Joubert Lexicon

A Companion to the Complete Notebooks

459 contextual articles with French headwords

Annotated passages and translation notes

Version 1 · October 2026

Prepared for Diotimos

Reviewer and editor: Steven Neff — review pending.

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Introduction

A companion to the notebooks

This Lexicon contains 459 articles for readers of the complete French and English notebooks of Joseph Joubert prepared for Diotimos. It follows the words through questions of thought and writing, religious and moral life, friendship and conduct, art, nature, and the body. Each article brings a French headword or related family of words together with English renderings, an explanation of particular uses, and passages in which those uses can be examined.

Joubert often tries a comparison, records another writer's thought, leaves a question unfinished, or revises an earlier formulation. A word can change force between these settings. The explanations therefore concern the cited passages; they do not turn the notebooks into a finished system or treat every quotation and report as Joubert's own settled conviction.

Being printed among the notebooks does not by itself establish autograph authorship. Beaunier identifies the passage on paternal authority at I, p. 128, entry 2 as being in another hand. Such qualifications are retained in the relevant articles. The vocabulary screen describes the reviewed running text of the edition, not a certified inventory of words written personally by Joubert.

The completed Stobaeus Lexicon supplies the model for the article structure, annotated references, translation discussions, and indexes. The explanations here are newly written for Joubert. The selection follows a vocabulary audit of the whole reviewed French corpus; its size was determined by the reading value of the attested terms rather than a numerical target.

How to read an article

The word introduces the meanings relevant to the selected passages. In Joubert develops the distinctions, comparisons, or tensions visible there. The places gives an annotated reading list. In this edition explains the choices made in the Version 6 English translation. Separate source notes identify the printed pages and any further qualification. See also connects related articles.

French headwords provide lookup forms. The running text may contain a plural, an inflected verb, a related adjective, or a historical spelling. Grouped forms are identified

as a family; their presence under one heading does not make their senses interchangeable. French words and brief French quotations remain distinct from the English editorial explanation.

The French index leads from a headword to its article. The English and French index includes the shorter treatments placed within broader articles. The thematic index offers another route through the same articles. Grouping an article under one subject is a navigation choice, not a restriction on its other uses.

The appendix on unsettled vocabulary records cases in which the existing translation remains provisional or retains an unexplained French form. These are deliberate limits on interpretation. An attractive association or a convenient dictionary gloss is not a resolution of damaged or anomalous evidence.

Sources and references

The base edition is Joseph Joubert, Les Carnets de Joseph Joubert, texts collected from the autograph manuscripts by André Beaunier, two volumes, Paris, Librairie Gallimard, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, 1938. The accompanying Version 6 translation covers volume I, printed pages 32–475; volume II, pages 475 bis–916; and the seventy undated pieces on pages 917–937. The edition's prefatory essays, biography, title and production pages, and closing index are outside that manuscript's scope.

The audit used all 8,310 notebook entry records and 10,611 paired main paragraphs in the reviewed manuscript. The source editor's separate introduction to the undated pieces is outside those counts and the lexical index. Source-editor annotations and translator's notes were consulted to qualify interpretation but were not counted as Joubert's running vocabulary. This work is a lexical audit of Version 6, not a new transcription or a fresh complete collation of the facsimile. The earlier manuscript review's qualifications remain in force.

A reference such as I, p. 214, entry 2, ¶1 identifies the first paragraph of the second entry beginning on printed page 214 of volume I. References give the cited paragraph's printed pages; when its entry begins on an earlier page, that starting page is also identified. These are the French edition's printed pages, not the Lexicon's pages or a reader's EPUB page count. The reference links lead to the first cited facsimile page; the passage register preserves every source-page link and the stable identifiers used by the bilingual book.

Entry and paragraph numbers are the bilingual edition's navigation aids. They do not assert that Joubert or Beaunier supplied those numbers as titles or divisions.

Printed dates, incomplete dates, and undated status belong to the source records. No year or day has been inferred for this Lexicon from a neighboring entry. The discussions use chronology only where their evidence supports it.

The English follows the project's independent translation. Paul Auster's translation was not consulted. A difference between two English renderings may reflect a difference of sense; conversely, the same English word may represent distinct French words. The articles explain consequential choices without imposing a fixed one-word substitution throughout the notebooks.

Editorial status

New Lexicon prepared for Diotimos, 2026. Version 1, October 2026.

Reviewer and editor: Steven Neff — review pending.

Absence

absence; absent — absent; absence[1]

The word. Absence can name a continuing relation to someone no longer present, rather than the cancellation of that relation.

In Joubert. The injunction to weep for people as absent rather than lost does not forbid tears. Remembrance can make up for absence without pretending that the person is physically present. The extended father-and-son example protects this distinction against an overhasty religious consolation: joy that a father is happy can coexist with grief that he is absent. Faith should restrain bad inclinations, not suppress praiseworthy movements of the heart. The argument concerns the legitimacy of grief even under a supposition of revealed happiness; it does not establish the fate of an identified father.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 91, entry 5, ¶1 — Weeping is permitted under the description of absence.

I, p. 131, entry 10, ¶1 — Remembrance compensates for absence.

II, p. 673, entry 8, ¶3 — Joy for a happy father and grief for his absence can coexist.

In this edition. Version 6 repeats the father where needed to clarify pronouns, then distinguishes the son's help for himself from help for another. Beaunier reports a dated separate sheet and a notebook sketch; the damaged main day is not recovered from that apparatus.

See also. Remembrance; Faith; Consolation; Sorrow; Family.

Absolute and relative

absolu; relatif — absolute; complete; relatives; correlatives[2]

The word. Absolute may mean complete or self-contained, while relative can mark a relation or dependence. These terms are not laid out as a single systematic opposition in the selected notes.

In Joubert. Nature can make a thing finished and absolute in every point before charm is attached to it. The historical report about a philosophy in which God is absolute but not infinite explicitly warns that infinite had a bad sense there. That semantic warning matters more than importing a current definition. The very short note on relatives or

[1] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 91, 131; II, pp. 673.

[2] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 141, 412; II, pp. 745.

correlatives concerning divine things remains a topic for investigation, not a finished explanation of how divine relations work.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 141, entry 4, ¶1 — Absolute is paired with completion of a natural thing.

I, p. 412, entry 2, ¶1 — A reported historical usage contrasts absolute perfection with a pejorative infinite.

II, p. 745, entry 6, ¶1 — Relatives or correlatives appear as an unelaborated topic.

In this edition. Version 6 renders absolue as “complete” in the natural-form sentence but “absolute” in the historical account. It keeps the terse divine-relations fragment terse and does not identify the unspecified historical school beyond its context.

See also. Perfection; Infinite; Whole and part; Essence; Dyad and mixture.

Abstraction

abstraction; abstrait — abstraction; abstract[3]

The word. Abstrait is not interchangeable with métaphysique. Joubert can oppose abstraction to genuine apprehension of intellectual things.

In Joubert. The art of metaphysical writing is to make the abstract perceptible and palpable; reversing that movement is a fault. This criticism concerns expression and intellectual access, not a denial that abstract objects may be discussed. The note pairing matter with excessive abstraction shows two different obstructions: matter obscures sight, whereas abstractions carry and hold it where nothing is. The later series repeats a substitution of the abstract for the metaphysical, matching it with obscure for clear and shadow for image. Those oppositions are Joubert’s working distinctions and should not be silently replaced by the assumption that all metaphysics is abstraction.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 135, entry 7, ¶1 — Good metaphysical writing makes the abstract palpable.

II, p. 588, entry 11, ¶1 — Too many abstractions misdirect intellectual sight.

II, p. 760, entry 11, ¶3 — Abstract and metaphysical are explicitly opposed.

In this edition. Version 6 retains palpable, sight, shadow and image. The opaque X-to-Δ notation on II.760 remains unexplained; Δ is a qualified diplomatic approximation of a damaged triangular sign, not a secure mathematical key.

[3] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 135; II, pp. 588, 719, 760.

Related terms.

Concrete. *concret* — The short paired direction moves from abstract to concrete and from unseen to seen. Version 6 retains both nominal movements, the semicolon and the linking and without supplying a governing verb. Their juxtaposition supports a relation to perceptible presentation, but does not explicitly define concrete as identical with visible or explain the whole path between them.

Places. II, p. 719, entry begun p. 718, no. 4, ¶7.

See also. Image; Clarity and obscurity; Idea; Definition.

Accent and tone

accent; ton — accent; tone[4]

The word. Accent and ton can concern audible expression, literary bearing, or socially approved manner. Their values depend on the kind of expression being judged.

In Joubert. The gentle accent of ancient books is part of their example of beautiful language, even though the books are read. Tone is more sharply qualified in the fashion comparison: there may be a truly best tone, but common usage calls the fashionable tone good. The tone/taste fragment argues that an expression offending taste must be excluded, while a departure from prevailing tone need not be. This distinction gives literary purism a boundary. Musical semitones belong to another, specifically acoustic and shading context; they should not be used to explain social tone as if it were merely pitch.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 495, entry 2, ¶1 — Accent describes the gentle bearing of written language.

II, p. 592, entry 3, ¶1 — Good tone is distinguished from the tone approved by fashion.

II, p. 748, entry 7, ¶1 — Tone and taste receive different authority over exclusion.

I, p. 321, entry 9, ¶1 — Semitones participate in a musical chiaroscuro analogy.

In this edition. Version 6 retains tone through its social and stylistic senses. Good dressmaker is a contextual reading of bonne faiseuse in the fashion analogy. The unfinished opening “Their differences and” remains unfinished, and the musical series’ attribution to de Brosses is source-editor apparatus.

See also. Taste; Music; Style; Sound and voice.

[4] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 321; II, pp. 495, 592, 748.

Action

action — action; actions[5]

The word. Action concerns what is done, but Joubert also considers the moral meaning of deeds not yet performed and the standards by which deeds are judged.

In Joubert. The universal-order maxim distributes beauty across ideas and images, goodness across actions, plans and undertakings. The good actions not yet done are then called a discovery and a step forward for will: possibility can educate willingness before accomplishment. The reported earlier judgment distinguishes judging the work and actions by the rule from judging the rule and actions by the work. It retains actions in both halves rather than making a tidier rule/work reversal.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 45, entry 2, ¶4 — Accord with universal order differentiates good action from beautiful representation.

II, p. 721, entry 2, ¶1 — An unperformed good action can advance will.

II, p. 888, entry 5, ¶1 — Actions and works are judged in relation to a rule.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the different lists, the unperformed condition and the bracketed contextual rendering “[discovery].” Progrès here becomes a step forward; it does not establish an inevitable historical law of progress.

Related terms.

Progress. *progrès* — The good action not yet performed is a step forward for will, a local moral possibility rather than a doctrine of universal progress.

Places. II, p. 721, entry 2, ¶1.

Ends and means. *but; moyen* — But and moyens are jointly required to be honorable in the saying attributed to Mme P. [Pastoret], which Joubert endorses. Version 6 translates honnête ethically rather than merely as truthful. The bracketed surname belongs to the source edition; yesterday remains relative to the note and supplies no independently dated encounter.

Places. II, p. 512, entry 7, ¶1.

See also. Will; Virtue; Morality; Law; Practice and effort.

[5] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 45; II, pp. 512, 721, 888.

Aesthetic grace

grâce — grace; graces[6]

The word. In aesthetic passages, grâce is an attractive manner, movement or tempering quality distinguishable from beauty itself.

In Joubert. Joubert assigns bodily grace to clothing, movements and manners, while beauty lies in nude forms and solid bodies in relation. He immediately changes the mapping for feelings: beauty belongs to elevation and spirituality, grace to moderation. This explicit shift prevents a single physical definition from covering every setting. The garment image makes grace beauty's natural clothing and compares artistic strength without it to a flayed figure. In a reflection on style, ingenuous fluency can possess grace without precision; elsewhere too rigid a precision is said to be incompatible with grace. The quality is therefore a relational fitness, not merely an additional ornament.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 519, entry 7, ¶1 — Bodily grace and beauty have different locations.

II, p. 519, entry 7, ¶2 — The distinction changes when applied to feelings.

II, p. 567, entry 8, ¶1 — Grace clothes beauty; strength without it resembles a flayed figure.

II, p. 512, entry 4, ¶1 — Ingenuous expression may have grace without precision.

II, p. 717, entry 6, ¶1 — Overly rigid precision is judged incompatible with grace, through a qualified damaged reading.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the clothing/flaying relation and uses ingenuous for naïf. Aesthetic grace is distinguished here from divine grace or an act of pardon; these different uses are not one doctrine. The English [incompatible] on II.717 is contextual: the damaged French incom[…]atible does not certify every lost letter.

See also. Beauty; Elegance; Precision; Divine grace.

Affectation

affectation; affecter — affectation; to affect[7]

The word. Affectation concerns a strained, displayed or misplaced expression. Joubert distinguishes it from vanity itself and asks what the expression serves, where it stands and whether it belongs sincerely to its speaker.

[6] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 512, 519, 567, 717.

[7] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 461; II, pp. 531, 578, 641.

In Joubert. A beautiful expression can become affected when detached from its proper position: an architectural capital belongs at the top, not the beginning, of a building. Studied wording also changes value with its underlying matter. Beautiful subjects deserve extreme care; the same care lavished on commonplace thoughts may look affected. Affectation attaches more closely to words than pretension does, and time can efface it. The decisive contrast in another note is between a writer seeking clarity or exactness for the reader and one seeking brilliance for himself. The definition of affecter as displaying what one lacks adds a personal test: identical tones and gestures are not affected in everyone. Sincerity, proportion and placement make the judgment contextual.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 461, entry 1, ¶1 — Displacement can make a beautiful expression affected.

II, p. 531, entry begun p. 530, no. 1, ¶7 — Studied expression is judged in relation to its matter.

II, p. 578, entry 4, ¶1 — Affectation differs from invariably offensive pretension.

II, p. 578, entry 4, ¶2 — Care for the reader differs from the wish to shine.

II, p. 641, entry 9, ¶2 — A gesture may be sincere in one person and affected in another.

In this edition. Version 6 uses affectation and to affect, while recherche in the neighboring explanation becomes studied refinement, not research. The conditional or comparative limits remain: affectation does not always displease, and the singer may fail to please. The dating of the exercise-book addition at II.530 is the source editor's inference, not an authorial date.

See also. Naturalness; Artifice; Style; Ornament; Vanity.

Affection

affection — affection; affections[8]

The word. Affection covers inward attachments and movements of feeling. Its range here is broader than the modern English sense of fondness alone.

In Joubert. In the account of Platonic faculties, reason should govern affections and affections govern appetites. The middle position gives affections an ordering function rather than treating them as identical to appetite. Elsewhere their multiplicity enlarges the heart. Domestic affections then appear as an exception within Joubert's sweeping claim about the French inability to sustain lasting feelings. The claim is historically

[8] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36; II, pp. 512, 827.

situated and categorical in his words; the lexicon should neither endorse the national stereotype nor quietly soften it into an established psychological law.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶2 — Affections occupy a middle place between reason and appetites.

II, p. 512, entry 10, ¶1 — Many affections enlarge the heart.

II, p. 827, entry 8, ¶1 — Domestic affections qualify a national generalization.

In this edition. Version 6 uses affections in the faculty hierarchy and domestic affections in the social judgment, while sentimens in the latter becomes feelings. The pair therefore helps readers see a difference that a blanket translation as emotions would erase.

See also. Heart; Love; Family; Passion; Feeling.

Aging and old age

vieillesse; vieillir — old age; grow old[9]

The word. Old age describes a stage of embodied life, a claim upon respect, and a relative measure that changes when compared with eternity.

In Joubert. Its authority is historically qualified: old age must have been more honored when people could scarcely know more than they had personally seen. A later literary judgment contrasts age's pursuit of taste and ease with youth's fashion-following. Before eternity, however, even a centenarian becomes a child and old age a dawn. Another passage distinguishes a morally good maxim about growing old from the beauty of an elliptical maxim. Age here is also material for thinking about expression, not simply a series of autobiographical complaints.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 333, entry 9, ¶1 — Experiential limits once gave age a special authority.

II, p. 476, entry 5, ¶1 — Literary old age follows taste and ease.

I, p. 469, entry 5, ¶1 — Old age is only dawn before eternity.

II, p. 736, entry 5, ¶1 — Two maxims about honoring age differ in literary construction.

[9] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 333, 469; II, pp. 476, 736.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the comparison's "before eternity" rather than treating the centenarian as literally young. The two quoted maxims remain distinct and are not merged into a familiar proverb. In the first witness, devoit is read inferentially as "must have been"; the alternative "ought to have been," expressing deserved honor, remains possible.

See also. Childhood and youth; Time; Eternity; Health and illness.

Air

air — air; words of air[10]

The word. Air is a surrounding medium, a carrier of sound, and an image of lightness and receptivity. Other French uses mean manner or a musical air and require separate interpretation.

In Joubert. An early account assigns air to hearing as its medium. The Aeolian harp later supplies an image for delicate organs that should perform thought only when stirred by moving air and the wind nature sends. Poetry can consist in luminous "words of air," and air can lightly mold itself without holding form too strongly. These contexts make air responsive and nearly unburdened, but do not turn it into a synonym for immaterial spirit.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶12 — Air is identified as hearing's medium.

II, p. 926, entry 4, ¶1 — Moving air plays the Aeolian harp in a comparison with thought.

II, p. 477, entry 11, ¶1 — Poetry is associated with luminous words of air.

II, p. 481, entry 1, ¶1 — Air illustrates light molding.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the strange "words of air." Air meaning manner, appearance, or tune occurs elsewhere; raw French matches therefore are not an inventory of atmospheric images.

See also. Breath; Ether; Light; Form; Fluid.

[10] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36; II, pp. 477, 481, 926. Beaunier identifies the early physiological passage at I.35 as a summary of Plato. Its presence records Joubert's reading, not an independently original anatomical claim.

Allegory

allégorie — allegory[11]

The word. Allegory receives an architectural image: it inhabits a diaphanous palace. Joubert's commentary attends as closely to the effect of the words as to a general account of indirect representation.

In Joubert. The verse, introduced by Joubert as a line by Lemierre, gives allegory a splendid, light-transmitting habitation. Joubert separately names the charm of allegory and diaphanous, calls inhabit merely right, and assigns palace a beautiful meaning. The distinction prevents every pleasing effect from being credited simply to a correct definition. The following ballet judgment turns the image into a precept: lodging allegory in a hut fails its need for palaces. The analogy conveys a demand for a fitting imaginative setting, but it does not provide a complete rule for decoding every allegorical figure.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 849, entry 10, ¶1 — Joubert attributes the following separate verse line to Lemierre.

II, p. 849, entry 10, ¶2 — The verse houses allegory in a diaphanous palace.

II, p. 849, entry 10, ¶3 — Joubert distinguishes charm, aptness and beautiful meaning within its words.

II, p. 849–850, entry 11, ¶1 — A hut is judged an inadequate habitation for allegory.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the attributed verse as a separate line; its external poem source is not independently authenticated. It preserves the metalinguistic wording in the comment. The opaque G—rd—l and b—ll—ts remain unexpanded; ballets is already supplied parenthetically by the source. The visible positional letters beside the first code do not authorize an invented name.

See also. Figure and metaphor; Charm and pleasure; Word; Architecture; Transparency.

Ambition

ambition — ambition[12]

The word. Ambition can motivate useful service, soften the soul toward something better, or attach each person to themselves at others' expense. Its object and situation alter the judgment.

[11] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 849, 850.

[12] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 106; II, pp. 608, 911.

In Joubert. The servant paradox makes good service depend on wanting to govern the master while remaining subject to him. The passions fragment proposes drawing from ambition a better effect, but stops at an allusion to memoirs; its mechanism is not completed. The list describing “uncivilization” includes everyone’s ambition among forces that disunite people. These passages therefore do not make ambition either a universal engine of excellence or an unvarying vice.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 106, entry 4, ¶1 — Ambition to influence can operate inside loyal service.

II, p. 608, entry 4, ¶1 — A fragment suggests a potentially better effect without finishing it.

II, p. 911, entry 2, ¶2 — Universal ambition contributes to social disunion.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the govern/remain-subject paradox and the unfinished “Ambition itself…” It retains the unusual “uncivilization,” the collective “all” and the self-attachment conclusion. The memoir reference remains unlocated and should not be expanded into an invented anecdote.

See also. Desire; Pride; Vanity; Society; Self.

Analogy and comparison

analogie; comparaison — analogy; comparison[13]

The word. Analogie concerns a relation or correspondence; comparaison explicitly places things beside one another. Resemblance may suggest, but does not necessarily prove, a conclusion.

In Joubert. The brief definition of comparison as a kind of conjecture makes its tentative character visible. The utility passage requires a real analogy between two natures, specifically the relation of help and need. That is more than ornamental resemblance. Elsewhere comparisons and metaphors are required not to offend the senses, placing an aesthetic condition on how intellectual things are presented. The undated dried-rose fragment illustrates both the power and incompleteness of such composition: danger and repentance inhabit the image, but the masculine “like it” lacks a certified antecedent and the backward pointer remains unresolved.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 238, entry 2, ¶1 — Comparison is expressly called a kind of conjecture.

I, p. 159, entry 7, ¶1 — Usefulness requires a real correspondence of help and need.

[13] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 159, 238; II, pp. 505, 917.

II, p. 505, entry 2, ¶1 — Comparisons and metaphors must respect the senses.

II, p. 917, entry 3, ¶1 — A rose comparison preserves an open antecedent and unresolved pointer.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves analogy and comparison separately. It does not resolve the rose's "like it" to pleasure or fabricate a link for Vid. The insect remains cantharid without adding a toxicological interpretation.

See also. Image; Figure and metaphor; Illusion; Judgment.

Analysis

analyse; synthèse — analysis; synthesis[14]

The word. Analyse can name an involuntary mental discrimination or an imposed procedure of separating a thing into constituents.

In Joubert. The distinction between natural analysis and analysis by trade or command turns on motivation and operation. The mind's own analysis serves its repose, often without its awareness; deliberate method is accused of usually performing badly. The Diderot remark supplies a reductive instance: Stoic analysis reduces a thing to matter and form, while Joubert keeps his hostile evaluation of the result. Against Condillac, the contrast becomes an avowed first-person refusal to defend a synthetic aversion by analytic questioning. It is a polemical judgment, not a demonstrated equivalence between synthesis and truth.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 281, entry 10, ¶1 — Natural and commanded analysis are distinguished.

II, p. 676, entry 6, ¶1 — A reported Stoic analysis reduces something to matter and form.

II, p. 898, entry 6, ¶1 — Joubert claims a synthetic judgment against analytic questioning.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the unexpanded fr-tt-m-nt and inst-st-ns rather than reconstructing the Diderot quotation. Its "I despise" preserves the personal force of the Condillac judgment. Synthesis is an explicit opposing term here, not an editorial reconstruction.

See also. Method; Reasoning; Distinction.

[14] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 281; II, pp. 676, 898.

Anatomy and neurology

anatomie; névrologie — anatomical; neurology[15]

The word. Névrologie names anatomical study and representation of nerves in the historical usage explained by Version 6. It should not silently become modern clinical neurology or neuroscience.

In Joubert. The philosophers who want thought stripped to lineaments are compared with engraved nerve anatomy and a leaf eaten down to its outlines. A second passage groups neurology with camp planning, surveying, and drawing plans, before asserting that the soul does more: it paints. A late criticism of historical writing returns to anatomy through the scalpel, herbarium, and dissection. These comparisons distinguish observation of structure from an account that gives objects living or affective presence. They do not condemn every anatomical observation in every context.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 235, entry begun p. 234, no. 12, ¶5 — Engraved anatomy and an eaten leaf model outline without filled substance.

I, p. 423, entry 1, ¶3 — The soul's painting exceeds the arts of anatomical and spatial outlines.

II, p. 737, entry 1, ¶1 — Historical description is criticized through anatomical and herbarium images.

In this edition. Version 6's existing notes explain the historical nerve-anatomy sense. At II.737 [ontogeny] translates Beaunier's supplied [ontogénie], an emendation rather than a recovered authorial word; [myology] is a contextual rendering of damaged myo[…]gie. The accompanying uncertain apparatus reading is treated separately in the qualified-readings appendix.

See also. Nerves and fibers; Image; History; Analysis; Organs and brain.

Ancients and moderns

ancien; moderne — ancients; moderns; earlier; later[16]

The word. Anciens and modernes organize comparisons between literary practices; ancien can also mean earlier within the modern period.

[15] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 235, 423; II, pp. 737.

[16] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 389; II, pp. 525, 672, 733.

In Joubert. Joubert contrasts calming, moderating and regulating passions through exercise with the modern aim of excitation. A second contrast concerns abundance: praise of everything plentiful almost reverses the ancient critics' maxim against excess. These are polemical comparisons of aims and judgments, not neutral histories of every ancient and modern writer. A separate contrast credits the earliest writers with saying only beautiful things and later writers with saying much in few words. Yet "earlier critics (among the moderns)" shows why ancien cannot invariably become ancient: the named critics belong within the modern group.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 389, entry 4, ¶1 — Ancient regulation and modern excitation of passions are opposed.

II, p. 672, entry 8, ¶1 — The capable/guilty contrast qualifies literary abundance.

II, p. 733, entry 9, ¶1 — Earliest and later writers receive different merits.

II, p. 525, entry 13, ¶1 — Anciens means earlier critics within the moderns.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes ancients from earlier rather than imposing a single equivalent. The Latin critical maxim on II.672 remains literal; its note reports a close Ciceronian parallel without replacing Joubert's Plus with magis. Relative periods in the earliest/later comparison receive no invented dates.

See also. Literature; Criticism; Brevity; Merit.

Anger

colère — anger[17]

The word. Colère is a passion whose value is discussed through its location and subordination. Joubert distinguishes using anger from allowing it to rule the mind.

In Joubert. The report attributed to Aristotle figures anger as a soldier rather than a captain; Father André is then reported as calling this a defense of human nature. Joubert's own closing formulation allows anger its natural place in the blood but denies it value in the mind, where reason cannot endure it. The discussion of public monuments adds a social consequence: viewers need not approach them in the calmer disposition associated with reading and may bring anger or resentment to the encounter.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 422, entry 2, ¶1 — Anger is discussed through the soldier/captain distinction.

I, p. 422, entry 7, ¶1 — Its place in blood is distinguished from its intrusion into mind.

[17] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 422; II, pp. 629, 689, 844.

II, p. 844, entry 9, ¶2 — Public images encounter potentially angry viewers.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the blood/mind contrast and the military comparison. Its note traces the reported comparison through Seneca without treating Joubert's words as a newly verified verbatim sentence from Aristotle. The monument passage describes a risk, not every visitor's response.

Related terms.

Resentment. *ressentiment* — Ressentiment can arise toward those who inspire more trust than they deserve. The fragment about anger purging resentment distinguishes a sustained grievance from the anger that changes it, without supplying a main verb or turning the image into advice to express anger.

Places. II, p. 689, entry 2, ¶1; II, p. 629, entry 12, ¶1.

See also. Passion; Moderation; Reason; Peace.

Animal

animal — animal; animals[18]

The word. Animal names living creatures and can mark an aspect of human life contrasted with intelligence or spiritual participation. Such contrasts belong to the particular argument, not to a modern classification of cognition.

In Joubert. Mere masonry houses a person as a thing or animal, while architecture unites beauty with utility and engages intelligence. The discussion of the trained pig cautiously allows the intelligence of linking words and movements, while denying that the display demonstrates more. It is therefore inaccurate to summarize the entry as saying that animals have no intelligence whatever. A broader cosmological fragment refuses to treat the world as an animal, calling it a place instead.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 501, entry 10, ¶1 — Shelter for the animal differs from architecture addressed to intelligence.

II, p. 933–934, entry 1, ¶3 — A trained performance has a narrowly specified associative intelligence.

I, p. 231, entry 2, ¶1 — The world is distinguished from an animal or machine.

[18] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 231; II, pp. 501, 933, 934.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the trained animal's limited "intelligence" and does not convert the passage into a modern account of conditioning. The notebook's hierarchical judgments are preserved as Joubert's.

See also. Life; Instinct; Mechanism; Bird; Insect and animalcule.

Antithesis

antithèse — antithesis; antitheses[19]

The word. Antithesis sets terms or thoughts in opposition. Joubert distinguishes its verbal display from a real balance of thoughts, yet also allows it a necessary role in verse and religious expression.

In Joubert. The applause note connects antithetical clashing with vocal effect and an audience's desire to signal attention; half attention is more demonstrative than captivated attention. But a figure's name alone cannot condemn a verse. Antithesis and even wordplay can be praiseworthy when they clearly express something good. The distinction from symmetry is stricter: mere verbal antithesis is called a false figure, whereas balanced thoughts form a real and beautiful one. In religious language, however, antitheses express truths that cannot otherwise be stated in human words, because opposition in subordinate natures becomes harmony in the divine. The apparent changes of judgment follow different uses rather than a single universal prohibition.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 423, entry 7, ¶1 — Antithetical clashing can win applause from half-attentive listeners.

II, p. 483, entry 11, ¶1 — Antithesis can contribute to a beautiful and clear line.

II, p. 624, entry 4, ¶1 — Verbal opposition is distinguished from real symmetry of thought.

II, p. 887, entry 3, ¶1 — Human antitheses express harmony in the divine nature.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves antithesis and antitheses. Cliquetis retains the audible clash instead of becoming a neutral contrast. The religious passage's all and cannot otherwise remain unqualified, while the verse passage keeps its conditions of clarity and goodness. No named theological doctrine is inserted.

See also. Figure and metaphor; Rhetoric; Harmony; Religion.

[19] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 423; II, pp. 483, 624, 887.

Aphorism and maxim

maxime; sentence — maxim; maxims; sayings[20]

The word. Maxime is a compact, memorable formulation. French sentence can likewise designate an aphoristic saying rather than a grammatical sentence.

In Joubert. Joubert's explicit definition requires exact and noble expression of an important, incontestable truth. But the form does not guarantee that it achieves this ideal: error speaking in maxims issues deceptive oracles, and assertion can deceive through authority. The image of coining wisdom emphasizes transmission and retention. In the Locke-reading note, maxims guide and even "save blindly" without enlightening: the nighttime compass and labyrinth-thread maintain the difference between practical guidance and understood reasons. These contexts explain the power of the form without certifying every compact sentence as wisdom.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 857, entry 1, ¶1 — A maxim receives a demanding explicit definition.

II, p. 766, entry 9, ¶1 — The aphoristic form can give error deceptive authority.

I, p. 218, entry 10, ¶1 — Wisdom is coined into transmissible maxims, proverbs and sayings.

I, p. 264, entry 6, ¶2 — Maxims can guide without providing illumination.

In this edition. Version 6 renders sentence as maxims in the error passage and as sayings in the coinage image. The title Aphorism is an English organizing term, not a claim that Joubert labels all his notebook entries aphorismes. The Locke material is translated from the French printed here, with source-editor framing separate.

Related terms.

Epigram. *épigramme* — The epigram appears in a sequence of forms whose attraction can seem to generate their supposed subject: blame for the epigram, praise for the madrigal, judgment for the witticism. The criticism concerns an inversion of form and matter, not every use of a short pointed poem. Version 6 retains epigram and the fragmentary opening; the damaged ending after sentence[…] remains unexplained rather than supplied with a connector.

Places. II, p. 635–636, entry 12, ¶1.

See also. Sentence; Truth; Error; Memory; Rules.

[20] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 218, 264; II, pp. 635, 636, 766, 857.

Appetite

appétit — appetite[21]

The word. Appétit binds bodily life to desire, but the notebooks also use it to distinguish kinds of intellectual and moral receptivity.

In Joubert. An unnamed speaker calls appetites the pegs fastening soul into body and necessary conditions of attachment to life. The image of the body as a mount with appetites of its own can help conduct, yet Joubert explicitly rejects it as a fixed metaphysical doctrine. That qualification is essential: practical discipline is not an anatomical partition of personhood. Literary taste also needs appetite, whereas the comparison of soul and body distinguishes a taste loving the good from an appetite loving pleasure. The repeated bodily language supplies relations and contrasts rather than one universal appetite theory.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 107, entry 10, ¶1 — Appetites fasten the soul into bodily life in a reported saying.

I, p. 405, entry 3, ¶1 — The body-as-mount image is allowed for practice but rejected as fixed doctrine.

II, p. 668, entry 12, ¶1 — Literature requires appetite as well as taste.

II, p. 671, entry 11, ¶1 — Soul and body are compared through taste for good and appetite for pleasure.

In this edition. Version 6 retains pegs, mount and the final squinting-mind fragment. It differentiates the usefulness of an image in morals from its validity in metaphysics. The speaker introduced by he said in the first maxim remains unidentified.

See also. Desire; Body; Taste; Pleasure; Morality.

Apprehension

appréhension; apréhension — apprehension; apprehensions[22]

The word. Apprehension here means an intellectual grasp or view, not fear. The term can be praised for beauty or criticized for obscurity; its meaning does not guarantee the quality of what is apprehended.

[21] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 107, 405; II, pp. 668, 671.

[22] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 266, 297; II, pp. 500, 703.

In Joubert. The innate-idea note pairs idea with apprehension of an unseen essence, but its opening negation is textually problematic and cannot safely establish a settled doctrine. The Kant criticism describes phrases and apprehensions as opaque and brown, suggesting that the density of constructed language can be mistaken for intellectual solidity. By contrast, Grand-Champ's beautiful apprehensions receive the incomplete explanation "these views etc." The period sentence-form is then criticized for expressing affections better than apprehensions and disguising the latter. This distinction gives the word a role in how form either discloses or obscures mental content.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 266, entry 6, ¶1 — Apprehension is paired with idea in an unresolved negative construction.

I, p. 297, entry begun p. 296, no. 6, ¶3 — Opaque language can make apprehensions seem substantial.

II, p. 500, entry 11, ¶1 — Beautiful apprehensions are glossed as views in an unfinished explanation.

II, p. 703, entry 12, ¶1 — The rhetorical period disguises apprehensions while expressing affections.

In this edition. Version 6 retains apprehension and apprehensions in their intellectual senses. At I.266, the French lacks the restrictive que expected by a possible alternative reading; the English adopts a negative reading without emending it. Whether Joubert meant denial or restriction remains unresolved. The Kant assessment is Joubert's criticism, not an externally verified account of Kantian terminology.

See also. Perception; Idea; Innateness; Clarity and obscurity; Sentence.

Architecture

architecture — architecture[23]

The word. Architecture is both the expressive arrangement of buildings and a model for the disposition of thoughts and sentences.

In Joubert. A building is asked to announce its inhabitant: materials should speak and tell what they conceal. This is an expressive demand, not merely an engineering rule. The best vantage point for a building can also flatten its projections into apparent harmony, producing an illusion unlike actual flatness. In writing, repeated architectures of thoughts and sentences extend construction to arrangement. A late note says elegance

[23] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 49, 59; II, pp. 673, 913.

should dominate but may need breaks in discourse, sounds, colors and architectural lines. Dominance is thereby distinguished from uninterrupted uniformity.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 49, entry begun p. 48, no. 2, ¶14 — A building's visible materials should express its inhabitant.

I, p. 59, entry 3, ¶2 — Architectural viewing coordinates projections into apparent flatness.

II, p. 673, entry 3, ¶1 — Writing receives a repeated architectural analogy.

II, p. 913, entry 10, ¶1 — Interruptions of elegance in architectural lines illustrate dominance without continuity.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves speak, tell and architecture rather than reducing the metaphors to generic organization. The damaged as[…]ertions and […]oit in II.673 remain residues, not securely recovered assertions and must.

See also. Style; Illusion; Harmony; Elegance.

Art

art — art; arts[24]

The word. Art includes acquired skill or a practice governed by means and rules, as well as the fine arts. It is not confined to objects now classified as artworks.

In Joubert. The origin statement assigns talent to nature or heaven and art to experience. Thus art can teach painters to do without genius, though that claim need not mean every work produced by art lacks genius. In criticism, one must judge a work by art rather than by prior works: resembling art need not mean resembling any model work. The following parenthetical chain relates art to rule, necessity and need, then names clarity, charm, distinctness and usefulness. Luxury can meanwhile pervert the arts' use. That warning keeps costly material or expenditure from serving as an automatic measure of artistic worth.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 718, entry 1, ¶1 — Art and talent receive different origins.

II, p. 775, entry 5, ¶1 — Acquired art can compensate for genius or impulse.

II, p. 898, entry 3, ¶1 — Art provides standards that are not mere imitation of works.

II, p. 538, entry 1, ¶1 — Luxury can pervert the use of the arts.

[24] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 538, 718, 775, 898.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the broad art and the differences among clarity, charm and distinctness. The reported claim about Asia on II.538 is not independently endorsed or converted into a history of Asian art.

See also. Genius; Talent; Imitation; Rules; Experience; Beauty.

Artifice

artifice; artificiel — artifice; artificial; the artificial[25]

The word. Artifice names a constructed means, contrivance or effect. It can assist a genuine capacity, but may also substitute an appearance of depth or an elaborate container for what matters within it.

In Joubert. The analogy with artificial memory cautiously proposes artificial aids to logic, metaphysics, painting and poetry. They may serve the genuine activity, provided they remain hidden. This instrumental use differs from identifying art with artifice, a distinction Joubert explicitly rejects. In the system metaphor, the fabrication interests him less than its natural treasure; sticks and a distaff may be necessary to production, but attention should settle on the silk. The comparison of literary obscurity to dark paint over light is more hostile: a manufactured recess becomes a counterfeit profundity. Nevertheless, the later list of in-between spaces allows a region between artificial and natural, resisting an exhaustive division of works into two pure categories.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 460–461, entry 12, ¶1 — Artificial aids can serve genuine mental and artistic activity.

II, p. 525, entry 14, ¶1 — Art is expressly distinguished from artifice.

II, p. 713, entry 3, ¶1 — The system's scaffolding differs from its treasure and silk.

II, p. 724, entry 6, ¶1 — Obscurity can manufacture an appearance of literary depth.

II, p. 895, entry 8, ¶1 — Artificial and natural admit an in-between region.

In this edition. Version 6 retains artifice and artificial. In the artificial-memory analogy, its unresolved singular pronouns remain unresolved after the plural list. In the system passage, [I], [coffer] and [way] are disclosed contextual completions of damaged French; the secure contrast of fabrication and treasure does not establish the lost letters.

See also. Art; System; Naturalness; Affectation; Clarity and obscurity; Craft and skill.

[25] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 460, 461; II, pp. 525, 713, 724, 895.

Ascetic austerity

austérité — austerity[26]

The word. Austérité can be a discipline of conduct or withdrawal from sensory occupation, but its value is judged by what it produces in the soul.

In Joubert. The explanation of adversity's formative power locates it in austere conduct and severe treatment, acknowledging Bonald's suggestion. A separate spatial image distinguishes destruction of the senses' places from the soul's absence from them through prayer, recollection or austerity. The distinction allows withdrawal without treating it as bodily death. The late judgment on the Genevans places a sharper condition on discipline: only the tender and ardent virtues austerity can produce recommend it. Mere regularity can usurp virtue's appearance. The article therefore cannot define austerity as automatically virtuous or describe all religious discipline as rejection of the body.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 323, entry 6, ¶1 — Austerity and severity are offered as the formative elements of adversity.

II, p. 700–701, entry 11, ¶1 — Spiritual discipline makes the soul absent from sensory places.

II, p. 899, entry 8, ¶1 — Austerity is evaluated by the tender virtues it can produce.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps religious or philosophical as two possibilities and preserves can, only, and perhaps in the evaluative passage. The Genevan characterization is Joubert's generalization. Bonald's contribution remains an acknowledgment within the main text.

See also. Prayer; Inward recollection; Severity; Virtue; Body.

Assent

assentiment — assent[27]

The word. Assent is an act or disposition of accepting. Joubert distinguishes its grounds and labor from habitual contradiction, and pairs it with clarity rather than with forced conviction.

In Joubert. The political and ethical fragment opposes a spirit of contradiction to a spirit of assent formed by study, experience and knowledge. The latter demands more

[26] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 323; II, pp. 700, 701, 899.

[27] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 657, 658, 737, 778, 779.

examination and work; it is praised as preserving and repairing, not as effortless conformity. A later list assigns different grounds for assent to logic, physics, morals, religion and metaphysics according to their ends. Its wording does not make proof and probability identical, even though both occur in its account of logic. Finally metaphysics seeks clarity and assent through a mode in which the soul participates, whereas logic aims at conviction and employs calculation. These local distinctions make assent more than a generic yes while leaving their tensions intact.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 657–658, entry 10, ¶1 — Assent is described as the demanding result of study and examination.

II, p. 737, entry 2, ¶1 — Different disciplines offer different grounds and ends for assent.

II, p. 778–779, entry 8, ¶1 — Metaphysical assent differs from logic's conviction.

In this edition. Version 6 retains assent and translates communis omnium consensus as the shared agreement of all. Preserving and repairing state effects without assigning a modern party label. The long disciplinary list contains disclosed contextual completions at damaged margins; its proved/probable contrast and opinion/knowledge alternatives are preserved.

See also. Conviction; Persuasion; Study and learning; Experience; Metaphysics.

Assertion

assertion — assertion; assertions[28]

The word. An assertion advances a claim or position. Joubert contrasts its solid, explicit character with the nourishment of reading and with an idea's opening of a view; he also examines the authority a claim can acquire without warrant.

In Joubert. The first criticism concerns people who value indisputable assertions as a power and prerogative. The nourishing-reading passage does not call assertions useless: it says they are not what most nourishes the mind, beside the invisible juice or salt of great writing. Physical systems can falsely promote suppositions into assertions, disguising their comparative origin. In revising a formulation attributed to La Harpe, Joubert calls thought an assertion and idea a glimpse; position-taking contains more will, the view more intelligence. The final maxim exposes a danger of delivery: bold assertion can make error deceive with authority. Explicitness, confidence and truth therefore remain separate questions.

[28] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 166, 202, 248, 291; II, pp. 766.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 166, entry 5, ¶1 — Indisputable claims may be valued as a form of power.

I, p. 202, entry 1, ¶1 — Assertions are not reading's most nourishing element.

I, p. 248, entry 6, ¶1 — Systems can turn suppositions into assertions.

I, p. 291, entry 4, ¶2 — Assertion takes a position where an idea opens a view.

II, p. 766, entry 9, ¶1 — Boldness can lend authority to error.

In this edition. Version 6 retains assertion throughout. "More will" and "more intelligence" preserve comparisons, not mutually exclusive faculties. The bracketed La Harpe identification is supplied by the source editor. The reading passage's "most" and "more nourishing" are essential to its distinction.

See also. Thought; Idea; Hypothesis; Truth; Reading.

Atheism

athéisme — atheism[29]

The word. Athéisme is characterized polemically in different ways; one note distinguishes a tendency to dispense with the idea of God from a tendency to dispense with his intervention in human affairs.

In Joubert. The early formula attributes to atheism a denial of invisible and untouchable beings. The later twofold distinction is narrower and more differentiated: dispensing with the idea of God is not the same as dispensing with his intervention in human affairs. A numbered fragment then turns an accusation of credulity against atheism, arguing conditionally that consistency would require belief in continual prodigies. These are Joubert's characterizations, not definitions accepted on behalf of every atheist. Their value for reading lies in the changing object of the criticism: invisible being, divine action, or the explanatory demands of a system.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 92, entry 7, ¶1 — Atheism is represented as denying untouchable invisible being.

II, p. 589, entry 1, ¶1 — Two forms differ over the idea and the intervention of God.

II, p. 799, entry 5, ¶1 — A conditional polemic attributes credulity to consistent atheism.

[29] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 92; II, pp. 589, 799.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves tends to in both branches of the distinction, and both can and must in the conditional accusation. The latter's date is qualified in its source notes; no firm chronological development is inferred here.

See also. God; Credulity; Unbelief; Miracle.

Atoms

atome — atom; atoms[30]

The word. Atoms are presented as indivisible constituent particles, but also as an image for smallness and for sharply defined units of writing.

In Joubert. Joubert's reflection on atoms stresses the intellectual need they satisfy: declaring particles uncuttable stops imagination and gives thought a fixed starting point. The entry does not offer an experimental account of atomic structure. Much later, atoms and monads describe what the facts, words, and sentences of a book should possess: something clear-cut and indivisible "in a way," whether round, square, or hooked. The qualifications and physical shapes matter because the comparison concerns the force and contour of literary units.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 150, entry 3, ¶1 — Indivisible particles illustrate the need for a fixed intellectual starting point.

II, p. 896, entry 11, ¶1 — Atoms and monads become a qualified image of clear-cut literary components.

I, p. 123–124, entry 10, ¶1 — Geneva is called an atom of a republic.

In this edition. "Atoms" preserves the shared image across these uses. Version 6 retains the attribution to Cervantes in II.896 without identifying an external passage, and retains "in a way"; the lexicon does not authenticate that attribution.

Related terms.

Portiuncules. *portiuncule* — Portiuncules is retained beside particles in the late comparison of apparently vast matter with hollow grains and a blown bubble. Its marked smallness reinforces the relation between the whole and its tiny parts. Version 6 does not claim an independently authenticated etymology. The Lexicon therefore explains its local juxtaposition rather than presenting a recovered Latin derivation.

[30] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 123, 124, 150; II, pp. 896, 906.

Places. II, p. 906, entry 4, ¶1.

See also. Monad; Division and indivisibility; Matter; Principle.

Attachment and detachment

attache; attacher; détachement — attached; binds; detachment; attaches[31]

The word. The attacher family describes bonds whose worth depends on their object; détachement need not imply contempt.

In Joubert. Attachment exclusively to abstract kinds can spend benevolence on humanity as a whole while leaving little for individuals. A later list criticizes motives that detach people from one another by attaching each to himself. These are not objections to every bond: religion is credited with binding powerfully to the dead. The brief reading note that substitutes detachment for contempt gives another limit. Detachment need not take the form of contempt. Together the passages ask what a bond includes, excludes or sacrifices rather than identifying attachment itself as either virtue or weakness.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 134, entry 6, ¶2 — Abstract attachment can dry up affection for individuals.

I, p. 304, entry 6, ¶1 — Religion sustains a bond with the dead.

I, p. 332, entry begun p. 331, no. 2, ¶8 — A reading correction rejects contempt in favor of detachment.

II, p. 911, entry 2, ¶2 — Self-attachment accompanies disunion from others.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the unexplained sentence about individuals presenting themselves too much. It supplies no object naming whom religion binds. The page 355 correction remains a reading note with no invented object for detachment.

See also. Love; Benevolence; Self; Contempt; Religion.

Attention

attention — attention; attentively[32]

The word. Attention is the mind's directed engagement, which can be held, attracted or intensified. Its quality does not by itself certify the value of its object.

[31] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 134, 304, 332; II, pp. 911.

[32] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 384; II, pp. 656, 877.

In Joubert. Firm attention can see ideas as though they were things, with retinal vision supplying the analogy. A literary prescription then distinguishes calling attention from retaining it: brilliance and clarity are both named as means, alongside the different effects of astonishing the mind and charming taste. The Voltaire remark supplies a pointed counterexample to any automatic praise of concentration. Joubert imagines immense attentive labor spent finding a small irreligious joke; the sustained effort is subordinated to a tendentious aim. The charge remains his literary judgment, not an independently verified report of Voltaire's reading.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 384, entry 6, ¶1 — Firm attention sees ideas by analogy with eyes seeing objects.

II, p. 656, entry 7, ¶1 — Calling and holding attention are distinct artistic tasks.

II, p. 877, entry 4, ¶1 — An imagined feat of attentive reading serves a narrow polemical aim.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the retinal image and differentiates brilliance from clarity. The conditional "would have read" is essential in the Voltaire passage; the source editor locates that remark only in the first-version notebook.

See also. Reading; Clarity and obscurity; Idea; Mind.

Attraction and affinity

attraction; affinité — attraction; affinity; affinities[33]

The word. Attraction names a drawing or pulling; affinity names a kinship or correspondence. They form a useful reading pair without being synonyms.

In Joubert. The falling stone is strikingly animated by attraction, described as a kind of passion and as almost spiritual. The qualification "a kind of" keeps the comparison visible. Words can similarly spring from the author's memory toward the reader's through a sort of attraction. Affinity, meanwhile, makes words intelligible when familiar sounds and senses bring related words promptly to mind. The material vocabulary connects relation with movement, while each context supplies a different mechanism or image.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 730, entry 5, ¶1 — Attraction animates a falling stone in an explicitly figurative account.

II, p. 490, entry 5, ¶1 — Words seem drawn from one memory toward another.

I, p. 327, entry 1, ¶12 — Affinities of sound and sense assist intelligibility.

[33] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 327; II, pp. 490, 730.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “attraction” and “affinities” distinct and retains “sort of,” “seem,” and “almost” where they qualify the comparisons. This is not a modern account of gravity or memory transfer.

See also. Force; Weight and gravity; Magnetism; Movement.

Author

auteur; écrivain — author; writer; authors[34]

The word. Auteur usually names an originating writer, but can extend to a progenitor; écrivain specifically concerns writing.

In Joubert. Taste may forgive an author’s false brilliancies when the attraction seems ingenuous: pretension revolts where error alone need not. The judgment joins the work’s effect to an inferred disposition without identifying the anonymous author. The first writers are elsewhere pictured as restrained by inexperience, while increasing ease in using a language also makes misuse easier. That historical-looking fragment should not be transformed into a rule about every beginner. The expression “author of a lineage” reveals a separate sense, with authors as ancestors or progenitors rather than makers of books.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 489, entry 8, ¶1 — An author’s ingenuous error is distinguished from pretension.

II, p. 733, entry 4, ¶1 — Inexperience restrains first writers, while ease enables misuse.

I, p. 407, entry 1, ¶1 — Authors can designate progenitors in a lineage.

In this edition. Version 6 uses ingenuously, not ingeniously. The damaged [misuse] on II.733 remains a contextual rendering, and “first writers” is not silently replaced by novice writers. Author is deliberately repeated in the lineage expressions to expose the French extension.

See also. Writing; Book; Wit; Taste.

[34] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 407; II, pp. 489, 733.

Authority

autorité — authority[35]

The word. Autorité concerns the weight of a person, office or tradition in directing judgment. It differs from mere numerical participation and can be placed against reasoning.

In Joubert. The religious reflection says authority, rather than reasoning, serves as the rule, yet ends with a difficult counterfactual about Jansenism that should not be repaired into a smooth argument. The temple-of-sages image assigns exceptional opinions a role in deciding rather than deliberating: a voice makes law instead of adding to a count. The earlier paternal-authority paragraph connects ownership and affection, but Beaunier expressly marks that paragraph as not in Joubert's handwriting. Its presence in the edition is evidence of transmitted material, not secure evidence of Joubert's own formulation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 128, entry 2, ¶1 — A transmitted paragraph advocates paternal authority, with an authorship qualification.

II, p. 704, entry 4, ¶1 — Religious authority is distinguished from reasoning.

II, p. 795, entry 7, ¶1 — Exceptional authority is set apart from the counting of opinions.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the three decision/deliberation, law/count and peer/rank contrasts. It preserves the incomplete argumentative relation in the religious witness, and does not name a modern assembly or electoral system.

See also. Law; Government; Wisdom; Faith; Family.

Axiom

axiome — axiom; axioms[36]

The word. An axiom declares what appears most true and can guide demonstration. Joubert nevertheless tests its formulation, use and relation to visible evidence rather than treating the name as a guarantee of certainty.

[35] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 128; II, pp. 704, 795. I.128 e02 p01 is explicitly reported by Beaunier as not in Joubert's handwriting. It must not be cited as an unqualified autograph assertion.

[36] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 126, 182, 183, 224, 305, 404; II, pp. 544.

In Joubert. The imagined perfectly enlightened book contains axioms and facts instead of the padding of unresolved inquiry. Yet the law comparison defines an axiom through what has seemed most true, preserving a standpoint rather than asserting infallibility. Even astrology, condemned as false science, can possess axioms and truths while drawing false deductions. The flexible-language argument then claims that removing all verbal misuse would remove even axioms, and the Bacon report makes their formulation a demanding test of the mind. In geometry, an axiom in the head can be checked through a figure before the eyes; the criticized political demonstration lacks that same independently visible check. Axiom, valid procedure and true application therefore remain distinguishable.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 126, entry 10, ¶1 — Axioms and facts characterize a hypothetical fully enlightened book.

I, p. 182–183, entry 7, ¶1 — An axiom declares what has seemed most true.

I, p. 224, entry 1, ¶1 — A false science can contain axioms and truths.

I, p. 305, entry 7, ¶1 — Axioms participate in the flexibility of words.

I, p. 404, entry 7, ¶1 — Their formulation tests a mind's limits and reach.

II, p. 544, entry 4, ¶1 — A visible figure helps check the application of an axiom.

In this edition. Version 6 retains axiom and axioms, with seemed, the hypothetical if and the distinction between an axiom and its figure. The Bacon and d'Alembert references are reported through the notebook. The geometry comparison does not establish that the unnamed political author's conclusion is false: Joubert explicitly allows that he may be right.

See also. Proposition; Proof; Evidence; Definition; Mathematics.

Beauty

beauté; beau — beauty; the beautiful; beautiful[37]

The word. Beauté and le beau range across bodies, ideas, conduct and works. A judgment of beauty may compare different kinds of excellence rather than one measurable scale.

In Joubert. The bodies/feelings comparison separates beauty from grace, then changes their locations according to the object: bodily beauty lies in forms and solids in relation, beauty of feeling in elevation and spirituality. The poetry passage reserves beauty to the idea, while the type/imprint/image sequence orders several kinds of representation and

[37] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 160; II, pp. 484, 485, 519, 834.

their places. These formulations should not be condensed into a single metaphysical definition. Even a broad preference is tested against an exception: beginnings are usually more beautiful than developments, yet the rose is not less beautiful than the bud. The notebook's own counterexample prevents "usually" from becoming an absolute law.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 519, entry 7, ¶1 — Bodily beauty differs from grace in movement or clothing.

II, p. 519, entry 7, ¶2 — Feeling relocates beauty to elevation and spirituality.

II, p. 484–485, entry 13, ¶4 — Beauty is reserved to idea within an account of imaginative arts.

II, p. 834, entry 7, ¶2 — Type, imprint, image and divine idea receive comparative ranks.

I, p. 160, entry 2, ¶1 — The rose qualifies a preference for beginnings.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the substantival beautiful where le beau names a category. It does not identify the unspecified places in the type/imprint comparison or remove the question of why beginnings may be more beautiful.

See also. Aesthetic grace; Art; Idea; Taste; Sculpture.

Bee, honey, and wax

abeille; miel; cire — bee; honey; wax[38]

The word. The bee's products distinguish work, sweetness, and poetic substance. Joubert reuses the image with different local emphases rather than maintaining a single fixed account of how thought is made.

In Joubert. In one passage, the soul kneads judgments as the bee kneads wax, while honey is made otherwise and flows or exhales like floral fragrance. The short sequence about poetry gives the products an evaluative contrast: wax without honey is like verse without poetry, and a drop may suffice. The later ruminant-brain fragment says honey is not made without kneading it, after wondering whether the bee too is ruminant. This change of emphasis should remain visible; it is not evidence that all three passages express one unchanging physiological mechanism.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 289, entry 2, ¶1 — Kneaded judgments are distinguished from honey's flowing or exhaling.

I, p. 357, entry 6, ¶1 — Wax/verse is set against honey/poetry.

II, p. 522, entry 1, ¶1 — Rumination and kneading return in a different account of honey.

[38] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 289, 357; II, pp. 522.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the successive material images and the explicit perhaps about the bee's rumination. The wasps' honey in the middle witness remains source text, not an independently checked zoological assertion. No chronological doctrinal development is inferred from the contrasting uses.

See also. Insect and animalcule; Poetry; Judgment; Nourishment and digestion; Mold and imprint.

Being

être — being; beings[39]

The word. As a noun, être can mean being itself or an individual entity. Those uses need to be separated from the very common infinitive and auxiliary verb meaning to be.

In Joubert. "God is being" is expressly said to require a literal reading. The next compact sequence distinguishes being, world as place, matter as appearance, body as the soul's mold, and life as beginning. A work, by contrast, must be a being rather than an arbitrary thing: proportions, limbs, stature, and personality make the claim concrete. The same noun can therefore speak of divine being and of an organized individual work, without making a literary work divine.

The idea of a government established of itself separates giving it firmness from giving it being. That contrast asks about origin rather than simply durability. These witnesses support a contextual lexicon of être; they do not justify promoting every grammatical "to be" into an ontological proposition.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 231, entry 4, ¶3 — God as being is explicitly marked for literal interpretation.

I, p. 232, entry 1, ¶1 — Being is distinguished from place, appearance, mold, and beginning.

I, p. 153, entry 5, ¶2 — A composed work should have the individuality of a being.

I, p. 248, entry 10, ¶1 — Giving a government consistency differs from giving it being.

In this edition. Version 6 uses "being" for the noun and does not replace it uniformly with existence. The literary passage keeps the parenthetic formulation and bodily list that give the abstract word its local force.

See also. Existence; Essence; Reality; Form; Whole and part.

[39] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 153, 231, 232, 248.

Benevolence

bienveillance — benevolence; goodwill[40]

The word. Bienveillance is a favorable disposition toward others whose breadth must not make particular people disappear.

In Joubert. To extinguish benevolence is figuratively to kill a person in part. Yet a heart that spends all its benevolence on an abstract totality can dry up its power to love individuals. A retrospective notice of the proposed Universal benevolence acknowledges a related difficulty: its bounds were never determined and the material failed. The later poetic prescription gives benevolence another use, as a clothing or gentle mediation placed between oneself and every object. That relation joins being good and being a poet, without requiring the observer to falsify what is seen.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 56, entry 2, ¶1 — Extinguished benevolence is represented as partial death.

I, p. 134, entry 6, ¶2 — Abstract universal love can exhaust particular affection.

I, p. 433, entry 8, ¶5 — A retrospective project fails to determine benevolence's bounds.

II, p. 867, entry 7, ¶1 — Goodwill mediates the poet's way of looking.

In this edition. Version 6 renders bienveillance as goodwill in the clothing image, where amenity means gentleness or pleasantness. The reference to 1779 is retrospective within a later unit; its damaged date and shifts of pronoun remain. No finished treatise or settled universal doctrine is inferred.

See also. Goodness; Love; Attachment and detachment; Poetry; Ambition.

Bird

oiseau — bird; birds[41]

The word. Birds are observed makers and movers, furnishing images for innate skill, circling thought, and the limits of perception.

In Joubert. The early question about a bird that has never seen a nest asks whether the nest's form resembles its inner constitution. It proposes an inquiry rather than supplying proof. The account of ancient writing compares its thought with a gliding, circling bird instead of a man walking straight ahead. A later bird confronted by glass sees a fly yet

[40] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 56, 134, 433; II, pp. 867.

[41] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 49, 284; II, pp. 880, 881.

cannot reach it. The three uses distinguish construction, movement, and the difference between visibility and accessibility.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 49, entry begun p. 48, no. 2, ¶6 — An unlearned nest suggests a question about inner constitution.

I, p. 284, entry 6, ¶1 — Circling flight models the advance of ancient thought.

II, p. 880–881, entry 4, ¶1 — Glass reveals something that remains materially unreachable.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the question and comparative “seems” rather than making the analogies factual explanations of bird behavior. “Through” in the final witness is a bracketed reading of damage.

See also. Animal; Instinct; Movement; Transparency; Organization.

Blood

sang — blood[42]

The word. Blood is a bodily substance, an image of living warmth, and a figure for inherited status. The reader must distinguish these senses rather than treating blood as a single explanatory principle.

In Joubert. The early physiological report makes nourishment become blood in the liver. The judgment on anger gives it a place in the blood but refuses it authority in the mind. Rousseau’s thoughts are imagined with pomp, colors, flesh and blood that might be stripped away. The conditional sequence leaves its consequence unstated. Conversely, nobility of soul is said to come from heaven or light, not blood: genealogy cannot itself confer the spiritual dignity being praised.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶9 — Blood is described within a historical account of nutrition.

I, p. 422, entry 7, ¶1 — Anger belongs in blood but not in the governing mind.

II, p. 767, entry 6, ¶1 — Rousseau’s thoughts are imagined with removable flesh and blood.

II, p. 915, entry 9, ¶1 — Spiritual nobility is distinguished from descent.

[42] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36, 422; II, pp. 767, 915. Beaunier identifies the early physiological passage at I.35 as a summary of Plato. Its presence records Joubert’s reading, not an independently original anatomical claim.

In this edition. Version 6 interprets the evident printed sans in the first physiological sentence as blood, while retaining the French anomaly. The bodily and hereditary metaphors remain recognizably “blood.”

See also. Body; Life; Fire and heat; Substance.

Body

corps — body[43]

The word. Corps can designate the living body or bodies as material objects. It is not confined to human flesh, and its opposition to soul does not make every occurrence a metaphysical definition.

In Joubert. The comparison of pain and pleasure with iron, lead, and marble uses bodies as apparently solid external realities; inward experiences are provocatively called more existent. The criticism of Condillac’s statue then calls it a body without a soul, a house without an inhabitant, and a place without a master. In the threefold account of things, body is the case of essence. These distinct images—solid object, uninhabited house, and enclosing case—clarify local relationships without settling how soul and body interact throughout the notebooks.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 242, entry 4, ¶1 — Bodies provide the contrast with experienced pain and pleasure.

II, p. 475 bis, entry 1, ¶2 — The soulless statue is also an empty house and masterless place.

II, p. 501–502, entry 15, ¶1 — Body encloses essence as a case.

In this edition. Version 6 uses “bodies” for the material objects and “body” for the statue and enclosing case. Idioms such as à corps perdu are translated idiomatically elsewhere; their presence in a word search does not make them evidence for a theory of body.

Related terms.

Hand. *main* — The early Platonic summary calls hands instruments rather than parts. Later, the hand supplies a measure of material resistance: marble does not obey it, and a clear seal imprint requires enough pressure from it. The examples give the hand a practical relation to tools, force, and receptive matter. The early classification is expressly a source-layer summary, not a modern anatomical judgment.

Places. I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶7; II, p. 757, entry 10, ¶1; II, p. 645, entry 5, ¶1.

[43] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36, 242, 253, 254, 341, 416; II, pp. 475 bis, 501, 502, 645, 757, 792.

Tongue, mouth, and lips. *langue; bouche; lèvre* — The tongue that writes is a physical organ: the fragment imagines it repeating movements behind the teeth while the mouth stays closed, with only the lips' service missing from speech. Elsewhere the mouth and kiss become organ and instrument in a comparison prompted by Milton's fruitful lips. Version 6 translates Joubert's French phrase rather than borrowing wording from an English Milton edition, and leaves the act performed by that organ unnamed.

Places. I, p. 416, entry 6, ¶1; I, p. 341, entry 4, ¶1.

Skin and outer skin. *peau; surpeau* — The unfinished skin, outer skin, flesh list keeps surpeau distinct from peau without assigning it a precise modern tissue layer. In the account of stripping envelopes from the spermatic animalcule, removing outer skins does not guarantee reaching essence or the true principle of life. Version 6's existing note explains the period outer-skin usage, while the earlier passage retains its unfinished conclusion. Neither witness certifies the speculative account of generation.

Places. II, p. 792, entry begun p. 791, no. 6, ¶5; I, p. 253–254, entry 8, ¶1.

See also. Essence; Matter; Organization; Life; Nerves and fibers.

Book

livre; ouvrage — book; work[44]

The word. Livre names a book, while ouvrage often emphasizes a made work. Both can become objects of inward activity and critical judgment.

In Joubert. Fine books are described as places in which the mind can put many things, after the caution that one finds largely what one brings. This is a description of receptive space, not a denial that books contain determinate words. Judging a book also requires distance and perspective rather than immersion alone. The comparison between predecessors and contemporaries asks whether a book helps or harms, perfects or corrupts minds, then contrasts those questions with whether it pleases. Joubert's criticism is directed at a narrowing of evaluation; it does not logically entail that all pleasure is corruption.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 287, entry 9, ¶1 — The book offers a place for the reader's mind.

II, p. 648, entry 1, ¶1 — Critical distance is required even for a book or discourse.

II, p. 767, entry 1, ¶4 — Pleasure is contrasted with earlier questions of benefit and harm.

[44] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 287; II, pp. 648, 767.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes book and work as context requires. The [harm] in the final comparison is a printed source-editor supplement, not a newly inferred reproduction loss. The rhetorical contrast does not constitute an external history of reading habits.

See also. Reading; Criticism; Author; Perspective.

Breath

souffle — breath[45]

The word. Breath connects slight physical motion with animation and verbal making. Souffle may be a movement of air rather than an individual act of respiration.

In Joubert. At evening the air has only a light breath as the fields fall silent. The poet's breath instead swells words, makes them light, and gives them color, in an image that moves on to tincture and the bee's honey. The hypothetical atmosphere made from one bubble makes breath animating on a cosmic scale. These shifts retain the smallness and efficacy of breath without identifying every breath-image with a defined theological substance.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 70, entry 10, ¶1 — The evening air breathes lightly as nature grows still.

II, p. 478, entry 1, ¶12 — The poet's breath changes the weight and color of words.

II, p. 836, entry 3, ¶1 — An animating breath expands a minimal material beginning.

In this edition. The translation keeps "breath" and the hypothetical "could." It renders animateur as "gives life," keeping animation rather than an unspecified persuasive influence.

See also. Air; Life; Light; Fluid; World and universe.

Brevity

brièveté; concision — brevity; concision[46]

The word. Brièveté and concision concern economy of expression, but a short formulation must still produce an intelligible or vivid effect.

[45] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 70; II, pp. 478, 836.

[46] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 397; II, pp. 609, 879.

In Joubert. The question inspired by a newspaper remark asks whether brevity rests attention while tiring memory. It is a proposed comparison, not an established law about cognition. Another note denies merit to concision that draws no features, alongside energy that strengthens nothing and softness that does not touch the heart. Brevity succeeds in the Hippocrates sentence because its few words have simplicity and wise economy, with the conjunction itself offered in two versions. This makes economy relational: what is omitted or compressed matters as much as word count.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 397, entry 7, ¶1 — The effects of brevity on attention and memory are posed as a question.

II, p. 609, entry 3, ¶2 — Concision without delineating force lacks merit.

II, p. 879, entry 3, ¶1 — A reported Hippocratic sentence exemplifies wise verbal economy.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps concision and brevity distinct words where Joubert gives both. The newspaper date is bibliographical text, not the entry's date. The Hippocrates wording is translated as reported, with "but (or, and)" left visible rather than externally corrected.

See also. Precision; Sentence; Aphorism and maxim; Memory.

Caput mortuum

caput mortuum — caput mortuum[47]

The word. The Latin expression, literally "dead head," is a historical chemical name for residue after heating or distillation. The contextual image criticizes a reduction that leaves the desired living whole unexplained.

In Joubert. The attack on analysis calls its products caput mortuum and compares the result with reducing the human body and the whole person to a small quantity of calcareous earth. The image does not require all such chemical residue to be absolutely inert: the existing translation note explicitly warns against that definition. Nor does the passage identify the count's observation precisely enough to reconstruct a modern experiment.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 703, entry 11, ¶1 — Chemical residue images a reductive analysis of thought and human life.

[47] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 703. Language: Latin. This explanation follows the reviewed manuscript's historical terminology note, not a new chemical-source audit.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the singular Latin form beneath a French plural construction. It translates pouces as inches, without inventing cubic units or changing them into a measure of weight. The count's identity and quantitative claim remain unverified.

See also. Mechanism; Life; Body; Matter.

Care

soin; souci — care; cares; worry[48]

The word. Soin can name painstaking attention or a burden of concern; souci here emphasizes the worry from which a moment of spiritual fullness is free.

In Joubert. The description of an instant of piety removes care and worry alongside disquiet and effort. That freedom is brief but affects the larger course of months and years. In the governmental address, great cares should fall on governors so private people can be relieved of them. Literary care has another value: it produces elegance and ease in the work, even when the writer's labor is difficult. The file-and-oil images reverse the expected complaint that effort has been excessive; awkwardness may show that polishing has not gone far enough. The word therefore cannot be translated or judged uniformly as anxiety.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 134, entry 10, ¶1 — A spiritual instant suspends care and worry.

I, p. 461–462, entry 7, ¶1 — Public responsibilities are cares borne on behalf of private people.

II, p. 524, entry 1, ¶1 — Care can produce an ease belonging to the work rather than the worker.

In this edition. Version 6 uses care for the painstaking literary process and cares for public burdens, with worry for souci. In the elegance paragraph the pronoun refers to care, not elegance; its transformation into facility is preserved.

See also. Attention; Piety; Government; Elegance; Practice and effort.

[48] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 134, 461, 462; II, pp. 524.

Cause and effect

cause; effet — cause; effect[49]

The word. Cause and effect distinguish what brings about something from what results. Their bond also supplies comparisons for mental, artistic, and historical relations.

In Joubert. Illusion is said to belong to reality as effect belongs to cause, so the comparison asserts dependence rather than treating illusion as merely extraneous error. The aphorism that causes are subtle while effects alone are palpable separates explanatory grounds from what is immediately grasped. A sentence can make that relation perceptible by having one word indicate the cause of an effect another has named. Causality here becomes a resource of verbal texture as well as an object of philosophical reflection.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 127, entry 1, ¶1 — The bond explains illusion's integral relation to reality.

II, p. 504, entry 5, ¶1 — Subtle causes are contrasted with palpable effects.

II, p. 536, entry 3, ¶1 — Words can reveal a cause–effect relation through sentence structure.

In this edition. The paired English terms preserve these relations. French cause can also mean a case or cause advocated by an orator; the argument on II.695 uses that sense, so it is not a direct witness for efficient causation.

See also. Principle; Necessity; Mechanism; Existence.

Center

centre — center[50]

The word. A center organizes relations: converging threads, points around a circumference, inward faculties, or the parts of a sentence.

In Joubert. The spider at the center of its web pictures the soul in the brain, but only under the explicit condition "if" and the qualification "to speak like these moderns." God as the center of corresponding circumferences is another relational image. In the late grammatical criticism, the center of the sentence is the prince; a construction that returns instead to the people is called eccentric and compared with a loose thread. Center thus marks coherence and reference as well as physical position.

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[49] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 127; II, pp. 504, 536.

[50] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 125, 323; II, pp. 914.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 125, entry 7, ¶1 — Nerves converge like threads at a spider's center.

I, p. 323, entry 7, ¶1 — The divine center coordinates points of circumferences.

II, p. 914, entry 7, ¶2 — A sentence becomes eccentric when it leaves its organizing referent.

In this edition. "Center" and "eccentric" keep the geometry of the last comparison. The first passage is not translated as an unqualified assertion that the soul inhabits the brain.

See also. Sphere and circle; Nerves and fibers; Order; Unity.

Certainty and doubt

certitude; doute — certainty; doubt[51]

The word. Certitude is the firmness with which an opinion is held; doute names its unsettled condition or a suspension of judgment.

In Joubert. The ground-and-feet comparison separates certainty from truth: truth is to mind what light is to eyes, while certainty gives opinion firm ground. Doubt is swaying or fluctuation. Yet a proposed wise philosophical doubt would veil dazzling light so that another organ could judge. Its parenthetic "if it existed" prevents that proposal from becoming an unqualified endorsement of a school of doubt. The reported remark about mute creatures values a charitable uncertainty, suggesting that not every unsettled judgment is merely a defect. These are different occasions and valuations, not a tidy movement from doubt to certainty.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 502, entry 14, ¶1 — Certainty gives opinion footing; doubt is motion without firm ground.

II, p. 655, entry 8, ¶1 — A hypothetical wise doubt would veil dazzling light.

II, p. 734–735, entry 8, ¶1 — A reported speaker finds charitable value in a doubt about animals.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps truth and certainty distinct, and "or rather" marks the change from extinguishing to veiling. The anomalous quoted English Doumbs creature is retained; the unnamed woman is not identified. Ordinary sans doute can mean certainly and is not itself evidence of philosophical skepticism.

See also. Evidence; Opinion; Judgment; Truth.

[51] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 502, 655, 734, 735.

Change

changement — change; changes[52]

The word. Change may affect things, languages, or the explanations people give of things. A new explanation is not automatically a changed object or genuine progress.

In Joubert. The scientific remark identifies many changes called progress as changed ways of conceiving causes and effects. The linguistic reflection is similarly ambivalent: the inventive spirit that created languages can deteriorate them by persisting. The comparison of a ray or a movement passing through a mass without changing it further separates motion and alteration. These distinctions keep novelty, movement, and improvement from being treated as interchangeable.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 686, entry 2, ¶1 — Changes of scientific explanation are distinguished from the name progress.

II, p. 528–529, entry 12, ¶1 — Continued invention can damage languages it helped create.

I, p. 472, entry 4, ¶1 — Movement through a mass is imagined without alteration.

In this edition. Version 6 retains “most” in the scientific claim, not all, and the fragmentary alternative introduced by “Or” in the ray comparison. The lexicon does not turn these local cautions into a rejection of every change.

See also. Movement; Time; Continuity; Cause and effect.

Character

caractère — character; national character[53]

The word. Caractère can describe a person’s or people’s distinctive disposition, as well as what marks an author’s achievement. It need not mean moral excellence.

In Joubert. The early link between accent and national character concerns a perceived affinity. Plato’s character is later identified through an eloquence that does not need passions to prevail. In the Fénelon comparison, a happy combination of mind, talent and character leads readers to credit him with more than he possesses. Character is thus also part of the effect a person produces on interpretation. The positive adjective “happy” need not identify that person’s internal emotional state.

[52] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 472; II, pp. 528, 529, 686.

[53] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 32; II, pp. 495, 817.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 32, entry 2, ¶1 — Accent is related to national character.

II, p. 495, entry 1, ¶1 — A distinctive eloquence characterizes Plato.

II, p. 817, entry 3, ¶1 — Character helps an author receive more credit than the work warrants.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps character across these senses but its surrounding nouns specify the use. It retains the Fénelon paragraph's subjectless "Had," the editorial brackets and its qualifiers, including "perhaps" and "two or three," rather than turning a nuanced comparison into a settled ranking.

See also. Habit; Virtue; Human nature; Manners.

Charity

charité — charity[54]

The word. Charité is not restricted to monetary giving in these witnesses. It belongs to a field of loving treatment and orientation toward other people.

In Joubert. The hospitality note associates chère with charité and glosses the relation through aimance. The passage is useful because it makes a seemingly ordinary welcome bear affectionate meaning. A second note calls vanity a half-charity and a half-humility insofar as it seeks to please others. The halves matter: Joubert is identifying an incomplete other-directed element within a compromised motive, not simply canonizing vanity as virtue.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 744, entry 9, ¶1 — Hospitality is connected verbally with charity and lovingness.

II, p. 868, entry 5, ¶1 — The desire to please is called a half-charity.

In this edition. Version 6 retains charity in the half-compound and translates aimance contextually as "lovingness." It leaves the French terms visible in Joubert's proposed derivation. Neither the translation nor this article certifies that derivation as historical etymology.

Related terms.

Disinterestedness. *désintéressement; désintéressé* — Désintéressement is without self-interest when writers are urged to warn against imitating their personal originality. The related désintéressés produces a harder paradox: loss of disinterested feelings is called

[54] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 372; II, pp. 607, 695, 697, 744, 868.

an evil that removes irreconcilable enmities. Disinterested therefore does not mean indifferent, and beneficial consequences do not make every originating motive good.

Places. I, p. 372, entry 1, ¶1; II, p. 697, entry 3, ¶1.

Generosity. *générosité* — Générosité is first linked to inattention to one's own needs, then explicitly reconsidered as attention directed toward aid. A second maxim permits gifts proportioned to heart or generosity but commands income proportioned to fortune. Version 6 preserves the surprising revenus, income, rather than replacing it with expenses; the passage is not converted into financial advice.

Places. II, p. 607, entry 3, ¶1; II, p. 695, entry 2, ¶1.

See also. Friendship; Love; Vanity; Humility.

Charm and pleasure

agrément; charme — charm[55]

The word. Agrément and charme name attractions that make an expression, object or mind pleasing. Their relation to taste, beauty and simplicity must be read locally.

In Joubert. Joubert links charm to mobility when a pleasing fleeting feature becomes hideous if fixed. The object remains unspecified: this is not exclusively a rule about faces. His criticism of Voltaire then separates charm and dazzling admiration from the savoring of taste. Yet charm is not merely a lesser deceptive effect: it can justify departing from simplicity when simplicity alone would not be beautiful. The unfinished prompts about the charm of words imagine enchanted edifices without resolving how their enchantment works. An account of a finished work distinguishes satisfaction in completion from admiration directed toward its maker, permitting traces of art to add charm.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 373, entry 6, ¶1 — Movement can be essential to charm.

II, p. 649, entry 2, ¶2 — Charm, admiration and savoring are separated in the Voltaire judgment.

II, p. 627, entry 6, ¶1 — Necessary charm can license a departure from simplicity.

II, p. 486, entry 14, ¶1 — The charm of words becomes a question about enchanted construction.

II, p. 697–698, entry 7, ¶2 — Admiration concerns the maker, while completion gives satisfaction.

In this edition. Version 6 generally uses charm for both nouns in these witnesses, while feature keeps trait's object open. Admiration is a subsidiary distinction here: it does not

[55] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 287, 373; II, pp. 486, 627, 649, 697, 698, 878.

mean the same response as taste or satisfaction. The lexicon does not turn the enchanted-edifice prompts into a finished explanation.

Related terms.

Admiration. *admiration; admirer* — Admiration is not automatically the savoring of taste: in the Voltaire criticism it accompanies dazzling movement. Elsewhere the idea of a work's maker causes admiration while completion of the work causes satisfaction. It can also be attention's chosen stopping point, giving pleasure and repose. These local contrasts preserve its intellectual and receptive uses without equating every instance with approval.

Places. II, p. 649, entry 2, ¶2; II, p. 697–698, entry 7, ¶2; I, p. 287, entry 2, ¶1.

I know not what. *je ne scais quoi; je ne sais quoi* — The repeated je ne scais quoi, also printed je ne sais quoi, is rendered literally as the I know not what. Joubert identifies it with charm and relates it to the marvelous: art and the hand are hidden, symmetry and forms are felt without being distinctly perceived, and nature and chance seem to contribute more than will. The seems and comparative more matter. Anything too pronounced loses this quality; the next paragraph opposes it to the too correct. This is an account of effects and their partial concealment, not permission to replace close description with vagueness.

Places. II, p. 878, entry 5, ¶1; II, p. 878, entry 5, ¶2.

See also. Taste; Aesthetic grace; Simplicity; Beauty; Attention.

Chastity

chasteté; continence — chastity; continence[56]

The word. Chasteté is represented as inward strength and a protected atmosphere; continence names restraint that can persist despite bodily condition.

In Joubert. The opening report that chastity is mother of virtues develops into the image of a soul strengthened to overcome obstacles. Its harsh judgment after chastity's loss belongs to that argument, not a modern diagnosis. The desert-island image makes a boundary possible wherever one lives, rather than requiring literal isolation. The later passage gives the soul pure air amid corrupt surroundings and calls her royal through dominion over the senses. Such images connect restraint to agency, peace and clarity.

[56] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 33, 148, 350; II, pp. 878.

They should not be reduced to outward reputation or confused with the embarrassment and protective reserve discussed under pudeur.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 33, entry 2, ¶1 — A reported maxim develops chastity as strength against commanding passion.

I, p. 148, entry 1, ¶1 — Chastity creates a figurative desert island around the person.

II, p. 878, entry 4, ¶1 — Pure air, dominion, light and peace describe the soul's restraint.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the repeated chastity/continence distinction and the feminine personification of the soul. In the early passage it retains the French anomaly est molle est lâche while rendering the coordinated qualities in ordinary English.

Related terms.

Abstinence. *abstinence* — Abstinence is rendered as abstaining in a fragment that distinguishes calling pleasures criminal from treating abstention as a duty. The pleasures themselves are unnamed. The relation belongs to the ethical vocabulary of restraint; it is not evidence for identifying an unmentioned food, practice or sexual act.

Places. I, p. 350, entry 1, ¶1.

See also. Modesty; Innocence; Scruple; Soul; Ascetic austerity.

Chemistry

chimie; chymie — chemistry[57]

The word. Chemistry supplies operations with which Joubert tests philosophy and reading. The value of the operation depends on what it leaves available for thought or life.

In Joubert. In the criticism of certain philosophers, a crucible leaves an intellectual residue that can be named but no longer pictured or felt. The contrast between the chemistry of the stomach and that of alembics asks instead for a transformation necessary to existence. Neither comparison makes every form of separation bad. When Joubert seeks an alternative to analysis, subliming suggests detaching character or effigy while leaving the whole intact. The analogy is explicitly approximate, and his lexical search initially remains unsuccessful.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 234–235, entry 12, ¶1 — The crucible models abstraction that leaves an inert residue.

[57] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 210, 234, 235, 263; II, pp. 644.

I, p. 263, entry 3, ¶1 — Necessary assimilation differs from alembic chemistry.

II, p. 644, entry 9, ¶1 — Subliming offers an approximate model for extracting character without dividing the whole.

In this edition. Version 6 renders printed chymie as chemistry, preserves crucible and alembics, and uses subliming for sublimant. The final operation is not described as a modern chemical procedure. French abstraire is retained where the problem concerns the construction of a French verb.

Related terms.

