Greek reading vocabulary — Hipparchus

Use in the book

These glosses follow the text in order. They explain the construction and local force of selected phrases; a gloss is not a new critical reading of the source.

Places to read

1. 231aTo acquire or obtain. The verb is deliberately broad enough to take both possessions and disease as objects. Acquiring something describes a change in what one has or experiences, while gaining already suggests an advantageous change under the argument's eventual interpretation.

Acquire

κτάομαι (ktaomai)

To acquire or obtain. The verb is deliberately broad enough to take both possessions and disease as objects. Acquiring something describes a change in what one has or experiences, while gaining already suggests an advantageous change under the argument's eventual interpretation.

Attestation. 231a: κτήσηται.

Admire

θαυμάζω (thaumazō)

To wonder at or admire. The town citizens admire Hipparchus for wisdom; the inscriptions aim to redirect admiration from Delphi to him. The repeated verb tracks a change in public regard rather than proving which object actually deserves it.

Attestation. 228d: ἐθαύμαζον.

After all

ποτέ (pote)

An enclitic which, in a question such as this, gives the inquiry an insistent or puzzled force: what is the thing, after all? It does not ask for a date. The opening presses for an account of the expression that has apparently already been in use.

Attestation. 225a: τί ποτέ ἐστιν.

Again

πάλιν (palin)

Back again or once more. Socrates restarts the question as though asking from the beginning. Later recurrence can signal the argument returning to the same conclusion, rather than the simple repetition of a word.

Attestation. 225c: πάλιν.

All

πᾶς (pas)

Every or all, with scope determined by the noun and construction. Here it quantifies gains, not people: good men are said to want all gains if these are good. The distinction between all men and all gains is essential to tracing the generalisation.

Attestation. 227d: πάντα τὰ κέρδη.

Always

ἀεί (aei)

At all times or always. The adverb intensifies the retrospective claim that everyone wishes for good things. The earlier agreement concerned loving good things and did not expressly add this unrestricted temporal claim.

Attestation. 227d: πάντας καὶ ἀεί.

Answer

ἀποκρίνομαι (apokrinomai)

To answer a question; the imperative asks for a responsive, considered reply. Answering here is subject to attention and sincerity, not merely the provision of any grammatical response. At 231a Socrates supplies a model for how an answer should identify a common character.

Attestation. 225c: ἀπόκριναι.

Archer

τοξότης (toxotēs)

A bowman. He extends the sequence from farming, horsemanship and military command to a specific practiced skill. His bow is judged by its fitness for that activity, which gives the phrase 'worth nothing' a practical standard.

Attestation. 226c: τοξότης.

Argument

λόγος (logos)

A statement, account or argument, according to context. Here it is the reasoning through which the speakers say they have refuted themselves. It names the articulated sequence of claims, not an infallible authority independent of their admissions.

Attestation. 226e: τῷ λόγῳ.

Arms

ὅπλον (hoplon)

Weapons or arms, here the army's equipment. The general's expertise is assumed to disclose the inadequacy of worthless arms. The word should not be narrowed to a particular weapon or treated as a claim that every item has zero resale value.

Attestation. 226c: ὅπλα.

Army

στρατιά (stratia)

An army or body of troops. Burnet prints this reading rather than B's στρατεία, which can mean a campaign or military service. The example locates the deficiency in the arms the general's army possesses.

Attestation. 226c: ἡ στρατιὰ.

As far as being food

κατὰ τὸ σιτίον εἶναι (kata to sition einai)

In respect of being food. This qualifying phrase isolates membership of a kind from goodness or badness within that kind. Its restriction must be retained: equal status as food does not establish equality in nutrition, quantity or consequences.

Attestation. 230b: κατὰ τὸ σιτίον εἶναι.

Ask

ἐρωτάω (erōtaō)

To ask or question. The companion's question about how Socrates is asking makes explicit that he has not yet understood the intended comparison. A request for clarification is different from an admission of the proposed proposition.

Attestation. 230a: ἐρωτᾷς.

At a loss

ἀπορέω (aporeō)

To be perplexed or unable to find a way forward, here to find what to say. This is the source of the English idiom 'at a loss'; it is not ζημία, financial or practical loss, despite the coincidence in English.

Attestation. 231c: Ἀπορῶ.

At least

γοῦν (goun)

At any rate or at least, drawing out a limited conclusion that remains available. Socrates accepts uncertainty about the companion's conviction but insists that he does concur. The particle helps preserve the gap between assent and persuasion.

Attestation. 232b: σύμφῃς γοῦν.

Attempt

ἐπιχειρέω (epicheireō)

To try, attempt or undertake. In the prohibition against trying to deceive, Socrates attributes a possible intention to the companion. The accusation is part of the drama and is not an independently established diagnosis of the companion's motives.

Attestation. 225d: ἐπιχείρει.

Attention

προσέχω τὸν νοῦν (prosechō ton noun)

To direct one's mind or attention to something or someone. Socrates opposes attentive answering to a resentful, unconsidered response. Νοῦς here is ordinary mind or attention, not a separately introduced technical faculty with a developed theory.

Attestation. 225c: προσέχων ἐμοὶ τὸν νοῦν.

Bad

κακός (kakos)

Bad, harmful or defective, depending on what is evaluated. Here loss has been associated with being harmed. The reasoning then treats gain as good because it is the opposite of bad loss; the broad adjective does not itself license that inference.

Attestation. 227a: Κακὸν ἄρα ἡ ζημία.

Base

πονηρός (ponēros)

Base, wicked or of bad character in the opening description of people. Later it qualifies gain and drink. The edition keeps 'base' distinct from 'bad' so that a moral judgement is not silently merged with an assessment of practical benefit.

Attestation. 225b: πονηροὺς.

Basket bearing

κανηφορία (kanēphoria)

Carrying a ritual basket in a procession, treated as an honour in the background supplied by the edition. Socrates rejects the sister's dishonour in connection with this role as the explanation of Hipparchus' death. The source does not name the sister.

Attestation. 229c: τῆς κανηφορίας.

Be

εἰμί (eimi)

To be. The opening asks what the love of gain is, moving toward an account of its character. Later uses distinguish what an item is from how good it is, particularly when both good and bad food are said to be food.

Attestation. 225a: τί ποτέ ἐστιν.

Be able

δύναμαι (dynamai)

To be able or have the capacity to do something. The companion cannot be persuaded that he is not being deceived. His stated inability concerns conviction at this point, not an assertion that he is incapable of all reasoning.

Attestation. 229e: οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι.

Be about to

μέλλω (mellō)

To be going or about to do or undergo something. The companion excludes gains from which people will be harmed. The future consequence matters: something conventionally called a gain may lead to a subsequent loss.

Attestation. 227e: μέλλουσιν.

Be beneficial

ὠφέλιμος (ōphelimos)

Beneficial or useful to someone. The neuter expression names what is beneficial and connects worth possessing with goodness. The dialogue does not separately specify a beneficiary or timescale at this point, which leaves the breadth of the equivalence open to scrutiny.

Attestation. 231e: τὸ ὠφέλιμον.

Be benefited

ὠφελέομαι (ōpheleomai)

To receive benefit. Socrates claims that gaining has just been agreed to be this, although the earlier exchange explicitly established that gain is good. The shift from a value predicate to this verbal identity deserves independent notice.

Attestation. 227d: ὠφελεῖσθαι.

Be ignorant

ἀγνοέω (agnoeō)

Not to know or to be ignorant of something. The construction specifies ignorance that the proposed sources of gain are worthless. This is a determinate lack of knowledge, not a general verdict about every ability the people in question possess.

Attestation. 225a: ἀγνοοῦντες.

Be willing

ἐθέλω (ethelō)

To be willing or ready. Socrates offers to take back a statement at the companion's request. Willingness to concede a move is a conversational act; it need not mean that Socrates has been persuaded that the withdrawn proposition is false.

Attestation. 229e: ἐθέλω σοι.

Beginning

ἀρχή (archē)

A beginning or starting point. 'From the beginning' describes a restart of the questioning. It should not be confused with ἄρχω, to rule, which becomes important in the Hipparchus narrative; the local meanings differ despite the family resemblance.

Attestation. 225c: ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

Begrudge

φθονέω (phthoneō)

To begrudge, envy or withhold from another out of jealousy. Hipparchus is said not to think he should begrudge wisdom to anyone. The generous motive is attributed to him by the speaker, alongside a programme that also promotes admiration of his own wisdom.

Attestation. 228c: σοφίας φθονεῖν.

Belong to

πρόσειμι (proseimi)

To be present in addition or belong to something. The more and less are said not to belong to good and bad gain considered as gains; later worth must belong to gain. The term links the degree argument and the value argument without itself proving either claim.

Attestation. 230d: πρόσεστιν.

Beloved

παιδικά (paidika)

A substantivised plural used of someone's male beloved. The phrase presents Harmodius as Aristogeiton's beloved in Socrates' story. It is not a reliable numerical age statement, and it does not by itself establish every educational or political detail subsequently narrated.

Attestation. 229c: παιδικὰ τοῦ Ἀριστογείτονος.

Better and best

βελτίων, βέλτιστος (beltiōn, beltistos)

Comparative and superlative expressions for better and best. Hipparchus wants to rule citizens who are as good as possible. The standard of improvement is represented through his educational project, without the narrative proving the goodness of his rule.

Attestation. 228c: ὡς βελτίστων.

Body

σῶμα (sōma)

The body, presented as what food nourishes. The bodily reference provides a common account of good and bad food. The analogy is practical and classificatory; no theory of body and soul is developed in this dialogue.

Attestation. 230e: τροφὴ σώματός.

Both

ἀμφότερος (amphoteros)

Both of two specified alternatives. The companion refuses the choice between gain and loss as exclusive causes of harm, saying people suffer by both loss and base gain. Later 'both' supports the attempt to define good and bad gain together.

Attestation. 227e: Ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων.

Bow

τόξον (toxon)

A bow, the archer's working implement. It is grouped with flutes and a lyre as a tool whose practical inadequacy a competent user recognises. The concrete object helps make knowledge of value relative to use intelligible.

Attestation. 226c: τόξον.

Bring

κομίζω (komizō)

To convey or bring. Socrates says Hipparchus brought Homer's epics into the land; the verb recurs for bringing Anacreon to the city. These are narrated cultural acts, not evidence that the dialogue has demonstrated the historical priority it claims.

Attestation. 228b: ἐκόμισεν.

Brother

ἀδελφός (adelphos)

A brother, here Hippias in relation to Hipparchus. The relationship is stated in the dialogue, while questions of relative seniority and political supremacy require comparison with other ancient accounts. Kinship alone does not establish who ruled first.

Attestation. 229b: τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἱππίου.

Call

καλέω (kaleō)

To call or name something. Socrates asks why the same name applies to good and bad gain. The inquiry goes beyond what sound is used: it asks what shared feature warrants the common name.

Attestation. 230d: κέρδος καλεῖς.

Carry

ἄγω (agō)

To lead or carry; here to transport cargo in a ship. The pilot risks everything being carried as well as his life and vessel. The example therefore covers several kinds of loss rather than merely failure to make a trading profit.

Attestation. 226b: ἃ ἂν ἄγῃ πάντα.

Certainly or surely

δήπου (dēpou)

An expression of presumed obviousness, rendered 'surely' in the answer about the exchange. It marks the speaker's expectation of agreement. Such a particle reinforces an assertion's conversational status without supplying an additional proof.

Attestation. 231d: Ζημίαν δήπου.

Choose

ἐκλέγομαι (eklegomai)

To select from a larger field. Hipparchus chooses what he regards as the wisest items of learned and discovered wisdom for his inscriptions. The selection is his own judgement, and the story makes that judgement part of his public self-presentation.

Attestation. 228d: ἐκλεξάμενος.

Citizen

πολίτης (politēs)

A member of a city or civic community. Calling Hipparchus a fellow citizen of both speakers identifies the unnamed companion as Athenian within the dialogue. It does not tell us the companion's name, family or public career.

Attestation. 228b: Πολίτῃ μὲν ἐμῷ τε καὶ σῷ.

City

πόλις (polis)

A city or political community. Here Anacreon is brought into Athens. The related words for citizen and town allow the narrative to distinguish membership in a political community from residence near its urban centre.

Attestation. 228c: εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

Clever

δεξιός (dexios)

Skilful, clever or dexterous, here in relation to lawsuits. Socrates parodies the verbal sophistication of such men with a rhyme. The praise can carry irony; rhetorical elegance is not identified with sound knowledge of plants.

Attestation. 225c: οἱ δεξιοὶ περὶ τὰς δίκας.

