Knowledge proof and ethical practice

Jurisprudence

Jurisprudenz; Scienz; memoire

Jurisprudence denotes the study and knowledge of law.

From the book

Candida Phoenix Philosophica

Anonymous · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordJurisprudence denotes the study and knowledge of law.
  • In the CandidaThe author sets it aside as outside his present account, yet earlier invokes Justinian on assessing authorities.
  • TranslationThe French maxim is presented as a reported judgement, not a settled definition of law.
  • A place to readII.058.2, pp. 58–59, read beside I.051.1, pp. 51–52.

Meaning

Jurisprudence receives only a short explicit discussion, but that discussion reveals how the author defines the scope of his inquiry. He says that most people do not regard it as a science and reports a French saying that makes it more a matter of memory than science. He then leaves the subject in its own domain because it does not belong to the present undertaking.

The wording is deliberately limited. The author says more might be said, but does not supply a philosophy of law. The passage should therefore not be expanded into a comprehensive account of legal knowledge or treated as proof of a general contemporary consensus. It records the author's stated reason for setting one field aside.

Use in the book

The placement follows a discussion of natural knowledge and the errors that arise when nature is poorly understood. The author is arguing for the relevance of his natural philosophy to other kinds of learning. Jurisprudence interrupts that expansion with a boundary: not every field is to be absorbed into the present discourse. This makes the short passage useful beside the broader entry on art and science.

An earlier legal appeal complicates any simple claim that the author dismisses law. At the end of the First Part, he invokes Justinian's injunction against deciding according to the multitude of authors (I.051.1). The legal authority supplies an argumentative rule: one opinion may outweigh many prestigious ones. He applies it to the interpretation of the spirit over the waters.117

The two passages are compatible if their functions are kept distinct. Jurisprudence as a subject is outside the announced programme, but a legal text can still offer an apt maxim. The author likewise draws on physicians and philosophical writers without treating every subject they discuss as part of his present exposition. Citation is selective use, not wholesale adoption of a discipline.

The entry has a practical reading consequence. When an authority appears, the reader should ask what it is being asked to establish. Justinian is used to support the assessment of opinions, not to identify the Hermetic matter. The French maxim is used to close a digression, not to demonstrate the theory of rainwater. Keeping these local tasks visible prevents the book's wide range of references from becoming an undifferentiated catalogue of authorities.

Places to read

  1. Part I · I.050.1; I.051.12The legal injunction employed against deciding by a majority of authors.
  2. Part II · II.058.1; II.058.2; II.059.123Natural knowledge, the brief legal digression and the return to the definition of nature.

Translation

Jurisprudenz is jurisprudence. Scienz is science in the historical sense of an organized kind of knowledge. The French memoire is memory. The translation preserves the reported character of the saying and the author's decision to leave the subject aside.

Cautions

The short passage does not establish a modern distinction between legal practice and legal science, nor does it justify attributing a detailed legal training or professional identity to the anonymous author.

Jurisprudenz

Jurisprudenz — jurisprudence. II.058.2.

Scienz

Scienz — science. II.058.2.

memoire

memoire — memory in the French maxim. II.058.2.

Source note

The French saying is reported at II.058.2 without a named originator. It is treated here as a maxim quoted by the Candida, rather than assigned conjecturally to a particular jurist.