Mordant. *mordant* — A mordant is the named substance in the comparison with painters separating a painting from its canvas. Version 6 retains the term and its existing note locates this use in the described transfer process. The philosophical comparison concerns separating natures from individual existences; neither the source nor this gloss specifies a universal chemical recipe or a complete account of restoration practice.

Places. I, p. 210, entry 5, ¶1.

See also. Analysis; Abstraction; Caput mortuum; Nourishment and digestion; Mold and imprint.

Childhood and youth

enfance; jeunesse — childhood; youth[58]

The word. Childhood and youth mark different stages and memories. Joubert's educational and literary uses depend upon that difference rather than on a generic notion of the young.

In Joubert. Remembering childhood is contrasted with remembering only school, suggesting a distinction in the range of remembered life without explaining it away. Literary youth follows fashion and needs a rule, whereas literary old age follows taste and ease. The appendix's "reversal of ages" complains of childhood without gaiety and maturity without gravity. These are normative portraits, not observations sufficient to establish universal developmental laws.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 472, entry 16, ¶1 — Childhood memory is distinguished from school memory.

II, p. 476, entry 5, ¶1 — Literary youth is contrasted with literary old age.

II, p. 918, entry 8, ¶1 — An inversion of qualities assigned to ages makes life incoherent.

[58] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 472; II, pp. 476, 918.

In this edition. The English keeps “childhood,” “youth,” and “maturity” distinct. The school-memory entry remains an “Of those” fragment, and the undated appendix is not assigned a guessed autobiographical date.

See also. Aging and old age; Time; Growth; Life.

Choice

choix; choisir — choose; choosing; choice[59]

The word. Choix concerns selection, but the act of choosing may coexist with constraint, labor or a need for qualitative judgment.

In Joubert. The political sentence joins a people’s preference with a necessity that makes it choose its government; the grammar refuses an easy opposition between choice and necessity. For the writer, selection is both important and painful, not an effortless consequence of abundance. In pleasure, merely limiting quantity is insufficient: choice is also required. The following fragment, The permissible, points toward a further question but is not expanded into an explicit rule absent from the sentence. These brief witnesses link selection with different kinds of responsibility without turning them into a comprehensive theory of free will.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 234, entry 1, ¶1 — Preference and necessity are joined in choosing government.

I, p. 375, entry 2, ¶1 — Writing involves a difficult and painful selection.

I, p. 455, entry 9, ¶1 — Moderation alone does not replace choice among pleasures.

In this edition. Version 6 renders embarras du choix as the difficulty of choosing. It retains the separate nominal fragment after the pleasure maxim. The damaged day attached to the writing note is not completed from a separate date in Beaunier’s apparatus.

See also. Freedom; Necessity; Moderation; Pleasure; Writing.

[59] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 234, 375, 455.

Christianity

christianisme — Christianity[60]

The word. Christianisme names the Christian tradition in claims about moral life and in discussions of connected mysteries. Catholicisme receives a distinct, more specific mention.

In Joubert. Joubert credits Christianity with deliverance from superstitions and with making high virtues common among women and children. The force of the second passage lies partly in its social reversal: the common people become the wisest. Neither assertion should be expanded into a historical proof. The account of mysteries then gives Christianity, especially Catholicism, a practical structure: Trinity considered alone is speculative, but joined to Incarnation it becomes a practical truth. The relations among beliefs matter as much as their isolated content.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 226, entry 2, ¶1 — Christianity is credited with release from superstition.

II, p. 633, entry 3, ¶1 — Wisdom and high virtues are described as socially widespread.

II, p. 669, entry 7, ¶1 — Connected mysteries acquire practical consequence.

In this edition. Version 6 translates le vulgaire as “the common people,” avoiding an implication of vulgar conduct. It preserves “especially” before Catholicism and the conditional in the discussion of Trinity. This article does not silently equate Christianity and Catholicism.

See also. Religion; Mystery; Faith; Virtue; Superstition.

Church

église — church[61]

The word. Église can name a building, a focus for religious attention or an institution facing changing dangers.

In Joubert. The dark church described as a prison for God is criticized through walls, windows and an underground dungeon. That judgment on a particular building is different from the claim that God, though everywhere, is more present to the human mind in a church. The latter concerns attention rather than divine confinement. The

[60] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 226; II, pp. 633, 669.

[61] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 78, 296; II, pp. 689.

letter-like fragment addresses the church institutionally: irreligion rather than heresy is now said to be its danger, requiring changed cares and struggles. Keeping these objects distinct prevents the architectural attack from being read as a universal denial of religious places or the later claim as their unqualified defense.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 78, entry 1, ¶1 — A particular church's architecture becomes a prison image.

I, p. 296, entry 4, ¶1 — A church can focus the mind's perception of an everywhere-present God.

II, p. 689, entry 7, ¶1 — Changed dangers prompt an appeal for changed institutional concerns.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the unnamed recipient M^{r} p. and the source-supplied brackets in the place names. The historical today belongs to that fragment; no modern ecclesial situation or specific campaign is substituted.

See also. Worship; Architecture; God; Priesthood; Religion.

Chyle

chyle; chîle — chyle[62]

The word. Chyle is the named nutritive product in several digestive comparisons. The unusual term matters because the passages distinguish what is extracted and assimilated from mere flavor or waste.

In Joubert. Feelings are described as a kind of chyle produced by the elaboration of sensations; organs become several stomachs, with digestion and filtration named separately. In the account of books that are disagreeable to taste but useful to reflection, chyle is precisely what the reader should seek. Another fragment contrasts the digestion and evacuation of the mind, but leaves the two things compared unnamed. Its requirement for chyle therefore cannot be expanded into a confident identification of those antecedents.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 295, entry 3, ¶1 — Feelings are compared with the product of processed sensation.

II, p. 617, entry 3, ¶1 — The reader seeks nutritive value beneath disagreeable flavor.

II, p. 492, entry 8, ¶1 — A comparison with unnamed terms distinguishes digestion from evacuation.

[62] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 295; II, pp. 492, 617.

In this edition. Version 6 retains chyle, including where the French prints chîle. Its existing notes explain the historical nutritive-fluid sense. Déjection in the last witness means evacuation, not sadness, and the unnamed “one” and “other” remain open.

See also. Nourishment and digestion; Feeling; Organs and brain.

Circulation

circulation; circuler — circulation; circulate[63]

The word. Circulation carries something through a course that can return, sustain a quantity, or distribute activity. Joubert uses the movement across bodily, elemental, and verbal settings.

In Joubert. Rain rises as vapor and returns as rain in an asserted eternal circle that maintains the same quantity of moisture. The musical account describes bodily humors, blood, breath, and movement circulating differently with different affections. Its aspiration to measure respiration does not turn the account into a completed experiment. The rhetorical fragment gives meaning a return from the last word to the first, making periodic style easier for memory to hold. What is conserved, distributed, or returned differs in each case.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 172, entry 4, ¶1 — The water cycle illustrates an asserted constant quantity.

I, p. 66–67, entry 3, ¶1 — Bodily circulation varies with affections in the music argument.

II, p. 500, entry 8, ¶1 — Meaning returns from a period’s last word to its first.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the conditional instrument proposal in the musical account and the opening If fragment in the rhetorical one. It does not substitute a modern circulatory or meteorological theory. Period and periodic in the last passage concern rhetorical construction, not a calendar interval.

Related terms.

Diastole and systole. *diastole; systole* — The early musical argument places varied diastole and systole among the bodily movements aroused by sound. Much later, a topic fragment speaks of contracting and dilating the brain, then of systoles and diastoles of mind and attention. Version 6 keeps the physiological names and their plurals instead of flattening them into general excitement. The later fragment lists proposed topics; it does not report a completed anatomical investigation.

[63] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 66, 67, 172; II, pp. 500, 884.

Places. I, p. 66–67, entry 3, ¶1; II, p. 884, entry 8, ¶1.

See also. Water; Blood; Breath; Pneumato-meter; Sentence.

Clarity and obscurity

clarté; obscurité — clarity; clarities; obscurity; obscurities[64]

The word. Clarté and obscurité concern intellectual or verbal visibility as well as literal light and darkness. The present article treats the cognitive and literary uses.

In Joubert. One fragment urges extreme clarity as the only stylistic aim, against affected harmony and elegance. Another derives elegance from clear forms that can be grasped and even counted. Yet the earlier clouded-style reflection tentatively allows an obscurity produced by excellence, uncommon words and unvulgar turns; it couples visible with hidden beauty. Reading also requires endurance of preliminary obscurities in a new doctrinal book if its later clarities are to be reached. These passages distinguish affectation, difficulty arising from excellence, and a reader's unfamiliarity. They should not be collapsed into an unconditional praise of either transparency or obscurity.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 568, entry 6, ¶1 — Extreme clarity is opposed to affected elegance and harmony.

II, p. 833, entry 2, ¶1 — Clarity makes forms graspable and supports elegance.

I, p. 173, entry 1, ¶1 — Obscurity arising from excellence is tentatively valued as clouded beauty.

II, p. 538–539, entry 10, ¶1 — Readers may need to endure preliminary obscurities.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves perhaps in the clouded-style note and plural clarities/obscurities in the reading passage. Condescendance there means indulgence or accommodation, not a patronizing dismissal of the writer.

See also. Style; Reading; Elegance; Evidence; Abstraction.

Cohesion

cohésion — cohesion[65]

The word. Cohesion is the holding together of parts, here particularly words or thoughts. Its desirable strength varies with the scale of composition.

[64] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 173; II, pp. 538, 539, 568, 833.

[65] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 112, 263.

In Joubert. One unfinished note remarks on the strong cohesion among the words of certain sentences. The extended stellar comparison asks instead for thoughts that follow one another at intervals, each capable of independent existence. It rejects cohesion that is too strict and also rejects even slight incoherence. Readers should therefore distinguish connection from fusion: the image neither demands isolated fragments nor makes a book into an unbroken chain.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 112, entry 1, ¶1 — Words are bound so firmly that the account of breaking them remains unfinished.

I, p. 263, entry 9, ¶1 — Thoughts require both independent space and harmonious succession.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “cohesion” and “incoherences,” preserving the close verbal contrast. It does not complete “one must etc.” in the first witness or supply the unspecified sentences.

See also. Order; Continuity; Unity; Void.

Color

couleur — color; colors[66]

The word. Couleur can be physical color, a constituent of visual distinction, or the felt surface of thought and style.

In Joubert. The account of drawing and writing insists that even line-based arts exist to the eye through two or more colors. Color is thus not confined to a decorative addition after form. Yet the eyes’ color differs from their character: eyes of different colors can possess the same character. The Rousseau fragment imagines wiping colors from thoughts alongside stripping pomp and removing flesh and blood, but its conditional series has no supplied conclusion. The reader should not finish it as a demonstrated claim that nothing would remain.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 247, entry 8, ¶3 — Colors make visible separation possible even in drawing and writing.

II, p. 578, entry 1, ¶1 — Eye color and expressive character are distinguished.

II, p. 767, entry 6, ¶1 — Colors join flesh and blood in an unfinished stripping-away experiment.

[66] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 247; II, pp. 578, 767.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps colors literal inside the literary metaphor. The Rousseau passage's if-clauses and detached Boileau quotation remain incomplete; an external quotation is not used to repair them. Coloris is not treated as attested by these couleur witnesses.

See also. Painting; Drawing; Style; Image.

Comedy

comique; comédie — the comic; writer of comedy; theater[67]

The word. Comique can name comic art or its quality, while comédie may refer to theatrical attendance as well as a genre.

In Joubert. The truly comic produces joy, not merely cheerfulness, because it gives characters light and space and shows them whole. Attention can move around them as around bodies. A descriptive observation about gait and work-specific posture similarly makes visible behavior material for the painter and comic author. The Lesage remark uses comédie for the theater in an imagined scene, without identifying a play. These contexts distinguish the comic's mode of apprehending character from a simple count of laughs or a blanket claim that comedy is unserious.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 592, entry 2, ¶1 — The truly comic shows whole characters in light and space.

I, p. 75, entry begun p. 74, no. 2, ¶7 — Gait and posture offer material for a comic author.

II, p. 830, entry 12, ¶1 — Comédie can mean a theater-going occasion.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves cheerfulness versus joy and the bodily movement of attention. "Writer of comedy" specifies the authorial role; the source account's historical terminology about deafness belongs to its separate context and is not adopted as a modern classification.

See also. Theater; Tragedy; Character; Laughter and ridicule.

[67] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 75; II, pp. 592, 830.

Commerce

commerce — commerce; exchange[68]

The word. Commerce ranges from economic trade to the circulation of thoughts and the relations created even by conflict.

In Joubert. The fierce address condemns commerce as a war of money, then imagines another commerce moved by rivalry in generosity and beneficence. It thus distinguishes actual conduct from a conditional ideal instead of abolishing the word's positive possibilities. Philosophy too may fail to enter habitual commerce if understanding it always requires laborious reflection; this exchange occurs within a person as well as between people. The final paradox calls war a kind of commerce because long fighting binds peoples in some way even while disuniting them. Exchange here is a relation, not necessarily a commercial transaction.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 47, entry 1, ¶6 — A polemic against money-war imagines a generous alternative.

I, p. 436, entry 5, ¶1 — Difficult philosophy may not enter ordinary exchange of thoughts.

II, p. 917, entry 2, ¶1 — Long wars establish ties between the peoples they divide.

In this edition. Version 6 uses exchange in the passage about thoughts and retains commerce in the trade and war passages. The qualifications kind of and in some way prevent the last comparison from becoming a simple identity of war and trade.

See also. Society; Conversation; War; Utility; Gratitude.

Composition

composition — composition[69]

The word. Composition joins the emergence of a work to its arrangement and execution. Germs, habits, necessary parts and guiding tools each describe a different condition of making.

In Joubert. The habit fragment records necessity without explaining it. The production note locates a beginning in an incompletely unfolded germ of movement, point of emotion or principle of idea. The first-fire image likewise describes the mind initially operating on phantoms raised from its own vapors, before any claim about finished

[68] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 47, 436; II, pp. 917.

[69] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 342, 412, 428; II, pp. 495, 782.

form. Two contrary wishes then cause trouble: omitting what is necessary and employing what is useless. The Aristotle passage distinguishes guidance from creation. Logic can direct composition, but its rule should not remain visibly embedded in the finished work, any more than a compass remains in a circle or a level in a wall. The exception concerns making instruments themselves, where a standard visibly guides the production of another standard.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 342, entry 7, ¶1 — Habit is named as necessary without further exposition.

I, p. 412, entry 3, ¶1 — An incomplete germ or principle starts production.

I, p. 428, entry 9, ¶1 — Necessary omission and useless inclusion are paired faults.

II, p. 495, entry 4, ¶1 — The first fire produces phantoms for the mind to work upon.

II, p. 782, entry 5, ¶1 — The rule guides making but should disappear from its product.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves composition beside production or texture where paired. In the final witness, the conditional “would find” and unidentified they remain; [uses] represents the source editor’s supplied [sert]. The general never-except condition is not weakened into an optional stylistic preference.

See also. Writing; Invention; Habit; Rules; Artifice; Practice and effort; Leisure.

Conception and understanding

concevoir; comprendre; entendement — conceive; understand; understandings[70]

The word. Concevoir and comprendre concern grasping something, but the particular intellectual operation depends on the surrounding contrast. Entendement can name the mind or faculty capable of such apprehension.

In Joubert. The remark on Fontanes permits conceiving and explaining through images while refusing to let images alone judge and conclude. Conception is therefore not equivalent to proof. In the sound/word/thought sequence, the problem is interference: sounds may obstruct understanding words, and words may obstruct thought. A reported claim attributed to Berkley concerns conceiving existence outside every understanding. Joubert’s shorthand reference and praise should be read as his report, not as a complete philosophical argument independently established here.

[70] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 260, 438, 440; II, pp. 618, 619, 732.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 732, entry 6, ¶1 — Images can support conception and explanation without justifying judgment or conclusion.

II, p. 618–619, entry 14, ¶1 — Sounds and words may obscure the content they should help one understand.

I, p. 260, entry 6, ¶1 — Joubert reports a claim about existence outside all understandings.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes conceive, understand and the plural understandings. The supplied [Words] on II.618 comes from the source editor; the ensuing ellipsis and alternative “or” remain incomplete. No fuller quotation from the work called Hylas is substituted.

Related terms.

Intellection. *intellection* — Intellection names intellectual apprehension in the account of an idea governing an image. The square’s imagined image and even its figure must conform to the idea conceived through pure intellection. Joubert’s quoted material, proposed clearer wording and added correction remain distinct. The shorter maxim relocates purity from the book to its effect: the written presentation need not itself contain wholly pure intellection if it brings that purity about in the reader’s mind. Version 6 retains the term; it does not equate purity with the absence of all imagery in writing.

Places. I, p. 438, entry begun p. 437, no. 3, ¶17; I, p. 440, entry 6, ¶1.

See also. Image; Judgment; Reasoning; Word.

Conjecture

conjecture; conjecturer — conjecture; conjectures; conjecturing[71]

The word. Conjecture reaches beyond what is directly seen or established. Joubert can defend it as a means of pursuing truth while warning against presenting its products as facts.

In Joubert. Explanations carried from physics into morals may multiply error if the first account already mistakes conjectures for facts. Comparison itself is called a kind of conjecture. Yet the hands-and-feet question refuses to abandon truth merely because it cannot be grasped in the preferred way; conjecture appears among the alternative means in an unfinished list. Poets combine knowledge of the terrestrial world with conjecture about the intellectual world, preserving a distinction between the two. The

[71] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 179, 238, 269; II, pp. 566, 756, 819.

blind person's stick supplies another image of indirect advance, beside induction. The later complaint about physical explanations then demands that conjecturing apply only to facts, rather than serving as a respectable name for unrestricted imagining. These tensions should remain visible.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 179, entry 5, ¶1 — Mistaking conjecture for fact can compound errors across domains.

I, p. 238, entry 2, ¶1 — Comparison is classed as a kind of conjecture.

I, p. 269, entry 2, ¶1 — Conjecture can pursue truth by an indirect means.

II, p. 566, entry 1, ¶1 — Poetic composition combines knowledge with conjecture.

II, p. 756, entry 7, ¶1 — Induction and conjecture support movement without direct sight.

II, p. 819, entry 4, ¶1 — A methodological restriction reserves conjecturing for facts.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves conjecture and conjecturing. Medical physics makes the source's elliptical la médicale readable without naming a modern clinical discipline. The final "ought" states Joubert's prescription; the blindness image is his analogy, not a contemporary assessment of sensory ability.

See also. Hypothesis; Analogy and comparison; Knowledge; Intuition; Science.

Conscience

conscience — conscience; awareness[72]

The word. Conscience spans inward awareness and moral self-judgment. Joubert can also place it beside sens intime, "inner sense," without making all three English expressions equivalent.

In Joubert. The early reflection on morality affirms a secret awareness of our destination at birth, suggests that some ideas do not come from outside, and calls for inquiry into mechanical actions and an inner mold. These different degrees of assertion matter: the paragraph does not present a finished proof of an innate moral code. By contrast, the cagot passage distinguishes possessing faith, law and religion from possessing conscience. External religious illumination can coexist with a deficient inward light.

The comparison between the wise person's mind and conscience gives both examinations, afflictions, shame and resolutions. Self-correction is therefore an activity

[72] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 50; II, pp. 687, 750, 868. The cagot paragraph contains damaged words and a printed blank; its secure initial contrast supports this article, but the missing connection to divine designs is not reconstructed. The speaker in the last witness remains unidentified.

shared by intellectual and moral life. Finally an unattributed reported voice says that even a strongly held opinion failed to satisfy conscience—or inner sense. Conviction and inward assent can pull apart. Taken together, these passages resist treating conscience as either whatever one firmly believes or a mere synonym for religious conformity.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 50, entry begun p. 48, no. 2, ¶19 — Awareness of destination within an inquiry into moral foundations.

II, p. 687, entry 2, ¶1 — Faith, law and religion do not guarantee conscience.

II, p. 750, entry 10, ¶4 — Mind and conscience share examinations and resolutions.

II, p. 868, entry 9, ¶1 — Inward dissatisfaction persists despite a strongly held opinion.

In this edition. Version 6 uses “secret awareness” in the early passage but “conscience” in the moral comparisons. It retains the parenthetic alternative “or my inner sense” and the unfinished quotation in the final witness. “Bigot” for cagot refers here to misconceived devotion, not necessarily modern group hostility.

Related terms.

Self-examination. *examen* — Examen in the wise mind is compared with examination of conscience, alongside affliction, shame and firm resolutions. Version 6 keeps the possessive repetitions and reads fermes propos in that context as resolutions. The analogy does not prescribe an unmentioned devotional schedule or identify thought with sin.

Places. II, p. 750, entry 10, ¶4.

See also. Faith; Heart; Shame; Repentance; Virtue.

Consolation

consolation; consoler — consolation; to console[73]

The word. Consolation names an inward benefit that is not reducible to acquiring historical information or proving a belief.

In Joubert. The immortality note gives consolation one reason for a necessary opinion, while expressly adding the teaching of justice. The scriptural reflection opposes searching Scripture for history to finding poetry and the spirit of piety, then adds patience and consolation with an attribution to Saint Paul and Nicole. The added pair

[73] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 309; II, pp. 803, 804. The scriptural witness’s damaged day remains incomplete. Its passage crosses a source page boundary without becoming two paragraphs.

widens the earlier account of reading's effects. Neither witness says that consolation alone establishes a proposition's truth.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 309, entry 6, ¶1 — Immortality serves consolation and the teaching of justice.

II, p. 803–804, entry 10, ¶1 — Scriptural reading is linked with patience and consolation.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes the verb console from the noun consolation and keeps "Add" as Joubert's instruction. The note records a scriptural parallel while leaving Nicole's commentary unlocated; this lexicon does not supply an unverified source identification.

See also. Immortality; Sorrow; Piety; Patience.

Contact

contact — contact[74]

The word. Contact is a way things meet or affect one another. The notebooks test whether that relation requires ordinary nearness, a shared point, or a fitting correspondence.

In Joubert. The comparison of philosophy and style says thoughts can touch across many possible points, whereas the fitting relation of one word to another has only one point on a particular occasion. Contact is there complete or absent, not an imprecise degree of resemblance. The geometrical account imagines points swelling into contact as notes join in resonance. The late reflection on emanations allows bodies to be in contact without being close, through light or shadow, and to be felt beforehand through heat or cold. These are different explanatory images rather than a unified physical law.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 53, entry 1, ¶3 — Stylistic correspondence requires a uniquely fitting point of contact.

I, p. 196, entry 8, ¶1 — Contact helps explain continuity between indivisible points.

II, p. 792, entry begun p. 791, no. 6, ¶6 — Light and shadow permit a proposed contact without proximity.

[74] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 53, 196; II, pp. 792.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the possibility expressed by can in the last witness and the distinction between proximity and contact. It leaves the swelling-points analogy as Joubert's argument, while the finer touch of the style discussion preserves tact's tactile force.

See also. Point and line; Continuity; Effluvia; Perception; Finesse.

Contempt

mépris; mépriser — contempt; despise; despised[75]

The word. Mépris concerns a damaging relation of appraisal, with consequences for the social support on which virtue can depend.

In Joubert. The conditional statement that it would be difficult to live despised and remain virtuous acknowledges need for support. It does not equate recognition with moral merit or say that despised people cannot be good. The practical injunction is correspondingly qualified: one must try, as far as possible, to despise no one. A final pair aligns contempt with contemptibility and respect with respectability while leaving the objects of the verbs unstated. That compression invites reflection on the relation itself; it does not authorize assigning its effect solely to the one who despises or the one despised.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 232, entry 2, ¶1 — Living despised threatens the support virtue needs.

II, p. 478, entry 2, ¶1 — Avoiding contempt is a qualified practical injunction.

II, p. 836, entry 7, ¶1 — Contempt and respect are paired with their corresponding qualities.

In this edition. Version 6 retains would be difficult, try, and as much as one can. It preserves the missing objects in the final paired fragments. The similar-looking méprise meaning mistake is not part of this word family's moral use.

See also. Respect; Esteem; Hatred; Virtue.

Continuity

continuité; continu — continuity; continuous[76]

The word. Continuity is persistence or connection across successive parts. It can belong to a landscape, an inward occupation, or the sustained making of a work.

[75] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 232; II, pp. 478, 836.

[76] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 470; II, pp. 736, 924.

In Joubert. The landscape passage offers two constructions: recurring level ground and the aggregation of connected inequalities. Continuity therefore need not be uniform smoothness. An extended literary work requires an even continuity of force, movement, and attention, while an uninterrupted chain of reasoning can lack the beautiful interval produced by an ellipsis. What counts as desirable continuity depends on the work and the scale: uninterrupted surface is not the only form of coherence.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 470, entry 4, ¶4 — Connected inequalities can make geographical continuity.

II, p. 924, entry 4, ¶1 — Extensive composition requires sustained force and attention.

II, p. 736, entry 5, ¶1 — An entirely continuous maxim differs from a beautifully elliptical one.

In this edition. “Continuity” and “continuous” preserve the family across these contexts. The epic-verse remark cites Aristotle generally; the lexicon does not supply an unverified location or make the attribution independent evidence.

See also. Order; Cohesion; Change; Time; Void.

Conversation

conversation — conversation[77]

The word. Conversation is an exchange whose conditions differ from solitary reading. It also provides a medium in which ideas can be spent and taste refined.

In Joubert. The comparison between conversing with men and women uses musical relations and different effects on the listener, while retaining a puzzling “mission.” The practical vocabulary rule excludes words that need visible presentation in a book and strenuous thought to be understood. Finally Parisian conversation is said to boil and skim the mind, spending mediocre ideas so that exquisite ones can be written. The culinary image expresses a selecting process rather than a general claim that all spoken ideas are inferior.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 108, entry 6, ¶1 — A gendered comparison figures conversation musically.

II, p. 570, entry 1, ¶1 — Some written words exceed conversation’s conditions of comprehension.

II, p. 720, entry 2, ¶1 — Parisian talk boils and skims the mind.

[77] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 108, 161; II, pp. 570, 720. Mission in I.108 remains a genuine reading question; musical context makes unisson conceivable, but Version 6 follows the printed word.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the printed mission rather than silently conjecturing unisson. “Mental exertion” translates contention d’esprit, not an interpersonal dispute. Boiling and skimming remain repeated actions; replacing them with mere improvement would lose Joubert’s mechanism.

Related terms.

Intimacy. *intimité* — Intimité changes the depth of conversation: society speaks of what it touches upon, intimacy of what it explores deeply. Version 6 keeps scarcely anything but, avoiding an absolute claim that every intimate exchange is profound. The distinction concerns manner and range of speech rather than a specified domestic relationship.

Places. I, p. 161, entry 5, ¶1.

See also. Politeness; Friendship; Society; Patience; Women.

Conviction

conviction; convaincre — conviction; convincing[78]

The word. Conviction can describe the outcome of an argument, but Joubert’s most striking uses expose its judicial or coercive character. It is not always a neutral synonym for inward confidence.

In Joubert. The extended torture comparison makes compelled admission the mind’s escape from pain, even to the paradox of believing what it does not believe. Argument against the simple resembles squeezing a child’s thumbs; against the skillful it resembles a gladiator’s net. The strongest condemnation is conditional on daily practice that forces others to conform their conduct, tastes and speech. A later classification assigns conviction to logic and the judicial, while metaphysics seeks clarity and assent through persuasive exposition. The contrast with persuasion then gives conviction chains and persuasion action. These witnesses distinguish constrained assent from an account of every sincerely held belief as torture.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 166, entry 1, ¶1 — Compelled conviction is developed through torture and gladiatorial images.

II, p. 778–779, entry 8, ¶1 — Logic’s conviction differs from metaphysical clarity and assent.

II, p. 803, entry 4, ¶1 — Conviction chains where persuasion produces action.

[78] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 166; II, pp. 778, 779, 803.

In this edition. Version 6 retains conviction and the art of convincing. Torture renders gehenne in the first image; confession preserves aveu rather than quietly changing it to agreement. The identities and exact historical reference behind Bronte are not expanded here. Judicial, demonstrative, persuasive and expository remain distinct classifications.

See also. Persuasion; Assent; Logic; Certainty and doubt; Reasoning.

Correctness and correction

correct; correction; corriger — correct; correctness; correcting; corrections[79]

The word. Correctness is an achieved quality of writing or thought; correction is the activity that may secure it. Joubert also describes revisions that injure a work and an excess of finish that excludes grace.

In Joubert. The early maxim makes correcting the condition of being correct. For journals, he demands correctness of thought as well as style, while abruptly warning against harmony there. But correction does not guarantee improvement: the revised Auger translation seems constrained and lifeless beside its earlier version, as if written with a chained pen. The later complaint about works to which nothing can be added includes correctness among their overcompleted qualities. Grace, by contrast, retains a softness that seems kneadable. The opposition of the “too correct” to the “I know not what” makes the limit explicit. These witnesses distinguish correction as necessary work from revisions constrained by another hand or finish carried so far that grace is lost.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 86, entry 3, ¶1 — Correctness requires correcting.

I, p. 410, entry 5, ¶1 — Correctness of thought and style is demanded of journals.

II, p. 614, entry 9, ¶1 — Revisions are compared with a chained pen.

II, p. 690, entry 4, ¶1 — Overfinished correctness can exclude the softness of grace.

II, p. 878, entry 5, ¶2 — The too correct is opposed to indefinable charm.

In this edition. Version 6 reads correction as correctness in the journal instruction, but as corrections for Auger’s revisions. The chained pen does not identify a censor or establish actual imprisonment. The sentence about kneading interprets the printed paitrir contextually without silently normalizing its French spelling.

See also. Grammar; Style; Aesthetic grace; The classical; Writing.

[79] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 86, 410; II, pp. 614, 690, 878.

Courage

courage — courage[80]

The word. Courage is distinguished from enjoyment of displaying bravery. Its manifestation in danger does not exempt it from folly.

In Joubert. The brief opposition between the courageous person and the brave person turns on having courage versus liking to show it. A dramatic example treats conversational familiarity during danger as evidence of presence of mind and therefore courage. The concluding historical pointer nevertheless insists that courage has its follies. The unnamed episode of Sertorius's Iberians is not enough to build a new narrative or moral diagnosis.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 86, entry 4, ¶1 — Possessing courage differs from liking to exhibit it.

II, p. 594–595, entry 14, ¶1 — Ease of speech in danger shows presence of mind.

II, p. 854, entry 11, ¶1 — Courage can have follies.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the pointed repetition of courage. Familiarité in danger becomes familiarity, with the note explaining conversational ease rather than previous acquaintance with danger. The dramatic identification is qualified to the wording transmitted by Joubert.

Related terms.

Timidity of spirit. *pusillanimité* — Pusillanimité is retained as pusillanimity in Version 6. The reported Rousseau judgment applies it to concealing aging from oneself; the stylistic judgment applies it to rejecting an expression that harms neither sound, sense, taste nor clarity. It is a shrinking from what can be faced, not simply physical fear.

Places. I, p. 346, entry 3, ¶1; II, p. 748, entry 7, ¶2.

See also. Virtue; Resignation; Honor; Fear.

[80] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 86, 346; II, pp. 594, 595, 748, 854.

Craft and skill

métier; habileté — craft; skill[81]

The word. Métier names a practiced or rule-governed competence; habileté can name natural skill. Joubert distinguishes both from art while also proposing that art can formulate skill as precepts.

In Joubert. Knowing the craft means knowing rules, whereas knowing art means grasping their reason, or feeling and obeying it. The distinction produces the severe verdict that La Harpe knew craft but nothing of art. In the instrument analogy, craft is explicitly glossed as reasoned habit: playing depends on instrument and craft, while aptitude belongs innately to the self. Natural skill, in a later fragment, is something art never supplies. Yet art can also be defined as skill reduced to precepts and theory. These formulations distinguish a capacity, its practiced exercise and its articulated guidance, without requiring the translator to harmonize every use into a single hierarchy.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 525, entry 14, ¶1 — Art, craft and artifice are explicitly separated.

II, p. 525–526, entry 14, ¶2 — Craft knows rules; art grasps or feels their reason.

II, p. 526, entry begun p. 525, no. 14, ¶3 — La Harpe is judged to possess craft without art.

II, p. 569, entry 5, ¶1 — Craft is glossed as reasoned habit in an instrument analogy.

II, p. 723, entry 3, ¶1 — Natural skill is not conferred by art.

II, p. 837, entry 1, ¶2 — Art can formulate skill in precepts and theory.

In this edition. Version 6 uses craft for métier in these witnesses and skill for habileté. [Natural] discloses the damaged natu[…]elle. Reasoned habit is Joubert's own gloss, not a translator's definition imposed on every occurrence; reduced in the final definition need not imply degradation.

See also. Art; Rules; Talent; Innateness; Habit; Model.

Credulity

crédulité; crédibilité — credulity; credibility[82]

The word. Crédulité concerns readiness to believe, but the notebooks separate its inward motives from external grounds of credibility and from faith's teachableness.

[81] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 525, 526, 569, 723, 837.

[82] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 470; II, pp. 686, 739, 871.

In Joubert. The credulity that comes from the heart is said to do no harm to the mind. Elsewhere the defect of credulity is contrasted sharply with faith: weakness is not the gentle receptivity compatible with strength. These formulations should remain contextual rather than forced into one verdict. The comparison with presumption adds that overconfidence brings as many errors as credulity, so refusing to trust others is no guarantee of truth. Finally, grounds for credulity spring from our own nature while grounds for credibility lie outside us and are felt less. The distinction concerns why we believe as well as what merits belief.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 470, entry 8, ¶1 — Heart-derived credulity is declared harmless to mind.

II, p. 686, entry 3, ¶1 — Presumption and credulity are compared as sources of error.

II, p. 739, entry 3, ¶1 — Credulity's weakness is distinguished from faithful teachableness.

II, p. 871, entry 2, ¶1 — External credibility differs from inward motives for credulity.

In this edition. Version 6 retains credibility for crédibilité and credulity for crédulité. Teachableness interprets docilité in the explicit strength/weakness contrast. The faith comparison retains bracketed contextual completions, and the pores image remains an image of human nature.

See also. Faith; Religious belief; Error; Heart; Judgment.

Criticism

critique — criticism; critic[83]

The word. Critique names a practice and its practitioner. Joubert separates the critic's character, the quality of an individual saying, and the value of the object receiving attention.

In Joubert. The complaint about L. and L. makes critical talent arise from misplaced importance and the patience to treat bad works as if they deserved the attention due to good ones. That is a criticism of allocation as well as judgment. A bad critic can nevertheless speak very well in the statement about fixed genre boundaries; the repeated bad does not cancel the concession. The reported censure of Euripides is praised because it refuses gratuitous wickedness in a character. Critical value therefore may include fitness and moral intelligibility, not only policing formal defects.

[83] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 474; II, pp. 621, 924.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 474, entry 9, ¶2 — Critical talent may be wasted on objects given excessive importance.

II, p. 621, entry 8, ¶1 — A bad critic can produce a good statement.

II, p. 924, entry 5, ¶1 — Censure of unnecessary wickedness is judged honorable.

In this edition. Version 6 leaves L. and L. unidentified, preserves the reversal in the bad-critic note and treats the Euripides example as Joubert's historical report. Inline Nota. is Joubert's cue, not a translator's comment.

See also. Judgment; Taste; Reading; Literature; Rules.

Curiosity

curiosité — curiosity[84]

The word. Curiosity is a desire to know whose value depends on its direction, measure and relation to other inward powers. It can nourish delight or become an insatiable ambition.

In Joubert. Examining how plants grow enriches the enjoyment of fruit; curiosity here extends pleasure rather than simply collecting facts. The historical-writing note turns against unrestricted disclosure driven less by truth than by wanting to know everything. In reading Tacitus, curiosity carries the mind onward while attention holds it to the density of expression, producing fatigue. Curiosity can nevertheless be described as a divine gift leading to knowledge and contemplation of God, distinguished from love's desire for presence. The soul's subtle curiosity also requires nourishment, although it predominates differently in different people. The late maxim ranks peace of soul above curiosity and the other ambitions without retrospectively erasing these positive uses.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 58, entry 5, ¶1 — Observation through curiosity enriches delight in fruit.

I, p. 138, entry 1, ¶1 — Insatiable curiosity can loosen the ethics of historical disclosure.

I, p. 154, entry 6, ¶1 — Curiosity and attention pull the reader in different directions.

I, p. 169, entry 5, ¶1 — Curiosity can be a gift directed toward divine wisdom.

I, p. 210, entry 7, ¶1 — A subtle inward curiosity needs nourishment.

II, p. 891, entry 7, ¶1 — Peace of soul is ranked above curiosity and ambition.

[84] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 58, 138, 154, 169, 210; II, pp. 891.

In this edition. Version 6 retains curiosity. In the nourishment passage, it is read as curiosity, although the delicate part of the soul is also a possible antecedent. The comparative “less out of love for truth” is not turned into a claim that every curious reader lacks love of truth.

See also. Attention; Knowledge; Reading; Desire; Peace; Ambition.

Death

mort; mourir — death; the dead; dying[85]

The word. Death names bodily cessation and the condition of the dead, but can also expose the inadequacy of an explanation that has dissected away life.

In Joubert. The contrast of death with life accompanies that of mechanism with movement. It supports an instruction to make man and world transparent rather than dissect them: explanation should preserve what it seeks to explain. The later account of the senses distinguishes destruction of their sites through death, age, or illness from the soul’s absence through recollection or prayer. The ethical injunction concerning the dead, meanwhile, asks us to refrain from what would have grieved them; its counterfactual form does not claim knowledge of what they now perceive.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 235, entry 3, ¶1 — Dissection risks substituting death for the life being explained.

II, p. 700–701, entry 11, ¶1 — Death destroys sensory sites rather than merely withdrawing attention.

I, p. 34–35, entry 3, ¶6 — Consideration for the dead is expressed counterfactually.

I, p. 466, entry 8, ¶1 — A fragment couples what is good for living and dying.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the living/dying parallel and the incomplete opening of the last fragment. It does not supply the absent referent of what is said to be good for both.

See also. Life; Body; Health and illness; Aging and old age; Transparency.

[85] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 34, 35, 235, 466; II, pp. 700, 701.

Definition

définition; définir — definition; define[86]

The word. Définir sets out what something is, but the notebooks question when such formulation clarifies and when it obstructs conception.

In Joubert. The remark about conceiving God makes ease of conception conditional on not forcing a definition. A definition is therefore not presented as the universal prerequisite of understanding. In another setting, Joubert drafts an account of jargon and immediately asks for a better definition, including a distinction from technical words. The practice remains useful but unfinished. His remark on the Theaetetus describes a dialogue refuting earlier definitions of knowledge and the meaning of “to know”; that description belongs to Joubert’s reading, not an independently established account of the entire dialogue.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 447, entry 4, ¶1 — Forcing a definition can hinder conception.

II, p. 671, entry 5, ¶1 — A provisional definition of jargon calls for further refinement.

II, p. 747, entry 8, ¶1 — Joubert describes the refutation of definitions of knowing.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the future question, the injunction to improve the jargon definition, and the source editor’s brackets around [the Theaetetus]. Defining is not silently made synonymous with proving.

See also. Conception and understanding; Word; Distinction; Knowledge.

Delicacy

délicatesse — delicacy[87]

The word. Délicatesse names a fineness of expression or discrimination that can be mistaken for affected refinement.

In Joubert. The books of the ancients form an imagined encyclopedia of style, teaching how to speak of everything with delicacy, taste and beauty. Delicacy is not a rule excluding particular subjects; it concerns their treatment. The complaint against coarseness reverses a hostile description: what is called “pinched elegance” may instead be moderation that an impatient reader cannot bear. The older characterization of the

[86] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 447; II, pp. 671, 747.

[87] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 393; II, pp. 495, 849.

Peripatetics groups delicacy with finesse and subtlety, giving the word an intellectual as well as literary use. None of these passages makes all complexity delicate or all simplicity coarse.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 495, entry 2, ¶1 — Delicacy belongs to the art of saying everything beautifully.

II, p. 849, entry 3, ¶1 — Coarseness misnames delicacy as affected or pinched elegance.

I, p. 393, entry 3, ¶1 — Delicacy is grouped with finesse and subtlety in an attributed philosophical characterization.

In this edition. Version 6 retains delicacy and the bodily oddity of pinched elegance. The explanation concerning old age belongs to Voltaire's intolerance, not Saint Evremond's. The shortened Amyot reference and the reported quotation remain source references rather than independently authenticated judgments.

See also. Taste; Elegance; Simplicity; Criticism.

Density and solidity

dense; solidité — dense; solidity; solidities[88]

The word. Density and solidity concern compactness and firmness in material or figurative accounts. They are related but not interchangeable properties.

In Joubert. The layered-pasteboard image makes the dense result from tenuities applied to one another. Another nested account makes the rare the counterpart of the dense: rare there means diffuse or thin, not uncommon. Solidity can also characterize thought, yet false solidities can mislead as surely as empty subtleties. The favorable appearance of firmness is therefore no guarantee of truth.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 236, entry 5, ¶1 — Thin layers and invisible adherence generate the dense.

I, p. 179, entry 12, ¶1 — Rare and dense mark degrees of material subtlety.

I, p. 169, entry 7, ¶1 — Thought is characterized through solidity.

I, p. 275–276, entry 9, ¶1 — False solidities are a source of intellectual error.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves "tenuity," "tenuities," and "the dense," avoiding a smoother but less exact paraphrase. Its note explains rare as thin or diffuse. The lexicon does not promote the unattested dictionary noun densité as Joubert's printed term.

See also. Matter; Substance; Impenetrability; Transparency; Form.

[88] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 169, 179, 236, 275, 276.

Dephlogisticate

déphlogistique; déflogistiquer; décalorer — déphlogistique; dephlogisticated; décalorer[89]

The word. This article groups the chemical words Joubert explicitly considers or metaphorically reuses. Décalorer means removing heat; it is not décolorer, removing color.

In Joubert. The early note compares a newly fabricated French word with the older déphlogistique, which Joubert calls Greek and suitable to natural philosophers' speech. The point includes the words' sound and fitness, so Version 6 leaves the French headwords visible. In the magnetism fragment, a cloud is imagined as something one might have dephlogisticated. The historical idea of removal of phlogiston remains in that comparison; it must not be modernized into oxygenation or treated as a demonstrated process occurring in clouds.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 157, entry 8, ¶1 — The notebook compares chemical naming and explicitly glosses removal of heat.

II, p. 506, entry 7, ¶2 — A hypothetical dephlogisticated cloud images magnetism.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the early French terms, but translates the later déflogistiqué as "dephlogisticated." Its note keeps both the hypothetical "might have" and the unnamed referent of "its." The lexicon repeats Joubert's description of the earlier word without supplying a verified etymology.

See also. Fire and heat; Magnetism; Substance.

Desire

désir — desire[90]

The word. Désir names an orientation toward an object; its moral character depends on that object and on the way it moves the soul. Pleasure in pleasing is distinguished from a desire to dominate.

In Joubert. In the account of Malebranche's educational advice, bodily pleasure used as a reward makes desire ardent and threatens the teaching of duty. The parenthetic bodily limitation is essential. Another note allows pleasure in pleasing while condemning

[89] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 157; II, pp. 506.

[90] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 436; II, pp. 488, 854.

domination. Yet the tiny phrase “faith of desire” introduces longing within religious life without explaining a doctrine. The shared word should not make all three desires morally identical. The related forms require similar care: envier names the act of envying distinctions, whereas avoir l’envie de détruire means having the desire to destroy.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 436, entry 2, ¶1 — Bodily desire is contrasted with restraint in an account of education.

II, p. 488, entry 6, ¶1 — Pleasure in pleasing and desire to dominate receive opposite judgments.

II, p. 854, entry 10, ¶1 — The bare phrase joins faith to desire.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “desire,” the unusual “antivirtuous,” and the fragmentary “faith of desire.” It does not supply a theological expansion or turn Joubert’s report of an educational prescription into present-day advice.

See also. Passion; Will; Pleasure; Faith; Ambition; Envy.

Despair

désespoir; désespérant — despair; inspires despair[91]

The word. Désespoir names an extreme state; désespérante also names the effect a critic can have on someone else.

In Joubert. The unnamed man who smiles when saying farewell after despair does not prove that suffering was insincere. The accompanying sentence denies uninterrupted permanence to both serenity and turmoil. The passage thus records an alternation of states without identifying its subject or episode. The literary comparison concerns a different agency: one criticism encourages beauty and effort, another seems to tell the writer to become nothing. Despair here is induced by a judgment that closes possibilities. Both witnesses resist treating the word as a permanent identity or as a modern clinical diagnosis.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 777, entry 9, ¶1 — Despair gives way to a smile in an unidentified narrative fragment.

II, p. 913, entry 3, ¶1 — Discouraging criticism is defined by its destructive effect.

[91] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 777, 913.

In this edition. Version 6 brackets the contextual completions [For] and [turmoil] in the damaged farewell passage and takes dit as narrative present while acknowledging the possible past tense. Inspires despair preserves the causative force of désespérante.

See also. Hope; Sorrow; Criticism.

Devotion

dévotion; dévouement — devotion; devotedness[92]

The word. Dévotion is an inward and practical dedication to religion. Joubert defends the word while criticizing forms that become self-indulgence or pride.

In Joubert. Those whose love depends on admiration are described as born for devotion because only God can fill their heart. The fragment about people for whom devotion is merely one pleasure more interrupts any automatic equation of devotional feeling with goodness. The explicit gloss through dévouement specifies conduct, and the warning about absent humility explains how devotion can become pride. Dedication, pleasure and self-regard must therefore remain distinguishable.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 166–167, entry 6, ¶2 — A heart moved through admiration is directed toward God.

I, p. 400, entry 7, ¶1 — Devotion can become another private pleasure.

I, p. 421, entry 9, ¶1 — Joubert defends devotion through a conduct-based gloss.

II, p. 787, entry 5, ¶1 — Without humility it can become pride.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps devotion and devotedness visibly related and preserves the parenthesis “in one’s conduct.” The final Pourquoi is rendered “Why” and remains an unfinished explanatory opening with a period, not a newly completed question or argument.

See also. Piety; Humility; Pride; God; Inward recollection.

Dialectic

dialectique; dialecticien — dialectic; dialectician[93]

The word. Dialectic concerns argumentative procedure, but its value changes with its relation to sight, persuasion, poetry and intellectual exercise.

[92] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 166, 167, 400, 421; II, pp. 787.

[93] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 180; II, pp. 580, 815, 846, 894.

In Joubert. In an explicitly approximate report of Aristotle, the dialectician is satisfied with proof while the philosopher seeks inspection and self-evidence. The preference for seeing over dialectical groping repeats this distinction. Argumentation also serves the wars conducted against others and is separated from reason itself and the orator's persuasive instinct. Yet the image of Plato's wings allows poetry to animate dialectic's languors, a quality absent from mere imitators. The exercise passage offers a further use: dialectic, like versification and rhetoric, can provide deliberately imposed obstacles through which a mind strengthens itself. Its discipline may therefore be useful without becoming the highest form of apprehension.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 180, entry 4, ¶1 — An approximate Aristotle report distinguishes proof from inspection.

II, p. 580, entry 11, ¶1 — Argumentation serves dialectical conflict rather than reason alone.

II, p. 815, entry 4, ¶1 — Seeing is preferred to dialectical groping.

II, p. 846, entry 13, ¶1 — Poetry gives Plato's dialectic wings that imitators lack.

II, p. 894, entry 7, ¶1 — Self-imposed dialectical obstacles train the mind.

In this edition. Version 6 retains dialectic and dialectician. "Approximately" belongs to Joubert's citation and prevents its use as an exact Aristotle quotation. The Plato pronoun can grammatically return to spirit as well as Plato. The account of Greek practices remains Joubert's historical argument; the abbreviated Ginguen. reference is not expanded.

See also. Logic; Reasoning; Persuasion; Poetry; Practice and effort.

Diamond

diamant — diamond[94]

The word. The diamond combines conspicuous material value with light and the difference between genuine and imitated brilliance.

In Joubert. Calling a diamond luminous mud compresses a precious object into humble matter plus visible effect. The formulation about its essence or soul puts light first and makes vitrification the condition for star-like reflection. This is a physical-metaphysical image, not an account revised to agree with modern mineralogy. The comparison of true and false diamonds complicates visible similarity: equal facets and brilliance do not give their light the same freedom and joy. Those surprising qualities name an aesthetic judgment about the true, not an offered laboratory test for authenticity.

[94] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 161; II, pp. 762, 823.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 161, entry 1, ¶1 — Preciousness is recast as luminous mud.

II, p. 762, entry 9, ¶1 — Light becomes the diamond's essence or soul in a qualified material image.

II, p. 823, entry 4, ¶1 — Equal facets and brilliance do not erase the difference attributed to true and false gems.

In this edition. Version 6 retains vitrification, freedom, and joy. Its bracketed [there is] and [found] in the comparison are contextual renderings of damaged openings. The quoted Boileau attribution is preserved without claiming an independently checked locus or using an existing translation.

See also. Light; Essence; Glass and crystal; Truth; Beauty.

Dignity

dignité — dignity[95]

The word. Dignité may arise from inward peace or nobility of soul; it is not confined to rank, and it need not exclude modesty.

In Joubert. The poet is to retain dignity even while making an object hateful, moderating language and sparing an enemy. This dignity comes from peace of soul rather than force of denunciation. The theologian's dignity and even majesty can likewise admit modesty: confidence in a doctrine need not become confidence in personal infallibility. The industry argument finally distinguishes dignity received from heaven or light from hereditary blood. These contexts locate dignity in different relations to peace, knowledge and worth. They do not erase the social meaning of rank, but prevent that meaning from occupying every use.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 87, entry 6, ¶1 — Poetic dignity requires peace and moderation even toward an enemy.

II, p. 709, entry 3, ¶1 — Dignity can coexist with modesty about one's demonstrations.

II, p. 915, entry 9, ¶1 — Nobility of soul is called dignity independent of blood.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the Lucan saying in Latin with its source attribution. The theologian passage's English completions remain bracketed where French letters are lost. The industry paragraph is undated and keeps heaven or light as alternatives.

See also. Peace; Modest conduct; Nobility; Poetry; Theology.

[95] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 87; II, pp. 709, 915.

Discernment

discernement — discernment[96]

The word. Discernement is discriminating apprehension. Its speed and fineness can distinguish it from a deliberate act of judgment.

In Joubert. The question whether anything is better than judgment is answered with a sequence: seeing, the mind's eye, penetration, prompt discernment and natural sagacity. The terms illuminate one another without constituting a formally ordered set of separate faculties. At the theater, shared emotion is said to sharpen tact and discernment until everyone has taste. This claim gives discernment an affective setting rather than making it necessarily dispassionate. The note on Cicero separates taste and discernment from criticism, allowing excellence in the former without an equivalent achievement in the latter.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 813, entry 7, ¶1 — Prompt discernment belongs to a series of powers valued above judgment.

I, p. 46, entry begun p. 45, no. 3, ¶8 — Emotion at the theater sharpens discernment and taste.

II, p. 701, entry 2, ¶1 — Cicero's discernment is distinguished from criticism.

In this edition. Discernment is retained, while tact is rendered intuition in the theatrical passage. "Spiritual" on II.813 preserves the intellectual/spiritual range of spirituël; the sentence does not restrict sagacity to a specific theology.

Related terms.

Tact. *tact* — Tact keeps an association with touch while extending to fine discrimination. The two-philosophies passage includes it among the soul's necessary resources; the moral-evidence fragment opposes self-evidence of touch to self-evidence of sight. Version 6 accordingly uses tact in the first and touch in the second. Neither should be restricted to social politeness.

Places. I, p. 259, entry 6, ¶1; II, p. 688, entry 2, ¶1.

See also. Judgment; Taste; Criticism; Intelligence.

[96] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 46, 259; II, pp. 688, 701, 813.

Distinction

distinction; distinguer — distinction; distinguish[97]

The word. Distinction can concern different concepts, different words, or maintained social differences. Their contexts should not be conflated.

In Joubert. The dissent/dissension note insists on distinguishing both things and words: disagreement between religions is required, conflict is forbidden. Lexical precision serves an ethical difference. The mind/matter remark claims that other pairs—earth/heaven, humans/gods, living/shades—were distinguished before a philosophical mind/matter distinction was understood. This is Joubert's broad historical judgment. In the uniforms fragment, distinctions are social and coexist with equality; the word does not name the same intellectual operation as separating dissent from dissension.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 667, entry 6, ¶1 — Distinguishing words preserves the difference between disagreement and conflict.

I, p. 383, entry 1, ¶1 — Conceptual distinctions are assigned different historical reach.

II, p. 744, entry 7, ¶1 — Uniforms are said to maintain social distinctions and equality.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps dissent and dissension distinct and renders mânes as shades. Neither an unnamed religious policy nor a modern theory of social equality is added. The lexicon's word-family grouping does not make all these senses interchangeable.

See also. Definition; Judgment; Precision; Language.

Divine grace

grâce — grace[98]

The word. Grâce in this witness is divine grace, distinguished by its divine possessors. It is not the elegance of an expression, garment or movement.

In Joubert. Joubert says the Augustinians seem to deny the grace of God from fear that the grace of Jesus Christ will receive insufficient acknowledgment. The repeated word makes the contrast internal to religious language. His formulation questions a tendency

[97] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 383; II, pp. 667, 744.

[98] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 813. No external history of Augustinian theology is inferred from this single witness.

he perceives; it does not supply a doctrinal definition of either grace, establish an absolute denial, or prove what all Augustinians held. The sentence's force depends on preserving both "seem" and "sufficiently."

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 813, entry 5, ¶1 — Two formulations of grace are contrasted within a qualified criticism of Augustinians.

In this edition. Version 6 uses grace twice, retains the different possessors and leaves the motive inside the tentative statement. This narrow theological witness should be read separately from the much more frequent aesthetic uses of grâce elsewhere in the notebooks.

See also. God; Christianity; Faith.

Division and indivisibility

divisible; indivisible; division — divisible; indivisible; division[99]

The word. Dividing matter, dividing an account into parts, and declaring a unity indivisible are different operations. Joubert repeatedly asks what conception or imagination permits in each case.

In Joubert. The lengthy divisibility argument distinguishes visible, imaginable, and mathematically conceivable parts. A later question proposes a more careful formulation: matter is not divisible into infinitely many imaginable parts, but into a multitude whose infinity can be conceived. The monad passage, meanwhile, pictures a bounded yet indivisible soul through a soap bubble. Physics divided analytically into parts can display apparent incoherence where synthesis shows order. None of these contrasts should be flattened into the claim that Joubert simply denies division.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 229, entry 5, ¶1 — Several meanings of infinite division are interrogated.

I, p. 437, entry 3, ¶7 — A question distinguishes imaginable parts from conceivable infinity.

I, p. 236, entry 3, ¶1 — The monad provides a bounded image of indivisibility.

II, p. 768, entry 8, ¶1 — Analytical division and synthetic order display different aspects.

[99] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 229, 236, 437; II, pp. 768.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the questioning form of the later formulation and the distinction between conceive and imagine. These are arguments in the notebooks, not certifications of modern mathematical conclusions.

See also. Infinite; Atoms; Monad; Matter; Order.

Dogma

dogme — dogma[100]

The word. Dogme can mean a revealed religious teaching, a reasoned metaphysical position, or the doctrinal force that makes morality binding.

In Joubert. The explicit contrast between revealed and reasoned dogmas shows that the word alone does not certify a claim's origin. Joubert assigns religion fuller promises of reward and punishment than the bare thesis of immortality. Another note contrasts morality as sayings with morality as precept, obligation and necessity when dogma accompanies it. Finally, an unidentified controversy is separated into old dogmas and a new explanation of them: bad explanation need not imply new teaching. These are contextual distinctions within arguments about religion, not a neutral survey of what all religions teach.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 538, entry 9, ¶1 — Revealed theological dogmas are contrasted with reasoned metaphysical ones.

II, p. 704, entry 5, ¶1 — Dogma supplies obligatory force to moral statements.

II, p. 914, entry 4, ¶1 — A new explanation is distinguished from a new dogma.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the compressed and awkward order rewarded…or punished for the evil or good in the immortality paragraph. It does not rearrange that sequence to repair the argument. The final witness does not identify the unnamed dispute.

See also. Religion; Theology; Morality; Immortality.

[100] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 538, 704, 914.

Double

double — double[101]

The word. Double describes paired aspects or directions. The recurrence is useful, but it does not by itself establish that Joubert consistently reduces everything to one pair of principles.

In Joubert. The ambitious claim that everything is double begins with soul and body, then nests body within body, thin within thick, and perhaps soul within soul. The parenthetic reversal—God's body within soul—already complicates a simple outer-body/inner-soul scheme. The shorter reminder to remember that everything is double supplies no independent definition of the pair. The account of great attention makes a different double relation: looking before oneself coincides with looking within. The shared word invites comparison while its different complements prevent a universal formula.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 179, entry 12, ¶1 — Paired and nested relations complicate a simple dual scheme.

I, p. 213, entry 6, ¶1 — The general reminder leaves the double's constituents unnamed.

II, p. 521, entry 11, ¶1 — Attention has outward and inward directions at once.

In this edition. Version 6 retains double and the final perhaps in the nested account. Rare there means thin or diffuse rather than uncommon. The French noun dualité was not established by this screening, so it is not presented as an attested Joubert headword.

See also. Unity; Body; Soul; Attention; Dyad and mixture.

Drawing

dessin — drawing; design; outline[102]

The word. Dessin may concern the act of drawing, a work's design, or its outlined form. The context determines which English noun is useful.

In Joubert. The drawing master who condemns color as rouge and lies illustrates a partial judgment: considering color's nature alone differs from considering its effect. The choice of Etruscan clay vases over royal precious-metal vessels for models of design further separates formal excellence from luxurious material. A third comparison maps

[101] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 179, 213; II, pp. 521.

[102] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 442; II, pp. 518, 780.

literary traditions onto sculpture, painting and engraving or simple outline. Its proposed correspondences remain suggestive rather than a worked-out history of those traditions. Across the passages, drawing provides an exactness of form that can be valuable without exhausting what an artwork does.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 442, entry 1, ¶1 — Drawing's perspective on color becomes inadequate when effect is ignored.

II, p. 518, entry 9, ¶1 — Clay vessels offer better design models than luxurious tableware.

II, p. 780, entry 7, ¶1 — Simple outline becomes one term in a comparison of literatures and arts.

In this edition. Version 6 uses drawing, design and outline respectively. It does not convert au simple dessin into a named printmaking technique, or interpret every drawing/painting contrast as a ranking of whole artistic traditions.

See also. Painting; Color; Imitation; Art.

Dream

rêve; songe — dream; dreams[103]

The word. The dream is an inward event that can intensify feeling, arrange dramatic action or supply an image for creation. Joubert's comparisons do not make every dream either a revelation or an illusion.

In Joubert. An early report of someone's observations on dreams says that pleasurable and painful impressions surpass their waking strength as imagination becomes less hampered. The compact claim that a dream is "half a reality" leaves the proportion unexplained. Later questions dwell on the exactness with which dreaming assigns words, tones and conduct to imagined characters, while the sleeper remains motionless. The dream is thus also evidence of an unbidden dramatic and musical capacity.

The creative extension reaches beyond sleeping: everything is said to originate in a dream, the world itself in an idea of God. The dreams of good people can become actions and institutions. Poems are elsewhere the dreams of a wise, wakeful person. These formulations place the dream between inward formation and outward realization; they do not erase the distinction between sleep and wakefulness or endorse every imagined project.

[103] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 37, 148, 323; II, pp. 580, 699, 876.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 37, entry 3, ¶2 — Reported observations on dreaming describe intensified pleasant and painful impressions.

I, p. 148, entry 4, ¶1 — Dream is called half a reality.

I, p. 323, entry 2, ¶1 — The sleeper stages coherent characters without bodily action.

II, p. 580, entry 7, ¶1 — Dreaming displays dramatic and musical invention.

II, p. 699, entry 5, ¶1 — Dream can precede action, institution and world.

II, p. 876, entry 4, ¶1 — Poems are dreams of a wise, wakeful person.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps dream rather than imposing a single psychological category. The opening he remains unidentified in the selected report. The waking-poet passage retains its main wording separately from the source's alternate version; beautiful/true and man/soul must not be silently combined. The questions about dream composition remain questions.

See also. Reverie; Sleep; Imagination; Poetry; Invention; Reality.

Dryness and moisture

sec; humide; humidité — dry; moist; moisture[104]

The word. Dryness and moisture are physical qualities used in physiological summaries and compact material comparisons. The bread fragment distinguishes dryness from hardness and aridity while preserving its capacity to nourish.

In Joubert. The early summary of Platonic physiology sets the dry and moist beside cold and hot: health depends on their balance rather than the absolute excellence of one. The later compressed distinction between dry wood and dry bread separates dryness from lack of nourishment and from hardness. It gives no subject whose style or character the reader may safely supply. Elsewhere an unfinished bee comparison makes moisture and dust hinder flight, leaving its application open. These settings keep the bodily property recognizable while varying what it makes possible.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶10 — Dry and moist are balanced physiological qualities.

II, p. 653, entry 7, ¶1 — Bread distinguishes nourishing dryness from hardness and aridity.

II, p. 630, entry 10, ¶1 — Moisture and dust hinder a bee's flight in an unfinished comparison.

[104] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36; II, pp. 630, 653.

In this edition. Version 6 retains repeated dry and the separate hard and arid. The Platonic material is explicitly a summary, not a claim of original or modern physiology. No unnamed style, author, or moral fault is supplied to complete the bread fragment.

Related terms.

Siccity. *siccité* — Siccité is rendered dryness in the account of the lungs beside the heart. It appears with softness and natural coolness, all given roles in receiving and tempering the heart's excess. Beaunier identifies this material as Joubert's summary of Platonic physiology. Siccity names the historical quality without making the proposed anatomy a modern explanation.

Places. I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶5.

See also. Equilibrium; Nourishment and digestion; Wings; Dust; Fire and heat.

Ductility

ductilité; ductile — ductility; ductile[105]

The word. Ductility concerns matter's capacity to be extended or worked. Joubert can transfer that capacity to verse while distinguishing it from life or soul.

In Joubert. The grain-of-matter image makes ductility, enclosed hollows, and the worker's art explain apparent immensity. The unfinished reference to a grain of gold is offered as a further illustration, not supplied as a completed calculation. The later classification of verse places ductility and brilliance in the mineral kingdom, sap in the vegetable, and life in the animal or animate. Soul then marks the most beautiful verses. Being ductile is thus a real quality in the comparison, but cannot stand for every kind of excellence.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 146, entry 9, ¶1 — Ductility helps a small material amount appear immense.

I, p. 236–237, entry 7, ¶1 — Ductile is distinguished from fusible and malleable in a series of material possibilities.

II, p. 727, entry 1, ¶1 — Mineral qualities distinguish one kind of verse from living and ensouled verse.

[105] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 146, 236, 237; II, pp. 727.

In this edition. Version 6 retains ductility beside the distinct fusible and malleable. The damaged mineral-kingdom passage preserves contextual brackets and unexpanded Ch. and Mr. C.; it does not identify those writers or specify a modern metallurgy.

See also. Matter; Measure; Poetry; Life.

Duration and instant

durée; instant — duration; instant; moment[106]

The word. Duration concerns continuance or a span; instant isolates a moment within succession. They relate to time without exhausting its meanings.

In Joubert. The early physical-only person is confined to the present instant, unable to extend a self into past or future. Intelligence is therefore involved in temporal reach, not merely in adding knowledge to a fully formed self. Brief duration belongs to enchantment together with radiance and lightness. Yet pure duration, unlike eternity, is later said to lack something divine. The notebooks value the fleeting and the enduring in different contexts rather than simply choosing one over the other.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 45, entry begun p. 44, no. 1, ¶10 — The instant confines a self without intelligence's temporal reach.

II, p. 487, entry begun p. 486, no. 14, ¶2 — Brief duration belongs to enchantment.

II, p. 725, entry 9, ¶1 — Pure duration is distinguished from eternity.

In this edition. The translation keeps "duration" and "instant" rather than harmonizing both to time. "Suspended" opens the enchantment fragment without an invented subject, and its short duration remains a positive feature there.

See also. Time; Eternity; Life; Movement.

Dust

poussière — dust[107]

The word. Dust can make apparent mass seem slight, or hinder the movement of something light. Smallness alone does not determine whether it is favorable.

[106] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 45; II, pp. 487, 725.

[107] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 149, 414; II, pp. 630.

In Joubert. The earth imagined as a fiery globe wears only a sprinkling of dust, while water forms a few lines over it. That formulation makes the dusty surface slight in relation to the globe of fire suspended in air. Another passage distinguishes elevated subtlety from dust's flight: airborne earth is said to be no longer what it ought to be. The bee fragment gives dust an obstructive role, alongside moisture on its wings. Its comparison remains unfinished, so the reader should not assign it a definite soul, writer, or doctrine as the missing subject.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 149, entry 7, ¶1 — Dust is a slight covering in an image of the earth.

I, p. 414, entry 10, ¶1 — Flying dust is distinguished from appropriately subtle elevated things.

II, p. 630, entry 10, ¶1 — Dust and moisture hinder a bee's flight in an unfinished comparison.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the matter as dust rather than turning it into abstract insignificance or impurity. It retains the open "Like the bee" construction. The cosmological and zoological formulations remain Joubert's images and assertions, not newly verified physical facts.

See also. Earth; Material subtlety and coarseness; Wings; Dryness and moisture.

Duty

devoir — duty; duties[108]

The word. Devoir names what ought to be done, and is not automatically identical with social propriety or present inclination.

In Joubert. The earliest maxim states that duty and propriety do not always agree. The moral program calls duty morality's object and virtue its end, then separates one's own virtue from others' happiness. A later analogy says faith and virtue can require going against sensory testimony or impression because duty would sometimes otherwise remain unfulfilled. The adverb "sometimes" prevents the claim from becoming a universal denunciation of sense experience.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 33, entry 1, ¶4 — Duty can conflict with propriety.

I, p. 298, entry begun p. 297, no. 2, ¶4 — Duty is the object of morality, virtue its end.

II, p. 859, entry 6, ¶1 — Fulfilling duty sometimes requires resisting sensory impression.

[108] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 33, 298; II, pp. 574, 740, 859.

In this edition. Version 6 gives propriety for bienséances, retaining its distinction from duty. It preserves object and end as separate terms, and the conditional failure of duty in the sensory comparison. The grammatical verb devoir elsewhere may mean must or ought and should not be counted indiscriminately as this noun.

Related terms.

Obligation. *obligation* — Two passages distinguish an obligation one must impose on oneself though nothing seems to prescribe it from an imaginary obligation one can privately cancel. Their tension makes the ground of self-prescription a real question. Version 6 preserves seems, nevertheless and the repeated on one's own; the lexicon does not supply a universal test absent from these notes.

Places. II, p. 574, entry 11, ¶1; II, p. 740, entry 6, ¶2.

See also. Virtue; Morality; Will; Politeness; Faith.

Dyad and mixture

dyade; mélange — dyad; mixture; mixing[109]

The word. Mixture joins unlike constituents without necessarily changing one into another. The dyad appears in a reported philosophical vocabulary, not as a name for every mixed thing.

In Joubert. The account of an unnamed older philosophy places dyad or mixture among principles of evil, alongside unfavorable senses of the infinite and formless. Its reported valuation differs from the account of moral nature: freedom there follows necessarily from the mixture of spirit and flesh, with the possibility of improvement as well as deterioration. A reading note on wine and water supplies a further limit. Mixing should not be mistaken for transmutation simply because the result appears changed. The three contexts therefore distinguish historical classification, composite capacity, and material process.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 412, entry 2, ¶1 — Dyad/mixture belongs to a reported unfavorable terminology.

I, p. 189, entry 5, ¶2 — Mixed moral nature permits opposite choices and change.

I, p. 439, entry begun p. 437, no. 3, ¶26 — Mixture is explicitly distinguished from transmutation.

[109] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 189, 412, 439.

In this edition. Version 6 does not identify the unnamed school at I.412. Its indeterminate choice at I.189 preserves the discussion of freedom and its empty bracket. The wine/water note retains the source's XXVII [sic.] and the unmirrored French agreement supplement même[s]; no alchemical or modern chemical result is silently supplied.

See also. Absolute and relative; Whole and part; Chemistry; Freedom; Change.

Earth

terre — earth; ground[110]

The word. Terre can be the planet, an element, ground beneath the feet, or the terrestrial condition contrasted with heaven. These ordinary and speculative senses coexist.

In Joubert. The planet becomes a globe of fire lightly covered by dust and water. In a simpler analogy, earth within air helps picture the finite within the infinite and the full within the empty. Earth also participates in the series of elemental transformations. None of these uses makes every mention of ground cosmological: the social observation about bare or cushioned earth concerns the material simplicity underlying different styles of sitting.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 149, entry 7, ¶1 — Earth is pictured as a dusted globe of fire.

I, p. 183, entry 7, ¶1 — Earth within air illustrates containment of the finite.

I, p. 220, entry 10, ¶1 — Earth is a term in a reversible elemental series.

I, p. 39, entry 2, ¶3 — Bare and covered earth underlie a social comparison.

In this edition. "Earth" and "ground" vary with context in Version 6; a single mandatory English equivalent would obscure these differences.

See also. World and universe; Element; Sphere and circle; Air.

[110] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 39, 149, 183, 220.

Echo

écho — echo[111]

The word. Echo relates a returned sound to its source, but it can signify resonant space, illuminating correspondence, or dependence mistaken for originality.

In Joubert. The analogy with reflected color pairs two kinds of return without making them the same physical event. The account of resonant endings gives echo a positive force: it makes space and measure sensible together. The critique of D[elalot], however, treats the speaker as an echo of Bonald's ideas who mistakes himself for a voice. Even here the image is not simply a claim that the imitator is quieter or less distinct: this echo speaks more loudly and distinctly than the voice that animated it. The quality of the return and its independence must therefore be judged separately.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 621, entry 5, ¶1 — Reflected color and echo occupy analogous relations.

I, p. 399, entry 3, ¶1 — Resonance makes space and measure sensible.

II, p. 593–594, entry 11, ¶1 — An echo can be clearer and louder while remaining dependent.

In this edition. Version 6 retains echo and the linked vibration, resounding, and buzzing. D[elalot] preserves the source's bracketed expansion; Z. stays unexplained. The initial all in the I.399 fragment receives no invented subject.

See also. Sound and voice; Reflection; Imitation; Space and place.

Education

éducation — education; educating[112]

The word. Éducation includes the formation of habits, feelings and conduct, not only the imparting of information. Joubert repeatedly distinguishes nourishment of a capacity from forced development.

In Joubert. The early account puts education beside philosophy and bodily constitution among sources of happiness, with an explicit reported-author qualification. The Malebranche discussion concerns bodily reward and punishment as means of teaching duty. The retrospective praise of old education then emphasizes masters' lives, mutual respect and childhood piety rather than instruction alone. Finally a self-correction urges

[111] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 399; II, pp. 593, 594, 621.

[112] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 38, 436; II, pp. 831, 866.

nourishment of the principle of mind and life rather than hasty development, which ruins the germ. The organic metaphor makes education a care for what enables growth, not merely acceleration.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 38, entry 3, ¶1 — Education is one cause among several in a reported account of happiness.

I, p. 436, entry 2, ¶1 — Bodily incentives are examined through Malebranche's advice.

II, p. 831, entry 6, ¶1 — Moral example and respect are distinguished from instruction.

II, p. 866, entry 5, ¶2 — Hasty development is opposed to nourishment of the germ.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps education distinct from instruction and principle distinct from development. It preserves Malebranche's attribution, the limitation to bodily pleasure and pain, and the conflicting abbreviated book references without silently reconciling them.

Related terms.

Childhood in education. *enfance* — Childhood receives piety and respect through the perceived example of teachers; this retrospective valuation does not certify every feature of the old education as historical fact.

Places. II, p. 831, entry 6, ¶1.

See also. Habit; Virtue; Piety; Childhood and youth; Desire; Society; Respect.

Effluvia

effluvion; exhalaison — effluvium; effluvia; effluences; exhalation[113]

The word. Effluvions are invisible outflows or emanations imagined as passing between beings. The related exhalaison is an exhalation filling air; it is grouped here without making the terms identical.

In Joubert. One account links agreeable sensation to a loss of substance: to give and receive pleasure entails changing and wasting away. Seeing someone dear is then pictured as reciprocal effluvia making each presence perceptible. The later explanation of historical "species" compares optical images shed by bodies with particles shed by odorous substances. These models preserve outward transmission rather than merely naming an inward impression.

[113] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 167, 168, 198, 241; II, pp. 758, 792.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 167, entry 4, ¶5 — Pleasure is linked to invisible outflow and loss of substance.

I, p. 167–168, entry 5, ¶1 — Dear persons exchange imagined emanations.

II, p. 758, entry 2, ¶3 — Optical images are compared with odor-bearing emissions.

I, p. 241, entry 2, ¶2 — Water fills surrounding air with exhalation.

In this edition. Version 6 uses “effluvia” in the earlier reflections and “effluences” in the later explanation. Neither is silently replaced by a modern sensory mechanism. These are historical accounts and images, not evidence that persons literally lose substance whenever they see one another.

Related terms.

Emanation. *émanation* — The modeled voice is more than air in the cited account: warmth and a skin-like vapor from an inner atmosphere give it configuration and powers of affecting minds. Émanation is rendered emanation as part of that outward transmission. The account is not silently converted into a modern account of sound waves, nor is every occurrence of voice taken to imply this same material mechanism.

Places. I, p. 198, entry 8, ¶1.

Expansibility and susceptivity. *expansibilité; susceptibilité; susceptivité* — The source condition joins extreme expansibility to extreme susceptibility, with susceptivity offered in parentheses as an alternative. If joined, those powers would permit perpetual repair rather than lasting loss, illustrated by heavenly bodies emptying and refilling, nourishing and being nourished. Version 6 preserves the technical words, the condition, and the detached ending Through divine irradiation. The reciprocity is not presented as a verified scientific mechanism or an unconditional theory of all outflow.

Places. II, p. 792, entry begun p. 791, no. 6, ¶16.

See also. Substance; Air; Life; Rays and radiance.

Elasticity

élasticité; élastique — elasticity; elastic[114]

The word. Elasticity concerns a capacity to yield and recover. Joubert carries its bodily image into the flexibility of political institutions.

In Joubert. The physical fragment claims that a subtle fluid leaves an elastic body during compression and returns during restoration. The constitutional reflection needs only the

[114] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 124, 350.

contrast between elastic and inflexible: a political constitution loses elasticity when fixed laws regulate everything. The second passage does not depend upon the scientific correctness of the first account. Their shared image makes room for adaptation while retaining some coherent form.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 124, entry 14, ¶1 — A historical physical explanation connects elasticity with a subtle fluid.

I, p. 350, entry 8, ¶1 — Fixed regulation can deprive constitutions of flexibility.

In this edition. “Elastic,” “compression,” and “restoration” reproduce the physical claim without updating it to a modern theory. The political passage retains its qualification “so to speak” before inflexible.

See also. Fluid; Form; Resistance; Order.

Elegance

élégance — elegance[115]

The word. Élégance is a valued refinement of form, but its appropriateness matters more than its mere presence.

In Joubert. The architectural fragment associates public exposure with magnificence and variety, and a small private circle with elegance. This distributes qualities by audience and setting rather than ranking every elegant work above a magnificent one. Excessive love of verbal elegance is then called childish when it demands elegance where none would be better. Clarity in forms supplies a positive explanation: elegance makes them easy to grasp, even to count. The remark on Villemain adds practice and studied ease to the account; an achieved effect need not be entirely spontaneous.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 425, entry 1, ¶1 — Elegance is fitted to a private circle rather than undifferentiated public display.

II, p. 529, entry 11, ¶1 — Demanding elegance everywhere is criticized as childish.

II, p. 833, entry 2, ¶1 — Clarity in forms explains an elegant effect.

II, p. 816, entry 2, ¶1 — Studied elegance and practiced ease complicate naturalness.

[115] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 425; II, pp. 529, 816, 833.

In this edition. Version 6 uses a small circle for petit monde without naming a social class. “Most felicitous” renders heureux as literary success. The compressed “There has been everything” in the Villemain note is left awkward because the French is awkward.

See also. Clarity and obscurity; Style; Aesthetic grace; Simplicity.

Element

élément — element; elements[116]

The word. Element can be a natural constituent, a medium in which something lives or works, or one contributing part of a larger condition.

In Joubert. Water and fire are contrasted as elements that leave differently shaped lands through their different operations. The cycle of rain and vapor maintains moisture and is extended to other elements. To inhabit a pure element, however, can describe a writer’s medium; to plunge into one’s element is part of an inward maxim paired with sphere and center. Joy is also an element of social concord. Physical constituent, congenial medium, and contributory part remain distinguishable.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 61, entry 4, ¶2 — Different elements are inferred from different landscape forms.

I, p. 172, entry 4, ¶1 — Circulation preserves the quantity of an element.

II, p. 808, entry 5, ¶1 — One’s element joins sphere and center as an image of inward return.

II, p. 913, entry 4, ¶1 — Shared joy contributes to concord.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the common word element while allowing each comparison to specify its meaning. These natural elements are not automatically entries in the modern periodic table.

See also. Air; Water; Earth; Fire and heat; Center; Sphere and circle.

Eloquence

éloquence — eloquence[117]

The word. Éloquence concerns effective, pleasurable and intelligible expression across public speech, history and philosophy.

[116] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 61, 172; II, pp. 808, 913.

[117] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 319; II, pp. 494, 755.

In Joubert. The question of pure eloquence places it in forum, history and philosophy, making it wider than live political oratory. Philosophical eloquence is asked to approach civic or popular eloquence, described through brevity and energy. The statement attributed to Pascal joins pleasurable listening with effortless understanding, then adds a damaged clause concerning being right. The first two requirements are legible, but the final clause cannot safely establish a complete ethical definition: Version 6's positive necessity is explicitly provisional because a lost negative component cannot be ruled out.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 319, entry 6, ¶1 — Pure eloquence is sought in several literary and civic fields.

II, p. 494, entry 5, ¶1 — Philosophical eloquence is compared with brief, energetic civic expression.

II, p. 755, entry 8, ¶1 — Pleasure and understanding are paired; the final rightness clause is damaged.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves philosophi[cal] as the counterpart of a source-editor completion and takes civil in its civic sense, not merely polite. [Must] on II.755 is not a secure restoration and must not support an unqualified maxim about truth and eloquence.

See also. Rhetoric; Brevity; Expression; Truth.

Emphasis

emphase — bombast; swelling; grandiloquence[118]

The word. Emphase concerns rhetorical amplification or inflated speech, not merely stressing an important word. Its valuation is not uniform.

In Joubert. The charlatan uses affected cold judgment or affected bombast to raise something above his own valuation of it. Affectation qualifies both apparent sobriety and inflated language. The distinction between apt words and grand words, however, allows a swelling born of emotion and contemplation to become enthusiasm. Translating every occurrence pejoratively would erase that argument. The animal passage tentatively questions magnificent language for an animal and then condemns its grandiloquence. Its "perhaps" remains part of the opening judgment, and no particular species or external stylistic law is supplied.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 161, entry 4, ¶1 — Affected bombast can deliberately overstate a speaker's valuation.

[118] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 161; II, pp. 493, 779.

II, p. 493, entry 7, ¶1 — Emotion distinguishes a potentially valid swelling from declamation.

II, p. 779, entry 5, ¶1 — Magnificent language can be judged disproportionate to its subject.

In this edition. Version 6 uses bombast, swelling and grandiloquence according to the local valuation. Proper words means apt words, not proper names. The lexicon's English title identifies the lexical family rather than prescribing the modern neutral rendering emphasis.

See also. Enthusiasm; Eloquence; Simplicity; Style.

Energy

énergie — energy[119]

The word. Literary energy is a power of expression whose value depends on what it accomplishes and how it is governed. It is expressly distinguished from strength and from noisy excess.

In Joubert. The damaged pen and strained singing voice exemplify the need to husband strength, mind and talent through art. Languages likewise corrupt themselves by exceeding their natural energy, ordinary sound and habitual brilliance, not simply by possessing energy. The judgment on empty stylistic effects asks whether energy strengthens anything; an effect with no such result has no merit. "Strength is not energy" then blocks easy substitution of muscular force for talent. The account of short words gives a positive verbal resource, locating energy and concision in skillful use rather than mere volume. Its numerical tension remains: the heading praises monosyllables while the examples extend to words of up to three syllables.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 212, entry 2, ¶1 — Unmanaged energy can spoil a young writer's pen.

I, p. 308, entry 10, ¶1 — Languages can exceed their natural energy.

II, p. 609, entry 3, ¶2 — Energy without a strengthening effect lacks merit.

II, p. 610, entry 5, ¶1 — Energy is distinguished from muscular strength.

II, p. 906, entry 2, ¶4 — Short words provide a resource for energy and concision.

[119] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 212, 308; II, pp. 609, 610, 906.

In this edition. Version 6 retains energy and distinguishes force or strength where the French does. The last witness contains damaged components and a source-supplied suffix; its English [and], [all], [of] and [everything] disclose their different interventions. The English examples translate meaning, not French letter or syllable counts.

See also. Force; Style; Brevity; Vivacity; Art.

