# Ficino Platonic Theology Volume I Lexicon

*A Philological and Philosophical Reading Companion*

October 2026

Authorial Proem and Books I–IV
Diotimos bilingual edition · August 2026 editorial proof

# Contents

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# Introduction

## Scope and purpose

This lexicon accompanies the Authorial Proem and Books I–IV of Marsilio Ficino's *Platonic Theology on the Immortality of Souls*, in the supplied Diotimos bilingual editorial proof of August 2026. It explains the Latin vocabulary, the English translation's choices, the distinctions on which the arguments turn, and the ordinary objects and actions that give those arguments their shape. Its scope is this volume, not the complete eighteen-book work.

Ficino's opening question is why human beings, whose restlessness and bodily fragility can make their earthly condition worse than that of other animals, should nevertheless be understood as capable of blessedness. He begins from that problem and constructs a hierarchy of body, quality, soul, angelic mind and God. The first four books do not simply repeat one proof of immortality. They establish the levels, describe the divine principle, place soul between the extremes, and distinguish kinds and activities of soul. A term's place in that movement matters as much as its most familiar English equivalent.

The Latin *ratio* can concern a reason, an account, a formative principle or rational activity. *Virtus* often means effective power rather than moral virtue. *Species* can designate an intelligible form, an appearance, a natural kind or a form received by a knower. *Spiritus* must be distinguished from soul and mind. A useful reading companion should make these changes accessible without pretending that one English word settles them. It should also explain the smaller verbs and images: receiving, imparting, turning, touching, weaving, making and being made can carry an argument that a list of abstract nouns would miss.

This edition develops the earlier lexicon through the same close-reading approach used for the *Charmides* companion. Extended articles remain central, but they are joined by independently explained Latin vocabulary records, annotated passages, an argument map and several routes for lookup. The aim is substantial coverage of meaningful words and uses. Inflections are not counted as new concepts, and an index redirect is not represented as a definition.

## How to use the articles

**The word** identifies a Latin lemma, phrase or family and explains the senses that the passages require. English article headings are editorial finding aids. A heading that gathers several Latin expressions does not claim that they are interchangeable, and an English term need not reproduce a single Latin technical label.

**In the Platonic Theology** follows the word through this volume's reasoning, imagery and attributions. It distinguishes an assertion Ficino defends from a position he reports, a premise granted temporarily, an objection, a comparison and a promised later demonstration. Related passages are brought together without making their differences disappear.

**The places** supplies annotated comparison-unit references. Further references preserve the earlier lexicon's useful reading routes. A selection of places is not an exhaustive concordance of every occurrence. The complete passage index offers a route through all 533 units, including those whose most useful treatment is in the vocabulary register rather than an extended article.

**In this edition** explains a local translation choice or a textual qualification that affects reading. Dictionary citation forms and exact printed attestations are different. The proof's punctuation and editorial divisions are evidence about this edition, not evidence that Ficino himself numbered or divided every argument in that way.

**See also** links continuations, contrasts and related examples. A link does not identify two concepts. In particular, soul and spirit, will and appetite, thought and imagination, actuality and operation, and divine necessity and external compulsion must remain distinguishable.

The Latin vocabulary register gives each retained record a definition, a local explanation and a source reference. Several records can belong to one larger article. A record may concern a lexical family or a significant phrase rather than a different dictionary lemma. The original-form and English lookup indexes supplement those explanations; their counts should not be added together as though they measured distinct words.

## References and edition

A reference such as **III.2.29** identifies Book III, chapter 2, comparison unit 29 in the supplied Diotimos edition. **Proem.4** identifies the fourth Proem unit. These are editorial anchors. A sentence or inference can run across an anchor, so the cited unit should be read with its neighbours. Source page references identify the supplied 417-page PDF, not the folios and pages of the early printed witnesses named in its footers. In the numbered comparison units, the Latin normally appears on an even-numbered PDF page and its facing English on the following odd-numbered page.

The source describes its Latin as a conservatively normalized reading text based on the Florence printing of 1482 and principally collated against Paris 1559, with a Paris 1641 printing as a later control. Those are the edition's statements. This lexicon checks the supplied Latin against its facing English and apparatus; it does not claim a new collation of those witnesses. Nor does it silently substitute the wording or paragraph numbers of a modern scholarly edition.

For historical orientation, Ficino composed the *Platonic Theology* between 1469 and 1474; it first appeared in print in 1482. Its effort to connect philosophy with religion belongs to his broader project of interpreting Platonic traditions within a Christian understanding of truth.[1]

## Reading the qualifications

The book repeatedly names Plato, Plotinus, Aristotle, Pythagoreans, Hermetic writers and other authorities. What matters first for this companion is what Ficino says they maintain and how he uses the claim. His attribution is not automatically a verified quotation from an

1 Christopher S. Celenza, "Marsilio Ficino," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, substantive revision 28 May 2024, section 2.1, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ficino/. Consulted for historical orientation; the lexical explanations and editorial anchor references follow the supplied Diotimos proof.

independently consulted ancient work. Familiar names can occur within a reported classification rather than as an endorsement of every doctrine associated with that name.

The unnumbered authorial reservation printed before Book I, on source page 13, states that Ficino wishes his assertions here and elsewhere to extend only as far as the Church approves. The edition reports this reservation from its 1482 witness. It governs the reading of the work alongside the local qualifications.

Several passages require particular care. The mental-presence account in **II.6.14–24** is reported through earlier thinkers. The account of divine self-production in **II.12.8–11** is reserved and attributed. The discussion in **IV.1.40–52** is a Pythagorean excursion, and its concluding qualification must not vanish when the passage is summarized. **IV.1.96** makes the sphere-soul account conditional on Christian theological approval. These are part of the argument's meaning, not marginal disclaimers.

Natural examples also need historical distance. Ficino uses the powers of stones, celestial influence, spontaneous generation, physiological effects and the supposed actions of animals as explanations or analogies. This lexicon reports their work in his reasoning. It does not endorse them as contemporary science or offer practical medical or astrological advice.

Several local source problems remain important. At **IV.1.11**, the facing English reverses the relation between a vivifying and motive power and the natural seeds with which it is imbued; the articles follow the Latin relation. The difficult wording at **II.11.17** and **III.2.29** remains unresolved here. **II.12.7** also admits a subject-and-scope question in its account of freedom. The source notes explain these cases. A plausible repair is not printed as an established reading.

## Coverage and its limits

The primary reading coverage comprises all 533 numbered units of the supplied Proem and Books I–IV: 11 in the Proem, 109 in Book I, 228 in Book II, 62 in Book III and 123 in Book IV. The unnumbered authorial reservation, editorial apparatus, locator register and translation glossary were also consulted. The passage index includes every numbered unit, with direct routes to the explanations.

There are 234 extended five-part articles. The Latin register contains 1,291 explained lemma, family and phrase records, bringing together 1,335 local records from the source sections. Its 3,039 distinct printed-form strings include phrases as well as single forms. These are different, overlapping measures of access and explanation, not counts to add together as distinct words. A separate set of 22 passage records explains the Greek expressions quoted in the Latin through Ficino's accompanying glosses.

The vocabulary review distinguished exact attestations, contextually explained families, ordinary grammar and words not separately expanded. Dictionary forms were kept distinct from printed inflections. Similar spelling alone was not accepted as evidence that words have the same meaning: forms of thinking and compelling, dwelling and habitual possession, or the sun and restrictive "only" required different treatment. The register supplies its own definitions and local explanations rather than merely directing the reader to a broad article. Nevertheless, this is a substantial reading lexicon, not a complete morphological dictionary or a concordance of every ordinary repetition.

The earlier 117 articles remain represented, with their supported substantive explanations retained and new lexical, passage and edition commentary added. Related new headings have been consolidated where they explain the same vocabulary, while distinct examples

and senses remain visible. Preserving an article's title alone was not treated as preservation of its analysis.

# Argument map

## Proem

**Proem.1–11 — Philosophy directed toward divine truth.** Ficino presents Plato as joining inquiry to purification, contemplation and worship. Self-knowledge opens a route toward the soul's dignity; Augustine authorizes the project's Christian orientation. The Proem's language of image, mirror, light, shadow and return sets up patterns that recur in the arguments. Proem.10 submits the work's claims to divine law; Proem.11 then dedicates the work to Lorenzo and links philosophical leisure with public authority.

## Book I

**I.1 — Human misery and the need for a higher account.** The opening contrast between earthly vulnerability and the capacity for blessedness motivates the inquiry. Body, quality, soul, angel and God begin to appear as levels to be distinguished rather than interchangeable names for one kind of thing.

**I.2 — Body and the source of bodily action.** Body considered as matter and quantity is divisible and passive. Its actions therefore require explanatory principles beyond bare bulk. Physical examples test the difference between a thing's size and its effective power.

**I.3 — Quality and the need for an indivisible principle.** A form divided in body does not explain its own efficacy or unity. Ficino compares the limitations of bodily quality with the kind of source required to produce and maintain it. Contrasts between extent, intensity and indivisibility carry the ascent. The argument also differentiates natural, mathematical and metaphysical forms by their relation to matter, and dimensions, points, numbers and unity by their relation to parts and position (I.3.12–16).

**I.4 — Soul as a stable source of changing effects.** Quality changes in essence, power and operation. The cause of these effects cannot simply repeat all its dependent features. Soul is introduced through a more stable mode of being that can nevertheless give rise to succession.

**I.5 — From soul to angelic mind.** Soul's stable essence, natural power, acquired dispositions and successive operations must be separated. An intellect that understands together rather than discursively supplies the next level. Ficino explores divisions and rankings without making angelic mind independent of a higher cause.

**I.6 — Beyond angel to unity truth and goodness.** Angelic mind remains multiple and dependent. Arguments from mediation, truth and goodness take the inquiry beyond it. The ascent does not end by turning an especially powerful created mind into God.

## Book II

**II.1 — Unity, truth and goodness as the highest principle.** Ficino identifies the three names reached by the preceding ascent as one divine source. Pure wine illustrates the connection between unity, genuineness and goodness. Things bear traces of these perfections and desire them as their source. The remaining arguments ask whether anything could stand above unity, truth or goodness: a proposed superior would either

depend upon the very perfection it supposedly surpassed, or lack what would make it a genuine and desirable principle.

**II.2 — Why the first principle is one.** Hypothetical rival principles are tested by relations of superiority, equality, difference and commonality. A temporary concession that there are two gods is a step in an objection and reply, not a settled assertion.

**II.3 — Why there is no endless hierarchy of gods.** An infinite sequence of superior causes is challenged through its consequences for effects, order and causal priority. The different senses of infinity should not be collapsed into one numerical puzzle.

**II.4 — Infinite divine power.** Pure act is contrasted with receptive potency and limitation. The source's effective power is not simply the greatest measurable degree among bodily strengths. Examples of limits and dependence explain the distinction.

**II.5 — Eternity.** Duration, truth and the priority of a first cause support the claim that God neither begins nor ceases. Eternity is not introduced as a very long life exposed to ordinary temporal change.

**II.6 — Presence without spatial extension.** Divine power is everywhere without becoming a body spread through space. Contact by power differs from contact by dimensions. The extended report about minds and their contents requires careful attribution and does not erase differences among minds.

**II.7 — Making and preserving.** Created composites depend upon the divine principle. Preservation is not merely the absence of a later destructive event; the argument concerns the continuing dependence of a thing's being and activity.

**II.8 — Activity without toil.** Ficino answers the objection that extensive divine activity would require burdensome deliberation or labour. Analogies with effortless or inward activity help distinguish the divine source from a craftsman fatigued by successive tasks.

**II.9 — Divine understanding, self-knowledge and particulars.** Separation from matter makes forms intelligible and supports Ficino's argument for divine understanding. Perfect self-knowledge depends on no external object that could complete God. Intellectual names apply to God through causal eminence rather than membership in the created genus of minds. In knowing himself as the source of every mode of being, God knows individual things distinctly, including the least. Ficino first illustrates knowledge through a sequence of causes, then expressly denies that God must inspect those causes outside himself. Knowledge of universal order includes its particular parts and relations.

**II.10 — Knowing infinity without enumeration.** Ficino extends divine knowledge from individual things to an unlimited range of actual and possible objects. Infinite power, the potential progressions of nature and number, the inexhaustible divine exemplar, and the human intellect's ability to pass beyond any assigned total supply distinct arguments. An objection equates comprehension with confinement within limits. Ficino replies that infinite self-comprehension imposes no external boundary and requires no successive counting. When he says the infinite is known "as finite," he immediately explains this as simplicity in essence together with multiplicity in a qualified respect.

**II.11 — Forms ideas and willing production.** The forms of effects must be present in their cause, but this does not make God an aggregate of forms or compel creation by a blind necessity. Crafts, images, relations and affect help distinguish divine understanding, will and external production. The difficult wording at II.11.17 remains visible.

**II.12 — Necessity and freedom.** Ficino asks how divine willing can be necessary and free together. External compulsion differs from willing in accordance with one's own

nature. The passage's qualified language of self-production should not be converted into the claim that God comes into existence after not existing.

**II.13 — Love and providential care.** Divine delight in the divine good extends to images and works. Love, ordering, and the care of lower things complete the book's account of the first principle, without making every creature equal in kind or perfection. The closing discussion distinguishes foreknowledge of an action's free manner from compulsion, and preserves rational judgement among particular means (II.13.25–30).

## Book III

**III.1 — Comparing the five levels.** The ascent is retraced as a descent. Number, motion, simplicity, power and dependence are compared across levels. The same general word can designate markedly different modes of possession and activity at different levels.

**III.2 — Soul in the middle.** Soul connects the extremes through understanding, desire and animation. Its middle position is an explanatory role rather than a spatial location. Images of bond, centre and union illuminate the role, but cannot be used to turn an incorporeal soul into an extended piece of matter. The wording at III.2.29 remains unresolved.

## Book IV

**IV.1.1–9 — Earthly life and a proximate living source.** After placing rational soul in the middle of the five grades, Ficino turns to its ranks. The earth's and water's supposed generation, nourishment and growth of living things become evidence of their animation. A remote celestial influence is an accident, so cannot alone explain the production of living substance. An inward living source must receive and specify the general influence, dispose matter, and supply the determinate principles of vines, flies and other products. The argument depends upon the natural philosophy presented in the text, including spontaneous generation.

**IV.1.10–19 — Inward natural art and productive seeds.** Nature is compared with a craft operating within its material. The carpenter within wood and the geometer shaping imagination explain how intellectual principles can direct inward production. Natural art is then distinguished from human art by its substantial forms and essential principles. Spiritual, life-giving seeds account for determinate results where bodily seeds are absent or insufficient. The fire example separates a remote bodily possibility from an adequate actual producer. At IV.1.11, the Latin makes the vivifying and motive power receive natural seeds; the facing English reverses this relation.

**IV.1.20–28 — Extraordinary powers and the distinction from God.** Powers attributed to herbs and stones are offered as further evidence of an animating nature superior to bare bodily qualities. These are historical claims, not verified remedies or physical effects. Ficino then rejects the identification of a sphere's life, or the world's life, with God: a life bound to an animated body is not the self-subsistent first life. God is neither the form of matter nor one component of a cosmic living being, and the changing life of a sphere requires a stable higher guide.

**IV.1.29–40 — Soul between mind and body; spheres and inhabitants.** Angelic mind cannot serve as the body's immediately joined life. Soul provides the required middle, sharing indivisibility with mind while bringing forms into mutable and temporal activity. The transparent-medium image clarifies this mediation. Ficino distinguishes the souls of the elemental and heavenly spheres from the proper souls of their inhabitants, including

stars, beasts and human beings. He argues that sphere-souls are rational and reports accounts of daemons and their bodies. The opening of IV.1.40 completes this discussion before announcing a temporary Pythagorean excursion.

**IV.1.40–52 — A qualified Pythagorean twelvefold scheme.** Within the announced excursion, many souls are gathered under twelve principal souls in each sphere. The zodiacal figures and twelve modes of human life supply corresponding signs at the highest and lowest spheres. Human lives are differentiated by the precedence of reason, anger and desire. The ascent then passes from souls through minds to the One and Good, interpreted through the name Apollo. The ruling minds are introduced with “perhaps,” and the final sentence expressly leaves the Pythagorean conversation and resumes the Platonic order. This scheme must retain those limits.

**IV.1.53–63 — A new argument from celestial motion.** Ficino now begins another proof of the spheres’ life. A first moved sphere requires an inward source of motion. Bodily quality, fixed to a determinate operation and position, is judged insufficient for heaven’s uniform yet varied and returning activity. God cannot be one sphere’s particular mover alongside other proportionate movers; as goodness, he moves as the desired end. An inward form possessed of life and reason must desire that end and produce the bodily movement. Even the comparison with Archimedes’ mechanical spheres is redirected toward a living and rational source.

**IV.1.64–73 — The self-moving middle and the celestial living being.** The immediate mover cannot be an unmoved angel. A self-moving soul connects stable angelic activity with a body moved by another. Its power is indivisible and wholly present throughout its sphere, without being confined like a geometrical point. Heaven’s generative and circular activity supplies further arguments for life. Ficino then treats soul and sphere as one enduring living being, using the supposed purity and balance of celestial bodies to explain their fitness for animation and knowledge. “Almost spiritual” still describes bodies.

**IV.1.74–79 — Elemental movement and the limits of apparent self-motion.** The Platonist account extends animation to the elements. As a magnet draws iron, a sphere’s soul is said to recall separated particles. Apparent spontaneous movement therefore need not be movement through a body’s own power. Proper circular motion within a natural place is distinguished from straight-line restoration to it. Earth is still treated as resting, with an alternative attributed to Egelias. Plants and stones are distinguished from beasts and humans by their dependence on the earth, and differences among bodies support corresponding distinctions among their souls.

**IV.1.79–83 — Arguments for one world-soul.** The chapter moves from distinct bodily souls to one soul above the individual spheres. One living maker is said to require one living work; the common primary matter receives a corresponding common soul; and the cooperation of contrary and separated members points to one animating source. The human soul’s whole presence in each bodily part supplies the analogy for the world-soul’s undivided presence. These arguments connect the world’s parts without identifying the subordinate souls with one another or identifying the world-soul with God.

**IV.1.84–87 — Rational order and different causal contributions.** Celestial regularity is attributed to unerring wisdom rather than lifeless necessity. Heaven’s instrumental preparation of bodies for intellectual souls supplies a further argument for intelligent direction. Ficino reports the Magian names Oromasis, Mitris and Arimanis as God, mind and soul, assigning unity, order and motion to them respectively. Natural kinds receive being, unity, order and perpetuity from higher stable causes, while their multiplication and

change proceed through soul and heaven. A kind's continued succession is therefore different from its individuals' permanence.

**IV.1.88–93 — Reported agreement and the elemental objection.** Ficino names Peripatetic as well as Platonic and Christian authorities in discussing heavenly animation. The elemental spheres are a separate point of dispute. The Platonist reply distinguishes complete elements, which serve the whole world, from particles mixed for particular bodies. Complete elements mediate influences to lower things. Purity, mixture and balance then explain differing capacities for extraordinary operations, life, sensation and reason within this historical account. A well-proportioned mixture can be beneficial; mixture is not uniformly a term of blame.

**IV.1.94–96 — Paired powers, three ranks and a final reservation.** The reported Orphic names distinguish each cosmic soul's knowing power from its life-giving and governing power. The nine Bacchus–Muse pairs include the world-soul's pair and should not be confused with the twelve-sphere count. Ficino concludes with three ranks: world-soul, twelve sphere-souls, and the many souls within the spheres. He subjects the Platonist account of sphere-souls to examination and approval by Christian theologians. The closing quotation attributed to Plato retains the alternative that soul is present to, or dwells within, each celestial body.

**IV.2 — How souls move bodies and spheres.** Thought and appetite explain purposive motion; changing effects require a cause capable of varied activity. Ficino compares stable angelic activity with the succession of soul. The treatment of celestial motion must retain its qualifications rather than becoming a simple claim that all things move or that created motion is independent of God.

# Distinctions for close reading

**Body and matter.** Body is treated through matter and quantity. The lowest level of the fivefold ascent is therefore often named body; replacing it everywhere with matter would conceal the role of extension and division in the opening arguments.

**Extent and intensity.** A larger body need not possess a more intense quality. A diminution of extent differs from remission of intensity. The distinction helps explain why quantity does not suffice as a cause of activity.

**Essence power and operation.** These three can vary differently. Soul can remain stable in essence while its operations follow one another. An acquired habit is not the same as a natural power, and the possession of a habit need not exclude its actual exercise.

**Actual habitual and potential possession.** Angel, soul and matter are compared through modes of possessing forms or principles. These are not simply different quantities of the same information. Matter's confused potential reception differs from soul's habitual possession and angelic actual understanding.

**Independence and stability.** A created intellect's stable activity does not make it self-caused or independent. Divine simplicity and the stability attributed to angelic mind must remain distinct.

**Image and identity.** Mirror, light, shadow, statue and portrait can explain dependence, appearance, cognition or likeness. The relation changes with the example. An image does not become its exemplar merely because it communicates something of it.

**Priority and chronology.** What is prior by nature or causal dependence need not occur earlier in time. Words for beginning, proceeding and returning must be read in their local construction rather than automatically turned into a chronological narrative.

**An argument's assumption and its conclusion.** Ficino frequently grants an opponent's proposal to expose its consequences. Questions, commands to suppose, statements introduced as someone else's opinion and concluding qualifications are substantive reading vocabulary.

# Article directory


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# Lexicon

## Act and operation

**Latin:** *actus*; *actio*; *operatio*; *agere*; *operari*; *actus primus*; *potentia*; *purus actus*; *merus actus*; *potentia susceptiva atque passiva*; *vigor agendi*; *actum*; *actu*

**The word.**

Actus may denote actuality, a present act, or the realized exercise of a capacity. Actio and operatio emphasize an agent's doing, including both inward cognition and outward production. They must be distinguished from potentia and from habitus, a settled possession.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

*Actus* can mean actuality, realized being, a present act, or the exercise of a power. *Actio* and *operatio* ordinarily emphasize what an agent does. Their relation is clearest in the triad essence, power, operation: the soul remains stable in essence while its operations occur successively; quality changes in all three respects. An operation such as heating water takes time, whereas a superior stable operation completes its work without succession. Natural philosophers also call form act because form supplies determinate being and efficacy. These uses differ from the soul's acquired power passing from potency into act and then into habit.

The opposition to potency becomes a measure of dependence. Matter is pure receptive capacity, while quality, soul, and angel combine actuality with reception: quality receives bodily division, soul acquires what it previously lacked, and angel receives being, illumination, and intelligible forms. Angelic potency does not require bodily matter. God's act alone contains no passive or receptive component. Ficino reasons that act considered in itself is not limited; limits arise from a receiving subject or a limiting cause. A second pure act could not differ from the first without an addition compromising its purity. Colored light illustrates the difference: red or green light is light qualified by something further. Matter contains forms confusedly as possibilities, whereas God contains them distinctly and actually.

Book IV applies the distinction to production and possession. A transition from potency to act requires a cause already possessing the corresponding act, or an equal or superior one; the remote possibility of fire in colliding cold bodies is insufficient by itself to explain its production. Angel holds principles actually and together, soul habitually, and matter potentially. These are modes of holding content, not three unrelated inventories. The lower powers of celestial soul actualize their seeds successively rather than all at once.

In II.4.6, *actus primus* names the divine act on which primary matter and the essences of minds and souls depend. Divine operation is identical with divine essence and understanding, not an acquired activity that perfects a previously incomplete God. Ficino distinguishes activity remaining within the agent, such as knowing and desire, from activity passing into external matter. This distinction does not deny divine external effects. Creation, indeed, exceeds the actualization of a receptive material: nothingness is not even a passive capacity. Finally, action is prior to the passion of being acted upon, supporting the argument for agents that move without being moved. Context therefore determines whether *actus* names achieved being, inward activity, an outward operation, or a power's present exercise.

**The places.**

- **I.4.1–5, PDF 54–59**. Essence, power and operation distinguish wholly changing quality from the partially stable third essence.
- **I.5.1–4, PDF 60–63**. Potency, act and habit govern acquired power; perpetual act is contrasted with inactivity.
- **II.8.5, PDF 162–163**. Pure being, essential power and deliberation are distinguished as modes of acting.
- **II.9.13, PDF 168–169**. Divine voluntary cognition and operation are identified without excluding effects outside God.

**Further passage references.** I.3.1 (PDF pp. 28–29); I.4.1, I.4.5 (pp. 54–55, 58–59); I.5.1–I.5.4 (pp. 60–63); I.5.19 (pp. 74–75); II.4.1–6, pp. 122–125; II.8.4–5, pp. 160–163; II.9.5–8, pp. 166–167; II.9.13, pp. 168–169; II.11.1, PDF 182–183; III.1.9–12, PDF 244–249; IV.1.15, pp. 288–289; IV.1.19, pp. 290–291; IV.1.87, pp. 326–327; IV.2.9–IV.2.12, pp. 336–341; IV.2.19, pp. 344–345

**In this edition.**

The translation's "act," "activity," "operation" and "actuality" reflect different objects and contrasts. I.5.1's transition into habit must not be erased by treating habitus as another occurrence of present activity. In II.8.5 acting through being means pure being only of the first agent; subordinate agents act through an essential power.

**See also.**

Power and potency; Motion and stability; Form; Essence and substance; Matter; Being; Choice and deliberation; Intellect and intellection; Body and bulk; Creation; Quality; Soul; Unity and multiplicity; Habitual possession; Seeds

## Affect

**Latin:** *affectus*; *affectum*; *afficit*; *voluntatis affectum*; *affectu*; *affectiones*

**The word.**

Affectus is an inclination or engagement, not necessarily a passing emotion. Psychological affectio overlaps with this use, while afficere can more generally mean to modify or affect.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Affect names an inclination or engagement through which cognition becomes effective, rather than merely a passing emotion or fondness. In II.11.31–33, Ficino compares cognition in creatures to an image that produces no substantial effect without an affective movement. The movement appears more essential, and the force of its action corresponds to its strength. He extends this analogy to divine intelligence: divine will must possess an immensely powerful and delightful affective engagement. Affect is then connected with the beginning of generation in creatures and the origin of creation in God. His illustration of an ostrich gazing intently at its egg belongs to the passage's natural lore, not to an independently validated account of incubation.

In IV.2.15–18, psychological affection connects the activities of souls to changing bodily and cosmic effects. Vigorous thought and affect are said to stir human spirits and humors; analogously, a varied succession of cosmic effects requires a varied succession of affections in the producing souls. A wholly stable cause considered by itself produces a

stable work, while a moved soul mediates changing effects. This does not attribute human emotional disorders to celestial souls, whose administration is elsewhere described as orderly and unwearied. The comparison concerns directed psychic activity, its bodily consequences, and its succession.

The Latin families overlap, but their contexts matter. *Affectus* and the psychological uses of *affectio* here concern inclination and soul-condition. The more general passive modification designated by *affectio* and *passio* elsewhere is treated under Affection and passivity; not every affected thing feels an emotion.

**The places.**

- **II.11.31–33, PDF 196–199**. Affective engagement is presented as making cognition effective and as connecting will with pleasure and production.
- **IV.2.16, PDF 342–343**. Thought and affect are compared with changes in spirits and humours to explain successive cosmic effects.

**Further passage references.** II.11.31–33, PDF 196–199; IV.2.15–IV.2.18, pp. 342–343

**In this edition.**

“Affect” and “affection” require their context: the ostrich example describes a supposed connection between directed cognition and generation, not verified physiology. The language of changing celestial affections concerns successive directed activity rather than automatically attributing human emotional disorder to heaven.

**See also.**

Appetite and desire; Love and pleasure; Will; Sense and imagination; Fate; Spirit; Affection and passivity

## Affection and passivity

**Latin:** *affectio*; *passio*; *affici*; *pati*; *patiens*

**The word.**

Passio is undergoing action or passivity; patiens is its recipient. Affectio is often a bodily condition or modification, while affici means to be affected. Neither noun must denote an emotion.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

An *affectio* here is often a condition or modification, not an emotion. A body’s extension and its being affected are called kinds of *passio*: passivity or undergoing action. The *patiens* is the recipient of action, paired with the *agens*, the agent. Ficino initially denies that body precisely as body acts, then assigns bodily effects to form and quality. In reporting Plotinus, he describes dimensions and qualities as the earliest passive conditions of matter; he also reports a different distinction under which quality acts upon both its own and foreign matter, though insufficiently. The passage thus compares different philosophical formulations rather than offering one unqualified definition. In the argument for angels, action and passion are asymmetric: moving is prior to being moved, and Ficino reasons that the former may exist without the latter. “Passion” in this discussion does not normally mean a strong feeling or moral vice.

**The places.**

- **I.2.1–4, PDF 18–21**. Body as body is passive; quantitative separation impedes agent, recipient and transmission.
- **I.3.19–20, PDF 42–43**. Different attributed accounts agree that bodily quality is not a sufficient first source of action.
- **I.5.19, PDF 74–75**. Moving is an action distinct from being moved, supporting the inference to unmoved movers.

**Further passage references.** I.2.1–I.2.4 (PDF pp. 18–21); I.3.19–I.3.20 (pp. 42–43); I.4.2 (pp. 56–57); I.5.19 (pp. 74–75)

**In this edition.**

The agent/patient wording preserves a causal opposition. At I.3.19, distinguish Ficino's report of Plotinus from the alternative account introduced afterward; the two accounts assign different degrees of activity to quantity and quality.

**See also.**

Act and operation; Body and bulk; Quality; Motion and stability

## Agreement and hypothetical concession

**Latin:** sint, si placet; concedetur; admittimus; detur; concedet forsitan; si primum detur; si concedatur alterum

**The word.**

Concedere and admittere can grant a claim for examination without affirming its truth. Detur, "let it be granted," marks a branch of an argument. Ficino also uses the subjunctive sint with si placet to invite a deliberately temporary supposition.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The invitation to posit "twin gods" begins a refutation, not a second theological position. The branches then test complete difference, complete agreement, and partial agreement. The language of granting keeps the reader oriented through this exhaustive division. When Ficino says a first alternative will not be conceded, he has supplied reasons why it cannot serve the opponent's proposal.

A new imagined interlocutor in II.3 may accept one God above the angel while maintaining an endless sequence of higher gods. That limited concession is precisely what the next chapter contests. Elsewhere the alternatives "from its own necessity" and "from elsewhere" test the angel's proposed independence. The conditional grammar must survive abridgment: a conclusion within a rejected hypothesis is not a claim Ficino adopts about the actual world.

**The places.**

- II.2.1, II.2.2 (PDF pp. 104–105): The provisional two-god hypothesis and its three alternatives
- II.3.1 (PDF pp. 116–117): A supposed concession introduces the infinite hierarchy to be refuted
- II.7.14 (PDF pp. 148–149): Alternative grants test the origin of an angel's distinguishing property

**In this edition.**

The translation's "if you please," "if … is granted," and "perhaps someone will grant" preserve differences between an invitation, a logical assumption, and an imagined opponent's position. "We desire" in II.2.2 identifies the desired result of the proof; it does not turn that result into an unsupported premise.

**See also.**

Common and proper; Redundancy and uselessness; God.

## Always and everywhere

**Latin:** semper; ipsum semper; sempiternitatem; ubi; ubique; ipsum ubique; nusquam; usquam

**The word.**

Semper ordinarily means always, ubi where, ubique everywhere, and nusquam nowhere. Ficino also substantivizes these adverbs: ipsum semper and ipsum ubique become "the very always" and "everywhere itself." This grammatical move distinguishes a condition of duration or presence from one item lasting or occupying a place.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

God is not simply one of the things that last always. In II.5.4 he is identified with sempiternity and with always itself. II.6 makes the spatial counterpart: things are in God, and even the "where" exists through God. Thus God can be said to be nowhere in the sense of being contained by no place and nowhere absent in the sense that nothing exists independently of him.

The dramatic exchange between reason and imagination develops this distinction. Imagination takes everywhere to mean the total bodily extension and then doubts that God fills it. Reason instead makes that extension dependent upon a more comprehensive reality. This is why the statements "in all things" and "all things in him" should be read together. Neither a giant spatial body nor a divine object located outside a container captures the chapter's intended relation.

**The places.**

- II.5.2, II.5.3, II.5.4 (PDF pp. 126–127): Simple duration is distinguished from temporal flux and named the very always
- II.6.8 (PDF pp. 130–131): Nowhere as uncontained and nowhere absent as universally sustaining
- II.6.12, II.6.13 (PDF pp. 132–135): Everywhere itself is distinguished from the corporeal extension imagination supplies

**In this edition.**

The English quotation marks around "always," "where," and "everywhere" mark adverbs treated as names. Sempiternitas here is not safely defined as merely endless successive time, since the text calls it simple and abiding.

**See also.**

Omnipresence and place; Eternity and time; Imagination and deceptive clothing; Indwelling and presence.

## Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities

**Latin:** Anebon et Abamon Aegyptii sacerdotes; Plotinus; Iamblicusque; Iulianus Platonici; voluerunt; Quorum sententia; Haec illi de mente

**The word.**

The two first names are identified as Egyptian priests; Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Julian as Platonists. Voluerunt here reports what they maintained, rather than a wish. Quorum sententia, “their position,” and Haec illi de mente, “so much for their account of mind,” frame the exposition.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino attributes to these authorities the view that every angelic or animating mind spreads whole throughout immensity without mutual confusion. The following arguments appeal to independence from matter, analogies between eternity and space, immunity from change, mind as divine expression, the range of thought and desire, and mind’s essential inclination toward God. The final candle example explains how universal presence could coexist with conspicuous activity in a particular region.

The opening of II.6.14 first continues Ficino’s account of God. Its later naming clause introduces the broader theory of every mind; the chapter’s last sentence then returns to God. This precise transition matters more than loosely labeling the whole chapter either Ficino’s doctrine or a quotation. No independent identification of Julian, or historical reconstruction of the priestly names, is needed to explain their local function.

**The places.**

- II.6.14, II.6.15 (PDF pp. 136–137): The named authorities and “their position” open the reported argument
- II.6.16, II.6.20, II.6.23 (PDF pp. 136–141): Temporal, linguistic, and essential-inclination grounds develop that position
- II.6.24 (PDF pp. 142–143): The candle illustration closes with an explicit return from their account to God

**In this edition.**

“Animating” for animalem and animales is essential: these are minds belonging to soul or giving life, not minds confined to nonhuman animals. The apparatus (PDF p. 370) notes Iamblicusque in the base text and a different form in later witnesses; the English uses the conventional Iamblichus. This is an apparatus report, not a new collation. The remaining supplied names are retained without conjectural identification.

**See also.**

Mind; Word and meaning; Candles and the hall; Heart and mistaken location.

## Angel

**Latin:** *angelus*; *angeli*; *mens angelica*; *mentes*; *nuntii*; *angelicae vitae*; *mens*

**The word.**

Angelus names a separate intellectual nature; mens can name either such a nature or the intellectual part of soul. Nuntius is “messenger,” the interpretive naming joined to angelus.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Angel names the fourth level of the ascending hierarchy: above soul and below God. In the Platonist account developed in Book I, the angel is indivisible and immutable in essence, power, and operation. Its understanding apprehends its objects together rather than through the soul's successive thoughts, and it can move a body without itself being moved with that body. Ficino explicitly marks this complete immobility as what the Platonists say, with other positions deferred.

Immobility does not make the angel absolutely simple or self-sufficient. It is an immobile multiplicity, containing essence, being, the power and act of understanding, and numerous understood forms. IV.2.6 further qualifies its stability: the angel can be called mutable insofar as it depends on another, yet its immediate origin from God and return to divine stability make it stable. Angelic immutability thus differs from divine independence. The imagined transformation of an entire soul into pure mind illustrates angelic cognition; it is not an account of a human soul literally changing into an angel.

Ficino calls the separate minds discussed through Aristotle 'angels and messengers,' presenting that terminology as Hebrew and later philosophical usage. He argues for very many, virtually innumerable, angelic species and questions counting them solely by celestial motions. Not every angel is assigned to move a sphere. Nor is an angel the sphere's immediately indwelling life. That role requires soul, which resembles angel in indivisibility and freedom from place but resembles body through changing activity and a relation to time. Soul mediates the angelic forms and order into divisible matter.

The distinction remains important within celestial psychology. A sphere's soul has an intellectual part that can hold its ideas simultaneously, and that part is called a mind. Consequently, not every *mens* is an independently subsisting angel: mind within soul, soul animating its body, and angelic mind above soul remain different levels and functions.

**The places.**

- **I.5.19–22, PDF 74–77**. Unmoved minds are distinguished from bodily movers and from a fixed census based only on motions.
- **I.6.1–6, PDF 82–85**. Angelic stability coexists with intellectual multiplicity and dependence on a higher unity.
- **I.6.8–10, PDF 86–89**. The enlarged-eye and pure-mind analogies distinguish an angel's reception of truth from identity with truth.
- **IV.1.31, PDF 296–297**. Angelic life is intellectual alone, unlike sphere-souls' intellectual and animating powers.

**Further passage references.** I.1.5–I.1.7 (PDF pp. 16–17); I.5.14–I.5.28 (pp. 68–81); I.6.1–I.6.6 (pp. 82–85); IV.1.29–IV.1.33, pp. 296–299; IV.1.64–IV.1.67, pp. 314–317; IV.2.6–IV.2.11, pp. 336–339; I.6.9, PDF pp. 86–87

**In this edition.**

I.5.20 expressly calls "angels and messengers" Hebrew and later philosophical names for the minds under discussion. I.6.1 marks complete angelic immobility as Platonist doctrine and defers other opinions. The hypothetical pure mind in I.6.9 is an explanatory comparison, not literal human metamorphosis.

**See also.**

Mind; Intellect and intellection; Unity and multiplicity; Number; Order and harmony; Degree and mediation; Soul; Whole and parts; Intellectual and animating powers

## Animating and animal

**Latin:** *animalis*; *animales vires*; *animalia*; *animal*; *animantes*

**The word.**

Animal means a living being, potentially including humans and cosmic living wholes. Animalis can mean belonging to an animated body or its life-giving powers; it does not necessarily mean beast-like.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The family of words should not automatically be restricted to nonhuman beasts. At IV.1.31 the *animales vires* are the powers through which particular human minds reach and move their bodies; the apparatus expressly explains *animalis* as belonging to or animating a living body. Likewise, *animalia* includes human beings in IV.1.37, where flight, buildings, and machines establish independence from the earth. Ficino also calls the world a vast *animal* and describes spheres with their souls as indissoluble living beings. The semantic range thus extends from familiar organisms to the cosmos as an organized living unity. “Animal” can be retained when the historical breadth is clear, but “living being” often prevents an unintended contrast with humans. His cosmic use is a substantive philosophical claim supported by analogies of parts, life, and governance; it is not merely decorative personification.

**The places.**

- **I.1.1, PDF 14–15**. Human beings are included in the comparison among animals while distinguished from beasts.
- **IV.1.31, PDF 296–297**. Animales vires are the body-reaching and body-moving powers mediated through soul.
- **IV.1.38, PDF 300–301**. Animalia includes celestial living beings as well as earthly and aquatic creatures.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.31, pp. 296–297; IV.1.37, pp. 300–301; IV.1.71–IV.1.73, pp. 318–319; IV.1.82–IV.1.83, pp. 324–325; apparatus p. 390

**In this edition.**

The English “animal powers” at IV.1.31 can mislead if read as irrational or nonhuman powers: the Latin expressly explains them as the souls through which human minds reach their bodies. Keep the adjective’s animating sense beside the noun’s broader living-being sense.

**See also.**

Life; World soul; Intellectual and animating powers

## Apelles and the meadow

**Latin:** *Apelles; pratum; tabula; pingere; flos; herba; exprimere; paulatim; subito*

**The word.**

Apelles is the named painter; pratum is a meadow, tabula a panel, pingere painting, and exprimere representing or reproducing. Subito and paulatim distinguish the immediate presentation from gradual work.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The example answers a precise objection: if higher causes move soul, how can soul move itself? The whole meadow presents itself and kindles Apelles's desire at once. His observing individual flowers and painting them proceeds gradually. Ficino assigns the beginning and end of the activity to the meadow, but its successive temporal manner to the painter's soul. The external source and object do not remove the inward source of sequence. He then applies the comparison to soul's wish to paint itself in the likeness of God and angel through contemplation, character, and action. The application joins intellectual and ethical formation; it is not merely an account of visual copying. Self-motion is thus compatible with received direction while remaining distinct from independence of any higher source.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.1.27 (Latin PDF p. 256; English PDF p. 257).** The painter is introduced to answer the self-motion objection.
- **III.1.28 (Latin PDF p. 258; English PDF p. 259).** Presentation and kindling are acts; gradual consideration and painting are motions.
- **III.1.30 (Latin PDF p. 258; English PDF p. 259).** The meadow is beginning and end; soul is the spring of succession.
- **III.1.31 (Latin PDF p. 258; English PDF p. 259).** Self-painting extends the analogy to contemplation, character, and action.

**In this edition.**

This is an illustrative scene narrated by Ficino. The supplied passage does not independently establish a historical painting or event in Apelles's life. "Panel" keeps tabula's material sense, while "paint itself" preserves the deliberately extended metaphor.

**See also.**

Motion and stability; Self knowledge; Art and nature; Principle.

## Apollo

**Latin:** *universalis Apollo*; *Apollinem*; *unum ipsum*; *ipsum bonum*

**The word.**

Apollo is a divine name used at different levels of the reported cosmology. Universalis Apollo identifies unity itself in the Pythagorean exposition; the particular Phoebus in the zodiac list has a different, restricted role.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

In the explicitly Pythagorean interlude, Apollo names unity beyond any particular unified thing. One mind still combines mind with oneness; Ficino's ascent passes beyond it to the One without qualification. He reports a wordplay relating Apollo to simplicity and separation from multiplicity, and then identifies the first One with the first Good. This is an attributed philosophical interpretation of a divine name rather than an independently established etymology. The passage's Greek is editorially regularized according to Ficino's Latin glosses, as the apparatus explains. Apollo also appears as the ruler whose musical command orders the chorus of Muses, and later as the splendor of an invisible sun around which Muses and Bacchuses revel. These meanings must be distinguished from the "particular Phoebus" assigned to Gemini in the zodiacal list. The name's level and function vary with context.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.43, PDF 304–305**. A particular Phoebus is assigned to Gemini, distinct from the universal Apollo.
- **IV.1.51, PDF 306–307**. Universal Apollo names the One beyond a mind that is merely one, and is identified with the Good.
- **IV.1.95, PDF 332–333**. Apollo becomes the splendour of the invisible sun around which the Bacchuses and Muses revel.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.43, pp. 304–305; IV.1.51–IV.1.52, pp. 306–309; IV.1.95, pp. 332–333; apparatus p. 391

**In this edition.**

The proposed connections of Apollo's name with simplicity and separation from the many are attributed wordplay, not an independently established etymology. The supplied Greek and Latin glosses belong to the edition's treatment; they should not silently be made proof of historical derivation.

**See also.**

Good and goodness; Twelve; Bacchus and the Muses

## Appetite and desire

**Latin:** *appetitus*; *appetere*; *cupere*; *expetere*; *nixus*; *appetibile*; *amor*; *appetitio*; *inclinatio*; *incitamentum boni*; *cupiditas*; *aviditas*; *appetit*

**The word.**

Appetitus is directed desire or tendency toward good; appetere, cupere and expetere name kinds of seeking. Nixus and incitamentum emphasize striving or prompting. Appetite is broader than hunger and does not always imply deliberation.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Appetite is directed tendency toward good, whether the good is absent and sought or present and embraced. It extends beyond bodily hunger and conscious human wishes. Ficino distinguishes insentient nature's inclination, sensation's appetite, and intellect's will. An object moves desire as good rather than simply as large or numerous: among things judged bad, people prefer the fewer or smaller. A thing in motion likewise seeks a completion it lacks, revealing dependence upon a more perfect source.

The universal orientation of desire supports an argument about origin and end. Effects seek the goodness from which they receive being, preservation, and perfection. All things desire good, whereas not all can attain or desire mind. Goodness thus has wider scope than intelligence, and the mind itself seeks understanding because it is good. A proposed principle beyond goodness would either be undesired or desirable through goodness, defeating its supposed superiority. A first source and final end supply what moves and settles appetite; an endless sequence of higher goals would leave it without ultimate orientation. In the reported account of mind's presence, essential, vital, and intellectual inclinations toward God are distinguishable, with essential orientation preceding deliberate thought.

This necessity does not make each particular judgment correct. A person can seek a harmful thing under an apparent good, or choose among means while remaining necessarily oriented toward goodness as such. Ficino compares appetite to sight finding light in every color: the common object does not erase differences among particular objects. Even a wish to desire nothing presents freedom from desire as a good. Apparent wisdom may satisfy someone who lacks it, although life requires possession of what that person actually judges beneficial.

Book IV gives desire a cosmological role. God moves heaven as a desired end, while an interior living form desires that good and brings about bodily movement. Celestial desire is portrayed as rational rather than blind like a stone's tendency or irrational like a beast's appetite. Thought arouses appetite within the soul's ordered or fated activity. Euclid's projected journey illustrates the difference between a general plan and particular execution: imagination presents a step, appetite selects it, and the feet perform it.

Ficino also attributes desire to matter and celestial bodies without implying human-like deliberation. Matter seeks forms it cannot possess simultaneously, so succession offers a qualified fulfillment. Saturn's sphere seeks through movement to enjoy everywhere the soul that is already wholly present everywhere. Desire here expresses an inferior mode of being's orientation toward fuller realization; the subject and object determine its particular meaning.

**The places.**

- **I.2.14, PDF 24–25**. Choosing smaller or fewer bad things shows that quantity alone is not desire's object.
- **I.5.4–6, PDF 62–63**. Motion seeks a completion lacking in the moving thing.
- **I.6.16–19, PDF 92–95**. Desire for the Good has wider scope and greater priority than desire for mind.
- **II.13.30, PDF 236–237**. Free judgement selects among means to the good rather than cancelling the basic orientation toward good.

**Further passage references.** I.2.14 (PDF pp. 24–25); I.5.4–I.5.6 (pp. 62–63); I.6.14, I.6.16 –I.6.19 (pp. 90–95); II.1.2, pp. 98–99; II.1.6–7, pp. 102–103; II.3.9–10, pp. 120–121; II.6.23, pp. 140–141; II.7.4–5, pp. 144–145; II.11.29–30, PDF 196–197; II.12.5–6, PDF 204–205; II.13.29–30, PDF 236–237; IV.1.61–IV.1.62, pp. 312–315; IV.2.1–IV.2.2, pp. 334–335; IV.2.13–IV.2.16, pp. 340–343; IV.2.20, pp. 344–345; IV.2.25, pp. 348–349

**In this edition.**

The translation distinguishes desire, inclination, appetite and will according to the subject and object. "As good" or "in respect of good" translates ratione boni: an apparent good may be pursued without the agent's judgement being correct.

**See also.**

Good and goodness; Freedom and necessity; Need and sufficiency; End and limit; Principle; Communication and imparting; Mind; Choice and free judgment; Will; Fate; Sense and imagination; Matter

## Archer and target

**Latin:** *sagitta; sagittarius; signum; prudentia; dirigere; praescribere*

**The word.**

Sagitta is an arrow, sagittarius an archer, and signum here a mark or target. Prudentia names the archer's intelligent skill. It is not the same use of signum as a piece of evidence or a constellation.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The analogy follows the claim that natural bodies repeatedly reach definite ends while remaining ignorant of their own movement. Since they cannot prescribe their own end, Ficino concludes that another source prescribes it, just as the archer directs arrows toward the mark. The point is the distinction between directed movement and the mover's knowledge of the direction. A body's reaching an end does not prove that the body itself consciously deliberated. Conversely, the comparison is not the whole account of providence: Ficino soon emphasizes inward governance through each nature, and says that souls are attracted and persuaded rather than dragged. An arrow's externally directed flight therefore must not become an indiscriminate model for human choice.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.13.9 (Latin PDF p. 220; English PDF p. 221).** The arrow comparison explains assigned ends in unknowing bodies.
- **II.13.12 (Latin PDF p. 224; English PDF p. 225).** Inward presence qualifies any model of an external operator.
- **II.13.26 (Latin PDF p. 234; English PDF p. 235).** Souls are governed in a manner preserving their freedom.

**In this edition.**

The translation's "mark" accurately selects the target-sense of signum. "Skill" renders prudentia contextually; "prudence" without explanation might misleadingly imply a separate ethical discussion.

**See also.**

Paths and prescribed ends; Intention; Providence; Persuasion and compulsion.

## Archimedes and the bronze spheres

**Latin:** *aeneae … Archimedis … sphaerae*, *temperatione*, *aequabilior*.

**The word.**

*Aeneus* means made of bronze or copper alloy. *Temperatio* is an arrangement, balanced constitution, or temperament; the context determines how physical or technical the term is. *Aequabilis* means even or uniform, not necessarily numerically equal to another thing.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Archimedes' revolving bronze spheres enter as a hypothetical alternative explanation: suppose the heavens move by a certain arrangement as those spheres once did. Ficino's reply does not provide a mechanical description of the device. It insists that the heavenly arrangement must be at least as substantial, living, and rational as the constitution that moves earthly animals' limbs, since heaven is nearer first substance, life, and reason and more uniform in nature and motion. The example is therefore absorbed into his hierarchical argument rather than establishing autonomous machinery as the sufficient cosmic cause.

The next question asks whether this living principle is an angel and rejects that identification. Celestial life accompanies its body in a certain manner, while angelic mind is unmoved. "Temperament" consequently does not end the inquiry; the relation of the proposed principle to living soul and superior mind remains to be specified.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.63, PDF pp. 314–315:** the bronze spheres provide a hypothetical model of heavenly movement
- **IV.1.64–67, pp. 314–317:** the immediate moving principle is distinguished from angel and identified as soul

**In this edition.**

"A certain temperament" keeps the abstract *temperatione quadam*. The source supplies neither construction details nor a claim that Archimedes' device had a soul. The living and rational conclusion concerns the heavenly arrangement within Ficino's reply.

**See also.**

Art and nature; Motion and stability; Purity and mixture; Proportion and analogy.

## Architect, house and decoration

**Latin:** *architectus; minister; aedificium; domus; picturae; opifex; artifex*

**The word.**

An architectus directs a construction; a minister serves under that direction. Domus is the house, aedificium the building, and picturae its paintings or painted decoration. The terms distinguish a coordinating skill from subordinate work and distinguish an original construction from later additions.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino uses the architect twice in different arguments. First, an agent restricted to a particular natural good stands to intellectual nature as a servant to an architect: local efficacy does not supply the whole plan. Second, the architect cannot conceive the building

without the proper accounts of its parts. The analogy supports the presence of particular intelligible accounts within the divine idea of universal order. It does not make divine simplicity a collection of drawings. The house then differentiates accidents accompanying the work from the outset from paintings added once it is complete. The former follow the original house-form; the latter call for other ideas. Finally, random handling of stones is contrasted with constructing beautiful, useful, interconnected walls. This last case tests purposive arrangement, rather than the earlier question of how many ideas are required.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.14 (Latin PDF p. 188; English PDF p. 189).** The servant–architect comparison orders particular and universal agency.
- **II.11.18 (Latin PDF p. 190; English PDF p. 191).** The plan of a whole requires accounts of its parts.
- **II.11.21 (Latin PDF p. 192; English PDF p. 193).** Original features and later paintings have different explanatory places.
- **II.13.15 (Latin PDF p. 226; English PDF p. 227).** Random stone-handling fails to provide an ordered building.

**In this edition.**

The English alternates “architect,” “maker,” and “artisan” with the Latin roles. “Accidental features” in the house example means features of an already constituted substance; it does not mean features acquired by chance. The paintings are a counterexample to treating every subsequent addition as contained in precisely the same way in the initial house-plan.

**See also.**

Art and nature; Ideas and exemplars; Substance and accident; Order and harmony.

## Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds

**Latin:** *Aristoteles*; *Avicenna*; *probabili … ratione*; *sapientioribus se dimittere*; *forte*; *dinumerandae*.

**The word.**

*Numerare* or *dinumerare* counts; *computare* calculates. *Probabilis* marks the offered reasoning’s status. *Se dimittere* here concerns deferring to others, as the translation makes explicit. “Angels” and “messengers” are introduced as later names for the separate minds, not presented as Aristotle’s own terminology.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino reports Aristotle’s reasoning from diverse, orderly, enduring celestial motions to unmoved minds, then notes that the number was calculated probably. Avicenna is said in one place to posit at least ten principal minds, while seeming elsewhere to indicate more. Ficino then reads the deference to wiser judges as suggesting that minds should perhaps be counted by their proper activity, understanding, rather than their common and secondary task of moving bodies. The repeated *forte* marks this reconstruction as tentative. It supports his own claim that many minds may have no assigned moving task and that intellectual species exceed bodily ones. The passage distinguishes a minimum number derived from motions from the total abundance of minds.

**The places.**

- **I.5.20, PDF 74–75.** Aristotle's mover argument, later naming, Avicenna's differing numerical indications and probable calculation
- **I.5.21–22, PDF 74–77.** A short editorial unit continues the preceding sentence; Ficino interprets its deference conjecturally
- **I.5.23–26, PDF 76–79.** Ficino supplies further arguments for intellectual abundance

**In this edition.**

I.5.21 should be read with I.5.20, not as a complete independent proof. The designation "Book XI of his work on divine things" reproduces Ficino's reference system; this article does not silently replace it with a modern book number. "Principal" qualifies the minds said to be no fewer than ten.

**See also.**

Angel; Number; Proof, signs and qualification; End and limit.

## Army and commander

**Latin:** exercitus; ducem unum; ordinatore; dirigente; ducem; dux; *exercitus; dux; princeps; ordo partium; ordo totius*

**The word.**

*Exercitus* is an army; *dux* a commander, leader or guide; *princeps* the ruling head; and *ordinator* one who arranges. *Dirigere* emphasizes direction toward a destination or end. The two order-relations distinguish the mutual arrangement of a collective body's parts from the orientation of the whole toward its leader. Military vocabulary can therefore supply a metaphysical comparison without making every occurrence of *dux* military.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The army supplies a relational example: its parts are ordered to one another because the entire army is ordered to one commander. The point is not merely that a powerful ruler imposes obedience. It is that one common orientation explains how mutually diverse parts belong to a single arrangement.

The vocabulary then broadens. God is the world's single arranger; God as guide and light enables action and seeking; God is a common rather than a private guide. These images explain universal causal scope. They do not make the divine cause a bodily commander standing beside the cosmic army or turn the philosophical example into advice about political government.

Ficino attributes to Aristotle an army comparison: relations among the army's parts and their relation to the whole proceed from the whole's ordering toward one commander. The world's parts likewise derive their common coordination from the whole's relation to God. The next unit says that the army's order is "in" the commander, providing a model for the whole world's order being in God. This is an explanatory "in," concerning intelligible direction; the troops are not bodily contained in the commander. The analogy establishes how many different agents can act within one order without becoming identical. It also points toward the later question whether subordinate angelic or psychic governance displaces the first ruler. Ficino's answer is that such governance remains dependent on God.

**The places.**

- II.2.8 (PDF pp. 108–109): Mutual order among army parts depends on the whole army's relation to one commander
- II.2.10 (PDF pp. 110–111): The world's unity is referred to one arranger
- II.6.9, II.7.6 (PDF pp. 130–131, 146–147): Guide becomes an image of universal enabling and common causal office

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.13.8 (Latin PDF p. 220; English PDF p. 221).** The comparison is attributed to Aristotle's books on divine matters.
- **II.13.9 (Latin PDF p. 220; English PDF p. 221).** The army's order in its commander models cosmic order in God.
- **II.13.10 (Latin PDF p. 222; English PDF p. 223).** Subordinate rule is retained within dependence on the first ruler.

**In this edition.**

The rendering "guide" rather than "commander" in II.6.9 and II.7.6 suits those wider contexts. In II.13.8, "books on divine matters" represents *in libris divinorum*. This article reports Ficino's attribution and his use of the comparison; it does not independently certify a precise Aristotelian quotation or identify a modern military doctrine.

**See also.**

Concord and convergence; Order and harmony; Communication and imparting.

Order and harmony; Providence; Mastery and service; Archer and target.

## Art and nature

**Latin:** *natura*; *naturalis*; *ars*; *artificium*; *opifex*; *architectus*; *artifex*; *faber*; *consilium*; *instrumenta*; *natura nuda*; *natura intellectualis*; *naturalis instinctus*; *naturae necessitas*; *ars humana*; *ars naturalis*; *naturae opus*

**The word.**

Ars means purposive skill or craft; artificium its work. Natura can be a thing's constitution, an inward productive power, or the universal natural order. Opifex and architectus provide maker analogies.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

*Ars* means purposive skill or craft, not only the fine arts. *Natura* can name a thing's constitution, a non-deliberative operative power, or the broader organized order of beings. Ficino uses craft to distinguish intelligent direction from the undirected capacities of material: fire's ability to heat does not explain the arrangement of a complete building. An architect knows parts through a plan of the whole; an accomplished artisan acts readily through settled skill. Divine counsel, on this analogy, need not imply hesitation or successive planning. God also differs decisively from a human craftsman by producing matter itself rather than borrowing it.

Book I argues that material does not give itself an artifact's form and therefore cannot be the sufficient source of natural form. Nature's superior control of its matter implies a formative source both more intimately present to it and more independent in substance. A

maker wholly mingled with and limited by its work could not be the first architect. These comparisons concern causal dependence, not a physical divine artisan standing outside the universe with tools.

Book IV develops the contrast between external human art and inward natural art. Human art is described as a kind of nature acting externally upon matter; nature is art ordering matter internally. The carpenter imagined within wood and the geometer forming figures in imagination model this intimacy. Drawing on the ground remains an external operation. An artifact is the craftsman's mind in matter separated from that craftsman; a natural work is nature's mind in matter joined to nature. Human art imposes contingent forms, while natural art produces substantial forms through lasting essential principles. Ficino argues from the life, beauty, and completeness of natural products that their source cannot be less intelligently equipped than human craftsmanship.

Other craft examples refine the causal account. A house's original structural features belong to its plan, while added paintings may require other plans. A Florentine mechanical display, in which one ball coordinates diverse figures and sounds, illustrates unified direction of varied effects. The examples link ideas, instruments, ends, and providential order without identifying divine action with ordinary manufacture.

'Bare nature' has a narrower meaning in II.11: a fixed power exerting its available force toward a determinate effect. Fire heats differently because materials and conditions vary, not because it intelligently selects them. This cannot explain God's full range of effects, yet Ficino does not oppose nature to intellect without qualification: he attributes intellectual nature and natural intelligence to God. Providence preserves each creature's proper nature rather than making every level act alike. A further local use distinguishes a body's natural tendency toward rest from rational soul's circular activity. The particular use of 'nature' therefore determines whether the contrast is with craft, deliberation, intelligence, or psychic motion.

**The places.**

- **I.3.6, PDF 32–33**. Craft matter cannot give itself an artifact's form, supporting the need for a natural formative source.
- **I.3.17, PDF 40–41**. Nature's superior efficacy implies both more intimate presence and greater substantial independence than art.
- **I.3.32, PDF 52–53**. A maker tainted by its own material work cannot be the first independent architect.
- **II.13.17, PDF 228–229**. Natural regularity and fitting products are compared with intelligent human design.

**Further passage references.** I.2.1–I.2.9 (PDF pp. 18–23); I.3.6, I.3.17–I.3.18, I.3.32 (pp. 32–33, 40–41, 52–53); I.5.11–I.5.12, I.5.17 (pp. 66–67, 72–73); II.11.14, 18, 21, PDF 188–193; II.13.2, 5, 13–18, PDF 216–229; II.11.8–16, PDF 184–189; II.13.5–19, 26, PDF 218–235; III.1.17–23, PDF 250–255; IV.1.9–IV.1.13, pp. 286–289; IV.1.56, pp. 310–311; IV.1.75, pp. 320–321

**In this edition.**

"Nature" should not always be read as the total environment, nor "art" restricted to fine art. The maker analogy distinguishes externally imposed form, inward natural formation and divine production of matter itself; it does not give God a bodily workshop.

**See also.**

Form; Cause; Instrument; Order and harmony; Perfection; Ideas and exemplars; Intuition and discourse; Providence; Contingency; Intellect and intellection; Principle; Sense and imagination; Natural motion and natural place

## Artifact and natural work

**Latin:** *artificium*, *naturae opus*, *mens artificis*, *materia separata*, *coniuncta materia*, *formae contingentes* (the text has *formas … contingentes*).

**The word.**

*Artificium* here is a crafted product or artifact, not deceit. *Opus* is a work or result; *artifex* the maker. “Separated” and “conjoined” matter describe the material’s relation to its forming cause, not two unrelated chemical materials.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino defines the artifact as the maker’s mind in matter separated from him, and the natural work as nature’s mind in matter joined to it. The first formulation is an explanatory compression: the artifact displays a rational order produced by the maker, rather than containing the maker’s whole personal mind. Natural production is said to express its inward formative order more closely because nature has greater command of its material. The relation between plan and result is therefore graded.

The following contrast assigns contingent principles and forms to human craft, essential and perpetual principles to natural art. The relevant division concerns producing an arrangement at the surface and generating or bringing out substantial form. It should not be exaggerated into a denial that artifacts have real order, nor read as though every natural individual lives forever. The eternity belongs to the formative principles, while later passages distinguish the continuity of a species from its changing individuals.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.10–13, PDF pp. 286–289:** the definitions and the contrast between contingent and substantial formation
- **IV.1.86–87, pp. 326–327:** stable principles are distinguished from mutable effects and the succession of individuals
- **IV.2.15, pp. 342–343:** the cosmic soul aims to imitate the first artisan through its own worldly work

**In this edition.**

“Artifact” renders *artificium* precisely in the definition. “Mind … in matter” should be read with the surrounding comparisons, and the English “draws substantial forms from the depths” preserves an alternative to straightforward making.

**See also.**

Art and nature; Carpenter and geometer; Surface and depth; Natural species and succession.

## Ascent

**Latin:** *ascendere*; *ascensus*; *gradus*; *transcendere*

**The word.**

Ascendere and transcendere name climbing or passing beyond; ascensus is the ascent and gradus its step, rank or degree. The argument uses the movement to order explanations and objects of attention.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Book I announces an ascent “as far as God.” Its steps are not movements through physical space but ordered comparisons of body, quality, soul, angel, and God. Ficino argues that a lower level’s limitations require a superior source: bodily passivity points toward quality, quality’s dependence toward an incorporeal form, the soul’s temporal operation toward angelic stability, and the angel’s multiplicity toward divine unity. The ascent also has a cognitive aspect. The mind moves from particular forms to universal forms, from natural through mathematical to metaphysical objects, and from dimensions through points and numbers to unity. The narrative language of climbing therefore joins a method of reasoning with a transformation in what the reader attends to. Ficino places earlier philosophers at different stopping points in this ascent. His classifications organize the argument rather than provide a comprehensive history of those philosophers.

**The places.**

- **I.1.3–7, PDF 14–17**. Five grades and named philosophical stopping points organize the announced ascent.
- **I.3.12–16, PDF 36–39**. Mental abstraction and increasingly independent principles give the ascent cognitive and ontological aspects.
- **I.3.33, PDF 52–53**. The reader is urged beyond bodily form to the third essence.
- **I.6.1–6, PDF 82–85**. The ascent must pass beyond even immobile angelic mind to simple unity.

**Further passage references.** Book I title (PDF p. 13); I.1.3–I.1.7 (pp. 14–17); I.3.12–I.3.16, I.3.33 (pp. 36–39, 52–53); I.6.1 (pp. 82–83)

**In this edition.**

The future programme and repeated exhortations should remain distinct from proofs already delivered. Ficino’s distribution of earlier philosophers among stopping points is his philosophical classification, not a comprehensive history of their doctrines.

**See also.**

Degree and mediation; Philosophy and theology; Reason and account; Perfection

## Assent of will

**Latin:** *assensus; approbare; eligere; anticipare; discernere; metiri*

**The word.**

Assensus is assent; approbare is to approve. Eligere selects among alternatives. Anticipare, discernere, and metiri respectively anticipate, distinguish, and measure. Together they differentiate knowing an end and means from approving an end and choosing a route.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

After arguing against production by bare nature, Ficino announces that intelligence alone is insufficient for external effects unless the assent of will is added. Intellect anticipates the best end, distinguishes paths, and measures their proportion to it; will approves the end and chooses one path rather than another. This is an explanatory analysis of directed action. Applied to God, it cannot be a temporal committee meeting of independent faculties, since the surrounding argument identifies divine being, intelligence, and will. The later account of human judgment retains genuine deliberation among proposed alternatives. Thus approval and choice should neither be collapsed into mere awareness nor always be given the same temporal mode in God and a human soul.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.24 (Latin PDF p. 194; English PDF p. 195).** The new stage requires the assent of will for external effects.
- **II.11.25 (Latin PDF p. 194; English PDF p. 195).** Intellectual anticipation and measurement precede approval in the exposition.
- **II.11.26 (Latin PDF p. 194; English PDF p. 195).** Choice selects the fitting route.
- **II.13.30 (Latin PDF p. 236; English PDF p. 237).** Human judgment deliberates and chooses among alternatives.

**In this edition.**

“Assent” here is practical willing rather than simply agreeing that a proposition is true. The English “then by will” follows rursus in II.11.25 but should not alone establish elapsed time within divine action.

**See also.**

Will; Choice and deliberation; Intention; Paths and prescribed ends.

## Assent, approval and belief

**Latin:** *acquiescant*; *cedunt*; *suffragantibus*; *reor*; *fides*; *probatum*; *comprobet*; *diffidere*.

**The word.**

*Acquiescere* is to rest satisfied or acquiesce; with an argument it concerns assent. *Cedere* is to yield. *Suffragari* means to support or favour a cause. *Probare* and *comprobare* concern approving or establishing, with the subject and object determining the force. *Fides* is confidence or faith here; *diffidere* is to distrust. These are related attitudes toward a claim or authority, not interchangeable names for demonstration.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino envisages readers who do not readily yield to the authority of divine law but may assent to Platonic reasons supporting religion. The distinction is between routes to acceptance within his religious project; he does not say that a reader’s assent by itself demonstrates the reasons’ truth. His confident *reor* and *nec vana fides* introduce what he believes providence has decreed. At the close of the Proem, his wish that divine law approve whatever he approves makes the theological constraint explicit. The following exhortation presents distrust of the soul’s divinity as a consequence of confinement to

bodily darkness. That diagnosis belongs to Ficino's address to the reader, not to a neutral classification of every possible objection.

**The places.**

- **Proem.8, PDF 8–9.** Yielding to law, assenting to reasons, and reasons supporting religion have different grammatical subjects and objects
- **Proem.10, PDF 10–11.** Human approval is subordinated to divine law's approval
- **I.1.2, PDF 14–15.** *Diffidere* identifies the distrust the opening exhortation seeks to overcome

**In this edition.**

"Assent," "yield," "support," "believe," and "approve" retain useful distinctions. *Probatum* in the Proem should not automatically be translated mentally as "formally proved" just because later *probare* introduces philosophical demonstrations.

**See also.**

Worship and piety; Philosophy and theology; Proof, signs and qualification.

## Assertion, report, and reservation

**Latin:** *placet Platonicis*, *arbitrantur*, *forsitan*, *forte*, *liceat … confabulari*, *ex … opinione narrata*, *tunc demum affirmanda*, *cum … placuerint*.

**The word.**

*Placere* can mean finding a view acceptable, not simply enjoying it; *arbitrari* judges or holds; *narrare* relates an account. *Forsitan* and *forte* qualify a claim as possible or tentative. *Affirmanda* marks what is to be affirmed, and *tunc demum … cum* restricts affirmation to the fulfillment of a condition.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Book IV often reconstructs what the Platonists will reply or hold. These formulas locate an argument within an attributed philosophical account even where Ficino develops it forcefully. A temporary conversation with the Pythagoreans is expressly opened and closed. Its twelvefold scheme cannot be treated as an unmarked continuation at exactly the same evidential level; "perhaps" further qualifies the twelve ruling minds. Earlier *forsitan* allows some multiplicity immediately from unity without conceding the immediate production of destructive contraries.

The chapter's concluding reservation has wider scope than a minor aside. Everything related concerning sphere-souls according to the Platonists' opinion is to be affirmed only after careful examination and approval by Christian theologians. The condition is not reported as already fulfilled. The final *Epinomis* quotation itself leaves two alternatives: a soul present to each body or dwelling within it. Strong arguments, reports, tentative numerical elaboration, and conditional doctrinal endorsement therefore coexist. They must remain distinct.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.23 and IV.1.33, PDF pp. 292–299:** a tentative possibility and an explicitly Platonic causal hierarchy

- **IV.1.40–52, pp. 302–309:** the marked Pythagorean conversation, its qualified twelve minds, and its closure
- **IV.1.88–91, pp. 328–329:** differing Peripatetic positions and a reconstructed Platonic response
- **IV.1.96, pp. 332–333:** conditional theological affirmation and the presence/indwelling alternative
- **IV.2.12, pp. 340–341:** Ficino's own "I believe" regarding Proteus is distinguished from recurrence claims assigned to Zoroaster and others

**In this edition.**

"Only when" at IV.1.96 translates the restrictive *tunc demum … cum*. The English does not say that approval has occurred. The article's title is an analytical finding aid, not a technical phrase coined by Ficino.

**See also.**

Philosophy and theology; Twelve; Indwelling and presence; Great year.

## Augustine and Christian proximity

**Latin:** *Aurelius Augustinus*; *Aureliana auctoritate*; *Christianae veritati*; *mutatis paucis*; *simillimum*.

**The word.**

*Aureliana* is an adjective referring back to Aurelius Augustine in the preceding unit. *Proximus* and *simillimus* indicate nearness and very close likeness; neither means identity. *Mutatis paucis* means "with a few things changed," leaving a qualification within the reported judgement.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino invokes Augustine as warrant for treating Plato as the philosopher nearest Christian truth and as a model to imitate. He then describes his own undertaking as fashioning a likeness of Plato as close as possible to that truth. The movement from *proximus* to *simillimum* is consequential: the first is a judgement attributed to Augustine; the second identifies Ficino's constructive aim. The Proem does not merely claim to reproduce Plato without mediation. Nor does the phrase about changing a few things enumerate the changes or establish that every Platonic doctrine has been accepted. Ficino's final submission to divine law gives the project a stated standard of approval.

**The places.**

- **Proem.6, PDF 8–9.** Augustine's reported judgement and its "few changes" qualification
- **Proem.7, PDF 8–9.** Ficino relies on that authority in constructing his likeness of Plato
- **Proem.10, PDF 10–11.** The resulting work is expressly subjected to divine law

**In this edition.**

"Augustine's authority" correctly resolves the compressed *Aureliana auctoritate*. "A certain likeness" preserves *simulacrum quoddam*: the noun need not mean a deceptive counterfeit in this passage. This article explains Ficino's report; it does not claim independent verification of Augustine's wording or its original location.

**See also.**

Image and likeness; Philosophy and theology; Assent, approval and belief.

## Bacchus and the Muses

**Latin:** *Bacchus*; *Musae*; *vis gemina*; *cognoscendo*; *vivificando atque regendo*

**The word.**

The paired names identify knowing and life-giving powers within cosmic souls. Vis gemina means a twofold power; cognoscendo and vivificando atque regendo specify its distinct activities.

The local vocabulary includes *nectare ebriae*, *debacchantur*, *chorea*, *modulis*, *cithara*, *temperas*. Intoxication, reveling, dancing chorus, musical measures, lyre, and tuning provide a connected expressive vocabulary without making all its words literal bodily activities of incorporeal powers.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino reports an Orphic naming scheme in which each cosmic soul has a knowing power and a bodily life-giving and governing power. In the four elements the pairs are Pluto/Proserpina, Oceanus/Thetis, Jupiter the Thunderer/Juno, and Phanetas/Aurora. For the lunar sphere through the eighth sphere, the pairs are Bacchus Licnitus/Thalia, Bacchus Silenus/Euterpe, Lysius/Erato, Trietericus/Melpomene, Bassareus/Clio, Sabasius/Terpsichore, Amphietus/Polyhymnia, and Pericionius/Urania. World-soul has Bacchus Eribromus/Calliope. The subsequent image of the Muses drunk with divine knowledge explains the relation: their powers receive the higher knowing power's nectar. These names thus serve as a vocabulary of coordinated functions rather than a collection of disconnected mythological characters. The edition retains Ficino's source spellings while giving conventional nominatives in English; it does not warrant silently equating every epithet with a modern reconstruction of an ancient cult name. The nine Bacchuses and nine Muses include the world-soul pair.

Two musical scenes should remain distinct. IV.1.52 closes the Pythagorean hierarchy with the Muses' perpetual singing and dancing at Apollo's command. IV.1.94–95 assigns paired names to the knowing and animating powers of sphere-souls, then says that each Muse's power is drunk with the nectar of divine knowledge supplied under its Bacchus. The subsequent revel around the invisible sun's splendor explains dependence and coordination through ecstatic imagery. It does not equate knowledge with ordinary alcoholic intoxication. The pairs also have different spheres and must not be moved from one list to another because a divine name recurs.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.94, PDF 330–331**. The Orphic naming scheme maps two powers across elements, eight heavens and world-soul.
- **IV.1.95, PDF 332–333**. Nectar and intoxication portray the lower powers' reception of higher divine knowledge.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.94–IV.1.95, pp. 330–333; apparatus pp. 393–394

- **IV.1.52, PDF pp. 308–309:** the lyre tunes the cosmic chorus at the close of the marked excursion

- **IV.1.94–95, pp. 330–333:** named pairs distinguish cognition from bodily animation; nectar explains the animating powers' dependence on divine knowledge

**In this edition.**

The Latin gives accusative forms and Ficino's source spellings, while English uses conventional name forms. Preserve the paired functions and the world-soul pair; the nine Bacchuses and nine Muses are not nine unrelated mythological anecdotes.

"Revel" and "drunk with the nectar" preserve the metaphor. The Latin passage itself supplies the interpretation through *designantur*, "are signified," so the imagery need not be silently literalized or erased.

**See also.**

Intellectual and animating powers; Apollo; Spheres and stars; World soul

Apollo; Ruling and following; Intellectual and animating powers; Order and harmony.

## Beauty and fittingness

**Latin:** *decor*; *decorum*; *decet*; *decentia*; *pulcherrime*; *formosissimi ordinis*; *ornamentum*; *decuit; decet; decorum; decor; decentia*

**The word.**

Decor and decorum concern beauty and fittingness; decet means "it is fitting." Ornamentum is adornment, and pulchre expresses beautiful execution. The family joins proportion and suitability with visual attractiveness.

The impersonal decet means it is fitting; decuit is its past tense. Decorum names what is fitting, decor beauty or fitting splendor, and decentia fitting things. The family enables a verbal shift from fitting action to its divine source.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The language of beauty is closely joined here to suitability, proportion, and order. In II.12.3, Ficino moves from what befits God to fittingness or beauty itself, which he identifies with God. In the providence chapter, the world's beauty lies in parts disposed for one another and for the whole, acting at suitable times and toward suitable ends. The vocabulary therefore includes utility and coherent arrangement rather than isolating beauty as an observer's pleasure in appearance.

This connection becomes especially important when something appears defective on its own. Ficino asks the reader to consider whether it contributes to the whole's good and adornment. That is his theological explanation of apparently disordered or unattractive particulars, not an identification of a benefit in every instance of suffering. The whole world also need not possess God's absolute perfection: its created beauty sufficiently indicates a higher source within the limits of a created work.

The correction from ut decuit to immo ut decet moves from "as was fitting" to "as is fitting," avoiding the impression of a past standard that once governed God. Ficino then locates the source of fittingness in God as decor itself. The grammar contributes to the argument about underived necessity rather than merely decorating a statement about beauty.

**The places.**

- **II.12.3, PDF 202–203**. What befits God is traced to fittingness or beauty itself.

- **II.13.17, PDF 228–229**. Natural beauty is joined to correct times, appointed forms and useful ends.
- **II.13.24, PDF 232–233**. Apparently defective parts are interpreted through the whole's beauty and good.

**Further passage references.** II.12.3, PDF 202–203; II.13.14, 16–18, 20, 23–24, PDF 226–233

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.12.3 (Latin PDF p. 202; English PDF p. 203).** The tense correction and progression through the decor-family connect fitting action to God as its source.

**In this edition.**

II.12.3 deliberately moves through decuit, decet, decorum and decor. The English "fitting" and "Beauty" should retain that progression without treating every use of decet as an aesthetic observation. The providential claim about the whole is Ficino's explanation, not a demonstrated benefit of each particular misfortune.

The supplied English uses "beautiful" for decorum and "Beauty itself" for decor. The Latin link with what befits or is appropriate remains important alongside aesthetic beauty.

**See also.**

Good and goodness; Order and harmony; Perfection; Providence

Freedom and necessity; Order and harmony.

## Before and after in nature

**Latin:** prius; posterius; secundum naturam; ab initio naturaliter; ante; deinde; ultimum

**The word.**

Prius and posterius can indicate temporal succession or explanatory order. Secundum naturam explicitly marks the latter. Antecedere and sequi likewise need not mean events separated by clock-time.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The preservation argument calls nonbeing prior to an effect's being because considered without its cause the effect would not exist. This is an analysis of dependence, not a report of a datable period when an eternal world failed to exist. Ficino has just allowed the conditional case of a world that always existed.

In the hierarchy of effects, a thing first is, then is this or that and has this or that character. Being is also described as the last thing lost: a particular determination can disappear while being remains. The trace analogy subsequently says the first cause's impression is earlier and effaced later. These expressions concern how determinations presuppose being. The argument does not require that a creature existed as undifferentiated being during an earlier moment before acquiring every specific character.

**The places.**

- II.7.18, II.7.20, II.7.21 (PDF pp. 152–153): Beginningless duration is compatible with natural priority of causal dependence
- II.7.28, II.7.29 (PDF pp. 156–157): Being is first in nature and last lost relative to its determinations

- II.7.32 (PDF pp. 158–159): Earlier impression and later effacement extend that order into a trace-image

**In this edition.**

The English “first in the order of nature” explicates secundum naturam and should be retained. Read II.7.28 with the opening “Then” in II.7.29: the editorial division interrupts one contrast.

**See also.**

Being; Beginning and ceasing; Impression and effacement; Cause.

## Beginning and ceasing

**Latin:** initium; incipere; desinere; incepturam; desivisse; nascitur; resolvitur; nuper; aliquando; semper

**The word.**

Incipere is to begin, desinere to cease, nasci to arise or be born, and resolvi to be dissolved or resolved into constituents. Aliquando means at some time; nuper indicates a new or recent production in its local alternative. These temporal expressions must be separated from explanatory priority.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The eternity argument asks whether truth can begin or end. Before its supposed beginning, Ficino says, it would already be true that it was going to begin; after its supposed end, it would still be true that it had ended. The tense shifts carry the argument. He also reasons that what arises comes from something prior, and what is dissolved resolves into something more ancient, so the first principle cannot have either fate.

The world’s temporal origin remains a separate question in the preservation argument. Whether it always existed or began at some time, it depends continually on God. Similarly, II.4.6 offers production anew from nothing alongside continual production without a prior subject. These alternatives do not authorize reading every use of “first” as an earliest instant.

**The places.**

- II.4.6 (PDF pp. 124–125): New production and continuing production are alternative cases
- II.5.1 (PDF pp. 126–127): Future and past truth frame the impossible beginning or ceasing of truth
- II.7.18, II.7.19 (PDF pp. 152–153): Preservation is required whether the world began or always existed

**In this edition.**

Keep the English future-in-the-past “would begin” and perfect “had ceased” distinct. Their temporal relations matter to the proof; the labels “creation” and “eternity” alone do not display it.

**See also.**

Eternity and time; Truth; Creation; Before and after in nature.

## Being

**Latin:** *esse*; *ipsum esse*; *esse ipsum*; *esse purum*; *esse tale*; *essendi modus*

**The word.**

Esse is often the nominal infinitive “being” or the act of being, while esse tale and essendi modus concern being of a certain character or in a certain manner. It is not interchangeable with a particular ens.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

*Esse* is often the substantivized infinitive, meaning the fact or act of being rather than an individual existing thing. Ficino calls being the common effect of the universal cause. Other agents produce this or that determinate being, whereas God gives the being presupposed by every determination. Being is first in the order of nature and last to be lost: losing a quality or a particular condition does not immediately mean ceasing to be altogether. This priority is explanatory and need not describe successive instants in the production of a thing. In God, being, understanding, and operation are identical; in other agents, acting through being means acting through a natural power inherent in their constitution. The distinction matters because *esse purum* belongs to the first agent in a stronger sense. Ficino also treats pure being as excluding both actual privation of being and the capacity not to be, connecting the word to divine necessity and eternity.

The distinction between being and a mode of being appears concretely in the account of corporeal change. Lower bodies pass into and out of existence; of higher bodies Ficino first says they change from one being into another, then qualifies this as change between modes of being. The editorial division between II.7.7 and II.7.8 can obscure that correction if either paragraph is read alone. Similarly, when Ficino says non-being belongs to a product “before” being does, his surrounding argument concerns what the effect has from itself and what it has from its cause. It is therefore safer to explain this as an order of dependence than to turn it into a universal chronological story in which each possible effect first spends time in nonexistence.

**The places.**

- **II.6.2, PDF 128–129**. Being is the universal effect of the universal cause.
- **II.7.7–8, PDF 146–147**. Change of being is qualified as change in mode of being for higher bodies.
- **II.8.5, PDF 162–163**. The first agent acts through pure being; other agents act through an inherent power.
- **II.9.13, PDF 168–169**. Divine being and understanding are identified through simplicity.

**Further passage references.** II.4.2–3, pp. 122–123; II.7.6–9, pp. 146–147; II.7.26–32, pp. 154–159; II.8.5, pp. 162–163; II.9.7, pp. 166–167

**In this edition.**

Read II.7.7 with II.7.8: the English “or rather” preserves Ficino’s immediate qualification from “another being” to “another mode of being.” Pure being in II.8.5 is expressly stronger than the subordinate agent’s action through its natural power.

**See also.**

Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity; Act and operation; Nothing and nonbeing; Cause

## Blessedness

**Latin:** *beatitudo*; *beatus*; *beatissimus*; *felicitas*; *felix*; *infelix*

**The word.**

Beatitudo and felicitas name fulfilled happiness; beatus and felix describe it, while infelix names misery or failure of fulfilment. Frui adds enjoyment or fulfilled possession, not merely a pleasant episode.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The opening argument connects immortality with the possibility of blessedness. Ficino emphasizes the restless soul, frail body, and extensive human needs, then reasons that a being drawing near God through worship cannot finally be the most miserable animal. God is the author of blessedness, and the soul's fuller good is sought beyond bodily death. In the five-level prospectus, the soul is called most blessed insofar as it enters into divine things. Blessedness also figures in the rejection of a composite God: a being lacking its whole self in each supposed part would not enjoy itself as fully as an utterly simple being. The term thus concerns complete enjoyment and fulfillment, not only a passing pleasant feeling. *Felicitas* in the Proem is tied to apprehending things and ordering life. The supplied passages support a relation among knowledge, worship, and happiness without reducing every one of these terms to a single technical synonym.

**The places.**

- **Proem.6, PDF 8–9**. Happiness is joined to apprehension and the ordering of life.
- **I.1.1–3, PDF 14–15**. Human restlessness and worship motivate the argument for a good beyond bodily death.
- **I.1.7, PDF 16–17**. Soul's blessedness is linked to entry into divine things.
- **I.6.6, PDF 84–85**. Supreme blessedness requires complete self-presence and self-enjoyment.

**Further passage references.** Proem.6 (PDF pp. 8–9); I.1.1–I.1.3, I.1.7 (pp. 14–17); I.6.6 (pp. 84–85)

**In this edition.**

The superlatives and comparatives are argumentative: "more blessed" after bodily death and "most miserable" in the opening have specified conditions. I.6.6's self-enjoyment is tested within a rejected composite-God hypothesis, not an assertion of actual divine bodily members.

**See also.**

Immortality; Good and goodness; Worship and piety; Need and sufficiency; God

## Body and bulk

**Latin:** *corpus*; *moles*; *moles corporis*; *corporis moles*; *corporalis*; *corporeus*; *corpora*; *natura corporalis*; *quantitas*

**The word.**

Corpus is body; moles emphasizes extended mass or bulk. Corporalis and corporeus qualify what belongs to body. Quantity gives bodily division and place, but a body's operative qualities are not identical with bulk.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Body is the lowest of the five principal grades and is analyzed through matter and quantity. Ficino's claim that body does nothing by its own nature concerns body precisely as body: extended bulk receives, divides, and is moved by another. Ordinary bodies nevertheless heat, cool, nourish, and move through their qualities and living powers. His account locates the active source beyond mere bulk rather than denying the observable effects of heated bodies or living animals.

Bulk disperses efficacy across parts, delays motion, and obstructs interpenetration. Fire, air, sparks, density, and falling wood illustrate these claims within Ficino's natural philosophy. Bodily quantity also makes one part occupy one position and another part another. This establishes the contrast with soul, which neither touches only a single bodily point nor distributes separate portions of itself among bodily portions. Body and soul consequently differ in their mode of existence and causal presence, not simply as visible and invisible objects. Bodily divisibility also differs from the temporal succession of soul's operations.

In the opening exhortation, the human body is described as a dark prison from which philosophical contemplation can turn toward the soul's divine origin and destiny. This evaluative image has a different function from the technical analysis of extension. The account of bodily matter and quantity supplies metaphysical distinctions; the prison image gives the reader an exhortatory orientation toward the inquiry.

**The places.**

- **I.1.1–3, PDF 14–15**. Bodily prison language gives the inquiry an exhortatory orientation.
- **I.2.1–5, PDF 18–21**. Extension, dispersion, density and delay make bulk a source of passivity and obstruction.
- **I.2.8–13, PDF 22–25**. Ordinary bodily effects are explained through form and quality rather than denied.
- **I.3.33, PDF 52–53**. Independence from bodily parts and material support marks the higher third essence.

**Further passage references.** I.1.1–I.1.3, I.1.7 (PDF pp. 14–17); I.2.1–I.2.10 (pp. 18–23); I.3.33 (pp. 52–53); III.1.1–3, 9, 16, 19–23, PDF 240–255; III.2.9–18, PDF 268–273

**In this edition.**

"Body precisely as body" preserves quatenus corpus at I.2.1. Omitting that restriction makes the denial of bodily action contradict the subsequent examples unnecessarily. The prison metaphor and the technical matter/quantity analysis answer different questions.

**See also.**

Matter; Quantity and dimension; Quality; Prison and homeland; Incorporeal and immaterial; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Soul

## Bond knot and chain

**Latin:** *vinculum*; *nodus*; *copula mundi*; *connexio*; *mundi series*; *conglutinare; copulare; connectere; colligare; deserere*

**The word.**

Vinculum, nodus, copula and connexio name bonds, knots and connections; series can name an ordered chain. The figures convey active mediation and preservation, not literal cords or links.

The connecting verbs range from gluing together to linking or binding. Deserere means abandoning: its repeated negation explains the bond's ability to retain relations to both extremes.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The text's linking words explain how a universe of unequal grades can form one work. Soul is the bond joining eternal and temporal things, the connection of higher and lower, and ultimately the knot and bond of the world. Its capacity to maintain both attachments distinguishes it from angel, oriented wholly upward, and quality, joined to body. The linkage is consequently active and reciprocal in direction: knowledge of higher realities and communication of life to lower ones belong to the same intermediate nature.

A related but distinct knot appears in III.1.5. There the "divine knot" is God's preservation of beings that might otherwise be dissoluble, through the predominance of unity and stability over multiplicity and movement. It should not automatically be treated as another name for soul in that sentence. Likewise, *mundi series*, rendered the world's chain, belongs to the final cluster of relational descriptions of soul; the text does not invite the reader to imagine a literal material chain. Keeping the different occurrences distinct preserves both divine conservation and psychic mediation.

III.2.6 describes a many-membered work as most perfect when glued into a coherent whole. At III.2.8 soul's mediation is defined negatively as well as positively: in ascending it does not desert lower things, and in descending it does not leave higher things. A one-way departure would make it another extreme. The light analogy therefore tests maintained connection, not a journey ending in abandonment.

**The places.**

- **I.1.7, PDF 16–17**. Rational soul is the bond of nature through joining higher and lower grades.
- **III.1.5, PDF 240–241**. The divine knot preserves beings whose components could otherwise be dissolved.
- **III.2.23, PDF 274–275**. Soul's middle office receives a cluster of relational names, including chain, knot and bond.

**Further passage references.** III.1.5, PDF 240–241; III.2.3, 7–8, 22–23, PDF 262–275

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.2.6 (Latin PDF p. 264; English PDF p. 265).** Gluing models unity among differentiated members.
- **III.2.8 (Latin PDF p. 266; English PDF p. 267).** Repeated non-abandonment distinguishes true mediation from movement into one extreme.

**In this edition.**

Distinguish the “divine knot” preserving otherwise dissoluble things in III.1.5 from the “knot and bond of the world” applied to soul in III.2.23. Sharing an image does not make God’s preserving action and soul’s mediating nature identical.

The English “joined,” “connection,” and “bond” translate a varied family. The metaphor of gluing does not require material adhesion between soul and God.

**See also.**

Degree and mediation; Indwelling and presence; Order and harmony; Soul; Unity and multiplicity

Soul; Ascent; Indwelling and presence.

## Borrowing and assistance

**Latin:** auxilio indigere; materiam mutuari; mutuant invicem naturas; subsidio indiget; adiuvante Deo

**The word.**

Mutuari is to borrow or draw from another; auxilium and subsidium are aid or support. Indigere marks need. The related mutuant in the cosmic-order passage describes exchanging natures, showing that the vocabulary is wider than monetary lending.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

God is called cause in the proper sense because he produces a whole thing without needing another’s assistance or borrowing matter. Created agents work with powers and materials they have not independently supplied. Their need does not make their action fictitious; it identifies its dependence and restricted scope.

The phrase “with God’s aid” in II.7.30 accompanies subordinate agents’ differentiation of universal divine action. It should not suggest two independent contractors who each supply a missing part: the next unit says divine power differentiates itself through various intermediaries. Conversely, the recipient’s continual need for support does not mean only occasional rescue after a mishap. The shadow comparison makes the support constitutive of continuing being.

**The places.**

- II.2.9 (PDF pp. 110–111): Cosmic parts exchange natures in the mutual order of the world
- II.7.21, II.7.22 (PDF pp. 152–155): The first cause borrows no matter; the whole effect requires continual support
- II.7.30, II.7.31 (PDF pp. 156–159): Divine aid and mediated differentiation belong to one dependent causal order

**In this edition.**

The translation's "borrow matter" preserves a deliberate ordinary-life comparison. "Aid" should be read beside the claim that God gives being, power, and action, rather than as assistance added to an otherwise self-sufficient agent.

**See also.**

Cause; Instrument; Dependence and receiving; Creation.

## Bounds and restriction

**Latin:** angustiis circumscribitur; limite coarctatur; cohiberi; terminante; finiri; terminum; capiant; alligantur

**The word.**

Circumscribere marks drawing a boundary around; coarctare narrows or constrains; cohibere holds within bounds; alligare binds. Terminare and finire can limit a thing's scope or determine its character. None is restricted to a drawn line in physical space.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

A common nature received in different things is confined within their limits, unlike unity subsisting in itself. Act and being receive limits, Ficino argues, from a receptive subject or a limiting cause; these are metaphysical restrictions, not necessarily external walls. Divine power lacks both.

The omnipresence chapter distinguishes a boundary of place around a thing from a boundary of dignity within it. The paired expressions prevent "infinite" from being read only as enormous extension. In the reported account of rational spirits, lower forms are restricted to the matters from which they arise, while rational spirits are neither dimensioned nor bound to a dimension. The latter inference belongs to the authorities' position and does not erase the chapter's distinction between God and created mind.

**The places.**

- II.2.4 (PDF pp. 106–107): Received common nature is circumscribed while unity itself is unconstrained
- II.4.1, II.4.2 (PDF pp. 122–123): Subject and cause are identified as sources of limitation
- II.6.4, II.6.15 (PDF pp. 128–129, 136–137): Spatial limits are distinguished from limits of dignity and from material attachment

**In this edition.**

The local English uses "bounded," "confined," "constrained," and "bound." A limiting subject in II.4 is a recipient or bearer, not a knowing subject in the modern psychological sense.

**See also.**

End and limit; Power and potency; Incorporeal and immaterial; Infinity.

## Burden labor and ease

**Latin:** sollicitari; onerari; cura; labore; sollicitudine; facillime; facillimo nutu; vibrat

**The word.**

Sollicitari means to be troubled or made anxious; onerari to be burdened. Cura can be care or concern, labor effort or toil, and nutus a nod or directive gesture. Facillime and facillimo emphasize ease.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The Epicurean objection imagines divine action as burdensome planning and work. Ficino answers by distinguishing action through being from an additional process of deliberation. Sunlight, fire's heating, and soul's bodily nutrition illustrate operations that do not wait for choices about every effect. Divine action is easier still, since it proceeds through pure being rather than an essential power distinguished from being.

The "easiest nod" is an image of effortless direction. God's being is likened to a simple center from which dependent things extend like lines; a minimal gesture sets them in motion. The phrasing should not be literalized into a bodily head or into intermittent commands. Nor does the rejection of burden deny intelligence: II.9.13 identifies divine operation with voluntary cognition.

**The places.**

- II.8.1, II.8.4 (PDF pp. 160–161): The anticipated Epicurean objection and the response from unlabored natural action
- II.8.5 (PDF pp. 162–163): The nod and center images explain effortless action through pure being
- II.9.13 (PDF pp. 168–169): Voluntary cognition prevents ease from becoming mindless action

**In this edition.**

"Deliberation" and "choice" are unnecessary as separate supplements to divine being in this argument. The passage does not license replacing "intelligent" with "automatic" in a modern technological sense.

**See also.**

Choice and deliberation; Act and operation; Hinge and center; Nutrition and digestion.

## Candles and the hall

**Latin:** candelae; aula; lumina; iuncta; non permixta; separari; diriguntur

**The word.**

Candelae are candles, aula a hall, and lumina their lights. Iungere joins; permiscere mingles. The contrast means that co-presence does not itself abolish distinguishable sources. Dirigi marks the relation of each light to its own candle.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

In the reported mental-presence theory, many candles illuminate the same whole hall. Their lights coexist and are joined, but are not confused into a single indistinguishable

source: one can be separated from another. Each remains referred to its own candle even though its illumination extends beyond that candle's immediate position.

This explains a distinction between the range of a mind's presence and the region where some of its actions are more manifest. Angelic minds govern; animating minds give life. The example is not a proof that lights or souls are literally fused, and it does not say all minds exercise identical functions everywhere. It works within the earlier thinkers' theory, which Ficino explicitly closes at the end of the unit.

**The places.**

- II.6.24 (PDF pp. 142–143): Joined lights with distinct sources model universal presence and localized manifestation
- II.6.14 (PDF pp. 136–137): Distinct virtue-habits and color-images first illustrate presence without confusion

**In this edition.**

The edition distinguishes "joined" from "mingled," and "more manifestly" must remain with the regional actions. Removing either qualifier turns the comparison into a stronger identity or localization claim.

**See also.**

Light and illumination; Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities; Heart and mistaken location; Purity and mixture.

## Care and custody

**Latin:** *diligentia; custodire; procurator; cura; neglegere; conservare*

**The word.**

Diligentia is attentive care, custodia's verb custodire to guard or preserve, and procurator one who looks after what is entrusted to him. Cura names concern or care. Neglect and preservation form the practical contrast.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Providence is introduced through a maker's care for what he has made. Productive fruitfulness and diligence in preserving the product share their source in the first agent. God is called the procurator of things as children: the image supplies continuing care rather than merely an original act of making. Ficino later distinguishes the abilities to make, consider, and conserve, arguing that an intelligent creator can also preserve his works and does not begrudge their well-being after giving being. Care for the whole is then used to reject neglect of any part, because the whole's best condition depends on its constituents. This does not remove the subsequent argument that a part's appropriate perfection is measured by its contribution to the whole.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.13.2 (Latin PDF p. 216; English PDF p. 217).** Creative fruitfulness is joined to diligence in preservation.
- **II.13.11 (Latin PDF p. 222; English PDF p. 223).** Making, observing, conserving, and willing well-being are distinguished.

- **II.13.21 (Latin PDF p. 230; English PDF p. 231).** Care of the whole is said to exclude neglect of its parts.
- **II.13.23 (Latin PDF p. 232; English PDF p. 233).** A part's perfection remains relative to the whole's order.

**In this edition.**

"Watches over them all as his children" conveys procuratoris without turning it into a modern legal office. The printed II.13.21 has negligit; the register distinguishes that attested spelling from the conventional lemma neglegere. "Well-being" concerns bene esse, a fuller gift than existence alone.

**See also.**

Providence; Conservation and preservation; Craftsman and father; Whole and parts.

## Carpenter and geometer

**Latin:** *faber lignarius*, *in ligno*, *geometrae anima*, *pulverem*, *figuras describit*, *geometrica mens*, *secum ipsa volutat*.

**The word.**

*Faber lignarius* is a woodworker or carpenter; *lignum* wood. The geometer can *describere* figures on a surface, while *volutare secum* means turning something over inwardly in thought. These are different senses of forming and turning.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

"As though the carpenter were inside the wood" is a deliberately impossible human-craft picture that clarifies what Ficino means by nature working inwardly. Human craft normally acts upon a material outside its maker. The geometer supplies a closer analogy: drawing in dust touches a surface, whereas thinking geometrical principles shapes imagination from within and through it the imaginative spirit. The progression moves from an external instrument to an inwardly formed medium.

The next comparison concerns natural art. Divine wisdom acts through intellectual principles, imbuing the conjoined vivifying and motive power with natural seeds; through that power it inwardly shapes matter. It is essential to preserve which thing receives what. The comparison is not a claim that geometry literally manufactures living organisms, nor does it identify the geometer with the Euclid who later travels to hear Socrates. It is an account of different modes of mediation and productive presence.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.10–11, PDF pp. 286–287:** craft as imitation of nature, the carpenter within wood, and external versus imaginative geometry
- **IV.1.12–13, pp. 288–289:** the contrast continues through artifact, natural work, and substantial formation
- **IV.2.13–15, pp. 340–343:** the separate Euclid example concerns execution of a journey, not geometric construction

**In this edition.**

At IV.1.11 the facing English reverses the recipient and content of *imbuit*: the Latin has *vim ipsam vivificam et motricem* as object and *naturalibus seminibus* as what is supplied.

This article follows the Latin. “Without labor or deliberation” applies to the comparison’s inward formation; it does not suppress the articulated differences among mind, imagination, and motive power.

**See also.**

Art and nature; Artifact and natural work; Sense and imagination; Seeds.

## Cause

**Latin:** *causa*; *principium*; *efficiens*; *effectus*; *causa prima*; *causa superior*; *causa universalis*; *causae mediae atque proximae*; *agens*; *finalem, efficientem, formalem causam*

**The word.**

Causa identifies a source explaining being, determination, activity or an end. Efficiens is a producer; effectus its product. Principium is an initiating or governing principle and need not be a temporally earlier event.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

A cause explains a thing’s being, determination, powers, or activity, not merely an event immediately preceding another event. The Proem directs inquiry toward the cause of causes. Book I distinguishes a local producer from the first cause adequate to an entire kind. A particular fire can generate another, yet it is itself generated and dependent. The first cause of a kind must account for that kind as a whole. Something can therefore be an effect in one relation and an agent or instrument in another. What generates must precede its product, and nothing can originate itself before it exists. This does not reduce causality to a chronological chain: an earlier local fire may already be extinguished while the present fire continues acting. A sufficient higher source explains the dependent agent’s continuing efficacy and regularity.

The first cause gives being itself, while intermediate causes determine this being in particular ways. Higher causes reach farther into their effects; their contribution is presupposed by, and outlasts, more particular determinations. Sunlight passing through red and green glass illustrates one power differently manifested through intermediaries. Another comparison describes the most fundamental contribution as a trace impressed earlier and erased later than other traces. Its priority is explanatory rather than a literal inscription or a numerical measure of force. Subordinate agents have a narrower range of operation, but their distinctive contributions remain genuine. God produces an angel’s work more fundamentally than the angel while the angel remains its proximate agent.

Calling God cause in the fullest sense means that he produces the whole effect, including its material and the powers of subordinate agents. He neither supplies an initial fragment that creatures finish independently nor gives a first impulse to a self-maintaining mechanism. A natural agent such as fire works upon conditions it has not arranged; God causes forms, materials, their order, and their degrees. An infinite regress of dependent causes would never supply this first source of their efficacy.

Ficino also reports Plato’s emphasis on formal, efficient, and final causes. His round-earth illustration distinguishes the idea of roundness, the wisdom producing conformity to that idea, and the good for whose sake the order exists. Effects ordinarily follow the mode of their nearer causes even though the entire order depends on God. First causation therefore preserves intermediate causal levels rather than cancelling them. God’s knowledge of causes likewise includes their effects, but does not require inspecting

intermediate causes outside himself: both the causal order and its intelligibility depend on his unified productive and cognitive power.

**The places.**

- **Proem.3, PDF 6–7**. Investigation of causes is directed toward the cause of causes.
- **I.3.5–11, PDF 30–37**. Origin, dependence and stable generation distinguish local producers from adequate higher causes.
- **II.6.2, PDF 128–129**. Universal cause is present to being as its universal effect.
- **II.12.20, PDF 214–215**. Effects retain the variable modes of proximate causes within universal order.

**Further passage references.** Proem.3 (PDF pp. 6–7); I.3.3–I.3.11, I.3.24, I.3.32 (pp. 30–37, 46–47, 52–53); I.6.16 (pp. 92–93); II.3.1–3, pp. 116–117; II.6.2, pp. 128–129; II.7.21–32, pp. 152–159; II.9.14–15, pp. 170–171; II.11.1, 8–18, 25–27, PDF 182–195; II.12.20, PDF 214–215; II.13.2–12, PDF 216–225

**In this edition.**

Keep first, superior, proximate and universal causes distinct. A particular fire can be both effect and producing instrument. The source's causal priority is not reducible to the earlier extinguished fire in the same material series.

**See also.**

Instrument; Generation and corruption; Perfection; Order and harmony; Good and goodness; Principle; Conservation and preservation; Being; Self knowledge; Art and nature; Contingency; End and limit; Form; Through itself and through another

## Celestial influence

**Latin:** *influxus*; *influxibus*; *caelestis instinctus*; *mundanos instinctus*

**The word.**

Influxus is an influx or communicated causal influence; instinctus is a directing impulse. Contrahere can specify a universal influence to a local recipient rather than physically compress it.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

An *instinctus* in these passages is an impulse arriving from celestial souls, not simply an animal's innate behavior. Such an influence is common or general until an intermediary makes it appropriate to a determinate lower effect. Ficino's earth-soul contracts celestial and universal impulses into earthly and particular lives; a fitting middle must be earthly and universal at once. "Contracting" here describes causal specification, rather than spatial compression. His account preserves both celestial influence and a genuinely present earthly source: the influx cannot independently supply a living substance because it is itself an accident. Later the whole elemental spheres receive influences from higher minds and spheres, and transmit them to particles and mixed bodies. The passage about parts of air and fire answering to stars makes this cosmology particularly explicit. This is the causal architecture of the Platonist exposition, rather than an account of physical radiation.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.7, PDF 284–285**. Earth-soul mediates universal celestial impulses into particular earthly life.
- **IV.1.91–92, PDF 328–331**. Whole elements receive higher influxes before parts; selected regions of air and fire answer to stars.
- **IV.1.96, PDF 332–333**. Ficino subjects the reported sphere-soul account to theological examination.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.3–IV.1.9, pp. 282–287; IV.1.91–IV.1.93, pp. 328–331; apparatus pp. 388, 393

**In this edition.**

The translation's "contracted" at IV.1.7 concerns specification from celestial/universal to earthly/particular through an earthly/universal middle. The claims about stellar reception and animated elements belong to the attributed cosmology and its chapter-end reservation.

**See also.**

Substance and accident; Instrument; Earth soul; Degree and mediation

## Chance

**Latin:** *casus*; *fortuna*; *fortuitum*; *sors*; *privatio rationis sive defectus*

**The word.**

Casus, fortuna and fortuitum concern chance or an outcome lacking the rational ordering proposed by Ficino. Contingency, by contrast, can be a permitted variable mode within providence.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Chance means a happening without the purposive and intelligible ordering that Ficino finds in the world. He calls fortune a privation or failure of reason and argues that it cannot account for either God or the world's sustained arrangement. His polemic addresses Lucretius by name and contrasts random handling of stones with constructing a useful, coordinated building. The repeated ends reached by living things and the stable relations among their organs supply further examples.

This strong rejection of chance as the ultimate explanation of the universe should not be collapsed into a denial of every contingent occurrence. In II.12.20–21, Ficino explicitly allows God to will contingent modes of events within an ordered universe. The difference is between treating lack of order as the source of order and admitting variable effects arising through created causes. "Chance" is therefore not automatically an interchangeable translation of every occurrence of *contingentia*.

**The places.**

- **II.12.3, PDF 202–203**. God's being and acting are denied to arise as chance happened to determine.
- **II.13.17, PDF 228–229**. The regularity of species, organs and motions is argued to require ordering counsel.
- **II.12.20, PDF 214–215**. Variable effects of mobile proximate causes retain a place in exact universal order.

**Further passage references.** II.11.17–18, 26, PDF 190–195; II.12.2–3, PDF 202–203; II.13.14–20, PDF 226–231; II.12.20–21, PDF pp. 214–215

**In this edition.**

Do not turn the polemic against fortune as first cause into a denial of every contingent created event. The latter vocabulary is expressly admitted in II.12.20–21, while II.12.3 rejects contingency as the explanation of God's own being.

**See also.**

Contingency; Intuition and discourse; Order and harmony; Providence

## Choice and deliberation

**Latin:** *electio*; *consilium*; *voluntaria cognitio*; *velle*; *nolle*

**The word.**

Electio selects; consilium is counsel, a plan or deliberation. Velle and nolle concern willing and refusing. The absence of laborious planning does not by itself mean absence of intelligence or will.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino rejects the suggestion, attributed to an Epicurean objection, that producing many things would burden God with planning and work. Divine being is already sufficient for action; no separate deliberative mechanism must be added to it. His argument begins with activities occurring without choice: fire heats, the sun illuminates, and soul gives life to the body. Choice itself also arises from the soul's being without another preceding choice, since an infinite series of choices before every action would prevent action from beginning. Ficino orders deliberative operation below operation through essential power and, finally, operation through pure being. This is not a denial of divine intelligence or all willing. In II.9.13 he explicitly identifies God's operation with *voluntaria cognitio*. The distinction concerns laborious or supplementary deliberation and God's simple intelligent activity. *Consilium* also means counsel in the reported account of mind as signifying God's nature and intentions, a broader sense than a laborious psychological process.

**The places.**

- **II.8.1, PDF 160–161**. The Epicurean objection about burdensome divine labour is rejected.
- **II.8.5, PDF 162–163**. Deliberative action is distinguished from action through essential power and pure being.
- **II.9.13, PDF 168–169**. Voluntary cognition and operation are identical in the simple God.

**Further passage references.** II.2.14, pp. 112–113; II.6.20, pp. 138–139; II.8.1–5, pp. 160–163; II.9.13, pp. 168–169

**In this edition.**

Read II.8.1's denial of need for consilium and electio beside II.9.13's voluntaria cognitio. These are distinct descriptions of divine action, not an unnoticed shift from wholly unwilling action to willing action.

**See also.**

Act and operation; Being; Intellect and intellection; Self knowledge

## Choice and free judgment

**Latin:** *electio*; *eligere*; *arbitrii libertas*; *iudicium liberum*; *nostri iudicii libertatem*

**The word.**

Electio and eligere concern selection; iudicium liberum and arbitrii libertas concern the capacity to assess alternatives and choose. Their objects are particular acts or means, unlike desire for good as such.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Choice is the selection of a particular action or means; free judgment is the rational capacity that weighs alternatives. Ficino differentiates this freedom from the basic orientation toward the good. Souls necessarily desire the good as such, yet God leaves their judgment free to deliberate about actions, assess which alternative is better, and choose what they consider more suitable. Consequently, the text's necessity of desire does not mean that only one concrete option is available to a human agent.

The application of choice to God is qualified. God produces some possible things and not others, so Ficino speaks of free election, but adds that divine election does not differ from divine essence. God is not a composite decision-maker whose choice is an additional accidental state. Providence likewise preserves human modes of acting: divine foreknowledge includes both what a person does and that person's voluntary, free manner of doing it. Ficino's argument is that a conditional necessity of foreknown events confirms rather than eliminates their mode. This is Ficino's proposed reconciliation of foreknowledge and freedom.

**The places.**

- **II.12.15–17, PDF 210–213**. God's willing is not exhausted by the creatures that actually exist, and effects are not absolutely necessary.
- **II.13.25–26, PDF 234–235**. Foreknowledge includes voluntary mode and governance preserves each nature.
- **II.13.30, PDF 236–237**. The soul deliberates, compares alternatives and chooses means judged apt for attaining good.

**Further passage references.** II.12.17–21, PDF 212–215; II.13.24–30, PDF 232–237

**In this edition.**

"Freedom of judgment" preserves a specified faculty and mode. II.13.30's comparative melius and aptius concern the agent's assessment, not an assertion that every freely selected option is objectively best.

**See also.**

Contingency; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Providence; Will

## Circularity and return

**Latin:** *circuitus*; *circulo reflectatur*; *revolvitur*; *explicando*; *replicando*; *circulus*; *in circulum*; *revolutio*; *redit*; *refluit*; *convertitur*; *recurrere*

**The word.**

Circuitus, circulus and revolutio name a circuit, circle or revolution. Redire, refluere and converti name return, flow back or turning. A bodily circuit and an intellectual return have different subjects and modes.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Circularity relates a movement's end to its beginning and provides Ficino with a model of return to a source. In Book III, he calls circular motion the most perfect motion: it remains close to its source, joins beginning and end, and repeats without meeting the boundary that stops a straight course. From this cosmological premise he reasons that soul's first proper movement returns upon itself. Its powers unfold from higher through intermediate to lower levels and fold back upward. Because a self-returning spiritual nature attends to itself and its contents, this return supports an argument for intellectual self-awareness. The circuit is a structure of activity, not a measurable circle inside a head.

Book IV differentiates the figures by their subjects. God is called one circle because beginning and end are within himself; an angel has two circuits, returning to its author and contemplating itself; soul has three, turning to God, considering itself, and descending from causes to effects before ascending back. These descriptions do not attribute geometrical shapes to incorporeal beings. An angel's return to its author occurs through understanding and love. The rational part of celestial soul passes from God through unity and mind and returns through mind and unity to God; its approach is described through natural desire, understanding, intellectual love, and loving union. Since this ordered return can be completed in a moment, a sequence of relations need not constitute an ordinary temporal journey.

Bodily heaven, by contrast, turns spatially while imitating its higher causes. Circular movement is close to stability because a sphere need not leave its general location or change its substance and natural quality, even as its parts change position. Ficino thus calls it almost non-motion. Several explanations accumulate: heaven imitates higher beings; its continuous parts draw and press one another into a circuit; it remains in its natural place; and equal affinity for different positions prevents satisfaction in one fixed position. Saturn's sphere is also said to seek everywhere the enjoyment of a soul already wholly present everywhere. Bodily succession approximates, without becoming, soul's simultaneous presence.

Return can additionally describe the renewed traversal of seminal contents after a cosmic cycle. This possible repetition differs from intellectual self-return and physical rotation, though they share a pattern of departure and recovery. Nor does circularity make the moving soul the ultimate source of cosmic action. The chapter closes by referring both moving body and moved mover to a stable principle and end. Its claims about everlasting circular movement belong to Ficino's cosmological argument rather than modern mechanics.

**The places.**

- **III.2.25, PDF 276–277**. Circular movement is judged most perfect because it remains closest to source and foundation.

- **IV.2.21, PDF 346–347**. One, two and three circles describe the different relations of God, angel and soul.
- **IV.2.26–27, PDF 348–351**. Bodily circulation is related to soul and finally to a stable higher principle and end.

**Further passage references.** III.2.25–30, PDF 276–279; IV.1.56–IV.1.57, pp. 310–311; IV.2.21–IV.2.27, pp. 346–351; IV.2.6, pp. 336–337; IV.2.11–IV.2.12, pp. 338–341; IV.2.21–IV.2.26, pp. 346–349

**In this edition.**

“Circle” does not give God or soul a geometrical body. IV.2.21 explicitly assigns different returns to God, angel and soul, while the bodily sphere’s parts subsequently rotate in place. Preserve that change of subject.

**See also.**

Intellect and intellection; Motion and stability; Soul; Spiritual union; Procession and return; Natural motion and natural place; Love and pleasure; Great year; Eternity and time

## Common and proper

**Latin:** communis; propriae; proprietate; propria; commune; proprius; proprium; *proprius*, *propriis*, *communis*, *communes*, *universalis*, *particularis*.

**The word.**

*Communis* means shared or common to several. *Proprius* means one’s own, specifically belonging to something, characteristic of it, or suited to it; *proprietas* can be a distinguishing feature rather than legal ownership. A common nature differs from an individual’s differentiating property. *Universalis* concerns general scope and *particularis* an individual or restricted instance. These related contrasts cannot be substituted for one another in every construction.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

In the test of two equal first principles, what the pair share cannot explain what distinguishes them. Ficino supposes a common nature plus two proper features, then argues that the resulting composition depends on a unifier. The proper natures also need an origin: if identical unrestricted nature produced each feature in the same way, their claimed difference would disappear.

The same family changes emphasis when God is called no thing’s “private guide” but the common guide. Here the contrast concerns the scope of causation, and a common office is assigned the common effect, being. By contrast, “the proper effect” at II.7.29 means the effect especially corresponding to the first agent. At II.9.8 and II.9.10, proper intelligence and proper object identify what belongs to divine knowing without dependence on something external. These are related claims of belonging, not one technical definition mechanically repeated.

A cause proper to vines need not be a vine’s separate personal soul. The principle may reside in the common soul of earth. Conversely, the animals that move independently and live apart from earth have souls of their own. The spheres themselves have common souls, and stars can have proper souls within their spheres. “Common” thus specifies a range of governance rather than numerical identity of every governed soul.

The same vocabulary governs the rejection of God as the proper mover of only one sphere: his causation is common to all, while each differentiated sphere requires an intimately corresponding mover. In the Pythagorean excursion, a particular Phoebus and a particular Jupiter belong to zodiacal positions; they must not be silently substituted for every universal divine name. In the lantern example a general plan cannot produce a particular step without a particular intervening cognition. The opposition moves among ownership, appropriate causation, scale of rule, and scope of thought.

**The places.**

- II.2.2, II.2.3, II.2.4 (PDF pp. 104–107): Shared nature and distinctive properties in the two-principle argument
- II.7.6, II.7.29 (PDF pp. 146–147, 156–157): Common office and the first agent's proper effect
- II.9.8, II.9.10 (PDF pp. 166–169): The characteristic intelligence and adequate object of divine self-knowledge
- **IV.1.7–9, PDF pp. 284–287:** proper causes operate within a common earthly life
- **IV.1.31 and IV.1.35–39, pp. 296–303:** human, elemental, stellar, and other souls have different scopes
- **IV.1.43 and IV.1.59, pp. 304–305 and 312–313:** particular divine designations and particular movers have limited assignments
- **IV.2.13–15, pp. 340–343:** a general purpose requires particular cognition for execution

**In this edition.**

"Proper," "private," "of their own," "particular," "common," and "universal" are contextual choices. At II.7.6, private means restricted to one recipient, not concealed. At II.2.3, property means a feature contributing to composition, not real estate. The Book IV discussion likewise distinguishes a sphere's common soul from the proper souls of its inhabitants. A single standardized English label would obscure those changes.

**See also.**

Simplicity and composition; Cause; Object and adequate object; Communication and imparting.

Universals and individuals; Soul; Zodiac; Euclid and the lantern.

## Communication and imparting

**Latin:** *communicare*; *impertire*; *impartire*; *munus*; *largiri*; *communis*; munus; munere; impertiet; impertit; largietur; commune munus

**The word.**

Communicare, impertire and largiri give a share or bestow; they need not transmit information. Munus can be a gift or office, and communis what is shared across recipients.

Munus can mean a gift bestowed or an office performed. The same noun therefore moves between what a cause gives and the task appropriate to a cause's scope.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

To communicate goodness or being is to give others a share in it, not to transmit information. Ficino makes self-communication characteristic of goodness: what is good

acts according to its power, produces likenesses of itself, and does so for the good. Supreme goodness therefore acts always and upon every species because it is not restricted to one. The language of gifts expresses causal dependence. Higher causes give something to lower things, and each effect's received good points back to its source. Yet God's universality is also described as an office: because he is no particular thing's private guide, his common task is giving being, common to all. Communication does not mean a divisible divine stock is exhausted or parcelled out. Diverse creatures correspond to diverse modes in which divine goodness can be communicated, while God knows these modes through self-knowledge. This word cluster joins generosity imagery with an argument about the origin and intelligibility of distinctions.

The shift is particularly instructive across II.1 and II.7. A proposed principle higher than goodness would have to bestow a superior munus, but whatever made the gift better would already involve goodness. Later, God's commune munus follows from his being a common rather than private guide: being itself is the effect common to all. The first use tests the alleged superiority of a gift; the second matches universal responsibility to universal effect. Both support divine primacy, but by different routes.

**The places.**

- **II.1.5, PDF 100–101**. Goodness gives each thing a share of goodness, testing any proposed principle above it.
- **II.6.6, PDF 130–131**. The Platonists' image of the whole Good poured throughout immensity emphasizes undivided presence.
- **II.9.15, PDF 170–171**. Knowledge of the modes of communicating goodness accounts for divine knowledge of distinct particulars.

**Further passage references.** II.1.5–6, pp. 100–103; II.3.9, pp. 120–121; II.6.6–7, pp. 130–131; II.7.4–6, pp. 144–147; II.9.15, pp. 170–171

- II.1.5, II.1.6 (PDF pp. 100–103): Munus is the allegedly superior gift whose goodness makes the hypothesis fail
- II.3.9 (PDF pp. 120–121): Infinite gifts expose a consequence of an endless causal hierarchy
- II.7.6 (PDF pp. 146–147): Munus becomes the common office of giving being

**In this edition.**

"Communication" concerns received being or goodness. Divine self-communication is not a divisible supply exhausted by distribution. The finite variety of creatures corresponds to different possible modes of receiving, not to pieces of divine substance.

The English "gift" and "office" preserve a real local difference in munus. A Latin register should include both senses rather than supplying one generic equivalent.

**See also.**

Participation; Good and goodness; Cause; Ideas and exemplars; Power and potency

Common and proper; Good and goodness; Dependence and receiving.

## Comparing, resembling and equalling

**Latin:** *comparabimus*; *comparata*; *similes*; *aequales*; *persimiles*; *proportionem*; *par*; *impar*.

**The word.**

*Comparare* brings things into a comparison; *similis* names likeness, whereas *aequalis* and *par* name equality. *Proportio* concerns a relation or relative arrangement. The respect of comparison must be supplied: likeness in quality, equality in magnitude, equality of causal power, and proportion between kinds are different claims.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The announced comparison of five levels is designed to expose differences in dependence and perfection. A particularly concrete distinction appears in natural generation: an effect resembles its cause qualitatively before it equals it quantitatively. Children resemble their parents in constitution and shape before, and more often than, matching their size. This is an example in Ficino's argument that action proceeds through qualities, not a claim that resemblance and equality are synonyms. The same precision matters in the hour-long bodily-condition test: equal powers are said to produce equal effects, so an unchanged power would preserve the condition for another equal period. Finally, form's greater *proportio* to matter than quantity supplies an argument about separability, not a numerical ratio measured in the passage.

**The places.**

- **I.1.7, PDF 16–17.** The five grades are to be compared with one another
- **I.2.12, PDF 24–25.** Qualitative resemblance is distinguished from quantitative equality through parents and children
- **I.3.27, PDF 48–49.** Form's relation to matter supports an inference about quantity
- **I.4.2, PDF 56–57.** Equal and unequal power structure the persistence dilemma

**In this edition.**

"Like" and "equal" should remain distinct. "Constitution" renders *complexio* in the parental comparison; the resemblance includes a bodily condition, not just visible facial similarity. The passage's *rarius et posterius* says that equality is less frequent and later, not impossible.

**See also.**

Image and likeness; Quantity and dimension; Quality; Permanence and the hour test.

## Concord and convergence

**Latin:** conveniant; congruerent; consentire; dissentire; conspirant; conciliantur; communione; concurrunt; conspirationem

**The word.**

Convenire and congruere mean agreeing, matching, or belonging suitably; consentire and dissentire mark agreement and disagreement. Conspirare describes coordinated tendency, while concurrere means coming or working together toward an outcome. These need not denote conscious agreement.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino moves from the hypothetical agreement of two gods to the actual mutual order he sees among diverse cosmic parts. An army's coordinated arrangement illustrates how relations between parts can depend on their common relation to a commander. Mere differences among the parts do not, on his argument, suffice to produce their concord. The world's recurrent order rules out chance as its explanation in his account.

In II.7 the language becomes causal. Parts must be reconciled for a compound to exist; agents converge on being as a common effect. Their unity is not identity of individual nature: they remain diverse agents whose work depends upon one first agent and one end. In the two-god dilemma, however, willing and refusing the same result are genuinely opposed acts. The reader should distinguish coordination among natural agents from agreement between hypothetical wills.

**The places.**

- II.2.2, II.2.8, II.2.9 (PDF pp. 104–105, 108–111): Agreement of natures and mutual cosmic coordination
- II.2.14 (PDF pp. 112–113): Willing and refusing become opposed alternatives
- II.7.9, II.7.27 (PDF pp. 146–147, 156–157): Composition and subordinate agency depend on a prior source of unity

**In this edition.**

English "conspire" retains the Latin image of concerted action; it does not imply a secret plot. "Belongs to" elsewhere can translate convenit, so that word should not everywhere be indexed only as agreement.

**See also.**

Army and commander; Order and harmony; Common and proper; Simplicity and composition.

## Conservation and preservation

**Latin:** *servare*; *conservare*; *conservator*; *influxus*; *permanere*; *perseverare*

**The word.**

Servare and conservare keep or preserve; conservator is the preserving cause. Permanere and perseverare describe the dependent thing's continued existence, which is not the same as self-sufficient causation.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Preservation is the continuing gift of existence, not merely protection against accidental damage. Ficino argues that a dependent thing cannot maintain itself independently once it has been produced. If God's universe existed always, there would be no privileged first moment in which it received being; it must receive being at every moment. If it began, it needs the same preservation. Thus the argument deliberately covers both alternatives rather than settling the world's temporal beginning here. The analogy of a statue distinguishes levels: an artwork endures because natural stone or bronze remains solid; natural things endure through divine influx. Shadow and mirror-image analogies then emphasize constant dependence upon a source. The world is not simply an artifact abandoned by its maker. Ficino extends the point from existence to agency: God preserves

the angel's being, power, and action, and therefore remains active in what the angel does. Continuous dependence is the organizing force of the vocabulary.

**The places.**

- **I.3.18, PDF 40–41**. Matter's making and preservation require a form not inhering in matter.
- **II.4.6, PDF 124–125**. Production without a prior subject is joined to continual preservation.
- **II.7.18–19, PDF 152–153**. Both temporal-origin alternatives require ongoing divine preservation.
- **II.7.24, PDF 154–155**. Angelic action operates through the received divine power as an instrument does through its maker.

**Further passage references.** II.4.6, pp. 124–125; II.6.11, pp. 132–133; II.7.17–25, pp. 150–155

**In this edition.**

II.7.18–19 deliberately covers both an always-existing world and one that began. Do not convert this preservation argument into a decision about the world's first temporal moment. The continuous gift concerns being, not only protection from damage.

**See also.**

Creation; Cause; Instrument; Motion and stability; Being

## Containing, receiving and lacking

**Latin:** *continet*; *complectitur*; *capiunt*; *capax*; *accipiet*; *caret*; *deest*; *indiget*.

**The word.**

*Continere* and *complecti* can mean to contain or embrace; *capere* can be to receive or apprehend. *Capax* is receptive or capable of receiving. *Carere*, *deesse*, and *indigere* indicate absence or need, with different constructions. None implies that an incorporeal mind is a physical receptacle.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The first member of a kind is said to contain the following members and to lack none of that kind's perfection. The claim concerns causal fullness, not a box containing every individual. Conversely, inferior luminous things do not receive the entire fullness of light. In the eye analogy, a bodily eye is a capacity receptive to light, not light itself. Enlarging the eye increases its reception without abolishing its dependence; likewise, the imagined pure mind receives truth more abundantly but is still distinct from truth. The vocabulary therefore helps distinguish possession from identity. God's simplicity is argued in part through complete self-presence: a composite would not embrace its whole self in each member and would be absent from itself in some respect. These are steps in Ficino's argument, not literal anatomical descriptions of God.

**The places.**

- **I.3.3, PDF 30–31.** Causal fullness contrasted with partial reception
- **I.6.6, PDF 84–85.** Embracing the whole self versus lacking oneself in the hypothetical composite God

• **I.6.7–9, PDF 86–87.** Receptivity remains after the eye or mind is imagined enlarged

• **I.6.10–12, PDF 88–89.** Mind needs truth, whereas truth does not need a receiving mind

**In this edition.**

“Apprehend” is suitable for intellectual *capere*; “receive” better displays the illumination analogy. The changing English should not conceal the shared relation of reception. “Comprehend” elsewhere can mean encompass rather than supply a separate technical cognitive faculty.

**See also.**

Need and sufficiency; Participation; Truth; Eye and imagined enlargement.

## Contingency

**Latin:** *contingentia*; *contingentes*; *secundum contingentiam*; *essendi modos*; *proximarum causarum*

**The word.**

Contingentia and contingens mark a variable or non-necessary created mode. Essendi modus is the manner of a thing’s being; proximate causes supply its particular mode of occurrence.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Contingency describes a created event’s variable mode of occurrence, rather than a deficiency that must remove it from providence. Ficino denies that God’s own being or activity results from contingency, but later says that exact universal order requires a range of causes: stable causes, mobile causes, and effects varying with those mobile causes. Because effects imitate their proximate causes, variation belongs to the created order itself.

God wills not only things but also their appropriate modes of being. Ficino consequently reports the theologians’ formula that God chooses an event to occur contingently. Nothing thereby escapes providence or destroys universal order. This distinction is the important reading aid: an event can be contingent in its own created mode while belonging to an order governed by God. Related arguments concern free human actions, whose known mode remains voluntary. The terminology does not supply a modern probability theory and should not be recast as statistical randomness. Nor should divine contingency be inferred from the legitimate contingency of created effects.

**The places.**

• **II.12.3, PDF 202–203**. Contingency is rejected as the ground of God’s own being and operation.

• **II.12.20–21, PDF 214–215**. God wills things with their appropriate modes, including contingent effects through mobile causes.

• **II.13.25, PDF 234–235**. Foreknowledge includes causes and free modes rather than merely bare outcomes.

**Further passage references.** II.12.2–3, 19–21, PDF 202–203, 212–215; II.13.25–30, PDF 234–237

**In this edition.**

The qualification quodammodo in II.12.20 makes contingency a specified respect, not absence from every order. It is distinct from chance as a sufficient first explanation and from a statistical probability calculation.

**See also.**

Cause; Chance; Choice and free judgment; Freedom and necessity; Providence

## Contraction and determination

**Latin:** *determinatur*, *determinet*, *contrahi*, *contrahit*, *disposita*, *disponendam*, *ordinet*.

**The word.**

*Determinare* bounds or directs something to a determinate result. *Contrahere* gathers or narrows a more general power to a particular realization. *Disponere* arranges or prepares a recipient; *ordinare* puts causes into an order. Contraction here need not involve material shrinking.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

A celestial impulse is common to every element. Ficino makes an element's common life determine it toward a particular generated life. Even if one initially assigns the cause to celestial souls, an earthly universal medium must contract their common impulses into earthly particulars. Nor will an unexplained meeting of many agents suffice: their convergence itself requires a cause organizing them toward this effect. The verbs articulate why mere plurality of contributing conditions does not yet explain a determinate product.

The soul of earth is then said to produce vines through the vine's principle and flies through the principle of flies. It also arranges matter beforehand by contracting the world's impulses in the needed manner. Preparing the material and producing the form therefore belong to a coordinated account. The preparatory verbs should not be taken to identify matter with the formative principle or to imply that an externally imposed shape exhausts natural generation.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.4, PDF pp. 282–283:** a common celestial impulse is determined within an element
- **IV.1.7–9, pp. 284–287:** contraction, convergence, ordering, and material disposition explain particular effects
- **IV.1.85, pp. 326–327:** bodily heaven's arranging activity is instrumental in the production of a higher kind of living recipient
- **IV.2.15, pp. 342–343:** one seed-kind is brought forward for particular execution under a general intellectual plan

**In this edition.**

"Contract" is technical in these contexts: the narrowing concerns the scope and mode of causation. The reiterated "in this way or that" in IV.1.9 preserves the specificity of material preparation rather than mere rhetorical indecision.

**See also.**

Cause; Celestial influence; Seeds; Euclid and the lantern.

## Contradiction and possibility

**Latin:** *contradictio; repugnare; adversari; ratio entis; potentia entis; non ens*

**The word.**

Contradictio is contradiction; repugnare and adversari oppose or conflict with something. Ratio entis is the intelligible character of being, while potentia entis concerns what can be. The logical exclusion is narrower than ordinary difference or contrary qualities.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino argues that whatever does not conflict with being's character lies within its possibility. Contradiction alone includes the character of nonbeing, and he attributes to the Peripatetics the inclusion of noncontradictory things within the potency of being. The mind's ability to range over that breadth supports a corresponding scope for divine productive power. The next paragraph is essential: possible changes in number, magnitude, and stellar distances need never occur in the actual order. God's ability therefore exceeds what God makes. This does not say that any arbitrary collection of words identifies a coherent possibility. Nor does the presence of physical contraries, such as heat and cold, amount to the contradiction excluded from possible being. Contraries are elsewhere reconciled and ordered in one world.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.12.16 (Latin PDF p. 210; English PDF p. 211).** The argument moves from corporeal possibility to the character of being.
- **II.12.17 (Latin PDF p. 212; English PDF p. 213).** Contradiction is excluded; the Peripatetic attribution is explicit.
- **II.12.18 (Latin PDF p. 212; English PDF p. 213).** Unactualized possibilities ground the distinction between power and choice.

**In this edition.**

"Conflicts with" and "opposite" must be interpreted through the next unit's explicit contradictio. The text does not enumerate a modern formal logic or prove that every mentally pictured object is possible. The examples of stars concern Ficino's modal argument, not observations of alternative universes.

**See also.**

Nothing and nonbeing; Power and potency; Productive and designing power; Contraries and opposition.

## Contraries and opposition

**Latin:** *contrarium*; *contraria*; *oppositio*; *opponere*; *pugnantia*

**The word.**

Contrarium and oppositio identify opposition; pugnantia are things in conflict. The relation can concern bodily qualities, physiological constituents, or paired conceptual distinctions in the hierarchy.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Opposition performs more than one job in Book I. Among natural bodies, Ficino places effective opposition in qualities rather than bare matter or quantity: heat and cold provide his recurring examples. A quality may affect another thing through such opposition, yet its own dependence and exposure to material dispersion prevent it from being a sufficient first cause. At a higher explanatory level, living power reconciles conflicting constituents and holds them together in one organism. In the argument from angel to God, the oppositions are conceptual: immobility opposes mobility, and unity opposes multiplicity. Since a mobile multiplicity and an immobile unity differ in both respects, Ficino argues for an intermediary, the immobile multiplicity of angelic mind. The word therefore does more than supply a generic metaphor of conflict. Its meaning depends on whether Ficino is discussing natural qualities, an organism's constituents, or paired distinctions within the hierarchy of being.

**The places.**

- **I.2.8, PDF 22–23**. Qualitative contraries are located as sources of natural bodily action.
- **I.3.23, PDF 44–45**. Life reconciles conflicting constituents within an organism.
- **I.6.1–3, PDF 82–83**. Immobile multiplicity mediates between mobile multiplicity and immobile unity.

**Further passage references.** I.2.8 (PDF pp. 22–23); I.3.9, I.3.23, I.3.33 (pp. 34–35, 44–45, 52–53); I.6.1–I.6.3 (pp. 82–83)

**In this edition.**

"Opposed" should retain the relevant respect. Heat versus cold differs from unity versus multiplicity and from mobility versus immobility; I.6.1 needs two independent contrasts to motivate an intermediate.

**See also.**

Quality; Life; Degree and mediation; Unity and multiplicity

## Counsel and settled skill

**Latin:** *consilium; consultare; callere; habitus; mora; transgressio; retractatio; per translationem*

**The word.**

Consilium is counsel or deliberative planning; consultare is to deliberate; callere to be thoroughly skilled. Habitus names settled acquired proficiency. Per translationem explicitly marks a transfer of expression or metaphor.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino anticipates a difficulty in calling natural order the result of counsel. Human deliberation can imply uncertainty, delay, departure from a plan, and reconsideration. He denies those features to the directing intelligence. "Counsel" is used by metaphor because some things are done for the sake of others, not because the maker investigates one thing from another. The accomplished craftsperson supplies an intermediate example: a perfected skill acts readily from its settled disposition, whereas the unskilled deliberate. This does not deny all human reasoning or claim that any impulsive action is expert. Its

purpose is to separate intelligent purposiveness from hesitant, successive inquiry. Human rational soul will still be defined as knowing through temporal discourse.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.13.17 (Latin PDF p. 228; English PDF p. 229).** Better counsel than the imagined human planner is inferred from natural order.
- **II.13.18 (Latin PDF p. 228; English PDF p. 229).** Ficino expressly defines the metaphor and contrasts acquired skill with deliberation.
- **III.2.29 (Latin PDF p. 278; English PDF p. 279).** Temporal discourse remains proper to rational soul's operation.

**In this edition.**

The edition's "settled skill" for habitu distinguishes this use from "possession" and "state" elsewhere. "Intuition" here translates intuitus, a direct intellectual apprehension; it need not mean an unsupported hunch.

**See also.**

Intuition and discourse; Habitual possession; Art and nature; Possession and privation.

## Counting and collective intuition

**Latin:** gradatim enumerando; intuendo summatim; actu unico; ratione multiplicem; omniformem; unicolor; omnicolorem

**The word.**

Enumerare counts off or lists; gradatim means step by step; summatim can mean collectively or in a gathered view. Omniformis is containing every form, not shapeless; unicolor and omnicolor make the corresponding contrast of one color and every color.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The final response in II.10 distinguishes an infinite multitude of objects from an infinite task performed by successive counting. God does not enumerate them one after another. He sees them through one form in one act, as simple in essence while in a certain respect multiple according to reason. "As finite" is immediately glossed by this distinction; it is not the claim that an infinite collection has suddenly acquired a last member.

The solar analogy makes the point differently: light, called one-colored "so to speak," might perceive itself as every-colored because it is the source of colors. Similarly, God's one form is regarded as all-formed through power and a certain respect. Both qualifications matter: the passage distinguishes productive capacity and intelligible relation from an aggregate of separate formal pieces.

**The places.**

- II.10.8, II.10.9 (PDF pp. 178–179): Self-comprehension is distinguished from being bounded by another
- II.10.10, II.10.11, II.10.12 (PDF pp. 180–181): Collective intuition, all-form, and the one-colored/all-colored analogy close the answer

**In this edition.**

“Collectively by intuition” renders intuendo summatim. Summatim should not imply a vague summary omitting details: the preceding argument repeatedly insists on distinct knowledge. “So to speak” qualifies unicolor in the Latin.

**See also.**

Infinity; Intuition and comprehension; Form; Light and illumination.

## Craftsman and father

**Latin:** *faber; genitor; filius; materia externa; materia intrinseca; fecunditas; proclivitas*

**The word.**

Faber is a craftsman; genitor a begetter or father; filius a son. External and internal material distinguish what a maker works on from what a parent supplies in generation. Fecunditas is fruitfulness; proclivitas an inclination or readiness to act.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino builds an ascending comparison of attachment to a product. The craftsman loves what he has made from external material. The father loves the son more, having begotten him from internal material, although that material was itself received through eating. God’s relation is fuller still, because he makes both the matter and the form rather than receiving either elsewhere. The comparison supports care as well as production: the cause of the complete work wills the work’s good. Its force depends on a contrast, not an identification. God is not said here to eat or generate bodies from a bodily substance of his own. The account of parental material belongs to Ficino’s historical physiology and is not evidence for a modern account of reproduction.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.13.1 (Latin PDF p. 216; English PDF p. 217).** Love of divine works follows from divine self-love.
- **II.13.2 (Latin PDF p. 216; English PDF p. 217).** Craftsman, father, and creator supply three different relations to material and product.

**In this edition.**

The translation’s “material within himself” preserves intrinseca while retaining the next qualification that the parent received it from elsewhere. Omitting that qualification would erase precisely the dependence that distinguishes the father from the creator.

**See also.**

Creation; Care and custody; Love and pleasure; Art and nature.

## Creation

**Latin:** *creare*; *creatio*; *ex nihilo*; *ex nullo antiquiore subiecto*; *efficere*

**The word.**

Creare and creatio concern divine production; ex nihilo and ex nullo antiquiore subiecto specify the absence of prior material. Efficere is broader and can also name subordinate production.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino distinguishes divine production from an agent's alteration of material already available to it. Heating water presupposes a receptive capacity; what does not exist has no capacity waiting to receive actuality. God therefore requires immeasurable power to produce without a prior subject. His formulation allows either creating something anew out of nothing or continuously bringing forth and preserving primary matter and the essence of minds and souls. Consequently, *ex nihilo* in this argument does not by itself specify a dated first event. The central point is radical dependence without borrowed material. II.6.2 links this distinctive causality to divine presence: wherever primary matter or spiritual essence subsists through God alone, their cause must be present. In II.7.21 God is called cause in the proper sense because he makes each thing wholly without another's assistance or a loan of matter. Created things can themselves act, but do so by powers and being they receive.

**The places.**

- **II.4.5–6, PDF 124–125**. No capacity to receive actuality belongs to what does not exist; production without prior subject exceeds material alteration.
- **II.6.2, PDF 128–129**. Primary matter and spiritual essence require God's immediate creative presence.
- **II.7.18–19, PDF 152–153**. Beginningless duration is distinguished from independence of a preserving cause.

**Further passage references.** II.4.5–6, pp. 124–125; II.6.2, pp. 128–129; II.7.18–21, pp. 152–153

**In this edition.**

"Out of nothing" does not make nothing a passive substrate. II.4.6 permits either newly creating or continuously producing and preserving without a prior subject, so the phrase alone does not settle a date of cosmic origin.

**See also.**

Matter; Nothing and nonbeing; Conservation and preservation; Cause; Power and potency

## Daemons

**Latin:** *daemones*; *daemones aquei*; *Nereides*; *daemonum*

**The word.**

Daemon names an intermediate rational spirit within Ficino's reported graded cosmology. Its body can be airy or watery; the term does not by itself mean a morally evil being.

The local vocabulary includes *Nereides*, *exhalationibus*, *acutioribus oculis*, *videri*, *tangi*, *Perside*, *Africa*, *Tuscos*: named beings, bodily constituents, perceptual conditions, and places of attributed reports are different lexical functions.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Book IV places rational living beings in different cosmic regions and presents aqueous daemons as examples in the purer exhalations of water. Their visibility or tangibility is explained through bodily composition: Ficino attributes claims about fiery content, earthly admixture, and regional appearances to Zoroaster and Porphyry. The point of the passage is to extend the gradation of purity, body, and rational soul beyond familiar land and aquatic animals. “Daemon” should accordingly be retained as a historically situated category; the paragraph does not characterize these beings as evil in the modern sense suggested by “demon.” They remain embodied souls, distinct from the unmixed intellectual lives called angels. They reappear in the closing circular-motion analogy alongside spheres, stars, and humans. The passage reports these beings within its graded cosmology without developing a comprehensive theory of spirits.

The Nereids are the watery daemons Orpheus is said to name. Zoroaster is assigned the claim that some are visible to sharper eyes, especially in Persia and Africa. Porphyry adds a distinction: fire in the watery body explains visibility, and added earth explains tangibility, with Tuscan examples placed in his own time. A lexicon should retain who supplies which part of the report. The neighboring assertion that all creatures above water possess reason rests on a separate argument about the absence of dense/rarefied divisions in those spheres.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.38–39, PDF 300–303**. Elemental constitution is used to explain invisible, visible and tangible living beings, with named attributions.
- **IV.1.96, PDF 332–333**. The broader account of sphere-souls remains subject to theological approval.
- **IV.2.26, PDF 348–349**. Daemons recur among embodied rational souls in the circular-motion analogy.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.38–IV.1.40, pp. 300–303; IV.2.26, pp. 348–349; apparatus pp. 390–391

- **IV.1.38–40, PDF pp. 300–303:** ordinary visibility criteria precede the named reports and the rationality inference

**In this edition.**

The retained English “daemon” avoids automatically importing the sense of an evil demon. The accounts of visibility and touch are attributed to Zoroaster and Porphyry, and are not verified observations of such beings.

“Seen” and “touched” are not interchangeable. The text gives neither a modern identification of the reported beings nor independent confirmation of the regional claims.

**See also.**

Spheres and stars; Purity and mixture; Ethereal garment; Angel

Seeming and evidence; Purity and mixture; Spirit.

## Degree and mediation

**Latin:** *gradus*; *medium*; *medius*; *extremum*; *intervallum*; *essentia tertia ac media*; *extrema*; *superiora*; *inferiora*; *medium competens*; *natura media*; *anima perspicua*; *intercesserit*

**The word.**

Gradus is a rank or degree; medium is an intermediate, while extremum marks an extreme. Intervallum expresses separation in the order, not necessarily measured physical distance.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

*Gradus* can mean a rank, a level of being, or a degree of intensity. The principal sequence is body, quality, soul, angel, and God in ascent, reversed in Book III's deliberate descent. Soul is third in either direction. These are not equally spaced rungs: the distinction between divine unity and angelic multiplicity places God infinitely beyond the rest, while the interval from soul to matter is described as finite. The intervals express dependence and perfection rather than measured spatial distances.

The ranks are differentiated through their characteristic activities. Body is moved; quality moves body while being moved by another; soul moves itself; angel acts while stable through God; God acts and is stable through himself. Soul's middle position therefore means more than being third in a list. It shares stability with higher beings and changing activity with lower ones, connecting knowing and life-giving within one independently subsisting nature. It is not a mixture of halves or a compromise lacking its own constitution.

Ficino repeatedly reasons that extremes require a proportionate intermediate. Quality mediates between bare body and incorporeal form; soul connects wholly changing quality with angelic stability; angelic immobile multiplicity connects mobile soul with immobile divine unity. Seasons supply an ordinary example of transition through an intermediate. Book IV gives soul the image of a transparent medium between luminous and opaque things. Indivisible and above place like angelic mind, but mutable and related to time, soul transmits forms into body, where they are received divisibly. The image explains causal function rather than physical transparency.

Mediation also explains the earth-soul: it is earthly like its particular products and universal like the celestial impulses it receives and specifies. A self-moving soul similarly connects an unmoved angel to a body moved by another. Making God the world's indwelling life would subordinate the independent first principle to an animated body; making an angel that life would join unmixed intellectual stability immediately to temporal matter. Soul's combined stability and changing activity is the middle required by Ficino's argument, not another name for either extreme.

**The places.**

- **I.1.7, PDF 16–17**. The five grades make rational soul the mediating bond.
- **I.4.3–5, PDF 56–59**. Seasonal transitions illustrate the intermediate between wholly mobile and wholly stable natures.
- **I.6.1–3, PDF 82–83**. Angel joins soul's multiplicity to the immobility of the higher principle.
- **IV.1.7, PDF 284–285**. Earth-soul is earthly and universal, mediating between celestial universality and earthly particulars.

**Further passage references.** I.1.7 (PDF pp. 16–17); I.3.19, I.3.27, I.3.33 (pp. 42–43, 48–49, 52–53); I.4.3 (pp. 56–57); I.5.15 (pp. 70–71); I.6.1–I.6.3 (pp. 82–83); Book III argument, PDF 239; III.1.1–5, 14–23, PDF 240–255; III.2.1–8, 20–24, PDF 262–275; IV.1.7, pp. 284–285; IV.1.29–IV.1.33, pp. 296–299; IV.1.65–IV.1.67, pp. 314–317

**In this edition.**

Soul's "third" position is not a mixture of two half-natures. Its stable essence and changing action supply specified likenesses to both sides. The seasonal comparison is an analogy supporting mediation, not a measured scale of ontological distances.

**See also.**

Ascent; Soul; Motion and stability; Participation; Act and operation; Quality; Unity and multiplicity; Angel; Celestial influence

## Dependence and receiving

**Latin:** pendet; pendentem; dependebit; accipit; capiunt; suscipit; sortitur; adipiscitur; nanciscitur; largitur

**The word.**

Pendere and dependere mark dependence, literally evoking hanging from a support. Accipere, suscipere, and capere receive or take; sortiri obtains as a lot or share; adipisci and nancisci acquire or attain. Largiri names the corresponding generous bestowal.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

A recipient's possession does not establish independence. A supposed supreme principle that receives unity or a distinctive property from another would already be composite and dependent. Ficino repeatedly asks where a thing obtains what makes it what it is, not merely where it was located when an event occurred.

Receiving also concerns continuing efficacy. God gives and preserves an angel's being, act, power of action, and action itself. The angel remains a subordinate agent, not a passive name for God; yet it cannot detach its activity from the source that enables it. The vocabulary is therefore more exact than "one thing affects another": it distinguishes receiving a constitution, obtaining a power, exercising that power, and continually depending on its preservation.

**The places.**

- II.1.3, II.2.5 (PDF pp. 100–101, 106–107): Receiving from a higher source excludes an alleged principle's self-sufficiency
- II.7.14, II.7.15 (PDF pp. 148–151): An acquired distinguishing property reveals dependence
- II.7.23, II.7.24, II.7.25 (PDF pp. 154–155): Bestowal and preservation extend from being to subordinate action

**In this edition.**

Sortitur in II.2.5 is "obtains," not a claim that essence is distributed by chance or lottery. The repeated largitur in II.7.23 deliberately separates what is given even as the causal dependence is unified.

**See also.**

Through itself and through another; Participation; Cause; Communication and imparting.

## Dionysius, Daniel and numerical orders

**Latin:** *Dionysius Areopagita*; *Danielis prophetae*; *ternario novenarioque*; *septenario*; *duodenarium*; *Iamblichus Proclusque*.

**The word.**

The numerical adjectives refer to three, nine, seven and twelve as ways of distinguishing orders. *Ordo* is a rank or arrangement, not automatically an individual angel. *Milia milium* is the phrase quoted for an immense company of attendants.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

After arguing that separated intellectual species exceed corporeal species, Ficino invokes Dionysius as a witness and quotes Daniel's multitude of ministers. He connects the likeness of creation to its creator with an abundance of separate minds, which he regards as most like that creator. He then places Christian numerical orders beside classifications attributed to Iamblichus and Proclus. The juxtaposition supports his concordant presentation of theology and Platonism. The statement that the latter philosophers came "after Dionysius" is Ficino's historical ordering within the passage; it is not independently established here. Nor should the different numbers be summed as though the text supplied an unambiguous census of individual angels. The following unit reports that some correlate angelic orders with orders of souls and bodies, and postpones more detail.

**The places.**

- **I.5.27, PDF 80–81.** Dionysius and Daniel support abundance; numerical orders are compared across the named authorities
- **I.5.28, PDF 80–81.** An alternative correspondence with souls and bodies is reported and deferred

**In this edition.**

In the Latin, *supremos enim et medios angelos ternario et novenario dividunt* groups highest and middle angels with the two numbers. The English distributes them as highest by three and middle by nine. The supplied apparatus expressly identifies this as its distributive rendering (PDF 364); it is an interpretation of the compressed coordination and should not be mistaken for more explicit Latin syntax. No independent historical identification of the Dionysian author is supplied by the source unit.

**See also.**

Angel; Number; Twelve; Image and likeness.

## Dispersion and concentration

**Latin:** *dispersa*; *distracta*; *dispergit*; *coarctet*; *rarefaciat*; *in angustum coactae*; *ad punctum colligitur*.

**The word.**

*Dispergere* scatters; *distrahere* draws apart. *Coarctare* compresses; *cogere* can collect or force together; *colligere* gathers. *Rarefacere* makes less dense. Their objects matter: gathering an argument's results is not the same operation as concentrating heat.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino's initial case against bulk turns on a trade-off. Concentrating bodily parts strengthens their united power but increases thickness, making penetration more difficult; rarefaction facilitates movement and penetration but disperses power. Body therefore cannot, in his model, fully satisfy all conditions of perfect action at once. Concentrated heat illustrates why force follows quality rather than mere size. The "point" marks maximum concentration in the comparison, not a claim that a geometrical point is a miniature flame. Later the language becomes temporal: the soul's life is drawn away from itself across successive acts, unlike angelic life, which is wholly together. Spatial scattering and temporal succession are analogous limitations, but remain distinct.

**The places.**

- **I.2.2–4, PDF 18–21.** Compression, rarefaction, separation of agent and patient, and delay enter the trade-off
- **I.2.11, PDF 24–25.** Heat concentrated into a point explains greater burning power
- **I.2.17, PDF 26–27.** Dispersion weakens quality; contraction emphasizes its non-bodily source
- **I.5.2, PDF 60–61.** A life dispersed through time is contrasted with a life wholly united at once

**In this edition.**

"Dispersed," "drawn apart," "compressed," and "rarefies" preserve an argument with several different operations. "Quantity" should not be treated as a modern measurement of energy; the natural examples belong to Ficino's theory of efficacy.

**See also.**

Body and bulk; Quality; Unity and multiplicity; Eternity and time.

## Divinity and the divine

**Latin:** *divinitas*; *divinus*; *animorum divinitas*; *creatae mentis divinitas*

**The word.**

Divinitas is divinity; divinus can describe God, a created thing's relation to God, or an honorific religious quality. Creatae mentis divinitas expressly qualifies the mind's divinity as created.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The Proem identifies the divinity of souls, together with worship of God, as a principal benefit of reading Plato. Ficino then specifies the "divinity of the created mind." The

qualification matters: the mind can be divine in dignity, likeness, or participation while remaining created and dependent. It is not thereby identical with the supreme God. The five-level structure makes this distinction explicit, placing both soul and angel below God. Divine vocabulary can also serve honorific or interpretive uses. Plato is called divine, and his teaching theology, because Ficino presents his inquiries as returning to contemplation and worship of God. An occurrence can therefore describe God, a created being's relation to God, or a philosopher's religious orientation. Created mind remains distinct from the divine origin of mind.

**The places.**

- **Proem.3, PDF 6–7**. Plato's return of every subject to contemplation and worship explains the divine title.
- **Proem.5–7, PDF 6–9**. Divinity of souls becomes an organizing benefit and the created mind a divine mirror.
- **I.6.5–13, PDF 84–91**. Divine simplicity and qualified intellectual names distinguish God from created mind.

**Further passage references.** Proem.3–Proem.7 (PDF pp. 6–9); I.1.1–I.1.7 (pp. 14–17); I.6.5–I.6.13 (pp. 84–91)

**In this edition.**

Do not omit "created" in Proem.7. Plato being called "divine" and the soul possessing "divinity" do not make either identical with the supreme first principle; the following hierarchy explicitly preserves their dependence.

**See also.**

Mind; Soul; God; Participation; Philosophy and theology

## Earth as mother

**Latin:** *feminae huius ventrem*, *parit fetus et alit*, *dorsum*, *dentes*, *pilos*, *parturiunt*, *terrae visceribus*.

**The word.**

*Venter* is belly or womb; *fetus* offspring; *parere* giving birth; *alere* nourishing. *Dorsum* is the back, *viscera* the inward parts or entrails. The anatomical vocabulary is transferred to earth without making every transferred noun a separate bodily organ in a fully worked-out cosmic anatomy.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The opening question asks who could deny life to this female's womb when it gives birth, nourishes offspring, and sustains itself. Stones are like teeth and plants like hair. The comparisons join fertility with continued attachment: what grows from earth appears to Ficino to stand to it as a living body's outgrowths stand to that body. Their explanatory force depends on the preceding argument from nourishment and generation, not simply on a poetic preference for calling earth a mother. Higher spheres subsequently foster earth and water as they give birth. Maternal imagery thus coexists with a hierarchy of causes.

The later wind within earth's entrails belongs to a different argument. Ficino uses the alleged ability of enclosed wind to shake mountains to make a celestial soul's easy movement of subtle bodies less astonishing. The womb image argues for an indwelling life;

the entrails image locates an ordinary physical comparison. These uses should not be flattened into one mythological doctrine.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.2, PDF pp. 282–283:** teeth, hair, womb, back, and offspring support the argument for the life of earth
- **IV.1.36, pp. 300–301:** earth and water give birth under the fostering of higher spheres
- **IV.2.19, pp. 344–345:** wind in earth's entrails illustrates the movement of massive bodies by something subtle

**In this edition.**

The English keeps "like its teeth" and "like its hairs," preserving the explicit *quasi*. The subsequent "womb of this female" is the text's personifying question. Reading either as modern anatomy would mistake the mode of the argument.

**See also.**

Earth soul; Nourishment and growth; Head, heart, and members; Weariness and agility.

## Earth soul

**Latin:** *anima terrae*; *terrena vita*; *universalis terrae anima*

**The word.**

Anima terrae and terrena vita name the earth's own living principle. Universalis terrae anima is universal relative to earthly particulars, not automatically the one world-soul.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino infers an earth-soul from the earth's purported generation, nourishment, and growth of living things. His striking image presents earth as a female body whose stones are teeth and plants are hair. Within the argument, earth-soul is the proximate living source that can receive general celestial impulses and direct them toward specifically earthly products. It contains the principles of vines and flies, disposes matter, and accounts for organisms that seem to arise without bodily seed. Later it also calls detached particles back toward their sphere, as a magnet draws iron. It is therefore more than a poetic name for fertility. Ficino distinguishes it from the proper souls of beasts and humans, which can sustain their bodies apart from the earth; he denies plants and stones such independence in this discussion. These conclusions depend on his inherited natural philosophy and belong under the chapter's final theological reservation.

The claim that the earth's soul is rational receives its own argument. Some earthly creatures possess reason, and the earth's products are judged more beautiful than human works; Ficino therefore refuses a lower status to their common productive source. Yet the earth's common soul is not the world's one soul, nor the same soul as every organism dwelling on earth. Bodies separate in place, nature, figure, quantity, motion, and species are given corresponding separate souls. The distinction lets him maintain a hierarchy of animation without treating each visible fragment of earth as an autonomous rational being.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.1–2, PDF 282–283**. Generation, nourishment, growth and the earth-as-female image motivate animation.

- **IV.1.7, PDF 284–285**. Earth-soul mediates heavenly impulses into local lives.
- **IV.1.39, PDF 302–303**. Reason in earthly products and beauty of their production support rationality of their source.
- **IV.1.96, PDF 332–333**. The account receives an explicit theological reservation.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.1–IV.1.9, pp. 282–287; IV.1.35–IV.1.39, pp. 298–303; IV.1.74–IV.1.80, pp. 320–323; IV.1.96, pp. 332–333

**In this edition.**

The claim of generation from putrefaction carries apparent or reported observation and belongs to Ficino's natural philosophy. "Contracted" celestial influences at IV.1.7 are made earthly and particular through a fitting causal middle, not physically squeezed.

**See also.**

Generation and corruption; Seeds; Celestial influence; World soul

## Elements and their spheres

**Latin:** *elementa*; *sphaerae elementorum*; *integra elementa*; *particulae*

**The word.**

Elementa names earth, water, air and fire; integra elementa and sphaerae designate their wholes, while particulae are separated portions entering mixtures. Whole and particle have different purposes and causal roles.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Earth, water, air, and fire belong to the lower cosmic spheres. The crucial distinction is between an entire elemental sphere and a detached particle or mixture. Objections that elements are inferior because they serve composite bodies miss, Ficino argues, the purpose of their wholes: complete spheres serve the world itself, whereas separated particles are mixed for the sake of particular bodies. The wholes also mediate divine and celestial influences before these descend to mixed bodies. A sphere's common soul must therefore be distinguished from the souls of creatures living within it. IV.1.36 adds the four elemental spheres to eight heavens, explaining the later total of twelve cosmic spheres; eight and twelve are not inconsistent counts of the same category. Descriptions of their location, purity, and animacy are part of the stated cosmology, rather than current scientific classification. The text's distinction between whole and particle does important argumentative work throughout.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.36, PDF 300–301**. Air and fire receive the same animating argument as earth and water, alongside eight heavens.
- **IV.1.89–91, PDF 328–329**. The objection about inferiority is answered by distinguishing the cosmic whole from mixed particles.
- **IV.1.96, PDF 332–333**. Twelve sphere-souls are distinguished from one world-soul and many souls within spheres.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.35–IV.1.39, pp. 298–303; IV.1.50, pp. 306–307; IV.1.89–IV.1.93, pp. 328–331

**In this edition.**

Eight heavens and twelve total spheres are compatible counts because the four elemental spheres are added. “Complete elements” should not be replaced by every small sample of earth or water; the whole/particle distinction is the response to the objection.

