὁρίζω

Attested: ὁρίζει (*horizei*; 12.36). To bound, to determine. "For the complete is determined by him who was then the cause of the compounding and now of the dissolution; but you are the cause of neither" (12.36; see Citizenship). Lemma: ὁρίζω.

ὅρος

Attested: ὅρος (*horos*; 2.4), ὅρον (*horon*; 3.11.1, 12.23), ὅρων (*horōn*; 5.33, 7.64). A boundary, a limit; in logic a definition. Marcus must perceive that "a limit of time has been set for you" (2.4); "always to make a definition or description of whatever presents itself as an object of impression" (3.11.1); "of all that lies within the bounds of the bit of flesh and the little breath" (5.33); in most pains Epicurus' saying is to help, that pain "is neither unbearable nor eternal, if you remember the limits and do not add opinion" (7.64); "the due time and the limit nature gives" (12.23). Lemma: ὅρος.

περιαιρέω

Attested: περιέλῃ (*perielēi*; 4.24), περιαιρεῖν (*periairein*; 4.24, 6.13), περιελεῖν (*perielein*; 9.32), περιαιρήσεις (*periairēseis*; 12.2). To take away what surrounds, to strip off. "one must take away not only unnecessary actions but also impressions" (4.24); "take away the story on which they pride themselves" (6.13); "You can strip away many superfluous things among those that vex you" (9.32); "you will strip away from yourself the great distraction" (12.2). Lemma: περιαιρέω.

περιγραφή

Attested: περιγραφαῖς (*perigraphais*; 12.30). An outline drawn round a thing, a circumscription. "One soul, even if it is parted among countless natures and individual circumscriptions" (12.30). Lemma: περιγραφή.

περιγράφω

Attested: περιγεγραμμένος (*perigegrammenos*; 2.4), περιγράφεται (*perigraphetai*; 4.3.3), περιγραφέτω (*perigraphetō*; 5.26), περίγραψον (*perigrapson*; 7.29), περιγράψας (*perigrapsas*; 9.25). To draw a line round, to circumscribe. “Set” in “a limit of time has been set for you” renders the perfect participle (2.4); “the narrowness of the place within which it is circumscribed” (4.3.3); “let it circumscribe itself” (5.26); “Circumscribe the present of time” (7.29); “having circumscribed it from the material” (9.25). Lemma: περιγράφω.

περιορίζω

Attested: περιοριζέτω (*periorizetō*; 5.26), περιορίζειν (*periorizein*; 7.55, 7.67), περιορίσῃς (*periorisēis*; 8.36), περιορίσασα (*periorisasa*; 8.50), περιόρισον (*periorison*; 9.25). To mark the bounds of, to confine within bounds. The ruling centre is to “confine those things undergone to the parts” (5.26); “to mark its own bounds” (7.55), of rational motion, and so of oneself (7.67) and of the nature of the whole (8.50); the present “is made small if you mark its bounds alone” (8.36); “then mark the bounds of the time too” (9.25). Lemma: περιορίζω.

ὑπογραφή

Attested: ὑπογραφήν (*hypographēn*; 3.11.1). An outline, a description in rough, set by the Stoics beside the strict definition. Marcus is “always to make a definition or description of whatever presents itself as an object of impression” (3.11.1; see Impression). Lemma: ὑπογραφή.

ψιλός

Attested: ψιλήν (*psilēn*; 4.45, 11.3), ψιλόν (*psilon*; 4.46, 6.14, 7.13, 8.36, 10.28). Bare, with nothing added; with κατά, “merely”. What comes to be shows “not bare succession but a wonderful kinship” (4.45); the present is made small if Marcus marks its bounds alone and convicts the understanding “if it cannot hold out against this, bare as it is” (8.36); he is to form an impression that to the rational living being alone it is given to follow willingly, “while bare following is necessary for all” (10.28); the soul’s readiness to be released from the body is to come from a judgement of its own, “not from bare opposition, like the Christians” (11.3). Whoever calls himself a part, not a limb, still does good

“barely, as what is seemly” (7.13), and κατὰ ψιλόν is “merely as we have received it” (4.46) and “merely in the possession of a crowd of slaves” (6.14). Lemma: ψιλός.

See also

Cause and matter; Citizenship; Cosmos and order; Death; Dissolution; Gods; Impression; Mind and reason; Nature; Philosophy; Ruling centre; Simplicity and sincerity; Soul; Time and eternity; Virtue and excellence; Whole and part.

Desire and aversion

What the soul reaches for and turns from · Meditations

ὄρεξις, orexis, “desire”; *ὀρέγεσθαι, oregesthai*, “desire”; *ἔκκλισις, ekklisis*, “avoidance”; *ἐκκλίνειν, ekklinein*, “avoid”; *ἐπιθυμία, epithymia*, “craving”; *ἐπιθυμεῖν, epithymein*, “crave”; *διώκειν, diōkein*, “pursue”; *δίωξις, diōxis*, “pursuit”; *φεύγειν, pheugein*, “flee”; *φυγή, phygē*, “flight”; *θέλειν, thelein*, “want”; *βούλεσθαι, boulesthai*, “will”, “was meant”

At a Glance

The word. Ὄρεξις is desire, the soul’s reaching for what it takes to be good, and ἔκκλισις avoidance, its turning from what it takes to be bad. Ἐπιθυμία is craving, desire as a passion. Διώκειν and φεύγειν, “pursue” and “flee”, are the everyday words for the same two movements, and θέλειν is “want”.

In the *Meditations*. A rational nature journeys well when it “has made its desires and avoidances of the things in our power only” (8.7). Marcus copies the harder rule of Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, “abstain altogether from desire” (11.37), and gives desire its own end, in “a just disposition and action” (5.34). Theophrastus, Aristotle’s successor, judged offences of craving graver than those of rage (2.10); craving is to be kept out of the soul (8.29) and prayed away (9.40). The man who has chosen his own mind will live “neither pursuing nor fleeing” (3.7), and philosophy “wants only what your nature wants” (5.9).

In this edition. Ὄρεξις and ὀρέγεσθαι are always “desire”, ἐπιθυμία and ἐπιθυμεῖν “craving” and “crave”, ἔκκλισις and ἐκκλίνειν “avoidance” and “avoid”, διώκειν “pursue” and φεύγειν “flee”; θέλειν is “want” and βούλεσθαι “will” (once “was meant”, 10.8.1).

A place to read. 9.40, where the prayer "How may I sleep with that woman?" becomes "How may I not crave to sleep with her?"

Meaning

Ὄρεξις (*orexis*) comes from ὀρέγεσθαι (*oregesthai*), to stretch oneself out towards a thing, to reach for it; ἔκκλισις (*ekklisis*), from ἐκκλίνειν (*ekklinein*), "to bend aside", is turning away. The Stoics made desire the genus. Craving, ἐπιθυμία (*epithymia*), was "irrational desire" and one of the four chief passions, with distress, fear and pleasure; reasonable desire they called wish, and reasonable avoidance caution.[29] Epictetus made desire and avoidance the first of his three fields of training (see Impulse).[30]

Marcus uses the school's pair sparingly: ὄρεξις and its verb in seven chapters, ἔκκλισις and its verb in five, and the two together only at 8.7, 8.28 and 11.37. Ἐπιθυμία is his word for the passion, though in Book I it is innocent: he "craved the pallet and the skin, and whatever else belongs to the Greek training" (1.6), and he counts among the gifts of the gods "that when I craved philosophy I did not fall in with a sophist" (1.17.9). Commoner than the school's pair are the plain words: φεύγειν (*pheugein*), "flee", in sixteen chapters, διώκειν (*diōkein*), "pursue", in ten, and θέλειν (*thelein*), "want", in forty-six.

Use in the book

The rule is Epictetus'. A rational nature journeys well when, among other things, it "has made its desires and avoidances of the things in our power only" (8.7), and "every judgement and impulse and desire and avoidance is within, and nothing climbs up so far" (8.28; see Pain and pleasure). At 11.37 Marcus copies Epictetus' sterner form: "abstain altogether from desire, and use avoidance towards none of the things not in our power." "Quench desire" is one of four commands at 9.7 (see Impression). Yet Marcus does not leave desire without an object. Among the things common to the soul of God and of man is "to have the good in a just disposition and action, and to let desire end there" (5.34), which can be read as giving desire an object it cannot miss,

---

[29] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.110 (the four passions, from Hecaton, *On Passions* book 2, and Zeno, *On Passions*), 7.113 (craving and its kinds) and 7.116 (the three good feelings).

[30] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.2.1–3.

since the just act is in one's power. Blocked by force, Marcus is to remember "that you did not desire the impossible" (6.50; see Impulse); and "To pursue the impossible is madness" (5.17). Elsewhere avoidance is a mild, practical word: those who give offence, like a rough sparring partner, are met "with kindly avoidance" (6.20), and briars in the road call for "Avoid" (8.50; see Nature).

Marcus approves Theophrastus, who, comparing wrongdoings "as one might compare such things in the ordinary way", held that "offences committed through craving are graver than those committed through rage". The angry man is seen to turn from reason "with a kind of distress and an unconscious contraction", and is "more like a man who has been wronged first and by distress compelled to rage"; the man who does wrong through craving, "overcome by pleasure", seems "somehow more licentious and more womanish", and "has had his impulse, of his own accord, towards acting unjustly" (2.10). Marcus is never to honour what would force him to "crave anything that needs walls and curtains" (3.7; see Daimon), and if the world is a jumble he asks, "why do I even crave to linger in such a random compound and confusion?" (6.10; see Providence and atoms). The ruling centre "does not frighten itself into craving" (7.16; see Ruling centre), and Marcus is to say to himself, "Now it is in my power that there be in this soul no wickedness, no craving, no trouble of any kind at all" (8.29). At 9.40 Marcus turns other men's prayers round: if the gods have power, why not pray that they give "not fearing any of these things, nor craving any of them"? "This man prays: 'How may I sleep with that woman?' You: 'How may I not crave to sleep with her?'" In short, "turn the prayers this way, and observe what comes about."

Marcus is to look into men's ruling centres, "and at the wise, what sort of things they flee, and what sort they pursue" (4.38; compare 7.34, 10.13). The man who has chosen his own mind and daimon "will live neither pursuing nor fleeing" (3.7), and if Marcus does the work in hand following right reason, keeps his daimon pure and holds to this, "expecting nothing and fleeing nothing", he will live well (3.12; see Daimon). "[If] The things whose pursuits and flights disturb you do not come to you, but in a way you yourself go to them. At any rate let the verdict about them be quiet, and they will remain still, and you will be seen neither pursuing nor fleeing" (11.11); J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford

text of 1908 the edition prints, brackets the manuscripts' "If", as Herbert Richards, whose notes on Marcus Aurelius appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905, proposed. Short duration is common to all, "but you flee and pursue all things as though they were to be eternal" (10.34). Flight has its right objects: one's own vice (7.71; see Good, bad and indifference), the plague of a corrupted understanding (9.2), "a wolf's friendship" (11.15).

Wanting is set right by being made nature's: "philosophy wants only what your nature wants; but you wanted something else, not according to nature" (5.9; see Philosophy). The healthy eye must not say "I want green things" (10.35); whoever "does not want the base man to do wrong" is like one who does not want the fig tree to carry juice (12.16, 4.6); and the intelligent faculty, once separated from what is not its own, may live "wanting what happens" (12.3.1; see Mind and reason). Wanting fails by postponement: "you want to become good tomorrow rather than to be good today" (8.22). Marcus copies from Epictetus, "To seek a fig in winter is the mark of a madman; such is he who seeks the child when it is no longer given" (11.33). Taken together, the book's teaching on desire can be read as a transfer rather than an extinction: from outcomes to one's own just act, from what is not given to what is.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ὄρεξις, ὀρέγεσθαι, ἔκκλισις, ἐκκλίνειν, ἐπιθυμία, ἐπιθυμεῖν, διώκειν, δίωξις, φεύγειν or φυγή occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the chief places of θέλειν, "want", and βούλεσθαι, "will" (4.6, 5.9, 5.25, 5.29, 7.20, 8.22, 8.34, 9.12, 10.11, 10.14, 10.35, 12.3.1, 12.16), and 11.33, the fig in winter. Every place of θέλειν and βούλεσθαι is given in their sub-entries. The compounds ἐκφεύγειν, "escape" (7.46), and καταφεύγειν, "flee" to the citadel (8.48), are left out.

1.6 Among his debts to Diognetus, his painting master, Marcus counts having craved the pallet and the skin and whatever else belongs to the Greek training.

1.17.5 Marcus counts among the gifts of the gods that he was quick to raise his tutors to the rank they seemed to him to crave.

1.17.9 Among the gifts of the gods is that when he craved philosophy he did not fall in with a sophist, nor sit down to treatises and syllogisms.

2.10 Theophrastus judges offences committed through craving graver than those committed through rage, for the man who does wrong through craving is overcome by pleasure and moves to injustice of his own accord.

3.7 Nothing is to be honoured that would force a man to crave what needs walls and curtains; the man who has chosen his mind and daimon before all else will live neither pursuing nor fleeing.

3.12 If Marcus does the work in hand by right reason, keeps his daimon pure and holds to this, expecting nothing and fleeing nothing, he will live well.

4.6 What such people do is bound to happen of necessity, and he who does not want it wants the fig tree to have no juice.

4.29 A fugitive is he who flees civic reason.

4.32.1 In the times of Vespasian men were marrying, dying, falling in love, hoarding and craving consulships and kingships, and that life is no longer anywhere.

4.38 Marcus is to look into men's ruling centres, and at the wise, what sort of things they flee and what sort they pursue.

5.9 Philosophy wants only what a man's nature wants, but Marcus wanted something else, not according to nature (see Philosophy).

5.17 To pursue the impossible is madness, and it is impossible for base people not to do such things.

5.25 Marcus has now what the common nature wants him to have now, and does what his own nature wants him to do now.

5.29 So long as nothing leads him out of life, no one will prevent Marcus doing what he wants, and he wants according to the nature of a rational and social living being.

5.34 Of the two things common to the soul of God and of man, one is to have the good in a just disposition and action, and to let desire end there.

6.10 If the world is a jumble, Marcus asks why he should even crave to linger in it; if it is order, he reveres and takes courage.

6.20 As a blow in the gymnasium is met with kindly avoidance, not suspicion, so in life it is open to avoid people without bearing ill will.

6.50 When force blocks a just act, Marcus is to remember that his impulse was with reservation and that he did not desire the impossible.

7.16 The ruling centre does not frighten itself into craving; if anyone else can frighten or distress it, let him.

7.20 Marcus' one distraction is the fear of doing what the constitution of man does not want, or in a way or at a time it does not want.

7.34 On fame, Marcus is to look at men's understandings, what sort of things they flee and what sort they pursue.

7.71 It is ridiculous not to flee one's own vice, which is possible, but to flee that of others, which is impossible.

8.7 A rational nature journeys well when, among other things, it has made its "desires and avoidances of the things in our power only".

8.22 Marcus wants to become good tomorrow rather than to be good today.

8.28 Every judgement, impulse, desire and avoidance is within, and nothing climbs up so far.

8.29 It is in Marcus' power that there be in his soul no wickedness, no craving, no trouble of any kind.

8.34 Whoever does not want what happens makes himself, so far as in him lies, like a severed hand, though he can unite himself to the whole again.

8.44 Those who pursue fame after death forget that later men will be like those they find burdensome now.

8.45 Wherever he is thrown, Marcus will have his daimon serene, if it fares and acts according to its own constitution, and he asks whether anything is worth the soul's becoming abased, desiring, shrinking, cowering.

8.50 If there are briars in the road, Marcus is to avoid them, and not ask why they came about in the universe.

8.52 Marcus asks what to think of a man who flees the praise of clappers, who know neither where they are nor who they are.

9.1.2 He who pursues pleasures as good things and flees pains as bad is impious, for he must often blame the common nature.

9.1.3 He who pursues pleasures will not abstain from acting unjustly, and those who will to follow nature must stand equally towards what it uses equally.

9.2 Marcus asks whether experience does not yet persuade him to flee from the plague, the corruption of the understanding.

9.7 "Quench desire" is one of four commands, with wiping out impression, stopping impulse and keeping the ruling centre in its own power.

9.9.3 Intelligent beings alone have forgotten their convergence towards one another, yet though they flee they are overtaken, for nature prevails.

9.12 Marcus is to labour, not as wanting to be pitied or admired, and to want one thing only: to move and to hold still as civic reason requires.

9.40 If the gods have power, Marcus should pray for not craving, not fearing and not being distressed, rather than for things to be present or absent, and observe what comes about.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever be full and without want, longing for nothing and craving nothing for the enjoyment of pleasures.

10.11 The man who has given himself wholly to justice and to the nature of the whole wills nothing else than to bring the straight road to its end through the law, and to follow God.

10.13 Those arrogant in praise and censure of others are such in bed and at table, and flee and pursue such things.

10.14 The educated and self-respecting man says to nature, "Give what you want; take back what you want."

10.25 He who flees the master is a runaway, and so is the man who is distressed, angry or afraid over any of the things ordered by him who governs all things.

10.31 Marcus exclaims at the material and occasion he flees, though all these are exercises for reason.

10.34 Short duration is common to all things, yet Marcus flees and pursues them all as though they were to be eternal.

10.35 The healthy eye must not say "I want green things", and the healthy understanding must be ready for all that happens.

11.11 Marcus is to let the verdict about the things whose pursuits and flights disturb him be quiet; then they will remain still, and he will be seen neither pursuing nor fleeing.

11.15 Nothing is more shameful than a wolf's friendship, which is to be fled above all.

11.33 In words from Epictetus, seeking the child when it is no longer given is like seeking a fig in winter, the mark of a madman.

11.37 Marcus copies Epictetus' rule, to "abstain altogether from desire, and use avoidance towards none of the things not in our power".

12.3.1 If Marcus separates from his understanding all that is not his own, it may live by itself, doing what is just, wanting what happens and saying what is true.

12.16 He who does not want the base man to do wrong is like one who does not want the fig tree to carry juice in the figs.

12.19 Marcus asks what his understanding now is: fear, suspicion, craving or some other such thing.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, gives the Stoic scheme. According to the Stoic Hecaton of Rhodes and to Zeno, the founder of the school, the chief passions are four: distress, fear, craving and pleasure. Craving is "irrational desire" (ἄλογος ὄρεξις, *alogos orexis*), and under it fall lack, hatred, rivalry, anger, love, wrath and rage; anger is the craving to punish one who

seems to have done wrong unfittingly. Against three of the passions the Stoics set three "good feelings": joy, a reasonable elation, against pleasure; caution, a "reasonable avoidance" (εὔλογος ἔκκλισις, *eulogos ekklisis*), against fear; and wish (βούλησις, *boulēsis*), a "reasonable desire", against craving.[31] On this scheme the angry man of 2.10 can be read as moved by a craving too; the comparison Marcus approves is Theophrastus', not the school's.

Epictetus gives the rule that Marcus copies, and the reason for it. What desire promises, he says, is getting what it desires, and what avoidance promises is not meeting what it avoids; restrict avoidance to what is against nature among the things in one's power, and one will meet none of the things one avoids, but avoid disease, death or poverty, and one will be unfortunate. Avoidance, then, is to be taken away from everything not in our power and moved to what is contrary to nature among the things in our power, and "desire, for the present, abolish altogether", since whoever desires anything not in our power must fail of it, and of the things in our power that it would be good to desire, none is yet within reach.[32] The man making progress has learned from the philosophers that desire is of good things and avoidance of bad, and that the smooth flow and freedom from passion come only to one who does not fail in desire nor fall into what he avoids; so he "has taken desire out of himself entirely and put it off, and uses avoidance only of what lies in his choice".[33] Of the three fields this is the most important and the most pressing, because a passion arises in no other way than from desire that fails of its object or avoidance that falls into what it avoids; it brings griefs, laments and envies.[34] Marcus copies the same teaching at 11.37 ("he said"), fragment 27 in Heinrich Schenkl's edition of Epictetus, as the edition's note at 11.33 records. The fig in winter (11.33) comes from the *Discourses*: what we love is mortal and given for the present, as a fig is, or a bunch of grapes, "at the appointed season of the year", and whoever longs for it in winter is a fool; so whoever longs for his son or

[31] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.110 (the four passions, from Hecaton, *On Passions* book 2, and Zeno, *On Passions*), 7.113 (craving and its kinds) and 7.116 (the three good feelings).

[32] Epictetus, *Handbook* 2.1–2.

[33] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.4.1.

[34] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.2.1–3.

his friend when he is not given "longs for a fig in winter".[35] In Marcus' words the fool is a madman.

Other ancient sources

Theophrastus' work is lost. The edition's note at 2.10 compares Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, where lack of self-control in rage is judged less shameful than lack of self-control in cravings. Rage, Aristotle says, does attend to reason but hears it wrong, like servants in a hurry who dash out before the instruction is finished, or dogs that bark at any sound before they know whether a friend is there; craving needs only reason or sense to say "pleasant", and it rushes to the enjoyment. Rage is also more natural, and open, while craving plots. And nobody is insolent while in distress; whoever acts from anger acts in distress, but the insolent man acts "with pleasure" (μεθ' ἡδονῆς, *meth' hēdonēs*).[36] Marcus' report that Theophrastus judged "wrong done with pleasure is open to a greater charge than wrong done with distress" (2.10) can be read as the last of these arguments carried on in Aristotle's school.

Translation in this edition

Ὄρεξις is "desire" at all five of its places, and ὀρέγεσθαι "desire" at both of its places: "you did not desire the impossible" (6.50) and "desiring" (8.45). "Desire" in the English renders these two words alone. Ἔκκλισις is "avoidance" (6.20, 8.7, 8.28, 11.37) and ἐκκλίνειν "avoid" (6.20, 8.50); "avoid" at 3.4.2 renders περιίστασθαι (*periistasthai*). Ἐπιθυμία is "craving" at all six of its occurrences and ἐπιθυμεῖν "crave" at all nine, with "craving" for its participle and articular infinitive (4.32.1, 9.40, 10.1); "craving" and "crave" render nothing else. Διώκειν is "pursue" at all eleven of its places and δίωξις "pursuits" (11.11); "pursuits" in the sense of occupations renders ἐπιτηδεύματα (*epitēdeumata*; 1.17.4, 6.47) and σπουδαί (*spoudai*; 10.11). Φεύγειν is "flee" at all seventeen of its occurrences, φυγή "flights" (11.11) and φυγάς "fugitive" (4.29); the compound καταφεύγειν is also "flee" (8.48 twice), and ἐκφεύγειν "escape" (7.46). Θέλειν is "want" at all sixty-five of its occurrences. Βούλεσθαι is "will" at eleven of its twelve places, and "was meant" where its subject is a

[35] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.24.86–87.

[36] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.6, 1149a24–b23.

word (10.8.1); the noun βούλημα (*boulēma*), the will of nature, is also “will” (4.49.1, 4.49.2, 5.1.2, 6.40, 9.1.1).

βούλομαι

Attested: ἐβουλήθην (*eboulēthēn*; 1.17.8), βούλεται (*bouletai*; 4.11, 4.34, 5.27, 10.11, 10.25), βούλεσθαι (*boulesthai*; 5.6.2), βούλονται (*boulontai*; 7.68), βουλομένους (*boulomenous*; 9.1.3), ἐβούλετο (*ebouleto*; 10.8.1), βούληται (*boulētai*; 11.1.1), βούλει (*boulei*; 11.18.6). To will, to wish. Of a man: “whenever I willed to help someone in poverty” (1.17.8); of the daimon, the soul and nature’s followers: he lives with the gods who does “what the daimon wills” (5.27), the rational soul “makes itself such as it wills” (11.1.1), and “those who will to follow nature” must stand equally towards what it uses equally (9.1.3). The man who is distressed, angry or afraid “does not will that something should have come about, or be coming about, or be going to come about” of the things ordered by “him who governs all things” (10.25), where “does not will” is the οὐ βούλεται (*ou bouletai*) of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, which Leopold prints for the manuscripts’ ὃ βούλεται (*ho bouletai*). Of a word, “‘sensible’ was meant to signify for you attention that discerns each thing” (10.8.1). Βουλεύεσθαι, “take counsel” (6.44.1, 6.44.2), and βούλημα, “will”, are separate lemmas. Lemma: βούλομαι.

διώκω

Attested: διώκων (*diōkōn*; 3.7, 8.52, 9.1.2, 9.1.3, 11.11), διώκουσιν (*diōkousin*; 4.38, 10.13), διώκειν (*diōkein*; 5.17), διώκουσαι (*diōkousai*; 7.34), διώκοντες (*diōkontes*; 8.44), διώκεις (*diōkeis*; 10.34). To pursue, the everyday word for desire’s movement, paired with “flee” in eight places. The man who has chosen his own mind and daimon before all else “will live neither pursuing nor fleeing” (3.7); “To pursue the impossible is madness” (5.17); “he who pursues pleasures will not abstain from acting unjustly” (9.1.3). At 8.52 the participle is the supplement ἢ διώκων (*ē diōkōn*), “or pursues”, of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, which Leopold prints; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has ἡδίων ἢ. Lemma: διώκω.

δίωξις

Attested: διώξεις (*diōxeis*; 11.11). Pursuit. “The things whose pursuits and flights disturb you do not come to you, but in a way you yourself go to them” (11.11), where Leopold brackets the “If” with which the manuscripts begin. Lemma: δίωξις.

ἐκκλίνω

Attested: ἐκκλίνειν (*ekklinein*; 6.20), ἔκκλινον (*ekklinon*; 8.50). To bend aside, to avoid. Both places are practical: “it is open to us, as I said, to avoid them, and neither to suspect nor to bear ill will” (6.20); “There are briars in the road? Avoid” (8.50). Lemma: ἐκκλίνω.

ἔκκλισις

Attested: ἐκκλίσεως (*ekkliseōs*; 6.20), ἐκκλίσεις (*ekkliseis*; 8.7), ἔκκλισις (*ekklisis*; 8.28), ἐκκλίσει (*ekklisei*; 11.37). Avoidance, the counterpart of desire. A rational nature “has made its desires and avoidances of the things in our power only” (8.7); Epictetus’ rule is to “use avoidance towards none of the things not in our power” (11.37); a sparring partner is met “with kindly avoidance” (6.20). Lemma: ἔκκλισις.

ἐπιθυμέω

Attested: ἐπιθυμῆσαι (*epithymēsai*; 1.6, 3.7), ἐπιθυμεῖν (*epithymein*; 1.17.5, 9.40), ἐπεθύμησα (*epethymēsa*; 1.17.9), ἐπιθυμοῦντας (*epithymountas*; 4.32.1), ἐπιθυμῶ (*epithymō*; 6.10), ἐπιθυμήσω (*epithymēsō*; 9.40), ἐπιθυμοῦσα (*epithymousa*; 10.1). To crave. Innocent in Book I, where Marcus “craved philosophy” (1.17.9); elsewhere the passion: to “crave anything that needs walls and curtains” (3.7), “craving consulships, kingships” (4.32.1), and the prayer “How may I not crave to sleep with her?” (9.40). Lemma: ἐπιθυμέω.

ἐπιθυμία

Attested: ἐπιθυμίαν (*epithymian*; 2.10 three times, 7.16), ἐπιθυμία (*epithymia*; 8.29, 12.19). Craving, desire as a passion. In Theophrastus’ judgement, offences “committed through craving are graver than those committed through rage” (2.10); the ruling centre “does not frighten itself into craving” (7.16), where Claudius Salmasius, the seventeenth-century French scholar, proposed “despondency”; “no

wickedness, no craving, no trouble of any kind at all" (8.29); "Is it fear? Suspicion? Craving?" (12.19). Lemma: ἐπιθυμία.

θέλω

Attested: ἐθελήσωσι (*ethelēsōsi*; 1.7.3), θέλει (*thelei*; 1.14.2 twice, 4.6, 5.9 twice, 5.25 twice, 6.8, 7.14, 7.20 three times, 8.1 twice, 8.48, 10.33.2, 11.15 twice), ἐθελήσῃς (*ethelēsēis*; 4.3.1), θέλων (*thelōn*; 4.6, 8.34, 9.12, 12.16), θέλεις (*theleis*; 4.13, 5.1.1, 7.58, 7.62, 8.22, 8.45, 8.53 twice, 9.3.2, 9.42.4, 10.14 twice, 10.23, 12.22), θέλουσι (*thelousi*; 5.1.3, 10.36), θελήσῃς (*thelēsēis*; 5.6.2), ἤθελες (*ētheles*; 5.9, 10.22), θέλω (*thelō*; 5.29 twice, 10.35), θέλῃ (*thelēi*; 6.8, 10.13), θέλουσιν (*thelousin*; 6.18, 6.59, 10.8.4), ἠθέλησε (*ēthelēse*; 6.30.1), θέλῃς (*thelēis*; 6.48), θελήσῃ (*thelēsēi*; 7.14, 8.55), ἐθέλει (*ethelei*; 7.55, 9.3.1), θέλε (*thele*; 7.58, 9.12), ἤθελε (*ēthele*; 9.29), θέλοντες (*thelontes*; 11.14), θέλησον (*thelēson*; 11.18.3), θέλετε (*thelete*; 11.39), θέλουσαν (*thelousan*; 12.3.1), θέλοντι (*thelonti*; 12.16). To want. Of nature: "philosophy wants only what your nature wants" (5.9), "what the common nature wants me to have now" (5.25); of the freed understanding, "wanting what happens" (12.3.1); of a man to nature, "Give what you want; take back what you want" (10.14); and in reproach, "you want to become good tomorrow rather than to be good today" (8.22). Lemma: θέλω.

ὀρέγω

Attested: ὠρέγου (*ōregou*; 6.50), ὀρεγομένη (*oregomenē*; 8.45). In the middle, to reach after, to desire. Marcus is to "remember that your impulse was with reservation, and that you did not desire the impossible" (6.50); Marcus asks whether anything is worth the soul's becoming "abased, desiring, shrinking, cowering" (8.45). Lemma: ὀρέγω.

ὄρεξις

Attested: ὄρεξιν (*orexin*; 5.34, 9.7), ὀρέξεις (*orexeis*; 8.7), ὄρεξις (*orexis*; 8.28), ὀρέξεως (*orexeōs*; 11.37). Desire, the reaching of the soul for what it takes to be good. Its proper end: "to have the good in a just disposition and action, and to let desire end there" (5.34); its rule: "its desires and avoidances of the things in our power only" (8.7); the commands "quench desire" (9.7) and, in Epictetus' words, "abstain altogether from desire" (11.37). Lemma: ὄρεξις.

φεύγω

Attested: φεύγων (*pheugōn*; 3.7, 3.12, 4.29, 8.52, 9.1.2, 10.25, 11.11), φεύγουσιν (*pheugousin*; 4.38, 10.13), φεύγουσαι (*pheugousai*; 7.34), φεύγειν (*pheugein*; 7.71 twice, 9.2), φεύγοντες (*pheugontes*; 9.9.3), φεύγεις (*pheugeis*; 10.31, 10.34), φεῦγε (*pheuge*; 11.15). To flee, avoidance in its everyday word. Of the wrong flight: “you flee and pursue all things as though they were to be eternal” (10.34); of the right: “flee this above all” (11.15), of a wolf’s friendship. “He who flees the master is a runaway” (10.25). Φυγάς, “fugitive” (4.29), καταφεύγω, “flee” (8.48), and ἐκφεύγω, “escape” (7.46), are separate lemmas. Lemma: φεύγω.

φυγή

Attested: φυγαί (*phygai*; 11.11). Flight. “The things whose pursuits and flights disturb you do not come to you” (11.11). Lemma: φυγή.

See also

Daimon; Good, bad and indifference; Impression; Impulse; Mind and reason; Nature; Pain and pleasure; Philosophy; Prayer; Providence and atoms; Ruling centre.

Disposition and frame of mind

How a man stands between his acts · Meditations

διάθεσις, diathesis, “disposition”; *διακεῖσθαι, diakeisthai*, “be disposed”, “be equally disposed”, “to be”; *διατίθεσθαι, diatithesthai*, “be put in a worse condition”, “be put in a bad condition”, “disposed”; *γνώμη, gnōmē*, “frame of mind”, “views”, “design”, “in view”; *ὁμογνώμων, homognōmōn*, “of one mind”; *εὐγνώμων, eugnōmōn*, “fair-minded”; *εὐγνωμοσύνη, eugnōmosynē*, “fair-mindedness”; *ἀγνώμων, agnōmōn*, “unfair”; *ἕξις, hexis*, “state”, “cohesion”; *ἦθος, ēthos*, “character”

At a Glance

The word. Διάθεσις is the condition in which a thing is disposed, and διακεῖσθαι to be so disposed. Γνώμη, from the verb “to know”, is a man’s judgement, intention and bent of mind. Ἕξις, from ἔχειν (*echein*), “to hold”, is a lasting state, and ἦθος character.

In the *Meditations*. Disposition is the inward half of a life whose other half is action: “a holy disposition and social actions” (6.30.1). It cannot be impeded (5.20); it is set right by setting right the principle (8.47); and another’s is his own (5.25). The frame of mind is to be serene before death (2.17.2), and carried “towards the same things” as God (12.23).

In this edition. Διάθεσις is always “disposition” and διακεῖσθαι “be disposed”; γνώμη is “frame of mind”, and by sense “views”, “design” and “in view”; ἕξις is “state”, once “cohesion”; ἦθος is always “character”.

A place to read. 8.47, where Marcus asks, if something in his own disposition distresses him, who prevents him from setting right the principle.

Meaning

Διάθεσις (*diathesis*) is the noun of διατιθέναι (*diatithenai*), “to arrange, to dispose”, and διακεῖσθαι (*diakeisthai*), “to lie in some way”, serves as that verb’s passive: the condition in which something has been placed. Γνώμη (*gnōmē*) belongs with γιγνώσκειν (*gignōskein*), “to come to know”: the mind as it judges and intends, an opinion, a purpose. Its compounds mean fair-minded, unfair and of one mind. Ἕξις (*hexis*), from ἔχειν (*echein*), “to have, to hold”, is a having, a lasting condition. Ἦθος (*ēthos*) is in early Greek an accustomed place, then custom, and a man’s character. Marcus’ use is plainer: disposition is how the ruling centre stands, frame of mind its bent, state what lies ready in a man to act, and character what others meet.

Use in the book

Marcus pairs disposition with action: “there is one fruit of life on earth, a holy disposition and social actions” (6.30.1; see Court and office); the good man is content with “his own just action and kindly disposition” (4.25; see Contentment and self-sufficiency); the soul of God and of every rational living being has “the good in a just disposition and action” (5.34; see Desire and aversion); what is worth effort ends in “a disposition that welcomes all that happens” (4.33; see Resentment and welcome); and what is enough is the present opinion, the present action and “the present disposition, well pleased with everything that happens” (9.6; see Present action). Action is what Marcus does; disposition,

in these pairs, is how he stands, towards the gods, towards men and towards what happens.

Disposition is in a man's keeping. By men who stand in his way, as by the sun or the wind, "some activity may be impeded, but there are no impediments to impulse and disposition, because of the reservation and the reversal" (5.20; see Obstacle and reservation). Nor is it beyond repair: "if something in your own disposition distresses you, who prevents you from setting right the principle?" (8.47; see Assent and judgement). The question can be read as defining the word: a disposition is made of principles, and changes when they do. So reason works on it from man to man: "move a rational disposition by a rational disposition; show, remind" (5.28; see Mind and reason). Another's disposition is his: "Another does wrong to me? He will see to it. He has his own disposition, his own activity" (5.25; see Present action).

A disposition is also what a man would do if occasion came. Marcus thanks the gods that he never slipped into offending those close to him, "although I had the kind of disposition from which, had things fallen out so, I might well have done something of the sort" (1.17.1; see Gratitude). When he blames a man as faithless, "yours is the wrong, whether you trusted that a man of such a disposition would guard faith", or gave the favour without taking its whole fruit from the act itself (9.42.4; see Beneficence). Marcus' word for the lasting condition behind wrongs is ἕξις, "state". Even if Marcus abstains from certain wrongs, "yet you have at least the state inclined to them", even if it is through cowardice or courting of fame or some such bad thing that he abstains (11.18.2; see Anger); of the base man he asks, "For what is he to do, having such a state?" (12.16; see Fault and ignorance). Taken together, these can be read as a reason for mildness: the wrongdoer acts from his state as, in the same chapter, the fig tree carries juice in its figs (12.16), and Marcus carries the same state within.

Γνώμη, "frame of mind", is the mind's bent towards what happens. Philosophy lies, among other things, in "awaiting death with a serene frame of mind" (2.17.2; see Dissolution). Those who will to follow nature, "being of one mind with it, must also be equally disposed" towards what nature treats equally, pain and pleasure, death and life, fame and obscurity (9.1.3; see Good, bad and indifference); and of the man whose life ends in due time Marcus writes, "For so he

too is borne by God who is carried along the same way as God and is carried, in frame of mind, towards the same things" (12.23; see Change). Elsewhere the word is ordinary Greek: the "views" of Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, who bore with frank opposition to them (6.30.4; see Care and tolerance), the "design" Marcus is to tell from "ignorance" at another man's ruling centre (9.22; see Fault and ignorance), and the universe embraced "in view" (9.32; see Time and eternity). The compounds turn it towards men. Marcus is to remember "to how many unfair people you have been fair-minded" (5.31; see Parents and education); nature has given "against the unfair man mildness" (9.42.2; see Fault and ignorance); and to expect the base not to wrong oneself while allowing them to wrong others "is unfair and tyrannical" (11.18.6; see Anger). A hindrance too is met "by a fair-minded passing over to what is given" (8.32; see Obstacle and reservation).

Character is what others meet. Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, gave Marcus "the impression of needing correction and treatment of character" (1.7.1; see Learning, practice and correction), and his brother could rouse him "by his character" to take care of himself (1.17.4; see Lucius Verus). It is hard "to bear with even the most refined" of the characters of those who live alongside him (5.10.1; see Care and tolerance), yet "nothing gladdens so much as the likenesses of the virtues showing in the characters of those who live with us" (6.48; see Exemplary lives). Bad characters come as a row of epithets, "A black character, a womanish character, a hard character" (4.28). Their opposite is a way of spending the day: "This is what the perfection of character holds: to pass each day as the last, and to be neither feverish nor torpid nor pretending" (7.69; see Simplicity and sincerity).

Marcus' disposition is not a temperament he is bound to: it is set right with a principle (8.47). Yet it outlasts good conduct: the disposition of 1.17.1 and the state of 11.18.2 remain where no wrong has been done. The book can be read as holding a man answerable for what he is between his acts as well as for the acts.

Places to read

Every chapter in which διάθεσις, διακεῖσθαι, διατίθεσθαι (*diatithesthai*), γνώμη, ὁμογνώμων (*homognōmōn*), εὐγνώμων (*eugnōmōn*), εὐγνωμοσύνη (*eugnōmosynē*),

ἀγνώμων (*agnōmōn*), ἕξις or ἦθος occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The compounds of ἦθος, καλοήθης (*kaloēthēs*; 1.1), κακοήθης (*kakoēthēs*; 3.4.2) and συνήθης (*synēthēs*), "usual", with συνήθεια (*synētheia*), "usage" (see Recurrence and repetition), and of γνώμη, συγγνώμη (*syngnōmē*) and its kin (see Kindness and correction), are left out.

1.7.1 From Rusticus Marcus got the impression of needing correction and treatment of character.

1.7.3 From Rusticus Marcus learned to be easily recalled towards those who had been exasperated or had given offence, as soon as they wanted to come back.

1.15.1 From Claudius Maximus, the Stoic, Marcus had self-mastery, good spirits and a well-tempered character, amiable and stately.

1.17.1 Marcus never slipped into offending those close to him, although he had the kind of disposition from which, had things fallen out so, he might have done so.

1.17.4 Marcus had a brother able by his character to rouse him to take care of himself.

2.12 Marcus lists how man touches God, with what part of himself, and how that part is disposed when it does.

2.17.2 Philosophy lies, among other things, in awaiting death with a serene frame of mind, as nothing but the dissolution of the elements.

4.18 One is to look only at what one is doing oneself, and, in the manner of the good man, not glance round at a black character but run straight along the line.

4.25 Marcus is to try how the life of the good man goes for him, content with his own just action and kindly disposition.

4.28 A row of bad characters: black, womanish, hard, bestial, cattle-like, childish, stupid, counterfeit, buffoonish, huckstering, tyrannical.

4.33 Since all fame fades, what is worth effort is, among other things, a disposition that welcomes all that happens.

5.9 Marcus is to see whether greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, fair-mindedness and holiness are not more agreeable than pleasure.

5.10.1 It is hard to bear with even the most refined of the characters of those who live alongside one.

5.20 Some activity may be impeded by men, but there are no impediments to impulse and disposition, because of the reservation and the reversal.

5.25 If another does wrong to Marcus, that is his affair: he has his own disposition, his own activity.

5.28 Marcus is not to be angry with the man who smells, but, since he too has reason, to move a rational disposition by a rational disposition.

5.31 Marcus is to remember how many things he has come through, and to how many unfair people he has been fair-minded.

5.34 Common to the soul of God and of every rational being is to have the good in a just disposition and action.

6.5 The governing reason knows how it is disposed, what it does and on what material.

6.14 The multitude admires things held together by cohesion or by nature; the man who honours a rational and civic soul preserves his own.

6.30.1 Life is short, and there is one fruit of life on earth, a holy disposition and social actions.

6.30.3 Antoninus was an exact examiner of characters and actions, not a reproacher or a sophist.

6.30.4 Antoninus bore with frank opposition to his views, and rejoiced if someone pointed out a better course.

6.48 Nothing gladdens so much as the likenesses of the virtues showing in the characters of those who live with us.

7.66 Marcus asks how we know whether Telauges, probably the Pythagorean ascetic of a dialogue of Aeschines the Socratic, was not better in disposition than Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, and what sort of soul Socrates had.

7.69 The perfection of character is to pass each day as the last, neither feverish nor torpid nor pretending.

8.32 If an action is prevented, being well pleased with the hindrance and a fair-minded passing over to what is given put another action in its place.

8.47 If something in his own disposition distresses Marcus, no one prevents him from setting right the principle.

9.1.3 Those who will to follow nature, being of one mind with it, must be equally disposed towards what the common nature treats equally.

9.3.2 What makes Marcus most at ease towards death is attention to the things he is about to leave, and to the sort of characters he will be free of.

9.6 Enough: the present opinion firmly grasping, the present action social, and the present disposition well pleased with everything that happens.

9.22 Marcus is to run to another man's ruling centre, to attend whether it is ignorance or design, and to reckon that it is kin.

9.32 Marcus can strip away many superfluous things that lie in his opinion and make much room for himself, embracing the whole universe in view and comprehending eternity.

9.42.2 Nature has given man mildness as an antidote against the unfair man.

9.42.4 When Marcus blames a man as faithless, the wrong is his own, whether he trusted a man of such a disposition to keep faith or gave a favour expecting more than the act.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever taste the loving and cherishing disposition.

10.2 Marcus is to watch what his nature seeks as of one governed by nature alone, and do it, if his nature as a living being is not going to be put in a worse condition; then what his nature as a living being seeks, and take it on, if his nature as a rational living being is not.

11.13 A man must be seen by the gods disposed to be indignant at nothing and to complain of nothing.

11.18.2 Wrongdoers are annoyed at being called unfair; and even if Marcus abstains from certain wrongs, he has the state inclined to them.

11.18.6 To allow the base to wrong others and expect them not to wrong oneself is unfair and tyrannical.

12.16 Marcus asks what the base man is to do, having such a state; if Marcus is vehement, he is to cure this.

12.23 He who ends his life in due time has not been put in a bad condition, and he is borne by God who is carried, in frame of mind, towards the same things as God.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, whose seventh book sets out the Stoic doctrines, reports that of the goods of the soul some are states, ἕξεις (*hexeis*), some dispositions, διαθέσεις (*diatheseis*), and some neither: the virtues are dispositions, the pursuits are states, and the activities are neither.[37] Virtue itself they called "a disposition in agreement with itself" (see Virtue and excellence). The pair had been the terms of Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC. In the *Categories* state and disposition are one kind of quality, and a state differs from a disposition by being more lasting and harder to move: the sciences and the virtues are states, while heat and chill, sickness and health are dispositions, by which a man is disposed in some way but quickly changes.[38] Simplicius, the Neoplatonist commentator of the sixth century, explains in his commentary on the *Categories* that the Stoics seemed to some to have reversed this and made disposition the more lasting, and grants that this has some ground, but says that their distinction did not lie in lasting: states can be tightened and slackened, dispositions cannot. So they called the straightness of a stick a disposition, though the stick can be bent, since straightness admits no more and less; and the virtues are dispositions in this way, not because they last but because they admit no increase, while the arts, hard to move though they are, are not dispositions.[39] Marcus does not use the words as the school's terms: his disposition is the ordinary word for how a man stands, holy (6.30.1) or such as might have offended (1.17.1), and his ἕξις is never a virtue. Epictetus, the Stoic

[37] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.98.

[38] Aristotle, *Categories* 8, 8b26–9a13.

[39] Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*, pp. 237.25–238.5 Kalbfleisch.

teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, held that every state is kept and increased by the acts that answer to it (see Temperance and self-mastery), which can be read beside the state "inclined to" wrongs that Marcus finds in himself (11.18.2). For γνώμη Epictetus has the thought behind Marcus' "of one mind": the man of worth has made his own γνώμη subject to the governor of the whole and keeps it fitted to what happens (see Resentment and welcome).[40] He bids his hearer dare to look up to God and say, "From now on use me for what you will; I am of one mind with you", ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι (*homognōmonō soi*), "… I decline nothing you see fit."[41] Marcus' "being of one mind with it" (9.1.3) and his frame of mind "carried … towards the same things" as God (12.23) can be read as Epictetus' thought in his own words.

Translation in this edition

Διάθεσις is "disposition" at all thirteen of its places (1.17.1, 4.25, 4.33, 5.20, 5.25, 5.28 twice, 5.34, 6.30.1, 7.66, 8.47, 9.6, 9.42.4, 10.1). Διακεῖσθαι is "is disposed" (2.12, 6.5) and, with ἐπίσης (*episēs*), "equally", "be equally disposed" (9.1.3); at 1.7.3, with two adverbs, it is "to be": "to be easily recalled and easily reconciled". The passive of διατιθέναι is "be put in a worse condition" (10.2 twice) and "been put in a bad condition" (12.23), with the adverbs "worse" and "badly", and "disposed" at 11.13, "disposed to be indignant at nothing". "Disposed" at 10.35, "the healthy stomach must be disposed alike towards all foods", renders ὁμοίως ἔχειν (*homoiōs echein*), and "the present condition" at 10.1 renders κατάστασις (*katastasis*). Γνώμη is "frame of mind" (2.17.2, 12.23), and is split by sense, as the Glossary records: "views" (6.30.4), "design" (9.22), and, in the dative of means, "in view" (9.32). Ἐπιβολή (*epibolē*), "project" (11.6.2), is kept apart from it (see Drama and role). Ὁμογνώμων is "of one mind" (9.1.3); εὐγνώμων is "fair-minded" (5.31, 8.32) and εὐγνωμοσύνη "fair-mindedness" (5.9); ἀγνώμων is "unfair" at all its places (5.31, 9.42.2, 11.18.2, 11.18.6). Συγγνώμη, "forgiveness", and its kin have their sub-entries in Kindness and correction. Ἕξις is "cohesion" at 6.14, where it names the lowest rung of the Stoic scale of being (see Living being), and "state" at 11.18.2 and 12.16. "State" also renders ἔχειν with an adverb ("in a state according to

[40] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.12.7 and 1.12.17.

[41] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.16.42.

nature", 4.1; "in a rational and social state", 6.14); at 2.12 "in what state" renders πῶς (*pōs*), "how", with διακέηται, and at 6.24 and 9.33 "state" renders καθίστασθαι (*kathistasthai*). Ἦθος is "character" at all its places; "good character" at 1.1 renders καλόηθες (see Parents and education), and κακόηθες is "malicious" (3.4.2). The "characters" of 6.26 are the letters of a name. At 10.36, where Marcus is to go away "preserving your own habit", the apparatus of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, records the proposal of Herbert Richards, whose notes on Marcus Aurelius appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905, to read ἦθος, "character", for ἔθος (*ethos*), "habit" (see Learning, practice and correction).

ἀγνώμων

Attested: ἀγνώμονας (*agnōmonas*; 5.31), ἀγνώμονα (*agnōmona*; 9.42.2), ἀγνώμονες (*agnōmones*; 11.18.2), ἄγνωμον (*agnōmon*; 11.18.6). Without good sense or feeling; unfair, ungrateful. "To how many unfair people you have been fair-minded" (5.31); "against the unfair man mildness" (9.42.2); wrongdoers are annoyed "at being called unjust and unfair and grasping" (11.18.2); to expect the base not to wrong oneself "is unfair and tyrannical" (11.18.6). Lemma: ἀγνώμων.

γνώμη

Attested: γνώμῃ (*gnōmēi*; 2.17.2, 9.32, 12.23), γνώμαις (*gnōmais*; 6.30.4), γνώμη (*gnōmē*; 9.22). Judgement, mind, purpose; an opinion; the bent of mind. "Awaiting death with a serene frame of mind" (2.17.2); "⟨those⟩ who frankly opposed his views" (6.30.4); "whether it is ignorance or design" (9.22); "having embraced the whole universe in view" (9.32), where the "⟨by⟩" before these words renders ⟨τῷ⟩ (*tōi*), the supplement of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints; "carried, in frame of mind, towards the same things" (12.23). Lemma: γνώμη.

διάθεσις

Attested: διάθεσιν (*diathesin*; 1.17.1, 5.25, 5.28, 7.66, 9.42.4), διαθέσει (*diathesei*; 4.25, 5.28, 5.34, 8.47), διάθεσις (*diathesis*; 4.33, 6.30.1, 9.6), διαθέσεως (*diatheseōs*; 5.20, 10.1). Arrangement; the condition in which a thing is disposed; a man's disposition. "A holy disposition

and social actions" (6.30.1); "no impediments to impulse and disposition" (5.20); "He has his own disposition, his own activity" (5.25); "move a rational disposition by a rational disposition" (5.28); "if something in your own disposition distresses you, who prevents you from setting right the principle?" (8.47). Lemma: διάθεσις.

διάκειμαι

Attested: διακεῖσθαι (*diakeisthai*; 1.7.3, 9.1.3), διακέηται (*diakeētai*; 2.12), διακείμενος (*diakeimenos*; 6.5). To be in a certain condition, to be disposed. "The governing reason knows how it is disposed, and what it does, and on what material" (6.5); those who follow nature "must also be equally disposed" (9.1.3). At 2.12, "in what state that part of man [stands and] is disposed", Leopold brackets ἔχῃ (*echēi*), "stands", after Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802; A, the Vatican manuscript, has a corrupt form of the verb and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, the indicative. At 1.7.3 the infinitive goes with two adverbs, "to be easily recalled and easily reconciled", where "easily reconciled" is the reading of D and of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor (see Anger). Lemma: διάκειμαι.

διατίθημι

Attested: διατίθεσθαι (*diatithesthai*; 10.2 twice), διατιθέμενον (*diatithemenon*; 11.13), διετέθη (*dietethē*; 12.23). To arrange, to dispose; in the passive, to be put in a condition, to be disposed. Marcus is to do what his nature seeks, "if your nature as a living being is not going to be put in a worse condition" (10.2; see Living being); "a man must be seen by the gods disposed to be indignant at nothing" (11.13); he who ended life in due time has not "been put in a bad condition" (12.23). Lemma: διατίθημι.

ἕξις

Attested: ἕξεως (*hexeōs*; 6.14), ἕξιν (*hexin*; 11.18.2, 12.16). A having; a lasting state; in the Stoic scale of being, the cohesion that holds stones and timber together. "Things held together by cohesion or by nature" (6.14; see Living being); "yet you have at least the state inclined to them" (11.18.2), where P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has ποιητικήν (*poiētikēn*), "productive of them", for ἐποιστικήν (*epoistikēn*), as Leopold reports; "For what is he to do, having such a state?" (12.16). Lemma: ἕξις.

εὐγνωμοσύνη

Attested: εὐγνωμοσύνη (*eugnōmosynē*; 5.9). Good feeling, fairness of mind. “But look whether greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, fair-mindedness, holiness are more agreeable” (5.9; see Philosophy). Lemma: εὐγνωμοσύνη.

εὐγνώμων

Attested: εὐγνώμων (*eugnōmōn*; 5.31), εὐγνώμονι (*eugnōmoni*; 8.32). Of good mind; fair, reasonable. “To how many unfair people you have been fair-minded” (5.31), where P has ἀγνώμων, “unfair”, as Leopold reports; “by a fair-minded passing over to what is given” (8.32). Lemma: εὐγνώμων.

ἦθος

Attested: ἤθους (*ēthous*; 1.7.1, 1.15.1, 1.17.4, 7.69), ἦθος (*ēthos*; 4.18, 4.28 three times), ἤθη (*ēthē*; 5.10.1), ἠθῶν (*ēthōn*; 6.30.3, 9.3.2), ἤθεσι (*ēthesi*; 6.48). Accustomed place; custom; character. “Correction and treatment of character” (1.7.1); “a well-tempered character, amiable and stately” (1.15.1); “an exact examiner of characters and actions” (6.30.3); “This is what the perfection of character holds” (7.69). At 4.18 A leaves out the words “not to glance round at a black character, but to run straight along the line”, as Leopold reports. Lemma: ἦθος.

ὁμογνώμων

Attested: ὁμογνώμονας (*homognōmonas*; 9.1.3). Of one mind. “Those who will to follow nature, being of one mind with it, must also be equally disposed” (9.1.3). Lemma: ὁμογνώμων.

See also

Anger; Assent and judgement; Beneficence; Care and tolerance; Change; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Court and office; Desire and aversion; Dissolution; Drama and role; Exemplary lives; Fault and ignorance; Good, bad and indifference; Gratitude; Kindness and correction; Learning, practice and correction; Living being; Lucius Verus; Mind and reason; Obstacle and reservation; Parents and education; Philosophy; Present action; Recurrence and repetition; Resentment and welcome; Simplicity and sincerity; Temperance and self-mastery; Time and eternity; Virtue and excellence.

Good, bad and indifference

What makes a man better or worse · Meditations

ἀγαθόν, agathon, “good”, “better”; *κακόν, kakon*, “bad”, “worst”; *κακία, kakia*, “vice”; *καλόν, kalon*, “honourable”, “beautiful”; *αἰσχρόν, aischron*, “shameful”; *τὰ μέσα, ta mesa*, “things indifferent”; *τὰ ἀδιάφορα, ta adiaphora*, “things that make no difference”; *ἀδιαφορεῖν, adiaphorein*, “treat as making no difference”; *ἀδιαφορία, adiaphoria*, “indifference”; *σπουδαῖος, spoudaios*, “serious”; *φαῦλος, phaulos*, “base”

At a Glance

The word. Ἀγαθόν is the good and κακόν the bad; κακία is badness of soul, vice. The Stoics held that only virtue is good and only vice bad, and called everything else indifferent: τὰ ἀδιάφορα, “things that make no difference”, or, in Marcus’ other word, τὰ μέσα, “the middle things”.

In the *Meditations*. Death and life, fame, pain, pleasure and wealth befall good men and bad alike, and are “neither good nor bad” (2.11.4); nothing is good for a man “which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous, free” (8.1). A man lives most honourably if he “treats as making no difference the things that make no difference” (11.16), yet among them he still seeks “what is according to worth” (3.11.3).

In this edition. Ἀγαθόν and κακόν are “good” and “bad”, never “evil”; κακία is “vice”, καλόν “honourable” and αἰσχρόν “shameful”; τὰ μέσα is “things indifferent”, kept apart from τὰ ἀδιάφορα, “things that make no difference”.

A place to read. 2.11, where Marcus argues from the gods’ care that what befalls good men and bad alike is neither good nor bad.

Meaning

Ἀγαθός (*agathos*) is “good” in every ordinary sense: good at something, brave, well born, useful. Κακός (*kakos*) is its opposite, bad, base or harmful, and κακία (*kakia*) is badness, in moral philosophy vice. Καλός (*kalos*) is beautiful and, of conduct, honourable; αἰσχρός (*aischros*) is ugly, and so shameful. The Stoics tied the two pairs together: only the honourable is good, and whatever neither benefits nor harms, such as life, health, wealth and fame, is ἀδιάφορον

(*adiaphoron*), a thing that makes no difference to whether a man is happy.[42]

Marcus takes over the doctrine and its words: the good is honourable and the bad shameful (2.1), and for what lies "between virtue and vice" (7.31) he has both ἀδιάφορα and τὰ μέσα (*ta mesa*), "the middle things". He uses the words less to sort the world than to judge what happens to him and what others do.

Use in the book

Book II opens with the doctrine as something Marcus has seen: "I have observed the nature of the good, that it is honourable, and of the bad, that it is shameful" (2.1), and so no one he meets can harm him, "for no one will involve me in what is shameful". Ten chapters later he argues it. The gods "do exist, and they do care for human affairs; and they have put it wholly in man's power not to fall into what is truly bad. And if there were anything bad in the rest, they would have provided for this too … But how could what does not make a man worse make a man's life worse?" (2.11.2). The nature of the whole would not have let good and bad "befall good men and bad indiscriminately and alike" (2.11.3). "But death and life, fame and obscurity, pain and pleasure, wealth and poverty: all these befall good men and bad alike, being neither honourable nor shameful. So they are neither good nor bad" (2.11.4).

The measure of good is what a thing does to the man: by Marcus' principles "about good things and bad", nothing is good for him that does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous and free (8.1; see Virtue and excellence). At 5.12 he tests the many's goods with a line of the comic poet Menander:[43] whoever has conceived of "truly goods, such as wisdom, self-control, justice, courage" could not listen to the phrase "from the goods", "for it will not fit"; said of wealth and luxury, the line is received "as aptly and wittily said", so that "even the many form an impression of the difference". Pleasure fails another test: no honourable and good man would regret having let a pleasure pass, "so pleasure is neither useful nor good" (8.10). The good and the bad lie "not in being acted upon but in activity" (9.16), and "Within is the spring of the good" (7.59).

---

[42] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.101–102, 7.104.

[43] Menander, fr. 530.9 Kock, as the edition's note at 5.12 identifies the line.

The bad is vice, and each man's vice is his own. "It is ridiculous not to flee one's own vice, which is indeed possible, but to flee that of others, which is impossible" (7.71). Another's vice "does no harm to another" (8.55), "otherwise my neighbour's vice would be bad for me, which God did not decide" (8.56). His own vice is the one to fear: a more gracious man would have left life without a taste of lying, pretence, luxury and vanity, and to die having had one's fill of them "is the second voyage", the proverbial next-best course;[44] and he asks whether he has "chosen to sit fast by vice" (9.2). Whoever counts things outside his choice good or bad must blame the gods and hate men; "But if we judge only what is in our power to be good and bad, no cause is left either to accuse God or to take an enemy's stand against a man" (6.41).

Everything else is indifferent. "To live through life most honourably: the faculty for this is in the soul, if one treats as making no difference the things that make no difference" (11.16). Even man, "in so far as some stand in the way of my proper works", becomes "one of the things that make no difference to me", though "in one respect" he is "the thing most proper to us" (5.20). The ground of it is piety. The common nature "uses equally" pain and pleasure, death and life, fame and obscurity, and whoever does not stand equally towards them "is clearly impious" (9.1.3); so is whoever pursues pleasures as good, for he must blame nature when "the base are often in pleasures … while the serious meet with pain" (9.1.2). Indifference here is not neglect. Of a kinsman ignorant of what is according to nature, Marcus says, "I treat him according to the natural law of fellowship, with goodwill and justice, while in things indifferent I try at the same time to hit on what is according to worth" (3.11.3). He is to help others "according to worth, even if they are losing in things indifferent" (5.36), and "what is just will not be kept" if we are at odds over things indifferent (11.10).

Good has a second measure, the whole. "To every part of nature that is good which the nature of the whole brings" (2.3; see Nature), and the ending of life "is for each not bad, because not shameful either, if indeed it is both outside choice and not unsocial; and good, if indeed it is opportune for the whole" (12.23; see Change). This can be read as agreeing with 2.11.4: measured by what it does to a man's character, death is neither good nor bad; measured by the

[44] Plato, *Phaedo* 99c–d.

whole, it is good when it is opportune. What the doctrine gives Marcus is not coldness but a single place where he can be harmed, his own choice, and so a world in which anger has no ground: anger goes when he reckons that what was done to him "is not shameful", "for if the shameful is not the only bad thing, you too must necessarily do much wrong" (11.18.3).

Places to read

The passages where good and bad, vice and the shameful are discussed or carry the argument, in the order of the book, with every place of τὰ μέσα and of ἀδιάφορος and its family; every place of each word is given in the sub-entries.

2.1 Marcus has observed that the nature of the good is honourable and of the bad shameful, so that no wrongdoer can harm him or involve him in what is shameful.

2.3 What the nature of the whole brings to each part of nature, and what preserves the whole, is good for that part.

2.11 The gods have put it wholly in man's power not to fall into what is truly bad; death and life, fame and obscurity, pain and pleasure, wealth and poverty befall good men and bad alike, and so are neither good nor bad.

2.17.2 Death is the dissolution of the elements, which is according to nature, and nothing according to nature is bad.

3.6.3 Nothing of another kind, the praise of the many, office, wealth or pleasure, may be set up against the rational good.

3.11.3 Marcus treats a kinsman according to the law of fellowship, and in things indifferent tries to hit on what is according to worth.

4.39 What is bad for a man lies only where he forms opinions about bad things; what can happen equally to a bad man and a good is neither bad nor good.

5.12 Even the many sense the difference between true goods, such as wisdom, self-control, justice and courage, and their own, since the comic poet's jibe fits only wealth and luxury.

5.15 Nothing that does not fall to a man as a man is his good, or the man who strips himself of such things would not be the better for it.

5.16 The good of each thing lies where its end is, and the good of a rational living being is fellowship.

5.20 In one respect man is most proper to us; in so far as he obstructs our work, he becomes one of the things that make no difference.

5.35 If a thing is neither Marcus' vice nor an act of his vice, and the community is not harmed, he asks why he should be at odds over it.

5.36 Marcus is to help others according to worth even when their losses are in things indifferent, but not to form the impression that the loss is a harm.

6.32 To the poor body all things make no difference; to the understanding, all that is not its own present act makes no difference.

6.33 Pain is not contrary to nature for a man who does what belongs to a man, and so not bad for him.

6.41 Whoever counts things outside his choice good or bad must blame the gods and hate men; if only what is in our power counts as good and bad, no cause is left to accuse God or to take an enemy's stand against a man.

6.44.2 Even if the gods take counsel about nothing, Marcus can take counsel for himself: what is advantageous to each accords with his nature, and only what benefits his cities, Rome and the universe, is good for him.

6.45 Whatever happens to each is advantageous to the whole; "advantageous" is also taken in the commoner sense, of things indifferent.

6.51 The lover of fame finds his good in another's activity, the lover of pleasure in being acted upon, the man with a mind in his own action.

7.26 When someone does wrong, Marcus is to consider with what opinion of good or bad he did it; seeing this, he will pity him.

7.31 Marcus is to make himself bright with simplicity, self-respect and indifference towards what lies between virtue and vice.

7.59 Within is the spring of the good, which can always gush up if one digs.

7.64 Pain is not shameful and does not make the understanding worse.

7.71 It is ridiculous to flee others' vice, which is impossible, and not one's own, which is possible.

8.1 The principles from which impulses and actions come are about good and bad: nothing is good that does not make a man just, self-controlled, courageous and free (see Virtue and excellence).

8.10 Regret is reproach for letting something useful pass; no honourable and good man regrets a pleasure let pass, so pleasure is neither useful nor good.

8.14 Whoever Marcus meets, he asks first what principles the man has about good and bad.

8.28 Pain is bad either for the body, which can speak for itself, or for the soul, which need not judge it bad.

8.55 Vice does no harm to the universe, and a man's vice harms only himself.

8.56 A neighbour's faculty of choice makes no difference to Marcus', or the neighbour's vice would be bad for him.

9.1.2–4 Whoever pursues pleasure as good and flees pain as bad is impious, for he must often blame nature for allotting pleasures to the base and pains to the serious; one must stand equally towards what nature uses equally.

9.2 It would have been the part of a more gracious man to leave life without a taste of lying, pretence, luxury and vanity; to die having had one's fill of them is the second voyage; corruption of the understanding is a plague.

9.16 The bad and the good of a rational civic living being, like its virtue and vice, lie in activity, not in being acted upon.

9.42.4 Man, beneficent by nature, has his own when he does something beneficent or co-operative in things indifferent.

10.33.4 Other things are made worse by what befalls them; man becomes better by using it rightly.

11.10 What is just will not be kept if we are at odds over things indifferent.

11.16 The soul lives most honourably if it treats as making no difference the things that make no difference, remembering that it is we who write the judgements about them in ourselves.

11.18.3 Anger goes when one reckons that what was done is not shameful, for if the shameful is not the only bad thing, one must do much wrong oneself.

12.23 The ending of life is not bad, because not shameful, if it is outside choice and not unsocial; and it is good if it is opportune for the whole.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, gives in his account of Stoic ethics the doctrine Marcus assumes, citing the Stoic Hecaton of Rhodes and Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school: of the things that are, some are good, some bad and some neither; good are the virtues, "wisdom, justice, courage, self-control and the rest", bad their opposites, and neither are "life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, fame, noble birth" and their opposites, "death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, obscurity, low birth".[45] Diogenes gives two of their arguments: "As it is the property of heat to warm and not to chill, so it is the property of good to benefit and not to harm"; but wealth and health do no more benefit than harm, and "what can be used well and badly is not good".[46] Marcus' test at 2.11 and 4.39, that what befalls good and bad alike is neither good nor bad, can be read as a form of the second. The Stoics also distinguished two senses of indifferent: what contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness, as wealth, fame, health and strength; and what moves neither impulse nor aversion, such as having an odd or an even number of hairs on one's head. Among the first, things that have worth, ἀξία (*axia*), are "preferred", and things with the opposite "dispreferred".[47] Marcus' search for "what is according to worth" in things indifferent (3.11.3) can be read as a search for that worth. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, puts

[45] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.101–102.

[46] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.103.

[47] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.104–105.

the division in the mouth of a pupil who recites it as he would a line of Homer: "Of the things that are, some are good, some bad, some indifferent. Good are the virtues and what shares in them, bad are vices and what shares in vice, and indifferent what lies between these: wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain." Then he asks whether the pupil has tested any of it and made it a principle of his own, and whether he remembers the division in a storm at sea, when a mischievous bystander asks him whether shipwreck is a vice or shares in vice.[48] Marcus' "what lies between virtue and vice" (7.31) is the same placing, and his notebook, with its constant restatement of the doctrine, can be read as the work Epictetus demands: making it his own.

Translation in this edition

Ἀγαθόν is "good", as adjective and as noun ("the good", "good things", "goods", "a good"), except at 5.15, where μᾶλλον ἀγαθός (*mallon agathos*) is "the better"; κακόν is "bad", never "evil", because the argument of 2.11 and much else turns on the single word, which is the same whether Marcus speaks of vice or of misfortune. The one other rendering of κακός is "worst" for the superlative in a saying of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, "the worst ruin" (11.25). The adverb κακῶς (*kakōs*) is "ill" (1.15.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.55, 7.36, 8.45, 8.49), "in a bad way" (8.40, 9.35), "badly" (at 9.35, a supplement of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, adopted by J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints) and "in a bad condition" (12.23). Κακία is "vice" at every place. Καλόν is "honourable" where the sense is moral, and "beautiful" where it is beauty (4.20, 5.31, 6.36, 6.57, 7.48, 12.23); the adverb καλῶς (*kalōs*) is "honourably" (9.35, 9.41, 10.7.1, 11.5, 12.5), and elsewhere is rendered as the phrase requires: "doing well" (4.24), "Good:" (4.26), "make good use" (6.42), "took good counsel" (6.44.1), "speak well" (7.44), "use them well" (7.58), "as it should be" (10.13), "You have said it well" (12.36). Αἰσχρόν is "shameful" throughout. Τὰ μέσα is "things indifferent" (3.11.3, 5.36, 6.45, 9.42.4, 11.10), kept apart from τὰ ἀδιάφορα, "things that make no difference": "one of the things that make no difference" (5.20), "all things make no difference" (6.32), "makes no difference" (8.56), "the things that make no difference" (11.16). The verb ἀδιαφορεῖν is "treat as making no

[48] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.19.12–15.

difference" (11.16), and the abstract noun ἀδιαφορία is "indifference" (7.31); the "indifference to pleasure" of 5.5 renders another word, τὸ ἀφιλήδονον (*to aphilēdonon*). "Make no difference" and its variants also render the impersonal διαφέρει (*diapherei*) and the imperative διαφέρου (2.14.2, 4.15, 6.2, 6.23, 10.13, 10.15, 12.35, 12.36; "what difference is there", 4.50), so that the English keeps the family Marcus plays on at 6.32, where the body "cannot tell a difference"; elsewhere the middle is "be at odds" (4.46, 5.35, 9.27, 9.40, 11.10, 11.39), and once "the things they are set on" (5.1.3). At 7.58 Leopold prints διάφορον (*diaphoron*), "makes a difference"; Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, proposed ἀδιάφορον, "makes no difference", and the note gives both.

ἀγαθός

Attested: ἀγαθοῖς (*agathois*; 1.4, 2.11.3, 2.11.4), ἀγαθούς (*agathous*; 1.17.1 four times), ἀγαθήν (*agathēn*; 1.17.1, 5.36), ἀγαθῶν (*agathōn*; 2.1, 2.13, 5.12, 8.1, 8.14, 11.21), ἀγαθοῦ (*agathou*; 2.1, 3.16.2, 4.25, 5.26, 6.41, 7.44, 7.59, 8.1, 10.1), ἀγαθόν (*agathon*; 2.3, 2.7, 3.6.2, 4.18, 4.39, 4.42, 5.15, 5.16 twice, 5.34, 6.30.1, 6.41, 6.51, 7.15, 7.17, 7.23, 7.26 twice, 7.46, 8.5, 8.10 twice, 8.20 twice, 9.16, 9.17, 9.41, 10.16, 10.30, 10.32, 11.5, 11.15, 11.16, 12.23, 12.29, 12.34, 12.35), ἀγαθά (*agatha*; 2.11.3, 2.11.4, 3.4.3, 5.12 four times, 5.15, 6.41, 6.44.2, 7.26, 9.1.2), ἀγαθῷ (*agathōi*; 3.6.3, 4.39, 8.10), ἀγαθός (*agathos*; 4.10 twice, 4.17, 5.15 twice, 7.17, 8.10, 8.22, 10.8.1, 10.13, 10.32, 11.15), ἀγαθαί (*agathai*; 5.36 four times), ἀγαθή (*agathē*; 10.1). Good; as a noun, the good, and in the plural goods. Of persons it is the good man, "in the sense in which the good man is specifically conceived" (4.10); of things, in Marcus' strict sense, only what makes a man better: "nothing is good for a man which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous, free" (8.1). At 7.23 the word is a supplement, which Leopold prints. Lemma: ἀγαθός.

ἀδιαφορέω

Attested: ἀδιαφορῇ (*adiaphorēi*; 11.16), ἀδιαφορήσει (*adiaphorēsei*; 11.16). To treat as making no difference. The faculty to live most honourably is in the soul, "if one treats as making no difference the things that make no difference. And one will so treat them if one observes each of them both in its parts and as a whole" (11.16). Lemma: ἀδιαφορέω.

ἀδιαφορία

Attested: ἀδιαφορίᾳ (*adiaphoriāi*; 7.31). Indifference, the disposition of one who treats things as making no difference. “Make yourself bright with simplicity and self-respect and indifference towards what lies between virtue and vice” (7.31). Lemma: ἀδιαφορία.

ἀδιάφορος

Attested: ἀδιαφόρων (*adiaphorōn*; 5.20), ἀδιάφορα (*adiaphora*; 6.32 three times, 11.16), ἀδιάφορον (*adiaphoron*; 8.56). Making no difference; in the neuter plural, the Stoic term for what is neither good nor bad. A man who obstructs Marcus’ work becomes “one of the things that make no difference to me” (5.20); to the understanding, “the things that make no difference are those that are not its own acts” (6.32); a neighbour’s faculty of choice “makes no difference” to Marcus’ own (8.56). Lemma: ἀδιάφορος.

αἰσχρός

Attested: αἰσχρόν (*aischron*; 2.1, 6.29, 7.37, 7.64, 8.15 twice, 11.18.3 twice, 12.23), αἰσχρῷ (*aischrōi*; 2.1), αἰσχρά (*aischra*; 2.11.4), αἰσχροῦ (*aischrou*; 7.45). Ugly; of conduct, shameful, the Stoic bad. “No one will involve me in what is shameful” (2.1); “if the shameful is not the only bad thing, you too must necessarily do much wrong” (11.18.3). At 7.45 the word is Socrates’ at his trial, in Plato’s *Apology*.[49] Lemma: αἰσχρός.

κακία

Attested: κακίᾳ (*kakiāi*; 4.3.2, 9.2), κακια (*kakia*; 5.35, 7.1, 8.55, 8.56, 9.16, 12.1.1), κακίαν (*kakian*; 5.35, 6.1, 7.66, 7.71), κακίας (*kakias*; 7.31). Badness of soul, vice, the opposite of virtue. “What is vice? It is what you have seen often” (7.1); it harms only its owner, “to whom it has been granted also to be rid of it, as soon as he so wants” (8.55). Lemma: κακία.

κακός

Attested: κακῶν (*kakōn*; 2.1, 2.13, 4.39, 8.1, 8.14), κακοῦ (*kakou*; 2.1, 5.26, 6.41, 7.44, 8.1, 8.58), κακῷ (*kakōi*; 2.11.1, 4.39, 10.7.1), κακοῖς (*kakois*; 2.11.2, 2.11.3, 2.11.4, 9.35), κακόν (*kakon*; 2.11.2, 2.17.2, 4.39 twice, 4.42, 5.29, 5.36, 6.33, 6.41, 7.14, 7.26, 8.20 twice, 8.28 twice, 8.41 five times, 8.56, 9.4, 9.16, 9.17, 9.21, 9.38, 9.42.3, 10.7.1 twice, 10.33.3,

[49] Plato, *Apology* 28d, as the edition’s note at 7.45 identifies it.

10.33.4, 10.36, 11.13, 11.17, 11.18.2, 11.18.3, 12.23 four times, 12.34), κακά (*kaka*; 2.11.3, 2.11.4, 6.41, 7.26, 9.1.2), κακός (*kakos*; 10.33.4), κακίστῳ (*kakistōi*; 11.25); the adverb κακῶς (*kakōs*; 1.15.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.55, 7.36, 8.40, 8.45, 8.49, 9.35 twice, 12.23), one of the two at 9.35 Reiske's supplement, which Leopold prints. Bad; as a noun, the bad, what harms a man by making him worse. "What is bad for you does not subsist in another's ruling centre … Where then? Where that in you is which forms opinions about bad things" (4.39). At 9.42.3 Leopold prints a conjecture, καινόν, "new", where the manuscripts have κακόν a second time; only the first κακόν there is counted. Lemma: κακός.

καλός

Attested: καλῶν (*kalōn*; 1.8.2, 4.20, 6.36), καλόν (*kalon*; 2.1, 4.20 four times, 5.3, 6.57, 7.48, 12.23), καλά (*kala*; 2.11.4, 3.4.3, 5.31), καλός (*kalos*; 7.58, 8.10), καλῷ (*kalōi*; 8.10), καλοῦ (*kalou*; 10.1), κάλλιστα (*kallista*; 11.16); the adverb καλῶς (*kalōs*; 4.24, 4.26, 6.42, 6.44.1, 7.44, 7.58, 9.35, 9.41, 10.7.1, 10.13, 11.5, 12.5, 12.36). Beautiful; of conduct, honourable, which for the Stoics is the same as good. "I have observed the nature of the good, that it is honourable" (2.1); the honourable and good man (8.10); "want to be honourable in your own eyes in everything you do" (7.58). Beauty is the sense at 4.20, where "Everything that is in any way beautiful is beautiful of itself", and at 5.31, 6.36, 6.57, 7.48 and 12.23. Lemma: καλός.

μέσος

Attested: μέσοις (*mesois*; 3.11.3), μέσα (*mesa*; 5.36, 9.42.4, 11.10), μέσων (*mesōn*; 6.45), μέσαι (*mesai*; 7.1), μέσον (*meson*; 7.31), μέσου (*mesou*; 8.2), μέσῳ (*mesōi*; 10.34), μέση (*mesē*; 11.6.2). Middle; the neuter plural τὰ μέσα, "the middle things", is what lies between virtue and vice, "things indifferent" (3.11.3, 5.36, 6.45, 9.42.4, 11.10), and τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας is "what lies between virtue and vice" (7.31). Elsewhere the word has its ordinary senses: the "middle" histories (7.1), ἐκ μέσου, "out of the way" (8.2), ἐν μέσῳ, what "lies open to all" (10.34), and "the Middle Comedy" (11.6.2). Lemma: μέσος.

σπουδαῖος

Attested: σπουδαῖα (*spoudaia*; 6.13), σπουδαίοις (*spoudaiois*; 9.1.2), σπουδαίους (*spoudaious*; 9.1.2),

σπουδαῖος (*spoudaios*; 10.36), σπουδαίου (*spoudaiou*; 10.36). Serious, earnest about what matters; of persons, the Stoic good man, set against the base. Whoever pursues pleasure as good must blame nature, "because the base are often in pleasures and acquire what produces them, while the serious meet with pain and what produces it" (9.1.2). Even the dying man who "was serious and wise" will have someone glad to be rid of him (10.36). Of things it is "serious things" (6.13), where vanity deceives a man into thinking himself busied about them. Lemma: σπουδαῖος.

φαῦλος

Attested: φαύλους (*phaulous*; 5.17, 9.1.2, 11.18.6), φαύλων (*phaulōn*; 7.70 twice, 11.39), φαύλοις (*phaulois*; 9.1.2), φαῦλον (*phaulon*; 12.16). Base, worthless; in Stoic usage the bad man, the opposite of the serious. "It is impossible for base people not to do some things of this kind" (5.17); the gods bear with "so many base people", and Marcus is "one of the base" (7.70). Lemma: φαῦλος.

See also

Anger; Assent and judgement; Change; Desire and aversion; Fault and ignorance; Justice; Moral choice and freedom; Nature; Obstacle and reservation; Pain and pleasure; Ruling centre; Self-respect and shame; Virtue and excellence.

Harm

What can harm a man · Meditations

βλάπτειν, blaptein, "harm", "be harmed", "does no harm", "intending harm"; *βλάβη, blabē*, "harm"; *βλαβερός, blaberos*, "harmful"; *ἀσινής, asinēs*, "unharmed"

At a Glance

The word. Βλάπτειν is to hinder, to damage, to harm; βλάβη is the harm done, and βλαβερός what does harm. The Stoics held that only vice harms, as only virtue benefits.

In the *Meditations*. The family comes in twenty-two chapters. Marcus' test is that "What does not make a man himself worse than himself does not make his life worse either, nor harm, from without or from within" (4.8). The particular vice "does no harm to another" (8.55), and the words Marcus would say, mildly, to the insolent man are "I

shall not be harmed, but you are being harmed, child" (11.18.4; see Anger). Yet he still asks whether the community is harmed (5.35).

In this edition. Βλάπτειν is always "harm", in the passive "be harmed"; βλάβη is "harm" and βλαβερός "harmful". "Unharmed" renders ἀσινής, once (2.17.2).

A place to read. 4.8, where what does not make a man worse than himself is said to harm him neither from without nor from within.

Meaning

Βλάπτειν (*blaptein*) is in Homer to hinder or disable: Ajax, the son of Oileus, slipping in the dung in the foot race at Patroclus' funeral games, complains that "the goddess hindered my feet".[50] In later Greek it is to damage or harm, and βλάβη (*blabē*) is the damage done. The Stoics made harm the opposite of benefit and tied both to character: to benefit is to move or to hold according to virtue (see Beneficence), and to harm is "to move or to hold according to vice"; what neither benefits nor harms, such as wealth and health, is indifferent (see Good, bad and indifference).[51] Marcus keeps the ordinary word and narrows its object. Harm, for him, is done to what a man is, his ruling centre, and its test is whether he is made worse.

Use in the book

The test is stated plainly at 4.8: "What does not make a man himself worse than himself does not make his life worse either, nor harm, from without or from within"; Book II had put it as a question (2.11.2; see Good, bad and indifference). The chapter before puts the harm in the opinion: take the opinion away and "I have been harmed" goes, and with it the harm (4.7; see Assent and judgement). Of whatever falls from outside, "the things affected will blame, if they want; but I, if I do not form the opinion that what has happened is bad, am not yet harmed; and it is open to me not to form it" (7.14). A report that someone speaks ill of him reports nothing of harm: "but that you have been harmed has not been reported" (8.49; see Impression). The same holds where the word is "bad": "What is bad for you does not subsist in another's ruling centre, nor indeed in any turning or variation of the surroundings. Where then? Where that in

[50] Homer, *Iliad* 23.754, 23.774 and 23.782.

[51] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.102–104.

you is which forms opinions about bad things." Even if the poor body "is cut, burned, festers, rots", that part is to keep quiet and to judge "that nothing is either bad or good which can happen equally to a bad man and a good" (4.39).

So the wrongs of others do not reach him. Book II opens with it: knowing the good and the bad, "I can neither be harmed by any of them, for no one will involve me in what is shameful" (2.1; see Fault and ignorance). Among the thoughts that let a man love those who stumble is, "above all, that he has not harmed you; for he has not made your ruling centre worse than it was before" (7.22; see Fault and ignorance), and before those who provoke him Marcus asks, "And how, too, have you been harmed?" (9.42.2; see Fault and ignorance). Censure is no exception: "When they think they harm by censuring, or benefit by extolling, what conceit!" (9.34). The doctrine is easier to state than to hold. "You will soon be dead," Marcus tells himself, "and you are not yet … free of the suspicion that you may be harmed from outside" (4.37; see Simplicity and sincerity).

Harm does not vanish; it changes owner. "Vice in general does no harm to the universe; and the particular vice does no harm to another, but is harmful only to the one to whom it has been granted also to be rid of it, as soon as he so wants" (8.55). The harm is real, and it is the wrongdoer's own. Truth harms no one, "but he is harmed who persists in his own deception and ignorance" (6.21; see Truth and falsehood); and the ninth head against anger turns the insolent man's attack back on him: "I shall not be harmed, but you are being harmed, child" (11.18.4; see Anger).

Marcus does not conclude that nothing in the world can be harmed. "Nothing is harmful to the part that is advantageous to the whole" (10.6.1; see Whole and part), but the city and the community can suffer harm. At every impression of having been harmed he is to apply a rule: "if the city is not harmed by this, I have not been harmed either"; and if it is, "one must not be angry" (5.22; see Citizenship), and to remember that nothing harms the citizen by nature that does not harm the city, nor the city that does not harm law (10.33.4; see Citizenship). The fullest form of the test has two questions: "If this is neither my vice nor an activity in accordance with my vice, and the community is not harmed, why am I at odds over it? And what is the harm to the community?" (5.35). They can be read as naming the only two places where Marcus allows harm to be done, his

own character and the common good; and harming is what rational beings were made not to do, for nature made them "to benefit one another according to worth and in no way to harm" (9.1.1; see Justice).

The doctrine does not forbid help. When others lose, the rule is: "Do not be wholly swept away by the impression, but help according to power and according to worth, even if they are losing in things indifferent; but do not form the impression that it is a harm: for that is a bad habit" (5.36). The help stands; only the opinion is refused. The image that follows, of the old man who, going away, asked for his foster-child's top back, "remembering that it was a top", can be read as that double attitude: the old man asks for the top and still remembers that it is a top. The account can be read as giving harm to a man a single door, which opens from within, and so as leaving Marcus free to help without fear and to be wronged without anger.

Places to read

Every chapter in which βλάπτειν, βλάβη or βλαβερός occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with 2.17.2, where "unharmed" renders ἀσινής, and 4.39, which treats harm under the word "bad".

2.1 Knowing the good honourable and the bad shameful, and the wrongdoer his kinsman, Marcus can neither be harmed by any of those he will meet nor be angry with them.

2.16 The soul does violence to itself when it turns away from a man or goes against him intending harm, as the souls of angry men do.

2.17.2 Philosophy lies in keeping the daimon within inviolate and unharmed, master of pleasures and pains.

4.7 If the opinion is taken away, "I have been harmed" is taken away, and with it the harm.

4.8 What does not make a man worse than himself does not make his life worse, nor harm him, from without or from within.

4.37 Marcus will soon be dead, and is not yet free of the suspicion that he may be harmed from outside.

4.39 What is bad for a man subsists only where the part of him is that forms opinions about bad things;

even if the body is cut or burned, that part is to keep quiet.

5.22 What is not harmful to the city does not harm the citizen; if the city is harmed, one must not be angry.

5.35 If a thing is neither Marcus' vice nor an activity of his vice, and the community is not harmed, he asks why he is at odds over it, and what the harm to the community is.

5.36 One is to help others according to power and worth when they lose in things indifferent, but not to form the impression that the loss is a harm, for that is a bad habit.

6.1 The reason that governs the substance of the whole has no vice, does nothing ill, and nothing is harmed by it.

6.21 Marcus seeks the truth, by which no one was ever harmed; he is harmed who persists in his own deception and ignorance.

7.14 Marcus is not yet harmed by what falls from outside if he does not form the opinion that it is bad, and it is open to him not to form it.

7.22 One comes to love even those who stumble if one remembers, above all, that the wrongdoer has not harmed one, for he has not made one's ruling centre worse.

7.53 Where a work can be accomplished according to the reason common to gods and men there is nothing terrible; where benefit can be had through an activity that journeys well and proceeds according to the constitution, no harm is to be looked at askance.

8.41 An impulse had without reservation is already bad when it meets an obstacle; if one takes what is common, one is not yet harmed or impeded.

8.49 A report that someone speaks ill of Marcus does not report that he has been harmed.

8.55 Vice in general does no harm to the universe, and the particular vice harms only its owner, who can be rid of it when he wants.

9.1.1 Nature made rational beings to benefit one another according to worth and in no way to harm; whoever transgresses her will is impious.

9.34 Those who censure think they harm, and those who extol think they benefit.

9.42.2 Marcus asks how he has been harmed, since none of those who provoke him has done anything to make his understanding worse.

9.42.3 What is bad and harmful for Marcus has its whole subsistence in his understanding.

10.6.1 Nothing is harmful to the part that is advantageous to the whole, and the nature of the universe is not compelled to generate anything harmful to itself.

10.33.4 Nothing harms the citizen by nature that does not harm the city, nor the city that does not harm law, and none of the so-called mischances harms law.

11.18.4 Marcus asks what the most insolent man will do to him if he stays kindly and, if it so happens, mildly teaches him at the very moment he tries to do ill, saying, "I shall not be harmed, but you are being harmed, child".

11.18.5 Anger with men and flattery of them are alike unsocial and lead to harm.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, asks, of himself and his hearers, whether they do not remember that one man neither harms another nor benefits him, but that the principle a man holds about each of these things is what harms and what overturns, and is fighting, faction and war.[52] In the *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of his teaching, the point becomes a rule, in the chapter on the brother who does wrong (see Duty and fitting action): another will not harm a man unless he wills it, and "you will be harmed at the moment you form the opinion that you are harmed".[53] The verb of that clause, ὑπολαμβάνειν (*hypolambanein*), is Marcus' "form the opinion" at 7.14, and his chain at 4.7 can be read as Epictetus' rule worked out in three steps. The first

[52] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.5.28.

[53] Epictetus, *Handbook* 30.

chapter of the *Handbook* promises the man who takes as his own only what is his own that no one will harm him and he will have no enemy, "for you will suffer nothing harmful" (see Obstacle and reservation).[54] Epictetus also puts the loss on the doer. When it is objected that a master can flog his slave, he asks whether it is done without loss, and says that doing what is unjust is without loss for no one; the loss of the man who has chained his own slave is the chaining itself. After the vine that fares badly when it acts against its nature (see Beneficence), the discourse asks whether Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, did not then fare badly, and answers, "No, but the jurors and the accusers".[55] Three times in the *Discourses* he gives the saying of Socrates against Anytus and Meletus, two of his accusers, in one form, and the *Handbook* ends with it: "Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but harm me they cannot."[56] Marcus' "you are being harmed, child" (11.18.4) and his vice that harms only its owner (8.55) can be read as the same reversal.

Other ancient sources

The saying comes from the *Apology* of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, Socrates' defence at his trial. He warns the jurors that if they put him to death, being the man he says he is, they will not harm him more than they harm themselves: neither Meletus nor Anytus could harm him at all, for they would not have the power, since he does not think it permitted by divine law that a better man should be harmed by a worse. His accuser might kill him, perhaps, or banish him or strip him of his rights, and he, and perhaps others, may think these great evils; Socrates does not, but thinks it far worse to do what that man is doing now, trying to put a man to death unjustly.[57] Marcus does not quote the passage, but his test at 4.8 can be read as its principle stated without the trial: a man is harmed only by being made worse, and no one but himself can make him worse.

Translation in this edition

Every "harm", "harmed" and "harmful" in the English renders a word of this family, and "unharmed" renders ἀσινής (*asinēs*; 2.17.2), beside ἀνύβριστος (*anybristos*),

[54] Epictetus, *Handbook* 1.3.

[55] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.119–120 and 4.1.121–123.

[56] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.29.18, 2.2.15, 3.23.21; *Handbook* 53.4.

[57] Plato, *Apology* 30c–d; the accusers are named at 23e.

“inviolate” (see Daimon). Βλάπτειν is “harm” at all thirty-three of its occurrences: in the active “harm” (4.8, 5.22, 7.22, 9.1.1, 9.34, 10.33.4) and “does no harm” (8.55), in the passive “be harmed” (2.1, 4.7, 4.37, 5.22, 5.35, 6.1, 6.21, 7.14, 8.41, 8.49, 9.42.2, 11.18.4), and in the future participle “intending harm” (2.16). The perfect βέβλαμμαι (*beblammai*) is “I have been harmed” (4.7, twice, as a saying in quotation marks), “I have not been harmed” (5.22) and “am not yet harmed” (7.14); the participle τῷ βλάπτοντι (*tōi blaptonti*) is “the one who harms” (5.22). Βλάβη is “harm” at all five places, “a harm” at 5.36, and βλαβερός is “harmful” at all five. At 9.4 the edition’s note reports that P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has “he who acts unjustly harms himself”; the verb there is κακοῖ (*kakoi*), “ill-treats”, not a word of this family, and J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, prints the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, “acts unjustly against himself” (see Justice). Βλάπτειν is kept apart from κακοποιεῖν (*kakopoiein*), “do ill” (11.18.4), and from the words of wrongdoing, ἀδικεῖν (*adikein*), “act unjustly”, and ἁμαρτάνειν (*hamartanein*), “do wrong” (see Fault and ignorance; Justice).

ἀσινής

Attested: ἀσινῆ (*asinē*; 2.17.2). Unharmed, undamaged; formed with the negative prefix from σίνος (*sinos*), “damage”. Philosophy “lies in keeping the daimon within inviolate and unharmed, master of pleasures and pains” (2.17.2; see Daimon). Lemma: ἀσινής.

βλαβερός

Attested: βλαβερόν (*blaberon*; 5.22, 9.42.3, 10.6.1 twice), βλαβερά (*blabera*; 8.55). Harmful. “What is not harmful to the city does not harm the citizen either” (5.22); “what is bad for you and harmful has its whole subsistence there” (9.42.3); “nothing is harmful to the part that is advantageous to the whole” (10.6.1). Vice “is harmful only to the one to whom it has been granted also to be rid of it, as soon as he so wants” (8.55), where “as soon as” renders πρῶτον (*prōton*), Coraes’ correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ πρῶτος (*prōtos*), “first”. Lemma: βλαβερός.

βλάβη

Attested: βλάβη (*blabē*; 4.7, 5.35), βλάβην (*blabēn*; 5.36, 7.53, 11.18.5). Harm, the damage done. With the opinion gone, “take away ‘I have been harmed’, the harm is taken away” (4.7); “And what is the harm to the community?” (5.35); “do not form the impression that it is a harm” (5.36); anger and flattery “are unsocial and lead to harm” (11.18.5). Lemma: βλάβη.

βλάπτω

Attested: βλαβῆναι (*blabēnai*; 2.1, 4.37), βλάψουσα (*blapsousa*; 2.16), βέβλαμμαι (*beblammai*; 4.7 twice, 5.22, 7.14), βλάπτει (*blaptei*; 4.8, 5.22, 8.55 twice, 10.33.4 six times), βεβλάφθαι (*beblaphthai*; 5.22), βλάπτεται (*blaptetai*; 5.22 twice, 5.35, 6.1, 6.21), βλάπτοντι (*blaptonti*; 5.22), ἐβλάβη (*eblabē*; 6.21), ἔβλαψε (*eblapse*; 7.22), βέβλαψαι (*beblapsai*; 8.41, 8.49, 9.42.2), βλάπτειν (*blaptein*; 9.1.1, 9.34), βλαβῶ (*blabō*; 11.18.4), βλάπτῃ (*blaptēi*; 11.18.4). To hinder, to damage, to harm; in the passive, to be harmed. “What does not make a man himself worse than himself does not make his life worse either, nor harm” (4.8); “I, if I do not form the opinion that what has happened is bad, am not yet harmed” (7.14); “I shall not be harmed, but you are being harmed, child” (11.18.4). At 4.7 the perfect βέβλαμμαι is a saying, “I have been harmed”, taken away with the opinion. Lemma: βλάπτω.

See also

Anger; Assent and judgement; Beneficence; Citizenship; Daimon; Duty and fitting action; Fault and ignorance; Good, bad and indifference; Impression; Justice; Obstacle and reservation; Simplicity and sincerity; Truth and falsehood; Whole and part.

Impression

What presents itself to the mind · Meditations

φαντασία, phantasia, “impression”; *φαντάζεσθαι, phantazesthai*, “form an impression (of)”, “give the impression of”; *φανταστόν, phantaston*, “object of impression”; *φάντασμα, phantasma*, “imagining”; *φανταστικῶς, phantastikōs*, “with impressions”; *ἐμφαντάζεσθαι, emphantazesthai*, “the impressions attached to”; *συμπεριφαντάζεσθαι, symperiphantazesthai*,

"include in your impression"; *φαντασιοπλήκτως, phantasioplēktōs*, "so as to strike the imagination"; *βάπτειν, baptein*, "dye"

At a Glance

The word. Φαντασία, from φαίνεσθαι, "to appear", is an appearance. For the Stoics it was an imprint on the soul, the first step in all knowing, which the mind may accept or refuse. Φαντάζεσθαι is to form such an impression; a φάντασμα is a picture the mind makes for itself.

In the *Meditations*. The family comes in forty-nine chapters. Impressions come to Marcus from his teachers (Book I), and the daimon within examines them (3.6.2); he defines what produces them (3.11), keeps to what they report (8.49), wipes them out (5.2, 7.29, 8.29, 9.7), and chooses those that will dye his soul (5.16).

In this edition. Φαντασία is "impression", φαντάζεσθαι "form an impression (of)", φάντασμα "imagining"; every "impression" in the English renders a word of this family.

A place to read. 8.49, where a report of slander and the sight of a sick child are kept apart from what the mind adds to them.

Meaning

Φαντασία (*phantasia*) and φαντάζεσθαι (*phantazesthai*) belong with φαίνεσθαι (*phainesthai*), "to appear". In ordinary Greek the noun is an appearance or a show, and the verb is to appear or to picture to oneself. Both senses survive here: Junius Rusticus, one of his Stoic teachers, taught Marcus not to parade himself "so as to strike the imagination" (1.7.1), and things can "give the impression of being all too worthy of belief" (6.13). The Stoics gave the noun their own technical definition. They called the impression an imprint on the soul, after the mark a seal-ring leaves in wax, and held that the impression comes first, and then thought puts into words what it has undergone.[58] Marcus keeps the seal: "To be stamped with impressions belongs to cattle as well" (3.16.1; again 6.16.1). A report (8.49) and a picture of a just state (1.14.1) are impressions as much as a sight, and the verb is often a command: "form an impression of" (10.28, 10.31, 12.32). Φάντασμα (*phantasma*),

[58] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.45 (the imprint and the seal-ring) and 7.49 (from Diocles of Magnesia: "the impression leads, and then thought, which can speak, brings out in speech what it undergoes from the impression").

"imagining", comes twice, both times of what the mind should not indulge (3.4.2, 11.19).

Use in the book

Book I treats impressions as things given and sought. From Rusticus Marcus "got the impression of needing correction and treatment of character" (1.7.1). His adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, did not leave an inquiry early, "content with the impressions that came first to hand" (1.16.2), and among the gifts of the gods Marcus counts "to have formed an impression, plainly and often, of what the life according to nature is" (1.17.6). An impression can teach. It cannot vouch for itself.

What belongs to a man is the use he makes of it. A doting old man still forms impressions after "the analysis of what presents itself" has been quenched (3.1). The daimon within "examines the impressions" (3.6.2; see Daimon). Marcus tells himself "in every impression preserve what can be firmly grasped" (4.22), and reminds himself that it is always in his power "to work with art upon the present impression, so that nothing slips in that is not firmly grasped" (7.54). A rational nature journeys well when "in impressions, it assents to nothing false or unclear" (8.7; see Assent and judgement), and "discernment of convincing impressions" is "peculiar to a man" (8.26).

The method is definition: "always to make a definition or description of whatever presents itself as an object of impression, so as to see distinctly what it is in its substance, naked, as a whole and in its parts" (3.11.1). Of "this thing that now makes the impression on me" Marcus asks its use and worth, its parts, its span, "and what virtue is needed towards it" (3.11.2). The remedy can itself be a set of impressions, "reaching to the things themselves and going right through them" (6.13; see Definition and analysis). Dying is stripped in the same way of "the impressions attached to it" (2.12), and whatever produces an impression is divided into cause, material, reference and time (12.17).

At 8.49 Marcus takes apart a report: "Say nothing more to yourself than what the leading impressions report. It has been reported that so-and-so speaks ill of you. This has been reported; but that you have been harmed has not been reported. I see that the child is ill. I see; but that it is in danger, I do not see." The rule, "stay always with the first impressions, and add nothing yourself from within, and

nothing happens to you", is then corrected: "or rather, add, as one who recognises each of the things that happen in the universe." The correction can be read as sorting additions: what the mind adds from within is refused, and what a man who knows how the universe runs adds is allowed. So with harm: "do not form the impression that it is a harm" (5.36), and, before another's apparent wrong, "But how do I know whether this is a wrong?" (12.16).

A vexing or foreign impression is simply removed: "How easy it is to push away and wipe away every impression that is vexing or foreign" (5.2). "Wipe out the impression" opens a run of seven commands at 7.29; at 9.7 it stands beside impulse and desire, the other fields of 8.7: "Wipe out impression; stop impulse; quench desire; have the ruling centre in its own power." At 8.29 the wiping makes room for sight: "seeing all things as they are, I use each according to worth." Marcus even speaks to one: "What then are you doing here, impression? … But you have come by the old habit" (7.17; see Daimon).

Impressions also make the man, by habit. "As are the things you often form an impression of, such will your understanding be; for the soul is dyed by the impressions" (5.16). Marcus chooses the dye. At 5.16 the dye is two arguments: that one can live well even at court, and that the good of a rational being is fellowship. Elsewhere the impressions he seeks are of the runs of the stars and the changes of the elements, which "clean away the filth of life on the ground" (7.47), of "the whole of eternity and the whole of substance" (10.17), and of "our bondage" (10.28); and he is to "form an impression of nothing as great, except to act as your nature leads" (12.32). Principles die only if the impressions that answer to them are quenched (7.2; see Principles and reminders). The wasteful impressions are those of "what so-and-so is doing and why" (3.4.1), and the "self-indulgent imaginings" one would blush to confess (3.4.2); of such a picture Marcus says, "This imagining is not necessary" (11.19). He does not ask to have no impressions, but to choose them, and the notebook can be read as his store of the impressions with which to dye his soul.

Places to read

Every chapter in which φαντασία, φαντάζεσθαι or a word of their family occurs (φανταστόν, φάντασμα, φανταστικῶς, ἐμφαντάζεσθαι, συμπεριφαντάζεσθαι, φαντασιοπλήκτως),

in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The places of βάπτειν, "dye", are given in its sub-entry.

1.7.1 From Rusticus Marcus got the impression that his character needed correction, and learned not to parade himself so as to strike the imagination.

1.14.1 From Severus, usually taken to be Claudius Severus, the Peripatetic among his teachers, Marcus got the impression of a state with the same laws for all and of a kingship that honours the freedom of the governed.

1.15.3 The Stoic Claudius Maximus gave the impression of a man who had never been bent rather than of one who had been straightened.

1.16.2 Antoninus did not abandon an inquiry early, content with the impressions that came first to hand.

1.17.6 Among the gifts of the gods Marcus counts having formed an impression, plainly and often, of the life according to nature.

2.5 Doing each act as the last of one's life gives leisure from all other impressions.

2.7 Those who have no target for every impulse and every impression are triflers in action too.

2.12 Whoever analyses the conception of dying strips away the impressions attached to it and sees it as a work of nature.

3.1 In dotage a man still forms impressions, but the analysis of what presents itself is quenched first.

3.4.1 The rest of life is not to be wasted in impressions about other people, unless they are referred to the common good.

3.4.2 One must form impressions only of what one could frankly tell anyone who asked, with no self-indulgent imaginings.

3.4.3 The best man forms impressions of what others say or do rarely, and only from great necessity for the common good.

3.6.2 The daimon within examines the impressions.

3.11.1 Marcus is always to make a definition or description of whatever presents itself as an object of impression.

3.11.2 Of what now makes the impression on him he asks its use, worth, parts, span and the virtue it calls for.

3.16.1 To be stamped with impressions belongs to cattle as well.

3.16.2 The good man does not disturb the daimon within with a crowd of impressions.

4.19 The man in a flutter about fame after death does not form the impression that those who remember him will soon die too.

4.22 In every impression one is to preserve what can be firmly grasped.

4.24 Unnecessary impressions are to be taken away, as well as unnecessary actions.

4.36 To form an impression of seeds only as what is cast into the earth or a womb is unphilosophical.

5.2 It is easy to wipe away every vexing or foreign impression and be at once in calm.

5.12 Even the many form an impression of the difference between true goods and what passes with them for goods.

5.16 Such as the things one often forms an impression of, such will one's understanding be, for the soul is dyed by the impressions.

5.22 At every impression of having been harmed, Marcus is to ask whether the city is harmed.

5.36 One should help others in their losses without being wholly swept away by the impression, and not form the impression that the loss is a harm.

6.13 Impressions of food, wine, purple and sex that go right through the things strip away their story, and whatever gives the impression of being worthy of belief is to be stripped bare.

6.16.1 Being stamped by impression is nothing to be honoured.

6.36 Marcus is not to form the impression that the lion's jaws and poison are alien to what he reveres.

7.2 Principles die only if the impressions that correspond to them are quenched, and it is in one's power to rekindle them.

7.17 Marcus tells an impression that has come by old habit to go away.

7.29 "Wipe out the impression" heads seven commands.

7.47 Impressions of the runs of the stars and the changes of the elements clean away the filth of life.

7.54 One can work with art upon the present impression, so that nothing slips in that is not firmly grasped.

8.7 A rational nature journeys well when, in impressions, it assents to nothing false or unclear.

8.13 On every impression, if it can be done, Marcus is to study nature and the passions and practise dialectic.

8.26 Discernment of convincing impressions is peculiar to a man, beside goodwill towards the kindred stock and observation of the nature of the whole.

8.29 Marcus is to wipe out the impressions and use each thing according to worth, seeing all things as they are.

8.36 The impression of life as a whole is not to confound him; he is to question himself about each present hardship.

8.49 Nothing is to be added to what the leading impressions report, except as one who recognises what happens in the universe.

8.51 Marcus is not to wander in impressions.

9.7 "Wipe out impression" comes first, before stopping impulse and quenching desire.

10.3 Whatever one's own opinion can make bearable can be borne, by the impression that it is advantageous or a duty.

10.7.3 One is not to form the impression that the body's solid and breath-like parts are what came from the first birth.

10.9 Principles are wiped away when one forms impressions without studying nature.

10.17 Marcus is to keep continually before him an impression of the whole of eternity and the whole of substance.

10.28 Marcus is to form the impression that every discontented man is like the sacrificed piglet, and an impression of our bondage.

10.31 Seeing a living man, Marcus is to form an impression of his dead counterpart, and ask where they are.

10.38 Marcus is never to include in his impression the vessel and instruments that surround what moves the puppet.

11.19 Over the first of four turnings of the ruling centre to be wiped away, Marcus is to say, "This imagining is not necessary".

12.16 Before one who has given the impression of doing wrong, Marcus asks how he knows that it is a wrong.

12.17 Marcus is to see what produces the impression and divide it into cause, material, reference and time.

12.32 He is to form an impression of nothing as great, except to act as his nature leads and be affected as the common nature brings.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school, as Diogenes Laertius reports in his *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, took the seal-ring's imprint as an alteration of the soul, since many imprints cannot stand in the same place at once. The Stoics set the impression apart from the φάντασμα, "a seeming of thought such as occurs in sleep", and made the impression that can be firmly grasped (καταληπτική, *katalēptikē*), which comes from what is and is stamped in accordance with it, the criterion of truth.[59] Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, made the use of impressions the whole of what is ours: of all things the gods "put in our power only the best and sovereign one, the right use of impressions".[60] His remedies are Marcus' remedies. One is to say at once to every harsh impression, "You are an impression, and not at all what you appear to be", and then

[59] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.45, 7.50 (Chrysippus, *On the Soul*, book 2; φάντασμα), 7.46 and 7.54 (the impression that can be grasped as criterion).

[60] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.1.7; compare 1.1.12, where Zeus gives "the faculty that makes use of impressions".

to test it; not to be swept away by its sharpness (the verb Marcus uses at 5.36), but to say, "Wait for me a little, impression: let me see what you are and what you are about; let me test you", and then to bring in "some other fine and noble impression" and throw the filthy one out; and, as Socrates would not live an unexamined life, not to accept an unexamined impression.[61] He also asked for daily practice against impressions, as against sophistical arguments, since they too put questions: "'So-and-so's son has died.' Answer: 'Not in the sphere of choice; not bad.'"[62] Marcus' address to an impression at 7.17, his dyeing of the soul with chosen impressions at 5.16, and his separation of report from addition at 8.49 can be read as this teaching put to work.

Translation in this edition

Φαντασία is "impression" at all its thirty-nine occurrences, and φαντάζεσθαι "form an impression (of)" ("forming impressions", 3.1, 3.4.1, 3.4.3; "form the impression that", 4.19, 5.36, 6.36, 10.7.3, 10.28), kept, as the edition's Key Terms say, even where "imagine" or "picture" would read more easily. The one exception is 6.13, where things are the subject and φαντάζεται is "give the impression of being". At 10.28 the English supplies a second "Form an impression of" from the opening Φαντάζου, on which, as J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, punctuates, "our bondage" depends. The phrases with φαντασία are rendered with "impression": φαντασίαν λαβεῖν "get the impression" (1.7.1, 1.14.1), φαντασίαν λαμβάνειν "taking an impression" (6.13), φαντασίαν παρέχειν "give the impression" (1.15.3, 12.16), φαντασίαν ποιεῖν "make the impression" (3.11.2) and "produce the impression" (12.17), κατὰ φαντασίαν "by impression" (6.16.1) and "by the impression that" (10.3). Τὰ ἐμφανταζόμενα is "the impressions attached to it" (2.12), συμπεριφαντάζου "include in your impression" (10.38), τυποῦσθαι φανταστικῶς "to be stamped with impressions" (3.16.1), and τὸ ὑποπίπτον φανταστόν "whatever presents itself as an object of impression" (3.11.1). Φάντασμα is "imagining" (3.4.2, 11.19) and φαντασιοπλήκτως "so as to strike the imagination" (1.7.1). Every "impression", "imagining" and "imagination" in the English renders a word of this family. At 8.49 "the leading impressions" are αἱ

[61] Epictetus, *Handbook* 1.5; *Discourses* 2.18.24–25 and 3.12.15.

[62] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.8.1–2.

προηγούμεναι φαντασίαι, with the Glossary's "leading" for προηγούμενα, and "the first impressions" αἱ πρῶται φαντασίαι.

βάπτω

Attested: βεβαμμένον (*bebammenon*; 3.4.3), βάπτεται (*baptetai*; 5.16), βάπτε (*bapte*; 5.16), βαφῇς (*baphēis*; 6.30.1), βαφήσεται (*baphēsetai*; 8.51). To dip, and so to dye. "The soul is dyed by the impressions. Dye it, then, with a continuous run of impressions like these" (5.16); the best man is "dyed deep with justice" (3.4.3), where the edition's note compares Plato's soldiers, who are to take the laws like wool taking a fast dye;[63] the wrong dye, perhaps the imperial purple, as the edition's note suggests: "See that you are not made into a Caesar, that you are not dyed" (6.30.1); and the pure spring, though mud is thrown in, "will very quickly scatter them and wash them out and in no way be dyed" (8.51). Lemma: βάπτω.

ἐμφαντάζομαι

Attested: ἐμφανταζόμενα (*emphantazomena*; 2.12). To appear in or with a thing; the neuter participle is "the impressions attached to" it. Whoever "by analysing the conception strips away the impressions attached to" dying "will no longer form the opinion that it is anything but a work of nature" (2.12). Lemma: ἐμφαντάζομαι.

συμπεριφαντάζομαι

Attested: συμπεριφαντάζου (*symperiphantazou*; 10.38). To take something into one's impression along with something else. What moves the puppet is hidden within: "Never include in your impression the vessel-like thing that surrounds it, and these little instruments moulded about it" (10.38). Lemma: συμπεριφαντάζομαι.

φαντάζομαι

Attested: φαντασθῆναι (*phantasthēnai*; 1.17.6), φαντάζεσθαι (*phantazesthai*; 3.1, 3.4.2, 5.36), φανταζόμενος (*phantazomenos*; 3.4.1), φανταζόμενον (*phantazomenon*; 3.4.3), φαντάζεται (*phantazetai*; 4.19, 6.13), φαντάζῃ (*phantazēi*; 4.36, 10.9), φαντάζονται (*phantazontai*; 5.12), φαντασθῇς (*phantasthēis*; 5.16), φαντάζου (*phantazou*; 6.36, 10.7.3, 10.28, 10.31 five times,

[63] Plato, *Republic* 429d–430a.

12.32). To form an impression of, to picture; with things as subject, to present an appearance. “As are the things you often form an impression of, such will your understanding be” (5.16); five times in one chapter Marcus orders himself, on seeing a living man, to “form an impression of” a dead one (10.31); and things can “give the impression of being all too worthy of belief” (6.13). Lemma: φαντάζομαι.

φαντασία

Attested: φαντασίαν (*phantasian*; 1.7.1, 1.14.1, 1.15.3, 2.7, 3.11.2, 5.2, 6.13, 6.16.1, 7.29, 9.7, 10.3, 12.16, 12.17), φαντασίαις (*phantasiais*; 1.16.2, 3.4.1, 8.7, 8.51), φαντασιῶν (*phantasiōn*; 2.5, 3.4.2, 3.16.2, 5.16 twice, 8.26, 8.49), φαντασίας (*phantasias*; 3.6.2, 4.22, 4.24, 5.22, 8.13, 8.29), φαντασίᾳ (*phantasiāi*; 5.36, 7.54), φαντασίαι (*phantasiai*; 6.13, 7.2, 7.47, 8.49), φαντασία (*phantasia*; 7.17, 8.36, 10.17). An impression, whatever presents itself to the mind: a sight, a report, a conception. It can be got from a teacher (1.7.1), examined (3.6.2), wiped out (“Wipe out the impression”, 7.29) and chosen, for “the soul is dyed by the impressions” (5.16); at 7.17 Marcus addresses one: “What then are you doing here, impression?” Lemma: φαντασία.

φαντασιοπλήκτως

Attested: φαντασιοπλήκτως (*phantasioplēktōs*; 1.7.1). So as to strike the imagination of others, for show; compounded of φαντασία and πλήσσειν (*plēssein*), “strike”. From Rusticus Marcus learned not “to parade myself, so as to strike the imagination, as the man of discipline or the man of action” (1.7.1). Lemma: φαντασιοπλήκτως.

φάντασμα

Attested: φαντασμάτων (*phantasmatōn*; 3.4.2), φάντασμα (*phantasma*; 11.19). An imagining, a picture the mind makes for itself. The social man “cares nothing for pleasurable or, in a word, self-indulgent imaginings” (3.4.2); over the first of four turnings of the ruling centre Marcus is to say, “This imagining is not necessary” (11.19). Lemma: φάντασμα.

φανταστικός

Attested: φανταστικῶς (*phantastikōs*; 3.16.1). Of impressions; the adverb, with τυποῦσθαι, “to be stamped”, gives “To be stamped with impressions”, which “belongs to cattle as well” (3.16.1). Lemma: φανταστικός.

φανταστός

Attested: φανταστοῦ (*phantastou*; 3.11.1). What can be the object of an impression. Marcus is "always to make a definition or description of whatever presents itself as an object of impression" (3.11.1). Lemma: φανταστός.

See also

Assent and judgement; Attention and self-examination; Daimon; Definition and analysis; Impulse; Principles and reminders; Ruling centre.

Impulse

The movement of the soul towards action · Meditations

ὁρμή, hormē, "impulse"; *ὁρμᾶν, horman*, "have an impulse", "feeling impulses", "your impulse was", "set out"; *ὁρμητικός, hormētikos*, "of impulse", "by impulse"; *ὁρμητόν, hormēton*, "the object of its impulse"; *ὑπεξαίρεσις, hypexairesis*, "reservation"; *ἀνυπεξαιρέτως, anypexairetōs*, "without reservation"; *προηγούμενον, proēgoumenon*, "leading", "what went before"; *σκοπός, skopos*, "target"

At a Glance

The word. Ὁρμή is an onrush or start; for the Stoics it is the movement of the soul towards an action. Ὁρμᾶν is to have that movement. Ὑπεξαίρεσις, "reservation", is the proviso under which an impulse is held: if nothing prevents.

In the *Meditations*. Impulse belongs to every living being, and to be "jerked like a puppet by impulse" belongs to beasts and tyrants too (3.16.1). An impulse is a man's own when it has a target (2.7, 2.16), goes to social works (8.7, 11.21), comes from principles (8.1) and is held with reservation (4.1, 6.50, 8.41). At 11.37 Marcus copies the rule of Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded: impulses with reservation, social, according to worth. The same word names the movement by which the universe "does all things" (4.40).

In this edition. Ὁρμή is always "impulse", and ὁρμᾶν "have an impulse", except "feeling impulses" (3.1), "your impulse was" (6.50) and "set out" (5.14). Ὑπεξαίρεσις is "reservation", σκοπός "target".

A place to read. 11.37, where Marcus copies Epictetus' three fields of training and the three conditions of impulse.

Meaning

Ὁρμή (*hormē*) is in common Greek a rush or onset, the charge of an army or the start of a journey, and ὁρμᾶν (*horman*) is to start, to set out, or to set a thing in motion. The Stoics made it a term of their psychology: the movement of the soul towards an action. Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, gives the sequence: a rational animal does nothing unless it has first been stirred by the impression of something, then has taken an impulse, and assent has confirmed the impulse.[64] On this account an impulse in a man can be read as no blind urge: it waits on the assent that confirms it. Marcus keeps impulse apart from desire: desire reaches after what is judged good; impulse goes out to an act (8.7, 11.37). Ὑπεξαίρεσις (*hypexairesis*), from ὑπεξαιρεῖν (*hypexairein*), "to take out from under, to except", is an exception or proviso.

Use in the book

Marcus begins from what impulse shares with lower life: impulses belong to the soul, as sensations to the body and principles to the mind (3.16.1). The motions of sense and of impulse "are animal", and the intelligent motion is "never to be overcome" by them (7.55). So impulse as such earns no honour: "to be jerked like a puppet by impulse belongs to wild beasts too, to effeminates, to Phalaris and Nero" (3.16.1; the puppet again at 6.16.1); Phalaris was the tyrant of Acragas in Sicily. Of the ruling centre Marcus tells himself, "you are an old man; no longer let it be a slave, no longer let it be jerked like a puppet by unsocial impulse" (2.2). The puppet returns: death is rest from "the puppet-jerking of impulse" (6.28), little figures jerked like puppets end a list of human trifles (7.3), "Stop the puppet-jerking" is the second of seven commands (7.29; see Impression), and at 12.19 it is the things that produce the passions that "jerk you like a puppet". At 10.38 the image turns round: "what jerks the puppet is that which is hidden within". The image can be read as one question: who pulls the strings?

His answer is that an impulse is a man's own when it is aimed. Those who are worn out by life and "have no target at which they aim every impulse and, in a word, every impression, are triflers in their actions as well" (2.7), and the soul does violence to itself "when it lets any act or impulse of its own go at no target, but does whatever it does at

[64] Seneca, *Letters* 113.18.

random and without attention" (2.16). To a saying about having one target of life, Marcus adds that "one must set before oneself the target that is social and civic. For he who directs all his own impulses towards this will render all actions alike, and in this respect will always be the same" (11.21). The same aim stands in the account of a rational nature that journeys well: it "directs its impulses to social works alone, has made its desires and avoidances of the things in our power only" (8.7). The two clauses have different objects: impulse goes to social works, desire is kept for what is in one's power. Justness is "impulse and action ending in the social action itself" (9.31).

An impulse also has a source. Living well lies in doing what the nature of man seeks, and Marcus will do it, he answers himself, if he has principles "from which come impulses and actions" (8.1; see Principles and reminders). Others have an impulse towards what appears to them proper and advantageous, and it is cruel to deny it them; if the appearance is false, "Then teach and show, without being indignant" (6.27; see Anger).

What keeps impulse free is the reservation. That which rules within "has its impulse towards the leading objects with reservation, and makes material for itself of whatever is brought in to replace them, as fire does when it masters what falls on it" (4.1): a small lamp would be quenched, but a bright fire feeds on what is heaped on it. Activity can be impeded, but "there are no impediments to impulse and disposition, because of the reservation and the reversal" (5.20; see Obstacle and reservation). When force blocks a just act, Marcus is to "remember that your impulse was with reservation, and that you did not desire the impossible. For what, then? For an impulse of this kind. And this you attain" (6.50; see Obstacle and reservation). Without the proviso the obstacle does harm: "If you had your impulse without reservation, already it is bad, as for a rational being" (8.41; see Obstacle and reservation).

At 11.37 Marcus copies Epictetus: "One must find, he said, an art concerning assent, and in the field of the impulses guard heedfulness, so that they be with reservation, so that they be social, so that they be according to worth; and abstain altogether from desire, and use avoidance towards none of the things not in our power." The three conditions sum up all the book asks of impulse. The command "stop impulse" (9.7; see Impression) is a check, not an abolition;

elsewhere Marcus tells himself, “have the impulse, if it is given” (9.29).

The same word serves the whole. The universe “does all things by one impulse” (4.40); “The nature of the whole had its impulse towards making the universe” (7.75); and either “the understanding of the whole has an impulse towards each thing”, or “it had its impulse once, and the rest by way of consequence” (9.28), a choice Marcus leaves open. A man’s impulse, held with reservation and aimed at the common good, can be read as his part in that larger movement: he wills his act, and welcomes whatever the whole brings in its place.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ὁρμή, ὁρμᾶν or the adjectives ὁρμητικός and ὁρμητός occur, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; every place of ὑπεξαίρεσις and ἀνυπεξαιρέτως (4.1, 5.20, 6.50, 8.41, 11.37) falls among them. Ἀφορμή (*aphormē*), “resources” (9.1.2, 9.42.3, 10.12), is left out.

2.2 The ruling centre is no longer to be “jerked like a puppet by unsocial impulse”.

2.7 Those who have no target at which they aim every impulse and every impression are triflers in their actions.

2.10 Theophrastus, Aristotle’s successor, judges wrong done through craving graver than wrong done through rage: the one who does wrong through craving has had his impulse, of his own accord, towards acting unjustly.

2.16 The soul does violence to itself when it lets an act or impulse of its own go at no target.

3.1 In dotage, feeling impulses will not fail a man, but the use of himself is quenched first.

3.6.2 The daimon within has subjected its own impulses to itself.

3.16.1 Impulses belong to the soul, and to be jerked like a puppet by impulse belongs to wild beasts and tyrants too.

4.1 That which rules within has its impulse towards the leading objects with reservation, and makes material of whatever replaces them, as fire does.

4.22 In every impulse Marcus is to render what is just, and in every impression preserve what can be firmly grasped.

4.40 The universe, one living being, does all things by one impulse.

5.3 Those who blame Marcus have their own ruling centre and use their own impulse, and he is not to look round at them.

5.14 Reason and the art of reasoning set out from their proper starting point and travel to the end set before them.

5.20 Activity may be impeded, but there are no impediments to impulse and disposition, because of the reservation and the reversal.

5.36 Good lots are good turnings of the soul, good impulses, good actions.

6.16.1 Being jerked like a puppet by impulse is not to be honoured, any more than breathing or feeding.

6.27 It is cruel not to allow people an impulse towards what appears to them proper and advantageous; if it is not so, Marcus is to teach and show.

6.28 Death is rest from the puppet-jerking of impulse, among other things.

6.36 All things come from the common ruling centre, having had their impulse from it, or by way of consequence.

6.44.1 If the gods took counsel about Marcus, for what cause would they have had an impulse to do him ill?

6.50 When force stands in the way, Marcus is to remember that his impulse was with reservation: what he sought was an impulse of this kind, and this he attains.

7.4 What is done must be kept track of impulse by impulse, as what is said is followed word by word.

7.55 Rational and intelligent motion is never to be overcome by the motion of sense or of impulse, both of which are animal.

7.62 Looking into the springs of others' opinion and impulse, one will not blame those who stumble unwillingly.

7.75 The nature of the whole had its impulse towards making the universe; now either all follows by way of consequence, or even the things towards which the ruling centre of the universe directs its own impulse are unreasoned.

8.1 Living well lies in having principles from which come impulses and actions.

8.7 A rational nature journeys well when it directs its impulses to social works alone.

8.16 To shift position at another's correction is free, for the activity is brought to its end according to one's own impulse and judgement.

8.28 Every judgement and impulse and desire and avoidance is within, and nothing climbs up so far.

8.35 The rational living being can make every hindrance material for itself and use it for whatever it had its impulse towards.

8.41 Impediment to impulse is bad for the vital nature, and an impulse had without reservation is already bad for a rational being.

9.1.4 Things happen in sequence by an original impulse of providence, by which it had its impulse from some beginning towards this world-order.

9.7 "Stop impulse" is one of four commands, with wiping out impression and quenching desire.

9.21 A stop of impulse, like the cessation of activity, is a kind of death and nothing bad.

9.28 Either the understanding of the whole has an impulse towards each thing, or it had its impulse once and the rest follows by way of consequence.

9.29 Marcus is to do what nature now demands, and have the impulse, if it is given.

9.31 Justness is impulse and action ending in the social action itself.

10.6.2 In so far as he stands in affinity to those of one kind with him, Marcus will lead every impulse of his towards what is of common advantage.

10.26 Another cause makes sensation and impulse out of the food a man swallows.

11.21 He who directs all his impulses towards the social and civic target will always be the same.

11.37 Epictetus' rule: in the field of the impulses guard heedfulness, so that they be with reservation, social and according to worth.

12.17 Marcus' impulse is to be towards seeing, in everything, what it is that produces the impression.

12.31 Having impulses is among the things easy to despise, against the last thing worth seeking, to follow reason and God.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, reports that the first of the topics into which the Stoics divided ethics was "on impulse". The first impulse of every living being, said Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school, is to preserve itself; nature governs plants without impulse or sensation, gives animals impulse, by which they go towards what is proper to them, and gives rational beings reason, which "supervenes as the craftsman of impulse".[65] Duties are among the acts done by impulse, and a passion, in the definition of Zeno, the founder of the school, is an irrational movement of the soul contrary to nature, or an "excessive impulse".[66] Epictetus made impulse the second of three fields of training: the first concerns desires and avoidances, the second "impulses and repulsions and, in a word, duty, so that one acts in order, with good reason, not carelessly", the third assent.[67] Marcus gives the three fields in reverse order, assent first, both at 8.7 and in the words of Epictetus he copies at 11.37. In the *Handbook* Epictetus tells the beginner to do away with desire for the present and to "use only impulse and repulsion, lightly, however, and with reservation and relaxed".[68] Seneca explains the reservation: the wise man comes to everything with the proviso "if nothing happens to prevent it", and so nothing happens to him against his expectation; the reservation, without which he plans nothing and undertakes nothing, protects him.[69] Marcus never names the counter-impulse that Epictetus

[65] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.84–86; the first impulse is reported from Chrysippus, *On Ends* Book 1.

[66] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.108 (duties among acts done by impulse) and 7.110 (Zeno's definition of passion).

[67] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.2.1–2.

[68] Epictetus, *Handbook* 2.2.

[69] Seneca, *On Benefits* 4.34.4–5.

pairs with impulse, ἀφορμή (*aphormē*); in the *Meditations* that word means only "resources".

Later readings

Pierre Hadot (1922–2010), the French historian of ancient philosophy, built *The Inner Citadel* (1992; English translation 1998) on Epictetus' three fields, which he called the disciplines of assent, of desire and of action, with a chapter on each (chapters 6–8); the first, "The Inner Citadel, or the Discipline of Assent", takes its title from 8.48.[70]

Translation in this edition

Ὁρμή is "impulse" at all its places, of men and of the universe. Ὁρμᾶν is "have an impulse" in its tenses and moods: "has had his impulse" (2.10), "has its impulse" (4.1), "having had their impulse" (6.36), "would they have had an impulse" (6.44.1), "had its impulse" (7.75, 8.35, 9.1.4, 9.28), "has an impulse" (9.28), "when you had an impulse" and "had your impulse" (8.41), "have the impulse" (9.29), "to have an impulse" (6.27) and "To have impulses?" (12.31). There are three exceptions: "feeling impulses" for the infinitive in the list of vital functions at 3.1; "your impulse was with reservation" for μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως ὥρμας (*meth' hypexaireseōs hōrmas*) at 6.50; and "set out" at 5.14, of reason and the art of reasoning leaving their starting point. The adverb ὁρμητικῶς is "by impulse" (3.16.1), the adjective ὁρμητικός "of impulse" (6.28, 7.55), and the verbal adjective ὁρμητόν "the object of its impulse" (9.28). Ὑπεξαίρεσις is "reservation": "with reservation" (4.1, 6.50, 11.37) and "the reservation" (5.20); and ἀνυπεξαιρέτως is "without reservation" (8.41; see Obstacle and reservation). Σκοπός is "target", kept apart from τέλος (*telos*), "end" (2.16), and προηγούμενον is "leading" (4.1, 5.20, 7.55, 8.49, 9.41), with "what went before" for the aorist participle at 4.45.

ὁρμάω

Attested: ὥρμηται (*hōrmētai*; 2.10), ὁρμᾶν (*horman*; 3.1, 6.27, 6.44.1, 12.31), ὁρμᾷ (*hormāi*; 4.1, 9.28), ὁρμῶνται (*hormōntai*; 5.14), ὁρμήσαντα (*hormēsanta*; 6.36), ὥρμας (*hōrmas*; 6.50, 8.41), ὥρμησε (*hōrmēse*; 7.75, 9.28), ὥρμησεν (*hōrmēsen*; 8.35, 9.1.4), ὁρμήσαντι (*hormēsanti*; 8.41), ὅρμησον (*hormēson*; 9.29). To start towards, to have

[70] Pierre Hadot, *La citadelle intérieure* (Paris, 1992), chapters 5–8; English translation by Michael Chase, *The Inner Citadel* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).

an impulse. Of a man, it is the movement that a reservation governs: “remember that your impulse was with reservation” (6.50). Of the whole, it is the act by which the universe was made: “The nature of the whole had its impulse towards making the universe” (7.75). At 5.14 it has its everyday sense: reason and the art of reasoning “set out” from their proper starting point. At 6.50 “your impulse was” renders ὥρμας, the reading of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts. Lemma: ὁρμάω.

ὁρμή

Attested: ὁρμήν (*hormēn*; 2.2, 2.7, 2.16, 6.16.1, 7.4, 7.75, 8.16, 9.7, 10.6.2, 10.26), ὁρμάς (*hormas*; 3.6.2, 8.7, 11.21, 11.37), ὁρμαί (*hormai*; 3.16.1, 5.36, 8.1), ὁρμῆς (*hormēs*; 4.22, 5.20, 6.50, 7.62, 8.41, 9.21), ὁρμῇ (*hormēi*; 4.40, 5.3, 9.1.4), ὁρμή (*hormē*; 8.28, 9.31, 12.17). Impulse, the movement of the soul towards action. It belongs to the soul, as sensation to the body and principles to the mind (3.16.1); a rational nature journeys well when it “directs its impulses to social works alone” (8.7); and, in Epictetus’ rule, it is to be “with reservation”, “social” and “according to worth” (11.37). Of the universe: “how it does all things by one impulse” (4.40). Lemma: ὁρμή.

ὁρμητικός

Attested: ὁρμητικῶς (*hormētikōs*; 3.16.1), ὁρμητικῆς (*hormētikēs*; 6.28, 7.55). Belonging to impulse. With the puppet image it marks a soul jerked about by impulse: “to be jerked like a puppet by impulse” (3.16.1), and death as rest from “the puppet-jerking of impulse” (6.28). At 7.55 the intelligent motion is never to be overcome “by the motion of sense or of impulse”. Lemma: ὁρμητικός.

ὁρμητός

Attested: ὁρμητόν (*hormēton*; 9.28). The verbal adjective of ὁρμάω: that towards which an impulse goes. If the understanding of the whole has an impulse towards each thing, Marcus tells himself to “accept the object of its impulse” (9.28). Lemma: ὁρμητός.

προηγέομαι

Attested: προηγούμενα (*proēgoumena*; 4.1, 9.41), προηγησαμένοις (*proēgēsamenois*; 4.45), προηγούμενον

(*proēgoumenon*; 5.20, 7.55), προηγούμεναι (*proēgoumenai*; 8.49). To go before, to lead; the participle is “leading”. It names the objects of impulse: that which rules within has its impulse “towards the leading objects with reservation” (4.1), where Leopold prints the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, προηγούμενα, for the manuscripts’ ἡγούμενα, and the understanding converts every hindrance “into the leading object” (5.20). At 7.55 “The leading thing, then, in the constitution of man is the social”; at 8.49 Marcus is to stay with “the leading impressions”, and at 9.41 Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, studied nature “in its leading questions”. At 4.45, in the ordinary sense, it is “what went before”. Lemma: προηγέομαι.

σκοπός

Attested: σκοπόν (*skopon*; 2.7, 2.16, 7.4, 11.6.2, 11.21 twice), σκοπός (*skopos*; 11.21). A target, the mark at which a man aims. Those with “no target at which they aim every impulse” are triflers (2.7); the soul does violence to itself when it lets an impulse “go at no target” (2.16); the target to set before oneself is “social and civic” (11.21). At 11.6.2 Marcus asks of the Middle and the New Comedy, “to what target did it ever look?” The verb σκοπεῖν, “look at”, is another word. Lemma: σκοπός.

See also

Anger; Assent and judgement; Desire and aversion; Duty and fitting action; Impression; Kinship and cooperation; Obstacle and reservation; Principles and reminders; Ruling centre.

Learning, practice and correction

Learning, habit and setting right · Meditations

μανθάνειν, manthanein, “learn”; *προσμανθάνειν, prosmanthanein*, “learn something more”; *μάθημα, mathēma*, “studies”; *μαθητής, mathētēs*, “pupil”; *πολυμαθής, polymathēs*, “very learned”; *ἐθίζειν, ethizein*, “accustom”, “grow used to”, “make a habit of”, “used to”, “accustomed”; *ἔθος, ethos*, “habit”, “customs”; *ἀνέθιστος, anethistos*, “want of habit”; *ἀσκεῖν, askein*, “train”; *ἀσκητικός, askētikos*, “the man of discipline”; *συγγυμνάζειν, syngymnazein*, “thoroughly trained”, “exercise yourself”;

προσγυμνάζεσθαι, prosgymnazesthai, “train with”; *γυμνάσιον, gymnasion*, “gymnasium”; *γύμνασμα, gymnasma*, “exercises”; *ἐκμελετᾶν, ekmeletān*, “practise”; *προκόπτειν, prokoptein*, “made … progress”; *διορθοῦν, diorthoun*, “set right”, “setting right”, “correct”, “straightened”; *διόρθωσις, diorthōsis*, “correction”; *ἀδιάστροφος, adiastrophos*, “never been bent”; *θεραπεία, therapeia*, “treatment”, “service”; *θεραπεύειν, therapeuein*, “cure”, “serve”, “being treated”; *θεράπευμα, therapeuma*, “cases”; *μετατίθεσθαι, metatithesthai*, “shift position”, “shift”; *μετάγειν, metagein*, “lead … away”; *μεταγωγή, metagōgē*, “the leading away”; *ἑτοιμότης, hetoimotēs*, “readinesses”

At a Glance

The word. Μανθάνειν is to learn, and ἐθίζειν to accustom, to make a thing an ἔθος, a habit. Ἀσκεῖν is to work at a thing and so to train. Διορθοῦν is to straighten what is bent, to set right, and διόρθωσις is correction.

In the *Meditations*. The first thing Marcus records from Q. Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, twice consul and prefect of the city (see Rusticus), is “the impression of needing correction and treatment of character” (1.7.1). He is to keep two readinesses, the second “to shift position, if perhaps someone is at hand to set one right” (4.12), and he tells himself, “Accustom yourself even to the things you despair of” (12.6). In life, as in writing and reading, “you will not rule before you have been ruled” (11.29).

In this edition. Μανθάνειν is “learn” at every place; ἐθίζειν is “accustom”, also “grow used to”, “make a habit of” and “used to”, and ἔθος “habit”, once “customs”; ἀσκεῖν is “train”; διορθοῦν is “set right”, once “correct” and once “straightened”, and διόρθωσις “correction”; μετατίθεσθαι is “shift position”.

A place to read. 12.6, where the left hand, idle for other tasks from want of habit, holds the bridle more vigorously than the right, because it is accustomed to this.

Meaning

Μανθάνειν (*manthanein*) is to learn, by teaching or by experience; μάθημα (*mathēma*) is a thing learned, a study, and μαθητής (*mathētēs*) a pupil. Ἐθίζειν (*ethizein*) is to accustom, from ἔθος (*ethos*), custom or habit, and ἀνέθιστος (*anethistos*) is unaccustomed. Ἀσκεῖν (*askein*) is

to work at a thing with skill, and so to practise and train; συγγυμνάζειν (*syngymnazein*) and προσγυμνάζεσθαι (*prosgymnazesthai*) are compounds of the verb of athletic exercise, built on γυμνός (*gymnos*), "naked". Διορθοῦν (*diorthoun*), built on ὀρθός (*orthos*), "straight", "right", is to make straight and so to correct; never to have needed it is to be ἀδιάστροφος (*adiastrophos*), never bent. Θεραπεία (*therapeia*) is service, and so a doctor's treatment. Προκόπτειν (*prokoptein*), to cut one's way forward, is to advance, to make progress; one of the discourses of Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, bears the title *On Progress*.[71] Marcus uses the verb once (1.17.4).

Use in the book

"From Rusticus: to have got the impression of needing correction and treatment of character" (1.7.1). Rusticus gave first not a doctrine but a diagnosis. The same list forbids display: "nor to parade myself, so as to strike the imagination, as the man of discipline or the man of action" (1.7.1). Training is to be done, not shown. Rusticus also taught him to write letters artlessly (1.7.2; see Simplicity and sincerity) and to read carefully (1.7.3; see Assent and judgement), and let him have "the notes of Epictetus" (1.7.3; see Principles and reminders).

The learning Marcus values is not that of books. He thanks the gods "that I made no further progress in rhetoric and poetry and the other pursuits in which I might perhaps have been held fast …" (1.17.4): the one progress the book names is one he was spared. The last voice of 4.30, which the edition's note takes for Marcus' own, says, "And I have no food from studies, and I hold fast" (4.30; see Philosophy). What he has learned is a craft and a will: "Love the little craft you have learned, and rest in it" (4.31); of the will of man's nature, "You have learned that will" (4.49.2; see Courage and endurance); "Learn this, and you are upright" (7.2; see Principles and reminders). It also restrains judgement: "one must first learn many things so that one may pronounce anything with a firm grasp about another's action" (11.18.3; see Anger). And it begins in obedience: "In writing and reading you will not rule before you have been ruled. This far more in life" (11.29). Written by an emperor, it can be read as setting the ruler among the learners.

[71] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.4, title, περὶ προκοπῆς (*peri prokopēs*).

What is learned has to become habit, and Marcus' verb for that is ἐθίζειν, mostly a command to himself. He is to accustom himself to form only impressions he could disclose at once if asked, "What are you thinking now?" (3.4.2; see Simplicity and sincerity), to bear in mind that nature loves change (4.36; see Change), to attend to what another says, and, "as far as possible", to "be inside the soul of the speaker" (6.53), and to examine what others do, beginning from himself (10.37; see Attention and self-examination). If he makes a habit of seeing ruling centres as God sees them, "you will strip away from yourself the great distraction" (12.2; see Gods). Habit also works against him. To form the impression that another's loss is a harm is "a bad habit" (5.36); an unwanted impression comes "by the old habit" (7.17; see Daimon); and gladness in present goods can make him "grow used to valuing them" (7.27; see Contentment and self-sufficiency).

Training answers bad habit, and its model is the body. Even slowness at keeping track is to be trained: "And this too one must train" (5.5). The plainest case is 12.6: "Accustom yourself even to the things you despair of. For the left hand too, which for other tasks is idle from want of habit, holds the bridle more vigorously than the right; for it is accustomed to this." The verb for despairing, ἀπογινώσκειν (*apoginōskein*), is the one at 7.67, where Marcus must not "give up hope" of being free and self-respecting because he has despaired of becoming a dialectician and a natural philosopher (see Philosophy); 12.6 can be read as the answer to it.

Correction is the other half of practice, and it may come from another. "One must always have these two readinesses: the one, to do only what the reason of the kingly and law-giving art suggests for the benefit of men; the other to shift position, if perhaps someone is at hand to set one right and lead one away from some notion. But the leading away must always come from something convincing, as that it is just or for the common good … not that it appeared pleasant or a source of repute" (4.12). Both to shift position and to follow the one who sets right are "likewise free" (8.16; see Moral choice and freedom), and refuted, Marcus will "rejoice to shift position" (6.21; see Truth and falsehood). Correction may also be his own: "who prevents you from setting right the principle?" (8.47; see Assent and judgement). When the thing is in another's power, one must

blame no one: “For if you can, set right; if you cannot do this, set right the thing itself at least” (8.17; see Providence and atoms). A man who offends may be cured, “if he listens” (5.28; see Mind and reason), and of the base man’s state Marcus writes, “If, then, you are vehement, cure this” (12.16; see Fault and ignorance). Against this stands Claudius Maximus, the Stoic, “giving the impression of a man who had never been bent rather than one who had been straightened” (1.15.3).

The notebook can be read as Rusticus’ lesson carried out: a man who had the impression of needing correction writes his corrections down and repeats them until they become habit, measures no progress of his own in philosophy, and asks of himself the second readiness and the left hand’s practice.

Places to read

Every chapter in which μανθάνειν or a word of its family (προσμανθάνειν, *prosmanthanein*; μάθημα; μαθητής; πολυμαθής, *polymathēs*) occurs, or ἐθίζειν, ἔθος or ἀνέθιστος, ἀσκεῖν or ἀσκητικός (*askētikos*), συγγυμνάζειν, προσγυμνάζεσθαι, γυμνάσιον (*gymnasion*) or γύμνασμα (*gymnasma*), ἐκμελετᾶν (*ekmeletān*), προκόπτειν, διορθοῦν, διόρθωσις or ἀδιάστροφος, ἑτοιμότης (*hetoimotēs*), μετάγειν (*metagein*) or μεταγωγή (*metagōgē*), or μετατίθεσθαι (*metatithesthai*) where it is to shift position, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with θεραπεία and θεραπεύειν (*therapeuein*) where they are treatment or cure (1.7.1, 5.28, 6.55, 12.16), and 11.29, on writing and reading. Μαθηματικός (*mathēmatikos*), “astrologer” (4.48.1), εἴωθα (*eiōtha*), “be accustomed” (4.3.1, 8.41, 8.46), μετατιθέναι (*metatithenai*) of nature moving things (8.6), θεραπεύειν and θεραπεία where they are service (2.13, 6.12), θεράπευμα (*therapeuma*; 3.13), and ἀμαθής (*amathēs*), “ignorant” (5.32, 8.48; see Fault and ignorance), are left out.

1.7.1 From Rusticus Marcus got the impression of needing correction and treatment of character, and learned not to parade himself as the man of discipline.

1.8.2 From Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic whom Antoninus Pius, Marcus’ adoptive father, summoned to Rome to teach him, Marcus learned how to receive what pass for favours from friends,

neither lowered by them nor letting them go by unfeelingly.

1.9.3 Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew, was very learned without display.

1.15.3 Maximus gave the impression of a man who had never been bent rather than one who had been straightened.

1.16.6 Antoninus Pius gave way ungrudgingly to those who had some ability, such as knowledge of laws or customs, and kept ancestral custom without making a point of it.

1.17.4 Marcus thanks the gods that he made no further progress in rhetoric, poetry and the other pursuits in which he might perhaps have been held fast, had he seen himself going well in them.

2.7 If things falling from outside distract him, Marcus is to give himself leisure to learn something more that is good, and stop wandering.

2.11.3 The nature of the whole would not have overlooked such things through ignorance, or through knowing them but being unable to guard against them or correct them.

3.1 If a man begins to dote, all that needs a thoroughly trained power of reckoning is quenched first.

3.4.2 One must accustom oneself to form only such impressions that, if suddenly asked what one is thinking, one could answer frankly at once.

4.1 That which rules within, when it is in a state according to nature, always shifts its position easily towards what is possible and given.

4.12 One must always have two readinesses: to do only what reason suggests for the benefit of men, and to shift position if someone sets one right, but only for something convincing, as that it is just or for the common good.

4.30 One man practises philosophy without a tunic, another without a book; the last speaker, probably Marcus himself, has no food from studies, yet holds fast.

4.31 Marcus is to love the little craft he has learned and rest in it.

4.36 Marcus is to observe that all things come about by change, and to accustom himself to bear in mind that nature loves nothing so much as to change the things that are.

4.49.2 Marcus has learned the will of man's nature, and asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-controlled and the rest.

5.5 Though others cannot admire his sharpness, Marcus could long ago have been rid of grumbling, flattery and bragging, and found fault with, if at all, only as rather slow; and this too he must train.

5.28 If the man who offends listens, Marcus will cure him by showing and reminding, and there is no need for anger.

5.36 To form the impression that another's loss in things indifferent is a harm is a bad habit.

6.20 In the gymnasium a sparring partner's scratches and blows are not held against him afterwards, and so in the rest of life with those who, as it were, train with us.

6.21 If anyone can refute Marcus and show that he is not forming opinions or acting rightly, he will rejoice to shift position.

6.30.2 Marcus is to do everything as a pupil of Antoninus, whose qualities follow.

6.53 Marcus is to accustom himself to attend to what another says, and as far as possible he is to be inside the speaker's soul.

6.55 Marcus asks whether, if sailors or the sick spoke ill of the one steering or doctoring, he would heed anything but the safety of those on board or the health of those being treated.

7.2 What is outside the understanding is nothing to the understanding: whoever learns this is upright.

7.17 An impression has come by the old habit; Marcus is not angry with it, but tells it to go away.

7.27 Marcus is to reckon up the most favourable things present, but beware that his gladness in them does not make him grow used to valuing them.

8.16 To shift position and to follow the one who sets right are likewise free, for the activity is one's own.

8.17 If a thing is in another's power, one must blame no one: if one can, one is to set right; if not, one is to set right the thing itself at least.

8.47 If something in his own disposition distresses Marcus, he asks who prevents him from setting right the principle.

9.35 Marcus asks what one is saying who holds that the universe is condemned to unceasing bad things, no power among so many gods having ever been found to set them right.

10.11 Marcus is to acquire a method of observing how all things change into one another and exercise himself in this part, for nothing so produces greatness of mind.

10.22 Either Marcus lives here and is already used to it, or goes off as he wanted, or dies; beyond these, nothing.

10.31 Marcus asks what the material and occasion he flees are but exercises for a reason that has seen the things in life exactly.

10.36 Marcus is not to go away from men less kindly to them, but preserving his own habit, friendly, well-wishing and serene.

10.37 Marcus is to accustom himself to question within himself everything done by anyone, but to begin from himself and examine himself first.

11.18.3 Marcus has not firmly grasped whether men do wrong, for one must first learn many things before pronouncing with a firm grasp on another's action.

11.29 In writing and reading one will not rule before one has been ruled, and far more so in life.

12.2 If Marcus makes a habit of seeing ruling centres naked, as God does, he will strip away from himself the great distraction.

12.3.2 If Marcus separates from the ruling centre what is fastened to it and practises living only the present, he will be able to live out what remains untroubled.

12.6 Marcus is to accustom himself even to what he despairs of, as the left hand, idle for other tasks from want of habit, holds the bridle more vigorously than the right.

12.16 Marcus asks what the base man is to do, having such a state; if Marcus is vehement, he is to cure this.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus is the school's chief witness on training. Every state and faculty, he says, is kept and increased by the acts that answer to it (see Temperance and self-mastery): whoever would be a reader must read, and a writer write, and whoever wants not to do a thing must not do it, but must accustom himself, ἔθισον (*ethison*), to do something else instead. Near its end the discourse names the man who exercises himself against such impressions: "this is the one in training in very truth".[72] Marcus' writing and reading (11.29) and his "Accustom yourself" can be read beside these rules. The discourse that bears the title *On Training* sets limits. Training is not to be done through what is contrary to nature and astonishing, or those who say they practise philosophy will be no different from conjurors; walking a rope is hard and dangerous, but not everything hard and dangerous is fit for training, only what serves the end proposed, which is to use desire and aversion without hindrance. And since habit has gone ahead strongly, accustoming men to use desire and aversion on things outside their choice alone, "one must set against this habit a contrary habit", and set the practice of training, τὸ ἀσκητικόν (*to askētikon*), where impressions slip most.[73] Training of the body directed at display, Epictetus goes on, belongs to one who looks outward and hunts for spectators to call him a great man; and he approves the counsel of one Apollonius: a man who wants to train for himself should, thirsty in the heat, take a mouthful of cold water, spit it out, and tell no one.[74] Rusticus' warning against parading "the man of discipline", τὸν ἀσκητικόν (*ton askētikon*; 1.7.1), can be read beside this, in Epictetus' own word. In *On Progress* Epictetus asks whether the man who makes progress is the one who has read many treatises of Chrysippus, the school's third head, and compares the man who shows his reading to an athlete who, asked to show his shoulders, shows his jumping weights; progress is in the man who has turned from external things to his own choice

[72] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.18.1–4 and 2.18.26–27.
[73] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.12, title, and 3.12.1–6.
[74] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.12.16–17.

and works at it, to bring it into accord with nature.[75] The three fields of 8.7 and 11.37 are Epictetus' fields of training (see Impulse), and Marcus copies one of Epictetus' exercises, to say inwardly while kissing one's child, "Tomorrow perhaps you will die" (11.34; see Love and affection), which the *Discourses* set under "the training", ἄσκησις (*askēsis*), against attachment to what can be taken away.[76] Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its seventh book, reports that the Stoics held the study of syllogisms most useful, since it shows what demonstrates, and this "contributes much to the correction of doctrines", πρὸς διόρθωσιν τῶν δογμάτων (*pros diorthōsin tōn dogmatōn*).[77] Marcus' "setting right the principle" (8.47) joins the verb of the same word to the same noun, διορθῶσαι τὸ δόγμα (*diorthōsai to dogma*), though he thanks the gods that he did not sit down to resolving syllogisms (1.17.9; see Philosophy).

Other ancient sources

Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, writes to his friend Lucilius that he understands himself to be "not only corrected but transformed", and that the proof of a mind changed for the better is that it sees its own faults, which it did not know before.[78] Rusticus' first gift, the impression of needing correction (1.7.1), can be read as such a beginning. In another letter Seneca tells of his wife's fool, Harpaste, who has gone blind and does not know it, and complains that the house is dark; so are we all, he says: we are ill and do not know it, and we blush to learn a sound mind. The mind must be shaped and corrected before its crookedness hardens, yet he does not despair even of the hardened, for persistent work and careful attention conquer everything, and timber however bent can be brought back straight; "to learn the virtues is to unlearn the vices".[79] The left hand that learns the bridle (12.6) and Maximus, who seemed never bent rather than straightened (1.15.3), can be read beside these images.

---

[75] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.4.6–9, 1.4.13 and 1.4.18.

[76] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.24.84; the words of 11.34 come from 3.24.88, as Leopold's testimonia record.

[77] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.45.

[78] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 6.1.

[79] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 50.2–7.

Translation in this edition

Μανθάνειν is “learn” at all five places (1.8.2, 4.31, 4.49.2, 7.2, 11.18.3), and προσμανθάνειν “learn something more” (2.7); “learned” renders γνῶναι (*gnōnai*) at 1.4, and “learned by trial” πεπείρασαι (*pepeirasai*) at 8.1, and “the unlearned” are ἰδιῶται (*idiōtai*; 1.9.1; see Philosophy). Μάθημα is “studies” (4.30), μαθητής “a pupil” (6.30.2) and πολυμαθής, with the article, “to be very learned” (1.9.3); μαθηματικοί (*mathēmatikoi*) are “astrologers” (4.48.1), as the edition’s note explains, and ἀμαθής is “ignorant” (5.32, 8.48; see Fault and ignorance). Ἐθίζειν is “accustom” (3.4.2, 4.36, 6.53, 10.37, 12.6), “grow used to” (7.27), “make a habit of” (12.2), and in the perfect “are already used to it” (10.22) and “is accustomed” (12.6); ἀνέθιστος, with the article, is “want of habit” (12.6). Ἔθος is “habit” (5.36, 7.17, 10.36) and “customs” (1.16.6). “Habit” renders only words of this family, except in “the habits of the rich”, for διαγωγή (*diagōgē*; 1.3). Εἴωθα is “much given to” (4.3.1), “is accustomed” (8.41) and “is used to” (8.46). Ἀσκεῖν is “train”, in “one must train” (5.5), and ἀσκητικός “the man of discipline” (1.7.1). “Train” renders also προσγυμνάζεσθαι, “train with” (6.20); συγγυμνάζειν is “thoroughly trained” (3.1) and “exercise yourself” (10.11), γύμνασμα “exercises” (10.31) and γυμνάσιον “gymnasium” (6.20); “the Greek training” renders ἀγωγή (*agōgē*; 1.6). Ἐκμελετᾶν is “practise” (12.3.2); “practises philosophy” renders φιλοσοφεῖν (*philosophein*; 4.30), “practise dialectic” διαλεκτικεύεσθαι (*dialektikeuesthai*; 8.13), and “practised virtue” ἀρετῇ χρησαμένων (*aretēi chrēsamenōn*), “used virtue” (11.26). Προκόπτειν is “made … progress” (1.17.4), the only “progress” in the English. Διορθοῦν is “set right” (4.12, 8.16, 8.17, 9.35) and “setting right” (8.47), “correct” (2.11.3) and, in the passive, “straightened” (1.15.3); at 8.17 the English says “set right” twice for one διόρθωσον (*diorthōson*). Διόρθωσις is “correction” (1.7.1), and “correction” and “correct” render no other words. Ἀδιάστροφος is “a man who had never been bent” (1.15.3). Θεραπεία is “treatment” (1.7.1) and “service” (2.13); θεραπεύειν is “cure” where its object is a man or a state (5.28, 12.16), “serve” (2.13, 6.12) and, in the passive participle, “those being treated” (6.55); θεράπευμα is “cases” (3.13). Μετατίθεσθαι is “shift position” (4.12, 6.21, 8.16) and “shifts its position” (4.1), and the active μετατιθέναι “shift” (8.6); μετάγειν is “lead … away” and μεταγωγή “the leading away” (4.12); ἑτοιμότης is

“readinesses” (4.12). The ἐνεργητικός (*energētikos*) of 1.7.1, “the man of action”, is the correction of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, for the manuscripts’ εὐεργετικός (*euergetikos*), “the benefactor” (see Present action). At 11.29 “before you have been ruled” renders ἀρχθῇς (*archthēis*), which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, takes from P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed; A, the Vatican manuscript, has ἀρχῆς (*archēs*). Διδάσκειν (*didaskein*) is “teach” and μεταδιδάσκειν (*metadidaskein*) “teach better” (see Kindness and correction).

ἀδιάστροφος

Attested: ἀδιαστρόφου (*adiastrophou*; 1.15.3). Not twisted, never bent out of shape. Claudius Maximus gave “the impression of a man who had never been bent rather than one who had been straightened” (1.15.3). Lemma: ἀδιάστροφος.

ἀνέθιστος

Attested: ἀνέθιστον (*anethiston*; 12.6). Unaccustomed; with the article, want of habit. The left hand “for other tasks is idle from want of habit” (12.6). A has ἀναίσθητον (*anaisthēton*), “insensible”; Leopold prints the reading of P. Lemma: ἀνέθιστος.

ἀσκέω

Attested: ἀσκητέον (*askēteon*; 5.5). To work at, to practise, to train; the verbal adjective, one must train. Of slowness at keeping track: “And this too one must train, not disregarding it nor delighting in the sluggishness” (5.5); “delighting in” renders ἐμφιληδονοῦντι (*emphilēdonounti*), the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, which Leopold prints; P has ἐμφιληδοῦντι νοθείᾳ (*emphilēdounti notheiāi*), a misspelt participle with νοθεία, “bastardy”, for νωθεία, “sluggishness”. Lemma: ἀσκέω.

ἀσκητικός

Attested: ἀσκητικόν (*askētikon*; 1.7.1). Given to training, disciplined; with ἀνήρ (*anēr*), the man in training. From Rusticus Marcus learned not “to parade myself, so as to strike the imagination, as the man of discipline or the man of action” (1.7.1). Lemma: ἀσκητικός.

γυμνάσιον

Attested: γυμνασίοις (*gymnasiois*; 6.20). A place of exercise, the gymnasium. “In the gymnasium someone has scratched with his nails and, butting with his head, dealt a blow; but we do not mark it” (6.20). Lemma: γυμνάσιον.

γύμνασμα

Attested: γυμνάσματα (*gymnasmata*; 10.31). An exercise. Of the material and occasion Marcus flees: “For what are all these but exercises for a reason that has seen exactly, and as one who studies nature, the things in life?” (10.31). Lemma: γύμνασμα.

διορθόω

Attested: διορθουμένου (*diorthoumenou*; 1.15.3), διορθώσασθαι (*diorthōsasthai*; 2.11.3), διορθῶν (*diorthōn*; 4.12), διορθοῦντι (*diorthounti*; 8.16), διόρθωσον (*diorthōson*; 8.17), διορθῶσαι (*diorthōsai*; 8.47), διορθώσουσα (*diorthōsousa*; 9.35). To make straight, to set right, to correct. Of a man set right by another: “if perhaps someone is at hand to set one right and lead one away from some notion” (4.12); “to follow the one who sets right” (8.16). Of oneself: “who prevents you from setting right the principle?” (8.47); “For if you can, set right” (8.17). Of nature and the gods: the nature of the whole would not have overlooked these things, “knowing it but unable to guard against it or correct it” (2.11.3), and Marcus asks whether one says that no power among so many gods “was ever found to set them right” (9.35). In the passive, “one who had been straightened” (1.15.3). Lemma: διορθόω.

διόρθωσις

Attested: διορθώσεως (*diorthōseōs*; 1.7.1). A making straight, correction. “From Rusticus: to have got the impression of needing correction and treatment of character” (1.7.1). Lemma: διόρθωσις.

ἐθίζω

Attested: ἐθιστέον (*ethisteon*; 3.4.2), ἐθίζου (*ethizou*; 4.36), ἔθισον (*ethison*; 6.53, 10.37), ἐθίσῃς (*ethisēis*; 7.27, 12.2), εἴθικας (*eithikas*; 10.22), ἔθιζε (*ethize*; 12.6), εἴθισται (*eithistai*; 12.6). To accustom; in the middle voice and with a reflexive, to accustom oneself; in the perfect, to be used to. Mostly a command: “one must accustom oneself to form impressions only of such things” (3.4.2); “accustom yourself

to bear in mind" (4.36); "Accustom yourself even to the things you despair of" (12.6). Also "do not grow used to valuing them" (7.27), "if you too make a habit of this doing" (12.2), "and are already used to it" (10.22), and of the left hand, "for it is accustomed to this" (12.6). At 12.2 A has αἰσθήσῃς (*aisthēsēis*), "perceive", and the excerpts ἐθίσῃς σαυτόν (*ethisēis sauton*). Lemma: ἐθίζω.

ἔθος

Attested: ἐθῶν (*ethōn*; 1.16.6), ἔθος (*ethos*; 5.36, 7.17, 10.36). Custom, habit. Of a people, "knowledge of laws or customs" (1.16.6); of a man, "for that is a bad habit" (5.36), "you have come by the old habit" (7.17), said to an impression, and "preserving your own habit, friendly and well-wishing and serene" (10.36). At 10.36 Herbert Richards, whose notes on Marcus Aurelius appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905, proposed ἦθος (*ēthos*), "character"; at 5.36 Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, proposed κακὸν γὰρ οὐδέν (*kakon gar ouden*), "for it is nothing bad". Lemma: ἔθος.

ἐκμελετάω

Attested: ἐκμελετήσῃς (*ekmeletēsēis*; 12.3.2). To practise thoroughly, to train oneself in. If Marcus will "practise living only what you live, that is, the present", he will be able to live out what remains untroubled (12.3.2). Lemma: ἐκμελετάω.

ἑτοιμότης

Attested: ἑτοιμότητας (*hetoimotētas*; 4.12). Readiness, preparedness. "One must always have these two readinesses" (4.12). Lemma: ἑτοιμότης.

θεραπεία

Attested: θεραπείας (*therapeias*; 1.7.1), θεραπεία (*therapeia*; 2.13). Service, care; of a doctor, treatment. "the impression of needing correction and treatment of character" (1.7.1); of the daimon within, "the service of it is to keep it pure of passion" (2.13). Lemma: θεραπεία.

θεράπευμα

Attested: θεραπευμάτων (*therapeumatōn*; 3.13). A thing to be treated, a case. Doctors "always have their instruments and knives at hand for sudden cases" (3.13). Lemma: θεράπευμα.

θεραπεύω

Attested: θεραπεύειν (*therapeuein*; 2.13), θεραπεύσεις (*therapeuseis*; 5.28), ἐθεράπευες (*etherapeues*; 6.12), θεραπευομένοις (*therapeuomenois*; 6.55), θεράπευσον (*therapeuson*; 12.16). To serve, to tend; of a doctor, to treat, to cure. “it is enough to be with the daimon within oneself alone and to serve it genuinely” (2.13); “you would serve the one” (6.12), the stepmother; “if he listens, you will cure him” (5.28); “the health of those being treated” (6.55); “If, then, you are vehement, cure this” (12.16). Lemma: θεραπεύω.

μάθημα

Attested: μαθημάτων (*mathēmatōn*; 4.30). A thing learned; in the plural, studies. “And I have no food from studies, and I hold fast” (4.30). Lemma: μάθημα.

μαθητής

Attested: μαθητής (*mathētēs*; 6.30.2). A learner, a pupil. “Everything as a pupil of Antoninus” (6.30.2). Lemma: μαθητής.

μανθάνω

Attested: μαθεῖν (*mathein*; 1.8.2, 11.18.3), ἔμαθες (*emathes*; 4.31), μεμάθηκας (*memathēkas*; 4.49.2), μάθε (*mathe*; 7.2). To learn, by teaching or by experience. “to have learned how one must receive what pass for favours from friends” (1.8.2); “Love the little craft you have learned” (4.31); “You have learned that will” (4.49.2); “Learn this, and you are upright” (7.2); “one must first learn many things” (11.18.3). At 7.2 P has πάθε (*pathe*), “undergo”, and at 11.18.3 A has παθεῖν (*pathein*). Lemma: μανθάνω.

μετάγω

Attested: μετάγων (*metagōn*; 4.12). To lead elsewhere, to bring over. “if perhaps someone is at hand to set one right and lead one away from some notion” (4.12). Lemma: μετάγω.

μεταγωγή

Attested: μεταγωγήν (*metagōgēn*; 4.12). A leading elsewhere, a change of view brought about by another. “But the leading away must always come from something convincing, as that it is just or for the common good” (4.12). Lemma: μεταγωγή.

μετατίθημι

Attested: μετατίθεσθαι (*metatithesthai*; 4.1, 8.16), μεταθέσθαι (*metathesthai*; 4.12), μεταθήσομαι (*metathēsomai*; 6.21), μετατιθέναι (*metatithenai*; 8.6). In the active, to move elsewhere; in the middle voice, to change one's place or view. The ruling centre "always shifts its position easily towards what is possible and given" (4.1); "the other to shift position, if perhaps someone is at hand to set one right" (4.12); "I will rejoice to shift position" (6.21); "both to shift position and to follow the one who sets right are likewise free" (8.16). In the active, nature's work is "to shift the things here to there" (8.6). Lemma: μετατίθημι.

πολυμαθής

Attested: πολυμαθές (*polymathes*; 1.9.3). Having learned much; with the article, much learning. From Sextus, "to be very learned without display" (1.9.3). Lemma: πολυμαθής.

προκόπτω

Attested: προκόψαι (*prokopsai*; 1.17.4). To advance, to make progress. Marcus thanks the gods "that I made no further progress in rhetoric and poetry and the other pursuits in which I might perhaps have been held fast" (1.17.4). Lemma: προκόπτω.

προσγυμνάζομαι

Attested: προσγυμναζομένων (*prosgymnazomenōn*; 6.20). To exercise with someone, to train with. "let us disregard much in those who, as it were, train with us" (6.20). Lemma: προσγυμνάζομαι.

προσμανθάνω

Attested: προσμανθάνειν (*prosmanthanein*; 2.7). To learn in addition. "Then give yourself leisure to learn something more that is good, and stop wandering" (2.7). Lemma: προσμανθάνω.

συγγυμνάζω

Attested: συγγεγυμνασμένου (*syngegymnasmenou*; 3.1), συγγυμνάσθητι (*syngymnasthēti*; 10.11). To exercise thoroughly; in the passive, to be trained. Dotage quenches first "all else of that kind that needs a thoroughly trained power of reckoning" (3.1); "and exercise yourself in this part; for nothing so produces greatness of mind" (10.11). Lemma: συγγυμνάζω.

See also

Anger; Assent and judgement; Attention and self-examination; Change; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Courage and endurance; Daimon; Fault and ignorance; Gods; Impulse; Kindness and correction; Love and affection; Mind and reason; Moral choice and freedom; Philosophy; Present action; Principles and reminders; Providence and atoms; Rusticus; Simplicity and sincerity; Temperance and self-mastery; Truth and falsehood.

Mind and reason

Reason in man and in the whole · Meditations

λόγος, logos, "reason", "word", "speech", "reply"; *λογικός, logikos*, "rational", "rationality", "the art of reasoning", "rationally"; *λογισμός, logismos*, "power of reckoning"; *νοῦς, nous*, "mind"; *νοερός, noeros*, "intelligent", "intelligence"; *διάνοια, dianoia*, "understanding"; *διανοεῖσθαι, dianoeisthai*, "think"

At a Glance

The word. Λόγος, from λέγειν (*legein*), "to say" and "to reckon", is word, account and reason; νοῦς is mind; διάνοια is the understanding, mind at work. Νοερός, "intelligent", is what has the nature of mind; λογικός, "rational", what has reason.

In the *Meditations*. Reason is one in man and in the whole: at death a man is taken back into the "seminal reason" of what begot him (4.14), and each man's "mind and reason" is Zeus' gift, "a fragment of himself" (5.27). From this Marcus argues to law and a common city (4.4). Of body, breath and mind, the mind alone is "properly yours" (12.3.1). He presses the difference between having reason and using it (4.13), and stops short of saying that he is nothing but reason (8.40).

In this edition. Λόγος is "reason" in man and in the universe, never "Word", with "word", "speech" and "reply" in the ordinary sense; νοῦς is "mind", διάνοια "understanding", νοερός "intelligent" and "intelligence", λογικός "rational" and "rationality".

A place to read. 4.4, where common intelligence and reason lead, step by step, to law, citizenship and the universe "as it were a city".

Meaning

Λόγος (*logos*) is what is said and what is reckoned: a word, an account, a ratio, a reason. The Stoics gave the name to the active principle of the universe, the reason in matter that they also called God, and to the same power in man.[80] Marcus uses it of both, and the edition renders both "reason": "the reason that governs the whole" (4.46) and the reason "by which we are rational" (4.4). Νοῦς (*nous*), mind, is the third of the things a man is made of, beside poor body and little breath (12.3.1), and is in the whole as well: "The mind of the whole is social" (5.30). Twice Marcus names the two together, "mind and reason" (5.27, 10.33.2).

Διάνοια (*dianoia*), from διανοεῖσθαι, "to think", is the understanding at work, and Marcus uses it where he speaks of its condition: sufficient for a task or not (7.5), calm (7.33), pure, sane, self-controlled and just (8.51), healthy (10.35), corrupted (9.2). The two adjectives sort living beings. Νοερός (*noeros*) is "intelligent", and its neuter used as a noun, "intelligence"; λογικός (*logikos*) is "rational". "Into the irrational living beings one soul has been divided; into the rational, one intelligent soul has been portioned out" (9.8). The same governing part, named by its office, is the ruling centre (12.3.2; see Ruling centre).

Use in the book

One reason runs through the whole and through each man. The universe is governed by "the reason that governs the whole", which, in words Marcus takes from Heraclitus, the philosopher of Ephesus of about 500 BC, is for men "the thing with which they most perpetually converse" and yet "the thing they are at odds with" (4.46).[81] As seminal reason it holds the seeds of things, and death returns a man to it: "You have subsisted within, as a part. You will vanish into what begot you; or rather you will be taken back, by change, into its seminal reason" (4.14). Souls too, on the supposition that they live on, are in time "kindled into the seminal reason of the whole" (4.21.1). Each man's reason comes from it. The daimon whom Zeus has given to each, "a fragment of himself", is "each man's mind and reason" (5.27; see Daimon); "the mind of each is a god and has flowed from there" (12.26); and as the earthy, moist and fiery in a man

[80] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.134.

[81] Heraclitus, fragments 71–74 and 76 Diels, freely combined, as the edition's note at 4.46 records from Leopold's testimonia.

come from somewhere, “so indeed intelligence too comes from somewhere” (4.4).

From this shared reason Marcus argues to obligation. At 4.4 a chain of conditions runs from an intelligence common to us, through common reason and common law, to the conclusion that “the universe is as it were a city” (4.4; see Citizenship). Reason ends in law. “For the rational living being the same action is according to nature and according to reason” (7.11); and because the rational soul, besides loving its neighbours, honours nothing above itself, “which is peculiar to law as well”, “right reason and the reason of justice differ in nothing” (11.1.2). The kinship of men is “a fellowship not of a little blood or a little seed, but of mind” (12.26; compare 2.1). Shared reason also sets the way to meet a man who gives offence, even one whose armpits stink. Told that he “has reason” and “can understand, if he attends, how he offends”, Marcus answers: “so you too have reason: move a rational disposition by a rational disposition; show, remind. For if he listens, you will cure him, and there is no need for anger” (5.28).

Of the three things a man is made of, poor body, little breath and mind, “the others are yours so far as one must take care of them, but the third alone is properly yours”; and if all that others do and say, and all that attaches from outside, is separated from the understanding, “the intelligent faculty” may “live released by itself, doing what is just, wanting what happens, and saying what is true” (12.3.1). If the world is “a confusion without a guide”, the surge may carry off “the poor flesh, the little breath, the rest; for the mind it will not carry away” (12.14). Unlike water or fire, “mind and reason can make their way through everything that resists, as they are by nature able and as they want” (10.33.2).

Yet having reason is not using it. “Have you reason? I have. Then why do you not use it?” (4.13). The powers that use reason can fail before the body does: if a man “begins to dote”, transpiring, feeding, impressions and impulses remain, but the use of himself and “all else of that kind that needs a thoroughly trained power of reckoning, is quenched first”; one must hurry, then, not only because death comes nearer but “because the conceiving of things and the keeping track of them give out before it” (3.1). “Corruption of the understanding is a plague”, a plague of men “in so far as they are men” (9.2). Nor does Marcus simply equate himself

with reason. When he tells himself that, his opinion taken away, "you yourself stand in complete safety", the dialogue goes on: "Who is 'yourself'?—Reason.—But I am not reason. —So be it. Then let reason not distress itself; and if something else in you is in a bad way, let it form its own opinion about itself" (8.40). The concession can be read as setting the limit of the identification: reason is the self Marcus chooses to live by, not the whole of what he is. Near the end reason in man and reason in the whole meet again. If transpiring, perceiving, impulse, growth, the voice and thinking are each easy to despise, then "go forward to the last: to follow reason and God" (12.31). The list can be read as setting even thinking below the following of reason.

Places to read

The passages where reason, mind, understanding and the rational and intelligent are discussed or carry the argument, in the order of the book; every place is given in the sub-entries.

1.8.1 From Apollonius, his Stoic teacher, Marcus learned to look to nothing else, even for a moment, but reason, and to be always the same in pain, bereavement and illness.

2.1 Marcus has observed that the wrongdoer is kin to him, sharing not blood or seed but mind and a portion of the divine, and so can neither harm him nor be hated by him.

2.12 The intelligent faculty is to attend to how cheap the objects of sense are, to what death is, and to how man touches God, and with what part of himself.

2.16 The end of rational living beings is to follow the reason and law of the most venerable city and commonwealth.

3.1 The understanding may not stay equal to its work in a longer life: the powers that need a trained power of reckoning are quenched before transpiring and feeding fail, and so one must hurry.

3.6.1 If anything in human life is better than justice, truth and the understanding's being content with itself where it makes one act according to right reason, Marcus is to turn to it with his whole soul.

3.16.1 Body, soul, mind: to have the mind as guide to what appear to be duties belongs even to those who do not believe in the gods.

4.3.2 The understanding does not mingle with the breath's smooth or rough motion once it has drawn itself back and come to know its own authority.

4.4 Common intelligence implies common reason, law, citizenship and a city that is the universe, and intelligence, like the elements in us, comes from somewhere.

4.13 Marcus has reason, and asks why he does not use it, since if it does its own work nothing else is wanted.

4.14 A man will be taken back, by change, into the seminal reason of what begot him.

4.21.1 If souls live on, after a time they are kindled into the seminal reason of the whole.

4.29 He who flees civic reason is a fugitive, he who shuts the eye of intelligence is blind, and he who separates himself from the reason of the common nature is an abscess on the universe.

4.46 Recalling Heraclitus, Marcus remembers that men are at odds with the reason that governs the whole, with which they most perpetually converse.

5.14 Reason and the art of reasoning are content with themselves and their works, set out from their proper starting point and travel to the end set before them.

5.27 The daimon Zeus has given each man as guardian and guide, a fragment of himself, is each man's mind and reason.

5.28 The man who offends, even by the smell of his armpits, has reason, but so has Marcus, who is to move a rational disposition by a rational disposition, with no need for anger.

5.30 The mind of the whole is social, and has made the worse for the sake of the better.

6.1 The reason that governs the substance of the whole has no vice and does no ill, and all things come to be according to it.

6.35 Marcus asks whether it is not terrible that craftsmen respect the reason of their craft more

than man respects his own, which he has in common with the gods.

7.5 If his understanding is sufficient, Marcus uses it as a tool given by the nature of the whole; if not, he yields the work to someone abler, if it is not otherwise a duty, or does it as he can with a helper.

7.9 There is one universe, one God, one substance, one law, reason common to all intelligent living beings, and one truth, if indeed there is also one perfection for living beings of one kind.

7.11 For the rational living being the same action is according to nature and according to reason.

7.55 Rational and intelligent motion marks its own bounds and is not overcome by the motion of sense or impulse.

8.40 The self that stands safe once opinion is taken away is reason; to the objection "But I am not reason" the answer is "So be it", and reason at least is not to distress itself.

8.41 Impediment to mind is bad for the intelligent nature, but nothing impedes what is peculiar to the mind once it has become the round sphere of Empedocles, the philosopher-poet of fifth-century Acragas.[82]

8.54 Marcus is not only to breathe with the surrounding air but to think together with the intelligence that surrounds all things, which is poured everywhere for whoever can draw it in.

8.60 An arrow travels one way and the mind another, for the mind goes straight to its object even when it is cautious or turns about in inquiry.

9.2 Corruption of the understanding is a plague far more than any ill-tempering of the breath poured around us, for it strikes men in so far as they are men.

9.10 Reason bears fruit, both common and its own.

10.12 The man who follows reason in everything is at leisure and quick to move, bright and collected.

10.33.2 Mind and reason can make their way through everything that resists.

---

[82] Empedocles, fragments 27–28 Diels, as the edition's note at 8.41 records.

11.1.2 The rational soul loves its neighbours and honours nothing above itself, as law does, and so right reason and the reason of justice differ in nothing.

11.20.2 Marcus asks whether it is not terrible that the intelligent part alone should be disobedient and indignant at its own place.

12.3.1 Of poor body, little breath and mind, the third alone is properly one's own; if all else is separated from it, the intelligent faculty may live released and pure.

12.14 If the world is a confusion without a guide, Marcus is to be glad to have a ruling mind, which the surge will not carry away.

12.19 Marcus has in himself something better than what jerks him like a puppet, and asks what his understanding is now: fear, suspicion, craving?

12.26 The kinship of men is a fellowship of mind, and the mind of each is a god and has flowed from there.

12.31 If transpiring, perceiving, impulse, growth, the voice and thinking are each easy to despise, Marcus is to go forward to the last, to follow reason and God.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The identity of the reason in man with the reason in the universe is the Stoics' doctrine. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out their teaching in its seventh book, reports that they held two principles of the whole, the passive and the active: the passive is matter, substance without quality, and "the active is the reason in it, God", which, being everlasting, crafts each thing throughout all matter.[83] In the beginning God, whom they held to be one with mind, fate and Zeus, "being the seminal reason of the universe", remained in the moist as the seed is held in the semen, making matter apt for what was to come;[84] hence Marcus' "seminal reason" (4.14, 4.21.1) and "seminal reasons" (6.24). The same reason is law. The end is to live in agreement with nature, one's own and the whole's, doing nothing that "the common law" forbids,

[83] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.134.

[84] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.135–136.

"which is right reason, going through all things, the same as Zeus":[85] the doctrine behind 4.4, 7.9 and 11.1.2. The same passage joins to it the concord of the daimon in each man with the will of the governor of the whole (5.27; see Daimon). For rational beings, the Stoics held, to live rightly according to reason is to live according to nature (see Impulse);[86] Marcus' sentence at 7.11 can be read as the school's formula. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, draws the same conclusions. Two things are mixed in our making, "the body, common with the animals, and reason and judgement, common with the gods" (compare 6.35, 7.53);[87] each man is a fragment of God (5.27; see Daimon);[88] and the rational faculty is the one faculty that contemplates both itself and all the others.[89] Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, puts it in a sentence: "Reason is nothing other than a part of the divine spirit sunk into a human body."[90]

Translation in this edition

Λόγος is "reason" wherever it means the faculty or the principle, in man and in the whole, and never "Word"; at 6.23 the second of three λόγον is left to ellipsis, "using what has not": so "right reason" (ὀρθὸς λόγος; 3.6.1, 3.12, 11.1.2, 11.9, 12.35), "seminal reason" and "seminal reasons" (σπερματικὸς λόγος; 4.14, 4.21.1, 6.24), "civic reason" (4.29, 9.12), "the reason that governs the whole" (4.46) and "the governing reason" (6.5). At 2.5 τοῦ αἱροῦντος λόγου is "the dictate of reason"; the "certain reasons of what was to be" at 9.1.4 are, as the edition's note says, the seminal reasons; and "reason" stands too in "for two reasons" (5.8.5) and in a line of Euripides, the Athenian tragic poet, "there is reason in this too" (7.41, 11.6.1).[91] In its ordinary sense the word is "word" (4.19; 5.3 twice), "speech" (4.33, 8.30) and "reply" (7.44). Idioms are rendered as idioms, without the noun: ἐν λόγῳ τίθεσθαι gives "sets no store even by" (3.4.4, with a negative) and "sets less store by" (12.4), λόγου χάριν "for example" (4.32.1), καθ' ἕτερον λόγον "in one respect"

[85] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.88.
[86] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.86.
[87] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.3.3.
[88] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.8.11; compare 1.14.6.
[89] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.1.4.
[90] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 66.12.
[91] Euripides, *Antiope*, fr. 208 Nauck, as the edition's note at 7.38 records.

(5.20) and “in another respect” (11.18.1), λόγους εὐφήμους ποιεῖσθαι “speak well of” (6.18), τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι “speak about” (7.48), τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν λόγον “as … so” (7.13), and περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος “in question” (8.32).

Λογικός is “rational”; “rational being” or “rational beings” where no noun stands with it (3.6.3, 4.29, 7.13 twice, 7.55 twice, 8.35 twice, 8.41, 10.8.4, 11.39), “the rational” (5.16, 9.8, 10.2) and “everything rational” (3.4.4). Τὸ λογικόν is “rationality” at 4.4, beside “intelligence” and “the sense of law”. Ἡ λογικὴ τέχνη is “the art of reasoning” (5.14), λογικῇ τινι πιθανότητι “something rationally convincing” (5.6.2), and the adverb λογικῶς is “rational” in “a rational and social state” (6.14). Λογισμός is “power of reckoning” (3.1).

Νοῦς is “mind” at every place, idioms included: “you had in mind” (3.4.2), “to your mind” and “to its mind” (6.40), “the man who has a mind” (6.51), “let into his mind” (10.11), “if he has any mind whatever” (11.1.2); with ἡγεμονικόν it is “a ruling mind” (12.14). Διάνοια is “understanding” at every place, kept apart from “mind”, and the adjective διανοητικός gives “the roving of the understanding” (6.28). Νοερός is “intelligent”, with “intelligent faculty” for νοερὰ δύναμις (2.12, 8.54, 12.3.1) and “intelligent part” for τὸ νοερὸν μέρος (11.20.2); used as a noun it is “intelligence” (4.4 three times, 8.54, 12.2), as also in “the eye of intelligence” (4.29). Διανοεῖσθαι is “think” at every place; at 12.4 it stands beside ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, “consider”.

διανοέομαι

Attested: διανοεῖσθαι (*dianoeisthai*; 2.11.1, 12.4, 12.31), διανοῇ (*dianoēi*; 3.4.2, 5.29), διανοεῖται (*dianoeitai*; 3.4.3, 5.6.1), διανοοῦ (*dianoou*; 4.3.4, 9.29), διενοήθη (*dienoēthē*; 4.18). To think, to have in one’s mind. “Do and say and think each thing as one who may leave life at this moment” (2.11.1). One should form impressions only of things such that, asked “What are you thinking now?”, one could answer at once (3.4.2). The god or sensible teacher of 12.4 who bids a man “nothing within himself to consider and think that he will not at the same moment also bring out, crying it aloud” would not be endured for one day; so much more, Marcus says, “do we respect those close by, what view they will take of us, than ourselves” (12.4). At 12.31 “To think?” is among the activities of which Marcus asks whether any is worth longing for. Lemma: διανοέομαι.

διάνοια

Attested: διάνοια (*dianoia*; 3.1, 4.3.2, 4.33, 5.16, 5.20, 7.5, 7.33, 7.37, 7.60, 8.48, 9.28, 9.41, 9.42.2, 12.19, 12.30), διάνοιάν (*dianoian*; 3.5, 3.6.1), διάνοιαν (*dianoian*; 3.7, 5.26, 7.2, 7.64, 7.68, 8.36, 8.51, 10.35), διανοίᾳ (*dianoiāi*; 3.8, 6.32, 7.35), διανοίας (*dianoias*; 6.16.5, 7.2, 7.34, 8.57, 9.2, 12.3.1). The understanding, the mind as it thinks and judges. Marcus speaks of its condition and its acts: it "does not mingle with the breath" once it has "come to know its own authority" (4.3.2); it "reverses and converts every hindrance to activity into the leading object" (5.20); "free from passions" it is "a citadel" (8.48); "Corruption of the understanding is a plague" (9.2). At 7.35 the word is Plato's, in a sentence Marcus quotes from the *Republic*;[92] at 9.28 it is "the understanding of the whole". The adjective διανοητικός occurs once, in "the roving of the understanding" (6.28). Lemma: διάνοια.

λογικός

Attested: λογικῶν (*logikōn*; 2.16, 4.29, 7.13, 7.55, 8.35 twice, 9.9.2, 11.39 three times), λογικόν (*logikon*; 3.4.4, 4.4, 7.28, 8.35, 10.2), λογικῷ (*logikōi*; 3.6.3 twice, 10.28), λογικοῦ (*logikou*; 3.9, 5.16, 5.29, 5.34, 8.39, 8.41, 9.16, 10.2), λογικά (*logika*; 4.3.2, 5.16, 7.13, 7.55, 9.1.1, 9.8, 10.8.4), λογικοί (*logikoi*; 4.4), λογικῇ (*logikēi*; 5.6.2, 5.28, 7.55), λογική (*logikē*; 5.14, 6.44.2, 7.64, 7.72, 8.7), λογικήν (*logikēn*; 5.28, 6.14), λογικῆς (*logikēs*; 6.14, 7.55, 7.68, 11.1.1, 11.1.2), λογικῶς (*logikōs*; 6.14), λογικῶ (*logikō*, a misprint for λογικῷ in J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints; 7.11). Possessed of reason, rational: the mark that sets men apart among living beings and joins them to one another. The good of a rational living being, Marcus says, "is fellowship" (5.16), and "the rational is at once civic too" (10.2); rational beings are made "for the sake of one another" (7.55). At 4.4 the neuter is "rationality", and at 5.14 ἡ λογικὴ τέχνη is "the art of reasoning". Lemma: λογικός.

λογισμός

Attested: λογισμοῦ (*logismou*; 3.1). Reckoning, the power of calculating and weighing. When a man "begins to dote", the exact reckoning of duties, the analysis of what presents itself and the question whether to take oneself out of life, "and all else of that kind that needs a thoroughly trained

[92] Plato, *Republic* 486a, as the edition's note at 7.35 records.

power of reckoning, is quenched first" (3.1). Lemma: λογισμός.

λόγος

Attested: λόγον (*logon*; 1.8.1, 2.10, 3.6.1, 4.5, 4.13, 4.14, 4.21.1, 4.29, 5.20, 5.28 twice, 5.32, 6.23 three times, 6.30.2, 6.35, 6.58 twice, 7.8, 7.10, 7.11, 7.13, 7.24, 7.41, 7.44, 7.53, 10.7.2, 11.6.1, 11.9, 11.18.1, 12.35), λόγου (*logou*; 2.5, 4.16, 4.19, 4.29, 4.32.1, 5.3, 6.35, 7.9, 8.48, 9.42.3, 10.31, 10.33.3, 11.30), λόγῳ (*logōi*; 2.16, 3.4.4, 3.12, 4.30, 4.46, 5.9, 8.30, 10.12, 12.4, 12.31), λόγος (*logos*; 4.4 twice, 4.12, 4.24, 4.33, 5.3, 5.14, 5.27, 6.1, 6.5, 6.50, 7.9, 8.32, 8.40 three times, 9.10 twice, 9.12, 10.32, 10.33.2, 10.33.3, 11.1.2 twice), λόγους (*logous*; 5.8.5, 6.18, 6.24, 7.48, 9.1.4). Reason, in man and in the universe; also word, speech and account. In the whole it is "the reason that governs the whole" (4.46), the "seminal reason" (4.14, 4.21.1, 6.24) and "the reason of the whole" (7.10, 10.7.2) into which things are taken back; in man it is what he has "in common with the gods" (6.35), and what he must use: "Have you reason? I have. Then why do you not use it?" (4.13). "Who is 'yourself'?—Reason" (8.40). Lemma: λόγος.

νοερός

Attested: νοερᾶς (*noeras*; 2.12, 7.55, 8.7, 8.41, 9.9.1, 9.39), νοεροῦ (*noerou*; 3.7, 8.2), νοερόν (*noeron*; 4.4 three times, 7.72, 11.20.2), νοερῷ (*noerōi*; 4.5, 4.29, 8.54, 12.2), νοερῶν (*noerōn*; 7.9), νοερά (*noera*; 7.55, 8.54, 9.8, 9.9.3, 12.30), νοεράν (*noeran*; 12.3.1). Intelligent, of the nature of mind, said of man, of the universe and of God. "If intelligence is common to us, reason too, by which we are rational, is common" (4.4); "the nature of man is part of a nature unimpeded, intelligent and just, if indeed it makes the portions of times, substance, cause, activity and conjuncture equal and according to worth for each" (8.7); "think together, too, with the intelligence that surrounds all things" (8.54); God touches only what has flowed from himself into the ruling centres, "with his own intelligence alone" (12.2). Lemma: νοερός.

νοῦς

Attested: νοῦ (*nou*; 2.1, 3.16.1, 8.41 twice, 10.24, 12.26), νοῦς (*nous*; 3.3, 3.16.1, 5.27, 5.30, 8.60 twice, 10.33.2, 12.3.1, 12.26), νῷ (*nōi*; 3.4.2), νοῦν (*noun*; 3.7, 3.16.1, 6.40

twice, 6.51, 7.30, 7.66, 8.16, 9.22, 10.11, 11.1.2, 12.14 twice). Mind, the intelligent part in man and in the whole. In man it is "the third" of his parts and "alone is properly yours" (12.3.1), "mind and daimon" against "earth and gore" (3.3); in the whole, "The mind of the whole is social" (5.30); and "the mind of each is a god and has flowed from there" (12.26). Unlike an arrow, the mind, "both when it is cautious and when it turns about in inquiry, is carried straight on no less, and towards what is set before it" (8.60). Lemma: νοῦς.

See also

Citizenship; Daimon; Death; Gods; Impulse; Kindness and correction; Kinship and cooperation; Nature; Ruling centre; Soul; Wisdom and discernment.

Moral choice and freedom

What belongs to choice, and the free man · Meditations

προαίρεσις, proairesis, "choice"; *προαιρεῖσθαι, proaireisthai*, "choose"; *προαιρετικός, proairetikos*, "faculty of choice", "belongs to choice"; *ἀπροαίρετος, aproairetos*, "outside choice", "outside your choice", "without choice"; *ἐλευθερία, eleutheria*, "freedom"; *ἐλεύθερος, eleutheros*, "free", "freedom", "freely"; *δοῦλος, doulos*, "slave", "servile"; *δουλεύειν, douleuein*, "be a slave"; *δουλεία, douleia*, "slavery"; *ἐφ' ἡμῖν, eph' hēmin*, "in our power"; *λῃστής, lēistēs*, "robber"

At a Glance

The word. Προαίρεσις, from προαιρεῖσθαι, "to take one thing before another", is choice, which Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, made the name of what in a man is his own. Ἐλευθερία is the condition of the free man, ἐλεύθερος, as against the slave, δοῦλος.

In the *Meditations*. The noun comes once, in a saying Marcus gives to Epictetus: "There comes to be no robber of choice" (11.36). Marcus' own words are the adjectives, which divide what "belongs to choice" from what "is outside choice" (12.33). Freedom stands beside justice, self-control and courage (8.1) and gives a manner, "simply and freely" (5.7); slavery is the state of those who serve what others can take, conquerors first (8.3).

In this edition. Προαίρεσις is “choice” (11.36); τὸ προαιρετικόν is “faculty of choice” (8.56), and προαιρετικά “belongs to choice” (12.33); ἀπροαίρετος is “outside choice” or “outside your choice”, and its adverb “without choice” (3.6.1). Ἐλευθερία is “freedom”, ἐλεύθερος “free” (with the article “freedom”) and ἐλευθέρως “freely”; δοῦλος is “slave” and once “servile” (3.8), δουλεύειν “be a slave” and δουλεία “slavery”.

A place to read. 9.40, where Marcus asks whether it is not better “to use what is in your power with freedom than to be at odds with what is not in your power with slavery and abasement”.

Meaning

Προαιρεῖσθαι (*proaireisthai*), the middle of αἱρεῖν (*hairein*), “to take”, with πρό (*pro*), “before”, is to take one thing before another, to prefer, to choose, and προαίρεσις (*proairesis*) is the choosing. In the *Meditations* the noun stands only in a saying of Epictetus (11.36); Marcus’ own words are the adjectives προαιρετικός (*proairetikos*), “belonging to choice”, and ἀπροαίρετος (*aproairetos*), “outside choice”, and the edition’s note at 8.56 calls τὸ προαιρετικόν “formed from Epictetus’ προαίρεσις”. Ἐλευθερία (*eleutheria*) is first a status, the free man’s as against the slave’s and the free city’s; ἐλεύθερος (*eleutheros*) also names the bearing that befits a free man, open and unservile, and the adverb ἐλευθέρως (*eleutherōs*) its manner. Δοῦλος (*doulos*) is the slave, δουλεύειν (*douleuein*) to be one, and δουλεία (*douleia*) slavery.

Use in the book

What Marcus takes from Epictetus is a dividing line. The noun stands once, in a saying he copies: “There comes to be no robber of choice: the saying of Epictetus” (11.36). Elsewhere the adjectives draw the line between what belongs to choice and what lies outside it. Whoever sets up anything “of the things outside your choice” as good or bad must, on falling into the one or failing of the other, blame the gods and hate men (6.41; see Good, bad and indifference). If Marcus separates from his understanding all that “attaches outside choice”, he will be able to live out what remains untroubled (12.3.1–2; see Mind and reason); and near the end of the book everything lies in how the ruling centre uses itself, and “the rest either belongs to choice or is outside

choice: corpses and smoke" (12.33; see Ruling centre), where "belongs to choice" is the reading of A, the Vatican manuscript. Only once does Marcus name the faculty: "To my faculty of choice my neighbour's faculty of choice makes no difference, equally with his little breath and poor flesh" (8.56). However much men have come to be for one another, each ruling centre has its own sovereignty, or a neighbour's vice would be bad for Marcus, "which God did not decide, so that my being unlucky should not be in another's power" (see Ruling centre). Προαιρεῖσθαι is used of the choice of a life (3.7; see Daimon), of vice (9.2) and of a simplicity announced and so counterfeit (11.15; see Simplicity and sincerity).

Freedom is most often one of a list. Marcus is to act with "dignity, affection, freedom and justness" (2.5; see Present action); freedom is among the qualities "wholly in your power" (5.5). At 8.1 "free" closes a list where the school's fourth virtue, wisdom, would stand (see Virtue and excellence). The adverb gives the manner: to "choose the better simply and freely" (3.6.3), to pray, if at all, "simply and freely" (5.7); if he cannot keep the mastery, to go into some corner or out of life, "not in anger, but simply and freely and with self-respect" (10.8.3; see Death); and to say what is true "freely and without circumlocution" (12.1.1; see Present action). This can be read as the free man's old bearing, open and unservile. From Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic summoned to teach him, Marcus learned "freedom, and a steadiness that unmistakably takes no chances" (1.8.1); from Severus, whom he calls his brother, the impression of "a kingship that honours above all things the freedom of the governed" (1.14.1; see Citizenship).

The other freedom can be read as Epictetus', of the man whom nothing outside can compel: "so long as nothing of the kind leads me out, I remain free, and no one will prevent me doing what I want; and I want according to the nature of a rational and social living being" (5.29; see Obstacle and reservation). It is lost by honouring what others can take away: "Then you will be neither free nor self-sufficient nor free from passion" (6.16.4; see Contentment and self-sufficiency). The understanding "free from passions" is a citadel (8.48; see Inner retreat and citadel). Nor is this freedom obstinacy: "Remember that both to shift position and to follow the one who sets right are likewise free; for it is your activity, brought to its end according to your impulse

and judgement, and indeed according to your mind" (8.16). An act is free because it is one's own, not because it never changes, provided the change comes "from something convincing, as that it is just or for the common good" (4.12).

Marcus finds slavery, the service of what is not one's own, first among the great. Of Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Pompey, beside Diogenes the Cynic, Heraclitus and Socrates: "but there, forethought for how many things, and slavery to how many!" (8.3); of men who lord it and swagger, "a little before they were slaves to how many, and for what" (10.19); and he asks, "without a change of principles, what else is there but slavery of men groaning and making a show of obeying?" (9.29; see Philosophy). He is to make himself "neither tyrant nor slave of any man" (4.31), and his ruling centre is no longer to be a slave (2.2; see Ruling centre).

At 9.40 what is in one's power, freedom and slavery meet. Marcus imagines the objection, "The gods have put these in my power", and answers: "Then is it not better to use what is in your power with freedom than to be at odds with what is not in your power with slavery and abasement? And who told you that the gods do not lend a hand even in what is in our power?" (see Desire and aversion). Freedom goes with the use of what lies within the line, slavery with a quarrel against what lies beyond it, and the gods are not shut out of the first. Marcus never asks whether the will is free. He asks what belongs to choice, and calls free the man who wants only that, and slave the man, conqueror or courtier, who wants anything else.

Places to read

Every chapter in which προαίρεσις, προαιρεῖσθαι, προαιρετικός or ἀπροαίρετος occurs, or ἐλευθερία, ἐλεύθερος or ἐλευθέρως, or δοῦλος, δουλεύειν or δουλεία, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with 4.12, on shifting position at another's correction. The phrases of what is "in our power", ἐφ' ἡμῖν (*eph' hēmin*) and ἐπὶ σοί (*epi soi*), are left out where none of these words stands with them, and so are ἀνδράποδον (*andrapodon*), "slaves" (6.14), οἰκέτης (*oiketēs*), "household slaves" (5.31), οὐερνάκλος (*ouernaklos*), "house-slave" (1.16.4), and λατρεύειν (*latreuein*), "slave for" (3.3). Λῃστής (*lēistēs*), "robber", is listed only at 11.36; its other places are

given in its sub-entry. The places of ἐφ' ἡμῖν are given in its sub-entry.

1.8.1 From Apollonius Marcus learned freedom, and a steadiness that unmistakably takes no chances.

1.14.1 From Severus Marcus received the impression of a kingship that honours above all things the freedom of the governed.

2.2 The ruling centre is no longer to be a slave, nor to be jerked like a puppet by unsocial impulse.

2.5 Marcus is to do what is in hand with dignity, affection, freedom and justness, and will have leisure from other impressions if he does each act as the last of his life.

3.6.1 If Marcus finds anything better than justice, truth, self-control, courage, and an understanding content with itself where it makes him act by right reason and in what is allotted without choice, he is to turn to it with his whole soul.

3.6.3 Nothing of another kind may be set against the rational good; Marcus is to choose the better simply and freely and hold fast to it.

3.7 A man by whom his own mind and daimon have been chosen before all else makes no tragedy and will live neither pursuing nor fleeing.

3.8 In the understanding of a man chastened and purified there is nothing servile.

4.3.4 In the withdrawal into his little field Marcus is to be free and look at things as a man, a citizen and a mortal.

4.12 Marcus is to be ready to shift position if someone sets him right, provided the change comes from something convincing, as that it is just or for the common good.

4.31 Marcus is to make himself neither tyrant nor slave of any man.

4.49.2 Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-controlled, sensible, self-respecting, free.

5.5 Among the qualities wholly in Marcus' power are genuineness, dignity, needing little, kindliness and freedom.

5.7 One must either not pray, or pray simply and freely, as the Athenians pray for rain.

5.9 Marcus is to look whether greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, fair-mindedness and holiness are more agreeable than pleasure.

5.29 So long as nothing leads him out of life, Marcus remains free, and no one will prevent him doing what he wants, which is according to the nature of a rational and social living being.

6.16.4 If Marcus goes on honouring many other things, he will be neither free nor self-sufficient nor free from passion.

6.23 Marcus is to use irrational beings and things with greatness of mind and freely, and men socially.

6.41 Whoever sets up things outside his choice as good or bad must, when he fails of them, blame the gods and hate men; if only what is in our power counts as good and bad, no cause is left to accuse God or to take an enemy's stand against a man.

7.66 Socrates is to be judged by whether he could be content to be just and holy, neither indignant at random at vice nor a slave to anyone's ignorance.

7.67 Marcus is not to give up hope of being free and self-respecting and social and obedient to God because he has despaired of dialectic and natural philosophy.

8.1 Among the principles from which living well comes is that nothing is good for a man which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous, free.

8.3 Beside Diogenes, Heraclitus and Socrates, Alexander, Caesar and Pompey had forethought for how many things, and slavery to how many.

8.16 Both to shift position and to follow the one who sets right are free, for the activity is one's own.

8.48 The understanding free from passions is a citadel to which a man can flee.

8.51 Marcus will have an ever-flowing spring if he guards himself every hour for freedom, together with kindliness, simplicity and self-respect.

8.56 A neighbour's faculty of choice makes no difference to Marcus' own, since each ruling centre has its own sovereignty.

9.2 Marcus asks whether he has chosen to sit fast by vice, and calls corruption of the understanding the plague of men as men.

9.29 Marcus asks what there is, without a change of principles, but the slavery of men groaning and making a show of obeying.

9.40 Marcus asks whether it is not better to use what is in one's power with freedom than to be at odds with what is not with slavery and abasement, and who said that the gods do not lend a hand even in what is in our power.

10.8.3 If he cannot stay on these few names of the virtues, Marcus is to go into some corner where he will have the mastery, or else out of life, simply and freely and with self-respect.

10.9 Amid mime, war, flutter, torpor and slavery, Marcus' principles are wiped away day by day.

10.19 Men who now lord it and swagger were a little before slaves to how many, and for what.

11.15 The man who announces "I have chosen to deal with you simply" is rotten and counterfeit.

11.30 In a line of tragedy: "You are by nature a slave: you have no share in reason."

11.36 There comes to be no robber of choice: the saying of Epictetus.

12.1.1 Marcus is to direct the present towards justice, so that he says what is true freely and without circumlocution and does what accords with law and worth.

12.3.1 If Marcus separates from his understanding all that attaches to body and breath outside choice, he will be able to live out what remains untroubled.

12.23 The ending of life is not bad, if indeed it is both outside choice and not unsocial.

12.33 Everything lies in how the ruling centre uses itself; the rest either belongs to choice or is outside choice.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, gives the Stoic paradox: only the wise man is free and the bad are slaves, for freedom is "the

power of acting for oneself", ἐξουσία αὐτοπραγίας (*exousia autopragias*), and slavery the want of it; there is also a slavery of subordination, and a third of ownership with subordination, whose opposite, mastery, is itself bad; and the wise are kings as well as free.[93] Epictetus made προαίρεσις the centre of his teaching. A man, he says, is first of all one who has nothing more authoritative than choice, everything else being subject to it, and choice itself "unenslaved and unsubordinated", ἀδούλευτον καὶ ἀνυπότακτον (*adouleuton kai anypotakton*).[94] To a threat he answers, "You will chain my leg, but my choice not even Zeus can overcome", and nothing can overcome choice but choice itself.[95] The good, in its being, is a choice of a certain kind, and so is the bad.[96] His daily exercise turns on the pair of adjectives that Marcus uses. At each thing seen from dawn to night one asks, "Outside choice or belonging to choice?", ἀπροαίρετον ἢ προαιρετικόν (*aproaireton ē proairetikon*): a death is outside choice, a consulship is outside choice, and both are to be put away; for lamenting, misfortune, faction, blame and impiety are only judgements about things outside choice as though they were goods and bads, and whoever moves these judgements over to what belongs to choice will stand firm, however things are around him.[97] Marcus' "either belongs to choice or is outside choice" (12.33) uses the same pair. The saying of 11.36 comes from the discourse *On Cynicism*: the Cynic keeps all his watchfulness for choice and the use of impressions and sleeps soundly about the rest, for "there comes to be no robber of choice, no tyrant"; of the body and of property, yes, and of offices and honours.[98] Marcus copies only the first half. The discourse *On Freedom* opens with a definition of the free man (see Obstacle and reservation) and pulls down the citadel of the tyrants within (see Inner retreat and citadel); it also draws a consequence that Marcus' 8.3 and 10.19 can be read as applying. A man twice consul, who says he cannot be a slave because his parents were free and he is a senator and Caesar's friend with many slaves of his own, and who asks who can compel him but Caesar, lord of all, is

[93] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.121–122.
[94] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.10.1.
[95] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.1.23 and 1.29.12.
[96] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.29.1.
[97] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.3.14–19.
[98] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.22 (title) and 3.22.103–106.

told that he has owned a master and is a slave from a great household;[99] the senator serves "the handsomest and glossiest slavery";[100] and whoever will not give back to God what he has given will be a slave among slaves, though he be consul ten thousand times and go up to the Palace.[101] What belongs to choice, Epictetus says, God has given him and put in his power, unimpeded and unhindered,[102] and freedom is won "not by fulfilling what one desires, but by doing away with desire".[103]

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, made προαίρεσις a term of ethics in the third book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Choice is voluntary, but the voluntary is wider: children and the other animals share in the voluntary, not in choice. It is not opinion, for it is by choosing good or bad things, not by opining, that we are of a certain kind; it goes with reason and thought, and "even the name seems to hint" that it is what is taken before other things. Since what is chosen is something deliberated and desired among the things in our power, choice is "a desire guided by deliberation, of things in our power".[104] In Epictetus the word names not the single act that ends a deliberation but the faculty itself, and the man: to a young student of rhetoric with elaborately dressed hair he says, "you are not flesh, nor hair, but choice"; if he keeps that beautiful, then he is beautiful.[105]

Translation in this edition

Προαίρεσις is "choice" at its one place (11.36). Προαιρετικός is "faculty of choice" for the neuter with the article (8.56, twice) and "belongs to choice" (12.33). Ἀπροαίρετος is "outside your choice" (6.41) and "outside choice" (12.3.1, 12.23, 12.33), and the adverb ἀπροαιρέτως (*aproairetōs*) "without choice" (3.6.1). Προαιρεῖσθαι is "choose": "have been chosen before all else" (3.7), "have you chosen" (9.2) and "I have chosen" (11.15); the "choose"

[99] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1 (title) and 4.1.6–13.
[100] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.40.
[101] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.172–173.
[102] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.100.
[103] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.175.
[104] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.2, 1111b6–10 and 1112a1–17; 3.3, 1113a9–12.
[105] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.1 (title), 3.1.1 and 3.1.39–40.

of 3.6.3 renders ἑλοῦ (*helou*), of the simple verb. Ἐλευθερία is “freedom” at all five of its places (1.14.1, 2.5, 5.9, 8.51, 9.40), and so is the neuter of ἐλεύθερος with the article (1.8.1, 5.5); ἐλεύθερος is otherwise “free” (4.3.4, 4.49.2, 5.29, 6.16.4, 7.67, 8.1, 8.16, 8.48), and ἐλευθέρως “freely” (3.6.3, 5.7, 6.23, 10.8.3, 12.1.1). Elsewhere “free” and “freedom” render privative words, as in “freedom from anger” (1.1), “free from passion” (1.9.3, 6.16.4), “free from distress” (4.49.1, 6.50) and “free of need” (7.16), and a few others: ἀπηλλαγμένος (*apēllagmenos*), “free of” (2.5), ἐκτενῶς (*ektenōs*) in “spend freely” (1.4) and “share freely” (1.14.2), ἐφεῖσθαι (*epheisthai*) in “leaving his friends free” (1.16.2), and ἀπό (*apo*) in “free of this schoolmaster” (10.36). “Equal freedom of speech” renders ἰσηγορία (*isēgoria*; 1.14.1; see Citizenship). Δοῦλος is “slave” (4.31, 11.30) and, of the understanding, “servile” (3.8); δουλεύειν is “be a slave” (2.2), “a slave to” (7.66) and “were slaves to” (10.19); δουλεία is “slavery” at all four places (8.3, 9.29, 9.40, 10.9). “Slaves” renders ἀνδράποδα (*andrapoda*; 6.14), “household slaves” οἰκέται (*oiketai*; 5.31), “house-slave” οὐερνάκλος (*ouernaklos*), the Latin *vernaculus* (1.16.4), and “slave for” λατρεύειν (3.3). Every “in our power”, “in your power” and the like renders ἐπί (*epi*) with the dative: τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν is “what is in our power” (6.41, 9.40) and “the things in our power” (8.7, 11.37); ἐπὶ σοί is “in your power” (5.33, 7.2, 7.54, 8.17, 8.47, 9.40, 10.32, 12.22) and “wholly in your power” with ὅλα (*hola*; 5.5); ἐπ’ ἐμοί (*ep’ emoi*) is “in my power” (8.29, 9.40), ἐπ’ αὐτῇ (*ep’ autēi*) “in its power” (6.32), ἐπ’ αὐτῷ (*ep’ autōi*) “in his power” (8.34), ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ (*eph’ heautōi*) “in its own power” (9.7), and ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ (*ep’ allōi*) “in another’s power” (8.56) and “in another’s” (8.17); ὅσον ἐπὶ σοί (*hoson epi soi*) is “as far as lies in you” (5.8.5), and ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ (*hoson eph’ heautōi*) “so far as in it lies” (7.16) and “so far as in him lies” (8.34). At 4.3.3 “who seem to speak good words” is the εὐφημεῖν (*euphēmein*) of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, for the manuscripts’ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. Ἀκύβευτος (*akybeutos*), literally “not dicing”, is rendered with “a steadiness that unmistakably takes no chances” (1.8.1), as the edition’s note explains.

ἀπροαίρετος

Attested: ἀπροαιρέτων (*aproairetōn*; 6.41), ἀπροαίρετα (*aproaireta*; 12.3.1, 12.33), ἀπροαίρετον (*aproaireton*; 12.23); the adverb ἀπροαιρέτως (*aproairetōs*; 3.6.1). Not subject to

choice; outside choice. “Whatever of the things outside your choice you set up for yourself as good or bad” (6.41; see Good, bad and indifference); “all that, belonging to the poor body that surrounds you or to the little breath grown with it, attaches outside choice” (12.3.1); “if indeed it is both outside choice and not unsocial” (12.23); “the rest either belongs to choice or is outside choice” (12.33); the understanding content “with fate in what is allotted without choice” (3.6.1), where the adverb stands in the manuscripts and the correction of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802, concerns the words “with fate” (see Contentment and self-sufficiency). Lemma: ἀπροαίρετος.

δουλεία

Attested: δουλεία (*douleia*; 8.3, 9.29, 10.9), δουλείας (*douleias*; 9.40). Slavery. “but there, forethought for how many things, and slavery to how many!” (8.3); “And without a change of principles, what else is there but slavery of men groaning and making a show of obeying?” (9.29); “Mime, war, flutter, torpor, slavery” (10.9); “to be at odds with what is not in your power with slavery and abasement” (9.40). Lemma: δουλεία.

δουλεύω

Attested: δουλεῦσαι (*douleusai*; 2.2), δουλεύων (*douleuōn*; 7.66), ἐδούλευον (*edouleuon*; 10.19). To be a slave, to serve. Of the ruling centre, “no longer let it be a slave” (2.2; see Ruling centre); of Socrates, “neither indignant at random at vice nor indeed a slave to anyone’s ignorance” (7.66; see Body and flesh); of the great, “but a little before they were slaves to how many, and for what” (10.19). Lemma: δουλεύω.

δοῦλος

Attested: δοῦλον (*doulon*; 3.8, 4.31), δοῦλος (*doulos*; 11.30). A slave; as an adjective, slavish. “Further, there is nothing servile in it” (3.8); “making yourself neither tyrant nor slave of any man” (4.31); “You are by nature a slave: you have no share in reason” (11.30), a line from an unknown tragedy, as the edition’s note records. Lemma: δοῦλος.

ἐλευθερία

Attested: ἐλευθερίαν (*eleutherian*; 1.14.1, 8.51), ἐλευθερίας (*eleutherias*; 2.5, 9.40), ἐλευθερία (*eleutheria*; 5.9). Freedom, the condition of the free man and of the free

state. “a kingship that honours above all things the freedom of the governed” (1.14.1; see Citizenship); “with exact and unaffected dignity, affection, freedom and justness” (2.5); “greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity …” (5.9); “If you guard yourself every hour for freedom” (8.51), where A and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have ἐλεύθερον (*eleutheron*), “free”; “to use what is in your power with freedom” (9.40). Lemma: ἐλευθερία.

ἐλεύθερος

Attested: ἐλεύθερον (*eleutheron*; 1.8.1, 4.49.2, 5.5, 8.1, 8.16), ἐλεύθερος (*eleutheros*; 4.3.4, 5.29, 6.16.4, 7.67), ἐλευθέρα (*eleuthera*; 8.48); the adverb ἐλευθέρως (*eleutherōs*; 3.6.3, 5.7, 6.23, 10.8.3, 12.1.1). Free; of a man’s bearing, open and unservile; with the article, freedom. “From Apollonius: freedom” (1.8.1); “do not be dragged about or strained, but be free” (4.3.4); “I remain free, and no one will prevent me doing what I want” (5.29); “both to shift position and to follow the one who sets right are likewise free” (8.16); “the understanding free from passions is a citadel” (8.48); “simply and freely” (5.7, 10.8.3). At 8.1 A has ἐλευθέριον (*eleutherion*), “liberal”, and at 3.6.3 P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has ἐλευθερίως (*eleutheriōs*), “liberally”. Lemma: ἐλεύθερος.

ἐφ’ ἡμῖν

Attested: ἐφ’ ἡμῖν (*eph’ hēmin*; 6.41, 8.7, 9.40, 11.37). In our power, literally “upon us”; with the article, the things in our power, which Epictetus divides from those not in our power (see Obstacle and reservation). If only “what is in our power” counts as good and bad, “no cause is left either to accuse God or to take an enemy’s stand against a man” (6.41); a rational nature journeys well when, among other things, it “has made its desires and avoidances of the things in our power only” (8.7); and Epictetus’ rule is to “use avoidance towards none of the things not in our power” (11.37). At 9.40 Marcus asks, “And who told you that the gods do not lend a hand even in what is in our power?” At 4.3.3 the manuscripts have ἐφ’ ἡμῖν where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts Gataker’s εὐφημεῖν, “speak good words”. Lemma: ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.

λῃστής

Attested: λῃστοῦ (*lēistou*; 5.10.1), λῃσταί (*lēistai*; 6.34, 10.10), λῃστήν (*lēistēn*; 11.18.3), λῃστής (*lēistēs*; 11.36). A robber, a bandit. Underlying things can be "in the possession of a catamite or a whore or a robber" (5.10.1); "What pleasures robbers, catamites, parricides, tyrants have felt!" (6.34); of those who hunt men, "For are these not robbers, if you examine the principles?" (10.10); "you too must necessarily do much wrong and become a robber and anything whatever" (11.18.3; see Anger); "There comes to be no robber of choice: the saying of Epictetus" (11.36). Lemma: λῃστής.

προαίρεσις

Attested: προαιρέσεως (*proaireseōs*; 11.36). Choice; in Epictetus, the faculty by which a man chooses, and so what is his own. "There comes to be no robber of choice: the saying of Epictetus" (11.36). The saying is from Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.22.105, as the edition's note at 11.33 records, where it goes on "no tyrant". G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*, bracketed "the saying of Epictetus", as Leopold's apparatus records; Leopold prints the words. Lemma: προαίρεσις.

προαιρετικός

Attested: προαιρετικῷ (*proairetikōi*; 8.56), προαιρετικόν (*proairetikon*; 8.56), προαιρετικά (*proairetika*; 12.33). Belonging to choice; with the article, the faculty of choice. "To my faculty of choice my neighbour's faculty of choice makes no difference" (8.56); "the rest either belongs to choice or is outside choice" (12.33; see Ruling centre), where Leopold prints the ἢ προαιρετικά (*ē proairetika*) of A, and P has εἰ προαιρετά (*ei proaireta*). Lemma: προαιρετικός.

προαιρέω

Attested: προελόμενος (*proelomenos*; 3.7), προῄρησαι (*proērēsai*; 9.2), προῄρημαι (*proērēmai*; 11.15). In the middle, to take one thing before another, to prefer, to choose. "For a man by whom his own mind and daimon and the rites of its virtue have been chosen before all else makes no tragedy" (3.7; see Daimon); "Or have you chosen to sit fast by vice …?" (9.2); "I have chosen to deal with you simply" (11.15; see Simplicity and sincerity). At 3.7 A has προσελόμενος (*proselomenos*); at 9.2 "have you chosen" is

the correction of Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus, the eighteenth-century German scholar who edited the *Meditations* at Leipzig, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' infinitive προῃρῆσθαι (*proēirēsthai*). Lemma: προαιρέω.

See also

Anger; Body and flesh; Change; Citizenship; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Daimon; Death; Desire and aversion; Good, bad and indifference; Inner retreat and citadel; Mind and reason; Obstacle and reservation; Philosophy; Present action; Ruling centre; Simplicity and sincerity; Virtue and excellence.

Obstacle and reservation

What stands in the way, and the impulse no one can stop · Meditations

ἐμποδίζειν, empodizein, "impede"; *ἐμπόδιον, empodion*, "impediment"; *ἐμποδισμός, empodismos*, "impediment"; *ἐμποδιστικός, empodistikos*, "that impedes"; *ἀνεμπόδιστος, anempodistos*, "unimpeded"; *κωλύειν, kōlyein*, "prevent"; *κώλυμα, kōlyma*, "hindrance"; *κώλυσις, kōlysis*, "hindering"; *κωλυτικός, kōlytikos*, "what hinders"; *ἐνίστασθαι, enistasthai*, "stand in the way"; *τὸ ἐνεστώς, to enestōs*, "the present"; *ἐνστατικός, enstatikos*, "what stands in the way"; *ἔνστημα, enstēma*, "obstacle"; *περιτροπή, peritropē*, "reversal"; *περιτρέπειν, peritrepein*, "reverse"; *ἐπιπεριτρέπειν, epiperitrepein*, "reverse"; *ὑπεξαίρεσις, hypexairesis*, "reservation"; *ἀνυπεξαιρέτως, anypexairetōs*, "without reservation"

At a Glance

The word. Ἐμποδίζειν is to get in the way, to impede; κωλύειν is to prevent; ἐνίστασθαι is to stand in the way. Ὑπεξαίρεσις, "reservation", is the proviso under which a Stoic held an impulse: if nothing prevents. Περιτροπή, "reversal", is the turning of an obstacle round into something to act on.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus grants that "some activity may be impeded", but holds that "there are no impediments to impulse and disposition, because of the reservation and the reversal" (5.20). An obstacle harms an impulse only if it was had "without reservation" (8.41); when force blocks a just

act, what was sought was “an impulse of this kind. And this you attain” (6.50). The hindrance makes way for another act (8.32) and becomes material for the first aim (8.35), and the ruling centre is “untroubled and unimpeded, unless it troubles and impedes itself” (7.16).

In this edition. Ἐμποδίζειν is always “impede” and κωλύειν always “prevent”; κώλυμα is “hindrance”, ἐνίστασθαι “stand in the way”, and ἔνστημα, once, “obstacle”; ὑπεξαίρεσις is “reservation”, περιτροπή “reversal”.

A place to read. 5.20, where the understanding turns every hindrance to activity into the leading object.

Meaning

Ἐμποδίζειν (*empodizein*) is formed from ἐν (*en*), “in”, and πούς (*pous*), “foot”: to shackle the feet, and so to hamper or impede; ἐμπόδιον (*empodion*) and ἐμποδισμός (*empodismos*) are the impediment. Κωλύειν (*kōlyein*) is the common verb for preventing, and κώλυμα (*kōlyma*) a hindrance. Ἐνίστασθαι (*enistasthai*), “to stand in”, is to stand in the way of a man or a work, and ἔνστημα (*enstēma*) is an obstacle. Ὑπεξαίρεσις (*hypexairesis*), from ὑπεξαιρεῖν (*hypexairein*), “to take out from under, to except”, is a proviso; an impulse held “with reservation” carries the condition “if nothing prevents” (see Impulse). Περιτροπή (*peritropē*), from περιτρέπειν (*peritrepein*), “to turn round”, is a turning about.

Use in the book

The fullest statement is 5.20. In one respect man is “the thing most proper to us”; “but in so far as some stand in the way of my proper works, one of the things that make no difference to me does man become, no less than the sun, or the wind, or a beast.” Then: “By these some activity may be impeded, but there are no impediments to impulse and disposition, because of the reservation and the reversal. For the understanding reverses and converts every hindrance to activity into the leading object, and what holds back this work furthers the work, and what stands in the way of this road advances the road.” Two things answer the obstacle. The reservation is there before it: that which rules within has its impulse “with reservation” (4.1; see Impulse). The reversal comes after it: the hindrance becomes the next thing to be done.

The reservation is no excuse for not trying. At 6.50 Marcus is first to persuade, and to "act even when they are unwilling, when the reason of justice leads so". Only then: "If, however, someone uses force and stands in your way, pass over to being well pleased and free from distress, and use the hindering for another virtue; and remember that your impulse was with reservation, and that you did not desire the impossible. For what, then? For an impulse of this kind. And this you attain". The aim moves to the one place no one can block, the impulse itself. At 8.41, after a scale of impediments, from sensation and impulse to mind, the question comes: "Did an obstacle arise when you had an impulse? If you had your impulse without reservation, already it is bad, as for a rational being; but if you take what is common, you are not yet harmed nor impeded." The harm lies in the unreserved impulse, the man's own act. The things peculiar to the mind "no one else is accustomed to impede": no fire, iron, tyrant or slander touches it once it has become, in a line of Empedocles, the philosopher-poet of fifth-century Acragas, a sphere. So the ruling centre is "untroubled and unimpeded, unless it troubles and impedes itself" (7.16).

Life is composed "action by action". To the objection that something from outside will interfere, Marcus answers that nothing interferes with acting justly, with self-control and with sound reckoning, and grants: "something else active, perhaps, will be prevented. But by being well pleased with the hindrance itself, and by a fair-minded passing over to what is given, another action at once takes its place, which will fit into the composition in question" (8.32). As the nature of rational beings "reverses everything that stands in the way and opposes, and sets it in its place in fate, and makes it a part of itself, so the rational living being too can make every hindrance material for itself, and use it for whatever it had its impulse towards" (8.35). The obstacle serves the first aim. The understanding is to meet it as a ray of sun meets a solid: "towards the hindrances it meets it must make its pressing neither forced nor dashing, nor indeed fall down, but stand and light up what receives it" (8.57).

At 10.33 the material is whatever lies at hand. "What is it that, in this material, can be done or said in the soundest way? For whatever this may be, it is open to you to do it or say it; and do not make excuses as though you were prevented" (10.33.1). A cylinder, water and fire cannot move

everywhere in their own way, “for the things that bar them and stand in the way are many. But mind and reason can make their way through everything that resists, as they are by nature able and as they want” (10.33.2). Where other things are made worse by what befalls them, “man even becomes better and more praiseworthy by using rightly what befalls” (10.33.4). The present is “always material for rational and civic virtue” (7.68; see Tranquillity). And those “who stand in your way as you go forward according to right reason” are not to knock Marcus off “kindliness towards them either” (11.9).

A question runs through the book: if something in his own disposition distresses him, “who prevents you from setting right the principle?” (8.47; see Assent and judgement); “who is it that prevents you from being good and simple?” (10.32). The answer is given: “No one will prevent you from living according to the reason of your own nature” (6.58), as at 2.9 (see Nature) and 3.12 (see Daimon). Nor, so far as depends on the gods, does anything: “nothing prevents me from living according to nature now; but that I still fall short of it is my own fault” (1.17.6). The book never says that nothing can stop Marcus. Twice it grants that activity may be impeded or prevented (5.20, 8.32). It claims something narrower and firmer: an impulse held with reservation, and the disposition behind it, cannot be impeded by another, and what blocks one act is material for the next. The only obstacle left is the one the mind makes for itself.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ἐμποδίζειν, κωλύειν, ἐνίστασθαι, περιτροπή or ὑπεξαίρεσις occurs, or a word of their families given in the sub-entries, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with three passages in which what befalls is material, ὕλη (*hylē*), without these words (7.58, 10.31, 12.27), and 10.33.4, where man becomes better by using rightly what befalls. Ἐνεστώς (*enestōs*), “the present” (6.36, 7.29), the perfect participle of ἐνίστασθαι, is left out.

1.17.6 As far as depends on the gods, nothing prevents Marcus from living according to nature now; that he still falls short of it is his own fault.

2.9 There is no one who prevents a man from always doing and saying what accords with the nature of which he is a part.

3.12 If Marcus does the work in hand following right reason and keeps his daimon pure, he will live well, and no one can prevent this.

4.1 That which rules within has its impulse with reservation, and makes material for itself of whatever replaces its objects, as a bright fire does.

4.49.2 Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-controlled, sensible and the rest.

5.13 Nothing prevents one saying that the change of the parts goes on to infinity, even if the universe is governed by limited periods.

5.20 In so far as men stand in the way of Marcus' proper works, they become indifferent to him; activity may be impeded, but impulse and disposition cannot, because of the reservation and the reversal.

5.29 So long as nothing leads him out of life, Marcus remains free, and no one will prevent him doing what he wants; and he wants according to the nature of a rational and social living being.

5.34 Not to be impeded by another is one of two things common to the soul of God, of man and of every rational living being.

6.50 When someone uses force and stands in the way of a just act, Marcus is to use the hindering for another virtue and remember that his impulse was with reservation.

6.58 No one will prevent Marcus from living according to the reason of his own nature.

7.16 The ruling centre is untroubled and unimpeded, unless it troubles and impedes itself.

7.58 If Marcus is intent on how to use what happens to him, he will use it well, and it will be material for him.

7.68 Marcus asks what, amid outcry and wild beasts, prevents the understanding from preserving itself in calm, true judgement and ready use of what is put before it, to which the present is always material for virtue.

8.7 The nature of the leaf is part of a nature able to be impeded, the nature of man part of one unimpeded,

intelligent and just, if indeed it gives each its portions equally and according to worth.

8.32 Nothing from outside interferes with acting justly and with self-control; something else active may be prevented, but by being well pleased with the hindrance and passing over to what is given, another action at once takes its place.

8.35 As the nature of rational beings reverses whatever stands in its way, so the rational living being can make every hindrance material for itself.

8.41 Impediment to sensation and to impulse is bad for the vital nature, impediment to mind for the intelligent; an obstacle harms an impulse only if it was had without reservation.

8.47 When something stronger stands in the way, Marcus is not to be distressed, for the cause does not lie with him; and if life is not worth living without the act, he is to depart, kindly and serene towards what stands in the way.

8.57 The understanding is to meet the hindrances it meets as a ray of the sun meets a solid, neither forcing nor falling, but standing and lighting up what receives it.

9.9.1 Fire is easily kindled in dry material because less is mixed in it of what hinders kindling.

9.11 If Marcus cannot teach better, kindliness has been given him for this; the gods too are kindly to such people, and it is open to him too: who, he asks, prevents him?

10.31 What Marcus flees is material and occasion, exercises for reason, to be brought into affinity with himself as the bright fire makes flame of what it is given.

10.32 It is in Marcus' power to be good and simple, and he asks who prevents him.

10.33.1 Whatever can be done most soundly in the material at hand, Marcus can do, and he is not to make excuses as though he were prevented.

10.33.2 Things governed by nature or by an irrational soul meet many things that bar them and stand in the way, but mind and reason make their way through everything that resists.

10.33.4 Other things are made worse by what befalls them, but man becomes better and more praiseworthy by using it rightly.

11.9 Those who stand in Marcus' way are not to knock him off kindliness towards them, and exasperation with those who try to prevent him is as weak as giving up the action.

11.37 Marcus copies the rule of Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, that impulses be with reservation, social and according to worth.

12.1.1 Neither another's vice nor opinion nor voice nor the sensation of the flesh is to impede Marcus.

12.8 Among the things Marcus is to look at is how no one is impeded by another.

12.25 Marcus is to throw out the opinion, and he asks who prevents him from throwing it out.

12.27 All that is strained after is cheap, and it is more philosophical to show oneself just, self-controlled, following the gods, artlessly, in the material given.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus begins the *Handbook* with a line that 5.20 can be read as drawing. Of the things that are, some are in our power, opinion, impulse, desire, avoidance, whatever is our own doing; others are not, the body, possessions, reputations, offices. What is in our power is "free by nature, not to be hindered or hampered", ἀκώλυτα, ἀπαραπόδιστα (*akōlyta, aparapodista*); what is not is "weak, slavish, open to hindrance, another's". Whoever takes what is another's for his own "will be impeded (ἐμποδισθήσῃ, *empodisthēsēi*), will grieve, will be troubled, will blame gods and men"; whoever takes as his own only what is his, "no one will ever compel, no one will prevent".[106] The *Handbook* also gives a formula that 8.41 can be read as applying to mind and impulse: "Sickness is an impediment of the body, not of choice, unless choice itself wills it; lameness is an impediment of the leg, not of choice. Say so at each thing that falls upon you, and you will find it an impediment of something else, not of you."[107] In the *Discourses* the free man is defined in words of the same families: "He is free

[106] Epictetus, *Handbook* 1.1–3.

[107] Epictetus, *Handbook* 9.

who lives as he wants, whom no one can compel or prevent or force, whose impulses are unimpeded (ἀνεμπόδιστοι, *anempodistoi*), whose desires reach their mark, whose avoidances do not fall into what they avoid."[108] Marcus' "no one will prevent me doing what I want; and I want according to the nature of a rational and social living being" (5.29) can be read as that definition applied to himself, with the condition on the wanting added. The reservation that keeps an impulse unimpeded is Epictetus' and Seneca's as well (see Impulse).

Translation in this edition

Ἐμποδίζειν is "impede" at all eight of its occurrences, in "may be impeded" (5.20), "to be impeded" and "able to be impeded" (5.34, 8.7), "impedes" (7.16), "impeded" and "impede" (8.41), "impede" (12.1.1) and "is impeded" (12.8); ἐμπόδια is "impediments" (5.20), ἐμποδισμός "impediment" (8.41, three times), ἐμποδιστικόν "something else that impedes" (8.41), and ἀνεμπόδιστος "unimpeded" (7.16, 8.7). "Impede" renders no other word. Κωλύειν is "prevent" at all sixteen of its occurrences, and "prevent" renders no other word; κώλυμα is "hindrance" (5.20, 8.32, 8.35), in the plural "hindrances" (8.57), κώλυσις "the hindering" (6.50) and κωλυτικόν "what hinders" (9.9.1). Ἐνίστασθαι is "stand in the way" (5.20, 8.32, 8.35, 8.47 twice, 10.33.2), "stands in your way" (6.50) and "stand in your way" (11.9); ἐνστατικόν is "what stands in the way" (5.20), and with the article the perfect participle ἐνεστώς is "the present" (6.36, 7.29); ἔνστημα, the only "obstacle" in the English, stands at 8.41. The Glossary keeps "impede" apart from "prevent", "hindrance" and "stand in the way". At 5.20 περιτροπή is "reversal" and περιτρέπει "reverses", with μεθίστησι (*methistēsi*) "converts" and ἐφεκτικόν (*ephektikon*) "what holds back"; ἐπιπεριτρέπει is "reverses" (8.35), beside ἀντιβαῖνον (*antibainon*), "opposes". At 10.33.2 διείργοντα (*dieirgonta*) is "bar" and ἀντιπίπτοντος (*antipiptontos*) "resists". Ὑπεξαίρεσις is "reservation", "with reservation" (4.1, 6.50, 11.37) and "the reservation" (5.20), and ἀνυπεξαιρέτως "without reservation" (8.41). Ὕλη is "material" at every place cited here (4.1 twice, 7.58, 7.68, 8.35, 10.31, 10.33.1 twice, 12.27; see Cause and matter).

[108] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.1.

ἀνεμπόδιστος

Attested: ἀνεμπόδιστον (*anempodiston*; 7.16), ἀνεμποδίστου (*anempodistou*; 8.7). Unimpeded. The ruling centre is "untroubled and unimpeded, unless it troubles and impedes itself" (7.16); the nature of man is part of "a nature unimpeded, intelligent and just, if indeed it makes the portions of times, substance, cause, activity and conjuncture equal and according to worth for each" (8.7). Lemma: ἀνεμπόδιστος.

ἀνυπεξαίρετος

Attested: ἀνυπεξαιρέτως (*anypexairetōs*; 8.41). Without reservation; only the adverb occurs. "If you had your impulse without reservation, already it is bad, as for a rational being" (8.41). Lemma: ἀνυπεξαίρετος.

ἐμποδίζω

Attested: ἐμποδισθείη (*empodistheiē*; 5.20), ἐμποδίζεσθαι (*empodizesthai*; 5.34, 8.7), ἐμποδίζῃ (*empodizēi*; 7.16, 12.1.1), ἐμπεπόδισαι (*empepodisai*; 8.41), ἐμποδίζειν (*empodizein*; 8.41), ἐμποδίζεται (*empodizetai*; 12.8). To impede. "By these some activity may be impeded" (5.20); "not to be impeded by another" (5.34); "the things peculiar to the mind no one else is accustomed to impede" (8.41); "let neither another's vice impede you, nor opinion, nor voice" (12.1.1). Lemma: ἐμποδίζω.

ἐμπόδιον

Attested: ἐμπόδια (*empodia*; 5.20). An impediment, what is in the way: "there are no impediments to impulse and disposition, because of the reservation and the reversal" (5.20). Lemma: ἐμπόδιον.

ἐμποδισμός

Attested: ἐμποδισμός (*empodismos*; 8.41 three times). Impediment. "Impediment to sensation is bad for the vital nature; impediment to impulse is likewise bad for the vital nature", and "impediment to mind is bad for the intelligent nature" (8.41). Lemma: ἐμποδισμός.

ἐμποδιστικός

Attested: ἐμποδιστικόν (*empodistikon*; 8.41). Apt to impede: "there is likewise something else that impedes and is bad for the constitution of plants" (8.41). Lemma: ἐμποδιστικός.