Come round

ἥκω (hēkō)

To have arrived or be present. The agreement that what is gainful is good has come back to the speakers for the third or fourth time. The repeated arrival is a feature of the argument's structure, not proof that the conclusion has gained independent support each time.

Attestation. 232a: ἥκει ἡμῖν ὁμολογούμενον.

Companion

ἑταῖρος (hetairos)

A companion or associate; the speaker label is ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. The person conversing with Socrates is unnamed. Hipparchus is the subject of the central story and should never be substituted as the living interlocutor.

Attestation. 227b: ὦ ἑταῖρε.

Compel

ἀναγκάζω (anankazō)

To constrain or compel. The companion says the argument has compelled him rather than persuaded him. The contrast separates an admission extracted through the accepted premises from an inward conviction that the result is satisfactory.

Attestation. 232b: ἠνάγκακε.

Concur

σύμφημι (symphēmi)

To say together with or concur. Socrates presses for continued assent despite the companion's reservation about persuasion. Concurrence here names a shared verbal position, not the demonstrated disappearance of the reservation.

Attestation. 232b: σύμφῃς.

Contempt

καταφρονέω (kataphroneō)

To look down on or despise. In the story the young man changes from admiration for Harmodius and Aristogeiton to contempt after associating with Hipparchus. This reversal makes perceived intellectual status the claimed cause of resentment.

Attestation. 229d: καταφρονῆσαι.

Contrary

ἐναντίος (enantios)

Opposite or contrary. Gain is set against loss, and that relation is used to infer goodness from loss's badness. A relation of opposition between terms does not, without further argument, determine every evaluative property of their instances.

Attestation. 227a: Ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ζημίᾳ τὸ κέρδος.

Country

ἀγρός (agros)

A field or rural area, here the countryside. The country audience is reached through roadside Herms after the town citizens have been educated. Rural location is not represented as an absence of citizenship.

Attestation. 228d: ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς.

Courageous

ἀνδρεῖος (andreios)

Brave or courageous; the superlative address means 'most courageous of all'. Applied to the resistant companion, it can sound teasing. It is not an argued definition of courage or evidence that the dialogue has changed its subject to a military virtue.

Attestation. 232a: ὦ ἀνδρειότατε πάντων.

Craftsman

δημιουργός (dēmiourgos)

A skilled worker or practitioner of a craft. The plural collects the preceding occupational examples and leaves the class open to others. It does not mean that all gain-seeking people are professional artisans, which is an issue for the reach of the analogy.

Attestation. 226c: τῶν δημιουργῶν.

Crave

γλίχομαι (glichomai)

To cling to or long insistently for something. The companion uses it for the lover of gain's appetite even for tiny worthless things. It contributes intensity and persistence beyond the bare verb 'love'.

Attestation. 226e: γλίχονται.

Cultivated

χαρίεις (charieis)

Graceful, refined or cultivated; the comparative marks a supposedly more discerning group. Socrates credits them with a version of Hipparchus' death different from the common account. Their description is a rhetorical credential, not an independent test of historical accuracy.

Attestation. 229b: τῶν χαριεστέρων ἀνθρώπων.

Dare

τολμάω (tolmaō)

To have the boldness to do something. Here it is readiness to pursue gain from worthless sources, whereas decent men later do not dare gain from certain sources. The verb identifies a boundary of conduct, not simply the ability to calculate profit.

Attestation. 225b: τολμῶσι.

Deceive

ἐξαπατάω (exapataō)

To deceive or mislead. The companion turns Socrates' accusation back on him and cannot explain how the arguments are being twisted. This charge motivates the Hipparchus story and the later offer of a retraction.

Attestation. 228a: ἐξαπατᾷς.

Decent

χρηστός (chrēstos)

Useful or serviceable in a broad range, and decent or respectable of people. The companion contrasts decent men with the lover of gain. The edition keeps this evaluative vocabulary distinct from ἀγαθός, 'good', because their relationship is at issue.

Attestation. 227d: οἱ χρηστοὶ.

Deme

δῆμος (dēmos)

A local Attic community or district. The Herms are described as standing midway between the town and each deme. The word here should not be translated as an undifferentiated 'people', since the geography is essential to the placement of the inscriptions.

Attestation. 228d: τῶν δήμων ἑκάστων.

Desire

ἐπιθυμέω (epithymeō)

To desire or long for. Socrates offers to withdraw the claim that everyone desires good things, but the companion refuses that revision. The verb enters a recap that also uses loving and wishing elsewhere; those verbs should not automatically be treated as a formal theory of distinct faculties.

Attestation. 229e: ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.

Die

ἀποθνῄσκω (apothnēskō)

To die. Hipparchus' death divides Socrates' idealised period of civic life from the explicitly tyrannical period under Hippias. The historical chronology and political interpretation of that division remain different questions.

Attestation. 229b: ἀποθανόντος.

Different

διαφέρω (diapherō)

To differ, here with an explicit qualification of respect. Good and bad food do not differ in being food, although they do differ in quality. Suppressing the qualification would turn a limited identity into a false claim of complete sameness.

Attestation. 230b: οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

Disbelieve or disobey

ἀπιστέω (apisteō)

To distrust, refuse belief or fail to obey. Socrates says he would not deceive a friend and disobey Hipparchus. The edition's 'disobey' gives the moral maxim practical authority rather than presenting only an opinion about its truth.

Attestation. 229b: ἀπιστεῖν.

Discover

ἐξευρίσκω (exeuriskō)

To find out or discover. Hipparchus' wisdom includes both what he learned and what he discovered himself. The distinction allows originality without implying that every displayed saying originated with him.

Attestation. 228d: ἐξηῦρεν.

Disease

νόσος (nosos)

Illness or disease. A guest may acquire it at a feast without spending anything. The example defeats the idea that acquiring any item at no expense counts as gain, because the acquisition can make the recipient worse off.

Attestation. 231b: νόσον κτήσηται.

Dishonour

ἀτιμία (atimia)

Lack of honour or an affront to someone's standing. Here the rivals feel dishonoured when the young man despises them. The narrative use does not mean the formal Athenian legal status of civic disenfranchisement.

Attestation. 229d: ταύτῃ τῇ ἀτιμίᾳ.

Display

ἀποδείκνυμι (apodeiknymi)

To show forth or display. Hipparchus displayed works of wisdom, according to Socrates. In this setting the verb refers to cultural achievements; it should not be made to imply a deductive proof of his wisdom.

Attestation. 228b: ἀπεδείξατο.

Dispute

ἀμφισβητέω (amphisbēteō)

To contest, dispute or maintain a contrary position. Socrates recalls the companion's resistance to good men's wanting all gains. The recollection returns to the dispute about harmful gain, not merely the dialogue's literal first question.

Attestation. 232a: ἠμφεσβήτησάς.

Do

ποιέω (poieō)

To do or make. Paired here with undergoing, it extends the comparison of more and less to acting and being affected. Elsewhere it is an ordinary verb of carrying out an action, including recitation practice and patronage.

Attestation. 230d: ποιοῖ.

Double

διπλάσιος (diplasios)

Twice as much or double. The implicit comparison must be read alongside the half-weight of gold, the following exchange-rate words and the edition's note. A larger amount of silver is not therefore a more valuable receipt.

Attestation. 231d: διπλάσιον.

Draughts

πεττεύω (petteuō)

To play a board game with counters, conventionally rendered 'playing draughts'. The dialogue draws on taking a move back. It does not supply enough rules to identify the game exactly with modern draughts or reconstruct a complete ancient game.

Attestation. 229e: πεττεύων.

Drink

ποτόν (poton)

Something drunk, or drink as a kind. Socrates defines it as the body's wet nourishment, whether decent or base. Its sameness as drink is separated from quality, providing a model for a proposed common definition of gain.

Attestation. 231a: ποτόν.

Dry

ξηρός (xēros)

Dry, contrasted with wet or liquid. Dry nourishment of the body is offered as the account common to good and bad food. The phrase is a working classification within the analogy, not a comprehensive modern nutritional definition.

Attestation. 230e: ξηρὰ τροφὴ.

Earnest

σπουδάζω (spoudazō)

To be serious or in earnest about something. The third definition concerns the person intent on profiting from sources that decent people reject. Earnest pursuit introduces a manner of conduct, beyond mere possession of something beneficial.

Attestation. 227d: σπουδάζῃ ἐπὶ τούτοις.

Educate

παιδεύω (paideuō)

To educate, train or form a person's character and abilities. Hipparchus' poetic patronage is explained through civic education; later Harmodius is said to have been educated by Aristogeiton. The same verb links a ruler's programme and personal rivalry.

Attestation. 228c: παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας.

Elegiac verse

ἐλεγεῖον (elegeion)

An elegiac verse form, in the edition's explanation a hexameter followed by a pentameter. The quoted maxims are pentameters, not entire surviving couplets. The name describes metre and does not require the poems to lament a death.

Attestation. 228d: εἰς ἐλεγεῖον.

Entertain

ἑστιάω (hestiaō)

To entertain at a meal; the passive means to be entertained or given a feast. The guest's lack of monetary expenditure is stipulated, so that disease can serve as a clear counterexample to cost-free acquisition as sufficient for gain.

Attestation. 231b: ἑστιαθείς.

Equally

ὁμοίως (homoiōs)

In the same or a similar way, here equally as gains. Equality concerns how the name or kind applies. The ensuing movement toward equal degrees of gaining should not be silently treated as already established by that classificatory equality.

Attestation. 230d: ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἀμφότερα.

Equipment

παρασκευή (paraskeuē)

Preparation, resources or equipment. Here any other equipment joins the craftsmen's instruments in the generalisation. The word broadens the list beyond its named examples without saying that a specific technical apparatus is shared by every craft.

Attestation. 226c: παρασκευὴν.

Every time

ἑκάστοτε (hekastote)

On each occasion or every time. It marks the repeated, habitual character of the second definition's grasping appetite. It is stronger than an isolated instance of obtaining something small or valueless.

Attestation. 226d: οἳ ἑκάστοτε.

Evident

δῆλος (dēlos)

Clear or evident; 'plainly' introduces the inferred alternative to knowing. If people do not know the worthlessness, Socrates says, they are ignorant of it. The phrase signals the supposed transparency of the inference rather than adding evidence.

Attestation. 226e: δῆλον ὅτι.

Excessively

ὑπερφυῶς (hyperphyōs)

Beyond the ordinary measure, extraordinarily or prodigiously. It intensifies the craving of the grasping person. The excess applies to the manner of desire even when its objects are extremely small.

Attestation. 226e: γλίχονται ὑπερφυῶς.

Exchange instead of

ἀντί (anti)

In place of or in exchange for, with the genitive. The phrase states the comparison of what gold should command and what it becomes for the exchanger. It helps shift the question from gross received weight to what has been surrendered.

Attestation. 231d: ἀντὶ δωδεκαστασίου.

Explain

φράζω (phrazō)

To tell or explain. Socrates responds to the companion's request for clarification by giving the food example. His promised explanation is an analogy before it is a definition of gain itself.

Attestation. 230a: Ἐγὼ φράσω.

Farmer

γεωργός (geōrgos)

A cultivator of the land. The farmer knows whether a plant can yield something worth having. Burnet's apparatus distinguishes γεωργός from a manuscript's γεωργικός; both remain within the agricultural example, rather than naming a theory of wealth.

Attestation. 225b: γεωργὸς ἀνὴρ.

Farming

γεωργικός (geōrgikos)

Concerned with or knowledgeable about farming. This adjective describes a man whose competence makes knowingly expecting gain from a worthless plant implausible. It reinforces a domain of expertise rather than merely recording rural residence.

Attestation. 226a: γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα.

Feast richly

εὐωχέομαι (euōcheomai)

To enjoy a plentiful or pleasant feast. The agreeable character of the experience sharpens the counterexample: pleasurable entertainment and zero expense do not guarantee a beneficial result if illness is acquired.

Attestation. 231b: εὐωχηθείς.

Few or little

ὀλίγος (oligos)

Small in number or amount; with worth it means worth little. The companion groups things worth little with things worth nothing, but those descriptions are not identical. Small positive value remains different from complete worthlessness.

Attestation. 226e: ὀλίγου ἄξια.

Fifty oared ship

πεντηκόντορος (pentēkontoros)

A ship named for fifty oars. Socrates says Hipparchus sent one for Anacreon. The term describes the vessel, not a statement that fifty passengers, fifty poets or fifty talents were involved.

Attestation. 228c: πεντηκόντορον.

Fine

καλός (kalos)

Fine, beautiful or admirable, depending on the object. Here it praises works of wisdom; elsewhere it describes poems, persons and the young beloved. Its range should not be compressed into the single modern sense 'morally good'.

