Cognition

Innateness

inné; infus

Innateness concerns what is already present in a mind or soul before particular experience or explicit formulation.

From the book

The Notebooks of Joseph Joubert, Volumes I–II

Joseph Joubert · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordInnateness concerns what is already present in a mind or soul before particular experience or explicit formulation.
  • In JoubertThe early reported speakers approve Locke’s denial of innate ideas but reject his denial of innate perceptions.
  • In this editionThe English translation preserves innate and infused rather than conflating them.
  • A place to beginReported speakers distinguish innate ideas from innate perceptions.
English renderings
innate; infused

Meaning

Innateness concerns what is already present in a mind or soul before particular experience or explicit formulation. Joubert repeatedly distinguishes ideas, germs, feelings, judgments and propositions instead of assigning one status to them all.

Use in the book

The early reported speakers approve Locke’s denial of innate ideas but reject his denial of innate perceptions. Joubert’s own later formulations take different positions: a denial of innate judgments does not establish a denial of innate ideas. He also proposes calling some confused notions infused rather than innate, then distributes moral and aesthetic notions beside ideas of God, matter and spirit under the two headings. These are local formulations, not a stable glossary imposed throughout the book.

The germ image supplies a way to describe an idea elicited by hearing a proposition without having previously met its object through the senses. Such germs can nonetheless be altered or driven out: the parenthetic eternity does not make them indestructible in us. The Leibnitz mirror argument likewise speaks of ideas, or rather their germs. Yet Joubert resists extending innateness to formulated propositions or actions, and elsewhere asks how much the dispute matters if the relevant ideas arise inevitably and almost immediately.

Places to read

  1. I, p. 64, entry begun p. 63, no. 4, ¶6Reported speakers distinguish innate ideas from innate perceptions.
  2. I, p. 256, entry 5, ¶1Some notions are proposed as infused rather than innate.
  3. I, p. 257, entry 7, ¶1Two lists distinguish innate notions and infused ideas.
  4. I, p. 266, entry 4, ¶1The denial of innate judgments does not settle the case of ideas.
  5. I, p. 266–267, entry 7, ¶2An idea may hatch from a germ when a proposition is heard.
  6. I, p. 267, entry begun p. 266, no. 7, ¶3Innate germs remain vulnerable to displacement.
  7. I, p. 288, entry 3, ¶1An innate understanding is compared with a receiving mirror.
  8. I, p. 305, entry 2, ¶1Inevitable early acquisition challenges the practical weight of the dispute.
  9. I, p. 319, entry 3, ¶1Innate ideas and feelings are distinguished from actions and propositions.

Translation in this edition

The English translation preserves innate and infused rather than conflating them. It keeps “one may” beside “one must,” “or rather,” and the conditional arguments. The reported Leibnitz wording and early unnamed speakers remain distinct from Joubert’s objections; no developmental sequence or modern psychological conclusion is inferred.

Source note

Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 64, 256, 257, 266, 267, 288, 305, 319.