ἐνίστημι

Attested: ἐνίστανται (*enistantai*; 5.20), ἐνεστώς (*enestōs*; 6.36, 7.29), ἐνίστηται (*enistētai*; 6.50), ἐνστήσεται (*enstēsetai*; 8.32), ἐνιστάμενον (*enistamenon*; 8.35), ἐνίσταται (*enistatai*; 8.47), ἐνισταμένοις (*enistamenois*; 8.47), ἐνιστάμενα (*enistamena*; 10.33.2), ἐνιστάμενοι (*enistamenoi*; 11.9). In the middle, to stand in the way, to oppose; in the perfect, to be present. Of men: “in so far as some stand in the way of my proper works” (5.20); “If, however, someone uses force and stands in your way” (6.50); “Those who stand in your way as you go forward according to right reason” (11.9). Of things: “for the things that bar them and stand in the way are many” (10.33.2). With the article the perfect participle is “the present”: “The whole present of time: a point of eternity” (6.36); “Circumscribe the present of time” (7.29; see Time and eternity). At 8.32 ἐνστήσεται is the correction of Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus, the eighteenth-century German scholar who edited the *Meditations* at Leipzig, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; the manuscripts have στήσεται (*stēsetai*), “will stand”. Lemma: ἐνίστημι.

ἐνστατικός

Attested: ἐνστατικόν (*enstatikon*; 5.20). Standing in the way: “what stands in the way of this road advances the road” (5.20). Lemma: ἐνστατικός.

ἔνστημα

Attested: ἔνστημα (*enstēma*; 8.41). An obstacle: “Did an obstacle arise when you had an impulse?” (8.41). Lemma: ἔνστημα.

ἐπιπεριτρέπω

Attested: ἐπιπεριτρέπει (*epiperitrepei*; 8.35). To turn round upon, to reverse. The nature of rational beings “reverses everything that stands in the way and opposes, and sets it in its place in fate” (8.35). Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, proposed περιτρέπει, the verb of 5.20; Leopold prints the manuscripts’ compound. Lemma: ἐπιπεριτρέπω.

κώλυμα

Attested: κώλυμα (*kōlyma*; 5.20, 8.32, 8.35), κωλύματα (*kōlymata*; 8.57). A hindrance. The understanding “reverses

and converts every hindrance to activity into the leading object" (5.20); "by being well pleased with the hindrance itself" another action takes its place (8.32); the rational living being "can make every hindrance material for itself" (8.35); "towards the hindrances it meets" the understanding must press neither forced nor dashing (8.57). Lemma: κώλυμα.

κώλυσις

Attested: κωλύσει (*kōlysei*; 6.50). Hindering: "use the hindering for another virtue" (6.50). Lemma: κώλυσις.

κωλυτικός

Attested: κωλυτικόν (*kōlytikon*; 9.9.1). Apt to hinder: dry material is easily kindled "because there is less mixed in it of what hinders kindling" (9.9.1). Lemma: κωλυτικός.

κωλύω

Attested: κωλύειν (*kōlyein*; 1.17.6, 11.9), κωλύων (*kōlyōn*; 2.9, 8.47, 9.11, 10.32, 12.25), κωλῦσαι (*kōlysai*; 3.12, 8.32), κωλύει (*kōlyei*; 4.49.2, 5.13, 7.68), κωλύσει (*kōlysei*; 5.29, 6.58), κωλυθήσεται (*kōlythēsetai*; 8.32), κωλυόμενος (*kōlyomenos*; 10.33.1). To prevent. It stands most often in a denial or a question: "there is no one who prevents you" (2.9); "No one will prevent you from living according to the reason of your own nature" (6.58); "who is it that prevents you from being good and simple?" (10.32). Once the prevention is granted: "something else active, perhaps, will be prevented" (8.32). Lemma: κωλύω.

περιτρέπω

Attested: περιτρέπει (*peritrepei*; 5.20). To turn round, to reverse: "the understanding reverses and converts every hindrance to activity into the leading object" (5.20). Lemma: περιτρέπω.

περιτροπή

Attested: περιτροπήν (*peritropēn*; 5.20). A turning round, a reversal: there are no impediments to impulse and disposition "because of the reservation and the reversal" (5.20). Lemma: περιτροπή.

ὑπεξαίρεσις

Attested: ὑπεξαιρέσεως (*hypexaireseōs*; 4.1, 6.50, 11.37), ὑπεξαίρεσιν (*hypexairesin*; 5.20). Reservation, the proviso "if nothing prevents". That which rules within has its impulse

“with reservation” (4.1); “remember that your impulse was with reservation” (6.50), where “was” renders Coraes’ ὥρμας (*hōrmas*), which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ present ὁρμᾷς (*hormāis*); and Epictetus’ rule is that impulses “be with reservation” (11.37). Lemma: ὑπεξαίρεσις.

See also

Assent and judgement; Cause and matter; Daimon; Impulse; Moral choice and freedom; Nature; Time and eternity; Tranquillity; Virtue and excellence.

Pain and pleasure

The motions of the flesh and the distress of the mind · Meditations

πόνος, ponos, “pain”; *πονεῖν, ponein*, “labour”; *ἐπίπονος, epiponos*, “painful”; *ἀλγηδών, algēdōn*, “pangs”; *λύπη, lypē*, “distress”; *λυπεῖν, lypein*, “distress”, “be distressed”; *ἄλυπος, alypos*, “free from distress”; *ἀλυπία, alypia*, “freedom from distress”; *ἡδονή, hēdonē*, “pleasure”; *ἥδεσθαι, hēdesthai*, “feel pleasure”; *ἡδύς, hēdys*, “pleasant”; *ἡδέως, hēdeōs*, “pleasingly”, “with … pleasure”; *ἡδονικός, hēdonikos*, “pleasurable”; *φιλήδονος, philēdonos*, “lover of pleasure”; *ἀφιλήδονος, aphilēdonos*, “indifference to pleasure”; *ἐμφιληδονεῖν, emphilēdonein*, “delighting in”; *πεῖσις, peisis*, “being acted upon”, “undergo”

At a Glance

The word. Πόνος is toil and the pain it brings; in Marcus it is the pain of the body. Λύπη is distress, the grief of the mind, which the Stoics counted among the four passions. Ἡδονή is pleasure.

In the *Meditations*. Pain and pleasure come as a pair, among the things that “befall good men and bad alike” (2.11.4). The ruling centre is not to be turned by “the smooth or rough motion in the flesh” (5.26), the old definition of pleasure and pain. Against pain Marcus has two aids (7.64); pleasure “is neither useful nor good” (8.10). Distress lies in the opinion: “If you take away your opinion about what seems to distress you, you yourself stand in complete safety” (8.40).

In this edition. Πόνος is always “pain”, λύπη and λυπεῖν always “distress”, ἡδονή always “pleasure” and ἥδεσθαι “feel pleasure” (“have felt” at 6.34); ἀλγηδών, once, is

"pangs" (1.8.1), and πεῖσις is "being acted upon" in the singular, while the plural is given with "undergo".

A place to read. 7.64, where Marcus gives himself two aids against pain, and finds pain in drowsiness, heat and loss of appetite.

Meaning

Πόνος (*ponos*), from πένεσθαι (*penesthai*), "to toil", is labour, hardship and the pain they bring; in the *Meditations* it is the pain of the body, and the verb πονεῖν (*ponein*) keeps the sense of toil: "Labour" (9.12). Ἀλγηδών (*algēdōn*), pain as suffering, comes once. Λύπη (*lypē*) is grief or distress, and ἡδονή (*hēdonē*), akin to ἡδύς (*hēdys*), "sweet", is pleasure. For the Stoics pleasure and pain were among the things that neither benefit nor harm; distress and pleasure were also two of the four chief passions (see Desire and aversion), distress "an irrational contraction", pleasure "an irrational elation at something worth choosing that seems to be at hand".[109] Ἡδονή stands in both lists, πόνος only among the things indifferent, λύπη only among the passions. The edition keeps "pain" for πόνος and "distress" for λύπη, and Marcus' teaching can be read as resting on that difference: pain is in the body, distress in the mind that judges.

Use in the book

Pain and pleasure come as a pair. With death and life, fame and obscurity, wealth and poverty, they "befall good men and bad alike" and are "neither good nor bad" (2.11.4; see Good, bad and indifference). Philosophy keeps the daimon "master of pleasures and pains" (2.17.2; see Daimon), and "it is open to get the better of pleasures and pains" (8.8). Whoever "pursues pleasures as good things and flees pains as bad is impious", for he must often blame the common nature (9.1.2; see Good, bad and indifference).

Marcus is to bear in mind that the understanding "does not mingle with the breath as it moves smoothly or roughly, once it has drawn itself back and come to know its own authority", and "all that you have heard and assented to about pain and pleasure" (4.3.2). The ruling centre is not to resist the sensation, which is natural, but neither is it to be turned "by the smooth or rough motion in the flesh" nor to

[109] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.102 (pleasure and pain among the things that neither benefit nor harm), 7.110 (the four chief passions) and 7.111, 7.114 (distress and pleasure defined).

add the opinion that it is good or bad (5.26; see Ruling centre). “Do pain, pleasure touch you? Sensation will see to it” (8.41). Marcus does not deny the feeling; he refuses it a verdict.

The note headed “On pain” is a single sentence: “the unbearable carries off, the lasting is bearable; and the understanding keeps its own calm by withdrawing, and the ruling centre has not become worse” (7.33). At 7.64 he gives himself two aids: “In every pain let it be ready to hand that it is not shameful, and does not make worse the understanding that steers”; and “In most pains, however, let Epicurus’ saying too help you, that it is neither unbearable nor eternal, if you remember the limits and do not add opinion.” The first aid holds for every pain; the saying of Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, only for most. Drowsiness, heat and loss of appetite are “the same as pain”, and when he is discontented with them he is to say that he is “giving in to pain”. At 8.28: “Pain is bad either for the body (then let it declare itself) or for the soul; but it is open to the soul to guard its own clear sky and calm, and not to form the opinion that it is bad.” And “you are by nature able to bear everything which it rests with your own opinion to make bearable and supportable, by the impression that it is advantageous to yourself, or your duty, to do this” (10.3). Marcus learned from Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic whom the emperor Antoninus Pius summoned to teach him, “to be always the same, in sharp pangs, in the loss of a child, in long illnesses” (1.8.1).

Pleasure is treated more harshly. Regret is self-reproach for having let something useful pass, and the useful, in the order of the words proposed by Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts, must be something good; but “no honourable and good man would regret having let some pleasure pass; so pleasure is neither useful nor good” (8.10). To the plea that bed “is more pleasant” Marcus answers, “Have you come to be, then, for feeling pleasure … or for activity?” (5.1.1; again 8.19). The lover of pleasure takes his good to be “his own being acted upon” (6.51), but “Not in being acted upon but in activity lie the bad and the good” of the rational and civic living being (9.16; see Virtue and excellence). Yet the word keeps a good sense. The man with a feeling for the whole “will look even at the real gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure”

than at painted ones (3.2.3), and Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever "feel pleasure in all that is present" (10.1). Against the pleasure that "trips one up" he sets greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, fair-mindedness and holiness, to see whether they are "more agreeable" (5.9).

Distress is the mind's own. "If you are distressed because of something external, it is not that which vexes you but your own verdict about it; and to wipe this out at once is in your power" (8.47; see Assent and judgement); "If you take away your opinion about what seems to distress you, you yourself stand in complete safety" (8.40; see Mind and reason). The man who is distressed, angry or afraid is "a runaway" (10.25; see Citizenship), and Marcus is to form the impression that everyone distressed at anything is "like the piglet being sacrificed, kicking and squealing", and so is "he who laments on the little bed, alone, in silence" (10.28). "And as distress is the mark of the weak man, so is anger too; for both have been wounded and have given in" (11.18.5). The book's line is plain: pain belongs to the body and can be borne; pleasure is neither useful nor good; distress belongs to the mind, and because it is a verdict, it can be wiped out.

Places to read

Every chapter in which πόνος, ἀλγηδών, λύπη, ἡδονή or πεῖσις occurs, or a word of their families given in the sub-entries, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with four passages that treat pain and pleasure without the words (9.41, 10.3, 10.8.1, 11.19). Compounds of πόνος that mean toil or work, φερέπονος, φιλόπονος and δυσκαταπόνητος, and ἡδυπαθεῖν, "live delicately" (10.33.1), are left out.

1.8.1 From Apollonius Marcus learned to be always the same, in sharp pangs, in the loss of a child, in long illnesses.

2.10 Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor, judges wrong done with pleasure open to a greater charge than wrong done with distress, for the man in a rage is seen to turn from reason with distress and a contraction.

2.11.4 Pain and pleasure, with death and life, fame and obscurity, wealth and poverty, befall good men and bad alike and are neither good nor bad.

2.12 The objects of sense that lure with pleasure or frighten with pain are cheap, perishable and dead.

2.16 The soul does violence to itself, third, when it is overcome by pleasure or pain.

2.17.2 Philosophy lies in keeping the daimon master of pleasures and pains.

3.2.3 To a man with a feeling for the whole, things hang together pleasingly, and he looks at the real jaws of beasts with no less pleasure than at painted ones.

3.3 If death is absence of sensation, Marcus will cease to put up with pains and pleasures and to slave for the body.

3.4.2 Marcus is to accustom himself to think only such things as would show at once that he cares nothing for pleasurable or self-indulgent imaginings.

3.4.3 What is enshrined in the good man renders him unstained by pleasures and unwounded by any pain.

3.6.2 The daimon within has drawn itself away, as Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, used to say, from what the senses undergo.

3.6.3 Nothing of another kind, the praise of the many, office, wealth or the enjoyment of pleasures, is to be set against the rational good.

4.3.2 The understanding does not mingle with the breath as it moves smoothly or roughly, and Marcus is to remember all he has heard and assented to about pain and pleasure.

4.12 A man is to shift position only for something convincing, as that it is just or for the common good, not because it appeared pleasant or a source of repute.

4.44 All that gladdens or distresses fools is as usual and familiar as the rose in spring.

4.49.1 Marcus is lucky because, though this has happened to him, he goes on free from distress.

4.49.2 At everything that leads towards distress, Marcus is to use the principle that to bear it nobly is good fortune.

5.1.1 Lying under the blankets is more pleasant, and Marcus asks himself whether he has come to be for feeling pleasure or for activity, when the little

plants, sparrows, ants, spiders and bees do their own work.

5.5 Among the qualities wholly in Marcus' power are the bearing of hardship and indifference to pleasure, and he is not to delight in his sluggishness.

5.9 Pleasure trips one up, and Marcus is to see whether greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, fair-mindedness and holiness are more agreeable.

5.26 The ruling centre is not to be turned by the smooth or rough motion in the flesh but is to confine those things undergone to the parts, and is not to add the opinion that sensation is good or bad.

5.31 Marcus is to remember how many pleasures and pains he has looked past.

6.18 To care for praise from posterity is close to being distressed that those who lived before did not speak well of one.

6.33 Pain is not contrary to nature for hand or foot, nor for a man, so long as he does what belongs to a man, and so it is not bad for him.

6.34 Robbers, catamites, parricides and tyrants have felt pleasures.

6.50 When force blocks a just act, Marcus is to pass over to being well pleased and free from distress.

6.51 The lover of pleasure takes his own good to be his own being acted upon, the man who has a mind his own action.

7.16 If anyone else can frighten or distress the ruling centre, let him; the little soul that fears and is distressed will suffer nothing, for Marcus will not bring it to such a judgement.

7.33 The unbearable carries off, the lasting is bearable, and the understanding keeps its own calm by withdrawing.

7.55 Second in the constitution of man is refusing to yield to what the body undergoes.

7.64 In every pain Marcus is to have ready that it is not shameful and does not make the understanding worse; in most, Epicurus' saying helps; and

drowsiness, heat and having no appetite are the same as pain.

8.8 It is open to Marcus to get the better of pleasures and pains.

8.10 No honourable and good man would regret having let some pleasure pass, so pleasure is neither useful nor good.

8.14 If a man has such and such principles about pleasure and pain, it is no wonder that he acts accordingly.

8.19 Each thing has come to be for something, and Marcus asks whether he has come to be to feel pleasure.

8.28 Pain is bad either for the body or for the soul, but the soul can guard its own calm and not form the opinion that it is bad.

8.36 Marcus is not to gather up in thought all the painful things likely to follow, but to ask of each present one what is unbearable in it.

8.37 Marcus asks whether, if the companions of the dead, Hadrian's among them, sat beside their tombs, they would perceive it, and if they perceived, would feel pleasure.

8.39 In the rational living being Marcus sees no virtue that revolts against justice, but against pleasure he sees continence.

8.40 Whoever takes away his opinion about what seems to distress him stands in complete safety, and reason is not to distress itself.

8.41 If pain and pleasure touch Marcus, sensation will see to it.

8.42 Marcus is not worthy to distress himself, for he has never willingly distressed even another.

8.47 If a man is distressed at something external, what vexes him is not the thing but his own verdict about it, which it is in his power to wipe out at once.

9.1.2 He who pursues pleasures as good and flees pains as bad is impious, for he must often blame the common nature, since the base are often in pleasures and the serious meet with pain.

9.1.3 He who fears pains will some day fear something of what will be in the universe, and he who does

not stand equally towards pain and pleasure, which nature uses equally, is impious.

9.12 Marcus is to labour, not as one wretched, nor as wanting to be pitied or admired.

9.16 The good and the bad of the rational civic living being lie not in being acted upon but in activity.

9.40 If the gods have power, Marcus should pray for not being distressed rather than for things to be present or absent.

9.41 Epicurus in his illness did not talk of the passions of his body but went on studying nature, intent on how the understanding stays untroubled; Marcus is to do the same if he is ill.

10.1 Marcus asks whether his soul will ever crave nothing for the enjoyment of pleasures, and feel pleasure in all that is present.

10.3 Marcus is by nature able to bear everything that his own opinion can make bearable and supportable, by the impression that it is advantageous to him, or his duty.

10.8.1 The name "transcending" was meant to signify the raising of the thinking part above smooth or rough motion of the flesh.

10.25 He who is distressed, angry or afraid over any of the things ordered by him who governs all things, who is law, is a runaway.

10.28 Marcus is to form the impression that whoever is distressed or discontented at anything is like the piglet being sacrificed, kicking and squealing.

10.30 When he takes offence at another's wrongdoing, Marcus is to pass at once to the like wrong he does himself, as in judging money, pleasure or little fame to be a good.

10.34 To one steeped in the true principles even a line of Homer is enough as a reminder of freedom from distress and from fear.

11.18.4 Angers and distresses bring on harder things than "the things themselves at which we are angry and distressed".

11.18.5 As distress is the mark of the weak man, so is anger, for both have been wounded and have given in.

11.19 The fourth turning of the ruling centre to be wiped away is the more divine part in a man being overcome and bowing before the less honoured and mortal lot, the body's.

11.20.2 The motion towards injustice and licence, and angers, distresses and fears, are the mark of one standing apart from nature.

12.8 Among the things Marcus is to look at are what pain is and what pleasure.

12.34 Even those who judged pleasure good and pain bad despised death.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports that the Stoic Hecaton of Rhodes and Chrysippus, the third head of the school, denied that pleasure is a good, "for there are also shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good".[110] Marcus reaches the same conclusion at 8.10 by another road, from regret. Chrysippus held the passions to be judgements. Among the kinds of distress the Stoics counted ὀδύνη (*odynē*), anguish, defined as "distress that brings pain" (λύπη ἐπίπονος, *lypē epiponos*), with the adjective of πόνος that Marcus uses at 8.36. Against pleasure they set joy, "a reasonable elation", and against distress no good feeling at all (see Desire and aversion).[111] Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, traced every passion to desire that fails or avoidance that falls into what it avoids (see Desire and aversion).[112] To his saying that men are troubled not by things but by their principles about things (see Principles and reminders) he adds that whenever we are impeded, troubled or distressed (λυπώμεθα, *lypōmetha*), we should blame no one else but ourselves, meaning our own principles.[113] Marcus' "it is not that which vexes you but your own verdict about it" (8.47) can be read as the same thought in his own word.

---

[110] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.103, citing Hecaton, *On Goods* book 9, and Chrysippus, *On Pleasure*.

[111] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.111 (the passions as judgements, from Chrysippus, *On Passions*), 7.112 (ὀδύνη) and 7.116 (the good feelings).

[112] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.2.3.

[113] Epictetus, *Handbook* 5.

Other ancient sources

The smooth and rough motion is the definition of the Cyrenaics, the followers of Aristippus of Cyrene, who held "that there are two feelings, pain and pleasure, pleasure a smooth motion and pain a rough one", as the edition's note at 4.3.2 recalls.[114] Epicurus' saying at 7.64 is close to the fourth of his *Principal Doctrines*, which the edition's note compares and Diogenes Laertius preserves: "Pain does not linger without a break in the flesh; at its height it is present for the shortest time, and what only just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not remain for many days; and long illnesses hold more pleasure in the flesh than pain."[115] Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, gives the same comfort in his own voice, speaking to pain: "if I can bear you, you are light; if I cannot, you are short"; and he reports that his friend Aufidius Bassus, old and failing, said, "following the precepts of Epicurus", that no pain that is great is long.[116] Marcus copies from Epicurus (fragment 191 Usener, as the edition's note records) an account of his conduct in illness and takes it as his model (9.41; see Philosophy).

Translation in this edition

Πόνος is "pain" at all twenty-six of its occurrences, and "pain" in the English renders it alone; "sharp pangs" renders ἀλγηδόσιν ὀξείαις (1.8.1), and "painful things" the adjective ἐπίπονα (8.36). The verb πονεῖν is "Labour" (9.12). Compounds that mean toil, not pain, take other words: φερέπονος, "bear hardship" (1.5) and "the bearing of hardship" (5.5); φιλόπονος, "love of work" (1.16.1) and "hard-working" (6.30.4, 6.47); δυσκαταπόνητος, "hard … to accomplish" (6.19). Λύπη is "distress" at all seven of its occurrences, and λυπεῖν "distress" in the active ("all that gladdens or distresses fools", 4.44; "to distress myself", 8.42) and "be distressed" in the middle and passive; ἄλυπος is "free from distress" (4.49.1 twice, 6.50) and ἀλυπία "freedom from distress" (10.34). "Distress" renders nothing else. Ἡδονή is "pleasure" at all twenty-seven of its occurrences; "the enjoyment of pleasures" (3.6.3, 10.1) adds the word for enjoyment, ἀπόλαυσις (*apolausis*). Ἥδεσθαι is

[114] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 2.86.

[115] Epicurus, *Principal Doctrines* 4, in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 10.140. Leopold's testimonia, as the edition's note at 7.64 reports, cite fragment 447 of Hermann Usener's collection of Epicurus at 7.64 and 7.33.

[116] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 24.14 and 30.14.

“feel pleasure” (5.1.1, 8.19, 8.37 twice, 10.1), and “have felt” where pleasures are its object (6.34). Ἡδύς is “pleasant” (4.12; the comparative “more pleasant”, 5.1.1), and its adverb ἡδέως “pleasingly” and “with no less pleasure” (3.2.3). Ἡδονικός is “pleasurable” (3.4.2), φιλήδονος “the lover of pleasure” (6.51) and ἐμφιληδονεῖν “delighting in” (5.5). Τὸ ἀφιλήδονον is “indifference to pleasure” (5.5), so that “indifference” stands for this word as well as for ἀδιαφορία (see Good, bad and indifference). The singular πεῖσις is “being acted upon” (5.1.1, 6.51, 9.16 twice), and the plural is given with the verb “undergo”: “what the senses undergo” (3.6.2), “those things undergone” (5.26), “what the body undergoes” (7.55). The phrase λεία ἢ τραχεῖα κίνησις (*leia ē tracheia kinēsis*) is “smooth or rough motion” (5.26, 10.8.1), and the adverbs at 4.3.2 are “smoothly or roughly”. At 11.19 “rough or smooth ⟨motions⟩” renders τραχείαις ἢ λείαις ⟨κινήσεσιν⟩, the conjecture of P. Fournier, who edited Auguste Couat’s French translation of the *Meditations* (1904), which Leopold prints; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has παχείαις ἡδοναῖς (*pacheiais hēdonais*), “gross pleasures”, and A, the Vatican manuscript, and X, the books of excerpts, παχείαις ἰδέαις (*pacheiais ideais*). At 8.37 the first tomb is that of Verus in the correction of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, which Leopold prints for P’s “the master’s” (see Lucius Verus), and at 10.25 “does not will”, which makes the distressed man a runaway, is Nauck’s correction for the manuscripts’ ὃ βούλεται (*ho bouletai*; see Citizenship).

ἀλγηδών

Attested: ἀλγηδόσιν (*algēdosin*; 1.8.1). Pain, suffering. From Apollonius Marcus learned “to be always the same, in sharp pangs, in the loss of a child, in long illnesses” (1.8.1). Lemma: ἀλγηδών.

ἀλυπία

Attested: ἀλυπίας (*alypias*; 10.34). Freedom from distress. To one steeped in the true principles even a line of Homer “is enough as a reminder of freedom from distress and from fear” (10.34). Lemma: ἀλυπία.

ἄλυπος

Attested: ἄλυπος (*alypos*; 4.49.1 twice), ἄλυπον (*alypon*; 6.50). Free from distress. “No: lucky am I, because though this has happened to me I go on free from distress” (4.49.1); when force blocks a just act, “pass over to being well pleased and free from distress” (6.50). Lemma: ἄλυπος.

ἀφιλήδονος

Attested: ἀφιλήδονον (*aphilēdonon*; 5.5). Not loving pleasure; with the article, “indifference to pleasure”, one of the qualities “wholly in your power” (5.5). Lemma: ἀφιλήδονος.

ἐμφιληδονέω

Attested: ἐμφιληδονοῦντι (*emphilēdonounti*; 5.5). To take pleasure in. Slowness too one must train, “not disregarding it nor delighting in the sluggishness” (5.5). Lemma: ἐμφιληδονέω.

ἐπίπονος

Attested: ἐπίπονα (*epipona*; 8.36). Painful, toilsome. Marcus is not to “take in together, in thought, what painful things and how many are likely to have followed” (8.36). Lemma: ἐπίπονος.

ἥδομαι

Attested: ἥδεσθαι (*hēdesthai*; 5.1.1, 8.19), ἥσθησαν (*hēsthēsan*; 6.34), ἡσθήσεσθαι (*hēsthēsesthai*; 8.37), ἥδοντο (*hēdonto*; 8.37), ἡσθήσῃ (*hēsthēsēi*; 10.1). To feel pleasure. “Have you come to be, then, for feeling pleasure … or for activity?” (5.1.1); “To feel pleasure? See whether the conception puts up with it” (8.19); and the soul is asked whether it will “feel pleasure in all that is present” (10.1). Lemma: ἥδομαι.

ἡδονή

Attested: ἡδονῆς (*hēdonēs*; 2.10 twice, 2.16, 4.3.2, 8.14, 8.39), ἡδονή (*hēdonē*; 2.11.4, 5.9, 8.10, 8.41, 12.8), ἡδονῇ (*hēdonēi*; 2.12), ἡδονῶν (*hēdonōn*; 2.17.2, 3.3, 3.4.3, 3.6.3, 5.31, 8.8, 10.1), ἡδονάς (*hēdonas*; 6.34, 9.1.2, 9.1.3), ἡδονήν (*hēdonēn*; 8.10, 9.1.3, 10.30, 12.34), ἡδοναῖς (*hēdonais*; 9.1.2). Pleasure, one of the things neither good nor bad (2.11.4), and for the Stoics also a passion. “So pleasure is neither useful nor good” (8.10), where “the useful must be something good” follows Reiske’s order of the words, which

Leopold prints, and the manuscripts have “the good must be something useful”; “against pleasure I see continence” (8.39); “For is it not by just this that pleasure trips one up?” (5.9). At 10.30 the noun stands with the supplement ⟨ἢ⟩ (*ē*), “or”, of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century. At 11.19, where Leopold prints Fournier’s “rough or smooth ⟨motions⟩”, P has ἡδοναῖς, “pleasures”; it is not counted here. Lemma: ἡδονή.

ἡδονικός

Attested: ἡδονικῶν (*hēdonikōn*; 3.4.2). Of pleasure, pleasurable. Marcus’ thoughts should show at once that they belong to a social living being “who cares nothing for pleasurable or, in a word, self-indulgent imaginings” (3.4.2). Lemma: ἡδονικός.

ἡδύς

Attested: ἡδέως (*hēdeōs*; 3.2.3 twice), ἡδύ (*hēdy*; 4.12), ἥδιον (*hēdion*; 5.1.1). Sweet, pleasant. Of the worse reason for a change of view, “not that it appeared pleasant” (4.12); of the bed, “But this is more pleasant” (5.1.1). The adverb is used of the pleasure of seeing nature: things “hang together pleasingly”, and the jaws of beasts are seen “with no less pleasure” than in imitation (3.2.3). Lemma: ἡδύς.

λυπέω

Attested: λυπεῖ (*lypei*; 4.44, 8.47), λυπηθῆναι (*lypēthēnai*; 6.18), λυπῆσαι (*lypēsai*; 7.16), λυπούμενον (*lypoumenon*; 7.16, 10.28), λυπεῖν (*lypein*; 8.40, 8.42), λυπείτω (*lypeitō*; 8.40), ἐλύπησα (*elypēsa*; 8.42), λυπῇ (*lypēi*; 8.47 three times), λυποῦ (*lypou*; 8.47), λυπεῖσθαι (*lypeisthai*; 9.40), λυπούμενος (*lypoumenos*; 10.25 twice), λυπούμεθα (*lypoumetha*; 11.18.4). To distress; in the middle and passive, to be distressed. “If you are distressed because of something external, it is not that which vexes you but your own verdict about it” (8.47); “Then let reason not distress itself” (8.40); “I am not worthy to distress myself; for I have never willingly distressed even another” (8.42). Lemma: λυπέω.

λύπη

Attested: λύπης (*lypēs*; 2.10 three times), λύπην (*lypēn*; 4.49.2), λῦπαι (*lypai*; 11.18.4), λύπη (*lypē*; 11.18.5), λύπας (*lypas*; 11.20.2). Distress, grief, one of the four Stoic passions. The man in a rage is seen to turn from reason

“with a kind of distress and an unconscious contraction” (2.10); “as distress is the mark of the weak man, so is anger too” (11.18.5); “angers and distresses and fears” are “the mark of one standing apart from nature” (11.20.2). Lemma: λύπη.

πεῖσις

Attested: πείσεων (*peiseōn*; 3.6.2), πεῖσιν (*peisin*; 5.1.1, 6.51), πείσεις (*peiseis*; 5.26, 7.55), πείσει (*peisei*; 9.16 twice). Being acted upon, the passive counterpart of activity: the lover of pleasure takes his good to be “his own being acted upon” (6.51); “Not in being acted upon but in activity lie the bad and the good” (9.16). In the plural, what the senses or the body undergo: the ruling centre is to “confine those things undergone to the parts” (5.26). At 5.1.1 “you, for being acted upon” is Fournier’s σὺ πρὸς πεῖσιν, which Leopold prints; A and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have “not for being acted upon”, and P “not for doing”. Lemma: πεῖσις.

πονέω

Attested: πόνει (*ponei*; 9.12). To toil, to labour. “Labour, not as one wretched, nor as wanting to be pitied or admired” (9.12). Lemma: πονέω.

πόνος

Attested: πόνος (*ponos*; 2.11.4, 6.33 twice, 8.28, 8.41, 12.8), πόνῳ (*ponōi*; 2.12, 7.64 twice, 9.1.2), πόνου (*ponou*; 2.16, 3.4.3, 4.3.2, 7.33 twice, 7.64, 8.14), πόνων (*ponōn*; 2.17.2, 3.3, 5.31, 7.64, 8.8), πόνους (*ponous*; 9.1.2, 9.1.3), πόνον (*ponon*; 9.1.3, 12.34). Toil, hardship; in the *Meditations*, pain, nearly always paired with pleasure. “On pain: the unbearable carries off, the lasting is bearable” (7.33); “In every pain let it be ready to hand that it is not shameful” (7.64); “Pain is bad either for the body (then let it declare itself) or for the soul” (8.28). Lemma: πόνος.

φιλήδονος

Attested: φιλήδονος (*philēdonos*; 6.51). Loving pleasure; as a noun, the lover of pleasure, who takes his good to be “his own being acted upon” (6.51). Lemma: φιλήδονος.

See also

Assent and judgement; Body and flesh; Citizenship; Courage and endurance; Daimon; Desire and aversion; Good, bad and indifference; Lucius Verus; Mind and reason;

Nature; Philosophy; Principles and reminders; Ruling centre; Self-respect and shame; Virtue and excellence.

Philosophy

The mother to whom one returns · Meditations

φιλοσοφία, philosophia, "philosophy"; *φιλοσοφεῖν, philosophein*, "practises philosophy", "true philosophers", "philosophy"; *φιλόσοφος, philosophos*, "philosophers", "as a philosopher", "a philosopher", "more philosophical", "act as philosophers"; *ἰδιωτικός, idiōtikos*, "unphilosophical"; *ἰδιώτης, idiōtēs*, "the unlearned", "a private citizen", "the wholly unphilosophical", "laymen", "the layman"; *σοφιστής, sophistēs*, "a sophist", "the sophists"; *σοφιστικός, sophistikos*, "sophistic"; *σχολαστικός, scholastikos*, "a pedant"; *μετεωρολογικός, meteōrologikos*, "the heavens"; *αἵρεσις, hairesis*, "school"; *Στωικός, Stōikos*, "the Stoics"; *Ἐπικούρειος, Epikoureios*, "the Epicureans"; *Πυθαγόρειος, Pythagoreios*, "the Pythagoreans"; *Κυνικός, Kynikos*, "the Cynic"; *Πλατωνικός, Platōnikos*, "the Platonist"

At a Glance

The word. Φιλοσοφία is the love of wisdom, and a φιλόσοφος one who pursues it. Against the philosopher stand the σοφιστής, the sophist, and the ἰδιώτης, the layman, whence ἰδιωτικός, "unphilosophical".

In the *Meditations*. Marcus came to philosophy through his teachers (1.6, 1.7.1) and thanks the gods that he did not fall in with a sophist (1.17.9). Philosophy "wants only what your nature wants" (5.9), its work "is simple and self-respecting" (9.29), and he is to return to it as to a remedy (5.9) and a mother (6.12). He is plainly "far from philosophy" (8.1), yet no station is "so fitted for philosophy" as his own (11.7).

In this edition. Φιλοσοφία is always "philosophy", φιλόσοφος "philosopher" and its comparative "more philosophical"; φιλοσοφεῖν is "practises philosophy" once (4.30) and otherwise a noun; ἰδιωτικός is always "unphilosophical"; the schools keep their names, such as "the Stoics".

A place to read. 6.12, where the court is a stepmother and philosophy a mother, and Marcus is to return to her often and rest in her.

Meaning

Φιλοσοφία (*philosophia*) joins φίλος (*philos*), "loving", and σοφία (*sophia*), "wisdom". Diogenes Laertius, the third-century author of the *Lives of the Philosophers*, reports that Pythagoras of Samos was the first to call it philosophy and himself a philosopher, because no one is wise but god; before, it was called wisdom, and the wise were also called sophists.[117] In Marcus the σοφιστής (*sophistēs*) is not the wise man but the man of words and display, set against the philosopher (1.7.1, 1.16.4, 1.17.9), and the ἰδιώτης (*idiōtēs*), the private man, is the man outside philosophy, "the layman" (9.41); its adjective ἰδιωτικός (*idiōtikos*) is "unphilosophical". Marcus never calls himself a philosopher. He gives the noun to others, to the dead (4.48.1, 6.47) and to the repute he can no longer easily win (8.1); to himself he gives philosophy, a thing to return to.

Use in the book

Marcus learned philosophy before he practised it. From Diognetus, his painting master, he had "to have come into affinity with philosophy" and "to have craved the pallet and the skin, and whatever else belongs to the Greek training" (1.6), the philosopher's low bed and the skin spread on it. From Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, he had "the impression of needing correction and treatment of character", and learned "not to be drawn aside into sophistic ambition, nor to write treatises on doctrines, nor to deliver little exhortations" (1.7.1). Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, honoured "those who were true philosophers" (1.16.5). Among the gifts of the gods Marcus counts "that when I craved philosophy I did not fall in with a sophist, nor sit down to writing treatises, or resolving syllogisms, or busying myself with the heavens" (1.17.9). "Writing treatises" is the correction of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, adopted by J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints; the manuscripts have "the writers".

Marcus speaks of philosophy as of a person with a will of her own. It is the one thing that "can serve as escort" through life, and lies in keeping the daimon within inviolate and unharmed (2.17.2; see Daimon). "And remember that philosophy wants only what your nature wants; but you wanted something else, not according to nature" (5.9). Lest he be "made into a Caesar", he writes, "Strive to remain such

[117] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 1.12.

as philosophy wanted to make you" (6.30.1). At 9.29 he turns on "these civic little men who, as he thinks, act as philosophers", and on his own hopes: "Do not hope for Plato's Republic, but be content if the smallest thing goes forward", for "who will change their principle?" The chapter ends with a rule: "The work of philosophy is simple and self-respecting: do not lead me away to solemn vanity" (9.29).

Above all, philosophy is what Marcus returns to. If acting on right principles "is not thickly established in you", he is not to lose heart: "when you have been knocked back, come back again … and do not return to philosophy as to a schoolmaster, but as those with sore eyes to the sponge and the egg, as another to a poultice, as to a lotion. For so you will make no show of obeying reason, but will rest in it" (5.9). The second image is domestic: "If you had a stepmother and a mother at the same time, you would serve the one, and yet your return to the mother would be continual. That is what the court and philosophy are to you now: return here often and rest in her, thanks to whom the things there seem bearable to you and you bearable among them" (6.12). The verbs of 5.9 come back, ἐπανιέναι (*epanienai*), "return", and προσαναπαύεσθαι (*prosanapauesthai*), "rest in". The stepmother is still served; the court is made bearable by the mother, not left for her.

The name of philosopher Marcus gives up. "This too contributes to freedom from empty glory: that you can no longer have lived the whole of life, or at least the life from youth on, as a philosopher, but to many others and to yourself it has become clear that you are far from philosophy. You are befouled, then, so that it is no longer easy for you to win the repute of a philosopher; and the station too works against it" (8.1). The station, ὑπόθεσις (*hypothesis*), is probably his position as emperor, as the edition's note says, and the word returns in a cry: "How plainly it strikes one that there is no other station of life so fitted for philosophy as this in which you now happen to be!" (11.7). Side by side, the two chapters can be read as an answer to his regret: the station that works against the repute is fitted for the thing. The thing needs no equipment: "One man practises philosophy without a tunic, another without a book" (4.30); and Marcus is not to give up hope "of being free and self-respecting and social and obedient to God" because "you have despaired of becoming a dialectician and a natural philosopher" (7.67).

Philosophy is also wider than his school. Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor, "speaks as a philosopher" (2.10; see Desire and aversion); the Stoics, named once, find things "hard to grasp firmly" (5.10.1; see Assent and judgement); the Epicureans, in the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, and the Pythagoreans supply reminders (11.26, 11.27; see Principles and reminders). Epicurus, the founder of the school of the Garden, said that in his illness he talked not of the body's passions but went on studying nature, intent on how the understanding stays untroubled; Marcus is to do the same, "if you are ill, and in any other circumstance; for not to stand apart from philosophy in whatever befalls … is common to every school" (9.41). Philosophers die like the rest (4.48.1; see Death), and Marcus takes the layman's help knowingly, "an unphilosophical but still effective help towards despising death" (4.50; see Time and eternity). It is "more philosophical" to show oneself just and self-controlled, artlessly (12.27; see Simplicity and sincerity). What he keeps of philosophy is not its name but the return.

Places to read

Every chapter in which φιλοσοφία, φιλοσοφεῖν, φιλόσοφος or its adverb φιλοσόφως occurs, or ἰδιωτικός, σοφιστής, σοφιστικός, σχολαστικός or μετεωρολογικός, or in which a school is named, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with ἰδιώτης where it is the man outside philosophy (5.8.3, 9.41), and 7.67, on the dialectician and the natural philosopher. The other places of ἰδιώτης are given in its sub-entry; the places where Marcus names or quotes a philosopher without these words are left out.

1.6 Diognetus brought Marcus into affinity with philosophy; Marcus wrote dialogues as a boy and craved the pallet and the skin and whatever else belongs to the Greek training.

1.7.1 Rusticus gave Marcus the impression of needing correction of character, and taught him not to be drawn aside into sophistic ambition, write treatises on doctrines or parade himself.

1.12 Alexander the Platonist taught Marcus not to plead, often or without necessity, that he was busy.

1.14.2 From Severus, usually taken to be Claudius Severus, the Peripatetic, Marcus had an even and unwavering honour for philosophy.

1.16.4 No one could have called Antoninus a sophist, a pert house-slave or a pedant, but a man mature and complete.

1.16.5 Antoninus honoured those who were true philosophers, without reproaching the others or being led astray by them.

1.17.9 Among the gods' gifts: when Marcus craved philosophy he did not fall in with a sophist, nor sit down to writing treatises, resolving syllogisms or busying himself with the heavens.

2.10 Theophrastus speaks as a philosopher, and in a manner worthy of philosophy, in judging offences of craving graver than offences of rage (see Desire and aversion).

2.15 That everything is opinion: what was said to Monimus the Cynic is plain, and so is its use, if one takes its pith as far as it is true (see Assent and judgement).

2.17.2 Philosophy is the one thing that can serve as escort, and lies in keeping the daimon within inviolate and unharmed (see Daimon).

4.3.1 To long for retreats in the country, by the sea or in the mountains is quite unphilosophical, when Marcus can retreat into himself at any hour (see Principles and reminders).

4.30 One man practises philosophy without a tunic, another without a book; Marcus, it seems, has no food from studies, and holds fast.

4.36 To form an impression of seeds only as what is cast into the earth or a womb is very unphilosophical.

4.48.1 Marcus is to bear in mind how many philosophers who argued endlessly about death or immortality have died (see Death).

4.50 An unphilosophical but still effective help towards despising death is to recall those who lingered greedily in life (see Time and eternity).

5.8.3 Even the wholly unphilosophical understand what Marcus means, for they say, "It brought him this".

5.9 When knocked back, Marcus is to return to philosophy not as to a schoolmaster but as the sore-eyed to sponge and egg; philosophy wants only what his nature wants.

5.10.1 To not a few philosophers things seemed beyond firm grasp, and even to the Stoics they seem hard to grasp firmly (see Assent and judgement).

6.12 The court is a stepmother and philosophy a mother: Marcus is to return to her often and rest in her.

6.30.1 Marcus is to keep himself simple, good and untainted, and strive to remain such as philosophy wanted to make him.

6.30.3 Antoninus was an exact examiner of characters and actions, not a reproacher, not suspicious, not a sophist.

6.47 Among the dead of every kind are so many dignified philosophers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates.

7.66 It is not enough that Socrates argued more adroitly with the sophists; one must look at what sort of soul he had.

7.67 Despair of becoming a dialectician and a natural philosopher is no reason for Marcus to give up hope of being free, self-respecting, social and obedient to God.

8.1 Marcus can no longer have lived as a philosopher, is plainly far from philosophy, and can no longer easily win a philosopher's repute; if he has truly seen where the matter lies, he is to let go of how he will seem.

8.25 Demetrius the Platonist is among the sharp men long dead (see Death).

9.3.2 If Marcus wants an unphilosophical precept that touches the heart, what will make him most at ease towards death is attention to the things he is about to leave and to the characters with which the ..., a word lost in a gap in the text, will no longer be befouled (see Death).

9.29 Marcus calls cheap the civic little men who, as he thinks, act as philosophers; the work of philosophy is simple and self-respecting.

9.41 Marcus is to do as Epicurus did in his illness, if he is ill and in any other circumstance, for not to stand apart from philosophy in whatever befalls, nor to talk idly with the layman, is common to every school.

11.7 No other station of life is so fitted for philosophy as the one in which Marcus now is.

11.26 A precept laid down in certain writings bids one remind oneself continually of one of those of old who practised virtue (see Principles and reminders).

11.27 The Pythagoreans bid one look up at the heaven at dawn, to be reminded of order, purity and nakedness (see Principles and reminders).

12.27 It is more philosophical, in the material given, to show oneself just, self-controlled, following the gods, artlessly (see Simplicity and sincerity).

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoics divided the discourse of philosophy into three parts, physics, ethics and logic, and compared philosophy to a living creature, whose bones and sinews are logic, its fleshier parts ethics and its soul physics; or to an egg, logic outermost, ethics next and physics innermost; or to a field that bears everything, with logic for its fence, ethics for its fruit and physics for its earth or its trees.[118] Marcus' rule "study nature, study the passions, practise dialectic" (8.13) is probably the three parts, as the edition's note there says, and he counts himself spared the syllogisms and the heavens (1.17.9). Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, distinguishes wisdom, the human mind's good made complete, from philosophy, the love of wisdom and the reaching after it, and reports that some defined philosophy as the pursuit of virtue, others as the pursuit of correcting the mind;[119] the last can be read beside what Rusticus first gave Marcus, "the impression of needing correction and treatment of character" (1.7.1). Seneca also warns his friend Lucilius against the marks of those who

[118] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.39–40.

[119] Seneca, *Letters* 89.4–5.

want not to make progress but to be noticed: rough dress, an unshorn head, a beard left untended, a declared hatred of silver, a bed set on the ground; the very name of philosophy, even when it is handled modestly, draws ill will enough.[120] Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, forbade the name that Marcus gives up at 8.1. Nowhere is one to name oneself a philosopher, or to chatter among laymen, ἰδιώταις (*idiōtais*), about doctrines; one is to act on them. A sheep does not show the shepherd how much it has eaten by bringing him the grass, but digests its pasture within, and what it shows is wool and milk.[121] And: "If you ever find yourself turned outward, wanting to please someone, know that you have lost your footing. So let it be enough for you, in everything, to be a philosopher; and if you want to seem one as well, seem one to yourself, and you will be equal to it."[122] Epictetus also calls the philosopher's school a doctor's consulting-room, which one should leave having been hurt, not pleased.[123] Marcus' remedies at 5.9, the sponge and the egg, the poultice and the lotion, are those a sufferer is glad of; beside Epictetus' consulting-room they can be read as making the return to philosophy a relief.

Other ancient sources

The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, says that Marcus gave himself keenly to philosophy while still a boy: entering his twelfth year he took up the philosopher's dress, and then his endurance, studying in a Greek cloak and sleeping on the ground, and only at his mother's urging, and with difficulty, lay on a little couch spread with skins. The edition's note at 1.6 sets this account beside the pallet and the skin that Marcus craved; the couch with skins, his mother's concession, can be read as that pallet. The same life says that his zeal was so great that, even after he had been taken into the imperial house, he still went to the house of Apollonius, the Stoic, to learn, and that he heard Sextus of Chaeronea, Junius Rusticus, Claudius Maximus and Cinna Catulus, all Stoics, and Claudius Severus, a Peripatetic, of Aristotle's school.[124] The Severus

[120] Seneca, *Letters* 5.1–2.

[121] Epictetus, *Handbook* 46.1–2.

[122] Epictetus, *Handbook* 23.

[123] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.23.30.

[124] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 2.6–3.3.

of 1.14, from whom Marcus had his “unwavering honour for philosophy” (1.14.2), is usually taken to be this teacher, as the edition’s note there says (see Severus).

Translation in this edition

Φιλοσοφία is “philosophy” at all twelve of its occurrences (1.6, 1.14.2, 1.17.9, 2.10, 2.17.2, 5.9 twice, 6.12, 6.30.1, 8.1, 9.29, 9.41); “in a manner worthy of philosophy” renders φιλοσοφίας ἀξίως (2.10). The verb φιλοσοφεῖν is “practises philosophy” at 4.30 and is rendered by a noun twice: “those who were true philosophers” for τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφούντων (*tōn alēthōs philosophountōn*; 1.16.5) and “so fitted for philosophy” for ἐπιτήδειον εἰς τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν (11.7). Φιλόσοφος is “philosophers” (4.48.1, 5.10.1, 6.47), “as a philosopher” and “the repute of a philosopher” (8.1), and the comparative φιλοσοφώτερον “more philosophical” (12.27); the adverb φιλοσόφως is “speaks as a philosopher” (2.10) and, in φιλοσόφως πρακτικά (*philosophōs praktika*), “act as philosophers” (9.29). Ἰδιωτικός is “unphilosophical” at all four places, “quite unphilosophical” for the superlative (4.3.1) and “very unphilosophical” with λίαν (*lian*; 4.36). Ἰδιώτης goes by sense: “the unlearned” (1.9.1), “a private citizen” (1.17.3), “the wholly unphilosophical” (5.8.3), “laymen” (6.35) and “the layman” (9.41); “unphilosophical” in the English thus renders two words. Σοφιστής is “sophist” (1.16.4, 1.17.9, 6.30.3) and “the sophists” (7.66), σοφιστικός “sophistic” (1.7.1), σχολαστικός “pedant” (1.16.4) and τὰ μετεωρολογικά “the heavens” (1.17.9). The schools keep their names: Στωικοί “the Stoics” (5.10.1), Ἐπικούρειοι “the Epicureans” (11.26), Πυθαγόρειοι “the Pythagoreans” (11.27), Κυνικός “the Cynic” (2.15), Πλατωνικός “the Platonist” (1.12, 8.25), and αἵρεσις “school” (9.41). “A dialectician and a natural philosopher” at 7.67 render διαλεκτικός (*dialektikos*) and φυσικός (*physikos*), which is elsewhere “natural”; “studies” at 4.30 is μαθήματα (*mathēmata*), and “schoolmaster” at 5.9 παιδαγωγός. Ὑπόθεσις is “station” (8.1, 11.7; see Principles and reminders). Three readings in the family are editors’: “even” in “an even and unwavering honour for philosophy” is the ὁμαλές (*homales*) of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, for the manuscripts’ ἀμελές (*ameles*), “careless”, as the edition’s note at 1.14.2 says; “writing treatises” at 1.17.9 is Reiske’s τὸ συγγράφειν (*to syngraphein*) for the manuscripts’ τοὺς συγγραφεῖς, “the

writers"; and "the Epicureans" at 11.26 is Gataker's Ἐπικουρείων for the witnesses' Ἐφεσίων (*Ephesiōn*), "Ephesians".

αἵρεσις

Attested: αἱρέσεως (*haireseōs*; 9.41). A taking, a choice; so a chosen way of thinking, a school. Not to stand apart from philosophy in whatever befalls "is common to every school" (9.41). Lemma: αἵρεσις.

Ἐπικούρειος

Attested: Ἐπικουρείων (*Epikoureiōn*; 11.26). Of Epicurus; in the plural, his followers. "In the writings of the Epicureans a precept was laid down: continually to remind oneself of one of those of old who practised virtue" (11.26; see Principles and reminders). The name is Gataker's correction, which Leopold prints; the witnesses have Ἐφεσίων, "Ephesians". Lemma: Ἐπικούρειος.

ἰδιώτης

Attested: ἰδιωτῶν (*idiōtōn*; 1.9.1), ἰδιώτου (*idiōtou*; 1.17.3), ἰδιῶται (*idiōtai*; 5.8.3), ἰδιώτας (*idiōtas*; 6.35), ἰδιώτῃ (*idiōtēi*; 9.41). A private person, as against one who holds office or has a craft or a learning: a layman. Sextus showed "forbearance towards the unlearned" (1.9.1); Antoninus brought Marcus to see that one may "draw oneself in very near to the style of a private citizen" (1.17.3); "Even the wholly unphilosophical understand what I mean" (5.8.3); craftsmen "accommodate themselves to laymen up to a point" (6.35); and every school forbids talking idly "with the layman" (9.41). Lemma: ἰδιώτης.

ἰδιωτικός

Attested: ἰδιωτικώτατον (*idiōtikōtaton*; 4.3.1), ἰδιωτικόν (*idiōtikon*; 4.36, 4.50, 9.3.2). Of a private person; in Marcus, of a thought or a help that belongs to the layman rather than to philosophy. Longing for retreats in the country "is quite unphilosophical" (4.3.1; see Principles and reminders), and to think of seeds only as what is sown "is very unphilosophical" (4.36); yet Marcus keeps "an unphilosophical but still effective help towards despising death" (4.50; see Time and eternity) and "an unphilosophical precept that touches the heart" (9.3.2; see Death). Lemma: ἰδιωτικός.

Κυνικός

Attested: Κυνικόν (*Kynikon*; 2.15). Dog-like, from κύων (*kyōn*), "dog"; the name of the Cynics. "For what was said to Monimus the Cynic is plain" (2.15; see Assent and judgement). Lemma: Κυνικός.

μετεωρολογικός

Attested: μετεωρολογικά (*meteōrologika*; 1.17.9). Concerned with τὰ μετέωρα (*ta meteōra*), the things aloft: the heavens and what happens in the sky. Among the gifts of the gods: "that when I craved philosophy I did not fall in with a sophist, nor sit down to writing treatises, or resolving syllogisms, or busying myself with the heavens" (1.17.9). Lemma: μετεωρολογικός.

Πλατωνικός

Attested: Πλατωνικοῦ (*Platōnikou*; 1.12), Πλατωνικός (*Platōnikos*; 8.25). Of Plato; of a man, a Platonist. "Alexander the Platonist", usually identified, as the edition's note says, with Alexander of Seleucia, Marcus' secretary for Greek letters, taught him not to say "I am busy" often or without necessity (1.12); "Demetrius the Platonist" is among the "sharp men" long dead (8.25; see Death). Lemma: Πλατωνικός.

Πυθαγόρειος

Attested: Πυθαγόρειοι (*Pythagoreioi*; 11.27). Of Pythagoras; in the plural, his followers. "The Pythagoreans: at dawn to look up at the heaven" (11.27; see Principles and reminders). Lemma: Πυθαγόρειος.

σοφιστής

Attested: σοφιστής (*sophistēs*; 1.16.4, 6.30.3), σοφιστήν (*sophistēn*; 1.17.9), σοφισταῖς (*sophistais*; 7.66). One who professes wisdom; in Marcus, the man of words set against the philosopher. No one could have called Antoninus "a sophist" (1.16.4), and he was "not a sophist" (6.30.3); Marcus "did not fall in with a sophist" (1.17.9); Socrates "argued more adroitly with the sophists" (7.66). Lemma: σοφιστής.

σοφιστικός

Attested: σοφιστικόν (*sophistikon*; 1.7.1). Of a sophist. Rusticus taught Marcus "not to be drawn aside into sophistic ambition" (1.7.1). Lemma: σοφιστικός.

Στωικός

Attested: Στωικοῖς (*Stōikois*; 5.10.1). Of the Stoa, the Painted Colonnade at Athens in which Zeno, the founder of the school, taught;[125] in the plural, the Stoics. Things seemed to not a few philosophers beyond firm grasp, "but to the Stoics themselves, at least, they seem hard to grasp firmly" (5.10.1; see Assent and judgement). Lemma: Στωικός.

σχολαστικός

Attested: σχολαστικός (*scholastikos*; 1.16.4). One who has leisure, σχολή (*scholē*), for study; a scholar, and in a bad sense a pedant, the bookish fool of the ancient joke-book *Philogelos*, as the edition's note says. No one could have called Antoninus "a sophist, or a pert house-slave, or a pedant, but a man mature, complete" (1.16.4). Lemma: σχολαστικός.

φιλοσοφέω

Attested: φιλοσοφούντων (*philosophountōn*; 1.16.5), φιλοσοφεῖ (*philosophei*; 4.30), φιλοσοφεῖν (*philosophein*; 11.7). To love wisdom, to practise philosophy. Antoninus honoured "those who were true philosophers" (1.16.5); "One man practises philosophy without a tunic, another without a book" (4.30); no other station is "so fitted for philosophy" (11.7). Lemma: φιλοσοφέω.

φιλοσοφία

Attested: φιλοσοφίᾳ (*philosophiāi*; 1.6), φιλοσοφίας (*philosophias*; 1.14.2, 1.17.9, 2.10, 8.1, 9.29, 9.41), φιλοσοφία (*philosophia*; 2.17.2, 5.9, 6.12, 6.30.1), φιλοσοφίαν (*philosophian*; 5.9). The love of wisdom; philosophy as study and as a way of life. It alone "can serve as escort" (2.17.2; see Daimon), "wants only what your nature wants" (5.9), and is the mother to whom Marcus returns from the court (6.12); "The work of philosophy is simple and self-respecting" (9.29). Lemma: φιλοσοφία.

φιλόσοφος

Attested: φιλόσοφοι (*philosophoi*; 4.48.1, 6.47), φιλοσόφοις (*philosophois*; 5.10.1), φιλόσοφον (*philosophon*; 8.1), φιλοσόφου (*philosophou*; 8.1), φιλοσοφώτερον (*philosophōteron*; 12.27); the adverb φιλοσόφως (*philosophōs*; 2.10, 9.29). Loving wisdom; as a noun, a

[125] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.5.

philosopher. Philosophers die like doctors and tyrants (4.48.1, 6.47; see Death); Marcus can no longer easily "win the repute of a philosopher" (8.1); "how much more philosophical it is … to show oneself just" (12.27; see Simplicity and sincerity). The adverb: "Theophrastus speaks as a philosopher" (2.10; see Desire and aversion); "these civic little men who, as he thinks, act as philosophers" (9.29). Lemma: φιλόσοφος.

See also

Assent and judgement; Court and office; Daimon; Death; Desire and aversion; Learning, practice and correction; Nature; Principles and reminders; Severus; Simplicity and sincerity; Time and eternity; Virtue and excellence.

Present action

Doing what is in hand, now · Meditations

ἐνέργεια, energeia, "activity"; *ἐνεργεῖν, energein*, "do", "act", "carry out", "bring about", "enact", "be in activity", "the doer"; *ἐνέργημα, energēma*, "act", "workings"; *ἐνεργητικός, energētikos*, "the man of action", "active"; *πρᾶξις, praxis*, "action", "act", "deeds"; *πράσσειν, prassein*, "do", "act"; *πρακτέος, prakteos*, "what must be done", "what is to be done", "is to do"; *πρακτικός, praktikos*, "the practical side", "act"; *τέλος, telos*, "end"; *τὸ παρόν, to paron*, "the present", "the work in hand"

At a Glance

The word. Ἐνέργεια, from ἔργον (*ergon*), "work", is being at work, activity; πρᾶξις, from πράσσειν, "to do", is an action, a thing done. Τὸ παρόν, "what is at hand", is the present.

In the *Meditations*. The good and the bad of a rational being lie "not in being acted upon but in activity" (9.16), and of its own acts the understanding is concerned only with the present (6.32). Marcus will give himself leisure "if you do each act as the last of your life" (2.5); dying too "is one of the actions of life" (6.2); and what he prays for he can have now, if he leaves the past behind, entrusts the future to providence and directs the present alone towards holiness and justice (12.1.1).

In this edition. Ἐνέργεια is always "activity", and πρᾶξις "action", twice "act" and once "deeds"; ἐνεργεῖν and

πράσσειν are “do” or “act”; τὸ παρόν is “the present”, once “the work in hand” (3.12).

A place to read. 6.2, where Marcus counts dying among the actions of life and asks only “to settle the present well”.

Meaning

Ἐνέργεια (*energeia*), from ἐν (*en*), “in”, and ἔργον (*ergon*), “work”, is being at work, a power used and not merely had; the verb ἐνεργεῖν (*energein*) is to be at work, to act, and ἐνέργημα (*energēma*) an act done. Πρᾶξις (*praxis*) is the noun of πράσσειν (*prassein*), “to do”, “to bring about”: an action. Marcus sets ἐνέργεια against πεῖσις (*peisis*), “being acted upon” (6.51, 9.16; see Pain and pleasure), and uses his two words of acting almost as one: in “do each act” at 2.5 the verb is ἐνεργῇς (*energēis*) and the noun πρᾶξιν (*praxin*). Τὸ παρόν (*to paron*), “what is at hand”, is the present (see Time and eternity), and at 3.12 the edition renders it “the work in hand”. Τέλος (*telos*), the end, is what every act is to be referred to (2.16, 9.23, 12.20).

Use in the book

A man’s good lies in what he does. “The lover of fame forms the opinion that his own good is another’s activity; the lover of pleasure, his own being acted upon; the man who has a mind, his own action” (6.51). Of the three, only the last places his good in what he does himself. Reluctant to get up at first light, Marcus asks whether he has come to be “for feeling pleasure, and in a word, you, for being acted upon, or for activity” (5.1.1), where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, has the “you” of P. Fournier, who edited Auguste Couat’s French translation of the *Meditations* (1904), for the manuscripts’ “not”; and the good and the bad of the rational living being lie “not in being acted upon but in activity” (9.16; see Virtue and excellence). Another’s activity is another’s affair: “He has his own disposition, his own activity. I have now what the common nature wants me to have now, and I do what my nature wants me to do now” (5.25).

Activity can be read as happening only now: the understanding’s own acts are in its power, and of these it is concerned only with the present, since its future and past acts already make no difference (6.32; see Time and eternity). Marcus’ rule for acting is a rule for the hour: “Every hour, set your mind firmly, as a Roman and a male, on doing

what is in hand with exact and unaffected dignity, affection, freedom and justness, and on giving yourself leisure from all other impressions. And you will give yourself it if you do each act as the last of your life, free of all aimlessness, of passionate turning away from the dictate of reason, of pretence, of self-love, and of discontent with what has been apportioned to you" (2.5). The leisure is from other impressions, and it comes from the act itself, done as if it were the last. Leopold prints the correction of H. I. Polak, whose notes on the text appeared in *Hermes* in 1886, so that it is Marcus who is "free" of aimlessness and the rest; in the manuscripts the word agrees with the act.

Death is no exception. "Let it make no difference to you whether you do what is seemly cold or warm, drowsy or with enough sleep, ill spoken of or well spoken of, dying or doing something else; for this too, by which we die, is one of the actions of life; it is enough, then, here too to settle the present well" (6.2). Cold, sleep, repute and dying are circumstances of an act, not its measure, and the rule for dying is the rule for every hour.

The present also holds what he prays for. "All those things which you pray to reach by a roundabout way you can have now, if you do not begrudge yourself" (12.1.1). The condition follows: to leave the past behind, entrust the future to providence, and direct the present alone towards holiness, so that he loves what is allotted, and towards justice, so that he says what is true and does what accords with law and with worth (12.1.1; see Justice). If, near the exit, he leaves all else behind, honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him and fears never having begun to live according to nature, he will cease, the chapter ends, "hanging on this and that" (12.1.2; see Death).

A life is made of such acts. "One must compose life action by action, and be content if each, so far as possible, provides its own" (8.32; see Obstacle and reservation), and life is "the system made up of all actions" (12.23; see Change). Each act is whole: the rational soul attains its end wherever life is cut short, "not as in a dance or in acting and the like, where the whole action is left incomplete if something cuts it short" (11.1.1; see Soul). The rest Marcus allows himself lies in the passage from act to act: "Take delight and rest in one thing: passing from one social action to another social action, with remembrance of God" (6.7). So too in Book XII: "What remains but to enjoy life, joining one

good thing to another, so as to leave not even the briefest interval?" (12.29).

Each present act has its measure. "At each action question yourself: how does this stand with me? Shall I regret it?", and nothing more is wanted "if the present work is that of an intelligent and social living being, under the same law as God" (8.2). At 9.6 what is "Enough" is all present: opinion, action and disposition. Every action is to "help to complete a civic life", and one without reference to the social end "tears life apart" (9.23; see Kinship and cooperation).

At 7.68 the understanding's "ready use of what is put before it" says to what presents itself that the present is "always material for rational and civic virtue, and in sum for the art of man or God" (see Tranquillity). Marcus' argument can be read as joining two claims, that a man's good lies in his activity and that activity is always now: so the whole of his good is within reach at every hour, and the thought of death, which takes away every future, sharpens the present act instead of emptying it (2.5, 6.2).

Places to read

The passages where activity and action, and acting in the present, are discussed or carry the argument, in the order of the book; every place of ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργεῖν, πρᾶξις, πράσσειν and the other words treated here is given in the sub-entries. Τὸ παρόν has its sub-entry under πάρειμι (*pareimi*; see Time and eternity).

2.5 Every hour Marcus is to set his mind on doing what is in hand with dignity, affection, freedom and justness, and he will give himself leisure from all other impressions if he does each act as the last of his life.

2.16 The soul does violence to itself when it lets any act or impulse go at no target and does whatever it does at random, when even the smallest things ought to be done with reference to the end.

3.12 If Marcus does the work in hand following right reason, keeps his daimon pure and is content with present activity according to nature and with heroic truth, he will live well (see Daimon).

3.14 Marcus is not going to read his little notebooks, the deeds of the ancient Romans and Greeks or the extracts he was laying aside for old age; he is to

hurry to the end and come to his own help, if he cares for himself at all, while it is open to him.

4.2 No act is to be done at random, nor otherwise than according to a doctrine that completes the art.

4.24 Against the saying of Democritus, the atomist philosopher of the fifth century BC, “Do little”, Marcus asks whether it is not better to do what is necessary and what the reason of a living being civic by nature requires; unnecessary actions are to be taken away with unnecessary impressions (see Tranquillity).

4.51 The short road is the one according to nature, so as to say and do everything in the soundest way, and it frees one from toils and from all management and pretentiousness.

5.1.1 Reluctant to get up, Marcus is to have ready the thought that he is rising to do the work of a man, and asks whether he has come to be for feeling pleasure or for activity.

5.25 Another who does wrong has his own disposition and his own activity; Marcus has now what the common nature wants him to have now, and does what his own nature wants him to do now.

6.2 It is to make no difference to Marcus whether he does what is seemly cold or warm, drowsy or rested, ill or well spoken of, dying or doing something else, for dying too is one of the actions of life, and it is enough here too to settle the present well.

6.7 Marcus is to take delight and rest in one thing: passing from one social action to another, with remembrance of God.

6.32 The understanding’s own acts are in its power, and of these it is concerned only with the present, for its future and past acts already make no difference (see Time and eternity).

6.51 The lover of fame takes his own good to be another’s activity, the lover of pleasure his own being acted upon, the man who has a mind his own action.

7.54 It is always in Marcus’ power to be piously well pleased with the present conjuncture, to behave

justly towards the men present, and to work with art upon the present impression.

7.68 Use says to what presents itself that the present is always material for rational and civic virtue (see Tranquillity).

7.69 The perfection of character is to pass each day as the last (see Simplicity and sincerity).

8.2 At each action Marcus is to ask himself how it stands with him and whether he will regret it; soon he will be dead, and nothing more is wanted if the present work is that of an intelligent and social living being.

8.12 When roused from sleep with reluctance, Marcus is to remind himself that rendering social actions accords with his constitution, while sleep is common to the irrational living beings.

8.32 Life is to be composed action by action, each providing its own so far as possible; and when something active is prevented, another action at once takes its place, by being well pleased with the hindrance and passing over fair-mindedly to what is given (see Obstacle and reservation).

9.6 Enough: the present opinion firmly grasping, the present action social, the present disposition well pleased with what happens.

9.16 The bad and the good of the rational living being, like its virtue and vice, lie not in being acted upon but in activity (see Virtue and excellence).

9.23 Every action is to help to complete a civic life, and an action without reference to the social end tears life apart (see Kinship and cooperation).

9.41 Marcus is to be intent only on what is being done now and on the instrument through which he does it (see Philosophy).

10.11 The man who has put off the body is content with two things, acting justly in what is now being done and loving what is now allotted to him (see Contentment and self-sufficiency).

10.33.1 Whatever in the material at hand can be done or said in the soundest way it is open to Marcus to do or say, and everything one can enact according

to one's own nature is to be held an enjoyment (see Obstacle and reservation).

11.1.1 The rational soul attains its end wherever life is cut short, not as in a dance or in acting, where the whole action is left incomplete (see Soul).

12.1.1 Marcus can have now all that he prays to reach by a roundabout way, if he does not begrudge himself: if he leaves the past behind, entrusts the future to providence and directs the present alone towards holiness and justice.

12.1.2 If near the exit Marcus leaves all else behind, honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, and fears never having begun to live according to nature, he will cease hanging on this and that (see Death).

12.23 A single activity that ceases in due time suffers nothing bad, and neither does life, the system made up of all actions (see Change).

12.29 The preservation of life is to see each thing through and through and with the whole soul to do what is just and say what is true; Marcus asks what remains but to enjoy life, joining one good thing to another without leaving the briefest interval.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoics' teaching in its seventh book, reports that they called duty an activity, ἐνέργημα, proper to constitutions that accord with nature (see Duty and fitting action).[126] Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, held his hearers to their activity and not its results. He asks to be shown a single man who cares how he does something and turns his attention "not to getting something but to his own activity", and asks who, walking, attends to the activity itself, or, deliberating, to the deliberation and not to what it may win; why, then, he asks, do we wonder that we are practised in our materials but in our activities mean, unseemly, worthless, cowardly, slack and failures through and through?[127] Nor will he let the hour be put off. In the *Handbook* he asks how long his hearer will wait before

[126] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.108.

[127] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.16.15–18.

thinking himself worthy of the best things: he is no longer a youth, and if he now fixes one day after another for attending to himself, he will live and die a layman without noticing it; whenever anything toilsome or pleasant, glorious or inglorious, comes before him, let him remember that "now is the contest, and the Olympic games are already here", that it is no longer possible to put it off, and that progress is lost or kept "by one day and one thing".[128] Seneca, the Roman Stoic and adviser of Nero, states a rule that can be read beside 2.5 and 7.69: "every day must be so ordered as if it closed the column and completed and filled out life". His aim is that one day should count for him as a whole life; he does not seize the day as his last, but regards it as one that might be. Life's worst fault, he writes, is that it is never complete and some part of it is always put off; whoever sets the last touch on his life each day has no need of time, for a man hangs on the future when his present comes to nothing; and he bids Lucilius, the friend to whom the letters are written, count each day a separate life.[129] Marcus' man who will cease "hanging on this and that" (12.1.2) can be read beside him.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, argued in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that if the work of man is "an activity of soul according to reason, or not without reason", the human good is "activity of the soul in keeping with virtue", and in a complete life besides, "for a single swallow does not bring the spring, nor does a single day; no more does one day, or a little time, make a man blessed and happy".[130] Marcus' rational soul, by contrast, "attains its own end wherever the term of life comes upon it" (11.1.1; see Soul), and of using things with greatness of mind and men socially "even three hours like that are enough" (6.23; see Time and eternity). Where Aristotle needs a whole life, Marcus' act can be read as complete at every point, and this as the ground of 2.5 and 6.2.

Translation in this edition

Ἐνέργεια is "activity" at all twenty of its occurrences, "activities" in the plural (5.23, 6.59, 9.3.1), and "activity"

[128] Epictetus, *Handbook* 51.1–2.

[129] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 12.8, 61.1 and 101.8–10.

[130] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7, 1098a7–8 and 1098a16–20.

renders no other word but the verb at 10.9. Ἐνεργεῖν is "do" (2.5, 2.16, 3.7 twice, 3.12, 3.16.2, 4.2, 8.47 four times, 9.31, 9.42.4) and "act" (3.5, 5.6.2, 8.45, 12.24), and by sense "carry out" (7.7), "bring about" (6.55, 10.11), "enact" (10.33.1), "is in activity" (10.9) and, for the participle, "the doer" (8.47). Ἐνέργημα is "act" (4.2, 6.32 three times) and "workings" (9.3.1), and ἐνεργητικός "the man of action" (1.7.1) and "active" (8.32). Πρᾶξις is "action" at forty-three of its forty-six occurrences, "act" at 2.5 and 2.16 and "deeds" at 3.14. "Action" renders also κατόρθωσις (*katorthōsis*) in "right actions" (5.14; see Virtue and excellence), ἐνεργητικός in "the man of action" (1.7.1), δικαιοπράγημα (*dikaiopragēma*) in "just actions" (11.20.2; see Justice) and, at 9.31, the infinitive of πράσσειν. Πράσσειν is "do", and "act" at six places (3.6.1, 5.9, 5.34, 6.21, 6.50, 7.44); εὖ (*eu*) and καλῶς (*kalōs*) πράττειν (*prattein*) are "do well" (3.13, 4.24, 7.36), οὐ κακῶς πράττει (*ou kakōs prattei*) "did without ill intent" (1.15.2), the articular infinitive τὸ κοινωνικῶς πρᾶξαι (*to koinōnikōs praxai*) "the social action itself" (9.31), and Democritus' Ionic πρῆσσε (*prēsse*) "Do little" (4.24). At 8.32 "acting justly" supplies a verb that Leopold's text lacks, as Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus, the eighteenth-century German scholar who edited the *Meditations* at Leipzig, proposed. Πρακτέος is "what must be done" (3.15), "what is to be done" and "is to do" (7.55); πρακτικός is "the practical side" (10.9) and, with φιλοσόφως (*philosophōs*), "act as philosophers" (9.29). Τέλος is "end" at all thirteen of its occurrences, kept apart from "target", σκοπός (*skopos*; see Impulse), and from "outcome", ἀποτέλεσμα (*apotelesma*; 6.42; see Kinship and cooperation). Τὸ παρόν is "the present", and at 3.12 "the work in hand"; ἀντιπράσσειν (*antiprassein*) is "work against" (2.1). "Dawdling" at 4.51 is στραγγεία (*strangeia*), the correction of Stephanus and of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' στρατεία (*strateia*), "soldiering".

ἐνέργεια

Attested: ἐνέργειαν (*energeian*; 3.4.3, 5.1.1, 5.25, 6.51), ἐνεργείᾳ (*energeiāi*; 3.12, 8.22, 9.16 twice), ἐνεργείας (*energeias*; 4.10, 5.20, 7.53, 8.7, 9.21), ἐνέργεια (*energeia*; 5.20, 5.35, 8.16, 12.23), ἐνέργειαι (*energeiai*; 5.23), ἐνεργειῶν (*energeiōn*; 6.59, 9.3.1). Being at work, activity, as against being acted upon. "Have you come to be … for

being acted upon, or for activity?" (5.1.1); "content with present activity according to nature" (3.12); "it is your activity, brought to its end according to your impulse and judgement" (8.16); "Cessation of activity, a stop of impulse, of opinion, and as it were a death: nothing bad" (9.21). At 5.1.1 "you" before "for being acted upon" is the correction of Fournier, which Leopold prints; A, the Vatican manuscript, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have "not for being acted upon", and P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, "not for doing". Lemma: ἐνέργεια.

ἐνεργέω

Attested: ἐνεργῇς (*energēis*; 2.5, 3.12), ἐνεργῇ (*energēi*; 2.16), ἐνέργει (*energei*; 3.5), ἐνεργεῖσθαι (*energeisthai*; 3.7, 8.47, 10.9), ἐνεργήσων (*energēsōn*; 3.7), ἐνεργοῦντα (*energounta*; 3.16.2, 9.42.4), ἐνεργείσθω (*energeisthō*; 4.2), ἐνεργεῖ (*energei*; 5.6.2), ἐνεργοίην (*energoiēn*; 6.55), ἐνεργεῖν (*energein*; 7.7, 10.33.1), ἐνεργοίη (*energoiē*; 8.45), ἐνεργεῖς (*energeis*; 8.47 twice), ἐνεργουμένου (*energoumenou*; 8.47), ἐνεργῶν (*energōn*; 8.47), ἐνεργουμένοις (*energoumenois*; 9.31), ἐνεργούμενα (*energoumena*; 10.11), ἐνήργησεν (*enērgēsen*; 12.24). To be at work, to act, to do; in the passive, to be done. "Do not act unwillingly, or unsocially" (3.5); "it is set before you to carry out what falls to you" (7.7); "why do you not rather do it than be distressed?" (8.47); "everything is an enjoyment which it is open to one to enact according to one's own nature" (10.33.1). At 6.55 the first person ἐνεργοίην, "I myself might bring about", is the correction of Herbert Richards, whose notes on Marcus Aurelius appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' ἐνεργοίη. Lemma: ἐνεργέω.

ἐνέργημα

Attested: ἐνέργημα (*energēma*; 4.2), ἐνεργήματα (*energēmata*; 6.32 three times, 9.3.1). An act done, a working. "Let no act be done at random" (4.2); "to the understanding, the things that make no difference are those that are not its own acts" (6.32); of the body, "the other natural workings that the seasons of life bring" (9.3.1). Lemma: ἐνέργημα.

ἐνεργητικός

Attested: ἐνεργητικόν (*energētikon*; 1.7.1, 8.32). Active, given to action. From Rusticus, the Stoic, Marcus learned not to parade himself "as the man of discipline or the man of action" (1.7.1); "but something else active, perhaps, will be prevented" (8.32). Lemma: ἐνεργητικός.

πρακτέος

Attested: πρακτέα (*praktea*; 3.15), πρακτέων (*prakteōn*; 7.55), πρακτέον (*prakteon*; 7.55). That must be done. Men do not know how many things are meant by "seeing what must be done" (3.15); nature guides Marcus "through what is to be done by you. And each is to do what follows from the constitution" (7.55). Lemma: πρακτέος.

πρακτικός

Attested: πρακτικά (*praktika*; 9.29), πρακτικόν (*praktikon*; 10.9). Of action, practical. Marcus scorns the "civic little men who, as he thinks, act as philosophers" (9.29; see Philosophy); "one must see and do everything so that at once the practical side is accomplished, and at once the observing side is in activity" (10.9), where πρακτικόν is the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' περιστατικόν (*peristatikon*). Lemma: πρακτικός.

πρᾶξις

Attested: πρᾶξιν (*praxin*; 2.5, 2.16, 4.32.2, 6.7, 6.51, 8.2, 8.32, 12.23), πράξεων (*praxeōn*; 2.7, 6.2, 6.30.3, 10.6.2, 12.8, 12.23), πράξεις (*praxeis*; 3.14, 4.24 twice, 4.33, 5.1.3, 5.14, 5.36, 6.30.1, 8.1, 8.12, 11.18.3, 11.21, 12.35), πράξει (*praxei*; 4.25, 5.34), πράξεσιν (*praxesin*; 5.1.2, 8.51), πράξεως (*praxeōs*; 6.7, 9.42.4, 11.9 three times, 11.18.3), πρᾶξις (*praxis*; 7.11, 7.58, 7.74, 8.32, 9.6, 9.23 twice, 9.31, 11.1.1). An action, a thing done. "the man who has a mind, his own action" (6.51); "passing from one social action to another social action" (6.7); "At each action question yourself" (8.2); life is "the system made up of all actions" (12.23). At 9.6 A and D lack "opinion, firmly grasping, and the present", so that they read only the present action and the present disposition; at 9.23 D lacks the second πρᾶξίς σου (*praxis sou*), "action of yours". Lemma: πρᾶξις.

πράσσω

Attested: πράττοι (*prattoi*; 1.15.2), πράττει (*prattei*; 1.15.2, 7.44), πράσσων (*prassōn*; 1.16.6, 8.34, 11.13), πραχθῆναι (*prachthēnai*; 1.16.7, 1.17.3, 10.12, 10.33.1), πραχθεῖσιν (*prachtheisin*; 1.16.7), ἔπραξα (*epraxa*; 1.17.1), πράξειν (*praxein*; 1.17.5), πρᾶξαι (*praxai*; 1.17.7, 2.10, 4.12, 9.31, 10.33.1), πράσσειν (*prassein*; 2.5, 2.9, 4.24 three times, 4.51, 5.9, 5.10.2, 5.25, 5.34, 10.9), πράσσει (*prassei*; 3.4.1, 3.4.3, 4.40, 8.53, 9.42.3), πράσσοντα (*prassonta*; 3.6.1), πράξεις (*praxeis*; 3.13, 6.23), ἔπραξεν (*epraxen*; 4.18), πρῆσσε (*prēsse*; 4.24), πράσσομεν (*prassomen*; 4.24, 6.44.2), πεπρᾶχθαι (*peprachthai*; 5.3), πράξῃ (*praxēi*; 5.6.1, 9.42.4), πράσσω (*prassō*; 5.25, 6.21, 7.5, 8.23 twice), πράττων (*prattōn*; 6.2), πρασσομένων (*prassomenōn*; 6.30.2), πράσσωμεν (*prassōmen*; 6.44.2), πρᾶττε (*pratte*; 6.50), πράττειν (*prattein*; 7.36), πράττῃ (*prattēi*; 7.44), πράσσεις (*prasseis*; 7.58, 9.41), πρᾶξον (*praxon*; 8.5), πρασσομένῳ (*prassomenōi*; 9.41), ἔπραξας (*epraxas*; 9.42.4), πράξω (*praxō*; 10.6.2, 10.35), πράξας (*praxas*; 10.8.3, 12.23), πράξει (*praxei*; 10.11), πρασσόμενον (*prassomenon*; 10.11), πρασσομένου (*prassomenou*; 10.37), πράσσῃς (*prassēis*; 12.1.1), πράξῃς (*praxēis*; 12.17). To do, to act, to bring about. “I do what my nature wants me to do now” (5.25); “Be intent only on what is being done now and on the instrument through which you do it” (9.41); “If it is not a duty, do not do it” (12.17), where A has πράξεις. Lemma: πράσσω.

τέλος

Attested: τέλος (*telos*; 2.16 twice, 3.14, 3.16.2, 5.14, 5.15, 5.16 twice, 5.32, 9.23, 12.20), τέλους (*telous*; 5.15, 11.1.1). End, that for which a thing is made and to which its acts are referred. “the end of rational living beings is to follow the reason and law of the most venerable city and commonwealth” (2.16; see Citizenship); “towards which it is carried, in that lies its end” (5.16); “to make the leading back to nothing other than the social end” (12.20); the rational soul “attains its own end wherever the term of life comes upon it” (11.1.1; see Soul). Lemma: τέλος.

See also

Change; Citizenship; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Daimon; Death; Duty and fitting action; Impulse; Justice; Kinship and cooperation; Obstacle and reservation; Pain and

pleasure; Philosophy; Simplicity and sincerity; Soul; Time and eternity; Tranquillity; Virtue and excellence.

Principles and reminders

Principles kept ready to hand · Meditations

δόγμα, dogma, "principle"; *ὁμοδογματεῖν, homodogmatein*, "share your principles", "hold the same principles"; *θεώρημα, theōrēma*, "doctrine"; *ὑπομιμνήσκειν, hypomimnēskein*, "remind"; *ὑπόμνησις, hypomnēsis*, "reminder"; *ὑπομνηστικός, hypomnēstikos*, "as reminders"; *παρυπόμνησις, parypomnēsis*, "reminder"; *ἀναμιμνήσκειν, anamimnēskein*, "remind yourself", "remember"; *ὑπόμνημα, hypomnēma*, "notes"; *ὑπομνημάτιον, hypomnēmation*, "little notebooks"; *πρόχειρος, procheiros*, "ready to hand", "ready", "at hand", "first to hand"; *στοιχειώδης, stoicheiōdēs*, "elementary", "elemental"; *ἀναζωπυρεῖν, anazōpyrein*, "rekindle"; *ἀναβιῶναι, anabiōnai*, "come back to life"; *ὑπόθεσις, hypothesis*, "supposition", "station", "occasion"

At a Glance

The word. A δόγμα is what seems right to a man and is settled with him: a principle. A θεώρημα is a proposition of philosophy as it is taught, a doctrine. Ὑπομιμνήσκειν is to remind, and πρόχειρος is "ready to hand".

In the *Meditations*. Principles are a few convictions about good and bad, "from which come impulses and actions" (8.1). They die only if the impressions that correspond to them are quenched, and it is in Marcus' power "perpetually to rekindle" those (7.2). They are to be brief (4.3.1), kept ready as a doctor keeps his knives (3.13), always to hand as the pancratiast, who fights with bare hands, has his hand (12.9), and called up by reminders.

In this edition. Δόγμα is always "principle", θεώρημα always "doctrine"; ὑπομιμνήσκειν is "remind" and ὑπόμνησις "reminder", ἀναμιμνήσκειν "remind yourself" and once "remember" (5.31); ὑπόμνημα is "notes" (1.7.3) and ὑπομνημάτιον "little notebooks" (3.14); πρόχειρος is "ready to hand", with "ready", "at hand" and "first to hand" by sense; ἀναζωπυρεῖν is "rekindle".

A place to read. 7.2, where principles die only when their impressions are quenched, and coming back to life is seeing things again as before.

Meaning

Δόγμα (*dogma*), from δοκεῖν (*dokein*), "to seem", is what seems so to someone and has been resolved: an opinion, a decree, and in the philosophical schools a tenet. In Marcus a principle is never a passing opinion: it is a conviction about good and bad, belonging to the mind (3.16.1) and issuing in action (8.1). Θεώρημα (*theōrēma*), from θεωρεῖν (*theōrein*), "to view", is what has been viewed and set out: a theorem in geometry, a doctrine in philosophy. The words of reminding are built on μιμνήσκειν (*mimnēskein*), "to bring to mind": ὑπομιμνήσκειν (*hypomimnēskein*) is to bring back to mind what is already known, ὑπόμνησις (*hypomnēsis*) a reminding, ὑπόμνημα (*hypomnēma*) a record kept to remind, a note. Πρόχειρος (*procheiros*), "before the hand", is what lies ready for use.

Use in the book

Marcus gives principles their place in one line: "Body, soul, mind. Of the body, sensations; of the soul, impulses; of the mind, principles" (3.16.1). At 2.3 he sets down a handful of sentences on providence and nature and ends, "Let this be enough for you; let these be your principles. As for the thirst for books, throw it away, so that you do not die grumbling" (2.3; see Nature). At 8.1, asking how he will do what the nature of man seeks, he answers, "If you have principles from which come impulses and actions. What principles? About good things and bad". A principle can be a single sentence, to be used "at everything that leads you towards distress": "not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune" (4.49.2). He admired Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew, for "finding and ordering, with a firm grasp and by method, the principles necessary for life" (1.9.2).

Doctrine is another thing. From Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, he learned not "to write treatises on doctrines" (1.7.1), and in Apollonius, another Stoic teacher, he saw a man who counted his skill "in passing on doctrines as the least of his own honourable qualities" (1.8.2). Yet he does not despise doctrine: "Let no act be done at random, nor otherwise than according to a doctrine that completes the art" (4.2), and the

art of being good comes about honourably only “from doctrines, some about the nature of the whole, others about man’s own constitution” (11.5). Doctrines are taught; principles are what a man lives by.

Other men too are explained by their principles. Whoever he meets, Marcus is to ask, “what principles does this man have about good things and bad?”, and then remember “that he is compelled to act so” (8.14). Socrates “used to call the principles of the many Lamias, children’s bugbears” (11.23). Marcus himself asks, “without a change of principles, what else is there but slavery of men groaning and making a show of obeying?” (9.29).

The centre of the matter is that principles can die. “How else can principles be put to death, unless the impressions that correspond to them are quenched, which it is in your power perpetually to rekindle?” (7.2). Distraction wears them away: “Mime, war, flutter, torpor, slavery: day by day those sacred principles of yours will be wiped away, all that you form impressions of without studying nature, and let pass” (10.9). Recovery is in his power: “It is open to you to come back to life. See things again as you used to see them; for in this lies coming back to life” (7.2). A principle can also be corrected: “who prevents you from setting right the principle?” (8.47; see Assent and judgement).

Against that death Marcus tells himself to keep his principles ready. “As doctors always have their instruments and knives at hand for sudden cases, so do you have the principles ready for knowing things divine and human” (3.13). At 12.9 he goes further: “one must be, in the use of principles, like the pancratiast, not the gladiator; for the one lays down the sword he uses and takes it up, but the other always has the hand, and there is need of nothing else than to clench it”. The things within, into which he looks when he retreats into himself, are to be “brief and elementary, the things that, as soon as they present themselves, will suffice to shut out the whole court” (4.3.1). One formula after another is to be “ready to hand”: at every event (7.1), in pain (7.64), at a man’s shamelessness (9.42.1), in fits of anger (11.18.5). To one “steeped in the true principles” even a line of Homer is “enough as a reminder of freedom from distress and from fear” (10.34).

Reminding is the method. Marcus puts his own falling short of the life according to nature down to “not keeping the reminders of the gods” (1.17.6). At each thing one must

"remind oneself" whether it is one of the things that are not necessary (4.24), and Marcus collects reminders from other schools: a precept from the writings of the Epicureans, as Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, corrected the manuscripts' "Ephesians": "continually to remind oneself of one of those of old who practised virtue" (11.26), and the Pythagoreans' rule of looking at the heaven at dawn (11.27). Rusticus let him have "the notes of Epictetus" (1.7.3), the Stoic teacher whose lectures Arrian recorded. But time is short: "you are not going to read your little notebooks, nor … the extracts from writings that you were laying aside for yourself against old age" (3.14). The *Meditations* themselves, "the things addressed to himself" in the title of the first printed edition, can be read as the practice that 7.2 asks for: principles written out again and again, so that the impressions that keep them alive are rekindled.

Places to read

Every chapter in which δόγμα, ὁμοδογματεῖν or θεώρημα occurs, or a word of reminding (ὑπομιμνήσκειν, ὑπόμνησις, ὑπομνηστικός, παρυπόμνησις, ὑπόμνημα, ὑπομνημάτιον, ἀναμιμνήσκειν), or πρόχειρος in any of its senses, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with 4.3.1, on the brief and elementary things. The other words of memory, μεμνῆσθαι (*memnēsthai*), "remember", μνήμη (*mnēmē*), μνημονεύειν (*mnēmoneuein*) and their compounds, are left out.

1.7.1 Rusticus taught Marcus not to be drawn aside into sophistic ambition, nor to write treatises on doctrines.

1.7.3 Through Rusticus Marcus came across the notes of Epictetus, which Rusticus let him have from his own house.

1.8.2 Apollonius, a Stoic teacher, counted his skill in passing on doctrines as the least of his honourable qualities.

1.9.2 Sextus found and ordered, with a firm grasp and by method, the principles necessary for life.

1.10 From Alexander the grammarian Marcus learned to correct a faulty expression not by reproach but by some tactful reminder.

1.16.2 Antoninus, Marcus' adoptive father, did not abandon an investigation early, content with the impressions that came first to hand.

1.17.6 That Marcus still falls short of the life according to nature comes from not keeping the reminders of the gods.

2.3 A few sentences on providence and nature are to be enough and to be his principles; the thirst for books is to be thrown away.

3.13 Principles are to be kept ready, as doctors keep their instruments and knives at hand for sudden cases.

3.14 Marcus is not going to read his little notebooks or the extracts he was laying aside for old age; he must come to his own help now.

3.16.1 Sensations belong to the body, impulses to the soul, principles to the mind.

4.2 No act is to be done at random, nor otherwise than according to a doctrine that completes the art.

4.3.1 When Marcus retreats into himself, the things within into which he looks are to be brief and elementary, things that will suffice to send him back not resenting what he returns to.

4.3.4 Among the things most ready to hand are to be two: that things do not touch the soul, and that all things change.

4.16 Marcus will seem a god within ten days if he turns back to the principles and reverence for reason.

4.24 At each thing one must remind oneself to ask whether it is one of the things that are not necessary.

4.49.2 At everything that leads towards distress Marcus is to use the principle that to bear it nobly is good fortune.

5.1.1 At first light, reluctant to get up, Marcus is to have this ready: that he is rising to do the work of a man.

5.6.1 One man is ready to reckon a favour to his account, another is not ready for this, a third does not even know what he has done.

5.9 If acting on right principles is not thickly established in him, Marcus is to come back again, and return to philosophy as to a remedy, not a schoolmaster.

5.28 Marcus is to move the man who offends by reason, “show, remind”; if the man listens, Marcus will cure him, and there is no need for anger.

5.31 Marcus is to remember what he has come through and what he has been strong enough to endure.

6.48 The merits of those who live alongside him are to be kept ready to hand, for nothing gladdens so much.

7.1 At everything that happens Marcus is to have ready to hand that it is what he has seen often.

7.2 Principles die only if the impressions that correspond to them are quenched, and it is in Marcus’ power perpetually to rekindle them.

7.27 Marcus is to reckon up the most favourable of things present, and remind himself how they would be sought after if they were not present.

7.64 In every pain Marcus is to have ready to hand that pain is not shameful and does not make the understanding worse.

8.1 Living well lies in doing what the nature of man seeks, and Marcus will do it if he has principles about good and bad from which come impulses and actions.

8.12 Roused from sleep with reluctance, Marcus is to remind himself that rendering social actions accords with his constitution.

8.14 Whoever he meets, Marcus is to ask what principles the man has about good and bad, and will not be astonished at what he does.

8.22 Marcus is to pay heed to the underlying thing, or the principle, or the activity, or what is meant.

8.36 Marcus is to remind himself that neither the future nor the past weighs on him, but always the present.

8.47 If something in his own disposition distresses him, nothing prevents Marcus from setting right the principle.

9.3.2 Death will release Marcus from men who do not share his principles; only life with those who held the same would hold him back.

9.29 Who will change men’s principle? Without a change of principles there is only the slavery of men making a show of obeying.

9.42.1 At every wrongdoer Marcus is to have ready to hand, and be reminded, that such people cannot fail to exist in the universe.

10.9 Day by day Marcus' sacred principles will be wiped away, all that he forms impressions of without studying nature.

10.10 Marcus asks whether those proud of catching flies, hares, bears or Sarmatians are not robbers, if one examines the principles.

10.34 To one steeped in the true principles even Homer's line on the leaves is enough as a reminder of freedom from distress and from fear.

11.4 Having done something socially, one has been benefited; this is always to meet Marcus ready to hand.

11.5 The art of being good comes about honourably from doctrines about the nature of the whole and about man's own constitution.

11.6.1 Tragedies were first brought on as reminders of what happens.

11.6.2 The Old Comedy reminded, not uselessly, of freedom from vanity through its very plain speaking.

11.8 The chapter on the branch cut off from the plant ends: "Grow on the same bush, but do not hold the same principles."

11.18.1 The second of the nine heads on those who give offence: consider what compulsions of principles they have laid down.

11.18.5 In fits of anger Marcus is to have ready to hand that it is not raging that is manly, but what is mild and gentle.

11.23 Socrates called the principles of the many Lamias, children's bugbears.

11.26 In certain writings a precept was laid down: continually to remind oneself of one of those of old who practised virtue.

11.27 The Pythagoreans' precept: at dawn to look up at the heaven, to be reminded of those who always do their own work, and of order, purity and nakedness.

12.9 In the use of principles one must be like the pancratiast, who always has his hand, not the gladiator, who lays down his sword.

12.24 Three things to have ready to hand: a test for one's acts and for what happens from outside, what each thing is like until it receives a soul and until it gives it back, and into what it breaks up, and the view of human things from above.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus put much of his teaching into one sentence about principles: "What troubles men is not things but their principles about things"; death is nothing terrible, but the principle that death is terrible is the terrible thing.[131] He taught that principles must be at hand when they are needed: "When the need of each principle is present, one must have it ready to hand: at breakfast what concerns breakfast, in the bath what concerns the bath, in bed what concerns bed", and he goes on to quote the verses, which he elsewhere calls Pythagoras', that bid a man go over each day's acts before sleep.[132] The *Handbook* ends with sayings to be kept "ready to hand in everything", in the phrase that Marcus uses (6.48, 12.24): a prayer to be led by Zeus and Destiny, verses on yielding to necessity, and two sayings of Socrates. It also sets the use of doctrines, such as not lying, before their proof, and complains that men lie while having the proof that one must not lie "ready to hand".[133] Arrian, who recorded the lectures, says that he wrote down what he heard Epictetus say, as far as he could in his very words, to keep for himself as notes (ὑπομνήματα) of his thought and frankness; this is the word of 1.7.3.[134] Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, gives the word its weight in Latin: every art of contemplation has its own "decrees, which the Greeks call dogmata", and the decrees of philosophy, *decreta*, stand to its precepts as elements to limbs; a conviction that bears on the whole of life must be fixed in a man: "such as the conviction is, such will be what is done and what is thought".[135] Marcus' "principles from which

[131] Epictetus, *Handbook* 5.

[132] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.10.1–3; the verses are "that of Pythagoras" at 4.6.32.

[133] Epictetus, *Handbook* 53 and 52.

[134] Arrian, letter to Lucius Gellius, prefaced to Epictetus' *Discourses*, 2.

[135] Seneca, *Letters* 95.10, 95.12 and 95.44.

come impulses and actions" (8.1) can be read as saying the same.

Other ancient sources

Some of Marcus' reminders come from other schools, and their sources can be traced. The precept of 11.26, which Marcus assigns to the Epicureans in Gataker's correction of the manuscripts' "Ephesians", is known from Seneca, who closes his eleventh letter with it: one must choose some good man and keep him always before one's eyes, so as to live as if he were watching and do everything as if he saw; this, Seneca says, Epicurus prescribed.[136] The Lamias of 11.23 are not in Plato, but the image is Socratic. In Plato's *Crito* Socrates will not yield even if the power of the many frightens them like children with bogeys, sending bonds, deaths and confiscations (46c); in the *Phaedo* Cebes, one of the Theban friends with him on his last day, asks him to persuade the child within them not to fear death as a bogey, and Socrates answers that one must sing charms to it every day (77e).[137] Epictetus says that Socrates did well to call such things bogeys, since they seem terrible to us as masks do to children, through inexperience, and asks, "What is death? A bogey".[138]

Translation in this edition

Δόγμα is "principle" at all its places, and ὁμοδογματεῖν is "share your principles" (9.3.2) and "hold the same principles" (11.8); θεώρημα is "doctrine" at all four of its places. Ὑπομιμνήσκειν is always "remind" (4.24, 5.28, 7.27, 9.42.1, 11.6.2, 11.26, 11.27), ὑπόμνησις "reminder" (1.17.6, 10.34), the adjective ὑπομνηστικαί "as reminders" (11.6.1), and παρυπόμνησις "reminder" in "tactful reminder" (1.10). Ἀναμιμνήσκειν is "remind yourself" at 8.12, in the middle, and at 8.36, in the active with σεαυτόν (*seauton*), "yourself", but "remember" at 5.31, where the form is the same as at 8.12. Ὑπόμνημα is "notes" (1.7.3), and its diminutive ὑπομνημάτιον "little notebooks" (3.14). Πρόχειρος is "ready to hand" (6.48, 7.1, 7.64, 9.42.1, 11.4, 11.18.5, 12.24), "most ready to hand" for the superlative (4.3.4), "ready" (5.1.1, and twice at 5.6.1 of a man prompt to reckon a favour), "at hand" for the doctors' instruments (3.13) and "first to hand" of

[136] Seneca, *Letters* 11.8–9 (Epicurus fr. 210 Usener).

[137] Plato, *Crito* 46c; *Phaedo* 77e.

[138] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.1.15–17.

impressions that content a man who gives up an inquiry early (1.16.2). The “ready” of the principles at 3.13 renders another word, ἕτοιμα (*hetoima*). Ἀναζωπυρεῖν is “rekindle” and ἀναβιῶναι “come back to life” (7.2); στοιχειώδης is “elementary” (4.3.1) and, of fire, “elemental” (9.9.1). At 4.3.1 “shut out the whole court” rests on the correction of Capel Lofft, whose edition of the *Meditations* appeared in 1863, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has “to wash it clean” (see Inner retreat and citadel). Ὑπόθεσις (*hypothesis*) is “supposition” (4.21.1), “station” of Marcus’ place in life (8.1, 11.7) and “occasion” beside “material” (10.31).

ἀναβιόω

Attested: ἀναβιῶναι (*anabiōnai*; 7.2 twice). To live again, come back to life. Principles are not dead while their impressions can be rekindled: “It is open to you to come back to life. See things again as you used to see them; for in this lies coming back to life” (7.2). Lemma: ἀναβιόω.

ἀναζωπυρέω

Attested: ἀναζωπυρεῖν (*anazōpyrein*; 7.2). To kindle into flame again, from ζώπυρον (*zōpyron*), a live coal. Principles die only if the impressions that correspond to them are quenched, impressions which “it is in your power perpetually to rekindle” (7.2). Lemma: ἀναζωπυρέω.

ἀναμιμνήσκω

Attested: ἀναμιμνῄσκου (*anamimnēiskou*; 5.31, 8.12), ἀναμίμνῃσκε (*anamimnēiske*; 8.36). To remind, and in the middle to call to mind. Marcus tells himself, “remember too what you have come through, and what you have been strong enough to endure” (5.31); “remind yourself that it accords with your constitution and with human nature to render social actions” (8.12); “remind yourself that neither the future nor the past weighs on you, but always the present” (8.36). Lemma: ἀναμιμνήσκω.

δόγμα

Attested: δογμάτων (*dogmatōn*; 1.9.2, 5.9, 9.29, 10.34, 11.18.1, 12.9), δόγματα (*dogmata*; 2.3, 3.13, 3.16.1, 4.16, 7.2, 8.1 twice, 8.14 twice, 9.3.2, 10.9, 10.10, 11.23), δόγματι (*dogmati*; 4.49.2, 8.22), δόγμα (*dogma*; 8.47, 9.29). A principle, a settled conviction by which a man lives.

Principles belong to the mind (3.16.1); from them "come impulses and actions" (8.1); they die only if the impressions that correspond to them are quenched (7.2); and they must be ready like a doctor's knives (3.13) and always to hand as the pancratiast has his hand (12.9). Of others: "what principles does this man have about good things and bad?" (8.14). Lemma: δόγμα.

θεώρημα

Attested: θεωρημάτων (*theōrēmatōn*; 1.7.1, 11.5), θεωρήματα (*theōrēmata*; 1.8.2), θεώρημα (*theōrēma*; 4.2). A doctrine, a proposition of philosophy as it is taught. Marcus learned not "to write treatises on doctrines" (1.7.1), yet no act is to be done "otherwise than according to a doctrine that completes the art" (4.2), and the art of being good comes "from doctrines" (11.5). Lemma: θεώρημα.

ὁμοδογματέω

Attested: ὁμοδογματούντων (*homodogmatountōn*; 9.3.2), ὁμοδογματεῖν (*homodogmatein*; 11.8). To hold the same principles as another. Death will not be a release "from men who share your principles" (9.3.2); "Grow on the same bush, but do not hold the same principles" (11.8). Lemma: ὁμοδογματέω.

παρυπόμνησις

Attested: παρυπομνήσεως (*parypomnēseōs*; 1.10). A reminder given in passing. Alexander the grammarian corrected a faulty expression by giving the right one "by some other such tactful reminder" (1.10). Lemma: παρυπόμνησις.

πρόχειρος

Attested: προχείροις (*procheirois*; 1.16.2), πρόχειρα (*procheira*; 3.13, 6.48, 12.24), προχειροτάτοις (*procheirotatois*; 4.3.4), πρόχειρον (*procheiron*; 5.1.1, 7.1, 7.64, 9.42.1, 11.4, 11.18.5), πρόχειρος (*procheiros*; 5.6.1 twice). Ready to hand. Of the doctors' instruments, "at hand" (3.13); of the sayings Marcus keeps for use, "ready to hand": "These three things one must have ready to hand" (12.24). At 1.16.2 the impressions "that came first to hand" are those that content a man who gives up an investigation early, and at 5.6.1 a man is "ready" to reckon a favour to his account. Lemma: πρόχειρος.

στοιχειώδης

Attested: στοιχειώδη (*stoicheiōdē*; 4.3.1), στοιχειῶδες (*stoicheiōdes*; 9.9.1). Elementary, of the nature of an element. When Marcus retreats into himself, the things within into which he looks are to be “brief and elementary” (4.3.1); at 9.9.1 fire is carried upward “because of the elemental fire”. Lemma: στοιχειώδης.

ὑπόθεσις

Attested: ὑποθέσει (*hypothesei*; 4.21.1), ὑπόθεσις (*hypothesis*; 8.1), ὑπόθεσιν (*hypothesin*; 10.31, 11.7). What is set down beneath: a supposition laid down for argument, and so the situation in which a man is placed. In argument, “This is what one might answer on the supposition that souls live on” (4.21.1; see Soul); of Marcus’ own situation, probably his position as emperor, as the edition’s note says, “and the station too works against it” (8.1) and “there is no other station of life so fitted for philosophy as this in which you now happen to be!” (11.7; see Philosophy); beside “material”, of the things of life as exercises for reason, “What material and what occasion you flee!” (10.31). Lemma: ὑπόθεσις.

ὑπομιμνήσκω

Attested: ὑπομιμνῄσκειν (*hypomimnēiskein*; 4.24), ὑπόμνησον (*hypomnēson*; 5.28), ὑπομιμνῄσκεσθαι (*hypomimnēiskesthai*; 7.27, 11.26), ὑπομνησθῆναι (*hypomnēsthēnai*; 9.42.1), ὑπομιμνῄσκουσα (*hypomimnēiskousa*; 11.6.2), ὑπομιμνῃσκώμεθα (*hypomimnēiskōmetha*; 11.27). To remind, to bring back to mind. Marcus reminds himself (4.24, 7.27), is told to “show, remind” the man who offends (5.28), and records the reminders of the Old Comedy (11.6.2), of a precept of the Epicureans (11.26) and of the Pythagoreans’ dawn (11.27). Lemma: ὑπομιμνήσκω.

ὑπόμνημα

Attested: ὑπομνήμασιν (*hypomnēmasin*; 1.7.3). A note or memorandum, a record kept to remind. Through Rusticus Marcus came across “the notes of Epictetus” (1.7.3). Lemma: ὑπόμνημα.

ὑπομνημάτιον

Attested: ὑπομνημάτια (*hypomnēmatia*; 3.14). A little note, the diminutive of ὑπόμνημα. Marcus tells himself, “you are

not going to read your little notebooks" (3.14). Lemma: ὑπομνημάτιον.

ὑπόμνησις

Attested: ὑπομνήσεις (*hypomnēseis*; 1.17.6), ὑπόμνησιν (*hypomnēsin*; 10.34). A reminding, a reminder. Marcus' falling short of the life according to nature comes "from not keeping the reminders of the gods, and all but their instructions" (1.17.6); to one steeped in the true principles even the briefest saying is "enough as a reminder of freedom from distress and from fear" (10.34). Lemma: ὑπόμνησις.

ὑπομνηστικός

Attested: ὑπομνηστικαί (*hypomnēstikai*; 11.6.1). Serving to remind. "First, tragedies were brought on as reminders of what happens" (11.6.1). Lemma: ὑπομνηστικός.

See also

Assent and judgement; Attention and self-examination; Impression; Impulse; Inner retreat and citadel; Learning, practice and correction; Nature; Philosophy; Soul.

Resentment and welcome

Taking ill and taking gladly what happens · Meditations

δυσχεραίνειν, dyscherainein, "resent", "be resentful"; *ἀντιδυσχεραίνειν, antidyscherainein*, "resenting in return"; *δυσχεραντικός, dyscherantikos*, "short-tempered"; *δυσχερῶς, dyscherōs*, "with reluctance"; *ἀσπάζεσθαι, aspazesthai*, "welcome"; *ἀρέσκεσθαι, areskesthai*, "be pleased"; *ἀρέσκειν, areskein*, "please"; *ἀρεστός, arestos*, "pleasing"; *ἀρέσκεια, areskeia*, "the wish to please"; *ἀρεσκεύεσθαι, areskeuesthai*, "curry favour", "court … favour"; *ἀρεσκευτικός, areskeutikos*, "eagerness to please"; *δέχεσθαι, dechesthai*, "receive"; *ἀποδέχεσθαι, apodechesthai*, "accept"; *ἀπόδεξις, apodexis*, "acceptance"; *προσίεσθαι, prosiesthai*, "admit"

At a Glance

The word. Δυσχεραίνειν is to find a thing hard to handle, to take it ill; ἀσπάζεσθαι is to greet, and so to welcome gladly; ἀρέσκεσθαι is to be pleased with, and δέχεσθαι to receive.

In the *Meditations*. “To resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature” (2.16), and Marcus asks himself whether he resents the vice of men or what is allotted from the whole (4.3.2). Against resentment he sets welcome: what is worth effort ends in “a disposition that welcomes all that happens” (4.33), as rough prescriptions are welcomed “in the hope of health” (5.8.3).

In this edition. Δυσχεραίνειν is “resent”, and twice “be resentful”; ἀσπάζεσθαι is always “welcome”, ἀρέσκεσθαι “be pleased”, δέχεσθαι always “receive” and ἀποδέχεσθαι “accept”.

A place to read. 4.33, where, once every famous name has faded, what is worth effort ends in a disposition that welcomes all that happens.

Meaning

Δυσχεραίνειν (*dyscherainein*) is formed from δυσχερής (*dyscherēs*), “hard to handle”, from δυσ- (*dys-*), “ill”, and χείρ (*cheir*), “hand”: to find a thing hard to bear. Its adverb δυσχερῶς (*dyscherōs*) is “with reluctance” (8.12), and δυσχεραντικός (*dyscherantikos*) “short-tempered” (1.8.2). Ἀσπάζεσθαι (*aspazesthai*) is to greet, to embrace, and so to welcome gladly. Ἀρέσκειν (*areskein*) is to please, and its middle ἀρέσκεσθαι (*areskesthai*), with the dative, to be pleased with; ἀρεσκεύεσθαι (*areskeuesthai*) is to court favour, and ἀρεστός (*arestos*) “pleasing”. Δέχεσθαι (*dechesthai*) is to take what is offered, to receive; ἀποδέχεσθαι (*apodechesthai*) is to accept, and ἀπόδεξις (*apodexis*) acceptance. Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, reports that the Stoics counted ἀσπασμός (*aspasmos*), welcoming, among the kinds of wish, the good feeling that answers to craving (see Desire and aversion).[139]

Use in the book

For Marcus resentment is a breach before it is a mood. The soul does violence to itself first when it becomes an abscess on the universe, “for to resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature” (2.16; see Interconnection), and “whenever the ruling centre resents anything that happens, then too it leaves its own place” (11.20.2; see Gods).

The retreat of 4.3 names its two objects. “For what will you resent? The vice of men?” Against that he is to reckon

[139] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.116.

up that rational beings have come to be for one another, that forbearance is a part of justice and that they do wrong unwillingly (see Care and tolerance). “But will you also resent what is allotted from the whole?” Against this he is to renew the disjunction, providence or atoms (4.3.2; see Providence and atoms); the brief principles of the retreat are to send him back “not resenting the things to which you return” (4.3.1; see Inner retreat and citadel). The first returns among the heads against anger (11.18.2; see Anger). Against the second the arguments are from nature. “If, then, there happens to each what it is used to and is by nature, why would you resent it?” (8.46; see Courage and endurance); what he is not by nature able to bear he is not to resent either, “for it will perish when it has consumed you” (10.3; see Pain and pleasure); and if someone, even leaving nature aside, explains change by things being so by nature, it is ridiculous at once to say that the parts of the whole are by nature such as to change and at once to be astonished or to resent it as contrary to nature (10.7.2; see Dissolution).

Not resenting is the lesser half; Marcus asks for welcome, the Greek word of greeting. Its object is what happens or is allotted, or its images, the doctor’s prescriptions and the city’s allotments. The good man is “welcoming with his whole soul all that happens and is allotted to him”, and the welcome rests on a judgement: of his own concerns and of what is spun for him, “the first he makes honourable, the second he is persuaded are good” (3.4.3; see Fate and allotment). 4.33 gives the grounds. All things fade and quickly become legend, and everlasting remembrance is “Wholly empty”; what one must spend effort on is “a just understanding, social actions, speech such as never to lie, and a disposition that welcomes all that happens as necessary, as familiar, as flowing from such a beginning and spring”. “Familiar” has its contrary at 7.66, where Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, is to be judged by whether he could be content to be just and holy, “neither receiving anything allotted from the whole as something strange nor enduring it as unbearable” (7.66; see Body and flesh).

Welcome does not wait for the thing to be pleasant. In the prescriptions of Asclepius, the god of healing, “many things … are rough, but we welcome them in the hope of health” (5.8.3), and so Marcus is to “welcome everything that comes about, even if it seems rather harsh, because it leads you there, to the health of the universe” (5.8.4; see Whole and

part). The ground is that he is a part. A rational nature journeys well when, among other things, “what by the common nature is allotted it welcomes, all of it; for it is a part of it, as the nature of the leaf is of the nature of the plant”, though of a nature that, unlike the plant’s, is “unimpeded” and “intelligent” (8.7), and when he is so disposed to the whole and to his kin, life must flow smoothly, like that of a citizen who “welcomes whatever the city allots” (10.6.2; see Citizenship). The welcome holds even on the lesser hypothesis: if the gods took no counsel about him individually, they took it about the common affairs, and what follows from these “I ought to welcome and cherish” (6.44.1; see Gods).

Receiving is the plainer word. Philosophy lies, among other things, in “receiving what happens and is allotted as coming from there, wherever that is, whence it came itself” (2.17.2; see Daimon); “Does something happen to me? I receive it, referring it to the gods and to the spring of all things” (8.23; see Fate and allotment). Receiving leads to use: what gladdens Marcus is a sound ruling centre, “looking on everything with kindly eyes, and receiving and using each according to worth” (8.43). At 11.13, in the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, which here follows Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, in reading “and receiving” where P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has “not receiving”, nothing is bad for Marcus if he is doing what is proper to his nature “and receiving what is now timely for the nature of the whole”. To be pleased is the same welcome named by its feeling: the good man is “pleased with what is allotted from the whole” (4.25; see Contentment and self-sufficiency).

The word keeps its edge: at every deathbed, Marcus’ own included, there will be “some standing by who welcome the bad thing that is happening” (10.36; see Death). Welcome in the *Meditations* is not resignation but a greeting given on reasons, by a part to its whole and a citizen to his city; its test is the rough prescription, and resentment, as 2.16 has it, is standing apart from nature.

Places to read

Every chapter in which δυσχεραίνειν, ἀντιδυσχεραίνειν (*antidyscherainein*), δυσχεραντικός, δυσχερῶς, ἀσπάζεσθαι or ἀρέσκειν occurs, in the order of the book, by section

where the chapter is divided, with the places where δέχεσθαι, ἀποδέχεσθαι or ἀπόδεξις is the receiving of what happens or is allotted (2.17.2, 5.8.3, 7.66, 8.23, 8.43, 9.28, 10.8.1, 11.13, 12.11). The other places of δέχεσθαι, the one place of προσίεσθαι (*prosiesthai*), "admit" (10.2), and the words of pleasing and courting favour, ἀρεστός, ἀρέσκεια (*areskeia*), ἀρεσκεύεσθαι and ἀρεσκευτικός (*areskeutikos*), are given in the sub-entries.

1.8.2 Among the lessons of Apollonius, the Stoic, is not being short-tempered in explanation.

2.2 Marcus, an old man, is no longer to let his ruling centre resent what is fated in the present.

2.16 The soul does violence to itself first when it becomes an abscess on the universe, for to resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature.

2.17.2 Philosophy lies, among other things, in receiving what happens and is allotted as coming from where the daimon itself came.

3.4.3 The good man welcomes with his whole soul all that happens and is allotted to him, and is persuaded that what is spun for him is good.

3.4.4 The good man sets no store by praise from those who do not live in agreement with nature, who are not even pleased with themselves.

3.16.2 It is peculiar to the good man to love and welcome what happens to him and is spun for him.

4.3.1 The brief and elementary things within are to send Marcus back from his retreat not resenting the things to which he returns.

4.3.2 Marcus asks himself whether he resents the vice of men or what is allotted from the whole, and is to meet the first with the verdict on rational beings and the second with the disjunction, providence or atoms.

4.25 Marcus is to try how the life of the good man goes for him, pleased with what is allotted from the whole and content with his own just action and kindly disposition.

4.33 All things fade into legend; what one must spend effort on is a just understanding, social actions, truthful speech and a disposition that welcomes all

that happens as necessary, as familiar, as flowing from such a beginning and spring.

5.8.3 What nature prescribes is to be received as the prescriptions of Asclepius are, which, rough as many of them are, are welcomed in the hope of health.

5.8.4 Marcus is to welcome everything that comes about, even if it seems rather harsh, because it leads to the health of the universe.

5.27 He lives with the gods who continually shows them his own soul pleased with what is allotted and doing what the daimon wills.

6.26 Every duty is to be brought to its end without being disturbed or resenting in return those who resent.

6.44.1 If the gods took no counsel about Marcus individually, they took it about the common affairs, and what follows from these he ought to welcome and cherish.

6.49 Marcus asks whether he resents weighing so many pounds and not three hundred, and applies the same to the number of his years.

6.59 Marcus considers what sort of people men want to please, for what gains and by what activities.

7.64 Many things that are the same as pain, such as drowsiness, heat and loss of appetite, escape notice while they are resented.

7.66 Socrates is to be judged by whether he could be content to be just and holy, neither receiving anything allotted from the whole as something strange nor enduring it as unbearable.

7.70 The immortal gods do not resent bearing with so many base people for so long, but even care for them.

8.7 A rational nature journeys well when, among other things, it welcomes all that the common nature allots it, being a part of it as the leaf is of the plant.

8.12 When Marcus is roused from sleep with reluctance, he is to remind himself that social actions accord with his constitution.

8.23 When something happens to Marcus, he receives it, referring it to the gods and to the spring of all things.

8.43 What gladdens Marcus is to have the ruling centre sound, turning away from no man, looking on everything with kindly eyes, and receiving and using each according to worth.

8.46 If what happens to each thing is what it is used to and is by nature, Marcus asks why he would resent it; for the common nature brought him nothing unbearable.

8.53 Marcus asks whether he wants to please a man who does not please himself.

9.28 If the understanding of the whole has an impulse towards each thing, Marcus is to accept the object of its impulse.

10.3 Whether what happens is such as Marcus is by nature able to bear or not, he is not to resent it.

10.6.2 When Marcus is so disposed to the whole and to his kin, life must flow smoothly, as the life of a citizen would who goes forward through actions profitable to the citizens and welcomes whatever the city allots.

10.7.2 If someone, even leaving nature aside, explains change by things being so by nature, it is ridiculous at once to say that the parts of the whole are by nature such as to change and at once to be astonished at it or resent it as something contrary to nature.

10.8.1 The name "consenting" was to signify for Marcus the willing acceptance of what is allotted by the common nature.

10.36 No one is so fortunate that some standing by his deathbed will not welcome what is happening; Marcus is not on this account to go away less kindly to them.

11.9 Marcus is to keep his mildness towards those who try to prevent him or are otherwise resentful.

11.13 A man must be seen by the gods disposed to be indignant at nothing and to complain of nothing, stretched towards the coming about of what is of common advantage.

11.18.2 The third head against anger is that if men do rightly one must not be resentful, and if not, they do wrong unwillingly and in ignorance.

11.20.2 Whenever the ruling centre resents anything that happens, it leaves its own place.

12.11 Man has the authority to do nothing but what God will praise and to receive all that God deals out to him.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, has the thought, but Marcus' two words only in other senses. In the *Discourses* ἀσπάζεσθαι is mostly the word of greeting, as when a man sent to pay his respects to someone answers that he will, but not abjectly;[140] δυσχεραίνειν stands once in the *Handbook*, of showing displeasure at foul talk by silence, a blush and a frown;[141] and for taking ill what happens Epictetus says δυσαρεστεῖν (*dysarestein*), "be discontented", and ἀγανακτεῖν (*aganaktein*), "be indignant". The discourse that bears the title "On being well pleased", περὶ εὐαρεστήσεως (*peri euarestēseōs*), sets out the doctrine. The good and excellent man has placed his own mind under the governor of the whole, as good citizens place theirs under the law of the city. Education is learning to want each thing in the way it comes to be, and things come to be as their ordainer arranged them; one must come to education not to alter the conditions of our life, which is neither granted us nor better, but so that, with things about us standing as they stand and as they were made, we may keep our own mind fitted to what happens. Alone, a man should call it peace and freedom, and among many not a mob but a festival, "and so take everything in with good pleasure", εὐαρέστως δέχεσθαι (*euarestōs dechesthai*); those who will not accept are punished by being what they are.[142] Marcus' citizen who welcomes whatever the city allots (10.6.2) can be read beside Epictetus' good citizens, and his good man "fitted without constraint to his own lot" (3.16.2; see Fate and allotment) beside the mind fitted to what happens. Seneca,

[140] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.6.6; the noun ἀσπασμοί (*aspasmoi*), "greetings", at 4.4.37.

[141] Epictetus, *Handbook* 33.16.

[142] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.12 (title), 1.12.7, 1.12.15, 1.12.17 and 1.12.21–22; δυσαρεστεῖν and ἀγανακτεῖν stand together at 1.12.25.

the Roman Stoic of the first century, gives the equipment against fortune in commands: a man is to be indignant at nothing that happens to him, and to know that the very things by which he seems to be hurt are among those that complete the course and the duties of the world; "let whatever has pleased God please man".[143] He asks Lucilius, his correspondent, whether he is still indignant and complaining, and does not understand that there is nothing bad in such things but this one, that he is indignant and complains; such things, he says, are decreed, not chance, and he himself does not obey God but assents to him, following him willingly, not of necessity: "nothing that befalls me shall I ever receive sadly, nothing with a sour look".[144] Seneca's *placeat*, "let it please", and his *excipiam*, "I shall receive", can be read as Marcus' ἀρέσκεσθαι and δέχεσθαι in Latin.

Translation in this edition

Δυσχεραίνειν is "resent" at fourteen of its sixteen occurrences: "resent" (2.2, 2.16, 4.3.2 twice, 6.49, 7.70, 8.46, 10.3 twice, 10.7.2), "resents" (11.20.2), "resenting" (4.3.1), "those who resent" (6.26) and, in the passive, "while they are resented" (7.64); it is "be resentful" in "are otherwise resentful" (11.9) and "one must not be resentful" (11.18.2). Its compound ἀντιδυσχεραίνειν is "resenting in return" (6.26), δυσχεραντικός is "short-tempered" (1.8.2) and δυσχερῶς "with reluctance" (8.12); "resent" and "resentful" render no other word. At 4.3.2 both futures, "will you resent?", are corrections that Leopold prints, the first of Coraes and the second of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802; P has the present. Ἀσπάζεσθαι is "welcome" at all nine of its places, and "welcome" renders no other word. Ἀρέσκεσθαι is "be pleased" (3.4.4, 4.25, 5.27) and the active ἀρέσκειν "please" (6.59, 8.53 three times); ἀρεστός is "pleasing" (6.16.5), ἀρέσκεια "the wish to please" (5.18), ἀρεσκεύεσθαι "curry favour" (5.5) and "court one another's favour" (11.14), and ἀρεσκευτικός, with the article, "eagerness to please" (1.16.3). "Pleased" renders no other word but the εὐαρεστεῖν (*euarestein*) family, "be well pleased" (see Contentment and self-sufficiency). Δέχεσθαι is "receive" at all twelve of its places. "Receive" also renders παραδέχεσθαι

[143] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 74.20.

[144] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 96.1–2.

(*paradechesthai*; 5.12, 6.42), λαμβάνειν (*lambanein*) and its compounds where a thing is got or taken (1.8.2, 4.46, 8.35, 9.1.2, 9.42.4, 10.6.1, 11.18.5), εὖ πάσχειν (*eu paschein*), "has received good" (7.73), and ψύχωσις (*psychōsis*), "receives a soul" and "receiving a soul" (12.24). Ἀποδέχεσθαι is "accept" (9.28) and ἀπόδεξις "acceptance" (10.8.1), the only places of either English word. The other compounds of δέχεσθαι keep their own English: ἐκδέχεσθαι (*ekdechesthai*) "await" (9.3.1), παρεκδέχεσθαι (*parekdechesthai*) "take wrongly" (5.6.2), ἐπιδέχεσθαι (*epidechesthai*) "admits of" (12.14), διαδέχεσθαι (*diadechesthai*) "took over from" (4.19) and "succeed to" (10.34), and the impersonal ἐνδέχεται (*endechetai*), "it is … possible" (7.67). Προσίεσθαι is "admit" at its one place (10.2). The neighbouring words have their sub-entries elsewhere: δυσαρεστεῖν, "be discontented", and δυσαρέστησις (*dysarestēsis*), "discontent", the second of which the Glossary lists beside δυσχεραίνειν under "resent" (see Contentment and self-sufficiency); στέργειν (*stergein*), "cherish", which stands beside "welcome" at 6.44.1 (see Contentment and self-sufficiency); ἀγανακτεῖν, "be indignant", and χαλεπαίνειν (*chalepainein*), "be exasperated" (see Anger); and μέμφεσθαι (*memphesthai*), "blame" (see Fault and ignorance).

ἀντιδυσχεραίνω

Attested: ἀντιδυσχεραίνοντα (*antidyscherainonta*; 6.26). To resent in return. Every duty is to be brought to its end "without being disturbed or resenting in return those who resent" (6.26; see Duty and fitting action). Lemma: ἀντιδυσχεραίνω.

ἀπόδεξις

Attested: ἀπόδεξιν (*apodexin*; 10.8.1). Acceptance, approval. The name "consenting" was to signify "the willing acceptance of what is allotted by the common nature" (10.8.1; see Wisdom and discernment). Lemma: ἀπόδεξις.

ἀποδέχομαι

Attested: ἀποδέχου (*apodechou*; 9.28). To accept, to take as one's own. "And either the understanding of the whole has an impulse towards each thing; and if this is so, accept the object of its impulse" (9.28; see Impulse). Lemma: ἀποδέχομαι.

ἀρέσκεια

Attested: ἀρέσκειαν (*areskeian*; 5.18). The wish to please, obsequiousness. “It is a terrible thing, then, that ignorance and the wish to please should be stronger than wisdom” (5.18; see Courage and endurance). Lemma: ἀρέσκεια.

ἀρεσκεύομαι

Attested: ἀρεσκεύεσθαι (*areskeuesthai*; 5.5), ἀρεσκεύονται (*areskeuontai*; 11.14). To make oneself agreeable, to court favour. Marcus asks whether, for want of talent, he is compelled “to grumble, to be stingy, to flatter, to blame the poor body, to curry favour” (5.5); “Despising one another they court one another’s favour” (11.14). Lemma: ἀρεσκεύομαι.

ἀρεσκευτικός

Attested: ἀρεσκευτικόν (*areskeutikon*; 1.16.3). Given to courting favour; with the article, eagerness to please. In Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, “towards men no courting of the people, no eagerness to please, no playing to the crowd” (1.16.3; see Court and office). Lemma: ἀρεσκευτικός.

ἀρέσκω

Attested: ἀρέσκονται (*areskontai*; 3.4.4), ἀρεσκομένου (*areskomenou*; 4.25), ἀρεσκομένην (*areskomenēn*; 5.27), ἀρέσκειν (*areskein*; 6.59, 8.53), ἀρέσκει (*areskei*; 8.53 twice). To please; in the middle, with the dative, to be pleased with. The good man is “pleased with what is allotted from the whole” (4.25), and he lives with the gods who “continually shows them his own soul pleased with what is allotted” (5.27; see Daimon); those whose praise he discounts “are not even pleased with themselves” (3.4.4), a clause that D, the Darmstadt manuscript, omits; “Do you want to please a man who does not please himself?” (8.53). Lemma: ἀρέσκω.

ἀρεστός

Attested: ἀρεστόν (*areston*; 6.16.5). Pleasing, acceptable. “But respect and honour for your own understanding will make you pleasing to yourself” (6.16.5; see Self-respect and shame). Lemma: ἀρεστός.

ἀσπάζομαι

Attested: ἀσπαζόμενον (*aspazomenon*; 3.4.3), ἀσπάζεσθαι (*aspazesthai*; 3.16.2, 6.44.1), ἀσπαζομένη (*aspazomenē*; 4.33, 8.7), ἀσπαζόμεθα (*aspazometha*; 5.8.3), ἀσπάζου (*aspazou*; 5.8.4), ἀσπαζομένου (*aspazomenou*; 10.6.2), ἀσπαζόμενοι (*aspazomenoi*; 10.36). To greet, to embrace; to welcome gladly. The good man is "welcoming with his whole soul all that happens and is allotted to him" (3.4.3); "a disposition that welcomes all that happens as necessary, as familiar, as flowing from such a beginning and spring" (4.33); "but we welcome them in the hope of health" (5.8.3); "welcome everything that comes about, even if it seems rather harsh" (5.8.4). At 10.36 the bystanders at a deathbed are those "who welcome the bad thing that is happening", where Leopold notes in his apparatus that the text would be better without κακόν (*kakon*), "bad". Lemma: ἀσπάζομαι.

δέχομαι

Attested: δέχηται (*dechētai*; 2.15), δεχόμενον (*dechomenon*; 2.17.2, 8.43, 8.57), δέχεται (*dechetai*; 4.21.2), δεχώμεθα (*dechōmetha*; 5.8.3), δέξεται (*dexetai*; 5.12), ἐδέχετο (*edecheto*; 6.30.3), δεχόμενος (*dechomenos*; 7.66), δέχομαι (*dechomai*; 8.23), δέχῃ (*dechēi*; 11.13), δέχεσθαι (*dechesthai*; 12.11). To take what is offered, to receive. Of what happens: "receiving what happens and is allotted as coming from there" (2.17.2); "Let us receive these things, then" (5.8.3), where A, the Vatican manuscript, has the indicative δεχόμεθα (*dechometha*), "we receive"; "I receive it, referring it to the gods" (8.23), words that A omits; "receiving and using each according to worth" (8.43); "to receive all that God deals out to him" (12.11). At 11.13 "and receiving" is Coraes' καὶ δέχῃ (*kai dechēi*), which Leopold prints; P has οὐ δέχῃ (*ou dechēi*), "not receiving", and "are doing" before it is the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, ποιεῖς (*poieis*), for P's ποιεῖ (*poiei*). Elsewhere it is used of a saying received (2.15, 5.12), of the space that receives the bodies consumed as food (4.21.2), of the slanders Antoninus did not receive (6.30.3) and of the solid that receives the sun's ray (8.57). Lemma: δέχομαι.

δυσχεραίνω

Attested: δυσχερᾶναι (*dyscheranai*; 2.2), δυσχεραίνειν (*dyscherainein*; 2.16, 10.7.2, 11.18.2), δυσχεραίνοντα (*dyscherainonta*; 4.3.1), δυσχερανεῖς (*dyscheraneis*; 4.3.2 twice), δυσχεραίνουσιν (*dyscherainousin*; 6.26, 7.70), δυσχεραίνεις (*dyscheraineis*; 6.49), δυσχεραινόμενα (*dyscherainomena*; 7.64), δυσχεραίνοις (*dyscherainois*; 8.46), δυσχέραινε (*dyscheraine*; 10.3 twice), δυσχεραίνοντας (*dyscherainontas*; 11.9), δυσχεραίνῃ (*dyscherainēi*; 11.20.2). To find hard to bear, to take ill, to resent. "For to resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature" (2.16); "For what will you resent? The vice of men? … But will you also resent what is allotted from the whole?" (4.3.2), where both futures are corrections that Leopold prints, the first of Coraes and the second of Schultz, and P has the present δυσχεραίνεις, "do you resent?"; "why would you resent it?" (8.46); "do not resent it" (10.3, twice); "whenever the ruling centre resents anything that happens, then too it leaves its own place" (11.20.2). Lemma: δυσχεραίνω.

δυσχεραντικός

Attested: δυσχεραντικόν (*dyscherantikon*; 1.8.2). Given to taking things ill, short-tempered. Among the lessons of Apollonius, "and in explanation not short-tempered" (1.8.2). Lemma: δυσχεραντικός.

δυσχερής

Attested: δυσχερῶς (*dyscherōs*; 8.12). Hard to handle, troublesome; the adverb, with difficulty, reluctantly. "When you are roused from sleep with reluctance, remind yourself that it accords with your constitution and with human nature to render social actions" (8.12; see Human work). Lemma: δυσχερής.

προσίημι

Attested: προσίεσο (*prosieso*; 10.2). In the middle, to let come to oneself, to admit. Of what one's nature as governed by nature alone seeks: "then do it and admit it, if your nature as a living being is not going to be put in a worse condition" (10.2; see Nature). Lemma: προσίημι.

See also

Anger; Body and flesh; Care and tolerance; Citizenship; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Courage and endurance;

Court and office; Daimon; Death; Desire and aversion; Dissolution; Duty and fitting action; Fate and allotment; Fault and ignorance; Gods; Human work; Impulse; Inner retreat and citadel; Interconnection; Nature; Pain and pleasure; Providence and atoms; Self-respect and shame; Whole and part; Wisdom and discernment.

Ruling centre

The governing part of the soul · Meditations

ἡγεμονικόν, hēgemonikon, "ruling centre", "ruling"; *ἡγεμονικῶς, hēgemonikōs*, "as a ruler"; *τὸ ἔνδον κυριεῦον, to endon kyrieuon*, "that which rules within"; *κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς σου μέρος, kyrieuon tēs psychēs sou meros*, "the part of your soul that rules"; *ἀνηγεμόνευτος, anēgemoneutos*, "without a guide"

At a Glance

The word. Ἡγεμονικόν is the neuter of ἡγεμονικός, "fit to lead", from ἡγεμών, a leader or guide. With the article it is the Stoic name for the commanding part of the soul, in which impressions and impulses arise and from which reason goes out.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus names it in thirty-eight chapters, and in a thirty-ninth by an editor's supplement (7.17). It is the third thing he is, beside flesh and breath (2.2). It acts on itself: it "wakes itself and turns itself" (6.8), nothing vexes it but its own opinion (7.16, 11.18.3), and no one else can make it worse (7.22). The book ends on a question: "How does the ruling centre use itself? For in this lies everything" (12.33).

In this edition. Ἡγεμονικόν is always "ruling centre"; with νοῦς the adjective is "a ruling mind" (12.14), and the adverb ἡγεμονικῶς is "as a ruler" (1.17.3). Τὸ ἔνδον κυριεῦον is kept apart as "that which rules within" (4.1).

A place to read. 5.26, where the ruling centre is to confine what the flesh undergoes to the parts and to add no opinion that it is good or bad.

Meaning

Ἡγεμονικός (*hēgemonikos*) belongs to ἡγεμών (*hēgemōn*), the one who goes first and shows the way, and in ordinary Greek describes what is fit to lead or command. The Stoics made the neuter with the article, τὸ ἡγεμονικόν,

the name of the soul's governing part. Marcus once marks it as the school's term: "this part which they call the ruling centre" (5.11). At 5.26 he glosses it, "the ruling centre, the part of your soul that rules", where "that rules" is κυριεῦον (*kyrieuon*), from κυριεύειν (*kyrieuein*), "to be master"; at 4.1 the participle stands alone, τὸ ἔνδον κυριεῦον, "that which rules within" (see Impulse). The universe has a ruling centre too (6.36, 7.75).

Marcus never asks where the ruling centre sits in the body, and his other words for the thinking part can name the same thing. At 12.3 the third of the things a man is made of is "mind"; Marcus goes on to speak of "your understanding" and "the intelligent faculty" (12.3.1), and then of "this ruling centre" (12.3.2). The ruling centre can be read as the part named by its office, mind and understanding as the same part named by its work (see Mind and reason). Once the adjective qualifies νοῦς (*nous*) itself, in what can be read as a pun: if the world is "a confusion without a guide", ἀνηγεμόνευτος (*anēgemoneutos*), Marcus is to be glad that he has in himself "a ruling mind", νοῦν ἡγεμονικόν (*noun hēgemonikon*; 12.14).

Use in the book

Marcus first sets the ruling centre against the body. "Whatever this is that I am, it is scraps of flesh, a little breath, and the ruling centre" (2.2). Flesh and breath are belittled as "gore, little bones" and "wind"; the third is not described but commanded: it is no longer to be a slave, jerked like a puppet by unsocial impulse (see Impulse), nor to "resent what is fated in the present or look askance at it in the future" (2.2). At 5.26 Marcus says how far the separation goes. The ruling centre is not to "be turned by the smooth or rough motion in the flesh", but is to "circumscribe itself and confine those things undergone to the parts". But when these things "pass up into the understanding by the other sympathy, as in a body that is unified", then "one must not try to resist the sensation, which is natural; but let the ruling centre not add of itself the opinion that it is good or bad." The line runs not between the soul and feeling but between feeling and the opinion added to it.

What sets the ruling centre apart is that it acts on itself. "The ruling centre is that which wakes itself and turns itself, and makes itself whatever it wants, and makes everything that happens appear to it such as it itself wants" (6.8). It

“does not vex itself”, and is “free of need, unless it makes a want for itself” (7.16). So with harm: things “stand outside the doors”, declaring nothing about themselves: “What, then, declares about them? The ruling centre” (9.15). A wrongdoer “has not made your ruling centre worse than it was before” (7.22); others’ actions “are in their ruling centres” (11.18.3); and “our ruling centres each have their own sovereignty”, since otherwise a neighbour’s vice would be bad for Marcus, which God did not decide (8.56). The power that keeps it free can also make it a slave. It has “turnings” to be watched for and wiped away (11.19), and “whenever the ruling centre resents anything that happens, then too it leaves its own place” (11.20.2). Hence the questioning: “What is my ruling centre to me, and what sort of thing am I making it now, and for what, ever, am I now using it?” (10.24; compare 5.11).

The ruling centre “becomes unconquerable when, drawn together into itself, it is content with itself, not doing what it does not want, even if it takes its stand without reason. What then, when it judges about something both with reason and after looking all round it?” (8.48). The argument runs from less to more: if even an unreasoned refusal holds, a reasoned judgement holds better, and so “the understanding free from passions is a citadel” (see Inner retreat and citadel). Its proper contentment is a just one: “It is the nature of the rational ruling centre to be content with itself when it acts justly and, on that very account, has calm” (7.28).

Yet it is not closed to others. Marcus forbids looking round at others’ ruling centres to steer by them: “Do not look round at others’ ruling centres, but look straight there, at what nature is guiding you to” (7.55; compare 3.4.1, 5.3). But he commands looking into them to be free of their verdicts: “Go within, into their ruling centres, and you will see what judges you fear, and what sort of judges they are even of themselves” (9.18; compare 4.38, 7.62, 9.34). And he commands it for fellowship: “Enter into the ruling centre of each; and allow every other, too, to enter into your own ruling centre” (8.61). At 9.22 the three directions are joined in one command: Marcus is to run to his own ruling centre “to make it a just mind”, to that of the whole “to remember at the same time what you are a part of”, and to the other man’s “to attend whether it is ignorance or design, and at the same time to reckon that it is kin”.

If at the exit Marcus honours “only your ruling centre and the divine in you”, he will be “a man worthy of the universe

that begot you" (12.1.2); and what remains is a single question: "How does the ruling centre use itself? For in this lies everything. But the rest either belongs to choice or is outside choice: corpses and smoke" (12.33). The word names a part of the soul, but Marcus treats it as an activity under examination: he asks, chapter after chapter, what it is making of itself now.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ἡγεμονικόν occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the adverb ἡγεμονικῶς (1.17.3), the supplement at 7.17 and τὸ ἔνδον κυριεῦον (4.1). Ἡγεμών, "guide" (3.16.1, 5.27), and ἡγεμονία, "empires" (7.49), are not listed.

1.17.3 Among his debts to the gods Marcus counts his being placed under Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father and predecessor, who showed him that one can live at court near the style of a private citizen without being slacker in what must be done, as a ruler, on behalf of public matters.

2.2 Marcus is flesh, a little breath and the ruling centre; the third is no longer to be a slave, jerked like a puppet by unsocial impulse, or resentful of what is fated.

3.4.1 Forming impressions of what others do and say, except for some common good, makes one wander from watching over one's own ruling centre.

3.9 The faculty of forming opinions is to be revered, so that no opinion arises in the ruling centre out of keeping with nature and with the constitution of a rational living being.

4.1 That which rules within, when it is in a state according to nature, shifts easily to what is possible and makes material for itself of whatever is brought in, as a bright fire does.

4.38 Marcus is to look into the ruling centres of others, and at what the wise flee and pursue.

4.39 What is bad for Marcus is not in another's ruling centre but in the part of him that forms opinions, which is to keep quiet even when the body is cut or burned.

5.3 Those who blame Marcus have their own ruling centre and impulse; he is to follow his own nature

and the common nature without looking round at them.

5.11 Marcus examines what he now has in the part they call the ruling centre, and asks whose soul he has, a child's, a tyrant's or a beast's.

5.26 The ruling centre, the part of the soul that rules, is not to be turned by the motions of the flesh; the sensation is not resisted, but the ruling centre adds no opinion that it is good or bad.

6.8 The ruling centre wakes itself, turns itself, makes itself whatever it wants, and makes whatever happens appear to it as it wants.

6.36 All things have had their impulse from that common ruling centre or come by way of consequence, and even the lion's jaws and poison are by-products of what is dignified and beautiful.

7.5 Where his understanding is not sufficient, Marcus yields the work to someone abler, if it is not otherwise a duty, or does it as he can, taking on one who can do, "with the use of my ruling centre", what is useful for the fellowship.

7.16 The ruling centre does not vex or frighten itself, and is free of need, untroubled and unimpeded unless it makes these things for itself.

7.17 Happiness is a good daimon or something good; Marcus tells the impression that has come by the old habit to go away, for he has no need of it.

7.22 A man who stumbles has not made Marcus' ruling centre worse than it was before, and so has not harmed him.

7.28 The rational ruling centre is by nature content with itself when it acts justly, and so has calm.

7.33 In pain the understanding keeps its calm by withdrawing, and the ruling centre has not become worse.

7.55 Marcus is not to look round at others' ruling centres; holding to the social, to mastery over the body and to freedom from rash assent, the ruling centre is to bring the straight way to its end.

7.62 Whoever attends to the ruling centres of those whose testimony he wants will neither blame those who stumble unwillingly nor need their testimony.

7.75 The nature of the whole had its impulse to make the universe; now either everything comes about by way of consequence, or even the things towards which the ruling centre of the universe directs its impulse are unreasoned.

8.3 Diogenes the Cynic, Heraclitus and Socrates saw things, their causes and materials, and their ruling centres were the same, a phrase whose sense is uncertain.

8.43 Marcus' gladness is to have the ruling centre sound, turning away from no man and from nothing that happens to men.

8.48 The ruling centre drawn together into itself is unconquerable even when it takes its stand without reason, and the understanding free from passions is a citadel.

8.56 However much men have come to be for one another, each ruling centre has its own sovereignty; otherwise a neighbour's vice would be bad for Marcus, which God did not decide.

8.61 Marcus is to enter into the ruling centre of each, and let every other enter into his.

9.7 Marcus tells himself to wipe out impression, stop impulse, quench desire and have the ruling centre in its own power.

9.15 Things stand outside the doors and declare nothing about themselves; what declares about them is the ruling centre.

9.18 Marcus is to go into the ruling centres of those whose judgement he fears, and see what sort of judges they are even of themselves.

9.22 Marcus is to run to his own ruling centre to make it a just mind, to that of the whole to remember what he is a part of, and to that of the other man to see whether he acts from ignorance or design, and that he is kin.

9.26 Countless troubles have come from not being content with the ruling centre doing what it was made to do.

9.34 Marcus asks what the ruling centres of those who censure and praise are like, and is to believe that he sees their little souls naked.

9.39 Whether all things come from one intelligent spring or are a scattering of atoms, Marcus asks why he is troubled, and whether he is telling the ruling centre that it is dead and has become a beast.

10.24 Marcus asks what his ruling centre is to him, what he is making it, and whether it is empty of mind, torn from fellowship, or blended with the flesh.

11.18.3 Others' actions are in their ruling centres; it is our own opinions that vex us, and when the judgement is taken away the anger goes.

11.19 Four turnings of the ruling centre are to be watched for and wiped away, the last being the more divine part bowing to the body.

11.20.2 Whenever the ruling centre resents anything that happens, it leaves its own place, for it was made for holiness and piety as well as justice.

12.1.2 If at the exit Marcus honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, and fears never having begun to live according to nature, he will be worthy of the universe that begot him.

12.2 God sees all ruling centres naked of their material husks, and whoever does the same sheds a great distraction.

12.3.2 If Marcus separates from this ruling centre what is fastened to it by attachment, with past and future, and makes himself like the sphere of Empedocles, the philosopher-poet of fifth-century Acragas, he will live out what remains untroubled.[145]

12.14 If the world is a confusion without a guide, Marcus is to be glad to have in himself a ruling mind, which the surge will not carry away.

12.33 How the ruling centre uses itself is everything; the rest is corpses and smoke.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The definition Marcus takes for granted is the school's. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the

[145] Empedocles, fragments 27–28 Diels, as the edition's note at 12.3.2 records.

third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its seventh book, gives the ruling centre as "the most sovereign part of the soul, in which impressions and impulses arise and from which reason is sent out", and says that it is in the heart.[146] His superlative, κυριώτατον (*kyriōtaton*), "most sovereign", is of one root with the participle of Marcus' gloss at 5.26, κυριεῦον, "the part of your soul that rules". The same book reports that the universe, a living and rational being, has a ruling centre of its own: the aether for Antipater of Tyre, a Stoic of the first century BC; the heaven for Chrysippus, the school's third head, and for Posidonius of Apamea, the Stoic of the late second and early first centuries BC; the sun for Cleanthes, Zeno's successor.[147] Marcus speaks of "that common ruling centre" (6.36) and "the ruling centre of the universe" (7.75) without choosing among them. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, uses the word as Marcus does, for the one thing a man answers for. "The material of the good and excellent man is his own ruling centre," he says, as the body is the doctor's material and the field the farmer's, "and the work of the good and excellent man is to use impressions according to nature";[148] Marcus' "How does the ruling centre use itself?" (12.33) can be read as asking the same thing. Socrates, Epictetus says, "remembered very securely that no one is master of another's ruling centre",[149] the thought of 8.56 and 11.18.3; the beginning of philosophy is "an awareness of how it stands with one's own ruling centre",[150] the self-examination of 5.11 and 10.24; and the *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of his teaching, asks one to take the same care not to harm one's ruling centre as one takes in walking not to step on a nail.[151] Epictetus' recurring aim, to keep the ruling centre "in a state according to nature",[152] is the condition Marcus sets for "that which rules within" at 4.1, "when it is in a state according to nature".

---

[146] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.159.

[147] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.139, citing Antipater, *On the Universe* book 8; Chrysippus, *On Providence* book 1; Posidonius, *On Gods*.

[148] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.3.1.

[149] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.5.4.

[150] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.26.15.

[151] Epictetus, *Handbook* 38.

[152] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.15.4, 3.9.11; compare 3.5.3, 4.4.43.

Translation in this edition

Ἡγεμονικόν is “ruling centre” at every place, in the plural “ruling centres” (4.38, 7.55, 7.62, 8.3, 8.56, 9.18, 9.34, 11.18.3, 12.2). At 7.17 the English keeps the angle brackets of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, “a good ⟨ruling centre⟩”, for the supplement ⟨ἡγεμονικόν⟩ of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor. The one exception is 12.14, where the adjective stands with νοῦς: νοῦν ἡγεμονικόν is “a ruling mind”. The adverb ἡγεμονικῶς is “as a ruler” (1.17.3), in the sense of one who governs, not the Stoic term. Τὸ ἔνδον κυριεῦον is “that which rules within” (4.1), kept apart from “ruling centre”; at 5.26 the Greek runs the two together, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς σου μέρος, and the English draws the participle out as an apposition, “the ruling centre, the part of your soul that rules”. Ἡγεμών (*hēgemōn*) is “guide” (3.16.1, 5.27; see Daimon), ἀνηγεμόνευτος “without a guide” (12.14), and ἡγεμονία (*hēgemonia*) “empires” (7.49). Other words of rule keep their own English: “ruler” is ἄρχων (*archōn*; 1.17.3, 3.5), “the most sovereign things” κυριώτατα (*kyriōtata*; 7.75), and “sovereignty” κυρία (*kyria*; 8.56).

ἀνηγεμόνευτος

Attested: ἀνηγεμόνευτος (*anēgemoneutos*; 12.14). Without a leader or guide: ἡγεμονεύειν, “to lead”, with the negative prefix. In a three-way alternative, fate, providence or a confusion, the third is first “a confusion of aimlessness without a leader” (ἀπροστάτητος) and then, taken up, “a confusion without a guide”; if so, Marcus is to “be glad that in such a surge you yourself have in yourself a ruling mind” (12.14). Lemma: ἀνηγεμόνευτος.

ἡγεμονικός

Attested: ἡγεμονικῶς (*hēgemonikōs*; 1.17.3), ἡγεμονικόν (*hēgemonikon*; 2.2 twice, 5.3, 5.11, 5.26 twice, 6.8, 7.16 twice, 7.17 supplied, 7.22, 7.28, 7.33, 7.55, 7.75, 8.43, 8.48, 8.61 twice, 9.7, 9.15, 9.22, 10.24, 11.20.2, 12.1.2, 12.14, 12.33), ἡγεμονικοῦ (*hēgemonikou*; 3.4.1, 6.36, 7.5, 11.19, 12.3.2), ἡγεμονικῷ (*hēgemonikōi*; 3.9, 4.39, 9.26, 9.39), ἡγεμονικά (*hēgemonika*; 4.38, 7.55, 7.62, 8.3, 8.56, 9.18, 9.34, 12.2), ἡγεμονικοῖς (*hēgemonikois*; 11.18.3). Fit to lead; with the article, the ruling centre, the commanding part of the soul and, at 6.36, 7.75 and 9.22, of the universe. Marcus is “scraps of flesh, a little breath, and the ruling centre” (2.2),

and “How does the ruling centre use itself? For in this lies everything” (12.33). At 12.14 the word is an adjective with νοῦς, “a ruling mind”; the adverb is used of the public business that must be done “as a ruler” (1.17.3). Lemma: ἡγεμονικός.

κυριεύω

Attested: κυριεῦον (*kyrieuon*; 4.1, 5.26). To be lord or master of; the participle is “that which rules”. “That which rules within, when it is in a state according to nature”, makes material for itself of whatever is brought in to replace the objects of its impulse (4.1); at 5.26 the participle stands beside ἡγεμονικόν, “the ruling centre, the part of your soul that rules”. Lemma: κυριεύω.

See also

Assent and judgement; Attention and self-examination; Body and flesh; Breath; Daimon; Impression; Impulse; Inner retreat and citadel; Mind and reason; Soul.

Self-respect and shame

The respect a man owes his own reason · Meditations

αἰδώς, aidōs, “self-respect”, “respect”; *αἰδήμων, aidēmōn*, “self-respecting”, “self-respect”; *αἰδημόνως, aidēmonōs*, “with self-respect”, “self-respect”; *αἰδεῖσθαι, aideisthai*, “respect”, “were ashamed”; *αἰδέσιμος, aidesimos*, “held in the highest respect”, “deserves respect”; *αἰσχύνεσθαι, aischynesthai*, “be ashamed”; *ἐρυθριᾶν, erythrian*, “blush”; *ἀναισχυντία, anaischyntia*, “shamelessness”; *ἀναίσχυντος, anaischyntos*, “shameless”

At a Glance

The word. Αἰδώς is the respect that holds a man back from what is unworthy of him, and αἰδήμων the man who has it; the verb αἰδεῖσθαι is to respect, or to be ashamed before. The Stoics counted αἰδώς a good feeling of the wise, and shame a passion.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus had self-respect from the memory of his father (1.2), gives himself the name “self-respecting” (10.8.1), and counts self-respect, with truth and the loving of neighbours, peculiar to the rational soul (11.1.2). It keeps company with faith and simplicity (3.7, 7.31), and its first object is a man’s own understanding (6.16.5, 12.4).

In this edition. Αἰδώς is “self-respect”, and once, with an object, “respect” (6.16.5); αἰδήμων is “self-respecting”, its neuter with the article “self-respect”, and its adverb “with self-respect” (but “self-respect” after “together with”, 8.51); αἰδεῖσθαι is “respect”, and once “were ashamed” (11.28); αἰσχύνεσθαι is “be ashamed”, and ἐρυθριᾶν “blush”.

A place to read. 6.16.5, where respect and honour for one’s own understanding make a man pleasing to himself, in tune with his fellows and in accord with the gods.

Meaning

Αἰδώς (*aidōs*), with the verb αἰδεῖσθαι (*aideisthai*), is the feeling that checks a man before those whose regard he values: the gods, other men, himself. Αἰδήμων (*aidēmōn*) is the man who has it, and αἰδέσιμος (*aidesimos*) what deserves it. Shame in the narrower sense is αἰσχύνη (*aischynē*), with the verb αἰσχύνεσθαι (*aischynesthai*), and the blush, ἐρυθριᾶν (*erythrian*), is its sign. The Stoics kept the two apart. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out their doctrines in its seventh book, puts shame among the kinds of fear, a passion: “shame is fear of disrepute”. Αἰδώς he places under caution, the reasonable avoidance that the wise man feels in place of fear, and so among the good feelings of the wise (see Desire and aversion).[153]

Marcus never uses the noun αἰσχύνη; the verb comes three times, the blush once, and shamelessness, ἀναισχυντία (*anaischyntia*), in one chapter. The family of αἰδώς comes in twenty-eight places, nearly always as a virtue to be kept; where it has an object, that is most often a man’s own self or reason (2.6, 6.16.5, 6.35, 12.4).

Use in the book

Self-respect is among the first things Marcus records: “From the repute and memory of the man who fathered me: self-respect and manliness” (1.2). His father died when Marcus was a small child, as the edition’s note says (see Annius Verus), so the quality came to him as a memory. He looks for it in those who live with him, “the energy of one, the self-respect of another” (6.48), and gives it to himself as a name: “Having given yourself these names, good, self-respecting, truthful, sensible, consenting, transcending, pay heed that you are never renamed” (10.8.1). The names are to

[153] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.112, 7.116.

be kept “not hankering after being named by them by others” (10.8.2); and if he perceives that he is falling out of them and not keeping the mastery, he is to go away into some corner where he will have the mastery, “or else go out of life altogether, not in anger, but simply and freely and with self-respect” (10.8.3).

Self-respect keeps company with faith, truth and simplicity. Marcus is never to honour as advantageous “anything that will some day force you to break faith, abandon self-respect, hate anyone, suspect, curse, pretend, or crave anything that needs walls and curtains” (3.7). Faith and self-respect stand together again among the virtues gone “to Olympus” (5.33; see Justice) and in the “most honoured part” even of arrogant critics, which “becomes, when it wants, faith, self-respect, truth, law, a good daimon” (10.13; see Daimon); “which becomes” is the correction of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, for the witnesses’ “through which there comes to be”. With simplicity the bond is closer still: “Make yourself bright with simplicity and self-respect and indifference towards what lies between virtue and vice. Love the human race. Follow God” (7.31); the good man “lives simply, with self-respect and in good spirits” (3.16.2; see Daimon); “The work of philosophy is simple and self-respecting” (9.29; compare 8.51). In these lists self-respect can be read as the virtue of a man with nothing to hide, the opposite of what “needs walls and curtains”.

Its first object is a man’s own reason, and 6.16 argues it. Neither breathing nor being clapped is to be honoured, “for the good words of the many are a clapping of tongues” (6.16.2), and the chapter ends, “But respect and honour for your own understanding will make you pleasing to yourself, in tune with your fellows, and in accord with the gods, that is, praising whatever they distribute and have ordained” (6.16.5). The common fault is the reverse: “you pay yourself no respect but place your own good lot in the souls of others” (2.6), and “So much more do we respect those close by, what view they will take of us, than ourselves” (12.4; compare 6.35). The rational soul has as its own “the loving of neighbours, and truth, and self-respect, and the honouring of nothing above itself, which is peculiar to law as well; so, then, right reason and the reason of justice differ in nothing” (11.1.2): truth and self-respect are qualities of the soul there, not objects of its love. The verb keeps its older

objects too: “Respect the gods, preserve men” (6.30.1); the power that made the things held together by nature and remains within them: “So one must respect it the more” (6.40; see Nature); and the gods, “I grasp that they exist and I respect them” (12.28; see Gods).

Shame Marcus uses as a test, and refuses where it is false. One should think only what one could confess at once if asked, with nothing “you would blush to confess you had in mind” (3.4.2). At each present hardship he asks what in the work is unbearable: “For you will be ashamed to admit it” (8.36). But “Do not be ashamed of being helped”, like a lame soldier at a wall (7.7); and death is “not a thing one would be ashamed of” (4.5). The companions of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, “were ashamed and drew back” when they saw him girt with a sheepskin (11.28). Others’ shamelessness is to be expected: “Can there, then, be no shameless people in the universe? There cannot” (9.42.1; see Fault and ignorance). The bad, Marcus has observed, is shameful, αἰσχρόν (*aischron*; 2.1; see Good, bad and indifference). In the *Meditations* the old feeling can be read as turned inward: the judge before whom a man is ashamed is his own understanding, and the regard of others becomes what self-respect learns to set aside (6.16.5, 12.4).

Places to read

Every chapter in which αἰδώς or a word of its family, or αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐρυθριᾶν, ἀναισχυντία or ἀναίσχυντος, occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. Αἰσχρός, “shameful”, is not listed (see Good, bad and indifference).

1.2 From the repute and memory of his father Marcus has self-respect and manliness.

1.9.2 Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch’s nephew, was in tune with everyone, so that his company was more agreeable than flattery while he was held in the highest respect by the same people.

2.6 Marcus’ soul, its life almost done, will have no further chance to honour itself while it pays itself no respect and places its good lot in the souls of others.

2.13 What comes from the gods deserves respect because of virtue, and what comes from men deserves love because of kinship.

3.4.2 One must accustom oneself to form impressions only of what one could at once confess if asked, with nothing one would blush to confess one had in mind.

3.7 Nothing is to be honoured as advantageous that will force Marcus to break faith or abandon self-respect; the man who has chosen his mind and daimon will depart as if to do any other thing that can be done with self-respect and in good order.

3.16.2 Even if all men refuse to believe that the good man lives simply, with self-respect and in good spirits, he is not exasperated with any of them.

4.5 Death, like birth, is a mystery of nature, and in general not a thing one would be ashamed of.

4.20 What is truly beautiful needs nothing, no more than law, truth, goodwill or self-respect, and is not made beautiful by praise.

4.49.2 Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-controlled, sensible, free from rash assent, free from deceit, self-respecting and free.

5.33 The things prized in life are empty, while faith, self-respect, justice and truth have gone "to Olympus from the wide-wayed earth", in a line of Hesiod, the early Greek poet.

6.16.5 Respect and honour for one's own understanding will make a man pleasing to himself, in tune with his fellows and in accord with the gods.

6.30.1 Marcus is to strive to remain such as philosophy wanted to make him, and is told, "Respect the gods, preserve men."

6.35 Marcus asks whether it is not terrible if the architect and the doctor respect the reason of their own craft more than man respects his own, which he has in common with the gods.

6.40 In the things held together by nature the power that made them is within and remains, and so one must respect it the more.

6.48 To gladden himself Marcus is to consider the merits of those who live with him, the energy of one, the self-respect of another.

7.7 Marcus is not to be ashamed of being helped, as a lame soldier may need another to climb the battlement.

7.31 Marcus is to make himself bright with simplicity, self-respect and indifference towards what lies between virtue and vice, to love the human race and to follow God.

7.52 A man may be superior in one thing and yet not more social, nor more self-respecting, nor better ordered in what happens, nor more kindly towards the oversights of neighbours.

7.67 Marcus is not, because he has despaired of becoming a dialectician and a natural philosopher, to give up hope of being free, self-respecting, social and obedient to God.

8.5 Marcus is to act and speak as seems to him most just, only kindly, with self-respect and without pretence.

8.36 At each present hardship Marcus is to ask what in the work is unbearable, for he will be ashamed to admit it.

8.51 Marcus will have an ever-flowing spring and not a well if he guards himself every hour for freedom, with kindliness, simplicity and self-respect.

9.29 The work of philosophy is simple and self-respecting, and Marcus is not to be led away to solemn vanity.

9.42.1 When Marcus takes offence at someone's shamelessness, he is to ask at once whether there can be no shameless people in the universe.

10.8.1 Marcus is to keep the names he has given himself, good, self-respecting, truthful, sensible, consenting, transcending, and to return to them quickly if he loses them.

10.8.3 If he perceives that he is falling out of these names and not keeping the mastery, Marcus is to go into some corner where he will have the mastery, or else to go out of life, not in anger but simply, freely and with self-respect.

10.13 Those who are arrogant in praise and censure of others steal and snatch, not with hands and feet, but with the most honoured part of themselves, the

part from which, when it wants, come faith, self-respect, truth, law, a good daimon.

10.14 To nature, who gives all things and takes them back, the educated and self-respecting man says, "Give what you want; take back what you want."

11.1.2 Peculiar to the rational soul are the loving of neighbours, truth, self-respect and the honouring of nothing above itself.

11.28 Socrates' companions were ashamed and drew back when they saw him girt with a sheepskin after Xanthippe, his wife, had gone out with his cloak.

12.4 Each man loves himself most, yet men respect the view that those close by will take of them more than their own.

12.28 Asked where he has seen the gods, Marcus answers that they are even visible, and that, as he honours his own soul though he has not seen it, so from their power he grasps that they exist and respects them.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius tells that Zeno of Citium, the school's founder, was as a pupil of Crates the Cynic "self-respecting in the face of Cynic shamelessness", and that Crates, to cure him, had him carry a pot of lentil soup through the Ceramicus, the potters' quarter of Athens, and broke it with his staff when he saw him ashamed and trying to hide it.[154] Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, makes the self-respecting and the trustworthy the marks of a man. He asks whether we have nothing self-respecting by nature, and, when it is granted that we have, whether the man who destroys it loses nothing; and he goes on, "Have we not by nature something trustworthy, something affectionate, something helpful, something tolerant of one another?"[155] What tells the worse man from the better, as running tells one horse from another, may be, he suggests, "self-respect, faith, justice";[156] and when a man loses some outward thing, what he keeps in its place, if he watches his impressions, is "self-respect and faith and steadiness, freedom from passion, from distress,

[154] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.3.

[155] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.10.22–23.

[156] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.14.13.

from fear, from trouble; in a word, freedom".[157] Marcus' "break faith, abandon self-respect" (3.7), and his "faith and self-respect" at 5.33 and 10.13, can be read as keeping Epictetus' pair. Epictetus also ties αἰδώς to the blush: we are made "as free, as noble, as self-respecting. For what other living being blushes, what other takes an impression of the shameful?"[158] Marcus' blush at 3.4.2 can be read as the same sign turned into a test.

Translation in this edition

Αἰδώς is "self-respect" (3.7, 4.20, 5.33, 7.31, 10.13, 11.1.2), and "respect" once, at 6.16.5, where it has an object: "respect and honour for your own understanding". The edition uses neither "modesty" nor "shame" for it. Αἰδήμων is "self-respecting" (4.49.2, 7.67, 9.29, 10.8.1, 10.14), in the comparative "more self-respecting" (7.52); the neuter with the article, τὸ αἰδῆμον, is the noun "self-respect" (1.2, 6.48). At 7.52 "A better thrower" is καββαλικώτερος (*kabbalikōteros*), the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, which Leopold prints; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has καββαλιώτερος (*kabbaliōteros*). The adverb αἰδημόνως is "with self-respect" (3.7, 3.16.2, 8.5, 10.8.3), and "self-respect" at 8.51, where "together with" governs three adverbs: "together with kindliness and simplicity and self-respect". Αἰδέσιμος is rendered with "respect": "held in the highest respect" (1.9.2) and "deserves respect" (2.13). The verb αἰδεῖσθαι is "respect" (6.30.1, 6.35, 6.40, 12.4, 12.28), "pay … respect" in "you pay yourself no respect" (2.6), and "were ashamed" at 11.28, where the companions draw back from Socrates. "Revere" and "reverence" in the English render another verb, σέβειν (*sebein*), and its noun σεβασμός (*sebasmos*; 3.9, 4.16, 5.33, 6.10, 6.36, 12.28), so that respect and reverence are kept apart. Αἰσχύνεσθαι is "be ashamed" (4.5, 7.7, 8.36), ἐρυθριᾶν "blush" (3.4.2), ἀναισχυντία "shamelessness" and ἀναίσχυντος "shameless" (9.42.1). "Shameful" is always αἰσχρός (see Good, bad and indifference).

αἰδέομαι

Attested: αἰδουμένῃ (*aidoumenēi*; 2.6), αἰδοῦ (*aidou*; 6.30.1), αἰδέσονται (*aidesontai*; 6.35), αἰδεῖσθαι (*aideisthai*;

[157] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.3.1–7.

[158] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.7.27.

6.40), αἰδεσθεῖσι (*aidestheisi*; 11.28), αἰδούμεθα (*aidoumetha*; 12.4), αἰδοῦμαι (*aidoumai*; 12.28). To respect, to stand in awe of; to be ashamed. Its objects are the gods, "Respect the gods, preserve men" (6.30.1); the power within things held together by nature (6.40); the reason of one's craft or of oneself (6.35); and oneself, as men fail to do: "you pay yourself no respect" (2.6), "So much more do we respect those close by, what view they will take of us, than ourselves" (12.4). At 11.28 Socrates' companions "were ashamed and drew back". Lemma: αἰδέομαι.

αἰδέσιμος

Attested: αἰδεσιμώτατον (*aidesimōtaton*; 1.9.2), αἰδέσιμα (*aidesima*; 2.13). Deserving respect. Sextus' company was agreeable while "he was held in the highest respect by those very people" (1.9.2); "what comes from the gods deserves respect because of virtue" (2.13). Lemma: αἰδέσιμος.

αἰδήμων

Attested: αἰδῆμον (*aidēmon*; 1.2, 6.48, 9.29), αἰδημόνως (*aidēmonōs*; 3.7, 3.16.2, 8.5, 8.51, 10.8.3), αἰδήμονα (*aidēmona*; 4.49.2), αἰδημονέστερος (*aidēmonesteros*; 7.52), αἰδήμων (*aidēmōn*; 7.67, 10.8.1, 10.14). Self-respecting; with the article, self-respect; the adverb is "with self-respect", and "self-respect" after "together with" (8.51). It is one of the names Marcus gives himself, "good, self-respecting, truthful" (10.8.1), and a mark of philosophy: "The work of philosophy is simple and self-respecting" (9.29). The man who goes out of life is to go "simply and freely and with self-respect" (10.8.3). Lemma: αἰδήμων.

αἰδώς

Attested: αἰδῶ (*aidō*; 3.7), αἰδώς (*aidōs*; 4.20, 5.33, 6.16.5, 10.13, 11.1.2), αἰδοῖ (*aidoi*; 7.31). Self-respect, the respect that keeps a man from what is unworthy of him. "Make yourself bright with simplicity and self-respect" (7.31); it is peculiar to the rational soul (11.1.2), and with an object it is "respect and honour for your own understanding" (6.16.5), where "fellows" in the same sentence is κοινωνοῖς, a correction by Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which Leopold prints; P has κοινωνικοῖς, "the social", and A, the Vatican manuscript, omits the word. At 10.13 the relative before the list, ὅ, "which

becomes", is Leopold's own correction; the witnesses have ᾧ, "through which there comes to be". Lemma: αἰδώς.

αἰσχύνομαι

Attested: αἰσχυνθείη (*aischyntheiē*; 4.5), αἰσχύνου (*aischynou*; 7.7), αἰσχυνθήσῃ (*aischynthēsēi*; 8.36). To be ashamed. Death is "not a thing one would be ashamed of" (4.5); "Do not be ashamed of being helped" (7.7); asked what in the work is unbearable, "you will be ashamed to admit it" (8.36). Lemma: αἰσχύνομαι.

ἀναισχυντία

Attested: ἀναισχυντίᾳ (*anaischyntiāi*; 9.42.1). Shamelessness. "When you take offence at someone's shamelessness, ask yourself at once: Can there, then, be no shameless people in the universe?" (9.42.1). Lemma: ἀναισχυντία.

ἀναίσχυντος

Attested: ἀναίσχυντοι (*anaischyntoi*; 9.42.1), ἀναισχύντων (*anaischyntōn*; 9.42.1). Shameless. Such people must exist in the universe, "for this man too is one of those shameless people who must be in the universe" (9.42.1). Lemma: ἀναίσχυντος.

ἐρυθριάω

Attested: ἐρυθριάσειας (*erythriaseias*; 3.4.2). To blush. One is to form impressions only of what one could confess at once if asked, with nothing in them "you would blush to confess you had in mind" (3.4.2). Lemma: ἐρυθριάω.

See also

Annius Verus; Daimon; Desire and aversion; Fault and ignorance; Gods; Good, bad and indifference; Justice; Nature; Reputation and praise; Simplicity and sincerity; Truth and falsehood.

Simplicity and sincerity

Singleness without pretence · Meditations

ἁπλότης, haplotēs, "simplicity"; *ἁπλοῦς, haplous*, "simple", "simpler", "simply", "simplicity"; *ἁπλόω, haploō*, "make yourself simple"; *ἀφέλεια, apheleia*, "artlessness"; *ἀφελής, aphelēs*, "artless", "artlessly"; *γνήσιος, gnēsios*,

“genuinely”, “genuine”, “sincerely”, “sincere”; *ἀκίβδηλος, akibdēlos*, “genuineness”; *κίβδηλος, kibdēlos*, “counterfeit”; *ἅπλαστος, aplastos*, “unaffected”; *ἐπίπλαστος, epiplastos*, “feignedly”; *ὑπόκρισις, hypokrisis*, “pretence”, “acting”; *ὑποκρίνεσθαι, hypokrinesthai*, “pretends”, “pretend”, “pretending”; *ἀνυπόκριτος, anypokritos*, “without pretence”; *προσποιεῖσθαι, prospoieisthai*, “making a show”; *κομψεία, kompseia*, “elegance”, “pretentiousness”; *κομψός, kompsos*, “affected”, “fine”; *ἄκομψος, akompsos*, “unpretentious”; *τῦφος, typhos*, “vanity”; *ἀτυφία, atyphia*, “freedom from vanity”; *ἄτυφος, atyphos*, “without vanity”; *τυφοῦσθαι, typhousthai*, “puffed up with vanity”; *τύφεσθαι, typhesthai*, “is vain”

At a Glance

The word. Ἁπλοῦς is single, one-fold, the opposite of “double”; ἁπλότης is singleness of character. Ἀφέλεια is plainness without contrivance, γνήσιος the true-born and so the genuine, and ὑπόκρισις, the actor’s art, is pretence.

In the *Meditations*. Simplicity is what Marcus has not yet reached: “You will soon be dead, and you are not yet simple” (4.37); yet he asks who it is “that prevents you from being good and simple” (10.32). It must show without being announced: the man who says “I have chosen to deal with you simply” is “rotten and counterfeit”, and “studied simplicity is a knife” (11.15). Pretence is a violence the soul does to itself (2.16), and kindliness is invincible “if it is sincere and not a grin nor a pretence” (11.18.4).

In this edition. Ἁπλότης is “simplicity” and ἁπλοῦς “simple”, kept apart from ἀφέλεια, “artlessness”; γνήσιος is “genuine” or “sincere”, ὑπόκρισις “pretence” (once, of the stage, “acting”), ὑποκρίνεσθαι “pretend” and ἅπλαστος “unaffected”.

A place to read. 11.15, where the man who announces his simplicity is called counterfeit, and simplicity shows in the voice and the eyes.

Meaning

Ἁπλοῦς (*haplous*) is single, one-fold, as against διπλοῦς (*diplous*), “double”, and ἁπλότης (*haplotēs*) is singleness: in a character, nothing folded behind what shows. Its contraries in Marcus are the counterfeit and the acted part. Κίβδηλος (*kibdēlos*) is base, adulterated, as false coin is, and ἀκίβδηλος (*akibdēlos*) unalloyed. Ὑπόκρισις

(*hypokrisis*) is an actor's delivery on the stage before it is pretence in life; ἁπλαστος (*aplastos*), from πλάσσειν (*plassein*), "to mould", is unmoulded, unaffected, and ἐπιπλάστως (*epiplastōs*) is "feignedly". Γνήσιος (*gnēsios*) is the legitimate child, born of the true stock, and so the genuine. Ἀφέλεια (*apheleia*), plainness, is the quality of a letter written without contrivance (1.7.2); the edition keeps it apart from simplicity.

Use in the book

Book I shows the quality in persons before it names it. Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, taught Marcus "to write letters artlessly, like the one he himself wrote to my mother from Sinuessa" (1.7.2); Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew, showed "unaffected dignity" (1.9.1) and the habit "to speak good words without noise, and to be very learned without display" (1.9.3); of Claudius Maximus, the Stoic, "everyone believed he thought as he spoke" (1.15.2). From Fronto, his teacher of rhetoric, Marcus learned to attend to "the envy, the double-dealing and the pretence of a tyrant" (1.11). Simplicity begins within. He is to accustom himself to form impressions only of such things that if someone suddenly asked, "What are you thinking now?", "you could at once answer frankly, 'This and that'; so that from them it would be plain at once that everything is simple and kindly and belongs to a social living being …" (3.4.2).

He has not reached it. "You will soon be dead, and you are not yet simple, nor untroubled, nor free of the suspicion that you may be harmed from outside, nor serene towards all, nor placing wisdom in acting justly alone" (4.37). "For when will you enjoy simplicity?" he asks (10.9), and of his soul, "Will you ever, then, soul, be good and simple and one and naked, more manifest than the body that surrounds you?" (10.1; see Soul). Yet it lies with him: "And all this is in your power; for who is it that prevents you from being good and simple?" (10.32). Genuineness, τὸ ἀκίβδηλον (*to akibdēlon*), heads the qualities "wholly in your power", in which there is "no excuse of want of talent or unfitness" (5.5). So the commands: "Do not trouble yourself; make yourself simple" (4.26; see Justice); "Keep yourself, then, simple, good, untainted, dignified, unpretentious" (6.30.1); and, after "No more of this wretched life and grumbling and aping", "towards the gods too, now at last, become simpler and kinder" (9.37).

The chapter on simplicity is 11.15. “How rotten and counterfeit is he who says: ‘I have chosen to deal with you simply.’ What are you doing, man? One must not announce this. It will show itself; it ought to be written on the forehead; at once the voice rings so, at once it stands out in the eyes, as the beloved at once recognizes everything in the look of the lovers.” The announcement can be read as refuting itself: to declare one’s simplicity is to stand beside it and point. The next image is deliberately low: “The simple and good man must be altogether such, like a man whose armpits stink, so that whoever stands near, as soon as he approaches, perceives it, whether he wants or not.” Then: “But studied simplicity is a knife. Nothing is more shameful than a wolf’s friendship; flee this above all.” The knife, σκάλμη (*skalmē*), is a Thracian blade, as the edition’s note says; simplicity practised as a manner is a weapon. Even an example is doubted: Marcus will show a man what he overlooks “sincerely and with kindness, like the famous Phocion, unless indeed he was making a show” (11.13); Phocion is the Athenian general put to death in 318 BC.

The contrary of simplicity is ὑπόκρισις, the actor’s art, which Marcus names once in that sense: the rational soul reaches its end wherever life is cut short, “not as in a dance or in acting” (11.1.1; see Soul). Elsewhere it is pretence. The soul does violence to itself “when it pretends and does or says anything feignedly and falsely” (2.16; see Impulse); philosophy lies in doing nothing “falsely or with pretence” (2.17.2; see Daimon). Twice freedom from pretence goes with living each day as the last: Marcus will give himself leisure “if you do each act as the last of your life, free of … pretence” (2.5; “free” is Marcus’ by the correction of H. I. Polak, whose notes on the text appeared in *Hermes* in 1886, and the act’s in the manuscripts), and “This is what the perfection of character holds: to pass each day as the last, and to be neither feverish nor torpid nor pretending” (7.69). Kindliness is invincible “if it is sincere and not a grin nor a pretence” (11.18.4; see Anger).

Plainness of manner belongs here too. “Let no elegance dress up your understanding” (3.5; see Daimon), and the short road of nature frees one “from all management and pretentiousness” (4.51). Artlessness is one of the virtues a thing may call for (3.11.2), and in the last book it is the manner in which the others are to be shown: “how much more philosophical it is, in the material given, to show

oneself just, self-controlled, following the gods, artlessly; for the vanity that is vain under the cover of freedom from vanity is the hardest of all" (12.27). Simplicity in the notebook is not a style but the absence of a second self: thoughts that could be told at once (3.4.2), a soul as manifest as its body (10.1), goodness that shows like a smell (11.15). Claimed, it is counterfeit (11.15); worn as a manner, it can be read as the vanity that 12.27 calls the hardest of all. What Marcus can do is take away what stands in its way, pretence, elegance and the acted part, and let it show.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ἁπλότης, ἁπλοῦς (with its adverb ἁπλῶς), ἁπλόω, ἀφέλεια, ἀφελής, γνήσιος, ἀκίβδηλος, κίβδηλος, ἄπλαστος, ἐπίπλαστος, ὑπόκρισις, ὑποκρίνεσθαι, ἀνυπόκριτος, προσποιεῖσθαι, κομψεία, κομψός or ἄκομψος occurs, or an adverb of one of them, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided.

1.7.2 Rusticus taught Marcus to write letters artlessly, like the one Rusticus wrote to Marcus' mother from Sinuessa.

1.9.1 From Sextus Marcus had, among much else, unaffected dignity.

1.11 Fronto taught Marcus to attend to the envy, the double-dealing and the pretence of a tyrant.

1.17.8 Among the gods' gifts is that Marcus' wife is so obedient, so affectionate, so artless.

2.5 Marcus is to do what is in hand with exact and unaffected dignity, and will give himself leisure from other impressions if he does each act as the last of his life, without aimlessness, pretence or self-love.

2.13 It is enough to be with the daimon within oneself and to serve it genuinely (see Daimon).

2.16 The soul does violence to itself, fourth, when it pretends and does or says anything feignedly and falsely (see Impulse).

2.17.2 Philosophy lies in keeping the daimon within inviolate, doing nothing at random, nothing falsely or with pretence (see Daimon).

3.2.3 Many such things, not convincing to everyone, are for the man alone who has come into genuine affinity with nature and her works.

3.4.2 Marcus is to accustom himself to form impressions only of such things that, if suddenly asked what he is thinking, he could answer at once and frankly, and it would be plain that everything is simple and kindly.

3.5 No elegance is to dress up Marcus' understanding (see Daimon).

3.6.3 Marcus is to choose the better simply and freely, and hold fast to it (see Daimon).

3.7 Nothing is to be honoured as advantageous that will some day force Marcus to break faith, curse or pretend.

3.8 In the understanding of a man who has been chastened and purified there is nothing servile or affected.

3.11.2 Among the virtues a thing that presents itself may call for are gentleness, truth, good faith and artlessness (see Impression).

3.16.2 If all men refuse to believe that the good man lives simply, with self-respect and in good spirits, he is not exasperated with any of them (see Daimon).

4.26 Marcus is not to trouble himself but to make himself simple (see Justice).

4.28 A list of bad characters includes the stupid, the counterfeit and the buffoonish.

4.37 Marcus will soon be dead, and is not yet simple, nor untroubled, nor serene towards all.

4.51 The short road, the one according to nature, frees one from toils, dawdling, management and pretentiousness.

5.5 Genuineness heads the qualities wholly in Marcus' power, with dignity, kindliness, freedom and freedom from idle talk, in which want of talent is no excuse.

5.7 Either one must not pray, or pray as the Athenians do, simply and freely.

5.9 Pleasure trips one up by seeming agreeable; Marcus is to look whether greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, fair-mindedness and holiness are more agreeable (see Philosophy).

6.30.1 So as not to be made into a Caesar, Marcus is to keep himself simple, good, untainted, dignified and unpretentious.

7.31 Marcus is to make himself bright with simplicity and self-respect (see Self-respect and shame).

7.69 The perfection of character is to pass each day as the last, neither feverish nor torpid nor pretending.

8.5 Marcus is to do what the nature of man demands and speak as seems to him most just, only kindly, with self-respect and without pretence.

8.34 Of the man who cuts himself off from the whole: "But here is the fine thing", that he can unite himself again.

8.51 Marcus will have an ever-flowing spring and not a well if he guards himself every hour for freedom, with kindliness, simplicity and self-respect.

9.2 It would have been the part of a more gracious man to leave life without a taste of lying, pretence, luxury and vanity.

9.29 Marcus asks what else there is, without a change of principles, but the slavery of men making a show of obeying; the work of philosophy is simple and self-respecting (see Philosophy).

9.37 Marcus is now at last to become simpler and kinder towards the gods too.

9.39 Marcus asks whether, being troubled, he is telling his ruling centre that it is dead, has become a beast, is pretending (see Providence and atoms).

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever be good and simple and one and naked, more manifest than the body that surrounds it.

10.8.3 If Marcus perceives that he is not keeping the mastery, he is to withdraw into some corner, or else go out of life, not in anger but simply and freely and with self-respect (see Self-respect and shame).

10.9 Marcus asks when he will enjoy simplicity, dignity and the recognition of each thing.

10.32 No one is to be able to say truly that Marcus is not simple or not good; Marcus asks who prevents him from being good and simple.

11.1.1 The rational soul reaches its end wherever life is cut short, not as in a dance or in acting (see Soul).

11.13 Marcus will show a man what he overlooks sincerely and with kindness, like Phocion, unless Phocion was making a show.

11.15 The man who announces that he will deal simply is counterfeit; simplicity must show itself, and studied simplicity is a knife.

11.18.4 The ninth head: kindliness is invincible, if it is sincere and not a grin nor a pretence (see Anger).

12.27 It is more philosophical to show oneself just, self-controlled, following the gods, artlessly; the vanity that hides under freedom from vanity is the hardest.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the third-century author of the *Lives of the Philosophers*, setting out the Stoic account of the wise and serious man, gives him Marcus' words. The wise man is ἄτυφος (*atyphos*), without vanity, being alike towards good repute and bad; but there is another man without vanity, ranked with the careless, and he is base. The serious are ἀκίβδηλοι, genuine, and ἄπλαστοι, unmoulded, for they have removed what is moulded and put on, τὸ πλάσμα (*to plasma*), from their voice and their bearing.[159] Marcus' "genuineness" (5.5) and "unaffected dignity" (1.9.1, 2.5) are these words, and the simplicity of 11.15 shows in the voice and the eyes; the "vanity that is vain under the cover of freedom from vanity" (12.27) can be read beside the school's two kinds of freedom from vanity. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, shows how a show of simplicity is used as a snare. When a man seems to have spoken simply, ἁπλῶς, about his own affairs, we are drawn to bring out our own secrets and think this simple, since keeping our own affairs to ourselves, we suppose, would not look like simple men; so in Rome the rash are caught by soldiers: a soldier dressed as a civilian takes a seat beside a man and starts abusing Caesar; the man, treating the soldier's having begun the abuse as a pledge of good faith, says all that he himself thinks, and is put in chains and taken off.[160] Marcus' "studied

[159] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.117–118.

[160] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.13.1–5.

simplicity is a knife" and his wolf's friendship (11.15) can be read as the same snare.

Other ancient sources

Plato, Socrates' pupil, gives ἁπλοῦς its weight. In the *Republic* Glaucon, Plato's brother, pressing Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, to defend justice, sets beside the perfectly unjust man the just man, "simple and noble", who, in a line Glaucon adapts from Aeschylus, the Athenian tragic poet, wants not to seem good but to be so; the seeming, Glaucon says, must be taken away.[161] Socrates asks whether god is a wizard who changes his shape and deceives, or "simple" and least of all things to depart from his own form, and concludes that god is "simple and true in deed and in word", and neither alters himself nor misleads others.[162] Marcus' "good and simple and one and naked" (10.1) can be read as Plato's simple god made a demand on the soul, and 11.15 as Glaucon's taking away of the seeming. The wolf of 11.15 the edition's note compares with the close of Socrates' first speech in Plato's *Phaedrus*, where the lover's friendship comes not with goodwill but like an appetite for food: "as wolves love lambs, so lovers love a boy".[163]

Translation in this edition

Ἁπλότης is "simplicity" at its four places (5.9, 7.31, 10.9, 11.15) and ἁπλοῦς "simple", "simpler" in the comparative (9.37); the adverb ἁπλῶς is "simply" (3.6.3, 3.16.2, 5.7, 10.8.3, 11.15) and, in a row of nouns after "together with", "simplicity" (8.51). Ἁπλῶς is in Marcus always the moral word, of choosing (3.6.3), living (3.16.2), praying (5.7), guarding oneself (8.51), dying (10.8.3) and dealing with another (11.15), never the weak "merely". Ἅπλωσον σεαυτόν is "make yourself simple" (4.26). The Glossary keeps "simplicity" apart from "artlessness": ἀφέλεια is "artlessness" (3.11.2), ἀφελής "artless" (1.17.8) and ἀφελῶς "artlessly" (1.7.2, 12.27). Γνήσιος goes by sense: "genuinely" (2.13), "genuine" for the adverb with "affinity" (3.2.3), "sincerely" (11.13) and "sincere" (11.18.4); "genuineness" renders another word, τὸ ἀκίβδηλον (5.5), and κίβδηλος is

[161] Plato, *Republic* 2, 361b; Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes* 592, where the Scout says of the seer Amphiaraus that he wishes not to seem the best but to be it. On Plato and Glaucon, Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 3.4, 3.6.

[162] Plato, *Republic* 2, 380d and 382e.

[163] Plato, *Phaedrus* 241c–d.

“counterfeit” (4.28, 11.15). Ἄπλαστος is “unaffected” in “unaffected dignity”, for the adverb with a noun, σεμνὸν ἁπλάστως (*semnon aplastōs*; 1.9.1), and for the adjective (2.5); ἐπιπλάστως is “feignedly” (2.16). Ὑπόκρισις is “pretence” (1.11, 2.5, 2.17.2, 9.2, 11.18.4) and “acting” at 11.1.1, of the stage; ὑποκρίνεσθαι is “pretend” in its forms (2.16, 3.7, 7.69, 9.39); ἀνυποκρίτως is “without pretence” (8.5); προσποιεῖσθαι is “making a show of” (9.29) and “making a show” (11.13). Κομψεία is “elegance” (3.5) and “pretentiousness” (4.51), κομψός “affected” (3.8) and, in its ordinary sense, “the fine thing” (8.34), and ἄκομψος “unpretentious” (6.30.1). At 11.15 three words rest on editors or are disputed. “It will show itself” is the αὐτό of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, for the manuscripts’ αὐτοῦ, “on the spot”; “rings” is ἠχεῖ, the correction of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, and of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*, for ἔχει, “has”; and for the knife, σκάλμη, Claudius Salmasius, the seventeenth-century French scholar, proposed σκαμβή, “crooked”. Τῦφος (*typhos*) is “vanity” at all eight of its places (1.17.3, 2.12, 2.17.1, 6.13, 9.2, 11.18.1, 12.24, 12.27), ἀτυφία (*atyphia*) “freedom from vanity” (11.6.2, 12.27) and the adverb ἀτύφως (*atyphōs*) “without vanity” (1.16.4, 3.6.3, 8.33); τετυφωμένοι (*tetyphōmenoi*), of τυφοῦσθαι (*typhousthai*), is “puffed up with vanity” (8.25), and τυφόμενος (*typhomenos*), of τύφεσθαι (*typhesthai*), “that is vain” in “the vanity that is vain under the cover of freedom from vanity” (12.27); and the compound σεμνοτυφία (*semnotyphia*) is “solemn vanity” (9.29).

ἀκίβδηλος

Attested: ἀκίβδηλον (*akibdēlon*; 5.5). Unalloyed, not counterfeit; with the article, genuineness. Marcus is to offer what is “wholly in your power: genuineness, dignity, the bearing of hardship” (5.5). Lemma: ἀκίβδηλος.

ἄκομψος

Attested: ἄκομψον (*akompson*; 6.30.1). Without elegance or affectation; unpretentious. “Keep yourself, then, simple, good, untainted, dignified, unpretentious” (6.30.1). Lemma: ἄκομψος.

ἀνυπόκριτος

Attested: the adverb ἀνυποκρίτως (*anypokritōs*; 8.5). Without pretence. Marcus is to do what the nature of man demands, and speak as seems to him most just, “only kindly and with self-respect and without pretence” (8.5). Lemma: ἀνυπόκριτος.

ἄπλαστος

Attested: ἀπλάστου (*aplastou*; 2.5); the adverb ἀπλάστως (*aplastōs*; 1.9.1). Unmoulded, unaffected. From Sextus, “unaffected dignity” (1.9.1); Marcus is to do what is in hand “with exact and unaffected dignity” (2.5). Lemma: ἄπλαστος.

ἁπλότης

Attested: ἁπλότης (*haplotēs*; 5.9), ἁπλότητι (*haplotēti*; 7.31), ἁπλότητος (*haplotētos*; 10.9, 11.15). Singleness, simplicity of character. “Make yourself bright with simplicity and self-respect” (7.31; see Self-respect and shame); “For when will you enjoy simplicity?” (10.9); “But studied simplicity is a knife” (11.15). Lemma: ἁπλότης.

ἁπλοῦς

Attested: ἁπλᾶ (*hapla*; 3.4.2), ἁπλοῦς (*haplous*; 4.37, 10.32, 11.15), ἁπλοῦν (*haploun*; 6.30.1, 9.29, 10.32, 11.15), ἁπλούστερος (*haplousteros*; 9.37), ἁπλῇ (*haplē*; 10.1); the adverb ἁπλῶς (*haplōs*; 3.6.3, 3.16.2, 5.7, 8.51, 10.8.3, 11.15). Single, simple, without a second fold. “You will soon be dead, and you are not yet simple” (4.37); “The work of philosophy is simple and self-respecting” (9.29; see Philosophy); “Will you ever, then, soul, be good and simple and one and naked” (10.1). The adverb: “choose the better simply and freely” (3.6.3; see Daimon); “I have chosen to deal with you simply” (11.15). Lemma: ἁπλοῦς.

ἁπλόω

Attested: ἅπλωσον (*haplōson*; 4.26). To make single, to make simple. “Do not trouble yourself; make yourself simple” (4.26; see Justice). Lemma: ἁπλόω.

ἀτυφία

Attested: ἀτυφίας (*atyphias*; 11.6.2), ἀτυφίᾳ (*atyphiāi*; 12.27). Freedom from smoke, freedom from vanity. The Old Comedy was brought on “with a schoolmaster’s frankness, and of freedom from vanity reminding not uselessly, through

its very plain speaking" (11.6.2; see Speech and silence); and the hardest vanity hides under this freedom (12.27). Lemma: ἀτυφία.

ἄτυφος

Attested: the adverb ἀτύφως (*atyphōs*; 1.16.4, 3.6.3, 8.33). Without smoke, without vanity. Antoninus used the things that make for ease of living "without vanity and at the same time without apology" (1.16.4); where a thing is advantageous to him as a living being, Marcus is to "declare it, and guard the judgement without vanity" (3.6.3); "Take without vanity; let go as one ready to be released" (8.33). Lemma: ἄτυφος.

ἀφέλεια

Attested: ἀφελείας (*apheleias*; 3.11.2). Plainness, artlessness. Among the virtues a thing may call for: "gentleness, courage, truth, good faith, artlessness, self-sufficiency and the rest" (3.11.2; see Impression). Lemma: ἀφέλεια.

ἀφελής

Attested: ἀφελῆ (*aphelē*; 1.17.8); the adverb ἀφελῶς (*aphelōs*; 1.7.2, 12.27). Plain, artless. Rusticus taught Marcus "to write letters artlessly" (1.7.2); his wife is "so artless" (1.17.8); it is more philosophical "to show oneself just, self-controlled, following the gods, artlessly" (12.27). Lemma: ἀφελής.

γνήσιος

Attested: γνήσιον (*gnēsion*; 11.18.4); the adverb γνησίως (*gnēsiōs*; 2.13, 3.2.3, 11.13). Legitimate, true-born; genuine, sincere. It is enough to be with the daimon within and "to serve it genuinely" (2.13; see Daimon); many such things "will strike only the man who has come into genuine affinity with nature and her works" (3.2.3); "sincerely and with kindness" (11.13); "if it is sincere and not a grin nor a pretence" (11.18.4; see Anger). Lemma: γνήσιος.

ἐπίπλαστος

Attested: the adverb ἐπιπλάστως (*epiplastōs*; 2.16). Moulded on, put on; feigned. The soul does violence to itself "when it pretends and does or says anything feignedly and falsely" (2.16; see Impulse). Lemma: ἐπίπλαστος.

κίβδηλος

Attested: κίβδηλον (*kibdēlon*; 4.28), κίβδηλος (*kibdēlos*; 11.15). Adulterated, as false coin; counterfeit. In a list of bad characters, “stupid, counterfeit, buffoonish” (4.28); “How rotten and counterfeit is he who says” that he will deal simply (11.15). Lemma: κίβδηλος.

κομψεία

Attested: κομψεία (*kompseia*; 3.5), κομψείας (*kompseias*; 4.51). Refinement, cleverness; elegance put on. “Let no elegance dress up your understanding” (3.5; see Daimon); “Always run the short road”, which frees one “from all management and pretentiousness” (4.51). Lemma: κομψεία.

κομψός

Attested: κομψόν (*kompson*; 3.8, 8.34). Refined, clever; affected. In the purified understanding there is “nothing servile in it, or affected” (3.8); in the ordinary sense, of the power to reunite with the whole, “But here is the fine thing” (8.34). Lemma: κομψός.

προσποιέω

Attested: προσποιουμένων (*prospoioumenōn*; 9.29), προσεποιεῖτο (*prosepoieito*; 11.13). In the middle, to make a show of, to pretend. Without a change of principles, Marcus asks, “what else is there but slavery of men groaning and making a show of obeying?” (9.29; see Philosophy); Phocion was sincere, “unless indeed he was making a show” (11.13). Lemma: προσποιέω.

τῦφος

Attested: τῦφον (*typhon*; 1.17.3), τύφῳ (*typhōi*; 2.12), τῦφος (*typhos*; 2.17.1, 6.13, 12.24, 12.27), τύφου (*typhou*; 9.2, 11.18.1). Smoke, vapour; in the Cynics’ use, delusion and self-importance, as the edition’s note at 1.17.3 says, and so vanity. Marcus was placed under a ruler and father “who was to take all vanity out of me” (1.17.3); the objects of sense are “cried up by vanity” (2.12); “all that belongs to the soul dream and vanity” (2.17.1), where beside “dream” the word can be read as keeping its first sense of smoke; “For vanity is a terrible deceiver” (6.13; see Definition and analysis); it would have been the part of a more gracious man to depart “without a taste of lying and of all pretence and luxury and vanity” (9.2); Marcus is to consider “with what vanity they do these very things too” (11.18.1; see Anger); of human things

seen from above, “On these, the vanity” (12.24); and “the vanity that is vain under the cover of freedom from vanity is the hardest of all” (12.27). Lemma: τῦφος.

τυφόω

Attested: τετυφωμένοι (*tetyphōmenoi*; 8.25). To fill with smoke; in the passive, to be puffed up, to be vain. “And those sharp men, either foreseers or puffed up with vanity, where are they?” (8.25). Lemma: τυφόω.

τύφω

Attested: τυφόμενος (*typhomenos*; 12.27). To raise smoke; in the passive, to smoulder. In “the vanity that is vain under the cover of freedom from vanity is the hardest of all” (12.27), the Greek can be read as saying that the smoke that smoulders under freedom from smoke is the hardest. Lemma: τύφω.

ὑποκρίνομαι

Attested: ὑποκρίνηται (*hypokrinētai*; 2.16), ὑποκρίνασθαι (*hypokrinasthai*; 3.7), ὑποκρίνεσθαι (*hypokrinesthai*; 7.69), ὑποκρίνῃ (*hypokrinēi*; 9.39). To play a part on the stage; to pretend. The soul does violence to itself “when it pretends” (2.16; see Impulse); nothing is to be honoured that will force a man to “pretend” (3.7); the perfection of character is to be “neither feverish nor torpid nor pretending” (7.69). Lemma: ὑποκρίνομαι.

ὑπόκρισις

Attested: ὑπόκρισις (*hypokrisis*; 1.11, 11.18.4), ὑποκρίσεως (*hypokriseōs*; 2.5, 2.17.2, 9.2, 11.1.1). Delivery on the stage, acting; pretence. “the pretence of a tyrant” (1.11); “nothing falsely or with pretence” (2.17.2; see Daimon); “not as in a dance or in acting” (11.1.1; see Soul); “if it is sincere and not a grin nor a pretence” (11.18.4; see Anger). Lemma: ὑπόκρισις.

See also

Anger; Daimon; Definition and analysis; Impression; Impulse; Justice; Philosophy; Providence and atoms; Reputation and praise; Self-respect and shame; Soul; Speech and silence; Virtue and excellence.

Mastering oneself, abstaining and enjoying · Meditations

κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ, kratein heautou, “self-mastery”; *κρατεῖν, kratein*, “mastering”, “have the mastery”, “prevails”, “holds”; *περικρατεῖν, perikratein*, “keeping the mastery”; *κατακρατεῖν, katakratein*, “overpower”, “be mastered”; *ἐγκράτεια, enkrateia*, “continence”; *ἐγκρατής, enkratēs*, “master of”; *ἡσσᾶσθαι, hēssasthai*, “be overcome”; *ἀήττητος, aēttētos*, “unconquerable”; *ἀνένδοτος, anendotos*, “refusing to yield”; *ἐνδοτικῶς, endotikōs*, “give way to”; *ἐνδιδόναι, endidonai*, “give in”; *ἀκόλαστος, akolastos*, “licentious”; *ἀκολάστημα, akolastēma*, “acts of … licence”; *ἀπέχεσθαι, apechesthai*, “abstain from”; *ἀπέχειν, apechein*, “have in full”, “has”; *ἀποχή, apochē*, “go without”; *ἀπολαύειν, apolauein*, “enjoy”, “have … enjoyment”; *ἀπόλαυσις, apolausis*, “enjoyment”, “enjoy”; *ἀπολαυστικός, apolaustikos*, “self-indulgent”; *νήφειν, nēphein*, “sobriety”, “be sober”; *ἐννήφειν, ennēphein*, “keep sober”; *ἀνανήφειν, ananēphein*, “sober up”; *σωφροσύνη, sōphrosynē*, “self-control”; *σώφρων, sōphrōn*, “self-controlled”, “with self-control”, “chaste”; *λιτός, litos*, “frugality”, “frugal”

At a Glance

The word. Κρατεῖν is to have power over, κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ to have power over oneself, and ἐγκράτεια continence, the power held within. The contrary is ἡσσᾶσθαι, to be worsted, as a man is “overcome by pleasure”. Σωφροσύνη, self-control, is one of the four primary virtues of the Stoics.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus learned “self-mastery” from Claudius Maximus, the Stoic (1.15.1), and saw in Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, what is recorded of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher (see Socrates), that “he could both abstain from and enjoy” what the many are too weak to go without (1.16.9). The intelligent motion is “never to be overcome by the motion of sense or of impulse” (7.55). Nature has given measures for rest, eating and drinking (5.1.2).

In this edition. Τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ is “self-mastery” and ἐγκράτεια “continence”, both kept apart from σωφροσύνη, “self-control”; ἡσσᾶσθαι is always “be overcome”, ἀπέχεσθαι “abstain from”, ἀπολαύειν “enjoy” and ἀπόλαυσις “enjoyment”.

A place to read. 1.16.9–10, where what is recorded of Socrates, that he could both abstain from and enjoy what the many cannot, is fitted to Antoninus.

Meaning

Κρατεῖν (*kratein*), from κράτος (*kratos*), "strength", is to prevail or to hold; κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ (*kratein heautou*) is to be master of oneself. Ἐγκράτεια (*enkrateia*) is the power held within, continence, and ἐγκρατής (*enkratēs*) one who has a thing in his power. The usual words for the failure, ἀκρασία (*akrasia*) and ἀκρατής (*akratēs*), do not occur in the *Meditations*; Marcus' word is ἡσσᾶσθαι (*hēssasthai*), to be the weaker, and so worsted. Ἀκόλαστος (*akolastos*), "unchastened", is licentious. Ἀπέχεσθαι (*apechesthai*) is to hold oneself off from a thing, ἀπολαύειν (*apolauein*) to enjoy it, and νήφειν (*nēphein*) to be sober. Σωφροσύνη (*sōphrosynē*), soundness of mind, is temperance, a primary virtue for the Stoics (see Virtue and excellence), who ranked continence under the primary virtues. In Marcus σωφροσύνη and σώφρων (*sōphrōn*) stand in lists of the virtues, and once of "chaste eyes" (3.2.3); his teaching runs through the words of mastering and being overcome, of abstaining and enjoying.

Use in the book

Self-mastery comes first as a trait of other men. From Maximus Marcus learned "self-mastery, and not being carried off by anything" (1.15.1). Antoninus touched the comforts fortune supplied "without making a point of it when they were there and did not need them when they were not" (1.16.4), and what is recorded of Socrates would fit him, "that he could both abstain from and enjoy" what the many "are too weak to go without and give way to when they enjoy them" (1.16.9). The many fail twice; the virtue is to be free in both. The next sentence can be read as applying to going without and enjoying alike: "To be strong and to hold out, and to keep sober, in each case, is the mark of a man with a sound and unconquerable soul, as in the illness of Maximus" (1.16.10). "To hold out" is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; and the closing words, the edition's note says, do not follow clearly from what precedes.

In his own case Marcus sets restraint among the gifts of the gods: “that I did not touch Benedicta or Theodotus, but that even later, when I fell into passions of love, I was cured of them” (1.17.7; compare 1.17.2). Both were probably of the household, the edition’s note says. What he records in Maximus as a lesson he records in himself as a gift.

The ground of self-mastery is the order of man’s constitution. After the social comes “refusing to yield to what the body undergoes; for it is peculiar to rational and intelligent motion to mark its own bounds and never to be overcome by the motion of sense or of impulse; for both are animal, but the intelligent wants to have the first place and not to be mastered by them. Justly, too; for it is by nature able to make use of all of them” (7.55; see Impulse). Being overcome is the reverse: the soul does violence to itself “when it is overcome by pleasure or pain” (2.16; see Impulse), and the last of the four turnings of the ruling centre to be wiped away is “the mark of the more divine part in you being overcome and bowing before the less honoured and mortal lot, the body’s” (11.19). In the comparison of Theophrastus, Aristotle’s successor, which Marcus approves, the man who does wrong “overcome by pleasure” is “somehow more licentious” than the man in a rage (2.10; see Desire and aversion). Praise, office, wealth, “or the enjoyment of pleasures”, “even if they seem for a while to fit, suddenly overpower and sweep away” (3.6.3), and against pleasure Marcus sees one virtue, continence (8.39; see Justice). Mastery lost is regained by return: he “will be more master of the harmony by continually returning to it” (6.11; see Tranquillity).

Abstinence is not the aim. To the plea that one must rest Marcus answers, in Leopold’s text, “I say so too; but nature has given measures for this too, … for eating and drinking too, and yet you go beyond the measures, beyond what is enough” (5.1.2): the fault is in the measure. Enjoyment keeps a good sense. Marcus asks, “For when will you enjoy simplicity?” (10.9), and tells himself that “one must form the opinion that everything is an enjoyment which it is open to one to enact according to one’s own nature” (10.33.1); the word passes from pleasures to acts. What keeps the mastery is sobriety, “Sober up, and call yourself back” (6.31), and analysis: a song is despised if it is divided into its notes and one asks of each “whether you are overcome by it; for you will be abashed” (11.2; see Definition and analysis).

Temperance in the *Meditations* is less a virtue of appetite than the rule of the mind over what the body undergoes, shown alike in going without and in enjoying. Its model is a man who could take or leave what the many can neither leave nor take soberly.

Places to read

Every chapter in which σωφροσύνη, σώφρων or a word of the sub-entries occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with 11.2, where "overcome by" renders ἥττων (*hēttōn*), "weaker than", and four passages that treat self-mastery without the words (1.16.4, 1.17.2, 1.17.7, 5.1.2). Κρατεῖν where it means to prevail or to hold (9.9.3, 12.6) and ἀπέχειν where it means to have in full (9.42.4, 11.1.1) are given in the sub-entries; ἐπικρατεῖν (*epikratein*; 4.1) and παρακρατεῖν (*parakratein*; 11.20.1), said of fire and of the elements, are left out.

1.15.1 From Claudius Maximus Marcus learned self-mastery and not being carried off by anything.

1.16.3 Antoninus Pius showed no courting of the people and no playing to the crowd, but sobriety in everything, and steadiness.

1.16.4 Antoninus used the comforts fortune supplied without vanity and without apology, touching them without making a point of it when they were there and not needing them when they were not.

1.16.9 What is recorded of Socrates would fit Antoninus: he could both abstain from and enjoy the things the many are too weak to go without and give way to when they enjoy them.

1.16.10 To be strong, to hold out and to keep sober, in each case, is the mark of a man with a sound and unconquerable soul, as in the illness of Maximus.

1.17.2 Among his debts to the gods Marcus counts that he preserved his bloom and did not become a man before the time, but even put it off.

1.17.7 Marcus thanks the gods that he did not touch Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, when he later fell into passions of love, he was cured of them.

2.5 Marcus will give himself leisure from other impressions if he does each act as the last of his life; few are the things by mastering which a man can live a smoothly flowing and godly life.

2.10 Theophrastus judges offences of craving graver than those of rage: the man who does wrong through craving, overcome by pleasure, is seen to be more licentious, and wrong done with pleasure is more open to a charge.

2.16 The soul does violence to itself, among other ways, when it is overcome by pleasure or pain.

3.2.3 If a man has a deeper conception of what happens in the whole, he will be able to see a ripeness in the old and the loveliness of boys with his own chaste eyes.

3.4.2 Marcus is to accustom himself to form impressions only of what he could disclose at once if asked, as becomes one who cares nothing for pleasurable or self-indulgent imaginings.

3.6.1 If Marcus finds in human life anything better than justice, truth, self-control and courage, he is to turn to it with his whole soul and enjoy the best he has found.

3.6.3 Nothing of another kind, such as the praise of the many, office, wealth or the enjoyment of pleasures, is to be set up against the rational good; all these, even if they seem for a while to fit, suddenly overpower and sweep away.

4.26 Life is short, and one must make gain of the present with sound reasoning and justice; Marcus is to be sober.

4.49.2 Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-controlled, sensible and the rest, through whose presence together man's nature has what is its own.

5.1.2 One must rest too, Marcus grants, but nature has given measures for rest, eating and drinking, and he goes beyond them, while in actions he stays within what is possible.

5.12 Whoever has conceived of wisdom, self-control, justice and courage as truly goods could not listen to the comic poet's phrase about the goods.

5.33 Until his time comes it is enough for Marcus to revere the gods, to do good to men, and to bear with them and to abstain from them.

6.11 When circumstances have thoroughly troubled him, Marcus is to return quickly into himself, for he will be more master of the harmony by continually returning to it.

6.31 Marcus is to sober up and call himself back, and, as one roused from dreams that vexed him, look at these things as he looked at those.

7.55 Second in the constitution of man is refusing to yield to what the body undergoes: the intelligent motion is never to be overcome or mastered by the motions of sense and impulse, which it is by nature able to use.

7.63 In a saying Marcus quotes, every soul is deprived of truth unwillingly; so too, he adds, of justice, self-control and kindliness.

7.64 Drowsiness, heat and loss of appetite are the same as pain, and when he is discontented with them Marcus is to say that he is giving in to pain.

8.1 Living well is found not in syllogisms, wealth, fame or enjoyment, but in doing what man's nature seeks, and nothing is good for a man which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous and free.

8.32 Nothing from outside stands in the way of justice, self-control and sound reckoning.

8.39 Marcus sees in the constitution of the rational living being no virtue that rises in revolt against justice, but against pleasure he sees continence.

8.51 Marcus asks what killing and cursing are to the understanding's remaining pure, sane, self-controlled and just.

9.1.3 He who pursues pleasures will not abstain from acting unjustly, and this is plainly impious (see Justice).

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever be full and without want, craving nothing for the enjoyment of pleasures, nor time for longer enjoyment.

10.8.3 If he perceives that he is falling out of his names and not keeping the mastery, Marcus is to go into some corner where he will have the mastery, or else out of life.

10.9 Marcus asks when he will enjoy simplicity, dignity and the recognition of each thing.

10.33.1 Everything that it is open to one to enact according to one's own nature, in the material laid before one, is to be thought an enjoyment.

11.2 A song, dancing and the pancratium will be despised if Marcus divides each into its parts and asks of each whether he is overcome by it.

11.9 To be exasperated with those who stand in the way is weak, as it is weak to give in from being dismayed.

11.18.2 Even if Marcus abstains from certain wrongs, he still has the state inclined to them, even if it is through cowardice, courting of fame or the like that he abstains.

11.19 Among the turnings of the ruling centre to be wiped away is the mark of the more divine part being overcome and bowing before the body's mortal lot.

11.20.2 The motion towards acts of injustice and of licence, angers, distresses and fears is the mark of one standing apart from nature.

11.37 In words Marcus gives to Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, one must abstain altogether from desire and use avoidance towards none of the things not in our power.

12.15 Marcus asks whether the lamp shines until it is quenched while the truth, justice and self-control in him will be quenched first.

12.27 It is more philosophical, in the material given, to show oneself just, self-controlled, following the gods, artlessly.

12.29 The preservation of life is to see each thing through and through and to do what is just and say what is true; what remains is to enjoy life, joining one good thing to another.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its seventh book, ranks continence, ἐγκράτεια, among the

virtues placed under the four primary ones, and defines it as "a disposition not to be overstepped in what accords with right reason, or a state not to be worsted by pleasures"; after the word for justice his text has a gap, and temperance itself goes undefined. Among the vices placed under the primary ones he names lack of self-control, ἀκρασία; licentiousness, ἀκολασία (*akolasia*), is one of the primary vices themselves (see Fault and ignorance).[164] The definition's ἀήττητος (*aēttētos*), "not to be worsted", is the word of the "unconquerable soul" of 1.16.10, and of one root with Marcus' "never to be overcome" (7.55). Epictetus held that every state is kept and increased by the acts that answer to it, so that whoever is overcome by desire for someone is to reckon not this one defeat, but that he has nourished his want of self-control and enlarged it.[165] His *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of his teaching, asks for restraint without display. The things of the body are to be taken up to bare use and no further, and everything kept for appearance or for luxury cut out; in love a man should stay clean before marriage so far as he is able, yet he is not to weigh on those who make use of it, or censure them, or be forever pointing out that he himself does without; and one who has accustomed his body to cheap fare is not to make a show of it, nor, if he drinks only water, to say so at every opening, and any training for hardship is to be for himself, not for others to see.[166] Antoninus' use of comforts "without making a point of it" (1.16.4) can be read beside these rules. Aulus Gellius, the Roman writer of the second century, heard from Favorinus of Arelate, the philosopher and orator, that Epictetus called intolerance and incontinence the two vices heaviest and foulest by far, the one when men neither tolerate nor bear the wrongs that must be borne, the other when they do not keep themselves from the things and pleasures they should keep from; whoever held two words in his heart, he said, and took care to rule and watch himself by them, would seldom go wrong and would live in the greatest calm: ἀνέχου (*anechou*), "bear with", and ἀπέχου (*apechou*), "abstain".[167] The edition's note at 5.33 hears the

[164] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.92–93.

[165] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.18.1–6.

[166] Epictetus, *Handbook* 33.7–8 and 47.

[167] Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 17.19.5–6; the edition's note at 5.33 cites 17.19.6.

pair in Marcus' "to bear with them and to abstain from them", where the object is men.

Other ancient sources

The saying fitted to Antoninus at 1.16.9 comes, as the edition's note there records, from Plato's *Symposium*, where Alcibiades, the Athenian general who served with Socrates at Potidaea, recalls him on campaign. After telling how Socrates outlasted everyone when the army was cut off and had to go without food (see Body and flesh), Alcibiades goes on: at feasts he alone was able to enjoy them, ἀπολαύειν, Marcus' word; he would not drink of his own will, but when pressed he outdrank everyone, ἐκράτει (*ekratei*); and, strangest of all, no man had ever seen Socrates the worse for wine.[168] Xenophon, the Athenian soldier and writer whose *Memorabilia* record conversations of Socrates, calls him the most continent of all men, ἐγκρατέστατος (*enkratestatos*), in love and at table, and so trained to want only what is moderate that with very little he easily had enough.[169] He ate only as much as he could eat with pleasure, came to his food so that his appetite was his relish, and every drink tasted sweet to him, since he never drank unless thirsty; in love he held off from the loveliest more readily than others from the ugliest; and so prepared, his pleasure, he thought, would be no smaller than that of men who went to great lengths over these things, and his pain far smaller.[170] In conversation with Euthydemus, who had collected the writings of famous poets and sophists and thought himself wiser than others of his age, he makes continence the condition of pleasure itself: lack of self-control, which will not let a man hold out against hunger, thirst, desire and want of sleep, through which alone eating, drinking, love, rest and sleep are pleasant, keeps him from pleasure worth the name, while continence alone, making him hold out, makes him feel pleasure worth remembering.[171] Antoninus' power both to abstain and to enjoy can be read as this Socrates in an emperor's life.

[168] Plato, *Symposium* 219e–220a, as the edition's note at 1.16.9 records.
[169] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.1.
[170] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.3.5, 1.3.14–15.
[171] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.1 and 4.5.9.

Translation in this edition

Τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ is “self-mastery” (1.15.1). Κρατεῖν alone is “by mastering which” (2.5), “you will have the mastery” (10.8.3), “prevails” (9.9.3) and, of the hand on the bridle, “holds” (12.6); περικρατεῖν is “keeping the mastery” (10.8.3), and κατακρατεῖν “overpower”, of the things that sweep a man away (3.6.3), and “be mastered”, in the passive (7.55). Ἐγκράτεια is “continence” (8.39) and ἐγκρατέστερος “more master of” (6.11); “continence” is kept apart from “self-control”, which renders σωφροσύνη at all four of its places (3.6.1, 5.12, 7.63, 12.15). Σώφρων is “self-controlled” (4.49.2, 8.1, 8.51, 12.27) and once, of the eyes, “chaste” (3.2.3), and the adverb σωφρόνως (*sōphronōs*) is “with self-control” (8.32); their sub-entries are under Virtue and excellence. Ἐπικρατεῖν, of fire that “masters what falls on it” (4.1), and παρακρατεῖσθαι, “are held back” (11.20.1), are left out. The “well-tempered character” of Maximus (1.15.1), τὸ εὔκρατον (*to eukraton*), is of another root, κεράννυμι (*kerannymi*), “mix”. Ἡσσᾶσθαι is “be overcome” at all four places (2.10, 2.16, 7.55, 11.19), and “you are overcome by it” at 11.2 renders ἥττων εἶ (*hēttōn ei*), “you are weaker than”; ἀήττητος is “unconquerable” (1.16.10). Τὸ ἀνένδοτον is “refusing to yield” (7.55), ἐνδοτικῶς ἔχειν (*endotikōs echein*) “give way to” (1.16.9), and ἐνδιδόναι “giving in” (7.64) and “give in” (11.9). Ἀκολαστότερος is “more licentious” (2.10) and ἀκολαστήματα “licence” in “acts of injustice and of licence” (11.20.2); ἀκρασία, ἀκρατής and ἀκολασία do not occur. Ἀπέχεσθαι is “abstain from” at all six places of the middle voice (1.16.9, 5.33, 9.1.3, 11.18.2 twice, 11.37); the active is “has” (4.49.2) and “have in full” (9.42.4, 11.1.1). At 1.16.9 πρός τε τὰς ἀποχὰς ἀσθενῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἐνδοτικῶς ἔχουσι (*pros te tas apochas asthenōs kai pros tas apolauseis endotikōs echousi*) is “are too weak to go without and give way to when they enjoy them”, the two nouns rendered with verbs. Elsewhere ἀπόλαυσις is “enjoyment” (3.6.3, 8.1, 10.1, 10.33.1), and ἀπολαύειν “enjoy” (1.16.9, 3.6.1, 10.9, 12.29), except at 10.1, “in which you will have longer enjoyment”; ἀπολαυστικός is “self-indulgent” (3.4.2). Νήφειν is “sobriety” for the neuter participle (1.16.3) and “Be sober” (4.26), ἐννήφειν “to keep sober” (1.16.10) and ἀνανήφειν “Sober up” (6.31). Τὸ λιτόν (*to liton*) is “frugality” in “frugality of life” (1.3), and λιτός (*litos*) “frugal” of Antoninus’ diet (6.30.4). At 5.1.2 Leopold’s text takes the objection and its

answer, “But one must rest too. I say so too”, from A, the Vatican manuscript, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, which P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, omits; and it takes “you go beyond” from P, where A and D have “you do not go beyond”.

ἀήττητος

Attested: ἀήττητον (*aēttēton*; 1.16.10). Not to be worsted, unconquerable. “To be strong and to hold out, and to keep sober, in each case, is the mark of a man with a sound and unconquerable soul” (1.16.10). “To hold out” is Gataker’s ἐγκαρτερεῖν (*enkarterein*), which Leopold prints for the manuscripts’ ἔτι καρτερεῖν (*eti karterein*), “still to hold out” (see Courage and endurance); and Leopold reports that A omits the words from ἀνδρός (*andros*), “of a man”, to ἔχοντος (*echontos*), “with”. Lemma: ἀήττητος.

ἀκολάστημα

Attested: ἀκολαστήματα (*akolastēmata*; 11.20.2). A licentious act. “For the motion towards acts of injustice and of licence, and angers and distresses and fears, is nothing else than the mark of one standing apart from nature” (11.20.2). Lemma: ἀκολάστημα.

ἀκόλαστος

Attested: ἀκολαστότερος (*akolastoteros*; 2.10). Unchastened, licentious. In Theophrastus’ comparison, the man who does wrong through craving, “overcome by pleasure, is seen to be somehow more licentious and more womanish in his wrongdoing” (2.10). Lemma: ἀκόλαστος.

ἀνανήφω

Attested: ἀνάνηφε (*ananēphe*; 6.31). To become sober again, to come to one’s senses. “Sober up, and call yourself back, and, roused from sleep again and bearing in mind that it was dreams that were vexing you, awake again look at these things as you looked at those” (6.31). Lemma: ἀνανήφω.

ἀνένδοτος

Attested: ἀνένδοτον (*anendoton*; 7.55). Not giving way; with the article, refusing to yield. Second in the constitution of man is “refusing to yield to what the body undergoes” (7.55). Lemma: ἀνένδοτος.

ἀπέχω

Attested: ἀπέχεσθαι (*apechesthai*; 1.16.9, 5.33, 11.37), ἀπέχει (*apechei*; 4.49.2, 9.42.4), ἀφέξεται (*aphexetai*; 9.1.3), ἀπέχω (*apechō*; 11.1.1), ἀπέχῃ (*apechēi*; 11.18.2 twice). In the active, to have in full; in the middle, to hold oneself off, to abstain. Antoninus "could both abstain from and enjoy" what the many cannot (1.16.9); it is enough "to bear with them and to abstain from them" (5.33); he who pursues pleasures "will not abstain from acting unjustly" (9.1.3); and one may "abstain from certain wrongs" through cowardice or courting of fame (11.18.2). In the active the rational soul can say, "I have what is mine in full" (11.1.1). At 4.49.2 Leopold reports ἐπέχει (*epechei*) in A. Lemma: ἀπέχω.

ἀπόλαυσις

Attested: ἀπολαύσεις (*apolauseis*; 1.16.9, 3.6.3, 10.1), ἀπολαύσει (*apolausei*; 8.1), ἀπόλαυσιν (*apolausin*; 10.33.1). Enjoyment, the having of the benefit of a thing. "The enjoyment of pleasures" is among the things that "suddenly overpower and sweep away" (3.6.3); living well was found "not in enjoyment" (8.1); yet "one must form the opinion that everything is an enjoyment which it is open to one to enact according to one's own nature" (10.33.1). Lemma: ἀπόλαυσις.

ἀπολαυστικός

Attested: ἀπολαυστικῶν (*apolaustikōn*; 3.4.2). Given to enjoyment, self-indulgent. Marcus' thoughts are to show at once that they belong to "a social living being who cares nothing for pleasurable or, in a word, self-indulgent imaginings" (3.4.2). Lemma: ἀπολαυστικός.

ἀπολαύω

Attested: ἀπολαύειν (*apolauein*; 1.16.9, 12.29), ἀπόλαυε (*apolaue*; 3.6.1), ἀπολαύσεις (*apolauseis*; 10.1, 10.9). To have the benefit of, to enjoy. Antoninus "could both abstain from and enjoy" (1.16.9); if Marcus finds anything better than justice, truth, self-control and courage, he is to "turn to it with your whole soul and enjoy the best that you have found" (3.6.1); "For when will you enjoy simplicity?" (10.9); "What remains but to enjoy life, joining one good thing to another" (12.29). At 10.1 and 10.9 the form is the future, ἀπολαύσεις, "you will enjoy". Lemma: ἀπολαύω.

ἀποχή

Attested: ἀποχάς (*apochas*; 1.16.9). Abstinence, the going without a thing. Rendered with a verb: the many are "too weak to go without" what Antoninus could both abstain from and enjoy (1.16.9). Lemma: ἀποχή.

ἐγκράτεια

Attested: ἐγκράτειαν (*enkrateian*; 8.39). Continence, the power held within over pleasure. "A virtue that rises in revolt against justice I do not see in the constitution of the rational living being; but against pleasure I see continence" (8.39). Lemma: ἐγκράτεια.

ἐγκρατής

Attested: ἐγκρατέστερος (*enkratesteros*; 6.11). Having a thing in one's power, master of it. "For you will be more master of the harmony by continually returning to it" (6.11). Lemma: ἐγκρατής.

ἐνδίδωμι

Attested: ἐνδίδως (*endidōs*; 7.64), ἐνδοῦναι (*endounai*; 11.9). To give in, to yield. Discontented with drowsiness, heat or loss of appetite, Marcus is to "say to yourself that you are giving in to pain" (7.64); to be exasperated with those who obstruct is weak, "just as it is to stand apart from the action and give in from being dismayed" (11.9). Lemma: ἐνδίδωμι.

ἐνδοτικός

Attested: the adverb ἐνδοτικῶς (*endotikōs*; 1.16.9). Yielding, giving way. The many "give way to" the things they enjoy "when they enjoy them" (1.16.9), where the English renders πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἐνδοτικῶς ἔχουσι (*pros tas apolauseis endotikōs echousi*). Lemma: ἐνδοτικός.

ἐννήφω

Attested: ἐννήφειν (*ennēphein*; 1.16.10). To be sober in a thing, to keep sober. "To be strong and to hold out, and to keep sober, in each case, is the mark of a man with a sound and unconquerable soul" (1.16.10). Lemma: ἐννήφω.

ἡσσάομαι

Attested: ἡττώμενος (*hēttōmenos*; 2.10), ἡσσᾶται (*hēssatai*; 2.16), ἡττᾶσθαι (*hēttasthai*; 7.55), ἡττωμένου (*hēttōmenou*; 11.19). To be the weaker, to be worsted, overcome. The man who does wrong through craving is

“overcome by pleasure” (2.10); the soul does violence to itself “when it is overcome by pleasure or pain” (2.16); the intelligent motion is “never to be overcome by the motion of sense or of impulse” (7.55); and Marcus is to reproach himself with “the more divine part in you being overcome” (11.19). At 7.55 Leopold prints μήποτε (*mēpote*), “never”, from P; A and D have μήπω (*mēpō*), “not yet”. Lemma: ἡσσάομαι.

κατακρατέω

Attested: κατεκράτησεν (*katekratēsen*; 3.6.3), κατακρατεῖσθαι (*katakrateisthai*; 7.55). To overpower, to get the mastery of. Praise, office, wealth and the enjoyment of pleasures, “even if they seem for a while to fit, suddenly overpower and sweep away” (3.6.3); the intelligent motion “wants to have the first place and not to be mastered by them” (7.55). Lemma: κατακρατέω.

κρατέω

Attested: κρατεῖν (*kratein*; 1.15.1), κρατήσας (*kratēsas*; 2.5), κρατεῖ (*kratei*; 9.9.3, 12.6), κρατήσεις (*kratēseis*; 10.8.3). To be strong, to prevail, to hold; with the genitive of oneself, to be master of oneself. From Maximus, “self-mastery, and not being carried off by anything” (1.15.1); “how few the things are by mastering which a man can live a smoothly flowing and godly life” (2.5); “some corner where you will have the mastery” (10.8.3). It is also “for nature prevails” (9.9.3) and, of the left hand, “holds the bridle more vigorously than the right” (12.6). Lemma: κρατέω.

λιτός

Attested: λιτόν (*liton*; 1.3), λιτήν (*litēn*; 6.30.4). Plain, frugal; with the article, frugality. From his mother Marcus has “frugality of life, far removed from the habits of the rich” (1.3); Antoninus, “through his frugal diet”, did not even need “to excrete the waste outside the usual hour” (6.30.4). Lemma: λιτός.

νήφω

Attested: νῆφον (*nēphon*; 1.16.3), νῆφε (*nēphe*; 4.26). To be sober, clear-headed. In Antoninus, “no courting of the people, no eagerness to please, no playing to the crowd, but sobriety in everything” (1.16.3); “Be sober, without strain” (4.26), where “without strain” is ἀνειμένως (*aneimenōs*), the correction of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the

Meditations in 1802, which Leopold prints, for P's ἀνειμένος (*aneimenos*). Lemma: νήφω.

περικρατέω

Attested: περικρατεῖς (*perikrateis*; 10.8.3). To keep the mastery, to have full hold. "But if you perceive that you are falling out and not keeping the mastery, go away with good courage into some corner where you will have the mastery" (10.8.3). Lemma: περικρατέω.

See also

Body and flesh; Courage and endurance; Definition and analysis; Desire and aversion; Fault and ignorance; Impulse; Justice; Pain and pleasure; Socrates; Tranquillity; Virtue and excellence; Wisdom and discernment.

Tranquillity

Calm, freedom from trouble and good spirits · Meditations

γαλήνη, galēnē, "calm"; *γαληνός, galēnos*, "calmer"; *ταράσσειν, tarassein*, "trouble", "be troubled", "cause … trouble"; *διαταράσσεσθαι, diatarassesthai*, "be thoroughly troubled"; *ταραχή, tarachē*, "trouble"; *ἀτάραχος, atarachos*, "untroubled"; *ἀτάρακτος, ataraktos*, "untroubled", "less troubled"; *ἀταρακτεῖν, ataraktein*, "stay untroubled"; *ἀταραξία, ataraxia*, "freedom from trouble"; *εὐθυμία, euthymia*, "good spirits"; *εὐθυμεῖν, euthymein*, "be in good spirits"; *εὔθυμος, euthymos*, "good spirits", "in good spirits"; *εὔρους, eurous*, "smoothly flowing", "smooth flow", "flow smoothly"; *εὐροεῖν, euroein*, "flow smoothly"; *ἵλεως, hileōs*, "serene", "serenely"; *ἡσυχία, hēsychia*, "peace"; *ἡσύχιος, hēsychios*, "at peace", "more quietly"; *ἡσυχάζειν, hēsychazein*, "keep quiet", "be quiet"; *ἡσυχῇ, hēsychēi*, "quietly"; *εὐμάρεια, eumareia*, "ease"; *εὐκοσμία, eukosmia*, "good order"; *ἄκρα, akra*, "headland"; *πτοία, ptoia*, "flutter"; *πτοεῖσθαι, ptoeisthai*, "be in a flutter"

At a Glance

The word. Γαλήνη is the calm of the sea when the wind has dropped; ταράσσειν is to stir up, and ἀταραξία freedom from being stirred; εὐθυμία is good spirits; εὔρους is smoothly flowing. Ἵλεως, "serene", is gracious; πτοία, "flutter", is the opposite of them all.

In the *Meditations*. Trouble comes from opinion: the ruling centre is "untroubled and unimpeded, unless it troubles and impedes itself" (7.16), and it is easy to wipe away a vexing impression "and at once to be in complete calm" (5.2). Calm and freedom from trouble go with just action (7.28, 9.31), good spirits with doing what is necessary (4.24). Marcus is to be "like the headland on which the waves break perpetually" (4.49.1), and when circumstances trouble him, to "return quickly into yourself" (6.11). The book closes on ἵλεως, "serene" (12.36).

In this edition. Γαλήνη is always "calm", ταράσσειν "trouble", ἀτάραχος "untroubled" and ἀταραξία "freedom from trouble"; εὐθυμία is "good spirits", εὐροεῖν "flow smoothly", ἵλεως "serene" ("serenely" once, 5.33), πτοία "flutter"; the ἡσυχ- words are "quiet" and "peace".

A place to read. 4.49.1, where Marcus tells himself to be like the headland on which the waves break, and calls himself lucky to go on free from distress.

Meaning

Γαλήνη (*galēnē*) is the stillness of sea and air after wind, the opposite of storm (9.30). Ταράσσειν (*tarassein*) is to stir up, as water is stirred, and so to throw into confusion; ἀτάραχος (*atarachos*) and ἀταραξία (*ataraxia*) are the absence of that. Εὐθυμία (*euthymia*), from εὖ (*eu*), "well", and θυμός (*thymos*), "spirit", is good spirits, which Democritus, the atomist philosopher of the fifth century BC, made the goal of life, as the edition's note at 4.24 records. Εὔρους (*eurous*), "flowing well", and the verb εὐροεῖν (*euroein*) belong to the definition of happiness that the edition's note at 2.5 gives from Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school: εὔροια βίου (*euroia biou*), "a good flow of life". Ἵλεως (*hileōs*) is gracious, said of gods who are well disposed and of men who are kindly; ἡσυχία (*hēsychia*) is quiet; πτοία (*ptoia*) is the flutter of excitement or alarm. Together they name a mind that what happens does not stir.

Use in the book

Marcus' word for what tranquillity is free of is ταράσσειν, and it comes most often in a question: "if I can, why am I troubled?" (7.2; see Principles and reminders); "Why, then, are you troubled?" (9.39; see Providence and atoms). The question can be read as assuming that the trouble is his own doing, and the commands follow: "Do not trouble yourself;

make yourself simple" (4.26; see Justice); "Let the things to come cause no trouble", for he will come to them, if need be, with the same reason (7.8). The ruling centre is "untroubled and unimpeded, unless it troubles and impedes itself" (7.16). Calm returns as soon as what vexes is pushed away: "How easy it is to push away and wipe away every impression that is vexing or foreign, and at once to be in complete calm" (5.2).

Calm is not idleness. The rational ruling centre has calm "on that very account", when it acts justly (7.28; see Ruling centre). Freedom from trouble is one half of a pair: it concerns "what happens from the cause outside", and justness what is done by reason of the cause within (9.31; see Justice). So with good spirits. Marcus quotes Democritus: "Do little," he says, "if you mean to be in good spirits." He answers with a question: "Is it not better to do what is necessary, and whatever the reason of a living being civic by nature requires, and as it requires? For this brings not only the good spirits that come from doing well, but also those that come from doing little" (4.24). Whoever takes away what is not necessary "will be more at leisure and less troubled". The smooth flow has its conditions too: when Marcus is well pleased with all that results and leads every impulse towards the common advantage, "it is necessary that life flow smoothly" (10.6.2). Good spirits and the smooth flow are what right action yields, not a refuge from it.