Attestation. 228b: πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα.

Fine and good

καλὸς κἀγαθός (kalos kagathos)

A conventional combination of 'fine' and 'good' used in praise of a person's standing and character. Applied to Hipparchus, it participates in Socrates' elevated portrait. Whether that praise is ironic remains an interpretive question, not something the formula resolves.

Attestation. 228c: καλός τε κἀγαθός.

Flute

αὐλός (aulos)

A reed-pipe conventionally called a flute in the edition. Its practical value is tested by the player who uses it. The conventional English name should not imply that the ancient instrument was identical to a modern transverse concert flute.

Attestation. 226c: αὐλοὺς.

Flute player

αὐλητής (aulētēs)

A performer on the aulos. The example asks whether a skilled musician with worthless instruments expects to gain from them. Musical expertise is treated alongside agricultural, navigational and military competence.

Attestation. 226c: αὐλητὴς.

Food

σιτίον (sition)

Food or provisions, here fodder given to a horse. Later the same word supplies the defining comparison of good and bad food. Repetition connects a practical example of harmful supplies to the later inquiry into a common kind.

Attestation. 226a: σιτία τῷ ἵππῳ.

Friend

φίλος (philos)

A friend or someone dear. The maxim forbids deceiving a friend, and Socrates invokes it because the companion is his friend. The companion then questions either that friendship or Socrates' obedience, showing that naming the relationship does not settle the charge.

Attestation. 229b: μὴ φίλον ἐξαπάτα.

From everything

ἀπὸ παντός (apo pantos)

From every source. The phrase attributes unrestricted readiness to gain to the lover of gain. 'From' matters: the initial concern is the source and propriety of acquisition, which later reasoning can replace with the goodness of the outcome.

Attestation. 225b: Ἀπὸ παντὸς.

Gain

κέρδος (kerdos)

Gain, profit or advantage. The dialogue tests whether it can be bad or base, or whether genuine gain is necessarily beneficial. The noun may refer to the result or object gained as well as profit as such; that flexibility matters to the argument.

Attestation. 226e: τὸ κέρδος.

Gainful

κερδαλέος (kerdaleos)

Bringing gain, profitable or gainful. It qualifies what is of worth regardless of size. The adjective helps carry the argument from the exchange example toward the conclusion that what is gainful is good.

Attestation. 231e: κερδαλέον.

General

στρατηγός (stratēgos)

A military commander. He is expected to recognise the inadequacy of his army's worthless arms. The dialogue does not analyse his constitutional appointment or equate command itself with an entitlement to profit.

Attestation. 226c: στρατηγὸς.

Get

λαμβάνω (lambanō)

To take, receive or get. The acquisition formula compares receiving more with spending less. The verb is neutral about whether the thing received benefits the recipient; disease and disadvantageous exchanges show why quantity is insufficient.

Attestation. 231a: πλέον λάβῃ.

Gift

δῶρον (dōron)

A gift or present. Gifts join large fees as the means by which Hipparchus keeps Simonides near him. The context is poetic patronage, so the word need not be turned into a claim of bribery or a legally defined corruption offence.

Attestation. 228c: δώροις.

Go through

διέρχομαι (dierchomai)

To pass through or recount in sequence. Socrates has gone through examples of competent practitioners. In the rhapsodic passage the corresponding infinitive describes going through the poems in order, with a different concrete setting.

Attestation. 226d: διεληλύθαμεν.

Go your way

στείχω (steichō)

To walk or proceed; the imperative tells the traveller to go on his way. Joined with 'thinking just things', it turns a road inscription into an instruction for conduct beyond the moment of reading.

Attestation. 229a: στεῖχε.

Gold

χρυσίον (chrysion)

Gold, here weighed and compared with silver. The monetary example distinguishes value from bulk. The source gives a particular exchange comparison; it does not establish a timeless or uniform ancient market rate.

Attestation. 231d: χρυσίου.

Good

ἀγαθός (agathos)

Good, beneficial or excellent of its kind. The first argument concludes that gain is good after treating loss as harmful and bad. The word's breadth makes it important to ask which sense of goodness is operating at each transition.

Attestation. 227a: Ἀγαθὸν ἄρα τὸ κέρδος.

Grow or rear

ἐκτρέφω (ektrephō)

To rear or bring to maturity; the passive participle describes the plant when grown. The imagined gain lies in the later yield, so the example already depends on judging a process over time rather than simply possessing a plant now.

Attestation. 225b: ἐκτραφέντος.

Half

ἥμισυς (hēmisys)

One half, here a half-weight of gold. The chosen weight must not be confused with value: at the stipulated gold-silver ratio a smaller gold amount can be worth more than a larger silver amount.

Attestation. 231d: σταθμὸν ἥμισυν.

Happen to be

τυγχάνω (tynchanō)

To happen to be or turn out to be, often with a participle. At the conclusion the reproacher is himself such a person. The construction asserts the fact about him; it does not advance a theory that his character is caused by random chance.

Attestation. 232c: τυγχάνει γὰρ.

Harm

βλάπτω (blaptō)

To damage or harm; the passive is to be harmed. Loss harms people, and later the companion says certain gains will harm them. Whether harm is excluded from the meaning of genuine gain is precisely part of the dispute.

Attestation. 227a: Βλάπτονται.

Hate

μισέω (miseō)

To hate or dislike. The universalisation pairs loving good things with hating bad ones. The dialogue accepts this general formulation without investigating people who knowingly pursue harmful objects or disagree about what is good.

Attestation. 227c: μισεῖν.

Health

ὑγίεια (hygieia)

Health, the beneficial bodily state contrasted with disease. Acquiring health from a feast counts as gain in the exchange. The example depends on the judgement of the acquired state, not on whether the guest paid for the meal.

Attestation. 231b: Ὑγίειαν.

Hear

ἀκούω (akouō)

To hear, including learning something from others. Socrates says the companion could have heard the favourable account from the men of old. This appeal to remembered testimony is part of the narrative's claim to credibility, not direct contemporary documentation.

Attestation. 229b: ἤκουσας.

Here and now

νῦν (nyn)

Now, with ἔτι adding 'still'. The rhapsodes are said still to follow the order Hipparchus imposed. The present is that of the dramatic conversation; it does not identify the date when the dialogue was composed.

Attestation. 228b: ὥσπερ νῦν ἔτι.

Herm

Ἑρμῆς (Hermēs)

A Herm, a pillar bearing a head of Hermes. The name can refer to the god or to the inscribed monument representing him. The speaking Herm mediates the founder's instruction to travellers along the road.

Attestation. 228d: Ἑρμᾶς.

Horse

ἵππος (hippos)

A horse, whose condition is damaged by worthless food. The object of the supposed profit is also a living creature whose ruin makes the practical cost visible. No price or racing context is specified.

Attestation. 226a: τὸν ἵππον.

Horseman

ἱππικός (hippikos)

Skilled in horses or horsemanship. The adjective qualifies the man who knows what his horse is being fed. It should not be inflated into a claim that he belongs to a specified cavalry regiment or wealth class in this scene.

Attestation. 226a: ἱππικὸν ἄνδρα.

Human being

ἄνθρωπος (anthrōpos)

A human being or person. A decent and a base person are equally human, supplying an analogy for a common kind that survives moral difference. The statement concerns their humanity, not equality of virtue, behaviour or benefit.

Attestation. 230c: ἄνθρωπός.

If indeed

εἴπερ (eiper)

If indeed or if it is really the case. The condition explicitly ties good men's wishing for all gains to gains' being good. Omitting it would conceal a premise the companion continues to contest by invoking harmful gains.

Attestation. 227d: εἴπερ ἀγαθά γέ ἐστιν.

Imitate

μιμέομαι (mimeomai)

To imitate or follow a model. Socrates invites the companion to reproduce the manner of his answer about food and drink. The requested imitation is methodological: identify what is common to the two cases bearing one name.

Attestation. 231a: μιμεῖσθαι.

Impossible

ἀδύνατος (adynatos)

Impossible or not capable of being done. Socrates declares the first model of knowingly gaining from worthless sources refuted as impossible. The verdict depends on his treatment of expertise and value; it is not offered as an independently demonstrated psychological law.

Attestation. 226e: ἀδύνατον.

In order

ἐφεξῆς (ephexēs)

In sequence or successively. The rhapsodes are to perform the epics in an ordered succession. Together with 'taking up', it describes continuity between reciters rather than simply several unrelated performances at the same festival.

Attestation. 228b: ἐφεξῆς.

In sum

συλλήβδην (syllēbdēn)

Taken together or in sum. Socrates gathers the particular experts into craftsmen and other intelligent people. It marks a generalisation, whose scope is broader than the individually tested examples but not thereby unlimited without argument.

Attestation. 226c: συλλήβδην.

Insatiability

ἀπληστία (aplēstia)

An inability to be filled or satisfied. The companion presents it as the motive for craving even tiny worthless objects. The proposed defect concerns appetite's excess, not merely an error in estimating an item's exchange value.

Attestation. 226d: ὑπὸ ἀπληστίας.

Inscription

ἐπίγραμμα (epigramma)

Something written upon a surface, here an inscription. The printed crasis and dual refer to two inscriptions on each Herm. It need not mean an 'epigram' in the modern sense of a self-contained witty literary poem.

Attestation. 228e: τὠπιγράμματε.

Instrument

ὄργανον (organon)

A tool or instrument, a means used in performing a task. The common category embraces the musicians' and other practitioners' equipment. It is used concretely here, not as the title of a formal logical treatise.

Attestation. 226c: ὄργανα.

Intelligent

ἔμφρων (emphrōn)

Possessing sense or understanding. 'Other intelligent men' expands the knowledgeable examples beyond named craftsmen. The phrase helps generalise the practical expectation that a person with sense does not knowingly profit through useless means.

Attestation. 226c: τῶν ἐμφρόνων ἀνδρῶν.

Intentionally

ἐπίτηδες (epitēdes)

On purpose or deliberately. Socrates describes the companion's contrary statements as intentional deception. The adverb sharpens the accusation, which the companion then reverses, and should not be treated as an established authorial verdict.

Attestation. 228a: ἐπίτηδες ἐναντία λέγων.

Judge or think

ἡγέομαι (hēgeomai)

To regard, consider or take someone to be something. The companion proposes how the lover of gain should correctly be classified. The same verb marks judgements of wisdom, friendship and rivalry in the central narrative.

Attestation. 227d: ἡγεῖσθαι φιλοκερδῆ.

Just

δίκαιος (dikaios)

Just or right. The neuter plural is the object of thinking in the inscription: proceed with just thoughts. The maxim does not define justice, but it makes reflective orientation part of conduct along one's way.

Attestation. 229a: δίκαια φρονῶν.

Kill

ἀποκτείνω (apokteinō)

To kill. The story explains the murder through the rivals' pain at perceived dishonour. That proposed motive belongs to Socrates' narrative and must be distinguished from the different accounts supplied by historians.

Attestation. 229d: ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἵππαρχον.

Know

γιγνώσκω (gignōskō)

To know or recognise. The opening question specifies knowing that things are worth nothing. Such knowledge is then paired with practical expertise, which is used to challenge the possibility of expecting gain from worthless means.

Attestation. 225a: γιγνώσκοντες.

Know thyself

Γνῶθι σαυτόν (Gnōthi sauton)

The Delphic command to know oneself. It appears as a celebrated inscription with which Hipparchus wants his own maxims to compete. Quoting it does not mean that the dialogue has supplied the detailed account of self-knowledge found in other dialogues.

Attestation. 228e: Γνῶθι σαυτόν.

Knowledgeable

ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

Knowing, skilled or expert concerning something. Socrates secures the claim that the lover of gain knows the worth of his intended source. The object of expertise is explicit; general cleverness and moral goodness are not thereby established.

Attestation. 225c: ἐπιστήμονα.

Land

γῆ (gē)

Land or country, here this land into which Homeric poetry was allegedly brought. The demonstrative gives the story an Athenian standpoint. It is not a claim about introducing epic to all Greek-speaking communities.

Attestation. 228b: εἰς τὴν γῆν ταυτηνί.

Lawsuit

δίκη (dikē)

A lawsuit or legal case in this context. The men clever at lawsuits supply the model for an ornamental rhyme. The common noun is related to a wider vocabulary of justice, but the local reference is forensic practice.

Attestation. 225c: περὶ τὰς δίκας.

Learn

μανθάνω (manthanō)

To learn. Some of Hipparchus' wisdom was learned, some found out by himself. The distinction prevents his inscriptions from being treated as wholly original merely because they advertise his wisdom.