**See also.**

Spheres and stars; Whole and parts; Purity and mixture; Soul

## Empyrean heaven

**Latin:** *caelum empyreum; prorsus immobile; in aeternitate; sunt et qui*

**The word.**

Caelum empyreum is the named heaven; prorsus immobile means wholly motionless. Sunt et qui, “there are also those who,” introduces a reported classification. The passage supplies the term’s classificatory role without explaining its etymology.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

After describing soul as a bond between eternal and temporal things, Ficino reports those who place the empyrean in eternity as wholly motionless, other spheres in eternity and time together, and composite things in time alone. A corresponding classification of pure intellects, ensouled intellects, and bodily souls follows. This is an analogy of ways of being related to eternity and time. It is not a fresh unqualified assertion that every sphere is motionless, nor a reason to add an extra sphere indiscriminately to every other enumeration in the work. The initial attribution governs the linked classification and must not disappear when the short sentence is quoted alone.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.2.3 (Latin PDF p. 262; English PDF p. 263).** Soul’s intermediate relation to eternal and temporal beings prepares the comparison.
- **III.2.4 (Latin PDF p. 262; English PDF p. 263).** An unnamed group places the empyrean in eternity as motionless.
- **III.2.5 (Latin PDF p. 264; English PDF p. 265).** The reported classification assigns other spheres to eternity and time.
- **III.2.6 (Latin PDF p. 264; English PDF p. 265).** The classification concludes with bodily souls before the argument resumes.

**In this edition.**

The supplied Latin and English have “wholly motionless.” The edition’s apparatus (PDF p. 385) reports prorsus immobile in M1482 and P1641 against prorsus mobile in G1559. This is the apparatus’s report, not a new collation. The opposite reading must not silently replace the text or erase its express attribution.

**See also.**

Eternity and time; Spheres and stars; Soul; Qualification and attribution.

## End and limit

**Latin:** *finis*; *terminus*; *terminare*; *determinare*; *scopus*; *ultimus finis*; *infinitus finis*; *finis ultimus*; *ad finem*; *cuius gratia*; *bonum*; *tamquam finis*; *motionum omnium fini*

**The word.**

Finis can be a goal or completion as well as an endpoint; terminus a boundary or determination; scopus an aim. Cuius gratia identifies what something is for. The relevant kind of end varies with the activity.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

*Finis* can mean a goal, a completion, or a boundary; *terminus* can mark a limiting determination or completed state. Neither is restricted to the moment when an event stops. The opening *terminus vivendi* concerns life's endpoint, but most later arguments concern what an agent seeks or an activity is for. A moving thing seeks a completion it lacks and therefore depends on something more perfect; it does not rest in itself. Intellectual substances can be called the ends of corporeal things because lower things are ordered for their sake. Their role as ends also explains why angels need not be counted solely from the motions they govern.

The first principle and final end belong together: the same goodness that produces effects gives their appetite an ultimate orientation and perfects them through return. In the reported theory of mind, God is its *scopus finisque*, aim and end; fire's upward tendency supplies an analogy. The designation *infinitus finis*, attributed to Orpheus, combines ultimate goal with unlimited power rather than enclosing God within a finite boundary.

An end also links intellect and will. Intelligence apprehends the good to be attained and understands suitable routes; will approves the end and selects a route. Knowing a possible form does not alone explain its actual production. God's ultimate end cannot be a good outside God, which would make him dependent. He wills his own goodness, with creatures ordered toward its manifestation. Yet divine goodness needs no creatures. The necessity of willing this end consequently differs from the conditional or absent necessity of particular created means. Human beings likewise necessarily seek goodness as such while retaining judgment about particular goods and ways of pursuing them. In providential action, an end can already be present in intention even when the natural bodies directed toward it do not themselves know it.

In the celestial account, God moves heaven as goodness moves appetite: as its desired end. Immediate bodily movement still requires an inner living form that desires and acts. The distinction separates final direction from a proximate mover's operation. Neither heaven's moving body nor its moved soul is the ultimate principle and end. IV.2.18's 'end of all motions' is read by the supplied apparatus as an apposition to the infinite stable state; it does not simply announce a temporal halt in cosmic activity.

**The places.**

- **I.1.1, PDF 14–15**. Terminus vivendi is the conditional endpoint of mortal life.
- **I.5.4–6, PDF 62–63**. A moving thing seeks its missing completion from a fuller source.
- **I.5.22, I.5.26, PDF 76–79**. Minds are ends of motions and corporeal things, exceeding their instrumental tasks.
- **II.13.30, PDF 236–237**. Free judgement selects means toward the good.

**Further passage references.** I.1.1 (PDF pp. 14–15); I.5.4–I.5.6 (pp. 62–63); I.5.22, I.5.25–I.5.26 (pp. 76–79); II.3.9–10, pp. 120–121; II.4.8, pp. 124–125; II.6.23, pp. 140–141; II.7.16, pp. 150–151; II.7.29, pp. 156–157; II.11.25–27, 33–38, PDF 194–201; II.12.12–15, PDF 208–211; II.13.3, 8–9, 25–30, PDF 216–237; IV.1.61–IV.1.62, pp. 312–315; IV.2.18, pp. 342–343; IV.2.27, pp. 350–351; apparatus pp. 395–396

**In this edition.**

The endpoint of life in I.1.1 differs from a final cause. Angels as the "ends" of motions need not mark a temporal stopping time; their finality is one reason not to count them solely by motions. Preserve such object-specific uses.

**See also.**

Appetite and desire; Need and sufficiency; Perfection; Angel; Principle; Infinity; Good and goodness; Cause; Choice and free judgment; Will; Motion and stability; God

## Enfolding and unfolding

**Latin:** implicat; explicat; effundit; refluunt; reformantur; restituuntur; replicatur; explicatur

**The word.**

Implicare can fold or gather together, explicare unfold or set forth, and replicare fold back or repeat. Ficino uses this related vocabulary to describe unity and developed plurality. The passive reformantur and restituuntur emphasize being re-formed and restored.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

At the close of II.3, unity enfolds, truth unfolds, and goodness pours forth. Return reverses the direction: things flow back through goodness, are re-formed through truth, and restored into one through unity. The sequence assigns explanatory roles to the one substance already identified as God. It does not narrate three substances creating in successive stages.

II.6.13 uses folding language in a discussion of magnitude: what is truly great is wholly great in everything within and wholly manifested throughout what is without. The wording responds to imagination's assumption that only bodily extension can be vast. The image of folds is useful precisely because it need not parcel the source into spatial fragments. It should not be taken as a description of physical surfaces inside a divine body.

**The places.**

- II.3.10 (PDF pp. 120–121): Enfolding, unfolding, outpouring, and the threefold return close the argument for one principle
- II.6.13 (PDF pp. 134–135): Whole presence within and without counters the model of divisible magnitude

**In this edition.**

The translation renders replicatur "is enfolded" and explicatur "is unfolded" in II.6.13. The Latin word-family is a reading aid, not proof that the two passages offer a complete technical doctrine with invariant terminology.

**See also.**

Unity and multiplicity; Procession and return; Whole and parts; Omnipresence and place.

## Essence and substance

**Latin:** *essentia*; *esse*; *exsistere*; *subsistere*; *substantia*; *essentialis*; *per se subsistens*; *accidens*; *accidentia*; *subiectum*; *essentia tertia*

**The word.**

Essentia concerns what a reality is; substantia identifies subsisting reality, not merely physical stuff. Esse is being, and subsistere means existing in a way not merely inhering in another. These terms are related without being interchangeable.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

*Essentia* concerns what a thing is or its ontological constitution; *substantia* marks a subsisting reality, especially in contrast to dependent accidents. *Esse*, being, is related but not interchangeable. Ficino expressly lists essence and being among the distinctions in angelic intellect. These words do not reproduce a modern contrast between abstract definition and material stuff: an incorporeal substance can be more fundamental than a body. *Subsistere* often means standing or existing through itself rather than inhering in a material subject. Such independence from matter does not remove every causal dependence; soul and angel remain below God.

Essence is the first member of the triad essence, power, operation. Soul's substance remains while its operations change; quality changes in essence as well as activity. The 'third essence' is rational soul, third between the two higher and two lower grades, not an additional kind beyond soul. Angelic essence is receptive of illumination and intelligible form, so stable incorporeal existence does not entail divine simplicity.

The dependency of substance and accident is asymmetric: an accident needs a substance, whereas substance does not depend upon an accident in the same fashion. God cannot receive additional qualities, and the many forms of his effects cannot be separate substances or accidental additions within him. They are understood through his own single substance. Divine essence and operation are identical; he is not an intelligence perfected by an object outside himself.

II.7.15 criticizes accounts that make matter, world, and mind dependent on God in operation but independent in essence. Ficino argues that what needs an external end to complete its activity cannot be wholly self-sufficient in its being. *Essentialis* can meanwhile identify the inherent natural power of a subordinate agent or mind's fundamental inclination, prior to vital and intellectual activity. Constitution, subsistence, causal dependence, and operation thus remain connected without becoming synonymous.

**The places.**

- **I.3.4, PDF 30–31**. Quality's inherence and dependence contrast with self-subsistence.
- **I.3.13, I.3.25, PDF 36–37, 46–47**. Substantial unity grounds accidents and is prior to quantity by nature and dignity.
- **I.3.33–I.4.5, PDF 52–59**. Third essence is named and its stable essence distinguished from changing operation.
- **I.6.4, PDF 82–83**. Essence and being contribute to angelic multiplicity.

**Further passage references.** I.3.4, I.3.13, I.3.25, I.3.33 (PDF pp. 30–31, 36–37, 46–47, 52–53); I.4.1–I.4.5 (pp. 54–59); I.6.4 (pp. 82–83); II.6.2, pp. 128–129; II.6.23, pp. 140–141; II.7.9–16, pp. 146–151; II.8.5, pp. 162–163; II.9.5–8, pp. 166–167; II.11.2–7, PDF 182–185; II.12.8, 15, PDF 206–211; III.1.12–17, PDF 248–251; III.2.1–2, 17–23, PDF 262–275

**In this edition.**

I.6.4 expressly distinguishes essentiam atque esse in angel. “Third essence” names rational soul in the graded order, not a sixth substance added to the five grades. Independence from material support must remain distinct from independence of every higher cause.

**See also.**

Substance and accident; Soul; Act and operation; Form; Being; Freedom and necessity; Mind; Degree and mediation; Motion and stability

## Eternity and time

**Latin:** *aeternitas*; *tempus*; *sempiternus*; *perennis*; *momentum*; *sempiternitas*; *semper*; *duratio*; *temporalis*; *aevum*; *perpetuus*; *aeternitatis punctum*; *tempus primum*; *momenta*; *motus aeternus*; *motus temporalis*

**The word.**

Tempus concerns succession; aeternitas names enduring fullness beyond such succession. Semper, perennis, sempiternus and perpetuus mark persistence but require their subject and mode. Momentum can be an instant contrasted with extended operation.

The local vocabulary includes *momentum*, *nutu oculi*, *comes*, *intervallum*, *motus aeternus*: a moment, the blink of an eye, an attendant, a measured interval, and eternal motion are different constructions within the account.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Time names succession, whereas eternity names stable fullness. Ficino places rational soul between them: its essence remains, but it thinks and performs living operations through successive acts. Angelic life is wholly united at once. An everlasting sequence can still be temporal, so the contrast is more than temporary versus endlessly long-lasting. *Momentum* can identify an instant in which a superior operation is completed, opposed to an operation extending through time.

Book II argues for God’s everlasting being through infinite power, the impossibility that truth begins or ceases, priority to change, and necessary existence. It warns that imagination misrepresents simple duration when it pictures a flowing sequence. God is not merely very long-lived but *ipsum semper*, the very ‘always.’ The text also uses *sempiternitas* for this abiding divine duration, preventing a rigid rule that the word must everywhere mean endless successive time. In the reported account of mind’s presence, indivisible eternity is met by every temporal moment as indivisible spirit is present throughout space. This is an analogy, not a measure of divine temporal magnitude.

Book III differentiates existence during part of time, throughout all time, through the eternal age (*aevum*), and the eternal age itself. Some placements of heavens and intellects are expressly reported as the views of others. The angel’s receiving being and intellectual formation in a certain ordered ‘before’ and ‘after’ cannot therefore automatically be read as a clock sequence. Similarly, Book I calls prime matter everlasting while treating it as made and preserved by a prior incorporeal form. Causal dependence and beginningless duration are distinct questions; Book II’s preservation argument deliberately covers a world that always existed as well as one that began.

Book IV places temporal multiplicity before spatial multiplicity in the descent from unity. Soul varies through moments without becoming divided among places; matter is extended through both. Time accompanies spiritual activity, place accompanies body. Within

celestial soul, intellectual return can be termed eternal motion because its ordered movement is completed in a moment. The lower power's successive actualization of seeds, however, constitutes first motion, whose interval is first time; the world's other times follow that course. Soul's perpetual circular life therefore does not simply become angelic immobility. The great-year account explores what continued activity means when its stock of seminal contents is finite. These usages distinguish different sources and modes of temporal order rather than supplying one physical clock for all beings.

In IV.2.5 one-in-moment means possessing together what could ever be possessed, illustrated as the blink of an eye. It should not be interpreted as a minute but finite acquisition process. IV.2.8 calls time an attendant of spiritual activity and place an attendant of body: priority of time to place is an explanatory descent, not an earlier date. IV.2.11 then explicitly allows ordered action through intermediaries to be called motion even when completed in a single moment. "Eternal motion" preserves order without temporal succession. The lowest power's successive course, by contrast, supplies first motion and its interval first time in IV.2.12. These two uses cannot be collapsed.

**The places.**

- **I.5.1–2, PDF 60–61**. Soul's successive operations contrast with life wholly together at once.
- **I.5.9, I.5.15, PDF 64–65, 70–71**. Everlasting matter and soul between eternity and time distinguish duration from independence.
- **II.7.18–19, PDF 152–153**. Either temporal-origin alternative requires continuous preservation.
- **IV.2.12, PDF 340–341**. Successive actualization of seeds is called first motion, whose interval is first time.

**Further passage references.** I.3.32–I.3.33 (PDF pp. 52–53); I.4.1–I.4.2 (pp. 54–57); I.5.1–I.5.2, I.5.9, I.5.15 (pp. 60–61, 64–65, 70–71); II.5.1–4, pp. 126–127; II.6.16–20, pp. 136–139; II.7.18–19, pp. 152–153; III.1.7, 12, 28–32, PDF 242–249, 258–261; III.2.2–5, 19–21, 25–30, PDF 262–279; IV.2.5–IV.2.12, pp. 334–341

- **IV.2.5–8, PDF pp. 334–337:** essence, point, and moment organize degrees of unity and the priority of time to place
- **IV.2.11–12, pp. 338–341:** simultaneous ordered return is distinguished from the lower power's successive productive course

**In this edition.**

Do not force every sempiternus into a single contrast with aeternus: context determines whether endless succession or simple abiding is at issue. Prime matter's being called everlasting in I.5.9 does not remove the causal dependence argued elsewhere.

"Companion" for *comes* is a relational metaphor. "In a single moment" is explicitly contrasted with "in time"; the explanation should preserve that contrast rather than make every motion a duration.

**See also.**

Motion and stability; Life; Essence and substance; Immortality; Sense and imagination; Omnipresence and place; Freedom and necessity; Infinity; Conservation and preservation; Circularity and return; Contingency; Intuition and discourse; Soul; Whole and parts; Habitual possession; Great year; Seeds

Whole and parts; Motion and stability; Sowing and weaving.

## Ethereal garment

**Latin:** *aethereo animae indumento*

**The word.**

Aethereum indumentum is an ethereal clothing or covering of soul. The material metaphor names a subtler embodiment in contrast to the gross body, without detailing its composition in this passage.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

At the close of the discussion of circular motion, Ficino says that the reciprocal relation of soul and body may be less apparent in the gross human body but is present in soul's ethereal garment. He immediately promises discussion elsewhere, and IV.2.27 continues the reference by attributing to Zoroaster the view that this garment turns continually within us. The image therefore names a subtler mode of embodiment invoked to preserve the analogy between human and cosmic soul-body relations. It should not be treated as a fully explained doctrine in this volume: the passage supplies neither a detailed composition nor an account of its origin, persistence, or posthumous role. The operative contrast supplied here is between a gross body and an ethereal covering in which circular movement is more intelligible.

**The places.**

- **IV.2.26, PDF 348–349**. The garment is invoked where the circular-motion analogy seems less clear in gross embodiment.
- **IV.2.27, PDF 350–351**. Continual turning is attributed to Zoroaster before the discussion returns to a stable principle.

**Further passage references.** IV.2.26–IV.2.27, pp. 348–351; apparatus p. 395

**In this edition.**

The relative Quod opening IV.2.27 continues the garment in IV.2.26. Read across the unit boundary. Ficino promises fuller discussion elsewhere, so the two units should not be expanded into an unqualified theory of its origin or posthumous career.

**See also.**

Circularity and return; Spirit; Daemons; Body and bulk

## Euclid and the lantern

**Latin:** *Euclides*, *Megaris*, *Athenas*, *Socratem auditurus*, *laternam*, *iter*, *passus*, *praescribit*, *designans*, *peragunt*.

**The word.**

*Iter* is the whole journey or route; *passus* an individual step. *Praescribere* traces out or prescribes a plan; *designare* marks a particular action; *peragere* carries it through. The printed *laterna* means lantern. The named Euclid is characterized here by departure from Megara to hear Socrates in Athens.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino offers the night journey to make celestial movement easier to understand. Euclid has a general conception of the whole route, but that conception alone produces no particular step. The lantern reveals a first step; imagination conceives it; appetite selects it; feet execute it. Then the process is repeated. The example separates knowing a general purpose from supplying its determinate, successive realization. Its explanatory work does not depend on turning the story into verified biography.

The celestial analogy is correspondingly specific. Mind and reason formulate the broad undertaking; the lowest motive power brings forward one seed-kind like a lantern; attached imagination considers and desires it and unfolds its effect. Fate belongs to the ordered succession of seeds, while desire belongs to the directing thought. The analogy explains differentiated execution under a general order without reducing every psychic function to imagination or every cause to fate. This Euclid should not be silently identified with the geometer in IV.1.11.

**The places.**

- **IV.2.13, PDF pp. 340–341:** person, places, night, purpose, lantern, and whole-route conception establish the example
- **IV.2.14, pp. 340–341:** the first and second steps distinguish illumination, cognition, choice, and execution
- **IV.2.15–16, pp. 342–343:** the sequence is transferred to celestial seed-activation and the relation of fate to desire

**In this edition.**

“Decides” at IV.2.13 renders *cogitat* in its practical context; the same family also appears as conceiving a particular step. “Appetite chooses” is the text’s *hunc eligit appetitus*, so choice here is not an exclusively intellectual label. “As a lantern” preserves the comparison rather than positing a literal heavenly lamp.

**See also.**

Fate; Sense and imagination; Proper and common; Carpenter and geometer.

## Exchange and reconciliation

**Latin:** *mutuare; mutuari; vicissim; conciliare; repugnantia; interimere; copulare*

**The word.**

Mutuare and mutuari express lending or giving and borrowing or receiving; vicissim marks reciprocity. Conciliare reconciles, interimere destroys, and copulare joins. Reciprocity is distinct from simple sameness.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The world’s opposed members exchange natures and motions, giving as well as receiving. Ficino asks what enables contrary powers to remain connected rather than separating according to weight and place or destroying one another. Their own opposition cannot, in his argument, explain their common ordered life; a superior unity must bind them. The subsequent reconciliation claim specifies the benefit: contending things are directed together toward good ends instead of mutually abolishing one another. The heat-and-cold comparison differentiates a power’s ordinary effect from the fitting measure of that effect

within a coordinated whole. These passages therefore require both difference and cooperation. Making all elements identical would remove the very oppositions that providence is said to coordinate.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.13.4 (Latin PDF p. 218; English PDF p. 219).** The paired active and deponent verbs articulate giving and receiving.
- **II.13.7 (Latin PDF p. 218; English PDF p. 219).** Heat and cold have contrasting effects.
- **II.13.10 (Latin PDF p. 222; English PDF p. 223).** Providence reconciles opposing things so they do not destroy each other.

**In this edition.**

The supplied English's "both giving and receiving" is an explanatory rendering of mutuarent … et mutuarentur. It makes a real grammatical distinction audible. The physical claims about elements' places and effects remain Ficino's premises.

**See also.**

Contraries and opposition; Order and harmony; Providence; Elements and their spheres.

## Eye and gaze

**Latin:** oculus; oculi; intuitu; contuetur; inspicit; cernere; oculus infinitus; Iovis perfectus oculus

**The word.**

Oculus is an eye; intuitus a look or gaze; contueri and inspicere can behold or inspect. Ficino applies visual words to intellectual knowledge while retaining the difference between a sensory illustration and the divine mode of knowing.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

An eye beholding many stars in one glance illustrates how a single act need not alternate between each object. The analogy answers distraction; it does not establish that God has bodily eyes. Orphic language then supplies the "perfect eye" of Jove and the "infinite eye." These expressions praise comprehensive and unbounded cognition as Ficino presents the hymnic authorities.

The argument for infinite knowledge distinguishes this gaze from enumeration. An infinite knower comprehends itself without being bounded by another. It sees many through one form and one act. Thus the imagery is not incidental ornament: it expresses unity of act, while the nearby reasoning supplies the qualifications that ordinary vision cannot itself furnish.

**The places.**

- II.9.18, II.9.19 (PDF pp. 172–173): The perfect eye and Jove's mind appear in an attributed Orphic saying
- II.9.21 (PDF pp. 174–175): One glance at many stars illustrates unified attention
- II.10.7, II.10.10 (PDF pp. 178–181): The infinite eye and collective intuition oppose a finite count of objects

**In this edition.**

II.9.18–19 divides the quoted material and its explanation between units; read them together. The English eye-language is metaphorical when applied to God even where no explicit “as if” appears in the name.

**See also.**

Intuition and comprehension; Counting and collective intuition; Light and illumination; Orpheus and divine names.

## Eye and imagined enlargement

**Latin:** *oculus*; *visus*; *Finge animo*; *excrescere*; *uno prospectu*; *unico intuitu*; *aucupabitur*.

**The word.**

*Oculus* is an eye; *visus* can mean sight or the visual capacity. *Fingere animo* asks the reader to imagine or fashion a supposition mentally. *Prospectus* and *intuitus* identify a view or apprehension. *Aucupari*, literally a hunting word, here depicts seeking one object and then another.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino invites two linked imaginary enlargements. First the eye grows to fill the whole body, removing the variety of bodily members. It sees all colours at once without turning but still receives the same sunlight and remains other than that light. Then mind takes the place of every other psychic faculty, leaving a pure mind which Ficino calls an angel. It apprehends all true things in one intuition rather than hunting them successively. The parallel is designed to preserve the distinction between recipient and truth even at the highest created intellectual level. It does not describe a biological transformation or prescribe the literal destruction of bodily or psychic functions. Nor does “the same truth” mean the same limited amount of apprehension: reception becomes more abundant while its source remains the same.

**The places.**

- **I.6.7, PDF 86–87.** Mind is established as the soul’s eye
- **I.6.8, PDF 86–87.** The eye thought experiment separates greater reception from identity with light
- **I.6.9, PDF 86–87.** The parallel pure-mind supposition illustrates angelic understanding
- **I.6.10–13, PDF 88–91.** The recipient/source distinction supports the ascent beyond mind

**In this edition.**

Both “Imagine” imperatives translate *finge*. “Hunting” preserves the vividness of *aucupabitur*, whereas “a single intuition” translates the cognitive *unico intuitu*. These are figurative aids to an argument, not evidence that *intuitus* always names a separate faculty.

**See also.**

Light and illumination; Mind; Intuition and comprehension; Containing, receiving and lacking.

## Failure weariness and endurance

**Latin:** imbecillitas; debilitetur; deficere; fatigatur; claudicat; infatigabilem; diuturnior; permanet

**The word.**

Imbecillitas is weakness; debilitari to become weaker; deficere to fail or fall short. Fatigari is to grow tired and claudicare literally to limp or falter. Permanere means remaining or enduring; diuturnior means longer-lasting.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The descent through less perfect causes is described as a gradual weakening that must eventually fail. The argument's vocabulary links intensity, efficacy, and causal rank. These assertions belong to Ficino's case against an endless hierarchy; they are not deductions from the dictionary sense of "decrease."

In the proof of divine infinity, finite power is said eventually to tire and falter, whereas the uniform motion of the vast world displays an indefatigable governor. The next chapter connects stronger preserving power with longer endurance. The imagery of fatigue makes the contrast vivid, but does not imply a divine body with muscles or an experimentally established physical law of energy. Its role is to connect dependence, continuance, and the first cause's inexhaustibility.

**The places.**

- II.3.3 (PDF pp. 116–117): Descending efficacy is said to weaken until it fails
- II.4.1, II.4.7 (PDF pp. 122–125): Dispersed weakness contrasts with unified power and the unwearied governor
- II.5.1 (PDF pp. 126–127): Duration is related to the strength of preserving power

**In this edition.**

"Falters" keeps the figurative claudicat legible. "Endures" for permanet stresses continuity, whereas servatur adds preservation by a cause; their conjunction should not be flattened into simple longevity.

**See also.**

Power and potency; Weaving and world fabric; Conservation and preservation; Eternity and time.

## Fate

**Latin:** *fatum*; *lex fatalis*; *fatali … lege*; *series successionis*

**The word.**

Fatum and lex fatalis name a causal law of ordered succession; series successionis identifies the sequence itself. Desire belongs to the thought associated with that sequence, rather than being identical with the sequence.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino defines the law of fate within the serial actualization of a celestial soul's seeds. Its mind and reason apprehend a general design, but its motive power presents one kind of seed after another for imagination, desire, and production. Fate consists in that

succession, while desire belongs to the corresponding thought. The definition therefore links law, cognition, and movement instead of making fate a bare external force. The Euclid-and-lantern analogy illustrates why a universal plan needs particular successive acts to become bodily action. IV.2.2 attributes an everlasting will and necessity to a traditional account of heaven, but IV.1.84 had already contrasted consistent cosmic order with lifeless necessity: unerring wisdom, rather than absence of life, explains regularity. This account explains celestial motion within the larger hierarchy of causes; it does not itself settle every question of human freedom.

The sequence also explains why a wholly general intention does not move a body one determinate step. A sphere's mind and reason intend to reproduce, as far as possible, the Ideas seen in angelic mind; one class of seeds must then prevail in the lower power before imagination and appetite produce its particular effect. Euclid's whole projected journey likewise remains different from the first step lit by his lantern. Fate is located in the order of successive particulars, rather than substituted for every level of planning and causation. The same architecture allows Ficino to speak of regular cosmic action through living agency while distinguishing the soul's changing acts from their stable higher sources.

**The places.**

- **IV.2.12, PDF 340–341**. The lowest cosmic power successively actualizes a finite stock of seeds.
- **IV.2.16, PDF 342–343**. Fate is located in the ordered series, desire in the associated thought.
- **IV.2.27, PDF 350–351**. The moved mover remains subordinate to the stable ultimate principle and end.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.84, pp. 324–325; IV.2.1–IV.2.2, pp. 334–335; IV.2.12–IV.2.17, pp. 340–343

**In this edition.**

The phrase "law of fate" has an explicit local definition in IV.2.16. It should not become an unexplained external force or a complete theory of human moral responsibility. Successive actualization is distinguished from the higher simultaneous grasp of principles.

**See also.**

Seeds; Appetite and desire; Sense and imagination; Order and harmony; Great year

## Fire and variable materials

**Latin:** *ignis; calefacere; calor; praeparationes materiarum; gradus; se toto; quantum in se est*

**The word.**

Calefacere means to heat; calor is heat; praeparatio is a material's preparation or disposition to receive an effect. Se toto says that an agent acts with its whole being, whereas quantum in se est means so far as depends on it.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Fire supplies a deliberately limited agent. Ficino says it heats with its available impetus and does not decide which recipient shall acquire which degree of heat. Different results arise from differences in materials or intervening media. With equal subjects it produces

equal heat; without any diversity of medium or subject it would produce either one result or highly similar results. God, by contrast, produces the forms, subjects, differences, and their order. The inference requires this contrast between causing an effect and being author of the conditions that differentiate effects. Ficino does not argue that ordinary fires always make every encountered object equally hot. His own qualification assigns observed inequality to the prepared recipients. Heat and cold return in the providence chapter as powers whose dissolving and condensing do not by themselves explain useful, measured coordination.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.8 (Latin PDF p. 184; English PDF p. 185).** Recipient preparations account for unequal degrees of heating.
- **II.11.9 (Latin PDF p. 186; English PDF p. 187).** The equal-subject and absent-medium cases isolate the natural agent's contribution.
- **II.13.7 (Latin PDF p. 218; English PDF p. 219).** Heat dissolves and cold condenses within the historical physical account.
- **II.13.8 (Latin PDF p. 220; English PDF p. 221).** Useful coordination requires a further source of order.

**In this edition.**

The supplied English's "same intensity" and "every degree" should be read with the qualification "so far as lies in it." These are Ficino's causal and physical claims, not a modern experimental account of heat transfer. Praeparationes does not necessarily imply a human preparer.

**See also.**

Art and nature; Cause; Measure and degree; Quality.

## Fire, spark, lightning and cannon

**Latin:** *ignis*; *scintilla*; *flamma*; *fulgur*; *bombarda*; *tenuitas*; *ferventissimus*.

**The word.**

*Ignis* names fire; *scintilla* a spark; *flamma* a flame. *Fulgur* is lightning and *bombarda* the cannon named in the supplied translation. *Tenuis* describes fineness or thinness; it is distinct from the intensity named by *ferventissimus*, "very hot."

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Fire carries several arguments and cannot be assigned one unchanging symbolic meaning. A spark's rapid ascent contrasts with a larger flame; fire's fineness, swift effects and expansive spread exemplify activity associated with reduced bodily bulk. Lightning and cannon fire are invoked as conspicuous demonstrations of fire and air's force. Later, concentrated heat rather than size explains burning. Yet Ficino then denies that any particular fire is the sufficient first cause of its own kind: it was generated, may outlast its producer, and acts as an instrument of a higher source. Finally, making fire in wool illustrates a distinction between accidental heating and production of a substantial form. The example that first demonstrates quality's efficacy therefore later demonstrates its insufficiency.

**The places.**

- **I.2.2, PDF 18–19.** Spark and flame illustrate a claim about lightness and speed
- **I.2.5, PDF 20–21.** Fire, lightning and cannon support the claim that reduced density aids activity
- **I.2.11, PDF 24–25.** Burning is assigned to intense heat, not great size
- **I.3.7–9, PDF 34–35.** Particular fires are effects and dependent instruments
- **I.3.22, PDF 44–45.** Accidental heating of wool is distinguished from substantial generation of fire

**In this edition.**

"Cannon" gives the historical weapon in the example without claiming a specification of its mechanism. The unusual printed phrase about air in a vessel in I.2.5 is rendered as air supporting a stone-laden vessel on water; the apparatus explains the two phrases as the vessel's upper part and the water's surface (PDF 357). This is the supplied editor's explanation; it is not a newly reconstructed experiment.

**See also.**

Instrument; Quality; Dispersion and concentration; Seeds.

## First movable

**Latin:** *primum mobile*; *primum quod mobile*

**The word.**

Primum mobile or primum quod mobile means the first nature encountered as movable in the descent from God. Here it is soul, not simply the name of an outer physical sphere.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

When Ficino descends from God through angel, the first movable nature he reaches is soul. He therefore calls soul the first movable and argues that it is movable through itself. Here the expression identifies soul's rank and its role as the source of temporal operation; it does not simply name an outer physical sphere. The claim remains compatible with soul's dependence on higher causes for actuality and direction. Its own nature supplies the successive manner in which its activity unfolds.

**The places.**

- **III.1.23, PDF 254–255**. Soul is the first movable after God and angel, with bodily self-motion as a sign.
- **III.1.25–26, PDF 254–257**. Regress and mediation arguments require a nature that moves itself and awakens inert body.

**Further passage references.** III.1.23–26 (PDF pp.254–257); III.1.28–31, PDF pp. 258–259

**In this edition.**

"Movable through itself" describes soul's intrinsic mode and does not remove its dependence on higher causes. III.1.23 explicitly glosses the Pythagorean self-moving number as manifold nature mutable through its own property.

**See also.**

Motion and stability; Soul; Through itself and through another; Spheres and stars

## Fitting and correspondence

**Latin:** *quadrant*, *quadrabit*, *congruit*, *conveniunt*, *accommodata*, *competens*, *convenientiam*.

**The word.**

*Quadrare*, *congruere*, and *convenire* concern fitting, agreeing, or corresponding. A *medium competens* is a suitable intermediary, and something *accommodatum* has been fitted or assigned to its recipient. Here these terms often name causal adequacy rather than aesthetic attractiveness or verbal agreement.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

A natural cause produces a definite effect because it has a definite principle fitted to that effect. Otherwise, Ficino argues, it would have no reason to produce this rather than that. The earth's universal soul fits between a universal celestial impulse and a particular earthly life because it combines earthly status with universal scope. Soul similarly fits angelic mind and body by sharing indivisibility with the former and mutable activity with the latter. The argument therefore uses agreement in one respect together with difference in another.

Fittingness also limits a proposed assignment of God as the first sphere's mover. If the assignment places God and other minds in the same proportional series as their spheres, divine transcendence is lost. At the end of Book IV, the equal suitability of each part of Saturn's sphere to each relevant place supports an argument for rotation. The repeated vocabulary thus does more than say that things go well together: it specifies relations of causal capacity, mediation, proportion, and local affinity.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.6–7, PDF pp. 284–285:** a determinate cause must fit a determinate effect; the intermediary must combine the relevant respects
- **IV.1.32, pp. 298–299:** soul accords with both the immutable and the mutable
- **IV.1.59–60, pp. 312–313:** placing God in a proportionate series of movers threatens simplicity and immeasurability
- **IV.2.24–25, pp. 348–349:** equal affinity for different positions is used to motivate circular motion

**In this edition.**

"Fitted," "accords," "agrees," "corresponds," and "affinity" distribute one recurring relational vocabulary across different English constructions. The terms should not all be indexed solely under beauty.

**See also.**

Beauty and fittingness; Degree and mediation; Proportion and analogy; Here, there, and the Antipodes.

## Florentine mechanism

**Latin:** *Florentiae; Germanus opifex; tabernaculum; statuae; pila; libratae; momentum; nutus*

**The word.**

Florentiae means at Florence. Tabernaculum here names a small constructed display; statuae are figures; pila a ball. Libratae indicates balanced or poised figures. Momentum concerns the ball's movement, while nutus is a nod or slight directive gesture.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino reports seeing a German craftsman's display at Florence. Figures attached to one ball perform different motions together: running in opposite directions, rising, bending, crowning, and wounding. Trumpets, horns, and birdsong are also heard. The next unit adds that similar events follow one another from one ball's movement. The example is therefore both simultaneous and successive, not simply a frozen array moved identically. One simple initiating motion can coordinate diverse results through an arranged mechanism. Ficino applies this to God's effortless governance through a simple center from which other things depend. The analogy shows coordinated variety; it does not disclose the device's construction or identify its unnamed maker. Nor does it erase the distinction between an artisan using borrowed matter and a creator causing matter itself.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.13.13 (Latin PDF p. 224; English PDF p. 225).** The report specifies the connected figures, contrasting motions, and sounds.
- **II.13.14 (Latin PDF p. 226; English PDF p. 227).** One ball's motion and the divine nod provide the comparison's causal point.

**In this edition.**

The supplied English calls tabernaculum a "mechanical display," an interpretive rendering warranted by the described actions. It should not be silently expanded into a named clock, church automaton, or historically identified invention. "At Florence we saw" is Ficino's reported observation, not a new verification.

**See also.**

Art and nature; Hinge and center; Providence; Army and commander.

## Foreknowledge

**Latin:** *praescientia*; *praevisio*; *praevidere*; *scire*; *volendo*

**The word.**

Praescientia and praevisio concern knowledge or foresight of what is future; praevidere is to foresee. Scire and velle remain distinct: knowing an object need not produce it simply by knowing.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Foreknowledge is God's knowledge of future events, including their causes and modes of occurrence. Ficino's distinction between knowing and willing does important work here: if

mere knowledge produced its object, God would produce all known things together and also produce evil. Will, rather than knowledge by itself, accounts for external production.

The issue of human freedom is addressed by specifying what is foreknown. God does not know merely that a person will perform an act; he also knows that the person performs it voluntarily and freely. If the supposition of divine foreknowledge makes the event necessary, Ficino argues, that same supposition confirms the event's free mode. Thus he distinguishes a necessity conditional on what is known from a compulsion imposed on the acting soul. This is the argument offered by the text, not an independently demonstrated solution to all problems of foreknowledge. The following appeal to God's preservation of each nature reinforces it: rational souls retain deliberation and judgment because governance operates through their proper capacities.

**The places.**

- **II.13.24–25, PDF 232–235**. Knowing is distinguished from willing, and foresight includes causes and voluntary modes.
- **II.13.26–27, PDF 234–235**. Governance preserves proper natures and is described as persuasion rather than compulsion for souls.
- **II.13.30, PDF 236–237**. The soul retains deliberation and comparative judgement about acts.

**Further passage references.** II.13.24–30, PDF 232–237

**In this edition.**

II.13.25 says conditional necessity "confirms" the known free mode. Present this as Ficino's proposed reconciliation, preserving both the conditional clause and voluntarie libereque; the passage does not define freedom as absence of divine knowledge.

**See also.**

Choice and free judgment; Contingency; Freedom and necessity; Providence; Will

## Form

**Latin:** *forma*; *forma corporea*; *forma substantialis*; *forma individua*; *species*; *genus*; *omniformis*; *formare*; *ratio formarum*; *uniformis*; *formae substantiales*; *formae contingentes*; *forma materiae*; *figurationes*; *decrementum*; *remissio*; *uniformis; omniformis; formator; Per hanc enim formam Dei*

**The word.**

Forma gives determinate being and efficacy, not merely outline. Species can be a kind or an intelligible form. Formare shapes or determines; substantial and accidental forms have different dependencies and modes of change.

Uniformis means having one form or uniform; omniformis containing every form; formator a producer of forms. The apparent opposition is resolved through a mode of intellectual containment, not by numerical aggregation.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Form supplies determinate being, intelligibility, and efficacy; it is not restricted to visible outline. In the definition attributed to Proclus, it is that by which something distinctly and actually is and acts. A body belongs to a kind and performs its characteristic operations through form rather than bulk. Yet *forma* and *species* vary by context: form can mean a

substantial constituting principle, an accidental quality, an intelligible pattern in a cause, or a natural kind. Humans and horses belong to different species, whereas God's knowing through *unam speciem* concerns one intelligible form rather than one biological species.

Book I calls quality a form divided in body. Its material dependence, dispersion, and change make it an incomplete form, prompting the ascent toward a self-subsisting incorporeal form identified as rational soul. I.3.15 refines the distinction through *decrementum* and *remissio*: decrease in extent differs from weakening of intensity. Quality admits both; substantial corporeal form can decrease without being remitted in intensity; the higher incorporeal substantial form is subject to neither. Divisibility, dependence, and variable intensity therefore do not name the same limitation. Nor does an incorporeal form's independence entail spatial remoteness: it can penetrate bodies and govern their qualities while remaining separate in substance. The mind's abstraction of forms belongs to the related cognitive argument for separateness.

The divine use requires further qualification. God is uniform because he transcends created forms and omniform because his power produces them all. Their presence in him is not like fire's collection of heat, dryness, and lightness. Divine intelligence understands how one perfection can be imitated in different degrees, such as life without cognition in plants or cognition without intelligence in animals. Many exemplary relations are thus known in one divine essence. The analogy of a light containing many colors through causal power illustrates how multiplicity can be present without constituent parts. In IV.1.25, God is expressly denied to be the form of matter: such a form is a principle of being, whereas God is being itself.

Book IV also distinguishes contingent forms externally imposed by human art from substantial forms produced through nature's inward activity. Its descending account says forms pass from one divine essence to 'manifold qualities' in angel, from stability into effective motion in soul, and from living activity into passive alteration in body. The angel remains indivisible; this vocabulary concerns modes of reception and efficacy rather than a physical object's descent through space. Forms received in angel, soul's formative principles, material forms, and visible configurations consequently retain different roles. IV.2.15 even distinguishes configurations in heaven from forms produced in matter as different results of coordinated activity.

In II.11.17 God is above forms and maker of all forms. Ficino distinguishes imitations by their degree and manner: life without cognition gives the plant example; cognition without intelligence gives the animal example. Those are differences among possible likenesses, not components assembled inside God. The following account of one form and one gaze makes the intellectual mode explicit.

**The places.**

- **I.2.9–10, PDF 22–23**. Form accounts for the body's kind and characteristic operation.
- **I.3.1–6, PDF 28–33**. Material quality is incomplete form and cannot be its own adequate source.
- **I.3.15, PDF 38–39**. Decreased extent is distinguished from remitted intensity.
- **I.3.28–29, PDF 48–51**. The definition of form and the active/passive extension argument support dimensionless form.
- **II.9.15, PDF 170–171**. Diverse forms and properties are understood through modes of communicating divine goodness.

**Further passage references.** I.2.9–I.2.10 (PDF pp. 22–23); I.3.1–I.3.6, I.3.14–I.3.18, I.3.24, I.3.28, I.3.33 (pp. 28–33, 38–41, 46–49, 52–53); II.2.7–8, pp. 108–109; II.9.1–4, pp. 164–165; II.9.12–15, pp. 168–171; II.10.10–12, pp. 180–181; II.11.1–23, PDF 182–193; III.1.2–4, 10–12, PDF 240–249; IV.1.10–IV.1.13, pp. 286–289; IV.1.25–IV.1.27, pp. 294–295; IV.1.32–IV.1.33, pp. 298–299; IV.2.15, pp. 342–343

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.17 (Latin PDF p. 190; English PDF p. 191).** Uniform and omniform are joined through intellectual nature and differentiated imitation.
- **II.11.18 (Latin PDF p. 190; English PDF p. 191).** One form and one gaze preserve simplicity while the exemplary relations multiply.

**In this edition.**

The definition attributed to Proclus does not expressly include dimension, though its “by which something” may suggest a subject. Do not equate immaterial celestial form with incorporeal form. Decrementum, decrease in extent, differs from remissio, diminished intensity.

The supplied Latin reads Per hanc enim formam Dei se ipsam intuendo se concipit. The English construes “Through this form, then, God…” That interpretation does not resolve the Latin construction. Preserve the printed wording and mark the difficulty; do not silently substitute forma Dei or Deus. The surrounding argument is intelligible without pretending that the local reading has been settled. The apparatus’s lexical note on II.11.17 (PDF p. 374) explains ratio as intelligible account or principle; it does not resolve the printed formam Dei construction.

**See also.**

Quality; Species; Substance and accident; Separation and abstraction; Art and nature; Universals and individuals; Intellect and intellection; Ideas and exemplars; Unity and multiplicity; Light and illumination; Act and operation; Image and likeness; Reason and account; Matter; Principle

Ideas and exemplars; Relations and respects.

## Fountain, womb and offspring

**Latin:** *fons*; *materiae … gremio*; *prolem*; *gignere*; *procreat*; *haurit*; *liquorem infundat*.

**The word.**

*Fons* is a spring or source. *Gremium* can be a lap, bosom or enclosing womb; the supplied translation uses “womb” for matter. *Proles* is offspring. *Haurire* draws or drinks in; *infundere* pours into. Ficino’s productive and receptive images shift between generation and flowing liquid.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Matter cannot supply form from itself: if it essentially possessed a sufficient productive power, it would be a fountain of forms rather than their substrate. Qualities, which exist in another, produce offspring no freer than themselves, in matter’s womb; a cause independent of that substrate is needed to make and preserve matter itself. The third essence is subsequently a fountain of changing qualities. At the end of Book I, mind “draws” goodness from elsewhere, and the Good pours the liquor of its perfection into mind. These images give direction to dependency: source gives, recipient receives. They do

not turn a non-bodily cause into a liquid or imply that it loses a divisible portion whenever something receives its perfection. The local metaphors also differ: biological generation explains a limitation inherited by an effect, whereas the fountain comparison stresses a superior productive source.

**The places.**

- **I.3.6, PDF 32–33.** Being a source of forms would contradict the role assigned to prime matter
- **I.3.18, PDF 40–41.** Offspring in matter contrasts with the independent source of matter itself
- **I.4.1, PDF 54–55.** Soul's level is a source of flowing qualities
- **I.6.17, PDF 92–93.** Mind's reception of goodness is figured as drawing and being filled

**In this edition.**

"Womb," "offspring," "fountain," and "liquor" preserve changing images rather than one literal mechanism. *Ut ita loquar* in I.6.14 similarly qualifies "seeds" of forms latent in matter; it does not identify physical seeds already present there.

**See also.**

Cause; Seeds; Communication and imparting; Matter.

## Freedom and necessity

**Latin:** *libertas*; *necessitas*; *liber*; *voluntarius*; *nolle*; *velle*; *essendi necessitas*; *necessario per se ipsum*; *per se sufficiens*; *libera voluntas*; *necessitas absoluta*; *conditionali quadam necessitate*; *spontaneus*; *sui iuris*

**The word.**

Libertas is freedom; necessitas can be underived necessity, conditional necessity or imposed compulsion according to context. Voluntarius concerns willing acceptance, and liber can also describe release from bodily constraint.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino joins necessity and freedom rather than defining every necessity as compulsion. God's necessity of being means that he exists through himself and cannot fail to be; it is not imposed by a superior power. Things unable to determine themselves to being rather than nonbeing require such a source. A dependent incorporeal being would still need another cause, while a composite first being would depend upon its parts and their unifier and be exposed to dissolution. Supreme necessity therefore belongs to the simple divine being alone. An angel's received existence is not that underived necessity. The name 'necessity' attributed to Orpheus acquires its local force from this argument.

God's will is likewise necessary and free. Being, understanding, and willing are identical in God; in creatures, willing depends on understanding, understanding upon the creature's condition, and that condition upon a giver of being. God necessarily wills the perfect goodness that he is. An ability to abandon it for something worse would be deficiency rather than greater freedom. With no external necessity standing above him, this necessity coincides with complete self-possession. The end of Book I offers a related account of desire: nothing is more necessary or more voluntary than seeking good as good. This does not make every particular choice morally correct.

Necessary self-willing differs from necessity toward created effects. Divine goodness requires no creature, and innumerably many possible images of goodness remain uncreated; the actual world does not exhaust God's capacity. In a distinction expressly attributed to Thomas Aquinas, Ficino admits conditional necessity once God wills an effect, because the will is immutable, while denying that effects are absolutely necessary as God himself is. Contingent effects can therefore belong to providence through their appropriate created causes.

Human souls necessarily seek goodness as the adequate object of appetite, yet retain free judgment among particular goods and means. Foreknowledge concerns both an action and its voluntary mode; Ficino argues that the necessity conditional on what God knows confirms that mode rather than replacing it with coercion. This is the text's proposed reconciliation, distinct from a claim that every event is mechanically forced. 'Free' also has ontological uses: a mind can be free or absolute insofar as it is not contracted to an embodied soul's capacity or dependent on bodily movement. Intrinsic necessity, external compulsion, conditional necessity, rational selection, and release from material constraint consequently require separate attention.

**The places.**

- **I.6.19, PDF 94–95**. Necessity and voluntary acceptance meet in desire for the Good as Good.
- **II.12.3, PDF 202–203**. No necessity above divine necessity is the stated ground of supreme freedom.
- **II.12.15, PDF 210–211**. Necessary divine self-willing differs from conditional necessity toward a willed effect.
- **II.13.25–30, PDF 234–237**. Foreknown voluntary action and free judgement are preserved within providence.

**Further passage references.** I.5.14, I.5.17 (PDF pp. 68–69, 72–73); I.6.17–I.6.19 (pp. 92–95); II.2.3, pp. 104–105; II.5.1, pp. 126–127; II.7.8–16, pp. 146–151; II.12.1–21, PDF 202–215; II.13.24–30, PDF 232–237

**In this edition.**

Keep "absolute" and "conditional" with necessity in II.12.15, where the distinction is attributed to Thomas Aquinas. The double negative non posse nolle in I.6.19 is meaningful: the will welcomes its inescapable orientation to good, without every particular option becoming compulsory.

**See also.**

Good and goodness; Appetite and desire; Will; Separation and abstraction; Simplicity and composition; Being; Cause; Conservation and preservation; God; Choice and free judgment; Contingency; End and limit

## Generation and corruption

**Latin:** *generatio*; *corruptio*; *generare*; *gignere*; *corrumpere*; *oriri*; *perire*; *creare*; *creatio*; *procreare*; *gignit*; *genitum*; *actus intra se manens*; *nutritio*; *augmentum*; *putrefactio*; *sola putrefactione*

**The word.**

Generatio and corruptio mean coming into being and passing away, not only reproduction and moral decay. Gignere, generare and procreare produce; oriri arises and perire perishes. Divine inward generation is a further, qualified use.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Generation and corruption are coming into being and passing away, not only reproduction and moral decay. They mark the instability of qualities: a quality's essence arises and perishes, its strength changes, and its operation occurs through time. A particular fire can produce another without being the first sufficient cause of the whole kind. Regular succession therefore leads Ficino toward a stable higher source. Nutrition and growth exemplify production more broadly: new parts must arise, and nonliving food becomes living form through an ordered power exceeding simple fiery heat.

Book IV extends this argument to the earth and water. Ficino reports organisms arising from putrefaction without visible bodily seeds, while also recognizing ordinary propagation. Apparent growth in stones belongs to the same inherited natural account. These claims motivate a search for living incorporeal sources rather than a denial of causation. 'Without bodily seed' means that spiritual life-giving seeds must produce directly or foster physical seeds left by organisms. The distinction is between visible propagation, unseen productive principles, and the requirement that determinate effects have determinate causes. The examples of spontaneous generation are part of Ficino's historical theory, not established modern biological observations.

Divine creation differs from ordinary generation because it depends on no preexisting matter, instrument, or time. A father generates from matter received from elsewhere, and an artisan shapes available material, whereas God produces material as well as form. This total causality also supports Ficino's account of God's love and preservation of his whole work.

A separate use concerns divine inward production. Reporting an interpretation associated with Plotinus, Ficino describes an infinitely fruitful act, an infinite product, and God in some sense begetting or establishing himself. This does not describe God beginning to exist at a date. Ficino immediately reserves judgment to God and affirms only what is worthy of him. Inward divine generation consequently cannot simply be equated with external creation. Similarly, the angel's receiving existence and illumination in an ordered 'first' and 'after' is explicitly qualified as priority in a certain sense, rather than straightforward temporal development.

**The places.**

- **I.3.5–11, PDF 30–37**. Particular producers and qualities depend on a stable higher source of generation.
- **I.3.22–23, PDF 44–45**. Alleged spontaneous generation, ignition and digestion distinguish life-giving power from mere heat.
- **II.12.8–11, PDF 206–209**. A Plotinian account of inward divine production receives an explicit authorial reservation.

- **IV.1.1–2, IV.1.7, PDF 282–285**. Earthly generation and growth motivate earth-soul and determinate seminal causes.

**Further passage references.** I.3.5–I.3.11, I.3.22–I.3.24 (PDF pp. 30–37, 44–47); I.4.1 (pp. 54–55); I.5.1 (pp. 60–61); II.11.9, 24, 31–38, PDF 186–201; II.12.8–11, PDF 206–209; II.13.2, PDF 216–217; III.1.12, PDF 248–249; IV.1.1–IV.1.2, pp. 282–283; IV.1.7, pp. 284–285; IV.1.14–IV.1.19, pp. 288–291; IV.1.78, pp. 322–323; apparatus pp. 388–389

**In this edition.**

Spontaneous-generation and growing-stone examples are historical natural lore. “Without bodily seed” does not mean without a cause in Ficino’s argument. II.12.8–11’s self-generation language is attributed and explicitly reserved to divine judgement; it is not a dated beginning of God.

**See also.**

Cause; Life; Quality; Motion and stability; Act and operation; Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity; Will; Seeds; Earth soul; Natural species and succession; Art and nature

## Glass and colored radiance

**Latin:** fenestras vitreas; rubra; viridis; pavimento; splendores; rubeus; vitrum; se format

**The word.**

Vitrum is glass, vitreus glass-made, fenestra a window, and pavimentum a paved floor. Splendor is radiance or brightness. Rubeus and ruber mark red, viridis green; the variant red forms belong to the same color-description.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Sunlight passes through two colored windows and produces red and green radiances on the pavement. Both radiances owe their being light to sunlight. Their distinct colors also come from that light, but as passing through one particular glass or the other. The example therefore avoids assigning universal being to God and then treating specific determinations as independent products of other causes.

The immediate claim is that divine power differentiates itself through various intermediaries. The intermediaries matter: their differences shape the manifestation. Yet their contribution remains dependent on the first source. The image illustrates coordinated levels of causation rather than a choice between one cause doing everything and many causes acting autonomously. It is Ficino’s explanatory optical analogy, not a complete account of the physics of color.

**The places.**

- II.7.30, II.7.31 (PDF pp. 156–159): Narrower agents differentiate universal action; colored windows illustrate how
- II.7.32 (PDF pp. 158–159): The following conclusion restates the dependence of subordinate powers and traces

**In this edition.**

“Radiance” renders splendor, while lumen is the light from which it proceeds. Preserve the qualification “insofar as” the light passes through particular glass; without it the role of the intermediary disappears.

**See also.**

Light and illumination; Instrument; Cause; Common and proper.

## God

**Latin:** *Deus*; *creator*; *primum principium*; *immobilis unitas*; *Deus unus, verusque et bonus*; *mens mentium*; *lumen luminum*

**The word.**

Deus, creator and primum principium name the first source; immobilis unitas stresses simple stability. “Mind of minds” and “light of lights” describe causal eminence rather than a merely superior member of a common created genus.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

God is the destination of Book I’s ascent beyond angelic mind. Even an immobile angel contains multiplicity and therefore points to a higher unity. God is wholly simple, with power grounded in unity rather than assembled from cooperating parts. He exceeds mind without lacking understanding: truth and goodness reach things that do not possess intelligence, and God is described as truth entirely transparent to itself and the origin of intellectual light. Intellectual names remain qualified. Angel is properly mind, whereas God is above the genus of minds; such names apply to him primarily through causal eminence rather than a shared created form.

Book II develops this principle as supreme unity, truth, and goodness, all one God rather than three divine substances. It rejects both several equal first gods and an endless ascent through higher gods. ‘God’ is thus not merely a title for the strongest member of a class. He is first, simple, infinitely powerful, eternal, everywhere present, giver and preserver of being, and the self-knowing source of knowledge of particular things and what is infinite. The statements distinguish his manner of possessing or causing a perfection from the received perfection of creatures. Shared vocabulary does not place them on the same categorical footing.

The Proem situates this inquiry within contemplation and worship of the Creator and subjects its claims to divine law. The authorial reservation before Book I also limits affirmation to what the Church approves. Ficino supports the exposition through named pagan and Christian authorities and the arguments he attributes to them; their conjunction is part of his philosophical synthesis. The qualifications concerning intellectual names and religious approval are integral to the presentation, rather than optional additions to a definition of the supreme being.

**The places.**

- **Proem.7–10, PDF 8–11**. The Creator is contemplated through created mind, and the author subjects approval to divine law.
- **I.6.5–13, PDF 84–91**. The ascent reaches simplicity beyond angelic multiplicity and qualifies the names of divine cognition.
- **II.3.10, PDF 120–121**. Unity, truth and goodness are explicitly coordinated as one God.
- **II.9.13, PDF 168–169**. God stands above the genus of minds while knowing and operating through all particulars.

**Further passage references.** Proem.1–Proem.10 (PDF pp. 6–11); authorial reservation (p. 13); I.1.7 (pp. 16–17); I.6.1–I.6.19 (pp. 82–95); Book II introduction, p. 97; II.1.7,

pp. 102–103; II.2.1–15, pp. 104–115; II.3.10, pp. 120–121; II.9.12–13, pp. 168–169; II.4.1, pp. 122–123; II.5.1, pp. 126–127; II.6.1, pp. 128–129; II.7.18–19, pp. 152–153; II.9.15, pp. 170–171; II.10.1, pp. 176–177

**In this edition.**

Intellectual names receive an explicit qualification in I.6.13. Divine truth, unity and goodness name one substance in II.3.10, not three separate first gods. Preserve Ficino's Proem submission to divine law alongside the positive assertions.

**See also.**

Good and goodness; Truth; Unity and multiplicity; Light and illumination; Philosophy and theology; Principle; Intellect and intellection

## Good and goodness

**Latin:** *bonum*; *bonitas*; *bonum ipsum*; *infinitum bonum*; *summum bonum*; *summa bonitas*; *bene esse*; *universale bonum*; *bona particularia*; *unum simpliciter*; *unum ipsum*; *ipsum bonum*; *summa unitas*

**The word.**

Bonum can be a particular good, the respect under which something is desired, or the Good itself; bonitas is goodness. Bene esse means well-being and differs from bare esse. The related expressions should not be made invariant synonyms.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The good is the object of desire, the end of action, and the perfection whose first source is God. Ficino moves among particular goods, the aspect under which something is desired, and the Good itself. These uses are connected but not identical. Matter is good in a qualified sense because it desires form, can receive it, and is required by a good world. Goodness therefore extends beyond living and thinking things. Ficino argues that removing life would stop the world's movement, whereas removing good would remove its existence. Mind itself seeks to become better through understanding and receives goodness from above.

Goodness is one with supreme unity and truth, while the three names describe different explanatory aspects of the same principle. A thing is good insofar as it is united with itself and its source rather than corrupted by inferior mixture. II.3.10 contrasts truth's gift of being with goodness's recalling effects to their source and granting well-being, *bene esse*. It does not divide divine functions among separate substances. Everything acts from, through, and toward good. Goodness is communicative as a source and attractive as an end, connecting production, preservation, perfection, and return. The inference that what all things seek is also their source belongs to Ficino's metaphysics; it is not merely the everyday meaning of desire.

Book II tests whether anything could rank above goodness. A superior principle would give a better gift, but that superiority would already be a greater share of goodness. If its gift were not better, the claimed superiority would lose its basis. An absolutely evil supreme being likewise could neither act, know, live, nor exist, since these are goods. Even defeating the good would require superiority and power, themselves good. Evil and privation can therefore be known through goodness and possession without an independent divine exemplar of evil. These arguments do not imply that every actual choice or condition is good in every respect.

In God, goodness is not received, and no independent good outside him supplies his end. He wills his own complete goodness and needs no creature to complete it. Created goods imitate that goodness according to their natures; an ordered whole may manifest it more fully than an isolated advantage. Ficino's appeal to the whole's benefit does not make each part, considered alone, equally beneficial. Particular natural agents pursue particular goods, while intellectual nature can regard universal good. Human appetite always seeks some good or apparent good, but judgment about objects and means can be mistaken.

The Pythagorean exposition in Book IV identifies the first One with the first Good. A mind that is one still combines mind and oneness, so the ascent continues beyond one member of an order to unity without qualification. God cannot simply be the first sphere's soul or one celestial mover among peers: that would give him a limited proportion to other beings and a composition of common and distinctive properties. Nor is his transcendence beyond every whole compatible with treating him as an aggregate. Supreme unity and goodness remain distinct from the lower beings that possess them by participation.

**The places.**

- **I.2.14, PDF 24–25**. Desire follows perceived goodness rather than quantity alone.
- **I.6.14–19, PDF 90–95**. Goodness reaches formless matter and exceeds mind as universal source and desired end.
- **II.1.5, PDF 100–101**. Any proposed superior source would already act through the goodness it gives.
- **II.3.10, PDF 120–121**. Goodness recalls products to their source and gives well-being alongside truth's gift of being.
- **IV.1.51, PDF 306–307**. The Pythagorean exposition identifies the first One and first Good.

**Further passage references.** I.2.14 (PDF pp. 24–25); I.5.25 (pp. 78–79); I.6.14–I.6.19 (pp. 90–95); II.1.1–7, pp. 98–103; II.2.15, pp. 114–115; II.3.10, pp. 120–121; II.6.5–7, pp. 130–131; II.7.4–5, pp. 144–145; II.11.13–14, 29–38, PDF 188–201; II.12.3–19, PDF 202–213; II.13.1–3, 23–30, PDF 216–237; IV.1.23–IV.1.28, pp. 292–295; IV.1.51–IV.1.52, pp. 306–309; IV.1.59–IV.1.60, pp. 312–313; IV.2.3–IV.2.6, pp. 334–337; II.11.19, PDF pp. 192–193

**In this edition.**

The qualifier "as good" in appetite arguments and "in a certain measure" of matter protect important differences. Divine goodness's being the final source does not certify every judgement of benefit, nor equate an isolated part's advantage with the whole's good.

**See also.**

Appetite and desire; Freedom and necessity; God; Matter; End and limit; Unity and multiplicity; Truth; Communication and imparting; Nothing and nonbeing; Ideas and exemplars; Love and pleasure; Apollo; Whole and parts; World soul

## Governing, serving and dominion

**Latin:** *regit*; *praesidet*; *dominatur*; *imperat*; *rectores*; *ministrabant*; *imperium*.; *dominari; dominus; compos; sui iuris; servilia; servire; imperium*; *praeest*, *praesunt*, *ducunt*, *regit*, *imperium*, *nutus sequantur*, *servit*, *dominatur*.

**The word.**

*Regere* governs or directs; *praesidere* presides over; *praeesse* stands at the head of; *ducere* leads; *dominari* exercises mastery; and *imperare* commands. *Imperium* can name command, dominion or the range of authority. *Nutus* is a directing nod. *Ministrare* and *servire* describe service or subordination. *Dominus* is a master, *compos* one who possesses or has command, and *sui iuris* expresses self-mastery. *Servilia* figures dependence as servitude. These governmental expressions can describe relations among faculties or cosmic causes without naming political institutions.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Soul governs qualities and bodies while joining itself to higher realities. Its centrality is an active office, not merely a coordinate in a list. Quality, by contrast, does not master even its own matter because it depends on that matter for support; it therefore cannot independently master foreign matter. The mind within a human soul is similarly said not to command its soul's effective power by thought alone, motivating an ascent to a more efficacious mind. The rulers in the saying attributed to Zoroaster are unmoved intellectual movers. At the book's close, truth's dominion reaches further than mind's, and the Good's dominion is at once necessary and willingly accepted. Ficino uses the range and mode of rule to distinguish causal ranks. None of this by itself establishes a programme for human political coercion.

Ficino measures a cause's mastery by the range of the work it controls. Fire does not govern the whole effect because it does not arrange the recipient's degrees; God governs forms and their ordering together. The later claim that God does not serve an alien good removes an external end that would determine divine action. Freedom then receives the language of becoming one's own master as one approaches God. In God, mastery over intelligence and essence depends on the asserted identity of being, understanding, and willing. It is not a decision made by a will independent of what God is. Created agents remain free in a qualified respect, while the first cause is the unrestricted source and end of its activity. The social and juridical language makes degrees of dependence vivid without establishing a literal social hierarchy among human persons.

The twelvefold hierarchy repeatedly distributes ruling and subordinate souls, but the distribution remains within a marked Pythagorean conversation and becomes tentative at the level of twelve minds. Apollo's command governs a singing, dancing chorus; political and musical language cooperate. The rankings of reason, anger, and desire similarly concern which faculty predominates and which serves, not the isolated existence of only one faculty.

In the world-soul argument, lower members follow the higher members' nods while communicating powers within one living whole. Direction is therefore compatible with distributed activity. Soul itself is self-governing in one respect and directed by higher mind in another. The lexicon should preserve those relative scopes: being a ruler does not make a soul the first source, and following does not mean being inert.

**The places.**

• **I.1.7, PDF 16–17.** Soul presides over the world's mechanism while linking its grades

- **I.3.7, PDF 34–35.** Dependence on matter prevents independent mastery
- **I.5.13, PDF 66–67.** Human intellectual activity does not by itself command effective power
- **I.5.19, PDF 74–75; I.5.27, PDF 80–81.** Intellectual rulers and prophetic attendants supply different images
- **I.6.11, PDF 88–89; I.6.19, PDF 94–95.** The dominions of truth and goodness exceed that of mind

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.8 (Latin PDF p. 184; English PDF p. 185).** Fire lacks mastery of the whole differentiated work.
- **II.11.38 (Latin PDF p. 200; English PDF p. 201).** Mastery of production is linked with free disposal of effects.
- **II.12.7 (Latin PDF p. 204; English PDF p. 205).** Sui iuris describes increasing self-mastery and divine supremacy.
- **II.12.8 (Latin PDF p. 206; English PDF p. 207).** Compos concerns command of intelligence and essence under their identity in God.
- **IV.1.44–52, PDF pp. 304–309:** faculties and governing souls are ranked; Apollo directs the cosmic chorus
- **IV.1.65, pp. 314–315:** a self-moving thing governs itself while mediating stability and externally moved body
- **IV.1.82 and IV.1.86, pp. 324–327:** cosmic cooperation receives higher direction and distributes unity, order, and motion
- **IV.2.19, pp. 344–345:** the slightest nod figures the ease of a soul's bodily direction

**In this edition.**

"Rule," "preside," "guide," "command," and "dominion" preserve distinctions that an unspecified "cause" would lose, but do not all assert absolute sovereignty. *Imperium* is not automatically an earthly empire. "His own master" renders *sui iuris*; "command of will" at II.12.1 renders *voluntatis imperio* without requiring a spoken order or arbitrary decree. In IV.1.82, "commands" interprets the plural *nutus* as higher guidance. These expressions must remain alongside the distinctions between absolute freedom, conditioned freedom and subordinate agency.

**See also.**

Lorenzo, dedication and public authority; Cause; Good and goodness; Freedom and necessity.

Freedom and necessity; Will; Through itself and through another; Need and sufficiency.

Order and harmony; Twelve; Bacchus and the Muses; Through itself and through another.

## Great year

**Latin:** *magnus ac mundanus annus*; *mundi senium*; *mundi restitutio*

**The word.**

Magnus ac mundanus annus is the great or cosmic year; mundi senium the world's old age, and mundi restitutio its restoration. The terms name a cosmological return, not an ordinary solar year.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

IV.2.12 explains the great year through the finite number of a cosmic soul's seminal contents and its continued activity. Having passed through all seeds, the soul must either rest, "as it seems to us," or traverse them again and reweave the sequence of generation. Ficino reports a cycle of thirty-six thousand solar years as the Platonists' period for the universal circuit. He associates its end with Mercury's world-old-age and Plato's world-restoration, and attributes to Zoroaster and followers an argument for bodily resurrection based on the return of the same causes and effects. These attributions are part of the supplied primary text; the apparatus does not independently establish their ancient provenance. The passage preserves alternatives between rest and renewed traversal. Its numerical period is part of the attributed cosmological theory, not a measured astronomical result.

**The places.**

- **IV.2.12, PDF 340–341**. A finite stock of seeds and continued psychic activity motivate either rest or recurring generation.
- **IV.2.12, PDF 340–341**. The period and names for its ending are expressly assigned to the Platonists, Mercury and Plato.

**Further passage references.** IV.2.12, pp. 340–341

**In this edition.**

The proposed period is thirty-six thousand solar years, attributed to the Platonists. Preserve vel … vel and ut nobis videtur: rest and renewed traversal are alternatives in the passage. The resurrection inference is reported as Zoroaster's and followers' reasoning, not independently proven here.

**See also.**

Fate; Seeds; Eternity and time; Procession and return; Proteus

## Habitual possession

**Latin:** *habitu*; *possessione et habitu*; *actu*; *potentia*

**The word.**

Habitus names an abiding possession or settled disposition, not only a repeated behavior. Habitu contrasts with actu, actual exercise or possession in act, and potentia, the capacity to receive or realize. The phrase possessione et habitu emphasizes that content is held even when it is not all exercised at once.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Habitual possession names content abidingly held without requiring its full exercise at every moment. It is more determinate than bare potency and differs from present actuality.

Book I's contrast of potency, act, and acquired habit helps establish this vocabulary: a capacity can become a settled ability without being continuously exercised. The word does not merely mean repeated behavior.

IV.2.9 says that angel possesses all principles in possession and actuality together; soul has them in possession, while matter holds them potentially and receives forms by succession. The next passage refines this contrast by distinguishing powers within celestial soul. Its intellectual part has ideas simultaneously in actuality, while its lowest motive powers hold the seeds of generated things without bringing them all into act together. Thus the claim that soul does not have all actually must not be generalized across every faculty. The supplied English renders *habitu* as possession or disposition; *possessione et habitu* makes the stable availability of content particularly explicit. The distinction concerns how intelligible or productive contents are possessed and activated, not simply whether they are present or absent.

**The places.**

- **I.5.1 (PDF pp. 60–61)**. Acquired power passes among potency, act, and habit while natural power endures
- **IV.2.9 (PDF pp. 336–337)**. Angel, soul, and matter differ by actuality, habitual possession, and potency
- **IV.2.10 (PDF pp. 338–339)**. The intellectual part possesses ideas actually; the lowest motive powers hold seeds without actualizing all together

**Further passage references.** IV.2.9–IV.2.12, pp. 336–341; apparatus p. 394; I.5.1, PDF pp. 60–61.

**In this edition.**

The supplied translation renders habitu as "in possession" in IV.2.9 and as "abiding possessions" or "disposition" in IV.2.10. These are contextual renderings of the same Latin. The latter passage distinguishes the soul's intellectual and lowest motive powers, so possession without actuality must not be applied indiscriminately to every faculty.

**See also.**

Power and potency; Act and operation; Whole and parts; Seeds; Intellectual and animating powers

## Head, heart, and members

**Latin:** *cor*, *corde*, *cerebro*, *iecori*, *artus*, *articulos*, *membra*, *caput*.

**The word.**

*Cor* is heart, *cerebrum* brain, *iecur* liver; *caput* head. *Artus* and *articuli* can name limbs and their joints, while *membra* is a broader word for members. The bodily vocabulary provides both reported physiological assignments and comparisons of cosmic hierarchy.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The Pythagorean excursion compares the world's twelve members and many joints with a descending organization of souls. A principal star is pictured as the heart of each zodiacal creature and the seat of its principal soul. In the immediately following classification of human lives, reason is assigned to brain, anger to heart, and desire to liver. These are

different uses of “heart”: the zodiacal heart identifies a ruling center, while the human heart is assigned one faculty within a tripartite physiological arrangement.

Later the world’s contrary members cooperate through one life, and the parts of animal bodies are described as furnished with distinct organs. The “head” of mind and reason in celestial soul is again hierarchical: soul’s unity is the head of its mind, and mind the head of reason. That language orders dependence rather than placing a literal brain inside an incorporeal soul.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.42–44, PDF pp. 302–305:** cosmic members, zodiacal hearts, and human brain-heart-liver assignments belong to the marked numerical excursion
- **IV.1.79 and IV.1.82–83, pp. 322–325:** organs differentiate bodies while common life unites the world’s members
- **IV.2.11, pp. 338–339:** “head” marks higher direction within the returning celestial soul

**In this edition.**

“Members,” “joints,” and “heart” retain the bodily comparisons. They should not be silently converted into modern anatomical claims or conflated with an invariant occult correspondence system.

**See also.**

Reason anger and desire; Zodiac; Whole and parts; Sympathy.

## Heart and mistaken location

**Latin:** corde; in corde tantum; putet; putat; regit; vivificando; gubernando

**The word.**

Cor, attested as corde, means heart. Putare is thinking or supposing; tantum limits the supposition to the heart alone. Regere and gubernare concern directing or governing, while vivificare gives life.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The closing example of II.6 distinguishes a mind’s own location-belief from the range of its presence. A mind may suppose it exists only in the body it governs although, according to the theory under discussion, it reaches beyond that body. The comparison is to our mind, described as present throughout the body yet, “according to many philosophers,” thinking itself confined to the heart.

The text thus contains two qualifications: a reported theory about immensity and an appeal to what many philosophers say about self-location. It is neither a direct observation of cardiac cognition nor a medical recommendation. The important lexical point is that governing a region, appearing more active there, and supposing oneself there are three different relations.

**The places.**

- II.6.24 (PDF pp. 142–143): The heart comparison distinguishes actual presence in the account from a mind’s belief about itself

**In this edition.**

The phrase “according to many philosophers” modifies the heart illustration and should not disappear. Putat is rendered “thinks itself,” preserving the possibility of mistaken self-description.

**See also.**

Candles and the hall; Mind; Self knowledge; Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities.

## Here, there, and the Antipodes

**Latin:** *hic*, *illic*, *ibi*, *super caput nostrum*, *super caput Antipodum*, *semicirculus*, *concava superficies*, *locus naturalis*.

**The word.**

*Hic* is here; *illic* and *ibi* there. The deictic contrast becomes argumentative when the text asks why an otherwise equivalent part should occupy this position rather than that. *Antipodum* names the people on the opposite side in this imagined orientation. *Semicirculus* here refers to the relevant half of the sphere.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino asks a reader who wants heaven to stop to fix Saturn’s sphere on its axis. One half then stands over our heads and the other over the Antipodes. Because the sphere’s parts are alike in nature, he finds no reason one should belong here rather than there; each tends toward the equally fitting position. The subsequent description makes the concave surface of the eighth sphere Saturn’s natural place and explains its parts’ desire to contact all corresponding parts.

The distinction between the whole sphere’s place and its parts’ successive contacts is crucial. Circular motion retains the sphere within its proper enclosure while changing which part contacts which. The argument is part of the historical nested-sphere model; it is not a description of modern Saturnian motion. Its logic also differs from a simple observation of motion: the imposed rest is a thought experiment used to display the supposed absence of a privileged resting distribution.

**The places.**

- **IV.2.22–23, PDF pp. 346–347:** circular motion remains in the same place while differing minimally from stability
- **IV.2.24, pp. 348–349:** the stopped sphere and the Antipodes frame the here/there argument
- **IV.2.25, pp. 348–349:** surrounding concavity and changing contacts specify natural place

**In this edition.**

The English explains the relevant outer surface of Saturn’s sphere in IV.2.25, while retaining the surrounding concave surface. “Here” and “there” are not dispensable filler: they carry the symmetry test.

**See also.**

Natural motion and natural place; Spheres and stars; Fitting and correspondence; Striving and enjoyment.

## Hermetic theologians and the Magi

**Latin:** *Mercuriales theologi*; *magi*; *Zoroaster*; *Oromasis*; *Mitris*; *Arimanis*

**The word.**

Mercuriales theologi names the theologians associated by Ficino with Mercury or Hermes; magi names an attributed body of religious-philosophical authorities. The proper names Oromasis, Mitris, and Arimanis receive their local meanings from Ficino's glosses God, mind, and soul, rather than from a modern etymological reconstruction.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

At the beginning of Book IV, the Hermetic theologians supply the model for examining grades of rational soul. Later, Ficino attributes a threefold hierarchy to the Magi: Oromasis, Mitris, and Arimanis, glossed as God, mind, and soul. He assigns unity to God, order to mind, and motion to soul, giving the names distinct roles in his causal account. Other appeals to the Magi and Zoroaster concern natural powers, daemons, cosmic motion, and recurrence.

These are Ficino's reported correspondences and claims of ancient authority. His assertion that ancient wisdom flowed from Zoroaster should be distinguished from independently established intellectual history. The supplied apparatus retains the source names Oromasis, Mitris, and Arimanis rather than substituting modernized equivalents. Their meaning within this argument is therefore best approached through Ficino's own glosses. A reader should not silently replace his stated hierarchy with a modern reconstruction of another religious system, or treat every appeal to the Magi as evidence that all the associated teachings have the same provenance.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.1 (PDF pp. 282–283)**. Hermetic theologians provide the model for investigating the grades of rational soul
- **IV.1.86 (PDF pp. 326–327)**. The Magian names are glossed through unity, order, and motion
- **II.7.7 (PDF pp. 146–147)**. Zoroaster's one-fire saying is used mystically for the common source of things

**Further passage references.** IV.1.1, pp. 282–283; IV.1.20, pp. 292–293; IV.1.39, pp. 302–303; IV.1.86, pp. 326–327; IV.2.2, pp. 334–335; apparatus pp. 388, 393.

**In this edition.**

The edition retains the source's Oromasis, Mitris, and Arimanis. The explanatory "that is, God, mind, and soul" is in Ficino's text. Attributions to Magi or Zoroaster should remain attributed; preserving these names does not independently authenticate the historical relationships asserted.

**See also.**

Unity and multiplicity; Order and harmony; Motion and stability; Apollo; Daemons; Philosophy and theology

## Hidden mover and magnet

**Latin:** *magnes ferrum*, *revocat*, *rapiat*, *trahit*, *magnetem non viderent*, *ex se ipso moveri putarent*.

**The word.**

*Trahere* draws; *rapere* seizes or carries rapidly; *revocare* calls back. These verbs distinguish active attraction from the moved body's apparent self-motion. A *magnes* is the magnet and *ferrum* the iron drawn by it.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The Platonist account attributes rising and falling elemental bodies to the soul of their proper sphere, which recalls its particles as a magnet draws iron. The alleged increasing speed near the appropriate sphere is explained by stronger near attraction and by the cooperating world-soul. Ficino then changes from the physical analogy to an epistemic one: someone who saw moving iron but not its magnet would suppose the iron moved itself. Likewise, ignorance of sphere-souls invites a mistaken assignment of self-motion to bodies.

This analogy must not be confused with the earlier claim that a diamond defeats magnetic attraction. That is a natural-lore example of a mineral's extraordinary power; this is an account of the difference between an unseen cause and no cause. The comparison also preserves the distinction between the local soul of a sphere and the one world-soul, since both are named as drawing toward the same destination.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.20, PDF pp. 292–293:** diamond and magnet occur in the separate mineral-power argument
- **IV.1.74, pp. 320–321:** attraction explains the recall of elemental parts and the hidden-magnet thought experiment
- **IV.1.75–77, pp. 320–323:** fixed paths and limits are used to deny independent self-motion to elemental parts

**In this edition.**

"Calls … back," "seizes," and "draws" preserve the variety of the Latin verbs. "Would think" in the imagined observer's inference marks an error explained by incomplete evidence, not an endorsed account of iron's motion.

**See also.**

Natural motion and natural place; Seeming and evidence; World soul; Hierobotanum and mineral powers.

## Hierobotanum and mineral powers

**Latin:** *hierobotanum*, *Achates*, *adamas*, *magneti*, *Corneola*, *Onyx*, *Corallus*; *fascinandos*, *roborandos*, *obtundit*, *sistit*, *mitigat*, *repellit*.

**The word.**

The passage names a herb and several stones, then gives distinct operative verbs: bewitching, strengthening, blunting, stopping, calming, and repelling. *Virtus* in this setting means effective power, not moral virtue. The names are retained as the supplied text's

identifications rather than independently certified mineralogical or botanical classifications.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino argues that dense mixed bodies cannot of themselves account for effects upon human souls and even storms; a stronger living and wise nature must work within them. He reports the Magi's claim that hierobotanum aids physicians' divinations. Agate is said to foster sight, blunt poison, and confer strength and fertility. A nearby diamond is said to deprive a magnet of what it attracts. Carnelian stops bleeding and calms anger; onyx inflames anger and frightens sleepers; coral, on the testimony attributed to Metrodorus and Zoroaster, banishes terrors and repels lightning and hail.

The opposing emotional effects of carnelian and onyx matter to the argument: these are allegedly determinate powers, not one undifferentiated beneficial influence. The conclusion concerns the rank of the nature said to produce them. These are historical natural-lore claims, not remedies or protections established here, and should not be used as medical or safety advice. The magnet reappears later in a different explanatory role, as an analogy for an invisible mover.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.19–20, PDF pp. 290–293:** sluggish bodily mixture is contrasted with alleged effects on souls; herb, agate, diamond, and magnet supply examples
- **IV.1.21–22, pp. 292–293:** the stones' differentiated effects support the inference to an infused superior nature
- **IV.1.74, pp. 320–321:** magnetic attraction later illustrates a hidden cause, without repeating the diamond claim

**In this edition.**

The reading *fecundiam* is rendered "fertility." The prior lexicon reports an apparatus variant concerning eloquence; that later variant must not be silently added to the list of effects in this continuous reading text. Individual verbs preserve the diversity of the claims rather than an assertion that all the stones simply heal.

**See also.**

Power and potency; Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Hidden mover and magnet; Seeming and evidence.

## Hinge and center

**Latin:** *cardo*; *centrum*; *lineae*; *circumferentia*; *punctum*

**The word.**

Cardo is a hinge, pivot, or axis; centrum the center; punctum a point; lineae rays or lines related to it. The images describe governing unity and relation to many effects. Their force depends on whether the subject is the first source, a subordinate order, or soul's undivided presence.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The hinge or pivot, *cardo*, describes a governing point through which many subordinate movements are coordinated. God is the universal hinge, turning the subsequent orders of essence, life, mind, soul, nature, and matter. Ficino conditionally elaborates a Platonist

formulation in which each order has its own proper hinge. The mechanical display driven by a single ball gives a concrete comparison for varied motion directed from one source.

The center image has more than one application. In II.13.14, God is the simplest center from which dependent realities issue like lines. In III.2, a circle's center illustrates how an undivided point can stand in relation to many radii, unlike a point fixed to one peripheral location. This supports the account of soul's undivided presence without making soul into a geometrical object. Calling soul the center of nature at III.2.23 then emphasizes its mediating position. A shared image therefore need not assign God and soul the same metaphysical status; the local relation being explained determines its force.

**The places.**

- **II.8.5 (PDF pp. 162–163)**. The simplest center and dependent lines illustrate effortless action through being
- **II.13.12 (PDF pp. 224–225)**. The universal hinge coordinates subordinate orders, with a conditionally introduced Platonist elaboration
- **II.13.14 (PDF pp. 226–227)**. The center image recurs after the single-ball display
- **III.2.19 (PDF pp. 272–273)**. Soul is compared with a center related to every line and the whole circle

**Further passage references.** II.13.12–14, PDF 224–227; III.2.13–19, 23, PDF 270–275.

**In this edition.**

The English "hinge" emphasizes coordinated turning; "center" emphasizes a single source's relation to many lines. The formula already occurs at II.8.5 and is repeated at II.13.14 with an explicit reference back. The conditional "as a Platonist might say" at II.13.12 qualifies the elaborated hierarchy of hinges.

**See also.**

Bond knot and chain; Indwelling and presence; Order and harmony; Providence; Soul

## Honey, whiteness and the wall

**Latin:** *mel*; *mellis*; *guttula*; *color flavus*; *dulcedo*; *odor*; *albedo*; *paries*.

**The word.**

*Mel*, encountered as *mellis*, is honey; *guttula* is a small drop. *Dulcedo* is sweetness, *odor* smell, *albedo* whiteness, and *paries* a wall. These ordinary nouns anchor distinct tests of quality; they are not interchangeable illustrations of sensation.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The wall tests access to size: one cannot judge its magnitude unless colour and light have first moved sight, and distance is said to impair judgement of size sooner than judgement of colour and light. Honey tests coexistence: each drop is coloured, sweet and fragrant, so multiple qualities occupy the same material where two bodies cannot occupy the same place without obstruction. Whiteness tests division. Dividing a white body leaves whiteness in each piece, with the same qualitative character and similar efficacy, though not the same extent. Ficino's contrast is between "whiteness of a part" and "part of whiteness." He does not say that the pieces are equal in size or that every qualitative intensity necessarily remains numerically identical under every material alteration.

**The places.**

- **I.2.13, PDF 24–25.** The wall's magnitude is perceived through colour and light
- **I.2.15, PDF 26–27.** A drop of honey contains several qualities together
- **I.2.17, PDF 26–27.** The white body distinguishes qualitative character from quantitative division

**In this edition.**

"Pleasing to the nostrils" renders the olfactory *naribusque suavis*, not a fourth quality added to colour, sweetness and odour. In the whiteness passage, the reversal of *partis albedo* and *pars albedinis* is the argument's lexical hinge and should remain visible.

**See also.**

Quality; Sense and imagination; Whole and parts; Quantity and dimension.

## Ideas and exemplars

**Latin:** *idea*; *exemplar*; *ratio*; *rationes propriae*; *respectus intellecti*; *species*; *reales respectus*; *rationes*; *ideae*; *exemplaria*; *conceptus*

**The word.**

Idea and exemplar name an intelligible pattern or model; ratio can name the determinate principle or account of a thing. Respectus is a relation or respect under which one essence is understood. These words distinguish a model, an intelligible determination, and the dependent likeness produced from it.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

A divine idea is the divine essence considered as the exemplar of a particular kind, rather than a separate substance or added quality within God. Ficino explains plurality by the distinct ways in which the single divine perfection can be imitated. God understands those determinate relations through his own intellect; created things do not first produce the relations in him. Several ideas are therefore several intelligible accounts of one essence, contemplated through one form and a single act of vision. Ficino explicitly calls the relations intellectual rather than real relations of the kind by which persons are said to be distinguished. This comparison marks a difference in the status of the relations; it does not make created things independent constituents within God.

Universal order is the principal idea because the world's ordered whole stands first in divine purpose. Knowing a whole requires the proper accounts of its parts, as an architect must conceive a building's components. The idea of a house also explains features belonging to it from its original construction, whereas additions such as paintings can require further ideas. These distinctions allow specific patterns without sacrificing divine simplicity. Many things can be known and made under one idea, and not everything needs an independent idea on the same footing. Evil and privation are known through good and possession; a substance's properties through its idea; common qualities are assigned proper ideas. Ficino reports, with the qualification that some think so, that matter is known through the idea of form.

The vocabulary changes its setting below God. Angel receives intellectual formation and ideas; soul possesses images of higher realities and exemplars of lower ones. Book IV then gives productive principles a determinate causal role: earth-soul generates vines through the vine's natural idea and principle, and flies through the principle of flies. Natural art

must possess patterns corresponding to its specific products, just as an artisan works according to designs. In celestial souls, the intellectual part possesses ideas together, while lower motive powers hold seeds that are realized successively. Idea, seed, and bodily form consequently name connected but differently situated modes of determination; they are not mechanically interchangeable or necessarily duplicate entities.

The Latin *ratio* can name these productive principles, but also an account, an argument, or reason as a faculty. At IV.1.17 the base reading *rationalibus* qualifies powers; the later reading *rationibus* would name principles. The supplied edition retains the former and should not be cited as though its base text had the latter. Ficino strongly claims this account of ideas for Plato and the Platonists; that historical attribution remains his, distinct from an independent adjudication of every Platonic source.

**The places.**

- **II.10.5 (PDF pp. 176–177)**. The infinite exemplar admits further possible likenesses beyond any finite collection
- **II.11.18 (PDF pp. 190–191)**. The divine essence is considered in distinct relations as an exemplar
- **IV.1.17 (PDF pp. 290–291)**. The rationalibus reading concerns the intellectual powers shaping substantial productions
- **IV.2.10 (PDF pp. 338–339)**. Ideas held in mind are distinguished from seeds held by the lowest motive powers

**Further passage references.** II.11.17–22, PDF 190–193; II.12.15, PDF 210–211; III.1.12, PDF 248–249; III.2.23, PDF 274–275; IV.1.9–IV.1.13, pp. 286–289; IV.1.17, pp. 290–291; IV.2.9–IV.2.15, pp. 336–343; apparatus pp. 388–389.

**In this edition.**

The prior discussion’s caution at II.11.17 is retained: its compressed wording must not be silently repaired. At IV.1.17 the supplied base text reads rationalibus, qualifying powers, rather than the alternative rationibus, which would name principles. The edition’s apparatus reports that difference; this lexicon has not newly collated the witnesses.

**See also.**

Art and nature; Form; Good and goodness; Image and likeness; Reason and account; Seeds; Habitual possession; Intellectual and animating powers

## Image and likeness

**Latin:** *imago*; *simulacrum*; *similis*; *umbra*; *speculum*; *exemplar*; *similitudo*; *imitari*; *exprimere*; *vultus*

**The word.**

Imago and simulacrum mean image or likeness; similitudo the relation of resemblance; exemplar a model; umbra a shadow; speculum a mirror. An image can represent, manifest a source dependently, or illustrate continuing causal support. These uses should not be collapsed into a single theory of mental pictures.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

An image discloses a source while possessing its character dependently and less completely. In the Proem, soul is a mirror of the divine countenance, and created mind a

mirror at the center of things. Self-knowledge can accordingly direct the reader toward knowledge of God. In the hierarchy, a likeness preserves something of its cause without acquiring the cause's full perfection: bodily ranks are presented as shadows of rational souls, whose ranks are images of angels.

Shadow often emphasizes diminution, but the imagery is not a simple opposition between good images and bad shadows. The sensible world can be mistakenly preferred to what is more real; transient qualities are likened, in a reported Plotinian account, to tree-shadows in flowing water; and irrational soul is called rational soul's shadow. Such comparisons do not make bodily beings sheer nonexistence. They distinguish the mode and degree in which an effect manifests its cause.

God's essence is the exemplar through which he knows all things. Its infinite perfection admits further possible modes of imitation beyond any single creature or finite collection, providing an argument that divine knowledge is not restricted to a finite total. These possible images are not independent models stored outside God, nor must all be actualized. Created goods express divine goodness in limited ways, while divine ideas specify their intelligible patterns. God himself does not learn through images received from creatures: he knows their source and possibilities in his own essence.

Reflection has another use in the argument for preservation. A mirror image continually depends on its source, just as the world continually depends on God. This dependence must be distinguished from representational images involved in cognition. Soul, meanwhile, possesses images of higher realities and principles or exemplars of lower ones; it is a mirror of divine things and the countenance of all things. The Apelles comparison makes likeness a task of active self-formation as well: rational soul models itself on higher realities through contemplation, character, and action. Its mirroring therefore does not imply mere passivity, since the same soul develops temporal operations and gives life to bodies.

**The places.**

- **II.7.22 (PDF pp. 154–155)**. The shadow image expresses the effect's relative dependence on its producing cause
- **II.7.23 (PDF pp. 154–155)**. A mirror-image illustrates both production and continual preservation
- **II.9.20 (PDF pp. 172–173)**. God knows through his essence rather than receiving images from things
- **II.10.5 (PDF pp. 176–177)**. Possible likenesses cannot exhaust the infinite exemplar's perfection
- **III.2.23 (PDF pp. 274–275)**. Soul contains images of higher and principles or exemplars of lower realities

**Further passage references.** Proem.4, Proem.7, Proem.9 (PDF pp. 6–9); I.3.19, I.3.33 (pp. 42–43, 52–53); I.4.1 (pp. 54–55); I.5.28 (pp. 80–81); II.7.22–23, pp. 154–155; II.9.20, pp. 172–173; II.10.5, pp. 176–177; II.10.10–12, pp. 180–181; II.11.17–18, 27, PDF 190–195; II.12.12–15, PDF 208–211; II.13.1, PDF 216–217; III.1.23, 31, PDF 254–259; III.2.8, 23, PDF 266–275.

**In this edition.**

In II.7.22 imaginarium is rendered "image-like," preserving the comparison with the cause without declaring the world an illusion. The phrases "compared with" and "as it were"

matter. At II.9.20 the denial of cognition through creatures' images distinguishes divine self-knowledge from receptive representation.

**See also.**

Light and illumination; Participation; Truth; Soul; Matter; Self knowledge; Form; Ideas and exemplars; Infinity; Conservation and preservation

## Imagination and deceptive clothing

**Latin:** phantasia; induit; confundit; fallit; involutus; praestigiis; persuadet; clamat; reclamat

**The word.**

Phantasia is imagination, the power of presenting images. Induere means clothing or putting on; involutus means wrapped or enfolded. Praestigiae are illusions or deceptive appearances. Clamare and reclamare personify the competing claims of imagination and reason.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

When the mind conceives simple duration, imagination immediately clothes it in manifold flux. What is divine eternity is consequently mistaken for time. The clothing image makes the mistake intelligible without saying the original intellectual object never appeared: God presents himself, but wrapped in time.

The same pattern governs space. A pure, unlimited capacity is replaced by lines of length, breadth, and depth, or by void. Imagination then treats divine fullness as an object placed inside other things. Reason protests against reducing nature to the bodily fabric. This is a local criticism of imagination's inappropriate substitution, not a verdict that imagination is always deceptive. II.9.16 gives it a constructive role gathering what the separate senses receive, while intellect grasps both particulars and universal principles more clearly.

**The places.**

- II.5.2, II.5.3 (PDF pp. 126–127): Imagination clothes stable duration in temporal flux
- II.6.12, II.6.13 (PDF pp. 132–135): The substitution of lines and void turns fullness into an imagined occupant
- II.9.16 (PDF pp. 172–173): Imagination also integrates the separate contributions of the senses

**In this edition.**

The edition's "illusions," "clothes," and "shrouded" are source-grounded metaphors. "Reason protests" translates the personifying reclamat, rather than introducing a new speaker in a dramatic dialogue.

**See also.**

Sense and imagination; Always and everywhere; Weaving and world fabric; Reason and account.

# Immortality

**Latin:** *immortalitas*; *immortalis*; *indissolubilis*

**The word.**

Immortalis means not subject to death; immortalitas the corresponding condition or thesis. Indissolubilis means not dissoluble into parts. They overlap in the argument but are not identical lexical claims: a thing may be preserved as undissolved by another rather than self-sufficient by nature.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The work's title and opening identify the immortality of souls as the major problem. Book I first frames it through human misery: Ficino argues that a being capable of worshipping God should not be the most unfortunate mortal and therefore must have a prospect of blessedness beyond bodily death. The subsequent metaphysical ascent seeks a more structural foundation. The rational soul is not divided into material parts, does not vanish when deprived of a material subject, and is not mixed with a contrary form capable of corrupting it. As the middle bond of nature, it is also announced as indissoluble. Together these considerations constitute Ficino's opening case for the thesis. Immortality does not mean immobility in every respect. The next chapter expressly distinguishes stable soul-substance from changing operations, preventing the claim of indestructibility from being mistaken for a denial that souls think, will, or act successively.

Book III extends the account through the divine gift of unity and stability. Some beings that would be dissoluble considered in themselves are preserved by the divine knot; their indissolubility does not make them self-sufficient first principles. Soul enters mortal things whole and withdraws whole, rather than being distributed into bodily pieces. These arguments belong to the opening development of the work's thesis, not a claim that this first volume contains every later specialized proof.

**The places.**

- **I.3.33 (PDF pp. 52–53)**. No dissoluble parts, removable material support, or corrupting contrary grounds the stated immortality
- **I.4.1 (PDF pp. 54–55)**. The question of changing operation follows and qualifies any inference from immortality to total immobility
- **III.2.22 (PDF pp. 274–275)**. Soul enters mortal things whole and withdraws whole without becoming mortal

**Further passage references.** Proem.7 (PDF pp. 8–9); I.1.1–I.1.7 (pp. 14–17); I.3.33 (pp. 52–53); I.4.1–I.4.5 (pp. 54–59); III.1.5, PDF pp. 240–241; III.2.22, PDF pp. 274–275.

**In this edition.**

The description of soul as true and immortal in I.3.33 is explicitly assigned to the Platonists. Its freedom from bodily dissolution does not remove all changing operation: I.4 immediately asks about mobility. The volume supplies an opening argument rather than every demonstration promised by the complete work.

**See also.**

Soul; Indivisibility; Eternity and time; Blessedness; Prison and homeland; Bond knot and chain

## Impression and effacement

**Latin:** imprimitur; deletur; vestigium; firmant; fundant; stabiliunt

**The word.**

Imprimere is to impress or stamp; delere to erase or efface. Firmare and stabilire make firm; fundare provides a foundation. The vocabulary converts an ordering of causes into an image of marks resting on a prior mark.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino concludes that the first cause acts more powerfully in every effect because its trace, being, is impressed earlier and erased later than the traces of other causes. He adds quasi, “as though,” when describing the stronger impression. The image makes explanatory priority and persistence intelligible without measuring a physical indentation.

Other causes establish their traces upon the first cause’s trace. In parallel, their works rest in its work and their powers and actions in its power and action. This does not deny subordinate causation: the other traces remain distinct. It explains why they cannot operate independently of the being and efficacy supplied by the first source.

**The places.**

- II.7.28, II.7.29 (PDF pp. 156–157): The order of being and particular determinations supplies the comparison’s basis
- II.7.32 (PDF pp. 158–159): Impression, erasure, and foundation summarize the priority of first causation

**In this edition.**

The translation’s “as though it were impressed more deeply” interprets fortius imprimatur spatially. Fortius literally marks greater force or strength; “depth” is the comparison’s English expression, not an additional Latin noun.

**See also.**

Traces; Before and after in nature; Cause; Being.

## Incorporeal and immaterial

**Latin:** *incorporeus*; *incorporalis*; *immaterialis*; *sine materia*; *absque dimensione*

**The word.**

Incorporeus and incorporalis mean nonbodily. Immaterialis and sine materia mean without matter, while absque dimensione specifies absence of quantitative extension. The argument sometimes distinguishes these rather than treating them as synonyms: freedom from matter need not imply absence of every dimension in an attributed cosmology.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The supplied Latin uses both *incorporeus* and *incorporalis* for what is not bodily. This is not automatically equivalent to *immaterialis*, “without matter.” In his reports of Averroes and Proclus, Ficino explicitly describes celestial bodies as having dimension while lacking matter in the relevant sense. Those passages make the distinction indispensable: something can be called immaterial without thereby being unextended or incorporeal. Elsewhere qualities are said not to be bodies because several can coincide in the same place and because extension is not essential to quality. Yet material qualities are still

divided along with their subjects. The soul's incorporeality is a stronger independence: it lacks bodily division and subsists without being tied to a material support. Nonbodily, separated, and immaterial consequently identify different kinds or degrees of independence within the ascent.

**The places.**

- **I.3.27 (PDF pp. 48–49)**. The reported heavenly form lacks matter while retaining dimension
- **I.3.28 (PDF pp. 48–49)**. Proclus's classification distinguishes material composition, elemental simplicity, and immaterial celestial body
- **II.6.1 (PDF pp. 128–129)**. Incorporeal substance touches through power rather than dimensions

**Further passage references.** I.2.3–I.2.5, I.2.15–I.2.17 (PDF pp. 20–21, 26–27); I.3.24–I.3.29, I.3.33 (pp. 46–53).

**In this edition.**

The supplied translation deliberately retains celestial bodies "with quantity, but without matter" in I.3.27 and "simple and immaterial" in I.3.28. These are the positions Ficino reports from Averroes and Proclus. They cannot be silently recast as claims that the heavens are incorporeal.

**See also.**

Matter; Body and bulk; Quantity and dimension; Separation and abstraction; Form

## Indivisibility

**Latin:** *individuus*; *indivisibilis*; *dividuus*; *divisibilis*; *divisio*; *divisus*; *dimensione*; *temporali discursione*; *vitalem sui umbram*

**The word.**

Individuus and indivisibilis mean undivided or indivisible; dividuus and divisibilis the contrary. Individuus does not ordinarily mean an individual human here. Division may concern a spatial body, successive operations, or distinctions in an intelligible nature, and these senses cannot substitute for one another.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The Latin *individuus* generally means undivided or indivisible here, rather than an individual person. Ficino distinguishes spatial division, temporal succession, qualitative determination, and intelligible composition; none should be substituted automatically for the others.

Quality supplies an initially qualified case. In I.2.17, dividing a white body leaves the character of whiteness in each piece, so the argument distinguishes the whiteness of a part from a part of whiteness. Yet quality remains dependent upon its bodily subject. III.2.11, explicitly appealing to natural philosophers, instead describes whiteness as extended and divided along with flesh, a larger portion of flesh containing a larger portion of whiteness. The first argument emphasizes the retained qualitative character, while the second invokes a received account of quantitative distribution. Their differing emphases and attribution should remain visible rather than being turned into one unqualified formula.

Soul's indivisibility is substantial. It is wholly present to every bodily part, and its communicated life or vital shadow extends throughout the divided body without cutting the soul into portions. This helps explain its inability to dissolve into bodily components. Similarly, unity present throughout a whole cannot itself be portioned out without requiring another unifier. Nonetheless, indivisibility is not absolute divine simplicity: angelic nature can be free of bodily division while containing distinctions of essence, being, understanding, and objects understood.

Soul can also be called divisible in three qualified respects. Its vital shadow is communicated to a divisible body; its operations are distributed through successive moments; and it inclines toward lower realities that are themselves divided. Correspondingly it remains indivisible in its whole presence, stable substance, and orientation toward higher unified realities. The formula that soul is both divisible and indivisible identifies its middle status between beings divided by neither time nor dimension and lower things subject to both. Ficino relates it to Timaeus of Locri and Plato. It does not assert that soul's substance is at once physically cut into pieces and uncut.

**The places.**

- **I.2.17 (PDF pp. 26–27)**. Whiteness of each divided bodily part retains its qualitative character
- **III.2.11 (PDF pp. 268–269)**. The received account of whiteness distributed with flesh supplies a contrast to soul
- **III.2.19 (PDF pp. 272–273)**. Soul's whole presence and stable substance coexist with divided bodily effects and successive activity
- **III.2.22 (PDF pp. 274–275)**. The divisible–indivisible formula is linked to Timaeus of Locri and Plato

**Further passage references.** I.2.17 (PDF pp. 26–27); I.3.13–I.3.16, I.3.29–I.3.33 (pp. 36–39, 50–53); I.6.4–I.6.5 (pp. 82–85); III.1.2–5, PDF 240–241; III.2.9–22, PDF 268–275.

**In this edition.**

I.2.17's partis albedo, "whiteness of a part," is opposed to pars albedinis, "a part of whiteness." III.2.11 presents the latter language under secundum physicos, "according to natural philosophers." Keep that attribution and difference in argumentative emphasis rather than silently forcing both into one formula.

**See also.**

Unity and multiplicity; Soul; Angel; Substance and accident; Quality; Body and bulk; Indwelling and presence; Eternity and time

## Indwelling and presence

**Latin:** *tota et indivisa*; *vis individua*; *latitudo quantitatis*; *punctum*; *centrum*; *situs*; *inesse*; *insita*; *praesentia*; *adsit aut insit*

**The word.**

Inesse is being in or inhering; adesse being present to; insitus implanted or inherent. Praesentia names presence, while situs names position. Tota et indivisa emphasizes whole undivided presence rather than spatial distribution. A source can be present to an effect without the precise relation of indwelling being settled.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Soul is wholly present to every part of its living body without acquiring bodily extension. Ficino rejects both contact with only one point, which would leave the remainder without life, and distribution like whiteness in flesh, which would divide soul with its subject and reduce it to quality. Soul touches through indivisible power, remaining entire in its communication to many bodily parts.

The geometrical comparisons sharpen the distinction. An endpoint fixed to one line is indivisible but still tied to a particular position. A center stands in relation to all radii and the circumference. Soul is likened to a living point freed from quantitative position, not identified with a mathematical point lodged in the body. An utterance and its meaning heard throughout a house provide another explicitly qualified likeness. The explanatory feature is freedom from spatial extension, not extreme smallness: a tiny spatial object would still occupy its own position.

Book IV repeatedly argues that a remote celestial influence alone cannot account for substantial living production. A proximate living source must be present, and soul's indivisibility permits its whole presence throughout a sphere. Yet presence and indwelling are not everywhere identical formulations. The closing quotation attributed to Plato preserves a disjunction: soul must either be present to each celestial body or dwell within it, *adsit aut insit*. According to the supplied apparatus, later witnesses omit the first alternative, while this edition retains the broader base wording. The distinction matters when moving from an argument that celestial motion requires soul to an assertion about the precise mode of union.

That disjunction follows Ficino's express reservation submitting the account of sphere-souls to Christian theological examination. It should not be suppressed in favor of an unqualified doctrine of immanence. Nor does a soul's presence make God the world's animating form; Ficino separately rejects that identification.

**The places.**

- **III.2.13 (PDF pp. 270–271)**. Whole utterance and meaning in a house illustrate presence unlike quantitative extension
- **III.2.19 (PDF pp. 272–273)**. Soul touches no exclusive point but is related to the whole as center to circle
- **IV.1.96 (PDF pp. 332–333)**. Presence or indwelling remains a disjunction in the qualified closing quotation

**Further passage references.** III.2.9–21, PDF 268–273; IV.1.5, pp. 284–285; IV.1.22–IV.1.28, pp. 292–295; IV.1.67, pp. 316–317; IV.1.96, pp. 332–333; apparatus p. 394.

**In this edition.**

At IV.1.96 adsit aut insit is rendered "either present to or dwelling within." The supplied apparatus reports that later witnesses omit the first alternative; this edition retains both. That report is not a new witness collation here. The disjunction also follows Ficino's explicit theological reservation.

**See also.**

Body and bulk; Indivisibility; Quality; Soul; Spiritual union; Degree and mediation; World soul; Angel; Instrument; Philosophy and theology

## Infection, lameness and Lethe

**Latin:** *inficitur*; *inquinetur*; *claudicat*; *Letheo flumine*; *mergitur*; *roboratur*.

**The word.**

*Inficere* can stain, imbue or infect; in these passages it describes form's impairment in matter. *Claudicare* is to limp, here to act inadequately. *Mergere* plunges beneath a surface; *roborare* strengthens. *Letheo* qualifies a river used in an explicitly comparative image.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Quality retains form's activity but is divided and impeded in the "womb of matter." Ficino calls this a taint: simplicity becomes divisibility, activity becomes liability to passion, and agility becomes ineptitude. He later says quality "limps" because, from its birth, it is scattered through material dimensions and plunged "as it were" into Lethe. The metaphor marks lost effective independence; the passage does not offer a literal river as a physical ingredient in matter. A higher living cause must strengthen and direct the impaired quality. The movement from infection and lameness to reinforcement gives a vivid causal account of why local action is real but insufficient.

**The places.**

- **I.3.1, PDF 28–29.** The contamination metaphor spells out three losses suffered by material form
- **I.3.20–21, PDF 42–45.** Lameness and the Lethe simile characterize inadequate action
- **I.3.22, PDF 44–45.** Strengthening by a living source answers the inadequacy
- **I.3.32, PDF 52–53.** A maker mingled with and tainted by its work cannot be the supreme architect

**In this edition.**

"Infect" and "taint" are causal metaphors, not diagnoses. The printed *quasi* and *quodammodo* constrain the Lethe comparison. The supplied passages name the river without explaining a full mythological narrative, so this article does not supply one as though Ficino had told it.

**See also.**

Purity and mixture; Quality; Life; Fountain, womb and offspring.

## Infinity

**Latin:** *infinitus*; *finitus*; *in infinitum*; *absque fine*; *absque termino*; *infinitas*; *immensus*; *innumerabilis*; *innumerus*; *interminatus*; *actu*; *potentia*; *potentia entis*; *potestas*; *contradictio*; *non ens*; *infinita*; *innumerabiles*; potentia infinita; actu infinitas; capacitas; divisio continui; multiplicatio numeri; adaequari

**The word.**

Infinitus and immensus mark what is unbounded or immeasurable; innumerus and innumerabilis concern number; interminatus lacks an assigned terminus. Infinity in act differs from an indefinitely extendable capacity or sequence. The same word can also name indeterminate potency opposed to limit.

Ficino distinguishes qualified or potential infinities from infinity in act. Adaequari means being equal or commensurate with; it does not mean being reduced to a finite measurement.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Infinity has several distinct meanings in the argument. Bodily matter is indefinitely divisible; this does not give any actual body infinite spatial extent. Matter can continue receiving forms, generation can succeed generation, time and motion can proceed, a continuum can be divided, and numbers can be multiplied without an assigned end. Such potential progression or reception differs from God's actual infinity: divine power has no passive or externally imposed limit, and divine understanding knows without completing a sequence of enumeration.

Ficino rejects an infinite regress of derivative causes because it never supplies a sufficient first source, rather than rejecting every kind of infinity. His analogy of one flowing liquid unable finally to contain another explains the need for a stable basis. A first principle requires unlimited power to exist perpetually through itself, and the distance between souls and that source is called infinite, unlike their finite distance toward matter. These are hierarchical and causal comparisons, not distances measured through space. Likewise, the assertion that one infinite is neither broader nor narrower than another belongs to this setting, not a modern classification of mathematical infinities. Angelic abundance described as almost innumerable does not by itself establish an actually infinite population.

The finite intellect's ability to think another number or figure supplies an argument for divine knowledge: God cannot be confined to a fixed total that human thought could surpass, nor have a further capacity left unrealized. God's infinite essence is an inexhaustible exemplar of possible likenesses. But complete knowledge raises an apparent difficulty: if comprehension encloses within limits, can it comprehend the infinite? Ficino distinguishes being bounded by another from perfect self-presence. God knows himself without an external measure restricting him. Infinite multitude can thus be said to be known as finite only with the immediate qualification that it is simple in essence and multiple in a certain respect. The formulation describes unified cognition, not a finite correction of an infinite total.

Divine productive capacity also exceeds the actual world's contents. Whatever involves no contradiction is within the potency of being and subject to divine power. Alternative numbers, magnitudes, and intervals of stars illustrate possibilities absent from the actual order. Realizing some and not others requires free selection; innumerable possible images need not all exist. Contradiction marks what fails to count as a possible being, rather than an independent power competing with God.

Finally, the infinite opposed to limit in Ficino's interpretation of the Philebus is indeterminate potency. God is free of that infinite because he is pure act, without thereby becoming finite in power. Actual divine infinity, receptive indetermination, endlessly extendable thought, and an infinite chain of dependent causes must therefore remain distinct.

The list in II.10.3–4 includes matter's receptivity, progression of motion and time, generational succession, division of a continuum, and multiplication of number. They are different ways an unending continuation is available, not interchangeable physical objects. God must know them and the limitless modes in which the infinite exemplar can be imitated. The response to the comprehension objection then turns on agency: being bounded by another differs from an infinite reality's self-comprehension. Self-adequacy confirms rather than cancels infinity in Ficino's account.

**The places.**

- **II.3.9 (PDF pp. 120–121)**. An endless hierarchy would collapse distinctions of rank and the intelligibility of causes
- **II.4.1 (PDF pp. 122–123)**. Pure act is argued to lack a passive or externally imposed limit
- **II.10.3 (PDF pp. 176–177)**. Potential infinities include reception, succession, motion, and time
- **II.10.10 (PDF pp. 180–181)**. Infinite self-comprehension is distinguished from external bounding and successive enumeration
- **III.1.11 (PDF pp. 246–247)**. The limit–infinite pair is glossed as act–potency

**Further passage references.** I.2.7 (PDF pp. 22–23); I.3.6, I.3.24, I.3.30–I.3.32 (pp. 32–33, 46–47, 50–53); I.5.15, I.5.20, I.5.23–I.5.25 (pp. 70–79); II.3.1–9, pp. 116–121; II.4.1–8, pp. 122–125; II.10.1–12, pp. 176–181; II.12.15–18, PDF 210–213; III.1.9–11, PDF 244–247.

- II.10.3, II.10.4 (PDF pp. 176–177): Five examples distinguish kinds of potential infinity
- II.10.5, II.10.7 (PDF pp. 176–179): The inexhaustible exemplar and human indefinite progress support unlimited divine knowledge
- II.10.8, II.10.9, II.10.10 (PDF pp. 178–181): Self-comprehension is distinguished from external bounding

**In this edition.**

II.10.10 immediately explains “as finite” by simplicity in essence and multiplicity in a certain rational respect. It does not reduce an infinite multitude to a finite count. In III.1.11 the “infinite” interpreted through the Philebus is potency, so God’s freedom from it does not retract active divine infinity.

“Actually infinite things” in II.10.7 concerns the stated scope and actuality of divine cognition. It should not be expanded without argument into an assertion that an actually infinite material universe exists.

**See also.**

Number; Unity and multiplicity; Cause; Perfection; Degree and mediation; Power and potency; Intuition and comprehension; Ideas and exemplars; Choice and free judgment; Freedom and necessity; Nothing and nonbeing

Counting and collective intuition; Intuition and comprehension; Number; Ideas and exemplars.

## Instrument

**Latin:** *instrumentum*; *opifex*; *agens*; *agentia*; *medium*; *media*; *instrumenta*; *artifex*

**The word.**

Instrumentum is a means or tool acting through the power of a principal agent; opifex and artifex name the maker or skilled worker. Medium is an intermediary, not necessarily an inert object. Instrumental dependence is a relation of efficacy, not proof that a subordinate cause does nothing.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

An instrument is a real means of action whose efficacy depends on a principal agent. Its dependence does not make it causally useless. The question is whether its power suffices to account for the whole effect, including the effect's form and ordering. A tool separated from its craftsman does not direct itself toward the intended work, and bodily qualities cannot independently explain the organized generation of living substance.

Book I uses this distinction to analyze fire producing fire. A particular fire is itself an effect before it acts as a producer. Neither another equal fire, the contrary elements, nor a distant heavenly body without an adequate intermediary supplies the sufficient account sought by the argument. Ficino arrives at an incorporeal substance that penetrates bodies, governs them, and employs their qualities as instruments. He does not deny that the qualities act; he denies that their efficacy is self-sufficient or that bare matter independently creates form.

The same relation explains angelic agency in Book II. God gives and preserves the angel's being, capacity, and activity, so God is the more fundamental source of the angel's works and their further effects. This is a causal comparison, not a claim that angel is materially constituted like a tool. Intermediaries nevertheless differentiate effects: one sunlight appears red or green through differently colored windows. God's fundamental agency therefore does not erase subordinate causes. A related argument about divine cognition says that intelligent minds would be unfitting instruments of a first mover wholly devoid of intelligence.

In Book IV, celestial influence requires a proximate living substance to participate in producing substantial life. Heaven also functions as an instrument of divine mind when it prepares bodies for intellectual souls, an effect exceeding heaven's independent bodily power. IV.1.68 adds a more specific premise: instruments through which living beings generate life are themselves alive, and heaven's generative role is taken to imply life. That is an additional biological analogy within Ficino's argument, not part of the word's basic definition.

**The places.**

- **II.7.23 (PDF pp. 154–155)**. God gives and preserves angelic being, power, and action
- **II.7.24 (PDF pp. 154–155)**. The craftsman's tool illustrates the dependence of angelic efficacy
- **II.7.31 (PDF pp. 158–159)**. Colored glass differentiates one light into distinct effects
- **II.9.5 (PDF pp. 166–167)**. Intelligent instruments are used to argue against a mindless first mover

**Further passage references.** I.3.7–I.3.11 (PDF pp. 34–37); I.3.18 (pp. 40–41); II.7.23–25, pp. 154–155; II.7.27–32, pp. 156–159; II.9.5, pp. 166–167; IV.1.3–IV.1.4, pp. 282–283; IV.1.68, pp. 316–317; IV.1.85, pp. 326–327.

**In this edition.**

II.7.24's tamquam, "just as," marks the tool comparison as analogical: angel is not said to be a material implement. II.7.31 retains both the contribution of sunlight and the difference made by particular glass, preserving dependent differentiation rather than autonomous secondary production.

**See also.**

Cause; Quality; Order and harmony; Art and nature; Conservation and preservation; Power and potency; Light and illumination; Intellect and intellection; Substance and accident; Celestial influence; End and limit

## Insults and rebuke

**Latin:** *canes; latrare; taceat; sensu carere; anima caret rationali*

**The word.**

Canes are dogs and latrare barking; these are polemical metaphors when applied to opponents. Carere means lacking, but a rebuke about lacking perception or rational soul need not function as a literal metaphysical classification.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino calls dissenters barking dogs when asserting what he presents as the certain Platonic doctrine of Ideas. The targets remain unnamed in this passage. He later tells Lucretius to be silent and plays on sensus: anyone denying perception to the ordering source is himself said to lack sense. The final sentence of Book III likewise says that someone who fails to recognize the definition of rational soul lacks rational soul. These are rhetorical sanctions attached to contested or concluding claims. They express confidence, impatience, and pressure toward assent; they do not add independent evidence for the claims. In particular, the closing rebuke should not be treated as an exception excluding philosophical opponents from the metaphysical kind whose definition has just been defended.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.22 (Latin PDF p. 192; English PDF p. 193).** The barking-dogs image accompanies the claimed Platonic consensus.
- **II.13.14 (Latin PDF p. 226; English PDF p. 227).** Taceat introduces the address against Lucretius.
- **II.13.19 (Latin PDF p. 228; English PDF p. 229).** A repeated sensus-family rebuke links perception with rational ordering.
- **III.2.30 (Latin PDF p. 278; English PDF p. 279).** The closing denial of rational soul functions as polemical emphasis.

**In this edition.**

The translation retains the sharpness instead of neutralizing the voice. No individual should be identified as one of the “dogs” without additional checked evidence. The ordinary negative verb and its argumentative use both belong in the lexical explanation.

**See also.**

Lucretius; Sense and imagination; Ideas and exemplars; Soul.

## Intellect and intellection

**Latin:** *intellectus*; *intelligibile*; *intellectio*; *intelligentia*; *intelligere*; *intellectualis*; *mens*; *intelligibilis*; *cognitio*

**The word.**

Intellectus can name the intellectual power or knower; intelligibile what is understood; intellectio and intelligentia intellectual apprehension; intelligere its activity. Cognitio is broader and need not designate intellect alone. Mens may be a faculty within soul or a separate intellectual being.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Intellect is the knowing power or knower; the intelligible is what can be understood; intellection is the act of understanding. The related Latin words *intellectus*, *intelligentia*, *mens*, and *cognitio* overlap without identifying three or four consistently separate faculties. Their particular force depends on whether the argument concerns a power, an activity, a separate intellectual being, or a mode of knowing. Cognition has the widest range here and includes sense: Ficino's example of animals possessing cognition without intelligence requires that distinction.

The relation between knower and known is central. Forms become intelligible through separation from matter and its conditions, while still greater independence from matter supports a being's capacity to understand. Ficino reasons from their kinship, not from a claim that any abstraction imagined by a person becomes an independently conscious mind. In the account of completely immaterial forms, intellect and intelligible coincide; nevertheless, angelic mind receives truth and has many intelligible contents. Human soul possesses mind as one power among others and normally knows successively. Its self-knowledge, however, concerns its spiritual essence, so a temporal mode of understanding does not make every object bodily.

The divine case requires a qualification stronger than these differences of degree. God is presented as intellection existing in itself and directed to itself, without an external object or a receiving faculty distinct from his essence. Yet even intellect, intelligible, and intellection are not fully proper names for God. Book II explains that intellectual language applies according to cause rather than form: angel belongs properly to the genus of minds, while God is its source and exceeds it. God is above mind without being ignorant, understanding in a mode above intelligence. The text therefore does not abandon its hierarchy when it attributes knowledge to the One.

Ficino supports that attribution in several ways. Intelligence is a desirable good that cannot be absent from the first Good's perfection; intelligent minds cannot appropriately be instruments of a first mover wholly devoid of intelligence; and maximal separation from matter supports the most exact understanding. Divine being and understanding are identical, and God knows through one power everything available to human sense, imagination, and intellect, as well as every individual and infinitely many possibilities. He acquires no information from external things.

This unified cognition gives the forms and intelligent order required for creation, while will accounts for the production of selected external effects. Book III characterizes rational soul's knowledge of itself, divine things, and bodily things as discursive. Book IV further differentiates faculties: celestial soul's intellectual part possesses ideas simultaneously, while its lowest motive powers unfold productive seeds successively. A statement about soul's characteristic temporal operation must not be made into a blanket denial of

simultaneous intellectual possession within it. The surrounding account of spiritual union explains how its different objects can be apprehended without reducing cognition to material contact. Reading the English word “intelligence” as a measurable personal aptitude would miss its metaphysical range across these passages.

**The places.**

- **I.6.13 (PDF pp. 90–91)**. Even names such as intelligible and intellection are said not to apply to God wholly properly
- **II.9.1 (PDF pp. 164–165)**. Kinship and separation from matter link knowable form with intellectual capacity
- **II.9.12 (PDF pp. 168–169)**. Causal naming qualifies the attribution of intelligence to God
- **II.9.16 (PDF pp. 172–173)**. The hierarchy of sense, imagination, and intellect retains knowledge of individuals
- **IV.2.10 (PDF pp. 338–339)**. Celestial mind possesses ideas together while lower powers hold unrealized seeds

**Further passage references.** I.5.10–I.5.14, I.5.20, I.5.24 (PDF pp. 64–69, 74–77); I.6.4, I.6.7–I.6.13 (pp. 82–91); II.9.1–13, pp. 164–169; II.9.16–20, pp. 172–173; II.10.6–7, pp. 178–179; II.11.11–18, 24–32, PDF 186–197; III.1.12, PDF 248–249; III.2.23–30, PDF 274–279; IV.2.9–IV.2.12, PDF pp. 336–341.

**In this edition.**

II.9.1 explicitly distinguishes intelligenda or intelligibilis, what can be understood, from intelligens, what understands. At II.9.12 intellectual names apply to God “in respect of cause rather than form”; angel is properly mind. Neither the object–subject distinction nor that divine qualification should disappear in English paraphrase.

**See also.**

Mind; Truth; Angel; God; Reason and account; Self knowledge; Sense and imagination; Intuition and comprehension; Matter; Form; Ideas and exemplars; Intuition and discourse; Soul; Spiritual union; Will

## Intellectual and animating powers

**Latin:** *vis gemina*; *mens*; *ratio*; *potentiae infimae motrices corporum*; *vis vivifica et motrix*

**The word.**

Vis and potentia name a power; vivifica and motrix specify life-giving and moving functions. Mens and ratio distinguish intellectual apprehension from the middle reasoning power. These are functional aspects within soul, not detachable extended pieces. Animalis in this setting means animating or belonging to soul.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Cosmic soul combines knowing with vivifying and governing a body. Ficino first distinguishes these two powers and illustrates them through paired divine names. Chapter 2 supplies a finer structure: intellectual mind possesses ideas simultaneously; middle reason follows mind in celestial souls; the lowest motive powers actualize productive seeds successively. The celestial body’s comparatively undemanding administration can be

handled by that lowest power, leaving reason free to be absorbed into mind. Human reason, by contrast, is occupied with the greater demands of bodily administration.

These parts are functional distinctions within an indivisible soul, not detachable spatial components. They explain how soul can participate in stable intellectual life while performing successive acts. They also qualify the general contrast between angel's actuality, soul's habitual possession, and matter's potency. Saying that soul holds its contents without actualizing them all together describes its characteristic grade; the further distinction of faculties allows its intellectual part to possess ideas in actuality while its lowest productive power still acts successively. The reader must attend both to the grade and to the faculty under discussion.

In the associated language, "animal" can mean belonging to soul or animation, rather than bestial or irrational. IV.1.11 connects the vivifying and motive power with natural seeds. The Latin makes that power the recipient which divine wisdom imbues with seeds; the supplied English reverses recipient and content. The Latin-supported relation accords with the later distinction between the intellectual possession of ideas and the motive power's realization of seeds.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.11 (PDF pp. 286–287)**. Intellectual principles imbue the life-giving and motive power with natural seeds
- **IV.1.94 (PDF pp. 330–331)**. The Orphic pairings distinguish knowing from giving life and governing
- **IV.2.10 (PDF pp. 338–339)**. Mind holds ideas actually while lowest powers possess seeds without simultaneous realization
- **IV.2.11 (PDF pp. 338–339)**. Celestial reason is freer from bodily administration than human reason

**Further passage references.** IV.1.11, pp. 286–287; IV.1.31–IV.1.32, pp. 296–299; IV.1.94, pp. 330–331; IV.2.10–IV.2.12, pp. 338–341.

**In this edition.**

At IV.1.11 the Latin makes vim ipsam vivificam et motricem the object of imbuit and naturalibus seminibus its content: wisdom imbues the power with seeds. The supplied English reverses that relationship. Preserve the prior correction. The animalis distinction is confirmed by the apparatus for II.6.14 and II.6.24.

**See also.**

Angel; Habitual possession; Reason and account; Bacchus and the Muses; Animating and animal; Seeds; Soul; Mind

## Intention

**Latin:** *intentio*; *intentione quadam*; *secunda quadam intentione*

**The word.**

Intentio can be an orientation of purpose, but secunda quadam intentione locally means a secondary degree or remove. Its force is determined by the construction: the noun does not invariably signify a person's deliberate choice or an additional act of will.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Intention does not have one fixed sense in these passages. In II.13.8 an end must precede, in intention, the movements directed toward it: the goal belongs to the explanatory ordering before its execution. In IV.2.7, however, soul's dependence on the One secunda quadam intentione is rendered at a certain second remove. The latter concerns a secondary degree of dependence, not a second conscious decision. Both uses require the local construction rather than automatic translation as personal purpose.

**The places.**

- **II.13.8 (PDF pp. 220–221)**. The end precedes movements directed toward it in intention
- **IV.2.7 (PDF pp. 336–337)**. Soul's second remove from unity explains its stable essence and temporal variation

**Further passage references.** II.13.8 (PDF pp.220–221); IV.2.7 (pp.336–337); apparatus p.394

**In this edition.**

The translation gives "in intention" at II.13.8 but "at a certain second remove" at IV.2.7. The difference is explanatory, not inconsistency: one concerns the priority of an end, the other soul's mediated dependence on the One.

**See also.**

End and limit; Order and harmony; Whole and parts; Degree and mediation

## Intuition and comprehension

**Latin:** *intuitus*; *intueri*; *comprehendere*; *cernere*; *intuendo summatim*

**The word.**

Intuitus and intueri designate a gaze or intellectual beholding. Comprehendere can grasp or encompass; the argument tests whether encompassing must impose a bound. Cernere sees or discriminates. Intuendo summatim indicates a gathered act, not an incomplete approximation.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Visual words explain the unity and immediacy of divine knowing. God does not search, enumerate, or move from an important object to a lesser one; he possesses knowledge and sees all in one gaze. Ficino compares this to an eye seeing many stars at once, while recognizing that a sensory comparison does not reproduce God's mode of cognition. The disputed word *comprehendere* is particularly important. An objection says that whatever is comprehended must be bounded and therefore finite. Ficino answers that the infinite would indeed not be encompassed by another, but may comprehend itself: divine self-knowledge is wholly commensurate with divine infinity and does not reduce it. The many are known through one form in one act. When he says infinite multitude is seen "as finite," he immediately explains this as simplicity in essence with multiplicity in a certain rational respect. The formulation describes the mode of divine knowledge, rather than any failure to recognize the extent of what is known.

**The places.**

- **II.9.20 (PDF pp. 172–173)**. God possesses rather than seeks and is not distracted by multiple objects
- **II.9.21 (PDF pp. 174–175)**. One gaze at many stars illustrates simultaneous cognition
- **II.10.8 (PDF pp. 178–179)**. The objection associates being comprehended with being bounded
- **II.10.9 (PDF pp. 178–179)**. Self-comprehension is distinguished from an infinite thing's enclosure by another
- **II.10.10 (PDF pp. 180–181)**. A single form and act encompass what is not counted successively

**Further passage references.** II.9.20–22, pp. 172–175; II.10.8–12, pp. 178–181.

**In this edition.**

"Comprehended" should retain the objection's possible bounding sense until Ficino distinguishes being encompassed by another from infinite self-comprehension. "As finite" in II.10.10 comes with an immediate gloss about simplicity in essence, not a denial of the known plurality's infinity.

**See also.**

Self knowledge; Infinity; Reason and account; Form; Species; Universals and individuals; Intuition and discourse

## Intuition and discourse

**Latin:** *intuitus*; *discursus*; *discurrendo*; *consilium*; *cognoscere*; *speculatio*

**The word.**

Discursus and discurrere can mean movement or ranging through successive acts; they do not chiefly mean conversation here. Intuitus is a unitary intellectual seeing rather than a hunch. Consilium can mean an intelligent plan without the hesitation associated with human deliberation.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Intuition in these passages means an immediate intellectual seeing; discourse is movement through a succession of acts or considerations. It does not mean conversation. When Ficino calls the world's ordering principle "counsel," he expressly says that the word is metaphorical: one thing is made for the sake of another, but the divine craftsman is not uncertainly investigating one thing by means of another. Perfect skill supplies the analogy of action without hesitant deliberation.

Rational soul has the different mode of understanding by discourse. The painter Apelles attends to one plant and then another, although the meadow presents itself all at once. Likewise, soul's temporal activity progressively receives and works through what comes from an undivided higher source. This difference helps explain how an immutable cause can be associated with changing effects without itself passing through the recipient's sequence. Neither "intuition" nor "discourse" should be imported directly from modern popular usage: the first is not mere hunch, and the second is not principally speech. The contrast concerns simultaneity and succession in cognition and action.

The wider word family also describes temporal succession without requiring inferential reasoning. At III.2.21, *discursio* is explicitly opposed to spatial division: soul's activity is divided by a course through time, although its substance is not divided by bodily dimension. This operational use must be distinguished from the more specific account of reasoning from one consideration to another.

**The places.**

- **II.6.22 (PDF pp. 140–141)**. Mind ranges through immensity in its operation within the attributed presence theory
- **II.9.20 (PDF pp. 172–173)**. Divine possession of knowledge differs from searching or diverting attention
- **III.2.23 (PDF pp. 274–275)**. Soul is characterized as understanding through time
- **IV.2.11 (PDF pp. 338–339)**. The account distinguishes motion through time from completion in a moment

**Further passage references.** II.11.18, PDF 190–191; II.13.17–19, PDF 228–229; III.1.28–31, PDF 258–259; III.2.23, 28–30, PDF 274–279; III.2.21, PDF pp. 272–273.

**In this edition.**

At IV.2.11 action passing through intermediaries is called motion; temporal passage and momentary completion distinguish temporal from eternal motion. This broad operational sense should not be confused with every narrower instance of discursive reasoning. The retained prior treatment explains the painter analogy separately.

**See also.**

Art and nature; Intellect and intellection; Motion and stability; Eternity and time; Indivisibility

## John and Amelius

**Latin:** Ioannis apostoli theologia; theologorum omnium divinissimi; Platonicus Amelius; amplectitur; principii rationem; principii rationalis amorem

**The word.**

Ioannis apostoli identifies John the apostle; Amelius is called a Platonist. Amplecti literally evokes embracing and here conveys welcoming or accepting a teaching. Ratio in principii rationem is the reason of the principle, within a theological sequence of principle, reason, and love.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino brings John's theology and Amelius's reception into his identification of unity, truth, and goodness as one divine substance. He aligns unity with principle, truth with the principle's reason, and goodness with the love of the rational principle. He does not introduce three independent first causes. The surrounding inversions, true good unity, one good truth, and one true goodness, insist on the identity of the substance under these descriptions.

The names function as attributed authorities within Ficino's synthesis. The supplied passage gives neither a direct Johannine chapter reference nor a work-title for Amelius. It should not be expanded into a verified history of transmission or a quotation of a specific biblical verse without further evidence.

**The places.**

- II.3.10 (PDF pp. 120–121): John’s theology and Amelius’s acceptance accompany the principle–reason–love alignment

**In this edition.**

The English “gladly embraces” preserves the receptive force of amplectitur. The apparatus (PDF p. 369) explains that the translation makes unitatem vocat passive to avoid imposing an uncertain personal subject after the Johannine parenthesis. “Reason” translates ratio; inserting “Word” as though it were the printed Latin would obscure the difference from verbum in the later mental-presence account.

**See also.**

Principle; Unity and multiplicity; Truth; Word and meaning.

## Kinship and separation

**Latin:** cognatio; capax; proficit; discessus a materia; separari; semotum; seorsum; materiae conditionibus

**The word.**

Cognatio is kinship or affinity; capax means capable of receiving or grasping. Discessus names a departure or separation, and seorsum means apart. In this argument separation concerns the conditions of intelligibility, not merely movement away from a physical object.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino argues that intellect could not receive an intelligible object without some kinship with it. He then connects two claims: separation from matter makes a form intelligible, and more fundamentally freedom from matter makes a thing intelligent. The direction of the argument should remain visible. Becoming available as an object of thought and being a thinking subject are different achievements, even though he traces both to immateriality.

The passage next assigns the most exact understanding to God, who is most remote from matter. “Remote” is not a distance measured beyond the last body. The text explicitly includes thinking things apart from matter and its conditions. It is thus concerned with the mode in which objects are known and with the nature of the knower.

**The places.**

- II.9.1 (PDF pp. 164–165): Kinship links intelligible object and intellect, followed by the argument from separation
- II.9.2 (PDF pp. 164–165): God’s maximal remoteness from matter grounds exact understanding

**In this edition.**

Intelligenda and intelligibilis are locally explained as what can properly be understood; intelligens identifies what understands. Preserving the contrast avoids confusing a comprehensible form with a knowing mind.

**See also.**

Separation and abstraction; Intellect and intellection; Incorporeal and immaterial; Object and adequate object.

## Least natural degree

**Latin:** *gradus minimus naturalis*

**The word.**

Gradus is a degree or rank; minimus the least; naturalis qualifies the degree belonging to natural form. The phrase names a comparatively indivisible point of reference within a kind, not a material atom or an independently explained physical minimum.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

I.3.14 refers natural form to a least natural degree within an argument that each kind rests on something comparatively indivisible. The parallel examples are motion and time referred to an instant, geometrical dimensions to a point, and numbers to unity. This brief expression supports the further inference to indivisible substance. The supplied passage does not give a separate theory of natural minima or identify this degree with a material atom; a lexicon should not supply those additional claims.

**The places.**

- **I.3.14 (PDF pp. 38–39)**. Natural form's least degree is placed beside instant, geometric point, and numerical unity as a basis for the ascent to indivisible substance

**Further passage references.** I.3.14 (PDF pp.38–39)

**In this edition.**

The English "least natural degree" closely follows gradum minimum naturalem. The only cited occurrence is brief and analogical. It does not supply the independent theory of minima that a reader might import from later or external natural philosophy.

**See also.**

Form; Indivisibility; Number; Degree and mediation

## Leisure

**Latin:** *otium*; *otium agere*; *id otium quo … philosophari*; *ex potentia et otio*; *ex otio … in actum*.

**The word.**

Otium is release from a competing occupation, allowing another activity; otium agere means enjoying that freedom. It need not be inactivity. The intellectual use here concerns freedom to philosophize or to attend to higher cognition without bodily administrative labor.

*Otium* has two locally distinct senses: leisure enabling study and inactivity opposed to actual exercise. Neither should be mechanically substituted for the other.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Leisure names freedom for a kind of activity rather than sheer inactivity. In the dedication Ficino credits Lorenzo's beneficence with providing the leisure to philosophize. In IV.2.11, celestial soul's middle faculty is free from bodily labor because the lowest power can govern its nearly needless body; reason can therefore become stable in mind. Human reason is contrasted with this freedom because bodily administration occupies it. The two uses connect intellectual availability with release from competing demands without equating human leisure with celestial life.

In the dedication, leisure is the beneficial condition made possible by Lorenzo's support. In the argument above soul, passing from *otium* to act is a sign of incomplete actuality and dependence on a higher source. The first use praises freedom for philosophy; the second identifies a state to be exceeded in an ontological comparison. Ficino does not thereby condemn scholarly leisure as metaphysical defect.

**The places.**

- **Proem.11 (PDF pp. 10–11)**. Lorenzo's beneficence is credited with making philosophical work possible
- **IV.2.11 (PDF pp. 338–339)**. Celestial reason's release from bodily administration permits stability in mind

**Further passage references.** Proem.11 (PDF pp.10–11); IV.2.11 (pp.338–339)

- **Proem.11, PDF 10–11.** Beneficence enables philosophical leisure
- **I.5.4, PDF 62–63.** Inactivity is contrasted with full and perpetual act

**In this edition.**

Proem.11's "leisure" and IV.2.11's "free from bodily labor" render the same otium family in different constructions. Human patronage and celestial psychic organization are distinct contexts; neither warrants treating leisure as simply doing nothing.

The translation's shift from "leisure" to "inactivity" is necessary, not inconsistent. An English-only reader can use the Latin register to see the common word without losing its contextual difference.

**See also.**

Philosophy and theology; Intellectual and animating powers; Need and sufficiency

Lorenzo, dedication and public authority; Act and operation; Need and sufficiency.

## Life

**Latin:** *vita*; *vivus*; *vivificus*; *vitalis*; *virtus vivifica*; *motus vitalis*; *sine sensu*; *vivere*; *vivificare*; *vis interna movendi*; *vita vivificans corpora*; *vita insita*; *vita vitarum*

**The word.**

Vita is life; vivere living; vivificare giving life; vitalis life-related. Vis interna movendi identifies life as inward power of motion in the argument. Life, sensation, and intelligence are not coextensive: an animate power can nourish or generate without sensing or understanding.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Life is an inward organizing efficacy, not simply bodily heat or visible locomotion. Book I argues that an indivisible power explains how nutrition transforms nonliving food into living form, moves constituents against their ordinary tendencies, and reconciles opposed elements. Ficino extends the comparison from organisms to the universe. Ordered matter points to reason, and reason subsists in life. These are steps in his ascent to incorporeal causation rather than a modern biological definition. I.3.26 explicitly appeals to life existing without sensation, identified by the supplied apparatus as vegetative life: if life can exist without the later capacity of sensing, much more can substance, prior to quantity in

both origin and dignity, exist apart from quantity. Life, sensation, and intellect consequently have different ranges.

The term also names inward operation and its mode of possession. A life united at once is more complete than activity dispersed over successive acts. Soul's distinctive work is vital motion, whereas mind orders through forms, including forms of nonliving things; life and intellectual causality therefore do not have identical ranges. In Book III, life is expressly identified with inward power of motion. Plants and animals illustrate activity from within, and soul, as the first movable nature, possesses such life primarily and communicates it to bodies. Rational soul's definition combines that vivifying power with understanding through time.

Cosmic applications require further distinctions. II.13 argues conditionally that a governing world-life establishes divine providence whether it is God or a subordinate acting under God. Book IV then distinguishes the life that depends upon and governs a sphere from the self-subsistent first life. The former is not God, who stands above derivative lives as life of lives. Angelic lives are intellectual alone; sphere-lives combine intellectual and animating powers. The argument for world-soul presents one living whole as requiring one life and one soul to explain the cooperation of its diverse members.

Life thus extends beyond ordinary biological usage without making every occurrence an identical entity or function. Earth can be animated despite its asserted stillness: its life is manifested in productive activity. Different souls have different bodily relations, and absence of local motion is not equivalent to absence of life. Conversely, describing a cosmic body as living depends on Ficino's stated metaphysical and natural-philosophical premises, not on an independently established modern observation.

**The places.**

- **I.3.26 (PDF pp. 46–47)**. Life without sensation supplies an analogy for substance independent of quantity
- **II.6.5 (PDF pp. 130–131)**. Goodness is argued to have a wider and more fundamental scope than life
- **II.8.3 (PDF pp. 160–161)**. Soul gives bodily life without selecting each act by choice
- **IV.1.22 (PDF pp. 292–293)**. A sphere's dependent life is explicitly distinguished from God
- **IV.2.11 (PDF pp. 338–339)**. Knowing and bodily administration have different places within celestial soul

**Further passage references.** I.3.22–I.3.23, I.3.26 (PDF pp. 44–47); I.5.2, I.5.17 (pp. 60–61, 72–73); I.6.14 (pp. 90–91); II.13.20–24, PDF 230–233; III.1.23, 26, 32, PDF 254–261; III.2.23–30, PDF 274–279; IV.1.1–IV.1.2, pp. 282–283; IV.1.22, pp. 292–293; IV.1.31, pp. 296–297; IV.1.69–IV.1.70, pp. 316–317; IV.1.79–IV.1.84, pp. 322–325.

**In this edition.**

The supplied "life without sensation" at I.3.26 should remain distinct from consciousness. At IV.1.22 life "belonging to another and existing in another" differs from life subsisting in itself. Cosmic uses are Ficino's philosophical claims and attributions, not modern biological classifications.

**See also.**

Seeds; Soul; Order and harmony; Eternity and time; Generation and corruption; Degree and mediation; Motion and stability; Providence; Animating and animal; World soul; Intellectual and animating powers

## Light and illumination

**Latin:** *lumen*; *lux*; *visus*; *oculus*; *acies*; *perspicacia*; *perspectio*; *splendor*; *radii*; *lumen invisibile*; *lumen luminum*; *illuminare*; *illustrare*; *umbra*; *infusio*; *serenior*; *mentis aciem*; *lucida*; *obscura*; *mutatque figuram*; *lux se ipsa videns*.

**The word.**

Lux and lumen both name light; splendor a radiance; radius a ray; illuminare or illustrare the activity of lighting. Visus, oculus, and perspicacia move from sight and eye to insight. The text does not establish an invariant technical division between lux and lumen.

Optical clarity, mental receptivity and divine illumination are connected but not identical senses. *Acies* is the sharp gaze or directed visual power of mind here; *serenior* describes the purified soul as clearer or more serene. *Lux* and *lumen* should be read locally rather than assigned a rigid metaphysical division unsupported by these units.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Light connects reception of truth, purity, causal diffusion, differentiated effects, and presence. The Proem's governing analogy is that minds require God's light as sight requires sunlight. Mind is the eye of soul: it apprehends truth but is not identical with truth. Book I imagines the whole body transformed into an eye to model angelic mind's comprehensive reception without turning from object to object; even then, eye and light remain distinct. Divine self-knowledge exceeds that arrangement and is described as light seeing itself and sight shining by itself, with no separate receptive organ.

The natural and divine uses remain analogical. Sensible light appears in examples of fire and vision, while a comparison of two supposed supreme lights argues for purity: differentiation would require something other than pure light, undermining supremacy. Visible light's diffusion supplies an image of unlimited invisible divine presence, but imagining divine rays as extended lines would falsely put God into bodily space. In the reported theory of universal mental presence, several candles illuminate the same hall while retaining distinct relations to their sources. In the causal argument, one sunlight appears red or green through differently colored windows; intermediaries explain differentiated effects without becoming independent sources. These comparisons serve different purposes rather than forming one physical identification of God with illumination.

Illumination also explains the communication of intellectual form and stable actuality. Angel receives intelligence by illumination; soul receives its stability from divine light while remaining multiple and temporally mutable through its lower grade. The creation-and-illumination account qualifies its priority as being so in a certain sense, so the reception should not automatically become an ordinary elapsed-time process in an otherwise immovable angel.

The Sun–Mercury–Moon analogy distinguishes an unchanged source from different modes of reception. The sun corresponds to God; Mercury, said to receive all its light completely, to angel; and the moon's changing reception over time to soul. Ficino extends the comparison of Mercury to the superlunary stars. These astronomical assertions belong to his historical illustration. At III.2.8, sunlight's continuing attachment to its source while

filling what lies below further illustrates soul's simultaneous relation to higher and lower realities.

Shadow emphasizes derivative limitation. God's shadow is explained as being beneath God, not a literal dark substance or an independent evil principle. Soul's vital shadow names life communicated throughout bodily division, not a soul cut into spatial pieces. Both *lux* and *lumen* occur in the related accounts, without a rigid distinction established by these passages. Their meaning, like that of vision and shadow, must be determined from the explanatory relation at issue.

The Proem's sunlight analogy makes knowing dependent on divine illumination; purification prepares reception. The Magi's riddle then distinguishes an entirely luminous thing, an entirely obscure thing and a mixed middle. Ficino supplies both a bodily mapping, star/air/moon, and a spiritual one, mind/irrational soul/rational soul. The rational soul's changing reception is compared with the moon's changing figure, whereas the angel always shines fully in the same manner with its sun's light. At the final ascent, the "light seeing itself" phrase deliberately cancels the separation of organ and light that characterized created mind. These are different uses within one developing argument.

**The places.**

- **I.6.12 (PDF pp. 88–89)**. Light seeing itself and sight shining express divine self-knowledge without a separate organ
- **II.6.11 (PDF pp. 132–133)**. Visible diffusion illustrates invisible presence, while absence emphasizes dependence
- **II.6.24 (PDF pp. 142–143)**. Distinct candlelights model the authorities' account of minds without confusion
- **II.7.31 (PDF pp. 158–159)**. Colored windows model differentiated effects through intermediaries
- **II.10.12 (PDF pp. 180–181)**. One-colored light imagined as every-colored illustrates an inexhaustible source

**Further passage references.** Proem.1–Proem.4 (PDF pp. 6–7); I.1.2, I.1.6 (pp. 14–17); I.2.5, I.2.13 (pp. 20–25); I.5.14 (pp. 68–69); I.6.7–I.6.13 (pp. 86–91); II.2.5–6, pp. 106–107; II.6.11–14, pp. 132–137; II.6.24, pp. 142–143; II.7.31, pp. 158–159; II.9.13, pp. 168–169; II.10.11–12, pp. 180–181; II.11.30, PDF 196–197; III.1.12, 17–19, 31–32, PDF 248–261; III.2.8, 19, PDF 266–273.

- **Proem.1–2, PDF 6–7.** Illumination and purification establish the programme
- **I.1.6, PDF 16–17.** Mind's purified gaze is directed toward the divine sun
- **I.5.14, PDF 68–69.** The riddle receives bodily and spiritual interpretations
- **I.6.12, PDF 88–89.** Divine self-seeing exceeds the eye's reception of another's light

**In this edition.**

Keep the optical examples distinct: visible light's spread, imagined divine rays, candlelight co-presence, and colored-window differentiation explain different relations. The II.6.14–24 candle theory remains attributed. At II.10.12 "so to speak" qualifies the description of light as unicolor.

"Changes its form" in the moon analogy renders *mutatque figuram* and concerns the figure of reception in the comparison; it should not casually become a change in the rational

soul’s substantial essence. The cosmological descriptions are Ficino’s model, not contemporary astronomy.

**See also.**

Truth; Mind; God; Image and likeness; Sense and imagination; Purity and mixture; Omnipresence and place; Instrument; Form; Species; Power and potency; Indivisibility; Motion and stability

Eye and imagined enlargement; Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Purity and mixture.

## Looking and recognizing

**Latin:** *intueri; cernere; inspicere; animadvertere; agnoscere; suspicere; augurari*

**The word.**

These verbs span looking at, discerning, attending to, recognizing, looking upward, and divining or dimly apprehending. Their subjects and objects determine whether the attention is sensory, intellectual, or a metaphorical orientation toward higher realities.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The painter inspects one flower and then another; rational soul, in the parallel, thinks of or in some manner divines God and angel through a continuing light. Auguratur makes that latter description more qualified than a claim of exhaustive vision. Later, soul’s return into itself yields animadvertit, apprehension of itself and its contents; Ficino draws the inference from apprehension to cognition and from recognition of spiritual essence to intellection. The object’s character is crucial to that step. In the final vision example, a solid thing placed directly on the eyes prevents seeing, whereas an image joined through spirit permits it. Contact and cognition are thus distinguished even when the same broad looking-language extends across levels.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.1.28 (Latin PDF p. 258; English PDF p. 259).** Inspection of flowers exemplifies successive attention.
- **III.1.31 (Latin PDF p. 258; English PDF p. 259).** Cogitat sive auguratur qualifies soul’s apprehension of higher beings.
- **III.2.28 (Latin PDF p. 276; English PDF p. 277).** Apprehending, recognizing, and understanding form an explicit inference.
- **III.2.29 (Latin PDF p. 278; English PDF p. 279).** Sight’s relation to an image contrasts with gross contact.

**In this edition.**

“Divines” for auguratur need not introduce fortune-telling in this context. The delicate printed phrase in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque in III.2.29 remains unresolved; cognitive vocabulary does not authorize silently changing corporalibus to incorporalibus. The apparatus (PDF p. 387) explains animadvertit as “apprehends” and species/rationes as “forms and principles”; those glosses are not a collation resolving the delicate Latin phrase.

**See also.**

Intuition and comprehension; Self knowledge; Spiritual union; Apelles and the meadow.

## Lorenzo, dedication and public authority

**Latin:** *magnanime Laurenti*; *dedicandum*; *beneficio tuo*; *otium*; *officio*; *summa in rebus publicis auctoritate*.

**The word.**

*Laurenti* is the vocative used to address Lorenzo. *Magnanimus* praises greatness of spirit. *Beneficium* is a benefit or act of beneficence; *officium* a service or duty; *auctoritas* authority or standing. *Res publicae* here are public affairs. The vocabulary constructs a relationship between dedication, support and civic esteem.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino opens and closes the Proem by addressing Lorenzo. He says the dedication is not needed to acquaint an ignorant patron with philosophy: Lorenzo is praised as already possessing unusual understanding. Ficino instead credits his beneficence with providing leisure for philosophical work. The dedication repays a benefit through an authorial duty and is presented as something Plato would welcome, because Lorenzo is said to unite philosophy with the highest authority in public affairs. These are Ficino's encomiastic claims about the dedicatee. The passage alone does not establish a formal constitutional title, prove the justice of Lorenzo's political position, or make every philosophical judgement in the book the patron's own.

**The places.**

- **Proem.1, PDF 6–7.** The direct address places the opening account of Plato within a dedication
- **Proem.11, PDF 10–11.** Philosophical attainment, beneficence, leisure, duty and public authority are joined

**In this edition.**

"Magnanimous Lorenzo" preserves the address; the prior name directory identifies the dedicatee as Lorenzo de' Medici. "Authority in public affairs" follows the broad Latin more closely than an invented office name. *Otium* means the supported leisure enabling study here, unlike the inactivity contrasted with act in I.5.4.

**See also.**

Leisure; Philosophy and theology; Governing, serving and dominion.

## Love and pleasure

**Latin:** *amare*; *dilectio*; *diligere*; *voluptas*; *quies voluntatis in bono*; *dilatatio voluntatis in bonum*

**The word.**

Amare and diligere mean loving; dilectio love or attachment; voluptas pleasure. The relevant pleasure is described through will's expansion toward and repose in good. Frui means enjoying or possessing the use of good; none of these words is restricted here to bodily gratification.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Love in these chapters is an intellectual or appetitive embrace of goodness. Pleasure is the will's expansion toward, and repose in, good. Ficino uses this connection to argue that perfect divine cognition must not be imagined as an affectless awareness without enjoyment. God wills and loves his own goodness, and from that love extends love to his images and works.

The craftsman and father illustrate degrees of attachment to one's production: God loves his works more fully because he has received neither their form nor their matter from another. This divine love leads directly to providence, the willing and preserving of their good. The language should not be reduced either to bodily pleasure or to changing human passions. Ficino qualifies divine desire as occurring in God's own manner and identifies being, understanding, and willing in God. These terms therefore express the perfection and efficacy of divine good rather than need, deprivation, or dependence on a beloved object outside God.

**The places.**

- **II.9.2 (PDF pp. 164–165)**. Intelligence is desirable because it allows enjoyment of self and other things
- **II.11.30 (PDF pp. 196–197)**. Divine will embraces its present good and connects outward production with goodness
- **II.13.1 (PDF pp. 216–217)**. Divine self-pleasure and self-love lead to love of images and works

**Further passage references.** II.11.30–38, PDF 196–201; II.12.4–7, PDF 202–205; II.13.1–3, PDF 216–217.

**In this edition.**

"Pleasure" or "love" should not import a fluctuating human passion into a passage that identifies divine being, knowing, and willing. In II.13.1 the paired amat and diligit connect self-love with love of images and works. Frui at II.9.2 describes the good of intellectual enjoyment.

**See also.**

Affect; Appetite and desire; Good and goodness; Providence; Will

## Lucretius

**Latin:** *Lucretius Epicureus; Lucreti; taceat; casu; consilium*

**The word.**

Lucretius Epicureus identifies the author as Epicurean; Lucreti is direct address. Taceat, "let him be silent," opens an adversarial exchange. Casu and consilium frame the disagreement as chance against purposive direction.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Following the Florentine mechanism, Ficino tells Lucretius to be silent and represents his position as deriving stable, beautiful order from unstable absence of order. He then addresses him with questions about aimless travel, stone-handling, organic structures, and the world's regularity. The apparent dialogue is an authorial apostrophe, not a report of an encounter. Its examples ask whether human activity without a plan would achieve the

coordination Ficino finds in nature. The closing “let us confess” presses the opponent toward providential life and intelligence. This identifies the polemical role of the name, but the passage supplies neither a detailed exposition of Epicurean mechanisms nor a quotation from Lucretius sufficient to settle whether Ficino represents them fairly.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.13.14 (Latin PDF p. 226; English PDF p. 227).** The name and command introduce the polemic against chance.
- **II.13.15 (Latin PDF p. 226; English PDF p. 227).** Direct questions compare aimless movement and unplanned building.
- **II.13.20 (Latin PDF p. 230; English PDF p. 231).** The apostrophe concludes with a demanded concession to providence.

**In this edition.**

The vocative should remain visible as address. The historical and doctrinal report is Ficino’s characterization; a reading companion should not restate it as an independently established account of everything Lucretius argued.

**See also.**

Chance; Wonder and familiarity; Architect, house and decoration; Insults and rebuke.

## Manichaeans and Gnostic philosophers

**Latin:** Manichaeis Gnosticisque philosophis; bonorum omnium auctor; summum malum; omni bono privatum

**The word.**

The two group-names occur in the dative after assentiendum: the reader is told not to assent to them. Auctor means source or producer here. The opposed “supreme evil” is defined by privation of every good within the position Ficino attacks.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino concludes the two-god argument by naming Manichaean and Gnostic philosophers as advocates of two divine sources, one of goods and one of evils. He then tests a wholly evil first principle. Since existence, life, knowledge, and activity are counted as goods, something lacking every good could not possess any of them. It would therefore lack the ability to function as a rival creator at all.

The entry records the polemical role of these names in Ficino’s exposition. The few lines do not establish a complete account of either historical tradition, nor do they show that every person called Gnostic held the same teaching. His generalized attribution and his inference from absolute privation should remain distinguishable.

**The places.**

- II.2.14 (PDF pp. 112–113): The named groups appear at the conclusion of the argument about rival wills
- II.2.15 (PDF pp. 114–115): The proposed evil source loses action, knowledge, life, and being because all are goods

**In this edition.**

The translation preserves the scope “philosophers” and the claim that there are two gods. The continuation in II.2.15 begins “Of these,” so it must be read with the preceding unit rather than as a freestanding assertion of two gods.

**See also.**

Good and goodness; Nothing and nonbeing; God; Agreement and hypothetical concession.

## Matter

**Latin:** *materia*; *materia prima*; *subiectum informe*; *subiectum*; *capacitas*; *patiens*; *prima et informis … materia*; *materia mundi*

**The word.**

Materia is the receptive material principle, not simply all visible objects. Subiectum names an underlying recipient or bearer; capacitas its receptivity; patiens that which undergoes or receives. Materia prima is primary matter without a prior material subject from which it is made.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Matter is the receptive subject of forms, rather than merely the collection of visible physical objects. Prime matter is common and formless, equally disposed in itself toward different forms and unable to produce the form it lacks. An intrinsic form-producing power would make it something other than prime matter in this sense. The word *subiectum* marks what receives and supports a form, not the modern knowing subject. Because the material basis is common, differing natural effects require distinct forms and qualities rather than being explained by matter’s commonness alone.

In an account attributed to Mercury Trismegistus and Timaeus, matter is not nothing but next to nothing: its low rank expresses primary, unlimited receptivity. It is nevertheless good insofar as it desires form, can receive goodness, and belongs to a good world. Material dependence and quantitative extension must remain distinguishable, particularly in Ficino’s reports of celestial bodies that have dimension without matter in the relevant sense. The claims that prime matter is everlasting and that matter is caused and preserved by prior incorporeal form likewise concern different questions, duration and dependence, and should not be silently collapsed.

Book II locates prime matter under God’s creative and preserving causality. God borrows no prior subject from another maker. Ficino pairs matter in bodies with essence in spirits when discussing direct divine production, but does not thereby turn spiritual essence into bodily material. A receiving subject can limit an act through its potency; God’s self-subsisting actuality has no such limitation. In cognition, freedom from matter and its conditions makes form intelligible. Matter’s indefinite receptivity also exemplifies potential infinity, not an already complete collection of infinitely many actual bodies. The *capacitas* imagined in discussion of divine presence has a different use: it names pure, unbounded capacity in thought and must not automatically be equated with prime matter.