The retreat is quiet, and its ease is order: "nowhere does a man retreat more quietly or with less business than into his own soul, above all one who has such things within that by looking into them he is at once in complete ease; and by ease I mean nothing other than good order" (4.3.1; see Inner retreat and citadel). Tranquillity is lost and regained: "When you have been compelled by circumstances to be, as it were, thoroughly troubled, return quickly into yourself, and do not go out of the rhythm beyond what is necessary; for you will be more master of the harmony by continually returning to it" (6.11). "As it were" and "beyond what is necessary" grant that the trouble comes; the skill is in the return. The headland gives the posture: "Be like the headland on which the waves break perpetually; it stands, and around it the swelling waters are lulled to rest" (4.49.1). The waves do not stop; the calm is round what stands, and Marcus, though this has happened to him, goes on "free from distress". At 12.22, once the opinion is taken away, the

headland is rounded and the calm lies in the bay beyond it (see Assent and judgement); here Marcus is the headland.

The fullest scene is 7.68. Even amid outcry and wild beasts, Marcus asks what prevents the understanding "from preserving itself in calm, and in true judgement about what surrounds it, and in ready use of what is put before it". Calm stands first, beside judgement and use, and use greets what comes with "It was you I was seeking" (see Obstacle and reservation). In pain the understanding keeps "its own calm by withdrawing" (7.33; see Pain and pleasure), and the soul can "guard its own clear sky and calm" (8.28; see Pain and pleasure).

Ἵλεως is above all Marcus' word for a man's ending. He is not to die "grumbling, but serene" (2.3; see Nature); he is to "come to rest serene, as an olive might fall when ripe" (4.48.2; see Death); and the book's last words use it of both parties: "Go away, then, serene; for he who releases you is serene too" (12.36; see Citizenship). The opposite of all this is flutter: the quails that Diognetus, his painting master, taught him not to be "in a flutter about" (1.6), fame after death (4.19), "the scurrying of little mice in a flutter" (7.3), and the bare line that recalls the fable of the town mouse and the country mouse, as the edition's note identifies it: "The mountain mouse and the house mouse, and the flutter of the latter and its scurrying" (11.22). Tranquillity in the *Meditations* is not a feeling sought for itself, nor a withdrawal from business. It is what remains when the opinion is taken away and the act is just; it is lost, and regained by returning.

Places to read

Every chapter in which γαλήνη, ταράσσειν, ἀταραξία, εὐθυμία, εὔρους, ἵλεως, ἡσυχία, πτοία, εὐμάρεια, εὐκοσμία or ἄκρα occurs, or a word of their families given in the sub-entries, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. Θορυβεῖν (*thorybein*), "disturb", which alone would bring in 6.26, εὔδιον (*eudion*), "fair weather" (6.30.2), and ἱλάσιμος (*hilasimos*) and ἱλάσκεσθαι (*hilaskesthai*), "propitiated" (12.14), cognates of ἵλεως, are left out.

1.6 From Diognetus Marcus learned not to keep quails, nor to be in a flutter about such things.

1.15.1 From Maximus, the Stoic Claudius Maximus, Marcus learned self-mastery and good spirits in other circumstances and in illness.

1.16.4 Marcus' adoptive father, the emperor Antoninus Pius, used the things that make for ease of living without vanity and without apology.

1.16.9 In his father everything was reckoned out point by point, as if at leisure, untroubled, in order, vigorously.

2.3 Marcus is to throw away the thirst for books, so as not to die grumbling but serene and grateful to the gods.

2.5 Few are the things by mastering which a man can live a smoothly flowing and godly life.

2.17.2 Philosophy lies, above all, in awaiting death with a serene frame of mind, as nothing but the dissolution of the elements.

3.5 Marcus is to have cheerfulness and no need of help from outside or of the peace that others give.

3.15 People do not know how many things are meant by stealing, sowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what must be done.

3.16.2 Peculiar to the good man is to keep the daimon within serene; if no one believes that he lives in good spirits, he is not exasperated, and he must come to the end of life at peace.

4.3.1 Nowhere does a man retreat more quietly than into his own soul, where he is at once in complete ease, and ease is good order.

4.19 He who is in a flutter about fame after death does not form the impression that those who remember him will soon die too.

4.24 Against Democritus' "do little" for good spirits, doing what is necessary brings the good spirits of doing well and of doing little, and leaves one less troubled.

4.26 Marcus is not to trouble himself, but to make himself simple.

4.37 Marcus will soon be dead and is not yet simple, untroubled, or serene towards all.

4.39 Even if the poor body is cut or burned, the part that forms opinions about it is to keep quiet,

judging nothing bad or good that can happen equally to a bad man and a good.

4.48.2 Marcus is to pass through this instant of time according to nature and come to rest serene, as a ripe olive falls.

4.49.1 Marcus is to be like the headland on which the waves break and around which the waters are lulled to rest; he is lucky to go on free from distress.

5.2 It is easy to push away every vexing or foreign impression and at once to be in complete calm.

5.9 Marcus asks what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, given the sureness and smooth flow of the faculty that keeps track and knows.

5.33 Marcus waits serenely for quenching or removal.

5.34 Marcus can always flow smoothly, if he can also journey well and form opinions and act by the road.

6.10 If the universe is a jumble and a scattering, Marcus asks why he is even troubled, since the scattering will come upon him whatever he does.

6.11 When circumstances compel Marcus to be, as it were, thoroughly troubled, he is to return quickly into himself and not go out of the rhythm beyond what is necessary.

7.2 If Marcus can form about a thing the opinion one must, he asks why he is troubled.

7.3 Among the trifles of human life is the scurrying of little mice in a flutter.

7.8 The things to come are to cause Marcus no trouble, for he will come to them, if need be, with the same reason.

7.16 The ruling centre is untroubled and unimpeded, unless it troubles and impedes itself.

7.27 Marcus is to guard against valuing present goods so much as to be troubled if ever they are absent.

7.28 The rational ruling centre is content with itself when it acts justly, and on that account has calm.

7.33 In pain the understanding keeps its own calm by withdrawing.

7.68 Marcus asks what, amid outcry and wild beasts, prevents the understanding from preserving itself

in calm, true judgement and ready use of what is put before it.

7.75 Remembering that the nature of the whole had its impulse towards making the universe, and that now either everything follows by way of consequence or even the most sovereign things are unreasoned, will make Marcus calmer in many things.

8.5 First, Marcus is not to be troubled, for all things are according to the nature of the whole.

8.28 It is open to the soul to guard its own clear sky and calm and not to form the opinion that pain is bad.

8.29 It is in Marcus' power that there be in his soul no wickedness, no craving, no trouble of any kind.

8.45 Wherever he is thrown, Marcus will have his daimon serene, if it fares and acts according to its own constitution.

8.47 If life is not worth living without an act in whose way something stronger stands, Marcus is to depart, kindly and serene towards what stands in the way.

9.30 Marcus is to observe from above every kind of voyage in storms and calms.

9.31 Freedom from trouble concerns what happens from the cause outside, justness what is done by reason of the cause from oneself.

9.37 Marcus asks himself why he is troubled, and what of all this is new.

9.39 Either all things come from one intelligent spring, or there are atoms; why, then, Marcus asks, is he troubled?

9.41 Epicurus in his illness was intent on how the understanding stays untroubled, keeping its own good, and Marcus is to do the same if he is ill, and in any other circumstance.

10.6.2 When these things are brought to their end, life must flow smoothly, as one would conceive a citizen's life to flow who acts for the citizens and welcomes what the city allots.

10.9 Mime, war, flutter, torpor, slavery: day by day the principles Marcus takes in without studying nature will be wiped away.

10.22 Whether Marcus lives on here, goes elsewhere or dies, there is nothing beyond these, and he is to be in good spirits.

10.34 To one steeped in the true principles a line of Homer is enough to remind him of freedom from distress: those who acclaim, curse or quietly censure are all leaves.

10.36 Even at a serious man's death someone will say that he quietly found fault with them; Marcus is to go away from life friendly, well-wishing and serene towards those glad to see him go.

11.11 The things whose pursuit and avoidance disturb Marcus do not come to him; in a way he goes to them, and the verdict about them is to be quiet.

11.22 The mountain mouse and the house mouse, and the flutter of the latter and its scurrying: the fable of the town mouse and the country mouse.

12.3.1 Among what Marcus can separate from his understanding is all that troubles him as things to come.

12.3.2 If he separates from the ruling centre what is fastened to it, Marcus will be able to live out what remains untroubled and serene towards his own daimon.

12.22 If the opinion is taken away, there is calm, all things still, as for one who has rounded the headland.

12.36 Marcus is to go away serene, for he who releases him is serene too.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Sextus Empiricus, the Sceptic philosopher and doctor, reports that happiness, as Zeno, Cleanthes, Zeno's successor, and Chrysippus, the school's third head, defined it, is "a good flow of life", εὔροια βίου;[172] Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, gives the formula in the account of living in agreement with nature (see Daimon). Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, made the good flow the promise of virtue (see Virtue and excellence), and gave the way to it in one sentence of the *Handbook*: "Do not seek that

[172] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* 11.30; compare Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.88.

what happens should happen as you wish, but wish what happens to happen as it does, and you will flow smoothly", εὐροήσεις (*euroēseis*).[173] "One road leads to the good flow," he says in the *Discourses*, and this is to be ready to hand at dawn, by day and at night: to stand away from what lies outside choice, to count nothing one's own, to hand everything over to the divine and to fortune and leave its stewardship to those whom Zeus has appointed, and to be intent on one thing only, one's own, the unhindered.[174] Freedom from trouble he put a price on. It is better to die of hunger free from distress and fear than to live troubled amid plenty, and the beginner is to start with small things: when a little oil is spilled or a little wine stolen, he is to say, "At this cost freedom from passion is sold, at this cost freedom from trouble", ἀταραξία; "nothing is had for nothing".[175] Marcus' "why are you troubled?" uses the verb of Epictetus' saying that men are troubled not by things but by their principles about things (see Principles and reminders).

Other ancient sources

Democritus, whose saying Marcus quotes at 4.24 (fragment 3 Diels, as the edition's note records), made good spirits the end of life. Diogenes Laertius reports that for him the end was εὐθυμία, "not the same as pleasure, as some who misheard took it, but the state in which the soul lives on calmly and steadily, troubled by no fear or superstition or any other passion", γαληνῶς καὶ εὐσταθῶς … ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ταραττομένη (*galēnōs kai eustathōs … hypo mēdenos tarattomenē*); he also called it εὐεστώ (*euestō*), well-being, and by many other names, and among his ethical books was one *On Good Spirits*.[176] The one sentence joins three of Marcus' words: calm, good spirits and trouble. Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, made freedom from trouble part of the end. An unwavering view of the desires, he writes, knows how to bring every choosing and refusing back "to the body's health and the soul's freedom from trouble, since this is the goal of a blessed life"; for its sake we do all we do, that we may neither suffer pain nor fear, and once it is ours "every storm in the soul is

[173] Epictetus, *Handbook* 8.
[174] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.4.39–40.
[175] Epictetus, *Handbook* 12.1–2.
[176] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.45–46.

broken up".[177] At 9.41 Marcus copies Epicurus' account of how, in illness, the understanding "stays untroubled, keeping its own good", and takes it for his own (see Philosophy).

Translation in this edition

Γαλήνη is "calm" at all six of its places in the singular (5.2, 7.28, 7.33, 7.68, 8.28, 12.22) and "calms" in the plural (9.30), and the comparative γαληνότερον is "calmer" (7.75); "calm" renders no other word, for εὔδιον, of the face, is "fair weather" (6.30.2). Ταράσσειν is "trouble" in the active (4.26, 7.16, 12.3.1) and "be troubled" in the middle and passive (6.10, 7.2, 7.27, 8.5, 9.37, 9.39); the imperative ταρασσέτω is "cause no trouble" (7.8). Διαταράσσεσθαι is "be thoroughly troubled" (6.11) and ταραχή "trouble" (8.29). Ἀτάραχος and ἀταράχως are "untroubled" (1.16.9, 4.37, 7.16), ἀταράκτως "untroubled" (12.3.2) and the comparative ἀταρακτότερος "less troubled" (4.24); ἀταρακτεῖν is "stays untroubled" (9.41), and ἀταραξία "freedom from trouble" (9.31). "Trouble" renders no other word; θορυβεῖν is "disturb" (3.16.2, 6.26, 11.11). Εὐθυμία is "good spirits" (4.24), εὐθυμεῖν "be in good spirits" (4.24, 10.22), τὸ εὔθυμον "good spirits" (1.15.1) and εὐθύμως "in good spirits" (3.16.2). Εὔρους is "smoothly flowing" (2.5), "the smooth flow" (5.9) and, of a citizen's life, "to flow smoothly" (10.6.2); εὐροεῖν is "flow smoothly" (5.34, 10.6.2). Ἵλεως is "serene" at eleven of its twelve occurrences and "serenely" at 5.33. Ἡσυχία is "peace" (3.5) and ἡσύχιος "at peace" (3.16.2), with the comparative adverb "more quietly" (4.3.1); ἡσυχάζειν is "keeping quiet" (3.15), "keep quiet" (4.39) and "be quiet" (11.11), and ἡσυχῇ "quietly" (10.34, 10.36); "quiet" and "peace" render no other word. Πτοία is "flutter" (10.9, 11.22), and the perfect of πτοεῖν "be in a flutter" (1.6) and "in a flutter" (4.19, 7.3). Εὐμάρεια is "ease" (1.16.4, 4.3.1 twice), but "ease" also renders ῥᾳστώνη (*rhāistōnē*; 10.33.3, 10.36) and stands in "ease of company" for εὐόμιλον (*euomilon*; 1.16.5); "at ease" and "with ease" render words of the εὔκολος family (9.3.2, 10.36). Εὐκοσμία is "good order" (4.3.1), a phrase that also renders κοσμίως (*kosmiōs*; 3.7, 3.16.2, 8.30, 10.31). Ἄκρα is "headland" (4.49.1, 12.22), and ἀκύμων (*akymōn*) "without waves" (12.22).

[177] Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus*, in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 10.128.

ἄκρα

Attested: ἄκρᾳ (*akrāi*; 4.49.1), ἄκραν (*akran*; 12.22). A headland, a height running out into the sea. “Be like the headland on which the waves break perpetually; it stands, and around it the swelling waters are lulled to rest” (4.49.1); “as for one who has rounded the headland, calm, all things still, and a bay without waves” (12.22), an image Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, thought taken from some poet, as the edition’s note records. Lemma: ἄκρα.

ἀταρακτέω

Attested: ἀταρακτεῖ (*ataraktei*; 9.41). To be untroubled. In the words of Epicurus that Marcus copies, he was intent in his illness on “how the understanding, while having its share in such motions in the poor flesh, stays untroubled, keeping its own good” (9.41). Lemma: ἀταρακτέω.

ἀτάρακτος

Attested: ἀταρακτότερος (*ataraktoteros*; 4.24), ἀταράκτως (*ataraktōs*; 12.3.2). Untroubled. Whoever takes away what is not necessary “will be more at leisure and less troubled” (4.24); if Marcus separates from his ruling centre what is fastened to it, “you will be able to live through at least what remains until you die untroubled and kindly and serene towards your own daimon” (12.3.2), where “kindly” is the correction εὐμενῶς of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; the witnesses have εὐγενῶς, “nobly”. Lemma: ἀτάρακτος.

ἀταραξία

Attested: ἀταραξία (*ataraxia*; 9.31). Freedom from trouble: “Freedom from trouble about what happens from the cause outside; justness in what is done by reason of the cause from you” (9.31). Lemma: ἀταραξία.

ἀτάραχος

Attested: ἀταράχως (*atarachōs*; 1.16.9), ἀτάραχος (*atarachos*; 4.37), ἀτάραχον (*atarachon*; 7.16). Untroubled. In his father everything was “reckoned out point by point, as if at leisure, untroubled, in order, vigorously” (1.16.9); Marcus is “not yet simple, nor untroubled” (4.37); the ruling centre is “untroubled and unimpeded, unless it troubles and impedes itself” (7.16). Lemma: ἀτάραχος.

γαλήνη

Attested: γαλήνῃ (*galēnēi*; 5.2, 7.68), γαλήνην (*galēnēn*; 7.28, 7.33, 8.28), γαλήναις (*galēnais*; 9.30), γαλήνη (*galēnē*; 12.22). Calm, the stillness of the sea. Of the sea: “every kind of voyage in storms and calms” (9.30). Of the mind: “at once to be in complete calm” (5.2); the ruling centre is content with itself “when it acts justly and, on that very account, has calm” (7.28); the soul can “guard its own clear sky and calm” (8.28). Lemma: γαλήνη.

γαληνός

Attested: γαληνότερον (*galēnoteron*; 7.75). Calm; only the comparative occurs: “Remembering this will make you calmer in many things” (7.75). Lemma: γαληνός.

διαταράσσω

Attested: διαταραχθῆναι (*diatarachthēnai*; 6.11). To trouble thoroughly: “When you have been compelled by circumstances to be, as it were, thoroughly troubled, return quickly into yourself” (6.11). Lemma: διαταράσσω.

εὐθυμέω

Attested: εὐθυμήσειν (*euthymēsein*; 4.24), εὐθύμει (*euthymei*; 10.22). To be in good spirits. In Democritus’ saying, “Do little,” he says, “if you mean to be in good spirits” (4.24); after the choice between living on, going elsewhere and dying, “Be in good spirits, then” (10.22). Lemma: εὐθυμέω.

εὐθυμία

Attested: εὐθυμίαν (*euthymian*; 4.24). Good spirits, Democritus’ word for the end of life. Doing what is necessary “brings not only the good spirits that come from doing well, but also those that come from doing little” (4.24); A, the Vatican manuscript, omits the words from “good spirits” to “doing little”. Lemma: εὐθυμία.

εὔθυμος

Attested: εὔθυμον (*euthymon*; 1.15.1), εὐθύμως (*euthymōs*; 3.16.2). In good spirits; with the article, good spirits. From Maximus, “good spirits in other circumstances and in illness” (1.15.1); the good man “lives simply, with self-respect and in good spirits” (3.16.2). Lemma: εὔθυμος.

εὐκοσμία

Attested: εὐκοσμίαν (*eukosmian*; 4.3.1). Good order: “and by ease I mean nothing other than good order” (4.3.1). Lemma: εὐκοσμία.

εὐμάρεια

Attested: εὐμάρειαν (*eumareian*; 1.16.4, 4.3.1), εὐμαρείᾳ (*eumareiāi*; 4.3.1). Ease. His father used “the things that make for ease of living, which fortune supplied in plenty, without vanity and at the same time without apology” (1.16.4); the man who retreats into his own soul is “at once in complete ease; and by ease I mean nothing other than good order” (4.3.1). At 4.3.1 Leopold’s testimonia, the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it, compare the Suda, the Byzantine lexicon, under the word. Lemma: εὐμάρεια.

εὐροέω

Attested: εὐροεῖν (*euroein*; 5.34, 10.6.2). To flow smoothly, to go well. “You can always flow smoothly, if you can also journey well, if you can also form opinions and act by the road” (5.34), where “journey well” is the correction εὐοδεῖν (*euodein*) of Johannes Stich, whose Teubner text appeared in 1882, which Leopold prints; “it is necessary that life flow smoothly” (10.6.2), where A has εὑρεῖν (*heurein*), “find”. Lemma: εὐροέω.

εὔρους

Attested: εὔρουν (*euroun*; 2.5, 5.9, 10.6.2). Flowing well, smooth. “You see how few the things are by mastering which a man can live a smoothly flowing and godly life” (2.5), where A and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have εὔνουν (*eunoun*), “well-disposed”; “the sureness and the smooth flow, in everything, of the faculty that keeps track and knows” (5.9); “as you would conceive the life of a citizen too to flow smoothly” (10.6.2). Lemma: εὔρους.

ἡσυχάζω

Attested: ἡσυχάζειν (*hēsychazein*; 3.15), ἡσυχαζέτω (*hēsychazetō*; 4.39, 11.11). To keep quiet. Among the things whose meaning men do not know is “keeping quiet” (3.15); “let the part that forms opinions about these things keep quiet” (4.39); “let the verdict about them be quiet” (11.11). Lemma: ἡσυχάζω.

ἡσυχῇ

Attested: ἡσυχῇ (*hēsychēi*; 10.34, 10.36). Quietly: those who “quietly censure and mock” (10.34); “I perceived that he quietly found fault with us” (10.36). Lemma: ἡσυχῇ.

ἡσυχία

Attested: ἡσυχίας (*hēsychias*; 3.5). Quiet, rest: “no need of the peace that others give” (3.5). Lemma: ἡσυχία.

ἥσύχιος

Attested: ἡσύχιον (*hēsychion*; 3.16.2), ἡσυχιώτερον (*hēsychiōteron*; 4.3.1). Quiet, at peace. The good man comes to the end of life “pure, at peace, ready to be released” (3.16.2); “nowhere does a man retreat more quietly or with less business than into his own soul” (4.3.1). Lemma: ἡσύχιος.

ἵλεως

Attested: ἵλεως (*hileōs*; 2.3, 4.37, 5.33, 8.47, 10.36, 12.3.2, 12.36 twice), ἵλεῳ (*hileōi*; 2.17.2), ἵλεων (*hileōn*; 3.16.2, 4.48.2, 8.45). Gracious, serene. Of a man at his death: “so that you do not die grumbling, but serene” (2.3); “come to rest serene, as an olive might fall when ripe” (4.48.2). Of the daimon: “I shall have my daimon serene, that is, content” (8.45). Towards others: “serene towards all” (4.37). And at the book’s end, of the man and of the one who releases him: “Go away, then, serene; for he who releases you is serene too” (12.36). Lemma: ἵλεως.

πτοέω

Attested: ἐπτοῆσθαι (*eptoēsthai*; 1.6), ἐπτοημένος (*eptoēmenos*; 4.19), ἐπτοημένων (*eptoēmenōn*; 7.3). To scare; in the perfect passive, to be in a flutter. Diognetus taught Marcus “not to keep quails, nor to be in a flutter about such things” (1.6); “He who is in a flutter about fame after death” (4.19); “the scurrying of little mice in a flutter” (7.3). At 4.19 P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has ἐπτοημένων a second time, “men in a flutter”, where Leopold prints the correction ἁπτομένων (*haptomenōn*), “lit”, of Hastings Crossley, whose edition of Book IV appeared in 1882. Lemma: πτοέω.

πτοία

Attested: πτοία (*ptoia*; 10.9), πτοίαν (*ptoian*; 11.22). Flutter, excitement. “Mime, war, flutter, torpor, slavery” (10.9); “The

mountain mouse and the house mouse, and the flutter of the latter and its scurrying" (11.22). Lemma: πτοία.

ταράσσω

Attested: τάρασσε (*tarasse*; 4.26), ταράσσομαι (*tarassomai*; 6.10, 7.2), ταρασσέτω (*tarassetō*; 7.8), ταράσσῃ (*tarassēi*; 7.16, 9.37, 9.39), ταραχθήσεσθαι (*tarachthēsesthai*; 7.27), ταράσσου (*tarassou*; 8.5), ταράσσει (*tarassei*; 12.3.1). To stir up, to trouble; in the middle and passive, to be troubled. "Do not trouble yourself" (4.26); "if I can, why am I troubled?" (7.2); "Let the things to come cause no trouble" (7.8); the ruling centre is untroubled "unless it troubles and impedes itself" (7.16); "Why, then, are you troubled?" (9.39). Lemma: ταράσσω.

ταραχή

Attested: ταραχή (*tarachē*; 8.29). Trouble, confusion: "no wickedness, no craving, no trouble of any kind at all" (8.29). Lemma: ταραχή.

See also

Assent and judgement; Citizenship; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Daimon; Death; Inner retreat and citadel; Justice; Nature; Obstacle and reservation; Pain and pleasure; Philosophy; Principles and reminders; Providence and atoms; Ruling centre; Simplicity and sincerity; Virtue and excellence.

Virtue and excellence

The excellence of the rational being · Meditations

ἀρετή, aretē, "virtue"; *φρόνησις, phronēsis*, "wisdom"; *φρόνιμος, phronimos*, "the wise"; *σωφροσύνη, sōphrosynē*, "self-control"; *σώφρων, sōphrōn*, "self-controlled", "with self-control", "chaste"; *ἀνδρεία, andreia*, "courage"; *ἀνδρεῖος, andreios*, "courageous"; *φρονέω, phroneō*, "wisdom", "thought", "thinking", "is proud", "view they will take"; *κατόρθωσις, katorthōsis*, "right actions"; *προτέρημα, proterēma*, "merits"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀρετή is excellence, what makes a thing good of its kind; in a man it is the excellence of the soul, which for the Stoics, with what shares in it, was the only good. They

counted four primary virtues: φρόνησις, "wisdom", ἀνδρεία, "courage", δικαιοσύνη (*dikaiosynē*), "justice", and σωφροσύνη, "self-control".

In the *Meditations*. Marcus challenges himself to find in human life anything better than "justice, truth, self-control, courage" (3.6.1), and holds that nothing is good for a man "which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous, free" (8.1). Virtue lies "not in being acted upon but in activity" (9.16); each thing that presents itself calls for its own virtue (3.11.2), and from justice the other virtues subsist (11.10).

In this edition. Ἀρετή is always "virtue"; φρόνησις is "wisdom", σωφροσύνη "self-control", σώφρων "self-controlled" (once "chaste") and ἀνδρεία "courage"; κατορθώσεις are "right actions" and προτερήματα "merits".

A place to read. 3.6.1, where Marcus tells himself that if he finds in human life anything better than justice, truth, self-control and courage, and the understanding's being content with itself, he is to turn to it with his whole soul.

Meaning

Ἀρετή (*aretē*) is excellence of any kind, the quality by which a thing is good at being what it is. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its seventh book, reports that the Stoics called virtue in its widest sense "the perfecting of anything, as of a statue".[178] Plato's *Republic* names four virtues, when Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, says of the city he has founded in speech, "plainly it is wise and courageous and self-controlled and just".[179] The Stoics kept four as primary, with φρόνησις (*phronēsis*), practical wisdom, first, as Plato's *Laws* also puts it, where the *Republic* has σοφία (*sophia*).[180] Virtue, with what shares in it, was for them the only good (see Good, bad and indifference),[181] "a disposition in agreement with itself", to be chosen for its own sake, "not through fear or hope or anything from outside", and happiness lay in it.[182] Marcus too speaks of a disposition: the good man is content with "his own just action and kindly disposition" (4.25), and "there is

[178] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.90.

[179] Plato, *Republic* 427e; the noun σοφία follows at 428b–429a.

[180] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.92; Plato, *Laws* 1, 631c.

[181] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.101.

[182] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.89.

one fruit of life on earth, a holy disposition and social actions" (6.30.1).

His wisdom is φρόνησις; σοφία never occurs, and σοφός (*sophos*), "wise", only twice (8.38, 10.36). He names the school's four together once, as the "truly goods" to which the comic poet's jibe will not fit (5.12; see Good, bad and indifference). Ἀρετή is paired with κακία (*kakia*), "vice" (7.31, 9.16; see Good, bad and indifference).

Use in the book

The virtues are Marcus' measure of everything else. "If you find in human life anything better than justice, truth, self-control, courage … turn to it with your whole soul and enjoy the best that you have found" (3.6.1). At 8.1 he reports: "you have learned by trial how many things you wandered among and nowhere found living well: not in syllogisms, not in wealth, not in fame, not in enjoyment, nowhere." Living well lies "in doing what the nature of man seeks", and he will do it, he answers himself, if he has principles "from which come impulses and actions", principles "that nothing is good for a man which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous, free; and nothing bad which does not make him the opposite of what has been said" (8.1).

Virtue is something done. "Not in being acted upon but in activity lie the bad and the good of the rational ⟨and⟩ civic living being; just as its virtue and vice too lie not in being acted upon but in activity" (9.16). The elements move up, down or round, but "the motion of virtue is in none of these; it is something more divine, and proceeding by a road hard to conceive, it journeys well" (6.17). The road returns in the term for a right act: actions of reason "are called right actions, signifying the rightness of the road" (5.14). And virtue alone survives the analysis that dissolves the rest: "except for virtue and what comes from virtue", Marcus is to divide things into their parts "and, by the division of them, to come to contempt" (11.2).

Because it is activity, virtue answers to what happens. Nothing, Marcus says, so produces greatness of mind as to test each thing that presents itself, taking in among much else "what virtue is needed towards it, such as gentleness, courage, truth, good faith, artlessness, self-sufficiency and the rest" (3.11.2; see Impression). Before another's wrong it is useful "to bear in mind at once what virtue nature has given man against this wrong": "against the unfair man

mildness, and against another some other faculty" (9.42.2). Obstruction is itself material: if someone stands in the way, "use the hindering for another virtue" (6.50), and he asks what prevents the understanding's "ready use of what is put before it" from saying to whatever presents itself, "It was you I was seeking; for to me the present is always material for rational and civic virtue" (7.68). He asks whether what has happened prevents him "from being just, great-souled, self-controlled, sensible" (4.49.2); and nothing from outside stands in the way of "acting justly and with self-control and with sound reckoning" (8.32).

One virtue governs the rest: Marcus sees none that rises in revolt against justice (8.39; see Justice), and from the common nature comes justice, "and from this the other virtues subsist" (11.10; see Justice). Wisdom, by contrast, seldom appears under its own name. Facing death, he finds himself not yet "placing wisdom in acting justly alone" (4.37; see Justice). When he does name it, he asks "what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when you consider the sureness and the smooth flow, in everything, of the faculty that keeps track and knows?" (5.9), and calls it "a terrible thing" that "ignorance and the wish to please should be stronger than wisdom" (5.18). Where wisdom would stand beside the school's other virtues, his lists set truth (3.6.1, 12.15), freedom (8.1) or "sound reckoning" (8.32). This can be read as a judgement on what wisdom is: not a fourth possession beside the others, but the understanding kept true and just in each act.

Virtue is also seen in others. "When you want to gladden yourself, consider the merits of those who live alongside you", for "nothing gladdens so much as the likenesses of the virtues showing in the characters of those who live with us" (6.48). The man who has them is the school's "serious" man, σπουδαῖος (*spoudaios*; 9.1.2, 10.36), and Marcus counts himself "one of the base" (7.70; see Good, bad and indifference). The demand falls on himself: "while you live, while it is open to you, become good" (4.17); "No longer discuss at all what sort of man the good man is, but be such" (10.16). He asks, too, whether it will last: "Or does the light of the lamp shine until it is quenched, and not lose the radiance, while the truth and justice and self-control in you will be quenched first?" (12.15). Virtue in the notebook is less a list to complete than a demand renewed at each occasion:

nothing outside can prevent it, everything that happens is material for it, and justice is its rule.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ἀρετή, φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη or ἀνδρεία occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the places of φρόνιμος (4.38), σώφρων and σωφρόνως, ἀνδρεῖος (8.1), κατόρθωσις (5.14) and προτέρημα (1.16.6, 6.48), and of φρονέω where its infinitive is "wisdom" (4.37). The verb's other places (1.15.2, 10.8.1, 10.10, 12.4) are given in its sub-entry, and δικαιοσύνη, "justice", is left out (see Justice).

1.16.6 Marcus' adoptive father, the emperor Antoninus Pius, gave way ungrudgingly to those with some particular ability, so that each might win credit by his own merits.

2.13 What comes from the gods deserves respect because of virtue, and what comes from men love because of kinship.

3.2.3 The man who has a deeper conception of what happens in the whole will be able to see with his own chaste eyes a ripeness in the old and the loveliness of boys.

3.6.1 If Marcus finds in human life anything better than justice, truth, self-control and courage, and the understanding's being content with itself, he is to turn to it with his whole soul.

3.7 The man who has chosen before all else his own mind and daimon and the rites of its virtue makes no tragedy and needs neither solitude nor a crowd.

3.11.2 Nothing so produces greatness of mind as to test each thing that presents itself, taking in among much else what virtue is needed towards it: gentleness, courage, truth, good faith, artlessness, self-sufficiency and the rest.

4.37 Marcus will soon be dead, and is not yet simple, untroubled or serene towards all, nor placing wisdom in acting justly alone.

4.38 Marcus is to look into the ruling centres of others, and at the wise, to see what they flee and what they pursue.

4.49.2 Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-

controlled, sensible and the rest, and is to hold that to bear it nobly is good fortune.

5.9 Marcus asks what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, given the sureness and smooth flow of the faculty that keeps track and knows.

5.12 Whoever has first conceived of wisdom, self-control, justice and courage as truly goods could not listen to the comic poet's phrase, for it will not fit; it is readily received of what appear goods to the many.

5.14 The actions of reason and the art of reasoning are called right actions, signifying the rightness of the road.

5.18 It is a terrible thing that ignorance and the wish to please should be stronger than wisdom.

6.17 The motion of virtue is not up, down or round, like the courses of the elements, but something more divine, which journeys well by a road hard to conceive.

6.48 To gladden himself Marcus is to consider the merits of those who live alongside him, for nothing gladdens so much as the likenesses of the virtues in their characters.

6.50 If someone uses force and stands in his way, Marcus is to use the hindering for another virtue.

7.31 Marcus is to make himself bright with simplicity, self-respect and indifference towards what lies between virtue and vice.

7.63 In a saying Marcus quotes, every soul is deprived of truth unwillingly; so too, he adds, of justice and self-control and kindliness.

7.68 Marcus asks what prevents the understanding from keeping calm and true judgement, so that its use of things says to whatever presents itself that the present is always material for rational and civic virtue.

8.1 Living well lies in doing what the nature of man seeks, and nothing is good for a man which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous and free.

8.32 Nothing from outside stands in the way of acting justly, with self-control and with sound reckoning.

8.39 Marcus sees in the constitution of the rational living being no virtue that rises in revolt against justice, but against pleasure he sees continence.

8.51 Marcus asks what killing and cursing are to the understanding's remaining pure, sane, self-controlled and just.

9.16 The bad and the good of the rational civic living being, like its virtue and vice, lie not in being acted upon but in activity.

9.42.2 It is useful to bear in mind what virtue nature has given man against a given wrong, as mildness against the unfair man.

11.2 Except for virtue and what comes from virtue, Marcus is to divide things into their parts and so come to contempt for them.

11.10 From the common nature comes the birth of justice, and from justice the other virtues subsist.

11.18.5 Not raging but what is mild and gentle is manly, and it is this that has a share in strength and sinews and courage.

11.26 In certain writings a precept was laid down: continually to remind oneself of one of those of old who practised virtue.

11.32 A line of verse, varied from Hesiod, the early Greek poet, says that they will blame virtue, speaking with hard words.[183]

12.15 Marcus asks whether the lamp shines until it is quenched, while the truth and justice and self-control in him will be quenched first.

12.27 It is more philosophical, in the material given, to show oneself just, self-controlled, following the gods, artlessly.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius gives each of the four primary virtues its own matter. What the virtuous man must do is to be chosen, endured, allotted or abided by, so that "if he does some things by choosing, some by enduring, some by allotting and some by abiding, he is wise and courageous

[183] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 186, where children "will blame" their aged parents, "speaking with hard words"; the edition's note at 11.30 records the variation from Leopold's testimonia, the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it.

and just and self-controlled"; courage concerns what must be endured, wisdom what must be done, what must not, and what is neither, and the others turn in the same way to their own, with lesser virtues following on each: good counsel on wisdom, for instance, and on justice equality and εὐγνωμοσύνη (*eugnōmosynē*), a word Marcus sets among the agreeable virtues at 5.9.[184] The virtues, the school held, follow upon one another, and whoever has one has them all, since their doctrines are common, as Chrysippus, the school's third head, says in the first book of his *On Virtues*.[185] Marcus' "from this the other virtues subsist" (11.10; see Justice) can be read as giving that unity a head. Diogenes Laertius also reports a dispute within the school over whether virtue, once had, can be lost. Chrysippus held that it can, through drunkenness and melancholy; Cleanthes, Zeno's successor, that it cannot, because it rests on secure grasps.[186] Marcus' question whether "the truth and justice and self-control in you will be quenched first" (12.15), and his warning that, if a man begins to dote, all "that needs a thoroughly trained power of reckoning, is quenched first" (3.1; see Mind and reason), can be read as taking Chrysippus' side. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, gives in the *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of his teaching, a practice close to that of 3.11.2 and 9.42.2: "At each thing that befalls you, remember to turn back on yourself and look for the faculty you have for its use. If you see a beautiful boy or a beautiful woman, you will find the faculty for that, continence; if toil is laid on you, endurance; if abuse, forbearance. Trained in this way, you will not be carried off by the impressions."[187] His "continence", ἐγκράτεια (*enkrateia*), is the virtue Marcus sees set against pleasure (8.39; see Justice), and his "faculty", δύναμις (*dynamis*), is Marcus' word at 9.42.2, where nature gives mildness against the unfair man "and against another some other faculty". In the *Discourses* Epictetus argues that if virtue "holds out this promise, to produce happiness and freedom from passion and a smooth flow", then progress towards it is progress towards each of

[184] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.126.

[185] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.125, citing Chrysippus, *On Virtues* book 1.

[186] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.127.

[187] Epictetus, *Handbook* 10.

these;[188] the "smooth flow" of wisdom at 5.9, τὸ εὔρουν (*to euroun*), is of one root with his εὔροια (*euroia*).

Translation in this edition

Ἀρετή is "virtue" at all sixteen of its occurrences, "virtues" in the plural (6.48, 11.10). Φρόνησις is "wisdom" (5.9, 5.12, 5.18), and so is the infinitive of φρονεῖν (*phronein*) with the article at 4.37, "placing wisdom in acting justly alone"; elsewhere the verb is rendered by sense. Φρόνιμος is "the wise" (4.38). "Wise" renders σοφός at 10.36, "serious and wise", and "the wisest" σοφωτάτοις (*sophōtatois*) at 8.38, in a saying for which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, names no source and whose last word, the edition's note says, does not construe. Σωφροσύνη is "self-control" (3.6.1, 5.12, 7.63, 12.15), σώφρων "self-controlled" (4.49.2, 8.1, 8.51, 12.27), and the adverb σωφρόνως "with self-control" (8.32); once, of the eyes, σώφρων is "chaste" (3.2.3). "Self-control" is kept apart from "continence", ἐγκράτεια (8.39). Ἀνδρεία is "courage" (3.6.1, 3.11.2, 5.12, 11.18.5) and ἀνδρεῖος "courageous" (8.1); "take courage" (6.10) and "with good courage" (10.8.3) render θαρρεῖν (*tharrein*), and "manly" at 11.18.5 renders ἀνδρικός (*andrikos*). Κατορθώσεις are "right actions" (5.14), and the edition's note there relates the word to the Stoic term κατόρθωμα (*katorthōma*), an act done rightly, from ὀρθός (*orthos*), "straight". Προτερήματα are "merits" (1.16.6, 6.48), kept apart at 6.48 from "the virtues" a sentence later. Δικαιοσύνη is "justice" at every place (see Justice). At 5.12 "from the goods" is the plural ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν (*hypo tōn agathōn*) of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, which Leopold prints for the manuscripts' singular, "from the good"; at 11.26 "Epicureans" is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, for Ἐφεσίων (*Ephesiōn*), "Ephesians", in the witnesses.

ἀνδρεία

Attested: ἀνδρείας (*andreias*; 3.6.1, 3.11.2, 11.18.5), ἀνδρείαν (*andreian*; 5.12). Courage, manliness, one of the four primary virtues. It is named with justice, truth and self-control at 3.6.1, among the virtues a thing may call for at 3.11.2, and among the "truly goods" at 5.12. At 11.18.5 it is claimed for mildness: "it is this that has a share in strength

[188] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.4.3.

and sinews and courage, not the man who is indignant and discontented". Lemma: ἀνδρεία.

ἀνδρεῖος

Attested: ἀνδρεῖον (*andreion*; 8.1). Courageous. Nothing is good for a man "which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous, free" (8.1). Lemma: ἀνδρεῖος.

ἀρετή

Attested: ἀρετήν (*aretēn*; 2.13, 6.50, 8.39, 9.42.2, 11.32), ἀρετῆς (*aretēs*; 3.7, 3.11.2, 6.17, 7.31, 7.68, 11.2 twice), ἀρετῶν (*aretōn*; 6.48), ἀρετή (*aretē*; 9.16), ἀρεταί (*aretai*; 11.10), ἀρετῇ (*aretēi*; 11.26). Excellence; in man, the excellence of the rational soul, set against vice. It lies "not in being acted upon but in activity" (9.16); "the motion of virtue … journeys well" (6.17); "to me the present is always material for rational and civic virtue" (7.68). Lemma: ἀρετή.

κατόρθωσις

Attested: κατορθώσεις (*katorthōseis*; 5.14). Right action, an act that goes straight to its end. The acts of reason and the art of reasoning "are called right actions, signifying the rightness of the road" (5.14). Lemma: κατόρθωσις.

προτέρημα

Attested: προτερήματα (*proterēmata*; 1.16.6, 6.48). An advantage, a point in which one excels; a merit. Antoninus Pius gave way to those with a particular ability, "so that each might win credit by his own merits" (1.16.6); "consider the merits of those who live alongside you" (6.48). Lemma: προτέρημα.

σωφροσύνη

Attested: σωφροσύνης (*sōphrosynēs*; 3.6.1, 7.63), σωφροσύνην (*sōphrosynēn*; 5.12), σωφροσύνη (*sōphrosynē*; 12.15). Self-control, soundness of mind, one of the four primary virtues. It stands with justice and truth in Marcus' lists (3.6.1, 12.15); and every soul is deprived of it, as of truth, unwillingly: "So too, then, of justice and self-control and kindliness and everything of that kind" (7.63). Lemma: σωφροσύνη.

σώφρων

Attested: σώφροσιν (*sōphrosin*; 3.2.3), σώφρονα (*sōphrona*; 4.49.2, 8.1, 8.51, 12.27); the adverb σωφρόνως

(*sōphronōs*; 8.32). Self-controlled, sound of mind; of the eyes, chaste. Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him "from being just, great-souled, self-controlled" (4.49.2), and nothing outside stands in the way of "acting justly and with self-control and with sound reckoning" (8.32). The man who has a deeper conception of the whole sees the loveliness of boys "with his own chaste eyes" (3.2.3). Lemma: σώφρων.

φρονέω

Attested: φρονεῖ (*phronei*; 1.15.2, 10.10), φρονεῖν (*phronein*; 4.37), φρονοῦντος (*phronountos*; 10.8.1), φρονήσουσιν (*phronēsousin*; 12.4). To think, to have a mind about something; with the article, to have sense. At 4.37 τὸ φρονεῖν is "wisdom": Marcus is not yet "placing wisdom in acting justly alone". Elsewhere the verb is rendered by sense: "he thought as he spoke" (1.15.2), "the thinking part" (10.8.1), "is proud" for μέγα φρονεῖ (*mega phronei*; 10.10), and "what view they will take of us" (12.4). Lemma: φρονέω.

φρόνησις

Attested: φρονήσεως (*phronēseōs*; 5.9, 5.18), φρόνησιν (*phronēsin*; 5.12). Practical wisdom, the first of the Stoics' primary virtues. Marcus names it rarely: "what is more agreeable than wisdom itself" (5.9), "stronger than wisdom" (5.18), and in the list of "truly goods" (5.12). At 4.37 "wisdom" renders the infinitive of the cognate verb, φρονεῖν. Lemma: φρόνησις.

φρόνιμος

Attested: φρονίμους (*phronimous*; 4.38). Wise, prudent. "Look into their ruling centres, and at the wise, what sort of things they flee, and what sort they pursue" (4.38). Lemma: φρόνιμος.

See also

Citizenship; Courage and endurance; Good, bad and indifference; Impression; Justice; Mind and reason; Pain and pleasure; Principles and reminders; Self-respect and shame; Temperance and self-mastery; Wisdom and discernment.

ἔμφρων, emphrōn, “sensible”, “good sense”; *σύμφρων, symphrōn*, “consenting”; *ὑπέρφρων, hyperphrōn*, “transcending”; *φρενήρης, phrenērēs*, “sane”; *σοφός, sophos*, “wise”, “the wisest”; *ἐπιστήμη, epistēmē*, “knowledge”; *ἐπιστήμων, epistēmōn*, “knowing”; *ἐπιστημονικός, epistēmonikos*, “that … knows”; *διακρίνειν, diakrinein*, “telling … from”, “distinguish”, “distinguished”, “be divided”; *διάκρισις, diakrisis*, “discernment”; *διαληπτικός, dialēptikos*, “that discerns”; *διαλαμβάνειν, dialambanein*, “point by point”; *μωρός, mōros*, “fool”; *μανικός, manikos*, “madness”; *μανιώδης, maniōdēs*, “madness”; *μαίνεσθαι, mainesthai*, “madman”, “being mad”; *φρόνησις, phronēsis*, “wisdom”; *φρόνιμος, phronimos*, “the wise”; *φρονεῖν, phronein*, “wisdom”, “thought”, “thinking”, “is proud”, “view they will take”

At a Glance

The word. Ἔμφρων, from φρήν (*phrēn*), “mind”, is one who has his mind within him, sensible; σοφός is wise, the Stoics’ word for the sage; διακρίνειν is to tell one thing from another, and διάκρισις is discernment. The man without sense is a fool, μωρός, and at the extreme mad.

In the *Meditations*. “Sensible” is one of the names Marcus gives himself, meant to signify “attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard” (10.8.1). “Discernment of convincing impressions” is among the things peculiar to a man (8.26), and Marcus is to look at what the wise flee and what they pursue (4.38). Fools are gladdened or distressed by what happens (4.44), and “To pursue the impossible is madness” (5.17).

In this edition. Ἔμφρων is “sensible”, and with the article “good sense” (1.16.7); φρενήρης is “sane”, σοφός “wise”, διάκρισις “discernment”, διακρίνειν “telling … from” and “distinguish”, μωρός “fool”, and the words of madness “madness”, “madman” and “being mad”; φρόνησις is “wisdom”.

A place to read. 8.26, where the gladness of a man is to do what is peculiar to a man, and discernment of convincing impressions is named among those things.

Meaning

Ἔμφρων (*emphrōn*), from φρήν, “mind”, is one who has his mind within him, sensible. At 10.8.1 it stands with σύμφρων (*symphrōn*) and ὑπέρφρων (*hyperphrōn*),

“consenting” and “transcending”, names that share the root, as the edition’s note says: the mind within, with, and above. Φρόνησις (*phronēsis*), “wisdom”, was set by the Stoics first among their primary virtues (see Virtue and excellence). Σοφός (*sophos*), “wise”, was the school’s name for the sage; σοφία (*sophia*) does not occur in the *Meditations*. Ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*) is knowledge, for the Stoics a grasp that reason cannot shake (see Assent and judgement). Διακρίνειν (*diakrinein*), from κρίνειν (*krinein*), “to separate”, is to tell one thing from another, and διάκρισις (*diakrisis*) is discernment. Μωρός (*mōros*) is dull, foolish; μαίνεσθαι (*mainesthai*) is to be mad, with its adjectives μανικός (*manikos*) and μανιώδης (*maniōdēs*).

Use in the book

Wisdom by name is rare. It is one of the “truly goods” (5.12; see Good, bad and indifference), it is terrible that ignorance and the wish to please should be stronger than it (5.18; see Courage and endurance), and Marcus is not yet “placing wisdom in acting justly alone” (4.37; see Justice); its pleasure lies in the sureness and smooth flow of “the faculty that keeps track and knows” (5.9; see Philosophy). His own word for good sense is ἔμφρων. “Sensible”, one of the names he has given himself, “was meant to signify for you attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard” (10.8.1; see Self-respect and shame).

In Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, Marcus records “good sense and measure in the giving of shows, the building of public works, distributions and the like”, and, in the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, with a supplement and correction of Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus, the eighteenth-century German scholar who edited the *Meditations* at Leipzig, “the mark of a man who looks to what must be done, and not to the good repute that comes from what has been done” (1.16.7). Good sense is judged by what a man looks to: the thing to be done, not how it will be seen.

The power behind it is discernment. “The gladness of a man is to do what is peculiar to a man; and peculiar to a man is goodwill towards the kindred stock, disregard of the motions of sense, discernment of convincing impressions, observation of the nature of the whole and of what comes about according to it” (8.26). It can be lost. The man who lies unwillingly, by neglecting the resources nature gave him,

can no longer distinguish false from true (9.1.2; see Justice), and ignorance of good and bad is "a disablement no less than the one that deprives a man of telling white from black" (2.13; see Daimon).

The wise are to be watched in their choices: "Look into their ruling centres, and at the wise, what sort of things they flee, and what sort they pursue" (4.38). The skilled and knowing soul is "the one that knows beginning and end, and the reason that pervades all substance" (5.32), and Marcus is to see and do everything so that "the self-assurance that comes from knowledge of each thing is preserved, escaping notice, not concealed" (10.9). Σοφός comes twice, in a saying of unknown source, "look, judging, he says, by the wisest" (8.38), and of a man who "was serious and wise", whose death some will still welcome (10.36; see Death).

The lack of sense has two names. The fool takes what passes as though it mattered: of the kind of the rose in spring are "disease, death, slander, plotting, and all that gladdens or distresses fools" (4.44); "How then is he not a fool who among these things is puffed up, or dragged about, or complains …?" (5.23); and to the excuse that others take such things very seriously the answer is, "Is that why, then, you too should become a fool?" (5.36). Madness is to ask for what cannot be. "To pursue the impossible is madness" (5.17); to expect the base not to do wrong "is madness, for it reaches after the impossible" (11.18.6; see Anger); if a thing is in another's power, to blame the atoms or the gods: "Both are madness" (8.17; see Providence and atoms). In words Marcus takes from Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, "To seek a fig in winter is the mark of a madman" (11.33; see Desire and aversion), and "The contest, then, he said, is not about any chance thing, but about being mad or not" (11.38).

Against folly and madness stands the understanding that remains "pure, sane, self-controlled, just" (8.51; see Inner retreat and citadel). Wisdom in the notebook is seldom named and never shown off. It is attention that tells each thing apart and lets nothing slip, proved in what a man flees and pursues; folly is to be moved by what passes, and madness to ask of things what they cannot give.

Places to read

Every chapter in which a word of the sub-entries occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is

divided, with the places of φρόνησις (5.9, 5.12, 5.18), φρόνιμος (4.38) and τὸ φρονεῖν, "wisdom" (4.37). The other places of φρονεῖν are given in its sub-entry (see Virtue and excellence). The other words of the root of φρήν are left out: καταφρονεῖν (*kataphronein*), "despise", with καταφρόνησις (*kataphronēsis*) and εὐκαταφρόνητος (*eukataphronētos*); συμφρονεῖν (*symphronein*; 8.54) and ὑπερφρονεῖν (*hyperphronein*; 5.15); μεγαλοφροσύνη (*megalophrosynē*), μεγαλόφρων (*megalophrōn*) and μεγαλοφρόνως (*megalophronōs*; 6.23); εὐφροσύνη (*euphrosynē*; 8.26); φροντίζειν (*phrontizein*; 2.5, 10.36); and σωφροσύνη and σώφρων (see Temperance and self-mastery).

1.16.7 Marcus records in Antoninus Pius good sense and measure in the giving of shows, public works and distributions, looking to what must be done and not to the repute that comes of it.

1.16.9 In Antoninus everything was reckoned out point by point, as if at leisure, untroubled, in order, vigorously and consistently with itself.

2.13 What comes from men sometimes deserves pity, because of ignorance of good and bad, a disablement no less than the one that deprives a man of telling white from black.

4.27 Marcus asks whether there can be order in him and disorder in the totality, when all things are so distinguished and diffused and in sympathy (see Providence and atoms).

4.37 Marcus will soon be dead, and is not yet simple, untroubled or serene towards all, nor placing wisdom in acting justly alone.

4.38 Marcus is to look into the ruling centres of others, and at the wise, to see what they flee and what they pursue.

4.44 Everything that happens is as usual as the rose in spring, and of this kind are disease, death, slander, plotting and all that gladdens or distresses fools.

4.49.2 Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-controlled, sensible, free from rash assent and the rest.

5.9 Marcus asks what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, given the sureness and smooth flow of the faculty that keeps track and knows.

5.12 Whoever has conceived of wisdom, self-control, justice and courage as truly goods could not listen to the comic poet's phrase about the goods.

5.17 To pursue the impossible is madness, and it is impossible for base people not to do some such things.

5.18 It is a terrible thing that ignorance and the wish to please should be stronger than wisdom.

5.23 Since substance is like a river and the infinity of past and future a gulf, he is a fool who among these things is puffed up, dragged about or complains.

5.32 The skilled and knowing soul is the one that knows beginning and end, and the reason that pervades all substance and manages the whole by appointed periods.

5.36 Marcus is to help others according to worth when they lose in things indifferent, without forming the impression that it is a harm, and is not to become a fool because others take such things seriously.

7.73 When he has done good and another has received it, Marcus is not to seek a third thing, like the fools: the repute of having done good, or a return.

8.17 If a thing is in another's power, to blame the atoms or the gods is in either case madness; one must blame no one.

8.26 The gladness of a man is to do what is peculiar to him: goodwill to his kind, disregard of the motions of sense, discernment of convincing impressions and observation of the whole.

8.38 If he can see sharply, Marcus is to look, judging, as someone says, by the wisest.

8.51 Marcus asks what killing and cursing are to the understanding's remaining pure, sane, self-controlled and just.

9.1.2 He who lies unwillingly has neglected the resources he had from nature, and is now unable to distinguish what is false from what is true.

10.8.1 Marcus is to keep the names good, self-respecting, truthful, sensible, consenting, transcending; "sensible" was to signify attention

that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard.

10.9 Marcus is to see and do everything so that the self-assurance that comes from knowledge of each thing is preserved, escaping notice, not concealed.

10.36 Even at the death of a serious and wise man someone will ask himself whether they shall ever breathe again, free of this schoolmaster.

11.18.6 To expect the base not to do wrong is madness, for it reaches after the impossible.

11.33 In words Marcus takes from Epictetus, to seek a fig in winter is the mark of a madman, and such is he who seeks the child when it is no longer given.

11.38 In words Marcus gives to Epictetus, the contest is not about any chance thing but about being mad or not.

12.4 If a god or a sensible teacher bade a man think nothing within himself that he would not at once bring out, he would not endure it even for one day.

12.30 There is one intelligent soul, even if it seems to be divided (see Substance).

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its seventh book, ranks among the virtues placed under the primary ones quick-wittedness, ἀγχίνοια (*anchinoia*), "a state that finds out what is fitting on the spot", and good counsel, εὐβουλία (*euboulia*), "knowledge of considering what we are to do, and how, so as to act to our advantage"; folly, ἀφροσύνη (*aphrosynē*), is named first among the primary vices (see Fault and ignorance).[189] Marcus uses neither ἀφροσύνη nor ἄφρων (*aphrōn*), "senseless"; he uses the school's harder word. "All the senseless are mad," Diogenes reports them as saying, "for they are not wise, but do everything in a madness equal to their folly."[190] Marcus' madness of pursuing the impossible (5.17) and of blaming atoms or gods (8.17) can be read as that doctrine brought down to single acts. Epictetus makes discernment the philosopher's first work. Wisdom, he argues, studies goods, bads and what is neither; being itself a good, as folly is a

[189] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.92–93.

[190] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.124.

bad, it must study itself and its contrary; "this is why the philosopher's greatest and first task is to put the impressions to the test and discern them, and to admit none untested". Where something seems to matter to them, as with money, men have even found an art: the coin-tester tries a coin by sight, touch and smell and at last by its ring, and listens so long that he becomes a musician; where men believe that being misled matters, they spend great care in telling apart what might mislead them, yet over their own poor ruling centre they sit open-mouthed and drowsy and let every impression in.[191] To one who said that, though senseless, he loved his child, Epictetus puts the question what he lacks: does he not use his senses, does he not discern impressions? He owns himself senseless, Epictetus answers, because he is often driven out of himself by impressions, and their plausibilities, πιθανότητες (*pithanotētes*), overcome him.[192] Marcus' "discernment of convincing impressions" (8.26), διάκρισις τῶν πιθανῶν φαντασιῶν (*diakrisis tōn pithanōn phantasiōn*), can be read as the remedy for that defeat. Epictetus describes the wrongdoer, too, as a man blinded "not in the sight that discerns white and black, but in the judgement that discerns goods and bads";[193] Marcus' disablement of 2.13 can be read beside it.

Translation in this edition

Ἔμφρων is "sensible" (4.49.2, 10.8.1 twice, 12.4), and with the article, τὸ ἔμφρον, "good sense" (1.16.7). Σύμφρων is "consenting" and ὑπέρφρων "transcending" (10.8.1), each defined in the same sentence as "sensible". Φρενήρης is "sane" (8.51). Φρόνησις is "wisdom" (5.9, 5.12, 5.18), and so is τὸ φρονεῖν at 4.37; φρόνιμος is "the wise" (4.38); their sub-entries, with the other places of φρονεῖν, are under Virtue and excellence. At 4.38 τοὺς φρονίμους is the reading of P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, which Leopold prints; A, the Vatican manuscript, has the misspelling φρονήμους (*phronēmous*), and Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, proposed τὰς φροντίδας (*tas phrontidas*), "their cares". Σοφός is "wise" (10.36), and its superlative "the wisest" (8.38); σοφία does not occur, and σοφιστής (*sophistēs*), "sophist", the man of words set against the

[191] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.20.6–11.

[192] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.22.4–6.

[193] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.18.6.

philosopher, has its sub-entry elsewhere (see Philosophy). Ἐπιστήμη is “knowledge” (10.9), ἐπιστήμων “knowing” (5.32, twice, beside ἔντεχνος (*entechnos*), “skilled”), and ἐπιστημονικός “knows”, in “the faculty that keeps track and knows” (5.9), where “keeps track” renders παρακολουθητικός (*parakolouthētikos*; see Attention and self-examination). Διακρίνειν is “telling … from” (2.13) and “distinguish” (9.1.2), and in the perfect passive “distinguished” (4.27) and “be divided” (12.30); διάκρισις is “discernment” (8.26), and διαληπτικός “that discerns” (10.8.1), in “attention that discerns each thing”, where ἐπίστασις (*epistasis*) is “attention”; διαλαμβάνειν is “point by point” (1.16.9). Κρίνειν, “judge”, has its sub-entry under Assent and judgement. Μωρός is “fool” (5.23, 5.36), “fools” (4.44) and “the fools” (7.73); μανικός (5.17, 11.18.6) and μανιώδης (8.17) are “madness”, and μαίνεσθαι “madman”, in “the mark of a madman” (11.33), and “being mad” (11.38). Μεγαλοφροσύνη is “greatness of mind” (3.11.2, 5.18, 10.11), μεγαλοφρόνως “with greatness of mind” (6.23), μεγαλόφρων “great-minded” (6.47), εὐφροσύνη “gladness” (8.26), συμφρονεῖν “think together” (8.54), and καταφρονεῖν, ὑπερφρονεῖν and their family “despise”, “contempt” and the like; these are of the root of φρήν but are not words of sense.

διακρίνω

Attested: διακρίνειν (*diakrinein*; 2.13, 9.1.2), διακεκριμένων (*diakekrimenōn*; 4.27), διακεκρίσθαι (*diakekristhai*; 12.30). To separate, to tell one thing from another, to distinguish; in the perfect passive, to be distinguished or divided. Ignorance of good and bad is “a disablement no less than the one that deprives a man of telling white from black” (2.13); the man who lies unwillingly, having neglected the resources he had from nature, “is now unable to distinguish what is false from what is true” (9.1.2). Of the universe, all things are “so distinguished and diffused and in sympathy” (4.27); “One intelligent soul, even if it seems to be divided” (12.30). At 2.13 Leopold reports τὸ διακρίνειν (*to diakrinein*) in A and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, for τοῦ (*tou*); at 9.1.2 X, the books of excerpts, has διακρίνων (*diakrinōn*). Lemma: διακρίνω.

διάκρισις

Attested: διάκρισις (*diakrisis*; 8.26). Separation, discernment. Peculiar to a man is “discernment of convincing impressions” (8.26), with goodwill towards the kindred stock, disregard of the motions of sense and observation of the nature of the whole. Lemma: διάκρισις.

διαλαμβάνω

Attested: διειλημμένα (*dieilēmmena*; 1.16.9). To take apart, to distinguish. In Antoninus there was “everything reckoned out point by point, as if at leisure, untroubled, in order, vigorously, consistently with itself” (1.16.9), where “point by point” renders the perfect participle. Lemma: διαλαμβάνω.

διαληπτικός

Attested: διαληπτικήν (*dialēptikēn*; 10.8.1). Able to distinguish, discerning. “Sensible” was to signify “attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard” (10.8.1). Lemma: διαληπτικός.

ἔμφρων

Attested: ἔμφρον (*emphron*; 1.16.7), ἔμφρονα (*emphrona*; 4.49.2), ἔμφρων (*emphrōn*; 10.8.1 twice, 12.4). Having one’s mind within, sensible; with the article, good sense. In Antoninus, “good sense and measure in the giving of shows, the building of public works, distributions and the like” (1.16.7); “sensible” is among the names Marcus gives himself, and was “meant to signify for you attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard” (10.8.1); “a sensible teacher” (12.4). At 1.16.7 “⟨which is⟩ the mark of a man” renders ⟨ὅ ἐστιν⟩ ἀνθρώπου (*ho estin anthrōpou*), the supplement and correction of Morus, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ ἀνθρώποις (*anthrōpois*), “for men”. At 10.8.1 P has the neuter ἔμφρον (*emphron*) in the second sentence, and so with the other two names. Lemma: ἔμφρων.

ἐπιστήμη

Attested: ἐπιστήμης (*epistēmēs*; 10.9). Knowledge. Marcus is to see and do everything so that “the self-assurance that comes from knowledge of each thing is preserved, escaping notice, not concealed” (10.9). Lemma: ἐπιστήμη.

ἐπιστημονικός

Attested: ἐπιστημονικῆς (*epistēmonikēs*; 5.9). Able to know, having knowledge. “For what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when you consider the sureness and the smooth flow, in everything, of the faculty that keeps track and knows?” (5.9). Lemma: ἐπιστημονικός.

ἐπιστήμων

Attested: ἐπιστήμονα (*epistēmona*; 5.32), ἐπιστήμων (*epistēmōn*; 5.32). Knowing, having knowledge. “Why do unskilled and ignorant souls confound the skilled and knowing? Which soul, then, is skilled and knowing? The one that knows beginning and end” (5.32). Lemma: ἐπιστήμων.

μαίνομαι

Attested: μαινομένου (*mainomenou*; 11.33), μαίνεσθαι (*mainesthai*; 11.38). To rage, to be mad. In words Marcus takes from Epictetus, “To seek a fig in winter is the mark of a madman” (11.33), and “The contest, then, he said, is not about any chance thing, but about being mad or not” (11.38). At 11.38 Leopold reports εἰ μή (*ei mē*) in P for ἢ μή (*ē mē*). Lemma: μαίνομαι.

μανικός

Attested: μανικόν (*manikon*; 5.17, 11.18.6). Mad, of madness. “To pursue the impossible is madness” (5.17); “to expect the base not to do wrong is madness, for it reaches after the impossible” (11.18.6). Lemma: μανικός.

μανιώδης

Attested: μανιώδη (*maniōdē*; 8.17). Like madness, mad. “If in another’s, whom do you blame? The atoms or the gods? Both are madness” (8.17). Lemma: μανιώδης.

μωρός

Attested: μωρούς (*mōrous*; 4.44), μωρός (*mōros*; 5.23, 5.36), μωροί (*mōroi*; 7.73). Dull, foolish; a fool. Of the kind of the rose in spring is “all that gladdens or distresses fools” (4.44); “How then is he not a fool who among these things is puffed up, or dragged about, or complains …?” (5.23); “Is that why, then, you too should become a fool?” (5.36); “why do you seek a third thing besides these, like the fools” (7.73), where “seek” is the correction ἐπιζητεῖς (*epizēteis*) of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, which Leopold prints for the manuscripts’ ἔτι ζητεῖς (*eti*

zēteis), “still seek”, and where Leopold reports that Nauck would delete “like the fools”. Lemma: μωρός.

σοφός

Attested: σοφωτάτοις (*sophōtatois*; 8.38), σοφός (*sophos*; 10.36). Wise; for the Stoics, the sage. “If you can see sharply, look, judging, he says, by the wisest” (8.38), a saying for which Leopold names no source and whose last word, the edition’s note says, does not construe; A has σοφωτάτης δικαιοσύνης (*sophōtatēs dikaiosynēs*), “the wisest justice”, and begins the next chapter after it. “He was serious and wise”, and yet at his death someone will say to himself, “Shall we ever breathe again, free of this schoolmaster?” (10.36). Lemma: σοφός.

σύμφρων

Attested: σύμφρων (*symphrōn*; 10.8.1 twice). Of one mind with, consenting. Among the names Marcus gives himself, “consenting” is to signify “the willing acceptance of what is allotted by the common nature” (10.8.1). Lemma: σύμφρων.

ὑπέρφρων

Attested: ὑπέρφρων (*hyperphrōn*; 10.8.1 twice). With the mind above, transcending. “Transcending” is to signify “the raising of the thinking part above smooth or rough motion of the flesh, and little fame, and death, and all such things” (10.8.1). Lemma: ὑπέρφρων.

φρενήρης

Attested: φρενήρη (*phrenērē*; 8.51). Sound of mind, sane. “What, then, is this to the understanding’s remaining pure, sane, self-controlled, just?” (8.51). Lemma: φρενήρης.

See also

Anger; Assent and judgement; Attention and self-examination; Courage and endurance; Daimon; Death; Desire and aversion; Fault and ignorance; Good, bad and indifference; Impression; Inner retreat and citadel; Justice; Philosophy; Providence and atoms; Self-respect and shame; Substance; Temperance and self-mastery; Virtue and excellence.

Nature and the whole

Affinity and the alien

What belongs to a man and what is another's · Meditations

οἰκείωσις, oikeiōsis, "affinity"; *οἰκειοῦσθαι, oikeiousthai*, "come into affinity with"; *ἐξοικειοῦν, exoikeioun*, "make its own", "come into affinity with", "bring into affinity with"; *οἰκεῖος, oikeios*, "proper", "more proper", "most proper", "good people about me", "kin", "intimates", "those akin", "more akin"; *οἰκείως, oikeiōs*, "in a way akin to it", "properly", "stand in affinity with"; *οἰκειότης, oikeiotēs*, "kinship"; *ἴδιος, idios*, "own", "peculiar to", "individual", "individually", "on its own"; *ἰδίως, idiōs*, "in their own way", "specifically", "in a way of its own", "individually"; *ἀνοίκειος, anoikeios*, "foreign"; *ἀνοικείωτος, anoikeiōtos*, "without affinity"; *ἀλλότριος, allotrios*, "another's", "others'", "alien"; *ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι, allotriousthai*, "be made alien"; *ξένος, xenos*, "stranger", "a stranger's", "strangers", "strange"; *ξενίζεσθαι, xenizesthai*, "think strange"

At a Glance

The word. Οἰκεῖος, from οἶκος (*oikos*), "house", is what belongs to the household: one's own people, and what is proper to a thing. Οἰκείωσις is the Stoic word for nature's attachment of a living being to itself and to what is proper to it. Ἀλλότριος, from ἄλλος (*allos*), "other", is another's, and so alien; ξένος is the stranger.

In the *Meditations*. Affinity widens from philosophy (1.6) and men (3.9) to nature (3.2.3), and at last to events: "everything that happens comes into affinity with God or man" (7.68). Almost nothing is "alien one to another" (7.9); the one thing Marcus calls alien is "the wrong done" (12.26), and the stranger is "he who is astonished at anything whatever that comes about in life" (12.13).

In this edition. Οἰκείωσις is "affinity" and οἰκειοῦσθαι "come into affinity with"; οἰκεῖος is "proper", and of persons "kin", "intimates" or "akin"; ἀλλότριος is "another's" before its noun and "alien" in the predicate; ἀνοίκειος is "foreign"; ξένος is "stranger" and "strange".

A place to read. 10.31, where Marcus is to stay with what he flees until he brings it into affinity with himself, as the vigorous stomach does with everything.

Meaning

Οἰκεῖος (*oikeios*) belongs with οἶκος (*oikos*), "house": it is what is of the household, a man's kinsmen and intimates, then whatever is one's own and proper to a thing. Οἰκειοῦν (*oikeioun*) is to make one's own or akin, and its middle and passive οἰκειοῦσθαι (*oikeiousthai*) to come into affinity with; the noun οἰκείωσις (*oikeiōsis*) is the Stoic term, which the edition's note at 3.9 explains as "the process by which a creature comes to treat itself, and then others, as its own". Ἀλλότριος (*allotrios*), from ἄλλος (*allos*), "other", is another's, and so foreign; the Stoics set ἀλλοτριοῦν (*allotrioun*), "to estrange", against οἰκειοῦν. Ἀνοίκειος (*anoikeios*) is what does not belong. Ξένος (*xenos*) is the guest-friend and the stranger, and ξενίζεσθαι (*xenizesthai*) is to be struck by something strange. Marcus uses the school's noun once (3.9); his verb reaches beyond the self, where the school began, to philosophy, nature and everything that happens.

Use in the book

Affinity enters the book as a debt: from Diognetus, his painting master, Marcus had "to have come into affinity with philosophy" (1.6; see Philosophy). The noun comes once, in a promise made by the faculty of forming opinions: "And this promises freedom from rash assent, affinity with men, and following the gods" (3.9; see Assent and judgement). The objects widen. Many sights in nature "will strike only the man who has come into genuine affinity with nature and her works" (3.2.3; see Natural beauty). Marcus lays down "that I stand in some affinity to the parts of one kind with me", and draws his social action from it (10.6.1–2; see Whole and part); the things that are "stand in affinity with all that exist" (9.1.1; see Truth and falsehood). The widening ends with events: "For everything that happens comes into affinity with God or man, and is neither new nor hard to handle, but familiar and easy to work" (7.68; see Tranquillity).

Affinity is also work. The compound verb names assimilation: a bright fire "makes its own whatever is heaped on it" (4.1; see Impulse). Of what he flees Marcus asks, "what are all these but exercises for a reason that has seen

exactly …?", and goes on: "Stay, then, until you bring these too into affinity with yourself, as the vigorous stomach brings everything into affinity with itself, as the bright fire makes flame and radiance out of whatever you throw into it" (10.31). In the school nature draws a creature to what is already its own; Marcus' affinity can be read as the reason's work on what is given, which it makes its own by using it.

What belongs to a thing by nature is "proper". Man and God and the universe bear fruit, "each … in its proper seasons" (9.10), and what is according to nature for each "is more proper to it, more native to it, and indeed more agreeable" (8.12; see Human work). The proper can be mistaken. It is cruel not to allow people an impulse towards "what appears to them proper and advantageous"; to the objection that it is not so, the answer is "Then teach and show, without being indignant" (6.27; see Anger). Man himself is "the thing most proper to us, in so far as one must do good to them and bear with them", and becomes a thing that makes no difference in so far as some stand in the way of "my proper works" (5.20; see Obstacle and reservation).

Against the proper stands the alien, in two senses. Before its noun ἀλλότριος is "another's", and marks a boundary. "What is bad for you does not subsist in another's ruling centre" (4.39; see Harm); Marcus is not to "look round at others' ruling centres" (7.55; see Ruling centre), and he asks himself whether he does not want "to leave others' turnings to those who turn them and are turned" (7.58). Standing alone it is "alien", and then Marcus mostly denies it: "almost nothing is alien one to another" (7.9; see Interconnection), and he is not to form the impression that the lion's jaws and poison are "alien to that which you revere" (6.36; see Natural beauty). One thing he calls alien: whoever is aggrieved has forgotten, among other things, "that the wrong done is alien" (12.26; see Mind and reason). The man who does it is not alien. Whoever is exasperated with those who stand in his way deserts his post as surely as the man who shrank back, "made alien towards him who is by nature kinsman and friend" (11.9; see Kindness and correction). The line between the proper and the alien runs neither between Marcus and the world nor between him and other men, but round each ruling centre, whose acts and wrongs are its own.

The stranger is the man to whom the world is new. "How ridiculous and a stranger is he who is astonished at anything

whatever that comes about in life" (12.13). If he is "a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it", no less a stranger is "he who does not know what happens" (4.29; see Citizenship); and if at the exit Marcus honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, and fears never having begun to live according to nature, he will "cease being a stranger to the fatherland, and being astonished at the things that come about day by day as unexpected" (12.1.2; see Death). It is "shameful to think it strange if the fig tree bears figs", and so "if the universe bears such and such things as it is fruitful of" (8.15); those to whom the same things happened "were annoyed, thought them strange, blamed", and are nowhere (7.58). If the man he meets has such and such principles about good and bad, "it will not seem astonishing or strange to me if he does such and such things" (8.14; see Principles and reminders). Book II calls life "a war and a stranger's sojourn" (2.17.1; see Soul), and Book XII can be read as answering it: the stranger is not the man passing through but the man who is surprised, and affinity, which makes what happens "familiar" (7.68), is the cure.

Places to read

Every chapter in which οἰκείωσις, οἰκειοῦσθαι or ἐξοικειοῦν (*exoikeioun*), οἰκεῖος or its adverb οἰκείως (*oikeiōs*), οἰκειότης (*oikeiotēs*), ἀνοίκειος, ἀνοικείωτος (*anoikeiōtos*), ἀλλότριος, ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι (*allotriousthai*), ξένος or ξενίζεσθαι occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. Φιλοίκειος (*philoikeios*), "love of family" (1.14.1), is left out (see Love and affection), and the places of ἴδιος (*idios*), "own", are given in its sub-entry.

1.6 Among Marcus' debts to Diognetus are to have come into affinity with philosophy and to have written dialogues as a boy.

1.17.1 From the gods Marcus had good grandfathers, parents, a sister, teachers, good people about him, kinsmen and friends.

2.17.1 In the summary of human life, life is a war and a stranger's sojourn, and fame after death oblivion.

3.2.3 Many such things, not convincing to everyone, are for the man alone who has come into genuine affinity with nature and her works.

3.7 The man who has chosen his own mind and daimon before all else is cautious throughout his life of one thing only, lest his understanding be in a turning foreign to an intelligent, civic living being.

3.9 The faculty of forming opinions is to be revered, for it promises freedom from rash assent, affinity with men and following the gods.

4.1 As a bright fire makes its own whatever is heaped on it, what rules within makes material for itself of whatever is brought in to replace what it aimed at.

4.29 If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it, no less a stranger is he who does not know what happens.

4.39 What is bad for Marcus does not subsist in another's ruling centre, but where that is in him which forms opinions about bad things.

4.45 What follows comes on what went before in a way akin to it, and the things that come to be show not bare succession but a wonderful kinship.

4.46 Of the sayings of Heraclitus of Ephesus, the philosopher of about 500 BC, Marcus is to remember that what men meet every day seems strange to them.

5.2 It is easy to push away and wipe away every impression that is vexing or foreign, and at once to be in complete calm.

5.12 The comic poet's line can properly be added to what the many take for goods, as it could not be to wisdom, self-control, justice and courage.

5.14 Reason and the art of reasoning set out from their proper starting point and travel to the end set before them.

5.20 Man is in one respect the thing most proper to us, in so far as one must do good to men and bear with them, but indifferent in so far as some stand in the way of Marcus' proper works.

5.31 Marcus is to ask how he has behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children, teachers, tutors, friends, kin and household slaves.

6.19 If something is possible for a man and proper to him, Marcus is to believe it attainable by himself too.

6.27 It is cruel not to allow people an impulse towards what appears to them proper and advantageous; if it is not so, one is to teach and show without being indignant.

6.36 Even the lion's jaws and poison come from the common ruling centre, and Marcus is not to form the impression that they are alien to what he reveres.

6.51 The lover of fame takes his own good to be another's activity, the lover of pleasure his own being acted upon, the man who has a mind his own action.

7.9 All things are woven together, the bond is sacred, and almost nothing is alien one to another.

7.18 Nothing can come to be without change, and nothing is dearer or more proper to the nature of the whole.

7.55 Marcus is not to look round at others' ruling centres, but straight at what nature is guiding him to.

7.58 Those to whom the same things happened were annoyed, thought them strange and blamed; Marcus asks whether he does not want to leave others' turnings to those who turn them, and be intent on how to use them.

7.66 Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, is to be judged by, among other things, whether he received nothing allotted from the whole as something strange.

7.68 Everything that happens comes into affinity with God or man, and is neither new nor hard to handle, but familiar and easy to work.

8.12 To render social actions accords with man's constitution, and what is according to nature for each is more proper to it, more native to it and more agreeable.

8.14 If Marcus knows a man's principles about good and bad, it will not seem astonishing or strange that he acts accordingly.

8.15 As it is shameful to think it strange that the fig tree bears figs, so it is if the universe bears what it is

fruitful of, or for a doctor or a helmsman to think a fever or a contrary wind strange.

8.31 The court of Augustus, the first emperor, with his wife, daughter, kinsmen, intimates and friends, is the death of a whole court.

9.1.1 The nature of the whole is the nature of the things that are, and the things that are stand in affinity with all that exist.

9.9.1 Whatever shares in the common intelligent nature hastens towards what is kin, and the better it is, the readier to blend with what is proper to it.

9.10 Man and God and the universe bear fruit, each in its proper seasons, and reason has fruit both common and its own.

9.42.3 Marcus asks what strange thing has happened if the uneducated man does what belongs to the uneducated.

10.6.1 Marcus lays down that he is a part of the whole governed by nature, and that he stands in some affinity to the parts of one kind with him.

10.6.2 In so far as he stands in some affinity to the parts of one kind with him, Marcus will do nothing unsocial and will lead every impulse towards what is of common advantage.

10.31 What Marcus flees is material and occasion, exercises for reason, and he is to stay until he brings it into affinity with himself, as the vigorous stomach brings everything into affinity with itself.

10.33.1 Doing, in the material that presents itself, the things proper to the constitution of man is to be for Marcus what luxury is to those who live delicately.

10.36 Dying, Marcus is to go away kindly to those who want him gone, dissolved as from those akin, yet without being pulled the other way.

11.9 Whoever is exasperated with those who stand in his way deserts his post as much as the coward, made alien towards one who is by nature kinsman and friend.

11.13 Nothing is bad for Marcus if he is now doing what is proper to his nature, a man stretched towards what is of common advantage.

11.18.3 One must first learn much before pronouncing with a firm grasp on another's action.

11.18.5 Mildness, not rage, is manly, for the more akin it is to freedom from passion, the more akin to power.

11.24 The Spartans at the spectacles set the seats for strangers in the shade, and sat themselves wherever they happened to be.

12.1.1 Marcus is to let neither another's vice impede him, nor opinion, nor voice, nor the sensation of the poor flesh.

12.1.2 If at the exit Marcus honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, and fears never having begun to live according to nature, he will cease being a stranger to the fatherland and astonished at what comes about.

12.13 He is ridiculous and a stranger who is astonished at anything that comes about in life.

12.26 Whoever is aggrieved at anything has forgotten, among other things, that the wrong done is alien.

12.30 The breaths and the underlying things are without affinity to one another, though held together, while understanding, in a way of its own, joins with its kindred stock.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, whose seventh book sets out the Stoic doctrines, reports the doctrine from the first book of *On Ends* by Chrysippus, the school's third head. Nature makes the living being akin to itself from the beginning, οἰκειούσης αὑτῷ τῆς φύσεως (*oikeiousēs hautōi tēs physeōs*), and the first thing proper to every living being is its own constitution and its awareness of it. It was not likely, the argument runs, that nature would estrange, ἀλλοτριῶσαι (*allotriōsai*), the living being, nor that, having made it, she would make it neither estranged nor akin; it remains that, having constituted it, she made it akin to itself, and so it thrusts away what harms it and admits what is proper to it.[194] The animal's first impulse, they say, is to preserve itself, because of this attachment; reason, which supervenes in rational beings as the craftsman of impulse, belongs to the same

[194] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.85.

account (see Impulse). Cicero, the Roman orator and statesman of the first century BC, gives the doctrine in Latin in the third book of his *On Ends*, where Cato the Younger, the Stoic senator, speaks for the school: as soon as an animal is born it is attached and commended to itself, *conciliari et commendari*, to preserve itself and to love its own condition and whatever preserves it, and estranged, *alienari*, from destruction and whatever seems to bring it; the proof is that the young seek what is healthy and spurn the contrary before pleasure or pain has touched them.[195] Man's first attachment, *conciliatio*, is to the things that accord with nature; but once he has a notion, which the Greeks call ἔννοια (*ennoia*), and has seen the order and, so to speak, the concord of the things to be done, he values it far above all he first loved. As a man commended to another often comes to value the one he was commended to above the one who commended him, so we are first commended to wisdom by the beginnings of nature, and later wisdom itself grows dearer to us than the things that brought us to her.[196] Marcus' debt to Diognetus, "to have come into affinity with philosophy" (1.6), can be read beside this. From parents' love of their children Cato draws the fellowship of the human race (see Kinship and cooperation). Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, uses the verb when he says that every living being is bound to nothing so closely as to its own advantage (see Friendship). He also says that all things are full of friends, first gods, then men, "by nature in affinity with one another", φύσει πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾠκειωμένων (*physei pros allēlous ōikeiōmenōn*), and some of them must be present to one another and some depart, glad of those who are with them and not vexed at those who go.[197] Of the man who grieves when a friend goes abroad he asks why he thought what was another's, τὰ ἀλλότρια (*ta allotria*), his own.[198] Marcus' "I am dissolved as from those akin" (10.36; see Death) and his rule that another's ruling centre is another's can be read beside both.

[195] Cicero, *On Ends* 3.16.

[196] Cicero, *On Ends* 3.21 and 3.23.

[197] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.24.11.

[198] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.24.4.

Translation in this edition

Οἰκείωσις is “affinity” at its one place (3.9), and οἰκειοῦσθαι “come into affinity with” (1.6, 3.2.3). The compound ἐξοικειοῦν (*exoikeioun*) is “makes its own” (4.1), “come into affinity with” (7.68) and “bring into affinity with” (10.31 twice). Οἰκεῖος is “proper” (5.14, 5.20, 6.19, 6.27 twice, 9.9.1, 9.10, 10.33.1, 11.13), in the comparative “more proper” (7.18, 8.12) and in the superlative “most proper” (5.20); of persons it is “good people about me” (1.17.1), “kin” (5.31), “intimates” (8.31) and “those akin” (10.36), and where the sense is kinship the comparative is “more akin”, rendered twice for one Greek word (11.18.5). The Glossary keeps “proper” apart from “own”, ἴδιος (*idios*). Ἴδιος is “own”, and with the genitive of the kind it marks out “peculiar to” (3.16.2, 5.6.2, 7.22, 7.55, 8.26 twice, 8.41, 8.46, 11.1.1, 11.1.2 twice), with “nothing is anyone’s own” (12.26) as its recorded exception; it is “individual” in “individual circumscriptions” (12.30), and its adverbial dative ἰδίᾳ (*idiāi*) and κατ’ ἰδίαν (*kat’ idian*) are “individually” (5.8.5, 6.44.1) and “on its own” (3.2.2). The adverb ἰδίως (*idiōs*) is “in their own way” (3.2.1), “specifically” (4.10) and “in a way of its own” (12.30), and with ποιός (*poios*) “individually qualified” (9.25, 10.7.3, 12.30). The adverb οἰκείως is “in a way akin to it” (4.45) and “properly” (5.12 twice), and with ἔχειν (*echein*), which with an adverb means to be in some way, it is “stand in affinity with” (9.1.1) and “stand in some affinity to” (10.6.1, 10.6.2); οἰκειότης is “kinship” (4.45). Not every “kin” or “kinship” in the English renders this family: συγγενής (*syngenēs*) and συγγένεια (*syngeneia*) are “kin”, “kinsman” and “kinship” (see Kinship and cooperation), and ὁμόφυλος (*homophylos*) is “the kindred stock” (8.26, 12.30). Ἀνοίκειος is “foreign” (3.7, 5.2), kept apart from “alien”, and ἀνοικείωτος “without affinity” (12.30). Ἀλλότριος is split by construction, as the Glossary records: before its noun “another’s” (4.39, 6.51, 11.18.3, 12.1.1) or, in the plural, “others’” (7.55, 7.58); in the predicate “alien” (6.36, 7.9, 12.26). The participle of ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι is “made alien” (11.9). “Another’s” also renders ἄλλος: its genitive at 2.8 and 9.20, and ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ (*ep’ allōi*), “in another’s” power, at 8.17 and 8.56; “others’” at 4.48.1 renders ἄλλων (*allōn*). At 10.7.1 the manuscripts have ἀλλοτρίωσιν (*allotriōsin*), “estrangement”, where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, prints ἀλλοίωσιν (*alloiōsin*), “alteration”, the correction of Thomas Gataker, the

seventeenth-century English editor. Ξένος is “stranger” (4.29 twice, 12.1.2, 12.13), “a stranger’s” (2.17.1) and “strangers” (11.24), and as an adjective “strange” (4.46, 7.66, 8.14, 9.42.3); ξενίζεσθαι is “think strange”, with its object: “thought them strange” (7.58) and “think it strange” (8.15 twice). Φιλοίκειος, “love of family” (1.14.1), has its sub-entry in Love and affection.

ἀλλότριος

Attested: ἀλλοτρίῳ (*allotriōi*; 4.39), ἀλλότρια (*allotria*; 6.36, 7.55), ἀλλοτρίαν (*allotrian*; 6.51), ἀλλότριον (*allotrion*; 7.9, 12.26), ἀλλοτρίας (*allotrias*; 7.58, 11.18.3), ἀλλοτρία (*allotria*; 12.1.1). Belonging to another; foreign, alien. Attributively, “another’s ruling centre” (4.39), “others’ ruling centres” (7.55), “others’ turnings” (7.58), “another’s action” (11.18.3), “another’s vice” (12.1.1); predicatively, “almost nothing is alien one to another” (7.9) and “the wrong done is alien” (12.26). Lemma: ἀλλότριος.

ἀλλοτριόω

Attested: ἀλλοτριωθείς (*allotriōtheis*; 11.9). To make another’s, to estrange; in the passive, to be made alien. Those who give in from dismay and those who are exasperated with men who stand in their way “are equally deserters of their post, the one who shrank back, and the one made alien towards him who is by nature kinsman and friend” (11.9). Lemma: ἀλλοτριόω.

ἀνοίκειος

Attested: ἀνοικείῳ (*anoikeiōi*; 3.7), ἀνοίκειον (*anoikeion*; 5.2). Not one’s own, unfitting, foreign. “Every impression that is vexing or foreign” (5.2). At 3.7 the man who has chosen his mind and daimon before all else is cautious only that his understanding should be “in any turning foreign to an intelligent ⟨and⟩ civic living being”, where “and” is the supplement of Johannes Stich, whose Teubner text appeared in 1882, and P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has ἔν τινι τῶν οἰκείων (*en tini tōn oikeiōn*), “in any of those proper to”, for ἔν τινι ἀνοικείῳ, as Leopold reports. Lemma: ἀνοίκειος.

ἀνοικείωτος

Attested: ἀνοικείωτα (*anoikeiōta*; 12.30). Without affinity. The breaths and the underlying things “are insensible and without affinity to one another”, though held together, while

understanding “stretches towards the kindred stock and joins with it” (12.30; see Substance), where “stretches” is the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which Leopold prints. Lemma: ἀνοικείωτος.

ἐξοικειόω

Attested: ἐξῳκείωσεν (*exōikeiōsen*; 4.1), ἐξοικειοῦται (*exoikeioutai*; 7.68), ἐξοικειώσῃς (*exoikeiōsēis*; 10.31), ἐξοικειοῖ (*exoikeioi*; 10.31). To make wholly one’s own, to assimilate. “A bright fire very quickly makes its own whatever is heaped on it” (4.1); “everything that happens comes into affinity with God or man” (7.68); “Stay, then, until you bring these too into affinity with yourself, as the vigorous stomach brings everything into affinity with itself” (10.31). Lemma: ἐξοικειόω.

ἴδιος

Attested: ἰδίου (*idiou*; 1.16.5, 3.4.1, 8.31, 11.1.1), ἰδίαν (*idian*; 1.16.5, 3.2.2, 4.3.2, 4.29, 4.32.2 twice, 5.25 twice, 6.16.2, 6.44.1, 6.51 twice, 7.71, 7.75, 8.28, 8.56, 9.42.4, 10.33.1, 10.33.2), ἴδια (*idia*; 1.16.6, 4.49.2, 8.18, 8.26, 8.41, 11.1.1), ἰδίας (*idias*; 2.8, 3.6.2, 4.4, 6.16.5, 6.35, 11.5, 11.21), ἴδιον (*idion*; 3.2.2, 3.6.2, 3.11.1, 3.16.2, 5.1.1, 5.3, 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 6.51, 7.22, 7.55, 8.26, 8.46, 9.10, 9.41, 9.42.4, 10.36, 11.1.2 twice, 11.16, 12.26), ἰδίᾳ (*idiāi*; 4.25, 5.3 twice, 5.8.5, 8.11, 8.45, 8.50), ἰδία (*idia*; 6.3, 12.23), ἰδίαις (*idiais*; 12.30); the adverb ἰδίως (*idiōs*; 3.2.1, 4.10, 9.25, 10.7.3, 12.30 twice). One’s own, private; with the genitive, peculiar to. Of what belongs to a man: the good man is “content with his own just action and kindly disposition” (4.25), and the man who has a mind takes “his own action” for his good (6.51). Of what marks out a kind: “It is peculiar to man to love even those who stumble” (7.22); “peculiar to a man is goodwill towards the kindred stock” (8.26). Once Marcus denies it of everything: “nothing is anyone’s own” (12.26). With ποιός (*poios*) the adverb gives the Stoic “individually qualified” thing (9.25, 10.7.3, 12.30; see Substance). At 9.32 the manuscripts have ἴδιον where Leopold prints ἀίδιον (*aidion*), “everlasting”, the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar. Lemma: ἴδιος.

ξενίζω

Attested: ἐξενίζοντο (*exenizonto*; 7.58), ξενίζεσθαι (*xenizesthai*; 8.15 twice). To receive as a guest; in the passive, to be struck by what is strange, to think strange. Those to whom the same things happened "were annoyed, thought them strange, blamed" (7.58); "it is shameful to think it strange if the fig tree bears figs" (8.15). Lemma: ξενίζω.

ξένος

Attested: ξένου (*xenou*; 2.17.1), ξένος (*xenos*; 4.29 twice, 12.1.2, 12.13), ξένα (*xena*; 4.46), ξένον (*xenon*; 7.66, 8.14, 9.42.3), ξένοις (*xenois*; 11.24). A guest-friend, a stranger, a foreigner; as an adjective, strange. "Life is a war and a stranger's sojourn" (2.17.1); "a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it" (4.29); "How ridiculous and a stranger is he who is astonished at anything whatever that comes about in life" (12.13); the Spartans "set the seats for strangers in the shade" (11.24). As an adjective: what men meet every day "seems strange to them" (4.46, from Heraclitus), and "what new or strange thing has happened" (9.42.3), where "new" is the correction of A. J. Kronenberg, whose notes on Marcus appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' κακόν (*kakon*), "bad". Lemma: ξένος.

οἰκεῖος

Attested: οἰκείους (*oikeious*; 1.17.1), οἰκείας (*oikeias*; 5.14), οἰκειότατον (*oikeiotaton*; 5.20), οἰκεῖα (*oikeia*; 5.20, 6.27 twice, 10.33.1), οἰκείοις (*oikeiois*; 5.31), οἰκεῖον (*oikeion*; 6.19, 11.13), οἰκειότερον (*oikeioteron*; 7.18, 8.12, 11.18.5), οἰκεῖοι (*oikeioi*; 8.31), οἰκείῳ (*oikeiōi*; 9.9.1), οἰκείαις (*oikeiais*; 9.10), οἰκείων (*oikeiōn*; 10.36); the adverb οἰκείως (*oikeiōs*; 4.45, 5.12 twice, 9.1.1, 10.6.1, 10.6.2). Of the household; one's own; proper, fitting; of persons, kin and intimates. "Each bears it in its proper seasons" (9.10); "what is according to nature for each is more proper to it, more native to it, and indeed more agreeable" (8.12); "man is the thing most proper to us, in so far as one must do good to them and bear with them" (5.20), where "bear with" is the correction of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, which Leopold prints; "I am dissolved as from those akin" (10.36). The adverb with ἔχειν: "I stand in some affinity to the parts of one kind with me" (10.6.1). At 6.27 Leopold prints "proper and advantageous" the second time

with P and A, the Vatican manuscript; editors before him had dropped the “and”. Lemma: οἰκεῖος.

οἰκειότης

Attested: οἰκειότητα (*oikeiotēta*; 4.45). Kinship, close relation. The things that come to be show “not bare succession but a wonderful kinship” (4.45; see Cosmos and order). Lemma: οἰκειότης.

οἰκειόω

Attested: οἰκειωθῆναι (*oikeiōthēnai*; 1.6), ᾠκειωμένῳ (*ōikeiōmenōi*; 3.2.3). To make one’s own or akin; in the passive, to come into affinity with. From Diognetus, “to have come into affinity with philosophy” (1.6; see Philosophy); “the man who has come into genuine affinity with nature and her works” (3.2.3; see Natural beauty), where the verb before these words, “will strike”, is Gataker’s correction, which Leopold prints. Lemma: οἰκειόω.

οἰκείωσις

Attested: οἰκείωσιν (*oikeiōsin*; 3.9). Affinity, the making of something one’s own; in the Stoics, nature’s attachment of a creature to itself and to what is proper to it. The faculty of forming opinions “promises freedom from rash assent, affinity with men, and following the gods” (3.9; see Assent and judgement). Lemma: οἰκείωσις.

See also

Anger; Assent and judgement; Citizenship; Cosmos and order; Death; Friendship; Harm; Human work; Impulse; Interconnection; Kindness and correction; Kinship and cooperation; Love and affection; Mind and reason; Natural beauty; Obstacle and reservation; Philosophy; Principles and reminders; Ruling centre; Soul; Substance; Tranquillity; Truth and falsehood; Whole and part.

Body and flesh

The poor body, the flesh and sensation · Meditations

σῶμα, sōma, “body”; *σωμάτιον, sōmation*, “poor body”, “body”; *σωματικός, sōmatikos*, “of the body”, “bodily”, “the body”; *σάρξ, sarx*, “flesh”; *σαρκίον, sarkion*, “scraps of flesh”; *σαρκίδιον, sarkidion*, “poor flesh”; *κρεάδιον, kreadion*, “bit of flesh”; *ἀγγεῖον, angeion*, “vessel”;

ἀγγειώδης, angeiōdēs, “vessel-like”; *φλοιός, phloios*, “husks”; *λύθρος, lythros*, “gore”; *γράσος, grasos*, “stink”; *αἴσθησις, aisthēsis*, “sensation”; *αἰσθάνεσθαι, aisthanesthai*, “perceive”; *αἰσθητός, aisthētos*, “objects of sense”; *αἰσθητήριον, aisthētērion*, “senses”; *αἰσθητικός, aisthētikos*, “of sense”, “the senses”; *ἀναίσθητος, anaisthētos*, “insensible”, “unfeelingly”

At a Glance

The word. Σῶμα is the body, and σάρξ its flesh; Marcus’ diminutives, σωμάτιον, “poor body”, and σαρκίδιον, “poor flesh”, make them small. Αἴσθησις, from αἰσθάνεσθαι, “to perceive”, is sensation, which in his triad of body, soul and mind belongs to the body (3.16.1).

In the *Meditations*. The body is a corpse that a little soul carries, in a saying of Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded (4.41), “stink and gore in a bag” (8.37), a vessel and a husk (12.2), a set of instruments grown attached (10.38). It does not judge: “To the poor body, then, all things make no difference” (6.32). Yet sensation, when it passes up into the understanding, is “natural” and not to be resisted (5.26), and the body is to be cared for and held firm (1.16.5, 7.60).

In this edition. Σῶμα is always “body” and σωμάτιον “poor body”, once “in body” (1.17.4); σάρξ is “flesh”, σαρκίον “scraps of flesh”, σαρκίδιον “poor flesh” and κρεάδιον “bit of flesh”; αἴσθησις is “sensation” and αἰσθάνεσθαι “perceive”.

A place to read. 12.2, where God sees ruling centres naked of their vessels and husks, and the man who does not look at the bits of flesh around him will still less be busied with clothing, house and fame.

Meaning

Σῶμα (*sōma*) is in Homer always a dead body, a corpse or a carcass;[199] later it is the living body as well, and any body at all. The Stoics held even the soul to be a body (see Soul). Σάρξ (*sarx*) is flesh, and σαρκίον (*sarkion*) and σαρκίδιον (*sarkidion*) are its diminutives; κρεάδιον (*kreadion*), from κρέας (*kreas*), “meat”, is a scrap of flesh. Αἴσθησις (*aisthēsis*), from αἰσθάνεσθαι (*aisthanesthai*), “to perceive”, is perception through the senses. In the triad of 3.16.1

[199] Homer, *Iliad* 3.23, 7.79, 18.161, 22.342, 23.169; *Odyssey* 11.53, 12.67, 24.187.

sensation is the body's, as impulse is the soul's and principles the mind's (see Impulse); where Marcus counts his parts again, flesh or the poor body stands beside breath and the ruling centre (2.2; see Ruling centre) or mind (12.3.1; see Mind and reason).

Use in the book

Seen from outside, the body is material, a corpse. "You are a little soul carrying a corpse, as Epictetus used to say" (4.41): the saying of Epictetus makes the living body a dead thing, and the "remaining knocks" either "belong to the poor body, the corpse", or do nothing bad without opinion (10.33.3; see Obstacle and reservation). In the summary of life "the compound of the whole body" is "quick to rot", and "all that belongs to the body is a river" (2.17.1; see Soul). "The rottenness of the material underlying each thing: water, dust, little bones, stink" (9.36). Of the favourites of dead emperors Marcus concludes, "All this is stink and gore in a bag" (8.37), where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, for "stink", and that of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, for "gore". The scraps of flesh of 2.2, "gore, little bones, a mesh, a tangle of nerves, veins and arteries", are to be despised (see Ruling centre).

The body is also a container and a tool. God "sees all ruling centres naked of the material vessels and husks and dross", and if Marcus makes a habit of the same, he will strip away the great distraction, "for he who does not look at the bits of flesh that lie around him, still less, surely, will he be busied with gazing at clothing and house and fame and such wrapping and stage" (12.2; see Gods). "What jerks the puppet is that which is hidden within"; Marcus is never to include in his impression "the vessel-like thing that surrounds it, and these little instruments moulded about it; for they are like an adze, differing only in that they grow attached", and without the cause that moves them they are of no more use than "the shuttle to the weaver and the pen to the writer and the whip to the charioteer" (10.38).

"I am made of a poor body and a soul. To the poor body, then, all things make no difference, for it cannot tell a difference" (6.32). "Let the poor body be concerned, if it can, that it suffers nothing, and let it say if it suffers anything" (7.16). Even if "what is nearest to it, the poor body,

is cut, burned, festers, rots", the part that forms opinions is to "keep quiet" (4.39). All that lies within the bounds of the bit of flesh and the little breath is neither his nor in his power (5.33; see Breath).

Sensation belongs to the body, and is not to be fought. It is "dim" (2.17.1; see Soul); yet when what the flesh undergoes passes up into the understanding "as in a body that is unified, then one must not try to resist the sensation, which is natural", and the ruling centre is only not to add the opinion that it is good or bad (5.26; see Ruling centre). Nor is "the sensation of the poor flesh that has grown around you" to impede Marcus, "for the part affected will see to it" (12.1.1). He asks of his ruling centre: "Is it melted into and blended with the poor flesh, so as to turn with it?" (10.24; see Ruling centre). So with Socrates, the Athenian philosopher: it is "not enough" that he "passed the night in the frost more hardily, and, when ordered to fetch the man of Salamis, seemed to resist more nobly"; one must look at "what sort of soul Socrates had", and whether he could be content to be just and holy, among other things not "lending the mind to share the passions of the poor flesh" (7.66). The last clause of the test is the body's. Marcus copies the same aim from Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, who in his illness was intent on "how the understanding, while having its share in such motions in the poor flesh, stays untroubled" (9.41; see Philosophy).

Yet the body is cared for. In his adoptive father, the emperor Antoninus Pius, Marcus records "a measured care of his own body, not as one in love with life, nor for show, nor yet neglectfully" (1.16.5). Body and breath "are yours so far as one must take care of them", though mind alone is properly one's own (12.3.1; see Mind and reason). "The body too must be firm and not sprawl, either in motion or at rest": as the understanding keeps the face "composed and decorous", so the like is to be required of the whole body, but "without affectation" (7.60); "composed" is Coraes' correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' "intelligent". He finds it "shameful that in a life in which your body does not give up, your soul should give up first" (6.29; see Soul). The body in the *Meditations* is neither the self nor its enemy. It is material lent, a vessel and a tool grown attached, to be kept in order and allowed its sensations; but it has no voice on good and bad.

Places to read

The passages where the body, the flesh and sensation are discussed or carry the argument, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with 4.41, where the body is a corpse; every place is given in the sub-entries.

1.16.5 Antoninus Pius took a measured care of his own body, not as one in love with life, nor for show, nor neglectfully, so that he seldom needed the doctor.

1.17.7 Among his debts to the gods Marcus counts that his body has held out so long in such a life.

2.2 Marcus is scraps of flesh, a little breath and the ruling centre, and he is to despise the scraps of flesh, gore, little bones, a mesh, a tangle of nerves, veins and arteries.

2.12 The bodies themselves vanish into the universe, and the objects of sense that lure with pleasure or frighten with pain are cheap, perishable and dead.

2.17.1 In human life sensation is dim, the compound of the whole body quick to rot, and all that belongs to the body a river.

3.3 If death is absence of sensation, Marcus will cease to slave for a vessel so much worse than what serves it, for the one is mind and daimon, the other earth and gore.

3.6.2 The daimon within has drawn itself away, as Socrates used to say, from what the senses undergo.

3.16.1 Sensations belong to the body, impulses to the soul, principles to the mind.

4.3.2 Asking whether the things of the body will still touch him, Marcus is to bear in mind that the understanding does not mingle with the breath as it moves smoothly or roughly, once it has drawn itself back and come to know its own authority.

4.39 Even if the poor body is cut, burned, festers or rots, the part that forms opinions is to keep quiet and judge nothing bad or good that can happen equally to a bad man and a good.

4.41 Marcus is a little soul carrying a corpse, as Epictetus used to say.

5.5 No want of talent compels Marcus to grumble or to blame the poor body.

5.26 The ruling centre is not to be turned by the smooth or rough motion in the flesh but is to confine it to the parts; when it passes up into the understanding, the sensation, which is natural, is not to be resisted, and the ruling centre is not to add the opinion that it is good or bad.

5.33 The objects of sense are changeable and the senses dim, and all within the bounds of the bit of flesh and the little breath is neither Marcus' own nor in his power.

6.28 Death is rest from the jolting of sense, the puppet-jerking of impulse, the roving of the understanding and the service owed to the flesh.

6.29 It is shameful that the soul should give up first in a life in which the body does not give up.

6.32 Marcus is made of a poor body and a soul; to the poor body all things make no difference, for it cannot tell a difference.

7.16 The poor body may be concerned, if it can, that it suffers nothing, and say if it suffers anything, but the little soul that fears and is distressed will suffer nothing at all, for Marcus will not bring it to such a judgement.

7.55 Second in the constitution of man is refusing to yield to what the body undergoes, for intelligent motion is never to be overcome by the motion of sense or of impulse.

7.60 The body too must be firm and not sprawl, composed and decorous like the face, but without affectation.

7.66 It is not enough that Socrates passed the night in the frost more hardily; what matters is what sort of soul he had, and whether he could be content to be just and holy without lending his mind to the passions of the poor flesh.

8.26 Disregard of the motions of sense is among the things peculiar to a man.

8.27 Of a man's three relations the first is to the surrounding vessel.

8.28 Pain is bad either for the body, which is to declare itself, or for the soul, which can guard its own calm and not judge it bad.

8.37 Marcus asks whether, if the favourites of dead emperors sat by their tombs, they would perceive it, and calls all this stink and gore in a bag.

8.41 Impediment to sensation is bad for the vital nature, and if pain or pleasure touch Marcus, sensation will see to it.

8.56 A neighbour's little breath and poor flesh make no difference to Marcus' faculty of choice.

8.58 He who fears death fears either absence of sensation or a different sensation.

9.36 The material underlying each thing is rotten: water, dust, little bones, stink.

9.41 Epicurus in his illness did not talk of the passions of his poor body, but was intent on how the understanding stays untroubled while sharing in the motions of the poor flesh.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever be more manifest than the body that surrounds it.

10.8.1 The name "transcending" was meant to signify the raising of the thinking part above smooth or rough motion of the flesh.

10.11 The man who studies how all things change has put off the body and given himself wholly to justice in what he does and to the nature of the whole in what happens.

10.24 Marcus asks whether his ruling centre is melted into and blended with the poor flesh, so as to turn with it.

10.26 Food goes down the throat, and another cause takes it over and makes sensation, impulse and life.

10.33.3 The knocks that remain belong to the poor body, the corpse, or without opinion do nothing bad.

10.38 What jerks the puppet is hidden within; the vessel-like thing around it and its little instruments are like an adze, useless without the cause that moves them.

11.19 The fourth turning to be wiped away is the more divine part being overcome and bowing before the body's lot.

12.1.1 Neither the sensation of the poor flesh that has grown around Marcus nor anything else is to impede him, for the part affected will see to it.

12.2 God sees ruling centres naked of the material vessels and husks, and the man who does not look at the bits of flesh around him will still less gaze at clothing, house and fame.

12.3.1 Of poor body, little breath and mind, the first two are Marcus' so far as he must take care of them, the mind alone properly his.

12.14 If all is a confusion without a guide and the surge carries Marcus away, it may carry away the poor flesh and the little breath, but not the mind.

12.26 Nothing is anyone's own: the little child, the poor body and the little soul have come from there.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports that the Stoics gave the name αἴσθησις to three things: the breath that reaches from the ruling centre to the senses, the grasp of things that comes through the senses, and the fitting-out of the sense organs, in which some men are maimed; the activity too is called sensation. By sensation, they held, we grasp white and black, rough and smooth.[200] Marcus' "senses", τὰ αἰσθητήρια (*ta aisthētēria*; 5.33), are the organs of that account, and the motions that "pass up into the understanding" (5.26) can be read as its breath reaching back from the senses to the ruling centre. Epictetus has the same diminutive. Zeus tells him, "Epictetus, if it had been possible, I would have made your poor body and your little property free and unhindered too; but as it is, do not forget, this is not yours, but clay neatly kneaded", and in its place the gods have given him a part of their own, the power of impulse and desire and of using impressions.[201] The hand, he says elsewhere, is a man's own part, but by nature clay, that can be hindered and forced, a slave to whatever is stronger; and one must keep the whole body as a little donkey under its pack, so far as one may and so long as it is granted, and if it is pressed into service and a soldier takes hold of it, he

[200] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.52.

[201] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.1.10–12.

must let it go, without resisting or muttering.[202] The *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of his teaching, counts the body among the things not in our power (see Obstacle and reservation), and asks that what concerns it be done by the way: "It is a mark of want of talent to linger over the things of the body", exercising much, eating much, drinking much, and the rest, and "the whole of one's attention should be turned to the mind".[203] Antoninus' "measured care of his own body" (1.16.5), and Marcus' refusal to "blame the poor body" for a want of talent (5.5), can be read beside it; Epictetus' word for that want, ἀφυΐα (*aphyia*), is Marcus' at 5.5.

Other ancient sources

Two of the deeds of Socrates (see Socrates) that Marcus sets aside at 7.66 are told by Plato, as the edition's note there records, though not as Marcus has them. In the *Symposium*, Alcibiades, the Athenian general who had served with Socrates at Potidaea, recalls that he outlasted everyone in hardship, when the army was cut off and had to go without food; and that in the winter there, the hardest frost, when others stayed indoors or went out wrapped up and with their feet bound in felt and fleece, he went out in his usual cloak and crossed the ice barefoot with less trouble than the others had in their shoes, and the soldiers eyed him with suspicion, taking it that he scorned them. Alcibiades tells of no night in the frost: the night Socrates passed in the open, standing from one dawn to the next over a problem, was in summer.[204] Marcus' "passed the night in the frost" can be read as joining the two stories. In the *Apology*, Socrates' defence at his trial, he tells the jury that when the Thirty, the oligarchs who ruled Athens in 404 BC, ordered him and four others to bring Leon of Salamis to be put to death, the others went and he went home, showing in deed that he cared nothing for death and everything for doing nothing unjust or unholy; and he might have died for it, had their rule not soon been overthrown.[205] Marcus' test, whether Socrates "could be content to be just in what concerns men and holy in what concerns gods" (7.66), can be read as Socrates' own pair, the unjust and the unholy, turned from the deed to the disposition.

---

[202] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.78–79.

[203] Epictetus, *Handbook* 41.

[204] Plato, *Symposium* 219e–220d.

[205] Plato, *Apology* 32c–d.

Translation in this edition

Σῶμα is “body” at all thirty of its occurrences, “bodies” in the plural, and “body” renders no other word except in “the dead body”, νεκρός (*nekros*; 6.13; see Death). Σωμάτιον is “poor body” at eleven of its twelve places; at 1.17.4, κατὰ τὸ σωμάτιον, “deformed in body”, it is “body”. Σωματικός is “the things of the body” (4.3.2), “bodily” (6.25) and, with πείσεις (*peiseis*), “what the body undergoes” (7.55). Σάρξ is “flesh” (5.26, 6.28, 10.8.1), σαρκίον “scraps of flesh” (2.2 twice), σαρκίδιον “poor flesh” at all six of its places, and κρεάδιον “bit of flesh” (5.33) and “bits of flesh” (12.2); “carve up the flesh” renders κρεανομεῖν (*kreanomein*; 8.51). “Flesh” renders no other word. Ἀγγεῖον is “vessel” (3.3, 8.27) and “vessels” (12.2), and ἀγγειώδης “the vessel-like thing” (10.38); “any vessel” at 6.40 is σκεῦος (*skeuos*). Φλοιός is “husks” (12.2, 12.8), and “husk” at 9.3.1 is ἔλυτρον (*elytron*). Λύθρος is “gore” at all four places, γράσος “stink” (8.37, 9.36), and “the man whose armpits stink” renders γράσων (*grasōn*; 5.28, 11.15). In the inventory of 2.2 “little bones” is ὀστάρια (*ostaria*), “a mesh” κροκύφαντος (*krokyphantos*) and “a tangle” πλεγμάτιον (*plegmation*). Περικείμενος (*perikeimenos*), of the body, is “surrounding” (8.27), “that surrounds you” (10.1, 12.3.1), “that surrounds it” (10.38) and “that lie around him” (12.2); the poor flesh “has grown around you”, περιτεθραμμένου (*peritethrammenou*; 12.1.1). Αἴσθησις is “sensation” at all eleven of its occurrences, “sensations” in the plural (3.16.1). Αἰσθάνεσθαι is “perceive” at all fourteen. Τὰ αἰσθητά are “the objects of sense” (2.12, 5.33), τὰ αἰσθητήρια “the senses” (5.33), and αἰσθητικός is “of sense” (6.28, 7.55, 8.26) and, with πείσεις, “what the senses undergo” (3.6.2). Ἀναίσθητος is “insensible” at all five places, and the adverb ἀναισθήτως “unfeelingly” (1.8.2). Ἀναισθησία (*anaisthēsia*) is “absence of sensation” (see Death), and συναίσθησις (*synaisthēsis*) “awareness” (7.24).

ἀγγεῖον

Attested: ἀγγείῳ (*angeiōi*; 3.3), ἀγγεῖον (*angeion*; 8.27), ἀγγείων (*angeiōn*; 12.2). A vessel, a container; the body as that which holds the mind. If death is absence of sensation, Marcus will cease “to slave for a vessel so much worse than what serves it” (3.3); God sees ruling centres “naked of the material vessels and husks and dross” (12.2); the first of three relations is “to the surrounding vessel” (8.27), where

the noun is the correction of Lodewijk Caspar Valckenaer, the eighteenth-century Dutch scholar, which Leopold prints, and the manuscripts have αἴτιον, “cause”. Lemma: ἀγγεῖον.

ἀγγειώδης

Attested: ἀγγειῶδες (*angeiōdes*; 10.38). Like a vessel. Marcus is never to include in his impression “the vessel-like thing that surrounds it, and these little instruments moulded about it” (10.38). Lemma: ἀγγειώδης.

αἰσθάνομαι

Attested: ᾐσθόμην (*ēisthomēn*; 1.17.4), αἰσθέσθαι (*aisthesthai*; 2.4, 5.6.2), αἰσθομένου (*aisthomenou*; 2.13), αἰσθάνῃ (*aisthanēi*; 5.5), αἰσθάνεσθαι (*aisthanesthai*; 5.6.2, 8.37, 12.31), ᾐσθάνοντο (*ēisthanonto*; 8.37), αἰσθήσῃ (*aisthēsēi*; 8.58), αἴσθῃ (*aisthēi*; 10.8.3), ᾐσθανόμην (*ēisthanomēn*; 10.36), αἴσθηται (*aisthētai*; 11.15), αἴσθου (*aisthou*; 12.19). To perceive, by the senses or by the mind. Of the senses: of favourites by the tombs of dead emperors, “would they perceive it?” (8.37); “But if no sensation any longer, you will not perceive anything bad either” (8.58). Mostly of the mind: “One must now at last perceive what universe you are a part of” (2.4); “Perceive at last that you have in yourself something better and more daimonic” (12.19). Lemma: αἰσθάνομαι.

αἴσθησις

Attested: αἴσθησις (*aisthēsis*; 2.17.1, 8.41, 12.1.1), αἰσθήσεις (*aisthēseis*; 3.16.1), αἴσθησιν (*aisthēsin*; 4.40, 5.26, 8.58 three times, 10.26), αἰσθήσεως (*aisthēseōs*; 8.41). Sensation, the work of the senses, which belongs to the body. “Of the body, sensations” (3.16.1); “sensation dim” (2.17.1); when what is undergone passes up into the understanding, “one must not try to resist the sensation, which is natural” (5.26); “Impediment to sensation is bad for the vital nature” (8.41); “He who fears death fears either absence of sensation or a different sensation” (8.58). Of the universe, “how all things pass up into its one sensation” (4.40; see Cosmos and order). Lemma: αἴσθησις.

αἰσθητήριον

Attested: αἰσθητήρια (*aisthētēria*; 5.33). An organ of sense; in the plural, the senses. Marcus asks what still keeps one here, if “the senses” are “dim and easily misled” (5.33). Lemma: αἰσθητήριον.

αἰσθητικός

Attested: αἰσθητικῶν (*aisthētikōn*; 3.6.2, 8.26), αἰσθητικῆς (*aisthētikēs*; 6.28, 7.55). Of sense, belonging to the senses. The daimon has drawn itself away "from what the senses undergo" (3.6.2); death is "rest from the jolting of sense" (6.28); intelligent motion is "never to be overcome by the motion of sense or of impulse" (7.55); "disregard of the motions of sense" is peculiar to a man (8.26). Lemma: αἰσθητικός.

αἰσθητός

Attested: αἰσθητά (*aisthēta*; 2.12, 5.33). Perceptible; as a noun, the objects of sense. "What all the objects of sense are like, and above all those that lure with pleasure or frighten with pain" (2.12); Marcus asks what still keeps one here, "if the objects of sense are changeable and not standing still" (5.33). Lemma: αἰσθητός.

ἀναίσθητος

Attested: ἀναίσθητον (*anaisthēton*; 3.4.3), ἀναισθήτου (*anaisthētou*; 8.7, 10.8.2), ἀναισθήτοις (*anaisthētois*; 8.8), ἀναίσθητα (*anaisthēta*; 12.30); the adverb ἀναισθήτως (*anaisthētōs*; 1.8.2). Without sensation, insensible; of a man, unfeeling. Plants are part of a nature "both insensible and irrational" (8.7), and the breaths and underlying things are "insensible and without affinity to one another" (12.30); the best man is "insensible to any wickedness" (3.4.3); to go on as before, torn and defiled in such a life, is "the mark of one too insensible and clinging to life" (10.8.2). Favours from friends are not to be let go by "unfeelingly" (1.8.2). Lemma: ἀναίσθητος.

γράσος

Attested: γράσος (*grasos*; 8.37, 9.36). The rank smell of a goat; stink. "The rottenness of the material underlying each thing: water, dust, little bones, stink" (9.36). At 8.37, "All this is stink and gore in a bag", the noun is Gataker's correction, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have γράσων, the word of 5.28 for a man whose armpits stink. Lemma: γράσος.

κρεάδιον

Attested: κρεᾳδίου (*kreāidiou*; 5.33), κρεᾴδια (*kreāidia*; 12.2). A scrap of meat; a bit of flesh. "Of all that lies within the bounds of the bit of flesh and the little breath, to

remember that it is neither yours nor in your power" (5.33; see Breath), where "within", ἐντός (*entos*), is the reading of A, the Vatican manuscript, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, which Leopold prints, and P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has ἐκτός (*ektos*), "outside"; "he who does not look at the bits of flesh that lie around him" (12.2). Lemma: κρεάδιον.

λύθρος

Attested: λύθρος (*lythros*; 2.2, 3.3, 8.37), λύθρου (*lythrou*; 10.8.2). Gore, spilt blood. The scraps of flesh are "gore, little bones, a mesh" (2.2); the vessel is "earth and gore" (3.3); the half-eaten beast-fighters are "full of wounds and gore" (10.8.2). At 8.37, "stink and gore in a bag", λύθρος is Coraes' correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' λύθρον. Lemma: λύθρος.

σαρκίδιον

Attested: σαρκιδίου (*sarkidiou*; 7.66, 12.1.1), σαρκίδιον (*sarkidion*; 8.56, 12.14), σαρκιδίῳ (*sarkidiōi*; 9.41, 10.24). Poor flesh, the diminutive of σάρξ. Socrates is to be judged by whether he lent his mind "to share the passions of the poor flesh" (7.66); "Is it melted into and blended with the poor flesh, so as to turn with it?" (10.24); "let it carry away the poor flesh, the little breath, the rest" (12.14). Lemma: σαρκίδιον.

σαρκίον

Attested: σαρκία (*sarkia*; 2.2), σαρκίων (*sarkiōn*; 2.2). A scrap of flesh. "Whatever this is that I am, it is scraps of flesh, a little breath, and the ruling centre"; "despise the scraps of flesh" (2.2). Lemma: σαρκίον.

σάρξ

Attested: σαρκί (*sarki*; 5.26), σάρκα (*sarka*; 6.28), σαρκός (*sarkos*; 10.8.1). Flesh. The ruling centre is not to be turned "by the smooth or rough motion in the flesh" (5.26); death is rest from "the service owed to the flesh" (6.28); "transcending" means raising the thinking part "above smooth or rough motion of the flesh" (10.8.1). Lemma: σάρξ.

σῶμα

Attested: σώματος (*sōmatos*; 1.16.5, 2.17.1 twice, 3.16.1, 7.13, 7.60, 8.34, 10.1, 10.36, 11.3, 11.19), σωμάτων (*sōmatōn*; 1.16.8, 4.21.2, 5.8.2), σῶμα (*sōma*; 1.17.7, 3.16.1, 5.8.2, 6.29,

7.60, 10.11), σώματα (*sōmata*; 2.12, 4.21.1, 7.19), σώματι (*sōmati*; 3.7, 5.26, 8.28, 9.39, 12.7), σώμασι (*sōmasi*; 4.21.2, 12.30). Body: a man's body, living or dead, and any body, the universe too, which "from all bodies" is "completed as such a body" (5.8.2). "All that belongs to the body is a river" (2.17.1); "Body, soul, mind. Of the body, sensations" (3.16.1); "The body too must be firm and not sprawl" (7.60). Lemma: σῶμα.

σωματικός

Attested: σωματικά (*sōmatika*; 4.3.2, 6.25), σωματικάς (*sōmatikas*; 7.55). Of the body, bodily. "But will the things of the body still touch you?" (4.3.2); "bodily and of the soul together" (6.25); "refusing to yield to what the body undergoes" (7.55). Lemma: σωματικός.

σωμάτιον

Attested: σωμάτιον (*sōmation*; 1.17.4, 4.39, 5.5, 7.16, 12.3.1, 12.26), σωματίῳ (*sōmatiōi*; 4.50, 6.32), σωματίου (*sōmatiou*; 6.32, 9.41, 10.33.3, 12.3.1). Poor body, the diminutive of σῶμα, used to belittle. "I am made of a poor body and a soul" (6.32); "the remaining knocks either belong to the poor body, the corpse" (10.33.3); "poor body, little breath, mind" (12.3.1). Leopold reports σωμάτων in P at 4.39, and σωματικοῦ in P at 10.33.3, where he prints A's σωματίου. Lemma: σωμάτιον.

φλοιός

Attested: φλοιῶν (*phloiōn*; 12.2, 12.8). Bark, rind, husk. God sees ruling centres "naked of the material vessels and husks and dross" (12.2); 12.8 opens, "Look at the causal parts naked of the husks". Lemma: φλοιός.

See also

Breath; Cause and matter; Cosmos and order; Death; Gods; Impulse; Mind and reason; Obstacle and reservation; Pain and pleasure; Philosophy; Ruling centre; Socrates; Soul.

Breath

Breath and breathing · Meditations

πνεῦμα, pneuma, "breath", "breaths"; *πνευμάτιον, pneumation*, "little breath", "little breaths"; *πνευματικός, pneumatikos*, "the breath", "the breath-like"; *ἀναπνεῖν,*

anapnein, “breathe”, “breathing”, “breathe again”; *ἀνάπνευσις, anapneusis*, “breathing in”; *ἀναπνευστικός, anapneustikos*, “of breathing”; *διαπνεῖσθαι, diapneisthai*, “transpiring”, “transpire”; *ἐκπνεῖν, ekpnein*, “breathed their last”; *ἀποπνεῖν, apopnein*, “breathe one’s last”; *ἐναποπνεῖν, enapopnein*, “breathing my last into”; *συμπνεῖν, sympnein*, “breathe together”; *σύμπνοια, sympnoia*, “breathing together”; *σύμπνους, sympnous*, “breathing together”

At a Glance

The word. Πνεῦμα, from πνεῖν, “to blow, to breathe”, is wind and breath, and πνευμάτιον its diminutive, the “little breath”. For the Stoics breath was the stuff of the soul and the bond that holds the universe together.

In the *Meditations*. A man is flesh, a little breath and the ruling centre (2.2), “poor body, little breath, mind” (12.3.1). The breath is air drawn in and given back, and all within the bounds of flesh and breath is “neither yours nor in your power” (5.33). Yet breathing gives Marcus his figure for the mind’s share in the whole (8.54).

In this edition. Πνεῦμα is always “breath” and πνευμάτιον “little breath”; πνευματικός is “the breath” (4.4) and “the breath-like” (10.7.2, 10.7.3); ἀναπνεῖν is “breathe”, διαπνεῖσθαι “transpire”, συμπνεῖν “breathe together”, and ἐκπνεῖν and ἀποπνεῖν “breathe one’s last”.

A place to read. 8.54, where Marcus tells himself to think together with the intelligence that surrounds all things, as he already breathes together with the surrounding air.

Meaning

Πνεῦμα (*pneuma*) is formed from πνεῖν (*pnein*), “to blow, to breathe”: a wind, the breath of a living thing. Πνευμάτιον (*pneumation*), its diminutive, belittles, like “poor body” and “little soul” (see Soul). The verbs are compounds of πνεῖν: ἀναπνεῖν (*anapnein*), to draw breath, and also to breathe again, to get relief; ἐκπνεῖν (*ekpnein*) and ἀποπνεῖν (*apopnein*), to breathe one’s last; συμπνεῖν (*sympnein*), to breathe together; διαπνεῖσθαι (*diapneisthai*), to transpire, “breathing through the skin”, as the edition’s note at 12.31 explains. In Stoic physics breath was more than air; the soul itself was a warm breath (see Soul). Marcus uses the word at both levels: the vital breath, which moves “smoothly or roughly” (4.3.2), and the air around him, “this breath that is poured around” (9.2).

Use in the book

The breath is the middle one of the three things a man is made of: “scraps of flesh, a little breath, and the ruling centre” (2.2; see Ruling centre). It is “wind, and not even always the same, but every hour spewed out and sucked in again” (2.2). It is matter like the flesh: “the little breath too is another such thing, and changes from these into these” (9.36; see Body and flesh), where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, for the manuscripts’ “breath-like”. Its stuff is lately borrowed from food and air (10.7.3; see Dissolution). Among the elements it stands where air would: “the breath from some spring” beside the earthy, the moist and the fiery (4.4; see Citizenship), and his “little breath and all that is fiery”, though “by nature carried upward”, are held back in the compound (11.20.1; see Elements).

Breathing is a loan repaid. Marcus goes on through what is according to nature “until I fall and rest, breathing my last into that from which I breathe each day” (5.4); what he breathes from is the air, as the edition’s note says, and what he falls on, the earth. Life itself is “like the exhalation from blood and the breathing in of air. For as it is to draw in the air once and give it back, which we do every moment, so also is it to give back the whole power of breathing, which you acquired yesterday or the day before at birth, to the place from which you first drew it” (6.15). For a man who has had his fill of lying and pretence, “to breathe one’s last is the second voyage” (9.2; see Good, bad and indifference), the next best way.

The breath is not properly Marcus’ own. Until his time comes he is to remember, “of all that lies within the bounds of the bit of flesh and the little breath, … that it is neither yours nor in your power” (5.33); “within” is the reading of A, the Vatican manuscript, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, which Leopold prints, and the “outside” of P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, would turn the sense round. Of “poor body, little breath, mind”, the others “are yours so far as one must take care of them, but the third alone is properly yours” (12.3.1; see Mind and reason). The understanding “does not mingle with the breath as it moves smoothly or roughly, once it has drawn itself back and come to know its own authority” (4.3.2; see Pain and pleasure); and if the world is a confusion and the surge

carries him away, “let it carry away the poor flesh, the little breath, the rest; for the mind it will not carry away” (12.14; see Providence and atoms). Breathing is shared with lower things: “It is not transpiring, as plants do, that is to be honoured, nor breathing, as cattle and beasts do”, any more than impulse or feeding (6.16.1); and “To transpire?” comes first among the things of which Marcus asks himself which is worth longing for (12.31; see Mind and reason), where the word is Leopold’s correction for the witnesses’ “to go on living”.

Yet breath also binds. All things follow one another “because of the tensional motion, the breathing together, and the unity of substance” (6.38; see Interconnection), the tensional motion being, as the edition’s note says, the Stoic tension of the breath that holds the universe together; and a branch that “has remained breathing together” with its plant is not like one grafted back (11.8; see Kinship and cooperation). The breaths and the underlying things are “insensible and without affinity to one another”, though they too are held together, while understanding, “in a way of its own”, joins its kindred (12.30; see Substance). And at 8.54 breathing becomes the pattern for thinking: “No longer only breathe together with the surrounding air, but now think together, too, with the intelligence that surrounds all things. For the intelligent faculty is poured everywhere and has spread through, for him who can draw it in, no less than the airy for him who can breathe it.”

Marcus never makes his breath a spirit. It is wind, borrowed and returned, ranked with the flesh among what is not properly his. But what breath does unasked, drawing in what surrounds it and living by what all share, can be read as what he asks of the mind at 8.54.

Places to read

Every chapter in which πνεῦμα, πνευμάτιον, πνευματικός or a verb, noun or adjective of breathing formed from πνεῖν occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The “inspirations” of 1.17.6 (ἐπίπνοια, *epipnoia*; see Gods), the wind that blows from the gods in tragic lines at 7.51 (πνεῖν) and the “contrary wind” of 8.15 (ἀντίπνοια, *antipnoia*) are left out.

2.2 Marcus is scraps of flesh, a little breath and the ruling centre; the breath is wind, not always the

same, but every hour spewed out and sucked in again (see Ruling centre).

3.1 If a man begins to dote, transpiring, feeding, impressions and impulses will not fail him, but the powers that need a trained power of reckoning are quenched first (see Mind and reason).

4.3.2 The understanding does not mingle with the breath as it moves smoothly or roughly, once it has drawn itself back and come to know its own authority (see Pain and pleasure).

4.4 As the earthy, the moist, the breath and the fiery in Marcus each come from a source of their own, so intelligence too comes from somewhere (see Citizenship).

4.33 Even famous names fade into legend, and the rest, as soon as they have breathed their last, are "unseen, unheard of".

5.4 Marcus goes on through what is according to nature until he falls and rests, breathing his last into the air from which he breathes each day, and falling on the earth that has fed him.

5.33 Marcus asks what still keeps one here, if among other things the little soul itself is an exhalation from blood; until his time comes, he is to remember that all within the bounds of the bit of flesh and the little breath is neither his nor in his power.

6.15 Flows and alterations renew the universe (see Time and eternity); life is like the exhalation from blood and the breathing in of air, and to give back the whole power of breathing at death is like drawing in the air once and giving it back.

6.16.1 Neither transpiring, as plants do, nor breathing, as cattle and beasts do, is to be honoured.

6.38 All things are woven together and follow one another because of the tensional motion, the breathing together and the unity of substance (see Interconnection).

8.25 Marcus must remember that either his little compound will be scattered, or the little breath be quenched, or be removed and posted elsewhere (see Death).

8.54 Marcus is no longer only to breathe together with the surrounding air, but to think together with the intelligence that surrounds all things, which is poured everywhere for whoever can draw it in.

8.56 A neighbour's faculty of choice makes no difference to Marcus', any more than the neighbour's little breath and poor flesh (see Ruling centre).

9.2 For one who has had his fill of lying and pretence, to breathe one's last is the second voyage; corruption of the understanding is a plague far more than any ill-tempering of the breath that is poured around (see Good, bad and indifference).

9.8 As one soul is divided among irrational beings and one intelligent soul among rational, so there is one earth of all earthy things, and all that see and are animate breathe one air (see Soul).

9.24 Children's angers and toys, and "little breaths carrying corpses", are set down so that the Nekyia, the calling up of the dead in the *Odyssey*, strikes one more plainly (see Death).

9.36 The material underlying each thing is rottenness, water, dust and little bones, and the little breath too changes from these into these (see Body and flesh).

10.7.2 Dissolution is either a scattering of the elements or a turning of the solid into the earthy and of the breath-like into the airy, taken up into the reason of the whole (see Dissolution).

10.7.3 The solid and the breath-like in a man are not what came from his first birth, but what took the inflow yesterday and the day before from food and the air drawn in (see Dissolution).

10.36 Even when a serious and wise man dies, someone will ask whether they shall ever breathe again, free of this schoolmaster (see Death).

11.8 A branch that has sprouted together with the plant from the beginning and remained breathing together with it is not like one grafted in again after cutting (see Kinship and cooperation).

11.20.1 Marcus' little breath and the fiery in him, though by nature carried upward, are held back in the

compound, obeying the ordering of the whole (see Elements).

12.3.1 Of poor body, little breath and mind, the first two are Marcus' own so far as he must take care of them, the third alone properly; if he separates from his understanding what attaches to body and breath outside choice, the intelligent faculty may live released (see Mind and reason).

12.14 If the world is a confusion without a guide and the surge carries Marcus away, it may carry off the poor flesh and the little breath, but not the mind (see Providence and atoms).

12.30 The breaths and the underlying things are insensible and without affinity to one another, though they too are held together, while understanding joins with its kindred stock (see Substance).

12.31 Marcus asks which of transpiring, perceiving, having impulses, growing and the rest is worth longing for; if each is easy to despise, he is to go forward to the last, to follow reason and God (see Mind and reason).

Epictetus and the Stoics

Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school, held that the whole of substance is unified, with "a breath passing through all of it, by which the whole is held together and stays together and is in sympathy with itself". The report is that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Aristotelian commentator of about AD 200, who sets the doctrine out in order to refute it, and who speaks of this breath as having "come to be from fire and air".[206] Balbus, the Stoic speaker in *On the Nature of the Gods*, the dialogue of Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, appeals to so great a kinship of things, "agreeing, breathing together, continuous", and argues that the seasons, the tides and the courses of the stars could not keep in step, all the parts of the world in concord, unless they were held together "by one divine and continuous breath", *spiritus*.[207] Later he says that rooted plants cling to the earth while animals are sustained by breathing in the air, and that the air

[206] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Mixture* 216.14–17 and 224.14–15 (Bruns).

[207] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.19.

itself “sees with us, hears with us, sounds with us”, and moves with us, yielding wherever we go.[208] Marcus’ “breathing together” of the universe (6.38) is a word of the school, which Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers, uses of the heavenly things and the earthly (see Whole and part); and his “breathe together with the surrounding air” (8.54) can be read beside Balbus’ air that lives with us, with one step added, from breathing with the air to thinking with the intelligence. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, counts the little breath among the elements that a man gives back at death (see Elements).

Translation in this edition

Πνεῦμα is “breath” at all four of its places (2.2, 4.3.2, 9.2), “breaths” in the plural (12.30). Πνευμάτιον is “little breath” at all ten of its occurrences, with the article or possessive as the Greek has them: “a little breath” where the Greek has no article (2.2), “his little breath” for τὸ πνευμάτιον αὐτοῦ (8.56), “Your little breath” for τὸ πνευμάτιόν σου (11.20.1), and “little breaths” in the plural (9.24). Πνευματικός is “the breath” (4.4) and “the breath-like” (10.7.2, 10.7.3). Ἀναπνεῖν is “breathe” (5.4, 8.54, 9.8), “breathing” for the articular infinitive (6.16.1) and “breathe again” at 10.36, where it is relief at a death; ἀνάπνευσις is “the breathing in” (6.15) and ἀναπνευστικός “of breathing”, in “the whole power of breathing” (6.15). Διαπνεῖσθαι is “transpiring” (3.1, 6.16.1) and “To transpire?” (12.31). The verbs of dying are “have breathed their last” (ἐκπνεῦσαι, 4.33), “to breathe one’s last” (ἀποπνεῦσαι, 9.2) and “breathing my last into” (ἐναποπνεύσας, 5.4). Συμπνεῖν is “breathe together” (8.54), σύμπνοια “the breathing together” (6.38) and the adjective σύμπνους “breathing together” (11.8). “Wind” at 2.2 renders ἄνεμος (*anemos*), as at 5.20; “the wind that blows from the gods” (7.51) renders πνέοντ’ οὖρον (*pneont’ ouron*) in a tragic line; “a contrary wind” (8.15) renders ἀντίπνοια; and “the man whose breath smells” (5.28) renders ὀζόστομος (*ozostomos*). “Air” is ἀήρ (*aēr*) and “the airy” ἀερώδης (*aerōdēs*; 8.54; see Elements); “exhalation” is ἀναθυμίασις (*anathymiasis*; 5.33, 6.15; see Soul); “inspirations” is ἐπίπνοια (1.17.6; see Gods). At 6.15 “draw in” renders ἑλκύσαι (*helkysai*) and “drew” ἔσπασας (*espasas*); at 8.54

[208] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.83.

“draw it in” renders σπάσαι (*spasai*); and “give back” twice renders ἀποδοῦναι (*apodounai*), of the air and of the whole power of breathing.

ἀνάπνευσις

Attested: ἀνάπνευσις (*anapneusis*; 6.15). A drawing in of breath. Life is “like the exhalation from blood and the breathing in of air” (6.15). Lemma: ἀνάπνευσις.

ἀναπνευστικός

Attested: ἀναπνευστικήν (*anapneustikēn*; 6.15). Of breathing, serving respiration. To give back at death “the whole power of breathing, which you acquired yesterday or the day before at birth”, is like giving back the air drawn in once (6.15). Lemma: ἀναπνευστικός.

ἀναπνέω

Attested: ἀναπνέω (*anapneō*; 5.4), ἀναπνεῖν (*anapnein*; 6.16.1), ἀναπνεῦσαι (*anapneusai*; 8.54), ἀναπνέομεν (*anapneomen*; 9.8), ἀναπνεύσομεν (*anapneusomen*; 10.36). To draw breath, to breathe; also to breathe again, to get relief. Marcus breathes his last “into that from which I breathe each day” (5.4); “we see by one light and breathe one air” (9.8); and at a serious man’s death someone will say, “Shall we ever breathe again, free of this schoolmaster?” (10.36). At 10.36 Leopold prints ἀναπνεύσομεν, “shall we breathe again”, as the edition’s note says; P has ἀναπνεύσω μέν, “I shall breathe again”. Lemma: ἀναπνέω.

ἀποπνέω

Attested: ἀποπνεῦσαι (*apopneusai*; 9.2). To breathe out one’s last, to die. “But at any rate, having had one’s fill of these at least, to breathe one’s last is the second voyage” (9.2). Lemma: ἀποπνέω.

διαπνέω

Attested: διαπνεῖσθαι (*diapneisthai*; 3.1, 6.16.1, 12.31). In the passive, to be breathed through, to transpire through the skin. “It is not transpiring, as plants do, that is to be honoured” (6.16.1); in dotage “transpiring, feeding, forming impressions, feeling impulses” do not fail a man (3.1). At 3.1 Leopold prints the reading of P; A has διυπνεῖσθαι and D δειπνεῖσθαι, “to dine”. At 12.31, “To transpire?”, the word is Leopold’s own correction; the witnesses have τὸ

διαγίνεσθαι, “to go on living”, as the edition’s note says. Lemma: διαπνέω.

ἐκπνέω

Attested: ἐκπνεῦσαι (*ekpneusai*; 4.33). To breathe out one’s last, to die. The others, “as soon as they have breathed their last, are ‘unseen, unheard of’” (4.33). Lemma: ἐκπνέω.

ἐναποπνέω

Attested: ἐναποπνεύσας (*enapopneusas*; 5.4). To breathe one’s last into something. Marcus goes on “until I fall and rest, breathing my last into that from which I breathe each day” (5.4), the air, as the edition’s note says. Lemma: ἐναποπνέω.

πνεῦμα

Attested: πνεῦμα (*pneuma*; 2.2), πνεύματι (*pneumati*; 4.3.2), πνεύματος (*pneumatos*; 9.2), πνεύματα (*pneumata*; 12.30). Breath, wind: the vital breath that a man is made of, and the air around him. “Look also at the breath, what sort of thing it is: wind” (2.2); the understanding “does not mingle with the breath as it moves smoothly or roughly” (4.3.2); “this breath that is poured around” (9.2) is the air. At 12.30 “the breaths and the underlying things” are held together “by what unifies”, in Leopold’s text the correction of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*; the witnesses have τὸν νοῦν, “the mind”. Lemma: πνεῦμα.

πνευματικός

Attested: πνευματικόν (*pneumatikon*; 4.4, 10.7.3), πνευματικοῦ (*pneumatikou*; 10.7.2). Of breath; with the article, the breath in a body: the earthy, the moist and “the breath from some spring” (4.4); dissolution may be “a turning of the solid into the earthy and of the breath-like into the airy” (10.7.2). At 9.36 the manuscripts have πνευματικόν where Leopold prints Coraes’ πνευμάτιον. Lemma: πνευματικός.

πνευμάτιον

Attested: πνευμάτιον (*pneumation*; 2.2, 8.25, 8.56, 9.36, 11.20.1, 12.3.1, 12.14), πνευματίου (*pneumatiou*; 5.33, 12.3.1), πνευμάτια (*pneumatia*; 9.24). Little breath, the diminutive of πνεῦμα, used to belittle: “poor body, little breath, mind” (12.3.1); “let it carry away the poor flesh, the little breath, the

rest" (12.14); "little breaths carrying corpses" (9.24). At 9.36 πνευμάτιον is the correction of Coraes; the manuscripts have πνευματικόν. In the triad of 12.3.1 Leopold follows P; A has διάνοια, "understanding", in place of the little breath. Lemma: πνευμάτιον.

συμπνέω

Attested: συμπνεῖν (*sympnein*; 8.54). To breathe together with. "No longer only breathe together with the surrounding air, but now think together, too, with the intelligence that surrounds all things" (8.54). Lemma: συμπνέω.

σύμπνοια

Attested: σύμπνοιαν (*sympnoian*; 6.38). A breathing together, the Stoic word for the concord of the universe. One thing follows another "because of the tensional motion, the breathing together, and the unity of substance" (6.38). Lemma: σύμπνοια.

σύμπνους

Attested: σύμπνους (*sympnous*; 11.8). Breathing together. Marcus writes that "the branch that has sprouted together from the beginning and has remained breathing together is not like the one grafted in again after the cutting off" (11.8). Lemma: σύμπνους.

See also

Body and flesh; Citizenship; Death; Dissolution; Elements; Gods; Good, bad and indifference; Interconnection; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Pain and pleasure; Providence and atoms; Ruling centre; Soul; Substance; Time and eternity; Whole and part.

Cause and matter

The causal and the material · Meditations

αἰτία, aitia, "cause", "fault"; *αἴτιος, aitios*, "the cause of", "the causes of"; *τὸ αἴτιον, to aition*, "cause"; *ἀναίτιος, anaitios*, "the cause of neither"; *συναίτιος, synaitios*, "joint causes"; *τὸ αἰτιῶδες, to aitiōdes*, "the causal", "causal part"; *ὕλη, hylē*, "material", "materials", "forest"; *τὸ ὑλικόν, to hylikon*, "the material", "material part", "material"; *ὑλικός, hylikos*, "material", "things of matter"; *ἔνυλος, enylos*, "material"

At a Glance

The word. Αἰτία is responsibility, blame, and so cause; ὕλη is woodland and timber, and so the stuff a thing is made of. The Stoics made the pair the two principles of everything: matter, which is acted on, and cause, the reason that shapes it.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus tells himself to divide the underlying thing "into the causal and the material" (7.29); in the case of the dead such a division is "the inquiry into the truth" (4.21.2), and he makes it of himself: "I am composed of the causal and the material" (5.13). Αἰτία also names the one answerable: his falling short is "my own fault" (1.17.6), and he sets what happens "from the cause outside" against what is done "by reason of the cause from you" (9.31). Matter is the stuff of action too: Marcus asks what prevents use from saying to whatever presents itself, "for to me the present is always material for rational and civic virtue" (7.68).

In this edition. Αἰτία and αἴτιος are "cause", except at 1.17.6, "fault"; τὸ αἰτιῶδες is "the causal" or "causal part"; ὕλη is "material", except "forest" in the line from Homer at 10.34; τὸ ὑλικόν is "the material".

A place to read. 5.13, where Marcus finds that neither the causal nor the material in him will perish into what is not, as neither came to subsist out of what is not.

Meaning

Αἰτία (*aitia*) is in ordinary Greek responsibility, mostly blame, the charge laid against a man; the adjective αἴτιος (*aitios*) is "answerable", and its neuter τὸ αἴτιον (*to aition*), what is answerable for a thing, its cause. The sense of blame survives once, of himself: that he still falls short of the life according to nature "is my own fault" (1.17.6). Ὕλη (*hylē*) is woodland, as in Homer's lines on the leaves, which Marcus abridges at 10.34, then timber, then any stuff from which a thing is made. Τὸ αἰτιῶδες (*to aitiōdes*), "the causal", and τὸ ὑλικόν (*to hylikon*), "the material", are adjectives made nouns: in a thing, what acts and what is acted on.

The pair is Stoic physics. The Stoics held two principles of the whole, matter, which is acted on, and the reason in it, God, which acts (see Mind and reason), and the edition's note at 4.21.2 calls Marcus' division "the Stoic analysis of every thing into matter and cause, the active reason that shapes it".

Use in the book

The division is first a way of seeing truly. After asking where the dead and the living beings eaten each day find room, Marcus asks, “What, in this case, is the inquiry into the truth? A division into the material and the causal” (4.21.2). Among seven commands he tells himself, “Divide and distribute the underlying thing into the causal and the material” (7.29); among questions, “What is its substantial and material part, what its causal part, what does it do in the universe, how long a time does it subsist?” (8.11). In Book XII the division grows: things are divided “into material, cause, reference” (12.10), the reference being the end to which a thing is referred (9.23), and what produces an impression “into the cause, the material, the reference, the time within which it will have to have ceased” (12.17). “The preservation of life: to see each thing through and through, what it is in itself, what is its material, what its causal part” (12.29). Marcus asks what Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Pompey are beside Diogenes the Cynic, Heraclitus of Ephesus and Socrates, for “these saw things, and their causes and their materials” (8.3).

So seen, a thing loses its power to unsettle. “What unsettles you? The cause? Look at it. But the material? Look at it. And outside these there is nothing” (9.37; see Simplicity and sincerity). Marcus is to “go to the quality of the cause, and look at it, having circumscribed it from the material” (9.25), and to look at “the causal parts naked of the husks” (12.8). Seen bare, matter is mean: things are “filthy in material” (9.14), and Marcus is to consider “the weakness of all material” (12.7).

Applied to himself, the division answers the fear of ending. “I am composed of the causal and the material, and neither of these will perish into what is not, as neither did it come to subsist out of what is not. So every part of me will be posted by change to some part of the universe” (5.13). Nothing prevents saying so, he adds, “even if the universe is governed by limited periods” (5.13). Each part goes back to its own: “Everything material vanishes very quickly into the substance of the whole; and every cause is very quickly taken back into the reason of the whole” (7.10).

The cause is hidden, and known by its work. A man lets seed go into a womb and goes away, “and then another cause takes it over and works and completes an infant”; food goes down the throat, and “another cause” makes

sensation, impulse, life and vigour. That power is to be seen "not with the eyes, but no less plainly" (10.26). In a man the body's parts are instruments, of no use without "the cause that moves and checks them", as the shuttle needs the weaver and the pen the writer (10.38; see Body and flesh). In the whole the causes are one web: "from all causes fate is completed as such a cause" (5.8.2; see Fate and allotment), and Marcus is to conceive "how all things are joint causes of all that happens" (4.40; see Cosmos and order).

The same word asks who is answerable, and there Marcus draws his line: "Freedom from trouble about what happens from the cause outside; justness in what is done by reason of the cause from you" (9.31; see Justice). When something stronger stands in the way, "the cause of its not being done does not lie with you" (8.47; see Assent and judgement). What is complete is determined by "him who was then the cause of the compounding and now of the dissolution; but you are the cause of neither" (12.36; see Citizenship). Marcus is also to look at "who is the cause of his own busyness" (12.8).

Matter, last, is what reason works on. That which rules within "makes material for itself of whatever is brought in to replace" what it sought, as a bright fire feeds on what falls on it (4.1; see Impulse); the rational being "can make every hindrance material for itself" (8.35; see Obstacle and reservation); and he asks what prevents use from saying to whatever presents itself that the present is "always material for rational and civic virtue" (7.68; see Tranquillity). Marcus reproaches himself, "What material and what occasion you flee!" (10.31), and asks what, "in this material, can be done or said in the soundest way" (10.33.1; see Obstacle and reservation). The governing reason of the whole, likewise, knows "on what material" it works (6.5). The two uses can be read as one doctrine: as the reason of the whole shapes passive matter, the ruling centre shapes whatever befalls it, and only the shaping is its own.

Places to read

Every chapter in which αἰτία, αἴτιος, ἀναίτιος, συναίτιος, αἰτιώδης, ὕλη, ὑλικός and ἔνυλος occur, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The verbs of blaming, αἰτιᾶσθαι (*aitiasthai*) and καταιτιᾶσθαι (*kataitiasthai*), and the noun καταιτίασις (*kataitiasis*) are left out (see Fault and ignorance).

1.17.6 As far as depends on the gods, nothing prevents Marcus from living according to nature, and that he still falls short of it is his own fault.

4.1 That which rules within loves no fixed material, but makes material for itself of whatever is brought in to replace what it sought, as a bright fire does (see Impulse).

4.20 Things called beautiful in the more ordinary sense, such as things of matter and works of art, are made neither worse nor better by praise.

4.21.2 Considering the multitude of the dead and of the living beings eaten each day, Marcus finds the inquiry into the truth to be a division into the material and the causal.

4.40 Marcus is to conceive the universe as one living being, and how all things are joint causes of all that happens (see Cosmos and order).

5.8.2 As from all bodies the universe is completed as such a body, so from all causes fate is completed as such a cause (see Fate and allotment).

5.8.5 What happens to each was spun together out of the most ancient causes and is a cause of the good journey of that which governs the whole; discontent cuts something off from the continuity of the causes (see Fate and allotment).

5.13 Marcus is composed of the causal and the material, neither of which will perish into what is not, and every part of him will be posted by change to some part of the universe.

5.23 Substance is like a river in perpetual flow, the activities in continual changes and the causes in countless turnings (see Change).

6.1 The reason that governs the substance of the whole has no cause in itself for doing ill (see Substance).

6.5 The governing reason knows how it is disposed, what it does and on what material.

6.41 Whoever sets up things outside his choice as good or bad must blame the gods and hate men as the causes of his failure; if only what is in our power counts as good and bad, no cause is left to accuse God or to stand against a man as an enemy (see Good, bad and indifference).

6.44.1 If the gods took counsel about Marcus, they took good counsel, and he asks for what cause they would have had an impulse to do him ill (see Gods).

7.10 Everything material vanishes very quickly into the substance of the whole, and every cause is very quickly taken back into the reason of the whole.

7.23 The nature of the whole moulds a little horse out of substance as out of wax, then melts it down and uses its material for a little tree (see Substance).

7.24 If even the awareness of doing wrong is going to depart, Marcus asks, what cause is there still for living?

7.29 Among seven commands, Marcus is to divide and distribute the underlying thing into the causal and the material.

7.58 Leaving others' turnings to them, Marcus is to be intent on how to use what happens, for he will use it well and it will be material for him.

7.68 Marcus asks what prevents use from saying to what presents itself that the present is always material for rational and civic virtue (see Tranquillity).

8.3 Beside Alexander, Gaius and Pompey, slaves to many things, Diogenes, Heraclitus and Socrates saw things, and their causes and their materials.

8.7 The common nature is just, if indeed it makes the portions of times, substance, cause, activity and conjuncture equal and according to worth for each (see Assent and judgement).

8.11 Marcus asks of a thing what is its substantial and material part, what its causal part, what it does in the universe and how long it subsists.

8.27 Of a man's three relations, one is to the divine cause, from which all things happen to all.

8.35 The rational living being can make every hindrance material for itself and use it for whatever it had its impulse towards (see Obstacle and reservation).

8.47 If something stronger stands in the way of an act, the cause of its not being done does not lie with Marcus (see Assent and judgement).

8.50 The nature of the whole has nothing outside, and is content with its own space, its own material and its own art (see Nature).

9.1.1 The nature of the whole is also named Truth, and is the first cause of all things true (see Justice).

9.6 Enough is the present opinion firmly grasping, the present action social, and the present disposition well pleased with all that happens from the cause outside.

9.9.1 Fire is so ready to be kindled together with all fire that even material a little drier is easily kindled (see Kinship and cooperation).

9.14 All these things are usual in experience, of a day in time, filthy in material.

9.25 Marcus is to go to the quality of the cause and look at it, having circumscribed it from the material, and then mark the longest time this individually qualified thing can subsist.

9.31 Freedom from trouble belongs to what happens from the cause outside, justness to what is done by reason of the cause from oneself (see Justice).

9.36 The material underlying each thing is rottenness: water, dust, little bones, stink (see Body and flesh).

9.37 To whatever troubles him Marcus answers that he is to look at the cause and at the material, for outside these there is nothing (see Simplicity and sincerity).

10.5 The interweaving of causes was spinning together from everlasting both a man's subsistence and what happens to him (see Fate and allotment).

10.6.1 The nature of the universe is not compelled even by any cause from outside to generate anything harmful to itself (see Whole and part).

10.26 After seed and after food, another cause takes over and completes an infant or makes sensation and impulse, a power to be seen not with the eyes but no less plainly.

10.31 Marcus exclaims at the material and the occasion he flees, for all these things are exercises for a reason that has seen the things in life exactly, as one who studies nature.

10.33.1 It is open to Marcus to do or say what in this material can be done or said in the soundest way, and doing what is proper to a man in the material laid before him is to be for him what luxury is to those who live delicately (see Obstacle and reservation).

10.34 In lines from Homer on the leaves, the wind throws them down and the forest puts forth others in their place.

10.38 What moves the puppet is hidden within; the body's parts, like the weaver's shuttle and the writer's pen, are of no use without the cause that moves and checks them (see Body and flesh).

12.2 God sees all ruling centres naked of the material vessels and husks and dross (see Gods).

12.7 Marcus is to consider the shortness of life, the gulf of eternity and the weakness of all material.

12.8 Marcus is to look at the causal parts naked of the husks, and at who is the cause of his own busyness.

12.10 Things are to be seen by dividing them into material, cause and reference.

12.17 Marcus' impulse is to be towards seeing what produces each impression, dividing it into the cause, the material, the reference and the time within which it will have ceased.

12.27 It is more philosophical, in the material given, to show oneself just, self-controlled and following the gods, artlessly (see Simplicity and sincerity).

12.29 The preservation of life is to see each thing through and through, what is its material and what its causal part, and to do what is just and say what is true with the whole soul.

12.36 The complete is determined by him who was the cause of the compounding and now of the dissolution; the man himself is the cause of neither (see Citizenship).

Epictetus and the Stoics

Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, sets out the doctrine behind Marcus' division in a letter on causes to his friend Lucilius. Our Stoics, he says, hold that there are two

things in nature from which everything comes, cause and matter. Matter lies inert, a thing ready for any use and idle if nothing moves it; the cause, which is reason, gives matter its form, turns it whichever way it will, and brings out of it works of every kind. Art copies nature: a statue had matter that suffered the artist and an artist who gave the matter a face, the bronze its matter and the craftsman its cause.[209] The Stoics, he goes on, allow one cause only, that which makes; Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, counts the matter, the maker, the form and the end, and Plato, the Athenian philosopher and Aristotle's teacher, adds the pattern. Seneca replies that such a list is either too long or too short, for if whatever a thing cannot come to be without is a cause, time, place and motion must be counted too; what is sought is the first and general cause, which must be simple, as matter is simple, and that is the reason that makes, God.[210] Marcus' fuller divisions, which add the reference and the time to the cause and the material (12.10, 12.17), can be read beside this argument. The letter ends with a man, and can be read beside 5.13: the universe consists of matter and of God; the place God holds in the world the mind holds in man, and what matter is there the body is in us; and death is either an end or a passing over.[211] The two principles themselves, the passive and the active, are reported in the summary of the school by Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers (see Mind and reason).[212]

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, gives matter its moral sense. Asked how he might persuade his brother to stop being angry with him, he answers that philosophy does not undertake to secure anything outside a man; it would be taking on something beyond its own material. The carpenter works on timber and the sculptor on bronze; the art of living works on each man's own life, and the brother's life belongs to the brother's own art.[213] The materials are indifferent, but the use made of them is not.[214] External things are materials for choice, which gains its own good or bad in dealing with

[209] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 65.2–3.
[210] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 65.4–12.
[211] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 65.23–24.
[212] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.134.
[213] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.15.1–3.
[214] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.5.1.

them, and gains the good by not admiring them.[215] Marcus' "material for rational and civic virtue" (7.68), his hindrance made "material for itself" (8.35) and his "What material and what occasion you flee!" (10.31) can be read as this teaching.

Translation in this edition

Αἰτία is "cause" at all its places (5.8.2, 6.1, 6.41, 6.44.1, 7.24, 8.3, 8.27, 8.47, 9.1.1, 9.6, 9.31 twice, 10.6.1, 10.26 twice, 10.38) except 1.17.6, "my own fault", as the Glossary records; with prepositions it is "for what cause" (6.44.1), "from the cause outside" (9.6, 9.31), "by reason of the cause from you" (9.31) and "any cause from outside" (10.6.1). The neuter τὸ αἴτιον is "cause" (5.8.2, 5.8.5, 5.23, 7.10, 8.7, 9.25, 9.37, 10.5, 12.10, 12.17), and the adjective αἴτιος, of persons, "the causes of" (6.41) and "the cause of" (12.8, 12.36); ἀναίτιος is "the cause of neither" (12.36), συναίτια "joint causes" (4.40). Τὸ αἰτιῶδες is "the causal" (4.21.2, 5.13, 7.29) and "causal part" (8.11, 12.29), the plural "the causal parts" (12.8). Ὕλη is "material" (4.1 twice, 6.5, 7.23, 7.58, 7.68, 8.35, 8.50, 9.14, 9.36, 9.37, 10.31, 10.33.1 twice, 12.7, 12.10, 12.27), "materials" in the plural (8.3), and "forest" in Homer's line at 10.34, as the Glossary records. Τὸ ὑλικόν is "the material" (4.21.2, 5.13, 7.29, 9.25, 12.17), "its material" (12.29), "material part" (8.11) and "material" (9.9.1); the adjective is "material" in "the material vessels" (12.2), and τὰ ὑλικά are "things of matter" (4.20), the one place where "matter" renders a word of the family. Ἔνυλος is "material" in "Everything material" (7.10). At 8.11 "substantial and material" render οὐσιῶδες (*ousiōdes*) and ὑλικόν under one article, one side of the question, with "causal" the other (see Substance). "Cause" in the English renders no other noun, and "material" no other word. The verbs of blaming are rendered by sense: αἰτιᾶσθαι "complaint" (1.13, twice) and "accuse" (10.4), καταιτιᾶσθαι "blame" (5.5), and καταιτίασις "accusations" (1.16.3).

αἰτία

Attested: αἰτίαν (*aitian*; 1.17.6, 6.1, 6.44.1, 8.27, 9.31), αἰτία (*aitia*; 5.8.2, 6.41, 7.24, 8.47, 9.1.1, 10.26 twice), αἰτίας (*aitias*; 8.3, 9.6, 9.31, 10.6.1, 10.38). Responsibility, blame; a reason or ground; a cause. Of Marcus' own shortfall, "my own fault" (1.17.6); as a ground, "what cause is there still for

[215] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.29.2–3.

living?" (7.24); of the whole, "the divine cause, from which all things happen to all" (8.27) and "the first cause of all things true" (9.1.1); of conduct, "the cause outside" and "the cause from you" (9.31). At 9.6 "from the cause outside" is the correction of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts for the manuscripts' τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας, "from the cause"; at 9.31 the phrase is transmitted. At 9.29 the manuscripts have αἰτία where Leopold prints Reiske's οὐσία, "substance" (see Substance). At 6.41 "no cause is left" stands under a condition, "if we judge only what is in our power to be good and bad", whose verb is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, κρίνωμεν, for the manuscripts' κινῶμεν. Lemma: αἰτία.

αἴτιος

Attested: αἰτίων (*aitiōn*; 5.8.2, 5.8.5 twice, 10.5), αἴτιον (*aition*; 5.8.5, 7.10, 9.37, 12.10, 12.17), αἴτια (*aitia*; 5.23), αἰτίους (*aitious*; 6.41), αἰτίου (*aitiou*; 8.7, 9.25), αἴτιος (*aitios*; 12.8, 12.36). Answerable for; as a neuter noun, a cause. "so from all causes fate is completed as such a cause" (5.8.2); "The cause? Look at it" (9.37); "who is the cause of his own busyness" (12.8). In the genitive plural P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, accents αἰτιῶν, of αἰτία, at 5.8.2, and A, the Vatican manuscript, at 5.8.5 and 10.5. At 8.27 the manuscripts have αἴτιον where Leopold prints ἀγγεῖον, "vessel", the correction of Lodewijk Caspar Valckenaer, the eighteenth-century Dutch scholar. Lemma: αἴτιος.

αἰτιώδης

Attested: αἰτιῶδες (*aitiōdes*; 4.21.2, 7.29, 8.11, 12.29), αἰτιώδους (*aitiōdous*; 5.13), αἰτιώδη (*aitiōdē*; 12.8). Causal; with the article, the causal part of a thing, its active principle, set against the material. "A division into the material and the causal" (4.21.2); "I am composed of the causal and the material" (5.13); "Look at the causal parts naked of the husks" (12.8). Lemma: αἰτιώδης.

ἀναίτιος

Attested: ἀναίτιος (*anaitios*; 12.36). Not answerable, without part in a thing. Nature determines the end of the play, "him who was then the cause of the compounding and

now of the dissolution; but you are the cause of neither" (12.36; see Citizenship). Lemma: ἀναίτιος.

ἔνυλος

Attested: ἔνυλον (*enylon*; 7.10). Material, having matter in it. "Everything material vanishes very quickly into the substance of the whole" (7.10). Lemma: ἔνυλος.

συναίτιος

Attested: συναίτια (*synaitia*; 4.40). Sharing in a cause, a joint cause. Marcus is to conceive the universe as one living being, and "how all things are joint causes of all that happens" (4.40; see Cosmos and order). Lemma: συναίτιος.

ὕλη

Attested: ὕλην (*hylēn*; 4.1 twice, 8.35, 10.31, 12.10), ὕλης (*hylēs*; 6.5, 9.36, 10.33.1 twice, 12.7, 12.27), ὕλῃ (*hylēi*; 7.23, 8.50, 9.14), ὕλη (*hylē*; 7.58, 7.68, 9.37, 10.34), ὕλας (*hylas*; 8.3). Woodland, timber; the stuff a thing is made of; for Marcus also the stuff of action. "it loves no fixed material" (4.1); use may say to what presents itself, "for to me the present is always material for rational and civic virtue" (7.68); "But the material? Look at it" (9.37). In Homer's line at 10.34 it is "the forest" that "puts forth others in place of these". Lemma: ὕλη.

ὑλικός

Attested: ὑλικῶν (*hylikōn*; 4.20, 12.2), ὑλικόν (*hylikon*; 4.21.2, 7.29, 8.11, 9.9.1, 12.17, 12.29), ὑλικοῦ (*hylikou*; 5.13, 9.25). Of matter, material; with the article, the material part of a thing, set against the causal. "Divide and distribute the underlying thing into the causal and the material" (7.29); "having circumscribed it from the material" (9.25); "things called beautiful in the more ordinary sense, such as things of matter and works of art" (4.20). Lemma: ὑλικός.

See also

Assent and judgement; Body and flesh; Change; Citizenship; Cosmos and order; Fate and allotment; Fault and ignorance; Gods; Good, bad and indifference; Impulse; Justice; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Nature; Obstacle and reservation; Simplicity and sincerity; Substance; Tranquillity; Whole and part.

Change

Change, alteration and flow · Meditations

μεταβολή, metabolē, “change”; *μεταβάλλειν, metaballein*, “change”, “turned into”; *ἀλλοίωσις, alloiōsis*, “alteration”; *ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, alloiousthai*, “be altered”; *ἑτεροίωσις, heteroiōsis*, “variation”; *τροπή, tropē*, “turning”; *ῥύσις, rhysis*, “flow”; *ῥεῖν, rhein*, “flow”, “flowing”, “has flowed”

At a Glance

The word. Μεταβολή is change from one thing or state into another; ἀλλοίωσις is alteration, a becoming other in quality, and ἑτεροίωσις variation; τροπή is a turning, ῥύσις a flowing.

In the *Meditations*. “All things are in change” (9.19). Change preserves the universe and keeps it young (2.3, 7.25); watching it is an exercise that teaches contempt for everything mortal (9.28); and “nothing is bad for things in the course of change” (4.42), death among them (9.21). The one change Marcus guards against is a turning of his own understanding (3.7).

In this edition. Μεταβολή and μεταβάλλειν are always “change” (once “turned into legends”, 8.25); ἀλλοίωσις is “alteration”, ἑτεροίωσις “variation”, τροπή “turning”, ῥύσις “flow”.

A place to read. 7.18, where a run of questions beginning “Is someone afraid of change?” shows one’s own changing to be similarly necessary to the nature of the whole.

Meaning

Μεταβολή (*metabolē*) and its verb μεταβάλλειν (*metaballein*) join μετά (*meta*), which marks a shift, to βάλλειν (*ballein*), “to throw”: a throwing over from one state into another. In ordinary Greek they cover any change, of place, fortune or mind, and Marcus uses them as broadly. Ἀλλοίωσις (*alloiōsis*), from ἀλλοῖος (*alloios*), “of another sort”, is alteration, becoming different in quality; ἑτεροίωσις (*heteroiōsis*), from ἕτερος (*heteros*), “other”, is a rarer word of the same sense. Τροπή (*tropē*), from τρέπειν (*trepein*), “to turn”, is a turning, of direction or of state; ῥύσις (*rhysis*), from ῥεῖν (*rhein*), “to flow”, is a flowing. Marcus takes over the Stoic physics of change, but what he asks of it is what change means for the man who undergoes it.

Use in the book

Change keeps the whole: “the universe is preserved by the changes of the elements and equally by the changes of the compounds” (2.3). Marcus tells himself, “Acquire a method of observing how all things change into one another”, “for nothing so produces greatness of mind” (10.11). The nature of the whole “loves nothing so much as to change the things that are and to make new things like them”, for “everything that is, is in a way the seed of what will come from it” (4.36). It “will very soon change” all that is seen and make others from their substance, “so that the universe may be always young” (7.25); out of substance, as out of wax, it moulds a little horse, a little tree, a little man, and “it is nothing terrible for the little box to be dissolved, as it is no ⟨good⟩ thing for it to be put together” (7.23). “What has died does not fall out of the universe”, but “changes here, and is dissolved into its own, which are elements of the universe and yours” (8.18). The manuscripts begin that sentence with “if”; J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, brackets it after John Jackson, whose English translation appeared at Oxford in 1906. Whether the whole is periodically consumed by fire or renewed “by everlasting exchanges”, Marcus leaves open (10.7.2). Souls too, if they live on, change and are taken back into the seminal reason of the whole (4.21.1; see Mind and reason).

Beside the physics runs the image of the river. “All that belongs to the body is a river” (2.17.1); “substance is like a river in perpetual flow, and the activities in continual changes, and the causes in countless turnings” (5.23); eternity is “a kind of river” (4.43; see Time and eternity), and “Flows and alterations renew the universe perpetually” (6.15; see Time and eternity); in this river Marcus asks what one would value among the things running past: it is “as if one began to love one of the little sparrows flying past, and it has already gone out of sight”. So seen, change is an exercise. One of the two thoughts to keep most ready to hand is “that all these things you see will all but at once change and be no more” (4.3.4), and he is to ask of each thing “into what it changes, and what it will be like when it has changed, and how it will suffer nothing bad” (11.17). “For one who considers the waves upon waves of changes and alterations, and the speed, will despise everything mortal” (9.28).

Its chief use is against the fear of death. “Nothing is bad for things in the course of change, as nothing is good ⟨for

things⟩ that subsist out of change" (4.42). The argument of 7.18 is a run of questions: "Is someone afraid of change? For what can come to be without change? … And can you yourself bathe unless the wood changes? … Do you not see, then, that your own changing too is similar, and similarly necessary to the nature of the whole?" Death becomes one of the changes a life already holds: of childhood, adolescence, youth and old age, "each change of these too is a death. Is it anything terrible?" (9.21). "Loss is nothing other than change. And in this the nature of the whole rejoices" (9.35). At 12.23 the argument is made for a whole life: an activity that ceases in due time "suffers nothing bad in so far as it has ceased", and so with life, "the system made up of all actions". The due time and the limit are given by nature, sometimes a man's own, "but in any case the nature of the whole, through whose parts changing the all-embracing universe remains ever young and in its prime"; and the ending of a life is good "if indeed it is opportune for the whole, and advantageous, and carried along with it". At 10.7.1 alteration is put in the place of perishing in so many words: the parts of the whole must perish, "but let this be said as signifying 'to be altered'". And Marcus condenses Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded: "Unripe grape, ripe cluster, raisin: all changes, not into what is not, but into what is not now" (11.35).

Change in the world is neither good nor bad; change in the understanding can be. What is bad does not subsist "in any turning or variation of the surroundings", but where that is "which forms opinions about bad things" (4.39). In the world "all things are turnings; not so that one need fear something new" (8.6). In the soul a turning is a moral event: "good lots are good turnings of the soul, good impulses, good actions" (5.36); the ruling centre "will not of itself, by forming an opinion, turn itself into such turnings" as fear (7.16); and Marcus must watch for "four turnings of the ruling centre" and wipe them away (11.19). The man who has chosen his mind and daimon before all else is "cautious throughout his life of this one thing only, that the understanding should be in any turning foreign to an intelligent ⟨and⟩ civic living being" (3.7). The one change Marcus cannot work is in other men: "For who will change their principle?" (9.29). The changes of the world, his own death among them, are to be watched, welcomed and

understood as the universe's preservation; the turnings of his own understanding are the only changes that can harm him, and they are in his power. This can be read as the sense of the double sentence of 4.3.4: "The universe is alteration; life is opinion."

Places to read

Every chapter in which μεταβολή, μεταβάλλειν, ἀλλοίωσις or ἀλλοιοῦσθαι occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the one place of ἑτεροίωσις (4.39) and the one place of ῥύσις not otherwise listed (5.10.2). The related εὐμετάβολος (*eumetabolos*, 4.3.3), εὐμετάβλητος (*eumetablētos*, 5.33) and ἀλλοῖος (6.2, 7.68, 8.58) are left out; the places of τροπή and ῥεῖν are given in their sub-entries.

2.3 Among the principles Marcus is to hold: the universe is preserved by the changes of the elements and equally by those of the compounds.

2.17.2 If there is nothing terrible for the elements in each perpetually changing into another, Marcus asks why anyone should look askance at the change and dissolution of all, which is according to nature (see Daimon).

4.3.4 One of the two thoughts most ready to hand is that all that is seen will all but at once change and be no more: "The universe is alteration; life is opinion."

4.14 Marcus will vanish into what begot him, or rather be taken back, by change, into its seminal reason (see Mind and reason).

4.21 If souls live on, they change and are taken back into the seminal reason of the whole, as buried bodies change and dissolve to make room; eaten bodies pass through the turning into blood and the alterations into the airy or the fiery (see Mind and reason).

4.36 All things come about by change, and the nature of the whole loves nothing so much as to change what is and make new things like it.

4.39 What is bad for Marcus does not subsist in any turning or variation of the surroundings, but in the part of him that forms opinions.

4.42 Nothing is bad for things in the course of change, as nothing is good for things that subsist out of change.

5.10.2 In so great a flow of substance, time and motion Marcus cannot conceive what could be valued, and waits for the natural release.

5.13 Composed of the causal and the material, Marcus will be posted by change to some part of the universe, as by such change he came to subsist.

5.23 Substance is like a river in perpetual flow, the activities in continual changes, the causes in countless turnings; it is folly to be puffed up or to complain among them.

6.4 All the underlying things will very soon change, and be turned to vapour if substance is unified, or else be scattered.

6.15 Flows and alterations renew the universe perpetually; in this river nothing running past offers a place to stand, and to love one of them is like loving a sparrow already out of sight.

6.47 Thinking of the dead of every kind, Marcus writes, “There, then, we must change”, where so many orators, philosophers, heroes and tyrants are.

7.18 No one should fear change: nothing comes to be without it, the bath and the meal depend on it, and one’s own changing is similarly necessary to the nature of the whole.

7.25 The nature that governs the whole will very soon change all that is seen and make other things from its substance, so that the universe may be always young.

7.47 To think of the changes of the elements into one another, with the runs of the stars, cleans away the filth of life on the ground.

7.49 Looking back on the many changes of empires, one can foresee the future, which will be of one form with the past.

8.6 The work of the nature of the whole is to shift things, to change them and carry them elsewhere; all things are turnings, and all are usual.

8.18 What has died does not fall out of the universe; it changes here and is dissolved into the elements, and they too change without grumbling.

8.25 Of the famous dead some are not remembered, some are turned into legends, and some have vanished even from legends.

8.50 The nature of the whole has nothing outside itself, and changes what decays within it into itself and makes new things from it (see Nature).

9.1.4 The common nature, by an original impulse of providence, marked off the generative powers of the subsistences, changes and successions to come.

9.19 All things are in change, and Marcus himself in perpetual alteration and in some sense perishing, and the whole universe too.

9.21 Each change of the times of life, from childhood to old age, is a death, and none is terrible; so neither is the ending and change of a whole life.

9.28 The earth will change, and what it becomes will change to infinity; whoever considers the waves of changes and alterations will despise everything mortal.

9.29 Marcus asks who will change men's principles; without a change of principles there is only the slavery of groaning men who make a show of obeying.

9.32 Marcus makes room for himself by embracing the whole universe and conceiving the swift change of the parts of each thing.

9.35 Loss is nothing other than change, and in this the nature of the whole rejoices.

9.36 The material of each thing is rottenness, and the little breath too changes from these into these.

10.7 The parts of the whole must perish, which is to say be altered; nature would not have made them so to their harm; it is ridiculous to resent what is by nature such as to change; and what changes is what was taken in yesterday from food and air, not what the mother bore.

10.11 A method of observing how all things change into one another produces greatness of mind.

10.18 Each underlying thing is to be conceived as already dissolving and in change.

10.31 To remember that what has once changed will no longer be in infinite time makes human things look like smoke and nothing.

11.17 Marcus is to ask of each thing whence it came, into what it changes, what it will be like when it has changed, and how it will suffer nothing bad.

11.35 Condensing Epictetus, Marcus calls unripe grape, ripe cluster and raisin all changes, not into what is not, but into what is not now.

12.21 All things are by nature such as to change and turn and perish, so that others may come to be in succession.

12.23 Through the changing of the parts of the nature of the whole the universe remains ever young; a life that ends in due time suffers nothing bad, and its ending is good if it is opportune for the whole.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoics made change the law of the universe's coming to be and passing away. Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers, reports their argument that the universe is perishable because its parts are, "for they change into one another", and that it comes to be "when substance turns from fire through air into moisture", whose thicker part settles as earth while the finer becomes air and, thinned further, generates fire.[216] Diogenes' verb for that turning, τρέπεσθαι (*trepesthai*), is the verb from which Marcus' τροπή is formed, and his "turning of the solid into the earthy and of the breath-like into the airy" (10.7.2) can be read as the same physics. The other alternative of 10.7.2, a whole "periodically consumed by fire", is the Stoic conflagration: the god who orders the world, Diogenes reports, "at certain periods of time consumes all substance into himself and generates it again from himself".[217]

Epictetus gave Marcus the moral use. In the passage from which Marcus draws 11.33–35, he tells the man who kisses his child to say, "Tomorrow you will die", and answers the objection that such words are ill-omened: then call it ill-

[216] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.141–142.

[217] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.137; at 7.134 the elements perish "in the conflagration".

omened that the ears of corn are reaped, that leaves fall, that the fig becomes a dried fig and the grape a raisin, "for all these are changes of the former things into others; not destruction, but an ordered management and governance". Going abroad is a small change; death is "a greater change, from what now is, not into what is not, but into what now is not".[218] Seneca, the Roman Stoic and adviser of Nero, draws the lesson for the body in his *Letters to Lucilius*: "Our bodies are swept along like rivers … I myself, while I say that these things change, have changed"; and he wonders that we fear to die some day, "when every moment is the death of a former condition".[219] Marcus' "each change of these too is a death" (9.21) can be read as the same thought.

Other ancient sources

The river goes back to Heraclitus of Ephesus, who flourished about 500 BC, whom Cleanthes, successor of Zeno of Citium at the head of the Stoic school, expounded in four books, and whom Marcus remembers as having studied nature "so much on the conflagration of the universe" (3.3).[220] In Plato's *Cratylus* Socrates reports that Heraclitus says "all things move on and nothing stays", and, likening the things that are to the flow of a river, that "you could not step twice into the same river".[221] Seneca gives the saying in another form, "Into the same river we go down twice and do not go down", and explains it: the river keeps its name, but the water has passed on.[222] Marcus does not quote the river saying. He quotes Heraclitus on the change of the elements: "the death of earth is to become water, the death of water to become air, the death of air fire, and back again" (4.46).[223]

Translation in this edition

Μεταβολή and μεταβάλλειν are "change", noun and verb, at every place but one: at 8.25 μεταβαλόντες is "turned into legends". "Changing" renders the articular infinitive at 2.17.2 and 7.18 and the participle at 12.23; other participles go by construction ("changes", 9.36; "what has once changed", 10.31; "when it has changed", 11.17). The

[218] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.24.88–93.

[219] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 58.22–23.

[220] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.1 (the sixty-ninth Olympiad, 504–501 BC) and 7.174.

[221] Plato, *Cratylus* 402a (DK 22 A6).

[222] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 58.23; compare DK 22 B49a.

[223] Heraclitus, DK 22 B76, in Marcus' version; the rest of 4.46 gives B71–74.

compounds εὐμετάβολον and εὐμετάβλητα are "changeableness" (4.3.3) and "changeable" (5.33). Ἀλλοίωσις is always "alteration" (4.3.4, 4.21.2, 6.15, 9.19, 9.28, 10.7.1), and the verb ἀλλοιοῦσθαι "to be altered" (10.7.1); ἑτεροίωσις, once, is "variation" (4.39). Τροπή is "turning" at all ten places; the verb τρέπειν is "turn" (3.6.1, 5.19, 6.8, 7.16, 7.58, 12.21), ἄτρεπτον "not be turned" (5.26) and εὔτρεπτα "easily turned" (6.36). "The turning into blood" at 4.21.2 renders ἐξαιματώσεις, not τροπή. Ῥύσις is "flow" (5.10.2, 5.23), in the plural "Flows" (6.15); ῥεῖν is "flow" (2.3), "flowing" (2.17.1, 3.2.2, 4.33) and "has flowed" (12.2, 12.26). Of its compounds and derivatives, ἀπόρροια is "outflow" (2.4), ἐπιρροή "inflow" (10.7.3), σύρρους "flows together" (9.9.1) and "the flowing together" (9.9.3), and περιρρέουσα "flowing round" (12.3.1); but ὑπερρύη is "slid down" (11.6.2). "River" is ποταμός (2.17.1, 4.43, 5.23, 6.15), "current" at 4.43 is ῥεῦμα, and "torrent" is χείμαρρος (7.19, 9.29). "Smoothly flowing" (2.5), "the smooth flow" (5.9) and "flow smoothly" (5.34, 10.6.2) belong to another family, εὐροεῖν (*euroein*), Zeno's "good flow of life".[224]

ἀλλοιόω

Attested: ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (*alloiousthai*; 10.7.1). To make other; in the passive, to be altered. Marcus grants that the parts of the whole must perish, "but let this be said as signifying 'to be altered'" (10.7.1), and so turns perishing into alteration. Lemma: ἀλλοιόω.

ἀλλοίωσις

Attested: ἀλλοίωσις (*alloiōsis*; 4.3.4), ἀλλοιώσεις (*alloiōseis*; 4.21.2, 6.15), ἀλλοιώσει (*alloiōsei*; 9.19), ἀλλοιώσεων (*alloiōseōn*; 9.28), ἀλλοίωσιν (*alloiōsin*; 10.7.1). Alteration, a becoming other in quality. "The universe is alteration; life is opinion" (4.3.4); "Flows and alterations renew the universe perpetually" (6.15); "you yourself are in perpetual alteration and in some sense perishing" (9.19). Eaten bodies pass "through the alterations into the airy or the fiery" (4.21.2). At 10.7.1, where the parts are "going into alteration", ἀλλοίωσιν is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' ἀλλοτρίωσιν, "estrangement". Lemma: ἀλλοίωσις.

---

[224] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* 11.30, of Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus; compare Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.88.

ἑτεροίωσις

Attested: ἑτεροιώσει (*heteroiōsei*; 4.39). Variation, a becoming otherwise. What is bad for Marcus does not subsist "in any turning or variation of the surroundings", but in the part of him that forms opinions (4.39). Lemma: ἑτεροίωσις.

μεταβάλλω

Attested: μεταβάλλειν (*metaballein*; 2.17.2, 4.36, 8.6, 10.7.2, 12.21), μεταβαλεῖ (*metabalei*; 4.3.4, 5.13, 6.4, 7.25, 9.28 twice, 9.29), μεταβάλλουσι (*metaballousi*; 4.21.1), μεταβαλεῖν (*metabalein*; 6.47, 7.18), μεταβάλῃ (*metabalēi*; 7.18 twice), μεταβάλλει (*metaballei*; 8.18 twice, 8.50, 10.7.3, 10.11, 11.17), μεταβαλόντες (*metabalontes*; 8.25), μεταβάλλον (*metaballon*; 9.36), μεταβαλόν (*metabalon*; 10.31, 11.17), μεταβαλλόντων (*metaballontōn*; 12.23). To change, transitive and intransitive: "the nature of the whole loves nothing so much as to change the things that are" (4.36); "can you yourself bathe unless the wood changes?" (7.18); "all things are by nature such as to change and turn and perish" (12.21). At 6.47 "There, then, we must change" is said of passing over among the dead, and at 8.25 the participle is "turned into legends". Lemma: μεταβάλλω.

μεταβολή

Attested: μεταβολαί (*metabolai*; 2.3, 11.35), μεταβολήν (*metabolēn*; 2.17.2, 4.14, 4.36, 5.13 twice, 7.18, 9.32), μεταβολαῖς (*metabolais*; 4.3.4, 5.23), μεταβολή (*metabolē*; 4.21.1, 9.21 twice, 9.35), μεταβολῇ (*metabolēi*; 4.42, 9.19, 10.18), μεταβολῆς (*metabolēs*; 4.42, 7.18 twice, 9.29), μεταβολάς (*metabolas*; 7.47, 7.49, 9.21), μεταβολῶν (*metabolōn*; 9.1.4, 9.28). Change: "Observe perpetually that all things come about by change" (4.36); "All things are in change" (9.19); "Loss is nothing other than change" (9.35). In the plural it is the changes of the elements and of the compounds (2.3), of empires (7.49), of the times of life (9.21); at 9.29 it is a change of principles. Lemma: μεταβολή.

ῥέω

Attested: ῥεῖ (*rhei*; 2.3), ῥέουσα (*rheousa*; 2.17.1), ῥέων (*rheōn*; 3.2.2), ῥέον (*rheon*; 4.33), ἐρρυηκότων (*errhyēkotōn*; 12.2), ἐρρύηκεν (*errhyēken*; 12.26). To flow. "All things flow from there" (2.3); in human life "the substance flowing" (2.17.1); a disposition welcomes all that

happens “as flowing from such a beginning and spring” (4.33); “the mind of each is a god and has flowed from there” (12.26). At 3.2.2 it is the foam “flowing from the mouths of boars”. Lemma: ῥέω.

ῥύσις

Attested: ῥύσει (*rhysei*; 5.10.2, 5.23), ῥύσεις (*rhyseis*; 6.15). Flow, a flowing: “substance is like a river in perpetual flow” (5.23); “in so great a flow of substance and of time and of motion and of things moved” (5.10.2); “Flows and alterations renew the universe perpetually” (6.15). Lemma: ῥύσις.

τροπή

Attested: τροπῇ (*tropēi*; 3.7, 4.39), τροπαῖς (*tropais*; 5.23), τροπαί (*tropai*; 5.36, 8.6), τροπάς (*tropas*; 7.16, 7.58, 11.19), τροπή (*tropē*; 9.2, 10.7.2). A turning, of direction, of state, of the soul. In the world it is neutral: “All things are turnings” (8.6); the causes are “in countless turnings” (5.23); a body may be dissolved by “a turning of the solid into the earthy” (10.7.2); and corruption of the understanding is a worse plague than any “ill-tempering and turning of this breath that is poured around” (9.2). In the soul it is good or bad: “good lots are good turnings of the soul” (5.36), and “four turnings of the ruling centre” are to be wiped away (11.19; also 3.7, 7.16, 7.58). Lemma: τροπή.

See also

Daimon; Death; Dissolution; Elements; Mind and reason; Nature; Recurrence and repetition; Ruling centre; Substance; Time and eternity.

Cosmos and order

The ordered universe · Meditations

κόσμος, kosmos, “universe”, “ordered universe”, “order”, “world”; *κοσμοποιία, kosmopoiia*, “making the universe”; *διακόσμησις, diakosmēsis*, “world-order”; *συγκοσμεῖν, synkosmein*, “order”, “the order made together”; *κατακοσμεῖσθαι, katakosmeisthai*, “be ordered”; *συνεπικοσμεῖν, synepikosmein*, “add to … beauty”; *κοσμίως, kosmiōs*, “in good order”; *ἀκοσμία, akosmia*, “disorder”; *ἀκοσμεῖν, akosmein*, “bring disorder”; *τάξις, taxis*, “order”, “post”; *τάσσειν, tassein*, “order”, “appoint”, “post”;

τεταγμένως, tetagmenōs, “in order”; *διατάσσειν, diatassein*, “order”, “ordain”; *διάταξις, diataxis*, “ordering”; *συντάσσειν, syntassein*, “order together”, “prescribe”, “coordinate”; *συγκατατάσσειν, synkatatassein*, “range together”; *κατατάσσειν, katatassein*, “post”, “place”, “set in its place”; *εὔτακτος, eutaktos*, “better ordered”

At a Glance

The word. Κόσμος is order and adornment, and in philosophy the ordered whole, the universe; τάξις is order, and a man’s post in a line, from τάσσειν, “to draw up”; διακόσμησις is the ordering of the world.

In the *Meditations*. “Continually conceive of the universe as one living being, holding one substance and one soul” (4.40). The things that are “have been ordered together in harmony” (4.45); the universe has nothing outside it (8.50; see Nature), and not to know what it is, is not to know where one is (8.52). The same words serve a man: Marcus asks why it is not enough to pass his brief span “in good order” (10.31).

In this edition. Κόσμος is “universe” at sixty-seven of its seventy occurrences; at 4.27 it is also “ordered universe” and “order”, and at 6.56 “world”. Τάξις is “order”, and of a part “post” (8.34); διακόσμησις is “world-order”, κοσμίως “in good order” and ἀκοσμία “disorder”.

A place to read. 4.40, where Marcus tells himself to conceive the universe as one living being, with one sensation and one impulse, in which all things are joint causes of all that happens.

Meaning

Κόσμος (*kosmos*) is first good order. In Homer the railer Thersites quarrels with the kings “not in order”, leaders marshal their men, and Hera puts on all her adornment, her κόσμος.[225] Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers, reports the claim that Pythagoras of Samos was the first to call the heaven κόσμος and the earth round, though Theophrastus, Aristotle’s successor, gave the first place to Parmenides of Elea, and Zeno to Hesiod.[226] The Stoics, Diogenes says, used the word in three ways: of the god himself, imperishable and ungenerated, the craftsman of

[225] Homer, *Iliad* 2.214 (Thersites), 2.704 and 2.727 (κόσμησε, of leaders marshalling their men), 14.187 (Hera’s adornment).

[226] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.48.

the διακόσμησις (*diakosmēsis*), the world-order; of that world-order itself, the order of the stars; and of the whole made of both.[227] Τάξις (*taxis*), from τάσσειν (*tassein*), "to draw up, to station", is a line of battle, a man's post in it, and order in general.

In Marcus κόσμος is the universe. Only at 4.27 does he play on its first sense, as the edition's note says, setting κόσμος against ἀκοσμία (*akosmia*), "disorder"; and once it is the world one is born into (6.56). Its compounds name the ordering and the making, συγκοσμεῖν (*synkosmein*), "to order together" (7.9, 7.48), and κοσμοποιία (*kosmopoiia*), "making the universe" (7.75); διακόσμησις comes twice (9.1.4, 12.5). Τάξις is the order the whole may have, one member of the disjunctions of 6.10 and 12.14, the order of the stars (11.27), and once a part's "post" (8.34). The adverb κοσμίως (*kosmiōs*), "in good order", is said only of a man (3.7, 3.16.2, 8.30, 10.31).

Use in the book

The universe is one, and alive. "Continually conceive of the universe as one living being, holding one substance and one soul; and how all things pass up into its one sensation; and how it does all things by one impulse; and how all things are joint causes of all that happens; and what the spinning together and the winding together are like" (4.40; see Fate and allotment). Each power of a living being is given to the whole. Unity returns as a run of "one": "one universe out of all things, and one God through all things, and one substance, and one law …" (7.9; see Interconnection). "The perfect living being", which "generates all things and holds them together and contains and encompasses them as they are dissolved into the birth of others like them" (10.1), can be read as the same universe.

Its order is connection. "What follows always comes on what went before in a way akin to it. For it is not like some enumeration … but a reasoned connection; and as the things that are have been ordered together in harmony, so the things that come to be show not bare succession but a wonderful kinship" (4.45). Surveyed from above, earthly things are "the medley of it all, and the order made together out of opposites" (7.48). The order was made: "The nature of the whole had its impulse towards making the universe" (7.75; see Impulse), and the gods "ordered all things

[227] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.137–138.

honourably and with love for mankind" (12.5; see Gods). Whether it is "unity, order and providence" or a jumble (6.10) Marcus leaves as a disjunction, and he asks whether there can be order in him and disorder in the totality (4.27; see Providence and atoms).

The universe is sufficient to itself. The nature of the whole "has nothing outside", and what decays within it, it changes into itself and makes new (8.50; see Nature). "What has died does not fall out of the universe" (8.18; see Change), and through the changing of the parts of the nature of the whole "the all-embracing universe remains ever young and in its prime" (12.23; see Change). "Vice in general does no harm to the universe" (8.55), and its nature "is not compelled even by any cause from outside to generate anything harmful to itself" (10.6.1; see Whole and part).

To know it is to know one's place. "He who does not know what the universe is does not know where he is. And he who does not know what he is by nature for does not know who he is, nor what the universe is" (8.52). Marcus was "brought into the universe" for his work, as plants, sparrows, ants and bees do theirs, "putting together, for their part, the universe" (5.1.1). Even the man who opposes what comes about works in it, "for the universe had need of such a man too" (6.42; see Kinship and cooperation). Marcus speaks to it: "Everything is in tune with me that is in tune with you, O universe" (4.23; see Nature); and, after a line of Euripides, the Athenian tragic poet, "the universe is in love with making whatever is going to come about. I say, then, to the universe: I am in love along with you" (10.21).

The same words order a man. Peculiar to the good man is "following God in good order" (3.16.2); Marcus tells himself to speak in the senate "in good order, not obtrusively" (8.30); it is shameful, Marcus writes, that the face should be shaped and ordered as the understanding commands while the understanding is not "shaped and ordered by itself" (7.37); whoever has cut himself off from the whole may "take up again the post of a part" (8.34; see Kinship and cooperation); and Marcus records the precept of the Pythagoreans, to look up at the heaven at dawn and be reminded "of order and purity and nakedness; for there is no veil on a star" (11.27). Providence he keeps as one member of a disjunction, but wherever he describes the universe outside that disjunction, it is one, alive, ordered and in need of nothing; and that order can be read as the measure he

sets himself, as τάξις is both the order of the stars (11.27) and a part's post (8.34).

Places to read

The passages where the universe and its order are discussed or carry the argument, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; every place is given in the sub-entries. Other words of the root of τάσσειν are left out.

2.3 Marcus is a part of the whole universe, which is preserved by the changes of the elements and equally by those of the compounds (see Nature).

2.4 Marcus must at last perceive what universe he is a part of, and of what governor of the universe he is an outflow (see Daimon).

4.3.2 Against resentment at what is allotted from the whole, Marcus is to renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms, and all that proved the universe to be as it were a city (see Providence and atoms).

4.4 If intelligence, reason and law are common, men are citizens and the universe is as it were a city (see Citizenship).

4.23 Everything is in tune with Marcus that is in tune with the universe; from nature are all things, in it and to it (see Nature).

4.27 Either an ordered universe or a jumble; Marcus asks whether there can be order in him and disorder in the totality (see Providence and atoms).

4.29 If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it, no less is he who does not know what happens; and he who is discontented with what happens is an abscess on the universe (see Citizenship).

4.40 Marcus is continually to conceive the universe as one living being, holding one substance and one soul, with one sensation and one impulse, and how all things are joint causes of all that happens.

4.45 What follows comes on what went before in a way akin to it; as the things that are have been ordered together in harmony, so what comes to be shows a wonderful kinship.

5.1.1 Marcus was brought into the universe for his work, as plants, sparrows, ants, spiders and bees do theirs, putting the universe together for their part.

5.8.2 As from all bodies the universe is completed as such a body, so from all causes fate is completed as such a cause (see Fate and allotment).

5.13 Every part of Marcus will be posted by change to some part of the universe, and nothing prevents saying so even if the universe is governed by limited periods (see Cause and matter).

6.10 Either a jumble, an intertwining and a scattering, or unity, order and providence (see Providence and atoms).

6.25 Considering how many things come about at once in each man, Marcus will not wonder that all that comes to be in the one and all-embracing universe subsists in it at once.

6.38 Marcus is to consider often the binding together of all things in the universe and their relation to one another (see Interconnection).

6.42 All work together towards one outcome, and the universe had need even of the man who tries to oppose what comes about (see Kinship and cooperation).

7.9 All things have been ranged together and together order the same universe: there is one universe out of all things, one God, one substance, one law and one truth, if indeed there is also one perfection for living beings of one kind (see Interconnection).

7.25 The nature that governs the whole will soon change all that is seen and make other things from its substance, so that the universe may be always young (see Change).

7.37 It is shameful that the face should be shaped and ordered as the understanding commands, while the understanding is not shaped and ordered by itself.

7.48 One who speaks about men must survey earthly things as if from above: marriages, dissolutions, births, deaths, the medley of it all, and the order made together out of opposites.

7.75 The nature of the whole had its impulse towards making the universe (see Impulse).

8.15 As it is shameful to think it strange that the fig tree bears figs, so it is if the universe bears the things it is fruitful of.

8.18 What has died does not fall out of the universe (see Change).

8.34 God has made it possible for a man who has broken himself off from the whole to come back and take up again the post of a part (see Kinship and cooperation).

8.50 The nature of the whole has nothing outside; it changes into itself what decays within it, and is content with its own space, material and art (see Nature).

8.52 He who does not know what the universe is does not know where he is; he who does not know what he is by nature for does not know who he is, nor what the universe is.

8.55 Vice in general does no harm to the universe, and a particular vice harms only the one who has it.

9.1.4 By an original impulse of providence the common nature had its impulse towards this world-order (see Providence and atoms).

9.10 Man and God and the universe bear fruit, each in its proper seasons.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will persuade itself that all it has comes from the gods and is well, whatever they mean to give for the preservation of the perfect living being, which generates and contains all things.

10.6.1 The nature of the universe is not compelled even by any cause from outside to generate anything harmful to itself (see Whole and part).

10.21 The universe is in love with making whatever is going to come about, and Marcus tells it that he is in love along with it.

10.31 Marcus asks why it is not enough for him to pass through this brief span in good order.

11.1.2 The rational soul goes round the whole universe and the void around it, and comprehends the periodic rebirth of the whole (see Soul).

11.20.1 The fiery and the earthy in Marcus, obeying the ordering of the whole, are held in the compound against their natural motion (see Elements).

11.27 The Pythagoreans' precept is to look up at the heaven at dawn and be reminded of order, purity and nakedness, for there is no veil on a star.

12.5 Marcus asks how the gods, who ordered all things honourably, overlooked the quenching of the best men, and answers that, if they are most good and most just, they would not have let anything in the world-order be neglected unjustly (see Gods).

12.14 Either a necessity of fate and an order not to be transgressed, or a providence that can be propitiated, or a confusion without a leader (see Providence and atoms).

12.23 Through the changing of the parts of the nature of the whole the all-embracing universe remains ever young (see Change).

12.24 If Marcus were raised aloft and looked down on human things, he would despise them, seeing how great is the number of beings of the air and the aether that dwell around.

Epictetus and the Stoics

That the universe is a living being is Stoic doctrine. Diogenes Laertius reports that Chrysippus, the school's third head, in the first book of *On Providence*, the Stoic Apollodorus in his *Physics*, and Posidonius of Apamea, the Stoic of the late second and early first centuries BC, held the universe to be a living being, rational, ensouled and intelligent: a living being is better than what is not, and nothing is better than the universe; it is ensouled, as our own soul shows, being a fragment from it; and Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school, in *On the Whole*, with Chrysippus, Apollodorus and Posidonius, held it to be one.[228] Zeno argued it from the parts. Balbus, the Stoic speaker in *On the Nature of the Gods*, the dialogue of Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, gives his syllogisms: nothing that lacks sensation can have a part that senses, and the parts of the world sense, so the world does not lack sensation; nothing without soul and reason can generate from itself what is animate and rational, and the world

[228] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.142–143.

generates such beings, so the world is animate and rational. If tuneful flutes grew from an olive, Zeno asked, would you doubt that there was some skill of piping in the olive?[229] Marcus' question at 4.27, whether there can be order in him and disorder in the totality, can be read as the same argument from part to whole. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, turns the picture to conduct. If madness can bring a man to fearlessness, he asks, and habit the Galilaeans, can no one learn by reason and demonstration that God made all the things in the universe, and the universe itself, as a whole unimpeded and complete in itself, and its parts for the use of the whole?[230] and his Cynic, threatened with exile, asks where anyone can throw him out: not outside the universe, and wherever he goes, there are sun, moon and stars.[231] Marcus' nature that "has nothing outside" (8.50) and his dead who do not "fall out of the universe" (8.18) can be read beside these. Epictetus has the adjective of Marcus' κοσμίως, and his τάξις, for order in a man. The man who wills his own correction will become, he says, "from disorderly, orderly", κόσμιος (*kosmios*); and whatever place and post (τάξις) God puts in his hands, he will die ten thousand times, "as Socrates says", rather than desert it.[232] Marcus copies the saying on the post at 7.45 from the *Apology* of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, the speech of Socrates at his trial (see Courage and endurance).[233]

Other ancient sources

The play of 4.27 on order and universe is Plato's before it is Marcus'. In the *Gorgias* Socrates tells Callicles, the Athenian with whom he argues in the last part of the dialogue, that the wise say heaven and earth, gods and men are held together by fellowship and friendship, orderliness, temperance and justice, "and for this reason they call this whole an order (κόσμος), my friend, not disorder (ἀκοσμία) nor licence".[234] Marcus' "disorder" at 4.27 is the same word. In the *Timaeus*, Timaeus of Locri, who gives the dialogue's account of the making of the world, says that the god, taking

[229] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.20–22.
[230] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.7.6.
[231] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.22.22.
[232] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.9.16–17 and 3.24.99.
[233] Plato, *Apology* 28d, as the edition's note at 7.45 records.
[234] Plato, *Gorgias* 507e–508a.

over all that was visible, not at rest but moving out of tune and without order, brought it into order (τάξις) out of disorder, judging order in every way better; so, by the likely account, this universe must be called in truth a living being with soul and mind, come to be through the providence of the god; and the god made it one, a single visible living being containing within itself all the living beings akin to it by nature.[235] Marcus' "one living being" (4.40) and "the one and all-embracing thing which we call the universe" (6.25) can be read beside it.

Translation in this edition

Κόσμος is "universe" at sixty-seven of its seventy occurrences. At 4.27, where the edition's note says that Marcus plays on "order" and "universe", the first κόσμος is "universe", with διατεταγμένος (*diatetagmenos*) as "ordered"; the second, standing alone, is "an ordered universe", in "But surely an ordered universe", where "But surely" is ἀλλὰ μήν (*alla mēn*), the correction of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts (see Providence and atoms); the third is "order". At 6.56, "came into the world", it is "world". "Universe" renders no other word except κοσμοποιία, "making the universe" (7.75). Διακόσμησις is "world-order" at both its places. The adverb κοσμίως is "in good order" at all four of its places, as εὐκοσμία (*eukosmia*) is "good order" (4.3.1; see Tranquillity). Ἀκοσμία is "disorder" (4.27) and ἀκοσμεῖν (*akosmein*) "brings disorder" (9.1.2). Συγκοσμεῖν is "order" (7.9) and its passive participle "the order made together" (7.48); κατακοσμεῖσθαι (*katakosmeisthai*) is "ordered", with "shaped", at both its places (7.37); συνεπικοσμεῖν (*synepikosmein*), of what ensues on nature's works, "adds to their beauty" (3.2.2). Τάξις is "order" (6.10, 11.27, 12.14) and, of a part, "post" (8.34). Τάσσειν is "ordered" (5.8.1 twice, 10.25), "appointed" (5.32), "posts himself" and "is posted" (7.45), and the adverb τεταγμένως (*tetagmenōs*) "in order" (1.16.9); διατάσσειν (*diatassein*) is "ordered" (4.27, 12.5) and "have ordained" (6.16.5), and διάταξις (*diataxis*) "ordering" (11.20.1); συντάσσειν (*syntassein*) is "have been ordered together" (4.45), "coordinated" (5.30) and, of Asclepius, the god of healing, and of the nature of the whole, "prescribed" and "prescribes" (5.8.1, 5.8.3, 5.8.5); συγκατατάσσεσθαι

[235] Plato, *Timaeus* 30a–b, 30d–31a.

(*synkatatassesthai*) is “have been ranged together” (7.9); κατατάσσειν (*katatassein*) is “be posted” (5.13, 8.25, 11.20.1), “place” (6.42) and “sets it in its place” (8.35); εὐτακτότερος (*eutaktoteros*) is “better ordered” (7.52). Other words of the root are not treated here: τακτικός (*taktikos*) “ordering” (1.9.2), ὑποτάσσειν (*hypotassein*) “placed under”, “subjected” and “subordinated” (1.17.3, 3.6.2, 5.30), ἀνατάσσεσθαι (*anatassesthai*) “taken up his post” (3.5), ἀποτάσσειν (*apotassein*) “fixed” (4.1), προστακτικός (*prostaktikos*) “prescribes” (4.4), παράταξις (*parataxis*) “battle” (3.3) and “opposition” (11.3), παρατάσσεσθαι (*paratassesthai*) “takes its stand” (8.48), λειποτάκτης (*leipotaktēs*) “deserters of their post” (11.9) and ἐπιτάσσειν (*epitassein*) “is laid upon” (11.20.2). At 12.24 ἐναέριοι (*enaerioi*) and ἐναιθέριοι (*enaitherioi*) are “beings of the air and the aether”.

ἀκοσμέω

Attested: ἀκοσμεῖ (*akosmei*; 9.1.2). To be disorderly, to bring disorder. He who lies unwillingly is impious “in so far as he is in discord with the nature of the whole and in so far as he brings disorder, fighting against the nature of the universe” (9.1.2; see Justice). Lemma: ἀκοσμέω.

ἀκοσμία

Attested: ἀκοσμία (*akosmia*; 4.27). Disorder, the opposite of κόσμος. “Or can a kind of order subsist in you, and disorder in the totality?” (4.27). Lemma: ἀκοσμία.

διακόσμησις

Attested: διακόσμησιν (*diakosmēsin*; 9.1.4), διακοσμήσει (*diakosmēsei*; 12.5). The ordering of the world, the world-order; in Stoic usage the arrangement of which the god is craftsman. The common nature “had its impulse towards this world-order” (9.1.4); the gods “would not have allowed anything in the world-order to be left neglected unjustly and without reason” (12.5). Lemma: διακόσμησις.

διάταξις

Attested: διατάξει (*diataxei*; 11.20.1). Arrangement, ordering. The little breath and all that is fiery in Marcus, “obeying the ordering of the whole, are held back here in the compound” (11.20.1; see Elements). Lemma: διάταξις.

διατάσσω

Attested: διατεταγμένος (*diatetagmenos*; 4.27), διατετάχασιν (*diatetachasin*; 6.16.5), διατάξαντες (*diataxantes*; 12.5). To arrange throughout, to order, to ordain. “Either an ordered universe or a jumble mixed together” (4.27); respect for one’s own understanding will make one “in accord with the gods, that is, praising whatever they distribute and have ordained” (6.16.5); the gods “ordered all things honourably and with love for mankind” (12.5). Lemma: διατάσσω.

εὔτακτος

Attested: εὐτακτότερος (*eutaktoteros*; 7.52). Well ordered; in the comparative, of a man. “A better thrower, but not more social, nor more self-respecting, nor better ordered in what happens” (7.52). Leopold reports ἀτακτότερος (*ataktoteros*), “more disorderly”, in A, the Vatican manuscript. Lemma: εὔτακτος.

κατακοσμέω

Attested: κατακοσμεῖσθαι (*katakosmeisthai*; 7.37 twice). To set in order, to array. “It is shameful that the face should be obedient, and be shaped and ordered as the understanding commands, while the understanding is not shaped and ordered by itself” (7.37). Lemma: κατακοσμέω.

κατατάσσω

Attested: καταταχθήσεται (*katatachthēsetai*; 5.13), κατατάσσεις (*katatasseis*; 6.42), καταταχθῆναι (*katatachthēnai*; 8.25), κατατάσσει (*katatassei*; 8.35), καταταχθῇ (*katatachthēi*; 11.20.1). To station, to post, to put in its place. “Every part of me will be posted by change to some part of the universe” (5.13); “understand among whom you place yourself” (6.42); of death, “or to be removed and posted elsewhere” (8.25); of what stands in the way, nature “sets it in its place in fate” (8.35); the elements remain “whenever they have been posted somewhere by force” (11.20.1). At 8.25 and 11.20.1 Leopold reports καταχθῆναι (*katachthēnai*) and καταχθῇ (*katachthēi*), “be brought down”, in A. Lemma: κατατάσσω.

κόσμιος

Attested: κοσμίως (*kosmiōs*, the adverb; 3.7, 3.16.2, 8.30, 10.31). Orderly, well conducted; Marcus uses only the adverb, “in good order”, and only of a man’s conduct. He will

go “as if about to do any other of the things that can be done with self-respect and in good order” (3.7); “following God in good order” (3.16.2); “Speak, both in the senate and to anyone whatever, in good order, not obtrusively” (8.30); “And why is it not enough for you to pass through this brief span in good order?” (10.31). Lemma: κόσμιος.

κοσμοποιία

Attested: κοσμοποιίαν (*kosmopoiian*; 7.75). The making of the universe. “The nature of the whole had its impulse towards making the universe” (7.75; see Impulse). Lemma: κοσμοποιία.

κόσμος

Attested: κόσμῳ (*kosmōi*; 2.3, 2.11.1, 2.12, 3.11.2, 5.21, 6.38, 6.42, 8.11, 8.49, 8.50, 9.1.3, 9.42.1 twice, 10.9, 10.15, 10.21), κόσμον (*kosmon*; 2.3, 2.4, 4.40, 5.1.1 twice, 6.15, 6.25, 6.56, 7.9, 8.55, 9.32, 11.1.2, 12.35), κόσμου (*kosmou*; 2.4, 2.16, 3.3, 4.29 twice, 5.8.4, 5.13 twice, 6.24, 6.36 three times, 7.75, 8.18 twice, 9.1.2, 9.28, 10.6.1, 10.7.1, 12.1.2), κόσμος (*kosmos*; 4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.4, 4.27 three times, 5.8.2, 5.13, 6.42, 6.44.2, 7.9, 7.25, 8.15, 8.52 twice, 9.10, 9.19, 9.35, 10.21, 12.23), κόσμε (*kosme*; 4.23). Order, and the ordered universe. “Continually conceive of the universe as one living being” (4.40); “The universe is alteration; life is opinion” (4.3.4); “Everything is in tune with me that is in tune with you, O universe” (4.23); and, in the play on its first sense, “Or can a kind of order subsist in you, and disorder in the totality?” (4.27). At 9.28, “The cycles of the universe are the same”, “the same” is ταὐτά (*tauta*), the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have ταῦτα (*tauta*), “these”. Lemma: κόσμος.

συγκατατάσσω

Attested: συγκατατέτακται (*synkatatetaktai*; 7.9). To arrange together, to range in one order. “For they have been ranged together, and together they order the same universe” (7.9). Lemma: συγκατατάσσω.

συγκοσμέω

Attested: συγκοσμεῖ (*synkosmei*; 7.9), συγκοσμούμενον (*synkosmoumenon*; 7.48). To order together, to help to order. “Together they order the same universe” (7.9); seen from above, “the medley of it all, and the order made

together out of opposites" (7.48). At 5.1.1, where Leopold prints συγκροτούσας (*synkrotousas*), "putting together", he reports συγκοσμούσας (*synkosmousas*), "ordering together", in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed. Lemma: συγκοσμέω.

συνεπικοσμέω

Attested: συνεπικοσμεῖ (*synepikosmei*; 3.2.2). To adorn besides, to add to the beauty of a thing. The ears of corn bending down, the lion's wrinkled brow, the boar's foam, "because it ensues upon the things that come about by nature adds to their beauty and gives delight" (3.2.2; see Natural beauty). Lemma: συνεπικοσμέω.

συντάσσω

Attested: συντέτακται (*syntetaktai*; 4.45), συνέταξεν (*synetaxen*; 5.8.1), συνέταξε (*synetaxe*; 5.8.1 twice, 5.30), συνετάττετο (*synetatteto*; 5.8.3, 5.8.5), συντάττει (*syntattei*; 5.8.3). To arrange together, to coordinate; of a doctor, to prescribe. "As the things that are have been ordered together in harmony" (4.45); "Asclepius prescribed for this man riding" (5.8.1), where, as the edition's note says, "prescribed" is also "arranged together", the sense the chapter turns on (see Fate and allotment); the mind of the whole "has subordinated, coordinated, and allotted to each according to worth" (5.30). Lemma: συντάσσω.

τάξις

Attested: τάξις (*taxis*; 6.10, 12.14), τάξιν (*taxin*; 8.34), τάξεως (*taxeōs*; 11.27). Arrangement, order; a post in a line. "Or unity, order and providence" (6.10); "a necessity of fate and an order not to be transgressed" (12.14); "to come back and grow together and take up again the post of a part" (8.34); "of order and purity and nakedness" (11.27). Lemma: τάξις.

τάσσω

Attested: τεταγμένως (*tetagmenōs*, adverb of the perfect participle; 1.16.9), ἔταξε (*etaxe*; 5.8.1), τέτακται (*tetaktai*; 5.8.1), τεταγμένας (*tetagmenas*; 5.32), τάξῃ (*taxēi*; 7.45), ταχθῇ (*tachthēi*; 7.45), τεταγμένων (*tetagmenōn*; 10.25). To draw up, to station, to order. Of Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, "everything reckoned out point by point, as if at leisure, untroubled, in order" (1.16.9); "what happens to each has in a way been ordered for him" (5.8.1); the reason

that manages the totality "by appointed periods" (5.32); in the words of Socrates in Plato's *Apology*, "wherever a man posts himself, judging it best, or is posted by a commander" (7.45); "the things ordered by him who governs all things, who is law" (10.25). Lemma: τάσσω.

See also

Cause and matter; Change; Citizenship; Courage and endurance; Daimon; Elements; Fate and allotment; Gods; Impulse; Interconnection; Justice; Kinship and cooperation; Natural beauty; Nature; Providence and atoms; Soul; Tranquillity; Whole and part.

Daimon

The divinity within · Meditations

δαίμων, daimōn, "daimon", "spirits"; *δαιμόνιος, daimonios*, "daimonic"; *εὐδαιμονία, eudaimonia*, "happiness"; *εὐδαιμόνως, eudaimonōs*, "happily"; *κακοδαιμονεῖν, kakodaimonein*, "be unhappy"; *δεισιδαιμονία, deisidaimonia*, "superstition"; *δεισιδαίμων, deisidaimōn*, "superstition"; *ὁ ἐν σοὶ θεός, ho en soi theos*, "the god within you"; *προστάτης, prostatēs*, "guardian"; *ἡγεμών, hēgemōn*, "guide"; *ἀπόσπασμα, apospasma*, "fragment"; *ἀπόρροια, aporroia*, "outflow"

At a Glance

The word. Δαίμων is a divine power, in particular the power that deals a man his fortune; εὐδαιμονία, happiness, is having a good daimon (7.17).

In the *Meditations*. The daimon is the divinity within each man, which Zeus has given to each "as guardian and guide, a fragment of himself", and which "is each man's mind and reason" (5.27). It is to be served and kept pure (2.13), "inviolate and unharmed" (2.17.2) and "serene" (3.16.2, 8.45); it is "enshrined" in a man (3.6.2), the god within him (3.5), and no one can compel him to act against it (5.10.2).

In this edition. Δαίμων is "daimon", never "demon" or "genius", and "spirits" only at 1.6, where it is the exorcists' word; δαιμόνιος is "daimonic", εὐδαιμονία "happiness", κακοδαιμονεῖν "be unhappy", and ὁ ἐν σοὶ θεός "the god within you".

A place to read. 5.27, where the maxim "Live with the gods" is explained by the daimon that Zeus has given to each man.

Meaning

Δαίμων (*daimōn*) is an old Greek word for a divine power, a god or a lesser divinity, and in particular the power that deals a man his fortune. So εὐδαίμων (*eudaimōn*), "happy", is a man with a good daimon, and κακοδαίμων (*kakodaimōn*), "unhappy", a man with a bad one. The fear of such powers is δεισιδαιμονία (*deisidaimonia*), superstition; Marcus counts it a merit in Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, that he was free of it (1.16.3, 6.30.4). The popular sense comes once: Diognetus, his painting master, taught him to disbelieve what charlatans say "about incantations and the driving out of spirits" (1.6).

Philosophy had long since moved the daimon inside: Plato made the highest part of the soul a daimon given by god, and the Stoics placed the happy life in the agreement of each man's daimon with the will of the governor of the whole. Marcus' daimon is this inner one. Apart from 1.6 it is always singular, always within a man, and usually his own: "the daimon within oneself" (2.13), "your daimon" (3.12), "my god and daimon" (5.10.2).

Use in the book

The daimon enters the notebook as the answer to curiosity. "Nothing is more wretched" than the man who goes round everything, "'searching the things beneath the earth', as he says" (the words of Pindar, the Theban lyric poet, as Plato's *Theaetetus* quotes him, with Plato's own "searching"),[236] and guessing at what is in his neighbours' souls, "and does not perceive that it is enough to be with the daimon within oneself alone and to serve it genuinely" (2.13). The service is "to keep it pure of passion, aimlessness and discontent with what comes from gods and men". Earlier he said the same without the god: those who do not keep track of the movements of their own soul "are bound to be unhappy" (2.8), κακοδαιμονεῖν (*kakodaimonein*), to have a bad daimon. Book II ends by making philosophy, the one escort through life, its guard: it "lies in keeping the daimon within inviolate and unharmed, master of pleasures and

[236] Pindar, fr. 292 Snell–Maehler, quoted by Plato, *Theaetetus* 173e–174a.

pains, doing nothing at random, nothing falsely or with pretence" (2.17.2).

Book III gathers the language of cult around it. The good man is "a kind of priest and servant of the gods, making use also of what is enshrined within him" (3.4.3). "Let the god within you", Marcus tells himself, "be the guardian of a living being that is male, elderly, civic, Roman, and a ruler, who has taken up his post" (3.5): the god is to guard one man, Marcus, at his post. If nothing appears better than "the daimon itself that is enshrined in you", which "has subjected its own impulses to itself, examines the impressions, has drawn itself away, as Socrates used to say, from what the senses undergo", he is to "give room to nothing else" (3.6.2). These can be read as the ruling centre's works (see Ruling centre), seen as divine and set over the man. He is to honour nothing that would force him to "crave anything that needs walls and curtains", for whoever has chosen "his own mind and daimon and the rites of its virtue" before all else "makes no tragedy, utters no groan" (3.7). The charge is to keep the daimon "pure and standing firm, as if you had to give it back even now" (3.12), and "not to befoul the daimon enshrined within, in the breast, or disturb it with a crowd of impressions, but to keep it serene, following God in good order" (3.16.2). Against it stands the body, "a vessel so much worse than what serves it: for the one is mind and daimon, the other earth and gore" (3.3).

At 5.27 Marcus takes up the maxim "Live with the gods" and explains it: "He lives with the gods who continually shows them his own soul pleased with what is allotted, and doing what the daimon wills, whom Zeus has given to each as guardian and guide, a fragment of himself. And this is each man's mind and reason." The daimon has a will, is a piece of Zeus, and is the man's own reason (see Mind and reason). The same picture stands behind 2.4, where Marcus must "now at last perceive" that he came to subsist as an "outflow" of the governor of the universe. No one can come between him and it: "it is open to me to do nothing against my god and daimon; for there is no one who will compel me to transgress against him" (5.10.2).

"Happiness is a good daimon, or a good ⟨ruling centre⟩" (7.17): the pun is in the Greek word, and the second clause, whose noun ⟨ruling centre⟩ Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, supplied, says what a good daimon is. "Living happily lies in very few things"

(7.67). Nor does the good daimon come and go with circumstance: “Take me up and throw me where you want. For there too I shall have my daimon serene, that is, content, if it should fare and act according to what follows from its own constitution” (8.45). At 10.13 the most honoured part of a man “becomes, when it wants, faith, self-respect, truth, law, a good daimon”, in a correction by J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, of the manuscripts’ “through which there comes to be”; so that, in his text, a good daimon can be read as something the ruling part can become, not only something given. Marcus tells himself that if he separates from his ruling centre “the things fastened to it by attachment”, “you will be able to live through at least what remains until you die untroubled and kindly and serene towards your own daimon” (12.3.2; see Mind and reason); and he must “perceive at last” that he has in himself “something better and more daimonic” than whatever jerks him like a puppet (12.19).

The daimon is never, for Marcus, a spirit standing at his side; it is his reason. What the religious words add is obligation. His reason is not simply his to use: it was given (5.27), it is to be served (2.13) and honoured (12.1.2), and it must be kept fit to be handed back (3.12). The word lets Marcus speak to his own mind as to something he owes, and judge himself by whether he has kept it as he received it.

Places to read

Every chapter in which δαίμων or δαιμόνιος occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with the places of κακοδαιμονεῖν (2.8) and εὐδαιμόνως (7.67), 2.4, where Marcus is an outflow of the governor of the universe, and the three places where the divinity within is named in other words (3.4.3, 3.5, 12.1.2). The places of δεισιδαιμονία and δεισιδαίμων are given in their sub-entries.

1.6 Diognetus taught Marcus to disbelieve what charlatans say about incantations and the driving out of spirits, the one place where δαίμονες are the spirits of popular belief.

2.4 Marcus must now at last perceive of what universe he is a part, of what governor of the universe he came to subsist as an outflow, and that a limit of time has been set for him.

2.8 Those who do not keep track of the movements of their own soul are bound to be unhappy, to have a bad daimon.

2.13 It is enough to be with the daimon within oneself and to serve it, keeping it pure of passion, aimlessness and discontent with what comes from gods and men.

2.17.2 Philosophy, the one escort through life, lies in keeping the daimon within inviolate and unharmed, master of pleasures and pains.

3.3 If death is absence of sensation, a man will cease to slave for the body, a vessel worse than what serves it, which is mind and daimon.

3.4.3 The good man is a priest and servant of the gods, using what is enshrined within him.

3.5 The god within Marcus is to be the guardian of a man who is male, elderly, civic, Roman and a ruler, waiting at his post for the recall from life.

3.6.2 If nothing appears better than the daimon enshrined within, which rules its impulses, examines impressions and subjects itself to the gods, Marcus is to give room to nothing else.

3.7 The man who has chosen his own mind and daimon and the rites of its virtue before all else makes no tragedy and needs neither solitude nor a crowd.

3.12 Whoever does the work in hand keeping his daimon pure and standing firm, as if he had to give it back now, will live well.

3.16.2 It is peculiar to the good man not to befoul the daimon enshrined in the breast or disturb it with impressions, but to keep it serene, following God.

5.10.2 Amid the flow of substance and time Marcus rests in two things, the second that no one can compel him to act against his god and daimon.

5.27 To live with the gods is to do what the daimon wills, which Zeus has given to each as guardian and guide, a fragment of himself, and which is each man’s mind and reason.

7.17 Happiness is a good daimon, or a good ruling centre; an impression that has come by old habit is told to go away.

7.67 Living happily lies in very few things, and despair of becoming a dialectician and a natural philosopher is no reason to give up hope of being free, self-respecting, social and obedient to God.

8.45 Wherever he is thrown, Marcus will have his daimon serene, if it fares and acts according to its own constitution.

10.13 Those who are arrogant in censuring others act with the most honoured part of themselves, the part from which, when it wants, come faith, self-respect, truth, law, a good daimon.

12.1.2 If near the exit Marcus honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, and fears only never having begun to live according to nature, he will be worthy of the universe that begot him.

12.3.2 Whoever separates from his ruling centre what clings to it will be able to live out his time serene towards his own daimon.

12.19 Marcus must perceive that he has in himself something better and more daimonic than what produces the passions.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoics made the daimon part of their account of the end. Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, reports that for them the end is to live in agreement with nature, one's own and that of the whole, and that "this is the virtue of the happy man and the smooth flow of life: when everything is done according to the concord of the daimon that dwells with each man with the will of the governor of the whole".[237] Marcus' "governor of the universe" (2.4), his "doing what the daimon wills" (5.27) and his "smoothly flowing" life (2.5) all have their counterparts in that sentence. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, says that God "has stationed beside each man, as overseer, his own daimon, and has given him into its keeping, a daimon that does not sleep and cannot be misled"; so "when you have shut your doors and made it dark inside", a man must never say that he is alone, "for you are not; God is within, and your daimon is".[238] Marcus too speaks of those who act "once they have

[237] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.88.

[238] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.14.12–14.

shut the doors" (3.16.1), and of what "needs walls and curtains" (3.7). In the same discourse Epictetus calls souls parts and fragments of God, μόρια καὶ ἀποσπάσματα (*moria kai apospasmata*), and in another he tells his hearer, "you are a fragment of God; you have some portion of him in yourself", and "you carry a god about with you, wretch, and do not know it", defiling him "with unclean thoughts and sordid deeds".[239] Marcus' "fragment of himself" (5.27) is Epictetus' word, ἀπόσπασμα (*apospasma*), and his warning not to "befoul" the daimon (3.16.2) echoes these passages. Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, writing to Lucilius, says the same in Latin: "God is near you, with you, within you … a holy spirit dwells within us, the observer and guardian of our bad and good deeds; as we treat it, so it treats us."[240] Epictetus' daimon is a watcher set over a man; Marcus says outright that it is the man's own mind and reason (5.27).

Other ancient sources

The inner daimon is Plato's before it is the Stoics'. In the *Timaeus* we are to think of the most sovereign kind of soul in us "that god has given it to each as a daimon", dwelling at the top of the body and lifting us towards our kinship in heaven, "since we are a plant not of earth but of heaven"; and the man who always tends the divine in himself and keeps "the daimon that dwells with him well ordered" must be "supremely happy", εὐδαίμων.[241] Plato's verb for tending, θεραπεύειν (*therapeuein*), is Marcus' "serve" at 2.13. The pun of 7.17 is in that sentence, and Plato's successors kept it: Aristotle, discussing in the *Topics* how one may argue by taking a word in its literal sense rather than its established one, gives the example of εὐδαίμων, the man "whose daimon is good, as Xenocrates says that he is happy who has a good soul, for this is each man's daimon".[242] Xenocrates was Plato's pupil and the third head of his school, the Academy. Socrates' own daimonic sign was another thing. At his trial, in Plato's *Apology*, he says that "something divine and daimonic" comes to him, "a kind of voice" that began in his childhood and, whenever it comes, "always turns me away from what I am about to do, but

[239] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.14.6; 2.8.11–13.

[240] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 41.1–2.

[241] Plato, *Timaeus* 90a, 90c.

[242] Aristotle, *Topics* 2.6, 112a37.

never urges me on".[243] It can be read as the opposite of Marcus' daimon: a check from outside his reasoning, where Marcus' daimon is the reasoning itself. Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, asking whether Socrates gave the name of god to his own nature, sets side by side the comic poet Menander's "for our mind is the god" and the saying of Heraclitus of Ephesus, the philosopher of about 500 BC, "character is a man's daimon".[244]

Translation in this edition

Δαίμων is "daimon" at all thirteen places where it is the divinity within a man, and "spirits" at 1.6, where a note ties the exorcists' word to its later use. The edition avoids "demon", which would bring in an evil spirit, and "genius" or "guardian spirit", which carry Roman and Christian senses that Marcus does not mean. In these places "within" renders ἔνδον (*endon*; 2.13, 2.17.2, 3.4.3, 3.16.2), and "enshrined" the participles of ἱδρύειν (*hidryein*), to set up a statue or a shrine: ἱδρυμένῳ (3.4.3), ἐνιδρυμένου (3.6.2) and ἱδρυμένον (3.16.2). The adjective δαιμόνιος is "daimonic", in the comparative "more daimonic" (12.19). Εὐδαιμονία is "happiness" (7.17), εὐδαιμόνως "happily" (7.67) and κακοδαιμονεῖν "be unhappy" (2.8); the notes at 2.8 and 7.17 give the literal senses, "to have a bad daimon" and "to have a good daimon". At 7.17 the angle brackets mark the noun ⟨ruling centre⟩ as Gataker's supplement. At 10.13 "which becomes" is Leopold's own ὅ (*ho*); the manuscripts have ᾧ (*hōi*), "through which there comes to be". The god within a man is "the god within you" (3.5) and "my god" (5.10.2), in lower case, where the god who orders the whole is "God" (3.16.2); τὸ ἐν σοὶ θεῖον (*to en soi theion*) is "the divine in you" (12.1.2). Προστάτης is "guardian" (3.5, 5.27) and ἡγεμών "guide" (5.27, and 3.16.1 of the mind). Ἀνύβριστος (*anybristos*), "inviolate" (2.17.2), is formed with the negative prefix from the verb by which the soul "does violence to itself" (2.16; see Impulse); ἵλεως (*hileōs*), "serene", is said of the daimon (3.16.2, 8.45) and of a man towards it (12.3.2).

ἀπόρροια

Attested: ἀπόρροια (*aporroia*; 2.4). An outflow, what streams off from a source. Marcus must "now at last

[243] Plato, *Apology* 31c–d.

[244] Plutarch, *Platonic Questions* 1, 999e; Heraclitus, DK 22 B119.

perceive what universe you are a part of, and of what governor of the universe you came to subsist as an outflow, and that a limit of time has been set for you" (2.4). The note there ties the picture to the "fragment" of 5.27 and to the mind that "has flowed from there" (12.26; see Mind and reason). Lemma: ἀπόρροια.

ἀπόσπασμα

Attested: ἀπόσπασμα (*apospasma*; 5.27). A piece torn off, a fragment. The daimon is the one "whom Zeus has given to each as guardian and guide, a fragment of himself" (5.27). Lemma: ἀπόσπασμα.

δαιμόνιος

Attested: δαιμονιώτερον (*daimoniōteron*; 12.19). Of a daimon, divine. "Perceive at last that you have in yourself something better and more daimonic than the things that produce the passions and, in a word, jerk you like a puppet" (12.19). Lemma: δαιμόνιος.

δαίμων

Attested: δαιμόνων (*daimonōn*; 1.6), δαίμονι (*daimoni*; 2.13, 12.3.2), δαίμονα (*daimona*; 2.17.2, 3.7, 3.12, 3.16.2, 5.10.2, 8.45), δαίμων (*daimōn*; 3.3, 5.27, 7.17, 10.13), δαίμονος (*daimonos*; 3.6.2). A divine power; in Marcus, apart from the exorcists' "spirits" of 1.6, the divinity within each man, which "is each man's mind and reason" (5.27). It is to be served (2.13), kept "inviolate and unharmed" (2.17.2), "pure and standing firm" (3.12), "serene" (3.16.2, 8.45), and a good daimon is happiness (7.17). Lemma: δαίμων.

δεισιδαιμονία

Attested: δεισιδαιμονίας (*deisidaimonias*; 6.30.4). Fear of the gods, superstition. Antoninus was "pious … without superstition" (6.30.4). Lemma: δεισιδαιμονία.

δεισιδαίμων

Attested: δεισίδαιμον (*deisidaimon*; 1.16.3). Superstitious; the neuter with the article serves as a noun. Among Antoninus' qualities: "no superstition towards the gods" (1.16.3). Lemma: δεισιδαίμων.

εὐδαιμονία

Attested: εὐδαιμονία (*eudaimonia*; 7.17). Happiness, literally having a good daimon. “Happiness is a good daimon, or a good ⟨ruling centre⟩” (7.17). Lemma: εὐδαιμονία.

εὐδαίμων

Attested: εὐδαιμόνως (*eudaimonōs*; 7.67). Happy; the adverb is “happily”. “Living happily lies in very few things” (7.67). The verb εὐδαιμονεῖν does not occur, and Εὐδαίμων at 8.25 is a man’s name, Eudaemon, one of the “sharp men” now long dead. Lemma: εὐδαίμων.

ἡγεμών

Attested: ἡγεμόνα (*hēgemona*; 3.16.1, 5.27). A guide, one who leads the way. Zeus has given the daimon to each “as guardian and guide” (5.27); “to have the mind as guide to what appear to be duties” belongs even to those who do not believe in the gods (3.16.1; see Ruling centre). Lemma: ἡγεμών.

κακοδαιμονέω

Attested: κακοδαιμονῶν (*kakodaimonōn*; 2.8), κακοδαιμονεῖν (*kakodaimonein*; 2.8). To be unhappy, literally to have a bad daimon. “Not attending to what goes on in another’s soul has not easily been seen to make anyone unhappy; but those who do not keep track of the movements of their own soul are bound to be unhappy” (2.8). Lemma: κακοδαιμονέω.

προστάτης

Attested: προστάτης (*prostatēs*; 3.5), προστάτην (*prostatēn*; 5.27). One who stands before another to protect him, a guardian. “Let the god within you be the guardian of a living being that is male, elderly, civic, Roman, and a ruler” (3.5); the daimon is given to each “as guardian and guide” (5.27). Lemma: προστάτης.

See also

Gods; Impulse; Mind and reason; Philosophy; Prayer; Ruling centre; Soul.

Death

Death and the going out of life · Meditations

θάνατος, thanatos, “death”; *ἀποθνῄσκειν, apothnēiskein*, “die”, “dying”, “in death”, “were dead”; *θνῄσκειν, thnēiskein*, “be dead”, “dead”, “die”, “dying”, “have died”; *εὐθανατεῖν, euthanatein*, “dies well”; *ἐναποθνῄσκειν, enapothnēiskein*, “die away in”; *νεκρός, nekros*, “corpse”, “dead”, “dead body”; *ἔξοδος, exodos*, “the exit”; *ἐξιέναι, exienai*, “go out”, “leave”; *ἐξέρχεσθαι, exerchesthai*, “go out”, “depart”, “come out”, “get out”; *ἐξάγειν, exagein*, “take out”, “lead out”, “carry off”; *ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι, apallassesthai*, “depart”, “leave”, “be rid of”, “free of”, “free from”; *ἀπαλλαγή, apallagē*, “release”; *σβέννυσθαι, sbennysthai*, “quench”; *ἀποσβέννυσθαι, aposbennysthai*, “be quenched”; *σβέσις, sbesis*, “quenching”; *ἀναισθησία, anaisthēsia*, “absence of sensation”

At a Glance

The word. Θάνατος is death, ἀποθνῄσκειν to die, and a νεκρός a corpse; ἔξοδος, ἐξιέναι, ἐξάγειν and ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι are words for leaving life.