Ennui

ennui — boredom; tedium[120]

The word. Ennui is more than unfilled leisure: it can arise from repetitive reasoning or insufficient thoughts, while duty can counter it.

In Joubert. Ceaseless reasoning can weary a lively soul into poetry, eloquence and metaphor. This account makes tedium productive without making it universally desirable. Another classification describes minds with too few thoughts, wasting away unless trifles cheer them; it distinguishes them from minds unable to manage too many thoughts. The terse appeal to duty offers a practical counterforce to the boredom unnamed people discuss so much. These notes place ennui between an impoverished inner life, a strained intellectual routine and an activity that gives direction. Their differences prevent a simple equation of boredom with solitude or idleness.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 280, entry 8, ¶1 — Tedium with ceaseless reasoning leads toward figurative expression.

II, p. 563, entry 2, ¶1 — Too few thoughts leave a mind vulnerable to boredom.

II, p. 657, entry 4, ¶1 — Duty is named as the force that drives boredom away.

In this edition. Version 6 varies boredom and tedium according to the construction. The quoted scholarly pointer retains the source spelling Warbuston; the lexicon does not independently certify the historical account of the arts.

See also. Leisure; Duty; Thought; Poetry.

[120] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 280; II, pp. 563, 657.

Enthusiasm

enthousiasme — enthusiasm[121]

The word. Enthousiasme can be an inspired or emotionally moving power. It is stronger and more specific than ordinary eagerness.

In Joubert. Joubert explicitly separates enthusiasm, which moves, from verve, which stirs, and ranks both in relation to inspiration. The word can also rescue certain rhetorical amplification from blame: the swelling of apt words in contemplation comes from emotion and is therefore closer to enthusiasm than to declamation. But false enthusiasm takes fire for what does not naturally kindle or move, so the mere intensity of feeling is no guarantee of value. The statement that religious enthusiasm is a second, spiritual nature extends the term beyond literary production and qualifies its love of torments with “sometimes.”

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 610, entry 1, ¶1 — Enthusiasm emotionally moves where verve stirs.

II, p. 493, entry 7, ¶1 — Emotion can distinguish inspired amplification from declamation.

I, p. 466, entry 1, ¶1 — False enthusiasm kindles over an unworthy object.

II, p. 767, entry 4, ¶1 — Religious enthusiasm is described as a second nature.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves enthusiasm and the distinct verbs remuer/émouvoir as stir/move. Emphase becomes swelling where the contrast admits a favorable kind; translating it uniformly as bombast would prejudge the passage.

See also. Verve; Poetry; Emphasis; Taste.

Envy

envie; envier; jaloux — envies; jealous; desire[122]

The word. The envie family requires a distinction between envious comparison and a desire to do something; jaloux can describe the jealousy of present spectators.

In Joubert. Pride that envies distinctions is called more pride than pride that aspires to them. The unusual comparison makes resentment of another’s distinction different from seeking one’s own. The verse contrasting grateful memory with jealous eyes gives a

[121] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 466; II, pp. 493, 610, 767.

[122] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 390; II, pp. 572, 866, 867. The verse at II.572 is identified in Version 6 as lines from Le Brun, Odes I.1, with Joubert’s variant wording retained.

related image of how present glory provokes an ungenerous response. It is borrowed verse, not a newly identified Joubert poem. In the reported Greek curse, by contrast, avoir l'envie de means to desire building or demolition. Reading envy into that construction would change the comparison from wishes for action into rivalry with other people.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 390, entry 3, ¶1 — Envying distinctions is distinguished from aspiring to them.

II, p. 572, entry 5, ¶1 — Borrowed verse contrasts grateful memory and jealous eyes.

II, p. 866–867, entry 7, ¶1 — Envie followed by an infinitive names a desire for action.

In this edition. Version 6 renders the verb envie as envies and avoir l'envie de as have the desire to. The Le Brun verse retains Joubert's differing opening. The alleged Greek usage is not independently certified, and the final demolition sentence retains explicit source losses.

See also. Desire; Pride; Glory; Gratitude.

Epic

épique; épopée — epic[123]

The word. Epic is a poetic form whose scale, world, action and audience must fit together. Joubert treats it as more than an extended story or an aggregation of heroic characters.

In Joubert. The poem must contain a whole, unified, great world with heaven, earth and the underworld. Its landscapes and figures are nevertheless distinguished from elaborate theatrical machinery. Illustrious action is glossed as known and famous, not simply morally admirable. The audience must already share part of the poet's ideas and fable and want to hear what he wants to tell; the separate note divides the poem between the poet's and readers' heads in a slightly different formulation.

Epic character is necessary but then questioned as sufficient. Time, places and events must also be epic, partly known and partly unknown, available to imagination even where history does not know them. Sustained composition finally requires even continuity of force, movement and attention, with a verse form demanding wisdom and calm. These are Joubert's interlocking prescriptions, not a neutral classification of every epic.

[123] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 264; II, pp. 605, 669, 741, 742, 845, 924.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 264, entry 2, ¶1 — Epic must present a whole, unified and great world.

II, p. 605, entry 6, ¶1 — Epic scenery and bearing differ from theatrical apparatus.

II, p. 669, entry 9, ¶1 — Illustrious action is defined as known and famous.

II, p. 741–742, entry 10, ¶1 — Poet and audience must share an epic disposition and materials.

II, p. 742, entry begun p. 741, no. 10, ¶2 — A second formulation divides the poem between their heads.

II, p. 845, entry 11, ¶1 — Epic character alone may not suffice without epic time and places.

II, p. 924, entry 4, ¶1 — Continuity of attention and verse form supports extensive composition.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes epic as adjective from the substantive epic for épopée. It preserves both formulations of the half relation, the paired conjunction/conjuncture and the unresolved questions. The final Aristotle pointer remains unverified and supplies no named meter.

See also. Poetry; Fable; Lyric; Theater; Composition; World and universe.

Equality

égalité — equality[124]

The word. Égalité is examined through distinctions of nature, judgment and legal arrangement. Joubert's criticism of simple equality does not erase its specific institutional uses.

In Joubert. The early denial of natural equality invokes differences produced by strength, ingenuity and reason. The measuring-instruments argument warns that ease of conceiving an equal distribution does not establish its justice. Yet sumptuary laws can maintain equality in a republic, or equality within classes together with distinctions between classes in a monarchy. This last use makes equality relative to a social framework rather than a single undifferentiated condition.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 50–51, entry begun p. 48, no. 2, ¶26 — Natural equality is denied through differences of capacity.

I, p. 258, entry 10, ¶1 — Clear conception does not establish distributive justice.

II, p. 749, entry 2, ¶1 — Equality operates differently in republic and monarchy.

[124] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 50, 51, 258; II, pp. 749.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes ingenuity from modern industrial production in the early passage and preserves all/every-class relations in the sumptuary discussion. Its bracketed English completions do not certify lost French letters. The latter's damaged May date remains as transmitted despite surrounding sequence.

See also. Justice; Law; Freedom; Government; Nation.

Equilibrium

équilibre — equilibrium; balance[125]

The word. Equilibrium is a balance among forces, parts, or dispositions. Its existence and the explanation of it are not the same thing.

In Joubert. The question about walking distinguishes learning how equilibrium works generally, learning how it works in us, and actually acquiring it through strengthened limbs and health. The account of plastic forms locates balance within an organized being and harmony in its visible proportions. Words, too, can be suspended and balanced by their own meaning, like the earth in the accompanying Latin comparison. Each example preserves a living or expressive result that cannot be reduced to a statement about it.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 266, entry 2, ¶1 — Knowing about equilibrium differs from possessing it in walking.

I, p. 458, entry 1, ¶1 — The inner balance of parts accompanies outward harmony.

II, p. 486, entry 4, ¶1 — Words are balanced and suspended by their meanings.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶10 — Balanced bodily qualities explain health in a historical report.

In this edition. Version 6 alternates "equilibrium" and "balance," without implying different French concepts. The Latin comparison is translated "balanced by its own weights," retaining the material image.

See also. Plastic forms; Measure; Weight and gravity; Rest; Organization.

[125] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36, 266, 458; II, pp. 486. Beaunier identifies the early physiological passage at I.35 as a summary of Plato. Its presence records Joubert's reading, not an independently original anatomical claim.

Equity

équité; droiture — equity; uprightness[126]

The word. Équité supplies a proportional and inwardly discriminating rule; droiture names the uprightness expected of judgment.

In Joubert. The short definition as proportional equality prevents equity from being reduced to identical shares or measures. The sequence assigning qualities to movement, thought, tone and hand gives equity to intention and uprightness to judgments. A further contrast with law places equity within conscience as a better rule than merely determining oneself by legal prescription. The passages do not supply a complete legal doctrine or settle every conflict between law and conscience. They do make equity a distinct reading problem: judgment may need a norm that measures proportion and intention beyond outward conformity.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 199, entry 9, ¶2 — Equity is defined as proportional equality.

I, p. 469, entry 12, ¶1 — Equity belongs to intention, uprightness to judgments.

II, p. 498, entry 4, ¶2 — Equity is a better inward rule than exclusive reliance on law.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps equity and uprightness separate in the compressed list, without supplying all the omitted verbs. The law sentence retains only, so its criticism is aimed at exclusive reliance on law, not at every lawful act.

See also. Equality; Justice; Law; Conscience.

Error

erreur; faux — error; false[127]

The word. Erreur is a condition or judgment of going wrong. Faux and fausse can also mark a misleading presentation or position rather than a deliberate lie.

In Joubert. Illusion is explicitly separated from error in the speculative account of sensory relations. Seeing colors without seeing any object is the example of error; the contrary case can place one in both illusion and truth. A different distinction gives physical errors contempt and metaphysical errors the power to please even when recognized or not adopted. The ensuing discussion retains the difficult printed

[126] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 199, 469; II, pp. 498.

[127] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 167; II, pp. 572, 745, 748, 863.

immaterial and should not be silently normalized to material in order to make the contrast simpler. The late false-light passage depicts discussion leaving the mind suspended without a fixed point: falsity there takes a spatial and orientational form.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 167, entry 4, ¶3 — Error differs from the illusion compatible with truth.

II, p. 572, entry 2, ¶1 — Recognized metaphysical error may still please or be admired.

II, p. 863, entry 7, ¶1 — False light and position leave the mind without a resting point.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps error, illusion and truth distinct. “In the air” on I.167 renders airs, not arts. The lexicon treats these as Joubert’s specific comparisons; it does not derive a unified theory explaining away their tensions.

Related terms.

Refutation. *réfutation* — The two related maxims make a reader’s involvement relevant to the tedium of refutation. The first excludes errors belonging to ourselves, friends or enemies and specifies length; the second excludes participation through ourselves or friends without naming enemies or length. Version 6 retains the differences instead of producing a composite maxim. Neither witness says that an error is true merely because its refutation is tedious.

Places. II, p. 745, entry 8, ¶1; II, p. 748, entry 6, ¶1.

See also. Truth; Illusion; Opinion; Judgment.

Erudition

érudition — erudition[128]

The word. Erudition is learned investigation and possession of historical or literary materials. Joubert asks both what grounds its claims and what kind of benefit its accumulated fragments provide.

In Joubert. The wings-without-feet fragment gives imagination a need for erudition. The severe Dupuis discussion then refuses to treat learning as certainty: abundant research, little system and a modest claim to probability are praised in the Academy’s memoirs. Traits of manners or imagination can be worth finding, while reconstruction of a complete antiquity from fragments is called a useless undertaking. The claim that half is better than whole follows from what survives, not a recommendation to falsify a complete text.

[128] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 87, 228, 464; II, pp. 767.

Historical truth receives its appropriate place in erudition beside moral and physical truth in their domains. The criticism of the Travels of Anacharsis offers another danger: learning can drown in frivolous charms and become neither instructive nor agreeable. Joubert approves that criticism's truth while finding its wording less than good. Both indiscriminate accumulation and pleasing presentation are therefore tested by their actual use.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 87, entry 4, ¶1 — Imagination without erudition has wings but no feet.

I, p. 228, entry 1, ¶1 — Moderate research is preferred to confident reconstruction.

I, p. 228, entry 1, ¶2 — Traits are distinguished from a recovered whole.

I, p. 228, entry 1, ¶8 — The surviving fragment limits claims to complete reconstruction.

I, p. 464, entry 1, ¶1 — Historical truth belongs to erudition's domain.

II, p. 767, entry 5, ¶1 — Frivolous charms can drown learning.

In this edition. Version 6 retains erudition, the open parenthesis in the early fragment and its broader English [it] for the supplied French [l']. The judgments on Dupuis and Anacharsis remain Joubert's. The account does not certify the cited newspaper issue or independently establish the priority claimed for Geoffroy.

See also. Study and learning; Science; History; System; Plausibility and probability.

Essence

essence — essence[129]

The word. Essence can identify what constitutes a thing, what is indispensable to its character, or the concentrated content of a larger work. The contexts should determine how strongly philosophical the word is.

In Joubert. The concise division of each thing into essence, body, and appearance makes essence what causes it to be itself; the body is its case and appearance multiplies it. This explanatory image is stronger than a loose claim about a thing's general character. Joubert's criticism of Locke, meanwhile, explicitly distinguishes nominal and real essences while saying that Locke often seems to confuse them.

A thought may contain the essence of an entire book. Here the vocabulary of constitution becomes an account of concentration: small verbal extent need not imply meager

[129] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 275; II, pp. 501, 502, 589.

intellectual content. The literary use should not be mistaken for a separate physical substance extracted from a book.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 501–502, entry 15, ¶1 — Essence, body, and appearance receive different functions.

I, p. 275, entry 5, ¶1 — Nominal and real essences enter a criticism of Locke’s terminology.

II, p. 589, entry 7, ¶1 — One thought may contain an entire book’s essence.

In this edition. The translation keeps “essence” in all three passages. The lexical continuity lets the reader see a philosophical term carried into literary judgment without forcing the judgments into one formal system.

See also. Substance; Form; Unity; Body.

Esteem

estime; estimer — esteem; esteemed; esteeming[130]

The word. Estime is an appraisal of worth, but what receives esteem and what deserves it need not coincide.

In Joubert. Fortune can give virtues to make someone worthy of esteem or successes to make that person esteemed. The difference separates value from recognition. Refined pride can more easily esteem good conduct as obedience to a rule than goodness as the merit of a person, because the latter exposes a merit it cannot simply confer on itself. Yet a tentative account of goodness allows esteem and love to exceed desert, while prudence adjusts what one entrusts to others. The perhaps and on-these-suppositions framing matter: a practical distinction is explored rather than made into an unconditional rule for all relationships.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 156, entry 1, ¶1 — Success produces recognition, virtue makes one worthy of it.

II, p. 509, entry 9, ¶1 — Refined pride more readily esteems rule-following than personal goodness.

II, p. 696, entry 2, ¶1 — Generous appraisal and prudent employment need not use the same measure.

[130] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 156; II, pp. 509, 696.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the repeated esteem in the rule/person contrast and does not turn could not give oneself into an assertion that goodness can never be cultivated. Worthy of esteem and esteemed preserve the early verbal distinction.

See also. Respect; Merit; Goodness; Prudence; Glory.

Eternity

éternité — eternity[131]

The word. Eternity is distinguished from pure duration and used to relativize the span of human life. It is not invariably a simple synonym for an indefinitely long time.

In Joubert. The claim that time cannot be conceived without eternity sets the ideas in relation. The later distinction between eternity and pure duration explicitly attributes something divine only to the former. Old age then becomes dawn before eternity. A still later paradox says eternity preceded time by only an instant and can be touched behind us. The paradox should be read as a concentrated image of a boundary, not silently converted into a chronological calculation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 276, entry 9, ¶1 — Time's conception presupposes eternity.

II, p. 725, entry 9, ¶1 — Eternity differs from pure duration.

I, p. 469, entry 5, ¶1 — Human age becomes infancy in the comparison.

II, p. 730, entry 8, ¶1 — An instant marks a paradoxical boundary between eternity and time.

In this edition. Version 6 retains "only an instant" and the spatial "behind ourselves." Other occurrences, such as the eternity of French music, are evaluative extensions rather than independent proofs about timelessness.

See also. Time; Duration and instant; Infinite; Aging and old age.

Ether

éther — ether[132]

The word. Ether is a subtle medium in Joubert's historical physical imagination. It should not be confused with the everyday modern name of a chemical solvent.

[131] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 276, 469; II, pp. 725, 730.

[132] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 197, 202, 241, 407.

In Joubert. The force of communicating wisdom is compared with ether in amber: it makes itself felt without showing itself, unlike palpable earthly fire. The criticism of Descartes says his subtle matter is not subtle enough, offering filings and dust where air and ether would better satisfy imagination. Stars are also pictured as islands surrounded by air or ether. The word supports degrees of material subtlety, but the passages do not establish a single verified physical medium.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 197, entry begun p. 196, no. 11, ¶3 — Ether in amber models an invisible yet effective communication.

I, p. 241, entry 5, ¶1 — Ether contrasts with the overly coarse matter attributed to Descartes.

I, p. 407, entry 5, ¶1 — Stars become islands in air or ether.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “ether” and renders électre as “amber” in the first analogy. It does not recast the comparison as a modern electrical theory.

Related terms.

Ethereality. *œthéréité* — Æthéréité becomes ethereality in the discussion of a highly finished work that otherwise remains outside the reader. Joubert allows that a thought may have such ethereality that it dematerializes its wording, overcoming the excessive solidity of form. The conditional exception matters: the property is not asserted of every perfect expression. Version 6 also retains masculine ce mémoire as this memoir, rather than silently changing the object into memory.

Places. I, p. 202, entry 8, ¶1.

See also. Air; Fire and heat; Substance; Light; Force.

Evidence

évidence; évident — self-evidence; self-evident; evident[133]

The word. Évidence chiefly concerns intellectual manifestness in these witnesses, not a collection of facts offered in support of an argument.

In Joubert. The poetic self-evidence fragment asks whether its language should reflect its poetic character. The separate following image makes a descent from rays of light more than mortal. Both formulations value how truth appears as well as what is asserted. In the moral passage, self-evidence belongs to touch rather than sight, and its opening qualification allows only as much evidence as that kind of thing permits. This prevents a

[133] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 149, 470; II, pp. 688, 908.

simple demand for the same visual certainty in every domain. A later sequence associates orientation toward the true with a sound mind, and tendency toward the beautiful and evident with eminent minds; its needle image remains a fragment, not a completed theory of an intellectual compass.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 470, entry 7, ¶1 — Self-evidence has something poetic and raises a question of language.

II, p. 688, entry 2, ¶1 — Moral self-evidence is figured as touch rather than sight.

II, p. 908, entry 1, ¶3 — Direction toward the true and evident is expressed through unfinished directional imagery.

In this edition. Version 6 uses self-evidence to prevent the English evidentiary sense from dominating. Touch retains the physical comparison in tact; it is not reduced to social tact. The latter passage's [Habitual] is a qualified rendering of damaged habituell[…].

Related terms.

Invidence. *invidence* — Joubert tentatively proposes invidence for inward, intimate self-evidence: clarity without brilliance, constituted by ease of belief. The final "if that word may be used" qualifies the coinage itself. Version 6 keeps the unusual word and the surrounding fragments rather than replacing it with a modern technical term. The description does not by itself establish that every easy belief is true.

Places. I, p. 149, entry 1, ¶1.

See also. Certainty and doubt; Truth; Discernment; Clarity and obscurity.

Existence

existence; exister — existence; exist; be[134]

The word. Existence names that something is, but Joubert tests what existing means for a sensing creature, a physical object, and an imagined thing. It is not everywhere synonymous with tangible material presence.

In Joubert. The thermometer and diamond provoke questions about heat and light beyond the limits of our sensations. Their existence "for" an instrument or a stone is posed interrogatively: the passage does not supply a worked-out account of nonhuman consciousness. Elsewhere pleasure and pain are called more existent than metals or

[134] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 242, 251, 252; II, pp. 572.

marble. The deliberately comparative expression makes experienced reality weigh more than the solidity of bodies.

An imagined thing introduces a further distinction: appearance can take the place of solidity and itself constitute existence and reality. This is a contextual account of the purely imagined, not permission to merge all the notebooks' uses of existence, truth, appearance, and being.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 251–252, entry 7, ¶1 — Heat and light are questioned in relation to objects that register or undergo them.

I, p. 242, entry 4, ¶1 — Pleasure and pain are emphatically more existent than bodies.

II, p. 572, entry 2, ¶2 — Appearance supplies existence and reality to the purely imagined.

In this edition. Version 6 retains "more existent," rather than reducing the comparison to importance alone. At II.572 it also retains the printed "immaterial" despite the difficult contrast with "purely imagined"; the translation note explicitly rejects silently changing the French to material.

See also. Body; Matter; Essence; Space and place.

Experience

expérience — experience; experiences; experiments[135]

The word. Expérience ranges from lived or accumulated experience to an experiment. Its value depends on how it is used and understood.

In Joubert. Theories are said to cause more experiments than experiments cause theories: rational inquiry can generate tests, so the passage does not derive all knowledge passively from observation. The arts are elsewhere children of experiences transmitted by centuries and common needs, emphasizing collective inheritance. Yet experience carried within a person may remain unknown without self-observation. Nor does age or exposure guarantee wisdom: the terse warning that most let experience corrupt them refuses automatic moral improvement. The history gloss names one route from trials to experience, not a definition that cancels experiments elsewhere.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 244, entry 8, ¶1 — Experiments can arise from rational theories.

I, p. 178, entry 9, ¶1 — The arts inherit collective experiences and shared needs.

[135] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 119, 178, 244, 399; II, pp. 642.

I, p. 399, entry 8, ¶1 — Unobserved inward experience can remain unknown.

I, p. 119, entry 4, ¶1 — Experience can corrupt its possessor.

II, p. 642, entry 7, ¶1 — Personal trials and history provide experience.

In this edition. Version 6 uses experiments in the theory comparison, experiences for the transmitted inheritance and experience in the inward and ethical passages. Observation of oneself is a substantive subsidiary here: it makes available what mere possession has not made known. M. de Luc's quoted history gloss remains a reported source, not an externally verified definition.

Related terms.

Observation. *observer* — Experience may be carried within a person yet remain unknown until that person observes himself. Observer here means attending to oneself; it should not be confused with observing a rule, which means conforming to it. The notebook therefore distinguishes having undergone something from having recognized it as experience.

Places. I, p. 399, entry 8, ¶1.

See also. Science; Philosophy; Art; Reflection; Study and learning.

Expression

expression; exprimer — expression; express[136]

The word. Expression is both the act of making something manifest and a particular verbal formulation. It may shape the thought it communicates.

In Joubert. The early conditional about a person without language links expression to the richness of ideas, memory and imagination. It is a conjecture about their relations, not simply the claim that complete thoughts exist before words. In the distinction between idea and judgment, exact clear notions and transparent words are required to bring an idea into existence; a merely correct expression can convey only a judgment well. A later reply to Bonald asks whose life literature expresses: society, studies, mood or personality. "Often" limits the account of literature's expressive sources; the final clause nevertheless calls the last the best. The feminine reference can point to the expression of personality or to personality itself.

[136] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 49; II, pp. 643, 798.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 49, entry begun p. 48, no. 2, ¶5 — Lack of expression is imagined to diminish ideas and mental richness.

II, p. 643, entry 7, ¶3 — Transparent expression helps bring an idea into existence.

II, p. 798, entry 1, ¶1 — Literature's expression of society is set beside personal sources.

In this edition. Version 6 retains "merely correct" against "exact and clear." On II.798 the final feminine reference can concern expression of personality or personality itself, and the damaged quotation closure is not supplied.

See also. Idea; Language; Writing; Literature.

Extension

étendue; étenduë — extension; extent; expanse[137]

The word. Étendue names spatial spread, but its English equivalent changes when the concern is magnitude, inward spaciousness, or a philosophical property.

In Joubert. The account of simple ideas describes space as extension or measure. Yet the later distinction between space and mere extension withholds from the latter the divine character attributed to the former. Extension therefore does not simply exhaust what space means. In the musical image of souls, a lack of étendue prevents resonance: "expanse" makes the imagined inward room audible. A king's comparison with a palace, by contrast, mocks judging worth by physical extent and dimensions.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 456, entry 7, ¶1 — Space is considered as extension or measure.

II, p. 725, entry 9, ¶1 — Mere extension is distinguished from space.

II, p. 513, entry 2, ¶1 — Inward expanse allows resonance.

I, p. 241, entry 3, ¶1 — Extent cannot by itself measure worth.

In this edition. Version 6 uses "extension," "expanse," and "extent" for the cited contexts. Étenduë is an older printed spelling, not a second concept. The participle étendues, meaning stretched out, is a false hit for a noun-only audit.

See also. Space and place; Body; Measure; Monad.

[137] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 241, 456; II, pp. 513, 725.

Eyes and ears

œil; oreille; vue; ouïe — eye; eyes; ear; ears; sight; hearing[138]

The word. Joubert distinguishes organs from their powers and uses the eyes and ears as models of inward access. Their figurative mobility does not erase their bodily differences.

In Joubert. The image of doors and windows makes the eyes and ears entrances to the soul. The account of the tender eye, however, stresses bodily proportion: straw may feel like a pebble or obscure sight like a beam, because the receiving organ is delicate. Speech and writing are then said to let us hear with eyes and see with ears, transferring effects across ordinary sensory divisions. The late undated assertion that we shall see with sight rather than eyes, and hear with hearing rather than an ear, separates the surviving faculty from its bodily instrument. It remains a spiritual assertion, not a description of ordinary anatomy.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 85, entry 2, ¶2 — Eyes and ears serve as doors and windows.

I, p. 204, entry 2, ¶1 — The eye's delicacy explains disproportionate effects.

I, p. 197, entry 4, ¶1 — Speech and writing exchange the expected tasks of eyes and ears.

II, p. 900, entry 5, ¶1 — Future faculties are distinguished from bodily senses and organs.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves singular ear beside plural eyes in the final witness, and sight/hearing beside the named organs. Its "visual orbit" at I.204 does not replace orbite visuel with a modern anatomical term. The odd et grands vides construction at I.197 remains visibly interrupted.

See also. Perception; Sensation; Faculty; Organs and brain; Image.

Fable

fable — fable; story[139]

The word. Fable can mean an invented tale, a poetic story or plot, or a fiction improperly presented as physical knowledge.

In Joubert. The note about episodes uses fable for a narrative fabric strengthened through interweaving. A second story can give the first more apparent existence and

[138] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 85, 197, 204; II, pp. 900.

[139] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 197; II, pp. 524, 843.

duration; it need not be a short moral fable. The song maxim makes fables the object of singing, in contrast with history recounted. But fables in physical sciences are condemned as encouraging gullibility and presumption. The difference lies partly in the kind of claim and the field in which it circulates, not merely in whether the narrative was invented.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 524, entry 5, ¶1 — Interwoven stories strengthen the poet's fabric and apparent reality.

II, p. 843, entry 3, ¶1 — Fables belong to song in contrast with narrated history.

I, p. 197, entry 1, ¶2 — Fables offered in physical sciences are faulted as misleading.

In this edition. Version 6 uses story in the episode passage and preserves fables in the generic contrasts. The supplied [They] on II.524 supplies an English subject after the printed period; it does not add a new story or identify a literary example.

See also. Poetry; Novel; History; Truth; Illusion.

Facility

facilité; facilement — facility; ease; easily[140]

The word. Facility is ease of production or expression. Joubert distinguishes the writer's fluency from the reader's ease, and negligent fluency from the ease achieved by care.

In Joubert. A formed language can remove the obstacles that would force a writer to search, choose and attend. In an age of bad taste, effortless writing may therefore turn into the reader's fatigue. Sure taste and considered choice supply resistance to the torrent of available expression. The compact contrast of care with negligence identifies two very different sources of apparent ease.

Even a work well made in all its parts needs a difficult final varnish that both hides the maker's pains and spares the reader those pains. The care–elegance–facility sequence locates the desirable result in the work, not necessarily in the worker's experience. The file and oil metaphors reverse the expected complaint about labor: their smell betrays too little finish or vigil. Natural facility finally requires acquired difficulty through art, reflection and taste.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 181, entry 4, ¶1 — Ease in a formed language can remove salutary obstacles.

I, p. 300, entry 9, ¶1 — The writer's ease can become the reader's fatigue.

[140] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 181, 300, 425, 435; II, pp. 496, 524, 755.

I, p. 425, entry 2, ¶1 — Taste and choice create resistance to verbal abundance.

I, p. 435, entry 3, ¶1 — Care and negligence yield different kinds of ease.

II, p. 496, entry 2, ¶1 — A final varnish hides and spares the labor of making.

II, p. 524, entry 1, ¶1 — Care becomes facility through achieved elegance.

II, p. 755, entry 2, ¶1 — Natural facility must be joined to acquired difficulty.

In this edition. Version 6 uses facility, ease and easily in this family. Aisance in the care passage also becomes ease, but remains a neighboring French term rather than an undeclared synonym. The masculine il refers to care, not elegance. Damaged difficulty words in the final witness remain bracketed as contextual readings.

See also. Care; Choice; Elegance; Art; Composition; Practice and effort.

Faculty

faculté — faculty; faculties[141]

The word. Faculté names a capacity, not necessarily its present exercise, acquired skill, or achieved result.

In Joubert. The contrast between thinking and expressing separates two powers that may be possessed unequally or fail to act together even in the same person. Pen, ink and paper distinguish equipment and material without providing a fixed anatomical map. The wise writer's four faculties—taste, judgment, imagination and reason—must be consulted together and separately. The quoted rector followed by four faculties turns the mental word toward its academic sense. Memory then joins as secretary, clerk or writer, rolling the material until it acquires polish and finish. These are practical images of cooperation, not an exhaustive immutable list of human powers.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 562, entry 2, ¶1 — Thinking and expression differ both in possession and in actual exercise.

II, p. 825, entry 8, ¶1 — Four mental faculties are compared to four academic faculties.

II, p. 825, entry 10, ¶1 — Memory joins the four as their figurative officeholder and finishing process.

[141] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 562, 825.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves potentially, in act and in exercise. The faculty/academic-faculty comparison remains within one paired paragraph, not a separate Joubert entry. Calendered finish preserves the cloth-pressing image with almost qualifying it; the word is not changed into a generic improvement.

See also. Mind; Taste; Judgment; Imagination; Reason; Memory.

Faith

foi — faith[142]

The word. Foi, also spelled foy, names a relation of trust or assent that Joubert repeatedly distinguishes from possessing a demonstrable idea. Its religious uses must also be distinguished from bonne foi, good faith or sincerity.

In Joubert. The saying about believing the absurd is interpreted as concerning the incomprehensible; Joubert leaves its saint unnamed. Another analogy makes faith a participation in light as hope is a participation in possession, without present sight or possession. The language describes a relation to what exceeds one's immediate hold, rather than supplying a demonstration of the object.

Faith is not simply credulity. One passage sets weakness against gentle teachableness and expressly makes the latter compatible with strength. Another locates faith in the mind's submission rather than in ideas. These formulations need not be made identical: receptivity, strength and submission create a field of distinctions. Nor is faith supposed to suppress worthy feeling. The son who believes his dead father happy may still grieve his absence; faith restrains bad inclinations while leaving praiseworthy movements intact.

Finally "moments of faith" resemble moments of love, and a following fragment allows believing with another person's faith when one lacks one's own. These notes make fluctuation and borrowed support part of the vocabulary. They should not be made into a claim that Joubert consistently possessed either settled certainty or permanent doubt.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 327, entry 1, ¶1 — The incomprehensible is distinguished from artful unreasoning.

I, p. 440, entry begun p. 437, no. 3, ¶36 — Faith/light and hope/possession form a double analogy.

II, p. 673, entry 8, ¶3 — Faith permits grief over a loved person's absence.

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[142] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 327, 440; II, pp. 673, 739, 803, 862, 871, 899. No author is supplied for the saint's saying. The damaged article and other partial words are preserved as qualified readings, not silently established French.

II, p. 739, entry 3, ¶1 — Faith is distinguished from credulity through strength and teachableness.

II, p. 803, entry 2, ¶3 — Submission of mind is opposed to possession of ideas.

II, p. 871, entry 10, ¶1 — Faith has moments, like love.

II, p. 871, entry 10, ¶2 — Another's faith can sustain belief.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps faith for both historical spellings. "Teachableness" interprets docilité in its explicit contrast with weakness. Bracketed English completions in damaged witnesses remain editorial qualifications. The son/father antecedents are clarified without removing the coexistence of joy and grief.

Related terms.

Revelation. *révélation* — Révélation can be natural: Plato is called its brilliant organ, with premier open to rank or priority. Another fragment ties firm belief to belief that revelation has occurred, without naming a particular event. Version 6 preserves all three firmness adverbs and does not turn the two passages into an identified doctrine of natural revelation.

Places. II, p. 862, entry 4, ¶1; II, p. 899, entry 7, ¶1.

Teachableness. *docilité* — Docilité becomes teachableness in Version 6 where faith is contrasted with credulity. This receptive virtue is compatible with strength and favorable to it; it is not equated with the weakness attributed to credulity. The contextual English brackets disclose damaged French wording around the contrast.

Places. II, p. 739, entry 3, ¶1.

See also. Prayer; Hope; Religious belief; Mystery; Conscience; Sorrow.

Falsehood

mensonge; menteur; mentir — lying; lie; lies[143]

The word. Mentir and mensonge distinguish lying from straightforward factual error, while Joubert also asks whether a lie can prevent self-deception, just as a truth can deceive.

In Joubert. The categorical account of the false mind describes deception directed both inward and toward others, opposed to sincerity and frankness. Its assertion should be read beside the separate caution that sincerity does not guarantee an accurate mind: the moral orientation of a mind is not identical with infallibility. An early question presses a different distinction, asking whether some lies might prevent listeners from deceiving

[143] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 155; II, pp. 659, 681, 843.

themselves, just as some truths deceive. It leaves the answer open. The final conditional presents silence as the remaining choice when one wishes neither to lie nor to wound in unnamed circumstances.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 681, entry 6, ¶2 — The false mind is described as lying to itself and others.

II, p. 681, entry 6, ¶5 — Frankness is placed opposite the false mind.

I, p. 155, entry 5, ¶1 — The relation of lies and self-deception is posed as a question.

II, p. 843, entry 10, ¶1 — Avoiding both lying and injury can lead to silence.

II, p. 659, entry 8, ¶1 — Sincerity is distinguished from infallibility and guaranteed accuracy.

In this edition. Version 6 retains always and never in the false-mind passage without weakening them into probabilities. The question about protective lies remains a question, and the silence sentence retains its contextual such. These witnesses do not create blanket permission to deceive.

See also. Truth; Error; Sincerity and frankness; Silence; Fable.

Familiarity

familiarité — familiarity[144]

The word. Familiarité is ease of manner or expression, distinguishable both from intimate disclosure and from goodness itself.

In Joubert. The first-person distinction between turns of confidence and turns of familiarity separates confiding from easy sociability: knowing how to disclose something does not guarantee mastery of familiar speech. In the dramatic example, such ease amid great danger indicates presence of mind and courage rather than inappropriate triviality. The final exclamation admits that familiarity can please even without goodness, though goodness makes it enchanting. These contexts keep social attractiveness from certifying moral worth and prevent familiarity from being reduced to prior acquaintance.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 479, entry 7, ¶1 — Confiding and familiar turns of phrase are separated.

II, p. 594–595, entry 14, ¶1 — Conversational ease in danger can show courage.

II, p. 783, entry 5, ¶1 — Familiarity pleases without goodness and enchants with it.

[144] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 479, 594, 595, 783.

In this edition. Version 6 uses confidence for confiding in the first witness and familiarity for the manner. The quoted Léontine line is identified in Version 6 as Corneille's Héraclius, but Joubert's punctuation is retained and the precise edition he used is not established.

See also. Conversation; Friendship; Courage; Goodness; Style.

Family

famille — family; families[145]

The word. Famille names a domestic group, while affections domestiques describes attachments within domestic life. Shared activity and durable feeling are central to the selected witnesses.

In Joubert. The fragment about families not warming themselves at the same fire or eating at the same hours makes disconnection visible through ordinary arrangements. Another note gives domestic affections a privileged duration within a sweeping judgment about the French. An earlier paragraph advocates paternal ownership and authority as producing love, but it has a decisive attribution limit: Beaunier says it is not in Joubert's handwriting. Its presence must therefore be reported as transmitted material, not used to prove Joubert's own family doctrine.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 128, entry 2, ¶1 — Paternal authority is discussed in a paragraph with an explicit authorship limitation.

II, p. 678, entry 9, ¶1 — Separate fires and meal times figure a divided household.

II, p. 827, entry 8, ¶1 — Domestic affections qualify a claim about lasting national feelings.

In this edition. Version 6 repeats the negative in the fire/meals fragment so that both forms of separation remain clear. It does not name a household behind the observation or endorse the national generalization. The paternal paragraph's qualification applies specifically to that paragraph.

See also. Affection; Society; Authority; Marriage; Education.

[145] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 128; II, pp. 678, 827. Beaunier marks I.128 e02 p01 as not in Joubert's handwriting; it is retained only as a qualified witness in the printed notebooks.

Fanaticism

fanatisme; fanatique — fanaticism; fanatic[146]

The word. Fanatisme is characterized through loss of bearings and destructive intoxication; it is not restricted to religious assent.

In Joubert. The high-seas image compares fanaticism and atheism as exaltations in which the shores disappear, leaving the object of losing sight unfinished. The later formulation explicitly allows both religious and irreligious fanaticism, then qualifies the intoxication as dark, harmful and furious. Its sequel distinguishes enthusiasm for an old religion from fanaticism for a new one and gives novelty, small numbers and private judgment a decisive role. These sweeping exclusions are Joubert's historical argument, not a definition the lexicon endorses as universally true. The contrast with enthusiasm remains useful even where the account of institutions is debatable.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 336, entry 2, ¶1 — Fanaticism and atheism are compared as exaltations losing sight of shore.

II, p. 879, entry 10, ¶1 — Religious or irreligious fanaticism is called destructive intoxication.

II, p. 879–880, entry 10, ¶2 — Novelty and private judgment distinguish fanaticism from enthusiasm in Joubert's account.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the unfinished losing-sight construction and the strict only/never formulations of the later note. Sens propre is private judgment here, not the literal meaning of a word. The new, cloudy, little-fermented wine remains an extended comparison.

See also. Intoxication; Enthusiasm; Atheism; Religion; Authority.

Fancy

phantaisie — fancy; fantasies; phantasy[147]

The word. Phantaisie can name fabricated images, their receptive field or an unstable private inclination. Joubert's explicit distinction from imagination must be kept local rather than imposed on every occurrence.

In Joubert. In the combination comparison, people lacking imagination manufacture fantasies as people born blind construct representations by conjecture. The analogy

[146] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 336; II, pp. 879, 880.

[147] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 185, 281; II, pp. 694, 837.

ranks these farther from truth; it is Joubert's account, not a modern assessment of blindness. A different note names imagination the worker and fancy the place or canvas that receives its products, distinguishing active faculty from mere capacity. The panorama fragment also makes phantasy a place formed when the soul wishes to think. The late queen-of-the-world image shifts toward caprice: each person makes a rule and changes it continually. Receptive imagery and arbitrary inclination are related by the word, but they are not identical claims.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 185, entry 6, ¶1 — Combination constructs fantasies in the absence of imagination.

I, p. 281, entry 11, ¶1 — Fancy is a receptive canvas beside imagination's activity.

II, p. 694, entry 8, ¶1 — Phantasy names the place of an inward panorama.

II, p. 837, entry 11, ¶1 — Fancy becomes a queen of perpetually changing private rules.

In this edition. Version 6 deliberately has fantasies, fancy and phantasy in these different contexts. None identifies a modern literary genre. The eighty-year interval is retained without computing an unprinted starting date, and the panorama's impersonal formation is not replaced by a fully specified psychological mechanism.

See also. Imagination; Representation; Faculty; Image; Rules.

Fear

crainte; peur — fear; dread[148]

The word. Crainte and peur name fear, but crainte can take the religious and anticipatory weight of dread. Fear also enters paired relations with hope and love.

In Joubert. The invisible-things fragment moves from no fear to dread impressing an idea upon minds, then makes fear of God constitutive of religion. It says fear and hope mingle in true affection. The mortality note places fear opposite the hope of immortality but leaves the animal comparison unfinished. Quietism and Jansenism are elsewhere compared as shivering love and fear of one unnamed state. The bodily force of "shivering" matters, while the state itself should not be supplied from an external doctrinal scheme.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 628, entry 1, ¶1 — Fear helps make invisible things present to thought.

II, p. 567, entry 11, ¶1 — Fear of death is paired with hope of immortality.

[148] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 567, 628, 823.

II, p. 823, entry 1, ¶2 — Fear and shivering love are compared through an unnamed state.

In this edition. Version 6 changes from fear to dread at the initial peur/crainte change, then returns to fear for familiar religious pairings. It retains the fragments and the incomplete words as qualified readings.

See also. Hope; Faith; Religion; Desire.

Feeling

sentiment — feeling; feelings[149]

The word. Sentiment, with plural sentimens or sentiments, can mean a felt disposition and a mode of inward judgment. It is not confined to a passing emotion.

In Joubert. The injunction to admit only opinions compatible with excellent feelings makes feeling a judge in intellectual matters, though not explicitly the sole judge. The pity fragment claims that every feeling includes pity for oneself or others. The angelic standard then defines goodness through feelings one can believe an angel would have. The modal words keep this an imaginative moral test rather than a claim to know angelic psychology. Across these examples, the value and quality of a feeling matter as much as its intensity.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 744, entry 10, ¶1 — Excellent feelings constrain acceptable opinions.

II, p. 855, entry 8, ¶1 — Pity is asserted as a component of every feeling.

II, p. 908, entry 4, ¶1 — An imagined angelic response becomes a standard of goodness.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the plural-to-singular movement in the judicial metaphor and the can-believe/would-have distinction in the angelic comparison. It uses feelings here but other contexts can require sense or sentiment; raw surface counts alone cannot fix the sense.

See also. Sensibility; Affection; Heart; Conscience; Goodness.

[149] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 744, 855, 908.

Fermentation

fermentation; ferment — fermentation; ferment; leaven[150]

The word. Fermentation may be a physical process or an image of activity that brings something to maturity, with the possibility of mere sourness instead of fruit.

In Joubert. Anger's fermentation can ripen gentle and peaceful feelings, but only if the crisis completes its course. The alternative is its own sourness. A ferment or leaven kept in the mind is likewise a principle of action, life, and fertility, shifting into the image of sleeping or self-brooding seeds. The warning that fermentation is not movement, and movement not life, prevents one process from serving as a sufficient explanation of another.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 402, entry 2, ¶1 — Fermentation can mature feeling or remain sour.

I, p. 372–373, entry 11, ¶1 — Ferment and leaven give mind and work fertility.

II, p. 767, entry 3, ¶1 — Fermentation, movement, and life remain distinct.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the changing images and the unusual reflexive "they brood over themselves." It does not convert ferment into a single modern biochemical term across the passages.

See also. Seed and germ; Growth; Life; Movement; Flower and fruit.

Fiction

fiction — fiction; fictions[151]

The word. Fiction is an invented presentation or supposition whose relation to truth depends on its purpose. It can frame truth, become imaginatively real, or falsely intrude where historical truth is wanted.

In Joubert. The theatrical-light fragment gives fictions a false light, the light of torches in the theater, without a completed governing assertion. Condillac's statue receives a contrary judgment: it might have been ingenious but is called useless. The approved saying about fiction in the frame and truth in the painting allows invention a supporting role. Children's games supply an embodied means of persuasion, as gestures help them believe their fictions again. A history of unfamiliar lands, however, is said to contain its

[150] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 372, 373, 402; II, pp. 767.

[151] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 449; II, pp. 475 bis, 581, 640, 737, 741, 795.

own poetry and to be spoiled by invented additions. Pleasing fictions are also bounded by the mind's nature. Finally the collective whole is itself a fiction through which a multitude becomes one, a use wider than any literary genre.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 449, entry 3, ¶1 — Theater supplies the fragment's false light for fictions.

II, p. 475 bis, entry 1, ¶2 — Condillac's statue is a fiction judged useless despite possible ingenuity.

II, p. 581, entry 6, ¶1 — Fiction can frame a truthful painting.

II, p. 640, entry 8, ¶1 — Children enact fictions into renewed belief.

II, p. 737, entry 6, ¶1 — Invented additions would spoil the desired historical truth.

II, p. 741, entry 7, ¶1 — The mind's nature bounds pleasing inventions.

II, p. 795, entry 5, ¶1 — A multitude becomes a whole through fiction.

In this edition. Version 6 retains fiction and fictions without turning them uniformly into falsehood or novel. The frame saying's speaker and journal reference remain unidentified. In the collective passage, the causal force of parce is retained despite the absent French que; no particular political theory is supplied.

See also. Imagination; Fable; Novel; Hypothesis; Representation; Whole and part.

Fidelity

fidélité — fidelity[152]

The word. Fidélité names continuance in custom, admiration or feeling; it is not restricted to literal accuracy in a copy or translation.

In Joubert. The fidelity to one's fathers' customs, even their religion, is called a social virtue. The description concerns the bond of transmission and does not itself demonstrate the inherited beliefs. The friendship fragment places long fidelity to first admirations beside the calming action of time, but leaves its second sentence without a verb. Finally, the interpretation of Petrarch and Laura explains fidelity through the easier preservation of feelings than sensations: devotion can endure toward an image. These witnesses describe different forms of constancy without certifying the history of knights or prescribing one unchanging attitude toward every inherited practice.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 351, entry 2, ¶1 — Inherited customs and religion receive the designation social virtue.

II, p. 489, entry 5, ¶2 — Friendship's first admirations are associated with long fidelity.

[152] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 351; II, pp. 489, 834.

II, p. 834, entry 12, ¶1 — Preserved feelings explain an idealized account of chivalric fidelity.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the friendship fragment instead of supplying how fidelity calms or is calmed. The thirty years in the Petrarch example belongs to Joubert's interpretation, not to an independently verified biography. Feelings and sensations remain distinct.

See also. Friendship; Habit; Feeling; Image; Religion.

Figure and metaphor

figure; métaphore — figure; metaphor[153]

The word. Figure may name visible form or a rhetorical arrangement; métaphore belongs to the verbal comparisons through which intellectual things are presented.

In Joubert. The symmetry/antithesis dispute distinguishes a merely verbal figure from a real balancing of thoughts. Joubert calls the former false and the latter beautiful; this is his proposed distinction, not a universal definition of rhetorical antithesis. The comparison/metaphor prescription also makes sensory fitness relevant to expression of spiritual things. A word's visible letters provide another sense of figure: their shapes can please the eye as sounds please the ear. These uses share a concern with perceptible form, but the visible outline of a letter is not itself a rhetorical trope.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 624, entry 4, ¶1 — A balancing of thoughts is distinguished from a merely verbal antithesis.

II, p. 505, entry 2, ¶1 — Comparisons and metaphors must avoid offending the senses.

II, p. 741, entry 3, ¶1 — Each letter's visible figure contributes to a word's appearance.

In this edition. Version 6 repeats figure through the antithesis dispute and keeps balancing as movement. The missing forms rendered [the ear] and [through] on II.741 remain contextual; no particular typeface is inferred.

Related terms.

Symmetry. *symétrie* — Symmetry is a real and beautiful balancing of thoughts in the dispute with verbal antithesis. In the account of the I know not what, however, a certain indefiniteness of symmetry and forms contributes to charm by allowing them to be felt without being perceived. Version 6 keeps both symmetry and indefiniteness; exact, conspicuous regularity is not made its universal ideal. The two uses connect intellectual balance with artistic effect without equating symmetry with every rhetorical opposition.

[153] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 505, 624, 741, 878.

Places. II, p. 624, entry 4, ¶1; II, p. 878, entry 5, ¶1.

See also. Analogy and comparison; Image; Rhetoric; Word.

Finesse

finesse — fineness; finesse; delicacy of touch; a finer touch[154]

The word. Finesse names a fine discriminating capacity, sometimes expressed through touch and sometimes through the quality of a reply or of wit. These uses need not imply cunning.

In Joubert. The early account of verbal composition imagines words meeting at a single exact point. The writer consequently needs a finer touch than the philosopher: fineness concerns appropriate contact, not simply ornamental elegance. A later question asks whether all souls possess the same delicacy of touch and susceptibility to the beautiful and good; it does not assert equal powers. In the reported doctor's remark, questions show breadth and answers fineness. Joubert's restrained approval leaves these complementary qualities distinct. The description of the Mortemarts' wit then joins finesse to jesting and naïveté, a combination that prevents it from being reduced to solemn refinement or calculating deception.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 53, entry 1, ¶3 — The writer needs fine touch for exact verbal contact.

I, p. 391, entry 9, ¶2 — Unequal delicacy of inward touch is posed as a question.

II, p. 870, entry 7, ¶1 — A reported contrast assigns breadth to questions and fineness to answers.

II, p. 872, entry 6, ¶1 — Finesse accompanies jesting and naïveté in a description of wit.

In this edition. Version 6 sometimes translates the complete phrase finesse de tact as a finer touch or delicacy of touch, while keeping fineness or finesse elsewhere. These are contextual renderings, not equivalents of finesse in isolation. The bracketed [souls] discloses the antecedent expansion; neither the doctor nor the abbreviated V. is identified.

See also. Subtlety; Delicacy; Discernment; Wit; Style; Contact.

[154] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 53, 391; II, pp. 870, 872.

Finite

fini — finite; finish; finished[155]

The word. Fini can mean bounded in extent or finished in workmanship. The apparently simple English alternatives identify a consequential difference in the French family.

In Joubert. The finite is placed within the infinite as the full within the empty and earth within air. The later argument about bodies makes finitude a restriction upon numbers and spaces within a bounded world; its conditional opening does not claim a proof about all abstract numbers. An observation on Egyptian and Greek statues, by contrast, uses fini for the degree of finish and denies that more finish is evidence of greater artistic perfection. Neither the physical limit nor the completed surface may simply be called "perfection."

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 183, entry 7, ¶1 — Finite/infinite is pictured through containment.

II, p. 598, entry 8, ¶1 — Bounded numbers and spaces are located within finite bodies and world.

I, p. 450, entry 1, ¶1 — Artistic finish is distinguished from greater perfection.

In this edition. Version 6 uses finite for the metaphysical and physical comparison, finish and finished for workmanship. "I would content myself" preserves the later argument's conditional presentation; the sculpture comparison remains Joubert's observation, without invented identifications of objects.

See also. Infinite; Limit and boundary; Perfection; Art.

Fire and heat

feu; chaleur — fire; heat[156]

The word. Feu and chaleur must remain distinct even when Joubert identifies them in a physical hypothesis. Fire also lends speech or feeling vigor without guaranteeing sound content.

In Joubert. An elemental fragment calls fire the essential principle of generative force; another expressly calls heat a substance and identifies it with fire, opposing cold as its

[155] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 183, 450; II, pp. 598.

[156] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 51, 219, 220, 238; II, pp. 479, 905. The movement material at I.237–238 comes from a separate exercise book. Beaunier reports likely borrowing from abbé Nollet, leaves the extent of Joubert's own contribution unsettled, and acknowledges omissions. This lexical witness does not establish an independently original physical theory by Joubert.

absence. The ascending and descending sequence of ether, fire, air, water, and earth pictures transformations rather than modern chemical elements. In the verbal judgment, men can say cold things with fire and weak things strongly. The energetic manner does not remedy the poverty of what is said.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 51, entry 1, ¶1 — Fire is assigned a generative function among the elements.

I, p. 238, entry 1, ¶7 — Heat as substance is identified with fire.

I, p. 220, entry 10, ¶1 — Fire occupies a place in an ascending and descending elemental series.

II, p. 479, entry 3, ¶3 — Fire in delivery does not supply good reasons.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “fire” and “heat” rather than replacing the historical material account with energy. The contrast of saying cold things with fire deliberately preserves the paradox.

Related terms.

Cold. *froid* — At I.238 cold is defined within a historical hypothesis as absence of fire; this is not a modern thermodynamic definition. This inserted movement material carries the Nollet and editorial-omission qualifications explained in the main article.

Places. I, p. 238, entry 1, ¶7.

Flame. *flamme* — At I.219 flame is called the body of fire, within a series distinguishing a medium from its bodily appearance.

Places. I, p. 219, entry 4, ¶1.

Electrical fire. *électrique* — The fire called electrical acts without showing itself and can be made to appear, chiefly through a transparent substance like a clear word. Version 6 preserves both the historical designation and the surprising verbal comparison. The passage supplies no modern explanation of electricity, and the name is not rewritten as a description of combustion.

Places. II, p. 905, entry 6, ¶3.

See also. Element; Ether; Force; Life; Blood.

Flower and fruit

fleur; fruit — flower; bloom; fruit[157]

The word. Flowers and fruits link beauty with production, ripeness, and what a thought may yield. Fleur can also mean a bloom or delicate freshness rather than a countable blossom.

In Joubert. Thought is asked to have bloom just as movement has grace and tone sincerity. Elsewhere single flowers carry seed while double flowers give pleasure without producing: the image distinguishes immediate splendor from fertility. The small apple-tree fragment follows color from blossom into fruit. Taken together, these uses do not oppose all beauty to usefulness; they ask how beauty survives or develops in what follows.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 469, entry 12, ¶1 — Bloom is a desired quality of thought.

I, p. 340, entry 1, ¶1 — Single and double flowers distinguish fertility from luxuriance.

II, p. 504, entry 7, ¶1 — Blossom color passes into the fruit.

In this edition. “Bloom” is the contextual rendering of avoir de la fleur. The apple-tree comparison remains an initial “As” fragment rather than a completed argument. Botanical metaphors do not warrant an invented doctrine of literary cultivation.

See also. Seed and germ; Growth; Tree; Nature.

Fluid

fluide; fluidité — fluid; fluidity[158]

The word. Fluidity can be a property of a material, the ease with which a sound flows, or the imagined medium in which beauty nourishes the soul.

In Joubert. Ink’s appropriate color and fluidity make writing possible, but do not mean that a book already exists in an inkwell. The material property is necessary to making, not identical with the finished work. Style’s unction is described through an oily lack of solidity, and a later account imagines the mind drinking clarity: beauty becomes nourishment in this kind of fluid. The sensuous vocabulary helps distinguish receptivity and transmission from already fixed shape.

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[157] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 340, 469; II, pp. 504.

[158] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 203, 302, 303; II, pp. 579.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 302–303, entry 11, ¶1 — Ink is suited to making a book without already containing it.

I, p. 203, entry begun p. 202, no. 8, ¶4 — Unction receives an oily, fluid comparison.

II, p. 579, entry 2, ¶3 — Clarity is drunk and beauty becomes nourishment.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “fluidity” in the material and stylistic passages and “fluid” in the drinking image. It does not explain away the oily comparison as merely smooth writing.

See also. Water; Matter; Density and solidity; Elasticity; Substance.

Folly

folie; fou — folly; fool; mad; madness[159]

The word. Folie and fou range across play, mistaken opinions and claims about illness; the same English equivalent cannot safely explain every occurrence.

In Joubert. The follies of witty men may be games with wisdom, not the follies of fools. The Diderot fragment likewise locates madness in opinions while denying that the head itself is mad. The theatrical discussion quotes Geoffroy calling Orestes’ frenzy a disease of soul rather than brain, and Joubert applies that distinction to performance. Another maxim calls madness a brain disease rather than a disease of mind. The difference of settings and the changing âme/esprit terms must remain visible. These are historical judgments and images, not a coherent diagnostic system or grounds for assigning a modern illness to any named person.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 436, entry 1, ¶1 — Some folly is playful commerce with wisdom.

II, p. 706, entry 6, ¶1 — Diderot’s opinions are distinguished from the condition of his head.

II, p. 610, entry 2, ¶1 — A theatrical quotation distinguishes soul and brain.

II, p. 883, entry 3, ¶1 — A separate maxim distinguishes disease of brain from disease of mind.

In this edition. Version 6 differentiates folly and madness contextually while retaining repeated mad in the Diderot fragment. The Orestes claim is quoted from Geoffroy; Joubert’s conditional account of Montfleury’s death does not establish deliberate suicide or independently verify the event.

See also. Wisdom; Reason; Error; Imagination; Health and illness.

[159] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 436; II, pp. 610, 706, 883.

Force

force — force; strength[160]

The word. Force is effective power, physical or inward strength, and the vigor with which an activity is performed. It need not guarantee wisdom, truth, or excellence.

In Joubert. Physical forces enter the late account of matter through gravitation, impenetrability, attraction, and impulse. Yet that very passage reduces apparently enormous matter to hollow grains, a bubble, and a shadow. In a different comparison, strength belongs to earth, elevation to earth and heaven, and light to God. This hierarchy distinguishes vigor from illumination. The mind's excellence is elsewhere expressly placed in patience and constancy rather than strength and fire, so a forceful performance can remain intellectually weak.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 906, entry 4, ¶1 — The imposing vocabulary of physical force is set against matter's imagined slightness.

II, p. 713, entry 2, ¶1 — Strength, elevation, and light are differentiated.

II, p. 658, entry 5, ¶1 — Excellence is not identical with strength or fire.

In this edition. Version 6 uses "forces" for the physical list and "strength" in the comparative judgments. The late matter paragraph has damaged words retained in qualified English brackets; no modern force taxonomy is supplied.

See also. Movement; Weight and gravity; Attraction and affinity; Light; Perfection.

Forgetting

oubli; oublier — oblivion; forget; forgetting[161]

The word. Oubli is not invariably a failure of knowledge. Joubert can treat forgetting as selection, relief or a condition of fulfilling one's lot.

In Joubert. The alternative formulations making memory and oblivion parents of the muses connect knowledge with a sieve. Forgetting removes as well as loses; it participates in what is retained. The remark attributed to Hesiod develops a related paradox: daughters of memory make one forget evils because remembering good things displaces them. Joubert's unnamed "other version" is not recoverable from that sentence

[160] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 658, 713, 906.

[161] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 106; II, pp. 581, 795.

alone. The account of things seen at night assigns seeing and forgetting separate purposes, the first disposing the soul and its inclinations, the second allowing the lot to be fulfilled blindly. That theological explanation should remain a particular notebook assertion.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 106, entry 9, ¶2 — Oblivion is paired with memory and figured as a sieve.

II, p. 795, entry 2, ¶1 — Remembering good things can make evils forgotten.

II, p. 581, entry 5, ¶1 — Seeing and forgetting receive different purposes in the account of nocturnal visions.

In this edition. “Riddle” in Version 6 means a coarse sieve, not an enigma. “Or” preserves alternative formulations rather than successive settled propositions. The Latin Noctu visa is translated “Things seen at night”; no specific dream content is supplied.

See also. Memory; Remembrance; Knowledge.

Forgiveness

pardonner; pardonneur — forgive; Forgiver[162]

The word. Pardonner addresses a wrong while releasing hatred; it need not deny that judgment or punishment occurs.

In Joubert. The petition that heaven forgive the wicked after punishing them retains both acts and their order. The admired invocation O Forgiver names a divine quality in a saying attributed broadly to Muslims. A further quoted moral maxim links divine forgiveness with human forgiving and opposes mortal life to immortal hatred. Joubert presents that saying as a truth, distinguishing it from examples of historical fact. These witnesses place forgiveness within religious and ethical language without proving a common formula or practice across traditions. They also keep it distinct from indulgence that simply overlooks a fault.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 96, entry 8, ¶1 — Forgiveness is wished after punishment.

II, p. 763, entry 1, ¶1 — An admired invocation names God as Forgiver.

II, p. 809, entry 7, ¶2 — Forgiving is exemplified as a moral truth, contrasted with historical facts.

[162] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 96; II, pp. 763, 809.

In this edition. Version 6 renders pardonneur as Forgiver and brackets [God] where the French is damaged. It supplies no Arabic original or identified prayer. The mortal/immortal repetition is preserved in the moral saying.

See also. Indulgence; Hatred; God; Justice.

Form

forme — form[163]

The word. Form concerns an object's configuration or the manner in which something takes perceptible shape. The same French form may also be a conjugated verb; occurrence searches therefore need contextual checking.

In Joubert. The human body is said to contain every form used in mechanical instruments, with movements that perform their work more perfectly and without our awareness. This is a comparison of configurations and operations. Air's ability to mold itself lightly produces the opposite emphasis: clinging too firmly to form seems insufficiently spiritual. Words, finally, possess form alongside sound, color, and transparency, making a place where thought becomes visible. Joubert can value a determinate form and its lightness or flexibility without simply retracting either judgment.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 928, entry 2, ¶2 — Mechanical forms are compared with configurations in the body.

II, p. 481, entry 1, ¶1 — Air illustrates light molding and a weak hold on form.

II, p. 651, entry 4, ¶1 — The form of beautiful words helps make thought visible.

In this edition. "Form" remains distinct from body, matter, and appearance. The comparison with mechanical instruments is presented as an assertion in the notebooks, without adding a modern anatomical explanation.

See also. Matter; Body; Air; Essence; Mechanism.

[163] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 481, 651, 928. Beaunier asks whether the II.928 block and preceding material summarize Condillac. The suggestion remains a question, not an established attribution.

Fortune and chance

fortune; hasard — fortune; station; success; chance[164]

The word. Fortune can signify a power distributing outcomes, social circumstances or success. Hazard, a historical spelling of hasard, explicitly names chance.

In Joubert. The personified fortune gives virtues to make a person worthy of esteem and successes to make that person esteemed. Social station then restricts familiarity, while the fortune enjoyed by mediocre people among the witty means favorable reception rather than wealth. The educational note gives chance a different role: appetites, passions, companions and reading mold a shapeless soul when a certain formation is missing. The unnamed sort of education remains unspecified.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 156, entry 1, ¶1 — Fortune distributes virtue and success differently.

II, p. 508, entry 2, ¶1 — Fortune denotes social station.

II, p. 585, entry 4, ¶1 — A person's fortune can mean success in reception.

II, p. 760, entry 5, ¶1 — Chance directs unsystematic inward formation.

In this edition. Version 6 varies fortune, station and success according to these constructions, using chance for hazard. It preserves the esteem/worthy-of-esteem distinction and does not automatically render fortune as financial wealth. Chance here concerns the contingent shaping of life, not a developed metaphysical account of causation.

See also. Glory; Education; Habit; Society; Goodness.

Freedom

liberté — freedom; liberty[165]

The word. Liberté can mean civic liberty, freedom of action or the moral capacity implicated in virtue and wrongdoing. These relations are not interchangeable.

In Joubert. The public-liberty passage requires reciprocal surrender of private liberties, including the fortunate person's advantages and the disadvantaged person's possible future gains. Another note describes every person as free and condemns permanent deprivation while defining permitted action through law. The moral fragment links

[164] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 156; II, pp. 508, 585, 760.

[165] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 55, 84, 179; II, pp. 892.

freedom to virtue and absence of foreknowledge; the later formula attributes bad actions to freedom. Thus freedom is a condition for moral worth and for culpable action. The passages should not be compressed into one political program or a demonstrated chronological reversal.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 55, entry 3, ¶1 — Public liberty is described through reciprocal sacrifices.

I, p. 84, entry 3, ¶1 — Personal freedom is framed by law and resistance to lifelong deprivation.

I, p. 179, entry 1, ¶1 — Freedom and limited foreknowledge are linked to virtue.

II, p. 892, entry 2, ¶1 — Bad actions are attributed to freedom.

In this edition. Version 6 uses liberty in the public/private contrast and freedom in the personal and moral statements. It retains both universal claims and the source-editor pronoun supply. The political passage follows the edited exception, with the manuscript variant recorded separately.

See also. Will; Virtue; Law; Equality; Good and evil.

Friendship

amitié — friendship[166]

The word. Amitié is an affectionate relation that belongs both to inward harmony and to visible acts of welcome. Joubert need not define its boundaries against love each time he uses it.

In Joubert. The harmonious-soul fragment places friendship beside love, sorrow and ordinary activities. Harmony does not require exemption from sorrow or business. The note on bonne chère locates tender friendship in treatment of a guest: fare includes reception and welcome, not food alone. Joubert then associates chère, charité and aimance. This verbal movement connects hospitality to lovingness, but its attraction as an association is not proof of its etymology.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 557, entry 8, ¶1 — Friendship is one sphere of the harmonious soul.

II, p. 744, entry 9, ¶1 — Hospitality manifests joy and tender friendship.

[166] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 557, 744.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves friendship and tender friendship. It uses “fare” with a note on the wider hospitality sense, and “lovingness” as a contextual rendering of aimance. The derivation remains Joubert’s proposal, not a claim endorsed by the lexicon.

See also. Love; Charity; Affection; Society; Family.

Generation

génération — generation[167]

The word. Génération can mean begetting or the succession of people born into an inherited world. The shared English word retains this range but needs contextual guidance.

In Joubert. The early physiological summary assigns veins a role in generation. The brief image of fire impelling one toward generation likewise concerns bringing life into being, without supplying a complete causal theory. The ethical fragment about the world as inheritance uses each generation as a collective successor charged to leave that world better. These are related through continuity of life, but the second sense must not be read as a claim about reproductive anatomy.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶8 — Generation belongs to the reproductive account in a summary of Platonic physiology.

II, p. 577, entry 2, ¶1 — Fire is the unnamed impulse toward generation.

I, p. 55, entry 2, ¶1 — Each generation inherits and should improve a shared world.

I, p. 237, entry 3, ¶5 — The generation of movement enters an incomplete bodily analogy in a separate exercise book.

In this edition. Version 6 retains generation in the first three settings. Beaunier expressly describes the I.35 material as Joubert’s summary of Platonic physiology. The short II.577 fragment is not expanded into a named desire or a developed theory. The fourth witness compares the generation of movement with an unnamed generation; its missing term remains unfilled. Beaunier identifies the passage as material from a separate exercise book, suggests a debt to abbé Nollet without settling its extent, and reports editorial omissions.

[167] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36, 55, 237, 411; II, pp. 577.

Related terms.

Sperma. *Σπέρμα* — The Greek Σπέρμα is retained in Version 6. Its existing note explains seed, here semen in the generation discussion. The fragment proposes an origin in the surplus of organs rather than food and connects that claim with inherited illnesses or particular strengths. These remain conjectures in the text; the final claim that the soul also has surpluses extends the vocabulary without defining a second bodily process.

Places. I, p. 411, entry 6, ¶1.

See also. Seed and germ; Life; Origin and root; Movement.

Genius

génie — genius[168]

The word. Génie can be a creative or intellectual power, or the distinctive spirit attributed to a literature or people. It is not always a name for an exceptionally gifted individual.

In Joubert. The abbé Arnaud remark grants truths, learning and fine observations yet rejects the resulting idea of Greek genius and literature. Correct parts do not ensure a true apprehension of the whole. The Gobelins comparison similarly distinguishes skillful reproduction with already dyed materials from genius, without denying the workers' industry or fidelity of color. Art's ability to dispense with genius makes the distinction explicit. Conversely, the account of true scholars and poets assigns their formation more to pleasure than labor, and their sustained studies to genius rather than ambition, using an imperfect comparison that Joubert himself marks as provisional.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 500–501, entry 15, ¶1 — Greek genius concerns the character of a literature, not a single prodigy.

II, p. 817, entry 5, ¶2 — Reproductive skill is distinguished from genius through the tapestry analogy.

II, p. 775, entry 5, ¶1 — Art can teach one to do without genius.

II, p. 793–794, entry 8, ¶1 — Pleasure and genius sustain genuine study in contrast with manufacture.

[168] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 500, 501, 775, 793, 794, 817.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves genius and the qualifying concessions. The barrage/Tivoli comparison on II.793 remains unresolved, and the article relies only on its explicit art/genius and pleasure/labor contrasts, not on a guessed physical explanation.

See also. Talent; Art; Verve; Study and learning.

Gentleness and sweetness

douceur — gentleness; sweetness[169]

The word. Douceur connects an affective quality with sweetness perceived through taste or style. The choice of English word depends on the comparison being made.

In Joubert. The lexical reflection places gentleness and goodness among affective rather than abstract words. The comparison of soul and body then makes sweetness of feelings and ideas delight the soul's taste, while flavors satisfy bodily taste. In prose, however, excessive sweetness becomes initially seductive and eventually unbearable. The pleasant quality is not unconditionally a virtue of writing. Its degree and duration matter.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 233, entry 3, ¶2 — Gentleness is described as an affective quality.

II, p. 662, entry 1, ¶1 — Sweetness links feelings and ideas to the soul's taste.

II, p. 815, entry 12, ¶1 — Too much sweetness can become a fault of prose.

In this edition. Version 6 uses gentleness for the personal quality and sweetness where taste or prose supplies the image. It keeps the transition from first pleasure to later intolerance and the emphatic ridiculous, rather than reducing the criticism to mere reader fatigue.

See also. Goodness; Feeling; Pleasure; Moderation; Temper and mood.

Glass and crystal

verre; cristal — glass; crystal[170]

The word. Glass and crystal give perceptible form to transparency, apparent depth, and the doubling of an object through resemblance.

In Joubert. The glass pane lets a bird see a fly it cannot reach, separating visual access from physical passage. A pearl can lack luster yet have a beautiful transparency,

[169] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 233; II, pp. 662, 815.

[170] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 616, 660, 880, 881.

compared separately with that of glass. Water resembling crystal and crystal resembling water each offer two objects at once. This is the pleasure of reciprocal appearance: the material does not literally change into the other merely because it evokes it.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 880–881, entry 4, ¶1 — Glass separates seeing from bodily access.

II, p. 616, entry 6, ¶1 — Glass and pearl suggest distinct kinds of transparency.

II, p. 660, entry 4, ¶1 — Crystal and water double their appearances through resemblance.

In this edition. Version 6 retains “glass,” “crystal,” and the reciprocal order of the water comparison. No mineral species or manufacturing process is inferred from cristal in this short image.

See also. Transparency; Water; Mirror; Bird; Form.

Glory

gloire — glory[171]

The word. Gloire concerns recognition or the distinction attached to an achievement, and is repeatedly separated from moral improvement and intrinsic merit.

In Joubert. Being better or worse is placed within our responsibility while glory and success depend on God. The Rivarol fragment contrasts merit with success and perfection with glory, leaving its two people incompletely identified. Thoughts’ usefulness is elsewhere called the constant principle of their glory or oblivion. Politics receives a different specification: its glory lies in guiding a multitude where it ought to go, rather than following either the multitude’s wishes or the leader’s own. These contexts define possible grounds of glory without making recognition itself proof of worth.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 482, entry 9, ¶1 — Glory is separated from personal responsibility for goodness.

II, p. 596, entry 11, ¶1 — Intrinsic merit and external success are contrasted.

II, p. 714, entry 4, ¶1 — The endurance of thoughts is related to usefulness.

II, p. 845, entry 2, ¶1 — Political glory is tested by a destination beyond private wishes.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the merit/success and perfection/glory contrasts. It keeps the unnamed person in the Rivarol fragment and the wish/would-wish/ought distinctions in the damaged political passage, without supplying a particular policy.

[171] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 156; II, pp. 482, 596, 714, 845.

Related terms.

Success. *succès* — Success can produce esteem without producing the virtue that makes a person worthy of esteem; it also stands opposite intrinsic merit in the Rivarol fragment.

Places. I, p. 156, entry 1, ¶1; II, p. 596, entry 11, ¶1.

See also. Ambition; Honor; Utility; Fortune and chance; Government.

God

Dieu — God[172]

The word. Dieu appears as the object of prayer and love, a principle of being, a judge, an image-bearing presence and a limit to human knowledge. These uses overlap but are not interchangeable propositions.

In Joubert. Calling God the place where the speaker forgets everything else turns theology into an inward location. The stairway image then makes the reality of ascent and arrival in peace more important than the imagined stairway's material or makers. It is an image of a path and its effect; it does not straightforwardly pronounce God imaginary. The contrast between those who seek presence through love and those who seek knowledge through curiosity allows distinct approaches, with curiosity itself called a divine gift.

The distinction between God as first principle and God as judge and providence gives another organizing axis: speculative truth and the truth from which practice follows. "Speculative" here concerns theoretical contemplation, not a mere guess. Joined mysteries likewise become practically consequential. Against any inference of guaranteed human infallibility, the inner-sense passage permits limited deception within divine willing: no person is destined to know everything. The final accumulation of light, truth, love, beauty, power, goodness, compassion and justice holds several registers together without defining their systematic relations.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 129, entry 7, ¶1 — God named as an inward place of release from the rest.

I, p. 158, entry 6, ¶1 — Imagined stairway distinguished from real ascent and peace.

I, p. 169, entry 5, ¶1 — Love and curiosity approach presence and wisdom differently.

[172] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 129, 158, 169, 362, 363, 457; II, pp. 669, 805, 854, 887. The damaged December day in the speculative/practical witness remains unspecified. The article compares uses across passages without supplying a unified theological system.

II, p. 669, entry 7, ¶1 — First principle differs in practical consequence from judge and providence.

II, p. 854, entry 13, ¶1 — Divine willing does not give people complete knowledge.

II, p. 887, entry 2, ¶1 — Eight qualities appear in paired, rhythmic assertions.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves God as "place," the apparently paradoxical imaginary stairway/real ascent, the paired qualities and the conditional in the Trinity argument. These concrete and grammatical choices should not be silently turned into abstract theological summaries.

Related terms.

Mercy. *miséricorde* — Miséricorde is distinguished from justice and goodness through its object: God has pity on all our ills. The short Isaiah-linked formulation contrasts momentary wrath and eternal mercy. Version 6 translates Joubert's compression, not an exact biblical quotation, and leaves the final abbreviated reference unexpanded.

Places. I, p. 457, entry 5, ¶1; II, p. 805, entry 4, ¶1.

Uncreatedness. *incréation* — Incréation means not being created. The paradoxical God made himself is defended as a way of speaking proportioned to human weakness while also pointing toward divine eternity. Version 6 retains uncreatedness and does not resolve the phrase into a literal beginning for God.

Places. I, p. 362–363, entry 13, ¶1.

See also. Providence; Faith; Prayer; Love; Mystery; Heaven and hell.

Good and evil

bien; mal — good; evil; affliction[173]

The word. Bien and mal cover moral value but also ordinary benefit and suffering; bien is often an adverb meaning well. Context is therefore essential before treating an occurrence as a philosophical noun.

In Joubert. The definition of virtue places doing good against doing evil despite the push of passion. The pairing of patience and mal instead concerns affliction, the condition that occasions endurance. The matter/freedom formula distinguishes all evil originating in matter from bad actions originating in freedom. Its two clauses should remain distinct, not be rewritten into a claim that matter excuses wrongdoing. These examples show why one English equivalent for every mal would obscure the argument.

[173] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 213; II, pp. 482, 892.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 213, entry 9, ¶1 — Good and evil are objects of accountable conduct.

II, p. 482, entry 2, ¶1 — Mal is affliction in its pairing with patience.

II, p. 892, entry 2, ¶1 — Evil and bad actions are given different stated origins.

In this edition. Version 6 uses affliction in the patience pairing and evil in the moral and metaphysical statements. It preserves both universal terms in the latter. The lexicon reports that assertion without supplying an unexpressed solution to the problem of evil.

See also. Virtue; Goodness; Malice; Freedom; Morality; Patience.

Good sense and common sense

bon sens; sens commun — good sense; common sense[174]

The word. Bon sens and sens commun are explicitly distinguished in a sustained comparison and therefore require different English terms.

In Joubert. Good sense can be applied to facts, ideas, politics or the arts. Especially when applied to ideas, it exceeds common sense in extent, subtlety and penetration, though not in usefulness. Common sense concerns the needs of life and the soul; literary and intellectual good sense concerns the delights of thought. The latter needs the former to prevent, arrest or correct its deviations, not because common sense actively shares all its work. A separate alternative formulation opposes self-concerned wit to good sense occupied with others. These contexts complicate the assumption that good sense means merely a conventional public opinion.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 613, entry 4, ¶1 — Good sense is distributed across several objects of application.

II, p. 613, entry 4, ¶2 — Good sense and common sense receive distinct objects and complementary roles.

I, p. 420, entry 4, ¶1 — Other-directed good sense contrasts with self-directed wit.

In this edition. Version 6 reserves good sense for bon sens and common sense for sens commun in the principal comparison. Spirituel there is intellectual, with a possible association with wit, rather than exclusively devotional. Its abbreviated personal names remain unexpanded.

See also. Reason; Wit; Judgment; Discernment.

[174] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 420; II, pp. 613.

Goodness

bonté — goodness; moral goodness[175]

The word. Bonté is the goodness of a person or soul, not merely correct behavior observed from outside. Its relation to rule-following is a central distinction.

In Joubert. In the report of Platonic faculties, moral goodness consists in their right ordering. The refined-pride passage then distinguishes esteeming good conduct, which can remain esteem for a rule, from esteeming goodness as the person's own merit. The difficult concession about "eternal" punishment makes goodness the possible medicinal result for a guilty soul. That conditional theological reasoning should not become an unqualified account of punishment or a claim that the notebooks deny moral cultivation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶2 — Moral goodness is described through an ordering of faculties.

II, p. 509, entry 9, ¶1 — Goodness asks esteem for a person rather than a rule alone.

II, p. 860, entry 2, ¶1 — A conditional account of punishment imagines giving a soul goodness.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves goodness against good conduct, retains the hypothetical "could not give oneself," and keeps the medicine image in the soul's treatment. The unnamed opponents and abbreviated Bayle reference remain unspecified.

Related terms.

Moral merit. *mérite* — Merit in the refined-pride passage belongs to a person whose goodness is difficult to esteem precisely because the observer could not confer the same merit on themselves.

Places. II, p. 509, entry 9, ¶1.

See also. Virtue; Pride; Justice; Good and evil; Esteem.

Government

gouvernement — government; governments[176]

The word. Gouvernement concerns the arrangement and exercise of political authority. Joubert tests it through religious, marital and protective images.

[175] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36; II, pp. 509, 860.

[176] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 156, 304, 461, 462.

In Joubert. The analogy with religion describes a descending sequence of objects of worship, leaving the governmental comparison suggestive rather than fully specified. Repudiating governments is then compared with divorce, but an objection concerning ascertainment of public will remains unfinished. The direct address to government assigns war, peace, abundance and tranquility to it so that private people may be freed from those cares. Its emblem is a sheltering tree. These images articulate dependence and duty without supplying a detailed constitution.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 156, entry 10, ¶1 — Government is compared with the objects of religious attachment.

I, p. 304, entry 4, ¶1 — Changing governments is placed beside divorce.

I, p. 461–462, entry 7, ¶1 — The sheltering tree figures the relief of private people's cares.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves "repudiate" across the marriage/politics comparison, and keeps the distinction between what governors should experience and what they do experience in a well-administered state. The unfinished objection is not answered by the translator.

See also. Authority; Law; Society; Marriage; Peace; War.

Grammar

grammaire; grammatical — grammar; grammatically; grammatical[177]

The word. Grammar orders relations among words, but Joubert also extends its analogy to ideas, individual authors and moral association. Its value is not exhausted by formal correctness.

In Joubert. Every great author can have a particular grammar along with an idiom and characteristic habits. Logic is then called a kind of grammar whose relations concern ideas rather than words. The pencil-writing comparison allows grammatical writing sometimes to suffice for excellence without added colors. In teaching children, however, formally agreeing words must also agree morally. An epithet can insinuate a judgment, and the relation of a verb to its object can join courage either to carnage or to rejection of needless destruction.

These approvals and demands coexist with sharply critical fragments. General grammar is accused of producing observations and chatter without practical precepts. Excessive correctness then makes grammar the enemy of rhetoric and of an indefinable charm.

[177] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 110, 309, 381; II, pp. 637, 670, 775, 878, 879.

The contexts distinguish grammatical order from a claim that grammatical correctness alone always makes good writing.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 110, entry 10, ¶1 — An author can possess a particular grammar.

I, p. 309, entry 1, ¶1 — Logic is compared with a grammar of ideas.

I, p. 381, entry begun p. 380, no. 4, ¶5 — Grammatical writing can sometimes suffice without verbal color.

II, p. 637, entry 5, ¶1 — Grammatical examples transmit moral associations.

II, p. 670, entry 8, ¶1 — General grammar is criticized for practical sterility.

II, p. 878, entry 5, ¶2 — The too correct opposes an indefinable charm.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps grammar and grammatical. General grammar is the historical category, not an identified textbook. Régime in the pedagogical example is rendered grammatical relation or object according to its local role; nominative remains a technical grammatical term. The moral judgments belong to Joubert. The final fragments receive no invented qualification or finite verb.

Related terms.

Conjunction. *et; mais* — And and but are themselves objects of criticism. In one sentence comparison, but reflects and and simply narrates; Joubert prefers and through an analogy of human judgment and divine intuition. In the Antiphilus translation example, however, removing the two but relations destroys grace, form and natural simplicity. These contexts prevent a universal preference for one conjunction. Version 6 preserves the named relations and the two alternative translations; it does not authenticate their Greek source or supply a general ancient-versus-modern grammar.

Places. II, p. 879, entry 3, ¶2; II, p. 775, entry 2, ¶1.

Epithet. *épithète; adjectif* — An epithet is called an insinuating judgment because it slips in with the word. Joubert's proposed grammatical examples therefore concern moral as well as formal agreement: adjective and noun, subject and verb, verb and object link ideas in the learner's mind. Version 6 retains epithet as a qualifying expression, not necessarily an insult. The passage's moral evaluations remain Joubert's, and its unfinished final example is not expanded into a complete teaching exercise.