Book IV invokes one common formless matter beneath the differentiated spheres in its argument for a corresponding world-soul. World-matter is one substance distributed through multiple places and moments, whereas soul’s unity is nonspatial. Matter possesses forms potentially and receives them successively, unlike actuality or habitual possession. IV.2.20 describes this receptivity appetitively: matter desires all forms as perfections, but

mutually contrary forms cannot coexist, so change provides successively what cannot be had together. The claim does not confer soul's intelligence or independent agency on matter. Its readiness to receive and be moved complements soul's power to move, while formed bodily spheres remain distinguishable from their common underlying matter.

**The places.**

- **I.3.19 (PDF pp. 42–43)**. The reported formless matter is maximally receptive but not nothing
- **II.4.5 (PDF pp. 124–125)**. Pure nonbeing has no capacity waiting to receive actuality
- **II.4.6 (PDF pp. 124–125)**. Primary matter is continually produced or preserved without an older subject
- **II.6.5 (PDF pp. 130–131)**. The first recipient contrasts with the first agent
- **IV.2.20 (PDF pp. 344–345)**. Matter receives contrary forms successively because it cannot possess all together

**Further passage references.** I.2.1, I.2.6–I.2.9 (PDF pp. 18–23); I.3.6, I.3.18–I.3.19, I.3.27–I.3.29 (pp. 32–33, 40–43, 48–51); I.5.9 (pp. 64–65); I.6.11, I.6.14 (pp. 88–91); II.4.1–8, pp. 122–125; II.6.2, pp. 128–129; II.6.5, pp. 130–131; II.6.12, pp. 132–133; II.6.15, pp. 136–137; II.9.1, pp. 164–165; II.10.3, pp. 176–177; IV.1.81, pp. 324–325; IV.2.5–IV.2.9, pp. 334–337; IV.2.19–IV.2.20, pp. 344–345.

**In this edition.**

The translation distinguishes "not nothing, but next to nothing" at I.3.19. In II.6.5 primum patiens is "first recipient," as the supplied apparatus explains, not a medical patient or an emotional sufferer. Reception is not sheer nonexistence, and creation from nothing presupposes no such recipient.

**See also.**

Form; Substance and accident; Quantity and dimension; Good and goodness; Incorporeal and immaterial; Creation; Act and operation; Power and potency; Infinity; Essence and substance; Intellect and intellection; Whole and parts; Appetite and desire; Habitual possession; World soul

## Measure and degree

**Latin:** *mensura*; *ratio mensuraque idealis*; *gradus*; *intervallum*; *propinquior*

**The word.**

Mensura is measure or standard; gradus a step, degree, or rank; ratio can supply the account or standard of comparison. These terms measure excellence, causal scope, or participation as well as quantity. A graded hierarchy is not necessarily a measurable spatial ladder.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino's comparative vocabulary presupposes an ultimate measure of value. He asks why soul is judged better than body and answers that it is nearer supreme goodness. If there were no highest good, only an endless ascent, body and soul would each be infinitely distant from the supposed summit; no ideal measure would remain by which the one could be preferred. His inference depends on comparing levels of perfection by their relation to a highest good. Degrees also organize power and perfection. A finite effective power is

bounded to certain degrees through a recipient or limiting cause, while pure divine power is not. Conversely, finite imitations of the infinite exemplar never exhaust all degrees or modes of likeness. The word group thus serves two connected purposes: comparing beings within a hierarchy and explaining why the first source exceeds any finite ranking. “Nearness” here describes likeness and perfection rather than a distance through physical space.

**The places.**

- **II.3.4 (PDF pp. 118–119)**. Soul’s superiority to body is framed through nearness to supreme goodness
- **II.3.5 (PDF pp. 118–119)**. An endless deferred summit would remove the ideal measure for ranking
- **II.4.1 (PDF pp. 122–123)**. Power considered as power includes no fixed number of degrees
- **II.10.5 (PDF pp. 176–177)**. Further modes of finite likeness leave the infinite exemplar inexhausted

**Further passage references.** II.3.3–6, pp. 116–119; II.3.9, pp. 120–121; II.4.1–5, pp. 122–125; II.10.5, pp. 176–177.

**In this edition.**

At II.3.5 “ideal standard and measure” renders ratio mensuraque idealis. The passage’s comparison of infinite intervals belongs to Ficino’s metaphysical argument, not a modern theory of numerical infinities. “Degree” in II.4 names conceivable efficacy rather than an empirically assigned unit.

**See also.**

Perfection; Good and goodness; Infinity; Order and harmony; Ideas and exemplars; Degree and mediation

## Mind

**Latin:** *mens*; *mens humana*; *mens angelica*; *mens in anima*; *spiritus rationalis*; *mentes angelicae*; *mentes animales*; *per immensum*

**The word.**

Mens names intellectual mind, but can designate a power of soul, an embodied intellectual subject, or an independently subsisting angelic mind. Spiritus rationalis means rational spirit. Animalis in mens animalis marks an animating or soul-mind rather than a merely nonhuman animal mind.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The Latin *mens* is not always interchangeable with *anima*. The Proem can speak broadly of human minds, but the later analysis makes mind the highest part or eye of soul. Soul also has powers of imagination, sensation, generation, and bodily government, and is therefore not wholly mind. Ficino reasons from its partial possession of intelligence toward a higher being that is mind wholly and alone. Angel supplies that model, though it still receives truth and goodness from above.

A human intellectual faculty, the embodied subject possessing it, and a separate intellectual being are consequently distinct uses or applications within the discussion.

Even incorporeal human mind operates under the conditions of an embodied soul and normally looks toward sensible things. Nor does mind have a uniform causal efficacy at every level: human understanding cannot produce every external effect or command every effective power of its soul merely by thinking. Ficino uses this limitation to argue for a more powerful intellectual cause above it. Translating every mind as soul, or every soul as mind, would conceal that transition.

Differences within soul must also remain visible. Book IV distinguishes the celestial soul's intellectual possession of ideas together from the successive actualization of seeds in its lower animating power. Its middle reason can be absorbed into mind because the lowest power suffices to administer its perfect body; human reason remains more occupied with bodily demands. The temporal activity characteristic of soul therefore does not mean that every one of its powers must exercise every content successively.

A separate excursus in II.6.14–24 attributes to Anebon, Abamon, Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Julian the claim that every angelic or animating mind is wholly present throughout immensity without mutual confusion. Rational spirits, on that theory, have neither dimensions nor attachment to a determinate dimension; their activity reaches immeasurable objects and their essential inclination reaches God. Several candles filling one hall illustrate distinct sources whose illumination shares a space. Particular operations can be more manifest in particular regions: angelic minds govern and animating minds vivify. A mind might mistake its principal sphere of operation for its limit, as philosophers can locate themselves in the heart.

Ficino explicitly closes this as their account before returning to God. The attribution prevents the excursus from becoming an unqualified statement that every soul is demonstrably omnipresent. Here *animales* means animating or belonging to soul, not exclusively nonhuman animal.

**The places.**

- **I.5.16 (PDF pp. 70–71)**. Embodied minds are contrasted with separated intellectual beings
- **II.6.14 (PDF pp. 136–137)**. The named priests and Platonists introduce a theory of all minds present through immensity
- **II.6.24 (PDF pp. 142–143)**. Localized manifestation, candlelights, and heart-belief close the attributed theory
- **II.9.12 (PDF pp. 168–169)**. Angel is properly mind while divine naming is qualified
- **IV.2.10 (PDF pp. 338–339)**. The intellectual part of celestial soul differs from its lower motive powers

**Further passage references.** Proem.1, Proem.7 (PDF pp. 6–9); I.5.10–I.5.17 (pp. 64–73); I.6.7–I.6.13 (pp. 86–91); II.6.14–24, pp. 136–143; IV.2.9–IV.2.12, PDF pp. 336–341.

**In this edition.**

The apparatus confirms animalem and animales as animating rather than bestial. The universal-presence account begins with named authorities in II.6.14, is introduced as "their position" in II.6.15, and ends "So much for their account of mind" in II.6.24. That attribution is structurally indispensable.

**See also.**

Soul; Intellect and intellection; Angel; Sense and imagination; Truth; Omnipresence and place; Light and illumination; Essence and substance; Eternity and time; Intellectual and animating powers; Habitual possession

## Motion and stability

**Latin:** *motus*; *motio*; *mobilis*; *immobilis*; *status*; *stabilitas*; *quies*; *fluere*; *manare*; *emanare*; *effluxus*; *fluxus*; *fluitare*; *cardo*; *immutabilis*; *stabilis*; *stare*; *manere*; *moveri*; *mobilis per se*; *se movens*; *fons et principium motionis*; *operatio temporalis*; *mobile per se ipsum*; *per aliud mobilis*; *motor immobilis*; *movetur propter statum*; *stat in motu*; *norma*; *secundum … species*.

**The word.**

Motus and motio mean motion or change; movere moving; mutare alteration; status or stabilitas abiding stability. Changes of place, quality, being-mode, and successive operation are distinct. Stable essence can coexist with changing action; divine stability also differs from an angel's received stability.

*Status* can mean stability or a stable condition. *Stare* does not everywhere mean the cessation of motion. The kind of motion is specified locally: change of substance, quantity, quality or place differs from the succession of thought.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Motion includes change of place, generation and corruption, increase and decrease of intensity, and successive activity such as thinking or self-formation. Stability may concern an underlying substance, an intellectual possession, an unwavering power, a regular pattern, or an ultimate source and end. The relevant respect must always be specified. Quality changes in essence, power, and operation; soul is stable in essence, mobile in operation, and partly stable and partly changeable in power. The claim in I.3.33 that soul is not subject to motion concerns the indivisible substance then under discussion, not a denial of its subsequent thoughts and acts.

Ficino argues that change itself requires stability: the changing subject must persist, and an enduring pattern of movement needs a stable moving power. Celestial revolutions are his principal cosmic example. Angelic immobility includes simultaneous intellectual comprehension, not inactivity; an unmoved mover can act. God is immovable because he lacks no better state, has no superior mover, is everywhere, and is perfectly simple. Angel receives fullness and stability from God rather than grounding them independently. To stand, in the relevant metaphysical sense, is to remain in the unity of one's nature.

At III.1.28, motion is an act running through successive moments of time, contrasted with an immediate act that has effects without undergoing temporal succession. Book IV extends the terminology in a qualified way: an action passing through intermediates toward an end is called temporal motion when it unfolds in time and eternal motion when accomplished in a moment. This later formulation must not disappear under a blanket assertion that every occurrence of motion necessarily takes elapsed time. The same care applies within celestial soul: its intellectual power possesses ideas simultaneously, while its lowest motive powers bring productive seeds into act successively.

Self-motion identifies soul as the first movable nature and the inward source of its own temporal operation. It is not a claim that soul is uncreated or independent of God. The Apelles example distinguishes external beginning and end from internal unfolding: the

meadow presents itself and prompts the desire to paint, while the painter's soul supplies the gradual sequence of attention and representation. Higher realities similarly provide soul's origin and object, while its own nature supplies the temporal manner of response. Soul bridges wholly stable beings and bodies moved through others. It is a fountain because it possesses motion inwardly and a principle because it communicates movement; animated bodies display an image of that capacity.

Book IV's physical arguments maintain these distinctions. Heat produces heat, cold produces cold, and heaviness or lightness tends in a particular direction. A quality tied to bodily position does not independently reverse and return upon itself. Ficino contrasts this limited agency with heaven's returning, uniform motion and varied effects, inferring a nonextended living power. The conclusion depends on his account of qualities and celestial behavior, not a general proposition that every curved trajectory proves consciousness. Apparently unprompted bodily movement is also not sufficient evidence of independent self-motion: iron is drawn by a magnet, and displaced stones are explained through the soul of their sphere.

Flowing words have a related but distinct role. They can signify derivation from a source or the instability of what does not possess being through itself. If all causes merely derived from others, Ficino argues, no stable ground for unity, likeness, order, or restoration would remain; one flowing liquid cannot finally contain another equally flowing liquid. Yet procession from God is not dissolution or physical leakage. Things are enfolded in unity, unfolded in truth, poured forth through goodness, and returned through those same principles. Their continuing dependence, expressed elsewhere as the danger of flowing away into nothing without conservation, does not deny their actual existence.

Finally, circular bodily motion can imitate stability by remaining in place while revolving. Celestial soul participates in repose through mind even as lower powers remain active. The moved mover still depends on the stable first source and end with which Book IV closes. Motion need not signify disorder, and stability need not signify inertness; the hierarchy connects their different forms without making them identical.

I.5.8 explains its own paradox. A thing "moves for the sake of stability" because its moving power must remain vigorous; it "stands in motion" by preserving the same, an equal or a similar pattern. The explanation concerns causal continuity and regularity, not the claim that a spatially moving thing occupies one fixed point. The surrounding discussion distinguishes the matter persisting through substantial change from the substance persisting through changes of quantity, quality or place. An account that makes soul wholly outside every kind of motion on the strength of I.3.33 must be qualified by I.4–5, where stable essence coexists with changing operation.

**The places.**

- **I.4.1 (PDF pp. 54–55)**. Quality changes in essence, power, and temporally extended action
- **I.5.1 (PDF pp. 60–61)**. Soul retains essence and natural power while thoughts and acquired powers vary
- **II.7.8 (PDF pp. 146–147)**. Higher bodily change is clarified as change of being-mode
- **III.1.23 (PDF pp. 254–255)**. Soul is first movable through itself between stable mind and externally moved body
- **IV.2.11 (PDF pp. 338–339)**. Temporal and eternal motion differ by time versus momentary completion

**Further passage references.** I.3.33 (PDF pp. 52–53); I.4.1–I.4.5 (pp. 54–59); I.5.1–I.5.10, I.5.18–I.5.20 (pp. 60–65, 72–75); I.6.1–I.6.3 (pp. 82–83); II.3.3, pp. 116–117; II.3.7–10, pp. 118–121; II.5.2, pp. 126–127; II.7.7–9, pp. 146–147; II.7.23, pp. 154–155; II.12.15, PDF 210–211; III.1.5–8, 13–22, PDF 240–253; III.2.2, PDF 262–263; III.1.16–32, PDF 250–261; III.2.1–3, 23–30, PDF 262–279; IV.1.53–IV.1.70, pp. 308–317; IV.1.74–IV.1.77, pp. 320–323; IV.2.11–IV.2.12, pp. 338–341; IV.2.27, pp. 350–351; IV.1.64–IV.1.65, pp. 314–315; IV.1.87, pp. 326–327; IV.2.6–IV.2.12, pp. 336–341; IV.2.18, pp. 342–343; IV.2.23–IV.2.27, pp. 346–351.

- **I.4.5, PDF 58–59.** Essence, power and operation receive different kinds of stability
- **I.5.7–9, PDF 62–65.** Ficino explicitly explains stability in motion and the subject preserved through change

**In this edition.**

The triad essentia, virtus, actio in I.4.1 must remain explicit because quality changes in all three respects. At IV.2.11 “eternal motion” means passage completed in a moment, not simply endless clock-time. The clarification “mode of being” in II.7.8 corrects the preceding compressed wording.

The supplied I.5.9 reads *dum admittit statum* and translates “when it admits a state of rest.” The supplied apparatus explains this as a state of rest: a thing without persistence loses motion rather than changes while resting (PDF 362). Preserve that supplied reading and explanation; do not silently substitute a conjecture about “losing” stability. The clear preceding argument is that total lack of persistence would preclude continued motion.

**See also.**

Act and operation; Eternity and time; Soul; Angel; Order and harmony; Principle; Conservation and preservation; Unity and multiplicity; Good and goodness; Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity; Circularity and return; Degree and mediation; Number; Through itself and through another; Natural motion and natural place; End and limit; Intellectual and animating powers; Procession and return

Permanence and the hour test; Eternity and time; Act and operation.

## Naming and defining

**Latin:** *appellamus*; *vocatur*; *nuncuparetur*; *nominatur*; *definitionem*; *haud propria omnino ratione*.

**The word.**

*Appellare*, *vocare*, *nominare* and *nuncupare* name or call something; they do not invariably announce a strict definition. *Definitio* explicitly introduces a definition. *Propria ratione* concerns whether a name applies in its proper sense.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino marks a convention when he says that “in Platonic usage” every form divided in body is called quality. He separately reports that natural philosophers often call form act. Later the form attributed to Proclus is explicitly defined as that by which something exists and acts distinctly and actually; the argument examines what is and is not included in that wording. The naming of rational soul is prospective: the third essence “we shall call” rational soul receives fuller treatment later. At the top of the ascent, naming becomes qualified. Some prefer “intelligible” or “intellection” to “intellect” for God, but Ficino adds

that even these do not apply altogether properly. A useful lexicon must therefore retain the difference between a local convention, an attributed definition, a promised identification and a deliberately imperfect divine name.

**The places.**

- **Proem.3, PDF 6–7.** Ficino explains why Plato was called divine and his teaching theology
- **I.3.1, PDF 28–29.** Platonic “quality” and the natural philosophers’ “act” are marked usages
- **I.3.28, PDF 48–49.** Proclus’s definition of form is tested for its implications
- **I.3.33, PDF 52–53.** The third essence is named before the promised fuller account
- **I.6.13, PDF 90–91.** The names applied to God receive an explicit propriety qualification

**In this edition.**

English “call” can hide different speech acts. *Haud propria omnino ratione* must not disappear when the divine names are indexed, and “as I might put it” in I.3.4 similarly signals a qualified description rather than an unconditional new definition.

**See also.**

Form; Quality; Intellect and intellection; Proof, signs and qualification.

## Naming by cause

**Latin:** nomen tribuimus; appellationes; secundum causam; per formam; proprie; mens mentium; lumen luminum

**The word.**

Tribuere a name is to attribute it; appellationes are designations. Secundum causam means with respect to cause, in contrast here to per formam, according to the form itself. Proprie marks the application regarded as proper or strict.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

After arguing that God understands, Ficino qualifies the names intellect and intelligence. Angel is properly mind; God is above the genus of minds. Calling God mind therefore need not classify him as another member of that genus. He is “mind of minds” and “light of lights,” the source of the perfection named.

The qualification neither retracts divine knowledge nor simply makes it ordinary creaturely cognition magnified. The next sentence says God understands in a mode above intelligence and proceeds to argue that he knows individual things. This lexical caution should govern every later use of “divine mind”: the author can use the name while denying that its mode is exactly the one found in an angel or human intellect.

**The places.**

- II.9.6 (PDF pp. 166–167): Cognition is affirmed as intelligence or something higher than intelligence
- II.9.12, II.9.13 (PDF pp. 168–169): Causal naming is distinguished from the form proper to angelic mind

**In this edition.**

The supplied “in respect of cause rather than form” retains the explicit contrast. It should not be replaced by an unexplained modern theological label as though that label were Ficino’s wording.

**See also.**

God; Intellect and intellection; Mind; Common and proper.

## Natural motion and natural place

**Latin:** *motus naturalis*; *locus naturalis*; *restitutio*; *ascensus*; *descensus*; *cardo*; flammula; concavum; evolaret; frueretur; scopus; instinctu; nititur

**The word.**

Motus naturalis is a motion fitting a thing’s natural order; locus naturalis its proper place. Restitutio returns a displaced thing, while ascensus and descensus describe upward and downward paths. Cardo is the axis or pivot of circular movement in the relevant cosmological model.

Flammula is a little flame; concavum a hollow or concavity; evolare to fly up or away. Scopus is an aim, and frui to enjoy or have the use of something. Here natural orientation is extended by analogy to mind’s goal.

The local vocabulary includes *cancelli*, *trames*, *restitutio*, *annixus*, *in praecipitium*: bounds, path, restoration, pressing effort, and downward precipice make the argument’s spatial distinctions concrete.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino distinguishes a body’s proper circuit within its own sphere from its straight-line return after displacement. Ascent and descent are therefore called restorations to natural place and motion, rather than natural motion in the strict sense. The sphere’s soul recalls detached parts, giving the magnet-and-iron analogy its explanatory role. This account should not be translated into modern gravitational language without qualification. In Chapter 2, natural place also helps explain why a heavenly sphere rotates rather than travels elsewhere: it remains within its appropriate encompassing surface while its parts seek equal access to all of it. Saturn’s sphere supplies the example, with the concave surface of the eighth sphere as its natural place. *Cardo* there denotes the axis or governing pivot around which the circuit continues. The discussion assumes nested spheres and a bounded corporeal cosmos, which are features of the historical model.

An important apparent tension concerns the earth. IV.1.75 mentions Egelias as holding that it moves, but retains the prevailing assertion of its rest; Ficino nevertheless describes its parts as pressing continually around the world’s center. IV.2.22 again opposes unmoving earth to heaven’s ceaseless motion. Thus the treatment should not be recruited as an unqualified endorsement of terrestrial rotation. The edition deliberately preserves the obscure name Egelias without conjectural correction, and nothing in the supplied apparatus independently resolves that attribution.

The reported mental-presence account places fire’s goal at the concavity of the outermost heaven. A little flame would reach it if unimpeded, fill it if sufficiently large, and be wholly at every point if indivisible. These increasingly qualified suppositions model complete enjoyment of a natural end. Mind is then said to run toward true good first through

essential, then vital, then intellectual instinct. The order distinguishes levels of orientation; it does not make deliberate thinking the origin of every inclination.

The “bounds of nature” are not a literal fence but the limits of proper place and motion. Ascent and descent are treated as a quick straight-line restoration to that condition, rather than the fully natural perpetual circuit itself. In the following units, the restoration’s externally determined terminus and single path are evidence against independent self-motion in the parts. The hypothetical consequence matters: if those parts moved themselves in the relevant way, they could also stop of themselves or act otherwise. The text does not simply replace every bodily regularity with a freely choosing minute soul.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.75 (PDF pp. 320–321)**. Proper circuit is distinguished from rectilinear return after displacement; earth’s motion remains qualified
- **IV.1.76 (PDF pp. 322–323)**. The determinate return-path indicates direction by another source
- **IV.2.25 (PDF pp. 348–349)**. Saturn’s sphere seeks fuller enjoyment of its encompassing place and wholly present soul
- **II.6.23 (PDF pp. 140–141)**. The earlier thinkers’ conditional flame analogy concerns orientation to a natural goal

**Further passage references.** IV.1.74–IV.1.77, pp. 320–323; IV.2.19, pp. 344–345; IV.2.22 –IV.2.26, pp. 346–349.

- II.6.23 (PDF pp. 140–141): The conditional flame comparison supports the earlier thinkers’ account of mind’s essential orientation
- **IV.1.75–77, PDF pp. 320–323:** proper circuit, rectilinear restoration, fixed path, and hypothetical freedom distinguish kinds of motion

**In this edition.**

IV.1.75 expressly calls ascent and descent restorations rather than natural motion in the strict sense. Its statement about earth is conditional and retains the prevailing claim of rest; the obscure source name Egelias is not silently corrected. These are historical cosmological claims, not modern gravitational explanations.

The heaven and flame statements are Ficino’s reported cosmological reasoning, not contemporary physics. The three “if” conditions and the attribution framing II.6.14–24 must survive any shortened explanation. The apparatus (PDF p. 371) also explains that instinctu is understood after vitali and intellectuali; the English supplies the noun in each member.

The earth-moving proposal remains conditional and assigned to the retained name Egelias. “In a certain fashion” qualifies the description of earth’s parts circling its center through mutual pressure.

**See also.**

Circularity and return; Spheres and stars; Earth soul; Motion and stability; Hinge and center

Touch and penetration; Appetite and desire; Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities.

Hidden mover and magnet; Circularity and return; Assertion, report, and reservation.

## Natural species and succession

**Latin:** *species naturalis*; *singula*; *continua singulorum successio*; *generationis successio*

**The word.**

Species naturalis names a natural kind or determining form; singula its individual instances. Successio is one thing following another. Perpetuity of a kind through successive individuals is therefore a different mode of persistence from an unchanging individual substance.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

IV.1.86–IV.1.87 distinguishes what a natural species receives from different causal levels. Being and unity come from God, order from mind, and perpetuity from these stable causes; multiplicity among individuals and mutability come through soul and heaven. Species therefore display a kind of persistence through the succession of changing individuals. This is not the same mode of permanence possessed by mind and soul, which Ficino calls immutable in substance despite the changeable action of souls. Nor should *species* here automatically be equated with the modern biological species concept. It participates in a wider vocabulary of form, intelligible determination, and the kind of thing produced. The passage is useful for readers trying to reconcile apparently perpetual nature with continual generation and corruption: the levels of causal dependence and the distinction between a kind and its instances do the explanatory work.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.86 (PDF pp. 326–327)**. A natural species receives being and unity from God, order from mind, and perpetuity from stable sources
- **IV.1.87 (PDF pp. 326–327)**. Soul and heaven mediate multiplicity and change; individuals succeed one another continuously
- **IV.2.20 (PDF pp. 344–345)**. Matter attains through succession forms it cannot possess together

**Further passage references.** IV.1.86–IV.1.87, pp. 326–327; IV.2.20, pp. 344–345; apparatus p. 393.

**In this edition.**

The translation at IV.1.87 preserves “in some measure mutable even in substance” and “appear perpetual.” Neither qualification should disappear. The historical species language cannot simply be equated with a modern biological species concept or evolutionary mechanism.

**See also.**

Form; Species; Generation and corruption; Seeds; Motion and stability; Order and harmony

## Need and sufficiency

**Latin:** *indigentia*; *indigere*; *egere*; *sufficientia*; *sufficere*; *indigere; sufficere; commodum; pro viribus*

**The word.**

Egere and indigere mean needing; indigentia need or lack; sufficere being enough for a purpose; sufficientia adequacy. The relation may concern subsistence, operation, or completion by an end, not an emotional state. Independence from matter is not necessarily independence from every cause.

Indigere needs; sufficere is enough for a specified end. Commodum denotes advantage or convenience; pro viribus qualifies something by its available powers.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Need is an explanatory category running from the opening account of human vulnerability to the argument for a supreme principle. Matter needs form; quality needs its subject and a higher source of action; a changing being seeks what it lacks; mind needs truth and goodness. Ficino repeatedly reasons from such dependence toward something more self-sufficient. A quality's lack of sufficiency in existing prevents it from supplying a body with complete sufficiency in acting. Likewise, an intellect that seeks truth cannot itself be truth, and a mind that improves through understanding is not the Good itself. The vocabulary does not always signify emotional dissatisfaction or bodily deprivation. It often marks a structural relation: one thing cannot be what it is or do what it does without another. Even forms said to subsist through themselves can remain dependent on a higher cause, so local independence from matter should not be confused with God's unrestricted self-sufficiency.

Divine goodness needs no creatures, which is crucial to distinguishing necessary willing of the end from contingent means. At II.13.23 the created world needs only the perfection sufficient to indicate its author's higher perfection according to its powers. This is a standard of adequacy relative to the work's purpose, not a claim that the world equals God or actualizes every possible perfection.

**The places.**

- **I.5.4 (PDF pp. 62–63)**. Motion toward an end is interpreted as a sign of incompleteness
- **I.6.17 (PDF pp. 92–93)**. Mind's striving to become better distinguishes it from goodness itself
- **II.2.3 (PDF pp. 104–105)**. A composed whole needs both parts and their unifying source
- **II.7.16 (PDF pp. 150–151)**. Operational dependence on an end is used to argue for dependence in essence

**Further passage references.** I.1.1 (PDF pp. 14–15); I.3.4–I.3.9 (pp. 30–35); I.5.4–I.5.6, I.5.16 (pp. 62–63, 70–71); I.6.10–I.6.17 (pp. 88–93).

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.12.14 (Latin PDF p. 210; English PDF p. 211).** Lack of divine need supports the distinction between an end and optional means.
- **II.13.23 (Latin PDF p. 232; English PDF p. 233).** Sufficiency is relative to the created work's representational task.

**In this edition.**

“Suffice for itself in acting” and “suffice for itself in essence” at II.7.16 preserve the distinction on which the inference depends. The given English “in need of nothing” at II.9.8 concerns the perfection of knowledge nearest its object, not the absence of all differentiation among created beings.

The English “according to the work’s powers” spells out pro viribus. The “apparent advantage” of one part at II.12.19 is not automatically the good of the whole.

**See also.**

Cause; Principle; Perfection; Truth; Good and goodness; Essence and substance; Being

Perfection; Freedom and necessity; Whole and parts.

## Nothing and nonbeing

**Latin:** *nihil*; *nihilum*; *non esse*; *privatio essendi*; *potentia ad non essendum*; *malum*

**The word.**

Nihil or nihilum is nothing; non esse not being; privatio essendi deprivation of being. Potentia ad non essendum is a possibility of not existing, distinct from receptive potency toward a form. A thing’s counterfactual nonbeing without its cause is not its actual nonexistence while caused.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino distinguishes the absence of existence from a recipient that has not yet acquired some actuality. Water not yet hot still has the capacity to receive heat; what does not exist at all has no such underlying capacity for existence. Creation without a prior subject therefore requires infinite power. Pure being, conversely, excludes both privation of being and any potency not to be. The phrase *non esse* also expresses the dependence of effects: considered apart from their cause, they would not exist, and without continued preservation would not persist. This describes dependence, while still affirming that creatures exist through their cause. In the polemic against two opposed gods, Ficino argues that a wholly evil deity, deprived of every good, could neither act, know, live, nor exist, since these are goods. That argument concerns the incoherence of absolute evil as a first principle; it is not yet a complete account of every experienced evil.

In II.12.16–18, nonbeing enters a modal argument: contradiction alone includes the character of nonbeing, while what involves no contradiction falls within the potency of being and divine productive power. The actual order therefore does not exhaust what could be made. This use must be distinguished both from a thing’s lacking one determination and from prime matter’s lowly but nonzero status. Describing matter as next to nothing does not supply an underlying subject to creation from nothing.

**The places.**

- **II.2.15 (PDF pp. 114–115)**. Absolute evil would lack every good, including existence and action
- **II.4.3 (PDF pp. 122–123)**. Pure being excludes both privation and potency not to be
- **II.4.5 (PDF pp. 124–125)**. Nothing lacks even the receptive capacity presupposed by ordinary alteration
- **II.7.20 (PDF pp. 152–153)**. An effect considered without its cause would not exist

- **II.12.16 (PDF pp. 210–211)**. The potency of being includes what does not oppose being's principle

**Further passage references.** II.2.14–15, pp. 112–115; II.4.2–6, pp. 122–125; II.7.7–10, pp. 146–149; II.7.20–23, pp. 152–155; II.12.16–II.12.18, PDF pp. 210–213.

**In this edition.**

II.7.20's priority of nonbeing is part of a causal argument just after both temporal-origin alternatives have been allowed. It should not force an earlier date of nonexistence on the hypothetical eternal world. "Next to nothing" for matter at I.3.19 still affirms a recipient and must remain distinct.

**See also.**

Creation; Good and goodness; Freedom and necessity; Being; Conservation and preservation; Matter; Infinity; Power and potency

## Nourishment, digestion and growth

**Latin:** *nutrimentum*; *concoquit*; *digerit*; *alimenta*; *suaviter et ordinate*; *conciliat*; *vivifica virtus*.; alit; nutrit; digerit; dat vitam; sine electione; multa simul; *nutritio*, *nutritionis*, *nutriri*, *nutrire*, *alit*; *augmentum*, *augmenti*, *augeri*, *augere*, *crescunt*; *fomentum*, *fovere* (dictionary infinitive), with the attested forms *foveant*, *fomento*, *fovet*.

**The word.**

*Concoquere* is to cook or digest; *digerere* here digests or distributes into an ordered condition. *Nutrimentum* and *alimenta* name nourishment or food, while *alere* and *nutrire* nourish or sustain. *Conciliare* brings opposed things into agreement. *Nutritio*, *augmentum* and *generatio* distinguish nourishment, growth and coming-to-be. *Fovere* fosters or supports, with its object determining whether it concerns offspring, a seed, sight or a whole elemental globe. *Dare vitam* gives life. These connected operations carry several arguments and should not be reduced to the mere consumption of fuel.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino asks what transforms nonliving food into living form, transfers heavy and light materials against their usual directions as life requires, and reconciles constituents "at war" with one another. He contrasts orderly, gentle digestion with violent destruction. Mere fiery heat, or one quality belonging to the conflicting constituents, cannot in his argument explain their coordinated transformation. He therefore identifies a higher, indivisible, life-giving power and asks the reader to consider the universe by analogy with the human case. This is an inference from his physiological model, not a modern account of metabolism. Later, nourishing, growing and generating the body exemplify the soul's temporal operation: those processes take time even though he holds the soul's essence stable.

The human soul does many things by choice but gives the body life without choice through its being. It also nourishes and digests many things at once without anxiety and labor. These are examples in a hierarchy of operations: deliberative action depends on essential activity, which in turn depends on the first cause's pure being.

Ficino's argument is not that every human action is involuntary, or that a person need not eat. Nor does the illustration supply a modern physiological explanation of digestion. Its philosophical role is to show that a source can sustain multiple operations without

selecting each afresh, and that even choice itself must arise without an endless chain of preceding choices.

Book IV begins with an inference from the ordinary life of growing things to the life of earth and water. Nothing can be nourished or enlarged, Ficino says, without the generation of some of its parts. Consequently, what exhibits generation followed by nourishment and growth gives evidence of life and soul. The sequence matters: growth is not an additional invisible substance; it is an observed activity used to argue for a source. Plants and stones are treated as remaining dependent upon earth while rooted or attached, whereas animals continue living after bodily separation. That contrast supports his distinction between an element's common soul and a creature's proper soul.

Fostering also differentiates the roles of bodily and spiritual seeds. An abandoned bodily seed may receive an external fostering influence; the proposed living nature both produces where such seeds are absent and fosters seeds left by animals. The source therefore does not make every new organism an instance of generation without a bodily seed. Its claims about stones, unseeded plants, and spontaneous generation belong to this historical natural philosophy.

**The places.**

- **I.3.23, PDF 44–45.** Digestion becomes an example of coordinated life exceeding a single bodily quality
- **I.5.1, PDF 60–61.** Nourishment, growth and generation distinguish temporal operation from stable essence
- II.8.2, II.8.3 (PDF pp. 160–161): Soul's imparting life is distinguished from its chosen activities
- II.8.5 (PDF pp. 162–163): Simultaneous nutrition and digestion illustrate activity without anxious deliberation
- **IV.1.1–2, PDF pp. 282–283:** generation of parts grounds nourishment and increase; earth is described as feeding its offspring
- **IV.1.14–16, pp. 288–291:** external fostering and the nurture of abandoned bodily seeds are distinguished from production without them
- **IV.1.78, pp. 322–323:** attachment to earth distinguishes the growth of plants and stones from the life of separated animals
- **IV.2.20, pp. 344–345:** celestial alternation is said to illuminate and foster the elemental globe on all sides

**In this edition.**

"Cooks and digests" preserves the paired verbs at I.3.23. "Gently" renders *suaviter* in an argument about ordered assimilation, rather than offering dietary advice. The printed *vincitque in unum* is rendered "binds them into one"; the supplied apparatus explicitly adopts this constructive sense (source PDF p. 360), and no conjectural replacement is silently introduced. The later shifts among "nourishes," "digests," "gives life," "grows" and "fosters" preserve distinct operations. Repeating the inference to an animating natural source does not endorse its historical biology.

**See also.**

Life; Order and harmony; Contraries and opposition; Act and operation.

Life; Soul; Choice and deliberation; Burden labor and ease.

Generation and corruption; Earth soul; Seeds; Earth as mother.

## Number

**Latin:** *numerus*; *unitas*; *multitudo*; *innumerus*; *infinitus*; *ternario*; *novenario*; *septenario*; *duodenario*; *multiplicatio numeri*; *enumerare*; *species numerorum*; *numerum se moventem*; *naturam multiplicem*

**The word.**

Numerus is number; multitudo a multitude; innumerus and innumerabilis an unnumbered or uncountable plurality; enumerare counting off. Numerical unity, species-unity, and divine unity are not identical. In the self-moving-number formula, Ficino expressly glosses number as a manifold nature.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Number supports several different arguments concerning abstraction, multiplicity, infinity, and soul. In the ascent of Book I, numbers require parts but not spatial position, unlike bodily dimensions. The mind then rises beyond numerical unity, which is accidental, toward substantial unity. Angel likewise contains intelligible distinctions without bodily division, while God is above number as its unifying source. Ficino compares incorporeal number with bodily dimension to explain how intellectual abundance can exceed bodily greatness.

The numbers assigned to angels require careful interpretation. Ficino argues that angelic species far exceed bodily species and describes their multitude as almost or virtually innumerable. This does not itself establish a literally infinite population. Ficino cites Dionysius the Areopagite for the greater abundance of separate intellectual species and Daniel for angelic multitudes. He says that Dionysius uses three and nine chiefly, sometimes seven, and notes twelve in Christian mysteries. He then reports Iamblichus and Proclus dividing the highest angels by three, the middle by nine, the succeeding by seven, and the last into twelve orders. These assignments are attributed classifications rather than an independently established census; the passage does not justify silently treating their reported historical relations as independently verified chronology. A separate distinction concerns determinate species and the indefinitely numerous individuals referred to them; the unity of a kind and the number of its instances are different questions.

Endlessly extendable mathematical thought then supports the argument for infinite divine knowledge. Human mind can always think another number, proportion, or figure beyond a fixed total. If God’s knowledge stopped at a number but could proceed, it would retain unrealized capacity; if it could not proceed, human thought could exceed it. Unity is hypothetically imagined as knowing every number potentially contained in it. The image illustrates a source’s knowledge of its productive range, not a conscious creature called numerical unity. God does not count through items but knows collectively through one form and act. These uses distinguish enumeration and potential progression from unified divine cognition without offering modern set theory.

Finally, III.1.23 explains the Pythagorean riddle, used by Xenocrates, that soul is a self-moving number. Ficino glosses number as a manifold nature and self-moving as mutable through its own characteristic power. Soul is not absolutely simple unity as God is, and unlike angelic multiplicity it has temporal movement. The five grades are likewise distinguished by different relations of one and many. This particular numerical phrase

therefore characterizes soul's composition and activity; it does not reduce a person to an integer or require a hidden calculation.

**The places.**

- **II.2.7 (PDF pp. 108–109)**. Many humans and horses are gathered under their respective species-unities
- **II.10.4 (PDF pp. 176–177)**. Unity is hypothetically imagined as knowing its potentially contained numbers
- **II.10.7 (PDF pp. 178–179)**. Indefinitely extendable human thought supports the argument against limited divine knowledge
- **II.10.10 (PDF pp. 180–181)**. Divine cognition does not enumerate step by step
- **III.1.23 (PDF pp. 254–255)**. Self-moving number is glossed as manifold nature mutable by its own property

**Further passage references.** I.3.12–I.3.14 (PDF pp. 36–39); I.5.20–I.5.27 (pp. 74–81); I.6.4–I.6.5 (pp. 82–85); II.2.7–8, pp. 108–109; II.4.4, pp. 122–123; II.10.3–4, pp. 176–177; II.10.7–10, pp. 178–181; III.1.1–8, PDF 240–245; III.1.23, PDF 254–255.

**In this edition.**

The formula numerum se moventem at III.1.23 is immediately explained, so it should not be literalized into a moving integer. At II.10.4 conscious numerical unity is hypothetical. At II.10.10 enumerando contrasts with a gathered intellectual act rather than proving the absence of distinctions.

**See also.**

Unity and multiplicity; Quantity and dimension; Angel; Infinity; Intuition and comprehension; Universals and individuals; Degree and mediation; Motion and stability; Soul; Twelve

## Object and adequate object

**Latin:** *obiectum*; *proprium obiectum*; *absolutum obiectum*; *adaequatum appetitus obiectum*; obiecto; obiectum; quam proxima; rei cognoscendae; externa sequi

**The word.**

Obiectum names what a cognitive or appetitive power is directed toward, whether bodily or not. Proprium marks the object characteristic of that power; absolutum unrestricted adequacy; adaequatum commensurateness. An object is not simply any physical item standing before an observer.

Obiectum is what a power apprehends or is directed toward; proximitas here is closeness of cognitive relation. An adequate object must be commensurate with the power, rather than merely physically near it.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

An object is what a cognitive or appetitive power is directed toward, not necessarily a physical thing. Ficino argues that the proper object of divine intelligence cannot be external to God, and calls divine goodness its absolute object. In the analysis of desire, the Good is appetite's adequate object: goodness explains the aspect under which anything is

desired. Individual objects can consequently be chosen mistakenly as good without altering that general orientation. The word connects the scope of a power with what fulfills it.

The nearest knowledge is self-knowledge because knower and known are not separated by an external source of completion. Since divine understanding and essence are identical, an external object perfecting that understanding would also perfect divine essence and make God dependent on another. The following rhetorical question reverses the supposed order: external things follow divine mind to exist, so divine mind need not follow external things in order to know. The argument is about causal and cognitive dependence, not neglect of the world.

**The places.**

- **I.6.13 (PDF pp. 90–91)**. The intelligible as object forms and perfects a receiving intellectual power
- **II.9.8 (PDF pp. 166–167)**. Self-knowledge avoids perfection by an external object
- **II.9.10 (PDF pp. 168–169)**. An external object cannot bound the proper scope of divine mind
- **II.12.12 (PDF pp. 208–209)**. Divine goodness is the absolute object of divine mind and will
- **II.13.29 (PDF pp. 236–237)**. Goodness is appetite's adequate object even when one seeks freedom from desire

**Further passage references.** I.6.12–13 (PDF pp.88–91); II.9.10–13 (pp.168–169); II.12.12 (pp.208–209); II.13.29 (pp.236–237)

- II.9.8, II.9.9 (PDF pp. 166–167): Self-knowledge avoids completion by an external object
- II.9.10, II.9.11 (PDF pp. 168–169): No externally bounded object can exhaust the unlimited divine power

**In this edition.**

The repeated sequi in II.9.9 reverses the proposed dependence: external things follow divine mind in being, rather than mind following them to know. At II.13.29 "adequate object" concerns goodness as the aspect under which anything is desired, not the claim that every desired particular is actually beneficial.

"Follows" translates sequi in both directions of II.9.9. The repeated verb sharpens the reversal from knowledge following reality to dependent things following their intelligent cause.

**See also.**

Intellect and intellection; Self knowledge; Appetite and desire; Good and goodness

Self knowledge; Naming by cause; Dependence and receiving.

## Omnipresence and place

**Latin:** *ubique*; *nusquam*; *praesentia*; *locus*; *situs*; *spatium*; *dimensio*

**The word.**

Ubique is everywhere; nusquam nowhere; locus place; situs position; spatium spatial scope; praesentia presence. Ficino also treats ubi and ubique as names of the very

condition of location. Presence through incorporeal power differs from the extension of a body within a container.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

God is everywhere through unlimited incorporeal power, not by possessing an infinitely large body. Ficino compares bodily contact through dimensions with incorporeal presence through power. Wherever being, the universal effect, exists, its universal cause is present. He then qualifies the language: God is “nowhere” insofar as no place or subject contains him, but absent nowhere because everything exists and is preserved in him. God is not extended through the world; the world is extended through God in the finite way it can attain divine presence. Imagination misleads when it makes God an occupant within a prior spatial container. The source’s unusually strong claim that “everywhere” names the entire nature of things, which is God, accompanies an explicit rejection of identifying that nature with corporeal extension alone. Calling this simply an identity between God and the physical world would discard the chapter’s qualifications. The argument concerns the source and condition of place as well as presence within it.

The chapter supplies several arguments rather than one geometric proof. Presence everywhere is desirable as a good; the first Good lacks no good. An infinite active purity meets no barrier that could exclude it. The world needs God more fundamentally than a living body needs soul, so divine presence cannot be less adequate than the soul’s presence to its body. Finally, the mind can conceive beyond any assigned spatial limit, and its divine cause cannot be absent from the scope that its effect can reach. These are Ficino’s inferences and analogies. The contrast between body and soul does not, on its own, identify God with the world’s soul. Indeed, Ficino says goodness extends more widely than life and explicitly includes what is conceived outside the world, so the vocabulary of universal presence outruns the living cosmos used to illustrate it.

**The places.**

- **II.6.1 (PDF pp. 128–129)**. Bodies touch by dimensions; incorporeal substance by power
- **II.6.2 (PDF pp. 128–129)**. The universal cause must be present wherever its universal effect subsists
- **II.6.8 (PDF pp. 130–131)**. Uncontained nowhere is distinguished from absent nowhere
- **II.6.13 (PDF pp. 134–135)**. Reason and imagination dispute whether everywhere is bodily extension
- **II.6.14 (PDF pp. 136–137)**. The world attains infinite divine presence through a finite site

**Further passage references.** II.6.1–14, pp. 128–137.

**In this edition.**

“Nowhere” at II.6.8 means unconfined by place or subject, not nonexistent or absent everywhere. II.6.13’s strong identification of everywhere with the whole nature of things comes with a rejection of reducing that nature to the corporeal fabric. The qualifiers prevent a simple identity of God with physical extension.

**See also.**

Infinity; Light and illumination; Sense and imagination; Mind; Cause; Indwelling and presence; World soul

## Order and harmony

**Latin:** *ordo*; *ordinatio*; *ordinare*; *lex*; *norma*; *concordia*; *communio*; *conspirare*; *proportio*; *ordinatus*; *ordo universi*; *gradus*; *ordinate*; *dispositio*; *ars integra*; *sapientia felix*

**The word.**

Ordo is arrangement, hierarchy, or rank; ordinare to arrange; concordia concord; communio shared relation; proportio proportion. Conspirare and consonare describe coordinated tendency or harmony, not necessarily a conscious agreement or literal sound. Lex can be governing law without implying a modern physical equation.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Order is the coordinated relation of differentiated parts, powers, causes, and ends. It includes regularity without being merely a repeated pattern noticed by an observer. The recurring production of forms at appointed times, orderly digestion, and celestial revolutions supply Ficino with evidence of a source more stable than the changing things governed. He traces order to reason, life, or mind according to the causal level. Mind's distinctive ordering through forms extends beyond vital motion alone, while the heavens that regulate mutable elements themselves require a higher stable mover.

The parts of an army are mutually coordinated because the army is directed toward one commander. Similarly, Ficino argues, unlike parts cannot derive their shared ordering simply from the particular natures by which they differ. Common source and end explain their cooperation. Multiple causes converging on an effect therefore call for a determining cause that arranges their contribution. Fire supplies heat without itself accounting for the preparation, degree, and arrangement of everything heated; an architect's plan provides relations that tools and materials alone do not. Universal order is consequently the principal divine idea, requiring knowledge of the proper accounts of every component.

Order is also a relation of value and knowledge. The good of the whole's arrangement exceeds the isolated excellence of one part, and includes proportions between precious and apparently base things. Something unattractive in isolation may fit the whole; Ficino's musical Apollo comparison reinforces that relational account. The argument explains why divine knowledge must reach lowly particulars rather than neglecting them. These are Ficino's theological inferences from the patterns and relations he invokes, and should be distinguished from the patterns themselves.

The order thus defended does not require every creature to be equally perfect, stable, or necessary. Different grades and variable proximate causes belong to it; appropriate contingency and free human judgment are preserved rather than abolished. In Book IV, the regular direction of cosmic motions toward what is better and more beautiful is taken as evidence of rational soul and unerring wisdom, not lifeless necessity. The Magian triad is then interpreted causally: God gives unity, mind orders united parts, and soul supplies movement through higher power. Soul can be mobile in action yet constant in office. Harmony preserves difference and coordinated contribution rather than erasing them.

The vocabulary also has less specialized uses. *Ordo* can mean a grade, rank, or angelic order rather than causal arrangement, while *lex* ranges between the Proem's divine religious law and the ordering associated with nature or the heavens. Neither word should be forced into the modern sense of a physical law. The context determines whether a passage discusses authority, rank, regularity, proportion, or intelligent government.

**The places.**

- **II.2.8 (PDF pp. 108–109)**. The army's mutual order depends on its shared orientation to one commander
- **II.2.9 (PDF pp. 110–111)**. Recurrent weaving illustrates an order Ficino refuses to attribute to chance
- **II.7.27 (PDF pp. 156–157)**. Diverse agents converge on being through one first source
- **II.9.21 (PDF pp. 174–175)**. Knowing the whole order requires distinguishing higher and lower parts
- **IV.1.86 (PDF pp. 326–327)**. God, mind, and soul are assigned unity, order, and motion without erasing dependence

**Further passage references.** Proem.8, Proem.10 (PDF pp. 8–11); I.3.11–I.3.13, I.3.22–I.3.23 (pp. 36–37, 44–45); I.5.7–I.5.9, I.5.18, I.5.27–I.5.28 (pp. 62–65, 72–73, 80–81); I.6.14 (pp. 90–91); II.2.2, pp. 104–105; II.2.8–9, pp. 108–111; II.2.12–14, pp. 112–113; II.7.27, pp. 156–157; II.9.21–22, pp. 174–175; II.11.8–10, 18, 23–27, PDF 184–195; II.12.19–21, PDF 212–215; II.13.4–24, PDF 218–233; IV.1.8, pp. 284–285; IV.1.84–IV.1.87, pp. 324–327.

**In this edition.**

"Conspire" at II.2.8 means concerted coordination, not a secret scheme. "Commonly called" and "considered in isolation" at II.9.22 qualify lowly or unattractive things. The order's goodness includes distinctions among parts; it does not assert that every part is equally excellent.

**See also.**

Reason and account; Life; Mind; Motion and stability; Angel; Unity and multiplicity; Whole and parts; Universals and individuals; Perfection; Cause; Contingency; Degree and mediation; Ideas and exemplars; Providence; Fate; Art and nature; Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Apollo; Sympathy

## Orpheus and divine names

**Latin:** Orpheo; Orpheus; ab Orphicis; infinitus finis; necessitatem; Iovis perfectus oculus; oculus infinitus; Saturni hymno; Apollinis hymno

**The word.**

Orpheus and the Orphics are named authorities for divine descriptions and hymnic sayings. Finis can be end or goal; necessitas necessity; oculus eye. Their differing senses allow a series of compact divine names rather than one literal description.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The "infinite end" caps the argument that potential or qualified infinities derive from infinity in act. The Saturn hymn supplies an inhabitant of all cosmic parts; the saying about mighty necessity supports God's necessity of being; the perfect and infinite eyes support comprehensive knowing. Finally, the Apollo hymn describes universal bounds, care for beginning and end, flourishing, and harmony through a resounding lyre.

These citations perform distinct tasks within Ficino's exposition. Their authority and attribution are reported as he gives them; no independent authorship claim or critical identification of fragments is made here. Likewise, necessity as the name of the self-

subsisting source should not be flattened into external coercion, and the eye or lyre should not be read as bodily equipment of the divine cause.

**The places.**

- II.4.8, II.6.11 (PDF pp. 124–125, 132–133): Infinite end and universal habitation support infinity and presence
- II.7.11 (PDF pp. 148–149): Mighty necessity accompanies the claim of necessary being
- II.9.18, II.9.19, II.9.22 (PDF pp. 172–175): Perfect sight and the Apollo hymn support knowledge and ordered harmony
- II.10.7 (PDF pp. 178–179): The infinite eye names unlimited divine knowledge

**In this edition.**

The supplied Latin gives a gloss after each Greek citation, sometimes across editorial units. Preserve both the attribution and the immediate argument rather than treating the gloss as a new statement independently verified by this lexicon.

**See also.**

End and limit; Freedom and necessity; Eye and gaze; Apollo.

## Ostrich and egg

**Latin:** *struthii oculus; ovum; intuitus; fovere; intentus; avidissime*

**The word.**

Struthii is the genitive identifying the ostrich; oculus is its eye, ovum its egg, and fovere warming or brooding. Intentus and avidissime characterize the eye as fixed with great eagerness. The vocabulary joins directed attention with affective force.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino claims that cognition in creatures produces no substantial effect without affect, and invokes the ostrich's eye fixed eagerly upon its egg as a qualified indication of that claim. He then reasons that divine intelligence, immeasurably more effective in creation than the ostrich's gaze in brooding, must contain a most powerful affect of will. The inference is comparative and inferential: coniectari possumus says that "we can infer" or conjecture, and quodammodo already limits the illustrative claim. Neither the anecdote nor its extension supplies an independent observation of the mechanism. The following appeal to divine delight is a second consideration, based on the perfection of intellect and object.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.31 (Latin PDF p. 196; English PDF p. 197).** The eye-and-egg example illustrates cognition operating through affect.
- **II.11.32 (Latin PDF p. 196; English PDF p. 197).** A comparison supports the power and delight attributed to divine will.

**In this edition.**

The English "brooding" renders fovendo without confirming the efficacy of a gaze. This is natural lore invoked by Ficino, not verified information about ostrich incubation. Struthii is

the printed form; a normalized dictionary name should be identified as supplied rather than substituted into the quotation.

**See also.**

Affect; Will; Intuition and comprehension; Love and pleasure.

## Parmenides and the summary formula

**Latin:** Parmenides Pythagoreus; De veritate et opinione; ens unum immobile infinitum

**The word.**

Ficino calls Parmenides Pythagorean and gives a work-title, De veritate et opinione, “On Truth and Opinion.” The four-word Latin gloss describes being as one, unmoved, and infinite; it is the gloss of a Greek expression quoted in this edition.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The citation opens the transition from proofs of God’s existence, unity, primacy, and infinity to the argument that God acts and preserves all things. Ficino presents the earlier conclusions as confirming what Parmenides said about God. The name thus serves as a compressed authority for a sequence already argued, not as the sole premise of the next proof.

This article records Ficino’s identification and title as printed. It does not independently authenticate the quotation, identify a modern fragment number, or imply that Parmenides himself used Ficino’s developed Christian account of divine causation. The later claims should be read as Ficino’s interpretation of the authority.

**The places.**

- II.7.1 (PDF pp. 144–145): The formula summarizes the preceding divine attributes before the proof of universal action

**In this edition.**

The translation retains “Parmenides the Pythagorean.” That label belongs to the source’s presentation and should be attributed rather than silently converted into an externally verified biographical classification.

**See also.**

God; Philosophy and theology; Infinity; Orpheus and divine names.

## Participation

**Latin:** *participatio*, *participare*, *particeps*; *participia* (shares or participations in the supplied text); *portio* (share); *vestigium* (trace)

**The word.**

Participatio and participare describe received possession of a perfection; particeps names a participant. Portio is a share, and vestigium a trace. These expressions need not mean a physical fraction broken from the source.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Participation is dependent possession of a perfection, as distinct from being its full or underived source. The clearest comparison uses heat: wood is hot through participation,

fire through form, and the sun in a more eminent causal manner. Ficino parallels these with soul's partial possession of mind, the angel's possession of mind's form, and God as mind's most effective origin. The contrast concerns different ways of possessing and causing a perfection; it does not physically divide intellectual nature among recipients.

The language also explains how creatures possess unity, truth, and goodness. Their received shares and traces point toward a source they desire and to which they return. If supreme unity itself received power from a higher cause, it would become a composite of unity and an addition, rather than unity itself. Similarly, something called better is better through a greater share of goodness, so it cannot surpass goodness independently of it. A *portio* is consequently a limited possession of perfection rather than a divine fragment. Later the *vestigium*, or trace, of the first cause names being itself, on which subordinate causes establish further determinations.

Other applications make the relation concrete. Earth participates in the idea of roundness; a creature enjoys itself by participating in goodness; bodies live and move through soul's communicated life. Celestial motion can participate in stability. What is received and how it is received vary with the example, so participation is more precise than generic membership in a class. Higher activity remains present in lower effects according to the recipient's mode. Yet a unifying presence may be whole in each part rather than partitioned: soul communicates life without being cut into bodily pieces, and divine goodness is reflected in many creatures without becoming many independent divine substances.

**The places.**

- **I.3.14**. Received inequality and divisible forms are referred toward more unified sources within the hierarchy.
- **I.5.7**. Ordered celestial motion participates in stability.
- **II.11.27**. Earth's roundness is explained through participation in the idea of roundness.
- **II.12.6**. Participation in goodness explains increasing self-contentment.
- **III.2.24**. Bodies live and move through participation in soul's life.

**Further passage references.** I.3.14, I.3.30 (PDF pp. 38–39, 50–51); I.5.7, I.5.14 (pp. 62–63, 68–69); I.6.10, I.6.12 (pp. 88–89); II.1.2–7, pp. 98–103; II.7.32, pp. 158–159; II.11.27, PDF 194–195; II.12.6, PDF 204–205; III.2.24, PDF 274–275

**In this edition.**

"Partake" and "participate" cover several grammatical constructions. At I.5.7 the moving heavens are particeps of stability; participation therefore need not exclude movement. At II.11.27 roundness is received through an Idea, while III.2.24 concerns bodies' participation in life.

**See also.**

Divinity and the divine; Unity and multiplicity; Mind; Form; Degree and mediation; Communication and imparting; Truth; Good and goodness; Purity and mixture; Power and potency; Image and likeness; Indwelling and presence; Life

## Paths and prescribed ends

**Latin:** *via; trames; finis; terminus; praescribere; peragere; proficisci*

**The word.**

Via and trames are a way or path; finis and terminus can be an end, goal, or boundary. Praescribere appoints or sets an end in advance; peragere carries a work through. The road imagery makes directed completion visible.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

An ordered agent needs a route proportioned to its end. Ficino's address to Lucretius asks whether aimless movement repeatedly follows one straight path to one fixed destination. The contrast rests on stable orientation, not merely on the geometric straightness of any particular movement. Natural bodies are said to reach prescribed ends without understanding their own motion; the archer supplies their missing purposive source. Living structures likewise seek and return to fitting limits at fitting times. When soul turns into itself, however, end and beginning coincide: circular return rather than forward travel models its continuity. The vocabulary of an end must therefore be distinguished from a temporal cessation. A circuit can have a finis without its activity coming to an ultimate stop.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.25 (Latin PDF p. 194; English PDF p. 195).** Paths are measured relative to an anticipated end.
- **II.13.9 (Latin PDF p. 220; English PDF p. 221).** Bodies have a prescribed end they cannot prescribe for themselves.
- **II.13.15 (Latin PDF p. 226; English PDF p. 227).** Aimless wandering contrasts with a fixed route and destination.
- **III.2.26 (Latin PDF p. 276; English PDF p. 277).** The same point functions as the circuit's end and beginning.

**In this edition.**

The translation uses "end," "destination," and "limit" according to context. Praescriptus can mean assigned or prescribed; it does not establish a written law or verbal instruction received by a body.

**See also.**

End and limit; Archer and target; Circularity and return; Intention.

## Perfection

**Latin:** *perfectio*, *perfectus*, *imperfectus*; *integer*, *integerrimus*; *summum*, *praestantior*; *perficere*, *efficere*; *totum*, *partes*, *particula*, *compago*, *compositum*, *concinat*, *conducat*

**The word.**

Perfectio is completeness or fulfilled actuality; perfectus and integer describe what is complete or whole. Perficere brings to completion, whereas efficere brings about. A part's adequate contribution and absolute perfection are different standards.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Perfection ordinarily means completeness or fullness of being and activity, rather than moral faultlessness alone. Ficino argues that what is first in a kind contains that kind's perfections fully, while what possesses them incompletely depends on something more complete. This premise drives the ascent from quality to incorporeal form and from successive soul-life to simultaneous angelic life. An act completed stably at once is more perfect than one requiring time. Arguments for an abundance of separate intellectual substances likewise appeal to the fitting realization of excellent capacities in an ordered universe.

Supremacy adds purity and uniqueness. Two supposedly supreme lights, truths, or goodnesses would either coincide or differ through some additional and limiting element; in the latter case neither would be supreme. Perfection also links origin to goal: *efficere*, bringing into being, belongs to the same source as *perficere*, bringing to completion. An effect's need for an end thus indicates its dependence upon a source of essence. Divine intelligence is perfect through knowing itself, without an external object supplying what it lacks. No finite created image or collection of images can exhaust the perfection of its divine exemplar.

Ficino nevertheless distinguishes the perfection of a whole from the perfection appropriate to a part. A created world need not possess God's absolute perfection, nor does a well-ordered whole maximize every possible excellence in each component independently. A part is assessed through its fitting contribution to other parts and to the whole. This qualifies the language of cosmic fullness: the work needs the degree of perfection appropriate to indicating its maker's higher goodness. In defending providence, Ficino argues that local defects or things appearing misshapen may contribute to a wider beauty and good. This is his account of a fitting order, not a finding that particular harms cease to matter. Book III applies the same concern for a unified composition to soul's role as the bond between otherwise separated extremes.

This cosmic-order reasoning is qualified by II.12.15–18: innumerable images of divine goodness remain possible beyond the creatures actually made. God freely produces some of these possibilities without being compelled to realize all of them. Completeness of a created order and actualization of every conceivable object of divine power are therefore different claims.

**The places.**

- **I.3.15**. The ascent distinguishes freedom from decrease and from remission of intensity.
- **II.9.7–8**. Divine intelligence is argued to be perfected through its own proper object.
- **II.12.15–18**. Possible images exceed actually produced creatures.
- **II.13.23–24**. The perfection of parts is assessed by concord with and benefit to the whole.
- **III.2.6–8**. A unified composition requires a fitting bond between extremes.

**Further passage references.** I.3.1–I.3.3, I.3.15, I.3.25–I.3.26 (PDF pp. 28–31, 38–39, 46–47); I.5.2–I.5.6, I.5.16, I.5.25–I.5.27 (pp. 60–63, 70–71, 78–81); I.6.6, I.6.17 (pp. 84–85, 92–93); II.2.5–11, pp. 106–111; II.3.3–6, pp. 116–119; II.7.16, pp. 150–151; II.9.7–8, pp. 166–167; II.10.5, pp. 176–177; II.12.19–21, PDF 212–215; II.13.16–24, PDF 226–233; III.2.6–8, PDF 264–267; II.12.15–18, pp. 210–213

**In this edition.**

The supplied “perfection” is broader than moral faultlessness. Pro viribus at II.13.23 limits the created work’s representation of its author; quanta sufficit specifies sufficiency rather than maximal possible excellence in every part. The repeated “most perfect” remains part of Ficino’s ranked argument.

**See also.**

Need and sufficiency; Cause; Ascent; Act and operation; Purity and mixture; Measure and degree; Ideas and exemplars; End and limit; Self knowledge; Beauty and fittingness; Good and goodness; Degree and mediation; Order and harmony; Providence; Freedom and necessity; Creation

## Permanence and the hour test

**Latin:** *permanere*; *perdurabit*; *perseverant*; *stetit*; *hora*; *incipiunt atque desinunt*; *complexio*.

**The word.**

*Permanere* remains or persists; *perdurare* endures; *perseverare* continues. *Stare* in this argument is to stand unchanged, not merely occupy an upright posture. *Complexio* is bodily constitution or temperament. The relevant sameness concerns the constitution’s power, not simply an observer’s ability to keep giving it the same name.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino reports a Platonist interrogation of the claim that a fully developed bodily condition stays unchanged for an hour. If its power differs at the end, it did not remain unchanged. If it is equal, equal powers produce equal effects, so it should last another hour, and the same reasoning repeats. Since bodily constitutions do not persist forever, the argument denies a completely stable interval. Its purpose is to support quality’s lack of sufficient independent activity and to locate the needed stability in a higher cause. The test relies on the premise that the same power must yield the same persistence; it should be presented as Ficino’s reasoning rather than a directly observed measurement of continuous change. Book I later insists that motion nevertheless requires some persisting subject and a stable ordering power. The two passages distinguish changing bodily states from their underlying and causal continuities.

**The places.**

- **I.4.2, PDF 56–57.** The hour and half-hour dilemma concerns unchanged bodily power
- **I.5.1, PDF 60–61.** Soul’s stable essence is distinguished from successive activity
- **I.5.7–9, PDF 62–65.** Change requires a persisting subject and regularity in motion

**In this edition.**

“Stand unchanged” often makes the local *stare* clearer than bare “stand.” The phrase *vix momentum* is “scarcely a moment,” not a measured minimum duration. The argument’s hour is a hypothetical test interval.

**See also.**

Motion and stability; Eternity and time; Affection and passivity; Comparing, resembling and equalling.

## Persuasion and compulsion

**Latin:** *allicere; trahere; cogere; persuadere; pulsare; metus; persuasio; quasi*

**The word.**

Allicere attracts or entices, trahere drags or draws, cogere compels, and persuadere persuades. Pulsare strikes or impels. Quasi qualifies the apparent compulsion discussed after persuasion.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

God governs each nature according to its mode: elements rise or fall, animals walk, and heavens revolve. Souls are impelled freely, attracted rather than dragged, persuaded rather than compelled. A saying attributed to Zoroaster supplies the contrast between fear and persuasion. Yet the next unit says that God "as it were" compels souls toward the good, so that they cannot fail to will good itself. The two statements concern different levels. Necessary orientation toward goodness is retained; judgment among particular means remains free. Even a desire to cease desiring treats that cessation as good. Ficino's reconciliation therefore requires the final paragraph's deliberation and choice, not merely the attractive language of persuasion. It also prevents the qualified necessity of seeking good from certifying each particular choice as actually beneficial.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.13.26 (Latin PDF p. 234; English PDF p. 235).** Preservation of nature differentiates persuasion from dragging.
- **II.13.27 (Latin PDF p. 234; English PDF p. 235).** The fear–persuasion saying is attributed to Zoroaster.
- **II.13.28 (Latin PDF p. 234; English PDF p. 235).** Quasi marks the qualified compulsion toward good.
- **II.13.30 (Latin PDF p. 236; English PDF p. 237).** Free judgment selects among particular proposed means.

**In this edition.**

The English's "in a certain sense compel" preserves quasi. Leaving it out would make the apparent reversal sharper than the Latin. Alliciat expresses attraction here; it does not independently imply deception.

**See also.**

Freedom and necessity; Choice and free judgment; Appetite and desire; Providence.

## Philosophers and stopping points

**Latin:** *Democritiorum*; *Cyrenaicorum*; *Epicureorum*; *Stoicorum Cynicorumque*; *Heraclitus*; *Marcus Varro*; *Marcus Manilius*; *Anaxagoras et Hermotimus*.

**The word.**

The first several names appear as group genitives: the followers or schools whose inquiry is described. *Finiebatur, ascenderunt* and *quievisse* mark limits, ascent and rest. Their apparently spatial language classifies philosophical achievements within Ficino's hierarchy.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino assigns the followers of Democritus, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans to bodily bulk; Stoics and Cynics to effective quality; Heraclitus, Varro and Manilius to rational soul; and Anaxagoras and Hermotimus to angelic mind. Plato directs the purified mind onward toward the divine sun. The list is a designed prospectus: the argument later revisits the stopping points and says why inquiry cannot halt there. It is not a comprehensive description of each thinker's surviving works, nor independent evidence that the grouped schools all held identical theories. The shared task is to exceed what Ficino represents as an insufficient explanatory level. *Videantur* in the Anaxagoras–Hermotimus clause also marks a presentation more qualified than an unqualified historical verdict.

**The places.**

- **I.1.3–6, PDF 14–17.** The historical names articulate the five-level prospectus
- **I.2.8, PDF 22–23.** The bodily schools recur in the criticism of action from bulk
- **I.3.1, PDF 28–29.** Ficino refuses to halt at the Stoic–Cynic quality level
- **I.5.2, PDF 60–61; I.6.1, PDF 82–83.** The soul and angelic stopping points are revisited and exceeded

**In this edition.**

"Followers of Democritus" makes the school-name construction visible. "Seem to have come to rest" retains *videantur … quievisse*. The names receive their local roles without unverified biographies or retrospective judgements about their whole philosophies.

**See also.**

Ascent; Body and bulk; Quality; Soul; Angel.

## Philosophy and theology

**Latin:** *philosophia*, *theologia*; *philosophari*; *amor sapientiae*

**The word.**

Philosophia and philosophari concern philosophical inquiry and its practice; theologia concerns discourse and contemplation directed toward God. Amor sapientiae names love of wisdom. Their conjunction in the Proem is a stated purpose, not a lexical identity in every setting.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The Proem presents philosophical inquiry as directed toward knowledge and worship of God. Ficino praises Plato for bringing moral, dialectical, mathematical, and natural questions back to divine contemplation, and explains why his teaching could accordingly be called theology. The relation is not merely a decorative religious preface to an otherwise unrelated argument. Purification prepares the soul to perceive divine light, investigation seeks the cause of causes, and self-knowledge becomes a route toward knowledge of God. Ficino also states a conciliatory purpose: Platonic arguments may support religion for people not readily moved by scriptural authority alone. His project relies on Augustine's authority as he reports it and seeks a likeness of Plato close to Christian truth. The Proem subjects the work's claims to divine law; Book I's prefatory reservation also invokes Church approval. These qualifications distinguish Ficino's

conciliatory project from a simple identification of every Platonic doctrine with Christian teaching.

**The places.**

- **Proem.1**. The analogy of sight and sunlight directs the human mind toward its divine source.
- **Proem.4**. Self-knowledge is presented as a route toward divine knowledge.
- **Proem.8–9**. Platonic arguments are assigned a conciliatory religious function.
- **Proem.11**. The dedication connects philosophical leisure with Lorenzo's support and public authority.

**Further passage references.** Proem.1–Proem.11 (PDF pp. 6–11); authorial reservation (p. 13)

**In this edition.**

The English "theology" preserves the author's theological designation of Plato's teaching without certifying all attributed Platonic claims as Christian doctrine. The authorial reservations belong to the work's framing and must remain distinct from the continuous philosophical proofs.

**See also.**

Worship and piety; Divinity and the divine; Ascent; Light and illumination; Truth

## Point and position

**Latin:** *punctum; situs; affixus; centrum; circumferentia; tangere; adstare*

**The word.**

Punctum is a point; situs its position or placement. Affixus means fixed to something. Centrum and circumferentia distinguish center and circumference. Tangere is touching; adstare standing present. Indivisibility alone does not remove position.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino first rejects soul's touching only one bodily point: that would leave the rest lifeless. He then rejects its partition like whiteness in flesh. A point offers a useful but limited analogy: though indivisible, a point on a line is fixed to quantitative position and cannot be present everywhere. A center stands differently to the radial lines and surveys the circle equally, so it better illustrates one source's relation to many parts. Still, soul is only "like" a point living in itself and wholly released from quantity and position. The qualifications do the work. Soul is not a tiny spatial center hidden in the body. Its whole presence is attributed to indivisible power rather than breadth, and its supposed independence of position exceeds literal geometry.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.2.9 (Latin PDF p. 268; English PDF p. 269).** Single-point contact is rejected as inadequate to bodily animation.
- **III.2.12 (Latin PDF p. 268; English PDF p. 269).** Power rather than quantitative breadth explains whole presence.

- **III.2.15 (Latin PDF p. 270; English PDF p. 271).** The center differs from points assigned to particular lines or the circumference.
- **III.2.18 (Latin PDF p. 272; English PDF p. 273).** Instar marks the living, position-free point as an analogy.

**In this edition.**

The translation's "like a point" must retain instar. "Point" and "position" cannot be treated as synonyms: the argument expressly separates lack of parts from freedom from place.

**See also.**

Indivisibility; Quantity and dimension; Indwelling and presence; Hinge and center.

## Point, position and mathematical ascent

**Latin:** *punctum*; *signum*; *situs*; *dimensiones*; *numeri*; *unitas*; *accidentalem*; *substantialem*.

**The word.**

*Punctum* and, in the geometrical example, *signum* name a point. *Situs* is position or placement, not the mere possession of parts. *Dimensio* concerns extension. Number, unity and substance enter successive comparisons; "indivisible" does not mean the same thing as "without position" or "substantial."

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino makes the mind's everyday ascent explicit. Natural forms require determinate matter, mathematical forms only indeterminate matter, and metaphysical forms neither. Dimensions need both parts and position; a point lacks parts but remains in some way related to position; numbers need parts but no position; unity needs neither. He then rises beyond indivisible accidental unity to substantial unity, the stable ground of changing accidents. The sequence prevents a reader from treating every nonextended object as already an independently subsisting soul. A second list compares the reductions of motion to an instant, natural form to a least degree, dimensions to a point and numbers to unity. Those examples support an argument for indivisible substance rather than establish that all these limiting items are one object.

**The places.**

- **I.3.12–13, PDF 36–37.** Position, parts and substantiality are successively distinguished
- **I.3.14, PDF 38–39.** The point and centre join an analogical argument about each genus's principle
- **I.5.24, PDF 76–77.** Mental extension of numerical and geometrical possibilities supports a further claim about intelligible abundance

**In this edition.**

"Point" translates both *punctum* and geometrical *signum*. "Free" for *absolutas* in I.3.12 concerns release from particular constraints. It does not yet imply that every universal imagined by a human is a separately existing substance.

**See also.**

Number; Substance and accident; Separation and abstraction; Least natural degree.

## Possession and privation

**Latin:** *habitus; privatio; defectus; carere; expers*

**The word.**

Habitus may mean possession or a state; privatio a lack of what is opposed to such possession. Defectus is a deficiency. Carere and expers indicate lacking or being without. None of these expressions has one invariant psychological sense.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

In the Ideas discussion, evil and privation are known through the idea of good and possession. The point concerns indirect intelligibility: knowing a positive determination can make its lack known, without requiring a separately productive idea of every defect. In the necessity argument, chance is called a privation or failure of reason. In the argument against divine change, past and future involve what no longer is and what is not yet; these are treated as privation incompatible with pure act. By contrast, a sphere departing from its present habitus leaves its present state or position, not a learned habit. The distinct sense of acting habitu in a perfected craft belongs to acquired skill. Keeping these uses apart prevents the general word habitus from importing the whole theory of settled ability into every occurrence.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.19 (Latin PDF p. 192; English PDF p. 193).** Good and possession provide intelligibility for evil and privation.
- **II.12.2 (Latin PDF p. 202; English PDF p. 203).** Fortune is described as reason’s privation or defect.
- **II.13.8 (Latin PDF p. 220; English PDF p. 221).** Habitus means the sphere’s current state.
- **III.1.7 (Latin PDF p. 242; English PDF p. 243).** Temporal change is analyzed through not-yet and no-longer being.

**In this edition.**

The translation distinguishes “possession,” “state,” and “settled skill” for habitus in these contexts. They should remain distinct register senses even though they share a Latin family. Expers is also used of being without sensation or contradiction’s exclusion; it does not invariably imply a culpable deprivation.

**See also.**

Habitual possession; Nothing and nonbeing; Chance; Counsel and settled skill.

## Power and potency

**Latin:** *virtus*, *vis*, *vires*, *potentia*, *potestas*, *facultas*, *efficacia*; *virtus naturalis*, *virtus acquisita*, *habitus*; *potentia passiva*; *fascinandos*, *roborandos*

**The word.**

Virtus and vis can mean operative efficacy rather than ethical virtue. Potentia may be active capacity, receptive potency, or possibility; potestas emphasizes power, facultas an

ability, and efficacia effectiveness. Habitus can designate an attained disposition distinct from presently exercising it.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

“Power” translates several related Latin words. *Virtus* frequently means efficacy or operative capacity rather than moral virtue; *vis* likewise names force or capacity. *Potentia* can name an active ability, a receptive capacity awaiting actualization, or a possibility of being. The immediate contrast determines its sense. In particular, passive potency is the capacity to undergo an actuality, as water can receive heat; what does not exist at all has no underlying receptivity of that kind. Creation without a prior subject therefore requires a different scope of power from altering an existing body.

Power also occupies the middle place in Ficino’s essence–power–operation analysis. Soul remains in essence while changing in activity because its power has both a persistent natural vigor and a changeable acquired aspect. Acquired power can pass between potency, present act, and *habitus*, an attained disposition rather than merely an everyday routine. The hierarchy consequently cannot be reduced to a binary contrast between having no ability and presently exercising it.

Union strengthens power and dispersion weakens it, supporting the argument against bodily bulk as a sufficient source of effective action. Supreme undivided power lacks limits imposed by a receptive subject or superior cause; divine power is therefore infinite. Incorporeal presence is also explained through power rather than dimensions. God’s self-knowledge includes the entire range of his productive ability, while the human intellect’s ability to exceed any finite numerical bound becomes evidence that its divine source cannot be narrower. These arguments distinguish active efficacy, passive receptivity, and potential infinity. Ficino’s earlier appeals to excellent unrealized capacities concern the fitting order he is defending; they do not turn every conceivable possibility into a necessary actual creature.

Book IV uses *virtus* for the extraordinary capacities attributed to plants and stones. Ficino reports that hierobotanum aids physicians’ divination, attributing the claim to the Magi. Agate strengthens sight, blunts poison, and confers strength and fertility. A nearby diamond deprives a magnet of what it attracts. Carnelian checks blood flow and calms anger; onyx provokes anger and terror in dreams. Coral banishes mad terrors and repels lightning and hail, according to the testimony Ficino attributes to Metrodorus and Zoroaster. These are historical natural-philosophical claims, not remedies or verified physical effects. Their argumentative role is to make a mixed body’s extraordinary efficacy evidence of a higher animating nature. A consequential variant concerns agate: the edition follows *fecundiam*, fertility, where later witnesses read *facundiam*, eloquence. The readings attribute different powers.

The scope of possibility is clarified in II.12.15–18. God can produce whatever involves no contradiction, but many possible things never occur in the created order; Ficino mentions number, magnitude, and distances between stars. God makes some things he can make and leaves others unmade through free choice. The earlier arguments from excellent capacities within a fitting cosmic order therefore cannot be generalized into a requirement that every divine potency be actualized.

**The places.**

- **I.4.1–5**. Essence, power, and operation differentiate persistent and acquired capacities.
- **II.4.1–8**. Unlimited effective power is contrasted with receptivity and externally imposed limits.

- **II.12.16–18**. Noncontradictory possibility exceeds what is actually made.
- **IV.1.19–22**. Reported plant and stone powers support an argument for animating causes.

**Further passage references.** I.2.2–I.2.7 (PDF pp. 18–23); I.3.25 (pp. 46–47); I.4.1–I.4.5 (pp. 54–59); I.5.1, I.5.4, I.5.25 (pp. 60–63, 78–79); II.4.1–8, pp. 122–125; II.6.1, pp. 128–129; II.7.23–32, pp. 154–159; II.10.2–7, pp. 176–179; IV.1.19–IV.1.22, pp. 290–293; apparatus p. 389; II.12.15–18, pp. 210–213

**In this edition.**

A single English "power" must not erase the active–receptive distinction. The edition's IV.1.20 agate note reports fecundiam, fertility, against facundiam, eloquence: these would attribute different powers. The extraordinary medicinal and natural effects remain Ficino's historical claims. II.12.17 keeps effectrix distinct from machinatrix.

**See also.**

Act and operation; Motion and stability; Perfection; Unity and multiplicity; Infinity; Matter; Intellect and intellection; Instrument; Life; Purity and mixture; Earth soul; Celestial influence; Habitual possession; Creation; Freedom and necessity

## Precedence and causal regress

**Latin:** *praecedat*; *antecedit*; *prius*; *posterius*; *in infinitum progrediemur*; *progressio*; *ne frustra sit ista potentia*.

**The word.**

*Praecedere* and *antecedere* go before; *prior* and *posterior* mark an ordering whose basis must be specified. *Progressio in infinitum* is an indefinitely continued explanatory sequence. *Frustra* means in vain or without fulfilled purpose. Temporal order, rank and dependence must not be collapsed.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

A generated thing cannot generate itself before it exists: the giving of its beginning must precede it. But the higher cause demanded for an acting fire is not merely the fire that happened earlier, since that producer may already be extinct or far away. The inquiry seeks a source adequate to the present action and the whole kind. In the matter argument, assigning productive power to matter through another power indefinitely fails to explain where such power originates; assigning it essentially would turn the alleged matter into a source of forms. Similar regress arguments require an unmixed form and an incorporeal unifier. A separate principle connects prior substance's possibility of existing without quantity to its realization, lest a perfection remain forever empty. Ficino expressly bounds that claim to the principal order of the universe. It should not become the claim that every event anyone can imagine must occur.

**The places.**

- **I.3.5–6, PDF 30–33.** Generation and the dilemma about matter's productive power
- **I.3.8–9, PDF 34–35.** A past producer is distinguished from a sufficient superior cause
- **I.3.24–25, PDF 46–47.** Regress is arrested at unmixed form; realized possibility receives a cosmic-order qualification

- **I.3.30–32, PDF 50–53.** Unity and the first principle cannot depend on endless further unifiers or beginnings

**In this edition.**

“Prior by nature,” “prior in dignity,” and “before” should retain their qualifiers. “At some time” in I.3.25 translates *aliquando*; the passage also gives the natural philosophers’ alternative that the relevant perfection already exists.

**See also.**

Cause; Principle; Through itself and through another; Power and potency.

## Precious and lowly

**Latin:** vilissimarum; viliora; pretiosiora; pretiosissima; nobilem; formosa; exactissima arte; aptissime consonare

**The word.**

Vilis can mean cheap or lowly, pretiosus valuable or precious, and nobilis distinguished or excellent. Formosus concerns beauty. Here value-language ranks things in the universe and should not automatically be reduced to market prices.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino refuses the objection, attributed to Epicurus and Averroes, that knowledge of the lowest things is beneath divine majesty. The good of the whole order is greater than the excellence of one isolated part; understanding that order requires distinguishing the higher and lower things whose intervals and proportions constitute it.

He then corrects ordinary appraisal. What people call lowest is made with exacting art, and what appears less beautiful in isolation harmonizes fittingly with itself and with other things in the whole. This does not assert that every part is equally beautiful or that all ranks disappear. The argument preserves difference while denying that lower rank excludes an object from divine knowledge.

**The places.**

- II.9.20, II.9.21 (PDF pp. 172–175): The polemic turns from supposed unworthiness to knowledge of the whole order
- II.9.22 (PDF pp. 174–175): Exact craft and relational harmony qualify ordinary judgments of baseness

**In this edition.**

“Commonly called” and “when considered in isolation” are indispensable qualifications. “Impious Averroes” is Ficino’s polemical address, not the lexicon’s judgment or a neutral historical characterization.

**See also.**

Universals and individuals; Order and harmony; Beauty and fittingness; Seeking possessing and distraction.

# Principle

**Latin:** *principium* (principle, origin); *primum* (first); *origo* (origin); *fons* (source, spring); *cardo* (pivot); *fons; principium; initium; finis*

**The word.**

Principium is an originating principle; primum identifies priority. Origo and fons name origin or spring, while cardo is a hinge or governing pivot. “First” can mark explanatory source rather than earliest chronological occurrence.

Fons is a spring or fountain, principium an originating principle, initium a beginning, and finis an end. Their distinctions are locally explained rather than fixed by one universal hierarchy of synonyms.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The first principle is the underived source of things, not merely the earliest member of a temporal sequence or an abstract proposition. Ficino identifies it with supreme unity, truth, and goodness. There cannot be two independent equal first principles, since their common and differentiating features would entail composition or a higher source. Nor can principles rise without end, since an order entirely received from elsewhere would lack an originating and stabilizing source. This priority supports preservation as well as initial production. In II.3.10 Ficino combines philosophical and theological names, describing unity as principle, truth as the principle’s reason, and goodness as the love of the rational principle. He attributes the theology to the apostle John and mentions the Platonist Amelius’s reception of it. The alignment brings these named authorities into Ficino’s own theological synthesis. *Fons* makes the causal meaning vivid: finite things have a source of essence rather than being their own inexhaustible springs.

III.1.26 distinguishes soul as fountain because it has motion from itself and as principle because it pours motion into others. The Apelles example then calls the meadow the beginning and end, while soul is the fountain accounting for the activity’s gradual mode. These local distinctions prevent “source” from erasing the difference between object, final cause, external incitement, and inward temporal operation.

**The places.**

- **II.1.2–7**. Received unities point toward a first unifying source.
- **II.2.1–8**. Competing equal first principles are rejected through dependence and composition.
- **II.3.10**. Unity, truth, and goodness are joined in the theological account of one source.
- **II.7.16**. Completion and origination are connected in causal explanation.

**Further passage references.** II.1.2–7, pp. 98–103; II.2.1–8, pp. 104–109; II.3.1–10, pp. 116–121; II.7.16, pp. 150–151

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.1.26 (Latin PDF p. 256; English PDF p. 257).** Fountain and principle receive explicit, different glosses.
- **III.1.30 (Latin PDF p. 258; English PDF p. 259).** Beginning and end belong to the meadow; the fountain of succession belongs to soul.

**In this edition.**

The English's "principle," "fountain," and "source" overlap without being dispensable synonyms. II.3.10 attributes a theological alignment of principle, reason, and love to John as received by Amelius; this is Ficino's report. III.1.26 explicitly differentiates fountain from principle.

The English's several source-words should be kept visible. Calling soul a fountain of motion does not make it the first cause of its own being.

**See also.**

Cause; Unity and multiplicity; Truth; Good and goodness; End and limit; Motion and stability

Apelles and the meadow; First movable; Through itself and through another.

## Prison and homeland

**Latin:** *carcer*, *claustra*, *vincula*, *compedes*; *patria*, *sedes aetherea*; *carcere caeco*; *compedum terrenarum*; *alis … Platonicis*; *Deo duce*; *tamquam a patre*; *tamquam ad patriam*.

**The word.**

Carcer is a prison; claustra enclosing barriers; vincula bonds; compedes fetters. Patria is homeland, and sedes aetherea an ethereal seat or dwelling. These images provide an evaluative orientation rather than a literal anatomy of soul.

*Carcer* is a prison; *compedes* fetters; *alae* wings; *patria* homeland. *Dux* supplies the guide. The family of images joins confinement, release and orientation rather than offering literal anatomy or geography.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The opening chapter describes souls as enclosed in a dark bodily prison and urges them to loosen earthly fetters, rise on Platonic wings, and contemplate their kind's excellence under God's guidance. This is the book's exhortatory framework for a philosophical ascent. The following sentence explains the method as an argument showing how human minds can perceive immortality and attain blessedness. The immediate explanation links the imagery to purification, contemplation, and reasoning. Homeland imagery returns at the end of Book I when everything is said to aspire to the Good as to its homeland, just as it derives from the Good as from a father. The paired beginning and ending connect estrangement, intellectual return, and fulfillment. "Prison" is an evaluative metaphor here, whereas "body" in the technical chapters receives a detailed account in terms of matter and quantity.

The opening request to loosen earthly bonds is immediately followed by a plan of philosophical demonstration. Platonic wings and God as guide describe the contemplative ascent through arguments, not an instruction to harm the body or accelerate death. The first book closes with father and homeland as paired comparisons for the Good: all things derive their origin from it and aspire toward it. This return resolves the opening image within Ficino's source-and-end argument. The "ethereal dwelling" of the exhortation should not be identified without argument with the later, more specific "ethereal garment" of soul.

**The places.**

• **I.1.1**. The embodied condition is figured as confinement amid darkness.

• **I.1.2–3**. The exhortation turns to philosophical ascent and the intended argument.

• **I.6.19**. All things derive from the Good as father and aspire toward it as homeland.

**Further passage references.** I.1.1–I.1.3 (PDF pp. 14–15); I.6.19 (pp. 94–95)

• **I.1.1–3, PDF 14–15.** Mortality, confinement, release and the forthcoming argument form one continuous opening

• **I.6.19, PDF 94–95.** Father and homeland identify the Good as source and end

**In this edition.**

The opening English retains the force of the imprisonment imagery, but the next statement makes contemplation and argument the proposed mode of ascent. At I.6.19 the paired pater and patria sustain the father–homeland analogy linking origin and end.

The repeated “let us loosen” retains the hortatory address. *Tamquam* in the father and homeland comparison marks figurative relation; its retention avoids turning the passage into a claim about a physical birthplace.

**See also.**

Ascent; Immortality; Blessedness; Good and goodness; Body and bulk

Ascent; Good and goodness; Procession and return; Ethereal garment.

## Procession and return

**Latin:** *profectio*, *conversio*; *procedere*, *converti*; *implicare*, *explicare*, *effundere*, *refluere*, *reformare*, *restituere*

**The word.**

Profectio names going forth or derivation; conversio a turning toward. Implicare enfolds, explicare unfolds, effundere pours forth, refluere flows back, reformare re-forms, and restituere restores. Their causal use need not imply bodily displacement.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino links the source of beings with the goal toward which they turn. The Proem says that mind receives everything from God and should direct everything back to God. At the close of Book I, a more general argument states that the procession of things comes from the point toward which their conversion is directed. Because all things desire the good, while not all desire mind, Ficino infers that the Good is their first cause. “Conversion” here is a turning toward a source or end, not specifically a change of religious affiliation. “Procession” names causal derivation rather than a march through physical space. The closing father-and-homeland comparison gives these relations a personal image: all things originate from the Good as from a father and aspire to it as to their homeland. The unity of origin and end is an asserted principle in the argument, not something established simply by the ordinary definitions of the words.

II.3.10 develops the relation through unity, truth, and goodness. God enfolds all things in unity, unfolds them in truth, and pours them forth through goodness. Things return through goodness, are re-formed through truth, and are restored into one through unity. The sequence differentiates ways of explaining the one source and its effects, rather than

separating three gods or describing material streams. The imagery of flowing therefore belongs to a structured account of causality and perfection; it does not by itself establish involuntary production or a temporal succession within God.

**The places.**

- **Proem.1**. Mind is directed to refer to God what it receives from God.
- **I.6.16**. The source of procession is linked with the goal of conversion.
- **I.6.19**. Father and homeland give origin and return a personal image.
- **II.3.10**. Enfolding, unfolding, outpouring, and return distinguish roles within one divine source.

**Further passage references.** Proem.1 (PDF pp. 6–7); I.6.16, I.6.19 (pp. 92–95); II.3.10, pp. 120–121

**In this edition.**

“Conversion” means turning toward a source or end here, not necessarily religious conversion. The prefix contrasts in implicat/explicat and fluxerunt/refluunt structure II.3.10. Their sequence is explanatory and does not by itself establish successive events or involuntary production within God.

**See also.**

Good and goodness; Cause; End and limit; Appetite and desire; Prison and homeland; Unity and multiplicity; Truth; Circularity and return

## Proclus, Syrianus and extending matter

**Latin:** *Proclo*; *Proclus et Syrianus*; *extenditur*; *extendit*; *cogitari*; *esse*; *subiectum*.

**The word.**

The active *extendit* and passive *extenditur* distinguish what extends from what receives extension. *Cogitari* means to be conceived; *esse* to exist. *Subiectum* is the underlying recipient in the definition being examined, not a modern conscious subject.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino reports Proclus’s classifications of bodies and forms, including celestial bodies described as simple and immaterial while retaining dimensions. He then examines a definition of form that includes acting and determinate actuality but does not explicitly include dimensions. The accompanying argument with Syrianus separates the need for extension in a recipient from the condition of the cause that extends it. If matter can be conceived without division, the extending principle can all the more be conceived and exist without dimensions. The shift from conceivability to existence is the argument’s conclusion, not something the lexicon should hide behind the single word “separate.” The surrounding arguments about whole, parts and unity continue Ficino’s case for incorporeal form; the precise boundary of attribution should be marked rather than assigning every later inference wholesale to both named authors.

**The places.**

- **I.3.28, PDF 48–49.** Proclus’s classifications and definition distinguish matter, dimension and form

- **I.3.29, PDF 50–51.** Proclus and Syrianus are explicitly named for the extending/extended argument
- **I.3.30–31, PDF 50–51.** Unity and whole–part arguments continue the local case

**In this edition.**

“Can be conceived” and “can exist” preserve the explicit *non modo … sed etiam* contrast. “Immaterial” must not here be substituted for “incorporeal”: the passage expressly calls some bodies immaterial.

**See also.**

Incorporeal and immaterial; Form; Whole and parts; Separation and abstraction.

## Productive and designing power

**Latin:** *effectrix Dei potestas*; *mentis potentia machinatrix*

**The word.**

Effectrix is productive or bringing about; machinatrix is capable of devising or designing. Both qualify powers, but one concerns making and the other conceptual range. The feminine forms agree with potestas and potentia.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

II.12.17 distinguishes God’s power to produce from the mind’s capacity to conceive or design. Ficino argues that, once contradiction is excluded, thought ranges through an immeasurable scope of possible being; the productive power of its divine source cannot be narrower. This supports possibilities beyond the existing world. It does not mean that every imagined object is coherent or that every possible thing is created. The paired terms concern different kinds of power, not a single act of mental invention producing its object.

**The places.**

- **II.12.16**. The conceptual character of being provides the modal boundary.
- **II.12.17**. Productive divine power is compared with mind’s designing capacity.
- **II.12.18**. Possible but unactualized arrangements demonstrate the gap between ability and actual creation.

**Further passage references.** II.12.16–18 (PDF pp.210–213); apparatus p.378

**In this edition.**

The edition’s apparatus (PDF p. 378) explicitly retains productive and designing as distinct. Neither word licenses treating every imagined combination as coherent: the argument repeatedly excludes contradiction before comparing the scopes of mind and divine production.

**See also.**

Power and potency; Infinity; Creation; Choice and free judgment

## Proof, signs and qualification

**Latin:** *demonstrare*; *rationibus*; *argumentationibus*; *signis*; *solutionibus quaestionum*; *videtur*; *quodammodo*; *ut plurimum*; *alias*.

**The word.**

*Demonstrare* aims to show or demonstrate; *ratio* may be a reason, argument or explanatory principle; *signum* can be evidence or a sign rather than a geometrical point. *Solutio quaestionum* resolves questions or difficulties. *Videtur* marks seeming, *quodammodo* an "in a certain way" qualification, *ut plurimum* what happens for the most part, and *alias* what is to be addressed elsewhere.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Book I's prospectus distinguishes common reasons, arguments proper to soul, signs and resolutions of questions. They are announced routes of support, not four synonyms for one proof. Throughout the ascent, rhetorical confidence coexists with qualifications: soul's mind is "in a certain way" part of higher mind; embodied minds generally look to sensible things; the number of celestial movers is calculated by a probable argument. Promises to demonstrate matters elsewhere preserve the limits of the present exposition. Attributions matter equally: *Haec Platonici* closes a stated Platonist account, and Ficino explicitly defers what others say about angelic immobility. A lexicon that drops these small expressions can turn a comparison, conjecture or reported view into a stronger universal assertion.

**The places.**

- **I.1.3, I.1.7, PDF 14–17.** The proposed demonstration and fourfold plan of support
- **I.5.11, PDF 66–67; I.5.16, PDF 70–71.** Qualifications govern the relation of mind to soul and embodied cognition
- **I.5.20–22, PDF 74–77.** Probable counting, deference and Ficino's conjectural reconstruction
- **I.6.1, PDF 82–83.** Complete angelic immobility is attributed to the Platonists; other positions are deferred

**In this edition.**

"Seems," "in a certain sense," "for the most part," "perhaps," and "elsewhere" should be indexed where they restrict a claim. *Alias* is not permission to import an unchecked later demonstration into the present unit. *Signis* in the prospectus and *signum* in geometry have different local senses.

**See also.**

Reason and account; Naming and defining; Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds.

## Proportion and analogy

**Latin:** *proportio*, *sicut … ita*, *quemadmodum*, *quanto … tanto*, *magis*, *multo magis*.

**The word.**

*Proportio* names a correspondence of relations. The paired constructions "as … so" and "the more … the more" organize analogy and graded inference; *multo magis* marks an a-fortiori step. Such expressions are argument-bearing grammar, not merely ornament.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Book IV repeatedly argues from lower to higher: if low, dense earth and water have lives, higher, purer spheres should have them still more; if small bodily instruments are alive, heaven as life's instrument should be alive; if ordinary animals are governed by one soul, the more powerful world-animal should be unified at least as strongly. Each inference has a particular shared respect, such as causal efficacy, receptivity, or order. It does not identify every feature of the compared cases.

Proportion can also expose an unacceptable result. Assigning God to the first sphere and other intellects to the others risks making their relative superiority merely proportional to that of the spheres. Ficino rejects that limitation. The body-to-body and mover-to-mover correspondence later supports distinct souls for sufficiently distinct bodies, while universal soul is related to nature as nature to body. These arguments must be assessed through their stated premises; a repeated "as … so" is not independent empirical confirmation.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.10–12 and IV.1.36, PDF pp. 286–289 and 300–301:** greater inward efficacy and higher bodily perfection ground a-fortiori inferences
- **IV.1.59–60, pp. 312–313:** a proportional allocation would wrongly limit God
- **IV.1.68 and IV.1.79–83, pp. 316–325:** living instruments, distinct bodies, and the world-animal supply different analogies
- **IV.2.13–16, pp. 340–343:** the journey explains the succession of celestial operations by explicitly transferred comparison

**In this edition.**

Comparative wording should be preserved rather than reduced to flat assertions. "By the same reasoning" can signal extension of an argument, but the reader must still identify which relation is being carried over.

**See also.**

Cause; Fitting and correspondence; Euclid and the lantern; Whole and parts.

## Proteus

**Latin:** *Protea, mutantem … formas*

**The word.**

Protea is the accusative of Proteus; mutantem … formas describes him changing forms. The name supplies a mythic interpretation of successive productive manifestations, not a new technical term for a distinct cosmic substance.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Proteus appears briefly when Ficino interprets the ceaseless activity of cosmic soul's lowest power. That power holds all its seeds but cannot realize them simultaneously, so it turns successively toward one and then another. The resulting course is called first motion, and its interval first time. Ficino says that he believes this is the Proteus changing forms found in Orpheus. The phrasing marks the identification as his interpretive proposal rather than a definition supplied by the surrounding philosophical argument. The name's function is to render a sequence of changing productive realizations imaginatively intelligible.

Proteus here names the changing realization of productive forms rather than an additional cosmic agent distinct from the soul and its powers.

**The places.**

- **IV.2.12**. The lower psychic power realizes seeds successively; Ficino interprets this through Proteus changing forms.
- **IV.2.10–11**. The preceding distinction between simultaneous intellectual possession and ordered operation supplies the example's context.

**Further passage references.** IV.2.12, pp. 340–341

**In this edition.**

The supplied English retains "I believe" for arbitror and the Orphic attribution. Those words mark Ficino's proposed identification. Protea is the printed inflection; Proteus is the dictionary name supplied for lookup.

**See also.**

Seeds; Eternity and time; Great year; Fate

## Providence

**Latin:** *providentia*, *providere*, *gubernare*, *regere*, *custodire*, *cura*, *praescientia*, *praevisio*

**The word.**

Providentia is intelligent provision and direction; providere can foresee or supply. Gubernare and regere govern, custodire guards, and cura cares. Praescientia and praevisio specify foreknowledge and foresight, narrower than the whole providential activity.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Providence is God's intelligent, loving direction and preservation of his work toward good. Ficino derives it from creative love: the cause that produces both matter and form has a fuller relation to its work than a human artisan or parent, and therefore wills and cares for its good. Providence is not limited to noticing events in advance; it includes the order through which opposed elements coexist, living bodies function, and differing causes act appropriately.

Its mode is both universal and particular. God governs inwardly through the powers and natures he gives, rather than laboring over alien materials from outside. The image of a single hinge or a mechanism moved by one ball explains coordinated variety. Intermediate angelic or psychic governance remains dependent on God and does not displace divine providence. Because the whole consists of particular parts, care for the whole cannot simply ignore them, though Ficino evaluates their perfection by their contribution to the whole.

The final section confronts freedom. Foreknowledge contains not only an event but its cause and free mode. God preserves each nature: elements follow their proper motions, animals walk, and rational souls are persuaded rather than dragged. Their necessary orientation toward goodness remains compatible, in Ficino's account, with free judgment of alternatives. This defended reconciliation distinguishes providence both from mechanical compulsion and from ungoverned chance.

**The places.**

- **II.13.1–3**. Creative love grounds continuing provision for the complete work.
- **II.13.8–14**. Army, inward hinges, and mechanism illustrate unified direction of diverse effects.
- **II.13.16–24**. The argument moves from organic provision to whole–part perfection.
- **II.13.25–30**. Foreknowledge, natural modes, persuasion, and free judgment are reconciled.

**Further passage references.** II.12.21, PDF 214–215; II.13.1–30, PDF 216–237

**In this edition.**

The concrete provisa of food, places, and times in II.13.16 means provided, not merely predicted. In II.13.25 the conditional necessity of foreseen action preserves its known free mode. The final persuasion language must be read with quasi cogit and the retained freedom of particular judgment.

**See also.**

Chance; Choice and free judgment; Contingency; Love and pleasure; Order and harmony; Perfection

## Providential provision

**Latin:** *alimenta; providere; loca; tempora; instrumenta; instruere; temperare; semen*

**The word.**

Alimenta are nourishment or food; providere supplies or makes provision as well as foreseeing. Instrumenta are equipment or organs serving a function. Tempora here are fitting times or seasons, not an abstract definition of time.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The providence argument connects an organism's internal arrangement with its external conditions. Its members serve one another and the composite whole; suitable instruments enable its natural work. Food, places, and times are provided, earth and water prepare nourishment, and heaven tempers earth and water. The following counterfactual imagines missing organs, wrong offspring, and mismatched limbs if no superior counsel ordered things. Seed, figure, season, and end together describe a regular production, rather than furnishing a separate biological classification. Ficino's claims about the completeness of organic provision and the role of heaven belong to his defense of cosmic order. They should not be treated as a contemporary medical or ecological assurance that every living thing always receives what it needs.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.13.16 (Latin PDF p. 226; English PDF p. 227).** Organs, nourishment, places, and times form one provisioned order.
- **II.13.17 (Latin PDF p. 228; English PDF p. 229).** Absent organs and mismatched offspring supply the counterfactual contrast.

**In this edition.**

“Provided for” preserves the concrete sense of provisa and provisurus. Its connection with providentia should remain audible, but translating every such occurrence as “foreknown” would erase the supply of food and equipment.

**See also.**

Providence; Seeds; Whole and parts; Instrument.

## Proximity and causal presence

**Latin:** *proximae*, *praesentia*, *admovetur*, *penetrat*, *penetrante*, *familiaris*, *familiarissima*, *proxime*.

**The word.**

*Proximus* is nearest, and *proxime* immediately or most closely. *Praesentia* is presence; *admovēre* brings something near; *penetrare* enters within. *Familiaris* here frequently means intimately joined or specifically related, rather than socially friendly.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The argument from celestial influences turns on the proximity of a substantial agent. An influence far removed from its celestial living source cannot independently generate a living substance: it must serve a proximate living substance as its instrument. Simply moving one body alongside another is not enough, Ficino argues, because what enters is an accidental effect while the body’s substance remains outside. He therefore requires an incorporeal living agent capable of inward presence. Spatial approach and causal presence are distinguishable.

Later the same vocabulary protects both divine transcendence and the soul’s intimacy with its sphere. God is common to everything and cannot be the exclusively proper mover of one body. Angelic mind, too, cannot be a sphere’s immediately indwelling life. Soul supplies the familiar mover; higher causes supply order and stability. Consequently, “God does not move heaven immediately” does not mean God has no causal role. It denies that the first cause occupies the same explanatory position as the soul’s conjoined motive power.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.3–5, PDF pp. 282–285:** a proximate substantial producer is distinguished from a remote influence and from bodily contact
- **IV.1.29–32, pp. 296–299:** soul mediates between separated mind and body
- **IV.1.54 and IV.1.59–64, pp. 308–315:** intimate movers are required without assigning God to one sphere as its proper governor
- **IV.1.66–67, pp. 316–317:** the immediate motive power is present throughout heaven without bodily extension

**In this edition.**

“Intimately joined,” “proper,” and “immediately” are functionally precise translations. Their familiar English connotations should not erase the difference between spatial distance, hierarchical nearness, and causal mediation.

**See also.**

Indwelling and presence; Cause; Instrument; Proper and common.

## Purity and mixture

**Latin:** *purus*, *puritas*; *commiscere*, *miscere*, *commixtio*, *mixtio*, *inquinare*, *contagio*; *crassitudo*, *simplicitas*, *temperatio*, *temperantia*, *aequalitas*, *complexio*

**The word.**

Purus and puritas describe absence of an alien admixture. Miscere, commiscere, and mixtio concern mixing; inquinare and contagio mark taint. Temperatio and complexio can instead describe a well-proportioned bodily constitution. Mixture is not evaluatively identical in these uses.

The local vocabulary includes *complexio*, *temperatio*, *temperantia*, *intemperantia*, *aequalitas*, *contemperat*, and *segregatae*. Constitution, tempering, balanced condition, imbalance, equality, coordinated mixture, and separation name successive aspects of receptivity.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Purity has distinct metaphysical and bodily applications. In the arguments about God, it means possessing a nature without an alien addition that would restrict it. True wine as pure wine introduces the connection among unity, truth, and goodness. The pattern extends to supreme light, heat, goodness, and necessary being. If two supreme lights differed, their differentiating addition would make their light impure and less than supreme. An angel cannot possess pure necessity in the same unrestricted sense as God when an added property distinguishes it from God. These uses of mixture concern dependence and limitation rather than literal ingredients alone. Divine purity excludes passive potency, causal dependence, and composition.

Bodily purity and tempering concern fitness to receive life and knowledge. Here a well-balanced mixture can be beneficial: earthly mixed bodies become more capable of life as they approach the equilibrium and freedom from grossness attributed to heavenly bodies. Detached elemental parts can lose purity through disturbance; enduring, carefully balanced mixtures can regain an equality associated in this account with extraordinary operations, vegetable life, sensation, and reason. This is Ficino’s historical account of bodily receptivity, not a modern theory of biological development.

The difference matters because mixture is not simply condemned wherever the word occurs. An addition would contradict God’s supreme simplicity, whereas proportion among a body’s qualities can make that body a better instrument of higher powers. *Temperatio* at IV.1.63 denotes a balanced constitution, not temperature, and *complexio* denotes constitution rather than outward appearance alone. “Pure,” “gross,” and “tempered” locate bodies within this explanatory hierarchy; they are not judgments of an individual person’s moral worth.

At IV.1.73 *temperantia* describes the balance of heavenly bodies in contrast with elemental imbalance, not a separately attributed moral virtue. IV.1.89–93 then distinguishes complete elemental spheres from their separated particles. Whole spheres retain their cosmic place and relation to higher causes; scattered parts lose that dignity and purity under external impacts. Careful mixture can restore a balance like the spheres’ balance and thereby prepare successively for extraordinary operations, vegetal life, sensation, and reason. Ficino’s hierarchy concerns degrees and modes of preparedness, not the claim that simple physical purity automatically equals intelligence.

**The places.**

- **II.1.1–4**. Pure wine and pure perfections connect unity with unmixed possession.
- **II.7.12–14**. Angelic being is distinguished from unrestricted pure necessity.
- **IV.1.36–39**. Balanced bodily constitution is linked with receptivity to life.
- **IV.1.63**. Temperatio is debated through the mechanism and animal-motion analogy.
- **IV.1.92–93**. The concluding physical classifications retain their historical and theological qualifications.

**Further passage references.** II.1.1–4, pp. 98–101; II.2.5–11, pp. 106–111; II.4.1, pp. 122–123; II.7.12–14, pp. 148–149; IV.1.36–IV.1.39, pp. 300–303; IV.1.63, pp. 314–315; IV.1.72–IV.1.73, pp. 318–319; IV.1.79, pp. 322–323; IV.1.92–IV.1.93, pp. 330–331; apparatus p. 391

- **IV.1.73, PDF pp. 318–319:** balance is linked with capacity for life and knowledge
- **IV.1.79, pp. 322–323:** an organism's constitution helps distinguish its proper soul from that of a sphere
- **IV.1.89–93, pp. 328–331:** whole elements, separated particles, and rebalanced mixtures have different causal standing

**In this edition.**

"Temperament" or balanced constitution at IV.1.63 renders temperatio, not modern measured temperature. Complexio concerns constitution rather than complexion alone. Red or green light in III.1.10 illustrates qualified actuality; impurity there means addition, not moral guilt.

"Balance" correctly prevents *temperantia* from being read only as ethical temperance here. *Animos non merentur* at IV.1.93 belongs to the historical claim about unsuitable recipients; "do not merit souls" is a metaphor of fitness, not moral blame assigned to particles.

**See also.**

Simplicity and composition; Perfection; Truth; Freedom and necessity; Light and illumination; Elements and their spheres; Daemons; Life; Power and potency

Fitting and correspondence; Archimedes and the bronze spheres; Elements and their spheres.

## Putrefaction and propagation

**Latin:** *putrefactione*, *propagatione*, *serendo*, *plantando*, *germine corporali*, *sponte nascuntur*, *coitum*.

**The word.**

*Putrefactio* is decay or putrefaction; *propagatio* propagation or reproduction. Sowing and planting describe deliberate cultivation, while *germen* identifies a bodily shoot or germ. *Sponte* can mean of itself or spontaneously; it does not, without more, mean without a cause.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Plants and creatures apparently arising from decay are contrasted with those generated by propagation. Ficino's question is where the proper, determinate causes of the former

reside. He rejects the inference that an absence of visible parental seed permits an absence of a specific formative cause. The proposed answer is the earth's common life and its incorporeal seeds. Even sowing and planting are contrasted with alleged spontaneous appearances; external fostering may also account for seeds remaining inactive for a time. The argument moves from what appears unseeded to what must, in his account, have an appropriate productive principle.

The final chapter-summary repeats unseeded plants and animals generated without mating as evidence against depriving the world of life and sensation. These are Ficino's examples under the Platonist account he reports. Neither the repetition nor the argument's confidence validates spontaneous generation by contemporary standards.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.3 and IV.1.7, PDF pp. 282–285:** apparent lack of bodily seeds poses the question of proper living causes
- **IV.1.14–16, pp. 288–291:** putrefaction, sowing, planting, bodily shoots, delayed fostering, and spiritual seeds are distinguished
- **IV.1.96, pp. 332–333:** unseeded plants and creatures without mating return in the closing inference

**In this edition.**

"Seem" at IV.1.7 preserves *videntur*; it should not be silently dropped when describing the initial evidence. "Spontaneously" concerns the apparent reproductive process, while the entire argument supplies a cause for it.

**See also.**

Seeds; Generation and corruption; Seeming and evidence.

## Qualification and attribution

**Latin:** *quodammodo; ut ita dicam; ut ita loquar; forsitan; arbitror; a quibusdam; ut quidam putant; apud Platonicos*

**The word.**

These phrases limit a predication, introduce approximate wording, express a tentative judgment, or attribute a claim. They are small expressions with large effects on what the text actually asserts.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Quodammodo allows forms or powers to be predicated in a qualified respect. Ut ita dicam and ut ita loquar mark conscious adjustments of language, including imitation of divine form and the ordering of beings. Forsitan makes the proposed rationale for a Zoroastrian saying tentative. A quibusdam limits one formulation of the necessity of divine willing to unnamed thinkers; sunt et qui likewise introduces the empyrean classification. Arbitror marks Ficino's assessment that an argument has been established or a riddle resolved. Such qualifications are neither all expressions of doubt nor all dispensable ornaments. Some mark a claim's mode, some its source, and some the confidence with which it is advanced. The immediate context determines which.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.19 (Latin PDF p. 192; English PDF p. 193).** Ut quidam putant reserves one account of knowing matter through the idea of form.
- **II.12.8 (Latin PDF p. 206; English PDF p. 207).** Forsitan and quodammodo qualify the self-production attribution.
- **III.1.23 (Latin PDF p. 254; English PDF p. 255).** Arbitror marks the claimed solution of Xenocrates's riddle.
- **III.2.4 (Latin PDF p. 262; English PDF p. 263).** Sunt et qui introduces a reported cosmological classification.

**In this edition.**

The translation usually preserves these as "in a certain sense," "so to speak," "perhaps," "some," or "I believe." A glossary or shortened quotation must retain the locally important restriction even when English can otherwise smooth it away.

**See also.**

Self-production and reservation; Empyrean heaven; Relations and respects; Xenocrates and the riddle.

## Quality

**Latin:** *qualitas*, *qualitates*; *forma divisa in corpore*; *albedo*, *calor*, *accidentia*; *Letheo flumine*; *partis albedo*; *pars albedinis*; *in genere qualitatum*; *qualitatis … causa*.

**The word.**

Qualitas names a form divided in body in the stated Platonic use; albedo and calor provide whiteness and heat as examples. An accidens is a dependent determination. Quality is neither bodily bulk itself nor every conceivable kind of form.

The local convention in I.3.1 is broader than an ordinary property list: Ficino calls every form divided in body "quality" in Platonic usage. Conversely, the argument that quality is not body does not prove that quality already has the soul's full independent subsistence.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino expressly defines quality, in Platonic usage, as every form divided in body. This is broader than a casual descriptive adjective, but narrower than form in every sense. Quality explains why bodies with the same underlying matter and dimension have different effects: water cools through coldness and fire heats through heat. It is not itself a body, since several qualities can coexist without bodily obstruction; honey's color, sweetness, and fragrance provide the example. Yet a bodily quality depends upon a material subject and is divided with its extension. It thus holds the grade between soul and body, combining act with receptive potency.

The examples of whiteness emphasize different aspects of this dependence. In I.2.17, the whiteness of each divided piece retains the character of whiteness even though its extent changes. In III.2, Ficino presents the natural philosophers' account in which a greater portion of flesh contains a greater portion of whiteness. These are distinct argumentative perspectives: preservation of a qualitative character through division is not the same claim

as undivided spiritual presence throughout a body. Quality is in a sense incorporeal considered in itself but becomes corporeal through reception and division in matter.

The motion vocabulary makes its rank precise. Quality moves another and is moved by another; soul moves itself, while body has no activity through itself. Quality changes in essence and operation, unlike soul's stable substance and changing operations. Its effective action is more fundamental than bodily bulk, but it is not a self-sufficient source. A body's activity can therefore be attributed to quality as proximate instrument and to an incorporeal nature as its sufficient cause without these being rival explanations. In the divine discussion, God cannot receive qualities as accidental determinations in a changing subject. The word consequently neither names a modern rating of excellence nor reduces all formative causation to material properties.

The image of Lethe at I.3.21 makes quality's limited efficacy vivid. Ficino says that as soon as quality is born it is scattered through matter's breadth and depth and plunged, as it were, into the river Lethe. Matter thus overcomes its power before it acts independently; a higher living cause must strengthen and direct it. The river functions as an image of immersion and impaired activity in the argument, not a new physical cause alongside matter and soul.

Retain the prior treatment and sharpen the apparent reversal across I.2–3. Chapter 2 assigns real efficacy to quality against bulk; chapter 3 asks whether quality is sufficient to explain that efficacy. The answer is no because quality is supported by matter and unable to account independently for generation's stable order. These conclusions are complementary. The part-whiteness distinction also gives a concrete lexical explanation of qualified indivisibility: what remains the same is the character of whiteness, with similar power and action, while extent changes.

**The places.**

- **I.2.8–17**. Bodily qualities act while depending on and dividing with their subjects.
- **I.3.21**. The Lethe comparison figures quality's limitation in matter.
- **II.11.2–8**. Received accidental qualities are excluded from the divine first agent.
- **III.1.9–10**. Quality combines actuality with reception and bodily division.
- **III.2.10–12**. Whiteness in flesh contrasts with soul's undivided whole presence.

**Further passage references.** I.2.8–I.2.17 (PDF pp. 22–27); I.3.1, I.3.4, I.3.7, I.3.19–I.3.21 (pp. 28–35, 42–45); I.4.1 (pp. 54–55); II.11.2–8, 19–21, PDF 182–193; III.1.1–3, 9–10, 16–23, PDF 240–255; III.2.9–17, PDF 268–271

- **I.2.15–17, PDF 26–27.** Coexisting qualities and the white-body division establish nonidentity with body
- **I.3.1, PDF 28–29.** The terminology is expressly labelled Platonic
- **I.3.7–11, PDF 34–37.** Real but insufficient quality requires a higher ordering cause

**In this edition.**

At I.2.17 the English preserves "whiteness of a part" versus "part of whiteness"; at III.2.11 it reports the natural philosophers' proportional partition of whiteness with flesh. These are different argumentative respects, not permission to suppress one passage. Lethe at I.3.21 remains an image of immersion and weakened power.

The word order in “whiteness of a part” versus “part of whiteness” must be retained. “In itself somehow indivisible” in I.2.17 keeps *quodammodo* and should not be abridged to “absolutely indivisible.”

**See also.**

Quantity and dimension; Form; Substance and accident; Instrument; Indivisibility; Power and potency; Body and bulk; Essence and substance; Indwelling and presence

Honey, whiteness and the wall; Support, inherence and dependence; Dispersion and concentration.

## Quantity and dimension

**Latin:** *quantitas*, *dimensio*, *extensio*; *magnitudo*, *amplitudo*; *decrementum*, *remissio*

**The word.**

Quantitas concerns amount and spatial extension; dimensio and extensio describe dimension and spreading. Magnitudo and amplitudo concern greatness or extent. Decrementum is decrease; remissio, in the technical contrast, diminution of intensity.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Quantity concerns extension and the multiplicity of spatial parts. Ficino considers whether it is simply matter’s extension or a form by which a higher cause extends matter. In either case, it does not explain effective action upon another body as quality does. The contrast is concrete: approaching something large does not make one large, whereas approaching something hot can make one hot. Quality can also move a sense before that sense judges quantity, as color and light make a wall’s magnitude perceptible. The argument carefully separates the amount of a quality from its character or intensity. A white body’s partition changes extent without necessarily changing the defining character of whiteness; concentrated heat can be more powerful than dispersed heat. “Dimension” is also distinguished from matter in the discussion of celestial forms that possess the former without the latter. These are claims within Ficino’s argument, not a simple equation of quantity with modern mathematical measurement.

A related distinction at I.3.15 separates *decrementum*, decrease in extent, from *remissio*, weakening of intensity. Quality can undergo both; substantial corporeal form can decrease without undergoing the latter. Ficino uses the contrast to argue for incorporeal substantial form subject to neither kind of diminution. The fuller hierarchy of forms therefore depends on two distinct senses of “less,” not two interchangeable labels for quantitative shrinking.

**The places.**

- **I.2.1–4**. Matter, dimensions, and bodily bulk are distinguished from active efficacy.
- **I.2.17**. Partition changes extent without necessarily changing the character of whiteness.
- **I.3.15**. Decrease and remission distinguish three grades of form.
- **I.5.26**. The account differentiates celestial dimension from matter.

**Further passage references.** I.2.1–I.2.4, I.2.9–I.2.17 (PDF pp. 18–27); I.3.19, I.3.25–I.3.29 (pp. 42–43, 46–51); I.5.26 (pp. 78–79); I.3.15, pp. 38–39

**In this edition.**

The supplied “remission of intensity” at I.3.15 clarifies a distinction that plain “decrease” would erase. I.2.17 likewise preserves qualitative character while denying equal extent after division. The contrast between dimensions and matter in I.5.26 must remain an argument in Ficino’s hierarchy, not a modern physics assertion.

**See also.**

Quality; Body and bulk; Matter; Number; Incorporeal and immaterial; Form

## Reason and account

**Latin:** *ratio*, *rationes*, *rationalis*, *argumentatio*; *ratio propria*, *rationes formarum*, *ratio entis* (attested as *rationi entis*), *ratio appetendi*; *rerum rationes universales*

**The word.**

Ratio can be a reasoning act, an argument, an intelligible account, a formative principle, or a respect of consideration. Rationalis can describe a capacity or mode of soul. Rationes need not be propositions verbally entertained by the things they determine.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

*Ratio* has no single fixed English equivalent. It can mean a reasoning activity, an argument, an intelligible account, a formative principle, a defining character, or the respect under which something is considered. The Proem’s Platonic *rationes* are arguments supporting religion, while successive demonstrations may be introduced as a first or second *ratio*. In the whiteness example, *albedinis ratio* is the character of whiteness preserved in each divided part. A *ratio generandi* is a principle of generation, not an argument verbally pronounced by the thing generating. Similarly, the hypothetical *ratio propagandae mentis* concerns a principle for producing mind.

The divine discussion gives further local senses. The phrase *ratio mensuraque idealis* supplies an ideal standard of comparison. In II.3.10 truth is the *ratio* of the first principle within Ficino’s theological alignment. In II.6 reason corrects imagination’s spatial misconception of God, whereas in II.9.16 the *rationes universales* are universal principles that intellect knows and imagination does not. At the end of II.10, what is simple in essence is multiple in a certain respect, *ratione*. This qualifies the plurality of divine knowledge without making God a composite of separate known things.

In the Ideas discussion, the proper *rationes* of a whole’s parts are their intelligible determining patterns, comprehended in the ordering of that whole. The *ratio entis* in the possibility argument is the intelligible character of being with which contradiction conflicts. The *ratio appetendi* is the ground or aspect under which something is desired, namely its goodness. In soul’s productive and cognitive activity, *rationes formarum* likewise concern the principles through which forms are known or realized.

These senses belong to a connected vocabulary of intelligibility and determination, but some name what is known while others name an act of knowing, a ground of desire, or the form of an argument. “Rational soul” therefore identifies a capacity and level of life without saying every operation of that soul is explicit inference. The supplied English’s alternatives—reason, account, principle, argument—often disclose real contextual differences within the same Latin family.

**The places.**

• **I.2.17**. Albedinis ratio is the preserved character of whiteness, not an argument about it.

• **II.3.10**. Ratio names the principle's reason within the theological alignment.

• **II.11.17–19**. Proper accounts of forms and parts explain distinct exemplary relations.

• **II.12.16–17**. Ratio entis specifies the character of being opposed by contradiction.

• **II.13.29**. Ratio appetendi is the aspect of goodness under which desire seeks its objects.

**Further passage references.** Proem.8–Proem.9 (PDF pp. 8–9); I.1.7 (pp. 16–17); I.2.17 (pp. 26–27); I.3.9, I.3.13, I.3.22 (pp. 34–37, 44–45); I.5.12 (pp. 66–67); II.2.7–11, pp. 108–111; II.3.5, pp. 118–119; II.3.10, pp. 120–121; II.6.13, pp. 134–135; II.9.16, pp. 172–173; II.10.10, pp. 180–181; II.11.17–19, PDF 190–193; II.12.2, 16–17, PDF 202–203, 210–213; II.13.29, PDF 236–237; III.2.23, 29, PDF 274–279

**In this edition.**

The English's argument/account/principle alternatives reflect contextual differences. The apparatus (PDF p. 374) notes that II.11.17 concerns intelligible principles; PDF p. 378 explains ratio entis. The difficult III.2.29 wording remains printed as in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque: these semantic glosses do not justify silently emending corporalibus.

**See also.**

Mind; Form; Order and harmony; Species; Soul; Measure and degree; Sense and imagination; Intellect and intellection; Truth; Intuition and comprehension; Good and goodness; Ideas and exemplars; Infinity

## Reason anger and desire

**Latin:** *ratio*, *ira*, *concupiscentia*, *cupiditas*, *libido*

**The word.**

Ratio, ira, and concupiscentia name reason, anger, and desire in a three-power scheme. Cupiditas and libido also express the desiring power locally. Their arrangement determines modes of life, not three anatomical substances inferred by modern science.

The comparative adverbs *magis*, *minus*, *minime*, *multum*, *parum*, *paulum*, and *paulum* make the enumeration readable. These adverbs describe differing predominance rather than twelve wholly different faculties.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The discussion of twelve human lives rests on three powers associated with brain, heart, and liver. Ficino argues that an embodied human cannot live by reason alone, and that anger or desire likewise cannot operate entirely alone. He then derives six lives from the different rankings of all three powers and six more from paired combinations in which one predominates. "Lives" here denotes modes of living ordered by dominant faculties, not twelve reincarnations or twelve chronological stages. The scheme is part of the Pythagorean numerical interlude linking earthly and celestial arrangements. It differs from the three functional levels of cosmic soul described in Chapter 2, although both accounts use *ratio*. The organic assignments belong to Ficino's historical psychology. The several words rendered as desire vary within this passage, while the structure of predominance and subordination is the essential explanatory feature.

IV.1.44 first rules out using none or only one of the three powers. The six three-power lives are then permutations of predominance, followed by six two-power lives distinguished by which of the pair governs. This is a combinatorial moral-psychological example within the Pythagorean excursion. It is not an assertion that a living human can actually discard all embodied dependence and use reason alone. In the sixth three-power case, *ira parum, paulum ratione* needs reading against the ordered series. That contextual ranking is a reason for explaining the enumeration, not by itself a confirmed mistranslation.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.44**. The three powers receive bodily assignments and are said to operate in combinations.
- **IV.1.45–47**. Six rankings arise from the joint use of all three powers.
- **IV.1.48–49**. Six additional rankings arise from paired powers.
- **IV.1.50**. The twelvefold analogy is extended into the cosmic hierarchy.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.44–IV.1.50, pp. 304–307; apparatus p. 391

- **IV.1.44–47, PDF pp. 304–305:** the impossibility of isolated faculties precedes the six three-power rankings
- **IV.1.48–49, pp. 306–307:** each two-power pair is counted in both orders of dominance

**In this edition.**

The English uses desire for concupiscentia, cupiditas, and libido across the permutations; the change of Latin noun should be visible without inventing three extra faculties. “Twelve modes of human life” clarifies duodecim vitae: these are ranked combinations of powers, not reincarnations or successive ages. The brain–heart–liver assignments are Ficino’s historical psychology.

The sixth case has “little anger, and little reason.” The Latin uses *parum* and *paulum*; the expected ranking follows from the sequence, while a strict invariant lexical difference should not be invented.

**See also.**

Twelve; Appetite and desire; Intellectual and animating powers; Reason and account

Twelve; Ruling and following; Head, heart, and members.

## Receiving and giving

**Latin:** *capere; accipere; suscipere; dare; susceptiva; passiva*

**The word.**

The verbs name taking, receiving, or accepting something; dare names giving. Their object determines whether reception is cognition, acquisition of form, material receptivity, or dependent possession. Susceptiva explicitly characterizes a receptive capacity.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

When God is imagined receiving qualities from himself, Ficino separates the giver as efficient cause from the recipient as subject. He rejects that divided role in the first agent. Later, receiving and undergoing characterize body, whereas giving and acting characterize incorporeal nature. This contrast is qualified immediately: quality, soul, and angel all have receptive potency in different respects. Angel receives illumination and intelligible

adornment without being bodily matter. Soul receives what it lacked through a changing act. The celestial-light example makes the receiver decisive: Mercury and the moon receive the same solar illumination in different manners, the latter successively. Thus reception does not by itself identify either a body or an absence of activity. The recipient's nature explains how the gift is possessed.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.3 (Latin PDF p. 182; English PDF p. 183).** Giving and receiving would divide efficient cause from subject within God.
- **III.1.9 (Latin PDF p. 244; English PDF p. 245).** Receiving and undergoing contrast with giving and acting.
- **III.1.12 (Latin PDF p. 248; English PDF p. 249).** Angel receives intellectual form and illumination.
- **III.1.32 (Latin PDF p. 260; English PDF p. 261).** Different receivers illustrate simultaneous and successive possession.

**In this edition.**

"Receive" renders several verbs. The English "passive" should not make every instance sound inert: angelic reception is compatible with stable intellectual activity. At II.13.3, capiant bonitatem concerns receiving goodness according to each nature, not grasping an object with the hands.

**See also.**

Power and potency; Affection and passivity; Angel; Sun, Mercury and moon.

## Redundancy and uselessness

**Latin:** frustra; sufficiet; superfluus; sufficiens; absque fine; transire

**The word.**

Frustra means in vain, fruitlessly, or to no purpose. Superfluus means surplus or unnecessary, whereas sufficere means being enough for a task. In these arguments the question is whether a proposed power or explanatory addition has any work left to do.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The twin-god argument tries several distributions of creative power. If neither creates, both powers are fruitless; if one creates the whole, the other's power adds no necessary effect; if each creates an identical complete world, one world suffices and the other is surplus. If each produces only a half, neither is independently the principle of everything and their coordination again requires explanation. These are conditional branches, not descriptions of multiple real universes.

Frustra has another argumentative role when the human mind's indefinite progress is said to require an infinite terminus. Ficino denies that its orientation could be purposeless. An endless sequence of choices before every choice would likewise prevent any action from beginning. The latter is a regress of prerequisites, distinct from the existence of indefinitely many possible objects of thought.

**The places.**

- II.2.11, II.2.12 (PDF pp. 110–113): Creative powers and duplicate worlds are tested for surplus or fruitless work
- II.4.4 (PDF pp. 122–123): The mind's infinite progression is argued not to be in vain
- II.8.3 (PDF pp. 160–161): An infinite sequence of prior choices would block the beginning of action

**In this edition.**

"Fruitless" aptly renders frustra where it modifies a power, while "in vain" suits the mind's orientation. Neither should be silently reduced to financial waste or physical inefficiency.

**See also.**

Agreement and hypothetical concession; Need and sufficiency; Choice and deliberation; Infinity.

## Relations and respects

**Latin:** *respectus; comparare; prout; quatenus; eatenus; reales; intellecti*

**The word.**

Respectus names a relation or respect of consideration. Comparare sets one thing in relation to another. Prout, quatenus, and eatenus delimit how far or in which respect a predication holds. Reales and intellecti contrast real relations with relations understood by intellect.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The plurality of Ideas is explained through one divine essence considered as exemplar of this or that species. The relations do not arise because created things act upon God; divine intellect compares its own essence with them. Ficino explicitly distinguishes these intellectual relations from the real relations by which the divine persons are said to be distinguished. This local contrast must not become a general dismissal of every relation as fictitious. In the discussion of will, the same act is necessary insofar as it regards divine goodness, while some call it not absolutely necessary insofar as it regards creatures. The limiting words carry the argument: two respects of one act do not require two separate divine wills.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.18 (Latin PDF p. 190; English PDF p. 191).** Quatenus and eatenus explain how many Ideas are understood from one essence.
- **II.11.19 (Latin PDF p. 192; English PDF p. 193).** Intellectual relations are distinguished from relations assigned to the divine persons.
- **II.12.13 (Latin PDF p. 208; English PDF p. 209).** Prout differentiates the act's relation to goodness and to creatures.
- **II.12.15 (Latin PDF p. 210; English PDF p. 211).** The act's relation to effects differs from its absolute relation to God.

**In this edition.**

The English “relations of thought” preserves intellecti. “Imaginary” would add a claim not made here. The formula a quibusdam, “by some,” in II.12.13 is part of the attribution and should remain attached to the necessity distinction.

**See also.**

Ideas and exemplars; Reason and account; Freedom and necessity; Simplicity and composition.

## Returning, referring and reducing

**Latin:** *referat*; *reducat*; *redigatur*; *revertamur*; *convertuntur*; *profectio*; *procedunt*.

**The word.**

*Referre* carries or refers something back; *reducere* leads back; *redigere* brings into a state or reduces to a principle. *Reverti* returns, and *converti* turns toward. “Reduction” here usually concerns explanatory order, not destruction or a reduction in physical size.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The Proem tells the reader that the mind should refer to God all that it receives from God, and depicts Plato as leading every subject back to divine contemplation and worship. Later the argument “reduces” each kind to an indivisible principle, connects lower movers to higher stable ones, and returns from an excursus to the immediate question. These are different operations joined by a directional vocabulary. At the close of Book I, all things’ conversion toward the Good supplies evidence, according to Ficino, of their procession from that same source: origin and goal are coordinated. This theological claim should not be inferred from every ordinary *referre*. In I.2.12, effects “reproduce” their causes through qualities: here *referunt* concerns resemblance, not a spiritual return.

**The places.**

- **Proem.1–3, PDF 6–7.** Reference back to God governs the programme of philosophy
- **I.2.12, PDF 24–25.** *Referunt* describes qualitative likeness of effects to causes
- **I.3.14, PDF 38–39.** Reduction identifies principles within different kinds
- **I.4.3, PDF 56–57.** *Revertamur* signals a return to the question after a supporting argument
- **I.6.16, PDF 92–93.** Conversion toward the Good is correlated with procession from it

**In this edition.**

“Lead back,” “reduce,” “return,” “reproduce” and “turn” must be read with their objects. A single invariant translation would conceal the differences between worship, resemblance, explanatory ordering and argumentative navigation.

**See also.**

Procession and return; Circularity and return; Ascent; Image and likeness.

## Second mind

**Latin:** *mens secunda*; *menti … secundae*

**The word.**

Mens is mind; secunda qualifies a mind receiving from a first source. The ordinal marks its place in a relation of dependence, not a second independent God.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

In III.1.12 Ficino cites a saying attributed to Zoroaster in which the Father perfects things and gives them to the second mind. The surrounding argument concerns angel: its essence receives illumination, intellectual actuality, and forms. Second mind therefore functions here within the hierarchy below God. The phrase should not be interpreted as another independent first principle, or assigned a different theological identity without evidence beyond this passage.

**The places.**

- **III.1.12, PDF pp. 248–249**. The Father gives completed things to the second mind within an argument about angelic reception, illumination, and multiplicity.

**Further passage references.** III.1.12 (PDF pp.248–249)

**In this edition.**

The printed menti … secundae is dative in Ficino's Latin gloss of the attributed Greek saying. The entry's nominative mens secunda is a lookup form, and the English follows the Latin gloss rather than establishing the saying's external textual history.

**See also.**

Angel; Mind; Light and illumination; Act and operation

## Seeds

**Latin:** *semen*, *semina*, *vitalia semina*, *formarum semina*; *semina corporalia*, *spiritalia et vivifica semina*, *naturalia semina*, *generandorum semina*

**The word.**

Semen can be a bodily reproductive seed or an incorporeal productive principle. Corporalia, spiritalia, vivifica, and generandorum identify kinds or roles; they are not interchangeable descriptions of visible seed matter.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Seed-language explains how determinate forms arise from apparently undetermined material. It may name a visible reproductive object or an incorporeal life-giving principle; these modes are connected without being identical. Ficino argues that diverse flowers require corresponding formative seeds and, when these cannot be located in their material, places them in the directing life. Vital seeds of fire likewise explain the production of fire's substantial form where accidental heat has warmed wool. At the end of Book I he speaks more cautiously of seeds of emerging forms hidden in primary matter, adding "so to speak." The passages do not impose one uniform material mechanism.

Book IV develops the inference through earth and water. Spiritual productive seeds explain determinate living products where bodily seeds appear absent and explain how bodily seeds left by their parents are fostered. A decaying grape seed, single and

comparatively base in itself, develops into a varied and ordered vine through powers capable of accounting for those determinations. Similarly, production of actual fire requires a substantial source rather than merely a remote bodily capacity. An appropriate agent both disposes matter and brings forth the determinate living or substantial result. These are arguments within Ficino's historical natural philosophy, not descriptions of modern genetics or independently verified spontaneous generation.

There is a local Latin–English discrepancy at IV.1.11. The supplied Latin makes divine wisdom imbue the vivifying and motive power with natural seeds. Its English translation reverses recipient and content, saying that wisdom imbues natural seeds with the power. The Latin-supported relation places seeds within the productive power; the two statements are not equivalent.

In cosmic souls, seeds belong to the lowest motive power, which possesses its contents together but realizes them successively. Intellectual Ideas, productive seeds, and realized bodily forms remain distinct modes of containment and expression. Successive activation connects seeds to fate, first motion, and time. The proposed finite stock of seeds also motivates a complete productive sequence and its recurrence. Ficino interprets the changing forms of Proteus through this activity, while the numerical cosmic period and reported resurrection argument remain separately attributed claims. The account does not depict miniature bodily organisms stored inside an angelic mind.

**The places.**

- **I.3.22, PDF pp. 44–45**. Vital seeds explain determinate flowers and the production of a substantial form beyond accidental heat.
- **I.6.14, PDF pp. 90–91**. Seed-language is applied cautiously to emerging forms in primary matter.
- **IV.1.11 and IV.1.14–19, PDF pp. 286–291**. Natural seeds belong in the productive power; bodily seeds, their fostering, and alleged unseeded generation remain distinct.
- **IV.2.10–16, PDF pp. 338–343**. Motive powers possess seeds together but realize them successively, linking productive content with fate and imagination.

**Further passage references.** I.3.22 (PDF pp. 44–45); I.6.14 (pp. 90–91); IV.1.9–IV.1.19, pp. 286–291; IV.2.10–IV.2.16, pp. 338–343

**In this edition.**

At IV.1.11 the Latin makes the vivifying and motive power receive natural seeds; the facing English reverses recipient and content. At I.6.14 the qualifying seed metaphor should remain qualified, and Book IV's spontaneous-generation examples are historical claims.

**See also.**

Life; Form; Generation and corruption; Matter; Cause; Reason and account; Fate; Habitual possession; Sense and imagination; Proteus; Great year; Intellectual and animating powers

## Seeking possessing and distraction

**Latin:** quaerit; possidet; distrahitur; divertitur; gravioribus; leviora; eodem intuitu

**The word.**

Quaerere seeks or searches; possidere possesses or holds. Distrahi is to be pulled in different directions or distracted, and diverti to turn aside. These ordinary verbs distinguish successive acquisition of knowledge from a unified possession of it.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

In answering the objection that lowly things are unworthy of divine knowledge, Ficino denies that God must search among external images. God sees things in himself through his essence. Because he possesses rather than seeks, knowing many does not entail labor; because he sees higher and lower in the same gaze, considering the lower does not divert attention from the higher.

The claims address a specific assumed cost of divine knowledge. Human attention can be divided and a search can require effort, but Ficino's conclusion is about the simple first knower. The star-seeing eye then provides a limited analogy for many objects in one act. The distinction should not become a universal disparagement of inquiry: the book itself repeatedly investigates, asks, and argues.

**The places.**

- II.9.20, II.9.21 (PDF pp. 172–175): Possession and one gaze answer distraction, labor, and displacement objections

**In this edition.**

"Weightier" and "lesser" render gravioribus and leviora as comparative importance, not literal mass. "Does not seek but possesses" concerns the mode of divine cognition, not possession of physical goods.

**See also.**

Intuition and comprehension; Eye and gaze; Precious and lowly; Self knowledge.

## Seeming and evidence

**Latin:** *videntur*, *videmus*, *apparet*, *indicat*, *ostendit*, *significant*, *argumento est*, *ut existimat*.

**The word.**

Seeing, seeming, appearing, indicating, and proving are different evidential operations. *Videri* can report appearance without deciding its explanation; *apparere* can mean becoming manifest. *Indicare*, *ostendere*, and *significare* draw attention to evidence, while a clause such as *ut existimat* assigns a belief to someone.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Apparent generation without bodily seeds is an explanandum, not the conclusion that no productive seed exists. Likewise, movements appearing self-originating may be caused by an unseen mover. Ficino explicitly illustrates that problem with iron whose magnet is hidden. An observer's sight of motion does not itself identify the cause. At the same time, the text freely argues from observed order, differing bodily constitutions, and visible

effects to invisible souls. A reader should preserve that inferential step rather than presenting the soul as something directly observed.

The discussion of airy and fiery creatures also distinguishes lack of visibility from absence: Ficino attributes it to the lack of sufficient brightness or density for earthly eyes. Claims about visible or touchable daemons are then assigned to Zoroaster and Porphyry. This is a reported explanation of alleged evidence, not independent verification of the creatures.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.3 and IV.1.7, PDF pp. 282–285:** plants and creatures appear to lack bodily seeds
- **IV.1.38–39, pp. 300–303:** visibility, density, brightness, and attributed daemon reports are distinguished
- **IV.1.74, pp. 320–321:** a hidden magnet exposes an error in inferring self-motion from visible movement
- **IV.1.79 and IV.1.84–85, pp. 322–327:** organic shape, constitution, and cosmic order supply arguments for soul and intelligence

**In this edition.**

“Seem,” “appear,” “show,” and “as … believes” are small but substantive qualifications. Removing them can turn an appearance into an established cause or an attributed report into Ficino’s direct observation.

**See also.**

Hidden mover and magnet; Daemons; Putrefaction and propagation; Assertion, report, and reservation.

## Self knowledge

**Latin:** *se ipsum intelligere* (understand oneself); *se ipsum cognoscere* (know oneself); *se inspicere* (behold oneself); *obiectum* (object); *Nosce te ipsum*; *speculum*; *animadvertere; agnoscere; se ipsam … pingere; mores*

**The word.**

The reflexive phrases se ipsum intelligere, cognoscere, and inspicere identify the knower as object; speculum supplies a mirror-image. Human self-examination and God’s knowledge through his own essence are distinct applications.

Animadvertere apprehends or attends to; agnoscere recognizes; pingere paints or represents. Mores here are character or conduct, not simply inherited customs.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The Proem introduces human self-knowledge through *Nosce te ipsum*, “Know thyself.” Ficino presents Plato as interpreting the oracle to mean that whoever desires knowledge of God must first know himself. Soul is a mirror in which the divine countenance shines; Proem.7 makes the created mind a central mirror through which the Creator’s works and mind can be contemplated and honored. This is Ficino’s reading of the oracle within his theological project. Human self-examination is a preparatory route through a received divine likeness, distinct from God’s underived self-knowledge.

God knows himself first because perfect intelligence must possess the closest possible relation to its object and lack dependence upon something external. Since God’s

understanding is his essence, an outside object that perfected his knowledge would also perfect his being, contradicting his status as first. This self-directed knowledge does not confine God to ignorance of the world. In knowing himself as the cause of all being, he knows the entire range of his power and every mode in which his goodness can be communicated. Ficino first explains knowledge through an ordered sequence of causes, then explicitly says God need not inspect these causes outside himself. He knows particulars distinctly through his own essence. The same reasoning extends to infinite possibilities: knowing the infinite exemplar is knowing its inexhaustible modes of imitation. The self-knowledge vocabulary therefore unites divine independence with comprehensive awareness. It is comprehensive knowledge without successive psychological introspection or withdrawal from lesser things.

Book III extends the earlier divine self-knowledge discussion to soul's reflective and formative activity. Soul paints itself in the likeness of higher beings by contemplation, character, and action. Later its unfolding and refolding of powers produces apprehension of itself and its contents; recognizing its own spiritual essence is termed intellection. This concerns a temporal, received, self-forming life, not the divine identity of knowing and being.

**The places.**

- **Proem.4 and Proem.7, PDF pp. 6–9**. Knowledge of self and created mind's mirror prepare knowledge and worship of the Creator.
- **II.9.7–15, PDF pp. 166–171**. God's immediate relation to his own essence grounds knowledge without an externally perfecting object.
- **II.9.20–21, PDF pp. 172–175**. Knowing things in himself is explicitly distinguished from inspecting their images outside himself.
- **II.10.2–12, PDF pp. 176–181**. Knowledge of the infinite exemplar extends to its inexhaustible possible imitations.

**Further passage references.** Proem.4, pp. 6–7; Proem.7, pp. 8–9; II.9.7–15, pp. 166–171; II.9.20–21, pp. 172–175; II.10.2–12, pp. 176–181

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.1.31 (Latin PDF p. 258; English PDF p. 259).** Self-painting includes ethical character and action.
- **III.2.28 (Latin PDF p. 276; English PDF p. 277).** Self-apprehension is articulated through a sequence of knowing verbs.

**In this edition.**

"Know thyself" is the oracle as Ficino interprets it in the Proem. The mirror is explicitly introduced as a comparison, and divine self-knowledge should not be translated into successive introspection or ignorance of external effects.

"Character" for moribus keeps the ethical dimension of the painting metaphor. "Recognizes" does not alone imply recollection of a previously learned fact; its object here is soul's spiritual essence.

**See also.**

Intellect and intellection; Intuition and comprehension; Ideas and exemplars; Universals and individuals; Essence and substance; Philosophy and theology; Image and likeness

Apelles and the meadow; Looking and recognizing; Spiritual union.

## Self-production and reservation

**Latin:** *semet ipsum agere; gignere; producere; ponere; signare in esse; pervigil; nixus*

**The word.**

Agere ranges from acting to producing; gignere means begetting; producere bringing forth. Ponere and signare in esse evoke positing or sealing in being. Pervigil is ever-watchful; nixus is effort or directed striving. The text actively interprets one verb through another.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino tentatively connects the followers of Zoroaster's statement that God in some manner makes himself with the identity of divine being, understanding, and willing. He then reports how Plotinus explained such language: the divine act remains within itself, is infinitely fruitful, and directs its entire striving toward itself. The successive glosses "acts," "begets," "produces," and "posits or seals" work to distinguish self-grounded actuality from production of an external effect. The conclusion is explicitly what Plotinus wishes to establish. Ficino immediately reserves judgment to God and asks to affirm only what is worthy of God. His next paragraph returns to the narrower proposition that supreme freedom and necessity coincide. Suppressing that reservation would convert an attributed exposition into an unqualified doctrine of a God who first does not exist and then creates himself.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.12.8 (Latin PDF p. 206; English PDF p. 207).** Forsitan and quodammodo qualify the attribution to Zoroaster's followers.
- **II.12.9 (Latin PDF p. 206; English PDF p. 207).** Plotinus is introduced as the expositor.
- **II.12.10 (Latin PDF p. 206; English PDF p. 207).** Fruitful inward activity is distinguished from an external product.
- **II.12.11 (Latin PDF p. 208; English PDF p. 209).** Ficino marks Plotinus's conclusion and explicitly reserves judgment.

**In this edition.**

The English preserves "in some manner" and "roughly." Acto in II.12.10 denotes what is acted or produced and is immediately glossed genito; it should not be silently treated as another occurrence of the abstract noun actus. "Let God himself judge" renders the reservation, not an endorsement.

**See also.**

Act and operation; Freedom and necessity; Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Qualification and attribution.

## Sense and imagination

**Latin:** *sensus*, *sentire*, *sensibilis*; *phantasia*, *imaginatio*, *imago*, *praestigiae*; *materia phantastica*, *spiritus phantasticus*; *ratio*; quinque sensus; singulatim; summatim; discernit; rationes universales

**The word.**

Sensus and sentire concern sensation; phantasia and imaginatio the image-forming and coordinating faculty. Materia phantastica and spiritus phantasticus name its formed medium and mediating spirit, rather than simply an external picture.

Singulatim means separately or one by one; summatim means in a gathered or collective way. Discernere distinguishes or discriminates. Here the contrast marks degrees of cognitive integration, not merely speed.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Sense apprehends bodily features through their qualities, not sheer bulk alone. Ficino's example of a visible wall makes the order clear: color and light affect sight before the wall's magnitude is judged. Embodied minds ordinarily turn toward sensible things in order to understand, whereas separate minds consider what is intelligible in itself. The comparison establishes differences of object and dependence rather than declaring all sensation false. Imagining a soul stripped of sensation, imagination, and generation helps Ficino describe pure angelic mind, while also distinguishing intellect from the soul's wider functions.

Imagination gathers what the five senses receive separately. Intellect sees more clearly, unites what imagination apprehends through many images, and knows universal principles beyond imagination's scope. This coordinating faculty nevertheless misleads when its image-based mode is imposed on eternity or divine presence. It clothes simple, abiding eternity in successive time; it substitutes extended lines for divine rays and imagines God occupying a place within an immense bodily container. Reason answers that corporeal extension and endless subdivision are not the measure of divine greatness. The fault lies in that application of imagination, not in treating the faculty as intrinsically evil.

Book IV emphasizes imagination's constructive mediation. In the geometer comparison, intellectual principles shape imagination from within and through it shape imaginative spirit. This differs from tracing a figure in dust: *materia phantastica* names the internally formed imaginative medium rather than an ordinary material surface. The neighboring account of divine wisdom and natural seeds must be read with a translation discrepancy in view: its Latin places natural seeds in the vivifying and motive power, while the supplied English reverses that relation.

In the Euclid example, the lantern reveals a particular step, imagination conceives it, appetite chooses it, and the feet execute it. The named traveler comes from Megara to hear Socrates; this does not identify him with the geometer of the separate analogy. Celestial imagination similarly attends to a seed presented by the motive power and unfolds the corresponding configuration. Imagination thus mediates both particular cognition and directed bodily realization. Its relation to reason changes with context, just as *ratio* elsewhere names an account or principle rather than the faculty opposed to imagination.

The five senses receive their objects separately; imagination gathers their contributions and adds something higher; intellect sees in one what imagination presents in many images and also knows universal principles. Crucially, Ficino says intellect sees individual

things more clearly as well. The ascent to universals is therefore not presented as losing particulars. God's single power is argued to encompass what humans know through the three levels.

**The places.**

- **I.2.13 and I.3.2, PDF pp. 24–29**. Sensible qualities, rather than bare bulk alone, account for the visible wall and its cognition.
- **II.5.2–3 and II.6.12–14, PDF pp. 126–137**. Image-bound imagination distorts eternity and divine presence when it imposes spatial or successive models.
- **IV.1.11, PDF pp. 286–287**. The geometer forms imagination from within, unlike drawing in dust.
- **IV.2.13–16, PDF pp. 340–343**. Imagination receives a particular displayed step or seed and mediates its desired execution.

**Further passage references.** Proem.9 (PDF pp. 8–9); I.2.13 (pp. 24–25); I.3.2, I.3.26 (pp. 28–29, 46–47); I.5.16 (pp. 70–71); I.6.9 (pp. 86–87); II.5.2–3, pp. 126–127; II.6.12–14, pp. 132–137; II.9.16, pp. 172–173; IV.1.11, pp. 286–287; IV.2.13–IV.2.16, pp. 340–343

- II.9.16, II.9.17 (PDF pp. 172–173): Integrated cognition retains individuals while adding universal principles and every mode of being

**In this edition.**

The same imagination that misleads when bodily imagery is imposed upon eternity mediates successful action in Book IV. The geometer and the Euclid traveling from Megara are separate examples; the IV.1.11 seed/power reversal must not be used to reconstruct their causal sequence.

"Collectively" for summatim here parallels its use for divine intuition in II.10.10, but the powers are not thereby identical. The local hierarchy and the qualifications of divine names remain necessary.

**See also.**

Mind; Intellect and intellection; Image and likeness; Quality; Eternity and time; Omnipresence and place; Reason and account; Ideas and exemplars; Art and nature; Seeds; Appetite and desire; Spirit

Intellect and intellection; Universals and individuals; Counting and collective intuition.

## Separation and abstraction

**Latin:** *separare*, *seiungere*; *separatus*, *seiunctus*; *seorsum*, *absolutus*; *formae naturales*, *mathematicae*, *metaphysicae*; *certa materia*, *incerta materia*; *punctum*, *numerus*, *unitas*, *situs*

**The word.**

Separare and seiungere concern separating or disjoining; seorsum means apart; absolutus can mean free of a restricting attachment. Abstraction in thought and independent existence are related but distinct senses.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The text links the mind's ability to separate forms in thought with the existence of forms and minds separate from body. These are related but distinct claims. In one argument,

even an opponent who grants only intellectual separation of otherwise conjoined forms must admit, Ficino says, that the minds performing this separation are themselves separate. Other arguments concern self-subsistence directly: incorporeal form need not depend on a material subject, and a superior mind can live apart from body and bodily motion. *Absolutus* often means free from a limiting attachment, not "absolute" in every later philosophical sense. A mind contracted to an embodied soul's capacity contrasts with a free and lucid mind existing in itself. Separation performed in thought and separation asserted as a mode of existence remain distinct parts of the argument. An object's mathematical generality alone is not the whole of the claim about independent being.

I.3.12 gives a precise ladder. Natural forms are bound to determinate kinds of matter; mathematical forms require only indeterminate matter; metaphysical forms require neither determinate nor indeterminate matter. The next comparison separates divisibility from position: dimensions require both parts and position; a point lacks parts but remains related to position; number has parts without spatial position; unity needs neither. The mind then rises beyond indivisible but accidental unity to substantial unity or form, the stable ground of changing accidents. Ficino argues from the limited human mind's ability to make this ascent to the greater power of the universal order from which that mind derives. This makes the passage an argument about degrees of independence and their real ground, rather than simply the extraction of a general feature from particular examples.

**The places.**

- **I.3.12–14, PDF pp. 36–39**. The mind ascends through kinds of form and through dimensions, points, number, and unity while distinguishing parts from position.
- **I.3.24–29, PDF pp. 46–51**. Intellectual separation supports arguments for forms and minds not dependent upon bodily recipients.
- **I.5.16–17, PDF pp. 70–73**. Conjoined minds and separately existing minds differ in completeness and characteristic objects.

**Further passage references.** I.3.12, I.3.24–I.3.29 (PDF pp. 36–37, 46–51); I.5.14–I.5.17, I.5.23–I.5.27 (pp. 68–73, 76–81); I.3.12–14, pp. 36–39

**In this edition.**

"Free" and "separate" should retain their specified object of freedom. The ladder of natural, mathematical, and metaphysical forms explicitly contrasts determinate matter, indeterminate matter, and freedom from either; it is not just a generic process of forming broad concepts.

**See also.**

Form; Incorporeal and immaterial; Mind; Angel; Number; Quantity and dimension; Unity and multiplicity; Matter

## Shadow and mirror

**Latin:** umbra; umbratilis; imaginarium; vanum; vanior; speculo; imagines

**The word.**

Umbra is a shadow; umbratilis means shadow-like. Speculum is a mirror. Imaginarium means image-like in this context, and vanum marks relative emptiness or insubstantiality. These words must be read with the comparison to the cause that qualifies them.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The effect produced wholly by its cause requires continuing support, as a shadow depends on a body. Ficino then intensifies the comparison: finite world to infinite God is even more dependent than a finite shadow is to its finite body. The point is not that the world is a hallucination. Its received being is contrasted with the self-subsisting source's substance.

The mirror image adds the simultaneity of production and preservation. Images are both made and sustained in a mirror through bodies. The first cause's dominion likewise includes continuing dependence, not merely a past outflow. Ficino uses this to explain why God acts in the operations of subordinate causes. Shadow and mirror thus perform different but related work: relative ontological frailty and ongoing causal support.

**The places.**

- II.7.22 (PDF pp. 154–155): The shadow models the whole effect's dependence on its producing cause
- II.7.23 (PDF pp. 154–155): Finite–infinite comparison intensifies the image; the mirror links making and preserving

**In this edition.**

"Image-like" is preferable here to an unqualified "imaginary" if the latter suggests that nothing real has been produced. The supplied "compared with" and "as it were" preserve the relative and analogical framing.

**See also.**

Image and likeness; Surpassing and comparison; Conservation and preservation; Cause.

## Shadows and dependence

**Latin:** *umbra; sub umbra; lux; degenerare; vitalis umbra*

**The word.**

Umbra is a shadow. Sub umbra figures a subordinate position relative to a higher cause; vitalis umbra names a life-bearing manifestation in a divisible body. Degenerare here is falling below a producer's perfection, not a charge of moral depravity.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The light of God gives angel and soul their unity and actuality, while their position beneath higher beings explains what they lack. Angel is under God's shadow and therefore manifold; soul is also under angel's shadow and therefore changeable. Ficino expressly glosses being under God's shadow as being beneath God, together with angel. This guards against treating shadow as an additional dark substance causing evil. Later the soul diffuses its vital shadow through bodily division while remaining whole and indivisible itself. That second use explains how one source has differentiated bodily effects. The two contexts are related by dependence and diminished manifestation, but one names a rank below a higher being while the other names a lower manifestation of soul's own life.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.1.17 (Latin PDF p. 250; English PDF p. 251).** Light and shadow differentiate received perfection from subordinate limitation.

- **III.1.19 (Latin PDF p. 250; English PDF p. 251).** The text glosses God's shadow as being beneath God.
- **III.2.19 (Latin PDF p. 272; English PDF p. 273).** The vital shadow is divisible with body while soul remains whole.

**In this edition.**

The English retains "shadow" and the explanatory "that is." Neither context identifies an evil rival principle. "Falls away" or "falls below" should not silently become a narrative of an individual angel's sin.

**See also.**

Light and illumination; Degree and mediation; Indivisibility; Image and likeness.

## Simplicity and composition

**Latin:** *simplicitas* (simplicity); *simplex* (simple); *compositus* (composite); *compositio* (composition); *pars*, plural *partes* (part, parts)

**The word.**

Simplex and simplicitas concern absence of composition; compositus and compositio the dependence of a whole on joined constituents. Parts need not be spatial pieces: a common nature and a distinguishing property can make a proposed being composite.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Simplicity means absence of the internal dependence entailed by composition, not lack of intelligence or explanatory richness. A composite needs its parts, the mutual relation of those parts, and the source that joins them. It can therefore be neither first nor self-sufficient in the unrestricted sense. The argument against two equal gods turns on this point: a common nature plus distinguishing properties would make each composite. God is supreme unity and therefore wholly simple, while whatever is besides God is described as manifold and composite. Divine simplicity also governs predication. God's being, understanding, and operation cannot be independent components combined in a subject. Yet simplicity does not prevent knowledge of diverse things; one divine form can contain their differences in power and in a certain rational respect. The doctrine thus requires a careful distinction between multiple explanatory names or known effects and an actual assembly of divine parts. Lack of bodily dimensions alone therefore does not make all incorporeal things equally simple.

The proof also has a modal consequence. What depends on parts joined together would be exposed to their separation, so composition is incompatible with the supreme necessity of being. This inference is stronger than saying that a particular composite happens to be durable. Conversely, God's complex-looking list of attributes does not amount to a parts list. Unity, truth, and goodness can be named according to different explanatory roles while remaining one substance. Knowledge of many individuals likewise need not insert their created differences into God as separate pieces. Ficino's one form contains all forms in power, explaining omniscience without internal aggregation. Such qualification is required wherever English plurals such as "attributes," "powers," or "ideas" might otherwise suggest constituent elements.