In the *Meditations*. Stripped of its impressions it is “a work of nature” (2.12) and “a mystery of nature” like birth (4.5), to be awaited “as one of the natural activities” (9.3.1). Whatever it is, scattering, quenching or removal (8.25), it is not to be feared (8.58); the longest life and the shortest lose the same (2.14.2); and if life cannot be lived as it should, Marcus may “go out of life” (5.29, 10.8.3).

In this edition. Θάνατος is always “death”; ἀποθνῄσκειν is “die”, and the perfect of θνῄσκειν mostly “be dead” or “dead”; νεκρός is “corpse”, “dead” or “dead body”; ἔξοδος is “the exit”, ἐξιέναι “go out” or “leave”, ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι, of life, “depart” or “leave”; σβέννυσθαι is “quench” and σβέσις “quenching”.

A place to read. 9.3.1, where Marcus tells himself to wait for death as one of the natural activities, as he waits for his wife to give birth.

Meaning

Θάνατος (*thanatos*) is the noun of θνῄσκειν (*thnēiskein*), “to die”; prose uses the compound ἀποθνῄσκειν (*apothnēiskein*) for the act and the perfect τέθνηκα (*tethnēka*), “I am dead”, for the state. A νεκρός (*nekros*) is a dead body. Leaving life is said with verbs of going out, ἐξιέναι (*exienai*) and ἐξέρχεσθαι (*exerchesthai*), with the noun ἔξοδος (*exodos*), “the way out”; with ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι

(*apallassesthai*), "to get clear, depart"; and with ἐξάγειν (*exagein*), "to lead out", the verb of the Stoic phrase for taking one's own life with good reason.[245] Σβέννυσθαι (*sbennysthai*) is to be put out, as a lamp is, and σβέσις (*sbesis*) the putting out. The Stoics counted death among the things neither good nor bad (see Good, bad and indifference),[246] and Marcus' account of what it is, a dissolution into the elements, is theirs (2.17.2; see Daimon, Dissolution); his own question is how to meet it.

Use in the book

The first exercise is to look at death bare. If dying is looked at by itself and stripped by analysis of the impressions attached to it, one will "no longer form the opinion that it is anything but a work of nature; and if anyone fears a work of nature, he is a child" (2.12). "Death is such as birth is, a mystery of nature" (4.5), and "one of the things that nature wants", like teething and giving birth (9.3.1). Marcus is to await "the hour in which your little soul will fall out of this husk" as he awaits the birth of his wife's child (9.3.1). It is also "rest from the jolting of sense, the puppet-jerking of impulse, the roving of the understanding, and the service owed to the flesh" (6.28).

Beyond this Marcus does not decide. He must remember "that it will be necessary either for your little compound to be scattered, or for the little breath to be quenched, or to be removed and posted elsewhere" (8.25); the three return, in other words, at 7.32 (see Providence and atoms) and 11.3 (see Soul). "If into another life, nothing is empty of gods there either; if into absence of sensation, you will cease to put up with pains and pleasures and to slave for a vessel so much worse than what serves it" (3.3). "He who fears death fears either absence of sensation or a different sensation": in the one case "you will not perceive anything bad either", in the other "you will be a living being of another kind, and will not cease from living" (8.58). If even men most intimate with the divine are "quenched for ever", it ought to be so (12.5; see Gods).

Length and rank make no difference. "The longest-lived and the one who will die soonest lose what is equal" (2.14.2); Alexander of Macedon and his muleteer "came, in death, to

---

[245] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.130.

[246] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.102, after Hecaton, Apollodorus and Chrysippus.

the same state" (6.24; see Providence and atoms). The catalogues of the dead make this ordinary. Of the emperor Vespasian's age Marcus writes, "that life of theirs is no longer anywhere" (4.32.1); philosophers "who argued endlessly about death or immortality" have died, and "cities have, so to speak, died whole" (4.48.1). Its lesson: "So pass through this instant of time according to nature, and come to rest serene, as an olive might fall when ripe, speaking well of her who bore it and giving thanks to the tree that grew it" (4.48.2). After the deaths of the physician Hippocrates, the conquerors Alexander and Gaius Caesar and the philosophers Heraclitus and Socrates, Marcus turns to himself: "What of it? You embarked, you made the voyage, you have come to port: disembark" (3.3).

The thought of death is turned on the present. "Do and say and think each thing as one who may leave life at this moment" (2.11.1). Dying is "one of the actions of life; it is enough, then, here too to settle the present well" (6.2). Fear has its measure: for him to whom only the timely is good, to whom more right actions or fewer are all one, and to observe the universe for a longer time or a shorter makes no difference, "not even death is a thing to fear" (12.35).

Marcus speaks as plainly of leaving life by his own act. If a man begins to dote, "attending to the very question whether one must now take oneself out of life" is among the powers "quenched first" (3.1; see Mind and reason). If others do not allow him to live here as he thinks to live once he has gone out, he tells himself, "then go out of life too, yet as one who suffers nothing bad. Smoke, and I leave" (5.29); if he cannot keep the names he has given himself, he is to withdraw into some corner where he will have the mastery, "or else go out of life altogether, not in anger, but simply and freely and with self-respect" (10.8.3; see Self-respect and shame). Yet he also bids himself wait for "the natural release" (5.10.2; see Daimon). Some will welcome even a wise man's death; Marcus is not on that account to go away less kindly, "but as, with one who dies well, the little soul slips out of the body with ease, such too must the going away from these be" (10.36). It is nature that sends him from the city: "Go away, then, serene; for he who releases you is serene too" (12.36; see Citizenship).

Marcus never settles what death is: under each account it holds nothing to fear, and this can be read as his point: death is the measure of the present, not a subject of

speculation. The one fear he allows stands in a condition: if near the exit he leaves all else behind, honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, and fears "not that you will some day cease ⟨from⟩ living, but rather that you will never have begun to live according to nature", he will be "a man worthy of the universe that begot you" (12.1.2). J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, has "not that" from the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, and ⟨from⟩ from the supplement of Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus, the eighteenth-century German scholar who edited the *Meditations* at Leipzig.

Places to read

The passages where death or the going out of life is discussed or carries the argument, in the order of the book; every place of the words treated here is given in the sub-entries. Θνητός, ἀθάνατος and ἀθανασία, "mortal", "immortal" and "immortality", are left out.

2.3 Marcus is to throw away the thirst for books, so as not to die grumbling but serene and grateful to the gods (see Nature).

2.11.1 Marcus is to do, say and think each thing as one who may leave life at this moment; to go away from among men is nothing terrible if there are gods (see Good, bad and indifference).

2.11.4 Death and life, fame and obscurity, pain and pleasure befall good men and bad alike, and so are neither good nor bad (see Good, bad and indifference).

2.12 If dying is looked at by itself and stripped by analysis of the impressions attached to it, it will be held nothing but a work of nature, and one to nature's advantage; to fear it is childish.

2.14.2 The longest-lived and the one who will die soonest lose what is equal, since each is deprived only of the present (see Time and eternity).

2.17.2 Philosophy awaits death with a serene frame of mind, as nothing but the dissolution of the elements of which each living being is compounded (see Daimon).

3.1 If a man begins to dote, the power of reckoning that judges even whether one must now take oneself

out of life is quenched first; so one must hurry, not only because death comes nearer each moment (see Mind and reason).

3.3 Hippocrates, the Chaldaean astrologers, Alexander, the Roman general Pompey, Gaius Caesar and Heraclitus died; lice, Marcus writes, killed Democritus the atomist (by a confusion with Pherecydes of Syros, as Leopold's testimonia, the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it, record), and lice of another kind, his accusers as the edition's note takes them, killed Socrates; if death leads into another life, nothing is empty of gods there, and if into absence of sensation, Marcus will cease to slave for the body.

3.7 The man who has chosen his own mind and daimon does not care how long he has the use of a soul enclosed in the body, and even if he must depart at once, he will go as one ready to be released.

3.8 Doom does not overtake the purified man's life unfinished, as one might say of a tragic actor who leaves before he has played out the play.

4.5 Death, like birth, is a mystery of nature, a combining out of the same elements into the same, and not a thing to be ashamed of.

4.6 What such men do comes of necessity; within a very short time both Marcus and the doer will be dead, and soon after not even a name of either will be left.

4.19 The man in a flutter about fame after death does not form the impression that those who remember him will soon die too, until the whole memory is quenched.

4.32.1 In the times of Vespasian men were marrying, falling ill, dying and praying for others to die, and that life of theirs is no longer anywhere.

4.32.2 That life of the emperor Trajan's times too is dead, and the records of other periods show how many soon fell and were resolved into the elements.

4.37 Marcus will soon be dead, and is not yet simple, untroubled or serene towards all (see Justice).

4.44 Disease and death are as usual and familiar as the rose in spring and fruit in summer.

4.47 If a god told Marcus that he would die tomorrow or the day after, he would not care which, unless he were utterly mean-spirited; no more should he care whether it is after very many years or tomorrow.

4.48.1 Marcus is to bear in mind how many doctors, astrologers, philosophers who argued about death or immortality, champions and tyrants have died, and how many cities have, so to speak, died whole.

4.48.2 Of those Marcus has known, one buried another and was then laid out himself; he is to pass through this instant of time according to nature and come to rest serene, as a ripe olive falls.

4.50 An unphilosophical help against death is to recall those who lingered greedily in life, and Marcus asks what difference there is, against the gulf of eternity, between a child of three days and one who has lived three lifetimes of Nestor, Homer's old king who outlived two generations (see Time and eternity).

5.29 If others do not allow Marcus to live here as he thinks to live once he has gone out, he is to go out of life too, as one who suffers nothing bad.

5.33 All but at once Marcus will be ashes or a skeleton; he waits serenely for quenching or removal, and until then it is enough to revere the gods and to do good to men, bear with them and abstain from them (see Justice).

6.2 Dying too is one of the actions of life, and it is enough here too to settle the present well.

6.24 Alexander of Macedon and his muleteer came, in death, to the same state, either taken back into the seminal reasons of the universe or scattered alike into atoms (see Providence and atoms).

6.28 Death is rest from the jolting of sense, the puppet-jerking of impulse, the roving of the understanding and the service owed to the flesh.

6.47 Men of every kind, orators, philosophers, heroes, generals and tyrants, have long been lying dead, and Marcus asks what is terrible in this for them.

7.32 On death: scattering, if atoms; otherwise, quenching or migration (see Providence and atoms).

7.35 In words of the *Republic* of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, the man whose understanding has the contemplation of all time and all substance will think death nothing terrible.

7.44 In Plato's *Apology* Socrates replies that a man of any use looks not at the risk of living or dying, but only at whether he does just things or unjust.

7.45 Socrates tells the Athenians that wherever a man is posted he must stay and run the risk, taking into account neither death nor anything else before what is shameful.

7.46 In Plato's *Gorgias* Socrates says that perhaps the man who is truly a man must not cling to life, but must look at how he may best live the time he is to live.

7.56 Marcus is to live what remains as one who has died, as something over and above, according to nature.

8.25 The famous dead, those who buried others and were buried in their turn, and sharp men too, are all of a day and long dead; Marcus' little compound must be scattered, or his little breath quenched, or removed and posted elsewhere.

8.31 The court of Augustus is the death of a whole court, and the tombstone "last of his own family" the death of a whole family.

8.47 If it is not worth living when what seems sound cannot be done, Marcus is to depart from living kindly, serene towards what stands in the way (see Assent and judgement).

8.58 Whoever fears death fears absence of sensation or a different sensation; in the first case nothing bad will be perceived, in the second one will be a living being of another kind and not cease from living.

9.3.1 Death is one of the things nature wants, like teething and giving birth, and Marcus is to await the hour when his little soul will fall out of its husk, as he waits for his wife's child.

9.3.2 An unphilosophical consolation towards death is that the release will not be from men who share one's principles; yet one must care for them and tolerate them mildly.

9.21 Each change of the times of life is a death and nothing terrible, and so neither is the ending of a whole life (see Change).

9.24 Children's angers and toys, and "little breaths carrying corpses", make the Nekyia, the calling up of the dead in the *Odyssey*, strike home.

9.33 All that is seen will very soon perish, and the man who has died in extreme old age will be brought to an equal state with the untimely.

10.8.3 If Marcus cannot keep the names he has given himself, he is to withdraw into some corner where he will have the mastery, or else go out of life, not in anger but simply, freely and with self-respect (see Self-respect and shame).

10.22 Either Marcus lives here, or goes off outside as he wished, or dies and has finished serving; beyond these there is nothing.

10.29 At each thing he does Marcus is to ask whether death is a terrible thing because of being deprived of this.

10.36 Some will welcome the death even of the serious and wise man; Marcus is not on that account to go away less kindly, but easily, as the little soul of one who dies well slips out of the body.

11.3 The soul is admirable that is ready, if it must at once be released from the body, to be quenched, scattered or kept together, if its readiness comes from a judgement of its own and not from bare opposition (see Soul).

11.34 Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, said that whoever kisses his child must say inwardly, "Tomorrow perhaps you will die", for nothing that signifies a work of nature is ill-omened.

12.1.2 If, whenever he comes near the exit, Marcus honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, and fears never having begun to live according to

nature, he will be a man worthy of the universe that begot him.

12.5 Marcus asks how the gods overlooked that men most intimate with the divine, once dead, should be quenched for ever, and answers that if it is so, it ought to be so (see Gods).

12.7 Marcus is to consider what one must be like, in body and in soul, when overtaken by death.

12.23 A life that ceases in due time suffers nothing bad; its ending is not bad if it is outside choice and not unsocial, and good if it is opportune for the whole, advantageous and carried along with it (see Change).

12.31 It conflicts with following reason and God to be annoyed at being deprived, through dying, of transpiring, perceiving and the rest.

12.34 Even those who judged pleasure good and pain bad despised death.

12.35 For one to whom only the timely is good, to whom more right actions or fewer are all one, and to whom a longer or a shorter time of observing the universe makes no difference, not even death is a thing to fear.

12.36 It is nature, not a tyrant or an unjust judge, that sends Marcus from the city, as a praetor releases a comic actor, and he is to go away serene (see Citizenship).

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers, reports the Stoic view that the wise man will lead himself out of life with good reason, for his country and for his friends, and if he falls into pain too harsh, or into mutilation or incurable disease.[247] The verb is ἐξάγειν, the one Marcus uses of "the very question whether one must now take oneself out of life" (3.1) and in "so long as nothing of the kind leads me out, I remain free" (5.29). Epictetus gave the teaching an image: "Someone has made smoke in the house? If it is moderate, I shall stay; if too much, I go out. For this is the thing to remember and keep hold of: the door is open."[248] The edition's note at 5.29 compares it with Marcus' "Smoke, and I leave". Yet to young men eager to

[247] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.130.

throw off the body and go away to their kin, their teacher, he says, should answer, "Men, wait for God": when God signals and discharges them from this service, they are to depart to him; for now they must put up with living in the place where he stationed them, and not leave without reason.[249] Marcus' man "who waits for the recall from life, ready to be released" (3.5) and his "natural release" (5.10.2) can be read as this side of the teaching. And the *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of the teaching, asks that death and exile and all that seems terrible be before one's eyes every day, death most of all, "and you will never think anything low, nor crave anything excessively".[250] The exercises of 2.11.1 and 4.37, and 7.69's "to pass each day as the last", can be read as the same practice.

Other ancient sources

Plato's *Apology*, the speech of Socrates at his trial, sets out two cases of its own. After his condemnation Socrates tells those of his judges who voted to acquit him that death is one of two things: either the dead man is, as it were, nothing and perceives nothing at all, or, as men say, it is a change, a change of dwelling for the soul from here to another place. If there is no perception, but death is like a sleep in which the sleeper sees not even a dream, it would be a marvellous profit; and if it is a journey from here to another place, and it is true, as men say, that all the dead are there, what good could be greater?[251] Marcus' "absence of sensation or a different sensation" (8.58) and his "If into another life … if into absence of sensation" (3.3) can be read beside Socrates' two cases, and his "migration" (7.32), μετάστασις (*metastasis*), the word rendered "removal" at 5.33, beside Socrates' change of dwelling, μετοίκησις (*metoikēsis*). Marcus copies Plato on death himself: the *Republic* on the philosopher who will not think death terrible (7.35), the *Apology* on the soldier's post (7.44–45) and the *Gorgias* on not clinging to life (7.46), as the edition's notes identify them. The other school had its own argument. Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, told Menoeceus in a letter that Diogenes Laertius preserves

[248] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.25.18, cited in the edition's note at 5.29 from Leopold's testimonia.

[249] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.9.11–17.

[250] Epictetus, *Handbook* 21.

[251] Plato, *Apology* 40c–e.

to grow used to holding that death is nothing to us, since all good and bad lies in sensation, and death is the privation of sensation;[252] the first case of 8.58, "if no sensation any longer, you will not perceive anything bad either", can be read as the same argument (see Providence and atoms). Marcus finds it "most rousing" that "even those who judged pleasure good and pain bad nevertheless despised" death (12.34), probably the Epicureans, as the edition's note says.

Translation in this edition

Θάνατος is "death" at all thirty-four of its occurrences, "deaths" where it is plural (3.3, 4.48.1, 7.48); at 9.3.2 the vocative is "death". Ἀποθνῄσκειν is "die" and "dying" throughout, except "in death" for the participle at 6.24 and "were dead" at 8.37. The perfect of θνῄσκειν is "be dead" (4.32.2, 8.2, 9.39), with "long dead" (3.10, 8.25), "the dead" (4.19), "dead" (6.47) and "have died" (4.48.1); the future perfect is "will be dead" (4.6, 4.37, 7.22) or "will die" (2.14.2, 3.10, 4.47); the perfect infinitive is "dying" (7.44, 12.31), and θανεῖν and θνῄσκειν are "die" (7.51, 10.18). The perfect of ἀποθνῄσκειν is "have died" (4.48.1) and "has died" (7.56). Εὐθανατοῦντος is "one who dies well" (10.36), and ἐναποθνῄσκειν "to die away in it" (7.24), in words that, as the edition's note says, do not strictly construe as transmitted. Νεκρός is "corpse" (4.41, 10.33.3), "corpses" (9.24, 12.33), "dead" (2.12, 4.21.1) and "the dead body" (6.13); the verb νεκροῦσθαι is "be put to death" (7.2), and νέκυια is "the Nekyia" (9.24). Of the words of leaving life, ἔξοδος is "the exit" (12.1.2); ἐξιέναι is "leave life" (2.11.1) and "go out of life" (5.29, 10.8.3); ἐξέρχεσθαι is "departed from life" (3.3), "gone out" (5.29) and "go out" (10.8.3, 10.36), and elsewhere "come out" (9.3.1) and "got out" (9.13); ἐξάγειν is "take oneself out of life" (3.1) and "leads me out" (5.29), and of pain "carries off" (7.33); ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι is "depart" (3.7) and "leaves" (3.8), and elsewhere "free of" (2.5), "frees one from" (4.51) and "be rid of" (5.5, 8.55), with ἀπαλλακτιᾶν "longs to be rid of" (10.36) and ἀπαλλαγή "the release" (9.3.2). Other verbs of going away are rendered with "depart", "leave" and "go away": ἄπειμι, "he will go" (3.7), "depart" (8.47) and "go away" (10.11, 10.36, 12.36); ἀπέρχεσθαι, "go away" (2.11.1), "depart" (9.2), "I leave" (5.29), "I am departing" (10.36) and "have already gone

[252] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 10.124 (Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus*).

away" (6.56). "Release" renders also ἀπολύειν (*apolyein*; 11.3, 12.36; see Dissolution) and λύσις (*lysis*; 5.10.2; see Dissolution), and "ready to be released" the adjective εὔλυτος (*eulytos*; 3.5, 3.16.2) and the adverb εὐλύτως (*eulytōs*; 3.7, 8.33; see Dissolution). Σβέννυσθαι and ἀποσβέννυσθαι are "be quenched" and "quench" at every place, and σβέσις "quenching" (5.33, 7.32); προαποσβέννυσθαι is "be quenched first" (3.1, 12.15). "Removal" at 5.33 and "migration" at 7.32 both render μετάστασις, and "removed" at 8.25 μεταστῆναι. Ἀναισθησία is "absence of sensation" (3.3, 8.58).

ἀναισθησία

Attested: ἀναισθησίᾳ (*anaisthēsiāi*; 3.3), ἀναισθησίαν (*anaisthēsian*; 8.58). Absence of sensation, one of the alternatives Marcus sets out for death. "If into absence of sensation, you will cease to put up with pains and pleasures" (3.3); "He who fears death fears either absence of sensation or a different sensation" (8.58). Lemma: ἀναισθησία.

ἀπαλλαγή

Attested: ἀπαλλαγή (*apallagē*; 9.3.2). Release, riddance. In the "unphilosophical precept" of 9.3.2 Marcus must remember "that the release will not be from men who share your principles". Lemma: ἀπαλλαγή.

ἀπαλλάσσω

Attested: ἀπηλλαγμένος (*apēllagmenos*; 2.5), ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι (*apallassesthai*; 3.7, 3.8), ἀπαλλάσσει (*apallassei*; 4.51), ἀπηλλάχθαι (*apēllachthai*; 5.5, 8.55). To set free; in the middle and passive, to be rid of, to get clear, and so to depart. Of life: "even if he must depart at once, he will go as one ready to be released" (3.7), and of the tragic actor "who leaves before he has finished and played out the play" (3.8). Elsewhere it is riddance: "free of all aimlessness" (2.5), "frees one from toils" (4.51), "you could have been rid of these long ago" (5.5), and of vice, harmful only to the one "to whom it has been granted also to be rid of it" (8.55). At 2.5 ἀπηλλαγμένος, which makes the man free of aimlessness, is the correction of H. I. Polak, whose notes on the text appeared in *Hermes* in 1886, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have ἀπηλλαγμένην (*apēllagmenēn*), which makes the act free of it. Lemma: ἀπαλλάσσω.

ἀποθνῄσκω

Attested: ἀποθνῄσκων (*apothnēiskōn*; 2.2, 6.2, 10.36), ἀποθάνῃς (*apothanēis*; 2.3), ἀποθανεῖν (*apothanein*; 2.12, 4.32.1, 8.37, 12.3.2), ἀπέθανεν (*apethanen*; 3.3), ἀπέθανε (*apethane*; 3.3, 7.66), ἀποθανεῖται (*apothaneitai*; 4.19), ἀποθνῄσκοντας (*apothnēiskontas*; 4.32.1), ἀποτεθνήκασι (*apotethnēkasi*; 4.48.1), ἀποθνῄσκομεν (*apothnēiskomen*; 6.2), ἀποθανόντες (*apothanontes*; 6.24), ἀποτεθνηκότα (*apotethnēkota*; 7.56), ἀποθανόν (*apothanon*; 8.18), ἀποθανόντων (*apothanontōn*; 8.37), ἀποθνῄσκει (*apothnēiskei*; 8.47), ἀποθανών (*apothanōn*; 9.33), ἀποθνῄσκεις (*apothnēiskeis*; 10.22), ἀποθνῄσκοντι (*apothnēiskonti*; 10.36), ἀποθανῇ (*apothanēi*; 11.34), ἀποθάνωσι (*apothanōsi*; 12.5). To die. “What is dying?” (2.12); “for this too, by which we die, is one of the actions of life” (6.2); “What has died does not fall out of the universe” (8.18). At 2.2 “as one already dying” stands in words that Leopold brackets as brought in from elsewhere. Lemma: ἀποθνῄσκω.

ἀποσβέννυμι

Attested: ἀποσβῇ (*aposbēi*; 4.19), ἀπέσβη (*apesbē*; 6.15), ἀπεσβέσθη (*apesbesthē*; 7.24), ἀπεσβηκέναι (*apesbēkenai*; 12.5). To put out; in the passive, to be quenched, to go out. Fame passes from man to man “until the whole memory too is quenched” (4.19); “of what is coming to be part is already quenched” (6.15); and Marcus asks why the gods should have let the best of men, once dead, “not come to be again, but be quenched for ever” (12.5). Lemma: ἀποσβέννυμι.

ἐναποθνῄσκω

Attested: ἐναποθνῄσκειν (*enapothnēiskein*; 7.24). To die in something, to die away in it. The wrathful look on the face is very much contrary to nature “when the comeliness is often to die away in it” (7.24), words that Leopold prints as transmitted, though they do not strictly construe. Lemma: ἐναποθνῄσκω.

ἐξάγω

Attested: ἐξακτέον (*exakteon*; 3.1), ἐξάγει (*exagei*; 5.29, 7.33). To lead out; with oneself as object, the Stoic phrase for leaving life by one’s own choice. The verbal adjective stands in “the very question whether one must now take oneself out of life” (3.1); “so long as nothing of the kind leads

me out, I remain free" (5.29). Of pain, "the unbearable carries off" (7.33). Lemma: ἐξάγω.

ἔξειμι

Attested: ἐξιέναι (*exienai*; 2.11.1), ἔξιθι (*exithi*; 5.29, 10.8.3). To go out; with "of life", to leave it. "Do and say and think each thing as one who may leave life at this moment" (2.11.1); "then go out of life too, yet as one who suffers nothing bad" (5.29); "or else go out of life altogether, not in anger, but simply and freely and with self-respect" (10.8.3). Lemma: ἔξειμι.

ἐξέρχομαι

Attested: ἐξῆλθον (*exēlthon*; 3.3, 9.13), ἐξελθών (*exelthōn*; 5.29), ἐξέλθῃ (*exelthēi*; 9.3.1), ἐξελθεῖν (*exelthein*; 10.8.3), ἐξελεύσῃ (*exeleusēi*; 10.36). To go out, come out. Of leaving life: Alexander, Pompey and Gaius Caesar "themselves at last departed from life" (3.3); "As you think to live when you have gone out" (5.29); "to go out so" (10.8.3); "you will go out more at ease" (10.36). Of birth, "the time when the infant will come out of your wife's womb" (9.3.1); and "Today I got out of every circumstance" (9.13). Lemma: ἐξέρχομαι.

ἔξοδος

Attested: ἐξόδῳ (*exodōi*; 12.1.2). A way out, a going out, and so the end of life. "If, then, whenever you come near the exit, you leave all else behind and honour only your ruling centre and the divine in you …" (12.1.2). Lemma: ἔξοδος.

εὐθανατέω

Attested: εὐθανατοῦντος (*euthanatountos*; 10.36). To die well, to have an easy death. Marcus is to leave men without being torn away, "as, with one who dies well, the little soul slips out of the body with ease" (10.36). Lemma: εὐθανατέω.

θάνατος

Attested: θάνατος (*thanatos*; 2.11.4, 4.5, 4.44, 4.46 twice, 6.28, 8.31, 9.21 twice, 10.29, 12.8, 12.35), θάνατον (*thanaton*; 2.17.2, 7.35, 7.45, 8.31 twice, 8.58, 9.1.3, 9.3.1, 9.3.2, 10.8.1), θανάτου (*thanatou*; 3.1, 4.48.1, 4.50, 7.32, 8.14, 9.3.1, 12.7, 12.34), θανάτους (*thanatous*; 3.3, 4.48.1, 7.48), θάνατε (*thanate*; 9.3.2). Death, of a man, a court, a family (8.31), and in Heraclitus' words of the elements: "the death of earth is to become water" (4.46). "Death is such as

birth is, a mystery of nature" (4.5); "Death: rest from the jolting of sense" (6.28); "Do not despise death, but be well pleased with it" (9.3.1). Lemma: θάνατος.

θνῄσκω

Attested: τεθνηξόμενος (*tethnēxomenos*; 2.14.2), τεθνηξομένων (*tethnēxomenōn*; 3.10), τεθνηκότα (*tethnēkota*; 3.10, 4.19, 8.25), τεθνήξεσθε (*tethnēxesthe*; 4.6, 7.22), τέθνηκε (*tethnēke*; 4.32.2), τεθνήξῃ (*tethnēxēi*; 4.37, 4.47), τεθνήκασιν (*tethnēkasin*; 4.48.1), τεθνεῶτας (*tethneōtas*; 6.47), τεθνάναι (*tethnanai*; 7.44), θανεῖν (*thanein*; 7.51), τέθνηκα (*tethnēka*; 8.2), τέθνηκας (*tethnēkas*; 9.39), θνῄσκειν (*thnēiskein*; 10.18), τεθνηκέναι (*tethnēkenai*; 12.31). To die; chiefly in the perfect, to be dead, and the future perfect, to be going to be dead. "You will soon be dead, and you are not yet simple" (4.37); "A little while and I am dead, and all things are out of the way" (8.2). The present θνῄσκειν is used once, of each thing "by nature such as, as it were, to die" (10.18), and θανεῖν stands in lines of Euripides, the Athenian tragic poet, at 7.51. Lemma: θνῄσκω.

νεκρός

Attested: νεκρά (*nekra*; 2.12, 12.33), νεκροῖς (*nekrois*; 4.21.1), νεκρόν (*nekron*; 4.41), νεκρός (*nekros*; 6.13 twice), νεκρούς (*nekrous*; 9.24), νεκροῦ (*nekrou*; 10.33.3). Dead; as a noun, a dead body, a corpse. Epictetus' "You are a little soul carrying a corpse" (4.41) returns as "little breaths carrying corpses" (9.24); the poor body is "the corpse" (10.33.3); fish and fowl on the table are "the dead body of a fish" and "the dead body of a bird or a pig" (6.13); and all outside the ruling centre is "corpses and smoke" (12.33). Lemma: νεκρός.

σβέννυμι

Attested: ἐσβέσθη (*esbesthē*; 4.1), σβεννυμένων (*sbennymenōn*; 4.19), σβεσθῶσιν (*sbesthōsin*; 7.2), σβεσθῆναι (*sbesthēnai*; 8.25, 11.3), σβέσαι (*sbesai*; 9.7), σβεσθῇ (*sbesthēi*; 12.15). To put out a fire or lamp; in the passive, to be quenched. Of death, "the little breath to be quenched" (8.25) and the soul "either quenched or scattered or remain together" (11.3); of the men through whom a memory passes, themselves "quenched" in turn (4.19). Elsewhere it is the lamp that a heap of fuel would quench

(4.1), impressions that are quenched (7.2), “quench desire” (9.7), and the lamp that shines “until it is quenched” (12.15). Lemma: σβέννυμι.

σβέσις

Attested: σβέσιν (*sbesin*; 5.33), σβέσις (*sbesis*; 7.32). A quenching, the going out of a flame, Marcus’ word for one end of the soul. “You wait serenely for quenching or removal” (5.33); “but if unity, either quenching or migration” (7.32), where “if unity” is the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have “or unity” and “or emptying”. Lemma: σβέσις.

See also

Assent and judgement; Change; Citizenship; Daimon; Dissolution; Gods; Good, bad and indifference; Justice; Mind and reason; Nature; Providence and atoms; Self-respect and shame; Soul; Time and eternity.

Dissolution

The loosing of a compound into what it was made of · Meditations

διάλυσις, dialysis, “dissolution”, “dissolutions”; *διαλύειν, dialyein*, “dissolve”, “be dissolved”, “dissolving”, “strip away”; *λύσις, lysis*, “dissolution”, “release”, “breaking up”; *ἀναλύειν, analyein*, “be resolved”, “resolving”; *λυτικός, lytikos*, “dissolves”; *ἀπολύειν, apolyein*, “be released”, “release”; *ἀπόλυτος, apolytos*, “loosed”, “released”; *εὔλυτος, eulytos*, “ready to be released”; *εὐλύτως, eulytōs*, “ready to be released”; *ἐκπύρωσις, ekpyrōsis*, “conflagration”; *ἐκπυροῦσθαι, ekpyrousthai*, “be consumed by fire”; *σύγκρισις, synkrisis*, “compound”, “combining”, “compounding”, “comparing”; *σύγκριμα, synkrima*, “compound”, “compounds”; *συγκριμάτιον, synkrimation*, “little compound”; *συγκρίνειν, synkrinein*, “compound”, “be combined”, “compare”

At a Glance

The word. Διάλυσις is the loosing of a thing into its parts; its opposite is σύγκρισις, the putting together of a compound; ἐκπύρωσις is the Stoic conflagration of the universe.

In the *Meditations*. Death is "nothing but the dissolution of the elements of which each living being is compounded" (2.17.2; see Daimon). Marcus tells himself to name, of each thing, "the things of which it was compounded and into which it will be resolved" (3.11.1). Dissolution "comes about into those things from which each is composed" (10.7.2).

In this edition. Διάλυσις is always "dissolution" and διαλύειν "dissolve" or "be dissolved", except at 2.12, "strip away"; λύσις is "dissolution", "release" and "breaking up"; ἀναλύειν is "be resolved", ἐκπύρωσις "conflagration", and σύγκρισις and σύγκριμα "compound" and "compounding"; ἀπολύειν is "release" and εὔλυτος "ready to be released".

A place to read. 10.7.2, where dissolution, by scattering or by turning, comes about into the things of which each is composed, whatever becomes of the whole.

Meaning

Διάλυσις (*dialysis*) is a loosing apart, from διά (*dia*), "apart", and λύειν (*lyein*), "to loose"; λύσις (*lysis*) is the loosing itself, and also release; ἀναλύειν (*analyein*) is to resolve a thing back into what it came from, and in logic to resolve a syllogism (1.17.9; see Philosophy). The opposite is σύγκρισις (*synkrisis*), from συγκρίνειν (*synkrinein*), "to put together", the compounding of a thing, and σύγκριμα (*synkrima*), the compound; at 2.10 the verb is "compare". Ἐκπύρωσις (*ekpyrōsis*), a burning out, is the Stoic conflagration, in which, as the edition's note at 10.7.2 says, the universe is periodically resolved into fire and made again. Ἀπολύειν (*apolyein*) is to release, and εὔλυτος (*eulytos*), with its adverb εὐλύτως (*eulytōs*), is easily loosed, "ready to be released". Marcus sets the pair side by side: the complete is determined "by him who was then the cause of the compounding and now of the dissolution" (12.36; see Citizenship).

Use in the book

Dissolution is what death is. Philosophy lies, above all, in "awaiting death with a serene frame of mind, as nothing but the dissolution of the elements of which each living being is compounded. But if there is nothing terrible for the elements themselves in each perpetually changing into another, why should anyone look askance at the change and dissolution of all? For it is according to nature; and nothing according to nature is bad" (2.17.2; see Daimon). It is one of nature's

works, like teething and giving birth: “such too is being dissolved” (9.3.1; see Death). Marcus asks what bad it is for the bubble “to be dissolved” (8.20; see Nature), and it is nothing terrible for the little box (7.23; see Substance). Death, like birth, is “a combining out of the same elements into the same” (4.5; see Death).

Dissolution is also an exercise of thought. One aid is to define each object of impression and “to tell oneself its own name and the names of the things of which it was compounded and into which it will be resolved” (3.11.1; see Impression); Marcus is also to have ready to hand “from what things the compounding, and into what the breaking up” (12.24); to conceive each underlying thing “as already dissolving and in change” (10.18); and to ask “Whence each thing has come, and from what underlying things each, and into what it changes … and how it will suffer nothing bad” (11.17). At 2.12 the verb of dissolution serves the analysis that “strips away the impressions attached to” dying (see Death); to dissolve a thing in thought can be read as a rehearsal for its dissolution in fact.

Chapter 10.7 makes the case. The parts of the whole must perish, “but let this be said as signifying ‘to be altered’” (10.7.1; see Change). Marcus finds it “ridiculous at once to say that the parts of the whole are by nature such as to change, and at once to be astonished or to resent it as at one of the things contrary to nature happening, especially since the dissolution comes about into those things from which each is composed. For either a scattering of the elements from which it was compounded, or a turning of the solid into the earthy and of the breath-like into the airy, so that these too are taken up into the reason of the whole, whether it is periodically consumed by fire or renewed by everlasting exchanges” (10.7.2). What changes is “this which it took in, not what the mother bore” (10.7.3). Two pairs stand open, scattering against turning, conflagration against everlasting exchanges, and Marcus decides neither question: dissolution into what each thing is made of holds under all four. At 7.50 likewise, after lines of Euripides, the Athenian tragic poet, “And what grew from earth, into earth; and what sprang from ethereal seed / went back again to the vault of heaven”, he adds, “Or this: a dissolution of the intertwinings among the atoms, and some such dispersal of the elements that cannot be affected”, probably the Epicurean account, as the edition’s note says. The

conflagration is named once more, as what Heraclitus of Ephesus studied so much before he died (3.3; see Death).

Nature does the dissolving and the releasing: “For indeed nature joined and compounded with these, but now she dissolves. I am dissolved as from those akin, yet not pulled the other way, but without constraint; for this too is one of the things according to nature” (10.36; see Death). The elements in a man stay where they are posted “until the signal for dissolution sounds from there again” (11.20.1; see Elements). The man who waits for the recall from life is “ready to be released” (3.5; see Daimon), and nature sends Marcus from the city “as if the praetor who had engaged a comic actor should release him from the stage” (12.36; see Citizenship). “What has died does not fall out of the universe” (8.18; see Change), and whatever the physics, dissolution ends the compound, not the things it was made of (10.7.2). The family has another use, which can be read as the counterweight: among the turnings of the ruling centre to be wiped away is the thought of which Marcus says, “this one dissolves fellowship” (11.19; see Kinship and cooperation). The dissolution of a compound is nature’s work and nothing bad; a dissolution of fellowship is the ruling centre’s own, and is to be wiped away.

Places to read

Every chapter in which a word of dissolution or release (διάλυσις, διαλύειν, λύσις, ἀναλύειν, λυτικός, ἀπολύειν, ἀπόλυτος, εὔλυτος, εὐλύτως), of the conflagration (ἐκπύρωσις, ἐκπυροῦσθαι) or of compounding (σύγκρισις, σύγκριμα, συγκριμάτιον, συγκρίνειν) occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with 6.4, 10.7.1, 10.7.3 and 11.17, where dissolution is described in other words; 2.10, where σύγκρισις and συγκρίνειν are “comparing” and “compare”, is left out.

1.17.9 Among Marcus’ debts to the gods: when he craved philosophy, he did not sit down to writing treatises or resolving syllogisms (see Philosophy).

2.3 The universe is preserved by the changes of the elements and equally by those of the compounds (see Nature).

2.12 If dying is looked at by itself and the impressions attached to it are stripped away by analysis, it will be held nothing but a work of nature (see Death).

2.17.1 Of human life, the compound of the whole body is quick to rot (see Soul).

2.17.2 Philosophy awaits death as nothing but the dissolution of the elements of which each living being is compounded, and the change and dissolution of all is according to nature (see Daimon).

3.3 Heraclitus studied nature so much on the conflagration of the universe, and was filled with water within and died (see Death).

3.5 The god within is to guard a man who has taken up his post as one who waits for the recall from life, ready to be released (see Daimon).

3.7 The man who has chosen his own mind and daimon, even if he must depart at once, will go as one ready to be released.

3.11.1 Marcus is to tell himself the names of the things of which each object of impression was compounded and into which it will be resolved (see Impression).

3.11.2 He is to ask of each thing what it is, of what things it is compounded and how long it is its nature to last (see Impression).

3.16.2 The good man must come to the end of life pure, at peace, ready to be released (see Daimon).

4.5 Death, like birth, is a mystery of nature, a combining out of the same elements into the same (see Death).

4.21.1 If souls live on, those in the air change and are diffused, as the change and dissolution of buried bodies makes space for other dead (see Soul).

4.32.2 The records of periods and nations show how many strained every nerve and soon fell and were resolved into the elements (see Death).

5.10.2 Marcus must console himself and wait for the natural release (see Daimon).

5.26 The ruling centre is not to be turned by the motion in the flesh nor combined with it (see Ruling centre).

6.4 All underlying things will very soon change, and either be turned to vapour, if substance is unified, or be scattered (see Providence and atoms).

6.10 If all is a jumble, Marcus asks why he should crave to linger in such a random compound and confusion (see Providence and atoms).

7.23 It is nothing terrible for the little box to be dissolved (see Substance).

7.48 One who speaks about men must survey from above marriages, dissolutions, births and deaths, and the order made out of opposites.

7.50 After Euripides' lines on what returns to earth and to heaven, Marcus gives another account: a dissolution of the intertwinings among the atoms.

7.67 Nature did not so blend with the compound as not to permit one to mark one's own bounds.

8.18 What has died does not fall out of the universe; what stays here changes here and is dissolved into its own, the elements, which change too and do not grumble (see Change).

8.20 Nature aims at the cessation of each thing no less than at its beginning; Marcus asks what good it is to the bubble to hold together, or bad to be dissolved, and the like with a lamp (see Nature).

8.25 Marcus' little compound must be scattered, or his little breath quenched, or removed and posted elsewhere (see Death).

8.33 Marcus is to take without vanity and let go as one ready to be released.

9.3.1 Being dissolved is one of the natural workings that the seasons of life bring, like teething and giving birth (see Death).

9.32 Marcus makes room for himself by conceiving how short is the time from birth to dissolution, and how infinite what is before and after (see Time and eternity).

10.1 The perfect living being generates and contains all things as they are dissolved into the birth of others like them (see Cosmos and order).

10.7.1 The parts of the whole must perish, which is to say be altered (see Change).

10.7.2 Dissolution comes about into the things of which each is composed: either a scattering of the elements from which it was compounded, or a turning of the solid into the earthy and of the

breath-like into the airy, whether the whole is periodically consumed by fire or renewed by everlasting exchanges.

10.7.3 What changes is what was taken in yesterday and the day before from food and air, not what the mother bore.

10.9 Recognition of each thing includes what it is in its substance and of what it is compounded.

10.18 Each underlying thing is to be conceived as already dissolving and in change, as if in putrefaction or scattering.

10.24 Marcus asks of his ruling centre whether it is loosed and torn away from fellowship (see Ruling centre).

10.36 Nature joined and compounded with these men, but now dissolves, and Marcus is dissolved as from those akin, without constraint (see Death).

11.3 Admirable is the soul that is ready, if it must at once be released from the body, to be quenched or scattered or remain together (see Soul).

11.17 Marcus is to consider whence each thing has come, into what it changes, and how it will suffer nothing bad.

11.19 One of the four turnings of the ruling centre to be wiped away is the thought that dissolves fellowship (see Kinship and cooperation).

11.20.1 The fiery and the earthy in Marcus are held in the compound against their natural motion until the signal for dissolution (see Elements).

12.3.1 If Marcus separates from his understanding all that others do and all that is not his, his intelligent faculty may live released by itself (see Mind and reason).

12.24 Marcus is to have ready to hand what each thing is like until it gives back its soul, from what things its compounding and into what its breaking up.

12.36 Nature releases Marcus from the city as a praetor releases a comic actor; what is complete is determined by him who was the cause of the compounding and now of the dissolution, and Marcus is the cause of neither (see Citizenship).

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, made dissolution part of the order of things. We have heard from the philosophers, he says, that this universe is one city and the substance from which it is made one, and that there must be a cycle and a giving way of some things to others, some being dissolved and others coming on, some staying where they are and others moving.[253] To one who says that it is now time to die he answers by asking what is meant by dying, and bids him not make a tragedy of it but say how it stands: it is time now for the material to be restored to the things from which it came together; and what is terrible in that, and which of the things in the universe is going to perish?[254] The man called out of life goes, he says elsewhere, to the elements (see Elements).[255] Marcus' dissolution that "comes about into those things from which each is composed" (10.7.2) can be read beside these. The conflagration, which Epictetus turns into a lesson in solitude (see Contentment and self-sufficiency),[256] was not held by the whole school. Balbus, the Stoic speaker in *On the Nature of the Gods*, the dialogue of Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, says that the Stoics think the whole world will at last take fire, when the moisture is used up (Panaetius of Rhodes, the Stoic of the second century BC, was said to doubt it); nothing will be left but fire, and from it, a living being and a god, the world will be renewed and the same adornment arise.[257] Marcus' "whether it is periodically consumed by fire or renewed by everlasting exchanges" (10.7.2) leaves the doctrine open.

Other ancient sources

Heraclitus, to whom, as the edition's note at 3.3 says, the Stoics traced their doctrine of the world-fire, held, as Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers, reports, that all things are constituted out of fire and resolved (ἀναλύεσθαι, Marcus' verb) into it; that the universe is one, and is born from fire and consumed by fire again in certain periods, alternately, through all time, and

[253] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.24.9–10.
[254] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.7.15.
[255] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.13.14–15.
[256] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.13.4–7.
[257] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.118.

that this comes about by fate; and he called change "the road up and down".[258] Marcus' "conflagration of the universe" (3.3) and "The cycles of the universe … up and down" (9.28) can be read in Heraclitus' terms. In the *Phaedo* of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, Socrates on his last day draws another conclusion from composition. Is it not fitting, he asks, for what has been put together and is composite by nature to be divided as it was put together, and for what is incomposite alone, if anything, not to be? And is it not fitting for a body to be quickly dissolved, but for a soul to be wholly indissoluble, or nearly so? Cebes, his Theban friend, agrees.[259] Marcus does not exempt the soul: the ready soul, if it must be released from the body, may "be either quenched or scattered or remain together" (11.3; see Soul).

Translation in this edition

Διάλυσις is "dissolution" at all nine of its occurrences, and in the plural "dissolutions" (7.48). Διαλύειν is "be dissolved" in the passive (7.23, 8.18, 8.20, 10.1, 10.36), "being dissolved" (9.3.1) and "dissolving" (10.18), and in the active "dissolves" (10.36); at 2.12, of analysing a conception, it is "strips away", and "strip away" renders other verbs at 9.32 and 12.2. Λύσις is "dissolution" (2.17.2), "release" (5.10.2; see Daimon) and "the breaking up" (12.24), where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, reports that Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802, proposed διάλυσις in his second edition. Ἀπολύειν is "be released" (11.3) and "release" and "releases" (12.36); ἀπόλυτος (*apolytos*) is "loosed" (10.24) and "released" (12.3.1); εὔλυτος and its adverb εὐλύτως are "ready to be released" at all four places (3.5, 3.16.2; 3.7, 8.33). Ἀναλύειν is "be resolved" (3.11.1, 4.32.2), and of syllogisms "resolving" (1.17.9). Λυτικός is "dissolves" in "this one dissolves fellowship" (11.19). Ἐκπύρωσις is "conflagration" (3.3) and ἐκπυροῦσθαι "consumed by fire" (10.7.2). Σύγκρισις is "compound" (2.17.1), "combining" (4.5), "compounding" (12.24, 12.36) and "comparing" (2.10); σύγκριμα is "compound" (6.10, 7.67, 11.20.1) and "compounds" (2.3), and συγκριμάτιον "little compound" (8.25); συγκρίνειν is "is compounded" (2.17.2, 3.11.2, 10.9), "was compounded" (3.11.1, 10.7.2), "compounded" in the active (10.36), "be combined" (5.26) and "compare" (2.10).

[258] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.7–8.

[259] Plato, *Phaedo* 78b–c, 80b–c.

Καταλῦσαι (*katalysai*) at 4.48.2 is “come to rest”. The words of scattering, σκεδασμός (*skedasmos*) and its family, have their sub-entries in Providence and atoms, σβέσις (*sbesis*), “quenching”, in Death, and μεταβολή (*metabolē*), “change”, in Change.

ἀναλύω

Attested: ἀναλύειν (*analyein*; 1.17.9), ἀναλυθήσεται (*analythēsetai*; 3.11.1), ἀνελύθησαν (*anelythēsan*; 4.32.2). To loose back, to resolve into what a thing came from; in logic, to resolve a syllogism. Of each object of impression, “the names of the things of which it was compounded and into which it will be resolved” (3.11.1); “how many strained every nerve and soon fell and were resolved into the elements” (4.32.2). Among his debts, Marcus did not, when he craved philosophy, sit down to “resolving syllogisms” (1.17.9; see Philosophy). Lemma: ἀναλύω.

ἀπολύω

Attested: ἀπολυθῆναι (*apolythēnai*; 11.3), ἀπολύοι (*apolyoi*; 12.36), ἀπολύων (*apolyōn*; 12.36); the verbal adjective ἀπόλυτον (*apolyton*; 10.24, 12.3.1). To loose from, to release; of an actor, to discharge from the stage. The soul that is ready “if it must at once be released from the body” (11.3; see Soul); nature sends Marcus from the city “as if the praetor who had engaged a comic actor should release him from the stage”, and “he who releases you is serene too” (12.36; see Citizenship). The adjective ἀπόλυτος (*apolytos*) is loosed, free of ties: Marcus asks of his ruling centre, “Is it loosed and torn away from fellowship?” (10.24; see Ruling centre); if he separates from his understanding all that others do or say and all that is not his, the intelligent faculty “may live released by itself” (12.3.1; see Mind and reason). Lemma: ἀπολύω.

διάλυσις

Attested: διάλυσιν (*dialysin*; 2.17.2, 9.32), διάλυσις (*dialysis*; 4.21.1, 7.50), διαλύσεις (*dialyseis*; 7.48), διαλύσεως (*dialyseōs*; 9.32, 10.7.2, 11.20.1, 12.36). A loosing apart, dissolution, the breaking up of a compound into what it was made of. “Why should anyone look askance at the change and dissolution of all?” (2.17.2); “how short from birth to dissolution” (9.32); “especially since the dissolution comes about into those things from which each is

composed" (10.7.2); "until the signal for dissolution sounds from there again" (11.20.1). At 7.48 the plural stands among the earthly things to be surveyed from above. Lemma: διάλυσις.

διαλύω

Attested: διαλύσῃ (*dialysēi*; 2.12), διαλυθῆναι (*dialythēnai*; 7.23, 9.3.1), διαλύεται (*dialyetai*; 8.18), διαλυθείσῃ (*dialytheisēi*; 8.20), διαλυόμενα (*dialyomena*; 10.1), διαλυόμενον (*dialyomenon*; 10.18), διαλύει (*dialyei*; 10.36), διαλύομαι (*dialyomai*; 10.36). To loose apart, to dissolve; in the passive, to be dissolved. "Such too is being dissolved" (9.3.1); "is dissolved into its own, which are elements of the universe and yours" (8.18); "For indeed nature joined and compounded with these, but now she dissolves. I am dissolved as from those akin" (10.36). Of analysing a conception, "strips away the impressions attached to it" (2.12). Lemma: διαλύω.

ἐκπυρόω

Attested: ἐκπυρουμένου (*ekpyroumenou*; 10.7.2). To burn out; in the passive, of the universe, to be consumed by fire in the conflagration. The elements are taken up into the reason of the whole, "whether it is periodically consumed by fire or renewed by everlasting exchanges" (10.7.2). Lemma: ἐκπυρόω.

ἐκπύρωσις

Attested: ἐκπυρώσεως (*ekpyrōseōs*; 3.3). The conflagration, the Stoic consumption of the universe by fire. "Heraclitus, after studying nature so much on the conflagration of the universe, was filled with water within and died plastered with cow-dung" (3.3). Lemma: ἐκπύρωσις.

εὔλυτος

Attested: εὔλυτος (*eulytos*; 3.5), εὐλύτως (*eulytōs*, the adverb; 3.7, 8.33), εὔλυτον (*eulyton*; 3.16.2). Easily loosed; of a man, ready to be released from life. The god within is to guard one "who waits for the recall from life, ready to be released" (3.5; see Daimon); "he will go as one ready to be released" (3.7); the good man must come to the end of life "pure, at peace, ready to be released" (3.16.2); "Take without vanity; let go as one ready to be released" (8.33). At 3.5 Leopold reports the proposal of the adverb by Thomas

Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, and at 3.7 that of the adjective by August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar. Lemma: εὔλυτος.

λύσις

Attested: λύσιν (*lysin*; 2.17.2, 5.10.2), λύσις (*lysis*; 12.24). A loosing: dissolution, and release. Death is "nothing but the dissolution of the elements" (2.17.2); one must "wait for the natural release" (5.10.2; see Daimon); and of each thing, "into what the breaking up" (12.24). At 8.57, where Leopold prints χύσιν (*chysin*), "pouring", from one manuscript of the excerpts, he reports λύσιν in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, A, the Vatican manuscript, and X, the books of excerpts. Lemma: λύσις.

λυτικός

Attested: λυτικόν (*lytikon*; 11.19). Able to loose, dissolving. Over one of the turnings of the ruling centre Marcus is to say, "this one dissolves fellowship" (11.19; see Kinship and cooperation). Lemma: λυτικός.

σύγκριμα

Attested: συγκριμάτων (*synkrimatōn*; 2.3), συγκρίματι (*synkrimati*; 6.10, 7.67), συγκρίματος (*synkrimatos*; 11.20.1). A compound, a thing put together. "The universe is preserved by the changes of the elements and equally by the changes of the compounds" (2.3); "such a random compound and confusion" (6.10); "Nature did not so blend with the compound" (7.67); the fiery in a man is "held back here in the compound" (11.20.1). Lemma: σύγκριμα.

συγκριμάτιον

Attested: συγκριμάτιον (*synkrimation*; 8.25). A little compound, Marcus' diminutive for his own body. It will be necessary "either for your little compound to be scattered, or for the little breath to be quenched, or to be removed and posted elsewhere" (8.25; see Death). Lemma: συγκριμάτιον.

συγκρίνω

Attested: συγκρίνειε (*synkrineie*; 2.10), συγκρίνεται (*synkrinetai*; 2.17.2), συνεκρίθη (*synekrithē*; 3.11.1, 10.7.2), συγκέκριται (*synkekritai*; 3.11.2, 10.9), συγκρινέσθω (*synkrinesthō*; 5.26), συνέκρινεν (*synekrinen*; 10.36). To put together, to compound; to combine; to compare. "The elements of which each living being is compounded"

(2.17.2); “a scattering of the elements from which it was compounded” (10.7.2); “nature joined and compounded with these” (10.36); of the ruling centre and the motion in the flesh, “let it not be combined with it” (5.26; see Ruling centre); and of Theophrastus, Aristotle’s successor, “comparing wrongdoings as one might compare such things in the ordinary way” (2.10). Lemma: συγκρίνω.

σύγκρισις

Attested: συγκρίσει (*synkrisei*; 2.10), σύγκρισις (*synkrisis*; 2.17.1, 4.5, 12.24), συγκρίσεως (*synkriseōs*; 12.36). A putting together: compounding, the compound; also comparison. “The compound of the whole body quick to rot” (2.17.1); death is “a combining out of the same elements into the same” (4.5), where, as the edition’s note says, one phrase in Leopold’s text holds birth and death, and “and a dissolution” is a supplement of Gataker, which Leopold does not print; “from what things the compounding, and into what the breaking up” (12.24); “the cause of the compounding and now of the dissolution” (12.36). At 2.10 it is Theophrastus’ “comparing” of wrongdoings. Lemma: σύγκρισις.

See also

Change; Citizenship; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Cosmos and order; Daimon; Death; Elements; Impression; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Nature; Philosophy; Providence and atoms; Ruling centre; Soul; Substance; Time and eternity.

Elements

The elements and their courses · Meditations

στοιχεῖον, stoicheion, “element”, “letter”; *πῦρ, pyr*, “fire”; *πυρώδης, pyrōdēs*, “fiery”; *ἀήρ, aēr*, “air”; *ἀερώδης, aerōdēs*, “airy”; *ὕδωρ, hydōr*, “water”; *ὑγρός, hygros*, “moist”; *γῆ, gē*, “earth”; *γαῖα, gaia*, “earth”; *γεώδης, geōdēs*, “earthy”; *βωλάριον, bōlarion*, “a little clod”, “grains”; *στερέμνιος, steremnios*, “solid”; *ὑποστάθμη, hypostathmē*, “sediments”

At a Glance

The word. Στοιχεῖον is one of the simplest parts of which a whole is made: a letter of a written word, and in physics an element, one of the four simple bodies, fire, air, water and

earth, of which all things are compounded and into which they are dissolved.

In the *Meditations*. Philosophy lies above all in awaiting death "as nothing but the dissolution of the elements of which each living being is compounded" (2.17.2), and the elements "change, and do not grumble" (8.18). Their courses are "Up, down, round" (6.17); in a man, posted there by force, they "submit to the whole" and keep a place not natural to them until the signal for dissolution (11.20.1), and Marcus asks whether it is not terrible that his intelligent part alone "should be disobedient and indignant at its own place" (11.20.2).

In this edition. Στοιχεῖον is "element", and "letter" where it is one (6.26, 7.13); πῦρ is "fire", ἀήρ "air", ὕδωρ "water" and γῆ "earth"; πυρώδης is "fiery", ἀερώδης "airy", ὑγρός "moist", γεώδης "earthy" and στερέμνιος "solid".

A place to read. 11.20.1–2, where the elements in Marcus obey the ordering of the whole against their natural motion, and his intelligent part alone does not.

Meaning

Στοιχεῖον (*stoicheion*) is one member of a series of simple parts. In ordinary Greek it is a letter, and Marcus uses it so twice: of the letters of the name Antoninus, counted off one by one (6.26; see Duty and fitting action), and of "the letter r" by which μέρος (*meros*), "part", differs from μέλος (*melos*), "limb" (7.13; see Kinship and cooperation). In physics it is an element. The Stoics defined it as that from which, first, the things that come to be come to be, and into which, last, they are resolved, and counted four: fire, water, air and earth.[260] Marcus names the four, and their portions in a body with adjectives: "the earthy", "the moist", "the airy", "the fiery", and, beside "the breath-like", "the solid". The word is not the Stoics' alone. In the saying of Democritus of Abdera, the atomist of the fifth century BC, that Marcus quotes at 7.31, the elements are the atomists', and probably, as the edition's note suggests, in "the elements that cannot be affected" of 7.50 (see Dissolution).

Use in the book

The elements are what all things are made of and what they come back to. The universe, Marcus says, "is

[260] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.136, citing Zeno, *On the Whole*, Chrysippus, *Physics* book 1, and Archedemus, *On Elements*.

preserved by the changes of the elements and equally by the changes of the compounds" (2.3; see Nature). Death returns a living being to its elements (2.17.2; see Dissolution), as 4.5 and 4.32.2 (see Death) and 8.18 (see Change) say in other words. The body is "earth and gore" (3.3; see Daimon), and the rottenness of the material underlying each thing is "water, dust, little bones, stink" (9.36; see Body and flesh).

Each portion in a man is borrowed from its own store. The earthy has been portioned off from some earth, "and the moist from another element, and the breath from some spring, and the hot and fiery from some spring of its own"; so intelligence too "comes from somewhere" (4.4; see Citizenship). The bodies eaten each day pass "into the airy or the fiery" (4.21.2; see Soul), and the solid and the breath-like in a man came in yesterday and the day before from food and air (10.7.3; see Dissolution). At the end there are two accounts, a scattering of the elements or "a turning of the solid into the earthy and of the breath-like into the airy" (10.7.2; see Dissolution).

The elements change into one another without end. Marcus tells himself always to remember Heraclitus of Ephesus, the philosopher of about 500 BC: "the death of earth is to become water, the death of water to become air, the death of air fire, and back again" (4.46; see Change). The earth that "will cover us all" will "change" in its turn, and what it becomes will change "to infinity" (9.28; see Change). He makes the sight an exercise: "Survey the runs of the stars as if running round with them, and think continually of the changes of the elements into one another; for the impressions of these clean away the filth of life on the ground" (7.47).

Each element has its course. "Up, down, round: courses of the elements"; the motion of virtue is in none of these, but is "something more divine" (6.17; see Virtue and excellence). The earthy inclines to earth, the moist flows together, the airy likewise, and fire is carried upward "because of the elemental fire" yet is quickly kindled with any fire here (9.9.1; see Kinship and cooperation). Water and fire are not free everywhere to move in their own way (10.33.2; see Obstacle and reservation), but reason is carried through all things "as fire upward, as a stone downward, as a cylinder down a slope" (10.33.3).

In a man the courses are crossed. “Your little breath and all that is fiery, as much as is blended in, though by nature carried upward, nevertheless, obeying the ordering of the whole, are held back here in the compound. And all the earthy in you too, and the moist, though carried downward, are nevertheless raised up and stand in a position not natural to them. So, then, the elements too submit to the whole, whenever they have been posted somewhere by force, remaining until the signal for dissolution sounds from there again” (11.20.1). Then Marcus turns from the elements to the mind: “Is it not terrible, then, that your intelligent part alone should be disobedient and indignant at its own place? And yet nothing forced at all is laid upon it, but only what is according to nature for it” (11.20.2).

Marcus takes the physics as he finds it. Of Democritus’ saying, “All things by convention, but in reality only the elements” (7.31; see Self-respect and shame), he keeps only the first half; in the saying, J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts the corrections of Hermann Usener, the German classical scholar of the nineteenth century, and Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century. What Marcus asks of the elements is not a theory but an example. They change “and do not grumble” (8.18), and keep a post not their own until the signal sounds. This can be read as the measure he sets for the intelligent part: what the elements do under force, it is to do by consent, since nothing is asked of it but its own nature.

Places to read

Every chapter in which στοιχεῖον occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the places where fire, air, water and earth, or the fiery, airy, moist, earthy and solid, are named as the stuff of bodies and of the world. Fire as an image (4.1, 8.41, 10.31), earth as the inhabited world or the ground (3.10, 4.3.3, 4.36, 8.21, 12.32), the “little clod” of Athos and of the earth and the “grains” of incense (βωλάριον, *bōlarion*; 4.15, 6.36, 12.32), water in the sea, the bath and a sick man’s fear (4.49.1, 6.57, 8.24), the air and the solid that the sun’s ray meets, and the air of climate (8.57, 10.1), the air that is breathed (6.15, 8.54; see Breath) and the line of Euripides, the Athenian tragic poet, “Earth is in love with rain” (10.21) are left out; every place is given in the sub-entries. The adjective στοιχειώδης

(*stoicheiōdēs*), “elementary” (4.3.1) and “elemental” (9.9.1), is left out (see Principles and reminders).

2.3 The universe is preserved by the changes of the elements and equally by the changes of the compounds (see Nature).

2.17.2 Philosophy lies above all in awaiting death with a serene frame of mind as nothing but the dissolution of the elements of which each living being is compounded; and Marcus asks why, if there is nothing terrible for the elements in each perpetually changing into another, anyone should look askance at the change and dissolution of all (see Daimon; Dissolution).

3.3 Heraclitus, after studying the conflagration of the universe, was filled with water within and died; if death is absence of sensation, Marcus will cease to slave for the body, which is earth and gore (see Daimon).

4.4 As the earthy in Marcus has come from some earth, the moist from another element, the breath and the fiery each from a source of its own, so intelligence too comes from somewhere (see Citizenship).

4.5 Death, like birth, is a mystery of nature: a combining out of the same elements into the same (see Death).

4.21.1 Marcus asks how the air holds the souls, if souls live on, and the earth the bodies of the buried, and answers, on the supposition that souls live on, that both change and make room (see Soul).

4.21.2 The bodies eaten every day find room through the turning into blood and the alterations into the airy or the fiery (see Soul).

4.32.2 In the records of past periods and nations many strained every nerve and soon fell and were resolved into the elements (see Death).

4.46 Marcus is always to remember Heraclitus: the death of earth is to become water, of water to become air, of air to become fire, and back again (see Change).

6.17 Up, down and round are the courses of the elements; the motion of virtue is in none of them,

but is something more divine (see Virtue and excellence).

6.26 Marcus asks whether, if someone wants to know how the name Antoninus is written, he will strain to bring out each of the letters, or answer anger with anger, and not rather count them off mildly; so every duty is completed out of certain numbers (see Duty and fitting action).

7.13 If, through the letter r, Marcus calls himself a part and not a limb of the system of rational beings, he does not yet love men from the heart (see Kinship and cooperation).

7.31 Democritus says that all things are by convention and in reality only the elements; it is enough for Marcus to remember that all things are by convention (see Self-respect and shame).

7.47 Surveying the runs of the stars and thinking of the changes of the elements into one another cleans away the filth of life on the ground.

7.50 What grew from earth goes back to earth, in Euripides' lines; or else there is a dissolution of the intertwinings among the atoms and a dispersal of the elements that cannot be affected (see Dissolution).

8.18 What has died does not fall out of the universe; it changes and is dissolved into its own, the elements of the universe and of Marcus, and they change without grumbling (see Change).

9.8 As one soul is divided among irrational beings and one intelligent soul among rational, so there is one earth of all earthy things, and all that are animate breathe one air (see Soul).

9.9.1 The earthy inclines to earth, the moist flows together, the airy likewise, and fire, carried upward because of the elemental fire, kindles readily with fire; so what shares the common intelligent nature hastens to its kind, or more (see Kinship and cooperation).

9.9.3 Sooner would one find something earthy touching nothing earthy than a man split off from man (see Kinship and cooperation).

9.28 Soon earth will cover all men; then the earth too will change, and what it becomes will change to infinity (see Change).

9.36 The material underlying each thing is rottenness: water, dust, little bones; marble is a callus of earth (see Body and flesh).

10.7.2 Dissolution is either a scattering of the elements from which a thing was compounded, or a turning of the solid into the earthy and of the breath-like into the airy, whether the whole is periodically consumed by fire or renewed by everlasting exchanges (see Dissolution).

10.7.3 The solid and the breath-like in a man are not what came from his first birth, but what took the inflow yesterday and the day before from food and the air drawn in (see Dissolution).

10.33.2 It is not given to water or to fire to be carried everywhere in its own motion, for many things bar them; mind and reason can make their way through everything (see Obstacle and reservation).

10.33.3 Marcus is to set before his eyes the ease with which reason will be carried through all things, as fire upward and a stone downward.

11.20.1 The fiery and the little breath in Marcus, though carried upward by nature, and the earthy and the moist, though carried downward, obey the ordering of the whole and, posted there by force, keep their places in the compound until the signal for dissolution.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers, sets out the Stoic account of the elements, which, he reports, God generated first. Taken together the four are matter, substance without qualities; the hot is fire, the moist water, the cold air, the dry earth. Fire, which is called aether, is uppermost, and in it the sphere of the fixed stars comes to be first, then that of the planets; after it comes air, then water, and the earth, the sediment of all, lies at the middle of everything.[261] The natural places of 11.20.1 can be read as these, the fiery above, the earthy and moist below; and Diogenes' word for the earth as sediment,

[261] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.136–137.

ὑποστάθμη (*hypostathmē*), is the one Marcus uses of gold and silver, "sediments" (9.36). Balbus, the Stoic speaker in *On the Nature of the Gods*, the dialogue of Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, makes the elements' motions and exchanges the bond of the world. What is carried to the middle of the world, which is lowest, what is carried from the middle upward, and what turns in a circle round the middle make the world continuous and one nature; and since there are four kinds of bodies, the world's nature holds together by their exchange: from earth comes water, from water air, from air aether, and back again from aether air, from air water, from water earth, the lowest, so that the parts of the world are kept joined by the natures of which all things consist travelling up and down, this way and that.[262] Marcus' "Up, down, round" (6.17), his preservation of the universe "by the changes of the elements" (2.3) and his "changes of the elements into one another" (7.47) can be read as this doctrine. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, gives the man who is at peace in his solitude a thought for the day when what he needs is no longer provided, the recall is sounded, the door is opened, and he is told, "Come". Where to? To nothing terrible, but to where he came from, "to what is dear and akin, to the elements": as much fire as was in him goes off into fire, as much earth into earth, as much breath into breath, as much water into water; there is no Hades, no Acheron, Cocytus or Pyriphlegethon, the rivers of the dead.[263] Epictetus' words are diminutives, a little earth, a little breath, a little water, and his breath is πνευμάτιον (*pneumation*), Marcus' "little breath" (11.20.1), standing among the elements where air would stand, as Marcus' breath does at 4.4 and 11.20.1 (see Breath).

Other ancient sources

The letter and the element share their name in Plato, the Athenian philosopher. In the *Cratylus* Socrates says that "the letter rho" seemed to the giver of names a fine instrument of motion, for making his names like movement, the phrase Marcus uses of the letter that makes "part" of "limb" (7.13); and in the *Theaetetus* he tells a dream in which "the first elements, as it were, of which we and everything else are composed" have no account, only a name, while what is

[262] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.84.

[263] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.13.14–15.

woven of them has one, and he says that the dream had the letters and syllables of words for its models.[264] "That man" of 7.31 is Democritus, as the edition's note identifies him. Sextus Empiricus, the Sceptic philosopher and doctor, quotes his saying in full: "By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; in reality atoms and void"; that is, what the senses show is believed to be, but in truth only the atoms and the void are.[265] In Leopold's text Marcus' "only the elements" stands for Democritus' atoms and void.

Translation in this edition

Στοιχεῖον is "element" or "elements" at thirteen of its fifteen occurrences ("another element", 4.4); it is "letters" at 6.26 ("each of the letters", where "characters" in the next sentence renders γραμμάτων, *grammatōn*) and "letter" in "the letter r" (7.13). The adjective στοιχειώδης is "elementary" (4.3.1) and, in "the elemental fire", "elemental" (9.9.1; see Principles and reminders). Πῦρ is "fire" at all ten of its occurrences ("a bright fire", 4.1; "the bright fire", 10.31); πυρώδης is "the fiery" (4.21.2), "the hot and fiery" with θερμός (*thermos*), "hot" (4.4), and "all that is fiery" (11.20.1). Ἀήρ is "air" at all eleven of its occurrences, "airs" in the plural (10.1); ἀερώδης is "the airy" at all four places. Ὕδωρ is "water", and "waters" in "the swelling waters" (4.49.1), where the Greek has the singular. Ὑγρός is "moist", always with the article or "everything" (4.4, 9.9.1, 11.20.1). Γῆ is "earth" at every place, and so is the poets' γαῖα in the lines of Euripides (7.50, twice; 10.21). Γεώδης is "earthy" throughout. Βωλάριον is "grains" of incense (4.15) and "a little clod" (6.36, 12.32). Στερέμνιος is "solid" at all three places, and ὑποστάθμη "sediments" (9.36). The conflagration of 3.3 is ἐκπύρωσις (*ekpyrōsis*), and "periodically consumed by fire" (10.7.2) renders the passive of ἐκπυροῦν (*ekpyroun*); "ethereal" (7.50) is αἰθέριος (*aitherios*) and "aether" (10.21) αἰθήρ (*aithēr*), both in quoted verse; "beings of the air and the aether" (12.24) renders ἐναερίων καὶ ἐναιθερίων (*enaeriōn kai enaitheriōn*).

ἀερώδης

Attested: ἀερῶδες (*aerōdes*; 4.21.2, 9.9.1, 10.7.2), ἀερώδης (*aerōdēs*; 8.54). Like air, airy; with the article, the

[264] Plato, *Cratylus* 426d; *Theaetetus* 201e–202b, 202e.

[265] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* 7.135 (Democritus, DK 68 B9).

airy element or portion. Eaten bodies pass “through the alterations into the airy or the fiery” (4.21.2); “the airy likewise” flows together (9.9.1); dissolution may be “a turning … of the breath-like into the airy” (10.7.2); the intelligent faculty has spread through for him who can draw it in, “no less than the airy for him who can breathe it” (8.54). Lemma: ἀερώδης.

ἀήρ

Attested: ἀήρ (*aēr*; 4.21.1), ἀέρα (*aera*; 4.21.1, 4.46, 6.15, 8.57, 9.8), ἀέρος (*aeros*; 4.46, 6.15, 10.7.3), ἀέρι (*aeri*; 8.54), ἀέρων (*aerōn*; 10.1). Air, one of the four elements, the stuff of breath, and the air round about. “If souls live on, how has the air held them from everlasting?” (4.21.1); “the death of water to become air” (4.46); “we see by one light and breathe one air” (9.8); “No longer only breathe together with the surrounding air” (8.54). Lemma: ἀήρ.

βωλάριον

Attested: βωλάρια (*bōlaria*; 4.15), βωλάριον (*bōlarion*; 6.36), βωλαρίῳ (*bōlariōi*; 12.32). A little lump, a little clod of earth, a diminutive whose simple noun Marcus does not use. “Many grains of incense on the same altar” (4.15); “Athos: a little clod of the universe” (6.36); “on what fraction of the whole earth, a little clod, you crawl” (12.32). Lemma: βωλάριον.

γαῖα

Attested: γαίας (*gaias*; 7.50), γαῖαν (*gaian*; 7.50), γαῖα (*gaia*; 10.21). Earth, the poets’ word, found only in quoted verse: “And what grew from earth, into earth” (7.50), in lines of Euripides, and “Earth is in love with rain, in love the august aether” (10.21), in another. At 7.50 the first form is the reading of the verse; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has γῆς and A, the Vatican manuscript, τῆς, as Leopold’s apparatus reports. Lemma: γαῖα.

γεώδης

Attested: γεῶδες (*geōdes*; 4.4, 9.9.1, 9.9.3, 10.7.2, 11.20.1), γεωδῶν (*geōdōn*; 9.8), γεώδους (*geōdous*; 9.9.3). Earthy; with the article, the earthy element or portion: “the earthy in me has been portioned off from some earth” (4.4); “Everything earthy inclines towards earth” (9.9.1); “sooner, at any rate, would one find something earthy touching

nothing earthy than a man split off from man" (9.9.3). Lemma: γεώδης.

γῆ

Attested: γῆ (*gē*; 3.3, 4.3.3, 4.21.1, 8.21, 9.8, 9.28), γῆς (*gēs*; 3.10, 4.4, 4.46, 9.36, 12.32), γῆν (*gēn*; 4.36, 9.9.1). Earth: the element, the ground, the whole inhabited earth: "the death of earth is to become water" (4.46); "one earth of all earthy things" (9.8); "Soon earth will cover us all" (9.28); "the whole earth is a point" (4.3.3, 8.21). Lemma: γῆ.

πῦρ

Attested: πῦρ (*pyr*; 4.1 twice, 4.46, 8.41, 9.9.1 twice, 10.31, 10.33.3), πυρί (*pyri*; 9.9.1, 10.33.2). Fire, the element and the burning thing. "Fire is carried upward because of the elemental fire" (9.9.1); "as fire upward, as a stone downward" (10.33.3). As an image: the bright fire "makes its own whatever is heaped on it" (4.1), "makes flame and radiance out of whatever you throw into it" (10.31); and fire does not touch the mind "when it has become 'a sphere, round, in its solitude'" (8.41), where "solitude" is the μονίῃ (*moniēi*) of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*, which Leopold prints for the manuscripts' μένει (*menei*), "remains". Lemma: πῦρ.

πυρώδης

Attested: πυρῶδες (*pyrōdes*; 4.4, 4.21.2, 11.20.1). Fiery; with the article, the fiery element or portion: "the hot and fiery from some spring of its own" (4.4); "Your little breath and all that is fiery, as much as is blended in, though by nature carried upward" (11.20.1). Lemma: πυρώδης.

στερέμνιος

Attested: στερέμνιον (*steremnion*; 8.57, 10.7.3), στερεμνίου (*steremniou*; 10.7.2). Solid, firm; with the article, the solid mass of a body. Dissolution may be "a turning of the solid into the earthy" (10.7.2); "as for the solid and the breath-like, do not form the impression that it is what came from the first birth" (10.7.3); the sun's ray meets "whatever solid it meets that cuts off the air beyond" (8.57). Lemma: στερέμνιος.

στοιχεῖον

Attested: στοιχείων (*stoicheiōn*; 2.3, 2.17.2, 4.5, 6.17, 6.26, 7.47, 7.50, 10.7.2), στοιχείοις (*stoicheiois*; 2.17.2),

στοιχείου (*stoicheiou*; 4.4, 7.13), στοιχεῖα (*stoicheia*; 4.32.2, 7.31, 8.18, 11.20.1). A letter; in physics an element: “the dissolution of the elements of which each living being is compounded” (2.17.2); “Up, down, round: courses of the elements” (6.17); “the elements too submit to the whole” (11.20.1); “the letter r” (7.13). At 7.13 Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, would delete the words “through the letter r”, as Leopold’s apparatus reports. At 7.31 “in reality” is Usener’s ἐτεῇ, for P’s ἔτι εἰ and A’s ἔτι ἢ, and “only the” Coraes’ δὲ μόνα, for the manuscripts’ δαίμονα. At 11.20.1 Leopold follows P; A has τοῖς ἄλλοις, “to the others”, for “to the whole” and σὺν βίῳ (*syn biōi*), “with life”, for σὺν βίᾳ (*syn biāi*), “by force”. Lemma: στοιχεῖον.

ὑγρός

Attested: ὑγρόν (*hygron*; 4.4, 9.9.1, 11.20.1). Moist, wet; with the article, the moist element or portion, water’s share in a body: “the moist from another element” (4.4); “everything moist flows together” (9.9.1); “the moist, though carried downward” (11.20.1). Lemma: ὑγρός.

ὕδωρ

Attested: ὕδατος (*hydatos*; 3.3, 4.46, 4.49.1), ὕδωρ (*hydōr*; 4.46, 6.57, 8.24, 9.36), ὕδατι (*hydati*; 10.33.2). Water, the element and the thing: “the death of earth is to become water, the death of water to become air” (4.46); the rottenness of the material underlying each thing is “water, dust, little bones, stink” (9.36); Heraclitus “was filled with water within” (3.3). Lemma: ὕδωρ.

ὑποστάθμη

Attested: ὑποστάθμαι (*hypostathmai*; 9.36). Sediment, what settles at the bottom; Diogenes Laertius’ word for the earth as the lowest of the elements. Of the material of things: “calluses of earth, marble; and sediments, gold, silver” (9.36). Lemma: ὑποστάθμη.

See also

Body and flesh; Breath; Change; Citizenship; Daimon; Death; Dissolution; Duty and fitting action; Kinship and cooperation; Nature; Obstacle and reservation; Principles and reminders; Self-respect and shame; Soul; Virtue and excellence.

What is spun for each · Meditations

εἱμαρμένη, heimarmenē, “fate”; *μείρεσθαι, meiresthai*, “what is fated”, “it was fated”; *συγκαθείμαρμαι, synkatheimarmai*, “was fated”; *συνείμαρται, syneimartai*, “fated along with”; *πεπρωμένη, peprōmenē*, “doom”; *μοῖρα, moira*, “lot”; *εὔμοιρος, eumoiros*, “of good lot”; *εὐμοιρία, eumoiria*, “good lot”; *ἀμεμψίμοιρος, amempsimoiros*, “not complaining of one’s lot”; *ἀπόμοιρα, apomoira*, “portion”; *συμμοιρᾶν, symmoiran*, “apportion”; *ἀπονέμειν, aponemein*, “allot”; *ἀπονέμησις, aponemēsis*, “allotment”; *ἀπονεμητικός, aponemētikos*, “allotting”; *νέμειν, nemein*, “deal out”; *διανέμειν, dianemein*, “distribute”; *συγκλώθειν, synklōthein*, “spun for”, “spun together”, “spin together”; *σύγκλωσις, synklōsis*, “spinning together”; *Κλωθώ, Klōthō*, “Clotho”; *συννήθειν, synnēthein*, “spin together”; *σύννησις, synnēsis*, “spinning together”; *συμμηρύεσθαι, symmēryesthai*, “wound along with”, “wound off together”; *συμμήρυσις, symmērysis*, “winding together”; *ἐπιπλοκή, epiplokē*, “interweaving”; *σύλληξις, syllēxis*, “fall of the lot”; *συγκληροῦν, synklēroun*, “fall to one’s lot”; *συλλαγχάνειν, syllanchanein*, “share one’s lot”; *εὔποτμος, eupotmos*, “of happy fate”; *συμβαίνειν, symbainein*, “happen”, “befall”, “come upon”, “fit”; *σύμβασις, symbasis*, “occurrence”, “conjuncture”; *σύμβαμα, symbama*, “event”

At a Glance

The word. Εἱμαρμένη is “what has been allotted”, from μείρεσθαι, “to receive as one’s share”, the root also of μοῖρα, “lot”, and of μέρος, “part”. The Stoics made it the chain of causes by which all things come about. Ἀπονέμειν is to deal out to each his share, and συγκλώθειν, “to spin together”, pictures the share as thread.

In the *Meditations*. “Everything that happens was fated and spun for you”, Marcus tells himself (4.26), and “from all causes fate is completed as such a cause” (5.8.2). He is to welcome and love what happens, and give himself up to Clotho, the Spinner, one of the three Fates, “willingly” (4.34). The good lot he deals out to himself: “to be of good lot is to have allotted yourself a good lot” (5.36).

In this edition. Εἱμαρμένη is always “fate”, and the participle “what is fated” (2.2); πεπρωμένη is “doom”; μοῖρα is “lot” and εὔμοιρος “of good lot”; ἀπονέμειν is always

“allot”; συγκλώθειν is “spun for” or “spun together”, and τὸ συμβαῖνον “what happens”.

A place to read. 5.8, where Marcus compares what the nature of the whole prescribes with what Asclepius, the god of healing, prescribes, and finds two reasons to cherish what happens.

Meaning

Εἱμαρμένη (*heimarmenē*) is the perfect participle of μείρεσθαι (*meiresthai*), “to receive as one’s portion”, used as a noun: what has been allotted. From the same root come μοῖρα (*moira*), a share and so a man’s lot, and μέρος (*meros*), “part” (see Whole and part). Πεπρωμένη (*peprōmenē*), “doom”, is likewise a perfect participle, of πόρω (*porō*), “to give”: what has been given. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoics’ teaching in its seventh book, reports that Zeno of Citium, the school’s founder, Chrysippus, its third head, and the Stoics Posidonius and Boethus held that all things come about by fate, and that fate is “a cause of the things that are, strung together in a series, or the reason by which the universe is carried on”.[266]

Marcus uses the noun in six chapters, one of them a quotation. His commoner words are those of the share: “what is allotted from the whole” (4.3.2), the “lot”, and what is “spun for” each. Κλωθώ (*Klōthō*), “the Spinner”, is one of the three Fates, as the edition’s note at 4.34 says.

Use in the book

Fate is first a chain. “As from all bodies the universe is completed as such a body, so from all causes fate is completed as such a cause” (5.8.2). Marcus is to conceive “what the spinning together and the winding together are like” (4.40), and he receives whatever happens, referring it “to the spring of all things, from which all that comes about is wound off together” (8.23). Of each thing he is to say: “this has come from God; this by the fall of the lot and the spinning together wound along with it and such coincidence and fortune”; and this from a kinsman (3.11.3; see Good, bad and indifference).

---

[266] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.149, citing Chrysippus’ books *On Fate*, the second book of Posidonius’ *On Fate*, Zeno, and the first book of Boethus’ *On Fate*.

The thread runs through the man who receives the event. The good man “perpetually bears in mind what is spun for him out of the whole … For the lot dealt out to each is carried along with him and carries him along” (3.4.3). “From the whole, from the beginning, everything that happens was fated and spun for you” (4.26). And: “Whatever happens to you was being prepared for you beforehand from eternity; and the interweaving of causes was spinning together, from everlasting, both your subsistence and the occurrence of this” (10.5).

At 5.8, as “Asclepius prescribed for this man riding, or cold baths, or going barefoot”, so “the nature of the whole prescribed for this man disease, or maiming, or loss, or something else of the kind”. The word “prescribed”, the edition’s note says, is also “arranged together”, and συμβαίνειν, “happen”, also means “fit”: things “fit” us as squared stones “fit” in walls (5.8.1–2). “So for two reasons one must cherish what happens to you”: it “was prescribed for you … spun together from above out of the most ancient causes”; and it is a cause of the good journey of “that which governs the whole” (5.8.5). The second reason is said of “even what comes to each individually” by J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, from the books of excerpts; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, and A, the Vatican manuscript, omit the words. Discontent is a cut: “you cut it off, as far as lies in you, whenever you are discontented, and in a way you destroy it” (5.8.5).

Allotting is also a just distributor’s work. The mind of the whole “allotted to each according to worth” (5.30); everything happens “as if by someone allotting according to worth” (4.10; see Justice); “the allotments, too, are equal” (8.6). The man who pursues pleasure as good is impious, since he “must often blame the common nature as allotting something to the base and to the serious contrary to worth” (9.1.2; see Good, bad and indifference). To resent “what is allotted from the whole” (4.3.2) can be read as charging the distributor with injustice.

The answer asked is love, not endurance. He lives with the gods who “continually shows them his own soul pleased with what is allotted, and doing what the daimon wills” (5.27; see Daimon). The good man is “welcoming with his whole soul all that happens and is allotted to him” (3.4.3); it is peculiar to him “to love and welcome what happens to him

and is spun for him", and he must come to the end of life "fitted without constraint to his own lot" (3.16.2). "Love only what happens to you and is spun for you; for what is more suitable?" (7.57). "The things that have fallen to your lot: fit yourself to these; and the people whose lot you share: love these, but truly" (6.39). "Give yourself up willingly to Clotho, letting her spin you together with whatever things she will" (4.34).

What fate deals out lies outside choice. Leopold's text speaks of being "content with fate in what is allotted without choice" (3.6.1; see Virtue and excellence), with the correction of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802; the manuscripts have "and in fate". If Marcus separates from himself what is not his, the intelligent faculty, "removed from the things fated along with it", may "live released by itself" (12.3.1; see Mind and reason); and as the nature of rational beings sets every obstacle "in its place in fate", the rational being "can make every hindrance material for itself" (8.35; see Obstacle and reservation). Marcus reproaches his soul for placing "your own good lot in the souls of others" (2.6), and at 5.36 turns the word inward: "to be of good lot is to have allotted yourself a good lot; and good lots are good turnings of the soul, good impulses, good actions". Fate allots the events; the lot that makes a man fortunate he allots himself. The two can be read as one weave, for his subsistence was spun together with what befalls him (10.5).

Places to read

Every chapter in which εἱμαρμένη, πεπρωμένη, μοῖρα or ἀπονέμειν, or a word of their families, νέμειν, διανέμειν, a word of spinning, winding or weaving (συγκλώθειν, σύγκλωσις, Κλωθώ, συννήθειν, σύννησις, συμμηρύεσθαι, συμμήρυσις, ἐπιπλοκή), σύλληξις, συγκληροῦν, συλλαγχάνειν or εὔποτμος occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The places of συμβαίνειν, "happen", σύμβασις and σύμβαμα, in fifty-one chapters, are given in the sub-entries; τύχη, "fortune", and its family are left out.

1.16.1 Among the qualities of Antoninus, Marcus' adoptive father: allotting to each according to worth, unswervingly.

2.1 The wrongdoer is kin to Marcus, sharing in mind and in a portion of the divine (see Kinship and cooperation).

2.2 The ruling centre is no longer to resent what is fated in the present or look askance at it in the future (see Ruling centre).

2.3 The works of fortune are not apart from nature, or from the spinning together and interweaving of the things that providence governs (see Nature).

2.5 Marcus will give himself leisure if he does each act as the last of his life, with no discontent, among other things, with what has been apportioned to him.

2.6 Marcus tells his soul to do violence to itself, but it will have no further chance to honour itself: its life is almost done, and it places its own good lot in the souls of others.

2.17.2 Philosophy lies in keeping the daimon unharmed and in receiving what happens and is allotted as coming from where the daimon itself came (see Daimon).

3.3 The Chaldaeans foretold the deaths of many, and then doom caught up with them too.

3.4.3 The good man welcomes with his whole soul all that happens and is allotted to him, and bears in mind what is spun for him out of the whole; the lot dealt out to each is carried along with him and carries him along.

3.6.1 If Marcus finds in human life anything better than justice, truth, self-control, courage and an understanding content with itself where it acts by right reason, and content with fate in what is allotted without choice, he is to turn to it with his whole soul (see Virtue and excellence).

3.8 Doom does not overtake the life of the purified man unfinished, as one might say of an actor who leaves before the play is played out.

3.11.3 Marcus is to say of each thing that it has come from God, or by the fall of the lot and the spinning together wound along with it, or from a kinsman (see Good, bad and indifference).

3.16.2 It is peculiar to the good man to love and welcome what happens to him and is spun for him, and he must come to the end of life fitted without constraint to his own lot.

4.3.2 Marcus asks whether he will resent what is allotted from the whole, and is to renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms (see Providence and atoms).

4.10 Everything that happens happens justly, as if by someone allotting according to worth (see Justice).

4.25 Marcus is to try the life of the good man, pleased with what is allotted from the whole and content with his own just action.

4.26 From the whole, from the beginning, everything that happens to Marcus was fated and spun for him.

4.34 Marcus is to give himself up willingly to Clotho, letting her spin him together with whatever things she will.

4.40 The universe is one living being; Marcus is to conceive how all things are joint causes of all that happens, and what the spinning together and the winding together are like.

5.5 Among the qualities wholly in Marcus' power is not complaining of one's lot.

5.8.1 As Asclepius prescribes a regimen, the nature of the whole prescribes disease, maiming or loss, and what happens to each has in a way been ordered for him as appropriate to fate.

5.8.2 Things fit us as squared stones fit in a wall; as from all bodies the universe is completed, so from all causes fate is completed as one cause.

5.8.5 Marcus must cherish what happens to him because it was prescribed for him, spun together from above out of the most ancient causes, and because it is a cause of the good journey of what governs the whole.

5.24 Marcus is to remember the all-embracing substance and eternity, and fate, of which he is how small a part.

5.27 He lives with the gods who shows them his soul pleased with what is allotted and doing what the daimon wills (see Daimon).

5.30 The mind of the whole is social: it has allotted to each according to worth.

5.36 Marcus was once a man of good lot; to be of good lot is to have allotted oneself a good lot, and good lots are good turnings of the soul, good impulses, good actions.

6.16.5 Respect for his own understanding will make Marcus accord with the gods, praising whatever they distribute and have ordained.

6.39 Marcus is to fit himself to the things that have fallen to his lot, and to love the people whose lot he shares, but truly.

7.46 In words of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, which Marcus copies, the true man must perhaps not cling to life, but leave these matters to God, believing the women that no one could escape fate.[267]

7.57 Marcus is to love only what happens to him and is spun for him, and asks what is more suitable.

7.66 The soul of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, is to be judged by whether it neither received anything allotted from the whole as strange nor endured it as unbearable.

8.6 The nature of the whole shifts and changes all things; all things are usual, and the allotments, too, are equal.

8.7 A rational nature journeys well when, among other things, it welcomes all that the common nature allots it (see Assent and judgement).

8.23 Whatever happens to Marcus he receives, referring it to the gods and to the spring of all things, from which all that comes about is wound off together.

8.35 As the nature of rational beings sets every obstacle in its place in fate and makes it a part of itself, so the rational being can make every hindrance material for itself (see Obstacle and reservation).

[267] Plato, *Gorgias* 512d–e, as the edition's note at 7.46 records.

8.37 The favourites of the dead do not sit by their tombs; it was fated that they too should first grow old and then die.

9.1.2 He who pursues pleasure as good is impious, for he must often blame the common nature as allotting contrary to worth (see Good, bad and indifference).

10.5 Whatever happens to Marcus was prepared from eternity, and the interweaving of causes was spinning together his subsistence and its occurrence.

10.6.1 Remembering that he is a part of the whole, Marcus will, in so far as he is a part, be discontented with nothing allotted from it (see Whole and part).

10.6.2 When these things are so brought to their end, life must flow smoothly, as a citizen's does who welcomes whatever the city allots (see Citizenship).

10.8.1 "Consenting", one of the names Marcus gives himself, means the willing acceptance of what is allotted by the common nature.

10.11 The man who has put off the body is content with two things, acting justly in what is now being done and loving what is now allotted to him.

10.25 The one who governs all things is law, dealing out what falls to each (see Citizenship).

10.36 No one is of so happy a fate that there will not be some standing by when he dies who welcome the bad thing that is happening (see Death).

11.19 The fourth turning of the ruling centre to be wiped away is the mark of the more divine part bowing before the less honoured and mortal lot, the body's.

12.1.1 Holiness is to love what is allotted, for nature brought it to Marcus and him to it (see Gods).

12.3.1 If Marcus separates from himself all that is not properly his, the intelligent faculty, removed from the things fated along with it, may live released by itself (see Mind and reason).

12.11 Man has the authority to receive all that God deals out to him.

12.14 Either a necessity of fate, or a providence that can be propitiated, or a confusion without a leader (see Providence and atoms).

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoic fate is a series of causes. In the first book of *On Divination* by Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, his brother Quintus, arguing the Stoic case after Posidonius, says that reason forces the admission that everything comes about by fate, and that he calls fate what the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, an order and series of causes, when cause bound to cause brings a thing forth from itself. It is truth flowing from all eternity, so that nothing has happened that was not going to be; fate is not what superstition means by the word but what physics means, the eternal cause of things, why the past was done, the present is being done, and the future will be.[268] Marcus' "prepared for you beforehand from eternity" and "from everlasting" (10.5) can be read as this physics. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, keeps the old picture of the thread. When a man protests that his leg should be lamed, Epictetus answers: "Slave, do you then accuse the universe over one little leg? Will you not make a gift of it to the whole, stand aside, and yield it gladly to the one who gave it? Will you be indignant and discontented with what Zeus has ordered, which he marked out and ordered with the Fates present and spinning your birth?" The verb is ἐπικλώθειν (*epiklōthein*), which Marcus does not use.[269] His word for "discontented", δυσαρεστεῖν (*dysarestein*), is Marcus' at 5.8.5 and 10.6.1. Epictetus also tells his hearers to have ready to hand the verses of Cleanthes, Zeno's successor at the head of the school, in which Marcus' word for doom is a power addressed beside Zeus: "Lead me, Zeus, and you, Doom, wherever I have been posted by you; for I shall follow without flinching; and if I am unwilling, I shall become bad and follow none the less."[270] Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, turns the verses into Latin, ending with a line that has no counterpart in the Greek as Epictetus quotes it: the fates lead the man who is willing and drag the man who

[268] Cicero, *On Divination* 1.125–126.

[269] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.12.24–25.

[270] Epictetus, *Handbook* 53.1; the verses are named as Cleanthes' at *Discourses* 4.4.34.

is not. He introduces them with a call not to desert the course of this most beautiful work, into which everything we shall suffer is woven.[271] Marcus' "Give yourself up willingly to Clotho" (4.34) can be read as Cleanthes' prayer put in the image of the thread. Chrysippus' saying, which Epictetus quotes, on an impulse towards a fated illness belongs to the same teaching (see Nature).

Other ancient sources

Plato gives the Fates their fullest picture in the myth of Er at the end of the *Republic*. The spindle of Necessity turns on her knees, and round it sit her daughters, the Moirai, Lachesis, Clotho and Atropos, singing, Lachesis of what has been, Clotho of what is, Atropos of what will be. Souls about to be born are told that no daimon will be allotted to them, but that they will choose a daimon; virtue has no master; the chooser is answerable, and god is not.[272] When each has chosen a life, Lachesis sends with it the daimon it chose; the daimon leads it under Clotho's hand, to ratify the lot it took, and then to the spinning of Atropos, which makes what was spun irreversible.[273] In Marcus the daimon is the gift of Zeus (5.27; see Daimon), and what is spun is the event, not the life chosen; but the good lot that a man allots himself (5.36) can be read beside Plato's lot that a soul chooses.

Translation in this edition

Εἱμαρμένη is "fate" at all seven of its places (3.6.1, 5.8.1, 5.8.2, 5.24, 7.46, 8.35, 12.14). The neuter participle εἱμαρμένον is "what is fated" (2.2), the pluperfect εἵμαρτο "it was fated" (8.37, "so it was fated"), συγκαθείμαρτο "was fated" (4.26), and τὰ συνειμαρμένα "the things fated along with it" (12.3.1). Πεπρωμένη (3.8) and the neuter τὸ πεπρωμένον (3.3) are "doom", kept apart from "fate"; "fate" renders one other word, εὔποτμος, in "of so happy a fate" (10.36). Μοῖρα is "lot" at all five of its places (3.4.3, 3.16.2, 5.36 twice, 11.19); εὔμοιρος is "of good lot" (5.36 twice), keeping Marcus' play with ἀπονέμειν, and εὐμοιρία "good lot" (2.6); ἀμεμψίμοιρος is rendered by a phrase, "not complaining of one's lot" (5.5); ἀπόμοιρα is "portion" (2.1), and τὰ συμμεμοιραμένα "what has been apportioned" (2.5). Ἀπονέμειν is "allot" at all its places; its noun ἀπονέμησις is

[271] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 107.10–11.

[272] Plato, *Republic* 10, 617b–e.

[273] Plato, *Republic* 10, 620d–e.

“allotments” (8.6), and its adjective ἀπονεμητικός, used as a noun, “allotting” (1.16.1). The simple νέμειν is “deal out” (3.4.3, 10.25, 12.11), keeping at 10.25 the play on νόμος, “law”, and νέμων, “dealing out”; διανέμειν is “distribute” (6.16.5). Συγκλώθειν is “spun for” (3.4.3, 3.16.2, 4.26, 7.57), “spun together” (5.8.5) and “was spinning together” (10.5); σύγκλωσις is “spinning together” (2.3, 3.11.3), as is σύννησις (4.40), and συννήθειν “spin … together” (4.34); συμμηρύεσθαι is “wound along with” (3.11.3) and “wound off together” (8.23), συμμήρυσις “the winding together” (4.40), and ἐπιπλοκή “interweaving” (2.3, 10.5). Σύλληξις is “the fall of the lot” (3.11.3); at 6.39 συγκεκλήρωσαι is “have fallen to your lot” and συνείληχας “whose lot you share”. Συμβαίνειν is “happen”, with τὸ συμβαῖνον and τὰ συμβαίνοντα “what happens”, except at five places: “befall” (2.11.3, 2.11.4), “have come upon” (2.1), and “fit”, twice, of things that fit us as squared stones fit in a wall (5.8.2), where the note gives both senses of the verb. Σύμβασις is “conjuncture” (7.54, 8.7) and “occurrence” (10.5), and σύμβαμα “event” (7.58). “Portion” at 5.24 renders the verb μετέχειν (*metechein*), “have a share”, and “portions” and “portioned” at 4.4, 8.7, 9.8 and 12.32 render words of the family of μέρος (see Whole and part).

ἀμεμψίμοιρος

Attested: ἀμεμψίμοιρον (*amempsimoiron*; 5.5). Not complaining of one’s lot; the neuter with the article serves as a noun. Among the qualities that are “wholly in your power”, Marcus lists “genuineness, dignity, the bearing of hardship, indifference to pleasure, not complaining of one’s lot, needing little” (5.5). Lemma: ἀμεμψίμοιρος.

ἀπόμοιρα

Attested: ἀπομοίρας (*apomoiras*; 2.1). A portion, a share allotted. The wrongdoer is kin to Marcus, “sharing in mind and in a portion of the divine” (2.1; see Kinship and cooperation). Lemma: ἀπόμοιρα.

ἀπονέμησις

Attested: ἀπονεμήσεις (*aponemēseis*; 8.6). A dealing out, an allotment. After all things are shifted and changed by the nature of the whole, “all things are usual; but the allotments, too, are equal” (8.6). Lemma: ἀπονέμησις.

ἀπονεμητικός

Attested: ἀπονεμητικόν (*aponemētikon*; 1.16.1). Disposed to distribute; the neuter with the article serves as a noun. Among the qualities of Antoninus: “allotting to each according to worth, unswervingly” (1.16.1). Lemma: ἀπονεμητικός.

ἀπονέμω

Attested: ἀπονεμόμενα (*aponemomena*; 2.17.2, 3.4.3), ἀπονεμομένοις (*aponemomenois*; 3.6.1, 4.3.2, 4.25, 5.27), ἀπονέμοντος (*aponemontos*; 4.10), ἀπένειμεν (*apeneimen*; 5.30), ἀπονείμας (*aponeimas*; 5.36), ἀπονεμομένων (*aponemomenōn*; 7.66, 10.6.1, 10.8.1), ἀπονεμόμενον (*aponemomenon*; 8.7, 10.11, 12.1.1), ἀπονεμούσῃ (*aponemousēi*; 9.1.2), ἀπονέμῃ (*aponemēi*; 10.6.2). To deal out to each his share, of nature and of a just distributor alike. “But will you also resent what is allotted from the whole?” (4.3.2); everything happens “as if by someone allotting according to worth” (4.10); “to be of good lot is to have allotted yourself a good lot” (5.36). At 10.11 the man who “loves what is now allotted to him” does so in the correction of John Jackson, whose English translation appeared at Oxford in 1906, which Leopold prints; P has the infinitive, A the imperative. Lemma: ἀπονέμω.

διανέμω

Attested: διανέμουσι (*dianemousi*; 6.16.5). To distribute, deal out among several. Respect for his own understanding will make Marcus “in accord with the gods, that is, praising whatever they distribute and have ordained” (6.16.5). Lemma: διανέμω.

εἱμαρμένη

Attested: εἱμαρμένῃ (*heimarmenēi*; 3.6.1), εἱμαρμένην (*heimarmenēn*; 5.8.1, 7.46, 8.35), εἱμαρμένη (*heimarmenē*; 5.8.2), εἱμαρμένης (*heimarmenēs*; 5.24, 12.14). Fate, the series of causes. “So from all causes fate is completed as such a cause” (5.8.2); “fate, of which you are how small a part?” (5.24); “a necessity of fate and an order not to be transgressed” (12.14). At 3.6.1 “content with fate” is the correction of Schultz, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have καὶ ἐν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ, “and in fate”. At 7.46 the word is Plato’s. Lemma: εἱμαρμένη.

ἐπιπλοκή

Attested: ἐπιπλοκῆς (*epiplokēs*; 2.3), ἐπιπλοκή (*epiplokē*; 10.5). A weaving together. The works of fortune are not apart from "the spinning together and interweaving of the things that providence governs" (2.3); "the interweaving of causes was spinning together, from everlasting, both your subsistence and the occurrence of this" (10.5). Lemma: ἐπιπλοκή.

εὐμοιρία

Attested: εὐμοιρίαν (*eumoirian*; 2.6). Good lot, good fortune. Marcus tells his soul to do violence to itself; its life is almost done, "while you pay yourself no respect but place your own good lot in the souls of others" (2.6). Lemma: εὐμοιρία.

εὔμοιρος

Attested: εὔμοιρος (*eumoiros*; 5.36 twice). Of good lot, fortunate. "I was once, wherever I was overtaken, a man of good lot; and to be of good lot is to have allotted yourself a good lot" (5.36). "Overtaken" is the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' καταλειφθείς, "left behind". Lemma: εὔμοιρος.

εὔποτμος

Attested: εὔποτμος (*eupotmos*; 10.36). Of happy fate, from πότμος (*potmos*), a man's lot or death. "No one is of so happy a fate that, when he is dying, there will not be some standing by who welcome the bad thing that is happening" (10.36; see Death). Lemma: εὔποτμος.

Κλωθώ

Attested: Κλωθοῖ (*Klōthoi*; 4.34). Clotho, "the Spinner", one of the three Fates. "Give yourself up willingly to Clotho, letting her spin you together with whatever things she will" (4.34). Lemma: Κλωθώ.

μείρομαι

Attested: εἱμαρμένον (*heimarmenon*; 2.2), εἵμαρτο (*heimarto*; 8.37). To receive as one's portion; in the perfect passive, impersonal, it is allotted, it is fated. The ruling centre is no longer to "resent what is fated in the present or look askance at it in the future" (2.2; see Ruling centre), where "look askance at" is the correction of Wilamowitz, the

German classical scholar, which Leopold prints, for P's ὑποδύεσθαι and A's ἀποδύεσθαι; of the favourites of the dead, who do not sit by their tombs, Marcus asks, "Was it not for these too first to become old women and old men, so it was fated, then to die?" (8.37). The noun εἱμαρμένη has its own sub-entry. Lemma: μείρομαι.

μοῖρα

Attested: μοῖρα (*moira*; 3.4.3), μοίρᾳ (*moirāi*; 3.16.2, 11.19), μοῖραν (*moiran*; 5.36), μοῖραι (*moirai*; 5.36). A share, a man's lot. "For the lot dealt out to each is carried along with him and carries him along" (3.4.3); the good man must come to the end of life "fitted without constraint to his own lot" (3.16.2); "good lots are good turnings of the soul, good impulses, good actions" (5.36); among the turnings to be wiped away is the more divine part bowing before "the less honoured and mortal lot, the body's" (11.19). Lemma: μοῖρα.

νέμω

Attested: νεμομένη (*nemomenē*; 3.4.3), νέμων (*nemōn*; 10.25), νέμῃ (*nemēi*; 12.11). To deal out. "The lot dealt out to each" (3.4.3); he who governs all things "is law, dealing out all that falls to each" (10.25); man has the authority "to receive all that God deals out to him" (12.11). Lemma: νέμω.

πόρω

Attested: πεπρωμένον (*peprōmenon*; 3.3), πεπρωμένη (*peprōmenē*; 3.8). To give, furnish; the perfect passive participle is what has been given, doom. The Chaldaeans "foretold the deaths of many; then doom caught up with them too" (3.3); "nor does doom overtake his life unfinished" (3.8). Lemma: πόρω.

συγκαθείμαρμαι

Attested: συγκαθείμαρτο (*synkatheimarto*; 4.26). To have been fated together, a perfect passive without a present. "From the whole, from the beginning, everything that happens was fated and spun for you" (4.26). Lemma: συγκαθείμαρμαι.

συγκληρόω

Attested: συγκεκλήρωσαι (*synkeklērōsai*; 6.39). To allot together; in the passive, to have one's lot cast with. "The things that have fallen to your lot: fit yourself to these" (6.39). Lemma: συγκληρόω.

συγκλώθω

Attested: συγκλωθόμενα (*synklōthomena*; 3.4.3, 3.16.2), συνεκλώθετο (*syneklōtheto*; 4.26), συγκλωθόμενον (*synklōthomenon*; 5.8.5, 7.57), συνέκλωθε (*syneklōthe*; 10.5). To spin together, as the Fates spin the thread. “What is spun for him out of the whole” (3.4.3); “Love only what happens to you and is spun for you” (7.57); “spun together from above out of the most ancient causes” (5.8.5). Lemma: συγκλώθω.

σύγκλωσις

Attested: συγκλώσεως (*synklōseōs*; 2.3), σύγκλωσιν (*synklōsin*; 3.11.3). A spinning together, of the thread of fate, as the edition’s note at 2.3 says. “The spinning together and interweaving of the things that providence governs” (2.3); “by the fall of the lot and the spinning together wound along with it” (3.11.3). Lemma: σύγκλωσις.

συλλαγχάνω

Attested: συνείληχας (*syneilēchas*; 6.39). To share a lot with others. “And the people whose lot you share: love these, but truly” (6.39). Lemma: συλλαγχάνω.

σύλληξις

Attested: σύλληξιν (*syllēxin*; 3.11.3). A falling together by lot. “This by the fall of the lot and the spinning together wound along with it and such coincidence and fortune” (3.11.3). Lemma: σύλληξις.

συμβαίνω

Attested: συμβέβηκεν (*symbebēken*; 2.1, 5.18), συμβαίνῃ (*symbainēi*; 2.11.3, 10.5), συμβαίνει (*symbainei*; 2.11.4, 4.10, 4.39, 5.18 twice, 6.45, 8.23, 8.27, 8.46, 10.3 twice), συμβαίνοντα (*symbainonta*; 2.17.2, 3.4.3, 3.16.2, 4.1, 6.44.1, 9.31, 10.35, 12.3.1), συμβαινόντων (*symbainontōn*; 3.2.3, 7.55, 8.43, 8.49, 11.6.1, 11.20.2, 12.24), συμβαῖνον (*symbainon*; 4.10, 4.26, 4.33, 4.44, 5.8.1, 5.8.5, 6.8, 7.29, 7.57, 7.68, 8.34, 9.6, 10.3, 10.36), συμβέβηκε (*symbebēke*; 4.26), συμβαίνουσιν (*symbainousin*; 4.29, 7.52), συμβαίνειν (*symbainein*; 4.39, 5.8.2 twice, 8.46, 9.1.4), συνέβη (*synebē*; 4.49.1), συμβεβηκότος (*symbebēkotos*; 4.49.1), συμβῆναι (*symbēnai*; 4.49.1, 6.44.1), συμβεβηκός (*symbebēkos*; 4.49.2, 7.14), συμβήσεται (*symbēsetai*; 5.10.2, 6.58), συμβαίνοντος (*symbainontos*; 7.1), συνέβαινεν (*synebainen*; 7.58), συμβαίνοντι (*symbainonti*; 10.7.2), συμβαίνουσι

(*symbainousi*; 10.11), συμβῇ (*symbēi*; 10.33.4). To come together; to happen, and also to fit. With the article, "what happens", the event that is spun and allotted: "That everything that happens, happens justly" (4.10; see Justice); "Love only what happens to you and is spun for you" (7.57). At 5.8.2 it is "fit": things "fit" us, "just as craftsmen say that the squared stones in walls or pyramids 'fit'". Lemma: συμβαίνω.

σύμβαμα

Attested: συμβάματος (*symbamatos*; 7.58). What happens, an event. "At each event have before your eyes those to whom the same things happened" (7.58). Lemma: σύμβαμα.

σύμβασις

Attested: συμβάσει (*symbasei*; 7.54), συμβάσεως (*symbaseōs*; 8.7), σύμβασιν (*symbasin*; 10.5). A coming together, a conjuncture, an occurrence. Marcus can always be "piously well pleased with the present conjuncture" (7.54); the nature of which man's is a part is just "if indeed it makes the portions of times, substance, cause, activity and conjuncture equal and according to worth for each" (8.7; see Assent and judgement); the interweaving of causes spun together "both your subsistence and the occurrence of this" (10.5). Lemma: σύμβασις.

συμμηρύομαι

Attested: συμμηρυομένην (*symmēryomenēn*; 3.11.3), συμμηρύεται (*symmēryetai*; 8.23). To be wound together, as thread on a reel. "The spinning together wound along with it" (3.11.3); "the spring of all things, from which all that comes about is wound off together" (8.23). Lemma: συμμηρύομαι.

συμμήρυσις

Attested: συμμήρυσις (*symmērysis*; 4.40). A winding together. Marcus is to conceive "what the spinning together and the winding together are like" (4.40). Lemma: συμμήρυσις.

συμμοιράω

Attested: συμμεμοιραμένα (*symmemoiramena*; 2.5). To give a share of; in the perfect passive, what has been apportioned. Leisure comes "if you do each act as the last of your life, free of all aimlessness, … and of discontent with

what has been apportioned to you" (2.5). Lemma: συμμοιράω.

συνείμαρται

Attested: συνειμαρμένων (*syneimarmenōn*; 12.3.1). It is fated along with; a perfect passive without a present. If Marcus separates from himself all that is not properly his, the intelligent faculty, "removed from the things fated along with it", may live released by itself (12.3.1; see Mind and reason). Lemma: συνείμαρται.

συννήθω

Attested: συννῆσαι (*synnēsai*; 4.34). To spin together. Marcus is to give himself up to Clotho, "letting her spin you together with whatever things she will" (4.34). Lemma: συννήθω.

σύννησις

Attested: σύννησις (*synnēsis*; 4.40). A spinning together. "And what the spinning together and the winding together are like" (4.40). Lemma: σύννησις.

See also

Assent and judgement; Cause and matter; Citizenship; Daimon; Death; Gods; Good, bad and indifference; Interconnection; Justice; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Nature; Necessity and chance; Obstacle and reservation; Providence and atoms; Ruling centre; Virtue and excellence; Whole and part.

Gods

The gods, God and piety · Meditations

θεός, theos, "God", "a god", "the god within you", "my god", "goddess"; *θεοί, theoi*, "gods", "the gods"; *θεῖος, theios*, "divine", "the divine", "things divine", "more divine"; *ὅσιος, hosios*, "holy", "holiness"; *ὁσιότης, hosiotēs*, "holiness"; *θεοσεβής, theosebēs*, "pious", "piety"; *θεοσεβῶς, theosebōs*, "piously"; *θεοσέβεια, theosebeia*, "piety"; *ἀσεβεῖν, asebein*, "be impious"; *ἀσεβής, asebēs*, "impious"; *σέβειν, sebein*, "revere"; *σεβασμός, sebasmos*, "reverence"; *Ζεύς, Zeus*, "Zeus"; *θεουδής, theoudēs*, "godly"; *θεόθεν, theothen*, "from the gods"; *θεοφόρητος, theophorētos*, "borne by God"; *ἐπίπνοια, epipnoia*,

"inspirations"; *ἱερουργία, hierourgia*, "sacred rites"; *θύειν, thyein*, "sacrifice", "being sacrificed"; *ὅρκος, horkos*, "oath"

At a Glance

The word. Θεός is a god, and the plural θεοί the gods of the cities; for the Stoics the singular named also the provident god of the whole. Ὅσιος is what is right towards the gods, "holy", and θεοσεβής is "pious".

In the *Meditations*. The gods "do exist, and they do care for human affairs" (2.11.2), and Marcus grasps that they exist "from what I experience of their power on each occasion" (12.28). In the singular he is "one God through all things" (7.9). Holiness is to "love what is allotted" (12.1.1), and piety forbids blame: "One must blame neither the gods … nor men" (12.12).

In this edition. Θεός in the singular is "God" for the power that orders the whole, "a god" where it is indefinite or predicative, and "the god within you" (3.5) or "my god" (5.10.2) for the god in a man, and once, of nature, "goddess" (9.1.1); the plural is "gods" or "the gods". Θεῖος is "divine", ὅσιος "holy", θεοσεβής "pious", ἀσεβεῖν "be impious" and σέβειν "revere".

A place to read. 6.44.1–2, where Marcus reasons from three suppositions about the gods' counsel to the counsel left to himself.

Meaning

Θεός (*theos*) is the common Greek word for a god. The gods of the Greek and Roman cities were many and immortal, honoured with sacrifice, prayer and oaths; what was right towards them was ὅσιος (*hosios*), "holy", as what was right towards men was δίκαιος (*dikaios*), "just", a pair Marcus keeps (7.66). The Stoics spoke also of God in the singular: a living being, immortal, rational and provident, not of human shape, the craftsman and as it were the father of all, called by many names according to his powers, among them Zeus, whom they call Δία (*Dia*) "because all things are through (*dia*) him".[274] Marcus' "one God through all things" (7.9) can be read in the light of that account. He passes from the plural to the singular from one sentence to the next: whoever counts things outside his choice good or bad must, when he fails of them, "blame the gods", and whoever

[274] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.147.

counts only what is in his power has no cause “to accuse God” (6.41; see Good, bad and indifference).

Use in the book

Marcus first meets the question as a condition: “To go away from among men, if there are gods, is nothing terrible …; and if either there are none, or they do not care for human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe empty of gods or empty of providence?” (2.11.1). Gods who do not care are those of Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, the edition’s note says (see Providence and atoms). Then he asserts: “But they do exist, and they do care for human affairs” (2.11.2; see Good, bad and indifference). Asked “Why, where have you seen the gods …?”, he answers twice. “First, they are even visible to sight”, probably the sun, moon and stars, the edition’s note says; “secondly, though, I have not seen my own soul either, and yet I honour it; so, then, the gods too: from what I experience of their power on each occasion, from that I grasp that they exist and I respect them” (12.28). Book I can be read as a list of that experience: good grandfathers, parents and teachers (1.17.1), help in dreams (1.17.9), and “the gifts and help and inspirations that come from them”; that he still falls short of the life according to nature is, he says, “my own fault” (1.17.6).

The fullest reasoning is 6.44. “If, then, the gods took counsel about me and about what ought to happen to me, they took good counsel; for a god without counsel is not easy even to conceive.” If they took none about him individually, they took it about the common affairs, whose consequences he “ought to welcome and cherish” (6.44.1). If after all they take counsel about nothing (“it is not holy to believe it; or else let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear …”), even then “it is open to me to take counsel about myself” (6.44.2; see Citizenship). At 12.5 the gods’ care meets a hard case: Marcus asks how the gods, “who ordered all things honourably and with love for mankind”, overlooked that men “most intimate with the divine” through “holy works and sacred rites” should, once dead, “not come to be again, but be quenched for ever?” He neither affirms nor denies it, but argues from the condition: “if, after all, this is indeed so, know well that, if it had had to be otherwise, they would have made it so”; to press further is “pleading a

case with God; and we would not so argue with the gods unless they are most good and most just."

God and mind belong together. "God sees all ruling centres naked of the material vessels and husks and dross" (12.2), and "the mind of each is a god and has flowed from there" (12.26; see Mind and reason). The singular stands in Marcus' question "How man touches God, and with what part of himself" (2.12), in the command "Follow God" (7.31), and in the two halves of a man's power: "to do nothing other than what God will praise, and to receive all that God deals out to him" (12.11).

What men owe the gods is piety. Marcus admired it in Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, "how pious he was, without superstition" (6.30.4; see Daimon). "Respect the gods, preserve men" (6.30.1). Of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, he asks "whether he could be content to be just in what concerns men and holy in what concerns gods" (7.66). Holiness has a content: "holiness, so that you love what is allotted, for nature brought it to you and you to it" (12.1.1); and the ruling centre that resents what happens leaves its place, "for it has been made for holiness and piety no less than for justice" (11.20.2). Piety forbids blame. At 9.1 the unjust man and the liar are impious towards nature, "the eldest of the gods" (9.1.1; see Justice), and the pursuer of pleasures is impious because he "must often blame the common nature" (9.1.2; see Good, bad and indifference). "If in another's, whom do you blame? The atoms or the gods? Both are madness" (8.17; see Providence and atoms); and neither the gods, who do no wrong, nor men, who do wrong only unwillingly, are to be blamed (12.12; see Fault and ignorance). Prayer turns the same way (see Prayer): if the gods have power, Marcus asks, why not pray that they give not fearing and not craving, rather than that things be absent or present (9.40; see Desire and aversion).

The gods are also a pattern. They bear with the base through all eternity, "and besides they even care for them in all sorts of ways", and Marcus asks whether he, about to cease and one of the base himself, gives up (7.70); and "they want not to be flattered, but want all rational beings to be assimilated to themselves" (10.8.4). Marcus' gods are those of the city's rites (6.44.2) and the Stoics' god at once, but his piety lies in the will: he believes from experience, reasons from the gods' goodness, and requires of himself

that he love what they allot, blame no one, and bear with men as they do.

Places to read

The passages where the gods are discussed or carry the argument, in the order of the book; every place is given in the sub-entries. Passing mentions, oaths by the gods and by Zeus, and the lines of poets and of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, that name the gods (7.39, 7.41, 7.46, 7.51, 11.6.1) are left out.

1.3 From his mother Marcus learned piety and generosity, and to abstain from doing ill and even from conceiving it.

1.17.1 From the gods Marcus has good grandfathers, parents, sister, teachers and friends, and it is the gods' doing of good that nothing arose to put him to the test.

1.17.6 As far as the gods and their gifts, help and inspirations go, nothing prevents Marcus from living according to nature; that he still falls short is his own fault.

1.17.9 Help was given Marcus in dreams, and his escape from sophists, treatises and syllogisms needed, in a quoted line, the help of gods and of fortune.

2.3 The works of the gods are full of providence, and Marcus is to die grateful to the gods from the heart.

2.4 Marcus remembers how many times the gods have given him days of grace that he has not used.

2.5 By mastering a few things a man can live a smoothly flowing and godly life, for the gods will ask nothing more of one who guards them.

2.11.1 To leave life is nothing terrible if there are gods; if there are none, or they do not care, Marcus asks what it is to him to live in a universe empty of gods or of providence.

2.11.2 The gods do exist and care for human affairs, and have put it wholly in man's power not to fall into what is truly bad.

2.12 Among the things for the mind to attend to is how man touches God, and with what part of himself.

2.13 What comes from the gods deserves respect because of virtue, as what comes from men deserves love because of kinship (see Daimon).

3.3 If death leads into another life, nothing is empty of gods there either.

3.4.3 The good man is a kind of priest and servant of the gods (see Daimon).

3.5 The god within Marcus is to be the guardian of a man who is male, elderly, civic, Roman and a ruler (see Daimon).

3.9 The faculty of forming opinions is to be revered, for it promises freedom from rash assent, affinity with men and following the gods.

3.11.3 Of each thing one must say whether it has come from God, from the fall of the lot and fortune, or from a fellow man.

3.13 Principles are to be ready for knowing things divine and human, for nothing human is done well without referring it to the divine.

3.16.1 To have the mind as guide to apparent duties belongs even to those who do not believe in the gods.

4.16 Within ten days Marcus will seem a god to those to whom he now seems a beast, if he turns back to the principles and reverence for reason.

4.31 Marcus is to go through the rest of life as one who has entrusted all that is his to the gods with his whole soul.

5.10.2 No one can compel Marcus to act against his god and daimon (see Daimon).

5.27 He lives with the gods who shows them his soul pleased with what is allotted and doing what the daimon wills (see Daimon).

5.33 Until his time comes, what is enough for Marcus is to revere the gods and speak well of them, and to do good to men.

6.16.4 The man who honours outside things must envy and plot, and often blame even the gods.

6.16.5 Respect for one's own understanding puts a man in accord with the gods, praising whatever they distribute and have ordained.

6.23 In all things Marcus is to call on the gods.

6.30.1 Marcus is to keep himself pious, to respect the gods and preserve men; the one fruit of life on earth is a holy disposition and social actions.

6.30.4 Antoninus was pious, without superstition.

6.35 Marcus asks whether it is not terrible that craftsmen respect the reason of their craft more than man respects his own, which he has in common with the gods.

6.41 Whoever counts things outside his choice good or bad must, when he fails of them, blame the gods; whoever counts only what is in his power has no cause to accuse God.

6.44.1 If the gods took counsel about Marcus they took good counsel, and if not about him individually, then about the common affairs, whose consequences he ought to welcome.

6.44.2 It is not holy to believe that the gods take counsel about nothing, or else sacrifice, prayer and oaths should stop; even if they take counsel about nothing, Marcus can take counsel about himself.

7.9 There is one universe out of all things and one God through all things.

7.31 Marcus tells himself to love the human race and follow God.

7.53 Where a work can be accomplished according to the reason common to gods and men, there is nothing terrible.

7.54 It is always in Marcus' power to be piously well pleased with the present conjuncture.

7.66 What matters in Socrates is whether he could be content to be just in what concerns men and holy in what concerns gods.

7.67 It is very possible to become a divine man and be recognised by no one, and despair of dialectic is no reason to give up hope of being obedient to God.

7.70 The immortal gods bear with the base and even care for them; Marcus asks whether he, about to cease and one of the base himself, gives up.

8.17 To blame the atoms or the gods is madness alike; one must blame no one.

8.19 The Sun and the other gods will say that they have come to be for some work, and Marcus asks himself what he is for.

8.23 What happens to Marcus he receives, referring it to the gods and to the spring of all things.

8.34 To no part but man has God granted to come together again with the whole once cut off (see Kinship and cooperation).

8.56 A neighbour's vice is not bad for Marcus, for God did not decide that his being unlucky should be in another's power.

9.1.1 He who acts unjustly is impious towards the nature of the whole, the eldest of the gods, and so is he who lies (see Justice).

9.1.2 Whoever pursues pleasures as good things is impious, for he must often blame the common nature (see Good, bad and indifference).

9.1.3 Whoever fears pains or pursues pleasures, or does not stand equally towards what the nature of the whole uses equally, is impious.

9.11 The gods are kindly even to those who do wrong, and work with them for health, wealth and fame.

9.27 The gods help even those who censure Marcus, through dreams and oracles.

9.28 If God, all is well; if at random, Marcus is not to act at random too (see Providence and atoms).

9.35 Marcus asks whether he will say that all things came about badly and that among so many gods no power was ever found to set them right.

9.37 Towards the gods too Marcus is now at last to become simpler and kinder.

9.40 Either the gods have no power or they have power; if they have, Marcus asks why he does not rather pray to be given not to fear or crave anything than that things be absent or present (see Desire and aversion).

10.1 Marcus asks whether he will ever persuade himself that everything present to him comes from the gods, and share citizenship with gods and men without blaming them.

10.8.4 The gods want not to be flattered but want all rational beings to be assimilated to themselves.

10.11 The man who has given himself to justice and to the nature of the whole wills nothing else than to bring the straight road to its end through the law and to follow God.

11.20.2 The ruling centre that resents what happens leaves its own place, for it was made for holiness and piety no less than for justice.

12.1.1 Holiness is to love what is allotted, for nature brought it to Marcus and him to it.

12.2 God sees all ruling centres naked of their material vessels, and touches with his own intelligence only what has flowed from himself into them.

12.5 Marcus asks how the gods overlooked that some very kind men, most intimate with the divine, are quenched for ever at death, and answers that if it is so, it ought to be so, for we would not argue with the gods unless they are most good and most just.

12.11 Man has the authority to do nothing but what God will praise, and to receive all that God deals out to him.

12.12 One must blame neither the gods, who do no wrong, nor men, who do wrong only unwillingly (see Fault and ignorance).

12.14 If providence admits of being propitiated, Marcus is to make himself worthy of help from the divine (see Providence and atoms).

12.26 The mind of each is a god and has flowed from there (see Mind and reason).

12.28 Asked where he has seen the gods, Marcus answers that they are visible to sight, and that, as he honours his soul unseen, he grasps their existence from what he experiences of their power.

12.31 If everything else is easy to despise, Marcus is to go forward to the last thing, to follow reason and God.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoics made the wise man pious. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out their teaching in its seventh book, reports that the wise are divine, “for they have in themselves as it were a god”, and the base man godless; that the wise are pious,

being experienced in the customs that concern the gods, piety being "knowledge of the service of the gods"; that they sacrifice to the gods and keep themselves pure, and the gods admire them, "for they are holy and just towards the divine"; and that the wise alone are priests.[275] Marcus' good man, "a kind of priest and servant of the gods" (3.4.3; see Daimon), and his "divine man" (7.67) can be read in the light of that account. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, sorts the opinions about the gods into five: that the divine does not exist; that it exists, but idle and careless, providing for nothing; that it provides, but for the great things of heaven and for nothing on earth; that it provides for earthly and human things too, but only in common and not for each man individually; and fifth, the view of Odysseus and Socrates, who say to the divine, in Homer's words, "nor do I escape you when I move".[276] The steps of 6.44.1, from counsel about Marcus himself to counsel about "the common affairs", can be read on that scale. The *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of the teaching, puts the chief thing in piety towards the gods in holding right opinions about them, "that they exist and that they govern the whole well and justly", and in having set oneself to obey them and to yield to all that happens, following it willingly as brought about by the best judgement: "for so you will never blame the gods, nor complain that you are neglected". Farmer, sailor and merchant revile the gods because they put the good in what is not in their power, and piety goes where advantage is.[277] Marcus' holiness at 12.1.1 and his rule against blame (6.41, 12.12) can be read as this piety. Balbus, the Stoic speaker in *On the Nature of the Gods*, the dialogue of Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, begins his proof of the gods with the sky: "what can be so plain and so evident, when we have looked up at the heaven and contemplated the things of heaven, as that there is some divinity of surpassing mind by which they are ruled?"[278] Marcus' first answer at 12.28, that the gods "are even visible to sight", can be read the same way.

---

[275] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.119.

[276] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.12.1–3, quoting Homer, *Iliad* 10.279–280.

[277] Epictetus, *Handbook* 31.1–4.

[278] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.4.

Other ancient sources

The suppositions of 2.11.1 and 6.44.2 are old. In Plato's *Laws* the Athenian, the dialogue's chief speaker, says that no one who holds, as the laws bid, that gods exist has ever of his own will done an unholy deed or let fall a lawless word; whoever does so is in one of three conditions: he does not hold that they exist; or he holds that they exist but give no thought to men; or he holds that sacrifices and prayers easily win them over and turn them aside.[279] Marcus names the first two at 2.11.1; the third can be read against 12.14, where, if providence "can be propitiated", Marcus' reply is not sacrifice but "make yourself worthy of help from the divine" (see Providence and atoms). Cicero, in his own preface to *On the Nature of the Gods*, makes the point of the parenthesis at 6.44.2. There are and have been philosophers who held that the gods have no care at all for human affairs; "if their view is true, what piety can there be, what holiness, what religion?" And if the gods neither can help us nor want to, nor care at all, nor notice what we do, why offer the immortal gods any worship, honours or prayers?[280]

Translation in this edition

Θεός in the singular is "God", with the capital, at twenty-four of its thirty-one occurrences (2.12, 3.11.3, 3.16.2, 5.34, 6.7, 6.41, 7.9, 7.31, 7.46, 7.67, 7.68 twice, 8.2, 8.34, 8.56, 9.10, 9.28, 10.11, 12.2, 12.5, 12.11 twice, 12.23, 12.31); "a god" where it is indefinite or predicative (4.16, 6.44.1, 12.4, 12.26); "the god within you" (3.5) and "my god" (5.10.2) of the god in a man; and, with the feminine article, "goddess" at 9.1.1, where it is the nature of the whole. J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, has θεός in lower case throughout; the capital is the edition's. "The Sun" at 8.19 has the capital because Leopold prints Ἥλιος there, where the sun speaks among "the other gods"; elsewhere the edition has "the sun" (5.20, 6.43, 8.57, 12.30). The plural is "gods" or "the gods" at all sixty-two occurrences, including the oaths "by the gods" (5.5, 7.17). Ζεύς is "Zeus" at all seven places, and νὴ Δία (*nē Dia*) "by Zeus" (5.6.2, 5.8.5).

Θεῖος is "divine" ("a divine man", 7.67; "the divine cause", 8.27), "more divine" in the comparative (6.17, 11.19), and with the article "the divine" (12.1.2, 12.5 twice, 12.14); τὰ θεῖα is

[279] Plato, *Laws* 10, 885b.

[280] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 1.3.

“things divine” (3.1, 3.13) and once “the divine” (3.13), and at 2.1 θείας ἀπομοίρας (*theias apomoiras*) is “a portion of the divine”. Ὅσιος is “holy” (4.18, 6.30.1, 6.44.2, 7.66, 12.5), and τὸ ὅσιον, of Antoninus, “his holiness” (6.30.2); ὁσιότης is “holiness”. Θεοσεβής is “pious”, and τὸ θεοσεβές “piety” (1.3); θεοσέβεια is “piety” and θεοσεβῶς “piously”. Ἀσεβεῖν is “be impious” (9.1.1–3) and ἀσεβής “impious” (9.1.3). Σέβειν is “revere” and σεβασμός “reverence”; “respect” renders αἰδεῖσθαι (*aideisthai*) in “Respect the gods” (6.30.1) and “I respect them” (12.28), and “honour” there renders τιμᾶν (*timan*). “Holy” is kept for ὅσιος, and “sacred” renders ἱερός (*hieros*; 7.9, 10.9) and, in “sacred rites”, ἱερουργία (12.5). Εὐσέβεια (*eusebeia*), the common word for piety, does not occur in the book. Θεουδής is “godly” (2.5), θεόθεν “from the gods” (7.51), and θεοφόρητος “borne by God” (12.23), where the note gives also “god-possessed”. Θύειν (*thyein*) is “sacrifice” (6.44.2) and, in the passive participle, “being sacrificed” (10.28); θύτης (*thytēs*) is “sacrificers” in the court of Augustus (8.31). Ὅρκος (*horkos*) is “oath” (3.5), and ὀμνύναι (*omnynai*) “swear” (6.44.2).

ἀσεβέω

Attested: ἀσεβεῖ (*asebei*; 9.1.1 three times, 9.1.2 twice, 9.1.3). To be impious, to fail in what is owed to the gods. At 9.1 impiety is measured against the nature of the whole, “the eldest of the gods”: “He who acts unjustly is impious”; the liar “is impious concerning the same goddess”; “he who pursues pleasures as good things and flees pains as bad is impious”; and whoever does not stand equally towards what the nature of the whole uses equally “is clearly impious” (9.1.1–3; see Justice). Lemma: ἀσεβέω.

ἀσεβής

Attested: ἀσεβές (*asebes*; 9.1.3 twice). Impious. Whoever fears pains will some day fear something of what will be in the universe, “and this is already impious”; the pursuer of pleasures will not abstain from injustice, “and this is plainly impious” (9.1.3). Lemma: ἀσεβής.

ἐπίπνοια

Attested: ἐπιπνοίαις (*epipnoiais*; 1.17.6). A breathing upon, inspiration. Marcus thanks the gods that, “as far as depends on the gods and on the gifts and help and inspirations that come from them”, nothing prevents him from living

according to nature (1.17.6). The word is the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have ἐπινοίαις (*epinoiais*), "thoughts". Lemma: ἐπίπνοια.

Ζεύς

Attested: Διός (*Dios*; 4.23, 5.8.4, 11.8), Δία (*Dia*; 5.6.2, 5.8.5), Ζεῦ (*Zeu*; 5.7), Ζεύς (*Zeus*; 5.27). Zeus, the chief of the gods, and for the Stoics the god of the whole. Marcus asks whether he will not say of the universe "O dear city of Zeus" (4.23), and whatever happens leads "to the health of the universe and to the good journey and prosperity of Zeus" (5.8.4); Zeus has given each man the daimon, "a fragment of himself" (5.27; see Daimon), and the power to grow together again with the whole is "a gift of Zeus, who established the fellowship" (11.8; see Kinship and cooperation). At 5.7 Marcus copies a prayer of the Athenians, "Rain, rain, dear Zeus, on the ploughland of the Athenians and on the plains" (see Prayer). The oath νὴ Δία (*nē Dia*) is "by Zeus" (5.6.2, 5.8.5). Lemma: Ζεύς.

θεῖος

Attested: θείας (*theias*; 2.1), θείων (*theiōn*; 3.1), θεῖα (*theia*; 3.13 twice), θειότερον (*theioteron*; 6.17), θεῖον (*theion*; 7.67, 12.1.2, 12.5), θείαν (*theian*; 8.27), θειοτέρου (*theioterou*; 11.19), θείῳ (*theiōi*; 12.5), θείου (*theiou*; 12.14). Divine, of the gods. "You will do nothing human well without referring it to the divine as well, nor the reverse" (3.13); "it is very possible to become a divine man and to be recognised by no one" (7.67); and of the relation "to the divine cause, from which all things happen to all" (8.27). The motion of virtue is "something more divine" than the courses of the elements (6.17), and the "more divine part" in a man must not bow before the body (11.19). Lemma: θεῖος.

θεόθεν

Attested: θεόθεν (*theothen*; 7.51). From the gods. In tragic lines that Marcus copies, from a play the edition's note leaves unknown: "But the wind that blows from the gods / one must bear, in toils without lament" (7.51). Lemma: θεόθεν.

θεός

Attested: θεούς (*theous*; 1.16.3, 3.16.1, 5.5, 5.33, 6.23, 6.30.1, 6.35, 6.44.2, 7.17, 7.66, 8.23, 9.37, 12.28 twice),

θεῶν (*theōn*; 1.17.1 twice, 1.17.6, 1.17.9, 2.3, 2.4, 2.11.1, 2.13 twice, 3.3, 3.4.3, 4.47, 7.41, 9.1.1, 10.1, 10.8.4, 11.6.1, 11.13), θεοῖς (*theois*; 1.17.6, 2.3, 3.6.2, 3.9, 4.31, 5.27 twice, 5.31, 6.16.4, 6.16.5, 6.41, 7.39, 7.53, 8.17, 9.35, 10.1, 12.5, 12.12, 12.27), θεοί (*theoi*; 2.5, 2.11.1, 6.44.1, 7.70, 8.19, 9.11, 9.27, 9.40 three times, 12.5), θεοῦ (*theou*; 2.12, 3.11.3, 5.34, 6.7, 7.68), θεός (*theos*; 3.5, 4.16, 7.9, 8.34, 9.10, 9.28, 12.2, 12.4, 12.11 twice, 12.26), θεῷ (*theōi*; 3.16.2, 6.41, 7.31, 7.46, 7.67, 7.68, 8.2, 8.56, 10.11, 12.23, 12.31), θεόν (*theon*; 5.10.2, 6.44.1, 9.1.1, 12.5). A god; in the plural, the gods; in the singular, God, the power that orders the whole. “But they do exist, and they do care for human affairs” (2.11.2); “one God through all things” (7.9). The mind of each is “a god” (12.26), and the god within a man is “the god within you” (3.5) and “my god” (5.10.2); at 9.1.1 the feminine θεόν is the nature of the whole, “the same goddess”. Lemma: θεός.

θεοσέβεια

Attested: θεοσέβειαν (*theosebeian*; 11.20.2). Reverence for the gods, piety. Whenever the ruling centre resents anything that happens, it leaves its own place, “for it has been made for holiness and piety no less than for justice. For these too are of the kind of good fellowship, or rather older than just actions” (11.20.2). Lemma: θεοσέβεια.

θεοσεβής

Attested: θεοσεβές (*theosebes*; 1.3), θεοσεβῆ (*theosebē*; 6.30.1), θεοσεβής (*theosebēs*; 6.30.4); the adverb θεοσεβῶς (*theosebōs*; 7.54). Reverent towards the gods, pious; the neuter with the article serves as a noun, “piety”. From his mother Marcus learned “piety and generosity” (1.3); he is to keep himself “pious” (6.30.1), as Antoninus was “pious … without superstition” (6.30.4); and it is always in his power “to be piously well pleased with the present conjuncture” (7.54). Lemma: θεοσεβής.

θεουδής

Attested: θεουδῆ (*theoudē*; 2.5). God-fearing, godly. “You see how few the things are by mastering which a man can live a smoothly flowing and godly life; for the gods will ask nothing more of one who guards them” (2.5). Lemma: θεουδής.

θεοφόρητος

Attested: θεοφόρητος (*theophorētos*; 12.23). Borne by God, or, as the note at the place adds, god-possessed. Of the ending of life, which is good "if indeed it is opportune for the whole": "For so he too is borne by God who is carried along the same way as God and is carried, in frame of mind, towards the same things" (12.23; see Change). The word ends a chain of plays on φέρειν (*pherein*), "carry", which the note sets out. Lemma: θεοφόρητος.

θύω

Attested: θύωμεν (*thyōmen*; 6.44.2), θυομένῳ (*thyomenōi*; 10.28). To sacrifice. Of the belief that the gods take counsel about nothing: "it is not holy to believe it; or else let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear nor do the other things we do at every turn as to gods present and living alongside us" (6.44.2). Marcus is to form the impression that whoever is distressed or discontented at anything is "like the piglet being sacrificed, kicking and squealing" (10.28). Lemma: θύω.

ἱερουργία

Attested: ἱερουργιῶν (*hierourgiōn*; 12.5). The performance of sacred rites. Some very kind men have become "most intimate with the divine" through "holy works and sacred rites"; Marcus asks how the gods overlooked their being quenched for ever at death (12.5). Lemma: ἱερουργία.

ὅρκος

Attested: ὅρκου (*horkou*; 3.5). An oath. The god within Marcus is to be the guardian of one who has taken up his post as a man waiting for the recall from life, ready to be released, "needing neither oath nor any man as witness" (3.5; see Daimon). Lemma: ὅρκος.

ὅσιος

Attested: ὅσιον (*hosion*; 4.18, 6.30.2, 6.44.2), ὁσία (*hosia*; 6.30.1), ὅσιος (*hosios*; 7.66), ὁσίων (*hosiōn*; 12.5). Holy, right in what concerns the gods; with the article, "holiness". A man is to look only at what he himself is doing, "that this very thing may be just and holy" (4.18); "there is one fruit of life on earth, a holy disposition and social actions" (6.30.1); of the belief that the gods take counsel about nothing, "it is not holy to believe it" (6.44.2); Socrates is to be judged by

whether he could be “just in what concerns men and holy in what concerns gods” (7.66). Among Antoninus’ qualities is “his holiness” (6.30.2). Lemma: ὅσιος.

ὁσιότης

Attested: ὁσιότης (*hosiotēs*; 5.9), ὁσιότητα (*hosiotēta*; 11.20.2, 12.1.1 twice). Holiness. Marcus is to look whether greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, fair-mindedness and holiness are not more agreeable than pleasure (5.9); holiness is “so that you love what is allotted” (12.1.1); and the ruling centre “has been made for holiness and piety no less than for justice” (11.20.2), where ὁσιότητα is Casaubon’s correction, which Leopold prints, for ἰσότητα (*isotēta*), “equality”. Lemma: ὁσιότης.

σεβασμός

Attested: σεβασμόν (*sebasmon*; 4.16). Reverence, worship. “Within ten days you will seem a god to those to whom you now seem a beast and an ape, if you turn back to the principles and reverence for reason” (4.16). Lemma: σεβασμός.

σέβω

Attested: σέβε (*sebe*; 3.9), σέβειν (*sebein*; 5.33), σέβω (*sebō*; 6.10), σέβεις (*sebeis*; 6.36, 12.28). To revere, to hold in awe. Its objects are the gods (5.33, 12.28), “that which you revere”, the spring of all things (6.36), and “the faculty of forming opinions” (3.9); at 6.10 it stands alone, “I revere”. Asked “that you revere them so?”, Marcus answers from what he experiences of the gods’ power (12.28). Lemma: σέβω.

See also

Change; Citizenship; Daimon; Desire and aversion; Fault and ignorance; Good, bad and indifference; Justice; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Prayer; Providence and atoms.

Interconnection

Binding together and the sympathy of the whole · Meditations

συμπάθεια, sympatheia, “sympathy”; *συμπαθής, sympathēs*, “in sympathy”, “share the passions”; *σύνδεσις,*

syndesis, “bond”, “bound”; *ἐπισύνδεσις, episyndesis*, “binding together”; *ἐπιπλέκεσθαι, epiplekesthai*, “woven together”, “woven in”; *τονικός, tonikos*, “tensional”; *ἕνωσις, henōsis*, “unity”; *ἑνοῦν, henoun*, “unified”, “unifies”, “unite”; *δυσένωτος, dysenōtos*, “hard to unite”; *συνάφεια, synapheia*, “connection”; *συνέχεια, synecheia*, “continuity”, “continuous run”; *συνέχειν, synechein*, “held together”, “holds … together”, “held fast”, “hold to”; *συναρμόζειν, synarmozein*, “fit”, “fitted”, “joining”, “in tune”, “in harmony”; *συμφυής, symphyēs*, “grown together”; *συμφύειν, symphyein*, “grow together”; *ἀπόστημα, apostēma*, “abscess”

At a Glance

The word. Συμπάθεια is being affected together: things are in sympathy when what touches one is felt by the other. For the Stoics it was the mark of a unified body, and they found it in the universe. Σύνδεσις and ἐπισύνδεσις are binding, ἕνωσις unity, συνάφεια connection and συνέχεια continuity.

In the *Meditations*. “All things are woven together, and the bond is sacred” (7.9), and Marcus tells himself to “consider often the binding together of all things in the universe” (6.38). Sympathy carries what the flesh undergoes to the understanding (5.26), and higher up reaches “even in things separate”, as among the stars (9.9.2); rational beings too are joined “in things separate” (7.13). A man can throw himself off from the unity, but only “so far as in him lies”, and he alone can return (8.34).

In this edition. Συμπάθεια is “sympathy” at both its places, and συμπαθής “in sympathy” (4.27) and “to share the passions” (7.66); σύνδεσις is “the bond” (7.9) and ἐπισύνδεσις “the binding together” (6.38); ἕνωσις is always “unity”, συνάφεια “connection”, and συνέχεια “continuity” (5.8.5).

A place to read. 6.38, where Marcus tells himself to consider often the binding together of all things, and gives the reason: the tensional motion, the breathing together and the unity of substance.

Meaning

Συμπάθεια (*sympatheia*) joins σύν (*syn*), “with”, to πάθος (*pathos*), what one undergoes. In Stoic physics it was the sign that a body is one, and the school argued from the

sympathies of moon, tide and stars that the universe is a unified body (see Breath).[281] Σύνδεσις (*syndesis*), from δεῖν (*dein*), "to bind", is a binding together, and ἐπισύνδεσις (*episyndesis*), with ἐπί (*epi*), "on", the binding of one thing on to the next. The handbook of the philosophers' opinions on nature that has come down among the works of Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, gives the Stoic definition of fate as "a chain of causes, that is, an order and binding together not to be transgressed" (see Fate and allotment).[282] Marcus has ἐπισύνδεσις at 6.38, and "an order not to be transgressed" at 12.14 (see Providence and atoms). Ἕνωσις (*henōsis*), from ἑνοῦν (*henoun*), "to make one", is unity; συνάφεια (*synapheia*), from συνάπτειν (*synaptein*), "to fasten together", is connection; συνέχεια (*synecheia*), from συνέχειν (*synechein*), "to hold together", is continuity. Marcus uses these words of the universe (4.27, 6.38, 7.9), of a body (5.26), and of beings joined though separate (7.13, 9.9.2).

Use in the book

The whole is woven. "Consider often the binding together of all things in the universe and their relation to one another. For in a way all things are woven in with one another, and all are for this reason friendly to one another; for one thing comes in sequence after another because of the tensional motion, the breathing together, and the unity of substance" (6.38). The reason given is Stoic, the tensional motion being, as the edition's note says, the tension of the breath that holds the universe together (see Breath). "In a way" limits the weaving, and the friendliness follows from it. At 7.9 the thought returns, with more: "All things are woven together, and the bond is sacred, and almost nothing is alien one to another; for they have been ranged together, and together they order the same universe" (7.9). The bond is called sacred, ἱερά (*hiera*), and the claim that nothing is alien is held back by "almost"; the sentence that follows, through one universe, one God, one substance and one law to one truth, ends on a condition, "if indeed there is also one perfection for the living beings that are of one kind and share in the same reason" (7.9).

---

[281] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* 9.77–80; Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.19.

[282] [Plutarch], *On the Opinions of the Philosophers* 1.28, 885b.

What follows comes on what went before not as “some enumeration” but as “a reasoned connection” (4.45; see Cosmos and order). The entire “is maimed if you cut off anything at all from the connection and continuity, as of the parts, so indeed of the causes too”, and Marcus cuts it off “as far as lies in you, whenever you are discontented, and in a way you destroy it” (5.8.5; see Contentment and self-sufficiency). The cut is limited twice, by “as far as lies in you” and by “in a way”.

Sympathy is named at four places. In the universe it is a reason against disorder: Marcus asks whether there can be order in him and disorder in the totality, “and that when all things are so distinguished and diffused and in sympathy” (4.27; see Providence and atoms). In a man it carries what the flesh undergoes “up into the understanding by the other sympathy, as in a body that is unified”, and the sensation is not to be resisted (5.26; see Ruling centre). “The other sympathy” is perhaps, the edition’s note says, that of soul and body, as against the universe’s. Yet Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, is to be judged by whether, among other things, he kept from “lending the mind to share the passions of the poor flesh” (7.66; see Body and flesh). The two places can be read together as admitting the sensation by sympathy and refusing the passion. Everything earthy inclines towards earth (9.9.1); where there are souls there are swarms and herds, among rational beings commonwealths and friendships; “Among the still better, even out of things separate, a kind of unity subsisted, as among the stars. So the ascent towards the better could produce sympathy even in things separate” (9.9.2; see Kinship and cooperation). The school found sympathy only in what is unified. Marcus finds it in things apart, and sets men in the same place: “As the limbs of the body are in things unified, so are rational beings in things separate, made for one joint working” (7.13; see Kinship and cooperation).

Rational beings can also break the bond. The soul does violence to itself first “when it becomes, as far as it can, an abscess and a kind of tumour on the universe; for to resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature” (2.16; see Nature); the abscess returns at 4.29 (see Citizenship). The man who does not want what happens and splits himself off, or does something unsocial, makes himself, “so far as in him lies”, a severed hand, thrown off “from the unity

according to nature"; yet he alone of the parts can unite himself again (8.34; see Kinship and cooperation). It is open to us "to grow together again", though division happening often makes what goes away "hard to unite and hard to restore" (11.8; see Kinship and cooperation).

The binding of all things holds whether Marcus attends to it or not. Stones and plants are held together by cohesion or by nature (6.14); rational beings, separate in body, are joined as limbs of one system; they alone sever themselves, and they alone can grow back (8.34, 11.8). This can be read as Marcus' turn on the school's physics: interconnection is a fact for everything, and for rational beings a task, kept or broken by their own judgement of what happens.

Places to read

Every chapter in which συμπάθεια, συμπαθής, σύνδεσις, ἐπισύνδεσις, ἐπιπλέκεσθαι, τονικός, ἕνωσις, ἑνοῦν, δυσένωτος, συνάφεια, συνέχεια, συνέχειν, συναρμόζειν, συμφυής, συμφύειν or ἀπόστημα occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. Σύμπνοια (*sympnoia*; 6.38) is given under Breath, ἐπιπλοκή (*epiplokē*; 2.3, 10.5) under Fate and allotment and ἔνδεσις (*endesis*; 10.28) under Necessity and chance; σύμφυτος (*symphytos*; 12.3.1), and συνεχής (*synechēs*) with its adverb συνεχῶς (*synechōs*), "continual" and "continually", are left out.

2.16 The soul does violence to itself first when it becomes, as far as it can, an abscess and a kind of tumour on the universe, for to resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature (see Nature).

3.10 Marcus is to throw everything else away and hold to these few things only, remembering that each lives only the present (see Time and eternity).

3.13 Marcus is to have his principles ready, as doctors have their instruments, for doing everything as one who remembers how things divine and human are bound to each other (see Principles and reminders).

3.16.2 The good man must come to the end of life fitted without constraint to his own lot (see Fate and allotment).

4.23 Everything is in tune with Marcus that is in tune with the universe (see Nature).

4.27 Marcus asks whether there can be order in him and disorder in the totality, and that when all things are so distinguished and diffused and in sympathy (see Providence and atoms).

4.29 He who stands apart and separates himself from the reason of the common nature by being discontented with what happens is an abscess on the universe (see Citizenship).

4.45 What follows comes on what went before not like an enumeration but in a reasoned connection; the things that are have been ordered together in harmony (see Cosmos and order).

5.8.2 Things fit us as squared stones in walls or pyramids fit, joining one another in a certain arrangement, for there is one harmony (see Fate and allotment).

5.8.5 The entire is maimed if anything at all is cut off from the connection and continuity of the parts or of the causes, and Marcus cuts it off, as far as lies in him, whenever he is discontented (see Contentment and self-sufficiency).

5.16 Marcus is to dye his soul with a continuous run of impressions, such as that the good of a rational living being is fellowship (see Impression).

5.26 When what the flesh undergoes passes up into the understanding by the other sympathy, as in a body that is unified, the sensation is natural and not to be resisted, but the ruling centre is not to add the opinion that it is good or bad (see Ruling centre).

5.30 The mind of the whole is social: it has made the worse for the sake of the better and fitted the better to one another.

6.4 All the underlying things will very soon change, and be turned to vapour if substance is unified, or be scattered (see Providence and atoms).

6.10 Marcus sets out the alternative: either a jumble, an intertwining and a scattering, or unity, order and providence (see Providence and atoms).

6.14 The multitude admires things held together by cohesion or by nature, the more measured things

held together by soul, the more refined things held together by a rational soul (see Soul).

6.38 Marcus is to consider often the binding together of all things in the universe: in a way all are woven in with one another and for this reason friendly, because of the tensional motion, the breathing together and the unity of substance.

6.39 Marcus is to fit himself to the things that have fallen to his lot, and to love the people whose lot he shares (see Fate and allotment).

6.40 In things held together by nature the power that made them is within and remains (see Nature).

7.9 All things are woven together, the bond is sacred and almost nothing is alien to another, for they have been ranged together and together order the same universe.

7.13 As the limbs of the body are in things unified, so are rational beings in things separate, made for one joint working (see Kinship and cooperation).

7.19 All bodies pass through the substance of the whole as through a torrent, grown together with the whole and working with it (see Substance).

7.32 Death is scattering, if atoms; otherwise, quenching or migration (see Providence and atoms).

7.66 Socrates is to be judged by whether, among other things, he did not lend his mind to share the passions of the poor flesh (see Body and flesh).

8.34 Whoever does not want what happens and splits himself off has been thrown off from the unity according to nature, but it is open to him to unite himself again and grow together (see Kinship and cooperation).

9.9.2 Among the still better a kind of unity subsisted even out of things separate, as among the stars, and the ascent towards the better could produce sympathy even in things separate (see Kinship and cooperation).

9.35 Marcus asks whether it is to be said that no power among so many gods was ever found to set things right, and that the universe has been condemned to be held fast in unceasing bad things (see Change).

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will persuade itself that all is well, whatever the gods mean to give for the preservation of the perfect living being, which generates all things and holds them together (see Cosmos and order).

11.8 It is open to men to grow together again with what is adjacent, but division happening often makes what goes away hard to unite and hard to restore (see Kinship and cooperation).

12.30 The breaths and the underlying things, though without affinity to one another, are held together, while understanding joins with its kindred stock (see Substance).

Epictetus and the Stoics

When someone asked Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, how one could be persuaded that everything one does is seen by God, he answered with two questions: did it not seem to him that all things are unified, and that the things on earth are in sympathy with the things in heaven? The man granted both. How else, Epictetus went on, do plants flower when God tells them to, put out shoots, bear and ripen their fruit, shed their leaves and rest, as if at a command; and how else do the waxing and waning of the moon and the coming and going of the sun bring such variation and change to the things on earth? If plants and our bodies are so bound in with the whole and affected along with it, are not our souls much more so?[283] His next step makes souls parts and fragments of God (see Daimon). Sextus Empiricus, the Sceptic philosopher and doctor of the late second century, among the arguments of those who hold that there are gods, reports one that made sympathy a proof. Of bodies, some are unified, held by a single cohesion, as plants and animals; some are made of things joined, lying side by side and tending to one head, as chains, turrets and ships; some are made of things separate, set apart and each standing by itself, as armies, flocks and choruses. The universe is a body, and the sympathies about it show that it is unified: with the waxing and waning of the moon many creatures of land and sea wane and grow, and ebbs and floods come about in parts of the sea; at the rising and setting of certain

[283] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.14.1–5.

stars the surrounding air changes, sometimes for the better, sometimes with pestilence. In bodies of things joined or separate the parts do not suffer with one another, for if all the soldiers of an army are destroyed the one who survives suffers nothing by transmission; but in unified bodies there is a kind of sympathy, since when a finger is cut the whole body is affected with it. Unified bodies, Sextus adds, are held together by bare cohesion, by nature or by soul: stones and timber, plants, animals.[284] These are the heads of Marcus' 6.14, and his "things unified" and "things separate" (7.13, 9.9.2) can be read as the terms of the same division. His "sympathy even in things separate" (9.9.2) can be read as claiming for the stars what the argument allowed only to a unified body, and his limbs "in things separate" (7.13) as claiming a like unity for rational beings. Two further witnesses bear on it (see Breath): Chrysippus, the school's third head, for whom a breath holds the whole together and keeps it in sympathy with itself, as Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Aristotelian commentator of about AD 200, reports; and Balbus, the Stoic speaker in *On the Nature of the Gods*, the dialogue of Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, who appeals to the breathing together of the world's parts.

Other ancient sources

In the second book of *On Divination*, Cicero answers in his own person the Stoic case for divination that his brother Quintus made in the first. He grants that there is some linkage in nature, and lists what the Stoics collect: the livers of mice are said to swell in the depth of winter, and dry pennyroyal to blossom on midwinter's day itself; strings on a lyre ring out when others are plucked; oysters and all shellfish grow and shrink with the moon; the ebb and flow of straits and seas is governed by its motion. Countless such cases, he says, could be brought to show a natural kinship of things far apart. Let that be granted; but by what joining of nature, by what "harmony and agreement, which the Greeks call sympathy", can a fissure in a liver agree with his small gain, or his little profit with heaven, earth and the nature of things?[285] Marcus never uses sympathy for omens. The kinship of things far apart is the one he finds among the stars (9.9.2) and, as limbs of one system, among rational

[284] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* 9.77–81.

[285] Cicero, *On Divination* 2.33–34.

beings (7.13), and can be read as turned from divination to fellowship.

Translation in this edition

Συμπάθεια is “sympathy” at both its places (5.26, 9.9.2). The adjective συμπαθής is “in sympathy” (4.27) and, at 7.66, where Socrates is judged by whether he kept from lending the mind to the passions of the poor flesh, “to share the passions”. Σύνδεσις is “the bond” (7.9), and at 3.13 it is rendered with a verb, “how the two are bound to each other”; ἐπισύνδεσις is “the binding together” (6.38). Ἐπιπλέκεσθαι is “are woven in with” (6.38) and “are woven together” (7.9); “interweaving” renders ἐπιπλοκή (2.3, 10.5; see Fate and allotment), “intertwining” ἀντεμπλοκή (*antemplokē*; 6.10, and “intertwinings” at 7.50; see Providence and atoms), and “the breathing together” σύμπνοια (6.38; see Breath). Τονικός is “tensional” (6.38). Ἕνωσις is “unity” at all five places; ἑνοῦν is “unified” (5.26, 7.13), “is unified” (6.4), “unite” (8.34) and, with the article, “what unifies” (12.30); δυσένωτος is “hard to unite” (11.8). Συνάφεια is “connection” (4.45, 5.8.5), συνέχεια “continuity” (5.8.5) and “a continuous run” (5.16). Συνέχειν is “held together” (6.14, 6.40, 12.30), “holds … together” (10.1), “be held fast” (9.35) and “hold to” (3.10); at 6.14 the English repeats “held together” for the two heads the Greek leaves without a verb. Συναρμόζειν is “fitted” (3.16.2, 5.30), “is in tune” (4.23), “joining” (5.8.2) and “fit yourself” (6.39), and the adverb συνηρμοσμένως “in harmony” (4.45). At 4.23 the second “in tune” renders εὐάρμοστον (*euarmoston*), as “in tune” renders εὐάρμοστος at 1.9.2, 6.16.5 and 7.5 and εὐαρμοστία (*euarmostia*) at 10.1; “harmony” at 5.8.2 and 6.11 is ἁρμονία (*harmonia*). Συμφυής is “grown together” (7.19) and συμφύειν “grow together” (8.34, 11.8); “grown with it” at 12.3.1 renders σύμφυτος (*symphytos*). Ἀπόστημα is “abscess” (2.16, 4.29), beside φῦμα (*phyma*), “tumour” (2.16); at 2.16 it plays, as the edition’s note says, on ἀπόστασις (*apostasis*), “standing apart”, rendered “to stand apart”. “Their relation to one another” at 6.38 renders σχέσιν πρὸς ἄλληλα (*schesin pros allēla*), “friendly” φίλα (*phila*), and “alien” at 7.9 ἀλλότριον (*allotrion*). “Bound fast” at 3.8 renders προσδεδεμένον (*prosdedemenon*), of the purified understanding, which has nothing bound fast in it, and “bondage” at 10.28 ἔνδεσις (*endesis*; see Necessity and chance). Συνεχής and συνεχῶς

are “continual” and “continually”. At 7.9 J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, follows A, the Vatican manuscript; in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, the sentence runs “one universe through all things”, without “out of all things, and one God”.

ἀπόστημα

Attested: ἀπόστημα (*apostēma*; 2.16, 4.29). An abscess; in ordinary Greek also a distance, from ἀφιστάναι (*aphistanai*), “to stand off”, the verb of “he who stands apart” at 4.29. The soul does violence to itself “when it becomes, as far as it can, an abscess and a kind of tumour on the universe” (2.16); “an abscess on the universe, he who stands apart and separates himself from the reason of the common nature by being discontented with what happens” (4.29; see Citizenship). Lemma: ἀπόστημα.

δυσένωτος

Attested: δυσένωτον (*dysenōton*; 11.8). Hard to unite. Division happening often “makes ⟨that which⟩ goes away hard to unite and hard to restore” (11.8; see Kinship and cooperation). “That which” renders the article supplied by Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, as the edition’s note says. Lemma: δυσένωτος.

ἑνόω

Attested: ἡνωμένῳ (*hēnōmenōi*; 5.26), ἥνωται (*hēnōtai*; 6.4), ἡνωμένοις (*hēnōmenois*; 7.13), ἑνῶσαι (*henōsai*; 8.34), ἑνοῦν (*henoun*; 12.30). To make one, to unify. What the flesh undergoes passes to the understanding “as in a body that is unified” (5.26); the underlying things will be turned to vapour “if substance is unified” (6.4); “As the limbs of the body are in things unified, so are rational beings in things separate” (7.13); “it is open to you to unite yourself again” (8.34). At 12.30, “held together by what unifies”, τὸ ἑνοῦν is the correction of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*, which Leopold adopts; Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, proposed τὸ νοοῦν (*to nooun*), “what thinks”, and the witnesses have τὸν νοῦν (*ton noun*), “the mind”. Lemma: ἑνόω.

ἕνωσις

Attested: ἕνωσις (*henōsis*; 6.10, 7.32, 9.9.2), ἕνωσιν (*henōsin*; 6.38), ἑνώσεως (*henōseōs*; 8.34). A making one,

unity. In the universe, “the unity of substance” (6.38) and, as one member of the disjunction, “unity, order and providence” (6.10); among things separate, “a kind of unity subsisted, as among the stars” (9.9.2); for a man, “You have been thrown off, somewhere, from the unity according to nature” (8.34). At 7.32, “but if unity, either quenching or migration”, “if unity” is the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, which Leopold prints; A has “or unity”, and P ἢ κένωσις (*ē kenōsis*), “or emptying”. Lemma: ἕνωσις.

ἐπιπλέκω

Attested: ἐπιπέπλεκται (*epipeplektai*; 6.38), ἐπιπλέκεται (*epipleketai*; 7.9). To twine on, to weave in; in the passive, to be woven together. “For in a way all things are woven in with one another” (6.38); “All things are woven together, and the bond is sacred” (7.9). At 6.38 A has the present ἐπιπλέκεται, and at 7.9 Coraes proposed the perfect ἐπιπέπλεκται, as Leopold reports. Lemma: ἐπιπλέκω.

ἐπισύνδεσις

Attested: ἐπισύνδεσιν (*episyndesin*; 6.38). A binding of one thing on to another, a binding together; the Stoics’ word in their definition of fate. “Consider often the binding together of all things in the universe and their relation to one another” (6.38). Lemma: ἐπισύνδεσις.

συμπάθεια

Attested: συμπάθειαν (*sympatheian*; 5.26, 9.9.2). Being affected together, sympathy; in Stoic physics the mark of a unified body. What the flesh undergoes passes “up into the understanding by the other sympathy, as in a body that is unified” (5.26); “So the ascent towards the better could produce sympathy even in things separate” (9.9.2). At 5.26 Rendall proposed “the sympathy of the parts” and Herbert Richards, whose notes on Marcus Aurelius appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905, “our sympathy”, as the edition’s note records; the manuscripts’ “the other sympathy” stands in Leopold’s text. At 9.9.2 A omits both “out of” and “in” before “things separate”. Lemma: συμπάθεια.

συμπαθής

Attested: συμπαθῶν (*sympathōn*; 4.27), συμπαθῆ (*sympathē*; 7.66). Affected together, in sympathy. All things are “so distinguished and diffused and in sympathy” (4.27);

Socrates was to be judged by whether he could be content to be just and holy, “nor lending the mind to share the passions of the poor flesh” (7.66). Lemma: συμπαθής.

συμφυής

Attested: συμφυῆ (*symphyē*; 7.19). Grown together, of one growth with. All bodies pass through the substance of the whole, “grown together with the whole and working with it, as our limbs with one another” (7.19; see Substance). Lemma: συμφυής.

συμφύω

Attested: συμφῦναι (*symphynai*; 8.34, 11.8). In the intransitive tenses, to grow together. God has made it in man’s power, “once broken off, to come back and grow together and take up again the post of a part” (8.34); “it is open to us to grow together again with what is adjacent” (11.8). At 8.34 A has συμβῆναι (*symbēnai*), “to come together”, as Leopold reports. Lemma: συμφύω.

συναρμόζω

Attested: συνηρμοσμένον (*synērmosmenon*; 3.16.2), συναρμόζει (*synarmozei*; 4.23), συνηρμοσμένως (*synērmosmenōs*, adverb of the perfect participle; 4.45), συναρμόζοντας (*synarmozontas*; 5.8.2), συνήρμοσεν (*synērmosen*; 5.30), συνάρμοζε (*synarmoze*; 6.39). To fit together, join; to be in tune. The mind of the whole “has made the worse for the sake of the better, and fitted the better to one another” (5.30); “Everything is in tune with me that is in tune with you, O universe” (4.23); “the squared stones in walls or pyramids ‘fit’, joining one another in a certain arrangement” (5.8.2); “The things that have fallen to your lot: fit yourself to these” (6.39); the good man is “fitted without constraint to his own lot” (3.16.2). At 5.8.2 the books of excerpts have the nominative συναρμόζοντες (*synarmozontes*). Lemma: συναρμόζω.

συνάφεια

Attested: συνάφεια (*synapheia*; 4.45), συναφείας (*synapheias*; 5.8.5). A fastening together, connection. What follows is not “some enumeration … but a reasoned connection” (4.45); “the entire is maimed if you cut off anything at all from the connection and continuity” (5.8.5). Lemma: συνάφεια.

σύνδεσις

Attested: συνδέσεως (*syndeseōs*; 3.13), σύνδεσις (*syndesis*; 7.9). A binding together, a bond. Marcus is to do everything "as one who remembers how the two are bound to each other", things divine and human (3.13); "All things are woven together, and the bond is sacred" (7.9). Lemma: σύνδεσις.

συνέχεια

Attested: συνεχείας (*synecheias*; 5.8.5), συνεχείᾳ (*synecheiāi*; 5.16). A holding together, continuity, an unbroken run. The entire is maimed if anything is cut off "from the connection and continuity, as of the parts, so indeed of the causes too" (5.8.5); "Dye it, then, with a continuous run of impressions like these" (5.16). Lemma: συνέχεια.

συνέχω

Attested: σύνεχε (*syneche*; 3.10), συνεχόμενα (*synechomena*; 6.14), συνεχομένων (*synechomenōn*; 6.40), συνέχεσθαι (*synechesthai*; 9.35), συνέχοντος (*synechontos*; 10.1), συνέχει (*synechei*; 12.30). To hold together; to hold fast; to keep hold of. "Things held together by cohesion or by nature" (6.14); "in the things held together by nature the power that made them is within and remains" (6.40); the perfect living being "generates all things and holds them together" (10.1); Marcus asks whether the universe "has been condemned to be held fast in unceasing bad things" (9.35); "hold to these few things only" (3.10). Lemma: συνέχω.

τονικός

Attested: τονικήν (*tonikēn*; 6.38). Of tension; in Stoic physics, of the tension of the breath that holds the universe together, as the edition's note says. One thing comes in sequence after another "because of the tensional motion, the breathing together, and the unity of substance" (6.38). Leopold reports τοπικὴν κόνησιν (*topikēn konēsin*) in P, which the note gives as "local motion", movement from place to place, and "constant motion" in the Latin version of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor. Lemma: τονικός.

See also

Body and flesh; Breath; Change; Citizenship; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Cosmos and order; Daimon; Fate and

allotment; Impression; Kinship and cooperation; Nature; Necessity and chance; Principles and reminders; Providence and atoms; Ruling centre; Soul; Substance; Time and eternity; Whole and part.

Living being

Man among the things that live · Meditations

ζῷον, zōion, "living being"; *ζῳώδης, zōiōdēs*, "animal"; *ἄλογος, alogos*, "irrational"; *θηρίον, thērion*, "beast", "wild beast"; *λογικός, logikos*, "rational"; *κοινωνικός, koinōnikos*, "social"; *πολιτικός, politikos*, "civic"; *νοερός, noeros*, "intelligent"

At a Glance

The word. Ζῷον, akin to ζῆν (*zēn*), "to live", is a living being: any animal, man included. Ἄλογος, "irrational", marks the other animals, and θηρίον is a beast.

In the *Meditations*. When Marcus says what man is for, he often calls him a living being and adds what kind: "rational", "social", "civic", "intelligent". For him "the good of a rational living being is fellowship" (5.16). Things are ranked by what holds them together, cohesion, nature, soul and rational soul (6.14); what man shares with plants and beasts is not to be honoured (6.16.1), and sleep is common to irrational living beings too (8.12); and Marcus is continually to conceive of the universe as "one living being" (4.40).

In this edition. Ζῷον is always "living being"; ζῳώδης is "animal" (7.55), ἄλογος "irrational", and θηρίον "beast" or "wild beast".

A place to read. 6.14, where the things men admire are sorted by what holds them together, and the man who honours a soul rational, universal and civic turns to none of the rest.

Meaning

Ζῷον (*zōion*) belongs with ζῆν, "to live", and ζωή (*zōē*), "life": it is whatever lives, beast or man, and for the Stoics the universe and God as well. Marcus uses it of animals generally, "the living beings eaten each day by us and by the other living beings" (4.21.2; see Cause and matter), but in most of its thirty-two chapters it names man, with an adjective that places him: λογικός (*logikos*), "rational", and νοερός (*noeros*), "intelligent" (see Mind and reason);

κοινωνικός (*koinōnikos*), “social” (see Kinship and cooperation); πολιτικός (*politikos*), “civic” (see Citizenship). The other animals are ἄλογα (*aloga*), “irrational”, without λόγος (*logos*), reason; θηρίον (*thērion*) is a beast, often a wild one.

Use in the book

The adjective does the defining: “the end of rational living beings is to follow the reason and law of the most venerable city and commonwealth” (2.16; see Citizenship); “the good of a rational living being is fellowship” (5.16; see Impression); “to the rational living being alone it is given to follow willingly what happens” (10.28; see Necessity and chance). Marcus measures himself by the same words: “I want according to the nature of a rational and social living being” (5.29; see Death). Once the adjectives narrow from the kind to the man, when the god within is to guard “a living being that is male, elderly, civic, Roman, and a ruler” (3.5; see Daimon); and once the list ends on the plainest name, when he is to look at things “as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal living being” (4.3.4; see Inner retreat and citadel).

The adjectives also rank. At 6.14 the things men admire are sorted by what holds them together. Most of what the multitude admires is “things held together by cohesion or by nature, stones, timber, fig trees, vines, olives”; a little more measured people, “things held together by soul, as flocks and herds”; still more refined people, things held together by a rational soul, though only as skilled in a craft or adroit, “or merely in the possession of a crowd of slaves”. “But the man who honours a soul that is rational, universal and civic no longer turns to any of the rest, but before all else preserves his own soul in a rational and social state and motion, and works with what is of one kind with him to this end” (6.14). The heads, as the edition’s note says, are the Stoic scale of being, from stones and plants to animals and men. The chapter can be read as ranking the admirers with what they admire, and at its top the thing honoured is no possession but a man’s own soul. The scale returns as an argument at 5.16: “or was it not plain that the worse are for the sake of the better, and the better for one another? And things with soul are better than things without soul, and of things with soul, the rational.”

What man shares with the lower rungs does not mark him out. Sleeping "is common to irrational living beings too" (8.12); "to be jerked like a puppet by impulse belongs to wild beasts too" (3.16.1; see Impulse); neither transpiring, as plants do, nor breathing, "as cattle and beasts do", is to be honoured (6.16.1; see Breath); sense and impulse "are animal" (7.55; see Temperance and self-mastery). Even plague is graded: a bad air is "a plague of living beings in so far as they are living beings", corruption of the understanding a plague of men (9.2; see Mind and reason). Yet the lower is given its due. At 10.2 Marcus is to give each level of his nature, the merely natural and the living, what it seeks, so long as the level above it "is not going to be put in a worse condition" (see Nature); "If it is what is advantageous to you as a rational being, keep to it; if as a living being, declare it, and guard the judgement without vanity" (3.6.3); and irrational living beings are to be used "with greatness of mind and freely, as one who has reason using what has not" (6.23; see Prayer).

The scale goes on above man. "Among the still better" a kind of unity subsisted even out of things separate, "as among the stars" (9.9.2; see Kinship and cooperation), and Marcus is to conceive the universe as "one living being, holding one substance and one soul" (4.40; see Cosmos and order); "the perfect living being, the good and just and honourable", for whose preservation the gods mean to give whatever they give, can be read as the same whole (10.1; see Cosmos and order). The word that sets man among the beasts names the whole as well. This can be read as the shape of Marcus' ethics: the noun keeps him among the things that feed, sleep and are dissolved (2.17.2; see Dissolution), and the adjective gives him his work.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ζῷον, ζῳώδης, ἄλογος or θηρίον occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with 6.14, where the scale of beings is given without these words. The adverb ἀλόγως (*alogōs*), "unreasonable" and "without reason" (1.13, 8.48, 12.5), ἀλόγιστος (*alogistos*), "unreasoned" (7.75), θηριώδης (*thēriōdēs*), "bestial" (4.28), θηριόω (*thērioō*), "become a beast" (9.39), θηριομάχος (*thēriomachos*), "beast-fighters" (10.8.2), and the words of living and life, ζῆν, ζωή and βίος (*bios*), are left out.

2.16 The end of rational living beings is to follow the reason and law of the most venerable city and commonwealth (see Citizenship).

2.17.2 Death is to be awaited with a serene frame of mind as nothing but the dissolution of the elements of which each living being is compounded (see Dissolution).

3.2.3 The man with a feeling for the whole will look at the real gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than at those painters and sculptors show (see Natural beauty).

3.4.2 Marcus is to form only such impressions as would show at once that everything in him is simple and kindly and belongs to a social living being (see Simplicity and sincerity).

3.5 The god within is to guard a living being that is male, elderly, civic, Roman and a ruler (see Daimon).

3.6.3 Of the better, which is the advantageous, Marcus is to keep to what is advantageous to him as a rational being, and if it is advantageous to him as a living being, to declare it and guard his judgement without vanity (see Common advantage).

3.7 The man who has chosen his own mind and daimon is cautious only that his understanding should be in no turning foreign to an intelligent civic living being (see Change).

3.9 The faculty of forming opinions is to be revered, so that no opinion may arise out of keeping with nature and with the constitution of a rational living being (see Assent and judgement).

3.16.1 To be stamped with impressions belongs to cattle as well, to be jerked like a puppet by impulse to wild beasts too (see Impulse).

4.3.2 Marcus is to reckon up the verdict that rational living beings have come to be for one another (see Kinship and cooperation).

4.3.4 Marcus is to look at things as a man, a human being, a citizen and a mortal living being (see Inner retreat and citadel).

4.5 Death, like birth, is a mystery of nature, not contrary to the sequence for an intelligent living being (see Death).

4.16 Within ten days Marcus will seem a god to those to whom he now seems a beast and an ape, if he turns back to the principles and reverence for reason.

4.21.2 Besides the buried dead there are the living beings eaten each day by men and by the other living beings, and the space still receives them (see Cause and matter).

4.24 Marcus asks whether it is not better than doing little to do what is necessary, and whatever the reason of a living being civic by nature requires (see Tranquillity).

4.40 Marcus is continually to conceive of the universe as one living being, holding one substance and one soul (see Cosmos and order).

5.11 Marcus asks whose soul he now has, whether a child's, a tyrant's, a brute's or a beast's (see Attention and self-examination).

5.16 Marcus is to dye his soul with the impression that the good of a rational living being is fellowship; things with soul are better than things without, and of things with soul the rational (see Impression).

5.20 In so far as men stand in the way of his proper works, man becomes to Marcus one of the things that make no difference, no less than the sun, the wind or a beast (see Obstacle and reservation).

5.29 So long as nothing leads him out of life, Marcus remains free and wants according to the nature of a rational and social living being (see Death).

5.34 Two things are common to the soul of God, of man and of every rational living being: not to be impeded by another, and to have the good in a just disposition and action (see Desire and aversion).

6.14 The multitude admires things held together by cohesion or by nature, the more measured things held together by soul, the more refined things held together by a rational soul; the man who honours a soul rational, universal and civic turns to none of these.

6.16.1 Neither transpiring, as plants do, nor breathing, as cattle and beasts do, is to be honoured, nor being stamped by impression, nor being jerked by impulse (see Breath).

6.22 Marcus does his own duty, and the other things do not distract him, for they are soulless, or irrational, or gone astray (see Duty and fitting action).

6.23 Irrational living beings are to be used with greatness of mind and freely, men socially (see Prayer).

7.9 There is one law, reason common to all intelligent living beings, and one truth, if indeed there is also one perfection for the living beings of one kind (see Interconnection).

7.11 For the rational living being the same action is according to nature and according to reason (see Mind and reason).

7.55 Sense and impulse are both animal, and the intelligent wants to have the first place and not to be mastered by them (see Temperance and self-mastery).

7.68 Marcus is to live through without constraint even if wild beasts tear apart the poor limbs of the body (see Tranquillity).

8.2 Marcus asks what more he could want if the present work is that of an intelligent and social living being (see Present action).

8.7 The nature of the leaf is part of a nature insensible, irrational and able to be impeded, the nature of man part of a nature unimpeded, intelligent and just, if indeed it makes the portions equal and according to worth (see Nature).

8.12 To render social actions accords with human nature, while sleeping is common to irrational living beings too (see Human work).

8.35 As that nature sets whatever opposes it in its place and makes it a part of itself, so the rational living being can make every hindrance material for itself (see Obstacle and reservation).

8.39 In the constitution of the rational living being Marcus sees no virtue that rises against justice (see Justice).

8.58 If a man acquires a sensation of another kind, he will be a living being of another kind, and will not cease from living (see Death).

9.1.1 The nature of the whole has made rational living beings for the sake of one another, and so he who acts unjustly is impious (see Justice).

9.2 A corrupt understanding is a plague of men in so far as they are men, worse than the bad air that is a plague of living beings in so far as they are living beings (see Mind and reason).

9.8 Into the irrational living beings one soul has been divided, into the rational one intelligent soul has been portioned out (see Mind and reason).

9.9.2 Among the irrational there were swarms and herds, among rational living beings commonwealths and friendships, among the still better a kind of unity even in things separate (see Kinship and cooperation).

9.16 The bad and the good of the rational, civic living being lie not in being acted upon but in activity (see Virtue and excellence).

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will persuade itself that everything is well with it, whatever the gods mean to give for the preservation of the perfect living being, which generates all things and holds them together (see Cosmos and order).

10.2 Marcus is to watch what his nature seeks as of one governed by nature alone, and then as a living being, and to grant each if the nature above it is not going to be put in a worse condition (see Nature).

10.28 To the rational living being alone it is given to follow willingly what happens, while bare following is necessary for all (see Necessity and chance).

10.33.2 Things governed by nature or by an irrational soul are not free to move everywhere, but mind and reason make their way through everything that resists (see Obstacle and reservation).

11.1.1 The rational soul harvests its own fruit, while the fruits of plants, and what corresponds to them in living beings, others harvest (see Soul).

11.39 Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, used to ask whether men want to have souls of rational beings or of irrational, and, since they say they have sound ones, why they fight and are at odds.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its seventh book, reports that Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school, and other Stoics held the universe to be a living being (see Cosmos and order), and gives the sense in which they meant it: a living being is an ensouled substance capable of sensation.[286] Marcus' answer to the fear of death can be read in those terms: "if you acquire a sensation of another kind, you will be a living being of another kind, and will not cease from living" (8.58; see Death). The same account calls God a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent, in happiness (see Gods), and says that they named him Ζῆνα (*Zēna*), a form of the name of Zeus, in so far as he is the cause of living, ζῆν, or has made his way through living;[287] Marcus' "perfect living being" (10.1) has the adjective of that definition. Balbus, the Stoic speaker in *On the Nature of the Gods*, the dialogue of Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, climbs a scale that can be read beside 6.14 and 10.2, from the first and unfinished natures to the last and perfect. Nature does no more for what grows from the earth than keep it by feeding it and making it grow; to beasts it gave sense and motion, and with a kind of appetite a going towards what preserves them and a drawing back from what destroys; to man it added reason, to govern the soul's appetites, now slackening and now restraining them; and the fourth and highest rung is of beings born good and wise, with right and constant reason from the first, a reason above man that must be given to god, that is, to the world.[288] In a vine or a beast, he goes on, nature reaches its end by a road of its own unless some

[286] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.142–143, citing Chrysippus, *On Providence* book 1, Apollodorus' *Physics* and Posidonius; the definition is at 7.143.

[287] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.147.

[288] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.33–34.

force stands in the way, and many things outside can keep other natures from being completed, but nothing can hinder the nature of the whole, since it holds and contains all natures.[289] Marcus' leaf, whose nature is part of a nature "able to be impeded", and man, whose nature is part of a nature "unimpeded, intelligent and just, if indeed it makes the portions … equal and according to worth for each" (8.7; see Nature), can be read beside this.

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, has Marcus' phrase. He asks whether the marks of a maker are found in men alone, and answers that many are, the things the rational living being especially needed, but many are common to men and the irrational; the animals use impressions, while man keeps track of the use (see Attention and self-examination). A man, then, should not begin and end where the irrational do, which would be shameful, but start from there and finish where nature finished in man: in contemplation, in keeping track of things, and in a life that agrees with nature.[290] Marcus' "sleeping is common to irrational living beings too" (8.12) can be read as the same thought turned on a reluctant riser.

Translation in this edition

Ζῷον is "living being" at all thirty-eight of its places, and "living beings" in the plural; "your nature as a living being" renders ἡ ὡς ζῴου φύσις (*hē hōs zōiou physis*; 10.2), and "if as a living being" ὡς ζῷῳ (*hōs zōiōi*; 3.6.3). With it λογικός is "rational" and νοερός "intelligent" (see Mind and reason), κοινωνικός "social" (see Kinship and cooperation), πολιτικός "civic" (see Citizenship), θνητός (*thnētos*) "mortal" (4.3.4) and τέλειος (*teleios*) "perfect" (10.1); used as a noun without ζῷον, λογικός is "rational being", as at 3.6.3, 7.13, 7.55 and 11.39. At 3.7 "intelligent ⟨and⟩ civic" has the "and" supplied by Johannes Stich, whose Teubner text appeared in 1882, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; the manuscripts have the two adjectives without it, and Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, proposed the dative. At 9.16 the "and" of "rational ⟨and⟩ civic" is the supplement of H. I. Polak, whose notes on the text appeared in *Hermes* in 1886, which Leopold prints, and A, the Vatican manuscript, has

[289] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.35.

[290] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.6.12–13 and 1.6.20–21.

ποιητικοῦ (*poiētikou*) for πολιτικοῦ, “civic”. Ζῳώδης is “animal” at its one place (7.55), and “animal” renders no other word. Ἄλογος is “irrational” (6.22, 6.23, 8.7, 8.12, 9.8, 10.33.2, 11.39), and with the article “the irrational” (9.9.2); the adverb ἀλόγως is “unreasonable” (1.13) and “without reason” (8.48, 12.5), and ἀλόγιστος “unreasoned” (7.75). Θηρίον is “wild beasts” (3.2.3, 3.16.1, 7.68), “a beast” (4.16, 5.20), “A beast’s” (5.11) and “beasts” (6.16.1); θηριώδης is “bestial” (4.28), the perfect τεθηρίωσαι (*tethēriōsai*) of θηριόω is “you have become a beast” (9.39), and θηριομάχος is “beast-fighters” (10.8.2). “Cattle” renders βόσκημα (*boskēma*; 3.16.1, 6.16.1), “cattle-like” βοσκηματώδης (*boskēmatōdēs*; 4.28), and “A brute’s” κτῆνος (*ktēnos*; 5.11). At 11.18.4 “creatures” is supplied by the English, for ὅσα συναγελαστικά (*hosa synagelastika*), “whatever is gregarious”.

ἄλογος

Attested: ἀλόγως (*alogōs*, adverb; 1.13, 8.48, 12.5), ἄλογα (*aloga*; 6.22, 9.8), ἀλόγοις (*alogois*; 6.23), ἀλόγου (*alogou*; 8.7, 10.33.2), ἀλόγων (*alogōn*; 8.12, 9.9.2, 11.39). Without reason, irrational; of animals, the beings that lack λόγος. “Use irrational living beings, and things and underlying things generally, with greatness of mind and freely, as one who has reason using what has not” (6.23); “sleeping is common to irrational living beings too” (8.12); “Into the irrational living beings one soul has been divided” (9.8); the things that do not distract Marcus from his duty are “either soulless, or irrational, or gone astray” (6.22). The leaf’s nature is part of a nature “insensible and irrational and able to be impeded” (8.7). The adverb is used of a friend’s complaint, “even if the complaint happens to be unreasonable” (1.13), of the ruling centre, “even if it takes its stand without reason” (8.48), and of the world-order, in which, if the gods are most good and most just, they would not have allowed anything “to be left neglected unjustly and without reason” (12.5). Lemma: ἄλογος.

ζῷον

Attested: ζῴων (*zōiōn*; 2.16, 4.21.2 twice, 7.9 twice, 8.12, 9.2, 9.9.2, 11.1.1), ζῷον (*zōion*; 2.17.2, 4.3.4, 4.40, 8.35, 8.58), ζῴου (*zōiou*; 3.4.2, 3.5, 3.7, 3.9, 4.24, 5.16, 5.29, 5.34, 8.2, 8.39, 9.16, 10.1, 10.2 three times), ζῴῳ (*zōiōi*; 3.6.3, 4.5, 7.11, 10.28), ζῷα (*zōia*; 4.3.2, 9.1.1, 9.2, 9.8),

ζῴοις (*zōiois*; 6.23). A living being, an animal; in the *Meditations* most often man, with an adjective, and at 4.40 the universe (10.1′s "perfect living being" can be read as the same). The good of man is named with it, "so the good of a rational living being is fellowship" (5.16); "look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal living being" (4.3.4); "Continually conceive of the universe as one living being" (4.40). At 9.2 A and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, lack the words "in so far as they are living beings, but that of men", and with them the second ζῷα; Leopold prints them from P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed. Lemma: ζῷον.

ζῳώδης

Attested: ζῳώδεις (*zōiōdeis*; 7.55). Animal, belonging to the animal in man. Of the motions of sense and impulse: "for both are animal, but the intelligent wants to have the first place and not to be mastered by them" (7.55; see Temperance and self-mastery). Lemma: ζῳώδης.

θηρίον

Attested: θηρίων (*thēriōn*; 3.2.3, 3.16.1), θηρίον (*thērion*; 4.16, 5.20), θηρίου (*thēriou*; 5.11), θηρία (*thēria*; 6.16.1, 7.68). A beast, a wild animal. Impulse is shared with them: "to be jerked like a puppet by impulse belongs to wild beasts too" (3.16.1); "Within ten days you will seem a god to those to whom you now seem a beast and an ape, if you turn back to the principles and reverence for reason" (4.16); "A brute's? A beast's?" (5.11). The man in affinity with nature "will look even at the real gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure" than at those of painters and sculptors (3.2.3; see Natural beauty), and the understanding can keep its calm "even if wild beasts tear apart the poor limbs of this kneaded lump that has grown round about" (7.68; see Tranquillity). Lemma: θηρίον.

See also

Assent and judgement; Attention and self-examination; Breath; Cause and matter; Change; Citizenship; Common advantage; Cosmos and order; Daimon; Death; Desire and aversion; Dissolution; Duty and fitting action; Gods; Human work; Impression; Impulse; Inner retreat and citadel; Interconnection; Justice; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Natural beauty; Nature; Necessity and chance;

Obstacle and reservation; Prayer; Present action; Simplicity and sincerity; Soul; Temperance and self-mastery; Tranquillity; Virtue and excellence.

Natural beauty

The charm of what follows on nature's works · Meditations

κάλλος, kallos, "beauty"; *καλός, kalos*, "beautiful", "honourable"; *συνεπικοσμεῖν, synepikosmein*, "add to … beauty"; *εὔχαρις, eucharis*, "charm"; *ἐπαγωγός, epagōgos*, "attraction"; *ψυχαγωγεῖν, psychagōgein*, "give delight", "delight"; *ἐπιπρέπειν, epiprepein*, "be becoming"; *εὐειδής, eueidēs*, "comely"; *ἐπαφρόδιτος, epaphroditos*, "loveliness"; *ὡραῖος, hōraios*, "in season"; *ἀκμή, akmē*, "ripeness"; *χαρίεις, charieis*, "refined", "gracious"; *εὐχαριεντίζεσθαι, eucharientizesthai*, "a gracious wit"; *ἐπακολούθησις, epakolouthēsis*, "by way of consequence"; *ἐπακολουθεῖν, epakolouthein*, "ensue"; *ἐπιγέννημα, epigennēma*, "by-product"

At a Glance

The word. Κάλλος is beauty, and καλός is both "beautiful" and, of conduct, "honourable"; εὔχαρις is what has charm, and ψυχαγωγεῖν, "to lead the soul", is to delight.

In the *Meditations*. One chapter is given to beauty in nature, and its examples are what "follows incidentally" on nature's works: bread that splits in baking, figs that gape, olives near decay, the foam at a boar's mouth (3.2). Their charm strikes "only the man who has come into genuine affinity with nature and her works" (3.2.3). The lion's jaws and poison are "by-products of those dignified and beautiful things" (6.36), and what is advantageous to the whole is "always beautiful and in season" (12.23).

In this edition. Κάλλος is "beauty"; καλός is "beautiful" where the sense is beauty (4.20, 5.31, 6.36, 6.57, 7.48, 12.23) and elsewhere "honourable"; εὔχαρις is "charm", ἐπαγωγός "attraction", ψυχαγωγεῖν "give delight" and "delight".

A place to read. 3.2, where the cracks in a loaf and the boar's foam lead to the man to whom, if he has a feeling for the whole, hardly anything will fail to seem to hang together pleasingly.

Meaning

Κάλλος (*kallos*) is beauty and καλός (*kalos*) beautiful; said of an act or a character, the same adjective is honourable, which for the Stoics is the only good (see Good, bad and indifference).[291] Marcus has κάλλος once (3.2.2), and καλός of beauty in six chapters. Εὔχαρις (*eucharis*), from εὖ (*eu*), "well", and χάρις (*charis*), "grace", is charming, and ἐπαγωγός (*epagōgos*) alluring; ψυχαγωγεῖν (*psychagōgein*), from ψυχή (*psychē*), "soul", and ἄγειν (*agein*), "to lead", is to win the soul over. Beside these stands ἐπακολούθησις (*epakolouthēsis*), from ἐπακολουθεῖν (*epakolouthein*), "to follow upon": what comes about as a consequence of what the whole has its impulse towards, not as the object of that impulse (6.36, 7.75, 9.28).

Use in the book

Chapter 3.2 opens with a command: "One must watch for things like this too: that even what follows incidentally on things that come about by nature has a certain charm and attraction" (3.2.1). None of the examples was made to be beautiful. When bread is baked some parts split open, "and these cracks, which in a way run counter to what the baker's art intends, are somehow becoming and in their own way stir the appetite for food". Figs "gape open when they are most in season; and in olives ripening on the tree the very nearness to decay adds a beauty of its own to the fruit" (3.2.2). Then come plainer things: "the ears of corn bending down, the lion's wrinkled brow, the foam flowing from the mouths of boars, and much else, if one should look at it on its own, far from being comely, yet because it ensues upon the things that come about by nature adds to their beauty and gives delight" (3.2.2).

The chapter then turns from the things to the man who sees them, and its conclusion is conditional: "if a man has a feeling and a deeper conception for the things that happen in the whole, hardly anything, even among the things that happen by way of consequence, will fail to seem to him to hang together pleasingly in its own way" (3.2.3). Such a man "will look even at the real gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than at the ones painters and sculptors show in imitation"; "with his own chaste eyes he will be able to see a

[291] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.101, citing Hecaton, *On Goods* book 3, and Chrysippus, *On the Honourable*.

kind of ripeness and bloom in an old woman or an old man, and the loveliness of boys". And "many such things, not convincing to everyone, will strike only the man who has come into genuine affinity with nature and her works". The verb is that of οἰκείωσις (*oikeiōsis*), the Stoic term, as the Glossary says, for the attachment by which a living being recognises what belongs to it. Beauty here needs a fit beholder: it shows itself only to the man for whom nature's works have become his own.

Book VI gives the thought its physics. "All things come from there, having had their impulse from that common ruling centre, or by way of consequence. So the lion's gaping jaws too, and poison, and all mischief, like thorns, like mud, are by-products of those dignified and beautiful things. Do not, then, form the impression that they are alien to that which you revere, but take account of the spring of all things" (6.36). The claim changes: the by-products are not called beautiful, but they are not to be thought alien to the beautiful things they come from, as at 8.50 a man who studies nature would laugh at one who asks why briars came about in the universe (see Nature). "By way of consequence" is the phrase of 3.2.3 too, and at 9.28 it names one member of an alternative that Marcus leaves open, that the understanding of the whole "had its impulse once, and the rest by way of consequence" (see Providence and atoms). The charm of 3.2 is the charm of consequences.

The word for beauty is also the word for honour, and at 4.20 the two meet. "Everything that is in any way beautiful is beautiful of itself", and so are "things called beautiful in the more ordinary sense"; and Marcus sets "the truly beautiful" beside law, truth, goodwill and self-respect (4.20; see Reputation and praise). Seeming follows the state of the one who sees: "to children a little ball beautiful", as honey seems bitter to the jaundiced (6.57; see Anger). The child's ball and the old woman's bloom can be read as opposite cases, a beauty lent by the eye and a beauty in the whole that only a trained eye finds.

Charm belongs to manners too: Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, had "charm without excess" (1.16.5), and Claudius Maximus, the Stoic, "a gracious wit" (1.15.3; see Exemplary lives). Delight is put to use: tragedies were brought on as reminders, among other things, "that by the things that delight you on the stage you should not be annoyed on the greater stage" (11.6.1; see Drama and role).

Marcus also strips the Falernian to "the juice of a bunch of grapes" and a song to its notes (6.13, 11.2; see Definition and analysis), and the two exercises can be read as one: each corrects the first impression, taking from the prized thing the story it prides itself on, and giving back to the despised thing its place in the whole.

The last use is of death. "And everything that is advantageous to the whole is always beautiful and in season" stands between the universe that "remains ever young and in its prime" and the ending of a life, which is good "if indeed it is opportune for the whole, and advantageous, and carried along with it" (12.23; see Change). "In season", ὡραῖον (*hōraion*), from ὥρα (*hōra*), "season", is the word of the figs "most in season" (3.2.2), and the universe's prime, ἀκμαῖος (*akmaios*), is akin to the "ripeness", ἀκμή (*akmē*), of the old (3.2.3). The two chapters can be read together as giving a life ended in due time the beauty of the olive near decay. Marcus' natural beauty is less a set of beautiful things than a way of seeing, and its test is the crack in the loaf.

Places to read

Every chapter in which κάλλος, καλός in the sense "beautiful", εὔχαρις, ἐπαγωγός, ψυχαγωγεῖν, ἐπιπρέπειν, εὐειδής, ἐπαφρόδιτος, ὡραῖος, ἀκμή, χαρίεις or εὐχαριεντίζεσθαι occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. Καλός where it is "honourable", its adverb καλῶς (*kalōs*), and the other places of ὥρα, "bloom", "season" and "hour", are left out; the other places of ἐπακολούθησις and ἐπακολουθεῖν are given in their sub-entries.

1.15.3 Among what Marcus learned from Maximus is a gracious wit (see Exemplary lives).

1.16.5 Antoninus had ease of company and charm without excess.

3.2.1 What follows incidentally on nature's works has a certain charm and attraction, as the cracks in baked bread are somehow becoming and stir the appetite.

3.2.2 Figs gape when most in season, the nearness of decay adds a beauty of its own to olives, and the bending corn, the lion's brow and the boar's foam, far from comely taken alone, add to the beauty of

nature's works and give delight because they ensue upon them.

3.2.3 If a man has a feeling and a deeper conception for what happens in the whole, hardly anything will fail to seem to him to hang together pleasingly; he will see the real jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than those of painters and sculptors, and the ripeness and bloom of the old; many such things, not convincing to everyone, are for the man alone who is in genuine affinity with nature.

4.20 Everything beautiful is beautiful of itself, and is made neither better nor worse by praise, the emerald as much as law, truth, goodwill and self-respect (see Reputation and praise).

5.10.1 It is hard to bear with even the most refined of those who live alongside a man.

5.31 Among what Marcus is to remember of a life now complete is how many beautiful things have been seen.

6.14 The still more refined admire things held together by a rational soul, but the man who honours a soul rational, universal and civic turns to none of the rest (see Living being).

6.36 All things come from the common ruling centre or by way of consequence, and the lion's jaws, poison and all mischief are by-products of what is dignified and beautiful, not to be thought alien to what Marcus reveres.

6.57 To children a little ball seems beautiful, as honey seems bitter to the jaundiced, and Marcus asks whether error has less power than bile (see Anger).

7.48 Marcus calls a saying of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, beautiful; one who speaks about men must survey earthly things as if from above (see Cosmos and order).

9.2 It would have been the part of a more gracious man to leave life without a taste of lying, pretence, luxury and vanity (see Good, bad and indifference).

11.6.1 Tragedies were brought on as reminders, among other things, that what delights men on the stage should not annoy them on the greater stage (see Drama and role).

12.23 Everything advantageous to the whole is always beautiful and in season, and the ending of a life is good if indeed it is opportune for the whole and advantageous (see Change).

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoics made the beauty of the world an argument for providence. Balbus, the Stoic speaker in *On the Nature of the Gods*, the dialogue of Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, says that one may now set close argument aside and look, as it were with the eyes, at the beauty of the things that, the Stoics say, divine providence has established: the earth set at the middle of the world, clothed with flowers, grasses, trees and crops in a number past belief and a variety that never tires; cold springs that never fail, clear rivers, green banks, deep caves, rough rocks, high mountains and wide plains; beasts tame and wild, the flight and song of birds, grazing herds; and then the beauty of the sea.[292] Marcus' examples are of another kind. He chooses the crack in the loaf and the foam at the boar's mouth, and his chapter can be read as finding the order of the whole where an argument from design would least look for it.

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, makes man the spectator of God's works (see Attention and self-examination), and in the discourse that bears the title "On providence" he presses the point. Men travel to Olympia, he says, to see the work of Pheidias, the Athenian sculptor, and each thinks it a misfortune to die without having seen it; he asks whether, where no journey is needed and they are already present at the works, they will not want to look at them and understand them. To the objection that life brings things disagreeable and harsh he answers with a question, whether they do not happen at Olympia too: the heat, the crush, the bad baths, the soaking when it rains, the din and the shouting. He supposes that the visitors bear them all by setting them against the worth of the sight.[293] Marcus' man who looks at the real jaws of beasts with no less pleasure than at those of painters and sculptors (3.2.3), and his poison and mischief that are not alien to the beautiful (6.36), can be read beside

[292] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.98–100.

[293] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.6.23–27.

the spectator who puts up with the crowd for the sake of the statue.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, in the first book of *Parts of Animals*, defends the study of the lowlier creatures in terms that can be read beside 3.2.3. Even among animals that give no pleasure to the senses, he says, nature, which made them, offers pleasures beyond measure, when they are studied, to those who can know the causes and are philosophers by nature. It would be absurd for men to delight in their likenesses because they see with them the art that made them, painting or sculpture, and not to love still more the study of the things that nature has put together, if one can discern their causes. So one should not shrink like a child from inquiry into the less honoured animals, for there is something to marvel at in all natural things; and as Heraclitus, the philosopher of Ephesus of about 500 BC, is said to have told visitors who hung back on finding him warming himself at the oven to come in boldly, since there were gods there too, so one should come to each animal without embarrassment, since in all of them there is something natural and beautiful. For what is not at random but for the sake of something is found above all in nature's works, and the end for which a thing has been put together or has come to be holds the place of the beautiful.[294] Marcus' painters and sculptors, and his man in genuine affinity with nature, can be read beside Aristotle's arts of likeness and his philosopher by nature. But Aristotle finds the beautiful in the end a thing is made for, while Marcus finds a charm in what only follows on it, and in cracks that in a way run counter to what the baker's art intends.

Translation in this edition

Κάλλος is "beauty" at its one place, "a beauty of its own" (3.2.2). Καλός is "beautiful" where the sense is beauty: five times at 4.20 ("in any way beautiful", "beautiful of itself", "things called beautiful", "the truly beautiful", "beautiful because it is praised"), and at 5.31, 6.36, 6.57, 7.48 and 12.23; elsewhere it is "honourable", and its adverb καλῶς "honourably" or as the phrase requires (see Good, bad and indifference). Συνεπικοσμεῖν is "adds to their beauty" (3.2.2;

[294] Aristotle, *Parts of Animals* 1.5, 645a7–26.

see Cosmos and order). Εὔχαρις, used with the article or with τι (*ti*) as a noun, is "charm" at both its places, "a certain charm" (3.2.1) and "charm without excess" (1.16.5); "charm" renders no other word (χάρις is "favour" and "thanks"; see Beneficence), and the "charms" in the verse of Euripides, the Athenian tragic poet, at 7.51 are spells, μαγεύμασι (*mageumasi*), the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, for the manuscripts' μαγγανεύμασι (*manganeumasi*), "trickeries". Ἐπαγωγός is "attraction" (3.2.1). Ψυχαγωγεῖν is "gives delight" (3.2.2), and its passive at 11.6.1 is recast as "the things that delight you"; "Take delight" (6.7) renders τέρπεσθαι (*terpesthai*), "delightful" (11.2) ἐπιτερπής (*epiterpēs*), and "delighting in" (5.5) ἐμφιληδονεῖν (*emphilēdonein*). Ἐπιπρέπειν is "are somehow becoming" (3.2.1), εὐειδής "comely" (3.2.2) and ἐπαφρόδιτος, with the article, "the loveliness" (3.2.3). Ὡραῖος is "most in season" in the superlative (3.2.2) and "in season" (12.23), and ἀκμή "a kind of ripeness" (3.2.3). Ὥρα is "bloom" at 1.16.8, 1.17.2 and 3.2.3, and elsewhere "hour", "season" and once "the time" (1.17.2); ἀκμαῖος is "in its prime" (12.23) and "vigorous" (1.16.7), and ἀκμάζειν (*akmazein*) "reaching one's prime" (9.3.1) and "reached their peak" (12.27). Χαρίεις is "most refined" (5.10.1), "more refined" (6.14) and "more gracious" (9.2); εὐχαριεντίζεσθαι is "a gracious wit" (1.15.3; see Exemplary lives). Κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν is "by way of consequence" at all five places; ἐπακολουθεῖν is "ensues upon" (3.2.2), "ensue" (4.24) and "that ensues" (5.3); ἐπιγέννημα is "by-products" (6.36); and ἐπιγίνεσθαι (*epiginesthai*) is "what follows incidentally" (3.2.1), "comes on" (4.45), "follow after" (9.1.4) and "to have followed" (8.36). Χάσμα (*chasma*) is "gaping jaws" (3.2.3, 6.36), and κέχηνε (*kechēne*), of figs, "gape open" (3.2.2).

At 3.2.2 "olives ripening on the tree" renders δρυπεπέσιν (*drypepesin*); J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, reports δρυπέπισιν (*drypepisin*) in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, with δρυπετέσιν (*drypetesin*), "falling from the tree", written in its margin and found in D, the Darmstadt manuscript. At 3.2.3 "will strike" is προσπεσεῖται (*prospeseitai*), the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' προπεσεῖται (*propeseitai*). In the same section Leopold keeps the manuscripts' "feeling" and "boys": the edition's note records

that Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus, the eighteenth-century German scholar who edited the *Meditations* at Leipzig, read βάθος (*bathos*), "depth", for "feeling" and struck out "and a deeper conception", and Leopold reports that Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, proposed ἐν πᾶσιν (*en pasin*), "in all", for ἐν παισίν (*en paisin*), "in boys".

ἀκμή

Attested: ἀκμήν (*akmēn*; 3.2.3). The point of full growth, prime; of the old, ripeness. The man with a feeling for the whole "will be able to see a kind of ripeness and bloom in an old woman or an old man" (3.2.3). Lemma: ἀκμή.

ἐπαγωγός

Attested: ἐπαγωγόν (*epagōgon*; 3.2.1). Drawing on, alluring; with the article or τι as a noun, attraction. What follows incidentally on nature's works "has a certain charm and attraction" (3.2.1). Lemma: ἐπαγωγός.

ἐπακολουθέω

Attested: ἐπακολουθεῖν (*epakolouthein*; 3.2.2), ἐπακολουθήσουσιν (*epakolouthēsousin*; 4.24), ἐπακολουθοῦσα (*epakolouthousa*; 5.3). To follow upon, to ensue. The ears of corn and the lion's brow, far from comely on their own, "yet because it ensues upon the things that come about by nature adds to their beauty and gives delight" (3.2.2); if unnecessary impressions are taken away, "so superfluous actions will not ensue either" (4.24); and Marcus is not to let "the blame or word of certain people that ensues" distract him (5.3), where "distract" is Coraes' περισπάτω (*perispatō*), which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' παρειπάτω (*pareipatō*). At 5.3 A, the Vatican manuscript, has the future ἐπακολουθήσει (*epakolouthēsei*). Lemma: ἐπακολουθέω.

ἐπακολούθησις

Attested: ἐπακολούθησιν (*epakolouthēsin*; 3.2.3, 6.36, 6.44.1, 7.75, 9.28). A following upon, consequence; always in the phrase κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν, "by way of consequence", of what comes about as the result of what the whole or the gods intend rather than as its object. To the man with a feeling for the whole "hardly anything, even among the things that happen by way of consequence, will fail to seem to him to hang together pleasingly" (3.2.3); "All

things come from there, having had their impulse from that common ruling centre, or by way of consequence" (6.36). If the gods took no counsel about Marcus, they took it about the common affairs, and what happens to him "by way of consequence of those" he ought to welcome (6.44.1; see Gods). At 7.75 and 9.28 it is one member of an alternative: "either everything that comes about comes about by way of consequence, or even the most sovereign things … are unreasoned" (7.75); either the understanding of the whole has an impulse towards each thing, "or it had its impulse once, and the rest by way of consequence" (9.28; see Providence and atoms). Lemma: ἐπακολούθησις.

ἐπαφρόδιτος

Attested: ἐπαφρόδιτον (*epaphroditon*; 3.2.3). Lovely, having the grace of Aphrodite; with the article, loveliness. With chaste eyes the man in affinity with nature will see "the loveliness of boys" (3.2.3). Meric Casaubon proposed "in all" for "in boys", as Leopold reports. Lemma: ἐπαφρόδιτος.

ἐπιγέννημα

Attested: ἐπιγεννήματα (*epigennēmata*; 6.36). An after-growth, a by-product: what is produced in addition to the thing made. "So the lion's gaping jaws too, and poison, and all mischief, like thorns, like mud, are by-products of those dignified and beautiful things" (6.36). Lemma: ἐπιγέννημα.

ἐπιπρέπω

Attested: ἐπιπρέπει (*epiprepei*; 3.2.1). To be conspicuous upon, to suit, to be becoming. The cracks in baked bread "are somehow becoming and in their own way stir the appetite for food" (3.2.1). A has ἐπιτρέπει (*epitrepei*), "permits", as Leopold reports. Lemma: ἐπιπρέπω.

εὐειδής

Attested: εὐειδοῦς (*eueidous*; 3.2.2). Well formed, comely; with the article, comeliness. The bending corn, the lion's brow and the boar's foam, looked at on their own, are "far from being comely" (3.2.2). Lemma: εὐειδής.

εὔχαρις

Attested: εὔχαρι (*euchari*; 1.16.5, 3.2.1). Charming, graceful; the neuter, with the article or τι, is charm. What follows incidentally on nature's works "has a certain charm

and attraction" (3.2.1); in Antoninus, "ease of company, and charm without excess" (1.16.5). Lemma: εὔχαρις.

κάλλος

Attested: κάλλος (*kallos*; 3.2.2). Beauty. Of olives near decay: "in olives ripening on the tree the very nearness to decay adds a beauty of its own to the fruit" (3.2.2). Lemma: κάλλος.

χαρίεις

Attested: χαριεστάτου (*chariestatou*; 5.10.1), χαριεστέρων (*chariesterōn*; 6.14), χαριεστέρου (*chariesterou*; 9.2). Graceful; of men, cultivated, refined, gracious. Of those who live alongside him, Marcus finds it "hard to bear with even the most refined" (5.10.1); the "still more refined" admire things held together by a rational soul (6.14); and it "would have been the part of a more gracious man" to leave life without a taste of lying and pretence (9.2). Lemma: χαρίεις.

ψυχαγωγέω

Attested: ψυχαγωγεῖ (*psychagōgei*; 3.2.2), ψυχαγωγεῖσθε (*psychagōgeisthe*; 11.6.1). To lead the soul; to win over, delight. What ensues upon nature's works "adds to their beauty and gives delight" (3.2.2); tragedies remind men "that by the things that delight you on the stage you should not be annoyed on the greater stage" (11.6.1). Lemma: ψυχαγωγέω.

ὡραῖος

Attested: ὡραιότατα (*hōraiotata*; 3.2.2), ὡραῖον (*hōraion*; 12.23). Seasonable, ripe, in its prime. Figs "gape open when they are most in season" (3.2.2); "everything that is advantageous to the whole is always beautiful and in season" (12.23). Lemma: ὡραῖος.

See also

Anger; Attention and self-examination; Beneficence; Change; Cosmos and order; Definition and analysis; Drama and role; Exemplary lives; Gods; Good, bad and indifference; Living being; Nature; Providence and atoms; Reputation and praise.

The nature of the whole and the nature of each · Meditations

φύσις, physis, "nature"; *κατὰ φύσιν, kata physin*, "according to nature"; *παρὰ φύσιν, para physin*, "contrary to nature", "against nature"; *φυσικός, physikos*, "natural", "of nature", "natural philosopher"; *φυσιολογεῖν, physiologein*, "study nature"; *φυσιολόγως, physiologōs*, "as one who studies nature"; *ἀφυσιολογήτως, aphysiologētōs*, "without studying nature"; *φυσιολόγος, physiologos*, "a man who studies nature"; *ἀφυσιολόγος, aphysiologos*, "the man who does not study nature"; *φύειν, phyein*, with *πέφυκα, pephyka*, "by nature able", "by nature", "by nature such as", "gifted by nature", "bound by nature", "its nature", "grew", "puts forth"; *κατασκευή, kataskeuē*, "constitution", "building"

At a Glance

The word. Φύσις, from φύειν, "to make grow", is the way a thing has grown and so what it is; for the Stoics it was also the power that holds the universe together.

In the *Meditations*. The word comes 184 times, in 100 chapters. It names two things that Marcus keeps together, the nature of the whole, which brings each part what happens to it, and a thing's own nature, which sets what it is to do: "the road of these two is one" (5.3). Death is "according to nature", and pain is not contrary to it for a man "so long as he does what belongs to a man" (6.33), so neither is bad; anger is contrary to nature, and resentment a standing apart from it.

In this edition. Φύσις is always "nature", κατὰ φύσιν "according to nature", παρὰ φύσιν "contrary to nature" (once "against nature", 2.1); ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις (*hē tōn holōn physis*) and ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις (*hē tou holou physis*) are both "the nature of the whole".

A place to read. 2.9, where Marcus tells himself always to remember what the nature of the whole is, what his own is, and how the one stands to the other.

Meaning

Φύσις (*physis*) is formed from φύειν (*phyein*), "to bring forth, make grow", and in ordinary Greek is the way a thing has grown: its make, its character. The Stoics stretched it to

the whole: Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers* (third century AD) keeps the fullest summary of their doctrine, reports that by nature they meant sometimes what holds the universe together and sometimes what makes things on earth grow.[295] Narrowly, nature was one rung of a scale. Philo of Alexandria, the Jewish philosopher of the first century AD, sets it out in Stoic terms: cohesion holds stones together, nature holds plants, and soul, which is nature with impression and impulse added, holds animals.[296]

Marcus uses all these senses: the narrow one at 6.14, of "things held together by cohesion or by nature", and at 10.2; the broad one throughout, "the nature of the whole", "the common nature"; and between them the nature of each kind, above all "the nature of man" (8.1). His ethics rests on the fact that one word names both the order of the universe and the make of a single man.

Use in the book

Marcus sets himself the question at 2.9: "what the nature of the whole is, and what mine is, and how this stands to that, and what sort of part it is of what sort of whole". The answer is among the principles of 2.3: "To every part of nature that is good which the nature of the whole brings, and which preserves that nature" (see Change). So the two natures make one rule: "following your own nature and the common nature; and the road of these two is one" (5.3). It has a half for what comes and a half for what is done: "I have now what the common nature wants me to have now, and I do what my nature wants me to do now" (5.25). Near the end nothing is to seem great "except to act as your nature leads, and to be affected as the common nature brings" (12.32).

The nature of the whole is an agent, not scenery: it "gives all things and takes them back" (10.14), and Marcus addresses it in the words of a hymn: "Everything is fruit to me that your seasons bring, O nature: from you are all things, in you all things, to you all things" (4.23). At 6.40 it is set against the craftsman. An instrument "is well" if it does what it was made for, "and yet there the maker is out of the way. But in the things held together by nature the power that made them is within and remains." So "one must respect it

[295] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.148.

[296] Philo, *Allegorical Interpretation* 2.22–23.

the more", and "if you are and go on according to its will, all is to your mind". At 8.7 the nature of man is part of the common nature as the leaf's is of the plant's, but the plant's nature is "able to be impeded", the common nature "unimpeded, intelligent and just, if indeed it makes the portions ... equal and according to worth for each" (see Assent and judgement).

A man's own nature has its place on the scale. At 10.2 Marcus is to do what his nature seeks "as of one governed by nature alone", if his nature as a living being "is not going to be put in a worse condition", and then what it seeks as a living being, if his rational nature is not made worse; "and the rational is at once civic too". "My nature is rational and civic" (6.44.2). What breaks fellowship is contrary to nature: "To work against one another is therefore against nature" (2.1), and "the wrathful look on the face is very much contrary to nature" (7.24). To resent what happens "is to stand apart from nature" (2.16).

The phrase "according to nature" does its heaviest work against fear. Death is "a mystery of nature" like birth (4.5), and "if anyone fears a work of nature, he is a child" (2.12). Dissolution "is according to nature; and nothing according to nature is bad" (2.17.2; see Daimon); pain "is not contrary to nature for the hand or for the foot, so long as the foot does what belongs to the foot and the hand what belongs to the hand" (6.33). "Nature has aimed at the cessation of each thing no less than at its beginning and its continuance, like the man who throws up the ball" (8.20), and it is "the nature that brought you in" that sends a man from the city (12.36). Whoever asks why there are bitter cucumbers and briars "will be laughed at by a man who studies nature", as a carpenter would laugh at complaints about shavings; the carpenter has somewhere to throw them, whereas "the nature of the whole has nothing outside", and makes new things from what decays within it (8.50; compare 3.2, and see Natural beauty).

"According to nature" thus depends on where one stands. From the whole, "all things are according to the nature of the whole" (8.5). From the part, Marcus allows that things may be contrary to nature: "if contrary to nature, seek what is, for you, according to your nature" (11.16). What happens equally to one who lives according to nature and to one who lives contrary to it "is neither according to nature nor contrary to nature" (4.39). This can be read as leaving only one thing

contrary to nature from every point of view: what a man does against his own rational and social nature (2.1, 7.24, 11.20.2). The word lets Marcus call his losses and his duties by one name; its force rests on the premise of 2.3, which he defends by arguing that nature is neither ignorant, nor powerless, nor malicious, nor worse than art (2.11.3, 10.7.1, 11.10). A rational nature is thus a standard, and the book can be read as Marcus' measuring of himself against it.

Places to read

The passages where nature is discussed or carries the argument, in the order of the book; every place of φύσις, φυσικός, φυσιολογεῖν and its family, φύω and κατασκευή is given in the sub-entries. Φυτόν (*phyton*), "plant", and its family are left out.

1.17.6 Marcus thanks the gods that he has often formed an impression of the life according to nature, and owns that he still falls short of it by his own fault.

2.1 Men have come to be for working together like feet, hands and eyelids, and so to work against one another is against nature.

2.3 To every part of nature that is good which the nature of the whole brings and which preserves it; the works of fortune are not apart from nature.

2.9 Marcus must always remember what the nature of the whole is, what his own is, and how the one stands to the other, as a part to a whole.

2.11.3 The nature of the whole would not have let good and bad befall good and bad men alike through ignorance or want of power.

2.12 Whoever strips dying of its impressions will see it as a work of nature and to nature's advantage; to fear it is childish.

2.16 To resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature, in which the natures of all the rest are contained.

2.17.2 The dissolution of the elements is according to nature, and nothing according to nature is bad (see Daimon).

3.2 What follows incidentally on things that come about by nature has its own charm, which only the man in genuine affinity with nature and her works perceives.

3.4.4 The good man remembers that to care for all men is according to man's nature, and holds only to the repute given by those who live in agreement with nature.

4.5 Death, like birth, is a mystery of nature, a combining out of the same elements into the same, and nothing to be ashamed of.

4.23 Marcus addresses nature as the source of all things: everything is fruit to him that her seasons bring.

4.29 Whoever separates himself from the reason of the common nature by discontent is an abscess on the universe.

4.36 The nature of the whole loves nothing so much as to change what is and make new things like it (see Change).

4.39 What can happen equally to the man who lives according to nature and to the man who lives contrary to it is neither according to nature nor contrary to it.

4.49.1 Marcus asks whether anything is a man's misfortune that is not a failure of man's nature, or a failure of it that is not contrary to the will of his nature.

5.1 Reluctant to get up, Marcus asks himself whether he does not run to what is according to his nature; nature has given measures for rest, as for eating and drinking.

5.3 Marcus is to judge himself worthy of every word and deed according to nature; the road of his own nature and of the common nature is one.

5.8.4 The fulfilment of what seems good to the common nature is to be welcomed like health, for not even any chance nature brings what is not appropriate to what it governs.

5.9 Philosophy wants only what Marcus' nature wants.

5.25 Marcus has what the common nature wants him to have now, and does what his own nature wants him to do now.

6.14 The multitude admires things held together by cohesion or by nature, more measured people

things held together by soul, the more refined things held together by a rational soul.

6.33 Pain is not contrary to nature for hand or foot, nor for a man, so long as each does its own work.

6.40 In made things the maker is absent; in things held together by nature the power that made them is within and remains, and must be respected the more.

6.44.2 What is advantageous to each accords with his constitution and nature, and Marcus' nature is rational and civic.

7.11 For a rational living being the same action is according to nature and according to reason.

7.18 Marcus asks what is dearer or more proper to the nature of the whole than change, and finds his own changing similarly necessary to it (see Change).

7.24 The wrathful look on the face is very much contrary to nature.

7.55 Nature guides Marcus through what happens to him and through what he is to do; the social is the leading thing in man's constitution.

8.1 Living well lies nowhere but in doing what the nature of man seeks.

8.5 Marcus is not to be troubled, for all things are according to the nature of the whole; he is to do what the nature of man demands, without turning back.

8.7 A rational nature is part of the common nature as the leaf's is of the plant's, but of a nature unimpeded, intelligent and just, if indeed it makes the portions equal and according to worth for each.

8.12 Social action accords with human nature, and what is according to nature for each is more proper and more agreeable to it.

8.20 Nature aims at the cessation of each thing no less than at its beginning, as one who throws up a ball.

8.46 Nothing can happen to a man, an ox, a vine or a stone but what is of its kind and what it is by nature, and the common nature brings nothing unbearable.

8.50 A man who studies nature laughs at complaints about bitter cucumbers and briars; the nature of

the whole has nothing outside and remakes what decays within it.

8.52 Whoever does not know what he is by nature for does not know who he is.

9.1 The nature of the whole, the eldest of the gods and named Truth, made rational beings for one another; injustice, lying and fear of pain are impious towards her.

9.3.1 Death is one of the things nature wants, like growing, teething, giving birth and the other natural workings that the seasons of life bring.

9.9 What shares in the common intelligent nature hastens towards its kin as much as earth to earth, or more; men who flee one another are overtaken, for nature prevails.

9.42.4 Man is by nature beneficent, and when he has done a kindness he has done what he was made for.

10.2 Marcus is to grant what his nature seeks as one governed by nature alone, if his nature as a living being is not made worse, and what it seeks as a living being, if his rational nature is not made worse; the rational is at once civic.

10.3 Whatever happens, he is either by nature able to bear it or not, and he is able to bear whatever his opinion can make bearable.

10.6.1 Marcus lays down first that he is a part of the whole governed by nature, and that nothing advantageous to the whole harms the part.

10.7 The parts of the whole must perish, that is, be altered; nature would not have made them so to their harm, and even leaving nature aside it is ridiculous to resent what is by nature such as to change.

10.14 To nature, who gives and takes back, the educated man says, “Give what you want; take back what you want.”

10.33.2 A cylinder, water, fire and the other things governed by nature or by an irrational soul are not free everywhere to move in their own way; mind and reason make their way through everything that resists, as they are by nature able.

11.10 From the saying "No nature is worse than art" Marcus argues that the common nature, like the arts, makes the worse for the sake of the better.

11.16 If things are according to nature, Marcus is to rejoice in them; if contrary to nature, he is to seek what is according to his own nature.

11.20 The elements in a man are held, against their natural motion, where the ordering of the whole posts them; only the intelligent part rebels, the mark of one standing apart from nature.

12.23 Nature gives a life its due time and limit, sometimes a man's own nature, in any case the nature of the whole, through whose changing parts the universe stays young (see Change).

12.32 Nothing is great but to act as one's own nature leads and to be affected as the common nature brings.

12.36 It is the nature that brought a man into the city that sends him away, as a praetor releases a comic actor.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Marcus' two natures are the Stoic doctrine of the end. Diogenes Laertius reports that Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school, first called the end "to live in agreement with nature", which is to live according to virtue; that Chrysippus, its third head, made this the same as to live by experience of what happens by nature, "for our natures are parts of the nature of the whole"; and that the end is therefore to live following nature, "both one's own and that of the whole".[297] Cleanthes, Zeno's successor, took the nature to be followed to be the common nature only; Chrysippus took it to be both the common and, particularly, the human.[298] Marcus' road of the two natures (5.3) can be read as Chrysippus' position, and his "those who live in agreement with nature" (3.4.4) keeps Zeno's words. The ascent of 10.2, from plants to animals to rational beings, can be read in the same account (see Impulse).[299]

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, argues the part's point of

[297] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.87–88.

[298] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.89.

[299] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.86.

view in the image of 6.33 and 8.34. Taken as detached, it is according to nature for the foot to be clean; but taken as a foot, a part, "it will be fitting for it to step into mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut off for the sake of the whole; otherwise it will no longer be a foot". So a man, as part of a whole, must now be ill, now go to sea and run risks, now be in want, and sometimes die before his time.[300] Epictetus quotes Chrysippus: while what follows is unclear, he holds to what is better suited to obtaining the things according to nature, "but if I knew that I am fated to be ill now, I would have an impulse towards it; for the foot too, if it had wits, would have an impulse to get muddy".[301] The *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of the teaching, gives a way to learn what Marcus calls the will of his nature (4.49.1): "The will of nature is to be learned from the matters on which we are not at odds with one another." When another's slave breaks a cup, we say at once that such things happen; when our own is broken, we should be as we were then.[302] And it states the aim that Marcus pursues: "What do I want? To learn nature and to follow it."[303]

Translation in this edition

Φύσις is "nature" at all 184 places, "natures" in the plural (2.16, 6.47, 10.6.1, 11.10, 12.30); the dative φύσει, used of how a thing is, is "by nature" (3.2.1, 3.2.2, 4.24, 9.27, 10.7.1, 10.33.4, 11.9, 11.20.1). Κατὰ φύσιν is always "according to nature" (2.17.2, 4.39, 5.3, 11.16 and elsewhere), and with a possessive "according to your nature" (5.1.1, 9.42.4, 11.16), "according to one's own nature" (10.33.1), "according to man's nature" (3.4.4); with the article and a second noun, κατά is "accords with" at 6.44.2 and 8.12 ("accords with his own constitution and nature", "accords with your constitution and with human nature"). Παρὰ φύσιν is "contrary to nature" (4.39, 6.33, 7.24, 10.7.2, 11.16), except at 2.1, "against nature". Ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει is "in agreement with nature" (3.4.4), ἀνακόλουθος τῇ φύσει "out of keeping with nature" (3.9), and τὰ ἀκόλουθα τῇ φύσει "what accords with the nature" (2.9). Ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις (2.9, 4.36, 7.23, 8.6, 9.35 and elsewhere) and ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις (2.3, 7.75, 8.5, 11.5) are both "the nature of the

[300] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.5.24–25.
[301] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.6.9–10.
[302] Epictetus, *Handbook* 26.
[303] Epictetus, *Handbook* 49.

whole"; ἡ κοινὴ φύσις is "the common nature"; ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα φύσις "the nature that governs the whole" (7.25, 11.18.1); ἡ τοῦ κόσμου φύσις "the nature of the universe" (9.1.2, and at 10.6.1 with the noun understood). The English calls the universal nature "she" or "her" at 2.12, 3.2.3, 4.29, 9.1.1, 9.42.2, 10.7.1, 10.14, 10.20 and 10.36, and "it" at 2.11.3, 5.8.4, 7.75, 8.7, 8.26, 8.35, 8.50, 9.1.3, 9.1.4 and 10.6.1; a particular nature is "it" (4.49.2, 5.1.2, 8.7).

Πέφυκα is rendered by sense with "by nature": "is by nature able" (5.18, 7.55, 10.3, 10.9, 10.33.2), "can by nature" (9.25), "is by nature" (8.46, 9.42.4, 11.18.4, 11.30), "is by nature for" (8.52, 11.18.4), "are by nature such as" (10.7.2, 10.18, 11.6.1, 12.21) and "by their being so by nature" (10.7.2), "gifted by nature" (5.5), "bound by nature" (4.6), "its nature to last" (3.11.2), and the pluperfect at 8.34 "you grew"; the other forms of φύειν are "grew" (4.48.2, "the tree that grew it"; 7.50) and "puts forth" (10.34). Φυσικός is "natural" (3.11.3, 5.10.2, 5.26, 9.3.1, 11.20.1), "of nature" in "the gift of nature" (4.19) and "a work of nature" (11.34), and as a noun "a natural philosopher" (7.67). Φυσιολογεῖν is "study nature", φυσιολόγως "as one who studies nature", ἀφυσιολογήτως "without studying nature"; φυσιολόγος is "a man who studies nature", ἀφυσιολόγος "the man who does not study nature". Κατασκευή is always "constitution", except at 1.16.7, "the building of public works".

κατασκευή

Attested: κατασκευαῖς (*kataskeuais*; 1.16.7), κατασκευῇ (*kataskeuēi*; 3.9, 7.55 three times, 8.11, 8.39, 8.45, 10.33.1), κατασκευῆς (*kataskeuēs*; 4.5, 8.41, 11.5), κατασκευήν (*kataskeuēn*; 4.32.2, 6.16.2, 6.44.2, 7.53, 8.12, 9.42.4), κατασκευή (*kataskeuē*; 7.20). Constitution: the way a thing is made, and so what it is made for. Marcus asks of each thing, "what is it in itself, by its own constitution?" (8.11), and of man, "The leading thing, then, in the constitution of man is the social" (7.55). It is paired with nature at 6.44.2 and 8.12. At 1.16.7, of the public works of Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, it is "the building"; at 4.5 κατασκευῆς is the correction of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts, for the manuscripts' παρασκευῆς, "equipment". Lemma: κατασκευή.

φυσικός

Attested: φυσικόν (*physikon*; 3.11.3), φυσικήν (*physikēn*; 4.19, 5.10.2, 5.26, 11.20.1), φυσικός (*physikos*; 7.67), φυσικά (*physika*; 9.3.1), φυσικῶν (*physikōn*; 9.3.1), φυσικοῦ (*physikou*; 11.34). Natural, belonging to nature: "the natural law of fellowship" (3.11.3), "the natural release" (5.10.2), "the other natural workings that the seasons of life bring" (9.3.1). As a noun it is the student of nature, "a natural philosopher", whom Marcus despairs of becoming (7.67). In Epictetus' words at 11.34, "Nothing is ill-omened … that signifies a work of nature". Lemma: φυσικός.

φυσιολογέω

Attested: φυσιολογήσας (*physiologēsas*; 3.3), φυσιολογεῖν (*physiologein*; 8.13), φυσιολογῶν (*physiologōn*; 9.41); the adverb ἀφυσιολογήτως (*aphysiologētōs*; 10.9). To study nature, to pursue physics, the part of philosophy that treats the universe. Marcus tells himself, "Perpetually, and on every impression if it can be done, study nature, study the passions, practise dialectic" (8.13); Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, in his illness "went on studying nature in its leading questions" (9.41); Heraclitus of Ephesus died "after studying nature so much on the conflagration of the universe" (3.3). Principles taken in "without studying nature" are wiped away (10.9). Lemma: φυσιολογέω.

φυσιολόγος

Attested: φυσιολόγου (*physiologou*; 8.50); the negative ἀφυσιολόγῳ (*aphysiologōi*; 9.41); the adverb φυσιολόγως (*physiologōs*; 10.31). One who studies nature, a student of physics. Whoever asks why there are bitter cucumbers and briars "will be laughed at by a man who studies nature" (8.50). Not to "talk idly with the layman and the man who does not study nature" is common to every school (9.41), where Leopold prints the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, ἀφυσιολόγῳ, for the manuscripts' φυσιολόγῳ. The adverb is "as one who studies nature": the things in life are exercises for a reason that has seen them "exactly, and as one who studies nature" (10.31). Lemma: φυσιολόγος.

φύσις

Attested: φύσιν (*physin*; 1.9.1, 1.17.6 twice, 2.1 three times, 2.17.2 twice, 3.2.3, 3.4.4, 3.11.3, 3.12, 4.1, 4.39 four times, 4.48.2, 4.51, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.3, 5.4, 5.9, 5.10.2, 5.29, 6.9 twice, 6.33 three times, 6.44.2, 6.52, 7.11, 7.24, 7.28, 7.56, 7.74, 8.5, 8.12 twice, 8.29, 8.34, 9.1.4, 9.31, 9.42.4, 10.7.2, 10.15, 10.33.1, 10.36, 11.16 three times, 11.20.2, 12.1.2, 12.5, 12.26), φύσεως (*physeōs*; 2.3 twice, 2.12 three times, 2.16, 4.5, 4.29, 4.49.1 three times, 5.15, 6.14, 6.40, 6.58 twice, 7.5, 8.7 four times, 8.26, 8.41 three times, 9.1.1, 9.1.2, 9.9.1, 10.2, 10.6.1, 10.7.2, 10.8.1, 10.33.2, 11.5, 11.20.2), φύσις (*physis*; 2.3, 2.9, 2.11.3, 4.9, 4.23, 4.36, 4.49.2, 5.1.2, 5.8.1, 5.8.4, 5.9, 5.15, 5.25 twice, 6.44.2, 7.23, 7.25, 7.55, 7.67, 7.75, 8.1 twice, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7 five times, 8.20, 8.35, 8.46, 8.50, 9.1.1 twice, 9.1.3 twice, 9.3.1, 9.9.3, 9.29 twice, 9.35, 9.42.2, 10.2 four times, 10.6.1, 10.7.1, 10.20, 10.36, 11.10 three times, 11.18.1, 12.1.1, 12.5, 12.23, 12.32 twice, 12.36), φύσει (*physei*; 2.9, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.4.4, 3.9, 4.24, 5.3, 5.8.4, 7.18 twice, 9.1.2 three times, 9.1.3, 9.27, 10.7.1 twice, 10.11, 10.14, 10.33.4, 11.9, 11.13 twice, 11.20.1, 12.11), φύσεις (*physeis*; 2.16, 6.47, 11.10), φύσεων (*physeōn*; 10.6.1), φύσεσι (*physesi*; 12.30). Nature: the way a thing has grown and is, and the power that makes things grow and governs the whole; κατὰ φύσιν and παρὰ φύσιν, “according to nature” and “contrary to nature”, are among its commonest uses. “For it is according to nature; and nothing according to nature is bad” (2.17.2). Of the four places at 4.39 one stands in Gataker’s supplement, which Leopold prints; at 10.6.1 his φύσις, “nature”, follows the Latin version of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, where the Greek of his edition has φύσεις, “natures”, and Leopold judges the words “Whether atoms or nature” foreign to the place; the two φύσει of 10.7.1 are the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which Leopold prints, for φημί, “I say”. Lemma: φύσις.