Attestation. 228d: ἔμαθεν.

Less

ἐλάττων (elattōn)

Less or a smaller amount. The proposed profit formula combines a smaller outgoing amount with a larger receipt. Without a common measure of value, that relation alone cannot establish gain.

Attestation. 231a: ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας.

Look into

ἐπισκέπτομαι (episkeptomai)

To examine or look into a matter. Socrates redirects the discussion to why both kinds are called gain. The inquiry seeks a shared account, rather than yet another example of a gain conventionally labelled good or bad.

Attestation. 230d: ἐπισκέψασθαι.

Loss

ζημία (zēmia)

Loss, damage or, in other contexts, a penalty. Here it is treated as harmful and bad, opposed to gain. The companion challenges the exclusiveness of that opposition when he says base gain can also cause loss.

Attestation. 227a: ἡ ζημία.

Love

φιλέω (phileō)

To love, like or be fond of. Expanding the compound 'lover of gain' into 'loves gain' looks simple but enables the argument to connect this blamed character with everyone who loves good things.

Attestation. 226e: φιλοῦσι τὸ κέρδος.

Love erotically

ἐράω (eraō)

To be in love with or desire erotically. Harmodius loves an unnamed young man in Socrates' story. The verb is not the same as φιλεῖν in the general claim that people love good things.

Attestation. 229d: ἐρῶντά.

Lover of gain

φιλοκερδής (philokerdēs)

Someone fond of gain, conventionally a grasping or greedy person. The companion begins with a reproachful category; the argument ends by applying the description to everyone. The dispute concerns what is lost when the ordinary reproach is reduced to its components.

Attestation. 225a: οἱ φιλοκερδεῖς.

Lyre

λύρα (lyra)

A stringed instrument, here the musician's working tool. The Greek names a lyre even though the performer is called a κιθαριστής. The edition preserves that wording rather than silently replacing the instrument name.

Attestation. 226c: λύραν.

Lyre player

κιθαριστής (kitharistēs)

A player of the kithara family of stringed instruments, conventionally the edition's lyre-player. The line pairs this performer with a λύρα. The lexical pairing should be reported before making broader claims about instrument taxonomy.

Attestation. 226c: κιθαριστὴς.

Mad

μανικός (manikos)

Mad or crazed. Socrates says lovers of the good are not madmen, after identifying lovers of gain as lovers of the good. The remark is pointed and colloquial; it is not a clinical classification or the dialogue's main psychological argument.

Attestation. 227b: μανικούς.

Many

πολύς (polys)

Many; substantivised with the article it means the many or majority. Socrates contrasts their explanation of the murder with that of the supposedly more cultivated. Numerical popularity and historical truth are not the same criterion.

Attestation. 229c: οἱ πολλοὶ.

Memorial

μνῆμα (mnēma)

A reminder, memorial or monument. The inscription names Hipparchus as the person commemorated. Such a memorial need not be a grave marker: here it is a roadside monument bearing a rule for living.

Attestation. 229a: μνῆμα τόδ’ Ἱππάρχου.

Middle

μέσος (mesos)

The middle or midway position. It locates the Herms between the town and the demes. The spatial midpoint provides a practical setting for travellers to encounter instruction and the founder's name.

Attestation. 228d: ἐν μέσῳ.

Mind or think

φρονέω (phroneō)

To think or have a disposition of mind. In the maxim it governs just things; in μέγα φρονεῖν it can mean to think highly of oneself. The two uses connect reflection and self-estimation without making them synonyms.

Attestation. 229a: φρονῶν.

More

πλείων (pleiōn)

More or a larger amount. At first the object of comparison is unspecified; the monetary example then shows why a greater weight of a different material need not have greater worth. The appropriate measure is part of the problem.

Attestation. 231a: πλέον λάβῃ.

Much or very

σφόδρα (sphodra)

Strongly or very much. The companion emphatically confirms the value comparison before the argument turns from worth to benefit. Strong assent at one step should not be confused with his eventual reservation about the entire argument.

Attestation. 231e: Σφόδρα.

Name

ὄνομα (onoma)

A name or designation. 'Drink' is the name given to wet nourishment whether decent or base. The discussion asks for the common feature that makes the same designation appropriate to different instances.

Attestation. 231a: τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομά.

Nearly

ἐγγύς (engys)

Near or nearly, with τι softening the comparison. The Athenians are said to have lived nearly as under Cronus. This is an idealising comparison qualified by the speaker, not a literal chronological placement in mythical time.

Attestation. 229b: ἐγγύς τι.

Necessary

ἀνάγκη (anankē)

Necessity or what must follow. As a short reply it grants that good and bad gain are equally gain. The dramatic assent must be checked against what the preceding analogy actually supports.

Attestation. 230c: Ἀνάγκη.

Neither

οὐδέτερος (oudeteros)

Neither of two. The decent and base person is neither more nor less human than the other. The repeated negatives carefully delimit the comparison and prepare the corresponding statement about gains.

Attestation. 230c: οὐδέτερος οὐδετέρου.

No benefit

ἀνωφελής (anōphelēs)

Unhelpful or of no benefit. The companion rejects it as the meaning of what is worth possessing. This exclusion pushes the value-language toward benefit, rather than permitting neutral possession as the final standard.

Attestation. 231e: τὸ ἀνωφελὲς.

No gain

ἀκερδής (akerdēs)

Without gain or unprofitable. It is paired with the worthless, against what is gainful and of worth. The negative does not by itself specify an amount of loss: failing to gain and incurring a deficit need not be identical in ordinary usage.

Attestation. 231e: ἀκερδές.

No match for

ἥττων (hēttōn)

Weaker than or overmastered by something. Being no match for gain means yielding to its attraction, not having less profit than someone else. The same comparative family can concern lesser degree in the later more-and-less argument, with a changed application.

Attestation. 225b: ἥττους τοῦ κέρδους.

No one

οὐδείς (oudeis)

No person or no one, here reinforced in a negative construction. The first treatment of the companion's account leaves no human lover of gain. The stark result contrasts with the later assertion that everyone is one.

Attestation. 226d: οὐκ ἔστ’ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς.

Nothing too much

Μηδὲν ἄγαν (Mēden agan)

The Delphic instruction to avoid excess, literally 'nothing too much'. In the story Hipparchus wants his sayings admired above this familiar maxim. The dialogue quotes it but does not develop an independent account of moderation.

Attestation. 228e: Μηδὲν ἄγαν.

Now just recently

ἄρτι (arti)

Just now or a short time ago. It gives Socrates' appeal to agreement apparent immediacy. The edition's note warns that the alleged agreement was not stated in those words, so the temporal cue must not replace checking the earlier exchange.

Attestation. 227d: ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν.

Old

παλαιός (palaios)

Of old, ancient or belonging to an earlier generation. 'All the men of old' are invoked as witnesses to the favourable picture of pre-Hippias Athens. The expression does not identify named informants whose testimony can be independently evaluated.

Attestation. 229b: τῶν παλαιῶν.

Older and eldest

πρεσβύτερος, πρεσβύτατος (presbyteros, presbytatos)

Older and oldest or eldest. The superlative describes Hipparchus within Socrates' portrait; historians cited by the edition instead make Hippias the elder. Socrates' own older age relative to the companion is a separate, dramatic comparison at 225d–226a.

Attestation. 228b: πρεσβύτατος καὶ σοφώτατος.

Opponent

ἀνταγωνιστής (antagōnistēs)

A rival or competitor. Aristogeiton regards Hipparchus as a rival in the story's setting of education and admired wisdom. The word supplies a contest metaphor without establishing an actual institutional teaching competition.

Attestation. 229c: ἀνταγωνιστὴν.

Or

ἤ (ē)

Or, joining alternatives. Asking whether health is gain or loss supplies an evaluative choice, whereas asking whether harm comes from gain or loss is resisted by 'both'. The alternatives' exclusiveness must be judged in each exchange.

Attestation. 231b: κέρδος ἂν κτήσαιτο ἢ ζημίαν.

Ought

δεῖ (dei)

It is necessary or one ought. Here it occurs inside what the lover of gain thinks: he thinks he ought to gain from everything. The dialogue does not endorse that unrestricted requirement merely by reporting his attitude.

Attestation. 225b: οἴεται δεῖν κερδαίνειν.

Pass by

πάρειμι (pareimi)

To go past or pass by, here of travellers along the roads. The participle belongs to the going-by verb, not simply the similarly spelled verb meaning 'be present'. Movement creates repeated opportunities to read the inscriptions.

Attestation. 228e: παριόντες.

Pay or fee

μισθός (misthos)

Payment, wages or a fee. Large fees are part of the means used to attract or retain Simonides. The material detail makes poetic wisdom and the dialogue's question about gain sit close together without proving a charge against the poet.

Attestation. 228c: μεγάλοις μισθοῖς.

Perhaps

ἴσως (isōs)

Perhaps or possibly. Socrates allows that persuasion might follow later, after compelled agreement. The word leaves that future open; the dialogue does not show the promised conviction actually occurring.

Attestation. 232b: ἴσως μετὰ τοῦτο.

Perish

ἀπόλλυμι (apollymi)

To destroy or lose in the active, and to perish in the middle. The pilot may perish himself and lose the vessel and cargo. The grammatical change makes personal death and the loss of property distinct consequences of bad equipment.

Attestation. 226b: ἀπολέσθαι.

Persuade

πείθω (peithō)

To persuade or bring someone to belief; related middle forms can mean obey. The final contrast with compulsion shows that agreeing under argumentative pressure is not necessarily the same as being persuaded.

Attestation. 232b: πέπεικεν.

Pilot

κυβερνήτης (kybernētēs)

A steersman or pilot. He knows the risk created by worthless sails and rudders. The noun describes practical navigational responsibility, and the passage does not turn it into a stated metaphor for political rule.

Attestation. 226b: κυβερνήτην.

Place or region

χώρα (chōra)

A place, district or region, here the location appropriate for planting. Its rhyme with ὥρα motivates the edition's 'clime'. Climate is a suggestive English equivalent, but the Greek word's ordinary geographical range is broader.

Attestation. 225c: χώρᾳ.

Plant

φυτόν (phyton)

A plant or something grown. Its worth is judged in relation to planting and eventual growth. The example assumes a competent evaluator and a recognised lack of productive value, which is stronger than observing a currently low market price.

Attestation. 225b: τὸ φυτόν.

Planting

φυτεύω (phyteuō)

To plant. The activity supplies the setting for the farmer's calculation of expected gain. The later question about season and place makes competence include knowing the conditions under which planting is worth doing.

Attestation. 225b: φυτεύων.

Plot

ἐπιβουλεύω (epibouleuō)

To plan against or devise a scheme; the edition pointedly uses 'plotting' for educating country people. The choice can create irony within the praise of Hipparchus without proving that the programme is described as hostile in a literal political sense.

Attestation. 228d: ἐπιβουλεύων.

Poem

ποίημα (poiēma)

Something made, here a poem. Hipparchus inscribes chosen wisdom as his own poems and specimens. The term foregrounds composition and display rather than implying that every maxim is a wholly unprecedented thought.

Attestation. 228d: ποιήματα.

Possess

κτάομαι in the perfect (ktaomai)

To have acquired and hence possess. The perfect infinitive expresses an established holding, unlike the acquisition event. 'Worth possessing' leads the argument from exchange worth to what is beneficial to hold.

Attestation. 231e: κεκτῆσθαι.

Possession

κτῆμα (ktēma)

A possession or something acquired. The proposed definition makes any cost-free or favourable acquisition a gain. The disease counterexample tests the breadth of 'any', including an acquired state that ordinary English might not initially call property.

Attestation. 231a: πᾶν κτῆμα.

Prepare or equip

παρασκευάζω (paraskeuazō)

To make ready or equip. The pilot has equipped the ship with sails and rudders. The completed preparation sets up a foreseeable future danger: inadequate equipment has been chosen before the voyage's result is realised.

Attestation. 226b: παρεσκευασμένον.

Pride

μέγα φρονεῖν (mega phronein)

To think highly of oneself or take pride. Aristogeiton prides himself on having educated a man. The idiom concerns self-esteem attached to an achievement, not the literal size of a thought.

Attestation. 229c: μέγα δ’ ἐφρόνει.

Provide

παρέχω (parechō)

To furnish, provide or give. The horseman supplies food to the horse, and his knowledge of its quality underlies the judgement that he is ruining it. The relation is one of care and use, not merely ownership.

Attestation. 226a: παρέχει.

Put into verse

ἐντείνω (enteinō)

Literally to stretch or draw into, here to cast selected sayings into elegiac verse. The expression marks the work of fitting thought to a metrical form. It does not mean the maxims were merely copied as unshaped prose.