**The places.**

- **II.1.1–3, PDF pp. 98–101**. Unity, truth, and goodness are presented as one source rather than three assembled constituents.
- **II.2.2–7, PDF pp. 104–109**. Two supposed gods sharing a nature but distinguished by properties would each be composite and dependent.
- **II.7.9–10, PDF pp. 146–149**. Dependence on parts is connected with separation and the necessity of first being.
- **II.9.7–13 and II.10.10–12, PDF pp. 166–181**. Knowledge of multiple things is explained without inserting their differences as assembled divine pieces.

**Further passage references.** II.1.1–3, pp. 98–101; II.2.2–7, pp. 104–109; II.3.10, pp. 120–121; II.7.1–2, pp. 144–145; II.7.9–10, pp. 146–149; II.9.7–13, pp. 166–169; II.10.10–12, pp. 180–181

**In this edition.**

The plural names of divine attributes do not automatically designate separate parts. The supplied English's "common nature" and "property" at II.2.3 make a nonbodily kind of composition explicit, while "pure wine" illustrates unified genuineness at II.1.1.

**See also.**

Unity and multiplicity; Freedom and necessity; Whole and parts; Purity and mixture; Intuition and comprehension

## Soul

**Latin:** *anima*, *animus*, *anima rationalis*, *anima irrationalis*; *tertia essentia*, *essentia tertia*, *copula mundi*, *nodus*, *connexio*; *tres rationalium animarum gradus*, *anima mundi*, *sphaerarum animae*, *animae … in sphaeris*

**The word.**

Anima and animus name soul in overlapping uses; rationalis specifies the rational kind. Tertia essentia places soul at the third metaphysical grade, while copula, nodus, and connexio describe its mediating function.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Soul is the third and middle grade in the fivefold order, below God and angel and above quality and body. It joins intellectual life to the inward communication of life and motion to bodies. The rational soul is an incorporeal, indivisible, self-subsisting form, yet unlike angel it is not immobile in every respect. Its essence remains while its operations change; its power has both enduring natural vigor and a changeable acquired aspect. Mind is within soul without exhausting its functions, which also include sensation, imagination, and generation. Ficino further describes an irrational soul accompanying rational soul as a shadow accompanies a body. *Animus* is prominent in the title, Proem, and exhortations, while *anima* dominates the technical hierarchy; the local uses do not establish an absolute system-wide separation of their meanings.

Book III defines rational soul as a life understanding discursively and vivifying body in time. Neither consciousness considered alone nor bodily animation alone captures its mediating role. It knows higher realities through spiritual union and gives life to lower ones through inward motion, maintaining both relations at once. The names center of

nature, middle of the universe, chain of the world, countenance of all things, knot, and bond of the world describe these powers and relations rather than additional entities. Soul contains images and gifts of higher realities and exemplary productive principles of lower ones. Its presence is whole in each bodily part: it is neither a spatial point lodged in one place nor a quality partitioned with bodily extension. Self-motion does not make it independent of God; it supplies the temporal manner of activity while receiving higher actuality and direction.

Book IV subdivides this middle grade into three ranks of rational souls: one world-soul; twelve sphere-souls; and the many souls living within particular spheres. Thus a star can possess its own soul within a sphere, and a human has a proper soul within the earth's region. This threefold subdivision does not replace the fivefold hierarchy. The intervening Pythagorean numerical scheme adds principal governing souls, while the concluding classification preserves the distinction among world, spheres, and inhabitants. Ficino subjects the narrated account of sphere-souls to examination and approval by Christian theologians.

A further qualification concerns activity within celestial souls. IV.2.10 says that their highest minds possess all Ideas together both habitually and actually; their lowest bodily motive powers possess all productive seeds but actualize them successively. Their middle reason can become stable through absorption in mind because their bodies require little administration. Human reason, by contrast, is drawn into the laborious governance of a needy body. Consequently, the general description of soul's successive operation does not mean every activity of every soul must be successive. IV.2.11 even reports an ordered rational return completed in one moment as "eternal motion."

The opening program announces common reasons, arguments proper to soul, signs, and solutions to questions in support of immortality. These first four books establish and develop the hierarchy and mediation within that larger project; they do not contain all the specialized demonstrations promised for the work.

**The places.**

- **I.1.7, PDF pp. 16–17**. The five-grade program places rational soul in the middle and announces the larger demonstration.
- **III.2.8 and III.2.28–30, PDF pp. 266–279**. Soul joins knowing higher realities with inwardly vivifying bodies and is defined through discursive cognition.
- **IV.1.37 and IV.1.96, PDF pp. 300–301 and 332–333**. Proper creature-souls are distinguished from sphere-souls and world-soul; the cosmic account receives a theological condition.
- **IV.2.9–11, PDF pp. 336–339**. Celestial mind, reason, and lower motive powers qualify the broad description of soul's temporal activity.

**Further passage references.** Proem.2, Proem.4–Proem.7 (PDF pp. 6–9); I.1.1–I.1.7 (pp. 14–17); I.3.33 (pp. 52–53); I.4.1–I.4.5 (pp. 54–59); I.5.1, I.5.11–I.5.14 (pp. 60–61, 66–69); I.6.14 (pp. 90–91); II.13.25–30, PDF 234–237; III.1.1–32, PDF 240–261; III.2.1–30, PDF 262–279; Book IV title, p. 281; IV.1 heading and IV.1.1, pp. 282–283; IV.1.37, pp. 300–301; IV.1.50–IV.1.52, pp. 306–309; IV.1.96, pp. 332–333; IV.2.9–11, pp. 336–339

**In this edition.**

Anima is not synonymous with only conscious thought, and animalis in Book IV means animating or belonging to bodily life. The general account of successive operation is

qualified by celestial mind's simultaneous possession and by the explicit discussion of eternal motion.

**See also.**

Mind; Life; Immortality; Degree and mediation; Motion and stability; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Intellect and intellection; World soul; Spheres and stars; Twelve; Earth soul; Intellectual and animating powers; Habitual possession; Eternity and time; Bond knot and chain

## Sowing and weaving

**Latin:** *semina*, *serit*, *parit*, *telam generationis retexere*, *explicat*, *promat*, *mutantem Protea formas*.

**The word.**

*Serere* sows; *parere* brings forth; *tela* is a woven fabric or web; *retexere* can weave again. *Explicare* unfolds or makes explicit, while *promere* brings out. These productive images describe successive realization of principles already held in another manner.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The lower celestial power cannot act upon all its seeds at once. It continually strives toward them, realizing one and then another. The resulting course supplies first motion and first time. Ficino identifies the changing Proteus with this process as his interpretation. Because the stock of seeds is finite, the course must eventually either rest or pass through them anew; the latter option becomes weaving the same fabric of generation again. The return of causes and effects and its use in an argument about bodily resurrection are then attributed to Zoroaster and successors.

The later expression "sows in heaven, brings forth in the elements" marks differentiated levels of manifestation. A celestial configuration is not already the same thing as its generated elemental product. Nor does weaving prove the asserted cosmic period: the thirty-six-thousand-year figure is separately reported as Platonic. The metaphors clarify succession and causal articulation without independently establishing the historical cosmology.

**The places.**

- **IV.2.10–12, PDF pp. 338–341:** possession of seeds, successive actualization, Proteus, the rewoven fabric, and the reported cosmic recurrence
- **IV.2.15–16, pp. 342–343:** one seed-kind is brought forth for attention, unfolded in heaven, and generated in the elements
- **IV.2.20, pp. 344–345:** matter seeks through succession perfections it cannot hold together at rest

**In this edition.**

"Weave again" preserves the recurrent force of *retexere*. The source's alternative "either … or" and Ficino's "I believe" should remain visible, as should the attribution of recurrence and its numerical span.

**See also.**

Proteus; Seeds; Great year; Fate; Assertion, report, and reservation.

## Species

**Latin:** *species*; *species naturalis*; *species rerum intellectarum*

**The word.**

Species can mean a kind, a determining form, or a form presented to cognition. A natural species, the species completed by a separate mind, and the intelligible species of understood things differ in immediate role.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

*Species* can mark a determinate kind, a form, or what is presented to cognition. The context must decide. Bodies belong to this or that species through form rather than bulk. The discussion of fire's substantial species concerns what makes fire the kind of thing it is, not merely its visible appearance. Separate minds are said to complete their own species, whereas a soul joined to a body is part of a composite living kind. In angelic intellect, the numerous *species* of understood things are intelligible forms or contents, not additional material organisms. The account of angelic abundance likewise compares species of separate substances with species of corporeal things. "Species" therefore has a wider range than a modern biological classification, while "idea" would fit only some contexts. Ontological kinds, bodily form, and intelligible objects remain distinguishable uses.

**The places.**

- **I.2.9 and I.3.22, PDF pp. 22–23 and 44–45**. Formal determination makes a thing belong to a kind, and substantial species distinguishes fire from accidental heat.
- **I.5.16, PDF pp. 70–71**. A separate mind completes its own species, unlike an embodied soul as a part of a composite living kind.
- **I.5.23–27, PDF pp. 76–81**. The plurality of intellectual species is compared with bodily kinds.
- **I.6.4, PDF pp. 82–83**. Species rerum intellectarum are the forms of things understood within intellect.

**Further passage references.** I.2.9 (PDF pp. 22–23); I.3.22, I.3.28 (pp. 44–45, 48–49); I.5.15–I.5.16, I.5.23–I.5.27 (pp. 70–71, 76–81); I.6.4, I.6.14 (pp. 82–83, 90–91)

**In this edition.**

The English alternates "species" and "forms" according to context. Restricting every occurrence to modern biological taxonomy would misread separate intellectual species and the forms contained in intellect.

**See also.**

Form; Reason and account; Intellect and intellection; Angel; Art and nature

## Spheres and stars

**Latin:** *sphaerae*, *globi*, *caeli*, *stellae*, *sidera*; *caelum empyreum*, *prorsus immobile*, *in aeternitate*

**The word.**

Sphaera and globus name a cosmic sphere or globe; caelum heaven; stella an individual star; sidus may designate a constellation or stellar configuration. Their scopes differ even when English uses a general heavenly noun.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino's account distinguishes a sphere from the living beings contained in it. The eight heavenly spheres have corresponding souls, while stars can possess particular souls differing in species because their size, light, powers, and motions differ. The four elemental spheres complete the total of twelve cosmic spheres. These distinctions explain why "soul of heaven," "soul of a sphere," and "soul of a star" are not universally substitutable expressions. The vocabulary is flexible: *sidus* in the zodiacal passage concerns a constellation imagined as a creature with a principal star as its heart, while other heavenly terms occur more broadly. Ficino argues that the simplicity, subtlety, and balanced constitution of celestial bodies make them more receptive to life than gross earthly mixtures. These are propositions of his historical cosmology, accompanied by the concluding theological reservation, rather than a description to be updated silently into modern planetary or stellar mechanics.

The empyrean heaven appears in a separate, expressly attributed classification at III.2.4. Ficino says that there are those who place it within eternity as wholly motionless, the other spheres in eternity and time together, and composite things in time alone. The contrast illustrates different relations to stability and change around soul's role as a bond between eternal and temporal things. This reported scheme does not add an unqualified new count to every other celestial classification in the work. The supplied apparatus retains *prorsus immobile*, wholly motionless, from M1482 and P1641 against G1559's opposite reading, *prorsus mobile*. These witness readings are reported by the edition's apparatus; the passage itself supplies neither a physical description nor an etymology of the empyrean.

**The places.**

- **III.2.3–5, PDF pp. 262–265**. An explicitly attributed classification relates the empyrean, other spheres, and composites differently to eternity and time.
- **IV.1.35–43, PDF pp. 298–305**. Elemental globes, eight heavens, their inhabitants, and zodiacal creatures occupy different levels.
- **IV.1.71–73 and IV.1.96, PDF pp. 318–319 and 332–333**. Subtle balanced bodies are argued to receive life; the conclusion remains under the theological reservation.
- **IV.2.24–25, PDF pp. 348–349**. Saturn's sphere and the surrounding eighth sphere illustrate natural place through nested surfaces.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.35–IV.1.43, pp. 298–305; IV.1.71–IV.1.73, pp. 318–319; IV.1.96, pp. 332–333; IV.2.24–IV.2.25, pp. 348–349; III.2.3–5, pp. 262–265; apparatus note for III.2.4, p. 385

**In this edition.**

The supplied apparatus retains prorsus immobile for the reported empyrean scheme at III.2.4 against an opposite witness reading. This attributed scheme should not silently alter the count of twelve cosmic spheres, which combines eight heavens with four elemental spheres.

**See also.**

Elements and their spheres; Soul; Circularity and return; Zodiac; Eternity and time; Motion and stability

## Spirit

**Latin:** *spiritus*, *spiritus phantasticus*, *spiritalis*, *quasi spiritalia*

**The word.**

Spiritus may name a cognitive or physiological medium; spiritalis may describe incorporeal activity or principles. Quasi spiritalia is a qualified comparison for unusually subtle bodies, not their removal from bodily status.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The term's immediate context matters. In the geometer analogy, imaginative spirit is shaped through imagination, linking intellectual pattern with a lower medium. In the account of celestial action, spirits and humors in the human being are stirred and formed by powerful thought and affect. Yet *spiritalis* can also mark incorporeal productive seeds, while celestial bodies are called almost spiritual because of their exceptional subtlety. The latter phrase does not remove their bodily status: Ficino continues to distinguish a body from the soul animating it. The family of words accordingly distinguishes incorporeal principles from perceptual and physiological media. What Book IV supplies is a set of mediating roles and comparisons. The separately named ethereal garment belongs to a related context, but these passages do not identify it with every form of *spiritus*.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.11 and IV.1.16, PDF pp. 286–291**. Imaginative spirit mediates inward formation, whereas spiritual seeds are productive principles.
- **IV.1.72, PDF pp. 318–319**. Celestial bodies are almost spiritual because of simplicity and subtlety, yet remain bodies animated by spirits.
- **IV.2.16, PDF pp. 342–343**. Human spirits and humors supply the bodily analogy for changing psychic affections.
- **IV.2.26–27, PDF pp. 348–351**. The ethereal garment's fuller discussion is deferred.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.11, pp. 286–287; IV.1.16, pp. 290–291; IV.1.72, pp. 318–319; IV.2.16, pp. 342–343; IV.2.26–IV.2.27, pp. 348–351

**In this edition.**

"Almost spiritual" at IV.1.72 preserves quasi. Spiritus in the visual or imaginative medium and spirits beside humors in bodily response should not all be silently identified with the separately named ethereal garment.

**See also.**

Sense and imagination; Affect; Seeds; Ethereal garment

## Spiritual union

**Latin:** *spiritalis*, *spiritus*, *spiritalis unio*, *cognitio*, *intellectio*, *coniungi*

**The word.**

Spiritalis unio means joining in a nonbodily mode; cognitio and intellectio identify the resulting knowledge and understanding. The spiritus of sight is a mediating medium, not simply a synonym for the whole soul.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Spiritual union is Ficino's explanation of knowing: a cognitive power joins an appropriate form in a non-bodily manner. Soul's adherence to divine things generates knowledge because the union is spiritual. Later he says that knowledge is a spiritual union with a spiritual form, and extends the explanation to the mind's self-knowledge and apprehension of higher and bodily realities.

Sight provides an analogy with its own more specific vocabulary. Through its *spiritus*, sight joins a spiritual image of colors; merely placing a solid body against the eyes produces no vision. Here *spiritus* names the medium through which sight receives an image; its role differs from soul as a whole or a general designation of incorporeality. The point of the example is the distinction between cognitive reception and gross physical contact. This does not mean that the mind fails to know bodily things: Ficino explicitly assigns them to its objects. At III.2.29 the supplied Latin reads *in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque*, which its English interprets as forms and principles of things within bodies. The phrase is textually delicate, but neither the supplied reading nor the general argument requires silently replacing *corporalibus* with *incorporalibus*.

**The places.**

- **III.2.8, PDF pp. 266–267**. Soul knows higher realities by spiritual union while giving life to bodies inwardly.
- **III.2.28, PDF pp. 276–277**. Knowledge is explicitly described as spiritual union with a spiritual form.
- **III.2.29–30, PDF pp. 278–279**. Vision, self-understanding, higher objects, and bodily objects lead into rational soul's definition.

**Further passage references.** III.2.8, PDF 266–267; III.2.28–30, PDF 276–279

**In this edition.**

At III.2.29 the supplied Latin reads in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque; the English construes forms and principles within bodies. Preserve that unresolved wording rather than silently replace corporalibus with incorporalibus. The visual comparison distinguishes image-reception from pressing a solid object against the eye.

**See also.**

Form; Indwelling and presence; Intellect and intellection; Soul

## Spring and flow

**Latin:** manaverint; profluit; vena; scaturiens; scaturiet; refluet; effluxus; fluit; fluitat; fluxum; fons; influxu

**The word.**

Fluere means flowing, while fluitare adds the sense of drifting or being unsettled. Scaturire evokes welling up from a spring; vena can mean a vein or channel supplying a spring. Fons names a source. These physical terms become models for derivation and dependence.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

In the two-principle argument, features springing from the same unrestricted nature would arise in the same way and flow inward again; this challenges their alleged difference. The following chapter turns flow into a test of dependent being: whatever flows from another is

not its own stable source. Without a first principle, Ficino argues, all things would be in flux and the stability actually encountered would lack explanation. Liquid restrained by a solid illustrates the need for something unlike the flux it holds.

The metaphors are not uniformly negative. Outflow can mean productive bestowal; return-flow can mean restoration; divine influx preserves natural things. A source is most perfect in itself in II.7.16, where the word supports an argument against matter, world, and mind being their own essential origins. Context determines whether flowing means generous production, received existence, unstable dependence, or return.

**The places.**

- II.2.4 (PDF pp. 106–107): The same vein and mode of outflow challenge allegedly different properties
- II.3.3, II.3.7, II.3.8 (PDF pp. 116–119): Flow and drifting are distinguished from the stable source that restrains them
- II.3.10, II.7.16, II.7.17 (PDF pp. 120–121, 150–151): Outflow, return, source, and preserving influx have positive causal functions

**In this edition.**

“Flow,” “in flux,” “spring,” and “influx” should be kept distinct. They do not describe divine fluid or imply that the first cause loses material as effects proceed from it.

**See also.**

Procession and return; Hinge and center; Conservation and preservation; Dependence and receiving.

## Statue and solidity

**Latin:** statua; lapidis; aeris; soliditatem; incorrupta; constat; servantur

**The word.**

Statua is a statue; lapis stone; aes, attested as aeris, bronze or copper alloy. Soliditas is firmness or solidity. Here aeris belongs to aes, not aer, air: the solid material of a statue determines the reading.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The statue distinguishes the endurance of a craft-product from the conditions that make that endurance possible. Art gives the work its crafted arrangement, but its continued integrity depends on the natural solidity of stone or bronze. Nature then stands in an analogous relation to God: natural things endure through divine influx, and nature’s own existence lasts only as God preserves it.

The analogy is graded, not an equation of all kinds of making. A human artisan presupposes material and its natural powers; God is said to grant being to nature itself. The statue therefore prepares the subsequent argument that the first cause does not merely begin a process and leave it independent. It does not assert that every statue remains forever or that crafted form and material solidity are the same cause.

**The places.**

- II.7.17, II.7.18 (PDF pp. 150–153): The statue’s material endurance illustrates nature’s continuing dependence on God

**In this edition.**

“Bronze” is the locally supported interpretation of aeris. This is a useful warning against automatically matching the written form to “air,” especially since aerem occurs elsewhere in the nearby heating example.

**See also.**

Art and nature; Conservation and preservation; Borrowing and assistance; Matter.

## Staying and preserving

**Latin:** *stare; manere; permanere; perseverare; servare; conservare; retinere*

**The word.**

Stare stands or remains stable; manere abides. Permanere and perseverare emphasize continuing; servare and conservare preserve; retinere retains. Remaining and being preserved are related but grammatically distinct relations.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino explicitly explains “standing” as continuing within the unity of one’s nature. Angel stands through divine unity, so its stability is not independent self-sufficiency. Soul’s substance stands while operation flows. The discourse thereby distinguishes persistence of a subject from unchanging activity. In the earlier hierarchy, creatures may be preserved indissoluble even when described as dissoluble in themselves. That preservation is not the same claim as God’s indissolubility through himself. The verbs of retaining and losing articulate limited likeness to a cause: angel retains stability while falling from simple unity, and must neither retain all divine attributes in the same mode nor lose every resemblance. Ordinary verbs thus carry the precise distinctions among underived stability, received endurance, and persistent substance amid changing acts.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.1.5 (Latin PDF p. 240; English PDF p. 241).** Preservation holds together things described as dissoluble in themselves.
- **III.1.8 (Latin PDF p. 244; English PDF p. 245).** Retaining stability and losing simple unity distinguish angel from God.
- **III.1.15 (Latin PDF p. 248; English PDF p. 249).** Soul’s substance is said to stand firm.
- **III.1.22 (Latin PDF p. 252; English PDF p. 253).** Standing is explicitly glossed as persevering in the unity of one’s nature.

**In this edition.**

The English alternates “stand,” “abide,” and “remain.” Their metaphorical use should not be reduced to physical immobility. Nor does conservare automatically mean merely repairing damage after it occurs; here it includes the continuing gift of persistence.

**See also.**

Motion and stability; Conservation and preservation; Angel; Essence and substance.

## Strato, Chrysippus, and the Almariani

**Latin:** *Strato et Chrysippus*, *confitebuntur*, *asseverabunt*, *Almariani*, *stulte putant*.

**The word.**

The proper names identify positions as Ficino presents them. *Confiteri* acknowledges or admits; *asseverare* asserts firmly; *putare* thinks or holds. The future forms stage what the named interlocutors would concede and maintain in the reconstructed dispute. *Stulte* marks Ficino's polemical judgment, not a neutral part of a group's name.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Strato and Chrysippus are introduced as agreeing that life is infused into the world but asserting that this life is the highest God. The Platonists reject that identification: life belonging to and residing in another cannot be first self-subsisting life. The following arguments distinguish God from a form of matter, a component in a composite, and the soul of a particular sphere. The Almariani appear specifically as the target of the claim that God and matter form one animal. Ficino rejects it because a composite's parts stand in potency to the whole, whereas God has no potency toward a further actuality.

The names therefore perform more than decorative historical citation. They mark a partly shared premise and a sharply disputed identification. Accepting an animated world does not, within this argument, imply identifying its animation with God. No independent reconstruction of these thinkers' doctrines is supplied by these local labels.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.22, PDF pp. 292–293:** Strato and Chrysippus are assigned a concession and a disputed identification
- **IV.1.23–27, pp. 292–295:** unity, goodness, being, primary agency, and freedom from potency distinguish God from matter's form
- **IV.1.28, pp. 294–295:** a sphere's mutable soul requires a higher stable guide and therefore cannot itself be God

**In this edition.**

"Will admit" and "will assert" preserve the staged future debate. The text's "foolishly" is Ficino's polemic against the Almariani. The supplied spelling is retained without a conjectural historical identification.

**See also.**

World soul; God; Simplicity and composition; Assertion, report, and reservation.

## Striving and enjoyment

**Latin:** *nixu*, *nititur*, *nitetur*, *contendet*, *affectat*, *fruendae*, *perfruatur*, *assequitur*.

**The word.**

*Nixus* is effort or striving; *niti* presses toward an outcome; *contendere* makes for it. *Affectare* seeks or aspires to something, whereas *frui* and *perfrui* concern enjoying or fully possessing it. In these contexts "affect" is not automatically a passing emotion.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The lowest celestial faculty strives toward all the seeds it possesses but cannot actualize them together. Its many-directed striving produces a continuing succession. At the level of body, world-matter seeks all forms as its perfections but cannot receive contrary forms simultaneously. Succession supplies a qualified substitute for simultaneous completeness.

The Saturn example sharpens the difference between striving and attainment. A part of its sphere seeks contact with every corresponding part of the surrounding sphere; through rotation it nearly attains what rest cannot provide. The sphere also longs to enjoy the soul that is wholly present at every point and hastens to resemble that simultaneous presence as far as possible. Yet motion never makes extended body literally indivisible or everywhere whole at once. The phrases “nearly” and “as far as possible” preserve the asymmetry between the desired model and its bodily imitation.

**The places.**

- **IV.2.12, PDF pp. 340–341:** manifold striving actualizes seeds successively
- **IV.2.20, pp. 344–345:** matter gains through succession what contrary forms prevent it possessing together
- **IV.2.24–26, pp. 348–349:** local affinity, contact, enjoyment of soul, and bodily imitation of whole presence explain continuous rotation

**In this edition.**

“Nearly attains” renders *ferme assequitur* and “as far as possible” renders *quoad fieri potest*. Omitting either would make Ficino claim that rotating body achieves the indivisible presence proper to soul.

**See also.**

Appetite and desire; Habitual possession; Circularity and return; Omnipresence and place.

## Substance and accident

**Latin:** *substantia*, *substantialis*; *accidens*, *accidentia*, *accidentalis*, *accidentale*, *qualitates accidentales*; *subiectum*

**The word.**

Substantia identifies a subsisting bearer or substantial producer; accidens a dependent condition. Subiectum is its underlying recipient. Accidentalis does not mean random, negligible, or causally idle.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Substance contrasts with a condition inhering in something else. Ficino calls indivisible essence the foundation and origin of accidents, a stable hinge for changing conditions. Quantity and quality are accidents in this context, but “accidental” means dependent on a subject rather than irrelevant, random, or merely coincidental. The subject is the underlying bearer, not necessarily a conscious observer. An accident may have real causal effects while remaining unable to subsist or act independently of its substantial source.

The ascent differentiates accidental qualitative form, substantial corporeal form, and substantial incorporeal form. Heated wool illustrates the distinction: accidental heat prepares a condition in which the substantial form of fire is produced, but heat as a mere accident does not independently account for the substantial result. Substance’s priority to

quantity in nature and dignity likewise supports Ficino's argument for substance without quantitative division. Self-subsistence is compatible with receiving existence or power from a higher cause; it does not automatically confer divine independence.

Book IV makes causal sufficiency especially important. An influence descending from a celestial soul is an accident separated from its substantial source and cannot by itself generate a living substance on earth. It needs a proximate living substance whose instrument it can be. IV.1.5 contrasts what remains substantial in an external bodily agent with the accidental effect entering another body, and infers the need for an incorporeal living agent present within. IV.1.19 allows qualities to contribute while denying their independent sufficiency. The claim therefore distinguishes instrumental preparation from a sufficient substantial producer rather than excluding qualities from generation. The supplied apparatus records a substantial later-witness addition after IV.1.4 reinforcing this argument; that addition is not part of the edition's base reading.

**The places.**

- **I.3.13–15, PDF pp. 36–39**. Indivisible substantial essence grounds changing accidents and supports the ascent beyond divisible forms.
- **I.3.22 and I.3.25–28, PDF pp. 44–49**. Substantial form is distinguished from preparatory accidental quality and bodily extension.
- **IV.1.3–5, PDF pp. 282–285**. A remote celestial accident needs a proximate living substantial agent to produce a living substance.
- **IV.1.19, PDF pp. 290–291**. Qualities may contribute while remaining insufficient without a substantial generative cause.

**Further passage references.** I.3.4, I.3.13–I.3.15, I.3.22, I.3.25–I.3.28 (PDF pp. 30–31, 36–39, 44–49); I.5.9 (pp. 64–65); I.6.6 (pp. 84–85); IV.1.3–IV.1.5, pp. 282–285; IV.1.19, pp. 290–291; apparatus p. 388

**In this edition.**

The IV.1.4 apparatus records a later-witness addition about accidental preparation; it must remain separate from the supplied continuous base text. The retained text itself differentiates an accident's contribution from the sufficient role of a proximate substantial source.

**See also.**

Essence and substance; Form; Quality; Matter; Indivisibility; Instrument; Celestial influence; Generation and corruption

## Sun, Mercury and moon

**Latin:** *sol; Mercurius; luna; infundere; suscipere; vicissitudo; plenissimus*

**The word.**

Sol is the sun, Mercurius here the celestial Mercury, and luna the moon. Infundere pours in or imparts; vicissitudo is alternation. Plenissimus describes complete fullness, not merely a large quantity.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino presents one source of light and two modes of receiving it. The sun gives its light immediately. Mercury receives it all at once and remains full; the moon receives differently

as it turns, producing alternation through its own nature. He makes the correspondences explicit: sun signifies God, Mercury angel, and moon soul. What he says of Mercury is then extended to stars above the moon. The point is the different receptive mode, which allows soul to receive a divine gift and yet have changing operation from its own nature. The passage's celestial claims must remain those of the historical model. Its use of Mercury does not refer to Mercury Trismegistus, cited as an authority elsewhere, and it does not establish contemporary planetary optics.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.1.32 (Latin PDF p. 260; English PDF p. 261).** The complete example distinguishes the common source, two receivers, and explicit correspondences.

**In this edition.**

The English "in a moment" and "over time" correspond to momento and tempore. Replacing the astronomical account with a modern correction inside the exposition would erase the example; affirming it without attribution would mislead. The stated analogical roles, rather than observational accuracy, explain the passage's function.

**See also.**

Receiving and giving; Light and illumination; Angel; Motion and stability.

## Support, inherence and dependence

**Latin:** *inhaeret*; *sustinet*; *sustinetur*; *subsistere*; *in alio iaceat*; *dependet*; *fomento materiae*.

**The word.**

*Inhaerere* adheres or inheres. *Sustinere* supports or sustains; *subsistere* subsists. *Iacere in alio* is to lie in another. *Dependere* depends; *fomentum* in this context is sustaining support. These spatially coloured words describe ontological reliance, not only physical contact.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Quality extends and divides with matter, perishes if separated, and is therefore supported by matter as subject. Ficino infers that what cannot support itself cannot exist from itself. The distinction between "in itself" and "from itself" is important: independence of a material substrate is not already independence of every cause. The rational soul's third essence is later said to subsist through itself, while remaining a grade below angel and God. Likewise, quality's reliance on matter is used to deny sufficient control over its own or foreign matter. The argument does not say quality is merely imaginary or ineffective; it explains why its real operation requires a superior agent.

**The places.**

- **I.3.4, PDF 30–31.** Inherence, material support and causal dependence are explicitly connected
- **I.3.7, PDF 34–35.** The "support of matter" limits quality's independent efficacy
- **I.3.18, PDF 40–41.** A form not lying in another is required for matter's production and preservation

- **I.3.33, PDF 52–53.** Self-subsisting third essence is distinguished from quality's dependence on a subject

**In this edition.**

*In se*, *a se*, *ex se* and *per se* are not automatic synonyms. In I.3.4, "support itself" and "subsist from itself" preserve a deliberate inference, while *fomentum* in I.3.7 should not be narrowed to literal food or fuel.

**See also.**

Essence and substance; Through itself and through another; Quality; Need and sufficiency.

## Surface and depth

**Latin:** *superficiem*, *intrinsecus*, *extrinsecus*, *e fundo materiae*, *funditus*, *eruit*, *educit*.

**The word.**

Surface and depth supply spatial language for different causal reach. *Intrinsecus* and *extrinsecus* mean from or on the inside and outside; *funditus* means fundamentally or to the depths. *Eruere* and *educere* can mean bringing out or drawing forth, rather than simply creating from nothing.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The contrast between human craft and nature turns upon access to matter. Human craft touches its surface, while natural art operates inwardly and brings substantial forms from its depths. Ficino argues that bodily substances cannot penetrate to this formative level; accidental qualities alone would only heat, cool, and perform similarly restricted operations. Living nature makes those qualities serve the articulated colors, figures, and vigor of life. Depth thus distinguishes substantial generation from mere juxtaposition or superficial arrangement.

The spatial terms remain comparisons applied to a metaphysical distinction. An incorporeal cause is not a very small body lodged far below a material surface. Nor does the claim that forms are drawn from matter make matter the sufficient active producer: the sentence explicitly assigns the operation to living nature. "Inward" names both a mode of presence and a depth of efficacy.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.5, PDF pp. 284–285:** bodily nearness is contrasted with an inwardly present substantial agent
- **IV.1.11–13, pp. 286–289:** surface work, inward formation, and essential principles are compared
- **IV.1.18–19, pp. 290–291:** living nature draws out substantial forms and directs elemental qualities beyond their isolated effects

**In this edition.**

The facing English preserves both "generates or draws" at IV.1.13. That *sive* alternative should remain visible: the vocabulary is not a uniform assertion of creation from nothing.

**See also.**

Matter; Form; Proximity and causal presence; Creation.

## Surpassing and comparison

**Latin:** praestat; praestantius; superabit; excedat; excedetur; melior; melius; propinquior; convenientior; comparetur

**The word.**

Praestare, superare, and excedere express surpassing, while melior and praestantior compare goodness or excellence. Propinquior can designate nearness in rank or likeness, not a measured spatial interval. Comparare here sets things in relation for appraisal.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The argument that nothing stands above goodness examines the very vocabulary of superiority: something could be “better” only by a greater share of goodness. Rule and predominance are desired as goods, so an evil supposedly overpowering goodness would already rely on what it excludes. The comparative is part of the proof, not merely enthusiastic praise.

The infinite-regress argument likewise asks what licenses judging soul better than body. Ficino appeals to nearness to a supreme standard. His claim that one infinite is neither broader nor narrower than another belongs to this argument; it should not be generalized into a modern theorem about infinities. When world and God are compared as finite and infinite, shadow-language expresses a radical inequality of dependence, without denying that the world has the being it receives.

**The places.**

- II.1.4, II.1.5, II.1.6 (PDF pp. 100–103): Better and surpassing are treated as dependent on goodness
- II.3.4, II.3.5, II.3.6 (PDF pp. 118–119): Rank requires an ideal measure rather than indefinitely deferred superiority
- II.7.22, II.7.23 (PDF pp. 154–155): Comparison governs the claim that an effect is empty or shadow-like

**In this edition.**

“Nearer” and “more akin” in II.3.5 translate different comparatives, propinquior and convenientior. “Compared with” in II.7.22–23 is essential: the text’s claim is relative to the first cause’s substance, not an unqualified declaration that creatures are nonexistent.

**See also.**

Measure and degree; Good and goodness; Shadow and mirror; Infinity.

## Sympathy

**Latin:** *compatiantur*, *conspirant*, *conspiratio*, *communicare vires*, *contemperat*

**The word.**

Compati means undergoing or responding together; conspirare acting in concert; contemperare blending or tempering diverse conditions into coordination. The family concerns a shared living order, not only human compassion.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino uses the world's cooperation as an argument for one animating source. Its members can be contrary in qualities and separated in place while communicating their powers and acting together. He asks what could account for this unless a single soul tempers the diverse humors of the immense living being and connects its members through harmony of life and motion. The vocabulary deliberately draws on the organized body: sympathy is a sharing of affects and actions across a whole, not merely emotional fellow-feeling between people. Nor does it abolish difference or require every component to have the same function. Its significance lies in coordinated difference. The proposed explanation proceeds from common action to common nature, and from common nature to one soul. The conclusion is a metaphysical inference within his account of shared action and its sufficient cause.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.82, PDF pp. 324–325**. Contrary and separated members communicate powers; one soul tempers their diverse humors and coordinates their motion.
- **IV.1.83, PDF pp. 324–325**. The world-animal's unity requires soul wholly present throughout its body and nature.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.82–IV.1.83, pp. 324–325; apparatus p. 393

**In this edition.**

"Are in sympathy" translates compatiantur as the edition's technical image of joint feeling and activity. The qualification ut ita loquar keeps the extension to cosmic members visible as figurative language within a substantive causal argument.

**See also.**

World soul; Life; Unity and multiplicity; Order and harmony; Purity and mixture

## Through itself and through another

**Latin:** *per se*, *per se ipsum*, *per aliud*, *ab alio*, *ex se ipso*, *per Deum*

**The word.**

Per se, per aliud, ab alio, and ex se mark different relations of intrinsic capacity, mediation, external agency, and source. Each phrase specifies a particular property or action rather than automatically declaring complete independence.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The contrast distinguishes a power belonging primarily to a nature from a power possessed through dependence on another. Ficino repeatedly argues that whatever is of a kind through another must be referred to something that is so through itself. Bodies act through qualities; qualities receive active power through higher levels; angel and soul receive unity and actuality from God. God alone is stable and active through himself without derivative dependence.

Soul's self-motion is a carefully restricted application, not an exception making soul uncreated. Among movable natures soul is first, and its own nature accounts for temporal succession, but its actuality and orientation remain dependent on higher realities. Similarly, angel is stable but stable through God. The prepositions matter: being moved "by another," acting "through another," and having something "from oneself" articulate

related but distinct causal relations. Each occurrence concerns a particular property or activity; none automatically asserts either complete independence or complete passivity.

**The places.**

- **III.1.17, PDF pp. 250–251**. Angel and soul receive unity and actuality from God while their lower modes of multiplicity and change belong to their grade.
- **III.1.23–27, PDF pp. 254–257**. The first movable is movable through itself, and lower bodily motion is referred to soul.
- **II.12.18, PDF pp. 212–213**. The relation to divine causation must preserve the particular mode of dependent action.

**Further passage references.** III.1.17–27, PDF 250–257; II.12.18, PDF 212–213

**In this edition.**

English “by,” “through,” and “from” should retain the Latin prepositions’ local roles. Soul’s being mobile through itself remains compatible with receiving actuality and unity from God; the contrast is not created versus uncreated in every occurrence.

**See also.**

Cause; Degree and mediation; Motion and stability; Unity and multiplicity

## Touch and penetration

**Latin:** tangit; penetrare; resistit; adest; obstat; attingit; penetrat

**The word.**

Tangere is to touch; penetrare to pass through or reach into; resistere and obstare to resist or obstruct; attingere to reach or make contact. Bodily and incorporeal subjects give these common verbs different modes of application.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

A body touches what contains it through quantitative dimensions, but incorporeal substance does so through power. The analogy establishes the chapter’s intended kind of presence before the argument expands it universally. Divine purity and power encounter no resisting obstacle; the claim is not that God moves through material pores.

In the reported theory of universal mental presence, mind’s essence reaches God through an essential inclination, prior to vital and intellectual activity. Because neither body nor spirit obstructs it, the cited thinkers infer an unrestricted presence. The flame reaching its natural goal illustrates orientation, but its hypothetical indivisibility is part of the analogy. It is not a claim that ordinary fire has no dimensions or that an intellect travels spatially until it finds a distant God.

**The places.**

- II.6.1, II.6.3 (PDF pp. 128–129): Contact through power and absence of resistance establish divine presence
- II.6.23 (PDF pp. 140–141): Reaching and penetration belong to the authorities’ account of essential orientation

**In this edition.**

“Touches” is retained in II.6.1, so the reader must preserve the explicit contrast between dimensions and power. “Reaches” in II.6.23 translates attingit; it need not imply locomotion.

**See also.**

Omnipresence and place; Natural motion and natural place; Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities.

## Traces

**Latin:** *vestigium*; *vestigia*; vestigia; quasi ab his cuncta manaverint; vestigium; quasi fortius imprimatur

**The word.**

Vestigium is a trace or sign left in an effect by its source; vestigia is plural. The metaphor concerns detectable dependence and communication, not portions detached from the cause.

The footprint or impression image has an evidential use and a causal use. Quasi marks a comparison, rather than literal tracks or a physically deeper stamp.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

A trace is an indication of a source through what it leaves in or communicates to an effect. The Proem follows traces toward God; Book II finds traces of unity, truth, and goodness throughout things. In the causal argument, being is compared with the first cause’s trace, impressed earlier and effaced later than subordinate determinations. Book IV identifies unity, order, and motion as traces of God, mind, and soul. These related uses concern intelligible dependence, not literal footprints or independent fragments of the source.

At II.1.2, traces of unity, truth, and goodness are evidence through which Ficino argues that things flow from and seek their principle. At II.7.32 the trace is identified with being and explains why the first cause’s contribution underlies and outlasts particular determinations. The second use gives the image a more explicit structure: later traces are established upon an earlier one. This distinction helps a reader move from detecting a source through its signs to understanding the ordered dependence of its effects.

**The places.**

- **Proem.4, PDF pp. 6–7**. The inquiry follows traces toward God and repeatedly turns toward soul as a mirror.
- **II.1.2, PDF pp. 98–99**. Things exhibit and desire traces of unity, truth, and goodness.
- **II.7.32, PDF pp. 158–159**. Being is the first cause’s trace, impressed before and removed after subordinate determinations.
- **IV.1.86, PDF pp. 326–327**. Unity, order, and motion display distinct effects of God, mind, and soul.

**Further passage references.** Proem.4 (PDF pp.6–7); II.1.2 (pp.98–99); II.7.32 (pp.158–159); IV.1.86 (pp.326–327)

- II.1.2 (PDF pp. 98–99): Traces serve the inference from universal participation and desire to a source

• II.7.32 (PDF pp. 158–159): Being is the prior impression supporting other causal traces

**In this edition.**

“Trace” is contextual: the Proem’s route of inquiry, being as the first cause’s enduring impression, and unity-order-motion in the world have different referents. The printing and erasure images at II.7.32 should remain comparisons.

The image should not be indexed only under the noun. Imprimitur, deletur, firmant, fundant, and stabiliunt articulate the causal work performed by the trace comparison.

**See also.**

Cause; Participation; Unity and multiplicity; Order and harmony; Image and likeness

Impression and effacement; Cause; Participation.

## Transparency and opacity

**Latin:** *clara mens*, *opaco corpori*, *animam perspicuam*, *diaphanum*, *perspicuum*, *lucis ingressum*.

**The word.**

*Clarus* is bright or clear; *opacus* dark or opaque; *perspicuus* transparent. Ficino explicitly glosses *diaphanum* by *perspicuum*. Transparency here differs from having light of one’s own: a medium may lack light yet not obstruct its entry.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The account of mind, soul, and body compares their conjunction to the transmission of light. A luminous body is joined to a dense one through a transparent medium; analogously, clear mind reaches opaque body through transparent soul. The middle is neither the illuminating source nor the wholly obstructive recipient. That distinction explains why mediation is required while denying that the mediator must already possess every excellence of the source in the same way.

The metaphor accompanies the claim that God joined mind to soul and soul to body, attributed here to Plato’s *Timaeus*. It prepares the more explicit account of shared properties: soul resembles angel through indivisibility and body through mutability. Later the transparency of parts of air and fire helps explain their alleged fitness to receive minds. That is a cosmological application, not proof that optical transparency by itself is rationality.

**The places.**

• **IV.1.29, PDF pp. 296–297:** transparent soul mediates between luminous mind and opaque body

• **IV.1.32–34, pp. 298–299:** the shared and differing properties explain the mediation behind the image

• **IV.1.92, pp. 330–331:** position and transparency are features fitting some regions of air and fire for minds

**In this edition.**

“Translucent—that is, transparent” renders the explicit gloss of *diaphanum*. The description that the medium lacks its own light but admits light is essential and should survive any paraphrase that simply calls soul luminous.

**See also.**

Light and illumination; Degree and mediation; Proximity and causal presence.

## Truth

**Latin:** *veritas*, *verum*, *verus*, *vere*, *revera*, *summa veritas*; *falsum*, *falsus*; *falsum*; *fallit*; *falluntur*; *veridica*; *imaginem veritatis*; *se ipsam minime latens*.

**The word.**

Veritas names truth; verum and verus can concern a true assertion or a genuine thing; vere and revera mark actuality or genuineness. Falsehood and deception are argued to depend on some truth or likeness of it.

*Falsum* is what is false; *fallere* deceives or misleads; *veridicus* speaks or carries truth, rendered “infallible” of minds in I.6.10. A “truer form” concerns ontological adequacy, whereas a true assertion that something is false concerns judgement. The argument moves between these uses and must make the transition visible.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Truth is both a standard of cognition and the genuineness or fullness of a thing’s being. Ficino argues that judging a material form deficient presupposes a truer form against which it is measured. Falsehood also depends upon truth: calling something false can itself be a true judgment, and deception succeeds through an image of truth. The starting point is the human mind’s fallibility, not its identification with an infallible standard.

The eye-and-light analogy in Book I places truth above the mind receiving it. Mind needs truth, whereas truth does not need a receptive mind in order to be true. Things lacking intelligence can nevertheless be genuine or true things. What exceeds mind is not consequently mindless: because the higher does not lack the goods of the lower, supreme truth possesses intellectual insight without being composed of insight and truth as separate constituents. Ficino describes its complete self-transparency, while qualifying the propriety of intellectual names applied to God.

Book II develops the relation through pure wine: *verum vinum* concerns a thing’s being genuinely what it is. Supreme unity, truth, and goodness are one source viewed through connected explanatory roles. Truth itself cannot receive its defining perfection from a higher cause without becoming a dependent true thing rather than truth itself. A supposedly superior principle could not even be truly superior without truth. In II.3.10 truth gives being by production and reforms returning things; within Ficino’s theological alignment it is called the reason of the principle. These claims concern the relation between reality, intelligibility, and judgment, not an identification of creatures with sentences.

Truth also supports an argument for eternity. If truth began, it would already have been true beforehand that it would begin; if it ceased, it would remain true afterward that it had ceased. Ficino takes this dependence on truth to show that truth cannot be conceived as beginning or ending. Here a claim’s truth across time differs in immediate sense from the authenticity of pure wine, but Ficino deliberately brings both under supreme truth. II.7.3 similarly asks how something could exist unless it really were what it is said to be and its existence were true. The argument unifies the source of genuine being and true judgment without erasing the difference between a thing and a statement about it.

I.3.2 says the judgement that bodily form is deficient presupposes some truer form, whether found within mind or outside it. It then claims truth's priority to falsehood: even falsity's existence or efficacy must truly be so, and deception works through a likeness of truth. This does not mean every deceptive image is a reliable representation. In I.6, human error distinguishes mind from truth, while mindless matter can still truly be matter. Finally, the truth above mind does not lack self-awareness: Ficino describes divine truth as not hidden from itself. The result is not a superior unconscious object but a proposed simple identity of truth and self-seeing.

**The places.**

- **I.6.7–13, PDF pp. 86–91**. Truth's relation to mind is developed through the light/eye analogy and the distinction between dependence and higher intellectual perfection.
- **II.1.1–3, PDF pp. 98–101**. Pure wine illustrates genuineness and the unity of first truth, goodness, and simplicity.
- **II.3.10, PDF pp. 120–121**. Truth gives being and reforms returning things within the principle-reason-love interpretation.
- **II.5.1 and II.7.3, PDF pp. 126–127 and 144–145**. Truth before an imagined beginning or after an imagined end supports eternity; genuine being supports the related ontological claim.

**Further passage references.** Proem.6–Proem.10 (PDF pp. 8–11); I.3.2, I.3.33 (pp. 28–29, 52–53); I.6.7–I.6.13 (pp. 86–91); II.1.1–3, pp. 98–101; II.2.10, pp. 110–111; II.3.10, pp. 120–121; II.5.1, pp. 126–127; II.7.3, pp. 144–145

- **I.3.2, PDF 28–29.** Deficient form, judgement of falsity and deception's likeness to truth
- **I.6.7–12, PDF 86–89.** Truth is distinguished from fallible mind and then described as self-manifest

**In this edition.**

"True wine" at II.1.1 means genuine or pure wine, not a proposition spoken by wine. Conversely, the eternity argument concerns what would be true before a beginning or after an end; those senses are related by the argument without being verbally identical.

"True" applied to matter in I.6.10–11 is not the claim that matter makes propositions. "Not hidden from itself" preserves the reflexive idiom more exactly than silently adding a separate faculty of awareness to God.

**See also.**

Light and illumination; Mind; God; Form; Image and likeness; Unity and multiplicity; Good and goodness; Being; Purity and mixture; Eternity and time

Eye and imagined enlargement; Image and likeness; Intellect and intellection.

## Turning and direction

**Latin:** *vertere; versare; converti; dirigere; ducere; respicere; referre*

**The word.**

Vertere and versare concern turning; dirigere directing; ducere leading. Respicere can mean looking toward or regarding an object or respect; referre can refer something to a cause or end. These need not denote travel through space.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The compact contrast between God's versatur secum and versat externa joins self-contemplation with the ordering of external things. The grammatical change from a verb of being occupied with oneself to active turning matters. Later, mind turns toward possibilities and agents turn toward action. Divine guidance leads things toward ends while preserving their particular modes of motion. Soul's return into itself unfolds and refolds powers rather than moving a little object through a bodily orbit. The same family can therefore express a celestial rotation, an intellectual orientation, a causal reference, or a psychic return. One must identify the subject and the object before importing the physical sense into the metaphysical claim.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.11.15 (Latin PDF p. 188; English PDF p. 189).** Versatur secum contrasts with versat externa.
- **II.12.18 (Latin PDF p. 212; English PDF p. 213).** The first agent turns toward its own act; divine choice concerns acting or not acting.
- **II.13.26 (Latin PDF p. 234; English PDF p. 235).** Leading preserves the different motions proper to different natures.
- **III.2.27 (Latin PDF p. 276; English PDF p. 277).** Soul revolves into itself while unfolding its powers.

**In this edition.**

The translation appropriately uses "regards" for some occurrences of respicit, especially the differing respects of one divine act at II.12.13. Replacing each occurrence with "sees" would conceal the distinction of reference; replacing every turning verb with bodily rotation would conceal intellectual activity.

**See also.**

Circularity and return; Procession and return; Intention; Persuasion and compulsion.

## Twelve

**Latin:** *duodecim*, *duodenarius numerus*, *duodenarii*, *principes*

**The word.**

Duodecim is twelve; duodenarius is a twelvefold grouping or number; duodenarii marks multiple such groups. Principes names rulers, not a second term for every ordinary soul.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino announces a temporary conversation with the Pythagoreans before elaborating a hierarchy of twelve ruling souls within each of twelve spheres. His examples connect twelve zodiacal figures at the outermost sphere with twelve modes of human life at the innermost. The latter derive from the rankings and pairings of reason, anger, and desire. The numerical scheme then gathers many souls under principal souls, sphere-souls, and world-soul, and ascends through minds toward unity. The text itself qualifies the account: IV.1.52 says "perhaps" when discussing twelve ruling minds above, and ends by leaving the Pythagorean conversation for the stated Platonic order. Twelve is therefore not a number to impose indiscriminately on every class mentioned in the book. Nor does twelve

cosmic spheres contradict eight heavens, since four elemental spheres are also counted. Numerical organization serves the account of unity governing multiplicity.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.36, PDF pp. 300–301**. Eight heavenly spheres supplement four elemental spheres rather than contradict the total of twelve.
- **IV.1.40–43, PDF pp. 302–305**. The excursion opens and the zodiac supplies a twelvefold comparison.
- **IV.1.44–49, PDF pp. 304–307**. Rankings of three powers and dominant pairs generate twelve human lives.
- **IV.1.50–52, PDF pp. 306–309**. The hierarchy ascends and descends, qualifies the minds with perhaps, and closes the conversation.
- **IV.1.96, PDF pp. 332–333**. The concluding three-rank classification distinguishes world, twelve spheres, and their many inhabitants.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.36, pp. 300–301; IV.1.40–IV.1.52, pp. 302–309; IV.1.96, pp. 332–333

**In this edition.**

The number belongs to an explicitly introduced and closed Pythagorean conversation. Forte at IV.1.52 qualifies twelve ruling minds. The sixth human three-faculty ranking depends on context; its parum/paulum wording is not independently a confirmed translation error.

**See also.**

Zodiac; Reason anger and desire; Soul; Unity and multiplicity

## Unity and multiplicity

**Latin:** *unitas*, *unum*, *unio*, *unicus*; *multitudo*, *multa*, *unum et multa*, *unum multa*; *simplex*, *simplicitas*, *immobilis unitas*, *immobilis multitudo*

**The word.**

Unitas names unity; unum something one or the One; unio a joining into unity; multitudo plurality. Numerical oneness, nonspatial articulation, and unrestricted first unity have different explanatory roles.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Unity is the condition by which parts make a whole and a power acts coherently, not merely the count of one object. Ficino argues that a union cannot be sufficiently explained by multiplicity alone: its unifying cause must not itself require another divided unifier. The same unity may be whole in each part rather than partitioned among them. Such a unifying presence differs from a whole assembled out of parts. The vocabulary consequently distinguishes accidental numerical unity, substantial unity, and the supreme unity of God.

The hierarchy makes nonspatial multiplicity explicit. Soul is mobile multiplicity, angel immobile multiplicity, and God immobile unity. Angelic essence, received being, power, act, and understood forms are distinguishable without being extended bodily pieces; act and potency already supply a kind of composition. Book III also reports deliberately differentiated Pythagorean formulas: body is many; quality many and one; soul one and

many; angel one-many; God one. Their changing word order expresses changing predominance of unity and plurality. Soul retains unified substance while its operations change; angel possesses greater stability, yet lacks divine absolute simplicity. God is not a subject plus a received form or an assembly of lesser perfections.

Supreme unity is supreme simplicity and is identified with truth and goodness. If unity itself received an addition from something higher, it would be composite. Conversely, what lacked unity altogether could be neither one whole nor a multitude of parts each of which was some one thing. Ordinary received unities therefore point toward unity subsisting in itself. God's unrestricted unity also grounds infinite power, undiminished by dispersion or composition.

II.2.7–8 follows the distinction through individuals and species. Many people belong to one human species and many horses to one equine species, but these species-unities remain determinate kinds beside one another. Ficino gathers them toward God as "sovereign of species," with parallel accounts of matters, bodies, lives, motions, and movers. This is an order of dependence, not a physical mixing of kinds. A common nature shared by two supposed gods would itself demand a higher unifying source; bounded participation in unity is not unity's first principle. Numerical unity also contains numbers potentially, but divine unity is not simply the first object counted.

II.3.10 describes all things as enfolded in unity and restored to one through unity, connecting origin and return. At the level of the created world, unity means the coordination of diverse parts, for which soul supplies a bond. The unity of the world's work does not erase its ranks or identify it with God, just as multiple divine Ideas do not divide the divine essence. *Unitas*, *unum*, and *unio* thus connect unity itself, something one, and the joining of plurality while retaining their local differences.

**The places.**

- **I.3.12–16, PDF pp. 36–39**. The ascent distinguishes mathematical, accidental, and substantial unity.
- **I.6.1–6, PDF pp. 82–85**. Angel's intellect includes nonspatial multiplicity while God supplies a higher unity.
- **II.2.7–11, PDF pp. 108–111**. Individuals are gathered under species, then determinate species-unities under their first principle.
- **III.1.1–22, PDF pp. 240–253**. The graded formulas distinguish body, quality, soul, angel, and God through different combinations of one and many.
- **III.2.19–23, PDF pp. 272–275**. Soul's unifying relation to bodily multiplicity does not divide its substance into extended pieces.

**Further passage references.** I.2.2, I.2.7, I.2.11 (PDF pp. 18–25); I.3.12–I.3.16, I.3.30–I.3.31 (pp. 36–39, 50–51); I.6.1–I.6.6 (pp. 82–85); II.1.1–3, pp. 98–101; II.2.4–11, pp. 106–111; II.3.10, pp. 120–121; II.7.1–2, pp. 144–145; II.10.4, pp. 176–177; II.11.6–7, 17–19, PDF 184–193; III.1.1–22, PDF 240–253; III.2.6–8, 19–23, PDF 264–275

**In this edition.**

The Pythagorean formulas in Book III depend on their different word order. Rendering them as an undifferentiated "unity and plurality" would erase the relative predominance Ficino explains. "One" applied to a species also differs from one bodily specimen.

**See also.**

Number; Indivisibility; Power and potency; Angel; God; Simplicity and composition; Participation; Order and harmony; Truth; Good and goodness; Degree and mediation; Ideas and exemplars; Soul

## Universals and individuals

**Latin:** *universalia* (universals); *singula*, *res singulares* (individual things); *genera*, *species* (genera, species); *proprietates* (properties); *minima*, *infima* (least, lowest things)

**The word.**

Universalia are universals; singula and res singulares individual things; genera and species broader and determinate kinds. Proprietates identifies differentiating features rather than merely possessions.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino refuses to restrict God's knowledge to genera and species. The intellect that knows the origin of being and every mode in which it can be communicated also knows what distinguishes one individual from another. Knowledge of universal order requires knowledge of the different relations among higher and lower particulars. Hence even things ordinarily called base or unattractive belong to the scope of divine cognition. Ficino directs this polemic against Epicurus and Averroes as he presents their positions here; the chapter speaks in the terms of his own controversy. The cognitive comparison with human powers is also significant: intellect does not merely abandon individuals when it apprehends universal principles, but sees particulars more clearly than imagination. Divine knowledge unites all these scopes in one power. Greater universality in this ascent consequently does not entail less awareness of individual detail.

**The places.**

- **II.2.7–8, PDF pp. 108–109**. Species provide specific unities for multiple individuals without exhausting the first unity.
- **II.9.13–16, PDF pp. 168–173**. Divine knowledge extends with divine operation to individuals and the least things.
- **II.9.20–22, PDF pp. 172–175**. Knowledge of lowly particulars is defended against named opponents without treating it as a distracting inspection.
- **II.10.1, PDF pp. 176–177**. The argument's announced scope extends from individuals and lowly things to infinite things.

**Further passage references.** II.2.7–8, pp. 108–109; II.9.13–22, pp. 168–175; II.10.1, pp. 176–177

**In this edition.**

The English "least" and "lowest" retains Ficino's evaluative scope in the polemic about divine cognition. The claims assigned to Epicurus and Averroes are his presentation of opponents, while "in himself" at II.9.20 explains how particulars can be known without external distraction.

**See also.**

Form; Intellect and intellection; Self knowledge; Order and harmony; Intuition and comprehension

## Utterance and meaning

**Latin:** *vox; significatio; audire; intelligere; domus; quodammodo; paene*

**The word.**

Vox can be a voice or utterance; significatio its meaning or signification. Audire and intelligere distinguish hearing from understanding. The domestic setting gives several hearers access to one spoken content.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

To illustrate soul's whole presence in bodily parts, Ficino says that a whole utterance and its meaning are in a certain way present in every part of a house, because the whole is heard and understood almost simultaneously there. The comparison concerns the integrity of what is apprehended: listeners do not each receive a different fraction of the sentence's meaning. It is explicitly qualified and does not identify acoustic sound with an incorporeal soul or prove that sound travels without time. The next sentences return to the metaphysical claim: an indivisible nature unconfined by place can encompass what is in place, whereas extended things cannot be whole in several places together. The illustrative utterance and that claimed explanatory principle should not be merged.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.2.13 (Latin PDF p. 270; English PDF p. 271).** Whole utterance and meaning illustrate whole presence, with two express qualifications.

**In this edition.**

The English "in a certain sense" and "almost at once" preserve quodammodo and paene. Dropping either would turn a measured analogy into an absolute physical claim. Vox is rendered "utterance" because both hearing and understanding are at issue.

**See also.**

Indwelling and presence; Point and position; Spiritual union; Indivisibility.

## Vine and grape seed

**Latin:** *vitis*, *vites*, *vinaceo semine*, *putrido*, *vilis*, *variam*, *ordinatam*, *pretiosam*.

**The word.**

*Vitis* names the vine; *vinaceum semen* here its grape seed. *Putridus* describes decay, while *vilis* and *pretiosus* contrast low value with preciousness. The adjectives are evaluative terms in a causal comparison, not measurements of a seed's biological complexity.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Vines and flies first illustrate the specificity of natural principles: the soul of earth is said to make each through its own appropriate *ratio*. A few units later the decaying grape seed becomes the focus. Ficino contrasts its single, base nature with the varied, ordered, precious vine produced from it. The explanation assigns corresponding variety, rationality, and worth to the higher productive powers. The example therefore concerns the explanatory resources needed for a differentiated living result.

The bodily seed is not denied. It is present and decaying; the question is why it yields this richer organized product. This differs from examples in which a bodily seed appears absent

altogether. Combining the two without distinction would conceal that Ficino invokes incorporeal productive principles both for allegedly unseeded generation and for the nurturing and development of bodily seeds.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.9, PDF pp. 286–287:** vine and fly require different natural principles
- **IV.1.16–17, pp. 290–291:** fostering bodily seeds leads to the contrast between decaying grape seed and ordered vine

**In this edition.**

“Single and base” represents *una et vilis*; “varied, ordered, and precious” represents the deliberately contrasted adjectives. The language ranks source and result within Ficino’s argument and should not be recast as modern embryology.

**See also.**

Seeds; Nourishment and growth; Contraction and determination; Beauty and fittingness.

## Weariness and agility

**Latin:** *fatigatur*, *fatigari*, *labor*, *operosa*, *ineptum*, *agile*, *nutu levissimo*, *proclivitas*.

**The word.**

*Fatigare* concerns tiring; *labor* toil; *operosus* laborious. *Agilis* is easily moved or nimble, while *ineptus* is unfitted for a task. *Proclivitas* denotes inclination or readiness; it is not a vice by default.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Limited quality is said to tire because it is tied to particular matter, position, and parts, so it cannot sustain perpetual uniform motion. Celestial soul is not extended with its body, and celestial body is described as remarkably suited to being moved. These are separate reasons for rejecting fatigue: the mover’s mode of being and the recipient’s readiness. The comparison with human soul should not be extended into a denial of bodily exhaustion. Elsewhere human reason is explicitly occupied by the demanding administration of a needy body, unlike celestial reason, which can rest in mind.

Breeze moving dust and wind shaking mountains illustrate how a subtle mover might affect bodies; heavenly souls are then said to turn exceptionally subtle bodies with the slightest command. The final judgment locates motion’s principal origin and end in stability so that toil and transgression of bounds do not become ultimate explanations. Ease is thus linked with appropriate order, not with inactivity.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.55–56, PDF pp. 310–311:** bounded quality cannot explain unwearying celestial motion
- **IV.2.11, pp. 338–339:** bodily need makes human administration laborious
- **IV.2.18–19, pp. 342–345:** mover and movable contribute distinct explanations of ease
- **IV.2.27, pp. 350–351:** stable direction prevents toil and passage beyond bounds from becoming the motion’s ultimate condition

**In this edition.**

“Agile” and “readiness to be moved” describe bodily receptivity, while “efficacy in moving” belongs to soul. Keeping this active/passive contrast prevents ease from being attributed indiscriminately to one side alone.

**See also.**

Quality; Leisure; Motion and stability; Need and sufficiency.

## Weaving and world fabric

**Latin:** machina mundi; retexit telam; machinae; machinam corporalem

**The word.**

Machina designates an organized construction or fabric here; tela is a woven web, and retexere is to weave again or renew the weaving. Neither noun by itself implies a modern mechanical machine or an electronic web.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The recurring world-order “weaves anew” a similar fabric in a similar way. Repetition, not just the existence of an intricate product, is the feature used against chance. Later, the enormous manifold cosmic fabric’s uniform motion over the ages serves as evidence of its governor’s inexhaustible power.

The image is then qualified in the debate between reason and imagination. Imagination takes the bodily fabric to be the whole nature of things and therefore treats divine presence as a spatial filling problem. Reason calls that fabric a slight shadow, limited in magnitude though indefinitely divisible. A word that first evokes impressive order thus later warns against confusing the visible organized whole with the full scope of reality.

**The places.**

- II.2.2, II.2.9 (PDF pp. 104–105, 110–111): Harmony in the cosmic fabric and the renewed web of recurrent order
- II.4.7 (PDF pp. 124–125): The vast manifold fabric supports the inference to an unwearied governor
- II.6.13 (PDF pp. 134–135): The bodily fabric is contrasted with the fuller nature of things

**In this edition.**

“Fabric” keeps machina’s sense of an arranged whole without introducing machinery absent from the passage. “Always” in the weaving sentence is Ficino’s description of cosmic regularity, not a modern observational finding.

**See also.**

Order and harmony; Chance; Imagination and deceptive clothing; Failure weariness and endurance.

## Whole and parts

**Latin:** *totum*, *pars*, *integram*, *integrum*, *universum*, *machina mundi*; *omne*, *triplex omne*, *super omne*, *sub omni*

**The word.**

Totum names a whole; pars a part; integrum emphasizes completeness; omne becomes a technical totality in Book IV. Whole presence and a whole assembled from parts are not equivalent senses.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

“Whole” has several distinct roles. A composite bodily whole depends upon its parts and their coordination. The world’s ordered whole possesses a goodness exceeding that of an isolated part, because their relations and proportions contribute to a shared end. When the language of wholeness is applied to God, it signifies completeness without assembly: whatever is in him is whole, without smaller and greater constituent portions. The later technical classification accordingly places him above a whole constituted by plurality. The theory of minds wholly present throughout immensity similarly describes indivisible presence rather than spatial distribution, but Ficino explicitly attributes that theory to earlier thinkers. In creation and preservation, God’s production of an effect *totum*, in its entirety, means that no independent remainder falls outside its dependence. Nor can any finite whole or collection of images exhaust the infinite exemplar.

Book IV introduces a more technical classification through *omne*. God is above every whole as simple unity beyond number, and individual bodies lie beneath the whole. Between these stand three modes of totality. Angel is one in essence, point, and moment: a single substance, spatially undispersed, and possessing its perfections together. Soul is one in essence and point but varies through moments. World-matter remains one substance while varying in time and extending through many spatial points. “One in point” means spatial indivisibility, not a soul reduced to a geometrical point situated in a body.

This is a descent between grades, not a transformation in which soul eventually acquires bodily extension. Temporal multiplicity first appears at the level of soul; spatial dispersion appears at the lower level of world-matter. Ficino argues that spatial plurality in essence entails temporal plurality in operation, but temporal plurality need not entail spatial division. An essence may exceed its operation in unity and perfection, not conversely. Hence time is encountered before place in the explanatory order, rather than at an earlier date in cosmic history.

The three wholes also differ in their manner of containing principles. Angel holds them all together in habitual possession and actuality; soul holds all in possession rather than universal simultaneous actualization; matter contains them all in potency, without habitual possession, and receives them only in succession. IV.2.10 then qualifies the soul-level description by distinguishing celestial mind, whose Ideas are together actually, from its lowest motive power, whose productive seeds unfold successively. These wholes are therefore modes of containing and realizing multiplicity, not simply larger and smaller collections of physical parts.

**The places.**

- **II.2.3, PDF pp. 104–105**. A composite whole depends on its parts and their unifying source.

- **II.6.13–14 and II.6.24, PDF pp. 134–143**. Wholly present mind is treated under an expressly attributed account rather than partitioned spatial distribution.
- **II.9.21–22, PDF pp. 174–175**. The whole order's goodness involves relations among differentiated parts.
- **IV.2.3–9, PDF pp. 334–337**. God above whole, three grades of whole, and individual bodies below whole are systematically distinguished.
- **IV.2.10–11, PDF pp. 338–339**. Celestial powers qualify the broad soul-totality account through different modes of simultaneous possession.

**Further passage references.** II.2.3, pp. 104–105; II.6.13–14, pp. 134–137; II.6.24, pp. 142–143; II.7.21–23, pp. 152–155; II.9.21–22, pp. 174–175; II.10.5, pp. 176–177; IV.2.3–IV.2.10, pp. 334–339; apparatus p. 394; IV.2.10–11, pp. 338–339

**In this edition.**

The edition renders omne as "whole" in IV.2 to retain its graded metaphysical use. "One in point" means spatially undispersed, not confined like a geometrical point; "one in moment" contrasts with successive variation.

**See also.**

Simplicity and composition; Order and harmony; Mind; Conservation and preservation; Ideas and exemplars; Unity and multiplicity; Habitual possession; Matter; Eternity and time; Angel

## Will

**Latin:** *voluntas*, *velle*, *nolle*, *recta voluntas*; *memoria*; *voluntatis assensus*, *voluntatis imperium*, *inclinatio mentis ad bonum*, *eligere*

**The word.**

Voluntas is intellectual inclination toward good; velle and nolle willing and refusing; assensus and imperium effective assent and command. Eligere concerns selecting, which requires attention to the agent and object in each context.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Will is mind's inclination toward the good. It both embraces a good already present and directs production toward a good to be realized. Ficino argues that knowledge of forms alone does not explain which external effects are made: intellect recognizes an end and possible routes toward it, while will assents to the end and selects a means. The assent or command of will is effective willing, rather than verbal agreement with a proposition.

The account uses inward and outward imagery. In seeing, mind folds forms inward and regards truth; in willing, it unfolds them outward and reaches good, whose characteristic is self-communication. In God these are analytical distinctions within a single being. Divine existence, understanding, and willing are identical, so their explanatory ordering does not describe successive decisions or a change in essence. God necessarily wills his own goodness while freely producing particular creatures. His willing therefore differs both from blind automatic production and from a requirement to actualize every object of his knowledge.

Human willing likewise has a necessary orientation toward good while retaining free judgment about particulars and means. People may reject a particular cognition as harmful

but cannot reject goodness precisely as goodness; this leaves room for mistaken judgments about which things are good. Providence, in Ficino's account, preserves these modes of created action instead of coercively replacing them. The relation among will, good, choice, and necessity makes will more specific than arbitrary preference or external compulsion.

The earlier books add two contexts. The Proem joins true understanding to *recta voluntas*, right will, within philosophy's religious purpose. In the discussion of soul's stability, enduring will and memory serve as signs that the soul's essence remains while thoughts and bodily activities change. *Memoria* appears here as an example in that distinction, not as a fully developed independent theory of memory. Ficino also appeals to the mind's lack of necessary bodily dependence in understanding and willing when arguing for the suitability of separate intellectual life.

**The places.**

- **Proem.8, PDF pp. 8–9**. True understanding is paired with right will as philosophy's religious orientation.
- **I.5.1 and I.5.17, PDF pp. 60–61 and 72–73**. Enduring will and memory bear on the soul's stability and the possibility of separate intellectual life.
- **II.11.24–38, PDF pp. 194–201**. The assent of will is required for external production beyond mere knowledge of possible forms.
- **II.12.1–21, PDF pp. 202–215**. Necessary willing of goodness and free production of particulars are distinguished.
- **II.13.24–30, PDF pp. 232–237**. Providence preserves the created modes of judgment and action rather than replacing them with coercion.

**Further passage references.** Proem.8 (PDF pp. 8–9); I.5.1, I.5.17 (pp. 60–61, 72–73); I.6.1, I.6.19 (pp. 82–83, 94–95); II.11.24–38, PDF 194–201; II.12.1–21, PDF 202–215; II.13.24–30, PDF 232–237

**In this edition.**

"Assent" in the production argument is operative willing, not merely accepting a statement. Explanatory priority among understanding, end, and willing does not make God deliberate successively; recta voluntas in the Proem adds an explicitly normative human context.

**See also.**

Soul; Mind; Freedom and necessity; Appetite and desire; Good and goodness; Affect; Choice and free judgment; End and limit

## Wishing, refusing and the good

**Latin:** *velle*; *nolle*; *respuimus*; *anteponimus*; *bene et bonum intelligamus*; *velimus … non posse nolle*.

**The word.**

*Velle* wills or wishes; *nolle* does not will or refuses. *Respuere* rejects, and *anteponere* prefers or places before. The difference between adverbial *bene* and substantival *bonum* matters: understanding well and understanding the good are not the same grammatical claim.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino argues that intelligence is sought because it is good, whereas the good is not sought because it is intelligent. People may prefer pleasure to contemplation or temporarily reject knowledge thought harmful. Such choices show, in his reasoning, that knowledge is not an unconditional final object. The Good as Good cannot be rejected because even refusal seeks some good in refusing. He therefore joins supreme necessity to supreme voluntariness: people will the Good so willingly that they want to be unable not to will it. This concerns the formal object of desire, not the correctness of every judgement about a particular beneficial thing, and it does not establish that every concrete action is coerced or uniquely determined. The father and homeland at the close describe a common source and desired end.

**The places.**

- **I.6.18, PDF 92–93.** Desire for the Good precedes rational prompting and explains desire for intelligence
- **I.6.19, PDF 94–95.** Refusal of troubling knowledge, preference for pleasure, and the impossibility of rejecting the Good as such

**In this edition.**

“We both understand well and understand the Good” preserves *bene et bonum*. The double negative in “wish … to be unable not to will” is intentional; removing it destroys Ficino’s proposed conjunction of necessity and willing acceptance.

**See also.**

Will; Good and goodness; Freedom and necessity; Appetite and desire.

## Wonder and familiarity

**Latin:** *admiratio; admirari; diuturna consuetudo; spectaculum; educare; ambigere*

**The word.**

Admiratio is wonder; consuetudo familiarity or accustomed experience; spectaculum something presented to sight. Educare concerns bringing up, and ambigere being in doubt. The imagined restriction of vision tests the effect of habit on judgment.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Ficino says that long familiarity diminishes wonder. He asks the reader to imagine being raised in a house shut on every side and first seeing the world’s beauty at thirty. The newly encountered spectacle would, he claims, make even a former doubter certain of providential craftsmanship. The age specifies the thought experiment; it is not a biographical report or a rule about intellectual maturity. Its argumentative role differs from the organ and motion arguments: the hypothetical change of perspective makes an allegedly overlooked order newly striking. Ficino’s confidence about the observer’s response is part of the rhetorical experiment, not empirical evidence that every newly sighted person would draw this conclusion.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **II.13.19 (Latin PDF p. 228; English PDF p. 229).** Familiarity is said to diminish admiration.

- **II.13.20 (Latin PDF p. 230; English PDF p. 231).** The enclosed-house supposition renews the world as a spectacle.

**In this edition.**

The English “suppose” appropriately keeps the conditional construction. “Wonder” does not itself mean proof; the conclusion is supplied by Ficino’s subsequent inference from the stable order of the world’s parts.

**See also.**

Lucretius; Beauty and fittingness; Providence; Qualification and attribution.

## Word and meaning

**Latin:** verbum; verbi significatio; loquente Deo; qui loquitur; significat; consilium; affectum

**The word.**

Verbum means a word or utterance; significatio its meaning or signification; loqui means to speak. Significare is to make something known or signify it. The distinction between word and meaning is explicitly sharpened by immo, “indeed” or “rather.”

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Within the earlier thinkers’ account of universal mental presence, mind signifies God’s nature, counsel, and affection to itself and to others. It therefore proceeds from God as a word, more precisely as the meaning of a word, from a speaking God. The next sentence argues that word and speaker are present together, and infers mind’s presence wherever God is.

The correction toward meaning prevents the analogy from being treated simply as an acoustic event spreading through air. The function of the comparison is intelligible expression and inseparability from its source. This is the exposition of the view introduced in II.6.14 and closed in II.6.24; it must not be promoted into an unqualified demonstration that every created mind is everywhere. Nor does the passage equate every human thought with divine speech.

**The places.**

- II.6.20, II.6.21 (PDF pp. 138–141): Mind as word, more precisely meaning, supports the reported co-presence argument
- II.6.24 (PDF pp. 142–143): The closing attribution marks the scope of the preceding explanation

**In this edition.**

“Counsel” in this passage renders consilium as what mind signifies of God; it need not mean anxious deliberation, the sense disputed in II.8. “Affection” likewise names a directed disposition, not necessarily emotional disturbance.

**See also.**

Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities; Mind; Choice and deliberation; John and Amelius.

## World and universe

**Latin:** *mundus*, *universum*; *mundi machina*, *mundi sphaerae*; *caelum*

**The word.**

Mundus is world or cosmos; universum the total order; machina the connected structure or machinery. Caelum may concern heaven specifically and should not replace every broader cosmic expression.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The world is the ordered whole within which body, quality, soul, angel, and God are compared, though God is their source rather than one bodily component among others. Ficino calls soul the bond of nature and says it presides over the world's machinery. Such language stresses connection and governance. The universe's order also grounds arguments from the human mind's capacities: since a limited embodied mind can rise toward indivisible forms, the whole cannot lack the superior power required for that order. Celestial spheres supply recurrent examples of proportion, stable motion, and greater nobility; earth and water appear very small relative to higher spheres. These claims belong to the cosmology presented by Ficino and those he cites. Its universal life-giving cause is developed through local arguments rather than a fully elaborated world-soul doctrine in every occurrence.

**The places.**

- **I.1.7, PDF pp. 16–17**. The five-grade program places soul over the world's machinery and between the higher and lower grades.
- **I.3.13 and I.3.23–26, PDF pp. 36–47**. The larger world's order is invoked to explain powers manifest even in a limited embodied mind.
- **I.5.18 and I.5.25–28, PDF pp. 72–81**. Cosmic scale and differentiated heavenly motions supply arguments about higher intellectual causes.

**Further passage references.** I.1.7 (PDF pp. 16–17); I.3.13, I.3.23, I.3.25–I.3.26 (pp. 36–37, 44–47); I.5.18, I.5.25–I.5.28 (pp. 72–73, 78–81)

**In this edition.**

"Machinery of the world" is an image of connected order and rule in the program of the work. It does not certify a modern mechanical model or make God a bodily member of the universe alongside the grades he causes.

**See also.**

Order and harmony; Soul; Life; Angel; Art and nature

## World soul

**Latin:** *anima mundi*, *una communis natura*, *una anima*

**The word.**

Anima mundi is the soul of the world; una communis natura a common nature; una anima one animating source. Universality of governance does not make all subordinate souls numerically identical.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The one world-soul is distinguished from the souls of individual cosmic spheres and the many souls living within them. Ficino argues for it from the world's unity as a living work, the one matter underlying the spheres, and the cooperation of diverse members. Its indivisible presence is compared with the human soul's whole presence in each part of its body: it can connect, enliven, and move the universe without being parcelled into spatial pieces. This claim does not mean that all subordinate souls are identical, or that the world-soul is God. Ficino expressly rejects the identification of a sphere's life, even the whole world's, with first self-subsistent life. The world-soul remains beneath mind in the hierarchy and receives order and constancy from higher sources. Its Orphic knowing and animating powers are named Bacchus Eribromus and Calliope. The chapter's Christian-theological reservation applies to this cosmic account.

The inference from one maker to one living work provides one line of argument, while the correspondence between one underlying matter and one soul provides another. Sympathy adds a third: contrary members exchange powers and obey coordinated higher directions rather than acting as wholly disconnected bodies. These are distinct arguments reinforcing the same conclusion. The assertion that universal soul is everywhere in universal nature likewise follows an analogy: as nature stands to body, soul stands to nature. This makes universal soul a principle of the world's unity and activity without eliminating the more particular natures and souls through which differentiated effects occur. The final hierarchy preserves unity and multiplicity together.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.22–28, PDF pp. 292–295**. World-infused life is rejected as an identification of the highest God.
- **IV.1.50–52, PDF pp. 306–309**. The marked Pythagorean hierarchy gathers sphere-souls under world-soul and then rises to mind and unity.
- **IV.1.79–83, PDF pp. 322–325**. One maker and living work, one matter, and shared action supply distinct arguments for one soul.
- **IV.1.86–87, PDF pp. 326–327**. Soul's motion depends on higher sources of order and perpetual unity.
- **IV.1.94–96, PDF pp. 330–333**. Orphic names distinguish knowing and animating powers before the closing reservation.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.22–IV.1.28, pp. 292–295; IV.1.50–IV.1.52, pp. 306–309; IV.1.79–IV.1.87, pp. 322–327; IV.1.94–IV.1.96, pp. 330–333

**In this edition.**

The English supplies "spheres" after super singulas in IV.1.79 from the context, as the apparatus states. The world-soul is explicitly distinguished from God, and IV.1.96 conditions affirmation of the narrated cosmic account upon theological approval.

**See also.**

Soul; Sympathy; Whole and parts; Bacchus and the Muses

## Worship and piety

**Latin:** *cultus*, *colere*, *pietas*, *pius*; *venerari*, *veneratio*

**The word.**

Cultus and colere concern worship or honoring; pietas and pius a proper reverent disposition; venerari and veneratio reverence. Here religious practice is connected with the direction and purpose of inquiry.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

Worship is one of the two principal ends Ficino finds in reading Plato, the other being recognition of souls' divinity. The Proem makes this activity depend on knowledge and purification: the soul is purified to perceive divine light, causes are investigated so that the cause of causes may be found and revered, and self-knowledge prepares knowledge of God. Piety consequently describes how inquiry is directed, not simply an external observance added after argument. Ficino opposes separating love of wisdom from the honor due to wisdom or true understanding from right will. The first chapter then uses human capacity for divine worship in an argument about blessedness beyond bodily death. This religious characterization of philosophy's proper end expresses Ficino's program, including his presentation of the ancient authorities he invokes.

**The places.**

- **Proem.1–4, PDF pp. 6–7**. Mind's received light, purification, and self-knowledge direct its return toward God.
- **Proem.7–8, PDF pp. 8–9**. The created mind's mirror is used to contemplate and worship the Creator; philosophy is joined to religion.
- **I.1.1, PDF pp. 14–15**. Human worship supplies a premise in the opening argument for blessedness beyond bodily death.

**Further passage references.** Proem.1–Proem.10 (PDF pp. 6–11); I.1.1 (pp. 14–15)

**In this edition.**

The Proem's claims about Plato's religious ends are Ficino's presentation, and "right will" expresses a normative commitment. The image of inquiry finding the cause of causes should not be detached from its stated aim of reverence.

**See also.**

Philosophy and theology; Blessedness; Light and illumination; Divinity and the divine; Will

## Xenocrates and the riddle

**Latin:** *Xenocrates; aenigma; numerus se movens; usurpare; solvere*

**The word.**

Aenigma is a riddle or enigmatic formulation. Usurpare here is to employ an expression; solvere to resolve or explain it. Numerus se movens is self-moving number, an expression Ficino expressly glosses.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

After establishing soul as the first movable nature and the source of movement in animated bodies, Ficino says he thinks he has solved the Pythagorean riddle used by Xenocrates. He

interprets “number” as manifold nature and “self-moving” as changeable by its own property. The formula thus joins two features already distinguished from higher grades: angel is manifold but stable, whereas soul is manifold and mobile. It does not reduce soul to an integer or describe arithmetic calculation as its essence. The attribution also has layers: the riddle is called Pythagorean, Xenocrates is said to use it, and Ficino supplies this interpretation. Those are three claims, not a single directly quoted doctrine independently verified from Xenocrates.

**The places.**

Selected annotated passages.

- **III.1.23 (Latin PDF p. 254; English PDF p. 255).** The formula is interpreted after the argument for primary self-motion.
- **III.1.24 (Latin PDF p. 254; English PDF p. 255).** Further reasons are promised for the existence of that nature.
- **III.1.25 (Latin PDF p. 254; English PDF p. 255).** Dependence, regress, and circularity motivate a self-moving source.

**In this edition.**

The English “I believe I have solved” keeps arbitror, an authorial claim about explanatory success. Numerum is the case form in the reported formula; the nominative numerus is a supplied citation form.

**See also.**

Number; Unity and multiplicity; First movable; Motion and stability.

## Zodiac

**Latin:** *Zodiacus*, *animalia siderea*, *cor*, *anima principalis*

**The word.**

Zodiacus names the zodiacal circle; animalia siderea its stellar creatures; cor the heart-like principal star; anima principalis the soul governing the constellation. These are different levels in the same image.

**In the Platonic Theology.**

The zodiacal figures supply a visible sign of twelvefold organization in the highest sphere. Ficino presents each constellation as a celestial creature with a principal star functioning as its heart, where the constellation’s principal soul lives. The divine correspondences reported as Pythagorean are Aries/Pallas, Taurus/Venus, Gemini/a particular Phoebus, Cancer/Mercury, Leo/a particular Jupiter, Virgo/Ceres, Libra/Vulcan, Scorpio/Mars, Sagittarius/Diana, Capricorn/Vesta, Aquarius/Juno, and Pisces/Neptune. These are the correspondences in this passage, rather than a general key interchangeable with every astrological scheme. “Particular” also matters: the Phoebus and Jupiter assigned here are contextual divine souls, not necessarily the same referents as a universal theological name elsewhere. The list explains Ficino’s twelvefold analogy and cosmic nomenclature. It does not authorize predictions about individual character or destiny from a person’s zodiac sign.

**The places.**

- **IV.1.42, PDF pp. 302–303**. The twelvefold analogy is introduced through cosmic members and principal souls.

- **IV.1.43, PDF pp. 304–305**. Each zodiacal creature receives a principal star-heart and one named divine soul, providing the visible twelvefold sign.

**Further passage references.** IV.1.42–IV.1.43, pp. 302–305; apparatus p. 391

**In this edition.**

The divine correspondences are those of this reported Pythagorean passage. The supplied English preserves “particular” before Phoebus and Jupiter; neither should be silently equated with a universal divine name or transferred into the separate Orphic pair-list.

**See also.**

Twelve; Spheres and stars; Apollo; Soul

# Latin vocabulary register

Each record explains a lemma, lexical family or significant phrase. The headword can be a dictionary form; the listed attestations are printed forms checked in the cited Latin units. A family record can contain several local senses. Counts of records, printed forms and fuller articles overlap and should not be added as distinct words.

**aberro.** Printed forms: *aberrare*.

To go astray or err. The error charged to those severing philosophy and religion is an evaluative claim within Ficino’s programme. References: Proem.8. See Assent, approval and belief.

**absens / praesens.** Printed forms: *absens*; *praesens*; *praesenti*.

Absent / present. The good is sought when absent and embraced when present; appetite is not confined to unsatisfied desire. References: II.11.29. See Appetite and desire.

**absolutus / absolute.** Printed forms: *absolutae*; *absolute*; *absolutum*.

Unrestricted or considered without an added qualification. Common nature producing absolutely would not explain divergent properties; being considered absolutely lacks intrinsic limitation. References: II.2.4, II.4.2. See Common and proper.

**absolutus / adstrictus.** Printed forms: *absolutasque*; *adstrictas*.

Released from constraint, and bound to something. Universal forms and determinate natural materials are contrasted; release from a particular material constraint is not automatically complete divine independence. References: I.3.12. See Separation and abstraction.

**absurdus.** Printed forms: *absurda*; *absurdum*.

Absurd or incompatible with the premises being tested. Ficino marks the consequences of a higher unity-source or finitely bounded divine knowledge as unacceptable. References: II.1.3, II.1.6, II.3.2, II.10.7. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

**accedere / recedere.** Printed forms: *accedet*; *recedet*.

To approach and withdraw. Each celestial part repeatedly passes a designated point; this recurring departure distinguishes circular motion from one-way qualitative tendency. References: IV.1.56. See Circularity and return.

**accendere / accensio.** Printed forms: *accendit*; *accensio*.

Kindle / kindling. The meadow kindles desire immediately; this is called an act but denied to be motion because it is not gradual. References: III.1.27, III.1.28. See Apelles and the meadow.

**accipere.** Printed forms: *acceperit*; *accipit*.

Receive something. The verb concerns either hypothetical divine reception or the material a father obtained elsewhere; its object specifies the dependence. References: II.11.3, II.13.2. See Receiving and giving.

**accipere / capere / suscipere.** Printed forms: *acceperit*; *accepit*; *accepta*; *accipit*; *capiunt*; *suscipiendum*; *suscipit*.

To receive, take, or admit a contribution; not necessarily a voluntary acquisition. A creature receives constitution and being; pure nothing has no capacity to receive actuality. References: II.1.3, II.2.5, II.4.5, II.7.18. See Dependence and receiving.

**accipere / concedere.** Printed forms: *accepimus*; *accipiamus*; *concedemus*.

To take, adopt, or grant a proposition for the argument. Adopting the initial grades, testing a proposed angelic sphere-life, and taking twelve rulers are different argumentative acts rather than identical unconditional endorsements. References: IV.1.1, IV.1.29, IV.1.50. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**accipere — example and lantern.** Printed forms: *accipe*; *accipitque*.

To take or receive; the object determines whether this is figurative or physical. Ficino asks the reader to take an example; in that example Euclid takes a lantern before the journey. Taking the lantern is not assent to a proposition. References: IV.2.13. See Euclid and the lantern.

**Achates / adamas.** Printed forms: *Achates*; *adamas*.

Agate; diamond as named in the source. Agate allegedly benefits sight, resists poison, and grants strength and fertility; nearby diamond allegedly removes the magnet’s attraction. References: IV.1.20. See Hierobotanum and mineral powers.

**acies / oculus mentis.** Printed forms: *mentis aciem*; *mentis oculo*.

The directed gaze or eye of mind. The mind receives and desires truth’s light but is not the divine sun toward which Plato directs it. References: I.1.6. See Light and illumination.

**acies oculorum.** Printed forms: *aciem oculorum*.

The eyes’ sight or visual point. A solid object placed upon the eyes blocks seeing, distinguishing gross physical contact from receiving an image. References: III.2.29. See Spiritual union.

**acquiesco.** Printed forms: *acquiescant*.

To rest satisfied or assent to something. Ficino expects Platonic reasons to secure assent from readers not readily persuaded by divine law alone; assent is an audience response, not itself a proof. References: Proem.8. See Assent, approval and belief.

**actus / actio / agere.** Printed forms: *Actio*; *actio*; *actionem*; *actionis*; *actu*; *actui*; *Actus*; *agente*; *agentis*; *agit*.

Actuality, operation, or acting; the noun's force depends on its contrast. Act excludes passivity in the infinity argument; operation can remain in an agent or extend into external matter. References: II.4.1, II.7.25, II.8.4, II.9.5. See Act and operation.

**actus / actum (product).** Printed forms: *acto*; *actum*; *actus*.

Activity / what is acted or produced. The reported argument distinguishes divine act from its inward product, immediately glossed as begotten. References: II.12.9, II.12.10. See Self-production and reservation.

**adaequare / sibimet.** Printed forms: *adaequari*; *sibimet*.

To be wholly commensurate with oneself. Infinite self-knowledge does not impose another's limit, but is the infinite reality's complete self-presence. References: II.10.10. See Intuition and comprehension.

**adaequatus.** Printed forms: *adaequatum*.

Adequate or matching the scope of a power. The good is appetite's adequate object, explaining what it seeks under all particular choices without guaranteeing their correctness. References: II.13.29. See Object and adequate object.

**addere / accedere / advenire.** Printed forms: *accedente*; *accedunt*; *addiciuntur*; *additam*; *advenit*; *adveniunt*.

To add, approach, or accrue from elsewhere. A distinguishing property added to necessity creates composition; what comes from elsewhere differs from what belongs naturally. References: II.2.4, II.7.14, II.7.20. See Common and proper.

**addere / mittere / omittere.** Printed forms: *Adde*; *Mitto*; *omittam*.

To add a consideration or leave one aside. These guide the exposition: an additional mediating argument, a compressed species claim, and a deliberately passed-over generation claim have different prominence. References: IV.1.14, IV.1.32, IV.1.86. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**additamentum / permixtio.** Printed forms: *additamentum*; *permixtione*.

Addition / admixture. Any addition distinguishing a second supposed pure act would qualify it, preventing its being pure act in the same sense. References: III.1.10. See Purity and mixture.

**addo / accedo.** Printed forms: *Accedit*; *Adde*.

To add, or a further consideration is added. These argumentative transitions accumulate support; the appended reason need not repeat the preceding proof or introduce a new ontological grade. References: I.2.9, I.2.16, I.3.14. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**adesse / abesse.** Printed forms: *absente*; *absit*; *absunt*; *adesse*; *adest*.

To be present or absent. Presence of a universal cause accompanies its effect; absence of being itself would mean the effect's collapse. References: II.6.2, II.6.8, II.6.11, II.6.16. See Omnipresence and place.

**adesse / inesse.** Printed forms: *adsit*; *insit*.

To be present to; to dwell within. The final quotation leaves these alternatives for soul's relation to cosmic bodies instead of certifying only indwelling animation. References: IV.1.96. See Indwelling and presence.

**adhortor / admoneo.** Printed forms: *adhortatur*; *admonere*; *commoniti*.

To exhort, warn or call something to attention. Plato's example is paired with exhortation, the oracle admonishes toward self-knowledge, and Platonic reason calls sensory-minded readers beyond shadows. References: Proem.3, Proem.4, Proem.9. See Self knowledge.

**admiratio / consuetudo.** Printed forms: *Admirationem*; *admiratus*; *consuetudo*.

Wonder / familiarity or accustomed experience. Long familiarity is said to dull wonder, motivating the enclosed-house thought experiment. References: II.13.19, II.13.20. See Wonder and familiarity.

**admixtio / inquinatio.** Printed forms: *admixtionem*; *inquinationem*.

Admixture / taint or contamination. Quality becomes divisible through bodily admixture; soul is denied such division even through involvement with body. References: III.1.3. See Purity and mixture.

**adsciscere / complecti.** Printed forms: *adsciscere*; *complecti*.

To take on form; to embrace matter. Matter's receptivity and form's guidance are complementary relations making a living composite possible. References: IV.1.71. See Form.

**adultus / affectio corporis.** Printed forms: *adultam*; *affectio corporis*.

A fully developed bodily condition. The hour test begins with a mature condition, not merely one still developing; the adjective is a supplied source-correction noted in the apparatus. References: I.4.2. See Permanence and the hour test.

**adversari / repugnare.** Printed forms: *adversatur*; *repugnet*.

Conflict with or oppose. The object is the intelligible character of being, so the argument concerns impossibility rather than ordinary physical opposition. References: II.12.16. See Contradiction and possibility.

**aedificia / machinae.** Printed forms: *aedificiis*; *machinis*.

Buildings and machines. The capacity to rise above earth by these means makes clear that animalia includes humans in this example. References: IV.1.37. See Animating and animal.

**aedificium / domus.** Printed forms: *aedificii*; *domui*; *domus*.

Building / house. The plan of a building requires accounts of parts; the house example then distinguishes original features from later additions. References: II.11.18, II.11.21. See Architect, house and decoration.

**aenigma / Xenocrates.** Printed forms: *aenigma*; *Xenocrate*.

Riddle / Xenocrates. Ficino claims to resolve the Pythagorean formula employed by Xenocrates, separating source, user, and interpretation. References: III.1.23. See Xenocrates and the riddle.

**aequalis / aeque.** Printed forms: *aequalem*; *aequalia*; *aeque*.

Equal, equally, or equally disposed in a specified respect. Equal first gods are tested; a body's equal disposition toward being and nonbeing indicates need for determination. References: II.2.1, II.2.4, II.7.8. See Common and proper.

**aer / aqua / terra.** Printed forms: *aer*; *aere*; *aerem*; *aqua*; *aquam*; *aquamve*; *terra*.

Air / water / earth. Elemental mediation joins unlike extremes through shared qualities; the historical physical account supplies the example, not modern chemical elements. References: III.2.6, III.2.8. See Elements and their spheres.

**aevum.** Printed forms: *aevum*.

Eternal age or enduring mode above temporal succession. The reported ladder distinguishes part of time, all time, existence through aevum, and aevum itself. References: III.2.3. See Eternity and time.

**affectus / afficere.** Printed forms: *affectum*; *afficit*.

Affective engagement / affect or incline. The intensity of affect is linked to productive efficacy and then applied analogically to divine will. References: II.11.31, II.11.32. See Affect.

**afficio / affectio / passio.** Printed forms: *affectioque*; *affici*; *passiones*; *passioni*.

To be affected, a condition, and undergoing action. Extension and modification are called passivities of matter; these uses concern receptivity, not necessarily emotion or moral passion. References: I.2.1. See Affection and passivity.

**affixus / situs.** Printed forms: *affixa*; *situ*; *situm*.

Fixed to / position. A geometrical point is indivisible but remains fixed to bodily quantity, unlike the position-free soul postulated by the argument. References: III.2.13, III.2.16, III.2.18. See Point and position.

**agens / patiens.** Printed forms: *agens*; *agenti*; *patiens*; *patienti*.

The acting agent and the recipient undergoing action. Perfect natural action requires the agent's power, readiness and close penetration of the patient; both may be impeded by quantitative division. References: I.2.2, I.2.4, I.2.10. See Affection and passivity.

**agere / actio / agens.** Printed forms: *agit*.

Act, produce, or cause / action / agent. An agent may act without temporal motion: the meadow's immediate presentation is efficacious, while painting is a gradual act. References: II.11.1, III.1.28. See Act and operation.

**agere: egerit.** Printed forms: *egerit*.

May have done or should do, a perfect form of agere. The anticipated Epicurean objection concerns God doing many things and becoming burdened; egerit does not mean needing. References: II.8.1. See Burden labor and ease.

**ala / dux / patria.** Printed forms: *alis*; *Deo duce*; *patriae*; *patriam*.

Wing, guide and homeland in an ascent-and-return image. Platonic wings and God's guidance lead the contemplative journey; the final homeland is a simile for the Good toward which all things aspire. References: I.1.2, I.6.19. See Prison and homeland.

**albedo / caro.** Printed forms: *albedo*; *Albedo*; *carne*; *carnis*.

Whiteness / flesh. Whiteness distributed proportionately with flesh supplies the natural philosophers' contrast to soul's whole presence in every part. References: III.2.10, III.2.11. See Quality.

**alere.** Printed forms: *alit*.

To nourish or sustain offspring. The earth-as-mother question links bringing forth with feeding what has been born. References: IV.1.2. See Earth as mother.

**alere / nutrire / digerere.** Printed forms: *alit*; *digeritque*; *nutrit*.

To nourish and digest. Soul's simultaneous bodily maintenance is Ficino's example of activity without anxious deliberation. References: II.8.2, II.8.5. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**alias / mitto.** Printed forms: *alias*; *Mitto*.

Elsewhere; I pass over or leave aside. Ficino expressly defers further arguments about the infinite interval above souls and about motion's source; a promise is not a demonstration supplied in the present unit. References: I.3.32, I.5.15. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**alii quidam / Peripatetici.** Printed forms: *Alii vero quidam*; *Peripateticos*.

Certain other thinkers, and the Peripatetics in a specifically attributed account. Ficino shifts from Plotinus's account to a distinction allowing quality some action on its own and other matter; the shift must not be flattened into one doctrine. References: I.3.19. See Quality.

**alimentum / providere.** Printed forms: *alimenta*; *providisses*; *provisa*; *provisurus*.

Nourishment / make provision. Food, places, and seasons are part of providence's concrete supply; foresight alone does not capture this use. References: II.13.16, II.13.17. See Providential provision.

**alit / auget / generat.** Printed forms: *alit*; *auget*; *generat*.

Nourishes, enlarges and generates. These bodily life-operations occur over time and therefore show changing activity despite the soul's stable essence. References: I.5.1. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**aliunde.** Printed forms: *aliunde*.

From elsewhere or another source. Quality supplies motion only insofar as it receives motion, leaving the source of its efficacy to be explained. References: IV.1.58. See Through itself and through another.

**alius / idem / uterque — explanatory distinction.** Printed forms: *alio*; *aliud*; *Idem*; *utrumque*.

Other / the same / both. Distinguishing giver and recipient or nature and intelligence can introduce explanatory roles without asserting separate substances in God. References: II.11.11, II.11.14, III.1.21. See Simplicity and composition.

**allicere / cogere / persuadere.** Printed forms: *alliciat*; *cogat*; *cogit*; *persuadeat*.

Attract / compel / persuade. Persuasion preserves soul's free manner, while the subsequent qualified compulsion concerns willing goodness itself. References: II.13.26, II.13.28. See Persuasion and compulsion.

**Almariani.** Printed forms: *Almariani*.

The group named as holding that God and matter form one living being. Ficino rejects the position through the relation of parts to a composite’s further actuality; the name is not conjecturally corrected. References: IV.1.27. See Strato, Chrysippus, and the Almariani.

**amare / amor.** Printed forms: *amari*; *amorem*.

To love; love as orientation toward or expression of goodness. The first principle’s goodness is aligned with love in the Johannine theological comparison. References: II.1.7, II.3.10. See Love and pleasure.

**ambigere.** Printed forms: *ambigere*; *ambiguus*.

Be uncertain or in doubt. Ficino claims the newly seen order would remove the imagined observer’s previous doubt about providence. References: II.13.20. See Wonder and familiarity.

**ambigere / disserere.** Printed forms: *ambigunt*; *disseruerunt*.

To doubt; to discuss or argue about. Ancient Peripatetic silence on elemental life is distinguished from the doubts of some later Peripatetics. References: IV.1.89. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**amittere / delere.** Printed forms: *amittitur*; *deletur*.

To lose or efface. Specific determinations are lost before being; the first cause’s trace is erased later than subordinate traces. References: II.7.21, II.7.29, II.7.32. See Impression and effacement.

**amitto.** Printed forms: *amittere*.

To lose or let go of. The supplied I.5.9 says a thing lacking persistence, when admitting rest, loses motion; the apparatus explains this difficult sentence without changing its printed wording. References: I.5.9. See Motion and stability.

**amplecti.** Printed forms: *amplectitur*.

To embrace or welcome a teaching. Amelius is said gladly to embrace John’s theology; the verb reports reception, not the details of a lost textual exchange. References: II.3.10. See John and Amelius.

**amplificare / porrigere.** Printed forms: *amplificare*; *amplificari*; *porrigere*.

Extend or enlarge / stretch out. The spatial verbs figuratively express the range of possible being and divine productive power. References: II.12.15, II.12.17. See Power and potency.

**amplitudo / plenitudo / implere.** Printed forms: *amplitudo*; *impleat*; *implere*; *plenitudo*; *replere*.

Expanse, fullness, and filling. The fullness argument must not be reduced to a large occupant filling an independently existing spatial container. References: II.6.10, II.6.13. See Omnipresence and place.

**amplus / amplior.** Printed forms: *amplior*; *ampliorem*; *Amplissima*; *amplissima*.

Wider or more comprehensive in scope. The more comprehensive cause acts through a more comprehensive form; this is causal scope rather than bodily size. References: II.9.4. See Form.

**Anaxagoras / Hermotimus.** Printed forms: *Anaxagora*; *Anaxagoras*; *Hermotimo*; *Hermotimus*.

The thinkers represented as stopping at angelic mind. Ficino first says they seem to have rested there, then refuses to halt with them below divine unity. References: I.1.5, I.6.1. See Philosophers and stopping points.

**Anebon / Abamon / Plotinus / Iamblichus / Julianus.** Printed forms: *Abamon*; *Anebon*; *Iamblicusque*; *Iulianus*; *Plotinus*.

The named authorities for the universal mental-presence account. The text identifies priests and Platonists, then expressly expounds their position before returning to God. References: II.6.14. See Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities.

**angelus.** Printed forms: *angeli*; *angelo*; *angelum*; *Angelus*; *angelus*.

Angel as a separate intellectual being subordinate to God. The angel is not pure necessary being and acts with power continually bestowed by its first cause. References: II.1.1, II.7.12, II.7.24. See Angel.

Angel, the stable intellectual grade below God. Angelic reception and multiplicity distinguish this grade from pure divine act without giving it bodily extension. References: III.1.4, III.1.10, III.1.12. See Angel.

**angelus / nuntius.** Printed forms: *angelos*; *nuntiosque*.

Angel and messenger. Ficino presents these as Hebrew and later philosophical names for the separate minds discussed through Aristotle, rather than Aristotle’s original vocabulary. References: I.5.20. See Angel.

**anima / animus.** Printed forms: *anima*; *animae*; *animam*; *animi*; *animorumque*; *animos*.

Soul or animate psychic subject, not invariably equivalent to intellectual mind. Soul gives life without choosing every act, while its deliberate choices also arise from its being. References: II.3.4, II.4.6, II.8.3. See Soul.

Soul. Animus is used for souls whose free judgment providence preserves; anima names the self-moving, temporally knowing middle essence. References: II.13.26, III.2.23. See Soul.

**anima rationalis.** Printed forms: *animae*; *rationalem animam*; *rationalis animae*.

Rational soul, the third or middle essence. It mediates higher and lower grades and is later distinguished by stable essence with successive operation. References: I.1.4, I.1.7, I.3.33, I.5.1. See Soul.

**animadvertere / agnoscere.** Printed forms: *agnoscit*; *animadvertit*.

Apprehend or attend to / recognize. Recognition of soul’s own spiritual essence makes its self-attention intellectual cognition within Ficino’s argument. References: III.2.28. See Looking and recognizing.

**animal / bestia / animans.** Printed forms: *animal*; *animantibus*; *bestiae*.

A living creature; a beast; a living being. The opening includes the human being among animals while distinguishing humans from beasts; “animal” is not restricted to nonhuman creatures. References: I.1.1. See Animating and animal.

**animalis / angelicus.** Printed forms: *angelicae*; *angelicam*; *animalem*; *animales*.

Animating or belonging to soul, contrasted with angelic. The contrast separates minds that vivify from minds that govern; animalis is not restricted to nonhuman beasts. References: II.6.14, II.6.24. See Intellectual and animating powers.

**animalis / animales vires.** Printed forms: *animales*; *animales vires*.

Animating or belonging to bodily life. Human minds reach their bodies through these powers; celestial lives combine intellectual and animating functions. References: IV.1.31. See Animating and animal.

**annixus / coartare.** Printed forms: *annixu*; *coartant*.

Pressing effort; constraining or pressing together. Earth's parts are said to circle the center in a qualified manner through their mutual pressure. References: IV.1.75. See Natural motion and natural place.

**antecedere / sequi / praecedere.** Printed forms: *antecedit*; *praecedens*; *praecedente*; *sequentes*; *sequentibus*; *succedit*.

To precede, follow, or succeed, with temporal and explanatory uses distinguished. Later causes follow God in dependence, whereas a sequence of prior choices would postpone action indefinitely. References: II.5.1, II.7.23, II.8.3. See Before and after in nature.

**anticipare / discernere / metiri.** Printed forms: *anticipet*; *discernat*; *metiatur*.

Anticipate / distinguish / measure. Intellect anticipates an end, distinguishes routes, and measures their proportion before will approves the end in the exposition. References: II.11.25. See Assent of will.

**Antipodes / semicirculus.** Printed forms: *Antipodum*; *semicirculus*.

Those on the opposite side; a half-circle or relevant half of the sphere. The imagined stopped Saturnian sphere places one half overhead here and one over the Antipodes to test any privileged position. References: IV.2.24. See Here, there, and the Antipodes.

**Apelles / pratum.** Printed forms: *Apelles*; *Apellis*; *Pratum*; *pratum*.

Apelles / meadow. The named painter and presented meadow distinguish an external starting point and end from soul's inward source of succession. References: III.1.27, III.1.29. See Apelles and the meadow.

**apex.** Printed forms: *apicem*.

The summit. A form divided in body is denied the status of nature's summit; the spatial noun summarizes a hierarchy of causal independence. References: I.3.31. See Ascent.

**Apollo / cithara / contemperare.** Printed forms: *Apollinis*; *cithara*; *contemperas*; *resonante*.

Apollo, lyre, and bringing into harmony. The attributed hymn gives musical form to the claim that divine ordering includes the whole sphere. References: II.9.22. See Apollo.

**Apollo / simplex et semotus.** Printed forms: *semotum a multitudine*; *simplicem*; *universalem Apollinem*.

Apollo interpreted through simplicity and removal from plurality. The offered Greek wordplays are Ficino's attributed Pythagorean interpretation, not independently established etymologies. References: IV.1.51. See Apollo.

**appareo / pateo.** Printed forms: *appareat*; *apparet*; *patet*.

To appear, become evident or be manifest. These verbs introduce what Ficino takes an argument or comparison to show; their evidential force depends on the surrounding support, not the verb alone. References: I.1.3, I.1.7, I.2.2. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**appellatio / nomen / proprie.** Printed forms: *appellationes*; *nomen*; *Proprie*.

A designation, name, or strict application of a name. Intellectual names apply to God by cause rather than form, whereas angel is properly mind. References: II.9.12. See Naming by cause.

**appetibile / effectrix.** Printed forms: *appetibile*; *effectrixque*.

An object of desire; a producer of motion. God moves as the good sought, while an interior desiring form produces the body’s movement toward that end. References: IV.1.61. See Appetite and desire.

**appetibilis / appetere.** Printed forms: *appetant*; *appetere*; *appetibilia*; *appetibilis*; *appetitum*; *appetitus*.

Desirable, and directed appetite toward what presents itself as good. Desire requires a first source and final end; intelligence is itself desired as a good. References: II.1.5, II.1.6, II.3.9, II.9.2. See Appetite and desire.

**appetitus excitatus.** Printed forms: *appetitum*; *excitatur*.

Appetite aroused by cognition. Heavenly motion is compared with a human soul moving its body through appetite awakened by thought. References: IV.2.1. See Appetite and desire.

**approbare / eligere.** Printed forms: *approbet*; *eligat*.

Approve / choose. Approval concerns the end; choice prefers one path among alternatives. These functions are not identical with merely knowing the end. References: II.11.25, II.11.26. See Assent of will.

**aptus / convenire / congruere.** Printed forms: *aptius*; *congruit*; *conveniat*.

Fit / agree or suit. A middle nature must agree with each extreme in a different respect; practical choice likewise selects what is judged fitting to an end. References: II.13.30, III.2.2. See Degree and mediation.

**arcana / edo.** Printed forms: *arcana*; *editurus*.

Secrets or difficult inherited teachings, and to publish or bring them forth. The dedication claims Lorenzo already understands what will be disclosed to others; the language participates in praise of the dedicatee’s philosophical capacity. References: Proem.11. See Lorenzo, dedication and public authority.

**Archimedes / aeneus.** Printed forms: *aeneae*; *Archimedis*.

The named maker and his bronze spheres. A hypothetical comparison with their arrangement is answered by arguing for a living rational principle in the heavens. References: IV.1.63. See Archimedes and the bronze spheres.

**argumentum / arguere.** Printed forms: *arguitur*; *argumentis*; *argumento*.

An argument or evidential consideration; to expose by reasoning. Traces supply an argument for a source, while the claim limiting divine knowledge is said to be exposed as error. References: II.1.1, II.1.2, II.10.8. See Reason and account.

**arguo / convinco.** Printed forms: *arguit*; *convincitur*.

To judge against or show to be defective. The mind’s verdict that bodily form is not fully true presupposes a truer standard in Ficino’s argument. References: I.3.2. See Truth.

**Aristoteles.** Printed forms: *Aristoteles*.

Aristotle as invoked authority. Ficino attributes the army analogy and inward movement comparison to Aristotelian works; the lexical record does not independently authenticate those attributions. References: II.13.8, II.13.12. See Army and commander.

**Aristoteles / Divinorum.** Printed forms: *Aristoteles*; *Divinorum*.

Aristotle and the work-title used by Ficino for the cited order argument. Ficino appeals to Averroes’s own authority for the good of the whole; his book number is not silently modernized. References: II.9.21. See Order and harmony.

**ars / artificium.** Printed forms: *ars*; *arti*; *artibus*; *artificii*; *artis*; *Artium*.

Craft or skill and its produced artifact. Material already shaped in some way still needs the art’s form to become the artifact; the comparison strengthens the case for a natural formative cause. References: I.3.6. See Art and nature.

Craft or purposive skill, broader than fine art. Art’s dependence on natural material and intellectual makers’ knowledge of products serve different causal arguments. References: II.7.17, II.9.13. See Art and nature.

**artificium / opus.** Printed forms: *artificium*; *naturae opus*.

Artifact; a work or completed result. The artifact manifests a maker’s mind in separated matter; nature’s work manifests mind in conjoined matter. References: IV.1.12. See Artifact and natural work.

**artus / articulus.** Printed forms: *articulos*; *artus*.

Members and joints. The world’s bodily articulation is compared with nested groupings of souls in the numerical argument. References: IV.1.42. See Head, heart, and members.

**arx / tertius / medius.** Printed forms: *arce*; *mediam*; *tertiam*.

Summit or citadel / third / middle. Soul is third counted either downward from God or upward from body; arx figuratively locates the two highest grades. References: III.2.1. See Degree and mediation.

**ascendere / descendere.** Printed forms: *ascendendo*; *ascensus*; *descendendo*; *descendit*.

To ascend or descend in an ordered hierarchy. Upward comparison increases perfection, while gifts and multiplicity descend from higher sources. References: II.1.6, II.3.2, II.3.3, II.7.2. See Ascent.

**ascendo / gradus.** Printed forms: *ascenderimus*; *ascenderunt*; *ascendimus*; *ascensus*; *gradus*.

To ascend; a step, rank or degree. The movement passes through grades of being and forms of cognition, not measured spatial steps. A degree of heat is a different local use of gradus. References: I.1.4, I.1.7, I.3.1, I.3.15. See Ascent.

**ascisco.** Printed forms: *asciscat*.

To claim or appropriate for oneself. A more excellent cosmic potency is said to claim actuality more fully and earlier; the personal verb portrays realization rather than a literal political vote. References: I.5.25. See Power and potency.

**assensus.** Printed forms: *assensus*.

Assent or approval. The assent of will is required for external production, so knowledge alone does not select the effect to be made. References: II.11.24. See Assent of will.

**assurgere / inclinari.** Printed forms: *assurgebant*; *inclinabantur*.

Rise up / bend down. Seated and standing figures perform different motions under one arrangement; uniform causation need not mean identical outcomes. References: II.13.13. See Florentine mechanism.

**attingere / affectare.** Printed forms: *affectat*; *attingere*.

To touch; to seek or aspire to. Each part seeks contact with all corresponding parts of the containing sphere, which rotation approximates successively. References: IV.2.25. See Striving and enjoyment.

**attingere / tetigit.** Printed forms: *tetigit*.

To touch on an idea rather than physically contact an object. Zoroaster is said mystically to have touched on common origin in the one-fire saying. References: II.7.7. See Philosophy and theology.

**attingo / tango.** Printed forms: *attingit*; *tangit*.

To touch or reach. The lowest degree of a higher nature is said to meet the highest of a lower; touch here marks a relation of grades, though illustrated by fire and air. References: I.5.14. See Degree and mediation.

**attribuere / dare.** Printed forms: *attribueris*; *dabit*; *dat*.

To attribute to a source or give an effect. Ascribing proper causes to celestial souls does not remove the need for an earthly mediator; giving motion or life specifies a causal contribution. References: IV.1.7, IV.1.66, IV.1.96. See Communication and imparting.

**auctor.** Printed forms: *auctor*.

An originator or source. The hypothetical source of all evil is deprived of the very goods required to act as an originator. References: II.2.15. See Manichaeans and Gnostic philosophers.

**auctor / auctoritas role.** Printed forms: *auctorem*; *auctorum*.

An authority for a doctrine or a source that originates something, depending on context. The names of divine authorities introduce reported Orphic nomenclature in IV.1.94. By contrast the angel understands and loves its author or originating source in IV.2.21. Identical family membership does not fix one causal sense. References: IV.1.94, IV.2.21. See Philosophy and theology.

**auctoritas.** Printed forms: *auctoritate*; *auctoritati*.

Authority, warrant or public standing. Augustine’s authority supports Ficino’s project, law’s authority meets resistance, and Lorenzo’s authority concerns public affairs; the objects distinguish the uses. References: Proem.7, Proem.8, Proem.11. See Lorenzo, dedication and public authority.

**aucupor.** Printed forms: *aucupabitur*.

To hunt or seek after successively. The pure mind does not hunt now one truth and now another; the hunting image characterizes discursive acquisition. References: I.6.9. See Eye and imagined enlargement.

**augere / augmentum.** Printed forms: *augere*; *augeri*; *augmenti*; *augmentum*.

To increase or grow; increase as an operation. Ficino treats increase as dependent on the production of parts, not as a separate substantial agent. References: IV.1.1. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**augurari.** Printed forms: *auguratur*.

Divine or apprehend in some measure. Rational soul's continuing apprehension of higher things is qualified as thinking or divining, not described as exhaustive knowledge. References: III.1.31. See Looking and recognizing.

**aura / viscera / quassare.** Printed forms: *aura*; *quassat*; *visceribus*.

Breeze; inward parts; to shake. Dust and mountains supply examples making subtle causes of bodily motion less surprising within the argument. References: IV.2.19. See Weariness and agility.

**Aurelius Augustinus / Aurelianus.** Printed forms: *Aureliana*; *Aurelius Augustinus*.

Augustine, with an adjective referring back to his authority. Ficino invokes his reported approval of Plato's proximity to Christian truth; the compressed adjective does not name a different authority. References: Proem.6, Proem.7. See Augustine and Christian proximity.

**aut semper aut plurimum.** Printed forms: *aut semper aut plurimum*.

Always or for the most part. The qualification limits the regularity claim about natural paths and works; it should not be rewritten as exceptionless observed success. References: II.13.9. See Qualification and attribution.

**auxilium / subsidium.** Printed forms: *adiuvante*; *auxilio*; *subsidio*.

Aid or support. God needs no assistance or borrowed material; effects require continual support, and subordinate agents work by divine aid. References: II.7.21, II.7.22, II.7.30. See Borrowing and assistance.

**Averrois / Aristoteles.** Printed forms: *Aristotelis*; *Averrois*.

Averroes and Aristotle in a reported account of celestial form. Ficino presents dimension without material potency as an intermediate and then makes his own further inference to dimensionless substance. References: I.3.27. See Incorporeal and immaterial.

**Avicenna.** Printed forms: *Avicenna*.

The named authority for a numerical indication of principal minds. Ficino reports at least ten in one place and a seeming suggestion of many more elsewhere, keeping the principal subset distinct from a total count. References: I.5.20. See Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds.

**aviditas caeca.** Printed forms: *aviditas*; *caeca*; *irrationalis*.

Desire that is blind or nonrational. Ficino denies these descriptions of the heavenly desire because of its superior order and proximity to truth. References: IV.1.62. See Appetite and desire.

**avidus / intentus.** Printed forms: *avidissime*; *intentus*.

Eager or avid / fixed intently. The adverb and participle emphasize affective intensity in the ostrich's directed gaze. References: II.11.31. See Ostrich and egg.

**beatitudo / felicitas.** Printed forms: *beatior*; *beatitudinem*; *beatitudinis*; *felicitas*; *infelicius*.

Blessedness, happiness and their opposites. The Proem links happiness to knowledge and life-ordering; the opening argues that nearness to God in worship cannot culminate in humanity's being most miserable. References: Proem.6, I.1.1, I.1.3. See Blessedness.

**bene et bonum.** Printed forms: *bene et bonum*.

Well and the good. Ficino demands both good understanding and understanding the Good; the adverb and substantive have different functions. References: I.6.19. See Wishing, refusing and the good.

**beneficium.** Printed forms: *beneficio*.

A benefit, aid, or advantage; beneficio can mean with the help of or by virtue of. The discussion of visibility contrasts abundant light with bodily thickness. Airy and fiery beings lack either means of appearing to earthly eyes in the reported account; the noun is not an inflection of the adverb bene. References: IV.1.38. See Light and illumination.

**beneficium / officium.** Printed forms: *beneficio*; *officio*.

A benefit or beneficence; a duty or service. Lorenzo's support provides leisure, while Ficino's dedication is the service offered in return; the two nouns name different sides of the relationship. References: Proem.11. See Lorenzo, dedication and public authority.

**bonitas / bonum.** Printed forms: *bona*; *bonae*; *bonitas*; *bonitate*; *bonitatem*; *bonitati*; *bonitatis*; *bonum*; *bonus*.

Goodness and the good, as a thing's perfection, desire's object, and the first source. A higher supposed good must already possess goodness; the one principle gives both being and well-being. References: II.1.1, II.1.4, II.1.7, II.3.10. See Good and goodness.

**bonum / bonitas.** Printed forms: *bona*; *bonitas*.

Good / goodness. God's own goodness is the necessary final end; created goods are images not all required for that end's possession. References: II.12.12, II.12.14, II.12.15. See Good and goodness.

**brevitas / raritas.** Printed forms: *brevitatem*; *raritatem*.

Smallness and rarity or low density. With lightness they make a body approach an incorporeal condition in the argument; they do not literally make every small body an incorporeal substance. References: I.2.3. See Incorporeal and immaterial.

**caelum / sphaera / stella.** Printed forms: *caelum*; *sphaeras*; *stellis*.

Heaven / sphere / star. The examples distinguish variable spheres, a reported motionless empyrean, and celestial lights used as analogues of intellectual reception. References: III.1.32, III.2.4, III.2.5. See Spheres and stars.

**calefacere / aqua / aer.** Printed forms: *aerem*; *aquam*; *calefaciendam*; *calefacit*.

To heat, with water and air as different recipients. Ficino uses greater effort heating water than air to illustrate degrees of active power; this remains his example. References: II.4.5, II.8.2, II.8.4. See Act and operation.

**calefactio.** Printed forms: *calefactio*.

Heating as an action. Fire heats water over time rather than instantaneously, illustrating why quality's operation belongs to motion. References: I.4.1. See Act and operation.

**calidus / frigidus / siccus / humidus.** Printed forms: *calida*; *frigida*; *humida*; *sicca*.

Hot / cold / dry / moist. These elemental qualities alone are said not to account for ordered forms, figures, and revolutions. References: II.13.5. See Quality.

**calor / frigus.** Printed forms: *calor*; *caloris*; *frigiditatem*; *frigori*; *frigoris*.

Heat and cold as active qualitative differences. They supply examples of efficacy strengthened by concentration; elsewhere cooling and heating distinguish specific actions of different forms. References: I.2.2, I.2.11. See Quality.

Heat and cold, opposed qualities in an example of purity. Supreme heat is imagined free of admixture that would hinder its intensity. References: II.2.6. See Purity and mixture.

**calor / ignis / lignum.** Printed forms: *igne*; *lignum*.

Heat / fire / wood. Heating begins in fire and ends in wood, furnishing the example of transitive activity contrasted with inward intellectual operation. References: II.11.14. See Act and operation.

**cancelli / restitutio.** Printed forms: *cancellos*; *restitutio*.

Bounds; restoration to a proper condition. Fully natural motion stays within natural place; rectilinear ascent or descent restores a displaced part to it. References: IV.1.75. See Natural motion and natural place.

**candela / aula.** Printed forms: *aula*; *aulam*; *candelae*; *candelas*.

Candle and hall. Several lights fill the same hall while each remains related to its own source, modeling co-presence without confusion. References: II.6.24. See Candles and the hall.

**canis / latrare.** Printed forms: *canes*; *latrant*.

Dog / bark. Unnamed dissenters are derided through animal imagery; the insult is not additional evidence for the claimed Platonic consensus. References: II.11.22. See Insults and rebuke.

**capacitas / capax.** Printed forms: *capacitas*; *capacitatem*; *capax*.

Capacity or receptivity, with cognitive and metaphysical senses. Unlimited capacity is initially conceived without bounds; intellect is capable of an object through kinship; matter receives forms. References: II.6.12, II.9.1, II.10.3. See Power and potency.

**capacitas materiae / continuum / multiplicatio.** Printed forms: *capacitas*; *continui*; *Multiplicatio*.

Material receptivity, the continuous, and multiplication of number as potentially infinite processes. The list includes distinct kinds of unending continuation rather than one actually infinite physical object. References: II.10.3, II.10.4. See Infinity.

**capax / capio.** Printed forms: *capax*; *capiat*; *capit*.

Receptive or capable of receiving; to receive or apprehend. The eye can receive light and mind truth while remaining distinct from what they receive; greater capacity does not erase dependency. References: I.1.6, I.6.7. See Containing, receiving and lacking.

**capere.** Printed forms: *capere*; *capit*.

Receive or take in. God’s hypothetical reception of qualities would assign him the recipient’s role, incompatible with the first pure agent in this argument. References: II.11.3. See Receiving and giving.

**caput / capacitas.** Printed forms: *capacitatem*; *caput*.

Head or governing summit, and capacity. Mind is the soul’s head but contracted to that soul’s capacity; its higher head is free and lucid mind existing in itself. References: I.5.14. See Mind.

**caput mentis / rationis.** Printed forms: *caput rationis*; *mentis est caput*.

The head or directing principle of mind and reason. The hierarchy is nonbodily: unity directs mind and mind directs reason in the soul’s outflow and return. References: IV.2.11. See Head, heart, and members.

**carcer / claustra.** Printed forms: *carcere*; *carcere caeco*; *claustra*.

Prison or barriers of confinement. These images frame the exhortation to philosophical ascent; the immediately following programme makes argument the means of release. References: I.1.1, I.1.2, I.1.3. See Prison and homeland.

**cardo.** Printed forms: *cardinem*; *cardines*; *cardo*.

Hinge or governing pivot. God’s being turns subordinate hinges, each corresponding to an order; the metaphor explains coordinated hierarchy. References: II.13.12. See Hinge and center.

**cardo / fundamentum.** Printed forms: *cardinem*; *fundamentum*.

A hinge or pivot, and a foundation. Stable substance grounds changing accidents; the material images identify an enduring reference and cause, not a literal joint inside the soul. References: I.3.13. See Hinge and center.

**cardo / liquidus / solidus.** Printed forms: *cardinis*; *liquido*; *liquidorum*; *soliditatem*; *solido*.

Pivot; liquid; solid or firm. A solid restrains liquid flux as stable first source restrains dependence; solidity also preserves the statue’s material. References: II.3.8, II.7.17. See Spring and flow.

**careo / expers.** Printed forms: *careat*; *carere*; *caret*; *expers*.

To lack or be without. Lacking life, lacking one’s own light, and being exempt from change concern different privations; transparent mediation is compatible with not originating light. References: IV.1.2, IV.1.29, IV.2.22. See Need and sufficiency.

**carere / deesse / destituere.** Printed forms: *careat*; *deesse*; *Deest*; *destitutam*.

To lack or be absent; to leave deprived. The supreme must lack no good, and no region of immensity may be left without the first good’s presence. References: II.2.10, II.4.3, II.6.6, II.9.5. See Need and sufficiency.

**caritas.** Printed forms: *caritate*.

Charity or love directed toward humanity. Ficino presents charity as a motive for composing a Platonic theology aligned with Christian truth; the term concerns his declared purpose. References: Proem.7. See Love and pleasure.

**casus / contingere.** Printed forms: *casu*; *contigit*; *obtigit*.

Chance, or occurrence and coming about. Ficino contrasts chance with an established recurrent order; contigit itself need not mean chance without casu. References: II.2.8, II.2.9. See Chance.

**causa / effectus.** Printed forms: *causa*; *causae*; *causam*; *causarum*; *causas*; *effectibus*; *effectu*; *effectui*; *effectum*; *effectus*; *effectuum*.

Cause and what it produces, with first, universal, intermediate, and proximate levels. A higher cause's contribution is presupposed by and outlasts narrower effects; knowledge of causes extends to their effects. References: II.3.2, II.6.2, II.7.32, II.9.14. See Cause.

Cause / effect. A cause contains the effect's form; this establishes the chapter's demand for intellectual containment before the distinction of will is developed. References: II.11.1. See Cause.

**cedere / excedere.** Printed forms: *cedit*; *excedit*.

Yield to / surpass. The graded comparison specifies what each rank lacks or possesses relative to its neighbors, then denies that God's superiority is merely finite. References: III.1.20. See Degree and mediation.

**cedo.** Printed forms: *cedunt*.

To yield, here to an authority. The minds described as perverse do not readily yield to divine law's authority; the description and religious judgement are Ficino's. References: Proem.8. See Assent, approval and belief.

**censeo.** Printed forms: *censetur*; *censui*; *censuit*.

To judge or consider, sometimes to assign evaluative standing. Plato is represented as judging a return to God just and pious; Ficino judges his title appropriate; the Good is judged more precious than mind. References: Proem.1, Proem.7, I.6.19. See Reason and account.

**centrum / circumspicere.** Printed forms: *centrum*; *circumspicit*.

Center / survey all around. The center's equal regard for the whole circle illustrates unified presence without belonging exclusively to one radius. References: III.2.15. See Point and position.

**cerebrum / cor / iecur.** Printed forms: *cerebro*; *cordi*; *iecori*.

Brain, heart, and liver. Reason, anger, and desire are assigned to these organs in the reported twelve-life classification. References: IV.1.44. See Head, heart, and members.

**cernere / respicere.** Printed forms: *cernere*; *respiciunt*.

To discern or turn one's attention toward. Minds fail to look toward their own light in the exhortation, while the proposed demonstration aims to make them discern immortality; seeing is cognitive in these objects. References: I.1.2, I.1.3. See Light and illumination.

**certo / certus.** Printed forms: *certa*; *certas*; *certis*; *certo*; *certum*.

Definite, determinate, or fixed in the relevant respect. Specific causes and effects differ from the fixed number and time-span invoked in the recurrence argument. References: IV.1.6, IV.1.11, IV.1.12, IV.2.12. See Contraction and determination.

**certus / assignare / limitare.** Printed forms: *assignari*; *assignatam*; *certo*; *limites*.

Determinate or fixed; to assign a boundary, dimension, or first moment. Assigned limits distinguish finite kinds and positions; the eternal-world supposition excludes an assignable first reception of being. References: II.2.7, II.6.12, II.6.23, II.7.18. See Bounds and restriction.

**certus / incertus.** Printed forms: *certa*; *certis*; *incerta*.

Determinate or fixed, and indeterminate. Natural forms require determinate matter while mathematical forms need only indeterminate matter; this is a distinction of dependence, not confidence versus doubt. References: I.3.12. See Point, position and mathematical ascent.

**certus / plenus.** Printed forms: *certa*; *plenissima*; *plenus*.

Certain or full; completion rather than an unspecified volume. Self-knowledge is described as certain, without need, and complete because knower and object are nearest. References: II.3.9, II.9.8. See Self knowledge.

**cessare.** Printed forms: *cessaret*.

To cease an activity. Removing life would stop the world's movement in Ficino's argument, contrasted with removing goodness and thereby being itself. References: II.6.5. See Life.

**chorea / modulus / cithara.** Printed forms: *chorea*; *cithara*; *modulis*.

Dancing chorus, musical measures, and lyre. The closing Pythagorean image depicts orderly perpetual activity under Apollo's command. References: IV.1.52. See Bacchus and the Muses.

**circuitus.** Printed forms: *Circuitus*; *circuitus*.

Circuit or circular movement. Circularity unites origin and end and supplies the model of soul's continuing return into itself; Ficino assumes bounded space. References: III.2.25, III.2.26. See Circularity and return.

**circulus / circuitus.** Printed forms: *circuitus*; *circulus*.

Circle; circuit or return. God, angel, and soul receive different nonbodily circular descriptions before physical heaven imitates them. References: IV.2.21. See Circularity and return.

**circumcurrere.** Printed forms: *circumcurrit*.

To run a circuit together with the body. Celestial life accompanies bodily motion in some manner, distinguishing it from wholly unmoved angel. References: IV.1.64. See Motion and stability.

**circumscribere / coarctare.** Printed forms: *angustiis*; *circumscribitur*; *coarctatur*.

To circumscribe or constrain within narrow bounds. A nature received in others is limited, unlike unity subsisting without any restricting boundary. References: II.2.4. See Bounds and restriction.

**clamare / reclamare / persuadere.** Printed forms: *clamat*; *persuadet*; *reclamat*.

To cry out, protest in reply, or persuade. Reason and imagination are personified as advancing conflicting accounts of what everywhere means. References: II.6.13. See Imagination and deceptive clothing.

**claudico.** Printed forms: *claudicat*.

To limp, figuratively to act inadequately. Quality's failure of complete efficacy calls for direction by a superior substance; it is neither literal lameness nor total inactivity. References: I.3.20, I.3.21. See Infection, lameness and Lethe.

**coarcto / rarefacio.** Printed forms: *coarctet*; *rarefaciat*.

To compress and to rarefy. Compression strengthens united power but obstructs entry; rarefaction aids motion but disperses power. The paired operations expose the trade-off. References: I.2.2. See Dispersion and concentration.

**cogere / compellere.** Printed forms: *cogantur*; *cogente*; *cogeris*; *cogetur*; *cogimur*; *cogitque*; *cogitur*; *compelletur*.

To force or compel, often a logical consequence rather than physical coercion. An opponent is compelled to admit a consequence; external things depend on divine mind for being. References: II.1.7, II.2.13, II.7.12, II.9.9. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

To compel, constrain, or require. At IV.1.53 cogimur expresses what the premises compel the argument to admit; at IV.2.11 bodily need compels human reason into laborious administration; at IV.2.20 heaven compels elemental mixing. These inferential, embodied, and causal uses must not all be read as external violence. References: IV.1.8, IV.1.53, IV.1.63, IV.2.11, IV.2.19, IV.2.20. See Freedom and necessity.

**cogitare / cogitatio.** Printed forms: *cogitat*; *cogitatio*.

Think or contemplate / thought. The artist’s thought orders materials; rational soul thinks of or divines higher beings. This family differs from cogere, compel. References: II.13.5, III.1.31. See Intellect and intellection.

**cogitare / fingere / effingere.** Printed forms: *Cogitamus*; *cogitamus*; *cogitare*; *cogitari*; *effingi*; *fingi*.

To think, imagine, or fashion mentally. The mind can conceive a degree beyond any assigned finite number; pure capacity can include whatever can be imagined. References: II.4.3, II.4.4, II.6.12. See Sense and imagination.

**cogito / esse.** Printed forms: *cogitari*; *esse*.

To be conceived, contrasted here with existing. The extending principle is argued to be not merely conceivable without dimensions but capable of existing without them; the transition is explicit. References: I.3.29. See Proclus, Syrianus and extending matter.

**cognatio.** Printed forms: *cognatio*.

Kinship or affinity of knower and knowable. The affinity connects intelligibility and intellectual capacity through their shared independence from matter. References: II.9.1. See Kinship and separation.

**cognatus.** Printed forms: *cognatissima*; *cognatius*.

Akin or naturally related. Minds are said to be more akin to heaven than earth; the lower celestial power is most closely akin to mutable bodies. The kinship adjective supports fitting mediation and is not a form of the cognition verb cognoscere. References: IV.1.73, IV.2.12. See Fitting and correspondence.

**cognitio / intelligentia.** Printed forms: *cognitio*; *intelligentia*; *intelligentiam*.

Cognition and intelligence, with divine application explicitly qualified. An inward operation remains in the agent; divine cognition is affirmed while surpassing the mode proper to created mind. References: II.9.5, II.9.6, II.9.7, II.9.13. See Intellect and intellection.

**cognoscere / cognitio.** Printed forms: *cognitio*; *cognitionem*; *cognoscit*; *Cognoscit*.

Know / cognition. Ficino distinguishes cognition from production through affect and later defines knowing through spiritual union. References: II.11.31, III.2.28, III.2.29. See Intellect and intellection.

**cognosco / agnosco.** Printed forms: *agnoscere*; *cogniti*; *cognoscat*; *cognoscere*.

To know or come to recognize. Self-knowledge is made prior to recognizing God; Ficino also hopes mistaken readers will recognize their error, so recognition is not restricted to divine vision. References: Proem.1, Proem.4, Proem.5, Proem.8. See Self knowledge.

**cohibere / detinere.** Printed forms: *cohiberi*; *cohibetur*; *detinerentur*.

To restrain, contain, or hold in place. Dependent flow is sustained by stability; divine presence is not contained by a subject or place. References: II.3.8, II.6.8, II.7.8. See Bounds and restriction.

**collige.** Printed forms: *collige*.

Collect or infer from the preceding considerations. Unlike gathering material power into a point, this imperative asks the reader to draw together the causal argument’s conclusions. References: I.3.24. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**colligere / reducere.** Printed forms: *colligenda*; *reducamus*; *reducenda*.

To gather or bring many under a smaller governing order. Multitude is reduced through a few ruling souls and sphere-souls toward one world-soul; this is hierarchical organization, not physical mixing. References: IV.1.41, IV.1.50. See Twelve.

**collisio.** Printed forms: *collisione*.

A collision of bodies. Fire from cold colliding bodies illustrates the alleged insufficiency of remote potency without a substantial productive cause. References: IV.1.19. See Act and operation.

**collisio / reflexio / lana.** Printed forms: *collisione*; *lana*; *lanam*; *reflexio*.

Collision, reflection and wool. Cold bodies’ collision and reflected rays or hot iron distinguish heating from the substantial generation of fire in wool. References: I.3.22. See Fire, spark, lightning and cannon.

**collocare.** Printed forms: *collocare*; *collocari*.

To place in or locate within a bearer. God is not placed inside things as a spatial occupant; divine intelligence is not located in an essence distinct from it. References: II.6.13, II.9.7. See Indwelling and presence.

**collocare / assignare.** Printed forms: *assignare*; *assignatam*; *collocavimus*.

To place or assign a role. Soul is placed in the middle, a determinate cause is assigned to convergence, and reason is assigned to the brain; the verb itself does not determine whether the location is spatial or explanatory. References: IV.1.1, IV.1.8, IV.1.44. See Head, heart, and members.

**colo / cultus.** Printed forms: *colamus*; *colat*; *cultu*; *cultum*.

To worship or honour, and the corresponding worship. The human relation to God involves worship as well as knowledge; Ficino uses this relation as a premise in the opening argument about blessedness. References: Proem.2, Proem.3, Proem.5, Proem.7, I.1.1. See Worship and piety.

**color / lumen.** Printed forms: *color*; *lumenque*; *luminis*.

Colour and light. Their sensible efficacy mediates judgement of bodily quantity; the terms here are used in a perceptual example, not only in divine illumination imagery. References: I.2.13. See Light and illumination.

**comburere / calefacere.** Printed forms: *calefacit*; *calefiat*; *comburendum*.

Burn / make hot. The burning or heating example isolates a natural agent determined to its characteristic work. References: II.11.7, II.11.8. See Fire and variable materials.

**comes.** Printed forms: *comes*.

An attendant or companion. Time accompanies spiritual activity and place body, explaining the priority of temporal to spatial multiplicity in the descent. References: IV.2.8. See Eternity and time.

**comitari / contingere.** Printed forms: *comitantur*; *contingunt*.

Accompany / accrue or happen to. Original accidental features accompany the house; later paintings accrue to it after completion. Contingunt here need not mean chance. References: II.11.21. See Architect, house and decoration.

**commigro.** Printed forms: *commigrare*.

To migrate together into one place. Bodies cannot merge into a single place in the argument about their mutual obstruction; the verb concerns spatial occupation, not migration of souls. References: I.2.2. See Body and bulk.

**commiscere / mixtio.** Printed forms: *commiscetur*; *commixtione*; *immixtam*; *miscetur*; *mixta*; *mixtionem*.

Mingling or admixture, and the resulting mixed condition. An added differentiating feature would compromise the purity needed for supreme light or necessary being. References: II.1.1, II.1.4, II.2.6, II.7.13. See Purity and mixture.

**commodum / apparens.** Printed forms: *apparens*; *commodum*.

Apparent / advantage or benefit. The apparent advantage of a single part is distinguished from the good of the universe’s order. References: II.12.19. See Perfection.

**commune / totum in singulis.** Printed forms: *commune*; *totumque in singulis*.

What is common to parts and whole in each. Unity cannot be divided among parts without requiring a further unifier; its nonpartitive presence supports the case for incorporeality. References: I.3.30. See Whole and parts.

**communicare.** Printed forms: *communicandam*; *communicari*; *communicat*; *communicatur*.

To share or impart being and goodness. Different modes of communicated goodness explain variety in creatures and the distinctness of divine knowledge. References: II.7.4, II.9.15. See Communication and imparting.

**communicare — imparting and sharing.** Printed forms: *communicant*; *communicat*.

To impart or give a share; with cum, to share or have communion with. The world’s members impart their powers to one another. Celestial soul is like angelic mind insofar as it shares with that mind, while remaining unlike it in another respect. The latter occurrence concerns participation or affinity, not a transfer of information. References: IV.1.82, IV.2.10. See Communication and imparting.

**communio.** Printed forms: *communio*; *communione*.

Communion or shared relation binding distinct things. The mutual relation of parts and their common end require a source of unity beyond sheer difference. References: II.1.3, II.2.8, II.2.12. See Concord and convergence.

**communis.** Printed forms: *commune*; *communem*; *communi*; *communis*.

Common or shared, as opposed to a differentiating or privately restricted feature. A common nature explains agreement; a common guide has the universal office of giving being. References: II.2.2, II.2.3, II.7.6. See Common and proper.

**compago / membrum.** Printed forms: *compago*; *membra*.

Joined structure / member or organ. Organic members serve one another and the whole; removing a member is said nearly to dissolve the structure. References: II.13.16. See Whole and parts.

**comparare.** Printed forms: *comparante*; *comparetur*.

Compare or relate. The divine intellect relates essence to creatures; a worldly part is elsewhere assessed relative to the whole. References: II.11.19, II.13.23. See Relations and respects.

**comparare / proportio.** Printed forms: *comparavimus*; *proportio*.

To compare; a proportion between related terms. The grades are compared in descent, while proportion between mover and moved cannot place God within a finite series of peer movers. References: IV.1.1, IV.1.59. See Proportion and analogy.

**competere / convenire.** Printed forms: *competit*; *convenit*.

To belong or be fitting to a subject. Vital motion belongs to living things, while ordering through forms extends to nonliving things; their distinct ranges support mind’s superiority to soul. References: I.6.14. See Order and harmony.

**competere / pertinere / spectare.** Printed forms: *competit*; *pertineant*; *spectat*.

To belong, pertain, or concern in a specific respect. Dominion belongs to goodness; impossibility of nonbeing concerns eternity; inward perfection is assigned its consequence. References: II.1.5, II.4.3, II.6.19. See Common and proper.

**complecti.** Printed forms: *complectitur*.

To embrace or include within one’s scope. Supreme goodness contains whatever good can be found, so two supposedly supreme goodnesses cannot lack each other’s good. References: II.2.11. See Good and goodness.

**complecti / comprehendere.** Printed forms: *complectantur*; *complectitur*; *comprehendit*.

To embrace or contain. Spheres’ minds embrace bodies through souls; soul contains higher and lower powers; its lowest activity does not embrace every seed at once. References: IV.1.31, IV.2.10, IV.2.12. See Whole and parts.

**complexio / figura.** Printed forms: *complexione*; *figura*.

Bodily constitution and figure or shape. The parental resemblance example concerns both constitution and appearance; complexio is not merely skin colour in this passage. References: I.2.12. See Comparing, resembling and equalling.

**complexio / instrumenta.** Printed forms: *complexio*; *instrumentis*.

Bodily constitution; organs or functional instruments. Differences of shape, organs, and constitution help establish proper souls for distinct animals. References: IV.1.79. See Purity and mixture.

**componere / compositio.** Printed forms: *componeretur*; *compositio*; *compositum*.

To compose or compound; composition that requires a unifier. A common nature plus distinctive property makes a supposed first principle dependent and non-simple. References: II.1.3, II.2.3, II.7.1, II.7.2, II.7.9. See Simplicity and composition.

**compono / pars / totum.** Printed forms: *compositum*; *compositus*; *pars*; *totum*.

To compose, a part and a whole. The hypothetical composite God would have unequal dependent parts, act through one part and fail to enjoy his whole self everywhere. References: I.6.6. See Whole and parts.

**compos.** Printed forms: *compos*.

Master or possessor of. God’s possession of intelligence and essence through will presupposes their identity, not competing independent powers within God. References: II.12.8. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**compos rationis / ratione captus.** Printed forms: *ratione capta*; *ratione non carent*; *vitae rationisque compos*.

Possessed of life and reason; deprived of reason; not lacking reason. Compos takes a genitive and means possessing or sharing, not composed from parts. Ratione capta is negated of earth-soul, while terrestrial rational creatures supply a premise for attributing reason to it. References: IV.1.39, IV.1.62. See Reason and account.

**comprehendere.** Printed forms: *comprehendi*.

Contain or encompass. The effect’s form must already be contained in its cause; the verb here concerns causal containment rather than a human act of understanding. References: II.11.1. See Form.

**conatus / affectus.** Printed forms: *affectum*; *affectus*; *conatus*.

Directed effort or inclination, not necessarily a passing emotion. Competing efforts would make rival gods mutable; mind’s affective range enters the reported presence theory. References: II.2.14, II.6.20, II.6.22. See Affect.

**concava superficies.** Printed forms: *concava superficies*; *concavum*.

A surrounding concave surface. The eighth sphere’s inner surface defines the natural place of Saturn’s sphere in the nested-sphere model. References: IV.2.25. See Here, there, and the Antipodes.

**concedere / admittere / dare as grant.** Printed forms: *admittimus*; *concedatur*; *concedet*; *concedetur*; *detur*.

To grant or admit a proposition provisionally in a divided argument. Branches of a refutation remain suppositions even when the author describes their consequences assertively. References: II.2.2, II.3.1, II.7.14. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

**conciliare.** Printed forms: *conciliantur*; *conciliavisset*; *conciliavit*.

To reconcile or unite diverse components. A whole's unity demands a source of concord beyond the parts considered simply as different. References: II.2.3, II.2.9, II.7.9. See Concord and convergence.

**conciliare / interimere.** Printed forms: *conciliet*; *interimant*.

Reconcile / destroy. Providence brings contending powers together so that they do not mutually abolish one another. References: II.13.10. See Exchange and reconciliation.

**concilio / vincit in unum.** Printed forms: *conciliat*; *vincitque in unum*.

To reconcile, and to bind conflicting things into one in the editor's constructive reading. The passage gathers opposed bodily constituents under a life-giving power; the supplied apparatus explicitly explains the printed vincit this way. References: I.3.23. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**concinere / conducere.** Printed forms: *concinat*; *conducat*.

Harmonize / contribute or benefit. A part's fitting perfection is what harmonizes with other parts and benefits the whole, not every possible excellence in isolation. References: II.13.23. See Perfection.

**concludere / colligere.** Printed forms: *colligitur*; *concludit*.

Conclude / gather or infer. The final definition is gathered from life, intelligence, and temporal animation; the inference must not be reduced to physical gathering. References: II.13.9, III.2.29. See Reason and account.

**concludere / confirmare / patere.** Printed forms: *Concludamus*; *confert*; *confirmat*; *confirmatum*; *patet*.

To conclude, confirm, be evident, or contribute to a proof. The verbs distinguish inference, support, and recap; several converging reasons establish divine knowing. References: II.7.1, II.7.32, II.9.5, II.9.13, II.10.10. See Reason and account.

**concoquo / digero.** Printed forms: *concoquit*; *digerit*.

To cook or digest, and to distribute or digest orderly. Gentle, ordered assimilation contrasts with violent consumption; the physiological description supports a life-giving cause. References: I.3.23. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**concursus / confluere.** Printed forms: *concursu*; *confluentes*.

Convergence; flowing together. A meeting of agents still requires one ordering cause to explain a determinate outcome. References: IV.1.8. See Contraction and determination.

**condicio / accidens.** Printed forms: *accidentalem*; *conditionibus*.

Condition or circumstance; accidental as contrasted with substantial. Temporal flux is called accidental compared with eternity's substantial stability, and intelligibility abstracts material conditions. References: II.5.2, II.9.1. See Substance and accident.

**condicio / innatus.** Printed forms: *conditio*; *innata*.

A condition and what belongs inherently to a thing. Dependency is said to be an innate condition of every effect; this is explanatory status, not a bodily trait inherited from parents. References: I.3.8. See Cause.

**conditionali necessitate.** Printed forms: *Conditionali quadam necessitate*.

With a qualified conditional necessity. Means are necessary insofar as required for an end; some means are unnecessary when the end can be possessed without them. References: II.12.14. See Freedom and necessity.

**conducere ad speciem.** Printed forms: *ad speciem mentis perfectae conducit*.

To contribute toward the realization of a higher kind. Heaven’s bodily arranging activity requires intellectual direction when it prepares recipients for intellectual souls. References: IV.1.85. See Instrument.

**confabulari.** Printed forms: *confabulari*; *confabulati sumus*.

To converse together for a time. The verb explicitly opens and closes the Pythagorean excursion; its boundaries qualify the intervening numerical elaboration. References: IV.1.40, IV.1.52. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**conferre / conducere.** Printed forms: *conducant*; *conferre*; *confert*.

To contribute or assist toward an outcome. Accidental qualities can contribute without being sufficient producers; bodily readiness and celestial motion likewise contribute in their specified roles. References: IV.1.19, IV.2.19, IV.2.20. See Cause.

**confiteri / asseverare.** Printed forms: *asseverabunt*; *confitebuntur*.

To admit; to assert firmly. Future tenses stage a philosophical disagreement rather than quote a recorded contemporary exchange. References: IV.1.22. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**confiteri / tradere.** Printed forms: *confitentur*; *tradunt*.

To acknowledge; to transmit or teach a claim. Ficino assigns celestial animation to philosophical authorities and a doctrinal-permissibility claim to Augustine and Aquinas. References: IV.1.88. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**confusio / permiscere / iungere.** Printed forms: *confusione*; *iuncta*; *permixta*.

Confusion, mingling, or joining, with union distinguished from loss of identity. Virtue-habits, color-images, and candlelights illustrate multiple presences that remain distinguishable. References: II.6.14, II.6.24. See Candles and the hall.

**confusus / distinctus.** Printed forms: *confusam*; *distinctum*.

Confused or undifferentiated / distinct. Forms in matter’s pure potency are contrasted with forms present distinctly in divine act; this is a difference of mode, not two inventories. References: II.11.1. See Form.

**confutare / refellere.** Printed forms: *confutatum*; *refellemus*.

To refute or disprove. Ficino announces new arguments against an infinite hierarchy even though he judges earlier reasoning already sufficient. References: II.3.1. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

**conglutinare / consonare.** Printed forms: *conglutinatur*; *consonet*.

Glue or join closely / harmonize. The well-composed work is unified, coherent, and resistant to dispersal; the bodily blend illustrates the larger requirement of cosmic connection. References: III.2.6. See Bond knot and chain.

**conicio.** Printed forms: *conicimus*.

To infer or conjecture from an indication. Nature’s superior efficacy compared with art supports an inference about greater mastery, closer presence and more independent substance. References: I.3.17. See Art and nature.

**coniectari.** Printed forms: *coniectari*.

Infer or conjecture. Ficino marks an inferential step from the comparative efficacy of intellect to the force of divine will. References: II.11.32. See Qualification and attribution.

**connectere / copulare / colligare.** Printed forms: *colligantur*; *connectit*; *connexio*; *copula*.

Join or link together. Soul maintains relations to both higher and lower things and thereby connects extremes into one world. References: III.2.8, III.2.23, III.2.30. See Bond knot and chain.

**connexio.** Printed forms: *connexioni*.

Connection or union of parts. What is subject to the joining of parts is likewise exposed to their dissolution and lacks unconditional necessary being. References: II.7.10. See Simplicity and composition.

**conor / pro viribus.** Printed forms: *conabimur*; *pro viribus*.

To attempt, and to the extent of one’s powers. Ficino announces an attempt to demonstrate the ascent, qualifying his authorial capacity without retracting the proposed conclusions. References: I.1.3. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**conquiescere / amplecti.** Printed forms: *amplecti*; *amplectitur*; *conquiescat*.

Rest contentedly / embrace. These verbs characterize possession and enjoyment of a present good rather than pursuit of something still lacking. References: II.11.29, II.11.30. See Love and pleasure.

**consentire / confirmare.** Printed forms: *confirmat*; *consentit*.

Agree or accord / confirm or strengthen. Natural necessity and freedom are said to support one another in God, rather than function as rival external constraints. References: II.12.5. See Freedom and necessity.

**consentire / dissentire.** Printed forms: *consentiant*; *consentire*; *dissentiant*; *dissentire*.

To agree or disagree, with conscious wills in the latter case. Alternately prevailing opposed wills would make each alleged god mutable. References: II.2.2, II.2.14. See Concord and convergence.

**consequi / assequi / nancisci.** Printed forms: *assequitur*; *consequens*; *consequitur*; *nanciscantur*; *nanciscitur*.

To attain or obtain; consequens can also mark logical consequence. The world attains divine presence finitely, while the same family introduces conclusions from a preceding premise. References: II.2.8, II.6.11, II.6.14, II.9.5. See Dependence and receiving.

**consequi / consequens.** Printed forms: *consequens*; *consequitur*; *consequuntur*.

To follow as a consequence or attain an outcome. The existence of earthly souls is a proposed inference, loving union is attained, and balanced mixtures acquire successive capacities. References: IV.1.34, IV.1.93, IV.2.11. See Striving and enjoyment.

**considerare / comparare.** Printed forms: *comparetur*; *considerantur*; *consideratur*.

To consider under an aspect or compare in a relation. Being considered absolutely, an effect compared with its cause, and a part considered alone are distinct frames that qualify conclusions. References: II.4.2, II.7.22, II.9.22, II.10.2. See Surpassing and comparison.

**consilium.** Printed forms: *consiliique*; *consilio*; *consilium*.

Counsel, plan, or deliberation, with context deciding the sense. Mind signifies divine counsel, while the later argument denies a separate laborious planning process in God. References: II.6.20, II.8.1, II.8.4. See Choice and deliberation.

**consilium / consultare.** Printed forms: *consilio*; *Consilium*; *consilium*; *consultare*; *consultat*.

Counsel / deliberate. Divine ordering is called counsel metaphorically; skilled action is distinguished from uncertain step-by-step deliberation. References: II.13.17, II.13.18. See Counsel and settled skill.

**consilium / propositum.** Printed forms: *consilio*; *proposito*.

Deliberative counsel; purpose or plan. Inward imaginative formation needs no laborious deliberation, while the maker’s universal purpose and Euclid’s route-plan direct differentiated effects. References: IV.1.11, IV.1.91, IV.2.14. See Choice and deliberation.

**consilium / statuo.** Printed forms: *consilium*; *statuissem*.

A design or purpose; to resolve or establish. Ficino states a compositional plan to contemplate the Creator through the created mind; “design” here is authorial intent rather than a divine idea. References: Proem.7. See Intention.

**conspirare / compati.** Printed forms: *compatiantur*; *conspirant*.

To act together; to share affections or responses. Contrary cosmic members cooperate and communicate powers, supporting a common nature and soul. References: IV.1.82. See Sympathy.

**conspirare / concurrere.** Printed forms: *concurrunt*; *conspirant*.

To act or tend together toward a common order or effect. Natural agents converge upon being without requiring conscious conspiracy or identical individual natures. References: II.2.8, II.2.12, II.7.27. See Concord and convergence.

**conspiratio / absurdum.** Printed forms: *absurdum*; *conspirationis*.

Concord and an absurd consequence. Making opposed multiplicity itself produce unity is rejected as absurd; concord is attributed to a further incorporeal unifier. References: I.3.31. See Unity and multiplicity.

**constare / consistere.** Printed forms: *constat*.

Consist of, be established, or stand together. A whole consists of its members; elsewhere constat introduces a conclusion regarded as evident. Context distinguishes composition from argumentative assertion. References: II.13.21, III.2.6. See Whole and parts.

**constare / consistere / constituere.** Printed forms: *consistit*; *constat*; *constituunt*.

To consist in, be established, or constitute a whole. Truth consists in simple unity; parts constitute one world; order consists in relations between unequal things. References: II.1.1, II.2.9, II.7.17, II.9.21. See Whole and parts.

**contemperare / continuare.** Printed forms: *contemperat*; *continuat*.

To temper together; to bind in continuity. One soul coordinates diverse humors and joins members separated by position and quality. References: IV.1.82. See Sympathy.

**contemplor / contemplatio.** Printed forms: *contemplabimur*; *contemplationem*; *contemplemur*; *contemplentur*.

To contemplate, or the activity of contemplating. Contemplation returns inquiry to God and later moves beyond sensory shadows; it is paired with worship rather than substituted for it. References: Proem.3, Proem.7, Proem.9, I.1.2. See Philosophy and theology.

**contineo / complector.** Printed forms: *complectitur*; *continet*.

To contain or embrace. A kind’s first principle contains its subsequent perfections; this is causal plenitude, not an inventory of physical objects stored inside it. References: I.3.3. See Containing, receiving and lacking.

**contingens / essentialis.** Printed forms: *contingentes*; *essentiales*.

Contingent; pertaining to essence. Human craft’s principles and forms are contrasted with the essential and perpetual principles of natural production. References: IV.1.13. See Artifact and natural work.

**continuatio / reflectere in gyrum.** Printed forms: *continuationem*; *reflectunt in gyrum*.

Continuity; turning back into a round. The connected parts of heaven draw and push one another when motion begins, explaining the bodily course after the higher analogies. References: IV.2.21. See Circularity and return.

**continuus / assiduus.** Printed forms: *assidue*; *continue*; *continuo*.

Continuous or unceasing. Preservation and causal dependence persist at every moment rather than occurring only once in the past. References: II.7.19, II.7.22, II.7.23. See Conservation and preservation.

**continuus / continuare / continuatio.** Printed forms: *continuam*; *continuatione*; *continuatis*.

Continuous; to join in continuity; continuity or uninterrupted continuation. Continuity describes three different relations: the continuous succession of individual natural beings, parts joined into the single mass of an elemental globe, and the uninterrupted course of circular motion. These forms are distinct from continere, to contain. References: IV.1.35, IV.1.87, IV.2.23. See Whole and parts.

**contradictio.** Printed forms: *Contradictio*; *contradictionem*.

Contradiction. It alone includes the character of nonbeing in the modal argument; noncontradictory possibilities can exceed the actual order. References: II.12.17, II.12.18. See Contradiction and possibility.