φύω

Attested: πέφυκε (*pephyke*; 3.11.2, 4.6, 5.18, 7.55, 8.46, 9.25, 10.33.2, 11.6.1, 11.18.4), φύσαντι (*physanti*; 4.48.2), πέφυκα (*pephyka*; 5.5), φύντ’ (*phynt’*; 7.50), ἐπεφύκεις (*epephykeis*; 8.34), πέφυκεν (*pephyken*; 8.52 twice, 10.9, 10.18, 12.21), πεφυκώς (*pephykōs*; 9.42.4), πέφυκας (*pephykas*; 10.3 six times, 11.30), πεφυκέναι (*pephykenai*; 10.7.2 twice), φύει (*phyei*; 10.34), πεφύκαμεν (*pephykamen*;

11.18.4). To make grow; the perfect πέφυκα, “I have grown”, is “I am by nature”. It carries the argument of 10.3, “Everything that happens either happens in such a way that you are by nature able to bear it, or in such a way that you are not by nature able to bear it”, and the self-knowledge of 8.52, “he who does not know what he is by nature for does not know who he is”. At 8.34 the pluperfect is “you grew as a part”. Outside the perfect there are three forms: φύσαντι, “the tree that grew it”, of the ripe olive at 4.48.2; φύντ’, “what grew from earth”, in the lines of Euripides, the Athenian tragic poet, quoted at 7.50; and φύει, “the forest puts forth others”, in Marcus’ paraphrase of Homer’s lines on the leaves at 10.34. Lemma: φύω.

See also

Assent and judgement; Change; Cosmos and order; Daimon; Death; Impulse; Natural beauty; Philosophy; Providence and atoms; Whole and part.

Necessity and chance

What must be and what falls out · Meditations

ἀνάγκη, anankē, “necessity”, “it is necessary”, “must”, “bound to”, “compulsions”; *ἀναγκαῖος, anankaios*, “necessary”, “necessity”, “unnecessary”, “needed”; *ἀναγκάζειν, anankazein*, “compel”, “force”; *καταναγκάζειν, katanankazein*, “compel”; *ἐπάναγκες, epanankes*, “as a matter of course”; *ἔνδεσις, endesis*, “bondage”; *τύχη, tychē*, “fortune”; *ἐπιτυχία, epitychia*, “chance”; *σύντευξις, synteuxis*, “coincidence”; *τυγχάνειν, tynchanein*, “chance”, “happen”, “attain”; *εὐτυχής, eutychēs*, “lucky”; *ἀτυχής, atychēs*, “unlucky”; *ἀτυχεῖν, atychein*, “being unlucky”; *εὐτύχημα, eutychēma*, “good fortune”; *ἀτύχημα, atychēma*, “misfortune”; *εὐκλήρημα, euklērēma*, “windfall”; *ἀκλήρημα, aklērēma*, “mischance”; *εἰκῇ, eikēi*, “at random”, “random”; *εἰκαῖος, eikaios*, “random”; *εἰκαιότης, eikaiotēs*, “aimlessness”

At a Glance

The word. Ἀνάγκη is necessity, what cannot be otherwise, and the constraint that makes it so. Τύχη, from τυγχάνειν, “to hit upon, to happen”, is fortune, what falls to a man; εἰκῇ is “at random”. The Stoics called fortune a cause hidden from human reasoning.

In the *Meditations*. The works of fortune "are not apart from nature" (2.3), though fortune is "hard to read" (2.17.1). Marcus moves luck inward: he is lucky because, though this has happened to him, he goes on free from distress (4.49.1). Necessity is common, but "to the rational living being alone it is given to follow willingly what happens, while bare following is necessary for all" (10.28); and if all is at random, "do not you too act at random" (9.28).

In this edition. Ἀνάγκη is "necessity" and, with an infinitive, "it is necessary", "must" or "bound to"; ἀναγκαῖος is "necessary" and ἀναγκάζειν "compel"; τύχη is always "fortune", ἐπιτυχία "chance", ἀτύχημα and εὐτύχημα "misfortune" and "good fortune"; εἰκῇ is "at random" and εἰκαιότης "aimlessness".

A place to read. 10.28, where Marcus tells himself to form an impression of "our bondage", and that the rational living being alone can follow willingly.

Meaning

Ἀνάγκη (*anankē*) is necessity, and also the force that constrains; ἀναγκαῖος (*anankaios*) is what is necessary or needful, and ἀναγκάζειν (*anankazein*) is to compel. Τύχη (*tychē*) belongs with τυγχάνειν (*tynchanein*), "to hit upon, to happen": it is what befalls a man, good or bad. The handbook of the philosophers' opinions on nature that has come down among the works of Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, reports that Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, the philosopher of the fifth century BC, and the Stoics called fortune "a cause unclear to human reasoning", for some things come about by necessity, some by fate, some by choice, some by fortune and some of themselves.[304] Fortune, so defined, is still a cause, only one not seen. Εἰκῇ (*eikēi*) is "at random", without plan, and εἰκαιότης (*eikaiotēs*) aimlessness.

Marcus' necessity is that of nature (2.3, 7.18, 10.7.1), of a man's principles (6.41, 8.14), and of the task in hand (4.24).

Use in the book

Necessity is first nature's. "And there is necessity too, and what is advantageous to the whole universe, of which you are a part" (2.3; see Nature). The parts of the whole must perish, "but let this be said as signifying 'to be altered'"

[304] [Plutarch], *On the Opinions of the Philosophers* 1.29, 885c–d.

(10.7.1; see Dissolution), and Marcus' own changing is "similarly necessary to the nature of the whole" (7.18; see Change). The bad falls under it: "These things are bound by nature to happen so, from such people, of necessity; and he who does not want this wants the fig tree to have no juice" (4.6); the shameless man is one of those "who must be in the universe" (9.42.1; see Fault and ignorance).

Within a man the necessity is that of his principles. Of whoever he meets Marcus is to remember "that he is compelled to act so" (8.14; see Principles and reminders), and in offenders he is to consider "what compulsions of principles they have laid down" (11.18.1; see Anger). The rule binds him too: whatever outside his choice he sets up as good or bad, "it is necessary, on falling into such a bad thing or failing to get such a good, that you blame the gods and hate men too" (6.41; see Good, bad and indifference). The compulsion stops short of the choice. "Or are you compelled, because you are made without talent, to grumble …? No, by the gods" (5.5); "there is no one who will compel me to transgress against him", his god and daimon (5.10.2; see Daimon). Circumstances may compel him "to be, as it were, thoroughly troubled", but he is to return quickly into himself (6.11; see Tranquillity).

The answer to necessity is willingness. After picturing the discontented man as a sacrificed piglet, kicking and squealing (10.28; see Pain and pleasure), Marcus writes: "Form an impression of our bondage, and that to the rational living being alone it is given to follow willingly what happens, while bare following is necessary for all" (10.28). Following is common to all; willing is the gift of reason. The disposition worth effort "welcomes all that happens as necessary, as familiar, as flowing from such a beginning and spring" (4.33), and if all is "a necessity not to be transgressed", the first of the three possibilities of 12.14, Marcus asks, "why do you resist?" (12.14; see Providence and atoms).

Fortune is not outside the order. "The works of fortune are not apart from nature, or from the spinning together and interweaving of the things that providence governs" (2.3; see Nature); of each thing one must say that it came from God, or "by the fall of the lot and the spinning together wound along with it and such coincidence and fortune", or from a kinsman (3.11.3; see Good, bad and indifference). Yet fortune is "hard to read" (2.17.1; see Soul), and what it brings passes: of those who reached their peak in fame or

“fortunes of any kind” Marcus asks where all those things are now, and answers, “Smoke and ash and a legend, or not even a legend” (12.27). What happens from outside “is either by chance or by providence; and one must neither blame chance nor bring a charge against providence” (12.24; see Providence and atoms).

Good and bad fortune Marcus moves into the man. “Unlucky am I, because this has happened to me. No: lucky am I, because though this has happened to me I go on free from distress” (4.49.1; see Tranquillity). Such a thing could have happened to anyone, but not everyone would have gone on free from distress; and he asks, “Do you call anything at all a man’s misfortune which is not a failure of man’s nature?” (4.49.1). The principle follows: “not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune” (4.49.2; see Courage and endurance). Of the so-called “mischances” none harms law, and so none harms city or citizen (10.33.4; see Citizenship). A neighbour’s vice is not bad for Marcus, since God did not decide so, “so that my being unlucky should not be in another’s power” (8.56; see Ruling centre). Whoever has seen the citadel of the understanding and does not flee to it “is unlucky” (8.48; see Inner retreat and citadel).

Randomness he refuses in himself. “Let no act be done at random” (4.2); “For one must do nothing at random” (8.17); and, whichever member of the disjunction holds, “if God, all is well; if at random, do not you too act at random” (9.28; see Providence and atoms). The soul does violence to itself when it “does whatever it does at random and without attention” (2.16; see Impulse).

Marcus does not settle how much of the world is necessity and how much chance. He grants both their reach over events, the body and the bad man’s acts, and keeps three things out of their reach: whether he follows willingly, how he bears what comes, and whether he acts at random. This can be read as his use of the school’s teaching: necessity and fortune name what happens to a man; good fortune names what he does with it.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ἀνάγκη, ἀναγκαῖος, ἀναγκάζειν, καταναγκάζειν, ἐπάναγκες, ἔνδεσις, τύχη, ἐπιτυχία, σύντευξις, one of the words of luck (εὐτυχής, ἀτυχής, ἀτυχεῖν, εὐτύχημα, ἀτύχημα, εὐκλήρημα, ἀκλήρημα), εἰκῇ,

εἰκαῖος or εἰκαιότης occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The places of τυγχάνειν, among them its uses for chance, "any chance" and "if it so happens", are given in the sub-entry; the names Eutyches and Eutychion (10.31) are left out.

1.9.2 From Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew, Marcus learned to find and order, with a firm grasp and by method, the principles necessary for life (see Principles and reminders).

1.12 From Alexander the Platonist, usually identified, as the edition's note says, with Alexander of Seleucia, Marcus' secretary for Greek letters, Marcus learned not to plead business often, or without necessity, as an excuse from the duties that arise from relations with others (see Duty and fitting action).

1.16.2 Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, left his friends free not to dine with him every time nor go with him on his journeys as a matter of course.

1.16.3 Antoninus kept constant guard over what the empire needed, and was sparing of its funds.

1.16.4 Antoninus used the things that make for ease of living, which fortune supplied in plenty, without vanity and without apology.

1.17.9 Among the gifts of the gods, Marcus did not fall in with a sophist nor sit down to writing treatises; all these things, in a quoted line, need the help of gods and of fortune (see Philosophy).

2.3 The works of fortune are not apart from nature or from the interweaving of the things that providence governs, and there is necessity too, and what is advantageous to the whole (see Nature).

2.5 Marcus will give himself leisure if he does each act as the last of his life, without any aimlessness (see Present action).

2.8 Those who do not keep track of the movements of their own soul are bound to be unhappy (see Attention and self-examination).

2.10 Theophrastus, successor of Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, judges the man who does wrong in rage more like one who

has been wronged first and by distress compelled to rage (see Desire and aversion).

2.13 The service of the daimon within is to keep it pure of passion, aimlessness and discontent with what comes from gods and men (see Daimon).

2.16 The soul does violence to itself when it lets an act or impulse of its own go at no target, but does whatever it does at random (see Impulse).

2.17.1 In human life fortune is hard to read (see Soul).

2.17.2 Philosophy lies in keeping the daimon within inviolate, doing nothing at random (see Daimon).

3.4.2 In the sequence of impressions one must avoid what is random and pointless.

3.4.3 The best man forms impressions of what another is saying or doing not often, nor without some great necessity for the common good (see Impression).

3.7 Marcus is never to honour as advantageous anything that will some day force him to break faith or abandon self-respect.

3.11.3 Of each thing one must say whether it has come from God, or by the fall of the lot and such coincidence and fortune, or from a fellow man (see Good, bad and indifference).

4.2 No act is to be done at random, nor otherwise than according to a doctrine that completes the art.

4.6 What such people do is bound by nature to happen of necessity, and he who does not want it wants the fig tree to have no juice.

4.9 The nature of the advantageous has been compelled to do this.

4.24 Against the “Do little” of Democritus, the atomist philosopher of the fifth century BC, Marcus asks whether it is not better to do what is necessary, and is to ask at each thing whether it is one of the things that are not necessary (see Tranquillity).

4.32.2 It is necessary to remember that the attention given to each action has its own worth and proportion.

4.33 What deserves effort is a just understanding, social actions, truthful speech and a disposition that welcomes all that happens as necessary.

4.45 The sequence of things is not an enumeration holding only what is compelled, but a reasoned connection (see Cosmos and order).

4.49.1 Marcus is lucky, not unlucky, because though this has happened to him he goes on free from distress, and he asks whether anything is a man's misfortune that is not a failure of man's nature (see Tranquillity).

4.49.2 At everything that leads towards distress Marcus is to use the principle that this is not a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune (see Courage and endurance).

5.5 Marcus asks whether he is compelled, because he is made without talent, to grumble and flatter, and answers no.

5.10.2 No one will compel Marcus to transgress against his god and daimon (see Daimon).

5.12 The many receive the comic poet's line about wealth and the windfalls that bring luxury or fame as aptly said (see Good, bad and indifference).

5.28 Marcus asks whether he is angry with the man whose armpits stink; such a smell must come from such things, and if the man listens, Marcus will cure him, and there is no need for anger (see Mind and reason).

6.10 If all is a jumble, Marcus asks why he should crave to linger in such a random compound and confusion (see Providence and atoms).

6.11 When Marcus has been compelled by circumstances to be, as it were, thoroughly troubled, he is to return quickly into himself and not go out of the rhythm beyond what is necessary (see Tranquillity).

6.16.4 Unless Marcus stops honouring many other things, he will be neither free nor self-sufficient, for it is necessary to envy, to be jealous and to plot (see Contentment and self-sufficiency).

6.41 Whoever sets up things outside choice as good or bad must, on failing to get them, blame the gods and hate men (see Good, bad and indifference).

7.18 Marcus' own changing is similarly necessary to the nature of the whole (see Change).

7.51 In tragic lines, the wind that blows from the gods one must bear, in toils without lament.

7.63 It is most necessary to remember the saying that every soul is deprived of truth unwillingly (see Soul).

7.66 Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, is to be judged by whether, among other things, he was neither indignant at random at vice nor a slave to anyone's ignorance (see Body and flesh).

8.14 Whoever Marcus meets, he is to ask what principles the man has about good and bad, and to remember that he is compelled to act so (see Principles and reminders).

8.17 One must blame no one, for one must do nothing at random (see Providence and atoms).

8.31 After all the efforts to leave a successor, it is necessary that someone be last of his family (see Death).

8.48 He who has seen that the understanding free from passions is a citadel and does not flee to it is unlucky (see Inner retreat and citadel).

8.56 God did not decide that a neighbour's vice should be bad for Marcus, so that his being unlucky should not be in another's power (see Ruling centre).

9.1.2 He who pursues pleasures as good is impious, for he must often blame the common nature as allotting contrary to worth (see Justice).

9.28 If God, all is well; if at random, Marcus is not to act at random too (see Providence and atoms).

9.42.1 The shameless man is one of those shameless people who must be in the universe (see Fault and ignorance).

10.6.1 The nature of the universe is not compelled even by any cause from outside to generate anything harmful to itself (see Whole and part).

10.6.2 When these things are brought to their end, it is necessary that life flow smoothly, as a citizen's does (see Citizenship).

10.7.1 For the parts of the whole it is necessary to perish, that is, to be altered; Marcus asks whether nature made her parts of necessity prone to fall

into the bad, and finds it unconvincing (see Dissolution).

10.28 Marcus is to form an impression of our bondage, and that the rational living being alone can follow willingly what happens, while bare following is necessary for all.

10.33.4 None of the so-called mischances harms law, and so none harms city or citizen (see Citizenship).

11.18.1 Marcus is to consider above all what compulsions of principles men have laid down (see Anger).

11.18.3 If the shameful is not the only bad thing, Marcus too must necessarily do much wrong (see Anger).

11.19 Over the first of four turnings of the ruling centre Marcus is to say, "This imagining is not necessary" (see Impression).

12.14 Either a necessity of fate and an order not to be transgressed, or a providence that can be propitiated, or a confusion of aimlessness without a leader; if the first, Marcus asks why he resists (see Providence and atoms).

12.16 He who does not want the base man to do wrong is like one who does not want the fig tree to carry juice, or all other things that are necessary (see Fault and ignorance).

12.20 The first rule is to act neither at random nor without reference, the second to refer everything to the social end (see Attention and self-examination).

12.24 In what he does, Marcus is to ask whether it is neither at random nor otherwise than Justice herself would have acted; what happens from outside is either by chance or by providence, and neither is to be blamed (see Providence and atoms).

12.27 Of those who reached their peak in fame, disasters, enmities or fortunes of any kind, Marcus asks where all those things are now: smoke and ash and a legend (see Simplicity and sincerity).

Epictetus and the Stoics

Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, reports in *On Fate* how Chrysippus, the school's third head, tried to keep both fate and what is in our power. Of the older philosophers, some held that everything comes about by fate in such a way that fate brings the force of necessity, Democritus, Heraclitus of Ephesus, Empedocles of Acragas and Aristotle among them; others, that the movements of the mind are voluntary and free of fate. Chrysippus wished, like an honorary arbiter, to strike the middle, but leaned to those who would free the mind from necessity. He divided causes into the perfect and principal and the helping and proximate, and said that when all things are said to come about by fate through antecedent causes, the second kind is meant. Assent cannot come about unless it is moved by an impression; but Chrysippus goes back to his cylinder and his top, which cannot begin to move unless they are pushed, and once pushed move on by their own nature. As the man who pushed the cylinder gave it the beginning of its motion but not its aptness to roll, so the impression will stamp its likeness on the mind, but assent will be in our power, and, once struck from outside, will move for the rest by its own force and nature.[305] Marcus' "he is compelled to act so" (8.14) and his "there is no one who will compel me" (5.10.2) can be read beside the cylinder: the push comes from outside; how a man moves under it comes from his principles. The school's image for following was a dog. The *Refutation of All Heresies*, a Christian work of the early third century ascribed to Hippolytus of Rome, whose first book sets out the opinions of the Greek philosophers, says that Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school, and Chrysippus affirmed that all things are by fate, with this example: if a dog is tied to a cart, then if it wants to follow, it is both pulled and follows, doing what is in its own power along with necessity; if it does not want to follow, it will be compelled all the same; so too with men, who, even if they do not want to follow, will in any case be compelled to go into what is destined.[306] Marcus' "bare following is necessary for all", and the willing following given to the rational living being alone (10.28), can be read as the two dogs. The prayer of Cleanthes, Zeno's successor at the head of the school, to be led by Zeus and Doom, and the Latin version of Seneca,

[305] Cicero, *On Fate* 39–43.

[306] Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 1.21.1–2.

the Roman Stoic of the first century, belong to the same teaching (see Fate and allotment). Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, makes the willing an oath: as soldiers swear to put Caesar's safety before everything, so men, honoured by God with so much, should swear never to disobey him, nor to charge or fault any of his gifts, nor to do or undergo against their will anything that must be.[307]

Translation in this edition

Ἀνάγκη is "necessity" (1.12, 3.4.3, 12.14 twice) and "of necessity" (4.6, 10.7.1); with an infinitive it is "it is necessary" (6.16.4 twice, 6.41, 8.31, 10.6.2, 10.7.1), "must" (5.28, 9.1.2, 9.42.1, and "one must" in the tragic lines of 7.51), "are bound to" (2.8) and "must necessarily" (11.18.3); the plural is "compulsions" (11.18.1). Ἀναγκαῖος is "necessary" (1.9.2, 4.24, 7.18, 10.7.1, 10.28, 11.19, 12.16), "it is necessary" (4.32.2), "as necessary" (4.33), "beyond what is necessary" (6.11), "unnecessary" with the negative (4.24), and in the superlative "most necessary" (7.63); with the article it is "necessity" (2.3), and τῶν ἀναγκαίων τῇ ἀρχῇ (*tōn anankaiōn tēi archēi*) is "what the empire needed" (1.16.3). Ἀναγκάζειν is "compel" (2.10, 4.9, 5.5, 5.10.2, 6.11, 8.14, 10.6.1) and "force" (3.7); καταναγκάζειν is "what is compelled" (4.45), and ἐπάναγκες "as a matter of course" (1.16.2). "Bound by nature" at 4.6 renders πέφυκε (*pephyke*), and "it will be necessary" at 8.25 renders δεήσει (*deēsei*). "Bondage" is ἔνδεσις (10.28), and "willingly" there ἑκουσίως (*hekousiōs*; see Fault and ignorance). Τύχη is "fortune" at all six places, "fortunes" in the plural (12.27). "Chance" renders ἐπιτυχία (12.24 twice) and the participle of τυγχάνειν in "any chance nature" (5.8.4) and "any chance thing" (11.38); "no further chance" at 2.6 renders καιρός (*kairos*), and "takes no chances" at 1.8.1 ἀκύβευτον (*akybeuton*), "not given to dicing". Σύντευξις is "coincidence" (3.11.3). Εὐτυχής is "lucky" (4.49.1) and ἀτυχής "unlucky" (4.49.1, 8.48), ἀτυχεῖν "my being unlucky" (8.56); εὐτύχημα and ἀτύχημα are "good fortune" and "misfortune" (4.49.1, 4.49.2), as the Glossary records, and ἀπότευγμα (*apoteugma*) beside them "a failure" (4.49.1). Εὐκλήρημα is "windfalls" (5.12) and ἀκλήρημα "mischances" (10.33.4); "disasters" at 12.27 renders συμφοραί (*symphorai*). Εἰκῇ is "at random" at all its places but 3.4.2, where τὸ εἰκῇ (*to eikēi*) is "what is

[307] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.14.15–16.

random"; εἰκαῖος is "random" (6.10) and εἰκαιότης "aimlessness" (2.5, 2.13, 12.14).

ἀκλήρημα

Attested: ἀκληρημάτων (*aklērēmatōn*; 10.33.4). A mishap; the word is formed on κλῆρος (*klēros*), "lot". "And of these so-called mischances none harms law" (10.33.4; see Citizenship). Lemma: ἀκλήρημα.

ἀναγκάζω

Attested: ἠναγκασμένῳ (*ēnankasmenōi*; 2.10), ἀναγκάσει (*anankasei*; 3.7), ἠνάγκασται (*ēnankastai*; 4.9), ἀναγκάζῃ (*anankazēi*; 5.5), ἀναγκάσων (*anankasōn*; 5.10.2), ἀναγκασθῇς (*anankasthēis*; 6.11), ἀναγκάζεται (*anankazetai*; 8.14), ἀναγκάζεσθαι (*anankazesthai*; 10.6.1). To compel, to force. "I shall remember that he is compelled to act so" (8.14); "for there is no one who will compel me to transgress against him" (5.10.2); "When you have been compelled by circumstances to be, as it were, thoroughly troubled, return quickly into yourself" (6.11); the nature of the universe "is not compelled even by any cause from outside to generate anything harmful to itself" (10.6.1). At 8.14 A, the Vatican manuscript, has the command "remember" for "I shall remember". Lemma: ἀναγκάζω.

ἀναγκαῖος

Attested: ἀναγκαίων (*anankaiōn*; 1.9.2, 1.16.3, 4.24), ἀναγκαῖον (*anankaion*; 2.3, 4.32.2, 4.33, 7.18, 10.7.1, 10.28, 11.19), τἀναγκαῖα (*tanankaia*; 4.24), ἀναγκαῖα (*anankaia*; 4.24, 6.11, 12.16), ἀναγκαίας (*anankaias*; 4.24), ἀναγκαιότατον (*anankaiotaton*, superlative; 7.63). Necessary, needful; with the article, necessity. "And there is necessity too" (2.3); "Is it not better to do what is necessary, and whatever the reason of a living being civic by nature requires, and as it requires?" (4.24); "while bare following is necessary for all" (10.28); "This imagining is not necessary" (11.19). Lemma: ἀναγκαῖος.

ἀνάγκη

Attested: ἀνάγκης (*anankēs*; 1.12, 3.4.3, 4.6, 10.7.1), ἀνάγκη (*anankē*; 2.8, 5.28, 6.16.4 twice, 6.41, 7.51, 8.31, 9.1.2, 9.42.1, 10.6.2, 10.7.1, 11.18.3, 12.14 twice), ἀνάγκας (*anankas*; 11.18.1). Necessity, constraint; with an infinitive, it is necessary. "These things are bound by nature to happen so, from such people, of necessity" (4.6); "this man too is

one of those shameless people who must be in the universe" (9.42.1); "If, then, a necessity not to be transgressed, why do you resist?" (12.14); in the plural, "what compulsions of principles they have laid down" (11.18.1). At 7.51 the word stands in two lines of an unknown tragedy, as the edition's note says. At 12.14 P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has εἱμαρμένη (*heimarmenē*), "fated", for εἱμαρμένης (*heimarmenēs*), "of fate", and omits the "and" that follows. Lemma: ἀνάγκη.

ἀτυχέω

Attested: ἀτυχεῖν (*atychein*; 8.56). To be unlucky, to fare ill. A neighbour's vice is not bad for Marcus, which God did not decide, "so that my being unlucky should not be in another's power" (8.56; see Ruling centre). Lemma: ἀτυχέω.

ἀτύχημα

Attested: ἀτύχημα (*atychēma*; 4.49.1 twice, 4.49.2). A misfortune. "Why then is that a misfortune rather than this good fortune? Do you call anything at all a man's misfortune which is not a failure of man's nature?" (4.49.1); "not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune" (4.49.2). Lemma: ἀτύχημα.

ἀτυχής

Attested: ἀτυχής (*atychēs*; 4.49.1, 8.48). Unlucky, unfortunate. "Unlucky am I, because this has happened to me" (4.49.1); "he who has seen it and does not flee to it is unlucky" (8.48). At 8.48 Herbert Richards, whose notes on Marcus Aurelius appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905, proposed to exchange "ignorant" and "unlucky", as J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, reports. Lemma: ἀτυχής.

εἰκαῖος

Attested: εἰκαίῳ (*eikaiōi*; 6.10). Random, haphazard. If all is a jumble, "why do I even crave to linger in such a random compound and confusion?" (6.10; see Providence and atoms). Lemma: εἰκαῖος.

εἰκαιότης

Attested: εἰκαιότητος (*eikaiotētos*; 2.5, 2.13, 12.14). Randomness, aimlessness. Marcus will give himself leisure if he does each act as the last of his life, "free of all aimlessness" (2.5); the service of the daimon is to keep it

“pure of passion, aimlessness and discontent” (2.13); the third member of 12.14 is “a confusion of aimlessness without a leader”. Lemma: εἰκαιότης.

εἰκῇ

Attested: εἰκῇ (*eikēi*; 2.16, 2.17.2, 3.4.2, 4.2, 7.66, 8.17, 9.28 twice, 12.20, 12.24). At random, without plan or aim. “Let no act be done at random” (4.2); “For one must do nothing at random” (8.17); “if God, all is well; if at random, do not you too act at random” (9.28); Socrates is to be judged by whether he was “neither indignant at random at vice nor indeed a slave to anyone’s ignorance” (7.66). With the article it is “what is random” (3.4.2). Lemma: εἰκῇ.

ἔνδεσις

Attested: ἔνδεσιν (*endesin*; 10.28). A binding in, bondage. “Form an impression of our bondage, and that to the rational living being alone it is given to follow willingly what happens” (10.28). Leopold ends the preceding sentence at “in silence”, so that “our bondage” depends on the chapter’s opening “Form the impression”, and the English supplies the verb; he reports ἔνδοσιν (*endosin*), “giving in”, in two manuscripts. Both points are in the edition’s note. Lemma: ἔνδεσις.

ἐπάναγκος

Attested: ἐπάναγκες (*epanankes*, the neuter used as an adverb; 1.16.2). Compulsory; as an adverb, of necessity. Antoninus left his friends free “not to dine with him every time nor go with him on his journeys as a matter of course” (1.16.2). Lemma: ἐπάναγκος.

ἐπιτυχία

Attested: ἐπιτυχίαν (*epitychian*; 12.24), ἐπιτυχίᾳ (*epitychiāi*; 12.24). A hitting upon, chance. What happens from outside “is either by chance or by providence; and one must neither blame chance nor bring a charge against providence” (12.24; see Providence and atoms). Lemma: ἐπιτυχία.

εὐκλήρημα

Attested: εὐκληρημάτων (*euklērēmatōn*; 5.12). A piece of good fortune, a windfall. The many receive “the line about wealth and the windfalls that bring luxury or fame” as aptly said (5.12; see Good, bad and indifference). Lemma: εὐκλήρημα.

εὐτύχημα

Attested: εὐτύχημα (*eutychēma*; 4.49.1, 4.49.2). A piece of good fortune. “Why then is that a misfortune rather than this good fortune?” (4.49.1); “to bear it nobly is good fortune” (4.49.2; see Courage and endurance). Lemma: εὐτύχημα.

εὐτυχής

Attested: εὐτυχής (*eutychēs*; 4.49.1). Lucky, fortunate. “No: lucky am I, because though this has happened to me I go on free from distress” (4.49.1). Lemma: εὐτυχής.

καταναγκάζω

Attested: κατηναγκασμένον (*katēnankasmenon*; 4.45). To compel, constrain; the perfect participle, what has been made necessary. The sequence of things is not “like some enumeration, holding disconnectedly [and] only what is compelled, but a reasoned connection” (4.45; see Cosmos and order). The bracket marks the “and” that Leopold deletes, after Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802. Lemma: καταναγκάζω.

σύντευξις

Attested: σύντευξιν (*synteuxin*; 3.11.3). A meeting, a coincidence, from συντυγχάνειν (*syntynchanein*), “to meet with”. Of each thing one must say that it has come “by the fall of the lot and the spinning together wound along with it and such coincidence and fortune” (3.11.3; see Good, bad and indifference). Lemma: σύντευξις.

τυγχάνω

Attested: τύχῃ (*tychēi*; 1.13), τυγχάνοντας (*tynchanontas*; 1.14.2), ἔτυχε (*etyche*; 1.17.1, 11.18.4), τυχεῖν (*tychein*; 1.17.4, 7.53, 7.73), τυχοῦσα (*tychousa*; 5.8.4), τυχοῦσιν (*tychousin*; 5.10.1), τυγχάνεις (*tynchaneis*; 6.50, 11.7), τυχόν (*tychon*; 10.36), τυγχάνει (*tynchanei*; 11.1.1), ἔτυχεν (*etychen*; 11.24), τυχόντος (*tychontos*; 11.38). To hit upon, to attain; to happen to be; and, in the participle, any chance one. Of chance: “for not even any chance nature brings anything that is not appropriate to what is governed by it” (5.8.4); philosophers “not ordinary ones” (5.10.1); “if it so happens” (11.18.4) and “had things fallen out so” (1.17.1); the contest, Epictetus said, “is not about any chance thing, but about being mad or not” (11.38), a saying the edition’s note identifies. Of attaining: the rational soul “attains its own end wherever the term of life

comes upon it" (11.1.1). Of happening to be: "this in which you now happen to be" (11.7). At 5.8.4 A and the books of excerpts omit τυχοῦσα. Lemma: τυγχάνω.

τύχη

Attested: τύχη (*tychē*; 1.16.4, 2.17.1), τύχης (*tychēs*; 1.17.9, 2.3), τύχην (*tychēn*; 3.11.3), τύχαις (*tychais*; 12.27). What befalls; fortune. "The works of fortune are not apart from nature" (2.3); "the soul a whirl, fortune hard to read" (2.17.1); Antoninus used what "fortune supplied in plenty" (1.16.4); all these gifts, among them his escape from sophists, "need the help of gods and of fortune", in a line Leopold marks as a quotation from an unknown source (1.17.9). Lemma: τύχη.

See also

Anger; Attention and self-examination; Body and flesh; Change; Citizenship; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Cosmos and order; Courage and endurance; Daimon; Death; Desire and aversion; Dissolution; Duty and fitting action; Fate and allotment; Fault and ignorance; Good, bad and indifference; Impression; Impulse; Inner retreat and citadel; Interconnection; Justice; Mind and reason; Nature; Pain and pleasure; Philosophy; Present action; Principles and reminders; Providence and atoms; Ruling centre; Simplicity and sincerity; Soul; Tranquillity; Whole and part.

Prayer

Asking the gods, simply and for the right things · Meditations

εὐχή, euchē, "prayer", "prayers"; *εὔχεσθαι, euchesthai*, "pray", "prays", "praying", "prayed"; *ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, epikaleisthai*, "call on"; *ἱλάσκεσθαι, hilaskesthai*, "being propitiated"; *ἱλάσιμος, hilasimos*, "that can be propitiated"

At a Glance

The word. Εὐχή is a prayer and εὔχεσθαι to pray, to ask something of a god or to vow it to him. Ἐπικαλεῖσθαι is to call on a god, and ἱλάσκεσθαι to make him gracious, to propitiate him.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus copies one prayer, the Athenians' "Rain, rain, dear Zeus, on the ploughland of the Athenians and on the plains", and adds, "Either one must not pray, or pray so, simply and freely" (5.7). If the gods have

power, he asks, why not "rather pray that they give not fearing any of these things, nor craving any of them, nor being distressed at any of them" (9.40)? And he tells himself, "in all things call on the gods" (6.23).

In this edition. Εὐχή is "prayer" and εὔχεσθαι "pray" at every place; ἐπικαλεῖσθαι is "call on", and ἱλάσιμος and ἱλάσκεσθαι are rendered with "propitiated" (12.14).

A place to read. 5.7, where Marcus copies the Athenians' prayer for rain and sets it as the pattern: either not to pray, or to pray so, simply and freely.

Meaning

Εὐχή (*euchē*) and εὔχεσθαι (*euchesthai*) are the common Greek words for prayer and praying. The verb is also to vow, and in Homer to claim to be.[308] Ἐπικαλεῖσθαι (*epikaleisthai*), from καλεῖν (*kalein*), "call", is to call a god to one's side; ἱλάσκεσθαι (*hilaskesthai*) is to make a god ἵλεως (*hileōs*), "gracious", the word that in Marcus is "serene", said of a man and, in the book's last words, of the one who releases him (12.36; see Tranquillity). The Stoics allowed the wise man prayer. He "will pray, asking the gods for good things", Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers, reports, citing Posidonius of Apamea, the Stoic of the late second and early first centuries BC, and the Stoic Hecaton of Rhodes.[309] What the good things are is the question Marcus presses.

Use in the book

Prayer belongs to the piety Marcus takes for granted. He tells himself to use irrational living beings and things "with greatness of mind and freely", men "socially", "and in all things call on the gods" (6.23). Supposing that the gods take counsel about nothing, he breaks off: "it is not holy to believe it; or else let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear nor do the other things we do at every turn as to gods present and living alongside us" (6.44.2; see Gods). Prayer is one of the acts that assume the gods care. It is also one of the common doings of every age: in the times of the emperor Vespasian, which he is to conceive, Marcus will see people "praying for certain people to die" (4.32.1; see Death), and dying he is to reckon that those for whom he

[308] Homer, *Iliad* 6.211.

[309] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.124.

“struggled so much, prayed, took thought” want him to go (10.36; see Death).

The one prayer Marcus copies is a people’s. “A prayer of the Athenians: ‘Rain, rain, dear Zeus, on the ploughland of the Athenians and on the plains.’ Either one must not pray, or pray so, simply and freely” (5.7). It is a folk prayer, the edition’s note says. It names the god, makes one request, and says where: the fields of a city. It asks for rain, a thing outside anyone’s choice, and Marcus finds no fault with the request; the words he adds concern the manner. “Simply” is ἁπλῶς (*haplōs*; see Simplicity and sincerity), with nothing added, and “freely” ἐλευθέρως (*eleutherōs*), as a free man speaks, the pair with which he tells himself to “choose the better simply and freely” (3.6.3; see Moral choice and freedom). The alternative he offers is not a better form of words but no prayer at all.

At 9.40 the object is put in question. “Either the gods have no power, or they have power. If, then, they have no power, why do you pray?” If they have, Marcus asks why one does not pray that they give not fearing, not craving and not being distressed at any of these things, “rather than that any of them be absent or present? For surely, if they can work with men, they can work with them for these too.” The objection that the gods have put these things in a man’s power, and its answer, belong to freedom; the question that follows, whether the gods do not lend a hand even in what is in a man’s power (see Moral choice and freedom), keeps prayer where his own effort reaches. Then comes a practice: “Begin, at any rate, to pray about these things, and you will see.” The first of three pairs concerns craving (see Desire and aversion); the others turn “How may I be deprived of that man?” into “How may I not need to be deprived?”, and “How may I not lose the little child?” into “How may I not fear to lose?” The other men’s prayers ask the gods to arrange events; Marcus’ ask them for a disposition. Marcus is to turn the prayers so and observe what comes about (see Desire and aversion), and prayer can be read here as a trial whose outcome is to be watched.

Book XII comes back to what prayer seeks. What Marcus prays to reach by a roundabout way he can have now, if he does not begrudge himself (12.1.1; see Present action). And if providence is one “that admits of being propitiated”, the instruction is “make yourself worthy of help from the divine” (12.14; see Providence and atoms).

Marcus keeps prayer and reforms it. Its manner is that of 5.7, short, plain and free; its best object is the one 9.40 names, a man's own freedom from fear, craving and distress; and it does not stand in for what he can do himself (12.1.1, 12.14). The two chief passages can be read as one standard: the prayer said "freely" (5.7) and the power used "with freedom" (9.40) belong to the same free man, who asks the gods openly and asks them for what keeps him free.

Places to read

Every chapter in which εὐχή, εὔχεσθαι, ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, ἱλάσκεσθαι or ἵλάσιμος occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided.

4.32.1 Marcus is to conceive the times of Vespasian, where he will see, among the doings of men, people praying for certain people to die (see Death).

5.7 Marcus copies the Athenians' prayer for rain to dear Zeus: either one must not pray, or pray so, simply and freely.

6.23 Marcus is to use irrational beings and things with greatness of mind and freely, men socially, and in all things to call on the gods.

6.44.2 It is not holy to believe that the gods take counsel about nothing, or else sacrifice, prayer and oaths should cease; even if they take counsel about nothing, Marcus can take counsel about himself (see Gods).

9.40 If the gods have no power, Marcus asks why he prays; if they have, why he does not pray for not fearing, craving or being distressed rather than for things to be absent or present; he is to begin praying so and observe what comes about.

10.36 Dying, Marcus is to reckon that the very fellows for whom he struggled, prayed and took thought want him to go (see Death).

12.1.1 All that Marcus prays to reach by a roundabout way he can have now, if he does not begrudge himself (see Present action).

12.14 If providence admits of being propitiated, Marcus is to make himself worthy of help from the divine (see Providence and atoms).

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, uses the imperative, ἐπικαλοῦ (*epikalou*), that Marcus uses at 6.23. The struggle against a strong impression is a great contest, he says, for kingship, freedom, a smooth flow of life and freedom from trouble: "remember God, call on him as helper and as one who stands at your side, as men at sea call on the Dioscuri in a storm"; and what storm, he asks, is greater than one of strong impressions that dislodge reason? The Dioscuri are the divine twins Castor and Polydeuces.[310] In the discourse that bears the title "How one should consult the diviners", Epictetus wants God approached as a guide, as men use their eyes, not begging them to show one thing rather than another but taking in what they show; men instead tremble, call on the god and beg, "Lord, have mercy; let me come out of it". "Slave," he asks, "do you want anything other than the better? And is anything better than what seems good to God?"[311] Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, tells his friend Lucilius that he may release the gods from his old prayers, and bids him make new ones: "ask for a good mind, for good health of the soul, and only then of the body"; Lucilius is to ask God boldly, for he will be asking him for nothing that belongs to another.[312] In a later letter Seneca calls it foolish to pray for a good mind "when you can obtain it from yourself" (see Daimon).[313] The prayers of 9.40 can be read as the first counsel, and Marcus' answer to "The gods have put these in my power" as a reply to the second.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon, the Athenian soldier and writer, whose *Memorabilia* record conversations of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, says that Socrates prayed to the gods simply to give him good things, since the gods know best what kinds of thing are good, and held that those who prayed for gold or silver or a tyranny prayed for nothing different than if they prayed for a throw of the dice or a battle, or anything else whose outcome is plainly unclear.[314] Xenophon's word for the manner, ἁπλῶς, is Marcus' "simply" at 5.7. Diogenes of

[310] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.18.28–29.
[311] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.7.11–13.
[312] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 10.4.
[313] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 41.1.
[314] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.3.2.

Sinope, the Cynic of the fourth century BC, found fault with men's prayers, Diogenes Laertius reports, because they ask for what seems good to them and not for what is good in truth;[315] and from the three books he lists under the name of Pythagoras of Samos, the philosopher of the sixth century BC, Diogenes reports that Pythagoras did not allow men to pray for themselves, because they do not know what is to their advantage.[316] Marcus' first alternative at 5.7, "Either one must not pray", can be read beside the Pythagorean rule, and the turned prayers of 9.40 beside Socrates' and Diogenes'.

Translation in this edition

Εὐχή is "prayer" (5.7) and in the plural "prayers" (9.40). Εὔχεσθαι is "pray" at all nine of its occurrences, in the forms "prays" (9.40), "praying" (4.32.1) and "prayed" (10.36); at 12.1.1 ἐφ' ἃ διὰ περιόδου εὐχῇ ἐλθεῖν (*eph' ha dia periodou euchēi elthein*) is "which you pray to reach by a roundabout way" (see Recurrence and repetition). At 9.40 "turn the prayers this way" renders ἐπίστρεψον (*epistrepson*), the reading adopted by J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, and X, the books of excerpts, have ἐπίτρεψον (*epitrepson*), "entrust". Ἐπικαλεῖσθαι is "call on" (6.23). At 5.7 ἁπλῶς is "simply" (see Simplicity and sincerity) and ἐλευθέρως "freely" (see Moral choice and freedom); ἵλεως is "serene" (see Tranquillity). Ἱλάσιμος is "that can be propitiated" and τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι "being propitiated" (12.14). "Entreat" at 10.8.2 renders παρακαλεῖν (*parakalein*), of beast-fighters who beg to be kept for the morrow. Beside prayer at 6.44.2 stand θύειν (*thyein*), "sacrifice", and ὀμνύναι (*omnynai*), "swear" (see Gods). Προσεύχεσθαι (*proseuchesthai*), ἐπεύχεσθαι (*epeuchesthai*) and λιτανεύειν (*litaneuein*), "supplicate", do not occur in the book.

ἐπικαλέω

Attested: ἐπικαλοῦ (*epikalou*; 6.23). To call upon, invoke; in the middle, to call a god to one's aid. Marcus is to use irrational beings and things with greatness of mind, men socially, "and in all things call on the gods" (6.23). Lemma: ἐπικαλέω.

---

[315] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 6.42.

[316] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.6 and 8.9.

εὐχή

Attested: εὐχή (*euchē*; 5.7), εὐχάς (*euchas*; 9.40). A prayer; also a vow. “A prayer of the Athenians: ‘Rain, rain, dear Zeus, on the ploughland of the Athenians and on the plains’” (5.7); “In short, turn the prayers this way, and observe what comes about” (9.40), where P and X read ἐπίτρεψον, “entrust”, for the ἐπίστρεψον, “turn”, that Leopold prints. Lemma: εὐχή.

εὔχομαι

Attested: εὐχομένους (*euchomenous*; 4.32.1), εὔχεσθαι (*euchesthai*; 5.7, 9.40), εὐχώμεθα (*euchōmetha*; 6.44.2), εὔχῃ (*euchēi*; 9.40 twice, 12.1.1), εὔχεται (*euchetai*; 9.40), ηὐξάμην (*ēuxamēn*; 10.36). To pray; also to vow, and in Homer to declare oneself. “Either one must not pray, or pray so, simply and freely” (5.7); “let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear” (6.44.2), if the gods take counsel about nothing; “If, then, they have no power, why do you pray?” (9.40); “All those things which you pray to reach by a roundabout way you can have now, if you do not begrudge yourself” (12.1.1). Lemma: εὔχομαι.

ἱλάσιμος

Attested: ἱλάσιμος (*hilasimos*; 12.14). Able to be propitiated, placable. Of the second of three possibilities: “Either a necessity of fate and an order not to be transgressed, or a providence that can be propitiated, or a confusion of aimlessness without a leader” (12.14; see Providence and atoms). Lemma: ἱλάσιμος.

ἱλάσκομαι

Attested: ἱλάσκεσθαι (*hilaskesthai*; 12.14). To make gracious, to propitiate. “If a providence that admits of being propitiated, make yourself worthy of help from the divine” (12.14). A, the Vatican manuscript, has ἱλᾶσθαι (*hilasthai*), another form of the same verb. Lemma: ἱλάσκομαι.

See also

Daimon; Death; Desire and aversion; Gods; Moral choice and freedom; Present action; Providence and atoms; Recurrence and repetition; Simplicity and sincerity; Tranquillity.

Either providence or atoms · Meditations

πρόνοια, pronoia, “providence”, “forethought”; *προνοεῖσθαι, pronoeisthai*, “provide”; *προνοητικός, pronoētikos*, “looking ahead”; *ἄτομοι, atomoi*, “atoms”; *ἀμερής, amerēs*, “without parts”; *κυκεών, kykeōn*, “jumble”; *συμφύρειν, symphyrein*, “mixed together”; *φυρμός, phyrmos*, “confusion”; *ἀντεμπλοκή, antemplokē*, “intertwining”; *σκεδασμός, skedasmos*, “scattering”; *σκέδασις, skedasis*, “scattering”; *σκεδαννύναι, skedannynai*, “be scattered”; *διασκεδαννύναι, diaskedannynai*, “be scattered”, “scatter”; *σκορπισμός, skorpismos*, “dispersal”

At a Glance

The word. Πρόνοια is forethought, and in philosophy the care with which the gods or nature order the world; the ἄτομοι, “uncuttables”, are the indivisible bodies of Epicurus, which make things by combining and unmake them by coming apart.

In the *Meditations*. “Renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms” (4.3.2): in ten chapters Marcus sets the two against each other, and where he draws conduct from them it is the same on both, no resentment, no blame, no trouble, no acting at random; at 12.14 fate makes a third. In the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, he once decides it, “But surely an ordered universe” (4.27), though “But surely” is a correction.

In this edition. Πρόνοια is “providence”, and “forethought” where it is a ruler’s (8.3); ἄτομοι is always “atoms”; κυκεών is “jumble”, φυρμός “confusion”, ἀντεμπλοκή “intertwining”, σκεδασμός “scattering” and σκορπισμός “dispersal”.

A place to read. 6.10, where both members of the disjunction are filled out and each is given its reply.

Meaning

Πρόνοια (*pronoia*) is formed from προνοεῖν (*pronoein*), “to think beforehand”: forethought, provision for what is to come. Philosophy made it the care with which the gods or nature order the world, and the Stoics made it doctrine: the universe is governed “according to mind and providence”, as Chrysippus, the school’s third head, wrote in his *On*

Providence, mind pervading every part of it as soul pervades us.[317] Ἄτομος (*atomos*), from the negative prefix and τέμνειν (*temnein*), "to cut", is "uncut", "indivisible". Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, taught that the whole is bodies and void, and that the bodies from which compounds are made are "uncuttable and unchangeable", so that something remains when the compounds are dissolved.[318]

In Marcus the noun πρόνοια is a man's only at 8.3; elsewhere it belongs to the gods, whose works "are full of providence" (2.3), and to nature (9.1.4). Ἄτομοι are always plural and always the other member of the disjunction. Around them he sets words for a world without order: κυκεών (*kykeōn*), "jumble", a drink of barley, wine and cheese that separates unless it is stirred, as the edition's note at 4.27 explains; φυρμός (*phyrmos*), "confusion", from φύρειν (*phyrein*), "to knead, to mix up"; ἀντεμπλοκή (*antemplokē*), "intertwining"; and σκεδασμός (*skedasmos*), "scattering".

Use in the book

Marcus gives himself the formula in the chapter on retreat into oneself, against resentment at "what is allotted from the whole": "Renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms, and all that proved the universe to be as it were a city" (4.3.2). At 6.10 both members are filled out: "Either a jumble, an intertwining and a scattering; or unity, order and providence. If, then, the former, why do I even crave to linger in such a random compound and confusion? … And why am I even troubled? For the scattering will come upon me, whatever I do. But if the other is the case, I revere, I stand steady, and I take courage in the one who governs." The replies differ; the conduct is the same. At 9.39 the question stands after both members: "Either all things happen from one intelligent spring, as to one body, and the part must not blame what comes about for the sake of the whole; or atoms, and nothing but a jumble and scattering. Why, then, are you troubled?" Blame is excluded on both: "If in another's, whom do you blame? The atoms or the gods? Both are madness" (8.17). So is aimlessness. After a

[317] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.138, citing Chrysippus, *On Providence* book 5, and Posidonius, *On Gods* book 3.

[318] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 10.39–41 (Epicurus, *Letter to Herodotus*).

sentence that the edition's note calls obscure, "For in a way, atoms or things without parts", Marcus sums up: "if God, all is well; if at random, do not you too act at random" (9.28).

Book XII adds a third member, fate (see Fate and allotment): "Either a necessity of fate and an order not to be transgressed, or a providence that can be propitiated, or a confusion of aimlessness without a leader." Each has its reply: "why do you resist?"; "make yourself worthy of help from the divine"; and, if a confusion without a guide, "be glad that in such a surge you yourself have in yourself a ruling mind; and if the surge carries you away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the little breath, the rest; for the mind it will not carry away" (12.14; see Mind and reason). At 12.24 the pair is chance and providence: what happens from outside "is either by chance or by providence; and one must neither blame chance nor bring a charge against providence".

Elsewhere the disjunction is a preface. "Whether atoms or nature, let it be laid down first that I am a part of the whole governed by nature" (10.6.1); "if not atoms, nature that governs the whole; if this, the worse for the sake of the better, and these for one another" (11.18.1; see Kinship and cooperation). In Leopold's text Marcus once decides it: "Either an ordered universe or a jumble mixed together. But surely an ordered universe. Or can a kind of order subsist in you, and disorder in the totality?" (4.27). The decision rests on two corrections Leopold prints: "mixed together" is the συμπεφυρμένος (*sympephyrmenos*) of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802, and "But surely", ἀλλὰ μήν (*alla mēn*), that of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*; the manuscripts read "or a jumble heaped together, but an order all the same". The question that follows argues for order in either text.

Death falls under the disjunction. Alexander of Macedon and his muleteer "came, in death, to the same state; for either they were taken back into the same seminal reasons of the universe, or they were scattered alike into atoms" (6.24). "On death: either scattering, if atoms; but if unity, either quenching or migration" (7.32); the three possibilities return in other words at 8.25 (see Death) and 11.3 (see Soul), and the scattering at 6.4 and 10.7.2 (see Dissolution).

Of providence itself Marcus says little. "The works of the gods are full of providence. The works of fortune are not apart from nature, or from the spinning together and

interweaving of the things that providence governs" (2.3; see Nature). The common nature had its impulse towards this world-order "by a certain original impulse of providence" (9.1.4), and the gods "chiefly provide" for the community (6.44.1; see Gods). What he prays for he can have now if, among other things, he will "entrust the future to providence" (12.1.1).

The two members are not equal. Providence has content, unity, order, a governor in whom Marcus takes courage; the atoms have only names of disorder, and that member is never argued for. The disjunction can be read as less a confession of doubt than a way of cutting conduct loose from physics: whichever member is true, resentment, blame, trouble and aimlessness are excluded, and Marcus asks the same of himself. Where the whole may lack order, he keeps it in himself, the "ruling mind" of 12.14; this can be read as the question of 4.27 turned round: there the order in himself was a reason to believe in order in the whole; here, if the whole is a surge, the order within is what the surge cannot carry away.

Places to read

Every chapter in which πρόνοια and its family, ἄτομοι, or one of the words of the alternative (ἀμερής, κυκεών, συμφύρειν, φυρμός, ἀντεμπλοκή, σκεδασμός and its family, σκορπισμός) occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; these include all ten chapters in which the disjunction is set out. Other words of the root of φυρμός, rendered "befoul", "muddled", "kneaded lump" and "indiscriminately", are left out.

1.16.3 Among the qualities of Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father: looking ahead from far off, and arranging the smallest matters in advance without theatre.

2.3 The works of the gods are full of providence, and the works of fortune are not apart from nature or from the interweaving of the things that providence governs.

2.11.1 If there are no gods, or they do not care for human affairs, Marcus asks what it is to him to live in a universe empty of gods or empty of providence.

4.3.2 Against resentment at what is allotted from the whole, Marcus is to renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms.

4.27 Either an ordered universe or a jumble; Marcus asks whether a kind of order can subsist in him and disorder in the totality, when all things are so distinguished, diffused and in sympathy.

6.4 All underlying things will very soon change, and be turned to vapour if substance is unified, or else be scattered.

6.10 Either a jumble, an intertwining and a scattering, or unity, order and providence: if the first, the scattering will come whatever Marcus does; if the second, he reveres and takes courage in the one who governs.

6.24 Alexander and his muleteer came to the same state in death, either taken back into the seminal reasons of the universe or scattered alike into atoms.

6.44.1 If the gods took no counsel about Marcus individually, they took counsel about the common affairs, the community for which they chiefly provide.

7.32 On death: scattering, if atoms; otherwise quenching or migration.

7.50 After Euripides' lines on what returns to earth and to heaven comes another account: a dissolution of the intertwinings among the atoms and a dispersal of the elements.

8.3 Beside Diogenes, Heraclitus and Socrates, Alexander, Gaius and Pompey had forethought for many things and were slaves to many.

8.17 To blame the atoms or the gods is madness alike; one must blame no one.

8.25 The famous dead are all of a day, and Marcus is to remember that his little compound must be scattered, or his little breath quenched, or removed and posted elsewhere.

8.51 A clear spring into which mud is thrown will quickly scatter it and wash it out; so the understanding can stay pure.

9.1.4 The common nature had its impulse towards this world-order by an original impulse of providence.

9.28 Either the understanding of the whole has an impulse towards each thing, or it had its impulse once; in a way, atoms or things without parts; if God, all is well, and if at random, Marcus is not to act at random too.

9.39 Either all things come from one intelligent spring, or atoms and nothing but a jumble and scattering; on either, Marcus asks why he is troubled.

10.6.1 With atoms as one member of the disjunction, Marcus lays down first that he is a part of the whole governed by nature, and that nothing advantageous to the whole harms the part.

10.7.2 Dissolution is either a scattering of the elements of which a thing was compounded or a turning of them into earth and air, taken up into the reason of the whole.

10.18 Each underlying thing is to be conceived as already dissolving, as it were in putrefaction or scattering.

11.3 A soul is ready if it must at once be released from the body and be quenched or scattered or remain together.

11.18.1 If not atoms, nature governs the whole; if so, the worse are for the sake of the better, and these for one another.

12.1.1 Marcus can have now what he prays for if he leaves the past behind, entrusts the future to providence and directs the present towards holiness and justice.

12.14 Either a necessity of fate, or a providence that can be propitiated, or a confusion of aimlessness without a leader; each has its reply, and under the last Marcus is to be glad of a ruling mind that the surge will not carry away.

12.24 What happens from outside is either by chance or by providence, and neither chance is to be blamed nor providence charged.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The disjunction is a term of Stoic logic. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoics' teaching in its seventh book, defines the disjunctive proposition, τὸ διεζευγμένον (*to diezeugmenon*), Marcus' word at 4.3.2, as one disjoined by the disjunctive connective "either", ἤτοι (*ētoi*), as in "It is either day or night", and says that the connective declares one or other of the two false.[319] Of the arguments the Stoics called indemonstrable, the fourth runs "Either the first or the second; but surely the first; so not the second", and the fifth "It is either day or night; it is not night; so it is day".[320] In Leopold's text Marcus' "Either an ordered universe or a jumble mixed together. But surely an ordered universe" (4.27) has the form of the fourth, with its "but surely", ἀλλὰ μήν, and its conclusion left unsaid; but ἀλλὰ μήν is Rendall's correction, and the manuscripts' μὲν ἀλλά gives "or a jumble heaped together, but an order all the same", which is not that argument. "If not atoms, nature that governs the whole" (11.18.1) can be read as the fifth put as a condition. Elsewhere he states the disjunction and stops, and draws his conduct from each member in turn. The Stoics' case against the atoms is put by Balbus, the Stoic speaker in *On the Nature of the Gods*, the dialogue of Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC. He marvels that anyone could persuade himself that certain solid and indivisible bodies, carried along by force and weight, make by their chance collision a world so adorned and so beautiful; such a man might as well think that if countless copies of the twenty-one letters were thrown together somewhere and shaken out on the ground, they could make the *Annals* of Ennius, the early Roman poet, so that they could be read in order.[321] Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, writing to Lucilius, meets the objection "What use is philosophy to me, if there is fate? What use, if God is the ruler? What use, if chance commands?" with three members like those of 12.14: whichever is so, or even if all are, one must do philosophy, whether the fates bind us by a law that cannot be swayed, or God, the arbiter of the universe, has ordered all things, or chance pushes human affairs about with no order; philosophy will urge us to obey

[319] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.72.

[320] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.81.

[321] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.93.

God willingly and to resist fortune.[322] Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, begins his discourse on providence: from each of the things that come about in the universe it is easy to praise providence, if a man has two things in himself, the power to see what has happened in each case, and gratitude.[323]

Other ancient sources

Epicurus did not deny the gods. In his letter to Menoeceus, which Diogenes Laertius preserves, "gods there are", imperishable and blessed, but they are not such as the many believe them to be; and the first of his *Principal Doctrines* is that what is blessed and imperishable has no troubles itself and makes none for another, so that it is held by neither anger nor favour.[324] These are the gods of 2.11.1 who "do not care for human affairs", as the edition's note there says (see Gods). The soul, for Epicurus, is made of atoms, and when the whole compound is dissolved "the soul is scattered" and no longer has the same powers, nor motion, nor sensation;[325] and the second of the *Principal Doctrines* is that "death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us".[326] Lucretius, the Roman poet of the first century BC who set out Epicurus' teaching in Latin verse in *On the Nature of Things*, states the alternative that Marcus sets against providence. It was not by counsel, he says, nor by any clever mind that the primary bodies took up each its place in the order; harried by blows through boundless time and trying every kind of motion and union, they come at length into the arrangements of which this world is made.[327] The soul too, once it has withdrawn from a man's limbs, is poured abroad and dissolved into its first bodies.[328] The note at 7.50 takes "a dissolution of the intertwinings among the atoms" to be probably the Epicurean account.

---

[322] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 16.4–5.

[323] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.6.1.

[324] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 10.123 (Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus*) and 10.139 (*Principal Doctrines* 1).

[325] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 10.65 (Epicurus, *Letter to Herodotus*).

[326] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 10.139 (*Principal Doctrines* 2).

[327] Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* 1.1021–1028.

[328] Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* 3.437–439.

Translation in this edition

Πρόνοια is “providence” at eleven of its twelve occurrences (2.3 twice, 2.11.1, 4.3.2, 6.10, 9.1.4, 12.1.1, 12.14 twice, 12.24 twice), and “forethought” at 8.3, of Alexander, Gaius and Pompey, where Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, proposed παράνοια (*paranoia*), “derangement”, as the edition’s note says. The verb προνοεῖσθαι is “provide” (6.44.1), and the adjective προνοητικός, of Antoninus, “looking ahead” (1.16.3). At 12.14 πρόνοια ἱλάσιμος (*pronoia hilasimos*) is “a providence that can be propitiated” and πρόνοια ἐπιδεχομένη τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι (*epidechomenē to hilaskesthai*) “a providence that admits of being propitiated”; φυρμὸς εἰκαιότητος ἀπροστάτητος (*phyrmos eikaiotētos aprostatētos*) is “a confusion of aimlessness without a leader”, and φυρμὸς ἀνηγεμόνευτος (*phyrmos anēgemoneutos*) “a confusion without a guide”. Ἄτομοι is “atoms” at all nine places; the word is feminine, as the article shows at 6.24 and 8.17. Τὸ διεζευγμένον is “the disjunction” (4.3.2), and ἤτοι … ἤ (*ētoi … ē*) “either … or”. Κυκεών is “jumble” at all three places. At 4.27 “mixed together” renders συμπεφυρμένος, Schultz’s correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ συμπεφορημένος (*sympephorēmenos*), “heaped together”, and “But surely” renders ἀλλὰ μήν, Rendall’s correction for the manuscripts’ μὲν ἀλλά, “but … all the same”. Φυρμός is “confusion”; ἀντεμπλοκή is “intertwining” (6.10), in the plural “intertwinings” (7.50); σκεδασμός and σκέδασις are “scattering”; σκεδαννύναι is “be scattered” (6.4, 8.25, 11.3), and διασκεδαννύναι “be scattered” (6.24) or, of the spring that clears away mud, “scatter” (8.51); σκορπισμός is “dispersal” (7.50). Ἕνωσις (*henōsis*), the other member at 6.10 and 7.32, is “unity”, and ἥνωται (*hēnōtai*) at 6.4 “is unified”; at 7.32 “but if unity” is εἰ δ’ ἕνωσις (*ei d’ henōsis*), Casaubon’s correction, which Leopold prints, for ἢ ἕνωσις (*ē henōsis*), “or unity”, in A, the Vatican manuscript, and ἢ κένωσις (*ē kenōsis*), “or emptying”, in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed. At 10.6.1 “nature” in “Whether atoms or nature” follows the Latin version of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, where P has φύσεις (*physeis*), “natures”; Leopold judges the words foreign to the place and would move them to the opening of the chapter before. At 6.10 εἰκαῖον σύγκριμα (*eikaion synkrima*) is “a random compound”, and εἰκῇ (*eikēi*) at 9.28 “at random”.

ἀμερής

Attested: ἀμερῆ (*amerē*; 9.28). Without parts, indivisible; the neuter plural serves as a noun, “things without parts”. In the alternative of 9.28, between an understanding of the whole that has an impulse towards each thing and one that had its impulse once, Marcus adds “For in a way, atoms or things without parts”, a sentence the edition’s note calls obscure. Lemma: ἀμερής.

ἀντεμπλοκή

Attested: ἀντεμπλοκή (*antemplokē*; 6.10), ἀντεμπλοκῶν (*antemplokōn*; 7.50). A twining in with one another, the tangling of particles in the atomists’ account. “Either a jumble, an intertwining and a scattering; or unity, order and providence” (6.10); death is perhaps “a dissolution of the intertwinings among the atoms” (7.50). Lemma: ἀντεμπλοκή.

ἄτομος

Attested: ἄτομοι (*atomoi*; 4.3.2, 7.32, 9.28, 9.39, 10.6.1, 11.18.1), ἀτόμους (*atomous*; 6.24), ἀτόμοις (*atomois*; 7.50, 8.17). Uncut, indivisible; in the feminine plural, the atoms of Epicurus. “Renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms” (4.3.2); “On death: either scattering, if atoms; but if unity, either quenching or migration” (7.32); “The atoms or the gods? Both are madness” (8.17). Lemma: ἄτομος.

διασκεδάννυμι

Attested: διεσκεδάσθησαν (*dieskedasthēsan*; 6.24), διασκεδάσει (*diaskedasei*; 8.51). To scatter abroad, disperse. Alexander and his muleteer “were scattered alike into atoms”, if they were not taken back into the seminal reasons of the universe (6.24); a clear, sweet spring into which mud or dung is thrown “will very quickly scatter them and wash them out” (8.51). Lemma: διασκεδάννυμι.

κυκεών

Attested: κυκεών (*kykeōn*; 4.27, 6.10, 9.39). A mixed drink, which the edition’s note describes as barley, wine and cheese that separate unless stirred; in Marcus a world of mere mixture. “Either an ordered universe or a jumble mixed together” (4.27); “or atoms, and nothing but a jumble and scattering” (9.39). Lemma: κυκεών.

προνοέω

Attested: προνοοῦνται (*pronoountai*; 6.44.1). To think of beforehand, provide for. If the gods took counsel about Marcus, they had no cause to do him ill: “For what would have come of it for them, or for the community, for which they chiefly provide?” (6.44.1; see Gods). Lemma: προνοέω.

προνοητικός

Attested: προνοητικόν (*pronoētikon*; 1.16.3). Provident; the neuter with the article serves as a noun. Among Antoninus’ qualities, “looking ahead from far off, and arranging the smallest matters in advance without theatre” (1.16.3). Lemma: προνοητικός.

πρόνοια

Attested: προνοίας (*pronoias*; 2.3, 2.11.1, 9.1.4), προνοίᾳ (*pronoiāi*; 2.3, 12.1.1, 12.24), πρόνοια (*pronoia*; 4.3.2, 6.10, 8.3, 12.14 twice), πρόνοιαν (*pronoian*; 12.24). Forethought; the providence of the gods and of nature. “The works of the gods are full of providence” (2.3); “Renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms” (4.3.2); “a providence that can be propitiated” (12.14). At 8.3 it is the “forethought” of Alexander, Gaius and Pompey, “forethought for how many things, and slavery to how many!” Lemma: πρόνοια.

σκεδάννυμι

Attested: σκεδασθήσεται (*skedasthēsetai*; 6.4), σκεδασθῆναι (*skedasthēnai*; 8.25, 11.3). To scatter; in the passive, be scattered. All the underlying things will “be turned to vapour, if substance is unified, or be scattered” (6.4); it will be necessary “either for your little compound to be scattered, or for the little breath to be quenched, or to be removed and posted elsewhere” (8.25); the soul that is ready, if it must be released from the body, is ready to “be either quenched or scattered or remain together” (11.3). Lemma: σκεδάννυμι.

σκέδασις

Attested: σκεδάσει (*skedasei*; 10.18). Scattering. Each underlying thing is to be conceived “as already dissolving and in change, and coming to be, as it were, in putrefaction or scattering” (10.18). Lemma: σκέδασις.

σκεδασμός

Attested: σκεδασμός (*skedasmos*; 6.10 twice, 7.32, 9.39, 10.7.2). Scattering, the end of a compound in the atomists' account. "For the scattering will come upon me, whatever I do" (6.10); "On death: either scattering, if atoms" (7.32); dissolution is "either a scattering of the elements from which it was compounded" or a turning of them into earth and air (10.7.2). Lemma: σκεδασμός.

σκορπισμός

Attested: σκορπισμός (*skorpismos*; 7.50). Dispersal. After Euripides' lines, "Or this: a dissolution of the intertwinings among the atoms, and some such dispersal of the elements that cannot be affected" (7.50). Lemma: σκορπισμός.

συμφύρω

Attested: συμπεφυρμένος (*sympephyrmenos*; 4.27). To knead together, mix up. In Leopold's text, "Either an ordered universe or a jumble mixed together" (4.27). The form is the correction of Schultz, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have συμπεφορημένος (*sympephorēmenos*), "heaped together", from συμφορεῖν (*symphorein*). Lemma: συμφύρω.

φυρμός

Attested: φυρμῷ (*phyrmōi*; 6.10), φυρμός (*phyrmos*; 12.14 twice). A mixing up, confusion. "Why do I even crave to linger in such a random compound and confusion?" (6.10); "or a confusion of aimlessness without a leader" (12.14). Lemma: φυρμός.

See also

Citizenship; Death; Dissolution; Fate and allotment; Gods; Impulse; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Nature; Necessity and chance; Soul.

Recurrence and repetition

The same things, seen again · Meditations

ὁμοειδής, homoeidēs, "of one form", "one form", "in one form", "uniformity"; *ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι, anakykleisthai*, "come round again"; *ἐγκύκλιος, enkyklios*, "cycles"; *περίοδος, periodos*, "periods", "periodically", "a roundabout way"; *περιοδικός, periodikos*, "periodic"; *παλιγγενεσία, palingenesia*, "rebirth"; *ἀνανεοῦν, ananeoun*, "renew",

"renewed"; *τὰ αὐτά, ta auta*, "the same things", "the same"; *συνήθης, synēthēs*, "usual", "in common use", "intimate"; *γνώριμος, gnōrimos*, "familiar"; *καινός, kainos*, "new"; *νέος, neos*, "new", "newer", "young"; *προσκορής, proskorēs*, "cloying"; *ἔαρ, ear*, "spring"

At a Glance

The word. Ὁμοειδής is "of one form", like another in kind; περίοδος is a way round, a cycle or a period; παλιγγενεσία is a coming to be again, "rebirth". Τὰ αὐτά are "the same things"; σύνηθες is the usual, what one is used to, and καινός the new.

In the *Meditations*. "He who has seen what is now has seen all things, both those that came to be from everlasting and those that will be to infinity; for all things are of one kind and one form" (6.37). The rational soul "comprehends the periodic rebirth of the whole", and "in a manner the man of forty, if he has any mind whatever, has seen all that has been and will be, by uniformity" (11.1.2). "Nothing is new" (7.1), and Marcus is to feel the whole of life as he feels the shows in the amphitheatre, whose uniformity makes the spectacle "cloying" (6.46).

In this edition. Ὁμοειδής is "of one form", and τὸ ὁμοειδές "uniformity"; περιοδικὴ παλιγγενεσία is "the periodic rebirth"; τὰ αὐτά and ταὐτά are "the same things" or "the same"; συνήθης is "usual", γνώριμος "familiar" and καινός "new".

A place to read. 7.49, where Marcus, looking back on the changes of empires, finds that to have inquired into human life for forty years is equal to ten thousand.

Meaning

Ὁμοειδής (*homoeidēs*) is made of ὁμός (*homos*), "same", and εἶδος (*eidos*), "form": having the same form, of a kind with another. Περίοδος (*periodos*), from περί (*peri*), "round", and ὁδός (*hodos*), "way", is a going round, a circuit or cycle, a period of time, and also a roundabout way (12.1.1). Παλιγγενεσία (*palingenesia*), from πάλιν (*palin*), "again", and γένεσις (*genesis*), "coming to be", is a coming to be again. In Stoic physics such words belonged to the world as a whole: the god who orders it, Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers, reports, consumes all substance into himself at certain periods, περίοδοι, and

generates it again (see Change).[329] Συνήθης (*synēthēs*), from ἦθος (*ēthos*), "custom", is what one is used to, and καινός (*kainos*) what is new. Marcus uses the words of the world's periods a few times, those of form, sameness and custom often.

Use in the book

Marcus speaks of the world's periods only in passing. Nothing prevents him saying that his parts will change to infinity, "even if the universe is governed by limited periods" (5.13; see Cause and matter); the skilled soul knows the reason that "through all eternity, by appointed periods, manages the totality" (5.32); and a dissolved body is taken up into the reason of the whole, "whether it is periodically consumed by fire or renewed by everlasting exchanges" (10.7.2; see Dissolution). The cycles of the universe run "up and down, from eternity to eternity" (9.28; see Providence and atoms), and the rational soul "embraces and comprehends the periodic rebirth of the whole" (11.1.2), the Stoic renewal of the world after each conflagration, as the edition's note explains. Marcus never asserts the conflagration itself: at 10.7.2 he leaves it beside its alternative, and at 5.13 the periods are a concession.

What he draws from the cycles is the sameness of human life. All things "from everlasting are of one form and come round again" (2.14.2; see Time and eternity). "He who has seen what is now has seen all things" (6.37). "Look back on the past, the so many changes of empires. It is open, too, to foresee the future; for it will be altogether of one form, and it is not possible to step out of the rhythm of what comes about now. Hence, too, to have inquired into human life for forty years is equal to having done so for ten thousand; for what more will you see?" (7.49). The fullest statement joins the world's return to a man's experience. The soul that comprehends the periodic rebirth of the whole "observes that those after us will see nothing newer, nor did those before us see anything more, but in a manner the man of forty, if he has any mind whatever, has seen all that has been and will be, by uniformity" (11.1.2). "In a manner" and "if he has any mind whatever" set the limits, and "by uniformity" says how he has seen it all: in its form.

Marcus tests this against the record. He is to pass from the times of the emperor Vespasian to those of the emperor

[329] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.137.

Trajan: “again all the same” (4.32.1–2; see Death); the histories, ancient, middle and recent, are full of “the same things”, and so are the cities and houses now (7.1). He is to set before his eyes “whole dramas and scenes of one form”, the courts of history (10.27; see Drama and role); and as often as he is raised aloft to look down on human things, he “will see the same things, uniformity, short duration” (12.24).

The sameness works in three ways. Nothing that happens is strange: “What is vice? It is what you have seen often. And at everything that happens, too, have this ready to hand: that it is what you have seen often”; “Nothing is new; all things are both usual and of short duration” (7.1). Nature’s turnings come “not so that one need fear something new: all things are usual” (8.6); everything that happens is “as usual and familiar as the rose in spring and fruit in summer”, disease, death, slander and plotting among them (4.44), “neither new nor hard to handle, but familiar and easy to work” (7.68; see Tranquillity). Longer inquiry adds nothing: “It is equal, to have inquired into these things for a hundred years and for three” (9.37; see Simplicity and sincerity). And the sameness can be felt as weariness: “As the shows in the amphitheatre and such places sicken you, because the same things are always seen, and the uniformity makes the spectacle cloying, so feel it with the whole of life too; for all things up and down are the same and from the same. Till when, then?” (6.46). The chapter ends on the question.

The same course also renews. “Flows and alterations renew the universe perpetually” (6.15; see Time and eternity), and nature loves “to change the things that are and to make new things like them” (4.36; see Change). Each thing is new in itself and old in its form.

Marcus never says that the same men will be born again. He will look at human things as smoke and nothing, “especially if you remember along with it that what has once changed will no longer be in infinite time” (10.31; see Exemplary lives). His word is ὁμοειδής, sameness of form, which a man can verify within one life from the histories and his own court. His recurrence can be read as a doctrine of the world turned into an exercise of sight, whose fruits are that nothing that happens need astonish or frighten him, and that nothing more is to be had from living longer.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ὁμοειδής, ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι, ἐγκύκλιος, περίοδος, περιοδικός, παλιγγενεσία, ἀνανεοῦν, συνήθης, γνώριμος, καινός, προσκορής or ἔαρ occurs, with νέος and with τὰ αὐτά and ταὐτά (*tauta*) where they are the new or the same through time, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The places of νέος as "young" (1.17.5, 1.17.7) and in the New Comedy (11.6.2), and the places of τὰ αὐτά and ταὐτά that concern sameness of kind, state or place (4.5, 5.18, 7.16, 7.64, 8.3, 9.3.2, 9.41, 10.23, 11.27, 12.23, 12.30) are left out.

1.13 From Cinna Catulus, a Stoic teacher, Marcus learned to try to restore a friend to the usual footing, even when his complaint was unreasonable.

1.16.7 Marcus' adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, was content to stay in the same places and with the same things, and was fresh for his usual work after his headaches.

2.14.2 All things from everlasting are of one form and come round again, and it makes no difference whether one sees the same things for a hundred years or for infinite time (see Time and eternity).

4.3.1 Marcus is continually to give himself the retreat into himself, and renew himself (see Inner retreat and citadel).

4.3.2 Against resentment at what is allotted from the whole, Marcus is to renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms (see Providence and atoms).

4.32.1 Marcus is to conceive the times of Vespasian, where he will see people marrying, falling ill, dying, making war, flattering and craving consulships and kingships, and that life of theirs is no longer anywhere (see Death).

4.32.2 In the times of Trajan it is again all the same, and that life too is dead.

4.33 Words once in common use are now glosses, and the one thing worth effort includes a disposition that welcomes all that happens as necessary and as familiar (see Reputation and praise).

4.36 Nature loves nothing so much as to change the things that are and to make new things like them (see Change).

4.44 Everything that happens, disease, death and slander among it, is as usual and familiar as the rose in spring and fruit in summer.

5.13 Marcus' parts will change to infinity, as he came to subsist by such change, even if the universe is governed by limited periods (see Cause and matter).

5.32 The skilled and knowing soul knows the reason that through all eternity, by appointed periods, manages the totality.

6.15 Flows and alterations renew the universe perpetually, as time keeps eternity always new (see Time and eternity).

6.30.4 Through his frugal diet Antoninus did not need to relieve himself outside the usual hour.

6.37 He who has seen what is now has seen all things, past and to come, for all things are of one kind and one form.

6.46 As the shows in the amphitheatre sicken because the same things are always seen, so Marcus is to feel the whole of life, for all things are the same and from the same; he asks, till when?

7.1 Vice is what one has seen often, and Marcus is to have ready at everything that happens that it too is what he has seen often; the histories, cities and houses are full of the same things, and nothing is new.

7.26 When someone does wrong, Marcus is to consider with what opinion of good and bad he did it; if Marcus holds the same opinion or another of one form with it, he must forgive (see Anger).

7.49 The future will be of one form with the past, so that to have inquired into human life for forty years is equal to ten thousand.

7.58 At each event Marcus is to have before his eyes those to whom the same things happened, who were annoyed and blamed and are now nowhere.

7.68 Everything that happens is neither new nor hard to handle, but familiar and easy to work (see Tranquillity).

8.4 Men will do the same things none the less, even if Marcus bursts.

8.6 All things are turnings, not so that one need fear something new: all things are usual, and the allotments equal.

9.14 All these things are usual in experience, of a day in time, filthy in material, and all now as in the time of those buried.

9.28 The cycles of the universe run up and down from eternity to eternity (see Providence and atoms).

9.35 In the nature of the whole all things came about in one form from eternity, and to infinity there will be others of the same kind (see Change).

9.37 Marcus asks what in his troubles is new, and it is equal to have inquired into these things for a hundred years and for three (see Simplicity and sincerity).

9.42.3 Marcus asks what strange thing has happened if the uneducated man does what belongs to the uneducated (see Fault and ignorance).

10.7.2 A dissolved body is taken up into the reason of the whole, whether it is periodically consumed by fire or renewed by everlasting exchanges (see Dissolution).

10.27 Marcus is to conceive that all things such as come about now came about before and will come about, and to set before his eyes whole dramas and scenes of one form, such as the courts of Hadrian and of Antoninus (see Drama and role).

10.34 Marcus' children, those who acclaim or curse him and those who will inherit his fame are little leaves that, in Homer's words, come up in the season of spring; the wind throws them down, and the forest puts forth others (see Time and eternity).

11.1.2 The rational soul comprehends the periodic rebirth of the whole and sees that those after us will see nothing newer, and that the man of forty, if he has any mind whatever, has seen all that has been and will be.

12.1.1 All that Marcus prays to reach by a roundabout way he can have now, if he does not begrudge himself (see Present action).

12.5 Marcus asks how the gods overlooked that men most intimate with the divine are quenched for ever at death (see Gods).

12.24 As often as one is raised aloft to look down on human things, one will see the same things, uniformity, short duration.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoic doctrine behind the "periodic rebirth" was that the world, after each conflagration, comes to be again and runs its course again. Origen, the Christian scholar of Alexandria of the third century, sets it out in *Against Celsus*, his reply to Celsus, a pagan critic of the Christians. Celsus had written that the period of mortals is alike from beginning to end, and that by the ordered recurrences, ἀνακυκλήσεις (*anakyklēseis*), the same things must always have come about, be and be to come; most of the Stoics, Origen adds, hold that not only the period of mortals but that of the immortals too is such: after the conflagration of the whole, which has happened infinitely often and will happen infinitely often, the same order of all things from beginning to end has come about and will come about; and, in an attempt to remedy the absurdity, they say that all in each period will be indistinguishable from those of earlier periods, so that it is not Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, who will come to be again, but someone indistinguishable from him, who will marry a woman indistinguishable from Xanthippe, his wife, and be accused by men indistinguishable from Anytus and Meletus, his accusers (see Socrates).[330] Elsewhere he says that some of them, ashamed of the doctrine, allowed a slight variation from one period to the next, and draws out what these men say will come about in the next period: Socrates will again be the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete, his accusers will rise again and the council of the Areopagus will condemn him, and he will put on clothes indistinguishable from those of the period before.[331] Celsus' ἀνακυκλήσεις is of one root with Marcus' "come round again" (2.14.2), and the Stoics' περίοδος is Marcus' word; but Marcus' word for the sameness is not "indistinguishable" but ὁμοειδής, of one form. Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, describes in his *Letters to Lucilius* a weariness that can be read beside 6.46. Satiety at doing and seeing the same things steals

[330] Origen, *Against Celsus* 4.65 and 4.68.

[331] Origen, *Against Celsus* 5.20.

upon some, he writes, a distaste for life rather than a hatred of it, into which men slide, with philosophy itself pushing them, when they say: "How long the same things? I shall wake, sleep, be hungry, be cold, be hot. Nothing has an end; all things are linked in a ring, fleeing and following … all things pass away so as to come back. I do nothing new, I see nothing new; in time there comes a nausea at this too."[332] Seneca sets the mood beside the wish to die, which he bids his friend Lucilius avoid above all; Marcus' "Till when, then?" (6.46) can be read as the same question kept as an exercise.

Translation in this edition

Ὁμοειδής is "of one form" (2.14.2, 7.26, 7.49, 10.27) and, with ὁμογενής (*homogenēs*), "of one kind and one form" (6.37); τὸ ὁμοειδές is "uniformity" (6.46, 12.24), with κατά (*kata*) "by uniformity" (11.1.2); the adverb ὁμοειδῶς is "in one form" (9.35). Ὁμογενής is "of one kind" at its other places too, where things or men are akin (5.21, 6.14, 7.9, 9.9.1, 10.6.1, 10.6.2; see Kinship and cooperation). Ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι is "come round again" (2.14.2), and τὰ ἐγκύκλια "the cycles" (9.28). Περίοδος is "periods" (5.13, 5.32), κατὰ περίοδον (*kata periodon*) "periodically" (10.7.2), and διὰ περιόδου (*dia periodou*) "by a roundabout way" (12.1.1); περιοδικός is "periodic" and παλιγγενεσία "rebirth", in "the periodic rebirth of the whole" (11.1.2). Ἀνανεοῦν is "renew" (4.3.1, 4.3.2, 6.15) and "renewed" (10.7.2); at 4.3.2 the participle ἀνανεωσάμενος (*ananeōsamenos*) is rendered as a command, "Renew the disjunction". Τὰ αὐτά is "the same things" (2.14.2, 4.32.1, 6.46, 7.1, 7.58, 8.4, and 12.24, where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, has ταὐτά (*tauta*)) and "the same" (4.32.2, 6.46, "the same and from the same", and 9.28, "are the same"). At 4.32.1 and 9.28 the phrase is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints for the manuscripts' ταῦτα (*tauta*), "these"; with the manuscripts' reading Marcus would see "all these things" in Vespasian's times, and "these" would be the cycles of the universe. At 4.32.2 A, the Vatican manuscript, has πάλιν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πάθη (*palin ta heautou pathē*), "again its own experiences". At 9.14, "All these things: usual in experience", and at 9.37, "to have inquired into these things for a hundred years and for three", Leopold prints the manuscripts' ταῦτα;

[332] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 24.25–26.

ταὐτά, “the same things”, was proposed at 9.14 by Gataker and at 9.37 by Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802, in his second edition. Συνήθης is “usual” (4.44, 7.1, 8.6, 9.14), with “the usual footing” (1.13), “the usual work” (1.16.7) and “the usual hour” (6.30.4); it is “in common use” of words (4.33) and “intimate” in “most intimate with the divine” (12.5). Συνήθεια (*synētheia*) is “usage” (9.10). Γνώριμος is “familiar” at all three places. Καινός is “new” at all five; at 9.42.3 it is the correction of A. J. Kronenberg, whose notes on Marcus appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ κακόν (*kakon*), “bad”. Καινοτόμος (*kainotomos*), of Antoninus, is “a seeker of novelty” (1.16.3). Νέος is “new” (4.36, 6.15, and “the New” Comedy, 11.6.2), “young” (1.17.5, 1.17.7) and the comparative “newer” (11.1.2). Προσκορής is “cloying” (6.46). Ἔαρ is “spring” (4.44) and, in the line of Homer that Marcus quotes at 10.34, “the season of spring”. Διηνεκῶς (*diēnekōs*), “perpetually” at all twelve of its places (6.15 among them), with the adjective διηνεκής (*diēnekēs*), “perpetual” (5.23, 9.19), is a word of continuance, not of return.

ἀνακυκλέω

Attested: ἀνακυκλούμενα (*anakykloumena*; 2.14.2). To bring round again; in the passive, to come round again in a cycle. “All things from everlasting are of one form and come round again” (2.14.2; see Time and eternity). Lemma: ἀνακυκλέω.

ἀνανεόω

Attested: ἀνανέου (*ananeou*; 4.3.1), ἀνανεωσάμενος (*ananeōsamenos*; 4.3.2), ἀνανεοῦσι (*ananeousi*; 6.15), ἀνανεουμένου (*ananeoumenou*; 10.7.2). To renew, make new again. Of a man: “give yourself this retreat, and renew yourself” (4.3.1; see Inner retreat and citadel); of a principle recalled, “Renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms” (4.3.2; see Providence and atoms); of the universe: “Flows and alterations renew the universe perpetually” (6.15), and the whole may be “renewed by everlasting exchanges” (10.7.2; see Dissolution). At 4.3.1, where Leopold prints ἀνανέου, A and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have ἀνανεύου (*ananeuou*), of another verb. Lemma: ἀνανεόω.

γνώριμος

Attested: γνώριμον (*gnōrimon*; 4.33, 4.44, 7.68). Well known, familiar. “Everything that happens is as usual and familiar as the rose in spring” (4.44); “neither new nor hard to handle, but familiar and easy to work” (7.68); a disposition that welcomes all that happens “as necessary, as familiar” (4.33). Lemma: γνώριμος.

ἔαρ

Attested: ἔαρι (*eari*; 4.44), ἔαρος (*earos*; 10.34). Spring, the season. “As usual and familiar as the rose in spring and fruit in summer” (4.44); and from Homer, of men like leaves, all these “come up in the season of spring” (10.34; see Time and eternity). Lemma: ἔαρ.

ἐγκύκλιος

Attested: ἐγκύκλια (*enkyklia*; 9.28). Circular, going round; τὰ ἐγκύκλια, the cycles. “The cycles of the universe are the same, up and down, from eternity to eternity” (9.28; see Providence and atoms), where “the same” is Gataker’s ταὐτά, which Leopold prints for the manuscripts’ ταῦτα, “these”. Lemma: ἐγκύκλιος.

καινός

Attested: καινόν (*kainon*; 7.1, 7.68, 8.6, 9.37, 9.42.3). New, unheard of. “Nothing is new” (7.1); “not so that one need fear something new” (8.6); “What of these is new?” (9.37); “And what new or strange thing has happened if the uneducated man does what belongs to the uneducated?” (9.42.3; see Fault and ignorance), where καινόν is Kronenberg’s correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ κακόν, “bad”. Lemma: καινός.

νέος

Attested: νέοι (*neoi*; 1.17.5), νέαν (*nean*; 1.17.7), νέα (*nea*; 4.36, 11.6.2), νέον (*neon*; 6.15), νεώτερον (*neōteron*; 11.1.2). New, young; the comparative, newer. Of persons, young: Marcus did not put off raising his tutors to the rank they seemed to crave in the hope that, “since they were still young”, he would do it later (1.17.5), and his mother “was to die young” (1.17.7). Of things, new: nature loves “to make new things like them” (4.36); time “keeps infinite eternity always new” (6.15); “those after us will see nothing newer” (11.1.2); and at 11.6.2 it is the New Comedy. Lemma: νέος.

ὁμοειδής

Attested: ὁμοειδῆ (*homoeidē*; 2.14.2, 6.37, 7.49), ὁμοειδές (*homoeides*; 6.46, 7.26, 11.1.2, 12.24), ὁμοειδεῖς (*homoeideis*; 10.27); the adverb ὁμοειδῶς (*homoeidōs*; 9.35). Of one form, of the same kind; τὸ ὁμοειδές, uniformity. "For all things are of one kind and one form" (6.37); "for it will be altogether of one form" (7.49); "the uniformity makes the spectacle cloying" (6.46); "by uniformity" (11.1.2); of opinions, "another of one form with it" (7.26). At 9.35, all things "from eternity came about in one form", where the "and" before the phrase is a supplement of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which Leopold prints. Lemma: ὁμοειδής.

παλιγγενεσία

Attested: παλιγγενεσίαν (*palingenesian*; 11.1.2). A coming to be again, rebirth; for the Stoics, the renewal of the world after the conflagration. The rational soul "embraces and comprehends the periodic rebirth of the whole" (11.1.2). Lemma: παλιγγενεσία.

περιοδικός

Attested: περιοδικήν (*periodikēn*; 11.1.2). Coming round at intervals, periodic. "The periodic rebirth of the whole" (11.1.2). Lemma: περιοδικός.

περίοδος

Attested: περιόδους (*periodous*; 5.13, 5.32), περίοδον (*periodon*; 10.7.2), περιόδου (*periodou*; 12.1.1). A going round; a cycle or period of the world; a roundabout way. "Even if the universe is governed by limited periods" (5.13); "by appointed periods, manages the totality" (5.32); the whole "periodically consumed by fire" (10.7.2); and of a road, "All those things which you pray to reach by a roundabout way you can have now" (12.1.1; see Present action). Lemma: περίοδος.

προσκορής

Attested: προσκορῆ (*proskorē*; 6.46). Sating, cloying. "Because the same things are always seen, and the uniformity makes the spectacle cloying" (6.46). Lemma: προσκορής.

συνήθης

Attested: σύνηθες (*synēthes*; 1.13, 4.44), συνήθη (*synēthē*; 1.16.7, 6.30.4, 7.1, 8.6, 9.14), συνήθεις (*synētheis*; 4.33, 12.5). Accustomed, usual; of persons, intimate. “All things are both usual and of short duration” (7.1); “all things are usual” (8.6); “usual in experience, of a day in time, filthy in material” (9.14); “Words once in common use are now glosses” (4.33); of men who through holy works and sacred rites “have become most intimate with the divine” (12.5; see Gods). Lemma: συνήθης.

See also

Anger; Cause and matter; Change; Death; Dissolution; Drama and role; Exemplary lives; Fault and ignorance; Gods; Inner retreat and citadel; Kinship and cooperation; Present action; Providence and atoms; Reputation and praise; Simplicity and sincerity; Socrates; Time and eternity; Tranquillity.

Soul

The life of a man and of the whole · Meditations

ψυχή, psychē, “soul”; *ψυχάριον, psycharion*, “little soul”; *ψυχικός, psychikos*, “of the soul”; *ψύχωσις, psychōsis*, “receives a soul”, “receiving a soul”; *ἔμψυχος, empsychos*, “with soul”, “animate”; *ἄψυχος, apsychos*, “without soul”, “soulless”, “inanimate”; *ἀναθυμίασις, anathymiasis*, “exhalation”

At a Glance

The word. Ψυχή is life and soul, and ψυχάριον its diminutive, the “little soul”. For the Stoics the soul was a body, the breath grown together with a living being, and the souls of living beings were parts of one soul of the whole.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus belittles the soul as “a whirl” (2.17.1) and, with Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, as “a little soul carrying a corpse” (4.41), and he leaves open whether at death it will be “quenched or scattered or remain together” (11.3). Yet nothing outside touches it: “it alone turns and moves itself” (5.19), and the rational soul “makes itself such as it wills” (11.1.1).

In this edition. Ψυχή is “soul” at every place and ψυχάριον “little soul”; ἔμψυχος is “with soul” or “animate”,

ἄψυχος “without soul”, “soulless” or “inanimate”, and ἀναθυμίασις “exhalation”.

A place to read. 11.1.1–2, where Marcus sets out what is peculiar to the rational soul: it sees and shapes itself, “attains its own end wherever the term of life comes upon it”, and ranges over the universe and eternity.

Meaning

Ψυχή (*psychē*) is in ordinary Greek a man’s life as well as his soul, the sense kept in φιλοψυχεῖν (*philopsychein*), “to cling to life”, in words of Plato’s *Gorgias* that Marcus copies (7.46).[333] Ψυχάριον (*psycharion*) is its diminutive, and Marcus uses it, as he uses “poor body” and “little breath”, to belittle. The Stoics held the soul to be a body. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out their doctrines in its seventh book, reports that they called it perceptive and “the breath grown together with us”, lasting on after death but perishable, while the soul of the whole, of which the souls in living beings are parts, does not perish.[334] The school’s scale of beings is in 6.14: things are held together “by cohesion or by nature”, as stones and vines, “by soul”, as flocks and herds, or “by a rational soul”.

Marcus uses the word at three widths. It is the life of every animal (6.14, 9.9.2; “an irrational soul”, 10.33.2). It is the whole inner man, of which the ruling centre is “the part of your soul that rules” (5.26; see Ruling centre). And in one triad it is narrowed to the seat of impulse: “Body, soul, mind. Of the body, sensations; of the soul, impulses; of the mind, principles” (3.16.1; see Impulse). Where the triad recurs, breath, πνεῦμα (*pneuma*), stands in the soul’s place (see Breath): “scraps of flesh, a little breath, and the ruling centre” (2.2; see Ruling centre), “poor body, little breath, mind” (12.3.1; see Mind and reason).

Use in the book

Seen from outside, the soul is a small and passing thing. In the summary of human life that closes Book II it is “a whirl”, and “all that belongs to the soul” is “dream and vanity” (2.17.1). The diminutive does the same work. Marcus quotes Epictetus: “You are a little soul carrying a corpse, as Epictetus used to say” (4.41). When Marcus asks what still

[333] Plato, *Gorgias* 512d–e, as the edition’s note at 7.46 records.

[334] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.156.

keeps one here, one of his conditions is “the little soul itself an exhalation from blood” (5.33); life itself is “like the exhalation from blood and the breathing in of air” (6.15; see Breath). He is to “await the hour in which your little soul will fall out of this husk” (9.3.1; see Death), and to leave men as, “with one who dies well, the little soul slips out of the body with ease” (10.36; see Death). Nor is it his own: “the little child and the poor body and the little soul itself have come from there” (12.26; see Mind and reason).

What becomes of the soul at death he leaves open. At 4.21.1 he meets an objection to its survival, “If souls live on, how has the air held them from everlasting?”, by analogy with the buried dead: “so the souls that move into the air, after persisting for some time, change and are diffused and kindled into the seminal reason of the whole” (see Mind and reason); and he marks this as “what one might answer on the supposition that souls live on”. He waits “serenely for quenching or removal” (5.33); “What a soul that is which is ready, if it must at once be released from the body, and be either quenched or scattered or remain together!” (11.3). The readiness must “come from a judgement of its own, not from bare opposition, like the Christians, but with reckoning and dignity” (11.3), the book’s one mention of the Christians, which some have taken for a reader’s gloss. Nor does he know the soul by sight: “I have not seen my own soul either, and yet I honour it” (12.28; see Gods).

Whatever its end, its condition is its own doing. “Things themselves do not touch the soul in any way at all, nor have any entry to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul; it alone turns and moves itself” (5.19). Pain is bad “either for the body (then let it declare itself) or for the soul; but it is open to the soul to guard its own clear sky and calm” (8.28; see Pain and pleasure). It can harm itself, and Marcus rebukes it: “Do violence to yourself, do violence to yourself, soul” (2.6). He lists five ways in which “the soul of man does violence to itself” (2.16; see Impulse), and writes, “It is shameful that in a life in which your body does not give up, your soul should give up first” (6.29). He questions it: “whose soul, then, do I now have? A child’s? An adolescent’s?” (5.11). He asks it to become what it is not yet: “Will you ever, then, soul, be good and simple and one and naked, more manifest than the body that surrounds you?” (10.1).

The rational soul has powers of its own. “What is peculiar to the rational soul: it sees itself, articulates itself, makes itself such as it wills; the fruit it bears it harvests itself”, and it “attains its own end wherever the term of life comes upon it, not as in a dance or in acting” (11.1.1). It “goes round the whole universe” and “stretches out into the infinity of eternity”, and the loving of neighbours, truth and self-respect are peculiar to it (11.1.2; see Self-respect and shame). Its right shape is a sphere that “shines with a light by which it sees the truth of all things and the truth in itself” (11.12). And soul is one. The universe is “one living being, holding one substance and one soul” (4.40); “into the rational, one intelligent soul has been portioned out” (9.8); “One intelligent soul, even if it seems to be divided” (12.30). Whoever “splits his own soul off from that of rational beings, which is one” is “a piece split off from the city” (4.29; see Citizenship).

The soul seen from outside and the soul that shapes itself meet in 11.1.1. A soul that is complete at every point of its life has no need to know which of the three ends awaits it. This can be read as Marcus’ reason for leaving the question open: the worth of the soul lies in what it makes of itself while it lasts, not in how long it lasts.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ψυχή or ψυχάριον occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the places of ψυχικός (6.25), ψύχωσις (12.24), ἄψυχος (6.22) and ἀναθυμίασις (6.15); ἔμψυχος and ἄψυχος stand also at 5.16, 9.8 and 10.1. Μεγαλόψυχος and μεγαλοψυχία, “great-souled” and “greatness of soul” (4.49.2, 5.9), φιλοψυχεῖν and φιλόψυχος, of clinging to life (7.46, 10.8.2), and ψυχαγωγεῖν, “delight” (3.2.2, 11.6.1), are left out.

1.16.10 To be strong, to hold out and to keep sober is the mark of a man with a sound and unconquerable soul, as in the illness of Maximus, probably the Stoic Claudius Maximus of 1.15.1.

2.6 Marcus’ soul, its life almost done, pays itself no respect but places its own good lot in the souls of others, and will have no further chance to honour itself.

2.8 Not attending to what goes on in another’s soul is not easily seen to make anyone unhappy, but those

who do not keep track of the movements of their own soul are bound to be.

2.13 Nothing is more wretched than the man who seeks by conjecture what is in the souls of his neighbours, and does not see that it is enough to serve the daimon within.

2.16 The soul of man does violence to itself in five ways: by resenting what happens, by turning against a man, by yielding to pleasure or pain, by pretending, and by acting at no target.

2.17.1 In human life the soul is a whirl, and all that belongs to the soul is dream and vanity.

3.4.3 The best man welcomes with his whole soul all that happens and is allotted to him.

3.6.1 If Marcus finds in human life anything better than justice, truth, self-control and courage, he is to turn to it with his whole soul.

3.7 The man who has chosen his own mind and daimon before all else does not care whether he has the use of a soul enclosed in the body for a longer time or a shorter.

3.16.1 Sensations belong to the body, impulses to the soul, principles to the mind.

4.3.1 Nowhere does a man retreat more quietly or with less business than into his own soul.

4.3.4 Among the things most ready to hand is that things do not touch the soul but stand outside, and vexations come only from the opinion within.

4.21.1 If souls live on, those that move into the air persist for some time and then change, are diffused and are kindled into the seminal reason of the whole, as buried bodies change and dissolve to make room for others.

4.29 He who splits his own soul off from that of rational beings, which is one, is a piece split off from the city.

4.31 Marcus is to go through the rest of life as one who has entrusted all that is his to the gods with the whole soul.

4.40 The universe is one living being, holding one substance and one soul.

4.41 Marcus is a little soul carrying a corpse, as Epictetus used to say.

4.48.1 Marcus is to bear in mind how many tyrants who used authority over souls with terrible arrogance, as though immortal, have died.

5.5 No want of talent compels Marcus to be tossed about so much in soul; he could have been rid of such things long ago.

5.11 Marcus is to ask himself to what use he is now putting his own soul, and whose soul he now has: a child's, a tyrant's, a beast's.

5.16 The soul is dyed by the impressions; things with soul are better than things without soul, and of things with soul, the rational.

5.19 Things do not touch, enter, turn or move the soul; it alone turns and moves itself, and makes what subsists alongside it such as the verdicts it thinks itself worthy of.

5.26 The ruling centre, the part of the soul that rules, is not to be turned by the smooth or rough motion in the flesh, nor to add the opinion that a sensation is good or bad.

5.27 He lives with the gods who continually shows them his own soul pleased with what is allotted and doing what the daimon wills.

5.32 The skilled and knowing soul is the one that knows beginning and end, and the reason that pervades all substance.

5.33 Marcus asks what still keeps one here, if the senses are dim and the little soul itself is an exhalation from blood, and waits serenely for quenching or removal.

5.34 Two things are common to the soul of God, of man and of every rational living being: not to be impeded by another, and to have the good in a just disposition and action.

5.36 Good lots are good turnings of the soul, good impulses, good actions.

6.14 The multitude admires things held together by cohesion or nature, more measured people things held together by soul; the man who honours a soul

that is rational, universal and civic preserves his own soul in a rational and social state and motion.

6.15 Life itself is like the exhalation from blood and the breathing in of air, and to give back the whole power of breathing is like giving back a single breath.

6.22 The things that do not distract Marcus from his duty are either soulless, or irrational, or gone astray.

6.25 If Marcus considers how many things, bodily and of the soul, come about at once in each man, he will not wonder that all things subsist at once in the universe.

6.29 It is shameful that the soul should give up first in a life in which the body does not give up.

6.32 Marcus is made of a poor body and a soul; to the understanding, the things that make no difference are those that are not its own acts.

6.52 It is open to Marcus to form no opinion about this and not to be vexed in soul.

6.53 Marcus is to accustom himself to attend to what another says and, as far as possible, to be inside the soul of the speaker.

7.16 The ruling centre does not vex itself, and the little soul that fears and is distressed will suffer nothing at all.

7.63 Every soul, in a saying that Epictetus gives as Plato's, is deprived of truth unwillingly, and so too of justice, self-control and kindliness; remembering it makes one milder towards all.

7.66 What matters about Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, is what sort of soul he had: whether he could be content to be just in what concerns men and holy in what concerns gods.

8.28 Pain is bad either for the body, which can declare itself, or for the soul, which can guard its own clear sky and calm and not judge it bad.

8.29 It is in Marcus' power that there be in this soul no wickedness, no craving, no trouble.

8.45 Marcus asks whether anything is worth this: that because of it the soul should fare ill and be worse than itself.

8.51 Marcus is to be neither contracted in soul nor leaping out, and asks what killing and cursing are to the understanding's remaining pure, sane, self-controlled and just.

9.3.1 Marcus is to await the hour when his little soul will fall out of this husk, as he waits for his wife to give birth.

9.8 One soul has been divided among the irrational living beings, and one intelligent soul portioned out among the rational.

9.9.2 Among irrational living beings, in which there were already souls, the drawing together of kind to kind was found intensified, as it was not in plants or stones.

9.27 When others censure or hate him, Marcus is to go to their little souls and see what sort of people they are.

9.34 Marcus is to look at the ruling centres of those who censure and extol, and believe that he sees their little souls naked.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever be good and simple and one and naked, content with the present, and able to share citizenship with gods and men.

10.33.2 Things governed by nature or by an irrational soul meet many obstacles, while mind and reason make their way through everything that resists.

10.36 Marcus is to leave men without being torn away, as with one who dies well the little soul slips out of the body with ease.

11.1.1 The rational soul sees itself, articulates itself, makes itself such as it wills, harvests its own fruit, and attains its own end wherever the term of life comes upon it.

11.1.2 The rational soul goes round the universe and stretches into eternity, and the loving of neighbours, truth, self-respect and the honouring of nothing above itself are peculiar to it.

11.3 The soul is admirable that is ready, if it must at once be released from the body, to be quenched or scattered or remain together, if its readiness comes from a judgement of its own.

11.12 The sphere of the soul is true to its form when it neither stretches out nor runs together inwards nor sinks down, but shines with a light by which it sees the truth.

11.16 The faculty to live most honourably is in the soul, if one treats as making no difference the things that make no difference.

11.18.2 Every soul is deprived unwillingly, as of truth, so also of dealing with each according to worth.

11.18.4 The insolent man is to be corrected affectionately and without sting in the soul.

11.39 In a passage that J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, would place among the fragments of Epictetus, Socrates used to ask whether men wanted souls of rational beings, and sound ones, and why, if they had them, they were fighting and at odds.

12.7 Marcus is to consider what one must be like, in body and in soul, when overtaken by death.

12.24 Marcus is to have ready to hand what each thing is like until it receives a soul, and from receiving a soul until it gives the soul back, and from what things it is compounded and into what it breaks up.

12.26 Nothing is anyone's own: the little child, the poor body and the little soul itself have come from there.

12.28 Marcus has not seen his own soul, yet honours it; so with the gods, whose existence he grasps from what he experiences of their power.

12.29 The preservation of life is to see each thing through and through, and with the whole soul to do what is just and to say what is true.

12.30 There is one soul, though parted among countless natures, and one intelligent soul, though it seems divided.

12.32 Marcus is to consider what fraction of the whole soul has been portioned off to each.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius reports that Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school, and the Stoic Antipater in their books *On the Soul*, and Posidonius of Apamea, the Stoic of the late second and early first centuries BC, called the soul "a warm breath",

since by it we have breath in us and by it we are moved; and that Cleanthes, Zeno's successor, held that all souls last until the conflagration of the universe, Chrysippus, the school's third head, that only the souls of the wise do.[335] The breath "grown together with us" of the same account, τὸ συμφυὲς ἡμῖν πνεῦμα (*to symphyes hēmin pneuma*), is of one root with Marcus' "little breath grown with it", τοῦ συμφύτου πνευματίου (*tou symphytou pneumatiou*; 12.3.1). Arius Didymus, whose summaries of Stoic doctrine Eusebius of Caesarea, the bishop and historian of the fourth century, quotes in his *Preparation for the Gospel*, gives Zeno's other word for the soul, which he shared with Heraclitus of Ephesus, the philosopher of about 500 BC. Zeno, Arius says, following Cleanthes' account of his teaching, "declares the soul an exhalation, like Heraclitus", and calls it perceptive because its leading part can take imprints from things through the senses.[336] Marcus' "exhalation from blood" (5.33) uses the same word. Arius reports too that the soul, though it came to be and will perish, "does not perish at once when released from the body, but remains for some time by itself", the soul of the serious until all things are resolved into fire, that of the foolish for certain periods.[337] The souls of 4.21.1 that move into the air and change "after persisting for some time" can be read as this doctrine, and Marcus' verb for living on, διαμένειν (*diamenein*), is the one Arius uses of the souls of the dead.[338] Epictetus is the source of the "little soul carrying a corpse" (4.41), a saying preserved by Marcus and counted among Epictetus' fragments;[339] in the *Discourses* he asks to be shown a man who longs to become a god instead of a man and, "in this little body, this corpse", takes counsel about his fellowship with Zeus, and he calls the body "by nature a corpse, earth, clay".[340]

---

[335] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.157.

[336] Arius Didymus, in Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 15.20.2–3; Eusebius names his source at 15.20.8.

[337] Arius Didymus, in Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 15.20.6.

[338] Arius Didymus, in Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 15.20.4 and 15.20.7.

[339] Epictetus, fr. 26, as the edition's note at 4.41 records from Leopold's testimonia, the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it.

[340] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.19.26–27, 3.22.41.

Other ancient sources

Two of Marcus' three ends for the soul are older than the Stoics. In Plato's *Phaedo*, the dialogue of Socrates' last day, Cebes, one of Socrates' companions, says that men are much in doubt, fearing that the soul, once released from the body, is no longer anywhere, but on the day the man dies is destroyed and, "going out like breath or smoke, scattered, flies off and is gone", whereas if it were somewhere "gathered together by itself" there would be good hope.[341] The "scattered" and "remain together" of 11.3 can be read as Cebes' two outcomes. Socrates goes on to argue that the soul is immortal; Marcus, who remembers how many "philosophers who argued endlessly about death or immortality" are dead (4.48.1), leaves all three standing. The saying of 7.63, "Every soul … is deprived of truth unwillingly", goes back to Plato as well. In the *Sophist* the visitor from Elea says, "we know that every soul is ignorant of anything unwillingly"; in the *Republic* Socrates holds that a true opinion leaves the mind only unwillingly, since men are deprived of good things unwillingly and to be deceived about the truth is bad.[342] Epictetus quotes the saying twice as Plato's, in the form in which Marcus quotes it at 7.63 and applies it at 11.18.2.[343]

Translation in this edition

Ψυχή is "soul" at all seventy of its occurrences, idioms included: "with his whole soul" (3.4.3), "with your whole soul" (3.6.1) and "with the whole soul" (4.31, 12.29), "tossed about so much in soul" (5.5), "vexed in soul" (6.52), "inside the soul of the speaker" (6.53), "contracted in soul" (8.51), "without sting in the soul" (11.18.4), "in body and in soul" (12.7) and "authority over souls" (4.48.1). The vocative is "soul", with no possessive supplied (2.6, 10.1). Twice the English names the soul where the Greek does not repeat the noun: "as the souls of angry men do" (2.16), where the Greek has the article alone, and "it is open to the soul" (8.28), for a pronoun. Ψυχάριον is "little soul" at all eight places, "your little soul" for τὸ ψυχάριόν σου (9.3.1) and "little souls" in the plural (9.27, 9.34). Ψυχικός is "of the soul" (6.25); ψύχωσις is rendered with a verb, "until it receives a soul" and "from receiving a soul" (12.24). Ἔμψυχος is "with soul" (5.16,

[341] Plato, *Phaedo* 70a.

[342] Plato, *Sophist* 228c; *Republic* 3, 412e–413a.

[343] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.28.4, 2.22.36.

twice) and “animate” (9.8, 10.1); ἄψυχος is “without soul” (5.16), “soulless” (6.22) and “inanimate” (10.1). Ἀναθυμίασις is “exhalation” (5.33, 6.15). “Soul” stands also in “great-souled” for μεγαλόψυχος (4.49.2) and “greatness of soul” for μεγαλοψυχία (5.9), kept apart from “greatness of mind”, μεγαλοφροσύνη (3.11.2, 5.18, 10.11). “Breath” and “little breath” render πνεῦμα and πνευμάτιον (2.2, 5.33, 12.3.1; see Breath), and “cling to life” and “clinging to life” render φιλοψυχεῖν (7.46) and φιλόψυχος (10.8.2).

ἀναθυμίασις

Attested: ἀναθυμίασις (*anathymiasis*; 5.33, 6.15). An exhalation, vapour rising from something moist or warm; Zeno’s word for the soul. Marcus asks what still keeps one here, if among other things “the little soul itself” is “an exhalation from blood” (5.33); and life itself is “like the exhalation from blood and the breathing in of air” (6.15). The edition’s note at 5.33 calls the account Stoic doctrine. Lemma: ἀναθυμίασις.

ἄψυχος

Attested: ἀψύχων (*apsychōn*; 5.16), ἄψυχα (*apsycha*; 6.22), ἀψύχου (*apsychou*; 10.1). Without soul, inanimate. “And things with soul are better than things without soul” (5.16); the things that do not distract Marcus from his duty “are either soulless, or irrational, or gone astray and not knowing the road” (6.22); Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever be “longing for nothing nor craving anything, animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of pleasures” (10.1). Lemma: ἄψυχος.

ἔμψυχος

Attested: ἔμψυχα (*empsycha*; 5.16, 9.8), ἐμψύχων (*empsychōn*; 5.16), ἐμψύχου (*empsychou*; 10.1). Having soul, animate. “And things with soul are better than things without soul, and of things with soul, the rational” (5.16); “we see by one light and breathe one air, all of us that have sight and are animate” (9.8). Lemma: ἔμψυχος.

ψυχάριον

Attested: ψυχάριον (*psycharion*; 4.41, 5.33, 7.16, 9.3.1, 10.36, 12.26), ψυχάρια (*psycharia*; 9.27, 9.34). Little soul, the diminutive of ψυχή, used to belittle: the soul seen as a perishable thing, or other men’s souls seen bare. “You are a little soul carrying a corpse, as Epictetus used to say” (4.41);

“believe that you see their little souls naked” (9.34). At 7.16 it is the part “which fears, which is distressed”, and which “will suffer nothing at all”. Lemma: ψυχάριον.

ψυχή

Attested: ψυχήν (*psychēn*; 1.16.10, 4.3.1, 4.29, 4.40, 5.11, 5.19 twice, 5.27, 6.14 twice, 6.29, 7.66, 12.24, 12.28), ψυχή (*psychē*; 2.6, 2.16, 2.17.1, 3.16.1, 5.16, 5.32, 7.63, 8.45, 9.8 twice, 10.1, 11.3, 11.18.2, 12.30 twice), ψυχαῖς (*psychais*; 2.6, 2.13), ψυχῇ (*psychēi*; 2.8, 3.7, 5.5, 5.11, 5.34, 6.52, 6.53, 8.28, 8.29, 8.51, 11.16, 11.18.4, 12.7), ψυχῆς (*psychēs*; 2.8, 2.17.1, 3.4.3, 3.6.1, 3.16.1, 4.3.4, 4.31, 5.19, 5.26, 5.36, 6.14 twice, 6.32, 10.33.2, 11.1.1, 11.1.2, 11.12, 12.29, 12.32), ψυχαί (*psychai*; 4.21.1 twice, 5.32, 9.9.2), ψυχάς (*psychas*; 4.21.1, 11.39), ψυχῶν (*psychōn*; 4.48.1). Soul, the life of a living being: in animals and men, and one soul of the whole of which theirs are parts; in man, the whole inner life, of which the ruling centre is the part that rules. “Things themselves do not touch the soul in any way at all … it alone turns and moves itself” (5.19); “the soul is dyed by the impressions” (5.16); “One soul, even if it is parted among countless natures and individual circumscriptions” (12.30). Lemma: ψυχή.

ψυχικός

Attested: ψυχικά (*psychika*; 6.25). Of the soul, belonging to the soul as against the body. Marcus is to consider how many things come about at once in each man, “bodily and of the soul together” (6.25). Lemma: ψυχικός.

ψύχωσις

Attested: ψυχώσεως (*psychōseōs*; 12.24 twice). Ensoulment, the coming of soul into a living thing. Among the three things to have ready to hand is “what each thing is like from seed until it receives a soul, and from receiving a soul until it gives the soul back” (12.24). “From seed” is the ἀπὸ σπέρματος (*apo spermatos*) of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have στερήματος (*sterēmatos*), “privation”. Lemma: ψύχωσις.

See also

Body and flesh; Breath; Citizenship; Daimon; Death; Dissolution; Gods; Impression; Impulse; Mind and reason; Pain and pleasure; Ruling centre; Self-respect and shame.

The one substance and what subsists · Meditations

οὐσία, ousia, “substance”; *οὐσιώδης, ousiōdēs*, “substantial”; *ὑπόστασις, hypostasis*, “subsistence”; *ὑφίστασθαι, hyphistasthai*, “subsist”, “set up”, “set before oneself”; *ἐνυφίστασθαι, enyphistasthai*, “subsisted within”, “subsist in”; *προσυφίστασθαι, prosyphistasthai*, “subsist alongside”; *τὰ ὑποκείμενα, ta hypokeimena*, “the underlying things”, “the underlying thing”, “underlying”; *ἰδίως ποιός, idiōs poios*, “individually qualified”; *χείμαρρος, cheimarros*, “torrent”

At a Glance

The word. Οὐσία, built on the participle of εἶναι, “to be”, is in ordinary Greek what a man has, his property, and for philosophers what a thing is. For the Stoics it was body: the matter of all things, shaped by the reason in it. Ὑφίστασθαι, “to stand under”, is to subsist, to be really there; ὑπόστασις is subsistence; τὰ ὑποκείμενα are the things that underlie.

In the *Meditations*. There is “one common substance, even if it is parted among countless individually qualified bodies”, that is, among particular things (12.30). It is “obedient and pliant”, and the reason that governs it “has no cause in itself for doing ill” (6.1); it is wax in the hands of nature (7.23), a torrent through which all bodies pass (7.19), and each man has “a very small portion” of it (5.24). What is bad for a man, by contrast, “has its whole subsistence” in his own understanding (9.42.3).

In this edition. Οὐσία is always “substance”, with κατά “in substance” or “in its substance”; ὑφίστασθαι is “subsist”, and “set up” or “set before oneself” where it takes an object (6.41, 11.21); ὑπόστασις is “subsistence”; τὰ ὑποκείμενα are “the underlying things”.

A place to read. 7.23, where the nature of the whole moulds a little horse out of the whole of substance as out of wax, melts it down for a little tree, then for a little man.

Meaning

Οὐσία (*ousia*) is formed on οὖσα (*ousa*), the feminine participle of εἶναι (*einai*), “to be”. In ordinary Greek it is property, a man’s estate, and in philosophy being, what a thing is. The Stoics made it the stuff of the world, the matter of all things, without quality of its own, which the reason in it

shapes (see Mind and reason).[344] Marcus uses the word both ways, of "the substance of the whole" (6.1, 7.10, 7.19, 9.29) and of what a thing is "in its substance" (3.11.1, 10.9).

Ὑφίστασθαι (*hyphistasthai*), from ὑπό (*hypo*), "under", and ἵστασθαι (*histasthai*), "to stand", is to stand under; it is used of a sediment that settles, and in philosophy it is to subsist, to have real being; ὑπόστασις (*hypostasis*) is subsistence. Τὸ ὑποκείμενον (*to hypokeimenon*), from ὑπόκεισθαι (*hypokeisthai*), "to lie under", is the underlying thing, the thing itself beneath what is thought or said of it. The individually qualified, τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν (*to idiōs poion*), is the Stoic name, as the edition's note at 9.25 says, for "the particular thing that persists through change".

Use in the book

The substance of the whole is passive. "The substance of the whole is obedient and pliant, and the reason that governs it has no cause in itself for doing ill; for it has no vice" (6.1). Everything is shaped from it and returned to it: "The nature of the whole, out of the whole of substance, as out of wax, now moulded a little horse, then, melting it down, used its material for a little tree; then for a little man; then for something else; and each of these subsisted for a very short time" (7.23). To dissolve the little box is nothing terrible (7.23). Nature makes new things "out of their substance" so that the universe may be always young (7.25; see Change), and needs no substance from outside (8.50; see Nature).

The substance is one, and the bodies many. "One light of the sun, even if it is parted by walls, mountains, countless other things. One common substance, even if it is parted among countless individually qualified bodies" (12.30). The horse, the tree and the man of 7.23 can be read as such bodies, each subsisting a short while in the common stuff. There is "one universe out of all things, and one God through all things, and one substance" (7.9; see Interconnection), a universe "holding one substance and one soul" (4.40; see Cosmos and order); at 6.4 the unity stays a condition: all the underlying things will change, and "either be turned to vapour, if substance is unified, or be scattered".

The substance flows. Of human life, "the substance flowing" (2.17.1; see Soul); "substance is like a river in perpetual flow" (5.23; see Change). "Through the substance of the whole, as through a torrent, all bodies pass, grown

[344] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.134.

together with the whole and working with it, as our limbs with one another"; and "How many a Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has eternity already swallowed!" (7.19). "The substance of the whole is a torrent: it carries all things" (9.29; see Philosophy), where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts the correction of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar; in the manuscripts it is the cause, αἰτία (*aitia*), that is a torrent. In "so great a flow of substance and of time and of motion and of things moved", Marcus cannot conceive "what could be valued or taken seriously at all" (5.10.2; see Daimon).

Each man's share is small. "Remember the all-embracing substance, of which you have a very small portion" (5.24); all particular things are, "in respect of substance, a fig-seed, and in respect of time, a turn of a drill" (10.17). As he cherishes "the amount of substance marked off for you", so he is to cherish his years (6.49; see Time and eternity), and to consider "what fraction of the whole substance" is his (12.32; see Time and eternity). He quotes from the *Republic* of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, Socrates' question whether to one whose understanding has "the contemplation of all time and all substance" human life seems anything great (7.35).

Substance is also what a thing is. Marcus is to define each thing "so as to see distinctly what it is in its substance, naked" (3.11.1; see Impression), and he asks when he will enjoy the recognition of each thing, "what it is in its substance, and what place it has in the universe, and for how long it is by nature able to subsist" (10.9). He asks what can prevent the understanding's judgement from saying to what falls upon it, "This is what you are in substance, even if in repute you appear of another kind" (7.68; see Tranquillity). He is to pass on to the underlying things themselves, "as of short duration and cheap, and able to be in the possession of a catamite or a whore or a robber" (5.10.1); as bathing appears "oil, sweat, filth, slimy water, all disgusting", "such is every part of life and every underlying thing" (8.24); and each is to be conceived "as already dissolving and in change" (10.18).

Good and bad do not subsist in things. "What is bad for you does not subsist in another's ruling centre, nor indeed in any turning or variation of the surroundings" (4.39; see Assent and judgement). None of those who provoke him has

done anything to make his understanding worse, “but what is bad for you and harmful has its whole subsistence there”, in the understanding (9.42.3); the soul makes “the things that subsist alongside it” such as the verdicts it thinks itself worthy of (5.19; see Soul); and from justice “the other virtues subsist” (11.10; see Justice). The physics and the ethics can be read as one division: bodies subsist in the common substance, a short while each, and good and bad subsist only in the ruling centre, which no substance touches.

Places to read

Every chapter in which οὐσία, οὐσιώδης, ὑπόστασις, ὑφίστασθαι and its compounds ἐνυφίστασθαι and προσυφίστασθαι, ὑπόκεισθαι, ἰδίως ποιός and χείμαρρος occur, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. Ὑποστάθμη (*hypostathmē*), “sediments” (9.36), is given under Elements, and ποιότης (*poiotēs*), “quality” (6.3, 9.25), is left out.

2.4 Marcus must perceive of what governor of the universe he came to subsist as an outflow, and that a limit of time has been set for him (see Daimon).

2.17.1 Of human life the time is a point, the substance flowing, and the compound of the whole body quick to rot (see Soul).

3.11.1 Marcus is to define whatever presents itself, so as to see what it is in its substance, naked, as a whole and in its parts (see Impression).

4.14 Marcus has subsisted within as a part, and will be taken back by change into the seminal reason of what begot him (see Mind and reason).

4.27 Marcus asks whether a kind of order can subsist in him and disorder in the totality (see Providence and atoms).

4.39 What is bad for Marcus does not subsist in another’s ruling centre, nor in any turning of his surroundings, but where that in him is which forms opinions (see Assent and judgement).

4.40 Marcus is to conceive the universe as one living being, holding one substance and one soul (see Cosmos and order).

4.42 Nothing is bad for things in the course of change, as nothing is good for things that subsist out of change (see Change).

5.10.1 Marcus is to pass on to the underlying things themselves, of short duration and cheap, and able to belong to a catamite, a whore or a robber.

5.10.2 In so great a flow of substance and of time and of motion and of things moved, Marcus cannot conceive what could be valued or taken seriously at all (see Daimon).

5.13 Neither the causal nor the material in Marcus came to subsist out of what is not, and by such change he too came to subsist (see Cause and matter).

5.19 Things do not touch the soul; the soul makes the things that subsist alongside it such as the verdicts it thinks itself worthy of (see Soul).

5.23 Substance is like a river in perpetual flow, and the infinity of past and future a yawning gulf in which all things vanish (see Change).

5.24 Marcus is to remember the all-embracing substance, of which he has a very small portion.

5.32 The skilled and knowing soul knows the reason that pervades all substance and manages the totality by appointed periods.

6.1 The substance of the whole is obedient and pliant, and the reason that governs it has no cause in itself for doing ill.

6.4 All the underlying things will very soon change, and either be turned to vapour, if substance is unified, or be scattered.

6.23 Marcus is to use irrational living beings, and things and underlying things generally, with greatness of mind and freely, and men socially.

6.25 Considering how many things come about at once in each man, Marcus will not wonder that all the things that come to be in the universe subsist in it at once.

6.38 One thing follows another in the universe because of the tensional motion, the breathing together and the unity of substance (see Interconnection).

6.41 Whoever sets up for himself as good or bad anything outside his choice must, on falling into the bad or failing of the good, blame the gods and hate men (see Good, bad and indifference).

6.49 Marcus asks whether he resents weighing so many pounds and not three hundred; as he cherishes the amount of substance marked off for him, so with time (see Time and eternity).

7.9 There is one universe out of all things, one God through all things, one substance and one law (see Interconnection).

7.10 Everything material vanishes very quickly into the substance of the whole (see Cause and matter).

7.19 All bodies pass through the substance of the whole as through a torrent, grown together with the whole and working with it.

7.23 The nature of the whole moulds things out of the whole of substance as out of wax, and each of them subsists for a very short time.

7.25 The nature that governs the whole will soon make other things out of the substance of all that is seen, so that the universe may be always young (see Change).

7.29 Marcus is to divide the underlying thing into the causal and the material, and to leave a wrong there where it subsisted (see Cause and matter).

7.35 In words from Plato, Socrates asks whether human life can seem anything great to one whose understanding has the contemplation of all time and all substance, and is told it cannot.

7.68 Judgement says to what falls upon it, "This is what you are in substance, even if in repute you appear of another kind" (see Tranquillity).

8.7 The common nature is just, if indeed it makes the portions of times, substance, cause, activity and conjuncture equal and according to worth for each (see Assent and judgement).

8.11 Marcus asks of each thing what is its substantial and material part, what its causal part, and how long it subsists (see Cause and matter).

8.22 Marcus is to pay heed to the underlying thing, or the principle, or the activity, or what is meant (see Attention and self-examination).

8.24 As bathing appears all disgusting, so is every part of life and every underlying thing.

8.50 The nature of the whole changes what decays within it into itself and makes new things from it, so that it needs no substance from outside (see Nature).

9.1.4 The common nature, by an original impulse of providence, marked off generative powers of such subsistences, changes and successions (see Providence and atoms).

9.3.2 If Marcus wants an unphilosophical precept, what will most ease him towards death is attention to the underlying things from which he is about to stand apart (see Death).

9.9.2 Among the still better beings, even out of things separate, a kind of unity subsisted, as among the stars (see Kinship and cooperation).

9.25 Marcus is to mark the longest time for which this individually qualified thing can by nature subsist (see Cause and matter).

9.29 The substance of the whole is a torrent that carries all things (see Philosophy).

9.36 The material underlying each thing is rottenness: water, dust, little bones, stink (see Body and flesh).

9.42.3 What is bad and harmful for Marcus has its whole subsistence in his own understanding, which no one who provokes him has made worse.

10.5 The interweaving of causes was spinning together from everlasting both Marcus' subsistence and what happens to him (see Fate and allotment).

10.7.3 What changes in a man is what he took in from food and air, not what his mother bore; and supposing that this binds him very closely to what is individually qualified, that, Marcus thinks, is nothing to the point (see Dissolution).

10.9 Marcus asks when he will enjoy the recognition of each thing, what it is in its substance and for how long it is by nature able to subsist (see Simplicity and sincerity).

10.17 All particular things are, in respect of substance, a fig-seed, and in respect of time, a turn of a drill.

10.18 Marcus is to conceive each of the underlying things as already dissolving and in change.

11.10 From justice the other virtues subsist (see Justice).

11.17 Marcus notes whence each thing has come, from what underlying things, into what it changes, and how it will suffer nothing bad (see Dissolution).

11.21 One must set before oneself the target that is social and civic (see Impulse).

12.30 One common substance is parted among countless individually qualified bodies, as one light of the sun is parted by walls and mountains.

12.32 Marcus is to consider what fraction of eternity, of the whole substance and of the whole soul is his, and to think nothing great but to act as his nature leads and be affected as the common nature brings (see Time and eternity).

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoics' teaching in its seventh book, reports that they made the first matter the substance of everything that is, following Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school, and Chrysippus, its third head, in the first book of his *Physics*. Matter is that from which anything at all comes to be; and substance and matter alike are spoken of in two ways, as that of all things and as that of the parts; that of the whole neither grows nor shrinks, that of the parts does both. Substance is body, and limited, according to the Stoics Antipater, in the second book of *On Substance*, and Apollodorus, in his *Physics*; and it can be acted on, for if it could not be changed, nothing that comes to be could come to be from it.[345] Marcus' substance of the whole, "obedient and pliant" (6.1), which needs no substance from outside (8.50), and his wax remade from horse to tree (7.23), can be read as this physics. Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, gives the other half in an attack on the school, *On Common Conceptions, against the Stoics*. The Stoics, he says, grant that every particular substance is in flux and on the move, letting some things go out of it and taking others in from elsewhere, so that it does not remain the same; and to keep the facts of growth they make each of

[345] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.150, citing Chrysippus, *Physics* book 1, Zeno, Antipater, *On Substance* book 2, and Apollodorus, *Physics*.

us double, two underlying things, ὑποκείμενα (*hypokeimena*), the one substance, the other quality: the first always flowing, neither growing nor shrinking nor remaining at all as it is, the second remaining, and growing and shrinking.[346] Marcus' "One common substance" parted among "individually qualified bodies" (12.30), and his reminder that what changes in a man is what he took in, "not what the mother bore" (10.7.3; see Dissolution), can be read in these terms.

Translation in this edition

Οὐσία is "substance" at all its places; with κατά it is "in substance" (7.68) and "in its substance" (3.11.1, 10.9), with πρός "in respect of substance" (10.17). Οὐσιῶδες is "substantial" (8.11), joined under one article with ὑλικόν, "substantial and material part" (see Cause and matter). Ὑφίστασθαι is "subsist" (4.27, 4.39, 4.42, 8.11, 9.25, 10.9, 11.10), its aorist "came to subsist" (2.4, 5.13 twice) and "subsisted" (7.23, 7.29, 9.9.2); with an object it is "set up for yourself" (6.41) and "set before oneself" (11.21). Ἐνυφίστασθαι is "have subsisted within" (4.14) and "subsist in it" (6.25); προσυφίστασθαι "subsist alongside" (5.19). Ὑπόστασις is "subsistence" (9.42.3, 10.5), the plural "subsistences" (9.1.4). Τὰ ὑποκείμενα are "the underlying things" (5.10.1, 6.4, 6.23, 9.3.2, 10.18, 11.17, 12.30), the singular "the underlying thing" (7.29, 8.22) and "every underlying thing" (8.24), and the participle with ὕλη "the material underlying each thing" (9.36). Ἰδίως ποιός is "individually qualified" (9.25, 10.7.3, 12.30; for the adverb ἰδίως see Affinity and the alien), and ποιότης "quality" (6.3, 9.25). At 7.23 "a little tree" is the correction of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, δενδρύφιον (*dendryphion*), which Leopold prints for the manuscripts' δένδρου φύσιν, "the nature of a tree", as the edition's note says. Χείμαρρος is "torrent" (7.19, 9.29). "Substance", "subsist" and "underlying" render no other words. Of the images of substance, εὐπειθής (*eupeithēs*) is "obedient" (6.1; at 7.67 "obedient to God") and εὐτρεπής (*eutrepēs*) "pliant" (6.1), the reading of P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, where A, the Vatican manuscript, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have εὐπρεπής (*euprepēs*), "seemly"; κηρός (*kēros*) is "wax" (7.23), κεγχραμίς (*kenchramis*) "fig-seed" (10.17), λίτρα

[346] Plutarch, *On Common Conceptions* 44, 1083b–d and 1084a.

(*litra*) “pounds” (6.49), ῥύσις (*rhysis*) “flow” (see Change) and ὑποστάθμη “sediments” (9.36; see Elements).

ἐνυφίστημι

Attested: ἐνυπέστης (*enypestēs*; 4.14), ἐνυφίσταται (*enyphistatai*; 6.25). To subsist within, to subsist in. “You have subsisted within, as a part. You will vanish into what begot you” (4.14; see Mind and reason); all the things that come to be in the universe “subsist in it at once” (6.25). At 4.14 A has ἀνυπέστης. Lemma: ἐνυφίστημι.

οὐσία

Attested: οὐσία (*ousia*; 2.17.1, 5.23, 6.1, 6.4, 7.9, 9.29, 12.30), οὐσίαν (*ousian*; 3.11.1, 4.40, 7.68, 10.9, 10.17), οὐσίας (*ousias*; 5.10.2, 5.24, 5.32, 6.38, 6.49, 7.19, 7.23, 7.25 twice, 7.35, 8.7, 8.50, 10.17, 12.32), οὐσίᾳ (*ousiāi*; 7.10). Being, substance: the one passive stuff of the universe, and what a thing is. “The substance of the whole is obedient and pliant” (6.1); “One common substance, even if it is parted among countless individually qualified bodies” (12.30); “This is what you are in substance” (7.68). At 9.29 the word is Reiske’s correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ αἰτία, “cause”; at 5.24 A omits it. Lemma: οὐσία.

οὐσιώδης

Attested: οὐσιῶδες (*ousiōdes*; 8.11). Of substance, substantial. “What is its substantial and material part, what its causal part” (8.11; see Cause and matter). Lemma: οὐσιώδης.

ποιός

Attested: ποιόν (*poion*; 9.25), ποιῷ (*poiōi*; 10.7.3), ποιοῖς (*poiois*; 12.30), always with ἰδίως. Of some quality; ἰδίως ποιός, individually qualified, is the Stoic term for a particular thing that persists through change. “the longest for which this individually qualified thing can by nature subsist” (9.25); “One common substance, even if it is parted among countless individually qualified bodies” (12.30). Lemma: ποιός.

προσυφίστημι

Attested: προσυφεστῶτα (*prosyphestōta*; 5.19). To subsist beside. The soul “makes such, for itself, the things that subsist alongside it” as are the verdicts it thinks itself

worthy of (5.19; see Soul). A has προεφεστῶτα. Lemma: προσυφίστημι.

ὑπόκειμαι

Attested: ὑποκείμενα (*hypokeimena*; 5.10.1, 6.4, 9.3.2, 12.30), ὑποκειμένοις (*hypokeimenois*; 6.23), ὑποκείμενον (*hypokeimenon*; 7.29, 8.24), ὑποκειμένῳ (*hypokeimenōi*; 8.22), ὑποκειμένης (*hypokeimenēs*; 9.36), ὑποκειμένων (*hypokeimenōn*; 10.18, 11.17). To lie under; as a participle with the article, the underlying thing, the thing itself. “Pass on, then, to the underlying things themselves, as of short duration and cheap” (5.10.1); “Divide and distribute the underlying thing into the causal and the material” (7.29); “such is every part of life and every underlying thing” (8.24). Lemma: ὑπόκειμαι.

ὑπόστασις

Attested: ὑποστάσεων (*hypostaseōn*; 9.1.4), ὑπόστασιν (*hypostasin*; 9.42.3, 10.5). Subsistence, real being. “what is bad for you and harmful has its whole subsistence there” (9.42.3); “the interweaving of causes was spinning together, from everlasting, both your subsistence and the occurrence of this” (10.5; see Fate and allotment). Lemma: ὑπόστασις.

ὑφίστημι

Attested: ὑπέστης (*hypestēs*; 2.4), ὑφίστασθαι (*hyphistasthai*; 4.27, 9.25, 10.9), ὑφίσταται (*hyphistatai*; 4.39, 8.11), ὑφισταμένοις (*hyphistamenois*; 4.42), ὑπέστη (*hypestē*; 5.13, 7.23, 7.29, 9.9.2), ὑπέστην (*hypestēn*; 5.13), ὑποστήσῃ (*hypostēsēi*; 6.41), ὑφίστανται (*hyphistantai*; 11.10), ὑποστήσασθαι (*hypostēsasthai*; 11.21). To set under; intransitive, to stand under, to subsist. “What is bad for you does not subsist in another’s ruling centre” (4.39); “each of these subsisted for a very short time” (7.23); “By such change I too came to subsist” (5.13). With an object it is to set up: “Whatever of the things outside your choice you set up for yourself as good or bad” (6.41), where ὑποστήσῃ σαυτῷ is Leopold’s own correction of the manuscripts’ ὑποστήσῃς αὐτῷ; “one must set before oneself the target that is social and civic” (11.21), where P and A have the future ὑποστήσεσθαι. Lemma: ὑφίστημι.

χείμαρρος

Attested: χειμάρρου (*cheimarrou*; 7.19), χειμάρρους (*cheimarrous*; 9.29). A winter torrent, a stream swollen by

rain. “Through the substance of the whole, as through a torrent, all bodies pass” (7.19); “The substance of the whole is a torrent: it carries all things” (9.29), where in the manuscripts the torrent is the cause of the whole. At 7.19 “limbs” is the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ μέρη, “parts”. Lemma: χείμαρρος.

See also

Affinity and the alien; Assent and judgement; Attention and self-examination; Body and flesh; Cause and matter; Change; Cosmos and order; Daimon; Death; Dissolution; Elements; Fate and allotment; Good, bad and indifference; Impression; Impulse; Interconnection; Justice; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Nature; Philosophy; Providence and atoms; Simplicity and sincerity; Soul; Time and eternity; Tranquillity.

Time and eternity

The present against infinite time · Meditations

χρόνος, chronos, “time”, “span of time”, “periods”; *αἰών, aiōn*, “eternity”; *αἰώνιος, aiōnios*, “eternal”; *ἀΐδιος, aidios*, “everlasting”; *ἄπειρος, apeiros*, “infinite”, “infinity”; *ἀπειρία, apeiria*, “infinity”; *ἀχανής, achanēs*, “yawning”, “yawning gulf”; *ἀχάνεια, achaneia*, “yawning gulf”; *χάος, chaos*, “abyss”; *ἐφήμερος, ephēmeros*, “of a day”; *ὀλιγοχρόνιος, oligochronios*, “of short duration”, “short duration”; *ἀκαριαῖος, akariaios*, “instant”, “momentary”; *τὸ παρόν, to paron*, “the present”, “the work in hand”

At a Glance

The word. Χρόνος is time, a span of it or the whole; αἰών is eternity, time without end on either side of the present; ἀΐδιος is everlasting and ἄπειρος infinite. Against them stand ἐφήμερος, “of a day”, and τὸ παρόν, the present.

In the *Meditations*. Eternity is “a kind of river” and “a violent current” (4.43), a “yawning gulf” behind and before (4.50, 5.23), and “the whole present of time” is “a point of eternity” (6.36). Yet the present is all anyone has: “no one could lose the past or the future” (2.14.1), and “each of us lives only this present, this instant” (3.10).

In this edition. Χρόνος is "time" and αἰών always "eternity", kept apart from ἀΐδιος, "everlasting", and ἄπειρος, "infinite"; ἐφήμερος is "of a day", ὀλιγοχρόνιος "of short duration", and τὸ παρόν and τὸ ἐνεστώς "the present".

A place to read. 2.14.1–2, where Marcus shows that the longest life and the shortest lose the same thing, the present.

Meaning

Χρόνος (*chronos*) is time, both a stretch of it, "a longer span of time or a shorter" (3.7), and time as a whole. Αἰών (*aiōn*) is in Homer a man's life, which leaves him with his soul when he dies;[347] in philosophy it became eternity. Ἀΐδιος (*aidios*), from ἀεί (*aei*), "always", is everlasting, and ἄπειρος (*apeiros*), "without limit", infinite. Ἐφήμερος (*ephēmeros*), from ἡμέρα (*hēmera*), "day", is what lasts a day, and ὀλιγοχρόνιος (*oligochronios*) what lasts a little time. The present is τὸ παρόν (*to paron*), "what is at hand", or τὸ ἐνεστώς (*to enestōs*), "what has set in", the Stoics' word for present time.[348] Marcus' eternity is not a timeless state above time: it has a past and a future, "from eternity to eternity" (9.28).

Use in the book

Marcus measures every life against eternity on both sides. Against the hope of a little fame he sets "the speed of the forgetting of all things, and the abyss of the infinite eternity on either side" (4.3.3); "the infinity of the past and the future is a yawning gulf, in which all things vanish" (5.23); of "the all-embracing eternity" "a brief and momentary interval has been marked off" for each (5.24), and "very quickly it vanishes into the everlasting" (12.32). On that scale "the whole present of time" is "a point of eternity", as Asia and Europe are corners of the universe and Athos a little clod (6.36), and each particular thing is, "in respect of time, a turn of a drill" (10.17). Even three lifetimes of Nestor, Homer's king who outlived two generations, are no exception: "For look behind at the yawning gulf of eternity, and in front at another infinity. In this, then, what difference is there between a child of three days and one who has lived three lifetimes of Nestor?" (4.50).

---

[347] Homer, *Iliad* 16.453.

[348] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.141.

Eternity is not empty extent but a force that carries things off. “Eternity is a kind of river of the things that come to be, a violent current; for as soon as each thing has been seen, it has been carried past, and another is being carried by, and that will be carried away” (4.43). “Is” is, in the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, the correction of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar; the manuscripts make eternity “a kind of river out of the things that come to be”. “How quickly eternity will cover everything, and how much it has covered already!” (6.59); “the memory of everything is very quickly buried in eternity” (7.10). The same course also renews: “Flows and alterations renew the universe perpetually, as the unbroken course of time keeps infinite eternity always new” (6.15). Within it all is “of a day, both what remembers and what is remembered” (4.35), and “short duration is common to all; but you flee and pursue all things as though they were to be eternal” (10.34), where Homer’s leaves that the wind sheds are a man’s children, those who praise or curse him, and those who will inherit his fame.

So length counts for nothing. “Even if you are going to live three thousand years, or as many times ten thousand, still remember that no one loses any other life than the one he is living, nor lives any other than the one he loses. So the longest and the shortest come to the same” (2.14.1). Marcus gives two reasons: all things “from everlasting are of one form and come round again, and it makes no difference whether one sees the same things for a hundred years or two hundred or for infinite time” (2.14.2; see Recurrence and repetition); and “it is only the present that he will be deprived of, since this is all he has; and no one loses what he does not have” (2.14.2). The years are a measure, like the body’s weight: “for as you cherish the amount of substance marked off for you, so too with time” (6.49). Of a life that uses things with greatness of mind and men socially, “let it make no difference to you for how long a time you will do this; for even three hours like that are enough” (6.23; compare 12.35, see Death).

What remains is the present. Marcus is to remember “that each of us lives only this present, this instant; the rest is either lived already or unclear” (3.10). He is not to gather in thought all the painful things that are likely to have followed, but to remember “that neither the future nor the past weighs on you, but always the present; and this is made small if you

mark its bounds alone" (8.36). The understanding "is concerned only with the present; for its future and past acts are themselves already things that make no difference" (6.32), and "Circumscribe the present of time" is one of seven commands (7.29; see Impression). What he prays for he can have now, "if you leave behind all the past, and entrust the future to providence, and direct the present alone towards holiness and justice" (12.1.1); and if he separates from his ruling centre what is fastened to it and "of time what lies beyond or what is past", makes himself like the sphere of Empedocles, the philosopher-poet of fifth-century Acragas, and practises "living only what you live, that is, the present", he will be able to live out what remains untroubled (12.3.2; see Mind and reason).

The rational soul can take this view: it "stretches out into the infinity of eternity" (11.1.2; see Soul). To comprehend "everlasting eternity" and to conceive "how short from birth to dissolution, how yawning the gulf before birth", Marcus says, will "make much room" (9.32); there the "by" that joins the room to the comprehending is a supplement of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints, and "everlasting" is the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, for the manuscripts' "own". The thought of eternity is not a counsel of despair. It can be read as a way of setting the present free: past and future cannot be had, so the present is at every moment the whole of a life, and the only place where it is lived well.

Places to read

The passages where time, eternity or the present is discussed or carries the argument, in the order of the book; every place of the words treated here is given in the sub-entries, with the other senses of πάρειμι.

2.2 The ruling centre is no longer to resent what is fated in the present or look askance at it in the future (see Ruling centre).

2.12 All things vanish quickly, the bodies into the universe, the memory of them into eternity.

2.14.1 However long a man lives, he loses only the life he is living, and no one could lose the past or the future.

2.14.2 All things from everlasting are of one form and come round again, and it makes no difference

whether one sees them for a hundred years or for infinite time; and each is deprived only of the present.

2.17.1 In human life the time is a point (see Soul).

3.7 Whether he will have the use of a soul in the body for a longer span of time or a shorter is no concern of the man who has chosen his own mind and daimon.

3.10 Each lives only this present, this instant, the rest being lived already or unclear, and even the longest fame after death is small.

4.3.3 Against a little fame Marcus sets the speed of the forgetting of all things and the abyss of the infinite eternity on either side.

4.21.1 If souls live on, Marcus asks how the air has held them from everlasting, and how the earth holds the buried through so long an eternity (see Soul).

4.26 One must make gain of the present with sound reasoning and justice (see Justice).

4.35 Everything is of a day, both what remembers and what is remembered.

4.43 Eternity is a kind of river of the things that come to be, a violent current in which each thing is carried past as soon as it is seen.

4.48.2 Human things are of a day, and Marcus is to pass through this instant of time according to nature (see Death).

4.49.1 Marcus is lucky to go on free from distress, neither crushed by the present nor afraid of what is coming (see Tranquillity).

4.50 Against the yawning gulf of eternity behind and another infinity in front, Marcus asks what difference there is between a child of three days and one who has lived three lifetimes of Nestor.

5.10.1 The underlying things are of short duration and cheap.

5.10.2 In so great a flow of substance and of time and of motion Marcus cannot conceive what could be valued, and waits for the natural release (see Daimon).

5.13 Every part of Marcus will be posted by change to another part of the universe, and so on to infinity,

as by such change he came to subsist, and so back into another infinity.

5.23 The infinity of the past and the future is a yawning gulf in which all things vanish, and it is folly to be puffed up or to complain among them.

5.24 Of the all-embracing eternity a brief and momentary interval has been marked off for each.

5.32 The skilled soul knows the reason that pervades all substance and through all eternity, by appointed periods, manages the totality.

6.2 It is enough, in dying as in all else, to settle the present well (see Present action).

6.15 Flows and alterations renew the universe perpetually, as the unbroken course of time keeps infinite eternity always new; life itself is something of this kind, like the breathing in of air (see Breath).

6.23 It is to make no difference to Marcus for how long a time he will use things with greatness of mind and men socially, for even three hours like that are enough.

6.32 The understanding is concerned only with the present, for its future and past acts already make no difference.

6.36 The whole present of time is a point of eternity, as Asia and Europe are corners of the universe.

6.37 He who has seen what is now has seen all things, those that came to be from everlasting and those that will be to infinity.

6.49 Marcus asks whether he resents weighing so many pounds and not three hundred; so too with living so many years and not longer, for as he cherishes his measure of substance, so too with time.

6.59 Eternity will very quickly cover everything, and has covered much already.

7.1 Nothing is new; all things are both usual and of short duration.

7.10 The memory of everything is very quickly buried in eternity.

7.19 Eternity has already swallowed many a Chrysippus, the Stoic school's third head, many a Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, and many an

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher whose lectures Arrian recorded.

7.29 "Circumscribe the present of time" is the third of seven commands (see Impression).

7.35 In words of the *Republic* of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, to the man whose understanding has the contemplation of all time and all substance human life seems nothing great (see Death).

7.46 In Plato's *Gorgias*, living for however long a time is perhaps a thing the true man must let be, and he must look at how he may best live the time he is going to live (see Death).

7.64 The saying of Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, helps in most pains, that pain is neither unbearable nor eternal, if one remembers its limits and adds no opinion (see Pain and pleasure).

7.68 To the understanding the present is always material for rational and civic virtue (see Tranquillity).

7.70 The gods do not resent bearing with base men through so long an eternity, and Marcus asks whether he, on the point of ceasing, gives up.

8.11 Of each thing Marcus is to ask how long a time it subsists.

8.36 Neither the future nor the past weighs on Marcus, but always the present, which is made small if he marks its bounds alone.

8.44 Marcus is to make a gift of this time to himself; those who pursue fame after death do not reckon that the men to come will be like those they find burdensome now.

9.14 All things are usual in experience, of a day in time, filthy in material.

9.25 Of each thing Marcus is to mark the bounds of the time, the longest for which it can by nature subsist.

9.28 The cycles of the universe are the same from eternity to eternity, and the earth and what it becomes will change to infinity.

9.32 Comprehending eternity and the yawning gulf before birth and after dissolution, Marcus will make much room for himself.

9.35 In the nature of the whole all things came about in one form from eternity, and to infinity there will be others of the same kind.

10.5 Whatever happens to Marcus was being prepared for him from eternity, and the interweaving of causes was spinning it together from everlasting (see Fate and allotment).

10.7.2 A dissolved body is scattered into its elements or turned into earth and air and taken up into the reason of the whole, whether the whole is periodically consumed by fire or renewed by everlasting exchanges (see Change).

10.17 Marcus is to keep continually an impression of the whole of eternity and the whole of substance, and each particular thing is, in respect of time, a turn of a drill.

10.31 Seeing the dead in the living makes human things look like smoke and nothing, especially if Marcus remembers that what has once changed will no longer be in infinite time; he asks why it is not enough to pass through this brief span in good order.

10.34 Short duration is common to all, men like the leaves of Homer's line, yet Marcus flees and pursues all things as though they were to be eternal.

11.1.2 The rational soul stretches out into the infinity of eternity and comprehends the periodic rebirth of the whole (see Soul).

11.16 The heedfulness that treats indifferent things as indifferent is needed only for a short time, and then life will have ceased.

12.1.1 If Marcus leaves behind all the past, entrusts the future to providence and directs the present alone to holiness and justice, he can have now all that he prays for.

12.3.2 If Marcus separates from his ruling centre what is fastened to it, with what lies beyond and what is past, makes himself like Empedocles' sphere and practises living only the present, he will be able to live through what remains untroubled (see Mind and reason).

12.7 Marcus is to consider the shortness of life and the yawning gulf of eternity behind and before.

12.24 Raised aloft, one would see the same things each time, uniformity, short duration.

12.26 Among the things a man has forgotten when he is aggrieved is that each lives only the present and loses this (see Mind and reason).

12.32 Each has a fraction of the infinite and yawning eternity, which very quickly vanishes into the everlasting.

12.35 For one to whom only the timely is good, to whom more right actions or fewer are all one, and to whom a longer or a shorter time of observing the universe makes no difference, not even death is a thing to fear (see Death).

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoics made time incorporeal. Diogenes Laertius, the third-century biographer of the philosophers, reports that they called it the interval of the motion of the universe, and that of time the past and the future are infinite, the present limited.[349] The Stoics' word for the present, ἐνεστώς, is Marcus' in "the present of time" (6.36, 7.29), and their word for infinite, ἄπειρος, Marcus' in "the infinity of the past and the future" (5.23). Chrysippus, the school's third head, went further, as Diadumenus, the Academic speaker of the dialogue *On Common Conceptions* by Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, reports in its attack on the Stoics: in his book *On the Void* and elsewhere Chrysippus said that the past and the future of time do not exist, ὑπάρχειν (*hyparchein*), but subsist, and that only the present exists, though in another work, Diadumenus objects, he divided the present itself into a part to come and a part gone by.[350] Marcus' "no one could lose the past or the future: how could anyone take from a man what he does not have?" (2.14.1) can be read as this doctrine turned against the fear of death. Seneca, the Roman Stoic and adviser of Nero, opens his *Letters to Lucilius* with a thought that can be read beside it. We deceive ourselves, he writes, in looking forward to death, for a great part of it has already passed:

[349] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.141.

[350] Plutarch, *On Common Conceptions* 41, 1081f–1082a.

whatever of our life lies behind, death holds; and "All things, Lucilius, are another's; time alone is ours."[351]

Other ancient sources

In Plato's *Timaeus*, Timaeus of Locri, who gives the dialogue's account of the making of the world, says that the god devised a moving image of eternity: while eternity abides in one, he made, as he ordered the heaven, an image of it that is eternal and goes according to number, and this we have named time. Days and nights, months and years are parts of time, and "was" and "will be" are forms of time that came to be, which we wrongly carry over to everlasting being; of it only "is" can truly be said.[352] Marcus uses the same words, αἰών, αἰώνιος and ἀΐδιος, of the other kind of eternity. His has a "was" and a "will be": all things "from eternity came about in one form, and to infinity there will be others of the same kind" (9.35), and what happens to him "was being prepared for you beforehand from eternity" (10.5; see Fate and allotment). And time does not imitate it; time renews it (6.15).

Translation in this edition

Χρόνος is "time" at thirty-one of its thirty-four occurrences, in the plural "times" (8.7), and "span of time" at 3.7; it is "periods" in "records of periods" (4.32.2); at 1.17.2 ἐπιλαβεῖν τοῦ χρόνου is "put it off", and at 3.11.2 πόσον χρόνον πέφυκε παραμένειν is "how long it is its nature to last". The compound πολυχρονιώτατος is "the longest-lived" (2.14.2), and the verb χρονίζειν "the lasting" (7.33). Αἰών is "eternity" at all twenty-two of its occurrences, and αἰώνιος "eternal" (7.64, 10.34). Ἀΐδιος is always "everlasting", "from everlasting" in ἐξ ἀιδίου (2.14.2, 4.21.1, 6.37, 10.5); at 9.32 it is Meric Casaubon's correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' ἴδιον, "own". Ἄπειρος is "infinite" as an adjective (2.14.2, 4.3.3, 6.15, 9.32, 10.31, 12.32) and "infinity" as a noun (4.50, 5.13, 5.23), "to infinity" for εἰς ἄπειρον (5.13, 6.37, 9.28, 9.35); ἀπειρία too is "infinity" (11.1.2). Ἀπειρόκαλος, "tasteless" (1.16.3), belongs to the other ἄπειρος, "without experience". Ἀχανής is "the yawning gulf" (4.50), "a yawning gulf" (5.23), "how yawning the gulf" (9.32) and "yawning" (12.32), and ἀχάνεια "the yawning gulf" (12.7); χάος is "abyss" (4.3.3). Ἐφήμερος is

[351] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 1.2–3.

[352] Plato, *Timaeus* 37d–38a.

always “of a day”, and ὀλιγοχρόνιος “of short duration” (5.10.1, 7.1) or, as a noun, “short duration” (10.34, 12.24); βραχύβιος, “short-lived” (8.21), is kept apart. Ἀκαριαῖος is “instant” (2.14.1, 3.10, 4.48.2) and “momentary” (5.24, 6.25, 11.18.3). Τὸ παρόν is “the present” (2.2, 2.14.1, 2.14.2, 3.10, 4.26, 6.2, 6.32, 7.68, 8.36, 12.1.1, 12.3.2, 12.26), and so are the participle without the article at 4.49.1 and the plural at 4.32.1; at 3.12 τὸ παρόν is “the work in hand”. Τὸ ἐνεστώς is “the present” in “the present of time” (6.36, 7.29; see Obstacle and reservation). “Eternity” in the English renders nothing but αἰών; “everlasting remembrance” at 4.33 renders ἀείμνηστον (*aeimnēston*).

ἀΐδιος

Attested: ἀιδίου (*aidiou*; 2.14.2, 4.21.1, 6.37, 10.5), ἀίδιον (*aidion*; 9.32), ἀιδίοις (*aidiois*; 10.7.2), ἀιδίῳ (*aidiōi*; 12.32). Everlasting, without beginning or end; with ἐκ, “from everlasting”. “All things from everlasting are of one form and come round again” (2.14.2); the interweaving of causes “was spinning together, from everlasting, both your subsistence and the occurrence of this” (10.5); of each man’s fraction of eternity Marcus writes, “for very quickly it vanishes into the everlasting” (12.32). At 9.32, “comprehending everlasting eternity”, ἀίδιον is Meric Casaubon’s correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ ἴδιον, with which the phrase would be one’s own span of eternity. Lemma: ἀΐδιος.

αἰών

Attested: αἰῶνι (*aiōni*; 2.12, 7.10, 7.70), αἰῶνος (*aiōnos*; 4.3.3, 4.21.1, 4.50, 5.24, 5.32, 6.36, 9.28, 9.35, 10.5, 10.17, 11.1.2, 12.7, 12.32), αἰών (*aiōn*; 4.43, 6.59, 7.19), αἰῶνα (*aiōna*; 6.15, 9.28, 9.32). Eternity, time without end before and after. “The whole present of time: a point of eternity” (6.36); “How quickly eternity will cover everything” (6.59); “The cycles of the universe are the same, up and down, from eternity to eternity” (9.28). At 4.43, “Eternity is a kind of river of the things that come to be”, “is” is Nauck’s correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ “out of”. Lemma: αἰών.

αἰώνιος

Attested: αἰώνιον (*aiōnion*; 7.64), αἰώνια (*aiōnia*; 10.34). Eternal, lasting for ever. In Epicurus’ saying, pain is “neither unbearable nor eternal” (7.64); men “flee and pursue all

things as though they were to be eternal" (10.34). Lemma: αἰώνιος.

ἀκαριαῖος

Attested: ἀκαριαῖον (*akariaion*; 2.14.1, 3.10, 4.48.2, 5.24, 6.25), ἀκαριαῖος (*akariaios*; 11.18.3). Momentary, lasting no longer than a moment. What is lost at death "is thus shown to be a mere instant" (2.14.1); "each of us lives only this present, this instant" (3.10); "So pass through this instant of time according to nature" (4.48.2); "human life is momentary" (11.18.3). Lemma: ἀκαριαῖος.

ἀπειρία

Attested: ἀπειρίαν (*apeirian*; 11.1.2). Infinity, boundlessness. The rational soul "stretches out into the infinity of eternity" (11.1.2). Lemma: ἀπειρία.

ἄπειρος

Attested: ἀπείρῳ (*apeirōi*; 2.14.2, 10.31), ἀπείρου (*apeirou*; 4.3.3, 12.32), ἄπειρον (*apeiron*; 4.50, 5.13 twice, 5.23, 6.15, 6.37, 9.28 twice, 9.32, 9.35). Without limit, infinite; as a noun, infinity. "The abyss of the infinite eternity on either side" (4.3.3); "the infinity of the past and the future is a yawning gulf" (5.23); "those things will change to infinity, and those again to infinity" (9.28); "what has once changed will no longer be in infinite time" (10.31). Lemma: ἄπειρος.

ἀχάνεια

Attested: ἀχάνειαν (*achaneian*; 12.7). A yawning, a gulf. Among the things to consider is "the yawning gulf of eternity behind and before" (12.7). Lemma: ἀχάνεια.

ἀχανής

Attested: ἀχανές (*achanes*; 4.50, 5.23, 9.32), ἀχανοῦς (*achanous*; 12.32). Gaping, yawning; as a noun, a yawning gulf. "For look behind at the yawning gulf of eternity, and in front at another infinity" (4.50); "how yawning the gulf before birth" (9.32); "the infinite and yawning eternity" (12.32). Lemma: ἀχανής.

ἐφήμερος

Attested: ἐφήμερον (*ephēmeron*; 4.35), ἐφήμερα (*ephēmera*; 4.48.2, 8.25, 9.14), ἐφημέρου (*ephēmerou*; 6.47). Lasting a day, short-lived. "Everything is of a day,

both what remembers and what is remembered" (4.35); "always look at human things as of a day and cheap" (4.48.2); the famous dead are "All of a day, long dead" (8.25); and men such as Menippus, the Cynic satirist, are "perishable and of a day" (6.47). Lemma: ἐφήμερος.

ὀλιγοχρόνιος

Attested: ὀλιγοχρόνια (*oligochronia*; 5.10.1, 7.1), ὀλιγοχρόνιον (*oligochronion*; 10.34, 12.24). Lasting a short time. "All things are both usual and of short duration" (7.1); "And short duration is common to all" (10.34); raised aloft, one would see "the same things, uniformity, short duration" (12.24). Lemma: ὀλιγοχρόνιος.

πάρειμι

Attested: παρόντων (*parontōn*; 1.16.4, 7.27, 8.36), παρόν (*paron*; 2.2, 2.14.1, 2.14.2, 3.10, 3.12, 4.26, 6.2, 6.32, 7.68, 8.2, 8.36, 10.12, 12.1.1, 12.3.2, 12.26), παρούσῃ (*parousēi*; 3.12, 7.54 twice, 10.1), παρῇ (*parēi*; 4.12, 7.27), παροῦσιν (*parousin*; 4.32.1, 7.54), παρόντος (*parontos*; 4.49.1), παρόντας (*parontas*; 6.44.2), παρόντα (*paronta*; 7.8), παρῆν (*parēn*; 7.27), παροῦσα (*parousa*; 9.6 three times), παρεῖναι (*pareinai*; 9.40 twice), παροῦσι (*parousi*; 10.1), πάρεστι (*paresti*; 10.1), παρούσας (*parousas*; 10.12). To be present, be at hand; τὸ παρόν, the present. In time: "For it is only the present that he will be deprived of, since this is all he has" (2.14.2); "neither the future nor the past weighs on you, but always the present" (8.36); "each lives only the present and loses this" (12.26). The participle is "present" with a noun, as in "the present impression" (7.54) and "the present action" (9.6; see Present action); τὸ παρόν is "the work in hand" at 3.12; and at 10.12 the impersonal παρόν is "it is possible". Lemma: πάρειμι.

χάος

Attested: χάος (*chaos*; 4.3.3). A gaping void, an abyss. Against a little fame Marcus sets "the abyss of the infinite eternity on either side" (4.3.3). Lemma: χάος.

χρόνος

Attested: χρόνου (*chronou*; 1.17.2, 2.4, 3.7, 4.6, 4.48.2, 5.10.2, 6.15, 6.18, 6.36, 6.49, 7.29, 7.35, 8.5, 10.1, 11.16, 12.3.2), χρόνῳ (*chronōi*; 2.14.2, 5.23, 6.23, 9.14, 10.31, 12.35), χρόνος (*chronos*; 2.17.1), χρόνον (*chronon*; 3.11.2, 6.25, 7.46 twice, 8.11, 8.44, 9.25, 10.17, 12.17), χρόνων

(*chronōn*; 4.32.2, 8.7). Time, a span of it or the whole. Marcus must perceive "that a limit of time has been set for you" (2.4); "the time a point" (2.17.1); "as you cherish the amount of substance marked off for you, so too with time" (6.49). It is one of the heads under which each thing is analysed: "how long a time does it subsist?" (8.11; also 3.11.2, 9.25, 12.17; see Definition and analysis). Lemma: χρόνος.

See also

Breath; Change; Daimon; Death; Definition and analysis; Fate and allotment; Impression; Justice; Mind and reason; Obstacle and reservation; Pain and pleasure; Present action; Recurrence and repetition; Ruling centre; Soul; Tranquillity.

Whole and part

What sort of part of what sort of whole · Meditations

τὸ ὅλον, to holon, *τὰ ὅλα, ta hola*, "the whole"; *ὅλος, holos*, "whole", "the whole of", "as a whole", "throughout", "all", "wholly", "through and through", "in sum", "in all", "in short"; *ὅλως, holōs*, "in general", "at all", "after all", "in a word", "in sum", "in short", "altogether"; *ὁλόκληρος, holoklēros*, "the entire"; *μέρος, meros*, "part", "fraction", "acts", "particular", "one by one", "for his own part"; *μόριον, morion*, "part"; *μερίζειν, merizein*, "distribute", "portion out"; *ἀπομερίζειν, apomerizein*, "portion off"; *μερισμός, merismos*, "analysing", "portions"; *τὸ πᾶν, to pan*, "the totality", "everything", "wholly"; *σύμπας, sympas*, "all-embracing", "whatever"

At a Glance

The word. Ὅλος is whole, entire; τὸ ὅλον and τὰ ὅλα, "the whole", were for the Stoics the universe. Μέρος, "part", is also a share, from the root of μοῖρα, "lot"; τὸ πᾶν, "the all", names the universe too, and the edition renders it "the totality".

In the *Meditations*. Marcus is to remember "what sort of part it is of what sort of whole" (2.9), and lays down "that I am a part of the whole governed by nature" (10.6.1). From this he draws contentment, for "nothing is harmful to the part that is advantageous to the whole", and from his affinity with the parts of his own kind he draws social action (10.6.1–2). The parts change and the elements submit to the whole; only

the intelligent part can be "disobedient and indignant at its own place" (11.20.1–2).

In this edition. Τὸ ὅλον and τὰ ὅλα, naming the whole, are always "the whole"; μέρος is "part", except "fraction" (12.32), "acts" (12.36) and the idioms with κατά; τὸ πᾶν, where it names the universe, is "the totality", and σύμπας "all-embracing". The idioms τὸ ὅλον, "in sum", and κατὰ μέρος, "one by one", are rendered as the sense requires.

A place to read. 10.6, where Marcus draws from his being a part of the whole his contentment with what is allotted, and from his affinity with the parts of his own kind his social action.

Meaning

Ὅλος (*holos*) is whole, entire, lacking no part. With the article, τὸ ὅλον (*to holon*) or the plural τὰ ὅλα (*ta hola*), it is the whole simply, the universe; Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school, wrote a book *On the Whole*. Μέρος (*meros*) is a share and a part, from the root of μοῖρα (*moira*), "lot" (see Fate and allotment); μόριον (*morion*) is a piece or portion, in Marcus most often a part of the soul (2.12, 4.39, 5.11, 10.8.1). Τὸ πᾶν (*to pan*), "the all", names the universe as well. Sextus Empiricus, the Sceptic physician of the late second century, reports that the Stoics distinguished the two: the whole is the universe, and is limited; the all is the universe together with the void outside it.[353] Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoics' teaching in its seventh book, reports that the Stoic Apollodorus used "the all" in both senses.[354] The rational soul, Marcus says, goes round "the whole universe and the void around it" (11.1.2; see Soul).

Ὅλος comes 127 times, most often in "the nature of the whole" (see Nature), and μέρος 58 times; τὸ δ' ὅλον (*to d' holon*) is the idiom "in sum" (4.26, 9.28).

Use in the book

Marcus is to remember "what sort of part it is of what sort of whole" (2.9; see Nature), and to run to the ruling centre of the whole, "to remember at the same time what you are a part of" (9.22; see Ruling centre). "You have subsisted within, as a part" (4.14; see Mind and reason); "every part of

[353] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* 9.332.

[354] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.143, where Zeno's *On the Whole* is also cited.

me will be posted by change to some part of the universe, and that again will change into another part of the universe, and so on to infinity" (5.13).

What comes to the part is for the whole. "Whatever happens to each is advantageous to the whole. That would be enough" (6.45). "What the nature of the whole brings to each is advantageous to each, and advantageous at the time when she brings it" (10.20). So Marcus is to welcome what comes, "even if it seems rather harsh, because it leads you there, to the health of the universe ... For it would not have brought this to anyone if it did not bring advantage to the whole" (5.8.4).

Chapter 10.6 states the argument whole: "let it be laid down first that I am a part of the whole governed by nature; next, that I stand in some affinity to the parts of one kind with me." From the first: "in so far as I am a part I shall be discontented with nothing allotted from the whole; for nothing is harmful to the part that is advantageous to the whole. For the whole has nothing that is not advantageous to itself", and the nature of the universe "is not compelled even by any cause from outside to generate anything harmful to itself" (10.6.1). From the second comes conduct: "in so far as I stand in some affinity to the parts of one kind with me, I shall do nothing unsocial", and when these things are so brought to their end, life must flow smoothly, like a citizen's who "welcomes whatever the city allots" (10.6.2; see Citizenship). One relation grounds acceptance, the other action, and each holds "in so far as".

The parts change, and change is their service. "For the parts of the whole ... it is necessary to perish; but let this be said as signifying 'to be altered'" (10.7.1; see Change). Both alternatives, that nature undertook to "maltreat her own parts" and that such things escaped her notice, are "unconvincing" (10.7.1). Through its parts changing "the all-embracing universe remains ever young and in its prime" (12.23; see Change). The elements obey: "the elements too submit to the whole, whenever they have been posted somewhere by force" (11.20.1). One part does not: "Is it not terrible, then, that your intelligent part alone should be disobedient and indignant at its own place?" (11.20.2).

The rational part can cut itself off, and alone can return. If all comes from one intelligent spring, "the part must not blame what comes about for the sake of the whole" (9.39; see Providence and atoms). Whoever does not want what

happens and splits himself off makes himself, so far as in him lies, like a hand cut off, “for you grew as a part”; but God has made it open to man “to come back and grow together and take up again the post of a part” (8.34; see Kinship and cooperation). And Marcus tells himself that if he says he is a part, not a limb, μέλος (*melos*), of the system of rational beings, “you do not yet love men from the heart” (7.13; see Kinship and cooperation).

Seen from the whole, the part is small. Marcus is to remember fate, “of which you are how small a part?” (5.24). Considering what fraction of the whole substance, the whole soul and the whole earth is his, he is to “form an impression of nothing as great, except to act as your nature leads, and to be affected as the common nature brings” (12.32; see Time and eternity). And the pair serves as a method: what is neither virtue nor from virtue Marcus is to despise by dividing it into its particular parts, and he is to “carry the same over to the whole of life too” (11.2; see Definition and analysis).

The relation can be read as Marcus’ physics put to ethical use: since the whole has nothing outside it and cannot harm itself, nothing that serves it harms the part, and the only harm left is the one the intelligent part does by refusing its place.

Places to read

The passages where the relation of part and whole is discussed or carries the argument, in the order of the book; every place of ὅλος, ὅλως, ὁλόκληρος, μέρος, μόριον, μερίζειν, ἀπομερίζειν, μερισμός, σύμπας and of τὸ πᾶν used as a noun is given in the sub-entries. Μέλος, “limb”, is given under Kinship and cooperation; the adverbs ὁλικῶς and ὁλοσχερῶς, καθολικός and καθόλου, and the many places of πᾶς, “all”, are left out.

2.3 To every part of nature that is good which the nature of the whole brings and which preserves it; Marcus is a part of the whole universe (see Nature).

2.4 Marcus must at last perceive what universe he is a part of, and of what governor of the universe he is an outflow (see Daimon).

2.9 Marcus must always remember what the nature of the whole is, what his own is, and what sort of part it is of what sort of whole (see Nature).

2.16 To resent anything that happens is to stand apart from nature, in which the natures of each of the rest are contained as parts (see Nature).

3.11.1 Marcus is to define whatever presents itself so as to see it naked, as a whole and in its parts (see Impression).

4.14 Marcus has subsisted within as a part, and will be taken back by change into the seminal reason of what begot him (see Mind and reason).

4.27 Marcus asks whether order can subsist in him and disorder in the totality (see Providence and atoms).

5.8.4 Marcus is to welcome what comes about, even if harsh, as leading to the health of the universe, for it would not have been brought to anyone if it did not bring advantage to the whole.

5.8.5 The entire is maimed if anything at all is cut off from the connection of the parts or of the causes, and Marcus cuts it off, as far as lies in him, whenever he is discontented (see Fate and allotment).

5.13 Every part of Marcus will be posted by change to some part of the universe, and that again to another, and so on to infinity.

5.24 Marcus is to remember the all-embracing substance and eternity, and fate, and asks how small a part of it he is.

5.32 The skilled and knowing soul knows the reason that pervades all substance and manages the totality by appointed periods.

6.40 In things held together by nature the power that made them remains within; for the totality too, what is its own is to its mind (see Nature).

6.42 The governor of the whole will use Marcus as a part of the fellow-workers, but he is not to become such a part as the cheap line in the play (see Kinship and cooperation).

6.45 Whatever happens to each is advantageous to the whole, and that would be enough.

7.13 Whoever calls himself a part, not a limb, of the system of rational beings does not yet love men from the heart (see Kinship and cooperation).

7.19 All bodies pass through the substance of the whole as through a torrent, grown together with the whole and working with it (see Kinship and cooperation).

8.7 A rational nature is a part of the common nature as the leaf's is of the plant's, of a nature unimpeded, intelligent and just, if indeed it makes the portions equal and according to worth (see Assent and judgement).

8.34 Whoever splits himself off makes himself like a hand cut off; he grew as a part, and God has made it open to man alone to grow together again and take up the post of a part (see Kinship and cooperation).

8.35 The nature of rational beings sets every obstacle in its place in fate and makes it a part of itself (see Obstacle and reservation).

8.55 Vice in general does no harm to the universe, and the particular vice harms only the one who has it.

9.22 Marcus is to run to the ruling centre of the whole, to remember what he is a part of (see Ruling centre).

9.39 Either all things happen from one intelligent spring, and the part must not blame what comes about for the sake of the whole, or atoms (see Providence and atoms).

10.6.1 Marcus lays down that he is a part of the whole governed by nature; in so far as he is a part he will be discontented with nothing allotted, for nothing is harmful to the part that is advantageous to the whole.

10.6.2 In so far as he is a part of such a whole Marcus will be well pleased with everything that results, and in so far as he stands in affinity to the parts of his own kind he will do nothing unsocial (see Citizenship).

10.7.1 The parts of the whole must perish, that is, be altered; nature would neither maltreat her own parts nor fail to notice it (see Change).

10.7.2 Even if one leaves nature aside, it is ridiculous at once to say that the parts of the whole are by

nature such as to change and to be astonished or resentful at it as at something contrary to nature.

10.20 What the nature of the whole brings to each is advantageous to each, and at the time when she brings it.

11.1.2 The rational soul goes round the whole universe and the void around it and embraces the periodic rebirth of the whole (see Soul).

11.2 Except for virtue, Marcus is to run to the particular parts and by dividing them come to contempt, and to carry this over to the whole of life.

11.8 A man split off from one man has fallen away from the whole fellowship, but may grow together again and become again one of the parts that complete the whole (see Kinship and cooperation).

11.20.1 The fiery and the earthy in Marcus, though carried by nature up or down, obey the ordering of the whole and are held in the compound; the elements submit to the whole whenever they have been posted somewhere by force.

11.20.2 Marcus asks whether it is not terrible that his intelligent part alone should be disobedient and indignant at its own place.

12.23 The nature of the whole sets the limit of each life, and through its parts changing the all-embracing universe remains ever young (see Change).

12.30 There is one intelligent soul, even if it seems to be divided; the other parts of those mentioned are insensible, but understanding joins with its kindred stock (see Soul).

12.32 Marcus is to consider what fraction of eternity, of the whole substance, of the whole soul and of the whole earth is his, and to think nothing great but to act as his nature leads and to be affected as the common nature brings (see Time and eternity).

12.36 The three acts are the whole drama, for its completion is determined by the one who was the cause of a man’s compounding and now of his dissolution (see Citizenship).

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoics held the whole to be one, and unified within. Diogenes Laertius reports that the universe is one and limited, with infinite void poured round it outside; within it there is no void, but it is unified, ἡνῶσθαι (*hēnōsthai*), as the breathing together and tension of the heavenly things with the earthly require.[355] Marcus' "tensional motion, the breathing together, and the unity of substance" (6.38; see Interconnection) and the "unity according to nature" from which the man who splits himself off, like a severed hand, has been thrown (8.34) can be read in these terms. The universe alone is complete. Balbus, the Stoic speaker in *On the Nature of the Gods*, the dialogue of Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, says that nothing but the universe lacks nothing and is fitted and complete in all its measures and parts. Chrysippus, the school's third head, put it neatly: as a cover is made for a shield and a sheath for a sword, so all things except the universe were made for the sake of others. Man himself, Balbus goes on, was born to contemplate and imitate the universe, in no way complete, but a small part of the complete; the universe, since it embraces all things and there is nothing not in it, is complete in every respect.[356] Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, makes the whole divine: all this in which we are contained is one, and is God, and we are his partners and his limbs.[357] Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, in the discourse in which the Fates spin a man's birth (see Fate and allotment), asks the man who complains of a lame leg whether he does not know how small a part he is in relation to the whole; in body, that is, for in reason he is no worse than the gods and no smaller, since the greatness of reason is judged not by length or height but by its principles.[358] Marcus' "how small a part" (5.24) and his fractions (12.32) can be read beside it, and his intelligent part, which alone can be "disobedient" (11.20.2), beside Epictetus' reason, which is not small. Epictetus' foot that, taken as a part, must step into mud (see Nature), his citizen who refers every impulse to the whole as a hand or foot would (see Citizenship), and the limbs of Cicero's *On Ends*

[355] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.140.

[356] Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.37–38.

[357] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 92.30.

[358] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.12.26.

and *On Duties* and of Seneca's ninety-fifth letter (see Kinship and cooperation) belong to the same teaching.

Other ancient sources

Plato, the Athenian philosopher, argues the part's place in the tenth book of the *Laws*, where the Athenian stranger answers a young man who thinks the gods neglect small things. A doctor charged with treating a whole, who, though willing and able, attended to the large things and neglected the parts and the small ones, would never have the whole in good condition; nor, the masons say, do the large stones lie well without the small. The young man is to be persuaded that by the one who cares for the all everything has been ordered together for the safety and the virtue of the whole, each part, as far as it can, undergoing and doing what befits it; his own portion too, though very small, always strains towards the all and looks to it. All coming to be is for the sake of the all, so that the life of the all may have a happy being; it does not come about for his sake, but he for its sake. For every doctor and every skilled craftsman does all he does for the sake of the all, directing it to the common best, and fashions each part for the whole's sake, never the whole for a part's; but the young man is indignant, not seeing how what is best for him falls out both for the all and for himself, as far as the common coming to be allows.[359] Marcus' Asclepius, the god of healing, whose prescriptions serve health (5.8.1), his squared stones (5.8.2), and his "nothing is harmful to the part that is advantageous to the whole" (10.6.1) can be read as this argument in Stoic terms.

Translation in this edition

Τὸ ὅλον and τὰ ὅλα, singular or plural, are always "the whole" where they name the whole: in "the nature of the whole" (ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις, ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις; see Nature), "the substance of the whole" (6.1, 7.10, 7.19, 9.29), "the reason of the whole" (4.21.1, 7.10, 10.7.2), "the mind of the whole" (5.30), "that which governs the whole" (5.8.5) and the like, and standing alone (4.3.2, 6.45, 10.6.1 and elsewhere); at 2.9 and 10.6.2, without the article, "what sort of whole" and "such a whole". The adjective is "whole" (2.3, 2.17.1, 3.3, 3.4.3, 3.6.1, 4.3.3, 4.31, 4.32.2, 7.60, 8.21, 8.31 twice, 9.19, 9.21, 9.32, 10.27 four times, 11.1.1, 11.1.2, 11.6.2, 11.8 three times, 12.29, 12.32 three times, 12.36), "the whole

[359] Plato, *Laws* 10, 902d–903d.

of” (6.13, 6.46, 7.23, 8.1, 10.17 twice, 11.2, 11.21), “as a whole” (8.36, “life as a whole”), “throughout” (3.7) and “all” (4.3.1, 5.32); predicatively it is “whole” in “died whole” (4.48.1) and “wholly” (4.33, 5.5, 7.58, 9.32, 10.11). Δι’ ὅλου is “through and through” (12.29), and ὅλον δι’ ὅλων “as a whole and in its parts” (3.11.1). As an idiom the neuter is “in sum” (4.26, 4.48.2, 9.28), “in all” (4.50) and “in short” (10.26). The adverb ὅλως is “in general” (2.10, 4.5, 4.6, 5.8.2, 7.1, 9.42.2, 10.33.4, 11.2, 11.8, 11.18.3, 12.27), “at all” (4.49.1, 5.10.2, 6.30.3, 6.47, 7.2, 7.16, 7.24, 8.29, 8.44, 10.16), “after all” (4.33), “in a word” (5.1.1), “in sum” (6.16.4), “in short” (9.40) and “altogether” (11.15). Ὁλόκληρος is “the entire” (5.8.5). Other words of the root are rendered by sense: ὁλικῶς “as a whole” (11.16, 11.18.4), ὁλοσχερῶς “roughly as a whole” (1.7.3), “wholly” (5.36) and “offhand” (9.3.1), καθολικός “most general” and “universal” (6.14), καθόλου “generally” (6.23). “Whole” also renders πᾶς, in “the whole court” (4.3.1), “the whole human race” (4.4, 12.26), “the whole memory” (4.19), “the whole power of breathing” (6.15), “the whole present of time” (6.36) and “its whole subsistence” (9.42.3).

Μέρος is “part” except at 12.32, “fraction”, and 12.36, the “acts” of a play; in phrases with κατά it is “particular” (8.55, 10.17, 11.2), “one by one” (10.29), “for his own part” (9.23) and, at 9.32, “the parts”; ἐν μέρει at 2.16 is “as parts”. Μόριον is always “part”. Μερίζειν is “distribute” (7.29) and “portion out” (9.8), ἀπομερίζειν “portion off” (4.4, 12.32), and μερισμός “analysing” (2.12) and “portions” (8.7). “Part” in the English also renders other words: “in its parts” (11.16), “causal part” and “material part” (8.11, 12.8, 12.29), “things without parts” (9.28; see Providence and atoms), “parts that complete the whole” (11.8), “the part affected” (12.1.1), “the tragic part” (9.29), “the part of a man” (9.2, 9.3.1), “part” in 6.15, and “for their part”, “for your part” (5.1.1, 10.32). Μέλος is “limb” (7.13, 7.19; see Kinship and cooperation). Τὸ πᾶν is “the totality” where it names the universe (4.27, 5.32, 6.40), and elsewhere “everything” (3.9, 12.17, 12.33) and “wholly” (2.11.2). Σύμπας is “all-embracing” (5.24 twice, 6.25, 12.23), and τὸ σύμπαν “whatever” in “nor anything else whatever” (9.30).

ἀπομερίζω

Attested: ἀπομεμέρισται (*apomemeristai*; 4.4, 12.32). To portion off, to assign as a share. The earthy in Marcus “has

been portioned off from some earth" (4.4; see Citizenship); "What fraction of the infinite and yawning eternity has been portioned off to each" (12.32). Lemma: ἀπομερίζω.

μερίζω

Attested: μέρισον (*merison*; 7.29), μεμέρισται (*memeristai*; 9.8). To divide into parts, to distribute. "Divide and distribute the underlying thing into the causal and the material" (7.29); "into the rational, one intelligent soul has been portioned out" (9.8). Lemma: μερίζω.

μερισμός

Attested: μερισμῷ (*merismōi*; 2.12), μερισμούς (*merismous*; 8.7). A dividing; a share. Whoever looks at dying by itself "and by analysing the conception strips away the impressions attached to it" will see it as a work of nature (2.12); the common nature is just "if indeed it makes the portions of times, substance, cause, activity and conjuncture equal and according to worth for each" (8.7; see Assent and judgement). Lemma: μερισμός.

μέρος

Attested: μέρος (*meros*; 2.3, 2.4, 2.9 twice, 2.12, 3.1, 3.4.1, 4.3.2, 4.14, 4.20, 5.13 three times, 5.24, 5.26, 6.42 twice, 7.13, 8.7 three times, 8.24, 8.34, 8.35, 8.55, 9.22, 9.23, 9.32, 9.39, 10.6.1 twice, 10.6.2, 10.11, 10.17, 10.29, 11.2, 11.20.2, 12.32), μέρει (*merei*; 2.3, 2.16, 8.34, 10.6.1, 10.13), μέρη (*merē*; 3.2.1, 7.33, 10.6.1, 10.6.2, 10.7.1, 10.7.2, 12.30, 12.36), μέρεσι (*meresi*; 6.20, 10.7.1), μέρους (*merous*; 8.34, 11.1.1, 11.19), μερῶν (*merōn*; 10.7.1, 12.23). A share; a part of a whole. "I am a part of the whole governed by nature" (10.6.1); "the part must not blame what comes about for the sake of the whole" (9.39); "your intelligent part" (11.20.2). Of time and life, "the part of life that is left to you" (3.4.1); of a play, "the five acts" (12.36). Κατὰ μέρος is "one by one" (10.29) and "particular" (8.55, 10.17, 11.2). Lemma: μέρος.

μόριον

Attested: μόριον (*morion*; 2.12, 4.39), μορίων (*moriōn*; 5.8.5, 10.38), μορίῳ (*moriōi*; 5.11), μορίοις (*moriois*; 5.26), μορίου (*moriou*; 10.8.1). A piece, a part. Of the soul: "in what state that part of man [stands and] is disposed" when he touches God (2.12), "the part that forms opinions about these things" (4.39), "this part which they call the ruling centre" (5.11), "the thinking part" (10.8.1); of the body, the

ruling centre is to “confine those things undergone to the parts” (5.26); of the whole, “as of the parts, so indeed of the causes too” (5.8.5). Lemma: μόριον.

ὁλόκληρος

Attested: ὁλόκληρον (*holoklēron*; 5.8.5). Complete in all its parts, entire. “For the entire is maimed if you cut off anything at all from the connection and continuity” (5.8.5; see Fate and allotment). Lemma: ὁλόκληρος.

ὅλος

Attested: ὅλῳ (*holōi*; 2.3, 3.2.3, 5.8.4, 6.45, 7.19, 10.6.1, 12.23 twice), ὅλου (*holou*; 2.3, 2.9, 2.17.1, 5.30, 6.46, 7.55, 7.60, 7.66, 7.75, 8.5, 8.31, 8.34, 8.36, 9.21, 9.22 twice, 9.28, 9.39, 10.6.1 twice, 10.6.2, 10.7.1, 10.7.2 twice, 10.17, 11.5, 11.8 three times, 11.21, 12.29), ὅλων (*holōn*; 2.9, 2.11.3, 3.4.3, 3.11.1, 4.3.2, 4.21.1, 4.25, 4.26, 4.32.2, 4.36, 5.8.1, 5.10.2, 6.1, 6.9, 7.5, 7.10 twice, 7.18 twice, 7.19, 7.23, 8.6, 8.26, 8.50, 9.1.1 twice, 9.1.2, 9.1.3, 9.29, 9.35, 10.11, 10.20, 11.1.2, 11.13, 11.20.1, 12.23, 12.26), ὅλας (*holas*; 3.3), ὅλης (*holēs*; 3.4.3, 3.6.1, 4.31, 5.32, 7.23, 8.31, 10.17, 11.8, 12.29, 12.32 three times), ὅλον (*holon*; 3.7, 3.11.1, 3.11.2, 4.3.1, 4.26, 4.33, 4.48.2, 4.50, 5.8.5, 6.13, 8.1, 9.28, 9.32, 10.6.1, 10.7.1, 10.11, 10.26, 11.1.2, 11.2, 12.36), ὅλη (*holē*; 4.3.3, 8.21, 11.1.1, 11.6.2), ὅλα (*hola*; 4.46, 5.5, 6.42, 7.25, 9.32, 10.27, 11.18.1), ὅλαι (*holai*; 4.48.1), ὅλος (*holos*; 7.58, 9.19), ὅλην (*holēn*; 10.27 three times), ὅλοις (*holois*; 11.20.1); the adverb ὅλως (*holōs*; 2.10, 4.5, 4.6, 4.33, 4.49.1, 5.1.1, 5.8.2, 5.10.2, 6.16.4, 6.30.3, 6.47, 7.1, 7.2, 7.16, 7.24, 8.29, 8.44, 9.40, 9.42.2, 10.16, 10.33.4, 11.2, 11.8, 11.15, 11.18.3, 12.27). Whole, entire; with the article, “the whole”, the universe. “Whatever happens to each is advantageous to the whole” (6.45); “for nothing is harmful to the part that is advantageous to the whole” (10.6.1); “the elements too submit to the whole, whenever they have been posted somewhere by force” (11.20.1). As an ordinary adjective, “with his whole soul” (3.4.3), “the whole earth is a point” (4.3.3); as an idiom, “In sum, life is short” (4.26). At 11.20.1 A, the Vatican manuscript, has τοῖς ἄλλοις, “the others”, for τοῖς ὅλοις. Lemma: ὅλος.

πᾶς

Attested: πᾶν (*pan*; 2.11.2, 3.9, 5.32, 12.17, 12.33), παντί (*panti*; 4.27, 6.40), with the article, as a noun. All, every; τὸ πᾶν, the all, the universe. The skilled soul knows the reason

that “manages the totality” (5.32); “can a kind of order subsist in you, and disorder in the totality?” (4.27); “And so too, for the totality, what is its own is to its mind” (6.40). Elsewhere τὸ πᾶν is “everything”: “How does the ruling centre use itself? For in this lies everything” (12.33). The adjective’s many other places are not given. Lemma: πᾶς.

σύμπας

Attested: συμπάσης (*sympasēs*; 5.24), σύμπαντος (*sympantos*; 5.24), σύμπαντι (*sympanti*; 6.25), σύμπαν (*sympan*; 9.30), σύμπας (*sympas*; 12.23). All together, all-embracing. “Remember the all-embracing substance, of which you have a very small portion; and the all-embracing eternity” (5.24); “the one and all-embracing thing which we call the universe” (6.25); through the changing of its parts “the all-embracing universe remains ever young and in its prime” (12.23). Lemma: σύμπας.

See also

Assent and judgement; Change; Citizenship; Cosmos and order; Daimon; Definition and analysis; Fate and allotment; Impression; Interconnection; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Nature; Obstacle and reservation; Providence and atoms; Ruling centre; Soul; Time and eternity.

Fellowship and the human world

Anger

Anger at men and the reckonings against it · Meditations

ὀργή, orgē, “anger”, “angers”, “fits of anger”; *ὀργίζεσθαι, orgizesthai*, “be angry”, “get angry”, “angry”, “in anger”; *ἀντοργίζεσθαι, antorgizesthai*, “get angry in return”; *ἀόργητος, aorgētos*, “freedom from anger”; *θυμός, thymos*, “rage”; *θυμοῦσθαι, thymousthai*, “rage”, “raging”, “in a rage”; *ἀγανακτεῖν, aganaktein*, “be indignant”, “indignant”; *ἀγανακτικῶς, aganaktikōs*, “to be indignant”; *χαλεπαίνειν, chalepainein*, “be exasperated”, “exasperated”

At a Glance

The word. Ὀργή is a man’s temper, and from that his anger; ὀργίζεσθαι is to be angry. Θυμός, the hot spirit, gives

θυμοῦσθαι, to rage. Ἀγανακτεῖν is to be indignant, and χαλεπαίνειν to be harsh or exasperated.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus answers anger with reckonings. The wrongdoer is kin and does wrong through ignorance of good and bad (2.1); when Marcus sees with what opinion he did wrong he will pity him (7.26); error has the power of a disease (6.57); and if he listens he can be cured (5.28). The nine heads of 11.18, "gifts received from the Muses", gather these, and for fits of anger Marcus keeps ready the thought "that it is not raging that is manly, but what is mild and gentle" (11.18.5).

In this edition. Ὀργή is "anger" and ὀργίζεσθαι "be angry"; θυμός and θυμοῦσθαι are "rage", kept apart from them; ἀγανακτεῖν is "be indignant" and χαλεπαίνειν "be exasperated", and δυσχεραίνειν (*dyscherainein*) keeps "resent".

A place to read. 11.18, where Marcus sets out nine heads against anger and, if he will, a tenth gift from Apollo, the Leader of the Muses.

Meaning

Ὀργή (*orgē*) is in early Greek a man's temper or mood, and then the anger that breaks out of it; ὀργίζεσθαι (*orgizesthai*) is to be angry, and ἀόργητος (*aorgētos*) free from anger. Θυμός (*thymos*), in Homer the spirit by which a man lives and feels, came to mean hot temper, and θυμοῦσθαι (*thymousthai*) is to rage. Ἀγανακτεῖν (*aganaktein*) is to be vexed or indignant, and χαλεπαίνειν (*chalepainein*), from χαλεπός (*chalepos*), "hard", to be harsh or angry. Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports that the Stoics counted anger a kind of craving, the craving to punish one who seems to have done wrong unfittingly (see Desire and aversion), and defined θυμός as anger beginning.[360] The anger Marcus reasons against is anger at men: a verse of Euripides, the Athenian tragedian, which he quotes twice, says that one must not rage at things, "for they care nothing" (7.38; compare 11.6.1).[361]

[360] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.113–114.

[361] Euripides, fr. 287 Nauck (*Bellerophon*), as the edition's note at 7.38 identifies the verse from Leopold's testimonia.

Use in the book

Book I sets out the model: from his grandfather Marcus Annius Verus, "good character and freedom from anger" (1.1); from Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew, never to show "so much as a sign of anger or of any other passion" (1.9.3). Against these he sets his own record, thanking the gods "that though I was often exasperated with Rusticus I did nothing more that I would have regretted" (1.17.7); Rusticus is Junius Rusticus, the Stoic.

Anger disorders the angry man's own soul. The soul does violence to itself when it goes against a man intending harm, "as the souls of angry men do" (2.16; see Impulse); the motion towards "angers and distresses and fears" is "the mark of one standing apart from nature" (11.20.2); the angry man is "a runaway" (10.25; see Citizenship). Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor, whom Marcus approves, judged offences of rage lighter than those of craving (2.10; see Desire and aversion).

The reckonings against anger turn on error, the wrongdoer's and Marcus' own. The wrongdoer is kin, and "no one will involve me in what is shameful", so Marcus can neither be harmed by him "nor be angry with a kinsman or hate him" (2.1; see Kinship and cooperation). "When someone does you some wrong, consider at once with what opinion of good or bad he did wrong. For when you see this you will pity him, and be neither astonished nor angry" (7.26). Error works like a disease: "Why then am I angry? Or do you think error has less power than bile in the jaundiced and the venom in the man bitten by a mad dog?" (6.57). To be indignant that men do wrong is in a way not to allow them an impulse towards what appears to them proper and advantageous, which is cruel; and if what they are carried towards is not so, "Then teach and show, without being indignant" (6.27). Of the man whose armpits stink: if he listens, "you will cure him, and there is no need for anger" (5.28; see Mind and reason). Nature has given mildness "as an antidote" against the unfair man, and "it is open to you to teach better the man who has gone astray" (9.42.2). When he takes offence at a wrong, Marcus is to reckon the like wrong he does himself, and "you will quickly forget the anger", when with it comes the thought "that he is under constraint" (10.30).

The nine heads of 11.18 gather these reckonings, and others. First, Marcus' relation to men: "we have come to be

for one another", and that he has come to be "to stand at their head, as a ram over the flock or a bull over the herd"; and, from further back, "if not atoms, nature that governs the whole" (11.18.1; see Providence and atoms). Second, what men are like "at table, in the little bed", and "what compulsions of principles they have laid down" (11.18.1). Third, that if they do rightly "one must not be resentful", and if not, "clearly they do so unwillingly and in ignorance". Fourth, "that you yourself also do much wrong and are another such" (11.18.2). Fifth, "that you have not even firmly grasped whether they do wrong". Sixth, "that, when you are very indignant or even take it hard, human life is momentary". Seventh, "that it is not their actions that vex us ... but our opinions. Take away, then, and want to let go, the judgement as about something terrible, and the anger is gone"; it is taken away "by reckoning that it is not shameful" (11.18.3). Eighth, that angers and distresses bring on harder things than their occasions (11.18.4). Ninth, "that kindliness is invincible, if it is sincere and not a grin nor a pretence"; Marcus asks what the most insolent man will do if one continues kindly to him and, if it so happens, teaches him better at the very moment he is trying to do ill: "No, child; we are by nature for something else. I shall not be harmed, but you are being harmed, child." It is to be done "affectionately and without sting in the soul" (11.18.4).

The nine are to be remembered "as gifts received from the Muses", and Marcus is to "begin at last to be a man". Anger and flattery are alike "unsocial and lead to harm", and "ready to hand in fits of anger" is the thought "that it is not raging that is manly, but what is mild and gentle"; anger, like distress, is weakness, "for both have been wounded and have given in" (11.18.5). A tenth gift, "if you will", comes from Apollo: "to expect the base not to do wrong is madness, for it reaches after the impossible; but to allow them to be such towards others and to expect them not to do wrong to you is unfair and tyrannical" (11.18.6; compare 9.42.1).

The heads can be read as a store of reckonings rather than one argument, each aimed at the judgement that makes anger. Several end in teaching (5.28, 6.27, 9.42.2, 11.18.4).

Places to read

Every chapter in which ὀργή, ὀργίζεσθαι, ἀντοργίζεσθαι, ἀόργητος, θυμός, θυμοῦσθαι, ἀγανακτεῖν, ἀγανακτικῶς or χαλεπαίνειν occurs, in the order of the book, by section

where the chapter is divided, with the three sections of 11.18 in which none of them stands (11.18.1, 11.18.2, 11.18.6). Other words of irritation, which the English renders “resent”, “be discontented”, “be annoyed”, “vex”, “take offence”, “be provoked”, “take it hard” and “wrathful”, are left out.

1.1 From his grandfather Verus Marcus has good character and freedom from anger.

1.7.3 From Rusticus Marcus learned to be easily recalled and easily reconciled towards those who have been exasperated or have given offence, as soon as they want to come back.

1.9.3 From Sextus Marcus learned never to show so much as a sign of anger or of any other passion, but to be wholly free from passion and full of affection.

1.15.2 Among the qualities Marcus has from Claudius Maximus, the Stoic, is never raging or looking askance.

1.17.7 Marcus thanks the gods that, though he was often exasperated with Rusticus, he did nothing more that he would have regretted.

2.1 The wrongdoer is kin, so that Marcus can neither be harmed by him nor be angry with him; being indignant and turning away is a kind of working against.

2.10 Theophrastus judges offences committed through rage lighter than those committed through craving, for the man in a rage is more like one wronged first and by distress compelled to rage.

2.16 The soul does violence to itself, second, when it turns away from a man or goes against him intending harm, as the souls of angry men do.

3.16.2 If all men refuse to believe that the good man lives simply, with self-respect and in good spirits, he is exasperated with none of them, nor turned aside from his road.

5.22 What does not harm the city does not harm the citizen; and if the city is harmed, one must not be angry.

5.28 Marcus asks whether he is angry with the man whose armpits stink, and answers that a rational disposition must move a rational disposition: if the

man listens he will be cured, and there is no need for anger.

6.26 Marcus asks whether, if people get angry when he spells out a name, he will get angry in return, and not rather count off each letter mildly; so too every duty is to be completed without resenting in return those who resent.

6.27 To be indignant that people do wrong is in a way not to allow them an impulse towards what appears to them proper and advantageous; if it is not so, Marcus is to teach and show, without being indignant.

6.57 Honey seems bitter to the jaundiced, and Marcus asks why then he is angry, or whether error has less power than bile in the jaundiced.

7.17 To an impression that has come by the old habit Marcus says that he is not angry with it, only it is to go away.

7.26 When someone does wrong, Marcus is to consider at once with what opinion of good or bad he did it, and then he will pity him and be neither astonished nor angry.

7.38 A verse of Euripides says that one must not rage at things, for they care nothing.

7.66 Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, is to be judged by whether he could be content to be just and holy, neither indignant at random at vice nor a slave to anyone's ignorance.

8.8 It is not open to Marcus to read, but it is open to him not to rage at the insensible and the ungrateful, and even to care for them.

9.24 Children's angers and toys, and little breaths carrying corpses, are named so that the Nekyia, the calling up of the dead in the *Odyssey*, strikes one more plainly.

10.8.3 If he perceives that he is falling out and not keeping the mastery, Marcus is to go away into some corner where he will have it, or else go out of life altogether, not in anger but simply, freely and with self-respect.

10.19 Men are to be pictured eating, sleeping and going to stool, and then lording it, being exasperated and

rebuking from on high, who a little before were slaves.

10.25 He who flees the master is a runaway, and the law is master; so too he who is afraid, distressed or angry is a runaway.

10.30 When he takes offence at a wrong, Marcus is to take account at once of the like wrong he does himself, and if he applies himself to this he will quickly forget the anger, when the thought that the man is under constraint comes with it.

11.6.1 Among the things said usefully by the makers of the dramas is the verse of 7.38, here without "one must".

11.9 To be exasperated with those who stand in the way of right action is as weak as to give the action up; both are deserters of their post.

11.13 A man must be seen by the gods disposed to be indignant at nothing and to complain of nothing.

11.18.1 The first head against anger is Marcus' relation to men, who have come to be for one another, and the second what they are like at table and in bed, and what compulsions of principles they have laid down.

11.18.2 The third head is that if men do rightly one must not be resentful, and if not, they do wrong unwillingly and in ignorance; the fourth, that Marcus himself does much wrong.

11.18.3 The fifth head is that Marcus has not firmly grasped whether they do wrong, the sixth that, when he is very indignant, human life is momentary, and the seventh that their actions do not vex us but our opinions, so that to let go the judgement is to end the anger.

11.18.4 The eighth head is that angers and distresses bring on harder things than their occasions, and the ninth that kindliness is invincible if it is sincere, teaching the insolent man affectionately and without sting.

11.18.5 The nine heads are gifts of the Muses; anger and flattery are alike unsocial, and the mild and gentle, not the raging, is manly and has a share in strength.

11.18.6 A tenth gift, from Apollo, is that to expect the base not to do wrong is madness, and to allow them to be such towards others but expect them not to wrong oneself is unfair and tyrannical.

11.20.2 Marcus asks whether it is not terrible that the intelligent part alone should be indignant at its own place; the motion towards angers, distresses and fears is the mark of one standing apart from nature.

12.27 Those who were very indignant at something, or reached their peak in fame, disasters or enmities, are now smoke and ash and a legend, or not even a legend.

Epictetus and the Stoics

One of the discourses of Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, has the title "That one must not be exasperated at wrongdoing", with Marcus' word for exasperation, χαλεπαίνειν. If what the philosophers say is true, that men assent because they feel that a thing is so, and have an impulse towards what they feel is to their advantage, why, he asks, are we still exasperated with the many? "They are thieves and robbers", says an objector; but that means only that they have gone astray about good and bad. "Is one to be exasperated with them, then, or to pity them? Show them their going astray, and you will see how they draw back from their wrongs."[362] Marcus' "you will pity him" (7.26) and "Then teach and show, without being indignant" (6.27) can be read as Epictetus' two answers made into rules for himself. Epictetus finds the cause of the exasperation in the one who feels it: we are exasperated because we admire the things of which the thieves rob us; cease to admire your clothes, and you are not exasperated with the thief. When his own iron lamp was taken, he reckoned that the man who took it had been moved by something not unconvincing, and told himself that tomorrow he would find an earthenware one.[363] Marcus' seventh head, "it is not their actions that vex us … but our opinions" (11.18.3), can be read as the same cause stated as a rule. In the *Handbook* the remedy is to remember, when someone does one harm or speaks badly of one, that he acts in the belief that this is his duty, and can follow not how things look to another but how they look to

[362] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.18 (title) and 1.18.1–4.

[363] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.18.11–12 and 1.18.15.

him; whoever starts from this will bear himself mildly towards the man who reviles him, saying at each thing, “So it seemed to him”.[364] And Epictetus treats anger as a habit to be starved. Whoever would not be irascible must not feed the habit; let him keep quiet at first and count the days on which he was not angry: “Once I was angry daily; now on alternate days, then every third day, then every fourth”; and if thirty pass, let him sacrifice to God.[365]

Translation in this edition

Ὀργή is “anger” (1.9.3, 5.28, 10.30, 11.18.3, 11.18.5), in the plural “angers” (9.24, 11.18.4, 11.20.2), and “fits of anger” for ἐν ταῖς ὀργαῖς (*en tais orgais*; 11.18.5). Ὀργίζεσθαι is “be angry” (2.1, 5.28 twice, 6.57, 7.17, 7.26, 11.18.4, 11.18.5), “angry” in “angry men” (2.16) and “angry” (10.25 twice), “get angry” (6.26), and “not in anger” for the participle μὴ ὀργιζόμενος (*mē orgizomenos*; 10.8.3); the verbal adjective ὀργιστέον (*orgisteon*) is “one must … be angry” (5.22), and the compound ἀντοργίζεσθαι “get angry in return” (6.26). Τὸ ἀόργητον (*to aorgēton*) is “freedom from anger” (1.1). Θυμός is “rage” (2.10), and θυμοῦσθαι “rage” (7.38, 8.8, 11.6.1), “raging” (1.15.2, 11.18.5), “the man in a rage” (2.10) and “compelled to rage” (2.10); θυμός, “rage”, is kept apart from ὀργή, “anger”. Ἀγανακτεῖν is “be indignant” at every place, “very indignant” with λίαν (*lian*), “very” (11.18.3, 12.27), and ἀγανακτικῶς διατιθέμενον (*aganaktikōs diatithemenon*) is “disposed to be indignant” (11.13). Χαλεπαίνειν is “be exasperated” at all five places, and “angry” is kept for ὀργίζεσθαι. So every “anger” and “angry” in the English renders ὀργή or ὀργίζεσθαι, every “rage” θυμός or θυμοῦσθαι, every “indignant” ἀγανακτεῖν and every “exasperated” χαλεπαίνειν. “Wrathful” renders ἐπίκοτον (*epikoton*; 7.24), and “short-tempered” μὴ δυσχεραντικόν (*mē dyscherantikon*; 1.8.2). The neighbouring words keep their own English: δυσχεραίνειν “resent” (“be resentful”, 11.18.2; ἀντιδυσχεραίνειν (*antidyscherainein*) “resenting in return”, 6.26), δυσαρεστεῖν (*dysarestein*) “be discontented” (11.18.5), ἄχθεσθαι (*achthesthai*) “be annoyed” (11.6.1, 11.18.2), ἐνοχλεῖν (*enochlein*) “vex” (11.18.3), προσκόπτειν (*proskoptein*) “take offence” (9.42.1, 10.30), παροξύνεσθαι (*paroxynesthai*) “be provoked” (9.42.2) and δυσπαθεῖν (*dyspathein*) “take it

[364] Epictetus, *Handbook* 42.

[365] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.18.12–13.

hard" (11.18.3). Against them stand πρᾷος (*prāios*) "mild" (11.18.5; "milder", 7.63), πρᾴως (*prāiōs*) "mildly" (6.26, 9.3.2, 11.18.4), πρᾳότης (*prāiotēs*) "mildness" (9.42.2, 11.9) and ἥμερος (*hēmeros*) "gentle" (11.18.5). In the seventh head of 11.18, "will you take it away?" renders ἀρεῖς (*areis*), the correction of Johannes Stich, whose Teubner text appeared in 1882; J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts it for ἀρῶ (*arō*), "shall I take it away", in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed. The last words of the ninth head (11.18.4) do not construe as transmitted, and the English goes as far as they allow.

ἀγανακτέω

Attested: ἀγανακτεῖν (*aganaktein*; 2.1, 11.20.2), ἀγανακτῇς (*aganaktēis*; 6.27, 11.18.3), ἀγανακτῶν (*aganaktōn*; 6.27, 7.66), ἀγανακτοῦντι (*aganaktounti*; 11.18.5), ἀγανακτήσαντας (*aganaktēsantas*; 12.27). To be vexed, indignant. Marcus counts "being indignant and turning away" as "a kind of working against" (2.1); "Then teach and show, without being indignant" (6.27); strength and courage belong to the mild, "not the man who is indignant and discontented" (11.18.5); and Marcus asks whether it is not terrible "that your intelligent part alone should be disobedient and indignant at its own place" (11.20.2). Lemma: ἀγανακτέω.

ἀγανακτικός

Attested: ἀγανακτικῶς (*aganaktikōs*; 11.13). Given to indignation; the adverb with διατίθεσθαι (*diatithesthai*), "to be disposed", is "disposed to be indignant". Marcus writes that "a man must be seen by the gods disposed to be indignant at nothing and to complain of nothing" (11.13). Lemma: ἀγανακτικός.

ἀντοργίζομαι

Attested: ἀντοργιῇ (*antorgiēi*; 6.26). To be angry in return. "What then if they get angry: will you get angry in return?" (6.26; see Duty and fitting action). Leopold reports that A, the Vatican manuscript, lacks the question. Lemma: ἀντοργίζομαι.

ἀόργητος

Attested: ἀόργητον (*aorgēton*; 1.1). Free from anger; with the article, freedom from anger. "From my grandfather

Verus: good character and freedom from anger" (1.1). Lemma: ἀόργητος.

θυμός

Attested: θυμόν (*thymon*; 2.10). Spirit, hot temper; rage. Theophrastus "says that offences committed through craving are graver than those committed through rage" (2.10). Lemma: θυμός.

θυμόω

Attested: θυμούμενον (*thymoumenon*; 1.15.2), θυμούμενος (*thymoumenos*; 2.10), θυμωθῆναι (*thymōthēnai*; 2.10), θυμοῦσθαι (*thymousthai*; 7.38, 8.8, 11.6.1, 11.18.5). In the middle and passive, to be in a rage, to rage. The man in a rage "is seen to turn away from reason with a kind of distress and an unconscious contraction" (2.10); "it is open not to rage at the insensible and the ungrateful" (8.8); "it is not raging that is manly" (11.18.5). At 7.38 and 11.6.1 the word is in a verse of Euripides; at 11.6.1 the verse lacks χρεών (*chreōn*), "one must", which Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, proposed adding. Lemma: θυμόω.

ὀργή

Attested: ὀργῆς (*orgēs*; 1.9.3, 5.28, 10.30), ὀργαί (*orgai*; 9.24, 11.18.4), ὀργή (*orgē*; 11.18.3, 11.18.5), ὀργαῖς (*orgais*; 11.18.5), ὀργάς (*orgas*; 11.20.2). Temper; anger, the passion. If the man listens, "you will cure him, and there is no need for anger" (5.28); "want to let go, the judgement as about something terrible, and the anger is gone" (11.18.3); "as distress is the mark of the weak man, so is anger too" (11.18.5). At 11.20.2 Leopold reports that P lacks "and angers", which the Latin version of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, renders. Lemma: ὀργή.

ὀργίζω

Attested: ὀργίζεσθαι (*orgizesthai*; 2.1, 11.18.5), ὀργιζομένων (*orgizomenōn*; 2.16), ὀργιστέον (*orgisteon*; 5.22), ὀργίζῃ (*orgizēi*; 5.28 twice), ὀργίζωνται (*orgizōntai*; 6.26), ὀργίζομαι (*orgizomai*; 6.57, 7.17), ὀργισθήσῃ (*orgisthēsēi*; 7.26), ὀργιζόμενος (*orgizomenos*; 10.8.3, 10.25 twice), ὀργιζόμεθα (*orgizometha*; 11.18.4). To make angry; in the middle and passive, to be angry. "Are you angry with the man whose armpits stink?" (5.28); "Why then am I angry?" (6.57); "I am not angry with you; only go away" (7.17), to an

impression; and one must guard “equally against being angry with them and flattering them” (11.18.5). At 5.22 “one must not be angry” stands in the manuscripts; the words that follow, “but must show”, are a supplement of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, and in A a new chapter begins with “what is being overlooked”. At 10.25 the step that the angry man “does not will” what is ordered by “him who governs all things” is the correction of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, οὐ βούλεται (*ou bouletai*), for the manuscripts’ ὃ βούλεται (*ho bouletai*). Lemma: ὀργίζω.

χαλεπαίνω

Attested: χαλεπήναντας (*chalepēnantas*; 1.7.3), χαλεπήναντα (*chalepēnanta*; 1.17.7), χαλεπαίνει (*chalepainei*; 3.16.2), χαλεπαίνοντες (*chalepainontes*; 10.19), χαλεπαίνειν (*chalepainein*; 11.9). To be harsh, to be angry or exasperated with someone. Marcus thanks the gods “that though I was often exasperated with Rusticus I did nothing more that I would have regretted” (1.17.7); “For this too is weak, to be exasperated with them” (11.9). At 1.7.3 “easily reconciled” renders εὐδιαλλάκτως (*eudiallaktōs*), the reading of D, the Darmstadt manuscript, and of Xylander, which Leopold prints; P and A have εὐδιαλέκτως (*eudialektōs*), “easy to speak with”. Lemma: χαλεπαίνω.

See also

Assent and judgement; Care and tolerance; Citizenship; Courage and endurance; Desire and aversion; Duty and fitting action; Fault and ignorance; Impulse; Kindness and correction; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Pain and pleasure; Providence and atoms; Soul.

Beneficence

Doing good, and the return it does not seek · Meditations

εὐεργετεῖν, euergetein, “act beneficently”; *εὐεργετικός, euergetikos*, “beneficent”, “beneficence”; *εὐποιητικός, eupoiētikos*, “doing good”; *εὐποιία, eupoiia*, “doing of good”; *εὖ ποιεῖν, eu poiein*, “do good”; *εὖ πάσχειν, eu paschein*, “receive good”, “be done good”; *ἀντευποιεῖν, anteupoiein*, “do good in return”; *χάρις, charis*, “favour”, “thanks”; *ἀχάριστος, acharistos*, “ungrateful”; *εὐχάριστος, eucharistos*, “grateful”; *ὠφελεῖν, ōphelein*, “benefit”;

ὠφέλεια, ōpheleia, "benefit"; *ὠφέλιμος, ōphelimos*, "that benefit"; *ἀμοιβή, amoibē*, "return", "exchanges"; *μισθός, misthos*, "reward"; *χρεώστης, chreōstēs*, "debtor"

At a Glance

The word. Εὐεργετεῖν is to do good service, to act as a benefactor; εὖ ποιεῖν is to do good to someone, and εὐποιία the doing of it. Χάρις is the favour done and the thanks returned for it, and ὠφελεῖν is to benefit.

In the *Meditations*. Man is "by nature beneficent" (9.42.4), and the man who has done good "does not make an outcry, but passes on to another, as a vine passes on to bear grapes again in season" (5.6.2). To seek "a third thing" besides the doing and the receiving of good, repute or a return, is to act "like the fools" (7.73), and whoever blames a man as faithless or ungrateful is himself at fault, for trusting such a man to keep faith or for not giving the favour "conclusively" (9.42.4). The benefit is the benefiter's: "I have done something socially; then I have been benefited" (11.4).

In this edition. Εὐεργετεῖν is "act beneficently" and εὐεργετικός "beneficent", kept apart from εὖ ποιεῖν, "do good", and its noun εὐποιία, "doing of good"; χάρις is "favour", and once "thanks"; ὠφελεῖν is "benefit".

A place to read. 5.6, where three men who do good are compared, the third like a vine that has borne grapes and seeks nothing more.

Meaning

Εὐεργετεῖν (*euergetein*), from εὖ (*eu*), "well", and ἔργον (*ergon*), "work", is to do someone good service; a εὐεργέτης (*euergetēs*) is a benefactor. Εὖ ποιεῖν (*eu poiein*), to do well by someone, is the plainer phrase, with its passive εὖ πάσχειν (*eu paschein*), to be well done by, and the noun εὐποιία (*eupoiia*). Χάρις (*charis*), akin to χαίρειν (*chairein*), "to rejoice", is grace or charm, and then both the favour done and the gratitude owed for it; the ἀχάριστος (*acharistos*) is the man who makes no return. Ὠφελεῖν (*ōphelein*) is to benefit. Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports that for the Stoics the good is benefit, or not other than benefit, and that to benefit is to move or to hold according to virtue.[366] Marcus' words of beneficence name a work of man's nature

[366] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.94, 7.104.

(9.42.4); his words of favour, debt and return name what that work does not seek (5.6.1, 7.73).

Use in the book

Book I gives the models. From his mother, Domitia Lucilla, Marcus has “piety and generosity” (1.3); from Claudius Maximus, the Stoic, “beneficence, readiness to forgive, and truthfulness” (1.15.3). He thanks the gods that “whenever I willed to help someone in poverty or in some other need, I was never told that I had no money to do it with” (1.17.8). From Apollonius, the Stoic whom Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father and predecessor, summoned to Rome to teach him, he learned “how one must receive what pass for favours from friends without being either lowered by them or letting them go by unfeelingly” (1.8.2). Gratitude, as in the wish to die “grateful to the gods from the heart” (2.3; see Nature), is the receiver’s part (see Gratitude).

Doing good is the work men are made for. “In one respect man is the thing most proper to us, in so far as one must do good to them and bear with them” (5.20); until death, what is enough but “to revere the gods and speak well of them, and to do good to men” (5.33)? “Am I doing something? I do it, referring it to the doing of good to men” (8.23). Nature made rational beings “to benefit one another according to worth” (9.1.1; see Justice).

The fullest picture is of three men. “One man, when he has done someone a good turn, is ready also to reckon the favour to his account. Another is not ready for this, but still, privately, as of a debtor he thinks, and knows what he has done. Another in a way does not even know what he has done, but is like a vine that has borne grapes and seeks nothing more once it has borne its own fruit” (5.6.1). So it is with a horse that has run, a dog that has tracked, a bee that has made honey; and “a man who has done good does not make an outcry, but passes on to another”. “One must, then, be among those who do this in a way without attention.” An objector holds that one must keep track of this very thing, “for it is peculiar to the social man, he says, to perceive that he is acting socially”; Marcus grants it, “What you say is true, but you take wrongly what is now being said”, and ends, “if you want to understand what is being said, do not fear that because of it you will leave any social work undone” (5.6.2). The “in a way” can be read as the point: Marcus asks not for

a man unaware of what he does, but for one who keeps no account of it.

The account is named again as a third term. “When you have done good and another has received good, why do you seek a third thing besides these, like the fools: to be thought to have done good as well, or to get a return?” (7.73). The benefiter is himself benefited: “No one tires of being benefited; and benefit is action according to nature. Do not, then, tire of being benefited in benefiting” (7.74); “I have done something socially; then I have been benefited” (11.4). The man who calls himself a part of the system of rational beings, not a limb, does good “barely, as what is seemly, not yet as doing good to yourself” (7.13; see Kinship and cooperation).

The ungrateful man is the test. When Marcus blames a man “as faithless or ungrateful”, he is to turn to himself, “for evidently yours is the wrong, whether you trusted that a man of such a disposition would guard faith, or, in giving the favour, did not give it conclusively, nor so as to have received the whole fruit at once from your very action. For what more do you want when you have done a man good? Is it not enough that you did something according to your nature, but you seek a reward for it? As if the eye demanded a return because it sees, or the feet because they walk.” So man, “being by nature beneficent, whenever he does something beneficent, or otherwise something co-operative in things indifferent, has done what he was made for, and has his own” (9.42.4). And it is open to him “not to rage at the insensible and the ungrateful; besides, to care for them” (8.8).

From the receiver’s side a return is owed. Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, would not go to Perdiccas, king of Macedon, “So that … I may not be ruined by the worst ruin”; “that is, not be unable, having been done good, to do good in return” (11.25). Marcus can be read as leaving the debt with the receiver and forbidding the giver to collect it. Beneficence in the *Meditations* is complete in the act, and its reward is the act itself: the giver “has his own” (9.42.4).

Places to read

Every chapter in which εὐεργετεῖν, εὐεργετικός, εὐποιητικός, εὐποιία, εὖ ποιεῖν, εὖ πάσχειν, ἀντευποιεῖν, χάρις in the sense of favour or thanks, ἀχάριστος, εὐχάριστος, ὠφελεῖν, ὠφέλεια or ὠφέλιμος occurs, in the

order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; every place of μισθός and χρεώστης, and every place of ἀμοιβή but its "exchanges" (10.7.2), falls among them. The preposition χάριν, "for the sake of" (4.32.1, 5.1.1, 7.27), χαρίζεσθαι, "make a gift" (8.44), the words of charm and grace (εὔχαρις, χαρίεις, εὐχαριεντίζεσθαι) and the compound κοινωφελής, "for the common good", are left out.

1.8.2 From Apollonius Marcus learned how to receive what pass for favours from friends, without being lowered by them or letting them go by unfeelingly.

1.14.2 From Severus, usually taken to be Claudius Severus, the Aristotelian philosopher among his teachers, Marcus has, among much else, doing good and readiness to share freely.

1.15.3 From Maximus Marcus has beneficence, readiness to forgive and truthfulness.

1.17.1 It is the gods' doing of good that no combination of circumstances arose to put Marcus to the test.

2.1 Among those Marcus expects to meet at dawn are the ungrateful, whose faults have come upon them through ignorance of good and bad.

2.3 Marcus is to throw away the thirst for books, so as to die not grumbling but serene and grateful to the gods from the heart.

4.12 One of the two readinesses Marcus must always have is to do only what the reason of the kingly and law-giving art suggests for the benefit of men.

4.48.2 Marcus is to pass through his instant of time according to nature and come to rest serene, as a ripe olive might fall, speaking well of her who bore it and giving thanks to the tree that grew it.

5.6.1 Of three men who do someone a good turn, one is ready to reckon the favour to his account, another privately thinks of the other as a debtor, and the third is like a vine that has borne grapes and seeks nothing more.

5.6.2 A man who has done good does not make an outcry but passes on to another, as a vine bears grapes again in season; to the objection that the social man perceives that he acts socially, Marcus answers that what the objector says is true, but that he takes wrongly what is now being said.

5.20 In so far as one must do good to men and bear with them, man is most proper to us; in so far as some stand in the way of one's proper works, he becomes one of the things that make no difference.

5.33 Until his time comes, what is enough is to revere the gods and speak well of them, and to do good to men, to bear with them and to abstain from them.

6.44.2 If the gods take counsel about none of the things that concern us, Marcus may take counsel about himself; his cities are Rome and the universe, and the things that benefit these alone are good for him.

7.13 Whoever calls himself a part, and not a limb, of the system of rational beings is not yet gladdened conclusively by acting beneficently, and does not yet do it as doing good to himself.

7.53 Where it is open to gain benefit through an activity that proceeds according to the constitution, one must look askance at no harm.

7.73 When one has done good and another has received good, Marcus asks why one should seek a third thing besides, to be thought to have done good or to get a return.

7.74 No one tires of being benefited, and benefit is action according to nature; so Marcus is not to tire of being benefited in benefiting.

8.8 It is open to Marcus not to rage at the insensible and the ungrateful, and even to care for them.

8.23 Whatever Marcus does, he does referring it to the doing of good to men.

9.1.1 Nature made rational beings for one another, to benefit one another according to worth and in no way to harm, so that whoever acts unjustly is impious.

9.34 When men think they harm by censuring, or benefit by extolling, it is conceit.

9.42.4 Whoever blames a man as faithless or ungrateful is himself at fault, for trusting such a man to keep faith or for not giving the favour conclusively; man, beneficent by nature, has his

own when he does good, and seeks no reward, as the eye seeks no return for seeing.

11.4 Having done something socially, Marcus has been benefited, and the thought is always to meet him ready to hand.

11.25 Socrates would not go to Perdiccas, so as not to be unable, having been done good, to do good in return.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, asks what man's nature is. A vine fares badly when it acts against its own nature, and so does a man; and man's nature is not "to bite and kick and throw into prison and behead", but "to do good, to work together, to pray for others' good".[367] Marcus' vine (5.6) and his man "by nature beneficent" (9.42.4) can be read as the same comparison. Cicero, the Roman orator and statesman of the first century BC, who says that in *On Duties* he follows chiefly the Stoics, makes beneficence the partner of justice in holding together the fellowship of men (see Justice), and holds that nothing suits man's nature better; but he gives it cautions: it must not harm those it seems to help, or others, must not exceed one's means, and must be given to each according to worth.[368] Of the two kinds of liberality, giving a benefit and returning one, he says that whether we give is in our power, but that a good man may not fail to return, if he can do so without injustice.[369] Marcus' "according to worth" (9.1.1) can be read as Cicero's measure, and Cicero's duty of return as the debt Socrates would not incur (11.25).

Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, gave seven books to benefits, and his rules for the giver are close to Marcus'. The reckoning of benefits, he says, is simple: they are only paid out; if he repays something, that is profit, and if he does not, it is no loss; "I gave in order to give"; nobody writes benefits into a ledger, and a good man thinks of them only when the man who repays reminds him, or else they turn into loans.[370] Between giver and receiver a benefit has one law: the giver must forget it at once, the receiver

[367] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.120–122.

[368] Cicero, *On Duties* 1.6, 1.20, 1.42.

[369] Cicero, *On Duties* 1.48.

[370] Seneca, *On Benefits* 1.2.3.

never.[371] It is proper to a great and good mind to pursue not the fruit of benefits but the benefits themselves, and virtue lies in giving what may never come back, whose fruit a good man has gathered at once.[372] Of the ungrateful man Seneca's giver says, "He has wronged not me but himself; I had the use of my benefit when I gave it", and goes on giving, as the gods persevere with the ungrateful.[373] Marcus' first man, "ready also to reckon the favour to his account" (5.6.1), can be read as keeping the ledger that Seneca forbids, and his "received the whole fruit at once from your very action" (9.42.4) as Seneca's fruit gathered at once.

Other ancient sources

The story at 11.25 is told elsewhere of Archelaus, king of Macedon at the end of the fifth century BC, the son of Perdiccas, as the edition's note observes. Diogenes Laertius says only that Socrates looked down on Archelaus and other rulers, neither accepting money from them nor going to them.[374] Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, in the *Rhetoric* gives the saying as an argument from definition: Socrates would not go to Archelaus, saying that it is an outrage to be unable to requite benefits as one can requite injuries.[375] Seneca reports that Socrates did not wish to go to one from whom he would receive benefits when he could not return equal ones, and argues against it: Socrates could have refused the gifts, and would have given the king more than he got: contempt for gold and silver, or the true cause of an eclipse of the sun, which had sent Archelaus into hiding; the saying, Seneca thinks, was the jest of a man who mocked the powerful, and what Socrates really refused was to go into a voluntary slavery.[376] Marcus takes the saying at its word, and glosses the "worst ruin" as the inability to do good in return.

Translation in this edition

Εὐεργετεῖν is "act beneficently" ("acting beneficently", 7.13), and εὐεργετικός "beneficent" (9.42.4 twice), with "beneficence" for τὸ εὐεργετικόν (*to euergetikon*; 1.15.3);

[371] Seneca, *On Benefits* 2.10.4.
[372] Seneca, *On Benefits* 1.1.12.
[373] Seneca, *On Benefits* 7.31.2, 7.32.1.
[374] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 2.25.
[375] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.23.8, 1398a24–26.
[376] Seneca, *On Benefits* 5.6.2–7.

the Glossary keeps them apart from εὖ ποιεῖν, “do good”, and from χρηστός (*chrēstos*) and χρηστότης (*chrēstotēs*), “kind” and “kindness”. Εὖ ποιεῖν is “do good” at every place (5.6.2, 5.20, 5.33, 7.13, 7.73 twice, 9.42.4), with “done a man good” for εὖ ποιήσας ἄνθρωπον (*eu poiēsas anthrōpon*; 9.42.4); its passive εὖ πάσχειν is “receive good” (7.73) and “be done good” (“having been done good”, 11.25), and ἀντευποιεῖν “do good in return” (11.25). The nouns are εὐποιία, “doing of good” (1.17.1, 8.23), and τὸ εὐποιητικόν (*to eupoiētikon*), “doing good” (1.14.2). “A good turn” (5.6.1) renders τι δεξιόν (*ti dexion*). Χάρις is “favour” (5.6.1, 9.42.4), in the plural “favours” (1.8.2), and “thanks” in χάριν εἰδυῖα (*charin eidyia*), “giving thanks” (4.48.2); the accusative χάριν, used as a preposition, is “for the sake of”, rendered by sense: “for example” for λόγου χάριν (*logou charin*; 4.32.1), “for which” (5.1.1) and “for their sake” (7.27). Ἀχάριστος is “ungrateful” (2.1, 8.8, 9.42.4) and εὐχάριστος “grateful” (2.3). Ὠφελεῖν is “benefit” (7.74, 9.1.1, 9.34), in the passive “be benefited” (7.74, 11.4); ὠφέλεια is “benefit” (4.12, 7.53, 7.74), and ὠφέλιμα (*ōphelima*) “the things that benefit” (6.44.2). Ἀμοιβή is “a return” (7.73, 9.42.4) and “exchanges” (10.7.2), μισθός “a reward” (9.42.4) and χρεώστης “a debtor” (5.6.1). Every “beneficent”, “beneficence” and “beneficently” in the English renders εὐεργετεῖν or εὐεργετικός, every “benefit” a word of the family of ὠφελεῖν, and every “ungrateful” ἀχάριστος; “favour” in “curry favour” (5.5) and “court one another’s favour” (11.14) renders ἀρεσκεύεσθαι (*areskeuesthai*; see Resentment and welcome), and “thanks to whom” (6.12) δι’ ἥν (*di’ hēn*). Words of giving and help outside this family keep their own English: μεταδοτικός (*metadotikos*) “generosity” (1.3), τὸ εὐμετάδοτον (*to eumetadoton*) “readiness to share” (6.48; “readiness to share freely”, with ἐκτενῶς (*ektenōs*), 1.14.2), ἐπικουρεῖν (*epikourein*) “help” (1.17.8). “Conclusively” (7.13, 9.42.4) renders καταληκτικῶς (*katalēktikōs*), “as an end in itself”, as the edition’s note at 7.13 explains.

ἀμοιβή

Attested: ἀμοιβῆς (*amoibēs*; 7.73), ἀμοιβήν (*amoibēn*; 9.42.4), ἀμοιβαῖς (*amoibais*; 10.7.2). Exchange, requital; a return for a service. To seek, besides doing good, “to be thought to have done good as well, or to get a return” is to act “like the fools” (7.73); “As if the eye demanded a return

because it sees, or the feet because they walk" (9.42.4). At 10.7.2 the universe may be "renewed by everlasting exchanges". Lemma: ἀμοιβή.

ἀντευποιέω

Attested: ἀντευποιῆσαι (*anteupoiēsai*; 11.25). To do good in return. Socrates' "worst ruin" is, in Marcus' gloss, "not be unable, having been done good, to do good in return" (11.25). Lemma: ἀντευποιέω.

ἀχάριστος

Attested: ἀχαρίστῳ (*acharistōi*; 2.1, 9.42.4), ἀχαρίστοις (*acharistois*; 8.8). Ungracious; ungrateful. The ungrateful are among those Marcus will meet at dawn (2.1); "it is open not to rage at the insensible and the ungrateful" (8.8); "when you blame a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to yourself" (9.42.4). Lemma: ἀχάριστος.

εὖ πάσχω

Attested: εὖ πεπονθώς (*eu peponthōs*; 7.73), εὖ παθών (*eu pathōn*; 11.25). To be well treated, to receive good. "When you have done good and another has received good" (7.73); "not be unable, having been done good, to do good in return" (11.25). Lemma: εὖ πάσχω.

εὖ ποιέω

Attested: εὖ ποιήσας (*eu poiēsas*; 5.6.2, 9.42.4), εὖ ποιητέον (*eu poiēteon*; 5.20), εὖ ποιεῖν (*eu poiein*; 5.33), εὖ ποιῶν (*eu poiōn*; 7.13), εὖ πεποιηκώς (*eu pepoiēkōs*; 7.73), εὖ πεποιηκέναι (*eu pepoiēkenai*; 7.73). To do good to someone, to do well by him. a man who has done good "does not make an outcry, but passes on to another" (5.6.2); "to do good to men" (5.33); "For what more do you want when you have done a man good?" (9.42.4). At 5.20 "bear with", which follows, is the correction of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts for the manuscripts' ἀνακτέον (*anakteon*). At 7.73 "seek" is ἐπιζητεῖς (*epizēteis*), the correction of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, which Leopold prints, where the manuscripts have ἔτι ζητεῖς (*eti zēteis*), "still seek", to the same effect; Nauck also bracketed "like the fools", which Leopold keeps. Lemma: εὖ ποιέω.