Places. II, p. 637, entry 5, ¶1.

See also. Language; Logic; Correctness and correction; Rhetoric; Education; Sentence.

Gratitude

reconnoissance — gratitude[178]

The word. Reconnoissance is acknowledgment of what is received, with a scope that can exceed visible success.

In Joubert. The warning against accepting pleasures without gratitude leaves the giver unnamed. The legal maxim about extending favors becomes a rule for generous acknowledgment, then an example of moral truth visible from every side. Its deed-and-intention formulation must be read in the printed direction rather than silently reversed. A separate fragment describes gratitude unmoved by whether a service succeeds: a regretful refusal can touch as deeply as a joyful and fruitful effort. Gratitude therefore responds to disposition and relation as well as benefit, without making unsuccessful action materially successful.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 656, entry 5, ¶1 — Receiving pleasures without gratitude is called a disastrous habit.

II, p. 740, entry 2, ¶1 — Gratitude is placed beside a maxim about broadly extending favors.

II, p. 805, entry 5, ¶1 — A regretful refusal can move generous gratitude as much as successful effort.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the cubic/square metaphor, the correction from morality alone to morality and laws, and both Latin maxims as separate sayings. The refusal fragment's final [and] is a contextual completion of a damaged conjunction.

See also. Pleasure; Charity; Justice; Glory.

Growth

croissance; croître — growth; grow[179]

The word. Growth connects bodily development with the expansion of feelings, capacities, or opinions. The image is not always an assurance that increase is beneficial.

In Joubert. The statement that whatever cannot grow dwindles is immediately followed by "Is that true?" Its status as a tested thought is essential. Another entry finds people whose opinions cannot grow or diminish poorly fitted for society: inflexibility prevents

[178] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 656, 740, 805.

[179] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 120, 416; II, pp. 573.

mutual influence. Bodily growth can also expose a person to embarrassment, censure, and judgment. These witnesses give growth both productive and vulnerable aspects.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 120, entry 6, ¶1 — The proposed opposition of growth and decline is openly questioned.

II, p. 573, entry 13, ¶1 — Fixed opinions resist social interaction.

I, p. 416, entry 3, ¶1 — Physical growth brings exposure and embarrassment.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the immediate question and the grow/diminish pairing. The lexicon must not promote the queried sentence into Joubert's settled law of growth.

See also. Childhood and youth; Change; Seed and germ; Vegetation.

Habit

habitude — habit[180]

The word. Habitude names an acquired disposition or recurring way of acting. Its relation to virtue is productive in one passage and limited in another.

In Joubert. The habit of virtue makes sacrifice become taste, instinct and moral habits. Yet another early reflection says even the best habits guide only a limited range of circumstances, whereas virtue or principles give life unity. This is a useful tension between acquisition and adaptability, not a contradiction the lexicon should silently remove. Novels can exercise ascendancy over habits, and faith can require habits as well as acts. The word therefore crosses moral, cultural and religious practice.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 44, entry 1, ¶2 — Practiced virtue comes to feel like instinct.

I, p. 47, entry 1, ¶13 — Habit's finite coverage is contrasted with principled unity.

II, p. 549, entry 5, ¶1 — Novels influence morals and habits.

II, p. 860, entry 7, ¶1 — Faith is considered through habits as well as acts.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes habits from acts and retains the parenthetic pairings mœurs/habitudes and vertu/principes. In the first witness it renders mœurs as moral habits, reflecting conduct rather than etiquette. No universal opposition between habit and principle is imposed on every occurrence.

See also. Virtue; Education; Faith; Manners; Character.

[180] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 44, 47; II, pp. 549, 860.

Happiness

bonheur — happiness[181]

The word. Bonheur may name a sustained pleasant condition, a moral good or a favorable portion of life that supports virtue. Félicité receives its own narrower place in one early definition.

In Joubert. The sequence pleasure, delight, happiness and felicity distinguishes duration and freedom from disturbance. Another quotation, which Joubert praises as generally true, says virtue requires a little happiness as happiness requires virtue. The qualification “in general” prevents an absolute logical equation. The happiness of wisdom is repose in light, while virtue’s is repose within order. Finally the remembered education joins happiness to innocence, respect and piety. These differences make happiness more than either private sensation or public good fortune alone.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 38, entry 1, ¶1 — Duration and disturbance distinguish four agreeable conditions.

I, p. 47, entry 1, ¶14 — Virtue and a measure of happiness support one another.

I, p. 207, entry 5, ¶1 — Wisdom and virtue have differently figured happinesses.

II, p. 831, entry 6, ¶1 — Remembered education joins happiness to respect and piety.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves four English nouns in the first sequence and keeps the bodily breadth of “delight” there. The parallel light/order images remain distinct. The education passage expresses a remembered valuation; it is not independent proof of the past’s innocence.

Related terms.

Contentment. *contentement; content* — Contentement is traced through balance and proportion to fullness without deficiency or excess. Yet self-satisfaction is not automatically good: a prayer asks not to be pleased with oneself in wrongdoing. The later permission to be content through conscience rather than reflection remains compressed, without an invented explanation of the distinction.

Places. I, p. 250, entry 3, ¶1; II, p. 726, entry 11, ¶1; II, p. 898, entry 8, ¶1.

See also. Pleasure; Joy; Virtue; Wisdom; Education.

[181] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 38, 47, 207, 250; II, pp. 726, 831, 898.

Hardness and softness

dur; mou; mollesse — hard; soft; softness[182]

The word. Hard and soft describe different capacities to receive force, bear tools, and retain form. Their evaluative use is not fixed: softness need not be weakness, nor hardness strength worth admiring.

In Joubert. In the account of artistic labor, clay is too soft for a chisel, marble too hard to obey the hand, and bronze too brittle without melting. Resistance belongs to every worker's material, and opposed defects require different responses. The movement exercise uses an even stranger reproductive image: the hard body admits nothing, while the soft one retains nothing. In a different, compressed formulation, thought has softness by nature and roundness by perfection. The physical adjectives there should remain available to imagination rather than becoming conventional moral praise or blame.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 757, entry 10, ¶1 — Opposite material limitations explain different kinds of artistic labor.

I, p. 237, entry 3, ¶5 — Hardness and softness are opposed through admission and retention.

II, p. 552, entry 12, ¶1 — Softness belongs to thought's nature, distinct from perfected roundness.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves vulva, not valve, in the movement comparison. Beaunier identifies that material as a separate exercise book, suspects a debt to Nollet whose extent is undetermined, and reports his own omissions. The analogy is not represented as independently established mechanics.

See also. Resistance; Matter; Movement; Form; Sculpture.

Harmony

harmonie — harmony[183]

The word. Harmonie can mean a relation among sounds or thoughts and a disposition of the soul. It is not merely regular meter or pleasant noise.

In Joubert. Thoughts should link through their relations as musical sounds do, instead of being externally chained or strung like pearls. The difference is in the kind of connection. In style, harmony addresses the soul while number addresses the ear, with number a means that may sometimes be dispensable. Another note separates harmony

[182] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 237; II, pp. 552, 757.

[183] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 320; II, pp. 510, 746, 815.

within the soul from music within it: the former makes the soul just and wise, the latter poetic. Harmony's figurative use thus does not make moral and poetic excellence interchangeable. Even in prose, too much harmony can be a seductive fault whose first pleasure becomes exhausting.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 320, entry 6, ¶1 — Thoughts link by relation rather than external chaining.

II, p. 510, entry 9, ¶1 — Harmony is an end distinct from rhetorical number.

II, p. 746, entry 14, ¶1 — Harmony and music designate different qualities of soul.

II, p. 815, entry 12, ¶1 — Excess harmony can become a fault in prose.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps harmony and music separate and preserves the soul/ear distinction. The moral analogy is Joubert's formulation, not a claim that acoustic harmony causes ethical virtue.

See also. Music; Rhythm and number; Thought; Prose.

Hatred

haine; haïr — hatred; hate[184]

The word. Haine is tested by its relation to other feelings, rather than justified simply by the badness of its object.

In Joubert. The early predicament is inability to hate or despise someone whom one cannot love or esteem. It records an unresolved relation, not a duty to hate. The long political account argues that even hatred of evil can make people wicked when too strong, too dominant or too isolated among other feelings. Joubert attaches this claim to a partisan causal account of revolutionary violence; the lexicon does not adopt that account as established history. The later requirement that pity enter every good feeling includes hatred for the wicked. It makes hatred's claimed moral legitimacy dependent on something gentler within it.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 33–34, entry 6, ¶1 — A painful relation remains between failed love and impossible hatred.

II, p. 560, entry 4, ¶1 — Excessive hatred of evil is itself charged with producing evil.

II, p. 855, entry 7, ¶1 — Pity is required even within hatred of the wicked.

[184] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 33, 34; II, pp. 560, 693, 780, 855.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves all three too qualifications and the plural hatreds in the pity passage. Beaunier's suggestion that a cross marks personal memory is explicitly conjectural. No person or episode is identified from that mark.

Related terms.

Revenge. *vengeance* — The nominal demand for generous acts of vengeance is insistently repeated; generous does not mean more severe. Another note warns that memories and systems can carry vengeance into laws for people not yet born. Its repeated possibilities are not claims about an identified law. Neither witness supplies a license for private retaliation.

Places. II, p. 693, entry 4, ¶1; II, p. 780, entry 5, ¶1.

See also. Pity and compassion; Good and evil; Contempt; Forgiveness; Revolution.

Health and illness

santé; maladie — health; illness[185]

The word. Health and illness concern bodily conditions, but their vocabulary may also describe thought or character. Such figurative extensions should not be mistaken for diagnoses.

In Joubert. The early physiological report relates health to a balance of dry, moist, cold, and hot. Its historical account remains a claim in the notebook, not medical advice. A practical reflection says that changing time and health change our tasks and obligations. The entry calling an illness "great and good" records a personal evaluation with dates and an unexplained abbreviation; it does not by itself show why the illness was good. The chronically ailing are elsewhere said to preserve a sound mind despite a sick body, a generalized reflection rather than a verified clinical observation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶10 — Health depends upon balanced qualities in a historical physiological report.

I, p. 459, entry 2, ¶2 — Changes of health alter duties and tasks.

II, p. 692, entry 8, ¶1 — A dated illness receives the paradoxical description great and good.

I, p. 463, entry 3, ¶1 — Chronic illness is contrasted with sudden decline in old age.

[185] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36, 459, 463; II, pp. 692. Beaunier identifies the early physiological passage at I.35 as a summary of Plato. Its presence records Joubert's reading, not an independently original anatomical claim.

In this edition. Version 6 retains D. G. without expansion and the damaged ending after maladie. Valétudinaires is rendered “the chronically ailing,” making a useful subsidiary term without adding a specific condition.

Related terms.

Chronic ill health. *valétudinaire* — The plural valétudinaires names people habitually in poor health in I.463, rather than a particular disease.

Places. I, p. 463, entry 3, ¶1.

See also. Body; Life; Aging and old age; Elasticity.

Heart

cœur — heart[186]

The word. Cœur can name an organ, a sensitive center, or the inward seat of affections and moral illumination. The concrete image remains active even when the use is not anatomical.

In Joubert. Joubert’s account of Platonic physiology places a sensitive faculty in the heart and surrounding viscera; it is a report of an inherited scheme. Elsewhere many affections enlarge the heart, while living only with one’s own heart and illusions becomes a “delicate debauch.” Inwardness thus requires discrimination: an enlarged capacity for attachment differs from enclosure in private feeling. The demand that truths enlighten the heart and govern actions further binds feeling to conduct. It does not simply oppose emotional warmth to intellectual truth.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶1 — Sensitive faculty in Joubert’s report of Platonic physiology.

II, p. 512, entry 10, ¶1 — Affections enlarge the heart.

II, p. 570, entry 5, ¶1 — Exclusive companionship with one’s own heart is criticized.

II, p. 809, entry 5, ¶1 — Truth is tested by illumination and conduct.

In this edition. Version 6 consistently uses heart in these witnesses, preserves the illuminating and enlarging images, and keeps the deliberately uncomfortable “delicate debauch.” Cœur should not automatically become emotion, conscience or sincerity.

See also. Soul; Affection; Conscience; Solitude.

[186] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36; II, pp. 512, 570, 809. The physiological account is historical source material, not an anatomical claim endorsed by this lexicon.

Heaven and hell

ciel; enfer — heaven; hell; underworld[187]

The word. Ciel and enfer are spatial words with religious and literary uses. Their rendering depends on the setting: plural enfers need not mean Christian hell.

In Joubert. Earth made in heaven's image parallels humanity made in God's image. The epic prescription, however, asks for heaven, earth and the underworld so that a poem's world will be whole. Another compressed formulation makes hell divine anger "reduced to a place," alongside passions personified as the Devil. These transformations into image, place and person should not disappear into a generic vocabulary of reward and punishment. The definition of religion's task as loving heaven gives the spatial term an affective direction.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 172, entry 2, ¶1 — Earth/heaven repeats the relation of humanity to divine image.

I, p. 264, entry 2, ¶1 — Epic needs the whole world, including the underworld.

II, p. 628, entry 1, ¶2 — Hell is defined through an anger-to-place transformation.

II, p. 808, entry 1, ¶2 — Religion is directed toward loving heaven.

In this edition. Version 6 uses underworld for the epic plural enfers and hell for the singular religious formulation. It preserves the epic passage's printed sequence of top, bottom and middle, even though that sequence does not mechanically align with the preceding three nouns.

Related terms.

Hell. *enfer* — The singular is rendered hell where divine anger is made a place; plural enfers becomes underworld in the epic world-picture.

Places. II, p. 628, entry 1, ¶2; I, p. 264, entry 2, ¶1.

See also. God; Religion; Passion; Anger.

[187] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 172, 264; II, pp. 628, 808.

History

histoire — history[188]

The word. Histoire may be a written representation of an era or a person's own course of events from which experience is drawn.

In Joubert. The era-portrait prescription makes history larger than a single biography: a life alone produces only half history. Yet the personal history in the de Luc remark is precisely what allows a person to deduce experience from trials. The Indies fragment claims that the subject carries its own poetry and therefore needs truth, not additional fiction. Another statement allows a historical scene to be beautiful because it paints and makes human character known, although its reasoning would be inadequate in didactic politics or morals. Historical truth here includes portrayal without making every reported fact secure.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 316, entry 7, ¶1 — History's subject should exceed an individual life.

II, p. 642, entry 7, ¶1 — Personal history supplies trials from which experience is drawn.

II, p. 737, entry 6, ¶1 — A historical subject's own poetry can make fiction intrusive.

II, p. 771, entry 6, ¶1 — Historical portrayal is assessed differently from didactic reasoning.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves history across these senses and does not narrow the Indies to a modern country. [Everything] is a contextual reading of […]out. The claimed unfamiliarity of peoples remains Joubert's perspective, not an assertion by this lexicon.

See also. Truth; Painting; Opinion; Experience; Fable.

Honesty

honnête; honnêteté — honorable; decent; decency[189]

The word. Honnête often means morally honorable or socially decent here, rather than merely truthful or financially honest.

In Joubert. The dispute about useful and honorable is recast by distinguishing usefulness from profit: changing the terms is meant to expose an ethical choice that the broader wording obscures. Another note connects honorable action with the soul's pleasure in exercising its nature and with honor in showing itself. The argument

[188] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 316; II, pp. 642, 737, 771.

[189] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 135, 337; II, pp. 760.

announces two utilities but does not label their completion neatly. Finally, a criticism of reasoning without pudeur distinguishes decency of manner from truth: indecent reasoning is not thereby declared false. This semantic range explains why one English equivalent cannot safely replace every honnête.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 135, entry 8, ¶2 — Honorable is contrasted with useful, profit and lucrative.

I, p. 337, entry 2, ¶1 — Honorable action gives the soul pleasure and honor.

II, p. 760, entry 10, ¶1 — Decency in reasoning is separated from its possible truth.

In this edition. Version 6 uses honorable for the ethical end of action and decent/decency for honnête/honnêteté in the criticism of reasoning. It preserves not all in the philosophical dispute and leaves the announced two utilities in their uneven form.

See also. Utility; Honor; Probity; Modesty; Truth.

Honor

honneur — honor[190]

The word. Honneur can govern conduct through its own discipline, yet an excess of honor can be detached from morality. The term is not a reliable synonym for virtue.

In Joubert. The comparison of human and religious morality grants separate doctrines to politeness, piety and honor. This division of work recognizes rules that do not automatically coincide. The later warning that “so much honor” leaves no morals explains the danger as placing all conscience in pride. The criticism is directed at that absorption, not necessarily every use of honor in conduct.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 434, entry 6, ¶1 — Honor has a doctrine separate from piety and politeness.

II, p. 835, entry 11, ¶1 — Excessive honor can absorb conscience into pride.

In this edition. Version 6 retains honor’s separate doctrine and the forceful so-much/no-morals relation. It keeps conscience and pride as distinct nouns. Readers should follow the local degree and contrast rather than replace honor throughout with either dignity or empty reputation.

See also. Pride; Duty; Conscience; Politeness; Courage.

[190] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 434; II, pp. 835.

Hope

espérance — hope[191]

The word. Espérance is directed toward something not yet possessed. Joubert connects it with faith, with immortality and with the way providence is felt.

In Joubert. The faith/light analogy makes hope a participation in possession without actual holding. This is stronger than a mere prediction of a favorable outcome and weaker than ownership of the thing hoped for. The fragment on mortality couples fear of death and hope of immortality but does not finish its claim about animals. The later preference for hopeful people over fearful people concerns their knowledge and feeling of providence. Hope thus has inward and cognitive effects without being identified with proof.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 440, entry begun p. 437, no. 3, ¶36 — Hope is to possession as faith is to light.

II, p. 567, entry 11, ¶1 — Hope is associated with a presentiment of immortality.

II, p. 859, entry 11, ¶1 — Hope gives a steadier feeling of providence than fear.

In this edition. Version 6 renders espérance as hope and the verb espérer as “hope.” It preserves the conditional seroit in the analogy and the difference between “foresee” and “have a presentiment.” Neither English choice licenses completion of the unfinished comparison.

See also. Faith; Immortality; Providence; Fear.

Hospitality

hospitalité; hospitalier — hospitality; hospitable[192]

The word. Hospitalité becomes an image for a bond formed through reception and for mental space left open to another person.

In Joubert. The dog’s alliance of bread links hospitality to attachment and recognition of authority. Its chain is described as a felt bond, and the comparison with horse and ox assigns different recognitions to different animals. This is Joubert’s observation and image, not a certified account of animal cognition. The later prescription moves indoors to the head: friends’ opinions need a free corner in which to lodge as they pass. A

[191] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 440; II, pp. 567, 859.

[192] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 386, 387; II, pp. 740.

hospitable mind does not have to make each guest opinion its permanent belief. It must avoid filling every compartment so completely that conversation becomes unbearable.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 386–387, entry 8, ¶1 — Hospitality supplies the dog with an alliance and a felt chain.

II, p. 740, entry 7, ¶1 — A free mental corner makes conversation with friends possible.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the unfinished as-long-as clause and alliance of bread in the first witness. In the second it preserves corner, lodging and occupied compartments; the brain language is a spatial image rather than a new anatomical explanation.

See also. Conversation; Friendship; Opinion; Animal.

Human nature

homme; nature humaine — man; human nature[193]

The word. Homme often names humanity collectively, while nature humaine may name the tendencies an argument seeks to defend or discipline. The notebook's use should not be mistaken for a single settled anthropology.

In Joubert. Life is described as made to be practiced and the world inhabited, emphasizing activity over complete knowledge. In the anger discussion, Father André's reported "cause of human nature" identifies a charitable accommodation of passion. The why-of-qualities formula combines goodness, being human and being God's work. The limitation on inner sense then denies that any person is destined to know everything or never err. These different accents make finite knowledge compatible with dignity and accountable conduct.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 143, entry 1, ¶1 — Life and world are assigned practical purposes.

I, p. 422, entry 2, ¶1 — An attributed defense of anger is called pleading for human nature.

II, p. 745, entry 1, ¶1 — Human qualities are related to goodness and divine making.

II, p. 854, entry 13, ¶1 — Human knowledge is expressly finite and fallible.

[193] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 143, 422; II, pp. 745, 854.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the historical collective “man” and the reported attribution. “Most” limits the claim about qualities, while the no-one/everything/never sequence limits knowledge. This entry does not silently make homme gender-exclusive in contexts where humanity is the subject.

See also. Soul; God; Virtue; Anger; Self.

Humanity

humanité — humanity[194]

The word. Humanité in these passages means humane feeling or conduct, rather than simply the human species.

In Joubert. The praise of an unnamed man makes his humanity the best thing that can be said of him. The next paragraph describes politeness as its flower, connecting outward manner to a compassionate disposition rather than treating courtesy as empty decoration. The earlier warning asserts a difficult limit: exaggerated ideas of humanity and compassion lead to cruelty. Its closing instruction to find out how leaves the mechanism unworked. The lexicon therefore keeps that paradox as a question for inquiry, not a completed psychological law or a reason to discount compassion.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 132, entry 2, ¶1 — The link between exaggerated humanity and cruelty is left for investigation.

II, p. 611, entry 6, ¶1 — Humanity is praised in an unnamed person.

II, p. 611, entry 6, ¶2 — Politeness is figured as humanity’s flower.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes humanity from humane while preserving their verbal relation. It does not identify the praised man. The two praise paragraphs remain paired within their source unit; the chronological irregularity in the printed date sequence is not silently corrected.

See also. Pity and compassion; Politeness; Human nature; Benevolence.

[194] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 132; II, pp. 611.

Humility

humilité — humility[195]

The word. Humilité names a fitting relation of the person to God, and can be reflected imperfectly in a desire to please other people.

In Joubert. The prayer for forgiveness of everything God knows about the speaker is praised as full of humility: it does not offer a self-curated list of faults. The following analogy places humanity before God as a child before people, pairing humility with modesty without identifying them. Vanity becomes a “half-humility” when considered as the desire to make oneself agreeable. The fractional term keeps both recognition and reservation in the judgment.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 763, entry 1, ¶2 — Forgiveness is requested beyond the speaker’s own self-description.

II, p. 763, entry 1, ¶3 — Humility before God is compared with childhood modesty.

II, p. 868, entry 5, ¶1 — Vanity has a partial other-directed humility.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the extent of “all that you know of me,” the child/adult analogy and all three half-compounds in the vanity passage. The damaged beginning of modestie receives a bracketed contextual English rendering, not a claim that the French letters have been recovered.

See also. Prayer; Vanity; Pride; Devotion; Education.

Humors

humeur; bile; phlegme — humor; humors; bile; phlegm; mood[196]

The word. Humeur can name a bodily fluid or a disposition of mood. Bile and phlegme keep the bodily vocabulary visible; the English reader must not reduce every humeur to either physiology or temperament.

In Joubert. A compact numbered fragment sets phlegm, bile, and blood beside water, fire, and air. Another distinguishes coarse from subtle humor and relates expenditure to the food needed for restoration. The long account of moral faults then assigns them physical conditions, while also claiming that restraining their effects can alter those

[195] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 763, 868.

[196] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 110, 191, 194; II, pp. 549.

conditions. Its agency runs in both directions: the source does not merely excuse conduct by naming a bodily cause.

A different warning against unfair judgment distinguishes a fault of mood from a fault of character. Here “mood” is the useful English choice, and the point concerns the irregularity of the evidence from which a general judgment is made. The change of rendering records a change of context rather than an inconsistency to be eliminated.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 110, entry 9, ¶3 — Three bodily fluids are aligned with three elements.

I, p. 191, entry 1, ¶1 — Coarse and subtle humors require different restoration.

I, p. 194, entry 3, ¶1 — A humoral explanation of faults also allows restraint to redirect their bodily causes.

II, p. 549, entry 1, ¶1 — Mood must not be mistaken for enduring character.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the historical physiology, its broken cause of envy, and the unexpanded initials D. G. at I.194. It uses humor for bodily fluid and mood in the judgment passage. Those distinctions do not authenticate the physiological claims.

Related terms.

Adustion, atony, and frothiness. *adustion; atonie; spumosité* — These terms appear in the humoral account of faults: atony describes deficient tone or firmness in nerves; adustion a scorching or burning condition of bile; spumosité becomes frothiness in the swelling image of pride. Version 6’s existing note supplies those historical senses. The passage also says restraint can redirect bodily causes. The gloss does not turn that speculation into medicine, fill its broken clause about envy, or expand its closing D. G.

Places. I, p. 194, entry 3, ¶1.

See also. Blood; Vital and animal spirits; Nourishment and digestion; Character; Judgment.

Hypothesis

hypothèse — hypothesis; hypotheses[197]

The word. A hypothesis is a supposition used to explain, imagine or act. Its utility does not by itself establish its reality, and Joubert repeatedly asks what a mind does with the supposition.

[197] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 240, 284, 447; II, pp. 627, 803.

In Joubert. The Descartes comparison presents a hypothesis useful for producing arts as apparently equal to truth in usefulness, beauty and value. In the Condillac discussion, convenience for making thought understood opens into a criticism of forbidden metaphors that return as arrangement, seal and imprint. The intentional-species passage grants explanatory hypotheses a conditional legitimacy: the mind must not become their dupe or treat mere suppositions as realities. Attraction is useful yet can attract excessive belief. The narrative note then shifts toward effects on the mature mind and bad consequences as a ground for disputing hypotheses. Applied to religion, entering a role allows emotion from merely supposing the true. That possibility is not a claim that a supposition has thereby been proved.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 240, entry 11, ¶1 — A useful Cartesian hypothesis is compared with truth itself.

I, p. 284, entry 7, ¶1 — A convenient hypothesis reintroduces prohibited metaphors.

I, p. 447, entry 1, ¶2 — Useful suppositions are permitted if not mistaken for realities.

II, p. 627, entry 3, ¶2 — The effect and consequence of a supposition become tests.

II, p. 803, entry 5, ¶1 — Supposing the true can elicit emotion within a religious role.

In this edition. Version 6 retains hypothesis and hypotheses. The Descartes and Condillac quotations or assessments are given through Joubert's report. Intentional species remains a scholastic term, not a claim of deliberate choice. The limits "provided," "perhaps" and "can" prevent the contextual permissions from becoming blanket approval.

Related terms.

Intentional species. *espèce intentionnelle* — Espèces intentionnelles is retained as intentional species, a historical term involving forms or representations in cognition. Intentional does not mean simply deliberately selected. Joubert conditionally entertains these as images sustaining attention without being seen and judges their name obscure and repellent. The repeated perhaps and if matter: explanatory convenience might justify their invention, provided a mind does not mistake its suppositions for realities. The text offers a bounded hypothetical defense, not an unconditional endorsement of a scholastic doctrine.

Places. I, p. 447, entry 1, ¶2.

See also. Conjecture; Assertion; Fiction; Reality; Metaphysics.

Idea

idée — idea; ideas[198]

The word. Idée names an intellectual content or apprehension. Some passages reserve it for an opening onto causes or relations rather than a bare assertion.

In Joubert. The thought/idea comparison on II.605 makes the difference active: thought asserts, while idea opens a perspective. In the sharper complaint on II.483, approvals and disapprovals replace ideas; a mind may judge without seeing. Neither passage licenses the assumption that every casual use of idée carries this stronger sense.

The hatching passage refuses a simple priority between ideas and words. First a completed idea lets the word hatch; then Joubert reverses the relation and lets the idea hatch from the word that clothes it. A later note pairs waiting for happy ideas with being fit to receive them. Reception requires a disposition as well as time; it is not a promise that inactivity alone produces good thinking.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 605, entry 10, ¶1 — Idea opens a perspective in contrast with thought's assertion.

II, p. 483, entry 6, ¶1 — Assent and refusal are contrasted with having ideas.

I, p. 274, entry 6, ¶1 — The word and idea alternately hatch from one another.

II, p. 815, entry 10, ¶1 — Happy ideas require waiting and receptivity.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves idea alongside thought, and makes the feminine referent explicit when the idea hatches from the word. "Happy ideas" retains heureuses rather than converting it into an unequivocal claim about originality. The source editor's supplied [des] on II.815 has no separate English article counterpart.

See also. Thought; Word; Notion; Imagination.

Ignorance

ignorance — ignorance[199]

The word. Ignorance is lack of knowledge, but its moral and literary valuation changes with the field and the kind of thing unknown.

In Joubert. Perfect innocence is called perfect ignorance in a formulation that admires its lovableness while denying its prudence and reliability. The later literary remark

[198] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 274; II, pp. 483, 605, 815.

[199] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 32; II, pp. 652, 832.

explicitly distinguishes fields: ignorance can mitigate a moral fault yet itself constitute a first and capital fault in literature. The final contrast between knowing evil and ignoring good questions an age's distribution of knowledge rather than its sheer quantity. One can therefore be learned in one respect while ignorant in the respect Joubert values most.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 32, entry 3, ¶1 — Innocent ignorance is lovable but not prudent or reliable.

II, p. 652, entry 5, ¶1 — Ignorance has different consequences in morals and literature.

II, p. 832, entry 5, ¶1 — An age knows evil and foolish doctrines while lacking knowledge of good and wise opinions.

In this edition. Version 6 leaves A. C. unexpanded in the literary quotation and preserves the unfinished addition "and on the contrary." Both science and scavoir become knowledge in the last witness, so their French difference cannot be recovered from English alone.

See also. Knowledge; Science; Literature; Opinion.

Illusion

illusion — illusion[200]

The word. Illusion can be an art's pleasurable appearance, a relation through which sense apprehends an object, or a misleading claim to truth. Its valuation changes accordingly.

In Joubert. The painting/building comparison makes optical illusion necessary to artistic pleasure: apparent relief or flatness has a merit absent from the corresponding literal condition. The sensory account on I.167 even distinguishes illusion compatible with truth from error. Yet II.724 calls the illusion that produces a claim of beauty good and the illusion that produces a claim of truth pernicious. The accounts are not identical; the lexicon preserves their different uses rather than removing the tension. A further warning reverses the usual story of intellectual progress: losing a glimpse need not mean escaping an illusion, since one can move from truth to error.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 59, entry 3, ¶2 — Optical appearance gives pleasure unavailable from literal flatness.

I, p. 167, entry 4, ¶3 — Illusion and truth can coexist in a sensory account.

II, p. 724, entry 7, ¶1 — Illusions producing beauty and truth claims receive opposed valuations.

[200] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 59, 167, 385; II, pp. 527, 724, 782.

II, p. 527, entry 9, ¶1 — Loss of insight can be mistaken for release from illusion.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves deceive, lie and the unsoftened harmful effects. It does not convert illusion to mere metaphor wherever the term is favorable, or silently rewrite the earlier truth/illusion conjunction to match the later contrast.

Related terms.

Prestige. *prestige* — Prestige and prestiges denote illusion, enchantment or bewitchment in these passages, not modern social prestige. Version 6 distinguishes illusions of imagination and feeling in the unnamed comparison, then uses bewitchments for Montesquieu's dazzling but scarcely illuminating sparks. The unnamed retiarius image in the first witness remains unexplained beyond its net-fighter sense.

Places. I, p. 385, entry 8, ¶1; II, p. 782, entry 7, ¶1.

See also. Truth; Error; Art; Imitation; Perspective.

Image

image — image; images[201]

The word. Image extends beyond visible pictures. It can name what presents something to a sense or mind, as well as a likeness through which something else is apprehended.

In Joubert. In the whole-body mirror passage, images enter through all the senses: an echo can be an image of a voice, and touch has images of its own. The vocabulary belongs to Joubert's speculative account rather than to a modern theory of sensory transmission. In the Fontanes note, images support conception and explanation but cannot legitimately perform every work of judgment and conclusion. The contrast prevents a blanket equation of image with either knowledge or illusion. It also matters for reading the painter account of imagination: clothing in images gives something a perceptible figure without, by itself, demonstrating it.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 367, entry 8, ¶2 — Images include the auditory and tactile, and the entire body becomes a mirror.

II, p. 732, entry 6, ¶1 — Conceiving by images is separated from judging by them.

I, p. 282, entry 3, ¶1 — Imagination clothes the bodiless in figures and images.

[201] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 282, 367; II, pp. 732.

In this edition. Version 6 retains image rather than narrowing the term to mental picture. Affections in the bodily account includes states and effects upon a person, not just fondness; “they say” qualifies the echo comparison.

See also. Imagination; Conception and understanding; Sign; Illusion.

Imagination

imagination — imagination[202]

The word. Imagination gives body, figure or inward visibility to what otherwise lacks them. Joubert does not treat every operation of this faculty as either pure invention or deception.

In Joubert. The painter passage describes imagination clothing things in images, both within one’s own soul and outwardly for others. Calling it the “eye” of intelligence makes a related claim about apprehension rather than decorative addition. In the taste/memory analogy, imagination is necessary to taste as simple memory is to cold judgment; the four terms remain distinct.

This power requires evaluation and direction. Joubert’s Rousseau remark traces a chain from senses to imagination to the person, parallel to appetites directing the heart. The Fontanes passage permits conceiving and explaining through images while refusing the same permission for judging and concluding. Consequently the lexicon cannot turn imagination’s vision into an unconditional warrant of truth. Its artistic and cognitive importance coexists with warnings about the work it is asked to do.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 282, entry 3, ¶1 — Imagination clothes the bodiless in body, figure and images.

II, p. 830, entry 7, ¶1 — Imagination is the singular eye of intelligence.

II, p. 804, entry 7, ¶1 — Imagination supports taste in a four-term analogy with memory and judgment.

II, p. 623, entry 1, ¶1 — In Joubert’s judgment of Rousseau, senses direct imagination.

II, p. 732, entry 6, ¶1 — Images can explain without being sufficient to judge or conclude.

In this edition. Version 6 retains painter, clothing, eye and the complete analogy instead of reducing them to abstract faculty labels. The incomplete final “clothes in images” is not given an invented object. [Simple] on II.804 remains a contextual rendering of damaged si[…]ple.

[202] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 282; II, pp. 623, 732, 804, 830, 872.

Related terms.

Imaging and imagining. *imager; imaginer; imaginative* — Joubert proposes separating imager, to image or form a picture, from imaginer, to imagine or form a mere idea, the latter conceived as a weakened form of the former. The conditional would reserves imagining for spiritual or intelligible things and imaging for bodily or perceptible ones. The next distinction gives imagination the power to spiritualize material things and the imaginative, translated imaging faculty, the habit of materializing spiritual things. Both processes are approved only when done well and aptly. These are proposed distinctions in one paragraph; they do not establish a universal translation rule for all earlier uses of imagination.

Places. II, p. 872, entry 4, ¶1.

See also. Image; Intelligence; Taste; Judgment; Memory.

Imitation

imitation; imiter — imitation; imitate[203]

The word. Imitation can mean reproducing an appearance or following a creative manner or operation. It is not confined to copying a finished model.

In Joubert. The poetic imitation of the divine makes much with little, even seemingly nothing; its thinness concerns material body rather than poverty of meaning. In a philosophical report, imitating heaven concerns both works and actions, while its unnamed subjects should not be assigned to an invented school. The later fine-arts fragment connects imitation with illusion and with representing to oneself and tracing anew. Art's injunction to resemble art without resembling any work supplies a useful limit: fidelity to an artistic principle may differ from resemblance to a prior object.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 319, entry 8, ¶1 — Poetry imitates the divine economy of making with little.

II, p. 588, entry 6, ¶1 — The unnamed philosophy links imitation to works and actions.

II, p. 843, entry 4, ¶1 — Imitation is related to illusion and renewed representation.

II, p. 898, entry 3, ¶1 — Resembling art is distinguished from resembling any work.

[203] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 319; II, pp. 588, 843, 898.

In this edition. Version 6 uses little substance for peu de pâte, preserving material thinness. In II.843 en may refer to the fine arts or to imitation; the English their selects the arts contextually without excluding the other reading.

See also. Art; Illusion; Poetry; Invention.

Immortality

immortalité — immortality[204]

The word. Immortalité concerns continued existence beyond death, particularly the soul's. The chosen witnesses argue through moral and aesthetic consequences rather than constructing a proof.

In Joubert. The soul's immortality is called a necessary opinion both for consolation and for teaching justice. A second note pairs foreknowledge of death with a presentiment of immortality, then leaves its comparison with animals unfinished. Finally Joubert declares that removing immortality removes the beauty of life, and adds "That is enough." The brevity is itself an argumentative choice: the claim of sufficiency should not be expanded into a demonstration he did not write.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 309, entry 6, ¶1 — The opinion matters for consolation and for teaching justice.

II, p. 567, entry 11, ¶1 — Death is foreseen; immortality is felt in advance.

II, p. 835, entry 8, ¶1 — Immortality is treated as necessary to life's beauty.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes foreseeing death from having a presentiment of immortality. It keeps "opinion," the incomplete conditional and the final two-sentence assertion. A lexicon should not raise these terms to the stronger status of established knowledge.

See also. Soul; Hope; Justice; Consolation.

Impenetrability

impénétrabilité — impenetrability; impenetrabilities[205]

The word. Impenetrability is a property associated here with material bodies. It is distinct from intellectual obscurity or an inability to understand.

[204] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 309; II, pp. 567, 835.

[205] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 183, 362, 446; II, pp. 906.

In Joubert. The mathematical body lacks weight and impenetrability, setting it apart from earthly bodies. The isolated suggestion that impenetrability can condense as color deepens compares degree in one property with degree in another without supplying a mechanism. The late plural “impenetrabilities” enters the imposing scientific vocabulary that the hollow-grain image seeks to diminish. These are different argumentative uses rather than an established physical law.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 446, entry 1, ¶2 — The property is excluded from a mathematical body.

I, p. 362, entry begun p. 361, no. 9, ¶3 — Condensation is compared with deepening color.

II, p. 906, entry 4, ¶1 — The unusual plural appears in an interrogation of matter’s apparent power.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the technical noun and its plural. In the late passage the qualification “[to] itself” is bracketed in English; the lexicon does not erase that source-related caution.

Related terms.

Penetrability. *pénétrabilité* — The short fragment assigns perfect penetrability to what is incorporeal, explicitly not to bodies. Version 6 retains both the parenthetic perfect and the contrast. This is not a claim that ordinary porous bodies are incorporeal: the perfect degree is part of the statement, and the fragment supplies no completed theory of how incorporeal things interpenetrate.

Places. I, p. 183, entry 6, ¶1.

See also. Body; Matter; Density and solidity; Weight and gravity.

Indeterminate and indefinite

indéterminé; indétermination; indéfini — indeterminate; indeterminacy; indefinite[206]

The word. The indeterminate is not securely fixed in form or meaning; the indefinite is not assigned a fixed limit. Joubert can value such openness or report a tradition in which it signifies imperfection.

In Joubert. The aphorism that everything beautiful is indeterminate gives the quality a positive role. The defense of verbal indeterminacy likewise makes flexible words necessary for exact expression of mobile affections. Yet the account of an unnamed older philosophy lists the indeterminate and formless among unfavorable senses of the

[206] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 301, 305, 412; II, pp. 539, 788.

infinite. The reported terminology cannot be made into Joubert's unqualified definition of beauty.

The unfinished question about an indefinite number of excellent books asks whether language has a fixed productive limit; it does not answer itself by asserting infinity. The conditional argument about indefinite perfectibility considers what endless approach would mean for ever reaching perfection. Keeping these modalities visible matters as much as choosing the English adjective.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 301, entry 8, ¶1 — Beauty receives an unrestricted but undeveloped association with indeterminacy.

I, p. 305, entry 7, ¶1 — Verbal flexibility enables exact expression.

I, p. 412, entry 2, ¶1 — An unnamed philosophy gives indeterminacy an unfavorable sense.

II, p. 539, entry 1, ¶1 — An unfinished question considers the limits of language's productivity.

II, p. 788, entry 6, ¶1 — Indefinite perfectibility is considered under an explicit condition.

In this edition. Version 6 separates indeterminate/indeterminacy from indefinite. The school at I.412 is not named; the journal and Y. at II.788 remain unexpanded. That entry's uncertain hyphen-like mark is retained without making it meaningful punctuation.

See also. Finite; Infinite; Perfection; Beauty; Language.

Indifference

indifférence — indifference[207]

The word. Indifférence can register a waning attachment, a pose of superiority or an inclination toward aversion; it is not identical with generous restraint.

In Joubert. The sequence pairing patience with affliction and resignation with necessity ends by bringing indifference to life alongside inability to preserve it. The account links an attitude with its occasion without commanding it. Another sentence warns that indifference can merely look superior. The explicit distinction from indulgence then removes an easy alibi: lack of concern does not become love simply because it refrains from censure. The preference rather toward aversion describes a tendency, while indulgence inclines toward love. These differences keep emotional distance from being automatically classified as either wisdom or cruelty.

[207] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 482, 724, 886.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 482, entry 2, ¶1 — Indifference to life is linked to inability to preserve it.

II, p. 724, entry 1, ¶1 — Apparent superiority may be false.

II, p. 886, entry 6, ¶1 — Indulgence and indifference are assigned different affective directions.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the qualification false in the air of superiority and rather in the comparison with aversion. It leaves the objects of the opening To love them all unnamed. Mal in the first witness is affliction rather than moral evil.

See also. Resignation; Indulgence; Love; Death; Pride.

Indulgence

indulgence — indulgence[208]

The word. Indulgence is active leniency or sympathetic allowance, capable of helping a person but also of failing justice.

In Joubert. The image of severity freezing faults contrasts with indulgence making them die. A good approver is declared as necessary as a good corrector. That claim has limits: some indulgences are denials of justice. A later distinction places indulgence near love and indifference nearer aversion, refusing to treat failure to condemn as one uniform attitude. The important question is what allowance does and from what relation it proceeds. These passages neither identify kindness with moral indifference nor make every indulgence beneficial.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 466, entry 6, ¶1 — Indulgence can undo faults that severity fixes.

II, p. 842, entry 7, ¶1 — Some leniency denies justice.

II, p. 886, entry 6, ¶1 — Indulgence is distinguished from indifference by its inclination toward love.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the physical verbs freezes, fixes and makes die rather than converting the metaphor into a psychological theory. The plural indulgences in the justice sentence denotes acts of leniency; no ecclesiastical remission is identified. The objects of the final opening To love them all remain unnamed.

See also. Severity; Forgiveness; Justice; Indifference.

[208] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 466; II, pp. 842, 886.

Infinite

infini; infinité — infinite; infinity[209]

The word. Infini can express unboundedness or something exceeding appraisal. The related noun infinité can also mark a great multiplicity; the surrounding argument or image determines how literally the family is used.

In Joubert. Joubert says that time cannot be conceived without eternity, nor place without space or infinite extension. Elsewhere he questions successive senses of infinitely dividing matter: visible, imaginable, and mathematical division are separated rather than silently equated. Saying that qualities of the heart have something infinite about them marks their resistance to appraisal, in contrast with the countable qualities of mind. The family thus carries metaphysical, argumentative, and evaluative uses that demand different degrees of literalness. In the visionary narrative of the ascending shades, an infinity of others arrive like rain falling upward. Here the phrase intensifies the multitude within an image rather than presenting a demonstration about number.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 276, entry 9, ¶1 — Infinite extension is paired with eternity as a condition of conception.

I, p. 229, entry 5, ¶1 — Different meanings of infinite division are interrogated.

I, p. 465, entry 4, ¶1 — The heart's qualities escape complete appraisal.

I, p. 103, entry begun p. 102, no. 10, ¶4 — An infinity of arriving shades gives a narrative use of multitude, within the image of upward-falling rain.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the distinctions among visible, imaginable, and mathematical parts in the divisibility argument. It does not certify the argument as a result of modern mathematics or physics.

See also. Division and indivisibility; Extension; Eternity; Measure.

Ingenuity

ingénieux — ingenious[210]

The word. Ingénieux describes inventive or illuminating intelligence. It is distinct from ingenuous artlessness and does not by itself guarantee sound judgment or exact truth.

[209] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 103, 229, 276, 465.

[210] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 231; II, pp. 540, 591, 660, 745.

In Joubert. The maxim placing the ingenious very near truth is qualified by another exclamation on the difficulty of being both ingenious and sensible. Ingenious thoughts attach themselves readily to mind or memory, but the isolated therefore leaves their further consequence unwritten. The luminous-body image explains a positive power: ingenious minds cast rays that help them see the objects they examine. The correction of Father Daniel then distinguishes an ingenious explanation of our attachment to apparent truth from a more exact one based on desire for mental repose. Finally ingenuity is favored in metaphysics while established certainty is demanded in physics. That domain-specific contrast does not license invention in place of material evidence.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 231, entry 3, ¶1 — The ingenious is said to stand near truth.

II, p. 540, entry 3, ¶1 — Ingenuity makes a thought memorable.

II, p. 540, entry 8, ¶1 — Ingenuity and good sense are difficult to combine.

II, p. 591, entry 3, ¶1 — An ingenious mind both illuminates and sees.

II, p. 660, entry 10, ¶1 — An ingenious saying can admit a more exact correction.

II, p. 745, entry 10, ¶1 — Metaphysics and physics receive different preferred criteria.

In this edition. Version 6 consistently uses ingenious in these witnesses. Sensible translates sensé in the difficult-combination exclamation, unlike perceptible for sensible in other French contexts. The Daniel passage preserves two gaps and both conditional proposals. Spirit/spiritual in the metaphysical contrast retains a range involving mind or wit without assigning a named doctrine.

See also. Wit; Intelligence; Invention; Memory; Precision; Metaphysics.

Innateness

inné; infus — innate; infused[211]

The word. Innateness concerns what is already present in a mind or soul before particular experience or explicit formulation. Joubert repeatedly distinguishes ideas, germs, feelings, judgments and propositions instead of assigning one status to them all.

In Joubert. The early reported speakers approve Locke’s denial of innate ideas but reject his denial of innate perceptions. Joubert’s own later formulations take different positions: a denial of innate judgments does not establish a denial of innate ideas. He also proposes calling some confused notions infused rather than innate, then distributes moral and aesthetic notions beside ideas of God, matter and spirit under the two

[211] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 64, 256, 257, 266, 267, 288, 305, 319.

headings. These are local formulations, not a stable glossary imposed throughout the book.

The germ image supplies a way to describe an idea elicited by hearing a proposition without having previously met its object through the senses. Such germs can nonetheless be altered or driven out: the parenthetic eternity does not make them indestructible in us. The Leibnitz mirror argument likewise speaks of ideas, or rather their germs. Yet Joubert resists extending innateness to formulated propositions or actions, and elsewhere asks how much the dispute matters if the relevant ideas arise inevitably and almost immediately.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 64, entry begun p. 63, no. 4, ¶6 — Reported speakers distinguish innate ideas from innate perceptions.

I, p. 256, entry 5, ¶1 — Some notions are proposed as infused rather than innate.

I, p. 257, entry 7, ¶1 — Two lists distinguish innate notions and infused ideas.

I, p. 266, entry 4, ¶1 — The denial of innate judgments does not settle the case of ideas.

I, p. 266–267, entry 7, ¶2 — An idea may hatch from a germ when a proposition is heard.

I, p. 267, entry begun p. 266, no. 7, ¶3 — Innate germs remain vulnerable to displacement.

I, p. 288, entry 3, ¶1 — An innate understanding is compared with a receiving mirror.

I, p. 305, entry 2, ¶1 — Inevitable early acquisition challenges the practical weight of the dispute.

I, p. 319, entry 3, ¶1 — Innate ideas and feelings are distinguished from actions and propositions.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves innate and infused rather than conflating them. It keeps “one may” beside “one must,” “or rather,” and the conditional arguments. The reported Leibnitz wording and early unnamed speakers remain distinct from Joubert’s objections; no developmental sequence or modern psychological conclusion is inferred.

See also. Idea; Notion; Perception; Judgment; Proposition; Faculty.

Innocence

innocence — innocence[212]

The word. Innocence can be ignorance of evil, an affectionate quality or a receptivity to truths inaccessible to pride. Joubert’s uses do not make it equivalent to mature virtue.

In Joubert. The first comparison calls perfect innocence perfect ignorance, lovable but unreliable. In the paraphrase attributed to Pope, innocence receives secret truths denied

[212] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 32; II, pp. 693, 876.

proud philosophers; Joubert praises the saying while acknowledging its laughter. The Bible/Gospel contrast then calls the Gospel a book of innocence and relates different reading habits to different religious dispositions. These are distinct valuations, not evidence for a single ascent from ignorant innocence to knowledge.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 32, entry 3, ¶1 — Innocence is loved but cannot substitute for prudent virtue.

II, p. 693, entry 6, ¶1 — An attributed saying gives innocence privileged receptivity.

II, p. 876, entry 5, ¶1 — The Gospel is characterized as a book of innocence.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the greater-love/equal-reverence comparison with virtue. It newly translates Joubert's French report of Pope and does not substitute an English quotation from Pope. The Bible/Gospel distinction remains his wording, without imposing a modern definition of Bible.

See also. Virtue; Education; Faith; Religious belief.

Insect and animalcule

insecte; animalcule — insect; animalcule[213]

The word. Insecte and animalcule both concern small living forms, but animalcule is a historical term for a tiny creature, especially in microscopic accounts. Smallness alone does not make a moving object alive.

In Joubert. The damselfly is seen as a living straw, its narrow body becoming a precise visual image. The spermatic animalcule is discussed very differently: penetrating layers does not mean one has reached life's essence. The passage stops amid worms, needles, and envelopes. A later analogy cautions against taking boiling drops for tailed animalcules, explicitly distinguishing movement from life. The comparison exposes an explanatory confusion without establishing a modern theory of generation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 172, entry 3, ¶1 — The insect's appearance is compared to a living straw.

I, p. 253–254, entry 8, ¶1 — The spermatic animalcule does not resolve the question of essence.

II, p. 767, entry 3, ¶1 — Moving drops should not be taken for living animalcules.

[213] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 172, 253, 254; II, pp. 767.

In this edition. Version 6 retains “spermatic animalcule” rather than substituting a modern cell name. Its incomplete phrases remain incomplete, so the lexicon does not invent the missing explanation.

See also. Animal; Life; Seed and germ; Fermentation; Essence.

Inspiration

inspiration; inspiré — inspiration; inspired[214]

The word. Inspiration names an arrival or prompting not fully commanded by deliberate will. Its felt presence, artistic necessity and possible misidentification remain distinct questions.

In Joubert. The language note offers alternative formulations: everyone is inspired, or languages contain something prophetic and inspired. The evening observation at Ussel distinguishes inspiration necessary to a poet from illumination that may name what a philosopher needs. Believing oneself inspired, however, is not the same as a verified external origin: the great-men note insists on their belief that they felt it. “Laziness awaiting inspiration” gives only a pointed fragment, not a theory of work. The delirium note warns equally against both confusions, inspiration mistaken for delirium and delirium mistaken for inspiration. Finally witticisms surprise their makers as well as listeners and arise despite us, or at least without voluntary participation. The qualification makes absence of willing more secure than resistance to the will.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 176, entry 4, ¶1 — Language receives two alternative accounts of inspired origin.

I, p. 270, entry 4, ¶1 — Poetic inspiration is paired with philosophical illumination.

I, p. 410, entry 3, ¶1 — Great men are said to believe they felt inspiration.

II, p. 658, entry 10, ¶1 — Laziness waits in an unresolved nominal fragment.

II, p. 839, entry 1, ¶1 — Either direction of confusing inspiration and delirium is harmful.

II, p. 866, entry 3, ¶1 — The unbidden witticism surprises its maker.

In this edition. Version 6 retains inspiration and inspired. The Bossuet context is source-supplied and bracketed. [Confused] is a contextual completion of con[…]ond; neither the damage nor the term delirium licenses a medical diagnosis. The opaque M-zv-ll-n reference remains unexpanded and no author is invented for its observation.

See also. Enthusiasm; Reverie; Poetry; Wit; Light.

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[214] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 176, 270, 410; II, pp. 658, 839, 866.

Instinct

instinct — instinct[215]

The word. Instinct is a direct or unreflective disposition, but it belongs to both animals and humans in these notebooks. It is not simply the opposite of every intelligent act.

In Joubert. The “inner sense” is explicitly glossed as moral and intellectual instinct, capable of becoming keen or remaining dormant. The comparison of animal instinct, human reason, and angelic penetration then locates the human difference in knowing its own limits. Some honorable feelings contain instinct and necessity stronger or better than calculation and reason. The variation makes it unsafe to convert instinct into a fixed lower rung in every context.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 187, entry 11, ¶1 — Moral and intellectual instinct glosses inner sense.

II, p. 570, entry 10, ¶1 — Reason, unlike instinct, is said to know its boundaries.

II, p. 744, entry 12, ¶1 — Honorable feelings can derive strength from instinct and necessity.

In this edition. Version 6 retains both “moral” and “intellectual” in the first gloss. The last witness has a provisionally read final comma; its note also allows a damaged period, so no lost continuation is asserted. “Better or more powerful” is not reduced to a single idea of greater force.

See also. Animal; Nature; Organization; Limit and boundary; Necessity.

Intelligence

intelligence — intelligence; understanding[216]

The word. Intelligence names understanding or the power of intelligent apprehension; it need not name a particular acquired skill.

In Joubert. Joubert says that all art comes from intelligence while allowing intelligence to exist without a fixed art or talent. The distinction is between a source or capacity and a specific determination of it. His fragment “Intelligence (principle)” also warns that the words offered to clarify a notion may obscure it instead; the parenthesis does not itself establish a developed theory of first principles.

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[215] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 187; II, pp. 570, 744.

[216] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 390; II, pp. 483, 541, 738, 830.

Calling imagination the singular “eye” of intelligence gives this power a means of vision. Elsewhere books exhibit will and judgments while lacking intelligence: assent and refusal do not amount to seeing. These comparisons place pressure on any rendering that treats intelligence as accumulated information or merely the ability to conclude.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 390, entry 1, ¶2 — Explanatory words may obscure the easily understood notion.

II, p. 541, entry 13, ¶1 — Intelligence is distinguished from fixed art or talent.

II, p. 830, entry 7, ¶1 — Imagination is the singular eye of intelligence.

II, p. 483, entry 6, ¶1 — Judgment and will can operate without intellectual seeing.

II, p. 738, entry 3, ¶1 — Understanding sufficient to know and savor exquisite things is preferred to limitless ambition.

In this edition. Version 6 retains intelligence in the conceptual contrasts but uses understanding for the amount needed to know and savor divine and human things. The singular eye on II.830 is a deliberate correction of plural eyes, not an accidental grammatical variation.

See also. Mind; Imagination; Talent; Idea.

Intelligible and sensible

intelligible; sensible — intelligible; perceptible; perceptible to the senses[217]

The word. Intelligible and sensible distinguish what understanding can apprehend from what can be presented to the senses. Neither term is interchangeable with clear, and sensible does not mean reasonable.

In Joubert. Writing in metaphysics should make the abstract perceptible and palpable, not obscure the palpable by abstraction. Yet mere intelligibility is explicitly distinguished from clarity. Imagination can bridge the domains by embodying the intellectual without altering its nature. The intelligible world itself is also distinguished from the ideal world: minds and, “so to speak,” God see the first; poets compose the second from terrestrial knowledge and conjectures about the intellectual world.

The later account of metaphysics extends the task through several stages: perceptible, apparent, imaginable if possible, and finally intelligible to attention. A proposed distinction between imager and imaginer again separates bodily or perceptible things

[217] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 135, 264; II, pp. 493, 566, 860, 872.

from spiritual or intelligible ones. It is a proposal with conditions, not an established terminology that the translator may apply retroactively throughout the notebooks.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 135, entry 7, ¶1 — Metaphysical writing should make abstraction perceptible.

I, p. 264, entry 1, ¶1 — Intelligibility need not be clarity.

II, p. 493, entry 1, ¶1 — Imagination embodies the intellectual without distortion.

II, p. 566, entry 1, ¶1 — The intelligible world differs from the poet's ideal world.

II, p. 860, entry 6, ¶1 — Metaphysics proceeds through several modes of accessibility.

II, p. 872, entry 4, ¶1 — A proposed verbal distinction separates perceptible and intelligible domains.

In this edition. Version 6 uses perceptible or perceptible to the senses for sensible in these contexts, and intelligible for intelligible. It preserves "so to speak," "if possible," "merely" and the conditional "would." Intellectual or intelligible is not silently replaced by ideal, nor is conjecture converted into knowledge.

See also. Abstraction; Clarity and obscurity; Imagination; Metaphysics; Perception.

Intolerance

intolérance — intolerance[218]

The word. Intolérance is a danger arising within religious feeling or contempt for other religions, requiring reflection rather than simple intensity of conviction.

In Joubert. The reading note connects contempt with intolerance and eventual persecution, then asks whether religions might instead be seen as unequal but concentric circles. The question offers an image of relation without declaring their doctrines identical. The extended account assigns a checking power to experience and reflection, then specifies experience accumulated over centuries rather than a single life. Children's questions and the unfinished One tolerates interrupt its reasoning. The closing To reconsider is therefore indispensable: the passage is an inquiry marked for return, not a final comprehensive theory of religious toleration.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 330, entry begun p. 329, no. 1, ¶31 — Contempt leads toward persecution; concentric religions are proposed as a question.

[218] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 330; II, pp. 588, 589.

II, p. 588–589, entry 12, ¶1 — Historical experience and reflection are proposed as checks, in a note marked for reconsideration.

In this edition. Version 6 retains active intolerance, the unfinished clause and Joubert's own review reminder in the main paragraph. Beaunier's separately dated Chênedollé excerpt remains apparatus and does not supply the main passage's date or voice.

See also. Religion; Contempt; Experience; History; Faith.

Intoxication

ivresse; ivre — intoxication; drunk[219]

The word. Ivresse extends from wine to nerves, mind and collective religious or political feeling, but these comparisons do not erase their differences.

In Joubert. The account of drunkenness distinguishes retaining a moral maxim from correctly applying it to a person. Political intoxication is then judged worse than intoxication by wine. The companion claim that wine can heighten conscience contrasts being drunk on wine with being drunk on mind, the latter linked with impiety. A further wine comparison defines fanaticism as dark, harmful and furious intoxication, whether religious or irreligious. These are Joubert's speculative and polemical assessments. They are useful for his distinctions between moral notions and their application, not for modern advice about alcohol or mental health.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 496–497, entry 14, ¶1 — Wine and political intoxication affect moral judgment differently in Joubert's account.

II, p. 497, entry 4, ¶1 — Wine is contrasted with being drunk on mind.

II, p. 879, entry 10, ¶1 — Fanaticism is compared with dark and furious intoxication.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the conditional capacity to reason and the conscience/memory relation. Esprit in drunk on mind does not mean distilled spirits. The religious-wine analogy preserves its historical generalizations as Joubert's claims rather than independently verified facts.

See also. Conscience; Fanaticism; Judgment; Religion.

[219] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 496, 497, 879.

Intromission

intromission — intromission[220]

The word. Intromission here means entry or introduction into another body, the physical sense documented in the reviewed translation note.

In Joubert. The struck body is said to generate no movement if it is too hard to permit either compression or intromission. The pairing matters: intromission is not merely a second word for compression. The smaller yielding mass begins a further note, but that explanation ends with an ellipsis and a marked gap. The lexicon cannot responsibly finish the proposed mechanism.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 238, entry 1, ¶2 — Intromission is paired with compression in a fragment about impact.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the technical word and the incomplete ending. The date embedded in this paragraph is retained within the larger manuscript entry rather than made into a new independent entry.

See also. Movement; Resistance; Impenetrability; Mechanism.

Intuition

intuition — intuition[221]

The word. Intuition names a kind of apprehension contrasted with ordinary sight or with judgment reached through reasoning. It does not simply mean a hunch or an unexplained personal preference.

In Joubert. The colorless, formless presence can be intuited without being seen in its appearance; the pronouns leave its identity unnamed. In the Locke passage, Joubert explicitly glosses knowledge as intuition and compares the judgment that supplies its lack to a blind person's stick. The comparison gives judgment a practical use while distinguishing it from immediate apprehension. The Malebranche note likewise assigns self-evidence to intuition and perception of premises, not to a conclusion. Finally a stylistic preference for and over but becomes a contrast between divine seeing and

[220] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 238. The movement material at I.237–238 comes from a separate exercise book. Beaunier reports likely borrowing from abbé Nollet, leaves the extent of Joubert's own contribution unsettled, and acknowledges omissions. This lexical witness does not establish an independently original physical theory by Joubert.

[221] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 149, 312; II, pp. 776, 879.

human judging. Here intuition enters an argument about narration and reflection; the sentence does not establish a general doctrine that people never apprehend directly.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 149, entry 2, ¶1 — Presence can be intuited without sight of an appearance.

I, p. 312, entry 1, ¶1 — Joubert glosses quoted knowledge as intuition.

II, p. 776, entry 1, ¶1 — Immediate premises are distinguished from inference.

II, p. 879, entry 3, ¶2 — A conjunction comparison gives intuition to the gods who see.

In this edition. Version 6 retains intuition in each case. The parenthetic gloss of Locke is Joubert's intervention and must remain separate from the quoted words. At I.149, he/him preserves a possible personal referent without naming God; it would also be grammatically possible to read an impersonal it. The gods in the last passage are plural.

See also. Perception; Judgment; Evidence; Reasoning; Ancients and moderns.

Invention

invention; inventer — invention; invent; inventing[222]

The word. Invention concerns bringing something into use or devising it; it does not invariably exclude imitation.

In Joubert. The invention of speech is explained through an inclination to attach ideas to sensible signs. Elsewhere the faculty of inventing languages is a skill natural to intelligence, so invention is not necessarily an isolated conscious stroke. The ventilator passage strikingly calls an invention an imitation of a mechanism of the world. Novelty of device and an antecedent pattern can therefore coexist. In the patience fragment, inventing and putting into practice are alternatives under the broader obligation to do well; invention is not praised merely because it is first.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 448, entry 2, ¶1 — Speech's invention is tied to ideas and sensible signs.

I, p. 306, entry 7, ¶1 — Language invention is called a natural intellectual skill.

II, p. 841, entry 3, ¶1 — An invention imitates a supposed cosmic mechanism.

II, p. 548, entry 7, ¶1 — Patience is needed both for inventing and for putting into practice.

[222] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 306, 448; II, pp. 548, 841.

In this edition. Version 6 uses skill for industrie in the language fragment and sensible for availability to the senses, not good judgment. The Theaetetus quotation remains a reported attribution without an independently established locus; ventilator denotes an air-moving apparatus in the analogy.

See also. Language; Imitation; Art; Intelligence.

Inward recollection

recueillement — recollection; gathering inward[223]

The word. Recueillement means gathering or collecting oneself inwardly in these contexts. It is not the retrieval of a memory, despite the familiar modern English sense of recollection.

In Joubert. The struck-breast fragment connects bodily action to a mechanical gathering inward and concentrated feeling. The senses passage describes the soul as absent from sensory places through recollection, prayer and austerity, distinguishing absence from their destruction by illness or age. The defense of devout people's comforts then allows bodily ease because it favors recollection of mind. Spiritual attentiveness is not necessarily best served by discomfort.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 482, entry 7, ¶1 — A bodily gesture is linked to gathered feeling.

II, p. 700–701, entry 11, ¶1 — Inward practice withdraws the soul from sensory locations.

II, p. 875, entry 4, ¶1 — Bodily comfort can favor collected attention.

In this edition. Version 6 varies between gathering inward and recollection; its notes explicitly exclude memory retrieval in these witnesses. "Mechanical" preserves machinal in the bodily sequence without providing a medical explanation. The forgiving tone toward comfort is retained rather than converted into a rule of asceticism.

See also. Meditation and contemplation; Prayer; Soul; Devotion; Solitude.

[223] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 482, 700, 701, 875.

Joy

joie — joy; joyfully[224]

The word. Joie, with historical variants joye and joië elsewhere in the corpus, names glad feeling but does not invariably certify moral goodness.

In Joubert. The instruction following the Latin saying about the cheerful giver makes joy a manner of giving. The literary note's "guilty joys of the heart," by contrast, permits sinful joy. The long image of an intelligible sun culminates in a person's own joy urging play within its rays. That movement gives joy an intellectual and imaginative setting. Its preceding pronouns are unresolved; the article can describe the stated joy without deciding the missing agent of the transformations.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 114, entry 3, ¶1 — Giving should be cheerful and smiling.

I, p. 341, entry 6, ¶1 — The heart can possess guilty joys.

II, p. 904, entry 2, ¶1 — Joy prompts play in an intelligible sun's rays.

In this edition. Version 6 uses "joyfully" for avec joie and retains joy in the sun passage, alongside happiness where bonheur appears as an alternative. It leaves the Latin separate from Joubert's French instruction and does not add a new antecedent for the difficult feminine pronoun.

See also. Happiness; Pleasure; Charity; Love.

Judgment

jugement; juger — judgment; judge[225]

The word. Jugement and juger concern assessing or deciding. Joubert repeatedly asks which faculty or standard makes a judgment appropriate to its object.

In Joubert. The moral/physical distinction demands that moral things be judged by moral sense and physical things by physical sense, with political sense left as a further prompt. Judgment is therefore not one undifferentiated procedure applied everywhere. The inquiry into taste asks whether its jurisdiction reaches everything in works of the mind, including light and brilliance; it does not settle the boundaries. In the imagined

[224] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 114, 341; II, pp. 904. The agent of the dust/cloud/air transformations on II.904 is unresolved in Version 6; it is not silently identified here.

[225] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 208; II, pp. 536, 655, 779, 780.

account of wise doubt, dazzling light must be veiled so that another mental organ can judge. This proposal remains conditional. The contrast between human and heavenly judgments changes the standard by which the self is assessed rather than describing a new cognitive mechanism.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 208, entry 2, ¶1 — Moral and physical judgments require different senses.

II, p. 536, entry 7, ¶1 — Taste's jurisdiction is questioned rather than defined conclusively.

II, p. 655, entry 8, ¶1 — A conditional account of doubt seeks judgment beyond dazzling sight.

II, p. 779–780, entry 11, ¶1 — Self-judgment is measured against heaven instead of social opinion.

In this edition. Version 6 retains judgment and judge, including the legal language of jurisdiction. "If it existed" qualifies philosophical doubt itself; the unnamed other organ must not be identified by the lexicon.

See also. Discernment; Taste; Reason; Certainty and doubt.

Justice

justice — justice[226]

The word. Justice concerns what is just, while justesse can name rightness or exactness. Joubert relates the qualities without removing the difference between them.

In Joubert. The shared-source maxim places justice beside justesse. The longer warning about equality then distinguishes a clear idea from a just arrangement: justice needs measurement, calculation and the balance rather than mere ease of conception. A final fragment includes indulgence—or the patience attributed to Marcus Aurelius—within justice. The three witnesses connect judgment, proportion and forbearance; none permits replacing them all with a single notion of mathematical exactness.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 45, entry begun p. 44, no. 1, ¶9 — Justice and rightness share a source without becoming one noun.

I, p. 258, entry 10, ¶1 — Justice requires more than intellectual clarity.

II, p. 675, entry 8, ¶1 — Forbearance is included within justice.

[226] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 45, 258; II, pp. 675.

In this edition. Version 6 renders justesse as rightness in the pair, and à vue d'œil as "by eye alone" where it is opposed to measured judgment. It leaves the gap before justice in the last witness and keeps indulgence distinct from the reported patience.

See also. Equality; Law; Patience; Goodness; Moderation.

Kinds and species

espèce; genre — kind; species; genre[227]

The word. Espèce and genre can classify things broadly or name literary kinds. Species also has a historical philosophical use for intelligible images, sharply different from biological species.

In Joubert. The explanation of what earlier thinkers called "species" identifies images suited to strike the mind as visible images strike the eye. Optical and olfactory outflows support the comparison. By contrast, the appendix's human species is the class of humans in a hypothetical extinction scenario. Genre may also mark a kind of clarity appropriate to moral exhortation or a literary form with its own manner. Reading must first determine which classificatory setting applies.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 758, entry 2, ¶3 — Historical species are explained as intelligible images.

II, p. 928, entry 2, ¶4 — The human species appears in a hypothetical survival question.

II, p. 481, entry 7, ¶1 — Genre means a kind of clarity appropriate to a purpose.

I, p. 475, entry 1, ¶1 — A manner can belong to a literary genre rather than an individual.

In this edition. Version 6 uses "species," "kind," and "genre" contextually. The historical "species" explanation remains attributed to an unnamed "they"; the lexicon does not identify a school more precisely than the witness permits.

See also. Effluvia; Animal; Nature; Object and subject.

[227] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 475; II, pp. 481, 758, 928. Beaunier asks whether the II.928 block and preceding material summarize Condillac. The suggestion remains a question, not an established attribution.

Knowledge

savoir — know; know how[228]

The word. Savoir, often printed scavoir, ranges from knowing facts to knowing how to perform an intellectual act. Its grammatical construction matters.

In Joubert. More books and facts burden modern memory in the comparison with the ancients. Knowledge viewed as total accumulation can overload the mind. By contrast, knowing how to enter and leave both other people's ideas and one's own is a flexible capacity. The late writing passage gives knowing an explicitly circular relation to composition: some things are known well only by thinking of writing them, yet one cannot think of writing them without already knowing them. Joubert leaves this reciprocal dependence intact. It need not be resolved into a rigid sequence in which all knowledge precedes expression.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 405, entry 1, ¶1 — The ambition to know everything burdens memory.

II, p. 512, entry 2, ¶1 — Know how governs reciprocal entry into and departure from ideas.

II, p. 898, entry 4, ¶1 — Knowing and preparing to write depend upon each other.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes know from know how and retains the repeated restrictions and "nevertheless" in the writing paradox. The headword normalizes scavoir to savoir for lookup; the manuscript's historical forms remain unchanged.

Related terms.

Knowing and acquaintance. *connaissance; connaître* — Connaissance, usually printed connoissance, can concern retained knowledge, familiarity with books or the world, and knowledge directed toward living well. Version 6 normally uses knowledge and know in these witnesses. The condition about entry through senses and body gives the soul the work of gathering, retaining and using; it does not establish sensory origin unconditionally. The publication sequence distinguishes having knowledge of a fact from a right to publish it, then paradoxically distinguishes knowing a fact from having knowledge of it. The text does not identify the first with hearsay or the second with personal experience. An idea of some books can also be more useful than acquaintance with them, although the translation keeps knowledge. The final realities/truth distinction concerns practical operation versus living, acting, thinking and willing well. No universal one-to-one contrast with savoir should replace these contextual uses.

[228] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 214, 405, 415; II, pp. 512, 513, 621, 853, 898.

Places. I, p. 214, entry 4, ¶1; I, p. 415, entry 6, ¶1; II, p. 513, entry 7, ¶3; II, p. 513, entry 7, ¶4; II, p. 621, entry 4, ¶1; II, p. 853, entry 7, ¶1.

See also. Science; Ignorance; Writing; Memory.

Language

langage; langue — language; common language; refined language[229]

The word. Langage can concern a mode or register of expression, langue a language or an expressive idiom; neither has one mechanically exclusive English equivalent.

In Joubert. Joubert contrasts adjusting doctrine to school language with adjusting it to common or refined language. Choisi adds selection without simply returning to scholastic terminology. The Homer remark similarly contrasts language understood by contemporaries with a language of books that excludes some readers. Its sweeping assertion about Homer belongs to Joubert's evaluation. A later distinction assigns languages to heart, soul and intelligence, making language the manner in which a power manifests itself rather than only a national vocabulary.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 259, entry 1, ¶1 — Common and refined language offer alternatives to school language.

II, p. 672, entry 7, ¶1 — Language of the world is contrasted with language of books.

II, p. 781, entry 1, ¶1 — Heart, soul and intelligence are assigned distinct languages.

In this edition. Version 6 uses refined for choisi and retains the initial "That" in the Homer fragment. The brackets in the final witness mark qualified contextual English readings of damaged French; they do not establish recovered source wording.

Related terms.

Jargon and technical words. *jargon; technique* — Jargon expresses a self-made semblance of ideas rather than something clear and eminently literary. Joubert immediately marks his own definition as needing improvement and proposes differences from technical words without completing them. The lexicon therefore preserves both the criticism and the unfinished distinction: it cannot use this fragment to condemn all specialized vocabulary.

Places. II, p. 671, entry 5, ¶1.

Purism. *purisme* — Purism becomes excessive when it excludes an expression that harms neither sound, sense, good taste nor clarity. The preceding contrast gives taste a

[229] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 259; II, pp. 671, 672, 748, 781, 890.

natural basis and tone a fashionable one: what violates taste must always be excluded, while nonconformity to tone need not always disqualify. Version 6 retains purism and the sharp pusillanimity judgment. The qualification not always prevents a simple claim that tonal fitness never matters.

Places. II, p. 748, entry 7, ¶1; II, p. 748, entry 7, ¶2.

Neologism and paradoxism. *néologisme; paradoxisme* — The entire witness is a reciprocal equation: neologism equals paradoxism, then paradoxism equals neologism. Version 6 uses the unusual paradoxism for paradoxisme, preserving both equality signs and their reversed order. The fragment offers no examples or explanation; it cannot support a detailed historical definition or a claim that every new word expresses a logical contradiction.

Places. II, p. 890, entry 8, ¶1.

See also. Word; Expression; Literature; Good sense and common sense.

Laughter and ridicule

rire; ridicule — laughter; laugh; ridicule[230]

The word. Rire names laughter and laughing; ridicule concerns what is made laughable or exposes someone to derision. The laugh does not certify a sound judgment.

In Joubert. The disappointed-expectation account concerns confidence belied by an outcome, especially when confidence is displayed in bearing. The later mask formulation similarly couples comic effect with something seriously worn; seriousness is part of the mechanism. Molière's composure belongs to the maker rather than the audience: he makes others laugh while not laughing himself. This difference prevents laughter from being treated as emotional contagion alone. The naïveté fragment then separates exposure from desert: innocent unreflecting trust risks ridicule but merits none. A social response can therefore be explained without being endorsed.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 325–326, entry 10, ¶1 — Laughter is linked to expectation disappointed by the outcome.

II, p. 916, entry 1, ¶1 — Misreckoning and a seriously worn mask explain distinct aspects of comedy.

II, p. 610, entry 1, ¶6 — The comic author's composure differs from his audience's laughter.

I, p. 435, entry 1, ¶1 — Naïveté risks ridicule without deserving it.

[230] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 325, 326, 435; II, pp. 610, 916.

In this edition. Version 6 retains in cold blood for sangfroid as composure and comic author for un grand comique. Misreckoning at II.916 is a qualified rendering of mécompte, retaining disappointed expectation and mistaken reckoning rather than reducing it to a joke. The lexicon reports Joubert's universal formulation without claiming it as established psychological science.

See also. Comedy; Wit; Criticism; Innocence.

Law

loi — law; laws[231]

The word. Loi, with plural lois or loix, can denote social norms, institutional ordering or what deserves the name of law under a moral standard.

In Joubert. The early modesty passage speaks of laws without identifying a statute; its strongly gendered demand belongs to a historical moral vocabulary. The passions passage assigns laws the task of satisfying certain impulses through social institutions while inner discipline keeps them bounded. Finally the restrictive definition allows the name law only to what appears most just, wise and morally binding to a universal reason of all places and times. This is a normative test, not a description of every enacted rule.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 40, entry 1, ¶1 — Laws of modesty function as social norms.

I, p. 462, entry 4, ¶1 — Institutions channel and satisfy passions.

II, p. 893, entry 8, ¶1 — Universal reason restricts what deserves to be called law.

In this edition. Version 6 uses law for both historical spellings and preserves the repeated "only" in the normative definition. It keeps the modesty passage's severe social language without presenting it as present-day advice. No particular legal institution is added to à statuer.

See also. Justice; Government; Freedom; Passion; Duty.

[231] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 40, 462; II, pp. 893.

Laziness

paresse; paresseux — lazy; laziness; idle[232]

The word. Paresse is differentiated by faculty and task: even laborious minds may be lazy in a particular operation.

In Joubert. The list of lazy heads and bodies divides inactivity among movement, care and attention instead of treating it as one simple condition. Scholarly laziness can mean accepting the first available expression or inheriting another's terminology until jargon obscures thought. The fragment of laziness awaiting inspiration is suggestive but has no completed judgment beyond its image. The optative wish for active men and peoples adds a counterweight: they should be active in duties and occupations, idle elsewhere. Selective inactivity can therefore be desired even while intellectual negligence is criticized. Leisure is not automatically laziness, nor is constant busyness its guaranteed opposite.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 135, entry 4, ¶1 — Inactivity is distributed among bodily and mental capacities.

I, p. 253, entry 2, ¶1 — Laborious scholars can be lazy about clarity of expression.

II, p. 658, entry 10, ¶1 — Laziness waits for inspiration in an unfinished image.

II, p. 766, entry 12, ¶1 — Activity is wished for duties, idleness for everything else.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes lazy from idle according to the last passage's contrast. It keeps the inspiration phrase nominal and the J.-J. reference unexpanded. The separate June annotation does not restore the damaged main date.

See also. Leisure; Practice and effort; Attention; Clarity and obscurity; Duty.

Leisure

loisir — leisure; at leisure[233]

The word. Loisir is available time or freedom from pressing activity, but not necessarily emptiness or intellectual idleness.

In Joubert. Attention to events, history, telling and remembering is said to arise from rest and leisure; the next short claim assigns arts to cities. The poetic formulation then compares excellent lines to impromptus made at leisure: peaceful reverie can issue in a

[232] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 135, 253; II, pp. 658, 766.

[233] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 91, 309, 462; II, pp. 509, 557.

sudden result. The soul-in-harmony fragment includes leisure beside business and study, rather than making it the only setting for inward life.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 91, entry 8, ¶1 — Leisure supports history, narration and memory.

I, p. 309, entry 4, ¶2 — Sudden verse can emerge from leisurely reverie.

II, p. 557, entry 8, ¶1 — Leisure belongs beside business and study within harmony.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the apparent paradox of leisurely impromptus that arrive all at once. It preserves the bosom image and the repeated emergence from reverie. The plural loisirs in the broad harmony fragment becomes ordinary English leisure without creating a new category of recreational activities.

Related terms.

Affairs. *affaire* — Affaires are called a serious game in one fragment. In another, a people's flourishing affairs coexist with poor tranquility and a willingness to pay dearly for riches. Version 6 preserves the unnamed people and the counterfactual loss of commerce. These are worldly concerns, not necessarily a modern occupation or company.

Places. II, p. 509, entry 8, ¶1; I, p. 462, entry 6, ¶1.

See also. Meditation and contemplation; Solitude; Patience; Soul.

Life

vie — life; living[234]

The word. Vie can mean bodily animation, the course of a person's days, or the lived sphere distinguished from art and abstraction. Its physical and spiritual images often overlap.

In Joubert. The early report that life circulates through veins belongs to historical physiology. The relation between life and movement is made even stronger in the claim that every movement leads back to a living being as its source. Elsewhere life is defined simply as a beginning, in a chain that also calls the body the soul's mold. These

[234] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36, 232, 237; II, pp. 689. The movement material at I.237–238 comes from a separate exercise book. Beaunier reports likely borrowing from abbé Nollet, leaves the extent of Joubert's own contribution unsettled, and acknowledges omissions. This lexical witness does not establish an independently original physical theory by Joubert. Beaunier identifies the early physiological passage at I.35 as a summary of Plato. Its presence records Joubert's reading, not an independently original anatomical claim.

formulations do not offer interchangeable modern definitions. The practical use of life as what theatrical morality can fail to reach supplies another register, where the word means conduct lived outside a performance.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶8 — Life is represented as circulating through veins.

I, p. 237, entry 3, ¶4 — Movement is traced to living origin in a speculative account.

I, p. 232, entry 1, ¶1 — Life is called a beginning.

II, p. 689, entry 4, ¶1 — Everyday life is contrasted with theatrical moral display.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the historical anatomical claims and the closing lacuna of the movement paragraph. “Life” is not uniformly replaced with either biological life or moral life.

See also. Death; Body; Blood; Movement; Time.

Light

lumière — light; lights[235]

The word. Light is the eye’s object and one of Joubert’s most productive ways of speaking about thought, spiritual presence, and the visibility of form. The optical image should remain active even when its application is intellectual.

In Joubert. Air helps explain how a vague idea can illuminate: it lets light through without itself giving a sharply bounded object. The qualification is decisive—one may allow a vague idea only of something vague. Waiting for a drop of light turns intellectual reception into a small, concrete event; the fragment does not tell us what “there” refers to or complete the implied sentence.

Light can also be distinguished from movement and mere mental activity, which make one write rather than meditate. The diamond’s essence or soul is described as light modified by vitrification into a starry reflection. This material-spiritual vocabulary cannot be reduced to an abstract synonym such as knowledge without losing the notebook’s imaginative work. Nor should every plural lumières be treated as a reference to a named historical movement.

[235] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36, 278, 473; II, pp. 477, 762. Beaunier identifies the early physiological passage at I.35 as a summary of Plato. Its presence records Joubert’s reading, not an independently original anatomical claim.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶12 — The eye is assigned light as its object.

I, p. 278, entry 1, ¶1 — Air transmitting light explains a qualified use of vague ideas.

I, p. 473, entry 5, ¶1 — Illumination is awaited as a falling drop.

II, p. 477, entry 7, ¶1 — Light is distinguished from mere mental movement.

II, p. 762, entry 9, ¶1 — The diamond's essence is described as modified light.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves "drop of light," the initial "Until," and the fragment's unsupplied referent. It retains "vitrification" and the qualified diamond account instead of converting it into modern mineralogy.

