Forethought and caution

Use in the book

Socrates asks for great forethought at 138b because a request can outrun its speaker’s understanding. The temporal position matters: care must precede the prayer and its possible fulfilment. The later palinode is too late to establish that the original act was safe. A capacity to foresee or withhold judgement is therefore more valuable here than the mere ability to obtain what one wants.

Alcibiades eventually voices the requirement for much caution at 148b. Socrates extends it at 149c to inquiry about what should and should not be said. The question joins religious speech to the earlier definition of intelligence as knowing what one must do and say. It also suggests that caution is active examination, not simply fearful silence.

The immediate recommendation nevertheless is to keep quiet and postpone. Alcibiades is not equipped to select a definite object of prayer, and Socrates doubts that he will tolerate the Spartan formula. Waiting is safer than a risk undertaken through pride. The promise of a teacher prevents this restraint from becoming a principle that nothing should ever be attempted: it is a temporary discipline directed toward learning.

Places to read

1. 138bForethought must guard against harmful requests that the gods might fulfil.
2. 141c–141dAccepting offered possessions at random is judged unsafe.
3. 148a–148b2Alcibiades acknowledges the need for caution himself.
4. 149cCaution includes examining what must and must not be said.
5. 150c–151a2Silence and postponement are the safer present course.

Translation in this edition

The source distinguishes forethought from caution rather than treating them as occurrences of one Greek noun. Its revised English at 148b preserves the lest-construction. At 151a safer is comparative: the dialogue recommends a better course under acknowledged ignorance, not a complete guarantee against every possible harm.