Attestation. 228d: ἐντείνας εἰς ἐλεγεῖον.

Randomly

εἰκῇ (eikē)

At random, carelessly or without due consideration. Socrates asks the companion not to answer as though smarting from an injury. The contrast is with attending to the question, not with eliminating all ordinary emotional responses from thought.

Attestation. 225b: οὕτως εἰκῇ.

Read

ἀναγιγνώσκω (anagignōskō)

To read, here the roadside inscriptions. The public writing is designed to be encountered by passers-by and to draw them toward further education. The text does not state whether each reader reads silently or aloud.

Attestation. 228e: ἀναγιγνώσκοντες.

Refute

ἐξελέγχω (exelenchō)

To refute, expose or show a claim untenable. Socrates says 'we have refuted ourselves', sharing ownership of the earlier test. The form does not guarantee that the argument has answered every morally distinct interpretation of the companion's original complaint.

Attestation. 226e: ἐξηλέγξαμεν.

Remember

μιμνῄσκομαι (mimnēskomai)

To remember or call to mind. Socrates says he cannot remember the young man's name while relating the story. That admission leaves the person unidentified; later speculation must not fill in the missing name as though the dialogue supplied it.

Attestation. 229d: οὐ μέμνημαι.

Remind

ὑπομιμνῄσκω (hypomimnēskō)

To remind or prompt another's memory. Socrates offers to reconstruct the starting disagreement. The resulting summary should be checked against the earlier words, because the dialogue has already made retrospective agreement a contested matter.

Attestation. 232a: ὑπομνήσω.

Reproach

ὀνειδίζω (oneidizō)

To reproach, blame or cast something in someone's teeth. The final argument challenges the propriety of blaming someone as a lover of gain when the accuser belongs to the same supposed class. Whether this dissolves the original moral distinction is the reader's remaining question.

Attestation. 232c: ὀνειδίζει.

Return in a circle

περιτρέχω (peritrechō)

To run around and return to the same point. Socrates uses the movement image for the renewed result that gain is good. The image can register recurrence and frustration without being the formal name of a circular fallacy.

Attestation. 231c: περιτρέχεις εἰς τὸ αὐτό.

Rhapsode

ῥαψῳδός (rhapsōdos)

A professional reciter of epic verse. Hipparchus is credited with imposing sequential recitation at the Panathenaea. The claim concerns performance order and attribution of a rule, not an assertion that the reciters composed Homer's poems.

Attestation. 228b: τοὺς ῥαψῳδοὺς.

Rightly

ὀρθῶς (orthōs)

Correctly or rightly. The companion wants the lover of gain correctly understood, and the ending denies that reproach is correctly applied. The adverb can concern classification or conduct; its meaning must follow the particular verb it modifies.

Attestation. 227c: ὀρθῶς λαμβάνοι.

Risk and likelihood

κινδυνεύω (kindyneuō)

To run a risk or be in danger, literally of the pilot here. At 229d Κινδυνεύεις introduces 'it looks as though' Socrates fails in friendship or obedience. The same verb moves from real physical peril to an idiomatic tentative assessment.

Attestation. 226b: κινδυνεύσει.

Road

ὁδός (hodos)

A road or route. Here it is the physical setting of the Herms, and one specified route is the Steirian road. Although road language may invite associations with moral direction, the dialogue first describes actual movement and public monuments.

Attestation. 228d: κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς.

Rudder

πηδάλιον (pēdalion)

A steering oar or rudder. It is a crucial item of ship equipment whose worthlessness creates danger. The plural should not be silently modernised into an engineering claim about a single central rudder.

Attestation. 226b: πηδάλια.

Ruin

διαφθείρω (diaphtheirō)

To ruin, destroy or spoil. Worthless food ruins the horse, a concrete harmful outcome. The passage does not describe political corruption of a person, although that broader sense of the family occurs elsewhere in Greek.

Attestation. 226a: διαφθείρει.

Rule

ἄρχω (archō)

To rule or govern. Socrates attributes the educational project to Hipparchus' wish to rule the best possible citizens. Education and political authority are deliberately joined in this explanation, even though the historians disagree about his actual governing position.

Attestation. 228c: ἄρχοι.

Sail

ἱστίον (histion)

A sail. Alongside rudders it represents the means needed to conduct a ship safely. The danger from worthless sails is intelligible without supposing that their material has literally no sale or salvage value whatsoever.

Attestation. 226b: ἱστία.

Same

αὐτός (autos)

The same, when used with the article or in the corresponding crasis. Socrates seeks the identical feature in good and bad gain. In other constructions αὐτός means self or the very person, so not every occurrence carries the classificatory sense.

Attestation. 230d: τί ταὐτὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις.

Sayings

ῥῆμα (rhēma)

Words, expressions or sayings. The term links the courtroom verbal display near the start and Hipparchus' admired maxims. Its use does not guarantee that the saying is wise merely because someone calls it a wise saying.

Attestation. 228e: ῥήματα.

See

ὁράω (horaō)

To see, here to discern a common feature. The question uses visual language for intellectual recognition. Elsewhere 'you see' can press home an argumentative point; neither use introduces a separate theory of perception.

Attestation. 230d: τί ταὐτὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὁρῶν.

Senseless

ἀνόητος (anoētos)

Without understanding or senseless. Socrates says that, if the supposed lovers of gain do not recognise the worthlessness, this would be the kind of person the companion is naming. The companion rejects that characterization in favour of knowing unscrupulousness.

Attestation. 225a: ἀνοήτους.

Shamelessness

ἀναισχυντία (anaischyntia)

Lack of shame or restraint before disgrace. The companion gives it as the reason people knowingly dare pursue improper gain. Socrates' tests of mistaken value must be compared with this original claim about moral inhibition.

Attestation. 225b: δι’ ἀναισχυντίαν.

Ship

ναῦς (naus)

A ship or vessel; inflected forms include νηί. The pilot may lose the ship as well as himself and the cargo. The sequence makes the costs of defective equipment larger than a simple accounting shortfall.

Attestation. 226b: τὴν ναῦν.

Silver

ἀργύριον (argyrion)

Silver, and often money in a monetary context. Here the material is explicitly weighed against gold, so the comparison requires attention to both amount and relative worth. It is not merely a larger count of identical coins.

Attestation. 231d: ἀργυρίου.

Simple minded

εὐήθης (euēthēs)

Naive, simple or simple-minded. Socrates dismisses the familiar basket-bearing explanation with this word. The dismissal belongs to his rhetorical presentation; the label itself supplies no historical argument against the alternative account.

Attestation. 229c: εὔηθες.

Sister

ἀδελφή (adelphē)

A sister, here Harmodius' sister in the disputed account of the assassination. She is not named in the dialogue. Her rejected ceremonial honour must be described as the alternative story being discussed, not confused with the unnamed young man in Socrates' preferred version.

Attestation. 229c: τῆς ἀδελφῆς.

Small

σμικρός (smikros)

Small in size, amount or importance. The companion originally combines smallness with little or no worth. Later the argument speaks of gains both small and great, which is a broader description than that initial disparaging cluster.

Attestation. 226e: σμικρὰ.

Some

τις, τι (tis, ti)

An indefinite someone or something; here some gain or a certain gain. The companion's retraction introduces a division within the class, some good and some bad. It does not deny that any good gain exists.

Attestation. 230a: κέρδος τι.

Son or child

παῖς (pais)

A child or offspring, here Pisistratus' sons. The word does not imply that these figures are minors at the narrated date. Hipparchus is further called eldest and wisest, claims that need to be separated and historically checked.

Attestation. 228b: τῶν Πεισιστράτου παίδων.

Speak auspiciously

εὐφημέω (euphēmeō)

To speak words of good omen, often an instruction to stop an ill-omened utterance. Socrates uses the imperative after the accusation of deception. The elevated reaction adds dramatic colour before his appeal to the wise man's maxim.

Attestation. 228b: Εὐφήμει.

Speak finely

καλλιεπέομαι (kalliepeomai)

To speak in fine or elegant language. Socrates' rhyming expression imitates forensic verbal polish. Fine phrasing can entertain without making the underlying claim more reliable, a distinction relevant to the dialogue's later displays of wisdom.

Attestation. 225c: καλλιεποῦνται.

Specimen

ἐπίδειγμα (epideigma)

A display, example or specimen. The inscriptions present selected sayings as specimens of Hipparchus' wisdom. The word makes the public display of his wisdom explicit; its quality still depends on what the sayings are and how they are used.

Attestation. 228d: ἐπιδείγματα τῆς σοφίας.

Spend

ἀναλίσκω (analiskō)

To expend or spend. The aorist participle sets the outgoing amount against what is acquired. Spending nothing is one proposed sufficient condition of gain, but the illness example shows that absence of expenditure is insufficient.

Attestation. 231a: ἀναλώσας.

Stand or set up

ἵστημι (histēmi)

To set something standing in the causative form, or stand in other forms. Hipparchus sets up Herms; each Herm declares where it stands. The verbal family relates the founder's action to the monument's enduring location.

Attestation. 228d: ἔστησεν.

Stay or associate

συγγίγνομαι (syngignomai)

To come together or associate with someone. The young man changes his evaluation after keeping company with Hipparchus. The word identifies association without specifying a formal course of instruction or all the personal details of their relationship.

Attestation. 229d: συγγενόμενον.

Steirian

Στειριακός (Steiriakos)

Belonging to or leading toward Steiria. The named road locates the Herm bearing the prohibition on deceiving a friend. Its specificity gives the appeal a local Athenian setting rather than an anonymous proverbial source.

Attestation. 229a: Στειριακῇ ὁδῷ.

Still

ἔτι (eti)

Still or yet. In the rhapsodic passage it claims persistence of the practice into the dramatic present; at other moments it can add one further question. Duration and argumentative addition are related but contextually distinct uses.

Attestation. 228b: νῦν ἔτι.

Strongly pained

περιαλγέω (perialgeō)

To feel intense pain or distress. Socrates' story makes the perceived dishonour deeply painful to Harmodius and Aristogeiton and then connects that pain with the killing. The psychological explanation remains a reported narrative motive.

Attestation. 229d: περιαλγήσαντας.

Suffer loss

ζημιόομαι (zēmioomai)

To incur loss, be damaged or suffer a penalty according to context. Here the pilot will suffer loss through bad equipment. Later the companion applies the family to harmful gain, reopening the question whether gain and loss are strictly exclusive.

Attestation. 226b: ζημιωθήσεται.

Tackle

σκεῦος (skeuos)

Equipment, gear or tackle. The term sums up the pilot's sails and rudders. It names material means needed for the activity and should not be mistaken for all cargo carried aboard the vessel.

Attestation. 226b: τῶν σκευῶν.

Take back

ἀνατίθεμαι (anatithemai)

To put back or retract. In the game analogy it is taking a move back; in argument it is withdrawing an agreed statement. The offer permits one premise to be revised while the rest of the earlier commitments remain in force.

Attestation. 229e: ἀναθέσθαι.

Taking up

ὑπόληψις (hypolēpsis)

Taking up or continuing from another. Combined with 'in sequence', it describes the rhapsodic practice of each performer taking up where the last left off. The phrase concerns continuity of recitation rather than a philosophical opinion or hypothesis.

Attestation. 228b: ἐξ ὑπολήψεως.

Taste

γεῦμα (geuma)

A taste or sample, here a figurative taste of wisdom from reading the inscriptions. The sample is meant to entice rural citizens into further education. The metaphor does not establish that the displayed material exhausts the ruler's wisdom.

Attestation. 228e: γεῦμα λαμβάνοντες.

The remaining things

λοιπός (loipos)

What remains or the rest. Travellers are meant to come for instruction in the rest after sampling the roadside wisdom. The content of this additional education is left unspecified, so the lexicon should not invent a curriculum.

Attestation. 228e: τὰ λοιπὰ.

Then in an opening question

γάρ (gar)

Usually explanatory 'for', here a connective opening 'what, then'. It creates the impression of joining a conversation already in progress. The implied earlier context is not preserved and should not be filled with an invented dramatic episode.

Attestation. 225a: Τί γὰρ.

Think fit

ἀξιόω (axioō)

To deem worthy, think fit or claim. The initial phrase plays on the related adjective meaning worth. Socrates later asks whether thinking fit to gain means thinking that one ought to gain, making this interpretation part of the questioning.

Attestation. 225a: ἀξιῶσιν.

Think or suppose

οἴομαι (oiomai)

To think, suppose or believe. The farmer or lover of gain is described through what he thinks he ought to do. The verb permits a distinction between an agent's belief about value and the value actually stipulated in the example.