εὐεργετέω

Attested: εὐεργετεῖν (*euergetein*; 7.13). To do good service, to act beneficently. Whoever calls himself a part, not a limb, of the system of rational beings finds that "acting beneficently does not yet gladden you conclusively" (7.13). There "conclusively" is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, καταληκτικῶς, which Leopold prints for the manuscripts' καταληπτικῶς (*katalēptikōs*), "with a firm grasp"; at 9.42.4 καταληκτικῶς stands in the manuscripts. Lemma: εὐεργετέω.

εὐεργετικός

Attested: εὐεργετικόν (*euergetikon*; 1.15.3, 9.42.4), εὐεργετικός (*euergetikos*; 9.42.4). Disposed to do good, beneficent; with the article, beneficence. From Maximus, "beneficence, readiness to forgive, and truthfulness" (1.15.3); man, "being by nature beneficent, whenever he does something beneficent … has done what he was made for" (9.42.4). At 1.7.1 Leopold reports εὐεργετικόν, "the benefactor", in the manuscripts, and prints Xylander's ἐνεργητικόν (*energētikon*), "the man of action". Lemma: εὐεργετικός.

εὐποιητικός

Attested: εὐποιητικόν (*eupoiētikon*; 1.14.2). Disposed to do good; with the article, doing good. From Severus, "doing good, and readiness to share freely" (1.14.2). Lemma: εὐποιητικός.

εὐποιία

Attested: εὐποιία (*eupoiia*; 1.17.1), εὐποιίαν (*eupoiian*; 8.23). The doing of good. "And it is the gods' doing of good that no combination of circumstances arose to put me to the test" (1.17.1); "I do it, referring it to the doing of good to men" (8.23). Lemma: εὐποιία.

εὐχάριστος

Attested: εὐχάριστος (*eucharistos*; 2.3). Grateful. Marcus is to throw away the thirst for books, "so that you do not die grumbling, but serene, truly, and grateful to the gods from the heart" (2.3). Lemma: εὐχάριστος.

μισθός

Attested: μισθόν (*misthon*; 9.42.4). Wages, a reward. “Is it not enough that you did something according to your nature, but you seek a reward for it?” (9.42.4). Lemma: μισθός.

χάρις

Attested: χάριτας (*charitas*; 1.8.2), χάριν (*charin*; 4.48.2, 5.6.1, 9.42.4). Grace; a favour done, and the thanks owed for it. Apollonius taught “how one must receive what pass for favours from friends” (1.8.2); the ripe olive falls “giving thanks to the tree that grew it” (4.48.2); one man is “ready also to reckon the favour to his account” (5.6.1); and the giver who blames the ungrateful may have failed, “in giving the favour”, to give it “conclusively” (9.42.4). The accusative χάριν also serves as a preposition, “for the sake of” (4.32.1, 5.1.1, 7.27). Lemma: χάρις.

χρεώστης

Attested: χρεώστου (*chreōstou*; 5.6.1). A debtor. The second man does not reckon the favour aloud, “but still, privately, as of a debtor he thinks, and knows what he has done” (5.6.1). Lemma: χρεώστης.

ὠφέλεια

Attested: ὠφελείᾳ (*ōpheleiāi*; 4.12), ὠφελείας (*ōpheleias*; 7.53), ὠφέλεια (*ōpheleia*; 7.74). Help, benefit. Marcus is to do only what reason suggests “for the benefit of men” (4.12); “benefit is action according to nature” (7.74). Lemma: ὠφέλεια.

ὠφελέω

Attested: ὠφελούμενος (*ōpheloumenos*; 7.74 twice), ὠφελεῖς (*ōpheleis*; 7.74), ὠφελεῖν (*ōphelein*; 9.1.1, 9.34), ὠφέλημαι (*ōphelēmai*; 11.4). To help, to benefit. “Do not, then, tire of being benefited in benefiting” (7.74); rational beings are made “to benefit one another according to worth and in no way to harm” (9.1.1; see Justice); “I have done something socially; then I have been benefited” (11.4). Lemma: ὠφελέω.

ὠφέλιμος

Attested: ὠφέλιμα (*ōphelima*; 6.44.2). Useful, beneficial. “So the things that benefit these cities are alone good for me” (6.44.2). Lemma: ὠφέλιμος.

See also

Anger; Common advantage; Gratitude; Human work; Justice; Kindness and correction; Kinship and cooperation; Nature; Reputation and praise; Resentment and welcome.

Care and tolerance

Caring for men and bearing with them · Meditations

κήδεσθαι, kēdesthai, "care for"; *προκήδεσθαι, prokēdesthai*, "takes care for"; *κηδεμονικῶς, kēdemonikōs*, "caring"; *ἐπιμέλεια, epimeleia*, "care", "forms of care"; *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, epimeleisthai*, "care for", "take care of"; *ἐπιμελητικός, epimelētikos*, "care"; *μέλει, melei*, "care for", "care nothing", "no concern"; *ἀμελεῖν, amelein*, "cares nothing for", "neglected", "neglecting"; *ἀνέχεσθαι, anechesthai*, "bear with", "put up with", "forbearance"; *ἀνεκτικός, anektikos*, "forbearance"; *φέρειν, pherein*, "tolerate"

At a Glance

The word. Κήδεσθαι is to be concerned for someone, to care for him; ἐπιμέλεια, built on μέλει, "it is a care", is the pains given to a thing. Ἀνέχεσθαι, the middle voice of ἀνέχειν (*anechein*), "to hold up", is to hold oneself up under someone or something: to bear with a person, to put up with a thing.

In the *Meditations*. The good man remembers "that to care for all men is according to man's nature" (3.4.4), and forbearance is "a part of justice" (4.3.2). The pattern is the gods, who bear with the base through so long an eternity "and besides they even care for them in all sorts of ways" (7.70). It is open to Marcus even to care for the ungrateful (8.8).

In this edition. Κήδεσθαι is "care for" at all four of its places; ἀνέχεσθαι is "bear with", "put up with" and once "forbearance"; ἐπιμέλεια and ἐπιμελεῖσθαι are "care", "care for" and "take care of"; φέρειν, where its object is a person, is "tolerate".

A place to read. 7.70, where Marcus sets the immortal gods, who bear with base men and even care for them, against himself, about to cease and one of the base.

Meaning

Κήδεσθαι (*kēdesthai*) is to be troubled on someone's behalf, and so to care for him. Προκήδεσθαι (*prokēdesthai*), with πρό (*pro*), "on behalf of", is to take thought for another, and κηδεμονικῶς (*kēdemonikōs*) is with a guardian's care. Ἐπιμέλεια (*epimeleia*) and its verb ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (*epimeleisthai*) are built on the impersonal μέλει (*melei*), "it is a care to"; ἀμελεῖν (*amelein*), with the negative prefix, is to neglect. Ἀνέχεσθαι (*anechesthai*) is to endure a thing or bear with a person, and ἀνεκτικός (*anektikos*) is disposed to bear with. In Marcus the words divide by their objects. Κήδεσθαι and προκήδεσθαι have men for their object at all five places, and at three of them men who are base, ungrateful or of other principles (7.70, 8.8, 9.3.2). Ἐπιμέλεια and its kin are used of the body (1.16.5, 12.3.1), of oneself (1.17.4), of the vine and the dog (6.16.3) and of what is both useful and good (8.10).

Use in the book

Care is a principle of nature. The good man of 3.4 "remembers too that everything rational is kin, and that to care for all men is according to man's nature; but that one must hold to the repute given not by all, but only by those who live in agreement with nature" (3.4.4; see Reputation and praise). The sentence divides care from regard: care is owed to every man, deference to his opinion is not. The daimon within does the same: it "has subjected itself to the gods and takes care for men" (3.6.2; see Daimon).

The gods give the pattern. "The gods, who are immortal, do not resent that in so long an eternity they will have to bear with, altogether and always, so many base people of such a kind; and besides they even care for them in all sorts of ways. But you, who are on the point of ceasing, do you give up, and that when you are one of the base?" (7.70). The argument runs from the greater to the less: the gods must bear with men for an eternity, Marcus only for the little while before he ceases, and what they bear with is what he is. The word "besides" adds care to bearing with.

Forbearance belongs to justice. Against resentment at "the vice of men" Marcus is to reckon up "that rational living beings have come to be for one another, and that forbearance is a part of justice, and that they do wrong unwillingly" (4.3.2; see Justice). Bearing with goes beside doing good: "In one respect man is the thing most proper to

us, in so far as one must do good to them and bear with them" (5.20; see Obstacle and reservation), where "bear with" is the correction of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts for the manuscripts' ἀνακτέον (*anakteon*). Until his time comes, Marcus asks, what is enough? "What else but to revere the gods and speak well of them, and to do good to men, and to bear with them and to abstain from them" (5.33; see Temperance and self-mastery). It is not easy: of those who live alongside one "it is hard to bear with even the most refined, not to say that one can hardly endure even oneself" (5.10.1).

Care goes further, and reaches those who least deserve it. When reading is not open, it is still open "not to rage at the insensible and the ungrateful; besides, to care for them" (8.8; see Beneficence). Men are to be taught or borne: "either teach, then, or tolerate" (8.59; see Kinship and cooperation). Of the men from whom death will release him, who do not share his principles, Marcus writes, "one must not take offence at them at all, but even care for them and tolerate them mildly" (9.3.2; see Death). Book I has a model in Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew, with his "forbearance towards the unlearned and towards those who hold opinions without thinking" (1.9.1; see Kindness and correction); and in Book VI Marcus recalls of Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, "how he tolerated those who blamed him unjustly, not blaming them in return" (6.30.3), and "his bearing with ⟨those⟩ who frankly opposed his views" (6.30.4).

Bearing with is not to be shown off. Marcus is ready to show the man who despises him what is overlooked, "not reproachfully, nor as displaying that I bear with it, but sincerely and with kindness" (11.13; see Kindness and correction). Body and breath are his "so far as one must take care of them" (12.3.1; see Mind and reason); the book sets no such limit to the care of men. Care and tolerance in the *Meditations* are the gods' way with men, owed to all, kept apart from any regard for their opinion, and practised by a man who counts himself among those who are borne with.

Places to read

Every chapter in which κήδεσθαι, προκήδεσθαι, κηδεμονικῶς, ἐπιμέλεια, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελητικός (*epimelētikos*), μέλει, ἀμελεῖν, ἀνέχεσθαι or ἀνεκτικός

occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with the places where φέρειν (*pherein*) is to tolerate a person (6.30.3, 8.59, 9.3.2, 10.15). Κηδεύειν (*kēdeuein*), "buried" (4.48.2), and ἀνεκτός (*anektos*), "bearable" and "supportable" (6.12, 10.3; see Courage and endurance), are left out.

1.6 From Diognetus, his painting master, Marcus learned, among other things, to put up with frankness.

1.9.1 From Sextus Marcus had kindliness, a caring eye for friends, and forbearance towards the unlearned and towards those who hold opinions without thinking.

1.16.5 His father took a measured care of his own body, not as one in love with life, nor for show, nor yet neglectfully.

1.17.4 Among the gifts of the gods Marcus counts a brother able by his character to rouse him to take care of himself.

2.11.1 If there are no gods, or they do not care for human affairs, Marcus asks what it is to him to live in a universe empty of gods or of providence.

2.11.2 But the gods do exist, and they do care for human affairs.

3.3 If death leads into absence of sensation, Marcus will cease to put up with pains and pleasures and to slave for the body.

3.4.2 Marcus is to accustom himself to form only such impressions as would show that everything belongs to a social living being who cares nothing for self-indulgent imaginings.

3.4.4 The good man remembers that everything rational is kin and that to care for all men is according to man's nature, but holds to the repute given only by those who live in agreement with nature.

3.6.2 If nothing appears better than the daimon within, which has subjected itself to the gods and takes care for men, Marcus is to give room to nothing else.

3.7 Whether his soul is to stay in the body for a longer time or a shorter is no concern of the man who has chosen his own mind and daimon before all else.

3.14 Marcus is to let empty hopes go and come to his own help, if he cares for himself at all, while it is open to him.

4.3.2 Against resentment at the vice of men Marcus is to reckon up that rational beings have come to be for one another, that forbearance is a part of justice, and that men do wrong unwillingly.

5.10.1 Of those who live alongside one it is hard to bear with even the most refined, and one can hardly endure even oneself.

5.15 The more a man strips himself of what does not fall to a man as a man, or even puts up with being stripped of it, the better he is.

5.20 Man is most proper to us in so far as one must do good to men and bear with them; in so far as some stand in the way of one's proper works, he becomes one of the things that make no difference.

5.33 Marcus asks what is enough until his time comes, and answers: to revere the gods and speak well of them, to do good to men, to bear with them and to abstain from them.

6.10 If all is a jumble, an intertwining and a scattering, Marcus asks why he should even care for anything else than how one day to become earth.

6.16.2 What is to be honoured is to move and to hold still according to one's own constitution, to which both the forms of care and the crafts lead.

6.16.3 The man who cares for the vine and the man who cares for the dog, like the colt-breaker, seek that what they tend should be fit for its work.

6.30.3 Antoninus tolerated those who blamed him unjustly, not blaming them in return.

6.30.4 Antoninus bore with men who frankly opposed his views, and rejoiced if someone pointed out what was better.

7.38 In a verse of Euripides, the Athenian tragic poet, one must not rage at things, for they care nothing.

7.41 In a verse of Euripides, if a man and his two sons have been neglected by the gods, there is reason in this too.

7.70 The immortal gods bear with base men through so long an eternity and even care for them; Marcus asks whether he, on the point of ceasing and one of the base, gives up.

8.8 When it is not open to read, it is still open not to rage at the insensible and the ungrateful, and even to care for them.

8.10 The useful must be something good, and the honourable and good man is to take care of it; no such man regrets having let a pleasure pass.

8.19 Each thing has come to be for something; Marcus asks for what he has come to be, whether to feel pleasure, and is to see whether the conception puts up with it.

8.59 Men have come to be for the sake of one another, so Marcus is either to teach them or to tolerate them.

9.1.2 He who lies unwillingly had received resources from nature, and by neglecting them he is now unable to distinguish what is false from what is true.

9.3.2 One must not take offence at men but care for them and tolerate them mildly, remembering that death will not be a release from men who share one's principles.

10.15 Men are to see a true man living according to nature; if they do not tolerate him, let them kill him, for that is better than to live so.

11.6.1 Among the things said usefully by the makers of tragedies is the verse that, if a man and his two sons have been neglected by the gods, there is reason in this too.

11.13 Marcus is ready to show the man who despises him what is overlooked, not reproachfully, nor as displaying that he bears with it, but sincerely and with kindness.

11.20.2 The intelligent part alone does not put up with what is according to nature for it, but is carried the opposite way.

12.3.1 Of poor body, little breath and mind, the first two are Marcus' so far as he must take care of them; the mind alone is properly his.

12.5 If the gods are most good and most just, they would not have allowed anything in the world-order to be left neglected unjustly and without reason.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, gives care for all men to the Cynic. Asked how the Cynic, if he does not marry and raise children, will keep up the fellowship of men, he answers that whoever oversees all men does them more good than one who brings two or three ugly-snouted children into the world, and that the Cynic has fathered all men, having the men for sons and the women for daughters; so he goes up to all, so he cares for all, πάντων κήδεται (*pantōn kēdetai*). If he rails at those he meets, Epictetus asks, is it out of meddling? He does it in the way of a father and a brother, and as servant of Zeus, the common father.[377] Of Diogenes of Sinope, the Cynic of the fourth century BC, Epictetus asks whether a man so mild and humane that he gladly took on toil and bodily hardship for the good men share loved no one. He loved, comes the answer, as a servant of Zeus should: caring for men, κηδόμενος (*kēdomenos*), and at the same time placed under God.[378] Marcus' daimon, which "has subjected itself to the gods and takes care for men" (3.6.2), can be read as the same pair. At the end of the discourse that bears the title "On friendship" (see Friendship), Epictetus gives forbearance to the man who, wanting to be a friend, has cut out the principles that set good and bad in outward things. He will be at peace with himself, and then a friend to others: simply to the man like him, and to the man unlike him forbearing, ἀνεκτικός (*anektikos*), mild, gentle and ready to forgive, as towards one ignorant and astray about the greatest things, hard on no one, because he knows the saying of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, that every soul is deprived of truth unwillingly (see Soul).[379] It is the word of the "forbearance" Marcus learned from Sextus (1.9.1). Epictetus also bids a son take care of his father, give way to him in everything and bear with him when he reviles

[377] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.22.77 and 3.22.81–82.

[378] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.24.64–65.

[379] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.22.34–36.

and strikes (see Duty and fitting action), and Aulus Gellius, the Roman writer of the second century, heard from Favorinus of Arelate, the philosopher and orator, his two words ἀνέχου (*anechou*), "bear with", and ἀπέχου (*apechou*), "abstain" (see Temperance and self-mastery).[380]

Translation in this edition

Κήδεσθαι is "care for" at all four of its places (3.4.4, 7.70, 8.8, 9.3.2), and προκήδεσθαι "takes care for" (3.6.2). Κηδεμονικῶς is "caring" in "a caring eye for friends" (1.9.1), and κηδεύσας (*kēdeusas*), from κηδεύειν, is "buried" (4.48.2). Ἐπιμέλεια is "care" in "to take care of myself" (1.17.4) and "the forms of care" (6.16.2); ἐπιμελεῖσθαι is "cares for" (6.16.3 twice) and "take care of" (12.3.1), with "is to take care of" for the verbal adjective ἐπιμελητέον (*epimelēteon*; 8.10); τὸ ἐπιμελητικόν (*to epimelētikon*) is "care" (1.16.5). The impersonal μέλει is "care for" (2.11.1, 2.11.2, 3.14, 6.10), "care nothing" with the negative (7.38) and "no concern of his" (3.7). Ἀμελεῖν is "cares nothing for" (3.4.2), "have been neglected" (7.41, 11.6.1), "left neglected" (12.5) and "neglecting" (9.1.2). "Neglectfully" (1.16.5) renders ὀλιγώρως (*oligōrōs*), which is "make light of" at 1.13, and "neglecting" at 4.32.2 renders ἀφέντας (*aphentas*), "letting go". Every "care", "cares" and "caring" in the English renders a word of this group; "carefully" (1.7.3) renders ἀκριβῶς (*akribōs*). Ἀνέχεσθαι is "bear with" where its object is a person (5.10.1, 5.20, 5.33, 6.30.4, 7.70), and "put up with" where it is a thing (1.6, 3.3, 5.15, 8.19, 11.20.2), as the Glossary records, and once, at 4.3.2, "forbearance". At 11.13, where the Greek has no object, ἀνέχομαι (*anechomai*) is "bear with it". Ἀνεκτικός, with the article, is "forbearance" (1.9.1), and ἀνεκτός "bearable" (6.12) and "supportable" (10.3; see Courage and endurance). Φέρειν, where its object is a person, is "tolerate" (6.30.3, 8.59, 9.3.2, 10.15; see Courage and endurance), and "tolerate" renders no other word; "endure" at 5.10.1 renders ὑπομένειν (*hypomenein*), and "patient" at 6.30.4 μακρόθυμος (*makrothymos*).

ἀμελέω

Attested: ἀμελοῦντος (*amelountos*; 3.4.2), ἠμελήθην (*ēmelēthēn*; 7.41, 11.6.1), ἀμελήσας (*amelēsas*; 9.1.2), ἠμελημένον (*ēmelēmenon*; 12.5). To have no care for, to neglect. Everything is to be plain as belonging to a social

[380] Epictetus, *Handbook* 30; Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 17.19.5–6.

living being “who cares nothing for pleasurable or, in a word, self-indulgent imaginings” (3.4.2); in a verse of Euripides, “But if I and my two sons have been neglected by the gods, / there is reason in this too” (7.41, 11.6.1); the man who lies unwillingly had resources from nature, “and by neglecting them he is now unable to distinguish what is false from what is true” (9.1.2); and if the gods are most good and most just, “they would not have allowed anything in the world-order to be left neglected unjustly and without reason” (12.5). Lemma: ἀμελέω.

ἀνεκτικός

Attested: ἀνεκτικόν (*anektikon*; 1.9.1). Disposed to bear with; with the article, forbearance. From Sextus, “forbearance towards the unlearned and towards those who hold opinions without thinking” (1.9.1; see Kindness and correction). Lemma: ἀνεκτικός.

ἀνέχω

Attested: ἀνέχεσθαι (*anechesthai*; 1.6, 4.3.2, 5.33, 6.30.4, 7.70), ἀνεχόμενος (*anechomenos*; 3.3), ἀνασχέσθαι (*anaschesthai*; 5.10.1), ἀνέχηται (*anechētai*; 5.15), ἀνεκτέον (*anekteon*; 5.20), ἀνέχεται (*anechetai*; 8.19, 11.20.2), ἀνέχομαι (*anechomai*; 11.13). In the middle voice, to hold oneself up under, to endure; of a person, to bear with him; of a thing, to put up with it. Of persons: “forbearance is a part of justice” (4.3.2); “in so far as one must do good to them and bear with them” (5.20); “to do good to men, and to bear with them and to abstain from them” (5.33); the gods “will have to bear with, altogether and always, so many base people of such a kind” (7.70). Of things: “to put up with frankness” (1.6); “you will cease to put up with pains and pleasures” (3.3); “See whether the conception puts up with it” (8.19). At 5.20 ἀνεκτέον is Xylander’s correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ ἀνακτέον. At 5.15 “being stripped” is ἀφαιρούμενος (*aphairoumenos*), the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints, for ἀφαιρούμενα (*aphairoumena*) in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed. At 8.19 A, the Vatican manuscript, has ἂν ἔχεται (*an echetai*) for εἰ ἀνέχεται (*ei anechetai*). Lemma: ἀνέχω.

ἐπιμέλεια

Attested: ἐπιμέλειαν (*epimeleian*; 1.17.4), ἐπιμέλειαι (*epimeleiai*; 6.16.2). Care, the pains given to a thing. Among the gifts of the gods, a brother "able by his character to rouse me to take care of myself" (1.17.4); what is to be honoured is to move and hold still according to one's own constitution, "to which both the forms of care and the crafts lead" (6.16.2). Lemma: ἐπιμέλεια.

ἐπιμελέομαι

Attested: ἐπιμελούμενος (*epimeloumenos*; 6.16.3 twice), ἐπιμελητέον (*epimelēteon*; 8.10), ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (*epimeleisthai*; 12.3.1). To take care of, to tend. Every craft aims at fitness for a work, "and the planter ⟨and⟩ the man who cares for the vine, and the colt-breaker and the man who cares for the dog, seek this" (6.16.3), where the bracketed "and" is Leopold's own supplement; "the useful must be something good, and the honourable and good man is to take care of it" (8.10), where the order "the useful … something good" is that of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, which Leopold prints, and the manuscripts have "the good must be something useful"; body and breath "are yours so far as one must take care of them" (12.3.1; see Mind and reason). Lemma: ἐπιμελέομαι.

ἐπιμελητικός

Attested: ἐπιμελητικόν (*epimelētikon*; 1.16.5). Careful of a thing; with the article, care. In his father "a measured care of his own body, not as one in love with life, nor for show, nor yet neglectfully" (1.16.5; see Body and flesh). Lemma: ἐπιμελητικός.

κηδεμονικός

Attested: κηδεμονικῶς (*kēdemonikōs*; 1.9.1). Careful as a guardian is; the adverb, with a guardian's care. From Sextus, "a caring eye for friends" (1.9.1), where the adverb goes with τὸ στοχαστικὸν τῶν φίλων (*to stochastikon tōn philōn*), attentiveness to friends. Lemma: κηδεμονικός.

κήδομαι

Attested: κήδεσθαι (*kēdesthai*; 3.4.4, 8.8, 9.3.2), κήδονται (*kēdontai*; 7.70). To be concerned for, to care for, with the person in the genitive: "to care for all men is according to man's nature" (3.4.4); the gods "even care for them in all

sorts of ways" (7.70); "besides, to care for them" (8.8); "but even care for them and tolerate them mildly" (9.3.2). At 7.70 D, the Darmstadt manuscript, has the sentence with God in the singular: God, being immortal, does not resent bearing with so many base men, but even cares for them, κήδεται (*kēdetai*), in all sorts of ways. Lemma: κήδομαι.

μέλω

Attested: μέλει (*melei*; 2.11.1, 2.11.2, 3.7, 3.14, 6.10, 7.38). In the impersonal μέλει, "it is a care to", with the person in the dative and the thing in the genitive: to care for, to be a concern. Marcus asks what it is to him to live in a universe empty of gods or of providence, "if either there are none, or they do not care for human affairs" (2.11.1); "But they do exist, and they do care for human affairs" (2.11.2; see Gods); "come to your own help, if you care for yourself at all" (3.14); if all is a jumble, "And why do I even care for anything else than how, some day, 'to become earth'?" (6.10), the last words being Homer's; the length of the soul's stay in the body "is no concern of his at all" (3.7); and things, in a verse of Euripides, "care nothing" (7.38). Lemma: μέλω.

προκήδομαι

Attested: προκηδομένου (*prokēdomenou*; 3.6.2). To take thought for another, to care for. The daimon enshrined within "has subjected itself to the gods and takes care for men" (3.6.2; see Daimon). Lemma: προκήδομαι.

See also

Beneficence; Body and flesh; Courage and endurance; Daimon; Death; Duty and fitting action; Friendship; Gods; Justice; Kindness and correction; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Obstacle and reservation; Reputation and praise; Soul; Temperance and self-mastery.

Citizenship

Rome and the city of the universe · Meditations

πόλις, polis, "city"; *πολίτης, politēs*, "citizen"; *πολιτικός, politikos*, "civic"; *πολίτευμα, politeuma*, "polity"; *πολιτεία, politeia*, "state", "commonwealth", "Republic"; *πολιτεύεσθαι, politeuesthai*, "have been a citizen"; *συμπολιτεύεσθαι, sympoliteuesthai*, "share citizenship"; *πατρίς, patris*, "fatherland", "country"; *ἰσόνομος, isonomos*, "with the same

laws for all", "under the same law"; *ἰσηγορία, isēgoria*, "equal freedom of speech"; *ἀπόσχισμα, aposchisma*, "a piece split off"; *φυγάς, phygas*, "fugitive"; *δραπέτης, drapetēs*, "runaway"; *στασιώδης, stasiōdēs*, "seditious"

At a Glance

The word. Πόλις is the city, the community of its citizens, πολῖται; πολιτικός is what belongs to the city and the citizen, and πολίτευμα and πολιτεία its polity. The Stoics called the universe a city of gods and men.

In the *Meditations*. The universe is "as it were a city" (4.3.2, 4.4), "the highest city, of which the other cities are like households" (3.11.2), and Marcus has two cities: "for me as Antoninus, Rome; as a man, the universe" (6.44.2). Nothing harms the citizen that does not harm the city, nor the city that does not harm law (5.22, 10.33.4); the fugitive flees civic reason, the runaway the law (4.29, 10.25); and the book ends with nature sending the citizen away from "this great city" (12.36).

In this edition. Πόλις is always "city", πολίτης "citizen", πολιτικός "civic" and πολίτευμα "polity"; πολιτεία is "state" (1.14.1), "commonwealth" (2.16, 9.9.2) and, for Plato's book, "Republic" (9.29). Πατρίς is "fatherland", once "country" (3.16.1).

A place to read. 4.4, where a chain of conditions runs from a common intelligence to a common law, to citizenship, and to the universe as a city.

Meaning

Πόλις (*polis*) is the Greek city, a body of citizens governing itself under its own laws; πολίτης (*politēs*) is the man who has a share in it, and πολιτικός (*politikos*) what belongs to the city and the citizen. Πολιτεία (*politeia*) and πολίτευμα (*politeuma*) are the constitution and the polity it orders. Aristotle, in the *Politics*, called man "by nature a political animal", φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον (*physei politikon zōion*);[381] Marcus keeps the words in "a living being civic by nature" (4.24). The Stoics carried the city into the universe. In the third book of *On Ends* by Cicero, the Roman orator and statesman of the first century BC, Cato the Younger, the Stoic senator, who speaks for the school, gives their view: the universe is ruled by the will of the gods and is "as it were a common city and state of men and gods", of which each of

[381] Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2, 1253a2–3.

us is a part, so that by nature we put the common advantage before our own.[382] Marcus' "as it were", ὡσανεί (*hōsanei*; 4.3.2, 4.4), can be read as marking the same comparison as Cicero's *quasi*. Again and again his adjective stands beside "rational", as in "rational and civic virtue" (7.68) and "the rational and civic faculty" (7.72). "Civic" names what a rational being is made for, not a career in public affairs.

Use in the book

The argument for the city is a chain of conditions: "If intelligence is common to us, reason too, by which we are rational, is common; if so, the reason that prescribes what is to be done or not done is common too; if so, law too is common; if so, we are citizens; if so, we share in a kind of polity; if so, the universe is as it were a city. For in what other common polity will anyone say that the whole human race shares?" (4.4). The city is the conclusion, not the premise; then the argument turns round: our intelligence, rationality and sense of law come "from this common city" (4.4). Against resentment Marcus is to renew "the disjunction, either providence or atoms, and all that proved the universe to be as it were a city" (4.3.2; see Providence and atoms).

Man is "a citizen of the highest city, of which the other cities are like households" (3.11.2), and "the end of rational living beings is to follow the reason and law of the most venerable city and commonwealth" (2.16). Against a line of Aristophanes, the Athenian comic poet, Marcus sets his own: "That man says, '⟨O⟩ dear city of Cecrops'; will you not say, 'O dear city of Zeus'?" (4.23; see Nature).[383] Cecrops was the legendary first king of Athens.

Rome keeps its place. If the gods take counsel about none of the things that concern us, Marcus can still take counsel about himself, and what is advantageous to each is what accords with his own constitution and nature: "my nature is rational and civic. City and fatherland: for me as Antoninus, Rome; as a man, the universe. So the things that benefit these cities are alone good for me" (6.44.2). Antoninus is his name as emperor. Of earthly constitutions he records one ideal, from Severus, whom he calls his brother (usually taken to be Claudius Severus, the Aristotelian philosopher among

[382] Cicero, *On Ends* 3.64.

[383] Aristophanes, fragment 110 Kock, as the edition's note at 4.23 records from Leopold's testimonia.

his teachers; see Severus): “the impression of a state with the same laws for all, governed by equality and equal freedom of speech, and of a kingship that honours above all things the freedom of the governed” (1.14.1). Of an ideal state he expects little: “Do not hope for Plato’s Republic, but be content if the smallest thing goes forward …” (9.29).

The city is also the measure of harm. “What is not harmful to the city does not harm the citizen either”; and “if the city is harmed, one must not be angry” (5.22). At 10.33.4 the measure reaches law: “nothing harms the citizen by nature that does not harm the city, nor indeed does anything harm the city that does not harm law; and of these so-called mischances none harms law.” If Marcus is well pleased with all that results, does nothing unsocial and leads every impulse towards what is of common advantage, his life must flow smoothly, as one would conceive the life of a citizen to flow “who goes forward through actions profitable to the citizens and welcomes whatever the city allots” (10.6.2). Nor does place matter: “Live as on a mountain; for it makes no difference, there or here, if one lives everywhere in the universe as in a city” (10.15).

Desertion has its names. “A fugitive, he who flees civic reason”; “a piece split off from the city, he who splits his own soul off from that of rational beings, which is one” (4.29). “The law is master”; and, in a correction of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts, he who is afraid, distressed or angry “does not will” what is ordered by him “who is law”, and so “is a runaway” (10.25). The man who hates his neighbour “has at the same time severed himself from the whole polity too” (11.8; see Kinship and cooperation), and an action without reference to the social end is “seditious” (9.23; see Kinship and cooperation). Marcus asks whether his soul will ever be such as “to share citizenship with gods and men” (10.1).

The book ends in the city. “Man, you have been a citizen in this great city: what difference does it make to you whether for five years …? For what is according to the laws is equal for each.” He asks what is terrible “if it is not a tyrant nor an unjust judge that sends you away from the city, but the nature that brought you in”, as if a praetor were releasing a comic actor from the stage (12.36; see Drama and role). The city of the universe can be read less as a doctrine about

the cosmos than as a rule for one citizen: it tells Marcus what can harm him, whom he serves, and how to go.

Places to read

Every chapter in which πόλις, πολίτης, πολιτικός, πολίτευμα, πολιτεία or one of the verbs πολιτεύεσθαι and συμπολιτεύεσθαι occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the places of πατρίς (3.16.1, 6.44.2, 12.1.2), ἰσόνομος (1.14.1, 8.2) and δραπέτης (10.25); every place of ἰσηγορία, ἀπόσχισμα, φυγάς and στασιώδης falls among them. Ἀκρόπολις, "citadel" (8.48), is left out.

1.14.1 From Severus, whom he calls his brother, Marcus received the impression of a state with the same laws for all, governed by equality and equal freedom of speech, and of a kingship that honours above all the freedom of the governed.

2.16 The soul does violence to itself when it acts at random, when even the smallest things ought to be done with reference to the end; and the end of rational living beings is to follow the reason and law of the most venerable city and commonwealth.

3.3 Alexander, Pompey and Gaius Caesar destroyed whole cities root and branch, and themselves at last departed from life.

3.5 The god within Marcus is to be the guardian of a living being that is male, elderly, civic, Roman and a ruler, waiting at his post for the recall from life.

3.6.3 Nothing of another kind, such as the praise of the many, office, wealth or the enjoyment of pleasures, may be set up against the rational good; all these, even if they seem for a while to fit, suddenly overpower and sweep away.

3.7 The man who has chosen his own mind and daimon before all else is cautious throughout his life of one thing only, that his understanding should take any turning foreign to an intelligent civic living being.

3.11.2 Nothing so produces greatness of mind as testing each thing for its use, and for its worth in relation to the whole and to man, a citizen of the highest city, of which the other cities are like households.

3.16.1 To have the mind as guide to what appear to be duties belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods, to those who abandon their country, and to those who act behind shut doors.

4.3.2 Against resentment at what is allotted from the whole, Marcus is to renew the disjunction, providence or atoms, and all that proved the universe to be as it were a city.

4.3.4 Marcus is to look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal living being.

4.4 If intelligence is common, so are reason and law; if so, we are citizens and share in a kind of polity, the universe is as it were a city, and from this common city come our intelligence, rationality and sense of law.

4.23 Where Aristophanes speaks of the dear city of Cecrops, Marcus asks whether he will not say, "O dear city of Zeus".

4.24 Against the advice of Democritus, the atomist philosopher of the fifth century BC, to do little, Marcus asks whether it is not better to do what is necessary, and whatever the reason of a living being civic by nature requires, and as it requires.

4.29 A fugitive is he who flees civic reason, and a piece split off from the city he who splits his own soul off from that of rational beings, which is one.

4.48.1 Marcus is to bear in mind how many cities have, so to speak, died whole, Helice, Pompeii, Herculaneum and countless others.

5.22 What is not harmful to the city does not harm the citizen; at every impression of having been harmed Marcus is to ask whether the city is harmed, and if it is, one must not be angry.

6.14 The man who honours a soul that is rational, universal and civic turns to nothing else, but keeps his own soul in a rational and social state and works with what is of one kind with him.

6.44.2 If the gods take counsel about nothing, Marcus can take counsel about himself: his nature is rational and civic, his city and fatherland Rome as Antoninus and the universe as a man, and only what benefits these cities is good for him.

7.1 Vice is what one has seen often; the same things fill the histories, ancient, middle and recent, and fill the cities and houses now.

7.68 To the understanding the present is always material for rational and civic virtue.

7.72 Whatever the rational and civic faculty finds neither intelligent nor social, it judges, with reason, inferior to itself.

8.2 At each action Marcus asks what more he seeks, if the present work is that of an intelligent and social living being, under the same law as God.

9.9.2 Among rational living beings there are commonwealths, friendships, households and gatherings, and in wars treaties and truces.

9.12 Marcus is to want one thing only: to move and to hold still as civic reason requires.

9.16 The bad and the good of the rational civic living being, like its virtue and vice, lie not in being acted upon but in activity.

9.23 As Marcus helps to complete a civic system, every action of his is to help complete a civic life; an action without reference to the social end is seditious.

9.29 How cheap are the civic little men who, as he thinks, act as philosophers; Marcus is not to hope for Plato's Republic, but to be content if the smallest thing goes forward.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever be such as to share citizenship with gods and men, neither blaming them nor found fault with by them.

10.2 Marcus is to give his nature as a living being what it seeks, if his nature as a rational living being is not made worse thereby; and the rational is at once civic too.

10.6.2 If Marcus is well pleased with all that results and, standing in some affinity to those of one kind with him, does nothing unsocial, his life must flow smoothly, as one would conceive the life of a citizen to flow who acts for the citizens and welcomes whatever the city allots.

10.15 Little life remains; Marcus is to live as on a mountain, for it makes no difference where one

lives, if one lives everywhere in the universe as in a city.

10.25 He who flees the master is a runaway, and the law is master; so too he who is afraid, distressed or angry over any of the things ordered by him who governs all things, who is law, is a runaway.

10.33.4 Nothing harms the citizen by nature that does not harm the city, nor the city that does not harm law, and none of the so-called mischances harms law.

11.8 A man who separates himself from his neighbour by hating and turning away has severed himself from the whole polity too.

11.21 One must set before oneself the target that is social and civic, and whoever directs all his own impulses towards it will in this respect always be the same.

12.1.2 If at the exit Marcus honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, and fears never having begun to live according to nature, he will cease being a stranger to the fatherland.

12.36 Marcus has been a citizen in this great city, and the length of his stay makes no difference; it is nature, not a tyrant or an unjust judge, that sends him away from the city.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoic definition of the city of the universe is preserved by Arius Didymus, whose summaries of Stoic doctrine Eusebius of Caesarea, the bishop and historian of the fourth century, quotes in his *Preparation for the Gospel*. A city, the Stoics say there, is spoken of in two ways, as the dwelling and as the system made of its inhabitants with the citizens; so the universe "is as it were a city made up of gods and men", the gods holding the leadership and men being subordinate, and there is fellowship between them because they share in reason, "which is by nature law".[384] The edition's note at 4.4 also compares a passage of Cicero's *On the Laws*.[385] The chain of 4.4, from common reason to law, citizenship and polity, can be read as the

[384] Arius Didymus, in Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 15.15.3–5; Eusebius names his source at 15.15.9.

[385] Cicero, *On the Laws* 1.23.

Stoic definition argued step by step, and the definition's word σύστημα (*systēma*), "system", is Marcus' word for the whole of which he is a limb (7.13) and for the "civic system" he helps to complete (9.23). The ideal goes back to the founder. Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, writes that the *Republic* of Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school, so much admired, comes down to one head: that we should not dwell city by city and people by people, each set apart by its own rules of right, but should hold all men fellow-demesmen and fellow-citizens, with one life and one order, like a flock grazing together and reared under a common law; Zeno wrote it, Plutarch adds, as a dream or image of a philosopher's good order and constitution.[386] Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, makes the ideal a rule of conduct. Whoever has learned that the greatest system of all is the one made of men and God should answer as Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, did when asked where he was from: not "Athenian" or "Corinthian", but "of the universe".[387] A man is "a citizen of the universe and a part of it"; the calling of a citizen is to have no advantage of his own and to deliberate about nothing as one cut loose, but as the hand or the foot would if they had reason, referring every impulse and desire to the whole; and, as the philosophers rightly say, the good man, if he knew what was coming, would work together even with illness, death and maiming, since "the whole has more authority than the part, and the city than the citizen".[388] The rule of 5.22 and 10.33.4 can be read as that order applied to harm, and Epictetus' word for the man cut loose, ἀπόλυτος (*apolytos*), is Marcus' for a ruling centre "loosed and torn away from fellowship" (10.24). Man, Epictetus says elsewhere, is a part of a city, "first of the one made of gods and men, then of the one said to be nearest, which is a small copy of the whole",[389] which can be read as the highest city and its households of 3.11.2. Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, puts Marcus' second fatherland in a sentence to live by: "I was not born for one corner; this whole world is my fatherland."[390]

---

[386] Plutarch, *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander* 1.6, 329a–b.

[387] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.9.1–6.

[388] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.10.3–5.

[389] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.5.26.

[390] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 28.4.

Other ancient sources

The citizen of the universe is older than the Stoa. Diogenes of Sinope, the Cynic of the fourth century BC, asked where he came from, answered, "A citizen of the universe", κοσμοπολίτης (*kosmopolitēs*).[391] Plato had already set the true city apart from every city on earth. At the close of the ninth book of the *Republic*, Glaucon, Plato's brother, concludes that the man who looks to the constitution within himself will not be willing to take part in public affairs; Socrates answers that he will, in his own city, though perhaps not in his fatherland, unless some divine chance befalls. Glaucon takes him to mean the city they have been founding in words, which he thinks is nowhere on earth; and Socrates replies that perhaps a pattern of it is laid up in heaven for whoever wishes to see it and, seeing it, to found himself there, and that it makes no difference whether it is anywhere or ever will be, for he would practise the ways of that city alone and of no other.[392] Marcus' "Do not hope for Plato's Republic" (9.29) can be read as taking Plato at his word: the city is to be lived in now, not waited for.

Translation in this edition

Πόλις is "city" at every place, "cities" in the plural (3.3, 3.11.2, 4.48.1, 6.44.2, 7.1), and the vocative πόλι is "city" in both phrases of 4.23, "⟨O⟩ dear city of Cecrops" and "O dear city of Zeus", where the first "O" is the supplement of Wilamowitz, the German classical scholar. Leopold prints two other supplements in these places: at 5.22 "but must show" is that of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, and in A, the Vatican manuscript, a new chapter begins with "what is being overlooked"; at 7.1 "the" before "houses" is that of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century. Πολίτης is always "citizen", "citizens" in the plural (4.4, 10.6.2), and τὸν φύσει πολίτην is "the citizen by nature" (10.33.4). Πολιτικός is "civic" at all its places, even where it describes the men of public business, "these civic little men" (9.29); the edition keeps it apart from κοινωνικός, "social", and the two stand together at 6.14, 7.72, 9.23 and 11.21. At 3.6.3 "civic" renders πολιτικῷ, Gataker's conjecture, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts, as his apparatus reports, have ποιητικῷ (*poiētikōi*), "productive". At 3.7 the "and" between

[391] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 6.63.

[392] Plato, *Republic* 9, 592a–b.

“intelligent” and “civic” is the supplement of Johannes Stich, whose Teubner text appeared in 1882, and at 9.16 the “and” between “rational” and “civic” that of H. I. Polak, whose notes on the text appeared in *Hermes* in 1886; the manuscripts join the adjectives without it, and at 9.16 A has ποιητικοῦ (*poiētikou*), “productive”, for πολιτικοῦ. Πολίτευμα is “polity” (4.4 twice, 11.8). Πολιτεία is rendered by sense: “a state” (1.14.1), “commonwealth” (2.16), “commonwealths” (9.9.2), and “Republic” for the title of Plato’s book (9.29). The verbs are “you have been a citizen” for ἐπολιτεύσω (12.36) and “share citizenship” for συμπολιτεύεσθαι (10.1). Πατρίς is “fatherland” (6.44.2, 12.1.2) and “country” (3.16.1). The comparison is “as it were a city” for ὡσανεὶ πόλις (4.3.2, 4.4) and “as in a city” for ὡς ἐν πόλει (10.15). Ἰσόνομος is “with the same laws for all”, of a state (1.14.1), and “under the same law as God”, of a living being (8.2); ἰσηγορία is “equal freedom of speech” (1.14.1). Ἀπόσχισμα is “a piece split off” and φυγάς “fugitive” (4.29), δραπέτης “runaway” (10.25), and στασιώδης “seditious” (9.23), where σύστημα is “system” and δῆμος “a people”. Ἀκρόπολις is “citadel” (8.48; see Inner retreat and citadel).

ἀπόσχισμα

Attested: ἀπόσχισμα (*aposchisma*; 4.29). A piece split off, from ἀποσχίζειν (*aposchizein*), “to split off”. “A piece split off from the city, he who splits his own soul off from that of rational beings, which is one” (4.29). The verb returns for the man who “splits himself off” like a severed hand (8.34) and for one “split off from one man” who falls away from the whole fellowship (11.8; also 3.8, 9.9.3). Lemma: ἀπόσχισμα.

δραπέτης

Attested: δραπέτης (*drapetēs*; 10.25 three times). A runaway slave. “He who flees the master is a runaway; and the law is master, and he who breaks the law is ⟨then⟩ a runaway”; so too, since he does not will what is ordered by him who governs all things, “he who is afraid or distressed or angry is a runaway” (10.25). In Leopold’s text “does not will” is Nauck’s correction, οὐ βούλεται, for the manuscripts’ ὃ βούλεται, and “then” is the οὖν supplied by Coraes. Lemma: δραπέτης.

ἰσηγορία

Attested: ἰσηγορίαν (*isēgorian*; 1.14.1). Equal freedom of speech, the right of every citizen to speak in the assembly. Through Severus Marcus received the impression of a state "governed by equality and equal freedom of speech" (1.14.1). Lemma: ἰσηγορία.

ἰσόνομος

Attested: ἰσονόμου (*isonomou*; 1.14.1, 8.2). Having equal laws, or the same law. Of a constitution, "a state with the same laws for all" (1.14.1); of a man, "an intelligent and social living being, under the same law as God" (8.2). Lemma: ἰσόνομος.

πατρίς

Attested: πατρίδα (*patrida*; 3.16.1), πατρίς (*patris*; 6.44.2), πατρίδος (*patridos*; 12.1.2). Fatherland, one's native country. "City and fatherland: for me as Antoninus, Rome; as a man, the universe" (6.44.2); if at the exit he honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, Marcus "will cease being a stranger to the fatherland" (12.1.2). At 3.16.1 those "who abandon their country" also have the mind as guide to what appear to be duties. Lemma: πατρίς.

πόλις

Attested: πόλεως (*poleōs*; 2.16, 3.11.2, 4.4, 4.29, 12.36), πόλεις (*poleis*; 3.3, 3.11.2, 4.48.1, 7.1), πόλις (*polis*; 4.3.2, 4.4, 5.22 twice, 6.44.2, 10.6.2), πόλι (*poli*; 4.23 twice), πόλει (*polei*; 5.22, 10.15, 12.36), πόλιν (*polin*; 5.22, 10.33.4 three times), πόλεσιν (*polesin*; 6.44.2). City. Of human cities, those destroyed by conquerors (3.3), those that have "died whole" (4.48.1), and Rome, Marcus' city "as Antoninus" (6.44.2); of the universe, "as it were a city" (4.3.2, 4.4), "the highest city, of which the other cities are like households" (3.11.2), "the most venerable city and commonwealth" (2.16), "O dear city of Zeus" (4.23) and "this great city" (12.36). Lemma: πόλις.

πολιτεία

Attested: πολιτείας (*politeias*; 1.14.1, 2.16), πολιτεῖαι (*politeiai*; 9.9.2), πολιτείαν (*politeian*; 9.29). A constitution, or the community it orders. "A state with the same laws for all" (1.14.1); "the most venerable city and commonwealth" (2.16); among rational living beings "commonwealths and friendships and households and gatherings" (9.9.2); and

“Plato’s Republic”, which Marcus is not to hope for (9.29). Lemma: πολιτεία.

πολίτευμα

Attested: πολιτεύματος (*politeumatos*; 4.4 twice, 11.8). A polity, the body of citizens under one government. “If so, we share in a kind of polity”; “in what other common polity will anyone say that the whole human race shares?” (4.4). The man who hates his neighbour “has at the same time severed himself from the whole polity too” (11.8). Lemma: πολίτευμα.

πολιτεύομαι

Attested: ἐπολιτεύσω (*epoliteusō*; 12.36). To be a citizen, to live as a citizen. “Man, you have been a citizen in this great city: what difference does it make to you whether for five years ⟨or three⟩?” (12.36), where “or three” is the supplement of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, which Leopold prints. Lemma: πολιτεύομαι.

πολίτης

Attested: πολίτην (*politēn*; 3.11.2, 5.22, 10.33.4 twice), πολίτης (*politēs*; 4.3.4), πολῖται (*politai*; 4.4), πολίτου (*politou*; 10.6.2), πολίταις (*politais*; 10.6.2). Citizen. Man is “a citizen of the highest city” (3.11.2); “if so, we are citizens” (4.4); “What is not harmful to the city does not harm the citizen either” (5.22), and “What, then, does not harm law harms neither city nor citizen” (10.33.4). Lemma: πολίτης.

πολιτικός

Attested: πολιτικοῦ (*politikou*; 3.5, 3.7, 4.24, 9.16, 9.23), πολιτικῷ (*politikōi*; 3.6.3), πολιτικόν (*politikon*; 4.29, 10.2, 11.21), πολιτικήν (*politikēn*; 6.14), πολιτική (*politikē*; 6.44.2, 7.72), πολιτικῆς (*politikēs*; 7.68, 9.23), πολιτικός (*politikos*; 9.12), πολιτικά (*politika*; 9.29). Of the city and the citizen; in Marcus, of what a rational being is made for. “My nature is rational and civic” (6.44.2); “the rational is at once civic too” (10.2); a fugitive “flees civic reason” (4.29), and Marcus wants “to move and to hold still as civic reason requires” (9.12). At 9.29 it describes men busy with public affairs, “these civic little men”. At 3.6.3 it is Gataker’s conjecture, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have ποιητικῷ, “productive”. Lemma: πολιτικός.

στασιώδης

Attested: στασιώδης (*stasiōdēs*; 9.23). Factious, seditious, from στάσις (*stasis*), "faction". An action without reference to the social end "tears life apart and does not let it be one, and is seditious, like the man in a people who, for his own part, stands separate from such concord" (9.23). Lemma: στασιώδης.

συμπολιτεύομαι

Attested: συμπολιτεύεσθαι (*sympoliteuesthai*; 10.1). To be a fellow citizen. Marcus asks his soul, "Will you ever, then, be such as to share citizenship with gods and men in such a way as neither to blame them in anything nor to have fault found with you by them?" (10.1). Lemma: συμπολιτεύομαι.

φυγάς

Attested: φυγάς (*phygas*; 4.29). An exile, a fugitive. "A fugitive, he who flees civic reason" (4.29). Lemma: φυγάς.

See also

Common advantage; Court and office; Daimon; Drama and role; Inner retreat and citadel; Justice; Kinship and cooperation; Nature; Providence and atoms; Ruling centre; Severus.

Common advantage

What profits the bee and the hive · Meditations

συμφέρειν, sympherein, "be advantageous", "bring advantage", "carried along with"; *τὸ συμφέρον, to sympheron*, "the advantageous", "what is advantageous", "advantage", "what is of common advantage"; *κοινωφελής, koinōphelēs*, "the common good"; *χρήσιμος, chrēsimos*, "useful", "use", "usefully"; *εὔχρηστος, euchrēstos*, "useful"; *ἄχρηστος, achrēstos*, "useless", "not uselessly"; *λυσιτελής, lysitelēs*, "profitable"; *σμῆνος, smēnos*, "hive", "swarms"; *περίεργος, periergos*, "meddling"; *περιεργάζεσθαι, periergazesthai*, "meddle"

At a Glance

The word. Συμφέρειν is to bring together, and so to be of use or profit to someone; τὸ συμφέρον is the advantageous, a man's advantage. Κοινωφελής is what benefits the community, χρήσιμος what is useful.

In the *Meditations*. “The better is the advantageous” (3.6.3), and what is advantageous to each “is what accords with his own constitution and nature” (6.44.2), which in Marcus is rational and civic. “What is not advantageous to the hive is not advantageous to the bee either” (6.54). In so far as he stands in affinity to his own kind, Marcus will lead every impulse “towards what is of common advantage” (10.6.2).

In this edition. Συμφέρειν and τὸ συμφέρον are “advantageous” or “advantage” at every place but the passive “carried along with it” (12.23), and τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον (*to koinēi sympheron*) is “what is of common advantage”; κοινωφελής is “the common good”, χρήσιμος “useful” and λυσιτελής “profitable”.

A place to read. 6.54, where the hive is made the measure of the bee’s advantage.

Meaning

Συμφέρειν (*sympherein*) joins σύν (*syn*), “together”, to φέρειν (*pherein*), “to bring” or “to carry”: to bring together, to contribute, and so, of a thing, to be of use to someone. Its neuter participle, τὸ συμφέρον (*to sympheron*), is the advantageous, a man’s interest; the passive keeps the literal sense, “carried along with” (12.23). Marcus hears the verb inside the word: what the nature of the whole “brings” to each is “advantageous” to each (10.20), a play the edition’s note there points out, and nature would not have brought a thing to anyone “if it did not bring advantage to the whole” (5.8.4). Κοινωφελής (*koinōphelēs*), from κοινός (*koinos*), “common”, and the root of ὠφελεῖν (*ōphelein*), “to benefit”, is what benefits the community; χρήσιμος (*chrēsimos*), from χρῆσθαι (*chrēsthai*), “to use”, is useful. Marcus’ question is always whose advantage: the rational being’s or the living being’s (3.6.3), the part’s or the whole’s (10.6.1).

Use in the book

Marcus first defines the advantageous by the better. “But you, I say, choose the better simply and freely, and hold fast to it. The better is the advantageous. If it is what is advantageous to you as a rational being, keep to it; if as a living being, declare it, and guard the judgement without vanity; only see that you make the examination safely” (3.6.3). Of the two advantages the first is to be kept, the second only declared, in a sentence that Johann Matthias

Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802, thought corrupt; both are to be examined. The test also runs the other way: nothing is to be honoured "as advantageous" that will some day force him "to break faith, abandon self-respect, hate anyone" (3.7; see Self-respect and shame).

The measure is the constitution. Even if the gods take counsel about none of the things that concern us, Marcus can take counsel about himself: "mine is the inquiry about what is advantageous. And what is advantageous to each is what accords with his own constitution and nature; and my nature is rational and civic", so that the things that benefit his two cities, Rome and the universe, "are alone good for me" (6.44.2; see Citizenship). The same measure runs from the whole to its parts: "nothing is harmful to the part that is advantageous to the whole" (10.6.1; see Whole and part), and dying is "not only a work of nature but also to her advantage" (2.12; see Death).

Book VI puts it in one line, which stands as a chapter by itself: "What is not advantageous to the hive is not advantageous to the bee either" (6.54). The sentence runs one way: it does not say that what profits the bee profits the hive, but makes the hive the test of the bee's profit. Nine chapters earlier the rule is put for men, with a correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts: "what is advantageous to a man is advantageous to other men too. But let 'advantageous' be taken now in the more common sense, of things indifferent" (6.45; see Whole and part). The proviso can be read as implying a stricter sense, that of 3.6.3, where the advantageous is the better.

Men misjudge it, and that is no ground for anger: they are carried "as towards what is proper and advantageous to them", and to the objection that it is not so Marcus answers, "Then teach and show, without being indignant" (6.27; see Anger). The impression of advantage can also serve Marcus himself, who can bear whatever his opinion can make bearable "by the impression that it is advantageous to yourself, or your duty, to do this" (10.3; see Pain and pleasure).

The common good governs attention. Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, had a "readiness to listen to anyone with something to contribute to the common good" (1.16.1). Marcus is not to waste his life on impressions of other

people “when you are not referring them to some common good” (3.4.1; see Attention and self-examination), and the good man forms them “not often, nor without some great necessity for the common good” (3.4.3). A change of mind must come “from something convincing, as that it is just or for the common good” (4.12; see Learning, practice and correction), and whatever Marcus does “must tend to this alone: to what is useful in common and in tune” (7.5; see Contentment and self-sufficiency).

The common advantage is where impulse is led. In so far as he stands in some affinity to the parts of his own kind, Marcus writes, “I shall lead every impulse of mine towards what is of common advantage” (10.6.2; see Citizenship), and at 11.13 he calls himself “a man stretched towards the coming about, by whatever means, of what is of common advantage” (see Kindness and correction). Marcus never sets his own advantage against the common one, because he measures both by one nature, rational and civic, and the hive and the bee can be read as that teaching in small.

Places to read

Every chapter in which συμφέρειν, κοινωφελής, χρήσιμος, εὔχρηστος, ἄχρηστος, λυσιτελής, σμῆνος, περίεργος or περιεργάζεσθαι occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The noun συμφορά (*symphora*), “disasters” (12.27), is left out.

1.16.1 Marcus’ father had, among much else, love of work and perseverance, and a readiness to listen to anyone with something to contribute to the common good.

2.1 Among those Marcus expects to meet at dawn are the meddling, whose faults have come upon them through ignorance of good and bad.

2.3 There is necessity too, and what is advantageous to the whole universe, of which Marcus is a part (see Nature).

2.12 If dying is looked at by itself and stripped of the impressions attached to it, it will be held nothing but a work of nature, and one to nature’s advantage (see Death).

2.15 The use of the saying addressed to Monimus the Cynic, a pupil of Diogenes the Cynic, that

everything is opinion, is plain, if one receives its pith as far as it is true.

3.4.1 Marcus is not to waste what is left of life on impressions about other people when he is not referring them to some common good.

3.4.2 In the sequence of impressions one must avoid what is random and pointless, and above all what is meddling and malicious.

3.4.3 The good man forms impressions of what another says, does or thinks not often, nor without some great necessity for the common good.

3.6.3 The better is the advantageous: what is advantageous to Marcus as a rational being he is to keep; what is advantageous to him as a living being he is to declare, guarding the judgement without vanity.

3.7 Marcus is never to honour as advantageous anything that will some day force him to break faith, abandon self-respect, hate, suspect, curse or pretend (see Self-respect and shame).

4.9 In a single sentence: the nature of the advantageous has been compelled to do this.

4.12 Marcus must always be ready to shift his position if someone is at hand to set him right, but the leading away must come from something convincing, as that it is just or for the common good, not from its seeming pleasant or a source of repute.

4.29 A beggar is he who needs another and does not have from himself all that is useful for life.

5.8.4 Marcus is to welcome whatever comes about, even if it seems harsh, for nature would not have brought it to anyone if it did not bring advantage to the whole (see Whole and part).

5.16 Among the impressions with which Marcus is to dye his soul: where the end of each thing is, there too is its advantage and its good, and so the good of a rational living being is fellowship (see Impression).

6.27 It is cruel not to allow men an impulse towards what appears to them proper and advantageous; to the objection that it is not so, the answer is that

Marcus is to teach and show them, without being indignant (see Anger).

6.44.2 If the gods take counsel about none of the things that concern us, Marcus may take counsel about himself, and what is advantageous to each accords with his own constitution and nature, which in Marcus is rational and civic (see Citizenship).

6.45 Whatever happens to each is advantageous to the whole, and that would be enough; Marcus adds a general rule about what is advantageous to men, taking "advantageous" in the more common sense, of things indifferent (see Whole and part).

6.54 What is not advantageous to the hive is not advantageous to the bee either.

7.5 If his understanding is not sufficient for a work, Marcus yields it to one abler, if it is not otherwise a duty, or takes on a helper, to do what is opportune and useful for the fellowship; whatever he does must tend to what is useful in common and in tune.

7.18 Marcus asks whether anything among useful things can be fulfilled without change (see Change).

8.10 Regret is self-reproach for having let something useful pass, and no honourable and good man regrets having let a pleasure pass; so pleasure is neither useful nor good (see Pain and pleasure).

8.50 Whatever within the nature of the whole seems to decay and grow old and useless, it changes into itself and makes new things from it (see Nature).

9.9.2 Among irrational beings there were found at once swarms and herds, and among rational beings commonwealths, friendships, households and gatherings (see Kinship and cooperation).

9.42.2 It is useful to bear in mind what virtue nature has given man against each wrong, as mildness against the unfair man.

10.2 Marcus is to watch what his nature seeks at each of its levels and grant it if the level above is not made worse; using these rules, he is to meddle with nothing beyond (see Nature).

10.3 Marcus is by nature able to bear everything that his own opinion can make bearable, by the impression that it is advantageous to him, or his duty, to do so (see Pain and pleasure).

10.6.1 Marcus lays down first that he is a part of the whole governed by nature; in so far as he is a part he will be discontented with nothing allotted, for nothing is harmful to the part that is advantageous to the whole (see Whole and part).

10.6.2 In so far as he stands in affinity to those of his own kind, Marcus will lead every impulse towards what is of common advantage; and when this is so, his life must flow smoothly, like that of a citizen who goes forward through actions profitable to the citizens (see Citizenship).

10.20 What the nature of the whole brings to each is advantageous to each, and at the time when she brings it (see Whole and part).

11.6.1 Some things are said usefully by the makers of the dramas, and Marcus copies three verses.

11.6.2 Old Comedy reminded men of freedom from vanity not uselessly; the Middle and the New say some useful things too, but Marcus asks to what target their whole project ever looked.

11.13 Kindly to everyone, Marcus is ready to show even the man who hates him what he overlooks, and asks what can be bad for him, a man stretched towards the coming about, by whatever means, of what is of common advantage (see Kindness and correction).

12.23 Everything that is advantageous to the whole is always beautiful and in season, and the ending of life is good if indeed it is opportune for the whole, advantageous, and carried along with it (see Change).

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its seventh book, reports that for the Stoics every good is advantageous, needful, profitable, useful, of good use, beautiful, beneficial, choiceworthy and just: advantageous because what it brings benefits us when it comes about;

profitable because it pays back what is spent on it, so that the return from the dealing exceeds the outlay in benefit; useful because it supplies the employment of benefit; of good use because it makes that employment praiseworthy; and just because it accords with law and produces fellowship.[393] Four of the words treated here stand in the list, συμφέρον, λυσιτελής, χρήσιμος and εὔχρηστος, and Marcus' "The better is the advantageous" (3.6.3) can be read as the doctrine in a line; Diogenes' account of συμφέρον by φέρειν, "to bring", can be read beside the play of 10.20. Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, meets the charge that to do everything for oneself is selfish. It is not self-love, he says: the living being is so made that it does everything for its own sake, and so do the sun and Zeus himself; but when Zeus wants to be the Sender of Rain, the Giver of Fruit and the father of men and gods, he cannot win these works and names unless he is useful to the community; and he has so made the nature of the rational animal that it can attain none of its own goods unless it contributes something useful to the community. So it is no longer unsocial to do everything for one's own sake; and he asks what else one expects, that a man should stand apart from himself and his own advantage.[394] Epictetus argues from the self to the community: a rational being cannot win its own good without serving the common one. Marcus' bee (6.54) can be read as the same thought turned round, that what does not profit the community does not profit the man. Cicero, the Roman orator and statesman of the first century BC, makes it a rule in *On Duties*: all men should have one aim, that the advantage of each one and of all together be the same, for if each snatches it for himself, all human partnership is dissolved; and if nature prescribes that a man should wish another man, whoever he is, to be looked after for the very reason that he is a man, then by the same nature the advantage of all is common.[395] In his first book he takes a comparison from bees: they do not swarm in order to build combs, but build combs because nature made them to flock together, and men, still more, being joined by nature, bring their skill to acting and thinking.[396] Marcus' hive (6.54), and

[393] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.98–99.

[394] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.19.11–15.

[395] Cicero, *On Duties* 3.26–27.

[396] Cicero, *On Duties* 1.157.

the bees and "creatures that are by nature gregarious" of 11.18.4 (see Anger), can be read beside Cicero's swarm. Cato the Younger, the Stoic speaker of Cicero's *On Ends*, draws from the city of gods and men that by nature we put the common advantage before our own (see Citizenship).[397]

Translation in this edition

Συμφέρειν is "be advantageous" where it is a verb: "is advantageous" (6.44.2, 6.45, 6.54, 10.6.1 twice, 10.20 twice) and "that it is advantageous" (10.3); at 5.8.4 the imperfect συνέφερεν (*synepheren*) is "bring advantage". The neuter participle τὸ συμφέρον is "advantageous" or "what is advantageous" (2.3, 3.7, 6.27 twice, 6.44.2, 6.45, 6.54, 12.23 twice), "the advantageous" (3.6.3, 4.9), "the advantage" (5.16) and "to her advantage" (2.12), and with κοινῇ (*koinēi*), "in common", "what is of common advantage" (10.6.2, 11.13). "Advantage" and "advantageous" render nothing else. The participle συμφερόμενον (*sympheromenon*), in the other sense of the verb, is "carried along with it" (12.23). Κοινωφελής is "the common good" at all four places, "to contribute to the common good" (1.16.1), "some common good" (3.4.1) and "for the common good" (3.4.3, 4.12), and "common good" renders nothing else; τὸ κοινόν (*to koinon*) is "the community" (5.35, 6.44.1). Χρήσιμος is "useful" (4.29, 7.5 twice, 8.10 three times, 11.6.2), "useful things" (7.18) and "use" in "the use of the saying" (2.15); "useful in common" (7.5) renders τὸ κοινῇ χρήσιμον (*to koinēi chrēsimon*), and the adverb χρησίμως (*chrēsimōs*) is "usefully" (11.6.1). Εὔχρηστος is "useful" (9.42.2), ἄχρηστος "useless" (8.50), and οὐκ ἀχρήστως (*ouk achrēstōs*) "not uselessly" (11.6.2). Λυσιτελής is "profitable" (10.6.2). The words of benefit, ὠφελεῖν (*ōphelein*) and ὠφέλεια (*ōpheleia*), "benefit", and ὠφέλιμος (*ōphelimos*), "the things that benefit" (6.44.2), have their sub-entries elsewhere (see Beneficence), and so has κοινωνικός (*koinōnikos*), "social" (see Kinship and cooperation). Σμῆνος is "hive" (6.54) and "swarms" (9.9.2); the bee, μέλισσα (*melissa*), has its sub-entry elsewhere (see Human work). Περίεργος is "the meddling" (2.1) and "meddling" (3.4.2), and περιεργάζεσθαι "meddle" (10.2).

[397] Cicero, *On Ends* 3.64.

ἄχρηστος

Attested: ἄχρηστον (*achrēston*; 8.50), ἀχρήστως (*achrēstōs*; 11.6.2). Of no use, useless. The nature of the whole changes into itself whatever within it is decaying "and growing old and useless, as it seems" (8.50; see Nature); Old Comedy reminded men of freedom from vanity "not uselessly, through its very plain speaking" (11.6.2). Lemma: ἄχρηστος.

εὔχρηστος

Attested: εὔχρηστον (*euchrēston*; 9.42.2). Of good use, useful. "It is useful, too, to bear in mind at once what virtue nature has given man against this wrong" (9.42.2; see Fault and ignorance). Lemma: εὔχρηστος.

κοινωφελής

Attested: κοινωφελές (*koinōpheles*; 1.16.1, 3.4.1), κοινωφελοῦς (*koinōphelous*; 3.4.3, 4.12). Of common benefit; as a noun, the common good. Antoninus Pius had a "readiness to listen to anyone with something to contribute to the common good" (1.16.1); Marcus is not to waste impressions of others "when you are not referring them to some common good" (3.4.1), and the good man forms them "not often, nor without some great necessity for the common good" (3.4.3); a change of mind must come "from something convincing, as that it is just or for the common good" (4.12). At 4.12 "and the like", which follows, is the reading of P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, which Leopold prints though it construes loosely, as the edition's note there records. Lemma: κοινωφελής.

λυσιτελής

Attested: λυσιτελῶν (*lysitelōn*; 10.6.2). Paying for itself, profitable. Marcus' life will flow smoothly, "as you would conceive the life of a citizen too to flow smoothly who goes forward through actions profitable to the citizens and welcomes whatever the city allots" (10.6.2; see Citizenship). Lemma: λυσιτελής.

περιεργάζομαι

Attested: περιεργάζου (*periergazou*; 10.2). To busy oneself with what is not one's affair, to meddle. After the rules for granting each level of his nature what it seeks: "Using these rules, then, meddle with nothing beyond" (10.2; see Nature). Lemma: περιεργάζομαι.

περίεργος

Attested: περιέργῳ (*periergōi*; 2.1), περίεργον (*periergon*; 3.4.2). Busy about what is not one's own, meddling. "I shall meet the meddling, the ungrateful, the insolent" (2.1; see Fault and ignorance); "one must avoid what is random and pointless, and above all what is meddling and malicious" (3.4.2; see Simplicity and sincerity). Lemma: περίεργος.

σμῆνος

Attested: σμήνει (*smēnei*; 6.54), σμήνη (*smēnē*; 9.9.2). A beehive, a swarm. "What is not advantageous to the hive is not advantageous to the bee either" (6.54); among irrational beings "there were found at once swarms and herds and the rearing of young and something like loves" (9.9.2; see Kinship and cooperation). Lemma: σμῆνος.

συμφέρω

Attested: συμφέρον (*sympheron*; 2.3, 2.12, 3.6.3, 3.7, 5.16, 6.45, 6.54, 10.6.2, 11.13, 12.23 twice), συμφέροντος (*sympherontos*; 4.9, 6.44.2), συνέφερεν (*synepheren*; 5.8.4), συμφέροντα (*sympheronta*; 6.27 twice), συμφέρει (*sympherei*; 6.44.2, 6.45, 6.54, 10.6.1 twice, 10.20 twice), συμφέρειν (*sympherein*; 10.3), συμφερόμενον (*sympheromenon*; 12.23). To bring together; to be of use, to be advantageous; in the passive, to be carried along with. "The better is the advantageous" (3.6.3); "what is advantageous to each is what accords with his own constitution and nature" (6.44.2); "What is not advantageous to the hive is not advantageous to the bee either" (6.54); "everything that is advantageous to the whole is always beautiful and in season" (12.23). At 3.7 "to you" is the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, σεαυτῷ (*seautōi*), which Leopold prints for the manuscripts' σεαυτοῦ (*seautou*); at 6.45 "to other men too" is Gataker's καί (*kai*), "and", for ἤ (*ē*), "or", in P and in A, the Vatican manuscript; at 10.20 A omits "what … brings to each"; and at 11.13 the condition that precedes "what is of common advantage", "if you yourself are now doing what is proper to your nature, and receiving what is now timely", rests on two corrections that Leopold prints, the ποιεῖς (*poieis*) of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, for P's ποιεῖ (*poiei*), "he is doing", and Coraes' καὶ δέχῃ (*kai dechēi*), "and receiving", for P's οὐ δέχῃ (*ou dechēi*), "not receiving". Lemma: συμφέρω.

χρήσιμος

Attested: χρήσιμον (*chrēsimon*; 2.15, 7.5 twice, 8.10 three times), χρήσιμα (*chrēsima*; 4.29, 11.6.2), χρησίμων (*chrēsimōn*; 7.18), χρησίμως (*chrēsimōs*; 11.6.1). Serviceable, useful. A beggar is “he who needs another and does not have from himself all that is useful for life” (4.29); whatever Marcus does “must tend to this alone: to what is useful in common and in tune” (7.5); “so pleasure is neither useful nor good” (8.10). At 8.10 “the useful must be something good” follows the order of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have “the good must be something useful”. Lemma: χρήσιμος.

See also

Anger; Attention and self-examination; Beneficence; Change; Citizenship; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Death; Fault and ignorance; Human work; Impression; Kindness and correction; Kinship and cooperation; Learning, practice and correction; Nature; Pain and pleasure; Self-respect and shame; Simplicity and sincerity; Whole and part.

Court and office

The court, rule and the danger of office · Meditations

αὐλή, aulē, “court”; *ἄρχων, archōn*, “ruler”, “a commander”; *ἀρχή, archē*, “office”, “the empire”, “beginning”, “starting point”, “in the first place”; *ἄρχειν, archein*, “rule”, “have been ruled”, “the governed”, “begin”; *βασιλεία, basileia*, “kingship”, “kingships”; *βασιλικός, basilikos*, “kingly”; *Καῖσαρ, Kaisar*, “Caesar”, “Caesars”; *ἀποκαισαρωθῆναι, apokaisarōthēnai*, “made into a Caesar”; *ἡγεμονία, hēgemonia*, “empires”; *ὑπατεία, hypateia*, “consulships”; *στρατηγός, stratēgos*, “generals”, “praetor”; *σύγκλητος, synklētos*, “the senate”; *δῆμος, dēmos*, “a people”; *τύραννος, tyrannos*, “tyrant”, “tyrants”; *τυραννικός, tyrannikos*, “of a tyrant”, “tyrannical”; *ποικιλία, poikilia*, “double-dealing”; *συμβούλιον, symboulion*, “council”; *κοινονοημοσύνη, koinonoēmosynē*, “considerateness”; *δημοκοπικός, dēmokopikos*, “courting of the people”; *ὀχλοχαρής, ochlocharēs*, “playing to the crowd”; *οὐερνάκλος, ouernaklos*, “pert house-slave”; *πάτριος, patrios*, “ancestral custom”; *μητρυιά, mētryia*,

"stepmother"; *κολακεία, kolakeia*, "flattery"; *κολακεύειν, kolakeuein*, "flatter", "flattering", "be flattered"; *ἀκολάκευτος, akolakeutos*, "proof against flattery"; *προΐστασθαι, proistasthai*, "govern", "to stand at their head"

At a Glance

The word. Αὐλή is the open court of a house, and then the court of a ruler, his household and the men about him. Ἀρχή is rule or office, ἄρχων the man who holds it, and βασιλεία kingship. From Καῖσαρ, Caesar, Marcus makes a verb, ἀποκαισαρωθῆναι, to be made into a Caesar.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus calls himself a ruler once (3.5) and speaks of his office mostly as a place, the court, where "it is possible also to live well" (5.16), and, as Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, taught him, to live "very near to the style of a private citizen" (1.17.3). The danger is a dye: "See that you are not made into a Caesar, that you are not dyed; for it happens" (6.30.1). Courts die whole and come round again (8.31, 10.27), and the tyrant is rule gone wrong (1.11, 4.31).

In this edition. Αὐλή is always "court". Ἄρχων is "ruler", and "a commander" in Plato's words at 7.45; ἀρχή is "office" (3.6.3) and "the empire" (1.16.3); βασιλεία is "kingship", τύραννος "tyrant", and ἀποκαισαρωθῇς "made into a Caesar".

A place to read. 6.30.1, where Marcus warns himself against being made into a Caesar and names what he is to keep himself, "simple, good, untainted, dignified".

Meaning

Αὐλή (*aulē*) is the open court before or within a house, and later a ruler's court, his household and the men who attend him; Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, uses it of the court at Rome.[398] Ἀρχή (*archē*) is both beginning and rule, an empire or an office; ἄρχειν (*archein*) is to begin and to rule, and its participle ἄρχων (*archōn*) a ruler or magistrate. Βασιλεία (*basileia*) is kingship and βασιλικός (*basilikos*) what befits a king. Καῖσαρ (*Kaisar*), the family name of Julius Caesar, had become the emperor's title; ἀποκαισαρωθῆναι (*apokaisarōthēnai*), "be Caesar-ed", occurs only at 6.30.1, and the edition's note calls it apparently Marcus' coinage. His words of office are few: ἀρχή is rule or office at two places (1.16.3, 3.6.3), against

[398] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.10.3–4.

eight where it is a beginning, and the part of the soul that rules has its own word, ἡγεμονικόν (*hēgemonikon*; see Ruling centre).

Use in the book

The one argument the book makes about the court is that it can be lived in well. Among the impressions that are to dye the soul (see Impression) stands a syllogism: "where it is possible to live, it is possible also to live well; but it is possible to live at court; so it is possible also to live well at court" (5.16). Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father and predecessor, had shown him how. He thanks the gods that he was "placed under a ruler and father" who brought him to the conception "that it is possible to live at court without needing bodyguards, or robes of state … but that it is open to one to draw oneself in very near to the style of a private citizen, and not on that account be meaner or slacker in the things that must be done, as a ruler, on behalf of public matters" (1.17.3). The display may go; the public work may not.

The court is endured, not loved. It is a stepmother, served while one returns continually to the mother, philosophy, "thanks to whom the things there seem bearable to you and you bearable among them" (6.12; see Philosophy). Marcus forbids himself the complaint: "Let no one hear you any longer blaming life at court, nor you yourself" (8.9).

The danger of office is a change of colour. "See that you are not made into a Caesar, that you are not dyed; for it happens" (6.30.1). The edition's note takes the dye to be perhaps the imperial purple; it can be read beside 5.16, where the soul takes the colour of its impressions. Against it Marcus sets what he is to keep himself: "simple, good, untainted, dignified, unpretentious, a friend of what is just …", and "Strive to remain such as philosophy wanted to make you"; the rest of the chapter is a second portrait of Antoninus, whose pupil he is to be in everything (6.30.2–4; see Antoninus Pius and Exemplary lives). When Marcus looks at himself he is to "form an impression of one of the Caesars" and ask where they are (10.31; see Exemplary lives).

Courts die whole. "The court of Augustus: wife, daughter, grandchildren, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends, Arius, Maecenas, doctors, sacrificers: the death of a whole court" (8.31). Augustus was the first

emperor; Agrippa, Maecenas and Arius were, the edition's note says, his son-in-law, friend and philosopher. And they come round again, played "only through others" (10.27; see Drama and role). In the times of Vespasian, emperor from AD 69 to 79, men were "craving consulships, kingships", and "that life of theirs is no longer anywhere" (4.32.1; see Death).

Of rule well done Marcus records models more than rules. From Severus, whom he calls his brother, usually taken for Claudius Severus, a Peripatetic among his teachers (see Severus), he took the impression "of a kingship that honours above all things the freedom of the governed" (1.14.1; see Citizenship). In Antoninus he noted "exact inquiry in council" (1.16.2), "constant guard over what the empire needed", "no courting of the people" and "no playing to the crowd" (1.16.3), and that he did "everything according to ancestral custom, yet not making a point of appearing to do this very thing" (1.16.6). The corruption of rule he learned to recognise from M. Cornelius Fronto, the Latin orator who taught him rhetoric: "what the envy, the double-dealing and the pretence of a tyrant are like" (1.11). He is to make himself "neither tyrant nor slave of any man" (4.31); and to allow the base to be such towards others while expecting them not to wrong oneself "is unfair and tyrannical" (11.18.6; see Anger). Nor are his own wars exempt. Beside the spider proud of a fly stands the man proud of catching Sarmatians, and Marcus asks, "For are these not robbers?" (10.10); he fought the Sarmatians himself, as the edition's note recalls.

Office is among the things "of another kind" that may not be set up against the good of a rational being: "the praise of the many, or office, or wealth" (3.6.3). When Marcus reasons from his station, it is to correct himself. That he has come to be "to stand at their head, as a ram over the flock or a bull over the herd" is part of the first head against anger (11.18.1; see Anger). The station works against his winning the repute of a philosopher, yet no station of life is "so fitted for philosophy as this in which you now happen to be" (8.1, 11.7; see Philosophy); the edition's notes take it, at both places, to be probably his position as emperor. The god within is to guard "a living being that is male, elderly, civic, Roman, and a ruler, who has taken up his post" (3.5; see Daimon), words that the edition's note takes for a military image. That can be read as the book's view of the office: a post held under orders, where Marcus asks of the ruler what

he asks of any man, and the court is only the harder ground for it.

Places to read

Every chapter in which αὐλή, ἄρχων, βασιλεία, βασιλικός, Καῖσαρ, ἀποκαισαρωθῆναι, ἡγεμονία (*hēgemonia*), ὑπατεία (*hypateia*), στρατηγός (*stratēgos*), σύγκλητος (*synklētos*), δῆμος (*dēmos*), τύραννος (*tyrannos*) or τυραννικός (*tyrannikos*) occurs, or ἀρχή or ἄρχειν where it is rule or office, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with 10.10, Marcus' own war, and the places of κοινονοημοσύνη (*koinonoēmosynē*) and συμβούλιον (*symboulion*; 1.16.2), οὐερνάκλος (*ouernaklos*; 1.16.4) and πάτριος (*patrios*; 1.16.6) in the portrait of Antoninus; every place of ποικιλία (*poikilia*), δημοκοπικός (*dēmokopikos*), ὀχλοχαρής (*ochlocharēs*) and μητρυιά (*mētryia*) falls among them. Ἀρχή and ἄρχειν where they are beginning, ἡγεμονικόν and the adverb ἡγεμονικῶς (*hēgemonikōs*; see Ruling centre), and ὑπόθεσις (*hypothesis*), "station" (8.1, 11.7; see Philosophy), are left out; the places of κολακεία (*kolakeia*), κολακεύειν (*kolakeuein*), ἀκολάκευτος (*akolakeutos*) and προΐστασθαι (*proistasthai*) are given in their sub-entries.

1.11 From Fronto Marcus learned to attend to what the envy, the double-dealing and the pretence of a tyrant are like.

1.14.1 From Severus Marcus had the impression of a state with the same laws for all and of a kingship that honours above all the freedom of the governed.

1.16.2 Antoninus showed considerateness, leaving his friends free not to dine with him every time nor go with him on his journeys as a matter of course, and exact and persistent inquiry in council.

1.16.3 Antoninus kept constant guard over what the empire needed and spent its funds sparingly, with no courting of the people and no playing to the crowd.

1.16.4 No one could have called Antoninus a sophist, a pert house-slave or a pedant, but a man mature, complete and able to govern his own affairs and those of others.

1.16.6 Antoninus did everything according to ancestral custom, without making a point of appearing to guard it.

1.17.3 Under Antoninus, ruler and father, Marcus learned that one can live at court without bodyguards and pomp, near the style of a private citizen, and not be slacker in what must be done as a ruler on behalf of public matters.

3.3 Alexander, Pompey, the Roman general of the first century BC, and Gaius Caesar, after destroying whole cities, themselves at last departed from life.

3.5 The god within is to be the guardian of a living being that is male, elderly, civic, Roman and a ruler, who has taken up his post.

3.6.3 The praise of the many, office, wealth and the enjoyment of pleasures are not to be set up against the good of a rational being.

4.3.1 The brief reminders Marcus finds within are to send him back not resenting what he returns to.

4.12 Marcus is to do only what the reason of the kingly and law-giving art suggests for the benefit of men, and to shift position if someone sets him right.

4.28 Among the characters Marcus lists is the tyrannical.

4.31 Marcus is to go through the rest of life making himself neither tyrant nor slave of any man.

4.32.1 In the times of Vespasian men were craving consulships and kingships, and that life of theirs is no longer anywhere.

4.48.1 Tyrants who used authority over souls with terrible arrogance, as though immortal, are dead.

5.11 Marcus asks whose soul he now has, a child's, a silly woman's, a tyrant's or a beast's.

5.16 Where it is possible to live, it is possible also to live well; it is possible to live at court; so it is possible also to live well at court.

6.12 The court and philosophy are to Marcus as a stepmother and a mother: he serves the one and returns often to the other, thanks to whom the things there seem bearable to him and he bearable among them.

6.30.1 Marcus is to see that he is not made into a Caesar and dyed, and to keep himself simple, good, a friend of what is just, pious, kindly and vigorous for seemly work.

6.34 Robbers, catamites, parricides and tyrants have felt pleasures.

6.47 Clever orators, philosophers, heroes, generals and tyrants are dead.

7.36 In a saying of Antisthenes, the companion of Socrates, it is kingly to do well and be ill spoken of.

7.45 Marcus copies the words of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, in Plato's *Apology* on staying where a man has posted himself or been posted by a commander.

7.49 Marcus is to look back on the past, the so many changes of empires; the future can be foreseen, for it will be of one form.

8.9 No one, not even Marcus himself, is to hear him blaming life at court any longer.

8.30 Marcus is to speak, in the senate and to anyone, in good order and not obtrusively.

8.31 The court of Augustus, with his family, friends, philosopher and doctors, is the death of a whole court.

8.41 No one else is accustomed to impede what is peculiar to the mind: fire does not touch it, nor iron, nor a tyrant, nor slander, when it has become a sphere.

9.23 An action without reference to the social end is seditious, like a man in a people who stands separate from its concord.

10.10 A spider is proud of catching a fly, another man of catching bears, another of catching Sarmatians; Marcus asks whether these are not robbers.

10.27 Marcus is to set before his eyes whole dramas and scenes of one form, the whole courts of Hadrian, Antoninus, Philip, Alexander and Croesus, which were such, only through others.

10.31 When Marcus looks at himself he is to form an impression of one of the Caesars, and ask where they are.

11.18.6 To allow the base to be such towards others and expect them not to wrong oneself is unfair and tyrannical.

11.29 In writing and reading one will not rule before one has been ruled, and far more so in life.

12.36 Marcus asks what is terrible if it is not a tyrant nor an unjust judge that sends him from the city, but the nature that brought him in, as if a praetor released a comic actor from the stage.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoics held that the wise man will take part in public life if nothing prevents him, as Chrysippus, the school's third head, says in the first book of his *On Lives*, for he will hold vice in check and spur men on to virtue. Not only are the wise free (see Moral choice and freedom) but they alone are kings, kingship being rule answerable to no one; for the ruler, Chrysippus says, must know about good and bad things, and none of the bad knows them; so too only the wise are fit to rule, to judge and to speak in public, as Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports.[399] Marcus' "kingly and law-giving art" (4.12; see Learning, practice and correction) can be read beside this account. Epictetus speaks of the court as it was. A discourse that bears the title "To those who are eager for advancement at Rome" tells of an older man, afterwards put in charge of the grain at Rome, who passed through on his return from exile running down his former life and promising to spend what was left of it in quiet. Epictetus told him that at the first smell of Rome he would forget it all, and if he were given any way into the court he would push in, rejoicing and thanking God. "Epictetus, if ever you catch me with a foot in the court, suppose of me what you please," the man answered; but while he was still on the road, writing-tablets from Caesar came to meet him, and once he had them he forgot all of it.[400] Marcus' "Let no one hear you any longer blaming life at court" (8.9) can be read as the rule of a man who cannot leave the court and will not make a show of disdaining it. In the discourse "On freedom from fear" a hearer answers that the tyrant is made fearsome by his bodyguards and their swords, his chamberlain and the men

[399] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.121–122, citing Chrysippus, *On Lives* book 1, and *On Zeno's Proper Use of Terms*.

[400] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.10 (title) and 1.10.2–5.

who shut out visitors; Epictetus replies that these frighten only one who cares for what they can take away, and that offices are scattered like figs and nuts among children: a praetorship or a consulship is for the children to scramble for.[401] The conception Marcus learned from Antoninus, that one can live at court "without needing bodyguards" (1.17.3), can be read beside it. The senate had its example in Helvidius Priscus, executed under Vespasian, son-in-law of Thrasea Paetus, whom Nero forced to suicide; Marcus names both in his debt to Severus (1.14.1). When Vespasian sent word that he was not to come into the senate, he answered that it was in Vespasian's power not to let him be a senator, but as long as he was one he must go in; told to go in and keep silent, he said that if he was not asked his opinion he would keep silent, but if asked he must say what seemed just; and to the threat of death he asked when he had ever said that he was immortal: it was the emperor's part to kill, and his own to die without trembling.[402]

Translation in this edition

Αὐλή is "court" at all eleven of its occurrences: "to live at court" (1.17.3), "the whole court" (4.3.1, with the αὐλήν of Capel Lofft, whose edition of the *Meditations* appeared in 1863; 10.27 three times), "at court" (5.16 twice), "the court" (6.12), "life at court" (8.9), and "the court of Augustus" and "a whole court" (8.31). Ἄρχων is "ruler" (1.17.3, 3.5) and, in the words of Plato's *Apology* quoted at 7.45, "a commander". Ἀρχή is "the empire" in "what the empire needed" (1.16.3) and "office" for the plural ἀρχάς (*archas*; 3.6.3); elsewhere it is "beginning" (4.26, 4.33, 5.32, 8.20, 9.1.4, 11.8), "starting point" (5.14) and "in the first place" (8.34). Ἄρχειν is "rule" and, in the passive, "have been ruled" (11.29), and its passive participle "the governed" (1.14.1); in the middle it is "begin" in its forms (3.1, 4.10, 6.15, 9.40, 10.37, 11.18.5, 12.1.2). The adverb ἡγεμονικῶς is "as a ruler" (1.17.3; see Ruling centre). Βασιλεία is "kingship" (1.14.1) and "kingships" (4.32.1), βασιλικός "kingly" (4.12, 7.36). Καῖσαρ is "Caesar" in "Gaius Caesar" (3.3) and "the Caesars" (10.31), and ἀποκαισαρωθῇς (*apokaisarōthēis*) "made into a Caesar" (6.30.1). Ἡγεμονία is "empires" (7.49), ὑπατεία "consulships" (4.32.1), σύγκλητος "the senate" (8.30) and δῆμος "a people" (9.23). Στρατηγός is "generals"

[401] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.7 (title), 4.7.1–5 and 4.7.22–23.

[402] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.2.19–21.

(6.47) and "praetor" (12.36). Τύραννος is "tyrant" (4.31, 5.11, 8.41, 12.36) and "tyrants" (4.48.1, 6.34, 6.47); τυραννικός is "of a tyrant" (1.11) and "tyrannical" (4.28, 11.18.6). In the portrait of Antoninus κοινονοημοσύνη is "considerateness" and συμβούλιον, in the plural, "council" (1.16.2), δημοκοπικόν (*dēmokopikon*) "courting of the people", ἀρεσκευτικόν (*areskeutikon*) "eagerness to please" (see Resentment and welcome) and ὀχλοχαρές (*ochlochares*) "playing to the crowd" (1.16.3), οὐερνάκλος "pert house-slave" and προεστάναι (*proestanai*) "govern" (1.16.4), and τὰ πάτρια (*ta patria*) "ancestral custom" (1.16.6). Κολακεία is "flattery" (1.9.2, 1.16.3), κολακεύειν "flatter" (5.5), "flattering" (4.32.1, 11.18.5) and, in the passive, "be flattered" (10.8.4), and ἀκολάκευτος "proof against flattery" (1.16.4). At 1.17.3 "bodyguards" renders δορυφορήσεις (*doryphorēseis*), "robes of state" ἐσθῆτες σημειώδεις (*esthētes sēmeiōdeis*), "pomp" κόμπος (*kompos*), "a private citizen" ἰδιώτης (*idiōtēs*; see Philosophy) and "public matters" τὰ κοινά (*ta koina*). Ὑπόθεσις (see Principles and reminders) is "station" where the edition's note takes it for Marcus' position as emperor (8.1, 11.7; see Philosophy), and "to stand at their head" at 11.18.1 renders προστησόμενος (*prostēsomenos*; see Anger).

ἀκολάκευτος

Attested: ἀκολάκευτος (*akolakeutos*; 1.16.4). Not to be flattered, proof against flattery. No one could have called Antoninus a sophist, a pert house-slave or a pedant, "but a man mature, complete, proof against flattery, able to govern his own affairs and those of others" (1.16.4). Lemma: ἀκολάκευτος.

ἀποκαισαρόομαι

Attested: ἀποκαισαρωθῇς (*apokaisarōthēis*; 6.30.1). To be made into a Caesar, "Caesar-ed"; the edition's note calls it apparently Marcus' coinage, and it occurs only here. "See that you are not made into a Caesar, that you are not dyed; for it happens" (6.30.1). A, the Vatican manuscript, has ἀποκαισαριανωθῇς (*apokaisarianōthēis*), built on Καισαριανός (*Kaisarianos*), the word Epictetus uses for a member of Caesar's household.[403] Lemma: ἀποκαισαρόομαι.

[403] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.19.19 and 3.24.117.

ἀρχή

Attested: ἀρχῇ (*archēi*; 1.16.3), ἀρχάς (*archas*; 3.6.3), ἀρχῆς (*archēs*; 4.26, 4.33, 5.14, 8.20, 9.1.4, 11.8), ἀρχήν (*archēn*; 5.32, 8.34). Beginning; rule, empire, office. Of rule, Antoninus' "constant guard over what the empire needed" (1.16.3) and "the praise of the many, or office, or wealth" (3.6.3). Elsewhere a beginning: "from the beginning, everything that happens was fated and spun for you" (4.26), "as flowing from such a beginning and spring" (4.33), and the soul "that knows beginning and end" (5.32). Lemma: ἀρχή.

ἄρχω

Attested: ἀρχομένων (*archomenōn*; 1.14.1), ἄρξηται (*arxētai*; 3.1), ἄρξω (*ērxō*; 4.10), ἄρχοιτο (*archoito*; 6.15), ἄρξαι (*arxai*; 9.40, 11.18.5), ἄρχου (*archou*; 10.37), ἄρξεις (*arxeis*; 11.29), ἀρχθῇς (*archthēis*; 11.29), ἄρξασθαι (*arxasthai*; 12.1.2). In the active, to rule, and in the passive to be ruled; in the middle, to begin. "a kingship that honours above all things the freedom of the governed" (1.14.1); "In writing and reading you will not rule before you have been ruled" (11.29), where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, takes ἀρχθῇς from P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed; A has ἀρχῆς. Of beginning: "Watch closely, then, as you began" (4.10); "begin at last to be a man, while you live" (11.18.5). Lemma: ἄρχω.

ἄρχων

Attested: ἄρχοντι (*archonti*; 1.17.3), ἄρχοντος (*archontos*; 3.5, 7.45). A ruler; a commander. "that I was placed under a ruler and father" (1.17.3); "a living being that is male, elderly, civic, Roman, and a ruler" (3.5); in Socrates' words from Plato's *Apology*, "or is posted by a commander" (7.45). At 7.45 P and A have ὑπάρχοντος (*hyparchontos*); Leopold divides the word as ὑπ' ἄρχοντος (*hyp' archontos*), the reading of Plato's text. Lemma: ἄρχων.

αὐλή

Attested: αὐλῇ (*aulēi*; 1.17.3, 5.16 twice, 8.9), αὐλήν (*aulēn*; 4.3.1, 10.27 three times), αὐλή (*aulē*; 6.12, 8.31), αὐλῆς (*aulēs*; 8.31). A courtyard; a ruler's court. "it is possible also to live well at court" (5.16); "That is what the court and philosophy are to you now" (6.12); "Let no one

hear you any longer blaming life at court, nor you yourself" (8.9); "the death of a whole court" (8.31); "the whole court of Hadrian" (10.27). At 4.3.1 "the whole court" is Lofft's αὐλήν (see Inner retreat and citadel); P has αὐτὴν ἀποκλύσαι (*autēn apoklysai*), "to wash it clean". At 5.16 A omits the rest of the minor premise and the conclusion, keeping only the opening words of the premise, ἐν αὐλῇ (*en aulēi*), "at court". Lemma: αὐλή.

βασιλεία

Attested: βασιλείας (*basileias*; 1.14.1, 4.32.1). Kingship. "a kingship that honours above all things the freedom of the governed" (1.14.1); "craving consulships, kingships" (4.32.1). Lemma: βασιλεία.

βασιλικός

Attested: βασιλικῆς (*basilikēs*; 4.12), βασιλικόν (*basilikon*; 7.36). Kingly, of a king. "the reason of the kingly and law-giving art" (4.12); "It is kingly to do well and be ill spoken of" (7.36), a saying of Antisthenes. Lemma: βασιλικός.

δημοκοπικός

Attested: δημοκοπικόν (*dēmokopikon*; 1.16.3). Courting the people, playing the demagogue; with the article, the courting of the people. In Antoninus, "towards men no courting of the people, no eagerness to please, no playing to the crowd" (1.16.3). Lemma: δημοκοπικός.

δῆμος

Attested: δήμῳ (*dēmōi*; 9.23). A people, a citizen body. An action without reference to the social end "is seditious, like the man in a people who, for his own part, stands separate from such concord" (9.23; see Kinship and cooperation). Lemma: δῆμος.

ἡγεμονία

Attested: ἡγεμονιῶν (*hēgemoniōn*; 7.49). Leadership, rule; in the plural, empires. "Look back on the past, the so many changes of empires" (7.49). A proposal of John Jackson, whose English translation appeared at Oxford in 1906, which Leopold's apparatus reports, would move the words to 7.48. Lemma: ἡγεμονία.

Καῖσαρ

Attested: Καῖσαρ (*Kaisar*; 3.3), Καισάρων (*Kaisarōn*; 10.31). Caesar, the name of Julius Caesar and of the emperors after him. “Alexander and Pompey and Gaius Caesar … themselves at last departed from life” (3.3); “form an impression of one of the Caesars” (10.31). At 10.31 A omits the words “and when you look at yourself, form an impression of one of the Caesars”. Lemma: Καῖσαρ.

κοινονοημοσύνη

Attested: κοινονοημοσύνη (*koinonoēmosynē*; 1.16.2). Considerateness, a sense of what is fitting towards others. In Antoninus, “considerateness, and leaving his friends free not to dine with him every time nor go with him on his journeys as a matter of course” (1.16.2). D, the Darmstadt manuscript, omits the clause. Lemma: κοινονοημοσύνη.

κολακεία

Attested: κολακείας (*kolakeias*; 1.9.2), κολακείαν (*kolakeian*; 1.16.3). Flattery. Sextus’ company “was more agreeable than any flattery” (1.9.2; see Kindness and correction); in Antoninus, “the checking, in his time, of acclamations and of every kind of flattery” (1.16.3), where “checking” is the correction of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ σταλῆναι (*stalēnai*). Lemma: κολακεία.

κολακεύω

Attested: κολακεύοντας (*kolakeuontas*; 4.32.1), κολακεύειν (*kolakeuein*; 5.5, 11.18.5), κολακεύεσθαι (*kolakeuesthai*; 10.8.4). To flatter, to fawn on. In the times of Vespasian men were “flattering, being self-willed, suspecting” (4.32.1; see Death); Marcus asks whether a want of talent compels him “to grumble, to be stingy, to flatter” (5.5); the gods “want not to be flattered, but want all rational beings to be assimilated to themselves” (10.8.4); and “one must guard equally against being angry with them and flattering them” (11.18.5; see Anger). Lemma: κολακεύω.

μητρυιά

Attested: μητρυιάν (*mētryian*; 6.12). A stepmother. “If you had a stepmother and a mother at the same time, you would serve the one, and yet your return to the mother would be continual. That is what the court and philosophy are to you now” (6.12; see Philosophy). Lemma: μητρυιά.

οὐερνάκλος

Attested: οὐερνάκλος (*ouernaklos*; 1.16.4). The Latin *vernaculus*, a slave born in the house, proverbially cheeky, as the edition's note explains. No one could have called Antoninus "a sophist, or a pert house-slave, or a pedant, but a man mature, complete, proof against flattery, able to govern his own affairs and those of others" (1.16.4). P has οἰκογενὴς οὐερνάκλος (*oikogenēs ouernaklos*), "home-born *vernaculus*", with a Greek gloss beside the Latin word. Lemma: οὐερνάκλος.

ὀχλοχαρής

Attested: ὀχλοχαρές (*ochlochares*; 1.16.3). Delighting the crowd; with the article, playing to the crowd. In Antoninus, "no eagerness to please, no playing to the crowd, but sobriety in everything" (1.16.3). Lemma: ὀχλοχαρής.

πάτριος

Attested: πάτρια (*patria*; 1.16.6 twice). Of one's fathers; with the article, ancestral custom. Antoninus did "everything according to ancestral custom, yet not making a point of appearing to do this very thing, to guard ancestral custom" (1.16.6). H. I. Polak, whose notes on the text appeared in *Hermes* in 1886, deleted the closing words, "to guard ancestral custom", as Leopold's apparatus reports. Lemma: πάτριος.

ποικιλία

Attested: ποικιλία (*poikilia*; 1.11). Many-colouredness; in conduct, double-dealing. From Fronto, "to have attended to what the envy, the double-dealing and the pretence of a tyrant are like" (1.11). Lemma: ποικιλία.

προΐστημι

Attested: προεστάναι (*proestanai*; 1.16.4), προστησόμενος (*prostēsomenos*; 11.18.1). In the intransitive tenses, to stand before, to be set over, to govern. Antoninus was a man "able to govern his own affairs and those of others" (1.16.4); and Marcus reckons that he has come to be "to stand at their head, as a ram over the flock or a bull over the herd" (11.18.1; see Anger). Lemma: προΐστημι.

στρατηγός

Attested: στρατηγοί (*stratēgoi*; 6.47), στρατηγός (*stratēgos*; 12.36). A general; at Rome, a praetor, who gave

the public games and engaged the actors, as the edition's note explains. "so many generals and tyrants after" (6.47); "as if the praetor who had engaged a comic actor should release him from the stage" (12.36; see Drama and role). At 12.36 August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, proposed χορηγός (*chorēgos*), "producer". Lemma: στρατηγός.

συμβούλιον

Attested: συμβουλίοις (*symbouliois*; 1.16.2). A council. In Antoninus, "exact inquiry in council, and persistence, and not being one to abandon an investigation early" (1.16.2); the last words give the sense of the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, since the manuscripts' words, which Leopold prints, do not construe. Lemma: συμβούλιον.

σύγκλητος

Attested: συγκλήτῳ (*synklētōi*; 8.30). The senate. "Speak, both in the senate and to anyone whatever, in good order, not obtrusively" (8.30; see Speech and silence). Lemma: σύγκλητος.

τυραννικός

Attested: τυραννική (*tyrannikē*; 1.11), τυραννικόν (*tyrannikon*; 4.28, 11.18.6). Of a tyrant, tyrannical. "the envy, the double-dealing and the pretence of a tyrant" (1.11); among the characters, "huckstering, tyrannical" (4.28); to expect the base not to wrong oneself "is unfair and tyrannical" (11.18.6). Lemma: τυραννικός.

τύραννος

Attested: τύραννον (*tyrannon*; 4.31), τύραννοι (*tyrannoi*; 4.48.1, 6.34, 6.47), τυράννου (*tyrannou*; 5.11), τύραννος (*tyrannos*; 8.41, 12.36). A tyrant, one who rules without law. "making yourself neither tyrant nor slave of any man" (4.31); "A tyrant's?" (5.11); "how many tyrants who used authority over souls with terrible arrogance, as though immortal" (4.48.1); fire does not touch the mind, "nor iron, nor a tyrant" (8.41); "if it is not a tyrant nor an unjust judge that sends you away from the city" (12.36). Lemma: τύραννος.

ὑπατεία

Attested: ὑπατείας (*hypateias*; 4.32.1). The consulship. In the times of Vespasian, men "craving consulships, kingships" (4.32.1). Lemma: ὑπατεία.

See also

Anger; Antoninus Pius; Citizenship; Daimon; Death; Drama and role; Exemplary lives; Impression; Inner retreat and citadel; Kindness and correction; Kinship and cooperation; Learning, practice and correction; Moral choice and freedom; Philosophy; Principles and reminders; Resentment and welcome; Ruling centre; Severus; Speech and silence.

Drama and role

Tragedy, comedy and the stage of life · Meditations

τραγῳδία, tragōidia, "tragedy", "tragedies"; *τραγῳδός, tragōidos*, "tragic actor"; *τραγῳδεῖν, tragōidein*, "played the tragic part"; *ἀτραγῴδως, atragōidōs*, "without theatre", "without tragic display"; *κωμῳδία, kōmōidia*, "Comedy"; *κωμικός, kōmikos*, "the comic poet"; *κωμῳδός, kōmōidos*, "comic actor"; *δρᾶμα, drama*, "play", "plays", "dramas", "drama"; *διαδραματίζειν, diadramatizein*, "played out the play"; *δραματουργία, dramatourgia*, "dramaturgy"; *ἐπιβολή, epibolē*, "project"; *σκηνή, skēnē*, "stage", "scenes"; *ἀμφιθέατρον, amphitheatron*, "amphitheatre"; *μῖμος, mimos*, "Mime"

At a Glance

The word. Τραγῳδία is tragedy and the τραγῳδός its actor; κωμῳδία is comedy. Δρᾶμα, from δρᾶν, "to do", is a play, and σκηνή, first a booth, the stage. The Stoic word for a role, πρόσωπον, the actor's mask, is not Marcus': for him it is a face.

In the *Meditations*. Tragedy is a reminder: what delights on the stage should not annoy "on the greater stage" (11.6.1), and the courts of history are "whole dramas and scenes of one form" (10.27). Marcus will not play tragedy himself: a man who has chosen his own mind "makes no tragedy" (3.7), and readiness for death comes "without tragic display" (11.3). The actor gives him his account of a complete life: "in life the three are the whole drama" (12.36).

In this edition. Τραγῳδία is "tragedy", τραγῳδός "tragic actor" and κωμῳδός "comic actor"; δρᾶμα is "play", "plays",

“dramas” or “drama”; σκηνή is “stage”, and “scenes” at 10.27; ἀτραγῳδως is “without theatre” (1.16.3) and “without tragic display” (11.3).

A place to read. 11.6.1, where tragedies were brought on as reminders of what happens, and what delights on the stage is not to annoy on the greater stage.

Meaning

Τραγῳδία (*tragōidia*) is built on τράγος (*tragos*), “goat”, and ᾠδή (*ōidē*), “song”, and κωμῳδία (*kōmōidia*) on κῶμος (*kōmos*), “revel”; the τραγῳδός (*tragōidos*) and the κωμῳδός (*kōmōidos*) are their actors. Δρᾶμα (*drama*), from δρᾶν (*dran*), is a thing done, a play; σκηνή (*skēnē*), a tent or booth, became the stage building and the stage. In Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, the actor’s role, πρόσωπον (*prosōpon*), the mask and so the part, is a word of Stoic teaching;[404] in the *Meditations* πρόσωπον is always a face (6.30.2, 7.24, 7.37, 7.60), and the theatre serves Marcus as an image, not a term.

Use in the book

Marcus’ short history of the stage begins with tragedy as a reminder. “First, tragedies were brought on as reminders of what happens … and that by the things that delight you on the stage you should not be annoyed on the greater stage; for you see that these things must be brought to their end so, and that even those who cry out ‘Alas, Cithaeron!’ bear them” (11.6.1). The cry is Oedipus’ in the *Oedipus the King* of Sophocles, the Athenian tragic poet, as the edition’s note says. “And some things too are said usefully by the makers of the dramas”, and three lines of Euripides, another Athenian tragic poet, follow. After the Old Comedy, Marcus asks of the later comedy to what target “the whole project of such poetry and dramaturgy” ever looked (11.6.2; see Speech and silence). The theatre is judged by its use, which is to make what happens on the greater stage familiar.

The same image turns history into a repertory. Marcus is to set before his eyes “whole dramas and scenes of one form”: “the whole court of Hadrian, and the whole court of Antoninus, and the whole court of Philip, Alexander, Croesus; for all those were such, only through others” (10.27). Hadrian and Antoninus Pius were the emperors

[404] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.2 (title), 1.2.7 and 1.2.14; *Handbook* 17.

before Marcus, Philip II of Macedon was the father of Alexander the Great, and Croesus was king of Lydia. The plays stay; the actors change. The shows in the amphitheatre sicken “because the same things are always seen”, and Marcus is to “feel it with the whole of life too” (6.46; see Recurrence and repetition). Among the trifles are “plays on the stage”, and among them one must stand “kindly and without arrogance” (7.3).

What Marcus refuses is to play tragedy himself. The man who has chosen his own mind and daimon before all else “makes no tragedy, utters no groan” (3.7; see Daimon); the soul’s readiness for death is to come “with reckoning and dignity and, so as to persuade another too, without tragic display” (11.3; see Soul); and Antoninus arranged even the smallest matters in advance “without theatre” (1.16.3). Of Alexander, Philip and Demetrius of Phalerum, who governed Athens for ten years, Marcus writes: “if they played the tragic part, no one has condemned me to imitate” (9.29; see Exemplary lives).

The actor also gives Marcus his account of a complete life. Doom does not overtake the purified man’s life unfinished, “as one might say of a tragic actor who leaves before he has finished and played out the play” (3.8). The rational soul attains its end wherever life is cut short, “not as in a dance or in acting and the like, where the whole action is left incomplete if something cuts it short” (11.1.1; see Soul). At the end of the book Marcus asks what is terrible if it is not a tyrant but the nature that brought him in that sends him from the city, “as if the praetor who had engaged a comic actor should release him from the stage”; then come the actor’s complaint and its answer: “But I have not spoken the five acts, but the three.—You have said it well; but in life the three are the whole drama. For the complete is determined by him who was then the cause of the compounding and now of the dissolution; but you are the cause of neither” (12.36). The length of the play can be read as not the actor’s to set, and his part within it as his own: the governor of the whole “will in any case make good use of you”, but Marcus is not to become such a part as the cheap and ridiculous line in the play which Chrysippus, the Stoic school’s third head, mentions (6.42; see Kinship and cooperation).

The theatre can be read as teaching Marcus two things: that what happens runs to an end already written, and that a life may stop at any act and still be whole. What it must not

teach him is to perform: watched, the stage reminds; played, it becomes the tragic display he refuses.

Places to read

Every chapter in which τραγῳδία, τραγῳδός, τραγῳδεῖν (*tragōidein*), ἀτραγῴδως (*atragōidōs*), κωμῳδία, κωμικός (*kōmikos*), κωμῳδός, δρᾶμα, διαδραματίζειν (*diadramatizein*), δραματουργία (*dramatourgia*), σκηνή, ἀμφιθέατρον (*amphitheatron*) or μῖμος (*mimos*) occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with 11.1.1, where ὑπόκρισις (*hypokrisis*) is acting on the stage; the one place of ἐπιβολή (*epibolē*) falls among them. Ὑπόκρισις and ὑποκρίνεσθαι (*hypokrinesthai*) where they are pretence (see Simplicity and sincerity), and πρόσωπον, which is always a face, are left out.

1.16.3 Antoninus looked ahead from far off and arranged the smallest matters in advance without theatre.

3.7 A man who has chosen his own mind and daimon before all else makes no tragedy and utters no groan.

3.8 Doom does not overtake the purified man's life unfinished, as one might say of a tragic actor who leaves before he has finished and played out the play.

5.12 Having first conceived of what the many think goods, one readily receives the comic poet's line about them, which would not fit things truly good.

5.28 After the argument against anger at the man whose armpits stink come the words "Neither tragic actor nor whore".

6.42 All work together towards one outcome, even the man who opposes; Marcus is not to become such a part as the cheap and ridiculous line in the play which Chrysippus mentions.

6.46 As the shows in the amphitheatre sicken because the same things are always seen, so Marcus is to feel it with the whole of life.

7.3 Plays on the stage are among the trifles, the empty seriousness of a procession and the rest, among which one must stand kindly and without arrogance.

9.29 If Alexander, Philip and Demetrius of Phalerum played the tragic part, no one has condemned Marcus to imitate them.

10.9 Mime, war, flutter, torpor, slavery: day by day the sacred principles that Marcus forms impressions of and lets pass will be wiped away.

10.27 Marcus is to set before his eyes whole dramas and scenes of one form, the courts of Hadrian, Antoninus, Philip, Alexander and Croesus, which were such, only through others.

11.1.1 The rational soul attains its end wherever life is cut short, not as in a dance or in acting, where the whole action is left incomplete.

11.3 Readiness for death is to come from a judgement of its own, with reckoning and dignity and without tragic display.

11.6.1 Tragedies were brought on as reminders of what happens, and that what delights on the stage should not annoy on the greater stage; the makers of the dramas also say some things usefully.

11.6.2 After tragedy the Old Comedy reminded men of freedom from vanity; Marcus asks to what target the whole project of the later comedy's poetry and dramaturgy ever looked.

12.2 Whoever does not look at the bits of flesh around him will still less be busied with gazing at clothing, house, fame and such wrapping and stage.

12.36 Marcus asks what is terrible if nature, not a tyrant, sends him from the city, as if a praetor released a comic actor from the stage; to the complaint that he has spoken three acts, not five, the answer is that in life the three are the whole drama.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus gave the school's theatre of life its rule. The *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of his teaching, bids its reader remember that he is an actor in a play of whatever kind the playwright wishes, short if he wishes it short, long if long; if the playwright wants him to act a beggar, he is to act even that part with skill, and so a lame man, a ruler or a private man; for his business is to play the role he has been handed, and to play it well, and the choosing of it lies with someone

else.[405] Marcus' "in life the three are the whole drama" (12.36), with the length set by "him who was then the cause of the compounding", can be read beside the playwright who decides how long the play shall be. A discourse that bears the title "How one may keep to one's role in everything" turns on πρόσωπον: in judging what is reasonable a man weighs not only the worth of external things but what accords with his own role. When Florus was considering whether to go down to Nero's shows and take a part in them himself, Agrippinus, a senator whose trial before the senate Epictetus also recounts, told him to go; asked why he did not go himself, he answered, "I do not even consider it." To the man who says that he will be beheaded unless he plays in tragedy, τραγῳδεῖν, Marcus' verb at 9.29, Epictetus answers, "Go, then, and play in tragedy; I shall not," and he would rather be the purple, the small bright stripe that makes the rest of the garment look fine, than one thread like the others.[406] Tragedy, he says elsewhere, has its place among the rich and among kings and tyrants, and no poor man fills a tragedy except as one of the chorus: kings begin with good things, "Garland the halls", and about the third or fourth act comes "Alas, Cithaeron, why did you receive me?"; whoever goes up to one of them is to remember that he goes up to a figure of tragedy, not the actor but Oedipus himself.[407] J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, compares the passage in his testimonia, the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it, at 11.6.1, as the edition's note records. Chrysippus used comedy otherwise. As Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, reports him, comedies carry ridiculous lines which are worthless in themselves but add a certain grace to the whole poem, and so vice, blameworthy in itself, is not useless to the whole. Diadumenus, the Academic speaker of Plutarch's dialogue *On Common Conceptions*, answers that Zeus did not make the universe a great and varied drama of many parts but a common city of gods and men.[408] At 6.42 Marcus grants that

[405] Epictetus, *Handbook* 17.

[406] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.2 (title), 1.2.7, 1.2.12–18; Agrippinus' trial, 1.1.28–30.

[407] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.24.15–18; Leopold's testimonia at 11.6.1, as the edition's note records, cite 1.24.16.

[408] Plutarch, *On Common Conceptions* 1065d (Chrysippus, fragment 1181 von Arnim, as the edition's note at 6.42 records) and 1065e–1066a.

the universe makes use even of those who oppose it, and refuses the part of the bad line for himself.

Translation in this edition

Τραγῳδία is “tragedy” (11.6.2), “tragedies” (11.6.1) and, with ποιεῖν (*poiein*), “makes no tragedy” (3.7). Τραγῳδός is “a tragic actor” (3.8) and “tragic actor” (5.28), and the verb τραγῳδεῖν “played the tragic part” (9.29). The adverb ἀτραγῴδως is “without theatre” (1.16.3) and “without tragic display” (11.3). Κωμῳδία is “Comedy” in “the Old Comedy” and “the Middle Comedy” (11.6.2), κωμικός “the comic poet” (5.12) and κωμῳδός “a comic actor” (12.36). Δρᾶμα is “the play” (6.42), “plays” (7.3), “dramas” (10.27, 11.6.1) and “drama” (12.36); διαδραματίσαι (*diadramatisai*) is “played out the play” (3.8), and δραματουργία “dramaturgy” and ἐπιβολή “project” (11.6.2). Σκηνή is “the stage” (7.3, 11.6.1, 12.36), “stage” in “such wrapping and stage” (12.2), “the greater stage” for ἡ μείζων σκηνή (*hē meizōn skēnē*; 11.6.1) and “scenes” (10.27). Ἀμφιθέατρον is “the amphitheatre” (6.46), where “the spectacle” renders θέα (*thea*) and “the uniformity” τὸ ὁμοειδές (*to homoeides*; see Recurrence and repetition); μῖμος is “Mime” (10.9). “Acts” at 12.36 renders μέρη (*merē*), “parts” (see Whole and part); “delight” at 11.6.1 renders ψυχαγωγεῖσθαι (*psychagōgeisthai*; see Natural beauty). Ὑπόκρισις is “acting” at 11.1.1, of the stage, and “pretence” elsewhere (see Simplicity and sincerity); ὑποκριτής (*hypokritēs*), the actor, does not occur, and the book’s actors are the τραγῳδός and the κωμῳδός. “Praetor” at 12.36 renders στρατηγός (*stratēgos*; see Court and office). Πρόσωπον is “face” at all four of its places (6.30.2, 7.24, 7.37, 7.60). Θέατρον (*theatron*) does not stand in the text the edition prints: “without theatre” (1.16.3) renders ἀτραγῴδως, and at 6.46 only P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has the word.

ἀμφιθέατρον

Attested: ἀμφιθεάτρῳ (*amphitheatrōi*; 6.46). An amphitheatre, the round building of the shows. “As the shows in the amphitheatre and such places sicken you, because the same things are always seen, and the uniformity makes the spectacle cloying, so feel it with the whole of life too” (6.46). The word is the reading of A, the Vatican manuscript; P has τὰ ἀμφὶ τῷ θεάτρῳ (*ta amphi tōi*

theatrōi), “the things about the theatre”. Lemma: ἀμφιθέατρον.

ἀτραγῴδως

Attested: ἀτραγῴδως (*atragōidōs*; 1.16.3, 11.3). Without the airs of tragedy. Of Antoninus, “arranging the smallest matters in advance without theatre” (1.16.3); of the soul ready to be released, “with reckoning and dignity and, so as to persuade another too, without tragic display” (11.3; see Soul). Lemma: ἀτραγῴδως.

διαδραματίζω

Attested: διαδραματίσαι (*diadramatisai*; 3.8). To play a drama through to its end. Doom does not overtake the purified man’s life unfinished, “as one might say of a tragic actor who leaves before he has finished and played out the play” (3.8). Lemma: διαδραματίζω.

δρᾶμα

Attested: δράματι (*dramati*; 6.42), δράματα (*dramata*; 7.3, 10.27, 11.6.1), δρᾶμα (*drama*; 12.36). A thing acted, a play. “the cheap and ridiculous line in the play which Chrysippus mentions” (6.42); “plays on the stage” (7.3); “whole dramas and scenes of one form” (10.27); “the makers of the dramas” (11.6.1); “in life the three are the whole drama” (12.36). Lemma: δρᾶμα.

δραματουργία

Attested: δραματουργίας (*dramatourgias*; 11.6.2). The making of plays, dramaturgy. “the whole project of such poetry and dramaturgy, to what target did it ever look?” (11.6.2; see Speech and silence). Lemma: δραματουργία.

ἐπιβολή

Attested: ἐπιβολή (*epibolē*; 11.6.2). An undertaking, a project, what a work as a whole is set upon. Of the Middle and New Comedy: “that some useful things are said by these too is not unknown; but the whole project of such poetry and dramaturgy, to what target did it ever look?” (11.6.2). Lemma: ἐπιβολή.

κωμικός

Attested: κωμικοῦ (*kōmikou*; 5.12). Of comedy; as a noun, a comic poet. The many readily receive “what the comic poet said” (5.12), a line of Menander, as the edition’s note

identifies it (see Good, bad and indifference). Lemma: κωμικός.

κωμῳδία

Attested: κωμῳδία (*kōmōidia*; 11.6.2 twice). Comedy. “After tragedy the Old Comedy was brought on, with a schoolmaster’s frankness” (11.6.2); “the Middle Comedy and then the New” (11.6.2; see Speech and silence). Lemma: κωμῳδία.

κωμῳδός

Attested: κωμῳδόν (*kōmōidon*; 12.36). A comic actor. “as if the praetor who had engaged a comic actor should release him from the stage?” (12.36). Lemma: κωμῳδός.

μῖμος

Attested: μῖμος (*mimos*; 10.9). A mime, the popular farce of the stage. “Mime, war, flutter, torpor, slavery: day by day those sacred principles of yours will be wiped away” (10.9). The word is the reading of the witnesses; Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, proposed λοιμός (*loimos*), “plague”, in his Basel edition, and Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, μῖσος (*misos*), “hatred”. Lemma: μῖμος.

σκηνή

Attested: σκηνῆς (*skēnēs*; 7.3, 11.6.1 twice, 12.36), σκηνάς (*skēnas*; 10.27), σκηνήν (*skēnēn*; 12.2). A booth; the stage; a scene. “plays on the stage” (7.3); “whole dramas and scenes of one form” (10.27); “by the things that delight you on the stage you should not be annoyed on the greater stage” (11.6.1); “such wrapping and stage” (12.2; see Body and flesh); “should release him from the stage” (12.36). At 12.2 Coraes proposed σκευήν (*skeuēn*), “apparel”. Lemma: σκηνή.

τραγῳδέω

Attested: ἐτραγῴδησαν (*etragōidēsan*; 9.29). To act in tragedy, to play the tragic part. Of Alexander, Philip and Demetrius of Phalerum: “but if they played the tragic part, no one has condemned me to imitate” (9.29; see Exemplary lives). D, the Darmstadt manuscript, omits the words from “Go on now” to “imitate”. Lemma: τραγῳδέω.

τραγῳδία

Attested: τραγῳδίαν (*tragōidian*; 3.7, 11.6.2), τραγῳδίαι (*tragōidiai*; 11.6.1). Tragedy. The man who has chosen his own mind "makes no tragedy, utters no groan" (3.7; see Daimon); "First, tragedies were brought on as reminders of what happens" (11.6.1); "After tragedy the Old Comedy was brought on" (11.6.2). Lemma: τραγῳδία.

τραγῳδός

Attested: τραγῳδόν (*tragōidon*; 3.8), τραγῳδός (*tragōidos*; 5.28). A tragic actor. "as one might say of a tragic actor who leaves before he has finished and played out the play" (3.8); "Neither tragic actor nor whore" (5.28). At 5.28 Leopold sets the words apart; A and the Latin version of Xylander begin a new chapter with them, and their point, the edition's note says, is uncertain. Lemma: τραγῳδός.

See also

Body and flesh; Citizenship; Court and office; Daimon; Exemplary lives; Good, bad and indifference; Kinship and cooperation; Natural beauty; Recurrence and repetition; Simplicity and sincerity; Soul; Speech and silence; Whole and part.

Duty and fitting action

What falls to a man to do · Meditations

καθῆκον, kathēkon, "duty"; *καθήκειν, kathēkein*, "be a duty", "duty"; *τὸ πρέπον, to prepon*, "what is seemly", "seemly"; *ἐπιβάλλειν, epiballein*, "fall to", "apply yourself"; *προσήκειν, prosēkein*, "be befitting"; *ἀριθμός, arithmos*, "numbers", "number"; *σχέσις, schesis*, "relations", "relation", "at rest", "pose"; *συμβιοῦν, symbioun*, "live alongside"

At a Glance

The word. Καθῆκον, from καθήκειν, "to come down to", is what falls to someone to do, the Stoic name for the act fitting to a creature's nature. Τὸ πρέπον is what is seemly; ἐπιβάλλειν is "to fall to" as one's share.

In the *Meditations*. The word comes eight times, never defined. Marcus speaks of "the duties that arise from relations with those who live alongside us" (1.12), and reminds himself that "every duty is completed out of certain

numbers" (6.26). But to have the mind "as guide to what appear to be duties" belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods (3.16.1).

In this edition. Καθῆκον is always "duty", and the verb καθήκειν is rendered with the same noun; τὸ πρέπον is "what is seemly" and ἐπιβάλλειν "fall to".

A place to read. 6.26, where Marcus likens a duty to a name spelled out letter by letter, mildly, even if the hearers get angry.

Meaning

Καθήκειν (*kathēkein*), from κατά (*kata*), "down", and ἥκειν (*hēkein*), "to have come", is to reach, and, of a thing, to fall to someone as his part. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoics' teaching in its seventh book, reports that Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school, first called the act τὸ καθῆκον (*to kathēkon*), from "coming to some", κατά τινας ἥκειν (*kata tinas hēkein*), and that the school defined it as what, once done, has a reasonable justification, an activity proper to constitutions that accord with nature.[409] Τὸ πρέπον (*to prepon*), from πρέπειν (*prepein*), "to be conspicuous", "to suit", is what becomes a person; ἐπιβάλλειν (*epiballein*), "to throw upon", is said of a share that falls to someone, and προσήκειν (*prosēkein*) of what befits. Marcus uses the Stoic term without defining it.

Use in the book

Duty begins with the people a man lives among. From Alexander the Platonist, usually identified, as the edition's note says, with Alexander of Seleucia, Marcus' secretary for Greek letters, he learned "not often, nor without necessity, to say to anyone or write in a letter 'I am busy', nor by this means continually to excuse myself from the duties that arise from relations with those who live alongside us, pleading the business in hand" (1.12). Of the three relations, σχέσεις (*scheseis*), that Marcus lists at 8.27, the third is "to those who live alongside us", and he asks himself how he has behaved "towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children, teachers, tutors, friends, kin, household slaves" (5.31).

A duty is done in its parts and in order. "If someone puts it to you how the name Antoninus is written, will you strain

[409] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.107–108.

yourself and bring out each of the letters? What then if they get angry: will you get angry in return? Will you not go through each of the characters mildly, counting them off? So here too remember that every duty is completed out of certain numbers. One must keep these, and, without being disturbed or resenting in return those who resent, bring what is set before one to its end by the road" (6.26). A duty, like the name, has all its parts in their order, and is brought to its end without resentment towards those who resent. The reckoning can be lost: if a man begins to dote, "the exact reckoning of the numbers of duty" is among the things "quenched first" (3.1; see Mind and reason).

Reckoning duties does not make a man good. "To have the mind as guide to what appear to be duties belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods, those who abandon their country, and those who act once they have shut the doors" (3.16.1); what is peculiar to the good man is "to love and welcome what happens to him and is spun for him", and to keep the daimon serene (3.16.2; see Daimon). J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, keeps the clause on the mind as guide where the manuscripts have it; Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, moved it among the good man's marks. In the manuscripts' order, finding one's duties is common to the good man and the godless; what sets him apart is what he loves.

A duty is one's own: "I do my own duty; the other things do not distract me; for they are either soulless, or irrational, or gone astray and not knowing the road" (6.22). A work beyond his understanding Marcus may yield to one who can do it better, "if it is not otherwise a duty", or do it as he can with a helper (7.5; see Contentment and self-sufficiency); and help does not lessen it: "it is set before you to carry out what falls to you, like a soldier in the storming of a wall" (7.7; see Self-respect and shame).

Duty is also a test of action and a support in hardship. "If it is not a duty, do not do it; if it is not true, do not say it" (12.17). And Marcus is by nature able to bear whatever his own opinion can make bearable "by the impression that it is advantageous to yourself, or your duty, to do this" (10.3; see Pain and pleasure).

The seemly, τὸ πρέπον, is the lesser word. Marcus is to be "vigorous for the works that are seemly" (6.30.1); but the man who calls himself a part of the system of rational beings, and not a limb, does not yet love men "from the

heart", and does good "barely, as what is seemly, not yet as doing good to yourself" (7.13; see Kinship and cooperation). Duty in the *Meditations* is relational and exact, reckoned like the letters of a name, and Marcus does not mistake it for goodness (3.16.1). The contrast of 7.13, between good done as what is seemly and good done from love, can be read as his form of the Stoic distinction between the duty any man may do and the right action of the good.

Places to read

Every chapter in which καθῆκον or καθήκειν, τὸ πρέπον, ἐπιβάλλειν in the sense "fall to", or προσήκειν occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with 5.31 and 8.27, where the relations from which duties arise are named without these words. Ἐπιβάλλειν in the sense "apply oneself" (10.30) is left out, and the other places of ἀριθμός, σχέσις and συμβιοῦν are given in the sub-entries.

1.12 From Alexander the Platonist Marcus learned not to say or write "I am busy" often or without necessity, nor by this means continually to excuse himself from the duties that arise from relations with those who live alongside him.

3.1 If a man begins to dote, the exact reckoning of the numbers of duty is among the things needing a thoroughly trained power of reckoning that are quenched first (see Mind and reason).

3.16.1 To have the mind as guide to what appear to be duties belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods, who abandon their country, and who act once they have shut the doors.

4.32.2 The attention given to each action has its own worth and proportion, and Marcus will not lose heart if he does not busy himself with lesser things more than is befitting.

5.15 None of the things that do not fall to a man as a man is to be called a man's; if any of them fell to him, it would not fall to him to despise them.

5.31 Marcus asks how he has behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children, teachers, tutors, friends, kin and household slaves.

6.2 It is to make no difference to Marcus whether he does what is seemly cold or warm, drowsy or

rested, ill or well spoken of, dying or doing something else (see Present action).

6.22 Marcus does his own duty, and the other things do not distract him, for they are soulless, irrational, or gone astray.

6.26 As one goes through the letters of the name Antoninus mildly, without anger at those who get angry, so every duty is completed out of certain numbers, which must be kept, and what is set before one brought to its end by the road.

6.30.1 Marcus is to keep himself simple, good, untainted, a friend of what is just, kindly, affectionate and vigorous for the works that are seemly.

7.5 If his understanding is not sufficient for a work, Marcus yields it to one who can accomplish it better, if it is not otherwise a duty, or does it as he can with a helper (see Contentment and self-sufficiency).

7.7 Marcus is not to be ashamed of being helped, for it is set before him to carry out what falls to him, like a soldier in the storming of a wall; and he asks what then, if being lame he cannot climb onto the battlement alone but can with another.

7.13 If Marcus calls himself a part and not a limb, he does not yet love men from the heart, and does good barely, as what is seemly, not yet as doing good to himself (see Kinship and cooperation).

8.27 Of Marcus' three relations, one is to the divine cause, from which all things happen to all, and one to those who live alongside him.

10.3 Marcus is by nature able to bear everything that his own opinion can make bearable, by the impression that it is advantageous to him or his duty to do this (see Pain and pleasure).

10.25 He who is afraid, distressed or angry is a runaway from the law, which deals out all that falls to each.

12.17 If it is not a duty, Marcus is not to do it; if it is not true, he is not to say it.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius gives the school's division. Duties are what reason dictates doing, such as honouring parents, brothers and country and keeping company with friends; against duty is what reason does not dictate, such as neglecting parents, taking no thought for brothers, failing to share in friends' feelings and slighting one's country; and some acts, such as picking up a twig or holding a stylus, reason neither dictates nor forbids. Some duties are always fitting, such as living according to virtue, and some not always, such as asking and answering or walking about.[410] Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC, who rendered the word *officium*, reports that the Greeks call the perfect duty κατόρθωμα (*katorthōma*), which he renders "right", and the common duty καθῆκον, and that they define the "middle" duty as one for which "a probable reason can be given why it was done". The middle duties are common and reach widely; the right duty, "as the same men say, has all the numbers", and can fall to no one but the wise man. Cato the Younger, the Stoic senator who speaks for the school in the third book of Cicero's *On Ends*, says that right actions "contain all the numbers of virtue", and Cicero, answering him in the fourth, reports Zeno's view that some faults can be borne and some cannot, because some pass over more and some fewer "numbers of duty", as it were.[411] Marcus' "numbers of duty" (3.1) and his duty "completed out of certain numbers" (6.26) keep the idiom, and his word for right actions, κατορθώσεις (*katorthōseis*), stands at 5.14 (see Virtue and excellence). For Cato the first duty is that a creature keep itself in its natural state. Duty lies among the things neither good nor bad, and the wise and the foolish share it, since both by nature take what accords with nature and reject its contrary: to return a deposit is a duty, to return it justly a right action. Both remaining in life and leaving it are duties, weighed by whether a man has more of what accords with nature or has, or seems likely to have, more of its contrary, so that it is sometimes the duty of the wise man to leave life though he is happy.[412] At 3.1, "attending to the very question whether one must now take oneself out of life" stands beside "the exact reckoning of the numbers of duty" (see Death).

[410] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.108–109.

[411] Cicero, *On Duties* 1.8 and 3.14; *On Ends* 3.24 and 4.56.

[412] Cicero, *On Ends* 3.20 and 3.58–61.

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, measures duties by relations. “Duties are on the whole measured by relations”, σχέσεσι (*schesesi*): a man has a father, and is bidden to care for him, give way to him in everything and bear with him when he reviles or strikes. If the father is bad, Epictetus asks whether nature made one kin to a good father, and answers: to a father. The man whose brother wrongs him is to keep his own place towards him, and look not at what the brother does but at what he must do to keep his own choice in accord with nature. “So you will find the duty that comes from a neighbour, from a citizen, from a general, if you grow used to looking at the relations.”[413] In the *Discourses* duties follow from names. After man and citizen of the universe come son, brother, councillor, young man, old man and father, “for each of such names, when it comes to be reckoned, always sketches out the works proper to it”; and among the things a man must attend to is to remember “who we are and what our name is”, and to try to direct his duties by what the relations can bear.[414] Marcus’ “duties that arise from relations with those who live alongside us” (1.12) can be read as Epictetus’ doctrine in Epictetus’ word.

Translation in this edition

Καθῆκον is “duty” at all eight places of the word, in the singular (3.1, 6.22, 6.26) and the plural (1.12, 3.16.1), and the impersonal verb is given with the same noun: “if it is not otherwise a duty” (7.5), “or your duty” (10.3), “If it is not a duty” (12.17). “Duty” renders no other word, and “fitting” does not occur in the English; the Glossary uses it only in its account of the term. Τὸ πρέπον is “what is seemly” (6.2, 7.13); the participle with a noun is “seemly” (6.30.1), and “seemly” renders nothing else. Ἐπιβάλλειν is “fall to” (5.15 three times, 7.7, 10.25) and, of the mind turned on a thing, “apply yourself” (10.30); the noun ἐπιβολή (*epibolē*) is “project” (11.6.2). Προσήκειν is “befitting” (4.32.2). Ἀριθμός is “numbers” (3.1, 6.26) and “number” (4.21.2), and ἐξαριθμεῖν (*exarithmein*) “counting them off” (6.26), where the letters are στοιχεῖα (*stoicheia*), “letters”, and γράμματα (*grammata*), “characters” (see Elements). Σχέσις is “relations” (1.12, 8.27) and “relation” (6.38, 11.18.1), and, of the body, “at rest” (7.60) and “pose” (11.2). Συμβιοῦν is

[413] Epictetus, *Handbook* 30.

[414] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.10.1–3, 2.10.7–11 and 4.12.15–16.

always “live alongside” (1.12, 5.10.1, 6.44.2, 6.48, 8.27); “those who live with us” at 6.48 renders συζῆν (*syzēn*), and συμβίωσις (*symbiōsis*) is “living together” (9.3.2). Ἄσχολος (*ascholos*) is “busy” in “I am busy” (1.12). Ἁρμόζειν (*harmozein*), “accommodate themselves” (6.35), and ἁρμοδιώτερον (*harmodiōteron*), “more suitable” (7.57), are not words of duty.

ἀριθμός

Attested: ἀριθμούς (*arithmous*; 3.1), ἀριθμός (*arithmos*; 4.21.2), ἀριθμῶν (*arithmōn*; 6.26). Number; in the Stoic idiom, the “numbers” of a duty are the parts that make it complete. “the exact reckoning of the numbers of duty” (3.1); “every duty is completed out of certain numbers” (6.26); at 4.21.2 the plain count of the living beings eaten each day, “what a number is consumed”. Lemma: ἀριθμός.

ἐπιβάλλω

Attested: ἐπιβάλλει (*epiballei*; 5.15, 10.25), ἐπιβάλλον (*epiballon*; 5.15 twice, 7.7), ἐπιβάλλων (*epiballōn*; 10.30). To throw upon; used intransitively, to fall to someone as his share; of the mind, to apply oneself. “One must call none of those things a man’s which do not fall to a man as a man” (5.15); “it is set before you to carry out what falls to you” (7.7); the law deals out “all that falls to each” (10.25); “if you apply yourself to this you will quickly forget the anger” (10.30). Lemma: ἐπιβάλλω.

καθήκω

Attested: καθήκοντα (*kathēkonta*; 1.12, 3.16.1), καθήκοντος (*kathēkontos*; 3.1), καθῆκον (*kathēkon*; 6.22, 6.26), καθήκῃ (*kathēkēi*; 7.5), καθήκειν (*kathēkein*; 10.3), καθήκει (*kathēkei*; 12.17). To come down to, to fall to; impersonally, to be fitting, to be a duty; the participle with the article, the Stoic term for the act fitting to a creature’s nature. “I do my own duty” (6.22); “If it is not a duty, do not do it” (12.17), where A, the Vatican manuscript, has the subjunctive καθήκῃ. At 3.16.1 “to have the mind as guide to what appear to be duties” stands, in the manuscripts and in Leopold’s text, among the things shared with the godless; Gataker moved the words to follow “what is peculiar to the good man”. Lemma: καθήκω.

πρέπω

Attested: πρέπον (*prepon*; 6.2, 7.13), πρέποντα (*preponta*; 6.30.1). To be conspicuous, to suit; the participle, what becomes a person, the seemly. “whether you do what is seemly cold or warm” (6.2); “vigorous for the works that are seemly” (6.30.1), where A has τὰ πρότερα ἔργα (*ta protera erga*), “the former works”; “you still do it barely, as what is seemly” (7.13). Lemma: πρέπω.

προσήκω

Attested: προσῆκε (*prosēke*; 4.32.2). To belong to, to befit. The attention given to each action has its own worth and proportion, “for so you will not lose heart, if you do not busy yourself with lesser things more than is befitting” (4.32.2). Lemma: προσήκω.

συμβιόω

Attested: συμβιοῦντας (*symbiountas*; 1.12, 6.44.2, 8.27), συμβιούντων (*symbiountōn*; 5.10.1, 6.48). To live with, to share one’s life with. “the duties that arise from relations with those who live alongside us” (1.12); “consider the merits of those who live alongside you” (6.48); and of the gods, “as to gods present and living alongside us” (6.44.2). Lemma: συμβιόω.

σχέσις

Attested: σχέσεις (*scheseis*; 1.12, 8.27), σχέσιν (*schesin*; 6.38, 11.2), σχέσει (*schesei*; 7.60), σχέσις (*schesis*; 11.18.1). A holding, a state; the relation in which one stands to another; of the body, a posture. “Three relations” (8.27); “what my relation is to them” (11.18.1; see Anger); of all things in the universe, “their relation to one another” (6.38; see Interconnection); of the body, “either in motion or at rest” (7.60), and in dancing, “each motion or pose” (11.2). Lemma: σχέσις.

See also

Anger; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Daimon; Death; Elements; Interconnection; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Pain and pleasure; Present action; Self-respect and shame; Virtue and excellence.

Examples seen, recorded and kept before one · Meditations

παράδειγμα, paradeigma, "example"; *μιμεῖσθαι, mimeisthai*, "imitate", "show in imitation"; *μίμησις, mimēsis*, "imitation"; *ζῆλος, zēlos*, "ambition"; *ζηλοτυπεῖν, zēlotypein*, "be jealous"; *πατρονομεῖσθαι, patronomeisthai*, "governed by its father"; *παραχωρητικός, parachōrētikos*, "giving way"; *παραχωρεῖν, parachōrein*, "yield"; *εὐχαριεντίζεσθαι, eucharientizesthai*, "a gracious wit"; *κῴδιον, kōidion*, "the sheepskin"

At a Glance

The word. Παράδειγμα, from παραδεικνύναι (*paradeiknynai*), "to show beside", is a pattern set alongside a thing, an example; μιμεῖσθαι, from μῖμος (*mimos*), the mimic, is to imitate.

In the *Meditations*. "Example" occurs twice, both times in Book I, and the first time of something seen: the "living example" of Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic whom Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, summoned to Rome to teach him (1.8.1), and "the example of a household governed by its father" in Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew (1.9.1). Imitation of a man is named once, under a condition: if Alexander, king of Macedon, his father Philip, and Demetrius of Phalerum, who governed Athens from 317 to 307 BC, "played the tragic part, no one has condemned me to imitate" (9.29). The practice runs through the book: "Everything as a pupil of Antoninus" (6.30.2), and the merits of those around him kept "ready to hand" (6.48).

In this edition. Παράδειγμα is "example"; μιμεῖσθαι is "imitate" (9.29, 11.10) and, of painters and sculptors, "show in imitation" (3.2.3); μίμησις is "imitation" (11.6.2). Ζηλοῦν (*zēloun*), "to emulate", does not occur, and ζῆλος is "ambition" (1.7.1).

A place to read. 6.30.2–4, where Marcus is to do everything as a pupil of Antoninus, and the habits he is to learn follow one by one.

Meaning

Παράδειγμα (*paradeigma*) belongs to παραδεικνύναι, "to show beside": a thing set beside another as its pattern, a model, an example. Μιμεῖσθαι (*mimeisthai*) comes from

μῖμος, the mime or mimic, and is to represent, to imitate; μίμησις (*mimēsis*) is the imitating. Ζῆλος (*zēlos*) is eager rivalry, and ζηλοῦν the common Greek for emulating a man; Marcus has neither the verb nor ζηλωτός (*zēlōtos*), "enviable", and his two words of the root name faults, "sophistic ambition" (1.7.1) and jealousy, ζηλοτυπεῖν (*zēlotypein*; 6.16.4). The words with which he keeps a model before him are plainer: ἰδεῖν (*idein*), "to have seen" (1.8.1, 1.8.2), μαθητής (*mathētēs*), "pupil" (6.30.2; see Learning, practice and correction), and ὑπομιμνῄσκεσθαι (*hypomimnēiskesthai*), "remind oneself" (11.26; see Principles and reminders).

Use in the book

Book I names two examples, and the first was seen. From Apollonius Marcus has "to look to nothing else, even for a moment, but reason", and "to have seen plainly, in a living example, that the same man can be most intense and yet relaxed" (1.8.1). The example proves a possibility: qualities that seem to exclude each other can live in one man. The next section has the same verb: "to have seen a man who clearly counted his experience and adroitness in passing on doctrines as the least of his own honourable qualities" (1.8.2). From Sextus he has "the example of a household governed by its father" (1.9.1), where the pattern is not a man but a house in its order. The other portraits can be read the same way, as records of qualities seen together: Sextus "at once wholly free from passion and full of affection" (1.9.3; see Love and affection); Claudius Maximus, the Stoic, with "a well-tempered character, amiable and stately" (1.15.1) and, last in his list, "a gracious wit" (1.15.3).

Other examples came by report. From Severus, usually taken to be Claudius Severus, the Peripatetic among his teachers, Marcus has "to have come to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus" (1.14.1). The edition's note names them: Thrasea Paetus, forced to suicide by Nero; his son-in-law Helvidius Priscus, executed under Vespasian; the younger Cato; probably Dion of Syracuse, Plato's friend; and Brutus, Caesar's assassin. Cinna Catulus, a Stoic teacher, taught him to speak well of his teachers "as is recorded of Domitius and Athenodotus" (1.13; see Reputation and praise); the first is unknown, the second probably the teacher of Fronto, the Latin orator who taught Marcus rhetoric. What was recorded could also measure the living: of Antoninus

Marcus writes, “And what is recorded of Socrates would fit him” (1.16.9; see Temperance and self-mastery), setting him beside Socrates, the Athenian philosopher.

Antoninus is the fullest example (see Antoninus Pius). Book I sets his portrait among the debts, “From my father” (1.16.1); Book VI makes it a rule: “Everything as a pupil of Antoninus” (6.30.2). What follows is less a list of virtues than of habits watched: “how he would let nothing pass at all without previously looking into it very well and understanding it clearly; … and how he hurried over nothing; and how he did not receive slanders” (6.30.3). Antoninus himself honoured excellence in others, “giving way ungrudgingly to those who had some particular ability … so that each might win credit by his own merits” (1.16.6), and Marcus’ rule for his own work can be read as the habit learned: if his understanding is not sufficient, “either I yield the work to the one who can accomplish it better, if it is not otherwise a duty, or I do it as I can” (7.5; see Contentment and self-sufficiency).

An example need not be one man. To gladden himself Marcus is to consider the merits of those who live alongside him, the energy of one, the self-respect of another (6.48; see Virtue and excellence); the likenesses of the virtues in their characters gladden most “falling together in a mass as far as possible. So one must have them ready to hand too” (6.48). Book XI keeps others: a precept found “in the writings of the Epicureans”, as Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, corrected the manuscripts’ “Ephesians”, to remind oneself continually “of one of those of old who practised virtue” (11.26; see Principles and reminders), and a remembered scene of Socrates, girt with a sheepskin when his wife Xanthippe had taken his cloak (11.28; see Self-respect and shame and Socrates).

The verb of imitation, used of men, comes once, and to refuse. “Go on now and tell me of Alexander and Philip and Demetrius of Phalerum. They will see to it, if they saw what the common nature wanted and schooled themselves; but if they played the tragic part, no one has condemned me to imitate” (9.29). The three are left to themselves: whether they saw what the common nature wanted is their affair, and if they played the tragic part, nothing binds Marcus to copy them. Elsewhere imitation belongs to the arts: painters and sculptors “show in imitation” the jaws of beasts (3.2.3), “the

arts imitate natures" (11.10; see Justice), and the Middle and New Comedy "slid down into the virtuosity of imitation" (11.6.2; see Speech and silence). The test is the soul: "one must look at this: what sort of soul Socrates had" (7.66; see Body and flesh), and Phocion, the Athenian general, is praised with a reserve, "unless indeed he was making a show" (11.13; see Kindness and correction).

The past serves a second use. "When you see Satyrion, form an impression of Socraticus or Eutyches or Hymen; … and when you look at yourself, form an impression of one of the Caesars; and in each case the counterpart. Then let this occur to you along with it: Where, then, are they? Nowhere, or wherever" (10.31). Here the dead are set beside the living to show "human things as smoke and nothing". Marcus keeps the dead before him in both ways, as patterns and as smoke, and the two can be read as one judgement: the name and the deed pass, and what is worth copying is a disposition, which cannot be put on like a tragic part.

Places to read

Every chapter in which παράδειγμα, μιμεῖσθαι or μίμησις occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the places of the other words of the sub-entries and the passages in which Marcus keeps a person, or at 11.27 the stars, before him as a pattern or a measure without these words (1.8.2, 1.13, 1.14.1, 1.15.1, 1.16.9, 6.30.2–4, 6.48, 7.66, 8.3, 10.31, 11.13, 11.25, 11.26, 11.27). Μῖμος, "mime" (10.9), is left out (see Drama and role).

1.7.1 Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, taught Marcus not to be drawn aside into sophistic ambition, nor to parade himself so as to strike the imagination.

1.8.1 From Apollonius Marcus has it that he saw plainly, in a living example, that the same man can be most intense and yet relaxed.

1.8.2 Marcus saw in Apollonius a man who counted his skill in passing on doctrines as the least of his honourable qualities.

1.9.1 From Sextus Marcus has kindliness and the example of a household governed by its father.

1.13 Catulus taught Marcus to speak of his teachers with heartfelt good words, as is recorded of Domitius and Athenodotus.

1.14.1 From Severus Marcus has it that he came to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion and Brutus, and got the impression of a state with the same laws for all.

1.15.1 From Maximus Marcus has self-mastery, good spirits in illness, and a well-tempered character, amiable and stately.

1.15.3 Maximus gave the impression of a man never bent rather than one straightened, and had a gracious wit.

1.16.6 Antoninus gave way ungrudgingly to those with a particular ability, so that each might win credit by his own merits.

1.16.9 What is recorded of Socrates, that he could both abstain from and enjoy what the many cannot, would fit Antoninus.

3.2.3 A man with a feeling for what happens in the whole will look at the real jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than at those that painters and sculptors show in imitation.

6.16.4 Whoever honours many other things must envy, be jealous and look askance at those who can take them away.

6.30.2 Marcus is to do everything as a pupil of Antoninus, beginning with his intensity on behalf of what is done according to reason, his evenness and his holiness.

6.30.3 Antoninus let nothing pass without looking into it, tolerated unjust blame, hurried over nothing, did not receive slanders, and was content with little.

6.30.4 Antoninus was hard-working and patient, firm in his friendships and pious without superstition; all this, so that Marcus' last hour may find him with as good a conscience as it found Antoninus.

6.48 To gladden himself Marcus is to consider the merits of those who live alongside him, for the likenesses of the virtues in their characters gladden most when they fall together, and he is to keep them ready to hand.

7.5 If his understanding is not sufficient for a work, Marcus either yields it to one who can accomplish

it better, if it is not otherwise a duty, or does it as he can, taking on a helper.

7.66 Marcus asks how we know whether Telauges, probably the Pythagorean ascetic of a dialogue of Aeschines the Socratic, was not better in disposition than Socrates; one must look at what sort of soul Socrates had.

8.3 Marcus asks what Alexander, Gaius, that is Julius Caesar, and Pompey, the Roman general, are beside Diogenes the Cynic, Heraclitus of Ephesus, the philosopher of about 500 BC, and Socrates, who saw things, and their causes and their materials.

9.29 Of Alexander, Philip and Demetrius of Phalerum: if they saw what the common nature wanted and schooled themselves, they will see to it; if they played the tragic part, no one has condemned Marcus to imitate them.

10.31 On seeing each man, and on looking at himself, Marcus is to form an impression of his counterpart, and to ask where they are: nowhere, or wherever.

11.6.2 The Old Comedy reminded through its plain speaking; the Middle and the New slid down into the virtuosity of imitation.

11.10 Marcus quotes the saying that no nature is worse than art, for the arts imitate natures; if so, the most perfect nature would not fall short of art.

11.13 Marcus is ready to show even the man who despises him what is overlooked, sincerely and with kindness, like Phocion, unless indeed Phocion was making a show.

11.25 Socrates would not go to Perdiccas, so as not to be unable, having been done good, to do good in return.

11.26 A precept bids one continually to remind oneself of one of those of old who practised virtue.

11.27 The Pythagoreans look up at the heaven at dawn, to be reminded of those who always accomplish their own work in the same way.

11.28 Marcus recalls what Socrates was like, girt with the sheepskin when Xanthippe, his wife, took the cloak, and what he said to his companions.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, makes the case for examples in a letter to his friend Lucilius. He will send him books, with the passages he approves marked; but the living voice and a shared life will do him more good than a discourse, first because men believe their eyes more than their ears, and then because the road through precepts is long, through examples short and effective. Cleanthes, who followed Zeno of Citium at the head of the Stoic school, would not have taken Zeno's stamp if he had only heard him: he shared his life, saw into his private hours, and watched whether he lived by his own rule. Plato and Aristotle, and all the wise men who would later part company, owed more to Socrates' ways than to his words; and Metrodorus, Hermarchus and Polyaenus were made great men not by the lectures of Epicurus, the founder of the school of the Garden, but by sharing his house.[415] Marcus' "to have seen plainly, in a living example" (1.8.1) can be read as Seneca's eyes against ears. The precept of 11.26 Seneca gives as Epicurus' (see Principles and reminders), and he goes on: Epicurus gave men a guardian and a tutor, *paedagogus*, Marcus' παιδαγωγός (*paidagōgos*; see Parents and education); happy the man who corrects others not only when he is present but even when he is thought of. One should choose Cato, Seneca writes, or, if Cato seems too stiff, Laelius, a man of gentler temper: one whose life and speech have pleased, and whose very face carries his mind before it; and one should show him always to oneself, as guardian or as example, for characters need someone against whom to measure themselves, and without a rule what is crooked will not be set straight.[416] Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, gives the practice a form. When his hearer is about to meet anyone, above all one of those thought to stand high, he is to put before himself what Socrates or Zeno would have done in that case, and he will not be at a loss how to deal fittingly with what befalls.[417] Socrates, he says, was brought to completion in this way, attending in all that came before him to nothing but reason; and the hearer, even if he is not yet Socrates, ought to live as a man who wants to

[415] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 6.5–6.

[416] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 11.9–10.

[417] Epictetus, *Handbook* 33.12.

be Socrates.[418] Apollonius' lesson, "to look to nothing else, even for a moment, but reason" (1.8.1), can be read as that pattern seen in a living teacher.

Other ancient sources

The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, says that Marcus heard above all Junius Rusticus, whom he both revered and followed, and for whom after his death he asked the senate for statues (see Rusticus); and that he paid his teachers such honour that he kept golden images of them in his household shrine, and always honoured their tombs with visits, sacrifices and flowers.[419] Book I can be read as the written counterpart of that shrine, a set of likenesses kept where they would be seen.

Translation in this edition

Παράδειγμα is "example" at both its places, "in a living example" for ἐπὶ παραδείγματος ζῶντος (*epi paradeigmatos zōntos*; 1.8.1) and "the example of a household" (1.9.1). Μιμεῖσθαι is "imitate" (9.29, 11.10) and, with δεικνύουσιν (*deiknyousin*), "show in imitation" (3.2.3); μίμησις is "imitation" in "the virtuosity of imitation", ἡ ἐκ μιμήσεως φιλοτεχνία (*hē ek mimēseōs philotechnia*; 11.6.2). Μῖμος is "Mime" (10.9; see Drama and role). Ζῆλος is "ambition" in "sophistic ambition" (1.7.1), and ζηλοτυπεῖν "be jealous" (6.16.4); "envy" there renders φθονεῖν (*phthonein*). Πατρονομεῖσθαι is "governed by its father" (1.9.1). Παραχωρητικός with the article is "giving way" (1.16.6), and παραχωρεῖν "yield" (7.5); προτέρημα (*proterēma*) is "merits" at both its places (1.16.6, 6.48; see Virtue and excellence), and μαθητής "pupil" (6.30.2; see Learning, practice and correction). "As is recorded" renders ἀπομνημονευόμενα (*apomnēmoneuomena*; 1.13) and "what is recorded" τὸ … μνημονευόμενον (*to … mnēmoneuomenon*; 1.16.9); "counterpart" renders τὸ ἀνάλογον (*to analogon*; 10.31). Three readings bear on these passages. At 1.14.1 "through him" is δι' αὐτοῦ (*di' autou*), the correction of Johannes Stich, whose Teubner text appeared in 1882, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; A, the Vatican manuscript, has δι' αὐτῶν, "through them", and P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, δι' αὐτόν, "on

[418] Epictetus, *Handbook* 51.3.

[419] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 3.3–5.

his account", which keeps Severus as the occasion of the names. At 9.29 Wilamowitz, the German classical scholar, proposed ἔψομαι (*hepsomai*), "I will follow", for "They will see to it", and A omits "common" before "nature"; Leopold prints the reading of P. At 10.31 A omits "and when you look at yourself, form an impression of one of the Caesars", which stands in P.

εὐχαριεντίζομαι

Attested: εὐχαριεντίζεσθαι (*eucharientizesthai*; 1.15.3). To be graceful in jest; with the article, a gracious wit. The last of the qualities of Claudius Maximus: "that no one would ever have thought himself looked down on by him, nor endured to form the opinion that he was better than he; and a gracious wit" (1.15.3). Leopold prints the manuscripts' word; Gilles Ménage, the seventeenth-century French scholar, proposed εὖ χαριεντίζεσθαι (*eu charientizesthai*), "to jest well", Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, μὴ χαριεντίζεσθαι (*mē charientizesthai*), "not to jest", and Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, προσχαριεντίζεσθαι (*proscharientizesthai*). Lemma: εὐχαριεντίζομαι.

ζηλοτυπέω

Attested: ζηλοτυπεῖν (*zēlotypein*; 6.16.4). To be jealous, to grudge another what one wants for oneself. Whoever honours many other things will be "neither free nor self-sufficient nor free from passion; for it is necessary to envy, to be jealous, to look askance at those who can take those things away" (6.16.4). Lemma: ζηλοτυπέω.

ζῆλος

Attested: ζῆλον (*zēlon*; 1.7.1). Zeal, rivalry, emulation; in Marcus, ambition. From Rusticus Marcus had it "not to be drawn aside into sophistic ambition, nor to write treatises on doctrines" (1.7.1). Lemma: ζῆλος.

κῴδιον

Attested: κῴδιον (*kōidion*; 11.28). A fleece, a sheepskin. "What Socrates was like, girt with the sheepskin, when Xanthippe took the cloak and went out" (11.28). Leopold's testimonia, the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it, take the chapter to allude to some Cynic anecdote, and the story is not known elsewhere, as the edition's note says. Lemma: κῴδιον.

μιμέομαι

Attested: μιμούμενοι (*mimoumenoi*; 3.2.3), μιμεῖσθαι (*mimeisthai*; 9.29), μιμοῦνται (*mimountai*; 11.10). To represent, to imitate. Of painters and sculptors, the jaws of beasts that they "show in imitation" (3.2.3); of the arts, explaining a saying he quotes, "for indeed the arts imitate natures" (11.10); and of men, once, in a refusal: "but if they played the tragic part, no one has condemned me to imitate" (9.29). Lemma: μιμέομαι.

μίμησις

Attested: μιμήσεως (*mimēseōs*; 11.6.2). Imitation, representation. The Middle and the New Comedy "little by little slid down into the virtuosity of imitation" (11.6.2). Lemma: μίμησις.

παράδειγμα

Attested: παραδείγματος (*paradeigmatos*; 1.8.1), παράδειγμα (*paradeigma*; 1.9.1). A pattern, a model; an example. "to have seen plainly, in a living example, that the same man can be most intense and yet relaxed" (1.8.1); "the example of a household governed by its father" (1.9.1). Lemma: παράδειγμα.

παραχωρέω

Attested: παραχωρῶ (*parachōrō*; 7.5). To make way, to yield a thing to another. "If it is not sufficient, either I yield the work to the one who can accomplish it better, if it is not otherwise a duty, or I do it as I can" (7.5). Lemma: παραχωρέω.

παραχωρητικός

Attested: παραχωρητικόν (*parachōrētikon*; 1.16.6). Ready to make way; with the article, giving way. Among the traits of Antoninus, "above all, giving way ungrudgingly to those who had some particular ability, in expression, say, or in knowledge of laws or customs or anything else" (1.16.6). Lemma: παραχωρητικός.

πατρονομέομαι

Attested: πατρονομουμένου (*patronomoumenou*; 1.9.1). To be governed as by a father. From Sextus, "the example of a household governed by its father" (1.9.1). Lemma: πατρονομέομαι.

See also

Antoninus Pius; Body and flesh; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Drama and role; Justice; Kindness and correction; Learning, practice and correction; Love and affection; Parents and education; Principles and reminders; Reputation and praise; Rusticus; Self-respect and shame; Socrates; Speech and silence; Temperance and self-mastery; Virtue and excellence.

Fault and ignorance

Wrongdoing, ignorance and blame · Meditations

ἁμαρτάνειν, hamartanein, “do wrong”, “the wrongdoer”, “the wrong done”, “doing wrong”; *ἁμάρτημα, hamartēma*, “wrong”, “wrongs”, “wrongdoings”; *ἁμαρτία, hamartia*, “wrongdoing”, “the wrong”; *ἁμαρτητικός, hamartētikos*, “given to wrongdoing”; *ἀφαμαρτάνειν, aphamartanein*, “miss the mark”; *πταίειν, ptaiein*, “stumble”; *ἄγνοια, agnoia*, “ignorance”; *ἀγνοεῖν, agnoein*, “not know”, “in ignorance”, “is not unknown”; *ἀμαθής, amathēs*, “ignorant”; *ἄκων, akōn*, “unwillingly”, “unwilling”; *ἀκούσιος, akousios*, “unwillingly”; *ἑκών, hekōn*, “willingly”; *ἑκούσιος, hekousios*, “willing”, “willingly”; *μέμφεσθαι, memphesthai*, “blame”; *μέμψις, mempsis*, “blame”; *ἀντιμέμφεσθαι, antimemphesthai*, “blame in return”; *καταμέμφεσθαι, katamemphesthai*, “blame”; *καταιτιᾶσθαι, kataitiasthai*, “blame”; *καταιτίασις, kataitiasis*, “accusations”; *αἰτιᾶσθαι, aitiasthai*, “accuse”, “complaint”; *ἐγκαλεῖν, enkalein*, “accuse”, “bring a charge”; *ἔγκλημα, enklēma*, “charge”

At a Glance

The word. Ἁμαρτάνειν is to miss the mark, and so to go wrong in act or judgement; ἄγνοια is not knowing, and ἄκων unwilling. Μέμφεσθαι is to blame, and αἰτιᾶσθαι to hold a man answerable, to accuse.

In the *Meditations*. The men Marcus expects to meet each morning are what they are “through ignorance of good and bad” (2.1); men “do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly” (7.22). Whoever does wrong “misses the mark set before him” (9.42.2), and the harm stays with him: “If he did wrong, the bad is there” (9.38). Whether he did wrong at all is not always known (12.16), and blame is ruled out: “So one must blame no one” (12.12).

In this edition. Ἁμαρτάνειν is "do wrong" at every place, kept apart from ἀδικεῖν (*adikein*), "act unjustly"; its nouns are "wrong" and "wrongdoing". Ἄγνοια is "ignorance", ἄκων "unwillingly" (once "unwilling"), πταίειν "stumble", μέμφεσθαι "blame", and αἰτιᾶσθαι "accuse", at 1.13 "complaint".

A place to read. 9.42.1–3, where Marcus finds that wrongdoers must exist and that the man gone astray can be taught better, and asks himself whether he ought not rather to accuse himself.

Meaning

Ἁμαρτάνειν (*hamartanein*) is first to miss what one aims at: "You missed, and did not hit," the Greek hero Diomedes tells the Trojan archer Pandarus, who has thrown his spear at him, in Homer's *Iliad*.[420] From that it is to fail of one's purpose, to err, to do wrong, and ἁμάρτημα (*hamartēma*) and ἁμαρτία (*hamartia*) are the wrong done. Marcus keeps that sense when he says that everyone who does wrong ἀφαμαρτάνει τοῦ προκειμένου (*aphamartanei tou prokeimenou*), "misses the mark set before him" (9.42.2). The word is wider than ἀδικεῖν (see Justice); the two stand side by side at 9.4. Πταίειν (*ptaiein*) is to stumble. Ἄγνοια (*agnoia*) is not knowing, and the ignorance that matters to Marcus is "ignorance of good and bad" (2.1, 2.13), of what is worth having. Ἄκων (*akōn*) and ἑκών (*hekōn*) are the common words for unwilling and willing. Of the words of blame, μέμφεσθαι (*memphesthai*) is to find fault with, αἰτιᾶσθαι (*aitiasthai*) to hold answerable, from αἰτία (*aitia*), a charge or a cause (see Cause and matter), and ἐγκαλεῖν (*enkalein*) to bring a charge.

Use in the book

Book II opens with a diagnosis: "At dawn, say to yourself in advance: I shall meet the meddling, the ungrateful, the insolent, the treacherous, the envious, the unsocial. All these things have come upon them through ignorance of good and bad." Against it Marcus sets his own knowledge of "the nature of the good, that it is honourable, and of the bad, that it is shameful", and so none of them can harm him, "for no one will involve me in what is shameful" (2.1; see Kinship and cooperation). The neighbour "does not know, however, what

[420] Homer, *Iliad* 5.287.

is according to nature for him. But I know" (3.11.3; see Good, bad and indifference).

Ignorance goes with unwillingness. Among the verdicts Marcus reckons up against resentment is "that they do wrong unwillingly" (4.3.2; see Justice). "It is peculiar to man to love even those who stumble", and this comes about if it occurs to him that they are kin, "and that they do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly", that both will soon be dead, and above all that the man "has not harmed you" (7.22). If he looks into the springs of opinion and impulse in those whose testimony he wants, he "will neither blame those who stumble unwillingly nor need testimony" (7.62).

Unwilling does not mean innocent. The man who lies unwillingly is impious as well as the man who lies willingly, for he fights against the nature of the universe, carried "through his own doing" towards what is contrary to the truth: "he had received resources beforehand from nature, and by neglecting them he is now unable to distinguish what is false from what is true" (9.1.2; see Justice). His ignorance is the fruit of neglect, and Marcus turns the reproach on himself: "you even had resources from reason for considering that this man would probably do this wrong, and yet, having forgotten, you are astonished that he has done wrong" (9.42.3). Nor does he take ignorance for granted. At another man's ruling centre he is "to attend whether it is ignorance or design" (9.22), and the wrong itself may be in doubt: "If he did wrong, the bad is there. But perhaps he did not do wrong" (9.38); "But how do I know whether this is a wrong?" (12.16; compare 11.18.3, see Anger).

Where there is a wrong, it stays where it was done. "Does someone do wrong? He does wrong to himself" (4.26; see Justice). "Another does wrong to me? He will see to it" (5.25). "Another's wrong one must leave there" (9.20; compare 7.29, see Impression). If he did indeed do wrong, "he has condemned himself, and so this is like tearing his own face" (12.16).

Wrongdoers must exist. Of shameless men Marcus asks whether there can be none in the universe, and answers, "There cannot. Do not, then, demand the impossible"; so too with "everyone who does wrong in any way whatever" (9.42.1). Whoever does not want the base man to do wrong "is like one who does not want the fig tree to carry juice in the figs …"; "If, then, you are vehement, cure this" (12.16). At 9.42.2 "it is open to you to teach better the man who has

gone astray". "And what new or strange thing has happened if the uneducated man does what belongs to the uneducated? See whether you ought not rather to accuse yourself for not expecting this man to do this wrong" (9.42.3); "new", in the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, is the correction of A. J. Kronenberg, whose notes on Marcus appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905, for the manuscripts' "bad".

Blame has two objects. Whoever counts things outside his choice good or bad must, "on falling into such a bad thing or failing to get such a good", "blame the gods and hate men too" (6.41; see Good, bad and indifference); and if all things happen "from one intelligent spring", "the part must not blame what comes about for the sake of the whole" (9.39; see Providence and atoms). Of men: "when you blame a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to yourself; for evidently yours is the wrong" (9.42.4; see Beneficence). Of what is in another's power Marcus asks, "whom do you blame? The atoms or the gods? Both are madness. One must blame no one" (8.17; see Providence and atoms). At 12.12 Marcus gives the reason from unwilling wrong: "One must blame neither the gods, for they do no wrong willingly or unwillingly, nor men, for they do none except unwillingly. So one must blame no one." What blame remains Marcus turns on himself, or lets fall: "accuse yourself, or not even yourself" (10.4; see Kindness and correction).

The doctrine can be read as an argument against blame, not against judgement. Marcus still calls the wrong a wrong and the bad bad, still asks whether it came from ignorance or design, and still means to teach. What he gives up is the charge laid against another, since the wrong is the wrongdoer's own loss, and he counts himself among those who "do much wrong" (11.18.2; compare 10.30, see Anger).

Places to read

Every chapter in which ἁμαρτάνειν or a word of its family, πταίειν, ἄγνοια, ἀγνοεῖν, ἀμαθής (*amathēs*), ἄκων or ἀκούσιος (*akousios*) occurs, or a word of blame, αἰτιᾶσθαι, καταιτιᾶσθαι (*kataitiasthai*), καταιτίασις (*kataitiasis*), μέμφεσθαι, μέμψις (*mempsis*) and their compounds, ἐγκαλεῖν or ἔγκλημα (*enklēma*), in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with ἑκών where it stands against ἄκων (9.1.2, 12.12). Ἑκών elsewhere (4.34, 5.5, 8.42), ἑκούσιος (*hekousios*; 10.8.1, 10.28), the idiom "is

not unknown" (11.6.2), ἀγνώμων (*agnōmōn*), "unfair", καταγινώσκειν (*kataginōskein*), "find fault", and ψέγειν (*psegein*), "censure", are left out.

1.13 From Cinna Catulus, a Stoic teacher, Marcus learned not to make light of a friend's complaint, even an unreasonable one, but to try to restore him to the usual footing.

1.16.3 His adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, guarded what the empire needed, used its funds sparingly, and endured the accusations some brought against him over such things.

2.1 The meddling, the ungrateful, the insolent and the rest are such through ignorance of good and bad; the wrongdoer is kin, and Marcus can neither be harmed by him nor be angry with him.

2.10 Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor, comparing wrongdoings in the ordinary way, judges wrong done with pleasure open to a greater charge than wrong done with distress.

2.11.3 The nature of the whole would not have overlooked anything through ignorance, nor done wrong so greatly through want of power or skill, that good and bad should befall good men and bad alike.

2.13 What comes from men deserves love because of kinship, and sometimes pity, because of ignorance of good and bad, a disablement no less than the one that deprives a man of telling white from black.

3.5 Marcus is not to act unwillingly, or unsocially, or without examination, or pulled two ways.

3.11.3 What comes from a fellow man comes from a kinsman who does not know what is according to nature for him; Marcus knows, and so treats him with goodwill and justice.

4.3.2 Among the verdicts against resenting the vice of men is that they do wrong unwillingly.

4.26 Whoever does wrong does wrong to himself.

5.3 Marcus is not to let the blame or word of certain people distract him from what is according to nature.

5.5 Not complaining of one's lot is among the qualities wholly in Marcus' power, and no want of talent compels him to blame the poor body.

5.18 Another man stands steady in misfortune because he does not know it has happened, or to show off; it is terrible that ignorance and the wish to please should be stronger than wisdom.

5.25 If another does wrong to Marcus, he will see to it; he has his own disposition and his own activity.

5.32 Marcus asks why unskilled and ignorant souls confound the skilled and knowing.

6.16.4 Whoever honours many things besides the one thing to be honoured must envy and plot against others, and often blame even the gods.

6.21 If anyone can show Marcus that he is not forming opinions or acting rightly, he will gladly shift position; it is the man who persists in his own deception and ignorance who is harmed.

6.22 The things that do not distract Marcus from his duty are soulless, or irrational, or gone astray and not knowing the road.

6.27 To be indignant that men do wrong is in a way not to allow them an impulse towards what appears to them proper; if what they are carried towards is not so, Marcus is to teach and show.

6.30.3 Antoninus tolerated those who blamed him unjustly, not blaming them in return.

6.41 Whoever counts things outside his choice good or bad must, on falling into such a bad thing or failing to get such a good, blame the gods and hate men.

6.42 Even the man who blames and tries to oppose what comes about works together with the rest, for the universe had need of such a man too.

6.50 Marcus is to try to persuade men, but to act even when they are unwilling, when the reason of justice leads so.

7.14 The things affected by what falls from outside will blame, if they want; Marcus is not harmed if he does not form the opinion that what has happened is bad.

7.22 It is peculiar to man to love even those who stumble, and this comes about if it occurs to

Marcus that they are kin, do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly, will soon be dead with him, and have not harmed him.

7.24 Marcus asks what cause there is still for living if even the awareness of doing wrong is going to depart.

7.26 When someone does him wrong, Marcus is to consider at once with what opinion of good or bad he did it, and then he will pity him and be neither astonished nor angry.

7.29 The wrong done by another is to be left there where the wrong subsisted.

7.58 Those who were annoyed at what happened to them, thought it strange and blamed, are now nowhere.

7.62 If Marcus looks into the springs of men's opinion and impulse, he will neither blame those who stumble unwillingly nor need their testimony.

7.63 Every soul, in a saying that Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, gives as that of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, is deprived of truth unwillingly; so too of justice, self-control and kindliness.

7.66 Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, is to be judged by whether he was neither indignant at random at vice nor a slave to anyone's ignorance.

8.9 No one is to hear Marcus blaming life at court any longer, nor is he to hear himself.

8.17 If a thing is in another's power, Marcus asks whom he blames, atoms or gods, and answers that both are madness: one must blame no one, but set right what one can.

8.48 He who has not seen that the understanding free from passions is a citadel is ignorant.

9.1.2 The man who lies willingly and the man who lies unwillingly are both impious, the second because he neglected the resources he had from nature; the pursuer of pleasure must often blame the common nature.

9.4 He who does wrong does wrong against himself.

9.20 Another's wrong is to be left where it is.

9.22 At another man's ruling centre Marcus is to attend whether it is ignorance or design, and to reckon that it is kin.

9.38 If a man did wrong, the bad is there; but perhaps he did not.

9.39 If all things happen from one intelligent spring, the part must not blame what comes about for the sake of the whole.

9.42.1 Shameless men and wrongdoers of every kind must exist in the universe, and to remember it makes Marcus more kindly to each.

9.42.2 Nature has given mildness against the unfair man, it is open to Marcus to teach better the man who has gone astray, and everyone who does wrong misses the mark set before him.

9.42.3 Marcus asks what strange thing has happened if the uneducated man does what belongs to the uneducated, and is to see whether he ought not rather to accuse himself for not expecting the wrong.

9.42.4 When Marcus blames a man as faithless or ungrateful, the wrong is his own, whether he trusted such a man to keep faith or did not give the favour conclusively.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever share citizenship with gods and men so as neither to blame them in anything nor to have fault found with it by them.

10.4 If a man errs, Marcus is to teach kindly and show what is overlooked; if he cannot, he is to accuse himself, or not even himself.

10.30 When he takes offence at someone's wrongdoing, Marcus is to take account at once of the like wrong he does himself.

11.8 A man who separates himself from his neighbour does not know that he has severed himself from the whole polity.

11.18.2 If men do not act rightly, they do so unwillingly and in ignorance; and Marcus himself does much wrong.

11.18.3 Marcus has not firmly grasped whether they do wrong, for many things are done for a practical

end; if the shameful were not the only bad thing, he too would necessarily do much wrong.

11.18.6 To expect the base not to do wrong is madness, and to allow them to be such towards others while expecting them not to wrong oneself is unfair and tyrannical.

11.32 In a line varied from Hesiod, the early Greek poet, men will blame virtue, speaking with hard words.

12.12 One must blame no one: the gods do no wrong, willingly or unwillingly, and men do none except unwillingly.

12.16 Of one who seems to have done wrong, Marcus asks how he knows that it is a wrong; the wrongdoer condemns himself, and he who does not want the base man to do wrong is like one who does not want the fig tree to carry juice.

12.24 One must neither blame chance nor bring a charge against providence.

12.26 Whoever is aggrieved at anything has forgotten, among other things, that the wrong done is alien.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports that the Stoics counted folly, cowardice, injustice and licentiousness among the primary vices, and held the vices to be ignorances of the things of which the virtues are knowledge; wisdom, φρόνησις (*phronēsis*), first of the primary virtues, is knowledge of what is bad, what is good and what is neither (see Virtue and excellence).[421] Marcus' "ignorance of good and bad" (2.1, 2.13) can be read as that doctrine in its plainest words. The same book reports that the Stoics held all wrongs, ἁμαρτήματα (*hamartēmata*), to be equal, as Chrysippus, the school's third head, says in the fourth book of his *Ethical Questions*, and Persaeus, Zeno's pupil, and Zeno, its founder: if one truth is not truer than another, neither is one falsehood falser, nor one wrong more a wrong than another; the man a hundred stades from Canopus, the town near Alexandria, and the man one stade away are alike not in Canopus, and so he who does more wrong and he who does less are alike not acting rightly. Heraclides of Tarsus, a pupil of the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus, another

[421] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.92–93.

Stoic, it adds, said that wrongs are unequal.[422] When Marcus approves Theophrastus' ranking of wrongs, he says that Theophrastus compares them "as one might compare such things in the ordinary way" (2.10; see Desire and aversion), which can be read as conceding that the school's measure is another. One of the discourses of Epictetus bears the title "What is peculiar to a wrong". Every wrong, he says, contains a conflict: the man who does wrong does not want to do wrong but to act rightly, and so plainly he does not do what he wants; the thief wants what is to his advantage, and if stealing is not to his advantage, he is not doing what he wants. Every rational soul is by nature averse to conflict; so long as it does not see that it is in one, nothing stops it from doing what conflicts, but once it sees, it must stand off from the conflict, as a man who perceives that a thing is false is under hard necessity to renounce it.[423] Marcus' wrongdoer who "misses the mark set before him" (9.42.2) can be read as this man, who aims at his own good and does not reach it. In the *Handbook* Epictetus sets out three stages of blame: to accuse others when one fares ill oneself is the work of the uneducated man, to accuse oneself the work of one who has begun to be educated, and to accuse neither another nor oneself the work of the educated.[424] Marcus' uneducated man and "accuse yourself" at 9.42.3, and his "accuse yourself, or not even yourself" at 10.4 (see Kindness and correction), can be read as these stages turned on the wrongs of others.

Other ancient sources

In Plato's *Protagoras* Socrates, explaining a poem of Simonides of Ceos, the lyric poet of the late sixth and early fifth centuries BC, will not read the poet's "willingly" as if some men did bad things willingly: none of the wise, he thinks, believes that any man goes wrong willingly, ἑκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν (*hekonta examartanein*), or willingly does what is shameful and bad; they know well that all who do such things do them unwillingly (345d–e). Later he gets the company to agree that to be "weaker than oneself", ἥττω αὑτοῦ (*hēttō hautou*), is nothing but ignorance, ἀμαθία (*amathia*), which is to hold a false opinion and be deceived about things of great worth, and that no one goes willingly

[422] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.120–121.

[423] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.26 (title) and 2.26.1–3.

[424] Epictetus, *Handbook* 5.

towards what is bad or what he thinks bad (358c–d).[425] The account of Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* can be read as an answer. Every bad man, he allows, does not know what he must do and what he must keep from, and through a failing of this kind men become unjust and bad generally; but an act is not called involuntary because a man is ignorant of what is advantageous. Ignorance in choice is the cause not of involuntariness but of wickedness, nor does ignorance of the universal make an act involuntary, for men are blamed for it; only ignorance of the particulars of an act makes it involuntary, and only there is there pity and pardon.[426] Marcus' pity can be read as given to the very ignorance that Aristotle blames: what comes from men deserves "sometimes, in a way, pity, because of ignorance of good and bad" (2.13; see Daimon). His liar who lies unwillingly, yet is impious, because by neglecting the resources nature gave him he can no longer tell false from true (9.1.2), can be read as Marcus' answer to that objection.

Translation in this edition

Ἁμαρτάνειν is "do wrong" at every place, and the Glossary keeps it apart from ἀδικεῖν, "act unjustly". The participle is "the wrongdoer" (2.1), "the man who does wrong" (2.10), "he who does wrong" (9.4) and "everyone who does wrong" (9.42.1, 9.42.2); the neuter passive participle is "the wrong done" (2.10, 7.29, 12.26), and the infinitive with the article "doing wrong" (7.24). With an object the verb is "does you some wrong" (7.26), "do this wrong" (9.42.3), "what similar wrong you do" (10.30) and "do much wrong" (11.18.2, 11.18.3). Ἁμάρτημα is "wrong" (9.20, 9.42.2, 9.42.4, 12.16), "wrongs" (11.18.2, twice) and "wrongdoings" (2.10); ἁμαρτία is "wrongdoing" (2.10, 10.30) and "the wrong" (7.29); ἁμαρτητικός (*hamartētikos*) is "given to wrongdoing" (11.18.2), and ἀφαμαρτάνειν (*aphamartanein*) "misses the mark" (9.42.2). "Wrong" renders no other word but προαδικεῖν (*proadikein*), "has been wronged first" (2.10; see Justice), and "take wrongly" at 5.6.2, which renders παρεκδέχεσθαι (*parekdechesthai*), "misunderstand". At 9.42.2 the "for" of "for everyone who does wrong" renders γάρ (*gar*), which Leopold prints from one of the Laurentian manuscripts of the excerpts; P, the lost manuscript from

[425] Plato, *Protagoras* 345d–e, 358c–d.

[426] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1, 1110b28–1111a2.

which the first edition was printed, A, the Vatican manuscript, and the excerpts generally have δέ (*de*), "and". Πταίειν is "stumble" (7.22, 7.62); ἄπταιστος (*aptaistos*), with the article, is "the sureness" of the faculty that knows (5.9). Ἄγνοια is "ignorance" at all eight places; ἀγνοεῖν is "not know" (3.11.3, 5.18, 6.22, 11.8), "in ignorance" (11.18.2), "I know" for the negative οὐκ ἀγνοῶ (*ouk agnoō*; 3.11.3) and "is not unknown" (11.6.2); ἀμαθής is "ignorant" (5.32, 8.48). Ἀγνώμων, "unfair" (5.31, 9.42.2, 11.18.2, 11.18.6), is another word, built on γνώμη (*gnōmē*), "frame of mind", which is "design" where it is set against ignorance (9.22). Ἄκων is "unwillingly" at every place but 6.50, where ἀκόντων (*akontōn*) is "even when they are unwilling"; ἀκούσιος, standing for an adverb, and ἀκουσίως (*akousiōs*) are "unwillingly" (3.5, 7.62). Ἑκών is "willingly" at all five places (4.34, 5.5, 8.42, 9.1.2, 12.12); ἑκούσιος is "willing" (10.8.1), and its adverb ἑκουσίως (*hekousiōs*) "willingly" (10.28; see Necessity and chance). Μέμφεσθαι and μέμψις are "blame" at every place, the verbal adjective μεμπτέον (*mempteon*) "one must blame" (8.17, 12.12, 12.24); ἀντιμέμφεσθαι (*antimemphesthai*) is "blaming them in return" (6.30.3), καταμέμφεσθαι (*katamemphesthai*) "blaming" (8.9), and ἀμεμψίμοιρος (*amempsimoiros*) "not complaining of one's lot" (5.5; see Fate and allotment). "Blame" renders καταιτιᾶσθαι as well (5.5), and καταιτίασις is "accusations" (1.16.3). Αἰτιᾶσθαι is "accuse" (10.4), but at 1.13 its participles are rendered by a noun, "a friend's complaint" and "the complaint happens to be unreasonable". Ἐγκαλεῖν is "accuse" (6.41, 9.42.3), its verbal adjective ἐγκλητέον (*enklēteon*) "bring a charge against" (12.24), and ἔγκλημα "charge" (2.10). The Glossary keeps "blame" apart from "censure", ψέγειν (4.20, 9.27, 9.30, 9.34, 10.13, 10.34), and "find fault", καταγινώσκειν (5.5, 8.50, 10.1, 10.36), with κατάγνωσις (*katagnōsis*; 1.14.2). Ἀπαίδευτος (*apaideutos*) is "uneducated" (9.42.3), and ἀντιφάρμακον (*antipharmakon*), nature's remedy against each wrong, "antidote" (9.42.2); ἐλεεῖν (*eleein*) is "pity" (7.26) and "be pitied" (9.12), and ἐλεεινός (*eleeinos*) "deserves … pity" (2.13).

ἀγνοέω

Attested: ἀγνοοῦντος (*agnoountos*; 3.11.3), ἀγνοῶ (*agnoō*; 3.11.3), ἀγνοῶν (*agnoōn*; 5.18), ἀγνοοῦντα (*agnoounta*; 6.22), ἀγνοεῖται (*agnoeitai*; 11.6.2), ἀγνοεῖ (*agnoei*; 11.8), ἀγνοοῦντες (*agnoountes*; 11.18.2). Not to

know, to be ignorant. The fellow man "does not know, however, what is according to nature for him. But I know" (3.11.3); things are "gone astray and not knowing the road" (6.22); the man who hates his neighbour "does not know that he has at the same time severed himself from the whole polity too" (11.8); men who do not act rightly do so "unwillingly and in ignorance" (11.18.2). In the passive with a negative, "is not unknown" (11.6.2). Lemma: ἀγνοέω.

ἄγνοια

Attested: ἄγνοιαν (*agnoian*; 2.1, 2.11.3, 2.13, 5.18, 7.22), ἀγνοίας (*agnoias*; 6.21), ἀγνοίᾳ (*agnoiāi*; 7.66), ἄγνοια (*agnoia*; 9.22). Ignorance; in Marcus chiefly "ignorance of good and bad" (2.1, 2.13). "All these things have come upon them through ignorance of good and bad" (2.1); "they do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly" (7.22); "he is harmed who persists in his own deception and ignorance" (6.21); Marcus is to attend at another's ruling centre "whether it is ignorance or design" (9.22). The nature of the whole would not have overlooked anything "through ignorance" (2.11.3). Lemma: ἄγνοια.

αἰτιάομαι

Attested: αἰτιωμένου (*aitiōmenou*; 1.13), αἰτιώμενος (*aitiōmenos*; 1.13), αἰτιᾶσθαι (*aitiasthai*; 10.4). To hold answerable, to accuse, to complain of. From Catulus, "not to make light of a friend's complaint, even if the complaint happens to be unreasonable" (1.13); when teaching fails, "accuse yourself, or not even yourself" (10.4). Lemma: αἰτιάομαι.

ἀκούσιος

Attested: ἀκούσιος (*akousios*; 3.5), ἀκουσίως (*akousiōs*; 7.62). Unwilling, against one's will; the adjective stands for an adverb at 3.5. "Do not act unwillingly, or unsocially, or without examination …" (3.5); "you will neither blame those who stumble unwillingly nor need testimony" (7.62). Lemma: ἀκούσιος.

ἄκων

Attested: ἄκοντες (*akontes*; 4.3.2, 7.22, 11.18.2, 12.12 twice), ἀκόντων (*akontōn*; 6.50), ἄκουσα (*akousa*; 7.63, 11.18.2), ἄκων (*akōn*; 9.1.2). Unwilling, against one's will. Men "do wrong unwillingly" (4.3.2); "they do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly" (7.22); "Every soul," Epictetus

says as Plato's, "is deprived of truth unwillingly" (7.63); the gods "do no wrong willingly or unwillingly", men "none except unwillingly" (12.12). Of others' resistance, "act even when they are unwilling" (6.50). Lemma: ἄκων.

ἀμαθής

Attested: ἀμαθεῖς (*amatheis*; 5.32), ἀμαθής (*amathēs*; 8.48). Unlearned, ignorant. "Why do unskilled and ignorant souls confound the skilled and knowing?" (5.32); he who has not seen that the understanding free from passions is a citadel "is ignorant" (8.48). Lemma: ἀμαθής.

ἁμαρτάνω

Attested: ἁμαρτάνοντος (*hamartanontos*; 2.1, 9.42.1), ἁμαρτάνων (*hamartanōn*; 2.10, 9.4, 9.42.2), ἁμαρτανόμενον (*hamartanomenon*; 2.10, 12.26), ἥμαρτεν (*hēmarten*; 2.11.3, 9.38 twice, 12.16), ἁμαρτάνουσι (*hamartanousi*; 4.3.2, 6.27, 7.22, 11.18.3, 12.12), ἁμαρτάνει (*hamartanei*; 4.26 twice, 5.25, 9.4), ἁμαρτάνειν (*hamartanein*; 7.24, 11.18.3, 11.18.6 twice, 12.16), ἁμάρτῃ (*hamartēi*; 7.26), ἥμαρτε (*hēmarte*; 7.26, 12.16), ἁμαρτηθέν (*hamartēthen*; 7.29), ἁμαρτήσεσθαι (*hamartēsesthai*; 9.42.3 twice), ἡμάρτηκε (*hēmartēke*; 9.42.3), ἁμαρτάνεις (*hamartaneis*; 10.30, 11.18.2). To miss the mark; to go wrong, to do wrong, in act or judgement. "the nature of the wrongdoer himself, that he is kin to me" (2.1); "Does someone do wrong? He does wrong to himself" (4.26); "If he did wrong, the bad is there. But perhaps he did not do wrong" (9.38); "One must blame neither the gods, for they do no wrong willingly or unwillingly, nor men, for they do none except unwillingly" (12.12). Even the nature of the whole is said not to have "done wrong so greatly" (2.11.3). Lemma: ἁμαρτάνω.

ἁμάρτημα

Attested: ἁμαρτημάτων (*hamartēmatōn*; 2.10, 11.18.2 twice), ἁμάρτημα (*hamartēma*; 9.20, 9.42.2, 9.42.4, 12.16). A wrong, a fault committed. "Another's wrong one must leave there" (9.20); "what virtue nature has given man against this wrong" (9.42.2); "evidently yours is the wrong" (9.42.4); "But how do I know whether this is a wrong?" (12.16). Theophrastus compared "wrongdoings" (2.10). Lemma: ἁμάρτημα.

ἁμαρτητικός

Attested: ἁμαρτητικοί (*hamartētikoi*; 11.18.2). Given to doing wrong. Men are annoyed at being called "unjust and unfair and grasping and, in a word, given to wrongdoing towards neighbours" (11.18.2). Lemma: ἁμαρτητικός.

ἁμαρτία

Attested: ἁμαρτίαις (*hamartiais*; 2.10), ἁμαρτία (*hamartia*; 7.29), ἁμαρτίᾳ (*hamartiāi*; 10.30). Wrongdoing, the wrong. The man who does wrong through craving "is seen to be somehow more licentious and more womanish in his wrongdoing" (2.10); "Leave the wrong done by that man there where the wrong subsisted" (7.29); "When you take offence at someone's wrongdoing …" (10.30). Lemma: ἁμαρτία.

ἀντιμέμφομαι

Attested: ἀντιμεμφόμενος (*antimemphomenos*; 6.30.3). To blame in return. Antoninus "tolerated those who blamed him unjustly, not blaming them in return" (6.30.3). Lemma: ἀντιμέμφομαι.

ἀφαμαρτάνω

Attested: ἀφαμαρτάνει (*aphamartanei*; 9.42.2). To miss, to fail of, with the genitive. "Everyone who does wrong misses the mark set before him and has gone astray" (9.42.2). Lemma: ἀφαμαρτάνω.

ἐγκαλέω

Attested: ἐγκαλέσαι (*enkalesai*; 6.41), ἐγκαλεῖν (*enkalein*; 9.42.3), ἐγκλητέον (*enklēteon*; 12.24). To bring a charge against, to accuse. If only what is in our power is judged good and bad, "no cause is left either to accuse God or to take an enemy's stand against a man" (6.41), where "judge" is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints for the manuscripts' "move"; "See whether you ought not rather to accuse yourself for not expecting this man to do this wrong" (9.42.3); "one must neither blame chance nor bring a charge against providence" (12.24). Lemma: ἐγκαλέω.

ἔγκλημα

Attested: ἐγκλήματος (*enklēmatos*; 2.10). A charge, an accusation. Theophrastus said "that wrong done with

pleasure is open to a greater charge than wrong done with distress" (2.10). Lemma: ἔγκλημα.

ἑκούσιος

Attested: ἑκούσιον (*hekousion*; 10.8.1), ἑκουσίως (*hekousiōs*; 10.28). Willing, of one's own will; the adverb, willingly; the opposite of ἀκούσιος. The name "consenting" was to signify for Marcus "the willing acceptance of what is allotted by the common nature" (10.8.1; see Self-respect and shame); "to the rational living being alone it is given to follow willingly what happens, while bare following is necessary for all" (10.28; see Necessity and chance). Lemma: ἑκούσιος.

ἑκών

Attested: ἑκών (*hekōn*; 4.34, 5.5, 8.42, 9.1.2), ἑκόντες (*hekontes*; 12.12). Willing, of one's own will. Set against ἄκων: "he who lies willingly is impious" (9.1.2), and the gods "do no wrong willingly or unwillingly" (12.12). Elsewhere: "Give yourself up willingly to Clotho …" (4.34); "and yet you still remain below, willingly?" (5.5); "I have never willingly distressed even another" (8.42). Lemma: ἑκών.

καταιτιάομαι

Attested: καταιτιᾶσθαι (*kataitiasthai*; 5.5). To lay the blame on. Marcus asks whether he is compelled, for want of talent, "to grumble, to be stingy, to flatter, to blame the poor body" (5.5). Lemma: καταιτιάομαι.

καταιτίασις

Attested: καταιτιάσεως (*kataitiaseōs*; 1.16.3). An accusation. Antoninus showed "endurance of the accusations some brought against him over such things" (1.16.3). Lemma: καταιτίασις.

καταμέμφομαι

Attested: καταμεμφομένου (*katamemphomenou*; 8.9). To find fault with, to blame. "Let no one hear you any longer blaming life at court, nor you yourself" (8.9). Lemma: καταμέμφομαι.

μέμφομαι

Attested: μέμφεσθαι (*memphesthai*; 6.16.4, 9.1.2, 9.39, 10.1), μεμφομένους (*memphomenous*; 6.30.3), μέμψασθαι (*mempsasthai*; 6.41, 8.17), μεμφόμενος (*memphomenos*; 6.42), μέμψεται (*mempsetai*; 7.14), ἐμέμφοντο

(*ememphonto*; 7.58), μέμψῃ (*mempsēi*; 7.62), μέμφῃ (*memphēi*; 8.17, 9.42.4), μεμπτέον (*mempteon*; 8.17, 12.12 twice, 12.24), μέμψονται (*mempsontai*; 11.32). To find fault with, to blame, mostly with the dative of the person or thing blamed. Of the gods and nature: "and moreover often blame even the gods" (6.16.4); "the part must not blame what comes about for the sake of the whole" (9.39). Of men: "when you blame a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to yourself" (9.42.4). Of both: "whom do you blame? The atoms or the gods? Both are madness. One must blame no one" (8.17); "So one must blame no one" (12.12). The verbal adjective μεμπτέον is "one must blame" (8.17, 12.12, 12.24). At 11.32 the word stands in a line varied from Hesiod. Lemma: μέμφομαι.

μέμψις

Attested: μέμψις (*mempsis*; 5.3). Blame, reproach. "do not let the blame or word of certain people that ensues distract you" (5.3). Lemma: μέμψις.

πταίω

Attested: πταίοντας (*ptaiontas*; 7.22), πταίουσιν (*ptaiousin*; 7.62). To stumble, to trip; of men, to fall into a fault. "It is peculiar to man to love even those who stumble" (7.22); "you will neither blame those who stumble unwillingly nor need testimony" (7.62). Lemma: πταίω.

See also

Anger; Beneficence; Cause and matter; Daimon; Desire and aversion; Fate and allotment; Good, bad and indifference; Impression; Justice; Kindness and correction; Kinship and cooperation; Necessity and chance; Providence and atoms; Self-respect and shame; Soul; Virtue and excellence.

Friendship

Friends chosen and friends by nature · Meditations

φίλος, philos, "friend", "friends", "friendly", "dear", "dearer", "deserves love"; *φιλία, philia*, "friendships"; *λυκοφιλία, lykophilia*, "wolf's friendship"; *ἀποκαθιστάναι, apokathistanai*, "restore"; *εὔνοια, eunoia*, "goodwill"; *εὔνους, eunous*, "well-wishing"; *εὔνως, eunōs*, "with goodwill"; *εὐνοεῖν, eunoein*, "wish ... well", "wishing ... well"

At a Glance

The word. Φίλος is dear, one's own, and as a noun a friend; φιλία is friendship. Εὔνοια is goodwill, and εὐνοεῖν is to wish another well.

In the *Meditations*. Book I remembers friends: from Cinna Catulus, a Stoic teacher, Marcus learned not to make light of a friend's complaint (1.13); the friends of Severus, usually taken to be Claudius Severus, the Peripatetic among his teachers, "had no need to guess what he wanted or did not want" (1.14.2); and Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, kept his friends, "never tiring of them nor infatuated with them" (1.16.2). Later the word widens: those who censure or hate Marcus are friends "by nature", and he must wish them well (9.27).

In this edition. Φίλος is "friend", and "dear" where it is an epithet; φιλία is "friendships" and λυκοφιλία "a wolf's friendship"; εὔνοια is "goodwill", εὔνους "well-wishing" and εὐνοεῖν "wish … well".

A place to read. 9.27, where Marcus, censured or hated, is to see what sort of people his critics are and still wish them well, "for by nature they are friends".

Meaning

Φίλος (*philos*) is in Homer what is one's own and dear, as in the line Marcus copies from the *Odyssey*, "And my dear heart laughed" (11.31); as a noun it is a friend, and φιλία (*philia*) is the bond of friendship. Εὔνοια (*eunoia*), from εὖ (*eu*), "well", and νοῦς (*nous*), "mind", is goodwill, being well minded towards another, and εὐνοεῖν (*eunoein*) is to wish him well. In the *Meditations* φίλος is a friend in Book I and wherever Marcus counts those close to a man (5.31, 8.31); "dear" in quotations and a prayer (4.23, 5.7); and what is dear by nature. All things in the universe are "friendly to one another", being woven together (6.38; see Interconnection), and men are friends "by nature" (9.27, 11.9). Φιλία comes twice, both times in the plural (6.30.4, 9.9.2).

Use in the book

Book I remembers friends by what they did. From Catulus Marcus learned "not to make light of a friend's complaint, even if the complaint happens to be unreasonable, but to try [also] to restore him to the usual footing" (1.13). Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, had taught him to be "easily recalled" towards those who have been exasperated or given offence,

“as soon as they themselves want to come back” (1.7.3; see Anger). In Rusticus’ lesson the other man has given offence, and Marcus is to be ready when he returns; in Catulus’ the friend complains, perhaps without reason, and Marcus can be read as asked to make the first move. From Severus, whom Marcus calls his brother, he had “hopefulness, and trust that he was loved by his friends; openness towards those he found fault with; and that his friends had no need to guess what he wanted or did not want: it was plain” (1.14.2). From Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch’s nephew, he had “a caring eye for friends” (1.9.1; see Kindness and correction), and Apollonius, the Stoic, taught him how to receive what pass for favours from friends (1.8.2; see Beneficence).

The fullest portrait is of Antoninus: “considerateness, and leaving his friends free not to dine with him every time nor go with him on his journeys as a matter of course, while those who had stayed behind on some business always found him the same”, and “keeping his friends, never tiring of them nor infatuated with them” (1.16.2). Later Marcus recalls “the firmness and constancy of his friendships” (6.30.4). What he praises is evenness: friends are not tested by attendance, and are kept without surfeit or passion. Among the gifts of the gods he counts “kinsmen, friends” (1.17.1; see Gratitude), and “to have known Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus” (1.17.5), the last being Claudius Maximus, the Stoic. Friends die with the rest: the court of Augustus, the first emperor, with its “kinsmen, intimates, friends”, is “the death of a whole court” (8.31).

Then the word widens beyond the friends he had. “When another censures you or hates you, or they utter some such things, go to their little souls, go within, and see what sort of people they are. … One must, however, wish them well; for by nature they are friends; and the gods too help them in all sorts of ways, through dreams, through oracles, towards those things, however, about which they are at odds” (9.27). The ground given is nature, and what is asked of Marcus is goodwill towards men who censure and hate him; the gods give the example. Whoever is exasperated with those who stand in his way deserts his post, “made alien towards him who is by nature kinsman and friend” (11.9; see Kindness and correction); what comes from men “deserves love because of kinship” (2.13; see Daimon); and among rational beings there are found “commonwealths and friendships and households and gatherings” (9.9.2; see Kinship and

cooperation). Goodwill can be read as the practice of this friendship. Marcus treats the kinsman who does not know what is according to nature "with goodwill and justice" (3.11.3; see Good, bad and indifference); "goodwill towards the kindred stock" is peculiar to a man (8.26); he is "kindly and well-wishing to everyone", and to the very man who may hate him (11.13; see Kindness and correction); and dying, he is not to go away less kindly from those who long to be rid of him, but "friendly and well-wishing and serene" (10.36; see Death). Its counterfeit is the friendliness of the predator: "Nothing is more shameful than a wolf's friendship; flee this above all" (11.15; see Simplicity and sincerity).

Marcus' friendship can be read as working at two levels. The friends of Book I are particular people, and what he records of them is conduct: a complaint attended to, plain dealing, freedom, constancy. The friendship of 9.27 and 11.9 belongs to every rational being by nature, is owed without return, and shows itself as goodwill. The second does not replace the first; it is what the notebook falls back on where Marcus is censured, hated and obstructed.

Places to read

Every chapter in which φίλος, φιλία, λυκοφιλία (*lykophilia*), εὔνοια, εὔνους (*eunous*), εὔνως (*eunōs*) or εὐνοεῖν occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with 1.7.3 and 1.17.5, where none of them stands. The verb φιλεῖν (*philein*), "love" (see Love and affection), and the compounds of φιλ- (*phil-*) are left out.

1.7.3 Rusticus taught Marcus to be easily recalled towards those who have been exasperated or given offence, as soon as they themselves want to come back.

1.8.2 From Apollonius Marcus learned how to receive what pass for favours from friends, without being lowered by them or letting them go by unfeelingly.

1.9.1 Among what Marcus learned from Sextus is a caring eye for friends.

1.13 From Catulus Marcus learned not to make light of a friend's complaint, even if it happens to be unreasonable, but to try to restore him to the usual footing.

1.14.2 Severus trusted that he was loved by his friends, was open with those he found fault with, and left his friends no need to guess what he wanted.

1.16.2 Antoninus left his friends free not to dine or travel with him every time, was always the same to those who had stayed behind on business, and kept his friends, never tiring of them nor infatuated with them.

1.17.1 Among the gifts of the gods are good people about Marcus, kinsmen and friends, and that he never slipped into offending any of them.

1.17.5 Among the gifts of the gods is to have known Apollonius, Rusticus and Maximus.

2.13 What comes from men deserves love because of kinship, and sometimes, in a way, pity, because of ignorance of good and bad.

3.11.3 Marcus treats the kinsman who does not know what is according to nature with goodwill and justice, according to the natural law of fellowship.

4.20 Marcus asks which of law, truth, goodwill and self-respect is beautiful because it is praised.

4.23 Against the poet's "dear city of Cecrops" Marcus asks whether he will not say "O dear city of Zeus".

5.7 The Athenians' prayer for rain calls on dear Zeus; one must pray so, simply and freely, or not at all.

5.31 Marcus asks how he has behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children, teachers, tutors, friends, kin and household slaves.

6.30.1 Marcus is to keep himself, among other things, a friend of what is just.

6.30.4 Antoninus' friendships were firm and constant.

6.38 In a way all things in the universe are woven in with one another, and for this reason friendly to one another.

7.18 Marcus asks what is dearer or more proper to the nature of the whole than change.

8.26 Goodwill towards the kindred stock is among the things peculiar to a man.

8.31 The court of Augustus, with its kinsmen, intimates and friends, is the death of a whole court.

9.9.2 Among rational living beings there are commonwealths, friendships, households and gatherings.

9.27 When others censure or hate Marcus, he must not be dragged about to win their opinion of him, but must wish them well, for by nature they are friends.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever be persuaded that everything is well with it and will be well, whatever is dear to the gods.

10.14 The educated and self-respecting man tells nature to give and take back what she wants, obeying her and wishing her well.

10.36 Though many would be glad to be rid of him, Marcus is not to go away less kindly to them, but friendly, well-wishing and serene.

11.9 Whoever is exasperated with those who stand in his way is a deserter, made alien towards him who is by nature kinsman and friend.

11.13 Marcus is kindly and well-wishing to everyone, even to the man who may despise or hate him.

11.15 Nothing is more shameful than a wolf's friendship, which is to be fled above all.

11.31 Marcus copies a line of Homer in which Odysseus' dear heart laughed.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports that the Stoics held friendship to exist among the serious alone, because they are alike, and called it a partnership in the things of life, in which we deal with our friends as with ourselves; a friend is to be chosen for his own sake, and many friends are a good, but among the base there is no friendship, and none of the base has a friend.[427] Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, argues the same in the discourse that bears the title "On friendship". Whatever a man is seriously concerned with, he loves; men are serious about goods alone; so whoever knows what is good would know how to love. How, Epictetus asks, could one who cannot tell goods from bads, and what is neither from both, still be able to love? Loving belongs to the wise man alone.[428]

[427] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.124.

[428] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.22 (title) and 2.22.1–3.

To see what friendship is among the rest, he says, throw a piece of meat among puppies that fawn on one another in play, or set a little field between a father and his child; for no living creature is bound so closely to anything as to its own advantage, and each hates whatever seems to stand in its way, brother, father, child or lover.[429] Only if a man places his "I" where his choice is will he be a friend as he should be, and a son and a father; and where else, Epictetus asks, is friendship than where there is faith, self-respect and a giving of what is honourable, and of nothing else?[430] Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, gives the practice. Whoever counts a man a friend and does not trust him as much as himself does not know the force of true friendship: judgement comes before friendship, trust after it; and once the choice is made, the friend is to be taken in with the whole heart and spoken to as freely as one speaks to oneself.[431] He quotes the Stoic Hecaton of Rhodes for a love charm needing no drug, no herb and no sorceress's chant: "if you want to be loved, love".[432] Severus' "trust that he was loved by his friends", and friends who did not have to guess his wishes (1.14.2), can be read as this practice.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, makes goodwill the ground of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. To a friend, people say, one must wish good things for his own sake; those who wish good to another in this way are called well-disposed, εὔνους, if the same does not come back from him, for goodwill between those who return it is friendship. Or must one add, he asks, that it is not unnoticed? Many wish well to men they have never seen, supposing them good or useful; but who would call them friends, unaware as they are of how each stands to the other? Friends, then, must bear goodwill to each other and wish each other's good, not unnoticed, and for one of the reasons he has named.[433] In these terms Marcus' goodwill towards those who censure and hate him (9.27) can be read as goodwill without return, and so not yet friendship; Marcus calls them friends by nature. Cicero, the Roman orator and

[429] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.22.9–10 and 2.22.15–16.
[430] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.22.19–20 and 2.22.30.
[431] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 3.2.
[432] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 9.6.
[433] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.2, 1155b31–1156a5.

philosopher, has Gaius Laelius, the friend of Scipio Africanus the younger, say in his dialogue *On Friendship* that friendship can exist only among the good; but he will not cut the matter to the quick, he says, like those who argue more subtly, perhaps truly but to little common use, and deny that any man is good except the wise, taking wisdom to be what no mortal has yet attained.[434] The force of friendship, Laelius goes on, is best seen in this: out of the boundless fellowship of the human race, which nature itself has joined, it is drawn into so narrow a space that all affection is joined between two or a few.[435]

Translation in this edition

Φίλος as a noun is "friend" or "friends" (1.8.2, 1.9.1, 1.14.2 twice, 1.16.2 twice, 1.17.1, 5.31, 8.31, 9.27, 11.9), "a friend's" (1.13) and, with a genitive, "a friend of what is just" (6.30.1). As an adjective it is "friendly" (6.38, 10.36), and "dear" where it is an epithet, in quotations and in the Athenians' prayer (4.23 twice, 5.7, 11.31), and of what is dear to the gods (10.1); its comparative is "dearer" (7.18); at 2.13 φίλα (*phila*), said of what comes from men, is rendered by sense, "deserves love". Φιλία is "friendships" at both its places (6.30.4, 9.9.2), and λυκοφιλία is "a wolf's friendship" (11.15). "My good friend" at 7.46 renders ὦ μακάριε (*ō makarie*), "blessed man", in a quotation of Plato, the Athenian philosopher. Ἀποκαθιστάναι (*apokathistanai*) is "restore" (1.13). Εὔνοια is "goodwill" (4.20, 8.26), and the adverb εὔνως "with goodwill" (3.11.3); εὔνους is "well-wishing" (10.36, 11.13), and εὐνοεῖν "wish … well" (9.27) and "wishing … well" (10.14). The companions of Socrates at 11.28 are ἑταῖροι (*hetairoi*), and the "intimates" of Augustus' court (8.31) οἰκεῖοι (*oikeioi*). Φιλεῖν, "love", and the words of affection are treated in Love and affection.

ἀποκαθίστημι

Attested: ἀποκαθιστάναι (*apokathistanai*; 1.13). To set back in a former state, to restore. From Catulus: "not to make light of a friend's complaint, even if the complaint happens to be unreasonable, but to try [also] to restore him to the usual footing" (1.13), where "also" renders καί (*kai*), which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition

[434] Cicero, *On Friendship* 18.
[435] Cicero, *On Friendship* 20.

prints, brackets after Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century. Lemma: ἀποκαθίστημι.

εὐνοέω

Attested: εὐνοεῖν (*eunoein*; 9.27), εὐνοῶν (*eunoōn*; 10.14). To be well minded towards, to wish well. “One must, however, wish them well; for by nature they are friends” (9.27); the educated and self-respecting man says to nature, “Give what you want; take back what you want”, “not in defiance, but only obeying her and wishing her well” (10.14). Lemma: εὐνοέω.

εὔνοια

Attested: εὔνοια (*eunoia*; 4.20, 8.26). Goodwill. Asking what need the truly beautiful has of anything, Marcus answers, “No more than law, no more than truth, no more than goodwill or self-respect” (4.20); “peculiar to a man is goodwill towards the kindred stock” (8.26). Lemma: εὔνοια.

εὔνους

Attested: εὔνως (*eunōs*; 3.11.3), εὔνους (*eunous*; 10.36, 11.13). Well minded, well-wishing; the adverb, with goodwill. “I treat him according to the natural law of fellowship, with goodwill and justice” (3.11.3); “preserving your own habit, friendly and well-wishing and serene” (10.36); “But I am kindly and well-wishing to everyone, and to this very man” (11.13). Lemma: εὔνους.

λυκοφιλία

Attested: λυκοφιλίας (*lykophilias*; 11.15). A wolf’s friendship, friendliness that hides the beast of prey. “But studied simplicity is a knife. Nothing is more shameful than a wolf’s friendship; flee this above all” (11.15; see Simplicity and sincerity). The edition’s note compares Plato, *Phaedrus* 241d, “as wolves love lambs”. Lemma: λυκοφιλία.

φιλία

Attested: φιλίαις (*philiais*; 6.30.4), φιλίαι (*philiai*; 9.9.2). Friendship. Antoninus’ “firmness and constancy of his friendships” (6.30.4); among rational living beings, “commonwealths and friendships and households and gatherings” (9.9.2). Lemma: φιλία.

φίλος

Attested: φίλων (*philōn*; 1.8.2, 1.9.1, 1.14.2, 1.16.2), φίλου (*philou*; 1.13), φίλους (*philous*; 1.14.2, 1.17.1), φίλοις (*philois*; 1.16.2, 5.31), φίλα (*phila*; 2.13, 6.38), φίλη (*philē*; 4.23 twice), φίλε (*phile*; 5.7), φίλον (*philon*; 6.30.1, 10.1, 11.9, 11.31), φίλτερον (*philteron*; 7.18), φίλοι (*philoi*; 8.31, 9.27), φίλος (*philos*; 10.36). Dear, one's own; as a noun, a friend. Of friends: "a caring eye for friends" (1.9.1), "keeping his friends, never tiring of them nor infatuated with them" (1.16.2), "for by nature they are friends" (9.27), "him who is by nature kinsman and friend" (11.9). Dear: "O dear city of Zeus" (4.23), "Rain, rain, dear Zeus" (5.7), "whatever is dear to them" (10.1), "And my dear heart laughed" (11.31); "And what is dearer or more proper to the nature of the whole?" (7.18). Of things in relation: "all are for this reason friendly to one another" (6.38); "what comes from men deserves love because of kinship" (2.13). At 1.17.1 "nearly all of them" good, after "kinsmen, friends", is ἅπαντας (*hapantas*), the correction of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802, which Leopold prints; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has ἅπαντα σχεῖν (*hapanta schein*), and A, the Vatican manuscript, ἅπαντα ἔχειν (*hapanta echein*), "nearly everything". Lemma: φίλος.

See also

Anger; Beneficence; Daimon; Death; Good, bad and indifference; Gratitude; Interconnection; Kindness and correction; Kinship and cooperation; Love and affection; Simplicity and sincerity.

Gratitude

The debts of Book I and the thanks owed to the gods · Meditations

εὐχάριστος, eucharistos, "grateful"; *ἀχάριστος, acharistos*, "ungrateful"; *χάρις, charis*, "thanks", "favour", "favours"; *διάδοσις, diadosis*, "gifts"; *σύλληψις, syllēpsis*, "help"; *βοήθημα, boēthēma*, "help"; *βοηθός, boēthos*, "help"; *δῶρον, dōron*, "gift", "gifts"

At a Glance

The word. Εὐχάριστος, built on εὖ (*eu*), "well", and the verb of χάρις, "favour", is grateful, and ἀχάριστος

ungrateful. The "From" that heads each chapter of Book I is παρά (*para*) with the genitive: from the side of a person.

In the *Meditations*. Book I sets down what Marcus took from his family, his teachers, his adoptive father and the gods: "From my grandfather Verus: good character and freedom from anger" (1.1). It has no word of thanks. The gods' list (1.17) counts escapes as gifts, and lays Marcus' shortfall on himself (1.17.6). Elsewhere gratitude is the manner of dying: "grateful to the gods from the heart" (2.3).

In this edition. Παρά at the head of the chapters of Book I is "From"; εὐχάριστος is "grateful" and ἀχάριστος "ungrateful"; χάρις is "thanks" once (4.48.2) and elsewhere "favour"; the gods' διαδόσεις (*diadoseis*) and συλλήψεις (*syllēpseis*) are "gifts" and "help".

A place to read. 1.17.1, where Marcus has from the gods good grandfathers, parents and teachers, and counts it their doing of good that no combination of circumstances arose to put him to the test.

Meaning

Εὐχάριστος (*eucharistos*), from εὖ (*eu*), "well", and the verbal adjective of χαρίζεσθαι (*charizesthai*), "to show favour", the verb of χάρις (*charis*), the favour done and the thanks returned for it (see Beneficence), is pleasing, and also, as in Marcus, grateful; ἀχάριστος (*acharistos*), with the negative prefix, is the man who makes no return. The ripe olive falls χάριν εἰδυῖα (*charin eidyia*), "knowing thanks", that is, "giving thanks" (4.48.2). Παρά (*para*) with the genitive is "from beside" a person, of what one hears, learns or receives from him. Book I uses it without a verb, as in Παρὰ τοῦ πάππου Οὐήρου τὸ καλόηθες καὶ ἀόργητον (*Para tou pappou Ouērou to kaloēthes kai aorgēton*; 1.1). The verb that would say how each thing came is never written. Nor is there a verb of thanking: εὐχαριστεῖν (*eucharistein*), "to give thanks", which Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, uses often, does not occur in the *Meditations*, and εὐχάριστος only once (2.3).[436]

Use in the book

Book I is a list of debts. Each of its seventeen chapters names a giver, and then what came from him: his family (1.1–

[436] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.4.32, 1.6.2, 1.10.3, 1.12.32, 1.16.6, 1.19.25, 2.7.9, 2.23.5, 4.1.105 and 4.4.18.

1.4), his tutor and teachers (1.5–1.15), his adoptive father, Antoninus Pius (1.16), and the gods (1.17). What came varies: a lesson, from Alexander the grammarian, his teacher of Greek, to correct a fault of speech without reproof (1.10; see Kindness and correction); an example, from Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic whom Antoninus summoned to Rome to teach him, "to have seen plainly, in a living example, that the same man can be most intense and yet relaxed" (1.8.1; see Exemplary lives); a thing done for him, from his great-grandfather, "not to have gone to the public schools, and to have had good teachers at home" (1.4; see Parents and education); and from a father who died when Marcus was a small child, "From the repute and memory of the man who fathered me: self-respect and manliness" (1.2). The gratitude can be read as lying in the form: what Marcus admires is set down as received, and from someone named.

The gods' list is of another kind. "From the gods: to have good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers ..." (1.17.1); but much of what it counts is what did not happen: "that I never slipped into offending any of them, although I had the kind of disposition from which, had things fallen out so, I might well have done something of the sort. And it is the gods' doing of good that no combination of circumstances arose to put me to the test" (1.17.1). So with the rhetoric and poetry in which he "made no further progress" (1.17.4), his exasperation with Rusticus, the Stoic, which led to nothing more that he "would have regretted" (1.17.7; see Anger), and the sophist he did not fall in with (1.17.9; see Philosophy). Marcus counts escapes among the gods' gifts as readily as goods, and with them the occasions that never put his own disposition to the test. One item can be read as a debt paid, "that I was quick to raise my tutors to the rank they seemed to me to crave" (1.17.5), and even this he sets among the gods' gifts.

The gifts do not excuse him. As far as depends on the gods "and on the gifts and help and inspirations that come from them, nothing prevents me from living according to nature now; but that I still fall short of it is my own fault, and comes from not keeping the reminders of the gods, and all but their instructions" (1.17.6; see Gods). He is also to remember "how many times you have been given days of grace by the gods and not used them" (2.4). The last section has help "given me in dreams" and a line whose source is

unknown: all these things “need the help of gods and of fortune” (1.17.9).

Outside Book I, gratitude belongs to dying. Marcus is to throw away the thirst for books, “so that you do not die grumbling, but serene, truly, and grateful to the gods from the heart” (2.3; see Nature), and to come to rest as a ripe olive falls, “speaking well of her who bore it and giving thanks to the tree that grew it” (4.48.2; see Death). The list of Book I can be read as returning as a question, how he has behaved “up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children, teachers, tutors, friends, kin, household slaves” (5.31; see Duty and fitting action), and the debt to his father, in Book VI, as a rule: “Everything as a pupil of Antoninus” (6.30.2), “so that your last hour may find you with as good a conscience as it found him” (6.30.4). Ingratitude in others is expected at dawn (2.1; see Fault and ignorance) and is to be borne (8.8, 9.42.4; see Beneficence). Gratitude in the *Meditations* is less a feeling voiced than an account kept: the giver named, the gift written down, and the shortfall owned as one’s own.

Places to read

The passages where thanks, ingratitude and the gods’ gifts are discussed or carry the argument, with the sections of Book I that the argument uses and every section of 1.17, in the order of the book; every place of the words of gift and help is given in the sub-entries, and every place of εὐχάριστος, χάρις and ἀχάριστος in those of Beneficence.

1.1 From his grandfather Verus Marcus has good character and freedom from anger.

1.2 From the repute and memory of his father, whom he knew only by report, Marcus has self-respect and manliness.

1.4 From his great-grandfather Marcus has it that he did not go to the public schools but had good teachers at home, and learned that on such things one must spend freely.

1.8.1 From Apollonius Marcus has freedom, steadiness, and the living example of a man most intense and yet relaxed.

1.8.2 Apollonius taught Marcus how to receive what pass for favours from friends without being lowered by them or letting them go by unfeelingly.

1.10 From Alexander the grammarian Marcus learned not to reprove a fault of speech but deftly to introduce the expression that ought to have been used.

1.16.1 From his father Marcus has gentleness and holding unshaken to decisions reached after thorough examination; the portrait of Antoninus runs to 1.16.10.

1.17.1 From the gods Marcus has good grandfathers, parents, a sister and teachers, kinsmen and friends, and it is their doing of good that no combination of circumstances arose to put him to the test.

1.17.2 Among the gods' gifts are that he was not brought up any longer with his grandfather's concubine, and that he did not become a man before the time.

1.17.3 He was placed under a ruler and father who was to take all vanity out of him and show him that one can live at court near to the style of a private citizen without being slacker in public duties.

1.17.4 He had a brother able to rouse him to take care of himself, children neither dull-witted nor deformed, and made no further progress in rhetoric and poetry.

1.17.5 He was quick to raise his tutors to the rank they seemed to crave, and came to know Apollonius, Rusticus and Maximus, that is Claudius Maximus, the Stoic.

1.17.6 As far as depends on the gods and their gifts and help and inspirations, nothing prevents Marcus from living according to nature; that he still falls short is his own fault.

1.17.7 His body held out; he did not touch Benedicta or Theodotus, probably of the household; often exasperated with Rusticus, he did nothing more he would have regretted; and his mother made her home with him in her last years.

1.17.8 He never lacked the means to help someone in need, nor fell into a like need himself; his wife is what she is; and he had suitable tutors for his children.

1.17.9 Help was given him in dreams, and when he craved philosophy he did not fall in with a sophist; all these things, in a quoted line, need the help of gods and of fortune.

2.1 Among those Marcus expects to meet at dawn are the ungrateful, whose faults come from ignorance of good and bad (see Fault and ignorance).

2.3 Marcus is to throw away the thirst for books, so as to die not grumbling but serene and grateful to the gods from the heart.

2.4 Marcus is to remember how many times he has been given days of grace by the gods and not used them.

4.48.2 Marcus is to come to rest serene, as a ripe olive might fall, speaking well of her who bore it and giving thanks to the tree that grew it.

5.31 Marcus asks how he has behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children, teachers, tutors, friends, kin and household slaves.

6.30.2–4 Marcus is to do everything as a pupil of Antoninus, so that his last hour may find him with as good a conscience as it found his father.

6.48 To gladden himself Marcus is to consider the merits of those who live alongside him (see Virtue and excellence).

8.8 It is open to Marcus not to rage at the insensible and the ungrateful, and even to care for them.

9.27 The gods help even those who censure or hate Marcus, in all sorts of ways, through dreams and oracles, towards the things about which they are at odds.

9.42.4 Whoever blames a man as ungrateful is himself at fault, for trusting such a man or for not giving the favour conclusively; man, beneficent by nature, has his own when he has done good.

11.25 Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, would not go to Perdiccas, king of Macedon, so as not to be unable, having been done good, to do good in return (see Beneficence).

Epictetus and the Stoics

Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, turns in the second of his seven books *On Benefits* from the giver to the receiver: a duty that is made up of two, he says, asks as much of the one as of the other.[437] Whoever teaches men to be grateful, he says, pleads the cause of the gods as well as of men: to the gods, who need nothing and stand beyond desire, gratitude can still be returned, and no one may plead weakness or want, for at the very moment a man is put under obligation he is quits with anyone, if he will, since whoever receives a benefit willingly has returned it. This, in his view, is the least strange and least incredible of the Stoic paradoxes: everything is referred to the mind, each has done as much as he willed, and since every virtue, piety, good faith and justice among them, is complete within itself even when it may not put out its hand, a man too can be grateful by his will.[438] Book I can be read as a return of that kind, made in writing to no one. Of teachers Seneca asks why he owes the doctor and the teacher something beyond their fee, and answers that from doctor and teacher they have become friends, and bind us not by the art they sell but by a kindly and familiar goodwill. Of the teacher who bore the labour and tedium of teaching, instilled something beyond what is said to all, roused a good nature by exhortation, and did not dole out what he knew so as to be needed longer, but wanted, if he could, to pour all of it over, Seneca says, "I am ungrateful unless I love him among my dearest ties."[439] Marcus' teachers of Book I can be read in that light, and his promptness in raising his tutors to rank (1.17.5). Epictetus asks what else men ought to do, if they had sense, in common and in private, than hymn the divine, speak well of it and go through its favours, τὰς χάριτας (*tas charitas*). Ought they not, he asks, while digging, ploughing and eating, to sing the hymn to God, "Great is God, for he has given us these tools to work the earth with; great is God, for he has given us hands, a gullet, a belly, growth we do not notice, breathing in our sleep"? This, he says, they should sing at each thing, and the greatest and most divine hymn for the faculty that keeps track of these things and uses them methodically. "If I were a nightingale, I would do the nightingale's work, if a swan, the swan's; as it is, I am

[437] Seneca, *On Benefits* 2.18.1.

[438] Seneca, *On Benefits* 2.30.2–2.31.1.

[439] Seneca, *On Benefits* 6.16.1 and 6.16.6–7.

rational: I must hymn God."[440] Epictetus' thanks are for what every man has; the gods' list of 1.17 can be read as its counterpart, the thanks for what fell to one man alone, these grandparents, this brother, these teachers, the help in dreams. The falling olive of 4.48.2, "speaking well of her who bore it and giving thanks to the tree that grew it", can be read beside Epictetus' hymn: it has his εὐφημεῖν (*euphēmein*), though its χάρις is thanks returned, not favours recounted.

Translation in this edition

Παρά with the genitive at the head of each of the seventeen chapters of Book I is "From", and καὶ ἔτι παρὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ (*kai eti para tou autou*) is "and from him also" (1.14.2). At 1.15.1 P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has Παράκλησις Μαξίμου (*Paraklēsis Maximou*), "the encouragement of Maximus", and Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, read "From Claudius Maximus"; J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, has Παρὰ Μαξίμου (*Para Maximou*), "From Maximus". The "From" has no verb to go with it, and the English supplies none. Εὐχάριστος is "grateful" (2.3) and ἀχάριστος "ungrateful" (2.1, 8.8, 9.42.4; see Beneficence). Χάρις is "thanks" in χάριν εἰδυῖα, "giving thanks" (4.48.2), and elsewhere "favour" (see Beneficence); "gracious" renders εὐχαριεντίζεσθαι (*eucharientizesthai*; 1.15.3) and χαρίεις (*charieis*; 9.2), words of charm. Εὐποιία (*eupoiia*) is "doing of good" in "the gods' doing of good" (1.17.1; see Beneficence). Διάδοσις is "gifts" and σύλληψις "help" (1.17.6), beside ἐπίπνοια (*epipnoia*), "inspirations", the correction of Casaubon, which Leopold prints (see Gods). Βοήθημα is "help" (1.17.9, 4.50), and βοηθός "help" in "the help of gods" (1.17.9). Δῶρον is "gift" (11.8, 11.18.6) and "gifts" (11.18.5); "the gift of nature" (4.19) renders δόσις (*dosis*), in a sentence whose text is uncertain, and "make a gift" (8.44) χαρίζεσθαι (*charizesthai*). The verb συλλαμβάνειν (*syllambanein*) is "lend a hand", of the gods (9.40), "lend you a hand" (10.8.4) and "having gathered together" (9.1.4).

βοήθημα

Attested: βοηθήματα (*boēthēmata*; 1.17.9), βοήθημα (*boēthēma*; 4.50). An aid, a help. Among the gods' gifts,

[440] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.16.15–21.

“that help was given me in dreams, among other things against spitting blood and dizziness …” (1.17.9); and “an unphilosophical but still effective help towards despising death” (4.50; see Time and eternity). Lemma: βοήθημα.

βοηθός

Attested: βοηθῶν (*boēthōn*; 1.17.9). Helping; as a noun, a helper. In a line that Leopold marks as a quotation, whose source is unknown, all these things “need the help of gods and of fortune” (1.17.9), literally gods as helpers. Lemma: βοηθός.

διάδοσις

Attested: διαδόσεσι (*diadosesi*; 1.17.6). A giving out, a distribution; in the plural, gifts. Nothing prevents Marcus from living according to nature “as far as depends on the gods and on the gifts and help and inspirations that come from them” (1.17.6). Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, proposed δόσεσι (*dosesi*), “gifts”; Leopold keeps the manuscripts’ word and compares Epictetus, who asks how it can be sound to follow the gods if they exist and take care, but nothing is given out from them to men, and by Zeus to himself.[441] Lemma: διάδοσις.

δῶρον

Attested: δῶρον (*dōron*; 11.8, 11.18.6), δῶρα (*dōra*; 11.18.5). A gift. “Except that this, at least, is a gift of Zeus, who established the fellowship: for it is open to us to grow together again with what is adjacent, and again to become parts that complete the whole” (11.8; see Kinship and cooperation); “Remember these nine heads as gifts received from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man, while you live” (11.18.5); “And if you will, take also a tenth gift from the Leader of the Muses” (11.18.6; see Anger), who is Apollo, as the edition’s note says. Lemma: δῶρον.

σύλληψις

Attested: συλλήψεσι (*syllēpsesi*; 1.17.6). A taking hold together; help. Among the things that come from the gods, “the gifts and help and inspirations” (1.17.6). Lemma: σύλληψις.

[441] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.12.4–6.

See also

Anger; Beneficence; Care and tolerance; Death; Duty and fitting action; Exemplary lives; Fault and ignorance; Friendship; Gods; Kindness and correction; Kinship and cooperation; Nature; Parents and education; Philosophy; Reputation and praise; Time and eternity; Virtue and excellence.

Human work

What a man is for · Meditations

ἔργον, ergon, "work", "works", "deed", "deeds"; *ἐργάζεσθαι, ergazesthai*, "works", "produce"; *ἐργαλεῖον, ergaleion*, "tool"; *ἐργαστήριον, ergastērion*, "workshop"; *ἐργάτης, ergatēs*, "workers"; *εὐεργής, euergēs*, "easy to work"; *κατεργαστικός, katergastikos*, "doing"; *φιλόπονος, philoponos*, "love of work", "hard-working"; *δυσκαταπόνητος, dyskataponētos*, "hard ... to accomplish"; *αὐτουργικός, autourgikos*, "to work with my own hands"; *κόπος, kopos*, "toils", "weariness"; *κάματος, kamatos*, "toils"; *ταλαιπωρία, talaipōria*, "hardships"; *ἀχθοφορία, achthophoria*, "burden-bearing"; *τέχνη, technē*, "craft", "art"; *τεχνίτης, technitēs*, "craftsmen"; *τεχνίον, technion*, "little craft"; *μέλισσα, melissa*, "bee", "bees"

At a Glance

The word. Ἔργον is work: a deed, a thing made, and the task a thing is made for; ἐργάζεσθαι is to work or produce. Τέχνη is a craft or art and τεχνίτης a craftsman; φιλόπονος is the man who loves work.

In the *Meditations*. "Each thing has come to be for something" (8.19), and at first light Marcus is to have ready the thought, "I am rising to do the work of a man", as the little plants, sparrows, ants, spiders and bees do theirs (5.1.1). Craftsmen wear themselves out over their works and cling to the reason of their craft (5.1.3, 6.35); Marcus' own art is "To be good" (11.5), and he asks what more he seeks "if the present work is that of an intelligent and social living being" (8.2).

In this edition. Ἔργον is "work", in the plural "works", and "deed" or "deeds" at 5.3 and 7.44; τέχνη is "craft" or "art" and τεχνίτης "craftsmen"; φιλόπονος is "love of work" and "hard-working"; "toils" renders κόπος and κάματος.

A place to read. 5.1.1–3, where Marcus argues himself out of bed with the little creatures and the craftsmen.

Meaning

Ἔργον (*ergon*), from the same root as English "work", is a deed, a product, and the function proper to a thing, what it does by being what it is; ἐργάζεσθαι (*ergazesthai*) is to work or to make. Πόνος (*ponos*), toil and the pain it brings, is in the *Meditations* always "pain" (see Pain and pleasure), but its verb πονεῖν (*ponein*) keeps the toil in "Labour" (9.12); φιλόπονος (*philoponos*) is the man who loves toil, and κόπος (*kopos*) is toil and weariness. Τέχνη (*technē*) is a craft, skill working by rule towards a product, and a τεχνίτης (*technitēs*) a craftsman. Marcus uses ἔργον of nature (2.12, 8.6), of the stars (11.27), of philosophy (9.29) and of man (5.1.1). For man the answer is not a product but a kind of action, "social actions" (5.1.3, 8.12).

Use in the book

Book V opens with the argument. "At first light, when you are reluctant to get up, have this ready: I am rising to do the work of a man. … Or was I made for this, to lie under the blankets and keep myself warm?" Against the plea of pleasure Marcus asks whether he came to be for feeling pleasure or for activity (5.1.1; see Present action), and points to the creatures: "Do you not see the little plants, the little sparrows, the ants, the spiders, the bees doing their own work, putting together, for their part, the universe? And then you do not want to do what is human?" (5.1.1). Rest he grants within the measures nature has given (5.1.2; see Temperance and self-mastery), and finds the fault in himself: "For you do not love yourself; for then you would surely love your nature too, and its will" (5.1.2). Then the crafts: "those, at least, who love their own crafts wear themselves out over the works that belong to them, unwashed and unfed; you honour your own nature less than the engraver honours engraving, or the dancer dancing, or the lover of money money, or the lover of empty glory the little fame?" (5.1.3). The engraver stands beside the lover of money: Marcus borrows the ardour, not the object. The last question names the work, "but do social actions seem to you cheaper, and worth less effort?" (5.1.3), and a note on another waking says it outright: "remind yourself that it accords with your constitution and with human nature to

render social actions, but sleeping is common to irrational living beings too" (8.12).

Behind it lies the question what each thing is for. "Each thing has come to be for something, a horse, a vine. Why are you astonished? The Sun too will say, 'I have come to be for some work', and so will the other gods. You, then: for what? To feel pleasure? See whether the conception puts up with it" (8.19). The gods want "the fig tree to be doing the things of a fig tree, the dog those of a dog, the bee those of a bee, and man those of a man" (10.8.4), and the Pythagoreans' precept was to look up at the heaven at dawn, to be reminded "of those who always, in the same respects and in the same way, accomplish their own work" (11.27; see Principles and reminders). The plant, the bee and the star need no reminder; man does, and the argument can be read as resting on that difference.