See also. Transparency; Rays and radiance; Shadow; Air; Substance; Movement.

Limit and boundary

limite; borne — limit; bounds; boundary stones[236]

The word. Limites and bornes can be physical boundaries, limits of competence, or constraints upon action. Borne may retain a concrete boundary-stone image.

In Joubert. The claim that reason knows its bounds while animal instinct does not makes awareness of limitation itself a distinction. The action of an unnamed "he" and human freedom are elsewhere said to serve as limits to one another, with life, illness, and death set apart from the domain of freedom. A fragment about moving boundary stones retains an image of disturbing what ought to stand fixed. These uses should not be merged into one numerical or spatial boundary.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 570, entry 10, ¶1 — Knowing its bounds distinguishes reason in a comparison with instinct.

I, p. 280, entry 6, ¶1 — Action and freedom serve as limits in a qualified relation.

II, p. 682, entry 5, ¶1 — Boundary stones make limit concrete in an unfinished accusation.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves "as it were" in the mutual-limits sentence and renders bornes concretely as "boundary stones" in the fragment. Its missing context is not supplied. A divine referent is plausible in context, but the paragraph supplies only pronouns.

See also. Infinite; Sphere and circle; Instinct; Necessity.

[236] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 280; II, pp. 570, 682.

Literary manner

manière — manner[237]

The word. Manière can name the characteristic form of a person, genre or thing, as well as a fabricated mannerism. Joubert's judgments depend on which sense is active.

In Joubert. The association of manner with mania divides involuntary tic, natural originality and chosen contrivance. The next classification distinguishes manners belonging to the thing, genre and person from the trade's evasive artifice: only the last receives the immediate verdict of worthlessness. An author's dictionary and manner can also make a recognizable hand through favored sounds, colors, forms and cuts of sentence.

The condemnations are nonetheless severe when manner substitutes for method or inwardness. It becomes a good-faith hypocrisy that deceives its possessor, or something simply willed and fabricated. The repeated contrasts of manner with hand, tone with voice and color with brush then allow pleasing unity without mechanical sameness. A recognizable author can remain present across different works; mere ink, paper and practiced execution cannot replace that presence.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 474, entry 1, ¶1 — A word association differentiates tic, originality and contrivance.

I, p. 475, entry 1, ¶1 — The trade's artifice is distinguished from three other manners.

II, p. 634, entry 3, ¶2 — Characteristic words and sentence cuts reveal an author's hand.

II, p. 662, entry 12, ¶1 — Manner can counterfeit method in good faith.

II, p. 710, entry 5, ¶1 — Fabricated manner lacks inwardness.

II, p. 730, entry begun p. 729, no. 9, ¶2 — The same manner bores where the same hand can please.

In this edition. Version 6 repeats manner so that its changing valuation remains visible. "Manner, from mania" reports Joubert's association, not a certified etymology. The final passage's double negative means an unrecognizable work displeases; its Latin is translated as printed without importing the omitted negation from the classical parallel.

See also. Style; Originality; Naturalness; Affectation; Method; Author.

[237] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 474, 475; II, pp. 634, 662, 710, 730.

Literature

littérature — literature[238]

The word. Littérature names the field of literary writing and cultivation, with intellectual and ethical demands that are not identical to those of other practices.

In Joubert. Imagination is declared necessary in literature as in life, even for those who decry it. The remark about literary ignorance then refuses a defense available in morals: here ignorance is itself a fault, not simply a mitigating circumstance. Against literature understood as society's expression, Joubert adds studies, mood and personality as alternative sources, with a local preference for the last. These observations keep the field connected to learning, imaginative apprehension and personal character without reducing it to any one of them.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 283, entry 9, ¶1 — Literature cannot dispense with imagination.

II, p. 652, entry 5, ¶1 — Literary ignorance is judged differently from moral ignorance.

II, p. 798, entry 1, ¶1 — The social account of literature is set beside personal expressive sources.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves often and only in the reply to Bonald. Its damaged quotation closure remains unresolved, and the final reference can point to personality or its expression. These are qualifications of the reading, not reasons to omit the argument.

See also. Poetry; Reading; Criticism; Expression; Imagination.

Logic

logique — logic[239]

The word. Logique names an art or disciplined exercise as well as the rules and terminology by which it is taught.

In Joubert. The contrast between school practice and the book of Port Royal turns on doing and knowing. Logic's usefulness lay in its exercise; a book may convey only rules and words. This is not the same criticism as rejecting those rules: a separate note pairs logic with poetics as arts whose received rules one does not simply invent. Abuses of logic are still possible, and a crank without a rope represents logic deprived of reason. The warning against placing love of parents in the head as a thesis or demonstration

[238] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 283; II, pp. 652, 798.

[239] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 183, 195, 215; II, pp. 649, 652, 744, 807.

establishes another limit: intellectual formulation cannot perform every office of feeling and conscience.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 649, entry 4, ¶1 — Exercise is distinguished from knowledge of rules and technical words.

I, p. 195, entry 2, ¶1 — Logic and poetics are singled out for received rather than invented rules.

II, p. 652, entry 9, ¶1 — The useless crank represents logic without reason.

II, p. 744, entry 4, ¶1 — Demonstration cannot replace the appropriate place of feeling and conscience.

In this edition. The parenthetic “is (or was)” and restriction “only” in the Port Royal remark remain. The lexicon does not identify an unstated edition of that book or turn Joubert’s evaluation into a comprehensive history of logic.

Related terms.

Syllogism. *syllogisme* — A brief fragment makes law the syllogism’s major premise. Elsewhere definitions and syllogisms cannot give virtue, which Joubert distinguishes from an intellectual operation even while allowing it to be communicated. The literary complaint replaces rhetorical figures with syllogistic forms and calculation, imagining criticism through countinghouses and bankers. Version 6 retains syllogism and syllogisms in these different uses; the commercial image does not identify a particular formal fallacy.

Places. I, p. 183, entry begun p. 182, no. 7, ¶2; I, p. 215, entry 9, ¶1; II, p. 807, entry 3, ¶3.

See also. Reason; Reasoning; Method; Rhetoric.

Love

amour — love[240]

The word. Amour reaches from erotic pleasure to the appreciation of another being’s perfection and to angelic compassion. The noun alone does not fix which relation is in view.

In Joubert. An early quotation expressly attributed to La Mettrie praises love’s great pleasure as the highest good. That reported proposition must not be absorbed without qualification into Joubert’s own voice. A later reflection, approvingly related to Leibniz, instead differentiates love as joy in the beloved’s perfection and contemplation from

[240] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 38, 368, 468; II, pp. 557, 855.

pleasure as joy of sex or existence. Love becomes “a joy of essence.” The philosophical vocabulary should remain strange enough to preserve the distinction.

Yet another formula names love as will both at rest and in action: possession accounts for rest, pleasure for action. It does not merely repeat the earlier love/pleasure opposition. The harmonic soul can experience love together with sorrow, friendship, business and study, while angelic love is called continual pity. These several constructions show why a single romantic or theological definition would be inadequate. They also keep activity, possession, contemplation and compassion available as distinct aspects of the word.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 38, entry 2, ¶1 — La Mettrie is the speaker of the praise of love’s pleasure.

I, p. 368, entry 4, ¶1 — Love is distinguished from pleasure through perfection and essence.

I, p. 468, entry 4, ¶1 — Love joins restful possession to pleasurable activity.

II, p. 557, entry 8, ¶1 — Love belongs within a broad field of inward harmony.

II, p. 855, entry 8, ¶1 — Angelic love is figured as continual pity.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the La Mettrie attribution, the repeated “joy” in the Leibniz-related passage and the contrast between existence and essence. It does not replace Joubert’s formulation with wording from another author’s edition. Rest/action and love/pity remain his explicit juxtapositions.

See also. Pleasure; Will; Affection; Friendship; Pity and compassion; Soul.

Luxury

luxe — luxury[241]

The word. Luxe extends from life and possessions to writing, where excess must be distinguished from useful adornment.

In Joubert. The question about luxury without beauty gives necessity and superfluity different demands: solidity may satisfy need, but charm is necessary to what exceeds it. The later condemnation of luxury in morals or taste is immediately qualified by distinguishing adornments that make an object visible or intelligible. Ornament alone is not enough to establish luxury. The shipwreck passage admits another complication: even those who may be unable to regain simplicity can continue to love and judge it. Its

[241] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 434; II, pp. 799, 806.

saving of taste amid personal loss is deliberately less than a promise of restored innocence.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 434, entry 8, ¶1 — Superfluity requires charm rather than bare solidity.

II, p. 799, entry 2, ¶1 — Not all adornment is luxury: some makes things manifest.

II, p. 806, entry begun p. 805, no. 9, ¶3 — Love of lost simplicity can survive luxury of life and writing.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the unfinished once-one-has-tasted clause and brackets contextual readings in the damaged ornament passage. The final exhortation retains perhaps, at least and the simultaneous perishing and saving. The verbal luxe meaning dislocates is outside this article.

See also. Ornament; Simplicity; Taste; Poverty and wealth.

Lyric

lyrique; ode — lyric; ode[242]

The word. The lyric is distinguished by concentrated poetic quality and an instinctive musical capacity. The ode also exemplifies greatness that depends on height rather than sheer length.

In Joubert. The vertical comparison allows a few pages or an ode as much mental breadth and power as a long epic. It then complicates ranking through sustained sublimity and an awkward final exception; the advantage of small scale is not made absolute. The genre fragment calls the ode the most purely poetic form, contrasting the didactic philosopher, epic historian and dramatic combination of genres. Its missing label for the orator's kind stays missing. The nightingale image finally presents the poet as a lyric or musical animal whose instinct should not be replaced by deliberate mind. The closing paradox, knowing what one is ignorant of, leaves that capacity unexplained rather than converting it into technical training.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 584, entry 6, ¶1 — An ode can rival an epic's mental power through height.

II, p. 732, entry 10, ¶1 — The lyric poet is distinguished from mixed poetic functions.

II, p. 789, entry begun p. 788, no. 11, ¶2 — The lyric animal makes verse through instinctive capacity.

[242] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 584, 732, 789.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps lyric and ode. It does not reverse the difficult first/other pronouns in the greatness passage, fill the missing genre name, or dissolve the knows/ignorant paradox. [Born], [is] and [what] in the nightingale witness disclose contextual readings of damaged components.

See also. Poetry; Epic; Sublime; Music; Instinct.

Magnetism

magnétisme; aiman — magnetism; magnet[243]

The word. Magnetism gives an image of effective attraction whose absence can distinguish habit from living affection.

In Joubert. The compact fragment calls loving only by habit a magnet without magnetism. The object remains while the force that makes it characteristic is missing. A neighboring but separately bounded note pictures “its magnetism” as a cloud one might have dephlogisticated. The referent of the possessive is not settled by the fragment. Neither comparison should be made into an assertion of a medical or psychological theory of magnetic influence.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 507, entry 2, ¶1 — Habitual loving is pictured as a magnet deprived of its force.

II, p. 506, entry 7, ¶2 — Magnetism receives an unresolved cloud comparison.

In this edition. The French noun is printed aiman without final t. Verbal aimant means loving and must not be counted as the noun magnet. Version 6 leaves the opening participle without a supplied person and does not join the fragment to a preceding dated block.

See also. Attraction and affinity; Force; Dephlogisticate.

Malice

méchanceté; méchant — wickedness; wicked[244]

The word. Méchanceté names wickedness, rather than every misfortune or every use of mal. It can concern the disposition of a person and the plausibility of dramatic characterization.

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[243] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 506, 507.

[244] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 233; II, pp. 889, 924.

In Joubert. The lexical reflection places wickedness among qualities whose names approach abstraction rather than lovable affective qualities. The polemical account of people who love disorder says wickedness protects them against mistakenly trusting their natural adversaries: moral defect can sharpen a hostile discrimination. The Euripides note approves criticism of gratuitous wickedness assigned to Menelaus. That is a claim about the necessity of characterization, not a prohibition on portraying any wicked character.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 233, entry 3, ¶3 — Wickedness appears in a reflection on abstract names of qualities.

II, p. 889, entry 5, ¶2 — Hostile moral recognition is contrasted with the trust of good people.

II, p. 924, entry 5, ¶1 — Gratuitous wickedness is criticized as a dramatic choice.

In this edition. Version 6 consistently gives wickedness or wicked in these witnesses. It keeps the severe claim of “infallible” aversion as Joubert’s judgment and does not authenticate the dramatic anecdote beyond the notebook’s report.

See also. Vice; Good and evil; Goodness; Character.

Manners

mœurs — ways; morals; manners[245]

The word. Mœurs extends from customary ways of living to moral dispositions. It should not automatically be reduced to etiquette; manières and politesse carry different emphases.

In Joubert. The posture comparison speculates that bodily habits influence collective ways, but leaves the relative faults of softness and stiffness undecided. The taste/morals note links aesthetic softness with a flattering morality. The final list of patriarchal, austere and holy manners gives a set of moral-social qualities rather than instructions for polite behavior. These uses show how mœurs can carry both descriptive custom and evaluative conduct.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 38, entry 4, ¶1 — Bodily posture is speculatively related to customary ways.

II, p. 536, entry 8, ¶1 — Taste and morals share a criticized softness.

II, p. 882, entry 2, ¶3 — Manners are qualified as patriarchal, austere and holy.

[245] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 38; II, pp. 536, 882.

In this edition. Version 6 uses ways in the bodily speculation, morals in the taste comparison and manners in the three-part list. This variation follows context. The generalization about Asians remains Joubert's historical wording and is not supplied as evidence about present populations.

See also. Habit; Politeness; Society; Morality; Character.

Marriage

mariage — marriage; wedding[246]

The word. Mariage names both a durable relation and the wedding that publicly marks it. Its contexts include political analogy, funeral custom and the tension between different vocations.

In Joubert. The divorce question is compared with a state's ability to repudiate governments, but the objection about determining public will trails off. The funeral note uses "it is their wedding" to explain bells and pomp for young people who died early; it does not say they had married. The application contrasting continence for those destined to marriage with marriage for those destined to chastity applies the preceding reported saying that God hates the peace of those destined for war. Continence and chastity remain distinct; the application is not a free-standing rule.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 304, entry 4, ¶1 — Divorce supplies a comparison for changing governments.

II, p. 481, entry 5, ¶1 — Funeral pomp is excused through wedding language.

II, p. 819, entry begun p. 818, no. 8, ¶2 — Marriage and chastity appear as contrasted destinations in an application.

In this edition. Version 6 uses wedding for the funeral saying and marriage elsewhere. Singular "their" avoids assigning a gender to the deceased individual. "Repudiate" preserves the political/marital overlap, and the unfinished comparison remains unfinished.

See also. Family; Government; Duty; Sacrifice.

[246] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 304; II, pp. 481, 819.

Material subtlety and coarseness

subtil; grossier — subtle; coarse[247]

The word. Subtil can concern fineness of substance, not merely intellectual cleverness. Its contrast with grossier becomes especially important where bodily expenditure and invisible beginnings are discussed.

In Joubert. Coarse and subtle humors call for different restoration in the account of food and labor. The parenthetic spirit explains the subtle humor within that historical picture; it does not remove the fluid vocabulary. The claim that nothing is subtler than germs makes fineness compatible with reality and causal importance. It therefore resists a reading in which what is difficult to perceive must be unreal. The related intellectual distinction between subtle ideas and palpable reasoning is treated under Subtlety, rather than used to make every physical application an intellectual one.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 191, entry 1, ¶1 — Coarse/subtle describes bodily humor and the expenditure of substance.

II, p. 833, entry 3, ¶1 — Subtle germs are asserted to be real and causally fundamental.

In this edition. Version 6 retains subtle and coarse; the former is not replaced with clever, the latter with bad manners. Germs in the later witness means beginnings or rudiments of growth, not disease-causing microbes. The article preserves Joubert's assertion without supplying scientific proof.

See also. Subtlety; Humors; Seed and germ; Density and solidity; Tenuity.

Materialism and spiritualism

matérialisme; spiritualisme; matérialiste — materialism; spiritualism; materialist[248]

The word. These terms distinguish orientations toward matter and spirit, but Joubert can separate an explanation's method from its author's sentiments and doctrine.

In Joubert. The claim that a people makes spiritualism out of materialism describes a transformation in reception, not a simple transmission of an unchanged theory. In a reading note, explanations can be those of a materialist even though sentiments and doctrine are wholly opposed to materialism. A later fragment places compact materialism and subtle spiritualism in contrasting regions of light and peace, ending

[247] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 191; II, pp. 833.

[248] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 220, 437; II, pp. 677.

with sylph and gnome. These changes of setting matter: a mode of explanation, a received belief, and a figurative region are not identical objects.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 220, entry 1, ¶1 — The receiving people transforms one orientation into the other.

I, p. 437, entry begun p. 436, no. 5, ¶3 — Explanatory method is distinguished from opposed sentiments and doctrine.

II, p. 677, entry 9, ¶1 — Compact and subtle regions lead to the sylph/gnome comparison.

In this edition. Version 6 retains spiritualism without importing the later sense of communication with the dead. The two damaged residues in the II.677 fragment stay visible rather than being certified as le and ces. Present “are” beside past “were” in the reading note follows the source’s distinction.

See also. Matter; Soul; Metaphysics; Vital and animal spirits; Material subtlety and coarseness.

Mathematics

mathématiques; géométrie — mathematics; geometry[249]

The word. Mathematics works with quantities, figures, or relations abstracted from material particulars. Joubert’s comparisons often place it between physical images and more remote abstractions.

In Joubert. Mathematics is called half-metaphysics because it operates on conceived relations rather than imagined substances. Elsewhere its figures are shadows of realities: line, point, and circle retain their relations to thread, tip, and hoop. Geometry can justifiably use abstract terms that would spoil other styles, since they are fitting and clear in their own domain. The letter O need only suggest a circle, whereas the mathematical figure demands perfection. The difference concerns purpose and exactness, not a simple preference for concrete over abstract language.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 441, entry 9, ¶1 — Relations distinguish mathematics from the metaphysics of substances.

I, p. 242, entry 8, ¶1 — Geometrical figures are described as shadows of realities.

II, p. 656, entry 1, ¶1 — Abstract vocabulary belongs appropriately to geometry.

II, p. 914–915, entry 7, ¶3 — A letter’s indicated figure differs from mathematical exactness.

[249] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 242, 441; II, pp. 656, 914, 915.

In this edition. Version 6 retains “half-metaphysics” and “shadows,” without substituting a current foundational account of mathematics. Geometry remains explicitly named rather than swallowed into a generic idea of abstraction.

See also. Number; Measure; Sphere and circle; Metaphysics; Shadow; Point and line.

Matter

matière — matter; subject; subjects[250]

The word. Matière is both the stuff of bodies and the subject on which one writes or thinks. The notebooks make the material sense unusually tactile, even when it is carried into metaphysics and poetics.

In Joubert. “The dough of which bodies are made” is an announced definition. Dough conveys a stuff capable of receiving shape; it should not be silently replaced with an abstract neutral material. Matter’s relation to God is elsewhere pictured through nails and fingers, hair and the head. These organic dependencies are Joubert’s comparisons, not equivalent formulations of a single proved account of creation.

In the discussion of the marvelous, a poem needs immense space and very little matter. The paradox distinguishes the imaginative room a work creates from the amount of material that fills it. Conversely, the demand for clarity when a matter is worth discussing uses matière in its ordinary sense of subject. Translation and reading must decide the sense locally rather than declaring every occurrence metaphysical.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 57, entry 1, ¶1 — Matter is expressly defined through dough.

I, p. 473, entry 10, ¶1 — Its dependence is expressed through bodily growth.

II, p. 487, entry begun p. 486, no. 14, ¶3 — The poem’s spaciousness requires little matter.

I, p. 253, entry 2, ¶1 — Matière is what a philosophical discussion concerns.

II, p. 926, entry 1, ¶1 — The plural matières is rendered subjects in a judgment about objectionable kinds of writing.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “dough,” “matter,” and the bodily comparisons. Elsewhere it uses “subjects” for matières when the immediate concern is objectionable kinds of writing. No uniform English equivalent should erase that ordinary sense.

[250] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 57, 162, 253, 473; II, pp. 487, 926.

Related terms.

Porosity. *porosité* — Porosity lets iron be pictured as crêpe within a world described as gauze. Version 6 preserves those fabric images. The claim makes even apparently solid matter perforated or slight within the comparison; it is not offered here as a numerical statement about the structure of iron.

Places. I, p. 162, entry 7, ¶1.

See also. Body; Form; Substance; Space and place; Division and indivisibility.

Meaning

sens; signification — meaning; meanings[251]

The word. Sens and signification can name what words convey. Sens also has other uses, including a faculty of perception or judgment, which should not be imported into every occurrence.

In Joubert. The demand that meaning be as clear as sound asks words to offer thought objects as transparent as their names. Yet richness is not excluded: another fragment says several meanings make a word beautiful as several voices make one voice beautiful. In the account of discourse's harmony, meaning shapes even auditory pleasure; apart from certain unusually harsh or soft words, sound is said to receive its charm from sense. The discussion of patrie and patria further makes historical affect part of the problem: an equivalent label need not reproduce what a word once made an ear or heart feel.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 566, entry 2, ¶1 — Meaning and sound are compared for clarity.

II, p. 571, entry 6, ¶1 — Plural meanings contribute to verbal beauty.

II, p. 649, entry 5, ¶1 — Meaning shapes the perceived harmony of discourse.

II, p. 564, entry 3, ¶1 — The force of patrie is compared with patria and alternate expressions.

In this edition. Version 6 uses meaning for both sens and signification in these contexts. Patrie, pays and Latin patria remain in their own languages where they are being examined; the claims about their force remain Joubert's, not a new etymological finding.

See also. Word; Harmony; Language; Good sense and common sense.

[251] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 564, 566, 571, 649.

Measure

mesure; mesurer — measure; measure with; beat[252]

The word. Measure names both a means of gauging and a due proportion or limit. Its images can be physical, musical, intellectual, or ethical.

In Joubert. The pulse offers a bodily regulator for measuring successive events. The unusual instruction to measure certain things "with the liquid" contrasts with an inapplicable dry rule: the image resists a single rigid instrument. In the late admonition, number, weight, and measure conclude an account of timely self-command, showing that even good impulses need limits. The term therefore joins precision to appropriateness rather than simply prescribing more calculation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 457, entry 3, ¶3 — The pulse supplies a regulator for measuring succession.

II, p. 513, entry 1, ¶1 — Some things require a liquid rather than a dry rule.

II, p. 903, entry 10, ¶1 — Measure regulates good sentiments and virtues.

I, p. 475, entry 3, ¶1 — Dance marks the measure or beat of an air.

In this edition. Version 6 deliberately retains "the liquid" instead of supplying an unnamed flexible instrument. In the musical sentence it renders battre la mesure as marking the beat, while keeping the comparison's "in some sense."

Related terms.

Measuring instruments. *graphomètre; hygromètre; thermomètre* — The graphometer is the surveying instrument in the contrast between exact measured distances and an intelligible half-hour's journey; the toises, foot, and inch remain unconverted. Saussure's hygrometer appears beside Bonnet's observations and assiduous microscopy in the remark on Geneva's attention to imperceptible objects; the fragment does not explain its construction. The thermometer then helps ask whether heat exists for an instrument at degrees at which we no longer feel it. These are three different uses of instruments—precision, inquiry, and a test of the perceiver's limits—not one list asserting the superiority of measurement.

Places. I, p. 204–205, entry 8, ¶1; I, p. 123–124, entry 10, ¶1; I, p. 251–252, entry 7, ¶1.

Grain and drop. *grain; goutte* — The small unit can carry an effect out of proportion to its apparent quantity. A grain of matter is worked into the apparent immensity of the world, while a single drop of the bee's liquor can suffice in the poetry comparison. In the

[252] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 123, 124, 146, 204, 205, 251, 252, 357, 457, 475; II, pp. 513, 903, 906.

late account of material forces, hollow grains and a blown bubble again diminish apparent mass. Version 6 preserves these units without inventing exact weights or volumes; the comparisons concern scale and power, not calibrated measurement.

Places. I, p. 146, entry 9, ¶1; I, p. 357, entry 6, ¶1; II, p. 906, entry 4, ¶1.

See also. Time; Number; Proportion; Weight and gravity.

Mechanism

mécanisme; méchanisme; machine — mechanism; machine[253]

The word. Mechanism is a working arrangement or explanatory construction; machine can name bodily, political, or argumentative machinery. Joubert often asks what such an account leaves out.

In Joubert. A mechanism does not resemble movement as death does not resemble life. This warning resists dissecting the phenomenon until its defining activity disappears. Political states without feeling become crank-driven machines, lacking a spring within themselves. The trained pig's mechanism, however, still includes a limited intelligence joining words to movements. Criticism of mechanism therefore does not always mean the absolute exclusion of mind from whatever is mechanical.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 235, entry 3, ¶1 — Mechanism can fail to preserve the movement being explained.

II, p. 504, entry 1, ¶1 — Political feeling supplies life missing from a crank-driven state.

II, p. 933–934, entry 1, ¶3 — The animal's trained mechanism includes a narrow associative intelligence.

In this edition. Version 6 uses modern English mechanism for the printed méchanisme and keeps the crank and spring images. It does not turn every machine comparison into a claim about literal machinery.

See also. Movement; Life; Death; Organization; Cause and effect.

[253] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 235; II, pp. 504, 933, 934.

Meditation and contemplation

méditation; contemplation — meditation; contemplation[254]

The word. Méditation and contemplation are related modes of inward engagement. The witnesses distinguish their movement, rest and participation rather than treating them as one fixed devotional technique.

In Joubert. The idiom of profound souls can combine assiduous meditation with experience of civil life. Contemplation involves the soul at least through pleasure. True meditation alternates movement and rest, while the search for divine wisdom is assigned rest or meditation rather than the movement of human inquiry. The unfinished ascent fragment then pairs contemplation with intellect, prayer with the entire soul, and sacrifice with will. These pairings articulate different participation, not a complete hierarchy of exercises.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 39, entry 1, ¶1 — Meditative depth can coexist with civil experience.

I, p. 392, entry 7, ¶1 — The soul participates in contemplation through pleasure.

I, p. 429, entry 12, ¶1 — Rest follows movement in true meditation.

II, p. 593, entry 3, ¶1 — Meditation is related to the search for divine wisdom.

II, p. 677, entry 2, ¶1 — Different practices are paired with different faculties.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps both nouns and the movement/rest vocabulary. It leaves the ascent conditional incomplete and its two damaged French residues visible. The article does not silently supply those letters or infer a named school of spiritual practice.

See also. Prayer; Soul; Inward recollection; Sacrifice; Leisure; Wisdom.

Melancholy

mélancolie; mélancolique — melancholy[255]

The word. Mélancolie names a feeling of inward enclosure; mélancolique can also characterize a person whose perception has unusual sharpness.

In Joubert. The brief fragment about the perspicacity of the weak and the melancholy associates vulnerability with insight, but leaves its explanation unfinished. A longer note gives another relation: attention to other people cheers, while attention confined to

[254] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 39, 392, 429; II, pp. 593, 677.

[255] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 269, 463.

oneself saddens. Melancholy there belongs to excessive enclosure within oneself. The second witness should not erase the perceptiveness of the first, nor should the first turn sadness into a necessary condition of intelligence. Together they give a small but useful distinction between a disposition's possible acuity and the narrow direction of attention that can sustain its sorrow.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 269, entry 5, ¶1 — A fragment connects melancholy with perspicacity.

I, p. 463, entry 9, ¶1 — Self-enclosure explains the particular melancholy described here.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the first witness as a fragment ending in etc. In the second, occupies us with others clarifies occupe des autres; it does not mean keeping other people occupied.

See also. Sorrow; Solitude; Self; Attention.

Memory

mémoire — memory[256]

The word. Mémoire can name the power of retention or the represented content retained. It is sometimes attributed to bodily members as well as the mind.

In Joubert. The distinction between individuals and qualities assigns fixed, definite figures to memory and qualities to ideas. It breaks off before completing the account of idea, so its asymmetry must remain. The dancer's feet and musician's fingers then show a different extension: the whole body remembers although reflection belongs to the head. An undated appendix fragment distinguishes each member's local memory from the "great memory," without identifying the member singled out as most independently existent. In style, memory can also recognize a successful rhetorical period even when a rule protests. Remembering here becomes a test of composition rather than a theory of mental storage.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 136, entry 3, ¶1 — Definite figures distinguish memory from the incomplete account of idea.

I, p. 43, entry 1, ¶1 — Skilled bodily members possess remembering.

II, p. 919, entry 1, ¶1 — Local bodily memory differs from the unnamed great memory.

II, p. 500, entry 8, ¶1 — Memory recognizes a periodic style despite the rule's protest.

[256] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 43, 136, 355, 356, 452; II, pp. 500, 919.

In this edition. Version 6 leaves “The idea cannot be…” unfinished and does not identify the appendix’s bodily member. The rhetorical period is a unit of composition, not simply a punctuation mark.

Related terms.

Impression. *impression* — The memory of a painting cannot perfectly keep its colors: recollection represents only the impression of their harmony’s charm. Impression denotes the retained effect, not a faithful internal reproduction. In faute d’impression the same noun belongs to printing: Joubert welcomes the fille/folle printing error as the occasion for distinct household roles for sensibility, imagination and reason.

Places. I, p. 355–356, entry 6, ¶1; I, p. 452, entry 1, ¶1.

See also. Remembrance; Forgetting; Idea; Reflection.

Merit

mérite — merit; merits[257]

The word. Mérite identifies an excellence or ground of valuation. In artistic contexts it may belong to a subject, its maker, a technique, or an unrealized capacity.

In Joubert. The historian’s merit must be added to that of history, just as the worker adds something to the material. This does not dissolve subject matter into execution or execution into a worthy subject. Art is itself called a merit when naturalness is absent: accuracy achieved through art still deserves recognition. Yet visible success is an inadequate measure, because talent may lack the strength to make beautiful works. The distinction between earlier writers’ beauty and later writers’ compression likewise shows that different achievements can earn praise under different descriptions.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 778, entry 5, ¶1 — Material and maker have distinct merits.

II, p. 865, entry 10, ¶1 — Art can be a merit even without naturalness.

II, p. 690, entry 10, ¶1 — Talent without the strength to produce is missed by judges of success alone.

II, p. 733, entry 9, ¶1 — Beauty and verbal compression receive different historical valuations.

[257] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 690, 733, 778, 865.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps repeated merit and distinguishes talent from strength. The unnamed subject in the unrealized-talent fragment is not identified as Joubert. Justesse in the art fragment becomes accuracy, not moral justice. Moral desert and reward are related uses, but this article's witnesses concern literary valuation.

See also. Art; Talent; Genius; Criticism; Perfection.

Metaphysics

métaphysique — metaphysics; metaphysical[258]

The word. Metaphysics addresses ideas of God, soul, world, and knowledge through contemplation and representation. Joubert repeatedly distinguishes it from both logical operation and physical inquiry.

In Joubert. The contrast with logic calls metaphysics contemplation, views, and paintings when its practitioner writes. Its related characterization as half-poetry gives bodiless things transparent bodies. These are descriptions of its representational work, not claims that every metaphysical statement is knowingly fictional.

The preference for ingenuity in metaphysics and certainty in physics assigns different criteria to different kinds of inquiry. Yet metaphysical style can be condemned even when metaphysics itself is called beautiful. Discovering the meaning of a daily word may count as a major metaphysical discovery. These distinctions make language central while leaving room for criticism of abstractions that obscure rather than illuminate.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 295, entry 2, ¶1 — Metaphysical contemplation differs from logical operation.

I, p. 289, entry 4, ¶1 — Half-poetry gives transparent bodies to the bodiless.

II, p. 745, entry 10, ¶1 — Metaphysics and physics receive different standards of preference.

II, p. 656, entry 1, ¶1 — The inquiry is distinguished from an objectionable style.

I, p. 468, entry 14, ¶1 — Discovery can mean fully understanding an everyday word.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves "ingenious," "paintings," and "transparent body." The related problematic reading nations elsewhere in the corpus is not silently changed to notions; it belongs in the lexicon's unresolved-readings apparatus, not in an invented definition.

See also. Physics; Mathematics; Being; Essence; Transparency.

[258] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 289, 295, 468; II, pp. 656, 745.

Method

méthode — method[259]

The word. Méthode is a way of proceeding or retracing thought; it need not be a universally valid sequence of straight steps.

In Joubert. Ariadne's thread follows the thinker and becomes useful on the return. The reversal is the point: method can retrace discovery without mechanically generating it. The comparison of Platonic circuits and modern straight lines likewise denies that rectilinear procedure is inherently more methodical. Another note requires method to partake of the nature of its science, contrasting the mind needed for metaphysics with the sense needed for physics. Taken together, these passages caution against importing one procedure into every field, while leaving room for disciplined explanation suited to its object.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 280, entry 9, ¶1 — The thread follows us and is useful on the return.

II, p. 592–593, entry 11, ¶1 — A circuit is not less methodical simply because it is indirect.

II, p. 747, entry 7, ¶1 — Method must fit the nature of the science.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the reversed following relation and "go back up." Science retains its broad sense of organized knowledge. The first [much] on II.747 qualifies damaged beaucoup; the second much is intact.

See also. Analysis; Science; Reasoning; Writing.

Mind

esprit — mind; spirit; minds; spirits[260]

The word. Esprit can designate the thinking mind, its disposition or quality, or an immaterial spirit. Its plural does not decide between individual minds and spiritual beings without context.

In Joubert. The comparison between bodies and spirits on I.214 is an explicitly proposed account of what each can see: Joubert writes "I think," not a neutral description of an established mechanism. Here translating esprits as spirits preserves its contrast with bodies. In the account of searching for words on I.251, esprit is instead the writer's mind

[259] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 280; II, pp. 592, 593, 747.

[260] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 214, 251; II, pp. 608, 724, 765, 766.

discovering a thought not yet whole. It is an activity still in formation, not a storehouse of finished sentences.

The mind can also receive a moral or literary character. The “she-ape mind” attributed to Voltaire has pleasing movements without the sense whose appearance it imitates; the “gentle mind” is fire attractive at the right intensity and dangerous when too ardent. These are different evaluative metaphors, not successive definitions. Elsewhere Joubert separates the soul’s nourishment from the mind’s occupation: âme and esprit should therefore not be automatically collapsed.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 214, entry 2, ¶1 — Spirits and bodies are compared through their supposed objects of sight.

I, p. 251, entry 2, ¶3 — The writer’s mind pursues words to find an incomplete thought.

II, p. 608, entry 7, ¶1 — The she-ape image distinguishes pleasing movement from genuine sense.

II, p. 765–766, entry 8, ¶1 — Gentleness controls the mind’s figurative fire.

II, p. 724, entry 10, ¶1 — The soul feeds on the mind’s repose.

In this edition. Version 6 uses spirit in the body/spirit contrast and mind in the intellectual and temperamental passages. Its unusual “she-ape mind” and repeated fire terms preserve Joubert’s comparisons. The date at I.251 has a damaged day; it supplies no secure chronological milestone.

See also. Intelligence; Thought; Wit; Imagination.

Miracle

miracle — miracle; miracles[261]

The word. Miracle names the marvelous event as an object of belief. Joubert also moves the reader’s attention from events to ways of living.

In Joubert. Following a saying attributed to Geoffroy, he observes that people displaced the marvelous from religion to physics. The criticism concerns a redistribution of belief, not a named scientific experiment. In another passage he permits disbelief in “their miracles” while urging belief in their manners, described as more wonderful and still observable in several kinds of dwelling. That contrast locates evidentiary force in continuing conduct. The pronoun should be followed through the source entry rather than used to invent a new named group.

[261] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 739, 883.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 739, entry 5, ¶1 — The marvelous is said to have shifted from religion to physics.

II, p. 883, entry 1, ¶3 — Observable manners are preferred to miraculous reports as evidence.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes miracles, marvelous and wonderful. It keeps the conditional allowance “if you wish” and the repeated movement through convent, cottage, palace and deserts. The damaged February day in the Geoffroy witness is not reconstructed.

See also. Religion; Faith; Manners; Virtue.

Mirror

miroir — mirror[262]

The word. The mirror is a receptive surface whose images can be faithful, distorted, memorable, or unavailable to the mirror itself. It is one of Joubert’s main models for the relation between inward life and representation.

In Joubert. Memory is a mirror whose backing consists in tenacious, material signs: without them, the image would pass through and escape. Curved or colored minds are then likened to mirrors that alter forms or colors, even when they represent what they receive. The possibility of combining embellishment with accuracy keeps the judgment from being a simple demand for mechanical copying.

The soul differs from an ordinary mirror because it can look within and reflect upon itself. This limit to the analogy matters. Calling something a mirror is not enough to decide whether it knows, remembers, distorts, or simply receives what it shows.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 280, entry 5, ¶1 — Memory needs the material backing of signs.

II, p. 616, entry 10, ¶1 — Curved and colored mirrors model transformations in reception.

II, p. 904, entry begun p. 903, no. 11, ¶5 — The soul can inspect itself where the mirror cannot.

In this edition. Version 6 renders taim as backing and étamé as tinned, retaining the craft image. The memory passage remains incomplete after etc.; the lexicon does not fill the absent object.

See also. Transparency; Surface and depth; Reality; Light; Body.

[262] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 280; II, pp. 616, 904.

Model

modèle — model; models[263]

The word. Modèle is something taken as a pattern or standard, whether an idea, an artwork, a person, or an example in education.

In Joubert. The idea–thing–image formulation makes idea the model, thing the portrait and image the copy. This relational triad should not be inflated into a complete philosophical system. The choice of clay Etruscan vases over royal metalware gives a concrete artistic test: costly material and rank do not by themselves establish a model of design. Children's need for models rather than criticisms extends the word into formation. Finally, the Crevier judgment distinguishes a model from a guide: one may show well without being the person whose manner of speaking should be imitated. Models and useful teachers need not coincide.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 614, entry 1, ¶1 — Model occupies the first position in a compact idea/thing/image relation.

II, p. 518, entry 9, ¶1 — Good design is sought in clay vessels rather than expensive royal tableware.

I, p. 232, entry 5, ¶1 — Children need models more than criticisms.

II, p. 655, entry 9, ¶1 — A guide need not be an exemplary model.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps model in each setting and preserves perhaps for Crevier's lesser speech and assuredly for his better showing. The lexicon reports Joubert's valuation of the named objects rather than certifying a general art-historical ranking or identifying a particular vessel.

See also. Idea; Image; Imitation; Drawing; Study and learning; Perfection.

Moderation

modération — moderation[264]

The word. Modération is measured response, not necessarily emotional extinction. It can qualify sorrow, discourse or the manner of being moved.

In Joubert. Sensitivity proportionate to a loss displays judgment; moderating sorrow once the loss is irreparable displays reason. Both responses are affirmed. The fragment

[263] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 232; II, pp. 518, 614, 655.

[264] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 59, 405; II, pp. 706, 807, 855.

on discourse places moderation beside excellence of taste, while the angelic comparison defines it as being moved as angels are. That image gives moderation an affective ideal rather than specifying a measurable degree of feeling. These uses allow restraint to coexist with responsiveness.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 59, entry 1, ¶1 — Measured sorrow accompanies proportionate sensitivity.

II, p. 706, entry 3, ¶2 — Moderation applies to discourse as well as emotion.

II, p. 855, entry 6, ¶1 — Angelic movement figures a mode of response.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves both sides of the loss comparison and leaves “moved” open to the kind of emotion involved. It does not substitute a later variant with different nouns for the cited angelic formula. The discourse continuation retains its dependence on the preceding paragraph.

Related terms.

Intemperance. *intempérance* — Intempérance can concern writing as well as conduct. Babbling books suggest an excess of production or expression; the political comparison says people dislike seeing their own vices in the great. Version 6 preserves that possessive relation and does not turn the people’s judgment into an impartial social law.

Places. I, p. 405, entry 4, ¶1; II, p. 807, entry 1, ¶1.

See also. Sorrow; Anger; Justice; Sensibility; Virtue.

Modest conduct

modestie; modeste — modest; modesty[265]

The word. Modestie and modeste concern manner, self-estimation and limits of judgment as well as outward appearance. They are related to, but not exhausted by, pudeur.

In Joubert. The clothing maxim attributes a formative effect to modest dress: appearance can help make a disposition. The inward account locates touching modesty less in distrust of oneself than in a just estimate of human nature, calling it both illumination and virtue. The statement that some ignorance is needed for some modesty introduces a limit to confident knowing, not a universal praise of ignorance. These witnesses give modest conduct an intellectual and ethical range that is lost if every modestie is explained only as sexual reserve or embarrassment.

[265] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 169, 401; II, pp. 712.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 169, entry 6, ¶1 — Modest clothing is said to shape those who wear it.

I, p. 401, entry 9, ¶1 — Modesty arises from a just estimate of human nature.

II, p. 712, entry 6, ¶1 — Limited ignorance is linked with limited modesty.

In this edition. Version 6 uses modest and modesty, and preserves both some qualifications in the ignorance sentence. The self-estimation note remains a fragment and keeps light as an image alongside virtue. The lexicon distinguishes this article from Modesty, whose principal French term is pudeur.

See also. Modesty; Humility; Judgment; Human nature.

Modesty

pudeur — modesty[266]

The word. Pudeur concerns reserve, concealment and the relation between one's embodied presence and others. It is not confined to chastity.

In Joubert. If modesty is absent from organization, the short maxim proposes placing it in will: acquired direction can supply what constitution lacks. The weaving image then gives it a fabric that clothes existence and makes a sphere apart. Its subject label is Beaunier's bracketed supply, which matters when interpreting the image. The list of beautiful feelings finally includes modesty among the qualities shaping expression on a face. The private boundary can therefore have a visible form.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 263, entry 2, ¶1 — Will can supply a missing constitutional reserve.

II, p. 726, entry 10, ¶1 — A supplied subject label identifies the fabric-and-sphere image.

II, p. 882, entry 7, ¶1 — Modesty joins feelings that beautify facial expression.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps organization in its bodily constitutional sense, not an institution, and preserves all weaving/clothing/structure terms. It translates the supplied label as "[Modesty.]" rather than converting it into an unqualified authorial title.

Related terms.

Obscenity. *obscène* — The quoted Bonald maxim calls the obscene the last degree of the familiar. Version 6 preserves the abstract categories and the force of last degree. This is an attributed saying, not a verified general definition of obscenity or an assertion that every familiar manner is obscene.

[266] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 263; II, pp. 582, 726, 882.

Places. II, p. 582, entry 8, ¶1.

See also. Humility; Will; Women; Honor; Feeling.

Mold and imprint

moule; empreinte — mold; imprint[267]

The word. Mold and imprint distinguish what gives form from the resulting mark. The image becomes especially useful when something unseen is judged through what it produces.

In Joubert. The body is a mold that gives form to the soul: informe is the verb of forming, not the modern-sounding verb of transmitting information. In the seal comparison, a visible imprint allows judgment of an unseen seal, but poor wax, insufficient warmth, or weak pressure may obstruct that judgment. An imperfect result therefore need not straightforwardly disclose an imperfect original. The hierarchy of type, imprint, mental image, and divine idea makes the resulting forms unequal in beauty without identifying their places more explicitly than the source does.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 162, entry 9, ¶1 — The body gives form rather than information.

II, p. 645, entry 5, ¶1 — The visibility of an imprint depends on material and pressure as well as its seal.

II, p. 834, entry 7, ¶2 — Imprint and mental image occupy different positions in a hierarchy of beauty.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes seal from imprint and preserves the wax, hand, machine, and instrument as separate elements. At II.834 the two possessive references to place remain open; the Lexicon does not silently supply matter and soul as their locations.

Related terms.

Type. *type* — Type names an original or model in the paired fragments, rather than an ordinary example or a stylistic classification. Heaven is said to contain things, truths, and pleasures in their types, while here we have their shadows. The next paragraph distinguishes type, imprint, and image in the mind, then makes the divine idea more beautiful than the type itself. Its comparisons retain the image's and imprint's different places without naming those places. Version 6 preserves types as a technical noun; this

[267] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 162; II, pp. 645, 834.

local hierarchy does not establish a single named philosophical system or make every use of type in the notebooks equivalent.

Places. II, p. 834, entry 7, ¶1; II, p. 834, entry 7, ¶2.

See also. Form; Body; Image; Bee, honey, and wax.

Monad

monade — monad[268]

The word. Joubert directly glosses monade as unity. Elsewhere it names an indivisible soul or supplies a comparison for the discrete units of a book.

In Joubert. The soul is called a monad in a passage that simultaneously acknowledges our difficulty conceiving it without boundaries. The soap-bubble question leaves the argument deliberately imagistic: an indivisible whole is being imagined, not anatomically located. The later question about Leibnitz's monad asks whether it can be full of ideas of which it is unaware. Finally, literary atoms and monads share clear-cutness and indivisibility "in a way." These uses are related by unity, but should not be collapsed into a complete exposition of Leibnitz.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 267, entry 1, ¶1 — The explicit gloss is "Monad means unity."

I, p. 236, entry 3, ¶1 — The bounded yet indivisible soul is compared with a soap bubble.

II, p. 831, entry 3, ¶1 — The monad's unawareness remains a question.

II, p. 896, entry 11, ¶1 — The term joins atoms in a literary comparison.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps "monad" and the printed spelling Leibnitz. Its note does not authenticate a particular philosophical source behind the question. The feminine pronoun in the French refers to the monad, not to Leibnitz.

See also. Unity; Atoms; Extension; Division and indivisibility.

Moon

lune — moon[269]

The word. The moon is an object seen at a distance, a source of reflected light in a literary comparison, and an agent of influence in a historical physical conjecture.

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[268] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 236, 267; II, pp. 831, 896.

[269] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 207, 408; II, pp. 723.

In Joubert. Children running from summit to summit to catch the moon illustrate mistaking what should be seen for what can be touched. Plutarch is called the moon of philosophy and a true mirror of Plato: he shines more than he illuminates. The note on moist influences extrapolates from the reported lunar action on the ocean to sap, clouds, and rain. Its “if, as they say” and inferential “must” belong to the conjecture, not to an independently verified account.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 207, entry 8, ¶1 — The distant moon illustrates the conditions and limits of perspective.

I, p. 408, entry 3, ¶1 — Reflected lunar light characterizes Plutarch’s relation to Plato.

II, p. 723, entry 4, ¶1 — Oceanic influence leads to a conjecture about moisture elsewhere.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the sensory distinction between seeing and touching, and the difference between shining and illuminating. Damage in the influence paragraph remains visibly qualified in English brackets.

See also. Light; Mirror; Water; Vapor and cloud; Sun and night.

Morality

morale — morality; morals[270]

The word. Morale names the field or discipline of conduct, as well as a moral teaching. Its methods and standards are distinguished from those of literature and contemplation.

In Joubert. Duty is called its object and virtue its end; the double human end joins one’s virtue with another person’s happiness. The rhetoric appropriate to morals must then move the will through fire and ardor rather than merely offer contemplation. In the ignorance comparison, the same circumstance can mitigate a moral fault while constituting a primary literary fault. Evaluation depends on what activity is being judged, not only on the person’s possession or lack of knowledge.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 298, entry begun p. 297, no. 2, ¶4 — Morality’s object and end are distinguished.

II, p. 481, entry 7, ¶1 — Moral discourse aims to move will.

II, p. 652, entry 5, ¶1 — Ignorance has different effects in moral and literary judgment.

In this edition. Version 6 varies morality and morals according to English construction. It keeps the duty/end distinction and the fire/light comparison. The abbreviated

[270] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 298; II, pp. 481, 652.

attribution in the literature note remains unexpanded; the lexicon does not identify an author behind A. C.

Related terms.

Fault. *faute* — Ignorance mitigates fault in morals but can itself be a fundamental fault in literature; the same word is evaluated by different standards.

Places. II, p. 652, entry 5, ¶1.

See also. Duty; Virtue; Will; Good and evil; Wisdom.

Movement

mouvement — movement[271]

The word. Mouvement ranges from change of place to an impulse, mental activity, and a movement of eloquence. Shared vocabulary does not mean that all these are instances of one mechanical account.

In Joubert. Time is pictured through movement over space and then measured by the pulse. The criticism of Descartes' demand for matter and movement treats the supposed starting materials as already containing everything that needs explaining. Mental movement may merely make one active and inclined to write, while light and happiness make one meditative. An account of oratory even values avoiding its characteristic movements. The word can therefore signify activity without insight, and eloquence without automatic approval.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 457, entry 3, ¶3 — Spatial movement and the pulse supply images of time.

I, p. 473, entry 3, ¶1 — Matter and movement are criticized as insufficiently explained assumptions.

II, p. 477, entry 7, ¶1 — Movement activates the mind but differs from illumination.

II, p. 645, entry 2, ¶1 — Movements of eloquence can need restraint.

[271] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 457, 473; II, pp. 477, 645. Related movement material at I.237–238 is inserted from a separate exercise book. Beaunier suggests a debt to abbé Nollet, explicitly leaves its extent undetermined, and reports omitted passages. This is a source-provenance qualification, not a statement that the passage is in another person's handwriting.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “movement” in the passages cited here. The lexical family includes printed mouvemens as well as modern mouvements. Compare Rest for the different rendering “motion” in the attributed Euler statement.

See also. Rest; Force; Time; Space and place; Mechanism.

Music

musique — music[272]

The word. Musique is an art of sound and an image for a specifically poetic inward disposition. Its pleasures and obligations differ from verbal composition.

In Joubert. The chiaroscuro note treats increasing and diminishing sound through gradations, shades and semitones as a musical art. Beaunier separately attributes a series of these notes to de Brosses; the lexicon must not erase that source layer. A reported judgment about modern music distinguishes better-made accompaniments from more beautiful airs, separating increased technique from beauty. Music may sound good without saying something, unlike verse in the explicit comparison. When music is placed in the soul, it marks the poetic quality distinguished from the just and wise quality called harmony.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 321, entry 9, ¶1 — Musical gradation is compared with visual chiaroscuro.

II, p. 599, entry 8, ¶1 — Accompaniment technique is separated from the beauty of airs.

II, p. 654, entry 10, ¶1 — Music’s stated sufficiency differs from verse’s requirement to say something.

II, p. 746, entry 14, ¶1 — Music in the soul is specifically poetic.

In this edition. Version 6 renders bruit as sound in the musical-gradation context and preserves semitones and chiaroscuro. The historical report on music’s improvement remains attributed to some connoisseurs, not verified as a survey.

See also. Harmony; Verse; Poetry; Color.

[272] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 321; II, pp. 599, 654, 746.

Mystery

mystère — mystery; mysteries[273]

The word. Mystère can be a religious secret or a truth not reduced to demonstration. Its force emerges through relationships and tensions, not simply through obscurity.

In Joubert. The tiny equation of mysteries with religious secrets remains open-ended. The extended account of Trinity and Incarnation instead asks how one mystery joined to another can produce practical consequences. Finally Joubert points to theologians who announce that everything in faith is mystery while claiming everything in their detailed systems is demonstrated. The last contrast criticizes the movement between those levels; it does not resolve their relation in a new theory supplied by the reader.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 191, entry begun p. 190, no. 13, ¶2 — An unfinished gloss relates mysteries to religious secrets.

II, p. 669, entry 7, ¶1 — Joining mysteries gives them practical consequences.

II, p. 802–803, entry 2, ¶10 — General mystery and detailed demonstration are juxtaposed critically.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves “religious secrets,” the speculative/practical distinction and both occurrences of “everything” in the criticism of theologians. Speculative means contemplative or theoretical here. The damaged words in the last witness are marked as contextual English completions.

See also. Faith; Christianity; God; Religious belief.

Mysticism

mysticisme; mysticité; mystique — mysticism; mystical quality; mystic[274]

The word. Mysticisme and mysticité are related but distinguished forms: the latter can name an inward devotional quality rather than a complete system.

In Joubert. The Staël discussion begins with the inmost recesses of mind and objects to nonreligious mystical expression that borrows the authority of conscience. Its prohibition on excessive inwardness is itself qualified by an exception for the heart, followed by renewed uncertainty. The separate condemnation of philosophical, quasi-physiological mysticité remains a compressed judgment. The later definition takes the

[273] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 191; II, pp. 669, 802, 803.

[274] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 806, 851.

mystic as inwardly devout and explains mystical quality as hidden devotion, fervent, private and singular. Its semantic emphasis is inwardness and concealment, not a claim that every unusual experience is a revelation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 806, entry 3, ¶1 — A criticism of nonreligious inward expression ends with a qualified exception.

II, p. 806, entry 5, ¶1 — Philosophical and quasi-physiological mystical quality is rejected in a fragment.

II, p. 851, entry 1, ¶1 — Mystic and mystical quality are explicitly glossed through inward devotion.

In this edition. Version 6 renders mysticisme as mysticism, mysticité as mystical quality and the personal mystique as mystic. It preserves the uncertainty after the heart exception and brackets conjectural [devotion] and [private] in the later definition. The Staël work and quoted wording are not externally established.

See also. Devotion; Heart; Conscience; Quietism; Faith.

Naïveté

naïveté; naïf — naïveté; artlessness; artless; ingenuous; natural simplicity[275]

The word. Naïveté belongs to unguarded natural expression and can be praiseworthy without being reflective, precise or immune to imitation. Modern associations with foolishness alone would misrepresent several uses.

In Joubert. The quoted definition of the sublime as the artlessness of greatness receives Joubert's approval. Naïveté elsewhere implies trust without reflection and innocence: it risks ridicule but deserves none. Its flowing expression can possess grace without precision, a limitation that does not annul the grace. The distinction from frankness turns on foresight: naïveté does not foresee mockery, while frankness foresees it without fear. The translation comparison then makes natural simplicity depend on verbal form, especially the two opposing but clauses that the anonymous version removes. Finally even naïveté can be aped in literature; the appearance of artlessness is not proof of its presence.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 378, entry 5, ¶1 — Artlessness contributes to the sublime.

I, p. 435, entry 1, ¶1 — Trust without reflection risks undeserved ridicule.

[275] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 378, 435; II, pp. 512, 641, 775, 885.

II, p. 512, entry 4, ¶1 — Ingenuous expression has grace without precision.

II, p. 641, entry 10, ¶1 — Naïveté differs from frankness by foresight of ridicule.

II, p. 775, entry 2, ¶1 — A translation can destroy natural simplicity by changing relations.

II, p. 885, entry 7, ¶1 — Literature can imitate even naïveté.

In this edition. Version 6 varies naïveté, artlessness, artless, ingenuous and natural simplicity according to context. The sublime passage preserves an ambiguous it: its referent may be the sublime or its artless quality. The Antiphilus example reports Joubert's comparison; neither its Greek original nor its intermediary translation has been independently verified.

See also. Naturalness; Sublime; Aesthetic grace; Translation; Sincerity and frankness; Affectation.

Name

nom — name[276]

The word. Nom can identify a person or thing, while having a name to lose concerns literary standing or reputation.

In Joubert. The early address to unnamed lovers refuses to invent names for them. The refusal makes naming an act affecting the beloved's identity within the story, not a harmless literary convenience. By contrast, the note on Bayle and Leclerc says they had a name to lose and regard to preserve, making reputation a constraint on critical judgment. They are said to think of the learned when giving their verdicts. The two uses show why a literal name and public standing should remain distinguishable even when the same English word conveniently serves both.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 34–35, entry 3, ¶5 — The narrator refuses to replace unknown lovers' names with invented ones.

II, p. 525, entry 13, ¶1 — A critic's name is a reputation vulnerable to loss.

In this edition. Version 6 retains name in both settings. The lovers' story has only a conjectural chronological placement in Beaunier; it should not be treated as a precisely dated manifesto about fictional naming. Its paired male and female beloveds remain distinct.

See also. Word; Author; Criticism; Novel.

[276] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 34, 35; II, pp. 525.

Nation

nation; peuple — nation; peoples[277]

The word. Nation and peuple can denote collective human communities rather than a single state apparatus. The cited notes consider intellectual reciprocity and the ends of collective life.

In Joubert. The birth of a great thinker is paired with the birth of someone able to understand and admire the thought. Another maxim generalizes about national eloquence's movement from oratorical to philosophical ostentation. The prosperity passage then opposes enriching peoples to legislating for them: virtue and poverty are preferred to wealth alone. The restriction "only" is crucial; the argument does not simply say every material improvement is wrong.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 55, entry 2, ¶2 — A nation supplies receptive as well as creative intelligence.

I, p. 338, entry 2, ¶1 — Eloquence is described through successive kinds of ostentation.

II, p. 828, entry 7, ¶1 — Enrichment alone is rejected as the aim of legislation.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves peoples and nations as successive terms, and keeps merchant/philosopher and banker/legislator as distinct comparisons. In the preference sentence, "them" jointly refers to virtue and poverty, while the nearer singular poverty remains a grammatical alternative recorded in the note.

Related terms.

Patriotism. *patriotisme* — Patriotisme can stifle love of humanity in the historical comparison, while the Alciphron note locates it in love of manners, temper, laws and customs rather than geography alone. The first leaf's chronology is explicitly uncertain in Beaunier's apparatus; the second's page 320 belongs to the book cited, not the notebook's own pagination.

Places. I, p. 50, entry begun p. 48, no. 2, ¶25; I, p. 255, entry 10, ¶1.

See also. Society; Government; Education; Utility; Poverty and wealth.

[277] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 50, 55, 255, 338; II, pp. 828.

Naturalness

naturel — naturalness; natural disposition; the natural[278]

The word. Naturel can name an artistic naturalness, a disposition or the substantive "natural." Its value depends on the kind of nature expressed; it does not invariably praise the first, easiest or least cultivated expression.

In Joubert. The Sévigné note accepts a naturalness made for oneself but adds that one can make it beautifully only if one already has it. Another note asks which natural disposition is intended—ingenious, literary or learned—rather than assuming a single untrained nature. In the arts, sincerity distinguishes natural expression from affectation: the same gestures may be genuine in one person and affected in another. The sharp judgment on Fénelon consequently calls an apparent excess of gentleness "affected naturalness." A later contrast between vulgar and exquisite natural defines it through conformity to essence and separates nature from habit. What appears first does not by that fact become what is best.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 550, entry 1, ¶1 — Made naturalness still presupposes a natural capacity.

II, p. 631, entry 2, ¶1 — Several kinds of natural disposition are distinguished.

II, p. 641, entry 9, ¶2 — Natural expression is tied to sincerity rather than fixed gestures.

II, p. 817, entry 1, ¶1 — Fénelon exemplifies an accusation of affected naturalness.

II, p. 912, entry begun p. 911, no. 11, ¶2 — The natural is distinguished from habit and mere priority.

In this edition. Version 6 varies naturalness, natural disposition and the natural with the context. The repetition within each passage remains deliberate. The paradox of making what one already has is preserved; the Fénelon judgment remains Joubert's literary assessment rather than a diagnosis of the author's private character.

See also. Nature; Habit; Affectation; Artifice; Naïveté; Style.

[278] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 550, 631, 641, 817, 912.

Nature

nature — nature; natures[279]

The word. Nature can mean the constitution of a thing, the world of living and material things, or an originating power encountered through them. The plural natures is especially important: it need not mean landscapes or scenes.

In Joubert. The account of a work as a being requires it to have its own nature, character, proportions, and personality. Nature there concerns a coherent individuality. Poetry made through thoughts can similarly draw upon truth "that belongs to natures," leaving the plural as a claim about what things are. The notebooks do not always replace this with a generalized abstraction called Nature.

The warning that plentiful artworks can distract artists from nature returns attention to impressions received from objects themselves. Such impressions are said to modify bodily constitution. The Aeolian-harp image gives nature the active role of sending wind to receptive organs. These passages link outward encounter and inward response, while differing from the explicitly personal or moral uses treated elsewhere in the lexicon.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 153, entry 5, ¶2 — A work needs its own nature and personality.

II, p. 487, entry 5, ¶1 — Poetry through thought draws on the truth of natures.

II, p. 927, entry 2, ¶1 — Artists risk consulting art before receiving impressions from nature.

II, p. 926, entry 4, ¶1 — Nature sends the wind that makes receptive organs sound.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves plural "natures" and the bodily sense of organisation in the appendix. No single personification or unified doctrine is imposed upon all uses of nature.

See also. Essence; Form; Organization; World and universe; Air; Instinct.

Necessity

nécessité; nécessaire — necessity; necessary[280]

The word. Nécessité may name a constraining condition or a requirement; nécessaire can also mean what a practice or person needs. These senses need not carry the same metaphysical strength.

[279] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 153; II, pp. 487, 926, 927.

[280] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 475; II, pp. 692, 711.

In Joubert. Space is argued to be necessary for movement and placement. Another stark sentence ascribes evils to necessity and order while reserving goods for God's will; the sentence offers no accompanying reconciliation, so the distinction should remain as written. When dance is called the necessary effect of certain airs, the term expresses the felt connection between rhythm and bodily response. These local arguments do not establish a doctrine that every action or evil is predetermined.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 711, entry begun p. 710, no. 11, ¶2 — Space is necessary for movements, existences, and placements.

II, p. 692, entry 12, ¶1 — Necessity and order are sharply distinguished from God's will.

I, p. 475, entry 3, ¶1 — Certain airs are said necessarily to produce dance.

In this edition. Version 6 retains "necessary" even in the musical claim; it does not dilute it to usual. In the damaged space paragraph, bracketed English readings remain qualifications on contextual English readings of damaged words, not on Joubert's modal claim.

See also. Possibility; Order; Space and place; Cause and effect.

Need

besoin — need[281]

The word. Besoin can name a requirement, an inward impulse or a socially conditioned lack. Its object decides whether it belongs to education, understanding or self-regard.

In Joubert. Children need models more than criticisms, directing education toward example. The priority of "what is this?" over "what good is it?" then makes knowing an essential need and acquiring ideas a great ambition. The fragment about Las Cazes names a perpetual need to honor himself in his own eyes. That last need is not certified as a necessity everyone should satisfy; the recurrence can itself be a diagnostic description.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 232, entry 5, ¶1 — Children require examples more than criticism.

I, p. 405, entry 5, ¶1 — Knowing is placed before practical usefulness.

II, p. 911, entry 4, ¶1 — Self-honoring can become a perpetual need.

[281] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 232, 405; II, pp. 911.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the comparative “more” in the childhood maxim and the ordinal first/second distinction in the questions. It leaves the final portrait a nominal fragment and keeps the printed name without adding a biographical identity.

See also. Education; Utility; Self; Ambition; Honor.

Nerves and fibers

nerf; fibre — nerves; sinews; fibers[282]

The word. Nerves and fibers belong to Joubert’s historical physiology and to his images of strings, tension, and resonance. Their literary application may criticize excessive mechanism rather than praise energy.

In Joubert. The speculation about ocular and erector fibers admits how little inner organization is known while relating bodily states to imagination. The self-directed note about easily agitated fibers makes slowness and moderate contemplation remedies for rapid weariness and excessive ambition for perfection. Style can also display its steel sinews too openly, or offer vibration without genuine emotion. The bodily material does not disappear when the comparison becomes literary.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 43–44, entry 1, ¶7 — Fibers are proposed as a bodily basis of intelligence and imagination.

I, p. 441, entry 6, ¶2 — Agitated fibers underlie a self-imposed discipline of restraint.

II, p. 486, entry 7, ¶1 — Steel sinews make a stylistic spring too evident.

II, p. 596, entry 14, ¶1 — Nerve and string are contrasted with heart and intelligence.

In this edition. “Erector fibers” retains the printed phrase without naming an organ. “Sinews” in the psaltery image preserves the string-like sense of nerfs; the translation does not impose a modern neurological account.

See also. Organization; Body; Force; Perfection; Mechanism.

Nobility

noblesse; noble — nobility; noble[283]

The word. Noblesse and noble carry a tension between social distinction and a quality of soul or conduct.

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[282] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 43, 44, 441; II, pp. 486, 596.

[283] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 742, 743, 915.

In Joubert. The fragment about receiving nobility from heaven keeps open whether it is transmissible; it does not identify a hereditary mechanism. The Lévis maxim is followed by Joubert's addition that nobility obliges one to be noble, making a title answerable to a quality. In the argument about industry and political power, he clarifies that his noble rulers mean those possessing nobility of soul, a dignity from heaven or light and not blood. The clarification belongs to this particular political claim. It should not erase every social or inherited sense elsewhere in the notebooks.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 742, entry 9, ¶1 — Heaven-given nobility may or may not be transmissible.

II, p. 743, entry 1, ¶1 — An attributed maxim is completed by an obligation to be noble.

II, p. 915, entry 9, ¶1 — Nobility of soul is explicitly distinguished from blood.

In this edition. Version 6 marks the boundary of the quoted maxim before Joubert's added infinitive. It preserves the transmissible/not-transmissible alternative and the undated status of the industry paragraph. The base provisionally renders villains in that paragraph, without converting it into modern criminality.

See also. Dignity; Honor; Virtue; Government.

Nothingness

néant — nothingness[284]

The word. Néant can name what seems absent or without substance, what offers thought no hold, or what has been lost. Its force is not identical in all three settings.

In Joubert. The spider-web account of creation calls what we name nothingness God's invisible fullness. The phrase unsettles the observer's label rather than presenting an empty receptacle from which things are mechanically produced. The first-person reflection on falsehood has a different limit: what seems false does not exist "for me," and comparison with something existent is needed before it can be refuted. That statement must not be generalized into a declaration that every falsehood is literally nonexistent.

The late imperative turns being and nothingness toward attention after loss: think of what remains rather than what is no longer yours. The distinction becomes practical without losing the larger vocabulary. These divergent uses help the reader avoid treating every occurrence as one settled metaphysical thesis.

[284] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 146, 305; II, pp. 862.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 146, entry 8, ¶1 — Apparently empty nothingness is recast as invisible fullness in the creation image.

I, p. 305, entry 4, ¶1 — What seems false gives the speaker's mind no argumentative hold.

II, p. 862, entry 10, ¶1 — Being/nothingness directs attention toward what remains.

In this edition. Version 6 retains nothingness and the local qualifications "what we call" and "for my mind." The second-person counsel at II.862 does not acquire a named addressee or an external philosophical school.

See also. Being; Void; Existence; Truth; Sorrow.

Notion

notion — notion; conception[285]

The word. Notion can be a first or comparatively undeveloped intellectual apprehension. It is not uniformly a disparaging name for a vague idea.

In Joubert. In the question about innate ideas, first notions serve, according to the reported account, as origins and materials; "we are told" keeps that explanation at a distance. The late glowworm image gives notions a different force: they are wrapped-up gleams that can be unwrapped, and they illuminate surroundings without necessarily becoming visible themselves. A note on physical truths says their discovery has practical uses while their conception brings the soul no happiness. Taken together, these passages ask what an apprehension contains, enables or nourishes rather than merely whether it is accurate.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 305, entry 2, ¶1 — First common notions appear in a qualified account of the origin of ideas.

II, p. 543, entry 11, ¶1 — The conception of physical truths is distinguished from their practical uses.

II, p. 905, entry 4, ¶1 — Wrapped gleams and a glowworm model illumination not fully seen by its possessor.

[285] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 305; II, pp. 543, 905.

In this edition. Version 6 uses notions in the origin and glowworm passages, conception for notion in the physical-truth fragment. “Wrapped-up” and “unwrap” preserve the enveloppées/développer relation, which an ordinary developed/undeveloped paraphrase would flatten.

See also. Idea; Knowledge; Intelligence; Truth.

Nourishment and digestion

nourriture; nutrition; aliment; digestion — food; nourishment; digestion[286]

The word. Joubert distinguishes taking something in from being nourished by it. The digestive vocabulary makes that difference available for books, learning, thought, and bodily effort.

In Joubert. The account of laborious digestion pictures the stomach as a hand that presses and wrings. It proposes that forceful processing can consume more vigor than the food restores. The later comparison with Vaucanson’s duck makes a related distinction in intellectual life: a mind may process what it learns yet produce only excretions. Neither passage allows the mere performance of digestion to prove assimilation or benefit.

The short pairing of expression with secretion and appropriate thought with nutrition separates giving something out from being sustained. The account of difficult books makes the distinction more precise: bad flavor need not imply a worthless nutritive product. Some books are good to digest although unpleasant to read. These comparisons differ in their immediate purpose, but together help explain why information, intellectual activity, pleasure, and nourishment are not interchangeable in the notebooks.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 123, entry 4, ¶1 — Muscular processing can cost more vigor than the food restores.

II, p. 605, entry 9, ¶1 — The mechanical duck models learning that does not nourish.

I, p. 111, entry 10, ¶1 — Expression and appropriate thought receive different bodily analogies.

II, p. 617, entry 3, ¶1 — Useful books may have disagreeable flavor but valuable digestive yield.

In this edition. Version 6 retains food, nourishment, digestion, and the coarse excretions of the mechanical comparison. Its account of Vaucanson’s duck is not a new technical

[286] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 111, 123, 187, 191; II, pp. 605, 617.

description of the automaton. The bodily account at I.123 likewise remains a historical observation and conjecture, not medical guidance.

Related terms.

Coction. *coction* — Coction is the historical digestive term retained by Version 6. Joubert quotes Aristotle on sleep occurring while coction takes place and waking when it is complete, then derives an account of forces concentrated in the stomach and juices distributed toward the extremities. The quoted maxim and the subsequent inference remain distinct. This is a historical physiological explanation, not a current definition of digestion or sleep.

Places. I, p. 187, entry 9, ¶1.

Secretion and excretion. *sécrétion; excrétion* — The contrast concerns what thought gives out and what sustains it. Expression produces a kind of pleasant secretion, whereas thinking what one should produces nourishment. The separate note on expenditure of coarse and subtle humors names excretions and secretions together while distinguishing what is lost and what must restore it. Version 6 retains both technical nouns; it does not replace them with a uniform metaphor of release.

Places. I, p. 111, entry 10, ¶1; I, p. 191, entry 1, ¶1.

See also. Chyle; Stomach; Science; Reading; Mechanism.

Novel

roman — novel; novels[287]

The word. Roman is a narrative genre and a comparison for a manner of reading. Its use does not by itself imply triviality or falsehood.

In Joubert. The reported Descartes reading instruction asks that a book first be read whole like a novel without strained attention. Joubert's answering wish chooses a poem for his own books. The contrast concerns the mode of reception, not simply whether one writes fiction. In the Greek/modern tragedy comparison, novel and poem supply another generic contrast, but the order of the pairs resists a neat point-for-point alignment; only the subsequent singing/speaking assignment is explicit. Lesage's café-and-domino scene is an imagined manner of composition, not evidence of where the novels were written.

[287] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 242; II, pp. 526, 830.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 242, entry 7, ¶1 — Novel-like reading is compared with Joubert's wished-for poem-like reading.

II, p. 526, entry 2, ¶1 — Novel and poem enter a qualified comparison between tragedies.

II, p. 830, entry 12, ¶1 — Lesage's novels receive a figurative scene of composition.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves [Descartes.] as a source-editor identification. It does not reverse novel and poem in the tragedy analogy to make the order conform to expectation, or turn "seem" in the Lesage passage into historical fact.

See also. Book; Reading; Poetry; Fable; Tragedy.

Number

nombre — number; numbers[288]

The word. Nombre can mean a count of things, the numerical strength of a multitude, or a formal measure in accounts of composition. The sense must come from the object being numbered.

In Joubert. The political passage makes a multitude's strength arise from its numbers, while recommending that it learn to contain that strength. In the reflection on concentration, a unity can equal a number, just as a thought can hold a book's essence. The late comparison of Tacitus and Cicero places exact number beside the weight and measure of words. These examples keep quantity in view while resisting the inference that more units necessarily mean greater excellence.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 459, entry 3, ¶1 — A multitude derives strength from its numbers.

II, p. 589, entry 7, ¶1 — A unity may equal a number in excellence.

II, p. 898, entry 2, ¶1 — Exact number accompanies weight and measure in perfect style.

In this edition. Version 6 retains "number" in the literary passages rather than silently paraphrasing it as either quantity or rhythm. Its relation to verbal measure remains available to the reader without an imposed technical definition. The translation note identifies a rhetorical-harmony or cadence sense in the Tacitus comparison, without excluding numerical proportion.

See also. Unity; Measure; Quantity and quality; Perfection.

[288] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 459; II, pp. 589, 898.

Obedience

obéir; obéissance — obey; obedience[289]

The word. Obedience connects the will to a command or recognized rule, but its direction matters: one may obey oneself, another person, or what is better than oneself.

In Joubert. Carrying out divine designs blindly differs from freely obeying commandments. The distinction leaves room for moral agency within providence. Excellence is likewise not reduced to constant self-command: the foremost have commanded themselves to obey what exceeds them. In education, children's obedience depends on seeing their parents obey a rule in turn. Finally, the compressed assertion that every power springs from some obedience reverses the expected order of explanation. These witnesses make obedience relational. They do not all describe the same institution, and they do not authorize assigning every form of submission the freedom claimed for obeying divine commandments.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 226, entry 12, ¶1 — Divine designs and freely obeyed commandments are distinguished.

II, p. 528, entry 2, ¶1 — Self-command is redirected toward something better than oneself.

II, p. 700, entry 10, ¶1 — Parents' obedience makes a rule visible to children.

II, p. 835, entry 10, ¶1 — Power is traced back to obedience without specifying an office.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the repeated verbs and reversals. The foremost renders rank rather than chronological priority. The universal power sentence keeps all, sole and some distinct and names no political office.

See also. Will; Freedom; Authority; Rules; Education.

Object and subject

objet; sujet — object; subject[290]

The word. Objet and sujet have several contexts that do not map neatly onto a modern opposition between knowing subject and external object. An object may be what is perceived or considered; a subject may be a bearer of qualities or a work's topic.

In Joubert. The reflection on definition circumscribes a bodiless object in an unreal space: being an object of discourse does not require being a physical body. The

[289] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 226; II, pp. 528, 700, 835.

[290] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 277; II, pp. 481, 489, 917.

provisional assemblage of qualities calls their bearer a subject and distinguishes substance as an assemblage of accidents. In literary making, however, an ordinary work needs a subject while a beautiful one needs a germ. Here subject names thematic material rather than a conscious observer. The material object entering a space supplies yet another use, in the optical displacement comparison.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 917, entry 1, ¶1 — An object of definition can be bodiless.

I, p. 277, entry 2, ¶1 — Subject is provisionally treated as an assemblage of qualities.

II, p. 489, entry 3, ¶1 — Subject is a work's topic, distinguished from its germ.

II, p. 481, entry 6, ¶1 — A visible object is considered as an entering body.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves object and subject where the contexts sustain them. Neither word by itself establishes a modern subject–object theory, and the tentative "Let us say" remains significant.

See also. Body; Essence; Substance; Seed and germ; Reality.

Opinion

opinion — opinion[291]

The word. Opinion is an adopted or held view; holding it and establishing its truth are different questions.

In Joubert. The intellectual-machine metaphor shows one opinion being fitted into another already accepted. A later reversal of facts and opinions makes the distinction especially clear: an opinion reported in a philosopher may be a certain fact because the philosopher held it, without thereby becoming a true opinion. The molding passage asks whether minds form opinions or opinions form minds, then sets the soul's reception of truth beside these reciprocal relations. That passage preserves an unresolved damaged conjunction in the parallel account of the heart; its formulation should not be regularized into a seamless doctrine.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 107, entry 2, ¶1 — Reasoning can force an opinion into a prior opinion.

II, p. 866, entry 4, ¶1 — The fact that an opinion was held is distinguished from its truth.

II, p. 681, entry 5, ¶3 — Mind and opinion can be mutually molded.

[291] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 107; II, pp. 681, 866.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps opinion separate from truth and from the act of seeing. In II.866 “held them” makes clear what is certain; it does not endorse the opinions. The French residue […]u remains visible in the English of II.681.

See also. Truth; Prejudice; Reasoning; History.

Oppression

oppression; opprimer — oppression; oppressed[292]

The word. Oppression describes the destructive use of a superior position and the condition imposed on those beneath it.

In Joubert. The statue that sinks its own base gives hierarchy a limit internal to its support: lowering an inferior can lower the superior too. Superposition must not be oppression. The verbal correction from slave people to oppressed people concerns how a description distributes blame and favor. Joubert hears reproach in the first epithet and a claim to commendation in the second. The distinction is his rhetorical and moral judgment, not a universal rule about the people to whom those terms have been applied. Read together, the passages connect dependence with the responsibility of those who possess power.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 332, entry 2, ¶5 — A superior that destroys its base destroys its own support.

II, p. 698, entry 3, ¶1 — Changing an epithet changes the moral implication of a people’s condition.

In this edition. Version 6 retains superposition and both sinkings rather than replacing the statue with a political abstraction. It leaves the fragment about lowering an inferior unfinished. In the later maxim no particular population is identified.

See also. Authority; Government; Servitude; Justice.

Order

ordre — order[293]

The word. Order can be an arrangement of parts, a regulating relation, or a standard to which rules themselves must answer. It is not simply obedience to an already written rule.

[292] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 332; II, pp. 698.

[293] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 45, 263; II, pp. 680.

In Joubert. The invitation to imagine universal order makes accordance with it the standard of beauty in ideas and institutions and of goodness in acts and plans. A later question asks what to do if a rule is badly regulated: order and the good remain the essential regulators of the rule. These formulations put a criterion beyond mere conformity.

The desired book of thoughts offers a concrete image of order: stars that follow one another harmoniously and at intervals, each able to subsist independently. Excessively strict cohesion and the smallest incoherence are both rejected. Readers should preserve this double demand, especially in a notebook whose entries cannot be forced into a continuous treatise.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 45, entry 2, ¶4 — Universal order relates differently to beauty and goodness.

II, p. 680, entry 6, ¶1 — A rule must itself conform to order and the good.

I, p. 263, entry 9, ¶1 — Thoughts should be coordinated like separated stars.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the repeated rule/regulate vocabulary in II.680 and the qualifications in the stellar image. Neither passage licenses reconstructing an unwritten systematic order for the notebooks.

See also. Cohesion; Unity; Proportion; Necessity; Measure.

Organization

organisation; organisé — organization; constitution; bodily constitution; organized[294]

The word. Organisation often concerns the bodily arrangement and disposition of organs, not the administration of a group. Organisé can likewise describe the relation of living parts.

In Joubert. The early account treats bodily constitution as one source of happiness. Later, aptitudes and powers belong to the instrument and are distinguished from what lies within responsibility. The brain passage makes causal reliance upon constitution conditional and cautions against inferring it from outward shape. Plastic forms, meanwhile, concern the balanced parts of organized bodies. These witnesses link structure and capacity without licensing a modern biological diagnosis of Joubert or his subjects.

[294] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 38, 458; II, pp. 677, 678, 680.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 38, entry 3, ¶1 — Bodily constitution is a reported source of stable happiness.

II, p. 677–678, entry 10, ¶1 — Constitution is distinguished from accountable choice.

II, p. 680, entry 2, ¶1 — Operation provides better evidence than external bodily signs.

I, p. 458, entry 1, ¶1 — Organized bodies possess internally balanced forms.

In this edition. The translation alternates “organization,” “constitution,” and “bodily constitution” to keep the physical meaning available. This is a contextual family, not three different source terms.

See also. Body; Nerves and fibers; Elasticity; Plastic forms; Quantity and quality.

Organs and brain

organe; cerveau; chair — organ; organs; brain; flesh[295]

The word. Organs are bodily instruments or sites of activity; cerveau is the brain, while chair names flesh. Joubert uses their differences when discussing the relation of thought to its bodily conditions.

In Joubert. The criticism of inferring mind from head-shape says the brain’s constitution is better known through operation than through outward dimensions. The appendix’s Aeolian-harp image asks delicate organs to respond to an impulse from nature instead of being forced into production by mere will. A separate account of ideas imagines an impression passing through the whole body when eyes, hearing, and flesh are insensible. These accounts are historically situated reflections, not mutually verified neurological mechanisms.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 680, entry 2, ¶1 — Operation, not external dimensions, discloses brain disposition.

II, p. 926, entry 3, ¶1 — An immediately preceding passage criticizes a brain made active only by will, without natural production.

II, p. 926, entry 4, ¶1 — Delicate organs respond like an Aeolian harp.

I, p. 249, entry 2, ¶1 — Flesh and sensory activity can be suspended in an account of impressions.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the differences among organ, brain, and flesh. It does not replace bodily constitution with a modern diagnostic category or turn the harp into a literal experimental model.

See also. Body; Organization; Nerves and fibers; Air; Mechanism.

[295] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 249; II, pp. 680, 926.

Origin and root

source; racine; naissance — source; root; birth[296]

The word. This grouped image family names where something begins, is nourished, or takes its first departure. Source, root, and birth remain different images rather than interchangeable technical terms.

In Joubert. Light is given intelligence as its source and movement will as its first point of departure. The plant image of a banyan makes branches touch earth, root, and rise again as new trees: origin can recur through connected growth. The “eve of the birth of the world” places cosmic beginning beside a paradox about eternity’s preceding time by an instant. Such usages make beginnings imaginable without always asserting a dated event.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 473, entry 2, ¶2 — Light and movement receive distinct originating principles.

I, p. 248, entry 3, ¶1 — Branching generates new rooted beginnings.

II, p. 730, entry 8, ¶1 — World-birth is joined to an image of eternity’s boundary.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the three source images. Racine as an author’s name is a false hit for racine meaning root and is not evidence here; no birthplace or date is inferred from metaphorical naissance.

See also. Cause and effect; Principle; Tree; Growth; Time; Eternity.