Attestation. 225b: οἴεται.

Throw in

ἐμβάλλω (emballō)

To put or throw into, here to insert a clever expression into the conversation. The joking purpose clause accompanies the rhyme about time and clime. It presents verbal ornament as consciously added rather than indispensable to the farming example.

Attestation. 225c: ἐμβάλωμεν.

Time or season

ὥρα (hōra)

Season, fitting time or period. Joined with χώρα in a conspicuous rhyme, it describes knowing when and where a plant is worth planting. The edition's 'time and clime' attempts an analogous English sound-effect.

Attestation. 225c: ὥρᾳ.

Town

ἄστυ (asty)

The town or urban centre, contrasted with the country and demes. The narrative first educates citizens around the town and then extends instruction into the countryside. The distinction is geographical rather than a division into citizens and non-citizens.

Attestation. 228c: τὸ ἄστυ.

True

ἀληθής (alēthēs)

True; the reply means 'what you say is true'. It endorses the proposition that moral difference does not make one person more human than another. Its assent should not be retroactively extended to every subsequent inference.

Attestation. 230c: Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Truly

ἀληθῶς (alēthōs)

Truly or in truth. Socrates demands an answer that corresponds to what the companion actually thinks. The adverb is part of a demand for sincerity, not a guarantee that the answer will be correct.

Attestation. 226a: ὡς ἀληθῶς.

Turn or twist

στρέφω (strephō)

To turn, twist or redirect. The companion says Socrates twists things up and down in the arguments. The physical image expresses his sense of manipulation even before he can identify its logical mechanism.

Attestation. 228a: στρέφεις.

Twelvefold weight

δωδεκαστάσιος (dōdekastasios)

Of twelve times the weight, used in the comparison between gold and silver. The edition interprets the example through gold valued at twelve times silver's weight. This is the stipulated ratio of the passage, not a universal claim about ancient prices.

Attestation. 231d: δωδεκαστασίου.

Twice the weight

διστάσιος (distasios)

Of twice the weight. It contrasts with twelvefold weight in describing what the gold becomes for the exchanger. Burnet prints T's form against B's διστάσιμον; the larger received amount remains insufficient in worth.

Attestation. 231d: διστάσιον.

Tyranny

τυραννίς (tyrannis)

The rule of a tyrant or autocratic dominion. Socrates' story limits the label to the years after Hipparchus' death. That favourable restriction must be distinguished from the historians' accounts of the Pisistratid regime.

Attestation. 229b: τυραννὶς.

Undergo

πάσχω (paschō)

To undergo, be affected or experience something. Paired with doing, it extends the question of more and less beyond names of kinds. The preceding equality of classification does not by itself establish equal effects upon people.

Attestation. 230d: πάσχοι.

Understand or consider

διανοέομαι (dianoeomai)

To think through or conceive a matter. Socrates proposes that gain be considered in the same way as people: good and bad are equally members of a kind. The invitation is to adopt a comparison, whose further consequences still require examination.

Attestation. 230c: διανοώμεθα.

Unjustly

ἀδίκως (adikōs)

Unjustly or without right; negated here, 'not unjustly'. Socrates treats the companion's perplexity as fitting or understandable in the circumstances. The brief phrase does not establish a separate theory of deserved intellectual punishment.

Attestation. 231c: Οὐκ ἀδίκως.

Unscrupulous

πανοῦργος (panourgos)

Ready for anything, cunning or unscrupulous. The companion expressly substitutes this description for senselessness. It makes the alleged fault knowing moral opportunism, so a refutation aimed only at ignorance may not dispose of the original complaint.

Attestation. 225a: πανούργους.

Use

χράομαι (chraomai)

To use or employ. Socrates asks which of the two arguments one could use without error after producing nobody and everybody as rival results. The phrase makes arguments instruments whose reliability is still to be assessed.

Attestation. 227c: τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος.

Value or worth

ἀξία (axia)

Worth or value. The dative specifies the respect in which silver is not more than gold, despite its greater amount. This explicit measure redirects the acquisition formula from bulk toward evaluative comparison.

Attestation. 231d: τῇ ἀξίᾳ.

Visit repeatedly

φοιτάω (phoitaō)

To go to and fro, frequent or keep visiting a place. The inscriptions are meant to encourage country people to come for further education. The repeated movement expands the initial roadside encounter into sustained attendance.

Attestation. 228e: φοιτῷεν.

Want or wish

βούλομαι (boulomai)

To want, wish or intend. Good men are said to wish for every gain on the condition that gains are good things. The verb also expresses intentions and requests elsewhere; its occurrences do not all name an identical kind of appetite.

Attestation. 227d: βούλονται.

Way or manner

τρόπος (tropos)

A manner, way or mode. 'In this way' qualifies the result that everyone appears a lover of gain. It reminds the reader that the conclusion has arisen through a particular treatment of the terms, contrasted with the earlier treatment.

Attestation. 227c: τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

Weight

σταθμός (stathmos)

A weight or weighed amount. The example specifies a half-weight of gold against a greater silver weight. Measuring matter and appraising worth are distinct operations, which is why the common word 'more' cannot do all the work.

Attestation. 231d: σταθμὸν.

Wellborn

γενναῖος (gennaios)

Of good birth, noble or wellborn in this description. It joins youth and beauty in identifying the unnamed beloved's social attractiveness. It is not evidence that the author supplies his ancestry or name.

Attestation. 229d: γενναίων.

Wet

ὑγρός (hygros)

Wet or liquid. With nourishment it supplies the defining feature of drink. The adjective's physical distinction from dry food is kept separate from the moral-quality pair 'decent or base'.

Attestation. 230e: ὑγρᾷ τροφῇ.

Where from

ὅθεν (hothen)

From where or from what source. In the early argument it directs attention to the source of gain; in the closing recollection it concerns where the argument began. The source of an acquisition and the starting point of a discussion are different applications.

Attestation. 225c: ὅθεν κερδαίνειν ἀξιοῖ.

Wisdom

σοφία (sophia)

Wisdom, skill or cultivated understanding. Hipparchus displays what he regards as his wisdom through verse and education. Admiration, originality and public display are narrated as marks of it, but the story does not independently establish a criterion of true wisdom.

Attestation. 228d: τῆς σοφίας τῆς αὑτοῦ.

Wise

σοφός (sophos)

Wise or skilled; the superlative means wisest. Hipparchus is praised as wisest among Pisistratus' sons. This judgement belongs to the dramatic encomium and should not be converted into a historical ranking of their intellectual abilities.

Attestation. 228b: σοφώτατος.

Without spending anything

μηδὲν ἀναλώσας (mēden analōsas)

Having spent nothing. This is one limb of Socrates' proposed acquisition definition, distinct from spending less and receiving more. The disease acquired at a free feast directly tests this limb rather than relying on an exchange of different metals.

Attestation. 231a: μηδὲν ἀναλώσας.

Wonderfully addressed

θαυμάσιος (thaumasios)

Wonderful or remarkable, used as a courteous or teasing form of address. Socrates deploys it while concluding that no one fits the offered definition. The literal praise should not be mistaken for a settled assessment of the companion's character.

Attestation. 226d: ὦ θαυμάσιε.

Worth nothing

οὐδενὸς ἄξιος (oudenos axios)

Worth nothing. The phrase is stronger than 'worth little', and the dialogue's examples often give it a practical standard of usefulness. A worthless tool for its intended job need not be literally unsaleable as raw material.

Attestation. 226e: οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

Worthless

ἀνάξιος (anaxios)

Not of worth or unworthy. Here it contrasts with what is of worth and is said to be without gain. The negative adjective belongs to the closing value argument, while the opening commonly says 'worth nothing' through a genitive construction.

Attestation. 231e: τὸ δὲ ἀνάξιον.

Wronged

ἀδικέω (adikeō)

To wrong or act unjustly toward someone; the perfect passive describes someone who has been wronged. Socrates likens the companion's answer to a grievance. The simile does not tell us that an actual offender or transaction lies behind the conversation.

Attestation. 225b: ἠδικημένος.

Young

νέος (neos)

Young or new. Socrates contrasts the companion's youth with his own greater age. The relative description establishes neither an exact age nor the companion's identity; a separate young man appears only inside the later story.

Attestation. 226a: οὕτω νέος.

Zeus

Ζεύς (Zeus)

Zeus, named through an oath formula. The oath strengthens a denial; it does not introduce Zeus as a participant or give the argument a divine revelation. The dialogue also invokes mythic Cronus in a different, historical-comparative role.

Attestation. 226a: Μὰ Δί’.

An opening that already answers someone

225a. Τί γὰρ τὸ φιλοκερδές; τί ποτέ ἐστιν, καὶ τίνες οἱ φιλοκερδεῖς; (ti gar to philokerdes? ti pote estin, kai tines hoi philokerdeis?)

“What, then, is the love of gain?” The opening γάρ normally links a remark to something already said. Here no earlier exchange is supplied: the reader enters an inquiry apparently under way. The edition's “then” preserves that conversational effect without inventing the missing occasion. In the next question ποτέ does not mean “at some time”; with τί it sharpens the demand for an explanation, “what is it, after all?”

The neuter singular article in τὸ φιλοκερδές turns an adjective into the name of a characteristic. The masculine plural οἱ φιλοκερδεῖς then identifies people possessing that characteristic. The two questions therefore ask for a nature and its bearers, not simply two English synonyms. The companion answers the second by describing a class; Socrates will test whether the description identifies anybody, and later whether it includes everybody.

Thinking fit to gain from what is worth nothing

225a. οἳ ἂν κερδαίνειν ἀξιῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων (hoi an kerdainein axiōsin apo tōn mēdenos axiōn)

The relative clause means “those who think fit to gain from things worth nothing”. Its ἄν with the subjunctive ἀξιῶσιν describes an indefinite class of people. The infinitive κερδαίνειν supplies what they think fit to do; ἀπό with the genitive gives the source from which the gain is expected. The substantivised phrase τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων leaves “things” to be understood.

The genitive μηδενός belongs to the valuation construction with ἀξίων: worth nothing. It does not negate the act of thinking. The repeated ἀξι- sound makes the definition pointed: they judge gaining appropriate precisely where the source lacks worth. English “think fit” and “worth” cannot reproduce that family resemblance. At 225d Socrates explicitly replaces “think fit” with “think that one ought”, securing the companion's assent before the examples put pressure on what this expectation involves.

Being weaker than gain

225b. ἥττους τοῦ κέρδους (hēttous tou kerdous)

The comparative ἥττους takes the genitive τοῦ κέρδους: literally, “weaker than gain”, rendered “no match for gain”. The accusative plural continues the companion's description of the people he calls lovers of gain. Gain is pictured as a force that overmasters them. The phrase thus describes their relation to an attraction, not the size of the profit they receive.

This matters because the surrounding participle γιγνώσκοντας insists that they know the worthlessness of the things involved, while ὅμως, “nevertheless”, says that they dare to pursue gain anyway. The companion is proposing a conflict between knowledge and motivation. Socrates' craft examples answer by showing that informed practitioners do not expect a beneficial outcome from useless means. That reply changes the test: understanding an object's practical uselessness is easier to expose than the moral failure expressed by being unable to resist gain.

The paired datives of time and place

225c. ἐν ὁποίᾳ ἄξια φυτευθῆναι καὶ ὥρᾳ καὶ χώρᾳ (en hopoiāi axia phyteuthēnai kai hōrāi kai chōrāi)

The sense is “in what time and clime they are worth planting”. The paired datives ὥρᾳ and χώρᾳ complete the opening ἐν ὁποίᾳ, with καί ... καί coordinating season and location. The plants remain the understood subject of ἄξια; the passive infinitive φυτευθῆναι specifies what they are suitable for: being planted. Worth here is relative to circumstances and a proposed use, rather than simply a price attached permanently to the plant.

The closely matching sounds make the pair conspicuous. Socrates immediately explains that he too is throwing in the fine expressions used by clever speakers in lawsuits. The edition answers this with “time and clime”. The verbal joke interrupts but does not remove the practical question: a farmer's competence includes judging when and where a plant will succeed. The wording gives “worth” a contextual standard before the later financial example supplies another.

A question shaped to obtain agreement

225d. Τὸ οὖν ἀξιοῦν κερδαίνειν ἄλλο τι λέγεις ἢ οἴεσθαι δεῖν κερδαίνειν; (to oun axioun kerdainein allo ti legeis ē oiesthai dein kerdainein?)