The crafts give Marcus his model, because a craft knows what its work is for. What is to be honoured is "to move and to hold still according to one's own constitution, to which both the forms of care and the crafts lead. For every craft aims at this, that what has been made should be fit for the work for which it has been made", and the man who tends the vine, the colt-breaker and the man who cares for the dog seek the same (6.16.2–3). The craftsman's fidelity is a reproach: "Is it not terrible if the architect and the doctor will respect the reason of their own craft more than man respects his own, which he has in common with the gods?" (6.35). Marcus tells himself, "Love the little craft you have learned, and rest in it" (4.31), and asks, "What is your art? To be good" (11.5; see Principles and reminders).

Book I gives labour its models. From his tutor Marcus learned "to bear hardship and need little; to work with my own hands" (1.5); his adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, had "love of work and perseverance" (1.16.1) and after his headaches was "fresh at once and vigorous for the usual work" (1.16.7), and in Book VI Marcus recalls "how hard-working and patient" he was (6.30.4). Yet the astronomers Eudoxus and Hipparchus, and Archimedes of Syracuse, with "other sharp natures, great-minded, hard-working", are long dead; what is worth much is "to live one's life through with truth and justice" (6.47). The rule of labour is one line: "Labour, not as one wretched, nor as wanting to be pitied or admired; but want one thing only: to move and to hold still as civic reason requires" (9.12). Its pair, to move and to hold

still, is that of 6.16.2. The work is lighter than it looks: at each present hardship Marcus is to ask, “what is there in the work that is unbearable and insupportable?” (8.36; see Self-respect and shame); “if something is hard for you yourself to accomplish”, he is not to judge it impossible for a man (6.19); a work beyond his understanding he yields to one more able, if it is not otherwise a duty, or does with a helper (7.5; see Contentment and self-sufficiency); and by the understanding’s reversal of every hindrance “what holds back this work furthers the work” (5.20; see Obstacle and reservation).

Marcus’ “work of a man” can be read as the craftsman’s ἔργον with a new object: the creatures show the fit, the craftsmen the ardour, and the product is the social act. What remains is the question at each action: “What more do I seek, if the present work is that of an intelligent and social living being, under the same law as God?” (8.2; see Present action).

Places to read

Every chapter in which ἔργον or a word of its family (ἐργάζεσθαι, ἐργαλεῖον, ἐργαστήριον, ἐργάτης, εὐεργής, κατεργαστικός), a word of labour (πονεῖν, φιλόπονος, δυσκαταπόνητος, αὐτουργικός, κόπος, κάματος, ταλαιπωρία, ἀχθοφορία), τέχνη, τεχνίτης, τεχνίον or μέλισσα occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with two passages that treat a man’s work without the words (6.55, 8.12). Πόνος, which is “pain” (see Pain and pleasure), the compounds of ἔργον and πόνος that have their sub-entries elsewhere (ἐνέργεια, *energeia*, and its family; συνεργεῖν, *synergein*, and its family; εὐεργετεῖν, *euergetein*, and εὐεργετικός, *euergetikos*; περίεργος, *periergos*, and περιεργάζεσθαι, *periergazesthai*; φερέπονος, *phereponos*; ἐπίπονος, *epiponos*), the other compounds of the root (φυτουργός, *phytourgos*; ὑπουργός, *hypourgos*; λειτουργία, *leitourgia*; πανοῦργος, *panourgos*; γεωργεῖν, *geōrgein*; and the rest), ὄργανον (*organon*), “instrument”, κάμνειν (*kamnein*), “tire”, and the other derivatives of τέχνη (at 2.11.3, 4.20, 5.32, 6.14, 7.54 and 11.6.2) are left out.

1.5 From his tutor Marcus learned to bear hardship and need little, to work with his own hands and keep out of other people’s business.

1.15.1 From Claudius Maximus, the Stoic, Marcus had, among much else, the habit of doing what lay before him without complaint.

1.16.1 Marcus' father had love of work and perseverance, and a readiness to listen to anyone with something to contribute to the common good.

1.16.7 After his fits of headache Antoninus was fresh at once and vigorous for the usual work, and he showed good sense and measure in the building of public works.

2.12 If dying is looked at by itself and stripped of the impressions attached to it, it will be held nothing but a work of nature, which only a child fears, and one to nature's advantage (see Death).

3.2.3 Many things not convincing to everyone are open only to the man who has come into genuine affinity with nature and her works.

3.4.1 Marcus is not to waste what is left of life on impressions about other people not referred to some common good, for he is then deprived of other work.

4.2 No act is to be done at random, nor otherwise than according to a doctrine that completes the art.

4.31 Marcus is to love the little craft he has learned and rest in it, and go through the rest of life entrusting all that is his to the gods, neither tyrant nor slave of any man.

4.51 The short road, the one according to nature, frees one from toils, from dawdling, and from all management and pretentiousness.

5.1.1 At first light, reluctant to get up, Marcus is to have ready the thought that he is rising to do the work of a man, as the little plants, sparrows, ants, spiders and bees do their own.

5.1.3 Those who love their crafts wear themselves out over their works, and Marcus asks whether he honours his own nature less than the engraver his engraving or the dancer his dancing, and whether social actions seem to him cheaper.

5.3 Marcus is to judge himself worthy of every word and deed according to nature, whatever blame from certain people follows.

5.6.2 A bee that has made honey, like a man who has done good, makes no outcry but passes on; and Marcus tells the objector that, if he wants to understand what is said, he need not fear leaving any social work undone because of it (see Beneficence).

5.8.2 Things "fit" us as craftsmen say that the squared stones in walls or pyramids "fit", joining one another in a certain arrangement (see Fate and allotment).

5.14 Reason and the art of reasoning are faculties content with themselves and with the works that belong to them.

5.20 In so far as some men stand in the way of Marcus' proper works, they become things that make no difference to him; and the understanding turns every hindrance into the leading object, so that what holds back the work furthers it (see Obstacle and reservation).

6.16.2 What is to be honoured is to move and to hold still according to one's own constitution, to which the forms of care and the crafts lead.

6.16.3 Every craft aims that what is made should be fit for the work it is made for, as the man who tends the vine, the colt-breaker and the man who cares for the dog seek; Marcus asks what the ways of rearing and teaching hurry towards.

6.19 If something is hard for Marcus himself to accomplish, he is not to think it impossible for a man; what is possible and proper for a man he is to believe attainable by himself too.

6.30.1 Marcus is to keep himself simple, good and kindly, vigorous for the works that are seemly, such as philosophy wanted to make him.

6.30.4 Among the traits of Antoninus to remember is how hard-working and patient he was.

6.35 Common craftsmen cling to the reason of their craft, and Marcus asks whether it is not terrible if the architect and the doctor respect the reason of their own craft more than man respects his own, which he has in common with the gods.

6.40 An instrument, a tool or any vessel is well if it does what it was made for, though its maker is out of the way; in the things held together by nature the power that made them remains within.

6.42 All work together towards one outcome, and Heraclitus, the philosopher of Ephesus of about 500 BC, says, as Marcus thinks, that even those asleep are workers and fellow-workers in what comes about (see Kinship and cooperation).

6.47 Orators, philosophers, Eudoxus, Hipparchus and Archimedes, and other sharp, hard-working natures, are all long dead; one thing is worth much, to live one's life through with truth and justice.

6.54 What is not advantageous to the hive is not advantageous to the bee either (see Common advantage).

6.55 Marcus asks whether, if the sailors spoke ill of the one steering or the sick of the one doctoring, any heed would be paid to anything but bringing about the safety of those on board or the health of those being treated.

7.3 Among the empty spectacles of life Marcus counts the hardships and burden-bearing of ants, and he is to stand among them kindly, keeping track that each man is worth as much as the things he takes seriously.

7.5 If his understanding is sufficient for a work, Marcus uses it as a tool given by nature; if not, he yields the work to one more able, if it is not otherwise a duty, or does it with a helper (see Contentment and self-sufficiency).

7.44 Marcus copies the reply of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, in the *Apology*, Plato's account of his defence: a man of even a little use must look only at whether, when he acts, he does just things or unjust.

7.51 Verses of an unknown tragedy that Marcus copies say that the wind that blows from the gods must be borne, in toils without lament.

7.53 Where a work can be accomplished according to the reason common to gods and men, there is nothing terrible.

7.68 Use, which Marcus makes speak, says to what presents itself that the present is always material for virtue and for the art of man or God; and all that happens is familiar and easy to work (see Tranquillity).

8.2 At each action Marcus asks what more he seeks, if the present work is that of an intelligent and social living being, under the same law as God (see Present action).

8.6 The nature of the whole has this work: to shift the things here to there and change them.

8.7 A rational nature journeys well when, among other things, it directs its impulses to social works alone (see Impulse).

8.12 When roused from sleep with reluctance, Marcus is to remind himself that rendering social actions accords with his constitution and with human nature, while sleeping is common to irrational beings too.

8.19 Each thing has come to be for something, and the Sun will say that it has come to be for some work; Marcus asks what he has come to be for, and whether it is to feel pleasure.

8.36 At each present hardship Marcus is to ask what in the work is unbearable and insupportable (see Self-respect and shame).

8.50 As a carpenter or a shoemaker would laugh at complaints about shavings in the workshop, so a man who studies nature laughs at the question why bitter cucumbers and briars came about; the wonder of nature's art is that it makes new things from what decays within it (see Nature).

9.3.2 The weariness of living in discord with men who do not share one's principles is so great that one says, "May you come quicker, death, lest perhaps I too forget myself."

9.9.2 The ascent towards the better could produce sympathy even in things separate, as among the stars (see Kinship and cooperation).

9.12 Marcus is to labour, not as one wretched, nor as wanting to be pitied or admired, but to want one

thing only: to move and to hold still as civic reason requires.

9.29 The work of philosophy is simple and self-respecting, and Marcus is not to be led away to solemn vanity (see Philosophy).

10.8.4 The gods want all rational beings to be made like themselves, and the fig tree to do the things of a fig tree, the dog those of a dog, the bee those of a bee, and man those of a man.

10.26 A man lets seed go into a womb and goes away, and another cause takes it over and works and completes an infant.

11.5 Asked what his art is, Marcus answers, to be good, and turns to the doctrines about the nature of the whole and about man's own constitution (see Principles and reminders).

11.10 Marcus quotes the saying that no nature is worse than art, since the arts imitate natures; and as all arts make the worse for the sake of the better, so does the common nature.

11.18.4 Marcus is to show the insolent man deftly that not even bees do this, nor any creatures that are by nature gregarious (see Anger).

11.27 The Pythagoreans bid men look at the heaven at dawn, to be reminded of those who always accomplish their own work in the same way, and of order, purity and nakedness (see Principles and reminders).

11.34 Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, said that nothing is ill-omened that signifies a work of nature, or else the reaping of the corn is ill-omened too (see Love and affection).

11.37 Epictetus said that one must find an art concerning assent, and keep the impulses with reservation, social and according to worth (see Impulse).

12.5 Marcus asks how the gods could overlook that some very kind men, most intimate with the divine through holy works and sacred rites, should be quenched for ever once they have died.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus sets two mornings side by side. The many, he says, are right that one work has no share in another. The man who seeks favour, rising at dawn, looks for whom of the household to greet, to whom to say a pleasing word or send a gift, how to please the dancer; but the man who cares truly for nothing but the right use of impressions is to consider, as soon as he has risen at dawn, what he still lacks for freedom from passion and from disturbance, and who he is: not a little body, nor property, nor repute, but a rational animal; and, going over what he has done, he is to ask what he did that was unfriendly, unsocial or inconsiderate.[442] Marcus' "I am rising to do the work of a man" (5.1.1) can be read as the second morning, and Epictetus' "unsocial" as the reverse of the "social actions" of 5.1.3 and 8.12. Elsewhere Epictetus, who would do the things of a nightingale if he were one, calls the hymning of God his own work (see Gratitude),[443] with the same turn of phrase as Marcus' fig tree "doing the things of a fig tree" (10.8.4). Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, argues in a letter that each thing is commended by its own good: the vine by how much it bears and how its wine tastes, the stag by its swiftness; of pack-animals, whose one use is to carry a load, one asks how strong their backs are; in a dog that must track wild beasts the first thing is a keen nose; in each thing that should be best for which it is born. What is best in man? Reason, by which he goes before the animals and follows the gods; strength, beauty and speed he shares with lions, peacocks and horses, and Seneca asks not what is greatest in man but what is his own.[444] Marcus' horse and vine, and his "You, then: for what?" (8.19), can be read beside the letter. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its seventh book, reports that one of the senses in which the Stoics called a thing beautiful was its being well fitted by nature for its own work;[445] Marcus' craft, which aims that what is made "should be fit for the work for which it has been made" (6.16.3), can be read as aiming at the same fitness.

---

[442] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.6.30–31 and 4.6.34–35.

[443] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.16.20–21.

[444] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 76.8–9.

[445] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.100.

Other ancient sources

Cicero, the Roman orator and statesman of the first century BC, answering the Epicureans in his own person in the second book of *On Ends*, says that Aristippus of Cyrene, the follower of Socrates, and the Cyrenaics, who placed the highest good in the pleasure that moves the senses most sweetly, did not see that as the horse is born for running, the ox for ploughing and the dog for tracking, so man, as Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, says, is born for two things, understanding and acting, as if a mortal god; they would have this divine animal born, like some slow and sluggish beast, for grazing and the pleasure of begetting.[446] Aristotle had asked in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* whether the carpenter and the cobbler have works and actions while man has none and is by nature idle, and had set aside, as shared with plants and animals, the life of nourishment and of sensation (see Present action).[447] Aristotle's carpenter and cobbler, τέκτων (*tektōn*) and σκυτεύς (*skyteus*), are the two craftsmen of Marcus' workshop (8.50), and Marcus' question at the bedside, whether he was made "to lie under the blankets and keep myself warm" (5.1.1), can be read as Cicero's charge against the Cyrenaics turned on himself.

Translation in this edition

Ἔργον is "work" (2.12 three times, 3.4.1, 5.1.1, 5.6.2, 5.20 twice, 6.16.3, 7.5 twice, 7.53, 8.2, 8.6, 8.19, 8.36, 9.29, 11.27, 11.34), "works" in the plural (3.2.3, 5.1.3, 5.14, 5.20, 6.30.1, 8.7, 12.5) and "public works" (1.16.7); at 1.16.7 the plural πρὸς τὰ συνήθη ἔργα (*pros ta synēthē erga*) is "for the usual work". It is "deed" in "every word and deed" (5.3) and "deeds" at 7.44, where ἔργα is a supplement of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor. Ἐργάζεσθαι is "works" (10.26) and "produce" (9.9.2), ἐργάτης "workers" (6.42), ἐργαλεῖον "a tool" (6.40) and ἐργαστήριον "workshop" (8.50); "tool" at 7.5 renders ὄργανον, elsewhere "instrument" (3.13, 6.40, 9.41). Εὐεργής is "easy to work" (7.68), and κατεργαστικός is rendered with a verb, "doing what lay before him without complaint" (1.15.1). "Work" in the English also renders idioms without ἔργον: τὸ ἴδιον ποιούσας (*to idion poiousas*), "doing their own work" (5.1.1; see Affinity and the alien), τὸ ἑαυτοῦ

[446] Cicero, *On Ends* 2.39–40.

[447] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7, 1097b28–1098a3.

ποιοῦντος (*to heautou poiountos*), “does its own work” (4.13), τὰ τοῦ ὑετοῦ (*ta tou hyetou*), “the work of the rain” (6.43), τὰ τῶν θεῶν (*ta tōn theōn*) and τὰ τῆς τύχης (*ta tēs tychēs*), “the works of the gods” and “the works of fortune” (2.3; see Nature), and τὸ παρόν (*to paron*), “the work in hand” (3.12; see Present action); the compounds of συνεργεῖν, “work together”, “work with”, have their sub-entries elsewhere (see Kinship and cooperation). Πονεῖν is “Labour” (9.12) and πόνος always “pain” (see Pain and pleasure). Φιλόπονος is “love of work” for τὸ φιλόπονον (*to philoponon*; 1.16.1) and “hard-working” (6.30.4, 6.47); δυσκαταπόνητος is “hard … to accomplish” (6.19); τὸ αὐτουργικόν (*to autourgikon*) is “to work with my own hands” (1.5). Κόπος is “toils” (4.51) and “weariness” (9.3.2), and κάματος “toils” in a verse (7.51); ταλαιπωρία is “hardships” and ἀχθοφορία “burden-bearing” (7.3). “Bear hardship” (1.5) and “the bearing of hardship” (5.5) render φερέπονος (see Courage and endurance). Τέχνη is “craft” (5.1.3, 6.16.2, 6.16.3, 6.35 twice) and “art” (4.2, 5.14, 7.68, 8.50 twice, 11.5, 11.10 three times, 11.37), with “the arts” and “all arts” for the plural at 11.10; τεχνίτης is “craftsmen” (5.8.2) and, with βάναυσοι (*banausoi*), “common craftsmen” (6.35); τεχνίον is “the little craft” (4.31). “Art” also renders adjectives that imply it: “the art of living” (ἡ βιωτική, *hē biōtikē*; 7.61), “the kingly and law-giving art” (τῆς βασιλικῆς καὶ νομοθετικῆς, *tēs basilikēs kai nomothetikēs*; 4.12) and “the doctor’s art” (ἰατρική, *iatrikē*; 1.16.5); “the baker’s art” (3.2.1) renders ἀρτοποιία (*artopoiia*). The other derivatives of τέχνη keep their own English: ἀτεχνία (*atechnia*) “want of skill” (2.11.3), τεχνικός (*technikos*) “works of art” (4.20), “skilled in a craft” (6.14) and “of art” (11.10), ἄτεχνος (*atechnos*) and ἔντεχνος (*entechnos*) “unskilled” and “skilled” (5.32), ἐμφιλοτεχνεῖν (*emphilotechnein*) “work with art upon” (7.54), φιλοτεχνία (*philotechnia*) “virtuosity” (11.6.2), and τεχνάζεσθαι (*technazesthai*) “scheming” (3.4.1). Μέλισσα is “bee” and “bees”; the hive, σμῆνος (*smēnos*), has its sub-entry elsewhere (see Common advantage).

αὐτουργικός

Attested: αὐτουργικόν (*autourgikon*; 1.5). Working with one’s own hands; with the article, the doing of one’s own work. From his tutor Marcus learned “to bear hardship and

need little; to work with my own hands and keep out of other people's business" (1.5). Lemma: αὐτουργικός.

ἀχθοφορία

Attested: ἀχθοφορίαι (*achthophoriai*; 7.3). The carrying of burdens. Among the empty spectacles of life are "the hardships and burden-bearing of ants" (7.3). Lemma: ἀχθοφορία.

δυσκαταπόνητος

Attested: δυσκαταπόνητον (*dyskataponēton*; 6.19). Hard to master by toil, hard to accomplish. "Do not, if something is hard for you yourself to accomplish, form the opinion that it is impossible for a man" (6.19). Lemma: δυσκαταπόνητος.

ἐργάζομαι

Attested: ἐργάσασθαι (*ergasasthai*; 9.9.2), ἐργάζεται (*ergazetai*; 10.26). To work, to produce; in the *Meditations* never of a man's labour. "So the ascent towards the better could produce sympathy even in things separate" (9.9.2; see Kinship and cooperation); "another cause takes it over and works and completes an infant" (10.26). Lemma: ἐργάζομαι.

ἐργαλεῖον

Attested: ἐργαλεῖον (*ergaleion*; 6.40). A tool. "An instrument, a tool, any vessel, if it does what it was made for, is well; and yet there the maker is out of the way" (6.40; see Nature). Lemma: ἐργαλεῖον.

ἐργαστήριον

Attested: ἐργαστηρίῳ (*ergastēriōi*; 8.50). A workshop. One would be laughed at by a carpenter and a shoemaker "if you found fault because you see shavings and parings of the things being made in the workshop" (8.50; see Nature). Lemma: ἐργαστήριον.

ἐργάτης

Attested: ἐργάτας (*ergatas*; 6.42). A worker. Heraclitus, as Marcus thinks, says "that even those asleep are workers and fellow-workers in what comes about in the universe" (6.42; see Kinship and cooperation). Lemma: ἐργάτης.

ἔργον

Attested: ἔργα (*erga*; 1.16.7, 3.2.3, 5.20, 6.30.1, 7.44, 8.7), ἔργων (*ergōn*; 1.16.7, 12.5), ἔργον (*ergon*; 2.12 three times,

5.1.1, 5.6.2, 6.16.3, 7.5, 7.53, 8.2, 8.6, 8.19, 9.29, 11.27), ἔργου (*ergou*; 3.4.1, 5.3, 5.20 twice, 7.5, 8.36, 11.34), ἔργοις (*ergois*; 5.1.3, 5.14). A deed, a thing made; the task or function that a thing is for. “I am rising to do the work of a man” (5.1.1); “I have come to be for some work” (8.19); “every craft aims at this, that what has been made should be fit for the work for which it has been made” (6.16.3); “The work of philosophy is simple and self-respecting” (9.29). At 7.44 ἔργα is Gataker’s supplement, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts in the words Marcus copies from Plato’s *Apology*. At 6.30.1 Leopold reports τὰ πρότερα ἔργα (*ta protera erga*), “the former works”, in A, the Vatican manuscript, for τὰ πρέποντα ἔργα (*ta preponta erga*), “the works that are seemly”; at 3.4.1 D, the Darmstadt manuscript, omits “for you are deprived of other work”. Lemma: ἔργον.

εὐεργής

Attested: εὐεργές (*euerges*; 7.68). Easy to work, easy to handle. Everything that happens “is neither new nor hard to handle, but familiar and easy to work” (7.68; see Tranquillity). Lemma: εὐεργής.

κάματος

Attested: καμάτοις (*kamatois*; 7.51). Toil, weariness. In verses of an unknown tragedy that Marcus copies, as the edition’s note there records: “But the wind that blows from the gods / one must bear, in toils without lament” (7.51). Lemma: κάματος.

κατεργαστικός

Attested: κατεργαστικόν (*katergastikon*; 1.15.1). Apt to accomplish; with the article, the accomplishing. From Maximus, “doing what lay before him without complaint” (1.15.1). Lemma: κατεργαστικός.

κόπος

Attested: κόπων (*kopōn*; 4.51), κόπος (*kopos*; 9.3.2). Toil, weariness. The short road “frees one from toils, from dawdling, and from all management and pretentiousness” (4.51); “you see how great the weariness is in the discord of living together” (9.3.2). Lemma: κόπος.

μέλισσα

Attested: μελίσσας (*melissas*; 5.1.1), μέλισσα (*melissa*; 5.6.2), μελίσσῃ (*melissēi*; 6.54), μέλισσαν (*melissan*; 10.8.4), μελίσσης (*melissēs*; 10.8.4), μέλισσαι (*melissai*; 11.18.4). A bee. The bees, with the plants, sparrows, ants and spiders, are "doing their own work" (5.1.1); "a bee that has made honey" makes no outcry (5.6.2; see Beneficence); "What is not advantageous to the hive is not advantageous to the bee either" (6.54; see Common advantage); the gods want the fig tree to do the things of a fig tree, "the dog those of a dog, the bee those of a bee" (10.8.4); and "not even bees do this, nor any creatures that are by nature gregarious" (11.18.4; see Anger). Lemma: μέλισσα.

ταλαιπωρία

Attested: ταλαιπωρίαι (*talaipōriai*; 7.3). Hardship, toilsome labour. "the hardships and burden-bearing of ants" (7.3). Lemma: ταλαιπωρία.

τέχνη

Attested: τέχνης (*technēs*; 4.2, 6.35 twice, 7.68, 8.50, 11.10), τέχνας (*technas*; 5.1.3), τέχνη (*technē*; 5.14, 6.16.3, 11.5), τέχναι (*technai*; 6.16.2, 11.10 twice), τέχνῃ (*technēi*; 8.50), τέχνην (*technēn*; 11.37). A craft, an art: skill that works by rule. "those, at least, who love their own crafts wear themselves out over the works that belong to them" (5.1.3); "every craft aims at this" (6.16.3); craftsmen "cling to the reason of their craft" (6.35); "What is your art? To be good" (11.5); of nature, "the wonder of its art" (8.50). At 5.1.3 "those, at least" is the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, for "others" in the manuscripts; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has τορνευτής (*torneutēs*), "turner", and "turning" for "engraver" and "engraving"; and A and D omit the words "but do social actions seem to you cheaper". At 11.5 the edition's "except", in the question that follows "To be good", gives the sense the passage needs; Leopold prints πῶς καλῶς (*pōs kalōs*), "how honourably", and Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, and Coraes proposed ἄλλως (*allōs*), "otherwise". Lemma: τέχνη.

τεχνίον

Attested: τεχνίον (*technion*; 4.31). A little craft, a modest skill. “Love the little craft you have learned, and rest in it” (4.31). Lemma: τεχνίον.

τεχνίτης

Attested: τεχνῖται (*technitai*; 5.8.2, 6.35). A craftsman. Things fit us “just as craftsmen say that the squared stones in walls or pyramids ‘fit’” (5.8.2); “the common craftsmen accommodate themselves to laymen up to a point, but none the less cling to the reason of their craft” (6.35). Lemma: τεχνίτης.

φιλόπονος

Attested: φιλόπονον (*philoponon*; 1.16.1), φιλόπονος (*philoponos*; 6.30.4), φιλόπονοι (*philoponoi*; 6.47). Fond of toil, hard-working; with the article, the love of work. From his father, “love of work and perseverance” (1.16.1); “how hard-working and patient” he was (6.30.4); with Eudoxus, Hipparchus and Archimedes, “other sharp natures, great-minded, hard-working” (6.47). Lemma: φιλόπονος.

See also

Affinity and the alien; Anger; Beneficence; Common advantage; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Courage and endurance; Death; Fate and allotment; Gratitude; Impulse; Kinship and cooperation; Love and affection; Nature; Obstacle and reservation; Pain and pleasure; Philosophy; Present action; Principles and reminders; Self-respect and shame; Temperance and self-mastery; Tranquillity.

Inner retreat and citadel

The retreat into oneself · Meditations

ἀναχώρησις, anachōrēsis, “retreat”; *ἀναχωρεῖν, anachōrein*, “retreat”, “drew back”; *ὑποχώρησις, hypochōrēsis*, “withdrawal”; *ἀγρίδιον, agridion*, “little field”; *ὄρος, oros*, “mountain”; *ἀκρόπολις, akropolis*, “citadel”; *συνειλεῖσθαι, syneileisthai*, “gather yourself”; *συστρέφειν, systrephein*, “drawn together”, “clench”; *ἀπόληψις, apolēpsis*, “withdrawing”; *πηγή, pēgē*, “spring”

At a Glance

The word. Ἀναχώρησις, from ἀναχωρεῖν, "to draw back", is a withdrawal or retreat, and ὑποχώρησις a drawing back. An ἀκρόπολις is the fortified height of a Greek city, and a πηγή a spring.

In the *Meditations*. Others seek retreats in the country, by the sea and in the mountains, but "it is open to you, at whatever hour you want, to retreat into yourself" (4.3.1); furnished with a few reminders, the retreat ends in a return. The understanding free from passions is "a citadel" (8.48), within is "the spring of the good" (7.59), and the mountain makes no difference, "if one lives everywhere in the universe as in a city" (10.15).

In this edition. Ἀναχώρησις and ἀναχωρεῖν are "retreat" at all their places in 4.3.1, and ἀναχωρεῖν "drew back" at 11.28; ὑποχώρησις is "withdrawal" and ἀγρίδιον "little field" (4.3.4); ἀκρόπολις is "citadel" (8.48), and πηγή is always "spring".

A place to read. 4.3.1–4, where the retreat into oneself is set against country, seashore and mountains, and ends in a return.

Meaning

Ἀναχωρεῖν (*anachōrein*), from ἀνά (*ana*), "back", and χωρεῖν (*chōrein*), "to make way, to go", is to go back, to withdraw; ἀναχώρησις (*anachōrēsis*) is the act, ὑποχώρησις (*hypochōrēsis*) a drawing back. The ἀκρόπολις (*akropolis*), from ἄκρος (*akros*), "highest", and πόλις (*polis*), "city", is the upper city, the stronghold held when the rest is lost; a πηγή (*pēgē*) is a spring, and so a source. Two verbs give the movement inward, συνειλεῖσθαι (*syneileisthai*), to roll oneself up, and συστρέφειν (*systrephein*), to draw together.

Use in the book

The retreat is set out at 4.3, which begins with a contrast of places. "They seek retreats for themselves, country places, seashores, mountains; and you too are much given to longing for such things. But all this is quite unphilosophical, when it is open to you, at whatever hour you want, to retreat into yourself" (4.3.1). The ease found there is "nothing other than good order" (see Tranquillity), and the retreat is to be repeated: "Continually, then, give yourself this retreat, and renew yourself." The things Marcus looks into there are to be "brief and elementary" (see

Principles and reminders), things that “will suffice to shut out the whole court and to send you back not resenting the things to which you return”. “The whole court” is a correction by Capel Lofft, whose edition of the *Meditations* appeared in 1863; J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts it, and P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has “to wash it clean”. In either text the retreat sends Marcus back.

The next section furnishes the retreat against resentment: that “rational living beings have come to be for one another” (4.3.2; see Kinship and cooperation), the disjunction “either providence or atoms” (see Providence and atoms) and the understanding drawn back into itself (see Pain and pleasure). Then it is named again as a place: “remember the withdrawal into this little field of your own; and above all do not be dragged about or strained, but be free, and look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal living being” (4.3.4). The little field can be read as the country place of the first sentence, owned within. Most ready to hand there are to be two things: that things do not touch the soul, and that all things change (see Change).

The citadel can be read as the retreat under siege. After the ruling centre that becomes unconquerable “when, drawn together into itself, it is content with itself” (8.48; see Ruling centre), Marcus goes on: “For this reason the understanding free from passions is a citadel; for a man has nothing more secure, to which he could flee and be impregnable thereafter. He, then, who has not seen this is ignorant; and he who has seen it and does not flee to it is unlucky.” The movement inward has its own command: “Gather yourself into yourself” (7.28; see Ruling centre).

The spring makes the inner place a source, not a store. “Dig within. Within is the spring of the good, and it can always gush up, if you always dig” (7.59). In Leopold’s text “Dig within” is the correction of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802; P and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, begin with a verb of looking, as at 6.3, “Look within”, and only the condition, “if you always dig”, is the manuscripts’. At 8.51 the spring is the understanding under abuse: slandered and fouled with mud or dung, it “will very quickly scatter them and wash them out and in no way be dyed”. Marcus will have “an ever-flowing spring and not a well” if he guards himself “every hour for freedom, together with kindliness and simplicity and self-respect”; the

sentence stands in no single manuscript, "and not a well" being P's alone and "if you guard" the reading of A, the Vatican manuscript, and D. The word is also his name for the source of the whole, "the spring of all things" (8.23; compare 6.36, 9.39), and the spring within can be read as that source in the single man.

"Live as on a mountain; for it makes no difference, there or here, if one lives everywhere in the universe as in a city" (10.15; see Citizenship). Marcus is to keep plain "how all things here are the same as those on the top of the mountain, or on the shore, or wherever you want" (10.23), and finds the point in the *Theaetetus* of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, where a king walled in his city is a herdsman with a fold on a mountain.[448] "Tiberius on Capri", the emperor who withdrew there, is one of the cases Marcus is to recall, with "how cheap is all that is strained after" (12.27). The retreat of the *Meditations* is a practice of the hour, not a place and not a flight: furnished with a few principles about other men and the whole, it sends Marcus back, and the one stronghold it grants is the understanding free from passions.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ἀναχώρησις, ἀναχωρεῖν, ὑποχώρησις, ἀγρίδιον (*agridion*), ὄρος (*oros*), ἀκρόπολις, συνειλεῖσθαι, συστρέφειν, ἀπόληψις (*apolēpsis*) or πηγή occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with 4.3.2 and 4.3.3, the rest of the chapter of the retreat, 6.3 and 6.11, on looking within and returning into oneself, and 12.27, on Tiberius on Capri.

4.3.1 Others seek retreats in country places, seashores and mountains, but Marcus can retreat into himself at any hour, renew himself, and be sent back not resenting what he returns to.

4.3.2 Against resentment at men's vice, at what is allotted and at the body, the retreat holds reminders: rational beings are for one another; providence or atoms; the understanding, once drawn back into itself, does not mingle with the breath.

4.3.3 Against the pull of a little fame, the retreat holds the forgetting of all things and the smallness of the earth.

---

[448] Plato, *Theaetetus* 174d–e, as the edition's note at 10.23 records.

4.3.4 Marcus is to remember the withdrawal into this little field of his own, to be free, and to keep most ready to hand that things do not touch the soul and that all things change.

4.4 The breath in a man has been portioned off from some spring, and the hot and fiery from a spring of its own, as intelligence too comes from somewhere.

4.33 One must spend effort on a disposition that welcomes all that happens as flowing from such a beginning and spring.

6.3 Marcus is to look within, and let neither the quality nor the worth of anything escape him.

6.11 When circumstances have thoroughly troubled him, Marcus is to return quickly into himself and not go out of the rhythm beyond what is necessary.

6.36 All things come from the common ruling centre, or by way of consequence, and Marcus is to take account of the spring of all things.

7.28 Marcus is to gather himself into himself; the rational ruling centre is content with itself when it acts justly.

7.33 In pain the understanding keeps its own calm by withdrawing, and the ruling centre has not become worse.

7.59 Within is the spring of the good, which can always gush up if one always digs.

7.62 If Marcus looks into the springs of men's opinion and impulse, he will neither blame those who stumble unwillingly nor need their testimony.

8.23 What happens to Marcus he receives, referring it to the gods and to the spring of all things.

8.48 The ruling centre becomes unconquerable when, drawn together into itself, it is content with itself, and the understanding free from passions is a citadel to which a man can flee.

8.51 A clear spring slandered and fouled goes on sending up water; Marcus will have an ever-flowing spring if he guards himself every hour for freedom.

9.39 Either all things happen from one intelligent spring, as to one body, or there are atoms and a jumble.

10.15 Marcus is to live as on a mountain, for it makes no difference there or here, if one lives everywhere in the universe as in a city.

10.23 All things here are the same as on the top of the mountain or on the shore, as Plato's words about a fold on a mountain show.

11.28 The companions of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, were ashamed and drew back when they saw him girt with a sheepskin.

12.9 In the use of principles one must be like the pancratiast, who has only to clench his hand.

12.27 Among the cases Marcus is to recall is the emperor Tiberius on Capri, with how cheap is all that is strained after.

12.30 There is one light of the sun, though it is parted by walls and mountains.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, uses the citadel the other way round. In his discourse *On Freedom* he asks how a citadel is destroyed, and answers: not by iron or fire, but by judgements. If we pull down the citadel in a city, he asks, have we thereby got rid of the citadel of fever, or of pretty women, in short of "the citadel in us and the tyrants in us", whom we have over us in each thing every day? One must begin here, and pull it down here, letting go the body, its parts, property, reputation, offices, honours, children, brothers and friends, and counting all of them another's. Once the tyrants are thrown out, he asks, why should he wall off the citadel any longer, for his own part? Standing, what does it do to him?[449] In Epictetus the citadel is the stronghold of the tyrants within us, which judgements pull down; in Marcus it is the understanding free from passions, the one place a man can flee to (8.48). The same discourse doubts the retreat of places. As a traveller on a road beset by robbers waits for safe company, so the wise man in the world looks for a protector and thinks of becoming Caesar's friend; but if Caesar turns enemy, is it better to retreat

[449] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1 (title) and 4.1.86–88.

somewhere, into the wilderness? Does fever not come there? He considers, Epictetus says, and sees that if he attaches himself to God he will pass through safely.[450] Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, asks what good it does to have withdrawn, when the causes of anxiety follow across the seas, and what hiding place the fear of death does not enter; philosophy must be put round us as a wall that fortune cannot cross, and the mind that has given up external things "stands in a place that cannot be overcome, and defends itself from its own citadel", *arce se sua vindicat*.[451] To a friend whose long travels had not lifted his gloom he writes that he must change his mind, not his sky, and gives the answer of Socrates to a man with the same complaint: why wonder that travel does him no good, since he carries himself round wherever he goes?[452]

Other ancient sources

Plato had already set reason in a citadel. In the *Republic* Socrates tells how, in the young man who turns from oligarchy to democracy, the desires at last "take the citadel of the young man's soul", finding it empty of learning, of fine pursuits and of true words, "the best sentinels and guards in the minds of men whom the gods love"; false and boastful words and opinions then hold the place.[453] In the *Timaeus* the spirited part of the soul is lodged between the midriff and the neck, near the head, so that it may join reason in holding the desires down by force "whenever they refuse of their own accord to obey the order and the reasoning from the citadel".[454] Dio of Prusa, called Chrysostom, the Greek orator of the late first and early second centuries, wrote a speech *On Retirement*, Περὶ ἀναχωρήσεως (*Peri anachōrēseōs*). The man who moves from one city or place to another cannot be said to retire, he argues, since wherever he arrives many things stand in his way; and he asks whether the best and most profitable of all retreats is not "the retreat into oneself", ἡ εἰς αὑτὸν ἀναχώρησις (*hē eis hauton anachōrēsis*), with attention to one's own affairs, whether one is in Babylon or Athens, in a camp or alone on a small island, since other retreats and journeys do little for

[450] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.91–98.
[451] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 82.4–5.
[452] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 28.1–2.
[453] Plato, *Republic* 8, 560b–c.
[454] Plato, *Timaeus* 70a.

leisure and right action, as a sick man's moving from bed to bed gives him a little rest but no cure.[455] A scholium on this sentence of Dio quotes Marcus' "nowhere does a man retreat more quietly …" (4.3.1), as Leopold's testimonia, the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it, and his apparatus record.[456] Seneca passes on the advice of Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, "retire into yourself most of all at the times when you must be among a crowd", but allows it only to one who has come to respect himself, and only if he is a good man, quiet and temperate; otherwise he should withdraw from himself into the crowd, for with himself he keeps closer company with a bad man.[457]

Translation in this edition

Ἀναχώρησις is "retreat" at both its places, in the plural "retreats" and in "this retreat" (4.3.1), and ἀναχωρεῖν is "retreat" at both its places in 4.3.1, "to retreat into yourself" and "does a man retreat", but "drew back" of Socrates' companions (11.28). In "to retreat into yourself" the pronoun σεαυτόν (*seauton*), "yourself", is Leopold's own correction of the manuscripts' ἑαυτόν (*heauton*), "oneself". Ὑποχώρησις is "withdrawal" (4.3.4), and ἀπόληψις "withdrawing" (7.33); the "going away" of 10.36 is ἀποχώρησις (*apochōrēsis*), and its verb ἀποχωρεῖν (*apochōrein*) is "has gone away" (10.26) and "goes away" (11.8). Ἀγρίδιον is "little field" (4.3.4). The places of 4.3.1 are ἀγροικίαι (*agroikiai*), "country places", αἰγιαλοί (*aigialoi*), "seashores", and ὄρη, "mountains"; at 10.23 ἀγρός (*agros*) is "the countryside", αἰγιαλός "the shore", and ἐν ἄκρῳ τῷ ὄρει (*en akrōi tōi orei*) "on the top of the mountain". "The whole court" renders πᾶσαν αὐλήν (*pasan aulēn*), with Lofft's αὐλήν (4.3.1). At 4.3.4 "be free" is ἐλεύθερος ἔσο (*eleutheros eso*; see Moral choice and freedom). Ἀκρόπολις is "citadel" at its one place (8.48), where ἀκαταμάχητον (*akatamachēton*) is "unconquerable", ὀχυρώτερον (*ochyrōteron*) "more secure", καταφεύγειν (*katapheugein*) "flee" and ἀνάλωτος (*analōtos*) "impregnable". Συνειλεῖσθαι is "gather yourself" (7.28), and συστρέφειν "drawn together" (8.48) and "clench" (12.9); "drawn itself

[455] Dio Chrysostom, *Orations* 20 (title), 20.3 and 20.8.

[456] Leopold's testimonia and apparatus at 4.3.1, citing the scholia on Dio Chrysostom, *Orations* 20.8.

[457] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 25.6–7.

back" renders ἑαυτὴν ἀπολάβῃ (*heautēn apolabēi*; 4.3.2). Πηγή is "spring" at all its places, in the plural "springs" (7.62), and "spring" renders no other word but ἔαρ (*ear*), the season (4.44, 10.34). With it go ἀναβλύειν (*anablyein*), "gush up" (7.59), and at 8.51 ἀναβλύζειν (*anablyzein*), "sending up", ἀέναος (*aenaos*), "ever-flowing", and φρέαρ (*phrear*), "well". "Dig" renders σκάπτειν (*skaptein*) twice at 7.59: the first, "Dig within", is Schultz's σκάπτε (*skapte*), for which P has βλέπε (*blepe*) and D σκόπει (*skopei*), both "look", and A σκέπε (*skepe*); the second, "if you always dig", stands in the manuscripts. "Look within" at 6.3 is ἔσω βλέπε (*esō blepe*), and "return quickly into yourself" at 6.11 ἐπάνιθι εἰς σεαυτόν (*epanithi eis seauton*).

ἀγρίδιον

Attested: ἀγρίδιον (*agridion*; 4.3.4). A little field or small farm, the diminutive of ἀγρός, "field". The place of the retreat once it is within: "remember the withdrawal into this little field of your own" (4.3.4). P has ἀρθρίδιον (*arthridion*), as Leopold's apparatus records. Lemma: ἀγρίδιον.

ἀκρόπολις

Attested: ἀκρόπολις (*akropolis*; 8.48). The upper city, the fortified height to which a city's people flee. "For this reason the understanding free from passions is a citadel; for a man has nothing more secure, to which he could flee and be impregnable thereafter" (8.48). Lemma: ἀκρόπολις.

ἀναχωρέω

Attested: ἀναχωρεῖν (*anachōrein*; 4.3.1), ἀναχωρεῖ (*anachōrei*; 4.3.1), ἀναχωρήσασιν (*anachōrēsasin*; 11.28). To go back, withdraw, retreat. "it is open to you, at whatever hour you want, to retreat into yourself", and "nowhere does a man retreat more quietly or with less business than into his own soul" (4.3.1); Socrates' companions "were ashamed and drew back when they saw him dressed so" (11.28; see Self-respect and shame). At 4.3.1 "into yourself" is Leopold's σεαυτόν for the manuscripts' ἑαυτόν. Lemma: ἀναχωρέω.

ἀναχώρησις

Attested: ἀναχωρήσεις (*anachōrēseis*; 4.3.1), ἀναχώρησιν (*anachōrēsin*; 4.3.1). A going back, a retreat; withdrawal from affairs. "They seek retreats for themselves, country places, seashores, mountains"; "Continually, then,

give yourself this retreat, and renew yourself" (4.3.1). Lemma: ἀναχώρησις.

ἀπόληψις

Attested: ἀπόληψιν (*apolēpsin*; 7.33). A cutting off, a withdrawal; κατὰ ἀπόληψιν (*kata apolēpsin*), "by withdrawing". "On pain: the unbearable carries off, the lasting is bearable; and the understanding keeps its own calm by withdrawing, and the ruling centre has not become worse" (7.33; see Pain and pleasure). The verb from which it is formed stands at 4.3.2, where the understanding has "drawn itself back". Lemma: ἀπόληψις.

ὄρος

Attested: ὄρη (*orē*; 4.3.1), ὄρει (*orei*; 10.15, 10.23 twice), ὄρεσιν (*oresin*; 12.30). A mountain. The mountains are among the retreats men seek (4.3.1); "Live as on a mountain; for it makes no difference, there or here, if one lives everywhere in the universe as in a city" (10.15); all things here are "the same as those on the top of the mountain" (10.23), where Marcus adds Plato's "putting a fold round himself on a mountain"; the light of the sun is parted by "walls, mountains, countless other things" (12.30). Lemma: ὄρος.

πηγή

Attested: πηγῆς (*pēgēs*; 4.4 twice, 4.33, 9.39), πηγήν (*pēgēn*; 6.36, 8.23, 8.51), πηγή (*pēgē*; 7.59), πηγάς (*pēgas*; 7.62), πηγῇ (*pēgēi*; 8.51). A spring of water; a source. Of the source of the whole: "the spring of all things" (6.36, 8.23), "such a beginning and spring" (4.33), "one intelligent spring" (9.39); of the elements in a man, the breath "from some spring" and the fiery "from some spring of its own" (4.4; see Citizenship); of the mind: "Within is the spring of the good" (7.59), "the springs of their opinion and impulse" (7.62), "an ever-flowing spring and not a well" (8.51). At 7.59 the command "Dig within" is Schultz's correction; at 7.62 A has εἰς τὰς ψυχάς (*eis tas psychas*), "into their souls", for "into the springs"; and at 8.51 "and not a well" stands in P and is omitted in A and in D, which have "if you guard" where P has φύου (*phyou*), "grow". Lemma: πηγή.

συνειλέω

Attested: συνειλοῦ (*syneilou*; 7.28). To roll up together; in the middle, to gather oneself up. "Gather yourself into

yourself. It is the nature of the rational ruling centre to be content with itself when it acts justly and, on that very account, has calm" (7.28; see Ruling centre). "Into yourself", εἰς σαυτόν (*eis sauton*), is written above the line in D; the manuscripts' text has the reflexive of the third person, εἰς αὑτόν (*eis hauton*). Lemma: συνειλέω.

συστρέφω

Attested: συστραφέν (*systraphen*; 8.48), συστρέψαι (*systrepsai*; 12.9). To twist or draw together; of a hand, to clench. The ruling centre becomes unconquerable "when, drawn together into itself, it is content with itself" (8.48; see Ruling centre); the pancratiast "always has the hand, and there is need of nothing else than to clench it" (12.9; see Principles and reminders). Lemma: συστρέφω.

ὑποχώρησις

Attested: ὑποχωρήσεως (*hypochōrēseōs*; 4.3.4). A drawing back, a withdrawal. "For the rest, then, remember the withdrawal into this little field of your own" (4.3.4). Lemma: ὑποχώρησις.

See also

Change; Citizenship; Court and office; Kinship and cooperation; Moral choice and freedom; Pain and pleasure; Principles and reminders; Providence and atoms; Ruling centre; Self-respect and shame; Time and eternity; Tranquillity.

Justice

What rational beings owe one another · Meditations

δικαιοσύνη, dikaiosynē, "justice"; *δίκη, dikē*, "justice", "Justice herself"; *δικαιότης, dikaiotēs*, "justness"; *δίκαιος, dikaios*, "just", "what is just", "what appears just", "just things", "most just"; *δικαίως, dikaiōs*, "justly", "with ... justice"; *δικαικός, dikaikos*, "just"; *δικαιοπραγεῖν, dikaiopragein*, "act justly"; *δικαιοπράγημα, dikaiopragēma*, "just action"; *φιλοδίκαιος, philodikaios*, "love of justice"; *ἀδικεῖν, adikein*, "act unjustly"; *προαδικεῖν, proadikein*, "wronged first"; *ἄδικος, adikos*, "unjust"; *ἀδίκως, adikōs*, "unjustly"; *ἀδίκημα, adikēma*, "act of injustice"; *δικαστής, dikastēs*, "judge"; *δικαστήριον, dikastērion*, "law court"; *δικαιολογεῖσθαι, dikaiologeisthai*, "plead a case"

At a Glance

The word. Δίκη is what is due, a judgement or a penalty, and Justice the goddess; δικαιοσύνη is the virtue of the just man, δίκαιος, and ἀδικεῖν is to act against it. For the Stoics justice was one of the four primary virtues.

In the *Meditations*. Nature made rational beings "for the sake of one another, to benefit one another according to worth and in no way to harm", and so "He who acts unjustly is impious" (9.1.1). From the common nature comes "the birth of justice, and from this the other virtues subsist" (11.10). Forbearance is "a part of justice" (4.3.2), and injustice harms its doer (9.4).

In this edition. Δικαιοσύνη and δίκη share the English "justice", with "Justice herself" for the goddess (12.24); δικαιότης is "justness"; δίκαιος is "just", and with the article "what is just"; ἀδικεῖν is always "act unjustly", kept apart from ἁμαρτάνειν (*hamartanein*), "do wrong".

A place to read. 9.1.1, where whoever acts unjustly is shown to be impious towards the nature of the whole, "the eldest of the gods".

Meaning

Δίκη (*dikē*) is what is due, a judgement, a lawsuit or a penalty, and Justice personified as a goddess; δίκαιος (*dikaios*) is the man who keeps to what is due, δικαιοσύνη (*dikaiosynē*) his virtue, and ἀδικεῖν (*adikein*) to act unjustly. For the Stoics justice was one of the four primary virtues (see Virtue and excellence). Marcus' measure of what is due is "according to worth", κατ' ἀξίαν (*kat' axian*): Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father and predecessor, was given to "allotting to each according to worth, unswervingly" (1.16.1).

Marcus names the virtue sixteen times and uses δίκαιος and its adverb thirty-one times; δίκη comes three times. Of courts there is almost nothing beyond "the din of law courts" seen from above (7.48). Justice in the book is a state of the mind, "a just understanding" (4.33), and the acts that come from it.

Use in the book

The ground of justice is the purpose for which nature made rational beings. "He who acts unjustly is impious. For since the nature of the whole has made rational living beings for the sake of one another, to benefit one another according to worth and in no way to harm, he who

transgresses her will is clearly impious towards the eldest of the gods" (9.1.1). The premise recurs (4.3.2, 7.55; see Kinship and cooperation), and by it Marcus measures other faults: the willing liar is impious "in so far as by deceiving he acts unjustly" (9.1.2), and "he who pursues pleasures will not abstain from acting unjustly; and this is plainly impious" (9.1.3).

Justice also comes first among the virtues: "A virtue that rises in revolt against justice I do not see in the constitution of the rational living being; but against pleasure I see continence" (8.39). It is their source as well. The arts make the worse for the sake of the better, and so does the common nature: "And indeed from here the birth of justice, and from this the other virtues subsist; for what is just will not be kept if we are either at odds over things indifferent, or easily deceived and rash in assent and liable to waver" (11.10). Right valuation and careful assent are the conditions on which justice is kept, for "we act unjustly in much because of contention over these things", the things outside choice (6.41; see Good, bad and indifference).

Justice faces men, as holiness faces the gods. Marcus would judge Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, by "whether he could be content to be just in what concerns men and holy in what concerns gods" (7.66), and directs the present towards both: "holiness, so that you love what is allotted …; justice, so that freely and without circumlocution you say what is true and do what accords with law and with worth" (12.1.1). The same line divides what happens from what is done: "Freedom from trouble about what happens from the cause outside; justness in what is done by reason of the cause from you" (9.31; compare 7.54, 10.11). Holiness is not the lesser: the ruling centre "has been made for holiness and piety no less than for justice", and these are "older than just actions" (11.20.2). There "holiness" is a correction by Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; the one witness that has the clause reads "equality".

Justice goes with truth, and is kept towards those who have neither. The preservation of life is "with the whole soul to do what is just and to say what is true" (12.29; compare 12.3.1; see Mind and reason), and one thing is "worth much: to live one's life through with truth and justice, kindly to liars and the unjust" (6.47). Among the reckonings against

resentment is “that forbearance is a part of justice, and that they do wrong unwillingly” (4.3.2). To a saying that Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, gives as Plato’s, “Every soul … is deprived of truth unwillingly”,[458] Marcus adds, “So too, then, of justice and self-control and kindliness and everything of that kind” (7.63; see Soul). The harm stays with the agent: “he who acts unjustly acts unjustly against himself, making himself bad” (9.4), in Leopold’s text, which follows a correction by Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century; the witnesses have “harms himself” or no verb, to the same effect. So too, “Does someone do wrong? He does wrong to himself … one must make gain of the present with sound reasoning and justice” (4.26). Injustice can also lie in omission: “He who does not do something often acts unjustly, not only he who does something” (9.5).

Marcus calls the course of things just as well. “That everything that happens, happens justly: … I do not say only according to sequence, but also according to what is just, and as if by someone allotting according to worth” (4.10). Man’s nature is part of a nature “unimpeded, intelligent and just, if indeed it makes the portions … equal and according to worth for each” (8.7). If good men, once dead, do not come to be again, then, Marcus reasons, it ought to be so, “for if it were just, it would also be possible” (12.5; see Gods). In a line of Hesiod, the early Greek poet, “faith and self-respect and justice and truth” have gone “to Olympus from the wide-wayed earth” (5.33), and the goddess is a test of action: “in what you do, whether it is neither at random nor otherwise than Justice herself would have acted” (12.24).

The justice of the *Meditations* is less a rule about shares than the quality of a mind, tested in each act. Marcus is to run to his ruling centre “to make it a just mind” (9.22; see Ruling centre) and “in every impulse” to “render what is just” (4.22); he reproaches himself for not yet “placing wisdom in acting justly alone” (4.37), and asks whether the truth, justice and self-control in him will be quenched before the lamp’s light (12.15; see Virtue and excellence). Justice is where his inward discipline meets other men: valuation and assent are trained so that what is just may be kept.

[458] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.28.4, 2.22.36.

Places to read

Every chapter in which a word of the family of δίκη occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided.

1.14.1 From Severus, whom he calls his brother, usually taken to be Claudius Severus, the Aristotelian philosopher among his teachers, Marcus has love of family, of truth and of justice, and the impression of a state with the same laws for all.

2.5 Every hour Marcus is to set his mind on doing what is in hand with exact and unaffected dignity, affection, freedom and justness, and on giving himself leisure from all other impressions.

2.10 Marcus approves the judgement of Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor at the head of his school, that offences of craving are graver than offences of rage: the angry man is more like one wronged first, while the man of craving has his impulse of his own accord towards acting unjustly.

3.4.3 The man who no longer puts off being among the best is a priest and servant of the gods, an athlete in the greatest contest, dyed deep with justice.

3.6.1 If Marcus finds in human life anything better than justice, truth, self-control and courage, he is to turn to it with his whole soul.

3.11.3 Marcus treats a kinsman who does not know what is according to nature for him according to the natural law of fellowship, with goodwill and justice.

3.16.2 Peculiar to the good man is to keep the daimon within serene, uttering nothing contrary to the truth and doing nothing contrary to what is just.

4.3.2 Against resentment of men's vice Marcus reckons that rational living beings have come to be for one another, that forbearance is a part of justice, and that men do wrong unwillingly.

4.10 Everything that happens happens justly, not only according to sequence but according to what is just, as if by someone allotting according to worth.

4.12 Marcus is to be ready to shift his position if someone sets him right, but only for something

convincing, as that it is just or for the common good.

4.18 Marcus speaks of the man who looks not at what his neighbour said, did or thought, but only at whether what he himself is doing is just and holy, and who, in the manner of the good man, does not glance round at a black character but runs straight along the line.

4.22 In every impulse Marcus is to render what is just, and in every impression preserve what can be firmly grasped.

4.25 Marcus is to try the life of the good man, who is pleased with what is allotted from the whole and content with his own just action and kindly disposition.

4.26 Whoever does wrong does wrong to himself; life is short, and one must make gain of the present with sound reasoning and justice.

4.33 Famous names fade into legend; what deserves effort is a just understanding, social actions, truthful speech and a disposition that welcomes all that happens.

4.37 Marcus will soon be dead, and is not yet simple, untroubled or serene towards all, nor placing wisdom in acting justly alone.

4.49.2 Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-controlled, sensible, free from rash assent, free from deceit, self-respecting and free.

5.12 Even the many sense that true goods such as wisdom, self-control, justice and courage differ from their own goods, since the comic poet's jibe fits only wealth and luxury.

5.33 The things prized in life are empty, rotten and petty, while faith, self-respect, justice and truth have gone "to Olympus from the wide-wayed earth", in a line of Hesiod.

5.34 Common to the soul of God and of man is not to be impeded by another and to have the good in a just disposition and action.

6.30.1 Marcus is to keep himself simple, good, untainted, dignified, a friend of what is just, pious and kindly, and not to be made into a Caesar.

6.30.3 Antoninus tolerated those who blamed him unjustly, without blaming them in return.

6.41 Whoever counts things outside his choice good or bad must blame the gods and hate men, and we act unjustly in much because of contention over such things.

6.47 Thinking of the dead of every kind, Marcus finds one thing here worth much, to live one's life through with truth and justice, kindly to liars and the unjust.

6.50 Marcus is to try to persuade men, but to act even against their will when the reason of justice leads so; if force stands in his way, he is to use the hindrance for another virtue.

7.28 The rational ruling centre is by nature content with itself when it acts justly, and on that account has calm.

7.42 A verse, which the edition's note gives as by Euripides, the Athenian tragedian, says that what is well and what is just are with the speaker; the same words stand in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes, the Athenian comic poet.[459]

7.44 Socrates at his trial, in Plato's *Apology*, gives a just reply: a man of any use looks only at whether he does just things or unjust.

7.48 Among the earthly things to be surveyed as if from above is the din of law courts.

7.54 It is always in Marcus' power to be piously well pleased with the present conjuncture and to behave towards the men present according to justice.

7.55 The intelligent motion wants the first place over the motions of sense and impulse, and justly, since it is by nature able to make use of them.

7.63 As every soul is deprived of truth unwillingly, in a saying Epictetus gives as Plato's, so too of justice,

[459] Euripides, fr. 918 Nauck, as the edition's note at 7.38 identifies the verse; Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 661.

self-control and kindliness; remembering this will make Marcus milder towards all.

7.66 Socrates is to be judged by his soul, by whether he could be content to be just in what concerns men and holy in what concerns gods.

8.1 Living well lies in doing what man's nature seeks, which Marcus will do if he has principles about good and bad: that nothing is good for a man which does not make him just, self-controlled, courageous and free.

8.5 Marcus is to look at the thing, remember that he must be a good man, and act and speak as seems to him most just, only kindly, with self-respect and without pretence.

8.7 The nature of man is part of a nature unimpeded, intelligent and just, if indeed it makes the portions of all things equal and according to worth for each.

8.22 "You suffer this justly", Marcus tells himself, and he wants to become good tomorrow rather than be good today.

8.32 Something from outside may prevent some other act, but nothing can stand in the way of acting justly, with self-control and with sound reckoning.

8.39 In the constitution of the rational living being there is no virtue that rises in revolt against justice, as continence rises against pleasure.

8.51 Marcus asks what killing and cursing are to the understanding's remaining pure, sane, self-controlled and just, like a spring that washes out the mud thrown into it.

9.1.1 Since the nature of the whole has made rational beings for one another, to benefit one another according to worth and in no way to harm, whoever acts unjustly is impious towards the eldest of the gods.

9.1.2 The willing liar is impious in so far as by deceiving he acts unjustly.

9.1.3 Whoever pursues pleasures will not abstain from acting unjustly, and this is plainly impious.

9.4 He who does wrong does wrong against himself, and he who acts unjustly makes himself bad.

9.5 A man often acts unjustly by not doing something, not only by doing something.

9.22 Marcus is to run to his own ruling centre to make it a just mind, and to that of the whole and of the other man.

9.31 Justness lies in what is done by reason of the cause from oneself, impulse and action ending in the social action itself.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever be content with all that the gods give for the preservation of the perfect living being, the good and just and honourable.

10.11 The man who has put off the body has given himself up wholly to justice in what he himself brings about, and to the nature of the whole in what happens, and does not even let into his mind what anyone will say or think of him or do against him.

10.12 Marcus is to look at what must be done and, if other things stand against it, go forward with reckoning, holding to what appears just.

10.13 On waking Marcus is to ask himself whether anything another does concerning what is just and as it should be will make a difference to him, and to answer that it will make none.

11.1.2 Peculiar to the rational soul are the loving of neighbours, truth, self-respect and the honouring of nothing above itself, so that right reason and the reason of justice differ in nothing.

11.10 From the common nature comes the birth of justice, from which the other virtues subsist, and what is just is not kept if we are at odds over things indifferent or rash in assent.

11.18.2 Wrongdoers are deprived unwillingly of dealing with each according to worth, as they are of truth, and are annoyed at being called unjust.

11.20.2 The motion towards acts of injustice is the mark of one standing apart from nature; the ruling centre, which leaves its own place when it resents anything that happens, was made for piety no less than for justice, and piety is older than just actions.

12.1.1 Marcus is to direct the present towards holiness, loving what is allotted, and towards justice, saying

what is true and doing what accords with law and with worth.

12.3.1 If Marcus separates from his understanding all that attaches to him outside choice, the intelligent faculty may live released, doing what is just and saying what is true.

12.5 If good men, once dead, do not come to be again, it ought to be so, for if it were just it would also be possible, and the gods, most good and most just, would have left nothing neglected unjustly.

12.15 Marcus asks whether a lamp shines until it is quenched, while the truth, justice and self-control in him will be quenched first.

12.24 In what he does, Marcus is to have ready to hand whether it is neither at random nor otherwise than Justice herself would have acted.

12.27 Fame and enmity end in smoke, and it is more philosophical to show oneself just, self-controlled and following the gods, artlessly.

12.29 The preservation of life is to see each thing through and through, and with the whole soul to do what is just and say what is true.

12.36 It is not a tyrant or an unjust judge that sends Marcus from the city, but the nature that brought him in.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its seventh book, reports the school's view that the virtues follow on one another, so that whoever has one has all (see Virtue and excellence);[460] Marcus' "from this the other virtues subsist" (11.10) can be read as giving justice the first place within that unity. Chrysippus, the school's third head, and Posidonius of Apamea, the Stoic of the late second and early first centuries BC, taught that there is no justice between us and the other animals, because of their unlikeness;[461] Marcus' "the rest have been made for the sake of rational beings … and rational beings for the sake of one another" (7.55) can be read as the ground of that limit.

[460] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.125.

[461] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.129, citing Chrysippus, *On Justice* book 1, and Posidonius, *On Duty* book 1.

Cicero, the Roman orator and statesman of the first century BC, who says that in *On Duties* he follows chiefly the Stoics, and above all Panaetius of Rhodes, the Stoic of the second century BC,[462] divides the reason "by which the fellowship of men among themselves, and as it were the community of life, is held together" into justice and beneficence, and gives as the first office of justice "that no one should harm anyone unless provoked by an injury".[463] Marcus' "in no way to harm" (9.1.1) has no such exception. Cicero reports as the Stoics' view that all that the earth brings forth is created for the use of men, while men are born for the sake of men, "so that they might be able to benefit one another";[464] Marcus states it at 7.55 and 9.1.1. He also distinguishes two kinds of injustice, that of those who inflict injury and that of those who do not ward it off from others when they can, and counts among the second those who, taken up with study or with their own affairs, desert the fellowship of life.[465] Marcus' "He who does not do something often acts unjustly" (9.5) is wider: it names no injury at all.

Other ancient sources

Hesiod says in *Works and Days* of the race of iron that "right will be in their fists, and self-respect will not be", and that at last Aidos and Nemesis, self-respect and retribution, will leave mankind and go "to Olympus from the wide-wayed earth", the line that Marcus quotes at 5.33, as the edition's note identifies it.[466] In that line Marcus has faith, self-respect, justice and truth gone from the earth, a list that can be read as Hesiod's self-respect with the justice, the kept oath and the straight word whose loss the lines before it lament. Later in the poem Justice is "a maiden, born of Zeus, glorious and revered by the gods who hold Olympus", who, whenever anyone harms her with crooked words, sits beside her father and tells of the unjust mind of men.[467] The "Justice herself" by whose act Marcus measures his own (12.24) can be read as this goddess.

---

[462] Cicero, *On Duties* 1.6, 3.7.
[463] Cicero, *On Duties* 1.20.
[464] Cicero, *On Duties* 1.22.
[465] Cicero, *On Duties* 1.23, 1.28–29.
[466] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 189–200; the edition's note at 5.33.
[467] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 256–262.

Translation in this edition

Δικαιοσύνη is "justice" at every place. Δίκη is also "justice" (4.26, 5.33), and "Justice herself" for the goddess (12.24); the two nouns share the English word, as the Glossary notes. Δικαιότης is "justness" (2.5, 9.31), kept apart from both. Δίκαιος is "just" (4.12, 4.18, 4.25, 4.33, 4.49.2, 7.44, 7.66, 8.1, 8.7, 8.51, 10.1, 12.5, 12.27), with "most just" for the superlative (8.5, 12.5); with the article, as a noun, it is "what is just" (3.16.2, 4.10, 4.22, 6.30.1, 7.42, 10.13, 11.10, 12.3.1, 12.29), except "what appears just" for τοῦ φαινομένου δικαίου (*tou phainomenou dikaiou*; 10.12) and Socrates' "whether he does just things or unjust" (7.44). Two of these places rest on corrections that Leopold prints: at 4.18 "leisure" is εὐσχολίαν (*euscholian*), the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, for the manuscripts' ἀσχολίαν (*ascholian*), "lack of leisure"; and at 10.13 "censured" is ψέγηται (*psegētai*), the correction of Capel Lofft, whose edition of the *Meditations* appeared in 1863, for γένηται (*genētai*), "is done", in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, and γίνεται (*ginetai*) in A, the Vatican manuscript. The adverb δικαίως is "justly" (4.10, 7.55, 8.22, 8.32, where the English supplies "acting", which the Greek lacks); at 3.11.3, beside εὔνως (*eunōs*), the two adverbs are "with goodwill and justice". Δικαιοπραγεῖν is "act justly" (4.37, 7.28, 10.11), δικαιοπράγημα "just actions" (11.20.2), δικαικός "just" (5.34, 9.22), and τὸ φιλοδίκαιον "love of justice" (1.14.1). Ἀδικεῖν is "act unjustly" at every place, kept apart from ἁμαρτάνειν, "do wrong"; at 9.4 the two stand side by side in Leopold's text, with Coraes' correction, "He who does wrong does wrong against himself; he who acts unjustly acts unjustly against himself". The one exception in the family is the compound προαδικεῖν, "a man who has been wronged first" (2.10). Ἄδικος is "unjust" (6.47, 7.44, 11.18.2, 12.36), ἀδίκως "unjustly" (6.30.3, 12.5) and ἀδίκημα "acts of injustice" (11.20.2); ἀδικία, "injustice", does not occur. Δικαστής is "judge" (12.36), δικαστήριον "law courts" (7.48), and δικαιολογεῖσθαι "pleading a case" (12.5). "Unfair" at 11.18.2 renders ἀγνώμονες (*agnōmones*), not a word of this family.

ἀδικέω

Attested: ἀδικεῖν (*adikein*; 2.10, 9.1.3), ἀδικοῦμεν (*adikoumen*; 6.41), ἀδικῶν (*adikōn*; 9.1.1, 9.4), ἀδικεῖ (*adikei*; 9.1.2, 9.4, 9.5). To act unjustly, to wrong. Whoever does it is

impious, since nature made rational beings to benefit one another "and in no way to harm" (9.1.1), and the harm is his own: "he who acts unjustly acts unjustly against himself, making himself bad" (9.4). One can do it by omission: "He who does not do something often acts unjustly, not only he who does something" (9.5). At 9.4 the second form, ἀδικεῖ, is Coraes' correction, which Leopold prints; P has ἑαυτὸν κακοῖ, "harms himself", and A and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have no verb before "making himself bad". Lemma: ἀδικέω.

ἀδίκημα

Attested: ἀδικήματα (*adikēmata*; 11.20.2). An unjust act. "For the motion towards acts of injustice and of licence, and angers and distresses and fears, is nothing else than the mark of one standing apart from nature" (11.20.2). Lemma: ἀδίκημα.

ἄδικος

Attested: ἀδίκως (*adikōs*; 6.30.3, 12.5), ἀδίκοις (*adikois*; 6.47), ἄδικα (*adika*; 7.44), ἄδικοι (*adikoi*; 11.18.2), ἄδικος (*adikos*; 12.36). Unjust; the adverb is "unjustly". One thing is worth much, to live "kindly to liars and the unjust" (6.47); wrongdoers "are annoyed at being called unjust" (11.18.2). Antoninus "tolerated those who blamed him unjustly" (6.30.3), and the gods would not have left anything "neglected unjustly and without reason" (12.5). Lemma: ἄδικος.

δικαικός

Attested: δικαικῇ (*dikaikēi*; 5.34), δικαικόν (*dikaikon*; 9.22). Just, a rare form beside δίκαιος. Common to every rational soul is "to have the good in a just disposition and action" (5.34); Marcus runs to his own ruling centre "to make it a just mind" (9.22), where the form is quoted from this place in the Suda, the Byzantine lexicon, and Leopold reports δικανικόν, "judicial", in A and D and in two manuscripts of the Suda. At 5.34 Coraes proposed the common δικαίᾳ. Lemma: δικαικός.

δικαιολογέομαι

Attested: δικαιολογῇ (*dikaiologēi*; 12.5). To plead one's case, as in a court. To press the gods on why good men, once dead, should not come to be again is to argue with

them: “in seeking this further you are pleading a case with God” (12.5). Lemma: δικαιολογέομαι.

δικαιοπραγέω

Attested: δικαιοπραγεῖν (*dikaiopragein*; 4.37), δικαιοπραγοῦντι (*dikaiopragounti*; 7.28), δικαιοπραγεῖ (*dikaiopragei*; 10.11). To act justly. Marcus is not yet “placing wisdom in acting justly alone” (4.37); the rational ruling centre is content with itself “when it acts justly” (7.28); and the man who has put off the body is content “if he himself acts justly in what is now being done, and loves what is now allotted to him” (10.11). There δικαιοπραγεῖ, with εἰ, “if”, is the correction of John Jackson, whose English translation appeared at Oxford in 1906, which Leopold prints; P has the infinitive δικαιοπραγεῖν and A the imperative δικαιοπράγει. Lemma: δικαιοπραγέω.

δικαιοπράγημα

Attested: δικαιοπραγημάτων (*dikaiopragēmatōn*; 11.20.2). A just act. Holiness and piety “are of the kind of good fellowship, or rather older than just actions” (11.20.2). A has πρεσβυτάτων δικαιοπραγμάτων, “the oldest just actions”. Lemma: δικαιοπράγημα.

δίκαιος

Attested: δικαίως (*dikaiōs*; 3.11.3, 4.10, 7.55, 8.22, 8.32), δίκαια (*dikaia*; 3.16.2, 7.44, 10.13, 12.3.1, 12.29), δίκαιον (*dikaion*; 4.10, 4.18, 4.22, 4.49.2, 7.42, 7.44, 8.1, 11.10, 12.5, 12.27), δικαίου (*dikaiou*; 4.12, 6.30.1, 10.1, 10.12), δικαίᾳ (*dikaiāi*; 4.25), δικαία (*dikaia*; 4.33), δίκαιος (*dikaios*; 7.66), δικαιότατον (*dikaiotaton*; 8.5), δικαίας (*dikaias*; 8.7), δικαίαν (*dikaian*; 8.51), δικαιότατοι (*dikaiotatoi*; 12.5). Just; with the article, what is just; the adverb is “justly”. Of men, their acts and their minds: “a just understanding” (4.33), “in every impulse render what is just” (4.22); of the whole and the gods: “everything that happens, happens justly” (4.10), and the gods are “most good and most just” (12.5). At 4.10 “also” renders ἔτι, a correction by Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, for the manuscripts’ ὅτι, “that”. Lemma: δίκαιος.

δικαιοσύνη

Attested: δικαιοσύνῃ (*dikaiosynēi*; 3.4.3, 10.11), δικαιοσύνης (*dikaiosynēs*; 3.6.1, 4.3.2, 6.47, 6.50, 7.63, 8.39, 11.1.2, 11.10), δικαιοσύνην (*dikaiosynēn*; 5.12, 7.54,

11.20.2, 12.1.1 twice), δικαιοσύνη (*dikaiosynē*; 12.15). Justice, the virtue. It stands in Marcus' lists beside truth, self-control, courage and wisdom (3.6.1, 5.12, 12.15), and from the common nature comes "the birth of justice, and from this the other virtues subsist" (11.10); its office is that "you say what is true and do what accords with law and with worth" (12.1.1). At 8.39 A reads σοφωτάτης δικαιοσύνης, "of the wisest justice", at the end of 8.38 and begins 8.39 without the word, and at 11.20.2 A lacks the clause; Leopold follows P at both places. Lemma: δικαιοσύνη.

δικαιότης

Attested: δικαιότητος (*dikaiotētos*; 2.5), δικαιότης (*dikaiotēs*; 9.31). Justness, the quality of a just act. Marcus is to do what is in hand "with exact and unaffected dignity, affection, freedom and justness" (2.5); justness lies "in what is done by reason of the cause from you: that is, impulse and action ending in the social action itself" (9.31). Lemma: δικαιότης.

δικαστήριον

Attested: δικαστηρίων (*dikastēriōn*; 7.48). A law court. Among the earthly things to be surveyed "as if from somewhere above" is "the din of law courts" (7.48). Lemma: δικαστήριον.

δικαστής

Attested: δικαστής (*dikastēs*; 12.36). A judge. It is "not a tyrant nor an unjust judge that sends you away from the city, but the nature that brought you in" (12.36). Lemma: δικαστής.

δίκη

Attested: δίκῃ (*dikēi*; 4.26), δίκη (*dikē*; 5.33, 12.24). What is due, justice; personified, the goddess Justice. Life is short, and "one must make gain of the present with sound reasoning and justice" (4.26); "faith and self-respect and justice and truth" go "to Olympus from the wide-wayed earth", in a line of Hesiod (5.33); and Marcus asks of his acts "whether it is neither at random nor otherwise than Justice herself would have acted" (12.24), where δίκη is the goddess. Lemma: δίκη.

προαδικέω

Attested: προηδικημένῳ (*proēdikēmenōi*; 2.10). To wrong first; in the passive, to be wronged first. The man in a rage "is more like a man who has been wronged first and by distress compelled to rage" (2.10). Lemma: προαδικέω.

φιλοδίκαιος

Attested: φιλοδίκαιον (*philodikaion*; 1.14.1). Loving justice; with the article, love of justice. "From my brother Severus: love of family, love of truth, love of justice" (1.14.1). Lemma: φιλοδίκαιος.

See also

Care and tolerance; Citizenship; Desire and aversion; Gods; Good, bad and indifference; Kinship and cooperation; Mind and reason; Ruling centre; Self-respect and shame; Soul; Truth and falsehood; Virtue and excellence.

Kindness and correction

Kindliness, mildness and teaching better · Meditations

εὐμένεια, eumeneia, "kindliness"; *εὐμενής, eumenēs*, "kindly", "kindliness", "more kindly"; *εὐμενῶς, eumenōs*, "kindly", "kindliness"; *πρᾳότης, prāiotēs*, "mildness"; *πρᾷος, prāios*, "mild", "milder"; *πρᾴως, prāiōs*, "mildly"; *ἥμερος, hēmeros*, "gentle", "gentleness"; *ἡμερότης, hēmerotēs*, "gentleness"; *χρηστός, chrēstos*, "kind", "kinder"; *χρηστῶς, chrēstōs*, "with kindness"; *χρηστότης, chrēstotēs*, "kindness"; *διδάσκειν, didaskein*, "teach"; *μεταδιδάσκειν, metadidaskein*, "teach better"; *δεικνύναι, deiknynai*, "show", "pointed out"; *παροραῖν, parorāin*, "overlook", "looked past", "sees amiss"; *παρόραμα, parorama*, "oversight"; *ὀνειδιστικῶς, oneidistikōs*, "reproachfully"; *ἀνεπίπληκτος, anepiplēktos*, "not to reprove"; *συγγινώσκειν, synginōskein*, "forgive"; *συγγνώμη, syngnōmē*, "forgiveness"; *συγγνωμονικός, syngnōmonikos*, "readiness to forgive"

At a Glance

The word. Εὐμενής, from εὖ (*eu*), "well", and μένος (*menos*), "spirit", is well disposed, kindly, and εὐμένεια is kindliness; πρᾷος is mild and ἥμερος gentle. Μεταδιδάσκειν is to teach otherwise, to teach better.

In the *Meditations*. Kindliness is learned from Sextus of Chaeronea (see Sextus), at 1.9.1, and is a quality "wholly in

your power" (5.5). Teaching is conditional and kindliness is not: "If you can, teach better; if not, remember that kindliness has been given you for this" (9.11). The manner of correction comes from Alexander the grammarian, Marcus' teacher of Greek, who corrected a fault without reproach (1.10), and Marcus will show a man his oversight "not reproachfully, nor as displaying that I bear with it" (11.13).

In this edition. Εὐμένεια and εὐμενής are "kindliness" and "kindly", kept apart from χρηστός, "kind", and χρηστότης, "kindness"; πρᾳότης is "mildness", πρᾶος "mild" and ἥμερος "gentle"; διδάσκειν is "teach", μεταδιδάσκειν "teach better" and δεικνύναι "show".

A place to read. 11.13, where Marcus, kindly and well-wishing even to the man who despises him, is ready to show him what he overlooks, sincerely and with kindness, like the famous Phocion, the Athenian general put to death in 318 BC.

Meaning

Εὐμενής (*eumenēs*), from εὖ, "well", and μένος, "spirit" or "temper", is well disposed towards someone, a word used of favourable gods; εὐμένεια (*eumeneia*) is the disposition and εὐμενῶς (*eumenōs*) the manner. Πρᾶος (*prāios*) is mild, of persons gentle, of animals tame, and πρᾳότης (*prāiotēs*) is mildness; ἥμερος (*hēmeros*), "gentle", is properly tame or cultivated. Χρηστός (*chrēstos*) is useful, and so good and kind. Διδάσκειν (*didaskein*) is to teach, and μεταδιδάσκειν (*metadidaskein*) to teach a man differently, to bring him to a better view. Marcus' words of correcting are plain ones: δεικνύναι (*deiknynai*), to show; παρορᾶν (*parorān*), to overlook, with τὸ παρορώμενον (*to parorōmenon*), "what is overlooked"; and ὀνειδιστικῶς (*oneidistikōs*), "reproachfully", for the manner he refuses.

Use in the book

Book I names the quality first: "From Sextus: kindliness" (1.9.1). Sextus, Plutarch's nephew, showed also "forbearance towards the unlearned and towards those who hold opinions without thinking" (1.9.1), and was so "in tune with everyone" that "his company was more agreeable than any flattery, while at that very moment he was held in the highest respect by those very people" (1.9.2). Kindliness stands among the qualities "wholly in your power" (5.5), and it is the manner of every act. If Marcus does the work in hand "seriously, with

vigour, kindly", he will live well (3.12; see Daimon); his speech is to be "only kindly and with self-respect and without pretence" (8.5); and if something stronger prevents a work without which life seems not worth living, Marcus is to "depart, kindly, from living" (8.47).

Its hardest object is the man who does wrong. "One thing here is worth much: to live one's life through with truth and justice, kindly to liars and the unjust" (6.47). The man who no longer shares the wrongdoer's opinion of good "will more easily be kindly to the one who sees amiss" (7.26; see Anger), and the reminder that wrongdoers must exist makes Marcus "more kindly to each one" (9.42.1; see Fault and ignorance). A man may be superior in one thing and yet "not more social, nor more self-respecting, nor better ordered in what happens, nor more kindly towards the oversights of neighbours" (7.52). Kindliness is not unguarded. When a sparring partner scratches and butts, "we are on our guard, though not as against an enemy, nor with suspicion, but with kindly avoidance", and so in the rest of life (6.20).

Teaching is the first answer to a fault, and it is always conditional. "If he errs, teach kindly and show what is overlooked. But if you cannot, accuse yourself, or not even yourself" (10.4). "If you can, teach better; if not, remember that kindliness has been given you for this. And the gods too are kindly to such people, and even work with them for some things, for health, for wealth, for fame; so kind are they. It is open to you too; or say, who prevents you?" (9.11). The pattern recurs: "Then teach and show, without being indignant" (6.27; see Anger); "show, remind" the man who offends (5.28; see Mind and reason); "either teach, then, or tolerate" (8.59; see Kinship and cooperation); and nature has given mildness "as an antidote" against the unfair man (9.42.2; see Fault and ignorance).

The manner of correction is learned, like kindliness, from a teacher. From Alexander of Cotiaeum, the grammarian and Homeric scholar, Marcus took this: "not to reprove; not to pounce reproachfully on those who have come out with a barbarism or a solecism or a jarring expression, but deftly to introduce just the expression that ought to have been used, by way of an answer, or of a confirmation, or of a shared consideration of the thing itself and not the word, or by some other such tactful reminder" (1.10). From Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic whom the emperor Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, summoned to Rome to teach him,

he had the example of a teacher "in explanation not short-tempered" (1.8.2). 11.13 can be read as the grammarian's rule carried from words to conduct. "Will someone despise me? He will see to that. … Will he hate? He will see to that. But I am kindly and well-wishing to everyone, and to this very man, ready to show what is overlooked, not reproachfully, nor as displaying that I bear with it, but sincerely and with kindness, like the famous Phocion, unless indeed he was making a show." "Reproachfully" returns in the ninth head against anger, where the insolent man is to be taught "neither ironically nor reproachfully", and "not as in a school, nor so that another standing by may admire" (11.18.4; see Anger). Both places rule out display: the correction is for the man corrected, not for onlookers, and Marcus doubts even Phocion's sincerity.

Mildness keeps company with firmness. "Those who stand in your way as you go forward according to right reason: just as they will not be able to turn you away from sound action, so let them not knock you off kindliness towards them either; but guard yourself on both sides alike, not only in steady judgement and action, but also in mildness towards those who try to prevent, or are otherwise resentful" (11.9). To be exasperated with them is as weak as to give up the action, and both are "deserters of their post". From his father Marcus learned "gentleness, and holding unshaken to decisions reached after thorough examination" (1.16.1). Elsewhere he would count off the letters of a name "mildly" (6.26; see Duty and fitting action), is to tolerate men "mildly" (9.3.2; see Death), and will be "milder towards all" if he remembers that every soul is deprived of truth unwillingly (7.63; see Soul).

Teaching depends on the other man's listening and on Marcus' own skill, and it may fail; kindliness can be read as what does not depend on either. On that reading it has been "given you for this" (9.11), for the failure itself, and it is "wholly in your power" (5.5), as success in teaching is not.

Places to read

Every chapter in which εὐμένεια, εὐμενής or εὐμενῶς, πρᾳότης, πρᾷος or πρᾴως (*prāiōs*), ἥμερος, ἡμερότης (*hēmerotēs*), χρηστός, χρηστῶς (*chrēstōs*) or χρηστότης (*chrēstotēs*), διδάσκειν, μεταδιδάσκειν, ὀνειδιστικῶς, ἀνεπίπληκτος (*anepiplēktos*), συγγινώσκειν (*synginōskein*), συγγνώμη (*syngnōmē*) or συγγνωμονικός (*syngnōmonikos*)

occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the places where δεικνύναι or παροραῖν is used of what a man overlooks or of showing him a better course (5.22, 5.28, 6.30.4). Δεικνύναι in other senses (3.2.3, 5.16, 5.27), παροραῖν in other senses (2.11.3, 5.31), and the nouns διδάσκαλος (*didaskalos*), "teacher", and διδασκαλία (*didaskalia*), "teaching", are left out.

1.9.1 From Sextus Marcus learned kindliness, and forbearance towards the unlearned and towards those who hold opinions without thinking.

1.10 From Alexander the grammarian Marcus learned not to reprove nor to pounce reproachfully on a fault of speech, but deftly to introduce the expression that ought to have been used.

1.15.3 Claudius Maximus, the Stoic, had beneficence, readiness to forgive and truthfulness.

1.16.1 From his father, Antoninus Pius, Marcus learned gentleness, and holding unshaken to decisions reached after thorough examination.

3.4.2 Marcus is to accustom himself to form impressions only of what he could disclose at once if asked, so that it would be plain that everything is simple and kindly and belongs to a social living being.

3.11.2 Among the virtues that a thing presenting itself may call for are gentleness, courage, truth and good faith.

3.12 If Marcus does the work in hand by right reason, seriously, with vigour, kindly and with no side-business, he will live well.

4.25 The life Marcus is to try is that of the good man, content with his own just action and kindly disposition.

5.5 Kindliness is among the qualities wholly in Marcus' power.

5.22 What does not harm the city does not harm the citizen; if the city is harmed, one must not be angry with the one who harms it, and the chapter ends with what is being overlooked.

5.28 To the objection that the man whose armpits stink has reason, Marcus answers that so has he: he is to move a rational disposition by a rational

disposition, show and remind; if the man listens, Marcus will cure him.

6.20 A sparring partner who scratches and butts is met not as an enemy but with kindly avoidance, and so too those who train with us in the rest of life.

6.26 Marcus asks whether, if people get angry when he spells out a name, he will not count off each letter mildly; so every duty is completed out of certain numbers.

6.27 If what men are carried towards is not proper and advantageous, Marcus is to teach and show, without being indignant.

6.30.1 Marcus is to keep himself simple, good, untainted, dignified, unpretentious, a friend of what is just, pious, kindly and affectionate.

6.30.4 Antoninus bore with those who frankly opposed his views, and rejoiced if someone pointed out what was better.

6.47 One thing is worth much: to live one's life through with truth and justice, kindly to liars and the unjust.

7.3 Among the trifles of human life Marcus must stand kindly and without arrogance, keeping track that each man is worth as much as the things he has taken seriously.

7.26 If Marcus still shares the wrongdoer's opinion of the good, one must forgive; if not, he will more easily be kindly to the one who sees amiss.

7.52 A man may be superior in one thing, but not more kindly towards the oversights of neighbours.

7.63 Remembering that every soul is deprived of truth unwillingly, and so too of kindliness, Marcus will be milder towards all.

8.5 Marcus is to do what the nature of man demands and speak as seems most just, only kindly, with self-respect and without pretence.

8.34 God's kindness has made it open to man, once cut off from the whole, to come back and grow together again.

8.43 What gladdens Marcus is to have his ruling centre sound, turning away from no man and looking on everything with kindly eyes.

8.47 If it is not worth living when what Marcus cannot do is left undone, he is to depart from living kindly, serene towards what stands in the way.

8.51 Marcus will have an ever-flowing spring if he guards himself every hour for freedom, with kindliness, simplicity and self-respect.

8.59 Men have come to be for the sake of one another, and so Marcus is either to teach or to tolerate.

9.3.2 One must not take offence at men but care for them and tolerate them mildly, remembering that death will not be a release from men who share one's principles.

9.11 If Marcus can, he is to teach better; if not, kindliness has been given him for this, and the gods too are kindly to such people.

9.37 Marcus is to become simpler and kinder towards the gods.

9.42.1 Remembering that wrongdoers must exist in the universe makes Marcus more kindly to each one.

9.42.2 Nature has given mildness as an antidote against the unfair man, and it is open to Marcus to teach better the man who has gone astray.

10.4 If a man errs, Marcus is to teach kindly and show what is overlooked; if he cannot, he is to accuse himself, or not even himself.

10.12 If Marcus sees clearly what must be done, he is to go that way kindly, without turning back.

10.36 Though there are many who would be glad to be rid of him, Marcus is not to go away less kindly to them when he dies.

11.9 Those who stand in Marcus' way will not be able to turn him from sound action, and are not to knock him off kindliness either; he is to guard himself on both sides, in steady judgement and action and in mildness towards them.

11.13 Marcus is kindly and well-wishing even to the man who despises or hates him, ready to show him what is overlooked, not reproachfully but sincerely and with kindness, like Phocion.

11.15 The good and simple and kindly have these things in the eyes, and it does not escape notice.

11.16 There is forgiveness for everyone who seeks his own good.

11.18.4 Kindliness is invincible if it is sincere, and the insolent man is to be taught better mildly, neither ironically nor reproachfully.

11.18.5 Not raging but what is mild and gentle is manly.

12.3.2 If Marcus separates from the ruling centre what is fastened to it and lives only the present, he will be able to live untroubled and kindly and serene towards his own daimon.

12.5 Marcus asks how the gods overlooked that some men, very kind and most intimate with the divine, should not come to be again after death.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, makes correction the work of argument. The man who can show each person the conflict by which he does wrong (see Fault and ignorance) is formidable in argument, able both to exhort and to refute; for once this is shown, the man will draw back of his own accord, and until it is shown one should not wonder that he persists, since he acts with the impression that he is acting rightly. Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, relied on this power, knowing that a rational soul tips like a balance whether one will or not. "Show a rational ruling centre the conflict," Epictetus goes on, "and it will stand off from it; but if you do not show it, accuse yourself rather than the man who is not persuaded."[468] Marcus' "show what is overlooked. But if you cannot, accuse yourself, or not even yourself" (10.4) can be read as the same rule, carried a step further. Of the man who, when an ordinary person answers him awkwardly, can do nothing but revile or mock him, Epictetus says that a guide who finds a man wandering does not jeer at him or abuse him and walk off, but brings him to the road he should take: "you too, show him the truth, and you will see that he follows"; and until one shows it, one should not mock him but rather be aware of one's own lack of power. It was first and most of all Socrates' mark, he adds, never to be provoked in argument, never to let fall a word of abuse or insolence, but to bear with those who abused him and stop

[468] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.26.4–7.

the quarrel.[469] The man "who has gone astray" whom Marcus may teach better (9.42.2) can be read as Epictetus' wanderer. On forgiveness the school was harder. Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports that the Stoics held the wise man not to be given to pity and to pardon no one, not remitting the punishments the law imposes, since yielding, pity and leniency itself are a nothingness of soul that pretends to kindness, χρηστότης, in punishing.[470] Marcus admired "readiness to forgive" in Claudius Maximus (1.15.3), and tells himself that "one must forgive" the wrongdoer if he still holds the same opinion of the good, "or another of one form with it" (7.26; see Anger).

Other ancient sources

Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, asks in his *Life of Phocion* how so harsh and sullen a man came to be called "the good", ὁ χρηστός (*ho chrēstos*). It is hard, he says, but not impossible for the same man to be at once pleasant and severe, like wine. Phocion did harm to no citizen out of enmity and counted no one his enemy, but was rough, unyielding and inexorable only so far as he had to be against those who opposed what he did for his country; in the rest of his life he was kindly, εὐμενής, towards everyone, easy of approach and humane, so that he even helped men who had stumbled and stood by his opponents when they were in danger.[471] Marcus' wish to show a man his oversight "sincerely and with kindness", χρηστῶς, "like the famous Phocion" (11.13), can be read as recalling the surname, and his pairing of mildness with steady action (11.9) as the same balance. Plutarch tells, as the edition's note recalls, that before he drank the hemlock a friend asked Phocion whether he had any message for his son, and he answered that he told him to bear the Athenians no grudge.[472] The funeral speech that Aelius Aristides, the orator of the second century, wrote for Alexander of Cotiaeum, who had reared and taught him, survives; the edition's note identifies the grammarian of 1.10 with him (see Alexander the grammarian). He alone, Aristides writes, did

[469] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.12.2–4 and 2.12.14.

[470] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.123.

[471] Plutarch, *Phocion* 10.2–4.

[472] Plutarch, *Phocion* 36.3, cited in the edition's note at 11.13.

not show up ordinary men, and yet he was admired among the clever as the first; in his teaching he is said never to have been the cause of anything unpleasant to anyone, but always of some good, to his pupils and to their attendants; and he had "a most gentle soul", ψυχὴ ἡμερωτάτη (*psychē hēmerōtatē*).[473]

Translation in this edition

Εὐμένεια is "kindliness" at all three places (7.63, 9.11, 11.9). Εὐμενής is "kindly", and with the neuter article "kindliness" (1.9.1, 5.5, 11.18.4); it is "kindly disposition" with its noun at 4.25, "kindly avoidance" at 6.20, "kindly eyes" at 8.43 and "less kindly" at 10.36, and the comparative is "more kindly" (7.52, 9.42.1). The adverb εὐμενῶς is "kindly" (3.12, 7.3, 8.5, 10.4, 10.12, 12.3.2), and with the article "kindliness" (8.51). The Glossary keeps "kindly" and "kindliness" apart from "kind" and "kindness": χρηστός is "kind" (9.11, 12.5) and "kinder" (9.37), its adverb χρηστῶς "with kindness" (11.13), and χρηστότης "kindness" (8.34). Πρᾳότης is "mildness" (9.42.2, 11.9); πρᾷος is "mild" (11.18.5) and "milder" (7.63), and πρᾴως "mildly" (6.26, 9.3.2, 11.18.4). Ἥμερος is "gentle" (11.18.5) and with the article "gentleness" (1.16.1), as ἡμερότης is (3.11.2); μειλίχιος (*meilichios*) is "amiable" (1.15.1) and "amiability" (6.30.2), and εὔνους (*eunous*) "well-wishing" (10.36, 11.13). Διδάσκειν is "teach" (6.27, 8.59, 10.4), μεταδιδάσκειν always "teach better" (9.11, 9.42.2, 11.18.4), and παραινεῖν (*parainein*) "exhort" (11.18.4); διδάσκαλος is "teacher" or "teachers" (1.4, 1.13, 1.17.1, 5.31, 12.4) and διδασκαλία "teaching" (6.16.3) and "instructions" (1.17.6). Δεικνύναι is "show" (3.2.3, 5.27, 5.28, 6.27, 10.4, 11.13, 11.18.4), "has long been shown" (5.16) and "pointed out" (6.30.4); at 5.22 "but must show" renders δεικτέον (*deikteon*), a supplement of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, and in A, the Vatican manuscript, a new chapter begins with "what is being overlooked". Its compounds are "parade myself" (ἐπιδείκνυσθαι, *epideiknysthai*; 1.7.1), "make no show" (5.9), "showing off" (5.18) and "displaying" (κατεπιδείκνυσθαι, *katepideiknysthai*; 11.13). Παροραῖν is "overlook" (2.11.3, 12.5) and "what is overlooked" or "what is being overlooked" for τὸ παρορώμενον (5.22, 10.4, 11.13), "looked past" (5.31) and "the one who sees amiss" (7.26); παρόραμα (*parorama*)

[473] Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 32 Keil (12 Dindorf), *Funeral Speech for Alexander*, pp. 80, 83 and 86 Jebb.

is “oversights” (7.52). Ὀνειδιστικῶς is “reproachfully” at all three places (1.10, 11.13, 11.18.4); ἐξονειδιστικός (*exoneidistikos*) is “reproaching” (1.16.5), ὀνειδιστής (*oneidistēs*) “reproacher” (6.30.3) and ὀνειδίζειν (*oneidizein*) “reproach” (11.19). Ἀνεπίπληκτος is “not to reprove” (1.10), and ἐπιπλήσσειν (*epiplēssein*) “rebuking” (10.19). Ἀδήκτως (*adēktōs*) is “without sting” (11.18.4; see Anger). Συγγινώσκειν is “forgive” (7.26), συγγνώμη “forgiveness” (11.16) and συγγνωμονικός “readiness to forgive” (1.15.3). Διορθοῦν (*diorthoun*) is “set right” (4.12, 8.16, 8.17, 8.47, 9.35), “correct” (2.11.3) and “straightened” (1.15.3), and διόρθωσις (*diorthōsis*) “correction” (1.7.1; see Learning, practice and correction).

ἀνεπίπληκτος

Attested: ἀνεπίπληκτον (*anepiplēkton*; 1.10). Not given to rebuke; with the article, the habit of not reproving. “From Alexander the grammarian: not to reprove; not to pounce reproachfully on those who have come out with a barbarism or a solecism or a jarring expression …” (1.10). Lemma: ἀνεπίπληκτος.

δείκνυμι

Attested: δεικνύουσιν (*deiknyousin*; 3.2.3), δέδεικται (*dedeiktai*; 5.16), δεικνύς (*deiknys*; 5.27), δεῖξον (*deixon*; 5.28), δείκνυε (*deiknye*; 6.27), δεικνύοι (*deiknyoi*; 6.30.4), δεικνύναι (*deiknynai*; 10.4, 11.18.4), δεῖξαι (*deixai*; 11.13). To show, to point out; with teaching, to show a man his fault. “Move a rational disposition by a rational disposition; show, remind” (5.28); “Then teach and show, without being indignant” (6.27); “teach kindly and show what is overlooked” (10.4); “ready to show what is overlooked” (11.13). Otherwise of what painters “show in imitation” (3.2.3), of what “has long been shown” (5.16) and of the man who “continually shows” the gods his own soul (5.27). At 5.22 the verbal adjective δεικτέον is Gataker’s supplement. Lemma: δείκνυμι.

διδάσκω

Attested: δίδασκε (*didaske*; 6.27, 8.59), διδάσκειν (*didaskein*; 10.4). To teach. “Then teach and show, without being indignant” (6.27); “either teach, then, or tolerate” (8.59); “If he errs, teach kindly and show what is overlooked” (10.4). Lemma: διδάσκω.

εὐμένεια

Attested: εὐμενείας (*eumeneias*; 7.63, 11.9), εὐμένεια (*eumeneia*; 9.11). Kindliness, a well-disposed temper towards others. Every soul is deprived unwillingly of truth, “So too, then, of justice and self-control and kindliness and everything of that kind” (7.63); “remember that kindliness has been given you for this” (9.11); “so let them not knock you off kindliness towards them either” (11.9). Lemma: εὐμένεια.

εὐμενής

Attested: εὐμενές (*eumenes*; 1.9.1, 5.5, 11.18.4), εὐμενῆ (*eumenē*; 3.4.2, 6.30.1, 6.47), εὐμενῶς (*eumenōs*; 3.12, 7.3, 8.5, 8.51, 10.4, 10.12, 12.3.2), εὐμενεῖ (*eumenei*; 4.25), εὐμενοῦς (*eumenous*; 6.20), εὐμενής (*eumenēs*; 7.26, 8.47, 10.36, 11.13, 11.15, 11.18.4), εὐμενέστερος (*eumenesteros*; 7.52, 9.42.1), εὐμενέσιν (*eumenesin*; 8.43), εὐμενεῖς (*eumeneis*; 9.11). Well disposed, kindly; the neuter with the article is kindliness, and the adverb εὐμενῶς is kindly. “From Sextus: kindliness” (1.9.1); “kindly to liars and the unjust” (6.47); “you will more easily be kindly to the one who sees amiss” (7.26); “And the gods too are kindly to such people …” (9.11); “that kindliness is invincible, if it is sincere and not a grin nor a pretence” (11.18.4); “teach kindly and show what is overlooked” (10.4). Lemma: εὐμενής.

ἥμερος

Attested: ἥμερον (*hēmeron*; 1.16.1, 11.18.5). Tame, cultivated; of men, gentle. “From my father: gentleness, and holding unshaken to decisions reached after thorough examination” (1.16.1); “it is not raging that is manly, but what is mild and gentle” (11.18.5). Lemma: ἥμερος.

ἡμερότης

Attested: ἡμερότητος (*hēmerotētos*; 3.11.2). Gentleness. Among the virtues a thing that presents itself may call for: “such as gentleness, courage, truth, good faith, artlessness, self-sufficiency and the rest” (3.11.2). Lemma: ἡμερότης.

μεταδιδάσκω

Attested: μεταδίδασκε (*metadidaske*; 9.11), μεταδιδάσκειν (*metadidaskein*; 9.42.2), μεταδιδάσκῃς (*metadidaskēis*; 11.18.4). To teach otherwise, to teach better, bringing a man from a wrong view to a right one. “If you can, teach better” (9.11); “it is open to you to teach better the man who has

gone astray" (9.42.2); "if it so happens, mildly exhort and teach better at your leisure" (11.18.4). Lemma: μεταδιδάσκω.

ὀνειδιστικός

Attested: ὀνειδιστικῶς (*oneidistikōs*; 1.10, 11.13, 11.18.4). Reproachful; the adverb, reproachfully, names the manner of correction that Marcus refuses. "not to pounce reproachfully on those who have come out with a barbarism …" (1.10); "ready to show what is overlooked, not reproachfully" (11.13); "neither ironically nor reproachfully, but affectionately and without sting in the soul" (11.18.4). Lemma: ὀνειδιστικός.

παρόραμα

Attested: παροράματα (*paroramata*; 7.52). An oversight, a thing overlooked. A man may be superior in one thing, but not "more kindly towards the oversights of neighbours" (7.52). Lemma: παρόραμα.

παροράω

Attested: παρεῖδεν (*pareiden*; 2.11.3), παρορώμενον (*parorōmenon*; 5.22, 10.4, 11.13), παρεῖδες (*pareides*; 5.31), παρορῶντι (*parorōnti*; 7.26), παρεῖδον (*pareidon*; 12.5). To look past, to overlook; to see amiss. Of a man's fault, τὸ παρορώμενον, "what is overlooked": "teach kindly and show what is overlooked" (10.4), "ready to show what is overlooked" (11.13); and "the one who sees amiss" (7.26). Of the gods and nature, to overlook: "How ever did the gods … overlook this one thing" (12.5); and "how many pleasures and pains you have looked past" (5.31). Lemma: παροράω.

πρᾷος

Attested: πρᾴως (*prāiōs*; 6.26, 9.3.2, 11.18.4), πρᾳότερος (*prāioteros*; 7.63), πρᾷον (*prāion*; 11.18.5). Mild, gentle; the adverb, mildly. "Will you not go through each of the characters mildly, counting them off?" (6.26); "even care for them and tolerate them mildly" (9.3.2); "for you will be milder towards all" (7.63); "mildly exhort and teach better" (11.18.4); "what is mild and gentle" (11.18.5). Lemma: πρᾷος.

πρᾳότης

Attested: πρᾳότητα (*prāiotēta*; 9.42.2), πρᾳότητος (*prāiotētos*; 11.9). Mildness. Nature "has given, as an antidote, against the unfair man mildness" (9.42.2); Marcus is to guard himself "also in mildness towards those who try

to prevent, or are otherwise resentful" (11.9). Lemma: πρᾳότης.

συγγινώσκω

Attested: συγγινώσκειν (*synginōskein*; 7.26). To pardon, to forgive. If Marcus still forms the same opinion of the good as the wrongdoer, "or another of one form with it; so one must forgive" (7.26). Lemma: συγγινώσκω.

συγγνώμη

Attested: συγγνώμη (*syngnōmē*; 11.16). Pardon, forgiveness. "for there is forgiveness for everyone who seeks his own good" (11.16), of one who hastens towards what is according to his own nature, "even if it is inglorious". Lemma: συγγνώμη.

συγγνωμονικός

Attested: συγγνωμονικόν (*syngnōmonikon*; 1.15.3). Disposed to pardon; with the article, readiness to forgive. From Claudius Maximus: "beneficence, readiness to forgive, and truthfulness" (1.15.3). Lemma: συγγνωμονικός.

χρηστός

Attested: χρηστοί (*chrēstoi*; 9.11), χρηστότερος (*chrēstoteros*; 9.37), χρηστῶς (*chrēstōs*; 11.13), χρηστούς (*chrēstous*; 12.5). Useful, good; of persons, kind; the adverb, with kindness. The gods help men to health, wealth and fame, "so kind are they" (9.11); "But towards the gods too, now at last, become simpler and kinder" (9.37); "but sincerely and with kindness, like the famous Phocion" (11.13); "some men, very kind" (12.5). Lemma: χρηστός.

χρηστότης

Attested: χρηστότητα (*chrēstotēta*; 8.34). Goodness, kindness. "But look at the kindness with which he has honoured man" (8.34), God's gift that a part cut off from the whole may come back and grow together again. Lemma: χρηστότης.

See also

Alexander the grammarian; Anger; Daimon; Death; Duty and fitting action; Fault and ignorance; Kinship and cooperation; Learning, practice and correction; Mind and reason; Sextus; Soul.

Kinship of mind and work done together · Meditations

συγγενής, syngenēs, “kin”, “kinsman”, “kinsmen”; *συγγένεια, syngeneia*, “kinship”; *ὁμογενής, homogenēs*, “of one kind”; *κοινωνία, koinōnia*, “fellowship”; *εὐκοινωνησία, eukoinōnēsia*, “good fellowship”; *κοινωνός, koinōnos*, “partner”, “fellow”, “fellows”; *κοινωνικός, koinōnikos*, “social”, “socially”; *ἀκοινώνητος, akoinōnētos*, “unsocial”, “unsocially”; *συνεργεῖν, synergein*, “work together”, “work with”; *συνεργία, synergia*, “working together”, “joint working”; *συνεργός, synergos*, “fellow-workers”, “working together”, “working with”; *συνεργητικός, synergētikos*, “helpers”, “co-operative”; *μέλος, melos*, “limb”; *κλάδος, klados*, “branch”; *ὁμοθαμνεῖν, homothamnein*, “grow on the same bush”

At a Glance

The word. Συγγενής is one of the same birth or stock, a kinsman, and συγγένεια kinship. Κοινωνία is fellowship, the having of something in common, and κοινωνικός what is made for it, “social”. Συνεργεῖν is to work together.

In the *Meditations*. The wrongdoer is “kin to me, not of the same blood or seed, but sharing in mind and in a portion of the divine”, and “we have come to be for working together, like feet, like hands” (2.1). A man is a limb of the system of rational beings, not merely a part (7.13); whoever acts unsocially cuts himself off like a hand from the body (8.34) or a branch from the plant (11.8), and can grow back.

In this edition. Συγγενής is “kin”, “kinsman” or “kinsmen”, and συγγένεια “kinship”; κοινωνία is always “fellowship”; κοινωνικός is “social”, the adverb “socially”, and ἀκοινώνητος “unsocial”. Συνεργεῖν is “work together” or “work with”, συνεργία “working together” (2.1) and “joint working” (7.13).

A place to read. 2.1, where Marcus, preparing at dawn to meet the unsocial, reminds himself that the wrongdoer is his kin.

Meaning

Συγγενής (*syngenēs*), from σύν (*syn*), “with”, and γένος (*genos*), “birth, stock”, is a relative, and συγγένεια (*syngeneia*) kinship. Κοινωνία (*koinōnia*), from κοινός (*koinos*), “common”, is partnership, the having of a thing in

common; a κοινωνός (*koinōnos*) is a partner, and κοινωνικός (*koinōnikos*) what is fitted for fellowship. Συνεργεῖν (*synergein*), from ἔργον (*ergon*), "work", is to work with another. Marcus' kinship is not of blood: the wrongdoer is kin "not of the same blood or seed, but sharing in mind and in a portion of the divine" (2.1), and the same kinship of mind joins a man to the whole human race (12.26; see Mind and reason). It reaches as far as reason: "everything rational is kin" (3.4.4). Fellowship, in turn, is the rational being's good (5.16; see Impression), and "The mind of the whole is social" (5.30).

Use in the book

The theme opens Book II. "At dawn, say to yourself in advance: I shall meet the meddling, the ungrateful, the insolent, the treacherous, the envious, the unsocial." Their faults come "through ignorance of good and bad". Marcus knows the good and the bad, "and the nature of the wrongdoer himself, that he is kin to me …; and so I can neither be harmed by any of them, … nor be angry with a kinsman or hate him. For we have come to be for working together, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of upper and lower teeth. To work against one another is therefore against nature; and being indignant and turning away is a kind of working against" (2.1). Two arguments run together: kinship rules out anger, and the paired parts of the body show what men are for. The last clause turns the charge on Marcus himself: if he is indignant, the working against is his.

When the vice of men tempts him to resentment, Marcus is to reckon up the verdict "that rational living beings have come to be for one another" (4.3.2). The verdict becomes a rule, "Men have come to be for the sake of one another; either teach, then, or tolerate" (8.59), and the first article of man's constitution: "The leading thing, then, in the constitution of man is the social" (7.55).

Nature itself draws like to like: earth to earth, fire to fire, and "everything that shares in the common intelligent nature hastens likewise towards what is kin, or even more" (9.9.1). Among rational living beings there are "commonwealths and friendships and households and gatherings, and in wars treaties and truces" (9.9.2), and men who flee one another are overtaken, "for nature prevails" (9.9.3).

Kinship is what Marcus calls to mind when others do wrong: to love even those who stumble is peculiar to man, and it comes about "if it occurs to you along with this that they are kinsmen" (7.22; see Fault and ignorance). The offender is "a fellow tribesman, a kinsman and partner", and Marcus treats him "according to the natural law of fellowship, with goodwill and justice" (3.11.3; see Good, bad and indifference). Whoever is aggrieved has forgotten "that the wrong done is alien" and "how great is the kinship of a man with the whole human race" (12.26; see Mind and reason). The man exasperated with those who obstruct him deserts his post as surely as the one who shrinks back: he is "made alien towards him who is by nature kinsman and friend" (11.9).

Cooperation runs through the universe. "We all work together towards one outcome, some knowingly and keeping track, others without attending", as Marcus thinks Heraclitus, the philosopher of Ephesus of about 500 BC, says "that even those asleep are workers and fellow-workers in what comes about in the universe" (6.42).[474] "As the limbs of the body are in things unified, so are rational beings in things separate, made for one joint working." Marcus is to say often, "I am a limb of the system made of rational beings"; "But if, through the letter r, you say you are a part, you do not yet love men from the heart; acting beneficently does not yet gladden you conclusively; you still do it barely, as what is seemly, not yet as doing good to yourself" (7.13). Μέλος (*melos*), "limb", and μέρος (*meros*), "part", differ by the one letter ρ (see Whole and part); the limb can be read as belonging to the body by a shared life, the part by its place.

Severance reverses the image. "If you have ever seen a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head severed, lying somewhere apart from the rest of the body: such does he make himself, so far as in him lies, who does not want what happens and splits himself off, or who does something unsocial." Yet "it is open to you to unite yourself again. This to no other part has God granted, once separated and cut apart, to come together again" (8.34). At 11.8 the image is a branch: "a branch is cut off by another; but a man separates himself from the neighbour by hating and turning away". Zeus, "who established the fellowship", allows us "to grow together

[474] Heraclitus, fragment 75 Diels, as the edition's note at 6.42 records from Leopold's testimonia.

again", though division "happening often" makes reunion hard, and the grafted branch is not like the one that grew from the beginning, "whatever the planters say". The chapter ends, "Grow on the same bush, but do not hold the same principles" (11.8; see Principles and reminders). Within one life the tear is the same: as Marcus helps "to complete a civic system", every action of his is to "help to complete a civic life", and an action without reference to the social end "tears life apart and does not let it be one, and is seditious" (9.23).

These words gather where Marcus is most tempted to anger, and can be read as a discipline: the offender is to be met as kin, his fault as alien, and the work as shared; and since only his own unsocial act cuts Marcus off, the way back lies in his own power (8.34).

Places to read

Every chapter in which συγγενής, συγγένεια, κοινωνία, κοινωνός, κοινωνικός, ἀκοινώνητος, εὐκοινωνησία or a word of the family of συνεργεῖν occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; every place of μέλος, κλάδος and ὁμοθαμνεῖν falls among them. Other words that the English renders "kin", "kinship" or "kindred" (οἰκεῖος, οἰκειότης, ὁμόφυλος), and the diminutive μελύδρια, "poor limbs" (7.68), are left out. The places of ὁμογενής (*homogenēs*), "of one kind", are given in its sub-entry.

1.17.1 Among the gifts of the gods Marcus counts good grandfathers, parents, sister and teachers, good people about him, kinsmen and friends, nearly all of them good.

2.1 The wrongdoer is kin to Marcus, not of the same blood or seed but sharing in mind and in a portion of the divine; men have come to be for working together, like feet and hands, and to work against one another is against nature.

2.2 The ruling centre is no longer to be jerked like a puppet by unsocial impulse.

2.13 What comes from men deserves love because of kinship, and sometimes pity, because of ignorance of good and bad.

3.4.2 One is to form impressions only of such things that, asked suddenly what one is thinking, one

could answer frankly, and it would be plain that everything belongs to a social living being.

3.4.4 The man Marcus describes remembers that everything rational is kin, and that to care for all men is according to man's nature.

3.5 Marcus is not to act unwillingly, or unsocially, or without examination, or pulled two ways.

3.11.3 What comes from a fellow tribesman, a kinsman and partner who does not know what is according to nature for him, Marcus treats according to the natural law of fellowship, with goodwill and justice.

4.33 What deserves effort is one thing: a just understanding, social actions, speech that never lies, and a disposition that welcomes all that happens.

5.1.3 Craftsmen and lovers of money or fame forget food and sleep for what they are set on; Marcus asks whether social actions seem to him cheaper and worth less effort.

5.6.2 To an objector who says that it is peculiar to the social man to perceive that he acts socially, and to will that his fellow perceive it too, Marcus answers that this is true but mistakes his meaning, and that understanding him need leave no social work undone.

5.16 The good of a rational living being is fellowship, for it has long been shown that we have come to be for fellowship.

5.29 So long as nothing leads him out of life, Marcus remains free, and wants according to the nature of a rational and social living being.

5.30 The mind of the whole is social: it has made the worse for the sake of the better and fitted the better to one another.

6.7 Marcus is to take delight and rest in one thing, passing from one social action to another, with remembrance of God.

6.14 The man who honours a soul that is rational, universal and civic preserves his own soul in a rational and social state and motion, and works with what is of one kind with him to this end.

6.16.5 Respect and honour for his own understanding will make Marcus pleasing to himself, in tune with his fellows and in accord with the gods.

6.23 Irrational beings and things are to be used with greatness of mind and freely, and men, as having reason, socially.

6.30.1 There is one fruit of life on earth, a holy disposition and social actions.

6.42 All work together towards one outcome, some knowingly and others without attending; the governor of the whole will use Marcus as a part of the fellow-workers and helpers, but he is not to be such a part as the cheap line in the play that Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school, mentions.

6.43 Marcus asks whether the sun thinks fit to do the work of the rain, or Asclepius, the god of healing, that of the Fruit-bearer, usually taken to be Demeter, and whether the stars are not different, but working together towards the same thing.

7.5 If his understanding is not sufficient for a work, Marcus yields it to one abler, if it is not otherwise a duty, or does it as he can with a helper, so as to do what is opportune and useful for the fellowship.

7.13 Rational beings are made for one joint working, as the limbs of the body are; whoever calls himself a part, not a limb, does not yet love men from the heart.

7.19 All bodies pass through the substance of the whole as through a torrent, grown together with it and working with it, as our limbs with one another.

7.22 It is peculiar to man to love even those who stumble, and this comes about if it occurs to Marcus that they are kinsmen and do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly.

7.52 Another may be superior in one thing, but not more social, more self-respecting, better ordered in what happens, or more kindly towards the oversights of neighbours.

7.55 The rest has been made for the sake of rational beings, and rational beings for the sake of one

another; the leading thing in the constitution of man is the social.

7.64 Pain does not corrupt the understanding either as it is rational or as it is social.

7.67 Though he has despaired of becoming a dialectician and a natural philosopher, Marcus is not to give up hope of being free, self-respecting, social and obedient to God.

7.72 Whatever the rational and civic faculty finds neither intelligent nor social, it judges inferior to itself.

8.2 At each action Marcus asks what more he seeks, if the present work is that of an intelligent and social living being, under the same law as God.

8.7 A rational nature journeys well when, among other things, it directs its impulses to social works alone.

8.12 When he is roused from sleep with reluctance, Marcus is to remind himself that to render social actions accords with his constitution and with human nature, while sleeping is common to irrational beings too.

8.31 The court of Augustus, the first Roman emperor, his wife, daughter, sister, kinsmen, intimates and friends, has died whole.

8.34 Whoever does not want what happens and splits himself off, or does something unsocial, makes himself like a hand cut off from the body; but God has made it open to man to unite himself again.

9.6 Enough: a present opinion firmly grasping, a present action that is social, and a present disposition well pleased with all that happens from the cause outside.

9.9.1 Everything that shares in the common intelligent nature hastens towards what is kin as earthy things incline to earth, or even more.

9.11 If Marcus cannot teach a man better, kindliness has been given him for this; the gods too are kindly to such men, and even work with them for health, wealth and fame.

9.22 Marcus is to run to the ruling centre of the other man, to see whether he acts from ignorance or design, and to reckon that it is kin.

9.23 An action without reference, near or remote, to the social end tears life apart and is seditious, like a man who stands apart from the concord of his people.

9.31 Justness is impulse and action ending in the social action itself, since this is according to nature for Marcus.

9.40 If the gods can work with men, they can work with them for not fearing, not craving and not being distressed.

9.42.4 Man, beneficent by nature, has done what he was made for whenever he does something beneficent, or otherwise something co-operative in things indifferent.

10.6.2 In so far as Marcus stands in some affinity to the parts of one kind with him, he will do nothing unsocial, and will lead every impulse towards what is of common advantage.

10.24 Marcus asks whether his ruling centre is loosed and torn away from fellowship.

10.36 Dying, Marcus may reflect that the very fellows for whom he struggled want him gone, but he is not to go less kindly to them.

11.4 Having done something socially, Marcus has been benefited, and the thought is always to be ready to hand.

11.8 A man who separates himself from his neighbour falls away from the whole fellowship, but Zeus, who established the fellowship, allows him to grow together again, though division happening often makes him hard to restore.

11.9 To be exasperated with those who obstruct right action is as weak as to give the action up; both are deserters, one shrinking back, one made alien towards his kinsman and friend.

11.18.5 Anger at men and flattery of them are both unsocial and lead to harm.

11.19 One of the four turnings of the ruling centre to be wiped away is the thought over which Marcus says, “this one dissolves fellowship”.

11.20.2 The ruling centre was made for holiness and piety no less than for justice, for these too are of the kind of good fellowship.

11.21 The target to set before oneself is social and civic.

11.37 The rule of Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, is that impulses be with reservation, social, and according to worth.

12.20 The second rule is to refer action to nothing other than the social end.

12.23 The ending of life is not bad for each, because not shameful either, if it is both outside choice and not unsocial.

12.26 Whoever is aggrieved has forgotten that the wrong done is alien, and how great is the kinship of a man with the whole human race, a fellowship not of blood or seed but of mind.

12.30 Understanding, in a way of its own, joins with the kindred stock, and the social feeling is not parted.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The Stoics derived the fellowship of men from nature's care for offspring. In the third book of *On Ends* by Cicero, the Roman orator and statesman of the first century BC, Cato the Younger, the Stoic senator, who speaks for the school, says that nature makes parents love their children, and that from this beginning comes the common fellowship of the human race: a natural attachment of man to man, so that a man must not seem alien to a man for the very reason that he is a man. Among the limbs, he goes on, some are born as if for themselves, like the eyes and the ears, while others, like the legs and the hands, also serve the use of the rest; so some savage beasts are born for themselves alone, while the ant, the bee and the stork do some things for the sake of others; men do this in far closer union, and so are fitted by nature for gatherings, assemblies and states.[475] His next step makes the universe a city (see Citizenship). Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, gives the doctrine as a formula of human duty: all that we see, in which things divine and human are enclosed, is one; "we are limbs of a great body"; nature brought us forth as kin, since she begot us from the same things and for the same ends, put mutual love

[475] Cicero, *On Ends* 3.62–63.

in us and made us fit for fellowship; and our fellowship is like an arch of stones, which would fall if the stones did not hold one another up.[476] Marcus' "I am a limb" (7.13) can be read as Seneca's image made into a sentence to say to oneself. Epictetus turns kinship on a master angry with his slave: "Slave, will you not put up with your own brother, whose forefather is Zeus, born like a son from the same seeds and the same sowing from above?" And if he is placed above others, will he set himself up as a tyrant and not remember whom he rules, "kinsmen, brothers by nature, the offspring of Zeus"?[477] Marcus' kin are "not of the same blood or seed" (2.1), Epictetus' of the same seed from above; both can be read as placing kinship in what men have from God. The founder of the school was charged with the opposite view. Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its seventh book, reports that some critics of Zeno of Citium, the school's founder, among them the followers of Cassius the Sceptic, accused him of saying that all who are not good are enemies, foes, slaves and aliens to one another, parents to children, brothers to brothers and kin to kin, and of making, in his *Republic*, the good alone citizens, friends, kin and free.[478] Marcus calls the wrongdoer himself his kin (2.1). Cicero, in *On Duties*, likens men who seize the advantages of others to limbs that would think they could be strong by drawing their neighbours' health into themselves: the whole body would weaken and die, as the fellowship of men would be overturned;[479] and he would cut tyrants off from the common body of humanity, as limbs are amputated when they begin to lack blood and harm the rest of the body.[480] In Marcus the limb cuts itself off, and can grow back (8.34).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon, the Athenian soldier and writer, whose *Memorabilia* record conversations of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, gives him the image of 2.1, as the edition's note there observes. Finding two brothers he knew, Chaerephon and Chaerecrates, at odds, Socrates tells Chaerecrates that they are behaving as if the two hands, which god made to

[476] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 95.51–53.
[477] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.13.3–4.
[478] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.32–33.
[479] Cicero, *On Duties* 3.21–22.
[480] Cicero, *On Duties* 3.32.

help each other, were to turn to hindering each other, or the two feet, made by divine dispensation to work together, were to trip each other up; and brothers, he says, god made for greater benefit to each other than hands and feet and eyes and the other things he made in pairs for men, since hands cannot reach at once two things more than a fathom apart, while brothers who are friends act together for each other's benefit even when far apart.[481] Xenophon's verb for the feet, συνεργεῖν, is the verb of Marcus' noun at 2.1, συνεργία; but Xenophon's pair are brothers, and Marcus' kin are every rational being.

Translation in this edition

Συγγενής is "kin" (2.1, 3.4.4, 9.9.1, 9.22), "kinsman" (2.1, 3.11.3, 11.9) and "kinsmen" (1.17.1, 7.22, 8.31); συγγένεια is "kinship" (2.13, 12.26). Not every "kin" in the English renders them: "kin" is οἰκείοις at 5.31, "kinship" οἰκειότητα at 4.45, and "akin" renders οἰκείως (4.45), οἰκείων (10.36) and the comparative οἰκειότερον (11.18.5); "the kindred stock" is τὸ ὁμόφυλον (8.26, 12.30), and "a fellow tribesman" σύμφυλος (3.11.3). Ὁμογενής is "of one kind" at all eight of its occurrences, kept apart from συγγενής: at 9.9.1 all things that share in something common hasten "towards what is of one kind", πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές (*pros to homogenes*), and everything that shares in the common intelligent nature "towards what is kin", πρὸς τὸ συγγενές (*pros to syngenes*). Κοινωνία is "fellowship" at all its places, and εὐκοινωνησία "good fellowship" (11.20.2); κοινωνός is "partner" (3.11.3), "fellow" (5.6.2) and "fellows" (6.16.5, 10.36). Κοινωνικός is always "social", "more social" in the comparative (7.52) and "the social" with the article (7.55); the adverb κοινωνικῶς is "socially" (5.6.2, 6.23, 11.4), but "social" where the English recasts the phrase, "in a rational and social state" (6.14) and "the social action itself" (9.31). Ἀκοινώνητος is "unsocial", and "unsocially" at 3.5, where it goes with the verb. The edition keeps κοινωνικός apart from πολιτικός, "civic" (see Citizenship). Συνεργεῖν is "work together" (6.42 twice) and "work with" (6.14, 9.11, 9.40 twice); συνεργία is "working together" (2.1) and "joint working" (7.13); συνεργός is "fellow-workers" (6.42 twice), "working together" (6.43) and "working with" (7.19); συνεργητικός is "helpers" (6.42) and "co-operative" (9.42.4). The opposites at 2.1 are ἀντιπράσσειν, "work against", and ἀντιπρακτικόν, "a kind of

[481] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.3.1 and 2.3.18–19.

working against". Μέλος is "limb" (7.13, 7.19), kept apart from μέρος, "part", and its diminutive μελύδρια is "poor limbs" (7.68). Κλάδος is "branch" and ὁμοθαμνεῖν "grow on the same bush" (11.8).

ἀκοινώνητος

Attested: ἀκοινωνήτῳ (*akoinōnētōi*; 2.1), ἀκοινώνητον (*akoinōnēton*; 2.2, 8.34, 10.6.2, 12.23), ἀκοινώνητος (*akoinōnētos*; 3.5), ἀκοινώνητα (*akoinōnēta*; 11.18.5). Without fellowship, unsocial. The last of those Marcus expects to meet at dawn is "the unsocial" (2.1); the ruling centre is no longer to be jerked like a puppet "by unsocial impulse" (2.2); and he "who does something unsocial" makes himself like a hand cut off (8.34). Anger and flattery "are unsocial and lead to harm" (11.18.5), and the ending of life is not bad, "because not shameful either, if indeed it is both outside choice and not unsocial" (12.23). Lemma: ἀκοινώνητος.

εὐκοινωνησία

Attested: εὐκοινωνησίας (*eukoinōnēsias*; 11.20.2). Good fellowship. The ruling centre "has been made for holiness and piety no less than for justice. For these too are of the kind of good fellowship, or rather older than just actions" (11.20.2). Lemma: εὐκοινωνησία.

κλάδος

Attested: κλάδος (*klados*; 11.8 twice), κλάδου (*kladou*; 11.8), κλάδον (*kladon*; 11.8). A branch, a shoot. "A branch cut off from the adjacent branch cannot but be cut off from the whole plant too"; but "a branch is cut off by another", while a man separates himself, and "the branch that has sprouted together from the beginning and has remained breathing together is not like the one grafted in again after the cutting off" (11.8). Lemma: κλάδος.

κοινωνία

Attested: κοινωνίας (*koinōnias*; 3.11.3, 10.24, 11.8, 11.19), κοινωνία (*koinōnia*; 5.16, 12.26), κοινωνίαν (*koinōnian*; 5.16, 7.5, 11.8). Fellowship, partnership. Marcus treats the offender "according to the natural law of fellowship" (3.11.3); "the good of a rational living being is fellowship" (5.16); a man split off from one man "has fallen away from the whole fellowship", which Zeus established (11.8); and the kinship of

men is “a fellowship not of a little blood or a little seed, but of mind” (12.26; see Mind and reason). Lemma: κοινωνία.

κοινωνικός

Attested: κοινωνικοῦ (*koinōnikou*; 3.4.2, 5.6.2, 5.29, 8.2), κοινωνικαί (*koinōnikai*; 4.33, 5.1.3, 6.30.1, 11.37), κοινωνικῶς (*koinōnikōs*; 5.6.2, 6.14, 6.23, 9.31, 11.4), κοινωνικόν (*koinōnikon*; 5.6.2, 7.55, 7.72, 9.23, 11.21, 12.20, 12.30), κοινωνικός (*koinōnikos*; 5.30, 7.67), κοινωνικῆς (*koinōnikēs*; 6.7), κοινωνικήν (*koinōnikēn*; 6.7), κοινωνικώτερος (*koinōnikōteros*; 7.52), κοινωνική (*koinōnikē*; 7.64, 9.6), κοινωνικά (*koinōnika*; 8.7), κοινωνικάς (*koinōnikas*; 8.12). Made for fellowship, social. “The leading thing, then, in the constitution of man is the social” (7.55); “The mind of the whole is social” (5.30); there is “one fruit of life on earth, a holy disposition and social actions” (6.30.1); and the target to set before oneself is “social and civic” (11.21). Lemma: κοινωνικός.

κοινωνός

Attested: κοινωνοῦ (*koinōnou*; 3.11.3), κοινωνόν (*koinōnon*; 5.6.2), κοινωνοῖς (*koinōnois*; 6.16.5), κοινωνοί (*koinōnoi*; 10.36). A partner, one who shares. The offender is “a fellow tribesman, a kinsman and partner” (3.11.3); respect for his own understanding will make Marcus “in tune with your fellows” (6.16.5); and dying he is to reckon that “the very fellows, for whom I struggled so much, prayed, took thought, they themselves want me to go off” (10.36). At 6.16.5 κοινωνοῖς is the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; Leopold reports κοινωνικοῖς in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, and the word’s omission in A, the Vatican manuscript. Lemma: κοινωνός.

μέλος

Attested: μέλη (*melē*; 7.13, 7.19), μέλος (*melos*; 7.13). A limb of the body. “As the limbs of the body are in things unified, so are rational beings in things separate”; Marcus is to say, “I am a limb of the system made of rational beings”, for whoever says “part” does not yet love men from the heart (7.13). All bodies pass through the substance of the whole “working with it, as our limbs with one another” (7.19). Lemma: μέλος.

ὁμογενής

Attested: ὁμογενές (*homogenes*; 5.21, 9.9.1), ὁμογενεῖ (*homogenei*; 6.14), ὁμογενῆ (*homogenē*; 6.37, 10.6.1, 10.6.2), ὁμογενῶν (*homogenōn*; 7.9, 10.6.2). Of the same kind or stock, from ὁμός (*homos*), "same", and γένος, "birth, stock". The most excellent thing in a man is "what is of one kind with" the most excellent in the universe (5.21); the man who honours a rational soul "works with what is of one kind with him" (6.14); "All things that share in something common hasten towards what is of one kind" (9.9.1); and Marcus lays it down "that I stand in some affinity to the parts of one kind with me" (10.6.1). Of all that was and will be, "all things are of one kind and one form" (6.37); and there is one truth, "if indeed there is also one perfection for the living beings that are of one kind and share in the same reason" (7.9). Lemma: ὁμογενής.

ὁμοθαμνέω

Attested: ὁμοθαμνεῖν (*homothamnein*; 11.8). To grow on the same bush, from θάμνος (*thamnos*), "bush". The chapter of the branch ends, "Grow on the same bush, but do not hold the same principles" (11.8; see Principles and reminders). Lemma: ὁμοθαμνέω.

συγγένεια

Attested: συγγένειαν (*syngeneian*; 2.13), συγγένεια (*syngeneia*; 12.26). Kinship. What comes from men "deserves love because of kinship" (2.13); "how great is the kinship of a man with the whole human race, for it is a fellowship not of a little blood or a little seed, but of mind" (12.26; see Mind and reason). Lemma: συγγένεια.

συγγενής

Attested: συγγενεῖς (*syngeneis*; 1.17.1, 7.22, 8.31), συγγενής (*syngenēs*; 2.1), συγγενεῖ (*syngenei*; 2.1), συγγενές (*syngenes*; 3.4.4, 9.9.1, 9.22), συγγενοῦς (*syngenous*; 3.11.3), συγγενῆ (*syngenē*; 11.9). Of the same birth or stock; as a noun, a kinsman. Of family, among the gifts of the gods (1.17.1) and in the court of Augustus (8.31); of men as such, the wrongdoer "is kin to me, not of the same blood or seed, but sharing in mind and in a portion of the divine" (2.1), "everything rational is kin" (3.4.4), and Marcus is to reckon of another man's ruling centre "that it is kin" (9.22). Lemma: συγγενής.

συνεργέω

Attested: συνεργεῖ (*synergei*; 6.14, 6.42), συνεργοῦμεν (*synergoumen*; 6.42), συνεργοῦσιν (*synergousin*; 9.11), συνεργεῖν (*synergein*; 9.40 twice). To work together, to work with. “We all work together towards one outcome” (6.42); the man who honours a rational soul “works with what is of one kind with him” (6.14); the gods “even work with” men for health, wealth and fame (9.11), and “if they can work with men, they can work with them for these too” (9.40). Lemma: συνεργέω.

συνεργητικός

Attested: συνεργητικῶν (*synergētikōn*; 6.42), συνεργητικόν (*synergētikon*; 9.42.4). Apt to work with others, helpful. The governor of the whole will receive Marcus “as some part of the fellow-workers and helpers” (6.42); man, being by nature beneficent, has done what he was made for when he does “something co-operative in things indifferent” (9.42.4). Lemma: συνεργητικός.

συνεργία

Attested: συνεργίαν (*synergian*; 2.1, 7.13). Working together, joint work. “For we have come to be for working together, like feet, like hands” (2.1); rational beings are “made for one joint working” (7.13). Lemma: συνεργία.

συνεργός

Attested: συνεργούς (*synergous*; 6.42), συνεργῶν (*synergōn*; 6.42), συνεργά (*synerga*; 6.43, 7.19). Working together; as a noun, a fellow-worker. Heraclitus, as Marcus thinks, says “that even those asleep are workers and fellow-workers in what comes about in the universe” (6.42); of the stars Marcus asks, “Are they not different, but working together towards the same thing?” (6.43); and all bodies are “grown together with the whole and working with it” (7.19). Lemma: συνεργός.

See also

Beneficence; Citizenship; Fault and ignorance; Good, bad and indifference; Impression; Kindness and correction; Love and affection; Mind and reason; Principles and reminders; Ruling centre; Whole and part.

Love and affection

Love of men, of kin and of what happens · Meditations

φιλεῖν, philein, “love”, “be loved”, “the loving of”; *καταφιλεῖν, kataphilein*, “kiss”; *φιλοστοργία, philostorgia*, “affection”; *φιλόστοργος, philostorgos*, “affectionate”, “full of affection”; *φιλοστόργως, philostorgōs*, “affectionately”; *ἄστοργος, astorgos*, “lacking in affection”; *στοργή, storgē*, “affection”; *ἀγαπητικός, agapētikos*, “love”; *φιλητικός, philētikos*, “loving”; *φιλοίκειος, philoikeios*, “love of family”; *φιλαυτία, philautia*, “self-love”; *φιλανθρώπως, philanthrōpōs*, “with love for mankind”; *ἐρᾶν, erān*, “be in love”, “the beloved”; *συνερᾶν, synerān*, “be in love along with”; *ἔρως, erōs*, “love affairs”, “loves”; *ἐρωτικός, erōtikos*, “of love”; *ἐραστής, erastēs*, “lover”; *δύσφημος, dysphēmos*, “ill-omened”

At a Glance

The word. Φιλεῖν is to love, to hold dear. Φιλοστοργία, built on στοργή, the love of parents and children, is affection, and ἄστοργος is without it. Ἐρᾶν is to be in love, the word of passion.

In the *Meditations*. From Sextus Marcus learned to be “at once wholly free from passion and full of affection” (1.9.3). Marcus tells himself to love the people whose lot he shares, “but truly” (6.39), and to “love the human race” (7.31); the same verb has for its object what happens (7.57), which the universe is in love with making (10.21).

In this edition. Φιλεῖν is always “love”; φιλοστοργία and its family are always “affection” and its derivatives; ἐρᾶν is “be in love”, kept apart from φιλεῖν at 10.21.

A place to read. 10.21, where Marcus is in love along with the universe, and asks whether the everyday “This loves to happen” is said in this way too.

Meaning

Φιλεῖν (*philein*) is to treat as one’s own, φίλος (*philos*; see Friendship), and so to love, persons or things; καταφιλεῖν (*kataphilein*) is to kiss. With an infinitive it is the everyday Greek for what tends to happen, φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι (*philei ginesthai*), as the edition’s note at 10.21 says. Στοργή (*storgē*) is the love of parents and children; φιλοστοργία (*philostorgia*) is that tenderness, said also of a wife and of friends, and ἄστοργος (*astorgos*) is without it. Ἔρως (*erōs*)

and ἐρᾶν (*erān*) are love as desire. Marcus uses φιλεῖν in nineteen chapters, of men, of what happens, of oneself and of a craft.

Use in the book

Book I sets affection beside freedom from passion. Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew, taught Marcus "never to show so much as a sign of anger or of any other passion, but to be at once wholly free from passion and full of affection" (1.9.3). The two superlatives, ἀπαθέστατον (*apathestaton*) and φιλοστοργότατον (*philostorgotaton*), stand together, and can be read as saying that affection is not one of the passions. It is first the love of kin. Cinna Catulus, a Stoic teacher, taught him "to love one's children truly" (1.13); Severus, whom he calls his brother, had "love of family" (1.14.1); and he thanks the gods that his wife, Faustina, daughter of his adoptive father Antoninus Pius, is "so obedient, so affectionate, so artless" (1.17.8). From M. Cornelius Fronto, the Latin orator who taught him rhetoric, he learned "that on the whole these people we call patricians are somehow rather lacking in affection" (1.11); Fronto remarks in a letter, as the edition's note records, that Latin has no word for φιλοστοργία, because the thing itself is not found at Rome (see Fronto).[482] Affection is also a manner of acting: Marcus is to do what is in hand "with exact and unaffected dignity, affection, freedom and justness" (2.5; see Present action), and to teach the insolent man "affectionately and without sting in the soul" (11.18.4; see Anger).

The verb asks the same towards all men. Marcus is to love the people whose lot he shares, "but truly" (6.39; see Fate and allotment). "Truly", ἀληθινῶς (*alēthinōs*), is the word of Catulus' love of children (1.13), and the love of fellows can be read as measured by it. "Love the human race" (7.31; see Self-respect and shame). The man who calls himself a part, not a limb, of the system of rational beings does "not yet love men from the heart" (7.13; see Kinship and cooperation); "It is peculiar to man to love even those who stumble" (7.22; see Fault and ignorance); and the loving of neighbours is peculiar to the rational soul (11.1.2; see Self-respect and shame).

The same verb has a second object. It is peculiar to the good man "to love and welcome what happens to him and is

[482] The edition's note at 1.11.

spun for him" (3.16.2; see Fate and allotment), and Marcus is to "love only what happens to you and is spun for you" (7.57; see Fate and allotment). At 10.21 this love is found in nature itself: "'Earth is in love with rain, in love the august aether'; and the universe is in love with making whatever is going to come about. I say, then, to the universe: I am in love along with you. And is that too said in this way: 'This loves to happen'?" The verse is by Euripides, the Athenian tragic poet,[483] and its verb is ἐρᾶν; Marcus carries the poet's love from earth and aether to the universe, joins it, συνερῶ (*synerō*), and then asks whether the commonplace φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι, "it tends to happen", is not said in this sense too. Loving what happens can be read as loving, with the universe, what the universe loves.

Love of self is both a fault and a duty. Marcus will give himself leisure if he does each act as the last of his life, "free of … self-love" (2.5; see Present action); yet "you do not love yourself; for then you would surely love your nature too, and its will" (5.1.2; see Human work). He has often wondered "how each man loves himself more than all others, yet sets less store by his own opinion of himself than by that of others" (12.4; see Reputation and praise).

What is loved will die, and for the love of a child Marcus copies an exercise from Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded: "The one who kisses the child, said Epictetus, must say inwardly: 'Tomorrow perhaps you will die.'—Those are ill-omened words.—Nothing is ill-omened, he said, that signifies a work of nature; or else it is ill-omened too that the ears of corn are reaped" (11.34). The kiss is not withheld; the knowledge is added to it. The words of passion, ἔρως and ἐρᾶν, are rarer: Marcus thanks the gods that he was cured of passions of love (1.17.7; see Temperance and self-mastery), and lends ἐρᾶν, after a poet, to the universe. His own word is φιλεῖν, the same for men and for what happens, and of the love of men he asks that it be true.

Places to read

Every chapter in which φιλεῖν or καταφιλεῖν, φιλοστοργία, φιλόστοργος (*philostorgos*) or φιλοστόργως (*philostorgōs*), ἄστοργος, στοργή, ἀγαπητικός (*agapētikos*), φιλητικός (*philētikos*), φιλοίκειος (*philoikeios*), φιλαυτία

[483] Euripides, fr. 898 Nauck, as the edition's note at 10.21 identifies the verse.

(*philautia*), φιλανθρώπως (*philanthrōpōs*), ἐρᾶν or συνερᾶν (*synerān*), ἔρως, ἐρωτικός (*erōtikos*), ἐραστής (*erastēs*) or δύσφημος (*dysphēmos*) occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. Φίλος, "friend", and φιλία (*philia*), "friendship" (see Friendship), στέργειν (*stergein*), "cherish" (see Contentment and self-sufficiency), ἀσπάζεσθαι (*aspazesthai*), "welcome", and the compounds φιλάληθες (*philalēthes*), φιλοδίκαιον (*philodikaion*), φιλόπονος (*philoponos*), φιλόζωος (*philozōos*), φιλοικοδόμος (*philoikodomos*), φιλάργυρος (*philargyros*), φιλόδοξος (*philodoxos*) and φιλήδονος (*philēdonos*), rendered with "love" or "lover", and the other compounds of φιλ- (*phil-*), such as φιλοσοφία (*philosophia*), "philosophy", are left out.

1.9.3 Sextus taught Marcus never to show a sign of anger or of any other passion, but to be at once wholly free from passion and full of affection.

1.11 From Fronto Marcus learned that the men called patricians are on the whole somehow rather lacking in affection.

1.13 From Catulus Marcus learned to love his children truly.

1.14.1 From Severus Marcus learned love of family, love of truth and love of justice.

1.14.2 Severus trusted that he was loved by his friends.

1.16.2 Antoninus put a stop to the love affairs with adolescents.

1.17.4 Marcus thanks the gods for a brother who roused him to take care of himself and gladdened him with honour and affection.

1.17.7 Marcus thanks the gods that, when he fell into passions of love, he was cured of them.

1.17.8 Marcus thanks the gods that his wife is so obedient, so affectionate, so artless.

2.5 Marcus is to do what is in hand with dignity, affection, freedom and justness; he will give himself leisure if he does each act as the last of his life, without, among other things, self-love.

3.16.2 It is peculiar to the good man to love and welcome what happens to him and is spun for him.

4.1 That which rules within, when it is in a state according to nature, loves no fixed material.

4.31 Marcus is to love the little craft he has learned and rest in it.

4.32.1 In the age of the emperor Vespasian, as now, people married, raised children, fell ill, died, were in love and craved consulships, and that life is no longer anywhere.

4.36 The nature of the whole loves nothing so much as to change the things that are and to make new things like them.

5.1.2 Marcus does not love himself, for then he would love his nature too, and its will.

5.1.3 Those who love their own crafts wear themselves out over their works, and Marcus asks whether he honours his own nature less than they their crafts.

5.9 When knocked back, Marcus is to come back again and love what he returns to.

6.15 Marcus asks what one would value among the things running past in the river of change: it is as if one began to love a sparrow that has already flown out of sight.

6.30.1 Marcus is to keep himself, among other things, kindly and affectionate.

6.39 Marcus is to fit himself to the things that have fallen to his lot, and to love the people whose lot he shares, but truly.

7.13 Whoever says that he is a part, not a limb, of the system of rational beings does not yet love men from the heart.

7.22 It is peculiar to man to love even those who stumble, and this comes about if it occurs to him that they are kin, that they do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly, that both he and they will soon be dead, and above all that the man has not harmed him.

7.31 Marcus is to love the human race and follow God.

7.57 Marcus is to love only what happens to him and is spun for him.

9.9.2 Among the irrational animals there were found at once something like loves.

9.34 Marcus is to look at what men take seriously and on account of what they love and honour, and believe that he sees their little souls naked.

10.1 Marcus asks his soul whether it will ever taste the loving and cherishing disposition.

10.11 The man who has put off the body is content with two things, acting justly in what is now being done and loving what is now allotted to him.

10.21 In a verse of Euripides earth is in love with rain; the universe is in love with making whatever is going to come about; Marcus is in love along with it, and asks whether "this loves to happen" is said in that way.

11.1.2 The loving of neighbours, truth and self-respect are peculiar to the rational soul.

11.15 Simplicity shows in the eyes, as the beloved at once recognizes everything in the look of the lovers.

11.18.4 The insolent man is to be taught neither ironically nor reproachfully, but affectionately and without sting in the soul.

11.34 Epictetus said that whoever kisses the child must say inwardly that tomorrow perhaps it will die, and, to the objection that the words are ill-omened, that nothing that signifies a work of nature is ill-omened.

12.1.1 All that Marcus prays to reach by a roundabout way he can have now, if he leaves the past behind, entrusts the future to providence and directs the present towards holiness, so that he loves what is allotted, and towards justice.

12.4 Marcus wonders how each man loves himself more than all others, yet sets less store by his own opinion of himself than by that of others.

12.5 Marcus asks how the gods, who ordered all things honourably and with love for mankind, overlooked that some very kind men, once dead, should be quenched for ever.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports that the Stoics held parents and brothers to be revered in the second place after the gods, and affection for children, φιλοστοργία, to be natural to the

serious and not to be found in the base.[484] One discourse of Epictetus bears the title "On affection". A man in office told him that he fared wretchedly with his wife and children: when his little daughter lately fell ill and seemed in danger, he could not endure so much as being with her, but ran off, and stayed away until word came that she was well; and this, he said, was natural, and what all fathers, or most, go through.[485] Epictetus does not dispute that it happens, only that it is right. Affection, the man agrees, is natural and honourable, and so is good reasoning, and the two do not conflict; to leave a sick child and go away is plainly not reasonable, and it remains to ask whether it is affectionate. The child's mother loves it, and its nurse and its tutor: should all of them have gone off too, leaving the child abandoned and without help because those around it loved it so much, or to die among people who had no love or care for it? Would he, when ill, wish his own to love him so that he was left alone? Or would he not rather pray, if it were possible, to be loved like that by his enemies, so as to be left alone by them? What he did, then, was not affectionate at all; what moved him, Epictetus concludes, was an opinion, for opinions, not death or exile or pain, are the cause of our acting or not acting.[486] Sextus' freedom from passion joined to affection (1.9.3) can be read as the agreement of affection and reason that Epictetus asks for. In another, which bears the title "That one must not be attached to what is not in our power", Epictetus asks a student who pines for the brother, country and friends he has left what kind of affection that is: if it is a good, it is the cause of nothing bad. Whenever a man kisses his child, his brother or his friend, he is never to let the impression have its way entirely, nor his outpouring run as far as it wants, but to pull it back and check it, as the men posted behind those who celebrate a triumph remind them that they are men;[487] the kiss with "Tomorrow you will die", which Marcus gives at 11.34 with "perhaps", follows in the same discourse (3.24.88; see Change).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, records near the start of his account of friendship in the

[484] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.120.
[485] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.11 (title) and 1.11.1–6.
[486] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.11.17–33.
[487] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.24 (title) and 3.24.78–85.

Nicomachean Ethics a dispute: some make friendship a kind of likeness, others say that like men are rivals, "potters" to one another. Some, he says, inquire into this at a higher level and more as students of nature: Euripides, who says that the dried earth is in love with rain, and the august heaven, once full of rain, is in love with falling to the earth; Heraclitus, the philosopher of Ephesus of about 500 BC, who says that what opposes is of benefit and all things come about through strife; and others, Empedocles of Acragas, the philosopher of the fifth century BC, among them, who say that like seeks its like. These questions of nature Aristotle sets aside as not belonging to his inquiry, and keeps to those that are human and bear on characters and passions.[488] Marcus can be read as taking up what Aristotle sets aside, and his love of what happens as that cosmic love made his own. In the ninth book Aristotle asks whether one should love oneself most, or another. Those who use "self-lover", φίλαυτος (*philautos*), as a reproach, he says, mean those who take for themselves more than their share of money, honours and the pleasures of the body; but a man who was always eager to be, before all others, the one doing what is just or temperate, no one would call a self-lover or blame, and yet he, if anyone, would seem a lover of self, for he keeps the finest things for himself, indulges the ruling part of himself and does whatever it bids. So the good man ought to love himself, since by doing fine things he will both profit himself and benefit others, and the bad man ought not.[489] Marcus' "self-love" (2.5) can be read as the first kind, and his "you do not love yourself; for then you would surely love your nature too" (5.1.2) can be read as asking for the second.

Translation in this edition

Φιλεῖν is "love" at every place, in the passive "be loved" (1.14.2) and with the article "the loving of" (11.1.2); at 10.21, where Marcus takes the idiom φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι at its word, it is "This loves to happen". Its compound καταφιλεῖν is "kisses" (11.34). Ἐρᾶν is "be in love" (4.32.1; 10.21 three times), kept apart from φιλεῖν so that 10.21 keeps both words, and its participle is "the beloved" (11.15); συνερᾶν is "I am in love along with" (10.21), ἐραστής "the lovers" (11.15), ἔρως "love affairs" (1.16.2) and "loves" (9.9.2), and ἐρωτικὰ πάθη

[488] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.1, 1155a32–b10.

[489] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.8, 1168a28–1169a18.

(*erōtika pathē*) “passions of love” (1.17.7). Φιλοστοργία and its family are always “affection”: φιλοστοργία “affection” (2.5), φιλόστοργος “affectionate” (1.17.8, 6.30.1) and in the superlative “full of affection” (1.9.3), φιλοστόργως “affectionately” (11.18.4), and ἄστοργος, in the comparative, “lacking in affection” (1.11); στοργή too is “affection” (1.17.4). Στέργειν is “cherish” and στερκτικός (*sterktikos*) “cherishing” (see Contentment and self-sufficiency). Ἀγαπᾶν (*agapan*) does not occur; its adjective, in τὸ … ἀγαπητικόν (*to … agapētikon*), is rendered with the verb, “to love” (1.13). Φιλητικός is “loving” (10.1), φιλοίκειον “love of family” (1.14.1), φιλαυτία “self-love” (2.5), φιλανθρώπως “with love for mankind” (12.5), and δύσφημος “ill-omened” (11.34). The compounds left out are rendered with “love” and “lover”: φιλάληθες “love of truth” (1.14.1), φιλοδίκαιον “love of justice” (1.14.1; see Justice), φιλόπονος “love of work” (1.16.1) and “hard-working” (6.30.4, 6.47; see Human work), φιλόζωος “in love with life” (1.16.5), φιλοικοδόμος “love of building” (1.16.8), φιλάργυρος “the lover of money” (5.1.3), and φιλόδοξος “the lover of fame” (6.51; see Reputation and praise) and φιλήδονος “the lover of pleasure” (6.51; see Pain and pleasure); “the lover of empty glory” (5.1.3) renders κενόδοξος (*kenodoxos*). Ἀσπάζεσθαι, which stands beside φιλεῖν at 3.16.2, is always “welcome”. “Loveliness” (3.2.3) renders τὸ ἐπαφρόδιτον (*to epaphroditon*).

ἀγαπητικός

Attested: ἀγαπητικόν (*agapētikon*; 1.13). Disposed to love; with the article, loving. From Catulus: “and to love one’s children truly” (1.13). Lemma: ἀγαπητικός.

ἄστοργος

Attested: ἀστοργότεροι (*astorgoteroi*; 1.11). Without natural affection. From Fronto: “on the whole these people we call patricians are somehow rather lacking in affection” (1.11). Lemma: ἄστοργος.

δύσφημος

Attested: δύσφημα (*dysphēma*; 11.34), δύσφημον (*dysphēmon*; 11.34 twice). Of ill omen, words better not spoken. The objection to Epictetus’ exercise, “Those are ill-omened words”, and his answer, “Nothing is ill-omened, he said, that signifies a work of nature; or else it is ill-omened

too that the ears of corn are reaped" (11.34). Lemma: δύσφημος.

ἐραστής

Attested: ἐραστῶν (*erastōn*; 11.15). A lover. Simplicity shows in the eyes, "as the beloved at once recognizes everything in the look of the lovers" (11.15; see Simplicity and sincerity). Lemma: ἐραστής.

ἐράω

Attested: ἐρῶντας (*erōntas*; 4.32.1), ἐρᾷ (*erāi*; 10.21 three times), ἐρώμενος (*erōmenos*; 11.15). To be in love; the passive participle, the beloved. Among the doings of the age of Vespasian, people "being in love" (4.32.1); "'Earth is in love with rain, in love the august aether'; and the universe is in love with making whatever is going to come about" (10.21), the first two in the verse of Euripides; "as the beloved at once recognizes everything in the look of the lovers" (11.15). Lemma: ἐράω.

ἔρως

Attested: ἔρωτας (*erōtas*; 1.16.2), ἔρωτες (*erōtes*; 9.9.2). Love, desire; in the plural, loves, love affairs. Of Antoninus, "putting a stop to the love affairs with adolescents" (1.16.2), where, as the edition's note says, the Greek does not say whose; among the irrational animals, "something like loves" (9.9.2; see Kinship and cooperation). Lemma: ἔρως.

ἐρωτικός

Attested: ἐρωτικοῖς (*erōtikois*; 1.17.7). Of love. Among the gifts of the gods, "that even later, when I fell into passions of love, I was cured of them" (1.17.7; see Temperance and self-mastery). Lemma: ἐρωτικός.

καταφιλέω

Attested: καταφιλοῦντα (*kataphilounta*; 11.34). To kiss. "The one who kisses the child, said Epictetus, must say inwardly: 'Tomorrow perhaps you will die'" (11.34). Lemma: καταφιλέω.

στοργή

Attested: στοργῇ (*storgēi*; 1.17.4). Natural affection, the love of kin. His brother was "at the same time gladdening me with honour and affection" (1.17.4). Lemma: στοργή.

συνεράω

Attested: συνερῶ (*synerō*; 10.21). To be in love together with. “I say, then, to the universe: I am in love along with you” (10.21). A, the Vatican manuscript, has σοὶ συνήρων (*soi synērōn*), without ὅτι (*hoti*), “that”, and with the imperfect, as the apparatus of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, reports. Lemma: συνεράω.

φιλάνθρωπος

Attested: φιλανθρώπως (*philanthrōpōs*; 12.5). Loving mankind; the adverb, with love for mankind. “How ever did the gods, who ordered all things honourably and with love for mankind, overlook this one thing” (12.5; see Gods). Lemma: φιλάνθρωπος.

φιλαυτία

Attested: φιλαυτίας (*philautias*; 2.5). Self-love. Marcus will give himself leisure if he does each act as the last of his life, “free of all aimlessness, of passionate turning away from the dictate of reason, of pretence, of self-love, and of discontent with what has been apportioned to you” (2.5). Lemma: φιλαυτία.

φιλέω

Attested: φιλεῖσθαι (*phileisthai*; 1.14.2), φιλεῖν (*philein*; 3.16.2, 5.9, 6.15, 7.22, 7.57, 11.1.2), φιλεῖ (*philei*; 4.1, 4.36, 10.11, 10.21, 12.4), φίλει (*philei*; 4.31, 6.39), φιλεῖς (*phileis*; 5.1.2, 7.13), ἐφίλεις (*ephileis*; 5.1.2), φιλοῦντες (*philountes*; 5.1.3), φίλησον (*philēson*; 7.31), φιλοῦσι (*philousi*; 9.34), φιλῇς (*philēis*; 12.1.1). To hold dear, to love; with an infinitive, to be wont. Of men: “love these, but truly” (6.39); “Love the human race” (7.31); “to love even those who stumble” (7.22). Of what happens: “Love only what happens to you and is spun for you” (7.57); “so that you love what is allotted” (12.1.1). Of oneself: “For you do not love yourself” (5.1.2); “how each man loves himself more than all others” (12.4). Of nature: “the nature of the whole loves nothing so much as to change the things that are” (4.36); and the idiom, “This loves to happen” (10.21). At 10.11 “loves” is φιλεῖ, the correction of John Jackson, whose English translation appeared at Oxford in 1906, which Leopold prints; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has the infinitive, and A the imperative. Lemma: φιλέω.

φιλητικός

Attested: φιλητικῆς (*philētikēs*; 10.1). Disposed to love. “Will you ever, then, taste the loving and cherishing disposition?” (10.1). Lemma: φιλητικός.

φιλοίκειος

Attested: φιλοίκειον (*philoikeion*; 1.14.1). Loving one’s own people; with the article, love of family. “From my brother Severus: love of family, love of truth, love of justice” (1.14.1). Lemma: φιλοίκειος.

φιλοστοργία

Attested: φιλοστοργίας (*philostorgias*; 2.5). Affection, the tenderness of kin. Marcus is to do what is in hand “with exact and unaffected dignity, affection, freedom and justness” (2.5). Lemma: φιλοστοργία.

φιλόστοργος

Attested: φιλοστοργότατον (*philostorgotaton*; 1.9.3), φιλόστοργον (*philostorgon*; 1.17.8, 6.30.1), φιλοστόργως (*philostorgōs*; 11.18.4). Affectionate; the adverb, affectionately. “At once wholly free from passion and full of affection” (1.9.3); “so obedient, so affectionate, so artless” (1.17.8); “kindly, affectionate, vigorous for the works that are seemly” (6.30.1); “neither ironically nor reproachfully, but affectionately and without sting in the soul” (11.18.4). Lemma: φιλόστοργος.

See also

Anger; Change; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Fate and allotment; Fault and ignorance; Friendship; Fronto; Gods; Human work; Justice; Kinship and cooperation; Pain and pleasure; Present action; Reputation and praise; Self-respect and shame; Simplicity and sincerity; Temperance and self-mastery.

Parents and education

The household that reared him and the schooling of a man · Meditations

μήτηρ, mētēr, “mother”; *πατήρ, patēr*, “father”; *πάππος, pappos*, “grandfather”, “grandfathers”; *πρόπαππος, propappos*, “great-grandfather”; *γονεύς, goneus*, “parents”; *γεννᾶν, gennan*, “fathered”, “begot”, “generate”; *τίκτειν,*

tiktein, “mother”, “bore”; *τοκεύς, tokeus*, “parents”; *τροφεύς, tropheus*, “tutor”, “tutors”; *τροφός, trophos*, “nurse”; *διδάσκαλος, didaskalos*, “teacher”, “teachers”; *διδασκαλία, didaskalia*, “instructions”, “the ways of teaching”; *διατριβή, diatribē*, “schools”, “delay”, “stay”; *παιδεύειν, paideuein*, “educated”; *ἀπαίδευτος, apaideutos*, “uneducated”; *παιδαγωγός, paidagōgos*, “schoolmaster”; *παιδαγωγεῖν, paidagōgein*, “schooled”; *παιδαγωγία, paidagōgia*, “the ways of rearing”; *παιδαγωγικός, paidagōgikos*, “a schoolmaster’s”; *παῖς, pais*, “boy”, “boys”, “children”, “sons”; *παιδίον, paidion*, “child”, “children”; *τέκνον, teknon*, “child”, “children”; *τεκνίον, teknion*, “little child”, “little children”; *παιδικός, paidikos*, “childhood”; *παιδαριώδης, paidariōdēs*, “childish”; *παιδοτροφεῖν, paidotrophein*, “raising children”; *ὀρτυγοτροφεῖν, ortygotrophein*, “keep quails”; *καλοήθης, kaloēthēs*, “good character”

At a Glance

The word. Μήτηρ, πατήρ and πάππος are mother, father and grandfather; τροφεύς, from τρέφειν (*trephein*), “to rear”, is the man who brings a child up, and διδάσκαλος a teacher. Παιδεύειν, from παῖς, “child”, is to bring up and educate.

In the *Meditations*. Book I opens in the household: a grandfather, a father, a mother, a great-grandfather who kept Marcus from “the public schools”, and a tutor (1.1–1.5); near its end the gods’ list names “suitable tutors for my children” (1.17.8). Later the household is matter and change (5.4, 9.21), and the educated man is one who lets nature take back what she gave (10.14).

In this edition. Μήτηρ is “mother”, πατήρ “father”, πάππος “grandfather” and πρόπαππος “great-grandfather”; γονεῖς (*goneis*) are “parents”; τροφεύς is “tutor” and τροφός “nurse”; διδάσκαλος is “teacher”; πεπαιδευμένος (*pepaideumenos*) is “educated”, ἀπαίδευτος “uneducated” and παιδαγωγός “schoolmaster”.

A place to read. 1.1–1.5, where Marcus sets down what he took from his grandfather, his father, his mother, his great-grandfather and his tutor.

Meaning

Μήτηρ (*mētēr*), πατήρ (*patēr*) and πάππος (*pappos*) are the common words for mother, father and grandfather, πρόπαππος (*propappos*) the great-grandfather, and γονεῖς,

“those who begot”, parents. Τροφεύς (*tropheus*), from τρέφειν, “to rear, to feed”, is one who rears a child, and τροφός (*trophos*) a nurse. Διδάσκαλος (*didaskalos*) is a teacher, from διδάσκειν (*didaskein*), “to teach” (see Kindness and correction). Παιδεύειν (*paideuein*) is to bring up a child, παῖς (*pais*), and so to educate; παιδεία (*paideia*), “education”, does not occur in the *Meditations*, and the verb only once, in πεπαιδευμένος, “educated” (10.14). The παιδαγωγός (*paidagōgos*) was the slave who took a boy to school and watched over him, as the edition’s note at 10.36 says. Τέκνον (*teknon*), from τίκτειν (*tiktein*), “to bear”, is one’s child, and παιδίον (*paidion*) and τεκνίον (*teknion*) are the little child.

Use in the book

Book I begins in the household, and its first members give qualities: from his grandfather Verus, in whose house he was brought up, “good character and freedom from anger” (1.1; see Anger); from the father who died when he was a small child, “self-respect and manliness” (1.2; see Self-respect and shame); from his mother, Domitia Lucilla (see Domitia Lucilla), “piety and generosity” (1.3; see Beneficence), and “frugality of life, far removed from the habits of the rich” (1.3). The great-grandfather’s gift was a decision: “not to have gone to the public schools, and to have had good teachers at home, and to have learned that on such things one must spend freely” (1.4). The two gifts can be read together: a house frugal in its living spent freely on teachers. The tutor gave a boy’s discipline: “not to have become a Green or a Blue, or a Small-shield or a Long-shield man”, a partisan of a racing colour or of a kind of gladiator, as the edition’s note explains, and “to be slow to give slander a hearing” (1.5; see Human work).

The gods’ list returns to the household. It thanks them for “good grandfathers, good parents” and “good teachers” (1.17.1; see Gratitude), and “that my mother, who was to die young, nevertheless made her home with me in her last years” (1.17.7); and, for the household Marcus heads himself, “that my children were not dull-witted, nor deformed in body” (1.17.4) and “that I had a good supply of suitable tutors for my children” (1.17.8). The boy whose great-grandfather found him good teachers has become the father who must find them, and Cinna Catulus, a Stoic teacher, had taught

him “to love one’s children truly” (1.13; see Love and affection).

Later the household returns in three forms. It is an account: “How have you behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children, teachers, tutors, friends, kin, household slaves” (5.31), measured by a line of Homer’s *Odyssey*, “doing no one any lawless deed, nor speaking ⟨one⟩”. It is matter: Marcus will fall onto the earth “from which my father gathered the little seed, and my mother the little blood, and my nurse the little milk” (5.4). And it is a series of deaths: “Pass on now to the life under the grandfather, then that under the mother, then that under the father; and, finding many other corruptions and changes and cessations, question yourself: Is it anything terrible?” (9.21). The three are probably his grandfather, his mother and Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, as the edition’s note says.

His own children are given back in the same way. “And little leaves too are your little children” (10.34), in a reminder drawn from Homer’s leaves that the wind sheds; the understanding that says “Let the little children be preserved” is “an eye seeking green things, or teeth soft things” (10.35); and where another prays “How may I not lose the little child?”, Marcus is to pray “How may I not fear to lose?” (9.40; see Prayer).

Education, in these books, is a man’s own work. One must not act and speak “⟨like⟩ children of parents, that is, merely as we have received it” (4.46), a saying of Heraclitus of Ephesus, the philosopher of about 500 BC. In the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, “children of parents” is the correction of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*, and “like” a supplement of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century; the manuscripts also speak of parents and of what “we have received”. Philosophy is not to be returned to “as to a schoolmaster” (5.9; see Philosophy). The educated man is given one sentence: “To nature, who gives all things and takes them back, the educated and self-respecting man says: Give what you want; take back what you want” (10.14). Book I records an education given by others, in a household that chose his teachers; the notebook can be read as asking for one that no tutor gives, in which a man holds what he received, parents, teachers and children among it, as nature’s to give and to take back.

Places to read

Every chapter in which μήτηρ, πατήρ, πάππος, πρόπαππος, γονεύς, τροφεύς, τροφός, διδάσκαλος, διδασκαλία, παιδεύειν, ἀπαίδευτος, ὀρτυγοτροφεῖν or a word of the family of παιδαγωγός occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the places where γεννᾶν, τίκτειν or τοκεύς names a man's parents (1.2, 1.17.7, 4.46, 5.13, 10.7.3) and where παῖς, τέκνον, τεκνίον or παιδίον names a man's own child or Marcus as a boy. The other places of these words, among them those where the children are not a man's own (2.12, 3.2.3, 5.11, 5.33, 6.57, 9.24, 11.18.4, 11.23), the verse of Euripides at 7.41 and 11.6.1, the places of παιδαριώδης (*paidariōdēs*; 4.28) and παιδοτροφεῖν (*paidotrophein*; 4.32.1), and διατριβή (*diatribē*) as "the delay" (5.10.2), are given in the sub-entries; πάτριος (*patrios*), "ancestral", πατρίς (*patris*), "fatherland", and μήτρα (*mētra*), "womb", are left out.

1.1 From his grandfather Verus Marcus has good character and freedom from anger.

1.2 From the repute and memory of the man who fathered him Marcus has self-respect and manliness.

1.3 From his mother Marcus has piety and generosity, keeping not only from doing ill but even from the conception of it, and frugality far removed from the habits of the rich.

1.4 From his great-grandfather Marcus has it that he did not go to the public schools but had good teachers at home, and learned that on such things one must spend freely.

1.5 From his tutor Marcus learned not to take sides with the colours of the races or the kinds of gladiator, to bear hardship, to work with his own hands and to be slow to hear slander.

1.6 From Diognetus, his painting master, Marcus learned not to keep quails, and wrote dialogues as a boy.

1.7.2 Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, taught Marcus to write letters artlessly, like the one Rusticus wrote to Marcus' mother from Sinuessa.

1.8.1 Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic, taught Marcus to be always the same, in sharp pangs, in the loss of a child and in long illnesses.

1.13 Catulus taught Marcus to speak of his teachers with heartfelt good words and to love his children truly.

1.16.1 From his father, Antoninus Pius, Marcus has gentleness and holding unshaken to decisions reached after thorough examination.

1.17.1 From the gods Marcus has good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister and good teachers.

1.17.2 Among the gods' gifts, Marcus was not brought up any longer with his grandfather's concubine.

1.17.3 Marcus was placed under a ruler and father who was to take all vanity out of him.

1.17.4 Marcus' children were not dull-witted nor deformed in body.

1.17.5 Marcus was quick to raise his tutors to the rank they seemed to crave.

1.17.6 Marcus' falling short of the life according to nature comes from not keeping the reminders of the gods, and all but their instructions.

1.17.7 His mother, who was to die young, made her home with Marcus in her last years.

1.17.8 Marcus had a good supply of suitable tutors for his children.

4.46 Marcus is to remember the saying of Heraclitus that one must not act and speak merely as one has received it from one's parents.

5.4 Marcus will fall onto the earth from which his father gathered the little seed, his mother the little blood and his nurse the little milk.

5.9 Marcus is not to return to philosophy as to a schoolmaster, but as the sore-eyed to the sponge and the egg.

5.13 By the change that will post every part of him elsewhere Marcus came to subsist, and so did those who begot him.

5.31 Marcus asks how he has behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children, teachers, tutors, friends, kin and household slaves.

6.12 If Marcus had a stepmother and a mother at the same time, he would serve the one and keep returning to the mother: so are the court and philosophy to him.

6.16.3 Every craft aims at fitting what it makes for its work; Marcus asks towards what the ways of rearing and the ways of teaching hurry.

8.49 Marcus is to say to himself no more than the leading impressions report: that the child is ill, not that it is in danger.

9.21 Marcus is to pass on to the life under the grandfather, then under the mother, then under the father, and to ask of each change whether it is anything terrible.

9.29 Alexander, king of Macedon, his father Philip and Demetrius of Phalerum will see to it, if they saw what the common nature wanted and schooled themselves.

9.40 Where another prays not to lose the little child, Marcus is to pray not to fear losing it.

9.42.3 Marcus asks what strange thing has happened if the uneducated man does what belongs to the uneducated.

10.7.3 What changes in the solid and the breath-like is what they took in yesterday from food and air, not what the mother bore.

10.14 The educated and self-respecting man says to nature, who gives all things and takes them back, "Give what you want; take back what you want".

10.34 Marcus' little children are little leaves, as are those who acclaim him and those who will succeed to his fame.

10.35 The understanding that says "Let the little children be preserved" is an eye seeking green things.

10.36 Marcus asks whether, at the death even of a serious and wise man, there will not be someone saying, "Shall we ever breathe again, free of this schoolmaster?"

11.6.2 After tragedy the Old Comedy was brought on with a schoolmaster's frankness.

11.33 In words of Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, whoever seeks the child when it is no longer given is like the madman who seeks a fig in winter.

11.34 Epictetus said that the one who kisses the child must say inwardly, "Tomorrow perhaps you will die".

12.4 If a god or a sensible teacher bade a man think nothing within himself that he would not at once bring out, he would not endure it for one day.

12.26 When Marcus is aggrieved, he has forgotten, among other things, that nothing is anyone's own, but even the little child has come from there.

Other ancient sources

The line that measures Marcus' conduct at 5.31 is spoken by Penelope, the wife of Odysseus, in the fourth book of the *Odyssey*, as the edition's note says, and its setting is a household. Taking the herald Medon for the suitors' messenger, she turns on the young men who are eating up her son's estate: they never heard from their fathers, when they were children, what sort of man Odysseus was among their parents, one who did no one any lawless deed and spoke no lawless word among the people, though it is the way of godlike kings to hate one man and love another; he never did any man wrong at all.[490] The test Marcus puts to himself can be read as a king's example that fathers should hand on to their sons, and that the suitors never heard.

The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, fills in the schooling that Book I leaves bare. Marcus was brought up where he was born and in the house of his grandfather Verus near the Lateran, and after his father's death was adopted and reared by that grandfather (see Annius Verus); as a child he bore the name of Catilius Severus, his great-grandfather on his mother's side, as the edition's note at 1.4 records.[491] Once past the years cared for by nurses he was handed over to great teachers: for his first letters a schoolmaster and a comic actor, and a musician who also taught geometry, all of whom he honoured greatly as the founders of his studies; then grammarians, Greek and

[490] Homer, *Odyssey* 4.677–693.

[491] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 1.7–10.

Latin, Alexander of Cotiaeum among the Greeks (see Alexander the grammarian), "of Cotiaeum" being the reading as modern editors print it, where the manuscript has *cotidianis*, "daily";[492] and orators: among the Greeks Herodes Atticus, the Athenian sophist and consul, Marcus' teacher of Greek oratory, and in Latin Fronto (see Fronto). Of these he paid Fronto great honour, seeking a statue for him in the senate, and he raised Proculus, one of his Latin grammarians, as far as a proconsulship, bearing the costs himself,[493] which can be read beside his tutors raised to rank at 1.17.5 (see Gratitude). The same life adds that he also went regularly to the declaimers' public schools.[494] Book I says only that he did not go to "the public schools" (1.4); the two can be read as different stages, the boy's first teachers at home and the declaimers' schools of his later study of rhetoric.

Translation in this edition

Μήτηρ is "mother" at all its places (1.3, 1.7.2, 5.4, 6.12 twice, 9.21, 10.7.3), and μητρυιά (*mētryia*) "stepmother" (6.12; see Court and office); ἡ τεκοῦσα (*hē tekousa*) is "my mother" (1.17.7), and ἔτεκεν (*eteken*) "bore" (10.7.3). Πατήρ is "father" at all four places: at 1.16.1 and 1.17.3 the father is Antoninus, at 5.4 the man who begot him, whom 1.2 calls ὁ γεννήσας (*ho gennēsas*), "the man who fathered me", and at 9.21 probably Antoninus, as the edition's note says. Γεννᾶν is otherwise "begot" (4.14, 5.13, 12.1.2) and "generate" (10.1, 10.6.1, 11.16), and πατρονομεῖσθαι (*patronomeisthai*) "governed by its father" (1.9.1; see Exemplary lives). Πάππος is "grandfather", "grandfathers" in the plural (1.17.1), and πρόπαππος "great-grandfather" (1.4). Γονεῖς are "parents" (1.17.1, 5.31), and so are τοκεῖς (*tokeis*) in "children of parents" (4.46), where Leopold adopts Rendall's τοκεώνων (*tokeōnōn*) for the manuscripts' τοκέων ὧν (*tokeōn hōn*), and "like" is Coraes' supplement. Τροφεύς is "tutor" at all four places (1.5, 1.17.5, 1.17.8, 5.31) and τροφός "nurse" (5.4). Διδάσκαλος is "teacher" (1.4, 1.13, 1.17.1, 5.31, 12.4); διδάσκειν, "teach", has its sub-entry under Kindness and correction. Διδασκαλία is "instructions" (1.17.6) and, in the plural, "the ways of teaching" (6.16.3),

[492] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 2.3, in David Magie's Loeb text, whose apparatus gives *cotidianis* as the manuscript's reading.

[493] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 2.1–5.

[494] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 3.8.

beside παιδαγωγίαι, “the ways of rearing”. Παιδαγωγός is “schoolmaster” at both places (5.9, 10.36), παιδαγωγικός “a schoolmaster’s” (11.6.2), and παιδαγωγεῖν ἑαυτούς (*paidagōgein heautous*) “schooled themselves” (9.29). Πεπαιδευμένος is “educated” (10.14) and ἀπαίδευτος “uneducated” (9.42.3). Τέκνον is “child” or “children” (1.8.1, 1.13, 5.31), and “child” in the address of 11.18.4; παιδίον is “child”, “children”, “child’s” (5.11) and “children’s” (9.24, 11.23); τεκνίον is “the little child” (9.40, 12.26) and τεκνία “little children” (10.34, 10.35). Παῖς is “boy” in “as a boy” (1.6), “boys” (3.2.3), “children” (4.46) and, in the dual, “sons” in “my two sons” (7.41, 11.6.1). Διατριβαί are “schools” in “the public schools” (1.4); διατριβή is “the delay” (5.10.2) and “stay” (10.36). The four Latin names of 1.5, Πρασιανός (*Prasianos*), Βενετιανός (*Benetianos*), Παλμουλάριος (*Palmoularios*) and Σκουτάριος (*Skoutarios*), are given their Roman sense, “a Green or a Blue, or a Small-shield or a Long-shield man”, with a note.

ἀπαίδευτος

Attested: ἀπαίδευτος (*apaideutos*; 9.42.3), ἀπαιδεύτου (*apaideutou*; 9.42.3). Without education. “And what new or strange thing has happened if the uneducated man does what belongs to the uneducated?” (9.42.3), where “new” is the correction καινόν (*kainon*) of A. J. Kronenberg, whose notes on Marcus appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts’ κακόν (*kakon*), “bad”. Lemma: ἀπαίδευτος.

γεννάω

Attested: γεννήσαντος (*gennēsantos*; 1.2, 12.1.2), γεννήσαντι (*gennēsanti*; 4.14), γεννήσαντες (*gennēsantes*; 5.13), γεννῶντος (*gennōntos*; 10.1), γεννᾶν (*gennan*; 10.6.1), γεννῶντες (*gennōntes*; 11.16). To beget, to generate. Of his father, “the man who fathered me” (1.2), and of his parents, “those who begot me” (5.13); of the whole, “what begot you” (4.14) and “the universe that begot you” (12.1.2); and of the perfect living being “which generates all things” (10.1), of the nature of the universe, not compelled “to generate anything harmful to itself” (10.6.1), and of ourselves, “we who generate the judgements about them” (11.16). Lemma: γεννάω.

γονεύς

Attested: γονέας (*goneas*; 1.17.1), γονεῦσιν (*goneusin*; 5.31). A parent; in the plural, parents. “From the gods: to have good grandfathers, good parents” (1.17.1); “How have you behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers …” (5.31). Lemma: γονεύς.

διατριβή

Attested: διατριβάς (*diatribas*; 1.4), διατριβῇ (*diatribēi*; 5.10.2), διατριβῆς (*diatribēs*; 10.36). A spending of time; a place where time is spent, a school. “not to have gone to the public schools” (1.4); “and not chafe at the delay” (5.10.2); “Why, then, should anyone cling to a longer stay here?” (10.36). Lemma: διατριβή.

διδασκαλία

Attested: διδασκαλίας (*didaskalias*; 1.17.6), διδασκαλίαι (*didaskaliai*; 6.16.3). Teaching, instruction. Marcus’ falling short comes “from not keeping the reminders of the gods, and all but their instructions” (1.17.6); “And towards what do the ways of rearing and the ways of teaching hurry?” (6.16.3). Lemma: διδασκαλία.

διδάσκαλος

Attested: διδασκάλοις (*didaskalois*; 1.4, 5.31), διδασκάλων (*didaskalōn*; 1.13), διδασκάλους (*didaskalous*; 1.17.1), διδάσκαλος (*didaskalos*; 12.4). A teacher. “to have had good teachers at home” (1.4); “to speak of one’s teachers with heartfelt good words” (1.13); “good teachers” (1.17.1); and “a sensible teacher”: if a god or such a teacher bade a man think nothing within himself that he would not at once bring out, “he will not endure this even for one day” (12.4). Lemma: διδάσκαλος.

καλοήθης

Attested: καλόηθες (*kaloēthes*; 1.1). Of good character; with the article, good character. “From my grandfather Verus: good character and freedom from anger” (1.1). Lemma: καλοήθης.

μήτηρ

Attested: μητρός (*mētros*; 1.3), μητρί (*mētri*; 1.7.2, 9.21), μήτηρ (*mētēr*; 5.4, 10.7.3), μητέρα (*mētera*; 6.12 twice). Mother. “From my mother: piety and generosity” (1.3); “my mother the little blood” (5.4); “your return to the mother

would be continual" (6.12; see Philosophy); "then that under the mother" (9.21); "not what the mother bore" (10.7.3). Lemma: μήτηρ.

ὀρτυγοτροφέω

Attested: ὀρτυγοτροφεῖν (*ortygotrophein*; 1.6). To keep quails, which were kept for fighting, as the edition's note says. From Diognetus, "not to keep quails, nor to be in a flutter about such things" (1.6; see Tranquillity). The Suda, the Byzantine lexicon, which quotes the sentence, has ὀρτυγοκοπεῖν (*ortygokopein*), "to play at quail-striking", as Leopold's apparatus records. Lemma: ὀρτυγοτροφέω.

παιδαγωγέω

Attested: ἐπαιδαγώγησαν (*epaidagōgēsan*; 9.29). To lead a boy, to school. Of Alexander, Philip and Demetrius: "They will see to it, if they saw what the common nature wanted and schooled themselves" (9.29; see Exemplary lives). Lemma: παιδαγωγέω.

παιδαγωγία

Attested: παιδαγωγίαι (*paidagōgiai*; 6.16.3). The rearing of a boy. "And towards what do the ways of rearing and the ways of teaching hurry?" (6.16.3). Lemma: παιδαγωγία.

παιδαγωγικός

Attested: παιδαγωγικήν (*paidagōgikēn*; 11.6.2). Of a schoolmaster. The Old Comedy was brought on "with a schoolmaster's frankness" (11.6.2; see Speech and silence). Lemma: παιδαγωγικός.

παιδαγωγός

Attested: παιδαγωγόν (*paidagōgon*; 5.9), παιδαγωγοῦ (*paidagōgou*; 10.36). The slave who took a boy to school and watched over him; a schoolmaster. "and do not return to philosophy as to a schoolmaster" (5.9); "Shall we ever breathe again, free of this schoolmaster?" (10.36). Lemma: παιδαγωγός.

παιδαριώδης

Attested: παιδαριῶδες (*paidariōdes*; 4.28). Childish. In a list of characters: "bestial, cattle-like, childish, stupid, counterfeit" (4.28). Lemma: παιδαριώδης.

παιδεύω

Attested: πεπαιδευμένος (*pepaideumenos*; 10.14). To bring up a child, to educate; the perfect participle, educated. “To nature, who gives all things and takes them back, the educated and self-respecting man says: Give what you want; take back what you want” (10.14). Lemma: παιδεύω.

παιδικός

Attested: παιδικήν (*paidikēn*; 9.21). Of a child; with “time of life” understood, childhood. “Pass on now to time of life, for instance childhood, adolescence, youth, old age” (9.21). Lemma: παιδικός.

παιδίον

Attested: παιδία (*paidia*; 1.17.4, 1.17.8, 5.33), παιδίον (*paidion*; 2.12, 8.49, 11.33, 11.34), παιδίου (*paidiou*; 5.11), παιδίοις (*paidiois*; 6.57), παιδίων (*paidiōn*; 9.24, 11.23). A little child. Marcus’ own children, “not dull-witted” (1.17.4) and with “suitable tutors” (1.17.8); “I see that the child is ill” (8.49); “such is he who seeks the child when it is no longer given” (11.33); “The one who kisses the child” (11.34; see Love and affection). In a figure: whoever fears a work of nature “is a child” (2.12), “A child’s?” (5.11), “quarrelsome children” (5.33), “to children a little ball beautiful” (6.57), “Children’s angers and toys” (9.24) and “children’s bugbears” (11.23). Lemma: παιδίον.

παιδοτροφέω

Attested: παιδοτροφοῦντας (*paidotrophountas*; 4.32.1). To rear children. In the times of Vespasian, “people marrying, raising children, falling ill, dying” (4.32.1; see Death). Lemma: παιδοτροφέω.

παῖς

Attested: παιδί (*paidi*; 1.6), παισίν (*paisin*; 3.2.3), παῖδας (*paidas*; 4.46), παῖδ’ (*paid’*, the dual, elided; 7.41, 11.6.1). A child, a boy; a son. “to have written dialogues as a boy” (1.6); “the loveliness of boys” (3.2.3); “⟨like⟩ children of parents” (4.46); and in a verse of Euripides, the Athenian tragic poet, that Marcus copies twice, as the edition’s note at 7.38 records, “But if I and my two sons have been neglected by the gods” (7.41, 11.6.1). Lemma: παῖς.

πάππος

Attested: πάππου (*pappou*; 1.1, 1.17.2), πάππους (*pappous*; 1.17.1), πάππῳ (*pappōi*; 9.21). A grandfather. “From my grandfather Verus” (1.1); “good grandfathers” (1.17.1); “my grandfather’s concubine” (1.17.2); “the life under the grandfather” (9.21). Lemma: πάππος.

πατήρ

Attested: πατρός (*patros*; 1.16.1), πατρί (*patri*; 1.17.3, 9.21), πατήρ (*patēr*; 5.4). Father. “From my father” (1.16.1); “that I was placed under a ruler and father” (1.17.3; see Court and office); “my father gathered the little seed” (5.4); “then that under the father” (9.21). Lemma: πατήρ.

πρόπαππος

Attested: προπάππου (*propappou*; 1.4). A great-grandfather. “From my great-grandfather: not to have gone to the public schools” (1.4). Lemma: πρόπαππος.

τεκνίον

Attested: τεκνίον (*teknion*; 9.40, 12.26), τεκνία (*teknia*; 10.34, 10.35). A little child. “How may I not lose the little child?” (9.40; see Prayer); “And little leaves too are your little children” (10.34), where P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, and A, the Vatican manuscript, have the singular φυλλάριον (*phyllarion*), “little leaf”; “Let the little children be preserved” (10.35); “even the little child … have come from there” (12.26). Lemma: τεκνίον.

τέκνον

Attested: τέκνου (*teknou*; 1.8.1), τέκνα (*tekna*; 1.13), τέκνοις (*teknois*; 5.31), τέκνον (*teknon*; 11.18.4 twice). A child. Apollonius was always the same “in the loss of a child” (1.8.1); “to love one’s children truly” (1.13); “children” among those towards whom Marcus asks how he has behaved (5.31); and in address, to the insolent man, “No, child; we are by nature for something else” (11.18.4; see Anger). Lemma: τέκνον.

τίκτω

Attested: τεκοῦσαν (*tekousan*; 1.17.7), ἔτεκεν (*eteken*; 10.7.3). To bear a child. With the article, the mother: “that my mother, who was to die young, nevertheless made her home with me in her last years” (1.17.7); “not what the mother bore” (10.7.3; see Dissolution). Lemma: τίκτω.

τοκεύς

Attested: τοκεώνων (*tokeōnōn*; 4.46). A parent. “and that one must not act and speak ⟨like⟩ children of parents, that is, merely as we have received it” (4.46), in a saying of Heraclitus. Leopold prints Rendall’s τοκεώνων; the manuscripts have τοκέων ὦν. Lemma: τοκεύς.

τροφεύς

Attested: τροφέως (*tropheōs*; 1.5), τροφέας (*tropheas*; 1.17.5), τροφέων (*tropheōn*; 1.17.8), τροφεῦσι (*tropheusi*; 5.31). One who rears a child; a tutor. “From my tutor” (1.5); “that I was quick to raise my tutors to the rank they seemed to me to crave” (1.17.5); “suitable tutors for my children” (1.17.8); “teachers, tutors” (5.31). Lemma: τροφεύς.

τροφός

Attested: τροφός (*trophos*; 5.4). A nurse. “and my nurse the little milk” (5.4). Lemma: τροφός.

See also

Alexander the grammarian; Anger; Annius Verus; Beneficence; Court and office; Death; Dissolution; Domitia Lucilla; Exemplary lives; Fronto; Gratitude; Human work; Kindness and correction; Love and affection; Philosophy; Prayer; Self-respect and shame; Speech and silence; Tranquillity.

Reputation and praise

Fame, praise and the judgement of others · Meditations

δόξα, doxa, “fame”, “repute”; *δοξάριον, doxarion*, “little fame”; *ὑστεροφημία, hysterophēmia*, “fame after death”; *φήμη, phēmē*, “fame”; *εὐδοξία, eudoxia*, “good repute”; *ἀδοξία, adoxia*, “obscurity”; *ἄδοξος, adoxos*, “inglorious”; *ἔνδοξος, endoxos*, “a source of repute”, “of repute”, “more gloriously”; *κενόδοξος, kenodoxos*, “lover of empty glory”; *ἀκενόδοξος, akenodoxos*, “no empty glory”, “freedom from empty glory”; *φιλόδοξος, philodoxos*, “lover of fame”; *δοξοκοπία, doxokopia*, “courting of fame”; *προσδοξάζειν, prosdoxazein*, “add opinion”; *εὐδοκιμεῖν, eudokimein*, “win credit”, “be well thought of”; *ἔπαινος, epainos*, “praise”; *ἐπαινεῖν, epainein*, “praise”; *ἐπαινετός, epainetos*, “praiseworthy”, “more praiseworthy”; *ψέγειν, psegein*, “censure”; *ψόγος, psogos*, “censure”; *εὐφημεῖν, euphēmein*,

“speak well of”, “speak good words”, “well spoken of”; *εὐφημία, euphēmia*, “good words”; *εὔφημος, euphēmos*, “good words”, “speak well of”; *ἐπευφημεῖν, epeuphēmein*, “speak good words”; *ἐξυμνεῖν, exymnein*, “extolling”; *ὑμνεῖν, hymnein*, “sang of”; *πολυύμνητος, polyymnētos*, “much-sung”; *κρότος, krotos*, “clapping”; *κροτεῖν, krotein*, “being clapped”, “clappers”; *ἐπιβόησις, epiboēsis*, “acclamations”; *ἐπιβοᾶν, epiboan*, “make an outcry”, “cry out acclaim”

At a Glance

The word. Δόξα, akin to δοκεῖν (*dokein*), “to seem”, is how a man seems to others: his repute among those who know him, his fame among many; δοξάριον is its diminutive, “a little fame”. Ἔπαινος is praise, ψέγειν to censure, and ὑστεροφημία fame after death.

In the *Meditations*. Fame and obscurity “befall good men and bad alike” and are “neither good nor bad” (2.11.4). Marcus makes fame small: the praisers are few and soon dead (4.3.3, 8.21), fame is “without judgement”, and “fame after death is oblivion” (2.17.1). Then he sets even this aside: were they immortal, “what, then, is that to you?” (4.19). Praise is no part of what is praised (4.20).

In this edition. Δόξα is “fame”, and “repute” where it is a man’s standing with others; it is never “opinion”. Δοξάριον is “little fame”, ὑστεροφημία “fame after death”, ἔπαινος and ἐπαινεῖν “praise”, εὐφημεῖν “speak well of”.

A place to read. 4.19, where the memory of a man is quenched as it passes through men who soon die; were they immortal, Marcus asks, “what, then, is that to you?”, and what is praise to the living, “except perhaps for some practical end”?

Meaning

Δόξα (*doxa*) belongs to δοκεῖν, to seem or to think, and can be a man’s opinion or the opinion others have of him. In the *Meditations* it is always the second, repute (1.2, 3.4.4) or fame (2.11.4, 9.30). Opinion is ὑπόληψις (*hypolēpsis*; see Assent and judgement), the word Marcus uses even at 12.4, where each man sets less store “by his own opinion of himself than by that of others”; only the compound προσδοξάζειν (*prosdoxazein*), “add opinion” (7.64), keeps the other sense. Δοξάριον (*doxarion*), “a little fame”, is one of Marcus’ belittling diminutives. Praise is ἔπαινος (*epainos*)

and ἐπαινεῖν (*epainein*), its opposite ψέγειν (*psegein*), to censure; εὐφημεῖν (*euphēmein*) is to speak well, of the gods (5.33) or of men, and κρότος (*krotos*) the clapping of hands. Φήμη (*phēmē*) is report or fame, and ὑστεροφημία (*hysterophēmia*) fame after death. Marcus counts fame, as the Stoics did, among the things neither good nor bad (2.11.4; see Good, bad and indifference).

Use in the book

Marcus' first move against fame is to make it small. "But will a little fame distract you?" he asks, and sets against it the forgetting of all things (see Time and eternity), "the emptiness of the echo, and the changeableness and lack of judgement of those who seem to speak good words", and the corner of a point-like earth: "And here, how many, and of what sort, are those who will praise?" (4.3.3). "Speak good words" is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; the manuscripts have ἐφ' ἡμῖν (*eph' hēmin*), "in our power". So too "small even the longest fame after death" (3.10); "Short-lived are both the one who praises and the one praised" (8.21); the names of "the much-sung men of old" are now glosses (4.33). In the summary of life that closes Book II, "fame after death is oblivion" (2.17.1; see Soul).

The fullest argument is 4.19. "He who is in a flutter about fame after death" does not form the impression that each who remembers him will soon die, and the next after him, "until the whole memory too is quenched as it passes along through men who are lit and quenched": the image, as the edition's note says, is of a torch passed on. "Lit" is the correction of Hastings Crossley, whose edition of Book IV appeared in 1882; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, repeats "in a flutter". Then Marcus sets the argument from death aside: "But suppose that those who will remember are even immortal, and the memory immortal: what, then, is that to you?" And to the living, "what is praise, except perhaps for some practical end?" The next chapter gives the reason: "Everything that is in any way beautiful is beautiful of itself and ends in itself, not having praise as a part of itself"; "does an emerald become worse than it was, if it is not praised?" (4.20).

Marcus allows repute one source. The good man "must hold to the repute given not by all, but only by those who live

in agreement with nature", and of those who do not live so he "sets no store even by praise from such people, who are not even pleased with themselves" (3.4.4). "Do you want to be praised by a man who curses himself three times an hour?" (8.53). Marcus asks whether he has forgotten that "these people who are arrogant in praise and censure of others are such in bed and such at table" (10.13), and he is to conceive "how many, praising you perhaps now, will very soon censure you" (9.30). Praise is noise, "for the good words of the many are a clapping of tongues. So you have let little fame go too" (6.16.2; see Self-respect and shame). The wish for fame after death is absurd on its own terms: men who "do not want to speak well of people living at the same time as themselves" set "great store by being spoken well of by those to come", which "is close to what it would be to be distressed that those before you too did not speak well of you" (6.18).

Marcus finds the root in a contradiction: "I have often wondered how each man loves himself more than all others, yet sets less store by his own opinion of himself than by that of others" (12.4). If a god or a sensible teacher bade a man think nothing he would not at once bring out, he would not endure it for one day: so much more do men respect what those close by will think of them than themselves (see Self-respect and shame). "The lover of fame forms the opinion that his own good is another's activity" (6.51; see Present action), and Marcus asks why, having done good, one should seek a third thing, "like the fools: to be thought to have done good as well, or to get a return?" (7.73; see Beneficence). One praise only is named as a measure: man has authority "to do nothing other than what God will praise" (12.11). Marcus gives praise where it is owed, as Cinna Catulus, a Stoic teacher, taught him "to speak of one's teachers with heartfelt good words" (1.13), and refuses flattery, as in his father's time "acclamations and … every kind of flattery" were checked (1.16.3). He copies a saying of Antisthenes, the Athenian follower of Socrates: "It is kingly to do well and be ill spoken of" (7.36).

The brevity of fame is the image Marcus uses most, but it is not his reason. At 4.19 he supposes the memory immortal and finds it still nothing to the man; at 4.20 praise is no part of the thing praised; at 6.51 the lover of fame has put his good in another's act. The shrinking of fame can be read as the exercise, and 4.20 as the argument.

Places to read

The passages where fame, repute or praise is discussed or carries the argument, in the order of the book, with 7.36, 7.73 and 12.4, where being well or ill thought of is the matter without these words; every place is given in the sub-entries. Προσδοξάζειν, "add opinion" (7.64), δοκεῖν, "seem", βλασφημία (*blasphēmia*) and βλασφημεῖν (*blasphēmein*), "slander" (4.44, 8.41, 8.51; see Speech and silence), and the words of memory, name, honour and vanity are left out.

1.2 From the repute and memory of his natural father Marcus took self-respect and manliness.

1.9.3 From Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew, Marcus learned to speak good words without noise.

1.13 From Catulus Marcus learned to speak of his teachers with heartfelt good words.

1.16.1 Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, sought no empty glory in what pass for honours.

1.16.3 In Antoninus' time acclamations and every kind of flattery were checked.

2.11.4 Death and life, fame and obscurity, pain and pleasure, wealth and poverty befall good men and bad alike and are neither good nor bad.

2.17.1 In human life fame is without judgement, and fame after death is oblivion.

3.4.4 The good man holds only to the repute given by those who live in agreement with nature, and sets no store by praise from others, who are not even pleased with themselves.

3.6.3 Nothing of another kind, such as the praise of the many, office or wealth, is to be set up against the rational good.

3.10 Even the longest fame after death is small, and passes through a succession of little men who will very soon die.

4.3.3 Against a little fame Marcus sets the forgetting of all things, the emptiness of the echo, the changeableness and lack of judgement of men, and how few and of what sort are those who will praise.

4.19 Fame after death passes through men who soon die until the memory is quenched; were they

immortal, Marcus asks what that would be to him, and what praise is to the living, except perhaps for some practical end.

4.20 Everything beautiful is beautiful of itself, not having praise as a part of itself, and becomes neither worse nor better by being praised or censured.

4.33 The names of the much-sung men of old are now glosses, and everlasting remembrance is wholly empty.

5.1.3 Marcus asks whether he honours his own nature less than the lover of empty glory honours his little fame, and whether social actions seem to him cheaper.

5.6.2 A man who has done good does not make an outcry, but passes on to another, as a vine bears grapes again in season.

5.33 Marcus asks what still keeps one here, if among other things to be well thought of among such people is empty, and what is enough until his time comes: to revere the gods and speak well of them, and to do good to men.

6.2 It is to make no difference to Marcus whether he does what is seemly ill spoken of or well spoken of.

6.16.2 Neither being clapped nor being clapped by tongues is to be honoured, for the good words of the many are a clapping of tongues; so little fame too is let go.

6.18 Men who will not speak well of those living with them set great store by being spoken well of by those to come, which is close to being distressed that men before them did not speak well of them.

6.30.2 Antoninus showed freedom from empty glory.

6.51 The lover of fame forms the opinion that his own good is another's activity.

7.6 Many who were much-sung are already handed over to forgetting, and those who sang of them are long gone.

7.34 On fame, Marcus is to look at men's understandings; in life, as sand-dunes hide earlier ones, what came before is very quickly covered.

7.36 In a saying of Antisthenes, it is kingly to do well and be ill spoken of.

7.73 Marcus asks why, having done good, one seeks a third thing besides, like the fools: to be thought to have done good, or to get a return.

8.8 It is open to Marcus to be above the little fame.

8.21 Short-lived are both the one who praises and the one praised, the one who remembers and the one remembered.

8.44 Those who pursue fame after death do not reckon that the men to come will be like those they find burdensome now, and mortal too.

8.52 He who does not know what the universe is does not know where he is, and the clappers whose praise is in question know neither where they are nor who they are.

8.53 Marcus asks whether he wants to be praised by a man who curses himself three times an hour.

9.1.3 Whoever does not stand equally towards fame and obscurity, which the nature of the whole uses equally, is clearly impious.

9.27 When another censures or hates Marcus, he is to go within their little souls and see what sort of people they are.

9.30 Many who praise Marcus now will very soon censure him, and neither memory nor fame is worth mentioning.

9.34 When men think they harm by censuring or benefit by extolling, it is conceit.

10.13 Those who are arrogant in praise and censure of others are such in bed and such at table.

10.34 Those who cry out acclaim and speak good words, those who curse or censure, and those who will succeed to the fame after death are all leaves.

10.35 The understanding that says, “Let everyone praise whatever I do”, is like an eye seeking green things.

12.4 Each man loves himself most, yet sets less store by his own opinion of himself than by that of others; if a god or a sensible teacher bade him think nothing he would not at once bring out, he would not endure it for one day.

12.11 Man has authority to do nothing other than what God will praise.

12.27 Of those who reached their peak in the greatest fame there remains smoke and ash and a legend, or not even a legend.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The school counted fame among the things neither good nor bad (see Good, bad and indifference), but among those that have worth. Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, lists fame, δόξα, with wealth and noble birth among the external things the Stoics called "preferred", and obscurity, ἀδοξία, with poverty and low birth among the "dispreferred".[495] The *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of the teaching of Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, opens by setting reputations, δόξαι, with body, property and offices among the things not in our power (see Obstacle and reservation),[496] a list that the "praise of the many, or office, or wealth" of 3.6.3 can be read as echoing. In a discourse that bears the title "To those who are pained at being pitied", Epictetus gets his hearer to agree that what another thinks of him belongs to the things outside choice, and so is nothing to him; he gives him the saying of Antisthenes that Marcus copies at 7.36; and he asks how a man can still have right principles who is not content to be who he is but is "in a flutter over seeming", ἐπτοημένος ὑπὲρ τοῦ δοκεῖν (*eptoēmenos hyper tou dokein*).[497] The participle is the one Marcus uses of the man "in a flutter about fame after death" (4.19). Among the signs of a man making progress, the *Handbook* lists that he censures no one and praises no one; if someone praises him, he laughs to himself at the man who praises, and if he is censured, he makes no defence.[498] Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century AD, reports a view of the school that Marcus nowhere states. Writing to his friend Lucilius, he defends what the Stoics hold, that renown, *claritas*, which comes after death, is a good; and he distinguishes it from glory: glory rests on the judgements of

[495] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.106.

[496] Epictetus, *Handbook* 1.1.

[497] Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.6.10, 4.6.20 and 4.6.24; the saying is Antisthenes' answer, in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 6.3, when he heard that Plato spoke ill of him.

[498] Epictetus, *Handbook* 48.2.

many, renown on those of the good, and the judgement of one good man may suffice for it.[499] Marcus' "repute given not by all, but only by those who live in agreement with nature" (3.4.4) can be read beside Seneca's renown; but Marcus never calls it a good, and of fame after death he says that it "is oblivion" (2.17.1).

Translation in this edition

Δόξα is "fame" at eleven places (2.11.4, 5.12, 7.34, 8.1, 8.14, 9.1.3, 9.11, 9.30, 12.2, 12.8, 12.27) and "repute" where it is a man's standing with those who know him (1.2, 3.4.4, 7.68, and "the repute of a philosopher", 8.1); it is never "opinion", which renders ὑπόληψις (see Assent and judgement). The forms δόξει (*doxei*; 3.2.3, 8.14), δόξῃ (*doxēi*; 3.6.3), δόξεις (*doxeis*; 4.16, 8.1) and δόξαι (*doxai*; 7.73) belong to δοκεῖν and are rendered with "seem" and "be thought"; at 8.1 δόξῃ, "fame", is the noun. Δοξάριον is "little fame" at all six places. Φήμη is also "fame" (2.17.1), a collision the Glossary records; ὑστεροφημία is "fame after death" at all five places. "Empty glory" renders κενόδοξος (*kenodoxos*), "the lover of empty glory" (5.1.3), and ἀκενόδοξος (*akenodoxos*), "no empty glory" (1.16.1) and "freedom from empty glory" (6.30.2, 8.1). The Glossary keeps it apart from "vanity", τῦφος (*typhos*; 1.17.3, 2.12, 2.17.1, 6.13, 9.2, 11.18.1, 12.24, 12.27; see Simplicity and sincerity), with ἀτύφως (*atyphōs*), "without vanity" (1.16.4, 3.6.3, 8.33), and ἀτυφία (*atyphia*), "freedom from vanity" (11.6.2, 12.27). Εὐδοξία (*eudoxia*) is "good repute" (1.16.7, 2.12), ἀδοξία (*adoxia*) "obscurity" (2.11.4, 8.14, 9.1.3), ἄδοξος (*adoxos*) "inglorious" (11.16), φιλόδοξος (*philodoxos*) "the lover of fame" (6.51; see Present action) and δοξοκοπία (*doxokopia*) "courting of fame" (11.18.2); ἔνδοξος (*endoxos*) is "a source of repute" (4.12), "things of repute" (5.31) and, in the comparative adverb, "more gloriously" (7.66). Εὐδοκιμεῖν (*eudokimein*) is "win credit" (1.16.6) and "to be well thought of" (5.33). Ἔπαινος and ἐπαινεῖν are "praise" at every place; ἐπαινετός (*epainetos*) is "praiseworthy" (5.15) and "more praiseworthy" (10.33.4); ἐξυμνεῖν (*exymnein*) is "extolling" (9.34), ὑμνεῖν (*hymnein*) "sang of" (7.6) and πολυύμνητος (*polyymnētos*) "much-sung" (4.33, 7.6). Ψέγειν and ψόγος (*psogos*) are "censure" at every place. Εὐφημεῖν is "speak good words" (4.3.3), "speaking well of" (4.48.2), "speak well of" (5.33, 6.18),

[499] Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius* 102.3, 102.11 and 102.17.

“being spoken well of” (6.18) and “well spoken of” (6.2), against κακῶς ἀκούειν (*kakōs akouein*), “be ill spoken of” (6.2, 7.36); εὐφημία (*euphēmia*) is “good words” (6.16.2), εὔφημος (*euphēmos*) “good words” (1.9.3, 1.13) and, with λόγους (*logous*), “speak well of” (6.18), and ἐπευφημεῖν (*epeuphēmein*) “speak good words” (10.34). Κρότος is “clapping”, and κροτεῖν (*krotein*) “being clapped” (6.16.2) and “the clappers” (8.52); ἐπιβόησις (*epiboēsis*) is “acclamations” (1.16.3), and ἐπιβοᾶν (*epiboan*) “make an outcry” (5.6.2) and “cry out acclaim” (10.34). “Honour” renders another family, τιμή (*timē*), τιμᾶν (*timan*) and τίμιος (*timios*; 1.16.1, 6.16.1–5), and “crying it aloud” γεγωνίσκειν (*gegōniskein*; 12.4; see Speech and silence).

ἀδοξία

Attested: ἀδοξία (*adoxia*; 2.11.4), ἀδοξίας (*adoxias*; 8.14), ἀδοξίαν (*adoxian*; 9.1.3). Obscurity, the want of fame, always paired with fame among the things neither good nor bad: “death and life, fame and obscurity, pain and pleasure, wealth and poverty” (2.11.4); whoever does not stand equally towards “fame and obscurity, which the nature of the whole uses equally, is clearly impious” (9.1.3; see Justice). Lemma: ἀδοξία.

ἄδοξος

Attested: ἄδοξον (*adoxon*; 11.16). Without fame, inglorious. If things are contrary to nature, Marcus is to seek what is according to his own nature “and hasten towards this, even if it is inglorious” (11.16). Lemma: ἄδοξος.

ἀκενόδοξος

Attested: ἀκενόδοξον (*akenodoxon*; 1.16.1, 6.30.2, 8.1). Free of empty glory; with the article, freedom from it. In Antoninus Pius, “no empty glory sought in what pass for honours” (1.16.1) and “his freedom from empty glory” (6.30.2); “This too contributes to freedom from empty glory” (8.1), that Marcus can no longer have lived as a philosopher, nor easily win a philosopher’s repute (see Philosophy). Lemma: ἀκενόδοξος.

δόξα

Attested: δόξης (*doxēs*; 1.2, 3.4.4, 7.34, 8.14), δόξα (*doxa*; 2.11.4, 9.30, 12.8), δόξαν (*doxan*; 5.12, 7.68, 8.1, 9.1.3, 9.11, 12.2), δόξῃ (*doxēi*; 8.1), δόξαις (*doxais*; 12.27). Repute, a man’s standing with those who know him; fame, his name

among many. “From the repute and memory of the man who fathered me: self-respect and manliness” (1.2); “one must hold to the repute given not by all, but only by those who live in agreement with nature” (3.4.4); “neither memory is worth mentioning at all, nor fame” (9.30); “what death; what fame” (12.8). At 7.68 judgement says to what falls upon it, “This is what you are in substance, even if in repute you appear of another kind”. Lemma: δόξα.

δοξάριον

Attested: δοξάριον (*doxarion*; 4.3.3, 5.1.3, 6.16.2, 10.8.1, 10.30), δοξαρίου (*doxariou*; 8.8). A little fame, the diminutive of δόξα, used to belittle. “But will a little fame distract you?” (4.3.3); “So you have let little fame go too” (6.16.2); “it is open to be above the little fame” (8.8); “judging money to be a good, ⟨or⟩ pleasure, or little fame” (10.30), where “or” is a supplement of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century. Lemma: δοξάριον.

δοξοκοπία

Attested: δοξοκοπίαν (*doxokopian*; 11.18.2). The courting of fame. In the fourth head against anger (see Anger), even if Marcus abstains from certain wrongs, it may be “through cowardice or courting of fame or some such bad thing” (11.18.2). Lemma: δοξοκοπία.

ἔνδοξος

Attested: ἔνδοξον (*endoxon*; 4.12), ἔνδοξα (*endoxa*; 5.31), ἐνδοξότερον (*endoxoteron*; 7.66). Held in repute, glorious. A change of mind must come from something convincing, “not that it appeared pleasant or a source of repute” (4.12); Marcus is to remember “how many things of repute you have passed over” (5.31); the comparative adverb, “Socrates died more gloriously” (7.66). Lemma: ἔνδοξος.

ἐξυμνέω

Attested: ἐξυμνοῦντες (*exymnountes*; 9.34). To sing the praises of, extol. “When they think they harm by censuring, or benefit by extolling, what conceit!” (9.34). Lemma: ἐξυμνέω.

ἐπαινετός

Attested: ἐπαινετός (*epainetos*; 5.15), ἐπαινετώτερος (*epainetōteros*; 10.33.4). Praiseworthy. If the things that do

not fall to man as man fell to him, the man who presents himself as not needing them would not be “praiseworthy” (5.15); “man even becomes better and more praiseworthy by using rightly what befalls” (10.33.4). Lemma: ἐπαινετός.

ἐπαινέω

Attested: ἐπαινεσόμενοι (*epainesomenoi*; 4.3.3), ἐπαινούμενον (*epainoumenon*; 4.20), ἐπαινεῖσθαι (*epaineisthai*; 4.20, 8.53), ἐπαινῆται (*epainētai*; 4.20), ἐπαινοῦντα (*epainounta*; 6.16.5), ἐπαινῶν (*epainōn*; 8.21), ἐπαινούμενος (*epainoumenos*; 8.21), ἐπαινοῦντες (*epainountes*; 9.30), ἐπαινείτωσαν (*epaineitōsan*; 10.35), ἐπαινεῖν (*epainein*; 12.11). To praise. “And here, how many, and of what sort, are those who will praise?” (4.3.3); “Which of these is beautiful because it is praised, or perishes by being censured?” (4.20); “Do you want to be praised by a man who curses himself three times an hour?” (8.53); “Let everyone praise whatever I do” (10.35); “to do nothing other than what God will praise” (12.11). Lemma: ἐπαινέω.

ἔπαινος

Attested: ἔπαινον (*epainon*; 3.4.4, 3.6.3, 4.20, 8.52), ἔπαινος (*epainos*; 4.19), ἐπαίνοις (*epainois*; 10.13). Praise. “So he sets no store even by praise from such people” (3.4.4); “the praise of the many” (3.6.3); “to the living, what is praise, except perhaps for some practical end?” (4.19); “not having praise as a part of itself” (4.20); “these people who are arrogant in praise and censure of others” (10.13). At 8.52 “or pursues” in “flees or pursues the praise of the clappers” is the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, which Leopold prints; P has ἡδίων ἢ (*hēdiōn ē*). Lemma: ἔπαινος.

ἐπευφημέω

Attested: ἐπευφημοῦντα (*epeuphēmounta*; 10.34). To speak good words in assent, to applaud. Among the leaves that the wind sheds are “these who cry out acclaim credibly and speak good words” (10.34; see Time and eternity). Lemma: ἐπευφημέω.

ἐπιβοάω

Attested: ἐπιβοᾶται (*epiboatai*; 5.6.2), ἐπιβοῶντα (*epiboōnta*; 10.34). To cry out; in the middle voice, to raise a cry: “a man who has done good does not make an outcry,

but passes on to another" (5.6.2; see Beneficence); "these who cry out acclaim credibly" (10.34). Lemma: ἐπιβοάω.

ἐπιβόησις

Attested: ἐπιβοήσεις (*epiboēseis*; 1.16.3). A shout of acclaim. Of Antoninus Pius, "the checking, in his time, of acclamations and of every kind of flattery" (1.16.3); the edition's note explains them as the rhythmic shouts with which senate and people greeted an emperor. Lemma: ἐπιβόησις.

εὐδοκιμέω

Attested: εὐδοκιμῶσι (*eudokimōsi*; 1.16.6), εὐδοκιμεῖν (*eudokimein*; 5.33). To be well thought of, to win credit. Antoninus shared the efforts of men of ability, "so that each might win credit by his own merits" (1.16.6); Marcus asks what still keeps one here if, among other things, "to be well thought of among such people" is "empty" (5.33). Lemma: εὐδοκιμέω.

εὐδοξία

Attested: εὐδοξίαν (*eudoxian*; 1.16.7, 2.12). Good repute. Antoninus looked to what must be done, "and not to the good repute that comes from what has been done" (1.16.7); "What are they whose opinions and voices ⟨confer⟩ good repute?" (2.12), where "confer" is Gataker's supplement, which Leopold prints. Lemma: εὐδοξία.

εὐφημέω

Attested: εὐφημεῖν (*euphēmein*; 4.3.3, 5.33, 6.18), εὐφημοῦσα (*euphēmousa*; 4.48.2), εὐφημούμενος (*euphēmoumenos*; 6.2), εὐφημηθῆναι (*euphēmēthēnai*; 6.18). To speak well, of the gods or of men: "to revere the gods and speak well of them" (5.33); the olive falls "speaking well of her who bore it" (4.48.2); "ill spoken of or well spoken of" (6.2); men who "do not want to speak well of people living at the same time" set "great store by being spoken well of by those to come" (6.18). At 4.3.3 "who seem to speak good words" is Gataker's εὐφημεῖν; the manuscripts have ἐφ' ἡμῖν, "in our power". Lemma: εὐφημέω.

εὐφημία

Attested: εὐφημίαι (*euphēmiai*; 6.16.2). Good words, praise spoken: “for the good words of the many are a clapping of tongues” (6.16.2). Lemma: εὐφημία.

εὔφημος

Attested: εὔφημον (*euphēmon*; 1.9.3, 1.13), εὐφήμους (*euphēmous*; 6.18). Speaking well; the neuter with the article, good words. From Sextus, “to speak good words without noise” (1.9.3); from Catulus, “to speak of one’s teachers with heartfelt good words” (1.13); with λόγους, “did not speak well of you” (6.18). Lemma: εὔφημος.

κενόδοξος

Attested: κενόδοξος (*kenodoxos*; 5.1.3). One who loves empty glory. Marcus asks whether he honours his own nature less than “the lover of empty glory the little fame” (5.1.3). Lemma: κενόδοξος.

κροτέω

Attested: κροτεῖσθαι (*kroteisthai*; 6.16.2 twice), κροτούντων (*krotountōn*; 8.52). To clap; in the passive, to be applauded. “Being clapped? No. Then not being clapped by tongues either” (6.16.2); “the praise of the clappers” (8.52). At 6.16.2 A, the Vatican manuscript, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have ὑπόγλωσσον (*hypoglōsson*) where P has “by tongues”. Lemma: κροτέω.

κρότος

Attested: κρότος (*krotos*; 6.16.2). A clapping of the hands, and of tongues: “the good words of the many are a clapping of tongues” (6.16.2). Lemma: κρότος.

πολυύμνητος

Attested: πολυυμνήτων (*polyymnētōn*; 4.33), πολυύμνητοι (*polyymnētoi*; 7.6). Much-sung, celebrated: “the names of the much-sung men of old are now in a way glosses” (4.33); “How many who were much-sung are already handed over to forgetting” (7.6). Lemma: πολυύμνητος.

προσδοξάζω

Attested: προσδοξάζῃς (*prosdoxazēis*; 7.64). To add an opinion of one’s own to what happens. In most pains, Epicurus’ saying helps, “that it is neither unbearable nor

eternal, if you remember the limits and do not add opinion" (7.64; see Pain and pleasure). Lemma: προσδοξάζω.

ὑμνέω

Attested: ὑμνήσαντες (*hymnēsantes*; 7.6). To sing of, to praise in song: "and how many who sang of them are long gone" (7.6). Lemma: ὑμνέω.

ὑστεροφημία

Attested: ὑστεροφημία (*hysterophēmia*; 2.17.1, 3.10), ὑστεροφημίαν (*hysterophēmian*; 4.19, 8.44, 10.34). Fame that comes after, fame after death: "fame after death is oblivion" (2.17.1); "small even the longest fame after death" (3.10); "He who is in a flutter about fame after death" (4.19); "Those who rather pursue fame after death" (8.44); "those who will succeed to the fame after death" (10.34). At 4.19 "lit" is Crossley's ἁπτομένων (*haptomenōn*), which Leopold prints; P has ἐπτοημένων (*eptoēmenōn*), "in a flutter". Lemma: ὑστεροφημία.

φήμη

Attested: φήμη (*phēmē*; 2.17.1). Report, rumour, fame. In the summary of human life, "fame without judgement" (2.17.1). Lemma: φήμη.

φιλόδοξος

Attested: φιλόδοξος (*philodoxos*; 6.51). Lover of fame. "The lover of fame forms the opinion that his own good is another's activity; the lover of pleasure, his own being acted upon; the man who has a mind, his own action" (6.51; see Present action). Lemma: φιλόδοξος.

ψέγω

Attested: ψεγόμενον (*psegomenon*; 4.20), ψέγῃ (*psegēi*; 9.27), ψέξουσι (*psexousi*; 9.30), ψέγοντες (*psegontes*; 9.34), ψέγηται (*psegētai*; 10.13), ψέγοντα (*psegonta*; 10.34). To censure, find fault with. "Which of these is beautiful because it is praised, or perishes by being censured?" (4.20); "When another censures you or hates you" (9.27); "how many, praising you perhaps now, will very soon censure you" (9.30); "or quietly censure and mock" (10.34). At 10.13 "is censured" is the correction of Capel Lofft, whose edition of the *Meditations* appeared in 1863, which Leopold prints; P has γένηται (*genētai*), "is done", and A γίνεται (*ginetai*). Lemma: ψέγω.

ψόγος

Attested: ψόγοις (*psogois*; 10.13). Censure, blame: “these people who are arrogant in praise and censure of others” (10.13). Lemma: ψόγος.

See also

Anger; Assent and judgement; Beneficence; Good, bad and indifference; Justice; Obstacle and reservation; Pain and pleasure; Philosophy; Present action; Self-respect and shame; Simplicity and sincerity; Soul; Speech and silence; Time and eternity.

Speech and silence

Frankness, plain speaking and few words · Meditations

παρρησία, parrēsia, “frankness”, “frankly”; *παρρησιαστικός, parrēsiastikos*, “frankly”; *εὐθυρρημοσύνη, euthyrrēmosynē*, “plain speaking”; *λαλεῖν, lalein*, “speak”; *περιλαλεῖν, perilalein*, “talk round a subject”; *συμφλυαρεῖν, symphlyarein*, “talk idly with”; *ἀφλύαρος, aphlyaros*, “freedom from idle talk”; *πολυρρήμων, polyrrēmōn*, “a man of many words”; *σιωπή, siōpē*, “in silence”; *ἀπόρρητος, aporrētos*, “secrets”; *ἀνεπίκρυπτος, anepikryptos*, “openness”; *περιπλοκή, periplokē*, “circumlocution”; *φθέγγεσθαι, phthengesthai*, “utter”; *ἐκφωνεῖν, ekphōnein*, “utter”; *γεγωνίσκειν, gegōniskein*, “crying it aloud”; *φωνή, phōnē*, “voice”; *ἐπιφθέγγεσθαι, epiphthengesthai*, “say inwardly”; *ὁμιλία, homilia*, “company”, “conversations”; *ὁμιλεῖν, homilein*, “converse”; *λέξις, lexis*, “words”, “word by word”; *ῥῆμα, rhēma*, “the word”; *διαλέγεσθαι, dialegesthai*, “deliver”, “argue”, “discuss”; *διάλογος, dialogos*, “dialogues”; *λογάριον, logarion*, “little exhortations”; *ἐπιστόλιον, epistolion*, “letters”; *ἐπιστολή, epistolē*, “letter”; *φραστικός, phrastikos*, “expression”; *ῥητορική, rhētorikē*, “rhetoric”; *ῥήτωρ, rhētōr*, “orators”; *ῥητορεία, rhētoreia*, “eloquence”; *ἀστειολογία, asteiologia*, “fine language”; *βλασφημία, blasphēmia*, “slander”; *βλασφημεῖν, blasphēmein*, “slander”

At a Glance

The word. Παρρησία, from πᾶν (*pan*), “all”, and ῥῆσις (*rhēsis*), “saying”, is saying everything: freedom of speech, frankness. Εὐθυρρημοσύνη is plain speaking, λαλεῖν to talk or speak, and σιωπή silence.

In the *Meditations*. Frankness is first something to bear: Diognetus taught Marcus "to put up with frankness" (1.6). His own rule is order and few words: "Speak, both in the senate and to anyone whatever, in good order, not obtrusively; use sound speech" (8.30). The test of speech is its use: the Old Comedy reminded "not uselessly" through its "plain speaking" (11.6.2).

In this edition. Παρρησία is "frankness", or "frankly" in a phrase; εὐθυρρημοσύνη is "plain speaking", λαλεῖν "speak", σιωπή "in silence"; λόγος (*logos*), where it is speech, is "word", "speech" or "reply".

A place to read. 11.6.2, where the Old Comedy, "with a schoolmaster's frankness", reminds of freedom from vanity "through its very plain speaking", and Marcus asks to what target the later comedy ever looked.

Meaning

Παρρησία (*parrēsia*) is speech that holds nothing back, frankness. Εὐθυρρημοσύνη (*euthyrrēmosynē*), from εὐθύς (*euthys*), "straight", and ῥῆμα (*rhēma*), "word", is straight speaking; Marcus has it once, beside παρρησία (11.6.2). Λαλεῖν (*lalein*) is to talk, in older Greek often to chatter; Marcus uses it plainly, of speech in the senate (8.30). From φλυαρεῖν (*phlyarein*), to talk nonsense, comes ἀφλύαρος (*aphlyaros*), "freedom from idle talk" (5.5); πολυρρήμων (*polyrrēmōn*) is "a man of many words" (3.5). Σιωπή (*siōpē*) is silence. Λόγος, speech as well as reason, has its sub-entry in Mind and reason; λέγειν (*legein*), "say" or "speak", runs through the whole book.

Use in the book

Book I teaches speech first as something received. From Diognetus, his painting master, Marcus learned "to put up with frankness" (1.6), and in Book VI he recalls that Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, bore with men who frankly opposed his views and was glad if someone pointed out what was better (6.30.4; see Kindness and correction). Severus, usually taken to be Claudius Severus, the Peripatetic, had "openness towards those he found fault with" (1.14.2; see Friendship), and Antoninus had "very few and very rare" secrets, "and those only on public matters" (1.16.7). Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, taught him "to keep away from rhetoric, poetry and fine language" and "to write letters artlessly" (1.7.2; see Simplicity and sincerity), and not "to

deliver little exhortations" (1.7.1; see Learning, practice and correction), and Marcus thanks the gods "that I made no further progress in rhetoric and poetry" (1.17.4). Alexander the grammarian, his teacher of Greek, met faults of speech by introducing the right expression, by way of an answer or "of a shared consideration of the thing itself and not the word" (1.10; see Kindness and correction). Frankness is first something borne, then something practised, and the speech Marcus learns is plain.

His own rule fits in one line: "Speak, both in the senate and to anyone whatever, in good order, not obtrusively; use sound speech" (8.30). The rule is one for the senate and for anyone; "in good order", κοσμίως (*kosmiōs*), is the adverb Marcus uses also of following God (3.16.2; see Cosmos and order). He is also to "speak as seems to you most just; only kindly and with self-respect and without pretence" (8.5); to be "neither a man of many words nor of many affairs" (3.5; see Daimon), nor "muddled in conversations" (8.51); to count "freedom from idle talk" among the qualities "wholly in your power" (5.5); not "to talk idly with the layman", which is "common to every school" (9.41; see Philosophy); and, for justice, to say what is true "freely and without circumlocution" (12.1.1; see Justice). Nor is talk to stand in for being: "No longer discuss at all what sort of man the good man is, but be such" (10.16).

Frankness also turns inward. Marcus is to form impressions only of things such that if someone suddenly asked, "What are you thinking now?", "you could at once answer frankly, 'This and that'" (3.4.2; see Simplicity and sincerity). In 12.4 no one, bidden by a god or a sensible teacher to think nothing "that he will not at the same moment also bring out, crying it aloud", would endure it "even for one day" (see Reputation and praise); "crying it aloud" is the correction of Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts for the witnesses' "knowing it". Frankness can be read here as a mind with nothing in it that could not be said.

Marcus weighs frank speech for its own sake once, in his short history of the stage (11.6.1; see Drama and role). "After tragedy the Old Comedy was brought on, with a schoolmaster's frankness, and of freedom from vanity reminding not uselessly, through its very plain speaking; to some such end Diogenes too took these things up" (11.6.2).

Diogenes, the edition's note says, is the Cynic: Diogenes of Sinope, of the fourth century BC.[500] Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, lists seven tragedies under his name, but reports that Satyrus gave them to Philiscus of Aegina, a pupil of Diogenes.[501] Of the Middle and the New Comedy, "which little by little slid down into the virtuosity of imitation", where "which" is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, as the edition's note records, Marcus asks: "For that some useful things are said by these too is not unknown; but the whole project of such poetry and dramaturgy, to what target did it ever look?" Frankness is praised for what it does, and skill in speech without a target is the decline.

Silence has almost no place in the book. Σιωπή comes once, and not as a virtue: like the piglet being sacrificed, "kicking and squealing", is "he who laments on the little bed, alone, in silence" (10.28; see Pain and pleasure). Marcus' discipline of speech is not silence but measure: few words, in good order, true, and frank, and it begins with bearing the frankness of others.

Places to read

Every chapter in which παρρησία, εὐθυρρημοσύνη, λαλεῖν, σιωπή or another word of the sub-entries occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with eight places where speaking is the matter in λόγος or λέγειν (5.3, 6.53, 7.44, 8.5, 11.19, 12.3.1, 12.17, 12.29). Λόγος as "word" at 4.19, λέγειν in its other uses, among them the many places where saying is paired with doing, ἰσηγορία (*isēgoria*), "equal freedom of speech" (1.14.1), and the words of flattery and of faults of speech are left out.

1.6 From Diognetus Marcus learned to put up with frankness, and to have written dialogues as a boy.

1.7.1 From Rusticus Marcus learned not to be drawn into sophistic ambition, nor to deliver little exhortations, nor to parade himself.

1.7.2 Rusticus taught Marcus to keep away from rhetoric, poetry and fine language, and to write letters artlessly.

---

[500] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 6.20 and 6.79.

[501] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 6.80.

1.7.3 Rusticus taught Marcus to read carefully and not to assent quickly to those who talk round a subject.

1.9.2 From Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew, Marcus learned to be in tune with everyone, so that his company was more agreeable than any flattery.

1.10 Alexander the grammarian did not reprove faults of speech, but introduced the right expression by way of an answer or of a shared consideration of the thing and not the word.

1.12 Alexander the Platonist, usually identified as Marcus' secretary for Greek letters, taught Marcus not often, nor without necessity, to say or write in a letter that he was busy.

1.14.2 Severus showed openness towards those he found fault with, and his friends had no need to guess what he wanted.

1.16.6 Antoninus gave way ungrudgingly to those with a particular ability, in expression or in knowledge of laws and customs.

1.16.7 Antoninus had very few secrets, and those only on public matters.

1.17.4 Marcus thanks the gods that he made no further progress in rhetoric and poetry.

2.12 Among the things for the intelligent faculty to attend to are the men whose opinions and voices good repute rests on.

3.4.2 Marcus is to accustom himself to form impressions only of things such that, if suddenly asked what he is thinking, he could answer at once and frankly.

3.5 Marcus is to be neither a man of many words nor of many affairs.

3.12 If Marcus does the work in hand by right reason, content with heroic truth in what he says and utters, he will live well.

3.16.2 Peculiar to the good man is to keep the daimon within serene, uttering nothing contrary to the truth and doing nothing contrary to what is just.

4.33 Words once in common use are now glosses, and so are the names of famous men; what deserves effort is a just understanding, social actions and speech such as never to lie.

4.46 Marcus is to remember Heraclitus of Ephesus, the philosopher of about 500 BC: men are at odds with the reason with which they most perpetually converse, and one must not act and speak as if asleep.

5.3 Marcus is to judge himself worthy of every word and deed according to nature, and not be distracted by the blame or word of others.

5.5 Freedom from idle talk is among the qualities wholly in Marcus' power.

6.30.4 Antoninus bore with men who frankly opposed his views, and rejoiced if someone pointed out what was better.

6.47 Marcus is to bear in mind that so many clever orators, philosophers and others have long been lying dead.

6.53 Marcus is to accustom himself to be at what another says and, as far as possible, inside the soul of the speaker.

7.4 One must keep track of what is said word by word, and see to what target the reference is.

7.44 In words of Plato's *Apology*, Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, would make a just reply to the man who thinks one should weigh the risk of living or dying.

7.66 It is not enough that Socrates argued more adroitly with the sophists; one must look at what sort of soul he had.

8.5 Marcus is to do what the nature of man demands and speak as seems to him most just, only kindly, with self-respect and without pretence.

8.30 Marcus is to speak, both in the senate and to anyone whatever, in good order, not obtrusively, and to use sound speech.

8.44 Those who pursue fame after death do not reckon that later men will be like those they find burdensome now, and Marcus asks what it is to him if they echo with such voices.

8.51 Marcus is to be neither slovenly in actions, nor muddled in conversations, nor wandering in impressions.

9.27 When others censure or hate Marcus, or utter such things, he is to go within their little souls and see what sort of people they are.

9.41 In his illness Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, did not speak to visitors of his body's passions; not to talk idly with the layman is common to every school.

10.16 Marcus is no longer to discuss what sort of man the good man is, but to be such.

10.28 Marcus is to form the impression that whoever is distressed or discontented is like the piglet being sacrificed, and so is he who laments on the little bed, alone, in silence.

10.38 What jerks the puppet is hidden within: that is eloquence, that is life, that is man.

11.2 Marcus will despise a delightful song if he divides its tuneful voice into its notes and asks of each whether he is overcome by it.

11.6.2 The Old Comedy reminded of freedom from vanity, not uselessly, through its schoolmaster's frankness and plain speaking, as Diogenes the Cynic did; the later comedy slid into the virtuosity of imitation.

11.15 The simple and good man shows himself at once, in the voice and in the eyes.

11.19 Among the turnings of the ruling centre that Marcus is to wipe away is saying what is not from himself, which he is to believe among the most absurd things.

11.34 Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, said that one who kisses his child must say inwardly, "Tomorrow perhaps you will die", and that nothing is ill-omened that signifies a work of nature.

12.1.1 Marcus is to direct the present towards justice, so that he says what is true freely and without circumlocution, and neither opinion nor voice is to impede him.

12.3.1 If Marcus separates from his understanding all that lies outside it, the intelligent faculty may live released by itself, doing what is just, wanting what happens and saying what is true.

12.4 No one, bidden by a god or a sensible teacher to think nothing he would not at once bring out, would endure it for one day.

12.5 Men would not so argue with the gods unless the gods were most good and most just.

12.17 If it is not a duty, Marcus is not to do it; if it is not true, he is not to say it.

12.29 The preservation of life is to see each thing through, and with the whole soul to do what is just and to say what is true.

12.31 Among the things Marcus asks whether to long for is to use the voice.

Epictetus and the Stoics

The *Handbook*, Arrian's digest of the teaching of Epictetus, sets out a rule of speech. Silence should be the rule for the most part, or only what is necessary should be said, and in few words; a man should speak rarely, when the occasion calls him, and then not about gladiators, horse races, athletes or food and drink, the talk of everywhere, and least of all about men, blaming, praising or comparing them; if he can, he should bring the talk of his company round by his own words to what is fitting, and if he is cut off among strangers, he should keep silent.[502] The *Handbook*'s two words for this are Marcus' two, σιωπή and λαλεῖν. In a discourse that bears the title "To those who read and discuss for display", Epictetus allows a style of exhortation, as there are styles of refutation and of teaching, but asks who ever named a fourth with them, the style of display; exhortation is the power to show one man or many the conflict in which they are tossed about, wanting what leads to happiness and seeking it elsewhere.[503] His teacher Rufus, he recalls, used to say, "If you have time to praise me, I am saying nothing", and spoke so that each listener thought someone had denounced him.[504] Aulus Gellius, the Roman writer of the second century, reports a like teaching of the philosopher Musonius: when a philosopher exhorts, warns, persuades or rebukes, and the hearers shout their praise and are carried away by the charm of his voice, both the man speaking and those listening labour in vain, and it is not a

[502] Epictetus, *Handbook* 33.2–3.

[503] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.23 (title) and 3.23.33–34.

[504] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.23.29; Rufus is his teacher at 1.7.32 and 1.9.29.

philosopher speaking but a flute-player playing; the greatest admiration brings forth not words but silence, as Homer has the hearers of Odysseus fall silent when his tale ends.[505] Rusticus' lesson not "to deliver little exhortations" (1.7.1) can be read beside this criticism of the speech that seeks applause.

Other ancient sources

Diogenes the Cynic was asked, Diogenes Laertius reports, what is most beautiful among men, and answered, "Frankness".[506] Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, wrote an essay on how to tell a flatterer from a friend, much of which concerns frankness. Frankness, he writes, is said and thought to be the very voice of friendship, as a living creature has its own voice, and so the flatterer imitates it too.[507] Of the comic poets he says that they put many severe and civic things before the theatre, but the laughter and buffoonery mixed in, like a nasty relish poured over food, made their frankness faded and useless, ἄχρηστον (*achrēston*), so that the speakers were left with a reputation for spite and indecency, and the listeners took nothing useful from what was said.[508] Marcus' verdict that the Old Comedy reminded "not uselessly", οὐκ ἀχρήστως (*ouk achrēstōs*; 11.6.2), can be read as an answer to the same question with the opposite judgement.