Originality

originalité — originality[297]

The word. Originality names a natural individual cast of mind or expression. It may reveal a writer’s character without making that character suitable for imitation or adding much to an idea already beautiful in itself.

In Joubert. The passage on naked ideas places a limit on expressive originality: some ideas need only clarity, and grandeur, energy or originality of wording adds almost nothing to their effect. This is not a denial that expression matters elsewhere. The warning about original writers concerns the audience’s imitation of their temperament; the exception requires readers to understand, from the writers themselves, that they

[296] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 248, 473; II, pp. 730.

[297] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 198, 372, 377, 474.

should not imitate them. Another note asks that good disposition, the “good-nature” of originality, prevail over fashionable judgment. Finally the manner classification calls a natural manner originality, distinguishing it both from involuntary tic and from contrived jargon. The family thus joins individuality to limits on its authority as a model.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 198, entry 9, ¶1 — Originality of expression can add little to already beautiful ideas.

I, p. 372, entry 1, ¶1 — Original writers require readers who know not to imitate them.

I, p. 377, entry 5, ¶4 — Good-natured originality is preferred to fashionable judgment.

I, p. 474, entry 1, ¶1 — Natural manner is called originality.

In this edition. Version 6 retains originality and the English borrowing good-nature already present in the French. Brk and the source editor’s [Berkeley] remain separate, and the attributed remark is not independently verified. “Almost nothing” is preserved; the passage does not claim expressive originality never matters.

See also. Literary manner; Imitation; Model; Author; Naturalness.

Ornament

ornement — ornament; adornment[298]

The word. Ornement can enrich appearance without being intrinsically opposed to truth, but excess or a misleading model can make it objectionable.

In Joubert. Personified Truth loves adornments, although the fragment stops before explaining when she appears adorned. The overloaded Cybele shows a different effect: clothing and accessories make the divine figure merely a queen with a country. Ornament can restrict a figure’s kind or reach rather than simply make it more beautiful. Voltaire’s ornaments may then be faulted for their example without being condemned as bad taste in themselves. The distinction asks what other writers will learn from the practice, not only whether the immediate effect pleases.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 59, entry 7, ¶1 — Truth’s love of adornment remains an unfinished personification.

II, p. 477, entry 6, ¶1 — Overloaded ornaments make Cybele human and geographically particular.

II, p. 848, entry 4, ¶1 — An ornament may set a bad example without being in bad taste.

[298] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 59; II, pp. 477, 848.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the condition in the Voltaire judgment and the feminine she for Truth. “Proper word” means the apt word in the criticism of globe, not a proper name. Neither unfinished statement is supplied with a conclusion.

See also. Aesthetic grace; Simplicity; Style; Truth; Taste.

Painting

peinture — painting[299]

The word. Peinture is a visual art and a recurrent model for literary or intellectual presentation. Its vocabulary often keeps a technical sense inside a metaphor.

In Joubert. The painter’s choice of how many figures to use depends on whether an event or a single passion is depicted. The distinction concerns compositional purpose, not an absolute preference for many or few figures. Painting’s planes and stippling then model the difference between the soul’s larger apprehension and the mind’s points. In history, painting a time or portraying an era is contrasted with the narrower portrait of a single life. The undated wish to express himself through painting, music and dance goes beyond communication: Joubert imagines acquiring ideas and feelings otherwise unavailable to him.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 59, entry 2, ¶1 — Compositional quantity depends on event or single passion.

II, p. 507, entry 7, ¶1 — Planes and stippling model different powers of apprehension.

I, p. 316, entry 7, ¶1 — Painting an era defines history’s wider task.

II, p. 922, entry 4, ¶1 — Different expressive arts could make different ideas available.

In this edition. Version 6 clarifies ne saurait trop as “no number … too great/too small.” Plans means planes, not plans of action, and pointillé is stippling. The supplied French [employer] has no isolated English verb counterpart in that revised construction.

See also. Drawing; Color; Art; History; Expression.

[299] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 59, 316; II, pp. 507, 922.

Passion

passion — passion; passions[300]

The word. Passion covers powerful affections and impulses, including those represented in tragedy. It is not consistently synonymous with vice or with romantic love.

In Joubert. Chastity is praised as restraint of a commanding passion that strengthens the soul for other virtues. Yet the account of law insists that certain passions must be satisfied through property, paternal power and polite ceremony while remaining bounded. Regulation includes inward exercise, not external suppression alone. Tragic passions are then described as purified of reality: shadows, bodiless and almost spiritual. Their force belongs to representation. These three uses distinguish discipline, institutional accommodation and artistic transformation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 33, entry 2, ¶1 — A restrained passion becomes a source of moral strength.

I, p. 462, entry 4, ¶1 — Laws satisfy passions while moderation and inward power bound them.

II, p. 868, entry 8, ¶1 — Tragedy removes passions from bodily reality.

In this edition. Version 6 repeats passions through the tragic formulation and preserves “almost,” avoiding an absolute claim of spirituality. The Latin amor habendi in the law passage remains in the text; its note explains love of having or possessing.

See also. Desire; Virtue; Will; Law; Pity and compassion.

Past, present, and future

passé; présent; avenir — past; present; future[301]

The word. These temporal positions have different imaginative forms and different uses in action. Joubert does not treat them simply as three exchangeable stretches of duration.

In Joubert. The Fates’ spinning apparatus distinguishes wound thread, the thread being spun, and unformed tow. The future is represented through something still shapeless, rather than through another completed part of the thread. The practical imperative assigns deliberation to the past, enjoyment to the present, and action to the future. A later fragment brings all three into the possession of a good through memory, prospect,

[300] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 33, 462; II, pp. 868.

[301] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 37, 47; II, pp. 723.

and reality. The orders of the two lists differ; their relation should be explained without rearranging the text.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 37, entry 1, ¶1 — Different parts and states of spinning represent temporal divisions.

I, p. 47, entry 1, ¶12 — Past, present and future have distinct uses in deliberation, enjoyment and action.

II, p. 723, entry 2, ¶1 — Memory, prospect and reality make good available in three temporal relations.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves distaff, spindle, and tow as separate objects. Consultes at I.47 is the intransitive deliberate, not an unnamed act of seeking advice. At II.723 [enjoys] and [good] remain contextual restorations of damaged words; the Lexicon does not certify their missing letters.

See also. Time; Duration and instant; Memory; Hope; Thread and spinning.

Pathos

pathétique; pathos — pathos; pathetic; appeal to emotion[302]

The word. Pathos concerns emotional effect. Joubert distinguishes rhetorical emotion from a pejorative false appeal and from a coarse physical response that leaves the mind uninvolved.

In Joubert. Voices lamenting invented misfortunes can create real suffering in their speakers through a circuit of tongue, ear and mind. The successive formulations about wholly physical pathos then narrow their criticism to artists aiming only at coarse sensations. Pathos nevertheless remains one legitimate mode of persuasion, operating through emotion beside the demonstrative mode's light. In comparing Rollin, Fénelon, Plato and Rousseau, the Greek term marks powerful emotional effect; Joubert expressly warns that the usual disparaging meaning of pathos is not intended there. The epos–ethos–pathos triad offers a more discriminating assessment: narration can be clear while the book's displayed character is morose and its emotional effect acrid.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 98, entry 12, ¶1 — Feigned misfortune can produce genuine suffering through vocal effect.

I, p. 457, entry 2, ¶1 — A revised formulation criticizes artists aiming only at coarse sensation.

II, p. 631, entry 1, ¶1 — The pathetic mode persuades through emotion.

[302] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 98, 457; II, pp. 631, 670, 683.

II, p. 670, entry 11, ¶1 — Greek pathos identifies a powerful effect beside ethos.

II, p. 670, entry 11, ¶2 — The usual pejorative sense is explicitly excluded from that example.

II, p. 683, entry 2, ¶1 — Narrative, character and emotional effect receive separate judgments.

In this edition. Version 6 uses pathos, pathetic and appeal to emotion with their local distinctions. Pathetic does not mean pitiful in the technical rhetorical contrast. Greek ἦθος and πάθος remain Greek in the French witness; the English loans preserve their contrast. The abbreviation A. Rné and its history remain unidentified.

See also. Eloquence; Persuasion; Sensation; Feeling; Tragedy; Rhetoric.

Patience

patience — patience; patiently[303]

The word. Patience covers waiting, sustained study and bearing with others. It is an active condition of attention as well as endurance.

In Joubert. The account of taking turns in speech contrasts patient listening with snatching the floor. The artistic-study passage makes patience in learning procedures and the craft's language evidence of composure; joined to an adequate idea of the aim, it enables excellent criticism. The attributed Marcus Aurelius comparison then makes patience part of justice. In each case patience serves something beyond merely letting time pass: another's completed speech, learned skill or fair treatment.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 71, entry 5, ¶2 — Waiting lets another's discourse reach its end.

II, p. 643, entry 3, ¶1 — Patient study demonstrates the composure needed for criticism.

II, p. 675, entry 8, ¶1 — Patience is included within justice through an attribution.

In this edition. Version 6 uses composure for sangfroid in the study passage, without equating it with artistic indifference. It retains the distinction between Joubert's indulgence and the attributed patience, and leaves the damaged preceding article unfilled in the French.

See also. Conversation; Justice; Consolation; Leisure.

[303] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 71; II, pp. 643, 675.

Peace

paix — peace[304]

The word. Paix concerns inward composure and relations with other people, as well as the absence of war. The selected witnesses make it a condition of expression and a practical truth.

In Joubert. The poet should keep calm style and moderate terms even when depicting hateful objects; the dignity of this restraint comes from peace of soul. The neighbor passage distinguishes the obligation to live in peace and union from incidental facts about where a neighbor has been. Its provocative criterion values a truth one needs for conduct over information one may ignore. The passage does not convert permissible ignorance into a command never to notice ordinary facts.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 87, entry 6, ¶1 — Peace of soul sustains dignity in hostile description.

II, p. 809, entry 6, ¶4 — Peace with a neighbor is a practically binding truth.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the peace/union pair and the contrasting cellar/attic examples. It keeps the Latin saying attributed to Lucan in the poet's instruction, with its note supplying the sense rather than replacing the source quotation.

See also. Anger; Moderation; Society; War; Duty; Dignity.

Perception

perception — perception; perceptions[305]

The word. Perception can name an apprehension of what is encountered, including intellectual premises. Joubert distinguishes it from attention, clarity and feeling rather than treating it as a self-sufficient act.

In Joubert. Against the reported claim that perception produces attention, Joubert replies that attention prepares perception and often precedes it in a formed person. He acknowledges the objection concerning the first perception and first attention, but the final reply breaks off. No completed solution should be supplied. Another paragraph inserts distance and an interval between senses and perceptions, impacts and responses: the repeated calming verbs resist a simple picture of immediate reaction. Elsewhere

[304] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 87; II, pp. 809.

[305] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 282, 290; II, pp. 605, 776.

perception can be present without clarity, warmth, movement or feeling. In the Malebranche note, however, perceiving premises belongs with intuition, in contrast to reasoning toward a conclusion. These uses show why perception need not mean merely registering an external sensation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 282, entry 1, ¶1 — Attention can prepare perception, but the reply remains unfinished.

I, p. 290, entry 10, ¶1 — An interval separates sensory impact from perception and determination.

II, p. 605, entry 7, ¶2 — Perception is allowed without clarity or feeling.

II, p. 776, entry 1, ¶1 — Perception of premises differs from reasoning or conclusion.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps perception in all four contexts. “This can… otherwise” preserves the unfinished response to Condillac. The interval paragraph retains all five spatial and temporal nouns rather than supplying a physiological mechanism. Self-evidence renders évidence in the Malebranche note, where perception is explicitly intellectual.

See also. Attention; Sensation; Intuition; Evidence; Eyes and ears.

Perfection

perfection; perfectibilité — perfection; perfectibility[306]

The word. Perfection can be completeness and exactness, an ideal guiding judgment, or the excellence of a particular mode. Perfectibility concerns the capacity for improvement rather than an achieved state.

In Joubert. The idea of perfection is expressly said to matter more than models in both arts and conduct. Respect itself presupposes some conception of excellence. Neither claim makes every perfected artifact appropriate to its occasion: the perfection found in Balzac’s letters may be useless to that genre and too laborious for ordinary correspondence.

The late comparison of Tacitus and Cicero allows a style to be less beautiful yet perhaps more perfect. Every word has its weight, its measure, and its exact number; perfection resides in elements and whole together. The qualification “perhaps” and the distinction between beauty and perfection prevent a simplistic ranking. Duration as a means of human perfectibility supplies the corresponding vocabulary of development, without guaranteeing indefinite progress.

[306] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 45, 471; II, pp. 515, 657, 898.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 657, entry 7, ¶1 — Perfection's idea guides arts and conduct beyond existing models.

I, p. 471, entry 6, ¶1 — Respect has as its underlying cause an opinion of excellence and an idea of perfection.

II, p. 515, entry 9, ¶1 — An achieved perfection can be unsuitable to a genre.

II, p. 898, entry 2, ¶1 — Perfect elements and a perfect whole are distinguished from comparative beauty.

I, p. 45, entry 2, ¶5 — Duration is a means of perfectibility.

In this edition. "Perfection" and "perfectibility" remain separate in Version 6. The Tacitus judgment keeps "perhaps"; the lexicon should not turn its qualified comparison into an absolute literary verdict. The English "perfect whole and perfect elements" adopts a contextual shared attachment: French prints parfaits only after élémens, and a narrower attachment to elements alone remains possible.

See also. Essence; Measure; Order; Time; Proportion.

Perspective

perspective — perspective; prospect; in view[307]

The word. Perspective can mean a visible prospect or an arranged intellectual distance from which something becomes apprehensible.

In Joubert. The reported mountain prospect gives scattered clouds a magical effect. In discussion of Plato, a detour may be justified by the perspective or surprise that makes truth striking; the repeated fragments do not complete the argument. The instruction for judging a work requires making distance, creating perspective and choosing a point of view, even for a word or discourse. These are distinct acts of arranging apprehension, not a measurable viewing distance. Elsewhere having a second life in perspective simply means having it in view within a conditional argument about education.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 69, entry 2, ¶2 — Perspective is the prospect made magical by clouds below the observer.

II, p. 492, entry 4, ¶1 — A philosophical detour can arrange perspective and surprise.

II, p. 648, entry 1, ¶1 — Judgment of works requires a chosen distance and viewpoint.

II, p. 734, entry 7, ¶1 — Perspective becomes the life kept in view by education.

[307] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 69; II, pp. 492, 648, 734.

In this edition. Version 6 uses prospect for the landscape and in view for the practical orientation, retaining perspective in the compositional analogies. The conditional argument about two lives is not expanded into an independent proof of an afterlife.

See also. Judgment; Method; Architecture; Idea.

Persuasion

persuasion; persuader — persuasion; persuade[308]

The word. Persuasion moves a listener toward a belief or act through receptive participation. Its means can be emotional or clarifying, and its distinction from force is not equivalent to the absence of influence.

In Joubert. The wind leading a ship supplies an image of guidance without force. Another maxim connects persuasion to what people already want: dissuasion can expose a difference between actual and imagined desire. In the extended oratorical contrast, persuasion makes the audience partners, moving rather than merely holding them and giving feelings and acts of will as well as thoughts. The kneading image keeps the force of this influence visible. A subsequent note rejects the restriction of persuasion to pathos, allowing rightness and clarity of expression to persuade through light. Finally persuasion is valued above conviction because it makes people act rather than chaining them. These contexts make persuasion active without reducing it to coercion or to bare demonstration.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 91, entry 7, ¶1 — Persuasion leads as wind leads a ship.

I, p. 293, entry 3, ¶1 — Dissuasion can disclose what someone actually wants.

II, p. 541, entry 14, ¶1 — The audience participates in persuasive eloquence.

II, p. 631, entry 1, ¶1 — Light and emotion offer different means of persuasion.

II, p. 803, entry 4, ¶1 — Persuasion moves to action where conviction chains.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves persuasion and persuade. The rhetorical pathetic concerns emotion, not pitiful quality. Joubert's attributed Boileau quotation remains distinct from his response; its independent textual location is not established. The God passage is a theological assertion in the notebook, not a translation rule for conviction elsewhere.

See also. Conviction; Eloquence; Pathos; Will; Desire.

[308] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 91, 293; II, pp. 541, 631, 803.

Philosophy

philosophie; philosophe; philosopher — philosophy; philosopher; philosophize[309]

The word. Philosophie can mean inquiry into matter or spirit, a manner of exercising the soul, or a historically qualified intellectual character.

In Joubert. The two-philosophies passage refuses a choice between material and inward inquiry: senses and experiments suit matter, inward sight and experience of oneself suit spirit. Its inventory of instruments includes reasoning but also imagination, feeling, patience and enthusiasm. The soul's wings and feet suggest that truth requires more than a single intellectual procedure. The instruction to philosophize with the soul accordingly distinguishes soul, mind and reason rather than treating them as interchangeable names.

The word philosopher is also explicitly disputed through its uses. In the French sense described on I.131, he erects his own tribunal and prefers private judgments to established customs. In the "old sense" on II.889, his mind and reason make him upright without those external supports. The shared independence therefore receives different emphasis, and the first criticism should not be turned into a blanket rejection of philosophical reason.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 259, entry 6, ¶1 — Two necessary inquiries use different but cooperating instruments.

II, p. 752, entry 10, ¶1 — Philosophizing with the soul exceeds exclusive reliance on mind or reason.

I, p. 131, entry 4, ¶1 — A specifically French sense of philosopher is contrasted with a Greek one.

II, p. 889, entry 4, ¶1 — An expressly old sense makes reason the source of uprightness.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes experiments from experience of oneself within I.259. In II.889 the printed Latin ratiosinandi is not silently corrected: [reasoning] is an English-only contextual emendation, not a recovered missing word or authenticated Latin maxim. These local distinctions establish neither a complete history of philosophy nor a single final system.

Related terms.

Philantosophy. *philantosophie; philantosophe* — The rare formations philantosophie and philantosophes become philantosophy and philantosophers in Version 6. The following paragraph contrasts philosophy as love of wisdom and duties with philantosophy as love

[309] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 131, 196, 259, 393; II, pp. 676, 696, 699, 700, 752, 882, 889.

of knowledge of rights or forgetting duties. Crucially, the printed gloss is exposé, exposition, not opposé, opposite; the apparently tempting correction is not made. The coinage carries Joubert's polemical distinction, but its history and etymology are not independently established here.

Places. II, p. 882, entry 3, ¶1; II, p. 882, entry 4, ¶1.

Peripatetic. *péripatéticien* — The Peripatetics appear through several judgments rather than one blanket approval. Joubert rejects their indivisible-point account using musical resonance and swelling contact; a reported older characterization nonetheless assigns them subtlety, finesse and delicacy. The light paragraph proposes an improved formulation in their language, then adds outside the eye to satisfy genus and difference. It must not be mistaken for an exact quotation from Aristotle. The Lyon classification makes logic Peripatetic while assigning other fields to other traditions. Version 6 retains the school name and all local qualifications; these witnesses do not establish an independently verified history of the school.

Places. I, p. 196, entry 8, ¶1; I, p. 393, entry 3, ¶1; II, p. 696, entry 5, ¶1; II, p. 699–700, entry 12, ¶1.

Stoic. *stoïcien* — The compressed judgment "Slaves of definitions" attaches to the Stoics in a separate paragraph. A later note calls Diderot's reduction of a thing to matter and form Stoic analysis recommended by Marcus Aurelius. The criticism belongs to Joubert and is not an externally authenticated account of either author. Version 6 retains Stoic and the opaque fr-tt-m-nt and inst-st-ns without expanding those codes or importing a fuller passage.

Places. I, p. 393, entry 2, ¶2; II, p. 676, entry 6, ¶1.

See also. Reason; Mind; Experience; Faculty; Metaphysics; Truth.

Phosphorus

phosphore — phosphorus[310]

The word. Phosphore is the material image for a light that seems transferable from the poet or his finger to writing. Its radiance need not amount to illumination of the reader.

In Joubert. The fragment about writing with mind and thought recalls the poet's finger passing its phosphorus into an unspecified thing. Its initial luminosity is kept as an appearance, without turning the chemical name into a precise substance in a laboratory account. Much later, minds rubbed with phosphorus seem luminous but shine without

[310] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 493, 772.

illuminating. The distinction limits the value of borrowed brilliance: visible effect and clarifying power are separate achievements.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 493, entry 2, ¶1 — The poet's finger supplies transferable literary luminosity.

II, p. 772, entry 7, ¶1 — Minds can shine through borrowed phosphorus without illuminating.

In this edition. Version 6 retains phosphorus instead of silently replacing it with inspiration or glow. The earlier pronoun has no named object and its possessor remains potentially ambiguous. At II.772 the English plural follows the plural verbs and pronouns, while French singular Esprit is left uncorrected.

See also. Light; Rays and radiance; Poetry; Truth.

Physics

physique — physics; physical[311]

The word. Physics is inquiry into material nature, with a historical breadth that need not match a modern academic department. The adjective physique may simply mean bodily or material.

In Joubert. Joubert challenges explanations that turn suppositions into assertions and conceal comparisons inside systems. His preference for the certain and established in physics follows from that concern. Synthetic physics shows order through a whole, while analytical physics may display apparent incoherence by dividing parts. These criticisms do not make every natural observation worthless; they press the distinction between a conjectural image and established evidence.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 248, entry 6, ¶1 — Explanations may disguise suppositions as assertions.

II, p. 745, entry 10, ¶1 — Physics should prefer what is certain and established.

II, p. 768, entry 8, ¶1 — Synthetic and analytical views produce different appearances of order.

I, p. 45, entry begun p. 44, no. 1, ¶10 — The adjective physical describes a person confined to present sensation.

[311] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 45, 248; II, pp. 745, 768.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes noun “physics” from adjective “physical.” It keeps “apparent incoherence,” which is not the same as declaring the analyzed world actually incoherent. The final celle-là in the synthesis/analysis entry is not a secure identification of its unnamed subject’s preferred kind; the translation note preserves that antecedent question.

See also. Metaphysics; Whole and part; Cause and effect; Matter; Mechanism.

Physiognomy

physionomie — physiognomy; physiognomies; countenance[312]

The word. Physionomie concerns the face as expressive appearance. Its use need not imply a systematic science of inferring fixed character from anatomical shape.

In Joubert. The word can be rendered countenance when Joubert contrasts an open expression with one shut in, extending the image to a buttoned-up air. Another fragment restricts its view of bodies to physiognomies, supports for heads, and finally dwellings for souls; its unexplained “that age” prevents an invented biographical setting. The question about masters asks how ways and hidden moods manifested in the face influence children. It remains a question about visible expression and influence, not proof of a reliable diagnostic method.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 448, entry 7, ¶1 — Countenance takes spatial and clothing metaphors.

II, p. 626, entry 4, ¶1 — Faces are viewed as expressions within a restrictive account of bodies.

II, p. 757, entry 9, ¶1 — A question links visible demeanor to influence on children.

In this edition. Version 6 varies countenance and physiognomy with context. It preserves the question, the unnamed age, and form/deform. Masters is not narrowed to a modern school occupation, and the Lexicon supplies no diagnosis or fixed physiognomic doctrine.

See also. Body; Character; Education; Expression.

[312] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 448; II, pp. 626, 757.

Piety

piété — piety[313]

The word. Piété describes an inward religious disposition that works through feeling and can shape a person's manner of life. Its relation to other disciplines is analogical rather than simply competitive.

In Joubert. Piety is to the heart what poetry is to imagination and beautiful metaphysics to mind: it exercises sensibility's full extent. Yet Joubert also says religious morality cannot by itself regulate manners, making politeness and honor separately necessary. The heavenly-court image gives piety an ennobling social setting without identifying the unnamed people whom it ennobles. Holiness is a related but stronger category: the distinction between reason making one moderate and holiness making one chaste should not be erased by treating every religious virtue as identical.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 130, entry 3, ¶1 — Piety exercises the heart and the extent of sensibility.

I, p. 434, entry 6, ¶1 — Politeness and honor have disciplines not supplied by piety alone.

II, p. 840, entry 13, ¶1 — Piety's ennobling work is figured as life at the heavenly court.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps piety distinct from devotion and preserves the court metaphor. "Them" in the ennobling fragment remains unspecified. The variant French spellings anoblit/annoblit do not produce different English senses.

Related terms.

Holiness. *sainteté* — Saintliness is distinguished from mere moderation; a saint who remains within holiness is placed above a sage. These are comparative judgments, not a general definition of sainthood.

Places. I, p. 174, entry 7, ¶1; II, p. 845, entry 8, ¶1.

See also. Devotion; Heart; Sensibility; Politeness; Humility.

[313] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 130, 174, 434; II, pp. 840, 845.

Pity and compassion

pitié; compassion — pity; compassion[314]

The word. Pitié and compassion join responsiveness to suffering with restraint in action. The vocabulary can also describe an emotion represented rather than actually endured.

In Joubert. The instruction concerning the dead makes pity prospective and ethical: avoid what would have grieved them had they foreseen it. The angelic-love fragment expands pity toward both self and others and concludes with “Eternal compassion!” Its universal language should remain an assertion, not be disguised as a modest psychological observation. In tragedy, pity belongs among passions purified of reality and described as bodiless shadows. The same term thus moves between conduct toward others, a spiritual image and dramatic representation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 34–35, entry 3, ¶6 — Pity for the dead restrains the living person’s conduct.

II, p. 855, entry 8, ¶1 — Pity enters every feeling in a sweeping angelic comparison.

II, p. 868, entry 8, ¶1 — Tragic pity is distinguished from passions rooted in present reality.

In this edition. Version 6 repeats pity where the French repeats pitié, then gives compassion for the closing noun. It retains the unreal conditional concerning the dead and the qualification “almost spiritual” in the tragic passage.

See also. Love; Charity; Sorrow; Passion.

Plastic forms

forme plastique — plastic forms; molding forms[315]

The word. Plastic here concerns shaping or molding. It does not name modern synthetic material.

In Joubert. The defining passage contrasts geometrical forms suited to measurement with plastic forms suited to organized bodies. Their work is to balance parts within and harmonize visible proportions without. An earlier criticism rejects the school’s assignment of particular souls to particular matters through substantial or plastic forms, preferring a general soul for matter in general. The two uses retain an interest in formative organization without proving assent to one inherited system.

[314] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 34, 35; II, pp. 855, 868.

[315] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 443, 458.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 458, entry 1, ¶1 — Plastic is expressly glossed by molding and bodily organization.

I, p. 443, entry 2, ¶1 — The forms of the school enter a critical contrast.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “plastic” and Joubert’s own explanatory “molding.” The Greek πλαστή remains in the manuscript; this article does not substitute an unsupported etymological derivation for the contextual gloss.

See also. Form; Organization; Proportion; Matter.

Plausibility and probability

vraisemblance; vraisemblable; probabilité — plausibility; the plausible; verisimilitude; verisimilitudes; probability; probabilities[316]

The word. Vraisemblance concerns likeness or credibility relative to truth; probabilité names probability. Joubert distinguishes their roles without supplying a numerical theory of likelihood.

In Joubert. An imagined wicked person must remain believable even to the best good person. In the proposed reply to Bonnald, plausibility suffices for represented feelings, while actions demand worldly reality; this is Joubert’s argument about poetry and history, not an uncontested rule of drama. The Malebranche-reading note makes a different division: probability can suffice for moral action and for the mind’s satisfaction in physics, but not for practical mechanics. Plausibility can suffice in metaphysics.

The later nominal formula assigns verisimilitudes to metaphysics and probabilities elsewhere, followed by a more specific pairing of metaphysics and logic. The brief quotation that probabilities prove nothing leaves its speaker unnamed. Taken together, these witnesses distinguish credible representation, sufficient grounds for action and proof; they do not allow every occurrence to be replaced by certainty.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 285, entry 8, ¶1 — Credibility must extend even to an audience unlike the person depicted.

I, p. 446, entry 5, ¶1 — The sufficiency of probability depends on the discipline and its practice.

II, p. 518, entry 8, ¶1 — Plausibility suffices for represented feeling in a proposed reply.

II, p. 560, entry 9, ¶1 — An unidentified speaker denies that probabilities prove.

II, p. 760, entry 7, ¶1 — A nominal formula distinguishes verisimilitudes from probabilities.

II, p. 760, entry 7, ¶2 — Metaphysics and logic receive different stated aims.

[316] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 285, 446; II, pp. 518, 560, 760.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps probabilité separate from vraisemblance, using plausibility or verisimilitude for the latter. The Aristotle statement is reported within Joubert's Malebranche reading and is not certified as an exact independent quotation. Singular and plural technical forms remain distinct.

See also. Certainty and doubt; Proof; Metaphysics; Fiction; Theater; History.

Pleasure

plaisir — pleasure; pleasures[317]

The word. Plaisir ranges from passing agreeable impressions to particular satisfactions that require moral discrimination. Volupté is distinct even where English might loosely call both pleasure.

In Joubert. Lively souls initially reject pleasures after disappointment, but may return and settle for what the object is. The opportunity for intervention is therefore brief. The early duration sequence distinguishes pleasure from delight, happiness and felicity. Later, pleasure in pleasing is legitimate while domination is condemned. In the old-age reflection, pleasures belong with affairs, honors and amusements among superfluities that may no longer be needed. None of these contexts makes the word uniformly vicious: object, duration and circumstance change its value.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 32, entry 1, ¶1 — Disappointment can either detach a soul or teach it to settle.

I, p. 38, entry 1, ¶1 — Pleasure is brief within a four-term sequence.

II, p. 488, entry 6, ¶1 — Pleasure in pleasing receives explicit approval.

II, p. 815–816, entry 13, ¶1 — Old age and sufficiency alter the need for pleasures.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the singular/plural changes and differentiates plaisir from volupté in the early definition. It keeps the social echo "pleasure in pleasing," and the aged speaker's conditional setting should remain visible when citing the renunciation of pleasures.

See also. Happiness; Love; Desire; Vanity; Leisure.

[317] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 32, 38; II, pp. 488, 815, 816.

Pneumato-meter

pneumato-mètre — pneumato-meter[318]

The word. Pneumato-mètre names a proposed instrument that would record breathing and make it perceptible to the eye. Its function is specified by Joubert's hypothetical description.

In Joubert. The long reflection connects music's rhythm with respiration, humors, blood, and bodily movement. Joubert proposes that an instrument registering breaths would demonstrate changes associated with sights, touches, and thoughts that alter feeling. The proposal remains hypothetical even though his language about the expected result is confident. It is not evidence that the device was built or that the physiological assertions were tested.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 66–67, entry 3, ¶1 — A proposed breath-recording instrument would, Joubert thinks, verify the bodily effects of music and feeling.

In this edition. Version 6 renders printed intenter as "invented" and leaves the French anomaly visible. It retains the historical vocabulary of diastole, systole, humors, and "animal economy," the functioning of the body, without substituting a modern theory.

Related terms.

Animal economy. *économie animale* — In the same paragraph this phrase names the functioning of the whole body, not economic conduct by animals.

Places. I, p. 66–67, entry 3, ¶1.

See also. Breath; Nerves and fibers; Organization; Measure.

Poetry

poésie; poète; poétique — poetry; poet; poetic[319]

The word. Poésie is not confined to verse form. It can designate a mode of imaginative apprehension, an inspired activity, or a particular literary art.

In Joubert. The early invitation to learn thought, morality and politics from poets makes pleasure a starting point for deeper inquiry. A later formulation calls poetry imaginary,

[318] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 66, 67.

[319] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 43, 137, 454, 463; II, pp. 480, 484, 485, 635, 688, 732, 771.

as all the fine arts are, and reserves beauty to the idea; fantastique here does not name the modern fantasy genre. Another proposes supreme clarity as poetry's character. The tentativeness of "Let us posit..." must remain visible beside these strong claims.

The celestial-poetry passage explicitly prefers Plato's poetry to Homer's for a soul approaching death. Elsewhere all beautiful poetry is likened to Homer's. The different purposes and objects of these judgments should not be forced into one hierarchy. The genre comparison gives the ode a specially pure poetic character, while didactic, epic and dramatic forms share other offices. Poetry can also be called more philosophical than philosophy, showing that disciplinary labels and experienced qualities do not always coincide.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 43, entry 1, ¶5 — Reading poets is proposed as a route into thought and conduct.

II, p. 484–485, entry 13, ¶4 — Poetry is imaginary in the sense of belonging to imagination.

II, p. 480, entry 4, ¶1 — Supreme clarity is proposed as poetry's character.

II, p. 635, entry 1, ¶1 — Celestial poetry is specified through Plato rather than Homer.

II, p. 688, entry 3, ¶1 — Beautiful poetry is compared with Homer's.

II, p. 732, entry 10, ¶1 — The ode and other genres distribute the poetic among different activities.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves poet, poetry and poetic, including the source's historical poësie/poëte spellings in French. It does not supply the omitted genre before the orator on II.732 or verify an unstated external locus for the Socrates allusion.

Related terms.

Poetics. *poétique* — Poëtique is attested with a diaeresis in the account of philosophical style: its poetics has yet to be made and has few models and no rules. Version 6 renders the noun poetics, an account of stylistic principles, not poem. Philosophical style is there the art of painting bodiless objects, while philosophical genius is the eye that sees them.

Places. I, p. 454, entry 7, ¶1.

Improvisation. *improvisateur* — The Italian improvisers occasion an inquiry into the riches of their language and its resources for fertility. Version 6 preserves the nominal opening and the uncompleted "By what kind" formulation. The witness names a problem rather than supplying a theory of spontaneous composition or identifying particular performers; compare the distinct image of leisurely impromptus under Reverie.

Places. I, p. 137, entry 2, ¶1.

The didactic. *didactique; didactiquement* — Didactic succession is the continuous form of writing for others, distinguished from the soul's bursts, breaks and understanding at half

a word. The genre fragment associates didactic poetry with the philosopher beside the lyric poet's purer poetic function. In the historical-scene judgment, what would be worthless didactically can be beautiful because it paints a person rather than clarifies a question. Version 6 keeps didactic and didactically, without equating them uniformly with dullness or identifying the scene left unnamed in the excerpt.

Places. I, p. 463, entry 6, ¶1; II, p. 732, entry 10, ¶1; II, p. 771, entry 6, ¶1.

See also. Imagination; Verse; Prose; Enthusiasm; Philosophy.

Point and line

point; ligne — point; line[320]

The word. Point and line are geometrical objects, yet Joubert repeatedly explains them through fine tips, thread, hair, and the movement between distinct positions.

In Joubert. The explicit definitions give a point a place on a surface where an imagined fine tip can rest, and a line a surface-part on which thread, hair, or a pen stroke can be laid. The point is not the physical tip itself. The ball-of-thread image then encloses the line within the point as something capable of being drawn out. In the disagreement with the Peripatetics, discrete notes joined by resonance provide a model for points joining into continuity through swelling. That unusual account is a philosophical analogy, not a result to be silently modernized into current geometry.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 241, entry 6, ¶1 — Tip, thread, hair and pen stroke support distinct definitions.

I, p. 163, entry 1, ¶1 — A ball of thread images a line contained within a point.

I, p. 196, entry 8, ¶1 — Musical continuity is offered as an analogy for a line composed of points.

In this edition. Version 6 uses point for point and tip for pointe, and reads individu as indivisible in the Peripatetic argument. The fragmentary opening "To the one" and the equals sign of the thread image are retained. Point used as a negative particle is not evidence for this geometrical headword.

See also. Mathematics; Continuity; Division and indivisibility; Thread and spinning; Sphere and circle.

[320] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 163, 196, 241.

Politeness

politesse — politeness[321]

The word. Politesse mediates between a person's character and the people who encounter it. Its forms can protect others while also accommodating vanity.

In Joubert. The blunting-cover image makes politeness wrap rough edges so they will not wound. Its function is not necessarily to remove all underlying roughness. The account of law gives polite ceremonies a role in satisfying vanity and bounds that passion partly through wanting to be regarded as polite. Yet one can also be a pedant of politeness, displaying and seeming to teach what one does not understand. The contrast is between protective practice and conspicuous performance.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 113, entry 6, ¶1 — A covering image protects others from rough character.

I, p. 462, entry 4, ¶1 — Ceremonies give vanity a socially managed expression.

II, p. 803, entry 1, ¶1 — Pedantry can imitate the display of politeness.

In this edition. Version 6 gives "blunting cover" for émoussoir without identifying an unsupported historical implement. It preserves the distinction between paternal and inward power in the law passage and the verbal sequence teaches/displays/does not understand in the pedant definition.

Related terms.

Complaisance. *complaisance* — Complaisance becomes obligingness in Version 6, one of the dispositions that make living and conversing together easier. The neighboring condescendance also has a period sense of accommodating others. The passage condemns a kind of mind that prevents being both lovable and loving, preserving that passive/active distinction.

Places. II, p. 769, entry 11, ¶1.

See also. Character; Vanity; Duty; Honor; Conversation.

[321] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 113, 462; II, pp. 769, 803.

Possibility

possible; possibilité — possible; possibility[322]

The word. Possibility can concern what circumstances allow, what our nature enables us to perceive, or what Joubert judges consistent with an argument. It should not automatically be upgraded to a prediction.

In Joubert. The early condition of perfect writing is stated through a chain of conditional verbs: a perfectly ordered person and an equilibrium of developed passions would make such writing possible. Later, the power to imagine exceeds the possibility of seeing allowed by our nature. This preserves a difference between faculties rather than claiming that whatever is imagined can physically exist. The distinction matters especially when a notebook explores a supposition without committing itself to its actuality.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 45, entry 2, ¶7 — Perfect writing is explored as a conditional possibility.

II, p. 790, entry 1, ¶2 — Imagination reaches what bodily vision cannot be enabled to see.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “would” in the early supposition and distinguishes “power” from “possibility” in the later passage. The latter’s “could not” remains within Joubert’s stated relation between divine giving and our nature.

See also. Necessity; Existence; Perfection; Body.

Poverty and wealth

pauvreté; richesse; enrichir — poverty; riches; enriching[323]

The word. Pauvreté and richesse appear as lived conditions, objects of imagination and disputed aims of collective life.

In Joubert. The woman’s imagined luxurious objects remove her feeling of poverty only for a moment; neither poverty itself nor her circumstances are said to disappear. The philosopher-and-banker comparison criticizes aiming only at enriching peoples, preserving a distinction between material gain and moral purpose. A long historical comparison contrasts the pursuit of fictitious riches with bounded true goods and pleasures. Its idealized categories and sweeping claims about peoples belong to Joubert’s

[322] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 45; II, pp. 790.

[323] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 41; II, pp. 828, 921.

argument, not to this lexicon's ethnography. These uses keep wealth's felt attraction, its social power and its actual usefulness distinct.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 41, entry 4, ¶1 — Imagination briefly suspends a woman's feeling of extreme poverty.

II, p. 828, entry 7, ¶1 — Enrichment alone is challenged as a legislator's aim.

II, p. 921, entry 1, ¶1 — An idealized comparison distinguishes fictitious riches from bounded real goods.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the temporary relief in the first scene, the final only restriction in the national argument and the blank in the historical comparison. The last is undated; its separate group marker supplies no calendar date. Enrichir is represented by enriching in the selected passage.

See also. Luxury; Need; Nation; Utility; Commerce.

Power and operation

puissance; opération — power; operation; operations[324]

The word. Puissance concerns a power or capacity; opération concerns its exercise or what is done. Their juxtaposition is useful without making them a formally defined pair throughout the notebooks.

In Joubert. Water and fire leave different landscapes through the operations of differently paced powers. The power to imagine is elsewhere distinguished from the possibility of seeing afforded by our nature. In the bodily discussion, actual operation is better evidence of inner dispositions than the shape of a head. These uses direct attention from an attributed ability to how it acts and what may be inferred from the action.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 61, entry 4, ¶2 — Elemental powers are distinguished through their operations.

II, p. 790, entry 1, ¶2 — Imaginative power exceeds possible bodily vision.

II, p. 680, entry 2, ¶1 — Operation provides evidence inaccessible from outward features.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps "power," "possibility," and "operation" separate in these witnesses. Political authority is another sense of puissance elsewhere; it should not be treated as a physical force merely because the same word occurs.

[324] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 61; II, pp. 677, 678, 680, 790.

Related terms.

Instrument. *instrument* — At II.677 aptitudes and powers are said to be given only to the instrument. The source does not explicitly identify that instrument as a particular organ.

Places. II, p. 677–678, entry 10, ¶1.

See also. Force; Possibility; Cause and effect; Organization.

Practice and effort

pratique; exercice; effort — practice; exercise; effort[325]

The word. Pratique names actual application or conduct; exercice concerns the use that develops a power; effort marks exertion. Related as they are, these words do not authorize treating all labor as beneficial.

In Joubert. The early organ analogy gives exercise greater mobility, strength and suppleness. The criticism of a literary, moral and civic mathematics without personal application instead targets abstraction detached from practice. The injunction to investigate mental wear through effort and immoderate flight leaves the cause unexplained. Read together, these witnesses resist both contempt for practice and indiscriminate praise of strain.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 43, entry 1, ¶3 — Exercise develops capacities through an organ analogy.

I, p. 411, entry 4, ¶1 — Unapplied theory is criticized as detached mathematics.

II, p. 720, entry 8, ¶1 — Mental wear prompts an unfinished inquiry into effort.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the speculative bodily account as historical language, not modern physiology. It uses transcendent, not transcendental, where Joubert himself explains the lack of practical application. The modifier immoderate follows flight in the final French; its possible wider scope is not resolved by rewriting the sentence.

See also. Habit; Action; Will; Patience; Leisure.

[325] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 43, 411; II, pp. 720.

Prayer

prière; prier — prayer; to pray[326]

The word. Prière is both address and an occupation of the inward life. Its efficacy is considered through what is asked, how the asking changes the person, and the persistence of the practice.

In Joubert. Prayer "occupies one with God," but Joubert distinguishes prayers that improve a person from prayers that make one worse. Virtue should be sought insistently; prosperity with resignation. A conditional reflection then credits prayer with changing feelings even if it does not change destiny. That conditional is not a declaration that destiny can never change. The daily injunction accumulates light, fire, model, peace and principle as objects upon which thought is fixed. A later fragment lists urgency, frequency, perseverance and even obstinacy. Together these witnesses describe demanding practice, not merely a request to obtain an external benefit.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 179, entry 6, ¶1 — Prayer directs occupation toward God.

I, p. 187, entry 10, ¶1 — Moral value depends on what is asked for.

I, p. 282, entry 9, ¶1 — Changing feelings has a usefulness no less great than changing destiny.

I, p. 457, entry 5, ¶2 — Daily prayer takes the form of sustained thought and purification.

II, p. 912, entry 2, ¶1 — The closing fragment names persistent prayer and promised efficacy.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the conditional "If," the daily infinitives, and the forceful noun "obstinacy." It renders vœux as wishes where requests for virtue and prosperity supply the context; a binding vow is not asserted.

See also. Faith; God; Sacrifice; Resignation; Meditation and contemplation.

Precision

précision; justesse — precision; exactness[327]

The word. Précision and justesse concern exact formulation or appropriate direction, not necessarily mathematical quantification.

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[326] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 179, 187, 282, 457; II, pp. 912. The statement of promised efficacy remains Joubert's fragmentary assertion, not an external theological guarantee.

[327] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 157, 231; II, pp. 512, 838.

In Joubert. The snail's tentacula prompt a praise of precise naming and a tentative new word, essayoirs. The precision lies in making the testing action felt. In style, reflection molds expression into a form; ingenuous fluency may have grace without precision. The political example of justesse then makes exactness a direction toward a proper goal, public virtue. This moves beyond verbal neatness without turning every use of juste into moral righteousness. The shared question is whether an act of thought or expression reaches what it should.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 157, entry 9, ¶1 — Precise naming motivates the tentative coinage essayoirs.

II, p. 512, entry 4, ¶1 — Molded reflective expression differs from graceful fluency.

II, p. 838, entry 12, ¶1 — Justesse depends on direction toward the appropriate goal.

In this edition. Version 6 renders essayoirs as "tryers," preserving its tentative character, and avant-corps as forebody. In the directional passage it distinguishes exactness for justesse, precision for exacte and right for juste rather than enforcing one equivalent.

Related terms.

Exactness. *exactitude* — Joubert distinguishes the precision sufficient to satisfy the mind from the exactness of which a thing is capable; perhaps no thing is known with the latter. This is a local contrast of adequacy and possible completeness, not a universal bilingual rule equating précision with approximation. The final likeness between pleasing imperfection and perfection remains deliberately paradoxical.

Places. I, p. 231, entry 5, ¶1.

See also. Expression; Reflection; Definition; Aesthetic grace.

Prejudice

préjugé — prejudice[328]

The word. Préjugé can name a received bias, but Joubert also uses it favorably for what precedes and guides judgment.

In Joubert. The remark that one could not judge without prejudices connects the words themselves: something prior to explicit judgment may be felt without being held as an opinion. The later description restricts its praise to natural and unacquired prejudices, imagined as guides along necessary paths. Neither passage vindicates every socially

[328] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 453; II, pp. 648, 832.

inherited bias. Indeed, Joubert calls contemporary unbelief a prejudice and distinguishes sources in people and time from sources in books and novelty. The supposedly new opinion can therefore be as received as the old one.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 453, entry 3, ¶2 — Prejudices can precede or support judgment without becoming explicit opinions.

II, p. 832, entry 8, ¶1 — The favorable account is limited to natural and unacquired guides.

II, p. 648, entry 7, ¶1 — Novelty and books can generate prejudice as well as tradition.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the potentially disconcerting prejudice instead of silently improving it to intuition. “Today” belongs to Joubert’s statement, not the date of this lexicon. The compressed order of experience and thought on I.453 remains qualified by “so to speak.”

See also. Judgment; Opinion; Discernment.

Pride

orgueil — pride[329]

The word. Orgueil is not identical with vanity or every form of self-love. Joubert often marks it through domination and resistance to another person’s worth.

In Joubert. The coercive art of convincing becomes torture when exercised proudly over another’s conduct and life. Refined pride may esteem rule-following yet resist goodness alone, because goodness belongs to the person and to a merit one cannot give oneself. The opposition between pride and innocent vanity then makes pride the enemy of goodness. Self-love complicates the picture: satisfied amour-propre can be tender or thankful to providence. That does not erase the criticism of pride; it prevents different self-relations from being collapsed into one vice.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 166, entry 1, ¶1 — Pride turns persuasion into coercive domination.

II, p. 509, entry 9, ¶1 — Rule-esteem differs from esteem for another person’s goodness.

II, p. 488, entry 6, ¶1 — Pride is condemned while some vanity is allowed.

[329] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 166; II, pp. 488, 509.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps pride, vanity and self-love separate. It preserves the torture imagery and the hypothetical "could not give oneself," which is not a claim that goodness can never be cultivated.

See also. Vanity; Goodness; Humility; Ambition; Self; Self-love.

Priesthood

prêtre; sacerdoce — priest; priesthood[330]

The word. Prêtre names a person in religious office; sacerdoce can name the condition of life that makes certain kinds of intellectual and spiritual work possible.

In Joubert. The people's faith is said to subject the priest's mind, and another maxim makes priest and people mutually formative. These reversals complicate a picture of authority proceeding only from office downward. The priesthood's meditation and leisure are also credited with the existence and excellence of Hebrew literature. A sharply polemical fragment calls the priest the philosopher par excellence and credits fables with teaching truth. The claims range from reciprocal formation to conditions of work and the authority of religious teaching; none by itself supplies a complete account of clerical power.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 107, entry 11, ¶1 — The faith of the people constrains the priest's mind.

I, p. 318, entry 4, ¶1 — Meditation and leisure make priesthood a literary condition.

II, p. 600, entry 1, ¶1 — A polemical exclamation links priestly teaching and philosophy.

II, p. 865, entry 11, ¶1 — Priest and people are said to form one another.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the reciprocal repetition of makes without interpreting it as election or appointment. The priest-as-philosopher passage is an exclamation about unnamed fables. Beaunier's separate-sheet note attached to that unit is apparatus, not part of its claim.

See also. Faith; Authority; Meditation and contemplation; Leisure; Scripture.

[330] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 107, 318; II, pp. 600, 865.

Principle

principe — principle; principles[331]

The word. Principe may identify an originating basis, a governing conviction, or a general ground prior to particular rules. Its force depends on what it is said to initiate or regulate.

In Joubert. Respect is given both a principle and an underlying cause: an opinion of excellence and an idea of perfection. The paired terms make the grounding relation explicit without requiring two wholly separate mechanisms. Another fragment distinguishes the principles of moral literature from rules that have not yet been made. In a mathematical report, a center can be called the principle of the whole. Such uses share explanatory priority, but do not amount to a single definition of first principles.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 471, entry 6, ¶1 — An estimate of excellence grounds the sentiment of respect.

II, p. 505, entry 7, ¶4 — Principles can be invoked before particular rules exist.

II, p. 747, entry 9, ¶1 — The center is reported as a principle of the whole.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “principle” distinct from “underlying cause.” The mathematical language is part of a reported comparison with a reference to Ficino, not an unattributed proposition proved by Joubert.

See also. Cause and effect; Center; Order; Perfection.

Probity

probité — probity[332]

The word. Probité names moral rectitude in lived conduct, distinguished from the more elevated rhetorical force of vertu.

In Joubert. The account of perfect probity gives it three relations: civil law, honor, and the just and unjust as delicately felt within conscience. It is therefore neither mere legal conformity nor only private sincerity. The later comment about ordinary usage observes that virtue commonly means probity, but finds the grander word excessive for that meaning. This is a lexical and stylistic distinction as well as a moral one: naming conduct with the highest available term can distort its scale. The two witnesses define a useful

[331] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 471; II, pp. 505, 747.

[332] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 129; II, pp. 568.

route between Law, Honor and Conscience without claiming that all uses of virtue elsewhere have this narrower sense.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 129, entry 1, ¶2 — Perfect probity answers to civil law, honor and conscience.

II, p. 568, entry 1, ¶1 — Ordinary virtue may mean probity, but the term can be excessive.

In this edition. Version 6 retains probity and uses grandiloquent for emphatique, indicating inflated elevation rather than merely strong emphasis. The numbered relations in the first passage are preserved; no hierarchy beyond their stated order is invented.

See also. Virtue; Honor; Conscience; Honesty; Law.

Proof

preuve; prouver — proof; proofs; prove; evidence[333]

The word. Preuve can be an argument offered to establish a claim or evidence of a quality. Proving and directly showing are not equivalent operations in these notes.

In Joubert. The fragment demanding “show, and do not prove” distinguishes modes of presenting something, while leaving the proposition uncompleted. The approximate Aristotle report contrasts a dialectician satisfied with proof with a philosopher seeking inspection and self-evidence. In reported instructions on I.165, proof can even make what is believed seem doubtful, because argument rehearses its problematic status. These forceful cautions are local claims about argument, belief and duty, not a license for the lexicon to reject verification. In the loss-and-sorrow passage, preuve instead names conduct that manifests judgment or reason; no formal deduction is supplied.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 115, entry 10, ¶1 — Showing and proving are expressly opposed in an unfinished formulation.

I, p. 180, entry 4, ¶1 — Proof is distinguished from inspection and self-evidence in an approximate report.

I, p. 165, entry 8, ¶2 — Argument may habituate a hearer to treating a proposition as doubtful.

I, p. 165, entry 8, ¶3 — Reported rules distinguish believed, certain, and practical matters.

I, p. 59, entry 1, ¶1 — Proportionate responses to loss count as evidence of judgment and reason.

[333] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 59, 115, 165, 180.

In this edition. Version 6 translates preuve as evidence in the grief comparison and proof in the argumentative passages. The Aristotle account remains explicitly approximate, with its printed bibliographical reference; it is not certified as a verbatim quotation. Believed and certain remain separate terms in the reported prescriptions.

See also. Evidence; Certainty and doubt; Reasoning; Philosophy; Judgment.

Proportion

proportion — proportion; proportions[334]

The word. Proportion concerns relations among parts or the suitability of an expression to its object. It may name bodily dimensions without endorsing bulk as a standard of excellence.

In Joubert. The work conceived as a being has proportions, a trunk, limbs, stature, and personality. The physical vocabulary makes composition an organized whole rather than an arbitrary heap. Plastic forms similarly balance parts within and harmonize visible proportions without. In literary controversy, excessive indignation violates proportion because the passions employed are misplaced. These examples connect structure and appropriateness without reducing the latter to a numerical ratio.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 153, entry 5, ¶2 — A work possesses proportions like an individual body.

I, p. 458, entry 1, ¶1 — Molding forms establish internal balance and visible harmony.

II, p. 485, entry 13, ¶1 — Inflamed literary criticism is judged disproportionate.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the plural “proportions” for an organized body or work, and uses singular “proportion” for the critical judgment. The metaphor’s bodily terms are not silently converted into an abstract plan.

See also. Form; Organization; Measure; Plastic forms.

[334] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 153, 458; II, pp. 485.

Proposition

proposition — proposition; propositions[335]

The word. A proposition puts a claim into an expressible form. Joubert distinguishes it from a rule or command, from an innate germ of thought and from the inference through which it is reached.

In Joubert. The warning against making a proposition of a precept prevents a practical direction from being treated automatically as a theoretical assertion. Interlaced propositions can also manufacture an apparent solidity absent from each thread, whereas good doctrine requires each to possess its own truth and clarity. In the Leibnitz response, ideas and feelings may be innate but expressly formulated propositions are not. The truth test then goes beyond inferential relation: a proposition must be true as principle, or independently satisfying, not only as consequence. The later reformulation distinguishes inference from consequent and rejects silencing an opponent as equivalent to convincing him. These are criticisms of unsupported or merely combative argument, not a denial that propositions can convey truth.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 272, entry 6, ¶1 — A proposition is distinguished from precept, rule and commandment.

I, p. 300, entry 3, ¶1 — Interlacing can conceal the weakness of separate claims.

I, p. 319, entry 3, ¶1 — A formulated proposition is not treated as innate.

II, p. 511, entry 3, ¶1 — Truth as consequence alone is declared insufficient.

II, p. 651, entry 3, ¶1 — The inferred claim must be true within its inference.

In this edition. Version 6 uses proposition consistently. Conséquence becomes consequence in the shorter maxim and inference in the scholastic comparison, where conséquent remains consequent. The “or rather” revision and the unfinished “Reasoning being” construction remain. The argument is not silently repaired into a modern logical theorem.

See also. Assertion; Axiom; Reasoning; Innateness; Rules.

[335] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 272, 300, 319; II, pp. 511, 651.

Prose

prose — prose[336]

The word. Prose is distinct from verse but can require cadence, rhythm or measure to correspond to a particular disposition of mind.

In Joubert. The rhythmic-prose fragment rejects language without character for a mind with a marked disposition. This does not make prose and verse identical; it asks what internal movement prose needs. Conversely prose can have too much harmony or sweetness, producing a seductive first pleasure that becomes intolerable. The Jourdain allusion points toward an everyday, unreflective kind of prose, but leaves its opening “when” unfinished. The category therefore ranges from ordinary speech to elaborately shaped writing, and a judgment about one level should not automatically govern the other.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 419, entry 9, ¶4 — Prose may need measure, cadence and rhythm.

II, p. 815, entry 12, ¶1 — Excess harmony and sweetness become faults over time.

II, p. 542, entry 7, ¶1 — Jourdain’s unknowing prose supplies an unfinished example.

In this edition. Version 6 follows Joubert’s wording of the Molière allusion, including its give/bring verbs, instead of correcting it from the play. The nearby unresolved glacis image does not determine the meaning of prose or harmony.

See also. Poetry; Rhythm and number; Harmony; Style.

Providence

providence — providence[337]

The word. Providence names divine ordering considered in relation to human life. Its contrast with necessity and its connection with practice are more informative here than an abstract definition.

In Joubert. The bare alternative “Necessity or providence” is restated as “It is so, or God wills it.” Another passage distinguishes God as first principle from God as judge and providence, the latter being truth from which conduct follows. A later comparison gives those who hope a better knowledge and steadier feeling of providence than those who

[336] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 419; II, pp. 542, 815.

[337] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 109, 130, 179, 456; II, pp. 669, 704, 859.

fear. This places affective orientation inside the account of knowing; it does not establish a promise that every hoped-for event will occur.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 130, entry 12, ¶1 — Necessity and divine willing form a terse alternative.

II, p. 669, entry 7, ¶1 — Providence concerns the practical consequences of believing in God.

II, p. 859, entry 11, ¶1 — Hope is preferred to fear as a disposition toward providence.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the short alternatives and uses “feeling” for sentiment in the hope/fear comparison. It does not translate that feeling into certainty. “Speculative” in the practical contrast means theoretical or contemplative, not merely doubtful.

Related terms.

Foreknowledge. *prescience; préscience; prévision* — Prescience or préscience becomes foreknowledge, while prévision becomes foresight. An early fragment asks whether foreknowledge is possible; the freedom maxim then describes its removal as enabling continued freedom, without naming its pronouns anew. The mirror passage distinguishes divine foresight from face-to-face sight of what exists, making God’s idea precede and cause the thing. The later instruction shifts attention away from divine foreknowledge toward will, justice, goodness, power and decrees. It concerns what matters to us, not denial of a divine attribute. These separate formulations should not be combined into a resolved theological system.

Places. I, p. 109, entry 1, ¶1; I, p. 179, entry 1, ¶1; I, p. 456, entry 2, ¶1; II, p. 704, entry 2, ¶1.

See also. God; Hope; Resignation; Faith.

Prudence

prudence — prudence[338]

The word. Prudence combines attention to consequences with practical judgment, but Joubert questions it when it serves only the self.

In Joubert. The paired sowing and harvest image joins prudence with success while denying an indissoluble connection: events can separate what seems naturally related. The contrast with justice assigns prudence concern for ourselves. A longer political note therefore insists on moral prudence, preferring frankness during deliberation to circumspection that benefits only its possessor. Circumspection can be better in

[338] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 164; II, pp. 510, 689, 872, 873.

execution, where the task differs. Finally, politics is assigned to prudence and choosing rather than demonstration. This is a distinction of intellectual methods, not a promise that prudent government never fails.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 164, entry 11, ¶1 — Success can be separated from prudence by the course of events.

II, p. 510, entry 6, ¶1 — Prudence and justice concern different objects.

II, p. 689, entry 3, ¶1 — Frank deliberation is distinguished from circumspect execution.

II, p. 872–873, entry 10, ¶1 — Politics is located in practical choosing and judgment.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the unresolved French residues in the deliberation passage and makes its pronoun refer to frankness or sincerity. Science becomes knowledge in the political contrast; the faculty of choosing is not narrowed to electoral procedure. The natural/not-indissoluble qualification remains.

Related terms.

Circumspection. *circonspection* — Circonspection is distinguished from moral prudence. Circumspection is judged better in execution, while frankness or sincerity is better in deliberation, where it opens more possible means for consideration. Version 6 preserves the source's damaged residues and keeps the following It attached to frankness or sincerity, not to circumspection.

Places. II, p. 689, entry 3, ¶1.

See also. Justice; Choice; Sincerity and frankness; Government; Glory.

Punishment

châtiment; peine; punir — punishment; punished[339]

The word. Châtiment and the punitive sense of peine connect consequence with correction and public example, not merely suffering.

In Joubert. The maxim says repentance effaces the fault without effacing punishment: we are always punished when we have done wrong. It distinguishes moral change from what follows wrongdoing. The prescription for a known fault then makes punishment both medicinal and exemplary; its public dimension depends on the condition that the fault is known. The crime-and-turbulence fragment considers an inverse failure: a penalty too small can diminish the visible enormity of a crime, whereas scandalous

[339] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 465; II, pp. 823, 857.

impunity might leave it more apparent. That argument is about punishment's expressive scale, not a specified sentence or a general commendation of impunity.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 465, entry 11, ¶1 — The maxim says repentance effaces the fault without effacing punishment.

II, p. 823, entry 2, ¶1 — A known fault calls for curative and exemplary punishment.

II, p. 857, entry 2, ¶1 — A disproportionally slight penalty can make a crime seem smaller.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the conditional known-fault parenthesis and brackets [medicinal] at the damaged word. In the last witness it preserves almost innocent, in a way and the counterfactual more visible. The lexicon supplies no modern legal rule.

See also. Justice; Repentance; Remorse; Equity; Law.

Quantity and quality

quantité; qualité — quantity; quality; qualities[340]

The word. This pair separates how much there is from what sort of character or constitution it has. Qualité also has ordinary evaluative uses, including a person's good qualities.

In Joubert. Joubert places the mind's excellence wholly in quality rather than quantity, unfolding the distinction through patience and constancy rather than strength and fire. A question about the brain applies both terms to physical substance but refuses to infer inner dispositions from outward features: operation is the relevant evidence. A more abstract fragment speaks of a subject as an assemblage of qualities and a substance as an assemblage of accidents, asking what binds them. That tentative "Let us say" should remain audible.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 658, entry 5, ¶1 — Mental excellence depends on quality rather than quantity.

II, p. 680, entry 2, ¶1 — Both terms enter a qualified account of brain constitution.

I, p. 277, entry 2, ¶1 — Qualities and accidents are provisionally assembled into subject and substance.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps quantity and quality distinct. At II.680 "admitting it as a cause" preserves the qualification on organization; the passage should not be repackaged as a confident method of judging intelligence from bodily dimensions.

[340] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 43, 277; II, pp. 658, 680.

Related terms.

Degree. *degré* — Degré can mark an intensity or extent, as the dancer's and musician's bodily memory has an eminent degree at I.43. It need not name a numerical measurement.

Places. I, p. 43, entry 1, ¶1.

See also. Substance; Organization; Number; Measure.

Quietism

quiétisme — quietism[341]

The word. Quiétisme is a named religious question treated through its moral consequences and its relation to an inward state.

In Joubert. The complaint against dismissing the affair as scholastic subtlety makes perfection practically consequential: small errors, if erected into principles, could harm even the best. The conditional is central; no particular erroneous proposition is identified. The comparison with Jansenism describes quietism as shivering love of a state that the other movement fears. The state itself remains unnamed, and the bodily word transi does not settle whether coldness, trembling or bashful intensity predominates. These bounded observations explain Joubert's use of the label without substituting a doctrinal history for what he actually wrote.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 653, entry 8, ¶1 — Quietism is treated as a consequential question of religious morals.

II, p. 823, entry 1, ¶2 — Quietism and Jansenism are contrasted through love and fear of one state.

In this edition. Version 6 retains shivering for transi and brackets [is] where the source is damaged. It does not assign the passage to a specific controversy. The surrounding unit's ambiguous pronoun sequence is not repaired by forcing named doctrines into its gaps.

See also. Religion; Love; Fear; Perfection; Mysticism.

[341] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 653, 823.

Rays and radiance

rayon; rayonnement — ray; rays; radiance[342]

The word. Rayon and rayonnement picture directed or spreading light. They can express illumination, spiritual derivation, and relations between a source and what receives it.

In Joubert. A ray piercing cloud and light piercing fog offer models for penetration that need not alter an entire mass. The literary arrangement of thoughts likewise needs a ray making them visible together in one glance, not merely one after another. God's radiance is said to be least felt and seen at earth's dark point, imagined as a cavern. This is a qualified cosmic picture, not a measurable distribution of physical light.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 472, entry 4, ¶1 — A penetrating ray supplies one of two compared images.

I, p. 330, entry 1, ¶1 — A ray helps communicate thoughts together in perspective.

II, p. 792, entry begun p. 791, no. 6, ¶17 — Divine radiance is least perceptible in earth's cavern.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the tentative "It seems" and the fragmentary comparisons. Rayons can also mean shelving, as the library entry shows; those matches are excluded from the light-related evidence.

See also. Light; Shadow; Transparency; Earth.

Reading

lecture; lire — reading; read[343]

The word. Lire is an act of mind, not merely the eyes' movement over written signs. Its success can require accommodation to unfamiliar thought.

In Joubert. The abbreviation remark says a short sign does not necessarily shorten reading because the mind does the seeing. The account of serious books asks for indulgence and respect toward an unfamiliar writer, permitting readers to pass through preliminary obscurities toward later clarities. Reading pleasure also differs from memorability: the Montesquieu note contrasts little fillings enjoyed in reading with what remembered thought preserves in dictation. Finally the remark about books as places where the mind puts things makes reading participatory. The book offers room without

[342] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 330, 472; II, pp. 792.

[343] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 93, 287; II, pp. 493, 538, 539.

guaranteeing that every apparent discovery was deposited there unchanged by the author.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 93, entry 2, ¶1 — Mental reading complicates the economy promised by abbreviations.

II, p. 538–539, entry 10, ¶1 — A reader must sometimes accommodate unfamiliar ideas and preliminary difficulty.

II, p. 493, entry 6, ¶1 — Pleasure in reading differs from memory's selection.

I, p. 287, entry 9, ¶1 — A fine book gives the mind room for its own contents.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps little fillings without dismissing them as errors. Condescendance becomes indulgence, avoiding the modern derogatory sense of condescension. The causal claim about Montesquieu remains Joubert's assessment.

See also. Book; Memory; Remembrance; Clarity and obscurity; Attention.

Reality

réalité; réel — reality; realities; real[344]

The word. Reality does not always coincide with truth or simply mean solid matter. Joubert can attribute it to inner experience, appearance, or a fact while still asking how that fact should be understood.

In Joubert. The explicit distinction at II.674 calls reality the fact, while truth lies in a just understanding of the fact's nature, moral character, and essence. An earlier statement makes illusion integral to reality as effect is bound to cause, not merely its deceptive opposite. For the purely imagined, appearance itself becomes existence and reality.

These claims require careful local reading. They do not give a blanket warrant to replace truth with imagination. The argument about art's room makes the real diminish place: actual filling can reduce imaginative spaciousness. Reality, truth, actuality of presence, and significance thus cannot be collapsed into one English label.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 674, entry 7, ¶1 — Reality as fact is explicitly distinguished from truth of understanding.

I, p. 127, entry 1, ¶1 — Illusion is treated as an integral part of reality.

II, p. 572, entry 2, ¶2 — Appearance constitutes the reality of the purely imagined.

II, p. 487, entry begun p. 486, no. 14, ¶3 — The real diminishes place in an account of poetic space.

[344] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 127, 210; II, pp. 487, 572, 674.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps reality and truth separate and retains the anomalous “immaterial” in II.572. The English “real” in the poetic passage translates réel, not a supplied philosophical category.

Related terms.

Concretion. *concrétion* — Human ideas are described as abstracted from individual existences, whereas our realities are called a concretion of divine ideas that existed first. The direction is reversed: separating a nature from a given object differs from realities taking form from an antecedent idea. Version 6 keeps the material word concretion, rather than converting it into a fixed named doctrine or a geological definition.

Places. I, p. 210, entry 5, ¶1.

See also. Existence; Essence; Matter; Space and place; Transparency.

Reason

raison — reason[345]

The word. Raison may name a governing intellectual faculty, a sound ground for action, or a particular reason advanced in argument. It should be distinguished from the process called raisonnement.

In Joubert. The image of logic as a well crank without a rope makes reason what gives formal procedure purchase and usefulness. Similarly, the courtly picture of passion serving tranquil intelligence reserves thinking and judging for reason while allowing temper a place in speech. These statements do not simply prohibit emotion; they distribute different activities among different powers.

Another formulation defines reason through a balance between reason, appetite and will. Its repetition of reason on both sides remains unresolved, and should not be silently repaired into a different faculty. The bee/butterfly image gives reason productive usefulness while demanding charm of esprit. Finally a dramatic reason can be good because it belongs to its speaker’s character, without being conclusive. The latter is a reason in a different sense from the governing faculty.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 652, entry 9, ¶1 — Logic needs reason as a well crank needs its rope.

I, p. 117, entry 10, ¶1 — Speech may use temper, but thought and judgment require reason.

II, p. 707, entry 7, ¶1 — Reason is repeatedly named in the balance that constitutes freedom.

[345] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 117; II, pp. 604, 652, 707, 857.

II, p. 857, entry 6, ¶1 — Reason's bee-like usefulness differs from the mind's butterfly-like charm.

II, p. 604, entry 4, ¶1 — A dramatic reason belongs to a character without being conclusive.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps reason distinct from reasoning and does not remove the apparent circularity on II.707. "Dramatic" concerns the character of the speaker, not merely exaggerated delivery.

See also. Reasoning; Logic; Judgment; Mind; Talent.

Reasoning

raisonnement; raisonner — reasoning; reasonings[346]

The word. Raisonnement is a process or sequence of argument, not an automatic synonym for sound reason. Raisonner names its exercise.

In Joubert. Joubert's intellectual machine encloses an opinion inside one already adopted, sometimes unnaturally. The metaphor exposes reasoning's capacity to force a conclusion rather than dismissing every inference. His blind-man comparison likewise contrasts laborious inductions and conjectures with direct seeing. In the "strong mind" passage, an overdeveloped capacity to reason misleads when it exceeds the soul's other faculties. The fragment about duties goes further, proposing that one must sometimes go against one's own reasoning; its examples break off and do not provide a universal rule for rejecting reason.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 107, entry 2, ¶1 — Conclusion is pictured as enclosing one opinion in another.

II, p. 756, entry 7, ¶1 — Reasoning, induction and conjecture are contrasted with seeing.

II, p. 657, entry 9, ¶1 — Disproportionate strength or practice can make reasoning misleading.

II, p. 859, entry 6, ¶2 — The limits of reasoning in duty are stated through unfinished examples.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves conclude/enclose, reason/reasoning, and the distinct inductions/conjectures. "Strong mind" retains the literal strength in esprit fort; the note also records its historical association with religious disbelief. "Sometimes" limits the claim about duty.

Related terms.

Induction. *induction* — Induction has a broad inferential force in these witnesses. Version 6 uses explicit inference in the moral passage and induction or inductions elsewhere. The first argument is conditional: if duties arise from nature, morality should

[346] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 107, 394, 395, 444; II, pp. 657, 756, 859.

emerge through clarity without an explicit inferential step. The criticism of Malebranche describes dependence on Cartesian principles as induction and consequence, while the stick analogy pairs inductions with conjectures in indirect movement. These uses do not establish a uniform technical contrast between modern induction and deduction. The printed Malebranche dates and unfinished publish[…] remain reported and qualified.

Places. I, p. 394–395, entry 7, ¶2; I, p. 444, entry 8, ¶1; II, p. 756, entry 7, ¶1.

See also. Reason; Logic; Opinion; Discernment.

Reflection

réflexion; réfléchir — reflection; reflect[347]

The word. Réflexion is attentive reconsideration or intellectual examination. It can cooperate with taste while differing from bodily memory and immediate facility.

In Joubert. The early contrast between the reflecting head and the remembering body assigns a dancer's feet and a musician's fingers their own faculty of recollection. This is Joubert's speculative account, not modern physiological evidence. Reflection also belongs to the pleasure of reading: Virgil is praised for satisfying reflection as much as taste, with remembered verses as delicious as their reading. In the writing fragment, reflection and good taste explain the acquired difficulty that must accompany natural facility. Difficulty here is a cultivated restraint or discrimination, not merely inability to write.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 43, entry 1, ¶1 — Reflection is distinguished from bodily remembering.

II, p. 655, entry 3, ¶1 — Poetry can satisfy reflection and taste together.

II, p. 755, entry 2, ¶1 — Reflection helps make artistic difficulty a complement to natural facility.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves reflection rather than substituting meditation. The I.43 fragments are undated and placed by Beaunier with acknowledged conjecture. Bracketed difficulty on II.755 marks contextual English renderings of damaged French words, not secure recovered letters.

See also. Memory; Writing; Taste; Reading.

[347] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 43; II, pp. 655, 755.

Religion

religion — religion; religions[348]

The word. Religion can name a particular tradition, a relation to heaven, and an institution shaping feelings and conduct. Joubert's praise of its inward effects coexists with criticism of religious fury.

In Joubert. The bread-symbol passage judges a religion through its capacity to touch the unfortunate. The candle-and-sun analogy allows morality without present religious practice while claiming religion as morality's source and a greater happiness within virtue. A terse formulation adds utility to truth. Yet the wine metaphor describes strong religions as furious until age, extent and dominion remove their fermentations. Such an account evaluates institutions historically and affectively, rather than simply equating all religious intensity with goodness.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 52, entry begun p. 51, no. 2, ¶12 — The bread symbol is evaluated through sympathy for the unfortunate.

I, p. 151, entry 9, ¶1 — Morality and religion are compared to candles and sun.

II, p. 672, entry 4, ¶1 — Religion is said to have utility as well as truth.

II, p. 880, entry 1, ¶3 — Institutional age and extent figure as processes of maturation.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the abstract nouns truth and utility, the sun/candle comparison, and the concrete plural "fermentations." Its "J.-C." follows the French abbreviation; the note identifies Jesus Christ.

Related terms.

The sacred. *sacré* — Sacré qualifies what should not be left unveiled before one's own eyes. The preceding injunction concerns examining duties too boldly, not an unqualified ban on examination. Version 6 keeps the two dependent That openings and the concrete veil image rather than replacing them with a completed theory of taboo.

Places. II, p. 765, entry 1, ¶1.

See also. Christianity; Faith; Worship; Piety; Superstition.

[348] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 52, 151; II, pp. 672, 765, 880. The numbered wine passage is undated; the neighboring October date does not govern it. Its generalization remains Joubert's, not an independently established history of religions.

Religious belief

croyance — belief; religious belief[349]

The word. Croyance can name a shared belief or an article held true. This entry concerns its religious and social uses; the noun does not itself guarantee that the object is religious.

In Joubert. Joubert links differences of belief within a nation to pressures on the opinions of its less privileged groups. His claim has a direction and a social hierarchy that should remain visible. In writing history, however, he permits a weakly proved circumstance into an account while refusing to make it an article of belief. Admission into a narrative is less than assent. The explicitly religious witness contrasts acquired unbelief with uninstructed irreligion and figures faith as bending and softening the mind for cultivation. This is Joubert's polemical evaluation, not a neutral description of people without religion.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 99, entry 7, ¶1 — Differences of belief are described through a social hierarchy.

I, p. 385, entry 2, ¶2 — Narrative admission is distinguished from an article of belief.

II, p. 765, entry 4, ¶3 — Religious belief is figured as preparation for cultivation.

In this edition. Version 6 distinguishes beliefs, opinions and faith rather than assigning one invariant English word to all three. "Cultivation" and "sowing" preserve the agricultural image without naming an unstated seed.

See also. Faith; Religion; Society; Education.

Remembrance

souvenir; réminiscence — recollection; memory; reminiscence[350]

The word. Souvenir can be a remembered thing or the act of recalling it. Réminiscence is explicitly described as a retrieval operation.

In Joubert. The mind in the reminiscence passage picks up a trail among memories to recover a particular lost one. Its tracking is a process, not the spontaneous invention of a replacement. The traveling minds that bring back everything from books offer a contrasting picture of extensive retention: Joubert assigns them dictionaries and

[349] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 99, 385; II, pp. 765.

[350] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 122; II, pp. 649, 783.

collections as suitable work. In old age, arrangement around oneself makes recollection easier and spares effort. That material assistance belongs to the practical setting of remembrance rather than to a claim that memory alone is sufficient for understanding.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 649, entry 1, ¶1 — Reminiscence tracks memories to recover a lost memory.

I, p. 122, entry 10, ¶1 — Traveling minds return from books with remembered contents.

II, p. 783, entry 3, ¶1 — External arrangement assists memory and recollection.

In this edition. Version 6 varies memory and recollection for souvenir while reserving reminiscence for the explicitly named operation. Trail and tracking preserve both images. The complete English brackets on II.783 qualify damaged French words; they are not authorial hesitations.

See also. Memory; Reading; Forgetting.

Remorse

remords — remorse[351]

The word. Remords is conscience's response to wrongdoing, but its relation to innocence, happiness and moral change varies across the notes.

In Joubert. The beautiful-and-beauty argument calls remorse innocence after crime, placing the disturbed conscience within an account of inward beauty. The happiness passage likewise permits feeling one's soul good amid remorse rather than equating happiness with pleasure. The later explicit distinction from repentance limits those suggestive formulas: remorse is punishment and belongs to a tormented conscience, while repentance is expiation and belongs to a soul changed for the better. The earlier positive relations are not erased, but neither are they proof that suffering remorse by itself completes moral transformation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 451–452, entry 11, ¶2 — Remorse is related to innocence within an argument about the beautiful.

II, p. 679, entry 2, ¶1 — Happiness can coexist with remorse.

II, p. 859, entry 7, ¶1 — Remorse and repentance differ as punishment and expiation.

[351] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 451, 452; II, pp. 679, 859.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the paradox of innocence after crime. Beaunier's variant in the midst of crime remains separate, and the June 29 of the following apparatus excerpt does not date the main passage. The damaged happiness witness retains its unresolved residues.

See also. Repentance; Conscience; Innocence; Happiness; Beauty.

Repentance

repentir — repentance[352]

The word. Repentir names a response after wrongdoing that can purify or signal change. Its temporal direction distinguishes it from innocence or an untouched disposition.

In Joubert. Among the immortals, repentance purifies while admiration perfects. The speculation on time then sets repentance after fault beside forgetting after a benefit, leaving their relation to imperishable moral nature unfinished. Finally good people are said to trust the repentance or conversion of adversaries because they passionately love the good. Their hope can expose them to deception; the passage does not say all reported repentance is false.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 165, entry 7, ¶1 — Repentance purifies in a fragment on immortals.

I, p. 369, entry 2, ¶1 — Repentance follows fault within an unfinished account of time.

II, p. 889, entry 5, ¶1 — Hope for an adversary's repentance can make good people credulous.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the distinction between purification and further perfection, and leaves the time fragment incomplete. The bracketed pronoun in "as [one] says" follows Beaunier's supply; conversion remains a parenthetic formulation rather than a certified transformation.

Related terms.

Penance and confession. *pénitence; confession; expiation* — Pénitence, confession and expiation are differentiated through public and secret wrongdoing. Avowal is called an instrument of expiation, while the later shame is secret but piercing. The analogy with correcting error makes confession to faults what retraction is to errors. Version 6 preserves the Voltaire verse as a quotation before Joubert's extension and does not assign the undated penitential unit the preceding date.

Places. I, p. 221, entry 5, ¶1; II, p. 810, entry 5, ¶1; II, p. 750, entry 10, ¶3.

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[352] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 165, 221, 369; II, pp. 750, 810, 889.

Conversion. *conversion* — Conversion appears with change and repentance as a hoped-for alteration in adversaries. The passage makes good people vulnerable to deception precisely through their love of the good. It neither certifies a particular conversion nor restricts the word to changing denominations. The bracketed on is Beaunier's printed supplement.

Places. II, p. 889, entry 5, ¶1.

See also. Conscience; Shame; Goodness; Hope; Good and evil.

Representation

représentation — representation[353]

The word. Representation gives an object or inward content a determinate presentation. Joubert distinguishes it from imitation and tests its relations to memory and idea.

In Joubert. The fine-arts statement deliberately refuses imitation as an insufficiently understood description of art's object and substitutes representation. Memory supplies a different context: it represents definite, fixed figures belonging to individuals, whereas ideas concern qualities. The unfinished account stops before completing its description of idea. In the practical account of art, representation must be exact and finished enough to call forth a fixed idea whenever seen again. Theater then qualifies the reality of presentation. An actor should appear half body, half shadow, half reality, and his gestures half feigned, half true, so that the whole spectacle seems a beautiful dream. Determinacy of presentation therefore need not mean the unmediated presence of the represented thing.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 117, entry 9, ¶1 — Representation replaces imitation as the stated aim of fine art.

I, p. 136, entry 3, ¶1 — Memory represents definite figures, distinguished from qualities.

I, p. 324, entry 7, ¶2 — A finished representation produces a repeatable fixed idea.

I, p. 370, entry 1, ¶1 — The actor's representation has a dreamlike, partial reality.

In this edition. Version 6 retains representation. It leaves the memory passage's "The idea cannot be…" incomplete. The actor's three halves are not arithmetically repaired; they describe an appearance. Believing, seeming, imagining and dreaming remain distinct verbs in that account.

See also. Imitation; Image; Memory; Idea; Theater; Dream.

[353] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 117, 136, 324, 370.

Resignation

résignation — resignation[354]

The word. Résignation is a yielding disposition that can reduce suffering through a motive outside one's own will. It is not simply lack of courage.

In Joubert. The comparison calls resignation easier than courage and explains "outside us" as outside our will. It invites using whichever diminishes ills better. In prayer, resignation qualifies requests for prosperity while virtue is to be asked insistently. A later aphorism gives resignation something sublime and courage merely strength. The different standards—ease, relief and sublimity—should not be collapsed into one scale of moral superiority.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 153, entry begun p. 152, no. 11, ¶4 — A motive outside will gives resignation a practical advantage.

I, p. 187, entry 10, ¶1 — Prosperity is to be asked with resignation.

I, p. 300, entry 6, ¶2 — Resignation is described as sublime rather than only strong.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the parenthetic explanation of outside, the conditional comparison of effects, and the contrast between requests for virtue and prosperity. It does not translate resignation as fatalism or complete inactivity when the cited texts do not do so.

See also. Courage; Prayer; Providence; Will; Sacrifice.

Resistance

résistance — resistance; resistances[355]

The word. Resistance names opposition that prevents easy realization. The obstacle may be a material, a habit, or a deliberately placed limit upon excessive facility.