**contrahere.** Printed forms: *contrahi*; *contrahit*.

To narrow a common impulse into a particular operation. The earthly common soul mediates celestial universality and particular terrestrial life, including preparation of matter. References: IV.1.7, IV.1.9. See Contraction and determination.

**contrarium / oppositio.** Printed forms: *contrariorum*; *oppositio*.

Contraries and their opposition. Natural bodily action is located where opposed qualities encounter one another; opposition of quality differs from mere difference in size. References: I.2.8. See Contraries and opposition.

**contueri / intueri / intuitus.** Printed forms: *contueatur*; *intuitu*; *Intuitum*.

Contemplate / direct apprehension or gaze. Divine Ideas are held in one gaze, while the natural-order argument calls divine counsel an intuition rather than sequential inquiry. References: II.11.18, II.13.18. See Intuition and comprehension.

**convenio / discrepo.** Printed forms: *convenit*; *Discrepat*.

To agree in a respect and to differ. Angel agrees with soul in multiplicity and differs in immobility; comparative grammar identifies the exact shared and distinguishing features. References: I.6.3. See Comparing, resembling and equalling.

**convenire / congruere.** Printed forms: *congruant*; *congruerent*; *conveniant*; *convenit*; *conveniunt*.

To agree or coincide, but also to belong fittingly to a subject. Shared predicates establish agreement; in the preservation argument “belongs to” marks a natural condition. References: II.2.2, II.2.5, II.6.19, II.7.20. See Common and proper.

**conversio / profectio.** Printed forms: *conversio*; *convertuntur*; *procedunt*; *profectio*.

Turning toward and proceeding from a source. Ficino correlates the universal desire for the Good with universal origin from it, distinguishing the Good’s range from mind’s. References: I.6.16. See Procession and return.

**convertere / reverti.** Printed forms: *conversa*; *reverti*; *revertitur*.

To turn toward or return. Reason turned toward mind sees principles together; recurrence of effects and local return in finite space are different kinds of return. References: IV.2.12, IV.2.22. See Circularity and return.

**convertere / reverti / converso.** Printed forms: *converso*; *converterentur*; *revertamur*.

Conversely, turning toward, or returning, with logical and directional senses distinguished. Converso reverses a statement; revertamur closes the mental-presence excursus and returns the exposition to God. References: II.6.13, II.6.24, II.7.16. See Procession and return.

**convolvi / revolvi.** Printed forms: *convolvitur*; *revolvitur*.

To coil or turn around. The world revolves within divine presence where its finite motion is prescribed, rather than traveling toward an absent God. References: II.6.14. See Circularity and return.

**copulo / conspiratio.** Printed forms: *conspirationis*; *copula*; *copulante*.

Binding together and concord. The unity of a bodily whole is attributed to an additional incorporeal cause rather than to ununified plurality itself. References: I.3.30, I.3.31. See Unity and multiplicity.

**cor / principalis stella.** Printed forms: *cor*; *corde*; *stella*.

Heart; a principal star serving as a ruling center. Each zodiacal creature is pictured with a star-heart where its principal soul lives. References: IV.1.43. See Zodiac.

**cor / putare.** Printed forms: *corde*; *putat*; *putet*.

Heart; to think or suppose. The heart illustration separates a mind's belief about its location from the theory's claim about its actual presence. References: II.6.24. See Heart and mistaken location.

**Corneola / Onyx / Corallus.** Printed forms: *Corallus*; *Corneola*; *Onyx*.

Carnelian, onyx, and coral in the source's nomenclature. Their alleged effects differ: checking blood and anger, kindling anger and dream-terror, and repelling terrors and storms. References: IV.1.21. See Hierobotanum and mineral powers.

**coronare / vulnerare.** Printed forms: *coronabant*; *vulnerabant*.

Crown / wound. The contrasting actions belong to the display's figures; they are reported features, not recommendations about human conduct. References: II.13.13. See Florentine mechanism.

**corpus / corporalis.** Printed forms: *corpora*; *corporalis*; *corpori*; *corporibus*; *corporis*; *corpus*.

Body and bodily, extended subjects distinguished from incorporeal efficacy. Bodily contact is dimensional; bodily instability points to a sustaining incorporeal source. References: II.6.1, II.6.4, II.7.8. See Body and bulk.

Body / bodily. A body's divided extension contrasts with soul's mode of being wholly present to each part; corporalibus in III.2.29 remains textually delicate. References: III.2.9, III.2.11, III.2.29. See Body and bulk.

**corruo / renascor.** Printed forms: *corruunt*; *renasci*.

To collapse and to arise again. If the first principle were extinguished, all things would collapse and no new beginning would be available; the scenario is counterfactual. References: I.3.32. See Principle.

**creare / ex nihilo.** Printed forms: *creat*; *creationis*; *ex nihilo*.

To create without a prior subject, not merely alter existing material. Creation anew and continuing origination both require the power to give being without borrowed matter. References: II.4.6, II.6.2. See Creation.

**crescere / decrescere / minuere.** Printed forms: *crescere*; *crescit*; *decrescere*; *minuatur*; *minuitur*.

To increase, decrease, or diminish. Ascending perfection increases; descending power weakens; mixture would diminish the purity of supreme necessity. References: II.3.3, II.7.13. See Measure and degree.

**culpare / deformis.** Printed forms: *culpanda*; *deformia*.

Find fault with / misshapen or unbeautiful. What appears blameworthy in isolation is evaluated by Ficino in relation to the whole's order; the theological claim remains his. References: II.13.23, II.13.24. See Beauty and fittingness.

**cumulus.** Printed forms: *cumulus*.

A gathered total or complete sum. The intermediate whole comprises the principles or content of all things in a specified mode, not necessarily a bodily heap. References: IV.2.4. See Whole and parts.

**cupere / avidus.** Printed forms: *avida*; *cupere*; *cupiunt*.

To desire or yearn, with avidus marking eager orientation. The desire of effects for unity, truth, and goodness is used to identify the source they seek again. References: II.1.2, II.1.7. See Appetite and desire.

**cura / labor / facilis.** Printed forms: *cura*; *facilior*; *facillime*; *facillimo*; *laborat*; *labore*.

Concern, toil, and ease. Operation through pure being is easier than operation through essential power, itself easier than deliberation. References: II.8.4, II.8.5, II.9.20. See Burden labor and ease.

**currere / incurrere / incumbere.** Printed forms: *currit*; *incumbunt*; *incurrunt*.

To run, encounter, or bend toward a goal. The verbs portray coordinated tendency and essential orientation without requiring literal locomotion of mind. References: II.2.8, II.6.17, II.6.23. See Natural motion and natural place.

**custodire / cura.** Printed forms: *curam*; *custodiendis*; *custodire*.

Guard or preserve / care. Providence includes preservation, not merely knowledge in advance; care of the whole is said to reach every part. References: II.13.2, II.13.11, II.13.21. See Care and custody.

**dare.** Printed forms: *dat*; *dedit*.

Give or bestow. Giving identifies the efficient role; elsewhere the giver of being is the source on which the creature’s being depends. References: II.11.3, II.12.8. See Receiving and giving.

**dare / donare / exhibere.** Printed forms: *donata*; *exhibebit*; *offert*.

To give, bestow, present, or offer. Gifts of goodness and being mark causation, while God offering himself under temporal wrapping concerns cognition. References: II.1.6, II.3.9, II.5.3, II.7.17. See Communication and imparting.

**debilitare / deficere.** Printed forms: *debilitetur*; *deficere*; *deficient*.

To weaken or fail, with deficient ranks falling away below others. The finite lower terminus is argued from diminishing efficacy, not established merely by the verb’s meaning. References: II.3.2, II.3.3. See Failure weariness and endurance.

**decere / dignitas.** Printed forms: *decet*; *digna*; *dignitatem*.

To be fitting; rank or worthiness. Cosmic recipients’ dignity is a causal and hierarchical fitness, while particles losing their sphere’s integrity lose its higher standing. References: IV.1.31, IV.1.91, IV.1.93. See Fitting and correspondence.

**decet / decor.** Printed forms: *decentia*; *decet*; *decor*; *decorum*; *decuit*.

It is fitting / fittingness or beauty. The correction from past to present and the cognate nouns connect fitting action with God as its source. References: II.12.3. See Beauty and fittingness.

**decidere.** Printed forms: *decidet*.

Fall away from. The departure from simple unity distinguishes angelic multiplicity, without introducing a narrative of moral rebellion. References: III.1.8. See Shadows and dependence.

**decrementum / remissio.** Printed forms: *decremento*; *decrescat*; *remissione*; *remissioni*.

Quantitative decrease and diminution of intensity. Quality undergoes both, bodily substantial form is said to escape remission but not decrease, and incorporeal substance escapes both. References: I.3.15. See Measure and degree.

**dedico / gratulor.** Printed forms: *dedicandum*; *gratulaturus*.

To dedicate and to rejoice or congratulate. Ficino dedicates the work in return for support and imagines Plato rejoicing at Lorenzo’s conjunction of philosophy with public authority. References: Proem.11. See Lorenzo, dedication and public authority.

**deficio / validus.** Printed forms: *deficit*; *validior*.

To fall short; stronger or more valid. A deficient material form is judged against a truer standard, and truth’s priority is argued through its ability to exist without falsehood. References: I.3.2. See Truth.

**definitio.** Printed forms: *definitio*; *definitione*; *definitionem*.

A definition or delimiting account. The reported definition of form as that by which something actually exists and acts is examined for whether it includes dimension or a subject. References: I.3.28. See Naming and defining.

Definition or account of what something is. The definition of rational soul is matched to the previously established third essence through life, discourse, and temporal animation. References: III.2.23, III.2.29, III.2.30. See Soul.

**degenerare.** Printed forms: *degenerare*; *degenerat*.

Fall below a producer’s perfection. Angelic multiplicity belongs to its being an effect outside its cause; the verb is hierarchical rather than a moral accusation. References: III.1.17. See Shadows and dependence.

To decline in grade or fall away from a higher dignity. Forms lose life and efficacy through descent; bodily world cannot share divine complete immutability. References: IV.1.33, IV.2.23. See Degree and mediation.

**Democritii / Cyrenaici / Epicurei.** Printed forms: *Cyrenaici*; *Cyrenaicorum*; *Democritii*; *Democritiorum*; *Epicurei*; *Epicureorum*.

The named schools grouped at the level of bodily bulk. Their common stopping point is Ficino’s argumentative classification; it is not a full historical account of three identical doctrines. References: I.1.3, I.2.8. See Philosophers and stopping points.

**demonstro / assevero.** Printed forms: *asseverabimus*; *demonstrare*.

To demonstrate; to affirm or maintain firmly. The prospectus promises support by reasons, proper arguments, signs and resolutions; the future tense announces work rather than claiming every result is already established. References: I.1.3, I.1.7. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**dens / pilus.** Printed forms: *dentes*; *pilos*.

Tooth and hair. Stones are compared with teeth and plants with hair, with attachment to earth doing argumentative work. References: IV.1.2. See Earth as mother.

**dependere / pendere.** Printed forms: *dependeat*; *dependet*; *pendet*.

Depend upon. The asymmetry between substance and accident supports the possibility of a substance existing apart from accidental restrictions. References: II.11.4, II.11.5. See Through itself and through another.

**deserere / relinquere.** Printed forms: *deserat*; *deserit*; *relinquit*.

Abandon / leave behind. Soul must not desert lower things when rising or higher things when descending, otherwise it becomes an extreme instead of a bond. References: III.2.8. See Bond knot and chain.

**designare.** Printed forms: *designantur*.

Assign or designate. Common qualities are assigned their own ideas; the verb marks a differentiated explanatory treatment. References: II.11.20. See Ideas and exemplars.

**determinare.** Printed forms: *determinatur*; *determinet*.

To bound or direct toward a definite effect. The common impulse and converging causes require an ordering source to explain this result rather than another. References: IV.1.4, IV.1.8. See Contraction and determination.

**determinatio / affectio.** Printed forms: *affectiones*; *determinationes*.

A determination or modification of being. Specific character presupposes being and is distinguished from the first cause’s universal gift of being itself. References: II.7.28, II.7.30. See Being.

**detestari.** Printed forms: *detestatur*.

Denounce or reject strongly. Ficino attributes to Plato a rejection of philosophers who explain nature through chance or necessity alone. References: II.11.26. See Art and nature.

**Deus / divinus.** Printed forms: *Dei*; *Deo*; *Deum*; *Deus*; *dii*; *divina*; *Divine*.

God and divine, with hypothetical plural gods distinguished from the affirmed one source. God is not simply the highest member of a class of equal deities; divine cognition also exceeds the created genus of minds. References: II.1.7, II.2.1, II.7.15, II.9.13. See God.

God / divine. The causal claim concerns God as source of matter, form, and order; the adjective does not by itself identify every lower divine thing with God. References: II.11.1, II.13.12. See God.

**Deus ipse viderit.** Printed forms: *Deus ipse viderit*.

Let God himself see to or judge it. The phrase marks Ficino’s express reservation after Plotinus’s reported conclusion. References: II.12.11. See Qualification and attribution.

**dextra / sinistra / sursum / deorsum.** Printed forms: *deorsum*; *dextram*; *sinistram*; *sursum*.

Right / left / upward / downward. Opposed directions make the variety of coordinated motions explicit in the device and later in descriptions of life. References: II.13.13. See Florentine mechanism.

**dialecticum / mathematicum / physicum.** Printed forms: *dialecticum*; *mathematicum*; *physicum*.

Dialectical, mathematical and natural subjects of inquiry. Ficino’s programme makes each route return to contemplation and worship; the list does not identify their methods or subject matters as one discipline. References: Proem.3. See Philosophy and theology.

**dicere / appellare / vocare.** Printed forms: *appellant*; *nominamus*.

Say, name, or call. The reported names of the ranks are not neutral synonyms: the Pythagorean formulas deliberately alter the relation of one and many. References: III.1.1, III.1.2, III.2.1. See Unity and multiplicity.

**dicere / vocare / appellare.** Printed forms: *appellationes*; *appellavit*; *dicuntur*; *nuncupantur*.

To say or name, with reported assertion and technical designation distinguished. Names such as necessity or mind require their local qualification; things “commonly called” lowly need not be inherently contemptible. References: II.5.4, II.7.11, II.9.12, II.9.22. See Naming by cause.

**differre / discrepare.** Printed forms: *differant*; *differt*; *differunt*; *discrepent*.

To differ or disagree in nature or property. A distinguishing feature cannot be explained by the common nature precisely as common. References: II.2.1, II.2.2, II.2.4, II.7.12. See Common and proper.

**diffido.** Printed forms: *diffidere*.

To distrust or lack confidence in. Bodily darkness is said to make minds distrust their own divinity; this is Ficino’s diagnosis of a spiritual impediment. References: I.1.2. See Assent, approval and belief.

**diffusio.** Printed forms: *diffusio*.

Diffusion or self-communication. Ficino assigns diffusion to the good, contrasted with the purity of truth as the object of seeing. References: II.11.30. See Communication and imparting.

**dignitas.** Printed forms: *dignitatis*.

Dignity or rank of excellence. A boundary of place around God is compared with a boundary of dignity within him, linking two different senses of limitation. References: II.6.4. See Bounds and restriction.

**dilectio / diligere.** Printed forms: *Dilectio*; *dilectione*; *diligit*.

Love or loving attachment. Divine love is called intellectual because its subject and object are intellectual and intelligible. References: II.11.36, II.11.37. See Love and pleasure.

**diligentia / procurator.** Printed forms: *diligentia*; *diligentior*; *procuratoris*.

Attentive care / one who looks after. Productive fruitfulness is joined to continuing care for works regarded as children. References: II.13.2. See Care and custody.

**Dionysius Areopagita / Daniel.** Printed forms: *Danielis*; *Dionysius Areopagita*.

The named theological witnesses in the angelic-number passage. Ficino cites Dionysius for intellectual abundance and Daniel for ministering multitudes; his claims are preserved as attributions. References: I.5.27. See Dionysius, Daniel and numerical orders.

**dirigere / manifestus.** Printed forms: *dirigere*; *diriguntur*; *manifestius*.

To direct toward a region; manifest or conspicuous. More conspicuous local operations are distinguished from the universal presence claimed for minds in the attributed theory. References: II.6.24. See Candles and the hall.

**discernere / animadvertere.** Printed forms: *animadvertimus*; *discernamus*; *Discernere*; *discernit*.

To discriminate or notice what is conceived. A person may conceive pure infinity without recognizing it as God; imagination also discriminates sensory contributions. References: II.5.2, II.6.12, II.9.16. See Sense and imagination.

**discessus / seorsum / semovere.** Printed forms: *discessum*; *discessus*; *semotum*; *seorsum*; *separari*.

Departure, apartness, or separation from matter and its conditions. Intelligible objecthood and intelligent subjecthood are distinguished even as both are traced to immateriality. References: II.9.1. See Separation and abstraction.

**discretus.** Printed forms: *discretae*.

Distinguished or separated in degree. Created minds and souls differ by degrees of perfection; these differences belong to God’s causal scope. References: II.11.9. See Degree and mediation.

**discurrere / cursus.** Printed forms: *discurrere*; *discurrit*.

To range or run through a course, in thought, activity, or time. The mind’s ranging activity helps the reported presence argument; the word need not signify spoken discourse. References: II.4.7, II.6.17, II.6.22. See Intuition and discourse.

**discursio.** Printed forms: *discursio*.

A line or course of reasoning. Ficino labels the argument from angelic multiplicity to divine simplicity his first route of proof above the angel; it is not a movement of God’s own thought. References: I.6.6. See Intuition and discourse.

**discursio / discerptio family.** Printed forms: *discerptam*; *discerptatur*; *discursione*.

Temporal running-through / tearing into parts. Soul’s successive operation is distinguished from spatial dismemberment; the similar-looking words must not be conflated. References: III.2.21, III.2.22. See Indivisibility.

**discursus / discurrere.** Printed forms: *discurrendo*; *discurrens*; *discursum*.

A running through / proceed successively. Temporal discourse characterizes soul’s knowing, unlike the simultaneous intuition attributed to higher intelligence. References: III.1.28, III.2.29, III.2.30. See Intuition and discourse.

**disiungere / disponere / instituere.** Printed forms: *disiunguntur*; *disponimus*; *institutus*.

To separate, arrange, or establish. Different natures as such disjoin; their mutual order calls for an arranger, and the order of effects reveals causes. References: II.2.8, II.7.28. See Order and harmony.

**dispergo / distractio.** Printed forms: *dispergit*; *dispersa*; *dispersione*; *distracta*.

Scattering or drawing apart. Separated parts dilute active power; the related temporal description of soul’s life is analogical rather than literal bodily division. References: I.2.2, I.2.17, I.5.2. See Dispersion and concentration.

**dispersio / imbecillitas.** Printed forms: *dispersione*; *imbecillitas*.

Dispersion and weakness. Supreme dispersion is opposed to supreme unity as weakness to unlimited power. References: II.4.1. See Power and potency.

**disponere.** Printed forms: *disponendam*; *disposita*.

To arrange or prepare material. The soul’s preparation of matter accompanies its determination of the incoming impulses. References: IV.1.9. See Contraction and determination.

**dissolubilis / indissolubilis.** Printed forms: *dissolubiles*; *dissolubilia*; *indissolubiles*.

Dissoluble / indissoluble. Some created beings are described as dissoluble in themselves but preserved indissoluble; God’s indissolubility has a different ground. References: III.1.5. See Conservation and preservation.

**dissolvere / condensare.** Printed forms: *condensat*; *dissolvit*.

Dissolve / condense. The historical physical account assigns these opposing operations to heat and cold; their useful measure requires further explanation. References: II.13.7. See Fire and variable materials.

**distare.** Printed forms: *distaret*; *distat*.

To be distant or separated, in rank or in degree of actualization. The body’s distance from supreme goodness and nonbeing’s distance from act are not measurements of physical location. References: II.3.4, II.4.5. See Surpassing and comparison.

**distincte / clare / plane.** Printed forms: *clare*; *clarissime*; *distinctam*; *distinctas*; *distincte*; *plane*; *planissime*.

Distinctly, clearly, or plainly, marking determinate knowledge. Unified divine knowing is repeatedly said to preserve particular distinctions rather than blur them into a vague whole. References: II.9.14, II.9.15, II.10.3. See Intuition and comprehension.

**distinguere / dividere / divisio.** Printed forms: *distinguunt*; *distinguuntur*; *dividatur*; *Divisio*.

To distinguish or divide; logical determination differs from cutting into parts. Agents distinguish effects, modes distinguish individuals, and continuous quantity is indefinitely divisible. References: II.6.13, II.7.30, II.9.17, II.10.4. See Indivisibility.

**distrahere / adstare.** Printed forms: *adstat*; *adstet*; *distrahiturve*.

Draw apart / stand present. Soul is said to stand present whole to spatially distant bodily parts without being stretched into corresponding pieces. References: III.2.12, III.2.19. See Indwelling and presence.

**distrahere / divertere / possidere.** Printed forms: *distrahitur*; *divertitur*; *possidet*.

To distract, turn aside, or possess. Divine knowledge involves neither searching nor shifting attention from important objects to minor ones. References: II.9.20. See Seeking possessing and distraction.

**diverto / dirigo.** Printed forms: *dirigere*; *divertit*.

To turn aside toward, or direct toward. Plato’s inquiry repeatedly turns toward the soul’s form; his purified mental gaze is directed toward the divine sun. Direction belongs to the contemplative image. References: Proem.4, I.1.6. See Ascent.

**dividuus / individuus.** Printed forms: *dividua*; *Individua*; *individua*.

Divisible / indivisible. Different respects must be specified: bodily manifestation, temporal activity, stable substance, and orientation to higher or lower objects. References: III.2.19. See Indivisibility.

**doctrina / tracto.** Printed forms: *doctrina*; *tractavimus*; *tractet*.

Teaching, and to treat a subject in exposition. Plato's teaching is called theology because of its religious orientation; Ficino later hopes his own treatment matches the truth he reveres. References: Proem.3, Proem.10. See Philosophy and theology.

**domina / comes.** Printed forms: *comes*; *domina*.

Mistress or ruler / companion. Soul rules bodies while retaining divine attachment; the contrast denies that it simply shares every bodily fate. References: III.2.22. See Soul.

**dominari.** Printed forms: *dominatur*.

Exercise mastery over. Fire lacks control of the whole differentiated work; God's causal scope includes its forms, ordering, and degrees. References: II.11.8, II.11.10. See Governing, serving and dominion.

To exercise command or predominance. Nature's command of matter explains its closer correspondence to its work; anger's rule distinguishes one two-faculty life. References: IV.1.12, IV.1.49. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**dominari / praevalere.** Printed forms: *dominatur*; *praevaleret*.

To rule or prevail. An always-prevailing will alone would qualify as God in the rival-god dilemma; necessity rules in the cited Orphic saying. References: II.2.14, II.7.11. See Army and commander.

**dominor.** Printed forms: *dominabitur*; *dominari*; *dominatur*.

To master or exercise control. Dependence on matter prevents quality's independent mastery; nature's better mastery than art later implies both closer presence and greater substantial independence. References: I.3.7, I.3.17. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**dubitare / diffidere / difficile.** Printed forms: *Difficile*; *Difficilius*; *diffidit*; *dubio*; *dubitare*.

To doubt, mistrust, or find difficult; dubio qualifies certainty. Difficulty locating an uncontained God differs from doubt caused by imagination's bodily model of presence. References: II.1.3, II.5.4, II.6.8, II.6.13. See Imagination and deceptive clothing.

**dubitatio / respondere.** Printed forms: *dubitatio*; *Respondeamus*.

Difficulty or doubt / answer. The self-motion objection is stated before the painter analogy provides a response; it should not be mistaken for Ficino's final denial. References: III.1.27. See Qualification and attribution.

**ducere / deducere / trahere.** Printed forms: *deducta*; *deducuntur*; *ducatur*; *duci*; *trahuntur*.

To lead, draw, or derive. Causal dependence is portrayed as derivation from a source, while lines drawn from a center illustrate related effects. References: II.2.12, II.3.2, II.3.8, II.8.5. See Hinge and center.

**dulcedo / odor / flavus.** Printed forms: *dulcedo*; *dulcis*; *flava*; *flavus*; *odor*.

Sweetness, odour and yellow colour. The three qualities of honey are distinguished by sensory character yet coexist throughout the same matter. References: I.2.15. See Honey, whiteness and the wall.

**dumtaxat.** Printed forms: *dumtaxat*.

Only, restricting a stated class. Intellectual operation is assigned only to the more excellent kinds; the restriction identifies its narrower distribution. References: II.11.12. See Qualification and attribution.

**dux / lex superioris.** Printed forms: *ducem*; *lege alicuius superioris*.

A guide; a law from a superior source. Mutable rational self-motion requires stable direction for perpetual uniformity, excluding God as a sphere’s soul. References: IV.1.28. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**e regione / suscipere.** Printed forms: *e regione*; *suscipiendas*.

Opposite or facing; to receive. Some parts of air and fire answer the stars directly and are said to be prepared by their influxes for minds. References: IV.1.92. See Transparency and opacity.

**eclipsis / nox / momentum.** Printed forms: *eclipsim*; *momenta*; *momento*; *momentum*; *noctem*.

Eclipse, night, and moment or instant. Brief lack of sunlight illustrates a stronger dependence on being; temporal moments also enter the eternity analogy. References: II.6.11, II.6.17, II.7.18. See Light and illumination.

**edere / servare / conservare.** Printed forms: *conservari*; *conservat*; *conservatore*; *edit*; *servantur*; *servat*; *servatque*; *servaturque*.

To bring forth and preserve in existence. The continuing grant of being, power, and action is distinguished from an initial act followed by independence. References: II.4.6, II.5.1, II.7.19, II.7.23. See Conservation and preservation.

**educare / spectaculum.** Printed forms: *educavissent*; *spectaculum*.

Bring up / spectacle or object newly seen. A hypothetical upbringing without sight of the world makes its first appearance dramatically striking; the scenario is not biographical. References: II.13.20. See Wonder and familiarity.

**effectrix / machinatrix.** Printed forms: *effectrix*; *machinatrix*.

Productive / capable of devising or designing. The two adjectives distinguish God’s making-power from mind’s conceptual range, whose breadth supports the inference. References: II.12.17. See Productive and designing power.

**effectus / efficiens.** Printed forms: *Effectui*; *effectus*; *efficiens*.

An effect and an efficient cause or producer. The same fire is first an effect relative to its origin, then a producer relative to another fire; causal roles are relational. References: I.3.8. See Cause.

**efficax.** Printed forms: *efficacior*; *efficacissimam*; *efficax*.

Effective or capable of producing an effect. Comparative efficacy in humans, angels, and God supports the claim that divine activity must be intellectual. References: II.11.11. See Power and potency.

**efficax / efficacia.** Printed forms: *efficacem*; *efficacia*; *efficacissimus*; *efficax*.

Effective or efficacious, and efficacy. Fire’s force and form’s active nature are compared with bulk’s impediments; efficacy is subsequently distinguished from the sufficiency of a first cause. References: I.1.3, I.2.5, I.2.13, I.3.1. See Power and potency.

**efficax / validus.** Printed forms: *efficacior*; *efficax*; *validius*.

Efficacious or powerful in producing an effect. An agent’s power is measured by the remoteness of receptive potency from the act it produces. References: II.4.1, II.4.5, II.6.19. See Power and potency.

**effingere.** Printed forms: *effingi*; *effinguntur*.

Fashion or form after a pattern. Innumerable images of divine goodness could be fashioned beyond those actually produced; imaging does not imply actualization of all possibilities. References: II.12.15. See Image and likeness.

**Egelias / crinitae.** Printed forms: *crinitarum*; *Egelias*.

A retained named advocate of earth’s motion; comets. Earth’s circular motion is conditional; the revolution of comets is invoked within the historical cosmology as evidence for air and fire’s circling. References: IV.1.75. See Natural motion and natural place.

**egere / indigere.** Printed forms: *egeat*; *eget*; *indiget*.

To need; lack of self-sufficiency in being or operation. Dependence concerns constituents, preservation, and completion by an end, rather than merely emotional wanting. References: II.2.3, II.6.4, II.7.16, II.7.22. See Need and sufficiency.

**electio / eligere.** Printed forms: *electio*; *electione*; *electionem*; *electiones*; *electionis*; *eligendo*; *eligunt*.

Choice or choosing, contrasted with activity through natural being. Choice itself cannot require an endless series of prior choices, so some activity precedes deliberative selection. References: II.8.1, II.8.3, II.8.4. See Choice and deliberation.

**eligere / peragere.** Printed forms: *eligit*; *peragit*; *peragunt*.

To select; to carry an act through. Appetite chooses the displayed step while the feet execute it, differentiating desire and bodily performance. References: IV.2.14. See Euclid and the lantern.

**eligo.** Printed forms: *eligeremus*; *eligimus*.

To select or choose. Choosing smaller evils is used against the hypothesis that magnitude or number alone attracts appetite; the word does not establish infallible practical judgement. References: I.2.14. See Choice and free judgment.

**empyreus / prorsus immobile.** Printed forms: *empyreum*; *prorsus immobile*.

Empyrean / wholly motionless. An expressly attributed classification places this heaven in eternity; it does not override other sphere accounts without qualification. References: III.2.4. See Empyrean heaven.

**enodo.** Printed forms: *enodatur*.

To unravel or resolve something knotted. The Magi’s riddle is “unravelled” by a double bodily and spiritual mapping; the knot-image names interpretation rather than a new cosmic bond. References: I.5.14. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi.

**enumerare / gradatim / summatim.** Printed forms: *enumerando*; *gradatim*; *summatim*.

To count successively, step by step, versus a gathered view. God’s knowledge of innumerable things is explicitly distinguished from completing an endless sequence of counting. References: II.10.10. See Counting and collective intuition.

**Epicureus / Epicurus / Averroes.** Printed forms: *Averroi*; *Averrois*; *Epicureus*; *Epicuro*.

The anticipated Epicurean opponent and named Epicurus and Averroes of the later polemic. Ficino attributes burdensome-action and lowly-knowledge objections to these opponents; the lexicon reports his presentation. References: II.8.1, II.9.20, II.9.21. See Seeking possessing and distraction.

**error / impius / profanus.** Printed forms: *condemnatur*; *error*; *impie*; *impius*; *profana*.

Error, impious, or profane, as Ficino’s polemical evaluations. The reader should attribute these judgments to Ficino rather than adopting them as neutral descriptions of opponents. References: II.7.15, II.9.21, II.10.8. See Philosophy and theology.

**errāre / iudicare.** Printed forms: *errat*; *iudicant*.

To err; to judge. The Platonists infer souls from inward motion; perfect celestial wisdom’s lack of deliberative error explains its unvarying operation. References: IV.1.74, IV.1.84. See Seeming and evidence.

**eruere / educere.** Printed forms: *educit*; *eruit*.

To draw forth or bring out. Natural art generates or draws substantial forms from matter; the verbs do not by themselves assert creation from nothing. References: IV.1.13, IV.1.18. See Surface and depth.

**esse / ens / exsistere.** Printed forms: *esse*; *Esse*; *essendi*; *existunt*.

Being or existing, distinguished from being this particular kind of thing. Being is the common effect on which determinations depend, while the scope of cognition includes actuality and potency. References: II.4.2, II.7.28, II.7.29, II.10.3. See Being.

**esse / fieri.** Printed forms: *est*; *fit*; *semper fit*.

Be / become. The stable angel, changing quality, and always-changing soul are distinguished by combining persistence with becoming, not by three identical meanings of existence. References: III.2.2. See Being.

**esse — existence and predication.** Printed forms: *erit*; *esse*; *esset*; *est*; *Est*; *sit*.

Be or exist. The existence–becoming contrast gives the ordinary verb a metaphysical role; elsewhere it functions as a copula, so morphology alone cannot assign one sense. References: II.12.5, III.2.2. See Being.

**essendi modus.** Printed forms: *essendi modo*; *essendi modos*.

Mode of being, distinguished from simply being or not being. The correction in II.7.8 clarifies higher bodies’ changes as changes of mode rather than sheer disappearance. References: II.7.8, II.9.17. See Being.

**essendi principium.** Printed forms: *essendi principium*.

A principle by which something has being. A form of matter supplies being to its recipient; it is distinguished from God as being itself. References: IV.1.25. See Being.

**essentia / essentialis / substantia.** Printed forms: *essentia*; *essentiam*.

Essence or substantial constitution, distinguished locally from operation and received being. Ficino rejects independence from God in essence despite dependence in act; in God essence and operation coincide. References: II.4.6, II.7.15, II.9.5. See Essence and substance.

**essentia / substantia.** Printed forms: *essentiam*; *substantia*.

Essence / substance. Soul’s substance remains while operations change; the third essence names its rank and nature, not a third bodily ingredient. References: III.1.15, III.2.1. See Essence and substance.

**essentia / virtus / actio.** Printed forms: *actio*; *essentia*; *virtus*.

Essence, power and action as three respects of a thing. Quality changes in all three; the third essence has stable essence, changing operation, and power that is stable in one respect and acquired in another. References: I.4.1, I.4.5, I.5.1. See Act and operation.

**essentia atque esse.** Printed forms: *esse*; *essentiam*.

Essence and being as distinguished within intellect. They are listed beside intellectual power, its act and understood forms, showing why angelic stability does not equal absolute simplicity. References: I.6.4. See Essence and substance.

**essentia puncto momento.** Printed forms: *essentia*; *momento*; *puncto*.

In essence, point, and moment: three modes of unity. Single substance, spatial indivisibility, and simultaneous possession distinguish angelic unity from lower totalities. References: IV.2.5. See Whole and parts.

**essentialis / accidentalis.** Printed forms: *accidentales*; *essentiales*.

Belonging to essence / belonging as an accident. Both proposed kinds of internally distinct divine forms are rejected, although for different reasons. References: II.11.2. See Substance and accident.

**Euclides / Megara / Athenae / Socrates.** Printed forms: *Athenas*; *Euclides*; *Megaris*; *Socratem*.

The traveler, departure city, destination, and teacher in the example. Euclid’s night journey to hear Socrates illustrates execution of a general plan; the passage does not identify him with the geometer. References: IV.2.13. See Euclid and the lantern.

**evellere / extirpare.** Printed forms: *evellantur*; *extirpentur*.

To tear out and uproot. Removal from earth allegedly ends the growth of the outgrowths, distinguishing their dependence from animals’ independent life. References: IV.1.2. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**ex / per / in causal uses.** Printed forms: *ex*; *in*; *per*.

From, through and in, distinguishing origin, means and inherence. Quality is in a subject and from another, while its operation occurs through a higher power; these prepositions carry different causal relations and should not be flattened into mere spatial location. References: I.3.4, I.3.7, I.3.18. See Through itself and through another.

**ex-cogitare / fateri.** Printed forms: *excogitemus*; *fateri*.

To conceive an explanatory mover; to acknowledge a required conclusion. Visible motion and the rejection of an endless series motivate a first-moving sphere with an intrinsic principle. References: IV.1.53. See First movable.

**excedere / superare.** Printed forms: *excedat*; *excedetur*; *excessus*; *superabit*; *superant*; *superantes*.

To exceed or surpass in rank, extent, or power. The reader must identify the respect of comparison; surpassing goodness would already depend on goodness. References: II.1.5, II.3.2, II.3.9, II.9.11. See Surpassing and comparison.

**excellens / eminens / deterior / altior / remotior.** Printed forms: *deterioribus*; *eminentior*; *excellentissimam*; *excellentius*; *remotiorem*.

Greater excellence, inferiority, height, or remoteness in the specified comparison. Higher cognition includes what lower powers know and more; remoter potency requires stronger actualization. References: II.1.1, II.3.10, II.4.5, II.9.6, II.9.16. See Surpassing and comparison.

**excresco / invalesco.** Printed forms: *excrescere*; *invalescere*.

To grow until filling something, and to grow powerful. The eye’s imagined bodily expansion parallels mind’s imagined dominance over other faculties; these are suppositious analogies, not a physical transformation. References: I.6.8, I.6.9. See Eye and imagined enlargement.

**exemplar / exprimere / imitari.** Printed forms: *exemplar*; *exemplaris*; *exprimi*; *imitari*.

Pattern, expression in its likeness, and imitation. No finite creature or collection exhausts the possible modes of imitating the infinite exemplar. References: II.10.5. See Ideas and exemplars.

**exemplum / instar.** Printed forms: *exemplum*; *instar*.

An example; after the likeness of. Euclid’s journey is explicitly introduced as an example, while God is described in the likeness of a circle; neither expression authorizes transferring every physical feature. References: IV.2.13, IV.2.21. See Proportion and analogy.

**exemplum / signum / indicare.** Printed forms: *exemplo*; *indicat*.

Example / indication / indicate. The ostrich case is said to indicate the thesis in a qualified way; an illustration does not thereby become independently verified evidence. References: II.11.31, III.1.32. See Ostrich and egg.

**exercitus / dux.** Printed forms: *ducem*; *dux*; *exercitus*.

Army and commander or guide. Military coordination illustrates relation to one source; guide later names God’s universal enabling role. References: II.2.8, II.6.9, II.7.6. See Army and commander.

**exercitus / dux / princeps.** Printed forms: *duce*; *ducem*; *exercitus*; *principe*.

Army / commander / sovereign. The army’s internal order derives from its relation to one leader, illustrating the world’s dependence on one ruling source. References: II.13.8, II.13.9. See Army and commander.

**exhalatio.** Printed forms: *exhalationem*; *exhalationibus*.

Exhalation or vaporous constituent. Water, fire, and earth are invoked to distinguish alleged daemon visibility from tangibility. References: IV.1.39. See Daemons.

**exigere / requirere.** Printed forms: *exigit*; *requireret*.

To require or demand a prerequisite. Outward diffusion requires inward preservation in the reported theory; a regress of required choices blocks any beginning. References: II.6.19, II.7.16, II.8.3. See Need and sufficiency.

**exigo / condicio.** Printed forms: *condiciones*; *exiguntur*.

To require; a condition necessary for an operation. The three stated conditions of perfect natural action structure the case against bodily bulk; the argument is relative to this model of perfection. References: I.2.2, I.2.3. See Perfection.

**exilis / exiguus / parvitas.** Printed forms: *exiguam*; *exilem*; *parvas*; *parvitatem*; *parvum*.

Slight, small, or littleness. The corporeal fabric has bounded magnitude yet can be divided into ever smaller parts, contrasting with indivisible fullness. References: II.6.13. See Quantity and dimension.

**existimare / opinari / arbitrari.** Printed forms: *arbitrantur*; *arbitremur*; *existimarunt*; *opinantur*.

To judge, suppose, or hold an opinion. These verbs mark interpretations or attributed positions, including the rejected independence of world, matter, and mind. References: II.2.4, II.3.1, II.7.15, II.10.8. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

**exordiri / prodire.** Printed forms: *exordiatur*; *prodiret*; *Prodit*; *prodit*.

To begin from a source or come forth into being. A first source gives outflow an origin; mind’s coming forth as word remains part of the attributed theory. References: II.3.3, II.3.7, II.6.20, II.7.21. See Procession and return.

**exordium / exordiri.** Printed forms: *exordium*.

An origin or starting point. Divisible things take their beginning from indivisible things and end in them; the phrase marks explanatory dependence rather than a demonstrated calendar date. References: I.3.16. See Precedence and causal regress.

**experiri / edere.** Printed forms: *edat*; *experiatur*.

Exercise or test / bring forth. Soul exercises powers inwardly before expressing them in body, distinguishing spiritual from bodily motion. References: III.1.26. See Intellectual and animating powers.

**expetere / desiderare.** Printed forms: *desideratur*; *expetendaque*; *expetunt*.

To seek or desire something considered good. Existence, life, and knowledge are desirable; seeking beyond goodness would contradict the stated ground of desire. References: II.1.6, II.2.15, II.6.10. See Appetite and desire.

**exprimere / referre.** Printed forms: *exprimatur*; *referatque*.

Represent or reproduce. The painter’s soul determines the successive manner in which the meadow’s different plants are represented. References: III.1.29. See Apelles and the meadow.

**expugnare / repugnare.** Printed forms: *expugnat*; *repugnat*.

To overcome by assault or to resist. Immunity from efficacious qualitative change is taken to imply the easier freedom from dimensional obstruction. References: II.6.18, II.6.19. See Touch and penetration.

**extendere / extensio.** Printed forms: *extendere*; *extendit*; *extenditur*.

To extend in power, operation, thought, or space. The object determines the mode: divine knowledge extends with operation, while the world’s extension is finite. References: II.4.4, II.6.14, II.9.13, II.10.2. See Omnipresence and place.

**extendo / extensio.** Printed forms: *extendi*; *extendit*; *extenditur*; *extensio*.

To extend; extension. Receiving extension differs from actively extending something; the latter is assigned to a cause that need not itself be dimensioned. References: I.2.1, I.3.29. See Proclus, Syrianus and extending matter.

**exterior / externus.** Printed forms: *externa*; *externam*.

External in relation to an agent, its object, or its source of completion. External matter contrasts with immanent operation; external objects cannot perfect divine self-knowledge. References: II.7.16, II.9.5, II.9.9. See Object and adequate object.

**extinguo / remotus.** Printed forms: *extinctus*; *remotissimus*.

Extinguished and very distant. The producer’s possible extinction or distance blocks treating it as the sufficient continuing higher cause of the present fire’s operation. References: I.3.9. See Precedence and causal regress.

**extra / intus.** Printed forms: *extra*; *intus*.

Outside and within, here relative to mind. The alternative locations of the truer form both support its presence in the world, since the mind itself belongs to the world. References: I.3.2. See Truth.

**extremum.** Printed forms: *extrema*.

Extreme or endpoint of an ordered range. God and body are the opposite grades; soul is needed to link them while retaining both relations. References: III.2.7, III.2.8. See Degree and mediation.

**extremum sine medio.** Printed forms: *extremo*; *extremum*; *sine medio*.

An extreme and transition without an intermediate. Averroes’s reported celestial form has dimension without matter to mediate material and divine forms; Ficino then advances his own inference beyond quantity. References: I.3.27. See Degree and mediation.

**extrinsecus / aliunde.** Printed forms: *aliunde*; *extrinseco*; *extrinsecus*.

From outside or elsewhere, marking an origin beyond the thing itself. An externally obtained proper nature excludes being necessary and self-sufficient through oneself. References: II.2.4, II.2.5, II.7.14, II.7.16. See Dependence and receiving.

**exuberare / fundere.** Printed forms: *diffunduntur*; *exuberando*; *fundere*.

To overflow or pour forth diffusely. Whole communication throughout immensity is emphasized without dividing the source into portions. References: II.6.6, II.6.14, II.6.24. See Communication and imparting.

**faber / genitor / filius.** Printed forms: *faber*; *filium*; *genitor*.

Craftsman / begetter or father / son. The ascending comparison differentiates external material, internal but received material, and divine production of matter itself. References: II.13.2. See Craftsman and father.

**faber lignarius.** Printed forms: *faber lignarius*; *ligno*.

Carpenter; wood as the material worked. The carpenter imagined within the wood illustrates nature's inward productive presence. References: IV.1.11. See Carpenter and geometer.

**fabricare / construere / conficere.** Printed forms: *conficere*; *constructa*; *construi*; *fabricat*.

To fashion, construct, or complete a product. The verbs range from hypothetical worlds to the exact craftsmanship attributed to even the lowest things. References: II.2.12, II.2.13, II.9.22. See Art and nature.

**facere / efficere.** Printed forms: *facere*; *facta*; *fecit*.

Make or bring about. The maker's causal scope is tested by whether it makes only a form in supplied matter or the whole effect including matter. References: II.13.2, II.13.11. See Creation.

**facile / difficilis.** Printed forms: *difficili*; *facile*; *facillime*.

Easily; difficult or laborious. Forms pass easily through a suitable mediator, and celestial bodies move readily, whereas needy human bodies demand difficult administration. References: IV.1.32, IV.2.11, IV.2.19. See Weariness and agility.

**facio / servo.** Printed forms: *facit*; *servatque*.

To make and preserve. The form that produces matter must also preserve it; quality's own dependence on matter prevents assigning it that foundational role. References: I.3.18. See Conservation and preservation.

**fallere / praestigiae / confundere.** Printed forms: *confundit*; *fallit*; *Fallit*; *praestigiis*.

To deceive or confuse; illusion. The error lies in substituting a spatial or temporal image for the intellectual object initially conceived. References: II.5.2, II.6.13. See Imagination and deceptive clothing.

**fallo / falsum.** Printed forms: *fallit*; *falso*; *falsum*.

To deceive; what is false. Ficino distinguishes falsehood's dependent being from truth and says deception works through an image of truth; the image is not therefore reliable. References: I.3.2. See Truth.

**falsus / falsum.** Printed forms: *falsum*.

False, either contrary to truth or an unacceptable explanatory claim. What lacked truth altogether would be nothing; "which is false" rejects no reception of being from God. References: II.1.3, II.7.18. See Truth.

**familiarissimus.** Printed forms: *familiarissima*; *familiarissimos*.

Most intimately conjoined or specifically appropriate. The spheres require movers closely related to them; this cannot make God the exclusive mover of one sphere. References: IV.1.54, IV.1.59. See Proximity and causal presence.

**fascinare / roborare.** Printed forms: *fascinandos*; *roborandos*.

To bewitch and to strengthen. Alleged bodily effects on souls support an inference to an infused power superior to the mixed bodies. References: IV.1.19. See Hierobotanum and mineral powers.

**fatalis lex / innata cupiditas.** Printed forms: *fatali*; *innata cupiditas*; *lege*.

Fated law; an inborn desire. The opening formula is explained later through the ordered seed sequence and the thought directing each realization. References: IV.2.2. See Fate.

**fateri / negare / affirmare.** Printed forms: *affirmet*; *assentiendum*; *fatentur*; *fateri*; *negas*; *negentur*.

To acknowledge, deny, affirm, or assent. Ficino presses concessions assigned to opponents, including that all things act toward good as an end. References: II.1.6, II.2.13, II.2.14, II.7.16, II.9.21. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

**fatigare.** Printed forms: *fatigari*; *fatigatur*.

To tire or become unable to sustain an operation. Bounded quality is contrasted with an unextended soul moving an exceptionally suitable celestial body. References: IV.1.55, IV.2.18. See Weariness and agility.

**fatigare / claudicare.** Printed forms: *claudicat*; *fatigatur*; *infatigabilem*.

To grow weary or falter; to be unwearied. Long-continued cosmic regularity is taken as evidence of a governor whose power does not tire. References: II.4.7. See Failure weariness and endurance.

**fatum.** Printed forms: *fatum*.

Fate, in the gloss of the cited Orphic saying. The local sentence couples fate with Jove’s mind surveying everything, rather than developing a separate doctrine of fatalism. References: II.9.19. See Fate.

**fecunditas.** Printed forms: *fecunditas*; *fecunditate*.

Fruitfulness or productive abundance. The creator’s complete causal relation to his works grounds both their productive capacity and his continuing care for them. References: II.13.2. See Craftsman and father.

**fecunditas / amplifico.** Printed forms: *amplificatae*; *fecunditate*.

Fecundity and enlargement in multiplicity. The unrestricted intellectual kind is said to unfold into virtually innumerable species; the generative image concerns abundance of forms, not sexual reproduction. References: I.5.23. See Angel.

**fecundus.** Printed forms: *fecundus*.

Fruitful or productive. Infinite goodness is said to make inward activity infinitely fruitful; the account is presented as Plotinus’s exposition. References: II.12.10. See Self-production and reservation.

**ferme / quoad fieri potest.** Printed forms: *ferme*; *quoad fieri potest*.

Nearly; as far as possible. The qualifications limit what rotation can achieve compared with soul’s whole simultaneous presence. References: IV.2.25. See Striving and enjoyment.

**ferme / ut ita loquar.** Printed forms: *ferme*; *ut ita loquar*.

Almost or approximately / so to speak. These qualify angel's likeness to divine immobility and prevent the comparison from erasing its inferior mode. References: III.1.13. See Qualification and attribution.

**ferre.** Printed forms: *ferri*; *fertur*; *feruntur*.

To carry, be borne, or tend toward. Natural causes tend toward specific effects; heaven is borne by will; the lower soul-power strives toward particular seeds in act. References: IV.1.6, IV.2.2, IV.2.12. See Motion and stability.

**fides adhibita.** Printed forms: *fidem adhibeat*.

To give credence or trust an assertion. The prohibition introduces Ficino's rejection of the claim that lowly objects are unworthy of divine cognition. References: II.9.20. See Seeking possessing and distraction.

**fieri / constare.** Printed forms: *constare*; *constat*; *fit*.

To become or result, and to consist or stand together. Body consists of matter and quantity, while multiple qualities can coexist in one subject; these relational uses are not definitions of independent substance. References: I.2.1, I.2.15, I.2.17. See Being.

**figere / ponere.** Printed forms: *figat*; *ponere*.

To fix in position; to posit or place. Fixing Saturn's heaven introduces a thought experiment, whereas positing principles in nature is an explanatory claim. References: IV.1.12, IV.2.24. See Here, there, and the Antipodes.

**filius / parens.** Printed forms: *filii*; *parentum*.

Child or offspring and parent. Newborn resemblance supports the priority of qualitative causation; later equality of size is less frequent and subsequent. References: I.2.12. See Comparing, resembling and equalling.

**finge animo / finge iterum.** Printed forms: *Finge animo*; *Finge iterum*.

Imagine, and imagine again. Two explicit thought experiments enlarge eye and mind to isolate simultaneous apprehension while preserving distinction from light or truth. References: I.6.8, I.6.9. See Eye and imagined enlargement.

**fingo and removed members.** Printed forms: *deletis*; *relicta*; *sublata*.

With something removed or abolished; left remaining. These participles specify hypothetical removal of bodily members or nonintellectual soul-powers in the paired eye/mind thought experiments, not actual prescriptions for transformation. References: I.6.8, I.6.9. See Eye and imagined enlargement.

**finis.** Printed forms: *finis*.

End, goal, or boundary. A circuit's end coincides with its beginning, so having an end need not mean ceasing to operate forever. References: III.2.26. See End and limit.

**finis / scopus.** Printed forms: *Finis*; *finis*; *finisque*; *Scopus*.

End as completion, terminus, or goal; scopus explicitly marks an aim. The first source is also desire's final end; mind's goal is true good in the reported mental-presence theory. References: II.3.9, II.4.8, II.6.23. See End and limit.

**flammula / concavum / evolare.** Printed forms: *concavum*; *evolaret*; *flammula*.

Little flame, concavity, and upward flight. A chain of conditional flame-examples models attaining and wholly enjoying a natural goal within the reported theory. References: II.6.23. See Natural motion and natural place.

**Florentia / Germanus.** Printed forms: *Florentiae*; *Germani*.

Florence / German. Ficino locates the display at Florence and describes its unnamed maker as German; the text does not identify him further. References: II.13.13. See Florentine mechanism.

**florere / virescere.** Printed forms: *virescunt*.

To grow green or flourish. The Apollo hymn’s flourishing belongs to the image of universal life and harmonious care, not a separate botanical argument. References: II.9.22. See Apollo.

**flos / herba.** Printed forms: *florem*; *herba*.

Flower / plant or herb. Successive attention to individual plants illustrates the temporal mode supplied by the painter’s soul. References: III.1.28, III.1.29. See Apelles and the meadow.

**fluctuo / labens.** Printed forms: *fluctuabit*; *labentes*; *labentium*.

To fluctuate and to pass away or slip onward. Matter’s changing forms and the reported Plotinian shadow-affections contrast with the stable essence that a first productive source would require. References: I.3.6, I.3.19. See Motion and stability.

**fluere.** Printed forms: *effluit*; *Fluet*.

Flow. Soul’s operation flows through different acts while its substance persists; the metaphor marks temporal succession. References: III.1.16, III.1.23. See Motion and stability.

**fluere / fluitare / fluxus.** Printed forms: *effluxus*; *fluentium*; *fluit*; *fluitabunt*; *fluitat*; *fluxerunt*; *fluxum*; *refluunt*.

To flow; to drift or remain unstable; a flowing process. The wordplay connects dependence on another with instability, while return-flow and outpouring have positive causal senses. References: II.3.3, II.3.7, II.3.8, II.3.10. See Spring and flow.

**fomentum.** Printed forms: *fomento*.

Sustaining support. Quality cannot exist without matter’s support; the noun here should not be reduced to literal food or fuel. References: I.3.7. See Support, inherence and dependence.

**fomentum / fovere.** Printed forms: *fomento*; *foveant*; *fovet*.

Fostering influence; to nurture or strengthen. External fostering helps seeds develop; spiritual seeds nurture abandoned seeds; agate is separately alleged to foster sight. References: IV.1.14, IV.1.16, IV.1.20. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**fons / influxus.** Printed forms: *fons*; *fonte*; *influxu*.

Source or spring; incoming preserving flow. Self-source would entail supreme perfection; nature endures through divine influx; light is compared with the source of colors. References: II.7.16, II.7.17, II.10.12. See Spring and flow.

**fons / principium.** Printed forms: *fontem*; *fontem et principium motionis*; *principium*.

Fountain / originating principle. Ficino explicitly explains fountain as having motion from itself, principle as communicating it to others. References: III.1.26. See Principle.

**fons formarum.** Printed forms: *fons*; *formarum*.

A source or fountain of forms. If matter possessed productive form essentially, it would be form's source rather than its recipient, contradicting its assigned role. References: I.3.6. See Fountain, womb and offspring.

**forma / formare.** Printed forms: *forma*; *formam*; *formata*.

Determining form, intelligible character, or forming an image. A wider cause acts through a more comprehensive form; finite formed things cannot exhaust the infinite exemplar. References: II.9.1, II.9.4, II.10.5. See Form.

**forma / species.** Printed forms: *formae*; *formam*; *formas*; *specie*; *species*.

Form and the kind determined by it. Different bodies act differently because form makes them members of different kinds; species in this argument is not a visual image. References: I.2.9. See Form.

Form / determinate form, kind, or intelligible presentation. At II.11.1 forms are present causally; in III.2.29 species belongs to the delicate cognitive phrase. The senses must be read with their recipients. References: II.11.1, III.2.29. See Form.

**formosus / exactus / ars.** Printed forms: *arte*; *exactissima*; *exactius*; *formosa*.

Beautiful, exact, and craft or skill. Exact intelligence is attributed to God; exacting craftsmanship is attributed to even things commonly called lowly. References: II.9.2, II.9.22. See Precious and lowly.

**forsitan / forte.** Printed forms: *forsitan*; *forte*.

Perhaps; a qualification of the asserted possibility. Some immediate multiplicity is tentatively allowed at IV.1.23; twelve governing minds remain qualified within the numerical excursion. References: IV.1.23, IV.1.52. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**forsitan / quodammodo.** Printed forms: *forsitan*; *quodammodo*.

Perhaps / in a certain way. Both qualifications limit the proposed explanation of the saying about divine self-production. References: II.12.8. See Qualification and attribution.

**forte / fortuitus / sors.** Printed forms: *forte*; *fortuito*; *fortuitum*; *sortis*.

By chance / fortuitous / chance or lot. The cluster excludes chance from God's own being and activity; it does not cancel the later allowance of contingent creatures. References: II.12.2. See Chance.

**forte / suspicor / vaticinor.** Printed forms: *forte*; *suspicabatur*; *vaticinabatur*.

Perhaps, to suspect, and to foresee or divine. Ficino conjecturally interprets Aristotle's deference as hinting that understanding, not bodily movement, should determine the count of minds. References: I.5.22. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**fortis / vehementia / valere.** Printed forms: *fortius*; *valet*; *vehementior*; *vehementius*.

Strong or vigorous; to have effective ability. Power is assessed relative to its effect, while the first cause is called more forceful through its prior and enduring contribution. References: II.2.6, II.2.12, II.7.32, II.10.7. See Power and potency.

**fretus / adductus.** Printed forms: *adductus*; *fretus*.

Relying upon something; moved or led by something. Augustine's authority and charity toward humanity are the two expressed motives for Ficino's project, not separately demonstrated causes of its correctness. References: Proem.7. See Augustine and Christian proximity.

**frigefacio / calefacio / uro.** Printed forms: *calefacit*; *comburendum*; *frigefacit*; *urit*.

To cool, heat or burn. The specified verbs show different effects of qualities; fire burns because it is intensely hot, not merely large. References: I.2.11. See Fire, spark, lightning and cannon.

**frui.** Printed forms: *frueretur*; *frui*; *fruitur*.

To enjoy or possess the use of something. The flame would enjoy its natural goal; intelligence lets a being enjoy itself and other things. References: II.6.23, II.9.2. See Love and pleasure.

Enjoy or possess with delight. Perfect intellect's continuing enjoyment of its perfect object supports the argument for delight in divine activity. References: II.11.32. See Love and pleasure.

**frui / perfrui.** Printed forms: *fruendae*; *perfruatur*.

To enjoy or participate fully in a desired presence. The sphere's desire to enjoy its wholly present soul motivates imitation of simultaneous whole presence without actually making body indivisible. References: IV.2.25. See Striving and enjoyment.

**fruor.** Printed forms: *fruetur*.

To enjoy or have fulfilled possession of. Divine blessedness is tested through full self-enjoyment: composition would prevent the whole from being present in each supposed member. References: I.6.6. See Blessedness.

**frustra / superfluus.** Printed forms: *frustra*; *superfluus*.

In vain or fruitlessly; surplus to what suffices. The twin-god hypothesis leaves a power or a duplicate world without necessary work to do. References: II.2.11, II.2.12, II.4.4. See Redundancy and uselessness.

**fugere materiam.** Printed forms: *materiam fugiat*.

To withdraw from matter in intellectual operation. Angel is wholly mind, making direct substantial adherence to matter unsuitable to its characteristic activity. References: IV.1.30. See Separation and abstraction.

**fulgur / bombarda.** Printed forms: *bombarda*; *fulgure*.

Lightning and cannon. Their conspicuous force is offered as evidence of the strength of fire and air; the passage does not detail a weapon's construction. References: I.2.5. See Fire, spark, lightning and cannon.

**geminus / binus.** Printed forms: *binos*; *gemini*; *geminis*.

Twin or paired, introducing a hypothetical pair. The "twin gods" and "twin worlds" are posited for refutation, not affirmed as existing. References: II.2.1, II.2.12, II.2.13. See Redundancy and uselessness.

**generatio / successio.** Printed forms: *generationis*; *successione*.

Generation and succession, capable of indefinite continuation in the account. Repeated generation is one potential infinity dependent on a source of active infinite power. References: II.4.8, II.10.3. See Generation and corruption.

**genus.** Printed forms: *genere*; *generis*; *genus*.

A kind or explanatory genus. The first cause of a kind must account for that whole kind; “human race” in the opening is another local sense, not a fixed biological taxonomic rank. References: I.1.1, I.3.3, I.3.8. See Species.

**geometra / geometrica mens.** Printed forms: *geometrae*; *geometrica mens*.

Geometer; geometrical mind. External drawing in dust is contrasted with inward formation of imagination. References: IV.1.11. See Carpenter and geometer.

**germen / corporale semen.** Printed forms: *germine corporali*; *semine corporali*.

A bodily shoot or reproductive seed. The absence of visible bodily material motivates the inference to incorporeal formative principles. References: IV.1.14. See Seeds.

**gignere / producere.** Printed forms: *genito*; *genitum*; *gignit*; *producit*.

Beget / bring forth. The verbs gloss divine self-activity in a reserved, attributed exposition, not a temporal emergence of God from nonbeing. References: II.12.10, II.12.11. See Self-production and reservation.

**gradus / gradatim.** Printed forms: *gradatim*; *gradibus*; *gradus*.

Degree or rank; stepwise progression. Degrees distinguish perfections and causal levels, whereas stepwise enumeration is denied of divine cognition. References: II.3.1, II.3.9, II.4.3, II.10.10. See Measure and degree.

**gradus / mensura / proportio.** Printed forms: *gradibus*; *gradu*; *gradus*; *graduum*; *mensuram*; *proportionem*.

Degree / measure / proportion. Different degrees of heat depend on recipients; measured routes fit a proposed end, distinguishing amount from intelligent ordering. References: II.11.8, II.11.25, II.13.7. See Measure and degree.

**gradus minimus naturalis.** Printed forms: *gradum minimum naturalem*.

The least natural degree. Ficino lists it as the limiting principle for natural form; the passage does not provide a numerical threshold or modern unit of measurement. References: I.3.14. See Least natural degree.

**gratia / causa with genitive.** Printed forms: *corpusculi talis causa*; *totius mundi gratia*.

For the sake of; an expression of purpose. Whole elemental spheres exist for the world’s sake, while their mixed particles serve particular composites. References: IV.1.90, IV.1.91. See Whole and parts.

**gratia — purpose.** Printed forms: *boni ipsius gratia*; *sui gratia*.

For the sake of, with a preceding genitive. The construction specifies the final good for which something is made; here gratia is not a separate gift of grace or a feeling of gratitude. References: II.11.27, II.13.3. See End and limit.

**gravior / levior.** Printed forms: *gravioribus*; *leviora*.

Weightier or lesser in importance. The contrast describes relative importance, not mass; the same gaze knows both without displacement. References: II.9.20. See Seeking possessing and distraction.

**gravitas / levitas.** Printed forms: *gravitas*; *gravitate*; *Levitas*; *levitate*.

Heaviness and lightness as directional qualities. These qualities have restricted downward or upward tendencies, unlike perpetual returning celestial motion. References: IV.1.55, IV.1.56. See Natural motion and natural place.

**gustus.** Printed forms: *gustus*.

Taste, savor, or appetite. Being devoid of every gustus is rejected as an absurd account of God’s relation to good; the sense is appetitive, not bodily tasting. References: II.12.12. See Appetite and desire.

**habere / possidere.** Printed forms: *possidebat*; *possideri*; *possidet*; *possidetur*.

Have or possess. Possessing all perfection excludes a divine acquisition of something new; received possession remains possible for creatures. References: II.12.14, III.1.6. See Possession and privation.

**habere / tenere / possidere.** Printed forms: *habeat*; *habet*; *tenet*.

To have, hold, or possess a power, object, or knowledge. Having potential cognition is distinguished from actually understanding everything within its reach in the argument about God. References: II.2.10, II.9.4, II.9.14, II.10.7. See Power and potency.

**habitare.** Printed forms: *habitas*.

To dwell or inhabit, here second-person singular in an attributed hymn. The Saturn hymn calls its addressee inhabitant of all cosmic parts; habitas belongs to habitare, not the noun habitus. References: II.6.11. See Orpheus and divine names.

**habitus.** Printed forms: *habitum*; *habitus*.

A settled possession or habitual state. Acquired power passes from potency into act and from act into habit, with reverse transitions; habit is not mere repetition or a bodily posture. References: I.5.1. See Habitual possession.

A condition or settled possession, with local uses distinguished. Nothing has no condition of being; distinct virtue-habits sharing a soul illustrate co-presence without confusion. References: II.4.2, II.6.14. See Habitual possession.

**habitus / actus / potentia.** Printed forms: *actu*; *habitu*; *potentia*.

Abiding possession, present actualization, and possibility. Angel, soul, and matter hold the principles of things in different modes; this is not merely a change in the number of principles. References: IV.2.9. See Habitual possession.

**habitus — condition of the whole.** Printed forms: *habitus*.

Settled state or condition. The world’s best status and habitus are constituted from its parts; this is not an acquired habit of the universe. References: II.13.21. See Possession and privation.

**habitus — possession.** Printed forms: *habitus*.

Possession, opposed to privation. An idea of possession makes its privation intelligible; this is not the craft-sense of a settled acquired disposition. References: II.11.19. See Possession and privation.

**habitus — present state.** Printed forms: *praesenti habitu*.

Present state or condition. Spheres continuously depart from their present state; no acquired craft or ethical habit is meant. References: II.13.8. See Possession and privation.

**habitus — settled skill.** Printed forms: *habitu*.

An acquired settled disposition. The skilled artisan acts through habitu as nature acts through forms; this differs from possession opposed to privation and a sphere's present state. References: II.13.18. See Habitual possession.

**hactenus / hucusque.** Printed forms: *Hactenus*; *Hucusque*.

Thus far or up to this point. The transition acknowledges the soul-level result before denying that it can be the first principle; progress is retained even when a higher explanation is sought. References: I.5.1, I.5.2. See Ascent.

**Haec Platonici.** Printed forms: *Haec Platonici*.

"So say the Platonists," an attribution marker. Complete angelic immobility in essence, power and action is explicitly assigned to this account, with other positions deferred. References: I.6.1. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**haerere.** Printed forms: *haerere*; *haeret*.

Cling or adhere. Sunlight's maintained attachment illustrates soul's continuing relation to divine things while enlivening mortal things. References: III.2.8. See Indwelling and presence.

**haerere / seiunctus.** Printed forms: *haerent*; *seiuncta*.

To remain attached; separated. Plant and stone growth is assigned to earth's soul, while animals' separated bodies live through proper souls. References: IV.1.78. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**harmonia.** Printed forms: *harmoniae*.

Harmony or ordered proportion. Harmony appears among items with unextended qualities, supporting the claim that extension is not intrinsic to quality as such; the passage does not give a musical theory. References: I.2.16. See Order and harmony.

**haud propria omnino ratione.** Printed forms: *haud propria omnino ratione*.

Not in an altogether proper sense. The qualification governs even "intelligible" and "intellection" as names for God; they must not be presented as exhaustive literal definitions. References: I.6.13. See Naming and defining.

**haurio / liquor / infundo.** Printed forms: *haurit*; *infundat*; *liquorem*.

To draw or drink in; liquid; to pour into. Mind receives goodness from the Good through a fluid metaphor of communicated perfection, without a claim of physical material transfer. References: I.6.17. See Fountain, womb and offspring.

**haurire / implere.** Printed forms: *haurit*; *impletur*.

Draw from a source / fill. Angel draws goodness immediately from God and remains filled; fountain and fullness express received stability. References: III.1.7. See Receiving and giving.

**Heraclitus / Varro / Manilius.** Printed forms: *Heraclitus*; *Manilius*; *Marcus Varro*; *Marcusque Manilius*; *Varro*.

The thinkers placed at the rational-soul level. Their names mark a stopping point the ascending argument must exceed, not an independently checked summary of all their writings. References: I.1.4, I.5.2. See Philosophers and stopping points.

**hic / illic.** Printed forms: *hic*; *ibi*; *illic*.

Here and there as opposed places. Identical fitness for the alternative positions drives the thought experiment; these demonstratives carry a substantive symmetry argument. References: IV.2.24. See Here, there, and the Antipodes.

**hiems / ver / aestas / autumnus.** Printed forms: *aestate*; *aestatem*; *autumnum*; *hieme*; *hiemem*; *ver*.

Winter, spring, summer and autumn. The seasonal transitions illustrate Ficino's principle that extremes are joined through intermediates; they are an analogy, not a demonstration of every metaphysical grade. References: I.4.3. See Degree and mediation.

**hierobotanum.** Printed forms: *hierobotanum*.

The herb named in the source. The Magi are said to claim that it aids physicians' divinations; the lexical record retains the attribution and does not identify or prescribe it. References: IV.1.20. See Hierobotanum and mineral powers.

**homo / equus.** Printed forms: *equinam*; *equorum*; *hominum*; *humanam*.

Human being and horse, examples of many individuals under one species. The paired examples make species-unity intelligible before the ascent to a common unity above species. References: II.2.7. See Unity and multiplicity.

**hora / par / impar.** Printed forms: *hora*; *impar*; *par*.

Hour, equal and unequal. The repeated question compares a condition's power at the beginning and end of a hypothetical interval to test complete persistence. References: I.4.2. See Permanence and the hour test.

**humor / humores.** Printed forms: *humores*.

Bodily fluids or humors in the organism and the world-body analogy. The world-soul tempers diverse humors within the cosmic animal; in the human comparison thought and affect stir spirits and humors. Humores and spiritus are coordinated terms, not synonyms or merely modern moods. References: IV.1.82, IV.2.16. See Sympathy.

**hymnus / theologia / sacerdos.** Printed forms: *Aegyptii*; *apostoli*; *cecinit*; *hymno*; *mystice*; *sacerdotes*; *Saturni*; *theologia*; *theologorum*.

Hymn, theology, priest, and source-identifying terms. These labels locate quoted or reported authorities and should not be mistaken for independent verification of their historical provenance. References: II.3.10, II.6.11, II.6.14, II.7.7, II.9.22. See Philosophy and theology.

**iacere / iactus.** Printed forms: *iaciat*; *iactus*.

To cast or project, and the reach of projection. A higher cause is said to cast power farther into effects, giving a spatial image to wider causal scope. References: II.3.2. See Cause.

**Iamblichus / Proclus.** Printed forms: *Iamblichus*; *Proclusque*.

The Platonists named beside the numerical angelic orders. Ficino places them after Dionysius within his presentation; this ordering is his assertion, not independently verified chronology here. References: I.5.27. See Dionysius, Daniel and numerical orders.

**ignarus / nescire.** Printed forms: *ignara*; *nesciant*.

Unaware / not know how. Bodies are said not to know their own movement or prescribe their ends, motivating the comparison with directed arrows. References: II.13.9. See Archer and target.

**ignis / sol / caelum / stella.** Printed forms: *caeli*; *caelo*; *ignis*; *ignito*; *solis*; *stellas*.

Fire, sun, heaven, and stars as natural examples. Kindled wood shows a particular cause present to its effect; sunlight and many stars illustrate different cognitive and causal relations. References: II.6.2, II.6.11, II.6.23, II.9.21. See Light and illumination.

**ignis / tenuis.** Printed forms: *ignis*; *tenuis*; *tenuitate*.

Fire, characterized here by fineness or thinness. Fire is presented as approaching spiritual nature and acting strongly; this qualitative efficacy is later shown insufficient as a first cause. References: I.2.5. See Fire, spark, lightning and cannon.

**illicere.** Printed forms: *illecta*.

Attract or entice. Things' desire for divine goodness is itself explained as a good attraction proceeding from that source. References: II.13.3. See Appetite and desire.

**illuminare / fulgere / radius / accendere.** Printed forms: *accendantur*; *fulget*; *illuminando*; *illuminat*; *radiis*.

To illuminate, shine, or light a source; rays as an optical image. Divine rays must not be mistaken for dimensional lines, while candlelights model distinct sources sharing a field. References: II.6.13, II.6.14, II.6.24, II.8.4. See Light and illumination.

**imago / simulacrum.** Printed forms: *imago*; *simulacrum*.

An image or fashioned likeness. The soul reflects an image of God; Ficino fashions a likeness of Plato close to Christian truth. Neither occurrence by itself means a deceptive counterfeit. References: Proem.4, Proem.7. See Image and likeness.

**imbecillitas / insipientia.** Printed forms: *imbecillitas*; *insipientiaque*.

Weakness / folly. A divine ability to become worse is denied as imperfection rather than counted as an additional freedom. References: II.12.5. See Freedom and necessity.

**imbuere.** Printed forms: *imbuit*.

To imbue a recipient with supplied content. The Latin makes the vivifying and motive power the recipient and natural seeds the content; the English reverses them. References: IV.1.11. See Seeds.

**imitari / deficere.** Printed forms: *deficere*; *imitari*.

Imitate / fall short. Distinct forms are conceived as different degrees and modes of likeness to divine form. References: II.11.17. See Image and likeness.

**imitatio / imitari.** Printed forms: *imitatio*; *imitetur*.

Imitation or producing a likeness of an exemplar. Human art imitates nature, while celestial soul imitates the first artisan through a worldly work. References: IV.1.10, IV.2.15. See Image and likeness.

**imitor / exprimo.** Printed forms: *exprimere*; *imitandum*; *imitati*.

To imitate and to fashion an expressed likeness. Augustine's reported selection of Plato for imitation supports Ficino's own constructive likeness, with Christian truth as the stated criterion. References: Proem.6, Proem.7, Proem.10. See Augustine and Christian proximity.

**immaterialis / incorporeus.** Printed forms: *immaterialia*; *incorporeum*.

Without matter and without body, distinguished locally. Proclus's celestial bodies are called immaterial yet retain bodily dimension; incorporeality therefore cannot simply be substituted for immateriality. References: I.3.28, I.3.31. See Incorporeal and immaterial.

**immo / potius / minime.** Printed forms: *immo*; *Minime*.

Rather, indeed, or by no means. These words sharpen a correction or rejection: the text revises bare-nature language and denies that soul fills body like a divided quality. References: II.11.12, III.2.10. See Qualification and attribution.

**immutabilis / immobilis.** Printed forms: *immobile*; *immobilis*; *immutabilis*.

Unchangeable / unmoving or stable. Divine immobility is underived, angelic immobility received; the reported empyrean classification is a further attributed application. References: III.1.6, III.1.7, III.2.4. See Motion and stability.

**impedimentum / impedio.** Printed forms: *impedimento*; *impedit*; *impedita*.

An obstacle and to hinder. Bulk obstructs perfect action; bodily bonds also hinder the mind's ascent. The contexts distinguish physical obstruction from the analogy for intellectual limitation. References: I.2.2, I.3.13. See Body and bulk.

**impedire / obesse.** Printed forms: *impediat*; *impedit*; *obstat*.

To impede; stand in the way. The transparent medium does not obstruct light, and an interrogative asks what prevents higher circular causes from giving heaven a circuit. References: IV.1.29, IV.2.21. See Transparency and opacity.

**impedire / purgare.** Printed forms: *impeditur*; *purgetur*.

To hinder, and to cleanse or remove an impediment. Mixed heat could become stronger if purified, so the mixed state cannot count as unqualified supreme heat. References: II.2.6. See Purity and mixture.

**impellere / inferre.** Printed forms: *impellit*; *infert*.

To impel or introduce into something. Imagination urges a mistaken identification with time, while nature imparts motion to its products. References: II.5.3, II.7.17. See Motion and stability.

**imperium.** Printed forms: *imperii*; *imperio*; *imperium*.

Dominion or range of rule. Truth's dominion exceeds mind's because even formless matter truly is matter; the metaphor concerns explanatory reach. References: I.6.11. See Governing, serving and dominion.

Dominion or scope of rule and action. Supremacy is treated as desirable good; inferior causes have a narrower domain of efficacy. References: II.1.5, II.7.30. See Surpassing and comparison.

Command or effective rule. The chapter opens by placing production under will's command, then asks how that will can be free and necessary together. References: II.12.1. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**impero / domina.** Printed forms: *dominam*; *imperat*.

To command and to be mistress of. The human mind does not by its act alone command effective psychic power; a superior mind is therefore proposed as efficacious in its own act. References: I.5.13. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**impertire / impartire / largiri.** Printed forms: *impartit*; *impertiet*; *impertit*; *largietur*; *Largitur*; *largitur*.

To impart or bestow a share generously. The repeated gifts to angel distinguish being, power, and activity while preserving one causal dependence. References: II.1.5, II.3.9, II.7.4, II.7.23. See Communication and imparting.

**impetus.** Printed forms: *impetu*.

Impetus or force of directed activity. Nature acts with its whole impetus, so differences of heat require differing recipients rather than decisions made by fire. References: II.11.8. See Fire and variable materials.

**impleo / prohibeo.** Printed forms: *impleat*; *prohibent*.

To fill and to prevent. Bodily occupation of place and resistance to penetration constrain the perfect-action model; the verbs name concrete obstacles rather than metaphysical nonexistence. References: I.2.2. See Body and bulk.

**implicare / explicare / replicare.** Printed forms: *explicat*; *explicatur*; *implicat*; *replicatur*.

To enfold, unfold, or fold back, used for unity and manifested plurality. The one principle enfolds and unfolds; whole presence within and without contrasts with divisible bodily magnitude. References: II.3.10, II.6.13. See Enfolding and unfolding.

**imprimere / fundare / stabilire.** Printed forms: *fundant*; *imprimatur*; *imprimitur*; *stabiliunt*.

To impress, found, or establish firmly. The first cause's trace supports other traces as its power and action support subordinate efficacy. References: II.7.32. See Impression and effacement.

**impulsus / incitamentum.** Printed forms: *impulsu*; *incitamentum*.

An impulse or prompting. Reason prompts the search for wisdom, but desire for the Good is said to precede rational prompting and to govern it. References: I.6.17, I.6.18, I.6.19. See Appetite and desire.

**impulsus / sua sponte.** Printed forms: *impulsu*; *sua sponte*.

Impulse / of its own accord. Unanimated bodies are contrasted with bodies displaying self-directed movement through soul; the latter is an image of primary self-motion. References: III.1.23. See First movable.

**in angustum / ad punctum.** Printed forms: *ad punctum*; *in angustum*.

Into a narrow compass or to a point. Concentrated heat and quality illustrate heightened efficacy through union; the comparison should not be confused with an independent geometrical point generating heat. References: I.2.11, I.2.17. See Dispersion and concentration.

**in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque.** Printed forms: *in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque*.

The printed, textually delicate phrase concerning forms and principles. The English reads forms and principles of things within bodies. The Latin is preserved without silently changing corporalibus to incorporalibus. References: III.2.29. See Spiritual union.

**in infinitum vagari / circulo revolvi.** Printed forms: *circulo revolvemur*; *in infinitum vagabimur*.

Wander without end / revolve in a circle. Regress and causal circularity are rejected as ways to account for motion through another; this differs from the positive psychic circuit. References: III.1.25. See Cause.

**inane.** Printed forms: *inane*.

Void or empty space. Imagination mistakes divine light for dimensional extension or void; neither image captures the intended pure fullness. References: II.6.13. See Imagination and deceptive clothing.

**incipio / desino.** Printed forms: *desinunt*; *incipiunt*.

To begin and end. The claim that bodily conditions scarcely persist is used to deny their full independent act of existing and acting. References: I.4.2. See Permanence and the hour test.

**inclinatio / appetitus / voluntas.** Printed forms: *appetitum*; *inclinationem*; *voluntatem*.

Inclination / appetite / will. The three terms distinguish the modes attributed to insentient nature, sensation, and intellect, not three unrelated final goods. References: II.11.29. See Appetite and desire.

**incorporeus / incorporalis / indivisibilis.** Printed forms: *incorporalis*; *incorporea*; *indivisibile*.

Nonbodily and indivisible, distinct from merely occupying a very small place. An incorporeal stable cause supports bodies; indivisible spirit’s spatial presence belongs to the authorities’ account. References: II.6.1, II.6.16, II.7.8. See Incorporeal and immaterial.

**indifferens / determino.** Printed forms: *determinetur*; *indifferens*.

Open to either alternative; to be determined toward one. Soul alternates between understanding and not understanding and is directed by a higher source always actual in that kind; this is not emotional indifference. References: I.5.10. See Intellect and intellection.

**indigentia.** Printed forms: *indigentiam*.

Need or lack of sufficiency. Human need appears in the opening existential comparison; change through need later points toward a fuller source beyond the changing thing. References: I.1.1, I.5.4. See Need and sufficiency.

**indissolubilis / dissolvo.** Printed forms: *dissolvi*; *indissolubile*.

Indissoluble, and to be dissolved. Soul’s binding office and lack of parts are used in arguments for its indissolubility; the adjective does not replace every other argument for continued existence. References: I.1.7, I.3.33. See Immortality.

**induere / involvere.** Printed forms: *induit*; *involutus*.

To clothe or wrap. Imagination clothes simple duration in temporal flux, so God is presented as though wrapped in time. References: II.5.2, II.5.3. See Imagination and deceptive clothing.

**indumentum aethereum.** Printed forms: *aethereo animae indumento*.

The soul’s ethereal garment. The promised further discussion is deferred; its claimed circulation is not established as a full doctrine within this passage alone. References: IV.2.26. See Ethereal garment.

**ineptus / agilis.** Printed forms: *agile*; *ineptum*.

Unfitted for movement; easily moved or agile. Celestial body’s readiness contrasts with earthly body’s resistance, complementing the soul’s unextended agency. References: IV.2.18. See Weariness and agility.

**iners / callere.** Printed forms: *callet*; *inertes*.

Unskilled or inactive / know thoroughly or master. The imperfect craftsperson deliberates; the accomplished one acts from settled proficiency. The contrast does not define all immediate acts as expert. References: II.13.18. See Counsel and settled skill.

**inesse / adesse / insitus.** Printed forms: *adesse*; *inesse*; *inest*; *insita*.

To be within, be present, or be implanted. Presence may concern life in an element, desire within heaven, or productive seeds in a soul; these objects specify the kind of indwelling. References: IV.1.1, IV.1.16, IV.1.34, IV.1.61. See Indwelling and presence.

**inesse / insitus.** Printed forms: *inerit*; *insint*; *insitam*; *insunt*.

To be in or inhere; implanted as a natural power. Being in a subject, co-presence without confusion, and essential power implanted in being require different contextual readings. References: II.1.3, II.4.5, II.6.14, II.8.2. See Indwelling and presence.

**inesse / praeesse.** Printed forms: *inesse*; *praeesse*.

To be present in and to preside over. The incorporeal substance is argued both to penetrate bodies and to govern their qualities; presence and causal superiority are combined. References: I.3.10. See Indwelling and presence.

**inficio / inquino.** Printed forms: *inficiente*; *inficitur*; *inquinetur*.

To taint or impair in a mixture. Material form loses simplicity, unhindered action and agility; infection is metaphorical causal language rather than a medical diagnosis. References: I.3.1, I.3.21. See Infection, lameness and Lethe.

**infinite and almost countless.** Printed forms: *paene innumeros*; *quasi innumeras*.

Almost or virtually innumerable. These qualifications describe angelic abundance without simply asserting a completed actually infinite census. References: I.5.23. See Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds.

**infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.** Printed forms: *immensae*; *immensi*; *immensum*; *infinita*; *infinitae*; *infinitam*; *infinitarum*; *infinitatem*; *infinitis*; *infinitos*; *infinitum*; *infinitus*; *innumerabilia*; *innumeras*; *innumere*; *interminabili*.

Unbounded, immeasurable, or without number, with actual infinity distinguished from indefinite capacity. The rejection of an endless dependent causal regress does not reject every potential infinity or divine actual infinity. References: II.3.9, II.4.8, II.6.6, II.10.3. See Infinity.

**influxus.** Printed forms: *influxum*.

An inflow or received influence. The soul's actual understanding is assigned to the influence of what is always actual; it is a causal metaphor rather than a physical fluid. References: I.5.10. See Communication and imparting.

**influxus / instinctus.** Printed forms: *influxibus*; *influxus*; *instinctus*.

An incoming influence or impulse from a higher cause. The common celestial impulse is treated as an instrument requiring a proximate substantial source for local generation. References: IV.1.3, IV.1.4. See Celestial influence.

**informis / informe subiectum.** Printed forms: *informe*; *informe subiectum*; *informis*.

Formless, or a formless substrate. Prime matter's equal openness to forms is contrasted with the active source that gives it different forms at different times and places. References: I.3.6. See Matter.

**informis / ornatus.** Printed forms: *informis*; *ornatum*.

Unformed / adornment or ordered array. Angel's essence is described as receptive before illumination in an explanatory order, receiving the ornament of forms and ideas. References: III.1.12. See Angel.

**infusio / infundere.** Printed forms: *infundit*; *Infusio*.

Influx or imparting / pour into. Higher activity is described as stable and immediate, while a receiver's nature explains successive results. References: III.1.31, III.1.32. See Light and illumination.

**ingenium.** Printed forms: *ingenia*; *ingenio*.

A mental disposition or native intellectual capacity. The Proem contrasts perverse dispositions resisting law with Lorenzo's praised ingenuity; the word is not uniformly a technical term for intellect. References: Proem.8, Proem.11. See Mind.

**inhaereo / sustineo.** Printed forms: *inhaeret*; *sustinet*; *sustinetur*.

To inhere; to support or be supported. Quality depends on its material subject and cannot sustain itself independently; the spatial language explains ontological reliance. References: I.3.4. See Support, inherence and dependence.

**initium / incipere / desinere.** Printed forms: *desinere*; *desivisse*; *incepisse*; *incepit*; *incepturam*; *incipere*; *inciperet*; *initium*.

Beginning and ceasing, distinct from natural or causal priority. Truth's supposed temporal limits presuppose truth before and after them; prior choices cannot regress indefinitely. References: II.5.1, II.7.18, II.8.3. See Beginning and ceasing.

**inniti / subsistere.** Printed forms: *innititur*; *subsistens*; *subsistere*; *subsistit*.

To rest upon a basis or subsist; one’s grounds of existence matter. Divine act subsists in itself; the authorities’ position rests on stated foundations; creatures subsist through a cause. References: II.4.1, II.6.2, II.6.15, II.7.10. See Through itself and through another.

**inquam / inquit.** Printed forms: *inquam*; *inquit*.

I say / he says. Inquam reinforces or clarifies the author’s assertion, whereas inquit can introduce an attributed authority’s words. Their voices should not be merged. References: II.11.37, II.11.38. See Qualification and attribution.

**inquietudo / imbecillitas.** Printed forms: *imbecillitatemque*; *inquietudinem*.

Restlessness of soul and frailty of body. These different human disadvantages help motivate the opening comparison with other living creatures and the argument for post-mortem blessedness. References: I.1.1. See Need and sufficiency.

**inquinare / contagio.** Printed forms: *contagione*; *inquinata*; *inquinatae*.

Polluting or contaminating addition. The language makes an alien differentiating nature incompatible with unqualified goodness or supreme light. References: II.1.4, II.2.6, II.2.11. See Purity and mixture.

**inscribo / opus.** Printed forms: *inscribendum*; *opus*.

To give a work its title; a work or undertaking. The title names Platonic theology and immortality, while the later repeated “this” gathers the enterprise into an authorial account of effort and divine aid. References: Proem.7, Proem.10. See Philosophy and theology.

**inserere / retrahere.** Printed forms: *inserit*; *retrahit*.

Insert or enter / withdraw. Soul enters mortal things whole and withdraws whole, supporting the claim that animation does not make its substance mortal. References: III.2.22. See Immortality.

**insinuo.** Printed forms: *insinuat*.

To enter closely or intimately into. The reflexive expression describes the soul’s participation in divine things and its blessedness, not a bodily insertion into a place. References: I.1.7. See Blessedness.

**insitus.** Printed forms: *insita*; *insitum*.

Implanted or present within. Bodily powers are said to act from a quality present within them; unity present in parts is later argued not to be divided into portions. References: I.2.8, I.3.30. See Indwelling and presence.

**instar.** Printed forms: *instar*.

Like or in the likeness of. Soul is like a point living in itself and free of position; the word prevents identifying soul literally with a geometrical point. References: III.2.18. See Point and position.

**instinctus.** Printed forms: *instinctu*.

Impulse or inclination. Natural instinct is denied as a sufficient account of divine action but positively describes soul’s inclination toward both extremes. References: II.11.10, III.2.8. See Art and nature.

**instinctus / niti.** Printed forms: *conaretur*; *instinctu*; *instinctum*; *nititur*.

An inclination or directed impulse; to strive toward. Essential, vital, and intellectual orientations are distinguished in that order before the theory infers mental presence. References: II.6.23. See Appetite and desire.

**instituo.** Printed forms: *instituta*; *institutus*.

To constitute or establish for a purpose. Sight is constituted to comprehend light and mind to perceive truth; their purpose shows dependence on the object they receive. References: I.6.8, I.6.10. See Containing, receiving and lacking.

**institutio vitae.** Printed forms: *institutio vitae*.

The ordering or formation of life. Ficino joins it with apprehension of things and happiness as depending on knowledge of God and the divinity of souls. References: Proem.6. See Philosophy and theology.

**instruere / instrumentum.** Printed forms: *instructum*; *instrumentis*.

Equip / equipment or functional instrument. The plant or animal is equipped for its characteristic works; instrumenta can include bodily organs rather than separate tools. References: II.13.16. See Providential provision.

**instrumentum.** Printed forms: *instrumenta*; *instrumentum*.

An instrument through which a higher cause acts. A fire’s present efficacy needs a superior source rather than merely the earlier local fire that may already be extinct. References: I.3.8, I.3.9, I.3.10. See Instrument.

**instrumentum / opifex.** Printed forms: *instrumenta*; *instrumentum*; *opificis*.

Instrument and craftsman or primary maker. Angel acts with received power like a tool, yet remains a genuine subordinate agent. References: II.7.24, II.9.5. See Instrument.

**instrumentum vitae.** Printed forms: *vitae alicuius instrumentum*.

The instrument of a living source. The argument from living generative instruments in organisms is extended to heaven’s generation of living things. References: IV.1.68. See Instrument.

**integer / totus / plenus.** Printed forms: *integram*; *integrum*; *plenissima*.

Whole, complete, or full rather than divided into portions. The account of presence repeatedly says the source is whole; no finite image captures the exemplar’s entire perfection. References: II.6.6, II.6.14, II.9.8, II.10.5. See Whole and parts.

**integritas / segregare.** Printed forms: *integritate*; *segregantur*; *segregatae*.

Wholeness; separation from a complete sphere. A whole element’s cosmic standing differs from that of its detached, mixed, and externally affected particles. References: IV.1.91, IV.1.93. See Purity and mixture.

**intellectus / intellectio / intelligibile.** Printed forms: *intellectio*; *intellectus*; *intelligibile*.

Intellectual capacity, its act and what is intelligible. Ficino prefers forms of naming that avoid making God a capacity perfected by an external object, while saying even these names do not apply altogether properly. References: I.6.12, I.6.13. See Intellect and intellection.

**intellectus / intelligentia / intelligere.** Printed forms: *intellectus*; *intelligentia*; *intelligere*.

Intellect or intelligence / understand. Intellectual awareness of possible effects is distinguished from effective willing; the concepts coincide in divine being without identical explanatory roles. References: II.11.11, II.11.29, II.12.8. See Intellect and intellection.

**intellectus / intelligere.** Printed forms: *intellectu*; *intellectum*; *intellectus*; *Intellectus*; *intelligantur*; *intelligere*; *intelligi*; *intelligit*; *intelliguntur*.

Intellect as knowing power or knower, and its act of understanding. God’s being and understanding are identified, while intellectual naming is qualified as causal rather than creaturely form. References: II.9.1, II.9.7, II.9.12, II.10.7. See Intellect and intellection.

**intellectus animales / animae corporales.** Printed forms: *animas corporales*; *intellectus animales*.

Ensouled intellects / bodily or embodied souls. These labels occupy successive positions in the reported eternity–time classification; animales does not mean exclusively nonhuman animals. References: III.2.5, III.2.6. See Empyrean heaven.

**intelligibilis / intelligendus / intelligens.** Printed forms: *intelligenda*; *intelligendae*; *intelligendam*; *intelligens*; *intelligibile*; *intelligibilisque*.

Understandable object, what is to be understood, or understanding subject. The grammatical differences keep being known distinct from knowing in the argument from immateriality. References: II.9.1, II.9.7, II.9.8. See Intellect and intellection.

**intendo / remitto.** Printed forms: *intenditur*; *remittatur*; *remittitur*.

To intensify and to diminish in intensity. Heat can become stronger or weaker; this alteration differs from the quantitative decrease separately discussed in the ascent. References: I.3.15, I.4.1. See Measure and degree.

**intercedere.** Printed forms: *intercedat*; *intercesserit*.

To intervene as a necessary middle. Particular thought mediates a general plan and a step just as soul mediates immutable mind and mutable body in another argument. References: IV.1.32, IV.2.14. See Degree and mediation.

**intercedere / deducere.** Printed forms: *deducit*; *intercesserit*.

To intervene as a mediator; to bring down into a lower mode. Soul receives indivisible forms and translates their operation into a mutable temporal nature before bodily division. References: IV.1.32. See Degree and mediation.

**interminatus / infinitus / finitus.** Printed forms: *finitam*; *finitas*; *infinitas*; *interminata*.

Undetermined, infinite and finite. Indeterminate dimension underlies diverse bodies; the first-principle argument separately contrasts infinite dimensions excluding other bodies with finite dimensions limiting power. References: I.2.9, I.3.32. See Infinity.

**intervallum.** Printed forms: *intervallaque*.

Interval or distance. Alternative distances between stars exemplify possibilities beyond the existing order; the passage does not claim they are actual. References: II.12.18. See Contradiction and possibility.

**intervallum / mensura.** Printed forms: *intervallis*; *intervallum*; *mensuraque*.

Interval, measure, or standard of comparison. Rank requires an ideal standard; the universal order includes proportions and intervals between unequal parts. References: II.3.4, II.3.5, II.9.21. See Measure and degree.

**intervallum / spatium.** Printed forms: *intervallum*; *spatium*.

Interval or distance between levels. Ficino promises an argument that the soul-to-first-principle interval is infinite but the soul-to-matter interval finite; this unit does not yet deliver it. References: I.5.15. See Degree and mediation.

**intervallum / tempus primum.** Printed forms: *intervallum*; *tempus primum*.

The interval of a course; first time. The lower productive course is first motion, and its interval gives the measure followed by the world's times. References: IV.2.12. See Eternity and time.

**intimus / communis.** Printed forms: *communis*; *intimus*.

Inward / shared or general. Inward motion extending throughout a living body supplies the sign of life, and primary motion grounds life's strongest possession. References: III.2.23, III.2.24. See Life.

**intrinsecus / extrinsecus.** Printed forms: *extrinseca*; *extrinsecum*; *extrinsecus*; *intrinseca*; *intrinsecos*; *intrinsecum*; *intrinsecus*.

Inward and outward. Ficino distinguishes life as inward operation from temporal outward work; the shared temporal dispersion does not erase the distinction. References: I.5.2. See Act and operation.

Inward or outward in relation to a thing's own perfection and spread. In the reported account, enduring always is inward and superior to the outward achievement of presence everywhere. References: II.6.19, II.6.20. See Perfection.

From outside / from within. God's government acts inwardly in things he made, unlike an artisan working upon alien matter from outside. References: II.13.12. See Indwelling and presence.

**intuitus / intueri / conspicere.** Printed forms: *cernere*; *cernit*; *conspicit*; *contuetur*; *inspicit*; *intuendo*; *intuetur*; *intuitu*.

Gaze or beholding, transferred from vision to unified understanding. The visual vocabulary marks one comprehensive act, with qualifications that distinguish it from bodily sight. References: II.9.20, II.9.21, II.10.5, II.10.10. See Eye and gaze.

**intus / intro / extra / ultra / superne / undique.** Printed forms: *extra*; *intro*; *intus*.

Within, beyond, from above, or on every side, applied to spatial and causal relations. The text denies that divine cognition must look outside itself while divine presence reaches beyond the corporeal world. References: II.2.4, II.6.6, II.6.13, II.9.15. See Omnipresence and place.

**intus / intro / intimus.** Printed forms: *intima*; *intro*; *intus*.

Within, inward, or most inward. The substantial agent must be inwardly present, and celestial motion is inferred to arise from intimate life. References: IV.1.5, IV.1.84. See Proximity and causal presence.

**invenire-related reperire.** Printed forms: *reperit*; *reperitur*.

To find or encounter. Time is encountered before place in the explanatory descent; body nowhere finds its directing soul idle in the later motion-image. References: IV.2.8, IV.2.26. See Eternity and time.

**invidere.** Printed forms: *invidet*; *invidit*.

Begrudge or withhold from envy. Having given existence, God is said not to begrudge gifts of well-being; envy is excluded from creative care. References: II.13.11. See Care and custody.

**Ioannes / Amelius.** Printed forms: *Amelius*; *Ioannis*.

John the apostle and Amelius, named as theological authority and Platonist recipient. Ficino aligns principle, reason, and love with unity, truth, and goodness without supplying an external history of transmission. References: II.3.10. See John and Amelius.

**ipsum semper.** Printed forms: *ipsum semper*.

The adverb always treated as the name of duration itself. God is identified with the very always, not merely with an item lasting for all temporal moments. References: II.5.4. See Always and everywhere.

**irrationalis.** Printed forms: *irrationales*; *irrationalisque*.

Without rational cognition in the specified comparison. Lower creatures and blind appetites are contrasted with the rational souls and desires assigned to higher spheres. References: IV.1.39, IV.1.62. See Reason and account.

**irrationalis anima.** Printed forms: *irrationalis anima*.

Irrational soul, accompanying rational soul in a comparison. It accompanies the higher soul as a shadow accompanies a body; the apparatus explains the Latin’s elliptical comparison without making the two souls identical. References: I.3.33. See Soul.

**iter / passus.** Printed forms: *iter*; *passum*; *passus*.

Whole journey; individual step. A general plan of a route does not yield a particular step until a particular cognition marks it out. References: IV.2.13, IV.2.14. See Euclid and the lantern.

**iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari.** Printed forms: *iudicamus*; *iudicari*; *nescit*; *nosse*; *notitiam*; *percipiat*; *speculatur*.

To judge, perceive, know, or contemplate, with local faculties distinguished. The color-source analogy imagines light perceiving itself, while divine contemplation is one act rather than enumeration. References: II.3.4, II.4.8, II.9.16, II.9.20, II.10.10, II.10.12. See Intellect and intellection.

**iudicium / censere.** Printed forms: *censuerit*; *iudicet*; *iudicium*.

Judgment / deem or assess. Soul compares proposed actions, judges one better, and chooses what seems apt for the good; necessity of the general end leaves this judgment free. References: II.13.30. See Choice and free judgment.

**iudicium / perdo.** Printed forms: *iudicium*; *perditur*.

Judgement and its loss or impairment. Distance impairs judgement of a wall’s quantity sooner than perception of colour and light, supporting quality’s perceptual priority in the argument. References: I.2.13. See Sense and imagination.

**iudico.** Printed forms: *iudicabit*; *iudicant*; *iudicavi*.

To judge or assess. The dedication is an authorial judgement, the wall example a perceptual assessment, and the final chapter an assessment of what is good for oneself; these are different objects of one family. References: Proem.11, I.2.13, I.6.18. See Reason and account.

**Iupiter.** Printed forms: *Iupiter*.

Jupiter, the divine name in an attributed Orphic saying. Ficino glosses the saying as the form of all things, using it within his argument about divine causal containment. References: II.11.1. See God.

**Iuppiter / oculus.** Printed forms: *Iovis*; *oculi*; *oculus*.

Jove and the eye-image used for comprehensive cognition. The attributed perfect and infinite eyes complement the example of one glance seeing many stars. References: II.9.18, II.9.19, II.9.21, II.10.7. See Eye and gaze.

**labi.** Printed forms: *labatur*.

Slip or fall away. The operation most fitting to God must not cause departure from stability or simplicity. References: II.11.14. See Motion and stability.

**labor / transgressio.** Printed forms: *labor*; *transgressioque*.

Toil; passing beyond bounds. The closing argument requires a stable principal origin and end so celestial motion does not terminate in these defects. References: IV.2.27. See Weariness and agility.

**lapis / paries / congeries.** Printed forms: *congeriem*; *lapides*; *parietibus*.

Stone / wall / heap. Unplanned stone-handling is said to yield a useless heap, whereas an ordered building requires coordinated walls. References: II.13.15, II.13.16. See Architect, house and decoration.

**largitio.** Printed forms: *largitio*.

Bounty or giving forth. The bounty of goodness extends farther than form’s reach because matter is receptive to good and needed by the good world. References: I.6.14. See Communication and imparting.

**lateo.** Printed forms: *lateat*; *latens*.

To be hidden or escape notice. Truth above mind is said not to be hidden from itself, preserving self-awareness without positing a distinct eye within God. References: I.6.12. See Truth.

**latere / exponere.** Printed forms: *exposita*; *latent*.

To lie hidden and to be open or disposed to receive. The incipient forms in matter are described as hidden seeds, while matter is open to good; its receptive goodness is qualified rather than full formal perfection. References: I.6.14. See Seeds.

**latere / informis.** Printed forms: *informis*; *lateat*.

To lie hidden; formless in itself. The reported one underlying matter supports a further argument for one soul; ut plerique disputant preserves its attribution. References: IV.1.81. See Matter.

**laterna.** Printed forms: *laterna*; *laternam*.

Lantern. It reveals successive steps in the human example and supplies a comparison for the motive power presenting successive seed-kinds. References: IV.2.13, IV.2.14. See Euclid and the lantern.

**Laurenti / magnanimus.** Printed forms: *Laurenti*; *magnanime*.

Lorenzo in direct address, praised as magnanimous. The vocative marks the Proem's dedicatee and its encomiastic tone; it is not a philosophical definition of magnanimity. References: Proem.1, Proem.11. See Lorenzo, dedication and public authority.

**leges / respublica / regnum / Critias (titles).** Printed forms: *Critia*; *Legibus*; *Legum*; *regno*; *republica*.

Dialogue titles cited through Latin words for laws, republic, rule, and Critias. Ficino cites these works in arguing that providence preserves free judgment; the titles must be read as citations rather than ordinary political nouns here. References: II.13.24, III.1.26. See Philosophy and theology.

**lego / diligentia.** Printed forms: *diligenter*; *diligentissime*; *legerit*.

To read, with the greatest care or attentively. The promised benefits of reading Plato are conditional on careful reading, while inquiry traces God diligently; the adverbs describe attentive engagement, not a new faculty. References: Proem.4, Proem.5. See Philosophy and theology.

**Letheus / mergo.** Printed forms: *Letheo flumine*; *mergitur*.

The Lethean river and being plunged into it. Quality's scattering through matter is compared, with quasi, to immersion in Lethe; the simile marks impaired power rather than a physical cosmological river. References: I.3.21. See Infection, lameness and Lethe.

**levitas / gravitas.** Printed forms: *gravitatis*; *levitatis*.

Lightness and heaviness as directed tendencies. The spark rises and wood falls in the examples; these are Ficino's inherited physical explanations, not modern definitions of mass or gravity. References: I.2.2. See Natural motion and natural place.

**lex.** Printed forms: *lege*; *lex*.

A law or ordering rule. The immutable superior directs regular motion; the law of fate is located more specifically in the succession of productive seeds. References: IV.1.28, IV.2.16. See Fate.

**lex divina.** Printed forms: *divina lex*; *divinae legis*.

Divine law as an authority and standard of approval. Ficino distinguishes resistance to its authority from assent through supporting philosophical reasons, then subjects his own approval to it. References: Proem.8, Proem.10. See Assent, approval and belief.

**liber / liberior.** Printed forms: *libera*; *liberam*; *liberiorem*.

Free or less constrained, with the freedom specified by context. Substantial form is free from remission, qualities cannot produce freer offspring than themselves, and pure mind is free from force and ignorance; these are different constraints. References: I.3.15, I.3.18, I.6.17. See Freedom and necessity.

**liber / libertas.** Printed forms: *Liber*; *Libertas*; *libertas*.

Free / freedom. Freedom is linked with living as one wills; God’s necessary willing of good is distinguished from external constraint. References: II.12.3, II.12.4. See Freedom and necessity.

**libera voluntate disponere.** Printed forms: *libera voluntate disponens*.

Dispose or arrange by free will. Mastery of production includes the choice of effects, rather than necessary simultaneous production of all intelligible possibilities. References: II.11.38. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**lignum / acutus / latus.** Printed forms: *acutum*; *latum*; *lignum*.

Wood, pointed, and broad. A pointed piece of wood is said to fall faster than a broad one; the example isolates shape within Ficino’s case about resistance and motion. References: I.2.2. See Body and bulk.

**linea / longum / latum / profundum.** Printed forms: *latum*; *linea*; *lineae*; *linearum*; *longum*; *profundum*.

Line and the three dimensions, or rays from a center in an analogy. Spatial lines can misrepresent divinity, while a center and lines can clarify dependence if kept analogical. References: II.6.13, II.6.17, II.8.5. See Quantity and dimension.

**locare / regio / localis.** Printed forms: *localem*; *Localis*; *locatur*; *regionem*.

To place; region; local or spatial. A higher supposed source is placed above truth in rank, while particular regions localize manifest operations in the mind theory. References: II.1.3, II.6.19, II.6.24. See Omnipresence and place.

**locus / situs / spatium.** Printed forms: *loci*; *situ*; *situs*; *spatii*; *spatium*.

Place, position, and spatial range, respectively. The world’s finite position attains divine presence only finitely; God is not an occupant bounded by place. References: II.6.4, II.6.14, II.6.16. See Omnipresence and place.

**locus / spatium.** Printed forms: *locum*; *locus*; *spatio*.

Place and intervening space. Bodies occupy place to the exclusion of another body, and separation between agent and patient delays action; these are distinct roles of spatiality. References: I.2.2, I.2.4. See Omnipresence and place.

**longius operatur.** Printed forms: *longius operatur*.

Acts farther or over a wider range. The compact maxim links greater causal power with wider scope; it is not a measurement in units of distance. References: I.6.15. See Cause.

**longum / latum / profundum.** Printed forms: *latum*; *longum*; *profundum*.

Length, breadth and depth as dimensions. Three-dimensional extension belongs to body by nature; some qualities of points, numbers or powers are offered as unextended counterexamples. References: I.2.16. See Quantity and dimension.

**loqui.** Printed forms: *loquente*; *loquitur*.

To speak. The co-presence of speaker and word illustrates the theory’s claim that mind is present wherever God is. References: II.6.20, II.6.21. See Word and meaning.

**lucidus / obscurus.** Printed forms: *lucida*; *obscura*; *obscurus*.

Luminous or clear, and dark or obscure. The Magi's riddle is mapped first onto stars, air and moon, then mind, irrational soul and rational soul; the mapping is Ficino's interpretation. References: I.5.14. See Light and illumination.

**Lucretius / taceat.** Printed forms: *Lucreti*; *Lucretius*; *Taceat*.

Lucretius / let him be silent. The named Epicurean becomes the addressee of Ficino's polemic, not a participant in a reported historical conversation. References: II.13.14, II.13.15. See Lucretius.

**luna / sol / stella.** Printed forms: *luna*; *sole*; *stella*.

Moon, sun and star. Changing lunar reception models rational soul, while uniformly shining stars model angels; these are cosmological analogies of intellectual reception. References: I.5.14. See Light and illumination.

**lutum / fimus / rana / musca.** Printed forms: *fimi*; *fimo*; *luto*; *muscae*; *ranae*.

Mud, dung, frogs and flies in alleged natural generation. Ficino's examples of organisms arising from nonliving material support a living seminal source; they are historical natural lore, not current biology. References: I.3.22. See Generation and corruption.

**lux / lumen.** Printed forms: *luceat*; *luces*; *lumen*; *lumine*; *lux*; *Lux*.

Light, sensible in examples and intelligible or divine by analogy. Pure light, diffused light, colored radiance, and self-knowing light illustrate different relations and should not be merged. References: II.2.5, II.6.11, II.7.31, II.10.12. See Light and illumination.

**lux / lumen / illuminare.** Printed forms: *illustratur*; *lumen*; *luminis*.

Light / radiance / illuminate. Angelic intelligence is described as received illumination, and differing reception of light models psychic succession. References: III.1.12, III.1.32. See Light and illumination.

**lux se ipsa videns.** Printed forms: *lux se ipsa videns*; *visus se ipso lucens*.

Light seeing itself and sight shining by itself. The reciprocity deliberately exceeds the created eye/light distinction; it does not describe an additional physical organ of divine sight. References: I.6.12. See Light and illumination.

**machina / praesideo.** Printed forms: *machinae*; *praesidet*.

A structured mechanism or fabric; to preside over. The soul's excellence is linked to governance of the world's mechanism, while blessedness is linked to its intimacy with divine things. References: I.1.7. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**machina / tela / retexere.** Printed forms: *machina*; *machinae*; *machinam*; *retexit*; *telam*.

Organized fabric; a woven web; to weave again. Repeated cosmic order is likened to renewed weaving, while bodily fabric is later distinguished from all reality. References: II.2.2, II.2.9, II.4.7, II.6.13. See Weaving and world fabric.

**machinatio / machinari.** Printed forms: *machinationem*; *machinatur*.

The mind's devising or ranging conception. The reach of thought enters the argument that its source cannot be absent from the immensity it conceives. References: II.6.6, II.6.22. See Mind.

**Magi / aenigma.** Printed forms: *enigma*; *Magorum*.

The Magi and a riddle attributed to them. The riddle supplies three light-conditions, which Ficino interprets as bodily and spiritual grades; the passage does not independently establish the saying’s provenance. References: I.5.14. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi.

**magis / minus / minime.** Printed forms: *magis*; *minime*; *minimum*; *minus*.

More, less, least. These relative degrees generate different rankings of the same three faculties, rather than new faculties. References: IV.1.45, IV.1.46. See Reason anger and desire.

**magnes / ferrum.** Printed forms: *ferrum*; *magnes*; *magnetem*.

Magnet and iron. Attraction illustrates the sphere’s recall of parts and how an unseen mover can be mistaken for bodily self-motion. References: IV.1.74. See Hidden mover and magnet.

**magnum / magnitudo / maior.** Printed forms: *magnitudinem*; *Magnum*; *magnumque*; *maiorem*.

Greatness or greater extent, power, or perfection depending on context. True greatness is contrasted with bodily magnitude divisible into small parts; no quantitative size is assigned to God. References: II.1.4, II.6.13, II.10.5. See Quantity and dimension.

**maiestas / indignus.** Printed forms: *indignam*; *maiestate*.

Majesty and what is deemed unworthy of it. Ficino reports and rejects the objection that knowledge of the basest things compromises divine dignity. References: II.9.20. See Precious and lowly.

**maior range of causal giving.** Printed forms: *superat*; *tendit*.

To surpass and to extend or reach. Mind’s order exceeds life’s range, and goodness exceeds form’s range; the hierarchy is argued through wider scope of effects. References: I.6.14. See Good and goodness.

**malum.** Printed forms: *mali*; *malo*; *malorum*; *malum*.

Evil or badness, here tested as a supposed unrestricted first source. The absolute evil hypothesis collapses because causal efficacy, cognition, life, and being are themselves goods. References: II.1.4, II.1.5, II.2.15. See Good and goodness.

**manare / emanare.** Printed forms: *emanabit*; *manantis*; *manantium*; *manaverint*.

To flow from or emanate, as a metaphor of derived existence. Effects flow from another and continue to depend on their origin rather than becoming self-sustaining. References: II.1.2, II.3.7, II.3.8, II.7.23. See Spring and flow.

**manere / exsuperare.** Printed forms: *exsuperet*; *manet*.

To remain, and to prevail, respectively. Pure things remain themselves; the alternating victory of rival divine efforts would imply mutable gods. References: II.1.1, II.2.14. See Motion and stability.

**manere / permanere / remanere.** Printed forms: *permanet*; *remanens*.

Remain or continue. Angel remains full through received goodness, while soul remains whole during its presence in divided body. References: III.1.7, III.2.12. See Staying and preserving.

**manere in agente.** Printed forms: *in agente manent*.

Remaining in the agent, as contrasted with passing into external matter. Cognition and appetite perfect the agent; this distinction helps explain the identity of divine essence and operation. References: II.9.5. See Act and operation.

**Manichaei / Gnostici.** Printed forms: *Gnosticisque*; *Manichaeis*.

The groups to whom Ficino attributes opposed good and evil divine principles. These are local polemical identifications, not comprehensive or independently verified definitions of the traditions. References: II.2.14. See Manichaeans and Gnostic philosophers.

**materia.** Printed forms: *materia*; *materiae*; *materiam*.

Receptive matter, with primary matter produced without a prior material subject. Its unlimited receptivity is a potential infinity, distinct from pure nothing and from active divine infinity. References: II.4.6, II.6.2, II.10.3. See Matter.

Matter, the receptive subject. The craftsman and father use received material; the creator is said to produce both matter and form. References: II.13.2. See Matter.

**materia / quantitas.** Printed forms: *materia*; *Quantitas*; *quantitate*.

Matter and quantity as constituents of body. Quantity is considered either matter’s extension or something making matter susceptible to division; the opening deliberately allows these alternative analyses. References: I.2.1. See Matter.

**materia aliena / propria.** Printed forms: *materia propria*; *materiam alienam*.

Other matter and one’s own underlying matter. Quantity and quality are compared by whether they act on their own subject, another subject, both or neither; aliena does not mean morally alien. References: I.2.10, I.3.19. See Quality.

**mathematicus / metaphysicus.** Printed forms: *mathematicas*; *metaphysicas*.

Mathematical and metaphysical forms. The distinction is drawn through dependence on indeterminate matter or on no matter, within a mental ascent beyond determinate natural forms. References: I.3.12. See Point, position and mathematical ascent.

**medium.** Printed forms: *media*; *medio*; *mediorum*.

An intervening medium or means. Natural diversity can depend on media; God’s production of first matter and minds is said to require neither medium nor subject. References: II.11.9. See Cause.

**medium / interpono.** Printed forms: *interponendus*; *Media*; *medium*.

An intermediary; to place between. Ficino tests whether intervening bodies could carry celestial causation to a local fire; he judges them unsuitable within the particular argument. References: I.3.9. See Degree and mediation.

**medium / particularis.** Printed forms: *medias*; *medius*; *particulari*; *particularis*; *particulas*.

Intermediate; particular; a small part. Intermediate causes differ from the universal source, while particles belong to the argument about corporeal divisibility. References: II.3.9, II.6.2, II.6.13, II.9.14. See Degree and mediation.

**medium competens.** Printed forms: *medium competens*.

An intermediary suitable in the relevant respects. Earth’s universal soul combines the earthly character of the effect with the universality of the higher impulse. References: IV.1.7. See Degree and mediation.

**mel / guttula.** Printed forms: *guttula*; *mellis*.

Honey and a small drop. Each drop’s simultaneous colour, taste and smell is offered as evidence that several qualities can coexist where two bodies cannot. References: I.2.15. See Honey, whiteness and the wall.

**melior / melius.** Printed forms: *melior*; *meliorem*; *meliores*; *meliori*; *Melius*; *melius*.

Better, with comparison grounded locally in greater goodness. The soul’s superiority to body and the alleged better gift require a standard of comparison. References: II.1.6, II.3.4, II.3.6, II.7.5. See Surpassing and comparison.

**membra / lignum / aer.** Printed forms: *aere*; *ligno*; *membra*.

Members or limbs, wood, and air in concrete examples. World-members form one body; fire is present to kindled wood; images of colors coexist in air in the reported theory. References: II.2.8, II.6.2, II.6.14. See Whole and parts.

**membrum / vicem gerere.** Printed forms: *membro*; *vicem formae gerebat*.

A member, and playing the role of form. The body-like language belongs to the rejected composite hypothesis; it does not assert that God actually has organs. References: I.6.6. See Simplicity and composition.

**memorare / respondere / docere.** Printed forms: *disseremus*; *Memento*; *meminisse*; *respondemus*; *respondere*.

To remind, answer, teach, or explain further. These verbs mark the exposition’s argumentative tasks and postponed elaborations rather than new metaphysical entities. References: II.4.5, II.7.14, II.8.1, II.9.22, II.10.8. See Reason and account.

**mens.** Printed forms: *Mens*; *mentem*; *menti*.

Mind as intellectual subject or power, with human, angelic, and animating uses. Universal mental presence belongs to a framed attribution; angel is properly mind while God is above the genus. References: II.6.14, II.6.22, II.9.12. See Mind.

Mind. Mind’s willing and knowing are distinguished explanatorily; the second mind receives formation rather than being the first source. References: II.11.30, III.1.12. See Mind.

**mens angelica.** Printed forms: *mentem angelicam*.

Angelic mind, distinguished from rational soul. Its announced indivisibility and immutability are later qualified by its difference from divine simplicity and by explicit Platonist attribution. References: I.1.5. See Angel.

**mens mentium / lumen luminum.** Printed forms: *lumenque luminum*; *mens sit mentium*.

Mind of minds and light of lights. The genitives mark the source of the perfections rather than ordinary membership in the class of minds or lights. References: II.9.13. See Naming by cause.

**mens secunda.** Printed forms: *menti praebuit secundae*.

Second mind. The Latin gloss of the attributed Zoroastrian saying concerns angel's received intellectual formation below God. References: III.1.12. See Second mind.

**Mercurius Trismegistus / Timaeus.** Printed forms: *Mercurius Trismegistus*; *Timaeusque*.

The named authorities for formless matter. Ficino reports them as treating matter as not nothing but next to nothing; this is the attribution in his account. References: I.3.19. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi.

**Mercurius — Hermetic authority.** Printed forms: *Mercurium Trismegistrum*; *Mercurius*.

Mercury Trismegistus as an attributed authority. Ficino cites divine will as the beginning of creatures and providence as humankind's nurse; this name is distinct from the planet in III.1.32. References: II.11.38, II.13.24. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi.

**Mercurius — planet.** Printed forms: *Mercurium*; *Mercurius*.

Mercury as celestial receiver of sunlight. Here Mercury signifies angel; the name does not designate the Hermetic author cited elsewhere. References: III.1.32. See Sun, Mercury and moon.

**mereri / aequalitatem recuperare.** Printed forms: *aequalitatem*; *merentur*; *recuperent*.

To merit or be fitted for; recover balanced condition. Separated particles lose receptivity, while careful mixture can recover a balance preparing for life, sense, and reason. References: IV.1.93. See Purity and mixture.

**merus / incorruptus / revera.** Printed forms: *incorrupta*; *merae*; *revera*; *veraque*; *verumque*.

Unmixed, uncorrupted, or genuinely real in different constructions. A true thing genuinely is what it is said to be; an artwork's uncorrupted endurance still depends on material solidity. References: II.1.1, II.2.4, II.7.3, II.7.17. See Purity and mixture.

**merus / verus / perfectus.** Printed forms: *mera*; *perfecta*; *vera*.

Pure, true and complete or perfect. The first form must meet all three descriptions; separate arguments address purity, truth and completeness rather than treating the adjectives as synonyms. References: I.3.1, I.3.2, I.3.3. See Perfection.

**Metrodorus / Zoroaster.** Printed forms: *Metrodorus*; *Zoroaster*.

Authorities named for the coral claim. Ficino invokes their testimony; the record does not independently verify either the attribution or the alleged effects. References: IV.1.21. See Hierobotanum and mineral powers.

**metus / persuasio.** Printed forms: *metum*; *persuasionem*.

Fear / persuasion. The attributed Zoroastrian saying rejects the instilling of fear in favor of persuasion. References: II.13.27. See Persuasion and compulsion.

**migrare / transire.** Printed forms: *migrant*; *migrat*; *transeunt*; *transire*; *transit*.

To pass or move between states, or to traverse a sequence. Bodies pass between being-states; an endless chain cannot be traversed before action; immanent operation does not pass into external matter. References: II.7.7, II.8.3, II.9.5. See Act and operation.

Migrate or pass into. Soul passes into particular things without abandoning the others; the verbs describe communicative range rather than spatial relocation alone. References: III.2.23. See Indwelling and presence.

**minister / architectus.** Printed forms: *architectum*; *architectus*; *minister*.

Servant or subordinate worker / architect. The contrast represents particular natural efficacy subordinated to the universal direction of intellectual nature. References: II.11.14. See Architect, house and decoration.

**minister / assisto.** Printed forms: *assistebant*; *ministrabant*.

To minister or serve, and to stand in attendance. The quoted prophetic multitude supports angelic abundance through the image of service to a ruler. References: I.5.27. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**minuo / debilito.** Printed forms: *debilitat*; *debilitetur*; *minui*; *minuitur*.

To diminish or weaken. Dispersion weakens bodily power; the proposed incorporeal substance cannot be diminished through partition, which supports its superiority. References: I.2.2, I.3.15, I.3.33. See Dispersion and concentration.

**miraculum.** Printed forms: *miraculum*.

Wonder or extraordinary marvel. Soul’s simultaneous mediating powers make it the greatest wonder in nature in Ficino’s exposition, not a separately narrated supernatural event. References: III.2.22. See Soul.

**mirari / mirabilis.** Printed forms: *miraberis*; *mirabilem*; *mirabiles*.

To wonder; remarkable or wondrous. A rhetorical challenge reduces surprise at celestial souls’ efficacy, while wondrous bodily actions function as premises within Ficino’s historical account. References: IV.1.19, IV.1.72, IV.2.19. See Seeming and evidence.

**mirus / mirabilis / mirabiliter.** Printed forms: *mirabiliter*; *mirabilius*; *miro*.

Wonderful or marvellous; wonderfully or marvellously, with comparative mirabilius meaning more marvellous. Lorenzo’s ability, heaven’s efficacy and digestion are praised in different registers; admiration marks rhetorical force rather than supplying an additional proof. References: Proem.11, I.2.5, I.3.23. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**mobilis multitudo / immobilis multitudo.** Printed forms: *immobilis multitudo*; *mobilis multitudo*.

Mobile multiplicity and immobile multiplicity. Soul and angel share multiplicity but differ in mobility; this intermediate relation leaves divine immobile unity above both. References: I.6.1, I.6.2, I.6.3. See Unity and multiplicity.

**modus.** Printed forms: *modique*; *modum*; *modus*.

Manner, mode, or measure. Foreknowledge includes how an act happens, so a known free action is not stripped of its free mode. References: II.13.25. See Foreknowledge.

**modus / modo.** Printed forms: *modo*; *modus*.

Mode, way, or manner; adverbial modo may instead mean only or at one time. Modes of being distinguish things; divine understanding has a mode above created intelligence. References: II.7.8, II.9.13, II.10.5. See Being.

**modus unitatis.** Printed forms: *modis*; *modum unitatis*.

A way or mode of being one. Essence, point, and moment are three specified respects of unity; soul loses one mode while retaining two. This is explanatory differentiation rather than three physical parts of unity. References: IV.2.5, IV.2.7. See Whole and parts.

**moles / piger.** Printed forms: *molem*; *moles*; *pigram*; *pigrius*.

Bulk or mass; sluggish in its own nature. Bulk is the passive and dispersive aspect of body, not a denial that qualified bodies have observable effects. References: I.1.3, I.2.2. See Body and bulk.

**molior / perficio.** Printed forms: *moliti*; *perfecerimus*.

To undertake with effort, and to bring to completion. Ficino distinguishes his laborious undertaking from the hope that it has been completed truthfully; effort alone is not offered as a guarantee of truth. References: Proem.10. See Philosophy and theology.

**momentum.** Printed forms: *momento*.

Movement, instant, or moment according to context. In the mechanism it is one ball’s motion; in the light analogy it expresses immediate reception as opposed to elapsed time. References: II.13.14, III.1.32. See Florentine mechanism.

**momentum / signum.** Printed forms: *momentum*; *signum*.

An instant and, in geometry, a point. They are limiting items for motion/time and dimensions respectively in an analogy of kinds reduced to indivisible principles. References: I.3.14. See Point, position and mathematical ascent.

**mora / transgressio / retractatio.** Printed forms: *mora*; *retractatio*; *transgressio*.

Delay / deviation / reconsideration. Their asserted absence in the work supports the denial of uncertainty in its maker. References: II.13.18. See Counsel and settled skill.

**more Platonico.** Printed forms: *more Platonico*.

In Platonic usage or manner. Ficino expressly marks his convention of calling every form divided in body a quality, rather than claiming a single universal dictionary definition. References: I.3.1. See Naming and defining.

**mores.** Printed forms: *moribus*.

Character or conduct. Soul’s self-painting includes character and action alongside contemplation; the metaphor has an ethical as well as intellectual role. References: III.1.31. See Self knowledge.

**mores / morale.** Printed forms: *morale*; *mores*.

Conduct and inquiry concerned with conduct. Ethical philosophy prepares soul for illumination; the later list places moral study alongside dialectical, mathematical and natural inquiry, all directed toward worship in Ficino’s account. References: Proem.2, Proem.3. See Philosophy and theology.

**mors / resolutio.** Printed forms: *mors*; *resolutione*.

Death and dissolution. Ficino contrasts life’s indivisible unifying power with death through division and dissolution; the inference is part of his metaphysics of life. References: I.3.22. See Life.

**mortalis / immortalis.** Printed forms: *immortalis*; *immortalitatem*; *mortalia*.

Mortal and immortal; immortality as the inquiry’s object. The opening promises to make immortality visible to mind; the third essence is later judged immortal through independence from dissoluble parts and material support. References: I.1.3, I.3.33. See Immortality.

**motor / motum.** Printed forms: *moto*; *motor*; *Motor*; *motorem*.

A mover and what it moves. A soul moves with the body it transports, whereas angels are proposed as movers not moved with it; the distinction supports the hierarchy of stable direction. References: I.5.18, I.5.19. See Motion and stability.

**motus / motio / motor / mutare.** Printed forms: *mobilibus*; *motoris*; *Motus*; *motus*; *mutantur*.

Motion, mover, and change, whether local, qualitative, or operational. Higher bodies change modes of being; divine cognition does not acquire the successive changes of creaturely operation. References: II.4.7, II.7.8, II.9.5. See Motion and stability.

**motus / motio / operatio.** Printed forms: *Motio*; *motus*; *Motus*; *operationis*.

Motion or change / operation. The painter example defines motion through temporal succession, while immediate efficacious presentation remains an act. References: III.1.28, III.1.31. See Motion and stability.

**motus aeternus.** Printed forms: *motum appellant aeternum*.

Ordered motion completed without temporal succession. Ficino distinguishes action through intermediaries in one moment from temporally extended motion. References: IV.2.11. See Eternity and time.

**movere / moveri.** Printed forms: *movere*; *moveri*.

To move something and to be moved. Ficino distinguishes action from passion and argues that the prior action can exist apart from the passion, supporting unmoved movers. References: I.5.19. See Affection and passivity.

**movere / sistere / firmare.** Printed forms: *firmant*; *firmatur*; *firmiterque*; *moveat*; *movetur*; *sistat*.

To move, still, or make firm. A first source and final end both activate and settle desire; firmitas also describes stable knowing and causal support. References: II.3.9, II.4.7, II.7.32. See Motion and stability.

**multa et unum / unum et multa / unum multa.** Printed forms: *multa et unum*; *unum et multa*; *unum multa*.

Many and one / one and many / one-many. Word order and the omission of et distinguish quality, soul, and angel; these are graded formulas, not interchangeable plurals. References: III.1.2. See Unity and multiplicity.

**multiplex / compositus.** Printed forms: *compositusque*; *multiplex*.

Manifold / composed. Distinct essential or accidental forms would make God more composite, contrary to the simplicity the argument requires. References: II.11.2. See Simplicity and composition.

**multitudo / multiplex.** Printed forms: *multiplex*; *multiplicem*; *multitudinem*; *multitudo*.

Multiplicity or manifoldness, spatial or intelligible according to context. Infinite known plurality is compatible in the argument with simplicity of divine essence and one act. References: II.1.3, II.2.7, II.7.1, II.10.10. See Unity and multiplicity.

**multitudo infinita.** Printed forms: *Infinitam multitudinem*; *multitudine infinita*.

Infinite multiplicity. Ficino reports the Pythagorean description of body as endlessly divisible and contrasts it with infinite active unity. References: I.2.7. See Unity and multiplicity.

**mundi series / vultus omnium.** Printed forms: *mundi series*; *vultus omnium*.

World's chain / countenance of all things. These titles express soul's universal connecting and manifesting role, not extra entities added to the five ranks. References: III.2.23. See Bond knot and chain.

**mundus / universum.** Printed forms: *mundanae*; *mundi*; *mundo*; *mundum*; *universam*; *universi*; *universum*; *universus*.

World and universe as an ordered whole. The human mind is a part of the universe, so Ficino reasons that the whole cannot lack the perfection exemplified by its part; the inference is metaphysical rather than a measurement of cosmic intelligence. References: I.3.2, I.3.13. See World and universe.

World or universe as an ordered whole, distinguished from its unrestricted divine source. The world is not coextensive with divine presence; preservation is argued whether this whole always existed or began. References: II.2.8, II.6.13, II.7.18. See World and universe.

World / universe or universal whole. The good and order of the whole are distinguished from one component's isolated apparent advantage. References: II.12.19, II.13.23. See World and universe.

**munus.** Printed forms: *munera*; *munere*; *munus*.

A gift bestowed or an office performed, according to construction. A higher cause's gift is tested for superiority; God's common office corresponds to the common effect being. References: II.1.5, II.1.6, II.3.9, II.7.6. See Communication and imparting.

**munus / donum.** Printed forms: *dona*; *munus*.

Gift or bestowed benefit. The gift of being and gifts that enable well-being are differentiated without separating their divine source. References: II.13.11. See Care and custody.

**munus / imago / exemplar.** Printed forms: *exemplaria*; *imagines*; *munera*.

Gift, image, and productive exemplar. Soul holds received likenesses of higher beings and formative powers for lower ones, expressing its middle position. References: IV.2.10. See Image and likeness.

**munus / ordinatio.** Printed forms: *munus*; *Ordinatio*.

An office or function, and ordering. Mind's function of ordering through forms reaches nonliving things, but its stated boundary leaves formless matter outside that function's scope. References: I.6.14. See Order and harmony.

**musca.** Printed forms: *muscarum*; *muscas*.

Fly. The principle of flies differs from the principle of vines, making causal specificity concrete. References: IV.1.9. See Contraction and determination.

**mutare / mutatio.** Printed forms: *mutabitur*; *mutationem*; *mutatur*.

Change / alteration. Soul changes in operation while its substance is said to persist; bodily quality changes in both respects. References: III.1.15, III.1.16, III.1.17. See Motion and stability.

**mutatis paucis.** Printed forms: *mutatis paucis*.

“With a few things changed,” a qualifying ablative phrase. The reported possibility of Platonists becoming Christians is qualified rather than unconditional, and the passage does not enumerate the changes. References: Proem.6. See Augustine and Christian proximity.

**mutua offensio.** Printed forms: *mutua offensione*.

Mutual obstruction or interference. Two bodies cannot coexist in one place without obstruction; the contrast concerns bodily occupation, not disagreement or moral offence. References: I.2.15. See Body and bulk.

**mutuare / mutuari.** Printed forms: *mutuant*; *mutuarentque*; *mutuarentur*; *mutuari*.

To exchange or borrow. Cosmic parts exchange natures; God is said to need no loan of matter to produce a whole effect. References: II.2.9, II.7.21. See Borrowing and assistance.

Give or lend / receive or borrow. The paired forms depict opposed members of the world exchanging natures and motions in both directions. References: II.13.4. See Exchange and reconciliation.

**mutuus / invicem.** Printed forms: *invicem*; *mutua*; *mutuo*; *mutuoque*; *mutuus*.

Mutual or reciprocal relation. Cosmic parts coordinate with one another; spirits are said to be in one another without confusion in the attributed theory. References: II.2.8, II.2.9, II.6.14. See Concord and convergence.

**natura / naturalis.** Printed forms: *natura*; *naturae*; *naturale*; *naturalem*; *naturalia*; *naturam*.

A thing’s nature or constitution; the natural productive order; what acts through natural being. A shared nature differs from a proper feature, while nature as a whole depends on God as art depends on nature. References: II.2.3, II.7.17, II.8.4. See Art and nature.

**natura communis / propria.** Printed forms: *natura communi*; *propria*.

A shared nature and a differentiating nature. Placing God within a common class of movers would make him composite from what he shares and what distinguishes him. References: IV.1.60. See Simplicity and composition.

**naturalis / acquisitus.** Printed forms: *acquisita*; *naturalis*.

Natural and acquired power. Natural vigour remains, while acquired capacity passes between potency, act and habit; the distinction explains how the intermediate power partly changes. References: I.5.1. See Power and potency.

**naturalis / natura.** Printed forms: *natura*; *naturalis*.

Natural / a thing’s nature or constitutive manner. God preserves each nature’s mode of action; the term’s broad use must be distinguished from bare nature as a limited necessary agent. References: II.11.14, II.13.26. See Art and nature.

**ne / nisi.** Printed forms: *ne*; *nisi*.

Lest or so that not; unless or except if. Lest an endless regress occur gives a reason for requiring unmixed form, while unless a higher cause strengthens quality restricts its ability to act independently. References: I.3.21, I.3.24. See Precedence and causal regress.

**ne frustra / ne inane.** Printed forms: *inane*; *ne frustra*.

Lest a capacity be vain or empty. The realization principle is expressly applied to the principal order of the universe; it does not say every imaginable particular event must occur. References: I.3.25. See Power and potency.

**necesse / oportere.** Printed forms: *necessarium*; *oportet*.

Necessary / it must or ought to be. These mark required premises or conclusions as well as the special divine necessity claim; not every occurrence names causal compulsion. References: II.11.1, III.2.8. See Freedom and necessity.

**necessitas / necessario.** Printed forms: *necessario*; *necessitas*; *necessitatem*.

Necessity of being or being necessarily through oneself. God alone possesses unrestricted necessity; an angel’s additional property exposes received and therefore dependent being. References: II.7.9, II.7.11, II.7.15. See Freedom and necessity.

**necessitas / oportere.** Printed forms: *necessarium*; *necessitas*; *necessitatis*; *oportet*.

Necessity; it is required or must be so. IV.1.84 rejects a lifeless necessity as the explanation of regular motion, substituting unerring art and wisdom. IV.2.2 nevertheless retains necessity alongside everlasting will in the attributed heavenly formula. Necessity therefore has a different explanatory scope from mechanical compulsion, and ordinary oportet marks required consequences. References: IV.1.15, IV.1.44, IV.1.84, IV.2.2. See Freedom and necessity.

**necessitas and willing acceptance.** Printed forms: *libertate*; *necessitas*; *voluntarium*.

Necessity, freedom and voluntariness. The Good’s necessary dominion is said to be willingly embraced; the comparison concerns desire for good as such rather than forced assent to every particular judgement. References: I.6.19. See Freedom and necessity.

**necessitas naturae.** Printed forms: *naturae suae necessitate*; *naturali quadam necessitate*.

A nature’s fixed necessity of operation. The question is whether divine forms determine action as fire’s nature determines burning; Ficino rejects that analogy as sufficient. References: II.11.1, II.11.7. See Freedom and necessity.

**nectar / ebrius / debacchari.** Printed forms: *debacchantur*; *ebriae*; *nectare*.

Nectar; intoxicated; to revel. The text interprets the imagery as the Muses’ powers filled with divine knowledge under their respective Bacchuses. References: IV.1.95. See Bacchus and the Muses.

**negare.** Printed forms: *negabunt*; *negant*; *neget*.

To deny a claim or withhold an identification. The Platonists deny that cosmic life is God; opponents deny life to whole elements; a rhetorical question challenges denial of celestial animation. References: IV.1.22, IV.1.71, IV.1.96. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**neglegere.** Printed forms: *negligit*.

Neglect or fail to attend to. Care for the complete work is said to exclude neglect of any constituent part. The printed form has negl-, not the fuller lemma spelling. References: II.13.21. See Care and custody.

**neque … neque.** Printed forms: *Neque*; *neque*.

Neither … nor, coordinating distinct exclusions. The third essence's freedom from divisibility, subject-dependence, contrariety and spatial-temporal restriction is accumulated through repeated negatives; the list should not be reduced to one generic immateriality claim. References: I.3.33. See Incorporeal and immaterial.

**Nereides.** Printed forms: *Nereides*.

The Orphic name given here to aqueous daemons. The named class occupies finer watery exhalations; the following visibility and tangibility claims have separate attributed sources. References: IV.1.39. See Daemons.

**nervus / nucha.** Printed forms: *nervum*; *nucam*.

Sinew or nerve / nape of the neck. Ficino invokes a reported animal mechanism in which one pull moves many members, before the Florentine device supplies another analogy. References: II.13.12. See Florentine mechanism.

**nescire quiescere.** Printed forms: *nescit quiescere*.

To know no rest. The continuing soul-motion and refusal to abandon natural place jointly motivate rotation within a finite bodily region. References: IV.2.22. See Circularity and return.

**nihil / non ens.** Printed forms: *Nihil*; *non ens*.

Nothing / nonbeing in the qualified expression. The modal argument identifies contradiction with the character of nonbeing, not with a receptive matter awaiting form. References: II.12.16, II.12.17. See Nothing and nonbeing.

**nihil / non esse.** Printed forms: *nihil*; *nihilo*; *nihilum*; *non esse*.

Nothing or nonbeing, distinguished from a receptive thing lacking one determination. Pure nothing contains no capacity to receive being; an effect without its cause would not exist. References: II.4.2, II.4.3, II.4.5, II.7.20. See Nothing and nonbeing.

**nihilo proximus.** Printed forms: *nihilo proximam*.

Next to nothing, distinguished from nothing. Matter's extreme passivity motivates the comparison; Ficino explicitly denies that matter is simply nothing. References: I.3.19. See Nothing and nonbeing.

**nixus / inniti.** Printed forms: *innititur*; *nixus*.

Striving or directed exertion / rest or lean upon. Divine activity's entire orientation is toward itself; the metaphor must remain within the attributed account. References: II.12.10, II.12.11. See Self-production and reservation.

**nixus / niti.** Printed forms: *nititur*; *nixu*.

Manifold striving; pressing toward actuality. The lower power cannot actualize every seed together and therefore runs through them in succession. References: IV.2.12. See Striving and enjoyment.

**nixus / nitor / conor.** Printed forms: *conatur*; *nititur*; *nixum*; *nixus*.

Striving, to strive, and to endeavour. Pure mind’s striving must improve it rather than worsen or leave it unchanged, so Ficino argues it receives goodness from a superior source. References: I.6.16, I.6.17. See Appetite and desire.

**nobilior / amplior.** Printed forms: *amplior*; *nobilior*.

Nobler and more extensive. The printed reading makes the larger extent of higher spheres an analogy for greater intellectual number; the apparatus reports a different later-witness reading, not adopted here. References: I.5.26. See Spheres and stars.

**nodus divinus.** Printed forms: *nodus ille divinus*.

Divine knot. This knot names divine preservation of otherwise dissoluble beings; it is not automatically another occurrence of soul’s title bond of the world. References: III.1.5. See Bond knot and chain.

**norma.** Printed forms: *norma*.

A pattern or regular standard. Continuing in a stable pattern is the specified sense in which a moving thing stands within motion. References: I.5.8. See Motion and stability.

**norma / condicio.** Printed forms: *conditionem*; *normam*.

Rule or norm / condition. In creatures the mode of willing follows understanding, which follows the condition of being received from its giver. References: II.12.8. See Order and harmony.

**nosce te ipsum.** Printed forms: *Nosce te ipsum*.

“Know yourself,” the oracle as quoted in the Proem. Ficino interprets it chiefly as an injunction to know oneself before seeking knowledge of God; the claimed chief meaning is his reading. References: Proem.4. See Self knowledge.

**noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere.** Printed forms: *cognoscit*; *Cognoscit*; *dinoscit*; *ignorat*; *noscens*; *Noscit*; *noscit*; *novit*.

To know or discern, with ignorance explicitly denied in divine causation. Knowledge of the first cause includes the proper, intermediate, and nearest causes and their distinct effects. References: II.9.14, II.9.15, II.10.2. See Self knowledge.

**novus / relinquere.** Printed forms: *novus*; *relinquat*.

New or remaining beyond what is already encompassed; to leave behind. No imagined region is left without divine presence, yet a new possible mode of finite imitation always remains. References: II.6.6, II.10.5. See Infinity.

**novus / varius.** Printed forms: *novas*; *novos*; *varias*; *variatur*; *variosque*.

New; varied or changing. New cosmic effects require varied psychic activity, while soul varies through moments without losing essential or spatial unity. References: IV.1.56, IV.2.7, IV.2.16. See Motion and stability.

**novus / vetus.** Printed forms: *nova*; *novum*; *veteribus*.

New / old or previously possessed. Adding a new form to persisting substance would compromise the divine simplicity asserted in the argument. References: III.1.6. See Simplicity and composition.

**nudus / adventitius.** Printed forms: *adventitiam*; *nudam*.

Bare or considered alone / added from outside. God acts neither by bare nature nor by an adventitious intelligence; the paired rejection prepares intellectual nature and natural intelligence. References: II.11.12. See Art and nature.

**numerus / unicus / unire.** Printed forms: *numeri*; *numero*; *numerorum*; *numeros*; *numerum*; *numerus*; *unicum*.

Number, uniqueness, and uniting, with numerical and substantial unity distinguished. Human numerical progress is indefinitely extendable; God’s uniqueness is not just occupying first place in a count. References: II.2.7, II.4.4, II.10.4, II.10.7. See Number.

**numerus se movens.** Printed forms: *numerum se moventem*.

Self-moving number. The text glosses number as manifold nature and self-moving as mutable through its own property; it does not define soul as an integer. References: III.1.23. See Xenocrates and the riddle.

**nuper / semel / diuturnior / perpetuo / generatio / successio.** Printed forms: *diuturnior*; *nuper*; *semel*; *successio*.

Newness, once-only occurrence, prolonged duration, and succession. The preservation argument contrasts one past origin with continual dependence and distinguishes indefinite sequence from stable eternity. References: II.4.6, II.5.1, II.7.23, II.10.3. See Beginning and ceasing.

**nutrimentum / alimentum.** Printed forms: *alimenta*; *nutrimentum*.

Nourishment or food. The transformation of nonliving food into living form is offered as an operation requiring more than fiery heat. References: I.3.23. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**nutrire / nutritio.** Printed forms: *nutrire*; *nutriri*; *nutritio*; *nutritionis*.

To nourish; nourishment as a continuing vital operation. Generation of parts is presented as the condition for nourishment and growth, supporting an inference to indwelling life. References: IV.1.1. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**nutrix.** Printed forms: *nutricem*.

Nurse or nurturer. Mercury is said to call providence the nurse of humankind, reinforcing its sustaining role. References: II.13.24. See Providence.

**nutu oculi.** Printed forms: *nutu oculi*.

In the blink of an eye. The expression illustrates possession without variation through successive moments, rather than measuring a physiological duration. References: IV.2.5. See Eternity and time.

**nutus / vibrare.** Printed forms: *nutu*; *vibrat*.

Nod or slight directive gesture / set in motion. The divine nod extends the mechanism analogy to effortless causal governance through a simple source. References: II.13.14. See Florentine mechanism.

**nutus / vibrare / centrum.** Printed forms: *centrum*; *nutu*; *vibrat*.

Nod, setting in motion, and center. A simple center with dependent lines models effortless divine direction without literal bodily gesture. References: II.8.5. See Hinge and center.

**obiectum.** Printed forms: *obiecto*; *obiectum*.

Object of a cognitive or appetitive power. The complete object of perfect intelligence grounds delight; goodness is appetite's adequate object across particular choices. References: II.11.32, II.13.29. See Object and adequate object.

**obiectum / proximus.** Printed forms: *obiecto*; *obiectum*; *proxima*.

Object of a cognitive power and closeness to it. Divine self-knowledge avoids dependence on an external object that would perfect both understanding and essence. References: II.9.8, II.9.10. See Object and adequate object.

**obnoxius / ineptus.** Printed forms: *inepta*; *obnoxia*.

Liable or subject to something, and ill-suited. Form becomes liable to passion and less agile when divided in matter; the adjectives identify impairment, not the complete absence of form. References: I.3.1. See Infection, lameness and Lethe.

**obtineo.** Printed forms: *obtinens*.

To hold or occupy a position. Rational soul holds the middle grade and actively connects the others; occupying the middle is not a merely spatial location. References: I.1.7. See Degree and mediation.

**obtundere / fecundia.** Printed forms: *fecundiam*; *obtundit*.

To blunt; fertility in the supplied reading. The agate claim uses different verbs for different powers; the edition's alternative eloquence reading is not added to its continuous text. References: IV.1.20. See Hierobotanum and mineral powers.

**occasio / nancisci.** Printed forms: *occasionem nacti*.

An occasion found or obtained. Ficino marks the Ideas discussion as an excursus arising almost by chance, without making chance his cosmic first cause. References: II.11.21. See Qualification and attribution.

**Oceanus / Thetis.** Printed forms: *Oceanum*; *Thetin*.

The names assigned to the watery sphere's two powers. The first names cognition and the second life-giving bodily rule within the reported Orphic scheme. References: IV.1.94. See Bacchus and the Muses.

**officium / perseverare.** Printed forms: *officio*; *Perseverat*.

An office or task; to persist in it. Soul's mutable motion remains in one governing task through the higher unity of God. References: IV.1.86. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**omniformis / unicolor / omnicolor.** Printed forms: *omnicolorem*; *omniformem*; *unicolor*.

All-formed, one-colored, and every-colored. One divine form has all-form through power and relation, as one-colored light is imagined knowing itself as source of every color. References: II.10.11, II.10.12. See Counting and collective intuition.

**omniformis / uniformis.** Printed forms: *omniformem*; *omniformis*; *uniformem*.

Containing every form / uniform or of one form. The divine intellect unites these predicates without assembling many constituent forms; the textual difficulty in II.11.17 remains open. References: II.11.1, II.11.17. See Form.

**omnis / cunctus / singulus.** Printed forms: *cuncta*; *omnium*; *singula*; *singulorum*.

Every or all / all together / each severally. Universal governance reaches each thing through its own nature; the quantifiers do not erase differentiated particular modes. References: II.13.26. See Universals and individuals.

**opacus.** Printed forms: *opaca*.

Dim or darkened. An alien addition would dim a supposed supreme light and destroy the purity required for its supremacy. References: II.2.6. See Purity and mixture.

**opacus / clarus.** Printed forms: *clara*; *lucidum*; *opaco*.

Opaque; clear or bright; luminous. Optical vocabulary distinguishes source, medium, and obstructive recipient in the analogy of causal mediation. References: IV.1.29. See Transparency and opacity.

**opifex.** Printed forms: *opificis*.

Maker or craftsman. The maker's intellect contains the form in whose likeness the ordered effect is produced. References: II.11.18. See Architect, house and decoration.

**opifex / architectus.** Printed forms: *architectum*; *opificem*.

A maker or artisan and an architect. A maker mingled with and impaired by its work cannot be its supreme independent source; the craft image tests causal mastery. References: I.3.32. See Art and nature.

**oportere / debere / decere.** Printed forms: *debet*; *decere*; *decet*.

To be necessary, due, or fitting, with inferential and evaluative force. It is said to be unfitting for intelligent minds to serve a mindless first mover; the inference uses a hierarchy of perfection. References: II.6.6, II.9.5, II.9.15. See Beauty and fittingness.

**oportet / necesse est / debet.** Printed forms: *esse debet*; *necesse est*; *oportet*.

It is required, necessary or must be so. These expressions state requirements inside Ficino's deductions, such as the need for a superior form or for intermediates; they do not all express moral duties. References: I.3.14, I.3.15, I.3.16, I.3.30. See Freedom and necessity.

**oppositus / contrarius / diversus.** Printed forms: *contrarius*; *dissimiles*; *diversa*; *diversos*; *opposita*.

Opposed, contrary, diverse, or unlike, with degrees of contrast distinguished. Difference can coexist with common being; absolute evil excludes all good; passivity is opposed to act. References: II.2.13, II.2.15, II.4.1, II.7.27. See Contraries and opposition.

**opto / cupio.** Printed forms: *cupit*; *optat*.

To desire or long for an object. Desiring to know God and the mind's desire for truth's light concern intellectual orientation rather than bodily appetite alone. References: Proem.4, I.1.6. See Appetite and desire.

**opus.** Printed forms: *operis*; *opus*.

Work or product; also need in opus est. God's one work requires unity of parts, while opus est medio means a middle is needed. The idiom must not be read as a separately manufactured work. References: II.13.2, III.2.2, III.2.6, III.2.7. See Art and nature.

**opus / operari / operatio.** Printed forms: *operari*; *operatio*; *operationem*; *operatur*.

Work as effect; acting or operation as exercise of power. The same family names an angel’s product and divine operation, whose relation to essence differs from creaturely activity. References: II.7.23, II.8.5, II.9.5. See Act and operation.

**oraculum.** Printed forms: *oraculum*.

An oracular saying or pronouncement. Ficino calls “Know yourself” an oracle and supplies his preferred theological interpretation, without telling a full history of the inscription. References: Proem.4. See Self knowledge.

**ordinare.** Printed forms: *ordinet*.

To arrange causes toward an effect. Ordering is the role demanded of the single cause governing a plurality of contributors. References: IV.1.8. See Order and harmony.

**ordinare / ordinator / ordo.** Printed forms: *ordinator*; *ordinatore*; *ordinatoribus*; *ordine*; *ordinem*; *ordo*.

To order, an arranger, or an ordered relation and hierarchy. A source and end coordinate diverse parts; the order of effects discloses the order of causes. References: II.2.8, II.2.10, II.7.28, II.9.22. See Order and harmony.

**ordo / ordinare.** Printed forms: *ordinantur*; *ordo*.

Order or rank / arrange toward an end. The world’s differentiated parts and subordinate causes form a coordinated whole; order need not erase contingency or free judgment. References: II.11.18, II.12.20, II.13.12, II.13.18. See Order and harmony.

**ordo / umbra / imago.** Printed forms: *imagines*; *ordines*; *umbrae*.

Ranks or ordered arrangements, shadows and images. Ficino reports some who distinguish angelic orders through corresponding souls and bodies; the analogy does not identify the levels. References: I.5.28. See Image and likeness.

**orior / initium.** Printed forms: *initium*; *oriatur*; *oritur*.

To originate and a beginning. Quality begins and perishes; whatever gives its beginning must precede it, so it cannot be its own sufficient origin. References: I.3.5. See Precedence and causal regress.

**orno.** Printed forms: *ornetur*.

To adorn or equip with form. Matter’s changing adornment requires an external formative source; the verb’s aesthetic colouring does not replace the causal question. References: I.3.6. See Beauty and fittingness.

**Oromasis / Mitris / Arimanis.** Printed forms: *Arimanis*; *Mitris*; *Oromasis*.

The three rulers named in Ficino’s account of the Magi. He glosses them as God, mind, and soul, distributing unity, order, and motion among their effects. References: IV.1.86. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi.

**Orpheus / Orphici.** Printed forms: *Orpheo*; *Orpheus*; *Orphicis*.

Named poetic-theological authorities as presented by Ficino. Infinite end, universal habitation, necessity, and infinite eye support different stages of the argument. References: II.4.8, II.6.11, II.7.11, II.10.7. See Orpheus and divine names.

**Orpheus / Orphicus.** Printed forms: *Orpheum*; *Orpheus*; *Orphicum*.

Orpheus / Orphic. Quoted sayings and their Latin glosses reinforce divine all-form containment, inward governance, and providence. These are Ficino's source attributions. References: II.11.1, II.13.12, II.13.22, II.13.24. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi.

**ostendere / monstrare / probare.** Printed forms: *monstravimus*; *ostendemus*; *ostendimus*; *probabimus*; *probare*.

To show, demonstrate, or prove, with completed and promised arguments distinguished. Retrospective proofs introduce new claims; what Ficino says he will show later is not already established in the present unit. References: II.1.1, II.5.1, II.6.1, II.7.1. See Philosophy and theology.

**otium.** Printed forms: *otio*; *otium*.

Leisure, or inactivity, according to context. The dedication praises leisure enabling philosophy; the later ascent contrasts inactivity with perpetual act. One English rendering would obscure the change. References: Proem.11, I.5.4. See Leisure.

**otium / administratio.** Printed forms: *administratione*; *otium*.

Freedom from bodily work; the task of governing a body. Celestial reason can rest in mind, whereas human reason is burdened by the needy body's administration. References: IV.2.11. See Leisure.

**ovum / fovere.** Printed forms: *fovendo*; *ovum*.

Egg / warm or brood. The brooding example supports the comparative argument about divine intelligence; its biological premise is attributed to Ficino. References: II.11.31, II.11.32. See Ostrich and egg.

**paene / quodammodo.** Printed forms: *paene*; *quodammodo*.

Almost / in a certain way. Both qualifications restrict the utterance analogy and prevent an absolute claim of instantaneous acoustic presence. References: III.2.13. See Utterance and meaning.

**paries / distantia.** Printed forms: *distantiam*; *paries*.

A wall and distance from perception. The wall's size can be judged only through colour and light, and its magnitude becomes harder to judge at distance sooner than those qualities. References: I.2.13. See Honey, whiteness and the wall.

**Parmenides / Pythagoreus.** Printed forms: *Parmenides*; *Pythagoreus*.

Parmenides as Ficino identifies and cites him. The formula one, unmoved, infinite being summarizes the preceding proof; the historical label remains the source's attribution. References: II.7.1. See Parmenides and the summary formula.

**Parmenides Pythagoreus.** Printed forms: *Parmenides Pythagoreus*.

Parmenides described here as Pythagorean. Ficino attributes to him the contrast between turning the moving world and remaining unmoved; the attribution is not independently verified here. References: II.11.16. See Motion and stability.

**pars / totum.** Printed forms: *parte*; *partes*; *partibus*; *partis*; *tota*; *totique*; *totius*; *toto*; *totum*.

Part / whole. The argument assesses a part's perfection through its fitting contribution to an ordered whole rather than maximizing it independently. References: II.13.23, II.13.24. See Whole and parts.

**pars / totus.** Printed forms: *pars*; *partes*; *partibus*; *partis*; *partium*; *totam*; *totius*; *toto*; *totum*; *totus*.

Part and whole, spatial or explanatory according to context. A compounded whole needs its parts and unifier; God produces the whole effect, and order exceeds an isolated part's excellence. References: II.2.3, II.2.8, II.7.21, II.9.21. See Whole and parts.

**particeps / participium.** Printed forms: *particeps*; *participia*.

A participant or sharer in a perfection received from another. What participates in unity or truth is distinguished from unity or truth itself. References: II.1.2, II.1.3. See Participation.

**participare / particeps.** Printed forms: *particeps*; *participatione*.

Participate / a participant. The creature's self-contentment comes from sharing in good; participation is received possession, not independent identity with its source. References: II.12.6, III.2.24. See Participation.

**participatio / forma / eminentia.** Printed forms: *eminentem*; *formam*; *participationem*.

Participation, formal possession and an eminent causal mode. Hot wood, fire and the sun illustrate soul's share of mind, angel's full mental form, and God as its superior origin. References: I.6.12. See Participation.

**particula / particularis.** Printed forms: *particulae*.

Small part / particular rather than universal. A particular part's apparent advantage can differ from the universal good; smallness alone does not make its contribution irrelevant. References: II.12.19, II.13.23. See Whole and parts.

**particularis / universalis.** Printed forms: *particularia*; *particularibus*; *universales*; *universalia*.

Particular and universal. The mind rises from particular forms to universal ones; later their widening in thought supports an argument about intelligible abundance. References: I.3.12, I.5.24. See Universals and individuals.

**partim.** Printed forms: *partim*.

Partly or in one respect. Soul is partly stable and partly mobile: the following units locate stability in substance and flow in operation. References: III.1.15. See Motion and stability.

**partim … partim.** Printed forms: *partim stat, partim vero movetur*.

Stable in one respect and changing in another. The subsequent triad specifies the respects, preventing a vague claim that half a soul is spatially motionless and half moves. References: I.4.4. See Motion and stability.

**partis albedo / pars albedinis.** Printed forms: *pars albedinis*; *partis albedo*.

Whiteness of a part, as opposed to a part of whiteness. The reversed genitive relation expresses why division of a white body does not divide qualitative character in the same way as extent. References: I.2.17. See Honey, whiteness and the wall.

**parturire.** Printed forms: *parturiunt*.

To bring forth offspring. Earth and water's fertility is fostered by higher spheres, extending the maternal image within a causal hierarchy. References: IV.1.36. See Earth as mother.

**parum / paululum / paulum.** Printed forms: *parum*; *paululum*; *paulum*.

Little or a small amount, with contextual degrees. The fifth and sixth lives complete the ordered three-faculty series; contextual ranking does not establish an invariant lexical distinction between the adverbs. References: IV.1.47. See Reason anger and desire.

**passim.** Printed forms: *passim*.

In various places or here and there. Inferior agents differentiate universal divine action in particular ways; passim is an adverb, not a form of suffering or passion. References: II.7.30. See Cause.

**passio / patiens / pati.** Printed forms: *passio*; *passiva*; *passivae*; *patiendi*; *patiens*; *patitur*.

Undergoing or receptivity, not necessarily emotion. To be bounded involves passivity; primary matter and essence are called the first recipient in contrast to the first agent. References: II.4.1, II.4.5, II.6.5. See Affection and passivity.

**pater / patria.** Printed forms: *patre*; *patriam*.

Father and homeland as paired comparisons. The Good is the source from which all things originate and the end toward which all aspire; tamquam marks both as comparisons. References: I.6.19. See Prison and homeland.

**pater philosophorum.** Printed forms: *pater*.

Father or originating authority in an intellectual lineage. Calling Plato the father of philosophers establishes Ficino's reverential point of departure; it is an honorific genealogy, not a literal parenthood claim. References: Proem.1. See Philosophy and theology.

**pati / passio.** Printed forms: *passione*; *pati*; *patiatur*; *patiendique*.

Undergo / being affected. A body's passive role differs from soul's acquisition of new activity and angel's receptive formation. References: III.1.9, III.1.10, III.1.19. See Affection and passivity.

**pati / passivus.** Printed forms: *passivam*; *pati*; *patitur*.

To undergo an effect; passive. Bodily action and suffering occur divisibly, temporal numbering affects operation, and bodily forms receive a passive alteration at the end of descent. References: IV.1.33, IV.2.8, IV.2.19. See Affection and passivity.

**pati / patior.** Printed forms: *pati*; *patiatur*; *patitur*; *patiuntur*.

To undergo or be acted upon. Fire is said to resist admixture while matter is universally receptive; the verb's object determines the kind of passivity, not necessarily conscious suffering. References: I.2.5, I.2.6. See Affection and passivity.