Translation in this edition

Παρρησία is "frankness" (1.6, 11.6.2), and μετὰ παρρησίας (*meta parrēsias*) "frankly" (3.4.2); the adverb παρρησιαστικῶς (*parrēsiastikōs*) is "frankly" (6.30.4). Εὐθυρρημοσύνη is "plain speaking" (11.6.2), kept apart from "frankness", as the Glossary records. Λαλεῖν is "speak" (8.30) and "did I speak" in Epicurus' words (9.41); περιλαλεῖν (*perilalein*) is "talk round a subject" (1.7.3) and συμφλυαρεῖν (*symphlyarein*) "talk idly with" (9.41). Σιωπή is "in silence" (10.28). Ἀπόρρητα (*aporrēta*) are "secrets" (1.16.7), τὸ ἀνεπίκρυπτον (*to anepikrypton*) "openness" (1.14.2), περιπλοκή (*periplokē*) "circumlocution" (12.1.1). Φθέγγεσθαι (*phthengesthai*) is "utter" (3.12) and "uttering"

[505] Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 5.1.
[506] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 6.69.
[507] Plutarch, *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 5, 51c.
[508] Plutarch, *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 27, 68b–c.

(3.16.2), ἐκφωνεῖν (*ekphōnein*) “utter” (9.27), and φωνή “voices” (2.12, 8.44) and “voice” (11.2, 11.15, 12.1.1, 12.31); its φθόγγοι (*phthongoi*) are the “notes” of a song (11.2). Λέξις (*lexis*) is “words” (4.33) and, in κατὰ λέξιν (*kata lexin*), “word by word” (7.4); ῥῆμα is “the word” (1.10), and φραστικός (*phrastikos*), with the article, “expression” (1.16.6). Διαλέγεσθαι (*dialegesthai*) is “deliver” with λογάρια (*logaria*), “little exhortations” (1.7.1), “argued” (7.66), “discuss” (10.16) and “argue” (12.5); διάλογοι (*dialogoi*) are “dialogues” (1.6). Ἐπιστόλια (*epistolia*) are “letters” (1.7.2) and ἐπιστολή (*epistolē*) “a letter” (1.12). Ῥητορική (*rhētorikē*) is “rhetoric” (1.7.2, 1.17.4), ἀστειολογία (*asteiologia*) “fine language” (1.7.2), ῥήτορες (*rhētores*) “orators” (6.47) and ῥητορεία (*rhētoreia*) “eloquence” (10.38). Γεγωνίσκειν (*gegōniskein*) is “crying it aloud” (12.4). Βλασφημία (*blasphēmia*) is “slander” (4.44, 8.41), and the verb βλασφημεῖν (*blasphēmein*) “slander” (8.51). Ὁμιλία (*homilia*) is “company” (1.9.2) and “conversations” (8.51, 9.41), ὁμιλεῖν (*homilein*) “converse” (4.46), and ἐπιφθέγγεσθαι (*epiphthengesthai*), with ἔνδον (*endon*), “say inwardly” (11.34). Λόγος, where it is speech, is “word” (4.19; 5.3 twice), “speech” (4.33, 8.30) and “reply” (7.44; see Mind and reason). Λέγειν is “say” and “speak” throughout, with “what is said” (7.4), “what another says” and “the speaker” (6.53). Ἰσηγορία (*isēgoria*) is “equal freedom of speech” (1.14.1; see Citizenship).

ἀνεπίκρυπτος

Attested: ἀνεπίκρυπτον (*anepikrypton*; 1.14.2). Not hidden; with the article, openness. From Severus: “openness towards those he found fault with; and that his friends had no need to guess what he wanted or did not want: it was plain” (1.14.2). A, the Vatican manuscript, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, omit “or did not want”. Lemma: ἀνεπίκρυπτος.

ἀπόρρητος

Attested: ἀπόρρητα (*aporrēta*; 1.16.7). Not to be spoken; as a noun, secrets. Of Antoninus Pius: “not having many secrets, but very few and very rare, and those only on public matters” (1.16.7). Lemma: ἀπόρρητος.

ἀστειολογία

Attested: ἀστειολογίας (*asteiologias*; 1.7.2). Elegant or witty talk. From Rusticus, “to keep away from rhetoric, poetry and fine language” (1.7.2). Lemma: ἀστειολογία.

ἀφλύαρος

Attested: ἀφλύαρον (*aphlyaron*; 5.5). Free from idle talk; with the article, freedom from it. Among the qualities “wholly in your power”: “kindliness, freedom, freedom from excess, freedom from idle talk, elevation” (5.5). Lemma: ἀφλύαρος.

βλασφημέω

Attested: βλασφημοίη (*blasphēmoiē*; 8.51). To speak ill of, to slander. “As if someone standing by a clear, sweet spring should slander it, and it does not stop sending up drinking water” (8.51; see Inner retreat and citadel). Lemma: βλασφημέω.

βλασφημία

Attested: βλασφημία (*blasphēmia*; 4.44, 8.41). Evil speaking, slander. Among the things as usual and familiar as the rose in spring are “disease, death, slander, plotting” (4.44); the things peculiar to the mind no one else impedes, “for fire does not touch it, nor iron, nor a tyrant, nor slander, nor anything at all”, once it has become the round sphere of Empedocles, the philosopher-poet of fifth-century Acragas (8.41; see Obstacle and reservation). Lemma: βλασφημία.

γεγωνίσκω

Attested: γεγωνίσκων (*gegōniskōn*; 12.4). To cry aloud, to make oneself heard. If a god or a sensible teacher bids a man consider and think nothing within himself “that he will not at the same moment also bring out, crying it aloud”, he will not endure it for one day (12.4). The word is the correction of Johann Jacob Reiske, which Leopold prints; the witnesses have γε γινώσκων (*ge ginōskōn*), “knowing it”. Lemma: γεγωνίσκω.

διαλέγομαι

Attested: διαλέγεσθαι (*dialegesthai*; 1.7.1, 10.16), διελέγετο (*dielegeto*; 7.66), διελεγόμεθα (*dielegometha*; 12.5). To converse, discuss, argue; with a speech as object, to deliver it. From Rusticus, not “to deliver little exhortations” (1.7.1); Socrates “argued more adroitly with the sophists” (7.66); “No longer discuss at all what sort of man the good

man is, but be such" (10.16); "we would not so argue with the gods unless they are most good and most just" (12.5). Lemma: διαλέγομαι.

διάλογος

Attested: διαλόγους (*dialogous*; 1.6). A dialogue, a written conversation. From Diognetus, "to have written dialogues as a boy" (1.6). Lemma: διάλογος.

ἐκφωνέω

Attested: ἐκφωνῶσιν (*ekphōnōsin*; 9.27). To speak out, to utter. "When another censures you or hates you, or they utter some such things, go to their little souls" (9.27). Lemma: ἐκφωνέω.

ἐπιστολή

Attested: ἐπιστολῇ (*epistolēi*; 1.12). A letter. From Alexander the Platonist, "not often, nor without necessity, to say to anyone or write in a letter 'I am busy'" (1.12; see Duty and fitting action). Lemma: ἐπιστολή.

ἐπιστόλιον

Attested: ἐπιστόλια (*epistolia*; 1.7.2). A letter, the diminutive of ἐπιστολή. From Rusticus, "to write letters artlessly, like the one he himself wrote to my mother from Sinuessa" (1.7.2). Lemma: ἐπιστόλιον.

ἐπιφθέγγομαι

Attested: ἐπιφθέγγεσθαι (*epiphthengesthai*; 11.34). To say in addition, to say over a thing; with ἔνδον, to say inwardly. "The one who kisses the child, said Epictetus, must say inwardly: 'Tomorrow perhaps you will die'" (11.34; see Love and affection). Lemma: ἐπιφθέγγομαι.

εὐθυρρημοσύνη

Attested: εὐθυρρημοσύνης (*euthyrrēmosynēs*; 11.6.2). Straight speaking, saying a thing outright. The Old Comedy reminded "of freedom from vanity … not uselessly, through its very plain speaking" (11.6.2). Lemma: εὐθυρρημοσύνη.

λαλέω

Attested: λαλεῖν (*lalein*; 8.30), ἐλάλουν (*elaloun*; 9.41). To talk, to speak. "Speak, both in the senate and to anyone whatever, in good order, not obtrusively" (8.30); in Epicurus'

words, “nor … did I speak about any such things to those who came in” (9.41). Lemma: λαλέω.

λέξις

Attested: λέξεις (*lexeis*; 4.33), λέξιν (*lexin*; 7.4). A word, an expression; κατὰ λέξιν, word by word. “Words once in common use are now glosses” (4.33); “One must keep track of what is said word by word” (7.4). Lemma: λέξις.

λογάριον

Attested: λογάρια (*logaria*; 1.7.1). A little speech, the diminutive of λόγος. From Rusticus, not “to deliver little exhortations” (1.7.1), where the adjective προτρεπτικά (*protreptika*), “exhorting”, is rendered in the noun. Lemma: λογάριον.

ὁμιλέω

Attested: ὁμιλοῦσι (*homilousi*; 4.46). To be in company with, to converse. In words drawn from Heraclitus, “the thing with which they most perpetually converse, the reason that governs the whole, is the thing they are at odds with” (4.46). Lemma: ὁμιλέω.

ὁμιλία

Attested: ὁμιλίαν (*homilian*; 1.9.2), ὁμιλίαις (*homiliais*; 8.51), ὁμιλίαι (*homiliai*; 9.41). Company, intercourse, conversation. From Sextus, “being in tune with everyone, so that his company was more agreeable than any flattery” (1.9.2); “Be neither slovenly in actions, nor muddled in conversations, nor wandering in impressions” (8.51); in Epicurus’ words, “In my illness my conversations were not about the passions of the poor body” (9.41). Lemma: ὁμιλία.

παρρησία

Attested: παρρησίας (*parrēsias*; 1.6, 3.4.2), παρρησίαν (*parrēsian*; 11.6.2). Freedom of speech, frankness. From Diognetus, “to put up with frankness” (1.6); “you could at once answer frankly, ‘This and that’” (3.4.2), for μετὰ παρρησίας; the Old Comedy “with a schoolmaster’s frankness” (11.6.2). Lemma: παρρησία.

παρρησιαστικός

Attested: παρρησιαστικῶς (*parrēsiastikōs*; 6.30.4). Given to frank speech; the adverb, frankly. In Antoninus, “his bearing with (those) who frankly opposed his views”

(6.30.4), where “those” is a supplement of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century. Lemma: παρρησιαστικός.

περιλαλέω

Attested: περιλαλοῦσι (*perilalousi*; 1.7.3). To talk round about, to chatter. From Rusticus, not “quickly assent to those who talk round a subject” (1.7.3). Lemma: περιλαλέω.

περιπλοκή

Attested: περιπλοκῆς (*periplokēs*; 12.1.1). An entanglement; in speech, circumlocution. Justice, “so that freely and without circumlocution you say what is true and do what accords with law and with worth” (12.1.1). Lemma: περιπλοκή.

πολυρρήμων

Attested: πολυρρήμων (*polyrrēmōn*; 3.5). Of many words: “be neither a man of many words nor of many affairs” (3.5). Lemma: πολυρρήμων.

ῥῆμα

Attested: ῥήματος (*rhēmatos*; 1.10). A word, an expression. Alexander the grammarian corrected a fault by way “of a shared consideration of the thing itself and not the word” (1.10). Lemma: ῥῆμα.

ῥητορεία

Attested: ῥητορεία (*rhētoreia*; 10.38). Eloquence, the power of speech. “What jerks the puppet is that which is hidden within: that is eloquence, that is life, that, if one must say it, is man” (10.38; see Body and flesh). Leopold thinks the place hardly sound, and reports ῥητορία (*rhētoria*) in A, as the edition’s note records. Lemma: ῥητορεία.

ῥητορική

Attested: ῥητορικῆς (*rhētorikēs*; 1.7.2), ῥητορικῇ (*rhētorikēi*; 1.17.4). The art of speaking, rhetoric. From Rusticus, “to keep away from rhetoric, poetry and fine language” (1.7.2); “that I made no further progress in rhetoric and poetry” (1.17.4). Lemma: ῥητορική.

ῥήτωρ

Attested: ῥήτορες (*rhētores*; 6.47). A public speaker, an orator. Among the dead, “so many clever orators are, so many dignified philosophers” (6.47). Lemma: ῥήτωρ.

σιωπή

Attested: σιωπῇ (*siōpēi*; 10.28). Silence; the dative, in silence. “Like it too is he who laments on the little bed, alone, in silence” (10.28). Lemma: σιωπή.

συμφλυαρέω

Attested: συμφλυαρεῖν (*symphlyarein*; 9.41). To talk nonsense with someone: “not to stand apart from philosophy in whatever befalls, nor to talk idly with the layman and the man who does not study nature, is common to every school” (9.41). “The man who does not study nature” is ἀφυσιολόγῳ (*aphysiologōi*), Gataker’s correction, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have φυσιολόγῳ (*physiologōi*), “the man who studies nature”. Lemma: συμφλυαρέω.

φθέγγομαι

Attested: φθέγγῃ (*phthengēi*; 3.12), φθεγγόμενον (*phthengomenon*; 3.16.2). To utter, to speak aloud: “with heroic truth in what you say and utter” (3.12); “uttering nothing contrary to the truth and doing nothing contrary to what is just” (3.16.2; see Daimon). Lemma: φθέγγομαι.

φραστικός

Attested: φραστικήν (*phrastikēn*; 1.16.6). Skilled in expression; with the article, the faculty of expression. Antoninus gave way ungrudgingly to those who had some particular ability, “in expression, say, or in knowledge of laws or customs” (1.16.6). Lemma: φραστικός.

φωνή

Attested: φωναί (*phōnai*; 2.12), φωναῖς (*phōnais*; 8.44), φωνήν (*phōnēn*; 11.2), φωνή (*phōnē*; 11.15, 12.1.1), φωνῇ (*phōnēi*; 12.31). Voice, sound; what others say. “What are they whose opinions and voices ⟨confer⟩ good repute?” (2.12); “if those others echo with such voices” (8.44); “at once the voice rings so, at once it stands out in the eyes” (11.15), where “rings” is ἠχεῖ (*ēchei*), the correction of Reiske and of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*, which Leopold prints for the manuscripts’ ἔχει

(*echei*); “neither another’s vice impede you, nor opinion, nor voice” (12.1.1); “To use the voice?” (12.31). Lemma: φωνή.

See also

Body and flesh; Citizenship; Cosmos and order; Daimon; Drama and role; Duty and fitting action; Friendship; Inner retreat and citadel; Justice; Kindness and correction; Learning, practice and correction; Love and affection; Mind and reason; Obstacle and reservation; Pain and pleasure; Philosophy; Reputation and praise; Simplicity and sincerity.

Truth and falsehood

Truth in nature, in the soul and in speech · Meditations

ἀλήθεια, alētheia, “truth”, “Truth”, “truly”, “in truth”; *ἀληθής, alēthēs*, “true”, “what is true”, “the truth”, “truthful”, “real”, “truly”; *ἀληθινός, alēthinos*, “true”, “truly”; *ἀληθεύειν, alētheuein*, “say truly”; *φιλαλήθης, philalēthēs*, “love of truth”; *ἀναλήθης, analēthēs*, “falsely”; *ψεύδεσθαι, pseudesthai*, “lie”, “be lying”; *ψευδής, pseudēs*, “false”; *ψεύστης, pseustēs*, “liars”; *ψευδολογία, pseudologia*, “lying”; *διαψεύδεσθαι, diapseudesthai*, “lie”, “falsely”, “error”; *ἀψευδής, apseudēs*, “truthfulness”; *ἀδιάψευστος, adiapseustos*, “free from deceit”; *ἀπάτη, apatē*, “deception”; *ἐξαπατᾶν, exapatān*, “deceiving”; *ἀνεξαπάτητος, anexapatētos*, “freedom … from being deceived”; *εὐεξαπάτητος, euexapatētos*, “easily deceived”; *ἐλέγχειν, elenchein*, “refute”, “test”, “put … to the test”

At a Glance

The word. Ἀλήθεια is truth and ἀληθής true, what does not lie hidden. Ψεύδεσθαι is to lie and ψευδής false; ἀπάτη is deception, practised or suffered.

In the *Meditations*. Nature “is also named Truth, and is the first cause of all things true” (9.1.1), and the soul in its right shape “sees the truth of all things and the truth in itself” (11.12). Marcus asks of himself “speech such as never to lie” (4.33), and if anyone can refute him, “I will rejoice to shift position” (6.21).

In this edition. Ἀλήθεια is “truth”, at 9.1.1 “Truth”, a name of nature, and in set phrases “truly” or “in truth”; ἀληθής is “true”, with the article “what is true” or “the truth”, once “truthful” and once “real”; ψεύδεσθαι is “lie”, ψευδής “false” and ἀπάτη “deception”.

A place to read. 6.21, where Marcus will gladly change his view if anyone can refute him, for the truth harms no one, and he is harmed who persists in his own deception and ignorance.

Meaning

Ἀλήθεια (*alētheia*) and ἀληθής (*alēthēs*) are built on the root of λανθάνειν (*lanthanein*), "to escape notice", with the negative prefix: the true is what does not lie hidden. The words cover the truth of a statement, "What you say is true" (5.6.2), the reality of a thing, "the real gaping jaws of wild beasts" (3.2.3), and the truthfulness of a man, "truthful" (10.8.1); the adverb ἀληθῶς (*alēthōs*) marks the genuine article, "those who were true philosophers" (1.16.5). Ψεύδεσθαι (*pseudesthai*) is to lie and ψευδής (*pseudēs*) false. The compound διαψεύδεσθαι (*diapseudesthai*) is to lie at 4.33, but its perfect participle, the state of one who has been deceived, is "error" at 6.57, and Marcus' word for deception, ἀπάτη (*apatē*), is at 6.21 a man's "own". Ἐλέγχειν (*elenchein*) is to test, and so to refute. Marcus' ἀλήθεια is less often the truth of what is said than a virtue, set beside justice, self-control and courage (3.6.1), or the reality that the mind sees (4.11, 11.12).

Use in the book

Truth is first a name of nature. "And he who lies, too, is impious concerning the same goddess; for the nature of the whole is the nature of the things that are; and the things that are, at least, stand in affinity with all that exist. Further, she is also named Truth, and is the first cause of all things true" (9.1.1). The clause on the liar stands in A, the Vatican manuscript, and in the excerpts, which then call the nature of the whole "truly nature"; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, omits the clause and has "of the things that are", which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, takes from it. On Leopold's text the liar can be read as setting himself against what is, and against the goddess who is its nature. Of the two liars of 9.1.2, the willing one is impious as one who acts unjustly by deceiving, the unwilling one as one in discord with the nature of the whole, unable through neglect "to distinguish what is false from what is true" (9.1.2; see Justice). And truth is among the things that are one: "and one truth, if indeed there is also one perfection for the living beings that are of

one kind and share in the same reason" (7.9; see Interconnection).

In the soul truth is both sight and virtue. Marcus is not to form opinions such as the insolent man judges or wants him to judge, "but see things as they are in truth" (4.11), and the sphere of the soul is true to its form when it "shines with a light by which it sees the truth of all things and the truth in itself" (11.12; see Soul). As a virtue truth stands with justice, self-control and courage (3.6.1), among the virtues a thing may call for (3.11.2), and among what is peculiar to the rational soul (11.1.2; see Self-respect and shame). Marcus asks whether a lamp keeps its radiance until it is quenched, "while the truth and justice and self-control in you will be quenched first?" (12.15; see Virtue and excellence).

In speech truth is a rule. Since everlasting remembrance is "wholly empty", the one thing on which to spend effort is "a just understanding, social actions, speech such as never to lie, and a disposition that welcomes all that happens as necessary …" (4.33). The good man keeps his daimon serene, "uttering nothing contrary to the truth and doing nothing contrary to what is just" (3.16.2; see Daimon), and among the conditions on which Marcus "will live well" is being content "with heroic truth in what you say and utter" (3.12; see Daimon). The rule is short: "if it is not true, do not say it" (12.17; see Duty and fitting action); and the present is to be directed towards justice, "so that freely and without circumlocution you say what is true and do what accords with law and with worth" (12.1.1; see Justice). "Truthful" is one of the names Marcus gives himself (10.8.1; see Self-respect and shame), and Book I records "love of truth" from Severus, usually taken to be Claudius Severus, the Peripatetic among his teachers (1.14.1), and "truthfulness" in Claudius Maximus, the Stoic (1.15.3). He answers even for what others say of him: "Let it not be open to anyone to say truly of you that you are not simple, or that you are not good; but let whoever forms any of these opinions about you be lying. And all this is in your power" (10.32). The truth of their words depends on his conduct.

The truth he seeks he is ready to receive from others. "If anyone can refute me and show me that I am not forming opinions or acting rightly, I will rejoice to shift position; for I seek the truth, by which no one was ever harmed; but he is harmed who persists in his own deception and ignorance" (6.21). What a refutation removes is an error, and the harm

falls on the man who keeps it. Error has the power of a disease: “Or do you think error has less power than bile in the jaundiced and the venom in the man bitten by a mad dog?” (6.57; see Anger). Every soul, in a saying that Epictetus, the Stoic teacher whose lectures Arrian recorded, gives as that of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, “is deprived of truth unwillingly” (7.63; see Soul). Hence Marcus guards against being deceived. “Third in the rational constitution is freedom from rash assent and from being deceived” (7.55); Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being “free from rash assent, free from deceit” (4.49.2; see Courage and endurance); and a rational nature journeys well when “in impressions, it assents to nothing false or unclear” (8.7; see Assent and judgement).

Marcus’ truth can be read as a condition of the man before it is a property of his sentences: to see things as they are, to say only what is so, and to live so that whatever is said against him is a lie. And since nature is named Truth, the man who refutes him can be read as no enemy: to be set right is to be brought into agreement with the whole, and nothing is lost but a deception.

Places to read

Every chapter in which ἀλήθεια, ἀληθής or ἀληθῶς, ἀληθινός (*alēthinos*), ἀληθεύειν (*alētheuein*), φιλαλήθης (*philalēthēs*) or ἀναλήθης (*analēthēs*), or a word of the family of ψεύδεσθαι (ψευδής; ψεύστης, *pseustēs*; ψευδολογία, *pseudologia*; διαψεύδεσθαι; ἀψευδής, *apseudēs*; ἀδιάψευστος, *adiapseustos*) occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with the words of deception, ἀπάτη, ἐξαπατᾶν (*exapatān*), ἀνεξαπάτητος (*anexapatētos*) and εὐεξαπάτητος (*euexapatētos*), and ἐλέγχειν where it is the testing of things or opinions (3.11.2, 6.21). Ἐλέγχειν at 1.17.1, ἀπελέγχειν (*apelenchein*), “convict” (8.36), and παραλογιστής (*paralogistēs*), “deceiver” (6.13), are left out.

1.13 From Cinna Catulus, a Stoic teacher, Marcus learned to love his children truly.

1.14.1 From Severus Marcus had love of family, love of truth and love of justice.

1.15.3 Claudius Maximus had beneficence, readiness to forgive and truthfulness.

1.16.5 Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, honoured those who were true philosophers, without reproaching the others.

2.3 Marcus is to throw away the thirst for books, so as to die not grumbling but serene, truly, and grateful to the gods.

2.11.2 The gods have put it wholly in man's power not to fall into what is truly bad.

2.15 Everything is opinion, as was said to Monimus the Cynic; the use of the saying is plain, if one takes its pith as far as it is true.

2.16 The soul does violence to itself, fourth, when it pretends and does or says anything feignedly and falsely.

2.17.2 Philosophy lies in keeping the daimon within doing nothing at random, nothing falsely or with pretence.

3.2.3 The man with a feeling for the whole will look at the real gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than at those that painters and sculptors show.

3.6.1 If Marcus finds in human life anything better than justice, truth, self-control and courage, he is to turn to it with his whole soul.

3.11.2 Nothing so produces greatness of mind as to be able to test with method and truth each thing that presents itself; truth is among the virtues a thing may call for.

3.12 If Marcus does the work in hand following right reason and is content with heroic truth in what he says and utters, he will live well.

3.16.2 The good man keeps the daimon within serene, uttering nothing contrary to the truth and doing nothing contrary to what is just.

4.11 Marcus is not to form the opinions the insolent man holds, but to see things as they are in truth.

4.20 Marcus asks what need the truly beautiful has of anything, and answers, no more than law, truth, goodwill or self-respect; he asks which of these is beautiful because it is praised.

4.21.2 In the case of bodies buried and eaten, the inquiry into the truth is a division into the material and the causal.

4.33 What one must spend effort on is a just understanding, social actions, speech such as never to lie, and a disposition that welcomes all that happens.

4.49.2 Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-controlled, free from rash assent, free from deceit and the rest.

5.6.2 To the objector who says one must perceive that one acts socially, Marcus answers that what he says is true, but that he takes wrongly what is now being said.

5.12 Whoever conceived of wisdom, self-control, justice and courage as truly goods could not listen to the comic poet's line on goods, for it would not fit.

5.33 The things prized in life are empty; of faith, self-respect, justice and truth Marcus says, in words of Hesiod, the early Greek poet, "to Olympus from the wide-wayed earth".

6.21 If anyone can refute Marcus and show that he is not forming opinions or acting rightly, he will rejoice to shift position, for he seeks the truth, by which no one was ever harmed.

6.39 Marcus is to fit himself to the things that have fallen to his lot, and to love truly the people whose lot he shares.

6.47 Marcus is to bear in mind the dead of every kind; one thing here is worth much, to live with truth and justice, kindly to liars and the unjust.

6.57 Marcus asks why he is angry, and whether error has less power than bile in the jaundiced or venom in one bitten by a mad dog.

7.9 There is one universe, one God, one substance, one law and one truth, if indeed there is one perfection for the living beings of one kind.

7.45 Words of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, at his trial, from Plato's *Apology*, begin "For so it is,

men of Athens, in truth", and concern holding the post one has taken or been given.

7.46 In Socrates' words to Callicles, the Athenian with whom he argues in Plato's *Gorgias*, living for however long a time is perhaps a thing the man who is truly a man must let be.

7.55 Third in the rational constitution, after the social and the refusal to yield to the body, is freedom from rash assent and from being deceived.

7.63 Every soul, in a saying that Epictetus gives as Plato's, is deprived of truth unwillingly; to remember it makes Marcus milder towards all.

7.66 One might attend to Socrates' swaggering in the streets, if it was true; but what matters is what sort of soul he had.

7.68 Marcus asks what prevents the understanding from preserving itself in calm and in true judgement about what surrounds it.

8.1 If Marcus has truly seen where the matter lies, he is to let go of how he will seem.

8.7 A rational nature journeys well when, in impressions, it assents to nothing false or unclear.

9.1.1 He who lies is impious towards the same goddess as he who acts unjustly, for the nature of the whole is the nature of the things that are, and is also named Truth, the first cause of all things true.

9.1.2 He who lies willingly is impious as one who acts unjustly by deceiving; he who lies unwillingly as one in discord with the nature of the whole, carried through his own doing towards what is contrary to the truth, since by neglecting the resources nature gave him he can no longer distinguish false from true.

9.2 It would have been the part of a more gracious man to depart from among men without a taste of lying, pretence, luxury and vanity.

10.8.1 Among the names Marcus gives himself are good, self-respecting and truthful, and he is to take heed that he is never renamed.

10.13 The critics who are arrogant in praise and censure steal and snatch with the most honoured part of themselves, through which, when it wants,

faith, self-respect, truth, law and a good daimon come to be.

10.15 Men are to see and look into a true man living according to nature, and kill him if they do not tolerate him, for that is better than to live so.

10.32 No one is to be able to say truly that Marcus is not simple or not good; whoever forms such an opinion is to be lying, and this is in his power.

10.34 For one who holds the true principles, even the briefest saying, such as Homer's on the leaves, is enough as a reminder of freedom from distress and from fear.

11.1.2 The loving of neighbours, truth, self-respect and the honouring of nothing above itself are peculiar to the rational soul.

11.10 What is just will not be kept if we are at odds over things indifferent, or easily deceived and rash in assent and liable to waver.

11.12 The sphere of the soul is true to its form when it shines with a light by which it sees the truth of all things and the truth in itself.

11.18.2 Every soul is deprived unwillingly, as of truth, so also of dealing with each according to worth.

12.1.1 Marcus is to direct the present towards justice, so that he says what is true freely and without circumlocution.

12.3.1 If Marcus separates from his understanding all that is not properly his, the intelligent faculty may live released, doing what is just, wanting what happens and saying what is true.

12.15 Marcus asks whether the light of a lamp shines until it is quenched, while the truth, justice and self-control in him will be quenched first.

12.17 If it is not a duty, Marcus is not to do it; if it is not true, he is not to say it.

12.29 The preservation of life is to see each thing through and through and with the whole soul to do what is just and to say what is true.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives of the Philosophers*, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its

seventh book, reports their account of the true in their logic. A proposition, ἀξίωμα (*axiōma*), is what is true or false; Chrysippus, the school's third head, defined it in his *Dialectical Definitions* as what can be denied or affirmed, taken by itself. "It is day", when it is day, is true, and when it is not, false.[509] Of the wise man Diogenes reports that he will not opine, that is, will assent to nothing false.[510] Sextus Empiricus, the Sceptic philosopher and doctor, sets out a distinction between truth and the true drawn by some, and above all by the Stoics. The true is a proposition, a thing said, and so incorporeal; truth is a body, being knowledge that can declare all true things, and knowledge is the ruling centre in a certain state. The true is single, as "It is day"; truth is a system of many, and differs from the true as a people from a citizen. And the base man, the infant and the madman sometimes say something true without having knowledge of it, whereas truth goes with knowledge, and whoever has it is wise and never lies, even when he says something false, since he does not say it from a bad disposition: a doctor who tells a falsehood for his patient's safety says something false but does not lie, and a man is to be judged a liar from his disposition, not from his bare words.[511] Marcus' ἀλήθεια, the truth "in you" that may be quenched (12.15), can be read as the school's truth, a state of the ruling centre; his willing liar, impious because "by deceiving he acts unjustly" (9.1.2), can be read in the school's terms, the fault lying in the deceiving; and his rule "if it is not true, do not say it" (12.17) can be read as leaving no room for the wise man's useful falsehood. Marcus' rational nature, which journeys well when it "assents to nothing false or unclear" (8.7), can be read as following Epictetus' doctrine of assent (see Assent and judgement). If what appears to a man appears wrongly, Epictetus says, he himself bears the loss, for it cannot be that one man goes astray and another is harmed;[512] Marcus' "he is harmed who persists in his own deception and ignorance" (6.21) can be read beside it. His third field of training, which concerns assent, names among its aims ἀνεξαπατησία (*anexapatēsia*), freedom from being deceived (see Assent

[509] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.65, citing Chrysippus, *Dialectical Definitions*.

[510] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.121.

[511] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* 7.38–45.

[512] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.28.10.

and judgement),[513] the quality Marcus puts, with freedom from rash assent, third in the rational constitution (7.55).

Other ancient sources

In Plato's *Gorgias* Socrates says that he is one of those who would gladly be refuted if they said anything untrue and gladly refute anyone who did, and would be no less glad to be refuted than to refute; he counts it the greater good, as it is a greater good to be rid of the greatest evil oneself than to rid another of it, and he thinks no evil so great for a man as a false opinion on the matters they are discussing.[514] Marcus' "I will rejoice to shift position" (6.21) can be read as this gladness, and his harm of persisting in deception as Socrates' greatest evil. In the *Republic* Socrates argues that what is truly a lie, if one may call it so, is hated by gods and men: no one is willing to be deceived in the most sovereign part of himself about the most sovereign things, and the true lie is the ignorance in the soul of the man who has been deceived, of which the lie in words is only an imitation; and the divine is wholly without falsehood, ἀψευδές (*apseudes*; see Simplicity and sincerity).[515] The word is the one Marcus uses of Claudius Maximus' truthfulness (1.15.3), and the soul's "own deception and ignorance" (6.21) can be read as Plato's true lie.

Translation in this edition

Ἀλήθεια is "truth" at fifteen of its nineteen places, and "Truth" at 9.1.1, where it is a name of nature; with prepositions κατ' ἀλήθειαν (*kat' alētheian*) is "truly" (2.11.2) and "in truth" (4.11), and τῇ ἀληθείᾳ (*tēi alētheiāi*) "in truth" in Socrates' words (7.45). At 11.12 the one noun is rendered twice, "the truth of all things and the truth in itself"; at 3.11.2 ὁδῷ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ (*hodōi kai alētheiāi*) is "with method and truth". Ἀληθής is "true" (2.15, 5.6.2, 7.66, 7.68, 9.1.1, 10.34, 12.17), with the article "what is true" (9.1.2; τἀληθῆ, *talēthē*, 12.1.1, 12.3.1, 12.29), "the truth" (3.16.2, 9.1.2) and "truth" (11.18.2), "truthful" as one of Marcus' names (10.8.1) and "real" of the jaws of beasts (3.2.3); the adverb ἀληθῶς is "truly" (2.3, 8.1), with ὡς (*hōs*) "truly" (5.12, 7.46), and "true" in "true philosophers" (1.16.5). Ἀληθινός is "true" (10.15) and its adverb ἀληθινῶς (*alēthinōs*) "truly" (1.13, 6.39);

[513] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.2.2.

[514] Plato, *Gorgias* 458a–b.

[515] Plato, *Republic* 2, 382a–e.

ἀληθεύειν is “say truly” (10.32), and φιλαλήθης, with the article, “love of truth” (1.14.1). “True”, “truth” and “truly” render no other words but ὄντως (*ontōs*) in “the truly beautiful” (4.20) and αὐτοειδής (*autoeidēs*), “true to its form” (11.12). Ψεύδεσθαι is “lie” (9.1.1, 9.1.2) and “be lying” (10.32), ψευδής “false” (8.7) and “what is false” (9.1.2), ψεύστης “liars” (6.47) and ψευδολογία “lying” (9.2). Διαψεύδεσθαι is “lie” in “speech such as never to lie” (4.33); its participles give “falsely” for the adverb διεψευσμένως (*diepseusmenōs*; 2.17.2) and “error” for τὸ διεψευσμένον (*to diepseusmenon*; 6.57). “Falsely” renders also ἀναλήθως (*analēthōs*; 2.16). Ἀψευδής, with the article, is “truthfulness” (1.15.3), and ἀδιάψευστος “free from deceit” (4.49.2). Ἀπάτη is “deception” (6.21), ἐξαπατᾶν “deceiving” (9.1.2), ἀνεξαπάτητος, with the article, “freedom … from being deceived” (7.55) and εὐεξαπάτητος “easily deceived” (11.10); “deceiver” renders παραλογιστής (6.13). Ἐλέγχειν is “put … to the test” (1.17.1), “test” (3.11.2) and “refute” (6.21), and ἀπελέγχειν “convict” (8.36). “Lying” at 6.47 (“they have long been lying”) renders κεῖνται (*keintai*), of the dead. At 6.21 “shift position” renders μεταθήσομαι (*metathēsomai*; see Learning, practice and correction). At 10.13 “which becomes” renders ὅ (*ho*), Leopold’s own correction; the witnesses have ᾧ (*hōi*), “through which there comes to be”.

ἀδιάψευστος

Attested: ἀδιάψευστον (*adiapseuston*; 4.49.2). Not deceived, not deceiving; beside ἀπρόπτωτος (*aproptōtos*), “free from rash assent”, it can be read as freedom from being deceived, as at 7.55. Marcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being “free from rash assent, free from deceit, self-respecting, free” (4.49.2). The excerpts have ἀψευδῆ (*apseudē*), “truthful”, in a shorter list. Lemma: ἀδιάψευστος.

ἀλήθεια

Attested: ἀλήθειαν (*alētheian*; 2.11.2, 4.11, 6.21, 11.12), ἀληθείας (*alētheias*; 3.6.1, 3.11.2, 4.21.2, 6.47, 7.63), ἀληθείᾳ (*alētheiāi*; 3.11.2, 3.12, 7.45), ἀλήθεια (*alētheia*; 4.20, 5.33, 7.9, 9.1.1, 10.13, 11.1.2, 12.15). Truth: the reality of things, the sight of it, and a virtue of the soul. Of nature, “she is also named Truth” (9.1.1); of sight, “see things as they are in truth” (4.11) and “sees the truth of all things and the truth in itself” (11.12); as a virtue, “justice, truth, self-control,

courage" (3.6.1) and "the truth and justice and self-control in you" (12.15); sought, "for I seek the truth, by which no one was ever harmed" (6.21). Lemma: ἀλήθεια.

ἀληθεύω

Attested: ἀληθεύοντι (*alētheuonti*; 10.32). To speak truly. "Let it not be open to anyone to say truly of you that you are not simple, or that you are not good" (10.32). Lemma: ἀληθεύω.

ἀληθής

Attested: ἀληθοῦς (*alēthous*; 2.15, 11.18.2), ἀληθῆ (*alēthē*; 3.2.3, 3.16.2), ἀληθές (*alēthes*; 5.6.2, 7.66, 12.17), ἀληθεῖ (*alēthei*; 7.68), ἀληθῶν (*alēthōn*; 9.1.1, 9.1.2, 10.34), ἀληθέσι (*alēthesi*; 9.1.2), ἀληθής (*alēthēs*; 10.8.1), τἀληθῆ (*talēthē*; 12.1.1, 12.3.1, 12.29); the adverb ἀληθῶς (*alēthōs*; 1.16.5, 2.3, 5.12, 7.46, 8.1). True, real; of a man, truthful; with the article, what is true, the truth. "if it is not true, do not say it" (12.17); "say what is true" (12.1.1, 12.3.1, 12.29); "uttering nothing contrary to the truth" (3.16.2); "the real gaping jaws of wild beasts" (3.2.3); "truthful" (10.8.1). The adverb marks what is genuine, "true philosophers" (1.16.5), "the man who is truly a man" (7.46), or what is really so, "If, then, you have truly seen where the matter lies" (8.1). Lemma: ἀληθής.

ἀληθινός

Attested: ἀληθινόν (*alēthinon*; 10.15); the adverb ἀληθινῶς (*alēthinōs*; 1.13, 6.39). Genuine, true. "Let men see, let them look into a true man living according to nature" (10.15); "to love one's children truly" (1.13); "love these, but truly" (6.39). Lemma: ἀληθινός.

ἀναλήθης

Attested: the adverb ἀναλήθως (*analēthōs*; 2.16). Untrue; the adverb, falsely. The soul does violence to itself "when it pretends and does or says anything feignedly and falsely" (2.16). Lemma: ἀναλήθης.

ἀνεξαπάτητος

Attested: ἀνεξαπάτητον (*anexapatēton*; 7.55). Not to be deceived; with the article, freedom from being deceived. "Third in the rational constitution is freedom from rash assent and from being deceived" (7.55). Lemma: ἀνεξαπάτητος.

ἀπάτη

Attested: ἀπάτης (*apatēs*; 6.21). Deception, practised on another or suffered. “but he is harmed who persists in his own deception and ignorance” (6.21). Lemma: ἀπάτη.

ἀψευδής

Attested: ἀψευδές (*apseudes*; 1.15.3). Free from falsehood, truthful; with the article, truthfulness. Claudius Maximus had “beneficence, readiness to forgive, and truthfulness” (1.15.3). Lemma: ἀψευδής.

διαψεύδω

Attested: διεψευσμένως (*diepseusmenōs*; 2.17.2), διαψεύσασθαι (*diapseusasthai*; 4.33), διεψευσμένον (*diepseusmenon*; 6.57). In the middle voice, to lie; in the passive, to be deceived; the adverb from the perfect participle, falsely. “speech such as never to lie” (4.33); the daimon doing “nothing at random, nothing falsely or with pretence” (2.17.2); “do you think error has less power than bile in the jaundiced …?” (6.57), where τὸ διεψευσμένον is the state of one who has been deceived; Johann Jacob Reiske, the eighteenth-century German scholar, proposed “the principle … in the man deceived”, ⟨τὸ δόγμα⟩ … τῷ διεψευσμένῳ (*to dogma … tōi diepseusmenōi*), which Leopold does not print. At 4.33 one manuscript of the excerpts has the present διαψεύδεσθαι (*diapseudesthai*). Lemma: διαψεύδω.

ἐλέγχω

Attested: ἐλέγξειν (*elenxein*; 1.17.1), ἐλέγχειν (*elenchein*; 3.11.2), ἐλέγξαι (*elenxai*; 6.21). To put to the test, to examine, to refute. No combination of circumstances arose “to put me to the test” (1.17.1); “to be able to test with method and truth each thing that presents itself in life” (3.11.2); “If anyone can refute me” (6.21). Lemma: ἐλέγχω.

ἐξαπατάω

Attested: ἐξαπατῶν (*exapatōn*; 9.1.2). To deceive thoroughly. “So he who lies willingly is impious, in so far as by deceiving he acts unjustly” (9.1.2). Lemma: ἐξαπατάω.

εὐεξαπάτητος

Attested: εὐεξαπάτητοι (*euexapatētoi*; 11.10). Easily deceived. “what is just will not be kept if we are either at

odds over things indifferent, or easily deceived and rash in assent and liable to waver" (11.10). Lemma: εὐεξαπάτητος.

φιλαλήθης

Attested: φιλάληθες (*philalēthes*; 1.14.1). Loving truth; with the article, love of truth. "From my brother Severus: love of family, love of truth, love of justice" (1.14.1). Lemma: φιλαλήθης.

ψευδής

Attested: ψευδεῖ (*pseudei*; 8.7), ψευδῆ (*pseudē*; 9.1.2). False. A rational nature "assents to nothing false or unclear" (8.7); the unwilling liar "is now unable to distinguish what is false from what is true" (9.1.2). Lemma: ψευδής.

ψευδολογία

Attested: ψευδολογίας (*pseudologias*; 9.2). Lying, false speaking. "It would have been the part of a more gracious man, without a taste of lying and of all pretence and luxury and vanity, to depart from among men" (9.2). Lemma: ψευδολογία.

ψεύδομαι

Attested: ψευδόμενος (*pseudomenos*; 9.1.1, 9.1.2), ψευδέσθω (*pseudesthō*; 10.32). To lie, to speak falsely. "And he who lies, too, is impious concerning the same goddess" (9.1.1); "So he who lies willingly is impious" (9.1.2); "let whoever forms any of these opinions about you be lying" (10.32). At 9.1.1 the clause "And he who lies … goddess" stands in A and the excerpts; P omits it. In the same sentence A and the excerpts, which keep the clause, have ὄντως (*ontōs*), "truly", where Leopold prints P's ὄντων (*ontōn*), "of the things that are". Lemma: ψεύδομαι.

ψεύστης

Attested: ψεύσταις (*pseustais*; 6.47). A liar. "One thing here is worth much: to live one's life through with truth and justice, kindly to liars and the unjust" (6.47). Lemma: ψεύστης.

See also

Anger; Assent and judgement; Courage and endurance; Daimon; Duty and fitting action; Impulse; Interconnection; Justice; Learning, practice and correction; Self-respect and shame; Simplicity and sincerity; Soul; Virtue and excellence.

Alexander the grammarian

Correction without reproof · Meditations

Ἀλέξανδρος, Alexandros, "Alexander"; *γραμματικός, grammatikos*, "the grammarian"

At a Glance

The word. Alexander the grammarian is Alexander of Cotiaeum, grammarian and Homeric scholar, Marcus' teacher of Greek, as the edition's note at 1.10 says. The funeral speech that Aelius Aristides, the orator of the second century, wrote for him survives.

In the *Meditations*. He has one chapter and one lesson: "not to reprove", but to answer a fault of speech by introducing "just the expression that ought to have been used", in passing, "by some other such tactful reminder" (1.10; see Kindness and correction).

In this edition. Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ γραμματικοῦ (*Alexandrou tou grammatikou*) is "Alexander the grammarian", kept apart by its epithet from "Alexander the Platonist" (1.12), usually identified, as the edition's note there says, with Alexander of Seleucia, Marcus' secretary for Greek letters, and from Alexander of Macedon.

A place to read. 1.10, where the right expression is given "by way of an answer, or of a confirmation, or of a shared consideration of the thing itself and not the word".

Meaning

Γραμματικός (*grammatikos*), from γράμματα (*grammata*), "letters", is a man skilled in letters, and as a calling the grammarian, who taught correct speech and the reading and explaining of the poets. Book I has two Alexanders among Marcus' teachers and tells them apart by their callings (see Alexander the Platonist). The identification of the grammarian rests chiefly on Aristides' speech for Alexander, written as a letter to the council and people of Cotiaeum, a city of the Phrygians, which shows him at the emperors' court.[516] The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, names a Greek Alexander among the

[516] Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 32 Keil (12 Dindorf), *Funeral Speech for Alexander*, pp. 80–81 and 83 Jebb.

grammarians who taught Marcus, of Cotiaeum as modern editors print the text; the manuscript has *cotidianis*, "daily" (see Parents and education).[517]

Use in the book

The lesson belongs to his trade. The faults it names are the grammarian's own, "a barbarism or a solecism or a jarring expression". Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports the Stoics' definitions of the first two: a barbarism is a way of speaking that departs from the custom of well-regarded Greeks, and a solecism a phrase whose parts do not agree.[518] The lesson opens with a refusal: "not to reprove; not to pounce reproachfully on those who have come out with" them (1.10). The remedy is to say the thing rightly oneself, "deftly to introduce just the expression that ought to have been used, by way of an answer, or of a confirmation, or of a shared consideration of the thing itself and not the word, or by some other such tactful reminder" (1.10; see Kindness and correction). The right word comes back as a reply, or as agreement, or in the course of talking about the matter, and the speaker hears it without being reproved.

The lesson is about words, but its third way takes attention off the word and puts it on the thing, "the thing itself and not the word". A grammarian's authority lies in correcting; Alexander's, as Marcus records it, lay in correcting without reproof. The word "reproachfully" returns at 11.13, where Marcus is ready to show a man what he overlooks "not reproachfully" (see Kindness and correction); in Book I the rule is still a teacher's habit with language, and it is all that Marcus keeps of him. Of his teacher of Greek he records no rule of grammar, only the manner in which another's fault was mended. What Marcus owed Alexander can be read as a way of correcting that spares the person corrected.

Places to read

The one chapter in which Alexander the grammarian is named; the other places of the name Alexander are in its sub-entry (see Alexander the Platonist).

---

[517] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 2.3, in David Magie's Loeb text, whose apparatus gives *cotidianis* as the manuscript's reading.

[518] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.59.

1.10 From Alexander the grammarian Marcus learned not to reprove, nor to pounce reproachfully on a fault of speech, but deftly to introduce the expression that ought to have been used, by way of an answer, a confirmation or a shared consideration of the thing itself and not the word.

Other ancient sources

Aristides' funeral speech is addressed to the council and people of Cotiaeum. He had been reared and taught by Alexander, and could call him "tutor, teacher, father, companion".[519] Of Alexander's gentleness with ordinary men and with his pupils Aristides says much (see Kindness and correction), and the speech gives the rest of the man as well. Though Alexander had gone through every branch of learning and was more exact in each than its own teachers, he did not take the grandest of titles but kept to the old one, and he did not draw other men's pupils away but helped every teacher's school to grow.[520] Having such a voice, he did not withdraw into writing books, but chose to serve the old Greek authors, and he set out the poets, from Homer, Archilochus and Hesiod to Pindar, Sappho and Alcaeus; what he left in writing Aristides counts as fine, and better than anything else of its kind, yet only small images of his learning and judgement, though his work on Homer was enough to be an ornament in many ways.[521] He came at last into the emperors' courts, where one emperor took him over from another as an ornament of the palace, and came to hold there the place of a tutor, and not only of a teacher, to the children.[522] He was not ashamed to take fees for his art, but never asked a reward for a kindness; he restored almost the whole of his city anew, as Aristides had heard from its citizens; and in the books he corrected his city stood written beside his name.[523] He died very old, not wasted by illness, after a day spent as usual, letting go his life over his book.[524] Aristides names no pupil at court. The children to whom Alexander was tutor can be read as including Marcus, whose Greek grammarian the *Historia Augusta* calls Alexander, and

[519] Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 32 Keil (12 Dindorf), p. 80 Jebb.
[520] Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 32 Keil (12 Dindorf), p. 82 Jebb.
[521] Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 32 Keil (12 Dindorf), pp. 82–83, 85 and 86 Jebb.
[522] Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 32 Keil (12 Dindorf), p. 83 Jebb.
[523] Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 32 Keil (12 Dindorf), pp. 84–85 Jebb.
[524] Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 32 Keil (12 Dindorf), p. 88 Jebb.

Marcus' "the grammarian" as the old title that Aristides says he kept.

Translation in this edition

Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ γραμματικοῦ is "Alexander the grammarian" after παρά (*para*), "from" (1.10). The name Ἀλέξανδρος (*Alexandros*) has its sub-entry under Alexander the Platonist (see Alexander the Platonist); γραμματικός, which occurs only here, is "the grammarian". Τὸ ἀνεπίπληκτον (*to anepiplēkton*) is "not to reprove" and ὀνειδιστικῶς (*oneidistikōs*) "reproachfully" (see Kindness and correction), and ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι (*epilambanesthai*) is "pounce". Βάρβαρον ἢ σόλοικόν τι ἢ ἀπηχές (*barbaron ē soloikon ti ē apēches*) is "a barbarism or a solecism or a jarring expression", and ἐπιδεξίως (*epidexiōs*) "deftly". Ἐν τρόπῳ ἀποκρίσεως ἢ συνεπιμαρτυρήσεως ἢ συνδιαλήψεως (*en tropōi apokriseōs ē synepimartyrēseōs ē syndialēpseōs*) is "by way of an answer, or of a confirmation, or of a shared consideration"; περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, οὐχὶ περὶ τοῦ ῥήματος (*peri autou tou pragmatos, ouchi peri tou rhēmatos*) is "of the thing itself and not the word" (see Speech and silence), and ἐμμελοῦς παρυπομνήσεως (*emmelous parypomnēseōs*) "tactful reminder" (see Principles and reminders). J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, records no variant in the chapter; Leopold's testimonia, the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it, record that the Suda, the Byzantine lexicon, quotes words from it under ἀπηχές and ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι.

γραμματικός

Attested: γραμματικοῦ (*grammatikou*; 1.10). Of letters; as a noun, a grammarian, a teacher of correct speech and of the poets. "From Alexander the grammarian: not to reprove" (1.10). Lemma: γραμματικός.

See also

Alexander the Platonist; Kindness and correction; Parents and education; Principles and reminders; Speech and silence.

The Platonist remembered for a rule of courtesy · Meditations

Ἀλέξανδρος, Alexandros, “Alexander”; *Πλατωνικός, Platōnikos*, “the Platonist”; *ἄσχολος, ascholos*, “busy”; *ἀσχολία, ascholia*, “busyness”; *ἀσχολεῖσθαι, ascholeisthai*, “overbusy”, “be busied”

At a Glance

The word. Alexander the Platonist is usually identified, as the edition’s note says, with Alexander of Seleucia, the sophist nicknamed “Clay-Plato”, Marcus’ secretary for Greek letters, whose life Philostratus tells in his *Lives of the Sophists*.

In the *Meditations*. He is named once, for a single rule: “not often, nor without necessity”, to say or write “I am busy”, nor by this means “continually to excuse myself from the duties that arise from relations with those who live alongside us” (1.12).

In this edition. Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ (*Alexandrou tou Platōnikou*) is “Alexander the Platonist”, kept apart by its epithet from “Alexander the grammarian” (1.10), Marcus’ teacher of Greek, and from Alexander of Macedon, the conqueror (3.3, 6.24, 8.3, 9.29, 10.27); ἄσχολός εἰμι (*ascholos eimi*) is “I am busy”.

A place to read. 1.12, where Marcus learns not to say “I am busy” often or without necessity, nor to make business a standing excuse from his duties to the people around him.

Meaning

Ἀλέξανδρος (*Alexandros*) was a common Greek name, and Book I tells its two Alexanders apart by their callings: the grammarian, Alexander of Cotiaeum as the edition’s note at 1.10 names him, and the Platonist. Πλατωνικός (*Platōnikos*), “of Plato”, is said of a man who follows Plato; Marcus uses it once more, of “Demetrius the Platonist” among the “sharp men” long dead (8.25; see Death).

The edition’s note gives the usual identification, with Alexander of Seleucia. Philostratus says that most people called him Πηλοπλάτων (*Pēloplatōn*), “Clay-Plato”, that his city was Seleucia in Cilicia, and that he was on his way to the Paeonian peoples, summoned by the emperor Marcus, who was campaigning there and had given him the office of

writing letters to the Greeks.[525] Philostratus nowhere in the *Lives* calls him a Platonist; the nickname, and an office spent on letters, can be read as what ties him to 1.12.

Use in the book

The rule is qualified, not a ban. Its first words, "not often, nor without necessity" (1.12), allow the plea "I am busy" when it is necessary and rare. What is refused is a habit and a use, "continually to excuse myself from the duties that arise from relations with those who live alongside us, pleading the business in hand" (1.12; see Duty and fitting action). The duties are owed to the people a man lives among, and business is not to be made a standing defence against them. If Alexander is the secretary of Philostratus, the rule about letters came from a man whose office was the emperor's Greek correspondence, and can be read as a courtesy of that trade turned into a duty.

Busyness returns in Marcus' self-examination, and there the fault is placed in the man himself. Among the things to look at bare is "who is the cause of his own busyness" (12.8; see Cause and matter), and the man who has put off the body "has let go all busyness and serious pursuits" (10.11; see Contentment and self-sufficiency). Beside these, 1.12 can be read as the first step of the same thought: business is first an excuse to others, and then something a man makes for himself.

The Platonist of Book I teaches no Plato. As Alexander the grammarian is remembered for correcting another's faulty expression without reproof (1.10; see Kindness and correction), the Platonist is remembered for a rule of courtesy. What Marcus keeps of both is a manner towards other people, not a doctrine.

Places to read

The one place where Alexander the Platonist is named; the other places of the name Alexander, and the places of ἀσχολία (*ascholia*) and ἀσχολεῖσθαι (*ascholeisthai*), are given in the sub-entries.

1.12 From Alexander the Platonist Marcus learned not to say or write "I am busy" often or without necessity, nor by this means continually to excuse himself from the duties that arise from relations with those who live alongside him.

[525] Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 2.5.1 and 2.5.3 (570–571 Olearius).

Other ancient sources

Philostratus' Alexander is a sophist of the display speech, handsome and rich. His father bore the same name and was most able in the speeches of the law courts; he himself had a curled beard, large soft eyes and very white teeth, and spent his wealth on pleasures no one could blame. As a grown man he went on an embassy for Seleucia to the emperor Antoninus, and, thinking that the emperor was not attending, raised his voice: "Attend to me, Caesar." Antoninus, nettled, answered that he was attending and understood him: "you are the one who dresses his hair, brightens his teeth, pares his nails and is always breathing of perfume".[526] His working life was spent mostly at Antioch, Rome and Tarsus and all over Egypt. On his way to Marcus he stopped at Athens and declaimed there, and Herodes Atticus, the Athenian sophist and consul, Marcus' teacher of Greek oratory, came to hear him;[527] afterwards, when Herodes asked his pupils what they thought of the sophist, Sceptus of Corinth said that he had found the clay but was looking for the Plato, and Herodes told him to say that to no one else, and to think of Alexander rather as a sober Scopelian, after the sophist of that name.[528] One of his speeches, urging the sick of the plains to move into the mountains, makes the craftsman of the universe throw the plains down as the baser matter and raise up the mountains as dignities, which the sun greets first and leaves last.[529] His teachers were Favorinus of Arelate, the philosopher and orator, and Dionysius, and Philostratus records his end without deciding it: some said he died among the Celts still writing the emperor's letters, others in Italy after giving them up, some at sixty and some younger.[530] Beyond the nickname, the craftsman of the universe can be read as the nearest the life comes to Plato; of the rule Marcus remembers, the life gives no trace but the letters.

Translation in this edition

Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ is "Alexander the Platonist" (1.12), and Πλατωνικός is "the Platonist" at both its places

[526] Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 2.5.1–2 (570–571 Olearius).

[527] Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 2.5.3 (571–572 Olearius); for Herodes as Marcus' teacher, *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 2.4.

[528] Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 2.5.3 (573 Olearius).

[529] Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 2.5.4 (575 Olearius).

[530] Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 2.5.4 (576 Olearius).

(1.12, 8.25; see Philosophy). Ἄσχολός εἰμι is "I am busy", given in quotation marks as words said or written; the verb ἀσχολεῖσθαι (*ascholeisthai*) is "overbusy" (8.51) and "be busied" (12.2), and ἀσχολία (*ascholia*) "busyness" (10.11, 12.8). Παραιτεῖσθαι (*paraiteisthai*) is "excuse myself", προβαλλόμενον τὰ περιεστῶτα πράγματα (*proballomenon ta periestōta pragmata*) "pleading the business in hand", τὰ καθήκοντα (*ta kathēkonta*) "the duties" (see Duty and fitting action), σχέσεις (*scheseis*) "relations" and τοὺς συμβιοῦντας (*tous symbiountas*) "those who live alongside us" (see Duty and fitting action); ἐπιστολή (*epistolē*) is "a letter" (see Speech and silence). J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, reports τοιούτου τρόπου (*toioutou tropou*), "such a means", for τούτου τοῦ τρόπου (*toutou tou tropou*), "this means", in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, and in the Suda, the lexicon that Leopold's testimonia, the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it, cite for the passage under ἄσχολος; A, the Vatican manuscript, has the aorist προβαλόμενον (*probalomenon*) for "pleading".

Ἀλέξανδρος

Attested: Ἀλεξάνδρου (*Alexandrou*; 1.10, 1.12, 10.27), Ἀλέξανδρος (*Alexandros*; 3.3, 6.24, 8.3), Ἀλέξανδρον (*Alexandron*; 9.29). A man's name, borne in the *Meditations* by three men. Alexander the grammarian, Alexander of Cotiaeum, Marcus' teacher of Greek, taught him not to pounce reproachfully on a faulty expression but to introduce the right one tactfully (1.10; see Kindness and correction). Alexander the Platonist taught him not to plead "I am busy" often or without necessity (1.12). Alexander of Macedon, the conqueror, stands among the dead: with Pompey, the Roman general, and Gaius, that is Julius Caesar, "after so often destroying whole cities root and branch ... themselves at last departed from life" (3.3; see Death); he and his muleteer "came, in death, to the same state" (6.24; see Providence and atoms); with Gaius and Pompey, "what are they beside Diogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates?" (8.3; see Cause and matter); with Philip, his father, and Demetrius of Phalerum, who governed Athens for Cassander, "They will see to it, if they saw what the common nature wanted and schooled themselves; but if they played the tragic part, no one has condemned me to imitate" (9.29; see Exemplary

lives); and his court is one of the “whole dramas and scenes of one form” that come round again (10.27; see Drama and role). Lemma: Ἀλέξανδρος.

ἀσχολέω

Attested: ἀσχολεῖσθαι (*ascholeisthai*; 8.51), ἀσχολήσεται (*ascholēsetai*; 12.2). To be without leisure, to be busy or taken up with something. Among the faults Marcus forbids himself, to be “overbusy in life” (8.51); and “he who does not look at the bits of flesh that lie around him, still less, surely, will he be busied with gazing at clothing and house and fame …” (12.2). Lemma: ἀσχολέω.

ἀσχολία

Attested: ἀσχολίας (*ascholias*; 10.11, 12.8). Want of leisure, busyness. The man who has put off the body “has let go all busyness and serious pursuits” (10.11; see Contentment and self-sufficiency); among the things to look at bare, “who is the cause of his own busyness” (12.8; see Cause and matter). At 4.18 P has ἀσχολίαν (*ascholian*), “lack of leisure”, where Leopold prints εὐσχολίαν (*euscholian*), “leisure”, the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor (see Attention and self-examination). Lemma: ἀσχολία.

ἄσχολος

Attested: ἄσχολος (*ascholos*; 1.12). Without leisure, busy. From Alexander the Platonist, “not often, nor without necessity, to say to anyone or write in a letter ‘I am busy’” (1.12), a passage that the Suda cites under the word. Lemma: ἄσχολος.

See also

Alexander the grammarian; Attention and self-examination; Cause and matter; Contentment and self-sufficiency; Death; Drama and role; Duty and fitting action; Exemplary lives; Kindness and correction; Philosophy; Providence and atoms; Speech and silence.

Annius Verus

Marcus’ grandfather and his father · Meditations
Οὐῆρος, Ouēros, “Verus”; *παλλακή, pallakē*, “concubine”

At a Glance

The word. Verus is the name of two men of Marcus' family, as the edition's notes identify them: his father's father, Marcus Annius Verus, three times consul, in whose house Marcus was brought up, and his father, Marcus Annius Verus the younger, who died when Marcus was a small child.

In the *Meditations*. From the grandfather Marcus has "good character and freedom from anger" (1.1), and from the father, whom he knew by report, "self-respect and manliness" (1.2). The grandfather's house probably returns in a debt to the gods, "that I was not brought up any longer with my grandfather's concubine" (1.17.2), and probably the father in a pair of the dead, "Lucilla Verus, then Lucilla" (8.25), Lucilla being probably Marcus' mother.

In this edition. Οὐῆρος is "Verus" at all three of its places; at 8.37, where it rests on an editor's correction, it names Lucius Verus, Marcus' adoptive brother. The grandfather is otherwise πάππος (*pappos*), "grandfather", and the father ὁ γεννήσας (*ho gennēsas*), "the man who fathered me" (1.2).

A place to read. 1.2, where Marcus takes self-respect and manliness from the repute and memory of a father he knew only by report.

Meaning

Οὐῆρος (*Ouēros*) is the Roman surname Verus, "true", in Greek letters. It was the family's name. The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, calls Marcus' father, his grandfather and his great-grandfather on his father's side each Annius Verus,[531] and Marcus bore it too: after his father's death the emperor Hadrian called the boy Annius Verissimus, "truest", and with the toga of manhood he became Annius Verus, until his adoption into the family of Antoninus Pius, Hadrian's successor, made him Aurelius instead of Annius.[532]

In the *Meditations* the grandfather is named once, at 1.1, and the father, if at all, only at 8.25: the Verus there is probably he, the husband whom Marcus' mother outlived, and the grandfather of 1.17.2 and of 9.21 is probably Verus, as the edition's notes say; Marcus had two grandfathers, and the gods' list thanks them for both (1.17.1). The Verus of 8.37 is Lucius Verus (see Lucius Verus).

---

[531] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 1.2–4.

[532] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 1.9–10 and 5.5.

Use in the book

The book opens with the grandfather: “From my grandfather Verus: good character and freedom from anger” (1.1; see Parents and education). If the grandfather of 1.17.2 is Verus, as the edition’s note says he probably is, the gods’ list sets down one thing more of his house: “that I was not brought up any longer with my grandfather’s concubine; that I preserved my bloom, and did not become a man before the time, but even put it off” (1.17.2). The second clause can be read as saying why the first was a gift (see Temperance and self-mastery). Later the life under the grandfather, probably Verus again, is one of the stages of a life, each a kind of death: “Pass on now to the life under the grandfather, then that under the mother, then that under the father”, and of each Marcus is to ask, “Is it anything terrible?” (9.21; see Parents and education).

The father is a memory: “From the repute and memory of the man who fathered me: self-respect and manliness” (1.2; see Self-respect and shame). He is the one giver of Book I whose gift Marcus takes from the repute and memory of a man, not from the man himself. Elsewhere Marcus will fall onto the earth “from which my father gathered the little seed” (5.4; see Parents and education). In Book VIII the name returns at the head of the pairs of the dead, “Lucilla Verus, then Lucilla” (8.25; see Domitia Lucilla): the widow outlives the husband, and then she too is named alone.

Neither man is drawn as a portrait. Each stands at the head of the book as two qualities, and nothing of his life is told. What the two Annii Veri gave is what a man receives before he can choose it: a temper and a house from the one, a reputation to live up to from the other. Marcus records both debts plainly, and with the same plainness thanks the gods that he was not brought up any longer beside one who probably belonged to the house that gave him his first virtues.

Places to read

Every place where Marcus’ grandfather or his father is named or plainly meant, with those where the edition’s notes say he probably is (1.17.2, 8.25, 9.21), in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The Verus of 8.37, Lucius Verus, is given in the sub-entry.

1.1 From his grandfather Verus Marcus has good character and freedom from anger.

1.2 From the repute and memory of the man who fathered him Marcus has self-respect and manliness.

1.17.1 Among the gifts of the gods Marcus counts good grandfathers and good parents.

1.17.2 Among the gods' gifts Marcus counts that he was not brought up any longer with his grandfather's concubine, and that he did not become a man before the time.

5.4 Marcus will fall onto the earth from which his father gathered the little seed and his mother the little blood.

5.13 By the change that will post every part of him elsewhere Marcus came to subsist, and so did those who begot him.

5.31 Marcus asks how he has behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children and the rest.

8.25 Lucilla outlives Verus, and then Lucilla follows, in the first of the pairs of the dead.

9.21 Marcus is to pass on to the life under the grandfather, then under the mother, then under the father, and to ask of each change whether it is anything terrible.

Other ancient sources

The *Historia Augusta* opens its life of Marcus with his family. His father was Annius Verus, "who died in his praetorship", and his grandfather Annius Verus was "consul for the second time and prefect of the city", enrolled among the patricians by the emperors Vespasian and Titus when they held the censorship;[533] the edition's note at 1.1 calls him three times consul. Marcus was born on the Caelian hill at Rome, in the gardens, in the year of his grandfather's second consulship,[534] and he was brought up there and in his grandfather's house near the Lateran, and after his father's death adopted and reared by him (see Parents and education). When Hadrian died away from the city and

[533] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 1.2, in David Magie's Loeb text, which keeps the manuscript's *iterum*, "for the second time"; its apparatus gives Petschenig's conjecture *tertium*, "for the third time".

[534] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 1.5, a dating by the consuls of the year, which the conjecture at 1.2 does not touch; for his upbringing, 1.7–10.

Antoninus went to bring back his remains, Marcus, left at Rome, performed the funeral rites for his grandfather.[535] When his mother bade him divide his father's estate, Marcus said that he was content with his grandfather's goods (see Domitia Lucilla).

Through his daughter the grandfather was also the father-in-law of Antoninus. The life of Antoninus names "his father-in-law Annius Verus" and "his wife Annia Faustina", and calls Marcus "the son of his wife's brother": Antoninus' wife was Marcus' father's sister.[536] Among the reasons it gives for the surname Pius is that Antoninus held up this aged father-in-law by the hand in the senate's presence (see Antoninus Pius).[537]

Translation in this edition

Οὐῆρος is "Verus" at all three places. "From my grandfather Verus" renders Παρὰ τοῦ πάππου Οὐήρου (*Para tou pappou Ouērou*; 1.1), the article becoming "my". At 8.25 Οὐῆρον (*Ouēron*) is the accusative of the one who died first (8.25; see Domitia Lucilla). At 8.37 "the tomb of Verus" rests on the correction of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar (see Lucius Verus). The father is named, if at all, only as the Verus of 8.25: "the man who fathered me" renders τοῦ γεννήσαντος (*tou gennēsantos*; 1.2), and "those who begot me" οἱ ἐμὲ γεννήσαντες (*hoi eme gennēsantes*; 5.13), both forms of γεννᾶν (*gennan*); πατήρ (*patēr*) is "father" (5.4), πάππος "grandfather" and, in the plural, "grandfathers" (1.17.1), and γονεῖς (*goneis*) "parents" (1.17.1, 5.31); all these words have their sub-entries in Parents and education. Παλλακή is "concubine" (1.17.2).

Οὐῆρος

Attested: Οὐήρου (*Ouērou*; 1.1, 8.37), Οὐῆρον (*Ouēron*; 8.25). Verus, a Roman surname. Marcus' grandfather: "From my grandfather Verus: good character and freedom from anger" (1.1); probably his father, outlived by his widow: "Lucilla Verus, then Lucilla" (8.25); and Lucius Verus, Marcus' adoptive brother: "Surely Panthea or Pergamus does not now sit beside the tomb of Verus?" (8.37), Panthea being his mistress, as the edition's note says, where the name rests on Nauck's correction for the manuscripts' "the

[535] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 6.1.

[536] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 1.7 and 4.5.

[537] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 2.3.

master's" (see Lucius Verus). "Verus" has also been conjectured at 1.14.1 for "Severus" (1.14.1; see Severus). Lemma: Οὐῆρος.

παλλακή

Attested: παλλακῇ (*pallakēi*; 1.17.2). A concubine. Among the gods' gifts, "that I was not brought up any longer with my grandfather's concubine" (1.17.2); the grandfather is probably Verus, and the woman is otherwise unknown, as the edition's note says. Where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, has μὴ ἐπὶ πλέον τραφῆναι (*mē epi pleon traphēnai*), "not brought up any longer", P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has μὴ πλέον ἐπιτραφῆναι (*mē pleon epitraphēnai*), to the same sense. Lemma: παλλακή.

See also

Antoninus Pius; Domitia Lucilla; Lucius Verus; Parents and education; Self-respect and shame; Severus; Temperance and self-mastery.

Antoninus Pius

Marcus' adoptive father and predecessor · Meditations
Ἀντωνῖνος, Antōninos, "Antoninus"

At a Glance

The word. Antoninus Pius was emperor from 138 to 161, and in 138, at the wish of Hadrian, the emperor before him, he adopted Marcus, as the edition's note at 1.16.1 says; Marcus married his daughter Faustina (1.17.8). Ἀντωνῖνος (*Antōninos*) is the Greek form of his Latin name, which Marcus bore after him.

In the *Meditations*. Book I gives him its longest chapter, the portrait of "my father" (1.16), and thanks the gods that he "was placed under a ruler and father who was to take all vanity out of me" (1.17.3). Book VI makes the portrait a rule: "Everything as a pupil of Antoninus" (6.30.2). Elsewhere he is one of the dead whose names fade (4.33, 8.25), and his court one of the scenes of one form (10.27).

In this edition. Ἀντωνῖνος is "Antoninus" at every place: the emperor at 4.33, 6.30.2, 8.25 and 10.27, and Marcus himself at 6.44.2 and probably at 6.26. Πατήρ (*patēr*) is

"father", and the father is Antoninus at 1.16.1 and 1.17.3, and probably at 9.21.

A place to read. 1.16, where Marcus sets down, in ten sections, what he had from his father.

Meaning

The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, gives his full name as Titus Aurelius Fulvus Boionius Antoninus Pius, and five reasons why the senate called him Pius, "dutiful": that in the senate's presence he held up by the hand his father-in-law, now weary with age, though the biographer thinks this small proof of dutifulness, since a man who failed to do it would be undutiful rather than one who paid his due dutiful; that he saved men whom Hadrian in his illness had ordered to be put to death; that after Hadrian's death he had boundless honours decreed for him against the wishes of all; that when Hadrian wished to kill himself he prevented it by close watch and care; or that he was truly most merciful by nature and did nothing harsh in his time.[538] It makes him the husband of Marcus' father's sister (see Annius Verus), and says that Hadrian adopted him on condition that he adopt Marcus in turn.[539] Marcus never calls him Pius. In Book I he is "my father" (1.16.1) and "a ruler and father" (1.17.3), whom the edition's notes identify as Antoninus Pius; outside Book I he is Antoninus, certainly at 4.33, 6.30.2, 8.25 and 10.27, and the father of 9.21 is probably he, as the note there says. The name passed to the son. After Pius' death, the *Historia Augusta* says, Marcus took the name Antoninus himself,[540] and at 6.44.2, "for me as Antoninus, Rome", it is Marcus' name as emperor, as the edition's note says; the name whose letters he would spell out at 6.26 is probably his own as well.

Use in the book

The portrait of 1.16 records a manner rather than a doctrine, and names no teaching of his: no one could have called him "a sophist, or a pert house-slave, or a pedant" (1.16.4), and he honoured "those who were true philosophers" (1.16.5; see Philosophy). What Marcus took from him are habits of judgement and of rule: "holding unshaken to decisions reached after thorough examination"

[538] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 1.1 and 2.3–7.

[539] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 5.1.

[540] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 7.5–7.

and “allotting to each according to worth, unswervingly” (1.16.1; see Justice); “exact inquiry in council”, and friends kept, “never tiring of them nor infatuated with them” (1.16.2; see Friendship); and “constant guard over what the empire needed”, with “endurance of the accusations some brought against him over such things” (1.16.3; see Courage and endurance). Through the chapter runs one refusal. He arranged the smallest matters “without theatre” (1.16.3); he used what fortune supplied “without vanity and at the same time without apology”, touching such things “without making a point of it when they were there” and not needing them “when they were not” (1.16.4; see Temperance and self-mastery); he cared for his body “not as one in love with life, nor for show, nor yet neglectfully” (1.16.5; see Body and flesh); and he kept ancestral custom, “yet not making a point of appearing to do this very thing” (1.16.6; see Court and office). The portrait can be read as one quality seen in many acts: goodness without display. Near its end it sets him beside Socrates, the Athenian philosopher: “what is recorded of Socrates would fit him” (1.16.9; see Temperance and self-mastery).

The next chapter says what that example did for Marcus. Among the gifts of the gods is “that I was placed under a ruler and father who was to take all vanity out of me”, and to bring him to see that one can live at court “very near to the style of a private citizen” without being slacker in the public work (1.17.3; see Court and office).

Book VI turns the portrait into a rule against the danger of office. “See that you are not made into a Caesar” (6.30.1; see Court and office) is followed by “Everything as a pupil of Antoninus” (6.30.2–4; see Exemplary lives). The second portrait repeats the first, “his freedom from empty glory” (6.30.2), how “content he was with little” (6.30.3), “how pious he was, without superstition” (6.30.4), and dwells on what a ruler has to bear, which the first portrait touched in “endurance of the accusations” (1.16.3): “how he tolerated those who blamed him unjustly, not blaming them in return”, how he turned slanders away (6.30.3), and how he bore with frank opposition to his views and was glad to be shown something better (6.30.4). Marcus’ own rule, “If anyone can refute me … I will rejoice to shift position” (6.21; see Truth and falsehood), can be read as that lesson learned. The portrait closes on death: “so that your last hour may find you with as good a conscience as it found him” (6.30.4).

Outside these chapters Antoninus is one of the dead. His name ends a list of names that are now "in a way glosses": "then Augustus too; then Hadrian too, and Antoninus" (4.33; see Reputation and praise). Among the pairs of the dead stands "Antoninus Faustina, then Antoninus" (8.25; see Domitia Lucilla), Faustina being his wife. His court is one of the "whole dramas and scenes of one form" that come about again (10.27; see Drama and role), and the life "under the father", probably Antoninus, is one of the changes over which Marcus is to ask himself, "Is it anything terrible?" (9.21; see Parents and education). He does not exempt the man whose pupil he is to be. Yet 4.33, which lets the name fade, goes on to say what deserves effort: "a just understanding, social actions, speech such as never to lie", and a disposition that welcomes all that happens (4.33; see Resentment and welcome). That can be read as what Marcus kept of Antoninus: not the name, though he bore it himself (6.44.2; see Citizenship), but the disposition his two portraits describe.

Places to read

Every place where Antoninus is named or plainly meant, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided: the portrait of 1.16; 1.17.3, where he is the father, and 9.21, where the father is probably he, as the edition's note says; and the places of the name, of which 6.44.2 names Marcus himself and 6.26 probably does.

1.16.1 From his father Marcus has gentleness, firmness in decisions reached after thorough examination, freedom from empty glory, love of work, readiness to listen to anyone with something for the common good, and allotting to each according to worth.

1.16.2 Antoninus left his friends free not to dine or travel with him, inquired exactly and persistently in council, and kept his friends without tiring of them; the section also records the stopping of the love affairs with adolescents.

1.16.3 Antoninus looked ahead and arranged the smallest matters without theatre, saw acclamations and flattery checked in his time, guarded what the empire needed and spent its funds sparingly, and was without superstition towards the gods and without courting of the people.

1.16.4 Antoninus used the comforts fortune supplied without vanity and without apology, not needing them when they were not there, and no one could have called him a sophist, a pert house-slave or a pedant, but a man mature and complete, able to govern his own affairs and those of others.

1.16.5 Antoninus honoured true philosophers, was easy company, and cared for his body in measure, so that he seldom needed the doctor.

1.16.6 Above all, Antoninus gave way ungrudgingly to those with a particular ability, and did everything according to ancestral custom without making a point of it.

1.16.7 Antoninus was not easily moved, was fresh for the usual work after his headaches, kept very few secrets, and those only on public matters, and showed good sense and measure in shows, public works and distributions.

1.16.8 Antoninus did not bathe at odd hours, love building or fuss over food, clothes or the bloom of bodies, and Marcus recalls him at Lorium, Lanuvium and Tusculum, places near Rome.

1.16.9 Nothing in Antoninus was harsh or violent, everything was reckoned out as if at leisure, and what is recorded of Socrates, that he could both abstain from and enjoy what most men are too weak to go without and give way to when they enjoy, would fit him.

1.16.10 The portrait ends with the mark of a man with a sound and unconquerable soul, “as in the illness of Maximus”, whether Antoninus’ conduct then or Maximus’ own.

1.17.3 Marcus thanks the gods that he was placed under a ruler and father who was to take all vanity out of him and bring him to see that one can live at court without bodyguards and pomp, near the style of a private citizen, and not be slacker in public work.

4.33 The names of the famous dead are now in a way glosses, down to Hadrian and Antoninus; what deserves effort is a just understanding, social actions, truthful speech and a disposition that welcomes all that happens.

6.26 Marcus asks whether, if someone put it to him how the name Antoninus, probably his own, is written, he would not go through its letters mildly, and reminds himself that every duty is completed out of certain numbers.

6.30.2 Marcus is to do everything as a pupil of Antoninus, beginning with his intensity on behalf of what is done according to reason, his evenness, his holiness and his freedom from empty glory.

6.30.3 Antoninus let nothing pass without looking into it, tolerated those who blamed him unjustly, hurried over nothing, did not receive slanders, examined characters exactly without reproach or suspicion, and was content with little.

6.30.4 Antoninus was hard-working and patient, firm in his friendships, bore with frank opposition to his views and was pious without superstition, so that Marcus' last hour may find him with as good a conscience as it found Antoninus.

6.44.2 Marcus' city and fatherland as Antoninus, his name as emperor, is Rome; as a man, the universe.

8.25 Antoninus outlived Faustina, his wife, and then died himself, among pairs of the dead.

9.21 Marcus is to pass on to the life under the grandfather, the mother and the father, probably Antoninus, and, finding other changes and cessations, to ask himself whether it is anything terrible.

10.27 Among the whole dramas of one form that Marcus is to set before his eyes are the whole courts of Hadrian and of Antoninus.

Other ancient sources

The *Historia Augusta* fills out the portrait. Its first sketch of Pius calls him gentle and generous, a man who kept his hands off what was not his, "and all this with measure and without boasting".[541] Marcus, it says, lived in his father's house for twenty-three years, Pius' love for him growing every day, and in all those years spent only two nights away from him.[542] Pius brought the height of imperial power down to the manners of a citizen, to the displeasure of the

[541] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 2.1.

[542] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 7.2–3.

courtiers, who, since he did nothing through intermediaries, could no longer frighten anyone or sell favours that were no secret; he changed nothing in the style of his private life, kept a table that showed plenty without reproach and thrift without meanness, and made no journeys except to his own estates and to Campania, holding that an emperor's train, however sparing, weighed on the provinces.[543] These can be read beside Marcus' "very near to the style of a private citizen" (1.17.3) and "content to stay in the same places" (1.16.7). He granted honours and salaries to rhetoricians and philosophers in every province; and when the courtiers called Marcus away from weeping for his dead tutor as a show of feeling, Pius told them, "Allow him to be a man: neither philosophy nor power does away with feeling".[544] The *Historia Augusta* also tells the death to which 6.30.4 looks. In his seventieth year, having eaten Alpine cheese greedily at dinner, he was sick in the night and feverish the next day; on the third, finding himself worse, he entrusted the commonwealth and his daughter to Marcus before the prefects, had the golden Fortune that stood in the emperors' bedroom carried to Marcus, gave the tribune the watchword *aequanimitas*, "equanimity", and, turning over as though to sleep, died at Lorium. In the wandering of his fever he spoke of nothing but the commonwealth and the kings who had angered him.[545]

Translation in this edition

Ἀντωνῖνος is "Antoninus" at all seven of its occurrences; Marcus never writes "Pius". At 8.25 the Greek has Φαυστῖναν Ἀντωνῖνος (*Phaustinan Antōninos*), which the English, naming the survivor first, gives as "Antoninus Faustina" (see Domitia Lucilla). Πατήρ is "father" (see Parents and education): "From my father" renders Παρὰ τοῦ πατρός (*Para tou patros*; 1.16.1), where the Greek has the article, not a possessive; "a ruler and father" renders ἄρχοντι καὶ πατρί (*archonti kai patri*; 1.17.3), and "the father" τῷ πατρί (*tōi patri*; 9.21). "As a pupil of Antoninus" renders ὡς Ἀντωνίνου μαθητής (*hōs Antōninou mathētēs*; 6.30.2; see Learning, practice and correction). A few words of the

[543] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 6.4, 7.5–7 and 7.11.

[544] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 11.3 and 10.5.

[545] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 12.4–7; for the watchword, *Marcus* 7.3, where it stands in the manuscript. At *Pius* 12.6 *signum*, "watchword", is Novak's correction in David Magie's Loeb text, whose apparatus gives *signatum* as the manuscript's reading.

portraits rest on corrections that J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts. At 1.16.8 “the tunic” and “the cloak” are corrections of Claudius Salmasius, the seventeenth-century French scholar, for the manuscripts’ καὶ τῶν (*kai tōn*) and τελώνῃ (*telōnēi*), “tax-collector”, so that the manuscripts tell how Antoninus treated the tax-collector at Tusculum who begged his pardon, as the edition’s note says. At 1.16.10 “hold out” is ἐγκαρτερεῖν (*enkarterein*), the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, for ἔτι καρτερεῖν (*eti karterein*). At 6.30.2 “the fair weather of his face” is εὔδιον (*eudion*), the correction of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, for the manuscripts’ εὐόδιον (*euodion*), and at 6.30.4 “stay in the ⟨same⟩ place” is the correction and supplement of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar.

Ἀντωνῖνος

Attested: Ἀντωνῖνος (*Antōninos*; 4.33, 8.25 twice), Ἀντωνίνου (*Antōninou*; 6.26, 6.30.2, 10.27), Ἀντωνίνῳ (*Antōninōi*; 6.44.2). Antoninus: the emperor Antoninus Pius, Marcus’ adoptive father, “Everything as a pupil of Antoninus” (6.30.2), “then Hadrian too, and Antoninus” (4.33), “Antoninus Faustina, then Antoninus” (8.25), “the whole court of Antoninus” (10.27); and Marcus’ own name as emperor, “for me as Antoninus, Rome” (6.44.2), probably also in “how the name Antoninus is written” (6.26). At 8.25 A, the Vatican manuscript, omits the second “then Antoninus”. Lemma: Ἀντωνῖνος.

See also

Annius Verus; Body and flesh; Citizenship; Courage and endurance; Court and office; Domitia Lucilla; Drama and role; Duty and fitting action; Exemplary lives; Faustina; Friendship; Justice; Learning, practice and correction; Parents and education; Philosophy; Reputation and praise; Resentment and welcome; Socrates; Temperance and self-mastery; Truth and falsehood.

Apollonius

Freedom, steadiness and the living example · Meditations
Ἀπολλώνιος, Apollōnios, “Apollonius”

At a Glance

The word. Apollonius of Chalcedon was a Stoic whom Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, summoned to Rome to teach him, as the edition's note at 1.8.1 says. The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, calls him of Chalcedon in one life and of Chalcis in another.

In the *Meditations*. From Apollonius Marcus has "freedom", a steadiness that "takes no chances", the rule "to look to nothing else, even for a moment, but reason", and the sight of a man "most intense and yet relaxed", who counted his skill in teaching the least of his merits (1.8.1–2). He is first of the three Stoics whom Marcus thanks the gods "to have known" (1.17.5).

In this edition. Ἀπολλώνιος (*Apollōnios*) is "Apollonius" at both places: Ἀπολλωνίου (*Apollōniou*) in "From Apollonius" (1.8.1), and Ἀπολλώνιον (*Apollōnion*; 1.17.5).

A place to read. 1.8.1, where Marcus has seen plainly, in a living example, that the same man can be most intense and yet relaxed.

Meaning

Ἀπολλώνιος (*Apollōnios*), "of Apollo", is a Greek name. Marcus gives his teacher no city. The edition's note identifies him from the *Historia Augusta*, whose life of Marcus calls him Apollonius of Chalcedon, the city on the Bosporus facing Byzantium, while its life of Antoninus says that Antoninus had summoned him from Chalcis.

Use in the book

The chapter keeps two kinds of debt apart: what Marcus has, and what he saw. What he has are qualities and rules: "freedom, and a steadiness that unmistakably takes no chances" (1.8.1; see Moral choice and freedom), where ἀκύβευτον (*akybeuton*) is literally "not dicing", a steadiness that stakes nothing on chance, as the edition's note says; "to look to nothing else, even for a moment, but reason"; and "to be always the same, in sharp pangs, in the loss of a child, in long illnesses" (1.8.1; see Courage and endurance). What he saw was a man: "to have seen plainly, in a living example, that the same man can be most intense and yet relaxed" (1.8.1; see Exemplary lives), and "to have seen a man who clearly counted his experience and adroitness in passing on doctrines as the least of his own honourable qualities" (1.8.2; see Principles and reminders). Between them stands his

manner as a teacher, “in explanation not short-tempered” (1.8.2; see Kindness and correction), and the chapter ends with a lesson in taking: “how one must receive what pass for favours from friends without being either lowered by them or letting them go by unfeelingly” (1.8.2; see Beneficence).

Freedom comes first, and the rest can be read as its conditions: steadiness, an eye on reason alone, and dignity in receiving favours. Several of the lessons hold a balance, as the living example held intensity and ease together: the receiver of a favour is neither lowered by it nor lets it go by unfeelingly. And the one thing Marcus says Apollonius made least of was his own skill in teaching. Apollonius is also the first of three names among the gods’ gifts, “to have known Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus” (1.17.5; see Friendship), the other two being Junius Rusticus and Claudius Maximus, his fellow Stoics. What Marcus owed him, taken together, can be read as the sight of independence held without harshness.

Places to read

Every chapter in which Apollonius is named, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided.

1.8.1 From Apollonius Marcus has freedom, a steadiness that takes no chances, looking to nothing but reason, being always the same in pain, loss and illness, and the living example of a man most intense and yet relaxed.

1.8.2 Apollonius was not short-tempered in explanation and counted his skill in passing on doctrines the least of his honourable qualities, and from him Marcus learned how to receive favours from friends without being lowered by them or letting them go by unfeelingly.

1.17.5 Among the gifts of the gods is to have known Apollonius, Rusticus and Maximus.

Other ancient sources

The *Historia Augusta* tells the summons as an anecdote of Antoninus. He had called Apollonius from Chalcis, and when he sent for him to the House of Tiberius, where he was living, to hand Marcus over to him, Apollonius answered that it was not for the master to come to the pupil but for the pupil to come to the master. Antoninus laughed at him: the journey from Chalcis to Rome, he said, had been easier for

Apollonius than the one from his own house to the Palace; and he took note of his greed, in his fees as well.[546] The life of Marcus names him "Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic philosopher", among Marcus' teachers, and says that his zeal for philosophy was such that even after he had been taken into the imperial house he still went to Apollonius' house to learn (see Philosophy).[547] Its life of Lucius Verus, Marcus' adoptive brother and co-emperor, names "the philosophers Apollonius and Sextus" among Lucius' teachers (see Lucius Verus), besides an Apollonius among his teachers of rhetoric.[548] Lucian, the Greek satirist of the second century, tells a joke of Demonax, the Cypriot philosopher whose companion he had long been. Seeing Apollonius the philosopher setting out with a crowd of his pupils, summoned to be with the emperor for teaching, Demonax said: "Apollonius is coming, and his Argonauts."[549] Lucian gives him no city, but the summons to the emperor can be read as the same man's, and the Argonauts, who sailed with Jason for the golden fleece, as a jibe at a voyage for gold. In the *Historia Augusta* Apollonius stands on his dignity and is marked for greed, and in Demonax's joke he is a philosopher travelling with a retinue. Marcus remembers none of this, and what he records instead, freedom and the receiving of favours without being lowered, can be read as the same independence seen from within.

Translation in this edition

Ἀπολλωνίου is "Apollonius" after παρά (*para*), "from", in the heading (1.8.1), and Ἀπολλώνιον the object of γνῶναι (*gnōnai*), "to have known" (1.17.5). Τὸ ἐλεύθερον (*to eleutheron*) is "freedom" (see Moral choice and freedom), and ἀναμφιβόλως ἀκύβευτον (*anamphibolōs akybeuton*) "a steadiness that unmistakably takes no chances", the noun supplied in English; A, the Vatican manuscript, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have ἀναμφιλόγως (*anamphilogōs*), "indisputably", for "unmistakably". Ἀλγηδόνες (*algēdones*) are "pangs" (see Pain and pleasure). Ἐπὶ παραδείγματος ζῶντος (*epi paradeigmatos zōntos*) is "in a living example" (see Exemplary lives), and σφοδρότατος … καὶ ἀνειμένος (*sphodrotatos … kai aneimenos*) "most intense and yet

[546] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 10.4.
[547] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 2.7 and 3.1.
[548] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 2.5–6.
[549] Lucian, *Demonax* 31.

relaxed". Ἐν ταῖς ἐξηγήσεσι μὴ δυσχεραντικόν (*en tais exēgēsesi mē dyscherantikon*) is "in explanation not short-tempered" (see Resentment and welcome); ἐμπειρία (*empeiria*) and ἐντρέχεια (*entrecheia*) are "experience and adroitness", and θεωρήματα (*theōrēmata*) "doctrines" (see Principles and reminders). Τὰς δοκούσας χάριτας (*tas dokousas charitas*) is "what pass for favours" (see Beneficence), ἐξηττώμενον (*exēttōmenon*) "lowered" and ἀναισθήτως παραπέμποντα (*anaisthētōs parapemponta*) "letting them go by unfeelingly".

Ἀπολλώνιος

Attested: Ἀπολλωνίου (*Apollōniou*; 1.8.1), Ἀπολλώνιον (*Apollōnion*; 1.17.5). Apollonius of Chalcedon, the Stoic: "From Apollonius: freedom, and a steadiness that unmistakably takes no chances" (1.8.1); "to have known Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus" (1.17.5). Lemma: Ἀπολλώνιος.

See also

Beneficence; Courage and endurance; Exemplary lives; Friendship; Kindness and correction; Lucius Verus; Moral choice and freedom; Pain and pleasure; Philosophy; Principles and reminders; Resentment and welcome; Rusticus; Sextus.

Catulus

A Stoic teacher and three loyalties · Meditations
Κάτουλος, Katoulos, "Catulus"

At a Glance

The word. Cinna Catulus was a Stoic teacher of Marcus, as the edition's note says; the *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, names him among the Stoics whom Marcus heard.

In the *Meditations*. He is named once, for three lessons, each owed to other people: not to make light of a friend's complaint, "even if the complaint happens to be unreasonable"; "to speak of one's teachers with heartfelt good words"; and "to love one's children truly" (1.13).

In this edition. Παρὰ Κατούλου (*Para Katoulou*) is "From Catulus" (1.13); the two men of his second lesson are "Domitius" and "Athenodotus".

A place to read. 1.13, where Marcus sets down the three lessons of Catulus.

Meaning

Κάτουλος (*Katoulos*) is the Greek spelling of the Roman name Catulus. The *Historia Augusta* names Cinna Catulus among the Stoics whom Marcus heard (see Philosophy).[550] On this evidence the edition's note calls him "a Stoic teacher". Of the two men named in his chapter, Domitius is unknown, and Athenodotus is probably Fronto's teacher of that name, as the note also says; Fronto was Marcus' teacher of Latin rhetoric (see Fronto).

Use in the book

The chapter has three parts, and each faces outward, to a friend, to one's teachers, to one's children.

The first: "not to make light of a friend's complaint, even if the complaint happens to be unreasonable, but to try [also] to restore him to the usual footing" (1.13; see Friendship). The duty does not wait on the complaint's being just. Ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν (*oligōrōs echein*), "make light of", is to hold a thing of small account; what is asked is not a verdict on the complaint but an attempt to bring the friend back to τὸ σύνηθες (*to synēthes*), "the usual footing", the friendship as it was.

The second: "to speak of one's teachers with heartfelt good words, as is recorded of Domitius and Athenodotus" (1.13; see Reputation and praise). The example is itself a remembered one, ἀπομνημονευόμενα (*apomnēmoneuomena*), "recorded" (see Exemplary lives), and the lesson can be read as one Book I keeps: the book is a set of good words spoken of teachers, Catulus among them. The golden images of his teachers that, by the *Historia Augusta*, Marcus kept in his household shrine can be read beside it (see Exemplary lives).[551]

The third: "to love one's children truly" (1.13; see Love and affection). The lesson can be read as lying in the adverb, ἀληθινῶς (*alēthinōs*), "truly": that a father loves his children is assumed; that he love them truly is what is taught.

What Marcus keeps of Catulus is a care for three bonds, each tested in its own way: the friend who complains, the teacher who must be remembered well, the child who must

[550] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 3.2.

[551] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 3.5.

be loved in truth. None of the three is a doctrine of the Stoa; all three are duties of the relations a man lives in, and Book I records them as a Stoic's lessons.

Places to read

The one place where Catulus is named.

1.13 From Catulus Marcus learned not to make light of a friend's complaint, even an unreasonable one, but to try to restore him to the usual footing; to speak of his teachers with heartfelt good words, as is recorded of Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love his children truly.

Translation in this edition

Κατούλου is "Catulus" at its one place, in "From Catulus:" (see Gratitude). Τὸ μὴ ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν (*to mē oligōrōs echein*) is "not to make light of"; the participles of αἰτιᾶσθαι (*aitiasthai*), "to complain of", are given with a noun, "a friend's complaint" and "the complaint happens to be unreasonable" (see Fault and ignorance), and ἀλόγως (*alogōs*) is "unreasonable" (see Living being). Ἀποκαθιστάναι ἐπὶ τὸ σύνηθες (*apokathistanai epi to synēthes*) is "restore him to the usual footing" (see Friendship); "[also]" is a καί (*kai*) that J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, brackets after Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century. Τὸ … ἐκθύμως εὔφημον (*to … ekthymōs euphēmon*) is "to speak … with heartfelt good words" (εὔφημος, *euphēmos*, see Reputation and praise), οἷα … ἀπομνημονευόμενα (*hoia … apomnēmoneuomena*) "as is recorded" (see Exemplary lives), and τὸ … ἀληθινῶς ἀγαπητικόν (*to … alēthinōs agapētikon*) "to love … truly": ἀγαπητικός (*agapētikos*) has its sub-entry in Love and affection, and ἀληθινῶς, "truly", under ἀληθινός (*alēthinos*) in Truth and falsehood (see Love and affection; Truth and falsehood). Δομιτίου (*Domitiou*), "Domitius", is the spelling of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' Δομητίου (*Domētiou*); Ἀθηνοδότου (*Athēnodotou*) is "Athenodotus".

Κάτουλος

Attested: Κατούλου (*Katoulou*; 1.13). The Roman name Catulus; in the *Meditations*, Cinna Catulus, a Stoic teacher of Marcus, named once, at the head of his chapter: "From

Catulus: not to make light of a friend's complaint" (1.13). Fabius Catullinus "in the country" (Κατουλλῖνος, *Katoullinos*), one of the examples of 12.27, is another man. Lemma: Κάτουλος.

See also

Exemplary lives; Fault and ignorance; Friendship; Fronto; Gratitude; Living being; Love and affection; Philosophy; Reputation and praise; Truth and falsehood.

Diognetus

The teacher who brought Marcus into affinity with philosophy · Meditations

Διόγνητος, *Diognētos*, "Diognetus"

At a Glance

The word. Diognetus taught Marcus when he was a boy. The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, names a Diognetus, as modern editors print the name, as his master in painting, and the edition's note at 1.6 takes him to be the Diognetus of Book I.

In the *Meditations*. He has one chapter. From Diognetus Marcus has it "not to take trifles seriously", "to disbelieve what wonder-workers and charlatans say about incantations and the driving out of spirits", not to keep quails, and "to put up with frankness"; and then his first steps in philosophy: "to have come into affinity with philosophy", to have heard three teachers, "to have written dialogues as a boy" and "to have craved the pallet and the skin" (1.6).

In this edition. Διόγνητος (*Diognētos*) is "Diognetus", in the chapter's heading Παρὰ Διογνήτου (*Para Diognētou*), "From Diognetus" (1.6).

A place to read. 1.6, where the lessons run from the trifles a boy is not to take seriously to the pallet and the skin of the Greek training.

Meaning

Διόγνητος (*Diognētos*), "born of Zeus", is a Greek name. Marcus gives him no city and no school, and names him only here. The identification comes from the *Historia Augusta*, which says that among the pursuits of his youth Marcus applied himself to painting under "the master Diognetus", as

modern editors print it; the manuscript has *Diogenetus*.[552] The edition's note at 1.6 follows the printed name. In the chapter Marcus says nothing of painting. Of the teachers whom Marcus heard, "first Baccheius, then Tandasis and Marcianus", a hearing he counts among his debts to Diognetus, the note says that all three are otherwise unknown and that editors have doubted the names.

Use in the book

Diognetus' is the one chapter of Book I in which Marcus speaks of himself as "a boy", and it moves in one direction. It begins with what is not to be taken seriously: trifles; the talk of "wonder-workers and charlatans … about incantations and the driving out of spirits and the like"; and quails, which were kept for fighting, as the edition's note says, "nor to be in a flutter about such things" (1.6). The spirits are δαίμονες (*daimones*), the exorcists' word, in the one place where Marcus uses it in the popular sense (see Daimon). The flutter is the word he later turns on fame after death (see Tranquillity), and the disbelief can be read as a caution about assent learned before the doctrine of assent (see Assent and judgement). Then comes one thing to be borne, "to put up with frankness" (see Speech and silence), and then the turn: "to have come into affinity with philosophy and to have heard first Baccheius, then Tandasis and Marcianus; to have written dialogues as a boy; to have craved the pallet and the skin, and whatever else belongs to the Greek training" (1.6; see Philosophy). The pallet is the philosopher's low bed, and the skin is spread on it.

The first and last items frame the list. Τὸ ἀκενόσπουδον (*to akenospoudon*), "not to take trifles seriously", is literally not to be in earnest about empty things, and the chapter ends in a craving, ἐπιθυμῆσαι (*epithymēsai*), for the hard bed of the philosophers. It is the only chapter on a teacher in which the verb of craving is used of Marcus himself, and it returns when he thanks the gods that, when he "craved philosophy", he did not fall in with a sophist (1.17.9; see Philosophy). What Marcus records from Diognetus is neither a skill nor a doctrine but a direction of attention: the things a boy is not to be serious about, and the one thing he is to want. Taken together, the chapter can be read as the moving of a boy's seriousness from his pastimes to philosophy.

---

[552] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 4.9, in David Magie's Loeb text, whose apparatus gives *Diogeneto* as the manuscript's reading.

Places to read

The one chapter in which Diognetus is named.

1.6 From Diognetus Marcus has it not to take trifles seriously, to disbelieve the wonder-workers, not to keep quails, to put up with frankness, to have come into affinity with philosophy, to have written dialogues as a boy and to have craved the pallet and the skin.

Other ancient sources

The *Historia Augusta* tells the same turning from the other side. In its account of his youth it says that he applied himself also to painting, with Diognetus for master; that he loved boxing, wrestling and running, and fowling, and was a first-rate player at ball and a hunter; and that the study of philosophy drew him away from all these interests and made him earnest and grave, though without wholly doing away with his friendliness.[553] There the painting master belongs among the pastimes that philosophy left behind. In Book I Diognetus is remembered for no painting at all, and stands instead at the point where philosophy began. The edition's note at 1.6 sets beside the pallet and the skin the same life's little couch spread with skins (see Philosophy).[554]

Translation in this edition

Διογνήτου is "Diognetus" after παρά (*para*), "from", in the heading (1.6). Τὸ ἀκενόσπουδον, which occurs only here, is "not to take trifles seriously", and τὸ ἀπιστητικόν (*to apistētikon*), the disposition to disbelieve, is "to disbelieve". Τερατευόμενοι (*terateuomenoi*) and γόητες (*goētes*) are "wonder-workers and charlatans", ἐπῳδαί (*epōidai*) "incantations", and δαιμόνων ἀποπομπή (*daimonōn apopompē*) "the driving out of spirits"; this is the only place where δαίμων (*daimōn*) is not "daimon" (see Daimon). Ὀρτυγοτροφεῖν (*ortygotrophein*) is "keep quails" (see Parents and education) and ἐπτοῆσθαι (*eptoēsthai*) "be in a flutter" (see Tranquillity); παρρησία (*parrēsia*) is "frankness" and διάλογοι (*dialogoi*) "dialogues" (see Speech and silence). Οἰκειωθῆναι φιλοσοφίᾳ (*oikeiōthēnai philosophiāi*) is "to have come into affinity with philosophy", as the Glossary renders the verb (see Affinity and the alien). Σκίμπους (*skimpous*) and δορά (*dora*) are "the pallet and the

[553] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 4.9–10.

[554] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 2.6.

skin", and ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ ἀγωγή (*hē Hellēnikē agōgē*) "the Greek training"; ἐπιθυμῆσαι is "to have craved" (see Desire and aversion). In the names of the three teachers, J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, gives Βακχείου (*Bakcheiou*) where P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has Βακχίου (*Bakchiou*), and records the corrections of earlier editors: Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, proposed Εὐτυχίου (*Eutychiou*), "Eutychius", for "Baccheius"; Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, Ἄνδρωνος (*Andrōnos*), "Andron", for "Tandasis"; and Gataker Μαικιανοῦ (*Maikianou*), "Maecianus", for "Marcianus". All three are names of teachers whom the *Historia Augusta* gives Marcus: Andron the musician and geometer, Eutychius Proculus, one of his Latin grammarians, and Lucius Volusius Maecianus, from whom he learned law.[555]

Διόγνητος

Attested: Διογνήτου (*Diognētou*; 1.6). Diognetus, the teacher of Marcus' boyhood whom the *Historia Augusta* names as his master in painting: "From Diognetus: not to take trifles seriously" (1.6). Lemma: Διόγνητος.

See also

Affinity and the alien; Assent and judgement; Daimon; Desire and aversion; Parents and education; Philosophy; Speech and silence; Tranquillity.

Domitia Lucilla

Marcus' mother · Meditations

Λούκιλλα, Loukilla, "Lucilla"; *ἀφεκτικός, aphektikos*, "abstaining"

At a Glance

The word. Domitia Lucilla was Marcus' mother, heiress of a great fortune, as the edition's note at 1.3 says. She outlived her husband, Marcus Annius Verus the younger (see Annius Verus), and died probably in the 150s.

In the *Meditations*. From her Marcus has "piety and generosity" and "frugality of life, far removed from the habits

[555] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 2.2–3 and 3.6.

of the rich" (1.3), and he thanks the gods that she, "who was to die young, nevertheless made her home with me in her last years" (1.17.7). She is probably the Lucilla who heads the pairs of the dead in Book VIII (8.25).

In this edition. Λούκιλλα is "Lucilla" (8.25); elsewhere she is μήτηρ (*mētēr*), "mother", and once ἡ τεκοῦσα (*hē tekousa*), "my mother" (1.17.7).

A place to read. 1.3, where Marcus sets down what he had from his mother: piety, generosity, a restraint that reaches the very conception of doing ill, and frugality far from the habits of the rich.

Meaning

Λούκιλλα (*Loukilla*) is the Roman name Lucilla in Greek letters. The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, names Marcus' mother Domitia Lucilla, as modern editors print it, daughter of Calvisius Tullus, twice consul,[556] and later speaks of "Lucilla, Marcus' mother".[557] In the *Meditations* she is named, if at all, only at 8.25; the Lucilla there, like the mother of 9.21, is probably she, as the edition's notes say. Elsewhere she is "my mother".

Use in the book

Her gifts go furthest into the mind: "From my mother: piety and generosity, and abstaining not only from doing ill but even from entertaining such a conception; and further, frugality of life, far removed from the habits of the rich" (1.3; see Parents and education). The restraint reaches past the deed to the thought of it. The great fortune she inherited did not set the style she handed on.

Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, wrote her the letter that Marcus took as his model of artless writing (1.7.2; see Simplicity and sincerity). Besides "good parents" (1.17.1), the gods' list gives her a clause of her own: "that my mother, who was to die young, nevertheless made her home with me in her last years" (1.17.7; see Parents and education). Her share in his body is "the little blood" (5.4), in his life a stage of it: "the life under the grandfather, then that under the mother, then that under the father" (9.21; see Parents and

---

[556] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 1.3–4, in David Magie's Loeb text, whose apparatus gives *Caluilla* as the manuscript's reading and *Lucilla* as Borghesi's correction.

[557] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 6.9, where the manuscript has *Lucillam*.

education), the father there being probably Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father.

Book VIII probably sets her at the head of a list of the dead: “Lucilla Verus, then Lucilla; Secunda Maximus, then Secunda; Epitynchanus Diotimus, then Epitynchanus; Antoninus Faustina, then Antoninus. Such is everything. Celer Hadrian, then Celer” (8.25). Each pair is two names without a verb: the survivor stands in the nominative and the one who died first, probably the one buried, in the accusative, as the edition’s note explains; then the survivor is named alone, and is gone too. The English names the survivor first throughout, so that the Greek “Faustina Antoninus” is “Antoninus Faustina”. The pairs are of Marcus’ own world, as far as the notes identify them: probably his mother and his father; probably Claudius Maximus, the Stoic of 1.15.1, and Secunda, probably his wife; Diotimus, probably a companion of the emperor Hadrian, and Epitynchanus, who is not known; Antoninus and his wife Faustina, who died twenty years before him (see Faustina); and Celer, probably Caninius Celer, Marcus’ teacher of Greek rhetoric, who outlived Hadrian. Then come the “sharp men”, and the chapter ends with what awaits Marcus (8.25; see Death).

She is the parent Marcus remembers rather than knows by report, and the one whose last years he shared. Book I gives her the debts that shape a character from within, and Book VIII, if she is its Lucilla, the first place among the dead: she taught him how to live, and is the first example he takes of how the living follow the dead.

Places to read

Every place where Marcus’ mother is named or plainly meant, with those where the edition’s notes say she probably is (8.25, 9.21), in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. The mother of the comparison at 6.12 and “what the mother bore” at 10.7.3 are left out.

1.3 From his mother Marcus has piety and generosity, a restraint that reaches even the conception of doing ill, and frugality far removed from the habits of the rich.

1.7.2 Rusticus taught Marcus to write letters artlessly, like the one Rusticus wrote to Marcus’ mother.

1.17.1 Among the gifts of the gods Marcus counts good grandfathers and good parents.

1.17.7 Marcus' mother, who was to die young, nevertheless made her home with him in her last years.

5.4 Marcus will fall onto the earth from which his father gathered the little seed and his mother the little blood.

5.13 By the change that will post every part of him elsewhere Marcus came to subsist, and so did those who begot him.

5.31 Marcus asks how he has behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children and the rest.

8.25 Lucilla outlives Verus, and then Lucilla follows, at the head of a list of the dead set out in pairs.

9.21 Marcus is to pass on to the life under the grandfather, then under the mother, then under the father, and to ask of each change whether it is anything terrible.

Other ancient sources

The *Historia Augusta* shows her in four scenes. When Marcus, still a boy, took up the philosopher's dress and slept on the ground, it was only at his mother's urging, and with difficulty, that he would lie on a little couch spread with skins (see Philosophy).[558] When she called on him to divide his father's estate, he gave the whole of it to his sister, saying that he was content with his grandfather's goods, and added that his mother too, if she wished, should make over her own estate to his sister, so that the sister should not be beneath her husband.[559] When he learned of his adoption by Hadrian, the life says, he was more alarmed than glad, and, ordered to move into Hadrian's private house, he left his mother's gardens unwillingly.[560] And of those who whispered against Marcus to Antoninus the chief was one Valerius Homollus, who saw Lucilla, Marcus' mother, worshipping an image of Apollo in her garden, and whispered to Antoninus, "She is praying now that you may end your days and her son reign"; it had no weight with Antoninus.[561] The piety Marcus learned from her (1.3) can be read beside the woman at prayer

[558] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 2.6.
[559] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 4.7.
[560] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 5.3.
[561] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 6.8–10.

before Apollo, and her generosity beside the estate she was asked to give her daughter.

Translation in this edition

Λούκιλλα is "Lucilla" at both its places in 8.25. Μήτηρ is "mother" at all its places where she is meant (1.3, 1.7.2, 5.4, 9.21), and τὴν τεκοῦσαν (*tēn tekousan*), "her who bore me", is "my mother" (1.17.7); both words have their sub-entries in Parents and education. "Who was to die young" renders μέλλουσαν νέαν τελευτᾶν (*mellousan nean teleutan*), and "made her home with me" οἰκῆσαι μετ' ἐμοῦ (*oikēsai met' emou*; 1.17.7). Of the qualities of 1.3, τὸ θεοσεβές (*to theosebes*) is "piety" (see Gods), τὸ μεταδοτικόν (*to metadotikon*) "generosity" (see Beneficence), τὸ ἀφεκτικόν (*to aphektikon*) "abstaining", τὸ λιτόν (*to liton*) "frugality", as λιτός (*litos*) is "frugal" at 6.30.4 (see Temperance and self-mastery), and πλουσιακὴ διαγωγή (*plousiakē diagōgē*) "the habits of the rich".

ἀφεκτικός

Attested: ἀφεκτικόν (*aphektikon*; 1.3). Given to abstaining, keeping oneself from a thing. From his mother, "abstaining not only from doing ill but even from entertaining such a conception" (1.3). The word is the correction of Johannes Stich, whose Teubner text appeared in 1882, and of P. Scaphidiotes, whose critical notes on the *Meditations* appeared at Athens in 1881, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has ἐφεκτικόν (*ephektikon*), "holding back", the word that at 5.20 is "what holds back" (see Obstacle and reservation), and A, the Vatican manuscript, ἀφετικόν (*aphetikon*). On P's word as on the correction, the restraint reaches the conception. Lemma: ἀφεκτικός.

Λούκιλλα

Attested: Λούκιλλα (*Loukilla*; 8.25 twice). Lucilla, probably Domitia Lucilla, Marcus' mother, as the edition's note says, named first in the pairs of the dead: "Lucilla Verus, then Lucilla" (8.25). Lemma: Λούκιλλα.

See also

Annius Verus; Beneficence; Death; Faustina; Gods; Obstacle and reservation; Parents and education;

Philosophy; Simplicity and sincerity; Temperance and self-mastery.

Epictetus

The Stoic teacher Marcus knew from notes · Meditations

Ἐπίκτητος, *Epiktētos*, “Epictetus”, “an Epictetus”; *Ἐπικτήτειος*, *Epiktēteios*, “of Epictetus”

At a Glance

The word. Epictetus was the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian, his hearer, wrote down as the *Discourses*. Aulus Gellius, the Roman writer of the second century, reports that he had been a slave, and he calls himself lame; when the senate under the emperor Domitian expelled the philosophers from Rome, he went to Nicopolis, where the *Discourses* show him living.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus names him five times. Rusticus, the Stoic, let him have “the notes of Epictetus” (1.7.3); he quotes “a little soul carrying a corpse, as Epictetus used to say” (4.41) and counts him among the famous dead (7.19); and near the end of Book XI he copies a run of sayings that the edition’s notes trace to Epictetus (11.33–11.38).

In this edition. Ἐπίκτητος is “Epictetus”, and its plural “an Epictetus” in “how many an Epictetus” (7.19); the adjective Ἐπικτήτειος is “of Epictetus” (1.7.3).

A place to read. 11.33–11.38, where Marcus copies a run of Epictetus’ sayings, naming him at 11.34 and 11.36.

Meaning

Ἐπίκτητος (*Epiktētos*) is the Greek adjective “acquired”, “gained besides”, used as a name; from it Marcus forms the adjective Ἐπικτήτειος (*Epiktēteios*), “of Epictetus” (1.7.3). Of the *Discourses* four books survive; Gellius read a fifth.[562] The identification in the *Meditations* is certain: Marcus names him beside words that the edition’s notes find in the *Discourses* (11.34, 11.36), and the sayings of 4.41, 11.37 and 11.38 are counted among his fragments by J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, in his testimonia, the notes under his text on ancient authors who quote or parallel it. In the *Discourses* he calls himself “a lame

[562] Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 19.1.14 (the fifth book of the *Discourses* “arranged by Arrian”).

old man",[563] recalls how his teacher Rufus used to test him by saying "this and that will happen to you from your master",[564] and speaks of himself as living at Nicopolis, "where there are so many earthquakes".[565] Gellius says that he had been a slave, and that when a decree of the senate under Domitian drove the philosophers from Rome and Italy, he left Rome for Nicopolis.[566]

Use in the book

Book I, the book of debts, names Epictetus once, and not as a creditor. Marcus thanks Rusticus, and among Rusticus' gifts counts "to have come across the notes of Epictetus, which he let me have from his own house" (1.7.3; see Rusticus). The notes are probably the *Discourses*, as the edition's note says, and their word, ὑπομνήματα (*hypomnēmata*), is the one Arrian uses of his own record (see Principles and reminders). The book does not say that Marcus ever heard Epictetus; its Epictetus is met in another man's copy.

He is a voice. "You are a little soul carrying a corpse, as Epictetus used to say" (4.41; see Body and flesh): the imperfect makes the saying a habit of speech, the second person turns it on Marcus, and the edition's note at 9.24 compares Marcus' "little breaths carrying corpses" with it. The saying does not stand in the *Discourses* or the *Handbook*. At 11.34 "said Epictetus" introduces a small dialogue copied with its objector, on the one who kisses his child and must say inwardly "Tomorrow perhaps you will die" (see Love and affection). At 11.36 the saying carries a label: "There comes to be no robber of choice: the saying of Epictetus" (see Moral choice and freedom). In the *Discourses* it is one clause in the portrait of the Cynic;[567] Marcus lifts it out and labels it with its author's name.

The run of 11.33–11.38 shows how he read. The edition's notes trace 11.33–11.35 to one discourse (3.24.86, 88 and 91) and 11.36 to another (3.22.105), and count 11.37 and 11.38 among the fragments. He compresses and sharpens. Epictetus' list of what one would then have to call ill-omened

[563] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.16.20; compare 1.8.14.

[564] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.9.29; Rufus corrects him over a syllogism at 1.7.32.

[565] Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.6.20; compare 1.19.28 and 1.25.19.

[566] Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 2.18.10 and 15.11.4–5.

[567] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.22.105, in the discourse that bears the title "On Cynicism" (3.22).

ends with the fig that becomes a dried fig and the grape a raisin, all of them changes, and death a greater change, not into what is not, but into what now is not (see Change);[568] Marcus keeps the grape, adds its first stage and gives death's formula to every stage: "Unripe grape, ripe cluster, raisin: all changes, not into what is not, but into what is not now" (11.35). Epictetus calls the man who longs for a fig in winter a fool;[569] Marcus makes the seeking "the mark of a madman" (11.33; see Desire and aversion), the word of the run's last saying, that "The contest, then, he said, is not about any chance thing, but about being mad or not" (11.38; see Wisdom and discernment). 11.37 gives under "he said" Epictetus' three fields of training, assent, impulse, and desire with avoidance, in the order Marcus also follows at 8.7 (see Impulse). After the run stand the questions of Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, to men who say their souls are sound and yet fight (11.39; see Socrates), which Leopold thought belong among Epictetus' fragments.

Elsewhere the notes find Epictetus' words without his name: the daimon given by Zeus as "a fragment of himself" (5.27; see Daimon), the smoky room that a man may leave (5.29; see Death), "to bear with them and to abstain from them" (5.33; see Temperance and self-mastery), a saying of Antisthenes, the Athenian follower of Socrates, that Epictetus also quotes (7.36; see Reputation and praise), the saying, which Epictetus gives as that of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, that every soul is deprived of truth unwillingly (7.63; see Soul), and the "faculty of choice" formed from his word for choice (8.56; see Moral choice and freedom). The edition's introduction puts him first among the writers Marcus quotes.

Eternity, too, has had him: "How many a Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has eternity already swallowed!" (7.19; see Socrates). Taken together, the passages give no life and no thanks: the debt in Book I is to Rusticus, and Epictetus is what Rusticus gave. What Marcus keeps is the voice, the "used to say" and the "he said", cut down to maxims and addressed to himself; Epictetus can be read as the teacher whose words he used most and whose face, as far as the book tells, he never saw.

---

[568] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.24.91–93.

[569] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.24.86.

Places to read

Every place where Epictetus is named, in the order of the book, with the sayings of 11.33, 11.35, 11.37 and 11.38, which the edition's notes identify as his, and 11.39, which Leopold thought belongs among his fragments. The passages where the notes compare words of Epictetus without his name (5.27, 5.29, 5.33, 7.36, 7.63, 8.7, 8.56, 9.24, 11.6.1) are left out.

1.7.3 Among the gifts of Rusticus, Marcus came across the notes of Epictetus, which Rusticus let him have from his own house.

4.41 Marcus is a little soul carrying a corpse, as Epictetus used to say.

7.19 Eternity has already swallowed many a Chrysippus, many a Socrates, many an Epictetus.

11.33 To seek a fig in winter is the mark of a madman, and so is seeking the child when it is no longer given.

11.34 The one who kisses his child, said Epictetus, must say inwardly that tomorrow perhaps it will die; nothing that signifies a work of nature is ill-omened.

11.35 Unripe grape, ripe cluster and raisin are all changes, not into what is not, but into what is not now.

11.36 There comes to be no robber of choice: the saying of Epictetus.

11.37 Epictetus, as Marcus records him, speaks of an art concerning assent, heedfulness in the field of the impulses, so that they be with reservation, social and according to worth, abstaining altogether from desire, and avoidance towards none of the things not in our power.

11.38 The contest, he said, is not about any chance thing, but about being mad or not.

11.39 Socrates asked his hearers whether they wanted the souls of rational beings, sound ones, and, since they said they had them, why they were fighting and at odds.

Other ancient sources

The *Discourses* are prefaced by a letter of Arrian to Lucius Gellius. He did not, he says, compose Epictetus'

words as one composes such things, nor publish them: what he heard him say he tried to write down as far as he could in the very words, as notes kept for himself (see Principles and reminders), and they have fallen among men, he does not know how, without his will or knowledge. They are what a man says on the spur of the moment to another, not what he writes for readers to come; and when Epictetus spoke them he plainly aimed at nothing but to move his hearers' minds towards the best; and if the written words fail of that, readers are to know that when Epictetus himself spoke, his hearer was bound to undergo what the speaker meant him to undergo.[570] The *Discourses* show the man in his own words. He measures himself by Socrates, naming himself: Epictetus will not be better than Socrates; if only he is not worse, that is enough for him.[571] He tells, as one who was there, how Epaphroditus, whom the *Discourses* place at Nero's court (1.1.20), had sold a cobbler as useless, and when the man, bought by one of Caesar's people, became Caesar's cobbler, courted him, so that "if one of us asked what he was about, he was said to be taking counsel with Felicio about something".[572] Aulus Gellius heard how he was read. At his villa near Athens, Herodes Atticus, the Athenian sophist and consul, Marcus' teacher of Greek oratory, silenced a boastful young man who called himself a Stoic by having the first book of "the *Discourses* of Epictetus, arranged by Arrian" brought out and read, and called Epictetus "the greatest of the Stoics".[573] From Favorinus of Arelate, the philosopher and orator, Gellius heard that Epictetus called most of those who seemed to philosophise philosophers "without the doing, as far as the saying"; and Gellius adds from Arrian's books that he would cry out at a corrupt man taking up philosophy, "Man, where are you putting it? See whether the vessel is clean."[574] Favorinus also gave Gellius his two words, "bear with" and "abstain" (see Temperance and self-mastery).

Translation in this edition

Ἐπίκτητος is "Epictetus" at its three places in the singular (4.41, 11.34, 11.36), and the plural Ἐπικτήτους (*Epiktētous*) is

[570] Arrian, letter to Lucius Gellius, prefaced to Epictetus' *Discourses*, 1–8.
[571] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.2.35–36.
[572] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.19.19–22.
[573] Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 1.2.1–7 and 1.2.13.
[574] Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 17.19.1–3.

“an Epictetus” in “how many an Epictetus” (7.19; see Socrates). “The notes of Epictetus” renders τοῖς Ἐπικτητείοις ὑπομνήμασιν (*tois Epiktēteiois hypomnēmasin*), “the Epictetan notes” (1.7.3). The same imperfect ἔλεγεν (*elegen*) is “used to say” in “as Epictetus used to say” (4.41) and “said” in “said Epictetus” (11.34); “the saying of Epictetus” renders τὸ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου (*to tou Epiktētou*), “that of Epictetus” (11.36); and “he said” renders ἔφη (*ephē*; 11.34, 11.37, 11.38). At 11.37 “One must find, he said” renders ἔφη, δεῖ (*ephē, dei*), the correction of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the *Meditations*, which Leopold prints; A, the Vatican manuscript, has ἔφη δέ and P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, δὲ ἔφη, without “one must”.

Ἐπικτήτειος

Attested: Ἐπικτητείοις (*Epiktēteiois*; 1.7.3). Of Epictetus, Epictetan. Among the gifts of Rusticus, “to have come across the notes of Epictetus, which he let me have from his own house” (1.7.3). Lemma: Ἐπικτήτειος.

Ἐπίκτητος

Attested: Ἐπίκτητος (*Epiktētos*; 4.41, 11.34), Ἐπικτήτους (*Epiktētous*; 7.19), Ἐπικτήτου (*Epiktētou*; 11.36). Epictetus, the Stoic teacher; in the plural, men like him. “You are a little soul carrying a corpse, as Epictetus used to say” (4.41); “how many an Epictetus has eternity already swallowed!” (7.19); “The one who kisses the child, said Epictetus, must say inwardly” (11.34); “There comes to be no robber of choice: the saying of Epictetus” (11.36), where Rendall would delete “the saying of Epictetus”, which Leopold prints with the manuscripts. Lemma: Ἐπίκτητος.

See also

Body and flesh; Change; Daimon; Death; Desire and aversion; Impulse; Love and affection; Moral choice and freedom; Principles and reminders; Reputation and praise; Rusticus; Socrates; Soul; Temperance and self-mastery; Wisdom and discernment.

Faustina

Marcus’ sister, Antoninus’ wife and Marcus’ wife · Meditations

Φαυστῖνα, Phaustina, "Faustina"; *ἀδελφή, adelphē*, "sister"; *γυνή, gynē*, "wife", "women"; *γυναικάριον, gynaikarion*, "silly woman"; *πειθήνιος, peithēnios*, "obedient"

At a Glance

The word. Faustina was a name of the women of Marcus' family, and the edition's notes find three of them in the *Meditations*: his only sister, Annia Cornificia Faustina (1.17.1); Faustina the Elder, wife of Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father, who died in 140/1 (8.25); and Marcus' wife, Faustina the Younger, Antoninus' daughter, who died in 175/6 (1.17.8).

In the *Meditations*. The name itself stands once, in a pair of the dead, "Antoninus Faustina, then Antoninus" (8.25). The sister is "a good sister" (1.17.1). Marcus thanks the gods "that my wife is what she is, so obedient, so affectionate, so artless" (1.17.8), and waiting for the infant to come out of "your wife's womb" gives him his image for awaiting death (9.3.1).

In this edition. Φαυστῖνα is "Faustina" (8.25); ἀδελφή is "sister", and γυνή "wife", except "the women" in a quotation of Plato, the Athenian philosopher (7.46); πειθήνιος is "obedient".

A place to read. 1.17.8, where Marcus thanks the gods that his wife is what she is.

Meaning

Φαυστῖνα (*Phaustina*) is the Roman name Faustina, from *faustus*, "fortunate", in Greek letters. In Marcus' family it ran through three generations. The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, names his father's mother Rupilia Faustina and his father's sister Galeria Faustina Augusta, the wife of Antoninus, and says that he had a younger sister, Annia Cornificia, and as his wife Annia Faustina, his cousin;[575] Antoninus' wife was Annius Verus' daughter, Marcus' aunt (see Annius Verus).[576] Faustina the Younger, Antoninus' daughter, was thus Marcus' first cousin as well as his wife.

The *Meditations* names only the elder Faustina, at 8.25. The sister and the wife are known only by the words for them, ἀδελφή (*adelphē*) and γυνή (*gynē*), and the names are

[575] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 1.3–4, 1.8–9 and 5.1.

[576] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 1.7 and 4.5.

the edition's notes': the note at 1.17.1 calls the sister Annia Cornificia Faustina, and the note at 1.17.8 identifies the wife.

Use in the book

The sister has one word. Among the gods' gifts are "good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister" (1.17.1; see Gratitude); the edition's note says she was his only sister. Antoninus' wife has a place in a pair of the dead: "Antoninus Faustina, then Antoninus" (8.25; see Domitia Lucilla). Antoninus outlived her by twenty years, as the note says, and then he too was gone; in the long portrait of Antoninus in Book I (1.16) she does not appear.

The wife has a clause of her own in the gods' list: "that my wife is what she is, so obedient, so affectionate, so artless" (1.17.8; see Love and affection). The second word, φιλόστοργος (*philostorgos*), "affectionate", names a quality Marcus asks of himself, "Keep yourself, then, simple, good … kindly, affectionate" (6.30.1); the third, ἀφελής (*aphelēs*), "artless", is the adjective of the adverb in which Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, taught him to write letters, "artlessly" (1.7.2; see Simplicity and sincerity). The clause stands between his never lacking money to help someone in need and his good supply of tutors for his children (1.17.8), among the fortunes of his household. Elsewhere she is among those towards whom Marcus asks how he has behaved, "gods, parents, brothers, wife, children" (5.31), and in Book IX death is to be awaited "as you now wait for the time when the infant will come out of your wife's womb" (9.3.1; see Death). The "now" can be read as written during one of her pregnancies.

Neither the sister nor the wife has a chapter among the givers of 1.1–1.16, whose debts are lessons and examples; like his adoptive brother, Lucius Verus (1.17.4; see Lucius Verus), they stand in the gods' list, among the things that fell to him. The wife's three adjectives describe her as her husband knew her, as the brother's "honour and affection" describe what Lucius was to Marcus. It is the only account of her in the book, a husband's thanks, and it is praise without reserve.

Places to read

Every place where a Faustina is named or plainly meant, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided: Marcus' sister (1.17.1), his wife (1.17.8, 5.31, 9.3.1)

and Antoninus' wife (8.25). The other places of ἀδελφή and γυνή, and γυναικάριον, are given in the sub-entries.

1.17.1 Among the gifts of the gods Marcus counts a good sister.

1.17.8 Among the gods' gifts Marcus counts that his wife is so obedient, so affectionate, so artless.

5.31 Marcus asks how he has behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children and the rest.

8.25 Antoninus outlives Faustina, and then Antoninus follows, in a list of the dead set out in pairs.

9.3.1 Marcus is to await the hour of his death as he now waits for the infant to come out of his wife's womb.

Other ancient sources

In the *Historia Augusta* Marcus made over his whole inheritance from his father to his sister (see Domitia Lucilla).[577] Of the elder Faustina the life of Antoninus says that much was said of her because of her excessive freedom and easy way of living, which Antoninus put down, with grief of mind;[578] that he let the senate name her Augusta;[579] and that when he lost her in the third year of his reign the senate deified her, with circus games, a temple, priestesses and statues of gold and silver, and he himself allowed her image to be set up at all the circus games.[580] He founded in her honour the Faustinian girls, girls supported by a public food allowance.[581]

The younger Faustina was first meant for Lucius, the life of Verus says: the emperor Hadrian's terms for the adoptions were that Lucius should receive Antoninus' daughter, and she was given to Marcus instead because Lucius seemed still too young.[582] Antoninus made the wedding famous, down to a gift of money to the soldiers,[583] and when a daughter was born Marcus received the tribunician power.[584] She died in a village called Halala at the foot of Mount Taurus, carried off by a sudden illness.

[577] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 4.7.
[578] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 3.7–8.
[579] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 5.2.
[580] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 6.7.
[581] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 8.1.
[582] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 2.3–4.
[583] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 10.2–3.
[584] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 6.6.

Marcus asked the senate to decree her honours and a temple, and praised her, though she had suffered badly from a reputation for unchastity, which, the life says, he either did not know of or pretended not to know; he founded new Faustinian girls in her honour, was glad that the senate called her a goddess, made the village where she died a colony and built a temple there; she had been with him even in his summer camps, so that he called her "Mother of the Camps".[585] The new foundation can be read as answering Antoninus' for her mother.

The same life reports, mostly as what some or many say, that Faustina took lovers and that Commodus, Marcus' son and successor, was not Marcus' son; and that Avidius Cassius, governor of Syria, proclaimed himself emperor "as some say, at Faustina's wish", because she despaired of her husband's health, while others say he did so on a false report of Marcus' death.[586] The edition's note at 1.17.8 sets beside these the charge of Cassius Dio, the historian of Rome, that she encouraged the revolt. Marcus' own words of her are those of 1.17.8.

Translation in this edition

Φαυστῖνα is "Faustina" at its one place, the accusative Φαυστῖναν (*Phaustinan*; 8.25; see Domitia Lucilla). Ἀδελφή is "sister" (1.17.1, 8.31). Γυνή is "wife" (1.17.8, 5.31, 8.31) and "wife's" (9.3.1), and "the women" in the words of Plato at 7.46; its diminutive γυναικάριον is "silly woman" (5.11). "That my wife is what she is" renders τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα τοιαύτην εἶναι (*to tēn gynaika toiautēn einai*), literally "that my wife is such"; of her qualities πειθήνιον is "obedient", φιλόστοργον "affectionate" (see Love and affection) and ἀφελῆ "artless" (see Simplicity and sincerity).

ἀδελφή

Attested: ἀδελφήν (*adelphēn*; 1.17.1), ἀδελφή (*adelphē*; 8.31). A sister. Among the gods' gifts, "a good sister" (1.17.1), Annia Cornificia Faustina, as the edition's note says; in the court of Augustus, the first emperor, "wife, daughter, grandchildren, ancestors, sister" (8.31), the sister being Octavia, as the note there says. Lemma: ἀδελφή.

[585] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 26.4–9.

[586] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 19.1–9, 24.6–7 and 29.1–3.

γυναικάριον

Attested: γυναικαρίου (*gynaikariou*; 5.11). A little woman, said in contempt: a silly woman. Marcus asks whose soul he has now: “A child’s? An adolescent’s? A silly woman’s?” (5.11). Lemma: γυναικάριον.

γυνή

Attested: γυναῖκα (*gynaika*; 1.17.8), γυναικί (*gynaiki*; 5.31), γυναιξίν (*gynaixin*; 7.46), γυνή (*gynē*; 8.31), γυναικός (*gynaikos*; 9.3.1). A woman; a wife. Marcus’ wife: “that my wife is what she is” (1.17.8); “How have you behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife” (5.31); “as you now wait for the time when the infant will come out of your wife’s womb” (9.3.1). The wife of Augustus, Livia, as the edition’s note says, heads the list of his court (8.31); and in words of Plato’s *Gorgias*, spoken by Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, to Callicles, who disputes with him there, as the note at 7.46 says, a man is to leave these matters to God, “believing the women that not one man could escape fate” (7.46). Lemma: γυνή.

πειθήνιος

Attested: πειθήνιον (*peithēnion*; 1.17.8). Obedient. Of Marcus’ wife: “so obedient, so affectionate, so artless” (1.17.8). Lemma: πειθήνιος.

Φαυστῖνα

Attested: Φαυστῖναν (*Phaustinan*; 8.25). Faustina, the wife of Antoninus, who died in 140/1, twenty years before him, as the edition’s note says: “Antoninus Faustina, then Antoninus” (8.25). Lemma: Φαυστῖνα.

See also

Annius Verus; Death; Domitia Lucilla; Gratitude; Love and affection; Lucius Verus; Simplicity and sincerity.

Fronto

The teacher of rhetoric, remembered for what he taught Marcus to see · Meditations

Φρόντων, Phrontōn, “Fronto”

At a Glance

The word. M. Cornelius Fronto of Cirta in Numidia, the leading Latin orator of the age, was Marcus' teacher of rhetoric, as the edition's note says; part of their correspondence survives.

In the *Meditations*. He is named once, and what Marcus records from him is not rhetoric but two things to recognise: "what the envy, the double-dealing and the pretence of a tyrant are like", and "that on the whole these people we call patricians are somehow rather lacking in affection" (1.11).

In this edition. Παρὰ Φρόντωνος (*Para Phrontōnos*) is "From Fronto"; εὐπατρίδαι (*eupatridai*) is "patricians", and ἀστοργότεροι (*astorgoteroi*) "rather lacking in affection".

A place to read. 1.11, where Marcus sets down the two things he learned from Fronto.

Meaning

Φρόντων (*Phrontōn*) is the Greek spelling of the Latin surname Fronto. The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, names "Cornelius Fronto" as Marcus' teacher of Latin oratory, beside Herodes Atticus, the Athenian sophist and consul, Marcus' teacher of Greek oratory, and two others who taught it, and says that of these he paid Fronto great honour and asked the senate for a statue of him (see Parents and education).[587] Its life of Lucius Verus, Marcus' adoptive brother and co-emperor, names Fronto among Lucius' teachers too (see Lucius Verus).[588] Book I touches Fronto once more at a remove: the Athenodotus of Catulus' chapter (1.13) is probably Fronto's teacher of that name, as the edition's note there says (see Catulus).

Use in the book

"From Fronto: to have attended to what the envy, the double-dealing and the pretence of a tyrant are like, and that on the whole these people we call patricians are somehow rather lacking in affection" (1.11). The debt to the teacher of rhetoric holds no rhetoric. Book I names that art only to set it aside: from Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, Marcus learned "to keep away from rhetoric, poetry and fine language" (1.7.2), and he counts among the gifts of the gods that he made no further progress in rhetoric and poetry and the other pursuits

[587] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 2.4–5.

[588] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 2.5–6.

in which he might perhaps have been held fast, had he seen himself going well in them (1.17.4; see Gratitude). Of the teachers' chapters, Fronto's alone records neither a quality of the teacher nor a way of acting, only two things to recognise.

The first is a matter of attention. Ἐπιστῆσαι (*epistēsai*) is "to have attended", to have stopped the mind on a thing (see Attention and self-examination), and the thing is the tyrant's three vices: envy, βασκανία (*baskania*); double-dealing, ποικιλία (*poikilia*), literally many-colouredness; and pretence, ὑπόκρισις (*hypokrisis*), the word for an actor's delivery (see Court and office; Simplicity and sincerity). None of the three is violence; all three can be read as vices of a ruler's dealings with the men around him, and the lesson, taught to a future emperor, as one about what a ruler may meet in others and become himself. Marcus later tells himself to go through life "making yourself neither tyrant nor slave of any man" (4.31; see Court and office).

The second is guarded three times, "on the whole", "somehow", "rather". Ἀστοργότεροι is the comparative of ἄστοργος (*astorgos*), without the natural affection of kin (see Love and affection), and the edition's note reports Fronto's remark in a letter that Latin has no word for φιλοστοργία (*philostorgia*), "affection", because the thing itself is not found at Rome. Εὐπατρίδαι, literally "of good fathers", is an old Greek name for nobility: Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, gives it to the first of the three orders into which Theseus divided the Athenians, those who were to know the things of the gods, supply the magistrates and teach the laws.[589] Marcus puts it to a Roman order and writes "we": the judgement is passed on Rome from within Rome.

What Book I keeps of Fronto is a pair of judgements on Rome, at the court and in its noble houses. The man who taught a future emperor to speak is thanked for teaching him to see.

Places to read

The one place where Fronto is named.

1.11 From Fronto Marcus learned to attend to what the envy, the double-dealing and the pretence of a tyrant are like, and that on the whole the men

[589] Plutarch, *Theseus* 25.1–2.

called patricians are somehow rather lacking in affection.

Other ancient sources

Aulus Gellius, the Roman writer of the second century, used to visit Fronto as a young man at Rome, before he went to Athens, and says that he came away from his talk almost without fail more polished and more learned.[590] His Fronto is a former consul, twice found at home ill in his feet, who receives the learned and argues about words. When Favorinus of Arelate, the philosopher and orator, said that Latin had fewer names than Greek for the shades of red, Fronto granted that Greek was the ampler tongue, but denied that Latin was poor in these colours, and named *fulvus*, *flavus*, *rubidus*, *poeniceus*, *rutilus*, *luteus* and *spadix*, with the poets who used them; Favorinus answered that without Fronto alone Greek might have won by far.[591] He defended the historian Claudius Quadrigarius' "many mortals" for "many men", since "mortals" takes in almost every rank, age and sex of a city, and then warned his hearers not to say it everywhere; Gellius records the judgement as one exercised even on small words.[592] Lying ill on a Greek couch, among men distinguished by learning, birth or fortune, with builders showing him plans for new baths, he caught up a friend's *praeterpropter*, "more or less", and when a grammarian dismissed it as a workman's word, answered that Cato, Varro and most of the older writers had used it; and when Julius Celsinus the Numidian recalled that it stood in the *Iphigenia* of the old Latin poet Ennius, he had the play brought and the lines read out.[593] The orator who would not grant that Latin lacked words for red is the man who, by the edition's note, said that it lacked one for affection because Rome lacked the thing; beside Gellius' scenes the remark can be read as a judgement on Rome rather than on its language, and 1.11 as Marcus' record of it.

Translation in this edition

Φρόντωνος is "Fronto" at its one place, in "From Fronto:"; as at the head of each debt of Book I, the Greek has Παρά

[590] Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 19.8.1.
[591] Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 2.26.1–20.
[592] Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 13.29.1–6.
[593] Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 19.10.1–14.

with the genitive and no verb, and the English supplies none (see Gratitude). Τὸ ἐπιστῆσαι (*to epistēsai*) is "to have attended to" (see Attention and self-examination). Βασκανία is "envy" here and at 3.4.2, and βάσκανος (*baskanos*) "the envious" (2.1); ποικιλία is "double-dealing" and τυραννική (*tyrannikē*) "of a tyrant" (see Court and office); ὑπόκρισις is "pretence" (see Simplicity and sincerity). Ὡς ἐπίπαν (*hōs epipan*) is "on the whole" and πως (*pōs*) "somehow". Οἱ καλούμενοι οὗτοι παρ' ἡμῖν εὐπατρίδαι (*hoi kaloumenoi houtoi par' hēmin eupatridai*) is "these people we call patricians": the English renders παρ' ἡμῖν, "among us", with "we", and εὐπατρίδαι, which occurs only here, with the Roman name of the order. Ἀστοργότεροι is "rather lacking in affection", the comparative given by "rather", in the family that is always "affection" (see Love and affection).

Φρόντων

Attested: Φρόντωνος (*Phrontōnos*; 1.11). The Latin surname Fronto; in the *Meditations*, M. Cornelius Fronto, Marcus' teacher of rhetoric, named once, at the head of his chapter: "From Fronto: to have attended to what the envy, the double-dealing and the pretence of a tyrant are like" (1.11). Lemma: Φρόντων.

See also

Attention and self-examination; Catulus; Court and office; Gratitude; Love and affection; Lucius Verus; Parents and education; Simplicity and sincerity.

Lucius Verus

Marcus' adoptive brother and fellow emperor · Meditations

ἀδελφός, adelphos, "brother", "brothers"; *Οὖῆρος, Ouēros*, "Verus"

At a Glance

The word. Lucius Verus was Marcus' adoptive brother and his co-emperor from 161 until his death in 169, as the edition's note at 1.17.4 says. Antoninus Pius, emperor from 138 to 161, adopted him together with Marcus in 138, at the direction of the emperor Hadrian, as the edition's Introduction says.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus counts among the gifts of the gods "that I had such a brother, one able by his character to rouse me to take care of myself, and at the same time gladdening me with honour and affection" (1.17.4). In the text the edition prints he is named once, after his death: "Surely Panthea or Pergamus does not now sit beside the tomb of Verus?" (8.37), Panthea being his mistress and Pergamus unknown, as the edition's note says.

In this edition. Ἀδελφός is "brother", and "brothers" in the plural; Οὐῆρος at 8.37 is "Verus", an editor's correction for the manuscripts' "the master's".

A place to read. 1.17.4, where Marcus thanks the gods for his brother.

Meaning

Lucius was Marcus' brother by adoption, not by birth. His father, the *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, says, was Lucius Aelius Verus, whom Hadrian adopted and who was the first to be called Caesar, and died in that rank;[594] and Hadrian's terms when he adopted Antoninus were that Antoninus in turn should adopt Marcus, his wife's nephew, and Lucius Verus, the son of Aelius.[595] On Antoninus' death in 161 Marcus became emperor and made Lucius his colleague, as the edition's Introduction says. The life of Marcus adds that he named him Caesar and Augustus, so that the Roman empire had two Augusti for the first time, and the life of Verus that Marcus ordered him to be called Verus, "transferring his own name to him", where before he had been called Commodus.[596] The Verus of 8.37 bears the name that Marcus himself had borne, and his father and grandfather before him (see Annius Verus).

The brother of 1.17.4 is Lucius Verus, as the edition's note says, and so, by the note at 8.37, is the Verus there. The "brother Severus" of 1.14.1 is usually taken to be another man (1.14.1; see Severus).

Use in the book

Marcus says nothing of what his brother's character was, only of what it did to him. It was able to rouse him "to take care of myself" (1.17.4; see Care and tolerance), and the whole notebook can be read as that care; and it gladdened

[594] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 1.6–7.

[595] *Historia Augusta*, *Pius* 4.5.

[596] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 7.5–7 and *Verus* 4.1.

him “with honour and affection” (see Love and affection). Lucius has no chapter among the givers of 1.1–1.16; he comes in the gods’ list, after the “ruler and father” who was to take all vanity out of Marcus (1.17.3; see Court and office), and in the same section as Marcus’ children.

In Book VIII he is a tomb: “Surely Panthea or Pergamus does not now sit beside the tomb of Verus? What, Chabrias or Diotimus beside Hadrian’s? Laughable” (8.37). Panthea is praised in the *Portraits* of Lucian, the Greek satirist of the second century, as the note says, and Chabrias and Diotimus were probably companions of Hadrian. The identification does not rest alone on the correction of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, for the manuscripts’ “the master’s”: a scholium on Lucian by Arethas, one of his annotators, says, as the note reports, that Marcus mentions Panthea in this book, and with her at the tomb “the master” can be read as Lucius. The questions run on to the chapter’s end (8.37; see Body and flesh).

Marcus writes of his brother twice, once in thanks and once among the dead, and passes judgement on him in neither. At 1.17.4 he is seen only in his effect on Marcus, at 8.37 only as a tomb beside which no favourite sits now. What the *Meditations* keep of Lucius is a debt and a death; his character, his pleasures and his reign are left to the biographers.

Places to read

Both places where Lucius Verus is named or plainly meant, in the order of the book. “My brother Severus” at 1.14.1, usually taken to be Claudius Severus, and the “brothers” of 5.31 are given in the sub-entry ἀδελφός.

1.17.4 Among the gifts of the gods Marcus counts a brother able by his character to rouse him to take care of himself, who gladdened him with honour and affection.

8.37 Marcus asks whether Panthea, Lucius’ mistress, or Pergamus now sits beside his tomb, or Chabrias or Diotimus beside Hadrian’s, and calls the thought laughable.

Other ancient sources

The *Historia Augusta*’s life of Verus sets him neither among the good emperors nor among the bad: he was neither rank with vices nor rich in virtues, and he lived not in

a principate of his own but under Marcus, in a power like his and of equal majesty, parting from Marcus' school by the wantonness of his manners and the excess of a looser life; he was, it says, a man of simple ways, who could keep nothing hidden.[597] After his seventh year he was brought into the Aurelian family and formed by Marcus' character and authority,[598] and he heard a Latin grammarian and three Greek ones, the rhetoricians Apollonius, Caninius Celer and Herodes Atticus, the Athenian sophist and consul, Marcus' teacher of Greek oratory, the Latin orator Cornelius Fronto, and the philosophers Apollonius and Sextus; he loved them all, and was loved by them in turn, and Celer, Fronto and the two philosophers bear, like Herodes, the names of men who taught Marcus.[599] As emperor, the life says, he obeyed Marcus as a legate obeys a proconsul or a governor the emperor,[600] and such was his reverence for Marcus that on the day of the triumph they held together he shared with his brother the titles that had been given him.[601] Of his pleasures, in Syria during the war with Parthia and at Rome after it, the life gives a long account. The life of Marcus says that such was Marcus' uprightness that he both hid and defended Verus' vices, though they displeased him intensely, and after his death had him named a god and honoured his aunts and sisters;[602] the life of Verus, that the talk of enmity between the brothers came not from plain truth but from hidden rumour.[603] He died on the way back to Rome from the German war, not far from Altinum: seized in the carriage, sitting beside his brother, by the illness called apoplexy, he lived three days without speech and died.[604] He was laid in Hadrian's tomb, where his natural father lay,[605] so that the two tombs of 8.37, Verus' and Hadrian's, can be read as standing in one building. The life tells, and rejects, the story that Marcus poisoned him.[606]

---

[597] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 1.3–5.
[598] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 2.10.
[599] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 2.5–6; for Marcus' teachers, *Marcus* 2.4, 2.7 and 3.2.
[600] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 4.2–3.
[601] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 8.5.
[602] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 15.3–4.
[603] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 9.1.
[604] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 9.10–11; *Marcus* 14.8.
[605] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 11.1.
[606] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 11.2–4; compare *Marcus* 15.5–6.

Lucian names neither the woman nor her emperor outright. In his *Portraits* Lycinus describes a woman of Smyrna, in Ionia, whom he saw with a train of eunuchs and maids, and his friend Polystratus knows her: she is "the woman who is with the emperor", and her name is that of the beautiful wife of Abradatas whom Xenophon, the Athenian soldier and writer, praised;[607] Xenophon calls Abradatas' wife Panthea.[608]

Translation in this edition

Ἀδελφός is "brother" (1.14.1, 1.17.4) and "brothers" (5.31). "That I had such a brother" renders τὸ ἀδελφοῦ τοιούτου τυχεῖν (*to adelphou toioutou tychein*), literally "to have met with such a brother"; "by his character" renders διὰ ἤθους (*dia ēthous*; see Disposition and frame of mind), "to take care of myself" πρὸς ἐπιμέλειαν ἐμαυτοῦ (*pros epimeleian emautou*; see Care and tolerance), and "honour and affection" τιμῇ καὶ στοργῇ (*timēi kai storgēi*; see Love and affection). At 8.37 "the tomb of Verus" renders τῇ Οὐήρου σορῷ (*tēi Ouērou sorōi*), where Οὐήρου is Nauck's correction, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts for the τοῦ κυρίου (*tou kyriou*), "the master's", of P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed; A, the Vatican manuscript, has τοῦ κυροῦ (*tou kyrou*). Οὐῆρος has its sub-entry in Annius Verus. Σορός (*soros*) is "tomb", and "Hadrian's" renders τῇ Ἀδριανοῦ (*tēi Hadrianou*), the noun being understood.

ἀδελφός

Attested: ἀδελφοῦ (*adelphou*; 1.14.1, 1.17.4), ἀδελφοῖς (*adelphois*; 5.31). A brother. Lucius Verus: "that I had such a brother, one able by his character to rouse me to take care of myself" (1.17.4); "brothers" among those towards whom Marcus asks how he has behaved (5.31); and "From my brother Severus" (1.14.1), where Marcus had no brother of the name, as the edition's note says, and the man is usually taken to be Claudius Severus (1.14.1; see Severus). Lemma: ἀδελφός.

[607] Lucian, *Portraits* 2 and 10.
[608] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 6.1.47.

See also

Annius Verus; Body and flesh; Care and tolerance; Court and office; Disposition and frame of mind; Faustina; Love and affection; Severus.

Maximus

Claudius Maximus, the Stoic · Meditations
Μάξιμος, Maximos, "Maximus"

At a Glance

The word. Claudius Maximus was a Stoic, named in the *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, among the teachers whom Marcus heard, and probably the proconsul before whom Apuleius of Madauros, the Latin writer, pleaded his *Apology*, as the edition's note says.

In the *Meditations*. Book I names him three times: for the portrait of 1.15, for an illness at the close of the portrait of Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father (1.16.10), and among the gifts of the gods, with Apollonius of Chalcedon and Junius Rusticus, two other Stoic teachers (1.17.5). He is probably the Maximus whom Secunda, probably his wife, survived (8.25).

In this edition. Μαξίμου (*Maximou*) and Μάξιμον (*Maximon*) are "Maximus" at all four places.

A place to read. 1.15.3, where Maximus gives "the impression of a man who had never been bent rather than one who had been straightened".

Meaning

Μάξιμος (*Maximos*) is the Greek spelling of the Latin Maximus, "greatest". The *Historia Augusta* names Claudius Maximus among the Stoics whom Marcus heard (see Philosophy),[609] and the edition's note identifies the Maximus of 1.15 with him. The proconsul before whom Apuleius defended himself is called Claudius Maximus, and the note takes him, probably, for the same man. At 1.16.10 the note, after Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, finds that the words do not follow clearly from what precedes: the example may be Antoninus' conduct when Maximus was ill, or Maximus' own. At 8.25 it takes Maximus

[609] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 3.2.

to be probably Claudius Maximus and Secunda probably his wife.

Use in the book

The portrait of 1.15 begins with the man himself: “self-mastery, and not being carried off by anything; good spirits in other circumstances and in illness; a well-tempered character, amiable and stately” (1.15.1; see Temperance and self-mastery). Then come the states he was never in, “never to be hurried or hesitant, at a loss or downcast, or wearing a forced smile, or again raging or looking askance” (1.15.2), and three virtues towards others, “beneficence, readiness to forgive, and truthfulness” (1.15.3; see Beneficence). Much of the rest is how others met him: “everyone believed he thought as he spoke, and that whatever he did, he did without ill intent” (1.15.2; see Simplicity and sincerity), and “no one would ever have thought himself looked down on by him, nor endured to form the opinion that he was better than he”; last comes “a gracious wit” (1.15.3; see Exemplary lives).

The qualities come in pairs that might pull apart: amiable and stately, μειλίχιον καὶ γεραρόν (*meilichion kai geraron*); a man who looked down on no one, and whom no one presumed to think himself above (see Exemplary lives). The centre of the portrait is a likeness: Maximus gave “the impression of a man who had never been bent rather than one who had been straightened” (1.15.3; see Learning, practice and correction). Marcus, who had from Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, “the impression of needing correction and treatment of character” (1.7.1; see Learning, practice and correction), records in Maximus the look of a nature that seemed not to need it; and he records it as an impression, what others saw, not as a claim about how Maximus became so.

Illness frames him. He kept “good spirits … in illness” (1.15.1), and his is the one teacher’s name to return inside the portrait of Antoninus, which ends: “as in the illness of Maximus” (1.16.10; see Temperance and self-mastery). Whether the example there is Antoninus’ conduct while Maximus was ill or Maximus’ own, the illness is the occasion of “a sound and unconquerable soul”. Among the gods’ gifts Marcus sets him last of the three Stoics: “to have known Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus” (1.17.5).

The last trace is a death: “Secunda Maximus, then Secunda” (8.25; see Domitia Lucilla), in a list that ends, “All of a day, long dead”. If the note is right, Marcus’ Stoic teacher appears in Book VIII only as the man his wife buried before she too died.

Places to read

Every place where Maximus is named or plainly meant, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided.

1.15.1 From Maximus Marcus has self-mastery, good spirits in illness and in other circumstances, a well-tempered character, amiable and stately, and doing what lay before him without complaint.

1.15.2 Everyone believed that Maximus thought as he spoke and acted without ill intent; he was never hurried or hesitant, downcast, raging or looking askance.

1.15.3 Maximus had beneficence, readiness to forgive and truthfulness, seemed a man never bent rather than one straightened, looked down on no one, and had a gracious wit.

1.16.10 Strength and sobriety in either case are the mark of a man with a sound and unconquerable soul, as in the illness of Maximus.

1.17.5 Among the gifts of the gods Marcus counts having known Apollonius, Rusticus and Maximus.

8.25 Secunda outlived Maximus, probably Claudius Maximus, and then died in her turn: such is everything.

Other ancient sources

Apuleius of Madauros, who counts himself among “the Platonic household”, defended himself against a charge of magic at Sabratha before a proconsul whom he addresses as Claudius Maximus, pleading “before these statues of the emperor Pius”.[610] He tells the accuser that Maximus, though he had come into a large estate, was no hearer for jokes about poverty, since a man of so austere a school and such long army service is a better friend to frugal means than to soft wealth; he calls him a stern man, taken up with the

[610] Apuleius, *Apology* 1, 59, 64 and 85.

business of the whole province, and "most upright".[611] He appeals to him as a fellow reader: what Apuleius admires in Aristotle he says he admires with Maximus, and Maximus has read carefully in Plato's *Phaedrus* of the place above the heaven and the back of the heaven.[612] Apuleius does not name the austere school; beside the *Historia Augusta*'s Stoic it can be read as the Stoa. Apuleius praises gravity and learning, the virtues of a judge; Marcus' portrait has the gravity, "stately" (1.15.1), says nothing of learning, and adds the warmth of a companion: readiness to forgive, a man who looked down on no one, a gracious wit.

Translation in this edition

Μαξίμου is "Maximus" (1.15.1, 1.16.10), and so is Μάξιμον (1.17.5, 8.25). At 1.15.1 J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, has Παρὰ Μαξίμου (*Para Maximou*), "From Maximus"; he reports Παράκλησις Μαξίμου (*Paraklēsis Maximou*), "the encouragement of Maximus", in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, and the reading of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, παρὰ Κλαυδίου Μαξίμου (*para Klaudiou Maximou*), "From Claudius Maximus". The qualities have their homes elsewhere: τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ (*to kratein heautou*), "self-mastery" (see Temperance and self-mastery); τὸ εὔθυμον (*to euthymon*), "good spirits" (see Tranquillity); τὸ εὐεργετικόν (*to euergetikon*), "beneficence" (see Beneficence); τὸ συγγνωμονικόν (*to syngnōmonikon*), "readiness to forgive" (see Kindness and correction); τὸ ἀψευδές (*to apseudes*), "truthfulness" (see Truth and falsehood); ἀδιάστροφος (*adiastrophos*), "a man who had never been bent", and διορθούμενος (*diorthoumenos*), "one who had been straightened" (see Learning, practice and correction); and τὸ εὐχαριεντίζεσθαι (*to eucharientizesthai*), "a gracious wit" (see Exemplary lives). Τὸ εὔκρατον τοῦ ἤθους (*to eukraton tou ēthous*) is "a well-tempered character", and μειλίχιον "amiable", where A, the Vatican manuscript, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have μείλιχον (*meilichon*), and γεραρόν "stately". At 1.15.2 "everyone believed" renders τὸ πάντας αὐτῷ πιστεύειν (*to pantas autōi pisteuein*), where A and D have πάντως (*pantōs*), "altogether", and "without ill intent" renders οὐ κακῶς πράττει (*ou kakōs prattei*), which

[611] Apuleius, *Apology* 19, 25 and 85.

[612] Apuleius, *Apology* 41 and 64.

Leopold keeps against the conjectures he reports, οὐκ ἄλλως (*ouk allōs*), "not otherwise", of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, and οὐκ ἄκων (*ouk akōn*), "not unwillingly", of Herbert Richards, whose notes on Marcus Aurelius appeared in the *Classical Review* in 1905. At 1.16.10 the closing words, οἷον ἐν τῇ νόσῳ τῇ Μαξίμου (*hoion en tēi nosōi tēi Maximou*), are "as in the illness of Maximus". At 8.25 Σέκουνδα Μάξιμον (*Sekounda Maximon*) is "Secunda Maximus" (see Domitia Lucilla).

Μάξιμος

Attested: Μαξίμου (*Maximou*; 1.15.1, 1.16.10), Μάξιμον (*Maximon*; 1.17.5, 8.25). The Latin name Maximus; in the *Meditations*, Claudius Maximus, the Stoic. "From Maximus: self-mastery, and not being carried off by anything" (1.15.1), where P has Παράκλησις Μαξίμου; "as in the illness of Maximus" (1.16.10); "to have known Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus" (1.17.5); and, probably the same man, "Secunda Maximus, then Secunda" (8.25). Lemma: Μάξιμος.

See also

Beneficence; Domitia Lucilla; Exemplary lives; Kindness and correction; Learning, practice and correction; Philosophy; Simplicity and sincerity; Temperance and self-mastery; Tranquillity; Truth and falsehood.

Rusticus

Correction, plainness and the notes of Epictetus · Meditations

Ῥούστικος, Rhoustikos, "Rusticus"

At a Glance

The word. Rusticus is Q. Junius Rusticus, the Stoic, consul for the second time in 162 and prefect of the city, in which office he condemned Justin Martyr, the Christian apologist, as the edition's note at 1.7.1 says. The *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, names him as the philosopher Marcus heard above all, and the man with whom he shared all his plans.

In the *Meditations*. From Rusticus Marcus has "the impression of needing correction and treatment of character", a list of displays given up, the plain letter, readiness to be "easily recalled" towards those who have

been exasperated or have given offence, “as soon as they themselves want to come back”, careful reading, and “the notes of Epictetus”, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded (1.7.1–3). Among the gods’ gifts are “to have known Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus”, with Apollonius of Chalcedon and Claudius Maximus, his fellow Stoics (1.17.5), and that, often exasperated with Rusticus, Marcus did nothing more that he would have regretted (1.17.7).

In this edition. Ῥούστικος (*Rhoustikos*) is “Rusticus” at all three places: Ῥουστίκου (*Rhoustikou*) in “From Rusticus” (1.7.1), Ῥούστικον (*Rhoustikon*; 1.17.5) and Ῥουστίκῳ (*Rhoustikōi*; 1.17.7).

A place to read. 1.7.3, where Rusticus teaches Marcus to be easily recalled towards those who have given offence, as soon as they want to come back, and to read carefully, and lets him have the notes of Epictetus from his own house.

Meaning

Rusticus is a Roman surname, from the Latin *rusticus*, “of the countryside”, and Ῥούστικος (*Rhoustikos*) is the Latin name in Greek letters. The edition’s note identifies him as Quintus Junius Rusticus, the *Historia Augusta*’s Junius Rusticus.

Use in the book

The chapter opens with a diagnosis: “From Rusticus: to have got the impression of needing correction and treatment of character” (1.7.1; see Learning, practice and correction). Most of what follows is a list of displays given up: “not to be drawn aside into sophistic ambition, nor to write treatises on doctrines, nor to deliver little exhortations, nor to parade myself, so as to strike the imagination, as the man of discipline …” (1.7.1; see Philosophy), and “to keep away from rhetoric, poetry and fine language; not to walk about the house in formal dress” (1.7.2; see Speech and silence). Each is a way of being seen. Against them Rusticus set a model from his own hand: “to write letters artlessly, like the one he himself wrote to my mother from Sinuessa” (1.7.2; see Simplicity and sincerity), a letter to Domitia Lucilla, Marcus’ mother, from the coastal town south of Rome.

The last section turns to other men and to books. Towards “those who have been exasperated or have given offence” Marcus is to be “easily recalled … as soon as they

themselves want to come back" (1.7.3; see Friendship), and he is "to read carefully" and not "quickly assent to those who talk round a subject" (1.7.3; see Assent and judgement). The list ends not with a lesson but with a loan: "to have come across the notes of Epictetus, which he let me have from his own house" (1.7.3; see Principles and reminders). The edition's note takes them to be probably the *Discourses*, Epictetus' lectures as Arrian wrote them down.

Rusticus returns among the gifts of the gods: "to have known Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus" (1.17.5; see Friendship), and "that though I was often exasperated with Rusticus I did nothing more that I would have regretted" (1.17.7; see Anger). He is the one teacher of Book I with whom Marcus records his own exasperation, and the participle, χαλεπήναντα (*chalepēnanta*), is the one of 1.7.3, where "those who have been exasperated" are τοὺς χαλεπήναντας (*tous chalepēnantas*). The two places can be read together, with the pupil himself among the exasperated of whom the lesson speaks. Two more of the gods' gifts can be read as the other side of Rusticus' account: "that I made no further progress in rhetoric and poetry" (1.17.4; see Gratitude), and that Marcus "did not fall in with a sophist" (1.17.9; see Philosophy).

Taken together, Marcus owes Rusticus a diagnosis rather than a doctrine, the giving up of display, plainness in writing and care in reading, and Epictetus; and he thanks the gods that, exasperated with this teacher, he did nothing more he would regret.

Places to read

Every chapter in which Rusticus is named, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided.

1.7.1 From Rusticus Marcus got the impression of needing correction and treatment of character, and learned not to be drawn into sophistic ambition, write treatises on doctrines, deliver little exhortations or parade himself so as to strike the imagination.

1.7.2 Rusticus taught Marcus to keep away from rhetoric, poetry and fine language, not to walk about the house in formal dress, and to write letters artlessly, like the one Rusticus himself wrote to Marcus' mother from Sinuessa.

1.7.3 Rusticus taught Marcus to be easily recalled towards those who have been exasperated or have given offence, as soon as they want to come back, and to read carefully, and let him have the notes of Epictetus from his own house.

1.17.5 Among the gifts of the gods is to have known Apollonius, Rusticus and Maximus.

1.17.7 Marcus thanks the gods that, though he was often exasperated with Rusticus, he did nothing more that he would have regretted.

Other ancient sources

The *Historia Augusta* names Junius Rusticus twice in one passage: once among the four Stoics whom Marcus heard (see Philosophy), and again, after Claudius Severus, the Peripatetic, as the one he heard above all, whom he both revered and followed. Rusticus was a man of weight at home and in the field, and most expert in the Stoic teaching; Marcus shared with him all his plans, public and private, always kissed him even before the prefects of the guard, designated him consul for a second time, and after his death asked the senate for statues of him.[613] The same passage tells of the golden likenesses of his teachers that Marcus kept in his household shrine (see Exemplary lives). Book I says nothing of the consulship and the statues, and the *Historia Augusta* nothing of the exasperation; the two accounts can be read as the teacher who corrected the young man and the counsellor whom the emperor kept beside him.

Translation in this edition

Ῥουστίκου is "Rusticus" after παρά (*para*), "from", in the heading (1.7.1); Ῥούστικον is the object of γνῶναι (*gnōnai*), "to have known" (1.17.5); and Ῥουστίκῳ is the dative with χαλεπήναντα, "exasperated with Rusticus" (1.17.7). "The notes of Epictetus" renders τοῖς Ἐπικτητείοις ὑπομνήμασιν (*tois Epiktēteiois hypomnēmasin*), the adjective Ἐπικτήτειος (*Epiktēteios*), "Epictetan", turned by "of Epictetus" (see Epictetus), and ὑπομνήματα (*hypomnēmata*) "notes" (see Principles and reminders); and "which he let me have from his own house" renders ὧν οἴκοθεν μετέδωκεν (*hōn oikothen metedōken*). "From Sinuessa" is ἀπὸ Σινοέσσης (*apo Sinoessēs*). Two readings bear on the chapter. At 1.7.1

[613] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 3.2–5.

“the man of action” renders ἐνεργητικόν (*energētikon*), the correction of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, which J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, adopts; the manuscripts have εὐεργετικόν (*euergetikon*), “the benefactor” (see Present action). At 1.7.3 “easily reconciled” renders εὐδιαλλάκτως (*eudiallaktōs*), the reading of D, the Darmstadt manuscript, and of Xylander; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, and A, the Vatican manuscript, have εὐδιαλέκτως (*eudialektōs*), “easy to speak with” (see Anger). “Easily recalled”, εὐανακλήτως (*euanaklētōs*), stands in all three.

Ῥούστικος

Attested: Ῥουστίκου (*Rhoustikou*; 1.7.1), Ῥούστικον (*Rhoustikon*; 1.17.5), Ῥουστίκῳ (*Rhoustikōi*; 1.17.7). Rusticus, Q. Junius Rusticus, the Stoic: “From Rusticus: to have got the impression of needing correction and treatment of character” (1.7.1); “to have known Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus” (1.17.5); “that though I was often exasperated with Rusticus I did nothing more that I would have regretted” (1.17.7). Lemma: Ῥούστικος.

See also

Anger; Assent and judgement; Domitia Lucilla; Epictetus; Exemplary lives; Friendship; Gratitude; Learning, practice and correction; Philosophy; Present action; Principles and reminders; Simplicity and sincerity; Speech and silence.

Severus

“My brother Severus” · Meditations

Σεουῆρος, Seouēros, “Severus”; *Σευῆρος, Seuēros*, “Severus”

At a Glance

The word. Marcus had no brother of this name. Severus is usually taken to be Claudius Severus, the Peripatetic among his teachers, whose son married Marcus’ daughter, as the edition’s note says.

In the *Meditations*. “From my brother Severus” (1.14.1) opens a portrait of two parts: three loves, five men of the past and an ideal of the state, and then a manner open and plain (1.14.1–2). A Severus, probably the same, is named

once more, with Crito and Xenophon, the Athenian soldier and writer, both companions of Socrates (10.31).

In this edition. Τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μου Σεουήρου (*tou adelphou mou Seouērou*) is "my brother Severus", as J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, keeps it, and Σευῆρον (*Seuēron*) at 10.31 is "Severus".

A place to read. 1.14.2, where Severus' friends "had no need to guess what he wanted or did not want: it was plain".

Meaning

Σεουῆρος (*Seouēros*) and Σευῆρος (*Seuēros*) are two Greek spellings of the Latin Severus, "stern"; Leopold prints the first at 1.14.1 and the second at 10.31.

"My brother" is the difficulty. Elsewhere in Book I Marcus has one brother, whom he thanks the gods for (1.17.4; see Lucius Verus): Lucius Verus, his adoptive brother and co-emperor, as the edition's note there says. Leopold keeps the words and the name as the manuscripts give them. The usual identification rests on the *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives, which says that Marcus heard, of the Peripatetic school, Claudius Severus.[614] Why Marcus calls him brother the text does not say.

Use in the book

The chapter opens with three loves: "love of family, love of truth, love of justice" (1.14.1; see Love and affection). Then names: "through him to have come to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus" (1.14.1; see Exemplary lives), that is, as the edition's note gives them, Thrasea Paetus, forced to suicide by Nero; his son-in-law Helvidius Priscus, executed under Vespasian; the younger Cato; probably Dion of Syracuse, Plato's friend; and Brutus, Caesar's assassin. "Through him" is the correction of Johannes Stich, whose Teubner text appeared in 1882, which Leopold prints; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, have "on his account". On either reading the names came to Marcus with Severus. Then the state: "the impression of a state with the same laws for all, governed by equality and equal freedom of speech, and of a kingship that honours above all things the freedom of the governed" (1.14.1; see Citizenship). The names and

[614] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 3.3, in David Magie's Loeb text, which prints Peter's *studiosum* and whose apparatus gives *studiosos* as the manuscript's reading and *studiosus* as Casaubon's.

the ideal can be read together: two of the five, as the note says, died under Nero and Vespasian and a third killed Caesar, and the kingship Marcus took from Severus is one that honours "the freedom of the governed".

The second part turns to the man: "an even and unwavering honour for philosophy", and "hopefulness, and trust that he was loved by his friends; openness towards those he found fault with; and that his friends had no need to guess what he wanted or did not want: it was plain" (1.14.2; see Friendship). What joins the two parts can be read as one quality, freedom held in plainness: in the state, equal freedom of speech and the freedom of the governed; in the man, openness towards those he blamed and a will his friends never had to guess.

At 10.31 Marcus is to set men beside counterparts and then ask, "Where, then, are they? Nowhere, or wherever": "and when you see Severus, form an impression of Crito or Xenophon" (10.31; see Exemplary lives); the edition's note takes this Severus to be probably the Severus of 1.14. The words stand so by Leopold's own transposition: the witnesses have "when you see Xenophon, form an impression of Crito or Severus". In either order Severus keeps company with the friends of Socrates.

Places to read

Every place where Severus is named or plainly meant, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided.

1.14.1 From his brother Severus Marcus has love of family, truth and justice, knowledge of Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion and Brutus, and the impression of a state with the same laws for all and of a kingship that honours the freedom of the governed.

1.14.2 From Severus too Marcus has an unwavering honour for philosophy, doing good and sharing freely, hopefulness and trust in his friends' love, openness towards those he found fault with, and a will so plain that his friends had no need to guess it.

10.31 Severus, probably the Severus of 1.14, is named with Crito and Xenophon, Socrates' companions, among the men Marcus is to set beside their counterparts before asking where they all are.

Other ancient sources

Galen, the physician, in his book *On Prognosis*, names among those who asked to see his anatomical demonstrations "Severus, a consul, who had also applied himself to Aristotle's philosophy".[615] Galen does not call him Marcus' teacher, and the edition's note, which gives the teacher a son who married Marcus' daughter, leaves room for either man.

Translation in this edition

Τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μου Σεουήρου is "From my brother Severus" (1.14.1) and καὶ ἔτι παρὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ (*kai eti para tou autou*) "and from him also" (1.14.2). Ἀδελφός (*adelphos*) is "brother" elsewhere too, of Lucius Verus (1.17.4), and "brothers" in the question how Marcus has behaved towards "gods, parents, brothers" (5.31; see Parents and education); ἀδελφός has its sub-entry in Lucius Verus (see Lucius Verus). Leopold's apparatus reports that Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the *Meditations* in 1802, bracketed τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μου, "my brother"; that A, the Vatican manuscript, and D have a third spelling, Σευουήρου (*Seuouērou*); and that Scaliger, whose conjecture Leopold reports, read Οὐήρου (*Ouērou*), "Verus", which would make the chapter Lucius'. At 1.14.1 τὸ φιλοίκειον (*to philoikeion*) is "love of family" (see Love and affection) and τὸ φιλάληθες (*to philalēthes*) "love of truth" (see Truth and falsehood), and ἰσόνομος (*isonomos*) and ἰσηγορία (*isēgoria*) are "with the same laws for all" and "equal freedom of speech" (see Citizenship); "through him" is Stich's δι' αὐτοῦ (*di' autou*), which Leopold prints, for δι' αὐτόν (*di' auton*), "on his account", in P and D, and δι' αὐτῶν (*di' autōn*), "through them", in A. At 1.14.2 "even" is the ὁμαλές (*homales*) of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, for the manuscripts' ἀμελές (*ameles*), "careless", as the edition's note says; τὸ εὐποιητικόν (*to eupoiētikon*) is "doing good" (see Beneficence) and τὸ ἀνεπίκρυπτον (*to anepikrypton*) "openness" (see Speech and silence); A and D omit "or did not want", ἢ τί οὐ θέλει (*ē ti ou thelei*), as Leopold's apparatus reports. At 10.31 the order "when you see Severus, form an impression of Crito or Xenophon" is Leopold's transposition of Σευῆρον and Ξενοφῶντα (*Xenophōnta*), as his apparatus says; the

[615] Galen, *On Prognosis* (*De praenotione ad Epigenem*) 2 (Kühn 14.613).

witnesses have Ξενοφῶντα ἰδὼν Κρίτωνα ἢ Σευῆρον (*Xenophōnta idōn Kritōna ē Seuēron*).

Σευῆρος

Attested: Σευήρου (*Seouērou*; 1.14.1), Σευῆρον (*Seuēron*; 10.31). The Latin name Severus, in two Greek spellings. At 1.14.1, "From my brother Severus: love of family, love of truth, love of justice", where A and D have Σευουήρου and Scaliger read Οὐήρου, "Verus"; at 10.31, "and when you see Severus, form an impression of Crito or Xenophon", in Leopold's transposition, where the witnesses have "form an impression of Crito or Severus". Lemma: Σευῆρος (Σευῆρος).

See also

Beneficence; Citizenship; Exemplary lives; Friendship; Love and affection; Lucius Verus; Parents and education; Speech and silence; Truth and falsehood.

Sextus

Kindliness, and a philosopher in company · Meditations
Σέξτος, *Sextos*, "Sextus"

At a Glance

The word. Sextus is Sextus of Chaeronea, nephew of Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist philosopher and biographer of the late first and early second centuries, as the edition's note at 1.9.1 says after the *Historia Augusta*, a later Latin collection of imperial lives. Philostratus, the biographer of the sophists, tells of the emperor Marcus, already growing old, going to the door of "Sextus the philosopher from Boeotia" to learn, and this Sextus can be read as the same man.

In the *Meditations*. He has one chapter. From Sextus Marcus has "kindliness", "the example of a household governed by its father", "the conception of living according to nature", and a manner among men: agreeable beyond flattery and yet most respected, "at once wholly free from passion and full of affection", and "very learned without display" (1.9.1–3).

In this edition. Σέξτος (*Sextos*) is "Sextus" in "From Sextus", Παρὰ Σέξτου (*Para Sextou*; 1.9.1). In the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, the

name is the reading of a later hand in D, the Darmstadt manuscript, and of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor; the other manuscripts, and D in its first hand, have ξέστου (*xestou*).

A place to read. 1.9.2, where Sextus' company is more agreeable than any flattery, while at that very moment he is held in the highest respect by the same people.

Meaning

Sextus, "sixth", is a Roman first name, and Σέξτος (*Sextos*) is the Latin name in Greek letters. Marcus gives him no city. The *Historia Augusta* names Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's *nepos*, a word for a nephew or a grandson, among the Stoics whom Marcus heard, and the edition's note follows it, with "nephew". Philostratus' "Sextus the philosopher from Boeotia" can be read as the same man, for Chaeronea is a town of Boeotia. The name itself in 1.9.1 rests on the later hand and on Xylander: P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, A, the Vatican manuscript, and D as first written have ξέστου. The identification therefore rests on the corrected name.

Use in the book

The chapter runs from doctrine to manner. It opens with "kindliness" (1.9.1; see Kindness and correction), "the example of a household governed by its father" (see Exemplary lives) and "the conception of living according to nature", the Stoic formula for the end of life, as the edition's note says. Then come the ways of living among others: "unaffected dignity" (see Simplicity and sincerity), "a caring eye for friends" (see Care and tolerance), "forbearance towards the unlearned and towards those who hold opinions without thinking" (1.9.1), and "being in tune with everyone, so that his company was more agreeable than any flattery, while at that very moment he was held in the highest respect by those very people" (1.9.2; see Kindness and correction). The doctrine returns as method, "finding and ordering, with a firm grasp and by method, the principles necessary for life" (1.9.2), and the chapter ends with temper and learning: "never to show so much as a sign of anger or of any other passion, but to be at once wholly free from passion and full of affection" (1.9.3; see Love and affection), and "to be very learned without display" (1.9.3; see Simplicity and sincerity).

Of all this, only the conception of living according to nature and the principles necessary for life are doctrine. The rest is company: a household, friends, the unlearned, everyone. Sextus' company was more agreeable than flattery, and yet he was revered by the same people; the lessons of 1.9.3 pair freedom from passion with affection, and much learning with no display. The pairs set together what might be thought to exclude each other (see Exemplary lives). Kindliness stands first, and what follows can be read as the forms it took in him: order in the household, care for friends, patience with the unlearned, agreeableness that kept respect. What Marcus owed Sextus, taken together, can be read as the pattern of a philosopher whom freedom from passion did not make cold, nor learning set apart.

Places to read

The one chapter in which Sextus is named, the name being the reading of a later hand in D, by section.

1.9.1 From Sextus Marcus has kindliness, the example of a household governed by its father, the conception of living according to nature, unaffected dignity, a caring eye for friends, and forbearance towards the unlearned.

1.9.2 Sextus was in tune with everyone, so that his company was more agreeable than any flattery while he was held in the highest respect by the same people, and found and ordered by method the principles necessary for life.

1.9.3 From Sextus Marcus has it never to show a sign of anger or of any other passion, but to be at once wholly free from passion and full of affection, and to be very learned without display.

Other ancient sources

The *Historia Augusta*'s life of Marcus names Sextus among the Stoics whom Marcus heard (see Philosophy).[616] Its life of Lucius Verus, Marcus' adoptive brother and co-emperor, names "the philosophers Apollonius and Sextus" among Lucius' teachers (see Lucius Verus),[617] and the two can be read as the men who taught Marcus. Philostratus, writing in the third century, tells two stories of Sextus in his life of Herodes Atticus, the Athenian sophist and consul,

[616] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 3.2.

[617] *Historia Augusta*, *Verus* 2.5–6.

Marcus' teacher of Greek oratory.[618] In the first, Lucius, a philosopher who had studied with Musonius of Tyre, as Philostratus calls him, newly come to Rome, met the emperor Marcus going out, and asked him where he was going and on what errand; the emperor was then eager for the teaching of "Sextus the philosopher from Boeotia", and was often at his door. Marcus answered that learning is a fine thing even for a man growing old: "I am going to Sextus the philosopher, to learn what I do not yet know." Lucius raised his hand to heaven: "O Zeus, the king of the Romans, already growing old, hangs a writing-tablet on himself and goes off to school, while my king Alexander died at thirty-two."[619] His king is Alexander of Macedon. In the second, when Herodes' daughter Elpinice died and he lay on the floor, beating the ground and crying out to her, Sextus the philosopher, who happened to be with him, said: "You will give your daughter great gifts if you mourn her with self-control."[620] The first story shows the pupil still at his teacher's door as emperor. The second can be read as the pair of 1.9.3 turned into counsel: the father is not told to stop mourning, but to mourn with self-control, so that the affection is honoured and the passion governed.

Translation in this edition

Σέξτου is "Sextus" after παρά (*para*), "from", in the heading (1.9.1). Τὸ εὐμενές (*to eumenes*) is "kindliness" (see Kindness and correction), τοῦ οἴκου τοῦ πατρονομουμένου (*tou oikou tou patronomoumenou*) "of a household governed by its father" (see Exemplary lives), and καταληπτικῶς (*katalēptikōs*) "with a firm grasp" (see Assent and judgement). Τὸ στοχαστικὸν τῶν φίλων κηδεμονικῶς (*to stochastikon tōn philōn kēdemonikōs*) is "a caring eye for friends", and τὸ ἀνεκτικόν (*to anektikon*) "forbearance" (see Care and tolerance). Ἀπαθέστατον (*apathestaton*) and φιλοστοργότατον (*philostorgotaton*) are "wholly free from passion" and "full of affection" (see Love and affection), and τὸ πολυμαθὲς ἀνεπιφάντως (*to polymathes anepiphantōs*) is "to be very learned without display" (see Learning, practice and correction). "To speak good words without noise" renders τὸ εὔφημον ἀψοφητί (*to euphēmon*

[618] *Historia Augusta*, *Marcus* 2.4, which names Herodes Atticus among Marcus' Greek teachers of oratory.

[619] Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 2.1.9 (557 Olearius).

[620] Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 2.1.10 (558 Olearius).

apsophēti), the text of P. Scaphidiotes, whose critical notes on the *Meditations* appeared at Athens in 1881, which Leopold adopts (εὔφημος, see Reputation and praise); P has "good words, and this without noise", and A and D "good words, and noiselessness".

Σέξτος

Attested: Σέξτου (*Sextou*; 1.9.1). Sextus of Chaeronea, Plutarch's nephew: "From Sextus: kindliness" (1.9.1). In Leopold's text the name is the reading of a later hand in D and of Xylander; P, A and D in its first hand have ξέστου (*xestou*). Lemma: Σέξτος.

See also

Apollonius; Assent and judgement; Care and tolerance; Exemplary lives; Kindness and correction; Learning, practice and correction; Love and affection; Lucius Verus; Philosophy; Reputation and praise; Simplicity and sincerity.

Socrates

The Athenian philosopher as Marcus remembers him · Meditations

Σωκράτης, *Sōkratēs*, "Socrates"

At a Glance

The word. Socrates was the Athenian philosopher whom an Athenian court condemned for impiety and for corrupting the young, and who drank the hemlock at the age of seventy, in the first year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, 400/399 BC, as Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports.

In the *Meditations*. Marcus names him in eleven chapters, more often than any other philosopher: as the measure of Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father (1.16.9), as one of the famous dead (3.3, 6.47, 7.19), as one who "saw things, and their causes and their materials" (8.3), and as the speaker of sayings (3.6.2, 11.23, 11.25, 11.39). Book VII copies his words from Plato, the Athenian philosopher, without his name (7.35, 7.44–46).

In this edition. Σωκράτης (*Sōkratēs*) is "Socrates" at every place, and its plural is "how many a Socrates" (7.19). Σωκρατικόν (*Sōkratikon*) at 10.31 is the name of another man, "Socraticus".

A place to read. 7.66, where Marcus sets aside Socrates' famous deeds and asks "what sort of soul Socrates had".

Meaning

Σωκράτης was a name borne by other men too, of whom Diogenes Laertius lists four; in Marcus it is always the philosopher. Diogenes makes him the son of Sophroniscus, a stonemason, and of Phaenarete, a midwife, of the Athenian district of Alopece. He gives the sworn charge: "Socrates does wrong by not believing in the gods the city believes in and by bringing in other, new divinities; he does wrong too by corrupting the young. Penalty: death." And he says that Socrates drank the hemlock a few days after his condemnation, and died aged seventy, though some, he says, put it at sixty.[621] In Plato's *Apology*, his defence at his trial, Socrates tells the jury that he is seventy and names his accusers, Meletus, Anytus and Lycon.[622] Marcus gives none of this, and his "lice of another kind" that killed Socrates (3.3) are presumably the accusers, as the edition's note says. His Socrates is a Socrates of report: "what is recorded" of him (1.16.9), what he "used to say" (3.6.2, 11.39) and "used to call" things (11.23).

Use in the book

Socrates enters the book as a measure for another man. Of his father Marcus writes, "what is recorded of Socrates would fit him" (1.16.9; see Temperance and self-mastery), a story the edition's note traces to Plato's *Symposium*, where Alcibiades tells of Socrates, with whom he served, on campaign at Potidaea.

He is also one of the dead. "Lice of another kind killed Socrates" (3.3; see Death); he is among "so many dignified philosophers" who "have long been lying" (6.47); and "How many a Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has eternity already swallowed!" (7.19; see Substance), with Chrysippus, the Stoic school's third head, and Epictetus, the Stoic teacher whose lectures Arrian recorded. In the plural Socrates becomes a kind of man. Yet death does not erase every difference. "And Alexander and Gaius and Pompey, what are they beside Diogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? For these saw things, and their

---

[621] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 2.18, 2.38, 2.40, 2.42, 2.44 and 2.47.

[622] Plato, *Apology* 17d and 23e.

causes and their materials" (8.3; see Cause and matter). Gaius is Julius Caesar and Diogenes the Cynic, as the edition's note says, and Heraclitus is the philosopher of Ephesus; the conquerors' part is "slavery to how many" (see Moral choice and freedom). What Marcus credits Socrates with can be read as the Stoic analysis of things into cause and matter.

Most often Socrates speaks. The daimon within "has drawn itself away, as Socrates used to say, from what the senses undergo" (3.6.2; see Daimon); "Socrates also used to call the principles of the many Lamias, children's bugbears" (11.23; see Principles and reminders); he would not go to Perdiccas, king of Macedon, "So that … I may not be ruined by the worst ruin" (11.25; see Beneficence). Book VII copies his words from Plato without his name, all of them on death: the man with "the contemplation of all time and all substance" will not think death terrible (7.35, from the *Republic*; see Substance); a man of any use ought to look only at "whether he does just things or unjust" (7.44), and Socrates speaks of staying and running the risk where a man is posted (7.45; both from the *Apology*; see Courage and endurance); and living for however long a time is perhaps "a thing the man who is truly a man must let be, and not cling to life" (7.46, from the *Gorgias*; see Death). Book XI ends with an exchange found only here: "Socrates used to say: What do you want? To have souls of rational beings or of irrational?—Of rational.—Of what rational beings? Sound or base?—Sound.—Why then do you not seek them?—Because we have them.—Why then are you fighting and at odds?" (11.39). The last question turns the hearers' own answer against them. J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, thought the passage belongs among the fragments of Epictetus.

The fullest passage turns from the legend to the man. "How do we know whether Telauges was not better in disposition than Socrates?" (7.66; see Body and flesh). Telauges is probably the Pythagorean ascetic of a dialogue of Aeschines the Socratic, as the edition's note says. It is "not enough" that Socrates "died more gloriously, and argued more adroitly with the sophists, and passed the night in the frost more hardily", or that, ordered to fetch the man of Salamis, he "seemed to resist more nobly"; "one must look at this: what sort of soul Socrates had". The questions Marcus then asks can be read as the ones he puts to

himself: whether Socrates could be "content to be just in what concerns men and holy in what concerns gods", neither indignant at random at vice nor a slave to anyone's ignorance, neither receiving what is allotted "as something strange nor enduring it as unbearable", nor "lending the mind to share the passions of the poor flesh". The last scene is kept as a cue, without its words: "What Socrates was like, girt with the sheepskin, when Xanthippe took the cloak and went out" (11.28; see Self-respect and shame), Xanthippe being his wife, and what he said to the companions who drew back ashamed, which Marcus does not write down.

Taken together, the passages give less the questioner of Plato's dialogues, though 11.39 keeps his manner, than a measure, a voice and a soul to be weighed. The Socrates who saw causes, held his post and drew away from the senses can be read as the Stoics' Socrates. Marcus measured his father by him, and yet will not take even his deeds as proof of what his soul was.

Places to read

Every place where Socrates is named, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the four chapters in which Marcus copies his words from Plato without naming him, as the edition's notes at 7.35, 7.45 (for 7.44 and 7.45) and 7.46 identify them. Passages that the notes only compare with Plato, or with Xenophon, the Athenian soldier and writer whose *Memorabilia* record conversations of Socrates (2.1, 2.13, 3.4.3 and others), are left out, and so is 10.31, where Socraticus is another man and Crito and Xenophon, Socrates' companions, are named.

1.16.9 What is recorded of Socrates, that he could both abstain from and enjoy what most men are too weak to go without and give way to when they enjoy, would fit Antoninus.

3.3 Lice of another kind, presumably his accusers, killed Socrates, as death took healers, seers, conquerors and other philosophers.

3.6.2 The daimon within has drawn itself away, as Socrates used to say, from what the senses undergo; if nothing appears better than it, Marcus is to give room to nothing else.

6.47 Socrates is among the dignified philosophers who, with men of every kind, have long been lying dead.

7.19 Eternity has already swallowed many a Chrysippus, many a Socrates, many an Epictetus.

7.35 In words of Plato's *Republic*, Socrates asks whether to a man whose understanding contemplates all time and all substance human life seems anything great, and it is agreed that such a man will not think death terrible.

7.44 In Plato's *Apology* Socrates answers that a man of even a little use ought not to take into account the risk of living or dying, but to look only at whether he does just things or unjust.

7.45 Socrates tells the men of Athens at his trial of staying and running the risk wherever a man posts himself or is posted by a commander, taking into account nothing before what is shameful.

7.46 In Plato's *Gorgias* Socrates says that perhaps the man who is truly a man must let length of life be and not cling to life, but look at how he may best live the time he is to live.

7.66 Marcus asks how we know whether Telauges was not better in disposition than Socrates, and turns from his famous deeds to what sort of soul he had.

8.3 Alexander, Gaius and Pompey are nothing beside Diogenes, Heraclitus and Socrates, who saw things, and their causes and their materials.

11.23 Socrates called the principles of the many Lamias, children's bugbears.

11.25 Socrates would not go to Perdiccas, so as not to be unable, having been done good, to do good in return.

11.28 Marcus recalls Socrates girt with the sheepskin when Xanthippe took the cloak, and what he said to the companions who drew back ashamed.

11.39 Socrates used to ask men whether they wanted souls of rational beings, and sound ones, and, since they said they had them, why they were fighting and at odds.

Epictetus and the Stoics

Socrates appears in more than sixty sections of the four books of Epictetus' *Discourses*. Epictetus holds him up as a pattern (see Exemplary lives), takes up his words at his trial

on keeping one's post (see Cosmos and order), and sometimes cites him in the form Marcus uses, what "Socrates used to say".[623] One of his discourses can be read beside 11.39, the exchange Leopold would give to Epictetus. It bears the title "To an orator going up to Rome for a lawsuit". To a man on his way to Rome over a dispute about his own standing, Epictetus says that every act has a principle for its cause, so that bad principles bring bad results, and asks: "Have we all sound principles, then, you and your opponent alike? And how do you come to be at odds?" A man's own opinion that he is right, Epictetus goes on, is a poor standard, since his opponent and madmen have the same.[624] His word for being at odds, διαφέρεσθαι (*diapheresthai*), is the last word of 11.39, and the argument can be read as the same: men who say that what they have is sound refute themselves by quarrelling.

Other ancient sources

Three of Marcus' notes can be set beside other accounts of Socrates. For "has drawn itself away, as Socrates used to say, from what the senses undergo" (3.6.2), the edition's note names, as perhaps the place meant, a passage of Plato's *Phaedo*, in which Socrates, on the day of his death, says that philosophy takes over a soul that is bound and glued to the body and made to look at things through it as through a prison; it speaks to the soul gently and works to free it, showing it that looking through the eyes is full of deception, and so is perceiving through the ears and the other senses, persuading it to withdraw from them save where it cannot do without them, and bidding it draw itself together into itself and rely on nothing but itself.[625] Marcus' phrase can be read as a summary of that passage.

The Socrates of 8.3, who "saw things, and their causes and their materials", is not the Socrates of Xenophon. Xenophon writes that Socrates did not discuss the nature of all things, as most others did, asking how what the sophists call the cosmos is made and by what necessities each of the things in the heavens comes about; he showed that those who busied themselves with such questions were fools, and himself always talked of human things, what is pious and what impious, what just and what unjust, what temperance is

[623] Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.26.18, 3.12.15 and 4.1.41; on the post, 3.24.99.

[624] Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.9 (title) and 3.9.1–5.

[625] Plato, *Phaedo* 82e–83b.

and what courage, what a city is and what rule over men.[626] Diogenes Laertius disagreed: he thought that Socrates discussed natural questions too, since even in Xenophon he speaks about providence.[627] Marcus can be read as on Diogenes' side.

The scene of 11.28 is not known elsewhere, as the edition's note says, and Leopold took it for an allusion to some Cynic anecdote. Diogenes Laertius tells one like it. Once, in the market place, Xanthippe even stripped his cloak from him, and his friends told him to defend himself with his fists. "Yes, by Zeus," Socrates said, "so that as we trade blows each of you can cheer, 'Bravo, Socrates! Bravo, Xanthippe!'"[628] In both stories his wife takes the cloak and his companions are moved by what they see; in Diogenes he answers them with a joke.

Translation in this edition

Σωκράτης is "Socrates" at all fourteen of its occurrences, with the article or without it; the plural Σωκράτεις (*Sōkrateis*) is "a Socrates" in "how many a Socrates" (7.19), as Χρυσίππους (*Chrysippous*) and Ἐπικτήτους (*Epiktētous*) are "a Chrysippus" and "an Epictetus" in the same sentence. Σωκρατικόν, at 10.31, is the accusative of another man's name, "Socraticus". One conjecture that Leopold's apparatus reports would put Socrates' name into the text, and he does not print it: at 6.13 Gilles Ménage, the seventeenth-century French scholar, proposed Σωκράτους (*Sōkratous*), "Socrates", for Ξενοκράτους (*Xenokratous*), "Xenocrates". At 8.38 Claudius Salmasius, the seventeenth-century French scholar, proposed "look, Crito, says the wisest", which can be read as giving the saying to Socrates; Leopold does not print it either. In the copied passages of Book VII P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, heads 7.35 Πλατωνικόν (*Platōnikon*), "Platonic", and 7.44 Πλατωνικά (*Platōnika*), as Leopold reports; at 7.44–45 "deeds" and "he must" are supplements of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, as the edition's note says. At 11.39 A, the Vatican manuscript, omits the "not" of "Why then do you not seek them?".

---

[626] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.11 and 1.1.16.

[627] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 2.45; for the passages on providence, compare Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.4 and 4.3.

[628] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 2.37.

Σωκράτης

Attested: Σωκράτους (*Sōkratous*; 1.16.9, 7.66), Σωκράτην (*Sōkratēn*; 3.3, 8.3), Σωκράτης (*Sōkratēs*; 3.6.2, 6.47, 7.66 twice, 11.23, 11.25, 11.28 twice, 11.39), Σωκράτεις (*Sōkrateis*; 7.19). Socrates, the Athenian philosopher: a measure, "what is recorded of Socrates would fit him" (1.16.9); one of the dead, "lice of another kind killed Socrates" (3.3), "how many a Socrates" (7.19); a speaker, "as Socrates used to say" (3.6.2), "Socrates used to say" (11.39); a soul to be weighed, "what sort of soul Socrates had" (7.66). At 7.66 P has Σωκράτης καί (*Sōkratēs kai*) for Σωκράτους τήν (*Sōkratous tēn*) and lacks μή (*mē*), "not", and A has εἰ μέν (*ei men*) for εἰ μή (*ei mē*), as Leopold reports. Lemma: Σωκράτης.

See also

Antoninus Pius; Beneficence; Body and flesh; Cause and matter; Cosmos and order; Courage and endurance; Daimon; Death; Epictetus; Exemplary lives; Moral choice and freedom; Principles and reminders; Self-respect and shame; Substance; Temperance and self-mastery.

Index of Greek Words

Every Greek word that has a sub-entry in the Lexicon, in the order of the Greek alphabet, with the entry in which its sub-entry stands.

ἀγαθός Good, bad and indifference
ἀγανακτέω Anger
ἀγανακτικός Anger
ἀγαπητικός Love and affection
ἀγγεῖον Body and flesh
ἀγγειώδης Body and flesh
ἀγεννής Courage and endurance
ἀγνοέω Fault and ignorance
ἄγνοια Fault and ignorance
ἀγνώμων Disposition and frame of mind
ἀγρίδιον Inner retreat and citadel
ἀδελφή Faustina
ἀδελφός Lucius Verus
ἀδιάστροφος Learning, practice and correction
ἀδιαφορέω Good, bad and indifference
ἀδιαφορία Good, bad and indifference
ἀδιάφορος Good, bad and indifference

ἀδιάψευστος Truth and falsehood
ἀδικέω Justice
ἀδίκημα Justice
ἄδικος Justice
ἀδοξία Reputation and praise
ἄδοξος Reputation and praise
ἀερώδης Elements
ἀήρ Elements
ἀήττητος Temperance and self-mastery
αἰδέομαι Self-respect and shame
αἰδέσιμος Self-respect and shame
αἰδήμων Self-respect and shame
ἀΐδιος Time and eternity
αἰδώς Self-respect and shame
αἵρεσις Philosophy
αἰσθάνομαι Body and flesh
αἴσθησις Body and flesh
αἰσθητήριον Body and flesh
αἰσθητικός Body and flesh
αἰσθητός Body and flesh
αἰσχρός Good, bad and indifference
αἰσχύνομαι Self-respect and shame
αἰτία Cause and matter
αἰτιάομαι Fault and ignorance
αἴτιος Cause and matter
αἰτιώδης Cause and matter
αἰών Time and eternity
αἰώνιος Time and eternity
ἀκαριαῖος Time and eternity
ἀκενόδοξος Reputation and praise
ἀκίβδηλος Simplicity and sincerity
ἀκλήρημα Necessity and chance
ἀκμή Natural beauty
ἀκοινώνητος Kinship and cooperation
ἀκολάκευτος Court and office
ἀκολάστημα Temperance and self-mastery
ἀκόλαστος Temperance and self-mastery
ἄκομψος Simplicity and sincerity
ἀκοσμέω Cosmos and order
ἀκοσμία Cosmos and order
ἀκούσιος Fault and ignorance
ἄκρα Tranquillity
ἀκρόπολις Inner retreat and citadel
ἄκων Fault and ignorance

ἀλγηδών Pain and pleasure
Ἀλέξανδρος Alexander the Platonist
ἀλήθεια Truth and falsehood
ἀληθεύω Truth and falsehood
ἀληθής Truth and falsehood
ἀληθινός Truth and falsehood
ἀλλοιόω Change
ἀλλοίωσις Change
ἀλλότριος Affinity and the alien
ἀλλοτριόω Affinity and the alien
ἄλογος Living being
ἀλυπία Pain and pleasure
ἄλυπος Pain and pleasure
ἀμαθής Fault and ignorance
ἁμαρτάνω Fault and ignorance
ἁμάρτημα Fault and ignorance
ἁμαρτητικός Fault and ignorance
ἁμαρτία Fault and ignorance
ἀμελέω Care and tolerance
ἀμεμψίμοιρος Fate and allotment
ἀμερής Providence and atoms
ἀμοιβή Beneficence
ἀμφιθέατρον Drama and role
ἀναβιόω Principles and reminders
ἀναγκάζω Necessity and chance
ἀναγκαῖος Necessity and chance
ἀνάγκη Necessity and chance
ἀναζωπυρέω Principles and reminders
ἀναθυμίασις Soul
ἀναισθησία Death
ἀναίσθητος Body and flesh
ἀναισχυντία Self-respect and shame
ἀναίσχυντος Self-respect and shame
ἀναίτιος Cause and matter
ἀνακυκλέω Recurrence and repetition
ἀναλήθης Truth and falsehood
ἀναλύω Dissolution
ἀναμιμνήσκω Principles and reminders
ἀνανεόω Recurrence and repetition
ἀνανήφω Temperance and self-mastery
ἀνάπνευσις Breath
ἀναπνευστικός Breath
ἀναπνέω Breath
ἀνατλάω Courage and endurance

ἀναχωρέω Inner retreat and citadel
ἀναχώρησις Inner retreat and citadel
ἀνδρεία Virtue and excellence
ἀνδρεῖος Virtue and excellence
ἀνδρικός Courage and endurance
ἀνέθιστος Learning, practice and correction
ἀνεκτικός Care and tolerance
ἀνεκτός Courage and endurance
ἀνεμπόδιστος Obstacle and reservation
ἀνενδεής Contentment and self-sufficiency
ἀνένδοτος Temperance and self-mastery
ἀνεξαπάτητος Truth and falsehood
ἀνεξέταστος Attention and self-examination
ἀνεπίκρυπτος Speech and silence
ἀνεπίπληκτος Kindness and correction
ἀνεπίστατος Attention and self-examination
ἀνέχω Care and tolerance
ἀνηγεμόνευτος Ruling centre
ἀνοίκειος Affinity and the alien
ἀνοικείωτος Affinity and the alien
ἀντεμπλοκή Providence and atoms
ἀντευποιέω Beneficence
ἀντέχω Courage and endurance
ἀντιδυσχεραίνω Resentment and welcome
ἀντιμέμφομαι Fault and ignorance
ἀντοργίζομαι Anger
Ἀντωνῖνος Antoninus Pius
ἀνυπεξαίρετος Obstacle and reservation
ἀνύποιστος Courage and endurance
ἀνυπόκριτος Simplicity and sincerity
ἀόργητος Anger
ἀπαίδευτος Parents and education
ἀπαλλαγή Death
ἀπαλλάσσω Death
ἀπαρακολούθητος Attention and self-examination
ἀπαρενθύμητος Attention and self-examination
ἀπάτη Truth and falsehood
ἀπειρία Time and eternity
ἄπειρος Time and eternity
ἀπέχω Temperance and self-mastery
ἅπλαστος Simplicity and sincerity
ἁπλότης Simplicity and sincerity
ἁπλοῦς Simplicity and sincerity
ἁπλόω Simplicity and sincerity

ἀπογυμνόω Definition and analysis
ἀπόδεξις Resentment and welcome
ἀποδέχομαι Resentment and welcome
ἀποθνήσκω Death
ἀποκαθίστημι Friendship
ἀποκαισαρόομαι Court and office
ἀπόλαυσις Temperance and self-mastery
ἀπολαυστικός Temperance and self-mastery
ἀπολαύω Temperance and self-mastery
ἀπόληψις Inner retreat and citadel
Ἀπολλώνιος Apollonius
ἀπολύω Dissolution
ἀπομερίζω Whole and part
ἀπόμοιρα Fate and allotment
ἀπονέμησις Fate and allotment
ἀπονεμητικός Fate and allotment
ἀπονέμω Fate and allotment
ἀποπνέω Breath
ἀπόρρητος Speech and silence
ἀπόρροια Daimon
ἀποσβέννυμι Death
ἀπόσπασμα Daimon
ἀπόστημα Interconnection
ἀπόσχισμα Citizenship
ἀποχή Temperance and self-mastery
ἀπροαίρετος Moral choice and freedom
ἀπροπτωσία Assent and judgement
ἀπρόπτωτος Assent and judgement
ἀπροσδεής Contentment and self-sufficiency
ἀρέσκεια Resentment and welcome
ἀρεσκεύομαι Resentment and welcome
ἀρεσκευτικός Resentment and welcome
ἀρέσκω Resentment and welcome
ἀρεστός Resentment and welcome
ἀρετή Virtue and excellence
ἀριθμός Duty and fitting action
ἀρκέω Contentment and self-sufficiency
ἀρχή Court and office
ἄρχω Court and office
ἄρχων Court and office
ἀσεβέω Gods
ἀσεβής Gods
ἀσινής Harm
ἀσκέω Learning, practice and correction

ἀσκητικός Learning, practice and correction
ἀσπάζομαι Resentment and welcome
ἀστειολογία Speech and silence
ἄστοργος Love and affection
ἀσχολέω Alexander the Platonist
ἀσχολία Alexander the Platonist
ἄσχολος Alexander the Platonist
ἀταρακτέω Tranquillity
ἀτάρακτος Tranquillity
ἀταραξία Tranquillity
ἀτάραχος Tranquillity
ἄτομος Providence and atoms
ἀτραγῴδως Drama and role
ἀτυφία Simplicity and sincerity
ἄτυφος Simplicity and sincerity
ἀτυχέω Necessity and chance
ἀτύχημα Necessity and chance
ἀτυχής Necessity and chance
αὐλή Court and office
αὐτάρκεια Contentment and self-sufficiency
αὐτάρκης Contentment and self-sufficiency
αὐτουργικός Human work
ἁφαμαρτάνω Fault and ignorance
ἀφεκτικός Domitia Lucilla
ἀφέλεια Simplicity and sincerity
ἀφελής Simplicity and sincerity
ἀφιλήδονος Pain and pleasure
ἄφλυαρος Speech and silence
ἀφόρητος Courage and endurance
ἀφορίζω Definition and analysis
ἀχάνεια Time and eternity
ἀχανής Time and eternity
ἀχάριστος Beneficence
ἀχθοφορία Human work
ἄχρηστος Common advantage
ἀψευδής Truth and falsehood
ἄψυχος Soul
βάπτω Impression
βασιλεία Court and office
βασιλικός Court and office
βλαβερός Harm
βλάβη Harm
βλάπτω Harm
βλασφημέω Speech and silence

βλασφημία Speech and silence
βοήθημα Gratitude
βοηθός Gratitude
βούλομαι Desire and aversion
βωλάριον Elements
γαῖα Elements
γαλήνη Tranquillity
γαληνός Tranquillity
γεγωνίσκω Speech and silence
γενναῖος Courage and endurance
γεννάω Parents and education
γεννικός Courage and endurance
γεώδης Elements
γῆ Elements
γνήσιος Simplicity and sincerity
γνώμη Disposition and frame of mind
γνώριμος Recurrence and repetition
γονεύς Parents and education
γραμματικός Alexander the grammarian
γράσος Body and flesh
γυμνάσιον Learning, practice and correction
γύμνασμα Learning, practice and correction
γυμνός Definition and analysis
γυμνότης Definition and analysis
γυναικάριον Faustina
γυνή Faustina
δαιμόνιος Daimon
δαίμων Daimon
δείκνυμι Kindness and correction
δειλία Courage and endurance
δεισιδαιμονία Daimon
δεισιδαίμων Daimon
δέχομαι Resentment and welcome
δημοκοπικός Court and office
δῆμος Court and office
διάδοσις Gratitude
διαδραματίζω Drama and role
διάθεσις Disposition and frame of mind
διαίρεσις Definition and analysis
διαιρέω Definition and analysis
διάκειμαι Disposition and frame of mind
διακόσμησις Cosmos and order
διακρίνω Wisdom and discernment
διάκρισις Wisdom and discernment

διαλαμβάνω Wisdom and discernment
διαλέγομαι Speech and silence
διαληπτικός Wisdom and discernment
διάλογος Speech and silence
διάλυσις Dissolution
διαλύω Dissolution
διανέμω Fate and allotment
διανοέομαι Mind and reason
διάνοια Mind and reason
διαπνέω Breath
διαρθρόω Definition and analysis
διασκεδάννυμι Providence and atoms
διάταξις Cosmos and order
διαταράσσω Tranquillity
διατάσσω Cosmos and order
διατίθημι Disposition and frame of mind
διατριβή Parents and education
διαψεύδω Truth and falsehood
διδασκαλία Parents and education
διδάσκαλος Parents and education
διδάσκω Kindness and correction
δικαικός Justice
δικαιολογέομαι Justice
δικαιοπραγέω Justice
δικαιοπράγημα Justice
δίκαιος Justice
δικαιοσύνη Justice
δικαιότης Justice
δικαστήριον Justice
δικαστής Justice
δίκη Justice
Διόγνητος Diognetus
διορθόω Learning, practice and correction
διόρθωσις Learning, practice and correction
διώκω Desire and aversion
δίωξις Desire and aversion
δόγμα Principles and reminders
δόξα Reputation and praise
δοξάριον Reputation and praise
δοξοκοπία Reputation and praise
δουλεία Moral choice and freedom
δουλεύω Moral choice and freedom
δοῦλος Moral choice and freedom
δρᾶμα Drama and role

δραματουργία Drama and role
δραπέτης Citizenship
δυσαρεστέω Contentment and self-sufficiency
δυσαρέστησις Contentment and self-sufficiency
δυσένωτος Interconnection
δυσκαταπόνητος Human work
δυσπαρακολούθητος Attention and self-examination
δύσφημος Love and affection
δυσχεραίνω Resentment and welcome
δυσχεραντικός Resentment and welcome
δυσχερής Resentment and welcome
δῶρον Gratitude
ἔαρ Recurrence and repetition
ἐγκαλέω Fault and ignorance
ἐγκαρτερέω Courage and endurance
ἔγκλημα Fault and ignorance
ἐγκράτεια Temperance and self-mastery
ἐγκρατής Temperance and self-mastery
ἐγκύκλιος Recurrence and repetition
ἐθίζω Learning, practice and correction
ἔθος Learning, practice and correction
εἰκαῖος Necessity and chance
εἰκαιότης Necessity and chance
εἰκῇ Necessity and chance
εἱμαρμένη Fate and allotment
ἐκκλίνω Desire and aversion
ἔκκλισις Desire and aversion
ἐκμελετάω Learning, practice and correction
ἑκούσιος Fault and ignorance
ἐκπνέω Breath
ἐκπυρόω Dissolution
ἐκπύρωσις Dissolution
ἐκφωνέω Speech and silence
ἑκών Fault and ignorance
ἐλέγχω Truth and falsehood
ἐλευθερία Moral choice and freedom
ἐλεύθερος Moral choice and freedom
ἐμποδίζω Obstacle and reservation
ἐμπόδιον Obstacle and reservation
ἐμποδισμός Obstacle and reservation
ἐμποδιστικός Obstacle and reservation
ἐμφαντάζομαι Impression
ἐμφιληδονέω Pain and pleasure
ἔμφρων Wisdom and discernment

ἔμψυχος Soul
ἐναποθνῄσκω Death
ἐναποπνέω Breath
ἔνδεσις Necessity and chance
ἐνδίδωμι Temperance and self-mastery
ἔνδοξος Reputation and praise
ἐνδοτικός Temperance and self-mastery
ἐνέργεια Present action
ἐνεργέω Present action
ἐνέργημα Present action
ἐνεργητικός Present action
ἐνθυμέομαι Attention and self-examination
ἐνίστημι Obstacle and reservation
ἐννήφω Temperance and self-mastery
ἑνόω Interconnection
ἐνστατικός Obstacle and reservation
ἔνστημα Obstacle and reservation
ἔνυλος Cause and matter
ἐνυφίστημι Substance
ἕνωσις Interconnection
ἐξάγω Death
ἐξαπατάω Truth and falsehood
ἐξαρκέω Contentment and self-sufficiency
ἔξειμι Death
ἐξέρχομαι Death
ἐξετάζω Attention and self-examination
ἐξέτασις Attention and self-examination
ἐξεταστής Attention and self-examination
ἕξις Disposition and frame of mind
ἔξοδος Death
ἐξοικειόω Affinity and the alien
ἐξυμνέω Reputation and praise
ἐπαγωγός Natural beauty
ἐπαινετός Reputation and praise
ἐπαινέω Reputation and praise
ἔπαινος Reputation and praise
ἐπακολουθέω Natural beauty
ἐπακολούθησις Natural beauty
ἐπάναγκος Necessity and chance
ἐπανερωτάω Attention and self-examination
ἐπαφρόδιτος Natural beauty
ἐπερωτάω Attention and self-examination
ἐπευφημέω Reputation and praise
ἐπιβάλλω Duty and fitting action

ἐπιβοάω Reputation and praise
ἐπιβόησις Reputation and praise
ἐπιβολή Drama and role
ἐπιγέννημα Natural beauty
ἐπιθυμέω Desire and aversion
ἐπιθυμία Desire and aversion
ἐπικαλέω Prayer
Ἐπικούρειος Philosophy
Ἐπικτήτειος Epictetus
Ἐπίκτητος Epictetus
ἐπιμέλεια Care and tolerance
ἐπιμελέομαι Care and tolerance
ἐπιμελητικός Care and tolerance
ἐπιπεριτρέπω Obstacle and reservation
ἐπίπλαστος Simplicity and sincerity
ἐπιπλέκω Interconnection
ἐπιπλοκή Fate and allotment
ἐπίπνοια Gods
ἐπίπονος Pain and pleasure
ἐπιπρέπω Natural beauty
ἐπίστασις Attention and self-examination
ἐπιστήμη Wisdom and discernment
ἐπιστημονικός Wisdom and discernment
ἐπιστήμων Wisdom and discernment
ἐπιστολή Speech and silence
ἐπιστόλιον Speech and silence
ἐπιστροφή Attention and self-examination
ἐπισύνδεσις Interconnection
ἐπιτυχία Necessity and chance
ἐπιφθέγγομαι Speech and silence
ἐραστής Love and affection
ἐράω Love and affection
ἐργάζομαι Human work
ἐργαλεῖον Human work
ἐργαστήριον Human work
ἐργάτης Human work
ἔργον Human work
ἐρυθριάω Self-respect and shame
ἔρως Love and affection
ἐρωτικός Love and affection
ἑτεροίωσις Change
ἑτοιμότης Learning, practice and correction
εὐαρεστέω Contentment and self-sufficiency
εὐαρεστικός Contentment and self-sufficiency

εὐάρεστος Contentment and self-sufficiency
εὐγνωμοσύνη Disposition and frame of mind
εὐγνώμων Disposition and frame of mind
εὐδαιμονία Daimon
εὐδαίμων Daimon
εὐδοκιμέω Reputation and praise
εὐδοξία Reputation and praise
εὐειδής Natural beauty
εὐεξαπάτητος Truth and falsehood
εὐεργετέω Beneficence
εὐεργετικός Beneficence
εὐεργής Human work
εὐθανατέω Death
εὐθυμέω Tranquillity
εὐθυμία Tranquillity
εὔθυμος Tranquillity
εὐθυρρημοσύνη Speech and silence
εὐκλήρημα Necessity and chance
εὐκοινωνησία Kinship and cooperation
εὐκοσμία Tranquillity
εὔλυτος Dissolution
εὐμάρεια Tranquillity
εὐμένεια Kindness and correction
εὐμενής Kindness and correction
εὐμοιρία Fate and allotment
εὔμοιρος Fate and allotment
εὐνοέω Friendship
εὔνοια Friendship
εὔνους Friendship
εὖ πάσχω Beneficence
εὖ ποιέω Beneficence
εὐποιητικός Beneficence
εὐποιία Beneficence
εὔποτμος Fate and allotment
εὐροέω Tranquillity
εὔρους Tranquillity
εὔτακτος Cosmos and order
εὐτύχημα Necessity and chance
εὐτυχής Necessity and chance
εὐφημέω Reputation and praise
εὐφημία Reputation and praise
εὔφημος Reputation and praise
εὐχαριεντίζομαι Exemplary lives
εὔχαρις Natural beauty

εὐχάριστος Beneficence
εὐχή Prayer
εὔχομαι Prayer
εὔχρηστος Common advantage
ἐφήμερος Time and eternity
ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν Moral choice and freedom
ἐφίστημι Attention and self-examination
Ζεύς Gods
ζῆλος Exemplary lives
ζηλοτυπέω Exemplary lives
ζῷον Living being
ζῳώδης Living being
ἡγεμονία Court and office
ἡγεμονικός Ruling centre
ἡγεμών Daimon
ἥδομαι Pain and pleasure
ἡδονή Pain and pleasure
ἡδονικός Pain and pleasure
ἡδύς Pain and pleasure
ἦθος Disposition and frame of mind
ἥμερος Kindness and correction
ἡμερότης Kindness and correction
ἡσσάομαι Temperance and self-mastery
ἡσυχάζω Tranquillity
ἡσυχῇ Tranquillity
ἡσυχία Tranquillity
ἡσύχιος Tranquillity
θάνατος Death
θαρρέω Courage and endurance
θεῖος Gods
θέλω Desire and aversion
θεόθεν Gods
θεός Gods
θεοσέβεια Gods
θεοσεβής Gods
θεουδής Gods
θεοφόρητος Gods
θεραπεία Learning, practice and correction
θεράπευμα Learning, practice and correction
θεραπεύω Learning, practice and correction
θεώρημα Principles and reminders
θηρίον Living being
θνῄσκω Death
θυμός Anger

θυμόω Anger
θύω Gods
ἴδιος Affinity and the alien
ἰδιώτης Philosophy
ἰδιωτικός Philosophy
ἱερουργία Gods
ἱλάσιμος Prayer
ἱλάσκομαι Prayer
ἵλεως Tranquillity
ἰσηγορία Citizenship
ἰσόνομος Citizenship
καθήκω Duty and fitting action
καινός Recurrence and repetition
Καῖσαρ Court and office
κακία Good, bad and indifference
κακοδαιμονέω Daimon
κακός Good, bad and indifference
κάλλος Natural beauty
καλοήθης Parents and education
καλός Good, bad and indifference
κάματος Human work
καρτερικός Courage and endurance
καταιτιάομαι Fault and ignorance
καταιτίασις Fault and ignorance
κατακοσμέω Cosmos and order
κατακρατέω Temperance and self-mastery
καταληπτικός Assent and judgement
καταμέμφομαι Fault and ignorance
καταμερίζω Definition and analysis
καταναγκάζω Necessity and chance
κατασκευή Nature
κατατάσσω Cosmos and order
καταφιλέω Love and affection
κατεργαστικός Human work
κατόρθωσις Virtue and excellence
Κάτουλος Catulus
κενόδοξος Reputation and praise
κηδεμονικός Care and tolerance
κήδομαι Care and tolerance
κίβδηλος Simplicity and sincerity
κλάδος Kinship and cooperation
Κλωθώ Fate and allotment
κοινονοημοσύνη Court and office
κοινωνία Kinship and cooperation

κοινωνικός Kinship and cooperation
κοινωνός Kinship and cooperation
κοινωφελής Common advantage
κολακεία Court and office
κολακεύω Court and office
κομψεία Simplicity and sincerity
κομψός Simplicity and sincerity
κόπος Human work
κόσμιος Cosmos and order
κοσμοποιία Cosmos and order
κόσμος Cosmos and order
κρατέω Temperance and self-mastery
κρεάδιον Body and flesh
κρίμα Assent and judgement
κρίνω Assent and judgement
κρίσις Assent and judgement
κροτέω Reputation and praise
κρότος Reputation and praise
κυκεών Providence and atoms
Κυνικός Philosophy
κυριεύω Ruling centre
κῲδιον Exemplary lives
κώλυμα Obstacle and reservation
κώλυσις Obstacle and reservation
κωλυτικός Obstacle and reservation
κωλύω Obstacle and reservation
κωμικός Drama and role
κωμῲδία Drama and role
κωμῲδός Drama and role
λαλέω Speech and silence
λέξις Speech and silence
λῃστής Moral choice and freedom
λιτός Temperance and self-mastery
λογάριον Speech and silence
λογικός Mind and reason
λογισμός Mind and reason
λόγος Mind and reason
Λούκιλλα Domitia Lucilla
λύθρος Body and flesh
λυκοφιλία Friendship
λυπέω Pain and pleasure
λύπη Pain and pleasure
λύσις Dissolution
λυσιτελής Common advantage

λυτικός Dissolution
μάθημα Learning, practice and correction
μαθητής Learning, practice and correction
μαίνομαι Wisdom and discernment
μανθάνω Learning, practice and correction
μανικός Wisdom and discernment
μανιώδης Wisdom and discernment
Μάξιμος Maximus
μείρομαι Fate and allotment
μέλισσα Human work
μέλος Kinship and cooperation
μέλω Care and tolerance
μέμφομαι Fault and ignorance
μέμψις Fault and ignorance
μερίζω Whole and part
μερισμός Whole and part
μέρος Whole and part
μέσος Good, bad and indifference
μεταβάλλω Change
μεταβολή Change
μετάγω Learning, practice and correction
μεταγωγή Learning, practice and correction
μεταδιδάσκω Kindness and correction
μετάπτωτος Assent and judgement
μετατίθημι Learning, practice and correction
μετεωρολογικός Philosophy
μήτηρ Parents and education
μητρυιά Court and office
μιμέομαι Exemplary lives
μίμησις Exemplary lives
μῖμος Drama and role
μισθός Beneficence
μοῖρα Fate and allotment
μόριον Whole and part
μωρός Wisdom and discernment
νεκρός Death
νέμω Fate and allotment
νέος Recurrence and repetition
νήφω Temperance and self-mastery
νοερός Mind and reason
νοῦς Mind and reason
ξενίζω Affinity and the alien
ξένος Affinity and the alien
οἰκεῖος Affinity and the alien

οἰκειότης Affinity and the alien
οἰκειόω Affinity and the alien
οἰκείωσις Affinity and the alien
ὀλιγοδεής Contentment and self-sufficiency
ὀλιγοχρόνιος Time and eternity
ὁλόκληρος Whole and part
ὅλος Whole and part
ὁμιλέω Speech and silence
ὁμιλία Speech and silence
ὁμογενής Kinship and cooperation
ὁμογνώμων Disposition and frame of mind
ὁμοδογματέω Principles and reminders
ὁμοειδής Recurrence and repetition
ὁμοθαμνέω Kinship and cooperation
ὀνειδιστικός Kindness and correction
ὀργή Anger
ὀργίζω Anger
ὀρέγω Desire and aversion
ὄρεξις Desire and aversion
ὁρίζω Definition and analysis
ὅρκος Gods
ὁρμάω Impulse
ὁρμή Impulse
ὁρμητικός Impulse
ὁρμητός Impulse
ὅρος Inner retreat and citadel
ὅρος Definition and analysis
ὀρτυγοτροφέω Parents and education
ὅσιος Gods
ὁσιότης Gods
οὐερνάκλος Court and office
Οὐῆρος Annius Verus
οὐσία Substance
οὐσιώδης Substance
ὀχλοχαρής Court and office
παιδαγωγέω Parents and education
παιδαγωγία Parents and education
παιδαγωγικός Parents and education
παιδαγωγός Parents and education
παιδαριώδης Parents and education
παιδεύω Parents and education
παιδικός Parents and education
παιδίον Parents and education
παιδοτροφέω Parents and education

παῖς Parents and education
παλιγγενεσία Recurrence and repetition
παλλακή Annius Verus
πάππος Parents and education
παράδειγμα Exemplary lives
παρακολουθέω Attention and self-examination
παρακολούθησις Attention and self-examination
παρακολουθητικός Attention and self-examination
παρατηρέω Attention and self-examination
παρατήρησις Attention and self-examination
παραφυλάσσω Attention and self-examination
παραχωρέω Exemplary lives
παραχωρητικός Exemplary lives
πάρειμι Time and eternity
παρενθυμέομαι Attention and self-examination
παρόραμα Kindness and correction
παροράω Kindness and correction
παρρησία Speech and silence
παρρησιαστικός Speech and silence
παρυπόμνησις Principles and reminders
πᾶς Whole and part
πατήρ Parents and education
πάτριος Court and office
πατρίς Citizenship
πατρονομέομαι Exemplary lives
πειθήνιος Faustina
πεῖσις Pain and pleasure
περιαιρέω Definition and analysis
περιβλέπω Attention and self-examination
περιγραφή Definition and analysis
περιγράφω Definition and analysis
περιεργάζομαι Common advantage
περίεργος Common advantage
περικρατέω Temperance and self-mastery
περιλαλέω Speech and silence
περιοδικός Recurrence and repetition
περίοδος Recurrence and repetition
περιορίζω Definition and analysis
περιπλοκή Speech and silence
περιτρέπω Obstacle and reservation
περιτροπή Obstacle and reservation
πηγή Inner retreat and citadel
Πλατωνικός Philosophy
πνεῦμα Breath

πνευματικός Breath
πνευμάτιον Breath
ποικιλία Court and office
ποιός Substance
πόλις Citizenship
πολιτεία Citizenship
πολίτευμα Citizenship
πολιτεύομαι Citizenship
πολίτης Citizenship
πολιτικός Citizenship
πολυμαθής Learning, practice and correction
πολυρρήμων Speech and silence
πολυύμνητος Reputation and praise
πονέω Pain and pleasure
πόνος Pain and pleasure
πόρω Fate and allotment
πρακτέος Present action
πρακτικός Present action
πρᾶξις Present action
πρᾷος Kindness and correction
πρᾳότης Kindness and correction
πράσσω Present action
πρέπω Duty and fitting action
προαδικέω Justice
προαίρεσις Moral choice and freedom
προαιρετικός Moral choice and freedom
προαιρέω Moral choice and freedom
προηγέομαι Impulse
προΐστημι Court and office
προκήδομαι Care and tolerance
προκόπτω Learning, practice and correction
προνοέω Providence and atoms
προνοητικός Providence and atoms
πρόνοια Providence and atoms
πρόπαππος Parents and education
προπτωτικός Assent and judgement
προσγυμνάζομαι Learning, practice and correction
προσδοξάζω Reputation and praise
προσεκτικός Attention and self-examination
προσέχω Attention and self-examination
προσήκω Duty and fitting action
προσίημι Resentment and welcome
προσκορής Recurrence and repetition
προσμανθάνω Learning, practice and correction

προσοχή Attention and self-examination
προσποιέω Simplicity and sincerity
προστάτης Daimon
προσυφίστημι Substance
προτέρημα Virtue and excellence
πρόχειρος Principles and reminders
πταίω Fault and ignorance
πτοέω Tranquillity
πτοία Tranquillity
Πυθαγόρειος Philosophy
πῦρ Elements
πυρώδης Elements
ῥέω Change
ῥῆμα Speech and silence
ῥητορεία Speech and silence
ῥητορική Speech and silence
ῥήτωρ Speech and silence
Ῥούστικος Rusticus
ῥύσις Change
σαρκίδιον Body and flesh
σαρκίον Body and flesh
σάρξ Body and flesh
σβέννυμι Death
σβέσις Death
σεβασμός Gods
σέβω Gods
Σέξτος Sextus
Σεουῆρος Severus
σιωπή Speech and silence
σκεδάννυμι Providence and atoms
σκέδασις Providence and atoms
σκεδασμός Providence and atoms
σκέπτομαι Attention and self-examination
σκέψις Attention and self-examination
σκηνή Drama and role
σκοπέω Attention and self-examination
σκοπός Impulse
σκορπισμός Providence and atoms
σμῆνος Common advantage
σοφιστής Philosophy
σοφιστικός Philosophy
σοφός Wisdom and discernment
σπουδαῖος Good, bad and indifference
στασιώδης Citizenship

στέργω Contentment and self-sufficiency
στερέμνιος Elements
στερκτικός Contentment and self-sufficiency
στοιχεῖον Elements
στοιχειώδης Principles and reminders
στοργή Love and affection
στρατηγός Court and office
Στωικός Philosophy
συγγένεια Kinship and cooperation
συγγενής Kinship and cooperation
συγγινώσκω Kindness and correction
συγγνώμη Kindness and correction
συγγνωμονικός Kindness and correction
συγγυμνάζω Learning, practice and correction
συγκαθείμαρμαι Fate and allotment
συγκατάθεσις Assent and judgement
συγκατατάσσω Cosmos and order
συγκατατίθημι Assent and judgement
συγκληρόω Fate and allotment
σύγκλητος Court and office
συγκλώθω Fate and allotment
σύγκλωσις Fate and allotment
συγκοσμέω Cosmos and order
σύγκριμα Dissolution
συγκριμάτιον Dissolution
συγκρίνω Dissolution
σύγκρισις Dissolution
συλλαγχάνω Fate and allotment
σύλληξις Fate and allotment
σύλληψις Gratitude
συμβαίνω Fate and allotment
σύμβαμα Fate and allotment
σύμβασις Fate and allotment
συμβιόω Duty and fitting action
συμβούλιον Court and office
συμμηρύομαι Fate and allotment
συμμήρυσις Fate and allotment
συμμοιράω Fate and allotment
συμπάθεια Interconnection
συμπαθής Interconnection
σύμπας Whole and part
συμπεριφαντάζομαι Impression
συμπνέω Breath
σύμπνοια Breath

σύμπνους Breath
συμπολιτεύομαι Citizenship
συμφέρω Common advantage
συμφλυαρέω Speech and silence
σύμφρων Wisdom and discernment
συμφυής Interconnection
συμφύρω Providence and atoms
συμφύω Interconnection
συναίτιος Cause and matter
συναρμόζω Interconnection
συνάφεια Interconnection
σύνδεσις Interconnection
συνειλέω Inner retreat and citadel
συνείμαρται Fate and allotment
συνεπικοσμέω Cosmos and order
συνεράω Love and affection
συνεργέω Kinship and cooperation
συνεργητικός Kinship and cooperation
συνεργία Kinship and cooperation
συνεργός Kinship and cooperation
συνέχεια Interconnection
συνέχω Interconnection
συνήθης Recurrence and repetition
συννήθω Fate and allotment
σύννησις Fate and allotment
συντάσσω Cosmos and order
σύντευξις Necessity and chance
συστρέφω Inner retreat and citadel
σχέσις Duty and fitting action
σχολαστικός Philosophy
Σωκράτης Socrates
σῶμα Body and flesh
σωματικός Body and flesh
σωμάτιον Body and flesh
σωφροσύνη Virtue and excellence
σώφρων Virtue and excellence
ταλαιπωρία Human work
τάξις Cosmos and order
ταράσσω Tranquillity
ταραχή Tranquillity
τάσσω Cosmos and order
τεκνίον Parents and education
τέκνον Parents and education
τέλος Present action

τέχνη Human work
τεχνίον Human work
τεχνίτης Human work
τίκτω Parents and education
τλάω Courage and endurance
τοκεύς Parents and education
τονικός Interconnection
τραγῳδέω Drama and role
τραγῳδία Drama and role
τραγῳδός Drama and role
τροπή Change
τροφεύς Parents and education
τροφός Parents and education
τυγχάνω Necessity and chance
τυραννικός Court and office
τύραννος Court and office
τῦφος Simplicity and sincerity
τυφόω Simplicity and sincerity
τύφω Simplicity and sincerity
τύχη Necessity and chance
ὑγρός Elements
ὕδωρ Elements
ὕλη Cause and matter
ὑλικός Cause and matter
ὑμνέω Reputation and praise
ὑπατεία Court and office
ὑπεξαίρεσις Obstacle and reservation
ὑπέρφρων Wisdom and discernment
ὑπογραφή Definition and analysis
ὑπόθεσις Principles and reminders
ὑπόκειμαι Substance
ὑποκρίνομαι Simplicity and sincerity
ὑπόκρισις Simplicity and sincerity
ὑπολαμβάνω Assent and judgement
ὑποληπτικός Assent and judgement
ὑπόληψις Assent and judgement
ὑπομενετικός Courage and endurance
ὑπομένω Courage and endurance
ὑπομιμνήσκω Principles and reminders
ὑπόμνημα Principles and reminders
ὑπομνημάτιον Principles and reminders
ὑπόμνησις Principles and reminders
ὑπομνηστικός Principles and reminders
ὑποστάθμη Elements

ὑπόστασις Substance
ὑποχώρησις Inner retreat and citadel
ὑστεροφημία Reputation and praise
ὑφίστημι Substance
φαντάζομαι Impression
φαντασία Impression
φαντασιοπλήκτως Impression
φάντασμα Impression
φανταστικός Impression
φανταστός Impression
φαῦλος Good, bad and indifference
Φαυστῖνα Faustina
φερέπονος Courage and endurance
φέρω Courage and endurance
φεύγω Desire and aversion
φήμη Reputation and praise
φθέγγομαι Speech and silence
φιλαλήθης Truth and falsehood
φιλάνθρωπος Love and affection
φιλαυτία Love and affection
φιλέω Love and affection
φιλήδονος Pain and pleasure
φιλητικός Love and affection
φιλία Friendship
φιλοδίκαιος Justice
φιλόδοξος Reputation and praise
φιλοίκειος Love and affection
φιλόπονος Human work
φίλος Friendship
φιλοσοφέω Philosophy
φιλοσοφία Philosophy
φιλόσοφος Philosophy
φιλοστοργία Love and affection
φιλόστοργος Love and affection
φλοιός Body and flesh
φορητός Courage and endurance
φραστικός Speech and silence
φρενήρης Wisdom and discernment
φρονέω Virtue and excellence
φρόνησις Virtue and excellence
φρόνιμος Virtue and excellence
Φρόντων Fronto
φυγάς Citizenship
φυγή Desire and aversion

φυρμός Providence and atoms
φυσικός Nature
φυσιολογέω Nature
φυσιολόγος Nature
φύσις Nature
φύω Nature
φωνή Speech and silence
χαλεπαίνω Anger
χάος Time and eternity
χαρίεις Natural beauty
χάρις Beneficence
χείμαρρος Substance
χρεώστης Beneficence
χρήσιμος Common advantage
χρηστός Kindness and correction
χρηστότης Kindness and correction
χρόνος Time and eternity
ψέγω Reputation and praise
ψευδής Truth and falsehood
ψευδολογία Truth and falsehood
ψεύδομαι Truth and falsehood
ψεύστης Truth and falsehood
ψιλός Definition and analysis
ψόγος Reputation and praise
ψυχαγωγέω Natural beauty
ψυχάριον Soul
ψυχή Soul
ψυχικός Soul
ψύχωσις Soul
ὡραῖος Natural beauty
ὠφέλεια Beneficence
ὠφελέω Beneficence
ὠφέλιμος Beneficence