In Joubert. Flesh is said to resist the making of beautiful bodies in a way colors and marble need not. The conditional comparison with divine making is a difficult claim about the limitations of a medium, not a casual assertion that an artist surpasses God absolutely. In the account of easy, abundant language, resistance is desirable: considered

[354] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 153, 187, 300.

[355] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 363, 425; II, pp. 573.

choice and sure taste must restrain the torrent. The same word can therefore indicate a constraint to overcome and a discipline to cultivate.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 573, entry 12, ¶1 — The material resistance of flesh limits bodily form.

I, p. 425, entry 2, ¶1 — Literary abundance requires deliberately placed resistances.

I, p. 363, entry 3, ¶1 — Habit resists a return to natural disposition.

In this edition. The translation preserves the plural “resistances” in the torrent image and the qualifications “could” and “more in conformity with” the archetypal idea in the artistic argument. It does not normalize all resistance as moral failure.

See also. Matter; Form; Perfection; Force.

Respect

respect; respecter — respect[356]

The word. Respect exceeds an exact measurement of merit: it can sustain tender affection and goodness within a reciprocal relation.

In Joubert. The extended account distinguishes the happiness of respecting from merely estimating another’s merit. It also describes a goodness toward those who respect us that exact justice alone would not call forth. The recollection of education values the respect pupils had for masters and masters had for themselves, alongside the spectacle and idea of their lives. This is a remembered moral relation, not proof of universal former innocence. The short contrast between contempt making contemptible and respect making respectable compresses the relation further, but leaves its objects unnamed. It should not be forced to decide whether giver or recipient is changed.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 206, entry 5, ¶1 — Respect adds affective goods to an exact appraisal of merit.

II, p. 831, entry 6, ¶1 — Educational respect runs toward masters and within their self-relation.

II, p. 836, entry 7, ¶1 — Respect and contempt are paired with their corresponding qualities.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the tender illusion attributed to respect without relabeling it deceit. The educational passage keeps moral distinct from instructive. The final paired fragments retain their unspecified objects rather than supplying an explicit psychological mechanism.

[356] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 206; II, pp. 780, 831, 836.

Related terms.

Deference. *déférence* — Déférence is divided by relation: toward age, merit and dignity it belongs to duty; toward equals, outsiders and unknown people it belongs to politeness or true civility. Version 6 does not identify étrangers with a particular nation. Deference is therefore not exclusively submission to a superior.

Places. II, p. 780, entry 3, ¶1.

See also. Esteem; Education; Tenderness; Contempt; Merit.

Rest

repos — rest; repose[357]

The word. Repos is physical rest, an interval in movement, or a condition of settled attention and feeling. It is not necessarily inactivity or lifelessness.

In Joubert. The reported Cartesian account makes solidity depend on the relative rest of a body's parts. Love, however, can be the will both at rest and in action, through possession and pleasure respectively. Contrasts are said to temper and lead to repose by establishing equilibrium. Finally, the Euler quotation questions whether rest and motion name appearance rather than truth. Read together, these witnesses invite precision about what is at rest and in relation to what, without making the quotation Joubert's final physical theory.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 244, entry 2, ¶1 — Rest is relative among the parts of a solid body.

I, p. 468, entry 4, ¶1 — Rest and action coexist within the account of love.

II, p. 697, entry 6, ¶2 — Balanced contrasts lead to repose.

II, p. 927, entry 5, ¶1 — A quotation questions the truth-value of the terms rest and motion.

In this edition. The translation varies "rest" and "repose" without creating a new French distinction. The Euler statement remains attributed, conjectural, and part of an undated appendix item.

See also. Movement; Density and solidity; Order; Void.

[357] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 244, 468; II, pp. 697, 927.

Reverie

rêverie — reverie[358]

The word. Reverie is an inward condition from which verse may emerge. It can be peaceful and receptive without excluding sustained attention, bodily circumstances or the labor of revision.

In Joubert. Excellent lines are likened to leisurely impromptus, emerging all at once from peaceful reverie. Another image gives verse a mother: lines that do not arise as if of themselves from the bosom and flanks of reverie are imperfect offspring. The qualification “if one may put it so” matters to this deliberately physical metaphor. At the hearth, posture, silence, place and the kind of reverie one enters all help give the mind attention and activity. When poetry is described as coming in reverie rather than through reflection, the claim concerns its arrival; the later exclamation over two versions of Malherbe’s stanza includes work, attention, reverie and “rechewing” together. These notes offer complementary pressures rather than a simple rule that poets should avoid work.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 309, entry 4, ¶2 — Peaceful reverie yields lines as if in a sudden impromptu.

I, p. 317, entry 1, ¶1 — Verse receives a maternal image and an explicit qualification.

I, p. 318, entry 5, ¶2 — The hearth supports reverie, attention and activity.

I, p. 419, entry 9, ¶1 — Poetry arrives in reverie and eludes deliberate reflection.

II, p. 738, entry 1, ¶4 — Reverie accompanies work, attention and rechewing.

In this edition. Version 6 retains reverie in each context. The Latin prolem sine matre creatam identifies motherless offspring; the imagery is not reduced to effortless inspiration. Rechewing preserves remâchement as a physical metaphor. The Malherbe comparison reports Joubert’s account of the stanza’s earlier composition and printing; that publication history has not been independently established.

See also. Dream; Reflection; Attention; Poetry; Inspiration; Meditation and contemplation.

[358] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 309, 317, 318, 419; II, pp. 738.

Revolution

révolution — revolution; revolutions[359]

The word. Révolution may describe transformation, but these witnesses concern political upheaval and the motives that give it character.

In Joubert. The sensitivity fragment points to the revolution as a field of examples for opinions turning nervous responsiveness toward cruelty. It does not name those examples or supply the missing object of "make fit." The later maxim says changing revolutions' motives changes their nature, direction and effects. Motivation is not merely an excuse attached after the outcome; it enters the account of what kind of event the revolution is. The editor's expanded variant remains separate evidence.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 347, entry 9, ¶1 — Political upheaval is cited as evidence of morally redirected sensitivity.

II, p. 873, entry 3, ¶1 — Motives alter the kind, direction and effects of revolutions.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the unfilled grammatical object, the imperative form of change and all three consequent terms. It does not convert an undetailed allusion into a catalog of revolutionary episodes. The lexical family also has nonpolitical uses elsewhere, so raw counts require sense checking.

See also. Sensibility; Government; Nation; Good and evil.

Rhetoric

rhétorique — rhetoric[360]

The word. Rhétorique is called the art of persuasion, but its excellence must be distinguished from the truth or moral perfection of what is taught.

In Joubert. The explicit description as persuasion places rhetoric among disciplines while contrasting the received rules of logic and poetics. The literature passage then locates literary excellence in forms of expression rather than perfection of doctrines, concluding that morality and rhetoric must not be confused. This is a distinction of evaluations, not an instruction to ignore every moral effect of writing. The countinghouse satire makes another substitution visible: syllogistic figures and calculation replace rhetorical figures, while literary values are appraised by a banker's

[359] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 347; II, pp. 873.

[360] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 195, 413; II, pp. 505, 518, 807.

mentality. It criticizes the manner of assessment rather than providing a literal economic analysis.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 195, entry 2, ¶1 — Rhetoric is named as the art of persuasion.

II, p. 518, entry 9, ¶2 — Forms of expression and moral doctrine require different evaluations.

II, p. 807, entry 3, ¶3 — Syllogistic calculation displaces rhetoric in a satirical comparison.

In this edition. Version 6 renders élocution as expression, not exclusively voice training, and reads the printed ne negatively without adding pas to the French. Taxées becomes appraised in the financial metaphor rather than implying a literal tax.

Related terms.

Irony. *ironie* — The Apollo comparison gives irony the motion of a released projectile: an orator has just “loosed an irony.” The later instruction excludes coarse irony, with bitter laughter, from discussions governed by moral beauty. Version 6 preserves the physical verb and the qualifying coarse; these witnesses do not prohibit every irony or identify the Apollo more precisely than the source does.

Places. I, p. 413, entry 8, ¶1; II, p. 505, entry 2, ¶1.

See also. Eloquence; Logic; Figure and metaphor; Criticism.

Rhythm and number

rythme; nombre — rhythm; number[361]

The word. Rythme, also printed rithme, and rhetorical nombre are related but explicitly distinguishable qualities of verbal movement.

In Joubert. The sentence definition gives number to distinct, varied, countable parts and rhythm to a measure that voice or gesture can beat. Later number is the ear’s means toward harmony in the soul, and the end may sometimes be reached without that means. Meaning can also introduce variety into an otherwise uniform rhythm, like continually renewed waves in a stream. The translation warning makes this distinction practical: imposing fixed rhythm and number on an original that lacks them may be an infidelity, even if the result sounds elegant.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 92–93, entry 9, ¶1 — Countable divisions and a beatable measure distinguish number and rhythm.

[361] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 92, 93, 429; II, pp. 510, 652, 730.

II, p. 510, entry 9, ¶1 — Number is a possible means toward harmony, not its identity.

I, p. 429, entry 4, ¶1 — Changing thought introduces variety into uniform rhythm.

II, p. 652, entry 10, ¶1 — A translator's fixed rhythm can misrepresent the original.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps number rather than replacing it everywhere with rhythm. Arithmetic or cosmic number is a separate sense treated under Number. The stream comparison supplies no precise metrical scheme.

Related terms.

Variety and uniformity. *variété; uniformité* — Meaning can introduce variety into a uniform rhythm, like equal-width waves continually renewed in a stream. The later voice/hand/brush comparisons also allow a unity and uniformity that please, distinguished from the boredom of repeated tone, manner and color. Version 6 keeps both variety and uniformity without making one automatically good and the other bad. Recognizable authorship and renewed movement matter more than a simple numerical alternation.

Places. I, p. 429, entry 4, ¶1; II, p. 730, entry begun p. 729, no. 9, ¶2.

See also. Harmony; Verse; Prose; Translation; Number.

Rules

règle — rule; rules[362]

The word. Règle can be a principle answering an art's needs or a convention that has lost its purpose. Observance alone does not establish worth.

In Joubert. In the late art fragment, the rule is connected to necessity and need, then to clarity, charm, distinctness and usefulness. A work should resemble art without copying an existing work. This contrasts with the difficult, useless formulas by which modern dramatists turn their art into a game governed by agreement. The contrast is not rules versus freedom in every case: it is a test of what rules do. In conduct, observing the rule at any cost must sometimes be practiced but never recommended; the difference between practice and advice remains deliberately severe.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 898, entry 3, ¶1 — Artistic rule answers needs rather than requiring imitation of a work.

I, p. 129, entry 4, ¶1 — Agreed dramatic rules can reduce art to a prize-winning game.

II, p. 814, entry 4, ¶1 — Rule-observance at any cost is distinguished as practice and advice.

[362] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 129, 148; II, pp. 814, 898.

I, p. 148, entry 10, ¶1 — A truth can become error through misapplication.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps both rule/necessity parentheses and distinguishes sometimes practicing from never recommending. Play is a subsidiary critical image, not a claim that all play is empty. Application is another necessary qualification: a true content wrongly placed can yield error, so correct formulation alone does not settle its use.

Related terms.

Play. *jeu* — The game image criticizes modern dramatists who agree on difficult, useless rules to win a prize and avoid loss. It describes a particular transformation of art into competitive procedure; it does not condemn every form of play, invention or lightness.

Places. I, p. 129, entry 4, ¶1.

Application. *application* — A good mind can err by displacing or misapplying a truth. Application therefore adds a question of fit to the question of truth: the content need not be false for its employment to mislead. Version 6 uses misapplication for mauvaise application in this particular warning.

Places. I, p. 148, entry 10, ¶1.

See also. Art; Imitation; Aphorism and maxim; Error; Theater.

Sacrifice

sacrifice; privation; renoncement — sacrifice; deprivation; renunciation[363]

The word. Sacrifice involves giving up something valued, either for heaven or in obligations to social life. Joubert makes its cost concrete rather than merely figurative.

In Joubert. The explicit definition accumulates deprivation, renunciation, abandonment and destitution, then compares the pagan's ox and the Christian's refusal of a desired woman. A separate maxim extends sacrifice to parts of independence, mind and reason owed to society. The later religious definition names giving God what pleases us, is dear to us and is loved. These are distinct objects of attachment; their threefold repetition measures what is surrendered.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 147, entry 9, ¶1 — Sacrifice is defined through cost and renunciation.

I, p. 323, entry 1, ¶1 — Society is said to require portions of independence and reason.

II, p. 766, entry 14, ¶1 — Religious sacrifice gives up what one values.

[363] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 147, 323; II, pp. 766.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the repeated sacrifice verb and the difference between pleasure, dearness and love. “Fortune” in the ox example concerns possessions rather than luck. The social note’s damaged day is not inferred, and no complete theory of obedience is added to its demand.

See also. Prayer; Resignation; Duty; Society; Desire.

Science

science — science; knowledge; sciences[364]

The word. Science can denote a body of knowledge or disciplined knowing. It is broader here than present-day experimental natural science.

In Joubert. Morals can be called a science of practice and circumstance, while metaphysics concerns real essences. Those labels underpin opposite relations between society and individuals, not a ranking of modern academic departments. Wisdom is then the “science of sciences” because it judges what kinds of knowledge are good for the soul, together with their uses and dangers. A challenge to learned truth asks whether possessing knowledge and “your sciences” is necessary for happiness and enlightenment. It does not say that the unlearned possess every truth of the learned; it distinguishes the relevant kind of truth.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 326, entry 3, ¶1 — Morals and metaphysics are contrasted as different sciences.

II, p. 715, entry 10, ¶1 — Wisdom evaluates the value, use and danger of sciences.

II, p. 782, entry 3, ¶1 — Learned truth is distinguished from truth necessary for happiness.

In this edition. Version 6 retains science in disciplinary and evaluative formulations, but uses knowledge for general singular science in the question on II.782. This is contextual variation, not an assertion that French science has only one English equivalent.

See also. Knowledge; Truth; Discernment.

[364] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 326; II, pp. 715, 782.

Scripture

bible; évangile — Bible; Gospel; Gospels[365]

The word. Scriptural books are discussed both as sources of religious meaning and as distinctive forms of language.

In Joubert. The comparison of the Bible with the Iliad concerns their relation to religions and poetry; it is not a claim of identical doctrine. Biblical style appears to conceal all operation of mind and art, leaving pure nature. Yet translating it requires choices: spacious words, loose joins and an air of age, in contrast with the Gospel's ease and flowing naturalness. Another fragment pairs the Gospels' hope with the old testament's promises without elaborating their difference. These witnesses show why a single uniform sacred style would flatten Joubert's vocabulary.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 151, entry 8, ¶1 — A relation between books and traditions is expressed by analogy.

I, p. 463, entry 5, ¶1 — Biblical style seems natural and without felt art.

II, p. 846, entry 4, ¶1 — Hope and promises form an unexplained nominal pairing.

II, p. 873–874, entry 8, ¶1 — Different translation textures are prescribed for Bible and Gospel.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the Bible/Gospel distinction and the unfinished syntax of the translation prescription. The source punctuation anomaly after air remains in French. Beaunier's first-version excerpt is separately labeled; its printed editorial omissions are not used to complete the main text.

See also. Religion; Style; Translation; Hope.

Scruple

scrupule; scrupuleux — scruple; scrupulous[366]

The word. Scruple is a restraining inward check; scrupulous can also describe a precision or hesitation that limits action.

In Joubert. A reported maxim makes scruple indispensable to continence. The restraint protects conduct rather than merely obstructing it. The fragment on scrupulous taste gives the reverse pressure: the scrupulous rarely accomplish great things. A third note grades the proper scruple in mockery. Natural gifts deserve protection as gifts of heaven,

[365] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 151, 463; II, pp. 846, 873, 874.

[366] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 161, 324; II, pp. 491, 492.

while acquired qualities may receive a less scrupulous response. The word therefore belongs to a judgment about when restraint is due, not a single scale on which more scruple is always better. Its overlap with conscience does not remove its specific role as a check on action or speech.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 161, entry 8, ¶1 — Scruple guards continence in a reported maxim.

I, p. 324, entry 1, ¶1 — Scrupulous taste is linked with limited achievement.

II, p. 491–492, entry 11, ¶1 — Different kinds of merit call for different restraint in mockery.

In this edition. Version 6 retains continence in its sexual sense, as the attached note explains. The taste witness remains a compressed assertion. The unusual expense-and in the final witness preserves a source hyphen rather than a missing word.

See also. Conscience; Chastity; Taste; Merit.

Sculpture

sculpture; statue — sculpture; statue[367]

The word. Sculpture and statue serve as specific artistic categories whose beauty can differ from beauty of expression or of a work considered more broadly.

In Joubert. The Apollo Belvedere judgment calls it unsurpassed as a statue while allowing other statues more beautiful expression. Joubert then restates the distinction as most beautiful statue but not most beautiful work. The shifting comparison matters: an art's category does not settle every kind of excellence. The note contrasting Christian painting and sculpture likewise leaves an explanatory question open, with inward worship explicitly said not to be the only reason. Sculpture is finally included among arts whose beauty comes from soul or entrails, so its formal medium does not exclude an inward source.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 465, entry 5, ¶1 — Beauty as a statue differs from beauty of expression and of the broader work.

II, p. 640, entry 4, ¶1 — Painting and sculpture receive a tentative religious comparison.

II, p. 814, entry 5, ¶1 — Sculpture joins other arts in the soul/entrails claim.

[367] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 465; II, pp. 640, 814.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the alternative restatement and does not supply an answer to “Why sculpture is not very Christian.” “Was bound to” expresses inferred inevitability in the Raphael remark, not an imposed obligation.

See also. Beauty; Painting; Expression; Art.

Seed and germ

germe; semence — seed; germ[368]

The word. Semence and germe connect potential growth, generation, and the self-developing beginnings of a work. They are grouped as related images, not made into one botanical term.

In Joubert. The elemental fragment puts seeds in air and gives water the growth of germs. A beautiful work differs from an ordinary work because it needs a germ that develops in the mind like a plant, rather than only a subject. The flower comparison distinguishes simple expressions that carry seed from richly double flowers that charm but produce nothing. The concern is generative capacity: a thought can please immediately yet fail to yield further thought.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 51, entry 1, ¶1 — Seeds and germs receive places in a speculative account of generation.

II, p. 489, entry 3, ¶1 — A work’s germ develops organically beyond its subject.

I, p. 340, entry 1, ¶1 — Single and double flowers distinguish productive expression from sterile richness.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps “seed” and “germ” distinct. “Germ” here is a beginning capable of development, not necessarily a microorganism; “single” and “double” retain the flower comparison.

See also. Growth; Flower and fruit; Life; Fermentation; Vegetation.

[368] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 51, 340; II, pp. 489.

Self

moi; soi — myself; oneself; himself[369]

The word. Moi and soi mark a relation to oneself, not automatically a philosophical substance called the self. Joubert's uses can describe inward companionship, comparison and isolation.

In Joubert. The difficulty of leaving the country is phrased as parting from oneself, balanced against leaving friends in Paris. This self-relation can sustain inward life. The social-disunion fragment instead makes ambition and love of well-being attach each person to themselves at others' expense. The early warning that pain at another's better treatment is not always jealousy further prevents a single moral diagnosis of every self-concern. The same reflexive direction can therefore appear as presence, hurt or enclosure.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 34, entry 1, ¶1 — Unequal treatment can hurt without necessarily being jealousy.

I, p. 403, entry 2, ¶2 — Country life is described as companionship with oneself.

II, p. 911, entry 2, ¶2 — Self-attachment can accompany disunion from others.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the friends/myself parallel and the repeated self-reference in the disunion passage. It does not replace the pronouns with an invented technical ego. The early "not always" should survive any summary of the jealousy maxim.

See also. Solitude; Pride; Ambition; Society; Conscience.

Self-love

amour-propre — self-love[370]

The word. Amour-propre names a regard for oneself that can produce satisfaction, tenderness or gratitude as well as demand accommodation from others.

In Joubert. The household argument gives each person a figurative kingdom in which faults can be at ease and self-love can contribute to happiness. But the same domestic life continually requires sacrificing those rights. The relinquishment is valuable because it is voluntary and can become a further enjoyment. The two shorter notes make satisfied

[369] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 34, 403; II, pp. 911.

[370] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 127, 128; II, pp. 482, 581.

self-love tender and personify grateful self-love giving thanks to providence. These effects do not determine whether its gratitude is generous or self-serving. The compound must therefore remain distinct from both a blanket condemnation of pride and a modern prescription of healthy self-esteem.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 127–128, entry 6, ¶1 — Domestic privileges and their voluntary sacrifice accommodate self-love.

II, p. 482, entry 1, ¶1 — Content, grateful self-love thanks providence.

II, p. 581, entry 8, ¶1 — Satisfied self-love is called tender.

In this edition. Version 6 uses self-love for both spaced amour propre and hyphenated amour-propre. It preserves the condition content or satisfied rather than attributing tenderness to self-love under every circumstance. No moral verdict is added to the thanksgiving personification.

See also. Pride; Family; Tenderness; Gratitude; Sacrifice.

Sensation

sensation — sensation; sensations[371]

The word. Sensation names a felt event or transmission. Its distinction from an idea or a lasting feeling is central to several arguments; it is not a synonym for every inward experience.

In Joubert. In the early account of imagination, sensations without its ordering activity are vivid and brief but lack harmony in succession. The criticism of Locke then insists that sensation and idea must be distinguished, while qualifying their real difference as at least a difference of degree. The numbered sequence makes sensation a “transmission felt” and places the idea or feeling of that sensation afterward. This is Joubert’s proposed ordering, not an independently established psychology.

The distinction becomes a criterion of art. One fragment says that tragic actors express sensation more than feeling; the artist who produces only sensations is accused of doing no more than a trade can do through the body. The later Petrarch comparison instead contrasts the persistence of feelings with the difficulty of preserving sensations. Neither the enduring image nor a powerful bodily effect by itself guarantees the full achievement of art.

[371] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 44, 275, 348, 454; II, pp. 834.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 44, entry begun p. 43, no. 1, ¶8 — Without imagination, sensations lack continuity of harmony.

I, p. 275, entry 5, ¶1 — Sensation and idea remain distinct, at least as degrees.

I, p. 275, entry 5, ¶2 — A numbered account separates impression, sensation and idea or feeling.

I, p. 348, entry 5, ¶1 — Acting may express sensation more than feeling.

I, p. 454, entry 1, ¶1 — Art is required to aspire beyond sensation alone.

II, p. 834, entry 12, ¶1 — An image sustains feelings more readily than sensations.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves sensation alongside idea, feeling or sentiments according to the surrounding French. The incomplete phrase “and the idea of pain” stays incomplete. The Petrarch passage is Joubert’s interpretation; its thirty years and claim about medieval fidelity are not independently verified biography. The lexicon does not convert the numbered account into medical fact.

See also. Feeling; Sensibility; Perception; Imagination; Art; Organs and brain.

Sensibility

sensibilité — feeling; sensitivity; sensibility[372]

The word. Sensibilité concerns a capacity to be affected, but can emphasize fellow feeling, nervous responsiveness or an emanating inward quality. One English equivalent cannot express all three uses equally well.

In Joubert. The wish to need nobody is called a sign of a soul without feeling: dependence can testify to receptivity. The note on nerves, however, says opinions may influence sensitivity toward cruelty, so heightened responsiveness is not automatically kindness. Finally sensibility is imagined as having a vapor around it, as intelligence radiates; together they give a person an atmosphere. That material image should remain an image rather than becoming a newly supplied physiological explanation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 33, entry 1, ¶2 — Refusal of all obligation signals absence of feeling.

I, p. 347, entry 9, ¶1 — Nervous sensitivity can be affected by cruel opinions.

II, p. 791, entry 6, ¶3 — Sensibility contributes vapor to a person’s atmosphere.

[372] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 33, 347; II, pp. 791.

In this edition. Version 6 uses feeling in the social maxim, sensitivity in the nervous account, and sensibility in the vapor image. The cruelty fragment leaves the object of "make fit" unstated, and the translation does not decide whether the person or faculty is meant.

See also. Feeling; Heart; Piety; Affection; Revolution.

Sensorium

sensorium — sensorium[373]

The word. Sensorium is a Latin term for a seat or organ of sensation, retained within Joubert's discussion of Newton's account of space.

In Joubert. Joubert says that Newton conceives space outside God where it should be put inside. He then moves through bodily images: face, sensorium, body, stature. The sentence that Newton does not dare call it God's body is Joubert's characterization, not an independently verified Newton quotation. The local series helps a reader understand what the unusual Latin term is doing without treating it as an exact substitute for brain.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 451, entry 8, ¶1 — The Latin term mediates a sequence of bodily comparisons applied to space.

In this edition. Version 6 leaves sensorium untranslated and explains the term separately. It retains "if I dare speak this way," marking Joubert's own caution about the divine bodily image.

See also. Space and place; Body; Extension.

Sentence

phrase — sentence[374]

The word. Phrase, often printed phraze, is a unit of verbal expression whose shape and movement can be compared with thought or the body.

In Joubert. The sentence resembling a thought must match its dimensions and form, neither falling short nor extending beyond. This is a spatial analogy for fit, not a

[373] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 451. Language: Latin within French prose. No external Newton passage is authenticated here.

[374] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 265; II, pp. 594, 818.

numerical rule for word count. The fidgeting sentence attributed to Locke has involuntary motion like a lively person forced to sit still. The writer's own cursed ambition then compresses book into page, page into sentence and sentence into word. That self-portrait exposes the pressure of concentration; it should not be recast as an uncomplicated recommendation for every writer.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 594, entry 5, ¶1 — Sentence and thought should fit in dimensions and form.

I, p. 265, entry 4, ¶1 — The sentence is compared to bodily fidgeting.

II, p. 818, entry 3, ¶1 — Sentence stands between page and word in a tormented ambition for compression.

In this edition. Version 6 renders phraze with ordinary English sentence while retaining the historical French spelling. The initial noun and relative clauses on II.594 remain a fragment. English sentence here must also be distinguished from French sentence, which can mean a maxim or a judicial judgment.

See also. Thought; Brevity; Word; Aphorism and maxim.

Servitude

servitude; esclave; esclavage — servitude; slave; slavery[375]

The word. Servitude and esclavage occur as historical conditions, models of submission and provocative metaphors for obligation; their ethical force cannot be fixed from the noun alone.

In Joubert. The response to a bronze angel serving a seated priest treats religious submission as training for political servility. Other notes do not simply repeat that criticism. An unfinished passage about admission to virtue imagines artisans and slaves becoming sovereign over themselves; its feminine agent is not named. The alternative between slaves of duty and slaves of force makes obligatory restraint a condition of peace among free people. These contrasts should remain visible rather than being arranged into an unproved conversion story.

The reply to Vauvenargues goes further, asserting that slavery able to make itself loved no longer debases. This historical judgment remains objectionable and is not softened into a harmless metaphor. Its presence is precisely why the article cannot give every occurrence the approving sense of voluntary discipline.

[375] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 78, 336; II, pp. 666, 761, 762.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 78, entry 2, ¶1 — A sculptural arrangement becomes an accusation of religious and political servility.

I, p. 336, entry 6, ¶1 — An unnamed feminine agent opens virtue to artisans and slaves.

II, p. 666, entry 2, ¶1 — Joubert disputes Vauvenargues's claim about loved slavery.

II, p. 761–762, entry 13, ¶1 — Duty and force are opposed as two forms of binding men.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the unnamed elle and anomalous feminine chacune in the virtue fragment. It preserves Joubert's wording of the Vauvenargues quotation rather than silently substituting the external text, which differs.

See also. Freedom; Duty; Authority; Priesthood; Virtue.

Severity

sévérité — severity[376]

The word. Sévérité is evaluated through its effects, which can differ even within relations of care and correction.

In Joubert. The parental fragment assigns increased tenderness to the person who is respectfully feared, not to the one who fears. Another note gives severity a contrary result: it freezes faults where indulgence may kill them. The later hypothetical choice prefers softness that allows time for improvement to severity that worsens people or haste that will not wait for repentance. These are not simply inconsistent definitions. They consider different effects and conditions, keeping severity from becoming an automatic synonym either for good discipline or for cruelty. Nor does the last comparison praise every possible softness.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 430, entry 3, ¶1 — Respectfully feared parents are said to become more tender.

I, p. 466, entry 6, ¶1 — Severity can fix faults instead of removing them.

II, p. 844, entry 2, ¶1 — Softness is conditionally preferred when it leaves time for improvement.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the direction of the parental fear and its respectful qualification. The frozen-fault image remains physical. The final preference stays hypothetical and first-person, with better/worse and time for repentance intact.

[376] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 377, 430, 466; II, pp. 844.

Related terms.

Rigorism. *rigorisme* — Rigorisme here describes a taste that refuses pleasures that would be permitted. The distinction is from good taste's refusal of false pleasures. Its reproach concerns excessive restriction; the unnamed addressee and conditional permitted pleasures are not expanded into a religious school or fixed list of prohibitions.

Places. I, p. 377, entry 1, ¶1.

See also. Indulgence; Education; Tenderness; Repentance; Ascetic austerity.

Shadow

ombre — shadow; shade[377]

The word. Ombre may be protective shade, a visible consequence of a body, or a diminished or indirect presentation of something else. A shadow is not invariably deception.

In Joubert. The physical observation about grass values shade as protection against excessive exposure. Mathematics, by contrast, operates on shadows of realities: a line is the shadow of a stretched thread, a circle that of a hoop. The image explains selective abstraction from material things. Another aphorism distinguishes beings by their shadows and God by his light. These relations give shadow positive explanatory work even when it marks distance from fullness or origin.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 38–39, entry 7, ¶1 — Shade preserves grass from excessive exposure.

I, p. 242, entry 8, ¶1 — Mathematical figures are shadows detached from realities.

I, p. 440, entry 4, ¶1 — Shadow distinguishes ordinary beings, light the divine.

In this edition. Version 6 uses "shade" for the botanical setting and "shadow" for abstraction and the divine contrast. The repeated figures remain concrete rather than being replaced by the generic word representation.

See also. Light; Rays and radiance; Sphere and circle; Body.

[377] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 38, 39, 242, 440.

Shame

honte — shame; ashamed[378]

The word. Honte evaluates a person, an age or an act of self-examination. The word can be intellectual as well as social or moral.

In Joubert. The rebuke of an otherwise wise reader's bad reasoning makes lack of shame a fault in historical judgment. The influence of novels is then assigned more to the century's shame than to the books' honor. In the analogy between a wise person's mind and conscience, shame joins examinations, afflictions and firm resolutions. Here it belongs to correction, not merely to exposure before a public audience.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 68, entry 1, ¶1 — Bad reasoning can be a cause for shame.

II, p. 549, entry 5, ¶1 — Literary influence can indict its age rather than glorify a book.

II, p. 750, entry 10, ¶4 — Shame participates in intellectual and moral self-examination.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the century/books contrast and the parallel list belonging to mind and conscience. It does not automatically translate honte as guilt, since the cited sentences do not all concern wrongdoing in the same sense. The unnamed critic in the first witness remains unnamed.

See also. Conscience; Repentance; Honor; Pride.

Sign

signe — sign[379]

The word. Signe names a means by which something is manifested or represented; its relation to speech and writing can vary.

In Joubert. The sequence thought–speech–writing makes writing the sign of another sign. Joubert does not thereby say that all signs are written. The conversation fragment lists eyes, gesture and voice among signs accompanying ideas that written expression cannot carry with it. The note on alphabetic finger signs then describes writing and reading in the air, with memory assisting the reading. It distinguishes that activity from mimes drawing in air. These observations identify several modes of signification without naming a particular sign language or offering a complete theory of communication.

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[378] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 68; II, pp. 549, 750.

[379] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 195, 376; II, pp. 505, 729, 741, 914, 915.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 376, entry 1, ¶1 — Writing signifies speech, which signifies thought.

II, p. 505, entry 9, ¶1 — Gesture, eyes and voice manifest ideas beyond the written word.

II, p. 729, entry 7, ¶1 — Alphabetic finger signs are writing in air, distinguished from mimed drawing.

In this edition. Version 6 repeats sign rather than substituting a modern semiotic vocabulary. Written word renders parole écrite in the conversation fragment, while speech renders parole in the two-stage sign relation.

Related terms.

Letter. *lettre* — Lettre here names a written character, not correspondence. The translation instruction would preserve letter as well as sound and word unless exactness deforms the intended features; its English conditional interprets anomalous printed ni as probable si and discloses that correction. Elsewhere each letter's figure can contribute to a word's visual charm. O and I need only indicate circle and perpendicular to function as letters, whereas mathematical figures require perfection and absolute straightness. The comparison distinguishes adequate indication from geometrical precision without naming a typeface.

Places. I, p. 195, entry 1, ¶1; II, p. 741, entry 3, ¶1; II, p. 914–915, entry 7, ¶3.

See also. Language; Writing; Expression; Conversation.

Silence

silence — silence; silences; silence of the pen[380]

The word. Silence may be an acoustic interval, a condition of receptive attention, or a deliberate abstention from writing.

In Joubert. The music/architecture analogy gives silences a positive formal role alongside sounds, as voids do alongside solids. The desert declaration reverses ordinary expectations: everything speaks in silence while noise makes everything mute. It supplies an inward relation, not a named location or a practical retreat program. Silence of the pen has a further, explicitly literary use: strength gathers and precision should emerge from not writing. The attentive-silence fragment finally makes words be born from silence, while thoughts are born from the soul. These images make silence generative without treating every absence of speech as fruitful.

[380] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 83, 103, 405; II, pp. 742.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 83, entry 7, ¶1 — Silences participate positively in musical arrangement.

I, p. 103, entry 1, ¶1 — Silence permits speech in a paradox of desert and noise.

I, p. 405, entry 2, ¶1 — Not writing can accumulate strength and produce precision.

II, p. 742, entry 1, ¶1 — Words are to be born from attentive silence.

In this edition. Version 6 repeats strength where French elle refers to force, not silence. The fragments about knowing how not to write retain their shifting grammar. Neither the desert image nor attentive silence receives an invented title, practice or setting.

See also. Writing; Attention; Music; Architecture; Solitude; Inward recollection.

Simplicity

simplicité — simplicity; simply[381]

The word. Simplicité can describe plain terminology, economy of thought or a work stripped of superfluity. It need not mean ease of production or absence of richness.

In Joubert. The criticism of analysis says that pompous terminology renames what plain speakers called division. Simplicity there concerns how one speaks. In the psalms, painting and gilding a work whose character is absolute necessity produces the paradox of a decorated simplicity. The criticism is directed at superfluous additions, not at a lack of skill in applying them. Sophocles supplies a different problem: Joubert admires perfect simplicity of thoughts but leaves the explanation as topics still to investigate. The lexicon must preserve that unanswered inquiry rather than deriving a formula from the praise.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 282, entry 6, ¶1 — Plain division contrasts with grandly named analysis.

II, p. 620, entry 10, ¶1 — Gilding the psalms covers necessary simplicity with superfluity.

II, p. 879, entry 6, ¶1 — Sophoclean simplicity is praised and left as a subject of inquiry.

In this edition. Version 6 renders emphase as grandiloquence in the terminology passage and repeats painted and gilded in the psalm passage. R-ss- remains unexpanded. No specific Sophoclean scene is invented.

See also. Brevity; Ornament; Emphasis; Thought.

[381] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 282; II, pp. 620, 879.

Sincerity and frankness

sincérité; franchise; véracité — sincerity; frankness; veracity[382]

The word. Sincérité concerns honesty of intention without guaranteeing correct judgment; franchise can be a natural disposition distinct from the virtue of sustained veracity.

In Joubert. The quotation attributed to Mme de Staël and Joubert's response distinguish frankness by character from truthfulness by principle. A frank person may fail to keep a secret, while a virtue gives way when it encounters a higher virtue. Joubert develops this into an ordering of duties, contrasting natural qualities with enlightened conduct. Another note makes sincerity, unlike infallibility or an accurate mind, something within one's power. The complaint that friends lose frankness through tact and silence adds a social cost to considerate restraint. None of these distinctions allows sincerity to certify that a belief is true.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 601, entry 5, ¶1 — A quoted comparison leads to a distinction between natural frankness and virtuous veracity.

II, p. 659, entry 8, ¶1 — Sincerity is within one's power, accuracy is not guaranteed.

II, p. 673, entry 1, ¶1 — Tact and silence can erode frankness among friends.

In this edition. Version 6 marks where the Staël quotation ends and Joubert's economic comparison and reformulation begin; the precise external quotation was not collated. The damaged [...]iscrétion in the friendship note remains unresolved rather than being presented as intact discretion.

Related terms.

Dissimulation. *dissimulation* — Dissimulation is assigned to experience, while vanity comes from temperament. The passage then insists that the former is a vice and the latter a passion: different origins and moral categories must not be confused. Version 6 retains dissimulation without treating it as mere polite reserve.

Places. I, p. 257, entry begun p. 256, no. 6, ¶3.

See also. Truth; Duty; Friendship; Falsehood; Modest conduct.

[382] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 257; II, pp. 601, 659, 673.

Sky and stars

ciel; astre — sky; heavens; stars[383]

The word. Ciel may be the visible sky or heavens, while astres names celestial bodies rather than exclusively the modern category of stars. Religious heaven is a related but separately treated use.

In Joubert. The desired succession of thoughts resembles stars ordered in the sky, separated enough to retain independence while remaining harmonious. Another fragment calls the stars aerial or ethereal islands. A nested sequence places earth in air, air in ether, ether in the heavens, the heavens in light, and light in God. The last moves from surrounding media toward a divine containing source; it should not be mistaken for a modern diagram of atmospheric layers.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 263, entry 9, ¶1 — The sky supplies an image of ordered but independent thoughts.

I, p. 407, entry 5, ¶1 — Celestial bodies are imagined as islands in air or ether.

I, p. 239, entry 4, ¶1 — The heavens occupy a place in a nested series.

In this edition. Version 6 uses “sky” for the literary constellation and “heavens” for the nested series. It retains “stars” where the comparison pictures isolated lights, without making the source a modern astronomical classification.

See also. World and universe; Ether; Light; Order; Sun and night.

Sleep

sommeil — sleep[384]

The word. Sleep suspends ordinary activity and supplies a model for the absence of thought or feeling without the disappearance of the person.

In Joubert. The early mechanical image gives the bodily machine slackened springs and describes animation as pausing. The later comparison makes mental sleep as conceivable as bodily sleep while fully alive. Death itself can become a deeper sleep when resurrection is understood as awakening. These are comparisons that make discontinuity imaginable; the first passage’s assertion that life’s functions stop must remain a historical claim, not a clinical definition.

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[383] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 239, 263, 407.

[384] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 61, 295, 437.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 61, entry 11, ¶1 — Sleep slackens the springs of the living machine.

I, p. 437, entry 3, ¶2 — Mental and bodily sleep provide parallel absences.

I, p. 295, entry 6, ¶1 — Awakening from deeper sleep explains the idea of resurrection.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps suspension, pause, and awakening distinct. The ellipsis after preservation in the first witness remains; the lexicon does not finish the account.

See also. Rest; Life; Death; Mechanism.

Society

société — society; relations with society[385]

The word. Société names the field of human relations, inherited customs and differentiated capacities. It is not merely a gathering of agreeable companions.

In Joubert. The early child-development speculation connects entering society with sexual maturation; this is a historical claim rather than present-day developmental evidence. The fidelity fragment calls loyalty to ancestral customs and even religion a virtue of society. The two travelers then embody practical good sense and historically attentive intelligence. Both do well, but their different proportions are said to serve society. The conclusion values complementary capacities while assigning them unequal numbers.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 41, entry 1, ¶1 — Social relations enter a speculative account of childhood.

I, p. 351, entry 2, ¶1 — Fidelity to inherited customs is named a social virtue.

II, p. 847, entry 7, ¶1 — Different capacities are assigned complementary social uses.

In this edition. Version 6 translates entrer en commerce as entering relations rather than literal trade. It retains “both do well,” the many/few contrast and the unresolved object after bivouac. The source’s damaged date in the fidelity fragment is not inferred from neighboring notes.

See also. Family; Education; Nation; Government; Conversation.

[385] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 41, 351; II, pp. 847.

Solitude

solitude — solitude[386]

The word. Solitude names privacy or separation from others; its value changes with the activity and stage of life involved. It does not always mean loneliness or spiritual retreat.

In Joubert. The early intimate example makes solitude protect a private pleasure from imagined witnesses and betrayal. The hermit-happiness note then contrasts a recent saying with an earlier valuation of solitude only with God, a comparison attributed in wording to Chateaubriand. The undated old-age fragment treats solitude as an imposed reduction and imagines comfort in posthumous remembrance. These uses distinguish chosen privacy, religious companionship and involuntary isolation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 40, entry 3, ¶1 — Privacy protects the confidence of lovers in a historically situated claim.

II, p. 614, entry 2, ¶1 — Solitude with God is contrasted with hermit happiness.

II, p. 918, entry 1, ¶1 — Old age's solitude gives a particular sweetness to imagined remembrance.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the hermit personification, the conditional historical comparison and the bodily setting of the first witness. Recueillement there becomes inward concentration; it is not an act of remembering. The last fragment's second-person continuity is an English adaptation of the French shift from vous to on.

See also. Inward recollection; God; Love; Society; Leisure.

Sophistry

sophiste; sophisme; sophistique; sophistiqué — sophistry; sophist; sophists; sophism; sophisms; sophisticated[387]

The word. Sophistry produces the appearance of philosophy, knowledge or beauty. The family includes both false reasoning and the cosmetic or adulterating work of expression.

In Joubert. The sophist's relation to philosophy is compared with the declaimer's relation to eloquence: speaking takes the place of thinking. Another note makes displayed knowledge, wit and doctrine a parade motivated by pride, opposed to the scholar's good faith. Sophistiqué is then glossed through disguise, adornment, paint and

[386] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 40; II, pp. 614, 918.

[387] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 156, 408, 409; II, pp. 723, 871.

adulteration. Literary sophistry applies cosmetics with words, granting brilliance without beauty; necessary stylistic luster is carefully distinguished as cleanliness. The final discussion complicates a simple condemnation of apparent reasoning. Beginning from a sophism as phantom and a reported remark by Frizel, Joubert judges philosophy through its aim and effect, then adds means: a good intention does not save a path that leads astray.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 156, entry 7, ¶1 — Philosophical speaking can substitute for philosophical thinking.

I, p. 408–409, entry 9, ¶1 — The sophist displays knowledge as a parade.

I, p. 409, entry begun p. 408, no. 9, ¶2 — The related adjective carries cosmetic and adulterating senses.

II, p. 723, entry 1, ¶1 — Literary cosmetics differ from necessary cleanliness.

II, p. 871, entry 6, ¶1 — Philosophy is tested by aim, effect and means.

In this edition. Version 6 uses sophistry, sophist and sophism; sophisticated in the explicit gloss carries the historical sense given there, not modern praise for cultivation. Monstre is show, not monster. In the cosmetic passage [adding] and [not] disclose contextual completions. Frizel remains as printed and the quotation is not independently authenticated.

See also. Philosophy; Artifice; Assertion; Error; Ornament; Sincerity and frankness.

Sorrow

chagrin; tristesse — sorrow[388]

The word. Chagrin and tristesse can both become sorrow in these witnesses. Sorrow can signify an inward condition, a response to loss, or the remembered circumstance of a note.

In Joubert. The reflection on loss calls proportionate sensitivity evidence of judgment and moderation of sorrow after irreparable loss evidence of reason. Moderation does not cancel the worth of what was lost. The note on imagination says joy is its natural element and that carrying it into sorrows makes everything ugly and makes imagination itself ugly. A separate record attaches “a day of great sorrow” to a conversation with Fontanes without explaining its cause. A lexicon must not turn that private circumstance into an invented biographical episode.

[388] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 59; II, pp. 632, 922.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 59, entry 1, ¶1 — Measured response to loss displays judgment and reason.

II, p. 632, entry 5, ¶1 — Imagination is said to be displaced within grief.

II, p. 922, entry 2, ¶1 — A recorded day of grief remains unexplained.

In this edition. Version 6 uses sorrow or sorrows in the selected passages and preserves the dated circumstance inside the last paragraph. The claim about imagination remains a particular aphoristic prohibition, not a diagnosis.

See also. Moderation; Consolation; Faith; Sensibility.

Soul

âme — soul[389]

The word. Âme names the inward being that feels, acts, suffers and can be cultivated. It is not consistently interchangeable with esprit, nor confined to an isolated religious faculty.

In Joubert. The compressed formula calling virtue the soul's health applies a bodily measure to moral condition. In a discussion of style, Joubert accepts Dussault's description of a habit of mind, then wishes for a habit of soul: the change of noun gives expression a more comprehensive inward origin. The fragment describing a soul in harmony joins friendship, sorrow, business, study and leisure in one field. Soul therefore reaches beyond exceptional spiritual experiences into the ordinary divisions of a life.

Its relation to the senses is equally precise. Senses are described as places where the soul experiences pleasures and pains. Age or illness destroys those places; recollection and prayer make the soul absent from them. Joubert does not say that contemplative practice destroys the senses. The program separating history, politics, morals, literature and religion nevertheless assigns politics needs of both soul and body. These different relations should remain visible rather than being reduced to a single definition of an immaterial substance.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 44, entry begun p. 43, no. 1, ¶10 — Virtue figured as the soul's health.

II, p. 517, entry 10, ¶3 — Style as a habit of mind is extended to a habit of soul.

II, p. 557, entry 8, ¶1 — Harmony embraces sorrow and ordinary activities as well as love.

[389] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 44; II, pp. 517, 557, 700, 701, 808. Beaunier's dating of the early group containing the health formula is conjectural. The damaged literary infinitive in the final witness remains a gap; it is not needed to establish the soul/body distinction.

II, p. 700–701, entry 11, ¶1 — Destruction of sensory places is distinguished from inward absence.

II, p. 808, entry 1, ¶2 — Political needs include soul and body; moral work is self-perfection.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps soul distinct from mind in the style passage and preserves the spatial places/points language in the passage on the senses. The harmony fragment has no finite governing verb; the translation leaves it a fragment.

See also. Heart; Virtue; Inward recollection; Prayer; Habit; Love.

Sound and voice

son; voix; bruit; chant; chanter — sound; voice; voices; noise; song; sing[390]

The word. Son, voix and bruit overlap in auditory contexts but are not interchangeable. Chant and chanter concern song and singing, with special claims about imagination.

In Joubert. The voice containing several voices and the word containing several meanings offer parallel images of beauty. They do not specify a physical theory of harmonics. In discourse, Joubert argues that meaning largely makes the ear take pleasure; in music the direction is reversed, the ear striking the mind. The singing fragment likewise requires more than fitting words accurately to notes: voice and accents must stir imagination. Sound “in its beauties” can then seem midway between silence and noise. This qualified judgment distinguishes artistic sound without declaring that bruit is always ugly.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 571, entry 6, ¶1 — Several voices within one voice parallel several meanings within a word.

II, p. 649, entry 5, ¶1 — Meaning and auditory pleasure act in different directions in discourse and music.

I, p. 259, entry 5, ¶2 — Singing must stir imagination beyond accurately fitting notes.

I, p. 209, entry 3, ¶1 — Beautiful sound is tentatively placed between silence and noise.

II, p. 843, entry 3, ¶1 — Song is called imagination’s natural tone.

In this edition. Version 6 uses noise for bruit in the midway comparison but sound in the musical chiaroscuro passage discussed under Music. Neutral sound in II.649 means neither inherently harsh nor soft. Song’s relation to history, fable and cadence remains Joubert’s compressed generic contrast, not a historical account of all oral traditions.

See also. Music; Harmony; Meaning; Accent and tone; Silence; Poetry.

[390] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 209, 259; II, pp. 571, 649, 843.

Space and place

espace; lieu — space; place[391]

The word. Espace and lieu are neighboring rather than interchangeable words. Space may provide the common setting within which bodies and particular places are situated; espace can also describe a temporal span.

In Joubert. The account on II.710–711 explicitly calls space the common place containing all places and bodies. Its repeated necessity connects it with movement, existence, placement, and displacement; air is then an image of space rather than a replacement definition. Another passage defines time through movement over space, using the billiard table and ball before turning to the pulse.

Poetry brings out a different contrast. A poem requires three worlds and little matter precisely because it needs so much space; the real is said to diminish place. Definition, in the undated appendix, circumscribes a bodiless object in a space without reality. Physical, imaginative, and verbal spaces consequently need to remain distinguishable, even when the vocabulary links them.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 711, entry begun p. 710, no. 11, ¶2 — Space contains particular places and makes movements and placements possible.

I, p. 457, entry 3, ¶3 — Time is pictured as movement over space.

II, p. 487, entry begun p. 486, no. 14, ¶3 — The poem's imaginative extent contrasts with material filling.

II, p. 917, entry 1, ¶1 — Definition circumscribes a bodiless object in unreal space.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves space/place distinctions. At II.711 several clipped words have qualified bracketed English readings; the lexicon relies on those qualifications and does not restore the damaged French. The appendix supplies no invented entry date.

See also. Void; Extension; Movement; Time; Air; Matter.

[391] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 457; II, pp. 487, 711, 917.

Speech

parole; discours — speech; written word; discourse[392]

The word. Parole can mean speech or words, including the written word; discours designates discourse or connected verbal expression rather than always a formal public address.

In Joubert. The chain thought–speech–writing makes writing the sign of a sign, but this is one account of mediation, not the whole range of parole. In the conversation fragment, written expression cannot carry all the eyes, gestures and vocal signs that certain ideas need. The question about writing imagines coarse dead matter given the power to speak and be heard without noise or voice, so speech need not imply acoustic sound in every use. The silence-of-the-pen passage brings discourse back to deliberate restraint: accumulated strength must be perceptible when expression resumes.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 376, entry 1, ¶1 — Speech and writing form successive signs of thought.

II, p. 505, entry 9, ¶1 — The written word lacks accompanying bodily signs available in conversation.

I, p. 116, entry 4, ¶1 — Writing is imagined as voiceless matter endowed with speech.

I, p. 405, entry 2, ¶1 — Strength gathered in silence is to become perceptible in discourse.

In this edition. Version 6 uses written word for parole écrite and speech in the chain of signs. The latter it refers to writing. Question is a substantive subsidiary here: the printed Question/Answer form ends with Therefore, etc., inviting a consequence without stating it. Neither an answer nor a general metaphysical doctrine should be supplied.

Related terms.

Question. *question* — The writing fragment formally announces a Question and an Answer, but the answer is only Therefore, etc., followed by an invitation to anticipate the conclusion. This is an instance of notebook inquiry that withholds its result; the reader should not supply a completed argument about matter, speech or soul.

Places. I, p. 116, entry 4, ¶1.

See also. Language; Word; Writing; Conversation; Silence; Sound and voice.

[392] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 116, 376, 405; II, pp. 505.

Sphere and circle

sphère; cercle; globe — sphere; circle; globe[393]

The word. This grouped family connects three distinct round forms: globe as a body, sphere as an encompassing domain, and circle as a geometrical boundary or figure.

In Joubert. The earth is imagined as a globe of fire dusted with a little matter and crossed by lines of water. A sphere of wisdom, by contrast, gives each mind a bounded competence: leaving it makes people foolish. The comparison of alphabetic and mathematical figures then distinguishes an indicated circle sufficient for the letter O from a perfect geometrical circle. Roundness can suggest wholeness, circumscription, or exact construction; the contexts do not make all three synonymous.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 149, entry 7, ¶1 — The terrestrial globe is described through fire, dust, and water.

II, p. 784, entry 9, ¶1 — A sphere bounds the mind's particular wisdom.

II, p. 914–915, entry 7, ¶3 — An indicated letter differs from a perfect mathematical circle.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves "globe," "sphere," and "circle" separately. At II.914–915 [regular] and [the] qualify damage; [be] instead represents the source editor's printed [soit]. Those different interventions are not interchangeable.

Related terms.

Roundness. *rondeur* — Thought is said to possess softness by nature and roundness by perfection. Version 6 preserves the physical quality rather than replacing roundness with completeness. The brief parallel does not identify a geometrical solid or imply that every perfectly finished work must have one shape.

Places. II, p. 552, entry 12, ¶1.

See also. Center; Limit and boundary; Perfection; Earth.

Spring

ressort — spring[394]

The word. Ressort names a spring or spring-like force, and can locate what sets a person, style, or polity in motion. It is not always a visible mechanical component.

[393] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 149; II, pp. 552, 784, 914, 915.

[394] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 486, 504.

In Joubert. The stylistic image criticizes a spring that makes itself felt too plainly, comparing it with steel sinews on a psaltery. The mechanism's effectiveness does not excuse its obtrusiveness. The account of political feelings asks a different question: whether the spring of movement lies within the state itself. Without such feelings, empires are compared with crank-operated machines. These uses show why movement alone does not prove inward life or artistic freedom.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 486, entry 7, ¶1 — A conspicuous spring makes stylistic mechanism too palpable.

II, p. 504, entry 1, ¶1 — A movement whose spring lies elsewhere is contrasted with the state's inward life.

In this edition. Version 6 retains spring and the bodily term sinews in the psaltery comparison. In the political passage, it does not supply an internal motive to the externally driven empire. Uses of du ressort de meaning within the province of something belong to a different idiom.

See also. Elasticity; Mechanism; Life; Style; Government.

Stomach

estomac; estomach — stomach[395]

The word. The stomach is both an organ felt as a bodily demand and a model of transforming what is received. Its contrast with the head does not simply contrast body with a disembodied mind.

In Joubert. The muscular account compares its action to a wringing hand and distinguishes effective processing from restoration of strength. The observation that spirits occupying the head are no longer in the stomach treats the two as competitors within a historical physiological picture. Much later, an unnamed physician's capricious little animal supplies an image that Joubert extends: stomach and brain digest different materials. The comparison gives the brain a bodily operation rather than treating digestion as the exclusive property of food.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 123, entry 4, ¶1 — The stomach is imagined as a hand that presses and wrings.

I, p. 379, entry 5, ¶1 — The head and stomach receive unequal shares of spirits.

II, p. 862, entry 7, ¶1 — A quoted physician's image leads to parallel stomach and brain digestion.

[395] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 123, 379; II, pp. 862.

In this edition. Version 6 renders the recurring spelling estomach as stomach. The Montpellier physician remains unidentified, and the final brain clause inherits “digests” from the stomach clause. These are source descriptions and comparisons, not a unified modern account of the gut and brain.

See also. Nourishment and digestion; Vital and animal spirits; Organs and brain; Animal.

Stone and marble

pierre; marbre — stone; marble[396]

The word. Stone and marble exemplify apparent solidity, transformed matter, and the resistance an artist must work with. They are not simply stable opposites to air and fluid.

In Joubert. The speculative account of materials calls stone dried paste and allows marble to become cloud through repeated evaporation. It treats solidity as a state within possible transformations. The artistic account instead emphasizes a worker’s difficulty: marble is too hard to obey the hand directly. Yet buildings made from it may appear airy, while mere forms can suggest greater solidity than piled rocks. Material and artistic effect therefore need not share the same apparent weight or consistency.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 236–237, entry 7, ¶1 — Stone and marble are placed in a speculative series of material transformations.

II, p. 757, entry 10, ¶1 — Marble’s hardness resists the sculptor’s hand.

II, p. 484, entry 13, ¶1 — Heavy material can produce airy appearance and forms can suggest solidity.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves dried paste, cloud, and the plural solidities. These are Joubert’s formulations, not silently corrected accounts of geology or phase changes. Proper names containing Pierre were excluded from the material headword evidence.

See also. Matter; Density and solidity; Hardness and softness; Architecture; Sculpture.

[396] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 236, 237; II, pp. 484, 757.

Study and learning

étude; apprendre — study; learn; teaches[397]

The word. Étude is deliberate study; apprendre can mean learning or teaching in its grammatical context. Acquiring discourse about a subject need not be knowing it.

In Joubert. The warning about books that teach speech rather than knowledge distinguishes verbal competence from acquaintance with the subject. The contrast between being learned through study and a wit through talent separates acquisition from a particular gift without claiming that one person cannot have both. Methodical learning is also likened to bodily exercise: it may improve agility and suppleness without changing underlying formation or beauty, and some exercise can dislocate. Study therefore needs proportion and attention to what is being developed. In reading a new author, patience with preliminary obscurity is part of entering another mind rather than merely confirming one's own.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 122, entry 8, ¶1 — Books may teach one to talk about what they do not teach one to know.

I, p. 332, entry 2, ¶4 — Study makes the learned person; talent makes the wit.

I, p. 402, entry 8, ¶1 — Methodical learning is compared with exercise, including its possible harm.

II, p. 538–539, entry 10, ¶1 — Reading a serious new author calls for patient accommodation.

In this edition. Version 6 renders apprendre with teaches in the book criticism and learn in the method fragment. Learned is not automatically wise. The volume and page embedded in the study/talent note locate an external reading; they are not a notebook date or a new heading.

Related terms.

Polymathy. *polymathiste* — Polymathiste becomes polymath in the self-question about writing merely to be read. Joubert asks whether he is only someone learned in many subjects or has an identifiable body of ideas with a determinate character, merit and usefulness. The inquiry gives breadth of learning a possible limit without declaring it worthless or announcing that his own project has been resolved. The head names a question about coherence and purpose, not a biographical label imposed from outside.

Places. I, p. 216, entry 5, ¶2.

See also. Reading; Knowledge; Talent; Method; Experience.

[397] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 122, 216, 332, 402; II, pp. 538, 539.

Style

style — style[398]

The word. Style is the distinctive manner in which writing takes form and acts upon a reader; its effects cannot always be judged from isolated sentences.

In Joubert. The fabric analogy distinguishes a style beautiful only in a whole piece from one whose single sample allows the entire texture to be judged. Excerptability is thus a property to investigate, not proof of superiority by itself. The Voltaire comparison reverses an ordinary relation: where ideas lend charm to style, his style lends charm to ideas. The source states this as a literary assessment, not a reason to identify charm with truth.

The distinction between awaited and sought style concerns how the writer obtains it. Both may be good when they arrive or are found, but the awaited is preferred; attendu does not mean merely predictable. Reflection complicates naturalness, and clarity can be demanded even when obscurity arising from excellence is tentatively valued elsewhere. The notebooks preserve such pressures rather than offering one final stylistic program.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 807, entry 5, ¶1 — The fabric/swatch image distinguishes whole effects from excerptable ones.

I, p. 273, entry 7, ¶1 — Voltaire's style is said to lend charm to ideas.

II, p. 896, entry 4, ¶1 — Awaited style and sought style have different modes of arrival.

II, p. 541, entry 5, ¶1 — Reflection changes what natural writing can mean.

II, p. 568, entry 6, ¶1 — Extreme clarity is stated as a stylistic aim.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves sample, whole piece and fabric; awaited/arrives and sought/finds also remain paired. V[oltaire] records the source editor's expansion. A style that works in a fragment is not silently promoted into a complete-work ideal.

Related terms.

Usage. *usage* — A style may sometimes depart from usage while conforming to nature and reaching art's aim—attention and remembrance—outside art. Usage here concerns customary expression, not all uses of an instrument or social customs. Sometimes limits the claim; the fragment does not authorize every novelty merely because it is unusual.

Places. II, p. 864, entry 4, ¶1.

[398] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 152, 203, 273; II, pp. 541, 568, 624, 807, 864, 896.

Unction. *onction* — Onction becomes unction in Version 6: a moving warmth of expression with the material association of anointing. A language lacking pomp or harmony may need unction among its flowing qualities; the parenthesis explicitly allows that pomp and harmony are often unnecessary. Another fragment connects unction of style with fluidity and an oily lack of solidity, while the final instruction adds one's own unction to dryness. The images can therefore disclose a texture as well as praise an effect. Unction is not automatically insincere flattery.

Places. I, p. 152, entry 6, ¶1; I, p. 203, entry begun p. 202, no. 8, ¶4; II, p. 624, entry 6, ¶1.

See also. Writing; Clarity and obscurity; Elegance; Brevity; Meaning.

Sublime

sublime — sublime[399]

The word. Sublime marks elevation or exceptional greatness of mind, thought or soul; the cause of that elevation is not always the same.

In Joubert. The Nicole judgment separates sublime thought from what the writer says, and derived doctrinal elevation from the natural elevation of a mind. Sublimity need not therefore be reducible to verbal grandeur or native genius. Another distinction makes natural subtlety a condition of the sublime while separating it from procedural cunning, ambush and evasion. The shared word subtilité carries both a discreditable method and a fine natural constitution. The passage's "one may even say" keeps the striking maxim at the level of a proposed formulation.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 885, entry 2, ¶1 — Nicole's sublimity lies in thought and doctrines rather than natural mental elevation.

I, p. 359, entry 3, ¶1 — Natural subtlety is distinguished from cunning and related to sublimity.

In this edition. Version 6 retains both not/but contrasts in the Nicole note and the contrast between procedural and natural subtlety. The anomalous Quand à is understood as "As for," while the French remains unchanged. Sublime is not restricted here to one later aesthetic theory.

Related terms.

Grandeur. *grandeur* — In the Tacitus note, grandeur of expression joins depth in preventing the reader from reading much, while narrative interest prevents reading

[399] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 114, 154, 359, 449; II, pp. 885.

little. Grandeur thus has a demanding effect on attention and can cause fatigue. It should not be reduced to length, numerical magnitude or a simple synonym for successful sublimity.

Places. I, p. 154, entry 6, ¶1.

Summit and leap. *cime; saut* — The sublime is called the summit of the great, and its author walks from summit to summit. The Cicero remark adds the obstacle and leap as precisely what ease may lack. Version 6 retains the concrete ascent and movement rather than reducing them to excellence. The three images do not specify a single rhetorical figure or deny every value to ease; they describe the contrast made in these short witnesses.

Places. I, p. 114, entry 8, ¶1; I, p. 114, entry 11, ¶1; I, p. 449, entry 6, ¶1.

See also. Thought; Genius; Beauty; Enthusiasm.

Substance

substance — substance[400]

The word. Substance ranges from bodily material and a proposed physical constituent to the content of speech. Joubert also uses it in extended images of spiritual nourishment.

In Joubert. The child feeds on its mother's substance: the word is concrete and intimately bodily. A physical note then labels heat "substance" and identifies it with fire. In another register, ordinary words can supply the meaning and substance of exquisite poetry or music. These are not interchangeable technical assertions. The soul's conversion of goodness into its own substance develops the feeding image through assimilation and nourishment, rather than offering a literal anatomical description of the soul.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 105, entry 3, ¶1 — Pregnancy is described as nourishment drawn from maternal substance.

I, p. 238, entry 1, ¶7 — The parenthesis explicitly treats heat as substance.

II, p. 756, entry 9, ¶1 — Substance is the meaningful content that artistry can transform.

II, p. 724, entry 10, ¶1 — Goodness becomes the soul's nourishment and substance.

[400] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 105, 238; II, pp. 724, 756. The movement material at I.237–238 comes from a separate exercise book. Beaunier reports likely borrowing from abbé Nollet, leaves the extent of Joubert's own contribution unsettled, and acknowledges omissions. This lexical witness does not establish an independently original physical theory by Joubert.

In this edition. Version 6 consistently retains “substance” in these witnesses. That repetition preserves the material vocabulary of the metaphors without endorsing the historical physical claims as present-day science.

See also. Essence; Matter; Fire and heat; Body; Life.

Subtlety

subtilité — subtlety[401]

The word. Mental subtlety may penetrate a difficult truth, discriminate fine qualities or conceal the absence of a defensible argument. Joubert repeatedly judges it by its object and means.

In Joubert. The short rule reverses an expected correspondence: avoid subtlety when treating subtle things and use it for coarse things. A personal defense then makes subtlety sometimes the only way through obstructing opinions and ignorances. The distinction between natural and fabricated subtlety separates a talent for fine apprehension from knavery that swindles questions and makes them disappear. Images offer a further check: even subtle images retain some body in which error may be recognized, whereas bare reasoning can leave no hold for correction. In the later stick-and-light comparison, extreme subtlety is possible in ideas but forbidden in reasoning, which must offer something palpable. This is a distinction between modes of thought, not a general attack on intellectual delicacy.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 176, entry 5, ¶1 — Subtlety must be adjusted to its subject.

I, p. 262, entry 1, ¶3 — It may be the mind’s only available means of penetration.

I, p. 353, entry 8, ¶1 — Natural aptitude is distinguished from fraudulent evasion.

I, p. 437, entry 3, ¶9 — An image retains a body in which error may be detected.

II, p. 808, entry 4, ¶1 — Ideas may be subtle; reasoning must remain palpable.

In this edition. Version 6 retains subtlety throughout. The fraud and conjuring images remain stronger than mere intellectual error. The Malebranche criticism preserves source-supplied brackets, the qualification “I believe” and the conditional possibility of finding error. May and must not remain distinct in the final witness.

See also. Finesse; Discernment; Image; Reasoning; Material subtlety and coarseness; Artifice.

[401] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 176, 262, 353, 437; II, pp. 808.

Suffering

douleur — pain; sorrow[402]

The word. Douleur crosses the boundary between bodily pain and inward sorrow; its value depends on what the experience does to the soul.

In Joubert. An excerpt about Adam gives pains the role of respectful warnings before the fall; Joubert comments on the surprising personification of these supposed modes. Elsewhere he distinguishes happiness as the feeling of a good soul from simple pleasantness: affliction and even remorse need not exclude it. The opposite possibility remains real. Pain can disturb reason so severely that a person prefers a greater loss to the present sensation. The horse escaping the spur by plunging into a precipice gives that disproportion a physical image. These are different arguments about pain, not a command to seek suffering.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 446–447, entry 6, ¶1 — Quoted pains become active poetic beings in Joubert's commentary.

II, p. 679, entry 2, ¶1 — Sorrows may coexist with goodness and happiness.

II, p. 778, entry 3, ¶1 — Pain disturbs judgment and changes the scale of feared losses.

In this edition. Version 6 renders douleur as pains or pain in the bodily and disturbing uses, but as sorrows in the comparison with joys. The damaged November happiness passage retains unresolved French residues; the lexicon does not complete them.

Related terms.

Misfortune. *malheur* — Malheur is distinguished from weakness in a partisan comparison of supposed Jansenists with their critics. Tenderness toward weaknesses can coexist with insensibility to misfortunes, while severity can accompany compassion for undeserved suffering. The unnamed groups and historical religious label remain Joubert's; the lexicon does not authenticate a general account of Jansenism.

Places. II, p. 710, entry 3, ¶1.

See also. Sorrow; Happiness; Remorse; Fear.

[402] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 446, 447; II, pp. 679, 710, 778. The Adam paragraph opens with an excerpt; its formulation is not presented as an independent autobiographical statement by Joubert.

Sun and night

soleil; nuit — sun; night; nights[403]

The word. The sun concentrates light, while night supplies both the conditions of rest and an image of obscurity. Their figurative uses need not turn them into a fixed good–evil pair.

In Joubert. The sun is called only a focus of light, as matter is a channel rather than a cause of movement. Evening's descending night instead gathers fields, creatures, and plants into silence. Artificial nights made by writers are explicitly suspect: they manufacture an appearance of depth and make weak lights seem brilliant. The natural hush of night and the strategic darkness of prose are therefore distinct judgments.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 473, entry 2, ¶3 — The sun is a focus, not the named origin, of light.

I, p. 70, entry 10, ¶1 — Night accompanies the quieting of fields and living things.

II, p. 910, entry 12, ¶1 — Artificial darkness exaggerates depth and brilliance in writing.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps "focus" for foyer in this light passage, rather than hearth. The search word nuit also matches a form of nuire, to harm; those grammatical false hits are excluded from the night evidence.

See also. Light; Shadow; Rest; Vapor and cloud; Surface and depth.

Superstition

superstition — superstition; superstitions[404]

The word. Superstition is a religious danger that Joubert sometimes proposes to manage through religion itself. The distinction is not a simple opposition between believing and ceasing to believe.

In Joubert. The analogy with fable and poetry gives superstition a relation to religion without declaring the two identical. The inoculation passage deliberately says to inoculate superstition by giving children religion. The image introduces a controlled form rather than erasing the object. A later note argues that physics is the wrong terrain for correcting superstition: drawing it away from every idea of heaven may make it

[403] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 70, 473; II, pp. 910.

[404] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 114; II, pp. 565, 897.

worse. These are arguments about correction within a field, not a blanket endorsement of every superstition.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 114, entry 14, ¶1 — Superstition/religion is compared with fable/poetry.

II, p. 565, entry 2, ¶1 — Religion is figured as an inoculation.

II, p. 897, entry 8, ¶1 — Correction should not remove every idea of heaven.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves "inoculate it," with superstition as the antecedent, and the final passage's risk rather than certainty of making matters worse. Physics retains the historical breadth of inquiry into nature. The unfinished criticism of Cicero remains unfinished.

See also. Religion; Christianity; Education; Faith.

Surface and depth

surface; profondeur — surface; depth[405]

The word. Surface and depth give spatial form to questions about visibility, explanation, and genuine thought. Depth is not a sufficient virtue if nothing can be seen there.

In Joubert. A point and line can be defined through what a tip or thread places upon a surface. Philosophical explanations, on the other hand, may resemble a depth where nothing is visible. The late complaint about artificial night makes writers darken their own surfaces to manufacture an appearance of depth and brighten their weak lights. The distinction is not simply between bad surfaces and good depths, but between intelligible articulation and an obscurity that simulates it.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 241, entry 6, ¶1 — Surface permits concrete definitions of point and line.

I, p. 439, entry begun p. 437, no. 3, ¶21 — An unseen depth criticizes some modern explanations.

II, p. 910, entry 12, ¶1 — Artificial darkness gives surfaces a deceptive depth.

In this edition. The translation preserves "depth" even in criticism and "surfaces" for superficies. A lexicon should not rewrite the geometrical or optical metaphors into a generic accusation of pretentiousness.

See also. Space and place; Transparency; Light; Shadow.

[405] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 241, 439; II, pp. 910.

Synthesis

synthèse; synthétique — synthesis; synthetic[406]

The word. Synthesis apprehends a combination or whole. Its contrast with analysis concerns the capacity of a mind, the kind of knowledge sought and, occasionally, the bond of an association.

In Joubert. The bundle-and-sticks comparison describes analysis as judging the whole through its components, then asserts that synthesis must deceive less before the unfinished "Why." A fuller educational note makes synthetic observation rapid and penetrating. Some good minds lack that capacity, just as others lack the patience of analysis. The contrast does not rank every synthetic thinker above every analytical one: it warns that forcing an unsuitable method upon pupils can dislocate their intellectual gait.

Synthetic physics displays the order of the whole; analytic physics displays the apparent incoherence of separated parts. The later refusal to defend a synthetic contempt for Condillac by analysis preserves a deliberately personal, polemical use. In a further extension, a common opinion or synthesis can bind a lay association, distinguished from the shared rule and distinctive life of an ecclesiastical order. Whole apprehension, intellectual aptitude and social combination should not be collapsed into one technical definition.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 276, entry 6, ¶1 — Analysis judges the bundle by its sticks.

II, p. 548, entry 9, ¶1 — Synthetic aptitude is distinguished from trainable analytical procedure.

II, p. 768, entry 8, ¶1 — Two kinds of physics exhibit whole and parts.

II, p. 866, entry 1, ¶1 — Synthesis can bind a lay association.

II, p. 898, entry 6, ¶1 — A synthetic verdict refuses analytical interrogation.

In this edition. Version 6 retains synthesis and synthetic. The questioned attribution "[Locke?]" and anomalous French Le synthèse are preserved. At II.768, "the former" follows the usual distal reference of celle-là, although the nearer analytic physics remains a possible referent; the unnamed they is not identified. The fragment "Why" is not answered by the translator.

See also. Analysis; Method; Faculty; System; Physics.

[406] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 276; II, pp. 548, 768, 866, 898.

System

système — system[407]

The word. Système, frequently printed systhème, can mean an invented doctrinal construction or a connected ordering of the world.

In Joubert. The doctrinal definition makes a system personal to its inventor. It can be good when it illuminates other doctrines, bad when it merely contradicts them; even approval is qualified as excellence “at least as a system.” The note on objections makes the object more important than the construction: a good objection reveals what is at issue while destroying the system. The phrase “system of the world” has a broader organizing sense in the ventilator comparison and need not denote a philosopher’s private doctrine.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 651, entry 2, ¶1 — A personal doctrine is judged by whether it illuminates others.

I, p. 270, entry 2, ¶1 — An objection should show the object even while destroying its system.

II, p. 841, entry 3, ¶1 — System of the world names an ordering whose mechanism can supposedly be imitated.

In this edition. Version 6 repeats system and preserves the qualification “at least.” It does not supply a precise Platonic locus for the reported Theaetetus wording or interpret ventilator as a modern medical machine.

Related terms.

Doctrine. *doctrine* — The system definition calls a system a doctrine absolutely personal to its inventor, then tests whether it contradicts or illuminates other doctrines. Doctrine here need not mean religious dogma. The final approval is qualified by at least as a system; illumination does not certify every proposition or supply an absolute standard of truth.

Places. II, p. 651, entry 2, ¶1.

See also. Method; Opinion; Science; Truth.

[407] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 270; II, pp. 651, 841.

Talent

talent — talent[408]

The word. Talent is an ability that can be exercised, conserved or given a determinate form. It is distinguishable from undetermined intelligence and from a finished work's perfection.

In Joubert. The instruction to husband talent treats excessive energy as damaging: art teaches how to use strength, voice and mind with restraint. Talent is not simply maximal force. The shepherd's dog supplies a nonliterary application, in which Joubert adds pleasure in establishing conceived order to his earlier account of exercising talent. The instrument/work comparison makes another distinction: a finished work depends partly on its instrument or language, while a strong talent has something independent in its vigor. The indefinite "something" leaves the precise extent of that independence open.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 212, entry 2, ¶1 — Art teaches conservation and restraint in exercising talent.

II, p. 502, entry 13, ¶1 — Talent extends to the shepherd's dog and its pleasure in order.

II, p. 816, entry 5, ¶1 — Talent's vigor differs from a work's dependence on instrument and language.

II, p. 541, entry 13, ¶1 — Intelligence need not be fixed into a particular talent.

In this edition. Version 6 uses husband in the sense of careful use. The II.816 second clause remains elliptical; it does not name every thing from which talent is independent.

See also. Genius; Intelligence; Art; Perfection.

Taste

goût; goûter — taste; savor[409]

The word. Goût is an evaluative enjoyment connected to sensory savor yet not reducible to bodily sensation or to general admiration.

In Joubert. The distinction between taste and charm says one can be enlivened, dazzled and impressed without savoring an author. A corresponding inquiry asks how far taste's jurisdiction extends in works of mind. Its continuation limits taste to flavors and what corresponds to them, leaving other matters to judgment properly so called. Later taste is

[408] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 212; II, pp. 502, 541, 816.

[409] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 466; II, pp. 536, 537, 649, 804.

the bond of soul and body and requires imagination, just as cold judgment requires memory. The shifts suggest several ways of locating taste among other powers rather than one fixed psychological diagram. Bad taste is also defined by its object: it loves what is not lovable, so sincerity or intensity of liking does not alone vindicate it.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 649, entry 2, ¶2 — Admiration and dazzlement are distinguished from savoring.

II, p. 536, entry 7, ¶1 — Taste's jurisdiction is questioned.

II, p. 537, entry 1, ¶1 — Flavors and their analogues mark a proposed limit to taste.

II, p. 804, entry 7, ¶1 — Imagination is necessary to taste as memory is to judgment.

I, p. 466, entry 1, ¶1 — Bad taste concerns loving an unlovable object.

In this edition. Version 6 uses savor for goûter to keep its relation to goût audible. Charm and admiration remain separate. The limitation in II.537 is a notebook assertion, not an editorial license to exclude all intellectual matters from aesthetics.

See also. Judgment; Imagination; Beauty; Charm and pleasure; Discernment.

Temper and mood

humeur — humor; mood[410]

The word. Humeur concerns temper or disposition, sometimes with older bodily associations. It does not normally mean comedy in these witnesses.

In Joubert. Manners are said to tame humors, a near-rhyme that links acquired conduct to temper. The style fragment distinguishes an expression of humor from an expression of soul, resisting the assumption that every personal manner reaches inward depth. A later threefold comparison associates mind with mood, heart with temperaments and soul with God. Restrained books can finally act on the mind as a calm face acts on eyes and moods. External form and company can modulate an inward state.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 406, entry 6, ¶1 — Acquired manners can tame temper.

II, p. 483, entry 9, ¶1 — A writer's style may express mood rather than soul.

II, p. 681, entry 5, ¶1 — Mind, heart and soul are paired with different sources.

II, p. 771, entry 9, ¶1 — Calm appearance and restrained writing affect moods.

[410] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 406; II, pp. 483, 681, 771.

In this edition. Version 6 moves between humor and mood, with the notes identifying temper as the relevant sense. The damaged residues in the mind/heart/soul sequence remain visible. The source-editor brackets in the calm-book fragment mark supplied words, not a new translator reconstruction.

See also. Character; Manners; Feeling; Soul; Gentleness and sweetness.

Tenderness

tendresse; tendre — tenderness; tender[411]

The word. Tendresse is an affective disposition whose strength need not take the form of exaltation or constant gratification.

In Joubert. The opposition between tenderness that satisfies itself and tenderness that restrains itself turns nourishment and exhaustion in unexpected directions: privation can sustain what repeated satisfaction spends. Another note assigns tenderness to the heart while reserving exaltation for imagination and passion for the body. Its demand for sober love criticizes a way of loving falsely, not necessarily deception. The compressed description of tenderness as the repose of passion makes rest internal to feeling. These related formulations should not be fused into a claim that tenderness has no intensity or that passion has simply vanished.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 306, entry 1, ¶1 — Restraint and satisfaction affect tenderness differently.

II, p. 511, entry 9, ¶1 — A tender heart is distinguished from an exalted one.

II, p. 670, entry 5, ¶1 — Tenderness is called passion's repose.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps tender apart from exalted and translates de sens rassis as in one's sober senses. Repose retains the ambiguity of rest without announcing the extinction of passion.

See also. Love; Passion; Sacrifice; Heart.

[411] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 306; II, pp. 511, 670.

Tenuity

ténuité — tenuity; tenuities[412]

The word. Ténuité names extreme thinness or fineness in these material comparisons. It can qualify something real; it is not a euphemism for nonexistence.

In Joubert. The compressed account of matter insists that calling it appearance expresses real tenuity without contesting its indubitable reality. The layered-pasteboard picture gives the word another task: tenuities combined produce the dense. Fineness and density are therefore related by arrangement, not simply treated as mutually exclusive kinds of substance. In the humoral account of faults, the term also qualifies digestive juices. The different uses explain why the slightly unfamiliar English tenuity is more precise than a uniform replacement by weakness or vagueness.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 235–236, entry 6, ¶1 — Real tenuity is explicitly distinguished from denial of reality.

I, p. 236, entry 5, ¶1 — Thin layers combined are imagined to produce density.

I, p. 194, entry 3, ¶1 — Tenuity also describes a condition of digestive juices.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the repeated noun and its plural. The physiological discussion carries unexpanded D. G. and an incomplete clause about envy; its appearance here neither identifies those initials nor repairs the clause.

See also. Matter; Density and solidity; Material subtlety and coarseness; Humors.

Text

texte — text[413]

The word. Texte can be the verbal material to develop, the wording to translate or quote, and the stated original distinguished from a paraphrase. Joubert also gives it a textile image of material prepared for further work.

In Joubert. The simplest declaration of love can supply a sufficient text and motif for excellent music or poetry: the effect need not be exhausted by the original words' ordinary meaning. Amyot's translation is then treated as an original whose text readers like quoting, while Dacier's receives the higher judgment specifically as translation. The Quesnel comparison distinguishes two nearly equivalent ideas through their charming

[412] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 194, 235, 236.

[413] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 756, 777, 808, 859, 912.

or graver expressions. Likewise the Batteux note records one formulation and then explicitly restores what Joubert calls the text. Finally weaving and embroidery make text a ground for elaboration. These witnesses preserve the difference between developing a starting point and claiming to reproduce its wording.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 756, entry 9, ¶1 — Ordinary words can furnish a powerful artistic text or motif.

II, p. 777, entry 3, ¶1 — A translation can acquire the status of an original text.

II, p. 808, entry 8, ¶1 — Two nearly equivalent ideas retain different wording and gravity.

II, p. 859, entry 10, ¶1 — Text receives a weaving and embroidery image.

II, p. 912, entry 3, ¶1 — A second quotation is identified as the stated original wording.

In this edition. Version 6 consistently uses text. The reported Amyot–Dacier comparison remains Joubert's judgment, including its qualified [hundred]. Quesnel's and Batteux's external originals are not independently certified here. The textile fragment offers associated images rather than a modern technical explanation of weaving.

See also. Translation; Word; Meaning; Writing; Book.

The classical

classique — classical; the classical[414]

The word. Classique is explicitly tested through teachability and exemplary value. In this witness it does not simply designate ancient Greek or Roman writing.

In Joubert. Joubert considers a reported comparison between the styles of Maintenon and Sévigné. If classical means correct and methodical, he accepts the first style's greater claim, because it can be learned and taught. He rejects the inference that it is therefore more natural. The definition then divides: what can be taught, and what ought to be taught. Transmissibility and irreproachability are two qualities, not interchangeable descriptions. The final sentence says the latter does not always admit the former. A work may therefore merit teaching without its excellence necessarily being transferable as a method.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 560–561, entry 10, ¶1 — Teachability and the obligation to teach supply two distinct tests.