**paulatim / subito / sero.** Printed forms: *cito*; *paulatim*; *sero*; *subito*.

Little by little, instantaneously, late and quickly. Ficino distinguishes intensity, gradual completion and delay over distance. Rapid action is not automatically the same as instantaneous action. References: I.2.4. See Act and operation.

**pellere.** Printed forms: *pellet*; *pellitque*.

To push or drive another part. Connected heavenly parts draw and push one another around, supplying a bodily component of the circular-motion explanation. References: IV.2.21, IV.2.25. See Circularity and return.

**pendere / converti.** Printed forms: *convertitur*; *pendet*.

To depend upon; to turn back toward. Angel's received stability is qualified by dependence, yet secured through immediate return to God. References: IV.2.6. See Angel.

**pendere / dependere.** Printed forms: *dependebit*; *dependere*; *pendeant*; *pendentem*; *pendet*.

To depend upon a sustaining or originating source. Neither a composed principle nor an angel receiving its nature exists necessarily through itself. References: II.2.3, II.3.9, II.4.6, II.7.15. See Dependence and receiving.

**penetralia.** Printed forms: *penetralibus*.

Innermost recesses. The spatial image expresses intimate divine presence in the things governed, rather than intervention solely from outside. References: II.13.12. See Indwelling and presence.

**penetrare.** Printed forms: *penetrant*; *penetrante*; *penetrat*.

To enter or reach within. Ficino contrasts penetrating accidental effects with a required inward substantial producer and the depths inaccessible to bodily substances. References: IV.1.5, IV.1.18. See Surface and depth.

**penetrare / resistere / obstare.** Printed forms: *obstat*; *penetrare*; *penetrat*; *penetret*; *resistit*.

To penetrate or reach through; to resist or obstruct. Unlimited divine purity meets no barrier; the reported mental-presence theory extends a similar nonresistance argument to mind. References: II.6.3, II.6.23. See Touch and penetration.

**penetro / penetratio.** Printed forms: *penetrationem*; *penetrationisque*; *penetret*.

To enter or penetrate; penetration. Thickness prevents bodily interpenetration, whereas power through quality can reach matter without merely occupying a larger spatial extent. References: I.2.2, I.2.3. See Body and bulk.

**per materiam / per substantiam.** Printed forms: *per materiam*; *per substantiam*.

Through matter and through substance as different bases of persistence. Ficino distinguishes matter remaining through substantial change from a substance remaining through changes of quantity, quality or place; "remaining" has a specified subject. References: I.5.9. See Motion and stability.

**per se / per superiora.** Printed forms: *per se*; *per superiora*.

Through itself and through higher causes. Imperfect possession indicates dependence on a higher source; the claim does not make every being called self-subsisting causally independent of God. References: I.5.3. See Through itself and through another.

**peragere.** Printed forms: *peragant*.

Carry through or complete. Natural bodies are said very often to accomplish their characteristic works as well as they can. References: II.13.9. See Paths and prescribed ends.

**peragere / explere.** Printed forms: *expletur*; *peragitur*.

To perform or accomplish completely. Operations are distinguished by whether they proceed through deliberation, essential power, or pure being. References: II.8.4, II.8.5. See Act and operation.

**percipio / perceptio.** Printed forms: *perceptio*; *percipiat*; *percipiendam*.

To apprehend or receive cognitively. The purified soul receives divine light; the whole apprehension of things rests on the Proem's two main benefits; mind is constituted to perceive truth. References: Proem.2, Proem.6, I.6.10. See Intuition and comprehension.

**perducere in actum.** Printed forms: *in actum perduci*.

To bring a possibility into actuality. A corresponding, equal, or superior actuality must already belong to the actualizing cause. References: IV.1.15. See Act and operation.

**perfectio / perfectus.** Printed forms: *perfecta*; *perfectio*; *perfectionem*; *perfectionemque*; *perfectionis*; *perfectionisque*; *perfectiores*; *perfectissima*.

Perfection or completion, with degrees and modes depending on the being considered. The source is most perfect in itself, and no finite imitation possesses the infinite exemplar's entire perfection. References: II.3.3, II.7.16, II.9.8, II.10.5. See Perfection.

**perfectus / perficere.** Printed forms: *perfecit*; *perfectio*; *perfectionem*.

Complete or perfect / bring to completion. The completion appropriate to a created work falls below the author's unrestricted perfection. References: II.13.23, III.1.12. See Perfection.

**perficere / efficere.** Printed forms: *efficere*; *efficit*; *efficiuntur*; *perficere*; *perficiuntur*.

To perfect or complete, contrasted with bringing an effect into being. Ficino argues that the same good is source and end, responsible for producing and perfecting. References: II.7.16, II.7.21, II.7.25. See Perfection.

**permaneo / perduro / persevero.** Printed forms: *perdurabit*; *permansisse*; *perseverant*.

To remain, endure and continue. The hour argument concerns wholly unchanged power, not merely everyday continuity of a body under changing states. References: I.4.2. See Permanence and the hour test.

**permanere / perseverare.** Printed forms: *permanent*; *permanet*; *perseveret*.

To remain or persist. Persistence is not self-sufficiency: the effect endures through continual preserving power. References: II.5.1, II.7.17, II.7.21. See Conservation and preservation.

**perscrutari.** Printed forms: *perscrutabimur*.

To investigate thoroughly or search into. The announced investigation concerns grades within rational soul after the earlier five-grade ascent and comparison. References: IV.1.1. See Soul.

**perscrutor / indago.** Printed forms: *indagat*; *perscrutemur*.

To investigate searchingly or trace out. The objects are causes and God through individual traces; the two verbs describe directed inquiry, not a single technical faculty. References: Proem.3, Proem.4. See Traces.

**perseverare.** Printed forms: *perseverare*.

Continue or persist. Ficino’s explicit gloss of standing is persevering in the unity of one’s own nature. References: III.1.22. See Staying and preserving.

**perspicacia / perspectio.** Printed forms: *perspectio*; *perspicacia*.

Penetrating insight or vision. Divine truth is not deprived of the excellence of mind, but its insight and truth are not two components; the expressions formulate simple self-manifestation. References: I.6.12. See Intuition and comprehension.

**perspicere / cernere.** Printed forms: *cernimus*; *perspicimus*.

To perceive clearly or discern. Brightness, nearness, and density explain visibility; the argument does not equate invisibility with nonexistence. References: IV.1.38. See Seeming and evidence.

**perspicuus / diaphanus.** Printed forms: *diaphanum*; *perspicuam*; *perspicuum*.

Transparent, admitting light without necessarily originating it. Soul mediates mind and body as a transparent medium joins luminous and opaque bodies. References: IV.1.29. See Transparency and opacity.

**pervigil / vigilare.** Printed forms: *pervigil*; *vigilat*.

Ever-watchful / keep watch or be awake. Watchful activity expresses abiding self-directed actuality in the reported divine argument; the adjective later characterizes soul’s active sourcehood. References: II.12.10, III.1.26. See Self-production and reservation.

**Phaedo / Philebus / Politicus / Phaedrus.** Printed forms: *Phaedone*; *Phaedro*; *Philebo*; *Politico*.

Names of Platonic dialogues in Ficino’s source claims. They support reported claims about purposive explanation, limit and infinite, and soul as the fountain of motion; their mere naming is not a fresh source collation. References: II.11.26, III.1.11, III.1.26. See Philosophy and theology.

**phantasia.** Printed forms: *phantasia*; *Phantasia*.

Imagination, a power presenting and combining images. It misleads when replacing eternity with flux or fullness with extension, yet also gathers the senses’ contributions. References: II.5.2, II.6.13, II.9.16. See Imagination and deceptive clothing.

**phantasia / sensus / generatio.** Printed forms: *generationemque*; *phantasiam*; *sensum*.

Imagination, sensation and generation as other psychic functions. Their removal is posited only within the imagined pure-mind analogy that isolates the angelic level. References: I.6.9. See Intellectual and animating powers.

**Phoebus particularis / Iupiter particularis.** Printed forms: *Iupiter particularis*; *Phoebus particularis*.

A particular Phoebus and Jupiter in this cosmic assignment. The qualifiers prevent unmarked substitution of these zodiacal souls for universal divine names in other passages. References: IV.1.43. See Common and proper.

**physici.** Printed forms: *physici*; *physicis*.

Natural philosophers, as a collective authority. They are reported as calling form act and as favouring existing realization of cosmic possibilities; these are specific attributed views,

not claims about every philosopher of nature. References: I.3.1, I.3.25. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**pictura.** Printed forms: *picturae*.

Painting or painted decoration. Later decoration exemplifies additions arranged by ideas other than the original house-plan. References: II.11.21. See Architect, house and decoration.

**pietas / pius.** Printed forms: *pietate*; *pietatis*; *pium*; *piumque*.

Piety or a pious relation and duty. Ficino represents the unification of philosophical inquiry with contemplation and worship as Plato's piety, not merely an inference about theoretical knowledge. References: Proem.1, Proem.3, Proem.5. See Worship and piety.

**piger.** Printed forms: *pigras*.

Sluggish or inert. Dimensions are called sluggish relative to the effective motion of quality and time, supporting the reported a-fortiori argument. References: II.6.20. See Quantity and dimension.

**pingere / figurare.** Printed forms: *figurant*; *pingunt*.

To paint and give figure. The souls of creatures adorn their bodies through implanted seeds under the sphere-soul's guidance. References: IV.1.34. See Beauty and fittingness.

**placere / displicere.** Printed forms: *displicet*; *placet*.

Please or satisfy / displease. Participation in good is linked to self-contentment; the Good itself is therefore said to will and delight in itself supremely. References: II.12.6. See Love and pleasure.

**placere / libenter.** Printed forms: *libenter*; *placet*.

To please or be approved; willingly or gladly. "If you please" introduces a hypothetical concession, while "as the natural philosophers hold" attributes an explanatory position. References: II.2.1, II.3.10, II.4.8. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

**planta / animal.** Printed forms: *animalis*; *plantarum*.

Plant / animal. Life without cognition and cognition without intelligence distinguish two illustrative modes of imitation; these are Ficino's hierarchical examples. References: II.11.17. See Life.

**Plato / Platonici.** Printed forms: *Plato*; *Platonici*; *Platonicorumque*; *Platonis*.

Plato / the Platonists, as attributed authorities. Claims about ideas, providence, and graded being are explicitly assigned to these authorities; Ficino's representation is distinct from independent source verification. References: II.11.22, II.13.24, III.2.2. See Philosophy and theology.

**Plato / Platonici / philosophi / physici.** Printed forms: *metaphysici*; *physicis*; *Platonici*; *Platonis*.

Named or grouped philosophical authorities, not a single unanimous voice. Ficino sometimes adopts, sometimes reports, and sometimes rejects positions attributed to these groups; attribution must be preserved. References: II.1.7, II.2.4, II.4.8, II.6.6. See Philosophy and theology.

**Platonica / Latina facere.** Printed forms: *Latina feci*; *Platonica*.

Platonic works, and making them Latin by translation. Ficino claims to have translated all the Platonic works long before; this is his authorial statement, not an independent bibliographical audit. References: Proem.5. See Philosophy and theology.

**plenitudo.** Printed forms: *plenitudinem*.

Fullness. The sun comparison distinguishes the first luminous source's fullness from what subordinate luminous beings receive. References: I.3.3. See Perfection.

**Plotinus.** Printed forms: *Plotini*; *Plotinus*.

Plotinus as reported authority or named manner of speaking. One passage reports radically passive matter and quality; another uses Plotinian idiom for divine intellection without an external subject or object. The two contexts should remain distinct. References: I.3.19, I.6.12. See Intellect and intellection.

Plotinus as the reported expositor. Ficino recounts an explanation of inward divine activity and later identifies the conclusion as what Plotinus wishes to establish. References: II.12.9, II.12.11. See Self-production and reservation.

**plus et minus.** Printed forms: *magis*; *maiora*; *minora*; *minusve*.

More and less in a stated respect. The appetite argument distinguishes larger or more numerous things from better ones; comparative vocabulary does not alone specify quantity, intensity or value. References: I.2.14, I.4.1. See Measure and degree.

**Pluto / Proserpina.** Printed forms: *Plutonem*; *Proserpinam*.

The names assigned to earth-soul's knowing and animating powers. Their paired roles belong to this list, which should not be conflated with zodiacal names or another sphere's pair. References: IV.1.94. See Bacchus and the Muses.

**polus / revolutio / restitutio.** Printed forms: *polos*; *restitutio*; *revolutio*.

Poles, revolution and return to a position. The heavens' regularity is offered as evidence of stability within motion in Ficino's cosmology, not a contemporary astronomical model. References: I.5.7. See Circularity and return.

**pondus / lapis.** Printed forms: *lapidum*; *pondere*.

Weight and stones. A stone-loaded vessel supported by air illustrates the supposed force of fine bodies; the supplied apparatus explains the vessel's spatial arrangement. References: I.2.5. See Fire, spark, lightning and cannon.

**pondus / librare.** Printed forms: *librata*; *ponderibus*.

Weight / balance or poise. Without higher governance, the elements are imagined separately balanced by their weights and places rather than mingling into an ordered whole. References: II.13.4. See Elements and their spheres.

**ponere / inducere / asserere.** Printed forms: *asserat*; *induxeris*; *poneretur*.

To posit, introduce, or assert a proposition. Positing two goodnesses or an eternal world temporarily frames a test; it does not always express authorial commitment. References: II.2.11, II.2.13, II.7.12, II.7.19. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

**ponere / signare in esse.** Printed forms: *ponit*; *signat in esse*.

Posit or seal in being. These are the exposition’s final reformulations of self-production before Ficino reserves judgment. References: II.12.11. See Self-production and reservation.

**Porphyrius / Persis / Tusci.** Printed forms: *Africa*; *Perside*; *Porphyrius*; *Tuscos*.

The cited authority and places in reported daemon observations. Zoroaster is associated with Persia and Africa; Porphyry adds fire for visibility and earth for tangibility, with Tuscan examples. References: IV.1.39. See Daemons.

**porrigere / tendere.** Printed forms: *porrigi*; *porrigit*; *tenditur*; *trahitur*.

To stretch or extend in scope. Extension through time or space is used analogically for indivisible spirit; self-extension describes infinite self-comprehension. References: II.6.16, II.6.17, II.10.10. See Omnipresence and place.

**portio.** Printed forms: *portione*; *portionem*.

A share or portion of a perfection. Comparative goodness is explained by a greater share, without making divine goodness a divisible stock. References: II.1.3, II.1.4, II.1.6. See Participation.

**positio.** Printed forms: *positionemve*.

A supposition or something posited. Here it qualifies conditional necessity after God has willed a thing; it is not a bodily position. References: II.12.15. See Freedom and necessity.

**posse / nequire.** Printed forms: *nequit*; *potest*.

Be able or possible / be unable. The scope of divine productive ability exceeds actual production, while the natural agent’s fixed limits constrain its mode of acting. References: II.11.9, II.11.25, II.12.17. See Power and potency.

**possum.** Printed forms: *posse*; *potest*.

To be able, or for something to be possible. The verb can concern a mind’s capacity to know or a substance’s possible separate existence; ability, logical possibility and actual realization require the local argument. References: Proem.1, I.3.25, I.3.29. See Power and potency.

**postponing and returning.** Printed forms: *Sed de his alias*; *Sed de hoc alias*.

This is deferred for discussion elsewhere. These transitions delimit the present claim and prevent a promised later discussion of material causation or angelic orders from being counted as completed here. References: I.3.19, I.5.28. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**potentia / potestas / virtus.** Printed forms: *potentia*; *potentiae*; *potentiam*; *potestas*; *Virtus*; *virtus*; *virtute*; *virtutem*.

Power or capacity; potentia also names receptive possibility, while virtus commonly means efficacy. Passive potency receiving act differs from divine active power and from moral virtue-habits in the presence analogy. References: II.4.1, II.4.5, II.7.23, II.10.2. See Power and potency.

**potissimum / summopere / penitus / prorsus / late.** Printed forms: *amplissimam*; *latissime*; *plurimum*; *prorsus*; *summopere*.

Intensive or comparative qualifiers of scope and completeness. They strengthen particular claims about knowledge, goodness, and light without by themselves identifying a distinct metaphysical power. References: II.6.10, II.6.11, II.6.13, II.7.4. See Measure and degree.

**prae / post / infra / supra.** Printed forms: *post*; *supra*.

Before or above / after / below / above. In the hierarchy these prepositions primarily express rank and dependence, not a measured location in physical space. References: III.2.20. See Degree and mediation.

**praebeo / do.** Printed forms: *datura*; *praebere*; *praebitura*.

To supply or give. Matter cannot supply itself with a form it does not already possess; later soul supplies vital motion, showing that the gift's object fixes the argument. References: I.3.6, I.6.14. See Communication and imparting.

**praebere / conducere.** Printed forms: *conducunt*; *praebeant*.

To furnish or contribute toward an effect. Other agents give being of this or that kind only through the first agent's power. References: II.7.26, II.7.29. See Cause.

**praecedo.** Printed forms: *praecedat*; *praecedit*.

To precede. Ficino's argument denies that a generated thing can precede itself; this temporal impossibility supports a causal distinction. References: I.3.5. See Precedence and causal regress.

**praecipitium / tenor.** Printed forms: *praecipitium*; *tenorem*.

A precipice; a sustained course or tenor. Flowing downward and maintaining a uniform course distinguish elemental regularity from a hypothetical minute soul's variable motion. References: IV.1.77. See Natural motion and natural place.

**praeditus.** Printed forms: *praedita*; *praeditis*.

Endowed or furnished with. An imagined eternal source would be endowed with eternal forms; bodies endowed with mind are later contrasted with those lacking it, so endowment is not identity with the gift. References: I.3.6, I.5.14. See Participation.

**praeesse.** Printed forms: *praeest*; *praesunt*.

To stand over or govern. Repeated governing relations organize the hierarchy from first unity to subordinate souls without making every ruler a first cause. References: IV.1.52. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**praefero / antepono.** Printed forms: *anteponant*; *anteponimus*; *praeferunt*.

To prefer or place before. The Proem asks readers to reverse a preference for shadows; the final chapter distinguishes preference for pleasure over contemplation from the impossibility of preferring something to the Good as Good. References: Proem.9, I.6.19. See Wishing, refusing and the good.

**praeparare / offerre.** Printed forms: *offerat*; *praeparantur*; *praeparatur*.

To prepare a recipient; to present content for attention. Bodies are fitted for a kind of life and mind, while the motive power presents a seed-kind to attached imagination. References: IV.1.29, IV.1.92, IV.2.15. See Contraction and determination.

**praeparatio.** Printed forms: *praeparationibus*.

Preparation or receptive disposition. The differing preparations of materials explain unequal degrees of heating. The word does not require a human preparer. References: II.11.8. See Fire and variable materials.

**praeponere / praeferre.** Printed forms: *praeferantur*; *praeponitur*; *praeponuntur*.

To place above or prefer in rank. A proposed principle above unity and an ideal standard for preferring one thing to another are examined, not assumed together. References: II.1.3, II.3.1, II.3.5. See Surpassing and comparison.

**praescientia / praevisio.** Printed forms: *praescientia*; *praevisio*.

Foreknowledge / foresight. The foreknown content includes causes and free modes of acting, not events stripped of their manner of occurrence. References: II.13.25. See Foreknowledge.

**praescribere.** Printed forms: *praescribere*; *praescribet*; *praescriptum*.

Prescribe, assign, or set in advance. The verb concerns determining an action’s end; unknowing bodies have prescribed ends without prescribing them to themselves. References: II.12.7, II.13.9. See Paths and prescribed ends.

**praescribere / designare.** Printed forms: *designans*; *praescribit*.

To trace out generally; to mark out particularly. The verbs articulate the transition from a whole-route conception to the next specified act. References: IV.2.13, IV.2.14. See Euclid and the lantern.

**praescribere / lex.** Printed forms: *lege*; *praescribitur*.

To prescribe, with law giving the order of position and motion. Divine law assigns the world a finite site and motion; the word is not here a modern empirical physical law. References: II.6.14. See Order and harmony.

**praesentia.** Printed forms: *praesentia*; *praesentiam*.

Presence, the availability or efficacy of a source where its effects are. Divine presence is not finite spatial occupation; the world participates in it through a finite site. References: II.6.4, II.6.6, II.6.14. See Omnipresence and place.

**praesentia / admovere.** Printed forms: *admovetur*; *praesentia*.

Presence; bringing one thing near another. Perfect action requires the agent’s presence, while bodily adjacency leaves the body’s substance outside its recipient. References: IV.1.5. See Proximity and causal presence.

**praestantior.** Printed forms: *praestantiore*; *praestantissimo*.

More excellent or superior in mode. Effects are said to exist more excellently in higher causes, so substantial effects cannot become mere accidents in God. References: II.11.6. See Perfection.

**praestare.** Printed forms: *praestat*.

To bestow something; or to surpass and exercise mastery, according to construction. Agate allegedly bestows strength and fertility; the nature said to produce coral’s effects surpasses or governs our souls and storms; soul imparts a trace of self-motion to bodies. The object and dative construction determine the local sense. References: IV.1.20, IV.1.21, IV.1.66. See Communication and imparting.

**praestare / praestans.** Printed forms: *praestabit*; *praestantior*; *praestantius*; *Praestantius*; *praestat*.

To surpass or be more excellent, but also to furnish or bestow. The same family compares ranks and says goodness gives the power claimed by an imagined rival. References: II.1.3, II.1.5, II.3.9, II.6.20. See Surpassing and comparison.

**praeteritum / futurum.** Printed forms: *futurum*; *praeteritum*.

Past / future. Their no-longer and not-yet existence supplies the privation analysis of temporal change. References: III.1.7. See Eternity and time.

**praevaricari / effugere.** Printed forms: *effugiat*; *praevaricatur*.

Transgress or deviate / escape. No contingent event is said to transgress so far as to escape the ordainer’s providence. References: II.12.21. See Contingency.

**primo agere.** Printed forms: *agit primo*; *primo agit*.

To act primarily, as the principal agent. The composite rather than one of its parts is the primary bodily agent; God therefore cannot merely be matter’s form. References: IV.1.26. See Cause.

**primum / summum / ultimum.** Printed forms: *primo*; *primum*; *primumque*; *summa*; *summam*; *Ultimum*; *ultimus*.

First / highest / last or final. Priority, rank, and finality can coincide in the divine first principle but are not identical lexical notions. References: II.11.35, II.12.12, III.1.23. See Principle.

**primum / ultimum.** Printed forms: *primum*; *ultimum*.

First and last in a causal or ontological order. God’s universal action and matter’s universal passivity are opposed as first and last; the ordering is not merely chronological. References: I.2.6. See Principle.

**princeps.** Printed forms: *principem*; *principes*.

Ruler or principal source. Twelve leading souls rule a multitude in the excursion; the Magian three rulers distribute unity, order, and motion; the final motion argument distinguishes a chief source from subordinate movers. A princeps need not be an embodied political ruler. References: IV.1.41, IV.1.86, IV.2.27. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**principatus / gubernare / regere.** Printed forms: *gubernando*; *gubernatore*; *princeps*; *principem*; *regit*.

Governance, leadership, or preeminence. The common ruler of species and cosmic governor differ from an animating mind’s localized governance within the reported presence theory. References: II.2.7, II.4.7, II.6.11, II.6.24. See Army and commander.

**principium / origo.** Printed forms: *origo*; *principium*.

Source or principle, and origin of being or action. The first principle also serves as the final end; a proximate producer is not therefore the first origin of its own efficacy. References: II.1.2, II.3.9, II.7.25. See Principle.

**prior dignitate / tempore.** Printed forms: *non tempore*; *prior est dignitate*.

Prior in rank or worth / in time. Intellectual operation has superiority in dignity without being temporally earlier in human development. References: II.11.12. See Degree and mediation.

**prior natura et dignitate.** Printed forms: *per naturam et dignitatem prior*.

Prior by nature and dignity. Substance’s priority to quantity is used to argue for its ability to exist without quantity; this is not a date of birth. References: I.3.25. See Precedence and causal regress.

**prius / posterius.** Printed forms: *posterius*; *prior*; *prius*.

Before or prior, and after or later. Children’s later equality in size is chronological, whereas substance’s priority to quantity is expressly by nature and dignity; the same vocabulary does not impose one ordering. References: I.2.12, I.3.25. See Precedence and causal regress.

**prius / posterius / deinde.** Printed forms: *Deinde*; *posterius*; *Prius*; *prius*; *ultimum*.

Before, after, next, and last, here often ordering dependence. Being is prior in nature and last lost, not a temporally separate stage lacking every determination. References: II.7.20, II.7.28, II.7.29, II.7.32. See Before and after in nature.

**privare / expers.** Printed forms: *expers*; *privata*; *privationis*; *privatum*.

To deprive; to be without a perfection or participation. A wholly evil source would be deprived of being, life, and action because Ficino counts them as goods. References: II.1.3, II.2.15, II.4.3. See Nothing and nonbeing.

**privatio / malum.** Printed forms: *malum*; *privatio*.

Privation / evil. They are known through the ideas of possession and good rather than being given a separately productive idea in this passage. References: II.11.19. See Possession and privation.

**pro arbitrio.** Printed forms: *pro arbitrio*.

At will or according to one’s choice in thought. The mind extends bounded bodily quantities and conceives countless objects; this mental possibility is one premise in a further metaphysical argument. References: I.5.24. See Choice and free judgment.

At will or according to one’s choice of continuation. Human thought can continue numerical series, used in the dilemma against a fixed upper bound of divine knowledge. References: II.10.7. See Infinity.

**probabilis / computo.** Printed forms: *computavisse*; *probabili*.

Probable, and to calculate. Aristotle’s reported number of movers is explicitly calculated by probable reasoning, which motivates deference rather than a dogmatic final census. References: I.5.20. See Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds.

**probare / ostendere / demonstrare.** Printed forms: *demonstrandum*; *probatum*.

Prove, show, or demonstrate. The opening of II.12 distinguishes what Ficino judges sufficiently proved from the necessary–free thesis he next proposes to demonstrate. References: II.12.1. See Reason and account.

**probo / comprobo.** Printed forms: *comprobet*; *probatum*.

To approve or establish, with the force fixed by the object. Ficino wishes to approve nothing except as divine law approves it; this is an authorial theological condition, not merely the vocabulary of formal proof. References: Proem.10. See Assent, approval and belief.

**procedere / progredi / proficere.** Printed forms: *pervenire*; *proficit*; *progredi*; *progrediantur*; *progreditur*; *progressionem*.

To advance or progress in a sequence or toward a condition. Indefinite thought-progress, increasing likeness, and attainment of intelligibility are not one physical journey. References: II.4.4, II.6.6, II.9.1, II.10.5. See Infinity.

**proclivitas.** Printed forms: *proclivitasque*.

Readiness or inclination to act. Every agent's inclination toward production is traced to the first agent's fruitfulness. References: II.13.2. See Craftsman and father.

**proclivitas / efficacia.** Printed forms: *efficacia*; *proclivitas*.

Readiness to be moved; efficacy in moving. Soul's active power and body's receptive inclination are explicitly complementary. References: IV.2.19. See Weariness and agility.

**Proclus / Syrianus.** Printed forms: *Proclo*; *Proclus*; *Syrianus*.

The named authorities for classification and the extension argument. Proclus's reported definition excludes dimensions explicitly; Proclus and Syrianus jointly distinguish the extending cause from the extended recipient. References: I.3.28, I.3.29. See Proclus, Syrianus and extending matter.

**produce / become.** Printed forms: *producant*; *provenire*; *provenit*.

To result, produce or become. The generation argument distinguishes effects' coming about, causes' producing them, and a quality's altered degree; English result-language should preserve who acts and what changes. References: I.2.11, I.2.12, I.2.17. See Cause.

**producere / facere / gignere.** Printed forms: *factum*; *gignit*; *producendis*; *producit*.

To produce, make, or beget, with material and first causation differentiated. Subordinate makers produce determinate effects; God is the source enabling both their being and work. References: II.3.2, II.4.5, II.7.25, II.8.4. See Cause.

**proficio / adipiscor.** Printed forms: *adipiscatur*; *proficere*; *proficiendi*.

To advance or improve, and to attain. A moving thing seeks a better state it does not yet possess and receives completion from a richer source; the verbs specify directed change. References: I.5.5. See Perfection.

**proficisci.** Printed forms: *proficiscitur*; *proficiscuntur*.

To proceed or arise from a source. All things proceed from supreme truth; deliberative operation proceeds from counsel and is distinguished from essential operation. References: II.7.3, II.8.5. See Procession and return.

**progressio in infinitum.** Printed forms: *in infinitum progressio*.

An indefinitely continued explanatory progression. A higher material form would itself require a further higher cause, so Ficino argues that the sequence must reach an unmixed form. References: I.3.24. See Precedence and causal regress.

**prohibere / claudere / includere.** Printed forms: *clauditur*; *includit*; *prohibeatur*; *prohiberet*; *prohibet*; *prohibetur*.

To prevent or shut within limits; to include within a scope. Goodness includes the ground of desire; no obstacle prevents divine power, and the flame analogy is explicitly conditional on no hindrance. References: II.1.7, II.4.1, II.6.3, II.6.23. See Bounds and restriction.

**proles / gremium.** Printed forms: *gremio*; *prolem*.

Offspring and an enclosing womb or bosom. Qualities cannot beget offspring freer than themselves and therefore generate forms in matter’s womb; the imagery expresses dependence on a substrate. References: I.3.18. See Fountain, womb and offspring.

**promere / praevalere.** Printed forms: *praevalet*; *promat*.

To bring forward; to prevail over alternatives. One seed-kind becomes prominent for imagination and appetite within the motive power’s held contents. References: IV.2.15. See Seeds.

**promptus / agilis.** Printed forms: *agili*; *agilis*; *promptissimum*.

Ready for motion or agile in acting. Bodily bulk inhibits readiness; form’s natural agility becomes impaired in matter. Readiness here concerns efficacy rather than a moral disposition. References: I.2.2, I.3.1. See Act and operation.

**propagare / amplificare / dilatare.** Printed forms: *amplificare*; *amplificat*; *dilatare*; *dilatatio*; *propagare*; *propagat*; *propagatur*.

To extend, diffuse, or expand in scope. Divine communication and spiritual presence are expressed through extension language without bodily partition. References: II.6.5, II.6.7, II.6.11, II.6.19. See Omnipresence and place.

**propago / facultas.** Printed forms: *facultas*; *propagandae*.

To propagate or communicate onward; a faculty or capacity. If intellect belonged to soul simply as soul, every soul, including a beast’s, would have it; the counterfactual distinguishes psychic life from intellect. References: I.5.12. See Intellectual and animating powers.

**prope / disto.** Printed forms: *distans*; *distantia*; *propius*; *proxime*.

Nearness and distance, spatial or causal according to context. The action model requires agent and patient close together, whereas nature’s greater intimacy with its matter accompanies greater independence in substance. References: I.2.2, I.3.17. See Indwelling and presence.

**propinquo / propinquus.** Printed forms: *propinquas*; *propinquat*; *propinquius*.

To approach; near or closely related, with propinquius meaning nearer. Fire approaches spiritual nature in fineness, while approaching heat makes one warm but approaching a large body does not make one large; the comparison distinguishes causal respects. References: I.2.5, I.2.13. See Quality.

**propinquus / conveniens.** Printed forms: *convenientior*; *propinquior*.

Nearer or more akin to a standard. The soul’s superiority over body is explained as greater proximity to supreme goodness. References: II.3.4, II.3.5. See Surpassing and comparison.

**propitius / punire.** Printed forms: *propitium*; *punire*.

Favorable / punish. Ficino’s report of Plato contrasts favor toward the gentle and religious with punishment of the proud and impious. References: II.13.24. See Worship and piety.

**proportio / consonare.** Printed forms: *aptissime*; *consonare*; *proportionibusque*.

Proportion and fitting harmony. What seems less beautiful alone can harmonize with others in the total order without becoming identical in rank. References: II.9.21, II.9.22. See Order and harmony.

**propositum.** Printed forms: *proposito*; *propositum*; *proposuimus*.

Design or purpose; also an announced topic or proposition. Divine design orders the world; Ficino’s own proposed discussion supplies a distinct discursive sense of the same family. References: II.11.17, II.11.18, II.11.21, II.11.24. See Intention.

**propositum / institutum.** Printed forms: *institutum*; *proposito*.

Purpose or projected undertaking; the established order of exposition. The general route-plan is different from the announced Platonic order to which the numerical excursion gives way. References: IV.1.52, IV.2.14. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**proprietas.** Printed forms: *proprietas*; *proprietatem*; *Proprietates*.

A characteristic property. Quality retains a feature of indivisible nature, but life cannot be reduced to a bare property of the conflicting bodily constituents. References: I.2.17, I.3.23. See Quality.

Property or characteristic. Properties of substance are known through its idea, whereas common qualities receive their proper ideas. References: II.11.19, II.11.20. See Substance and accident.

**proprius.** Printed forms: *Propriae*; *proprias*; *proprium*.

Proper, distinctive, or one’s own. Proper accounts distinguish a whole’s parts; the central point belongs exclusively to no individual radius. The context determines possession versus characteristic definition. References: II.11.18, III.2.15. See Relations and respects.

**proprius / communis.** Printed forms: *communes*; *communi*; *propriam*; *propriis*.

Belonging to an individual or appropriately its own; common to a wider whole. Independent animal life is distinguished from the common life of an elemental sphere. References: IV.1.37. See Common and proper.

**proprius / communis / posterior.** Printed forms: *communem*; *posteriorem*; *propriam*.

Proper or characteristic, shared, and subsequent. Understanding is the principal activity of minds; moving bodies is a common and secondary activity and need not characterize every mind. References: I.5.22. See Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds.

**proprius / proprietas.** Printed forms: *propria*; *Propria*; *propriae*; *proprietas*; *proprietate*; *proprietatem*; *proprietates*.

One’s own, specific, characteristic; a distinguishing property. The feature differentiating an angel from God must have an origin and therefore disclose dependence. References: II.2.3, II.2.4, II.7.14, II.9.8. See Common and proper.

**prorumpo / migro.** Printed forms: *migrat*; *prorumpit*.

To break forth and to pass from one condition to another. Movement from potency and inactivity into act signals incomplete actuality and a sought end. References: I.5.4. See Act and operation.

**prospectus / intuitus.** Printed forms: *intuitu*; *prospectu*.

A view and an intuitive apprehension. Seeing all colours in one view parallels grasping all truths in one intuition; the shared simultaneity contrasts with successive search. References: I.6.8, I.6.9. See Intuition and comprehension.

**protendo / amplifico.** Printed forms: *amplificari*; *protenduntur*.

To extend or enlarge in mental scope. The mind’s ability to extend bodily numbers and dimensions without their physical limits is used as a premise for intelligible abundance, not as a declaration that imagined bodies physically exist. References: I.5.24, I.5.25. See Universals and individuals.

**protendo / tumeo.** Printed forms: *protendatur*; *tumeat*.

To stretch out and swell. The argument says a thing must first be before extension and swelling; the physical verbs mark the priority of simple being to divisible expansion. References: I.3.16. See Precedence and causal regress.

**prout.** Printed forms: *prout*.

Insofar as, according as, or in the respect that. One act of will is distinguished by its reference to divine goodness and to creatures; the qualification does not multiply divine acts. References: II.12.12, II.12.13. See Relations and respects.

**provenire / oriri / nasci.** Printed forms: *nascantur*; *nascatur*; *oriuntur*; *provenientem*; *provenit*.

To originate or arise, with the source specifying dependence. Different features allegedly arise from common nature; the mental-presence theory denies rational spirits’ origin from matter. References: II.2.4, II.2.8, II.6.15, II.7.14. See Dependence and receiving.

**providentia / decretum.** Printed forms: *decretum*; *providentia*.

Providence, and what is decreed. The claim that the work will bring resistant readers toward religion is Ficino’s professed belief about divine providence. References: Proem.8. See Providence.

**proximum bonitati.** Printed forms: *bonitati*; *proximum*.

Nearness to goodness in a causal hierarchy. The presence of evils around matter is used against treating the world-infused life as the highest goodness. References: IV.1.24. See Good and goodness.

**proximus.** Printed forms: *proximae*; *proxime*.

Nearest or immediately related. The required producer is a proximate substance, while angel’s activity makes immediate adherence to matter problematic. References: IV.1.3, IV.1.30. See Proximity and causal presence.

**proximus / remotus.** Printed forms: *proximarum*; *remotarum*.

Proximate / remote. Effects imitate the mode of nearer causes, allowing variable effects within a universally governed order. References: II.12.20. See Cause.

**proximus / simillimus.** Printed forms: *proximum*; *simillimum*.

Nearest and very like, distinct from identity. Augustine’s reported ranking of Plato is followed by Ficino’s own aim to fashion a likeness close to Christian truth. References: Proem.6, Proem.7. See Augustine and Christian proximity.

**prudentia.** Printed forms: *prudentia*.

Intelligent practical skill. The archer’s prudentia explains aiming; it is invoked as a craft analogy rather than analyzed as a separate moral virtue. References: II.13.9. See Archer and target.

**pullulare.** Printed forms: *pullulant*.

To sprout or spring forth. Seeds cast away may develop long afterward, with or without evident external fostering. References: IV.1.14. See Putrefaction and propagation.

**pullulare / alligare.** Printed forms: *alligantur*; *pullulant*.

To spring up or sprout; to bind to a dimension. The authorities' argument denies rational spirit's origin from matter and infers freedom from determinate extension. References: II.6.15. See Incorporeal and immaterial.

**pullulo / incohatio.** Printed forms: *incohationes*; *pullulantium*.

To sprout and beginnings of formation. Latent seeds of forms in matter are introduced with a "so to speak" qualification; their incipient goodness helps extend the Good beyond completed form. References: I.6.14. See Seeds.

**pulsare.** Printed forms: *pulsat*.

Strike, stir, or impel. The verb's force is qualified by freely: divine impulsion of souls proceeds according to their nature. References: II.13.26. See Persuasion and compulsion.

**pulvis / describere.** Printed forms: *describit*; *pulverem*.

Dust; drawing or tracing figures. The material surface is the less intimate model of production, contrasted with the imaginative medium. References: IV.1.11. See Carpenter and geometer.

**punctum.** Printed forms: *puncta*; *puncto*; *punctum*.

A point, used geometrically and as an image of indivisibility. Every temporal moment meets eternity's point in the theory, as every location is said to meet eternal spirit. References: II.6.17, II.6.23. See Indivisibility.

**punctum / adstrictus dimensionibus.** Printed forms: *adstricta dimensionibus*; *punctum*.

A geometrical point; confined by dimensions. Soul's indivisibility differs from a point's localization; its whole presence enables movement of the whole heaven. References: IV.1.67. See Indivisibility.

**punctum / linea / circumferentia.** Printed forms: *circumferentiam*; *linea*; *punctum*.

Point / line / circumference. A point on one line or the circumference differs from a center's equal relation to all radii; the geometry is analogical. References: III.2.14, III.2.15. See Point and position.

**punctum / situs.** Printed forms: *punctis*; *punctum*; *situ*; *situm*.

A point and position. A point lacks parts yet remains related to position; numbers lack position while requiring parts, distinguishing two kinds of non-bodily abstraction. References: I.3.12. See Point, position and mathematical ascent.

**purgo / serenus.** Printed forms: *purgandum*; *purgatam*; *serenior*.

To purify; clearer or more serene after purification. Soul and mental gaze are prepared for divine light; the optical-moral comparison concerns receptive orientation rather than physical washing. References: Proem.2, I.1.6. See Purity and mixture.

**purus / merus.** Printed forms: *merus*; *pura*; *puri*; *purus*.

Pure / unmixed or considered alone. A colored light is no longer pure light in the example; merus actus excludes added receptive determination. References: III.1.10. See Purity and mixture.

**purus / puritas.** Printed forms: *pura*; *puritati*; *purum*.

Pure, unmixed with alien limitation; purity rather than merely physical cleanliness. Divine power's purity excludes limiting reception, while the wine example begins from an ordinary material comparison. References: II.1.1, II.4.1, II.6.3. See Purity and mixture.

**puta.** Printed forms: *puta*.

For example or namely. The parenthetical introduces bodies and qualities as examples of things moved by another; it is not an assertion attributed to a thinker. References: III.1.23. See Qualification and attribution.

**putare / arbitrari.** Printed forms: *arbitror*; *putant*.

Think, judge, or hold. These verbs can mark an attributed doctrine or Ficino's own assessment of a proof's success; they do not always express doubt. References: II.11.19, III.1.23. See Qualification and attribution.

**putare / videri as appearance.** Printed forms: *videntur*; *videri*; *videtur*.

To appear or seem, without automatically certifying the appearance as reality. Regional operations seem more manifest; isolated things seem less beautiful; both appearances are qualified by a broader account. References: II.6.17, II.6.24, II.9.22. See Precious and lowly.

**putrefactio / propagatio.** Printed forms: *propagatione*; *putrefactione*.

Decay; reproduction or propagation. Allegedly spontaneous organisms are contrasted with propagated ones, but both are required to have proper causes. References: IV.1.7, IV.1.14. See Putrefaction and propagation.

**putridus / vilis / pretiosus.** Printed forms: *pretiosamque*; *pretiosis*; *putrido*; *vilis*.

Decaying; low in worth; precious. The evaluative contrast separates the grape seed's described condition from the articulated vine and its higher formative powers. References: IV.1.17. See Vine and grape seed.

**Pythagorici.** Printed forms: *Pythagorici*.

The Pythagoreans, as the attributed source of graded names. Body, quality, soul, angel, and God receive deliberately different formulas relating one and many. References: III.1.1, III.1.2. See Unity and multiplicity.

**qua ratione … eadem.** Printed forms: *qua ratione sunt, eadem agunt*.

By the same principle by which they are, they act. The second eadem is ablative with ratione understood; the maxim assigns species-specific operation to form rather than common matter. References: I.2.9. See Cause.

**qua ratione / quantum / quatenus.** Printed forms: *qua ratione*; *quantum*; *quatenus*.

In the respect in which, insofar as, or so far as. Body acts in the respect by which it has its determinate form, while body precisely as body does not act; these restrictions prevent apparent contradiction. References: I.2.1, I.2.9, I.3.6. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**quadrare.** Printed forms: *quadrabit*; *quadrant*.

To fit or be adequate to something. Natural causes work insofar as fitted to their task; angelic mind cannot fit mutable body directly without a mediator. References: IV.1.6, IV.1.32. See Fitting and correspondence.

**quaerere / interrogare.** Printed forms: *interrogamus*; *Quaerimus*; *quaerit*.

To ask or investigate; quaerere can also seek something not yet possessed. Ficino's inquiries test alternatives, whereas divine knowledge is said to possess rather than search. References: II.1.6, II.2.1, II.2.2, II.9.20. See Seeking possessing and distraction.

**quaerere / persuadere.** Printed forms: *persuadet*; *quaerat*.

To ask or investigate; to persuade through a reason. A question about elemental ascent prompts the Platonist reply, while a stated argument supports inward productive life. References: IV.1.5, IV.1.74. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**quaero / invenio.** Printed forms: *inveniamus*; *inventamque*; *quaerendas*; *quaerit*.

Seeking and finding are different stages of inquiry. The Proem requires seeking causes until finding and venerating the cause of causes; mind's later seeking truth shows it is not truth itself. References: Proem.3, I.6.7. See Truth.

**qualitas.** Printed forms: *qualitas*; *qualitate*; *qualitates*; *qualitatis*.

Quality as an efficacious determination, not merely a favorable evaluation. The reported presence theory ranks quality's power above dimension, while qualities act without deliberation in II.8. References: II.6.19, II.8.2. See Quality.

Quality, a form received and divided in body. The whiteness comparison distinguishes quality's part-by-part distribution from soul's whole presence. References: III.2.10, III.2.11. See Quality.

**qualitas / virtus.** Printed forms: *qualitate*; *qualitatem*; *virtutem*.

Quality and effective power. The introductory ascent moves beyond bulk to efficacious quality, then beyond quality's divided and changing condition to a more independent form. References: I.1.3, I.1.4, I.2.8. See Quality.

**quamvis / licet.** Printed forms: *licet*; *quamvis*.

Although or even though. A form can remain superior while undergoing a specified limitation: soul changes in a certain respect yet is indivisible, and bodily substantial form decreases without remission of intensity. References: I.1.4, I.3.15. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**quandoque.** Printed forms: *quandoque*.

At some time, eventually, or at length. The substance argument uses it within a possibility claim; the transition in III.2.1 instead means coming at last to the desired subject. References: II.11.5, III.2.1. See Qualification and attribution.

**quantitas / dimensio.** Printed forms: *dimensio*; *dimensionem*; *dimensiones*; *dimensioni*; *quantitatis*.

Quantity and extension in dimensions. Dimensional contact differs from incorporeal efficacy; imagination falsely turns divine rays into three-dimensional lines. References: II.6.1, II.6.13, II.6.15. See Quantity and dimension.

**quantitas / extensio / dimensio.** Printed forms: *extensa*; *Extensio*; *extensione*; *quantitatem*; *quantitati*; *quantitatis*.

Quantity / extension / dimension. Both divisibility and fixed position obstruct whole multiple presence; soul is argued to be free of these restrictions. References: III.2.13, III.2.16, III.2.17. See Quantity and dimension.

**quantum / quatenus / eatenus.** Printed forms: *eatenus*; *quantum*; *quatenus*.

Insofar as or to the extent that. These limit a predication to a specified explanatory respect, especially when the same essence grounds plural exemplary relations. References: II.11.18. See Relations and respects.

**quantum ens est.** Printed forms: *quantum ens est*.

Insofar as it is a being. The formula shifts from a particular being's features to what accompanies being as such in the argument for divine will. References: II.11.28. See Being.

**quasi non motus.** Printed forms: *quasi non motus*.

Almost not motion. Circular local motion preserves place and need not alter substance or natural quality, making it the closest bodily imitation of stability. References: IV.2.23. See Motion and stability.

**quatenus corpus.** Printed forms: *quatenus corpus*.

Precisely insofar as it is body. The qualification confines the denial of action to body as matter and quantity; subsequent actions belong to its qualities and higher powers. References: I.2.1. See Body and bulk.

**qui / quod — scope of a condition.** Printed forms: *quaecumque*; *Quaecumque*; *quicquid*.

Whatever or whoever, with generalizing scope. The modal statement quantifies over whatever excludes contradiction; its scope is constrained by that condition, not by arbitrary imagination. References: II.12.17, II.12.18. See Contradiction and possibility.

**quies / quiesco.** Printed forms: *quiete*.

Rest or stability. Mind is said to advance through rest rather than bodily motion; the claim identifies the manner of intellectual perfection, not laziness or absence of all activity. References: I.5.17. See Motion and stability.

**quinque sensus / singulatim / summatim.** Printed forms: *quinque*; *sensibus*; *sensus*; *singulatim*; *summatim*.

Five senses, separate reception, and gathered cognition. Imagination integrates sensory contributions; divine collective intuition is a higher use of summatim, not sensory summary. References: II.9.16, II.10.10. See Sense and imagination.

**quodammodo.** Printed forms: *quodammodo*.

In a certain way or respect. This qualification restricts quality's indivisibility and mind's partial relation to higher mind; it must not be erased in categorical summaries. References: I.2.17, I.5.11. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**quorsum.** Printed forms: *Quorsum*.

To what end or why this discussion? The rhetorical question signals the conclusion: unactualized, noncontradictory possibilities fall within divine power. References: II.12.18. See Qualification and attribution.

**rapere / includere.** Printed forms: *inclusit*; *rapuit*.

Snatch away / enclose. The attributed saying figures God’s transcendence as withdrawal beyond the following mind’s capacity to contain his fire. References: III.1.21. See Divinity and the divine.

**raptare.** Printed forms: *raptaret*.

Sweep or carry away forcefully. The counterfactual necessity of producing all things would also compel and sweep each along at once. References: II.11.38. See Persuasion and compulsion.

**rarus / densus.** Printed forms: *densa*; *rara*.

Rare or tenuous / dense. The physical contrast belongs to the elementary effects which mixing can produce, distinguished from a whole intelligible arrangement. References: II.13.5. See Quality.

**ratio.** Printed forms: *ratio*; *rationes*.

Argument, account, defining character, or determining principle. The chapter’s numbered ratio is an argument; the proper rationes of a building’s parts are intelligible accounts. References: II.11.2, II.11.18. See Reason and account.

**ratio / argumentatio / signum.** Printed forms: *argumentationibus*; *rationibus*; *signis*.

Reasons, articulated arguments, and signs as distinct kinds of support. Ficino’s fourfold programme also includes resolving questions; signs here are evidential, unlike the geometrical point called signum elsewhere. References: I.1.7. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**ratio / rationalis.** Printed forms: *rationalis*; *rationem*; *rationes*.

Account, ground, reason, principle, or rational, according to construction. The ground of desire, ideal measure, reason of the divine principle, and universal cognitive principles are distinct local uses. References: II.1.7, II.3.5, II.3.10, II.9.16. See Reason and account.

**ratio albedinis.** Printed forms: *albedinis ratio*.

The character or account of whiteness. The same character remains in each divided piece, with similar power and action; the argument distinguishes that sameness from equal extension. References: I.2.17. See Quality.

**ratio appetendi.** Printed forms: *ratio appetendi*.

The ground or rationale of desiring. Ficino says the entire ground of desire is contained in goodness, excluding a desirable source beyond it. References: II.1.7. See Appetite and desire.

**ratio boni.** Printed forms: *ratione boni*.

In respect of good or because of goodness. Objects move appetite as good, not simply as large or numerous; among things judged bad, smaller or fewer can be preferred. References: I.2.14. See Appetite and desire.

**ratio naturalis and usualness.** Printed forms: *convenire*; *generi*; *ut plurimum*.

What accords with a kind’s nature and is found for the most part. Ficino infers that minds separate from bodies should be more abundant because separation better accords with incorporeal nature; the abundance claim depends on this naturalness premise. References: I.5.17. See Angel.

**rationis compos / expers.** Printed forms: *compotes rationis*; *rationis expertes*.

Possessing reason; devoid of reason. Ficino's cosmological classification assigns rationality to higher spheres and differentiates lower living bodies by purity. References: IV.1.39. See Daemons.

**realis / intellectus (adjectival).** Printed forms: *intellecti*; *reales*.

Real / understood or conceived intellectually. Ficino distinguishes exemplary relations from the real relations said to distinguish divine persons. References: II.11.19. See Relations and respects.

**receptaculum.** Printed forms: *receptacula*; *receptaculum*.

Receptacle or that which receives. Angel contains forms as immovable multiplicity, so receptivity does not imply bodily extension or temporal change. References: III.1.4. See Angel.

A receptive seat or recipient. Elemental globes become fitting recipients of rational souls through their place within the whole cosmic order. References: IV.1.91. See Fitting and correspondence.

**rector / gubernare / regere.** Printed forms: *gubernare*; *rector*; *regere*.

Ruler / govern / direct or rule. Making intelligently is taken to establish the capacity to govern and preserve; subordinate rulers still act through God. References: II.13.11. See Providence.

**rector proprius.** Printed forms: *rector proprius*.

A governor assigned specifically to one body. God's universal causation excludes confinement to this particular governing role. References: IV.1.59. See Common and proper.

**recurrere in duodenarium.** Printed forms: *recurrit rursus in duodenarium*.

To return to a twelvefold grouping. A sphere-soul selected from twelve is said to organize subordinate souls in a corresponding twelvefold pattern. References: IV.1.42. See Twelve.

**redigere / colligere / referre.** Printed forms: *collige*; *redigitur*; *referantur*; *referatur*; *referri*.

To bring back or gather under a principle, collect an inference, or refer to a source or end. Individuals are gathered under species, species under divine unity, and parts referred to the good of the whole. References: II.2.7, II.2.8, II.9.21. See Unity and multiplicity.

**reducere / redigere.** Printed forms: *redigatur*; *reducatur*; *reducuntur*.

To refer or reduce to a principle. Different kinds are led to their indivisible limiting principle; reduction here does not mean eliminating the things explained. References: I.3.14. See Returning, referring and reducing.

**reducere / referre.** Printed forms: *reducendum*; *reducuntur*; *referamus*; *retulimus*.

Trace back or refer to a source. Dependent stability is referred to God, whereas dependent mobility is referred to soul; the property being traced must be specified. References: III.1.22, III.1.23. See Through itself and through another.

To lead back or refer to a higher explanatory source. A derivative property requires a primary bearer, and subordinate souls are ordered under sphere-souls and world-soul. References: IV.1.50, IV.1.53. See Through itself and through another.

**reflectere.** Printed forms: *reflectendae*; *reflecti*.

To turn back upon itself. A spatially extended quality allegedly lacks the self-return needed to give heaven a revolution into itself. References: IV.1.57. See Circularity and return.

**reformare / restituere.** Printed forms: *reformantur*; *restitutio*; *restituuntur*.

To form anew and restore to an origin or order. Returning effects are re-formed through truth and restored into one through unity. References: II.3.8, II.3.10. See Procession and return.

**regina / pedisequa.** Printed forms: *pedisequa*; *regina*.

Queen / handmaid or attendant. The life governing the world is either God or God’s handmaid; subordinate governance still supports divine providence in the argument. References: II.13.20. See World soul.

**regula.** Printed forms: *regula*.

Rule or ordering standard. God is presented as the very rule that orders things, so cannot himself receive his manner of being from chance. References: II.12.3. See Order and harmony.

**remissior / vehemens.** Printed forms: *remissior*; *vehemens*; *vehementior*.

Weaker in intensity, more forceful and forceful. Intensity is contrasted with rapidity and instantaneous completion in the threefold action argument; a stronger action is not automatically faster in every respect. References: I.2.4. See Measure and degree.

**reor / fides.** Printed forms: *fides*; *reor*.

A judgement of belief, accompanied here by confidence or faith. Ficino’s “I believe” and “this faith is not vain” assert confidence in a providential purpose rather than introduce an independently demonstrated decree. References: Proem.8. See Assent, approval and belief.

**reperio / insum.** Printed forms: *Insunt*; *reperitur*; *reperiuntur*.

To find and to be present within. Qualities coexist throughout honey, unextended qualities are said to occur in mathematical items, and a higher form is argued to have a place in reality. References: I.2.15, I.2.16, I.3.2. See Indwelling and presence.

**reperire / invenire.** Printed forms: *inveniretur*; *reperitur*; *reperiuntur*.

To find or discover, in intellectual inquiry or presence. The difficulty of finding where God is arises from lack of containment, not from evidence of absence. References: II.1.2, II.4.4, II.6.8, II.6.12. See Omnipresence and place.

**repetere / reflectere.** Printed forms: *reflectatur*; *repetit*.

Repeat or seek again / bend back. A circuit repeats its course, and soul’s movement returns into itself rather than exhausting a one-way path. References: III.2.26. See Circularity and return.

**repetere / revocare.** Printed forms: *repetunt*; *revocando*.

To seek again or return to; to call back toward a source. Desire repeats the movement toward origin, while goodness recalls produced things and perfects them. References: II.1.2, II.3.10, II.7.4. See Procession and return.

**replicare / explicare.** Printed forms: *explicat*; *replicat*.

Fold inward or back / unfold outward. Seeing gathers forms inward; willing unfolds them outward. Soul later refolds its powers upward after unfolding them downward. References: II.11.30, III.2.27, III.2.28. See Procession and return.

**res.** Printed forms: *rebus*; *rerum*; *rerumque*; *res*.

A thing, reality or matter under discussion. The Proem distinguishes shadows of things from true realities; the broad noun leaves the kind of thing to its modifiers and the argument. References: Proem.9. See Being.

Thing or reality, capable of referring to individuals or the objects of causal and cognitive claims. The argument's scope includes every smallest thing and even what is said to exist in potency; res is not restricted to bodies. References: II.1.1, II.9.14, II.10.3. See Universals and individuals.

**res / re ipsa.** Printed forms: *re ipsa*; *res*.

Thing or reality / in reality or as a matter of identity. Real identity of being, understanding, and willing in God is contrasted with their difference in creatures; re ipsa is not merely another physical thing. References: II.12.6, II.12.8. See Being.

**res publicae.** Printed forms: *rebus publicis*.

Public affairs. Ficino praises Lorenzo for uniting philosophy with the highest authority in public affairs; the wording does not itself specify a constitutional office. References: Proem.11. See Lorenzo, dedication and public authority.

**resolvi / dissolutio.** Printed forms: *dissolutionem*; *dissolutioni*; *resolvitur*.

To dissolve or resolve into what is prior; dissolution of parts. A composed thing is exposed to dissolution, so it cannot be necessary being through itself. References: II.5.1, II.7.10. See Simplicity and composition.

**respectus.** Printed forms: *respectus*; *Respectusque*.

Relation or respect. Ideas multiply through intellect's comparison of one divine essence with things, not because creatures produce new states in God. References: II.11.19. See Relations and respects.

**respectus / vigor.** Printed forms: *respectu*; *vigore*.

A respect or relation, and effective power. These qualifications explain how the truly one form can be considered all-formed without literal aggregation. References: II.10.11. See Form.

**respicere.** Printed forms: *respiciant*.

To stand in a relation to or regard. Equal relation to every spatial part supports the reported inference that spirit is absent nowhere. References: II.6.16. See Omnipresence and place.

**respicere / suspicere / inspicere.** Printed forms: *inspicit*; *suspicit*.

Regard / look upward / inspect. Inspecting flowers is sensory and successive; looking toward higher things marks soul's orientation. These uses must be distinguished from suspicari, suspect. References: III.1.28, III.2.19. See Looking and recognizing.

**respondere.** Printed forms: *respondebunt*; *respondentes*.

To reply; to correspond or face something. A philosophical reply and air or fire situated opposite stars use the same verb in distinct argumentative and spatial senses. References: IV.1.90, IV.1.92. See Fitting and correspondence.

**respuo.** Printed forms: *respuere*; *respuimus*.

To reject or refuse. Knowledge thought harmful may be temporarily rejected, whereas the Good precisely as good cannot be rejected within Ficino’s account of desire. References: I.6.19. See Wishing, refusing and the good.

**retardo / differo.** Printed forms: *differt*; *retardat*.

To slow or postpone. Greater bulk delays motion and action, while later distinctions separate slow completion in the patient from delay across the intervening distance. References: I.2.2, I.2.4. See Body and bulk.

**retexere telam.** Printed forms: *telam generationis retexere*.

To weave again the fabric of generation. The reported recurrence of a finite stock of causes is presented through a weaving image, with rest retained as the alternative. References: IV.2.12. See Sowing and weaving.

**retinere / amittere.** Printed forms: *amittit*; *retinebit*; *Retinere*.

Retain / lose. Angel cannot retain all divine features in their unrestricted mode or lose every likeness; it retains stability while losing simple unity. References: III.1.7, III.1.8. See Staying and preserving.

**revertamur ad quaestionem.** Printed forms: *ad quaestionem hic propositam revertamur*.

Let us return to the question proposed here. The phrase returns from the persistence test to whether the immediate cause of moving qualities is wholly immobile. References: I.4.3. See Returning, referring and reducing.

**revocare / rapere.** Printed forms: *rapiat*; *revocat*.

To call back; to seize or draw strongly. The sphere-soul recalls its parts, and greater near attraction is invoked to explain increased speed. References: IV.1.74. See Hidden mover and magnet.

**roboro / duco.** Printed forms: *ducitur*; *Roboratur*; *roboretur*.

To strengthen and guide. A higher living source reinforces and directs quality; this answers the preceding image of its lameness. References: I.3.21, I.3.22. See Infection, lameness and Lethe.

**rotare.** Printed forms: *rotat*.

Turn or rotate. The attributed saying contrasts the world’s rotation with the mover’s preserved immobility. References: II.11.16. See Turning and direction.

**rotunditas.** Printed forms: *rotunditatis*.

Roundness. The earth’s roundness illustrates formal, efficient, and final explanation: idea, making wisdom, and the good judged better. References: II.11.27. See Cause.

**ruber / viridis / splendor.** Printed forms: *rubeus*; *rubra*; *rubrum*; *splendor*; *splendores*; *viridem*; *viridis*.

Red, green, and radiance. Each radiance owes both its luminosity and its color to sunlight as transmitted through particular glass. References: II.7.31. See Glass and colored radiance.

**ruere in nihilum.** Printed forms: *in nihilum ruituras*.

To fall suddenly into nothing. The phrase intensifies the preserving-cause argument: even momentary absence of being itself would remove existence. References: II.6.11. See Conservation and preservation.

**saeculum / duratio.** Printed forms: *durationem*; *durationemque*; *saecula*.

An age or extended duration; duration can be simple rather than successive. Many ages display cosmic endurance, but simple divine duration must not be pictured as temporal flow. References: II.4.7, II.5.2, II.6.4. See Eternity and time.

**sagitta / sagittarius / signum.** Printed forms: *sagittae*; *sagittarii*; *signum*.

Arrow / archer / target. The archer’s skill supplies directedness absent from the arrow’s own awareness; signum here is a mark to aim at. References: II.13.9. See Archer and target.

**sapientia / sapiens.** Printed forms: *sapientia*; *sapientiae*; *sapientissima*; *sapientissimi*.

Wisdom / wise. Wisdom supplies the purpose and order that bare material powers do not explain in Ficino’s argument. References: II.11.23, II.13.20. See Art and nature.

**sapientioribus se dimittere.** Printed forms: *sapientioribus se dimittere*.

To defer to those who are wiser, as rendered here. This short editorial unit continues the preceding report about Aristotle’s calculation and should be read across the unit break. References: I.5.21. See Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds.

**scaturire / vena.** Printed forms: *scaturiens*; *Scaturiet*; *vena*.

To well up or spring forth; a vein or spring-channel. Identical effects springing from one unrestricted source cannot explain the two proposed differentiating properties. References: II.2.4. See Spring and flow.

**scientia / comprehendere.** Printed forms: *comprehendantur*; *Comprehendi*; *comprehendi*; *comprehendit*; *comprehenduntur*; *scientia*.

Knowledge; to grasp or comprehend, with a disputed sense of bounding. An infinite regress would block causal knowledge; divine self-comprehension is distinguished from limitation by another. References: II.3.9, II.9.15, II.10.8, II.10.9. See Intuition and comprehension.

**scintilla / flamma.** Printed forms: *flammam*; *Scintilla*; *scintillam*.

A spark and a flame. The smaller spark illustrates faster ascent; a spark’s potentially extensive spread later supports the priority of force over size. References: I.2.2, I.2.5. See Fire, spark, lightning and cannon.

**scribere.** Printed forms: *scripti*.

Write or inscribe. Future events are metaphorically inscribed in divine foreknowledge; the surrounding argument includes their causes and modes. References: II.13.25. See Foreknowledge.

**se habere.** Printed forms: *habituras*.

To fare or be in a condition. The future participle habituras agrees with res in the indirect question about how badly things would fare without God; it is not habitual possession. References: II.6.11. See Conservation and preservation.

**se regere / se sistere.** Printed forms: *se ipsam regit*; *se sistit*.

To govern itself and remain grounded in its nature. Self-moving soul shares mutability with body and self-maintenance with stability, making it a mediator. References: IV.1.65. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**se toto.** Printed forms: *se toto*.

With the whole of its being. This describes the natural agent’s undivided exertion, not uniformity of every result regardless of the recipient. References: II.11.9, II.13.7. See Fire and variable materials.

**secunda intentio.** Printed forms: *secunda quadam intentione*.

At a second directed remove in the order. Soul retains essential and spatial unity but loses the mode of unity that excludes successive moments. References: IV.2.7. See Intention.

**secundum causam / per formam.** Printed forms: *per formam*; *secundum causam*.

By causal relation rather than the form proper to a kind. The qualification prevents divine intelligence from being classified as one more member of the genus of minds. References: II.9.12. See Naming by cause.

**secundum partem / ex toto.** Printed forms: *ex toto*; *secundum partem*.

In part and throughout. Wood hot in part and fire hot throughout model partial intellectual possession in soul versus a higher nature wholly mind. References: I.5.11. See Participation.

**secundum se / per se.** Printed forms: *per se ipsum*; *secundum se*.

Considered in itself, or through itself, according to the causal claim. The effect considered apart from its cause does not exist; God alone exists necessarily through himself. References: II.7.15, II.7.20. See Through itself and through another.

**sedes / regio.** Printed forms: *regionem*; *sedem*.

Seat or assigned place / region. Rational soul occupies the middle grade of nature; this is hierarchical placement, not a physical address for an incorporeal substance. References: III.2.30. See Soul.

**seiungo / disiungo.** Printed forms: *disiunxerit*; *seiungunt*.

To separate or sever things conceptually or practically. Ficino condemns separating philosophy from religion by comparing it with separating love of wisdom from its honour and true understanding from right will. References: Proem.8. See Philosophy and theology.

**semen.** Printed forms: *semine*; *seminibus*.

Seed or productive source. The contrast between appointed seeds and mismatched offspring supports Ficino’s claim of determinate natural production. References: II.13.17. See Seeds.

**semen / flos.** Printed forms: *flores*; *semina*.

Seed or formative principle; flower. The supposed absence of bodily seeds from dung leads Ficino to locate principles in a higher life; the conclusion is part of his causal argument. References: I.3.22. See Seeds.

**semotus motor.** Printed forms: *semotus motor*.

A remote or separated mover. Even a higher separated mover must supply a conjoined motive power before the body actually moves. References: IV.1.66. See Proximity and causal presence.

**semper / aliquando.** Printed forms: *aliquando*; *semper*.

Always and at some time. The first principle's always-existing is contrasted with generated things' beginning; elsewhere possible perfection must at least occur at some time, under a specific cosmic-order restriction. References: I.3.25, I.3.32. See Eternity and time.

**semper / simul / aliquando / nondum / amplius.** Printed forms: *aliquando*; *amplius*; *nondum*; *semper*; *simul*.

Always / together or simultaneously / at some time / not yet / further or any longer. The contrast between always being, sometimes becoming, and always becoming establishes the proposed middle; simultaneity must not be inferred from mere endurance. References: III.1.7, III.2.2, III.2.13. See Eternity and time.

**sempiternitas / aeternitas.** Printed forms: *Aeterna*; *aeternam*; *aeterni*; *aeternitatem*; *aeternitatis*; *aeternum*; *sempiterna*; *sempiternitas*; *sempiternitatem*.

Unending or eternal duration, here qualified as simple and stable. The text uses sempiternity for divine abiding duration rather than merely an endlessly prolonged sequence. References: II.5.1, II.5.2, II.5.4, II.6.17. See Eternity and time.

**senium / restitutio mundi.** Printed forms: *mundi restitutionem*; *senium*.

Old age; restoration of the world. Mercury and Plato receive different names for the end of the reported cosmic year; their labels do not collapse into one literal mechanism. References: IV.2.12. See Great year.

**sensus rationalis.** Printed forms: *sensum, inquam, rationalem*.

Rational perception or awareness. Ficino argues that a nature ordering its works more rationally than humans cannot lack a superior form of awareness. References: II.13.19. See Sense and imagination.

**sententia.** Printed forms: *sententia*.

Position, teaching, or judgment. Ficino asserts the account as Plato's and the Platonists' certain teaching, so the claim of consensus remains attributed to him. References: II.11.22. See Ideas and exemplars.

**sententia / voluerunt.** Printed forms: *sententia*; *voluerunt*.

An opinion or position; voluerunt reports what thinkers maintained. These reporting markers distinguish an attributed theory from the author's direct assertion or a literal wish. References: II.6.14, II.6.15, II.7.15. See Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities.

**seorsum.** Printed forms: *seorsum*.

Separately or apart. Independence is tested through the possibility of existing apart from the conditions and limits of accidents. References: II.11.5. See Separation and abstraction.

Apart or separately. An instrument apart from its craftsman cannot carry out the art's form; separation concerns causal sufficiency. References: IV.1.3. See Instrument.

**separo / seiungo.** Printed forms: *seiunctas*; *seiungi*; *separant*; *separatae*.

To separate or abstract. Even the objection that separation occurs only through mental contemplation is turned into evidence that the separating minds are themselves independent of matter. References: I.3.24. See Separation and abstraction.

**sequi.** Printed forms: *sequi*.

To follow, here expressing a dependence relation. The rhetorical reversal says external things follow divine mind to be, rather than divine mind following them to know. References: II.9.9. See Object and adequate object.

**serere / parere / explicare.** Printed forms: *explicat*; *parit*; *serit*.

To sow, bring forth, and unfold. The passage distinguishes celestial configuration from elemental production while coordinating both under one seed's realization. References: IV.2.15. See Sowing and weaving.

**serere / plantare.** Printed forms: *plantando*; *serendo*.

To sow and plant. Ordinary cultivation is contrasted with the alleged spontaneous emergence of plants without bodily seed or shoot. References: IV.1.14. See Putrefaction and propagation.

**series successionis.** Printed forms: *serie successionis*; *seriem successionis*.

An ordered succession or sequence. The law of fate consists in this ordering, whereas desire is assigned to the accompanying thought. References: IV.2.16. See Fate.

**servire / alienus.** Printed forms: *alieno*; *servit*.

Serve / belonging to another or alien. God cannot serve an external good as final cause, because that would make all goodness subordinate to a particular good. References: II.11.35. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**servire / depravare.** Printed forms: *depravata*; *servit*.

To serve; to corrupt or distort. Anger serves reason or desire; desire is reinforced by corrupted reason or anger, excluding the proposed isolation of one power. References: IV.1.44. See Reason anger and desire.

**si / sin.** Printed forms: *Si*; *Sin*.

If; but if or if instead. The alternatives about matter's possessing productive form are hypothetical branches used to test a proposed explanation, not assertions that both branches obtain. References: I.3.6. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**siccitas / humiditas.** Printed forms: *humiditas*; *siccitas*.

Dryness and moisture as opposed bodily conditions. Ficino says dryness unites and strengthens heat or cold while moisture disperses and weakens; these are historical natural-philosophical assertions. References: I.2.2. See Dispersion and concentration.

**signum.** Printed forms: *signum*.

A sign used as evidence for a claim. The twelve zodiacal creatures are a sign of the proposed number; spontaneous inward motion is a sign of interior life. Neither is treated as direct sensory perception of an incorporeal soul. References: IV.1.43, IV.1.69. See Seeming and evidence.

**similis / aequalis.** Printed forms: *aequales*; *persimiles*; *similes*.

Like in a specified respect and equal in a specified respect. Children are said to resemble parents in constitution and figure before equalling their size, separating qualitative likeness from quantitative equality. References: I.2.12. See Comparing, resembling and equalling.

**similis / dissimilis / similitudo.** Printed forms: *dissimillimum*; *similem*; *similes*; *similibus*; *simillimum*.

Like / unlike / likeness. The effect resembles its cause in form without retaining every perfection; becoming utterly unlike its cause is a different, rejected alternative. References: II.11.1, II.11.9, III.1.8. See Image and likeness.

**similis / similitudo.** Printed forms: *similia*; *similitudinem*.

Like, similar, or likeness. Agents produce likenesses according to their power; no finite collection exhausts the infinite exemplar’s possible imitations. References: II.7.5, II.10.5. See Image and likeness.

**simplex / simplicitas.** Printed forms: *simplex*; *simplicem*; *simplici*; *simplicissimam*; *simplicissimo*; *simplicissimus*; *simplicitas*; *simplicitate*; *simplicitatem*; *simpliciter*.

Simple, and simplicity. God’s power is connected with complete simplicity; angel’s internal number keeps it below this unity. References: I.6.5. See Simplicity and composition.

Simple or uncompounded; simplicity can exclude distinguishable constituents rather than only spatial parts. God’s identity of being and understanding is argued from supreme simplicity. References: II.1.1, II.7.9, II.9.13. See Simplicity and composition.

Simple / simplicity. One divine form knows many exemplary relations without being divided into a composite of separate forms. References: II.11.18. See Simplicity and composition.

**simul.** Printed forms: *simul*.

Together or at once. Abiding possession and actual simultaneity differ; body strives only approximately toward the soul’s wholly simultaneous presence. References: IV.2.9, IV.2.10, IV.2.25. See Habitual possession.

**simulacrum / color.** Printed forms: *colorem*; *colorum*; *simulacra*.

An image or likeness; color. Images of colors share air without confusion; colored glass and color-source light later serve different causal analogies. References: II.6.14, II.7.31, II.10.12. See Image and likeness.

**sine controversia.** Printed forms: *sine controversia*.

Without dispute, as an assertion of confidence. Ficino says Plato was called divine beyond dispute; the phrase intensifies his encomium and does not independently establish universal historical agreement. References: Proem.3. See Assent, approval and belief.

**sine medio.** Printed forms: *sine medio*.

Without an intermediary. Primary matter and spiritual essence require the cause capable of creation immediately, supporting that cause’s presence. References: II.6.2. See Cause.

**singulus / minimus / infimus.** Printed forms: *infima*; *infimarum*; *minimarum*; *minimas*; *singula*.

Individual, least, or lowest, with number and rank distinguished. Divine operation and knowledge reach individuals and the lowest things rather than only genera and species. References: II.9.13, II.9.14, II.10.1. See Universals and individuals.

**sistere / mitigare / repellere.** Printed forms: *mitigat*; *repellit*; *sistit*.

To stop, calm, and repel. The natural-lore list differentiates action upon bleeding, anger, and lightning or hail rather than one uniform healing property. References: IV.1.21. See Hierobotanum and mineral powers.

**sol / luna.** Printed forms: *luna*; *Luna*; *lunam*; *Sol*.

Sun / moon. The sun signifies God and the moon soul in the expressly stated analogy of differing reception. The astronomy is Ficino’s model. References: III.1.32. See Sun, Mercury and moon.

**soliditas / densitas / crassitudo.** Printed forms: *crassitudo*; *densitateque*; *soliditate*.

Solidity, density and thickness. They explain resistance to mutual bodily penetration, not every form of metaphysical dependence. References: I.2.2. See Body and bulk.

**sollicitare / sollicitudo / onerare.** Printed forms: *onerari*; *sollicitari*; *sollicitudine*.

To trouble or worry, anxiety, and burden. The imagined costs of many divine actions are answered by effortless activity through being. References: II.8.1, II.8.5. See Burden labor and ease.

**solus / solum.** Printed forms: *solum*; *solus*.

Alone or only. God alone creates matter without a subject; action through bare nature alone is rejected as sufficient. This exclusivity vocabulary is unrelated to sol, the sun. References: II.11.9, II.11.10. See Qualification and attribution.

**solutio quaestionum.** Printed forms: *solutionibus quaestionum*.

Resolutions of questions or difficulties. This is the fourth announced way of supporting the soul’s character, not a synonym for the first three modes. References: I.1.7. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**solvo / vincula / compedes.** Printed forms: *compedum*; *solvamus*; *vincula*.

To loosen; bonds and fetters. The repeated exhortation asks heavenly souls to loosen earthly fetters, then proceeds into philosophical demonstration rather than a prescription for bodily harm. References: I.1.2. See Prison and homeland.

**sortiri / adipisci.** Printed forms: *adipiscitur*; *sortitur*.

To obtain or acquire a share or condition. Obtaining one’s proper nature from elsewhere reveals dependence; no literal drawing of lots is asserted. References: II.2.5, II.7.14, II.9.1. See Dependence and receiving.

**speciem complere.** Printed forms: *compleant*; *complent*; *speciem*.

To constitute a complete species or kind. Embodied minds are parts of a composite living species; separate minds are said to complete their own kinds, distinguishing completeness from mere numerical individuality. References: I.5.16. See Species.

**species / genus.** Printed forms: *generum*; *genus*; *speciem*; *specierum*; *specierumque*; *species*.

A kind or intelligible determination; a genus grouping kinds. Species-unities remain determinate and multiple; divine knowledge also reaches the individuals belonging to them. References: II.2.7, II.2.8, II.9.15. See Universals and individuals.

**species / idea.** Printed forms: *idea*; *ideae*; *idearum*.

Idea as exemplary account. The whole’s principal idea includes proper accounts of its parts, while one divine essence remains simple. References: II.11.18. See Ideas and exemplars.

**species motionis.** Printed forms: *speciem motus*; *species alias*.

A kind of motion, distinguished from other kinds. A thing can change in one respect while remaining unchanged in another, so partial rest is consistent with motion. References: I.5.9. See Motion and stability.

**speculari.** Printed forms: *speculando*.

Contemplate. God’s self-contemplation is presented as compatible with external efficacy, rather than withdrawal from governance. References: II.11.15. See Self knowledge.

**speculum.** Printed forms: *speculo*; *speculum*.

A mirror used as an image of the created soul or mind. The soul reflects the divine countenance; the created mind is a mirror at the centre of things through which the Creator’s works may be contemplated. References: Proem.4, Proem.7. See Image and likeness.

Mirror. Soul is called the mirror of divine things while also life of mortal things; the image highlights cognition within a two-sided mediation. References: III.2.8. See Self knowledge.

**speculum / imago.** Printed forms: *imagines*; *speculo*.

Mirror and image, with causal and representational uses distinguished. Mirror images illustrate continuing dependence; God’s cognition does not acquire images from external things. References: II.7.23, II.9.20, II.10.5. See Image and likeness.

**sphaera.** Printed forms: *sphaeram*.

Sphere, the cosmic whole invoked in the Apollo hymn. The lyre harmonizes the whole sphere, extending musical language to cosmological order. References: II.9.22. See Spheres and stars.

**spirare.** Printed forms: *spirabit*.

To breathe. The impossibility of using none of the three powers is stressed by saying such a person would not even breathe. References: IV.1.44. See Reason anger and desire.

**spiritalia et vivifica semina.** Printed forms: *spiritalia et vivifica semina*.

Incorporeal, life-giving productive principles. They explain production where bodily seeds are absent and fostering where bodily seeds remain. References: IV.1.16. See Seeds.

**spiritual aid and confidence.** Printed forms: *Deo aspirante*; *divina dumtaxat ope confisi*.

With God inspiring; relying solely on divine aid. Ficino credits divine assistance for Plato's and his own philosophical work, preserving an authorial devotional statement rather than an independently evidenced causal mechanism. References: Proem.10. See Worship and piety.

**spiritus.** Printed forms: *spiritibus*; *spiritu*; *spiritui*; *Spiritus*; *spiritus*.

Spirit or spiritual substance, here rational and nonbodily. Rational spirit's asserted independence from matter supports the attributed presence theory; bodily spirit in other contexts must be distinguished. References: II.6.2, II.6.14, II.6.15, II.6.23. See Spirit.

**spiritus / spiritalis.** Printed forms: *spiritali*; *spiritalis*; *spiritum*.

Spirit as a medium / spiritual or non-bodily in manner. Sight's spirit joins a color-image, while soul's spiritual union with itself and higher things explains knowing at a different level. References: III.2.29. See Spiritual union.

**spontaneus / sponte.** Printed forms: *spontaneus*; *sponte*.

Spontaneous or from an inward source. Natural circular return is used as a sign of inner life, with ut ita loquar qualifying the description. References: IV.1.69, IV.1.70. See Motion and stability.

**spontaneus / voluntarius.** Printed forms: *spontaneumque*; *voluntarium*; *voluntariusque*.

Voluntary / spontaneous. The good's attraction is described as necessary and voluntary together, distinguishing necessity from imposed coercion. References: II.12.5. See Freedom and necessity.

**stabilis / instabilis / inordinatus.** Printed forms: *inordinataeque*; *instabiles*; *stabilem*.

Stable; unstable; unordered or lacking order. Individual qualities cannot independently explain stable generational succession and recurring appointed effects in Ficino's argument. References: I.3.11. See Natural species and succession.

**stabilis causa / opus.** Printed forms: *causa*; *opus*; *stabile*; *stabilis*.

An entirely stable cause and its stable work. The brief sentence explains why new variable effects require a mediating mutable activity. References: IV.2.17. See Motion and stability.

**stare / status.** Printed forms: *stare*; *status*.

Stand or remain stable / stability or state. Standing is explained through remaining in the unity of a nature, not merely occupying an unmoving spatial location. References: III.1.6, III.1.22. See Staying and preserving.

**statua / lapis / aes.** Printed forms: *aeris*; *lapidis*; *soliditatem*; *statua*.

Statue, stone, and bronze, with material solidity. The statue endures through natural firmness; aeris here is bronze rather than air. References: II.7.17. See Statue and solidity.

**status / stare.** Printed forms: *consistentem*; *stabiliore*; *stabilis*; *statu*; *status*.

Stability or abiding condition, opposed to flux in this setting. A stable source must guide dependent flow; eternity is substantial stability rather than accidental temporal succession. References: II.3.8, II.5.2, II.7.8. See Motion and stability.

**status / stat in motu.** Printed forms: *stat in motu*; *status*.

Stability; remaining stable in motion. The next unit explains this as preserved moving power and a same, equal or similar pattern, not literal absence of every motion. References: I.5.7, I.5.8. See Motion and stability.

**statutis temporibus / quovis tempore.** Printed forms: *quovis tempore*; *statutis*; *temporibus*.

At appointed times; at any time or throughout the recurring order. One and the same directing cause is inferred from recurrent effects, not from a claim that each individual quality remains permanently unchanged. References: I.3.11. See Natural species and succession.

**Stoici / Cynici.** Printed forms: *Cynicorumque*; *Stoicorum*.

The Stoics and Cynics in Ficino's classification. They are represented as reaching efficacious quality, which the argument subsequently refuses to treat as the highest principle. References: I.1.3, I.3.1. See Philosophers and stopping points.

**Strato / Chrysippus.** Printed forms: *Chrysippus*; *Strato*.

Named advocates, as represented here, of identifying cosmic life with the highest God. Their agreement about infused life is separated from the identification the Platonists reject. References: IV.1.22. See Strato, Chrysippus, and the Almariani.

**struthii oculus.** Printed forms: *struthii intuitus*; *struthii oculus*.

The ostrich's eye or gaze. The eye fixed upon the egg supplies Ficino's natural-lore illustration of affective efficacy, not verified incubation science. References: II.11.31, II.11.32. See Ostrich and egg.

**studium / incumbo.** Printed forms: *incubui*; *studium*.

Study or sustained pursuit, and to apply oneself closely. Ficino devotes himself to worship and the soul's divinity, while censuring a pursuit of philosophy severed from religion. References: Proem.7, Proem.8. See Philosophy and theology.

**stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis.** Printed forms: *gratia*; *idealis*; *perspicue*; *stultum*; *vulgo*.

Foolish, wisely, plainly, commonly, for the sake of, and ideal, with differing grammatical functions. These qualify Ficino's appraisals, evidential confidence, end-directed action, and comparison standard; they are not separate ontological grades. References: II.1.6, II.3.3, II.3.5, II.7.5, II.9.22. See Reason and account.

**suavis / naris.** Printed forms: *naribusque suavis*.

Pleasing to the nostrils. The honey example's phrase specifies fragrance as pleasant smell; it is not a fourth independent quality added to colour, sweetness and odour. References: I.2.15. See Honey, whiteness and the wall.

**suaviter / ordinate.** Printed forms: *ordinate*; *suaviter*.

Gently or agreeably, and in an ordered way. These adverbs distinguish nourishment from destructive heat; they are descriptions within Ficino's physiological analogy rather than medical advice. References: I.3.23. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**sub propria persona.** Printed forms: *sub propria persona*.

In one’s own person or speaking voice. Ficino represents Plato as speaking in his own voice in the Epinomis quotation. This remains Ficino’s attribution and does not certify modern authorship of the work. References: IV.1.96. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**subdere / subicere.** Printed forms: *subditur*; *subiciatur*.

To subordinate to an agent or governing power. The celestial impulse can contribute to generation as the instrument of an element’s common life. References: IV.1.3, IV.1.4. See Instrument.

**subicere / tollere / removere.** Printed forms: *subici*; *sublata*; *sublato*; *submota*.

To subject to a limit or remove a supporting condition. Removing life stops motion in Ficino’s argument; removing good or preserving cause removes being. References: II.4.1, II.6.5, II.7.21. See Affection and passivity.

**subiectum.** Printed forms: *subiecta*; *subiecti*; *subiectis*; *subiecto*; *subiectum*.

An underlying recipient or bearer, sometimes a prior material basis. Received act can be limited by its subject, while creation does not presuppose a borrowed substrate. References: II.4.1, II.4.2, II.4.6, II.6.8. See Matter.

Underlying subject or recipient. A material subject bears heat; divine creation of minds and matter is distinguished from production within such a preexisting recipient. References: II.11.3, II.11.9. See Matter.

**subiectus, ruled subject.** Printed forms: *subiectis*.

Those subject to a dominion. At the close of Book I, the Good’s rule is necessary and voluntary for its subjects; these are governed beings, not merely the material substrates called subiecta elsewhere. References: I.6.19. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**subire.** Printed forms: *subire*.

Enter or assume a condition. The first agent cannot assume the condition of a subject that receives qualities from another source. References: II.11.4. See Affection and passivity.

**subito / paulatim.** Printed forms: *paulatim*; *subito*.

Immediately / gradually. The contrast separates presentation and arousal from the painter’s successive observation and execution. References: III.1.27, III.1.28. See Motion and stability.

**sublatus.** Printed forms: *Sublata*.

Removed or taken away. Removing diversity of media and materials supplies a hypothetical test of the agent’s own contribution. References: II.11.9. See Fire and variable materials.

**subsisto / dependeo.** Printed forms: *dependet*; *subsistere*; *subsistit*.

To subsist and to depend. Lying in a subject is used to infer dependence on another; later soul’s self-subsistence removes dependence on material support, not all dependence on a higher cause. References: I.3.4, I.3.33. See Support, inherence and dependence.

**successio / curriculum.** Printed forms: *curriculis*; *successione*.

Succession and a recurring course or cycle. Stable generations and appointed times are used to infer one enduring directive cause behind unstable qualities. References: I.3.11. See Natural species and succession.

**successio singulorum.** Printed forms: *generationis successionem*; *singulorum successionem*.

Succession of individuals or generated instances. A species can be perpetually maintained through changing individuals, unlike the substantial stability of mind and soul. References: IV.1.87. See Natural species and succession.

**successione saltem.** Printed forms: *successione saltem*.

At least through succession. Matter attains in sequence what contrary forms prevent its possessing together in stable simultaneity. References: IV.2.20. See Striving and enjoyment.

**sufficere / geminus.** Printed forms: *geminas*; *sufficit*.

To suffice; two as a distinct pair. One soul suffices for each continuous elemental globe, but earth and water require two species-different souls. References: IV.1.35. See Earth soul.

**sufficere / sufficientia.** Printed forms: *sufficere*; *sufficiens*; *sufficientiam*; *sufficiet*.

To be enough or sufficient for a task; sufficiency. A duplicate world is surplus if one suffices; inability to suffice in operation signals deeper dependence. References: II.2.3, II.2.12, II.7.16. See Need and sufficiency.

**sufficientia / sufficienter.** Printed forms: *sufficienter*; *sufficientiam*.

Sufficiency for a specified task or mode of being. Quality’s insufficiency in existing grounds its insufficiency in operating; the argument does not deny all qualitative action. References: I.3.7. See Need and sufficiency.

**suffragor.** Printed forms: *suffragantibus*.

To support or favour a cause. The Platonic reasons are said to support religion; they do not receive the support in this grammatical construction. References: Proem.8. See Assent, approval and belief.

**sui iuris.** Printed forms: *sui iuris*.

One’s own master or under one’s own right. The juridical idiom expresses relative independence, brought to its maximum in God. References: II.12.7. See Governing, serving and dominion.

**sulfur / quasi spiritalia.** Printed forms: *quasi spiritalia*; *sulfur*.

Sulfur; almost spiritual through exceptional subtlety. Readiness to ignite supplies an analogy for celestial bodies’ readiness to receive animation; almost spiritual still describes bodies. References: IV.1.72. See Spirit.

**summus / summum.** Printed forms: *summa*; *summae*; *summum*; *summus*.

Supreme, at the summit of a kind or of all things. The argument combines uniqueness with purity: supreme light is one light and light alone. References: II.2.5, II.2.6, II.2.7. See Perfection.

**super omne / sub omni.** Printed forms: *sub omni*; *super omne*.

Above the whole; below the whole. God’s simple unity is distinguished from articulated totalities and the individual bodies beneath them. References: IV.2.3. See Whole and parts.

**superare / e converso.** Printed forms: *e converso*; *superat*.

To surpass; conversely or with the order reversed. The paired two-faculty lives are counted separately according to which member dominates. References: IV.1.48, IV.1.49. See Reason anger and desire.

**superesse / discedere.** Printed forms: *discedentibus*; *superesse*.

To remain over or survive; to depart. The remaining light for souls departing bodily imprisonment is the conclusion Ficino says seems necessary; it is not yet the whole promised demonstration of immortality. References: I.1.1. See Immortality.

**superficies / fundus.** Printed forms: *funditus*; *fundo*; *superficiem*.

Surface; depth; fundamentally or to the depths. Human surface work is contrasted with substantial formation from the depths of matter. References: IV.1.13. See Surface and depth.

**superior / inferior.** Printed forms: *Inferiora*; *inferiorem*; *inferiores*; *inferiori*; *inferioribus*; *inferioris*; *superior*; *superiore*; *superioribus*; *superioris*.

Higher and lower in causal rank, scope, or perfection. A higher cause is expected to impart a greater perfection, and the regress argument tests an endless hierarchy. References: II.1.3, II.1.6, II.3.9. See Degree and mediation.

**superior / inferior / propinquus.** Printed forms: *propinqua*; *propinquior*; *propinquius*.

Higher / lower / near. These specify causal and ranked relations; proximity in perfection is not automatically physical distance. References: III.1.14, III.1.26. See Degree and mediation.

**sursum / deorsum.** Printed forms: *deorsum*; *sursum*.

Upward and downward. They first describe light and heavy bodies' tendencies, then the living power's movement of food contrary to those tendencies as life requires. References: I.2.2, I.3.23. See Natural motion and natural place.

**susceptivus / passivus.** Printed forms: *passiva*; *passivam*; *susceptiva*; *susceptivam*.

Receptive / capable of undergoing. Potency is predicated of body, soul, and angel in different respects; soul's acquisition through change is one receptive mode. References: III.1.9, III.1.10. See Power and potency.

**suscipere.** Printed forms: *suscipere*; *suscipit*; *suscipitur*.

Take up or receive. The receiving mode belongs to the recipient; soul's gradual reception is contrasted with angel's immediate fullness. References: III.1.9, III.1.32. See Receiving and giving.

**suspicari.** Printed forms: *suspicetur*.

Suspect or entertain a supposition. The warning forbids entertaining the thought that God's being and activity occur by chance; this differs from suspicere, look upward. References: II.12.2. See Qualification and attribution.

**tabernaculum / statua / pila.** Printed forms: *pilae*; *pilam*; *statuae*; *tabernaculum*.

Constructed display / figure / ball. The connected and balanced figures perform different actions from the movement of one ball. References: II.13.13. See Florentine mechanism.

**tabula / pingere / color.** Printed forms: *coloribus*; *pingendi*; *pingere*; *tabula*.

Panel / paint / color. Painting proceeds flower by flower and later becomes the metaphor for soul's gradual intellectual and ethical self-formation. References: III.1.27, III.1.28, III.1.31. See Apelles and the meadow.

**tangere.** Printed forms: *tangendum*; *tangit*.

Touch or reach. Soul's contact cannot be confined to one bodily point and is later explained through indivisible power rather than quantitative breadth. References: III.2.9, III.2.19. See Point and position.

**tangere / attingere.** Printed forms: *attingeret*; *Attingit*; *attingit*; *attingunt*; *tangent*; *tangi*; *tangit*.

To touch or reach, with the mode determined by bodily or spiritual subject. Incorporeal contact is through power rather than quantitative dimensions; mental reaching is not bodily travel. References: II.6.1, II.6.17, II.6.23. See Touch and penetration.

To touch or reach, physically or through mediating power. Contact between sphere surfaces, alleged daemon tangibility, craft's surface action, and mind's bodily reach are different constructions. References: IV.1.13, IV.1.31, IV.1.39, IV.2.25. See Proximity and causal presence.

**temperantia / intemperantia.** Printed forms: *intemperantia*; *temperantiam*.

Balanced and imbalanced bodily condition. The contrast concerns fitness for life and cognition, not primarily ethical self-restraint. References: IV.1.73. See Purity and mixture.

**temperare.** Printed forms: *temperans*; *temperas*; *temperat*.

Moderate or bring into a fitting condition. Heaven is said to temper earth and water in the historical account of provisioning living things. References: II.13.16. See Providential provision.

To order or regulate by fitting adjustment; to tune. Nature orders matter inwardly, while Apollo tunes heaven through the musical comparison. References: IV.1.11, IV.1.52. See Art and nature.

**temperatio / aequabilis.** Printed forms: *aequabilior*; *temperatio*; *temperatione*.

An ordered constitution; more uniform. The argument compares heavenly arrangement with the constitution moving animal limbs, without describing the bronze device's mechanics. References: IV.1.63. See Archimedes and the bronze spheres.

**tempus / temporalis.** Printed forms: *temporale*; *temporalem*; *temporali*; *temporalis*; *temporis*; *tempus*; *tempusque*.

Time and temporal succession, as distinguished from stable eternity. Temporal moments and endless progression differ from the simple duration called divine sempiternity. References: II.5.1, II.6.17, II.10.3. See Eternity and time.

Time / temporal. Soul's operation runs through succession; this temporal division differs from spatial partition of its substance. References: III.1.28, III.2.21. See Eternity and time.

**tenebrae / caecus.** Printed forms: *caeco*; *tenebris*.

Darkness and blind or unlit. Bodily confinement is portrayed as darkness preventing sight of the soul's divinity; the image diagnoses spiritual inattention rather than visual disability. References: I.1.2. See Prison and homeland.

**tenor.** Printed forms: *tenore*.

A consistent course or manner. Eodem semper tenore describes fire’s uniform manner of heating in the limited causal model. References: II.11.8. See Fire and variable materials.

**tenor / lex.** Printed forms: *lege*; *tenorem*.

A sustained course and an ordering law. Regular cosmic motion is attributed to stable higher direction; law here concerns cosmological order rather than a written civic statute. References: I.5.18. See Order and harmony.

**tenuari / clarescere / hebescere.** Printed forms: *clarescit*; *hebescit*; *tenuatur*.

Grow fine / grow bright / become dull. The air analogy assigns different features through affinity with fire and water, illustrating mediation through shared qualities. References: III.2.8. See Degree and mediation.

**terminare / finire.** Printed forms: *finiri*; *finit*; *finita*; *finitam*; *finiti*; *finito*; *finitum*; *terminante*; *termino*; *terminum*.

To limit or bound; a term or limit can also serve as an end. A subject or cause bounds received being, but infinite self-knowledge does not impose an external limit. References: II.4.1, II.4.2, II.6.4, II.10.10. See Bounds and restriction.

**termino.** Printed forms: *terminandum*.

To determine or supply a completion. What does not rest in itself requires a more perfect source of its terminus; the passive construction identifies dependence. References: I.5.6. See End and limit.

**terminus / infinitum.** Printed forms: *infinito*; *terminum*.

Limit / indefinite or unlimited. Ficino interprets the attributed Philebus contrast as actuality forming potency, not simply finite and infinite spatial magnitudes. References: III.1.11. See End and limit.

**terminus operationis.** Printed forms: *utrumque terminum*.

A term or endpoint of an activity. Intellectual activity retains both terms within the agent, unlike heating that begins in fire and ends in wood. References: II.11.14. See Act and operation.

**terminus vivendi.** Printed forms: *terminum vivendi*.

The endpoint of living. Ficino’s conditional asks what would follow if human beings had precisely the same final endpoint as other creatures; the conditional must not be omitted. References: I.1.1. See End and limit.

**ternarius / novenarius / septenarius / duodenarius.** Printed forms: *duodenario*; *duodenarium*; *novenarioque*; *septenario*; *ternario*.

Numerical classifications by three, nine, seven and twelve. These distinguish orders rather than supply an unambiguous sum of individual angels; the paired highest/middle syntax is rendered distributively by the edition. References: I.5.27. See Dionysius, Daniel and numerical orders.

**tertia essentia.** Printed forms: *essentia*; *tertia*.

The third essence, identified prospectively as rational soul. Its independence from bodily parts and material subject is argued here; subsequent chapters distinguish its stable essence from changing operation. References: I.3.33. See Soul.

**Thomas Aquinas.** Printed forms: *Thomae Aquinati*.

Thomas Aquinas, the named theological authority. Ficino cites him on necessity following a divine willing already posited, distinguished from absolute necessity toward God’s own goodness. References: II.12.15. See Freedom and necessity.

**Timaeus / Timaeus Locrus.** Printed forms: *Locrus*; *Timaeus*.

Timaeus / Timaeus of Locri. The divine preservation knot is attributed to Timaeus; the divisible–indivisible soul account names Timaeus of Locri alongside Plato. References: III.1.5, III.2.22. See Indivisibility.

**tollo / traho / transfero.** Printed forms: *tollit*; *trahit*; *transfert*.

To lift, draw and transfer. A spark and falling wood illustrate physical direction; the mind’s self-transfer toward substantial unity uses analogous movement vocabulary for cognition. References: I.2.2, I.3.13. See Ascent.

**torpere / suscitare.** Printed forms: *suscitet*; *torpent*; *torpentia*.

Be inert / awaken or stir up. The mediation argument requires a mutable nature able to approach and enliven otherwise inert bodies. References: III.1.26. See Life.

**tota simul.** Printed forms: *tota simul*.

Wholly together at once. Angelic life’s completeness is contrasted with soul’s life extended across successive inward acts; endless duration alone does not supply this simultaneity. References: I.5.2. See Eternity and time.

**tractus / trahere.** Printed forms: *tractu*; *trahunt*.

Pull or drawing / draw. A single drawing of the imagined sinew coordinates differentiated movements; elsewhere dragging is contrasted with persuasion of souls. References: II.13.12, II.13.26. See Turning and direction.

**trames.** Printed forms: *tramitem*.

A single track or route. A predetermined route and externally bounded destination are evidence against a part’s independent self-motion. References: IV.1.76. See Natural motion and natural place.

**trames / oberrare.** Printed forms: *oberras*; *tramite*.

Path or track / wander about. Aimless movement supplies the contrast to stable movement toward a prescribed destination. References: II.13.15. See Paths and prescribed ends.

**transcendo / proveho.** Printed forms: *provehamur*; *transcendamus*.

To pass beyond and to advance. These hortatory verbs move the reader from corporeal form to incorporeal third essence; the ascent is explanatory rather than bodily travel. References: I.3.33. See Ascent.

**transferre / assequi.** Printed forms: *assequatur*; *assequitur*; *transferre*.

Transfer or move to another state / acquire or attain. The immobility argument asks whether a supposed divine change gains something new, which would imply previous incompleteness. References: III.1.6. See Motion and stability.

**transigo / perago / consummation.** Printed forms: *consumaret*; *peragitur*; *transigitur*.

To accomplish, carry through or finish. The bodily action example separates gradual completion from late completion across space. The apparatus retains consumaret with an

implicit agent rather than the later passive regularization. References: I.2.4. See Act and operation.

**translatio.** Printed forms: *translationem*.

Transfer of expression or metaphor. Ficino explicitly says that calling direct intellectual ordering counsel is a metaphor, explained by acting for ends rather than successive investigation. References: II.13.18. See Counsel and settled skill.

**tribuere / tradere.** Printed forms: *tradit*; *tribuimus*.

To attribute a name or hand down a teaching. John’s theology is presented as transmitted authority; intellectual designations of God are explicitly qualified. References: II.3.10, II.9.12. See Naming by cause.

**tuba / cornu / cantus.** Printed forms: *cantus*; *cornuum*; *Tubarum*.

Trumpet / horn / song. The report includes sounds alongside movement, widening the variety produced through the device’s arrangement. References: II.13.13. See Florentine mechanism.

**tunc demum affirmanda.** Printed forms: *tunc demum affirmanda*.

To be affirmed only then, under the following condition. The sphere-soul account remains conditional upon careful examination and Christian theological approval, not stated to have occurred. References: IV.1.96. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**ubique / nusquam / ubi.** Printed forms: *nusquam*; *Nusquam*; *ubi*; *ubique*.

Everywhere, nowhere, and where, sometimes treated as substantive names. God is nowhere as uncontained, nowhere absent as sustaining all, and the condition through which where exists. References: II.6.8, II.6.13. See Always and everywhere.

**umbra.** Printed forms: *umbra*; *umbram*.

Shadow. Subordinate rank explains limitation in III.1; a vital manifestation divided with body is a distinct sense in III.2. References: III.1.17, III.1.19, III.2.19. See Shadows and dependence.

**umbra / res vera.** Printed forms: *rebus veris*; *umbras*; *umbris*.

A shadow contrasted with true realities. The Proem rebukes preference for sensory shadows; this is an evaluative hierarchy, not a denial that sensory appearances occur. References: Proem.9. See Image and likeness.

**umbra / umbratilis / vanus.** Printed forms: *imaginarium*; *umbra*; *umbratilis*; *vanior*; *vanum*; *vanus*.

Shadow or shadow-like; relatively empty or image-like. The words compare dependent effects with the substance of their cause rather than declaring creatures unreal. References: II.7.22, II.7.23. See Shadow and mirror.

**umbra arborum in torrente.** Printed forms: *arborum*; *in torrente*; *umbras*.

Shadows of trees in a stream. The reported Plotinian image makes qualities shadowy and fleeting; it is an image of instability, not a literal composition of matter. References: I.3.19. See Image and likeness.

**unio / augeo.** Printed forms: *auget*; *augetur*; *unione*.

Union and increase. Ficino says power increases by union, yet concentrating a body also increases thickness, producing the action model’s trade-off. References: I.2.2. See Dispersion and concentration.

**unire.** Printed forms: *uniri*.

Unite or join. The most perfect union in God is explained as identity with God in that mode, not coexistence as many substances. References: II.11.7. See Unity and multiplicity.

**unitas / unio.** Printed forms: *unitas*; *unitate*; *unitatem*; *unitates*; *unitati*; *unitatis*.

Unity as simplicity or unifying condition; union as the joining by which many form a whole. A proposed source above unity would make unity composite and itself lack any coherent whole or parts. References: II.1.1, II.1.3, II.2.7. See Unity and multiplicity.

**unitas accidentalis / substantialis.** Printed forms: *accidentalem*; *substantialem*; *unitatem*.

Accidental unity and substantial unity. Ficino rises beyond the indivisible unit toward a subsisting essence that grounds accidents; indivisibility alone does not finish the ascent. References: I.3.13. See Point, position and mathematical ascent.

**universalis / universalia.** Printed forms: *universale*; *universalem*; *universales*; *universali*; *universalia*; *universalis*.

Universal in causal scope or in the principles known. Intellect adds universal principles without losing clearer knowledge of individuals; universal cause is present to universal effect. References: II.6.2, II.7.30, II.9.16, II.9.17. See Universals and individuals.

**unum simpliciter.** Printed forms: *unum ipsum*; *unum simpliciter*.

The One without qualification; unity itself. One mind remains both mind and one, so the ascent passes beyond it to unrestricted unity. References: IV.1.51. See Unity and multiplicity.

**unum vivens.** Printed forms: *unam habeat animam*; *unam vitam*; *unum vivens*.

One living being, life, and soul. The argument links the unity of the world’s life to one animating source, without thereby eliminating subordinate souls. References: IV.1.80. See World soul.

**unus / unitas / multitudo.** Printed forms: *multitudo*; *unitas*; *unum*.

One / unity / multiplicity. The grades combine unity and multiplicity differently; nonspatial multiplicity in angel and soul does not imply bodily pieces. References: III.1.1, III.1.2, III.1.4, III.1.5. See Unity and multiplicity.

**urere / frigefacere.** Printed forms: *frigefacerentque*; *urerent*.

To burn or cool. Isolated elemental qualities have restricted effects; living nature directs them toward varied organic forms. References: IV.1.18. See Quality.

**usurpare / superesse.** Printed forms: *superest*; *usurpare*.

To claim or appropriate; to remain beyond what has been realized. Finite things cannot lay claim to the whole exemplar’s perfection, so a further mode of imitation always remains. References: II.10.5. See Image and likeness.

**ut plurimum.** Printed forms: *ut plurimum*.

For the most part. Embodied minds generally turn to sensible things in order to understand; the qualification prevents making this an exceptionless dependence claim. References: I.5.16, I.5.17. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**uti / usus.** Printed forms: *usu*; *uti*; *utitur*.

To employ a power; its use. The twelve-life scheme counts patterns of using faculties together, excluding the isolated use of only one. References: IV.1.44, IV.1.45, IV.1.47. See Reason anger and desire.

**vacatio appetendi.** Printed forms: *appetendi vacationem*.

Cessation or freedom from desiring. Even wanting to desire no further is presented as choosing that rest under the aspect of good. References: II.13.29. See Appetite and desire.

**vacillo.** Printed forms: *vacillaret*.

To waver or vacillate. If the higher cause changed as completely as quality, it would not surpass quality sufficiently; the verb expresses instability rather than indecision. References: I.4.4. See Motion and stability.

**vagari / consultare.** Printed forms: *consultando*; *vagatur*.

To wander; to deliberate or consider. Cosmic wisdom does not wander in action because it does not err in its counsel; regularity is interpreted as rational success. References: IV.1.84. See Choice and deliberation.

**vagus / variabilis.** Printed forms: *vagos*; *variabili*.

Wandering or variable. Mobile causes produce less stable effects; this variability is incorporated into providential order rather than excluded from it. References: II.12.20. See Contingency.

**valere / praestare.** Printed forms: *valeant*; *valeat*; *valere*.

To be capable or effective. The mind’s ability to break mortal confinement and quality’s inability to originate itself require different grounds; “can” is not one technical causal relation in every sentence. References: I.1.3, I.3.2, I.3.5. See Power and potency.

**vanus / umbratilis.** Printed forms: *umbratiles*; *vanissimum*.

Empty or tenuous in being, and shadow-like. These words belong to the reported Plotinian description of dimensions and qualities as fleeting passive affections, not to an independent claim that perception is impossible. References: I.3.19. See Image and likeness.

**vas / aquae summum.** Printed forms: *in aquae summo*; *vas*; *vasis*.

A vessel and the surface of water. The apparatus explains the compressed example as air in a vessel’s upper part supporting it at the water’s surface, even under added weight. References: I.2.5. See Fire, spark, lightning and cannon.

**velle / nolle.** Printed forms: *nolle*; *velimus*; *velle*; *volumus*; *voluntaria*; *vult*.

To will or wish, and not to will. The wish to be unable not to will the Good expresses Ficino’s proposed coincidence of necessity and willing acceptance, not coercion into one particular act. References: I.6.19. See Wishing, refusing and the good.

To will or refuse; willing cognition in the divine case. Opposing equal wills produce contradiction in the two-god supposition; voluntary cognition later characterizes divine action. References: II.2.14, II.9.13. See Will.

**velle / nolle / malle.** Printed forms: *malle*; *nolle*; *nolunt*; *volunt*; *vult*.

Will / refuse or not will / prefer. Willing good itself is distinguished from choosing particular means and from preferring the whole's good to a part's apparent advantage. References: II.12.19, II.13.28, II.13.29. See Will.

**velox / tardus.** Printed forms: *tardius*; *velocior*; *velocius*; *velox*.

Swift or slow; comparative speed. Variable speed marks mutable living agency, while speed ordered into perpetual celestial motion supports the inference to inward life. References: IV.1.28, IV.1.74, IV.1.84. See Motion and stability.

**veneror / veneratio.** Printed forms: *veneratione*; *veneremur*.

To venerate, and reverence directed toward an object. The cause of causes is to be venerated once found; the author hopes his work's truth matches his reverence for divine truth. References: Proem.3, Proem.10. See Worship and piety.

**venter / fetus.** Printed forms: *fetus*; *ventrem*.

Womb or belly; offspring brought forth. The maternal anatomy helps argue for earth's life; it is an explicit bodily image applied to the earth. References: IV.1.2. See Earth as mother.

**verbum / significatio / significare.** Printed forms: *significat*; *significatio*; *verbi*; *verbum*.

Word, meaning, and signifying. Mind is compared first to a divine word and then more precisely to its meaning in the reported presence theory. References: II.6.20, II.6.21. See Word and meaning.

**vergere.** Printed forms: *vergerent*.

To tend or incline toward. Without a determinate principle a cause would have no special tendency toward this effect rather than another. References: IV.1.6. See Contraction and determination.

**veridicus.** Printed forms: *veridica*.

Truth-bearing or infallible in this context. If mind were identical with truth, every mind would be infallible; human error is the counterexample Ficino uses. References: I.6.10. See Truth.

**veritas / verus.** Printed forms: *Veritas*; *veritas*; *veritate*; *veritatem*; *veritatis*; *Verum*; *verum*.

Truth and genuine or true being, with propositional and ontological uses distinguished. Pure wine illustrates genuineness; the eternity proof concerns what is true before and after supposed temporal limits Adversative verum is separately explained; not every occurrence of that written form means true. References: II.1.1, II.1.3, II.5.1, II.7.3. See Truth.

**vero / verum: connectives.** Printed forms: *vero*; *Verum*; *verum*.

Adversative or emphatic connectives, and the but-also member of non solum…verum etiam. Vero is a discourse connective in the inspected scope. Verum is connective in II.1.3's opening and II.2.1, but also genuinely means true elsewhere; occurrences require context. References: II.1.3, II.2.1, II.2.2, II.7.15, II.10.1. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

**versari / versare.** Printed forms: *versat*; *versatur*.

Be occupied or turn oneself / turn other things. The change of grammatical voice joins divine self-contemplation to governance of external things. References: II.11.15. See Turning and direction.

**vestigium.** Printed forms: *vestigia*; *vestigium*.

A trace through which something further is sought. The Proem's movement through individual traces leads back to soul as mirror, so a trace is an evidential route rather than identity with its source. References: Proem.4. See Traces.

A trace indicating a source or embodying its causal contribution. Universal unity, truth, and goodness point to their source; being is later the first cause's enduring impression. References: II.1.2, II.7.32. See Traces.

**via.** Printed forms: *viam*; *vias*.

Path, route, or means. The route is assessed for its proportion to an intended good; the image connects cognition with practical direction. References: II.11.25, II.11.26. See Paths and prescribed ends.

**via / pactum / tractus.** Printed forms: *pacto*; *tractum*; *via*.

Way or manner, and a stretch in the spatial image. Qua via means the route of an explanation, while nullo pacto means in no way; a line's stretch belongs to imagination's substitute. References: II.2.2, II.2.13, II.6.13, II.9.1. See Reason and account.

**vibrare / affectio.** Printed forms: *affectiones*; *vibrantur*.

To be stirred or set in motion; psychic conditions. The bodily analogy uses human spirits and humors stirred by thought and affect to explain changing cosmic effects. References: IV.2.16. See Affect.

**vicem gerere.** Printed forms: *gerit subiecti vicem*; *vicem genitricis substantiae gerit*; *vicem gerit*.

Occupy or perform another role. The same hypothetical subject would count as efficient cause insofar as giving and as recipient insofar as receiving. References: II.11.3. See Receiving and giving.

To perform the office of a generative substance. Living nature supplies the substantial role that accidental qualities cannot adequately perform alone. References: IV.1.19. See Substance and accident.

**vicissim / invicem.** Printed forms: *invicem*; *vicissim*.

Reciprocally or in turn / mutually. The adverbs mark exchange and mutual connection; a shared order coordinates distinct agents without making them identical. References: II.13.4. See Exchange and reconciliation.

**vicissitudo.** Printed forms: *vicissitudine*.

Alternation or changing succession. The moon's varying reception represents soul's successive operation despite a stable higher gift. References: III.1.32. See Sun, Mercury and moon.

Alternation or successive exchange. Celestial motion is said to illuminate and foster the elemental globe equally on every side. References: IV.2.20. See Circularity and return.

**videor habere / revera possideo.** Printed forms: *possideant*; *revera*; *videantur habere*.

To seem to possess, contrasted with actual possession. Some are satisfied with seeming wise, Ficino says, yet demand actual possession of what they chiefly judge good for life; appearance and possession are distinguished. References: I.6.18. See Good and goodness.

**videre / visibilis.** Printed forms: *invisibile*; *videt*; *visibile*.

To see or behold, physically or intellectually; visible and invisible. Seeing the divine essence includes knowing the modes of its communication; visible light supplies only an analogy of invisible light. References: II.6.11, II.9.15, II.9.16. See Eye and gaze.

**videtur.** Printed forms: *videantur*; *videtur*.

It seems or appears, with the claim qualified by its construction. The opening immortality conclusion “seems necessary,” while the reported historical stopping point of Anaxagoras and Hermotimus “seems” to be angelic mind; retain the differing evidential force. References: I.1.1, I.1.5. See Proof, signs and qualification.

**vigeo / prodo.** Printed forms: *proditur*; *viget*.

To flourish or be vigorous; to bring forth or make manifest. Passive proditur means is brought forth into act. A greater power is said to appear in act more fully and quickly; the inference moves from human mental ability to the order of the universe. References: I.3.13. See Power and potency.

**vigor.** Printed forms: *vigor*.

Effective energy or strength. God is called pure vigor of acting, separated from the recipient’s mode of undergoing. References: III.1.10. See Act and operation.

**vilis / pretiosus / nobilis.** Printed forms: *nobilem*; *pretiosiora*; *pretiosissima*; *viliora*; *vilissima*; *vilissimarum*.

Lowly, precious, or excellent in rank and common appraisal. The whole order includes relations among higher and lower things, so divine knowledge must distinguish both. References: II.9.20, II.9.21, II.9.22. See Precious and lowly.

**vim inferre.** Printed forms: *vim inferre*.

Do violence or impose force. Ficino forestalls the inference that divine choice compels every created cause to act in one unvarying manner. References: II.12.19. See Persuasion and compulsion.

**vincire / connectere.** Printed forms: *connectere*; *vinciuntur*.

To bind and connect. The world-soul’s whole presence is argued to be necessary for perfect cosmic unity, life, and motion. References: IV.1.83. See World soul.

**vinculum / connecto.** Printed forms: *connectit*; *vinculum*.

A bond; to join or connect. Rational soul is called indissoluble insofar as it binds the levels of nature; the bond is its mediating activity, not a physical chain. References: I.1.7. See Bond knot and chain.

**vinum.** Printed forms: *vinum*.

Wine, the familiar material example used to explain genuineness. True wine is pure wine; the illustration links truth with a thing remaining genuinely what it is. References: II.1.1. See Truth.

**violentia / usus vitae.** Printed forms: *usus vitae*; *violentia*.

Violence and the requirements or use of life. The organism moves heavy and light materials beyond their normal directions without manifest violence as life requires; the qualification manifesta should remain. References: I.3.23. See Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**violentus / violentia.** Printed forms: *violentia*; *violentiam*; *violentum*.

Forced or contrary to the fitting natural course. Ficino argues that violence cannot explain motion that is enduring, uniform, and ordered. References: IV.1.54, IV.1.56. See Motion and stability.

**viridis / rubens.** Printed forms: *rubens*; *viridis*.

Green / red. Colored light illustrates light qualified by something further; the example explains restricted actuality rather than purity as moral worth. References: III.1.10. See Light and illumination.

**vis / inscitia.** Printed forms: *inscitia*; *vi*.

Force and ignorance. They are the two routes to deterioration excluded from pure free mind within the argument; the exclusion belongs to that defined subject. References: I.6.17. See Freedom and necessity.

**vis / vires.** Printed forms: *vi*; *vim*; *vis*.

Force or power, in singular or plural. A received force would compromise unity’s simplicity; divine universal force is differentiated through narrower agents. References: II.1.3, II.4.3, II.7.30. See Power and potency.

**vis / virtus / potestas.** Printed forms: *potestas*; *virtus*; *vis*.

Power, efficacy, or capacity. The context distinguishes receptive capacity from active power; vis in the soul’s presence argument replaces quantitative breadth as the mode of contact. References: III.1.9, III.2.12, III.2.24. See Power and potency.

**vis gemina.** Printed forms: *vim geminam*.

A paired or twofold power. The Orphic naming scheme separates knowing from vivifying and governing the sphere’s body. References: IV.1.94. See Intellectual and animating powers.

**visus / videre.** Printed forms: *videt*; *Visus*.

Sight / see. Sight receives the spiritual image of colors rather than the solid object placed directly upon the eyes. References: III.2.29. See Spiritual union.

**vita / vivere / vivificare.** Printed forms: *vita*; *Vita*; *vitali*; *vitam*; *vivant*; *vivat*; *vivente*; *vivere*; *vivificando*; *vivificans*; *vivificat*; *vivit*.

Life, living, and giving life. Goodness has wider scope than life; animating minds give life while angelic minds govern in the reported theory. References: II.6.5, II.6.23, II.6.24, II.8.3. See Life.

Life / live / give life. The third essence is life that animates bodies; its intelligent activity and its life-giving effect are both needed in the definition. References: III.2.23, III.2.24, III.2.29. See Life.

**vita sine sensu.** Printed forms: *sine sensu*; *vita*.

Life without sensation. The existence of nonsentient life supports an analogy from what is prior to what can exist separately; life and sensing are not treated as identical. References: I.3.26. See Life.

**vita vitarum.** Printed forms: *vita vitarum*.

Life of lives. God is placed above bodily vivifying lives and purely intellectual angelic lives, rather than identified with either. References: IV.1.31. See Life.

**vitis / vinaceus.** Printed forms: *vinaceo*; *vitem*; *vites*; *vitis*.

Vine; belonging to a grape seed in this phrase. The vine supplies both an example of species-specific production and a contrast between decaying seed and rich living result. References: IV.1.9, IV.1.17. See Vine and grape seed.

**vitrum / fenestra / pavimentum.** Printed forms: *fenestras*; *pavimento*; *vitreas*; *vitrum*.

Glass, window, and pavement. Colored windows shape sunlight into distinct radiances on the floor, illustrating differentiated dependent causation. References: II.7.31. See Glass and colored radiance.

**vivere ut vult.** Printed forms: *Vivit ut vult*; *vivit ut vult*.

Live as one wills. This formulation defines freedom in the argument; goodness itself is then said to satisfy it supremely. References: II.12.4. See Freedom and necessity.

**volente Deo.** Printed forms: *volente Deo*.

God willing. The conventional qualification accompanies the announced next proof and differs from the technical analysis of divine will that follows. References: II.11.24. See Qualification and attribution.

**voluntas / memoria.** Printed forms: *memoriae*; *voluntatis*.

Will and memory. Their stability is presented as a sign of soul’s stable essence; this is a sign within Ficino’s argument, not a claim that every act of remembering is unchanging. References: I.5.1. See Habitual possession.

**voluptas.** Printed forms: *voluptatem*.

Pleasure as a possible object of preference. People may prefer pleasure to contemplation, showing knowledge’s subordinate status relative to what is taken as good; this is not an unrestricted endorsement of every pleasure. References: I.6.19. See Love and pleasure.

**voluptas / dilatatio.** Printed forms: *dilatatio*; *voluptas*.

Pleasure / expansion or dilation. Mental pleasure is defined through will’s expansion into and repose in the good, distinguishing delight from bare appetite. References: II.11.33. See Love and pleasure.

**volutare secum.** Printed forms: *secum ipsa volutat*.

To turn something over inwardly in thought. Mind’s thinking of geometrical principles shapes imagination without an external hand or drawing tool. References: IV.1.11. See Sense and imagination.

**vox / significatio.** Printed forms: *vox significatioque*.

Utterance and its meaning. One complete utterance is heard and understood almost together across a house, providing a qualified analogy of whole presence. References: III.2.13. See Utterance and meaning.

**vult / lubet.** Printed forms: *lubet*; *vult*.

Holds or wishes; pleases. Ut vult Plotinus assigns a view to Plotinus, while whenever one pleases permits an arbitrary stopping-point in a thought experiment. References: IV.2.11, IV.2.24. See Assertion, report, and reservation.

**vultus / imago.** Printed forms: *vultus imagines*.

Images of a countenance. Creatures flowing from God reflect divine goodness, while their being in God is distinguished as identity in that mode. References: II.12.12. See Image and likeness.

**vultus / reluceo.** Printed forms: *reluceat*; *vultus*.

A countenance, and to shine by reflection. The divine countenance is mirrored in soul in Ficino’s analogy; the vocabulary does not describe God as having a literal bodily face. References: Proem.4. See Image and likeness.

**Zoroaster / ignis unus.** Printed forms: *ex uno igne genita*; *Zoroaster*.

The named ancient authority and one-fire saying as presented by Ficino. The mystical gloss supports derivation from one source; it should not be made a literal material account of God. References: II.7.7. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi.

**Zoroaster / rectores.** Printed forms: *rectores*; *Zoroaster*.

Zoroaster as attributed authority; rulers or directors. The saying about immobile intellectual rulers supports the angelic level; the later quotation distinguishes the intelligible from mind. Both are Ficino’s attributions. References: I.5.19, I.6.9. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi.

**Zoroastris sectatores.** Printed forms: *Zoroastris sectatores*.

Followers of Zoroaster. The self-production saying is attributed to this group before Plotinus’s exposition is reported; the groups and authorial voices remain distinct. References: II.12.8. See Self-production and reservation.

# Greek quotations in the Latin text

These 22 passage records explain the function of Greek expressions quoted within the supplied Latin text. They follow Ficino’s accompanying Latin glosses and the edition’s notes. They are not an independent Greek dictionary or a new verification of the attributed ancient sources.

## Intellectual immovable rulers

*νοερούς ἀνοχῆας ἀκαμπεῖς*

Ficino attributes the saying to Zoroaster and immediately glosses its rulers as intellectual and immovable. It supports the transition from souls, which are partly mobile, to angels, which move other things without being moved in the same way. The source apparatus

preserves a difference in Greek word order between its witnesses; this lexicon follows the supplied reading and its Latin gloss.

**Place.** I.5.19, source PDF pp. 74–75. See Angel.

## The intelligible beyond mind

*τὸ νοητὸν*

The quoted instruction is glossed by Ficino as recognizing that the intelligible itself is outside mind. In his imagined expansion of the human intellectual faculty into pure angelic mind, truth remains distinct from the mind that contemplates it. The expression therefore supplies a step beyond angelic cognition, not a claim that knowing occurs without an object.

**Place.** I.6.9, source PDF pp. 86–87. See Truth.

## An infinite end

*ἀτελὴς τελευτή*

The expression attributed to Orpheus is rendered by Ficino’s infinitus finis. It joins the language of end or limit to that of absence of limit, at the conclusion of an argument connecting derivative kinds of infinity with divine actual infinity. It is a deliberate paradox, not a reason to erase either half of the expression.

**Place.** II.4.8, source PDF pp. 124–125. See Infinity.

## Indwelling throughout the world

*ὃς ναίεις κατὰ πάντα μέρη κόσμοιο γενάρχα*

Ficino identifies the line as Orphic and associates it with Saturn’s hymn. His Latin gloss names one who inhabits all the world’s parts and is the source of generation. The quotation supports sustaining divine presence; it does not make divine being a quantity divided among those parts.

**Place.** II.6.11, source PDF pp. 132–133. See Omnipresence and place.

## One unmoved infinite being

*ὂν ἓν ἀκίνητον ἄπειρον*

The fourfold expression is attributed by Ficino to Parmenides the Pythagorean and glossed as being, one, immobile and infinite. It recapitulates claims already argued before the chapter turns to divine action and preservation. Ficino’s title and attribution are reported here, without an independent identification or reconstruction of a Parmenidean original.

**Place.** II.7.1, source PDF pp. 144–145. See God.

## Generated from one fire

*εἰσὶ πάντα πυρὸς ἑνὸς ἐκγεγαῶτα*

Ficino’s gloss says that all things are generated from a single fire; he attributes the statement to Zoroaster. It figures the unity of the source while the surrounding discussion

distinguishes ways in which lower and higher bodies change. The fire image should not be substituted for the argument’s incorporeal first cause. The edition notes a Greek reading adopted in accordance with the Latin gloss.

**Place.** II.7.7, source PDF pp. 146–147. See Cause.

## Necessity ruling all things

*δεινὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη πάντα κρατεῖ*

The quotation attributed to Orpheus is glossed as a strong necessity ruling everything. Ficino uses it while identifying God with supreme necessity of being. The point is the dependence of other beings, not an undifferentiated denial of creaturely freedom. The apparatus reports a correction in the Greek verb supported by the Latin dominatur.

**Place.** II.7.11, source PDF pp. 148–149. See Freedom and necessity.

## The perfect eye of Jupiter

*Διὸς ὄμμα τέλειον*

This is the expression identified by Ficino’s immediately following Latin gloss, Iovis perfectus oculus. The supplied Greek includes a longer sequence concerning what comes to pass and divine knowledge. The short gloss must not be represented as a full independent translation of every word in that sequence. Its local function is to continue the account of divine cognition.

**Place.** II.9.18, source PDF pp. 172–173. See Intellect and intellection.

## The bounds of the world and cosmic tuning

*τὰ πείρατα κόσμου*

In the passage attributed to Orpheus’s hymn to Apollo, Ficino’s extended Latin gloss joins the world’s bounds, care for beginning and end, universal flourishing, and the tuning of the whole sphere. The local argument concerns the order in which things apparently poor or ugly contribute to the whole. The musical image supports intelligible arrangement rather than erasing differences among parts.

**Place.** II.9.22, source PDF pp. 174–175. See Order and harmony.

## The infinite eye

*ἄπειρον ὄμμα*

The Orphic designation is glossed as an infinite eye. It concludes the comparison between human thought’s ability to continue potentially without limit and divine understanding’s actual knowledge of an unlimited range. The eye is an image of cognition, not an organ with infinite physical dimensions.

**Place.** II.10.7, source PDF pp. 178–179. See Infinity.

## Jupiter as the form of all things

*Ζεὺς εἶδος πάντων*

Ficino’s gloss, Iupiter species omnium, makes this an expression of the all-containing causal source. The chapter immediately asks how the forms are in God and rejects a mode of plurality that would compel production by natural necessity. The quotation therefore does not license a simple identification of God with the aggregate of bodily forms.

**Place.** II.11.1, source PDF pp. 182–183. See Ideas and exemplars.

## Turning through an everlasting pivot

*ἀενάῳ στροφάλιγγι θοὸν ῥῦμα δινεύουσα*

The Orphic line is glossed through the language of a perpetual hinge or pivot and a swift impulse. Ficino uses it in a sustained explanation of effortless divine governance through subordinate orders. The apparatus reports adopting volutans rather than voluntas in the Latin gloss: turning, not merely a coincidental occurrence of the noun will.

**Place.** II.13.12, source PDF pp. 224–225. See Hinge and center.

## Begetter beginning and end

*παντογένεθλ’, ἀρχὴ πάντων, πάντων τε τελευτή*

Ficino glosses the Orphic address to Jupiter as begetter, beginning and end of all. It supports the claim that the first principle moves things for its own sake, while the life of the world provides under that higher direction. Beginning and end are causal and final relations here, not simply the earliest and latest moments of a temporal sequence.

**Place.** II.13.21, source PDF pp. 230–231. See Principle.

## Seeing hearing and distributing

*πάντ’ ἐσορᾷς, καὶ πάντ’ ἐπακούεις, πάντα βραβεύεις*

The supplied Latin gloss makes the Orphic address concern seeing within, hearing within and distributing all things. In context it supports the care of the whole without neglect of its parts. The apparatus notes a connective variation in the Greek tradition; this lexicon does not silently import a fuller line from another edition.

**Place.** II.13.22, source PDF pp. 230–231. See Providence.

## Everlasting life and immortal providence

*ἀΐδιος ζωή, ἠδ’ ἀθανάτη τε πρόνοια*

The Orphic description is glossed as everlasting life and immortal providence. It appears where Ficino relates apparent local defects to the good of the whole, then proceeds to authorities on providence and freedom. It is a theological characterization within that argument, not a substitute for the following distinctions about how willing and foreknowledge operate.

**Place.** II.13.24, source PDF pp. 232–233. See Providence.

## Persuasion rather than fear

*πατὴρ οὐ φόβον ἐνθρῴσκει, πειθὼ δ’ ἐπιχέει*

Ficino attributes the saying to Zoroaster and glosses it as the father not striking in fear but introducing persuasion. The contrast belongs to the account of how higher causation preserves the characteristic mode of a rational nature. It should be read with the next passage’s carefully qualified language of compelling souls toward the universal good.

**Place.** II.13.27, source PDF pp. 234–235. See Choice and free judgment.

## Giving to the second mind

*καὶ νῷ παρέδωκε δευτέρῳ*

In the Zoroastrian attribution, the father perfects all things and hands them to a second mind. Ficino applies the line to an angelic essence receiving illumination and the adornment of forms. The language of first and second moments explains dependence; the lexicon does not infer a literal temporal gap in angelic creation from that wording alone.

**Place.** III.1.12, source PDF pp. 248–249. See Second mind.

## The father withdrawing himself

*Πατὴρ ἑαυτὸν ἥρπασεν*

Ficino’s gloss says that the father withdrew himself and did not enclose his own fire even in the mind that follows him. Ficino then explains the point as the divine source’s incomparability with other things. The image marks transcendence within the comparison of causes; it should not be read as a geographical departure.

**Place.** III.1.21, source PDF pp. 252–253. See Degree and mediation.

## Apollo simplicity and the good

*Ἀπόλλωνα · ἁπλοῦν · ἀπὸ πολλῶν · τἀγαθόν*

These expressions belong to the Pythagorean wordplay reported by Ficino: Apollo is connected with simplicity and separation from multiplicity, and with the good itself. His accompanying Latin gloss controls the use here. The associations are not presented as modern historical etymologies, and the paragraph remains within the explicitly marked Pythagorean excursion.

**Place.** IV.1.51, source PDF pp. 306–307. See Apollo.

## Tuning the whole heaven

*Σὺ δὲ πάντα πόλον κιθάρῃ πολυκρέκτῳ ἁρμόζεις*

Ficino’s Latin gloss describes tuning the whole heaven with a melodious lyre. The line gives musical form to the ordered chorus of Muses under Apollo. The same unit retains perhaps in its hierarchy and closes by leaving the Pythagorean conversation for the established Platonic order. Both qualifications matter to the quotation’s doctrinal use.

**Place.** IV.1.52, source PDF pp. 308–309. See Bacchus and the Muses.

## Everlasting will and the work of necessity

*ἀϊδίῳ βουλῇ φέρεται, ἀεὶ τρέχει ἔργῳ ἀνάγκης*

The saying attributed to Zoroaster is glossed as heaven's being carried by everlasting will and continually running through necessity's work. It follows the account of heavenly motion through appetite aroused by thought, with thought governed by a fatal law. Will and necessity therefore occur in a structured causal account rather than as mutually exclusive labels.

**Place.** IV.2.2, source PDF pp. 334–335. See Fate.

## The world's many fullnesses

*καὶ ἴσχει κόσμου πολλὰ πληρώματα κόλπων*

Ficino glosses the Zoroastrian expression through the many fullnesses of the world's recesses or folds. It helps explain soul's mediation between higher gifts and lower productive powers. The unit then distinguishes Ideas held together in celestial mind from seminal powers held habitually but actualized successively; the image must not flatten that contrast.

**Place.** IV.2.10, source PDF pp. 338–339. See Habitual possession.

# Additional printed-form lookup

These printed forms lead directly to their explained Latin records; the earlier Latin word and phrase index remains available below.