“By thinking fit to gain do you mean anything other than thinking that one ought to gain?” The article τὸ makes the infinitive phrase ἀξιοῦν κερδαίνειν the expression under examination. The construction ἄλλο τι ... ἤ supplies the alternative: something other than the proposed paraphrase. Socrates expects the companion to reject a difference, not to produce a new example of gain.

The nested infinitives matter. Οἴεσθαι introduces a belief, δεῖν its claim of necessity or propriety, and κερδαίνειν the action thought necessary. Socrates is not yet asserting that gaining is objectively obligatory. He is determining what the supposed lover of gain thinks he ought to do. The companion's “That is what I mean” accepts this analysis. Later uses of the shorter question-form can be translated “is it not ...?”; here the full alternative is important because an expression is being explicitly redefined.

An argument that has refuted its own speakers

226e. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ ἐξηλέγξαμεν ὅτι ἀδύνατον (touto men gar ēdē hēmas autous tōi logōi exēlenxamen hoti adynaton)

The edition renders this “we have already refuted ourselves on this point by the argument: it is impossible”. The first-person plural ἐξηλέγξαμεν has the emphatic reflexive object ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, “ourselves”. Socrates makes both speakers answerable for the result, even though he has led the questions. The dative τῷ λόγῳ identifies the means, the argument, rather than another person who has defeated them.

Τοῦτο points forward to what the ὅτι clause specifies: the impossibility of knowingly pursuing gain from things recognised as worthless, as the preceding examples have construed that claim. The word “already” lets Socrates treat this issue as settled when the companion offers insatiability as a new definition. Readers should keep the precise scope in view. The accepted craft examples supply the result being recalled; “the argument” is not independent proof that every possible case of knowing greed has been examined.

A participial alternative with the verb understood

226e. εἰ μὴ γιγνώσκοντες, δῆλον ὅτι ἀγνοοῦντες, οἰόμενοι δὲ τὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πολλοῦ ἄξια εἶναι (ei mē gignōskontes, dēlon hoti agnoountes, oiomenoi de ta oudenos axia pollou axia einai)

“If not knowing it, plainly being ignorant of it, and thinking that things worth nothing are worth a great deal.” The participles describe the people just discussed; their craving and pursuit of gain remain understood from the exchange. Μή is the negative appropriate to the conditional phrase, not evidence that Socrates is issuing a prohibition. Δῆλον ὅτι, “plainly” or “it is clear that”, presents the second alternative as following immediately.

The final participle adds a positive belief to the absence of knowledge. These people do not merely fail to assign a value: they think the worthless things highly valuable. The two genitives, οὐδενός and πολλοῦ, set contrary valuations around the repeated ἄξια. This makes the next move possible. Their desire can now be interpreted as desire for what they take to be valuable, even though the companion had meant to condemn excessive craving for negligible things.

From a dative of opposition to a new conclusion

227a. Ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ζημίᾳ τὸ κέρδος. (enantion de tēi zēmiāi to kerdos.)

“And gain is the opposite of loss.” The article marks τὸ κέρδος as the subject; ἐναντίον is its predicate, and τῇ ζημίᾳ is the dative complement naming what it is opposed to. The copula is omitted, as it often is in compact statements of definition or relation. The companion repeats the predicate, “The opposite”, before Socrates concludes that gain is good.

Keep the relational statement distinct from the inference following it. The dative establishes the opposition of gain and loss. It does not grammatically supply the further premise that the opposite of this bad thing must be good. The preceding questions have identified loss as harmful and bad, so Socrates uses the opposition to transfer the discussion to good gain. The particles track the steps efficiently, but their smoothness should not make the additional logical commitment disappear.

What a claim to prior agreement includes

227d. τὸ κερδαίνειν ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν εἶναι ὠφελεῖσθαι (to kerdainein arti hōmologēsamen einai ōpheleisthai)

“We agreed just now that to gain is to be benefited.” The article turns κερδαίνειν into the subject of an infinitival statement governed by ὡμολογήσαμεν. The second infinitive, ὠφελεῖσθαι, gives its proposed equivalent; the passive form means receiving benefit. This is stronger than saying that gain is a good thing.

The temporal ἄρτι presents the equation as a fresh recollection. Earlier, however, the speakers explicitly agreed that gain was good, not in these words that gaining and being benefited were identical. Socrates immediately adds another claimed agreement, that everyone always wishes for good things. The earlier exchange concerned loving good things and did not expressly include “always”. The construction is therefore a useful checkpoint: a grammatical report of agreement can subtly enlarge what the conversation actually secured. The companion's next resistance concerns harmful gains, precisely where that enlargement matters.

The condition attached to all gains

227d. πάντα τὰ κέρδη βούλονται ἔχειν, εἴπερ ἀγαθά γέ ἐστιν (panta ta kerdē boulontai echein, eiper agatha ge estin)

Good men “wish to have all gains, if indeed they are good”. Πάντα belongs to τὰ κέρδη: the sentence concerns all gains, not simply all good men. The infinitive ἔχειν completes βούλονται, giving the possession they wish for. Εἴπερ introduces an emphatic condition, “if indeed” or “if, as maintained”; γε focuses attention on their being good.

The condition must remain visible. Socrates can appeal to the preceding universal claim about wishing for good things only if the items called gains fall within that description. The companion immediately excludes gains that will harm their recipients. He is challenging the application of the condition, not straightforwardly confessing that good men reject what is good. The indicative ἐστιν does not remove the logical dependence: the sentence can press a premise already accepted in the discussion while still exposing exactly where resistance can arise.

Turning an accusation back on its speaker

228a. ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον σύ με ἐξαπατᾷς (alla tounantion sy me exapatāis)

“It is the opposite: it is you who are deceiving me.” Τοὐναντίον is the contracted form of τὸ ἐναντίον, used here adverbially to reverse the preceding accusation. Socrates had charged the companion with deliberately saying things contrary to their agreements. The companion answers by shifting the roles of deceiver and deceived.

The expressed pronoun σύ is emphatic because the verb already identifies its subject as “you”; με identifies the person allegedly being deceived. This is not a denial that the conversation has become inconsistent. The companion adds that he cannot explain how Socrates twists matters in the arguments. The reversal therefore separates recognition of a disturbing effect from possession of an analysis of it. It also prepares the appeal to Hipparchus: Socrates responds to the accusation through a friend's obligation not to deceive, before returning to the disputed premises.

Taking up a recital from the preceding performer

228b. ἐξ ὑπολήψεως ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ διιέναι (ex hypolēpseōs ephexēs auta diienai)

The rhapsodes are compelled to “go through them in order, each taking up from the last”. The infinitive διιέναι is governed by ἠνάγκασε, “compelled”, with the rhapsodes as its accusative subject. Αὐτά refers to Homer's epics. Ἐφεξῆς supplies succession or order; ἐξ ὑπολήψεως explains the taking-up by which that succession is maintained.

The two expressions work together. “Taking up” should not be reduced to answering someone in an argument, and “in order” need not be expanded into a detailed reconstruction of festival procedure absent from the passage. The immediate claim is coordinated performance rather than disconnected selection. Within Socrates' praise, authority organises the transmission of poetry. The edition notes that a comparable rule is elsewhere attributed to Solon; that historical comparison does not change the grammar or warrant silently replacing Hipparchus as the subject of this narrative.

A purpose clause about educated citizens

228c. ἵν’ ὡς βελτίστων ὄντων αὐτῶν ἄρχοι (hin’ hōs beltistōn ontōn autōn archoi)

Hipparchus educated the citizens “so that he might rule over them as men who were as good as could be”. The purpose clause begins with ἵνα, elided before the following vowel; ἄρχοι is an optative in the past narrative. The genitive αὐτῶν names the people over whom he rules; βελτίστων ὄντων is a participial description of their condition. The ὡς with a superlative gives the maximal force, “as good as possible”.

This is not a claim that Hipparchus wished to surrender rule to the best citizens. He remains the subject of ruling, while their improvement describes the circumstances in which he wants to rule. The construction holds education and government together without stating whether one is merely a means to the other. That distinction is important to the tone of the encomium: the text credits a public benefit while leaving the ruler's place at its centre grammatically unmistakable.

A character-description presented as a reason

228c. ἅτε ὢν καλός τε κἀγαθός (hate ōn kalos te kagathos)

The phrase means “since he was a fine and good man”. The particle ἅτε with the participle presents the character-description as the narrator's explanation for Hipparchus' behaviour. Κἀγαθός contracts καὶ ἀγαθός; τε ... καί joins the two adjectives into the familiar commendatory pair. The grammar places the praise inside the account Socrates is giving, rather than introducing an independently verified judgment.

It explains Hipparchus' refusal to begrudge wisdom to anyone. Immediately before, his wish to educate the citizens has been tied to ruling over them when they are as good as possible. The expression thus supplies a generous motive at a point where civic improvement and the ruler's interests coincide. One can hear the conventional dignity of the formula without assuming that the dialogue guarantees every part of the encomium. The later rivalry for admiration gives the same praise a context in which its sincerity can be weighed.

A sample intended to produce further study

228e. γεῦμα λαμβάνοντες αὐτοῦ τῆς σοφίας (geuma lambanontes autou tēs sophias)

The country people are to be “getting a taste of his wisdom”. The participle λαμβάνοντες belongs to the same series as passing along the roads and reading the inscriptions. Its object γεῦμα is the taste or sample obtained; τῆς σοφίας identifies what is sampled, while αὐτοῦ assigns that wisdom to Hipparchus. The expression is an intellectual use of the language of tasting.

The participles lead into the intended result that these readers would keep coming from the country for further education. A short roadside maxim is therefore an introduction, not the whole curriculum. This purpose follows the wish that citizens should admire Hipparchus' sayings more than Delphi's inscriptions. The taste metaphor makes the attraction gradual and experiential: people encounter something on a familiar journey and are drawn toward more. It also helps explain why the physical placement and brevity of the inscriptions matter to the story.

The dual marks the pair

228e. ἐστὸν δὲ δύο τὠπιγράμματε (eston de dyo tōpigrammate)

“And the inscriptions are two.” Both ἐστόν, the verb “are”, and τὠπιγράμματε, the noun phrase “the two inscriptions”, are dual forms. The latter contracts τὼ ἐπιγράμματε. Greek can mark an exact pair grammatically where English ordinarily needs “both” or “two”; here δύο also makes the number explicit.

The following explanation distributes the pair over the left and right of each Herm. One side locates the marker midway between the town and the deme; the other carries Hipparchus' saying. These are not simply the two moral verses quoted in the surrounding narrative. Socrates first gives one right-side maxim, then mentions another on the Steirian road. Following the dual into the left–right explanation prevents a misleading identification of “the two inscriptions” with the two memorable quotations selected for the reader.

A monument speaks to the passer-by

229a. μνῆμα τόδ’ Ἱππάρχου· στεῖχε δίκαια φρονῶν (mnēma tod’ Hipparchou; steiche dikaia phronōn)

“This is Hipparchus' memorial: go your way with just thoughts.” The first clause has no expressed “is”: τόδε, elided as τόδ’, points to the inscribed object, μνῆμα names it as a memorial, and the genitive identifies Hipparchus. The imperative στεῖχε addresses the traveller. The participle φρονῶν describes how that person is to proceed, while the neuter plural δίκαια supplies the content of the thoughts: just things.

The line joins a permanent marker to a moving reader. Its injunction fits a roadside setting without limiting justice to conduct on the road. The edition identifies the quoted line as a pentameter, the second line of an elegiac couplet; it should not be mistaken for the entire couplet. “Memorial” also need not make this a gravestone: in the narrative Hipparchus himself had arranged the inscriptions before the account reaches his death.

A negative command used in self defence

229b. μνῆμα τόδ’ Ἱππάρχου· μὴ φίλον ἐξαπάτα. (mnēma tod’ Hipparchou; mē philon exapata.)

“This is Hipparchus' memorial: do not deceive a friend.” The opening repeats the memorial formula of the preceding verse. Μή introduces the prohibition, and ἐξαπάτα is a singular imperative addressed to a person reading or hearing it. Φίλον is the object, “a friend”; nothing in the wording restricts the maxim to Hipparchus' own friends.

Socrates turns the command into an argument about the present conversation. He identifies the companion as his friend and says he would not dare to deceive him while disobeying such an authority. The inference requires his actual obedience, not merely the existence of the inscription. The companion will expose that dependence by proposing two alternatives: either Socrates does not regard him as a friend or he fails to obey Hipparchus. The compact imperative thus supplies the terms of an immediate dispute about conduct and trust.