[414] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 560, 561.

In this edition. Version 6 retains classical and the classical, along with the change from or to and. The conditional if, the opening source ellipsis and the break after more natural remain. This compact argument is not converted into a comprehensive canon or a historical definition applying to every use of the word.

See also. Ancients and moderns; Correctness and correction; Naturalness; Education; Style.

The marvelous

merveilleux — the marvelous; marvelous[415]

The word. The marvelous is what opens wonder beyond ordinary experience or gives discourse an arresting quality. Joubert's treatment depends on the domain: its role in public writing differs from its intrusion into physical science.

In Joubert. The palpable and marvelous are required to exclude one another in the physical-science discussion. Fables there seem to invite gullibility and presumption rather than good faith. By contrast, the reported St Lambert distinction explains why unfamiliar kinds of beings can be admitted more readily than extraordinary events: imagined space outside the known world gives illusions room. In public discourse, the marvelous is made a condition of lastingness. Joubert defends the ancients' attention to it against a quoted criticism, then qualifies the defense with "in a certain sense." These statements do not authorize the conversion of unsupported physical claims into knowledge; they locate different demands on science and imaginative language.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 197, entry 1, ¶1 — The marvelous is opposed to palpability in physical science.

I, p. 197, entry 1, ¶2 — Scientific credulity is distinguished from good faith.

I, p. 474, entry 5, ¶1 — Kinds of beings can admit wonder more readily than events.

II, p. 878, entry 2, ¶1 — Public discourse requires something marvelous to last.

II, p. 878, entry 2, ¶2 — Ancient attention to wonder receives a qualified defense.

In this edition. Version 6 retains marvelous. Species in the St Lambert quotation means kinds of beings in its contrast with events, not a supplied modern biological classification. The Calmet and Boileau quotations are reported as Joubert gives them; their sources and the abbreviated pointer are not independently certified.

See also. Imagination; Illusion; Fiction; Science; Charm and pleasure.

[415] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 197, 474; II, pp. 878.

Theater

théâtre — theater[416]

The word. Théâtre can be a place of performance or an image for public display, competition and judgment.

In Joubert. The distinction between a person's performance and private being allows criticism or hissing at his theater but not indiscriminately in his house or street. The ethical question concerns the limits of presentation and audience response. The conversation passage resists treating companions as judges, asking whether conversation is theater or competition. Its damaged wording must remain visible, but the opposed social roles are clear. The Rousseau fragment then invokes taking away a theater alongside removing colors and flesh from thoughts; because the conditional sequence is unfinished, its ultimate verdict cannot be supplied.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 157, entry 1, ¶1 — Criticism of public performance is bounded against intrusion into private life.

II, p. 586, entry 6, ¶2 — Conversation is questioned as competitive performance before judges.

II, p. 767, entry 6, ¶1 — Theater joins other images in an unfinished stripping-away comparison.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the first passage's may, never and unless restrictions. In the conversation note p[…] remains an unresolved French residue, not a certified prize. The external Boileau wording is not reconstructed.

See also. Conversation; Comedy; Tragedy; Criticism.

Theology

théologie; théologien — theology; theologian[417]

The word. Théologie is called a philosophy distinguished by where it seeks truth and by the authority on which it relies.

In Joubert. The search beyond the world is not described as dependence on an identified institution; the alternative authority remains unnamed. The criticism of certain theologians concerns their secret confidence in personal infallibility, not simply their belief in sacred truths. One can retain doctrine while questioning one's demonstrations.

[416] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 157; II, pp. 586, 767.

[417] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 498, 709, 819.

Another sharp formulation contrasts faith that saves with the theologians' wish to prove their teaching true, then reports Bossuet's compressed appeal to the written word and tradition. These passages distinguish teaching, demonstration, authority and faith rather than treating them as interchangeable religious knowledge.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 498, entry 6, ¶1 — Theology seeks truth beyond the world on another authority.

II, p. 709, entry 3, ¶1 — Personal infallibility is separated from confidence in doctrine.

II, p. 819, entry 10, ¶1 — Faith and demonstration are contrasted in the work of theologians.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the personal limitation of the criticism and the contextual brackets in its damaged text. It renders the Bossuet attribution without authenticating a particular external source or supplying a verb between the written word and tradition.

See also. Faith; Dogma; Authority; Modest conduct; Proof.

Thought

pensée — thought; thoughts[418]

The word. Pensée can mean thinking as an inward act or a particular thought that can be expressed, judged or revised.

In Joubert. An explicit contrast on II.605 associates thought with fact and assertion, idea with cause or affinity and an opening perspective. This compressed distinction is useful locally, but it should not be imposed on every pensée in the notebooks. The writer on I.251 seeks a thought he does not yet possess whole, so thought need not always be a finished assertion. The reference to Sophocles asks what constitutes the simplicity of thoughts; it praises an effect without completing the proposed explanation. The image of thought lowering itself before the forbidden gives the same word an ethical bearing without turning every use into a moral faculty.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 605, entry 10, ¶1 — A compact thought/idea distinction opposes assertion to perspective.

I, p. 251, entry 2, ¶3 — The thought sought through words is not yet whole.

II, p. 879, entry 6, ¶1 — Sophoclean simplicity becomes an unfinished question about thoughts.

I, p. 155–156, entry 10, ¶1 — Thought lowers itself before a figurative barrier.

[418] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 109, 155, 156, 251; II, pp. 605, 879.

In this edition. Thought is retained across these settings. The incomplete “In what” and “Of what” formulations about Sophocles remain research prompts, not completed explanations supplied by the translator.

Related terms.

Paradox. *paradoxe* — The sole definition says that a paradox most often states a true proportion whose contrary is also true. Version 6 retains proportion because that is the printed word; substituting proposition would silently repair the witness. Most often remains a limit, and the fragment supplies no example. The article therefore records Joubert’s formulation without converting it into a general theory that all contradictions are true.

Places. I, p. 109, entry 11, ¶1.

See also. Idea; Writing; Simplicity; Mind.

Thread and spinning

fil; filer — thread; spun[419]

The word. Thread links a hidden store to an extended form. Spinning and unwinding can thus picture time, creation, or a line drawn from a point.

In Joubert. The Fates’ distaff separates completed thread, the thread being spun, and unformed tow into past, present, and future. The creation image changes the relation: divine power is a substantial ball that unwinds without becoming less whole. That inexhaustibility is part of the image’s claim, not a property of ordinary textile work. The line contained in a point is likewise compared with an armful of thread within a ball. Here the material model helps imagine extension arising from concentrated form, without giving a mathematical proof.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 37, entry 1, ¶1 — Spinning differentiates temporal positions and degrees of formedness.

I, p. 146, entry 8, ¶1 — An inexhaustible ball models creation without loss of divine fullness.

I, p. 163, entry 1, ¶1 — A line is imagined as thread drawn from a point.

[419] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 37, 146, 163.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps distaff, spindle, and tow separate, and preserves substantial in the divine ball-of-thread image. The “To the one” opening and equals sign in the point/line fragment are not completed or erased. No textile object is made a universal key to all three passages.

See also. Past, present, and future; Point and line; Whole and part; God.

Time

temps — time[420]

The word. Time is measured succession, experienced duration, an era, and the condition within which growth or change occurs. Joubert repeatedly tests how it depends on movement and the mind.

In Joubert. The billiard-ball comparison describes time as movement over space. The pulse then becomes a secret regulator for measuring other successions. Elsewhere time is called a being of reason born of the mind: without memory and foresight it cannot measure movement. These statements illuminate the relation between measure, bodily rhythm, and mental apprehension without being a fully reconciled theory.

The comparison with eternity makes time more than a mere count of instants, while the ordinary images of whitening hair or changing health return it to lived consequences. Time can alter what we can undertake. A lexicon should keep that range visible and should not infer a chronological evolution of doctrine from a few selected dated notes.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 457, entry 3, ¶3 — Movement and pulse supply a physical image and a measure.

II, p. 696, entry 6, ¶1 — Time as a being of reason depends on memory and foresight.

I, p. 276, entry 9, ¶1 — The idea of time is related to eternity.

I, p. 34–35, entry 3, ¶1 — Time whitens materials and hair.

I, p. 459, entry 2, ¶2 — Changing time and health alter tasks.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves “being of reason” and “secret regulator,” rather than replacing the former with unreal or the latter with a modern internal clock. Ordinary “times” can mean a historical period rather than a philosophical entity.

See also. Duration and instant; Eternity; Movement; Measure; Aging and old age.

[420] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 34, 35, 276, 457, 459; II, pp. 696.

Tradition

tradition — tradition[421]

The word. Tradition concerns what a voice or a memory transmits, including religious authority, without guaranteeing that every alteration is corruption.

In Joubert. The voice is credited with an authority and an insinuating power that writing lacks. Another fragment treats traditional works as having stood memory's test. The Hercules passage adds a less conservative possibility: transforming an extravagant allegory into proportioned earthly adventures can improve what is transmitted. Change alone therefore does not prove deterioration. The reported Bossuet appeal to written word and tradition supplies a religious context in which inherited authority is placed against further demonstration. These witnesses distinguish the medium, survival and transformation of transmission rather than defining tradition as an unalterable collection of propositions.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 100, entry 8, ¶1 — Voice supplies authority and insinuation unavailable to writing.

I, p. 224, entry 7, ¶1 — An altered myth is judged more proportioned, not necessarily corrupted.

I, p. 352, entry 4, ¶1 — Remembered works have survived a test.

II, p. 819, entry 10, ¶1 — Tradition appears with the written word in a reported appeal to authority.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the Hercules passage's bracketed source ellipsis and translates roman as romance in the narrative sense. The Bossuet formula remains compressed and externally unlocated; no conjunction or doctrine is inserted to complete it.

See also. Memory; Sound and voice; Authority; Fidelity; Scripture.

Tragedy

tragédie — tragedy[422]

The word. Tragédie is considered through its kind of action, its mode of performance and the passions it presents.

[421] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 100, 224, 352; II, pp. 819.

[422] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 526, 585, 868.

In Joubert. The Oedipus at Colonus remark locates poetic movement in the soul, even when the central figure does not change place. Physical traffic onstage is not the only measure of action. The Greek/modern comparison explicitly assigns singing to the former and speaking to the latter, though its novel/poem analogy should not be artificially reordered. The purified-passions fragment defines purification as removal from reality: terror and pity become shadows, bodiless and almost spiritual. This is Joubert's formulation and should not silently be equated with a settled external theory of catharsis.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 585, entry 10, ¶1 — Inward movement, rather than travel, defines the admired tragic action.

II, p. 526, entry 2, ¶1 — Greek and modern tragedies are distinguished by singing and speaking.

II, p. 868, entry 8, ¶1 — Tragic passions are purified of reality and made almost spiritual.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the incomplete "action... in the soul" quotation, singular he and the separate impersonal going and coming. "Almost" limits spiritual; consistance becomes substance without importing a named aesthetic system. Beaunier's separate notice at II.585 describes extracts from an article by Ch. D[elalot]; the notebook's critical wording should be read with that source layer in view.

See also. Theater; Poetry; Comedy; Illusion.

Translation

traduction; traduire — translation; translate[423]

The word. Traduction is a mediated rendering, including the inward translation a reader makes when reading another idiom.

In Joubert. The universal statement about foreign books includes both a translation made for us and one we make ourselves; knowing a language does not remove mediation in this formulation. The practical prescription differentiates expansively translating orators and wordy moralists from strictly translating poets and aphoristic writers, according to their nature. A separate warning distrusts fixed rhythm and number imposed by a translator when the original has no corresponding movement. The criticism of Florian concerns a conflict between elegance and Cervantes's familiar good nature, not an objection to elegance under every circumstance.

[423] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 557, 558, 652, 877.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 877, entry 3, ¶1 — Translation includes the reader's own inward rendering.

II, p. 557–558, entry 10, ¶2 — Different kinds of authors call for expansive or strict translation.

II, p. 652, entry 10, ¶1 — Imposed rhythm can alter an original's character.

In this edition. Version 6 uses aphoristic for sentencieux, avoiding its modern disparaging English cognate. Strictly does not itself specify a mechanical word-for-word procedure. The novel in the Florian comparison remains unnamed, and number is a rhetorical quality, not a count.

See also. Reading; Language; Rhythm and number; Aphorism and maxim.

Transparency

transparence; transparent — transparency; transparent[424]

The word. Transparency makes something perceptible through a medium while allowing what is within or beyond it to show. Joubert uses it to join bodily form with intellectual clarity.

In Joubert. Crowded words resemble transparent globules that flatten, stick, and become a pasty mass. Separation preserves their transparency as well as their distinctness. Metaphysics is said to give a transparent body to what has none, while false thoughts deprive words of transparency. The pearl comparison then distinguishes transparency from luster. These examples prevent the term from collapsing into either mere brightness or a colorless absence of form.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 66, entry 2, ¶3 — Crowding destroys the transparency of verbal globules.

I, p. 289, entry 4, ¶1 — Metaphysics gives bodiless things a transparent body.

II, p. 481, entry 3, ¶1 — False thoughts diminish the transparency of words.

II, p. 616, entry 6, ¶1 — A pearl can possess transparency without luster.

In this edition. The English retains "transparent body," "pasty body," and the distinct pearl and glass comparisons. Transparency is not substituted for every occurrence of clarté, lumière, or netteté.

See also. Light; Body; Form; Fluid; Shadow.

[424] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 66, 289; II, pp. 481, 616.

Tree

arbre — tree[425]

The word. Trees supply shelter, rooted development, and visible change. Joubert sometimes interprets them through human vulnerability or institutional care.

In Joubert. The banyan fragment imagines branching that takes root and becomes new trees, offering a form of proliferating continuity. The sheltering tree is explicitly the emblem of government relieving private people of collective worries. The dislike of evergreens takes another course: because they seem to fear and lose nothing, they appear insensible. The personal “I do not like” is crucial; this is an affective judgment rather than a botanical classification.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 248, entry 3, ¶1 — Branches root and rise into new trees.

I, p. 461–462, entry 7, ¶1 — Government receives the emblem of a sheltering tree.

II, p. 749, entry 5, ¶1 — Evergreen persistence is judged through an image of insensibility.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the banyan comparison fragmentary. At II.749 [green] reproduces a source-editor supplement, while [seem] and [and] interpret damaged words. The lexicon keeps those qualifications distinct from its account of personification.

See also. Growth; Seed and germ; Flower and fruit; Continuity; Nature.

Trust

confiance; défiance — trust; confidence; distrust[426]

The word. Confiance can be an active force in a relationship or an outcome of experience; it is not always an accurate estimate of merit.

In Joubert. The early maxim claims that great trust can make deception impossible for its recipient. This is an assertion about the obligation trust can create, not a practical guarantee against deception. A fragment records resentment toward those who inspire more trust than they deserve. The passage on experience then prevents either trusting or distrusting from claiming automatic authority: experience can produce both, and must be joined with other people’s experience for sound judgment. Trust thus concerns both conduct between persons and the correction of one’s standpoint.

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[425] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 248, 461, 462; II, pp. 749.

[426] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 33; II, pp. 629, 656, 657.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 33, entry 4, ¶1 — Trust is represented as binding another person against deception.

II, p. 629, entry 12, ¶1 — Excessive inspired trust occasions resentment.

II, p. 656–657, entry 12, ¶1 — Experience can support confidence or distrust; comparison is needed.

In this edition. Version 6 uses trust in the interpersonal maxims and confidence alongside distrust in the experience argument. The latter preserves the attribution to Hippocrates without locating an ancient source. The torn-word annotation associated with the early unit does not expand its intact maxim.

See also. Friendship; Experience; Judgment; Sincerity and frankness.

Truth

vérité; vrai — truth; truths; true[427]

The word. Vérité names truth or a truth; vrai qualifies what is true. Joubert sometimes expressly separates truth from an individual true thing.

In Joubert. The true-thing passage compares truth and error with virtue and vice: a particular true thing is no more identical with truth than a good action is with virtue. The note on subordinate truths then asks whether one truth depends on another and whether a truth may cancel another's usefulness. This is a prompt to examine relations and consequences, not permission to treat every contradiction as resolved.

Truth can also be personified as a woman who loves adornment, and historical writing can possess truth by making a human character known even when it offers no good reasoning. These literary uses complicate any equation of truth with a bare demonstrative proposition. The startling metaphysical claim that everything plausible imagined of God and the world is true must likewise remain strong and local: the notebook's wording says true, but it supplies no universal test that can be imposed on the whole corpus.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 627–628, entry 7, ¶1 — Truth is distinguished from a true thing.

I, p. 212–213, entry 7, ¶1 — Truths may depend on one another and differ in usefulness.

I, p. 59, entry 7, ¶1 — Personified Truth loves adornment; the sentence breaks off.

II, p. 771, entry 6, ¶1 — Historical portrayal can be beautiful in truth without good reasoning.

[427] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 59, 212, 213; II, pp. 572, 627, 628, 771.

II, p. 572, entry 2, ¶3 — A strong claim links metaphysical plausibility to truth.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps true distinct from plausible and preserves the editor's [true] supplement on II.627. The feminine pronoun in the adornment fragment follows the personification. "Subordinatement" and "subordinance" deliberately echo Joubert's exploratory word forms on I.212.

See also. Error; Reason; Ornament; History; Science.

Unbelief

incrédulité — incredulity; unbelief[428]

The word. Incrédulité ranges from a disposition of mind to a systematic rejection described as an active state of conflict.

In Joubert. The contrast with impiety is important even within Joubert's disapproval: unbelief is a mental disposition, whereas impiety is called a vice of the heart. Dogmatic or systematic unbelief receives a more elaborate polemic, imagined as war against education, family, public order and past time, with the future becoming its idol. A heavily damaged passage then compares faith after reasoned unbelief with chosen chastity after lost innocence. Its argument depends on voluntary restraint of attention, not on a demonstration that objections have disappeared. These distinctions prevent treating all uncertainty or intellectual doubt as the same religious condition.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 669, entry 5, ¶1 — Unbelief is distinguished from impiety without being approved.

II, p. 765, entry 4, ¶2 — Systematic unbelief is polemically described as perpetual war.

II, p. 800, entry 3, ¶2 — Recovered faith is compared with chosen restraint after innocence.

In this edition. Version 6 uses incredulity in the mind/heart contrast and unbelief in the systematic and recovered-faith passages. The latter contains numerous contextual English brackets and wholly unresolved gaps. The lexicon neither supplies its missing connectors nor resolves its shifting pronouns.

See also. Faith; Atheism; Certainty and doubt; Will; Chastity.

[428] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 669, 765, 800.

Unity

unité — unity; unit; units[429]

The word. Unité may be oneness, a single constituent, or a principle that makes diverse parts cohere. It need not imply monotony or the exclusion of variety.

In Joubert. The explicit gloss of monad as unity provides the compact philosophical use. In a literary discussion, the recurring voice of a writer creates a special unity among complicated and winding events. The warning against abusing experience speaks instead of a few units, from which one must not leap to a multitude or absolute universality. The capacity of one thought to contain a book's essence further shows that unity can be rich rather than merely small.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 267, entry 1, ¶1 — Monad is glossed as unity.

I, p. 85, entry begun p. 84, no. 4, ¶3 — The writer's presence provides unity within complicated narrative.

II, p. 512, entry 9, ¶1 — A few units do not establish absolute universality.

II, p. 589, entry 7, ¶1 — Unity can equal the excellence of a larger composition.

In this edition. The translation distinguishes singular "unity" from plural "units" where the latter are counted examples. The Tasso account is explicitly approximate in the French and remains "in substance" in English.

See also. Monad; Number; Order; Essence.

Utility

utilité; utile — utility; usefulness; the useful[430]

The word. Utilité concerns beneficial effect or capacity for use, while utile can name what is useful. Joubert does not consistently oppose utility to truth, religion or intellectual life.

In Joubert. Religion is assigned utility alongside truth. The crank-without-a-rope image makes logic without reason a cumbersome useless mechanism. Thoughts' essential utility or inutility is then made the constant principle of their glory or oblivion. In the distinction between wisdom and philosophy, wisdom studies and loves both useful and

[429] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 85, 267; II, pp. 512, 589.

[430] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 652, 663, 672, 714.

true. These contexts make utility a relation to effective practice and enduring reception, not necessarily financial profit or convenience.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 672, entry 4, ¶1 — Utility is added to truth as a property of religion.

II, p. 652, entry 9, ¶1 — Logic without reason is figured as a useless device.

II, p. 714, entry 4, ¶1 — Thoughts endure or disappear in relation to essential usefulness.

II, p. 663, entry 3, ¶2 — Wisdom concerns the useful together with the true.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the abstract noun utility in the religion formula but uses usefulness in the broken-mechanism image and “the useful” in the wisdom comparison. It retains logic/reason as different terms and does not replace utility with a modern doctrinal label.

See also. Wisdom; Religion; Practice and effort; Glory; Need.

Vanity

vanité — vanity[431]

The word. Vanité is a passion associated with temperament and the wish to please. It can shade into literary pretension without being identical to pride.

In Joubert. Joubert explicitly distinguishes vanity as a passion from dissimulation as a vice learned through experience. In writing, pretension attaches to the writer’s vanity, whereas affectation concerns words more directly; the two receive different judgments. The personified vanity that seeks affronts by seeking success exposes a danger within ambition for approval. These passages make vanity neither harmless in every setting nor intrinsically the same vice as orgueil.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 257, entry begun p. 256, no. 6, ¶3 — Vanity is classified as passion, unlike dissimulation.

II, p. 578, entry 4, ¶1 — Writerly pretension is linked to vanity.

II, p. 841, entry 7, ¶1 — Seeking success brings vanity into the path of affronts.

In this edition. Version 6 maintains vanity, affectation and pretension as separate terms. It preserves “she” in the affronts fragment because vanity is personified, and does not supply a particular vain person behind that pronoun.

See also. Pride; Desire; Humility; Ambition; Charity.

[431] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 257; II, pp. 578, 841.

Vapor and cloud

vapeur; nuage — vapor; cloud; clouds[432]

The word. Vapor is a subtle, spreading material image; clouds can carry color or obstruct illumination. Neither is uniformly a name for confusion.

In Joubert. Moist vapors are necessary to revive exposed plants. Sunset color on clouds prompts a reflection upon color not reducible to earthy dust on surfaces, though that reflection remains unfinished. Plato's writing can also release an intellectual vapor in which mind swims. Elsewhere intelligence lets its clouds disperse to see light. The images distinguish subtle diffusion from obstruction without making every vague apprehension a defect.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 38–39, entry 7, ¶1 — Vapors sustain exposed plants.

I, p. 183, entry 3, ¶1 — Cloud color prompts an unfinished inquiry into material appearance.

II, p. 721, entry 4, ¶1 — Intellectual vapor rises from Plato's writings.

II, p. 483, entry 4, ¶1 — Dispersing clouds permits intellectual light.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the partial and elliptical color argument. "Intellectual" is bracketed in the Plato fragment because of source damage; its incompleteness is not silently repaired into a full critical verdict.

See also. Water; Air; Light; Shadow; Transparency.

Vegetation

végétation; végéter — vegetation; grows[433]

The word. Vegetation means plant growth and activity in the single selected fragment. The verb végéter is positive here, not the modern figurative complaint about a stagnant life.

In Joubert. The wind is called necessary to vegetation because it shakes plants and gives air penetrating force. It is then likened, elliptically, to a crossbow string. The closing parallel makes movement necessary to everything that grows as to everything that lives. This is Joubert's compressed explanatory analogy; it should not be enlarged into a complete botanical mechanism.

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[432] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 38, 39, 183; II, pp. 483, 721.

[433] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 177.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 177, entry 5, ¶1 — Wind, shaking, and penetrating air are linked with plant growth.

In this edition. Version 6 translates tout ce qui végète as “everything that grows,” avoiding the misleading pejorative English vegetates. The subjectless “Are the string” remains an unfinished form rather than being silently regularized.

See also. Growth; Tree; Air; Life; Movement.

Veil

voile; voiler — veil; veiling[434]

The word. A veil can clothe without rigidly enclosing, separate without becoming a wall, or temper light without extinguishing it. Concealment here is not uniformly deception.

In Joubert. The instruction for translating Plato gives his subtle ideas a loose veil, drapery, cloud, or vapor; tight clothing makes them misshapen. Another fragment requires a veil rather than a wall between an unnamed him and us. It states a contrast of barriers without naming the party separated. In the conditional definition of philosophical doubt, veiling corrects extinguishing as the response to dazzling light. Another organ of judgment is wanted, but remains unspecified. These distinctions keep partial mediation separate from complete exclusion.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 153, entry 4, ¶1 — A loose covering suits the subtle body of Plato’s ideas.

I, p. 246, entry 1, ¶2 — A veil is required instead of a wall, with the pronoun unexpanded.

II, p. 655, entry 8, ¶1 — Veiling corrects extinguishing within a qualified account of doubt.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the images and the explicit self-correction “or rather.” The doubt itself is qualified by “if it existed”; the statement is not turned into an unconditional recommendation. The noun voile can elsewhere mean sail, so that distinct material use is not evidence for every claim made here.

See also. Translation; Clarity and obscurity; Certainty and doubt; Transparency.

[434] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 153, 246; II, pp. 655.

Verse

vers; verset — verse; lines of verse; versets[435]

The word. Vers names metrical verse or a line of it. The identical spelling vers also means toward, an unrelated preposition excluded from this article's evidence.

In Joubert. Verse is required to say something, whereas music is allowed to say nothing if it sounds good. The comparison does not deny verbal music; it marks an additional obligation of verse. Joubert also attributes poetry's degeneration partly to verse no longer being made for singing, keeping the two arts related without identifying them. The self-correction about versets distinguishes short prose or scriptural units from metrical verse: he first ranks versets after good verse in difficulty, then explicitly reverses the ranking. The correction is part of the thought, not an editorial inconsistency to remove.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 654, entry 10, ¶1 — Verse must say something, unlike the stated sufficient condition for music.

I, p. 265, entry 5, ¶1 — Loss of singing is proposed as one cause of poetry's degeneration.

II, p. 680, entry 11, ¶1 — Joubert corrects his ranking of good verse and good versets.

In this edition. Version 6 retains versets as a technical term distinct from verse. "I was wrong" and the repeated comparisons remain. Surface searches for vers include directional false hits; none supports a claim about verse.

See also. Poetry; Music; Rhythm and number; Prose.

Verve

verve — verve; inspiration[436]

The word. Verve is creative impulse or animation. Joubert distinguishes its stirring effect from the emotional movement of enthusiasm.

In Joubert. The explicit two-quality distinction is followed by a ranking: after enthusiasm, verve is best for inspiration. The author comparisons do not assign one total score to each writer; a poet may exceed another in verve and fall below him in enthusiasm. A separate remark makes verve one of the impulsive powers that art can

[435] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 265; II, pp. 654, 680.

[436] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 84; II, pp. 610, 775.

teach a person to do without, alongside genius, instinct and inspiration. This is not the claim that verve has no value, but that acquired art and native impulse can produce different routes to an effect.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 610, entry 1, ¶1 — Verve stirs, distinct from enthusiasm's emotional movement.

II, p. 610, entry 1, ¶2 — Verve is ranked as a source of inspiration.

II, p. 610, entry 1, ¶4 — The comparisons of poets maintain independent scales of verve and enthusiasm.

II, p. 775, entry 5, ¶1 — Art can compensate for powers such as verve.

I, p. 84, entry 4, ¶2 — Untamed verve becomes inspiration in the draft discussion of Tasso.

In this edition. Version 6 usually retains verve in these distinctions but uses inspiration for the earlier untamed verve in the Tasso discussion. J. B. Rousseau in the comparisons is not J.-J. Rousseau. The gap in [inspiration] on II.775 remains qualified.

See also. Enthusiasm; Genius; Art; Talent.

Vibration and undulation

vibration; ondulation — vibration; undulation; undulations[437]

The word. Vibration and undulation describe oscillating or spreading movement. In literary judgments, the felt physical effect may support emotion or fail to become it.

In Joubert. The early musical account compares circulation in happy love with sound's undulations in a smooth, homogeneous resonant body. Its physiological claim is more extensive than the comparison itself can establish. The contrast between kinds of clarity makes poetic meaning continue to resound in many undulations, while another kind falls back into itself. But the judgment of Céruti finds more vibration than emotion, more string or nerve than heart or intelligence. Repeated movement is therefore not a sufficient condition of inward significance.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 66–67, entry 3, ¶1 — Undulation is part of a proposed bodily and musical correspondence.

II, p. 558, entry 8, ¶1 — Poetic meaning is imagined as continuing in resonant waves.

II, p. 596, entry 14, ¶1 — Stylistic vibration can exceed emotion and intelligence.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps string and nerve as alternatives, not an identical modern mechanism. The pronouns in the clarity comparison remain as printed; its later

[437] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 66, 67, 246; II, pp. 558, 596.

masculine first is not repaired with an invented noun. No acoustic experiment is claimed by the Lexicon.

Related terms.

Oscillation. *oscillation* — The pendulum's overly rapid oscillations supply an analogy for lively minds and passionate men whose hearts may be said to beat too fast. The wording remains comparative and conditional. Version 6 retains oscillations instead of diagnosing the described people or naming an instrument actually used to examine them.

Places. I, p. 246, entry 6, ¶1.

See also. Movement; Echo; Sound and voice; Music; Feeling.

Vice

vice — vice[438]

The word. Vice identifies a morally defective disposition or source of distortion. Joubert expressly warns against treating every passion as a vice.

In Joubert. The haste of French authors is traced to a fundamental vice in their ways of life: living and enjoying too quickly. The move runs from conduct to literary fault. Vanity and dissimulation then receive different classifications, passion and vice, despite both being susceptible to criticism. The fragment on falsified truths locates vice in the mind expressing or receiving them; distortion need not arise from an accidental copying error. These cases place moral evaluation within habits of thought and expression.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 46, entry begun p. 45, no. 3, ¶15 — Cultural haste is treated as the root of literary faults.

I, p. 257, entry begun p. 256, no. 6, ¶3 — Passion and vice are explicitly distinguished.

II, p. 844, entry 5, ¶1 — A mind's vice can falsify truths in expression or reception.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps vice distinct from faults and passions. It retains the expression/receiving alternatives in the final parenthesis, and "Of truths falsified" remains a topical fragment rather than a complete explanatory proposition.

See also. Virtue; Vanity; Malice; Habit; Good and evil.

[438] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 46, 257; II, pp. 844.

Virtue

vertu — virtue[439]

The word. Vertu names moral excellence and the capacity for right conduct. It can be figured as health, identified with principled unity, or tested by resistance to inclination.

In Joubert. Perfect innocence is lovable but unreliable, so admiration for innocence is not yet an account of virtue. The soul's health formula gives virtue an image of well-being. The distinction between limited habits and principles gives it a broader reach across circumstances. The explicit definition through doing good without favorable inclination and avoiding evil despite passion stresses self-command. Finally the moral program assigns a person their own virtue and other people's happiness as a double end. These are related but distinct descriptions: virtue is not merely having agreeable feelings, nor is it simply maximizing one's own happiness.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 32, entry 3, ¶1 — Innocence is compared with virtue without being equated to it.

I, p. 44, entry begun p. 43, no. 1, ¶10 — Virtue is the soul's health.

I, p. 47, entry 1, ¶13 — Principles give coherence beyond habitual cases.

I, p. 213, entry 9, ¶1 — Virtue acts against inclination when necessary.

I, p. 298, entry begun p. 297, no. 2, ¶4 — Own virtue is coupled with others' happiness.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the love/reverence distinction in the innocence comparison, the habits/principles alternatives, and the own/others distribution in the double-end passage. It does not turn the nominal definitions into one systematic creed.

Related terms.

Moral perfection. *perfection* — A brief perfection fragment distinguishes attaining a condition from sustaining it; its field is unspecified. The securely moral application occurs in the separate program that assigns self-perfection to morals.

Places. I, p. 428, entry 13, ¶1; II, p. 808, entry 1, ¶2.

See also. Duty; Habit; Will; Goodness; Innocence; Morality.

[439] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 32, 44, 47, 213, 298, 428; II, pp. 808.

Vital and animal spirits

esprits vitaux; esprits animaux — vital spirits; animal spirits[440]

The word. These phrases name historical physiological agents. They are not interchangeable with the soul, with intelligence, or with someone's cheerful "spirits."

In Joubert. Joubert's first-person contrast gives him more vital than animal spirits and says those going to his head are no longer in his stomach. The terms organize an account of distribution within the body. In the later quotation about imagination's vertigos, animal spirits and brain fibers explain intellectual effects; Joubert immediately asks whether the soul alone can have no part. The objection is to explaining everything through matter alone, and remains compatible with his use of bodily vocabulary elsewhere.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 379, entry 5, ¶1 — The two kinds of spirits are distinguished within a head/stomach distribution.

I, p. 447–448, entry 7, ¶1 — A quoted physiological explanation prompts an objection to exclusive material explanation.

In this edition. The existing Version 6 note identifies these as period physiological terms and distinguishes their arterial and nervous associations. The Lexicon follows that note without claiming fresh dictionary verification. Vertiges remains "vertigos," not the conjecturally smoother "traces"; the quoted sentence's source wording and Joubert's response stay distinct.

See also. Humors; Stomach; Nerves and fibers; Materialism and spiritualism; Soul.

Vivacity

vivacité — vivacity; liveliness[441]

The word. Vivacity is rapid or lively mental and expressive movement. Its speed can outrun taste, judgment or the enduring capacities a writer needs.

In Joubert. The early contrast between fiery delivery and cold matter attributes ordinary vivacity to blood rather than soul; its regional generalization belongs to Joubert and is not a verified account of character. A practical instruction asks the mind to learn

[440] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 379, 447, 448.

[441] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 87, 195, 376; II, pp. 604, 702.

to function without liveliness, since age and setbacks can remove it. The race between slow taste and rapid mind, reason and imagination, gives maturation a different tempo from immediate brilliance. Voltaire's verses are said to spring from vivacity alone, gushing instead of flowing. A later warning is more qualified: even the liveliness of good taste can sometimes mislead good judgment. The repeated good prevents this from becoming a simple contrast of bad taste with sound reason.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 87, entry 3, ¶1 — Fiery expression is distinguished from the temperature of its matter.

I, p. 195, entry begun p. 194, no. 4, ¶2 — The mind should learn to work without constant liveliness.

I, p. 376, entry 6, ¶1 — Taste and reason take time to catch up with rapid powers.

II, p. 604, entry 10, ¶2 — Voltaire's verses gush rather than flow.

II, p. 702, entry 12, ¶1 — Lively good taste can sometimes mislead good judgment.

In this edition. Version 6 alternates vivacity and liveliness. The peculiar jaillisssnt in the Voltaire passage is interpreted as gush while retained with qualification in French. The possibility and occasional force of "can sometimes" remain in the final warning.

See also. Energy; Taste; Judgment; Perfection; Aging and old age.

Void

vide; vuide — void; empty space; empty[442]

The word. Vide and the older spelling vuide can name an empty interval or space. They must be distinguished from Latin vide, an instruction to see another passage.

In Joubert. The aesthetic comparison of music with architecture pairs silence and rests with voids and solids. Emptiness here is an arranged interval that helps produce pleasure, not sheer deficiency. An imagined world outside the actual world also supplies empty space in which illusions can be placed. In the balloon hypothesis, the universe could shrink back to an atom in the void. Its status as a hypothesis matters: the analogy is a speculative picture, not an asserted physical history.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 83, entry 7, ¶1 — Architectural voids function like musical silences.

I, p. 474, entry 5, ¶1 — Empty space offers room for imagined marvels.

I, p. 152, entry 3, ¶2 — The void receives an atom within an explicitly named hypothesis.

[442] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 83, 152, 474.

In this edition. Version 6 uses “voids” and “empty space” according to context. Latin vide is translated “See” in many later references, and is not evidence for the French concept of emptiness. The candidate search includes those false hits, which the selected references exclude.

See also. Space and place; Matter; Atoms; Rest.

War

guerre — war; wars[443]

The word. Guerre can name armed conflict or supply an image for destructive exchange. Joubert also sees relations formed through the very process of hostility.

In Joubert. The criticism of commerce calls it a war of money and opposes it to a possible rivalry in generosity. Government is separately charged with war and peace so that private people are relieved of those great cares. The undated note on long wars then calls war a kind of commerce that binds those it disunites. The opposed verbs are the point: exchange and conflict cannot be divided into wholly unrelated spheres.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 47, entry 1, ¶6 — Commerce is criticized through a war metaphor.

I, p. 461–462, entry 7, ¶1 — War and peace are assigned to governmental responsibility.

II, p. 917, entry 2, ¶1 — Long wars create ties between opposing peoples.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves “war of money,” “rivalry of generosity” and the later binds/disunites paradox. Commerce in the latter includes intercourse or exchange and need not mean literal trade. Its qualification “in some way” remains essential.

See also. Peace; Government; Nation; Society.

Water

eau — water; waters[444]

The word. Water supplies images of circulation, displacement, flexibility, and motion held in a visible shape.

In Joubert. The rain-and-vapor circle maintains a quantity of moisture through change of state. Another comparison explains the perceptibility of a body by likening displaced

[443] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 47, 461, 462; II, pp. 917.

[444] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 172; II, pp. 481, 912.

light to water displaced by a solid. The analogy's own sequence of mass and volume remains important even where it is physically awkward. The late note on a fountain carefully separates Joubert's initial recollection from Batteux's wording: the jet shines and does not advance. Movement need not therefore be represented as the whole visible form traveling elsewhere.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 172, entry 4, ¶1 — Water circulates as rain and vapor.

II, p. 481, entry 6, ¶1 — Water displacement supplies an analogy for a body's effect on light.

II, p. 912, entry 3, ¶1 — The fountain is both moving and stationary in appearance.

In this edition. Version 6 does not silently correct the mass/volume language. It also preserves both formulations in the Batteux note and the explicit announcement "There is the text."

See also. Fluid; Movement; Light; Element; Continuity.

Weakness

faiblesse — weakness[445]

The word. Faiblesse need not mean a defect to be eliminated: its place and its effects can reverse the apparent value of strength.

In Joubert. The ability to complain of mental weakness is itself evidence of some remaining strength. The friendship maxim recasts what another person calls weakness as the force of a bond. Another comparison prefers weakness that brings back to order to strength that moves away from it, locating improvement in removal of excess rather than mere increase of force. The contrast between my weakness and your strength then distinguishes an impaired instrument from deficient heart, reason or goodwill. No instrument or addressee is identified. These passages make weakness a relational judgment, not a simple measurement of bodily or moral capacity.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 445, entry 10, ¶1 — Complaint of weakness still requires mental strength.

II, p. 559, entry 3, ¶1 — Apparent weakness may be strength of friendship.

II, p. 653, entry 11, ¶1 — Preserving order can make weakness better than strength.

II, p. 771, entry 7, ¶1 — Weak instrument and weak inward disposition are distinguished.

[445] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 445; II, pp. 559, 653, 771.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the repeated strength/weakness terms and the two explanatory parentheses. The source's sic remains beside the reflexive departure from order; no object is added to brings back. The complaint maxim does not claim that every complaint proves full health.

See also. Force; Friendship; Health and illness; Order; Will.

Weariness

fatigue; lassitude — fatigue; weariness[446]

The word. Fatigue and lassitude register the limits of present capacity, especially the mind's capacity to continue work or judgment.

In Joubert. The warning of fatigue concerns powerlessness for the moment, not a verdict of permanent incapacity. Yet weariness can produce a counterfeit conclusion: a person decides to escape an examination or an uncertainty instead of reaching a judgment through intelligence. A first-person note adds another complication. Doing well may itself require slowness and extreme fatigue. The three witnesses make fatigue a signal to interpret, not an infallible instruction either to stop or to persevere. They also distinguish the discomfort of work from the wish to finish thinking at any cost.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 520, entry 1, ¶1 — Fatigue indicates a temporary limit in intellectual labor.

II, p. 589, entry 5, ¶1 — Weariness can substitute an act of will for intelligent judgment.

II, p. 770, entry 6, ¶1 — Doing well is described as slow and extremely tiring.

In this edition. Version 6 uses fatigue for fatigue and weariness for lassitude in these witnesses. The first-person sentence leaves the activity unspecified; neither composition nor translation is supplied as its object.

See also. Practice and effort; Judgment; Will; Rest.

Weight and gravity

poids; pesanteur; gravitation — weight; gravitation[447]

The word. Poids and pesanteur concern weight; gravitation names a physical process or force. Poids also gives words and judgments seriousness or authority.

[446] Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 520, 589, 770.

[447] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 446; II, pp. 898, 906, 921.

In Joubert. A mathematical body is explicitly imagined without weight or impenetrability. This separates a conceptual figure from the properties used to characterize earthly bodies. In the late skeptical image of matter, gravitations and other forces belong to an enormous appearance that can nevertheless be pictured as a hollow grain or bubble. The literary uses pull in another direction: Spartan style derives its weight from the way of life behind it, and Tacitus's words have weight and measure alongside exact number.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 446, entry 1, ¶2 — Weight is excluded from the mathematical body.

II, p. 906, entry 4, ¶1 — Gravitations enter the highly figurative interrogation of matter.

II, p. 921, entry 4, ¶2 — A way of life lends weight to style.

II, p. 898, entry 2, ¶1 — Words possess weight, measure, and exact number; exact modifies number alone.

In this edition. Version 6 retains "gravitations" in the unusual plural list and "weight" in the literary judgments. The metaphor should not be converted into heaviness of style: here weight can praise concentrated authority.

See also. Force; Matter; Measure; Number; Impenetrability.

Whole and part

tout; partie; ensemble — whole; part; parts[448]

The word. The relation of whole and parts is central to composition and explanation. A whole may require each part's integrity while also depending on relations that cannot be reduced to a list.

In Joubert. The Tacitus comparison locates supreme perfection in a perfect whole and perfect elements. The desired literary order holds parts together through harmony and relation, yet insists that nothing be nailed in place. The two forms of physics show why the relation matters to inquiry: synthesis displays order through the whole, whereas analysis can produce apparent incoherence through divided parts. These passages favor neither indiscriminate fusion nor disconnected enumeration.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 898, entry 2, ¶1 — Perfection belongs jointly to whole and elements.

II, p. 700, entry 1, ¶1 — Parts should hold together without being nailed in place.

[448] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 179; II, pp. 700, 768, 898.

II, p. 768, entry 8, ¶1 — Whole and divided parts yield different appearances in physics.

I, p. 179, entry 12, ¶1 — The repeated whole-account imagines nested bodies and souls.

In this edition. Version 6 renders ensemble as “whole” in the relevant arguments; adverbial ensemble elsewhere means together and supplies no independent theory of wholeness. The title groups a relation rather than inventing an unprinted technical phrase. The English “perfect whole and perfect elements” adopts a contextual shared attachment: French prints parfaits only after élémens, and a narrower attachment to elements alone remains possible.

See also. Unity; Order; Cohesion; Division and indivisibility; Perfection.

Will

volonté — will[449]

The word. Volonté names a power of willing that can sustain virtue or bring inquiry prematurely to an end. Moral strength and intellectual warrant are different questions.

In Joubert. The formula joining firm, constant will to virtue is followed by a claim that children can possess it through honor or piety. In the light/movement pairing, intelligence supplies light while will supplies movement. The distinction becomes practical in the call for morality to give impulses to will rather than contemplation to understanding: it needs fire and ardor. Conversely, decisions made from weariness, haste or tormenting uncertainty may arise from will without intelligence. The faculty’s power therefore does not guarantee the truth of its decisions.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 256, entry 3, ¶1 — Constant will is joined to virtue and childhood capacity.

I, p. 473, entry 2, ¶2 — Will is the starting point of movement.

II, p. 481, entry 7, ¶1 — Moral discourse needs to move will.

II, p. 589, entry 5, ¶1 — Will can decide in the absence of judgment.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves will against intelligence or understanding and keeps the imagery of fire and light. In the childhood fragment, “it” leaves open whether the French elle points specifically to will or virtue. This lexicon does not settle that antecedent more firmly.

[449] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 256, 473; II, pp. 481, 589, 743, 912.

Related terms.

Obstinacy. *opiniâtre; entêté; obstination* — Opiniâtre holds strongly to opinions whether weak or strong, while entêté thinks strongly whatever is thought. Version 6 distinguishes obstinate from headstrong. Obstination also belongs to prayer's repeated acts in a nominal list whose promised efficacy is reported, not independently guaranteed. Strength of attachment is therefore not the same as strength of reasons.

Places. II, p. 743, entry 13, ¶1; II, p. 912, entry 2, ¶1.

See also. Freedom; Virtue; Duty; Desire; Education.

Wind

vent — wind; winds[450]

The word. Wind is moving air, an agent acting upon vegetation or responsive organs, and a figure for transience or unstable influence.

In Joubert. The plant-growth fragment gives wind a shaking and penetrating action. The Aeolian harp responds when moving air strikes it, offering a comparison for organs performing thought. By contrast, attaching thought to passing events is building on the wind's wing, a deliberately insecure foundation. The physical explanation of cold wind distinguishes motion of transport from intrinsic motion among parts; it is Joubert's historical attempt to distinguish kinds of motion, not a modern thermal account.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 177, entry 5, ¶1 — Wind is given an active role in vegetation.

II, p. 926, entry 4, ¶1 — Wind elicits sound from a receptive instrument.

I, p. 218, entry 2, ¶1 — Wind figures the instability of thoughts tied to passing events.

II, p. 575, entry 12, ¶1 — Cold wind illustrates transport as distinct from internal motion.

In this edition. Version 6 keeps the peculiar "wing of the winds" and the physical distinction between transported air and movement of parts. It does not silently correct the speculative account of cold.

See also. Air; Vegetation; Breath; Movement; Fire and heat.

[450] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 177, 218; II, pp. 575, 926.

Wine

vin — wine[451]

The word. Wine supplies more than an image of intoxication. Its containment, production, clarity, strength, and nourishment help distinguish kinds of writing and intellectual activity.

In Joubert. The bottled-mind comparison makes constraint productive: a fixed subject and short time concentrate a lively fermentation that greater freedom would destroy. The contrast between ancient and modern writing compares first cuvée with wine from pomace; fuller body is not the same as fineness or distance from the lees. The comparison of Voltaire and Bossuet then allows more than one valuable kind of clarity: water and wine are both clear, while the latter continues to suggest nourishment and strength. These passages do not yield a simple hierarchy in which the strongest or most transparent writing is always best.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 116, entry 11, ¶1 — Containment concentrates the wine's and mind's liveliness.

I, p. 358, entry 3, ¶1 — Body and fineness are distinguished through different products of winemaking.

II, p. 583, entry 5, ¶1 — Wine's clarity can nourish and strengthen without becoming water.

In this edition. Version 6 renders printed mark as pomace and keeps it distinct from lees. First cuvée does not identify a vintage year. The final He at II.583 refers to Bossuet while leaving wine's qualities active in the comparison.

See also. Fermentation; Ancients and moderns; Clarity and obscurity; Nourishment and digestion.

Wings

aile — wing; wings[452]

The word. Wings make unsupported movement and elevation imaginable. Their contrast with feet can praise freedom, expose limitation, or identify a missing practical capacity.

[451] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 116, 358; II, pp. 583.

[452] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 162; II, pp. 569, 611.

In Joubert. Common minds without wings require fixed supports even where exact determination would be error. Bonald's mind, in another comparison, has no wings—or only short ones that improve walking rather than permit flight. The revision within that sentence matters: the image is qualified instead of simply withdrawn. Conversely, the address to someone with wings and no feet does not present wings as a sufficient excellence. It is followed by alternative ways of entering truths and by the warning that space can impress and deceive. These different uses resist a single rule that more flight is always better.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 162, entry 8, ¶1 — Wings allow a mind to remain in space without fabricated supports.

II, p. 611, entry 4, ¶1 — Bonald's wings are absent or limited to assisting walking.

II, p. 569, entry 9, ¶1 — Wings without feet leave another capacity missing.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the literal wings and feet and the short-wing qualification. It distinguishes imposer from en imposer as impressing and deceiving, without deciding that space must mean book length or prestige. The images are not assigned to a fixed psychological classification.

See also. Bird; Space and place; Imagination; Precision; Dust.

Wisdom

sagesse — wisdom[453]

The word. Sagesse combines discernment with a directed manner of living. Joubert sometimes distinguishes its love of the useful and true from philosophy's pursuit of truth alone.

In Joubert. The Platonic report locates wisdom in the ordering of faculties. Joubert's revision of a saying attributed to Rivarol is more explicit about vocabulary: replace reason/truth with wisdom/philosophy, because wisdom can admit good prejudices and attend to utility. The alteration is his own intervention in another speaker's formulation. In the Fénelon/Bossuet comparison wisdom acquires voice, authority and a terrain of valleys and heights. Its final effect is a taste or ardent love for wisdom, not merely a stock of propositions.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶2 — Wisdom belongs to ordered conduct in the Platonic account.

[453] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 35, 36; II, pp. 663, 885.

II, p. 663, entry 3, ¶2 — A revision distinguishes wisdom's practical orientation from philosophy.

II, p. 885, entry 6, ¶1 — Writers differ in the way they make wisdom felt and authoritative.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the grammatical term "nominatives" in the proposed revision and the repeated "only truth alone." The awkward this-one/that-one sequence in the terrain comparison remains unassigned; the final names are explicit.

See also. Virtue; Utility; Authority; Education.

Wit

bel esprit; esprit — wit; a wit[454]

The word. Esprit may mean verbal brilliance, and bel esprit can name the person who possesses or cultivates it. These uses differ from esprit as mind or spirit.

In Joubert. The brief learned/wit contrast assigns learning to study and being a wit to talent. A later note criticizes the bel esprit who cares only to speak well and is satisfied by the resulting glory. That is a particular narrowing of ambition, not a claim that eloquent language is always empty. The contrast with good sense makes self-directed brilliance the issue: wit occupies us with ourselves, while good sense concerns others. Finally the criticism of the Saint Helena collection denies wit, good sense and genius even while allowing some truths, so a true statement does not automatically possess these literary virtues.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 332, entry 2, ¶4 — Study and talent produce learnedness and wit respectively.

II, p. 854, entry 5, ¶1 — The bel esprit seeks glory for speaking well.

I, p. 420, entry 4, ¶1 — Wit's self-concern contrasts with good sense.

II, p. 900, entry 6, ¶1 — Some truths can coexist with an absence of wit and genius.

In this edition. Version 6 uses wit for these contexts while preserving mind or spirit elsewhere. The supplied [us] in the second formulation on I.420 is an English grammatical supplement. The article does not make every occurrence of esprit an accusation of vanity.

See also. Mind; Good sense and common sense; Talent; Eloquence.

[454] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 332, 420; II, pp. 854, 900.

Women

femme — woman; women[455]

The word. Femme may designate an individual woman or a generalized social category. Joubert's contrasting judgments should be read with their historical assumptions visible.

In Joubert. The education-and-class comparison gives women superiority in uneducated classes but men in distinguished ones, explaining it through natural versus acquired virtues. The musical conversation comparison distributes satisfaction and enchantment by gender. By contrast the note on Mme Necker concerns a particular person whose books form her world. These are not interchangeable evidence for a universal account of women, and the individual judgment should not be generalized to the whole category.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 113, entry 3, ¶1 — Sex and social class are linked through a natural/acquired virtue contrast.

I, p. 108, entry 6, ¶1 — Conversation is described through a gendered musical comparison.

I, p. 354, entry 4, ¶1 — Mme Necker receives a particular literary characterization.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the source's categorical language while retaining "literatures" in the plural for Mme Necker. In the conversation passage it keeps the puzzling printed mission rather than silently adopting the conjecture unisson. The lexicon reports the claims without endorsing their hierarchy.

See also. Education; Conversation; Virtue; Family.

Word

mot — word; words[456]

The word. Mot names a verbal unit, but Joubert also imagines words as bodies possessing movement, texture and affective force.

In Joubert. The hatching passage lets word and idea emerge from each other, then clothes the idea in the word. This reciprocal process resists the model of language as a neutral label attached to fully formed content. Winged, creeping, fixed, moving, flowing and dry words have different manners of appearing; the list is a working set of material comparisons rather than a completed classification. The words for altars, tombs, inheritance and native land depend on an answering feeling in those who utter or hear

[455] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 108, 113, 354.

[456] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 274; II, pp. 571, 621, 622, 859.

them. Indifference threatens their force even when their dictionary meanings remain available.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 274, entry 6, ¶1 — Word and idea alternately hatch, then stand in a clothing relation.

II, p. 621–622, entry 15, ¶1 — Words are distinguished through kinetic and material metaphors.

II, p. 859, entry 9, ¶1 — A group of words requires an affective response in speaker and hearer.

II, p. 571, entry 6, ¶1 — Several meanings contribute to a word's beauty.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves the hatching reversal and the material adjectives rather than substituting generic good or bad diction. The abbreviated names in the list of word types remain unexpanded; no author identification follows from the lexicon.

See also. Idea; Meaning; Name; Expression; Style.

World and universe

monde; univers — world; universe; society[457]

The word. Monde may mean the world, a sphere of activity, or society; univers usually extends attention to the cosmic whole. The scale is supplied by the context.

In Joubert. The compressed sequence "God is being; the world is a place" distinguishes world from matter, body, and life rather than making them synonyms. The balloon hypothesis pictures the universe as an inflated volume that could collapse back to an atom without ruins. A poem requires three worlds—heavens, earth, and underworld—to create its imaginative space. These are different uses of the world-image, not rival factual descriptions that a lexicon must reconcile.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 232, entry 1, ¶1 — The world is distinguished as a place within a chain of definitions.

I, p. 152, entry 3, ¶2 — The universe is pictured as a deflatable balloon within a hypothesis.

II, p. 487, entry begun p. 486, no. 14, ¶3 — The poem requires three worlds.

II, p. 482, entry 13, ¶1 — Gens du monde means people of society.

In this edition. Version 6 retains the explicit hypothetical wording and renders gens du monde as "people of society." The plural underworld region in les enfers is translated "the underworld," without naming an unprinted poem.

See also. Earth; Space and place; Matter; Void; Atoms.

[457] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 152, 232; II, pp. 482, 487.

Worship

culte — worship[458]

The word. Culte names religious worship and its observances, including both outward manifestation and inward orientation. The English “cult” would misleadingly narrow these witnesses.

In Joubert. Public noise, pomp, bells and dietary observances make worship useful by marking festivals and the year. Joubert expressly places these practices within private as well as public life. The painting fragment, however, speaks of inward worship while refusing to make that inwardness the sole explanation of painting’s Christian character. A further note imagines God accepting worship judged true in simplicity. Outward observance and inward sincerity are thus distinct dimensions, not mutually exclusive definitions.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

I, p. 141, entry 6, ¶1 — Public observance gives time and communal life their variety.

II, p. 640, entry 4, ¶1 — Inward worship enters an unfinished comparison between painting and sculpture.

II, p. 845, entry 4, ¶1 — Simplicity qualifies the judgment that worship is true.

In this edition. Version 6 renders le maigre and le gras as abstinence from meat and eating meat. In the public/private pairing, vie intérieure becomes “private life”; in the painting note, intérieur becomes “inward.” The translation does not force one English adjective upon both contexts.

Related terms.

Blessing. *bénir* — Bénir links a Capuchin’s blessing with the speaker’s consolation of a thief in a stark two-sentence juxtaposition. Another prayer wishes the holy name blessed for mortals’ happiness. Version 6 leaves the first day incomplete and does not infer a specific ritual or a causal relation between blessing and consolation.

Places. I, p. 61, entry 1, ¶1; I, p. 127, entry 2, ¶2.

See also. Religion; Piety; Prayer; Society.

[458] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 61, 127, 141; II, pp. 640, 845.

Writing

écrire — write; writing[459]

The word. Écrire is an activity of composition as well as inscription. Joubert often examines the conditions under which it discovers or shapes its own thought.

In Joubert. Writing can become inseparable from knowing: the late circular formulation requires prior knowledge yet says some things are known well only when one thinks of writing them. Reflection also changes a writer's relation to naturalness. In one particular sense natural writing is unreflective writing, but someone who has reflected on style cannot return to the position of someone who never attended to it. The paired natural facility and acquired difficulty gives another formulation: art, reflection and taste bring resistance into an otherwise easy activity. These local claims should be held together without turning them into a fixed recipe.

The places. Selected passages in the notebooks.

II, p. 898, entry 4, ¶1 — Knowing and preparing to write depend reciprocally on each other.

II, p. 541, entry 5, ¶1 — Reflection changes the conditions of apparently natural writing.

II, p. 755, entry 2, ¶1 — Natural facility is paired with acquired artistic difficulty.

I, p. 251, entry 2, ¶3 — Seeking words may be a search for an incomplete thought.

In this edition. Version 6 preserves "In this sense" and the circular restrictions instead of reconciling them into a universal prescription. The damaged forms rendered [difficulty] remain qualified. Écriture as an inscribed sign system is treated separately under Sign.

See also. Style; Thought; Reflection; Knowledge; Sign.

[459] Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 251; II, pp. 541, 755, 898.

Unsettled vocabulary

These selected cases retain the limitations recorded in Version 6. Their explanations identify what can be read securely without turning an unresolved form into a settled definition.

Coche

The two brief travel records do not establish whether coche means a road coach or a passenger boat. Version 6 uses coach provisionally in both places. The second occurrence should therefore be read alongside the first, rather than treated as independent confirmation of a journey by road. The Lexicon does not resolve the transport reference.

Places. I, p. 61, entry 8, ¶1; I, p. 80, entry begun p. 79, no. 1, ¶14.

Palais

The fragment moves from sneezes of the mind to le palais des éternûmens. Palace preserves one possible image, but palate is also open in the manuscript's existing translation note. Neither the brevity of the fragment nor the preceding bodily metaphor decides the issue. A lexical account of Joubert's imagery should retain this uncertainty instead of building an argument on an assured palace metaphor.

Places. I, p. 257, entry 8, ¶1.

Anormal

The discussion of embryonic parts prints l’anormal where the surrounding account might lead a reader to expect l’animal. The translation retains the abnormal because that is the reviewed printed reading. This occurrence cannot securely establish a special biological category of abnormality, and the expected animal cannot be substituted without an explicit editorial decision.

Places. I, p. 272, entry 9, ¶1.

Nations

An account distinguishing metaphysics from morality, politics, and legislation prints nations as the object of metaphysics. The translation note identifies notions as an expected but unverified alternative. The present edition keeps nations. Consequently, this anomalous occurrence supplies neither a secure definition of metaphysics nor straightforward evidence for a political theory of the nation.

Places. I, p. 273, entry 4, ¶1.

Succrément

The paired fragments read breath or animation, then the nail or succrément. The reviewed witness preserves this unusual printed form, and Version 6 retains it untranslated. Its sense remains undetermined. Secretion, excrement, and growth are possible associations a reader might supply, but none is an established replacement in this passage.

Places. I, p. 361, entry 9, ¶2.

Surfaix

Surfaix occurs amid images of intellectual birth, false offspring, and the anger of a mind deprived of its opinions. The existing note records the ordinary surcingle sense but explains that it does not settle the metaphor here. Version 6 therefore retains surfaix. An interpretation such as afterbirth must not be promoted into a definition merely because it fits the surrounding imagery.

Places. II, p. 533, entry 2, ¶1.

Angre

The passage compares talent with a tempered tool made from inferior iron. Angre is followed by the alternatives soft and brittle, but the sequence does not explain the first term. Version 6 retains angre and the source's sic. The article on substance or education can discuss the secure distinction between the material and its temper while leaving this particular quality of iron unidentified.

Places. II, p. 566–567, entry 11, ¶1.

Barrage

Manufactured scholars are compared with eaux de barrage made at Tivoli. Joubert himself calls the comparison unsatisfactory. The translation retains barrage because its intended reference is unresolved; neither a damming gloss nor a substitution of Barèges has been established. The secure contrast is between artificial qualities and a natural aptitude sustained by pleasure. That contrast does not identify the waters.

Places. II, p. 793–794, entry 8, ¶1.

Borgnon

Three unexpanded names or initials are associated with borgnon, twilight, and black night. The sequence clearly develops an image of inadequate intellectual illumination, but it does not determine the first noun. The existing translation note's related phrase about going blindly does not certify eye or lantern as a substitute. Version 6 keeps borgnon untranslated.

Places. II, p. 889, entry 1, ¶1.

Orge moulé

A writer's collection becomes a storehouse of grains, seeds, and fruit pips. Ground barley is Version 6's contextual interpretation of orge moulé. The existing note does not certify that grain sense or authorize changing the French to moulu. The broader seed image is secure; the precise treatment of this grain is not.

Places. II, p. 892, entry 9, ¶1.

Élaterium

The paragraph explains moral tendency through an imagined elastic spring connected with a bodily center. This comparison is fully available for interpretation, while the historical sense of élaterium remains unsettled in the translation's note. A medicinal definition would introduce a meaning not established here. The secure spring image and the unresolved history of the term must remain distinct.

Places. II, p. 904, entry begun p. 903, no. 11, ¶8.

Nomes and cursive

Joubert argues that laws should possess an appearance of antiquity and rejects an ordinary, cursive style for nomes. Version 6 preserves both unusual choices. Its note allows a possible relation between law and ordered song but does not establish a unique intended sense; nomes is not silently corrected to normes. Likewise, an attested handwriting sense of cursive does not by itself settle the figurative judgment of style.

Places. II, p. 916, entry 5, ¶1.

Cohobition

Cohobition remains the printed form in the list of possible natural means of discharge and absorption. Version 6’s existing note considers cohibition (restraint) and cohobation (repeated distillation) as neighboring terms; neither is established as Joubert’s intended

word. The conditional account of unknown natural processes does not settle the choice. No conjectural substitution or confident technical definition is made here.

Places. I, p. 184, entry 1, ¶1.

Exformation

Exformation is retained as an unusual printed term in Version 6. The paragraph associates it with separation from divinity and with experiencing human errors and passions; it then describes stains and imprints that can no longer be erased, without defining the process more precisely. It is not silently equated with emanation, incarnation, or any other named doctrine.

Places. I, p. 217, entry 4, ¶1.

Immatériabilité

The French retains irregular immatériabilité. Version 6 interprets it as immateriality in the comparison of thought and vision through inward mirrors. The word's normalization is an interpretation, not a recovery of a differently spelled manuscript term. The preceding Perhaps also qualifies the claim that thought requires no purer immateriality than vision.

Places. I, p. 147, entry 6, ¶1.

Ontogeny and the uncertain source form

[Ontogénie] is Beaunier's explicitly supplied correction, not a securely transcribed authorial word. Version 6 renders it [ontogeny] and retains the separate source apparatus, where orltologie is a provisional reading of an opaque form in a damaged reproduction. Neither the editor's assertion about Joubert's manuscript nor that form is freshly certified here. The surrounding anatomical catalogue also has damaged myo[…]gie, contextually rendered [myology]. Familiar technical vocabulary must not conceal those different kinds of intervention.

Places. II, p. 737, entry 1, ¶1.

French index

abeille — Bee, honey, and wax

absence — Absence

absent — Absence

absolu — Absolute and relative

abstinence — Chastity

abstraction — Abstraction

abstrait — Abstraction

accent — Accent and tone

action — Action

adjectif — Grammar

admiration — Charm and pleasure

admirer — Charm and pleasure

adustion — Humors

æthéréité — Ether

affaire — Leisure

affectation — Affectation

affecter — Affectation

affection — Affection

affinité — Attraction and affinity

agrément — Charm and pleasure

aile — Wings

aiman — Magnetism

air — Air

aliment — Nourishment and digestion

allégorie — Allegory

ambition — Ambition

âme — Soul

amitié — Friendship

amour — Love

amour-propre — Self-love

analogie — Analogy and comparison

analyse — Analysis

anatomie — Anatomy and neurology

ancien — Ancients and moderns

animal — Animal

animalcule — Insect and animalcule

antithèse — Antithesis

appétit — Appetite

application — Rules

appréhension — Apprehension

apprendre — Study and learning

apréhension — Apprehension

arbre — Tree

architecture — Architecture

art — Art

artifice — Artifice

artificiel — Artifice

assentiment — Assent

assertion — Assertion

astre — Sky and stars

athéisme — Atheism

atome — Atoms

atonie — Humors

attache — Attachment and detachment

attacher — Attachment and detachment

attention — Attention

attraction — Attraction and affinity

austérité — Ascetic austerity

auteur — Author

autorité — Authority

avenir — Past, present, and future

axiome — Axiom

beau — Beauty

beauté — Beauty

bel esprit — Wit

bénir — Worship

besoin — Need

bible — Scripture

bien — Good and evil

bienveillance — Benevolence

bile — Humors

bon sens — Good sense and common sense

bonheur — Happiness

bonté — Goodness

borne — Limit and boundary

bouche — Body

brièveté — Brevity

bruit — Sound and voice

but — Action

caput mortuum — Caput mortuum

caractère — Character

cause — Cause and effect

centre — Center

cercle — Sphere and circle

certitude — Certainty and doubt

cerveau — Organs and brain

chagrin — Sorrow

chair — Organs and brain

chaleur — Fire and heat

changement — Change

chant — Sound and voice

chanter — Sound and voice

charité — Charity

charme — Charm and pleasure

chasteté — Chastity

châtiment — Punishment

chîle — Chyle

chimie — Chemistry

choisir — Choice

choix — Choice

christianisme — Christianity

chyle — Chyle

chymie — Chemistry

ciel — Heaven and hell

ciel — Sky and stars

cime — Sublime

circonspection — Prudence

circulation — Circulation

circuler — Circulation

cire — Bee, honey, and wax

clarté — Clarity and obscurity

classique — The classical

coction — Nourishment and digestion

cœur — Heart

cohésion — Cohesion

colère — Anger

comédie — Comedy

comique — Comedy

commerce — Commerce

comparaison — Analogy and comparison

compassion — Pity and compassion

complaisance — Politeness

composition — Composition

comprendre — Conception and understanding

concevoir — Conception and understanding

concision — Brevity

concret — Abstraction

concrétion — Reality

confession — Repentance

confiance — Trust

conjecture — Conjecture

conjecturer — Conjecture

connaissance — Knowledge

connaître — Knowledge

conscience — Conscience

consolation — Consolation

consoler — Consolation

contact — Contact

contemplation — Meditation and contemplation

content — Happiness

contentement — Happiness

continence — Chastity

continu — Continuity

continuité — Continuity

convaincre — Conviction

conversation — Conversation

conversion — Repentance

conviction — Conviction

corps — Body

correct — Correctness and correction

correction — Correctness and correction

corriger — Correctness and correction

couleur — Color

courage — Courage

crainte — Fear

crédibilité — Credulity

crédulité — Credulity

cristal — Glass and crystal

critique — Criticism

croissance — Growth

croître — Growth

croyance — Religious belief

culte — Worship

curiosité — Curiosity

décalorer — Dephlogisticate

déférence — Respect

défiance — Trust

définir — Definition

définition — Definition

déflogistiquer — Dephlogisticate

degré — Quantity and quality

délicatesse — Delicacy

dense — Density and solidity

déphlogistique — Dephlogisticate

désespérant — Despair

désespoir — Despair

désintéressé — Charity

désintéressement — Charity

désir — Desire

dessin — Drawing

détachement — Attachment and detachment

devoir — Duty

dévotion — Devotion

dévouement — Devotion

dialecticien — Dialectic

dialectique — Dialectic

diamant — Diamond

diastole — Circulation

didactique — Poetry

didactiquement — Poetry

Dieu — God

digestion — Nourishment and digestion

dignité — Dignity

discernement — Discernment

discours — Speech

dissimulation — Sincerity and frankness

distinction — Distinction

distinguer — Distinction

divisible — Division and indivisibility

division — Division and indivisibility

docilité — Faith

doctrine — System

dogme — Dogma

double — Double

douceur — Gentleness and sweetness

douleur — Suffering

doute — Certainty and doubt

droiture — Equity

ductile — Ductility

ductilité — Ductility

dur — Hardness and softness

durée — Duration and instant

dyade — Dyad and mixture

eau — Water

écho — Echo

économie animale — Pneumato-meter

écrire — Writing

écrivain — Author

éducation — Education

effet — Cause and effect

effluvion — Effluvia

effort — Practice and effort

égalité — Equality

église — Church

élasticité — Elasticity

élastique — Elasticity

électrique — Fire and heat

élégance — Elegance

élément — Element

éloquence — Eloquence

émanation — Effluvia

emphase — Emphasis

empreinte — Mold and imprint

énergie — Energy

enfance — Childhood and youth

enfance — Education

enfer — Heaven and hell

ennui — Ennui

enrichir — Poverty and wealth

ensemble — Whole and part

entendement — Conception and understanding

entêté — Will

enthousiasme — Enthusiasm

envie — Envy

envier — Envy

épigramme — Aphorism and maxim

épique — Epic

épithète — Grammar

épopée — Epic

équilibre — Equilibrium

équité — Equity

erreur — Error

érudition — Erudition

esclavage — Servitude

esclave — Servitude

espace — Space and place

espèce — Kinds and species

espèce intentionnelle — Hypothesis

espérance — Hope

esprit — Mind

esprit — Wit

esprits animaux — Vital and animal spirits

esprits vitaux — Vital and animal spirits

essence — Essence

estime — Esteem

estimer — Esteem

estomac — Stomach

estomach — Stomach

et — Grammar

étendue — Extension

étenduë — Extension

éternité — Eternity

éther — Ether

être — Being

étude — Study and learning

évangile — Scripture

évidence — Evidence

évident — Evidence

exactitude — Precision

examen — Conscience

excrétion — Nourishment and digestion

exercice — Practice and effort

exhalaison — Effluvia

existence — Existence

exister — Existence

expansibilité — Effluvia

expérience — Experience

expiation — Repentance

expression — Expression

exprimer — Expression

fable — Fable

facilement — Facility

facilité — Facility

faculté — Faculty

faiblesse — Weakness

familiarité — Familiarity

famille — Family

fanatique — Fanaticism

fanatisme — Fanaticism

fatigue — Weariness

faute — Morality

faux — Error

femme — Women

ferment — Fermentation

fermentation — Fermentation

feu — Fire and heat

fibre — Nerves and fibers

fiction — Fiction

fidélité — Fidelity

figure — Figure and metaphor

fil — Thread and spinning

filer — Thread and spinning

finesse — Finesse

fini — Finite

flamme — Fire and heat

fleur — Flower and fruit

fluide — Fluid

fluidité — Fluid

foi — Faith

folie — Folly

force — Force

forme — Form

forme plastique — Plastic forms

fortune — Fortune and chance

fou — Folly

franchise — Sincerity and frankness

froid — Fire and heat

fruit — Flower and fruit

génération — Generation

générosité — Charity

génie — Genius

genre — Kinds and species

géométrie — Mathematics

germe — Seed and germ

globe — Sphere and circle

gloire — Glory

goût — Taste

goûter — Taste

goutte — Measure

gouvernement — Government

grâce — Aesthetic grace

grâce — Divine grace

grain — Measure

grammaire — Grammar

grammatical — Grammar

grandeur — Sublime

graphomètre — Measure

gravitation — Weight and gravity

grossier — Material subtlety and coarseness

guerre — War

habileté — Craft and skill

habitude — Habit

haine — Hatred

haïr — Hatred

harmonie — Harmony

hasard — Fortune and chance

histoire — History

homme — Human nature

honnête — Honesty

honnêteté — Honesty

honneur — Honor

honte — Shame

hospitalier — Hospitality

hospitalité — Hospitality

humanité — Humanity

humeur — Humors

humeur — Temper and mood

humide — Dryness and moisture

humidité — Dryness and moisture

humilité — Humility

hygromètre — Measure

hypothèse — Hypothesis

idée — Idea

ignorance — Ignorance

illusion — Illusion

image — Image

imager — Imagination

imagination — Imagination

imaginative — Imagination

imaginer — Imagination

imitation — Imitation

imiter — Imitation

immortalité — Immortality

impénétrabilité — Impenetrability

impression — Memory

improvisateur — Poetry

incréation — God

incrédulité — Unbelief

indéfini — Indeterminate and indefinite

indétermination — Indeterminate and indefinite

indéterminé — Indeterminate and indefinite

indifférence — Indifference

indivisible — Division and indivisibility

induction — Reasoning

indulgence — Indulgence

infini — Infinite

infinité — Infinite

infus — Innateness

ingénieux — Ingenuity

inné — Innateness

innocence — Innocence

insecte — Insect and animalcule

inspiration — Inspiration

inspiré — Inspiration

instant — Duration and instant

instinct — Instinct

instrument — Power and operation

intellection — Conception and understanding

intelligence — Intelligence

intelligible — Intelligible and sensible

intempérance — Moderation

intimité — Conversation

intolérance — Intolerance

intromission — Intromission

intuition — Intuition

inventer — Invention

invention — Invention

invidence — Evidence

ironie — Rhetoric

ivre — Intoxication

ivresse — Intoxication

jaloux — Envy

jargon — Language

je ne sais quoi — Charm and pleasure

je ne scais quoi — Charm and pleasure

jeu — Rules

jeunesse — Childhood and youth

joie — Joy

jugement — Judgment

juger — Judgment

justesse — Precision

justice — Justice

langage — Language

langue — Body

langue — Language

lassitude — Weariness

lecture — Reading

lettre — Sign

lèvre — Body

liberté — Freedom

lieu — Space and place

ligne — Point and line

limite — Limit and boundary

lire — Reading

littérature — Literature

livre — Book

logique — Logic

loi — Law

loisir — Leisure

lumière — Light

lune — Moon

luxe — Luxury

lyrique — Lyric

machine — Mechanism

magnétisme — Magnetism

main — Body

mais — Grammar

mal — Good and evil

maladie — Health and illness

malheur — Suffering

manière — Literary manner

marbre — Stone and marble

mariage — Marriage

matérialisme — Materialism and spiritualism

matérialiste — Materialism and spiritualism

mathématiques — Mathematics

matière — Matter

maxime — Aphorism and maxim

mécanisme — Mechanism

méchanceté — Malice

méchanisme — Mechanism

méchant — Malice

méditation — Meditation and contemplation

mélancolie — Melancholy

mélancolique — Melancholy

mélange — Dyad and mixture

mémoire — Memory

mensonge — Falsehood

menteur — Falsehood

mentir — Falsehood

mépris — Contempt

mépriser — Contempt

mérite — Goodness

mérite — Merit

merveilleux — The marvelous

mesure — Measure

mesurer — Measure

métaphore — Figure and metaphor

métaphysique — Metaphysics

méthode — Method

métier — Craft and skill

miel — Bee, honey, and wax

miracle — Miracle

miroir — Mirror

miséricorde — God

modèle — Model

modération — Moderation

moderne — Ancients and moderns

modeste — Modest conduct

modestie — Modest conduct

mœurs — Manners

moi — Self

mollesse — Hardness and softness

monade — Monad

monde — World and universe

morale — Morality

mordant — Chemistry

mort — Death

mot — Word

mou — Hardness and softness

moule — Mold and imprint

mourir — Death

mouvement — Movement

moyen — Action

musique — Music

mystère — Mystery

mysticisme — Mysticism

mysticité — Mysticism

mystique — Mysticism

naïf — Naïveté

naissance — Origin and root

naïveté — Naïveté

nation — Nation

nature — Nature

nature humaine — Human nature

naturel — Naturalness

néant — Nothingness

nécessaire — Necessity

nécessité — Necessity

néologisme — Language

nerf — Nerves and fibers

névrologie — Anatomy and neurology

noble — Nobility

noblesse — Nobility

nom — Name

nombre — Number

nombre — Rhythm and number

notion — Notion

nourriture — Nourishment and digestion

nuage — Vapor and cloud

nuit — Sun and night

nutrition — Nourishment and digestion

obéir — Obedience

obéissance — Obedience

objet — Object and subject

obligation — Duty

obscène — Modesty

obscurité — Clarity and obscurity

observer — Experience

obstination — Will

ode — Lyric

œil — Eyes and ears

oiseau — Bird

ombre — Shadow

onction — Style

ondulation — Vibration and undulation

opération — Power and operation

opiniâtre — Will

opinion — Opinion

oppression — Oppression

opprimer — Oppression

ordre — Order

oreille — Eyes and ears

organe — Organs and brain

organisation — Organization

organisé — Organization

orgueil — Pride

originalité — Originality

ornement — Ornament

oscillation — Vibration and undulation

oubli — Forgetting

oublier — Forgetting

ouïe — Eyes and ears

ouvrage — Book

paix — Peace

paradoxe — Thought

paradoxisme — Language

pardonner — Forgiveness

pardonneur — Forgiveness

paresse — Laziness

paresseux — Laziness

parole — Speech

partie — Whole and part

passé — Past, present, and future

passion — Passion

pathétique — Pathos

pathos — Pathos

patience — Patience

patriotisme — Nation

pauvreté — Poverty and wealth

peau — Body

peine — Punishment

peinture — Painting

pénétrabilité — Impenetrability

pénitence — Repentance

pensée — Thought

perception — Perception

perfectibilité — Perfection

perfection — Perfection

perfection — Virtue

péripatéticien — Philosophy

perspective — Perspective

persuader — Persuasion

persuasion — Persuasion

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peuple — Nation

peur — Fear

phantaisie — Fancy

philantosophe — Philosophy

philantosophie — Philosophy

philosophe — Philosophy

philosopher — Philosophy

philosophie — Philosophy

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physionomie — Physiognomy

physique — Physics

pierre — Stone and marble

piété — Piety

pitié — Pity and compassion

plaisir — Pleasure

pneumato-mètre — Pneumato-meter

poésie — Poetry

poète — Poetry

poétique — Poetry

poids — Weight and gravity

point — Point and line

politesse — Politeness

polymathiste — Study and learning

porosité — Matter

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pratique — Practice and effort

précision — Precision

préjugé — Prejudice

prescience — Providence

préscience — Providence

présent — Past, present, and future

prestige — Illusion

prêtre — Priesthood

preuve — Proof

prévision — Providence

prier — Prayer

prière — Prayer

principe — Principle

privation — Sacrifice

probabilité — Plausibility and probability

probité — Probity

profondeur — Surface and depth

progrès — Action

proportion — Proportion

proposition — Proposition

prose — Prose

prouver — Proof

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pudeur — Modesty

puissance — Power and operation

punir — Punishment

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pusillanimité — Courage

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quantité — Quantity and quality

question — Speech

quiétisme — Quietism

racine — Origin and root

raison — Reason

raisonnement — Reasoning

raisonner — Reasoning

rayon — Rays and radiance

rayonnement — Rays and radiance

réalité — Reality

reconnoissance — Gratitude

recueillement — Inward recollection

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réfléchir — Reflection

réflexion — Reflection

réfutation — Error

règle — Rules

relatif — Absolute and relative

religion — Religion

réminiscence — Remembrance

remords — Remorse

renoncement — Sacrifice

repentir — Repentance

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représentation — Representation

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sang — Blood

santé — Health and illness

saut — Sublime

savoir — Knowledge

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scrupuleux — Scruple

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sec — Dryness and moisture

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semence — Seed and germ

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sens commun — Good sense and common sense

sensation — Sensation

sensibilité — Sensibility

sensible — Intelligible and sensible

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siccité — Dryness and moisture

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sophiste — Sophistry

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végéter — Vegetation

vengeance — Hatred

vent — Wind

véracité — Sincerity and frankness

vérité — Truth

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verset — Verse

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vieillir — Aging and old age

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Qualified readings

[ontogénie] / orltologie — Ontogeny and the uncertain source form (unsettled vocabulary)

angre — Angre (unsettled vocabulary)

anormal — Anormal (unsettled vocabulary)

barrage — Barrage (unsettled vocabulary)

borgnon — Borgnon (unsettled vocabulary)

coche — Coche (unsettled vocabulary)

cohobition — Cohobition (unsettled vocabulary)

élaterium — Élaterium (unsettled vocabulary)

exformation — Exformation (unsettled vocabulary)

immatériabilité — Immatériabilité (unsettled vocabulary)

nations — Nations (unsettled vocabulary)

nomes; cursif — Nomes and cursive (unsettled vocabulary)

orge moulé — Orge moulé (unsettled vocabulary)

palais — Palais (unsettled vocabulary)

succrément — Succrément (unsettled vocabulary)

surfaix — Surfaix (unsettled vocabulary)

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Vocabulary audit

The whole-corpus screen indexed 349,582 letter-token occurrences and 19,905 distinct case-folded forms in the running French. Historical spellings were retained. These are surface-form counts, not a count of dictionary lemmas or an exhaustive semantic concordance.

The editorial register contains 626 candidate decisions. It admits 459 main articles and records 110 subsidiary treatments, with 17 candidates held and 40 excluded or transferred. Every admitted main article is present in this edition. The register states the rationale and supporting paragraph identifiers for each decision.

The first subject lists were checked against the unassigned vocabulary. A second coverage review then examined omissions and distinctions compressed inside broader articles, bringing further concepts and useful terms into review. Related forms were consolidated where a shared discussion was more informative; distinct senses were separated where combining them would obscure the text. Frequency helped discover candidates but did not determine their importance.

The three specialist contributions were reviewed across domains and then reconciled in a senior editorial pass. Selected evidence was read in its French and English context with the attached qualifications. The final checks verified passage identifiers, quoted words, article references, index destinations, and agreement between the output formats.

The passage lists are selective. They identify witnesses that support an article’s explanation; they do not claim to enumerate every occurrence of the word. The accompanying audit register and surface-form inventory make the scope of the screening explicit.