**Abamon.** Anebon / Abamon / Plotinus / Iamblichus / Julianus.

**aberrare.** aberro.

**absens.** absens / praesens.

**absente.** adesse / abesse.

**absit.** adesse / abesse.

**absolutae.** absolutus / absolute.

**absolutasque.** absolutus / adstrictus.

**absolute.** absolutus / absolute.

**absolutum.** absolutus / absolute.

**absunt.** adesse / abesse.

**absurda.** absurdus.

**absurdum.** absurdus; conspiratio / absurdum.

**accedente.** addere / accedere / advenire.

**accedet.** accedere / recedere.

**Accedit.** addo / accedo.

**accedunt.** addere / accedere / advenire.

**accendantur.** illuminare / fulgere / radius / accendere.

**accendit.** accendere / accensio.

**accensio.** accendere / accensio.

**acceperit.** accipere; accipere / capere / suscipere.

**accepimus.** accipere / concedere.

**accepit.** accipere / capere / suscipere.

**accepta.** accipere / capere / suscipere.

**accidentalem.** condicio / accidens; unitas accidentalis / substantialis.

**accidentales.** essentialis / accidentalis.

**accipe.** accipere — example and lantern.

**accipiamus.** accipere / concedere.

**accipit.** accipere; accipere / capere / suscipere.

**accipitque.** accipere — example and lantern.

**Achates.** Achates / adamas.

**aciem oculorum.** acies oculorum.

**acquiescant.** acquiesco.

**acquisita.** naturalis / acquisitus.

**Actio.** actus / actio / agere.

**actio.** actus / actio / agere; essentia / virtus / actio.

**actionem.** actus / actio / agere.

**actionis.** actus / actio / agere.

**acto.** actus / actum (product).

**actu.** actus / actio / agere; habitus / actus / potentia.

**actui.** actus / actio / agere.

**actum.** actus / actum (product).

**Actus.** actus / actio / agere.

**actus.** actus / actum (product).

**acutum.** lignum / acutus / latus.

**ad punctum.** in angustum / ad punctum.

**ad quaestionem hic propositam revertamur.** revertamur ad quaestionem.

**ad speciem mentis perfectae conducit.** conducere ad speciem.

**adaequari.** adaequare / sibimet.

**adaequatum.** adaequatus.

**adamas.** Achates / adamas.

**Adde.** addere / mittere / omittere; addo / accedo.

**addiciuntur.** addere / accedere / advenire.

**additam.** addere / accedere / advenire.

**additamentum.** additamentum / permixtio.

**adductus.** fretus / adductus.

**adesse.** adesse / abesse; inesse / adesse / insitus.

**adest.** adesse / abesse.

**adhortatur.** adhortor / admoneo.

**adipiscatur.** proficio / adipiscor.

**adipiscitur.** sortiri / adipisci.

**adiuvante.** auxilium / subsidium.

**administratione.** otium / administratio.

**Admirationem.** admiratio / consuetudo.

**admiratus.** admiratio / consuetudo.

**admittimus.** concedere / admittere / dare as grant.

**admixtionem.** admixtio / inquinatio.

**admonere.** adhortor / admoneo.

**admovetur.** praesentia / admovere.

**adsciscere.** adsciscere / complecti.

**adsit.** adesse / inesse.

**adstat.** distrahere / adstare.

**adstet.** distrahere / adstare.

**adstricta dimensionibus.** punctum / adstrictus dimensionibus.

**adstrictas.** absolutus / adstrictus.

**adultam.** adultus / affectio corporis.

**advenit.** addere / accedere / advenire.

**adveniunt.** addere / accedere / advenire.

**adventitiam.** nudus / adventitius.

**adversatur.** adversari / repugnare.

**aedificii.** aedificium / domus.

**aedificiis.** aedificia / machinae.

**Aegyptii.** hymnus / theologia / sacerdos.

**aeneae.** Archimedes / aeneus.

**aenigma.** aenigma / Xenocrates.

**aequabilior.** temperatio / aequabilis.

**aequalem.** aequalis / aeque.

**aequales.** similis / aequalis.

**aequalia.** aequalis / aeque.

**aequalitatem.** mereri / aequalitatem recuperare.

**aeque.** aequalis / aeque.

**aer.** aer / aqua / terra.

**aere.** aer / aqua / terra; membra / lignum / aer.

**aerem.** aer / aqua / terra; calefacere / aqua / aer.

**aeris.** statua / lapis / aes.

**aestate.** hiems / ver / aestas / autumnus.

**aestatem.** hiems / ver / aestas / autumnus.

**Aeterna.** sempiternitas / aeternitas.

**aeternam.** sempiternitas / aeternitas.

**aeterni.** sempiternitas / aeternitas.

**aeternitatem.** sempiternitas / aeternitas.

**aeternitatis.** sempiternitas / aeternitas.

**aeternum.** sempiternitas / aeternitas.

**aethereo animae indumento.** indumentum aethereum.

**aevum.** aevum.

**affectat.** attingere / affectare.

**affectio corporis.** adultus / affectio corporis.

**affectiones.** determinatio / affectio; vibrare / affectio.

**affectioque.** afficio / affectio / passio.

**affectum.** affectus / afficere; conatus / affectus.

**affectus.** conatus / affectus.

**affici.** afficio / affectio / passio.

**afficit.** affectus / afficere.

**affirmet.** fateri / negare / affirmare.

**affixa.** affixus / situs.

**Africa.** Porphyrius / Persis / Tusci.

**agens.** agens / patiens.

**agente.** actus / actio / agere.

**agenti.** agens / patiens.

**agentis.** actus / actio / agere.

**agile.** ineptus / agilis.

**agili.** promptus / agilis.

**agilis.** promptus / agilis.

**agit.** actus / actio / agere; agere / actio / agens.

**agit primo.** primo agere.

**agnoscere.** cognosco / agnosco.

**agnoscit.** animadvertere / agnoscere.

**albedinis ratio.** ratio albedinis.

**albedo.** albedo / caro.

**Albedo.** albedo / caro.

**alias.** alias / mitto.

**alieno.** servire / alienus.

**Alii vero quidam.** alii quidam / Peripatetici.

**alimenta.** alimentum / providere; nutrimentum / alimentum.

**alio.** alius / idem / uterque — explanatory distinction.

**aliquando.** semper / aliquando; semper / simul / aliquando / nondum / amplius.

**alis.** ala / dux / patria.

**alit.** alere; alere / nutrire / digerere; alit / auget / generat.

**aliud.** alius / idem / uterque — explanatory distinction.

**aliunde.** aliunde; extrinsecus / aliunde.

**alliciat.** allicere / cogere / persuadere.

**alligantur.** pullulare / alligare.

**Almariani.** Almariani.

**amari.** amare / amor.

**ambigere.** ambigere.

**ambigunt.** ambigere / disserere.

**ambiguus.** ambigere.

**Amelius.** Ioannes / Amelius.

**amittere.** amitto.

**amittit.** retinere / amittere.

**amittitur.** amittere / delere.

**amorem.** amare / amor.

**amplecti.** conquiescere / amplecti.

**amplectitur.** amplecti; conquiescere / amplecti.

**amplificare.** amplificare / porrigere; propagare / amplificare / dilatare.

**amplificari.** amplificare / porrigere; protendo / amplifico.

**amplificat.** propagare / amplificare / dilatare.

**amplificatae.** fecunditas / amplifico.

**amplior.** amplus / amplior; nobilior / amplior.

**ampliorem.** amplus / amplior.

**Amplissima.** amplus / amplior.

**amplissima.** amplus / amplior.

**amplissimam.** potissimum / summopere / penitus / prorsus / late.

**amplitudo.** amplitudo / plenitudo / implere.

**amplius.** semper / simul / aliquando / nondum / amplius.

**Anaxagora.** Anaxagoras / Hermotimus.

**Anaxagoras.** Anaxagoras / Hermotimus.

**Anebon.** Anebon / Abamon / Plotinus / Iamblichus / Julianus.

**angeli.** angelus.

**angelicae.** animalis / angelicus.

**angelicam.** animalis / angelicus.

**angelo.** angelus.

**angelos.** angelus / nuntius.

**angelum.** angelus.

**Angelus.** angelus.

**angelus.** angelus.

**angustiis.** circumscribere / coarctare.

**anima.** anima / animus.

**animadvertimus.** discernere / animadvertere.

**animadvertit.** animadvertere / agnoscere.

**animae.** anima / animus; anima rationalis.

**animal.** animal / bestia / animans.

**animalem.** animalis / angelicus.

**animales.** animalis / angelicus; animalis / animales vires.

**animales vires.** animalis / animales vires.

**animalis.** planta / animal.

**animam.** anima / animus.

**animantibus.** animal / bestia / animans.

**animas corporales.** intellectus animales / animae corporales.

**animi.** anima / animus.

**animorumque.** anima / animus.

**animos.** anima / animus.

**annixu.** annixus / coartare.

**antecedit.** antecedere / sequi / praecedere.

**anteponant.** praefero / antepono.

**anteponimus.** praefero / antepono.

**anticipet.** anticipare / discernere / metiri.

**Antipodum.** Antipodes / semicirculus.

**Apelles.** Apelles / pratum.

**Apellis.** Apelles / pratum.

**apicem.** apex.

**Apollinis.** Apollo / cithara / contemperare.

**apostoli.** hymnus / theologia / sacerdos.

**appareat.** appareo / pateo.

**apparens.** commodum / apparens.

**apparet.** appareo / pateo.

**appellant.** dicere / appellare / vocare.

**appellationes.** appellatio / nomen / proprie; dicere / vocare / appellare.

**appellavit.** dicere / vocare / appellare.

**appetant.** appetibilis / appetere.

**appetendi vacationem.** vacatio appetendi.

**appetere.** appetibilis / appetere.

**appetibile.** appetibile / effectrix.

**appetibilia.** appetibilis / appetere.

**appetibilis.** appetibilis / appetere.

**appetitum.** appetibilis / appetere; appetitus excitatus; inclinatio / appetitus / voluntas.

**appetitus.** appetibilis / appetere.

**approbet.** approbare / eligere.

**aptissime.** proportio / consonare.

**aptius.** aptus / convenire / congruere.

**aqua.** aer / aqua / terra.

**aquam.** aer / aqua / terra; calefacere / aqua / aer.

**aquamve.** aer / aqua / terra.

**arbitrantur.** existimare / opinari / arbitrari.

**arbitremur.** existimare / opinari / arbitrari.

**arbitror.** putare / arbitrari.

**arborum.** umbra arborum in torrente.

**arcana.** arcana / edo.

**arce.** arx / tertius / medius.

**Archimedis.** Archimedes / aeneus.

**architectum.** minister / architectus; opifex / architectus.

**architectus.** minister / architectus.

**arguit.** arguo / convinco.

**arguitur.** argumentum / arguere.

**argumentationibus.** ratio / argumentatio / signum.

**argumentis.** argumentum / arguere.

**argumento.** argumentum / arguere.

**Arimanis.** Oromasis / Mitris / Arimanis.

**Aristoteles.** Aristoteles; Aristoteles / Divinorum.

**Aristotelis.** Averrois / Aristoteles.

**ars.** ars / artificium.

**arte.** formosus / exactus / ars.

**arti.** ars / artificium.

**artibus.** ars / artificium.

**articulos.** artus / articulus.

**artificii.** ars / artificium.

**artificium.** artificium / opus.

**artis.** ars / artificium.

**Artium.** ars / artificium.

**artus.** artus / articulus.

**ascendendo.** ascendere / descendere.

**ascenderimus.** ascendo / gradus.

**ascenderunt.** ascendo / gradus.

**ascendimus.** ascendo / gradus.

**ascensus.** ascendere / descendere; ascendo / gradus.

**asciscat.** ascisco.

**assensus.** assensus.

**assentiendum.** fateri / negare / affirmare.

**assequatur.** transferre / assequi.

**assequitur.** consequi / assequi / nancisci; transferre / assequi.

**asserat.** ponere / inducere / asserere.

**asseverabimus.** demonstro / assevero.

**asseverabunt.** confiteri / asseverare.

**assidue.** continuus / assiduus.

**assignare.** collocare / assignare.

**assignari.** certus / assignare / limitare.

**assignatam.** certus / assignare / limitare; collocare / assignare.

**assistebant.** minister / assisto.

**assurgebant.** assurgere / inclinari.

**Athenas.** Euclides / Megara / Athenae / Socrates.

**attingere.** attingere / affectare.

**attingeret.** tangere / attingere.

**attingit.** attingo / tango; tangere / attingere.

**Attingit.** tangere / attingere.

**attingunt.** tangere / attingere.

**attribueris.** attribuere / dare.

**auctor.** auctor.

**auctorem.** auctor / auctoritas role.

**auctoritate.** auctoritas.

**auctoritati.** auctoritas.

**auctorum.** auctor / auctoritas role.

**aucupabitur.** aucupor.

**augere.** augere / augmentum.

**augeri.** augere / augmentum.

**auget.** alit / auget / generat; unio / augeo.

**augetur.** unio / augeo.

**augmenti.** augere / augmentum.

**augmentum.** augere / augmentum.

**auguratur.** augurari.

**aula.** candela / aula.

**aulam.** candela / aula.

**aura.** aura / viscera / quassare.

**Aureliana.** Aurelius Augustinus / Aurelianus.

**Aurelius Augustinus.** Aurelius Augustinus / Aurelianus.

**aut semper aut plurimum.** aut semper aut plurimum.

**autumnum.** hiems / ver / aestas / autumnus.

**auxilio.** auxilium / subsidium.

**Averroi.** Epicureus / Epicurus / Averroes.

**Averrois.** Averrois / Aristoteles; Epicureus / Epicurus / Averroes.

**Avicenna.** Avicenna.

**avida.** cupere / avidus.

**avidissime.** avidus / intentus.

**aviditas.** aviditas caeca.

**beatior.** beatitudo / felicitas.

**beatitudinem.** beatitudo / felicitas.

**beatitudinis.** beatitudo / felicitas.

**bene et bonum.** bene et bonum.

**beneficio.** beneficium; beneficium / officium.

**bestiae.** animal / bestia / animans.

**binos.** geminus / binus.

**bombarda.** fulgur / bombarda.

**bona.** bonitas / bonum; bonum / bonitas.

**bonae.** bonitas / bonum.

**boni ipsius gratia.** gratia — purpose.

**bonitas.** bonitas / bonum; bonum / bonitas.

**bonitate.** bonitas / bonum.

**bonitatem.** bonitas / bonum.

**bonitati.** bonitas / bonum; proximum bonitati.

**bonitatis.** bonitas / bonum.

**bonum.** bonitas / bonum.

**bonus.** bonitas / bonum.

**brevitatem.** brevitas / raritas.

**caeca.** aviditas caeca.

**caeco.** tenebrae / caecus.

**caeli.** ignis / sol / caelum / stella.

**caelo.** ignis / sol / caelum / stella.

**caelum.** caelum / sphaera / stella.

**calefaciendam.** calefacere / aqua / aer.

**calefacit.** calefacere / aqua / aer; comburere / calefacere; frigefacio / calefacio / uro.

**calefactio.** calefactio.

**calefiat.** comburere / calefacere.

**calida.** calidus / frigidus / siccus / humidus.

**callet.** iners / callere.

**calor.** calor / frigus.

**caloris.** calor / frigus.

**cancellos.** cancelli / restitutio.

**candelae.** candela / aula.

**candelas.** candela / aula.

**canes.** canis / latrare.

**cantus.** tuba / cornu / cantus.

**capacitas.** capacitas / capax; capacitas materiae / continuum / multiplicatio.

**capacitatem.** capacitas / capax; caput / capacitas.

**capax.** capacitas / capax; capax / capio.

**capere.** capere.

**capiat.** capax / capio.

**capit.** capax / capio; capere.

**capiunt.** accipere / capere / suscipere.

**caput.** caput / capacitas.

**caput rationis.** caput mentis / rationis.

**carcere.** carcer / claustra.

**carcere caeco.** carcer / claustra.

**cardinem.** cardo; cardo / fundamentum.

**cardines.** cardo.

**cardinis.** cardo / liquidus / solidus.

**cardo.** cardo.

**careat.** careo / expers; carere / deesse / destituere.

**carere.** careo / expers.

**caret.** careo / expers.

**caritate.** caritas.

**carne.** albedo / caro.

**carnis.** albedo / caro.

**casu.** casus / contingere.

**causa.** causa / effectus; stabilis causa / opus.

**causae.** causa / effectus.

**causam.** causa / effectus.

**causarum.** causa / effectus.

**causas.** causa / effectus.

**cecinit.** hymnus / theologia / sacerdos.

**cedit.** cedere / excedere.

**cedunt.** cedo.

**censetur.** censeo.

**censuerit.** iudicium / censere.

**censui.** censeo.

**censuit.** censeo.

**centrum.** centrum / circumspicere; nutus / vibrare / centrum.

**cerebro.** cerebrum / cor / iecur.

**cernere.** cernere / respicere; intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

**cernimus.** perspicere / cernere.

**cernit.** intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

**certa.** certo / certus; certus / incertus; certus / plenus.

**certas.** certo / certus.

**certis.** certo / certus; certus / incertus.

**certo.** certo / certus; certus / assignare / limitare.

**certum.** certo / certus.

**cessaret.** cessare.

**chorea.** chorea / modulus / cithara.

**Chrysippus.** Strato / Chrysippus.

**Circuitus.** circuitus.

**circuitus.** circuitus; circulus / circuitus.

**circulo revolvemur.** in infinitum vagari / circulo revolvi.

**circulus.** circulus / circuitus.

**circumcurrit.** circumcurrere.

**circumferentiam.** punctum / linea / circumferentia.

**circumscribitur.** circumscribere / coarctare.

**circumspicit.** centrum / circumspicere.

**cithara.** Apollo / cithara / contemperare; chorea / modulus / cithara.

**cito.** paulatim / subito / sero.

**clamat.** clamare / reclamare / persuadere.

**clara.** opacus / clarus.

**clare.** distincte / clare / plane.

**clarescit.** tenuari / clarescere / hebescere.

**clarissime.** distincte / clare / plane.

**claudicat.** claudico; fatigare / claudicare.

**clauditur.** prohibere / claudere / includere.

**claustra.** carcer / claustra.

**coarctatur.** circumscribere / coarctare.

**coarctet.** coarcto / rarefacio.

**coartant.** annixus / coartare.

**cogantur.** cogere / compellere.

**cogat.** allicere / cogere / persuadere.

**cogente.** cogere / compellere.

**cogeris.** cogere / compellere.

**cogetur.** cogere / compellere.

**cogimur.** cogere / compellere.

**cogit.** allicere / cogere / persuadere.

**Cogitamus.** cogitare / fingere / effingere.

**cogitamus.** cogitare / fingere / effingere.

**cogitare.** cogitare / fingere / effingere.

**cogitari.** cogitare / fingere / effingere; cogito / esse.

**cogitat.** cogitare / cogitatio.

**cogitatio.** cogitare / cogitatio.

**cogitque.** cogere / compellere.

**cogitur.** cogere / compellere.

**cognatio.** cognatio.

**cognatissima.** cognatus.

**cognatius.** cognatus.

**cogniti.** cognosco / agnosco.

**cognitio.** cognitio / intelligentia; cognoscere / cognitio.

**cognitionem.** cognoscere / cognitio.

**cognoscat.** cognosco / agnosco.

**cognoscere.** cognosco / agnosco.

**cognoscit.** cognoscere / cognitio; noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere.

**Cognoscit.** cognoscere / cognitio; noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere.

**cohiberi.** cohibere / detinere.

**cohibetur.** cohibere / detinere.

**colamus.** colo / cultus.

**colat.** colo / cultus.

**colligantur.** connectere / copulare / colligare.

**collige.** collige; redigere / colligere / referre.

**colligenda.** colligere / reducere.

**colligitur.** concludere / colligere.

**collisione.** collisio; collisio / reflexio / lana.

**collocare.** collocare.

**collocari.** collocare.

**collocavimus.** collocare / assignare.

**color.** color / lumen.

**colorem.** simulacrum / color.

**coloribus.** tabula / pingere / color.

**colorum.** simulacrum / color.

**comburendum.** comburere / calefacere; frigefacio / calefacio / uro.

**comes.** comes; domina / comes.

**comitantur.** comitari / contingere.

**commigrare.** commigro.

**commiscetur.** commiscere / mixtio.

**commixtione.** commiscere / mixtio.

**commodum.** commodum / apparens.

**commoniti.** adhortor / admoneo.

**commune.** commune / totum in singulis; communis.

**communem.** communis; proprius / communis / posterior.

**communes.** proprius / communis.

**communi.** communis; proprius / communis.

**communicandam.** communicare.

**communicant.** communicare — imparting and sharing.

**communicari.** communicare.

**communicat.** communicare; communicare — imparting and sharing.

**communicatur.** communicare.

**communio.** communio.

**communione.** communio.

**communis.** communis; intimus / communis.

**compago.** compago / membrum.

**comparante.** comparare.

**comparavimus.** comparare / proportio.

**comparetur.** comparare; considerare / comparare.

**compatiantur.** conspirare / compati.

**compedum.** solvo / vincula / compedes.

**compelletur.** cogere / compellere.

**competit.** competere / convenire; competere / pertinere / spectare.

**compleant.** speciem complere.

**complectantur.** complecti / comprehendere.

**complecti.** adsciscere / complecti.

**complectitur.** complecti; complecti / comprehendere; contineo / complector.

**complent.** speciem complere.

**complexio.** complexio / instrumenta.

**complexione.** complexio / figura.

**componeretur.** componere / compositio.

**compos.** compos.

**compositio.** componere / compositio.

**compositum.** componere / compositio; compono / pars / totum.

**compositus.** compono / pars / totum.

**compositusque.** multiplex / compositus.

**compotes rationis.** rationis compos / expers.

**comprehendantur.** scientia / comprehendere.

**comprehendi.** comprehendere; scientia / comprehendere.

**Comprehendi.** scientia / comprehendere.

**comprehendit.** complecti / comprehendere; scientia / comprehendere.

**comprehenduntur.** scientia / comprehendere.

**comprobet.** probo / comprobo.

**computavisse.** probabilis / computo.

**conabimur.** conor / pro viribus.

**conaretur.** instinctus / niti.

**conatur.** nixus / nitor / conor.

**conatus.** conatus / affectus.

**concava superficies.** concava superficies.

**concavum.** concava superficies; flammula / concavum / evolare.

**concedatur.** concedere / admittere / dare as grant.

**concedemus.** accipere / concedere.

**concedet.** concedere / admittere / dare as grant.

**concedetur.** concedere / admittere / dare as grant.

**conciliantur.** conciliare.

**conciliat.** concilio / vincit in unum.

**conciliavisset.** conciliare.

**conciliavit.** conciliare.

**conciliet.** conciliare / interimere.

**concinat.** concinere / conducere.

**Concludamus.** concludere / confirmare / patere.

**concludit.** concludere / colligere.

**concoquit.** concoquo / digero.

**concurrunt.** conspirare / concurrere.

**concursu.** concursus / confluere.

**condemnatur.** error / impius / profanus.

**condensat.** dissolvere / condensare.

**condiciones.** exigo / condicio.

**conditio.** condicio / innatus.

**Conditionali quadam necessitate.** conditionali necessitate.

**conditionem.** norma / condicio.

**conditionibus.** condicio / accidens.

**conducant.** conferre / conducere.

**conducat.** concinere / conducere.

**conducunt.** praebere / conducere.

**confabulari.** confabulari.

**confabulati sumus.** confabulari.

**conferre.** conferre / conducere.

**confert.** concludere / confirmare / patere; conferre / conducere.

**conficere.** fabricare / construere / conficere.

**confirmat.** concludere / confirmare / patere; consentire / confirmare.

**confirmatum.** concludere / confirmare / patere.

**confitebuntur.** confiteri / asseverare.

**confitentur.** confiteri / tradere.

**confluentes.** concursus / confluere.

**confundit.** fallere / praestigiae / confundere.

**confusam.** confusus / distinctus.

**confusione.** confusio / permiscere / iungere.

**confutatum.** confutare / refellere.

**congeriem.** lapis / paries / congeries.

**conglutinatur.** conglutinare / consonare.

**congruant.** convenire / congruere.

**congruerent.** convenire / congruere.

**congruit.** aptus / convenire / congruere.

**conicimus.** conicio.

**coniectari.** coniectari.

**connectere.** vincire / connectere.

**connectit.** connectere / copulare / colligare; vinculum / connecto.

**connexio.** connectere / copulare / colligare.

**connexioni.** connexio.

**conquiescat.** conquiescere / amplecti.

**consentiant.** consentire / dissentire.

**consentire.** consentire / dissentire.

**consentit.** consentire / confirmare.

**consequens.** consequi / assequi / nancisci; consequi / consequens.

**consequitur.** consequi / assequi / nancisci; consequi / consequens.

**consequuntur.** consequi / consequens.

**conservari.** edere / servare / conservare.

**conservat.** edere / servare / conservare.

**conservatore.** edere / servare / conservare.

**considerantur.** considerare / comparare.

**consideratur.** considerare / comparare.

**consiliique.** consilium.

**consilio.** consilium; consilium / consultare; consilium / propositum.

**consilium.** consilium; consilium / consultare; consilium / statuo.

**Consilium.** consilium / consultare.

**consistentem.** status / stare.

**consistit.** constare / consistere / constituere.

**consonare.** proportio / consonare.

**consonet.** conglutinare / consonare.

**conspicit.** intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

**conspirant.** conspirare / compati; conspirare / concurrere.

**conspirationis.** conspiratio / absurdum; copulo / conspiratio.

**constare.** fieri / constare.

**constat.** constare / consistere; constare / consistere / constituere; fieri / constare.

**constituunt.** constare / consistere / constituere.

**constructa.** fabricare / construere / conficere.

**construi.** fabricare / construere / conficere.

**consuetudo.** admiratio / consuetudo.

**consultando.** vagari / consultare.

**consultare.** consilium / consultare.

**consultat.** consilium / consultare.

**consumaret.** transigo / perago / consummation.

**contagione.** inquinare / contagio.

**contemperas.** Apollo / cithara / contemperare.

**contemperat.** contemperare / continuare.

**contemplabimur.** contemplor / contemplatio.

**contemplationem.** contemplor / contemplatio.

**contemplemur.** contemplor / contemplatio.

**contemplentur.** contemplor / contemplatio.

**contigit.** casus / contingere.

**continet.** contineo / complector.

**contingentes.** contingens / essentialis.

**contingunt.** comitari / contingere.

**continuam.** continuus / continuare / continuatio.

**continuat.** contemperare / continuare.

**continuatione.** continuus / continuare / continuatio.

**continuationem.** continuatio / reflectere in gyrum.

**continuatis.** continuus / continuare / continuatio.

**continue.** continuus / assiduus.

**continui.** capacitas materiae / continuum / multiplicatio.

**continuo.** continuus / assiduus.

**Contradictio.** contradictio.

**contradictionem.** contradictio.

**contrahi.** contrahere.

**contrahit.** contrahere.

**contrariorum.** contrarium / oppositio.

**contrarius.** oppositus / contrarius / diversus.

**contueatur.** contueri / intueri / intuitus.

**contuetur.** intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

**conveniant.** convenire / congruere.

**conveniat.** aptus / convenire / congruere.

**convenientior.** propinquus / conveniens.

**convenire.** ratio naturalis and usualness.

**convenit.** competere / convenire; convenio / discrepo; convenire / congruere.

**conveniunt.** convenire / congruere.

**conversa.** convertere / reverti.

**conversio.** conversio / profectio.

**converso.** convertere / reverti / converso.

**converterentur.** convertere / reverti / converso.

**convertitur.** pendere / converti.

**convertuntur.** conversio / profectio.

**convincitur.** arguo / convinco.

**convolvitur.** convolvi / revolvi.

**copula.** connectere / copulare / colligare; copulo / conspiratio.

**copulante.** copulo / conspiratio.

**cor.** cor / principalis stella.

**Corallus.** Corneola / Onyx / Corallus.

**corde.** cor / principalis stella; cor / putare.

**cordi.** cerebrum / cor / iecur.

**Corneola.** Corneola / Onyx / Corallus.

**cornuum.** tuba / cornu / cantus.

**coronabant.** coronare / vulnerare.

**corpora.** corpus / corporalis.

**corporalis.** corpus / corporalis.

**corpori.** corpus / corporalis.

**corporibus.** corpus / corporalis.

**corporis.** corpus / corporalis.

**corpus.** corpus / corporalis.

**corpusculi talis causa.** gratia / causa with genitive.

**corruunt.** corruo / renascor.

**crassitudo.** soliditas / densitas / crassitudo.

**creat.** creare / ex nihilo.

**creationis.** creare / ex nihilo.

**crescere.** crescere / decrescere / minuere.

**crescit.** crescere / decrescere / minuere.

**crinitarum.** Egelias / crinitae.

**Critia.** leges / respublica / regnum / Critias (titles).

**culpanda.** culpare / deformis.

**cultu.** colo / cultus.

**cultum.** colo / cultus.

**cumulus.** cumulus.

**cuncta.** omnis / cunctus / singulus.

**cupere.** cupere / avidus.

**cupit.** opto / cupio.

**cupiunt.** cupere / avidus.

**cura.** cura / labor / facilis.

**curam.** custodire / cura.

**curriculis.** successio / curriculum.

**currit.** currere / incurrere / incumbere.

**custodiendis.** custodire / cura.

**custodire.** custodire / cura.

**Cynicorumque.** Stoici / Cynici.

**Cyrenaici.** Democritii / Cyrenaici / Epicurei.

**Cyrenaicorum.** Democritii / Cyrenaici / Epicurei.

**dabit.** attribuere / dare.

**Danielis.** Dionysius Areopagita / Daniel.

**dat.** attribuere / dare; dare.

**datura.** praebeo / do.

**debacchantur.** nectar / ebrius / debacchari.

**debet.** oportere / debere / decere.

**debilitat.** minuo / debilito.

**debilitetur.** debilitare / deficere; minuo / debilito.

**decentia.** decet / decor.

**decere.** oportere / debere / decere.

**decet.** decere / dignitas; decet / decor; oportere / debere / decere.

**decidet.** decidere.

**decor.** decet / decor.

**decorum.** decet / decor.

**decremento.** decrementum / remissio.

**decrescat.** decrementum / remissio.

**decrescere.** crescere / decrescere / minuere.

**decretum.** providentia / decretum.

**decuit.** decet / decor.

**dedicandum.** dedico / gratulor.

**dedit.** dare.

**deducit.** intercedere / deducere.

**deducta.** ducere / deducere / trahere.

**deducuntur.** ducere / deducere / trahere.

**deesse.** carere / deesse / destituere.

**Deest.** carere / deesse / destituere.

**deficere.** debilitare / deficere; imitari / deficere.

**deficient.** debilitare / deficere.

**deficit.** deficio / validus.

**definitio.** definitio.

**definitione.** definitio.

**definitionem.** definitio.

**deformia.** culpare / deformis.

**degenerare.** degenerare.

**degenerat.** degenerare.

**Dei.** Deus / divinus.

**Deinde.** prius / posterius / deinde.

**deletis.** fingo and removed members.

**deletur.** amittere / delere.

**Democritii.** Democritii / Cyrenaici / Epicurei.

**Democritiorum.** Democritii / Cyrenaici / Epicurei.

**demonstrandum.** probare / ostendere / demonstrare.

**demonstrare.** demonstro / assevero.

**densa.** rarus / densus.

**densitateque.** soliditas / densitas / crassitudo.

**dentes.** dens / pilus.

**Deo.** Deus / divinus.

**Deo aspirante.** spiritual aid and confidence.

**Deo duce.** ala / dux / patria.

**deorsum.** dextra / sinistra / sursum / deorsum; sursum / deorsum.

**dependeat.** dependere / pendere.

**dependebit.** pendere / dependere.

**dependere.** pendere / dependere.

**dependet.** dependere / pendere; subsisto / dependeo.

**depravata.** servire / depravare.

**descendendo.** ascendere / descendere.

**descendit.** ascendere / descendere.

**describit.** pulvis / describere.

**deserat.** deserere / relinquere.

**deserit.** deserere / relinquere.

**desideratur.** expetere / desiderare.

**designans.** praescribere / designare.

**designantur.** designare.

**desinere.** initium / incipere / desinere.

**desinunt.** incipio / desino.

**desivisse.** initium / incipere / desinere.

**destitutam.** carere / deesse / destituere.

**deterioribus.** excellens / eminens / deterior / altior / remotior.

**determinationes.** determinatio / affectio.

**determinatur.** determinare.

**determinet.** determinare.

**determinetur.** indifferens / determino.

**detestatur.** detestari.

**detinerentur.** cohibere / detinere.

**detur.** concedere / admittere / dare as grant.

**Deum.** Deus / divinus.

**Deus.** Deus / divinus.

**Deus ipse viderit.** Deus ipse viderit.

**dextram.** dextra / sinistra / sursum / deorsum.

**dialecticum.** dialecticum / mathematicum / physicum.

**diaphanum.** perspicuus / diaphanus.

**dicuntur.** dicere / vocare / appellare.

**differant.** differre / discrepare.

**differt.** differre / discrepare; retardo / differo.

**differunt.** differre / discrepare.

**Difficile.** dubitare / diffidere / difficile.

**difficili.** facile / difficilis.

**Difficilius.** dubitare / diffidere / difficile.

**diffidere.** diffido.

**diffidit.** dubitare / diffidere / difficile.

**diffunduntur.** exuberare / fundere.

**diffusio.** diffusio.

**digerit.** concoquo / digero.

**digeritque.** alere / nutrire / digerere.

**digna.** decere / dignitas.

**dignitatem.** decere / dignitas.

**dignitatis.** dignitas.

**dii.** Deus / divinus.

**dilatare.** propagare / amplificare / dilatare.

**dilatatio.** propagare / amplificare / dilatare; voluptas / dilatatio.

**Dilectio.** dilectio / diligere.

**dilectione.** dilectio / diligere.

**diligenter.** lego / diligentia.

**diligentia.** diligentia / procurator.

**diligentior.** diligentia / procurator.

**diligentissime.** lego / diligentia.

**diligit.** dilectio / diligere.

**dimensio.** quantitas / dimensio.

**dimensionem.** quantitas / dimensio.

**dimensiones.** quantitas / dimensio.

**dimensioni.** quantitas / dimensio.

**dinoscit.** noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere.

**Dionysius Areopagita.** Dionysius Areopagita / Daniel.

**dirigere.** dirigere / manifestus; diverto / dirigo.

**diriguntur.** dirigere / manifestus.

**discedentibus.** superesse / discedere.

**discernamus.** discernere / animadvertere.

**discernat.** anticipare / discernere / metiri.

**Discernere.** discernere / animadvertere.

**discernit.** discernere / animadvertere.

**discerptam.** discursio / discerptio family.

**discerptatur.** discursio / discerptio family.

**discessum.** discessus / seorsum / semovere.

**discessus.** discessus / seorsum / semovere.

**Discrepat.** convenio / discrepo.

**discrepent.** differre / discrepare.

**discretae.** discretus.

**discurrendo.** discursus / discurrere.

**discurrens.** discursus / discurrere.

**discurrere.** discurrere / cursus.

**discurrit.** discurrere / cursus.

**discursio.** discursio.

**discursione.** discursio / discerptio family.

**discursum.** discursus / discurrere.

**disiunguntur.** disiungere / disponere / instituere.

**disiunxerit.** seiungo / disiungo.

**dispergit.** dispergo / distractio.

**dispersa.** dispergo / distractio.

**dispersione.** dispergo / distractio; dispersio / imbecillitas.

**displicet.** placere / displicere.

**disponendam.** disponere.

**disponimus.** disiungere / disponere / instituere.

**disposita.** disponere.

**dissentiant.** consentire / dissentire.

**dissentire.** consentire / dissentire.

**disseremus.** memorare / respondere / docere.

**disseruerunt.** ambigere / disserere.

**dissimiles.** oppositus / contrarius / diversus.

**dissimillimum.** similis / dissimilis / similitudo.

**dissolubiles.** dissolubilis / indissolubilis.

**dissolubilia.** dissolubilis / indissolubilis.

**dissolutionem.** resolvi / dissolutio.

**dissolutioni.** resolvi / dissolutio.

**dissolvi.** indissolubilis / dissolvo.

**dissolvit.** dissolvere / condensare.

**distans.** prope / disto.

**distantia.** prope / disto.

**distantiam.** paries / distantia.

**distaret.** distare.

**distat.** distare.

**distinctam.** distincte / clare / plane.

**distinctas.** distincte / clare / plane.

**distincte.** distincte / clare / plane.

**distinctum.** confusus / distinctus.

**distinguunt.** distinguere / dividere / divisio.

**distinguuntur.** distinguere / dividere / divisio.

**distracta.** dispergo / distractio.

**distrahitur.** distrahere / divertere / possidere.

**distrahiturve.** distrahere / adstare.

**diuturnior.** nuper / semel / diuturnior / perpetuo / generatio / successio.

**diversa.** oppositus / contrarius / diversus.

**diversos.** oppositus / contrarius / diversus.

**divertit.** diverto / dirigo.

**divertitur.** distrahere / divertere / possidere.

**dividatur.** distinguere / dividere / divisio.

**dividua.** dividuus / individuus.

**divina.** Deus / divinus.

**divina dumtaxat ope confisi.** spiritual aid and confidence.

**divina lex.** lex divina.

**divinae legis.** lex divina.

**Divine.** Deus / divinus.

**Divinorum.** Aristoteles / Divinorum.

**Divisio.** distinguere / dividere / divisio.

**doctrina.** doctrina / tracto.

**domina.** domina / comes.

**dominabitur.** dominor.

**dominam.** impero / domina.

**dominari.** dominor.

**dominatur.** dominari; dominari / praevalere; dominor.

**domui.** aedificium / domus.

**domus.** aedificium / domus.

**dona.** munus / donum.

**donata.** dare / donare / exhibere.

**dubio.** dubitare / diffidere / difficile.

**dubitare.** dubitare / diffidere / difficile.

**dubitatio.** dubitatio / respondere.

**ducatur.** ducere / deducere / trahere.

**duce.** exercitus / dux / princeps.

**ducem.** dux / lex superioris; exercitus / dux; exercitus / dux / princeps.

**duci.** ducere / deducere / trahere.

**ducitur.** roboro / duco.

**dulcedo.** dulcedo / odor / flavus.

**dulcis.** dulcedo / odor / flavus.

**dumtaxat.** dumtaxat.

**duodenario.** ternarius / novenarius / septenarius / duodenarius.

**duodenarium.** ternarius / novenarius / septenarius / duodenarius.

**durationem.** saeculum / duratio.

**durationemque.** saeculum / duratio.

**dux.** exercitus / dux.

**e converso.** superare / e converso.

**e regione.** e regione / suscipere.

**eatenus.** quantum / quatenus / eatenus.

**ebriae.** nectar / ebrius / debacchari.

**eclipsim.** eclipsis / nox / momentum.

**edat.** experiri / edere.

**edit.** edere / servare / conservare.

**editurus.** arcana / edo.

**educavissent.** educare / spectaculum.

**educit.** eruere / educere.

**effectibus.** causa / effectus.

**effectrix.** effectrix / machinatrix.

**effectrixque.** appetibile / effectrix.

**effectu.** causa / effectus.

**effectui.** causa / effectus.

**Effectui.** effectus / efficiens.

**effectum.** causa / effectus.

**effectus.** causa / effectus; effectus / efficiens.

**effectuum.** causa / effectus.

**efficacem.** efficax / efficacia.

**efficacia.** efficax / efficacia; proclivitas / efficacia.

**efficacior.** efficax; efficax / validus.

**efficacissimam.** efficax.

**efficacissimus.** efficax / efficacia.

**efficax.** efficax; efficax / efficacia; efficax / validus.

**efficere.** perficere / efficere.

**efficiens.** effectus / efficiens.

**efficit.** perficere / efficere.

**efficiuntur.** perficere / efficere.

**effingi.** cogitare / fingere / effingere; effingere.

**effinguntur.** effingere.

**effluit.** fluere.

**effluxus.** fluere / fluitare / fluxus.

**effugiat.** praevaricari / effugere.

**egeat.** egere / indigere.

**Egelias.** Egelias / crinitae.

**egerit.** agere: egerit.

**eget.** egere / indigere.

**electio.** electio / eligere.

**electione.** electio / eligere.

**electionem.** electio / eligere.

**electiones.** electio / eligere.

**electionis.** electio / eligere.

**eligat.** approbare / eligere.

**eligendo.** electio / eligere.

**eligeremus.** eligo.

**eligimus.** eligo.

**eligit.** eligere / peragere.

**eligunt.** electio / eligere.

**emanabit.** manare / emanare.

**eminentem.** participatio / forma / eminentia.

**eminentior.** excellens / eminens / deterior / altior / remotior.

**empyreum.** empyreus / prorsus immobile.

**enigma.** Magi / aenigma.

**enodatur.** enodo.

**enumerando.** enumerare / gradatim / summatim.

**Epicurei.** Democritii / Cyrenaici / Epicurei.

**Epicureorum.** Democritii / Cyrenaici / Epicurei.

**Epicureus.** Epicureus / Epicurus / Averroes.

**Epicuro.** Epicureus / Epicurus / Averroes.

**equinam.** homo / equus.

**equorum.** homo / equus.

**erit.** esse — existence and predication.

**errat.** errāre / iudicare.

**error.** error / impius / profanus.

**eruit.** eruere / educere.

**esse.** cogito / esse; esse / ens / exsistere; esse — existence and predication; essentia atque esse.

**Esse.** esse / ens / exsistere.

**esse debet.** oportet / necesse est / debet.

**essendi.** esse / ens / exsistere.

**essendi modo.** essendi modus.

**essendi modos.** essendi modus.

**essendi principium.** essendi principium.

**essentia.** essentia / essentialis / substantia; essentia / virtus / actio; essentia puncto momento; tertia essentia.

**essentiales.** contingens / essentialis; essentialis / accidentalis.

**essentiam.** essentia / essentialis / substantia; essentia / substantia; essentia atque esse.

**esset.** esse — existence and predication.

**est.** esse / fieri; esse — existence and predication.

**Est.** esse — existence and predication.

**Euclides.** Euclides / Megara / Athenae / Socrates.

**evellantur.** evellere / extirpare.

**evolaret.** flammula / concavum / evolare.

**ex.** ex / per / in causal uses.

**ex nihilo.** creare / ex nihilo.

**ex toto.** secundum partem / ex toto.

**ex uno igne genita.** Zoroaster / ignis unus.

**exactissima.** formosus / exactus / ars.

**exactius.** formosus / exactus / ars.

**excedat.** excedere / superare.

**excedetur.** excedere / superare.

**excedit.** cedere / excedere.

**excellentissimam.** excellens / eminens / deterior / altior / remotior.

**excellentius.** excellens / eminens / deterior / altior / remotior.

**excessus.** excedere / superare.

**excitatur.** appetitus excitatus.

**excogitemus.** ex-cogitare / fateri.

**excrescere.** excresco / invalesco.

**exemplar.** exemplar / exprimere / imitari.

**exemplaria.** munus / imago / exemplar.

**exemplaris.** exemplar / exprimere / imitari.

**exemplo.** exemplum / signum / indicare.

**exemplum.** exemplum / instar.

**exercitus.** exercitus / dux; exercitus / dux / princeps.

**exhalationem.** exhalatio.

**exhalationibus.** exhalatio.

**exhibebit.** dare / donare / exhibere.

**exigit.** exigere / requirere.

**exiguam.** exilis / exiguus / parvitas.

**exiguntur.** exigo / condicio.

**exilem.** exilis / exiguus / parvitas.

**existimarunt.** existimare / opinari / arbitrari.

**existunt.** esse / ens / exsistere.

**exordiatur.** exordiri / prodire.

**exordium.** exordium / exordiri.

**experiatur.** experiri / edere.

**expers.** careo / expers; privare / expers.

**expetendaque.** expetere / desiderare.

**expetunt.** expetere / desiderare.

**expletur.** peragere / explere.

**explicat.** implicare / explicare / replicare; replicare / explicare; serere / parere / explicare.

**explicatur.** implicare / explicare / replicare.

**exposita.** latere / exponere.

**exprimatur.** exprimere / referre.

**exprimere.** imitor / exprimo.

**exprimi.** exemplar / exprimere / imitari.

**expugnat.** expugnare / repugnare.

**exsuperet.** manere / exsuperare.

**extendere.** extendere / extensio.

**extendi.** extendo / extensio.

**extendit.** extendere / extensio; extendo / extensio.

**extenditur.** extendere / extensio; extendo / extensio.

**extensa.** quantitas / extensio / dimensio.

**extensio.** extendo / extensio.

**Extensio.** quantitas / extensio / dimensio.

**extensione.** quantitas / extensio / dimensio.

**externa.** exterior / externus.

**externam.** exterior / externus.

**extinctus.** extinguo / remotus.

**extirpentur.** evellere / extirpare.

**extra.** extra / intus; intus / intro / extra / ultra / superne / undique.

**extrema.** extremum.

**extremo.** extremum sine medio.

**extremum.** extremum sine medio.

**extrinseca.** intrinsecus / extrinsecus.

**extrinseco.** extrinsecus / aliunde.

**extrinsecum.** intrinsecus / extrinsecus.

**extrinsecus.** extrinsecus / aliunde; intrinsecus / extrinsecus.

**exuberando.** exuberare / fundere.

**faber.** faber / genitor / filius.

**faber lignarius.** faber lignarius.

**fabricat.** fabricare / construere / conficere.

**facere.** facere / efficere.

**facile.** facile / difficilis.

**facilior.** cura / labor / facilis.

**facillime.** cura / labor / facilis; facile / difficilis.

**facillimo.** cura / labor / facilis.

**facit.** facio / servo.

**facta.** facere / efficere.

**factum.** producere / facere / gignere.

**facultas.** propago / facultas.

**fallit.** fallere / praestigiae / confundere; fallo / falsum.

**Fallit.** fallere / praestigiae / confundere.

**falso.** fallo / falsum.

**falsum.** fallo / falsum; falsus / falsum.

**familiarissima.** familiarissimus.

**familiarissimos.** familiarissimus.

**fascinandos.** fascinare / roborare.

**fatali.** fatalis lex / innata cupiditas.

**fatentur.** fateri / negare / affirmare.

**fateri.** ex-cogitare / fateri; fateri / negare / affirmare.

**fatigari.** fatigare.

**fatigatur.** fatigare; fatigare / claudicare.

**fatum.** fatum.

**fecit.** facere / efficere.

**fecundiam.** obtundere / fecundia.

**fecunditas.** fecunditas.

**fecunditate.** fecunditas; fecunditas / amplifico.

**fecundus.** fecundus.

**felicitas.** beatitudo / felicitas.

**fenestras.** vitrum / fenestra / pavimentum.

**ferme.** ferme / quoad fieri potest; ferme / ut ita loquar.

**ferri.** ferre.

**ferrum.** magnes / ferrum.

**fertur.** ferre.

**feruntur.** ferre.

**fetus.** venter / fetus.

**fidem adhibeat.** fides adhibita.

**fides.** reor / fides.

**figat.** figere / ponere.

**figura.** complexio / figura.

**figurant.** pingere / figurare.

**filii.** filius / parens.

**filium.** faber / genitor / filius.

**fimi.** lutum / fimus / rana / musca.

**fimo.** lutum / fimus / rana / musca.

**Finge animo.** finge animo / finge iterum.

**Finge iterum.** finge animo / finge iterum.

**fingi.** cogitare / fingere / effingere.

**finiri.** terminare / finire.

**finis.** finis; finis / scopus.

**Finis.** finis / scopus.

**finisque.** finis / scopus.

**finit.** terminare / finire.

**finita.** terminare / finire.

**finitam.** interminatus / infinitus / finitus; terminare / finire.

**finitas.** interminatus / infinitus / finitus.

**finiti.** terminare / finire.

**finito.** terminare / finire.

**finitum.** terminare / finire.

**firmant.** movere / sistere / firmare.

**firmatur.** movere / sistere / firmare.

**firmiterque.** movere / sistere / firmare.

**fit.** esse / fieri; fieri / constare.

**flammam.** scintilla / flamma.

**flammula.** flammula / concavum / evolare.

**flava.** dulcedo / odor / flavus.

**flavus.** dulcedo / odor / flavus.

**florem.** flos / herba.

**Florentiae.** Florentia / Germanus.

**flores.** semen / flos.

**fluctuabit.** fluctuo / labens.

**fluentium.** fluere / fluitare / fluxus.

**Fluet.** fluere.

**fluit.** fluere / fluitare / fluxus.

**fluitabunt.** fluere / fluitare / fluxus.

**fluitat.** fluere / fluitare / fluxus.

**fluxerunt.** fluere / fluitare / fluxus.

**fluxum.** fluere / fluitare / fluxus.

**fomento.** fomentum; fomentum / fovere.

**fons.** fons / influxus; fons formarum.

**fonte.** fons / influxus.

**fontem.** fons / principium.

**fontem et principium motionis.** fons / principium.

**forma.** forma / formare.

**formae.** forma / species.

**formam.** forma / formare; forma / species; participatio / forma / eminentia.

**formarum.** fons formarum.

**formas.** forma / species.

**formata.** forma / formare.

**formosa.** formosus / exactus / ars.

**forsitan.** forsitan / forte; forsitan / quodammodo.

**forte.** forsitan / forte; forte / fortuitus / sors; forte / suspicor / vaticinor.

**fortius.** fortis / vehementia / valere.

**fortuito.** forte / fortuitus / sors.

**fortuitum.** forte / fortuitus / sors.

**foveant.** fomentum / fovere.

**fovendo.** ovum / fovere.

**fovet.** fomentum / fovere.

**fretus.** fretus / adductus.

**frigefacerentque.** urere / frigefacere.

**frigefacit.** frigefacio / calefacio / uro.

**frigida.** calidus / frigidus / siccus / humidus.

**frigiditatem.** calor / frigus.

**frigori.** calor / frigus.

**frigoris.** calor / frigus.

**fruendae.** frui / perfrui.

**frueretur.** frui.

**fruetur.** fruor.

**frui.** frui.

**fruitur.** frui.

**frustra.** frustra / superfluus.

**fulget.** illuminare / fulgere / radius / accendere.

**fulgure.** fulgur / bombarda.

**fundamentum.** cardo / fundamentum.

**fundant.** imprimere / fundare / stabilire.

**fundere.** exuberare / fundere.

**funditus.** superficies / fundus.

**fundo.** superficies / fundus.

**futurum.** praeteritum / futurum.

**geminas.** sufficere / geminus.

**gemini.** geminus / binus.

**geminis.** geminus / binus.

**generat.** alit / auget / generat.

**generationemque.** phantasia / sensus / generatio.

**generationis.** generatio / successio.

**generationis successionem.** successio singulorum.

**genere.** genus.

**generi.** ratio naturalis and usualness.

**generis.** genus.

**generum.** species / genus.

**genito.** gignere / producere.

**genitor.** faber / genitor / filius.

**genitum.** gignere / producere.

**genus.** genus; species / genus.

**geometrae.** geometra / geometrica mens.

**geometrica mens.** geometra / geometrica mens.

**gerit subiecti vicem.** vicem gerere.

**Germani.** Florentia / Germanus.

**germine corporali.** germen / corporale semen.

**gignit.** gignere / producere; producere / facere / gignere.

**Gnosticisque.** Manichaei / Gnostici.

**gradatim.** enumerare / gradatim / summatim; gradus / gradatim.

**gradibus.** gradus / gradatim; gradus / mensura / proportio.

**gradu.** gradus / mensura / proportio.

**gradum minimum naturalem.** gradus minimus naturalis.

**gradus.** ascendo / gradus; gradus / gradatim; gradus / mensura / proportio.

**graduum.** gradus / mensura / proportio.

**gratia.** stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis.

**gratulaturus.** dedico / gratulor.

**gravioribus.** gravior / levior.

**gravitas.** gravitas / levitas.

**gravitate.** gravitas / levitas.

**gravitatis.** levitas / gravitas.

**gremio.** proles / gremium.

**gubernando.** principatus / gubernare / regere.

**gubernare.** rector / gubernare / regere.

**gubernatore.** principatus / gubernare / regere.

**gustus.** gustus.

**guttula.** mel / guttula.

**habeat.** habere / tenere / possidere.

**habet.** habere / tenere / possidere.

**habitas.** habitare.

**habitu.** habitus / actus / potentia; habitus — settled skill.

**habitum.** habitus.

**habituras.** se habere.

**habitus.** habitus; habitus — condition of the whole; habitus — possession.

**Hactenus.** hactenus / hucusque.

**Haec Platonici.** Haec Platonici.

**haerent.** haerere / seiunctus.

**haerere.** haerere.

**haeret.** haerere.

**harmoniae.** harmonia.

**haud propria omnino ratione.** haud propria omnino ratione.

**haurit.** haurio / liquor / infundo; haurire / implere.

**hebescit.** tenuari / clarescere / hebescere.

**Heraclitus.** Heraclitus / Varro / Manilius.

**herba.** flos / herba.

**Hermotimo.** Anaxagoras / Hermotimus.

**Hermotimus.** Anaxagoras / Hermotimus.

**hic.** hic / illic.

**hieme.** hiems / ver / aestas / autumnus.

**hiemem.** hiems / ver / aestas / autumnus.

**hierobotanum.** hierobotanum.

**hominum.** homo / equus.

**hora.** hora / par / impar.

**Hucusque.** hactenus / hucusque.

**humanam.** homo / equus.

**humida.** calidus / frigidus / siccus / humidus.

**humiditas.** siccitas / humiditas.

**humores.** humor / humores.

**hymno.** hymnus / theologia / sacerdos.

**iaciat.** iacere / iactus.

**iactus.** iacere / iactus.

**Iamblichus.** Iamblichus / Proclus.

**Iamblicusque.** Anebon / Abamon / Plotinus / Iamblichus / Julianus.

**ibi.** hic / illic.

**idea.** species / idea.

**ideae.** species / idea.

**idealis.** stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis.

**idearum.** species / idea.

**Idem.** alius / idem / uterque — explanatory distinction.

**iecori.** cerebrum / cor / iecur.

**ignara.** ignarus / nescire.

**igne.** calor / ignis / lignum.

**ignis.** ignis / sol / caelum / stella; ignis / tenuis.

**ignito.** ignis / sol / caelum / stella.

**ignorat.** noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere.

**illecta.** illicere.

**illic.** hic / illic.

**illuminando.** illuminare / fulgere / radius / accendere.

**illuminat.** illuminare / fulgere / radius / accendere.

**illustratur.** lux / lumen / illuminare.

**imaginarium.** umbra / umbratilis / vanus.

**imagines.** munus / imago / exemplar; ordo / umbra / imago; speculum / imago.

**imago.** imago / simulacrum.

**imbecillitas.** dispersio / imbecillitas; imbecillitas / insipientia.

**imbecillitatemque.** inquietudo / imbecillitas.

**imbuit.** imbuere.

**imitandum.** imitor / exprimo.

**imitari.** exemplar / exprimere / imitari; imitari / deficere.

**imitati.** imitor / exprimo.

**imitatio.** imitatio / imitari.

**imitetur.** imitatio / imitari.

**immaterialia.** immaterialis / incorporeus.

**immensae.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**immensi.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**immensum.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**immixtam.** commiscere / mixtio.

**immo.** immo / potius / minime.

**immobile.** immutabilis / immobilis.

**immobilis.** immutabilis / immobilis.

**immobilis multitudo.** mobilis multitudo / immobilis multitudo.

**immortalis.** mortalis / immortalis.

**immortalitatem.** mortalis / immortalis.

**immutabilis.** immutabilis / immobilis.

**impar.** hora / par / impar.

**impartit.** impertire / impartire / largiri.

**impediat.** impedire / obesse.

**impedimento.** impedimentum / impedio.

**impedit.** impedimentum / impedio; impedire / obesse.

**impedita.** impedimentum / impedio.

**impeditur.** impedire / purgare.

**impellit.** impellere / inferre.

**imperat.** impero / domina.

**imperii.** imperium.

**imperio.** imperium.

**imperium.** imperium.

**impertiet.** impertire / impartire / largiri.

**impertit.** impertire / impartire / largiri.

**impetu.** impetus.

**impie.** error / impius / profanus.

**impius.** error / impius / profanus.

**impleat.** amplitudo / plenitudo / implere; impleo / prohibeo.

**implere.** amplitudo / plenitudo / implere.

**impletur.** haurire / implere.

**implicat.** implicare / explicare / replicare.

**imprimatur.** imprimere / fundare / stabilire.

**imprimitur.** imprimere / fundare / stabilire.

**impulsu.** impulsus / incitamentum; impulsus / sua sponte.

**in.** ex / per / in causal uses.

**in actum perduci.** perducere in actum.

**in agente manent.** manere in agente.

**in angustum.** in angustum / ad punctum.

**in aquae summo.** vas / aquae summum.

**in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque.** in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque.

**in infinitum progressio.** progressio in infinitum.

**in infinitum vagabimur.** in infinitum vagari / circulo revolvi.

**in nihilum ruituras.** ruere in nihilum.

**in torrente.** umbra arborum in torrente.

**inane.** inane; ne frustra / ne inane.

**incepisse.** initium / incipere / desinere.

**incepit.** initium / incipere / desinere.

**incepturam.** initium / incipere / desinere.

**incerta.** certus / incertus.

**incipere.** initium / incipere / desinere.

**inciperet.** initium / incipere / desinere.

**incipiunt.** incipio / desino.

**incitamentum.** impulsus / incitamentum.

**inclinabantur.** assurgere / inclinari.

**inclinationem.** inclinatio / appetitus / voluntas.

**includit.** prohibere / claudere / includere.

**inclusit.** rapere / includere.

**incohationes.** pullulo / incohatio.

**incorporalis.** incorporeus / incorporalis / indivisibilis.

**incorporea.** incorporeus / incorporalis / indivisibilis.

**incorporeum.** immaterialis / incorporeus.

**incorrupta.** merus / incorruptus / revera.

**incubui.** studium / incumbo.

**incumbunt.** currere / incurrere / incumbere.

**incurrunt.** currere / incurrere / incumbere.

**indagat.** perscrutor / indago.

**indicat.** exemplum / signum / indicare.

**indifferens.** indifferens / determino.

**indigentiam.** indigentia.

**indiget.** egere / indigere.

**indignam.** maiestas / indignus.

**indissolubile.** indissolubilis / dissolvo.

**indissolubiles.** dissolubilis / indissolubilis.

**Individua.** dividuus / individuus.

**individua.** dividuus / individuus.

**indivisibile.** incorporeus / incorporalis / indivisibilis.

**induit.** induere / involvere.

**induxeris.** ponere / inducere / asserere.

**inepta.** obnoxius / ineptus.

**ineptum.** ineptus / agilis.

**inerit.** inesse / insitus.

**inertes.** iners / callere.

**inesse.** inesse / adesse / insitus; inesse / praeesse.

**inest.** inesse / adesse / insitus.

**infatigabilem.** fatigare / claudicare.

**infelicius.** beatitudo / felicitas.

**Inferiora.** superior / inferior.

**inferiorem.** superior / inferior.

**inferiores.** superior / inferior.

**inferiori.** superior / inferior.

**inferioribus.** superior / inferior.

**inferioris.** superior / inferior.

**infert.** impellere / inferre.

**inficiente.** inficio / inquino.

**inficitur.** inficio / inquino.

**infima.** singulus / minimus / infimus.

**infimarum.** singulus / minimus / infimus.

**infinita.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**infinitae.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**infinitam.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**Infinitam multitudinem.** multitudo infinita.

**infinitarum.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**infinitas.** interminatus / infinitus / finitus.

**infinitatem.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**infinitis.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**infinito.** terminus / infinitum.

**infinitos.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**infinitum.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**infinitus.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**influxibus.** influxus / instinctus.

**influxu.** fons / influxus.

**influxum.** influxus.

**influxus.** influxus / instinctus.

**informe.** informis / informe subiectum.

**informe subiectum.** informis / informe subiectum.

**informis.** informis / informe subiectum; informis / ornatus; latere / informis.

**infundat.** haurio / liquor / infundo.

**infundit.** infusio / infundere.

**Infusio.** infusio / infundere.

**ingenia.** ingenium.

**ingenio.** ingenium.

**inhaeret.** inhaereo / sustineo.

**initium.** initium / incipere / desinere; orior / initium.

**innata.** condicio / innatus.

**innata cupiditas.** fatalis lex / innata cupiditas.

**innititur.** inniti / subsistere; nixus / inniti.

**innumerabilia.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**innumeras.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**innumere.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**inordinataeque.** stabilis / instabilis / inordinatus.

**inquam.** inquam / inquit.

**inquietudinem.** inquietudo / imbecillitas.

**inquinata.** inquinare / contagio.

**inquinatae.** inquinare / contagio.

**inquinationem.** admixtio / inquinatio.

**inquinetur.** inficio / inquino.

**inquit.** inquam / inquit.

**inscitia.** vis / inscitia.

**inscribendum.** inscribo / opus.

**inserit.** inserere / retrahere.

**insint.** inesse / insitus.

**insinuat.** insinuo.

**insipientiaque.** imbecillitas / insipientia.

**insit.** adesse / inesse.

**insita.** inesse / adesse / insitus; insitus.

**insitam.** inesse / insitus.

**insitum.** insitus.

**inspicit.** intuitus / intueri / conspicere; respicere / suspicere / inspicere.

**instabiles.** stabilis / instabilis / inordinatus.

**instar.** exemplum / instar; instar.

**instinctu.** instinctus; instinctus / niti.

**instinctum.** instinctus / niti.

**instinctus.** influxus / instinctus.

**instituta.** instituo.

**institutio vitae.** institutio vitae.

**institutum.** propositum / institutum.

**institutus.** disiungere / disponere / instituere; instituo.

**instructum.** instruere / instrumentum.

**instrumenta.** instrumentum; instrumentum / opifex.

**instrumentis.** complexio / instrumenta; instruere / instrumentum.

**instrumentum.** instrumentum; instrumentum / opifex.

**insunt.** inesse / insitus.

**Insunt.** reperio / insum.

**integram.** integer / totus / plenus.

**integritate.** integritas / segregare.

**integrum.** integer / totus / plenus.

**intellecti.** realis / intellectus (adjectival).

**intellectio.** intellectus / intellectio / intelligibile.

**intellectu.** intellectus / intelligere.

**intellectum.** intellectus / intelligere.

**intellectus.** intellectus / intellectio / intelligibile; intellectus / intelligentia / intelligere; intellectus / intelligere.

**Intellectus.** intellectus / intelligere.

**intellectus animales.** intellectus animales / animae corporales.

**intelligantur.** intellectus / intelligere.

**intelligenda.** intelligibilis / intelligendus / intelligens.

**intelligendae.** intelligibilis / intelligendus / intelligens.

**intelligendam.** intelligibilis / intelligendus / intelligens.

**intelligens.** intelligibilis / intelligendus / intelligens.

**intelligentia.** cognitio / intelligentia; intellectus / intelligentia / intelligere.

**intelligentiam.** cognitio / intelligentia.

**intelligere.** intellectus / intelligentia / intelligere; intellectus / intelligere.

**intelligi.** intellectus / intelligere.

**intelligibile.** intellectus / intellectio / intelligibile; intelligibilis / intelligendus / intelligens.

**intelligibilisque.** intelligibilis / intelligendus / intelligens.

**intelligit.** intellectus / intelligere.

**intelliguntur.** intellectus / intelligere.

**intemperantia.** temperantia / intemperantia.

**intenditur.** intendo / remitto.

**intentus.** avidus / intentus.

**intercedat.** intercedere.

**intercesserit.** intercedere; intercedere / deducere.

**interimant.** conciliare / interimere.

**interminabili.** infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus.

**interminata.** interminatus / infinitus / finitus.

**interponendus.** medium / interpono.

**interrogamus.** quaerere / interrogare.

**intervallaque.** intervallum.

**intervallis.** intervallum / mensura.

**intervallum.** intervallum / mensura; intervallum / spatium; intervallum / tempus primum.

**intima.** intus / intro / intimus.

**intimus.** intimus / communis.

**intrinseca.** intrinsecus / extrinsecus.

**intrinsecos.** intrinsecus / extrinsecus.

**intrinsecum.** intrinsecus / extrinsecus.

**intrinsecus.** intrinsecus / extrinsecus.

**intro.** intus / intro / extra / ultra / superne / undique; intus / intro / intimus.

**intuendo.** intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

**intuetur.** intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

**intuitu.** contueri / intueri / intuitus; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; prospectus / intuitus.

**Intuitum.** contueri / intueri / intuitus.

**intus.** extra / intus; intus / intro / extra / ultra / superne / undique; intus / intro / intimus.

**invalescere.** excresco / invalesco.

**inveniamus.** quaero / invenio.

**inveniretur.** reperire / invenire.

**inventamque.** quaero / invenio.

**invicem.** mutuus / invicem; vicissim / invicem.

**invidet.** invidere.

**invidit.** invidere.

**invisibile.** videre / visibilis.

**involutus.** induere / involvere.

**Ioannis.** Ioannes / Amelius.

**Iovis.** Iuppiter / oculus.

**ipsum semper.** ipsum semper.

**irrationales.** irrationalis.

**irrationalis.** aviditas caeca.

**irrationalis anima.** irrationalis anima.

**irrationalisque.** irrationalis.

**iter.** iter / passus.

**iudicabit.** iudico.

**iudicamus.** iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari.

**iudicant.** errāre / iudicare; iudico.

**iudicari.** iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari.

**iudicavi.** iudico.

**iudicet.** iudicium / censere.

**iudicium.** iudicium / censere; iudicium / perdo.

**Iulianus.** Anebon / Abamon / Plotinus / Iamblichus / Julianus.

**iuncta.** confusio / permiscere / iungere.

**Iupiter.** Iupiter.

**Iupiter particularis.** Phoebus particularis / Iupiter particularis.

**labatur.** labi.

**labentes.** fluctuo / labens.

**labentium.** fluctuo / labens.

**labor.** labor / transgressio.

**laborat.** cura / labor / facilis.

**labore.** cura / labor / facilis.

**lana.** collisio / reflexio / lana.

**lanam.** collisio / reflexio / lana.

**lapides.** lapis / paries / congeries.

**lapidis.** statua / lapis / aes.

**lapidum.** pondus / lapis.

**largietur.** impertire / impartire / largiri.

**largitio.** largitio.

**Largitur.** impertire / impartire / largiri.

**largitur.** impertire / impartire / largiri.

**lateat.** lateo; latere / informis.

**latens.** lateo.

**latent.** latere / exponere.

**laterna.** laterna.

**laternam.** laterna.

**Latina feci.** Platonica / Latina facere.

**latissime.** potissimum / summopere / penitus / prorsus / late.

**latrant.** canis / latrare.

**latum.** lignum / acutus / latus; linea / longum / latum / profundum; longum / latum / profundum.

**Laurenti.** Laurenti / magnanimus.

**lege.** fatalis lex / innata cupiditas; lex; praescribere / lex; tenor / lex.

**lege alicuius superioris.** dux / lex superioris.

**legerit.** lego / diligentia.

**Legibus.** leges / respublica / regnum / Critias (titles).

**Legum.** leges / respublica / regnum / Critias (titles).

**Letheo flumine.** Letheus / mergo.

**leviora.** gravior / levior.

**Levitas.** gravitas / levitas.

**levitate.** gravitas / levitas.

**levitatis.** levitas / gravitas.

**lex.** lex.

**libenter.** placere / libenter.

**Liber.** liber / libertas.

**libera.** liber / liberior.

**libera voluntate disponens.** libera voluntate disponere.

**liberam.** liber / liberior.

**liberiorem.** liber / liberior.

**Libertas.** liber / libertas.

**libertas.** liber / libertas.

**libertate.** necessitas and willing acceptance.

**librata.** pondus / librare.

**licet.** quamvis / licet.

**ligno.** faber lignarius; membra / lignum / aer.

**lignum.** calor / ignis / lignum; lignum / acutus / latus.

**limites.** certus / assignare / limitare.

**linea.** linea / longum / latum / profundum; punctum / linea / circumferentia.

**lineae.** linea / longum / latum / profundum.

**linearum.** linea / longum / latum / profundum.

**liquido.** cardo / liquidus / solidus.

**liquidorum.** cardo / liquidus / solidus.

**liquorem.** haurio / liquor / infundo.

**localem.** locare / regio / localis.

**Localis.** locare / regio / localis.

**locatur.** locare / regio / localis.

**loci.** locus / situs / spatium.

**Locrus.** Timaeus / Timaeus Locrus.

**locum.** locus / spatium.

**locus.** locus / spatium.

**longius operatur.** longius operatur.

**longum.** linea / longum / latum / profundum; longum / latum / profundum.

**loquente.** loqui.

**loquitur.** loqui.

**lubet.** vult / lubet.

**luceat.** lux / lumen.

**luces.** lux / lumen.

**lucida.** lucidus / obscurus.

**lucidum.** opacus / clarus.

**Lucreti.** Lucretius / taceat.

**Lucretius.** Lucretius / taceat.

**lumen.** lux / lumen; lux / lumen / illuminare.

**lumenque.** color / lumen.

**lumenque luminum.** mens mentium / lumen luminum.

**lumine.** lux / lumen.

**luminis.** color / lumen; lux / lumen / illuminare.

**luna.** luna / sol / stella; sol / luna.

**Luna.** sol / luna.

**lunam.** sol / luna.

**luto.** lutum / fimus / rana / musca.

**lux.** lux / lumen.

**Lux.** lux / lumen.

**lux se ipsa videns.** lux se ipsa videns.

**machina.** machina / tela / retexere.

**machinae.** machina / praesideo; machina / tela / retexere.

**machinam.** machina / tela / retexere.

**machinationem.** machinatio / machinari.

**machinatrix.** effectrix / machinatrix.

**machinatur.** machinatio / machinari.

**machinis.** aedificia / machinae.

**magis.** magis / minus / minime; plus et minus.

**magnanime.** Laurenti / magnanimus.

**magnes.** magnes / ferrum.

**magnetem.** magnes / ferrum.

**magnitudinem.** magnum / magnitudo / maior.

**Magnum.** magnum / magnitudo / maior.

**magnumque.** magnum / magnitudo / maior.

**Magorum.** Magi / aenigma.

**maiestate.** maiestas / indignus.

**maiora.** plus et minus.

**maiorem.** magnum / magnitudo / maior.

**mali.** malum.

**malle.** velle / nolle / malle.

**malo.** malum.

**malorum.** malum.

**malum.** malum; privatio / malum.

**manantis.** manare / emanare.

**manantium.** manare / emanare.

**manaverint.** manare / emanare.

**manet.** manere / exsuperare.

**Manichaeis.** Manichaei / Gnostici.

**manifestius.** dirigere / manifestus.

**Manilius.** Heraclitus / Varro / Manilius.

**Marcus Varro.** Heraclitus / Varro / Manilius.

**Marcusque Manilius.** Heraclitus / Varro / Manilius.

**materia.** materia; materia / quantitas.

**materia propria.** materia aliena / propria.

**materiae.** materia.

**materiam.** materia.

**materiam alienam.** materia aliena / propria.

**materiam fugiat.** fugere materiam.

**mathematicas.** mathematicus / metaphysicus.

**mathematicum.** dialecticum / mathematicum / physicum.

**media.** medium.

**Media.** medium / interpono.

**mediam.** arx / tertius / medius.

**medias.** medium / particularis.

**medio.** medium.

**mediorum.** medium.

**medium.** medium / interpono.

**medium competens.** medium competens.

**medius.** medium / particularis.

**Megaris.** Euclides / Megara / Athenae / Socrates.

**melior.** melior / melius.

**meliorem.** melior / melius.

**meliores.** melior / melius.

**meliori.** melior / melius.

**Melius.** melior / melius.

**melius.** melior / melius.

**mellis.** mel / guttula.

**membra.** compago / membrum; membra / lignum / aer.

**membro.** membrum / vicem gerere.

**Memento.** memorare / respondere / docere.

**meminisse.** memorare / respondere / docere.

**memoriae.** voluntas / memoria.

**Mens.** mens.

**mens sit mentium.** mens mentium / lumen luminum.

**mensuram.** gradus / mensura / proportio.

**mensuraque.** intervallum / mensura.

**mentem.** mens.

**mentem angelicam.** mens angelica.

**menti.** mens.

**menti praebuit secundae.** mens secunda.

**mentis aciem.** acies / oculus mentis.

**mentis est caput.** caput mentis / rationis.

**mentis oculo.** acies / oculus mentis.

**mera.** merus / verus / perfectus.

**merae.** merus / incorruptus / revera.

**Mercurium.** Mercurius — planet.

**Mercurium Trismegistrum.** Mercurius — Hermetic authority.

**Mercurius.** Mercurius — Hermetic authority; Mercurius — planet.

**Mercurius Trismegistus.** Mercurius Trismegistus / Timaeus.

**merentur.** mereri / aequalitatem recuperare.

**mergitur.** Letheus / mergo.

**merus.** purus / merus.
**metaphysicas.** mathematicus / metaphysicus.
**metaphysici.** Plato / Platonici / philosophi / physici.
**metiatur.** anticipare / discernere / metiri.
**Metrodorus.** Metrodorus / Zoroaster.
**metum.** metus / persuasio.
**migrant.** migrare / transire.
**migrat.** migrare / transire; prorumpo / migro.
**minimarum.** singulus / minimus / infimus.
**minimas.** singulus / minimus / infimus.
**Minime.** immo / potius / minime.
**minime.** magis / minus / minime.
**minimum.** magis / minus / minime.
**minister.** minister / architectus.
**ministrabant.** minister / assisto.
**minora.** plus et minus.
**minuatur.** crescere / decrescere / minuere.
**minui.** minuo / debilito.
**minuitur.** crescere / decrescere / minuere; minuo / debilito.
**minus.** magis / minus / minime.
**minusve.** plus et minus.
**miraberis.** mirari / mirabilis.
**mirabilem.** mirari / mirabilis.
**mirabiles.** mirari / mirabilis.
**mirabiliter.** mirus / mirabilis / mirabiliter.
**mirabilius.** mirus / mirabilis / mirabiliter.
**miraculum.** miraculum.
**miro.** mirus / mirabilis / mirabiliter.
**miscetur.** commiscere / mixtio.
**mitigat.** sistere / mitigare / repellere.
**Mitris.** Oromasis / Mitris / Arimanis.
**Mitto.** addere / mittere / omittere; alias / mitto.
**mixta.** commiscere / mixtio.
**mixtionem.** commiscere / mixtio.
**mobilibus.** motus / motio / motor / mutare.

**mobilis multitudo.** mobilis multitudo / immobilis multitudo.

**modique.** modus.

**modis.** modus unitatis.

**modo.** modus / modo.

**modulis.** chorea / modulus / cithara.

**modum.** modus.

**modum unitatis.** modus unitatis.

**modus.** modus; modus / modo.

**molem.** moles / piger.

**moles.** moles / piger.

**moliti.** molior / perficio.

**momenta.** eclipsis / nox / momentum.

**momento.** eclipsis / nox / momentum; essentia puncto momento; momentum.

**momentum.** eclipsis / nox / momentum; momentum / signum.

**monstravimus.** ostendere / monstrare / probare.

**mora.** mora / transgressio / retractatio.

**morale.** mores / morale.

**more Platonico.** more Platonico.

**mores.** mores / morale.

**moribus.** mores.

**mors.** mors / resolutio.

**mortalia.** mortalis / immortalis.

**Motio.** motus / motio / operatio.

**moto.** motor / motum.

**motor.** motor / motum.

**Motor.** motor / motum.

**motorem.** motor / motum.

**motoris.** motus / motio / motor / mutare.

**motum appellant aeternum.** motus aeternus.

**Motus.** motus / motio / motor / mutare; motus / motio / operatio.

**motus.** motus / motio / motor / mutare; motus / motio / operatio.

**moveat.** movere / sistere / firmare.

**movere.** movere / moveri.

**moveri.** movere / moveri.

**movetur.** movere / sistere / firmare.

**multa et unum.** multa et unum / unum et multa / unum multa.

**multiplex.** multiplex / compositus; multitudo / multiplex.

**Multiplicatio.** capacitas materiae / continuum / multiplicatio.

**multiplicem.** multitudo / multiplex.

**multitudine infinita.** multitudo infinita.

**multitudinem.** multitudo / multiplex.

**multitudo.** multitudo / multiplex; unus / unitas / multitudo.

**mundanae.** mundus / universum.

**mundi.** mundus / universum.

**mundi restitutionem.** senium / restitutio mundi.

**mundi series.** mundi series / vultus omnium.

**mundo.** mundus / universum.

**mundum.** mundus / universum.

**munera.** munus; munus / imago / exemplar.

**munere.** munus.

**munus.** munus; munus / donum; munus / ordinatio.

**muscae.** lutum / fimus / rana / musca.

**muscarum.** musca.

**muscas.** musca.

**mutabitur.** mutare / mutatio.

**mutantur.** motus / motio / motor / mutare.

**mutationem.** mutare / mutatio.

**mutatis paucis.** mutatis paucis.

**mutatur.** mutare / mutatio.

**mutua.** mutuus / invicem.

**mutua offensione.** mutua offensio.

**mutuant.** mutuare / mutuari.

**mutuarentque.** mutuare / mutuari.

**mutuarentur.** mutuare / mutuari.

**mutuari.** mutuare / mutuari.

**mutuo.** mutuus / invicem.

**mutuoque.** mutuus / invicem.

**mutuus.** mutuus / invicem.

**mystice.** hymnus / theologia / sacerdos.

**nanciscantur.** consequi / assequi / nancisci.

**nanciscitur.** consequi / assequi / nancisci.

**naribusque suavis.** suavis / naris.

**nascantur.** provenire / oriri / nasci.

**nascatur.** provenire / oriri / nasci.

**natura.** natura / naturalis; naturalis / natura.

**natura communi.** natura communis / propria.

**naturae.** natura / naturalis.

**naturae opus.** artificium / opus.

**naturae suae necessitate.** necessitas naturae.

**naturale.** natura / naturalis.

**naturalem.** natura / naturalis.

**naturali quadam necessitate.** necessitas naturae.

**naturalia.** natura / naturalis.

**naturalis.** naturalis / acquisitus; naturalis / natura.

**naturam.** natura / naturalis.

**ne.** ne / nisi.

**ne frustra.** ne frustra / ne inane.

**necessario.** necessitas / necessario.

**necessarium.** necesse / oportere; necessitas / oportere.

**necesse est.** oportet / necesse est / debet.

**necessitas.** necessitas / necessario; necessitas / oportere; necessitas and willing acceptance.

**necessitatem.** necessitas / necessario.

**necessitatis.** necessitas / oportere.

**nectare.** nectar / ebrius / debacchari.

**negabunt.** negare.

**negant.** negare.

**negas.** fateri / negare / affirmare.

**negentur.** fateri / negare / affirmare.

**neget.** negare.

**negligit.** neglegere.

**Neque.** neque … neque.

**neque.** neque … neque.

**nequit.** posse / nequire.

**Nereides.** Nereides.

**nervum.** nervus / nucha.

**nesciant.** ignarus / nescire.

**nescit.** iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari.

**nescit quiescere.** nescire quiescere.

**Nihil.** nihil / non ens.

**nihil.** nihil / non esse.

**nihilo.** nihil / non esse.

**nihilo proximam.** nihilo proximus.

**nihilum.** nihil / non esse.

**nisi.** ne / nisi.

**nititur.** instinctus / niti; nixus / niti; nixus / nitor / conor.

**nixu.** nixus / niti.

**nixum.** nixus / nitor / conor.

**nixus.** nixus / inniti; nixus / nitor / conor.

**nobilem.** vilis / pretiosus / nobilis.

**nobilior.** nobilior / amplior.

**noctem.** eclipsis / nox / momentum.

**nodus ille divinus.** nodus divinus.

**nolle.** velle / nolle; velle / nolle / malle.

**nolunt.** velle / nolle / malle.

**nomen.** appellatio / nomen / proprie.

**nominamus.** dicere / appellare / vocare.

**non ens.** nihil / non ens.

**non esse.** nihil / non esse.

**non tempore.** prior dignitate / tempore.

**nondum.** semper / simul / aliquando / nondum / amplius.

**norma.** norma.

**normam.** norma / condicio.

**Nosce te ipsum.** nosce te ipsum.

**noscens.** noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere.

**Noscit.** noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere.

**noscit.** noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere.

**nosse.** iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari.

**notitiam.** iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari.

**nova.** novus / vetus.

**novas.** novus / varius.

**novenarioque.** ternarius / novenarius / septenarius / duodenarius.

**novit.** noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere.

**novos.** novus / varius.

**novum.** novus / vetus.

**novus.** novus / relinquere.

**nucam.** nervus / nucha.

**nudam.** nudus / adventitius.

**numeri.** numerus / unicus / unire.

**numero.** numerus / unicus / unire.

**numerorum.** numerus / unicus / unire.

**numeros.** numerus / unicus / unire.

**numerum.** numerus / unicus / unire.

**numerum se moventem.** numerus se movens.

**numerus.** numerus / unicus / unire.

**nuncupantur.** dicere / vocare / appellare.

**nuntiosque.** angelus / nuntius.

**nuper.** nuper / semel / diuturnior / perpetuo / generatio / successio.

**nusquam.** ubique / nusquam / ubi.

**Nusquam.** ubique / nusquam / ubi.

**nutricem.** nutrix.

**nutrimentum.** nutrimentum / alimentum.

**nutrire.** nutrire / nutritio.

**nutriri.** nutrire / nutritio.

**nutrit.** alere / nutrire / digerere.

**nutritio.** nutrire / nutritio.

**nutritionis.** nutrire / nutritio.

**nutu.** nutus / vibrare; nutus / vibrare / centrum.

**nutu oculi.** nutu oculi.

**oberras.** trames / oberrare.

**obiecto.** obiectum; obiectum / proximus.

**obiectum.** obiectum; obiectum / proximus.

**obnoxia.** obnoxius / ineptus.

**obscura.** lucidus / obscurus.

**obscurus.** lucidus / obscurus.

**obstat.** impedire / obesse; penetrare / resistere / obstare.

**obtigit.** casus / contingere.

**obtinens.** obtineo.

**obtundit.** obtundere / fecundia.

**occasionem nacti.** occasio / nancisci.

**Oceanum.** Oceanus / Thetis.

**oculi.** Iuppiter / oculus.

**oculus.** Iuppiter / oculus.

**odor.** dulcedo / odor / flavus.

**offerat.** praeparare / offerre.

**offert.** dare / donare / exhibere.

**officio.** beneficium / officium; officium / perseverare.

**omittam.** addere / mittere / omittere.

**omnicolorem.** omniformis / unicolor / omnicolor.

**omniformem.** omniformis / unicolor / omnicolor; omniformis / uniformis.

**omniformis.** omniformis / uniformis.

**omnium.** omnis / cunctus / singulus.

**onerari.** sollicitare / sollicitudo / onerare.

**Onyx.** Corneola / Onyx / Corallus.

**opaca.** opacus.

**opaco.** opacus / clarus.

**operari.** opus / operari / operatio.

**operatio.** opus / operari / operatio.

**operationem.** opus / operari / operatio.

**operationis.** motus / motio / operatio.

**operatur.** opus / operari / operatio.

**operis.** opus.

**opificem.** opifex / architectus.

**opificis.** instrumentum / opifex; opifex.

**opinantur.** existimare / opinari / arbitrari.

**oportet.** necesse / oportere; necessitas / oportere; oportet / necesse est / debet.

**opposita.** oppositus / contrarius / diversus.

**oppositio.** contrarium / oppositio.

**optat.** opto / cupio.

**opus.** inscribo / opus; opus; stabilis causa / opus.

**oraculum.** oraculum.

**ordinantur.** ordo / ordinare.

**ordinate.** suaviter / ordinate.

**Ordinatio.** munus / ordinatio.

**ordinator.** ordinare / ordinator / ordo.

**ordinatore.** ordinare / ordinator / ordo.

**ordinatoribus.** ordinare / ordinator / ordo.

**ordine.** ordinare / ordinator / ordo.

**ordinem.** ordinare / ordinator / ordo.

**ordines.** ordo / umbra / imago.

**ordinet.** ordinare.

**ordo.** ordinare / ordinator / ordo; ordo / ordinare.

**oriatur.** orior / initium.

**origo.** principium / origo.

**oritur.** orior / initium.

**oriuntur.** provenire / oriri / nasci.

**ornatum.** informis / ornatus.

**ornetur.** orno.

**Oromasis.** Oromasis / Mitris / Arimanis.

**Orpheo.** Orpheus / Orphici.

**Orpheum.** Orpheus / Orphicus.

**Orpheus.** Orpheus / Orphici; Orpheus / Orphicus.

**Orphicis.** Orpheus / Orphici.

**Orphicum.** Orpheus / Orphicus.

**ostendemus.** ostendere / monstrare / probare.

**ostendimus.** ostendere / monstrare / probare.

**otio.** otium.

**otium.** otium; otium / administratio.

**ovum.** ovum / fovere.

**pacto.** via / pactum / tractus.

**paene.** paene / quodammodo.

**paene innumeros.** infinite and almost countless.

**par.** hora / par / impar.

**parentum.** filius / parens.

**paries.** paries / distantia.

**parietibus.** lapis / paries / congeries.

**parit.** serere / parere / explicare.

**Parmenides.** Parmenides / Pythagoreus.

**Parmenides Pythagoreus.** Parmenides Pythagoreus.

**pars.** compono / pars / totum; pars / totus.

**pars albedinis.** partis albedo / pars albedinis.

**parte.** pars / totum.

**partes.** pars / totum; pars / totus.

**partibus.** pars / totum; pars / totus.

**particeps.** particeps / participium; participare / particeps.

**participatione.** participare / particeps.

**participationem.** participatio / forma / eminentia.

**participia.** particeps / participium.

**particulae.** particula / particularis.

**particulari.** medium / particularis.

**particularia.** particularis / universalis.

**particularibus.** particularis / universalis.

**particularis.** medium / particularis.

**particulas.** medium / particularis.

**partim.** partim.

**partim stat, partim vero movetur.** partim … partim.

**partis.** pars / totum; pars / totus.

**partis albedo.** partis albedo / pars albedinis.

**partium.** pars / totus.

**parturiunt.** parturire.

**parum.** parum / paululum / paulum.

**parvas.** exilis / exiguus / parvitas.

**parvitatem.** exilis / exiguus / parvitas.

**parvum.** exilis / exiguus / parvitas.

**passim.** passim.

**passio.** passio / patiens / pati.

**passione.** pati / passio.

**passiones.** afficio / affectio / passio.

**passioni.** afficio / affectio / passio.

**passiva.** passio / patiens / pati; susceptivus / passivus.

**passivae.** passio / patiens / pati.

**passivam.** pati / passivus; susceptivus / passivus.

**passum.** iter / passus.

**passus.** iter / passus.

**pater.** pater philosophorum.

**patet.** appareo / pateo; concludere / confirmare / patere.

**pati.** pati / passio; pati / passivus; pati / patior.

**patiatur.** pati / passio; pati / patior.

**patiendi.** passio / patiens / pati.

**patiendique.** pati / passio.

**patiens.** agens / patiens; passio / patiens / pati.

**patienti.** agens / patiens.

**patitur.** passio / patiens / pati; pati / passivus; pati / patior.

**patiuntur.** pati / patior.

**patre.** pater / patria.

**patriae.** ala / dux / patria.

**patriam.** ala / dux / patria; pater / patria.

**paulatim.** paulatim / subito / sero; subito / paulatim.

**paululum.** parum / paululum / paulum.

**paulum.** parum / paululum / paulum.

**pavimento.** vitrum / fenestra / pavimentum.

**pedisequa.** regina / pedisequa.

**pellet.** pellere.

**pellitque.** pellere.

**pendeant.** pendere / dependere.

**pendentem.** pendere / dependere.

**pendet.** dependere / pendere; pendere / converti; pendere / dependere.

**penetralibus.** penetralia.

**penetrant.** penetrare.

**penetrante.** penetrare.

**penetrare.** penetrare / resistere / obstare.

**penetrat.** penetrare; penetrare / resistere / obstare.

**penetrationem.** penetro / penetratio.

**penetrationisque.** penetro / penetratio.

**penetret.** penetrare / resistere / obstare; penetro / penetratio.

**per.** ex / per / in causal uses.

**per formam.** secundum causam / per formam.

**per materiam.** per materiam / per substantiam.

**per naturam et dignitatem prior.** prior natura et dignitate.

**per se.** per se / per superiora.

**per se ipsum.** secundum se / per se.

**per substantiam.** per materiam / per substantiam.

**per superiora.** per se / per superiora.

**peragant.** peragere.

**peragit.** eligere / peragere.

**peragitur.** peragere / explere; transigo / perago / consummation.

**peragunt.** eligere / peragere.

**perceptio.** percipio / perceptio.

**percipiat.** iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari; percipio / perceptio.

**percipiendam.** percipio / perceptio.

**perditur.** iudicium / perdo.

**perdurabit.** permaneo / perduro / persevero.

**perfecerimus.** molior / perficio.

**perfecit.** perfectus / perficere.

**perfecta.** merus / verus / perfectus; perfectio / perfectus.

**perfectio.** perfectio / perfectus; perfectus / perficere.

**perfectionem.** perfectio / perfectus; perfectus / perficere.

**perfectionemque.** perfectio / perfectus.

**perfectionis.** perfectio / perfectus.

**perfectionisque.** perfectio / perfectus.

**perfectiores.** perfectio / perfectus.

**perfectissima.** perfectio / perfectus.

**perficere.** perficere / efficere.

**perficiuntur.** perficere / efficere.

**perfruatur.** frui / perfrui.

**Peripateticos.** alii quidam / Peripatetici.

**permanent.** permanere / perseverare.

**permanet.** manere / permanere / remanere; permanere / perseverare.

**permansisse.** permaneo / perduro / persevero.

**permixta.** confusio / permiscere / iungere.

**permixtione.** additamentum / permixtio.

**perscrutabimur.** perscrutari.

**perscrutemur.** perscrutor / indago.

**perseverant.** permaneo / perduro / persevero.

**perseverare.** perseverare.

**Perseverat.** officium / perseverare.

**perseveret.** permanere / perseverare.

**Perside.** Porphyrius / Persis / Tusci.

**persimiles.** similis / aequalis.

**perspectio.** perspicacia / perspectio.

**perspicacia.** perspicacia / perspectio.

**perspicimus.** perspicere / cernere.

**perspicuam.** perspicuus / diaphanus.

**perspicue.** stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis.

**perspicuum.** perspicuus / diaphanus.

**persuadeat.** allicere / cogere / persuadere.

**persuadet.** clamare / reclamare / persuadere; quaerere / persuadere.

**persuasionem.** metus / persuasio.

**pertineant.** competere / pertinere / spectare.

**pervenire.** procedere / progredi / proficere.

**pervigil.** pervigil / vigilare.

**Phaedone.** Phaedo / Philebus / Politicus / Phaedrus.

**Phaedro.** Phaedo / Philebus / Politicus / Phaedrus.

**phantasia.** phantasia.

**Phantasia.** phantasia.

**phantasiam.** phantasia / sensus / generatio.

**Philebo.** Phaedo / Philebus / Politicus / Phaedrus.

**Phoebus particularis.** Phoebus particularis / Iupiter particularis.

**physici.** physici.

**physicis.** physici; Plato / Platonici / philosophi / physici.

**physicum.** dialecticum / mathematicum / physicum.

**picturae.** pictura.

**pietate.** pietas / pius.

**pietatis.** pietas / pius.

**pigram.** moles / piger.

**pigras.** piger.

**pigrius.** moles / piger.

**pilae.** tabernaculum / statua / pila.

**pilam.** tabernaculum / statua / pila.

**pilos.** dens / pilus.

**pingendi.** tabula / pingere / color.

**pingere.** tabula / pingere / color.

**pinguntur.** pingere / figurare.

**pium.** pietas / pius.

**piumque.** pietas / pius.

**placet.** placere / displicere; placere / libenter.

**plane.** distincte / clare / plane.

**planissime.** distincte / clare / plane.

**plantando.** serere / plantare.

**plantarum.** planta / animal.

**Plato.** Plato / Platonici.

**Platonica.** Platonica / Latina facere.

**Platonici.** Plato / Platonici; Plato / Platonici / philosophi / physici.

**Platonicorumque.** Plato / Platonici.

**Platonis.** Plato / Platonici; Plato / Platonici / philosophi / physici.

**plenissima.** certus / plenus; integer / totus / plenus.

**plenitudinem.** plenitudo.

**plenitudo.** amplitudo / plenitudo / implere.

**plenus.** certus / plenus.

**Plotini.** Plotinus.

**Plotinus.** Anebon / Abamon / Plotinus / Iamblichus / Julianus; Plotinus.

**plurimum.** potissimum / summopere / penitus / prorsus / late.

**Plutonem.** Pluto / Proserpina.

**Politico.** Phaedo / Philebus / Politicus / Phaedrus.

**polos.** polus / revolutio / restitutio.

**pondere.** pondus / lapis.

**ponderibus.** pondus / librare.

**ponere.** figere / ponere.

**poneretur.** ponere / inducere / asserere.

**ponit.** ponere / signare in esse.

**Porphyrius.** Porphyrius / Persis / Tusci.

**porrigere.** amplificare / porrigere.

**porrigi.** porrigere / tendere.

**porrigit.** porrigere / tendere.

**portione.** portio.

**portionem.** portio.

**positionemve.** positio.

**posse.** possum.

**possideant.** videor habere / revera possideo.

**possidebat.** habere / possidere.

**possideri.** habere / possidere.

**possidet.** distrahere / divertere / possidere; habere / possidere.

**possidetur.** habere / possidere.

**post.** prae / post / infra / supra.

**posteriorem.** proprius / communis / posterior.

**posterius.** prius / posterius; prius / posterius / deinde.

**potentia.** habitus / actus / potentia; potentia / potestas / virtus.

**potentiae.** potentia / potestas / virtus.

**potentiam.** potentia / potestas / virtus.

**potest.** posse / nequire; possum.

**potestas.** potentia / potestas / virtus; vis / virtus / potestas.

**praebeant.** praebere / conducere.

**praebere.** praebeo / do.

**praebitura.** praebeo / do.

**praecedat.** praecedo.

**praecedens.** antecedere / sequi / praecedere.

**praecedente.** antecedere / sequi / praecedere.

**praecedit.** praecedo.

**praecipitium.** praecipitium / tenor.

**praedita.** praeditus.

**praeditis.** praeditus.

**praeesse.** inesse / praeesse.

**praeest.** praeesse.

**praeferantur.** praeponere / praeferre.

**praeferunt.** praefero / antepono.

**praeparantur.** praeparare / offerre.

**praeparationibus.** praeparatio.

**praeparatur.** praeparare / offerre.

**praeponitur.** praeponere / praeferre.

**praeponuntur.** praeponere / praeferre.

**praescientia.** praescientia / praevisio.

**praescribere.** praescribere.

**praescribet.** praescribere.

**praescribit.** praescribere / designare.

**praescribitur.** praescribere / lex.

**praescriptum.** praescribere.

**praesens.** absens / praesens.

**praesenti.** absens / praesens.

**praesenti habitu.** habitus — present state.

**praesentia.** praesentia; praesentia / admovere.

**praesentiam.** praesentia.

**praesidet.** machina / praesideo.

**praestabit.** praestare / praestans.

**praestantior.** praestare / praestans.

**praestantiore.** praestantior.

**praestantissimo.** praestantior.

**praestantius.** praestare / praestans.

**Praestantius.** praestare / praestans.

**praestat.** praestare; praestare / praestans.

**praestigiis.** fallere / praestigiae / confundere.

**praesunt.** praeesse.

**praeteritum.** praeteritum / futurum.

**praevaleret.** dominari / praevalere.

**praevalet.** promere / praevalere.

**praevaricatur.** praevaricari / effugere.

**praevisio.** praescientia / praevisio.

**Pratum.** Apelles / pratum.

**pratum.** Apelles / pratum.

**pretiosamque.** putridus / vilis / pretiosus.

**pretiosiora.** vilis / pretiosus / nobilis.

**pretiosis.** putridus / vilis / pretiosus.

**pretiosissima.** vilis / pretiosus / nobilis.

**primo.** primum / summum / ultimum.

**primo agit.** primo agere.

**primum.** primum / summum / ultimum; primum / ultimum.

**primumque.** primum / summum / ultimum.

**princeps.** principatus / gubernare / regere.

**principe.** exercitus / dux / princeps.

**principem.** princeps; principatus / gubernare / regere.

**principes.** princeps.

**principium.** fons / principium; principium / origo.

**prior.** prius / posterius.

**prior est dignitate.** prior dignitate / tempore.

**prius.** prius / posterius; prius / posterius / deinde.

**Prius.** prius / posterius / deinde.

**privata.** privare / expers.

**privatio.** privatio / malum.

**privationis.** privare / expers.

**privatum.** privare / expers.

**pro arbitrio.** pro arbitrio.

**pro viribus.** conor / pro viribus.

**probabili.** probabilis / computo.

**probabimus.** ostendere / monstrare / probare.

**probare.** ostendere / monstrare / probare.

**probatum.** probare / ostendere / demonstrare; probo / comprobo.

**procedunt.** conversio / profectio.

**proclivitas.** proclivitas / efficacia.

**proclivitasque.** proclivitas.

**Proclo.** Proclus / Syrianus.

**Proclus.** Proclus / Syrianus.

**Proclusque.** Iamblichus / Proclus.

**procuratoris.** diligentia / procurator.

**prodiret.** exordiri / prodire.

**Prodit.** exordiri / prodire.

**prodit.** exordiri / prodire.

**proditur.** vigeo / prodo.

**producant.** produce / become.

**producendis.** producere / facere / gignere.

**producit.** gignere / producere; producere / facere / gignere.

**profana.** error / impius / profanus.

**profectio.** conversio / profectio.

**proficere.** proficio / adipiscor.

**proficiendi.** proficio / adipiscor.

**proficiscitur.** proficisci.

**proficiscuntur.** proficisci.

**proficit.** procedere / progredi / proficere.

**profundum.** linea / longum / latum / profundum; longum / latum / profundum.

**progredi.** procedere / progredi / proficere.

**progrediantur.** procedere / progredi / proficere.

**progreditur.** procedere / progredi / proficere.

**progressionem.** procedere / progredi / proficere.

**prohibeatur.** prohibere / claudere / includere.

**prohibent.** impleo / prohibeo.

**prohiberet.** prohibere / claudere / includere.

**prohibet.** prohibere / claudere / includere.

**prohibetur.** prohibere / claudere / includere.

**prolem.** proles / gremium.

**promat.** promere / praevalere.

**promptissimum.** promptus / agilis.

**propagandae.** propago / facultas.

**propagare.** propagare / amplificare / dilatare.

**propagat.** propagare / amplificare / dilatare.

**propagatione.** putrefactio / propagatio.

**propagatur.** propagare / amplificare / dilatare.

**propinqua.** superior / inferior / propinquus.

**propinquas.** propinquo / propinquus.

**propinquat.** propinquo / propinquus.

**propinquior.** propinquus / conveniens; superior / inferior / propinquus.

**propinquius.** propinquo / propinquus; superior / inferior / propinquus.

**propitium.** propitius / punire.

**propius.** prope / disto.

**proportio.** comparare / proportio.

**proportionem.** gradus / mensura / proportio.

**proportionibusque.** proportio / consonare.

**proposito.** consilium / propositum; propositum; propositum / institutum.

**propositum.** propositum.

**proposuimus.** propositum.

**propria.** natura communis / propria; proprius / proprietas.

**Propria.** proprius / proprietas.

**Propriae.** proprius.

**propriae.** proprius / proprietas.

**propriam.** proprius / communis; proprius / communis / posterior.

**proprias.** proprius.

**Proprie.** appellatio / nomen / proprie.

**proprietas.** proprietas; proprius / proprietas.

**proprietate.** proprius / proprietas.

**proprietatem.** proprietas; proprius / proprietas.

**Proprietates.** proprietas.

**proprietates.** proprius / proprietas.

**propriis.** proprius / communis.

**proprium.** proprius.

**prorsus.** potissimum / summopere / penitus / prorsus / late.

**prorsus immobile.** empyreus / prorsus immobile.

**prorumpit.** prorumpo / migro.

**Proserpinam.** Pluto / Proserpina.

**prospectu.** prospectus / intuitus.

**protendatur.** protendo / tumeo.

**protenduntur.** protendo / amplifico.

**prout.** prout.

**provehamur.** transcendo / proveho.

**provenientem.** provenire / oriri / nasci.

**provenire.** produce / become.

**provenit.** produce / become; provenire / oriri / nasci.

**providentia.** providentia / decretum.

**providisses.** alimentum / providere.

**provisa.** alimentum / providere.

**provisurus.** alimentum / providere.

**proxima.** obiectum / proximus.

**proximae.** proximus.

**proximarum.** proximus / remotus.

**proxime.** prope / disto; proximus.

**proximum.** proximum bonitati; proximus / simillimus.

**prudentia.** prudentia.

**pullulant.** pullulare; pullulare / alligare.

**pullulantium.** pullulo / incohatio.

**pulsat.** pulsare.

**pulverem.** pulvis / describere.

**puncta.** punctum.

**punctis.** punctum / situs.

**puncto.** essentia puncto momento; punctum.

**punctum.** punctum; punctum / adstrictus dimensionibus; punctum / linea / circumferentia; punctum / situs.

**punire.** propitius / punire.

**pura.** purus / merus; purus / puritas.

**purgandum.** purgo / serenus.

**purgatam.** purgo / serenus.

**purgetur.** impedire / purgare.

**puri.** purus / merus.

**puritati.** purus / puritas.

**purum.** purus / puritas.

**purus.** purus / merus.

**puta.** puta.

**putant.** putare / arbitrari.

**putat.** cor / putare.

**putet.** cor / putare.

**putrefactione.** putrefactio / propagatio.

**putrido.** putridus / vilis / pretiosus.

**Pythagoreus.** Parmenides / Pythagoreus.

**Pythagorici.** Pythagorici.

**qua ratione.** qua ratione / quantum / quatenus.

**qua ratione sunt, eadem agunt.** qua ratione … eadem.

**quadrabit.** quadrare.

**quadrant.** quadrare.

**quaecumque.** qui / quod — scope of a condition.

**Quaecumque.** qui / quod — scope of a condition.

**quaerat.** quaerere / persuadere.

**quaerendas.** quaero / invenio.

**Quaerimus.** quaerere / interrogare.

**quaerit.** quaerere / interrogare; quaero / invenio.

**qualitas.** qualitas.

**qualitate.** qualitas; qualitas / virtus.

**qualitatem.** qualitas / virtus.

**qualitates.** qualitas.

**qualitatis.** qualitas.

**quamvis.** quamvis / licet.

**quandoque.** quandoque.

**Quantitas.** materia / quantitas.

**quantitate.** materia / quantitas.

**quantitatem.** quantitas / extensio / dimensio.

**quantitati.** quantitas / extensio / dimensio.

**quantitatis.** quantitas / dimensio; quantitas / extensio / dimensio.

**quantum.** qua ratione / quantum / quatenus; quantum / quatenus / eatenus.

**quantum ens est.** quantum ens est.

**quasi innumeras.** infinite and almost countless.

**quasi non motus.** quasi non motus.

**quasi spiritalia.** sulfur / quasi spiritalia.

**quassat.** aura / viscera / quassare.

**quatenus.** qua ratione / quantum / quatenus; quantum / quatenus / eatenus.

**quatenus corpus.** quatenus corpus.

**quicquid.** qui / quod — scope of a condition.

**quiete.** quies / quiesco.

**quinque.** quinque sensus / singulatim / summatim.

**quoad fieri potest.** ferme / quoad fieri potest.

**quodammodo.** forsitan / quodammodo; paene / quodammodo; quodammodo.

**Quorsum.** quorsum.

**quovis tempore.** statutis temporibus / quovis tempore.

**radiis.** illuminare / fulgere / radius / accendere.

**ranae.** lutum / fimus / rana / musca.

**rapiat.** revocare / rapere.

**raptaret.** raptare.

**rapuit.** rapere / includere.

**rara.** rarus / densus.

**rarefaciat.** coarcto / rarefacio.

**raritatem.** brevitas / raritas.

**ratio.** ratio.

**ratio appetendi.** ratio appetendi.

**rationalem animam.** anima rationalis.

**rationalis.** ratio / rationalis.

**rationalis animae.** anima rationalis.

**ratione boni.** ratio boni.

**ratione capta.** compos rationis / ratione captus.

**ratione non carent.** compos rationis / ratione captus.

**rationem.** ratio / rationalis.

**rationes.** ratio; ratio / rationalis.

**rationibus.** ratio / argumentatio / signum.

**rationis expertes.** rationis compos / expers.

**re ipsa.** res / re ipsa.

**reales.** realis / intellectus (adjectival).

**rebus.** res.

**rebus publicis.** res publicae.

**rebus veris.** umbra / res vera.

**recedet.** accedere / recedere.

**receptacula.** receptaculum.

**receptaculum.** receptaculum.

**reclamat.** clamare / reclamare / persuadere.

**rector.** rector / gubernare / regere.

**rector proprius.** rector proprius.

**rectores.** Zoroaster / rectores.

**recuperent.** mereri / aequalitatem recuperare.

**recurrit rursus in duodenarium.** recurrere in duodenarium.

**redigatur.** reducere / redigere.

**redigitur.** redigere / colligere / referre.

**reducamus.** colligere / reducere.

**reducatur.** reducere / redigere.

**reducenda.** colligere / reducere.

**reducendum.** reducere / referre.

**reducuntur.** reducere / redigere; reducere / referre.

**refellemus.** confutare / refellere.

**referamus.** reducere / referre.

**referantur.** redigere / colligere / referre.

**referatque.** exprimere / referre.

**referatur.** redigere / colligere / referre.

**referri.** redigere / colligere / referre.

**reflectatur.** repetere / reflectere.

**reflectendae.** reflectere.

**reflecti.** reflectere.

**reflectunt in gyrum.** continuatio / reflectere in gyrum.

**reflexio.** collisio / reflexio / lana.

**refluunt.** fluere / fluitare / fluxus.

**reformantur.** reformare / restituere.

**regere.** rector / gubernare / regere.

**regina.** regina / pedisequa.

**regionem.** locare / regio / localis; sedes / regio.

**regit.** principatus / gubernare / regere.

**regno.** leges / respublica / regnum / Critias (titles).

**regula.** regula.

**relicta.** fingo and removed members.

**relinquat.** novus / relinquere.

**relinquit.** deserere / relinquere.

**reluceat.** vultus / reluceo.

**remanens.** manere / permanere / remanere.

**remissione.** decrementum / remissio.

**remissioni.** decrementum / remissio.

**remissior.** remissior / vehemens.

**remittatur.** intendo / remitto.

**remittitur.** intendo / remitto.

**remotarum.** proximus / remotus.

**remotiorem.** excellens / eminens / deterior / altior / remotior.

**remotissimus.** extinguo / remotus.

**renasci.** corruo / renascor.

**reor.** reor / fides.

**repellit.** sistere / mitigare / repellere.

**reperit.** invenire-related reperire.

**reperitur.** invenire-related reperire; reperio / insum; reperire / invenire.

**reperiuntur.** reperio / insum; reperire / invenire.

**repetit.** repetere / reflectere.

**repetunt.** repetere / revocare.

**replere.** amplitudo / plenitudo / implere.

**replicat.** replicare / explicare.

**replicatur.** implicare / explicare / replicare.

**republica.** leges / respublica / regnum / Critias (titles).

**repugnat.** expugnare / repugnare.

**repugnet.** adversari / repugnare.

**requireret.** exigere / requirere.

**rerum.** res.

**rerumque.** res.

**res.** res; res / re ipsa.

**resistit.** penetrare / resistere / obstare.

**resolutione.** mors / resolutio.

**resolvitur.** resolvi / dissolutio.

**resonante.** Apollo / cithara / contemperare.

**respectu.** respectus / vigor.

**respectus.** respectus.

**Respectusque.** respectus.

**respiciant.** respicere.

**respiciunt.** cernere / respicere.

**Respondeamus.** dubitatio / respondere.

**respondebunt.** respondere.

**respondemus.** memorare / respondere / docere.

**respondentes.** respondere.

**respondere.** memorare / respondere / docere.

**respuere.** respuo.

**respuimus.** respuo.

**restitutio.** cancelli / restitutio; polus / revolutio / restitutio; reformare / restituere.

**restituuntur.** reformare / restituere.

**retardat.** retardo / differo.

**retexit.** machina / tela / retexere.

**retinebit.** retinere / amittere.

**Retinere.** retinere / amittere.

**retractatio.** mora / transgressio / retractatio.

**retrahit.** inserere / retrahere.

**retulimus.** reducere / referre.

**revera.** merus / incorruptus / revera; videor habere / revera possideo.

**revertamur.** convertere / reverti / converso.

**reverti.** convertere / reverti.

**revertitur.** convertere / reverti.

**revocando.** repetere / revocare.

**revocat.** revocare / rapere.

**revolutio.** polus / revolutio / restitutio.

**revolvitur.** convolvi / revolvi.

**roborandos.** fascinare / roborare.

**Roboratur.** roboro / duco.

**roboretur.** roboro / duco.

**rotat.** rotare.

**rotunditatis.** rotunditas.

**rubens.** viridis / rubens.

**rubeus.** ruber / viridis / splendor.

**rubra.** ruber / viridis / splendor.

**rubrum.** ruber / viridis / splendor.

**sacerdotes.** hymnus / theologia / sacerdos.

**saecula.** saeculum / duratio.

**sagittae.** sagitta / sagittarius / signum.

**sagittarii.** sagitta / sagittarius / signum.

**sapientia.** sapientia / sapiens.

**sapientiae.** sapientia / sapiens.

**sapientioribus se dimittere.** sapientioribus se dimittere.

**sapientissima.** sapientia / sapiens.

**sapientissimi.** sapientia / sapiens.

**Saturni.** hymnus / theologia / sacerdos.

**scaturiens.** scaturire / vena.

**Scaturiet.** scaturire / vena.

**scientia.** scientia / comprehendere.

**Scintilla.** scintilla / flamma.

**scintillam.** scintilla / flamma.

**Scopus.** finis / scopus.

**scripti.** scribere.

**se ipsam regit.** se regere / se sistere.

**se sistit.** se regere / se sistere.

**se toto.** se toto.

**secum ipsa volutat.** volutare secum.

**secunda quadam intentione.** secunda intentio.

**secundum causam.** secundum causam / per formam.

**secundum partem.** secundum partem / ex toto.

**secundum se.** secundum se / per se.

**Sed de his alias.** postponing and returning.

**Sed de hoc alias.** postponing and returning.

**sedem.** sedes / regio.

**segregantur.** integritas / segregare.

**segregatae.** integritas / segregare.

**seiuncta.** haerere / seiunctus.

**seiunctas.** separo / seiungo.

**seiungi.** separo / seiungo.

**seiungunt.** seiungo / disiungo.

**semel.** nuper / semel / diuturnior / perpetuo / generatio / successio.

**semicirculus.** Antipodes / semicirculus.

**semina.** semen / flos.

**semine.** semen.

**semine corporali.** germen / corporale semen.

**seminibus.** semen.

**semotum.** discessus / seorsum / semovere.

**semotum a multitudine.** Apollo / simplex et semotus.

**semotus motor.** semotus motor.

**semper.** semper / aliquando; semper / simul / aliquando / nondum / amplius.

**semper fit.** esse / fieri.

**sempiterna.** sempiternitas / aeternitas.

**sempiternitas.** sempiternitas / aeternitas.

**sempiternitatem.** sempiternitas / aeternitas.

**senium.** senium / restitutio mundi.

**sensibus.** quinque sensus / singulatim / summatim.

**sensum.** phantasia / sensus / generatio.

**sensum, inquam, rationalem.** sensus rationalis.

**sensus.** quinque sensus / singulatim / summatim.

**sententia.** sententia; sententia / voluerunt.

**seorsum.** discessus / seorsum / semovere; seorsum.

**separant.** separo / seiungo.

**separari.** discessus / seorsum / semovere.

**separatae.** separo / seiungo.

**septenario.** ternarius / novenarius / septenarius / duodenarius.

**sequentes.** antecedere / sequi / praecedere.

**sequentibus.** antecedere / sequi / praecedere.

**sequi.** sequi.

**serendo.** serere / plantare.

**serenior.** purgo / serenus.

**serie successionis.** series successionis.

**seriem successionis.** series successionis.

**serit.** serere / parere / explicare.

**sero.** paulatim / subito / sero.

**servantur.** edere / servare / conservare.

**servat.** edere / servare / conservare.

**servatque.** edere / servare / conservare; facio / servo.

**servaturque.** edere / servare / conservare.

**servit.** servire / alienus; servire / depravare.

**Si.** si / sin.

**sibimet.** adaequare / sibimet.

**sicca.** calidus / frigidus / siccus / humidus.

**siccitas.** siccitas / humiditas.

**signat in esse.** ponere / signare in esse.

**significat.** verbum / significatio / significare.

**significatio.** verbum / significatio / significare.

**signis.** ratio / argumentatio / signum.

**signum.** momentum / signum; sagitta / sagittarius / signum; signum.

**similem.** similis / dissimilis / similitudo.

**similes.** similis / aequalis; similis / dissimilis / similitudo.

**similia.** similis / similitudo.

**similibus.** similis / dissimilis / similitudo.

**similitudinem.** similis / similitudo.

**simillimum.** proximus / simillimus; similis / dissimilis / similitudo.

**simplex.** simplex / simplicitas.

**simplicem.** Apollo / simplex et semotus; simplex / simplicitas.

**simplici.** simplex / simplicitas.

**simplicissimam.** simplex / simplicitas.

**simplicissimo.** simplex / simplicitas.

**simplicissimus.** simplex / simplicitas.

**simplicitas.** simplex / simplicitas.

**simplicitate.** simplex / simplicitas.

**simplicitatem.** simplex / simplicitas.

**simpliciter.** simplex / simplicitas.

**simul.** semper / simul / aliquando / nondum / amplius; simul.

**simulacra.** simulacrum / color.

**simulacrum.** imago / simulacrum.

**Sin.** si / sin.

**sine controversia.** sine controversia.

**sine medio.** extremum sine medio; sine medio.

**sine sensu.** vita sine sensu.

**singula.** omnis / cunctus / singulus; singulus / minimus / infimus.

**singulatim.** quinque sensus / singulatim / summatim.

**singulorum.** omnis / cunctus / singulus.

**singulorum successionem.** successio singulorum.

**sinistram.** dextra / sinistra / sursum / deorsum.

**sistat.** movere / sistere / firmare.

**sistit.** sistere / mitigare / repellere.

**sit.** esse — existence and predication.

**situ.** affixus / situs; locus / situs / spatium; punctum / situs.

**situm.** affixus / situs; punctum / situs.

**situs.** locus / situs / spatium.

**Socratem.** Euclides / Megara / Athenae / Socrates.

**Sol.** sol / luna.

**sole.** luna / sol / stella.

**soliditate.** soliditas / densitas / crassitudo.

**soliditatem.** cardo / liquidus / solidus; statua / lapis / aes.

**solido.** cardo / liquidus / solidus.

**solis.** ignis / sol / caelum / stella.

**sollicitari.** sollicitare / sollicitudo / onerare.

**sollicitudine.** sollicitare / sollicitudo / onerare.

**solum.** solus / solum.

**solus.** solus / solum.

**solutionibus quaestionum.** solutio quaestionum.

**solvamus.** solvo / vincula / compedes.

**sortis.** forte / fortuitus / sors.

**sortitur.** sortiri / adipisci.

**spatii.** locus / situs / spatium.

**spatio.** locus / spatium.

**spatium.** intervallum / spatium; locus / situs / spatium.

**specie.** forma / species.

**speciem.** speciem complere; species / genus.

**speciem motus.** species motionis.

**specierum.** species / genus.

**specierumque.** species / genus.

**species.** forma / species; species / genus.

**species alias.** species motionis.

**spectaculum.** educare / spectaculum.

**spectat.** competere / pertinere / spectare.

**speculando.** speculari.

**speculatur.** iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari.

**speculo.** speculum; speculum / imago.

**speculum.** speculum.

**sphaeram.** sphaera.

**sphaeras.** caelum / sphaera / stella.

**spirabit.** spirare.

**spiritali.** spiritus / spiritalis.

**spiritalia et vivifica semina.** spiritalia et vivifica semina.

**spiritalis.** spiritus / spiritalis.

**spiritibus.** spiritus.

**spiritu.** spiritus.

**spiritui.** spiritus.

**spiritum.** spiritus / spiritalis.

**Spiritus.** spiritus.

**spiritus.** spiritus.

**splendor.** ruber / viridis / splendor.

**splendores.** ruber / viridis / splendor.

**spontaneumque.** spontaneus / voluntarius.

**spontaneus.** spontaneus / sponte.

**sponte.** spontaneus / sponte.

**stabile.** stabilis causa / opus.

**stabilem.** stabilis / instabilis / inordinatus.

**stabiliore.** status / stare.

**stabilis.** stabilis causa / opus; status / stare.

**stabiliunt.** imprimere / fundare / stabilire.

**stare.** stare / status.

**stat in motu.** status / stat in motu.

**statu.** status / stare.

**statua.** statua / lapis / aes.

**statuae.** tabernaculum / statua / pila.

**statuissem.** consilium / statuo.

**status.** stare / status; status / stare; status / stat in motu.

**statutis.** statutis temporibus / quovis tempore.

**stella.** cor / principalis stella; luna / sol / stella.

**stellas.** ignis / sol / caelum / stella.

**stellis.** caelum / sphaera / stella.

**Stoicorum.** Stoici / Cynici.

**Strato.** Strato / Chrysippus.

**struthii intuitus.** struthii oculus.

**struthii oculus.** struthii oculus.

**studium.** studium / incumbo.

**stultum.** stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis.

**sua sponte.** impulsus / sua sponte.

**suaviter.** suaviter / ordinate.

**sub omni.** super omne / sub omni.

**sub propria persona.** sub propria persona.

**subditur.** subdere / subicere.

**subici.** subicere / tollere / removere.

**subiciatur.** subdere / subicere.

**subiecta.** subiectum.

**subiecti.** subiectum.

**subiectis.** subiectum; subiectus, ruled subject.

**subiecto.** subiectum.

**subiectum.** subiectum.

**subire.** subire.

**subito.** paulatim / subito / sero; subito / paulatim.

**sublata.** fingo and removed members; subicere / tollere / removere.

**Sublata.** sublatus.

**sublato.** subicere / tollere / removere.

**submota.** subicere / tollere / removere.

**subsidio.** auxilium / subsidium.

**subsistens.** inniti / subsistere.

**subsistere.** inniti / subsistere; subsisto / dependeo.

**subsistit.** inniti / subsistere; subsisto / dependeo.

**substantia.** essentia / substantia.

**substantialem.** unitas accidentalis / substantialis.

**succedit.** antecedere / sequi / praecedere.

**successio.** nuper / semel / diuturnior / perpetuo / generatio / successio.

**successione.** generatio / successio; successio / curriculum.

**successione saltem.** successione saltem.

**sufficere.** sufficere / sufficientia.

**sufficiens.** sufficere / sufficientia.

**sufficienter.** sufficientia / sufficienter.

**sufficientiam.** sufficere / sufficientia; sufficientia / sufficienter.

**sufficiet.** sufficere / sufficientia.

**sufficit.** sufficere / geminus.

**suffragantibus.** suffragor.

**sui gratia.** gratia — purpose.

**sui iuris.** sui iuris.

**sulfur.** sulfur / quasi spiritalia.

**summa.** primum / summum / ultimum; summus / summum.

**summae.** summus / summum.

**summam.** primum / summum / ultimum.

**summatim.** enumerare / gradatim / summatim; quinque sensus / singulatim / summatim.

**summopere.** potissimum / summopere / penitus / prorsus / late.

**summum.** summus / summum.

**summus.** summus / summum.

**super omne.** super omne / sub omni.

**superabit.** excedere / superare.

**superant.** excedere / superare.

**superantes.** excedere / superare.

**superat.** maior range of causal giving; superare / e converso.

**superesse.** superesse / discedere.

**superest.** usurpare / superesse.

**superficiem.** superficies / fundus.

**superfluus.** frustra / superfluus.

**superior.** superior / inferior.

**superiore.** superior / inferior.

**superioribus.** superior / inferior.

**superioris.** superior / inferior.

**supra.** prae / post / infra / supra.

**sursum.** dextra / sinistra / sursum / deorsum; sursum / deorsum.

**susceptiva.** susceptivus / passivus.

**susceptivam.** susceptivus / passivus.

**suscipere.** suscipere.

**suscipiendas.** e regione / suscipere.

**suscipiendum.** accipere / capere / suscipere.

**suscipit.** accipere / capere / suscipere; suscipere.

**suscipitur.** suscipere.

**suscitet.** torpere / suscitare.

**suspicabatur.** forte / suspicor / vaticinor.

**suspicetur.** suspicari.

**suspicit.** respicere / suspicere / inspicere.

**sustinet.** inhaereo / sustineo.

**sustinetur.** inhaereo / sustineo.

**Syrianus.** Proclus / Syrianus.

**tabernaculum.** tabernaculum / statua / pila.

**tabula.** tabula / pingere / color.

**Taceat.** Lucretius / taceat.

**tangendum.** tangere.

**tangent.** tangere / attingere.

**tangi.** tangere / attingere.

**tangit.** attingo / tango; tangere; tangere / attingere.

**tardius.** velox / tardus.

**telam.** machina / tela / retexere.

**telam generationis retexere.** retexere telam.

**temperans.** temperare.

**temperantiam.** temperantia / intemperantia.

**temperas.** temperare.

**temperat.** temperare.

**temperatio.** temperatio / aequabilis.

**temperatione.** temperatio / aequabilis.

**temporale.** tempus / temporalis.

**temporalem.** tempus / temporalis.

**temporali.** tempus / temporalis.

**temporalis.** tempus / temporalis.

**temporibus.** statutis temporibus / quovis tempore.

**temporis.** tempus / temporalis.

**tempus.** tempus / temporalis.

**tempus primum.** intervallum / tempus primum.

**tempusque.** tempus / temporalis.

**tendit.** maior range of causal giving.

**tenditur.** porrigere / tendere.

**tenebris.** tenebrae / caecus.

**tenet.** habere / tenere / possidere.

**tenore.** tenor.

**tenorem.** praecipitium / tenor; tenor / lex.

**tenuatur.** tenuari / clarescere / hebescere.

**tenuis.** ignis / tenuis.

**tenuitate.** ignis / tenuis.

**terminandum.** termino.

**terminante.** terminare / finire.

**termino.** terminare / finire.

**terminum.** terminare / finire; terminus / infinitum.

**terminum vivendi.** terminus vivendi.

**ternario.** ternarius / novenarius / septenarius / duodenarius.

**terra.** aer / aqua / terra.

**tertia.** tertia essentia.

**tertiam.** arx / tertius / medius.

**tetigit.** attingere / tetigit.

**theologia.** hymnus / theologia / sacerdos.

**theologorum.** hymnus / theologia / sacerdos.

**Thetin.** Oceanus / Thetis.

**Thomae Aquinati.** Thomas Aquinas.

**Timaeus.** Timaeus / Timaeus Locrus.

**Timaeusque.** Mercurius Trismegistus / Timaeus.

**tollit.** tollo / traho / transfero.

**torpent.** torpere / suscitare.

**torpentia.** torpere / suscitare.

**tota.** pars / totum.

**tota simul.** tota simul.

**totam.** pars / totus.

**totique.** pars / totum.

**totius.** pars / totum; pars / totus.

**totius mundi gratia.** gratia / causa with genitive.

**toto.** pars / totum; pars / totus.

**totum.** compono / pars / totum; pars / totum; pars / totus.

**totumque in singulis.** commune / totum in singulis.

**totus.** pars / totus.

**tractavimus.** doctrina / tracto.

**tractet.** doctrina / tracto.

**tractu.** tractus / trahere.

**tractum.** via / pactum / tractus.

**tradit.** tribuere / tradere.

**tradunt.** confiteri / tradere.

**trahit.** tollo / traho / transfero.

**trahitur.** porrigere / tendere.

**trahunt.** tractus / trahere.

**trahuntur.** ducere / deducere / trahere.

**tramite.** trames / oberrare.

**tramitem.** trames.

**transcendamus.** transcendo / proveho.

**transeunt.** migrare / transire.

**transferre.** transferre / assequi.

**transfert.** tollo / traho / transfero.

**transgressio.** mora / transgressio / retractatio.

**transgressioque.** labor / transgressio.

**transigitur.** transigo / perago / consummation.

**transire.** migrare / transire.

**transit.** migrare / transire.

**translationem.** translatio.

**tribuimus.** tribuere / tradere.

**Tubarum.** tuba / cornu / cantus.

**tumeat.** protendo / tumeo.

**tunc demum affirmanda.** tunc demum affirmanda.

**Tuscos.** Porphyrius / Persis / Tusci.

**ubi.** ubique / nusquam / ubi.

**ubique.** ubique / nusquam / ubi.

**Ultimum.** primum / summum / ultimum.

**ultimum.** primum / ultimum; prius / posterius / deinde.

**ultimus.** primum / summum / ultimum.

**umbra.** umbra; umbra / umbratilis / vanus.

**umbrae.** ordo / umbra / imago.

**umbram.** umbra.

**umbras.** umbra / res vera; umbra arborum in torrente.

**umbratiles.** vanus / umbratilis.

**umbratilis.** umbra / umbratilis / vanus.

**umbris.** umbra / res vera.

**unam habeat animam.** unum vivens.

**unam vitam.** unum vivens.

**unicolor.** omniformis / unicolor / omnicolor.

**unicum.** numerus / unicus / unire.

**uniformem.** omniformis / uniformis.

**unione.** unio / augeo.

**uniri.** unire.

**unitas.** unitas / unio; unus / unitas / multitudo.

**unitate.** unitas / unio.

**unitatem.** unitas / unio; unitas accidentalis / substantialis.

**unitates.** unitas / unio.

**unitati.** unitas / unio.

**unitatis.** unitas / unio.

**universale.** universalis / universalia.

**universalem.** universalis / universalia.

**universalem Apollinem.** Apollo / simplex et semotus.

**universales.** particularis / universalis; universalis / universalia.

**universali.** universalis / universalia.

**universalia.** particularis / universalis; universalis / universalia.

**universalis.** universalis / universalia.

**universam.** mundus / universum.

**universi.** mundus / universum.

**universum.** mundus / universum.

**universus.** mundus / universum.

**unum.** unus / unitas / multitudo.

**unum et multa.** multa et unum / unum et multa / unum multa.

**unum ipsum.** unum simpliciter.

**unum multa.** multa et unum / unum et multa / unum multa.

**unum simpliciter.** unum simpliciter.

**unum vivens.** unum vivens.

**urerent.** urere / frigefacere.

**urit.** frigefacio / calefacio / uro.

**usu.** uti / usus.

**usurpare.** usurpare / superesse.

**usus vitae.** violentia / usus vitae.

**ut ita loquar.** ferme / ut ita loquar.

**ut plurimum.** ratio naturalis and usualness; ut plurimum.

**uti.** uti / usus.

**utitur.** uti / usus.

**utrumque.** alius / idem / uterque — explanatory distinction.

**utrumque terminum.** terminus operationis.

**vacillaret.** vacillo.

**vagatur.** vagari / consultare.

**vagos.** vagus / variabilis.

**valeant.** valere / praestare.

**valeat.** valere / praestare.

**valere.** valere / praestare.

**valet.** fortis / vehementia / valere.

**validior.** deficio / validus.

**validius.** efficax / validus.

**vanior.** umbra / umbratilis / vanus.

**vanissimum.** vanus / umbratilis.

**vanum.** umbra / umbratilis / vanus.

**vanus.** umbra / umbratilis / vanus.

**variabili.** vagus / variabilis.

**varias.** novus / varius.

**variatur.** novus / varius.

**variosque.** novus / varius.

**Varro.** Heraclitus / Varro / Manilius.

**vas.** vas / aquae summum.

**vasis.** vas / aquae summum.

**vaticinabatur.** forte / suspicor / vaticinor.

**vehemens.** remissior / vehemens.

**vehementior.** fortis / vehementia / valere; remissior / vehemens.

**vehementius.** fortis / vehementia / valere.

**velimus.** velle / nolle.

**velle.** velle / nolle.

**velocior.** velox / tardus.

**velocius.** velox / tardus.

**velox.** velox / tardus.

**vena.** scaturire / vena.

**veneratione.** veneror / veneratio.

**veneremur.** veneror / veneratio.

**ventrem.** venter / fetus.

**ver.** hiems / ver / aestas / autumnus.

**vera.** merus / verus / perfectus.

**veraque.** merus / incorruptus / revera.

**verbi.** verbum / significatio / significare.

**verbum.** verbum / significatio / significare.

**vergerent.** vergere.

**veridica.** veridicus.

**Veritas.** veritas / verus.

**veritas.** veritas / verus.

**veritate.** veritas / verus.

**veritatem.** veritas / verus.

**veritatis.** veritas / verus.

**vero.** vero / verum: connectives.

**versat.** versari / versare.

**versatur.** versari / versare.

**Verum.** veritas / verus; vero / verum: connectives.

**verum.** veritas / verus; vero / verum: connectives.

**verumque.** merus / incorruptus / revera.

**vestigia.** vestigium.

**vestigium.** vestigium.

**veteribus.** novus / vetus.

**vi.** vis / inscitia; vis / vires.

**via.** via / pactum / tractus.

**viam.** via.

**vias.** via.

**vibrantur.** vibrare / affectio.

**vibrat.** nutus / vibrare; nutus / vibrare / centrum.

**vicem formae gerebat.** membrum / vicem gerere.

**vicem genitricis substantiae gerit.** vicem gerere.

**vicem gerit.** vicem gerere.

**vicissim.** vicissim / invicem.

**vicissitudine.** vicissitudo.

**videantur.** videtur.

**videantur habere.** videor habere / revera possideo.

**videntur.** putare / videri as appearance.

**videri.** putare / videri as appearance.

**videt.** videre / visibilis; visus / videre.

**videtur.** putare / videri as appearance; videtur.

**viget.** vigeo / prodo.

**vigilat.** pervigil / vigilare.

**vigor.** vigor.

**vigore.** respectus / vigor.

**viliora.** vilis / pretiosus / nobilis.

**vilis.** putridus / vilis / pretiosus.

**vilissima.** vilis / pretiosus / nobilis.

**vilissimarum.** vilis / pretiosus / nobilis.

**vim.** vis / vires.

**vim geminam.** vis gemina.

**vim inferre.** vim inferre.

**vinaceo.** vitis / vinaceus.

**vincitque in unum.** concilio / vincit in unum.

**vinciuntur.** vincire / connectere.

**vincula.** solvo / vincula / compedes.

**vinculum.** vinculum / connecto.

**vinum.** vinum.

**violentia.** violentia / usus vitae; violentus / violentia.

**violentiam.** violentus / violentia.

**violentum.** violentus / violentia.

**virescunt.** florere / virescere.

**viridem.** ruber / viridis / splendor.

**viridis.** ruber / viridis / splendor; viridis / rubens.

**virtus.** essentia / virtus / actio; potentia / potestas / virtus; vis / virtus / potestas.

**Virtus.** potentia / potestas / virtus.

**virtute.** potentia / potestas / virtus.

**virtutem.** potentia / potestas / virtus; qualitas / virtus.

**vis.** vis / vires; vis / virtus / potestas.

**visceribus.** aura / viscera / quassare.

**visibile.** videre / visibilis.

**Visus.** visus / videre.

**visus se ipso lucens.** lux se ipsa videns.

**vita.** vita / vivere / vivificare; vita sine sensu.

**Vita.** vita / vivere / vivificare.

**vita vitarum.** vita vitarum.

**vitae alicuius instrumentum.** instrumentum vitae.

**vitae rationisque compos.** compos rationis / ratione captus.

**vitali.** vita / vivere / vivificare.

**vitam.** vita / vivere / vivificare.

**vitem.** vitis / vinaceus.

**vites.** vitis / vinaceus.

**vitis.** vitis / vinaceus.

**vitreas.** vitrum / fenestra / pavimentum.

**vitrum.** vitrum / fenestra / pavimentum.

**vivant.** vita / vivere / vivificare.

**vivat.** vita / vivere / vivificare.

**vivente.** vita / vivere / vivificare.

**vivere.** vita / vivere / vivificare.

**vivificando.** vita / vivere / vivificare.

**vivificans.** vita / vivere / vivificare.

**vivificat.** vita / vivere / vivificare.

**vivit.** vita / vivere / vivificare.

**Vivit ut vult.** vivere ut vult.

**vivit ut vult.** vivere ut vult.

**volente Deo.** volente Deo.

**voluerunt.** sententia / voluerunt.

**volumus.** velle / nolle.

**volunt.** velle / nolle / malle.

**voluntaria.** velle / nolle.

**voluntarium.** necessitas and willing acceptance; spontaneus / voluntarius.

**voluntariusque.** spontaneus / voluntarius.

**voluntatem.** inclinatio / appetitus / voluntas.

**voluntatis.** voluntas / memoria.

**voluptas.** voluptas / dilatatio.

**voluptatem.** voluptas.

**vox significatioque.** vox / significatio.

**vulgo.** stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis.

**vulnerabant.** coronare / vulnerare.

**vult.** velle / nolle; velle / nolle / malle; vult / lubet.

**vultus.** vultus / reluceo.

**vultus imagines.** vultus / imago.

**vultus omnium.** mundi series / vultus omnium.

**Xenocrate.** aenigma / Xenocrates.

**Zoroaster.** Metrodorus / Zoroaster; Zoroaster / ignis unus; Zoroaster / rectores.

**Zoroastris sectatores.** Zoroastris sectatores.

# Passage index

All 533 numbered comparison units appear below, in source order. Each row gives the supplied PDF page pair and reading routes into articles or vocabulary explanations. The unnumbered authorial reservation on source page 13 is discussed in the Introduction. Coverage of a unit is not a claim that every token has an independent definition.

## Proem

**Proem.1, source pp. 6–7.** Articles: God; Light and illumination; Lorenzo, dedication and public authority; Mind; Philosophy and theology; Procession and return; Returning, referring and reducing; Worship and piety. Vocabulary: censeo; cognosco / agnosco; Laurenti / magnanimus; pater philosophorum; pietas / pius; possum.

**Proem.2, source pp. 6–7.** Articles: God; Light and illumination; Philosophy and theology; Returning, referring and reducing; Soul; Worship and piety. Vocabulary: colo / cultus; mores / morale; percipio / perceptio; purgo / serenus.

**Proem.3, source pp. 6–7.** Articles: Cause; Divinity and the divine; God; Light and illumination; Naming and defining; Philosophy and theology; Returning, referring and reducing; Worship and piety. Vocabulary: adhortor / admoneo; colo / cultus; contemplor / contemplatio; dialecticum / mathematicum / physicum; doctrina / tracto; mores / morale; perscrutor / indago; pietas / pius; quaero / invenio; sine controversia; veneror / veneratio.

**Proem.4, source pp. 6–7.** Articles: Divinity and the divine; God; Image and likeness; Light and illumination; Philosophy and theology; Self knowledge; Soul; Traces; Worship and piety. Vocabulary: adhortor / admoneo; cognosco / agnosco; diverto / dirigo; imago / simulacrum; lego / diligentia; nosce te ipsum; opto / cupio; oraculum; perscrutor / indago; speculum; vestigium; vultus / reluceo.

**Proem.5, source pp. 6–7.** Articles: Divinity and the divine; God; Philosophy and theology; Soul; Worship and piety. Vocabulary: cognosco / agnosco; colo / cultus; lego / diligentia; pietas / pius; Platonica / Latina facere.

**Proem.6, source pp. 8–9.** Articles: Augustine and Christian proximity; Blessedness; Divinity and the divine; God; Philosophy and theology; Soul; Truth; Worship and piety. Vocabulary: Aurelius Augustinus / Aurelianus; beatitudo / felicitas; imitor / exprimo; institutio vitae; mutatis paucis; percipio / perceptio; proximus / simillimus.

**Proem.7, source pp. 8–9.** Articles: Augustine and Christian proximity; Divinity and the divine; God; Image and likeness; Immortality; Mind; Philosophy and theology; Self knowledge; Soul; Truth; Worship and piety. Vocabulary: auctoritas; Aurelius Augustinus / Aurelianus; caritas; censeo; colo / cultus; consilium / statuo; contemplor / contemplatio; fretus / adductus; imago / simulacrum; imitor / exprimo; inscribo / opus; proximus / simillimus; speculum; studium / incumbo.

**Proem.8, source pp. 8–9.** Articles: Assent, approval and belief; God; Order and harmony; Philosophy and theology; Reason and account; Truth; Will; Worship and piety. Vocabulary: aberro; acquiesco; auctoritas; cedo; cognosco / agnosco; ingenium; lex divina; providentia / decretum; reor / fides; seiungo / disiungo; studium / incumbo; suffragor.

**Proem.9, source pp. 8–9.** Articles: God; Image and likeness; Philosophy and theology; Reason and account; Sense and imagination; Truth; Worship and piety. Vocabulary: adhortor / admoneo; contemplor / contemplatio; praefero / antepono; res; umbra / res vera.

**Proem.10, source pp. 10–11.** Articles: Assent, approval and belief; Augustine and Christian proximity; God; Order and harmony; Philosophy and theology; Truth; Worship and piety. Vocabulary: doctrina / tracto; imitor / exprimo; inscribo / opus; lex divina; molior / perficio; probo / comprobo; spiritual aid and confidence; veneror / veneratio.

**Proem.11, source pp. 10–11.** Articles: Leisure; Lorenzo, dedication and public authority; Philosophy and theology. Vocabulary: arcana / edo; auctoritas; beneficium / officium; dedico / gratulor; ingenium; iudico; Laurenti / magnanimus; mirus / mirabilis / mirabiliter; otium; res publicae.

## Chapter I.1

**I.1.1, source pp. 14–15.** Articles: Animating and animal; Blessedness; Body and bulk; Divinity and the divine; End and limit; Immortality; Need and sufficiency; Prison and homeland; Soul; Worship and piety. Vocabulary: animal / bestia / animans; beatitudo / felicitas; carcer / claustra; colo / cultus; genus; indigentia; inquietudo / imbecillitas; superesse / discedere; terminus vivendi; videtur.

**I.1.2, source pp. 14–15.** Articles: Assent, approval and belief; Blessedness; Body and bulk; Divinity and the divine; Immortality; Light and illumination; Prison and homeland; Soul. Vocabulary: ala / dux / patria; carcer / claustra; cernere / respicere; contemplor / contemplatio; diffido; solvo / vincula / compedes; tenebrae / caecus.

**I.1.3, source pp. 14–15.** Articles: Ascent; Blessedness; Body and bulk; Divinity and the divine; Immortality; Philosophers and stopping points; Prison and homeland; Proof, signs

and qualification; Soul. Vocabulary: appareo / pateo; beatitudo / felicitas; carcer / claustra; cernere / respicere; conor / pro viribus; Democritii / Cyrenaici / Epicurei; demonstro / assevero; efficax / efficacia; moles / piger; mortalis / immortalis; qualitas / virtus; Stoici / Cynici; valere / praestare.

**I.1.4, source pp. 14–15.** Articles: Ascent; Divinity and the divine; Immortality; Philosophers and stopping points; Soul. Vocabulary: anima rationalis; ascendo / gradus; Heraclitus / Varro / Manilius; qualitas / virtus; quamvis / licet.

**I.1.5, source pp. 16–17.** Articles: Angel; Ascent; Divinity and the divine; Immortality; Philosophers and stopping points; Soul. Vocabulary: Anaxagoras / Hermotimus; mens angelica; videtur.

**I.1.6, source pp. 16–17.** Articles: Angel; Ascent; Divinity and the divine; Immortality; Light and illumination; Philosophers and stopping points; Soul. Vocabulary: acies / oculus mentis; capax / capio; diverto / dirigo; opto / cupio; purgo / serenus.

**I.1.7, source pp. 16–17.** Articles: Angel; Ascent; Blessedness; Body and bulk; Bond knot and chain; Comparing, resembling and equalling; Degree and mediation; Divinity and the divine; God; Governing, serving and dominion; Immortality; Proof, signs and qualification; Reason and account; Soul; World and universe. Vocabulary: anima rationalis; appareo / pateo; ascendo / gradus; demonstro / assevero; indissolubilis / dissolvo; insinuo; machina / praesideo; obtineo; ratio / argumentatio / signum; solutio quaestionum; vinculum / connecto.

## Chapter I.2

**I.2.1, source pp. 18–19.** Articles: Affection and passivity; Art and nature; Body and bulk; Matter; Quantity and dimension. Vocabulary: afficio / affectio / passio; extendo / extensio; fieri / constare; materia / quantitas; qua ratione / quantum / quatenus; quatenus corpus.

**I.2.2, source pp. 18–19.** Articles: Affection and passivity; Art and nature; Body and bulk; Dispersion and concentration; Fire, spark, lightning and cannon; Power and potency; Quantity and dimension; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: agens / patiens; appareo / pateo; calor / frigus; coarcto / rarefacio; commigro; dispergo / distractio; exigo / condicio; impedimentum / impedio; impleo / prohibeo; levitas / gravitas; lignum / acutus / latus; locus / spatium; minuo / debilito; moles / piger; penetro / penetratio; promptus / agilis; prope / disto; retardo / differo; scintilla / flamma; siccitas / humiditas; soliditas / densitas / crassitudo; sursum / deorsum; tollo / traho / transfero; unio / augeo.

**I.2.3, source pp. 20–21.** Articles: Affection and passivity; Art and nature; Body and bulk; Dispersion and concentration; Incorporeal and immaterial; Power and potency; Quantity and dimension. Vocabulary: brevitas / raritas; exigo / condicio; penetro / penetratio.

**I.2.4, source pp. 20–21.** Articles: Affection and passivity; Art and nature; Body and bulk; Dispersion and concentration; Incorporeal and immaterial; Power and potency; Quantity and dimension. Vocabulary: agens / patiens; locus / spatium; paulatim / subito / sero; remissior / vehemens; retardo / differo; transigo / perago / consummation.

**I.2.5, source pp. 20–21.** Articles: Art and nature; Body and bulk; Fire, spark, lightning and cannon; Incorporeal and immaterial; Light and illumination; Power and potency. Vocabulary: efficax / efficacia; fulgur / bombarda; ignis / tenuis; mirus / mirabilis / mirabiliter; pati / patior; pondus / lapis; propinquo / propinquus; scintilla / flamma; vas / aquae summum.

**I.2.6, source pp. 22–23.** Articles: Art and nature; Body and bulk; Matter; Power and potency. Vocabulary: pati / patior; primum / ultimum.

**I.2.7, source pp. 22–23.** Articles: Art and nature; Body and bulk; Infinity; Matter; Power and potency; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: multitudo infinita.

**I.2.8, source pp. 22–23.** Articles: Art and nature; Body and bulk; Contraries and opposition; Matter; Philosophers and stopping points; Quality. Vocabulary: contrarium / oppositio; Democritii / Cyrenaici / Epicurei; insitus; qualitas / virtus.

**I.2.9, source pp. 22–23.** Articles: Art and nature; Body and bulk; Form; Matter; Quality; Quantity and dimension; Species. Vocabulary: addo / accedo; forma / species; interminatus / infinitus / finitus; qua ratione … eadem; qua ratione / quantum / quatenus.

**I.2.10, source pp. 22–23.** Articles: Body and bulk; Form; Quality; Quantity and dimension. Vocabulary: agens / patiens; materia aliena / propria.

**I.2.11, source pp. 24–25.** Articles: Body and bulk; Dispersion and concentration; Fire, spark, lightning and cannon; Quality; Quantity and dimension; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: calor / frigus; frigefacio / calefacio / uro; in angustum / ad punctum; produce / become.

**I.2.12, source pp. 24–25.** Articles: Body and bulk; Comparing, resembling and equalling; Quality; Quantity and dimension; Returning, referring and reducing. Vocabulary: complexio / figura; filius / parens; prius / posterius; produce / become; similis / aequalis.

**I.2.13, source pp. 24–25.** Articles: Body and bulk; Honey, whiteness and the wall; Light and illumination; Quality; Quantity and dimension; Sense and imagination. Vocabulary: color / lumen; efficax / efficacia; iudicium / perdo; iudico; paries / distantia; propinquo / propinquus.

**I.2.14, source pp. 24–25.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Good and goodness; Quality; Quantity and dimension. Vocabulary: eligo; plus et minus; ratio boni.

**I.2.15, source pp. 26–27.** Articles: Honey, whiteness and the wall; Incorporeal and immaterial; Quality; Quantity and dimension. Vocabulary: dulcedo / odor / flavus; fieri / constare; mel / guttula; mutua offensio; reperio / insum; suavis / naris.

**I.2.16, source pp. 26–27.** Articles: Incorporeal and immaterial; Quality; Quantity and dimension. Vocabulary: addo / accedo; harmonia; longum / latum / profundum; reperio / insum.

**I.2.17, source pp. 26–27.** Articles: Dispersion and concentration; Honey, whiteness and the wall; Incorporeal and immaterial; Indivisibility; Quality; Quantity and dimension; Reason and account. Vocabulary: dispergo / distractio; fieri / constare; in angustum / ad punctum; partis albedo / pars albedinis; produce / become; proprietas; quodammodo; ratio albedinis.

## Chapter I.3

**I.3.1, source pp. 28–29.** Articles: Act and operation; Form; Infection, lameness and Lethe; Naming and defining; Perfection; Philosophers and stopping points; Quality. Vocabulary: ascendo / gradus; efficax / efficacia; inficio / inquino; merus / verus / perfectus; more Platonico; obnoxius / ineptus; physici; promptus / agilis; Stoici / Cynici.

**I.3.2, source pp. 28–29.** Articles: Form; Perfection; Sense and imagination; Truth. Vocabulary: arguo / convinco; deficio / validus; extra / intus; fallo / falsum; merus / verus / perfectus; mundus / universum; reperio / insum; valere / praestare.

**I.3.3, source pp. 30–31.** Articles: Cause; Containing, receiving and lacking; Form; Perfection. Vocabulary: contineo / complector; genus; merus / verus / perfectus; plenitudo.

**I.3.4, source pp. 30–31.** Articles: Cause; Essence and substance; Form; Naming and defining; Need and sufficiency; Quality; Substance and accident; Support, inherence and dependence. Vocabulary: ex / per / in causal uses; inhaereo / sustineo; subsisto / dependeo.

**I.3.5, source pp. 30–31.** Articles: Cause; Form; Generation and corruption; Need and sufficiency; Precedence and causal regress. Vocabulary: orior / initium; praecedo; valere / praestare.

**I.3.6, source pp. 32–33.** Articles: Art and nature; Cause; Form; Fountain, womb and offspring; Generation and corruption; Infinity; Matter; Need and sufficiency; Precedence and causal regress. Vocabulary: ars / artificium; fluctuo / labens; fons formarum; informis / informe subiectum; orno; praebeo / do; praeditus; qua ratione / quantum / quatenus; si / sin.

**I.3.7, source pp. 34–35.** Articles: Cause; Fire, spark, lightning and cannon; Generation and corruption; Governing, serving and dominion; Instrument; Need and sufficiency; Quality; Support, inherence and dependence. Vocabulary: dominor; ex / per / in causal uses; fomentum; sufficientia / sufficienter.

**I.3.8, source pp. 34–35.** Articles: Cause; Fire, spark, lightning and cannon; Generation and corruption; Instrument; Need and sufficiency; Precedence and causal regress; Quality. Vocabulary: condicio / innatus; effectus / efficiens; genus; instrumentum.

**I.3.9, source pp. 34–35.** Articles: Cause; Contraries and opposition; Fire, spark, lightning and cannon; Generation and corruption; Instrument; Need and sufficiency; Precedence and causal regress; Quality; Reason and account. Vocabulary: extinguo / remotus; instrumentum; medium / interpono.

**I.3.10, source pp. 36–37.** Articles: Cause; Generation and corruption; Instrument; Quality. Vocabulary: inesse / praeesse; instrumentum.

**I.3.11, source pp. 36–37.** Articles: Cause; Generation and corruption; Instrument; Order and harmony; Quality. Vocabulary: stabilis / instabilis / inordinatus; statutis temporibus / quovis tempore; successio / curriculum.

**I.3.12, source pp. 36–37.** Articles: Ascent; Number; Order and harmony; Point, position and mathematical ascent; Separation and abstraction; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: absolutus / adstrictus; certus / incertus; mathematicus / metaphysicus; particularis / universalis; punctum / situs.

**I.3.13, source pp. 36–37.** Articles: Ascent; Essence and substance; Indivisibility; Number; Order and harmony; Point, position and mathematical ascent; Reason and account; Separation and abstraction; Substance and accident; Unity and multiplicity; World and universe. Vocabulary: cardo / fundamentum; impedimentum / impedio; mundus / universum; tollo / traho / transfero; unitas accidentalis / substantialis; vigeo / prodo.

**I.3.14, source pp. 38–39.** Articles: Ascent; Form; Indivisibility; Least natural degree; Number; Participation; Point, position and mathematical ascent; Returning, referring and reducing; Separation and abstraction; Substance and accident; Unity and multiplicity.

Vocabulary: addo / accedo; gradus minimus naturalis; momentum / signum; oportet / necesse est / debet; reducere / redigere.

**I.3.15, source pp. 38–39.** Articles: Ascent; Form; Indivisibility; Perfection; Quantity and dimension; Substance and accident; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: ascendo / gradus; decrementum / remissio; intendo / remitto; liber / liberior; minuo / debilito; oportet / necesse est / debet; quamvis / licet.

**I.3.16, source pp. 38–39.** Articles: Ascent; Form; Indivisibility; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: exordium / exordiri; oportet / necesse est / debet; protendo / tumeo.

**I.3.17, source pp. 40–41.** Articles: Art and nature; Form. Vocabulary: conicio; dominor; prope / disto.

**I.3.18, source pp. 40–41.** Articles: Art and nature; Conservation and preservation; Form; Fountain, womb and offspring; Instrument; Matter; Support, inherence and dependence. Vocabulary: ex / per / in causal uses; facio / servo; liber / liberior; proles / gremium.

**I.3.19, source pp. 42–43.** Articles: Affection and passivity; Degree and mediation; Image and likeness; Matter; Nothing and nonbeing; Quality; Quantity and dimension. Vocabulary: alii quidam / Peripatetici; fluctuo / labens; materia aliena / propria; Mercurius Trismegistus / Timaeus; nihilo proximus; Plotinus; postponing and returning; umbra arborum in torrente; vanus / umbratilis.

**I.3.20, source pp. 42–43.** Articles: Affection and passivity; Infection, lameness and Lethe; Quality. Vocabulary: claudico.

**I.3.21, source pp. 44–45.** Articles: Infection, lameness and Lethe; Quality. Vocabulary: claudico; inficio / inquino; Letheus / mergo; ne / nisi; roboro / duco.

**I.3.22, source pp. 44–45.** Articles: Fire, spark, lightning and cannon; Generation and corruption; Infection, lameness and Lethe; Life; Order and harmony; Reason and account; Seeds; Species; Substance and accident. Vocabulary: collisio / reflexio / lana; lutum / fimus / rana / musca; mors / resolutio; roboro / duco; semen / flos.

**I.3.23, source pp. 44–45.** Articles: Contraries and opposition; Generation and corruption; Life; Nourishment, digestion and growth; Order and harmony; World and universe. Vocabulary: concilio / vincit in unum; concoquo / digero; mirus / mirabilis / mirabiliter; nutrimentum / alimentum; proprietas; suaviter / ordinate; sursum / deorsum; violentia / usus vitae.

**I.3.24, source pp. 46–47.** Articles: Cause; Form; Generation and corruption; Incorporeal and immaterial; Infinity; Precedence and causal regress; Separation and abstraction; World and universe. Vocabulary: collige; ne / nisi; progressio in infinitum; separo / seiungo.

**I.3.25, source pp. 46–47.** Articles: Essence and substance; Incorporeal and immaterial; Perfection; Power and potency; Precedence and causal regress; Quantity and dimension; Separation and abstraction; Substance and accident; World and universe. Vocabulary: ne frustra / ne inane; physici; possum; prior natura et dignitate; prius / posterius; semper / aliquando.

**I.3.26, source pp. 46–47.** Articles: Incorporeal and immaterial; Life; Perfection; Quantity and dimension; Sense and imagination; Separation and abstraction; Substance and accident; World and universe. Vocabulary: vita sine sensu.

**I.3.27, source pp. 48–49.** Articles: Comparing, resembling and equalling; Degree and mediation; Incorporeal and immaterial; Matter; Quantity and dimension; Separation and

abstraction; Substance and accident. Vocabulary: Averrois / Aristoteles; extremum sine medio.

**I.3.28, source pp. 48–49.** Articles: Form; Incorporeal and immaterial; Matter; Naming and defining; Proclus, Syrianus and extending matter; Quantity and dimension; Separation and abstraction; Species; Substance and accident. Vocabulary: definitio; immaterialis / incorporeus; Proclus / Syrianus.

**I.3.29, source pp. 50–51.** Articles: Form; Incorporeal and immaterial; Indivisibility; Matter; Proclus, Syrianus and extending matter; Quantity and dimension; Separation and abstraction. Vocabulary: cogito / esse; extendo / extensio; possum; Proclus / Syrianus.

**I.3.30, source pp. 50–51.** Articles: Indivisibility; Infinity; Participation; Precedence and causal regress; Proclus, Syrianus and extending matter; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: commune / totum in singulis; copulo / conspiratio; insitus; oportet / necesse est / debet.

**I.3.31, source pp. 50–51.** Articles: Indivisibility; Infinity; Precedence and causal regress; Proclus, Syrianus and extending matter; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: apex; conspiratio / absurdum; copulo / conspiratio; immaterialis / incorporeus.

**I.3.32, source pp. 52–53.** Articles: Art and nature; Cause; Eternity and time; Indivisibility; Infection, lameness and Lethe; Infinity; Precedence and causal regress. Vocabulary: alias / mitto; corruo / renascor; interminatus / infinitus / finitus; opifex / architectus; semper / aliquando.

**I.3.33, source pp. 52–53.** Articles: Ascent; Body and bulk; Contraries and opposition; Degree and mediation; Essence and substance; Eternity and time; Form; Image and likeness; Immortality; Incorporeal and immaterial; Indivisibility; Motion and stability; Naming and defining; Soul; Support, inherence and dependence; Truth. Vocabulary: anima rationalis; indissolubilis / dissolvo; irrationalis anima; minuo / debilito; mortalis / immortalis; neque … neque; subsisto / dependeo; tertia essentia; transcendo / proveho.

## Chapter I.4

**I.4.1, source pp. 54–55.** Articles: Act and operation; Essence and substance; Eternity and time; Fountain, womb and offspring; Generation and corruption; Image and likeness; Immortality; Motion and stability; Power and potency; Quality; Soul. Vocabulary: calefactio; essentia / virtus / actio; intendo / remitto; plus et minus.

**I.4.2, source pp. 56–57.** Articles: Act and operation; Affection and passivity; Comparing, resembling and equalling; Essence and substance; Eternity and time; Immortality; Motion and stability; Permanence and the hour test; Power and potency; Soul. Vocabulary: adultus / affectio corporis; hora / par / impar; incipio / desino; permaneo / perduro / persevero.

**I.4.3, source pp. 56–57.** Articles: Act and operation; Degree and mediation; Essence and substance; Immortality; Motion and stability; Power and potency; Returning, referring and reducing; Soul. Vocabulary: hiems / ver / aestas / autumnus; revertamur ad quaestionem.

**I.4.4, source pp. 58–59.** Articles: Act and operation; Degree and mediation; Essence and substance; Immortality; Motion and stability; Power and potency; Soul. Vocabulary: partim … partim; vacillo.

**I.4.5, source pp. 58–59.** Articles: Act and operation; Degree and mediation; Essence and substance; Immortality; Motion and stability; Power and potency; Soul. Vocabulary: essentia / virtus / actio.

## Chapter I.5

**I.5.1, source pp. 60–61.** Articles: Act and operation; Eternity and time; Generation and corruption; Habitual possession; Motion and stability; Nourishment, digestion and growth; Permanence and the hour test; Power and potency; Soul; Will. Vocabulary: alit / auget / generat; anima rationalis; essentia / virtus / actio; habitus; hactenus / hucusque; naturalis / acquisitus; voluntas / memoria.

**I.5.2, source pp. 60–61.** Articles: Act and operation; Dispersion and concentration; Eternity and time; Life; Motion and stability; Perfection; Philosophers and stopping points. Vocabulary: dispergo / distractio; hactenus / hucusque; Heraclitus / Varro / Manilius; intrinsecus / extrinsecus; tota simul.

**I.5.3, source pp. 60–61.** Articles: Act and operation; Motion and stability; Perfection. Vocabulary: per se / per superiora.

**I.5.4, source pp. 62–63.** Articles: Act and operation; Appetite and desire; End and limit; Leisure; Lorenzo, dedication and public authority; Motion and stability; Need and sufficiency; Perfection; Power and potency. Vocabulary: indigentia; otium; prorumpo / migro.

**I.5.5, source pp. 62–63.** Articles: Appetite and desire; End and limit; Motion and stability; Need and sufficiency; Perfection. Vocabulary: proficio / adipiscor.

**I.5.6, source pp. 62–63.** Articles: Appetite and desire; End and limit; Motion and stability; Need and sufficiency; Perfection. Vocabulary: termino.

**I.5.7, source pp. 62–63.** Articles: Motion and stability; Order and harmony; Participation; Permanence and the hour test. Vocabulary: polus / revolutio / restitutio; status / stat in motu.

**I.5.8, source pp. 64–65.** Articles: Motion and stability; Order and harmony; Permanence and the hour test. Vocabulary: norma; status / stat in motu.

**I.5.9, source pp. 64–65.** Articles: Eternity and time; Matter; Motion and stability; Order and harmony; Permanence and the hour test; Substance and accident. Vocabulary: amitto; per materiam / per substantiam; species motionis.

**I.5.10, source pp. 64–65.** Articles: Intellect and intellection; Mind; Motion and stability. Vocabulary: indifferens / determino; influxus.

**I.5.11, source pp. 66–67.** Articles: Art and nature; Intellect and intellection; Mind; Proof, signs and qualification; Soul. Vocabulary: quodammodo; secundum partem / ex toto.

**I.5.12, source pp. 66–67.** Articles: Art and nature; Intellect and intellection; Mind; Reason and account; Soul. Vocabulary: propago / facultas.

**I.5.13, source pp. 66–67.** Articles: Governing, serving and dominion; Intellect and intellection; Mind; Soul. Vocabulary: impero / domina.

**I.5.14, source pp. 68–69.** Articles: Angel; Freedom and necessity; Intellect and intellection; Light and illumination; Mind; Participation; Separation and abstraction; Soul. Vocabulary: attingo / tango; caput / capacitas; enodo; lucidus / obscurus; luna / sol / stella; Magi / aenigma; praeditus.

**I.5.15, source pp. 70–71.** Articles: Angel; Degree and mediation; Eternity and time; Infinity; Mind; Separation and abstraction; Species. Vocabulary: alias / mitto; intervallum / spatium.

**I.5.16, source pp. 70–71.** Articles: Angel; Mind; Need and sufficiency; Perfection; Proof, signs and qualification; Sense and imagination; Separation and abstraction; Species. Vocabulary: speciem complere; ut plurimum.

**I.5.17, source pp. 72–73.** Articles: Angel; Art and nature; Freedom and necessity; Life; Mind; Separation and abstraction; Will. Vocabulary: quies / quiesco; ratio naturalis and usualness; ut plurimum.

**I.5.18, source pp. 72–73.** Articles: Angel; Motion and stability; Order and harmony; World and universe. Vocabulary: motor / motum; tenor / lex.

**I.5.19, source pp. 74–75.** Articles: Act and operation; Affection and passivity; Angel; Governing, serving and dominion; Motion and stability. Vocabulary: motor / motum; movere / moveri; Zoroaster / rectores; Intellectual immovable rulers.

**I.5.20, source pp. 74–75.** Articles: Angel; Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds; Infinity; Intellect and intellection; Motion and stability; Number; Proof, signs and qualification. Vocabulary: angelus / nuntius; Avicenna; probabilis / computo.

**I.5.21, source pp. 74–75.** Articles: Angel; Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds; Number; Proof, signs and qualification. Vocabulary: sapientioribus se dimittere.

**I.5.22, source pp. 76–77.** Articles: Angel; Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds; End and limit; Number; Proof, signs and qualification. Vocabulary: forte / suspicor / vaticinor; proprius / communis / posterior.

**I.5.23, source pp. 76–77.** Articles: Angel; Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds; Infinity; Number; Separation and abstraction; Species. Vocabulary: fecunditas / amplifico; infinite and almost countless.

**I.5.24, source pp. 76–77.** Articles: Angel; Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds; Infinity; Intellect and intellection; Number; Point, position and mathematical ascent; Separation and abstraction; Species. Vocabulary: particularis / universalis; pro arbitrio; protendo / amplifico.

**I.5.25, source pp. 78–79.** Articles: Angel; Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds; End and limit; Good and goodness; Infinity; Number; Perfection; Power and potency; Separation and abstraction; Species; World and universe. Vocabulary: ascisco; protendo / amplifico.

**I.5.26, source pp. 78–79.** Articles: Angel; Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds; End and limit; Number; Perfection; Quantity and dimension; Separation and abstraction; Species; World and universe. Vocabulary: nobilior / amplior.

**I.5.27, source pp. 80–81.** Articles: Angel; Dionysius, Daniel and numerical orders; Governing, serving and dominion; Number; Order and harmony; Perfection; Separation and abstraction; Species; World and universe. Vocabulary: Dionysius Areopagita / Daniel; Iamblichus / Proclus; minister / assisto; ternarius / novenarius / septenarius / duodenarius.

**I.5.28, source pp. 80–81.** Articles: Angel; Dionysius, Daniel and numerical orders; Image and likeness; Order and harmony; World and universe. Vocabulary: ordo / umbra / imago; postponing and returning.

## Chapter I.6

**I.6.1, source pp. 82–83.** Articles: Angel; Ascent; Contraries and opposition; Degree and mediation; God; Motion and stability; Philosophers and stopping points; Proof, signs and

qualification; Unity and multiplicity; Will. Vocabulary: Anaxagoras / Hermotimus; Haec Platonici; mobilis multitudo / immobilis multitudo.

**I.6.2, source pp. 82–83.** Articles: Angel; Ascent; Contraries and opposition; Degree and mediation; God; Motion and stability; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: mobilis multitudo / immobilis multitudo.

**I.6.3, source pp. 82–83.** Articles: Angel; Ascent; Contraries and opposition; Degree and mediation; God; Motion and stability; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: convenio / discrepo; mobilis multitudo / immobilis multitudo.

**I.6.4, source pp. 82–83.** Articles: Angel; Ascent; Essence and substance; God; Indivisibility; Intellect and intellection; Number; Species; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: essentia atque esse.

**I.6.5, source pp. 84–85.** Articles: Angel; Ascent; Divinity and the divine; God; Indivisibility; Number; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: simplex / simplicitas.

**I.6.6, source pp. 84–85.** Articles: Angel; Ascent; Blessedness; Containing, receiving and lacking; Divinity and the divine; God; Perfection; Substance and accident; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: compono / pars / totum; discursio; fruor; membrum / vicem gerere.

**I.6.7, source pp. 86–87.** Articles: Containing, receiving and lacking; Divinity and the divine; Eye and imagined enlargement; God; Intellect and intellection; Light and illumination; Mind; Truth. Vocabulary: capax / capio; quaero / invenio.

**I.6.8, source pp. 86–87.** Articles: Angel; Containing, receiving and lacking; Divinity and the divine; Eye and imagined enlargement; God; Intellect and intellection; Light and illumination; Mind; Truth. Vocabulary: excresco / invalesco; finge animo / finge iterum; fingo and removed members; instituo; prospectus / intuitus.

**I.6.9, source pp. 86–87.** Articles: Angel; Containing, receiving and lacking; Divinity and the divine; Eye and imagined enlargement; God; Intellect and intellection; Light and illumination; Mind; Sense and imagination; Truth. Vocabulary: aucupor; excresco / invalesco; finge animo / finge iterum; fingo and removed members; phantasia / sensus / generatio; prospectus / intuitus; Zoroaster / rectores; The intelligible beyond mind.

**I.6.10, source pp. 88–89.** Articles: Angel; Containing, receiving and lacking; Divinity and the divine; Eye and imagined enlargement; God; Intellect and intellection; Light and illumination; Mind; Need and sufficiency; Participation; Truth. Vocabulary: instituo; percipio / perceptio; veridicus.

**I.6.11, source pp. 88–89.** Articles: Containing, receiving and lacking; Divinity and the divine; Eye and imagined enlargement; God; Governing, serving and dominion; Intellect and intellection; Light and illumination; Matter; Mind; Need and sufficiency; Truth. Vocabulary: imperium.

**I.6.12, source pp. 88–89.** Articles: Containing, receiving and lacking; Divinity and the divine; Eye and imagined enlargement; God; Intellect and intellection; Light and illumination; Mind; Need and sufficiency; Object and adequate object; Participation; Truth. Vocabulary: intellectus / intellectio / intelligibile; lateo; lux se ipsa videns; participatio / forma / eminentia; perspicacia / perspectio; Plotinus.

**I.6.13, source pp. 90–91.** Articles: Divinity and the divine; Eye and imagined enlargement; God; Intellect and intellection; Light and illumination; Mind; Naming and

defining; Need and sufficiency; Object and adequate object; Truth. Vocabulary: haud propria omnino ratione; intellectus / intellectio / intelligibile.

**I.6.14, source pp. 90–91.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Fountain, womb and offspring; God; Good and goodness; Life; Matter; Need and sufficiency; Order and harmony; Seeds; Soul; Species. Vocabulary: competere / convenire; largitio; latere / exponere; maior range of causal giving; munus / ordinatio; praebeo / do; pullulo / incohatio.

**I.6.15, source pp. 90–91.** Articles: God; Good and goodness; Need and sufficiency. Vocabulary: longius operatur.

**I.6.16, source pp. 92–93.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Cause; God; Good and goodness; Need and sufficiency; Procession and return; Returning, referring and reducing. Vocabulary: conversio / profectio; nixus / nitor / conor.

**I.6.17, source pp. 92–93.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Fountain, womb and offspring; Freedom and necessity; God; Good and goodness; Need and sufficiency; Perfection. Vocabulary: haurio / liquor / infundo; impulsus / incitamentum; liber / liberior; nixus / nitor / conor; vis / inscitia.

**I.6.18, source pp. 92–93.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Freedom and necessity; God; Good and goodness; Wishing, refusing and the good. Vocabulary: impulsus / incitamentum; iudico; videor habere / revera possideo.

**I.6.19, source pp. 94–95.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Freedom and necessity; God; Good and goodness; Governing, serving and dominion; Prison and homeland; Procession and return; Will; Wishing, refusing and the good. Vocabulary: ala / dux / patria; bene et bonum; censeo; impulsus / incitamentum; necessitas and willing acceptance; pater / patria; praefero / antepono; respuo; subiectus, ruled subject; velle / nolle; voluptas.

## Chapter II.1

**II.1.1, source pp. 98–99.** Articles: Good and goodness; Purity and mixture; Simplicity and composition; Truth; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: angelus; argumentum / arguere; bonitas / bonum; commiscere / mixtio; constare / consistere / constituere; excellens / eminens / deterior / altior / remotior; manere / exsuperare; merus / incorruptus / revera; ostendere / monstrare / probare; purus / puritas; res; simplex / simplicitas; unitas / unio; veritas / verus; vinum.

**II.1.2, source pp. 98–99.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Good and goodness; Participation; Principle; Purity and mixture; Simplicity and composition; Traces; Truth; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: argumentum / arguere; cupere / avidus; manare / emanare; particeps / participium; principium / origo; reperire / invenire; repetere / revocare; vestigium.

**II.1.3, source pp. 100–101.** Articles: Dependence and receiving; Good and goodness; Participation; Principle; Purity and mixture; Simplicity and composition; Truth; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: absurdus; accipere / capere / suscipere; communio; componere / compositio; dubitare / diffidere / difficile; falsus / falsum; inesse / insitus; locare / regio / localis; multitudo / multiplex; particeps / participium; portio; praeponere / praeferre; praestare / praestans; privare / expers; superior / inferior; unitas / unio; veritas / verus; vero / verum: connectives; vis / vires.

**II.1.4, source pp. 100–101.** Articles: Good and goodness; Participation; Principle; Purity and mixture; Surpassing and comparison. Vocabulary: bonitas / bonum; commiscere / mixtio; inquinare / contagio; magnum / magnitudo / maior; malum; portio.

**II.1.5, source pp. 100–101.** Articles: Communication and imparting; Good and goodness; Participation; Principle; Surpassing and comparison. Vocabulary: appetibilis / appetere; competere / pertinere / spectare; excedere / superare; imperium; impertire / impartire / largiri; malum; munus; praestare / praestans.

**II.1.6, source pp. 102–103.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Communication and imparting; Good and goodness; Participation; Principle; Surpassing and comparison. Vocabulary: absurdus; appetibilis / appetere; ascendere / descendere; dare / donare / exhibere; expetere / desiderare; fateri / negare / affirmare; melior / melius; munus; portio; quaerere / interrogare; stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis; superior / inferior.

**II.1.7, source pp. 102–103.** Articles: Appetite and desire; God; Good and goodness; Participation; Principle. Vocabulary: amare / amor; bonitas / bonum; cogere / compellere; cupere / avidus; Deus / divinus; Plato / Platonici / philosophi / physici; prohibere / claudere / includere; ratio / rationalis; ratio appetendi.

## Chapter II.2

**II.2.1, source pp. 104–105.** Articles: Agreement and hypothetical concession; God; Principle. Vocabulary: aequalis / aeque; Deus / divinus; differre / discrepare; geminus / binus; placere / libenter; quaerere / interrogare; vero / verum: connectives.

**II.2.2, source pp. 104–105.** Articles: Agreement and hypothetical concession; Common and proper; Concord and convergence; God; Order and harmony; Principle; Simplicity and composition; Weaving and world fabric. Vocabulary: communis; concedere / admittere / dare as grant; consentire / dissentire; convenire / congruere; differre / discrepare; machina / tela / retexere; quaerere / interrogare; vero / verum: connectives; via / pactum / tractus.

**II.2.3, source pp. 104–105.** Articles: Common and proper; Freedom and necessity; God; Need and sufficiency; Principle; Simplicity and composition; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: communis; componere / compositio; conciliare; egere / indigere; natura / naturalis; pars / totus; pendere / dependere; proprius / proprietas; sufficere / sufficientia.

**II.2.4, source pp. 106–107.** Articles: Bounds and restriction; Common and proper; God; Principle; Simplicity and composition; Spring and flow; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: absolutus / absolute; addere / accedere / advenire; aequalis / aeque; circumscribere / coarctare; differre / discrepare; existimare / opinari / arbitrari; extrinsecus / aliunde; intus / intro / extra / ultra / superne / undique; merus / incorruptus / revera; Plato / Platonici / philosophi / physici; proprius / proprietas; provenire / oriri / nasci; scaturire / vena.

**II.2.5, source pp. 106–107.** Articles: Dependence and receiving; God; Light and illumination; Perfection; Principle; Purity and mixture; Simplicity and composition; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: accipere / capere / suscipere; convenire / congruere; extrinsecus / aliunde; lux / lumen; sortiri / adipisci; summus / summum.

**II.2.6, source pp. 106–107.** Articles: God; Light and illumination; Perfection; Principle; Purity and mixture; Simplicity and composition; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: calor / frigus; commiscere / mixtio; fortis / vehementia / valere; impedire / purgare; inquinare / contagio; opacus; summus / summum.

**II.2.7, source pp. 108–109.** Articles: Form; God; Number; Perfection; Principle; Purity and mixture; Reason and account; Simplicity and composition; Unity and multiplicity; Universals and individuals. Vocabulary: certus / assignare / limitare; homo / equus; multitudo / multiplex; numerus / unicus / unire; principatus / gubernare / regere; redigere / colligere / referre; species / genus; summus / summum; unitas / unio.

**II.2.8, source pp. 108–109.** Articles: Army and commander; Concord and convergence; Form; God; Number; Order and harmony; Perfection; Principle; Purity and mixture; Reason and account; Unity and multiplicity; Universals and individuals. Vocabulary: casus / contingere; communio; consequi / assequi / nancisci; conspirare / concurrere; currere / incurrere / incumbere; disiungere / disponere / instituere; exercitus / dux; membra / lignum / aer; mundus / universum; mutuus / invicem; ordinare / ordinator / ordo; pars / totus; provenire / oriri / nasci; redigere / colligere / referre; species / genus.

**II.2.9, source pp. 110–111.** Articles: Borrowing and assistance; Concord and convergence; God; Order and harmony; Perfection; Purity and mixture; Reason and account; Unity and multiplicity; Weaving and world fabric. Vocabulary: casus / contingere; conciliare; constare / consistere / constituere; machina / tela / retexere; mutuare / mutuari; mutuus / invicem.

**II.2.10, source pp. 110–111.** Articles: Army and commander; God; Perfection; Purity and mixture; Reason and account; Truth; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: carere / deesse / destituere; habere / tenere / possidere; ordinare / ordinator / ordo.

**II.2.11, source pp. 110–111.** Articles: God; Perfection; Purity and mixture; Reason and account; Redundancy and uselessness; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: complecti; frustra / superfluus; inquinare / contagio; ponere / inducere / asserere.

**II.2.12, source pp. 112–113.** Articles: God; Order and harmony; Redundancy and uselessness. Vocabulary: communio; conspirare / concurrere; ducere / deducere / trahere; fabricare / construere / conficere; fortis / vehementia / valere; frustra / superfluus; geminus / binus; sufficere / sufficientia.

**II.2.13, source pp. 112–113.** Articles: God; Order and harmony. Vocabulary: cogere / compellere; fabricare / construere / conficere; fateri / negare / affirmare; geminus / binus; oppositus / contrarius / diversus; ponere / inducere / asserere; via / pactum / tractus.

**II.2.14, source pp. 112–113.** Articles: Choice and deliberation; Concord and convergence; God; Manichaeans and Gnostic philosophers; Nothing and nonbeing; Order and harmony. Vocabulary: conatus / affectus; consentire / dissentire; dominari / praevalere; fateri / negare / affirmare; manere / exsuperare; Manichaei / Gnostici; velle / nolle.

**II.2.15, source pp. 114–115.** Articles: God; Good and goodness; Manichaeans and Gnostic philosophers; Nothing and nonbeing. Vocabulary: auctor; expetere / desiderare; malum; oppositus / contrarius / diversus; privare / expers.

## Chapter II.3

**II.3.1, source pp. 116–117.** Articles: Agreement and hypothetical concession; Cause; Infinity; Principle. Vocabulary: concedere / admittere / dare as grant; confutare / refellere; existimare / opinari / arbitrari; gradus / gradatim; praeponere / praeferre.

**II.3.2, source pp. 116–117.** Articles: Cause; Infinity; Principle. Vocabulary: absurdus; ascendere / descendere; causa / effectus; debilitare / deficere; ducere / deducere / trahere; excedere / superare; iacere / iactus; producere / facere / gignere.

**II.3.3, source pp. 116–117.** Articles: Cause; Failure weariness and endurance; Infinity; Measure and degree; Motion and stability; Perfection; Principle; Spring and flow. Vocabulary: ascendere / descendere; crescere / decrescere / minuere; debilitare / deficere; exordiri / prodire; fluere / fluitare / fluxus; perfectio / perfectus; stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis.

**II.3.4, source pp. 118–119.** Articles: Infinity; Measure and degree; Perfection; Principle; Surpassing and comparison. Vocabulary: anima / animus; distare; intervallum / mensura; iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari; melior / melius; propinquus / conveniens.

**II.3.5, source pp. 118–119.** Articles: Infinity; Measure and degree; Perfection; Principle; Reason and account; Surpassing and comparison. Vocabulary: intervallum / mensura; praeponere / praeferre; propinquus / conveniens; ratio / rationalis; stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis.

**II.3.6, source pp. 118–119.** Articles: Infinity; Measure and degree; Perfection; Principle; Surpassing and comparison. Vocabulary: melior / melius.

**II.3.7, source pp. 118–119.** Articles: Infinity; Motion and stability; Principle; Spring and flow. Vocabulary: exordiri / prodire; fluere / fluitare / fluxus; manare / emanare.

**II.3.8, source pp. 118–119.** Articles: Infinity; Motion and stability; Principle; Spring and flow. Vocabulary: cardo / liquidus / solidus; cohibere / detinere; ducere / deducere / trahere; fluere / fluitare / fluxus; manare / emanare; reformare / restituere; status / stare.

**II.3.9, source pp. 120–121.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Communication and imparting; End and limit; Infinity; Measure and degree; Motion and stability; Principle. Vocabulary: appetibilis / appetere; certus / plenus; dare / donare / exhibere; excedere / superare; finis / scopus; gradus / gradatim; impertire / impartire / largiri; infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus; medium / particularis; movere / sistere / firmare; munus; pendere / dependere; praestare / praestans; principium / origo; scientia / comprehendere; superior / inferior.

**II.3.10, source pp. 120–121.** Articles: Appetite and desire; End and limit; Enfolding and unfolding; God; Good and goodness; John and Amelius; Motion and stability; Principle; Procession and return; Reason and account; Simplicity and composition; Spring and flow; Truth; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: amare / amor; amplecti; bonitas / bonum; excellens / eminens / deterior / altior / remotior; fluere / fluitare / fluxus; hymnus / theologia / sacerdos; implicare / explicare / replicare; Ioannes / Amelius; placere / libenter; ratio / rationalis; reformare / restituere; repetere / revocare; tribuere / tradere.

## Chapter II.4

**II.4.1, source pp. 122–123.** Articles: Act and operation; Bounds and restriction; Failure weariness and endurance; God; Infinity; Matter; Measure and degree; Power and potency; Purity and mixture. Vocabulary: actus / actio / agere; dispersio / imbecillitas; efficax / validus; inniti / subsistere; oppositus / contrarius / diversus; passio / patiens / pati; potentia / potestas / virtus; prohibere / claudere / includere; purus / puritas; subicere / tollere / removere; subiectum; terminare / finire.

**II.4.2, source pp. 122–123.** Articles: Act and operation; Being; Bounds and restriction; Infinity; Matter; Measure and degree; Nothing and nonbeing; Power and potency. Vocabulary: absolutus / absolute; considerare / comparare; esse / ens / exsistere; habitus; nihil / non esse; subiectum; terminare / finire.

**II.4.3, source pp. 122–123.** Articles: Act and operation; Being; Infinity; Matter; Measure and degree; Nothing and nonbeing; Power and potency. Vocabulary: carere / deesse / destituere; cogitare / fingere / effingere; competere / pertinere / spectare; gradus / gradatim; nihil / non esse; privare / expers; vis / vires.

**II.4.4, source pp. 122–123.** Articles: Act and operation; Infinity; Matter; Measure and degree; Nothing and nonbeing; Number; Power and potency; Redundancy and uselessness.

Vocabulary: cogitare / fingere / effingere; extendere / extensio; frustra / superfluus; numerus / unicus / unire; procedere / progredi / proficere; reperire / invenire.

**II.4.5, source pp. 124–125.** Articles: Act and operation; Creation; Infinity; Matter; Measure and degree; Nothing and nonbeing; Power and potency. Vocabulary: accipere / capere / suscipere; calefacere / aqua / aer; distare; efficax / validus; excellens / eminens / deterior / altior / remotior; inesse / insitus; memorare / respondere / docere; nihil / non esse; passio / patiens / pati; potentia / potestas / virtus; producere / facere / gignere.

**II.4.6, source pp. 124–125.** Articles: Act and operation; Beginning and ceasing; Conservation and preservation; Creation; Infinity; Matter; Nothing and nonbeing; Power and potency. Vocabulary: anima / animus; creare / ex nihilo; edere / servare / conservare; essentia / essentialis / substantia; materia; nuper / semel / diuturnior / perpetuo / generatio / successio; pendere / dependere; subiectum.

**II.4.7, source pp. 124–125.** Articles: Failure weariness and endurance; Infinity; Matter; Power and potency; Weaving and world fabric. Vocabulary: discurrere / cursus; fatigare / claudicare; machina / tela / retexere; motus / motio / motor / mutare; movere / sistere / firmare; principatus / gubernare / regere; saeculum / duratio.

**II.4.8, source pp. 124–125.** Articles: End and limit; Infinity; Matter; Orpheus and divine names; Power and potency. Vocabulary: finis / scopus; generatio / successio; infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus; iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari; Orpheus / Orphici; placere / libenter; Plato / Platonici / philosophi / physici; An infinite end.

## Chapter II.5

**II.5.1, source pp. 126–127.** Articles: Beginning and ceasing; Eternity and time; Failure weariness and endurance; Freedom and necessity; God; Truth. Vocabulary: antecedere / sequi / praecedere; edere / servare / conservare; initium / incipere / desinere; nuper / semel / diuturnior / perpetuo / generatio / successio; ostendere / monstrare / probare; permanere / perseverare; resolvi / dissolutio; sempiternitas / aeternitas; tempus / temporalis; veritas / verus.

**II.5.2, source pp. 126–127.** Articles: Always and everywhere; Eternity and time; Imagination and deceptive clothing; Motion and stability; Sense and imagination. Vocabulary: condicio / accidens; discernere / animadvertere; fallere / praestigiae / confundere; induere / involvere; phantasia; saeculum / duratio; sempiternitas / aeternitas; status / stare.

**II.5.3, source pp. 126–127.** Articles: Always and everywhere; Eternity and time; Imagination and deceptive clothing; Sense and imagination. Vocabulary: dare / donare / exhibere; impellere / inferre; induere / involvere.

**II.5.4, source pp. 126–127.** Articles: Always and everywhere; Eternity and time. Vocabulary: dicere / vocare / appellare; dubitare / diffidere / difficile; ipsum semper; sempiternitas / aeternitas.