Thinking greatly of an educational achievement

229c. μέγα δ’ ἐφρόνει ἄρα καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων ἐπὶ τῷ παιδεῦσαι ἄνθρωπον (mega d’ ephronei ara kai ho Aristogeitōn epi tōi paideusai anthrōpon)

Aristogeiton “prided himself on having educated a man”. Μέγα is adverbial with ἐφρόνει: to think greatly, hence to entertain a high opinion of oneself. The construction ἐπί with the dative identifies the ground of his pride. The article τῷ makes the aorist infinitive παιδεῦσαι a noun-like expression for the achievement of educating someone.

The aorist presents that educational achievement as a whole, while the imperfect ἐφρόνει describes his continuing attitude in the narrative. Καί includes Aristogeiton too among those whose standing is connected with education; ἄρα gives the telling a note of discovery, rendered “as it turns out”. The next clause makes Hipparchus his opponent. The syntax helps explain the transition from public praise to rivalry: an educational accomplishment becomes a claim to personal distinction, vulnerable when the admiration of a young man moves elsewhere.

An appearance rather than literal danger

229d. Κινδυνεύεις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ οὐ φίλον με ἡγεῖσθαι (kindyneueis toinyn, ō Sōkrates, ē ou philon me hēgeisthai)

The companion begins “It looks, then, Socrates, as though either you do not think me a friend”. Κινδυνεύεις with the infinitive here expresses an apparent or likely conclusion. Translating it as literal danger would misdirect the exchange: the companion is diagnosing Socrates' position after hearing the maxim, not warning him of a physical hazard.

The quoted phrase opens a disjunction. The second branch is that, if Socrates does regard him as a friend, he does not obey Hipparchus. The alternatives test the two supports of Socrates' reassurance: friendship and obedience. Τοίνυν links this diagnosis to the preceding story, making the long encomium relevant to the accusation rather than simply changing the subject. The companion still cannot identify the precise argumentative trick; his complaint is that he cannot be persuaded he is not being deceived.

A retraction offered as a courtesy

229e. ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων (hōsper petteuōn ethelō soi en tois logois anathesthai hoti boulei tōn eirēmenōn)

“Just as when playing draughts, I am willing to take back for you, in the arguments, whatever you wish of what has been said.” The participle πεττεύων supplies the game comparison, not a claim that counters are actually on the table. The infinitive ἀναθέσθαι completes ἐθέλω; σοι marks the person for whose benefit the retraction is offered.

Here ὅτι is “whatever”, followed by the partitive genitive τῶν εἰρημένων, “of the things said”. It does not introduce an explanation meaning “because you wish”. Socrates then itemises possible withdrawals, allowing the companion to preserve several premises and reject the universal goodness of gain. The game language makes revisability a concession within an orderly exchange. It need not imply that Socrates has admitted fraud, since his expressed purpose is to remove the companion's belief that he is being deceived.

Restricting a universal without rejecting every case

230a. Οὔτι πᾶν γε· τουτί μοι ἀνάθου. (outi pan ge; touti moi anathou.)

“Not all of it, at any rate. Take that back for me.” Πᾶν refers to gaining in the preceding question; the companion is refusing the unrestricted claim that all gaining is good. He is not claiming that no gaining is good. Γε focuses the restriction, while τουτί, the emphatic demonstrative, singles out this particular move for withdrawal.

The imperative ἀνάθου answers Socrates' offer to take back an agreed step, and μοι repeats the personal interest in that concession. Socrates immediately interprets the reply as dividing gain into something good and something bad. That division supplies the next inquiry: what must the two share if both are gain? The small difference between “not all” and “none” is therefore structurally decisive. The companion retains a positive kind of gain, making a common definition necessary rather than permitting the whole subject to be dismissed as bad.

Keeping a comparison within its stated respect

230b. κατὰ τὸ σιτίον εἶναι (kata to sition einai)

The expression means “as far as being food goes”. Κατά with the accusative introduces the respect under consideration; the article τὸ turns the infinitive phrase into its complement. Σιτίον is the predicate within that phrase: being food. Good food and bad food differ in quality, but neither is more or less an instance of food simply because of that difference.

The surrounding ταύτῃ, “in this respect”, and ᾗ, “insofar as”, reinforce the restriction. These are not expendable conversational fillers. They keep sameness of kind distinct from equality of goodness, quantity or effect. The subsequent examples of drink and human beings apply the same discrimination. When the argument returns to gain, a reader should check whether the restriction is retained: two acquisitions being equally describable as gain does not, on that ground alone, make their amount or benefit equal.

Extending a comparison to action and experience

230d. πῶς ἄν τις μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον ὁτιοῦν ἂν ποιοῖ ἢ πάσχοι (pōs an tis mallon ē hētton hotioun an poioi ē paschoi)

The question asks how anyone could “do or undergo anything more or less” by means of the thing being considered. Ποιοῖ and πάσχοι form a familiar active–passive range: what one does and what one experiences. The optatives with ἄν make this a question about possibility, while μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον tests degrees. The preceding dative supplies the means or thing through which the doing or undergoing occurs.

The premise is that neither “more” nor “less” belongs to the gains as gains. This follows the comparison of membership in a kind: good and bad men are equally human. The new question extends that comparison to effects or activities. Its breadth is philosophically important. Equal entitlement to a description does not by itself establish equal power to produce benefit or harm. The companion's “Impossible” accepts the extension, clearing the way for a search for the common character of gain.

A definition requested through a shared feature

230d. διὰ τί ποτε ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ κέρδος καλεῖς, τί ταὐτὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὁρῶν; (dia ti pote amphotera auta kerdos kaleis, ti tauton en amphoterois horōn?)

“Why ever do you call both of them gain, seeing what same thing in both?” The first question asks for the ground of a shared name. The participle ὁρῶν then sharpens that request: what common feature does the speaker recognise when applying it? Ταὐτόν contracts τὸ αὐτό, “the same”; ἐν ἀμφοτέροις places that feature in both supposed kinds of gain.

Socrates is no longer asking merely whether bad gain exists. He asks what makes the adjective “bad” modify gain rather than change the subject altogether. The food and drink examples model an answer in terms of nourishment, with quality treated separately. “Seeing” need not imply literal visual perception or a fully stated theory of abstract forms. Here it is the recognition required to explain why one description covers two cases. The companion's difficulty answering prompts Socrates to propose an acquisition-based definition.

Two routes into the proposed definition of gain

231a. πᾶν κτῆμα ὃ ἄν τις κτήσηται ἢ μηδὲν ἀναλώσας, ἢ ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον λάβῃ (pan ktēma ho an tis ktēsētai ē mēden analōsas, ē elatton analōsas pleon labē)

Socrates proposes “every possession that one acquires either without spending anything, or by spending less and getting more”. The indefinite relative clause makes the definition general. Its paired ἤ ... ἤ gives two routes: costless acquisition and a return exceeding expenditure. The aorist participles ἀναλώσας state the expenditure accompanying the acquisition; the second branch expressly adds λάβῃ, “gets”.

The proposed account deliberately leaves the character of the possession unrestricted. Πᾶν, “every”, makes the next test possible: disease can be acquired after a feast at which one spends nothing. Likewise, “less” and “more” initially lack an explicit standard of comparison. The later gold-and-silver example will show why quantity alone is insufficient. Readers should resist silently improving the definition to “every beneficial possession” or “greater value”. Those additions are what the subsequent questions seek to establish.

When acquiring something is not gaining

231b. μηδὲν ἀναλώσας ἀλλ’ εὐωχηθείς, νόσον κτήσηται (mēden analōsas all’ euōchētheis, noson ktēsētai)

The hypothetical guest, “without spending anything, but having feasted”, acquires a disease. The participles establish that he meets the definition's first condition: his acquisition required no expenditure. Κτήσηται is the aorist subjunctive in the conditional scenario begun with ἐάν, and νόσον is its object. Greek can speak of acquiring an illness without treating it as a desirable possession.

The counterexample therefore exploits the breadth of acquisition language rather than a special sense of financial profit. The companion refuses to call the result gain, but accepts health acquired from a feast as gain. The difference is what has been acquired and its effect on the recipient. This response narrows the apparently neutral definition: absence of cost is insufficient. It also anticipates the final appeal to what is worth possessing, where beneficial possession again supplies the criterion that the original formula omitted.

Supplying the missing standard of more

231d. Οὔτι τῇ ἀξίᾳ γε ἀργύριον χρυσίου. (outi tēi axiāi ge argyrion chrysiou.)

“Not in worth, at any rate, is silver more than gold.” The reply is elliptical: the preceding question supplies the comparative “more” and the verb. The dative τῇ ἀξίᾳ specifies the respect in which the comparison must be made. Χρυσίου is the genitive of comparison, while ἀργύριον is the subject whose supposed superiority is denied.

Socrates has insisted that the exchange yields more material. The companion answers that this is not more in the relevant sense. The phrase isolates the central point without requiring a new reconstruction of the implicit weights: increased quantity need not be increased worth. Γε keeps the correction targeted. The reply does not say that silver has no worth whatever, and it does not deny the stated weight comparison. It changes the standard needed for deciding whether the transaction counts as gain or loss.

A perfect infinitive names the state of possession

231e. Τὸ δὲ ἄξιον λέγεις ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλο τι ἢ κεκτῆσθαι; (to de axion legeis axion einai allo ti ē kektēsthai?)

“When you say that something is of worth, you mean that it is worth possessing, don't you?” The first τὸ ἄξιον is substantivised, “what is of worth”; the second ἄξιον predicates worth and receives a specification through the infinitive κεκτῆσθαι. The familiar “anything other than” question invites agreement with that completion.

Κεκτῆσθαι is the perfect infinitive of the acquisition verb. Its force here is the resulting state, possessing or having, rather than the event of acquiring. The shift matters because the preceding exchange compared the worth of quantities received and spent. Socrates now asks what is worth holding, then identifies it as beneficial and therefore good. The grammar makes the added specification explicit. It should not be flattened into a timeless dictionary equation in which exchange value, acquisition and beneficial possession were identical from the beginning.

What agreement has and has not achieved

232b. Ἠνάγκακε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεικεν. (ēnankake gar, ō Sōkrates, mallon eme ge ē pepeiken.)

“It has compelled, yes, Socrates, me at any rate, rather than persuaded.” The subject remains the argument from Socrates' question. Both ἠνάγκακε and πέπεικεν are perfects, presenting its present result: the companion stands compelled but not correspondingly convinced. Μᾶλλον ... ἤ makes the contrast, and ἐμέ γε narrows the response to his own experience after Socrates had spoken of compelling “us”.

The distinction is not between replying and remaining silent: the companion does explicitly agree. He distinguishes the pressure of accepted premises from persuasion. Socrates responds with the possibility that the argument might persuade later, then relies on the agreement available now. Readers should preserve both facts. The ending is neither a simple refusal of the conclusion nor an unqualified announcement of conversion. Its grammar records an assent whose psychological and intellectual completion is still deferred.

A conclusion located within accepted commitments

232c. κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον πάντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοκερδεῖς ἂν εἶεν (kata ton son logon pantes anthrōpoi philokerdeis an eien)

“By your argument all men would be lovers of gain.” Κατά with the accusative identifies the account or reasoning according to which the conclusion follows. The possessive σόν makes the attribution pointed: Socrates returns the result to the companion whose admissions have sustained the exchange. Πάντες includes every person, and the following words expressly include both decent and base people.

The optative εἶεν with ἄν presents the result as what would follow under that account. It is stronger than a detached guess, but the qualifying phrase still matters: the conclusion is attached to the argument the speakers have accepted. This need not settle whether the original reproach has been represented adequately. The subsequent judgment against reproaching someone as gain-loving extends the universal result into a judgment about blame. Tracking that final step requires remembering which sense of loving gain has actually been made universal.

The final participle brings the reproach home

232c. τυγχάνει γὰρ καὶ ὁ ταῦτα ὀνειδίζων αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος ὤν (tynchanei gar kai ho tauta oneidizōn autos toioutos ōn)

“For even the one who casts this reproach is himself, in fact, such a man.” Τυγχάνει with a supplementary participle is an idiom for being in a certain condition, often conveyed by “happens to be” or “is in fact”. Here ὤν supplies the being, and τοιοῦτος refers back to the lover of gain. The construction does not require accidental gain-seeking or chance moral character.

The article turns ὀνειδίζων into a description of a person, “the one reproaching”; αὐτός stresses that very person's inclusion. Καί adds “even” or “also”, making the conclusion rebound on its user. Γάρ supplies the reason offered for saying the reproach is improper. That reason depends on the preceding universal classification. The sentence completes the dialogue's personal reversal, though shared membership in a broad category still leaves the reader to ask whether every possible distinction in manner or motive has been answered.