## Chapter II.6

**II.6.1, source pp. 128–129.** Articles: God; Incorporeal and immaterial; Omnipresence and place; Power and potency; Touch and penetration. Vocabulary: corpus / corporalis; incorporeus / incorporalis / indivisibilis; ostendere / monstrare / probare; quantitas / dimensio; tangere / attingere.

**II.6.2, source pp. 128–129.** Articles: Being; Cause; Creation; Essence and substance; Matter; Omnipresence and place. Vocabulary: adesse / abesse; causa / effectus; creare / ex nihilo; ignis / sol / caelum / stella; inniti / subsistere; materia; medium / particularis; membra / lignum / aer; sine medio; spiritus; universalis / universalia.

**II.6.3, source pp. 128–129.** Articles: Omnipresence and place; Touch and penetration. Vocabulary: penetrare / resistere / obstare; prohibere / claudere / includere; purus / puritas.

**II.6.4, source pp. 128–129.** Articles: Bounds and restriction; Omnipresence and place. Vocabulary: corpus / corporalis; dignitas; egere / indigere; locus / situs / spatium; praesentia; saeculum / duratio; terminare / finire.

**II.6.5, source pp. 130–131.** Articles: Good and goodness; Life; Matter; Omnipresence and place. Vocabulary: cessare; passio / patiens / pati; propagare / amplificare / dilatare; subicere / tollere / removere; vita / vivere / vivificare.

**II.6.6, source pp. 130–131.** Articles: Communication and imparting; Good and goodness; Omnipresence and place. Vocabulary: carere / deesse / destituere; exuberare / fundere; infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus; integer / totus / plenus; intus / intro / extra / ultra / superne / undique; machinatio / machinari; novus / relinquere; oportere / debere / decere; Plato / Platonici / philosophi / physici; praesentia; procedere / progredi / proficere.

**II.6.7, source pp. 130–131.** Articles: Communication and imparting; Good and goodness; Omnipresence and place. Vocabulary: propagare / amplificare / dilatare.

**II.6.8, source pp. 130–131.** Articles: Always and everywhere; Omnipresence and place. Vocabulary: adesse / abesse; cohibere / detinere; dubitare / diffidere / difficile; reperire / invenire; subiectum; ubique / nusquam / ubi.

**II.6.9, source pp. 130–131.** Articles: Army and commander; Omnipresence and place. Vocabulary: exercitus / dux.

**II.6.10, source pp. 132–133.** Articles: Omnipresence and place. Vocabulary: amplitudo / plenitudo / implere; expetere / desiderare; potissimum / summopere / penitus / prorsus / late.

**II.6.11, source pp. 132–133.** Articles: Conservation and preservation; Light and illumination; Omnipresence and place; Orpheus and divine names. Vocabulary: adesse / abesse; consequi / assequi / nancisci; eclipsis / nox / momentum; habitare; hymnus / theologia / sacerdos; ignis / sol / caelum / stella; lux / lumen; Orpheus / Orphici; potissimum / summopere / penitus / prorsus / late; principatus / gubernare / regere; propagare / amplificare / dilatare; ruere in nihilum; se habere; videre / visibilis; Indwelling throughout the world.

**II.6.12, source pp. 132–133.** Articles: Always and everywhere; Imagination and deceptive clothing; Light and illumination; Matter; Omnipresence and place; Sense and imagination. Vocabulary: capacitas / capax; certus / assignare / limitare; cogitare / fingere / effingere; discernere / animadvertere; reperire / invenire.

**II.6.13, source pp. 134–135.** Articles: Always and everywhere; Enfolding and unfolding; Imagination and deceptive clothing; Light and illumination; Omnipresence and place; Reason and account; Sense and imagination; Weaving and world fabric; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: amplitudo / plenitudo / implere; clamare / reclamare / persuadere; collocare; convertere / reverti / converso; distinguere / dividere / divisio; dubitare / diffidere / difficile; exilis / exiguus / parvitas; fallere / praestigiae / confundere; illuminare / fulgere / radius / accendere; implicare / explicare / replicare; inane; intus / intro / extra / ultra / superne /

undique; linea / longum / latum / profundum; machina / tela / retexere; magnum / magnitudo / maior; medium / particularis; mundus / universum; phantasia; potissimum / summopere / penitus / prorsus / late; quantitas / dimensio; ubique / nusquam / ubi; via / pactum / tractus.

**II.6.14, source pp. 136–137.** Articles: Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities; Candles and the hall; Intellectual and animating powers; Light and illumination; Mind; Natural motion and natural place; Omnipresence and place; Sense and imagination; Whole and parts; Word and meaning. Vocabulary: Anebon / Abamon / Plotinus / Iamblichus / Julianus; animalis / angelicus; confusio / permiscere / iungere; consequi / assequi / nancisci; convolvi / revolvi; extendere / extensio; exuberare / fundere; habitus; hymnus / theologia / sacerdos; illuminare / fulgere / radius / accendere; inesse / insitus; integer / totus / plenus; locus / situs / spatium; membra / lignum / aer; mens; mutuus / invicem; praescribere / lex; praesentia; sententia / voluerunt; simulacrum / color; spiritus.

**II.6.15, source pp. 136–137.** Articles: Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities; Bounds and restriction; Light and illumination; Matter; Mind; Natural motion and natural place. Vocabulary: inniti / subsistere; provenire / oriri / nasci; pullulare / alligare; quantitas / dimensio; sententia / voluerunt; spiritus.

**II.6.16, source pp. 136–137.** Articles: Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities; Eternity and time; Light and illumination; Mind; Natural motion and natural place. Vocabulary: adesse / abesse; incorporeus / incorporalis / indivisibilis; locus / situs / spatium; porrigere / tendere; respicere.

**II.6.17, source pp. 138–139.** Articles: Eternity and time; Light and illumination; Mind; Natural motion and natural place. Vocabulary: currere / incurrere / incumbere; discurrere / cursus; eclipsis / nox / momentum; linea / longum / latum / profundum; porrigere / tendere; punctum; putare / videri as appearance; sempiternitas / aeternitas; tangere / attingere; tempus / temporalis.

**II.6.18, source pp. 138–139.** Articles: Eternity and time; Light and illumination; Mind; Natural motion and natural place. Vocabulary: expugnare / repugnare.

**II.6.19, source pp. 138–139.** Articles: Eternity and time; Light and illumination; Mind; Natural motion and natural place. Vocabulary: competere / pertinere / spectare; convenire / congruere; efficax / validus; exigere / requirere; expugnare / repugnare; intrinsecus / extrinsecus; locare / regio / localis; propagare / amplificare / dilatare; qualitas.

**II.6.20, source pp. 138–139.** Articles: Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities; Choice and deliberation; Eternity and time; Light and illumination; Mind; Natural motion and natural place; Word and meaning. Vocabulary: conatus / affectus; consilium; exordiri / prodire; intrinsecus / extrinsecus; loqui; piger; praestare / praestans; verbum / significatio / significare.

**II.6.21, source pp. 140–141.** Articles: Light and illumination; Mind; Natural motion and natural place; Word and meaning. Vocabulary: loqui; verbum / significatio / significare.

**II.6.22, source pp. 140–141.** Articles: Intuition and discourse; Light and illumination; Mind; Natural motion and natural place. Vocabulary: conatus / affectus; discurrere / cursus; machinatio / machinari; mens.

**II.6.23, source pp. 140–141.** Articles: Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities; Appetite and desire; End and limit; Essence and substance; Light and illumination; Mind; Natural motion and natural place; Touch and penetration. Vocabulary: certus / assignare / limitare; currere / incurrere / incumbere; finis / scopus; flammula /

concavum / evolare; frui; ignis / sol / caelum / stella; instinctus / niti; penetrare / resistere / obstare; prohibere / claudere / includere; punctum; spiritus; tangere / attingere; vita / vivere / vivificare.

**II.6.24, source pp. 142–143.** Articles: Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities; Candles and the hall; Heart and mistaken location; Intellectual and animating powers; Light and illumination; Mind; Natural motion and natural place; Whole and parts; Word and meaning. Vocabulary: animalis / angelicus; candela / aula; confusio / permiscere / iungere; convertere / reverti / converso; cor / putare; dirigere / manifestus; exuberare / fundere; illuminare / fulgere / radius / accendere; locare / regio / localis; principatus / gubernare / regere; putare / videri as appearance; vita / vivere / vivificare.

## Chapter II.7

**II.7.1, source pp. 144–145.** Articles: Parmenides and the summary formula; Simplicity and composition; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: componere / compositio; concludere / confirmare / patere; multitudo / multiplex; ostendere / monstrare / probare; Parmenides / Pythagoreus; One unmoved infinite being.

**II.7.2, source pp. 144–145.** Articles: Simplicity and composition; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: ascendere / descendere; componere / compositio.

**II.7.3, source pp. 144–145.** Articles: Truth. Vocabulary: merus / incorruptus / revera; proficisci; veritas / verus.

**II.7.4, source pp. 144–145.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Communication and imparting; Good and goodness. Vocabulary: communicare; impertire / impartire / largiri; potissimum / summopere / penitus / prorsus / late; repetere / revocare.

**II.7.5, source pp. 144–145.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Communication and imparting; Good and goodness. Vocabulary: melior / melius; similis / similitudo; stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis.

**II.7.6, source pp. 146–147.** Articles: Army and commander; Being; Common and proper; Communication and imparting. Vocabulary: communis; exercitus / dux; munus.

**II.7.7, source pp. 146–147.** Articles: Being; Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Motion and stability; Nothing and nonbeing. Vocabulary: attingere / tetigit; hymnus / theologia / sacerdos; migrare / transire; Zoroaster / ignis unus; Generated from one fire.

**II.7.8, source pp. 146–147.** Articles: Being; Freedom and necessity; Motion and stability; Nothing and nonbeing. Vocabulary: aequalis / aeque; cohibere / detinere; corpus / corporalis; essendi modus; incorporeus / incorporalis / indivisibilis; modus / modo; motus / motio / motor / mutare; status / stare.

**II.7.9, source pp. 146–147.** Articles: Being; Concord and convergence; Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity; Motion and stability; Nothing and nonbeing; Simplicity and composition. Vocabulary: componere / compositio; conciliare; necessitas / necessario; simplex / simplicitas.

**II.7.10, source pp. 148–149.** Articles: Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity; Nothing and nonbeing; Simplicity and composition. Vocabulary: connexio; inniti / subsistere; resolvi / dissolutio.

**II.7.11, source pp. 148–149.** Articles: Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity; Orpheus and divine names. Vocabulary: dicere / vocare / appellare; dominari / praevalere; necessitas / necessario; Orpheus / Orphici; Necessity ruling all things.

**II.7.12, source pp. 148–149.** Articles: Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity; Purity and mixture. Vocabulary: angelus; cogere / compellere; differre / discrepare; ponere / inducere / asserere.

**II.7.13, source pp. 148–149.** Articles: Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity; Purity and mixture. Vocabulary: commiscere / mixtio; crescere / decrescere / minuere.

**II.7.14, source pp. 148–149.** Articles: Agreement and hypothetical concession; Dependence and receiving; Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity; Purity and mixture. Vocabulary: addere / accedere / advenire; concedere / admittere / dare as grant; extrinsecus / aliunde; memorare / respondere / docere; proprius / proprietas; provenire / oriri / nasci; sortiri / adipisci.

**II.7.15, source pp. 150–151.** Articles: Dependence and receiving; Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity. Vocabulary: Deus / divinus; error / impius / profanus; essentia / essentialis / substantia; existimare / opinari / arbitrari; necessitas / necessario; pendere / dependere; secundum se / per se; sententia / voluerunt; vero / verum: connectives.

**II.7.16, source pp. 150–151.** Articles: End and limit; Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity; Need and sufficiency; Perfection; Principle; Spring and flow. Vocabulary: convertere / reverti / converso; egere / indigere; exigere / requirere; exterior / externus; extrinsecus / aliunde; fateri / negare / affirmare; fons / influxus; perfectio / perfectus; perficere / efficere; sufficere / sufficientia.

**II.7.17, source pp. 150–151.** Articles: Conservation and preservation; Spring and flow; Statue and solidity. Vocabulary: ars / artificium; cardo / liquidus / solidus; constare / consistere / constituere; dare / donare / exhibere; fons / influxus; impellere / inferre; merus / incorruptus / revera; natura / naturalis; permanere / perseverare; statua / lapis / aes.

**II.7.18, source pp. 152–153.** Articles: Before and after in nature; Beginning and ceasing; Conservation and preservation; Creation; Eternity and time; God; Statue and solidity. Vocabulary: accipere / capere / suscipere; certus / assignare / limitare; eclipsis / nox / momentum; falsus / falsum; initium / incipere / desinere; mundus / universum.

**II.7.19, source pp. 152–153.** Articles: Beginning and ceasing; Conservation and preservation; Creation; Eternity and time; God. Vocabulary: continuus / assiduus; edere / servare / conservare; ponere / inducere / asserere.

**II.7.20, source pp. 152–153.** Articles: Before and after in nature; Conservation and preservation; Creation; Nothing and nonbeing. Vocabulary: addere / accedere / advenire; convenire / congruere; nihil / non esse; prius / posterius / deinde; secundum se / per se.

**II.7.21, source pp. 152–153.** Articles: Before and after in nature; Borrowing and assistance; Cause; Conservation and preservation; Creation; Nothing and nonbeing; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: amittere / delere; auxilium / subsidium; exordiri / prodire; mutuare / mutuari; pars / totus; perficere / efficere; permanere / perseverare; subicere / tollere / removere.

**II.7.22, source pp. 154–155.** Articles: Borrowing and assistance; Cause; Conservation and preservation; Image and likeness; Nothing and nonbeing; Shadow and mirror; Surpassing and comparison; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: auxilium / subsidium; considerare / comparare; continuus / assiduus; egere / indigere; umbra / umbratilis / vanus.

**II.7.23, source pp. 154–155.** Articles: Cause; Conservation and preservation; Dependence and receiving; Image and likeness; Instrument; Motion and stability; Nothing

and nonbeing; Power and potency; Shadow and mirror; Surpassing and comparison; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: antecedere / sequi / praecedere; continuus / assiduus; edere / servare / conservare; impertire / impartire / largiri; manare / emanare; nuper / semel / diuturnior / perpetuo / generatio / successio; opus / operari / operatio; potentia / potestas / virtus; speculum / imago; umbra / umbratilis / vanus.

**II.7.24, source pp. 154–155.** Articles: Cause; Conservation and preservation; Dependence and receiving; Instrument; Power and potency. Vocabulary: angelus; instrumentum / opifex.

**II.7.25, source pp. 154–155.** Articles: Cause; Conservation and preservation; Dependence and receiving; Instrument; Power and potency. Vocabulary: actus / actio / agere; perficere / efficere; principium / origo; producere / facere / gignere.

**II.7.26, source pp. 154–155.** Articles: Being; Cause; Power and potency. Vocabulary: praebere / conducere.

**II.7.27, source pp. 156–157.** Articles: Being; Cause; Concord and convergence; Instrument; Order and harmony; Power and potency. Vocabulary: conspirare / concurrere; oppositus / contrarius / diversus.

**II.7.28, source pp. 156–157.** Articles: Before and after in nature; Being; Cause; Impression and effacement; Instrument; Power and potency. Vocabulary: determinatio / affectio; disiungere / disponere / instituere; esse / ens / exsistere; ordinare / ordinator / ordo; prius / posterius / deinde.

**II.7.29, source pp. 156–157.** Articles: Before and after in nature; Being; Cause; Common and proper; End and limit; Impression and effacement; Instrument; Power and potency. Vocabulary: amittere / delere; esse / ens / exsistere; praebere / conducere; prius / posterius / deinde.

**II.7.30, source pp. 156–157.** Articles: Being; Borrowing and assistance; Cause; Glass and colored radiance; Instrument; Power and potency. Vocabulary: auxilium / subsidium; determinatio / affectio; distinguere / dividere / divisio; imperium; passim; universalis / universalia; vis / vires.

**II.7.31, source pp. 158–159.** Articles: Being; Borrowing and assistance; Cause; Glass and colored radiance; Instrument; Light and illumination; Power and potency. Vocabulary: lux / lumen; ruber / viridis / splendor; simulacrum / color; vitrum / fenestra / pavimentum.

**II.7.32, source pp. 158–159.** Articles: Before and after in nature; Being; Cause; Glass and colored radiance; Impression and effacement; Instrument; Participation; Power and potency; Traces. Vocabulary: amittere / delere; causa / effectus; concludere / confirmare / patere; fortis / vehementia / valere; imprimere / fundare / stabilire; movere / sistere / firmare; prius / posterius / deinde; vestigium.

## Chapter II.8

**II.8.1, source pp. 160–161.** Articles: Burden labor and ease; Choice and deliberation. Vocabulary: agere: egerit; consilium; electio / eligere; Epicureus / Epicurus / Averroes; memorare / respondere / docere; sollicitare / sollicitudo / onerare.

**II.8.2, source pp. 160–161.** Articles: Choice and deliberation; Nourishment, digestion and growth. Vocabulary: alere / nutrire / digerere; calefacere / aqua / aer; inesse / insitus; qualitas.

**II.8.3, source pp. 160–161.** Articles: Choice and deliberation; Life; Nourishment, digestion and growth; Redundancy and uselessness. Vocabulary: anima / animus; antecedere / sequi / praecedere; electio / eligere; exigere / requirere; initium / incipere / desinere; migrare / transire; vita / vivere / vivificare.

**II.8.4, source pp. 160–161.** Articles: Act and operation; Burden labor and ease; Choice and deliberation. Vocabulary: actus / actio / agere; calefacere / aqua / aer; consilium; cura / labor / facilis; electio / eligere; illuminare / fulgere / radius / accendere; natura / naturalis; peragere / explere; producere / facere / gignere.

**II.8.5, source pp. 162–163.** Articles: Act and operation; Being; Burden labor and ease; Choice and deliberation; Essence and substance; Hinge and center; Nourishment, digestion and growth. Vocabulary: alere / nutrire / digerere; cura / labor / facilis; ducere / deducere / trahere; linea / longum / latum / profundum; nutus / vibrare / centrum; opus / operari / operatio; peragere / explere; proficisci; sollicitare / sollicitudo / onerare.

## Chapter II.9

**II.9.1, source pp. 164–165.** Articles: Form; Intellect and intellection; Kinship and separation; Matter. Vocabulary: capacitas / capax; cognatio; condicio / accidens; discessus / seorsum / semovere; forma / formare; intellectus / intelligere; intelligibilis / intelligendus / intelligens; procedere / progredi / proficere; sortiri / adipisci; via / pactum / tractus.

**II.9.2, source pp. 164–165.** Articles: Form; Intellect and intellection; Kinship and separation; Love and pleasure. Vocabulary: appetibilis / appetere; formosus / exactus / ars; frui.

**II.9.3, source pp. 164–165.** Articles: Form; Intellect and intellection.

**II.9.4, source pp. 164–165.** Articles: Form; Intellect and intellection. Vocabulary: amplus / amplior; forma / formare; habere / tenere / possidere.

**II.9.5, source pp. 166–167.** Articles: Act and operation; Essence and substance; Instrument; Intellect and intellection. Vocabulary: actus / actio / agere; carere / deesse / destituere; cognitio / intelligentia; concludere / confirmare / patere; consequi / assequi / nancisci; essentia / essentialis / substantia; exterior / externus; instrumentum / opifex; manere in agente; migrare / transire; motus / motio / motor / mutare; oportere / debere / decere; opus / operari / operatio.

**II.9.6, source pp. 166–167.** Articles: Act and operation; Essence and substance; Intellect and intellection; Naming by cause. Vocabulary: cognitio / intelligentia; excellens / eminens / deterior / altior / remotior.

**II.9.7, source pp. 166–167.** Articles: Act and operation; Being; Essence and substance; Intellect and intellection; Perfection; Self knowledge; Simplicity and composition. Vocabulary: cognitio / intelligentia; collocare; intellectus / intelligere; intelligibilis / intelligendus / intelligens.

**II.9.8, source pp. 166–167.** Articles: Act and operation; Common and proper; Essence and substance; Intellect and intellection; Need and sufficiency; Object and adequate object; Perfection; Self knowledge; Simplicity and composition. Vocabulary: certus / plenus; integer / totus / plenus; intelligibilis / intelligendus / intelligens; obiectum / proximus; perfectio / perfectus; proprius / proprietas.

**II.9.9, source pp. 166–167.** Articles: Intellect and intellection; Object and adequate object; Self knowledge; Simplicity and composition. Vocabulary: cogere / compellere; exterior / externus; sequi.

**II.9.10, source pp. 168–169.** Articles: Common and proper; Intellect and intellection; Object and adequate object; Self knowledge; Simplicity and composition. Vocabulary: obiectum / proximus.

**II.9.11, source pp. 168–169.** Articles: Intellect and intellection; Object and adequate object; Self knowledge; Simplicity and composition. Vocabulary: excedere / superare.

**II.9.12, source pp. 168–169.** Articles: Form; God; Intellect and intellection; Mind; Naming by cause; Object and adequate object; Self knowledge; Simplicity and composition. Vocabulary: appellatio / nomen / proprie; dicere / vocare / appellare; intellectus / intelligere; mens; secundum causam / per formam; tribuere / tradere.

**II.9.13, source pp. 168–169.** Articles: Act and operation; Being; Burden labor and ease; Choice and deliberation; Form; God; Intellect and intellection; Light and illumination; Naming by cause; Object and adequate object; Self knowledge; Simplicity and composition; Universals and individuals. Vocabulary: ars / artificium; cognitio / intelligentia; concludere / confirmare / patere; Deus / divinus; extendere / extensio; mens mentium / lumen luminum; modus / modo; simplex / simplicitas; singulus / minimus / infimus; velle / nolle.

**II.9.14, source pp. 170–171.** Articles: Cause; Form; Self knowledge; Universals and individuals. Vocabulary: causa / effectus; distincte / clare / plane; habere / tenere / possidere; medium / particularis; noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere; res; singulus / minimus / infimus.

**II.9.15, source pp. 170–171.** Articles: Cause; Communication and imparting; Form; God; Self knowledge; Universals and individuals. Vocabulary: communicare; distincte / clare / plane; intus / intro / extra / ultra / superne / undique; noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere; oportere / debere / decere; scientia / comprehendere; species / genus; videre / visibilis.

**II.9.16, source pp. 172–173.** Articles: Imagination and deceptive clothing; Intellect and intellection; Reason and account; Sense and imagination; Universals and individuals. Vocabulary: discernere / animadvertere; excellens / eminens / deterior / altior / remotior; iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari; phantasia; quinque sensus / singulatim / summatim; ratio / rationalis; universalis / universalia; videre / visibilis.

**II.9.17, source pp. 172–173.** Articles: Intellect and intellection; Sense and imagination; Universals and individuals. Vocabulary: distinguere / dividere / divisio; essendi modus; universalis / universalia.

**II.9.18, source pp. 172–173.** Articles: Eye and gaze; Intellect and intellection; Orpheus and divine names; Universals and individuals. Vocabulary: Iuppiter / oculus; The perfect eye of Jupiter.

**II.9.19, source pp. 172–173.** Articles: Eye and gaze; Intellect and intellection; Orpheus and divine names; Universals and individuals. Vocabulary: fatum; Iuppiter / oculus.

**II.9.20, source pp. 172–173.** Articles: Image and likeness; Intellect and intellection; Intuition and comprehension; Intuition and discourse; Precious and lowly; Seeking possessing and distraction; Self knowledge; Universals and individuals. Vocabulary: cura / labor / facilis; distrahere / divertere / possidere; Epicureus / Epicurus / Averroes; fides adhibita; gravior / levior; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; iudicare / percipere / nescire /

nosse / notitia / speculari; maiestas / indignus; quaerere / interrogare; speculum / imago; vilis / pretiosus / nobilis.

**II.9.21, source pp. 174–175.** Articles: Eye and gaze; Intuition and comprehension; Order and harmony; Precious and lowly; Seeking possessing and distraction; Self knowledge; Universals and individuals; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: Aristoteles / Divinorum; constare / consistere / constituere; Epicureus / Epicurus / Averroes; error / impius / profanus; fateri / negare / affirmare; ignis / sol / caelum / stella; intervallum / mensura; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; Iuppiter / oculus; pars / totus; proportio / consonare; redigere / colligere / referre; vilis / pretiosus / nobilis.

**II.9.22, source pp. 174–175.** Articles: Intuition and comprehension; Order and harmony; Orpheus and divine names; Precious and lowly; Universals and individuals; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: Apollo / cithara / contemperare; considerare / comparare; dicere / vocare / appellare; fabricare / construere / conficere; florere / virescere; formosus / exactus / ars; hymnus / theologia / sacerdos; memorare / respondere / docere; ordinare / ordinator / ordo; proportio / consonare; putare / videri as appearance; sphaera; stultus / sapienter / perspicue / vulgo / gratia / idealis; vilis / pretiosus / nobilis; The bounds of the world and cosmic tuning.

## Chapter II.10

**II.10.1, source pp. 176–177.** Articles: God; Infinity; Universals and individuals. Vocabulary: singulus / minimus / infimus; vero / verum: connectives.

**II.10.2, source pp. 176–177.** Articles: Infinity; Power and potency; Self knowledge. Vocabulary: considerare / comparare; extendere / extensio; noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere; potentia / potestas / virtus.

**II.10.3, source pp. 176–177.** Articles: Infinity; Matter; Number; Power and potency; Self knowledge. Vocabulary: capacitas / capax; capacitas materiae / continuum / multiplicatio; distincte / clare / plane; esse / ens / exsistere; generatio / successio; infinitus / infinitas / immensus / innumerus; materia; nuper / semel / diuturnior / perpetuo / generatio / successio; res; tempus / temporalis.

**II.10.4, source pp. 176–177.** Articles: Infinity; Number; Power and potency; Self knowledge; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: capacitas materiae / continuum / multiplicatio; distinguere / dividere / divisio; numerus / unicus / unire.

**II.10.5, source pp. 176–177.** Articles: Ideas and exemplars; Image and likeness; Infinity; Measure and degree; Perfection; Power and potency; Self knowledge; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: exemplar / exprimere / imitari; forma / formare; integer / totus / plenus; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; magnum / magnitudo / maior; modus / modo; novus / relinquere; perfectio / perfectus; procedere / progredi / proficere; similis / similitudo; speculum / imago; usurpare / superesse.

**II.10.6, source pp. 178–179.** Articles: Infinity; Intellect and intellection; Power and potency; Self knowledge.

**II.10.7, source pp. 178–179.** Articles: Eye and gaze; Infinity; Intellect and intellection; Number; Orpheus and divine names; Power and potency; Self knowledge. Vocabulary: absurdus; fortis / vehementia / valere; habere / tenere / possidere; intellectus / intelligere; Iuppiter / oculus; numerus / unicus / unire; Orpheus / Orphici; pro arbitrio; The infinite eye.

**II.10.8, source pp. 178–179.** Articles: Counting and collective intuition; Infinity; Intuition and comprehension; Number; Self knowledge. Vocabulary: argumentum / arguere; error /

impius / profanus; existimare / opinari / arbitrari; memorare / respondere / docere; scientia / comprehendere.

**II.10.9, source pp. 178–179.** Articles: Counting and collective intuition; Infinity; Intuition and comprehension; Number; Self knowledge. Vocabulary: scientia / comprehendere.

**II.10.10, source pp. 180–181.** Articles: Counting and collective intuition; Eye and gaze; Form; Image and likeness; Infinity; Intuition and comprehension; Number; Reason and account; Self knowledge; Sense and imagination; Simplicity and composition. Vocabulary: adaequare / sibimet; concludere / confirmare / patere; enumerare / gradatim / summatim; gradus / gradatim; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari; multitudo / multiplex; porrigere / tendere; quinque sensus / singulatim / summatim; terminare / finire.

**II.10.11, source pp. 180–181.** Articles: Counting and collective intuition; Form; Image and likeness; Infinity; Intuition and comprehension; Light and illumination; Self knowledge; Simplicity and composition. Vocabulary: omniformis / unicolor / omnicolor; respectus / vigor.

**II.10.12, source pp. 180–181.** Articles: Counting and collective intuition; Form; Image and likeness; Infinity; Intuition and comprehension; Light and illumination; Self knowledge; Simplicity and composition. Vocabulary: fons / influxus; iudicare / percipere / nescire / nosse / notitia / speculari; lux / lumen; omniformis / unicolor / omnicolor; simulacrum / color.

## Chapter II.11

**II.11.1, source pp. 182–183.** Articles: Act and operation; Cause; Form. Vocabulary: agere / actio / agens; causa / effectus; comprehendere; confusus / distinctus; Deus / divinus; forma / species; Iupiter; necesse / oportere; necessitas naturae; omniformis / uniformis; Orpheus / Orphicus; similis / dissimilis / similitudo; Jupiter as the form of all things.

**II.11.2, source pp. 182–183.** Articles: Essence and substance; Form; Quality. Vocabulary: essentialis / accidentalis; multiplex / compositus; ratio.

**II.11.3, source pp. 182–183.** Articles: Essence and substance; Form; Quality; Receiving and giving. Vocabulary: accipere; capere; dare; subiectum; vicem gerere.

**II.11.4, source pp. 182–183.** Articles: Essence and substance; Form; Quality. Vocabulary: dependere / pendere; subire.

**II.11.5, source pp. 182–183.** Articles: Essence and substance; Form; Quality. Vocabulary: dependere / pendere; quandoque; seorsum.

**II.11.6, source pp. 184–185.** Articles: Essence and substance; Form; Quality; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: praestantior.

**II.11.7, source pp. 184–185.** Articles: Essence and substance; Form; Quality; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: comburere / calefacere; necessitas naturae; unire.

**II.11.8, source pp. 184–185.** Articles: Art and nature; Fire and variable materials; Form; Governing, serving and dominion; Order and harmony; Quality. Vocabulary: comburere / calefacere; dominari; gradus / mensura / proportio; impetus; praeparatio; tenor.

**II.11.9, source pp. 186–187.** Articles: Art and nature; Fire and variable materials; Form; Generation and corruption; Order and harmony. Vocabulary: discretus; medium; posse / nequire; se toto; similis / dissimilis / similitudo; solus / solum; subiectum; sublatus.

**II.11.10, source pp. 186–187.** Articles: Art and nature; Form; Order and harmony. Vocabulary: dominari; instinctus; solus / solum.

**II.11.11, source pp. 186–187.** Articles: Art and nature; Form; Intellect and intellection. Vocabulary: alius / idem / uterque — explanatory distinction; efficax; intellectus / intelligentia / intelligere.

**II.11.12, source pp. 188–189.** Articles: Art and nature; Form; Intellect and intellection. Vocabulary: dumtaxat; immo / potius / minime; nudus / adventitius; prior dignitate / tempore.

**II.11.13, source pp. 188–189.** Articles: Art and nature; Form; Good and goodness; Intellect and intellection.

**II.11.14, source pp. 188–189.** Articles: Architect, house and decoration; Art and nature; Form; Good and goodness; Intellect and intellection. Vocabulary: alius / idem / uterque — explanatory distinction; calor / ignis / lignum; labi; minister / architectus; naturalis / natura; terminus operationis.

**II.11.15, source pp. 188–189.** Articles: Art and nature; Form; Intellect and intellection; Turning and direction. Vocabulary: speculari; versari / versare.

**II.11.16, source pp. 188–189.** Articles: Art and nature; Form; Intellect and intellection. Vocabulary: Parmenides Pythagoreus; rotare.

**II.11.17, source pp. 190–191.** Articles: Chance; Form; Ideas and exemplars; Image and likeness; Intellect and intellection; Reason and account. Vocabulary: imitari / deficere; omniformis / uniformis; planta / animal; propositum.

**II.11.18, source pp. 190–191.** Articles: Architect, house and decoration; Chance; Form; Ideas and exemplars; Image and likeness; Intellect and intellection; Intuition and discourse; Reason and account; Relations and respects. Vocabulary: aedificium / domus; contueri / intueri / intuitus; opifex; ordo / ordinare; propositum; proprius; quantum / quatenus / eatenus; ratio; simplex / simplicitas; species / idea.

**II.11.19, source pp. 192–193.** Articles: Form; Good and goodness; Ideas and exemplars; Possession and privation; Qualification and attribution; Reason and account; Relations and respects. Vocabulary: comparare; habitus — possession; privatio / malum; proprietas; putare / arbitrari; realis / intellectus (adjectival); respectus.

**II.11.20, source pp. 192–193.** Articles: Form; Ideas and exemplars. Vocabulary: designare; proprietas.

**II.11.21, source pp. 192–193.** Articles: Architect, house and decoration; Form; Ideas and exemplars. Vocabulary: aedificium / domus; comitari / contingere; occasio / nancisci; pictura; propositum.

**II.11.22, source pp. 192–193.** Articles: Form; Ideas and exemplars; Insults and rebuke. Vocabulary: canis / latrare; Plato / Platonici; sententia.

**II.11.23, source pp. 192–193.** Articles: Form. Vocabulary: sapientia / sapiens.

**II.11.24, source pp. 194–195.** Articles: Assent of will; Will. Vocabulary: assensus; propositum; volente Deo.

**II.11.25, source pp. 194–195.** Articles: Assent of will; End and limit; Paths and prescribed ends; Will. Vocabulary: anticipare / discernere / metiri; approbare / eligere; gradus / mensura / proportio; posse / nequire; via.

**II.11.26, source pp. 194–195.** Articles: Assent of will; End and limit; Will. Vocabulary: approbare / eligere; detestari; Phaedo / Philebus / Politicus / Phaedrus; via.

**II.11.27, source pp. 194–195.** Articles: End and limit; Participation; Will. Vocabulary: gratia — purpose; rotunditas.

**II.11.28, source pp. 194–195.** Articles: Will. Vocabulary: quantum ens est.

**II.11.29, source pp. 196–197.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Will. Vocabulary: absens / praesens; conquiescere / amplecti; inclinatio / appetitus / voluntas; intellectus / intelligentia / intelligere.

**II.11.30, source pp. 196–197.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Light and illumination; Love and pleasure; Will. Vocabulary: conquiescere / amplecti; diffusio; mens; replicare / explicare.

**II.11.31, source pp. 196–197.** Articles: Affect; Love and pleasure; Ostrich and egg; Will. Vocabulary: affectus / afficere; avidus / intentus; cognoscere / cognitio; exemplum / signum / indicare; ovum / fovere; struthii oculus.

**II.11.32, source pp. 196–197.** Articles: Affect; Love and pleasure; Ostrich and egg; Will. Vocabulary: affectus / afficere; coniectari; frui; obiectum; ovum / fovere; struthii oculus.

**II.11.33, source pp. 198–199.** Articles: Affect; Love and pleasure; Will. Vocabulary: voluptas / dilatatio.

**II.11.34, source pp. 198–199.** Articles: Love and pleasure; Will.

**II.11.35, source pp. 198–199.** Articles: Love and pleasure; Will. Vocabulary: primum / summum / ultimum; servire / alienus.

**II.11.36, source pp. 198–199.** Articles: Love and pleasure; Will. Vocabulary: dilectio / diligere.

**II.11.37, source pp. 200–201.** Articles: Love and pleasure; Will. Vocabulary: dilectio / diligere; inquam / inquit.

**II.11.38, source pp. 200–201.** Articles: Governing, serving and dominion; Love and pleasure; Will. Vocabulary: inquam / inquit; libera voluntate disponere; Mercurius — Hermetic authority; raptare.

## Chapter II.12

**II.12.1, source pp. 202–203.** Articles: Freedom and necessity; Governing, serving and dominion; Will. Vocabulary: imperium; probare / ostendere / demonstrare.

**II.12.2, source pp. 202–203.** Articles: Chance; Contingency; Freedom and necessity; Possession and privation; Reason and account; Will. Vocabulary: forte / fortuitus / sors; suspicari.

**II.12.3, source pp. 202–203.** Articles: Beauty and fittingness; Chance; Contingency; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Will. Vocabulary: decet / decor; liber / libertas; regula.

**II.12.4, source pp. 202–203.** Articles: Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Love and pleasure; Will. Vocabulary: liber / libertas; vivere ut vult.

**II.12.5, source pp. 204–205.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Love and pleasure; Will. Vocabulary: consentire / confirmare; esse — existence and predication; imbecillitas / insipientia; spontaneus / voluntarius.

**II.12.6, source pp. 204–205.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Love and pleasure; Participation; Will. Vocabulary: participare / particeps; placere / displicere; res / re ipsa.

**II.12.7, source pp. 204–205.** Articles: Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Governing, serving and dominion; Love and pleasure; Will. Vocabulary: praescribere; sui iuris.

**II.12.8, source pp. 206–207.** Articles: Essence and substance; Freedom and necessity; Generation and corruption; Good and goodness; Governing, serving and dominion; Qualification and attribution; Self-production and reservation; Will. Vocabulary: compos; dare; forsitan / quodammodo; intellectus / intelligentia / intelligere; norma / condicio; res / re ipsa; Zoroastris sectatores.

**II.12.9, source pp. 206–207.** Articles: Freedom and necessity; Generation and corruption; Good and goodness; Self-production and reservation; Will. Vocabulary: actus / actum (product); Plotinus.

**II.12.10, source pp. 206–207.** Articles: Freedom and necessity; Generation and corruption; Good and goodness; Self-production and reservation; Will. Vocabulary: actus / actum (product); fecundus; gignere / producere; nixus / inniti; pervigil / vigilare.

**II.12.11, source pp. 208–209.** Articles: Freedom and necessity; Generation and corruption; Good and goodness; Self-production and reservation; Will. Vocabulary: Deus ipse viderit; gignere / producere; nixus / inniti; Plotinus; ponere / signare in esse.

**II.12.12, source pp. 208–209.** Articles: End and limit; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Image and likeness; Object and adequate object; Will. Vocabulary: bonum / bonitas; gustus; primum / summum / ultimum; prout; vultus / imago.

**II.12.13, source pp. 208–209.** Articles: End and limit; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Image and likeness; Relations and respects; Turning and direction; Will. Vocabulary: prout.

**II.12.14, source pp. 210–211.** Articles: End and limit; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Image and likeness; Need and sufficiency; Will. Vocabulary: bonum / bonitas; conditionali necessitate; habere / possidere.

**II.12.15, source pp. 210–211.** Articles: Choice and free judgment; End and limit; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Ideas and exemplars; Image and likeness; Infinity; Motion and stability; Perfection; Power and potency; Relations and respects; Will. Vocabulary: amplificare / porrigere; bonum / bonitas; effingere; positio; Thomas Aquinas.

**II.12.16, source pp. 210–211.** Articles: Choice and free judgment; Contradiction and possibility; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Infinity; Nothing and nonbeing; Perfection; Power and potency; Productive and designing power; Reason and account; Will. Vocabulary: adversari / repugnare; nihil / non ens.

**II.12.17, source pp. 212–213.** Articles: Choice and free judgment; Contradiction and possibility; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Infinity; Nothing and nonbeing; Perfection; Power and potency; Productive and designing power; Reason and account; Will. Vocabulary: amplificare / porrigere; contradictio; effectrix / machinatrix; nihil / non ens; posse / nequire; qui / quod — scope of a condition.

**II.12.18, source pp. 212–213.** Articles: Choice and free judgment; Contradiction and possibility; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Infinity; Nothing and nonbeing; Perfection; Power and potency; Productive and designing power; Through itself and through another; Turning and direction; Will. Vocabulary: contradictio; intervallum; qui / quod — scope of a condition; quorsum.

**II.12.19, source pp. 212–213.** Articles: Choice and free judgment; Freedom and necessity; Good and goodness; Need and sufficiency; Order and harmony; Perfection; Will. Vocabulary: commodum / apparens; mundus / universum; particula / particularis; velle / nolle / malle; vim inferre.

**II.12.20, source pp. 214–215.** Articles: Cause; Chance; Choice and free judgment; Contingency; Freedom and necessity; Order and harmony; Perfection; Will. Vocabulary: ordo / ordinare; proximus / remotus; vagus / variabilis.

**II.12.21, source pp. 214–215.** Articles: Chance; Choice and free judgment; Contingency; Freedom and necessity; Order and harmony; Perfection; Providence; Will. Vocabulary: praevaricari / effugere.

## Chapter II.13

**II.13.1, source pp. 216–217.** Articles: Craftsman and father; Good and goodness; Image and likeness; Love and pleasure; Providence.

**II.13.2, source pp. 216–217.** Articles: Art and nature; Care and custody; Cause; Craftsman and father; Generation and corruption; Good and goodness; Love and pleasure; Providence. Vocabulary: accipere; custodire / cura; diligentia / procurator; faber / genitor / filius; facere / efficere; fecunditas; materia; opus; proclivitas.

**II.13.3, source pp. 216–217.** Articles: Cause; End and limit; Good and goodness; Love and pleasure; Providence; Receiving and giving. Vocabulary: gratia — purpose; illicere.

**II.13.4, source pp. 218–219.** Articles: Cause; Exchange and reconciliation; Order and harmony; Providence. Vocabulary: mutuare / mutuari; pondus / librare; vicissim / invicem.

**II.13.5, source pp. 218–219.** Articles: Art and nature; Cause; Order and harmony; Providence. Vocabulary: calidus / frigidus / siccus / humidus; cogitare / cogitatio; rarus / densus.

**II.13.6, source pp. 218–219.** Articles: Art and nature; Cause; Order and harmony; Providence.

**II.13.7, source pp. 218–219.** Articles: Art and nature; Cause; Exchange and reconciliation; Fire and variable materials; Order and harmony; Providence. Vocabulary: dissolvere / condensare; gradus / mensura / proportio; se toto.

**II.13.8, source pp. 220–221.** Articles: Army and commander; Art and nature; Cause; Fire and variable materials; Intention; Order and harmony; Possession and privation; Providence. Vocabulary: Aristoteles; exercitus / dux / princeps; habitus — present state.

**II.13.9, source pp. 220–221.** Articles: Archer and target; Army and commander; Art and nature; Cause; Order and harmony; Paths and prescribed ends; Providence. Vocabulary: aut semper aut plurimum; concludere / colligere; exercitus / dux / princeps; ignarus / nescire; peragere; praescribere; prudentia; sagitta / sagittarius / signum.

**II.13.10, source pp. 222–223.** Articles: Army and commander; Art and nature; Cause; Exchange and reconciliation; Order and harmony; Providence. Vocabulary: conciliare / interimere.

**II.13.11, source pp. 222–223.** Articles: Art and nature; Care and custody; Cause; Order and harmony; Providence. Vocabulary: custodire / cura; facere / efficere; invidere; munus / donum; rector / gubernare / regere.

**II.13.12, source pp. 224–225.** Articles: Archer and target; Art and nature; Cause; Hinge and center; Order and harmony; Providence. Vocabulary: Aristoteles; cardo; Deus / divinus; intrinsecus / extrinsecus; nervus / nucha; ordo / ordinare; Orpheus / Orphicus; penetralia; tractus / trahere; Turning through an everlasting pivot.

**II.13.13, source pp. 224–225.** Articles: Art and nature; Florentine mechanism; Hinge and center; Order and harmony; Providence. Vocabulary: assurgere / inclinari; coronare / vulnerare; dextra / sinistra / sursum / deorsum; Florentia / Germanus; tabernaculum / statua / pila; tuba / cornu / cantus.

**II.13.14, source pp. 226–227.** Articles: Art and nature; Beauty and fittingness; Chance; Florentine mechanism; Hinge and center; Insults and rebuke; Lucretius; Order and harmony; Providence. Vocabulary: Lucretius / taceat; momentum; nutus / vibrare.

**II.13.15, source pp. 226–227.** Articles: Architect, house and decoration; Art and nature; Chance; Lucretius; Order and harmony; Paths and prescribed ends; Providence. Vocabulary: lapis / paries / congeries; Lucretius / taceat; trames / oberrare.

**II.13.16, source pp. 226–227.** Articles: Art and nature; Chance; Order and harmony; Perfection; Providence; Providential provision. Vocabulary: alimentum / providere; compago / membrum; instruere / instrumentum; lapis / paries / congeries; temperare.

**II.13.17, source pp. 228–229.** Articles: Art and nature; Beauty and fittingness; Chance; Counsel and settled skill; Intuition and discourse; Order and harmony; Perfection; Providence; Providential provision. Vocabulary: alimentum / providere; consilium / consultare; semen.

**II.13.18, source pp. 228–229.** Articles: Art and nature; Chance; Counsel and settled skill; Intuition and discourse; Order and harmony; Perfection; Providence. Vocabulary: consilium / consultare; contueri / intueri / intuitus; habitus — settled skill; iners / callere; mora / transgressio / retractatio; ordo / ordinare; translatio.

**II.13.19, source pp. 228–229.** Articles: Art and nature; Chance; Insults and rebuke; Intuition and discourse; Order and harmony; Perfection; Providence; Wonder and familiarity. Vocabulary: admiratio / consuetudo; sensus rationalis.

**II.13.20, source pp. 230–231.** Articles: Chance; Life; Lucretius; Order and harmony; Perfection; Providence; Wonder and familiarity. Vocabulary: admiratio / consuetudo; ambigere; educare / spectaculum; regina / pedisequa; sapientia / sapiens.

**II.13.21, source pp. 230–231.** Articles: Care and custody; Life; Order and harmony; Perfection; Providence. Vocabulary: constare / consistere; custodire / cura; habitus — condition of the whole; neglegere; Begetter beginning and end.

**II.13.22, source pp. 230–231.** Articles: Life; Order and harmony; Perfection; Providence. Vocabulary: Orpheus / Orphicus; Seeing hearing and distributing.

**II.13.23, source pp. 232–233.** Articles: Care and custody; Life; Need and sufficiency; Order and harmony; Perfection; Providence. Vocabulary: comparare; concinere /

conducere; culpare / deformis; mundus / universum; pars / totum; particula / particularis; perfectus / perficere.

**II.13.24, source pp. 232–233.** Articles: Beauty and fittingness; Choice and free judgment; Foreknowledge; Freedom and necessity; Life; Order and harmony; Perfection; Providence; Will. Vocabulary: culpare / deformis; leges / respublica / regnum / Critias (titles); Mercurius — Hermetic authority; nutrix; Orpheus / Orphicus; pars / totum; Plato / Platonici; propitius / punire; Everlasting life and immortal providence.

**II.13.25, source pp. 234–235.** Articles: Choice and free judgment; Contingency; Foreknowledge; Freedom and necessity; Providence; Soul; Will. Vocabulary: modus; praescientia / praevisio; scribere.

**II.13.26, source pp. 234–235.** Articles: Archer and target; Choice and free judgment; Contingency; Foreknowledge; Freedom and necessity; Persuasion and compulsion; Providence; Soul; Turning and direction; Will. Vocabulary: allicere / cogere / persuadere; anima / animus; naturalis / natura; omnis / cunctus / singulus; pulsare; tractus / trahere.

**II.13.27, source pp. 234–235.** Articles: Choice and free judgment; Contingency; Foreknowledge; Freedom and necessity; Persuasion and compulsion; Providence; Soul; Will. Vocabulary: metus / persuasio; Persuasion rather than fear.

**II.13.28, source pp. 234–235.** Articles: Choice and free judgment; Contingency; Foreknowledge; Freedom and necessity; Persuasion and compulsion; Providence; Soul; Will. Vocabulary: allicere / cogere / persuadere; velle / nolle / malle.

**II.13.29, source pp. 236–237.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Choice and free judgment; Contingency; Foreknowledge; Freedom and necessity; Object and adequate object; Providence; Reason and account; Soul; Will. Vocabulary: adaequatus; obiectum; vacatio appetendi; velle / nolle / malle.

**II.13.30, source pp. 236–237.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Assent of will; Choice and free judgment; Contingency; End and limit; Foreknowledge; Freedom and necessity; Persuasion and compulsion; Providence; Soul; Will. Vocabulary: aptus / convenire / congruere; iudicium / censere.

## Chapter III.1

**III.1.1, source pp. 240–241.** Articles: Body and bulk; Degree and mediation; Number; Quality; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: dicere / appellare / vocare; Pythagorici; unus / unitas / multitudo.

**III.1.2, source pp. 240–241.** Articles: Body and bulk; Degree and mediation; Form; Indivisibility; Number; Quality; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: dicere / appellare / vocare; multa et unum / unum et multa / unum multa; Pythagorici; unus / unitas / multitudo.

**III.1.3, source pp. 240–241.** Articles: Body and bulk; Degree and mediation; Form; Indivisibility; Number; Quality; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: admixtio / inquinatio.

**III.1.4, source pp. 240–241.** Articles: Degree and mediation; Form; Indivisibility; Number; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: angelus; receptaculum; unus / unitas / multitudo.

**III.1.5, source pp. 240–241.** Articles: Bond knot and chain; Degree and mediation; Immortality; Indivisibility; Motion and stability; Number; Soul; Staying and preserving;

Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: dissolubilis / indissolubilis; nodus divinus; Timaeus / Timaeus Locrus; unus / unitas / multitudo.

**III.1.6, source pp. 242–243.** Articles: Motion and stability; Number; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: habere / possidere; immutabilis / immobilis; novus / vetus; stare / status; transferre / assequi.

**III.1.7, source pp. 242–243.** Articles: Eternity and time; Motion and stability; Number; Possession and privation; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: haurire / implere; immutabilis / immobilis; manere / permanere / remanere; praeteritum / futurum; retinere / amittere; semper / simul / aliquando / nondum / amplius.

**III.1.8, source pp. 244–245.** Articles: Motion and stability; Number; Soul; Staying and preserving; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: decidere; retinere / amittere; similis / dissimilis / similitudo.

**III.1.9, source pp. 244–245.** Articles: Act and operation; Infinity; Quality; Receiving and giving; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: pati / passio; susceptivus / passivus; suscipere; vis / virtus / potestas.

**III.1.10, source pp. 246–247.** Articles: Act and operation; Infinity; Purity and mixture; Quality; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: additamentum / permixtio; angelus; pati / passio; purus / merus; susceptivus / passivus; vigor; viridis / rubens.

**III.1.11, source pp. 246–247.** Articles: Act and operation; Infinity; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: Phaedo / Philebus / Politicus / Phaedrus; terminus / infinitum.

**III.1.12, source pp. 248–249.** Articles: Act and operation; Essence and substance; Generation and corruption; Ideas and exemplars; Intellect and intellection; Light and illumination; Receiving and giving; Second mind; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: angelus; informis / ornatus; lux / lumen / illuminare; mens; mens secunda; perfectus / perficere; Giving to the second mind.

**III.1.13, source pp. 248–249.** Articles: Essence and substance; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: ferme / ut ita loquar.

**III.1.14, source pp. 248–249.** Articles: Essence and substance; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: superior / inferior / propinquus.

**III.1.15, source pp. 248–249.** Articles: Essence and substance; Soul; Staying and preserving; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: essentia / substantia; mutare / mutatio; partim.

**III.1.16, source pp. 250–251.** Articles: Essence and substance; Motion and stability; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: fluere; mutare / mutatio.

**III.1.17, source pp. 250–251.** Articles: Art and nature; Essence and substance; Motion and stability; Shadows and dependence; Soul; Through itself and through another; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: degenerare; mutare / mutatio; umbra.

**III.1.18, source pp. 250–251.** Articles: Art and nature; Motion and stability; Soul; Through itself and through another; Unity and multiplicity.

**III.1.19, source pp. 250–251.** Articles: Art and nature; Motion and stability; Shadows and dependence; Soul; Through itself and through another; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: pati / passio; umbra.

**III.1.20, source pp. 252–253.** Articles: Art and nature; Motion and stability; Soul; Through itself and through another; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: cedere / excedere.

**III.1.21, source pp. 252–253.** Articles: Art and nature; Motion and stability; Soul; Through itself and through another; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: alius / idem / uterque — explanatory distinction; rapere / includere; The father withdrawing himself.

**III.1.22, source pp. 252–253.** Articles: Art and nature; Motion and stability; Soul; Staying and preserving; Through itself and through another; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: perseverare; reducere / referre; stare / status.

**III.1.23, source pp. 254–255.** Articles: Art and nature; First movable; Image and likeness; Life; Motion and stability; Number; Qualification and attribution; Soul; Through itself and through another; Xenocrates and the riddle. Vocabulary: aenigma / Xenocrates; fluere; impulsus / sua sponte; numerus se movens; primum / summum / ultimum; puta; putare / arbitrari; reducere / referre.

**III.1.24, source pp. 254–255.** Articles: First movable; Motion and stability; Soul; Through itself and through another; Xenocrates and the riddle.

**III.1.25, source pp. 254–255.** Articles: First movable; Motion and stability; Soul; Through itself and through another; Xenocrates and the riddle. Vocabulary: in infinitum vagari / circulo revolvi.

**III.1.26, source pp. 256–257.** Articles: First movable; Motion and stability; Principle; Soul; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: experiri / edere; fons / principium; leges / respublica / regnum / Critias (titles); pervigil / vigilare; Phaedo / Philebus / Politicus / Phaedrus; superior / inferior / propinquus; torpere / suscitare.

**III.1.27, source pp. 256–257.** Articles: Apelles and the meadow; Motion and stability; Soul; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: accendere / accensio; Apelles / pratum; dubitatio / respondere; subito / paulatim; tabula / pingere / color.

**III.1.28, source pp. 258–259.** Articles: Apelles and the meadow; First movable; Intuition and discourse; Looking and recognizing; Motion and stability; Soul. Vocabulary: accendere / accensio; agere / actio / agens; discursus / discurrere; flos / herba; motus / motio / operatio; respicere / suspicere / inspicere; subito / paulatim; tabula / pingere / color; tempus / temporalis.

**III.1.29, source pp. 258–259.** Articles: First movable; Intuition and discourse; Motion and stability; Soul. Vocabulary: Apelles / pratum; exprimere / referre; flos / herba.

**III.1.30, source pp. 258–259.** Articles: Apelles and the meadow; First movable; Intuition and discourse; Motion and stability; Principle; Soul.

**III.1.31, source pp. 258–259.** Articles: Apelles and the meadow; First movable; Intuition and discourse; Looking and recognizing; Motion and stability; Self knowledge; Soul. Vocabulary: augurari; cogitare / cogitatio; infusio / infundere; mores; motus / motio / operatio; tabula / pingere / color.

**III.1.32, source pp. 260–261.** Articles: Motion and stability; Receiving and giving; Soul; Sun, Mercury and moon. Vocabulary: caelum / sphaera / stella; exemplum / signum / indicare; infusio / infundere; lux / lumen / illuminare; Mercurius — planet; momentum; sol / luna; suscipere; vicissitudo.

## Chapter III.2

**III.2.1, source pp. 262–263.** Articles: Degree and mediation; Essence and substance; Motion and stability; Soul. Vocabulary: arx / tertius / medius; dicere / appellare / vocare; essentia / substantia; quandoque.

**III.2.2, source pp. 262–263.** Articles: Degree and mediation; Essence and substance; Eternity and time; Motion and stability; Soul. Vocabulary: aptus / convenire / congruere; esse / fieri; esse — existence and predication; opus; Plato / Platonici; semper / simul / aliquando / nondum / amplius.

**III.2.3, source pp. 262–263.** Articles: Bond knot and chain; Degree and mediation; Empyrean heaven; Eternity and time; Motion and stability; Soul; Spheres and stars. Vocabulary: aevum.

**III.2.4, source pp. 262–263.** Articles: Degree and mediation; Empyrean heaven; Eternity and time; Qualification and attribution; Soul; Spheres and stars. Vocabulary: caelum / sphaera / stella; empyreus / prorsus immobile; immutabilis / immobilis.

**III.2.5, source pp. 264–265.** Articles: Degree and mediation; Empyrean heaven; Eternity and time; Soul; Spheres and stars. Vocabulary: caelum / sphaera / stella; intellectus animales / animae corporales.

**III.2.6, source pp. 264–265.** Articles: Bond knot and chain; Degree and mediation; Empyrean heaven; Perfection; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: aer / aqua / terra; conglutinare / consonare; constare / consistere; intellectus animales / animae corporales; opus.

**III.2.7, source pp. 264–265.** Articles: Degree and mediation; Perfection; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: extremum; opus.

**III.2.8, source pp. 266–267.** Articles: Bond knot and chain; Degree and mediation; Image and likeness; Light and illumination; Perfection; Soul; Spiritual union; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: aer / aqua / terra; connectere / copulare / colligare; deserere / relinquere; extremum; haerere; instinctus; necesse / oportere; speculum; tenuari / clarescere / hebescere.

**III.2.9, source pp. 268–269.** Articles: Body and bulk; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Point and position; Quality; Soul. Vocabulary: corpus / corporalis; tangere.

**III.2.10, source pp. 268–269.** Articles: Body and bulk; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Quality; Soul. Vocabulary: albedo / caro; immo / potius / minime; qualitas.

**III.2.11, source pp. 268–269.** Articles: Body and bulk; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Quality; Soul. Vocabulary: albedo / caro; corpus / corporalis; qualitas.

**III.2.12, source pp. 268–269.** Articles: Body and bulk; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Point and position; Quality; Soul. Vocabulary: distrahere / adstare; manere / permanere / remanere; vis / virtus / potestas.

**III.2.13, source pp. 270–271.** Articles: Body and bulk; Hinge and center; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Quality; Soul; Utterance and meaning. Vocabulary: affixus / situs; paene / quodammodo; quantitas / extensio / dimensio; semper / simul / aliquando / nondum / amplius; vox / significatio.

**III.2.14, source pp. 270–271.** Articles: Body and bulk; Hinge and center; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Quality; Soul. Vocabulary: punctum / linea / circumferentia.

**III.2.15, source pp. 270–271.** Articles: Body and bulk; Hinge and center; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Point and position; Quality; Soul. Vocabulary: centrum / circumspicere; proprius; punctum / linea / circumferentia.

**III.2.16, source pp. 270–271.** Articles: Body and bulk; Hinge and center; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Quality; Soul. Vocabulary: affixus / situs; quantitas / extensio / dimensio.

**III.2.17, source pp. 270–271.** Articles: Body and bulk; Hinge and center; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Quality; Soul. Vocabulary: quantitas / extensio / dimensio.

**III.2.18, source pp. 272–273.** Articles: Body and bulk; Hinge and center; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Point and position; Soul. Vocabulary: affixus / situs; instar.

**III.2.19, source pp. 272–273.** Articles: Hinge and center; Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Shadows and dependence; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: distrahere / adstare; dividuus / individuus; respicere / suspicere / inspicere; tangere; umbra.

**III.2.20, source pp. 272–273.** Articles: Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: prae / post / infra / supra.

**III.2.21, source pp. 272–273.** Articles: Indivisibility; Indwelling and presence; Intuition and discourse; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: discursio / discerptio family; tempus / temporalis.

**III.2.22, source pp. 274–275.** Articles: Immortality; Indivisibility; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: discursio / discerptio family; domina / comes; inserere / retrahere; miraculum; Timaeus / Timaeus Locrus.

**III.2.23, source pp. 274–275.** Articles: Bond knot and chain; Hinge and center; Ideas and exemplars; Image and likeness; Intellect and intellection; Intuition and discourse; Life; Reason and account; Soul; Unity and multiplicity. Vocabulary: anima / animus; connectere / copulare / colligare; definitio; intimus / communis; migrare / transire; mundi series / vultus omnium; vita / vivere / vivificare.

**III.2.24, source pp. 274–275.** Articles: Intellect and intellection; Life; Participation; Soul. Vocabulary: intimus / communis; participare / particeps; vis / virtus / potestas; vita / vivere / vivificare.

**III.2.25, source pp. 276–277.** Articles: Circularity and return; Intellect and intellection; Life; Soul. Vocabulary: circuitus.

**III.2.26, source pp. 276–277.** Articles: Circularity and return; Intellect and intellection; Life; Paths and prescribed ends; Soul. Vocabulary: circuitus; finis; repetere / reflectere.

**III.2.27, source pp. 276–277.** Articles: Circularity and return; Intellect and intellection; Life; Soul; Turning and direction. Vocabulary: replicare / explicare.

**III.2.28, source pp. 276–277.** Articles: Circularity and return; Intellect and intellection; Life; Looking and recognizing; Self knowledge; Soul; Spiritual union. Vocabulary: animadvertere / agnoscere; cognoscere / cognitio; replicare / explicare.

**III.2.29, source pp. 278–279.** Articles: Circularity and return; Counsel and settled skill; Intellect and intellection; Life; Looking and recognizing; Reason and account; Soul; Spiritual union. Vocabulary: acies oculorum; cognoscere / cognitio; concludere / colligere; corpus / corporalis; definitio; discursus / discurrere; forma / species; in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque; spiritus / spiritalis; visus / videre; vita / vivere / vivificare.

**III.2.30, source pp. 278–279.** Articles: Circularity and return; Insults and rebuke; Intellect and intellection; Life; Soul; Spiritual union. Vocabulary: connectere / copulare / colligare; definitio; discursus / discurrere; sedes / regio.

## Chapter IV.1

**IV.1.1, source pp. 282–283.** Articles: Earth soul; Generation and corruption; Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Life; Nourishment, digestion and growth; Soul. Vocabulary: accipere / concedere; augere / augmentum; collocare / assignare; comparare / proportio; inesse / adesse / insitus; nutrire / nutritio; perscrutari.

**IV.1.2, source pp. 282–283.** Articles: Earth as mother; Earth soul; Generation and corruption; Life; Nourishment, digestion and growth. Vocabulary: alere; careo / expers; dens / pilus; evellere / extirpare; venter / fetus.

**IV.1.3, source pp. 282–283.** Articles: Celestial influence; Earth soul; Instrument; Proximity and causal presence; Putrefaction and propagation; Seeming and evidence; Substance and accident. Vocabulary: influxus / instinctus; proximus; seorsum; subdere / subicere.

**IV.1.4, source pp. 282–283.** Articles: Celestial influence; Contraction and determination; Earth soul; Instrument; Proximity and causal presence; Substance and accident. Vocabulary: determinare; influxus / instinctus; subdere / subicere.

**IV.1.5, source pp. 284–285.** Articles: Celestial influence; Earth soul; Indwelling and presence; Proximity and causal presence; Substance and accident; Surface and depth. Vocabulary: intus / intro / intimus; penetrare; praesentia / admovere; quaerere / persuadere.

**IV.1.6, source pp. 284–285.** Articles: Celestial influence; Earth soul; Fitting and correspondence. Vocabulary: certo / certus; ferre; quadrare; vergere.

**IV.1.7, source pp. 284–285.** Articles: Celestial influence; Common and proper; Contraction and determination; Degree and mediation; Earth soul; Fitting and correspondence; Generation and corruption; Putrefaction and propagation; Seeming and evidence. Vocabulary: attribuere / dare; contrahere; medium competens; putrefactio / propagatio.

**IV.1.8, source pp. 284–285.** Articles: Celestial influence; Common and proper; Contraction and determination; Earth soul; Order and harmony. Vocabulary: cogere / compellere; collocare / assignare; concursus / confluere; determinare; ordinare.

**IV.1.9, source pp. 286–287.** Articles: Art and nature; Celestial influence; Common and proper; Contraction and determination; Earth soul; Ideas and exemplars; Seeds; Vine and grape seed. Vocabulary: contrahere; disponere; musca; vitis / vinaceus.

**IV.1.10, source pp. 286–287.** Articles: Art and nature; Artifact and natural work; Carpenter and geometer; Form; Ideas and exemplars; Proportion and analogy; Seeds. Vocabulary: imitatio / imitari.

**IV.1.11, source pp. 286–287.** Articles: Art and nature; Artifact and natural work; Carpenter and geometer; Euclid and the lantern; Form; Ideas and exemplars; Intellectual and animating powers; Proportion and analogy; Seeds; Sense and imagination; Spirit; Surface and depth. Vocabulary: certo / certus; consilium / propositum; faber lignarius; geometra / geometrica mens; imbuere; pulvis / describere; temperare; volutare secum.

**IV.1.12, source pp. 288–289.** Articles: Art and nature; Artifact and natural work; Carpenter and geometer; Form; Ideas and exemplars; Proportion and analogy; Seeds; Surface and depth. Vocabulary: artificium / opus; certo / certus; dominari; figere / ponere.

**IV.1.13, source pp. 288–289.** Articles: Art and nature; Artifact and natural work; Carpenter and geometer; Form; Ideas and exemplars; Seeds; Surface and depth. Vocabulary: contingens / essentialis; eruere / educere; superficies / fundus; tangere / attingere.

**IV.1.14, source pp. 288–289.** Articles: Generation and corruption; Nourishment, digestion and growth; Putrefaction and propagation; Seeds. Vocabulary: addere / mittere / omittere; fomentum / fovere; germen / corporale semen; pullulare; putrefactio / propagatio; serere / plantare.

**IV.1.15, source pp. 288–289.** Articles: Act and operation; Generation and corruption; Nourishment, digestion and growth; Putrefaction and propagation; Seeds. Vocabulary: necessitas / oportere; perducere in actum.

**IV.1.16, source pp. 290–291.** Articles: Generation and corruption; Nourishment, digestion and growth; Putrefaction and propagation; Seeds; Spirit; Vine and grape seed. Vocabulary: fomentum / fovere; inesse / adesse / insitus; spiritalia et vivifica semina.

**IV.1.17, source pp. 290–291.** Articles: Generation and corruption; Ideas and exemplars; Seeds; Vine and grape seed. Vocabulary: putridus / vilis / pretiosus; vitis / vinaceus.

**IV.1.18, source pp. 290–291.** Articles: Generation and corruption; Seeds; Surface and depth. Vocabulary: eruere / educere; penetrare; urere / frigefacere.

**IV.1.19, source pp. 290–291.** Articles: Act and operation; Generation and corruption; Hierobotanum and mineral powers; Power and potency; Seeds; Substance and accident; Surface and depth. Vocabulary: collisio; conferre / conducere; fascinare / roborare; mirari / mirabilis; vicem gerere.

**IV.1.20, source pp. 292–293.** Articles: Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Hidden mover and magnet; Hierobotanum and mineral powers; Power and potency. Vocabulary: Achates / adamas; fomentum / fovere; hierobotanum; obtundere / fecundia; praestare.

**IV.1.21, source pp. 292–293.** Articles: Hierobotanum and mineral powers; Power and potency. Vocabulary: Corneola / Onyx / Corallus; Metrodorus / Zoroaster; praestare; sistere / mitigare / repellere.

**IV.1.22, source pp. 292–293.** Articles: Hierobotanum and mineral powers; Indwelling and presence; Life; Power and potency; Strato, Chrysippus, and the Almariani; World soul. Vocabulary: confiteri / asseverare; negare; Strato / Chrysippus.

**IV.1.23, source pp. 292–293.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Good and goodness; Indwelling and presence; Strato, Chrysippus, and the Almariani; World soul. Vocabulary: forsitan / forte.

**IV.1.24, source pp. 292–293.** Articles: Good and goodness; Indwelling and presence; Strato, Chrysippus, and the Almariani; World soul. Vocabulary: proximum bonitati.

**IV.1.25, source pp. 294–295.** Articles: Form; Good and goodness; Indwelling and presence; Strato, Chrysippus, and the Almariani; World soul. Vocabulary: essendi principium.

**IV.1.26, source pp. 294–295.** Articles: Form; Good and goodness; Indwelling and presence; Strato, Chrysippus, and the Almariani; World soul. Vocabulary: primo agere.

**IV.1.27, source pp. 294–295.** Articles: Form; Good and goodness; Indwelling and presence; Strato, Chrysippus, and the Almariani; World soul. Vocabulary: Almariani.

**IV.1.28, source pp. 294–295.** Articles: Good and goodness; Indwelling and presence; Strato, Chrysippus, and the Almariani; World soul. Vocabulary: dux / lex superioris; lex; velox / tardus.

**IV.1.29, source pp. 296–297.** Articles: Angel; Degree and mediation; Proximity and causal presence; Transparency and opacity. Vocabulary: accipere / concedere; careo / expers; impedire / obesse; opacus / clarus; perspicuus / diaphanus; praeparare / offerre.

**IV.1.30, source pp. 296–297.** Articles: Angel; Degree and mediation; Proximity and causal presence. Vocabulary: fugere materiam; proximus.

**IV.1.31, source pp. 296–297.** Articles: Angel; Animating and animal; Common and proper; Degree and mediation; Intellectual and animating powers; Life; Proximity and causal presence. Vocabulary: animalis / animales vires; complecti / comprehendere; decere / dignitas; tangere / attingere; vita vitarum.

**IV.1.32, source pp. 298–299.** Articles: Angel; Degree and mediation; Fitting and correspondence; Form; Intellectual and animating powers; Proximity and causal presence; Transparency and opacity. Vocabulary: addere / mittere / omittere; facile / difficilis; intercedere; intercedere / deducere; quadrare.

**IV.1.33, source pp. 298–299.** Articles: Angel; Assertion, report, and reservation; Degree and mediation; Form; Transparency and opacity. Vocabulary: degenerare; pati / passivus.

**IV.1.34, source pp. 298–299.** Articles: Transparency and opacity. Vocabulary: consequi / consequens; inesse / adesse / insitus; pingere / figurare.

**IV.1.35, source pp. 298–299.** Articles: Common and proper; Earth soul; Elements and their spheres; Spheres and stars. Vocabulary: continuus / continuare / continuatio; sufficere / geminus.

**IV.1.36, source pp. 300–301.** Articles: Common and proper; Earth as mother; Earth soul; Elements and their spheres; Proportion and analogy; Purity and mixture; Spheres and stars; Twelve. Vocabulary: parturire.

**IV.1.37, source pp. 300–301.** Articles: Animating and animal; Common and proper; Earth soul; Elements and their spheres; Purity and mixture; Soul; Spheres and stars. Vocabulary: aedificia / machinae; proprius / communis.

**IV.1.38, source pp. 300–301.** Articles: Animating and animal; Common and proper; Daemons; Earth soul; Elements and their spheres; Purity and mixture; Seeming and evidence; Spheres and stars. Vocabulary: beneficium; perspicere / cernere.

**IV.1.39, source pp. 302–303.** Articles: Common and proper; Daemons; Earth soul; Elements and their spheres; Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Purity and mixture; Seeming and evidence; Spheres and stars. Vocabulary: compos rationis / ratione captus; exhalatio; irrationalis; Nereides; Porphyrius / Persis / Tusci; rationis compos / expers; tangere / attingere.

**IV.1.40, source pp. 302–303.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Daemons; Spheres and stars; Twelve. Vocabulary: confabulari.

**IV.1.41, source pp. 302–303.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Spheres and stars; Twelve. Vocabulary: colligere / reducere; princeps.

**IV.1.42, source pp. 302–303.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Head, heart, and members; Spheres and stars; Twelve; Zodiac. Vocabulary: artus / articulus; recurrere in duodenarium.

**IV.1.43, source pp. 304–305.** Articles: Apollo; Assertion, report, and reservation; Common and proper; Head, heart, and members; Spheres and stars; Twelve; Zodiac. Vocabulary: cor / principalis stella; Phoebus particularis / Iupiter particularis; signum.

**IV.1.44, source pp. 304–305.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Governing, serving and dominion; Head, heart, and members; Reason anger and desire; Twelve. Vocabulary: cerebrum / cor / iecur; collocare / assignare; necessitas / oportere; servire / depravare; spirare; uti / usus.

**IV.1.45, source pp. 304–305.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Governing, serving and dominion; Reason anger and desire; Twelve. Vocabulary: magis / minus / minime; uti / usus.

**IV.1.46, source pp. 304–305.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Governing, serving and dominion; Reason anger and desire; Twelve. Vocabulary: magis / minus / minime.

**IV.1.47, source pp. 304–305.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Governing, serving and dominion; Reason anger and desire; Twelve. Vocabulary: parum / paululum / paulum; uti / usus.

**IV.1.48, source pp. 306–307.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Governing, serving and dominion; Reason anger and desire; Twelve. Vocabulary: superare / e converso.

**IV.1.49, source pp. 306–307.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Governing, serving and dominion; Reason anger and desire; Twelve. Vocabulary: dominari; superare / e converso.

**IV.1.50, source pp. 306–307.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Elements and their spheres; Governing, serving and dominion; Reason anger and desire; Soul; Twelve; World soul. Vocabulary: accipere / concedere; colligere / reducere; reducere / referre.

**IV.1.51, source pp. 306–307.** Articles: Apollo; Assertion, report, and reservation; Good and goodness; Governing, serving and dominion; Soul; Twelve; World soul. Vocabulary: Apollo / simplex et semotus; unum simpliciter; Apollo simplicity and the good.

**IV.1.52, source pp. 308–309.** Articles: Apollo; Assertion, report, and reservation; Bacchus and the Muses; Good and goodness; Governing, serving and dominion; Soul; Twelve; World soul. Vocabulary: chorea / modulus / cithara; confabulari; forsitan / forte; praeesse; propositum / institutum; temperare; Tuning the whole heaven.

**IV.1.53, source pp. 308–309.** Articles: Motion and stability. Vocabulary: cogere / compellere; ex-cogitare / fateri; reducere / referre.

**IV.1.54, source pp. 308–309.** Articles: Motion and stability; Proximity and causal presence. Vocabulary: familiarissimus; violentus / violentia.

**IV.1.55, source pp. 310–311.** Articles: Motion and stability; Weariness and agility. Vocabulary: fatigare; gravitas / levitas.

**IV.1.56, source pp. 310–311.** Articles: Art and nature; Circularity and return; Motion and stability; Weariness and agility. Vocabulary: accedere / recedere; gravitas / levitas; novus / varius; violentus / violentia.

**IV.1.57, source pp. 310–311.** Articles: Circularity and return; Motion and stability. Vocabulary: reflectere.

**IV.1.58, source pp. 312–313.** Articles: Motion and stability. Vocabulary: aliunde.

**IV.1.59, source pp. 312–313.** Articles: Common and proper; Fitting and correspondence; Good and goodness; Motion and stability; Proportion and analogy; Proximity and causal presence. Vocabulary: comparare / proportio; familiarissimus; rector proprius.

**IV.1.60, source pp. 312–313.** Articles: Fitting and correspondence; Good and goodness; Motion and stability; Proportion and analogy; Proximity and causal presence. Vocabulary: natura communis / propria.

**IV.1.61, source pp. 312–313.** Articles: Appetite and desire; End and limit; Motion and stability; Proximity and causal presence. Vocabulary: appetibile / effectrix; inesse / adesse / insitus.

**IV.1.62, source pp. 314–315.** Articles: Appetite and desire; End and limit; Motion and stability; Proximity and causal presence. Vocabulary: aviditas caeca; compos rationis / ratione captus; irrationalis.

**IV.1.63, source pp. 314–315.** Articles: Archimedes and the bronze spheres; Motion and stability; Proximity and causal presence; Purity and mixture. Vocabulary: Archimedes / aeneus; cogere / compellere; temperatio / aequabilis.

**IV.1.64, source pp. 314–315.** Articles: Angel; Archimedes and the bronze spheres; Motion and stability; Proximity and causal presence. Vocabulary: circumcurrere.

**IV.1.65, source pp. 314–315.** Articles: Angel; Archimedes and the bronze spheres; Degree and mediation; Governing, serving and dominion; Motion and stability. Vocabulary: se regere / se sistere.

**IV.1.66, source pp. 316–317.** Articles: Angel; Archimedes and the bronze spheres; Degree and mediation; Motion and stability; Proximity and causal presence. Vocabulary: attribuere / dare; praestare; semotus motor.

**IV.1.67, source pp. 316–317.** Articles: Angel; Archimedes and the bronze spheres; Degree and mediation; Indwelling and presence; Motion and stability; Proximity and causal presence. Vocabulary: punctum / adstrictus dimensionibus.

**IV.1.68, source pp. 316–317.** Articles: Instrument; Motion and stability; Proportion and analogy. Vocabulary: instrumentum vitae.

**IV.1.69, source pp. 316–317.** Articles: Life; Motion and stability. Vocabulary: signum; spontaneus / sponte.

**IV.1.70, source pp. 316–317.** Articles: Life; Motion and stability. Vocabulary: spontaneus / sponte.

**IV.1.71, source pp. 318–319.** Articles: Animating and animal; Spheres and stars. Vocabulary: adsciscere / complecti; negare.

**IV.1.72, source pp. 318–319.** Articles: Animating and animal; Purity and mixture; Spheres and stars; Spirit. Vocabulary: mirari / mirabilis; sulfur / quasi spiritalia.

**IV.1.73, source pp. 318–319.** Articles: Animating and animal; Purity and mixture; Spheres and stars. Vocabulary: cognatus; temperantia / intemperantia.

**IV.1.74, source pp. 320–321.** Articles: Earth soul; Hidden mover and magnet; Hierobotanum and mineral powers; Motion and stability; Natural motion and natural place; Seeming and evidence. Vocabulary: errāre / iudicare; magnes / ferrum; quaerere / persuadere; revocare / rapere; velox / tardus.

**IV.1.75, source pp. 320–321.** Articles: Art and nature; Earth soul; Hidden mover and magnet; Motion and stability; Natural motion and natural place. Vocabulary: annixus / coartare; cancelli / restitutio; Egelias / crinitae.

**IV.1.76, source pp. 322–323.** Articles: Earth soul; Hidden mover and magnet; Motion and stability; Natural motion and natural place. Vocabulary: trames.

**IV.1.77, source pp. 322–323.** Articles: Earth soul; Hidden mover and magnet; Motion and stability; Natural motion and natural place. Vocabulary: praecipitium / tenor.

**IV.1.78, source pp. 322–323.** Articles: Earth soul; Generation and corruption; Nourishment, digestion and growth. Vocabulary: haerere / seiunctus.

**IV.1.79, source pp. 322–323.** Articles: Earth soul; Head, heart, and members; Life; Proportion and analogy; Purity and mixture; Seeming and evidence; World soul. Vocabulary: complexio / instrumenta.

**IV.1.80, source pp. 322–323.** Articles: Earth soul; Life; Proportion and analogy; World soul. Vocabulary: unum vivens.

**IV.1.81, source pp. 324–325.** Articles: Life; Matter; Proportion and analogy; World soul. Vocabulary: latere / informis.

**IV.1.82, source pp. 324–325.** Articles: Animating and animal; Governing, serving and dominion; Head, heart, and members; Life; Proportion and analogy; Sympathy; World soul. Vocabulary: communicare — imparting and sharing; conspirare / compati; contemperare / continuare; humor / humores.

**IV.1.83, source pp. 324–325.** Articles: Animating and animal; Head, heart, and members; Life; Proportion and analogy; Sympathy; World soul. Vocabulary: vincire / connectere.

**IV.1.84, source pp. 324–325.** Articles: Fate; Life; Order and harmony; Seeming and evidence; World soul. Vocabulary: errāre / iudicare; intus / intro / intimus; necessitas / oportere; vagari / consultare; velox / tardus.

**IV.1.85, source pp. 326–327.** Articles: Contraction and determination; Instrument; Order and harmony; Seeming and evidence; World soul. Vocabulary: conducere ad speciem.

**IV.1.86, source pp. 326–327.** Articles: Artifact and natural work; Governing, serving and dominion; Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Natural species and succession; Order and harmony; Traces; World soul. Vocabulary: addere / mittere / omittere; officium / perseverare; Oromasis / Mitris / Arimanis; princeps.

**IV.1.87, source pp. 326–327.** Articles: Act and operation; Artifact and natural work; Motion and stability; Natural species and succession; Order and harmony; World soul. Vocabulary: continuus / continuare / continuatio; successio singulorum.

**IV.1.88, source pp. 328–329.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation. Vocabulary: confiteri / tradere.

**IV.1.89, source pp. 328–329.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Elements and their spheres; Purity and mixture. Vocabulary: ambigere / disserere.

**IV.1.90, source pp. 328–329.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Elements and their spheres; Purity and mixture. Vocabulary: gratia / causa with genitive; respondere.

**IV.1.91, source pp. 328–329.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Celestial influence; Elements and their spheres; Purity and mixture. Vocabulary: consilium /

propositum; decere / dignitas; gratia / causa with genitive; integritas / segregare; receptaculum.

**IV.1.92, source pp. 330–331.** Articles: Celestial influence; Elements and their spheres; Purity and mixture; Transparency and opacity. Vocabulary: e regione / suscipere; praeparare / offerre; respondere.

**IV.1.93, source pp. 330–331.** Articles: Celestial influence; Elements and their spheres; Purity and mixture. Vocabulary: consequi / consequens; decere / dignitas; integritas / segregare; mereri / aequalitatem recuperare.

**IV.1.94, source pp. 330–331.** Articles: Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers; World soul. Vocabulary: auctor / auctoritas role; Oceanus / Thetis; Pluto / Proserpina; vis gemina.

**IV.1.95, source pp. 332–333.** Articles: Apollo; Bacchus and the Muses; World soul. Vocabulary: nectar / ebrius / debacchari.

**IV.1.96, source pp. 332–333.** Articles: Assertion, report, and reservation; Celestial influence; Daemons; Earth soul; Elements and their spheres; Indwelling and presence; Putrefaction and propagation; Soul; Spheres and stars; Twelve; World soul. Vocabulary: adesse / inesse; attribuere / dare; negare; sub propria persona; tunc demum affirmanda.

## Chapter IV.2

**IV.2.1, source pp. 334–335.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Fate. Vocabulary: appetitus excitatus.

**IV.2.2, source pp. 334–335.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Fate; Hermetic theologians and the Magi. Vocabulary: fatalis lex / innata cupiditas; ferre; necessitas / oportere; Everlasting will and the work of necessity.

**IV.2.3, source pp. 334–335.** Articles: Good and goodness; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: super omne / sub omni.

**IV.2.4, source pp. 334–335.** Articles: Good and goodness; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: cumulus.

**IV.2.5, source pp. 334–335.** Articles: Eternity and time; Good and goodness; Matter; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: essentia puncto momento; modus unitatis; nutu oculi.

**IV.2.6, source pp. 336–337.** Articles: Angel; Circularity and return; Eternity and time; Good and goodness; Matter; Motion and stability; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: pendere / converti.

**IV.2.7, source pp. 336–337.** Articles: Angel; Eternity and time; Intention; Matter; Motion and stability; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: modus unitatis; novus / varius; secunda intentio.

**IV.2.8, source pp. 336–337.** Articles: Angel; Eternity and time; Matter; Motion and stability; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: comes; invenire-related reperire; pati / passivus.

**IV.2.9, source pp. 336–337.** Articles: Act and operation; Angel; Eternity and time; Habitual possession; Ideas and exemplars; Intellect and intellection; Matter; Mind; Motion and stability; Soul; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: habitus / actus / potentia; simul.

**IV.2.10, source pp. 338–339.** Articles: Act and operation; Angel; Eternity and time; Habitual possession; Ideas and exemplars; Intellect and intellection; Intellectual and

animating powers; Mind; Motion and stability; Proteus; Seeds; Soul; Sowing and weaving; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: communicare — imparting and sharing; complecti / comprehendere; munus / imago / exemplar; simul; The world’s many fullnesses.

**IV.2.11, source pp. 338–339.** Articles: Act and operation; Angel; Circularity and return; Eternity and time; Habitual possession; Head, heart, and members; Ideas and exemplars; Intellect and intellection; Intellectual and animating powers; Intuition and discourse; Leisure; Life; Mind; Motion and stability; Proteus; Seeds; Soul; Sowing and weaving; Weariness and agility; Whole and parts. Vocabulary: caput mentis / rationis; cogere / compellere; consequi / consequens; facile / difficilis; motus aeternus; otium / administratio; vult / lubet.

**IV.2.12, source pp. 340–341.** Articles: Act and operation; Assertion, report, and reservation; Circularity and return; Eternity and time; Fate; Great year; Habitual possession; Ideas and exemplars; Intellect and intellection; Intellectual and animating powers; Mind; Motion and stability; Proteus; Seeds; Sowing and weaving; Striving and enjoyment. Vocabulary: certo / certus; cognatus; complecti / comprehendere; convertere / reverti; ferre; intervallum / tempus primum; nixus / niti; retexere telam; senium / restitutio mundi.

**IV.2.13, source pp. 340–341.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Carpenter and geometer; Common and proper; Euclid and the lantern; Fate; Ideas and exemplars; Proportion and analogy; Seeds; Sense and imagination. Vocabulary: accipere — example and lantern; Euclides / Megara / Athenae / Socrates; exemplum / instar; iter / passus; laterna; praescribere / designare.

**IV.2.14, source pp. 340–341.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Carpenter and geometer; Common and proper; Euclid and the lantern; Fate; Ideas and exemplars; Proportion and analogy; Seeds; Sense and imagination. Vocabulary: consilium / propositum; eligere / peragere; intercedere; iter / passus; laterna; praescribere / designare; propositum / institutum.

**IV.2.15, source pp. 342–343.** Articles: Affect; Appetite and desire; Artifact and natural work; Carpenter and geometer; Common and proper; Contraction and determination; Euclid and the lantern; Fate; Form; Ideas and exemplars; Proportion and analogy; Seeds; Sense and imagination; Sowing and weaving. Vocabulary: imitatio / imitari; praeparare / offerre; promere / praevalere; serere / parere / explicare.

**IV.2.16, source pp. 342–343.** Articles: Affect; Appetite and desire; Euclid and the lantern; Fate; Proportion and analogy; Seeds; Sense and imagination; Sowing and weaving; Spirit. Vocabulary: humor / humores; lex; novus / varius; series successionis; vibrare / affectio.

**IV.2.17, source pp. 342–343.** Articles: Affect; Fate. Vocabulary: stabilis causa / opus.

**IV.2.18, source pp. 342–343.** Articles: Affect; End and limit; Motion and stability; Weariness and agility. Vocabulary: fatigare; ineptus / agilis.

**IV.2.19, source pp. 344–345.** Articles: Act and operation; Earth as mother; Governing, serving and dominion; Matter; Natural motion and natural place; Weariness and agility. Vocabulary: aura / viscera / quassare; cogere / compellere; conferre / conducere; facile / difficilis; mirari / mirabilis; pati / passivus; proclivitas / efficacia.

**IV.2.20, source pp. 344–345.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Matter; Natural species and succession; Nourishment, digestion and growth; Sowing and weaving; Striving and

enjoyment. Vocabulary: cogere / compellere; conferre / conducere; successione saltem; vicissitudo.

**IV.2.21, source pp. 346–347.** Articles: Circularity and return. Vocabulary: auctor / auctoritas role; circulus / circuitus; continuatio / reflectere in gyrum; exemplum / instar; impedire / obesse; pellere.

**IV.2.22, source pp. 346–347.** Articles: Circularity and return; Here, there, and the Antipodes; Natural motion and natural place. Vocabulary: careo / expers; convertere / reverti; nescire quiescere.

**IV.2.23, source pp. 346–347.** Articles: Circularity and return; Here, there, and the Antipodes; Motion and stability; Natural motion and natural place. Vocabulary: continuus / continuare / continuatio; degenerare; quasi non motus.

**IV.2.24, source pp. 348–349.** Articles: Circularity and return; Fitting and correspondence; Here, there, and the Antipodes; Motion and stability; Natural motion and natural place; Spheres and stars; Striving and enjoyment. Vocabulary: Antipodes / semicirculus; figere / ponere; hic / illic; vult / lubet.

**IV.2.25, source pp. 348–349.** Articles: Appetite and desire; Circularity and return; Fitting and correspondence; Here, there, and the Antipodes; Motion and stability; Natural motion and natural place; Spheres and stars; Striving and enjoyment. Vocabulary: attingere / affectare; concava superficies; ferme / quoad fieri potest; frui / perfrui; pellere; simul; tangere / attingere.

**IV.2.26, source pp. 348–349.** Articles: Circularity and return; Daemons; Ethereal garment; Motion and stability; Natural motion and natural place; Spirit; Striving and enjoyment. Vocabulary: indumentum aethereum; invenire-related reperire.

**IV.2.27, source pp. 350–351.** Articles: Circularity and return; End and limit; Ethereal garment; Fate; Motion and stability; Spirit; Weariness and agility. Vocabulary: labor / transgressio; princeps.

# Alternative lookup terms

## Consolidated article headings

**Proper and common.** Common and proper.

**Digestion nourishment and reconciliation.** Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**Nutrition and digestion.** Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**Nourishment and growth.** Nourishment, digestion and growth.

**Ruling and following.** Governing, serving and dominion.

**Mastery and service.** Governing, serving and dominion.

These alternative English labels lead to the main entries. Latin forms and phrases appear in the next index.

- Absolute — Separation and abstraction
- Accident — Substance and accident
- Acquired power — Power and potency

- Act — Act and operation
- Act and potency — Act and operation
- Act, action, and operation — Act and operation
- Act, action, operation — Act and operation
- Actuality — Act and operation
- Actuality and potency — Act and operation
- Affection — Affection and passivity; Affect
- Agent — Cause
- Angelic mind — Angel
- Animating; animal — Animating and animal
- Appetite — Appetite and desire
- Appetite and inclination — Appetite and desire
- Apprehension — Intellect and intellection
- Art — Art and nature
- Art, craft, and architect — Art and nature
- Bare nature — Art and nature
- Being well — Good and goodness
- Body — Body and bulk
- Cause and principle — Cause
- Choice — Choice and free judgment
- Church approval — Philosophy and theology
- Circle — Circularity and return
- Circle and circuit — Circularity and return
- Circularity and reflection — Circularity and return
- Cognition — Intellect and intellection
- Common — Simplicity and composition
- Common qualities — Ideas and exemplars
- Considered in itself — Body and bulk
- Contemplation (attentive intellectual consideration) — Philosophy and theology
- Continuum — Infinity
- Contracted — Separation and abstraction
- Contradiction — Infinity
- Creation and generation — Generation and corruption
- Decrease — Form
- Degree and middle — Degree and mediation

- Determinate matter — Separation and abstraction
- Dignity (rank and fullness of being in the hierarchy) — Degree and mediation
- Discourse — Intuition and discourse
- Discursive succession — Intuition and discourse
- Disposition — Habitual possession
- Divine law — Philosophy and theology
- Divisibility — Indivisibility
- Divisibility and indivisibility — Indivisibility
- Earth-soul — Earth soul
- Efficacy — Power and potency
- Emanation — Procession and return
- Eminent power — Participation
- Empyrean heaven — Spheres and stars
- End — End and limit
- Enfolding and unfolding — Unity and multiplicity
- Essence — Essence and substance
- Essence and being — Essence and substance
- Essential instinct — Appetite and desire
- Eternal age — Eternity and time
- Eternal motion — Motion and stability
- Eternity and always — Eternity and time
- Exemplar — Ideas and exemplars
- Exemplar and image — Image and likeness
- First act — Act and operation
- First time — Eternity and time
- Flux — Motion and stability
- Flux and stability — Motion and stability
- Form and species — Form
- Fountain — Principle
- Free judgment — Choice and free judgment
- Freedom — Freedom and necessity
- Generation — Generation and corruption
- Generation and putrefaction — Generation and corruption
- Good — Good and goodness
- Grade — Degree and mediation

• Grade and middle — Degree and mediation
• Habit — Habitual possession
• Idea — Ideas and exemplars
• Idea and exemplar — Ideas and exemplars
• Ideas — Ideas and exemplars
• Illumination, light, and shadow — Light and illumination
• Image, likeness, and shadow — Image and likeness
• Imagination — Sense and imagination
• Imaginative matter — Sense and imagination
• Imaginative spirit — Spirit
• Immanent action — Act and operation
• Immutability — Motion and stability
• Immutability and stability — Motion and stability
• Indeterminate matter — Separation and abstraction
• Indivisible — Indivisibility
• Indivisible presence — Indwelling and presence
• Indwelling — Indwelling and presence
• Infinite and finite — Infinity
• Infinite end — End and limit
• Intellect — Intellect and intellection
• Intellect and intelligence — Intellect and intellection
• Intellect, intelligible, and intellection — Intellect and intellection
• Intellectual nature — Art and nature
• Intuition — Intuition and comprehension
• Know thyself — Self knowledge
• Lethe — Quality
• Life and living power — Life
• Light — Light and illumination
• Light and vision — Light and illumination
• Limit and infinite — Infinity
• Living point — Indwelling and presence
• Love — Love and pleasure
• Matter and subject — Matter
• Mediation — Degree and mediation
• Memory — Will

- Middle — Degree and mediation
- Mind and universal presence — Mind
- Mode of being — Being
- Motion — Motion and stability
- Motion and self-motion — Motion and stability
- Natural intelligence — Art and nature
- Natural place — Natural motion and natural place
- Natural power — Power and potency
- Nature — Art and nature
- Nature and art — Art and nature
- Necessity — Freedom and necessity
- Next to nothing — Matter
- Nothing and non-being — Nothing and nonbeing
- One and Good — Good and goodness
- One in essence point and moment — Whole and parts
- Order — Order and harmony
- Outflow — Procession and return
- Participation by form — Participation
- Particular — Universals and individuals
- Patient — Affection and passivity
- Perfection and supremacy — Perfection
- Perfection of whole and part — Perfection
- Pleasure — Love and pleasure
- Posited condition (a supposition in an argument, rather than a spatial position) — Freedom and necessity
- Possibility — Infinity
- Possibility, infinity, and contradiction — Infinity
- Potency — Power and potency
- Power — Power and potency
- Power and the virtues of natural things — Power and potency
- Principles and Ideas — Ideas and exemplars
- Priority by nature — Cause
- Proper (characteristic or specifically appropriate, rather than morally respectable) — Cause
- Pure — Purity and mixture
- Purification — Worship and piety

- Purity and tempering — Purity and mixture
- Real relations — Ideas and exemplars
- Reason — Reason and account
- Reason, anger, and desire — Reason anger and desire
- Recipient — Affection and passivity
- Relations of thought — Ideas and exemplars
- Remission — Form
- Restoration — Natural motion and natural place
- Return — Circularity and return
- Self motion — Motion and stability
- Self moving number — Number
- Self-knowledge — Self knowledge
- Self-motion — Motion and stability
- Seminal principle — Seeds
- Sense — Sense and imagination
- Soul, three ranks — Soul
- Species and succession — Natural species and succession
- Spiritual presence — Indwelling and presence
- Stability — Motion and stability
- Subject — Matter
- Substance — Substance and accident
- Substrate — Matter
- Temperament — Purity and mixture
- Tempering — Purity and mixture
- Theological reservation — Philosophy and theology
- Time — Eternity and time
- Time and eternity — Eternity and time
- Unity — Unity and multiplicity
- Universal — Universals and individuals
- Unmixed — Purity and mixture
- Vegetative life — Life
- Virtue — Power and potency
- Well being — Good and goodness
- Whiteness — Quality
- Whole — Whole and parts

- Whole in each part — Indwelling and presence
- Will and memory — Will
- World — World and universe
- World-soul — World soul

# Latin word and phrase index

The index reproduces the Latin lookup forms and phrases supplied in the entries, including significant inflections. It is not a complete morphological concordance of the text.

- *ab alio* — Through itself and through another
- *absolutum obiectum* — Object and adequate object
- *absolutus* — Separation and abstraction
- *absque dimensione* — Incorporeal and immaterial
- *absque fine* — Infinity
- *absque termino* — Infinity
- *accidens* — Essence and substance; Substance and accident
- *accidentale* — Substance and accident
- *accidentalis* — Substance and accident
- *accidentia* — Essence and substance; Quality; Substance and accident
- *acies* — Light and illumination
- *actio* — Act and operation
- *actu* — Act and operation; Habitual possession; Infinity
- *actum* — Act and operation
- *actus* — Act and operation
- *actus intra se manens* — Generation and corruption
- *actus primus* — Act and operation
- *ad finem* — End and limit
- *adaequatum appetitus obiectum* — Object and adequate object
- *adsit aut insit* — Indwelling and presence
- *aequalitas* — Purity and mixture
- *aeternitas* — Eternity and time
- *aeternitatis punctum* — Eternity and time
- *aethereo animae indumento* — Ethereal garment
- *aevum* — Eternity and time
- *affectio* — Affection and passivity
- *affectiones* — Affect

- *affectu* — Affect
- *affectum* — Affect
- *affectus* — Affect
- *affici* — Affection and passivity
- *afficit* — Affect
- *agens* — Cause; Instrument
- *agentia* — Instrument
- *agere* — Act and operation
- *albedo* — Quality
- *amare* — Love and pleasure
- *amor* — Appetite and desire
- *amor sapientiae* — Philosophy and theology
- *amplitudo* — Quantity and dimension
- *angeli* — Angel
- *angelicae vitae* — Angel
- *angelus* — Angel
- *anima* — Soul
- *anima irrationalis* — Soul
- *anima mundi* — Soul; World soul
- *anima perspicua* — Degree and mediation
- *anima principalis* — Zodiac
- *anima rationalis* — Soul
- *anima terrae* — Earth soul
- *animae … in sphaeris* — Soul
- *animal* — Animating and animal
- *animales vires* — Animating and animal
- *animalia* — Animating and animal
- *animalia siderea* — Zodiac
- *animalis* — Animating and animal
- *animantes* — Animating and animal
- *animorum divinitas* — Divinity and the divine
- *animus* — Soul
- *Apollinem* — Apollo
- *appetere* — Appetite and desire
- *appetibile* — Appetite and desire

- *appetit* — Appetite and desire
- *appetitio* — Appetite and desire
- *appetitus* — Appetite and desire
- *arbitrii libertas* — Choice and free judgment
- *architectus* — Art and nature
- *argumentatio* — Reason and account
- *Arimanis* — Hermetic theologians and the Magi
- *ars* — Art and nature
- *ars humana* — Art and nature
- *ars integra* — Order and harmony
- *ars naturalis* — Art and nature
- *artifex* — Art and nature; Instrument
- *artificium* — Art and nature
- *ascendere* — Ascent
- *ascensus* — Ascent; Natural motion and natural place
- *augmentum* — Generation and corruption
- *aviditas* — Appetite and desire
- *Bacchus* — Bacchus and the Muses
- *beatissimus* — Blessedness
- *beatitudo* — Blessedness
- *beatus* — Blessedness
- *bene esse* — Good and goodness
- *bona particularia* — Good and goodness
- *bonitas* — Good and goodness
- *bonum* — End and limit; Good and goodness
- *bonum ipsum* — Good and goodness
- *caelestis instinctus* — Celestial influence
- *caeli* — Spheres and stars
- *caelum* — World and universe
- *caelum empyreum* — Spheres and stars
- *calor* — Quality
- *capacitas* — Matter
- *carcer* — Prison and homeland
- *cardo* — Hinge and center; Motion and stability; Natural motion and natural place; Principle

- *casus* — Chance
- *causa* — Cause
- *causa prima* — Cause
- *causa superior* — Cause
- *causa universalis* — Cause
- *causae mediae atque proximae* — Cause
- *centrum* — Hinge and center; Indwelling and presence
- *cernere* — Intuition and comprehension
- *certa materia* — Separation and abstraction
- *circuitus* — Circularity and return
- *circulo reflectatur* — Circularity and return
- *circulus* — Circularity and return
- *circumferentia* — Hinge and center
- *claustra* — Prison and homeland
- *cognitio* — Intellect and intellection; Spiritual union
- *cognoscendo* — Bacchus and the Muses
- *cognoscere* — Intuition and discourse
- *colere* — Worship and piety
- *commiscere* — Purity and mixture
- *commixtio* — Purity and mixture
- *communicare* — Communication and imparting
- *communicare vires* — Sympathy
- *communio* — Order and harmony
- *communis* — Communication and imparting
- *compago* — Perfection
- *compatiantur* — Sympathy
- *compedes* — Prison and homeland
- *complexio* — Purity and mixture
- *compositio* — Simplicity and composition
- *compositum* — Perfection
- *compositus* — Simplicity and composition
- *comprehendere* — Intuition and comprehension
- *conceptus* — Ideas and exemplars
- *concinat* — Perfection
- *concordia* — Order and harmony

- *concupiscentia* — Reason anger and desire
- *conditionali quadam necessitate* — Freedom and necessity
- *conditionis alicuius positione* — Foreknowledge
- *conducat* — Perfection
- *coniungi* — Spiritual union
- *connexio* — Bond knot and chain; Soul
- *conservare* — Conservation and preservation
- *conservator* — Conservation and preservation
- *consilium* — Art and nature; Choice and deliberation; Intuition and discourse
- *conspirant* — Sympathy
- *conspirare* — Order and harmony
- *conspiratio* — Sympathy
- *contagio* — Purity and mixture
- *contemperat* — Sympathy
- *contingentes* — Contingency
- *contingentia* — Contingency
- *continua singulorum successio* — Natural species and succession
- *contradictio* — Infinity
- *contraria* — Contraries and opposition
- *contrarium* — Contraries and opposition
- *conversio* — Procession and return
- *converti* — Procession and return
- *convertitur* — Circularity and return
- *copula mundi* — Bond knot and chain; Soul
- *cor* — Zodiac
- *corpora* — Body and bulk
- *corporalis* — Body and bulk
- *corporeus* — Body and bulk
- *corporis moles* — Body and bulk
- *corpus* — Body and bulk
- *corrumpere* — Generation and corruption
- *corruptio* — Generation and corruption
- *crassitudo* — Purity and mixture
- *creare* — Creation; Generation and corruption
- *creatae mentis divinitas* — Divinity and the divine

- *creatio* — Creation; Generation and corruption
- *creator* — God
- *cuius gratia* — End and limit
- *cultus* — Worship and piety
- *cupere* — Appetite and desire
- *cupiditas* — Appetite and desire; Reason anger and desire
- *cura* — Providence
- *custodire* — Providence
- *daemones* — Daemons
- *daemones aquei* — Daemons
- *daemonum* — Daemons
- *decentia* — Beauty and fittingness
- *decet* — Beauty and fittingness
- *decor* — Beauty and fittingness
- *decorum* — Beauty and fittingness
- *decrementum* — Form; Quantity and dimension
- *descensus* — Natural motion and natural place
- *determinare* — End and limit
- *Deus* — God
- *Deus unus, verusque et bonus* — God
- *dilatatio voluntatis in bonum* — Love and pleasure
- *dilectio* — Love and pleasure
- *diligere* — Love and pleasure
- *dimensio* — Omnipresence and place; Quantity and dimension
- *dimensione* — Indivisibility
- *discurrendo* — Intuition and discourse
- *discursus* — Intuition and discourse
- *dispositio* — Order and harmony
- *dividuus* — Indivisibility
- *divinitas* — Divinity and the divine
- *divinus* — Divinity and the divine
- *divisibilis* — Indivisibility
- *divisio* — Indivisibility
- *divisus* — Indivisibility
- *duodecim* — Twelve

- *duodenarii* — Twelve
- *duodenario* — Number
- *duodenarius numerus* — Twelve
- *duratio* — Eternity and time
- *effectrix Dei potestas* — Productive and designing power
- *effectus* — Cause
- *efficacia* — Power and potency
- *efficere* — Creation; Perfection
- *efficiens* — Cause
- *effluxus* — Motion and stability
- *effundere* — Procession and return
- *egere* — Need and sufficiency
- *electio* — Choice and deliberation; Choice and free judgment
- *elementa* — Elements and their spheres
- *eligere* — Choice and free judgment; Will
- *emanare* — Motion and stability
- *enumerare* — Number
- *esse* — Being; Essence and substance
- *esse ipsum* — Being
- *esse purum* — Being
- *esse tale* — Being
- *essendi modos* — Contingency
- *essendi modus* — Being
- *essendi necessitas* — Freedom and necessity
- *essentia* — Essence and substance
- *essentia tertia* — Essence and substance; Soul
- *essentia tertia ac media* — Degree and mediation
- *essentiali quodam instinctu* — Appetite and desire
- *essentialis* — Essence and substance
- *ex nihilo* — Creation
- *ex nullo antiquiore subiecto* — Creation
- *ex se ipso* — Through itself and through another
- *exemplar* — Ideas and exemplars; Image and likeness
- *exemplaria* — Ideas and exemplars
- *expetere* — Appetite and desire

- *explicando* — Circularity and return
- *explicare* — Procession and return
- *exprimere* — Image and likeness
- *exsistere* — Essence and substance
- *extensio* — Quantity and dimension
- *extrema* — Degree and mediation
- *extremum* — Degree and mediation
- *faber* — Art and nature
- *facultas* — Power and potency
- *falsum* — Truth
- *falsus* — Truth
- *fascinandos* — Power and potency
- *fatali … lege* — Fate
- *fatum* — Fate
- *felicitas* — Blessedness
- *felix* — Blessedness
- *figurationes* — Form
- *finalem, efficientem, formalem causam* — Cause
- *finis* — End and limit
- *finis ultimus* — End and limit
- *finitus* — Infinity
- *fluere* — Motion and stability
- *fluitare* — Motion and stability
- *fluxus* — Motion and stability
- *fons* — Principle
- *fons et principium motionis* — Motion and stability
- *forma* — Form
- *forma corporea* — Form
- *forma divisa in corpore* — Quality
- *forma individua* — Form
- *forma materiae* — Form
- *forma substantialis* — Form
- *formae contingentes* — Form
- *formae naturales* — Separation and abstraction
- *formae substantiales* — Form

- *formare* — Form
- *formarum semina* — Seeds
- *formosissimi ordinis* — Beauty and fittingness
- *fortuitum* — Chance
- *fortuna* — Chance
- *genera* — Universals and individuals
- *generandorum semina* — Seeds
- *generare* — Generation and corruption
- *generatio* — Generation and corruption
- *generationis successio* — Natural species and succession
- *genitum* — Generation and corruption
- *genus* — Form
- *gignere* — Generation and corruption
- *gignit* — Generation and corruption
- *globi* — Spheres and stars
- *gradus* — Ascent; Degree and mediation; Measure and degree; Order and harmony
- *gradus minimus naturalis* — Least natural degree
- *gubernare* — Providence
- *habitu* — Habitual possession
- *habitus* — Power and potency
- *idea* — Ideas and exemplars
- *ideae* — Ideas and exemplars
- *illuminare* — Light and illumination
- *illustrare* — Light and illumination
- *imaginatio* — Sense and imagination
- *imago* — Image and likeness; Sense and imagination
- *imitari* — Image and likeness
- *immaterialis* — Incorporeal and immaterial
- *immensus* — Infinity
- *immobilis* — Motion and stability
- *immobilis multitudo* — Unity and multiplicity
- *immobilis unitas* — God; Unity and multiplicity
- *immortalis* — Immortality
- *immortalitas* — Immortality
- *immutabilis* — Motion and stability

- *impartire* — Communication and imparting
- *imperfectus* — Perfection
- *impertire* — Communication and imparting
- *implicare* — Procession and return
- *in aeternitate* — Spheres and stars
- *in circulum* — Circularity and return
- *in infinitum* — Infinity
- *incerta materia* — Separation and abstraction
- *incitamentum boni* — Appetite and desire
- *inclinatio* — Appetite and desire
- *inclinatio mentis ad bonum* — Will
- *incorporalis* — Incorporeal and immaterial
- *incorporeus* — Incorporeal and immaterial
- *indigentia* — Need and sufficiency
- *indigere* — Need and sufficiency
- *indissolubilis* — Immortality
- *individuus* — Indivisibility
- *indivisibilis* — Indivisibility
- *inesse* — Indwelling and presence
- *infelix* — Blessedness
- *inferiora* — Degree and mediation
- *infima* — Universals and individuals
- *infinita* — Infinity
- *infinitas* — Infinity
- *infinitum bonum* — Good and goodness
- *infinitus* — Infinity; Number
- *infinitus finis* — End and limit
- *influxibus* — Celestial influence
- *influxus* — Celestial influence; Conservation and preservation
- *infusio* — Light and illumination
- *innumerabiles* — Infinity
- *innumerabilis* — Infinity
- *innumerus* — Infinity; Number
- *inquinare* — Purity and mixture
- *insita* — Indwelling and presence

- *instinctum essentialem* — Appetite and desire
- *instrumenta* — Art and nature; Instrument
- *instrumentum* — Instrument
- *integer* — Perfection
- *integerrimus* — Perfection
- *integra elementa* — Elements and their spheres
- *integram* — Whole and parts
- *integrum* — Whole and parts
- *intellectio* — Intellect and intellection; Spiritual union
- *intellectualis* — Intellect and intellection
- *intellectus* — Intellect and intellection
- *intelligentia* — Intellect and intellection
- *intelligentiam naturalem* — Art and nature
- *intelligere* — Intellect and intellection
- *intelligibile* — Intellect and intellection
- *intelligibilis* — Intellect and intellection
- *intentio* — Intention
- *intentione quadam* — Intention
- *intercesserit* — Degree and mediation
- *interminatus* — Infinity
- *intervallum* — Degree and mediation; Measure and degree
- *intuendo summatim* — Intuition and comprehension
- *intueri* — Intuition and comprehension
- *intuitus* — Intuition and comprehension; Intuition and discourse
- *ipsum bonum* — Apollo; Good and goodness
- *ipsum esse* — Being
- *ira* — Reason anger and desire
- *iudicium liberum* — Choice and free judgment
- *largiri* — Communication and imparting
- *latitudo quantitatis* — Indwelling and presence
- *Letheo flumine* — Quality
- *lex* — Order and harmony
- *lex fatalis* — Fate
- *liber* — Freedom and necessity
- *libera voluntas* — Freedom and necessity

- *libertas* — Freedom and necessity
- *libido* — Reason anger and desire
- *lineae* — Hinge and center
- *locus* — Omnipresence and place
- *locus naturalis* — Natural motion and natural place
- *lumen* — Light and illumination
- *lumen invisibile* — Light and illumination
- *lumen luminum* — God; Light and illumination
- *lux* — Light and illumination
- *machina mundi* — Whole and parts
- *magi* — Hermetic theologians and the Magi
- *magnitudo* — Quantity and dimension
- *magnus ac mundanus annus* — Great year
- *malum* — Nothing and nonbeing
- *manare* — Motion and stability
- *manere* — Motion and stability
- *materia* — Matter
- *materia mundi* — Matter
- *materia phantastica* — Sense and imagination
- *materia prima* — Matter
- *mathematicae* — Separation and abstraction
- *media* — Instrument
- *medium* — Degree and mediation; Instrument
- *medium competens* — Degree and mediation
- *medius* — Degree and mediation
- *memoria* — Will
- *mens* — Angel; Intellect and intellection; Intellectual and animating powers; Mind
- *mens angelica* — Angel; Mind
- *mens humana* — Mind
- *mens in anima* — Mind
- *mens mentium* — God
- *mens secunda* — Second mind
- *mensura* — Measure and degree
- *mentes* — Angel
- *mentes angelicae* — Mind

- *mentes animales* — Mind
- *menti … secundae* — Second mind
- *mentis potentia machinatrix* — Productive and designing power
- *Mercuriales theologi* — Hermetic theologians and the Magi
- *merus actus* — Act and operation
- *metaphysicae* — Separation and abstraction
- *minima* — Universals and individuals
- *miscere* — Purity and mixture
- *Mitris* — Hermetic theologians and the Magi
- *mixtio* — Purity and mixture
- *mobile per se ipsum* — Motion and stability
- *mobilis* — Motion and stability
- *mobilis per se* — Motion and stability
- *moles* — Body and bulk
- *moles corporis* — Body and bulk
- *momenta* — Eternity and time
- *momentum* — Eternity and time
- *motio* — Motion and stability
- *motionum omnium fini* — End and limit
- *motor immobilis* — Motion and stability
- *motus* — Motion and stability
- *motus aeternus* — Eternity and time
- *motus naturalis* — Natural motion and natural place
- *motus temporalis* — Eternity and time
- *motus vitalis* — Life
- *moveri* — Motion and stability
- *multa* — Unity and multiplicity
- *multiplicatio numeri* — Number
- *multitudo* — Number; Unity and multiplicity
- *mundanos instinctus* — Celestial influence
- *mundi machina* — World and universe
- *mundi restitutio* — Great year
- *mundi senium* — Great year
- *mundi series* — Bond knot and chain
- *mundi sphaerae* — World and universe

- *mundus* — World and universe
- *munus* — Communication and imparting
- *Musae* — Bacchus and the Muses
- *mutantem … formas* — Proteus
- *natura* — Art and nature
- *natura corporalis* — Body and bulk
- *natura intellectualis* — Art and nature
- *natura media* — Degree and mediation
- *natura nuda* — Art and nature
- *naturae necessitas* — Art and nature
- *naturae opus* — Art and nature
- *naturalia semina* — Seeds
- *naturalis* — Art and nature
- *naturalis instinctus* — Art and nature
- *naturam multiplicem* — Number
- *necessario per se ipsum* — Freedom and necessity
- *necessitas* — Freedom and necessity
- *necessitas absoluta* — Freedom and necessity
- *Nereides* — Daemons
- *nihil* — Nothing and nonbeing
- *nihilum* — Nothing and nonbeing
- *nixus* — Appetite and desire
- *nodus* — Bond knot and chain; Soul
- *nolle* — Choice and deliberation; Freedom and necessity; Will
- *non ens* — Infinity
- *non esse* — Nothing and nonbeing
- *norma* — Order and harmony
- *Nosce te ipsum* — Self knowledge
- *nostri iudicii libertatem* — Choice and free judgment
- *novenario* — Number
- *numerum se moventem* — Number
- *numerus* — Number; Separation and abstraction
- *nuntii* — Angel
- *nusquam* — Omnipresence and place
- *nutritio* — Generation and corruption

- *obiectum* — Object and adequate object; Self knowledge
- *oculus* — Light and illumination
- *omne* — Whole and parts
- *omniformis* — Form
- *operari* — Act and operation
- *operatio* — Act and operation
- *operatio temporalis* — Motion and stability
- *opifex* — Art and nature; Instrument
- *opponere* — Contraries and opposition
- *oppositio* — Contraries and opposition
- *ordinare* — Order and harmony
- *ordinate* — Order and harmony
- *ordinatio* — Order and harmony
- *ordinatus* — Order and harmony
- *ordo* — Order and harmony
- *ordo universi* — Order and harmony
- *origo* — Principle
- *oriri* — Generation and corruption
- *ornamentum* — Beauty and fittingness
- *Oromasis* — Hermetic theologians and the Magi
- *otium* — Leisure
- *otium agere* — Leisure
- *pars* — Simplicity and composition; Whole and parts
- *partes* — Perfection; Simplicity and composition
- *particeps* — Participation
- *participare* — Participation
- *participatio* — Participation
- *participia* — Participation
- *particula* — Perfection
- *particulae* — Elements and their spheres
- *passio* — Affection and passivity
- *pati* — Affection and passivity
- *patiens* — Affection and passivity; Matter
- *patria* — Prison and homeland
- *per aliud* — Through itself and through another

- *per aliud mobilis* — Motion and stability
- *per Deum* — Through itself and through another
- *per immensum* — Mind
- *per se* — Through itself and through another
- *per se ipsum* — Through itself and through another
- *per se subsistens* — Essence and substance
- *per se sufficiens* — Freedom and necessity
- *perennis* — Eternity and time
- *perfectio* — Perfection
- *perfectus* — Perfection
- *perficere* — Perfection
- *perire* — Generation and corruption
- *permanere* — Conservation and preservation
- *perpetuus* — Eternity and time
- *perseverare* — Conservation and preservation
- *perspectio* — Light and illumination
- *perspicacia* — Light and illumination
- *phantasia* — Sense and imagination
- *philosophari* — Philosophy and theology
- *philosophia* — Philosophy and theology
- *pietas* — Worship and piety
- *pius* — Worship and piety
- *portio* — Participation
- *possessione et habitu* — Habitual possession
- *potentia* — Act and operation; Habitual possession; Infinity; Power and potency
- *potentia ad non essendum* — Nothing and nonbeing
- *potentia entis* — Infinity
- *potentia passiva* — Power and potency
- *potentia susceptiva atque passiva* — Act and operation
- *potentiae infimae motrices corporum* — Intellectual and animating powers
- *potestas* — Infinity; Power and potency
- *praescientia* — Foreknowledge; Providence
- *praesentia* — Indwelling and presence; Omnipresence and place
- *praestantior* — Perfection
- *praestigiae* — Sense and imagination

- *praevidere* — Foreknowledge
- *praevisio* — Foreknowledge; Providence
- *prima et informis … materia* — Matter
- *primum* — Principle
- *primum mobile* — First movable
- *primum principium* — God
- *primum quod mobile* — First movable
- *principes* — Twelve
- *principium* — Cause; Principle
- *privatio essendi* — Nothing and nonbeing
- *privatio rationis sive defectus* — Chance
- *procedere* — Procession and return
- *procreare* — Generation and corruption
- *profectio* — Procession and return
- *propinquior* — Measure and degree
- *proportio* — Order and harmony
- *proprietates* — Universals and individuals
- *proprium obiectum* — Object and adequate object
- *prorsus immobile* — Spheres and stars
- *Protea* — Proteus
- *providentia* — Providence
- *providere* — Providence
- *proximarum causarum* — Contingency
- *pugnantia* — Contraries and opposition
- *pulcherrime* — Beauty and fittingness
- *punctum* — Hinge and center; Indwelling and presence; Separation and abstraction
- *puritas* — Purity and mixture
- *purus* — Purity and mixture
- *purus actus* — Act and operation
- *putrefactio* — Generation and corruption
- *qualitas* — Quality
- *qualitates* — Quality
- *qualitates accidentales* — Substance and accident
- *quantitas* — Body and bulk; Quantity and dimension
- *quasi spiritalia* — Spirit

- *quies* — Motion and stability
- *quies voluntatis in bono* — Love and pleasure
- *radii* — Light and illumination
- *ratio* — Ideas and exemplars; Intellectual and animating powers; Reason and account; Reason anger and desire; Sense and imagination
- *ratio appetendi* — Reason and account
- *ratio entis* — Reason and account
- *ratio formarum* — Form
- *ratio mensuraque idealis* — Measure and degree
- *ratio propria* — Reason and account
- *rationalis* — Reason and account
- *rationes* — Ideas and exemplars; Reason and account
- *rationes formarum* — Reason and account
- *rationes propriae* — Ideas and exemplars
- *rationi entis* — Reason and account
- *reales respectus* — Ideas and exemplars
- *recta voluntas* — Will
- *recurrere* — Circularity and return
- *redit* — Circularity and return
- *refluere* — Procession and return
- *refluit* — Circularity and return
- *reformare* — Procession and return
- *regere* — Providence
- *remissio* — Form; Quantity and dimension
- *replicando* — Circularity and return
- *rerum rationes universales* — Reason and account
- *res singulares* — Universals and individuals
- *respectus intellecti* — Ideas and exemplars
- *restituere* — Procession and return
- *restitutio* — Natural motion and natural place
- *revera* — Truth
- *revolutio* — Circularity and return
- *revolvitur* — Circularity and return
- *roborandos* — Power and potency
- *sapientia felix* — Order and harmony

- *scire* — Foreknowledge
- *scopus* — End and limit
- *se inspicere* — Self knowledge
- *se ipsum cognoscere* — Self knowledge
- *se ipsum intelligere* — Self knowledge
- *se movens* — Motion and stability
- *secunda quadam intentione* — Intention
- *secundum contingentiam* — Contingency
- *sedes aetherea* — Prison and homeland
- *seiunctus* — Separation and abstraction
- *seiungere* — Separation and abstraction
- *semen* — Seeds
- *semina* — Seeds
- *semina corporalia* — Seeds
- *semper* — Eternity and time
- *sempiternitas* — Eternity and time
- *sempiternus* — Eternity and time
- *sensibilis* — Sense and imagination
- *sensus* — Sense and imagination
- *sentire* — Sense and imagination
- *seorsum* — Separation and abstraction
- *separare* — Separation and abstraction
- *separatus* — Separation and abstraction
- *septenario* — Number
- *series successionis* — Fate
- *servare* — Conservation and preservation
- *sidera* — Spheres and stars
- *signum* — Separation and abstraction
- *similis* — Image and likeness
- *similitudo* — Image and likeness
- *simplex* — Simplicity and composition; Unity and multiplicity
- *simplicitas* — Purity and mixture; Simplicity and composition; Unity and multiplicity
- *simulacrum* — Image and likeness
- *sine materia* — Incorporeal and immaterial
- *sine sensu* — Life

- *singula* — Natural species and succession; Universals and individuals
- *situs* — Indwelling and presence; Omnipresence and place; Separation and abstraction
- *sola putrefactione* — Generation and corruption
- *sors* — Chance
- *spatium* — Omnipresence and place
- *species* — Form; Ideas and exemplars; Species; Universals and individuals
- *species naturalis* — Natural species and succession; Species
- *species numerorum* — Number
- *species rerum intellectarum* — Species
- *speculatio* — Intuition and discourse
- *speculum* — Image and likeness; Self knowledge
- *sphaerae* — Spheres and stars
- *sphaerae elementorum* — Elements and their spheres
- *sphaerarum animae* — Soul
- *spiritalia et vivifica semina* — Seeds
- *spiritalis* — Spirit; Spiritual union
- *spiritalis unio* — Spiritual union
- *spiritus* — Spirit; Spiritual union
- *spiritus phantasticus* — Sense and imagination; Spirit
- *spiritus rationalis* — Mind
- *splendor* — Light and illumination
- *spontaneus* — Freedom and necessity
- *stabilis* — Motion and stability
- *stabilitas* — Motion and stability
- *stare* — Motion and stability
- *status* — Motion and stability
- *stellae* — Spheres and stars
- *sub omni* — Whole and parts
- *subiectum* — Essence and substance; Matter; Substance and accident
- *subiectum informe* — Matter
- *subsistere* — Essence and substance
- *substantia* — Essence and substance; Substance and accident
- *substantialis* — Substance and accident
- *sufficere* — Need and sufficiency
- *sufficientia* — Need and sufficiency

- *sui iuris* — Freedom and necessity
- *summa bonitas* — Good and goodness
- *summa unitas* — Good and goodness
- *summa veritas* — Truth
- *summum* — Perfection
- *summum bonum* — Good and goodness
- *super omne* — Whole and parts
- *superiora* — Degree and mediation
- *tamquam finis* — End and limit
- *temperantia* — Purity and mixture
- *temperatio* — Purity and mixture
- *temporali discursione* — Indivisibility
- *temporalis* — Eternity and time
- *tempus* — Eternity and time
- *tempus primum* — Eternity and time
- *terminare* — End and limit
- *terminus* — End and limit
- *ternario* — Number
- *terrena vita* — Earth soul
- *tertia essentia* — Soul
- *theologia* — Philosophy and theology
- *tota et indivisa* — Indwelling and presence
- *totum* — Perfection; Whole and parts
- *transcendere* — Ascent
- *tres rationalium animarum gradus* — Soul
- *triplex omne* — Whole and parts
- *ubique* — Omnipresence and place
- *ultimus finis* — End and limit
- *umbra* — Image and likeness; Light and illumination
- *una anima* — World soul
- *una communis natura* — World soul
- *unicus* — Unity and multiplicity
- *uniformis* — Form
- *unio* — Unity and multiplicity
- *unitas* — Number; Separation and abstraction; Unity and multiplicity

- *universale bonum* — Good and goodness
- *universalia* — Universals and individuals
- *universalis Apollo* — Apollo
- *universalis terrae anima* — Earth soul
- *universum* — Whole and parts; World and universe
- *unum* — Unity and multiplicity
- *unum et multa* — Unity and multiplicity
- *unum ipsum* — Apollo; Good and goodness
- *unum multa* — Unity and multiplicity
- *unum simpliciter* — Good and goodness
- *velle* — Choice and deliberation; Freedom and necessity; Will
- *venerari* — Worship and piety
- *veneratio* — Worship and piety
- *vere* — Truth
- *veritas* — Truth
- *verum* — Truth
- *verus* — Truth
- *vestigia* — Traces
- *vestigium* — Participation; Traces
- *vigor agendi* — Act and operation
- *vincula* — Prison and homeland
- *vinculum* — Bond knot and chain
- *vires* — Power and potency
- *virtus* — Power and potency
- *virtus acquisita* — Power and potency
- *virtus naturalis* — Power and potency
- *virtus vivifica* — Life
- *vis* — Power and potency
- *vis gemina* — Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers
- *vis individua* — Indwelling and presence
- *vis interna movendi* — Life
- *vis vivifica et motrix* — Intellectual and animating powers
- *visus* — Light and illumination
- *vita* — Life
- *vita insita* — Life

- *vita vitarum* — Life
- *vita vivificans corpora* — Life
- *vitalem sui umbram* — Indivisibility
- *vitalia semina* — Seeds
- *vitalis* — Life
- *vivere* — Life
- *vivificando atque regendo* — Bacchus and the Muses
- *vivificare* — Life
- *vivificus* — Life
- *vivus* — Life
- *volendo* — Foreknowledge
- *voluntaria cognitio* — Choice and deliberation
- *voluntarius* — Freedom and necessity
- *voluntas* — Will
- *voluntatis affectum* — Affect
- *voluntatis assensus* — Will
- *voluntatis imperium* — Will
- *voluptas* — Love and pleasure
- *vultus* — Image and likeness
- *Zodiacus* — Zodiac
- *Zoroaster* — Hermetic theologians and the Magi

# Mythological and cosmic names

This lookup index records the complete zodiacal assignments in IV.1.43 and the complete Orphic power pairs in IV.1.94, with related names from the surrounding discussion. The first belongs to the explicitly Pythagorean excursion of IV.1.40–52. The second distinguishes knowing from life giving and governing powers. The sphere soul discussion remains subject to the reservation at IV.1.96. Names and roles are those supplied in Ficino's exposition; the same name can have more than one role.

- **Air** (*aere*). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Jupiter; life-giving and governing power Juno. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Elements and their spheres.
- **Amphietus** (*Amphietum*). Name of the knowing power of the soul of Saturn, paired with Polyhymnia, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Apollo** (*Apollinem*, *universalem Apollinem*). In the Pythagorean ascent, the universal Apollo names the unqualified One; in the later image, the nine Muses and Bacchuses revel around Apollo as the splendor of the invisible sun. This universal role differs from

the particular Phoebus in Gemini. IV.1.51–IV.1.52; IV.1.95 (source pp. 306–309, 332–333). See Apollo; Bacchus and the Muses; Zodiac.

- **Aquarius** (*Aquarii*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is Juno; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Aries** (*Arietis*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is Pallas; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Aurora** (*Auroram*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of fire, paired with the knowing power named Phanetas. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Bacchus** (*Bacchum*, *Bacchis*). Collective naming principle for the knowing powers paired with the nine Muses, with one Bacchus presiding over each Muse; the nine pairs comprise eight celestial spheres plus world soul. IV.1.94–IV.1.95 (source pp. 330–333). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Bacchus Eribromus** (*Bacchum Eribromum*, *Eribromus*). Name of the knowing power of the world-soul, paired with Calliope, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Bacchus Licnitus** (*Bacchum Licnitum*, *Licnitus*). Name of the knowing power of the soul of Moon, paired with Thalia, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Bacchus Silenus** (*Bacchum Silenum*, *Silenus*). Name of the knowing power of the soul of Mercury, paired with Euterpe, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Bassareus** (*Bassareum*). Name of the knowing power of the soul of Mars, paired with Clio, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Calliope** (*Musam Calliopen*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the world-soul's body, paired with the knowing power named Bacchus Eribromus. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Cancer** (*Cancri*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is Mercury; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Capricorn** (*Capricorni*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is Vesta; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Ceres** (*Ceres*). Divine soul assigned to the heart of Virgo in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac.
- **Clio** (*Clio*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of Mars, paired with the knowing power named Bassareus. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Diana** (*Diana*). Divine soul assigned to the heart of Sagittarius in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac.
- **Earth** (*elemento terrae*). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Pluto; life-giving and governing power Proserpina. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Earth soul; Elements and their spheres.

- **Eighth sphere** (*Octavae sphaerae*). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Pericionius; life-giving and governing power Urania. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Spheres and stars.
- **Erato** (*Erato*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of Venus, paired with the knowing power named Lysius. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Euterpe** (*Euterpen*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of Mercury, paired with the knowing power named Bacchus Silenus. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Fire** (*igne*). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Phanetas; life-giving and governing power Aurora. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Elements and their spheres.
- **Gemini** (*Geminorum*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is a particular Phoebus; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Juno** (*Iuno*, *Iunonem*). Divine soul assigned to the heart of Aquarius in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of air, paired with the knowing power named Jupiter. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Zodiac; Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Jupiter** (*Iupiter particularis*, *fulminatorem Iovem*, *Jupiter the Thunderer*, *Iovis*). A particular divine soul assigned to the heart of Leo in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). Name of the knowing power of the soul of air, paired with Juno, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Sabasius; life-giving and governing power Terpsichore. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Zodiac; Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers; Spheres and stars.
- **Leo** (*Leonis*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is a particular Jupiter; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Libra** (*Librae*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is Vulcan; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Lysius** (*Lysium*). Name of the knowing power of the soul of Venus, paired with Erato, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Mars** (*Mars*, *Martis*). Divine soul assigned to the heart of Scorpio in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Bassareus; life-giving and governing power Clio. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Zodiac; Bacchus and the Muses; Spheres and stars.
- **Melpomene** (*Melpomenen*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of Sun, paired with the knowing power named Trietericus. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Mercury** (*Mercurius*, *Mercurii sphaerae*). Divine soul assigned to the heart of Cancer in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Bacchus Silenus; life-giving and governing power

Euterpe. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Zodiac; Bacchus and the Muses; Spheres and stars.

- **Moon** (*sphaerae lunaris*). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Bacchus Licnitus; life-giving and governing power Thalia. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Spheres and stars.
- **Muses** (*Musae*, *Musis*, *Musarum*, *Musam*). The nine life-giving/governing powers named Thalia, Euterpe, Erato, Melpomene, Clio, Terpsichore, Polyhymnia, Urania, and Calliope; their powers are described as drunk with the nectar of divine knowledge. IV.1.94–IV.1.95 (source pp. 330–333). See Bacchus and the Muses.
- **Neptune** (*Neptunus*). Divine soul assigned to the heart of Pisces in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac.
- **Oceanus** (*Oceanum*). Name of the knowing power of the soul of water, paired with Thetis, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Orpheus** (*Orphei*, *Orpheus*, *Orpheum*). Authority to whom Ficino attributes the twofold naming of cosmic souls; in the following unit, the Bacchus/Muse relation is interpreted through divine knowledge. IV.1.94–IV.1.95 (source pp. 330–333). See Bacchus and the Muses.
- **Pallas** (*Pallas*). Divine soul assigned to the heart of Aries in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac.
- **Pericionius** (*Pericionium*). Name of the knowing power of the soul of the eighth sphere, paired with Urania, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Phanetas** (*Phanetam*). Name of the knowing power of the soul of fire, paired with Aurora, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Phoebus** (*Phoebus particularis*). A particular divine soul assigned to the heart of Gemini in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Apollo.
- **Pisces** (*Piscium*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is Neptune; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Pluto** (*Plutonem*). Name of the knowing power of the soul of earth, paired with Proserpina, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Polyhymnia** (*Polymniamque*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of Saturn, paired with the knowing power named Amphietus. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Proserpina** (*Proserpinam*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of earth, paired with the knowing power named Pluto. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Pythagoreans** (*Pythagoricis*). Group to whom Ficino attributes the zodiacal divine-soul catalogue; the wider discussion is explicitly introduced and closed as a Pythagorean excursion. IV.1.40–IV.1.52 (source pp. 302–309). See Twelve; Zodiac.

- **Sabasius** (*Sabasium*). Name of the knowing power of the soul of Jupiter, paired with Terpsichore, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Sagittarius** (*Sagittarii*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is Diana; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Saturn** (*Saturni*). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Amphietus; life-giving and governing power Polyhymnia. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Spheres and stars.
- **Scorpio** (*Scorpionis*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is Mars; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Sun** (*Solis*). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Trietericus; life-giving and governing power Melpomene. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Spheres and stars.
- **Taurus** (*Tauri*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is Venus; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Terpsichore** (*Terpsichorem*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of Jupiter, paired with the knowing power named Sabasius. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Thalia** (*Thaliam Musam*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of Moon, paired with the knowing power named Bacchus Licnitus. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Thetis** (*Thetin*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of water, paired with the knowing power named Oceanus. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Trietericus** (*Trietericum*). Name of the knowing power of the soul of Sun, paired with Melpomene, in Ficino's reported Orphic catalogue. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Urania** (*Uraniam*). Name of the power giving life to and governing the body of the eighth sphere, paired with the knowing power named Pericionius. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Intellectual and animating powers.
- **Venus** (*Venus*, *Veneris*). Divine soul assigned to the heart of Taurus in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Lysius; life-giving and governing power Erato. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Zodiac; Bacchus and the Muses; Spheres and stars.
- **Vesta** (*Vesta*). Divine soul assigned to the heart of Capricorn in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac.
- **Virgo** (*Virginis*). Zodiacal stellar creature whose principal divine soul is Ceres; the principal star is described as its heart. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac; Twelve.
- **Vulcan** (*Vulcanus*). Divine soul assigned to the heart of Libra in Ficino's reported Pythagorean catalogue. IV.1.43 (source pp. 304–305). See Zodiac.
- **Water** (*aqua*). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Oceanus; life-giving and governing power Thetis. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; Elements and their spheres.

- **World soul** (*anima … mundi*). Context in the Orphic catalogue: knowing power Bacchus Eribromus; life-giving and governing power Calliope. IV.1.94 (source pp. 330–331). See Bacchus and the Muses; World soul.

# Authorities and cited works

These brief notices identify the roles that names play in Ficino’s exposition. They report his attributions and classifications rather than supplying independent biographies or verifying every ancient citation. References use the comparison units of the supplied edition.

## People and schools

**Abamon and Anebon.** Egyptian priests named among the authorities for the account that angelic and animating minds are present throughout immensity. Ficino closes this as their account before returning to God. II.6.14–24. See Mind; Omnipresence and place.

**Algazeles.** Named with Avicenna among those who strongly confirmed celestial animation. The source form is retained. IV.1.88. See Spheres and stars.

**Almariani.** Ficino’s name for the group he criticizes for making God and matter a single living being. The edition retains the term without identifying the group through a modernized name. IV.1.27. See World soul; God.

**Amelius.** The Platonist whom Ficino associates with the reception of John’s theology in the alignment of unity, truth, and goodness with principle, reason, and love. II.3.10. See Principle; Unity and multiplicity.

**Anaxagoras and Hermotimus.** Ficino presents them as reaching angelic mind but stopping below the final ascent to God. I.1.5; I.6.1. See Ascent; Angel.

**Apelles.** The painter in the meadow example: the scene presents itself at once, while the painter’s observing and representing it proceed successively. The comparison explains how soul moves itself while receiving an external beginning and end. III.1.27–31. See Motion and stability; Image and likeness.

**Archimedes.** His revolving bronze spheres enter a hypothetical comparison about the temperament that moves heaven. Ficino uses it to press the question of an inward living and rational cause. IV.1.63. See Purity and mixture; Motion and stability.

**Aristotle and the Peripatetics.** Ficino invokes their arguments concerning forms, unmoved movers, ends, cosmic order, possibility, and celestial animation. He also distinguishes their accounts from Platonist positions. His titles, book numbers, and attributions are retained as part of his exposition. I.3.19, I.3.27; I.5.20–22; II.9.21; II.12.17; II.13.8–12; IV.1.88–93. See Cause; Angel; Order and harmony; Spheres and stars.

**Augustine; Aurelius Augustine.** The Proem invokes his authority for the proximity of Plato to Christian truth. Later he is cited concerning the doctrinal permissibility of celestial animation. *Aureliana auctoritas* in Proem.7 refers back to this Augustine. Proem.6–7; IV.1.88. See Philosophy and theology; Spheres and stars.

**Averroes.** A source for celestial form having dimension without matter, and later a target of Ficino’s polemic against restricting divine knowledge of particulars. These are two distinct uses of his name. I.3.27–28; II.9.20–22. See Incorporeal and immaterial; Universals and individuals.

**Avicenna.** Named in the discussion of the principal angelic minds and their number, and with Algazeles in support of celestial animation. I.5.20; IV.1.88. See Angel; Number; Spheres and stars.

**Chrysippus.** With Strato, represents an identification of the world's infused life with the highest God that Ficino rejects. IV.1.22–28. See World soul; Life.

**Cynics.** Paired with Stoics as investigators who reached quality and effective power in Ficino's introductory ascent. I.1.3; I.3.1. See Ascent; Quality.

**Cyrenaics.** Grouped with followers of Democritus and Epicurus as confining inquiry to bodily bulk. This is Ficino's argumentative classification. I.1.3; I.2.8. See Body and bulk; Ascent.

**Daniel.** The prophetic saying concerning innumerable attendants supplies support for angelic abundance. Ficino places it beside discussion of Dionysius and angelic orders. I.5.27. See Angel; Number.

**Democritus and his followers.** Assigned to the bodily stopping point in the ascent and associated with explaining bodies' action from bulk. Ficino argues instead for the efficacy of quality and higher causes. I.1.3; I.2.8. See Body and bulk; Quality.

**Dionysius the Areopagite.** Cited concerning the abundance of separate intellectual species and the numerical orders of angels. Ficino's account connects these classifications with Iamblichus and Proclus. I.5.27. See Angel; Number.

**Dionysius, King.** The addressee of the Platonic letter Ficino cites for the threefold order of divine principles and their traces. He is not the Dionysius named in the angelic-orders passage. IV.1.86. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Order and harmony.

**Egelias.** The retained source name associated with a view that earth moves. Ficino gives the circular motion conditionally and also reports the predominant view that earth remains still. The edition does not resolve the name by conjectural correction. IV.1.75. See Natural motion and natural place.

**Epicurus and the Epicureans.** Appear at the bodily stopping point of the ascent, in the objection that divine activity would entail burdensome deliberation, and in the polemic about divine knowledge of lowly things. I.1.3; I.2.8; II.8.1; II.9.20. See Body and bulk; Choice and deliberation; Universals and individuals.

**Euclid.** In the lantern example, he plans to travel from Megara to Athens to hear Socrates; each step still requires a particular perception, desire, and action. The passage does not identify him as the geometer used in another analogy. IV.2.13–16. See Fate; Sense and imagination.

**Gnostic philosophers.** Named with Manichaeans in Ficino's rejection of opposed good and evil divine principles. The entry concerns this attribution in his argument, not a definition of every group called Gnostic. II.2.14–15. See God; Good and goodness.

**Heraclitus.** Grouped with Marcus Varro and Marcus Manilius as reaching rational soul in the ascent. I.1.4; I.5.2. See Ascent; Soul.

**Hermes.** See Mercury Trismegistus below and Hermetic theologians and the Magi.

**Hermotimus.** See Anaxagoras and Hermotimus above; I.1.5; I.6.1.

**Iamblichus.** Appears with Proclus in the account of angelic numerical orders and among the named authorities for universal mental presence. I.5.27; II.6.14–24. See Angel; Mind.

**John the Apostle.** Ficino attributes to his theology the principle–reason–love interpretation of unity, truth, and goodness, with Amelius named as a recipient. II.3.10. See Principle.

**Julian.** Named as a Platonist in the attributed account of all minds present throughout immensity. The local text supplies this role without requiring a more specific identification. II.6.14–24. See Mind.

**Lorenzo de' Medici.** The dedicatee, addressed as magnanimous and praised for joining philosophy with authority in public affairs. Ficino credits his beneficence with providing philosophical leisure. Proem heading; Proem.11. See Philosophy and theology.

**Lucretius.** The named Epicurean opponent in Ficino's argument against chance as the explanation of the world's orderly formation and governance. The direct addresses belong to Ficino's polemical presentation. II.13.14–20. See Chance; Providence; Art and nature.

**Magi.** Authorities for the light riddle, natural powers, and the triad Oromasis–Mitris–Arimanis. Their appearances belong to Ficino's presentation of ancient theology. I.5.14; IV.1.20; IV.1.86. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Light and illumination.

**Manichaeans.** Named with Gnostic philosophers in the rejected account of a good divine principle opposed by an evil one. Ficino argues that absolute evil would lack being, life, knowledge, and action. II.2.14–15. See Nothing and nonbeing; Good and goodness.

**Manilius, Marcus.** With Heraclitus and Marcus Varro, placed at the soul level in Ficino's introductory classification. I.1.4; I.5.2. See Ascent.

**Mercury Trismegistus; Hermes.** Cited on formless matter, divine will, providence, and the world's old age. The Hermetic theologians frame the inquiry into grades of rational soul. Distinguish this authority from Mercury as planet or cosmic divine name. I.3.19; II.11.38; II.13.24; IV.1.1; IV.2.12. See Matter; Will; Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Great year.

**Metrodorus.** Cited with Zoroaster for coral's alleged effects on terrors, lightning, and hail within the historical natural-lore argument. IV.1.21. See Power and potency.

**Orpheus and the Orphics.** Supply divine names, hymnic descriptions, and mythological interpretations throughout the argument: infinite end, necessity, divine sight, cosmic order, and the paired powers of souls. These are Ficino's presented attributions. II.4.8; II.7.11; II.9.18–22; II.10.7; II.13.21–24; IV.1.94–95; IV.2.12. See End and limit; Apollo; Bacchus and the Muses; Proteus.

**Parmenides.** Called Pythagorean by Ficino and cited for the one, unmoved, infinite divine being and the unmoved source of the world's turning. II.7.1; II.11.16. See God; Motion and stability.

**Peripatetics.** See Aristotle and the Peripatetics above, especially I.3.19; II.12.17; IV.1.88–93.

**Plato and the Platonists.** The principal philosophical authorities and interlocutors. Ficino presents their account in relation to Christian truth but also marks specific attributed doctrines, numerical excursions, and reservations. Proem.1–11; I.6.1; III.1–2; IV.1.40–52, IV.1.96. See Philosophy and theology; Ascent; Soul; God.

**Plotinus.** Invoked for matter and qualities as passive, God's self-directed intellection, universal mental presence, divine inward self-production, and celestial reason's motion. These passages have different attribution and qualification needs. I.3.19; I.6.12; II.6.14–24;

II.12.9–11; IV.2.11. See Matter; Intellect and intellection; Mind; Generation and corruption.

**Porphyry.** Ficino reports his explanation of daemons' visibility and tangibility through the constituents of their bodies, including regional examples. IV.1.39. See Daemons.

**Proclus.** A source for classifications of bodies and forms, arguments for incorporeal substance with Syrianus, and angelic numerical orders with Iamblichus. I.3.28–31; I.5.27. See Form; Incorporeal and immaterial; Angel.

**Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans.** Provide compact numerical descriptions of the five grades, soul as self-moving number, and the explicitly marked twelvefold excursion. Apollo's name is interpreted through attributed wordplay. I.2.7; III.1.1–5, III.1.23; IV.1.40–52. See Number; Unity and multiplicity; Twelve; Apollo.

**Socrates.** The figure Euclid wishes to hear in Athens in the stepwise-journey example. IV.2.13. See Fate.

**Stoics.** Paired with Cynics as reaching effective quality and power, a level Ficino argues must be surpassed. I.1.3; I.3.1. See Ascent; Quality.

**Strato.** With Chrysippus, represents the identification of cosmic life with the highest God rejected in the sphere-soul discussion. IV.1.22–28. See World soul.

**Syrianus.** With Proclus, supports the argument distinguishing the extended recipient from its extending cause, and thus the case for an incorporeal principle. I.3.29–31. See Incorporeal and immaterial; Unity and multiplicity.

**Theophrastus.** Named as Aristotle's disciple and as a source for celestial animation. IV.1.88. See Spheres and stars.

**Thomas Aquinas.** Explicitly credited for the distinction between absolute and conditional necessity in divine willing, and later cited concerning celestial animation's relation to Christian doctrine. II.12.15; IV.1.88. See Freedom and necessity; Spheres and stars.

**Timaeus; Timaeus of Locri.** An authority in the account of formless matter and the divine knot preserving otherwise dissoluble things. III.2.22 names Timaeus of Locri alongside Plato concerning soul's divisible and indivisible nature. Distinguish these references from the dialogue title *Timaeus*. I.3.19; III.1.5; III.2.22. See Matter; Bond, knot, and chain; Indivisibility.

**Varro, Marcus.** Grouped with Heraclitus and Marcus Manilius at the soul level of the introductory ascent. I.1.4; I.5.2. See Ascent.

**Xenocrates.** Named as using the Pythagorean definition of soul as self-moving number. Ficino glosses number as manifold nature and self-moving as mutable through its own property. III.1.23. See Number; Motion and stability.

**Zoroaster.** A recurrent ancient theological authority for intellectual rulers, the intelligible beyond mind, divine production and persuasion, cosmic principles, fate, recurrence, and the ethereal garment. Ficino's claims about this authority and the origin of ancient wisdom remain attributions within the work. I.5.19; I.6.9; II.12.8–11; II.13.27; III.1.12; IV.2.2, IV.2.10–12, IV.2.27. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Fate; Great year; Ethereal garment.

## Cited works: reading routes

**Against the Gentiles.** Thomas Aquinas’s work cited in the discussion of whether celestial bodies possess souls. IV.1.88. See Spheres and stars.

**Book on love.** Ficino refers to his own treatment of the Platonic letter about the three principles and their traces. IV.1.86. See Hermetic theologians and the Magi.

**Critias.** Named among Platonic texts used to support the compatibility of providence and free judgment. II.13.24. See Providence.

**Enchiridion.** Augustine’s work cited concerning celestial animation and Christian doctrine. IV.1.88. See Spheres and stars.

**Epinomis.** The closing quotation concerning soul present to or dwelling within cosmic bodies follows Ficino’s theological reservation. Its alternatives should remain visible. IV.1.96. See Indwelling and presence.

**Ethics.** Ficino refers to the tenth book as indicating providence. II.13.12. See Providence.

**Hymns to Apollo and Saturn.** The hymnic references contribute images of universal harmony and divine presence. II.6.11; II.9.22. See Light and illumination; Order and harmony.

**Laws.** Invoked for providential governance and for the source of motion when all things are imagined at rest. II.13.24; III.1.26. See Providence; Motion and stability.

**Letter to King Dionysius.** Cited for the three principles associated with unity, order, and motion. IV.1.86. See Order and harmony.

**Metaphysics; divine philosophy; books on divine things.** Ficino uses these designations in arguments about unmoved movers, the good of universal order, and the world’s relation to its governor. His book numbers should not silently be treated as modern critical references. I.5.20–22; II.9.21; II.13.8; IV.1.88. See Angel; Cause; Order and harmony.

**On Heaven.** Aristotle and Theophrastus are cited in support of celestial animation. IV.1.88. See Spheres and stars.

**On the Soul.** Named in the series of Aristotelian references supporting celestial animation. IV.1.88. See Soul; Spheres and stars.

**On the World.** Ficino attributes this work to Aristotle when explaining coordinated divine governance. The supplied edition’s apparatus notes that the work is generally regarded as pseudo-Aristotelian. II.13.12; apparatus p.380. See Hinge and center; Providence.

**On Truth and Opinion.** The title under which Ficino cites Parmenides for one unmoved infinite being. II.7.1. See God.

**Phaedo.** Listed among the dialogues supporting the priority of final, efficient, and formal explanations over chance or material necessity. II.11.26. See Cause.

**Phaedrus.** Invoked for soul as fountain and principle of motion. III.1.26. See Motion and stability.

**Philebus.** Appears in the causal discussion and in Ficino’s explanation of limit and infinite through actuality and potency. II.11.26; III.1.11. See Cause; Infinity; Act and operation.

**Physics; works on nature.** Invoked for purposive natural order and celestial animation. II.13.12; IV.1.88. See Art and nature; Spheres and stars.

**Republic.** The tenth book is cited concerning providence’s preservation of free judgment. II.13.24. See Choice and free judgment.

**Statesman; Politicus; book on kingship.** Appears in arguments about ends and providence, the fated desire moving heaven, cosmic restoration, and circular motion’s proximity to stability. II.11.26; II.13.24; IV.2.2, IV.2.12, IV.2.22–23. See Fate; Great year; Circularity and return.

**Timaeus.** Invoked for divine will and goodness, intellectual ordering, the joining of mind to soul and soul to body, and soul’s intermediate composition. II.11.26–27, II.11.38; II.13.3; III.2.22; IV.1.29. See Will; Indivisibility; Degree and mediation.

# Thematic index

These overlapping reading routes group related questions, examples and contrasts. They are selective guides to the articles, not additional vocabulary entries.

## God and the first principle

God; Unity and multiplicity; Truth; Good and goodness; Simplicity and composition; Infinity; Eternity and time; Omnipresence and place; Creation; Providence; Freedom and necessity; Divinity and the divine; Self-production and reservation; Common and proper; Parmenides and the summary formula; Naming by cause; Being; Nothing and nonbeing.

## Soul and mediation

Soul; Degree and mediation; Bond knot and chain; Hinge and center; Immortality; Life; Indivisibility; Spiritual union; Indwelling and presence; World soul; Earth soul; Second mind; Intellectual and animating powers; Common and proper; Point and position; Transparency and opacity; Animating and animal; Incorporeal and immaterial; Participation.

## Knowledge and its objects

Mind; Intellect and intellection; Self knowledge; Ideas and exemplars; Form; Species; Reason and account; Sense and imagination; Intuition and discourse; Intuition and comprehension; Object and adequate object; Looking and recognizing; Eye and gaze; Counting and collective intuition; Kinship and separation; Utterance and meaning; Word and meaning; Separation and abstraction.

## Will desire and freedom

Will; Appetite and desire; Affect; Love and pleasure; Choice and deliberation; Choice and free judgment; Freedom and necessity; Foreknowledge; Contingency; Reason anger and desire; Assent of will; Wishing, refusing and the good; Persuasion and compulsion; Striving and enjoyment; Paths and prescribed ends; Intention.

## Cause dependence and production

Cause; Principle; Act and operation; Power and potency; Conservation and preservation; Communication and imparting; Productive and designing power; Creation; Art and nature; Seeds; Instrument; Through itself and through another; Precedence and causal regress;

Receiving and giving; Containing, receiving and lacking; Dependence and receiving; Support, inherence and dependence; Proximity and causal presence; Staying and preserving; Chance.

## Bodies qualities and living processes

Body and bulk; Matter; Quality; Quantity and dimension; Substance and accident; Essence and substance; Affection and passivity; Generation and corruption; Natural species and succession; Nourishment, digestion and growth; Putrefaction and propagation; Vine and grape seed; Spirit; Purity and mixture; Contraction and determination; Surface and depth; Head, heart, and members.

## Time motion and spatial presence

Motion and stability; Eternity and time; Natural motion and natural place; First movable; Circularity and return; Procession and return; Great year; Always and everywhere; Touch and penetration; Beginning and ceasing; Before and after in nature; Permanence and the hour test; Turning and direction; Here, there, and the Antipodes; Heart and mistaken location; Dispersion and concentration; Returning, referring and reducing.

## Number degree and comparison

Number; Twelve; Measure and degree; Least natural degree; End and limit; Infinity; Whole and parts; Universals and individuals; Contraries and opposition; Perfection; Comparing, resembling and equalling; Surpassing and comparison; Proportion and analogy; Bounds and restriction; Point, position and mathematical ascent; Dionysius, Daniel and numerical orders.

## Light appearance and representation

Light and illumination; Image and likeness; Traces; Beauty and fittingness; Eye and imagined enlargement; Shadow and mirror; Shadows and dependence; Glass and colored radiance; Imagination and deceptive clothing; Impression and effacement; Apelles and the meadow; Statue and solidity; Honey, whiteness and the wall; Euclid and the lantern.

## Crafts objects and worked examples

Architect, house and decoration; Carpenter and geometer; Artifact and natural work; Craftsman and father; Archimedes and the bronze spheres; Florentine mechanism; Archer and target; Army and commander; Weaving and world fabric; Sowing and weaving; Fire, spark, lightning and cannon; Fire and variable materials; Candles and the hall; Hidden mover and magnet; Ostrich and egg.

## Argument language and qualification

Proof, signs and qualification; Agreement and hypothetical concession; Assent, approval and belief; Assertion, report, and reservation; Qualification and attribution; Seeming and evidence; Naming and defining; Naming by cause; Relations and respects; Contradiction and possibility; Redundancy and uselessness; Insults and rebuke; Wonder and familiarity.

## Care order and governing

Providence; Order and harmony; Governing, serving and dominion; Care and custody; Providential provision; Exchange and reconciliation; Sympathy; Fitting and correspondence; Concord and convergence; Counsel and settled skill; Burden labor and ease; Failure weariness and endurance; Weariness and agility; Borrowing and assistance; Habitual possession; Possession and privation.

## Human orientation and philosophical life

Philosophy and theology; Worship and piety; Blessedness; Ascent; Prison and homeland; Leisure; Lorenzo, dedication and public authority; Augustine and Christian proximity; Need and sufficiency; Seeking possessing and distraction; Precious and lowly; Infection, lameness and Lethe.

## Authorities traditions and their reception

Philosophers and stopping points; Aristotle, Avicenna and counting minds; Proclus, Syrianus and extending matter; Anebon Abamon and the mental-presence authorities; Manichaeans and Gnostic philosophers; John and Amelius; Hermetic theologians and the Magi; Strato, Chrysippus, and the Almariani; Lucretius; Xenocrates and the riddle; Orpheus and divine names; Augustine and Christian proximity.

## Heaven divine names and cosmological figures

Angel; World soul; Spheres and stars; Elements and their spheres; Celestial influence; Daemons; Ethereal garment; Fate; Zodiac; Apollo; Bacchus and the Muses; Proteus; Empyrean heaven; Sun, Mercury and moon; Hierobotanum and mineral powers; Earth as mother; Fountain, womb and offspring; Spring and flow; Enfolding and unfolding; World and universe.

# Source edition and editorial notes

## Edition consulted

Marsilio Ficino, *Platonic Theology on the Immortality of Souls*, Diotimos bilingual edition, Volume I, Authorial Proem and Books I–IV, “Complete editorial proof,” August 2026, 417 PDF pages. The source describes its English as an independent translation and its Latin as a conservatively normalized reading text.

The edition names the Florence printing of 7 November 1482 as its base witness, the Paris printing of 1559 as its principal collating witness, and a Paris 1641 printing as a late control and OCR aid. Those are the edition’s statements. The lexicon’s evidence is the supplied bilingual proof and its apparatus; it does not certify a new collation of those historical witnesses.

The complete Proem and Books I–IV were reread in paired Latin and English for this revision. The editorial apparatus, comparison-unit locator register, and translation glossary were also consulted. The unit-by-unit coverage record includes all 533 comparison units. The independent source review checked the lexical and edition blocks of every article, the listed attestations against their cited units, and selected complete passages with high-risk

distinctions or attributions. It was not a second complete Latin–English collation. A separate preservation review checked retained analysis and retrieval paths. Reading coverage does not mean that every ordinary word or incidental occurrence receives its own article.

- Proem: 11 comparison units
- Book I: 109 comparison units
- Book II: 228 comparison units
- Book III: 62 comparison units
- Book IV: 123 comparison units

## A confirmed translation discrepancy

At **IV.1.11**, source pages **286–287**, the Latin makes *vim ipsam vivificam et motricem* the object of *imbuit*, with *naturalibus seminibus* naming what is supplied. Divine wisdom imbues the vivifying and motive power with natural seeds. The facing English instead says that wisdom imbues natural seeds with that power, reversing recipient and content. The entries on art, seeds, and related powers follow the relation expressed by the supplied Latin. This is a local comparison within the proof, not an independent claim about the early printed witnesses.

## Readings left unresolved

At **III.2.29**, source pages **278–279**, the supplied Latin reads *in corporalibus rerum speciebus rationibusque*. The English construes this as the forms and principles of things “within bodies,” and the apparatus repeats that interpretation. The lexicon preserves the printed wording without silently substituting *incorporalibus*. Its explanation of spiritual union rests on the wider passage rather than a conjectural correction.

At **II.11.17**, source pages **190–191**, the wording beginning *Per hanc enim formam Dei* is difficult in the supplied Latin. The discussion of Ideas is explained through the surrounding argument without treating a proposed grammatical repair as established text.

At **II.12.7**, source pages **204–205**, the subject and scope of the clause beginning *nisi principium finisque universi* require care. One reading makes the universe’s source and end the subject: no agent is free unless that first source is master of its own action and establishes its own end. The supplied English instead continues with the agent and describes being the universe’s source and end as a condition. The latter can concern the absolute freedom reserved to God, especially in light of II.12.8; the former fits the inference from lesser agents’ freedom to supreme self-mastery. This lexicon records the grammatical and argumentative alternatives without declaring a settled translation error or altering the supplied text. No new witness evidence is claimed to resolve the question.

## Attribution and source variants

The source apparatus distinguishes its base readings from later-witness additions. For example, it records substantial additions after IV.1.4 and IV.1.15 and the fertility/eloquence variant at IV.1.20. Entries follow the supplied reading text unless a variant is expressly identified. A later reading is not silently added as another property asserted in the base text.

The lexicon also retains source-specific names and designations when their modern identity has not been independently established. Ficino’s attribution of a saying, book, or doctrine to an ancient figure is identified as his attribution. The mythological and cosmological lookup index records his own presentation and does not substitute a modern handbook’s system for it.